{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_41412/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_41412","id":"gutenberg_41412","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/41412","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Other","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Philosophy -- History"],"text":"\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n Transcriber\u2019s note:\n\n The letters A and B with the plus sign at the top\n are shown as A\u207a and B\u207a.\n \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n\n\n A\n\n HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY\n\n IN EPITOME,\n\n BY\n\n DR. ALBERT SCHWEGLER.\n\n _TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL GERMAN_,\n\n BY\n\n JULIUS H. SEELYE.\n\n THIRD EDITION.\n\n NEW YORK:\n D. APPLETON AND COMPANY,\n 443 & 445 BROADWAY.\n LONDON: 16 LITTLE BRITAIN.\n 1864.\n\n\nENTERED, according to act of Congress, in the year 1856,\n\nBY JULIUS H. SEELYE,\n\nIn the Clerk\u2019s Office of the District Court of the United States for the\nNorthern District of New York.\n\nINTRODUCTORY NOTE\n\nBY HENRY B. SMITH, D. D.\n\n\nThe History of Philosophy, by Dr. Albert Schwegler, is considered in\nGermany as the best concise manual upon the subject from the school of\nHegel. Its account of the Greek and of the German systems, is of\nespecial value and importance. It presents the whole history of\nspeculation in its consecutive order. Though following the method of\nHegel\u2019s more extended lectures upon the progress of philosophy, and\nthough it makes the system of Hegel to be the ripest product of\nphilosophy, yet it also rests upon independent investigations. It will\nwell reward diligent study, and is one of the best works for a text-book\nin our colleges, upon this neglected branch of scientific investigation.\nThe translation is made by a competent person, and gives, I doubt not, a\nfaithful rendering of the original.\n\n\n HENRY B. SMITH.\n\n UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, NEW YORK, _Nov. 6, 1855_.\n\n\nTRANSLATOR\u2019S PREFACE.\n\n\nSchwegler\u2019s History of Philosophy originally appeared in the \u201c_Neue\nEncyklop\u00e4die f\u00fcr Wissenschaften und K\u00fcnste_.\u201d Its great value soon\nawakened a call for its separate issue, in which form it has attained a\nvery wide circulation in Germany. It is found in the hands of almost\nevery student in the philosophical department of a German university,\nand is highly esteemed for its clearness, conciseness, and\ncomprehensiveness.\n\nThe present translation was commenced in Germany three years ago, and\nhas been carefully finished. It was undertaken with the conviction that\nthe work would not lose its interest or its value in an English dress,\nand with the hope that it might be of wider service in such a form to\nstudents of philosophy here. It was thought especially, that a proper\ntranslation of this manual would supply a want for a suitable text-book\non this branch of study, long felt by both teachers and students in our\nAmerican colleges.\n\nThe effort has been made to translate, and not to paraphrase the\nauthor\u2019s meaning. Many of his statements might have been amplified\nwithout diffuseness, and made more perceptible to the superficial reader\nwithout losing their interest to the more profound student, but he has\nso happily seized upon the germs of the different systems, that they\nneither need, nor would be improved by any farther development, and has,\nmoreover, presented them so clearly, that no student need have any\ndifficulty in apprehending them as they are. The translator has\ntherefore endeavored to represent faithfully and clearly the original\nhistory. As such, he offers his work to the American public, indulging\nno hope, and making no efforts for its success beyond that which its own\nmerits shall ensure.\n\n\n J. H. S.\n\n SCHENECTADY, N. Y., _January, 1856_.\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n PAGE\n\n INTRODUCTORY NOTE, by HENRY B. SMITH, D. D. iii\n\n TRANSLATOR\u2019S PREFACE v\n\n TABLE OF CONTENTS vii\n\n SECTION I.\u2014WHAT IS MEANT BY THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 11\n\n II.\u2014CLASSIFICATION 16\n\n III.\u2014GENERAL VIEW OF THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY 17\n 1. The Ionics 17\n 2. The Pythagoreans 18\n 3. The Eleatics 18\n 4. Heraclitus 18\n 5. The Atomists 19\n 6. Anaxagoras 19\n 7. The Sophists 20\n\n IV.\u2014THE IONIC PHILOSOPHERS 21\n 1. Thales 21\n 2. Anaximander 22\n 3. Anaximenes 23\n 4. Retrospect 23\n\n V.\u2014PYTHAGOREANISM 23\n 1. Its Relative Position 23\n 2. Historical and Chronological 23\n 3. The Pythagorean Principle 24\n 4. Carrying out of this Principle 25\n\n VI.\u2014THE ELEATICS 27\n 1. The Relation of the Eleatic Principle\n to the Pythagorean 27\n 2. Xenophanes 28\n 3. Parmenides 28\n 4. Zeno 30\n\n VII.\u2014HERACLITUS 31\n 1. Relation of the Heraclitic Principle\n to the Eleatic 31\n 2. Historical and Chronological 32\n 3. The Principle of the Becoming 32\n 4. The Principle of Fire 33\n 5. Transition to the Atomists 33\n\n VIII.\u2014EMPEDOCLES 35\n 1. General View 35\n 2. The Four Elements 35\n 3. The Two Powers 36\n 4. Relation of the Empedoclean to the Eleatic\n and Heraclitic Philosophy 36\n\n IX.\u2014THE ATOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY 37\n 1. Its Propounders 37\n 2. The Atoms 37\n 3. The Fulness and the Void 38\n 4. The Atomistic Necessity 38\n 5. Relative Position of the Atomistic Philosophy 39\n\n X.\u2014ANAXAGORAS 40\n 1. His Personal History 40\n 2. His Relation to his Predecessors 41\n 3. The Principle of the \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2 41\n 4. Anaxagoras as the close of the Pre-Socratic\n Realism 42\n\n XI.\u2014THE SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY 43\n 1. The Relation of the Sophistic Philosophy to\n the Anaxagorean Principle 43\n 2. Relation of the Sophistic Philosophy to the\n Universal Life of that Age 44\n 3. Tendencies of the Sophistic Philosophy 46\n 4. Significance of the Sophistic Philosophy from\n its relation to the Culture of the Age 47\n 5. Individual Sophists 48\n 6. Transition to Socrates, and characteristic\n of the following Period 51\n\n XII.\u2014SOCRATES 52\n 1. His Personal Character 52\n 2. Socrates and Aristophanes 55\n 3. The Condemnation of Socrates 57\n 4. The Genius of Socrates 60\n 5. Sources of the Philosophy of Socrates 61\n 6. Universal Character of the Philosophizing\n of Socrates 62\n 7. The Socratic Method 64\n 8. The Socratic Doctrine concerning Virtue 66\n\n XIII.\u2014THE PARTIAL DISCIPLES OF SOCRATES 67\n 1. Their Relation to the Socratic Philosophy 67\n 2. Antisthenes and the Cynics 68\n 3. Aristippus and the Cyrenians 69\n 4. Euclid and the Megarians 70\n 5. Plato as the complete Socraticist 71\n\n XIV.\u2014PLATO 72\n I. PLATO\u2019S LIFE 72\n 1. His Youth 72\n 2. His Years of Discipline 73\n 3. His Years of Travel 73\n 4. His Years of Instruction 74\n\n II. THE INNER DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY\n AND WRITINGS 75\n\n III. CLASSIFICATION OF THE PLATONIC SYSTEM 82\n\n IV. THE PLATONIC DIALECTICS 83\n 1. Conception of Dialectics 83\n 2. What is Science? 84\n (1.) As opposed to Sensation 84\n (2.) The Relation of Knowing to Opinion 86\n (3.) The Relation of Science to Thinking 86\n 3. The Doctrine of Ideas in its Genesis 87\n 4. Positive Exposition of the Doctrine of Ideas 91\n 5. The Relation of Ideas to the Phenomenal World 93\n 6. The Idea of the Good and the Deity 95\n\n V. THE PLATONIC PHYSICS 96\n 1. Nature 96\n 2. The Soul 98\n\n VI. THE PLATONIC ETHICS 100\n 1. Good and Pleasure 100\n 2. Virtue 102\n 3. The State 102\n\n XV.\u2014THE OLD ACADEMY 107\n\n XVI.\u2014ARISTOTLE 108\n I. LIFE AND WRITINGS OF ARISTOTLE 108\n II. UNIVERSAL CHARACTER AND DIVISION OF THE\n ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY 109\n III. LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS 112\n 1. Conception and Relation of the Two 112\n 2. Logic 113\n 3. Metaphysics 115\n (1.) The Aristotelian Criticism of\n the Platonic Doctrine of Ideas 116\n (2.) The Four Aristotelian Principles,\n or Causes, and the Relation\n of Form and Matter 120\n (3.) Potentiality and Actuality 123\n (4.) The Absolute Divine Spirit 124\n IV. THE ARISTOTELIAN PHYSICS 127\n 1. Motion, Matter, Space, and Time 127\n 2. The Collective Universe 128\n 3. Nature 129\n 4. Man 129\n V. THE ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS 131\n 1. Relation of Ethics to Physics 131\n 2. The Highest Good 132\n 3. Conception of Virtue 134\n 4. The State 135\n VI. THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL 136\n VII. TRANSITION TO THE POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY 137\n\n XVII.\u2014STOICISM 138\n 1. Logic 139\n 2. Physics 140\n 3. Ethics 142\n (1.) Respecting the Relation of Virtue\n to Pleasure 142\n (2.) The View of the Stoics concerning\n External Good 142\n (3.) Farther Verification of this View 143\n (4.) Impossibility of furnishing a System\n of Concrete Moral Duties from this\n Standpoint 143\n\n XVIII.-EPICUREANISM 145\n\n XIX.\u2014SCEPTICISM AND THE NEW ACADEMY 148\n 1. The Old Scepticism 149\n 2. The New Academy 150\n 3. The Later Scepticism 151\n\n XX.\u2014THE ROMANS 152\n\n XXI.\u2014NEW PLATONISM 154\n 1. Ecstasy as a Subjective State 154\n 2. The Cosmical Principles 154\n 3. The Emanation Theory of the New Platonists 155\n\n XXII.\u2014CHRISTIANITY AND SCHOLASTICISM 157\n 1. The Christian Idea 157\n 2. Scholasticism 159\n 3. Nominalism and Realism 160\n\n XXIII.\u2014TRANSITION TO THE MODERN PHILOSOPHY 161\n 1. Fall of Scholasticism 161\n 2. The Results of Scholasticism 162\n 3. The Revival of Letters 163\n 4. The German Reformation 164\n 5. The Advancement of the Natural Sciences 165\n 6. Bacon of Verulam 166\n 7. The Italian Philosophers of the Transition Epoch 167\n 8. Jacob Boehme 169\n\n XXIV.\u2014DESCARTES 172\n 1. The Beginning of Philosophy with Doubt 173\n 2. Cogito ergo sum 173\n 3. The Nature of Mind deduced from this Principle 173\n 4. The Universal Rule of all Certainty follows from\n the same 174\n 5. The Existence of God 174\n 6. Results of this Fact in Philosophy 176\n 7. The Two Substances 177\n 8. The Anthropology of Descartes 177\n 9. Results of the Cartesian System 178\n\n XXV.\u2014GEULINCX AND MALEBRANCHE 180\n 1. Geulincx 180\n 2. Malebranche 182\n 3. The Defects of the Philosophy of Descartes 183\n\n XXVI.\u2014SPINOZA 184\n 1. The One Infinite Substance 185\n 2. The Two Attributes 186\n 3. The Modes 188\n 4. His Practical Philosophy 189\n\n XXVII.\u2014IDEALISM AND REALISM 192\n\n XXVIII.\u2014LOCKE 193\n\n XXIX.\u2014HUME 198\n\n XXX.\u2014CONDILLAC 201\n\n XXXI.\u2014HELVETIUS 203\n\n XXXII.-THE FRENCH CLEARING UP AND MATERIALISM 205\n 1. The Common Character of the French Philosophers\n of this Age 205\n 2. Voltaire 206\n 3. Diderot 206\n 4. La Mettrie\u2019s Materialism 207\n 5. Syst\u00e8me de la Nature 208\n (1.) The Materiality of Man 208\n (2.) The Atheism of this System 209\n (3.) Its Denial of Freedom and Immortality 210\n (4.) The Practical Consequences of these\n Principles 210\n\n XXXIII.\u2014LEIBNITZ 211\n 1. The Doctrine of Monads 213\n 2. The Monads more accurately determined 214\n 3. The Pre-established Harmony 215\n 4. The Relation of the Deity to the Monads 216\n 5. The Relation of Soul and Body 217\n 6. The Theory of Knowledge 218\n 7. Leibnitz\u2019s Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e 219\n\n XXXIV.\u2014BERKELEY 220\n\n XXXV.\u2014WOLFF 222\n 1. Ontology 224\n 2. Cosmology 225\n 3. Rational Psychology 225\n 4. Natural Theology 226\n\n XXXVI.\u2014THE GERMAN CLEARING UP 227\n\n XXXVII.\u2014TRANSITION TO KANT 229\n 1. Examination of the Faculty of Knowledge 230\n 2. Three Chief Principles of the Kantian Theory\n of Knowledge 232\n\n XXXVIII.\u2014KANT 235\n I. CRITICK OF PURE REASON 238\n 1. The Transcendental \u00c6sthetics 238\n (1.) The Metaphysical Discussion 239\n (2.) The Transcendental Discussion 239\n 2. The Transcendental Analytic 241\n 3. The Transcendental Dialectics 246\n (1.) The Psychological Ideas 247\n (2.) The Antinomies of Cosmology 248\n (3.) The Ideal of the Pure Reason 249\n (_a._) The Ontological Proof 249\n (_b._) The Cosmological Proof 250\n (_c._) The Physico-Theological\n Proof 250\n II. CRITICK OF THE PRACTICAL REASON 252\n (1.) The Analytic 254\n (2.) The Dialectic: What is this Highest\n Good? 256\n (_a._) Perfect Virtue or Holiness 257\n (_b._) Perfect Happiness 258\n (_c._) Kant\u2019s Views of Religion 259\n III. CRITICK OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGMENT 262\n 1. Critick of the \u00c6sthetic Faculty of Judgment 263\n (1.) Analytic 263\n (2.) Dialectic 265\n 2. Critick of the Teleological Faculty\n of Judgment 266\n (1.) Analytic of the Teleological Faculty\n of Judgment 267\n (2.) Dialectic 267\n\n XXXIX.\u2014TRANSITION TO THE POST-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY 268\n\n XL.\u2014JACOBI 271\n\n XLI.\u2014FICHTE 279\n I. THE FICHTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM 282\n 1. The Theoretical Philosophy of Fichte,\n his Wissenschaftslehre, or Theory\n of Science 282\n 2. Fichte\u2019s Practical Philosophy 295\n II. THE LATER FORM OF FICHTE\u2019S PHILOSOPHY 301\n\n XLII.\u2014HERBART 303\n 1. The Basis and Starting Point of Philosophy 304\n 2. The First Act of Philosophy 304\n 3. Remodelling the Conceptions of Experience 305\n 4. Herbart\u2019s Reals 306\n 5. Psychology connected with Metaphysics 310\n 6. The Importance of Herbart\u2019s Philosophy 311\n\n XLIII.\u2014SCHELLING 312\n I. FIRST PERIOD: SCHELLING\u2019S PROCESSION FROM FICHTE 314\n II. SECOND PERIOD: STANDPOINT OF THE DISTINGUISHING\n BETWEEN THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND OF MIND 318\n 1. Natural Philosophy 318\n (1.) Organic Nature 319\n (2.) Inorganic Nature 321\n (3.) The Reciprocal Determination of the\n Organic and Inorganic World 321\n 2. Transcendental Philosophy 322\n (1.) The Theoretical Philosophy 323\n (2.) The Practical Philosophy 324\n (3.) Philosophy of Art 324\n III. THIRD PERIOD: PERIOD OF SPINOZISM, OR THE\n INDIFFERENCE OF THE IDEAL AND THE REAL 326\n IV. FOURTH PERIOD: THE DIRECTION OF SCHELLING\u2019S\n PHILOSOPHY AS MYSTICAL, AND ALLIED TO NEW\n PLATONISM 333\n V. FIFTH PERIOD: ATTEMPT AT A THEOGONY AND COSMOGONY,\n AFTER THE MANNER OF JACOB BOEHME 335\n (1.) The Progressive Development of Nature\n to Man 337\n (2.) The Development of Mind in History 337\n VI. SIXTH PERIOD 338\n\n XLIV.\u2014TRANSITION TO HEGEL 339\n\n XLV.\u2014HEGEL 343\n I. SCIENCE OF LOGIC 346\n 1. The Doctrine of Being 347\n (1.) Quality 347\n (2.) Quantity 348\n (3.) Measure 348\n 2. The Doctrine of Essence 349\n (1.) The Essence as such 349\n (2.) Essence and Phenomenon 350\n (3.) Actuality 351\n 3. The Doctrine of the Conception 352\n (1.) The Subjective Conception 352\n (2.) Objectivity 353\n (3.) The Idea 353\n II. THE SCIENCE OF NATURE 353\n 1. Mechanics 354\n 2. Physics 355\n 3. Organics 355\n (1.) Geological Organism 355\n (2.) Vegetable Organism 355\n (3.) Animal Organism 356\n III. PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 356\n 1. The Subjective Mind 356\n 2. The Objective Mind 358\n 3. The Absolute Mind 362\n (1.) \u00c6sthetics 363\n (_a._) Architecture 363\n (_b._) Sculpture 363\n (_c._) Painting 364\n (_d._) Music 364\n (_e._) Poetry 364\n (2.) Philosophy of Religion 364\n (_a._) The Natural Religion of the\n Oriental World 364\n (_b._) The Religion of Mental\n Individuality 364\n (_c._) Revealed, or the Christian\n Religion 365\n (3.) Absolute Philosophy 365\n\n\nA\n\nHISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION I.\n\nWHAT IS MEANT BY THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\nTo philosophize is to reflect; to examine things, in thought.\n\nYet in this is the conception of philosophy not sufficiently defined.\nMan, as thinking, also employs those practical activities concerned in\nthe adaptation of means to an end; the whole body of sciences also, even\nthose which do not in strict sense belong to philosophy, still lie in\nthe realm of thought. In what, then, is philosophy distinguished from\nthese sciences, _e. g._ from the science of astronomy, of medicine, or\nof rights? Certainly not in that it has a different material to work\nupon. Its material is precisely the same as that of the different\nempirical sciences. The construction and disposition of the universe,\nthe arrangement and functions of the human body, the doctrines of\nproperty, of rights and of the state\u2014all these materials belong as truly\nto philosophy as to their appropriate sciences. That which is given in\nthe world of experience, that which is real, is the content likewise of\nphilosophy. It is not, therefore, in its material but in its form, in\nits method, in its mode of knowledge, that philosophy is to be\ndistinguished from the empirical sciences. These latter derive their\nmaterial directly from experience; they find it at hand and take it up\njust as they find it. Philosophy, on the other hand, is never satisfied\nwith receiving that which is given simply as it is given, but rather\nfollows it out to its ultimate grounds; it examines every individual\nthing in reference to a final principle, and considers it as one link in\nthe whole chain of knowledge. In this way philosophy removes from the\nindividual thing given in experience, its immediate, individual, and\naccidental character; from the sea of empirical individualities, it\nbrings out that which is common to all; from the infinite and orderless\nmass of contingencies it finds that which is necessary, and throws over\nall a universal law. In short, philosophy examines the _totality_ of\nexperience in the form of an _organic system_ in harmony with the laws\nof thought. From the above it is seen, that philosophy (in the sense we\nhave given it) and the empirical sciences have a reciprocal influence;\nthe latter conditioning the former, while they at the same time are\nconditioned by it. We shall, therefore, in the history of the world, no\nmore find an absolute and complete philosophy, than a complete empirical\nscience (_Empirik_). Rather is philosophy found only in the form of the\ndifferent philosophical systems, which have successively appeared in the\ncourse of history, advancing hand in hand with the progress of the\nempirical sciences and the universal, social, and civil culture, and\nshowing in their advance the different steps in the development and\nimprovement of human science. The history of philosophy has, for its\nobject, to represent the content, the succession, and the inner\nconnection of these philosophical systems.\n\nThe relation of these different systems to each other is thus already\nintimated. The historical and collective life of the race is bound\ntogether by the idea of a spiritual and intellectual progress, and\nmanifests a regular order of advancing, though not always continuous,\nstages of development. In this, the fact harmonizes with what we should\nexpect from antecedent probabilities. Since, therefore, every\nphilosophical system is only the philosophical expression of the\ncollective life of its time, it follows that these different systems\nwhich have appeared in history will disclose one organic movement and\nform together one rational and internally connected (_gegliedertes_)\nsystem. In all their developments, we shall find one constant order,\ngrounded in the striving of the spirit ever to raise itself to a higher\npoint of consciousness and knowledge, and to recognize the whole\nspiritual and natural universe, more and more, as its outward being, as\nits reality, as the mirror of itself.\n\n_Hegel_ was the first to utter these thoughts and to consider the\nhistory of philosophy as a united process, but this view, which is, in\nits principle, true, he has applied in a way which would destroy the\nfreedom of human actions, and remove the very conception of contingency,\n_i. e._ that any thing should be contrary to reason. Hegel\u2019s view is,\nthat the succession of the systems of philosophy which have appeared in\nhistory, corresponds to the succession of logical categories in a system\nof logic. According to him, if, from the fundamental conceptions of\nthese different philosophical systems, we remove that which pertains to\ntheir outward form or particular application, &c., so do we find the\ndifferent steps of the logical conceptions (_e. g._ being, becoming,\nexistence, being _per se_ (_f\u00fcrsichseyn_) quantity, &c.). And on the\nother hand, if we take up the logical process by itself, we find also in\nit the actual historical process.\n\nThis opinion, however, can be sustained neither in its principle nor in\nits historical application. It is defective in its principle, because in\nhistory freedom and necessity interpenetrate, and, therefore, while we\nfind, if we consider it in its general aspects, a rational connection\nrunning through the whole, we also see, if we look solely at its\nindividual parts, only a play of numberless contingencies, just as the\nkingdom of nature, taken as a whole, reveals a rational plan in its\nsuccessions, but viewed only in its parts, mocks at every attempt to\nreduce them to a preconceived plan. In history we have to do with free\nsubjectivities, with individuals capable of originating actions, and\nhave, therefore, a factor which does not admit of a previous\ncalculation. For however accurately we may estimate the controlling\nconditions which may attach to an individual, from the general\ncircumstances in which he may be placed, his age, his associations, his\nnationality, &c., a free will can never be calculated like a\nmathematical problem. History is no example for a strict arithmetical\ncalculation. The history of philosophy, therefore, cannot admit of an\napriori construction; the actual occurrences should not be joined\ntogether as illustrative of a preconceived plan; but the facts, so far\nas they can be admitted, after a critical sifting, should be received as\nsuch, and their rational connection be analytically determined. The\nspeculative idea can only supply the law for the arrangement and\nscientific connection of that which may be historically furnished.\n\nA more comprehensive view, which contradicts the above-given Hegelian\nnotion, is the following. The actual historical development is, very\ngenerally, different from the theoretical. Historically _e. g._ the\nState arose as a means of protection against robbers, while\ntheoretically it is derived from the idea of rights. So also, even in\nthe actual history of philosophy, while the logical (theoretical)\nprocess is an ascent from the abstract to the concrete, yet does the\nhistorical development of philosophy, quite generally, descend from the\nconcrete to the abstract, from intuition to thought, and separates the\nabstract from the concrete in those general forms of culture and those\nreligious and social circumstances, in which the philosophizing subject\nis placed. A _system_ of philosophy proceeds synthetically, while the\n_history_ of philosophy, _i. e._ the history of the thinking process\nproceeds analytically. We might, therefore, with great propriety, adopt\ndirectly the reverse of the Hegelian position, and say that what in\nreality is the first, is for us, in fact, the last. This is illustrated\nin the Ionic philosophy. It began not with being as an abstract\nconception, but with the most concrete, and most apparent, _e. g._ with\nthe material conception of water, air, &c. Even if we leave the Ionics\nand advance to the being of the Eleatics or the becoming of the\nHeraclitics, we find, that these, instead of being pure thought\ndeterminations, are only unpurified conceptions, and materially colored\nintuitions. Still farther, is the attempt impracticable to refer every\nphilosophy that has appeared in history to some logical category as its\ncentral principle, because the most of these philosophies have taken,\nfor their object, the idea, not as an abstract conception, but in its\nrealization as nature and mind, and, therefore, for the most part, have\nto do, not with logical questions, but with those relating to natural\nphilosophy, psychology and ethics. Hegel should not, therefore, limit\nhis comparison of the historical and systematic process of development\nsimply to logic, but should extend it to the whole system of\nphilosophical science. Granted that the Eleatics, the Heraclitics and\nthe Atomists may have made such a category as the centre of their\nsystems, and we may find thus far the Hegelian logic in harmony with the\nHegelian history of philosophy. But if we go farther, how is it? How\nwith Anaxagoras, the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle? We cannot,\ncertainly, without violence, press one central principle into the\nsystems of these men, but if we should be able to do it, and could\nreduce _e. g._ the philosophy of Anaxagoras to the conception of \u201cthe\nend,\u201d that of the Sophists to the conception of \u201cthe appearance,\u201d and\nthe Socratic Philosophy to the conception of \u201cthe good,\u201d\u2014yet even then\nwe have the new difficulty that the historical does not correspond to\nthe logical succession of these categories. In fact, Hegel himself has\nnot attempted a complete application of his principle, and indeed gave\nit up at the very threshold of the Grecian philosophy. To the Eleatics,\nthe Heraclitics and the Atomists, the logical categories of \u201cbeing,\u201d\n\u201cbecoming,\u201d and being _per se_ may be successively ascribed, and so far,\nas already remarked, the parallelism extends, but no farther. Not only\ndoes Anaxagoras follow with the conception of reason working according\nto an end, but if we go back before the Eleatics, we find in the very\nbeginning of philosophy a total diversity between the logical and\nhistorical order. If Hegel had carried out his principle consistently,\nhe should have thrown away entirely the Ionic philosophy, for matter is\nno logical category; he should have placed the Pythagoreans after the\nEleatics and the Atomists, for in logical order the categories of\nquantity follow those of quality; in short, he would have been obliged\nto set aside all chronology. Unless this be done, we must be satisfied\nwith a theoretical reproduction of the course which the thinking spirit\nhas taken in its history, only so far as we can see in the grand stages\nof history a rational progress of thought; only so far as the\nphilosophical historian, surveying a period of development, actually\nfinds in it a philosophical acquisition,\u2014the acquisition of a new idea:\nbut we must guard ourselves against applying to the transition and\nintermediate steps, as well as to the whole detail of history, the\npostulate of an immanent conformity to law, or an organism in harmony\nwith our own thoughts. History often winds its way like a serpent in\nlines which appear retrogressive, and philosophy, especially, has not\nseldom withdrawn herself from a wide and already fruitful field, in\norder to settle down upon a narrow strip of land, the limits even of\nwhich she has sought still more closely to abridge. At one time we find\nthousands of years expended in fruitless attempts with only a negative\nresult;\u2014at another, a fulness of philosophical ideas are crowded\ntogether in the experience of a lifetime. There is here no sway of an\nimmutable and regularly returning law, but history, as the realm of\nfreedom, will first completely manifest itself at the end of time as the\nwork of reason.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION II.\n\nCLASSIFICATION.\n\n\nA few words will suffice to define our problem and classify its\nelements. Where and when does philosophy begin? Manifestly, according to\nthe analysis made in \u00a7 I., where a final philosophical principle, a\nfinal ground of being is first sought in a philosophical way,\u2014and hence\nwith the Grecian philosophy. The Oriental\u2014Chinese and Hindoo\u2014so named\nphilosophies,\u2014but which are rather theologies or mythologies,\u2014and the\nmythic cosmogonies of Greece, in its earliest periods, are, therefore,\nexcluded from our more definite problem. Like Aristotle, we shall begin\nthe history of philosophy with Thales. For similar reasons we exclude\nalso the philosophy of the Christian middle ages, or Scholasticism. This\nis not so much a philosophy, as a philosophizing or reflecting within\nthe already prescribed limits of positive religion. It is, therefore,\nessentially theology, and belongs to the science of the history of\nChristian doctrines.\n\nThe material which remains after this exclusion, may be naturally\ndivided into two periods; viz:\u2014ancient\u2014Grecian and Gr\u00e6co-Romanic\u2014and\nmodern philosophy. Since a preliminary comparison of the characteristics\nof these two epochs could not here be given without a subsequent\nrepetition, we shall first speak of their inner relations, when we come\nto treat of the transition from the one to the other.\n\nThe first epoch can be still farther divided into three periods; (1.)\nThe pre-Socratic philosophy, _i. e._ from Thales to the Sophists\ninclusive; (2.) Socrates, Plato, Aristotle; (3.) The post-Aristotelian\nphilosophy, including New Platonism.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION III.\n\nGENERAL VIEW OF THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n1. The universal tendency of the pre-Socratic philosophy is to find some\nprinciple for the explanation of nature. Nature, the most immediate,\nthat which first met the eye and was the most palpable, was that which\nfirst aroused the inquiring mind. At the basis of its changing\nforms,\u2014beneath its manifold appearances, thought they, lies a first\nprinciple which abides the same through all change. What then, they\nasked, is this principle? What is the original ground of things? Or,\nmore accurately, what element of nature is the fundamental element? To\nsolve this inquiry was the problem of the _Ionic_ natural philosophers.\nOne proposes as a solution, water, another, air, and a third, an\noriginal chaotic matter.\n\n2. The _Pythagoreans_ attempted a higher solution of this problem. The\nproportions and dimensions of matter rather than its sensible\nconcretions, seemed to them to furnish the true explanation of being.\nThey, accordingly, adopted as the principle of their philosophy, that\nwhich would express a determination of proportions, _i. e._ numbers.\n\u201cNumber is the essence of all things,\u201d was their position. Number is the\nmean between the immediate sensuous intuition and the pure thought.\nNumber and measure have, to be sure, nothing to do with matter only in\nso far as it possesses extension, and is capable of division in space\nand time, but yet we should have no numbers or measures if there were no\nmatter, or nothing which could meet the intuitions of our sense. This\nelevation above matter, which is at the same time a cleaving to matter,\nconstitutes the essence and the character of Pythagoreanism.\n\n3. Next come the _Eleatics_, who step absolutely beyond that which is\ngiven in experience, and make a complete abstraction of every thing\nmaterial. This abstraction, this negation of all division in space and\ntime, they take as their principle, and call it pure being. Instead of\nthe sensuous principle of the Ionics, or the symbolic principle of the\nPythagoreans, the Eleatics, therefore, adopt an intelligible principle.\n\n4. Herewith closes the analytic, the first course in the development of\nGrecian philosophy, to make way for the second, or synthetic course. The\nEleatics had sacrificed to their principle of pure being, the existence\nof the world and every finite existence. But the denial of nature and\nthe world could not be maintained. The reality of both forced itself\nupon the attention, and even the Eleatics had affirmed it, though in\nguarded and hypothetical terms. But from their abstract being there was\nno passage back to the sensuous and concrete; their principle ought to\nhave explained the being of events, but it did not. To find a principle\nfor the explanation of these, a principle which would account for the\nbecoming, the event was still the problem. _Heraclitus_ solved it, by\nasserting that, inasmuch as being has no more reality than not being,\ntherefore the unity of the two, or in other words the becoming, is the\nabsolute principle. He held that it belonged to the very essence of\nfinite being that it be conceived in a continual flow, in an endless\nstream. \u201cEvery thing flows.\u201d We have here the conception of original\nenergy, instead of the Ionic original matter; the first attempt to\nexplain being and its motion from a principle analytically attained.\nFrom the time of Heraclitus, this inquiry after the cause of the\nbecoming, remained the chief interest and the moving spring of\nphilosophical development.\n\n5. Becoming is the unity of being and not-being, and into these two\nelements is the Heraclitic principle consciously analyzed by the\n_Atomists_. Heraclitus had uttered the principle of the becoming, but\nonly as a fact of experience. He had simply expressed it as a law, but\nhad not explained it. The necessity for this universal law yet remained\nto be proved. WHY is every thing in a perpetual flow\u2014in an eternal\nmovement? From the dynamical combination of matter and the moving force,\nthe next step was to a consciously determined distinction, to a\nmechanical division of the two. Thus Empedocles combining the doctrines\nof Heraclitus and Parmenides, considered matter as the abiding being,\nwhile force was the ground of the movement. But the Atomists still\nconsidered the moving mythic energies as forces; Empedocles regarded\nthem as love and hate; and Democritus as unconscious necessity. The\nresult was, therefore, that the becoming was rather limited as a means\nfor the mechanical explanation of nature, than itself explained.\n\n6. Despairing of any merely materialistic explanation of the becoming,\n_Anaxagoras_ next appears, and places a world-forming Intelligence by\nthe side of matter. He recognized mind as the primal causality, to which\nthe existence of the world, together with its determined arrangement and\ndesign (_zweckm\u00e4ssigkeit_) must be referred. In this, philosophy gained\na great principle, viz.\u2014an ideal one. But Anaxagoras did not know how to\nfully carry out his principles. Instead of a theoretical comprehension\nof the universe\u2014instead of deriving being from the idea, he grasped\nagain after some mechanical explanation. His \u201cworld-forming reason\u201d\nserves him only as a first impulse, only as a moving power. It is to him\na _Deus ex machina_. Notwithstanding, therefore, his glimpse of\nsomething higher than matter, yet was Anaxagoras only a physical\nphilosopher, like his predecessors. Mind had not yet appeared to him as\na true force above nature, as an organizing soul of the universe.\n\n7. It is, therefore, a farther progress in thought, to comprehend\naccurately the distinction between mind and nature, and to recognize\nmind as something higher and contra-distinguished from all natural\nbeing. This problem fell to the _Sophists_. They entangled in\ncontradictions, the thinking which had been confined to the object, to\nthat which was given, and gave to the objective world which had before\nbeen exalted above the subject, a subordinate position in the dawning\nand yet infantile consciousness of the superiority of subjective\nthinking. The Sophists carried their principle of subjectivity, though\nat first this was only negative, into the form of the universal\nreligious and political changing condition (_Aufkl\u00e4rung_).[1] They stood\nforth as the destroyers of the whole edifice of thought that had been\nthus far built, until _Socrates_ appeared, and set up against this\nprinciple of _empirical_ subjectivity, that of the _absolute_\nsubjectivity,\u2014that of the spirit in the form of a free moral will, and\nthe thought is positively considered as something higher than existence,\nas the truth of all reality. With the Sophist closes our first period,\nfor with these the oldest philosophy finds its self-destruction\n(_Selbstaufl\u00f6sung_).\n\n\n\n\nSECTION IV.\n\nTHE IONIC PHILOSOPHERS.\n\n\n1. THALES.\u2014At the head of the Ionic natural philosophers, and therefore\nat the head of philosophy, the ancients are generally agreed in placing\nThales of Miletus, a cotemporary of Cr\u0153sus and Solon; although this\nbeginning lies more in the region of tradition than of history. The\nphilosophical principle to which he owes his place in the history of\nphilosophy is, that, \u201cthe principle (the primal, the original ground) of\nall things is water; from water every thing arises and into water every\nthing returns.\u201d But simply to assume water as the original ground of\nthings was not to advance beyond his myth-making predecessors and their\ncosmologies. Aristotle, himself, when speaking of Thales, refers to the\nold \u201ctheologians,\u201d\u2014meaning, doubtless, Homer and Hesiod,\u2014who had\nascribed to Oceanus and Thetis, the origin of all things. Thales,\nhowever, merits his place as the beginner of philosophy, because he made\nthe first attempt to establish his physical principle, without resorting\nto a mythical representation, and, therefore, brought into philosophy a\nscientific procedure. He is the first who has placed his foot upon the\nground of a logical (_verst\u00e4ndig_) explanation of nature. We cannot now\nsay with certainty, how he came to adopt his principle, though he might\nhave been led to it, by perceiving that dampness belonged to the seed\nand nourishment of things; that warmth is developed from moisture; and\nthat, generally, moisture might be the plastic, living and life-giving\nprinciple. From the condensation and expansion of this first principle,\nhe derives, as it seems, the changes of things, though the way in which\nthis is done, he has not accurately determined.\n\nThe philosophical significance of Thales does not appear to extend any\nfarther. He was not a speculative philosopher after a later mode.\nPhilosophical book-making was not at all the order of his day, and he\ndoes not seem to have given any of his opinions a written form. On\naccount of his ethico-political wisdom, he is numbered among the\nso-named \u201cseven wise men,\u201d and the characteristics which the ancients\nfurnish concerning him only testify to his practical understanding. He\nis said _e. g._ to have first calculated an eclipse of the sun, to have\nsuperintended the turning of the course of the Halys under Cr\u0153sus, &c.\nWhen subsequent narrators relate that he had asserted the unity of the\nworld, had set up the idea of a world-soul, and had taught the\nimmortality of the soul and the personality of God, it is doubtless an\nunhistorical reference of later ideas to a standpoint, which was, as\nyet, far from being developed.\n\n2. ANAXIMANDER.\u2014Anaximander, sometimes represented by the ancients as a\nscholar and sometimes as a companion of Thales, but who was, at all\nevents, younger than the latter, sought to carry out still farther his\nprinciples. The original essence which he assumed, and which he is said\nto have been the first to have named principle (\u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74), he defined as the\n\u201cunlimited, eternal and unconditioned,\u201d as that which embraced all\nthings and ruled all things, and which, since it lay at the basis of all\ndeterminateness of the finite and the changeable, is itself infinite and\nundeterminate. How we are to regard this original essence of Anaximander\nis a matter of dispute. Evidently it was not one of the four common\nelements, though we must not, therefore, think it was something\nincorporeal and immaterial. Anaximander probably conceived it as the\noriginal matter before it had separated into determined elements,\u2014as\nthat which was first in the order of time, or what is in our day called\nthe chemical indifference in the opposition of elements. In this respect\nhis original essence is indeed \u201cunlimited\u201d and \u201cundetermined,\u201d _i. e._\nhas no determination of quality nor limit of quantity, yet it is not,\ntherefore, in any way, a pure dynamical principle, as perhaps the\n\u201cfriendship\u201d and \u201cenmity\u201d of Empedocles might have been, but it was only\na more philosophical expression for the same thought, which the old\ncosmogonies have attempted to utter in their representation of chaos.\nAccordingly, Anaximander suffers the original opposition of cold and\nwarm, of dry and moist (_i. e._ the basis of the four elements) to be\nsecreted from his original essence, a clear proof that it was only the\nundeveloped, unanalyzed, potential being of these elemental opposites.\n\n3. ANAXIMENES.\u2014Anaximenes, who is called by some the scholar, and by\nothers the companion of Anaximander, turned back more closely to the\nview of Thales, in that he made air as the principle of all things. The\nperception that air surrounds the whole world, and that breath\nconditions the activity of life, seems to have led him to his position.\n\n4. RETROSPECT.\u2014The whole philosophy of the three Ionic sages may be\nreduced to these three points, viz:\u2014(1.) They sought for the universal\nessence of concrete being; (2.) They found this essence in a material\nsubstance or substratum; (3.) They gave some intimation respecting the\nderivation of the elements from this original matter.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION V.\n\nPYTHAGOREANISM.\n\n\n1. ITS RELATIVE POSITION.\u2014The development of the Ionic philosophy\ndiscloses the tendency to abstract matter from all else; though they\ndirected this process solely to the determined _quality_ of matter. It\nis this abstraction carried to a higher step, when we look away from the\nsensible concretions of matter, and no more regard its _qualitative_\ndeterminateness as water, air, &c., but only direct our attention to its\n_quantitative_ determinateness,\u2014to its space-filling property. But the\ndeterminateness of quantity is number, and this is the principle and\nstandpoint of Pythagoreanism.\n\n2. HISTORICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL.\u2014The Pythagorean doctrine of numbers is\nreferred to Pythagoras of Samos, who is said to have flourished between\n540 and 500 B. C. He dwelt in the latter part of his life at Crotonia,\nin Magna Grecia, where he founded a society, or, more properly, an\norder, for the moral and political regeneration of the lower Italian\ncities. Through this society, this new direction of philosophy seems to\nhave been introduced,\u2014though more as a mode of life than in the form of\na scientific theory. What is related concerning the life of Pythagoras,\nhis journeys, the new order which he founded, his political influence\nupon the lower Italian cities, &c., is so thoroughly interwoven with\ntraditions, legends, and palpable fabrications, that we can be certain\nat no point that we stand upon a historical basis. Not only the old\nPythagoreans, who have spoken of him, delighted in the mysterious and\nesoteric, but even his new-Platonistic biographers, Porphyry and\nJamblichus, have treated his life as a historico-philosophical romance.\nWe have the same uncertainty in reference to his doctrines, _i. e._ in\nreference to his share in the number-theory. Aristotle, _e. g._ does not\nascribe this to Pythagoras himself, but only to the Pythagoreans\ngenerally, _i. e._ to their school. The accounts which are given\nrespecting his school have no certainty till the time of Socrates, a\nhundred years after Pythagoras. Among the few sources of light which we\nhave upon this subject, are the mention made in Plato\u2019s Ph\u00e6don of the\nPythagorean Philolaus and his doctrines, and the writings of Archytas, a\ncotemporary of Plato. We possess in fact the Pythagorean doctrine only\nin the manner in which it was taken up by Philolaus, Eurytas and\nArchytas, since its earlier adherents left nothing in a written form.\n\n3. THE PYTHAGOREAN PRINCIPLE.\u2014The ancients are united in affirming that\nthe principle of the Pythagorean philosophy was number. But in what\nsense was this their principle\u2014in a material or a formal sense? Did they\nhold number as the material of things, _i. e._ did they believe that\nthings had their origin in numbers, or did they regard it as the\narchetype of things, _i. e._ did they believe that things were made as\nthe copy or the representation of numbers? From this very point the\naccounts given by the ancients diverge, and even the expressions of\nAristotle seem to contradict each other. At one time he speaks of\nPythagoreanism in the former, and at another in the latter sense. From\nthis circumstance modern scholars have concluded that the Pythagorean\ndoctrine of numbers had different forms of development; that some of the\nPythagoreans regarded numbers as the substances and others as the\narchetypes of things. Aristotle, however, gives an intimation how the\ntwo statements may be reconciled with each other. Originally, without\ndoubt, the Pythagoreans regarded number as the material, as the inherent\nessence of things, and therefore Aristotle places them together with the\nHylics (the Ionic natural philosophers), and says of them that \u201cthey\nheld things for numbers\u201d (_Metaph._ I., 5, 6). But as the Hylics did not\nidentify their matter, _e. g._ water, immediately with the sensuous\nthing, but only gave it out as the fundamental element, as the original\nform of the individual thing, so, on the other side, numbers also might\nbe regarded as similar fundamental types, and therefore Aristotle might\nsay of the Pythagoreans, that \u201cthey held numbers to be the corresponding\noriginal forms of being, as water, air, &c.\u201d But if there still remains\na degree of uncertainty in the expressions of Aristotle respecting the\nsense of the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, it can only have its\nground in the fact that the Pythagoreans did not make any distinction\nbetween a formal and material principle, but contented themselves with\nthe undeveloped view, that, \u201cnumber is the essence of things, every\nthing is number.\u201d\n\n4. THE CARRYING-OUT OF THIS PRINCIPLE.\u2014From the very nature of the\n\u201cnumber-principle,\u201d it follows that its complete application to the\nprovince of the real, can only lead to a fruitless and empty symbolism.\nIf we take numbers as even and odd, and still farther as finite and\ninfinite, and apply them as such to astronomy, music, psychology,\nethics, &c., there arise combinations like the following, viz.: one is\nthe point, two are the line, three are the superficies, four are the\nextension of a body, five are the condition (_beschaffenheit_),\n&c.\u2014still farther, the soul is a musical harmony, as is also virtue, the\nsoul of the world, &c. Not only the philosophical, but even the\nhistorical interest here ceases, since the ancients themselves\u2014as was\nunavoidable from the arbitrary nature of such combinations\u2014have given\nthe most contradictory account, some affirming that the Pythagoreans\nreduced righteousness to the number three, others, that they reduced it\nto the number four, others again to five, and still others to nine.\nNaturally, from such a vague and arbitrary philosophizing, there would\nearly arise, in this, more than in other schools, a great diversity of\nviews, one ascribing this signification to a certain mathematical form,\nand another that. In this mysticism of numbers, that which alone has\ntruth and value, is the thought, which lies at the ground of it all,\nthat there prevails in the phenomena of nature a rational order, harmony\nand conformity to law, and that these laws of nature can be represented\nin measure and number. But this truth has the Pythagorean school hid\nunder extravagant fancies, as vapid as they are unbridled.\n\nThe physics of the Pythagoreans possesses little scientific value, with\nthe exception of the doctrine taught by Philolaus respecting the\ncircular motion of the earth. Their ethics is also defective. What we\nhave remaining of it relates more to the Pythagorean life, _i. e._ to\nthe practice and discipline of their order than to their philosophy. The\nwhole tendency of Pythagoreanism was in a practical respect ascetic, and\ndirected to a strict culture of the character. As showing this, we need\nonly to cite their doctrines concerning the transmigration of the soul,\nor, as it has been called, their \u201cimmortality doctrine,\u201d their notion in\nrespect of the lower world, their opposition to suicide, and their view\nof the body as the prison of the soul\u2014all of which ideas are referred to\nin Plato\u2019s Ph\u00e6don, and the last two of which are indicated as belonging\nto Philolaus.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION VI\n\nTHE ELEATICS.\n\n\n1. RELATION OF THE ELEATIC PRINCIPLE TO THE PYTHAGOREAN.\u2014While the\nPythagoreans had made matter, in so far as it is quantity and the\nmanifold, the basis of their philosophizing, and while in this they only\nabstracted from the determined elemental condition of matter, the\nEleatics carry the process to its ultimate limit, and make, as the\nprinciple of their philosophy, a total abstraction from every finite\ndeterminateness, from every change and vicissitude which belongs to\nconcrete being. While the Pythagoreans had held fast to the form of\nbeing as having existence in space and time, the Eleatics reject this,\nand make as their fundamental thought the negation of all exterior and\nposterior. Only being is, and there is no not-being, nor becoming. This\nbeing is the purely undetermined, changeless ground of all things. It is\nnot being _in_ becoming, but it is being as exclusive of all becoming;\nin other words, it is pure being.\n\nEleaticism is, therefore, Monism, in so far as it strove to carry back\nthe manifoldness of all being to a single ultimate principle; but on the\nother hand it becomes Dualism, in so far as it could neither carry out\nits denial of concrete existence, _i. e._, the phenomenal world, nor yet\nderive the latter from its presupposed original ground. The phenomenal\nworld, though it might be explained as only an empty appearance, did yet\nexist; and, since the sensuous perception would not ignore this, there\nmust be allowed it, hypothetically at least, the right of existence. Its\norigin must be explained, even though with reservations. This\ncontradiction of an unreconciled Dualism between being and existence, is\nthe point where the Eleatic philosophy is at war with itself\u2014though, in\nthe beginning of the school\u2014with _Xenophanes_, it does not yet appear.\nThe principle itself, with its results, is only fully apparent in the\nlapse of time. It has three periods of formation, which successively\nappear in three successive generations. Its foundation belongs to\n_Xenophanes_; its systematic formation to _Parmenides_; its completion\nand partial dissolution to _Zeno_ and _Melissus_\u2014the latter of whom we\ncan pass by.\n\n2. XENOPHANES.\u2014Xenophanes is considered as the originator of the Eleatic\ntendency. He was born at Colophon; emigrated to Elea, a Phocian colony\nin Lucania, and was a younger cotemporary of Pythagoras. He appears to\nhave first uttered the proposition\u2014\u201cevery thing is one,\u201d without,\nhowever, giving any more explicit determination respecting this unity,\nwhether it be one simply in conception or in actuality. Turning his\nattention, says Aristotle, upon the world as a whole, he names the unity\nwhich he finds, God. God is the One. The Eleatic \u201cOne and All\u201d (\u1f12\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c0\u1fb6\u03bd) had, therefore, with Xenophanes, a theological and religious\ncharacter. The idea of the unity of God, and an opposition to the\nanthropomorphism of the ordinary views of religion, is his starting\npoint. He declaimed against the delusion that the gods were born, that\nthey had a human voice or form, and railed at the robbery, adultery, and\ndeceit of the gods as sung by Homer and Hesiod. According to him the\nGodhead is wholly seeing, wholly understanding, wholly hearing, unmoved,\nundivided, calmly ruling all things by his thought, like men neither in\nform nor in understanding. In this way, with his thought turned only\ntowards removing from the Godhead all finite determinations and\npredicates, and holding fast to its unity and unchangeableness, he\ndeclared this doctrine of its being to be the highest philosophical\nprinciple, without however directing this principle polemically against\nthe doctrine of finite being, or carrying it out in its negative\napplication.\n\n3. PARMENIDES.\u2014The proper head of the Eleatic school is Parmenides of\nElea, a scholar, or at least an adherent of Xenophanes. Though we\npossess but little reliable information respecting the circumstances of\nhis life, yet we have, in inverse proportion, the harmonious voice of\nall antiquity in an expression of reverence for the Eleatic sage, and of\nadmiration for the depth of his mind, as well as for the earnestness and\nelevation of his character. The saying\u2014\u201ca life like Parmenides,\u201d became\nafterwards a proverb among the Greeks.\n\nParmenides embodied his philosophy in an epic poem, of which we have\nstill important fragments. It is divided into two parts. In the first he\ndiscusses the conception of being. Rising far above the yet unmediated\nview of Xenophanes, he attains a conception of pure single being, which\nhe sets up as absolutely opposed to every thing manifold and changeable,\n_i. e._, to that which has no being, and which consequently cannot be\nthought. From this conception of being he not only excludes all becoming\nand departing, but also all relation to space and time, all divisibility\nand movement. This being he explains as something which has not become\nand which does not depart, as complete and of its own kind, as\nunalterable and without limit, as indivisible and present though not in\ntime, and since all these are only negative, he ascribes to it, also, as\na positive determination\u2014thought. Being and thought are therefore\nidentical with Parmenides. This pure thought, directed to the pure\nbeing, he declares is the only true and undeceptive knowledge, in\nopposition to the deceptive notions concerning the manifoldness and\nmutability of the phenomenal. He has no hesitancy in holding that to be\nonly a name which mortals regard as truth, viz., becoming and departing,\nbeing and not-being, change of place and vicissitude of circumstance. We\nmust therefore be careful not to hold \u201cthe One\u201d of Parmenides, as the\ncollective unity of all concrete being.\n\nSo much for the first part of Parmenides\u2019 poem. After the principle that\nthere is only being has been developed according to its negative and\npositive determinations, we might believe that the system was at an end.\nBut there follows a second part, which is occupied solely with the\nhypothetical attempt to explain the phenomenal world and give it a\nphysical derivation. Though firmly convinced that, according to reason\nand conception, there is only \u201cthe One,\u201d yet is Parmenides unable to\nwithdraw himself from the recognition of an appearing manifoldness and\nchange. Forced, therefore, by his sensuous perception to enter upon a\ndiscussion of the phenomenal world, he prefaces this second part of his\npoem with the remark, that he had now closed what he had to say\nrespecting the truth, and was hereafter to deal only with the opinion of\na mortal. Unfortunately, this second part has been very imperfectly\ntransmitted to us. Enough however remains to show, that he explained the\nphenomena of nature from the mingling of two unchangeable elements,\nwhich Aristotle, though apparently only by way of example, indicates as\nwarm and cold, fire and earth. Concerning these two elements, Aristotle\nremarks still farther that Parmenides united the warmth with being, and\nthe other element with not-being.\n\nIt is scarcely necessary to remark that between the two parts of the\nParmenidean philosophy\u2014between the doctrine concerning being and the\ndoctrine concerning appearance\u2014there can exist no inner scientific\nconnection. What Parmenides absolutely denies in the first part, and\nindeed declares to be unutterable, viz., the not-being, the many and the\nchangeable, he yet in the second part admits to have an existence at\nleast in the representation of men. But it is clear that the not-being\ncannot once exist in the representation, if it does not exist generally\nand every where, and that the attempt to explain a not-being of the\nrepresentation, is in complete contradiction with his exclusive\nrecognition of being. This contradiction, this unmediated juxtaposition\nof being and not-being, of the one and the many, _Zeno_, a scholar of\nParmenides, sought to remove, by affirming that from the very conception\nof being, the sensuous representation, and thus the world of the\nnot-being, are dialectically annihilated.\n\n4. ZENO.\u2014The Eleatic Zeno was born about 500 B. C.; was a scholar of\nParmenides, and the earliest prose writer among the Grecian\nphilosophers. He is said to have written in the form of dialogues. He\nperfected, dialectically, the doctrine of his master, and carried out to\nthe completest extent the abstraction of the Eleatic One, in opposition\nto the manifoldness and determinateness of the finite. He justified the\ndoctrine of a single, simple, and unchangeable being, in a polemical\nway, by showing up the contradictions into which the ordinary\nrepresentations of the phenomenal world become involved. While\nParmenides affirms that there is only the One, Zeno shows in his\nwell-known proofs (which unfortunately we cannot here more widely\nunfold), that the many, the changing, that which has relation to space,\nor that which has relation to time, is not. While Parmenides affirmed\nthe being, Zeno denied the appearance. On account of these proofs, in\nwhich Zeno takes up the conceptions of extension, manifoldness and\nmovement, and shows their inner contradictory nature, Aristotle names\nhim the founder of dialectics.\n\nWhile the philosophizing of Zeno is the completion of the Eleatic\nprinciple, so is it at the same time the beginning of its dissolution.\nZeno had embraced the opposition of being and existence, of the one and\nthe many, so abstractly, and had carried it so far, that with him the\ninner contradiction of the Eleatic principle comes forth still more\nboldly than with Parmenides; for the more logical he is in the denial of\nthe phenomenal world, so much the more striking must be the\ncontradiction, of turning, on the one side, his whole philosophical\nactivity to the refutation of the sensuous representation, while, on the\nother side, he sets over against it a doctrine which destroys the very\npossibility of a false representation.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION VII.\n\nHERACLITUS.\n\n\n1. RELATION OF THE HERACLITIC PRINCIPLE TO THE ELEATIC.\u2014Being and\nexistence, the one and the many, could not be united by the principle of\nthe Eleatics; the Monism which they had striven for had resulted in an\nill-concealed Dualism. Heraclitus reconciled this contradiction by\naffirming that being and not-being, the one and the many, existed at the\nsame time as the becoming. While the Eleatics could not extricate\nthemselves from the dilemma that the world is either being or not-being,\nHeraclitus removes the difficulty by answering\u2014it is neither being nor\nnot-being, because it is both.\n\n2. HISTORICAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL.\u2014Heraclitus, surnamed by later writers\nthe mystic, was born at Ephesus, and flourished about 500 B. C. His\nperiod was subsequent to that of Xenophanes, though partially\ncotemporary with that of Parmenides. He laid down his philosophical\nthoughts in a writing \u201cConcerning Nature,\u201d of which we possess only\nfragments. Its rapid transitions, its expressions so concise, and full\nof meaning, the general philosophical peculiarity of Heraclitus, and the\nantique character of the earliest prose writings, all combine to make\nthis work so difficult to be understood that it has long been a proverb.\nSocrates said concerning it, that \u201cwhat he understood of it was\nexcellent, and he had no doubt that what he did not understand was\nequally good; but the book requires an expert swimmer.\u201d Later Stoics and\nAcademicians have written commentaries upon it.\n\n3. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE BECOMING.\u2014The ancients unite in ascribing to\nHeraclitus the principle that the totality of things should be conceived\nin an eternal flow, in an uninterrupted movement and transformation, and\nthat all continuance of things is only appearance. \u201cInto the same\nstream,\u201d so runs a saying of Heraclitus, \u201cwe descend, and at the same\ntime we do not descend; we are, and also we are not. For into the same\nstream we cannot possibly descend twice, since it is always scattering\nand collecting itself again, or rather it at the same time flows to us\nand from us.\u201d There is, therefore, ground for the assertion that\nHeraclitus had banished all rest and continuance from the totality of\nthings; and it is doubtless in this very respect that he accuses the eye\nand the ear of deception, because they reveal to men a continuance where\nthere is only an uninterrupted change.\n\nHeraclitus has analyzed the principle of the becoming still more\nclosely, in the propositions which he utters, to account for the origin\nof things, where he shows that all becoming must be conceived as the\nproduct of warring opposites, as the harmonious union of opposite\ndeterminations. Hence his two well-known propositions: \u201cStrife is the\nfather of things,\u201d and \u201cThe One setting itself at variance with itself,\nharmonizes with itself, like the harmony of the bow and the viol.\u201d\n\u201cUnite,\u201d so runs another of his sayings, \u201cthe whole and the not-whole,\nthe coalescing and the not-coalescing, the harmonious and the\ndiscordant, and thus we have the one becoming from the all, and the all\nfrom the one.\u201d\n\n4. THE PRINCIPLE OF FIRE.\u2014In what relation does the principle of fire,\nwhich is also ascribed to Heraclitus, stand to the principle of the\nbecoming? Aristotle says that he took fire as his principle, in the same\nway that Thales took water, and Anaximenes took air. But it is clear we\nmust not interpret this to mean that Heraclitus regarded fire as the\noriginal material or fundamental element of things, after the manner of\nthe Ionics. If he ascribed reality only to the becoming, it is\nimpossible that he should have set by the side of this becoming, yet\nanother elemental matter as a fundamental substance. When, therefore,\nHeraclitus calls the world an ever-living fire, which in certain stages\nand certain degrees extinguishes and again enkindles itself, when he\nsays that every thing can be exchanged for fire, and fire for every\nthing, just as we barter things for gold and gold for things, he can\nonly mean thereby that fire represents the abiding power of this eternal\ntransformation and transposition, in other words, the conception of\nlife, in the most obvious and effective way. We might name fire, in the\nHeraclitic sense, the symbol or the manifestation of the becoming, but\nthat it is also with him the substratum of movement, _i. e._ the means\nwith which the power of movement, which is antecedent to all matter,\nserves it self in order to bring out the living process of things. In\nthe same way Heraclitus goes on to explain the manifoldness of things,\nby affirming that they arise from certain hindrances and a partial\nextinction of this fire. The product of its extremest hindrance is the\nearth, and the other things lie intermediately between.\n\n5. TRANSITION TO THE ATOMISTS.\u2014We have above regarded the Heraclitic\nprinciple as the consequent of the Eleatic, but we might as properly\nconsider the two as antitheses. While Heraclitus destroys all abiding\nbeing in an absolutely flowing becoming, so, on the other hand,\nParmenides destroys all becoming in an absolutely abiding being; and\nwhile the former charges the eye and the ear with deception, in that\nthey transform the flowing becoming into a quiescent being, the latter\nalso accuses these same senses of an untrue representation, in that they\ndraw the abiding being into the movement of the becoming. We can\ntherefore say that the being and the becoming are equally valid\nantitheses, which demand again a synthesis and reconciliation. But now\ncan we say that Heraclitus actually and satisfactorily solved the\nproblem of Zeno? Zeno had shown every thing actual to be a\ncontradiction, and from this had inferred their not-being, and it is\nonly in this inference that Heraclitus deviates from the Eleatics. He\nalso regarded the phenomenal world as an existing contradiction, but he\nclung to this contradiction as to an ultimate fact. That which had been\nthe negative result of the Eleatics, he uttered as his positive\nprinciple. The dialectics which Zeno had subjectively used against the\nphenomenal, he directed objectively as a proof for the becoming. But\nthis becoming which the Eleatics had thought themselves obliged to deny\nentirely, Heraclitus did not explain by simply asserting that it was the\nonly true principle. The question continually returned\u2014why is all being\na becoming? Why does the one go out over into the many? To give an\nanswer to this question, _i. e._ to explain the becoming from the\npresupposed principle of being, forms the standpoint and problem of the\n_Empedoclean_ and _Atomistic_ philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION VIII.\n\nEMPEDOCLES.\n\n\n1. GENERAL VIEW.\u2014Empedocles was born at Agrigentum, and is extolled by\nthe ancients as a natural philosopher, physician and poet, and also as a\nseer and worker of miracles. He flourished about 440 B. C., and was\nconsequently younger than Parmenides and Heraclitus. He wrote a\ndoctrinal poem concerning nature, which has been preserved to us in\ntolerably complete fragments. His philosophical system may be\ncharacterized in brief, as an attempt to combine the Eleatic being and\nthe Heraclitic becoming. Starting with the Eleatic thought, that neither\nany thing which had previously been could become, nor any thing which\nnow is could depart, he sets up as unchangeable being, four eternal\noriginal materials, which, though divisible, were independent, and\nunderived from each other. In this we have what in our day are called\nthe four elements. With this Eleatic thought he united also the\nHeraclitic view of nature, and suffered his four elements to become\nmingled together, and to receive a form by the working of two moving\npowers, which he names unifying friendship and dividing strife.\nOriginally, these four elements were absolutely alike and unmovable,\ndwelling together in a divine sphere where friendship united them, until\ngradually strife pressing from the circumference to the centre of the\nsphere (_i. e._ attaining a separating activity), broke this union, and\nthe formation of the world immediately began as the result.\n\n2. THE FOUR ELEMENTS.\u2014With his doctrine of the four elements,\nEmpedocles, on the one side, may be joined to the series of the Ionic\nphilosophers, but, on the other, he is excluded from this by his\nassuming the original elements to be four. He is distinctly said by the\nancients to have originated the theory of the four elements. He is more\ndefinitely distinguished from the old Ionics, from the fact that he\nascribed to his four \u201croot-elements\u201d a changeless being, by virtue of\nwhich they neither arose from each other nor departed into each other,\nand were capable of no change of essence but only of a change of state.\nEvery thing which is called arising and departing, every change rests\ntherefore only upon the mingling and withdrawing of these eternal and\nfundamental materials; the inexhaustible manifoldness of being rests\nupon the different proportions in which these elements are mingled.\nEvery becoming is conceived as such only as a change of place. In this\nwe have a mechanical in opposition to a dynamic explanation of nature.\n\n3. THE TWO POWERS.\u2014Whence now can arise any becoming, if in matter\nitself there is found no principle to account for the change? Since\nEmpedocles did not, like the Eleatics, deny that there was change, nor\nyet, like Heraclitus, introduce it in his matter, as an indwelling\nprinciple, so there was no other course left him but to place, by the\nside of his matter, a moving power. The opposition of the one and the\nmany which had been set up by his predecessors, and which demanded an\nexplanation, led him to ascribe to this moving power, two originally\ndiverse directions, viz.: repulsion and attraction. The separation of\nthe one into the many, and the union again of the many into the one, had\nindicated an opposition of powers which Heraclitus had already\nrecognized. While now Parmenides starting from the one had made love as\nhis principle, and Heraclitus starting from the many had made strife as\nhis, Empedocles combines the two as the principle of his philosophy. The\ndifficulty is, he has not sufficiently limited in respect to one\nanother, the sphere of operation of these two directions of his power.\nAlthough, to friendship belonged peculiarly the attractive, and to\nstrife the repelling function, yet does Empedocles, on the other hand,\nsuffer his strife to have in the formation of the world a unifying, and\nhis friendship a dividing effect. In fact, the complete separation of a\ndividing and unifying power in the movement of the becoming, is an\nunmaintainable abstraction.\n\n4. RELATION OF THE EMPEDOCLEAN TO THE ELEATIC AND HERACLITIC\nPHILOSOPHY.\u2014Empedocles, by placing, as the principle of the becoming, a\nmoving power by the side of his matter, makes his philosophy a mediation\nof the Eleatic and Heraclitic principles, or more properly a placing of\nthem side by side. He has interwoven these two principles in equal\nproportions in his system. With the Eleatics he denied all arising and\ndeparting, _i. e._ the transition of being into not-being and of\nnot-being into being, and with Heraclitus he shared the interest to find\nan explanation for change. From the former he derived the abiding,\nunchangeable being of his fundamental matter, and from the latter the\nprinciple of the moving power. With the Eleatics, in fine, he considered\nthe true being in an original and indistinguishable unity as a sphere,\nand with Heraclitus, he regarded the present world as a constant product\nof striving powers and oppositions. He has, therefore, been properly\ncalled an Eclectic, who has united the fundamental thoughts of his two\npredecessors, though not always in a logical way.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION IX.\n\nTHE ATOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n1. ITS PROPOUNDERS.\u2014Empedocles had sought to effect a combination of the\nEleatic and Heraclitic principle\u2014the same was attempted, though in a\ndifferent way, by the Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus. Democritus,\nthe better known of the two, was the son of rich parents, and was born\nabout 460 B. C. in Abdera, an Ionian colony. He travelled extensively,\nand no Greek before the time of Aristotle possessed such varied\nattainments. He embodied the wealth of his collected knowledge in a\nseries of writings, of which, however, only a few fragments have come\ndown to us. For rhythm and elegance of language, Cicero compared him\nwith Plato. He died in a good old age.\n\n2. THE ATOMS.\u2014Empedocles derived all determinateness of the phenomenal\nfrom a certain number of qualitatively determined and undistinguishable\noriginal materials, while the Atomists derived the same from an\noriginally unlimited number of constituent elements, or atoms, which\nwere homogeneous in respect of quality, but diverse in respect of form.\nThese atoms are unchangeable, material particles, possessing indeed\nextension, but yet indivisible, and can only be determined in respect of\nmagnitude. As being, and without quality, they are entirely incapable of\nany transformation or qualitative change, and, therefore, all becoming\nis, as with Empedocles, only a change of place. The manifoldness of the\nphenomenal world is only to be explained from the different form,\ndisposition, and arrangement of the atoms as they become, in various\nways, united.\n\n3. THE FULNESS AND THE VOID.\u2014The atoms, in order to be atoms, _i. e._\nundivided and impenetrable unities,\u2014must be mutually limited and\nseparated. There must be something set over against them which preserves\nthem as atoms, and which is the original cause of their separateness and\nimpenetrability. This is the void space, or more strictly the intervals\nwhich are found between the atoms, and which hinder their mutual\ncontact. The atoms, as being and absolute fulness, and the interval\nbetween them, as the void and the not-being, are two determinations\nwhich only represent in a real and objective way, what are in thought,\nas logical conceptions, the two elements in the Heraclitic becoming,\nviz. being and the not-being. But since the void space is one\ndetermination of being, it must possess objective reality no less than\nthe atoms, and Democritus even went so far as to expressly affirm in\nopposition to the Eleatics, that being is no more than nothing.\n\n4. THE ATOMISTIC NECESSITY.\u2014Democritus, like Empedocles, though far more\nextensively than he, attempted to answer the question\u2014whence arise these\nchanges and movements which we behold? Wherein lies the ground that the\natoms should enter into these manifold combinations, and bring forth\nsuch a wealth of inorganic and organic forms? Democritus attempted to\nsolve the problem by affirming that the ground of movement lay in the\ngravity or original condition of the material particles, and, therefore,\nin the matter itself, but in this way he only talked about the question\nwithout answering it. The idea of an infinite series of causalities was\nthus attained, but not a final ground of all the manifestations of the\nbecoming, and of change. Such a final ground was still to be sought, and\nas Democritus expressly declared that it could not lie in an ultimate\nreason \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, where Anaxagoras placed it, there only remained for him to\nfind it in an absolute necessity, or a necessary pre-determinateness\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7. This he adopted as his \u201cfinal ground,\u201d and is said to have named\nit chance \u03c4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7, in opposition to the inquiry after final causes, or the\nAnaxagorean teleology. Consequent upon this, we find as the prominent\ncharacteristic of the later Atomistic school (Diagoras the Melier),\npolemics against the gods of the people, and a constantly more publicly\naffirmed Atheism and Materialism.\n\n5. RELATIVE POSITION OF THE ATOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY.\u2014Hegel characterizes\nthe relative position of the Atomistic Philosophy as follows, viz.:\u2014\u201cIn\nthe Eleatic Philosophy being and not-being stand as antitheses,\u2014being\nalone is, and not-being is not; in the Heraclitic idea, being and\nnot-being are the same,\u2014both together, _i. e._ the becoming, are the\npredicate of concrete being; but being and not-being, as objectively\ndetermined, or in other words, as appearing to the sensuous intuition,\nare precisely the same as the antithesis of the fulness and the void.\nParmenides, Heraclitus and the Atomists all sought for the abstract\nuniversal; Parmenides found it in _being_, Heraclitus in the _process_\nof being _per se_, and the Atomists in the _determination_ of being _per\nse_.\u201d So much of this as ascribes to the Atomists the characteristic\npredicate of being _per se_ is doubtless correct,\u2014but the real thought\nof the Atomistic system is rather analogous with the Empedoclean, to\nexplain the possibility of the becoming, by presupposing these\nsubstances as possessing being _per se_, but without quality. To this\nend the not-being or the void, _i. e._ the side which is opposed to the\nEleatic principle, is elaborated with no less care than the side which\nharmonizes with it, _i. e._ that the atoms are without quality and never\nchange in their original elements. The Atomistic Philosophy is therefore\na mediation between the Eleatic and the Heraclitic principles. It is\nEleatic in affirming the undivided being _per se_ of the\natoms;\u2014Heraclitic, in declaring their multeity and manifoldness. It is\nEleatic in the declaration of an absolute fulness in the atoms, and\nHeraclitic in the claim of a real not-being, _i. e._ the void space. It\nis Eleatic in its denial of the becoming, _i. e._ of the arising and\ndeparting,\u2014and Heraclitic in its affirmation that to the atoms belong\nmovement and a capacity for unlimited combinations. The Atomists carried\nout their leading thought more logically than Empedocles, and we might\neven say that their system is the perfection of a purely mechanical\nexplanation of nature, since all subsequent Atomists, even to our own\nday, have only repeated their fundamental conceptions. But the great\ndefect which cleaves to every Atomistic system, Aristotle has justly\nrecognized, when he shows that it is a contradiction, on the one hand,\nto set up something corporeal or space-filling as indivisible, and on\nthe other, to derive the extended from that which has no extension, and\nthat the consciousless and inconceivable necessity of Democritus is\nespecially defective, in that it totally banishes from nature all\nconception of design. This is the point to which Anaxagoras turns his\nattention, and introduces his principle of an intelligence working with\ndesign.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION X.\n\nANAXAGORAS.\n\n\n1. HIS PERSONAL HISTORY.\u2014Anaxagoras is said to have been born at\nClazamena, about the year 500 B. C.; to have gone to Athens immediately,\nor soon after the Persian war, to have lived and taught there for a long\ntime, and, finally, accused of irreverence to the gods, to have fled,\nand died at Lampsacus, at the age of 72. He it was who first planted\nphilosophy at Athens, which from this time on became the centre of\nintellectual life in Greece. Through his personal relations to Pericles,\nEuripides, and other important men,\u2014among whom Themistocles and\nThucydides should be named\u2014he exerted a decisive influence upon the\nculture of the age. It was on account of this that the charge of\ndefaming the gods was brought against him, doubtless by the political\nopponents of Pericles. Anaxagoras wrote a work \u201c_Concerning Nature_\u201d\nwhich in the time of Socrates was widely circulated.\n\n2. HIS RELATION TO HIS PREDECESSORS.\u2014The system of Anaxagoras starts\nfrom the same point with his predecessors, and is simply another attempt\nat the solution of the same problem. Like Empedocles and the Atomists so\ndid Anaxagoras most vehemently deny the becoming. \u201cThe becoming and\ndeparting,\u201d\u2014so runs one of his sayings\u2014\u201cthe Greeks hold without\nfoundation, for nothing can ever be said to become or depart; but, since\nexisting things may be compounded together and again divided, we should\nname the becoming more correctly a combination, and the departing a\nseparation.\u201d From this view, that every thing arose by the mingling of\ndifferent elements, and departed by the withdrawing of these elements,\nAnaxagoras, like his predecessors, was obliged to separate matter from\nthe moving power. But though his point of starting was the same, yet was\nhis direction essentially different from that of any previous\nphilosopher. It was clear that neither Empedocles nor Democritus had\nsatisfactorily apprehended the moving power. The mythical energies of\nlove and hate of the one, or the unconscious necessity of the other,\nexplained nothing, and least of all, the design of the becoming in\nnature. The conception of an activity which could thus work designedly,\nmust, therefore, be brought into the conception of the moving power, and\nthis Anaxagoras accomplished by setting up the idea of a world-forming\nintelligence (\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2), absolutely separated from all matter and working\nwith design.\n\n3. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2.\u2014Anaxagoras described this intelligence as\nfree to dispose, unmingled with any thing, the ground of movement, but\nitself unmoved, every where active, and the most refined and pure of all\nthings. Although these predicates rest partly upon a physical analogy,\nand do not exhibit purely the conception of immateriality, yet on the\nother hand does the attribute of thought and of a conscious acting with\ndesign admit no doubt to remain of the decided idealistic character of\nthe Anaxagorean principle. Nevertheless, Anaxagoras went no farther than\nto enunciate his fundamental thought without attempting its complete\napplication. The explanation of this is obvious from the reasons which\nfirst led him to adopt his principle. It was only the need of an\noriginal cause of motion, to which also might be attributed the capacity\nto work designedly, which had led him to the idea of an immaterial\nprinciple. His \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, therefore, is almost nothing but a mover of matter,\nand in this function nearly all its activity is expended. Hence the\nuniversal complaint of the ancients, especially of Plato and Aristotle,\nrespecting the mechanical character of his doctrine. In Plato\u2019s Ph\u00e6don\nSocrates relates that, in the hope of being directed beyond a simple\noccasioning, or mediate cause, he had turned to the book of Anaxagoras,\nbut had found there only a mechanical instead of a truly teleological\nexplanation of being. And as Plato so also does Aristotle find fault\nwith Anaxagoras in that, while he admits mind as the ultimate ground of\nthings, he yet resorts to it only as to a _Deus ex machina_ for the\nexplanation of phenomena, whose necessity he could not derive from the\ncausality in nature. Anaxagoras, therefore, has rather postulated than\nproved mind as an energy above nature, and as the truth and actuality of\nnatural being.\n\nThe further extension of his system, his doctrine concerning the\nhomoiomeria (constituent elements of things), which according to him\nexisted together originally in a chaotic condition until with their\nseparation and parting the formation of the world began\u2014can here only be\nmentioned.\n\n4. ANAXAGORAS AS THE CLOSE OF THE PRE-SOCRATIC REALISM.\u2014With the\nAnaxagorean principle of the \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2, _i. e._ with the acquisition of an\nabsolutely immaterial principle, closes the realistic period of the old\nGrecian Philosophy. Anaxagoras combined together the principles of all\nhis predecessors. The infinite matter of the Hylics is represented in\nhis chaotic original mingling of things; the Eleatic pure being appears\nin the idea of the \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c2; the Heraclitic power of becoming and the\nEmpedoclean moving energies are both seen in the creating and arranging\npower of the eternal mind, while the Democritic atoms come to view in\nthe homoiomeria. Anaxagoras is the closing point of an old and the\nbeginning point of a new course of development,\u2014the latter through the\nsetting up of his ideal principle, and the former through the defective\nand completely physical manner in which this principle was yet again\napplied.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XI.\n\nTHE SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\n1. RELATION OF THE SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY TO THE ANAXAGOREAN\nPRINCIPLE.\u2014Anaxagoras had formed the conception of mind, and in this had\nrecognized thought as a power above the objective world. Upon this newly\nconquered field the Sophistic philosophy now began its gambols, and with\nchildish wantonness delighted itself in setting at work this power, and\nin destroying, by means of a subjective dialectic, all objective\ndeterminations. The Sophistic philosophy\u2014though of far more significance\nfrom its relation to the culture of the age than from its philosophy\u2014had\nfor its starting principle the breach which Anaxagoras had commenced\nbetween the subjective and the objective,\u2014the Ego and the external\nworld. The subject, after recognizing himself as something higher than\nthe objective world, and especially as something above the laws of the\nstate, above custom and religious tradition and the popular faith, in\nthe next place attempted to prescribe laws for this objective world, and\ninstead of beholding in it the historical manifestation of reason, he\nlooked upon it only as an exanimated matter, upon which he might\nexercise his will.\n\nThe Sophistic philosophy should be characterized as the clearing up\nreflection. It is, therefore, no philosophical system, for its doctrines\nand affirmations exhibit often so popular and even trivial a character\nthat for their own sake they would merit no place at all in the history\nof philosophy. It is also no philosophical school in the ordinary sense\nof the term,\u2014for Plato cites a vast number of persons under the common\nname of \u201cSophists,\u201d\u2014but it is an intellectual and widely spread\ndirection of the age, which had struck its roots into the whole moral,\npolitical, and religious character of the Athenian life of that time,\nand which may be called the Athenian clearing up period.\n\n2. RELATION OF THE SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY TO THE UNIVERSAL LIFE OF THAT\nAGE.\u2014The Sophistic philosophy is, theoretically, what the whole Athenian\nlife during the Peloponnesian war was practically. Plato justly remarks\nin his Republic that the doctrines of the Sophists only expressed the\nvery principles which guided the course of the great mass of men of that\ntime in their civil and social relations, and the hatred with which they\nwere pursued by the practical statesmen, clearly indicates the jealousy\nwith which the latter saw in them their rivals and the destroyers of\ntheir polity. If the absoluteness of the empirical subject\u2014i. e. the\nview that the individual Ego can arbitrarily determine what is true,\nright and good,\u2014is in fact the theoretical principle of the Sophistic\nphilosophy, so does this in a practical direction, as an unlimited\nEgoism meet us in all the spheres of the public and private life of that\nage. The public life had become an arena of passion and selfishness;\nthose party struggles which racked Athens during the Peloponnesian war\nhad blunted and stifled the moral feeling; every individual accustomed\nhimself to set up his own private interest above that of the state and\nthe common weal, and to seek in his own arbitrariness and advantage the\nmeasuring rod for all his actions. The Protagorean sentence that \u201cthe\nman is the measure of all things\u201d became practically carried out only\ntoo faithfully, and the influence of the orator in the assemblies of the\npeople and the courts, the corruptibility of the great masses and their\nleaders, and the weak points which showed to the adroit student of human\nnature the covetousness, vanity, and factiousness of others around him,\noffered only too many opportunities to bring this rule into practice.\nCustom had lost its weight; the laws were regarded as only an agreement\nof the majority, the civil ordinance as an arbitrary restriction, the\nmoral feeling as the effect of the policy of the state in education, the\nfaith in the gods as a human invention to intimidate the free power of\naction, while piety was looked upon as a statute which some men have\nenacted and which every one else is justified in using all his eloquence\nto change. This degradation of a necessity, which is conformable to\nnature and reason, and which is of universal validity,\u2014to an accidental\nhuman ordinance, is chiefly the point in which the Sophistic philosophy\ncame in contact with the universal consciousness of the educated class\nof that period, and we cannot with certainty determine what share\nscience and what share the life may have had in this connection,\u2014whether\nthe Sophistic philosophy found only the theoretical formula for the\npractical life and tendencies of the age, or whether the moral\ncorruption was rather a consequence of that destructive influence which\nthe principles of the Sophists exerted upon the whole course of\ncontemporaneous thought.\n\nIt would be, however, to mistake the spirit of history if we were only\nto bewail the epoch of the Sophists instead of admitting for it a\nrelative justification. These phenomena were in part the necessary\nproduct of the collective development of the age. The faith in the\npopular religion fell so suddenly to the ground simply because it\npossessed in itself no inner, moral support. The grossest vices and acts\nof baseness could all be justified and excused from the examples of\nmythology. Even Plato himself, though otherwise an advocate of a devout\nfaith in the traditional religion, accuses the poets of his nation with\nleading the very moral feeling astray, through the unworthy\nrepresentations which they had spread abroad concerning the gods and the\nhero world. It was moreover unavoidable that the advancing science\nshould clash with tradition. The physical philosophers had already long\nlived in open hostility to the popular religion, and the more\nconvincingly they demonstrated by analogies and laws that many things\nwhich had hitherto been regarded as the immediate effect of Divine\nomnipotence, were only the results of natural causes, so much the more\neasily would it happen that the educated classes would become perplexed\nin reference to all their previous convictions. It was no wonder then\nthat the transformed consciousness of the time should penetrate all the\nprovinces of art and poesy; that in sculpture, wholly analogous to the\nrhetoric art of the Sophistic philosophy, the emotive should occupy the\nplace of the elevated style; that Euripides, the sophist among\ntragedians, should bring the whole philosophy of the time and its manner\nof moral reflection upon the stage; and that, instead of like the\nearlier poets, bringing forward his actors to represent an idea, he\nshould use them only as means to excite a momentary emotion or some\nother stage effect.\n\n3. TENDENCIES OF THE SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY.\u2014To give a definite\nclassification of the Sophistic philosophy, which should be derived from\nthe conception of the general phenomena of the age, is exceedingly\ndifficult, since, like the French \u201cclearing up\u201d of the last century, it\nentered into every department of knowledge. The Sophists directed the\nuniversal culture of the time. Protagoras was known as a teacher of\nvirtue, Gorgias as a rhetorician and politician, Prodicus as a\ngrammarian and teacher of synonyms, Hippias as a man of various\nattainments, who besides astronomical and mathematical studies busied\nhimself with a theory of mnemonics; others took for their problem the\nart of education, and others still the explanation of the old poets; the\nbrothers Euthydemus and Dionysidorus gave instruction in the bearing of\narms and military tactics; many among them, as Gorgias, Prodicus, and\nHippias, were intrusted with embassies: in short the Sophists, each one\naccording to his individual tendency, took upon themselves every variety\nof calling and entered into every sphere of science; their method is the\nonly thing common to all. Moreover the relation of the Sophists to the\neducated public, their striving after popularity, fame and money,\ndisclose the fact that their studies and occupations were for the most\npart controlled, not by a subjective scientific interest, but by some\nexternal motive. With that roving spirit which was an essential\npeculiarity of the later Sophists, travelling from city to city, and\nannouncing themselves as thinkers by profession\u2014and giving their\ninstructions with prominent reference to a good recompense and the favor\nof the rich private classes, it was very natural that they should\ndiscourse upon the prominent questions of universal interest and of\npublic culture, with occasional reference also to the favorite\noccupation of this or that rich man with whom they might be brought in\ncontact. Hence their peculiar strength lay far more in a formal\ndexterity, in an acuteness of thought and a capacity of bringing it\nreadily into exercise, in the art of discourse than in any positive\nknowledge; their instruction in virtue was given either in positive\ndogmatism or in empty bombast, and even where the Sophistic philosophy\nbecame really polymathic, the art of speech still remained as the great\nthing. So we find in Xenophon, Hippias boasting that he can speak\nrepeatedly upon every subject and say something new each time, while we\nhear it expressly affirmed of others, that they had no need of positive\nknowledge in order to discourse satisfactorily upon every thing, and to\nanswer every question extemporaneously; and when many Sophists make it a\ngreat point to hold a well-arranged discourse about something of the\nleast possible significance (_e. g._ salt), so do we see that with them\nthe thing was only a means while the word was the end, and we ought not\nto be surprised that in this respect the Sophistic philosophy sunk to\nthat empty technicality which Plato in his Ph\u00e6drus, on account of its\nwant of character, subjects to so rigid a criticism.\n\n4. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY FROM ITS RELATION TO THE\nCULTURE OF THE AGE.\u2014The scientific and moral defect of the Sophistic\nphilosophy is at first view obvious; and, since certain modern writers\nof history with over-officious zeal have painted its dark sides in\nblack, and raised an earnest accusation against its frivolity,\nimmorality, and greediness for pleasure, its conceitedness and\nselfishness, and bare appearance of wisdom and art of dispute\u2014it needs\nhere no farther elucidation. But the point in it most apt to be\noverlooked is the merit of the Sophists in their effect upon the culture\nof the age. To say, as is done, that they had only the negative merit of\ncalling out the opposition of Socrates and Plato, is to leave the\nimmense influence and the high fame of so many among them, as well as\nthe revolution which they brought about in the thinking of a whole\nnation, an inexplicable phenomenon. It were inexplicable that _e. g._\nSocrates should attend the lectures of Prodicus, and direct to him other\nstudents, if he did not acknowledge the worth of his grammatical\nperformances or recognize his merit for the soundness of his logic.\nMoreover, it cannot be denied that Protagoras has hit upon many correct\nprinciples of rhetoric, and has satisfactorily established certain\ngrammatical categories. Generally may it be said of the Sophists, that\nthey threw among the people a fulness in every department of knowledge;\nthat they strewed about them a vast number of fruitful germs of\ndevelopment; that they called out investigations in the theory of\nknowledge, in logic and in language; that they laid the basis for the\nmethodical treatment of many branches of human knowledge, and that they\npartly founded and partly called forth that wonderful intellectual\nactivity which characterized Athens at that time. Their greatest merit\nis their service in the department of language. They may even be said to\nhave created and formed the Attic prose. They are the first who made\nstyle as such a separate object of attention and study, and who set\nabout rigid investigations respecting number and the art of rhetorical\nrepresentation. With them Athenian eloquence, which they first incited,\nbegins. Antiphon as well as Isocrates\u2014the latter the founder of the most\nflourishing school of Greek rhetoric\u2014are offshoots of the Sophistic\nphilosophy. In all this there is ground enough to regard this whole\nphenomenon as not barely a symptom of decay.\n\n5. INDIVIDUAL SOPHISTS.\u2014The first, who is said to have been called, in\nthe received sense, Sophist, is _Protagoras_ of Abdera, who flourished\nabout 440 B. C. He taught, and for wages, in Sicily and in Athens, but\nwas driven out of the latter place as a reviler of the gods, and his\nbook concerning the gods was burnt by the herald in the public\nmarket-place. It began with these words: \u201cI can know nothing concerning\nthe gods, whether they exist or not; for we are prevented from gaining\nsuch knowledge not only by the obscurity of the thing itself, but by the\nshortness of the human life,\u201d In another writing he develops his\ndoctrine concerning knowing or not-knowing. Starting from the Heraclitic\nposition that every thing is in a constant flow, and applying this\npre\u00ebminently to the thinking subject, he taught that the man is the\nmeasure of all things, who determines in respect of being that it may\nbe, and of not-being that it may not be, _i. e._ that is true for the\nperceiving subject which he, in the constant movement of things and of\nhimself, at every moment perceives and is sensible of\u2014and hence he has\ntheoretically no other relation to the external world than the sensuous\napprehension, and practically no other than the sensuous desire. But\nnow, since perception and sensation are as diverse as the subjects\nthemselves, and are in the highest degree variable in the very same\nsubject, there follows the farther result that nothing has an objective\nvalidity and determination, that contradictory affirmations in reference\nto the same object must be received as alike true, and that error and\ncontradiction cannot be. Protagoras does not seem to have made any\nefforts to give these frivolous propositions a practical and logical\napplication. According to the testimony of the ancients, a personal\ncharacter worthy of esteem, cannot be denied him; and even Plato, in the\ndialogue which bears his name, goes no farther than to object to his\ncomplete obscurity respecting the nature of morality, while, in his\nGorgias and Philebus, he charges the later Sophists with affirming the\nprinciples of immorality and moral baseness.\n\nNext to Protagoras, the most famous Sophist was _Gorgias_. During the\nPeloponnesian war (426 B. C.), he came from Leontium to Athens in order\nto gain assistance for his native city against the encroachments of\nSyracuse, After the successful accomplishment of his errand he still\nabode for some time in Athens, but resided the latter part of his life\nin Thessaly, where he died about the same time with Socrates. The\npompous ostentation of his external appearance is often ridiculed by\nPlato, and the discourses through which he was wont to exhibit himself\ndisplay the same character, attempting, through poetical ornament, and\nflorid metaphors, and uncommon words, and a mass of hitherto unheard of\nfigures of speech, to dazzle and delude the mind. As a philosopher he\nadhered to the Eleatics, especially to Zeno, and attempts to prove upon\nthe basis of their dialectic schematism, that universally nothing is, or\nif there could be a being, it would not be cognizable, or if cognizable\nit would not be communicable. Hence his writing bore characteristically\nenough the title\u2014\u201c_Concerning Not-being or Nature_.\u201d The proof of the\nfirst proposition that universally nothing is, since it can be\nestablished neither as being nor as not-being, nor yet as at the same\ntime both being and not-being, rests entirely upon the position that all\nexistence is a space-filling existence (has place and body), and is in\nfact the final consequence which overturns itself, in other words the\nself-destruction of the hitherto physical method of philosophizing.\n\nThe later Sophists with reckless daring carried their conclusions far\nbeyond Gorgias and Protagoras. They were for the most part free\nthinkers, who pulled to the ground the religion, laws, and customs of\ntheir birth. Among these should be named, prominently, the tyrant\nCritias, Polus, Callicles, and Thrasymachus. The two latter openly\ntaught the right of the stronger as the law of nature, the unbridled\nsatisfaction of desire as the natural right of the stronger, and the\nsetting up of restraining laws as a crafty invention of the weaker; and\nCritias, the most talented but the most abandoned of the thirty tyrants,\nwrote a poem, in which he represented the faith in the gods as an\ninvention of crafty statesmen. Hippias of Elis, a man of great\nknowledge, bore an honorable character, although he did not fall behind\nthe rest in bombast and boasting; but before all, was Prodicus, in\nreference to whom it became a proverb to say\u2014\u201cas wise as Prodicus,\u201d and\nconcerning whom Plato himself and even Aristophanes never spoke without\nveneration. Especially famous among the ancients were his parenetical\n(persuasive) lectures concerning the choice of a mode of life\n(Xenophon\u2019s Memorabilia, II. 1), concerning external good and its use,\nconcerning life and death, &c., discourses in which he manifests a\nrefined moral feeling, and his observation of life; although, through\nthe want of a higher ethical and scientific principle, he must be placed\nbehind Socrates, whose forerunner he has been called. The later\ngenerations of Sophists, as they are shown in the Euthydemus of Plato,\nsink to a common level of buffoonery and disgraceful strife for gain,\nand comprise their whole dialectic art in certain formul\u00e6 for entangling\nfallacies.\n\n6. TRANSITION TO SOCRATES AND CHARACTERISTIC OF THE FOLLOWING\nPERIOD.\u2014That which is true in the Sophistic philosophy is the truth of\nthe subjectivity, of the self-consciousness, _i. e._ the demand that\nevery thing which I am to admit must be shown as rational before my own\nconsciousness\u2014that which is false in it is its apprehension of this\nsubjectivity as nothing farther than finite, empirical egoistic\nsubjectivity, _i. e._ the demand that my accidental will and opinion\nshould determine what is rational; its truth is that it set up the\nprinciple of freedom, of self-certainty; its untruth is that it\nestablished the accidental will and notion of the individual upon the\nthrone. To carry out now the principle of freedom and self-consciousness\nto its truth, to gain a true world of objective thought with a real and\ndistinct content, by the same means of reflection which the Sophists had\nonly used to destroy it, to establish the objective will, the rational\nthinking, the absolute or ideal in the place of the empirical\nsubjectivity was the problem of the next advent in philosophy, the\nproblem which Socrates took up and solved. To make the absolute or ideal\nsubjectivity instead of the empirical for a principle, is to affirm that\nthe true measure of all things is not _my_ (_i. e._ the individual\nperson\u2019s) opinion, fancy and will; that what is true, right and good,\ndoes not depend upon my caprice and arbitrary determination, or upon\nthat of any other empirical subject; but while it is _my_ thinking, it\nis my _thinking_, the rational within me, which has to decide upon all\nthose points. But my thinking, my reason, is not something specially\nbelonging to me, but something common to every rational being; something\nuniversal, and in so far as I am a rational and thinking being, is my\nsubjectivity a universal one. But every thinking individual has the\nconsciousness that what he holds as right, as duty, as good or evil,\ndoes not appear as such to him alone but to every rational being, and\nthat consequently his thinking has the character of universality, of\nuniversal validity, in a word\u2014of objectivity. This then in opposition to\nthe Sophistic philosophy is the standpoint of Socrates, and therefore\nwith him the _philosophy of objective thought_ begins. What Socrates\ncould do in opposition to the Sophists was to show that reflection led\nto the same results as faith or obedience, hitherto without reflection,\nhad done, and that the thinking man guided by his free consciousness and\nhis own conviction, would learn to form the same judgments and take the\nsame course to which life and custom had already and unconsciously\ninduced the ordinary man. The position, that while the man is the\nmeasure of all things, it is the man as universal, as thinking, as\nrational, is the fundamental thought of the Socratic philosophy, which\nis, by virtue of this thought, the positive complement of the Sophistic\nprinciple.\n\nWith Socrates begins the second period of the Grecian philosophy. This\nperiod contains three philosophical systems, whose authors, standing to\neach other in the personal relation of teacher and pupil, represent\nthree successive generations,\u2014SOCRATES, PLATO, ARISTOTLE.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XII.\n\nSOCRATES.[2]\n\n\n1. HIS PERSONAL CHARACTER.\u2014The new philosophical principle appears in\nthe personal character of Socrates. His philosophy is his mode of acting\nas an individual; his life and doctrine cannot be separated. His\nbiography, therefore, forms the only complete representation of his\nphilosophy, and what the narrative of Xenophon presents us as the\ndefinite doctrine of Socrates, is consequently nothing but an abstract\nof his inward character, as it found expression from time to time in his\nconversation. Plato yet more regarded his master as such an archetypal\npersonality, and a luminous exhibition of the historical Socrates is the\nspecial object of his later and maturer dialogues, and of these again,\nthe Symposium is the most brilliant apotheosis of the Eros incarnated in\nthe person of Socrates, of the philosophical impulse transformed into\ncharacter.\n\nSocrates was born in the year 469 B. C, the son of Sophroniscus, a\nsculptor, and Ph\u00e6narete, a midwife. In his youth he was trained by his\nfather to follow his own profession, and in this he is said not to have\nbeen without skill. Three draped figures of the Graces, called the work\nof Socrates, were seen by Pausanias, upon the Akropolis. Little farther\nis known of his education. He may have profited by the instruction of\nProdicus and the musician, Damon, but he stood in no personal connection\nwith the proper philosophers, who flourished before, or cotemporaneously\nwith him. He became what he was by himself alone, and just for this\nreason does he form an era in the old philosophy. If the ancients call\nhim a scholar of Anaxagoras, or of the natural philosopher, Archelaus,\nthe first is demonstrably false, and the second, to say the least, is\naltogether improbable. He never sought other means of culture than those\nafforded in his native city. With the exception of one journey to a\npublic festival, the military campaigns which led him as far as Potid\u00e6a,\nDelion, and Amphipolis, he never left Athens.\n\nThe period when Socrates first began to devote himself to the education\nof youth, can be determined only approximately from the time of the\nfirst representation of the Clouds of Aristophanes, which was in the\nyear 423. The date of the Delphic oracle, which pronounced him the\nwisest of men, is not known. But in the traditions of his followers, he\nis almost uniformly represented as an old, or as a gray-headed man. His\nmode of instruction, wholly different from the pedantry and boastful\nostentation of the Sophists, was altogether unconstrained,\nconversational, popular, starting from objects lying nearest at hand and\nthe most insignificant, and deriving the necessary illustrations and\nproofs from the most common matters of every day life; in fact, he was\nreproached by his cotemporaries for speaking ever only of drudges,\nsmiths, cobblers and tanners. So we find him at the market, in the\ngymnasia, in the workshops, busy early and late, talking with youth,\nwith young men, and with old men, on the proper aim and business of\nlife, convincing them of their ignorance, and wakening up in them the\nslumbering desires after knowledge. In every human effort, whether\ndirected to the interests of the commonwealth, or to the private\nindividual and the gains of trade, to science or to art, this master of\nhelps to spiritual births could find fit points of contact for the\nawakening of a true self-knowledge, and a moral and religions\nconsciousness. However often his attempts failed, or were rejected with\nbitter scorn, or requited with hatred and unthankfulness, yet, led on by\nthe clear conviction that a real improvement in the condition of the\nstate could come only from a proper education of its youth, he remained\nto the last true to his chosen vocation. Purely Greek in these relations\nto the rising generation, he designated himself, by preference, as the\nmost ardent lover; Greek too in this, that with him, notwithstanding\nthese free relations of friendship, his own domestic life fell quite\ninto the background. He nowhere shows much regard for his wife and\nchildren; the notorious, though altogether too much exaggerated\nill-nature of Xantippe, leads us to suspect, however, that his domestic\nrelations were not the most happy.\n\nAs a man, as a practical sage, Socrates is pictured in the brightest\ncolors by all narrators. \u201cHe was,\u201d says Xenophon, \u201cso pious, that he did\nnothing without the advice of the gods; so just, that he never injured\nany one even in the least; so completely master of himself, that he\nnever chose the agreeable instead of the good; so discerning, that he\nnever failed in distinguishing the better from the worse;\u201d in short, he\nwas \u201cjust the best and happiest man possible.\u201d (Xen. _Mem._ I. 1, 11.\nIV. 8, 11.) Still that which lends to his person such a peculiar charm,\nis the happy blending and harmonious connection of all its\ncharacteristic traits, the perfection of a beautiful, plastic nature. In\nall this universality of his genius, in this force of character, by\nwhich he combined the most contradictory and incongruous elements into a\nharmonious whole, in this lofty elevation above every human weakness,\u2014in\na word, as a perfect model, he is most strikingly depicted in the\nbrilliant eulogy of Alcibiades, in the Symposium of Plato. In the\nscantier representation of Xenophon, also, we find everywhere a classic\nform, a man possessed of the finest social culture, full of Athenian\npoliteness, infinitely removed from every thing like gloomy asceticism,\na man as valiant upon the field of battle as in the festive hall,\nconducting himself with the most unconstrained freedom, and yet with\nentire sobriety and self-control, a perfect picture of the happiest\nAthenian time, without the acerbity, the one-sidedness, and contracted\nreserve of the later moralists, an ideal representation of the genuinely\nhuman virtues.\n\n2. SOCRATES AND ARISTOPHANES.\u2014Socrates seems early to have attained\nuniversal celebrity through the peculiarities attaching to his person\nand character. Nature had furnished him with a remarkable external\nphysiognomy. His crooked, turned-up nose, his projecting eye, his bald\npate, his corpulent body, gave his form a striking similarity to the\nSilenic, a comparison which is carried out in Xenophon\u2019s \u201cFeast,\u201d in\nsprightly jest, and in Plato\u2019s Symposium, with as much ingenuity as\nprofoundness. To this was added his miserable dress, his going barefoot,\nhis posture, his often standing still, and rolling his eyes. After all\nthis, one will hardly be surprised that the Athenian comedy took\nadvantage of such a remarkable character. But there was another and\npeculiar motive, which influenced Aristophanes. He was a most ardent\nadmirer of the good old times, an enthusiastic eulogist of the manners\nand the constitution, under which the fathers had been reared. As it was\nhis great object to waken up anew in his people, and to stimulate a\nlonging after those good old times, his passionate hatred broke out\nagainst all modern efforts in politics, art and philosophy, of that\nincreasing mock-wisdom, which went hand in hand with a degenerating\ndemocracy. Hence comes his bitter railing at Cleon, the Demagogue (in\nthe _Knights_), at Euripides, the sentimental play-writer (in the\n_Frogs_) and at Socrates, the Sophist (in the _Clouds_). The latter, as\nthe representative of a subtle, destructive philosophy, must have\nappeared to him just as corrupt and pernicious, as the party of progress\nin politics, who trampled without conscience upon every thing which had\ncome down from the past. It is, therefore, the fundamental thought of\nthe Clouds to expose Socrates to public contempt, as the representative\nof the Sophistic philosophy, a mere semblance of wisdom, at once vain,\nprofitless, corrupting in its influence upon the youth, and undermining\nall true discipline and morality. Seen in this light, and from a moral\nstandpoint, the motives of Aristophanes may find some excuse, but they\ncannot be justified; and his representation of Socrates, into whose\ncharacter all the characteristic features of the Sophistic philosophy\nare interwoven, even the most contemptible and hateful, yet so that the\nmost unmistakable likeness is still apparent, cannot be admitted on the\nground that Socrates did really have the greatest formal resemblance to\nthe Sophists. The Clouds can only be designated as a culpable\nmisunderstanding, and as an act of gross injustice brought about by\nblinded passion; and Hegel, when he attempts to defend the conduct of\nAristophanes, forgets, that, while the comic writer may caricature, he\nmust do it without having recourse to public calumniation. In fact all\nthe political and social tendencies of Aristophanes rest on a gross\nmisunderstanding of historical development. The good old times, as he\nfancies them, are a fiction. It lies just as little in the realm of\npossibility, that a morality without reflection, and a homely\ningenuousness, such as mark a nation\u2019s childhood, should be forced upon\na time in which reflection has utterly eaten out all immediateness, and\nunconscious moral simplicity, as that a grown up man should became a\nchild again in the natural way. Aristophanes himself attests the\nimpossibility of such a return, when in a fit of humor, with cynic\nraillery, he gives up all divine and human authority to ridicule, and\nthereby, however commendable may have been the patriotic motive\nprompting him to this comic extravagance, demonstrates, that he himself\nno longer stands upon the basis of the old morality, that he too is the\nson of his time.\n\n3. THE CONDEMNATION OF SOCRATES.\u2014To this same confounding of his efforts\nwith those of the Sophists, and the same tendency to restore by violent\nmeans the old discipline and morality, Socrates, twenty-four years\nlater, fell a victim. After he had lived and labored at Athens for many\nyears in his usual manner, after the storm of the Peloponnesian war had\npassed by, and this city had experienced the most varied political\nfortunes, in his seventieth year he was brought to trial and accused of\nneglecting the gods of the state, of introducing new deities, and also\nof corrupting the youth. His accusers were Melitus, a young poet,\nAnytus, a demagogue, and Lycon, an orator, men in every respect\ninsignificant, and acting, as it seems, without motives of personal\nenmity. The trial resulted in his condemnation. After a fortunate\naccident had enabled him to spend thirty days more with his scholars in\nhis confinement, spurning a flight from prison, he drank the poisoned\ncup in the year 399 B. C.\n\nThe first motive to his accusation, as already remarked, was his\nidentification with the Sophists, the actual belief that his doctrines\nand activity were marked with the same character of hostility to the\ninterests of the state, as those of the Sophists, which had already\noccasioned so much mischief. The three points in the accusation, though\nevidently resting on a misunderstanding, alike indicate this; they are\nprecisely those by which Aristophanes had sought to characterize the\nSophist in the person of Socrates. This \u201ccorruption of the youth,\u201d this\nbringing in of new customs, and a new mode of culture and education\ngenerally, was precisely the charge which was brought against the\nSophists; moreover, in Plato\u2019s Menon, Anytus, one of the three accusers,\nis introduced as the bitter enemy of the Sophists and of their manner of\ninstruction. So too in respect to the denial of the national gods:\nbefore this, Protagoras, accused of denying the gods, had been obliged\nto flee, and Prodicus, to drink hemlock, a victim to the same distrust.\nEven five years after the death of Socrates, Xenophon, who was not\npresent at the trial, felt himself called upon to write his Memorabilia\nin defence of his teacher, so wide-spread and deep-rooted was the\nprejudice against him.\n\nBeside this there was also a second, probably a more decisive reason. As\nthe Sophistic philosophy was, in its very nature, eminently\naristocratic, and Socrates, as a supposed Sophist, consequently passed\nfor an aristocrat, his entire mode of life could not fail to make him\nappear like a bad citizen in the eyes of the restored democracy. He had\nnever concerned himself in the affairs of the state, had never but once\nsustained an official character, and then, as chief of the Prytanes, had\ndisagreed with the will of the people and the rulers. (_Plat. Apol._ \u00a7\n32. Xen. _Mem._ I. 1, 18.) In his seventieth year, he mounted the\norator\u2019s stand for the first time in his life, on the occasion of his\nown accusation. His whole manner was somewhat cosmopolitan; he is even\nsaid to have remarked, that he was not an Athenian, nor a Greek, but a\ncitizen of the world. We must also take into account, that he found\nfault with the Athenian democracy upon every occasion, especially with\nthe democratic institution of choice by lot, that he decidedly preferred\nthe Spartan state to the Athenian, and that he excited the distrust of\nthe democrats by his confidential relations with the former leaders of\nthe oligarchic party. (Xen. _Mem._ I. 2, 9, sq.) Among others who were\nof the oligarchic interest, and friendly to the Spartans, Critias in\nparticular, one of the thirty tyrants, had been his scholar; so too\nAlcibiades\u2014two men, who had been the cause of much evil to the Athenian\npeople. If now we accept the uniform tradition, that two of his accusers\nwere men of fair standing in the democratic party, and farther, that his\njudges were men who had fled before the thirty tyrants, and later had\noverthrown the power of the oligarchy, we find it much more easy to\nunderstand how they, in the case before them, should have supposed they\nwere acting wholly in the interest of the democratic party, when they\npronounced condemnation upon the accused, especially as enough to all\nappearance could be brought against him. The hurried trial presents\nnothing very remarkable, in a generation which had grown up during the\nPeloponnesian war, and in a people that adopted and repented of their\npassionate resolves with the like haste. Yea, more, if we consider that\nSocrates spurned to have recourse to the usual means and forms adopted\nby those accused of capital crime, and to gain the sympathy of the\npeople by lamentations, or their favor by flattery, that he in proud\nconsciousness of his innocence defied his judges, it becomes rather a\nmatter of wonder, that his condemnation was carried by a majority of\nonly three to six votes. And even now he might have escaped the sentence\nto death, had he been willing to bow to the will of the sovereign people\nfor the sake of a commutation of his punishment. But as he spurned to\nset a value upon himself, by proposing another punishment, a fine, for\nexample, instead of the one moved by his accuser, because this would be\nthe same as to acknowledge himself guilty, his disdain could not fail to\nexasperate the easily excited Athenians, and no farther explanation is\nneeded to show why eighty of his judges who had before voted for his\ninnocence, now voted for his death. Such was the most lamentable\nresult\u2014a result, afterwards most deeply regretted by the Athenians\nthemselves\u2014of an accusation, which at the outset was probably only\nintended to humble the aristocratic philosopher, and to force him to an\nacknowledgment of the power and the majesty of the people.\n\nHegel\u2019s view of the fate of Socrates, that it was the result of the\ncollision of equally just powers\u2014the Tragedy of Athens as he calls\nit\u2014and that guilt and innocence were shared alike on both sides, cannot\nbe maintained on historical grounds, since Socrates can neither be\nregarded exclusively as the representative of the modern spirit, the\nprinciple of freedom, subjectivity, the concrete personality; nor his\njudges, as the representatives of the old Athenian unreflecting\nmorality. The first cannot be, since Socrates, if his principle was at\nvariance with the old Greek morality, rested nevertheless so far on the\nbasis of tradition, that the accusations brought against him in this\nrespect were false and groundless; and the last cannot be, since at that\ntime, after the close of the Peloponnesian war, the old morality and\npiety had long been wanting to the mass of the people, and given place\nto the modern culture, and the whole process against Socrates must be\nregarded rather as an attempt to restore by violence, in connection with\nthe old constitution, the old defunct morality. The fault is not\ntherefore the same on both sides, and it must be held, that Socrates\nfell a victim to a misunderstanding, and to an unjustifiable reaction of\npublic sentiment.\n\n4. THE \u201cGENIUS\u201d \u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd OF SOCRATES.\u2014Those traces of the old religious\nsentiment, which have been handed down to us from so many different\nsources, and are certainly not to be explained from a bare accommodation\nto the popular belief, on the part of the philosopher, and which\ndistinguish him so decidedly from the Sophists, show how little Socrates\nis really to be regarded as an innovator in discipline and morals. He\ncommends the art of divination, believes in dreams, sacrifices with all\nproper care, speaks of the gods, of their omniscience, omnipresence,\ngoodness, and complete sufficiency in themselves, even with the greatest\nreverence, and, at the close of his defence, makes the most solemn\nasseveration of his belief in their existence. In keeping with his\nattaching himself in this way to the popular religion, his new\nprinciple, though in its results hostile to all external authority,\nnevertheless assumed the form of the popular belief in \u201cDemonic\u201d signs\nand symbols. These suggestions of the \u201cDemon\u201d are a knowledge, which is\nat the same time connected with unconsciousness. They occupy the middle\nground between the bare external of the Greek oracle, and the purely\ninternal of the spirit. That Socrates had the conception of a particular\nsubject, a personal \u201cDemon,\u201d or \u201cGenius,\u201d is altogether improbable. Just\nas little can these \u201cDemonic\u201d signs, this inward oracle, whose voice\nSocrates professed to hear, be regarded after the modern acceptation,\nsimply as the personification of the conscience, or of the practical\ninstinct, or of the individual tact. The first article in the form of\naccusation, which evidently refers to this very point, shows that\nSocrates did not speak barely metaphorically of this voice, to which he\nprofessed to owe his prophecies. And it was not solely in reference to\nthose higher questions of decided importance, that Socrates had these\nsuggestions, but rather and preeminently with respect to matters of mere\naccident and arbitrary choice, as for example, whether, and when, his\nfriends should set out on a journey. It is no longer possible to explain\nthe \u201cDemon\u201d or \u201cGenius\u201d of Socrates on psychological grounds; there may\nhave been something of a magnetic character about it. It is possible\nthat there may be some connection between this and the many other\necstatic or cataleptic states, which are related of Socrates in the\nSymposium of Plato.\n\n5. THE SOURCES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES.\u2014Well known is the old\ncontroversy, whether the picture of Socrates, drawn by Xenophon or by\nPlato, is the most complete and true to history, and which of the two\nmen is to be considered as the more reliable source for obtaining a\nknowledge of his philosophy. This question is being decided more and\nmore in favor of Xenophon. Great pains has been taken in former as in\nlater times, to bring Xenophon\u2019s Memorabilia into disrepute, as a\nshallow and insufficient source, because their plain, and any thing\nother than speculative contents, seemed to furnish no satisfactory\nground for such a revolution in the world of mind as is attributed to\nSocrates, or for the splendor which invests his name in history, or for\nthe character which Plato assigns him; because again the Memorabilia of\nXenophon have especially an apologetic aim, and their defence does not\nrelate so much to the philosopher as to the man; and finally, because\nthey have been supposed to have the appearance of carrying the\nphilosophical over into the unphilosophical style of the common\nunderstanding. A distinction has therefore been made between an exoteric\nand an esoteric Socrates, obtaining the first from Xenophon, the latter\nfrom Plato. But the preference of Plato to Xenophon has in the first\nplace no historical right in its favor, since Xenophon appears as a\nproper historian and claims historical credibility, while Plato on the\nother hand never professes to be an historical narrator, save in a few\npassages, and will by no means have all the rest which he puts in the\nmouth of Socrates understood as his authentic expressions and discourse.\nThere is, therefore, no historical reason for preferring the\nrepresentation of Socrates which is given by Plato. In the second place,\nthe under-valuation of Xenophon rests, for the most part, on the false\nnotion, that Socrates had a proper philosophy, _i. e._ a speculative\nsystem, and on an unhistorical mistaking of the limits by which the\nphilosophical character of Socrates was conditioned and restricted.\nThere was no proper Socratic doctrine, but a Socratic life; and, just on\nthis ground, are the different philosophical tendencies of his scholars\nto be explained.\n\n6. THE UNIVERSAL CHARACTER OF THE PHILOSOPHIZING OF SOCRATES.\u2014The\nphilosophizing of Socrates was limited and restricted by his opposition,\npartly to the preceding, and partly to the Sophistic philosophy.\n\nPhilosophy before the time of Socrates had been in its essential\ncharacter investigation of nature. But in Socrates, the human mind, for\nthe first time, turned itself in upon itself, upon its own being, and\nthat too in the most immediate manner, by conceiving itself as active,\nmoral spirit. The positive philosophizing of Socrates, is exclusively of\nan ethical character, exclusively an inquiry into the nature of virtue,\nso exclusively, and so onesidedly, that, as is wont to be the case upon\nthe appearance of a new principle, it even expressed a contempt for the\nstriving of the entire previous period, with its natural philosophy, and\nits mathematics. Setting every thing under the standpoint of immediate\nmoral law, Socrates was so far from finding any object in \u201cirrational\u201d\nnature worthy of study, that he rather, in a kind of general\nteleological manner, conceived it simply in the light of external means\nfor the attainment of external ends; yea, he would not even go out to\nwalk, as he says in the Ph\u00e6drus of Plato, since one can learn nothing\nfrom trees and districts of country. Self-knowledge, the Delphic \u03b3\u03bd\u1ff6\u03b8\u03b9\n\u03c3\u03b1\u03c5\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd appeared to him the only object worthy of a man, as the\nstarting-point of all philosophy. Knowledge of every other kind, he\npronounced so insignificant and worthless, that he was wont to boast of\nhis ignorance, and to declare that he excelled other men in wisdom only\nin this, that he was conscious of his own ignorance. (Plat. _Ap. S._ 21,\n23.)\n\nThe other side of the Socratic philosophizing, is its opposition to the\nphilosophy of the time. His object, as is well understood, could have\nbeen only this, to place himself upon the same position as that occupied\nby the philosophy of the Sophists, and overcome it on its own ground,\nand by its own principles. That Socrates shared in the general position\nof the Sophists, and even had many features of external resemblance to\nthem\u2014the Socratic irony, for instance\u2014has been remarked above. Many of\nhis assertions, particularly these propositions, that no man knowingly\ndoes wrong, and if a man were knowingly to lie, or to do some other\nwrong act, still he would be better than he who should do the same\nunconsciously, at first sight bear a purely Sophistic stamp. The great\nfundamental thought of the Sophistic philosophy, that all moral acting\nmust be a conscious act, was also his. But whilst the Sophists made it\ntheir object, through subjective reflection to confuse and to break up\nall stable convictions, to make all rules relating to outward conduct\nimpossible, Socrates had recognized thinking as the activity of the\nuniversal principle, free, objective thought as the measure of all\nthings, and, therefore, instead of referring moral duties, and all moral\naction to the fancy and caprice of the individual, had rather referred\nall to true knowledge, to the essence of spirit. It was this idea of\nknowledge that led him to seek, by the process of thought, to gain a\nconceivable objective ground, something real, abiding, absolute,\nindependent of the arbitrary volitions of the subject, and to hold fast\nto unconditioned moral laws. Hegel expresses the same opinion, when he\nsays that Socrates put morality from ethical grounds, in the place of\nthe morality of custom and habit. Hegel distinguishes morality, as\nconscious right conduct, resting on reflection and moral principles,\nfrom the morality of unsophisticated, half-unconscious virtue, which\nrests on the compliance with prevailing custom. The logical condition of\nthis ethical striving of Socrates, was the determining of conceptions,\nthe method of their formation. To search out the \u201cwhat\u201d of every thing\nsays Xenophon (_Mem._ IV. 6, 1.) was the uninterrupted care of Socrates,\nand Aristotle says expressly that a twofold merit must be ascribed to\nhim, viz.: the forming of the method of induction and the giving of\nstrictly logical definitions,\u2014the two elements which constitute the\nbasis of science. How these two elements stand connected with the\nprinciple of Socrates we shall at once see.\n\n7. THE SOCRATIC METHOD.\u2014We must not regard the Socratic method as we are\naccustomed to speak of method in our day, _i. e._ as something which, as\nsuch, was distinctly in his consciousness, and which he abstracted from\nevery concrete content, but it rather had its growth in the very mode of\nhis philosophizing, which was not directed to the imparting of a system\nbut to the education of the subject in philosophical thinking and life.\nIt is only a subjective technicality for his mode of instruction, the\npeculiar manner of his philosophical, familiar life.\n\nThe Socratic method has a twofold side, a negative and a positive one.\nThe negative side is the well known Socratic _irony_. The philosopher\ntakes the attitude of ignorance, and would apparently let himself be\ninstructed by those with whom he converses, but through the questions\nwhich he puts, the unexpected consequences which he deduces, and the\ncontradictions in which he involves the opposite party, he soon leads\nthem to see that their supposed knowledge would only entangle and\nconfuse them. In the embarrassment in which they now find themselves\nplaced, and seeing that they do not know what they supposed, this\nsupposed knowledge completes its own destruction, and the subject who\nhad pretended to wisdom learns to distrust his previous opinions and\nfirmly held notions. \u201cWhat we knew, has contradicted itself,\u201d is the\nrefrain of the most of these conversations.\n\nThis result of the Socratic method was only to lead the subject to know\nthat he knew nothing, and a great part of the dialogues of Xenophon and\nPlato go no farther than to represent ostensibly this negative result.\nBut there is yet another element in his method in which the irony loses\nits negative appearance.\n\nThe positive side of the Socratic method is the so-called obstetrics or\nart of intellectual midwifery. Socrates compares himself with his mother\nPh\u00e6narete, a midwife, because his position was rather to help others\nbring forth thoughts than to produce them himself, and because he took\nupon himself to distinguish the birth of an empty thought from one rich\nin its content. (Plato _The\u00e6tetus_, p. 149.) Through this art of\nmidwifery the philosopher, by his assiduous questioning, by his\ninterrogatory dissection of the notions of him with whom he might be\nconversing, knew how to elicit from him a thought of which he had\npreviously been unconscious, and how to help him to the birth of a new\nthought. A chief means in this operation was the method of _induction_,\nor the leading of the representation to a conception. The philosopher,\nthus, starting from some individual, concrete case, and seizing hold of\nthe most common notions concerning it, and finding illustrations in the\nmost ordinary and trivial occurrences, knew how to remove by his\ncomparisons that which was individual, and by thus separating the\naccidental and contingent from the essential, could bring up to\nconsciousness a universal truth and a universal determination,\u2014in other\nwords, could form conceptions. In order _e. g._ to find the conception\nof justice or valor, he would start from individual examples of them,\nand from these deduce the universal character or conception of these\nvirtues. From this we see that the direction of the Socratic induction\nwas to gain logical _definitions_. I define a conception when I develope\nwhat it is, its essence, its content. I define the conception of justice\nwhen I set up the common property and logical unity of all its different\nmodes of manifestation. Socrates sought to go no farther than this. \u201cTo\nseek for the essence of virtue,\u201d says an Aristotelian writing (_Eth._ I.\n5), \u201cSocrates regarded as the problem of philosophy, and hence, since he\nregarded all virtue as a knowing, he sought to determine in respect of\njustice or valor what they might really be, _i. e._ he investigated\ntheir essence or conception.\u201d From this it is very easy to see the\nconnection which his method of definitions or of forming conceptions had\nwith his practical strivings. He went back to the conception of every\nindividual virtue, _e. g._ justice, only because he was convinced that\nthe knowledge of this conception, the knowledge of it for every\nindividual case, was the surest guide for every moral relation. Every\nmoral action, he believed, should start as a conscious action from the\nconception.\n\nFrom this we might characterize the Socratic method as the skill by\nwhich a certain sum of given, homogeneous and individual phenomena was\ntaken, and their logical unity, the universal principle which lay at\ntheir base, inductively found. This method presupposes the recognition\nthat the essence of the objects must be comprehended in the thought,\nthat the conception is the true being of the thing. Hence we see that\nthe Platonic doctrine of ideas is only the objectifying of this method\nwhich in Socrates appears no farther than a subjective dexterity. The\nPlatonic ideas are the universal conceptions of Socrates posited as real\nindividual beings. Hence Aristotle (_Metaph._ XIII. 4) most fittingly\ncharacterizes the relation between the Socratic method and the Platonic\ndoctrine of ideas with the words, \u201cSocrates posits the universal\nconceptions not as separate, individual substances, while Plato does\nthis, and names them ideas.\u201d\n\n8. THE SOCRATIC DOCTRINE CONCERNING VIRTUE.\u2014The single, positive\ndoctrinal sentence which has been transmitted us from Socrates is, that\nvirtue is a knowing,\u2014that, consequently, nothing is good which happens\nwithout discernment, and nothing bad which is done with discernment, or,\nwhat is the same thing, that no man is voluntarily vicious, that the\nbase are such against their will, aye, even he who knowingly does wrong\nis better than he who does it ignorantly, because in the latter case,\nmorality and true knowledge are both wanting, while in the former\u2014if\nsuch a case could happen\u2014morality alone is violated. Socrates could not\nconceive how a man should know the good and yet not do it; it was to him\na logical contradiction that the man who sought his own well being\nshould at the same time knowingly despise it. Therefore, with him the\ngood action followed as necessarily from the knowledge of the good as a\nlogical conclusion from its premise.\n\nThe sentence that virtue is a knowing, has for its logical consequence\nthe unity of virtue and for its practical consequence the teachableness\nof it. With these three propositions, in which every thing is embraced\nwhich we can properly term the Socratic philosophy, Socrates has laid\nthe first foundation stone for a scientific treatment of ethics, a\ntreatment which must be dated first from him. But he laid only the\nfoundation stone, for on the one side he attempted no carrying out of\nhis principle into details, nor any setting up of a concrete doctrine of\nethics, but only, after the ancient manner, referred to the laws of\nstates and the unwritten laws of the universal human order, and on the\nother side, he has not seldom served himself with utilitarian motives to\nestablish his ethical propositions, in other words he has referred to\nthe external advantages and useful consequences of virtue, by which the\npurity of his ethical point of view became tarnished.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XIII.\n\nTHE PARTIAL DISCIPLES OF SOCRATES.\n\n\n1. THEIR RELATION TO THE SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY.\u2014The death of Socrates gave\nto his life an ideal perfection, and this became an animating principle\nwhich had its working in many directions. The apprehension of him as an\nideal type forms the common character of the immediate Socratic schools.\nThe fundamental thought, that men should have one universal and\nessentially true aim, they all received from Socrates; but since their\nmaster left no complete and systematic doctrine, but only his many-sided\nlife to determine the nature of this aim, every thing would depend upon\nthe subjective apprehension of the personal character of Socrates, and\nof this we should at the outset naturally expect to find among his\ndifferent disciples a different estimate. Socrates had numerous\nscholars, but no school. Among these, three views of his character have\nfound a place in history. That of _Antisthenes_, or the Cynical, that of\n_Aristippus_, or the Cyrenian, and that of _Euclid_, or the\nMegarian\u2014three modes of apprehending him, each of which contains a true\nelement of the Socratic character, but all of which separate that which\nin the master was a harmonious unity, and affirm of the isolated\nelements that which could be truly predicated only of the whole. They\nare therefore, one-sided, and give of Socrates a false picture. This,\nhowever, was not wholly their fault; but in that Aristippus was forced\nto go back to the theory of knowledge of Protagoras, and Euclid to the\nmetaphysics of the Eleatics, they rather testify to the subjective\ncharacter and to the want of method and system of the Socratic\nphilosophy, and exhibit in their defects and one-sidedness, in part,\nonly the original weakness which belongs to the doctrine of their\nmaster.\n\n2. ANTISTHENES AND THE CYNICS.\u2014As a strictly literal adherent of the\ndoctrine of Socrates, and zealously though grossly, and often with\ncaricature imitating his method, Antisthenes stands nearest his master.\nIn early life a disciple of Gorgias, and himself a teacher of the\nSophistic philosophy, he subsequently became an inseparable attendant of\nSocrates, after whose death he founded a school in the Cynosarges,\nwhence his scholars and adherents took the name of Cynics, though\naccording to others this name was derived from their mode of life. The\ndoctrine of Antisthenes is only an abstract expression for the Socratic\nideal of virtue. Like Socrates he considered virtue the final cause of\nmen, regarding it also as knowledge or science, and thus as an object of\ninstruction; but the ideal of virtue as he had beheld it in the person\nof Socrates was realized in his estimation only in the absence of every\nneed (in his appearance he imitated a beggar with staff and scrip) and\nhence in the disregarding of all former intellectual interests; virtue\nwith him aims only to avoid evil, and therefore has no need of\ndialectical demonstrations, but only of Socratic vigor; the wise man,\naccording to him, is self-sufficient, independent of every thing,\nindifferent in respect of marriage, family, and the public life of\nsociety, as also in respect of wealth, honor, and enjoyment. In this\nideal of Antisthenes, which is more negative than positive, we miss\nentirely the genial humanity and the universal susceptibility of his\nmaster, and still more a cultivation of those fruitful dialectic\nelements which the Socratic philosophizing contained. With a more\ndecided contempt for all knowledge, and a still greater scorn of all the\ncustoms of society, the later Cynicism became frequently a repulsive and\nshameful caricature of the Socratic spirit. This was especially the case\nwith Diogenes of Sinope, the only one of his disciples whom Antisthenes\nsuffered to remain with him. In their high estimation of virtue and\nphilosophy these Cynics, who have been suitably styled the Capuchins of\nthe Grecian world, preserved a trace of the original Socratic\nphilosophy, but they sought virtue \u201cin the shortest way,\u201d in a life\naccording to nature as they themselves expressed it, that is, in\nshutting out the outer world, in attaining a complete independence, and\nabsence of every need, and in renouncing art and science as well as\nevery determinate aim. To the wise man said they nothing should go\namiss; he should be mighty over every need and desire, free from the\nrestraints of civil law and of custom, and of equal privileges with the\ngods. An easy life, said Diogenes, is assigned by the gods to that man\nwho limits himself to his necessities, and this true philosophy may be\nattained by every one, through perseverance and the power of\nself-denial. Philosophy and philosophical interest is there none in this\nschool of beggars. All that is related of Diogenes are anecdotes and\nsarcasms.\n\nWe see here how the ethics of the Cynic school lost itself in entirely\nnegative statements, a consequence naturally resulting from the fact\nthat the original Socratic conception of virtue lacked a concrete\npositive content, and was not systematically carried out. Cynicism is\nthe negative side of the Socratic doctrine.\n\n3. ARISTIPPUS AND THE CYRENIANS.\u2014Aristippus of Cyrene, numbered till the\ndeath of Socrates among his adherents, is represented by Aristotle as a\nSophist, and this with propriety, since he received money for his\ninstructions. He appears in Xenophon as a man devoted to pleasure. The\nadroitness with which he adapted himself to every circumstance, and the\nknowledge of human nature by which in every condition he knew how to\nprovide means to satisfy his desire for good living and luxury, were\nwell known among the ancients. Brought in contact with the government,\nhe kept himself aloof from its cares lest he should become dependent; he\nspent most of his time abroad in order to free himself from every\nrestraint; he made it his rule that circumstances should be dependent\nupon him, while he should be independent of them. Though such a man\nseems little worthy of the name of a Socraticist, yet has he two points\nof contact with his master which should not be overlooked. Socrates had\ncalled virtue _and_ happiness coordinately the highest end of man, _i.\ne._ he had indeed asserted most decidedly the idea of a moral action,\nbut because he brought this forward only in an undeveloped and abstract\nform, he was only able in concrete cases to establish the obligation of\nthe moral law in a utilitarian way, by appealing to the benefit\nresulting from the practice of virtue. This side of the Socratic\nprinciple Aristippus adopted for his own, affirming that pleasure is the\nultimate end of life, and the highest good. Moreover, this pleasure, as\nAristippus regards it, is not happiness as a condition embracing the\nwhole life, nor pleasure reduced to a system, but is only the individual\nsensation of pleasure which the body receives, and in this all\ndeterminations of moral worth entirely disappear; but in that Aristippus\nrecommends knowledge, self-government, temperance, and intellectual\nculture as means for acquiring and preserving enjoyment, and, therefore,\nmakes a cultivated mind necessary to judge respecting a true\nsatisfaction, he shows that the Socratic spirit was not yet wholly\nextinguished within him, and that the name of pseudo-Socraticist which\nSchleiermacher gives him, hardly belongs to him.\n\nThe other leaders of the Cyrenian school, _Hegesias_, _Theodorus_,\n_Anniceris_, we can here only name. The farther development of this\nschool is wholly occupied in more closely defining the nature of\npleasure, _i. e._ in determining whether it is to be apprehended as a\nmomentary sensation, or as an enduring condition embracing the whole\nlife; whether it belonged to the mind or the body, whether an isolated\nindividual could possess it, or whether it is found alone in the social\nrelations of life; whether we should regard it as positive or negative,\n(_i. e._ simply the absence of pain).\n\n4. EUCLID AND THE MEGARIANS.\u2014The union of the dialectical and the\nethical is a common character in all the partial Socratic schools; the\ndifference consists only in this, that in the one the ethical is made to\ndo service to the dialectical, and that in the other, the dialectical\nstands in subjection to the ethical. The former is especially true of\nthe Megarian school, whose essential peculiarity was pointed out by the\nancients themselves as a combination of the Socratic and Eleatic\nprinciples. The idea of the good is on the ethical side the same as the\nidea of being on the physical; it was, therefore, only an application to\nethics of the Eleatic view and method when Euclid called the good pure\nbeing, and the not-good, not-being. What is farther related of Euclid is\nobscure, and may here be omitted. The Megarian school was kept up under\ndifferent leaders after his death, but without living force, and without\nthe independent activity of an organic development. As hedonism (the\nphilosophical doctrine of the Cyreneans that pleasure is the chief good)\nled the way to the doctrine of Epicurus, and cynicism was the bridge\ntoward the Stoic, so the later Megaric development formed the transition\npoint to scepticism. Directing its attention ever more exclusively\ntowards the culture of the formal and logical method of argument, it\nleft entirely out of view the moral thoughts of Socrates. Its\nsophistries and quiddities which were, for the most part, only plays of\nword and wit, were widely known and noted among the ancients.\n\n5. PLATO, AS THE COMPLETE SOCRATICIST.\u2014The attempts thus far to build\nupon the foundation pillars of the Socratic doctrine, started without a\nvigorous germinating principle, and ended fruitlessly. Plato was the\nonly one of his scholars who has approached and represented _the whole_\nSocrates. Starting from the Socratic idea of knowledge he brought into\none focus the scattered elements and rays of truth which could be\ncollected from his master or from the philosophers preceding him, and\ngave to philosophy a systematic completeness. Socrates had affirmed the\nprinciple that conception is the true being and the only actual, and had\nurged to a knowledge according to the conception; but these positions\nwere no farther developed. His philosophy is not yet a system, but is\nonly the first impulse toward a philosophical development and method.\nPlato is the first who has approached a systematic representation and\ndevelopment of the ideal world of conceptions true in themselves.\n\nThe Platonic system is Socrates objectified, the blending and\nreconciling of preceding philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XIV.\n\nPLATO.\n\n\nI. PLATO\u2019S LIFE. 1. His YOUTH.\u2014Plato, the son of Aristo, of a noble\nAthenian family, was born in the year 429 B. C. It was the year of the\ndeath of Pericles, the second year of the Peloponnesian war, so fatal to\nAthens. Born in the centre of Grecian culture and industry, and\ndescended from an old and noble family, he received a corresponding\neducation, although no farther tidings of this have been transmitted to\nus, than the insignificant names of his teachers. That the youth growing\nup under such circumstances should choose the seclusion of a philosophic\nlife rather than a political career may seem strange, since many and\nfavorable opportunities for the latter course lay open before him.\nCritias, one of the thirty tyrants, was the cousin of his mother, and\nCharmides, who subsequently, under the oligarchic rule at Athens, found\nhis death at Thrasybulus on the same day with Critias, was his uncle.\nNotwithstanding this, he is never known to have appeared a single time\nas a public speaker in the assembly of the people. In view of the rising\ndegeneracy and increasing political corruption of his native land, he\nwas too proud to court for himself the favor of the many-headed _Demos_;\nand more attached to Doricism than to the democracy and practice of the\nAttic public life, he chose to make science his chief pursuit, rather\nthan as a patriot to struggle in vain against unavoidable disaster, and\nbecome a martyr to his political opinions. He regarded the Athenian\nstate as lost, and to hinder its inevitable ruin he would not bring a\nuseless offering.\n\n2. HIS YEARS OF DISCIPLINE.\u2014A youth of twenty, Plato came to Socrates,\nin whose intercourse he spent eight years. Besides a few doubtful\nanecdotes, nothing is known more particularly of this portion of his\nhistory. In Xenophon\u2019s Memorabilia (III. 6) Plato is only once cursorily\nmentioned, but this in a way that indicates an intimate relation between\nthe scholar and his master. Plato himself in his dialogues has\ntransmitted nothing concerning his personal relations to Socrates; only\nonce (_Ph\u00e6d._ p. 59) he names himself among the intimate friends of\nSocrates. But the influence which Socrates exerted upon him, how he\nrecognized in him the complete representation of a wise man, how he\nfound not only in his doctrine but also in his life and action the most\nfruitful philosophic germs, the significance which the personal\ncharacter of his master as an ideal type had for him\u2014all this we learn\nwith sufficient accuracy from his writings, where he places his own\nincomparably more developed philosophical system in the mouth of his\nmaster, whom he makes the centre of his dialogues and the leader of his\ndiscourses.\n\n3. HIS YEARS OF TRAVEL.\u2014After the death of Socrates 399 B. C, in the\nthirtieth year of his age, Plato, fearing lest he also should be met by\nthe incoming reaction against philosophy, left, in company with other\nSocraticists, his native city, and betook himself to Euclid, his former\nfellow-scholar, the founder of the Megaric school (_cf._ \u00a7 XIII. 4) at\nMegara. Up to this time a pure Socraticist, he became greatly animated\nand energized by his intercourse with the Megarians, among whom a\npeculiar philosophical direction, a modification of Socraticism, was\nalready asserted. We shall see farther on the influence of this\nresidence at Megara upon the foundation of his philosophy, and\nespecially upon the elaboration and confirmation of his doctrine of\nIdeas. One whole period of his literary activity and an entire group of\nhis dialogues, can only be satisfactorily explained by the intellectual\nstimulus gained at this place. From Megara, Plato visited Cyrene, Egypt,\nMagna-Grecia and Sicily. In Magna-Grecia he became acquainted with the\nPythagorean philosophy, which was then in its highest bloom. His abode\namong the Pythagoreans had a marked effect upon him; as a man it made\nhim more practical, and increased his zest for life and his interest in\npublic life and social intercourse; as a philosopher it furnished him\nwith a new incitement to science, and new motives to literary labor. The\ntraces of the Pythagorean philosophy may be seen through all the last\nperiod of his literary life; especially his aversion to public and\npolitical life was greatly softened by his intercourse with the\nPythagoreans. While in the Theat\u00e6tus, he affirmed most positively the\nincompatibility of philosophy with public life, we find in his later\ndialogues, especially in the Republic and also in the Statesman\u2014upon\nwhich Pythagoreanism seems already to have had an influence\u2014a returning\nfavor for the actual world, and the well-known sentence that the ruler\nmust be a philosopher is an expression very characteristic of this\nchange. His visit to Sicily gave him the acquaintance of the elder\nDionysius and Dion his brother-in-law, but the philosopher and the\ntyrant had little in common. Plato is said to have incurred his\ndispleasure to so high a degree, that his life was in danger. After\nabout ten years spent in travel, he returned to Athens in the fortieth\nyear of his age, (389 or 388 B. C.)\n\n4. PLATO AS HEAD OF THE ACADEMY; HIS YEARS OF INSTRUCTION.\u2014On his\nreturn, Plato surrounded himself with a circle of pupils. The place\nwhere he taught was known as the academy, a gymnasium outside of Athens\nwhere Plato had inherited a garden from his father. Of his school and of\nhis later life, we have only the most meagre accounts. His life passed\nevenly along, interrupted only by a second and third visit to Sicily,\nwhere meanwhile the younger Dionysius had come to the throne. This\nsecond and third residence of Plato at the court of Syracuse abounds in\nvicissitudes, and shows us the philosopher in a great variety of\nconditions (_cf._ Plutarch\u2019s _Life of Dion_); but to us, in estimating\nhis philosophical character, it is of interest only for the attempt,\nwhich, as seems probable from all accounts, he there made to realize his\nideal of a moral state, and by the philosophical education of the new\nruler to unite philosophy and the reins of government in one and the\nsame hand, or at least in some way by means of philosophy to achieve a\nhealthy change in the Sicilian state constitution. His efforts were\nhowever fruitless; the circumstances were not propitious, and the\ncharacter of the young Dionysius, who was one of those mediocre natures\nwho strive after renown and distinction, but are capable of nothing\nprofound and earnest, deceived the expectations concerning him which\nPlato, according to Dion\u2019s account, thought he had reason to entertain.\n\nWhen we look at Plato\u2019s philosophical labors in the academy, we are\nstruck with the different relations to public life which philosophy\nalready assumes. Instead of carrying philosophy, like Socrates, into the\nstreets and public places and making it there a subject of social\nconversation with any one who desired it, he lived and labored entirely\nwithdrawn from the movements of the public, satisfied to influence the\npupils who surrounded him. In precisely the measure in which philosophy\nbecomes a system and the systematic form is seen to be essential, does\nit lose its popular character and begin to demand a scientific training,\nand to become a topic for the school, an esoteric affair. Yet such was\nthe respect for the name of a philosopher, and especially for the name\nof Plato, that requests were made to him by different states to compose\nfor them a book of laws, a work which in some instances it was said was\nactually performed. Attended by a retinue of devoted disciples, among\nwhom were even women disguised as men, and receiving reiterated\ndemonstrations of respect, he reached the age of eighty-one years, with\nhis powers of mind unweakened to the latest moment.\n\nThe close of his life seems to have been clouded by disturbances and\ndivisions which arose in his school under the lead of Aristotle. Engaged\nin writing, or as others state it at a marriage feast, death came upon\nhim as a gentle sleep, 348 B. C. His remains were buried in the\nCeramicus, not far from the academy.\n\nII. THE INNER DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY AND WRITINGS.\u2014That\nthe Platonic philosophy has a real development, that it should not be\napprehended as a perfectly finished system to which the different\nwritings stand related as constituent elements, but that these are\nrather steps of this inner development, as it were stages passed over in\nthe philosophical journeyings of the philosopher\u2014is a view of the\nhighest importance for the true estimate of Plato\u2019s literary labors.\n\nPlato\u2019s philosophical and literary labors may be divided into three\nperiods, which we can characterize in different ways. Looking at them in\na chronological or biographical respect, we might call them respectively\nthe periods of his years of discipline, of travel, of instruction, or if\nwe view them in reference to the prevailing external influence under\nwhich they were formed, they might be termed the Socratic,\nHeraclitic-Eleatic, and the Pythagorean; or if we looked at the content\nalone, we might term them the Anti-Sophistic-Ethic, the Dialectic or\nmediating, and the systematic or constructive periods.\n\nTHE FIRST PERIOD\u2014the Socratic\u2014is marked externally by the predominance\nof the dramatic element, and in reference to its philosophical\nstandpoint, by an adherence to the method and the fundamental principles\nof the Socratic doctrine. Not yet accurately informed of the results of\nformer inquiries, and rather repelled from the study of the history of\nphilosophy than attracted to it by the character of the Socratic\nphilosophizing, Plato confined himself to an analytical treatment of\nconceptions, particularly of the conception of virtue, and to a\nreproducing of his master, which, though something more than a mere\nrecital of verbal recollections, had yet no philosophical independence.\nHis Socrates exhibits the same view of life and the same scientific\nstandpoint which the historical Socrates of Xenophon had had. His\nefforts were thus, like those of his contemporary fellow disciples,\ndirected prominently toward practical wisdom. His conflicts however,\nlike those of Socrates, had far more weight against the prevailing want\nof science and the shallow sophisms of the day than for the opposite\nscientific directions. The whole period bears an eclectic and hortatory\ncharacter. The highest point in which the dialogues of this group\nculminate is the attempt which at the same time is found in the Socratic\ndoctrine to determine the certainty of an absolute content (of an\nobjective reality) to the good.\n\nThe history of the development of the Platonic philosophy would assume a\nvery different form if the view of some modern scholars respecting the\ndate of the Ph\u00e6drus were correct. If, as they claim, the Ph\u00e6drus were\nPlato\u2019s earliest work, this circumstance would betray from the outset an\nentirely different course of culture for him than we could suppose in a\nmere scholar of Socrates. The doctrine in this dialogue of the\npre-existence of souls, and their periodical transmigrations, of the\nrelation of earthly beauty with heavenly truth, of divine inspiration in\ncontrast to human wisdom, the conception of love,\u2014these and other\nPythagorean ingredients are all so distinct from the original Socratic\ndoctrine that we must transfer the most of that which Plato has\ncreatively produced during his whole philosophical career, to the\nbeginning of his philosophical development. The improbability of this,\nand numerous other grounds of objection, claim a far later composition\nfor this dialogue. Setting aside for the present the Ph\u00e6drus, the\nPlatonic development assumes the following form:\n\nAmong the earliest works (if they are genuine) are the small dialogues\nwhich treat of Socratic questions and themes in a Socratic way. Of these\n_e. g._ the Charmides discusses temperance, the Lysis friendship, the\nLaches valor, the lesser Hippias knowing and wilful wrong-doing, the\nfirst Alcibiades, the moral and intellectual qualifications of a\nstatesman, &c. The immaturity and the crudeness of these dialogues, the\nuse of scenic means which have only an external relation to the content,\nthe scantiness and want of independence in the content, the indirect\nmanner of investigation which lacks a satisfactory and positive result,\nthe formal and analytical treatment of the conceptions discussed\u2014all\nthese features indicate the early character of these minor dialogues.\n\nThe Protagoras may be taken as a proper type of the Socratic period.\nSince this dialogue, though directing its whole polemic against the\nSophistic philosophy, confined itself almost exclusively to the outward\nmanifestation of this system, to its influence on its age and its method\nof instruction in opposition to that of Socrates, without entering into\nthe ground and philosophical character of the doctrine itself, and,\nstill farther, since, when it comes in a strict sense to philosophize,\nit confines itself, in an indirect investigation, to the Socratic\nconception of virtue according to its different sides (virtue as\nknowing, its unity and its teachableness, _cf._ \u00a7 XII. 8,)\u2014it represents\nin the clearest manner the tendency, character and want of the first\nperiod of Plato\u2019s literary life.\n\nThe Gorgias, written soon after the death of Socrates, represents the\nthird and highest stage of this period. Directed against the Sophistical\nidentification of pleasure and virtue, of the good and of the agreeable,\n_i. e._ against the affirmation of an absolute moral relativity, this\ndialogue maintains the proof that the good, far from owing its origin\nonly to the right of the stronger, and thus to the arbitrariness of the\nsubject, has in itself an independent reality and objective validity,\nand, consequently, alone is truly useful, and thus, therefore, the\nmeasure of pleasure must follow the higher measure of the good. In this\ndirect and positive polemic against the Sophistic doctrine of pleasure,\nin its tendency to a view of the good as something firm and abiding, and\nsecure against all subjective arbitrariness, consists prominently the\nadvance which the Gorgias makes over the Protagoras.\n\nIn the first Socratic period the Platonic philosophizing became ripe and\nready for the reception of Eleatic and Pythagorean categories. To\ngrapple by means of these categories with the higher questions of\nphilosophy, and so to free the Socratic philosophy from its so close\nconnection with practical life, was the task of the second period.\n\nTHE SECOND PERIOD\u2014the dialectic or the Megaric\u2014is marked externally, by\na less prominence of form and poetic contemplation, and not unfrequently\nindeed, by obscurity and difficulties of style, and internally, by the\nattempt to give a satisfactory mediation for the Eleatic doctrine and a\ndialectic foundation for the doctrine of ideas.\n\nBy his exile at Megara, and his journeys to Italy, Plato became\nacquainted with other and opposing philosophical directions, from which\nhe must now separate himself in order to elevate the Socratic doctrine\nto its true significance. It was now that he first learned to know the\nphilosophic theories of the earlier sages, for whose study the necessary\nmeans could not at that period, so wanting in literary publicity, be\nfound at Athens. By his separation from these varying standpoints, as\nhis older fellow pupils had already striven to do, he attempted striding\nover the narrow limits of ethical philosophizing, to reach the final\nground of knowing, and to carry out the art of forming conceptions as\nbrought forward by Socrates, to a science of conceptions, _i. e._ to the\ndoctrine of ideas. That all human acting depends upon knowing, and that\nall thinking depends upon the conception, were results to which Plato\nmight already have attained through the scientific generalization of the\nSocratic doctrine itself, but now to bring this Socratic wisdom within\nthe circle of speculative thinking, to establish dialectically that the\nconception in its simple unity is that which abides in the change of\nphenomena, to disclose the fundamental principles of knowledge which had\nbeen evaded by Socrates, to grasp the scientific theories of the\nopposers direct in their scientific grounds, and follow them out in all\ntheir ramifications,\u2014this is the problem which the Megaric family of\ndialogues attempts to solve.\n\nThe Theat\u00e6tus stands at the head of this group. This is chiefly directed\nagainst the Protagorean theory of knowledge, against the identification\nof the thinking and the sensible perception, or against the claim of an\nobjective relativity of all knowledge. As the Gorgias before it had\nsought to establish the independent being of the ethical, so does the\nTheat\u00e6tus ascending from the ethical to the theoretical, endeavor to\nprove an independent being and objective reality for the logical\nconceptions which lie at the ground of all representation and thinking,\nin a word, to prove the objectivity of truth, the fact that there lies a\nprovince of thought immanent in the thinking and independent of the\nperceptions of the senses. These conceptions, whose objective reality is\nthus affirmed, are those of a species, likeness and unlikeness, sameness\nand difference, &c.\n\nThe Theat\u00e6tus is followed by the trilogy of the Sophist, the Statesman,\nand the Philosopher, which completes the Megaric group of dialogues. The\nfirst of these dialogues examines the conception of appearance, that is\nof the not-being, the last (for which the Parmenides may be taken) the\nconception of being. Both dialogues are especially directed to the\nEleatic doctrine. After Plato had recognized the conception in its\nsimple unity as that which abides in the change of phenomena, his\nattention was naturally turned towards the Eleatics, who in an opposite\nway had attained the similar result that in unity consists all true\nsubstantiality, and to multiplicity as such no true being belongs. In\norder more easily on the one side to carry out this fundamental thought\nof the Eleatic to its legitimate result, in which the Megarians had\nalready preceded him, he was obliged to give a metaphysical substance to\nhis abstract conceptions of species, _i. e._ ideas. But on the other\nside, he could not agree with the inflexibility and exclusiveness of the\nEleatic unity, unless he would wholly sacrifice the multiplicity of\nthings; he was rather obliged to attempt to show by a dialectic\ndevelopment of the Eleatic principle that the one must be at the same\ntime a totality, organically connected, and embracing multiplicity in\nitself. This double relation to the Eleatic principle is carried out by\nthe Sophist and the Parmenides; by the former polemically against the\nEleatic doctrine, in that it proves the being of the appearance or the\nnot-being, and by the latter pacifically, in that it analyzes the\nEleatic one by its own logical consequences into many. The inner\nprogress of the doctrine of Ideas in the Megaric group of dialogues is\ntherefore this, viz., that the Theat\u00e6tus, in opposition to the\nHeraclitico-Protagorean theory of the absolute becoming, affirms the\nobjective and independent reality of ideas, and the Sophist shows their\nreciprocal relation and combining qualities, while the Parmenides in\nfine exhibits their whole dialectic completeness with their relation to\nthe phenomenal world.\n\nTHE THIRD PERIOD begins with the return of the philosopher to his native\ncity. It unites the completeness of form belonging to the first with the\nprofounder characteristical content belonging to the second. The\nmemories of his youthful years seem at this time to have risen anew\nbefore the soul of Plato, and to have imparted again to his literary\nactivity the long lost freshness and fulness of that period, while at\nthe same time his abode in foreign lands, and especially his\nacquaintance with the Pythagorean philosophy, had greatly enriched his\nmind with a store of images and ideals. This reviving of old memories is\nseen in the fact that the writings of this group return with fondness to\nthe personality of Socrates, and represent in a certain degree the whole\nphilosophy of Plato as the exaltation of the doctrine and the ideal\nembodiment of the historical character of his early master. In\nopposition to both of the first two periods, the third is marked\nexternally by an excess of the mythical form connected with the growing\ninfluence of Pythagoreanism in this period, and internally by the\napplication of the doctrine of ideas to the concrete spheres of\npsychology, ethics and natural science. That ideas possess objective\nreality, and are the foundation of all essentiality and truth, while the\nphenomena of the sensible world are only copies of these, was a theory\nwhose vindication was no longer attempted, but which was presupposed as\nalready proved, and as forming a dialectical basis for the pursuit of\nthe different branches of science. With this was connected a tendency to\nunite the hitherto separate branches of science into a systematic whole,\nas well as to mould together the previous philosophical directions, and\nshow the inner application of the Socratic philosophy for ethics, of the\nEleatic for dialectics, and the Pythagorean for physics.\n\nUpon this standpoint, the Ph\u00e6drus, Plato\u2019s inaugural to his labors in\nthe Academy, together with the Symposium, which is closely connected\nwith it, attempts to subject the rhetorical theory and practice of their\ntime to a thorough criticism, in order to show in opposition to this\ntheory and practice, that the fixedness and stability of a true\nscientific principle could only be attained by grounding every thing on\nthe idea. On the same standpoint the Ph\u00e6don attempts to prove the\nimmortality of the soul from the doctrine of ideas; the Philebus to\nbring out the conception of pleasure and of the highest good; the\nRepublic to develop the essence of the state, and the Tim\u00e6us that of\nnature.\n\nHaving thus sketched the inner development of the Platonic philosophy,\nwe now turn to a systematic statement of its principles.\n\nIII.\u2014CLASSIFICATION OF THE PLATONIC SYSTEM.\u2014The philosophy of Plato, as\nleft by himself, is without a systematic statement, and has no\ncomprehensive principle of classification. He has given us only the\nhistory of his thinking, the statement of his philosophical development;\nwe are therefore limited in reference to his classification of\nphilosophy to simple intimations. Accordingly, some have divided the\nPlatonic system into theoretical and practical science, and others into\na philosophy of the good, the beautiful and the true. Another\nclassification, which has some support in old records, is more correct.\nSome of the ancients say that Plato was the first to unite in one whole\nthe scattered philosophical elements of the earlier sages, and so to\nobtain for philosophy the three parts, logic, physics, and ethics. The\nmore accurate statement is given by _Sextus Empiricus_, that Plato has\nlaid the foundation for this threefold division of philosophy, but that\nit was first expressly recognized and affirmed by his scholars,\nXenocrates and Aristotle. The Platonic system may, however, without\ndifficulty, be divided into these three parts. True, there are many\ndialogues which mingle together in different proportions the logical,\nthe ethical, and the physical element, and though even where Plato\ntreats of some special discipline, the three are suffered constantly to\ninterpenetrate each other, still there are some dialogues in which this\nfundamental scheme can be clearly recognized. It cannot be mistaken that\nthe Tim\u00e6us has predominantly a physical, and the Republic as decidedly\nan ethical element, and if the dialectic is expressly represented in no\nseparate dialogue, yet does the whole Megaric group pursue the common\nend of bringing out the conception of science and its true object,\nbeing, and is, therefore, in its content decidedly dialectical. Plato\nmust have been led to this threefold division by even the earlier\ndevelopment of philosophy, and though Xenocrates does not clearly see\nit, yet since Aristotle presupposes it as universally admitted, we need\nnot scruple to make it the basis on which to represent the Platonic\nsystem.\n\nThe order which these different parts should take, Plato himself has not\ndeclared. Manifestly, however, dialectics should have the first place as\nthe ground of all philosophy, since Plato uniformly directs that every\nphilosophical investigation should begin with accurately determining the\n_idea_ (_Ph\u00e6d._ p. 99. Ph\u00e6dr. p. 237), while he subsequently examines\nall the concrete spheres of science on the standpoint of the doctrine of\nideas. The relative position of the other two parts is not so clear.\nSince, however, the physics culminates in the ethics, and the ethics, on\nthe other hand, has for its basis physical investigations into the\nensouling power in nature, we may assign to physics the former place of\nthe two.\n\nThe mathematical sciences Plato has expressly excluded from philosophy.\nHe considers them as helps to philosophical thinking (_Rep._ VII. 526),\nas necessary steps of knowledge, without which no one can come to\nphilosophy (_Ib._ VI. 510); but mathematics with him is not philosophy,\nfor it assumes its principles or axioms, without at all accounting for\nthem, as though they were manifest to all, a procedure which is not\npermitted to pure science; it also serves itself for its demonstrations,\nwith illustrative figures, although it does not treat of these, but of\nthat which they represent to the understanding (_Ib._). Plato thus\nplaces mathematics midway between a correct opinion and science, clearer\nthan the one, but more obscure than the other. (_Ib._ VII. 533.)\n\nIV. THE PLATONIC DIALECTICS. 1. CONCEPTION OF DIALECTICS.\u2014The conception\nof dialectics or of logic, is used by the ancients for the most part in\na very wide sense, while Plato employs it in repeated instances\ninterchangeably with philosophy, though on the other hand he treats it\nalso as a separate branch of philosophy. He divides it from physics as\nthe science of the eternal and unchangeable from the science of the\nchangeable, which never is, but is only ever becoming; he distinguishes\nalso between it and ethics, so far as the latter treats of the good not\nabsolutely, but in its concrete exhibition in morals and in the state;\nso that dialectics may be termed philosophy in a higher sense, while\nphysics and ethics follow it as two less exact sciences, or as a not yet\nperfected philosophy. Plato himself defines dialectics, according to the\nordinary signification of the word, as the art of developing knowledge\nby way of dialogue in questions and answers. (_Rep._ VII. 534). But\nsince the art of communicating correctly in dialogue is according to\nPlato, at the same time the art of thinking correctly, and as thus\nthinking and speaking could not be separated by the ancients, but every\nprocess of thought was a living dialogue, so Plato would more accurately\ndefine dialectics as the science which brings speech to a correct issue,\nand which combines or separates the species, _i. e._ the conceptions of\nthings correctly with one another. (_Soph._ p. 253. _Ph\u00e6dr._ p. 266).\nDialectics with him has two divisions, to know what can and what cannot\nbe connected, and to know how division or combination can be. But as\nwith Plato these conceptions of species or ideas are the only actual and\ntrue existence, so have we, in entire conformity with this, a third\ndefinition of dialectics (_Philebus_ p. 57), as the science of being,\nthe science of that which is true and unchangeable, the science of all\nother sciences. We may therefore briefly characterize it as the science\nof absolute being or of ideas.\n\n2. WHAT IS SCIENCE? (1.) _As opposed to sensation and the sensuous\nrepresentation._\u2014The Theat\u00e6tus is devoted to the discussion of this\nquestion in opposition to the Protagorean sensualism. That all knowledge\nconsists in perception, and that the two are one and the same thing, was\nthe Protagorean proposition. From this it followed, as Protagoras\nhimself had inferred, that things are, as they appear to me, that the\nperception or sensation is infallible. But since perception and\nsensation are infinitely diversified with different individuals, and\neven greatly vary in the same individual, it follows farther, that there\nare no objective determinations and predicates, that we can never affirm\nwhat a thing is in itself, that all conceptions, great, small, light,\nheavy, to increase, to diminish, &c., have only a relative significance,\nand consequently, also, the conceptions of species, as combinations of\nthe changeful many, are wholly wanting in constancy and stability. In\nopposition to this Protagorean thesis, Plato urges the following\nobjections and contradictions. _First._ The Protagorean doctrine leads\nto the most startling consequences. If being and appearance, knowledge\nand perception are one and the same thing, then is the irrational brute,\nwhich is capable of perception, as fully entitled to be called the\nmeasure of all things, as man, and if the representation is infallible,\nas the expression of my subjective character at a given time, then need\nthere be no more instruction, no more scientific conclusion, no more\nstrife, and no more refutation. _Second._ The Protagorean doctrine is a\nlogical contradiction; for according to it Protagoras must yield the\nquestion to every one who disputes with him, since, as he himself\naffirms, no one is incorrect, but every one judges only according to\ntruth; the pretended truth of Protagoras is therefore true for no man,\nnot even for himself. _Third._ Protagoras destroys the knowledge of\nfuture events. That which I may regard as profitable may not therefore\ncertainly prove itself as such in the result. To determine that which is\nreally profitable implies a calculation of the future, but since the\nability of men to form such a calculation is very diverse, it follows\nfrom this that not man as such, but only the wise man can be the measure\nof things. _Fourth._ The theory of Protagoras destroys perception.\nPerception, according to him, rests upon a distinction of the perceived\nobject and the perceiving subject, and is the common product of the two.\nBut in his view the objects are in such an uninterrupted flow, that they\ncan neither become fixed in seeing nor in hearing. This condition of\nconstant change renders all knowledge from sense, and hence (the\nidentity of the two being assumed), all knowledge impossible. _Fifth._\nProtagoras overlooks the apriori element in knowledge. It is seen in an\nanalysis of the sense-perception itself, that all knowledge cannot be\ntraced to the activity of the senses, but that there must also be\npresupposed besides these, intellectual functions, and hence an\nindependent province of supersensible knowledge. We see with the eyes,\nand hear with the ears, but to group together the perceptions attained\nthrough these different organs, and to hold them fast in the unity of\nself-consciousness, is beyond the power of the activity of the senses.\nAgain, we compare the different sense-perceptions with one another, a\nfunction which cannot belong to the senses, since each sense can only\nfurnish its own distinctive perception. Still farther, we bring forward\ndeterminations respecting the perceptions which we manifestly cannot owe\nto the senses, in that we predicate of these perceptions, being and\nnot-being, likeness and unlikeness, &c. These determinations, to which\nalso belong the beautiful and the odious, good and evil, constitute a\npeculiar province of knowledge, which the soul, independently of every\nsense-perception, brings forward through its own independent activity.\nThe ethical element of this Plato exhibits in his attack upon\nsensualism, and also in other dialogues. He maintains (_in the\nSophist_), that men holding such opinions must be improved before they\ncan be instructed, and that when made morally better, they will readily\nrecognize the truth of the soul and its moral and rational capacities,\nand affirm that these are real things, though objects of neither sight\nnor of feeling.\n\n(2.) _The Relation of Knowing to Opinion._\u2014Opinion is just as little\nidentical with knowing as is the sense-perception. An incorrect opinion\nis certainly different from knowing, and a correct one is not the same,\nfor it can be engendered by the art of speech without therefore\nattaining the validity of true knowledge. The correct opinion, so far as\nit is true in matter though imperfect in form, stands rather midway\nbetween knowing and not-knowing, and participates in both.\n\n(3.) _The Relation of Science to Thinking._\u2014In opposition to the\nProtagorean sensualism, we have already referred to an energy of the\nsoul independent of the sensuous perception and sensation, competent in\nitself to examine the universal, and grasp true being in thought. There\nis, therefore, a double source of knowledge, sensation and rational\nthinking. Sensation refers to that which is conceived in the constant\nbecoming and perpetual change, to the pure momentary, which is in an\nincessant transition from the was, through the now, into the shall be\n(_Parm._ p. 152); it is, therefore, the source of dim, impure, and\nuncertain knowledge; thinking on the other hand refers to the abiding,\nwhich neither becomes nor departs, but remains ever the same. (_Tim._ p.\n51.) Existence, says the Tim\u00e6us (p. 27) is of two kinds, \u201cthat which\never is but has no becoming, and that which ever becomes but never is.\nThe one kind, which is always in the same state, is comprehended through\nreflection by the reason, the other, which becomes and departs, but\nnever properly is, may be apprehended by the sensuous perception without\nthe reason.\u201d True science, therefore, flows alone from that pure and\nthoroughly internal activity of the soul which is free from all\ncorporeal qualities and every sensuous disturbance. (_Ph\u00e6d._ p. 65.) In\nthis state the soul looks upon things purely as they are (_Ph\u00e6d._ p. 66)\nin their eternal being and their unchangeable condition. Hence the true\nstate of the philosopher is announced in the Ph\u00e6don (p. 64) to be a\nwillingness to die, a longing to fly from the body, as from a hinderance\nto true knowledge, and become pure spirit. According to all this,\nscience is the thinking of true being or of ideas; the means to discover\nand to know these ideas, or the organ for their apprehension is the\ndialectic, as the art of separating and combining conceptions; the true\nobjects of dialectics are ideas.\n\n3. THE DOCTRINE OF IDEAS IN ITS GENESIS.\u2014The Platonic doctrine of ideas\nis the common product of the Socratic method of forming conceptions, the\nHeraclitic doctrine of absolute becoming, and the Eleatic doctrine of\nabsolute being. To the first of these Plato owes the idea of a knowing\nthrough conceptions, to the second the recognition of the becoming in\nthe field of the sensuous, to the third the position of a field of\nabsolute reality. Elsewhere (_in the Philebus_) Plato connects the\ndoctrine of ideas with the Pythagorean thought that every thing may be\nformed from unity and multiplicity, from the limit and the unlimited.\nThe aim of the Theat\u00e6tus, the Sophist, and the Parmenides is to refute\nthe principles of the Eleatics and Heraclitics: this refutation is\neffected in the Theat\u00e6tus by combating directly the principle of an\nabsolute becoming, in the Sophist by combating directly the principle of\nabstract being, and in the Parmenides by taking up the Eleatic one and\nshowing its true relations. We have already spoken of the Theat\u00e6tus; we\nwill now look for the development of the doctrine of ideas in the\nSophist and Parmenides.\n\nThe ostensible end of the former of these dialogues is to show that the\nSophist is really but a caricature of the philosopher, but its true end\nis to fix the reality of the appearance, _i. e._ of the not-being, and\nto discuss speculatively the relation of being and not-being. The\ndoctrine of the Eleatics ended with the rejection of all sensuous\nknowledge, declaring that what we receive as the perception of a\nmultiplicity of things or of a becoming is only an appearance. In this\nthe contradiction was clear, the not-being was absolutely denied, and\nyet its existence was admitted in the notion of men. Plato at once draws\nattention to this contradiction, showing that a delusive opinion, which\ngives rise to a false image or representation, is not possible, since\nthe whole theory rests upon the assumption that the false, the not-true,\n_i. e._ not-being cannot even be thought. This, Plato continues, is the\ngreat difficulty in thinking of not-being, that both he who denies and\nhe who affirms its reality is driven to contradict himself. For though\nit is inexpressible and inconceivable either as one or as many, still,\nwhen speaking of it, we must attribute to it both being and\nmultiplicity. If we admit that there is such a thing as a false opinion,\nwe assume in this very fact the notion of not-being, for only that\nopinion can be said to be false which supposes either the not-being to\nbe, or makes that, which is not, to be. In short, if there actually\nexists a false notion, so does there actually and truly exist a\nnot-being. After Plato had thus fixed the reality of not-being, he\ndiscusses the relation of being and not-being, _i. e._ the relation of\nconceptions generally in their combinations and differences. If\nnot-being has no less reality than being, and being no more than\nnot-being, if, therefore, _e. g._ the not-great is as truly real as the\ngreat, then every conception may be apprehended according to its\nopposite sides as being and not-being at the same time: it is a being in\nreference to itself, as something identical with itself, but it is\nnot-being in reference to every one of the numberless other conceptions\nwhich can be referred to it, and with which, on account of its\ndifference from them, it can have nothing in common. The conception of\nthe same \u03c4\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd and the different \u03b8\u03ac\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd represent the general form of\nan antithesis. These are the universal formul\u00e6 of combination for all\nconceptions. This reciprocal relation of conceptions as at the same time\nbeing and not-being, by virtue of which they can be arranged among\nthemselves, forms now the basis for the art of dialectics, which has to\njudge what conceptions can and what cannot be joined together. Plato\nillustrates here by taking the conceptions of being, motion (becoming),\nand rest (existence), and showing what are the results of the\ncombinations of these ideas. The conceptions of motion and rest cannot\nwell be joined together, though both of them may be joined with that of\nbeing, since both are; the conception of rest is therefore in reference\nto itself a being, but in reference to the conception of motion a\nnot-being or different. Thus the Platonic doctrine of ideas, after\nhaving in the Theat\u00e6tus attained its general foundation in fixing the\nobjective reality of conceptions, becomes now still farther developed in\nthe Sophist to a doctrine of the agreement and disagreement of\nconceptions. The category which conditions these reciprocal relations is\nthat of not-being or difference. This fundamental thought of the\nSophist, that being is not without not-being and not-being is not\nwithout being, may be expressed in modern phraseology thus: negation is\nnot not-being but determinateness, and on the other hand all\ndeterminateness and concreteness of conceptions, or every thing\naffirmative can be only through negation; in other words the conception\nof contradiction is the soul of a philosophical method.\n\nThe doctrine of ideas appears in the Parmenides as the positive\nconsequence and progressive development of the Eleatic principle. Indeed\nin this dialogue, in that Plato makes Parmenides the chief speaker, he\nseems willing to allow that his doctrine is in substance that of the\nEleatic sage. True, the fundamental thought of the dialogue\u2014that the one\nis not conceivable in its complete singleness without the many, nor the\nmany without the one, that each necessarily presupposes and reciprocally\nconditions the other\u2014stands in the most direct contradiction to\nEleaticism. Yet Parmenides himself, by dividing his poem into two parts,\nand treating in the first of the one and in the second of the many,\npostulates an inner mediation between these two externally so disjointed\nparts of his philosophy, and in this respect the Platonic theory of\nideas might give itself out as the farther elimination, and the true\nsense of the Parmenidean philosophizing. This dialectical mediation\nbetween the one and the not-one or the many Plato now attempts in four\nantinomies, which have ostensibly only a negative result in so far as\nthey show that contradictions arise both whether the one be adopted or\nrejected. The positive sense of these antinomies, though it can be\ngained only through inferences which Plato himself does not expressly\nutter, but leaves to be drawn by the reader\u2014is as follows. The first\nantinomy shows that the one is inconceivable as such since it is only\napprehended in its abstract opposition to the many; the second, that in\nthis case also the reality of the many is inconceivable; the third, that\nthe one or the idea cannot be conceived as not-being, since there can be\nneither conception nor predicate of the absolute not-being, and since,\nif not-being is excluded from all fellowship with being, all becoming\nand departing, all similarity and difference, every representation and\nexplanation concerning it must also be denied; and lastly, the fourth\naffirms that the not-one or the many cannot be conceived without the one\nor the idea. What now is Plato\u2019s aim in this discussion of the dialectic\nrelations between the conceptions of the one and the many? Would he use\nthe conception of the one only as an example to explain his dialectic\nmethod with conceptions, or is the discussion of this conception itself\nthe very object before him? Manifestly the latter, or the dialogue ends\nwithout result and without any inner connection of its two parts. But\nhow came Plato to make such a special investigation of this conception\nof the one? If we bear in mind that the Eleatics had already perceived\nthe antithesis of the actual and the phenomenal world in the antithesis\nof the one and the many, and that Plato himself had also regarded his\nideas as the unity of the manifold, as the one and the same in the\nmany\u2014since he repeatedly uses \u201cidea\u201d and \u201cthe one\u201d in the same sense,\nand places (_Rep._ VII. 537) dialectics in the same rank with the\nfaculty of bringing many to unity\u2014then is it clear that the one which is\nmade an object of investigation in the Parmenides is the idea in its\ngeneral sense, _i. e._ in its logical form, and that Plato consequently\nin the dialectic of the one and the many would represent the dialectic\nof the idea and the phenomenal world, or in other words would\ndialectically determine and establish the correct view of the idea as\nthe unity in the manifoldness of the phenomenal. In that it is shown in\nthe Parmenides, on the one side, that the many cannot be conceived\nwithout the one, and on the other side, that the one must be something\nwhich embraces in itself manifoldness, so have we the ready inference on\nthe one side, that the phenomenal world, or the many, has a true being\nonly in so far as it has the one or the conception within it, and on the\nother side, that since the conception is not an abstract one but\nmanifoldness in unity, it must actually have manifoldness in unity in\norder to be able to be in the phenomenal world. The indirect result of\nthe Parmenides is that matter as the infinitely divisible and\nundetermined mass has no actuality, but is in relation to the ideal\nworld a not-being, and though the ideas as the true being gain their\nappearance in it, yet the idea itself is all that is actual in the\nappearance or phenomenon; the phenomenal world derives its whole\nexistence from the ideal world which appears in it, and has a being only\nso far as it has a conception or idea for its content.\n\n4. POSITIVE EXPOSITION OF THE DOCTRINE OF IDEAS.\u2014Ideas may be defined\naccording to the different sides of their historical connection, as the\ncommon in the manifold, the universal in the particular, the one in the\nmany, or the constant and abiding in the changing. Subjectively they are\nprinciples of knowing which cannot be derived from experience they are\nthe intuitively certain and innate regulators of our knowledge.\nObjectively they are the immutable principles of being and of the\nphenomenal world, incorporeal and simple unities which have no relation\nto space, and which may be predicated of every independent thing. The\ndoctrine of ideas grew originally out of the desire to give a definite\nconception to the inner essence of things, and make the real world\nconceivable as a harmoniously connected intellectual world. This desire\nof scientific knowledge Aristotle cites expressly as the motive to the\nPlatonic doctrine of ideas. \u201cPlato,\u201d he says (_Metaph._ XIII. 4), \u201ccame\nto the doctrine of ideas because he was convinced of the truth of the\nHeraclitic view which regarded the sensible world as a ceaseless flowing\nand changing. His conclusion from this was, that if there be a science\nof any thing there must be, besides the sensible, other substances which\nhave a permanence, for there can be no science of the fleeting.\u201d It is,\ntherefore, the idea of science which demands the reality of ideas, a\ndemand which cannot be granted unless an idea or conception is also the\nground of all being. This is the case with Plato. According to him there\ncan be neither a true knowing nor a true being without ideas and\nconceptions which have an independent reality.\n\nWhat now does Plato mean by idea? From what has already been said it is\nclear that he means something more than ideal conceptions of the\nbeautiful and the good. An idea is found, as the name itself (\u03b5\u1f30\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2)\nindicates, wherever a universal conception of a species or kind is\nfound. Hence Plato speaks of the idea of a bed, table, strength, health,\nvoice, color, ideas of simple relations and properties, ideas of\nmathematical figures, and even ideas of not-being, and of that, which in\nits essence only contradicts the idea, baseness and vice. In a word, we\nmay put an idea wherever many things may be characterized by a common\nname (_Rep._ X. 596): or as Aristotle expresses it (_Met._ XII. 3).\nPlato places an idea to every class of being. In this sense Plato\nhimself speaks in the beginning of the Parmenides. Parmenides asks the\nyoung Socrates what he calls ideas. Socrates answers by naming\nunconditionally the moral ideas, the ideas of the true, the beautiful,\nthe good, and then after a little delay he mentions some physical ones,\nas the ideas of man, of fire, of water; he will not allow ideas to be\npredicated of that which is only a formless mass, or which is a part of\nsomething else, as hair, mud and clay, but in this he is answered by\nParmenides, that if he would be fully imbued with philosophy, he must\nnot consider such things as these to be wholly despicable, but should\nlook upon them as truly though remotely participating in the idea. Here\nat least the claim is asserted that no province of being is excluded\nfrom the idea, that even that which appears most accidental and\nirrational is yet a part of rational knowledge, in fact that every thing\nexisting may be brought within a rational conception.\n\n5. THE RELATION OF IDEAS TO THE PHENOMENAL WORLD. Analogous to the\ndifferent definitions of idea are the different names which Plato gives\nto the sensible and phenomenal world. He calls it the many, the\ndivisible, the unbounded, the undetermined and measureless, the\nbecoming, the relative, great and small, not-being. The relation now in\nwhich these two worlds of sense and of ideas stand to each other is a\nquestion which Plato has answered neither fully nor consistently with\nhimself. His most common way is to characterize the relation of things\nto conceptions as a participant, or to call things the copies and\nadumbrations, while ideas are the archetypes. Yet this is so indefinite\nthat Aristotle properly says that to talk in this way is only to use\npoetical metaphors. The great difficulty of the doctrine of ideas is not\nsolved but only increased by these figurative representations. The\ndifficulty lies in the contradiction which grows out of the fact that\nwhile Plato admits the reality of the becoming and of the province of\nthe becoming, he still affirms that ideas which are substances ever at\nrest and ever the same are the only actual. Now in this Plato is\nformally consistent with himself, while he characterizes the _mat\u00e9riel_\nof matter not as a positive substratum but as not-being, and guards\nhimself with the express affirmation that he does not consider the\nsensible as being, but only as something similar to being. (_Rep._ X.\n597.) The position laid down in the Parmenides is also consistent with\nthis, that a perfect philosophy should look upon the idea as the\ncognizable in the phenomenal world, and should follow it out in the\nsmallest particulars until every part of being should be known and all\ndualism removed. In fine, Plato in many of his expressions seems to\nregard the world of sensation only as a subjective appearance, as a\nproduct of the subjective notion, as the result of a confused way of\nrepresenting ideas. In this sense the phenomena are entirely dependent\non ideas; they are nothing but the ideas themselves in the form of not\nbeing; the phenomenal world derives its whole existence from the ideal\nworld which appears in it. But yet when Plato calls the sensible a\nmingling of the same with the different or the not-being (_Tim._ p. 35),\nwhen he characterizes the ideas as vowels which go through every thing\nlike a chain (_Soph._ p. 253), when he himself conceives the possibility\nthat matter might offer opposition to the formative energy of ideas\n(_Tim._ p. 56), when he speaks of an evil soul of the world (_de Leg._\nX. 896), and gives intimations of the presence in the world of a\nprinciple in nature hostile to God (_Polit._ p. 268), when he in the\nPh\u00e6don treats of the relation between body and soul as one wholly\ndiscordant and malignant,\u2014in all this there is evidence enough, even\nafter allowing for the mythical form of the Tim\u00e6us, and the rhetorical\ncomposition which prevails in the Ph\u00e6don, to substantiate the\ncontradiction mentioned above. This is most clear in the Tim\u00e6us. Plato\nin this dialogue makes the sensible world to be formed by a Creator\nafter the pattern of an idea, but in this he lays down as a condition\nthat this Demi-urge or Creator should find at hand a something which\nshould be apt to receive and exhibit this ideal image. This something\nPlato compares to the matter which is fashioned by the artisan (whence\nthe later name _hyle_). He characterizes it as wholly undetermined and\nformless, but possessing in itself an aptitude for every variety of\nforms, an invisible and shapeless thing, a something which it is\ndifficult to characterize, and which Plato even does not seem inclined\nvery closely to describe. In this the actuality of matter is denied;\nwhile Plato makes it equivalent to space it is only the place, the\nnegative condition of the sensible while it possesses a being only as it\nreceives in itself the ideal form. Still matter remains the objective\nand phenomenal form of the idea: the visible world arises only through\nthe mingling of ideas with this substratum, and if matter be\nmetaphysically expressed as \u201cthe different,\u201d then does it follow with\nlogical necessity in a dialectical discussion that it is just as truly\nbeing as not-being. Plato does not conceal from himself this difficulty,\nand therefore attempts to represent with comparisons and images this\npresupposition of a _hyle_ which he finds it as impossible to do without\nas to express in a conceivable form. If he would do without it he must\nrise to the conception of an absolute creation, or consider matter as an\nultimate emanation from the absolute spirit, or else explain it as\nappearance only. Thus the Platonic system is only a fruitless struggle\nagainst dualism.\n\n6. THE IDEA OF THE GOOD AND THE DEITY. If the true and the real is\nexhibited in general conceptions which are so related to each other that\nevery higher conception embraces and combines under it several lower, so\nthat any one starting from a single idea may eventually discover all\n(_Meno._ p. 81), then must the sum of ideas form a connected organism\nand succession in which the lower idea appears as a stepping-stone and\npresupposition to a higher. This succession must have its end in an idea\nwhich needs no higher idea or presupposition to sustain it. This highest\nidea, the ultimate limit of all knowledge, and itself the independent\nground of all other ideas, Plato calls the idea of the good, _i. e._ not\nof the moral but of the metaphysical good. (_Rep._ VII. 517.)\n\nWhat this good is in itself, Plato undertakes to show only in images.\n\u201cIn the same manner as the sun,\u201d he says in the Republic (VI. 506), \u201cis\nthe cause of sight, and the cause not merely that objects are visible\nbut also that they grow and are produced, so the good is of such power\nand beauty, that it is not merely the cause of science to the soul, but\nis also the cause of being and reality to whatever is the object of\nscience, and as the sun is not itself sight or the object of sight but\npresides over both, so the good is not science and truth but is superior\nto both, they being not the good itself but of a goodly nature.\u201d The\ngood has unconditioned worth, and gives to every other thing all the\nvalue it possesses. The idea of the good excludes all presupposition. It\nis the ultimate ground at the same time of knowing and of being, of the\nperceiver and the perceived, of the subjective and the objective, of the\nideal and the real, though exalted itself above such a division. (_Rep._\nVI. 508-517.) Plato, however, has not attempted a derivation of the\nremaining ideas from the idea of the good; his course here is wholly an\nempirical one; a certain class of objects are taken, and having referred\nthese to their common essence this is given out as their idea. He has\ntreated the individual conceptions so independently, and has made each\none so complete in itself, that it is impossible to find a proper\ndivision or establish an immanent continuation of one into another.\n\nIt is difficult to say precisely what relation this idea of the good\nbore to the Deity in the Platonic view. Taking every thing together it\nseems clear that Plato regarded the two as identical, but whether he\nconceived this highest cause to be a personal being or not is a question\nwhich hardly admits of a definite answer. The logical result of his\nsystem would exclude the personality of God. If only the universal (the\nidea) is the true being, then can the only absolute idea, the Deity, be\nonly the absolute universal; but that Plato was himself conscious of\nthis logical conclusion we can hardly affirm, any more than we can say\non the other hand that he was clearly a theist. For whenever in a\nmythical or popular statement he speaks of innumerable gods, this only\nindicates that he is speaking in the language of the popular religion,\nand when he speaks in an accurate philosophical sense, he only makes the\nrelation of the personal deity with the idea a very uncertain one. Most\nprobable, therefore, is it that this whole question concerning the\npersonality of God was not yet definitely before him, that he took up\nthe religious idea of God and defended it in ethical interest against\nthe anthropomorphism of the mythic poets, that he sought to establish it\nby arguments drawn from the evidences of design in nature, and the\nuniversal prevalence of a belief in a God, while as a philosopher he\nmade no use of it.\n\nV. THE PLATONIC PHYSICS. 1. NATURE.\u2014The connection between the Physics\nand the Dialectics of Plato lies principally in two points\u2014the\nconception of becoming, which forms the chief property of nature, and\nthat of real being, which is at once the all sufficient and good, and\nthe true end of all becoming. Because nature belongs to the province of\nirrational sensation we cannot look for the same accuracy in the\ntreatment of it, as is furnished in dialectics. Plato therefore applied\nhimself with much less zest to physical investigations than to those of\nan ethical or dialectical character, and indeed only attended to them in\nhis later years. Only in one dialogue, the Tim\u00e6us, do we find any\nextended evolution of physical doctrines, and even here Plato seems to\nhave gone to his work with much less independence than his wont, this\ndialogue being more strongly tinctured with Pythagoreanism than any\nother of his writings. The difficulty of the Tim\u00e6us is increased by the\nmythical form on which the old commentators themselves have stumbled. If\nwe take the first impression that it gives us, we have, before the\ncreation of the world, a Creator as a moving and a reflecting principle,\nwith on the one side the ideal world existing immovable as the eternal\narchetype, and on the other side, a chaotic, formless, irregular,\nfluctuating mass, which holds in itself the germ of the material world,\nbut has no determined character nor substance. With these two elements\nthe Creator now blends the world-soul which he distributes according to\nthe relation of numbers, and sets it in definite and harmonious motion.\nIn this way the material world, which has become actual through the\narrangement of the chaotic mass into the four elements, finds its\nexternal frame, and the process thus begun is completed in its external\nstructure by the formation of the organic world.\n\nIt is difficult to separate the mythical and the philosophical elements\nin this cosmogony of the Tim\u00e6us, especially difficult to determine how\nfar the historical construction, which gives a succession in time to the\nacts of creation, is only a formal one, and also how far the affirmation\nthat matter is absolutely a not-being can be harmonized with the general\ntenor of Plato\u2019s statements. The significance of the world-soul is\nclearer. Since the soul in the Platonic system is the mean between\nspirit and body, and as in the same way mathematical relations, in their\nmost universal expression as numbers, are the mean between mere sensuous\nexistence and the pure idea (between the one and the many as Plato\nexpresses it), it would seem clear that the world-soul, construed\naccording to the relation of numbers, must express the relation of the\nworld of ideas to that of sense, in other words, that it denotes the\nsensible world as a thought represented in the form of material\nexistence. The Platonic view of nature, in opposition to the mechanical\nattempts to explain it of the earlier philosophers, is entirely\nteleological, and based upon the conception of the good, or, on the\nmoral idea. Plato conceives the world as the image of the good, as the\nwork of the divine munificence. As it is the image of the perfect it is\ntherefore only one, corresponding to the idea of the single\nall-embracing substance, for an infinite number of worlds is not to be\nconceived as actual. For the same reason the world is spherical, after\nthe most perfect and uniform structure, which embraces in itself all\nother forms; its movement is in a circle, because this, by returning\ninto itself, is most like the movement of reason. The particular points\nof the Tim\u00e6us, the derivation of the four elements, the separation of\nthe seven planets according to the musical scale, the opinion that the\nstars were immortal and heavenly substances, the affirmation that the\nearth holds an abiding position in the middle of the world, a view which\nsubsequently became elaborated to the Ptolemaic system, the reference of\nall material figures to the triangle as the simplest plane figure, the\ndivision of inanimate nature, according to the four elements, into\ncreatures of earth, water, and air, his discussions respecting organic\nnature, and especially respecting the construction of the human body\u2014all\nthese we need here only mention. Their philosophical worth consists not\nso much in their material content, but rather in their fundamental idea,\nthat the world should be conceived as the image and the work of reason,\nas an organism of order, harmony, and beauty, as the good actualizing\nitself.\n\n2. THE SOUL.\u2014The doctrine of the soul, considering it simply as the\nbasis of a moral action, and leaving out of view all questions of\nconcrete ethics, forms a constituent element in the Platonic physics.\nSince the soul is united to the body, it participates in the motions and\nchanges of the body, and is, in this respect, related to the perishable.\nBut in so far as it participates in the knowledge of the eternal, _i.\ne._ in so far as it knows ideas, does there live within it a divine\nprinciple\u2014reason. Accordingly, Plato distinguishes two components of the\nsoul\u2014the divine and the mortal, the rational and the irrational. These\ntwo are united by an intermediate link, which Plato calls \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2 or\nspirit, and which, though allied to reason is not reason itself, since\nit is often exhibited in children and also in brutes, and since even men\nare often carried away by it without reflection. This threefoldness,\nhere exhibited psychologically, is found, in different applications,\nthrough all the last general period of Plato\u2019s literary life. Based upon\nthe anthropological triplicate of reason, soul and body, it corresponds\nalso to the division of theoretical knowledge into science (or\nthinking), correct opinions (or sense-perception), and ignorance, to the\ntriple ladder of eroticism in the Symposium and the mythological\nrepresentation connected with this of Poros, Eros, and Penia; to the\nmetaphysical triplicate of the ideal world, mathematical relations and\nthe sensible world; and furnishes ground for deriving the ethical\ndivision of virtue and the political division of ranks.\n\nSo far as the soul is a mean between the spiritual and corporeal, may we\nconnect the Ph\u00e6don\u2019s proofs of its immortality with the psychological\nview now before us. The common thought of these arguments is that the\nsoul, in its capacity for thinking, participates in the reason, and\nbeing thus of an opposite nature to, and uncontrolled by the corporeal,\nit may have an independent existence. The arguments are wholly\nanalytical, and possess no valid and universal proof; they proceed\nentirely upon a _petitio principii_, they are derived partly from\nmythical philosophemes, and manifest not only an obscure conception of\nthe soul, but of its relations to the body and the reason, and, so far\nas the relation of the soul to the ideal world is in view, they furnish\nin the best case only some proof for the immortality of him who has\nraised his soul to a pure spirit, _i. e._ the immortality of the\nphilosopher. Plato was not himself deceived as to the theoretical\ninsufficiency of his arguments. Their number would show this, and,\nbesides, he expressly calls them proofs which amount to only human\nprobability, and furnish practical postulates alone. With this view he\nintroduces at the close of his arguments the myth of the lower world,\nand the state of departed souls, in order, by complying with the\nreligious notions, and traditions of his countrymen, to gain a positive\nsupport for belief in the soul\u2019s immortality. Elsewhere Plato also\nspeaks of the lower world, and of the future rewards and punishments of\nthe good and the evil, in accordance with the popular notions, as though\nhe saw the elements of a divine revelation therein; he tells of\npurifying punishment in Hades, analogous to a purgatory; he avails\nhimself of the common notion to affirm that shades still subject to the\ncorporeal principle will hover after death over their graves, seeking to\nrecover their lifeless bodies, and at times he dilates upon the\nmigration of the soul to various human and brute forms. On the whole, we\nfind in Plato\u2019s proofs of immortality, as in his psychology generally,\nthat dualism, which here expresses itself as hatred to the corporeal,\nand is connected with the tendency to seek the ultimate ground of evil\nin the nature of the \u201cdifferent\u201d and the sensible world.\n\nVI. THE PLATONIC ETHICS.\u2014The ground idea of the good, which in physics\nserved only as an inventive conception, finds now, in the ethics, its\ntrue exhibition. Plato has developed it prominently according to three\nsides, as good, as individual virtue, and as ethical world in the state.\nThe conception of duty remains in the background with him as with the\nolder philosophers.\n\n1. GOOD AND PLEASURE.\u2014That the highest good can be nothing other than\nthe idea of the good itself, has already been shown in the dialectics,\nwhere this idea was suffered to appear as the ultimate end of all our\nstriving. But since the dialectics represent the supreme good as\nunattainable by human reason, and only cognizable in its different modes\nof manifestation, we can, therefore, only follow these different\nmanifestations of the highest good, which represent not the good itself,\nbut the good in becoming, where it appears as science, truth, beauty,\nvirtue, &c. We are thus not required to be equal to God, but only like\nhim (_The\u00e6t._) It is this point of view which lies at the basis of the\ngraduated table of good, given in the Philebus.\n\nIn seeking the highest good, the conception of pleasure must be\ninvestigated. The Platonic standpoint here is the attempt to strike a\nbalance between Hedonism, (the Cyrenian theory that pleasure is the\nhighest good, _cf._ \u00a7 XIII. 3), and Cynicism. While he will not admit\nwith Aristippus that pleasure is the true good, neither will he find it\nas the Cynics maintain, simply in the negation of its contrary, pain,\nand thus deny that it belongs to the good things of human life. He finds\nhis refutation of Hedonism in the indeterminateness and relativity of\nall pleasure, since that which at one time may seem as pleasure, under\nother circumstances may appear as pain; and since he who chooses\npleasure without distinction, will find impure pleasures always combined\nin his life with more or less of pain; his refutation of Cynicism he\nestablishes by showing the necessary connection between virtue and true\npleasure, showing that there is a true and enduring pleasure, the\npleasure of reason, found in the possession of truth and of goodness,\nwhile a rational condition separate from all pleasure, cannot be the\nhighest good of a finite being. It is most prominently by this\ndistinction of a true and false, of a pure and impure pleasure, that\nPlato adjusts the controversy of the two Socratic schools.\u2014A detailed\nexhibition of the Philebus we must here omit.\u2014On the whole, in the\nPlatonic apprehension of pleasure, we cannot but notice that same\nvacillation with which Plato every where treats of the relation between\nthe corporeal and the spiritual, at one time considering the former as a\nhindrance to the latter, and at another as its serving instrument; now,\nregarding it as a concurring cause to the good, and then, as the ground\nof all evil; here, as something purely negative, and there, as a\npositive substratum which supports all the higher intellectual\ndevelopments; and in conformity with this, pleasure is also considered\nat one time as something equivalent to a moral act, and to knowledge,\nand at another as the means and accidental consequence of the good.\n\n2. VIRTUE.\u2014In his theory of virtue, Plato is wholly Socratic. He holds\nfast to the opinion that it is science (_Protagoras_), and therefore,\nteachable (_Meno_), and as to its unity, it follows from the dialectical\nprinciple that the one can be manifold, or the manifold one, that,\ntherefore, virtue must both be regarded as one, and also in a different\nrespect, as many. Plato thus brings out prominently the union and\nconnection of all virtues, and is fond of painting, especially in the\nintroductory dialogues, some single virtue as comprising in itself the\nsum of all the rest. Plato follows for the most part the fourfold\ndivision of virtues, as popularly made; and first, in the Republic (IV.\n441), he attempts a scientific derivation of them, by referring to each\nof the three parts of the soul its appropriate virtue. The virtue of the\nreason he calls prudence or wisdom, the directing or measuring virtue,\nwithout whose activity valor would sink to brute impulse, and calm\nendurance to stupid indifference; the virtue of spirit is valor, the\nhelp-meet of reason, or spirit (\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u1f78\u03c2) penetrated by science, which in\nthe struggle against pleasure and pain, desire and fear, preserves the\nrational intelligence against the alarms with which sensuous desires,\nwould seek to sway the soul; the virtue of the sensuous desires, and\nwhich has to reduce these within true and proper grounds, is temperance,\nand that virtue in fine to which belong the due regulation and mutual\nadjustment of the several powers of the soul, and which, therefore,\nconstitutes the bond and the unity of the three other virtues, is\njustice.\n\nIn this last conception, that of justice, all the elements of moral\nculture meet together and centre, exhibiting the moral life of the\nindividual as a perfect whole, and then, by requiring an application of\nthe same principle to communities, the moral consideration is advanced\nbeyond the narrow circle of individual life. Thus is established the\nwhole of the moral world\u2014Justice \u201cin great letters,\u201d the moral life in\nits complete totality, is the state. In this is first actualized the\ndemand for the complete harmony of the human life. In and through the\nstate comes the complete formation of matter for the reason.\n\n3. THE STATE.\u2014The Platonic state is generally regarded as an ideal or\nchimera, which it is impracticable to realize among men. This view of\nthe case has even been ascribed to Plato, and it has been said that in\nhis _Republic_ he attempted to sketch only a fine ideal of a state\nconstitution, while in the _Laws_ he traced out a practicable philosophy\nof the state from the standpoint of the common consciousness. But in the\nfirst place, this was not Plato\u2019s true meaning. Although he acknowledges\nthat the state he describes cannot be found on earth, and has its\narchetype only in heaven, by which the philosopher ought to form himself\n(IX. 592), still he demands that efforts should be made to realize it\nhere, and he even attempts to show the conditions and means under which\nsuch a state could be made actual, not overlooking in all this the\ndefects arising from the different characters and temperaments of men. A\ncomposition, dissociated from the idea, could only appear untrue to a\nphilosopher like Plato, who saw the actual and the true only in the\nidea; and the common view which supposes that he wrote his Republic in\nthe full consciousness of its impracticability, mistakes entirely the\nstandpoint of the Platonic philosophy. Still farther the question\nwhether such a state as the Platonic is attainable and the best, is\ngenerally perverted. The Platonic state is the Grecian state-idea given\nin a narrative form. It is no vain and powerless ideal to picture the\nidea as a rational principle in every moment of the world\u2019s history,\nsince the idea itself is that which is absolutely actual, that which is\nessential and necessary in existing things. The truly ideal _ought_ not\nto be actual, but _is_ actual, and the only actual; if an idea were too\ngood for existence, or the empirical actuality too bad for it, then were\nthis a fault of the ideal itself. Plato has not given himself up merely\nto abstract theories, the philosopher cannot leap beyond his age, but\ncan only see and grasp it in its true content. This Plato has done. His\nstandpoint is his own age. He looks upon the political life of the\nGreeks as then existing, and it is this life, exalted to its idea, which\nforms the real content of the Platonic Republic. Plato has here\nrepresented the Grecian morality in its substantial condition, If the\nPlatonic Republic seems prominently an ideal which can never be\nrealized, this is owing much less to its ideality than to the defects of\nthe old political life. The most prominent characteristic of the\nHellenic conception of the state, before the Greeks began to fall into\nunbridled licentiousness, was the constraint thrown upon personal\nsubjective freedom, in the sacrifice of every individual interest to the\nabsolute sovereignty of the state. With Plato also, the state is every\nthing. His political institutions, so loudly ridiculed by the ancients,\nare only the undeniable consequences following from the very idea of the\nGrecian state, which allowed neither to the individual citizen nor to a\ncorporation, any lawful sphere of action independent of itself.\n\nThe grand feature of the Platonic state is, as has been said, the\nexclusive sacrifice of the individual to the state, the reference of\nmoral to political virtue. Since man cannot reach his complete\ndevelopment in isolation, but only as a member of an organic society\n(the state), Plato therefore concludes that the individual purpose\nshould wholly conform to the general aim, and that the state must\nrepresent a perfect and harmonious unity, and be a counterpart of the\nmoral life of the individual. In a perfect state all things, joy and\nsorrow, and even eyes, ears and hands, must be common to all, so that\nthe social life would be as it were the life of one man. This perfect\nuniversality and unity, can only be actualized when every thing\nindividual and particular falls away, and hence the difficulty of the\nPlatonic Republic. Private property and domestic life (in place of which\ncomes a community of goods and of wives), the duty of education, the\nchoice of rank and profession, the arts and sciences, all these must be\nsubjected and placed under the exclusive and absolute control of the\nstate. The individual may lay claim only to that happiness which belongs\nto him as a constituent element of the state. From this point Plato goes\ndown into the minutest particulars, and gives the closest directions\nrespecting gymnastics and music, which form the two means of culture of\nthe higher ranks; respecting the study of mathematics, and philosophy,\nthe choice of stringed instruments, and the proper measure of verse;\nrespecting bodily exercise and the service of women in war; respecting\nmarriage settlements, and the age at which any one should study\ndialectics, marry, and beget children. The state with him is only a\ngreat educational establishment, a family in the mass.\u2014Lyric poetry he\nwould allow only under the inspection of competent judges. Epic and\ndramatic poetry, even Homer and Hesiod, should be banished from the\nstate, since they rouse and lead astray the passions, and give unworthy\nrepresentations of the gods. Exhibitions of physical degeneracy or\nweakness should not be tolerated in the Platonic state; deformed and\nsickly infants should be abandoned, and food and attention should be\ndenied to the sick.\u2014In all this we find the chief antithesis of the\nancient to the modern state. Plato did not recognize the will and choice\nof the individual, and yet the individual has a right to demand this.\nThe problem of the modern state has been to unite these two sides, to\nbring the universal end and the particular end of the individual into\nharmony, to reconcile the highest possible freedom of the conscious\nindividual will, with the highest possible supremacy of the state.\n\nThe political institutions of the Platonic state are decidedly\naristocratic. Grown up in opposition to the extravagances of the\nAthenian democracy, Plato prefers an absolute monarchy to every other\nconstitution, though this should have as its absolute ruler only the\nperfect philosopher. It is a well-known expression of his, that the\nstate can only attain its end when philosophers become its rulers, or\nwhen its present rulers have carried their studies so far and so\naccurately, that they can unite philosophy with a superintendence of\npublic affairs (V. 473). His reason for claiming that the sovereign\npower should be vested only in one, is the fact that very few are\nendowed with political wisdom. This ideal of an absolute ruler who\nshould be able to lead the state perfectly, Plato abandons in the\n_Laws_, in which work he shows his preference for a mixed constitution,\nembracing both a monarchical and an aristocratic element. From the\naristocratic tendency of the Platonic ideal of a state, follows farther\nthe sharp division of ranks, and the total exclusion of the third rank\nfrom a proper political life. In reality Plato makes but two classes in\nhis state, the subjects and the sovereign, analogous to his twofold\npsychological division of sensible and intellectual, mortal and\nimmortal, but as in psychology he had introduced a middle step, spirit,\nto stand between his two divisions there, so in the state he brings in\nthe military class between the ruler and those intended to supply the\nbodily wants of the community. We have thus three ranks, that of the\nruler, corresponding to the reason, that of the watcher or warrior,\nanswering to spirit, and that of the craftsman, which is made parallel\nto the appetites or sensuous desires. To these three ranks belong three\nseparate functions: to the first, that of making the law and caring for\nthe general good; to the second, that of defending the public welfare\nfrom attacks of external foes; and to the third, the care of separate\ninterests and wants, as agriculture, mechanics, &c. From each of these\nthree ranks and its functions the state derives a peculiar virtue\u2014wisdom\nfrom the ruler, bravery from the warrior, and temperance from the\ncraftsman, so far as he lives in obedience to his rulers. In the proper\nunion of these three virtues is found the justice of the state, a virtue\nwhich is thus the sum of all other virtues. Plato pays little attention\nto the lowest rank, that of the craftsman, who exists in the state only\nas means. He held that it was not necessary to give laws and care for\nthe rights of this portion of the community. The separation between the\nruler and the warrior is not so broad. Plato suffers these two ranks to\ninterpenetrate each other, and analogous to his original psychological\ndivision, as though the reason were but spirit in the highest step of\nits development, he makes the oldest and the best of the warriors rise\nto the dignity and power of the rulers. The education of its warriors\nshould therefore be a chief care of the state, in order that their\nspirit, though losing none of its peculiar energy, may yet be penetrated\nby reason. The best endowed by nature and culture among the warriors,\nmay be selected at the age of thirty, and put upon a course of careful\ntraining. When he has reached the age of fifty and looked upon the idea\nof the good, he may be bound to actualize this archetype in the state,\nprovided always that every one wait his turn, and spend his remaining\ntime in philosophy. Only thus can the state be raised to the\nunconditioned rule of reason under the supremacy of the good.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XV.\n\nTHE OLD ACADEMY.\n\n\nIn the old Academy, we lose the presence of inventive genius; with few\nexceptions we find here no movements of progress, but rather a gradual\nretrogression of the Platonic philosophizing. After the death of Plato,\nSpeusippus, his nephew and disciple, held the chair of his master in the\nAcademy during eight years. He was succeeded by Xenocrates, after whom\nwe meet with Polemo, Crates, and Crantor. It was a time in which schools\nfor high culture were established, and the older teacher yielded to his\nyounger successor the post of instruction. The general characteristics\nof the old Academy, so far as can be gathered from the scanty accounts,\nwere great attention to learning, the prevalence of Pythagorean\nelements, especially the doctrine of numbers, and lastly, the reception\nof fantastic and demonological notions, among which the worship of the\nstars played a part. The prevalence of the Pythagorean doctrine of\nnumbers in the later instructions of the Academy, gave to mathematical\nsciences, particularly arithmetic and astronomy, a high place, and at\nthe same time assigned to the doctrine of ideas a much lower position\nthan Plato had given it. Subsequently, the attempt was made to get back\nto the unadulterated doctrine of Plato. Crantor is said to be the first\neditor of the Platonic writings.\n\nAs Plato was the only true Socraticist, so was Aristotle the only\ngenuine disciple of Plato, though often abused by his fellow-disciples\nas unfaithful to his master\u2019s principles.\n\nWe pass on at once to him, without stopping now to inquire into his\nrelation to Plato, or the advance which he made beyond his predecessor,\nsince these points will come up before us in the exhibition of the\nAristotelian philosophy. (_See_ \u00a7 XVI: III. 1.)\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XVI.\n\nARISTOTLE.\n\n\nI. LIFE AND WRITINGS OF ARISTOTLE.\u2014Aristotle was born 384 B. C. at\nStagira, a Greek colony in Thrace. His father, Nicomachus, was a\nphysician, and the friend of Amyntas, king of Macedonia. The former fact\nmay have had its influence in determining the scientific direction of\nthe son, and the latter may have procured his subsequent summons to the\nMacedonian court. Aristotle at a very early age lost both his parents.\nIn his seventeenth year he came to Plato at Athens, and continued with\nhim twenty years. On account of his indomitable zeal for study, Plato\nnamed him \u201cthe Teacher,\u201d and said, upon comparing him with Xenocrates,\nthat the latter required the spur, the former the bit. Among the many\ncharges made against his character, most prominent are those of jealousy\nand ingratitude towards his master, but most of the anecdotes in which\nthese charges are embodied merit little credence. It is certain that\nAristotle, after the death of Plato, stood in friendly relations with\nXenocrates; still, as a writer, he can hardly be absolved from a certain\nwant of friendship and regard towards Plato and his philosophy, though\nall this can be explained on psychological grounds. After Plato\u2019s death,\nAristotle went with Xenocrates to Hermeas, tyrant of Atarneus, whose\nsister Pythias he married after Hermeas had fallen a prey to Persian\nviolence. After the death of Pythias he is said to have married his\nconcubine, Herpyllis, who was the mother of his son Nicomachus. In the\nyear 343 he was called by Philip of Macedon, to take the charge of the\neducation of his son Alexander, then thirteen years old. Both father and\nson honored him highly, and the latter, with royal munificence,\nsubsequently supported him in his studies. When Alexander went to\nPersia, Aristotle betook himself to Athens, and taught in the Lyceum,\nthe only gymnasium then vacant, since Xenocrates had possession of the\nAcademy, and the Cynics of the Cynosaerges. From the shady walks\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03af\u03c0\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 of the Lyceum, in which Aristotle was accustomed to walk and\nexpound his philosophy, his school received the name of the Peripatetic.\nAristotle is said to have spent his mornings with his more mature\ndisciples, exercising them in the profoundest questions of philosophy,\nwhile his evenings were occupied with a greater number of pupils in a\nmore general and preparatory instruction. The former investigations were\ncalled acroamatic, the latter exoteric. He abode at Athens, and taught\nthirteen years, and then, after the death of Alexander, whose\ndispleasure he had incurred, he is said to have been accused by the\nAthenians of impiety towards the gods, and to have fled to Chalcis, in\norder to escape a fate similar to that of Socrates. He died in the year\n322 at Chalcis, in Eub\u00e6a.\n\nAristotle left a vast number of writings, of which the smaller (perhaps\na fourth), but unquestionably the more important portion have come down\nto us, though in a form which cannot be received without some scruples.\nThe story of Strabo about the fate of the Aristotelian writings, and the\ninjury which they suffered in a cellar at Scepsis, is confessedly a\nfable, or at least limited to the original manuscripts; but the\nfragmentary and descriptive form which many among them, and even the\nmost important (_e. g._ the metaphysics) possess, the fact that\nscattered portions of one and the same work (_e. g._ the ethics) are\nrepeatedly found in different treatises, the irregularities and striking\ncontradictions in one and the same writing, the disagreement found in\nother particulars among different works, and the distinction made by\nAristotle himself between acroamatic and exoterical writings, all this\ngives reason to believe that we have, for the most part, before us only\nhis oral lectures written down, and subsequently edited by his scholars.\n\nII. UNIVERSAL CHARACTER AND DIVISION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN\nPHILOSOPHY.\u2014With Plato, philosophy had been national in both its form\nand content, but with Aristotle, it loses its Hellenic peculiarity, and\nbecomes universal in scope and meaning; the Platonic dialogue changes\ninto barren prose; a rigid, artistic language takes the place of the\nmythical and poetical dress; the thinking which had been with Plato\nintuitive, is with Aristotle discursive; the immediate beholding of\nreason in the former, becomes reflection and conception in the latter.\nTurning away from the Platonic unity of all being, Aristotle prefers to\ndirect his attention to the manifoldness of the phenomenal; he seeks the\nidea only in its concrete actualization, and consequently grasps the\nparticular far more prominently in its peculiar determinateness and\nreciprocal differences, than in its connection with the idea. He\nembraces with equal interest the facts given in nature, in history, and\nin the inner life of man. But he ever tends toward the individual, he\nmust ever have a fact given in order to develope his thought upon it; it\nis always the empirical, the actual, which solicits and guides his\nspeculation; his whole course is a description of the facts given, and\nonly merits the name of a philosophy because it comprehends the\nempirical in its totality and synthesis; because it has carried out its\ninduction to the farthest extent. Only because he is the absolute\nempiricist may Aristotle be called the truly philosopher.\n\nThis character of the Aristotelian philosophy explains at the outset its\nencyclopedian tendency, inasmuch as every thing given in experience is\nequally worthy of regard and investigation. Aristotle is thus the\nfounder of many courses of study unknown before him; he is not only the\nfather of logic, but also of natural history, empirical psychology, and\nthe science of natural rights.\n\nThis devotion of Aristotle to that which is given will also explain his\npredominant inclination towards physics, for nature is the most\nimmediate and actual. Connected also with this is the fact that\nAristotle is the first among philosophers who has given to history and\nits tendencies an accurate attention. The first book of the\n_Metaphysics_ is also the first attempt at a history of philosophy, as\nhis politics is the first critical history of the different states and\nconstitutions. In both these cases he brings out his own theory only as\nthe consequence of that which has been historically given, basing it in\nthe former case upon the works of his predecessors, and in the latter\ncase upon the constitutions which lie before him.\n\nIt is clear that according to this, the method of Aristotle must be a\ndifferent one from that of Plato. Instead of proceeding like the latter,\nsynthetically and dialectically, he pursues for the most part an\nanalytic and regressive course, that is, going backward from the\nconcrete to its ultimate ground and determination. While Plato would\ntake his standpoint in the idea, in order to explain from this position\nand set in a clearer light that which is given and empirical, Aristotle\non the other hand, starts with that which is given, in order to find and\nexhibit the idea in it. His method is, hence, induction; that is, the\nderivation of certain principles and maxims from a sum of given facts\nand phenomena; his mode of procedure is, usually, argument, a barren\nbalancing of facts, phenomena, circumstances and possibilities. He\nstands out for the most part only as the thoughtful observer. Renouncing\nall claim to universality and necessity in his results, he is content to\nhave brought out that which has an approximative truth, and the highest\ndegree of probability. He often affirms that science does not simply\nrelate to the changeless and necessary, but also to that which\nordinarily takes place, that being alone excluded from its province,\nwhich is strictly accidental. Philosophy, consequently, has with him the\ncharacter and worth of a reckoning of probabilities, and his mode of\nexhibition assumes not unfrequently only the form of a doubtful\ndeliberation. Hence there is no trace of the Platonic ideals, hence,\nalso, his repugnance to a glowing and poetic style in philosophy, a\nrepugnance which, while indeed it induces in him a fixed, philosophical\nterminology, also frequently leads him to mistake and misrepresent the\nopinions of his predecessors. Hence, also, in whatever he treated, his\nthorough adherence to that which is actually given.\n\nConnected in fine with the empirical character of the Aristotelian\nphilosophizing, is the fragmentary form of his writings, and their want\nof a systematic division and arrangement. Proceeding always in the line\nof that which is given, from individual to individual, he considers\nevery province of the actual by itself, and makes it the subject of a\nseparate treatise; but he, for the most part, fails to indicate the\nlines by which the different parts hang together, and are comprehended\nin a systematic whole. Thus he holds up a number of co-ordinate\nsciences, each one of which has an independent basis, but he fails to\ngive us the highest science which embraces them all. The principle is\nsometimes affirmed that all the writings follow the idea of a whole; but\nin their procedure there is such a want of all systematic connection,\nand every one of his writings is a monograph so thoroughly independent\nand complete in itself, that we are sometimes puzzled to know what\nAristotle himself received as a part of philosophy, and what he\nexcluded. We are never furnished with an independent scheme or outline,\nwe rarely find definite results or summary explanations, and even the\ndifferent divisions of philosophy which he gives, vary essentially from\none another. At one time he divides science into theoretical and\npractical, at another, he adds to these two a poetical creative science,\nwhile still again he speaks of the three parts of science, ethics,\nphysics, and logic. At one time he divides the theoretical philosophy\ninto logic and physics, and at another into theology, mathematics, and\nphysics. But no one of these divisions has he expressly given as the\nbasis on which to represent his system; he himself places no value upon\nthis method of division, and, indeed, openly declares himself opposed to\nit. It is, therefore, only for the sake of uniformity that we can give\nthe preference here to the threefold division of philosophy as already\nadopted by Plato.\n\nIII. LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS. 1. CONCEPTION AND RELATION OF THE TWO.\u2014The\nword metaphysics was first furnished by the Aristotelian commentators.\nPlato had used the term dialectics, and Aristotle had characterized the\nsame thing as \u201cfirst philosophy,\u201d while he calls physics the \u201csecond\nphilosophy.\u201d The relation of this first philosophy to the other sciences\nAristotle determines in the following way. Every science, he says, must\nhave for investigation a determined province and separate form of being,\nbut none of these sciences reaches the conception of being itself. Hence\nthere is needed a science which should investigate that which the other\nsciences take up hypothetically, or through experience. This is done by\nthe first philosophy which has to do with being as such, while the other\nsciences relate only to determined and concrete being. The metaphysics,\nwhich is this science of being and its primitive grounds, is the _first_\nphilosophy, since it is presupposed by every other discipline. Thus,\nsays Aristotle, if there were only a physical substance, then would\nphysics be the first and the only philosophy, but if there be an\nimmaterial and unmoved essence which is the ground of all being, then\nmust there also be an antecedent, and because it is antecedent, a\nuniversal philosophy. The first ground of all being is God, whence\nAristotle occasionally gives to the first philosophy the name of\ntheology.\n\nIt is difficult to determine the relation between this first philosophy\nas the science of the ultimate ground of things, and that science which\nis ordinarily termed the logic of Aristotle, and which is exhibited in\nthe writings bearing the name of the _Organon_. Aristotle himself has\nnot accurately examined the relations of these two sciences, the reason\nof which is doubtless to be found in the incomplete form of the\nmetaphysics. But since he has embraced them both under the same name of\nlogic, since the investigation of the essence of things (VII. 17), and\nthe doctrine of ideas (XIII. 5), are expressly called logical, since he\nrepeatedly attempts in the Metaphysics (_Book_ IV.), to establish the\nlogical principle of contradiction as an absolute presupposition for all\nthinking and speaking and philosophizing, and employs the method of\nargument belonging to that science which has to do with the essence of\nthings (III. 2. IV. 3), and since, in fine, the categories to which he\nhad already dedicated a separate book in the Organon are also discussed\nagain in the Metaphysics (_Book_ V.), it follows that this much at least\nmay be affirmed with certainty, that he would not absolutely separate\nthe investigations of the Organon from those of the Metaphysics, and\nthat he would not counsel the ordinary division of formal logic and\nmetaphysics, although he has omitted to show more clearly their inner\nconnection.\n\n2. LOGIC.\u2014The great problem both of the logical faculty and also of\nlogic both as science and art, consists in this, viz., to form and judge\nof conclusions, and through conclusions to be able to establish a proof.\nThe conclusions, however, arise from propositions, and the propositions\nfrom conceptions. According to this natural point of view, which lies in\nthe very nature of the case, Aristotle has divided the content of the\nlogical and dialectical doctrine contained in the different treatises of\nthe Organon. The first treatise in the Organon is that containing the\n_categories_, a work which treats of the universal determinations of\nbeing, and gives the first attempt at an ontology. Of these categories\nAristotle enumerates ten; essence, magnitude, quality, relation, the\nwhere, the when, position, habit, action, and passion. The second\ntreatise (_de interpretatione_) investigates speech as the expression of\nthought, and discusses the doctrine of the parts of speech, propositions\nand judgments. The third are the analytic books, which show how\nconclusions may be referred back to their principles and arranged in\norder of their antecedence. The first Analytic contains in two books the\nuniversal doctrine of the Syllogism. Conclusions are according to their\ncontent and end either apodictic, which possess a certain and\nincontrovertible truth, or dialectic, which are directed toward that\nwhich may be disputed and is probable, or, finally, sophistic, which are\nannounced deceptively as correct conclusions while they are not. The\ndoctrine of apodictic conclusions and thus of proofs is given in the two\nbooks of the second Analytic, that of dialectic, is furnished in the\neight books of the Topic, and that of sophistic in the treatise\nconcerning \u201cSophistical Convictions.\u201d\n\nA closer statement of the Aristotelian logic would be familiar to every\none, since the formal representations of this science ordinarily given,\nemploy for the most part only the material furnished by Aristotle. Kant\nhas remarked, that since the time of the Grecian sage, logic has made\nneither progress nor retrogression. Only in two points has the formal\nlogic of our time advanced beyond that of Aristotle; first, in adding to\nthe categorical conclusion which was the only one Aristotle had in mind,\nthe hypothetical and disjunctive, and second, in adding the fourth to\nthe first three figures of conclusion. But the incompleteness of the\nAristotelian logic, which might be pardoned in the founder of this\nscience, yet abides, and its thoroughly empirical method not only still\ncontinues, but has even been exalted to a principle by making the\nantithesis, which Aristotle did not, between the form of a thought and\nthe content. Aristotle, in reality, only attempted to collect the\nlogical facts in reference to the formation of propositions, and the\nmethod of conclusions; he has given in his logic only the natural\nhistory of finite thinking. However highly now we may rate the\ncorrectness of his abstraction, and the clearness with which he brings\ninto consciousness the logical operation of the understanding, we must\nmake equally conspicuous with this the want of all scientific derivation\nand foundation. The ten categories which he, as already remarked, has\ndiscussed in a separate treatise, he simply mentions, without furnishing\nany ground or principle for this enumeration; that there are this number\nof categories is only a matter of fact to him, and he even cites them\ndifferently in different writings. In the same way also he takes up the\nfigures of the conclusion empirically; he considers them only as forms\nand determinations of relation of the formal thinking, and continues\nthus, although he allows the conclusion to stand for the only form of\nscience within the province of the logic of the understanding. Neither\nin his Metaphysics nor in his Physics does he cite the rules of the\nformal methods of conclusion which he develops in the Organon, clearly\nproving that he has nowhere in his system properly elaborated either his\ncategories or his analytic; his logical investigations do not influence\ngenerally the development of his philosophical thought, but have for the\nmost part only the value of a preliminary scrutiny.\n\n3. METAPHYSICS.\u2014Among all the Aristotelian writings, the Metaphysics is\nleast entitled to be called a connected whole; it is only a connection\nof sketches, which, though they follow a certain fundamental idea,\nutterly fail of an inner mediation and a perfect development. We may\ndistinguish in it seven distinct groups. (1) Criticism of the previous\nphilosophic systems viewed in the light of the four Aristotelian\nprinciples, _Book_ I. (2) Positing of the apories or the philosophical\npreliminary questions, III. (3) The principle of contradiction, IV. (4)\nDefinitions, V. (5) Examination of the conception of essence (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1) and\nconceivable being (the \u03c4\u03af \u1f26\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9) or the conception of matter (\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7),\nform (\u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2), and that which arises from the connection of these two\n(\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd), VII. VIII. (6) Potentiality and actuality, IX. (7) The Divine\nSpirit moving all, but itself unmoved, XII. (8) To these we may add the\npolemic against the Platonic doctrine of ideas and numbers, which runs\nthrough the whole Metaphysics, but is especially carried out in _Books_\nXIII. and XIV.\n\n(1) _The Aristotelian Criticism of the Platonic Doctrine of Ideas._\u2014In\nAristotle\u2019s antagonism to the Platonic doctrine of ideas, we must seek\nfor the specific difference between the two systems, a difference of\nwhich Aristotle avails himself of every opportunity (especially\n_Metaph._ I. and XIII.) to express. Plato had beheld every thing actual\nin the idea, but the idea was to him a rigid truth, which had not yet\nbecome interwoven with the life and the movement of existence. Such a\nview, however, had this difficulty, the idea, however little Plato would\nhave it so, found standing over against it in independent being the\nphenomenal world, while it furnished no principle on which the being of\nthe phenomenal world could be affirmed. This Aristotle recognizes and\ncharges upon Plato, that his ideas were only \u201cimmortalized things of\nsense,\u201d out of which the being and becoming of the sensible could not be\nexplained. In order to avoid this consequence, he himself makes out an\noriginal reference of mind to phenomenon, affirming that the relation of\nthe two is, that of the actual to the possible, or that of form to\nmatter, and considering also mind as the absolute actuality of matter,\nand matter, as the potentially mind. His argument against the Platonic\ndoctrine of ideas, Aristotle makes out in the following way.\n\nPassing by now the fact that Plato has furnished no satisfactory proof\nfor the objective and independent reality of ideas, and that his theory\nis without vindication, we may affirm in the first place that it is\nwholly unfruitful, since it possesses no ground of explanation for\nbeing. The ideas have no proper and independent content. To see this we\nneed only refer to the manner in which Plato introduced them. In order\nto make science possible he had posited certain substances independent\nof the sensible, and uninfluenced by its changes. But to serve such a\npurpose, there was offered to him nothing other than this individual\nthing of sense. Hence he gave to this individual a universal form, which\nwas with him the idea. From this it resulted, that his ideas can hardly\nbe separated from the sensible and individual objects which participate\nin them. The ideal duality and the empirical duality is one and the same\ncontent. The truth of this we can readily see, whenever we gain from the\nadherents to the doctrine of ideas a definite statement respecting the\npeculiar character of their unchangeable substances, in comparison with\nthe sensible and individual things which participate in them. The only\ndifference between the two consists in appending _per se_ to the names\nexpressing the respective ideas; thus, while the individual things are\n_e. g._ man, horse, etc., the ideas are man _per se_, horse _per se_,\netc. There is only this formal change for the doctrine of ideas to rest\nupon; the finite content is not removed, but is only _characterized_ as\nperpetual. This objection, that in the doctrine of ideas we have in\nreality only the sensible posited as a not-sensible, and endowed with\nthe predicate of immutability, Aristotle urges as above remarked when he\ncalls the ideas \u201cimmortalized things of sense,\u201d not as though they were\nactually something sensible and spacial, but because in them the\nsensible individual loses at once its individuality, and becomes a\nuniversal. He compares them in this respect with the gods of the popular\nand anthropomorphical religion; as these are nothing but deified men, so\nthe ideas are only things of nature endowed with a supernatural potency,\na sensible exalted to a not-sensible. This identity between the ideas\nand their respective individual things amounts moreover to this, that\nthe introduction of ideas doubles the objects to be known in a\nburdensome manner, and without any good results. Why set up the same\nthing over again? Why besides the sensible twofoldness and\nthreefoldness, affirm a twofoldness and threefoldness in the idea? The\nadherents of the doctrine of ideas, when they posit an idea for every\nclass of natural things, and through this theory set up two equivalent\ntheories of sensible and not-sensible substances, seem therefore to\nAristotle like men who think they can reckon better with many numbers\nthan with few, and who therefore go to multiplying their numbers before\nthey begin their reckoning. Therefore again the doctrine of ideas is a\ntautology, and wholly unfruitful of the explanation of being, \u201cThe ideas\ngive no aid to the knowledge of the individual things participating in\nthem, since the ideas are not immanent in these things, but separate\nfrom them.\u201d Equally unfruitful are the ideas when considered in\nreference to the arising and departing of the things of sense. They\ncontain no principle of becoming, of movement. There is in them no\ncausality which might bring out the event, or explain the event when it\nhad actually happened. Themselves without motion and process, if they\nhad any effect, it could only be that of perfect repose. True, Plato\naffirms in his Ph\u00e6don that the ideas are causes both of being and\nbecoming, but in spite of the ideas, nothing ever _becomes_ without a\nmoving; the ideas, by their separation from the becoming, have no such\ncapacity to move. This indifferent relation of ideas to the actual\nbecoming, Aristotle brings under the categories, potentiality and\nactuality, and farther says that the ideas are only potential, they are\nonly bare possibility and essentiality because they are wanting in\nactuality.\u2014The inner contradiction of the doctrine of ideas is in brief\nthis, viz., that it posits an individual immediately as a universal, and\nat the same time pronounces the universal, the species, as numerically\nan individual, and also that the ideas are set up on the one side as\nseparate individual substances, and on the other side as participant,\nand therefore as universal. Although the ideas as the original\nconceptions of species are a universal, which arise when being is fixed\nin existence, and the one brought out in the many, and the abiding is\ngiven a place in the changeable, yet can they not be defined as they\nshould be according to the Platonic notion, that they are individual\nsubstances, for there can be neither definition nor derivation of an\nabsolute individual, since even the word (and only in words is a\ndefinition possible) is in its nature a universal, and belongs also to\nother objects, consequently, every predicate in which I attempt to\ndetermine an individual thing cannot belong exclusively to that thing.\nThe adherents of the doctrine of ideas, are therefore not at all in a\ncondition to give an idea a conceivable termination; their ideas are\nindefinable.\u2014In general, Plato has left the relation of the individual\nobjects to ideas very obscure. He calls the ideas archetypes, and allows\nthat the objects may participate in them; yet are these only poetical\nmetaphors. How shall we represent to ourselves this \u201cparticipation,\u201d\nthis copying of the original archetype? We seek in vain for more\naccurate explanations of this in Plato. It is impossible to conceive how\nand why matter participates in the ideas. In order to explain this, we\nmust add to the ideas a still higher and wider principle, which contains\nthe cause for this \u201cparticipation\u201d of objects, for without a moving\nprinciple we find no ground for \u201cparticipation.\u201d Alike above the idea\n(_e. g._ the idea of man), and the phenomenon (_e. g._ the individual\nman), there must stand a third common to both, and in which the two were\nunited, _i. e._ as Aristotle was in the habit of expressing this\nobjection, the doctrine of ideas leads to the adoption of a \u201cthird man.\u201d\nThe result of this Aristotelian criticism is the immanence of the\nuniversal in the individual. The method of Socrates in trying to find\nthe universal as the essence of the individual, and to give definitions\naccording to conception, was as correct (for no science is possible\nwithout the universal) as the theory of Plato in exalting these\nuniversal conceptions to an independent subsistence as real individual\nsubstances, was erroneous. Nothing universal, nothing which is a kind or\na species, exists besides and separate from the individual; a thing and\nits conception cannot be separated from each other. With these\nprinciples Aristotle hardly deviated from Plato\u2019s fundamental idea that\nthe universal is the only true being, and the essence of individual\nthings; it may rather be said that he has freed this idea from its\noriginal abstraction, and given it a more profound mediation with the\nphenomenal world. Notwithstanding his apparent contradiction to Plato,\nthe fundamental position of Aristotle is the same as that of his master,\nviz., that the essence of a thing (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03af \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03af \u1f26\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9) is known\nand represented in the conception; Aristotle however recognizes the\nuniversal, the conception to be as little separated from the determined\nphenomenon as form from matter, and essence or substance (\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1) in its\nmost proper sense is, according to him, only that which cannot be\npredicated of another, though of this other every remaining thing may be\npredicated; it is that which is a this (\u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b9), the individual thing\nand not a universal.\n\n(2.) _The four Aristotelian principles or causes, and the relation of\nform and matter._\u2014From the criticism of the Platonic doctrine of ideas\narose directly the groundwork of the Aristotelian system, the\ndeterminations of matter (\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7), and form (\u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2). Aristotle enumerates\nfour metaphysical principles or causes: matter, form, moving cause, and\nend. In a house, for instance, the matter is the wood, the form is the\nconception of the house, the moving cause is the builder, and the end is\nthe actual house. These four determinations of all being resolve\nthemselves upon a closer scrutiny into the fundamental antithesis of\nmatter and form. The conception of the moving cause is involved with the\ntwo other ideal principles of form and of end. The moving cause is that\nwhich has secured the transition of the incomplete actuality or\npotentiality to the complete actuality, or induces the becoming of\nmatter to form. But in every movement of the incomplete to the complete,\nthe latter antedates in conception this movement, and is its motive. The\nmoving cause of matter is therefore form. So is man the moving and\nproducing cause of man; the form of the statue in the understanding of\nthe artist is the cause of the movement by which the statue is produced;\nhealth must be in the thought of the physician before it can become the\nmoving cause of convalescence; so in a certain degree is medicine,\nhealth, and the art of building the form of the house. But in the same\nway, the moving or first cause is also identical with the final cause or\nend, for the end is the motive for all becoming and movement. The moving\ncause of the house is the builder, but the moving cause of the builder\nis the end to be attained, _i. e._ the house. From such examples as\nthese it is seen that the determinations of form and end may be\nconsidered under one, in so far as both are united in the conception of\nactuality (\u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1), for the end of every thing is its completed being,\nits conception or its form, the bringing out into complete actuality\nthat which was potentially contained in it. The end of the hand is its\nconception, the end of the seed is the tree, which is at the same time\nthe essence of the seed. The only fundamental determinations, therefore,\nwhich cannot be wholly resolved into each other, are matter and form.\n\nMatter when abstracted from form in thought, Aristotle regarded as that\nwhich was entirely without predicate, determination and distinction. It\nis that abiding thing which lies at the basis of all becoming; but which\nin its own being is different from every thing which has become. It is\ncapable of the widest diversity of forms, but is itself without\ndeterminate form; it is every thing in possibility, but nothing in\nactuality. There is a first matter which lies at the basis of every\ndeterminate thing, precisely as the wood is related to the bench and the\nmarble to the statue. With this conception of matter Aristotle prides\nhimself upon having conquered the difficulty so frequently urged of\nexplaining the possibility that any thing can become, since being can\nneither come out of being nor out of not-being. For it is not out of\nnot-being absolutely, but only out of that which as to actuality is\nnot-being, but which potentially is being, that any thing becomes.\nPossible or potential being is no more not-being than actuality. Every\nexisting object of nature is hence but a potential thing which has\nbecome actualized. Matter is thus a far more positive substratum with\nAristotle than with Plato, who had treated it as absolutely not-being.\nFrom this is clearly seen how Aristotle could apprehend matter in\nopposition to form as something positively negative and antithetic to\nthe form, and as its positive denial (\u03c3\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2).\n\nAs matter coalesces with potentiality, so does form coincide with\nactuality. It is that which makes a distinguishable and actual object, a\nthis (\u03c4\u03cc\u03b4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03b9) out of the undistinguished and indeterminate matter; it\nis the peculiar virtue, the completed activity, the soul of every thing.\nThat which Aristotle calls form, therefore, is not to be confounded with\nwhat we perhaps may call shape; a hand severed from the arm, for\ninstance, has still the outward shape of a hand, but according to the\nAristotelian apprehension, it is only a hand now as to matter and not as\nto form: an actual hand, a hand as to form, is only that which can do\nthe proper work of a hand. Pure form is that which, in truth, is without\nmatter (\u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03af \u1f26\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9); or, in other words, the conception of being,\nthe pure conception. But such pure form does not exist in the realm of\ndetermined being; every determined being, every individual substance\n(\u03bf\u1f50\u03c3\u03af\u03b1), every thing which is a this, is rather a totality of matter\nand form, a (\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd). It is, therefore, owing to matter, that being is\nnot pure form and pure conception; matter is the ground of the becoming,\nthe manifold, and the accidental; and it is this, also, which gives to\nscience its limits. For in precisely the measure in which the individual\nthing bears in itself a material element is it uncognizable. From what\nhas been said, it follows that the opposition between matter and form is\na variable one, that being matter in one respect which in another is\nform; building-wood, _e. g._ is matter in relation to the completed\nhouse, but in relation to the unhewn tree it is form; the soul in\nrespect to the body is form, but in respect to the reason, which is the\nform of form (\u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f34\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2) is it matter. On this standpoint the\ntotality of all existence may be represented as a ladder, whose lowest\nstep is a prime matter (\u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7 \u1f55\u03bb\u03b7), which is not at all form, and whose\nhighest step is an ultimate form which is not at all matter, but is pure\nform (the absolute, divine spirit). That which stands between these two\npoints is in one respect matter, and in another respect form, _i. e._\nthe former is ever translating itself into the latter. This position,\nwhich lies at the basis of the Aristotelian view of nature, is attained\nanalytically through the observation that all nature exhibits the\nperpetual and progressive transition of matter into form, and shows the\nexhaustless and original ground of things as it comes to view in ever\nascending ideal formations. That all matter should become form, and all\nthat is potential should be actual, and all that is should be known, is\ndoubtless the demand of the reason and the end of all becoming; yet is\nthis actually impracticable, since Aristotle expressly affirms that\nmatter as the antithesis, or denial of form, can never become wholly\nactualized, and therefore can never be perfectly known. The Aristotelian\nsystem ends thus like its predecessors, in the unsubdued dualism of\nmatter and form.\n\n(3.) _Potentiality and Actuality_ (\u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bc\u03b9\u03c2 and \u1f10\u03bd\u03ad\u03c1\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1).\u2014The relation\nof matter to form, logically apprehended, is but the relation of\npotentiality to actuality. These terms, which Aristotle first employed\naccording to their philosophical significance, are very characteristic\nfor his system. We have in the movement of potential being to actual\nbeing the explicit conception of becoming, and in the four principles we\nhave a distribution of this conception in its parts. The Aristotelian\nsystem is consequently a system of the becoming, in which the Heraclitic\nprinciple appears again in a richer and profounder apprehension, as that\nof the Eleatics had done with Plato. Aristotle in this has made no\ninsignificant step towards the subjection of the Platonic dualism. If\nmatter is the possibility of form, or reason becoming, then is the\nopposition between the idea and the phenomenal world potentially\novercome, at least in principle, since there is one being which appears\nboth in matter and form only in different stages of development. The\nrelation of the potential to the actual Aristotle exhibits by the\nrelation of the unfinished to the finished work, of the unemployed\ncarpenter to the one at work upon his building, of the individual asleep\nto him awake. Potentially the seed-corn is the tree, but the grown up\ntree is it actually; the potential philosopher is he who is not at this\nmoment in a philosophizing condition; even before the battle the better\ngeneral is the potential conqueror; potentially is space infinitely\ndivisible; in fact every thing is potentially which possesses a\nprinciple of motion, of development, or of change, and which, if\nunhindered by any thing external, will be of itself. Actuality or\nentelechy on the other hand indicates the perfect act, the end as\ngained, the completely actual (the grown-up tree _e.g._ is the entelechy\nof the seed-corn), that activity in which the act and the completeness\nof the act fall together, _e. g._ to see, to think where he sees and he\nhas seen, he thinks and he has thought (the acting and the completeness\nof the act) are one and the same, while in those activities which\ninvolve a becoming, _e. g._ to learn, to go, to become well, the two are\nseparated. In this apprehension of form (or idea) as actuality or\nentelechy, _i. e._ in joining it with the movement of the becoming, is\nfound the chief antagonism of the Aristotelian and Platonic systems.\nPlato considers the idea as being at rest, and consisting for itself, in\nopposition to the becoming and to motion; but with Aristotle the idea is\nthe eternal product of the becoming, it is an eternal energy, _i. e._ an\nactivity in complete actuality, it is not perfect being, but is being\nproduced in every moment and eternally, through the movement of the\npotential to its actual end.\n\n(4.) _The Absolute, Divine Spirit._\u2014Aristotle has sought to establish\nfrom a number of sides, the conception of the absolute spirit, or as he\ncalls it, the first mover, and especially by joining it to the relation\nof potentiality and actuality.\n\n(_a._) _The Cosmological Form._\u2014The actual is ever antecedent to the\npotential not only in conception (for I can speak of potentiality only\nin reference to some activity) but also in time, for the acting becomes\nactual only through an acting; the uneducated becomes educated through\nthe educated, and this leads to the claim of a first mover which shall\nbe pure activity. Or, again, it is only possible that there should be\nmotion, becoming, or a chain of causes, except as a principle of motion,\na mover exists. But this principle of motion must be one whose essence\nis actuality, since that which only exists in possibility cannot alone\nbecome actual, and therefore cannot be a principle of motion. All\nbecoming postulates with itself that which is eternal and which has not\nbecome, that which itself unmoved is a principle of motion, a first\nmover.\n\n(_b._) _The Ontological Form._\u2014In the same way it follows from the\nconception of potentiality, that the eternal and necessary being cannot\nbe potential. For that which potentially is, may just as well either be\nor not be; but that which possibly is not, is temporal and not eternal.\nNothing therefore which is absolutely permanent, is potential, but only\nactual. Or, again, if potentiality be the first, then can there be no\npossible existence, but this contradicts the conception of the absolute\nor that which it is impossible should not be.\n\n(_c._) _The Moral Form._\u2014Potentiality always involves a possibility to\nthe most opposite. He who has the capacity to be well, has also the\ncapacity to be sick, but actually no man is at the same time both sick\nand well. Therefore actuality is better than potentiality, and only it\ncan belong to the eternal.\n\n(_d._) So far as the relation of potentiality and actuality is identical\nwith the relation of matter and form, we may apprehend in the following\nway these arguments for the existence of a being which is pure\nactuality. The supposition of an absolute matter without form (the \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7\n\u1f55\u03bb\u03b7) involves also the supposition of an absolute form without matter (a\n\u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2). And since the conception of form resolves itself into the\nthree determinations, of the moving, the conceivable, and the final\ncause, so is the eternal one the absolute principle of motion (the first\nmover \u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c7\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd), the absolute conception or pure intelligible (the\npure \u03c4\u03af \u1f27\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9), and the absolute end.\n\nAll the other predicates of the first mover or the highest principle of\nthe world, follow from these premises with logical necessity. Unity\nbelongs to him, since the ground of the manifoldness of being lies in\nthe matter and he has no participation in matter; he is immovable and\nabiding ever the same, since otherwise he could not be the absolute\nmover and the cause of all becoming; he is life as active self-end and\nactuality; he is at the same time intelligible and intelligence, because\nhe is absolutely immaterial and free from nature; he is active, _i. e._\nthinking intelligence, because his essence is pure actuality; he is\nself-contemplating intelligence, because the divine thought cannot\nattain its actuality in any thing extrinsic, and because if it were the\nthought of any thing other than itself, this would make it depend upon\nsome potential existence for its actualization. Hence the famed\nAristotelian definition of the absolute that it is the thought of\nthought (\u03bd\u03cc\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03ae\u03b1\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2), the personal unity of the thinking and the\nthought, of the knowing and the known, the absolute subject-object. In\nthe Metaphysics (XII. 1.) we have a statement in order of these\nattributes of the Divine Spirit, and an almost devout sketch of the\neternally blessed Deity, knowing himself in his eternal tranquillity as\nthe absolute truth, satisfied with himself, and wanting neither in\nactivity nor in any virtue.\n\nAs would appear from this statement, Aristotle has never fully developed\nthe idea of his absolute spirit, and still less has he harmonized it\nwith the fundamental principles and demands of his philosophy, although\nmany consequences of his system would seem to drive him to this, and\nnumerous principles which he has laid down would seem to prepare the way\nfor it. This idea is unexpectedly introduced in the twelfth book of the\nMetaphysics simply as an assertion, without being farther and\ninductively substantiated. It is at once attended with important\ndifficulties. We do not see why the ultimate ground of motion or the\nabsolute spirit must be conceived as a personal being; we do not see how\nany thing can he a moving cause and yet itself unmoved; how it can be\nthe origin of all becoming, that is of the departing and arising, and\nitself remain a changeless energy, a principle of motion with no\npotentiality to be moved, for the moving thing must stand in a relation\nof passive and active with the thing moved. Moreover, Aristotle, as\nwould follow from these contradictory determinations, has never\nthoroughly and consistently determined the relation between God and the\nworld. He has considered the absolute spirit only as contemplative and\ntheoretical reason, from whom all action must be excluded because he is\nperfect end in himself, but every action presupposes an end not yet\nperfected; we have thus no true motive for his activity in reference to\nthe world. He cannot be truly called the first mover in his theoretical\nrelation alone, and since he is in his essence extra-mundane and\nunmoved, he cannot once permeate the life of the world with his\nactivity; and since also matter on one side never rises wholly to form,\nwe have, therefore, here again the unreconciled dualism between the\nDivine spirit and the unmistakable reality of matter. Many of the\narguments which Aristotle brings against the gods of Anaxagoras may be\nurged against his own theory.\n\nIV. THE ARISTOTELIAN PHYSICS.\u2014The Aristotelian Physics, which embraces\nthe greater portion of his writings, follows the becoming and the\nbuilding up of matter into form, the course through which nature as a\nliving being progresses in order to become individual soul. All becoming\nhas an end; but end is form, and the absolute form is spirit. With\nperfect consistency, therefore, Aristotle regards the human individual\nof the male sex as the end and the centre of earthly nature in its\nrealized form. All else beneath the moon is, as it were, an unsuccessful\nattempt of nature to produce the male human, a superfluity which arises\nfrom the impotence of nature to subdue the whole of matter and bring it\ninto form. Every thing which does not gain the universal end of nature\nmust be regarded as incomplete, and is properly an exception or\nabortion. For instance, he calls it an abortion when a child does not\nresemble its father; and the female child he looks upon as an abortion\nin a less degree, which he accounts for by the insufficient energy of\nthe male as the forming principle. In general, Aristotle regards the\nfemale as imperfect in comparison with the male, an imperfection which\nbelongs in a higher degree to all animals except man. If nature did her\nwork with perfect consciousness, then were all these mistakes, these\nincomplete and improper formations inexplicable, but she is an artist\nworking only after an unconscious impulse, and does not complete her\nwork with a clear and rational insight.\n\n1. The universal conditions of all natural existence, _motion_,\n_matter_, _space_ and _time_, Aristotle investigates in the books of\nPhysics. These physical conceptions may, moreover, be reduced to the\nmetaphysical notions of potentiality and actuality; motion is\naccordingly defined as the activity of being potentially, and is\ntherefore a mean between the merely potential entity and the perfectly\nrealized activity;\u2014space is the possibility of motion and possesses,\ntherefore, potentially, though not actively, the property of infinite\ndivisibility; time is in the same way the infinitely divisible,\nexpressing the measure of motion in number, and is the number of motion\naccording to before and after. All three are infinite, but the infinite\nwhich is represented in them is only potentially but not actually a\nwhole: it comprehends nothing, but is itself comprehended,\u2014a fact\nmistaken by those who are accustomed to extol the infinite as though it\ncomprehended and held every thing in itself, because it had some\nsimilarity with the whole.\n\n2. From his conception of motion Aristotle derives his view of the\n_collective universe_, as brought out in his books _De C\u00e6lo_. The most\nperfect motion is the circular, because this is constant, uniform, and\never returning into itself. The world as a whole is therefore\nconditioned by the circular motion, and being a whole complete in\nitself, it has a spherical form. But because the motion which returns\ninto itself is better than every other, it follows, from the same\nground, that in this spherical universe the better sphere will be in the\ncircumference where the circular motion is most perfect, and the\ninferior one will arrange itself around the centre of the universal\nsphere. The former is heaven, the latter is earth, and between the two\nstand the planetary spheres. Heaven, as the place of circular motion,\nand the scene of unchangeable order, stands nearest the first moving\ncause, and is under its immediate influence; it is the place where the\nancients, guided by the correct tradition of a lost wisdom, have, placed\nthe Divine abode. Its parts, the fixed stars, are passionless and\neternal essences, which have attained the best end, which must be\neternally conceived in a tireless activity, and which, though not\nclearly cognizable, are yet much more divine than man, A lower sphere,\nnext to that of the fixed stars, is the sphere of the planets, among\nwhich, besides the five known to the ancients, he reckons the sun and\nthe moon. This sphere stands a little removed from the greatest\nperfection: instead of moving directly from right to left, as do the\nfixed stars, the planets move in contrary directions and in oblique\norbits; they serve the fixed stars, and are ruled by their motion.\nLastly, the earth is in the centre of the universe, farthest removed\nfrom the first mover, and hence partaking in the smallest degree of the\nDivine. There are thus three kinds of being, exhibiting three stages of\nperfection, and necessary for the explanation of nature; first, the\nabsolute spirit or God, an immaterial being, who, himself unmoved,\nproduces motion; second, the super-terrestrial region of the heavens, a\nbeing which is moved and which moves, and which, though not without\nmatter, is eternal and unchangeable, and possesses ever a circular\nmotion; and, lastly, in the lowest course this earth, a changeful being,\nwhich has only to play the passive part of being moved.\n\n3. _Nature in a strict sense_, the scene of elemental working,\nrepresents to us a constant and progressive transition of the elementary\nto the vegetative, and of the vegetative to the animal world. The lowest\nstep is occupied by the inanimate bodies of nature, which are simple\nproducts of the elements mingling themselves together, and have their\nentelechy only in the determinate combinations of these elements, but\nwhose energy consists only in striving after a fitting place in the\nuniverse, and in resting there so far as they reach it unhindered. But\nnow such a mere external entelechy is not possessed by the living\nbodies; within them dwells a motion as organizing principle by which\nthey attain to actuality, and which as a preserving activity develops in\nthem towards a perfected organization,\u2014in a word they have a soul, for a\nsoul is the entelechy of an organic body. In plants we find the soul\nworking only as persevering and nourishing energy: the plant has no\nother function than to nourish itself and to propagate its kind; among\nanimals\u2014where we find a progress according to the mode of their\nreproduction\u2014the soul appears as sensitive; animals have sense, and are\ncapable of locomotion; lastly, the human soul is at the same time\nnutritive, sensitive, and cognitive.\n\n4. _Man_, as the end of all nature, embraces in himself the different\nsteps of development in which the life of nature is exhibited. The\ndivision of the faculties of the soul must therefore be necessarily\nregulated, according to the division of living creatures. As the\nnutritive faculty is alone the property of vegetables, and sensation, of\nanimals, while to the more perfect animals locomotion also belongs, so\nare these three activities also development steps of the human soul, the\nantecedent being the necessary condition of, and presupposed in time by,\nthe subsequent, while the soul itself is nothing other than the union of\nthese different activities of an organic body in one common end, as the\nentelechy of the organic body. The fourth step, thought or reason,\nwhich, added to the three others, constitutes the peculiarity of the\nhuman soul, forms alone an exception from the general law. It is not a\nsimple product of the lower facilities of the soul, it does not stand\nrelated to them simply as a higher stage of development, nor simply as\nthe soul to the body, as the end to the instrument, as actuality to\npossibility, as form to matter. But as pure intellectual activity, it\ncompletes itself without any mediation of a bodily organ; as the reason\ncomes into the body from without, so is it separable from the body, and\ntherefore has it no inner connection with the bodily functions, but is\nsomething wholly foreign in nature. True, there exists a connection\nbetween thought and sensation, for while the sensations are outwardly\ndivided, according to the different objects of sense, yet internally\nthey meet in one centre, as a common sense. Here they become changed\ninto images and representations, which again become transmuted into\nthoughts, and so it might seem as if thought were only the result of the\nsensation, as if intelligence were passively determined; (here we might\nnotice the proposition falsely ascribed to Aristotle: _nihil est in\nintellectu quod non fuerit in sensu_, and also the well-known though\noften misunderstood comparison of the soul with an unwritten tablet,\nwhich only implies this much, viz., that as the unwritten tablet is\npotentially but not actually a book, so does knowledge belong\npotentially though not actually to the human reason; fundamentally and\nradically the thought may have in itself universal conceptions, so far\nas it has the capacity to form them, but not actually, nor in a\ndetermined or developed form). But this passivity presupposes rather an\nactivity; for if the thought in its actuality, in that it appears as\nknowledge, _becomes_ all forms and therefore all things, then must the\nthought _constitute itself_ that which it becomes, and therefore all\npassively determined human intelligence rests on an originally active\nintelligence, which exists as self-actualizing possibility and pure\nactuality, and which, as such, is wholly independent of the human body,\nand has not its entelechy in it but in itself, and is not therefore\nparticipant in the death of the body, but lives on as universal reason,\neternal and immortal. The Aristotelian dualism here again appears.\nManifestly this active intelligence stands related to the soul as God to\nnature. The two sides possess no essential relation to each other. As\nthe Divine spirit could not enter the life of the world, so is the human\nspirit unable to permeate the life of sense; although it is determined\nas something passionless and immaterial, still must it as soul be\nconnected with matter, and although it is pure and self-contemplative\nform, still it should be distinguished from the Divine spirit which is\nits counterpart; the want of a satisfactory mediation on the side of the\nhuman and on that of the Divine, is in these respects unmistakable.\n\nV. THE ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS. 1. RELATION OF ETHICS TO PHYSICS.\u2014Aristotle,\nguided by his tendency towards the natural, has more closely connected\nethics and physics than either of his predecessors, Socrates or Plato,\nhad done. While Plato found it impossible to speak of the good in man\u2019s\nmoral condition, disconnected from the idea of the good in itself,\nAristotle\u2019s principal object is to determine what is good for man\nsolely; and he supposes that the good in itself, the idea of the good,\nin no way facilitates the knowledge of that good, which alone is\nattainable in practical life. It is only the latter, the moral element\nin the life of men, and not the good in the great affairs of the\nuniverse, with which ethics has to do. Aristotle therefore considers the\ngood especially in its relation to the natural condition of men, and\naffirms that it is the end towards which nature herself tends. Instead\nof viewing the moral element as something purely intellectual, he rather\napprehends it as only the bloom of the physical, which here becomes\nspiritualized and ethical; instead of making virtue to be knowledge, he\ntreats it as the normal perfection of the natural instinct. That man is\n_by nature_ a political animal, is his fundamental proposition for the\ndoctrine of the state.\n\nFrom this connection of the ethical and the physical, arose the\nobjections which Aristotle urged against the Socratic conception of\nvirtue. Socrates had looked to the dialectical exclusively for the\nground of all morality, and had accordingly made virtue and knowledge\none. But in this, said Aristotle, the pathological element which is\nassociated by nature with every moral act, is destroyed. It is not\nreason, but the circumstances and natural bias of the soul which are the\nfirst ground of virtue. There is an instinct in the soul which at first\nstrives unconsciously after the good, which is only subsequently sought\nwith the full moral insight. Moral virtue arises first from that which\nis natural. It is on this ground, also, that Aristotle combats the\nnotion that virtue may be learned. It is not through the perfection of\nknowledge, but by exercise that we become acquainted with the good. It\nis by a practice of moral acts that we become virtuous, just as by a\npractice of building and of music we become architects and musicians;\nfor the habit which is the ground of moral constancy, is only a fruit of\nthe abundant repetition of a moral action. Hence it is that originally\nwe have our virtuous or our vicious dispositions in our power, but as\nsoon as they are formed either to virtue or to vice, we are no longer\nable to control them. It is by three things, therefore, nature, habit,\nand reason, that man becomes good. The standpoint of Aristotle is in\nthese respects directly opposed to that of Socrates. While Socrates\nregarded the moral and the natural as two opposites, and made the moral\nconduct to be the consequent of a rational enlightenment, Aristotle\ntreated both as different steps of development, and reversing the order\nof Socrates, made the rational enlightenment in moral things consequent\nupon the moral conduct.\n\n2. THE HIGHEST GOOD.\u2014Every action has an end; but since every end is\nonly itself a means to some other, we need therefore something after\nwhich we can strive for its own sake, and which is a good absolutely, or\na best. What now is this highest good and supreme object of human\npursuit? In name, at least, all men are agreed upon it, and call it\nhappiness, but what happiness is, is a much disputed point. If asked in\nwhat human happiness consists, the first characteristic given would be\nthat it belongs alone to the peculiar being of man. But sensation is not\npeculiar to man, for he shares this with the brute. A sensation of\npleasure, therefore, which arises when some desire is gratified, may be\nthe happiness of the brute, but certainly does not constitute the\nessential of human happiness. Human happiness must express the\ncompleteness of intelligent existence, and because intelligence is\nessentially activity, therefore the happiness of man cannot consist in\nany merely passive condition, but must express a completeness of human\naction. Happiness therefore is a well-being, which is at the same time a\nwell-doing, and it is a well-doing which satisfies all the conditions of\nnature, and which finds the highest contentment or well-being in an\nunrestrained energy. Activity and pleasure are thus inseparably bound\ntogether by a natural bond, and happiness is the result of their union\nwhen they are sustained through a perfect life. Hence the Aristotelian\ndefinition of happiness. It is a perfect practical activity in a perfect\nlife.\n\nAlthough it might seem from this as though Aristotle placed the\nhappiness of man in the natural activity of the soul, and regarded this\nas self-sufficient, still he is not blind to the fact that perfect\nhappiness is dependent on other kinds of good whose possession is not\nabsolutely within our power. It is true he expresses an opinion, that\noutward things in moderation are sufficient, and that only great success\nor signal reverses materially influence the happens of life; still he\nholds that wealth, the possession of friends and children, noble birth,\nbeauty of body, etc., are more or less necessary conditions of\nhappiness, though these are partly dependent on accidental\ncircumstances. These wavering and inconsistent views of Aristotle\nrespecting the nature of happiness, naturally rise from his empirical\nmethod of investigation. Careful in noting every thing which our limited\nexperience seems to utter, he expressly avoids making either virtue or\npleasure his principle, because actual experience shows the separation\nof the two. Although therefore he gives directions in general to strive\nafter that pleasure in which the good man delights, or which is\nconnected with a virtuous activity, yet is pleasure with him an end for\nits own sake, and not merely an accident of virtue, an empiricist,\nAristotle is here also a dualist, while the Stoics and Epicureans have\nrespectively taken and held fast to each of the two sides.\n\n3. CONCEPTION OF VIRTUE.\u2014As has already been seen in the Aristotelian\nPolemic against Socrates, virtue is the product of an oft-repeated moral\naction, a condition acquired through practice, a moral dexterity of the\nsoul. The nature of this dexterity is seen in the following way: every\naction completes something as its work; but now if a work is imperfect\nwhen it has either a want or a superfluity, so also is every action\nimperfect in so far as there is in it either too little or too much; its\nperfection, therefore, is only found as it contains the right degree,\nthe true mean between the too much and too little. Accordingly, virtue\nin general may be explained as the observation of the right mean in\naction, by which is meant not the arithmetical or absolute mean, but the\none relative to ourselves. For what is enough for one individual is\ninsufficient for another. The virtue of a man, of a woman, of a child,\nand of a slave is respectively different. Thus, virtue depends upon\ntime, circumstance, and relation. The determination of this correct mean\nwill always waver. In the impossibility of an active and exhaustive\nformula, we can only say respecting it that it is the correct mean as\ndetermined by a correct practical insight which is seen to be such by\nthe intelligent man.\n\nIt follows from this general conception of virtue, that there will be as\nmany separate virtues as there are circumstances of life, and as men are\never entering into new relations, in which it becomes difficult\npractically to determine the correct method of action, Aristotle, in\nopposition to Plato, would limit the field of separate virtues by no\ndefinite number. Only certain fundamental virtues can be named according\nas there are certain fixed and fundamental relations among men. For\ninstance, man has a fixed relation to pleasure and pain. In relation to\npain, the true moral mean is found in neither fearing nor courting it,\nand this is valor. In relation to pleasure, the true mean standing\nbetween greediness and indifference is temperance. In social life, the\nmoral mean is between doing and suffering wrong, which is justice. In a\nsimilar way many other virtues might be characterized, each one of them\nstanding as a mean between two vices, the one of which expresses a want\nand the other a superfluity. A closer exhibition of the Aristotelian\ndoctrine of virtue would have much psychological and linguistic\ninterest, though but little philosophical worth. Aristotle takes the\nconception of his virtues more from the use of language than from a\nthoroughly applied principle of classification. His classification of\nvirtues is, therefore, without any stable ground, and is differently\ngiven in different places. The conception of the correct mean which\nAristotle makes the measure of a moral act is obviously unworthy of a\nsystematic representation, for as it cannot be determined how the\nintelligent man would act in every case, there could never be given any\nspecific directions how others should act. In fine, the criterion of\nvirtue as the correct mean between two vices cannot be always applied\nfor in the virtue of wisdom, _e. g._ which Aristotle describes as the\nmean between simplicity and cunning, there is no such thing as too much.\n\n4. THE STATE.\u2014Aristotle, like Plato, makes the highest condition of\nmoral virtue attainable only through political life. The state exists\nbefore the individual, as the whole is prior to its parts. The\nrationality and morality of the state is thus antecedent to that of the\nindividual. Hence in the best state, moral and political virtue, the\nvirtue of the man and the virtue of the citizen are one and the same\nthing, although in states as they are, the good citizen is not\nnecessarily also the good man. But though this principle harmonized with\nPlato, yet Aristotle, at whose time the old aboriginal states had\nalready begun their process of dissolution, cherished a very different\nview concerning the relation of the individual and the family to the\nstate. He allows to both these an incomparably greater consideration,\nand yields to them a far wider field of independent action. Hence he\ncombats Plato\u2019s community of wives and goods, not simply on the ground\nof its practicability, but also on the ground of its principle, since\nthe state cannot be conceived as a strict unit, or as possessing any\nsuch centralization as would weaken or destroy individual activity. With\nPlato the state is but the product of the philosophical reflection,\nwhile with Aristotle it results from given circumstances, from history\nand experience, and he therefore wholly omits to sketch a model state or\na normal constitution, but carefully confines his attention to those\nwhich actually exist. Although the ideal of a state constitution in the\nform of a limited monarchy is unmistakably in his mind, still he\ncontents himself with portraying the different kinds of polities in\ntheir peculiarities, their origin, and their reciprocal transitions. He\ndoes not undertake to declare which is the best state absolutely, since\nthis depends upon circumstances, and one constitution is not adapted for\nevery state. He simply attempts to show what form of the state is\nrelatively the best and the most advisable under certain historical\ncircumstances, and under given natural, climatic, geographic, economic,\nand intellectual conditions. In this he is faithful to the character of\nhis whole philosophy. Standing on the basis of the empirical, he\nadvances here as elsewhere, critically and reflectively, and in despair\nof attaining the absolutely true and good, he seeks for these\nrelatively, with his eye fixed only on the probable and the practicable.\n\nVI.\u2014THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL.\u2014The school of Aristotle, called the\nPeripatetic, can here only be mentioned; the want of independence in its\nphilosophizing, and the absence of any great and universal influence,\nrendering it unworthy an extended notice. Theophrastus, Eudemus, and\nStrato are its most famous leaders. Like most philosophical schools, it\nconfines itself chiefly to a more thorough elaboration and explanation\nof the system of its master. In some empirical provinces, especially the\nphysical, the attempt was made to carry out still further the system,\nwhile at the same time its speculative basis was set aside and\nneglected.\n\nVII.\u2014TRANSITION TO THE POST-ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY.\u2014The productive\nenergy of Grecian philosophy expends itself with Aristotle,\ncontemporaneously and in connection with the universal decay of Grecian\nlife and spirit. Instead of the great and universal systems of a Plato\nand an Aristotle, we have now systems of a partial and one-sided\ncharacter, corresponding to that universal breach between the subject\nand the objective world which characterized the civil, religious, and\nsocial life of this last epoch of Greece, the time succeeding Alexander\nthe Great. That subjectivity, which had been first propounded by the\nSophists, was at length, after numerous struggles, victorious, though\nits triumph was gained upon the ruins of the Grecian civil and artistic\nlife; the individual has become emancipated, the subject is no longer to\nbe given up to the objective world, the liberated subjectivity must now\nbe perfected and satisfied. This process of development is seen in the\npost-Aristotelian philosophy, though it finds its conditioning cause in\nthe character of the preceding philosophical strivings. The dualism\nwhich formed the chief want of the systems both of Plato and Aristotle,\nhas forced itself upon our attention at every step. The attempt which\nhad been made, with the greatest expenditure of which the Grecian mind\nwas capable, to refer back to one ultimate ground both subject and\nobject, mind and matter, had produced no satisfactory result; and these\ntwo oppositions, around which all previous philosophy had struggled in\nvain, still remained disconnected. Wearied with the fruitless attempts\nat mediation, the subject now breaks with the objective world. Its\nattention is directed towards itself in its own self-consciousness. The\nresult of this gives us either STOICISM, where the moral subject appears\nin the self-sufficiency of the sage to whom every external good and\nevery objective work is indifferent, and who finds a good only in a\nmoral activity; or EPICUREANISM, where the subject delights itself in\nthe inner feeling of pleasure and the calm repose of a satisfied heart,\nenjoying the present and the past, and never fearing the future while it\nsees in the objective world only a means by which it can utter itself;\nor, again, Scepticism, where the subject, doubting and rejecting all\nobjective truth and science, appears in the apathy of the Sceptic, who\nhas broken both theoretically and practically with the objective world.\nIn fine, NEW-PLATONISM, the last of the ancient philosophical systems,\nbears this same character of subjectivity, for this whole system turns\nupon the exaltation of the subject to the absolute, and wherever it\nspeculates respecting God and his relation to man, it is alone in order\nto establish the progressive transition from the absolute object to the\nhuman personality. The ruling principle in it all is the interest of the\nsubjectivity, and the fact that in this system there are numerous\nobjective determinations, is only because the subject has become\nabsolute.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XVII.\n\nSTOICISM.\n\n\nZeno, of Cittium, a city of Cyprus, an elder contemporary of Antigonus\nGonatas, king of Macedon, is generally given as the founder of the\nStoical school. Deprived of his property by shipwreck, he took refuge in\nphilosophy, incited also by an inner bias to such pursuits. He at first\nbecame a disciple of the Cynic Crateas, then of Stilpo, one of the\nMegarians, and lastly he betook himself to the Academy, where he heard\nthe lessons of Xenocrates and Polemo. Hence the eclectic character of\nhis teaching. It has in fact been charged against him, that differing\nbut little if at all from the earlier schools, he attempted to form a\nschool of his own, with a system wherein he had changed nothing but\nnames. He opened a school at Athens, in the \u201cvariegated porch,\u201d so\ncalled from the paintings of Polygnotus, with which it was adorned,\nwhence his adherents received the name of \u201cphilosophers of the porch\u201d\n(Stoics). Zeno is said to have presided over his school for fifty-eight\nyears, and at a very advanced age to have put an end to his existence.\nHe is praised for the temperance and the austerity of his habits, while\nhis abstemiousness is proverbial. The monument in his honor, erected\nafter his death by the Athenians, at the instance of Antigonus, bore the\nhigh but simple eulogium that his life had been in unison with his\nphilosophy. _Cleanthes_ was the successor of Zeno in the Stoic school,\nand faithfully carried out the method of his master. Cleanthes was\nsucceeded by _Chrysippus_, who died about 208 B. C. He has been regarded\nas the chief prop of this school, in which respect it was said of him,\nthat without a Chrysippus there would never have been a Porch. At all\nevents, as Chrysippus was an object of the greatest veneration, and of\nalmost undisputed authority with the later Stoics, he ought to be\nconsidered as the principal founder of the school. He was a writer so\nvoluminous, that his works have been said to amount to seven hundred and\nfive, among which, however, were repeated treatises upon the same\npropositions, and citations without measure from poets and historians,\ngiven to prove and illustrate his opinions. Not one of all his writings\nhas come down to us. Chrysippus closes the series of the philosophers\nwho founded the Porch. The later heads of the school, as _Pan\u00e6tius_, the\nfriend of the younger Scipio (his famous work De Officiis, Cicero has\nelaborated in his treatise of the same name), and _Posidonius_, may be\nclassed with Cicero, Pompeius, and others, and were eclectic in their\nteachings. The Stoics have connected philosophy most intimately with the\nduties of practical life. Philosophy is with them the practice of\nwisdom, the exercise of virtue. Virtue and science are with them one, in\nso far at least that they divide virtue in reference to philosophy into\nphysical, ethical, and logical. But though they go on according to this\nthreefold division, and treat of logic and physics, and though they even\nrank physics higher than either of the other sciences, regarding it as\nthe mother of the ethical and the science of the Divine, yet do we find\ntheir characteristic standpoint most prominently in their theory of\nmorals.\n\n1. LOGIC.\u2014We have already said that it is the breach between subject and\nobject, which forms the basis of all post-Aristotelian philosophy. The\nbeginning of this philosophy of subjectivity is found with the Stoics.\nThe feature most worthy of notice in their logic, is the striving after\na subjective criterion of the truth, by which they might distinguish the\ntrue representation from the false. Since they limited all scientific\nknowledge to the knowledge of the senses, they found this criterion in\nthat which was evident in the sensuous impression. They conceived that\nthey had answered the whole problem, in affirming that the true or\nconceivable representation reveals not only itself, but also its object:\nit, they said, is nothing else than a representation which is produced\nby a present object in a manner like itself.\n\n2. PHYSICS.\u2014In their physics, where they follow for the most part\nHeraclitus, the Stoics are distinguished from their predecessors,\nespecially from Plato and Aristotle, by their thoroughly carried out\nproposition that nothing uncorporeal exists, that every thing essential\nis corporeal (just as in their logic they had sought to derive all\nknowledge from the sensuous perception). This sensualism or materialism\nof the Stoics which, as we have seen in their logic, lies at the basis\nof their theory of knowledge, might seem foreign to all their moral and\nidealistic tendencies, but is clearly explained from their subjective\nstandpoint, for, when the thought has become so intensely engrossed in\nthe subject, the objective world can only be regarded as a corporeal and\nmaterial existence. The most immediate consequence of such a view is\ntheir pantheism. Aristotle before them had separated the Divine Being\nfrom the world, as the pure and eternal form from the eternal matter;\nbut so far as this separation implied a distinction which was not simply\nlogical, but actual and real, the Stoics would not admit it. It seemed\nto them impossible to dissever God from matter, and they therefore\nconsidered God and the world as power and its manifestation, and thus as\none. Matter is the passive ground of things, the original substratum for\nthe divine activity: God is the active and formative energy of matter\ndwelling within it, and essentially united to it: the world is the body\nof God, and God is the soul of the world. The Stoics, therefore,\nconsidered God and matter as one identical substance, which, on the side\nof its passive and changeable capacity they call matter, and on the side\nof its active and changeless energy, God. But since they, as already\nremarked, considered the world as ensouled by God in the light of a\nliving and rational being, they were obliged to treat the conception of\nGod not only in a physical but also in its ethical aspect. God is not\nonly in the world as the ruling and living energy of this great [\u03b6\u1ff7\u03bf\u03bd\nGreek: z\u00f4on] (animal), but he is also the universal reason which rules\nthe whole world and penetrates all matter; he is the gracious Providence\nwhich cares for the individual and the whole; he is wise, and is the\nground of that natural law which commands the good and forbids the evil;\nhe punishes and rewards; he possesses a perfect and blessed life. But\naccustomed to regard every thing spiritual only in a sensuous way, the\nStoics were obliged to clothe this ideal conception of God in a material\nform, apprehending it as the vital warmth or an original fire, analogous\nto the view of the earlier natural philosophers, who held that the soul,\nand even reason itself, consisted in the vital warmth. The Stoics\nexpress this thought in different ways. At one time they call God the\nrational breath which passes through all nature; at another, the\nartistic fire which fashions or begets the universe; and still again the\nether; which, however, they hardly distinguish from the artistic fire.\nFrom these varying views, we see that it did not belong to the Stoics to\nrepresent the conception of God in any determinate kind of existence.\nThey availed themselves of these expressions only to indicate that God,\nas the universal animating energy in the world, could not be\ndisconnected from a corporeal agency. This identification of God and the\nworld, according to which the Stoics regarded the whole formation of the\nuniverse as but a period in the development of God, renders their\nremaining doctrine concerning the world very simple. Every thing in the\nworld seemed to them to be permeated by the divine life, and was\nregarded as but the flowing out of this most perfect life through\ncertain channels, until it returned in a necessary circle back again to\nitself. It is not necessary here to speak more closely of the physics of\nthis school.\n\n3. THE ETHICS.\u2014The ethics of the Stoics is most closely connected with\ntheir physics. In the physics we saw the rational order of the universe\nas it existed through the divine thought. In the ethics, the highest law\nof human action, and thus the whole moral legality of life is dependent\nupon this rational order and conformity to law in universal nature, and\nthe highest good or the highest end of our strivings is to shape our\nlife according to this universal law, to live in conformity with the\nharmony of the world or with nature. \u201cFollow nature,\u201d or \u201clive in\nharmony with nature,\u201d is the moral maxim of the Stoics. More accurately:\nlive in harmony with thy rational nature so far as this has not been\ndistorted nor refined by art, but is held in its natural simplicity.\n\nFrom this moral principle, in which we have also the Stoic conception of\nvirtue, the peculiarities of their theory of morals follow with logical\nnecessity.\n\n(1.) _Respecting the Relation of Virtue to Pleasure._\u2014When the demand is\nmade that the life should be in conformity with nature, the individual\nbecomes wholly subjected to the universal, and every personal end is\nexcluded. Hence pleasure, which of all ends is the most individual, must\nbe disregarded. In pleasure that activity in which blessedness consists\nis abated, and this could only appear to the Stoics as a restraint of\nlife, and thus as an evil. Pleasure is not in conformity with nature,\nand is no end of nature, says Cleanthes; and though other Stoics relax a\nlittle from the strictness of this opinion, and admit that pleasure may\nbe according to nature, and is to be considered in a certain degree as a\ngood, yet they all held fast to the doctrine, that it has no moral worth\nand is no end of nature, but is only something which is accidentally\nconnected with the free and fitting activity of nature, while itself is\nnot an activity, but a passive condition of the soul. In this lies the\nwhole severity of the Stoic doctrine of morals; every thing personal is\ncast aside, every external end of action is foreign to the moral man,\nthe action in wisdom is the only good. From this follows directly:\n\n(2.) _The View of the Stoics Concerning External Good._\u2014If virtue, as\nthe activity in conformity to nature, is exclusively a good, and if it\nalone can lead to happiness, then external good of every kind is\nsomething morally indifferent, and can neither be the object of our\nstriving nor the end of any moral action. The action itself and not that\ntowards which it tends is good. Hence such special ends as health,\nwealth, &c., are in themselves worthless and indifferent. They may\nresult either in good or evil, and when deprived of them the happiness\nof the virtuous man is not destroyed. The Stoics yield from the rigor of\ntheir fundamental principle only in a single instance. They admit that\nthere may be a distinction among indifferent things; that while none of\nthese can be called a moral good, yet some may be preferable to others,\nand that the preferable, so far as it contributes to a life in\nconformity to nature, should enter into the account of a moral life. So\nthe sage will prefer health and wealth when these are balanced in the\nchoice with sickness and poverty, but though these objects have been\nrationally chosen, he does not esteem them as really good, for they are\nnot the highest, they are inferior to the virtuous acting, in comparison\nwith which every thing else sinks to insignificance. In making this\ndistinction between the good and the preferable, we see how the Stoics\nexclude from the good every thing relative, and hold fast to it alone in\nits highest significance.\n\n(3.) This abstract apprehension of the conception of virtue is still\nfarther verified in the rigid antagonism which the Stoics affirmed\nbetween virtue and not-virtue, reason and sense. Either, they conclude,\nreason is awakened in the life of man and holds the mastery over him, or\nit is not awakened, and he serves his irrational instincts. In the\nformer case we have a good and in the latter a bad man, while between\nthese two cases as between virtue and vice, there is no mean. And since\nvirtue cannot be partially possessed, but the man must be wholly\nvirtuous or not at all, it follows that virtue as such is without\ndegree, just as truth is, and hence also all good acts are equally good,\nbecause they spring from the full freedom of the reason, and all vicious\nones equally bad, because they are impelled by the irrational instinct.\n\n(4.) But this abstractedness of the moral standpoint, this rigid\nopposition of reason and irrationality, of the highest good and the\nindividual good, of virtue and pleasure, has no power to furnish a\nsystem of concrete moral duties. The universal moral principle of the\nStoics fails in its applicability to the individual instance. The Stoic\nmorals has no concrete principle of moral self-determination. How must\nwe act in every individual instance, in every moral relation, so as to\nact according to nature? To this inquiry Stoicism can give no answer.\nIts system of particular duties is thus wholly without a scientific\nform, and is only held together by some universal conceptions which it\ncontains. For the most part they satisfy themselves with describing in\ngeneral terms the action according to nature, and with portraying their\nideal of the wise man. The characteristics which they give this ideal\nare partly paradoxical. The wise man is free even in chains, for he acts\nfrom himself unmoved by fear or desire; the wise man alone is king, for\nhe alone is not bound by laws and owes fealty to no one; he is the true\nrich man, the true priest, prophet, and poet. He is exalted above all\nlaw and every custom; even that which is most despicable and\nbase\u2014deception, suicide, murder\u2014he may commit at a proper time and in a\nvirtuous character. In a word the Stoics describe their wise man as a\ngod, and yield it to him to be proud and to boast of his life like Zeus.\nBut where shall we find such a sage? Certainly not among the living. In\nthe time long ago there may have been a perfect sage of such a pattern;\nbut now, and for a long time back, are men at best only fools who strive\nafter wisdom and virtue. The conception of the wise man represented,\ntherefore, to the Stoics only an ideal, the actualization of which we\nshould strive after, though without ever hoping to reach it; and yet\ntheir system of particular duties is almost wholly occupied in\nportraying this unreal and abstract ideal\u2014a contradiction in which it is\nseen most clearly that their whole standpoint is one of abstract\nsubjectivity.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XVIII.\n\nEPICUREANISM.\n\n\nThe Epicurean school arose at Athens, almost contemporaneously with the\nPorch, though perhaps a little earlier than this. Epicurus, its founder,\nwas born 342 B.C., six years after the death of Plato. Of his youth and\neducation little is known. In his thirty-sixth year he opened a\nphilosophical school at Athens, over which he presided till his death,\n271 B.C. His disciples and adherents formed a social league, in which\nthey were united by the closest band of friendship, illustrating the\ngeneral condition of things in Greece after the time of Alexander, when\nthe social took the place of the decaying poetical life. Epicurus\nhimself compared his society to the Pythagorean fraternity, although the\ncommunity of goods, which forms an element in the latter, Epicurus\nexcludes, affirming that true friends can confide in one another. The\nmoral conduct of Epicurus has been repeatedly assailed but, according to\nthe testimony of the most reliable witnesses, his life was blameless in\nevery respect, and his personal character was estimable and amiable.\nMoreover, it cannot be doubted that much of that, which is told by some,\nof the offensive voluptuousness of the Epicurean band, should be\nregarded as calumny. Epicurus was a voluminous writer, surpassing, in\nthis respect, even Aristotle, and exceeded by Chrysippus alone. To the\nloss of his greater works he has himself contributed, by his practice of\ncomposing summaries of his system, which he recommended his disciples to\ncommit to memory. These summaries have been for the most part preserved.\n\nThe end which Epicurus proposed to himself in science is distinctly\nrevealed in his definition of philosophy. He calls it an activity which,\nby means of conceptions and arguments, procures the happiness of life.\nIts end is, therefore, with him essentially a practical one, and on this\naccount the object of his whole system is to produce a scheme of morals\nwhich should teach us how we might inevitably attain a happy life. It is\ntrue that the Epicureans adopted the usual division of philosophy into\nlogic, which they called canonics, physics, and ethics; but they\nconfined logic to the doctrine of the criterion of truth, and considered\nit only as an instrument and introduction to physics, while they only\ntreated of physics as existing wholly for ethics, and being necessary in\norder to free men from superstitious fear, and deliver them from the\npower of fables and mythical fancies concerning nature, which might\nhinder the attainment of happiness. We have therefore in Epicureanism\nthe three old parts of philosophy, but in a reversed order, since logic\nand physics here stand as the handmaids of ethics. We shall confine\nourselves in our exposition to the latter, since the Epicurean canonics\nand physics offer little scientific interest, and since the physics\nespecially is not only very incomplete and without any internal\nconnection, but rests entirely upon the atomic theory of Democritus.\n\nEpicurus, like Aristotle and the other philosophers of his day, placed\nthe highest good in happiness, or a happy life. More closely he makes\npleasure to be the principal constituent of happiness, and even calls it\nthe highest good. But Epicurus goes on to give a more accurate\ndetermination of pleasure, and in this he differs essentially from his\npredecessors, the Cyrenians. (_cf._ \u00a7 XIII. 3.)\n\n1. While with Aristippus the pleasure of the moment is made the end of\nhuman efforts, Epicurus directs men to strive after a system of\npleasures which should insure an abiding course of happiness for the\nwhole life. _True_ pleasure is thus the object to be considered and\nweighed. Many a pleasure should be despised because it will result in\npain, and many a pain should be rejoiced in because it would lead to a\ngreater pleasure.\n\n2. Since the sage will seek after the highest good, not simply for the\npresent but for his whole life, he will hold the pleasures and pains of\nthe soul, which like memory and hope stretch over the past and the\nfuture, in greater esteem than those of the body, which relate only to\nthe present moment. The pleasure of the soul consists in the untroubled\ntranquillity of the sage, who rests secure in the feeling of his inner\nworth and his exaltation above the strokes of destiny. Thus Epicurus,\nwould say that it is better to be miserable but rational than to be\nhappy and irrational, and that the wise man might be happy though in\ntorture. He would even affirm, like a true follower of Aristotle, that\npleasure and happiness were most closely connected with virtue, that\nvirtue is in fact inseparable from true pleasure, and that there can be\nno agreeable life without virtue, and no virtue without an agreeable\nlife.\n\n3. While other Hedonists would regard the most positive and intense\nfeeling of pleasure as the highest good, Epicurus, on the other hand,\nfixed his eye on a happiness which should be abiding and for the whole\nlife. He would not seek the most exquisite enjoyments in order to attain\nto a happy life, but he rather recommends one to be satisfied with\nlittle, and to practise sobriety and temperance of life. He guards\nhimself against such a false application of his doctrine as would imply\nthat the pleasure of the debauchee were the highest good, and boasts\nthat with a little barley-bread and water he would rival Zeus in\nhappiness. He even expresses an aversion for all costly pleasures, not,\nhowever, in themselves, but because of the evil consequences which they\nentail. True, the Epicurean sage need not therefore live as a Cynic. He\nwill enjoy himself where he can without harm, and will even seek to\nacquire means to live with dignity and ease. But though all these\nenjoyments of life may properly belong to the sage, yet he _can_ deprive\nhimself of them without misery\u2014though he _ought_ not to do so\u2014since he\nenjoys the truest and most essential pleasure in the calmness of his\nsoul and the tranquillity of his heart. In opposition to the positive\npleasure of some Hedonists, the theory of Epicurus expends itself in\nnegative conceptions, representing that freedom from pain is pleasure,\nand that hence the activity of the sage should be prominently directed\nto avoid that which is disagreeable. All that man does, says Epicurus,\nis that he may neither suffer nor apprehend pain, and in another place\nhe remarks, that not to live is far from being an evil. Hence death, for\nwhich men have the greatest terror, the wise man does not fear. For\nwhile we live, death is not, and when death is, we are not; when it is\npresent we feel it not, for it is the end of all feeling, and that,\nwhich by its presence cannot affect our happiness, ought not, when\nthought of as a future, to trouble us. Here Epicurus must bear the\ncensure urged against him by the ancients, that he does not recognize\nany positive end of life, and that the object after which his sage\nshould strive is a mere passionless state.\n\nThe crown of Epicurus\u2019s view of the universe is his doctrine of the\ngods, where he has carried over his ideal of happiness. To the gods\nbelong a human form, though without any fixed body or human wants. In\nthe void space they lead an undisturbed and changeless life, whose\nhappiness is incapable of increase. From the blessedness of the gods he\ninferred that they had nothing to do with the management of our affairs,\nfor blessedness is repose, and on this account the gods neither take\ntrouble to themselves nor cause it to others. It may indeed be said that\nthese inactive gods of Epicurus, these indestructible and yet not fixed\nforms, these bodies which are not bodies, have but an ill connection\nwith his general system, in which there is in fact no point to which his\ndoctrine of the gods can be fitly joined\u2014but a strict scientific\nconnection is hardly the merit of this whole philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XIX.\n\nSCEPTICISM AND THE NEW ACADEMY.\n\n\nThis subjective direction already noticed was carried out to its\nfarthest extent by the Sceptics, who broke down completely the bridge\nbetween subject and object, denying all objective truth, knowledge and\nscience, and wholly withdrawing the philosopher from every thing but\nhimself and his own subjective estimates. In this direction we may\ndistinguish between the old Scepticism, the new Academy, and the later\nScepticism.\n\n1. THE OLD SCEPTICISM.\u2014_Pyrrho_ of Elis, who was perhaps a cotemporary\nof Aristotle, was the head of the old Sceptics. He left no writings\nbehind him, and we are dependent for a knowledge of his opinions upon\nhis scholar and follower, Timon of Phlius. The tendency of these\nsceptical philosophers, like that of the Stoics and Epicureans, was a\npractical one, for philosophy, said they, ought to lead us to happiness.\nBut in order to live happily we must know how things are, and,\ntherefore, in what kind of a relation we stand to them. The first of\nthese questions the Sceptics answered by attempting to show that all\nthings, without exception, are indifferent as to truth and falsehood,\nuncertain, and in nowise subject to man\u2019s judgment. Neither our senses\nnor our opinions concerning any thing teach us any truth; to every\nprecept and to every position a contrary may be advanced, and hence the\ncontradictory views of men, and especially of the philosophies of the\nschools respecting one and the same thing. All objective knowledge and\nscience being thus impossible, the true relation of the philosopher to\nthings consists in the entire suspension of judgment, and the\nwithholding of every positive assertion. In order to avoid every thing\nlike a positive assertion, the Sceptics had recourse to a variety of\nartifices, and availed themselves of doubtful modes of expression, such\nas _it is possible_; _it may be so_; _perhaps_; _I assert\nnothing_,\u2014cautiously subjoining to this last\u2014_not even that I assert\nnothing_. By this suspension of judgment the Sceptics thought they could\nattain their practical end, happiness; for the abstinence from all\npositive opinion is followed by a freedom from all mental disturbance,\nas a substance is by a shadow. He who has embraced Scepticism lives\nthenceforward tranquilly, without inquietude, without agitation, with an\nequable state of mind, and, in fact, divested of his humanity. Pyrrho is\nsaid to have originated the doctrine which lies at the basis of\nsceptical apathy, that no difference exists between sickness and health,\nor between life and death. The Sceptics, for the most part, derived the\nmaterial for their views from the previous investigations in the\ndogmatic schools. But the grounds on which they rested were far from\nbeing profound, and were for the most part either dialectic errors which\ncould easily be refuted, or mere subtleties. The use of the following\nten tropes is ascribed to the old Sceptics, though these were perhaps\nnot definitely brought out by either Pyrrho or Timon, but were probably\nfirst collected by \u00c6nesidemus, soon after the time of Cicero. The\nwithholding of all decisive judgment may rest; (1) upon the distinction\ngenerally existing between individual living objects; (2) upon the\ndifference among men; (3) the different functions of the organs of\nsense; (4) the circumstances under which objects appear; (5) the\nrelative positions, intervals, and places; (6) intermixtures; (7) the\nquantities and modifications of the objects we perceive; (8) relations;\n(9) the frequent or rare occurrence; (10) the different ways of life,\nthe varieties of customs and laws, the mythical representations and\ndogmatic opinions of men.\n\n2. THE NEW ACADEMY.\u2014Scepticism, in its conflict with the Stoics, as it\nappeared in the Platonic school established by _Arcesilaus_ (316-241),\nhas a far greater significance than belongs to the performances of the\nPyrrhonists. In this school Scepticism sought its support by its great\nrespect for the writings and its transmission of the oral teachings of\nPlato. Arcesilaus could neither have assumed nor maintained the chair of\ninstruction in the Academy, had he not carefully cherished and imparted\nto his disciples the impression that his own view, respecting the\nwithholding of a decisive judgment, coincided essentially with that of\nSocrates and of Plato, and if he had not also taught that he only\nrestored the genuine and original significance of Platonism, when he set\naside the dogmatic method of teaching. An immediate incitement to the\nefforts of Arcesilaus is found in his opposition to the rigid dogmatic\nsystem which had lately arisen in the Porch, and which claimed to be in\nevery respect an improvement upon Platonism. Hence, as Cicero remarks,\nArcesilaus directed all his sceptical and polemic attacks against Zeno,\nthe founder of Stoicism. He granted with his opponent that no\nrepresentation should form a part of undoubted knowledge, if it could\npossibly have arisen through any other object than that from which it\nactually sprung, but he would not admit that there might be a notion\nwhich expressed so truly and accurately its own object, that it could\nnot have arisen from any other. Accordingly, Arcesilaus denied the\nexistence of a criterion which could certify to us the truth of our\nknowledge. If there be any truth in our affirmations, said he, we cannot\nbe certain of it. In this sense he taught that one can know nothing, not\neven that he does know nothing. But in moral matters, in choosing the\ngood and rejecting the evil, he taught that we should follow that which\nis probable.\n\nOf the subsequent leaders in the new Academy, _Carneades_ (214-129)\nalone need here be mentioned, whose whole philosophy, however, consists\nalmost exclusively in a polemic against Stoicism and in the attempt to\nset up a criterion of truth. His positive performance is the attempt to\nbring out a philosophical theory of probabilities. The later\nAcademicians fell back to an eclectic dogmaticism.\n\n3. THE LATER SCEPTICISM.\u2014Once more we meet with a peculiar Scepticism at\nthe time when Grecian philosophy had wholly fallen to decay. To this\ntime belong _\u00c6nesidemus_, who probably\u2014though this cannot be affirmed\nwith certainty\u2014lived but a little after Cicero; _Agrippa_, whose date is\nalso uncertain, though subsequent to \u00c6nesidemus, and _Sextus\nEmpiricus_\u2014_i. e._ a Grecian physician of the empiric sect, who probably\nflourished in the first half of the third century of the Christian era.\nThese are the most significant names. Of these the last has the greatest\ninterest for us, from two writings which he left behind him (the\nhypotyposes of Pyrrho in three books, and a treatise against the\nmathematicians in nine books), which are sources of much historical\ninformation. In these he has profusely collected every thing which the\nScepticism of the ancients knew how to advance against the certainty of\nknowledge.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XX.\n\nTHE ROMANS.\n\n\nThe Romans have taken no independent part in the progress of philosophy.\nAfter Grecian philosophy and literature had begun to gain a foothold\namong them, and especially after three distinguished representatives of\nAttic culture and eloquence\u2014Carneades the Academician, Critolaus the\nPeripatetic, and Diogenes the Stoic\u2014had appeared in Rome as envoys from\nAthens; and after Greece, a few years later, had become a Roman\nprovince, and thus outwardly in a close connection with Rome, almost all\nthe more significant systems of Grecian philosophy, especially the\nEpicurean (Lucretius), and the Stoic (Seneca), flourished and found\nadherents in Rome, though without gaining any real philosophical\nprogress. The Romish philosophizing is wholly eclectic, as is seen in\nCicero, the most important and influential philosophic writer among the\nRomans. But the popular philosophy of this man and of the minds akin to\nhim cannot be strongly assailed, for, notwithstanding its want of\noriginality and logical sequence, it gave philosophy a broad\ndissemination, and made it a means of universal culture.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXI.\n\nNEW PLATONISM.\n\n\nIn New Platonism, the ancient mind made its last and almost despairing\nattempt at a philosophy which should resolve the dualism between the\nsubjective and the objective. The attempt was made by taking on the one\nside a subjective standpoint, like the other philosophies of the\npost-Aristotelian time (_cf._ \u00a7 XVI 7); and on the other with the design\nto bring out objective determinations concerning the highest conceptions\nof metaphysics, and concerning the absolute; in other words, to sketch a\nsystem of absolute philosophy. In this respect the effort was made to\ncopy the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, and the claim was set up\nby the new system to be a revival of the original Platonism. On both\nsides the new attempt formed the closing period of an ancient\nphilosophy. It represents the last struggle, but at the same time the\nexhaustion of the ancient thinking and the dissolution of the old\nphilosophy.\n\nThe first, and also the most important, representative of New Platonism,\nis _Plotinus_. He was a pupil of Ammonius Saccas, who taught the\nPlatonic philosophy at Alexandria in the beginning of the third century,\nthough he left no writings behind him. Plotinus (A. D. 205-270) from his\nfortieth year taught philosophy at Rome. His opinions are contained in a\ncourse of hastily written and not closely connected treatises, which,\nafter his death, were collected and published in six enneads by\n_Porphyry_ (who was born A. D. 233, and taught both philosophy and\neloquence at Rome), his most noted disciple. From Rome and Alexandria,\nthe New Platonism of Plotinus passed over in the fourth century to\nAthens, where it established itself in the Academy. In the fourth\ncentury, _Jamblichus_, a scholar of Porphyry, and in the fifth, Proclus,\n(412-485), were prominently distinguished among the New Platonists. With\nthe triumph of Christianity and the consequent fall of heathenism, in\nthe course of the sixth century, even this last bloom of Grecian\nphilosophy faded away.\n\nThe common characteristic of all the New Platonists is a tendency to\nmysticism, theosophy, and theurgy. The majority of them gave themselves\nup to magic and sorcery, and the most distinguished boasted that they\nwere the subjects of divine inspiration and illumination, able to look\ninto the future, and to work miracles. They professed to be hierophants\nas much as philosophers, and exhibited the unmistakable tendency to\nrepresent a Pagan copy of Christianity, which should be at the same time\na philosophy and a universal religion. In the following sketch of New\nPlatonism we follow mainly the track of Plotinus.\n\n1. ECSTASY AS A SUBJECTIVE STATE.\u2014The result of the philosophical\nstrivings antecedent to New Platonism had been Scepticism; which, seeing\nthe impracticability of both the Stoic and Epicurean wisdom, had assumed\na totally negative relation to every positive and theoretical content.\nBut the end which Scepticism had actually gained was the opposite of\nthat for which it had striven. It had striven for the perfect apathy of\nthe sage, but it had gained only the necessity of incessantly opposing\nevery positive affirmation. Instead of the rest which they had sought,\nthey found rather an absolute unrest. This absolute unrest of the\nconsciousness striving after an absolute rest, begat immediately a\nlonging to be freed from this unrest, a longing after some content which\nshould be absolutely satisfying, and stripped of every sceptical\nobjection. This longing after an absolutely true, found its historical\nexpression in New Platonism. The subject sought to master and comprehend\nthe absolute; and this, neither by objective knowledge nor dialectic\nmediation, but immediately, by an inner and mystical mounting up of the\nsubject in the form of an immediate beholding, or ecstasy. The knowledge\nof the true, says Plotinus, is not gained by proof nor by any mediation;\nit cannot be found when the objects known remain separate from the\nsubject knowing, but only when the distinction between knower and known\ndisappears; it is a beholding of the reason in itself, not in the sense\nthat we see the reason, but the reason beholds itself; in no other way\ncan knowledge come. If any one has attained to such a beholding, to such\na true unison with the divine, he will despise the pure thinking which\nhe otherwise loved, for this thinking was only a movement which\npresupposed a difference between the perceiver and the perceived. This\nmystical absorption into the Deity, or, the One, this resolving the self\ninto the absolute, is that which gives to New Platonism a character so\npeculiarly distinct from the genuine Grecian systems of philosophy.\n\n2. THE COSMICAL PRINCIPLES.\u2014The doctrine of the three cosmical\nprinciples is most closely connected with the theory just named. To the\ntwo cosmical principles already received, viz., the world-soul and the\nworld-reason, a third and higher one was added by the New Platonists.\nFor if the reason apprehends the true by means of thinking, and not\nwithin itself alone; if, in order to grasp the absolute and behold the\ndivine, it must lose its own self-consciousness, and go out beyond\nitself, then reason cannot be the highest principle, but there stands\nabove it that primal essence, with which it must be united if it will\nbehold the true. To this primal essence Plotinus gives different names,\nas \u201cthe first,\u201d \u201cthe one,\u201d \u201cthe good,\u201d and \u201cthat which stands above\nbeing\u201d (being is with him but a conception, which, like the reason, may\nbe resolved into a higher ground, and which, united with the reason,\nforms but the second step in the series of highest conceptions). In all\nthese names, Plotinus does not profess to have satisfactorily expressed\nthe essence of this primal one, but only to have given a representation\nof it. In characterizing it still farther, he denies it all thinking and\nwilling, because it needs nothing and can desire nothing; it is not\nenergy, but above energy; life does not belong to it; neither being nor\nessence nor any of the most general categories of being can be ascribed\nto it; in short, it is that which can neither be expressed nor thought.\nPlotinus has thoroughly striven to think of this first principle not as\nfirst principle, _i. e._ not in its relation to that of which it is the\nground, but only in itself, as being wholly without reference either to\nus or to any thing else. This pure abstraction, however, he could not\ncarry out. He sets himself to show how every thing else, and especially\nthe two other cosmical principles, could emanate from this first; but in\norder to have a principle for his emanation theory, he was obliged to\nconsider the first in its relation to the second and as its producer.\n\n3. THE EMANATION THEORY OF THE NEW PLATONISTS.\u2014Every emanation theory,\nand hence also that of the New Platonists, considers the world as the\neffluence of God, and gives to the emanation a greater or less degree of\nperfection, according as it is nearer or more remote from its source.\nThey all have for their principle the totality of being, and represent a\nprogressively ascending relation in its several parts. Fire, says\nPlotinus, emits heat, snow cold, fragrant bodies odors, and every\norganic thing so far as it is perfect begets something like itself. In\nthe same way the all-perfect and the eternal, in the overflowing of his\nperfection sends out from himself that which is also eternal, and after\nhim, the best, viz., the reason or world-intelligence, which is the\nimmediate reflection and image of the primal one. Plotinus abounds in\nfigures to show how the primal one need lose nothing nor become weakened\nby this emanation of reason. Next to the original one, reason is the\nmost perfect. It contains in itself the ideal world, and the whole of\ntrue and changeless being. Some notion may be formed of its exaltation\nand glory by carefully beholding the sensible world in its greatness,\nits beauty, and the order of its ceaseless motion, and then by rising to\ncontemplate its archetype in the pure and changeless being of the\nintelligible world, and then by recognizing in intelligence the author\nand finisher of all. In it there is neither past nor future, but only an\never abiding present. It is, moreover, as incapable of division in space\nas of change in time. It is the true eternity, which is only copied by\ntime. As reason flows from the primal one, so does the world-soul\neternally emanate from reason, though the latter incurs no change\nthereby. The world-soul is the copy of reason, permeated by it, and\nactualizing it in an outer world. It gives ideas externally to sensible\nmatter, which is the last and lowest step in the series of emanations\nand in itself is undetermined, and has neither quality nor being. In\nthis way the visible universe is but the transcript of the world-soul,\nwhich forms it out of matter, permeates and animates it, and carries it\nforward in a circle. Here closes the series of emanations, and, as was\nthe aim of the theory, we have been carried in a constant current from\nthe highest to the lowest, from God to the mere image of true being, or\nthe sensible world.\n\nIndividual souls, like the world-soul, are linked both to the higher and\nthe lower, to reason and the sensible; now bound with the latter and\nsharing its destiny, and anon rising to their source in reason. Their\noriginal and proper home was in the rational world, from whence they\nhave come down, each one in its proper time, into the corporeal; not,\nhowever, wholly forsaking their ideal abode, but as a sunbeam touches at\nthe same time the sun and the earth, so are they found alike in the\nworld of reason and the world of sense. Our calling, therefore\u2014and here\nwe come back to the point from which we started in our exhibition of New\nPlatonism\u2014can only be to direct our senses and aspirations towards our\nproper home, in the ideal world, and by asceticism and crucifying of the\nflesh, to free our better self from its participation with the body. But\nwhen our soul has once mounted up to the ideal world, that image of the\noriginally good and beautiful, it then attains the final goal of all its\nlongings and efforts, the immediate union with God, through the\nenraptured beholding of the primal one in which it loses its\nconsciousness and becomes buried and absorbed.\n\nAccording to all this, the New Platonic philosophy would seem to be a\nmonism, and thus the most perfect development of ancient philosophy, in\nso far as this had striven to carry back the sum of all being to one\nultimate ground. But as it attained its highest principle from which all\nthe rest was derived, by means of ecstasy, by a mystical\nself-destruction of the individual person (_Ichheit_), by asceticism and\ntheurgy, and not by means of self-conscious thinking, nor by any natural\nor rational way, it is seen that ancient philosophy, instead of becoming\nperfected in New Platonism, only makes a despairing leap beyond itself\nto its own self-destruction.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXII.\n\nCHRISTIANITY AND SCHOLASTICISM.\n\n\n1. THE CHRISTIAN IDEA.\u2014The Grecian intellectual life at the time of its\nfairest bloom, was characterized by the immediate sacrifice of the\nsubject to the object (nature, the state, &c.): the full breach between\nthe two, between spirit and nature, had not yet arrived; the subject had\nnot yet so far reflected upon himself that he could apprehend his own\nabsolute worth. This breach came in, with the decay of Grecian life, in\nthe time after Alexander the Great. As the objective world lost its\ninfluence, the thinking consciousness turned back upon itself; but even\nin this very process, the bridge between subject and object was broken\ndown. The self-consciousness had not yet become sufficiently absorbed in\nitself to look upon the true, the divine, in any other light than as\nseparate from itself, and belonging to an opposite world; while a\nfeeling of pain, of unsatisfied desire, took the place of that fair\nunity between spirit and nature which had been peculiar to the better\nperiods of the Grecian civil and artistic life. New Platonism, by its\noverleaping speculation, and, practically, by its mortification of the\nsense, made a last and despairing attempt to overcome this separation,\nor to bury itself within it, by bringing the two sides forcibly\ntogether. The attempt was in vain, and the old philosophy, totally\nexhausted, came to its end. Dualism is therefore the rock on which it\nsplit. This problem, thus left without a solution, Christianity took up.\nIt assumed for its principle the idea which the ancient thinking had not\nknown how to carry out, affirming that the separation between God and\nman might be overcome, and that the human and the divine could be united\nin one. The speculative fundamental idea of Christianity is, that God\nhas become incarnate, and this had its practical exhibition (for\nChristianity was a practical religion) in the idea of the atonement and\nthe demand of the new birth, _i. e._ the positive purifying of the sense\nfrom its corruptions, instead of holding it, as asceticism, in a merely\nnegative relation.\n\nFrom the introduction of Christianity, monism has been the character and\nthe fundamental tendency of the whole modern philosophy. In fact, the\nnew philosophy started from the very point at which the old had stood\nstill. The turning of the self-consciousness upon itself, which was the\nstandpoint of the post-Aristotelian speculations, forms in Descartes the\nstarting-point of the new philosophy, whose whole course has been the\nreconciling of that opposition beyond which the old could not pass.\n\n2. SCHOLASTICISM.\u2014It very early resulted that Christianity came in\ncontact with the cotemporaneous philosophy, especially with Platonism.\nThis arose first with the apologists of the second century, and the\nfathers of the Alexandrian church. Subsequently, in the ninth century,\nScotus Erigena made an attempt to combine Christianity with New\nPlatonism, though it was not till the second half of the Middle Ages,\nfrom the eleventh century, that there was developed any thing that might\nbe properly termed a Christian philosophy. This was the so-called\nScholasticism.\n\nThe effort of Scholasticism was to mediate between the dogma of religion\nand the reflecting self-consciousness; to reconcile faith and knowledge.\nWhen the dogma passed over into the schools from the Church which had\ngiven it utterance, and theology became a science of the universities,\nthe scientific interest asserted its rights, and undertook to bring the\ndogma which had hitherto stood over against the self-consciousness as an\nexternal power, into a closer relation to the thinking subject. A series\nof attempts was now made to bring out the doctrines of the Church in the\nform of scientific systems (the first complete dogmatic system was given\nby _Peter Lombard_, who died 1164, in his four books of sentences, and\nwas voluminously commented upon by the later Scholastics), all starting\nfrom the indisputable premise (beyond which scholastic thinking never\nreached), that the faith of the church is absolute truth; but all guided\nlikewise by the interest to make this revealed truth intelligible, and\nto show it to be rational. \u201c_Credo ut intelligam_\u201d\u2014this expression of\n_Anselm_, the beginner and founder of Scholasticism (he was born about\n1034, and made Archbishop of Canterbury in 1093), was the watchword of\nthis whole direction. Scholasticism applied to the solution of its\nproblem the most remarkable logical acumen, and brought out systems of\ndoctrine like the Gothic cathedrals in their architecture. The extended\nstudy of Aristotle, called _par eminence_ \u201cthe philosopher,\u201d whom many\nof the most distinguished Scholastics wrote commentaries upon, and who\nwas greatly studied at the same period among the Arabians (_Avicenna_\nand _Averroes_), furnished their terminology and most of their points of\nview. At the summit of Scholasticism we must place the two incontestably\ngreatest masters of the Scholastic art and method, _Thomas Aquinas_\n(Dominican, who died 1274) and _Duns Scotus_ (Franciscan, who died\n1308), the founders of two schools, in which since their time the whole\nScholastic theology divides itself\u2014the former exalting the understanding\n(_intellectus_), and the latter the will (_voluntas_), as their highest\nprinciple, both being driven into essentially differing directions by\nthis opposition of a theoretical and a practical principle. Even with\nthis began the downfall of Scholasticism; its highest point was also the\nturning-point to its self-destruction. The rationality of the dogma, the\noneness of faith and knowledge, had been constantly their fundamental\npremise; but this premise fell away, and the whole basis of their\nmetaphysics was given up in principle, the moment Duns Scotus placed the\nproblem of theology in the practical. When the practical and the\ntheoretical became divided, and still more when thought and being were\nseparated by Nominalism (_cf._ 3), philosophy broke loose from theology\nand knowledge from faith; knowledge assumed its position above faith and\nabove authority (modern philosophy), and the religious consciousness\nbroke with the traditional dogma (the Reformation).\n\n3. NOMINALISM AND REALISM.\u2014Hand in hand with the whole development of\nScholasticism, there was developed the opposition between Nominalism and\nRealism, an opposition whose origin is to be found in the relation of\nScholasticism to the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. The\nNominalists were those who held that the conceptions of the universal\n(the universalia) were simple names, _flatus vocis_, representations\nwithout content and without reality. According to them there are no\nuniversal conceptions, no species, no class; every thing which is,\nexists only as separate in its pure individuality; there is, therefore,\nno pure thinking, but only a representation and sensuous perception. The\nRealists, on the other hand, taking pattern from Plato, held fast to the\nobjective reality of the universals (_universalia ante rem_). These\nopposite directions appeared first between _Roscellinus_, who took the\nside of Nominalism, and _Anselm_, who advocated the Realistic theory,\nand it is seen from this time through the whole period of Scholasticism,\nthough from the age of _Abelard_ (born 1079) a middle view, which was\nboth Nominalistic and Realistic, held with some slight modifications the\nprominent place (_universalia in re_). According to this view the\nuniversal is only something thought and represented, though as such it\nis not simply a product of the representing consciousness, but has also\nits objective reality in objects themselves, from which it was argued we\ncould not abstract it if it were not essentially contained in them. This\nidentity of thought and being, is the fundamental premise on which the\nwhole dialectic course of the Scholastics rests. All their arguments are\nfounded on the claim, that that which has been syllogistically proved is\nin reality the same as in logical thinking. If this premise is\noverthrown, so falls with it the whole basis of Scholasticism; and there\nremains nothing more for the thinker to do, who has gone astray in his\nobjectivity, but to fall back upon himself. This self-dissolution of\nScholasticism actually appears with _William of Occam_ (died 1347), the\nmost influential reviver of that Nominalism which had been so mighty in\nthe beginning of Scholasticism, but which now, more victorious against a\ndecaying than then against a rising form of culture, plucked away its\nfoundation from the framework of Scholastic dogmatism, and brought the\nwhole structure into inevitable ruin.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXIII.\n\nTRANSITION TO THE MODERN PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\nThe emancipation of modern philosophy from the bondage of Scholasticism\nwas a gradual process. It first showed itself in a series of preparative\nmovements during the fifteenth century, and became perfected,\nnegatively, in the course of the sixteenth, and positively in the first\nhalf of the seventeenth century.\n\n1. FALL OF SCHOLASTICISM.\u2014The immediate ground of this changed direction\nof the time, we have already seen in the inner decay of Scholasticism\nitself. Just so soon as the fundamental premise on which the Scholastic\ntheology and method rested, the rationality of the dogma, was abandoned,\nthe whole structure, as already remarked, fell to inevitable ruin. The\nconviction, directly opposed to the principle of Scholasticism, that\nwhat might be true dogmatically, might be false, or, at least, incapable\nof proof in the eye of the reason\u2014a point of view from which _e. g._ the\nAristotelian _Pomponatius_ (1462-1530) treated the doctrines of the\nfuture state, and in whose light _Vanini_ subsequently went over the\nchief problems of philosophy\u2014kept gaining ground, notwithstanding the\nopposition of the Church, and even associated with itself the opinion\nthat reason and revelation could not be harmonized. The feeling became\nprevalent that philosophy must be freed from its previous condition of\nminority and servitude; a struggle after a greater independence of\nphilosophic investigation was awakened, and though no one yet ventured\nto attack directly the doctrine of the Church, the effort was made to\nshatter the confidence in the chief bulwark of Scholasticism, the\nAristotelian philosophy, or what at that period was regarded as such;\n(especially in this connection _Peter Ramus_, (1515-1572) should be\nmentioned, who fell in the massacre of St. Bartholomew). The authority\nof the Church became more and more weakened in the faith of the people,\nand the great principles of Scholasticism came to an end.\n\n2. THE RESULTS OF SCHOLASTICISM.\u2014Notwithstanding all, Scholasticism was\nnot without its positively good results. Though standing wholly in the\nservice of the Church, it had, nevertheless, grown out of a scientific\nimpulse, and so naturally awakened a free spirit of inquiry and a sense\nfor knowledge. It made the objects of faith the objects of thought, it\nraised men from the sphere of unconditional faith to the sphere of\ndoubt, of investigation and of knowledge, and by its very effort to\ndemonstrate the principles of theology it established, though against\nits knowledge and design, the authority of reason. It thus introduced to\nthe world another principle than that of the old Church, the principle\nof the thinking spirit, the self-consciousness of the reason, or at\nleast prepared the way for the victory of this principle. Even the\ndeformities and unfavorable side of Scholasticism, the many absurd\nquestions upon which the Scholastics divided, even their thousandfold\nunnecessary and accidental distinctions, their inquisitiveness and\nsubtleties, all sprang from a rational principle, and grew out of a\nspirit of investigation, which could only utter itself in this way under\nthe all powerful ecclesiastical spirit of the time. Only when it was\nsurpassed by the advancing spirit of the age, did Scholasticism,\nfalsifying its original meaning, make common cause and interest with the\nold ecclesiasticism, and turned itself as the most violent opposer\nagainst the improvements of the new period.\n\n3. THE REVIVAL OF LETTERS.\u2014The revival of classic literature contributed\nprominently to that change in the spirit of the age which marks the\nbeginning of the new epoch of philosophy. The study of the ancients,\nespecially of the Greeks, had almost wholly ceased in the course of the\nMiddle Ages; even the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle was known, for\nthe most part, only through Latin translations or secondary sources; no\none realized the spirit of classic life, and all sense for beauty of\nform and elegant composition had passed away. The change was chiefly\nbrought about by means of the Greek scholars who fled from\nConstantinople to Italy; the study of the ancients in the original\nsources came up again; the newly discovered art of printing allowed the\nclassics to be widely circulated; the Medicis drew classic scholars to\ntheir court; all this working for a far better understanding of the\nancient philosophy. _Besarion_ (died 1472) and _Ficinus_ (died 1499)\nwere prominent in this movement. The result was presently seen. The new\nscholars contended against the stiff and uncouth manner in which the\nsciences had hitherto been treated, new ideas began to circulate, and\nthere arose again the free, universal, thinking spirit of antiquity. In\nGermany, also, classic studies found a fruitful soil. _Reuchlin_ (born\n1454), _Melancthon_ and _Erasmus_, labored in this sense, and the\nclassic movement, hostile as it was to the Scholastic impulse, favored\nmost decidedly the growing tendencies to the Reformation.\n\n4. THE GERMAN REFORMATION.\u2014All the elements of the new age, the struggle\nagainst Scholasticism, the revival of letters and the more enlarged\nculture thus secured, the striving after national independence, the\nattempts of the state to free itself from the Church and the hierarchy,\nand above all, the desire of the thinking self-consciousness for\nautonomy, for freedom from the fetters of authority\u2014all these elements\nfound their focus and point of union in the German Reformation. Though\nhaving its root at first in practical, and religious, and national\ninterests, and expending itself mainly upon the Christian doctrine and\nChurch, yet was the Reformation in principle and in its true\nconsequences a rupture of the thinking spirit with authority, a\nprotesting against the fetters of the positive, a return of the mind\nfrom its self-estrangement to itself. From that which was without, the\nmind now came back to that which is within, and the purely human as\nsuch, the individual heart and conscience, the subjective conviction, in\na word, the rights of the subject now began to be of worth. While\nmarriage had formerly been regarded, though not immoral, as yet inferior\nto continence and celibacy, it appeared now as a divine institution, a\nnatural law ordained of God. While poverty had formerly been esteemed\nhigher than wealth, and the contemplative life of the monk was superior\nto the manual labor of the layman supporting himself by his own toil,\nyet now poverty ceased to be desirable in itself, and labor was no\nlonger despised. Ecclesiastical freedom took the place of spiritual\nbondage; monasticism and the priesthood lost their power. In the same\nway, on the side of knowledge the individual man came back to himself,\nand threw off the restraints of authority. He was impressed with the\nconviction that the whole process of redemption must be experienced\nwithin himself, that his reconciliation to God and salvation was his own\nconcern, for which he needed no mediation of priests, and that he stood\nin an immediate relation to God. He found his whole being in his faith,\nin the depth of his feelings and convictions.\n\nSince thus Protestantism sprang from the essence of the same spirit in\nwhich modern philosophy had its birth, the two have the closest relation\nto each other, though of course there is a specific difference between\nthe religious and the scientific principle. Yet in their origin, both\nkinds of Protestantism, that of religion and that of thought, are one\nand the same, and in their progress they have also gone hand in hand\ntogether. For religion, reduced to its simple elements, will be found to\nhave its source, like philosophy, in the self-knowledge of the reason.\n\n5. THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES.\u2014To all these phenomena,\nwhich should be regarded both as causes and as symptoms of the\nintellectual revolution of this period, we must add yet another, which\nessentially facilitated and gave a positive assistance to the freedom of\nthe mind from the fetters of authority\u2014the starting up of the natural\nsciences and the inductive method of examining nature. This epoch was a\nperiod of the most fruitful and influential discoveries in nature. The\ndiscovery of America and the passage to the East Indies had already\nwidened the circle of view, but still greater revolutions are connected\nwith the name of a _Copernicus_ (died 1543), _Kepler_ (died 1630), and\n_Galileo_ (died 1642), revolutions which could not remain, without an\ninfluence upon the whole mode of thinking of that age, and which\ncontributed prominently to break the faith in the prevailing\necclesiastical authority. Scholasticism had turned away from nature and\nthe phenomenal world, and, blind towards that which lay before the very\neyes, had spent itself in a dreamy intellectuality; but now nature rose\nagain in honor; her glory and exaltation, her infinite diversity and\nfulness of life became again the immediate objects of observation; to\ninvestigate nature became an essential object of philosophy, and\nscientific empiricism was thus regarded as a universal and essential\nconcern of the thinking man. From this time the natural sciences date\ntheir historical importance, for only from this time have they had an\nuninterrupted history. The results of this new intellectual movement can\nbe readily estimated. Such a scientific investigation of nature not only\ndestroyed a series of traditional errors and prejudices, but, what was\nof greater importance, it directed the intellectual interest towards\nthat which is real and actual, it nourished and protected the\nself-thinking and feeling of self-dependence, the spirit of inquiry and\nproof. The standpoint of observation and experiment presupposes an\nindependent self-consciousness of the individual, a breaking loose from\nauthority\u2014in a word, scepticism, with which, in fact, the founders of\nmodern philosophy, _Bacon_ and _Descartes_, began; the former by\nconditioning the knowledge of nature upon the removal of all prejudice\nand every preconceived opinion, and the latter by demanding that\nphilosophy should be begun with universal doubt. No wonder that a bitter\nstruggle should soon break out between the natural sciences and\necclesiastical orthodoxy, which could only result in breaking the power\nof the latter.\n\n6. BACON OF VERULAM.\u2014Francis of Verulam was born in 1561, and was Lord\nHigh Chancellor of England and keeper of the king\u2019s seal under James I.\nFrom these offices he was subsequently expelled, and died in 1626, with\na character which has not been without reproach. He took as his\nprinciple the inductive method, which he directed expressly against\nScholasticism and the ruling scientific method. On this account he is\nfrequently placed at the head of modern philosophy.\n\nThe sciences, says Bacon, have hitherto been in a most sad condition.\nPhilosophy, wasted in empty and fruitless logomachies, has failed during\nso many centuries to bring out a single work or experiment of actual\nbenefit to human life. Logic hitherto has served more to the\nestablishment of error than to the investigation of truth. Whence all\nthis? Why this penury of the sciences? Simply because they have broken\naway from their root in nature and experience. The blame of this is\nchargeable to many sources; first, the old and rooted prejudice that the\nhuman mind loses somewhat of its dignity when it busies itself much and\ncontinuously with experiments and material things; next, superstition\nand a blind religious zeal, which has been the most irreconcilable\nopposer to natural philosophy; again, the exclusive attention paid to\nmorals and politics by the Romans, and since the Christian era to\ntheology by every acute mind; still farther, the great authority which\ncertain philosophers have professed, and the great reverence given, to\nantiquity; and in fine, a want of courage and a despair of overcoming\nthe many and great difficulties which lie in the way of the\ninvestigation of nature. All these causes have contributed to keep down\nthe sciences. Hence they must now be renewed, and regenerated, and\nreformed in their most fundamental principles; there must now be found a\nnew basis of knowledge and new principles of science. This radical\nreformation of the sciences depends upon two conditions, objectively\nupon the referring of science to experience and the philosophy of\nnature, and subjectively upon the purifying of the sense and the\nintellect from all abstract theories and traditional prejudices. Both\nconditions furnish the correct method of natural science, which is\nnothing other than the method of induction. Upon a true induction\ndepends all the soundness of the sciences.\n\nIn these propositions the Baconian philosophy is contained. The\nhistorical significance of its founder is, therefore, in general\nthis,\u2014that he directed the attention and reflection of his\ncontemporaries again upon the given actuality, upon nature; that he\naffirmed the necessity of experience, which had been formerly only a\nmatter of accident, and made it as in and for itself an object of\nthought. His merit consists in having brought up the principle of\nscientific empiricism, and only in this. Strictly speaking, we can allow\nno _content_ to the Baconian philosophy, although (in his treatise _de\naugmentis scientiarum_) he has attempted a systematic encyclopedia of\nthe sciences according to a new principle of classification, through\nwhich he has scattered an abundance of fine and fruitful observations,\nwhich are still used as apothegms.\n\n7. THE ITALIAN PHILOSOPHERS OF THE TRANSITION EPOCH.\u2014Besides Bacon,\nother phenomena must be noticed which have prepared and introduced the\nnew age of philosophy. First among these is a list of Italian\nphilosophers, from the second half of the sixteenth and the first half\nof the seventeenth century. These philosophers are connected in a\ntwofold manner with the movements already sketched of this transition\nperiod, first by an enthusiasm for nature which among them all partook\nin a greater or less degree of pantheism (Vanini _e. g._ gave to one of\nhis writings the title \u201cconcerning the wonderful secrets of nature, the\nqueen and goddess of mortals\u201d), and second, by their connection with the\nsystems of ancient philosophy. The best known of these philosophers are\nthe following: _Cardanus_ (1501-1575), _Campanella_ (1568-1639),\n_Giordano Bruno_ (\u20141600), _Vanini_ (1586-1619.) They were all men of a\npassionate, enthusiastic and impetuous nature, unsteady and wild in\ncharacter, restless and adventurous in life, men who were inspired by an\neager impulse towards knowledge, but who were carried away by great\nfantasy, wildness of imagination, and a seeking after secret\nastrological and geomantic knowledge. For these reasons they also passed\naway, leaving no fruitful result behind. They were all persecuted by the\nhierarchy, and two of them (Bruno and Vanini) ended their lives at the\nstake. In their whole historical appearance they are like the eruption\nof a volcano, and are to be regarded more as forerunners and announcers\nthan as beginners and founders of the new age of philosophy. The most\nimportant among them is _Giordano Bruno_. He reviewed the old idea of\nthe Stoics, that the world is a living being, and that a world-soul\npenetrates it all. The content of his general thought is the profoundest\nenthusiasm for nature, and the plastic reason which is present in it.\nThe reason is, according to him, the inner artist who shapes the matter\nand manifests himself in the forms of the universe. From the heart of\nthe root or the germ he sends out the lobes, and from these again he\nevolves the shoots, and from the shoots the branches, until bud, and\nleaf, and blossom are brought forth. Every thing is arranged, adjusted,\nand perfected within. Thus the universal reason calls back from within\nthe sap out of the fruits and flowers to the branches again, &c. The\nuniverse thus is an infinite living thing, in which every thing lives\nand moves after the most manifold way.\n\nThe relation of the reason to matter, Bruno determines wholly in the\nAristotelian manner; both stand related to each other as form and\nmatter, as actuality and potentiality, neither is without the other; the\nform is the inner impelling might of matter, and matter, as the\nunlimited possibility, as the capability for an infinite diversity of\nform, is the mother of all forms. The other side of Bruno\u2019s\nphilosophizing, his elaboration of the topics of Lullus, which occupies\nthe greater part of his writings, has little philosophic interest, and\nwe therefore pass it by.\n\n8. JACOB BOEHME.\u2014As Bacon among the English and Bruno among the\nItalians, so _Jacob Boehme_ is the index among the Germans of this\ntransition period. Each one of these three indicates it in a way\npeculiar to his own nationality; Bacon as the herald of empiricism,\nBruno as the representative of a poetic pantheism, and Boehme as the\nfather of the theosophic mysticism. If we regarded alone the\nprofoundness of his principle, Boehme should hold a much later place in\nthe history of philosophy, but if we looked chiefly at the imperfect\nform of his philosophizing, his rank would be assigned to the mystics of\nthe Middle Ages, while chronologically we must associate him with the\nGerman Reformation and the protestant elements that were nourished at\nthat time. His true position is among the forerunners and prophets of\nthe new age.\n\nJacob Boehme was born in 1575, in old Seidenburg, a village of upper\nLusace, not far from Goerlitz. His parents were poor peasants. In his\nboyhood be took care of the cattle, and in his youth, after he had\nacquired the rudiments of reading and writing in a village school, he\nwas sent to Goerlitz to learn the shoe-maker\u2019s art. He finished his\napprenticeship and settled down at Goerlitz in 1594 as master of his\ntrade. Even in his youth he had received illuminations or mysterious\nrevealings, which were subsequently repeated when his soul, striving for\nthe truth, had become profoundly agitated by the religious conflicts of\nthe age. Besides the Bible, the only books which Boehme read were some\nmystical writings of a theosophic and alchymistic content, _e. g._ those\nof Paracelsus. His entire want of culture is seen as soon as he\nundertakes to write down his thoughts, or, as he calls them, his\nilluminations. Hence the imperious struggle of the thought with the\nexpression, which, however, not unfrequently rises to a dialectical\nacuteness and a poetic beauty. His first treatise, Aurora, composed in\nthe year 1612, brought Boehme into trouble with the chief pastor in\nGoerlitz, Gregorious Richter, who publicly condemned the book from the\npulpit, and even ridiculed the person of its author. The writing of\nbooks was prohibited him by a magistrate, a prohibition which Boehme\nobserved for many years, till at length the command of the spirit was\ntoo mighty within him, and he took up again his literary labors. Boehme\nwas a plain, quiet, modest and gentle man. He died in 1624.\n\nTo give an exhibition of his theosophy in a few words is very difficult,\nsince Boehme, instead of clothing his thoughts in a logical form,\ndressed them only in pictures of the sense and obscure analogies, and\noften availed himself of the most arbitrary and singular modes of\nexpression. A twilight reigns in his writings, as in a Gothic cathedral\nwhere the light falls through variegated windows. Hence the magic effect\nwhich he has made upon many hearts. The chief thought of his\nphilosophizing is this, viz., that the distinguishing of the self from\nthe not-self is the essential determination of spirit, and hence of God\nso far as God is to be apprehended as spirit. God, according to Boehme,\nis living spirit only at the time and in the degree in which he\nconceives the distinction within himself from himself, and is in this\ndistinction object and consciousness. The distinction of God in himself\nis the only source of his and of all actuosity and spontaneity, the\nspring and fountain of that self-active life which produces\nconsciousness out of itself. Boehme is inexhaustible in images by which\nthis negativity in God, his self-distinguishing and self-renunciation to\nthe world, may be made conceivable. The great expansion without end, he\nsays, needs limitation and a compass in which it may manifest itself,\nfor in expansion without limit there could be no manifestation, there\nmust be a contraction and an enclosing, in order that a manifestation\nmay arise. See, he says in another place, if the will were only of one\nkind, then would the soul have only one quality, and were an immovable\nthing, which would always lie still and never do any thing farther than\none thing; in this there could be no joy, as also no art nor science of\nother things, and no wisdom; every thing would be a nothing, and there\nwould be neither heart nor will for any thing, for there would be only\nthe single. Hence it cannot be said that the whole God is in one will\nand essence, there is a distinction. Nothing can ever become manifest to\nitself without resistance, for if it has nothing resisting, it expends\nitself and never comes to itself again; but if it does not come to\nitself again except in that from which it has originally sprung, it thus\nknows nothing of its original condition. The above thought Boehme\nexpresses when he says in his _Questionibus Theosophicis_; the reader\nshould know that in yea and nay all things consist, whether divine,\ndevilish, earthly, or whatever may be named. The one as the yea, is\nsimple energy and love, and is the truth of God and God himself. But\nthis were inconceivable, and there were neither delight, nor importance,\nnor sensibility, without the nay. The nay is thrown in the way of the\nyea, or of truth, in order that the truth may be manifest and something,\nin which there may be a contrarium, where eternal love may work and\nbecome sensitive and willing. There is nothing in the one which is an\noccasion for willing until the one becomes duplicated, and so there can\nbe no sensation in unity, but only in duality. In brief, according to\nBoehme, neither knowledge nor consciousness is possible, without\ndistinction, without opposition, without duplication; a thing becomes\nclear and an object of consciousness only through something else,\nthrough its own opposition identical with its own being. It was very\nnatural to connect this thought of a unity distinguishing itself in\nitself, with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, as Boehme has, in\nfact, repeatedly done when treating of the Divine life and its process\nof duplication. Schelling afterwards took up these ideas of Boehme and\nphilosophically elaborated them.\n\nIf we should assign to the theosophy of Boehme a position in the\ndevelopment of later philosophy corresponding to the inner content of\nits principle, it would most properly be placed as a complement to the\nsystem of _Spinoza_. If Spinoza taught the flowing back of all the\nfinite into the eternal one, Boehme, on the other hand, shows the\nprocession of the finite from the eternal one, and the inner necessity\nof this procession, since the being of this one would be rather a\nnot-being without such a self-duplication. Compared with Descartes,\nBoehme has at least more profoundly apprehended the conception of\nself-consciousness and the relation of the finite to God. But his\nhistorical position in other respects is far too isolated and\nexceptional, and his mode of statement far too impure, to warrant us in\nincorporating him anywhere in a series of systems developed continuously\nand in a genetic connection.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXIV.\n\nDESCARTES.\n\n\nThe beginner and founder of modern philosophy is _Descartes_. While he,\nlike the men of the transition epoch just noticed, broke loose entirely\nfrom the previous philosophizing, and began his work wholly _de novo_,\nyet he did not content himself, like Bacon, with merely bringing out a\nnew method, or like Boehme and his contemporaries among the Italians,\nwith affirming philosophical views without a methodical ground. He went\nfurther than any of these, and making his standpoint one of universal\ndoubt, he affirms a new, positive, and pregnant philosophical principle,\nfrom which he attempted logically to deduce the chief points of his\nsystem. The character and novelty of his principle makes him the\nbeginner, and its inner fruitfulness the founder, of modern philosophy.\n\nRene Descartes (_Renatus Cartesius_) was born in 1596, at La Haye in\nTorraine. Possessing an independent property, he volunteered as a\nsoldier in his twenty-first year, and served in the wars with the Dutch,\nthe Bavarians, and the Imperialists. After this he travelled a good\ndeal, and then abode a considerable time in Paris. In 1629 he left his\nnative land, and betook himself to Holland, that he might there,\nundisturbed and unknown, devote himself to philosophy, and elaborate his\nscientific ideas. He spent twenty years in Holland, enduring much\nvexatious treatment from fanatical theologians, till in 1649 he accepted\nan invitation from Queen Christina of Sweden, to visit Stockholm, where\nhe died in the following year.\n\nThe chief content of the Cartesian system may be seen condensed in the\nfollowing epitome.\n\n1. If science would have any thing fixed and abiding, it must begin with\nthe primal ground of things; every presupposition which we may have\ncherished from infancy must be abandoned; in a word, we must doubt at\nevery point to which the least uncertainty is attached. We must\ntherefore doubt not only the existence of the objects of sense, since\nthe senses so frequently deceive, but also the truths of mathematics and\ngeometry\u2014for, however evident the proposition may appear that two and\nthree make five, or that the square has four sides, yet we cannot know\nbut what God may have designedly formed us for erroneous judgments. It\nis therefore advisable to doubt every thing, in fact to deny every\nthing, to posit every thing as false.\n\n2. But though we posit every thing as false to which the slightest doubt\nmay be attached, yet we cannot deny one thing, viz., the truth that we,\nwho so think, do exist. But rather from the very fact that I posit every\nthing as false, that I doubt every thing, is it manifest that I, the\ndoubter, exist. Hence the proposition: I think, therefore I am (_cogito\nergo sum_), is the first and most certain position which offers itself\nto every one attempting to philosophize. Upon this the most certain of\nall propositions, the certainty of all other knowledge depends. The\nobjection of _Gassendi_ that the truth of existence follows from any\nother activity of man as well as from thinking, that I might just as\nwell say: I go to walk, therefore I exist,\u2014has no weight; for, of all my\nactions, I can be absolutely certain only of my thinking.\n\n3. From the proposition I think, therefore, I am, the whole nature of\nthe mind may be determined. When we examine who we are who hold every\nthing to be false that is distinct from ourselves, we see clearly that\nneither extension nor figure, nor any thing which can be predicated of\nbody, but only thought, belongs to our nature. I am therefore only a\nthinking being, _i. e._ mind, soul, intelligence, reason. Thought is my\nsubstance. Mind can therefore be apprehended clearly and completely for\nitself alone, without any of those attributes which belong to body. Its\nconception contains nothing of that which belongs to the conception of\nbody. It is therefore impossible to apprehend it through any sensuous\nrepresentation, or to make an image of it: it apprehends itself only\nthrough the pure intelligence.\n\n4. From the proposition _cogito ergo sum_, follows still farther the\nuniversal rule of all certainty. I am certain that I am a thinking\nbeing, what now is involved in the fact that I am certain of any thing?\nWhence comes this certainty? From no other source than the knowledge\nthat this first proposition contains a clear conception of that which I\naffirm. I know of a certainty that I am, and I know any thing else only\nwhen I know it as certainly as I know that I am. Hence I may regard it\nas a universal rule, that every thing is true which I know clearly and\ndeterminately.\n\n5. This rule, however, is only a principle of certainty, not of\nknowledge and of truth. We apply it therefore to our thoughts or ideas,\nin order to discover what is objectively true. But our ideas are partly\ninnate, partly acquired, and partly self-originated. Among those of the\nfirst class we find the idea of a God. The question arises, whence have\nwe this idea? Manifestly not from ourselves; this idea could only be\nimplanted within us by a being who has the fulness of all perfection in\nhimself, _i. e._ only by an actually existing God. If I ask now the\nquestion, whence have I the faculty to conceive of a nature more perfect\nthan my own? the answer must ever come, that I have it only from him\nwhose nature is actually more perfect. All the attributes of God, the\nmore I contemplate them, show that their idea could not have originated\nwith myself alone. For though there might be in me the idea of substance\nbecause I am a substance, yet I could not of myself have the idea of an\ninfinite substance, since I am finite; such an idea could only be given\nme through a substance actually infinite. Moreover, we must not think\nthat the conception of the infinite is to be gained through abstraction\nand negation, as we might gain darkness through the negation of light;\nbut I perceive, rather, that the infinite contains more reality than the\nfinite, and that, therefore, the conception of the infinite must be\ncorrespondingly antecedent in me to that of the finite. Since then I\nhave a clear and determined idea of the infinite substance, and since\nthis has a greater objective reality than every other, so is there no\nother which I have so little reason to doubt. But now since I am certain\nthat the idea of God has come to me from God himself, it only remains\nfor me to examine the way in which I have received it from God. I have\nnever derived it directly nor indirectly from the sense, for ideas\nthrough the sense arise only by affecting the external organs of sense;\nneither have I devised it, for I can neither add to it nor diminish it\nin any respect,\u2014it must, therefore, be innate as the idea of myself is\ninnate. Hence the first proof we can assign for the being of a God is\nthe fact that we find the idea of a God within us, and that we must have\na cause for its being. Again, the being of a God may be concluded from\nmy own imperfection, and especially from the knowledge of my\nimperfection. For since I know that there is a perfection which is\nwanting in me, it follows that there must exist a being who is more\nperfect than I, on whom I depend and from whom I receive all I\npossess.\u2014But the best and most evident proof for the being of a God is,\nin fine, that which is gained from the conception of a God. The mind\namong all its different ideas singles out the chiefest of all, that of\nthe most perfect being, and perceives that this has not only the\npossibility of existence, _i. e._ accidental existence like all other\nideas, but that it possesses necessary existence in itself. And as the\nmind knows that in every triangle its three angles are equal to two\nright angles, because this is involved in the very idea of a triangle,\nso does the mind necessarily infer that necessary existence belongs to\nthe conception of the most perfect being, and that, therefore, the most\nperfect being actually exists. No other idea which the mind finds within\nitself contains necessary existence, but from the idea of the highest\nbeing existence cannot be separated without contradiction. It is only\nour prejudices which keep us from seeing this. Since we are accustomed\nin every thing to separate its conception from its existence, and since\nwe often make ideas arbitrarily, it readily happens, that when we\ncontemplate the highest being we are in doubt whether its idea may not\nbe one also arbitrarily devised, or at least one in whose conception\nexistence does not lie.\u2014This proof is essentially different from that of\nThomas (Anselm of Canterbury). His argument was as follows: \u201cIf we\nunderstand what is indicated by the word GOD, it is all that can be\nconceived of greatness; but now there is actually and in thought more\nbelonging to him than the word represents, and therefore God exists not\nonly in word (or representation), but in fact.\u201d Here the defect in the\nsyllogism is manifest, for from the premise it could only be concluded\nthat God must therefore be _represented_ as existing in fact, while his\nactual existence would not follow. My proof on the other hand is\nthis,\u2014we may predicate of a thing what we clearly see belongs to its\ntrue and changeless nature, or to its essence, or to its form. But now\nafter we had examined what God is, we found existence to belong to his\ntrue and changeless nature, and therefore may we properly predicate\nexistence of God. Necessary existence is contained in the idea of the\nmost perfect being, not by a fiction of our understanding but because\nexistence belongs to his eternal and changeless nature.\n\n6. The result just found\u2014the existence of God\u2014is of the highest\nconsequence. Before attaining this we were obliged to doubt every thing,\nand give up even every certainty, for we did not know but that it\nbelonged to the nature of the human mind to err, but that God had\ncreated us for error. But so soon as we look at the necessary attributes\nof God in the innate idea of him, so soon as we know that he is true, it\nwould be a contradiction to suppose that he would deceive us, or that he\ncould have made us to err; for though an ability to deceive might prove\nhis skill, a willingness to deceive would only demonstrate his frailty.\nOur reason, therefore, can never apprehend an object which would not be\ntrue so far as the reason apprehended it, _i. e._ so far as it is\nclearly known. For God might justly be styled a deceiver if he had given\nus a reason so perverted as to hold the false for the true. And thus\nevery absolute doubt with which we began is dispelled. From the being of\nGod we derive every certainty. For every sure knowledge it is only\nnecessary that we have clearly known a thing, and are also certain of\nthe existence of a God, who would not deceive.\n\n7. From the true idea of God follow the principles of a philosophy of\nnature or the doctrine of the two substances. Substance is that which so\nexists that it needs nothing else for its existence. In this (highest)\nsense God is the only substance. God, as the infinite substance, has his\nground in himself, is the cause of himself. The two created substances,\non the other hand, the thinking and the corporeal substance, mind and\nmatter, are substances only in a broader sense of the word; they may be\napprehended under the common conception that they are things which need\nonly the co-operation of God for their existence. Each of these two\nsubstances has an attribute which constitutes its nature and its\nessence, and to which all its other determinations may be referred. The\nattribute and essence of matter is extension, that of mind, thought. For\nevery thing else which can be predicated of body presupposes extension,\nand is only a mode of extension, as every thing we can find in mind is\nonly a modification of thought. A substance to which thought immediately\nbelongs is called mind, and a substance, whose immediate substratum is\nextension, is called body. Since thought and extension are distinct from\neach other, and since mind cannot only be known without the attributes\nof the body, but is in itself the negation of those attributes, we may\nsay that the essence of these substances is in their reciprocal\nnegation. Mind and body are wholly distinct, and have nothing in common.\n\n8. We pass by the physics of Descartes, which has only a subordinate\nphilosophical interest, and notice next his views of anthropology. From\nthis dualistic relation between mind and matter, there follows a\ndualistic relation between soul and body. If matter is essentially\nextension, and mind essentially thought, and if the two have nothing in\ncommon, then the union of soul and body can be conceived only as a\nmechanical one. The body is to be regarded as an artistic automaton,\nwhich God has made, as a statue or machine formed by God from the earth.\nWithin this body the soul dwells, closely but not internally connected\nwith it. The union of the two is only a powerful bringing of the two\ntogether, since each is not only an independent factor, but is\nessentially distinct from and even opposed to the other. The body by\nitself is a machine fully prepared, in which nothing is changed by the\nentrance of the thinking soul, except that through it certain motions\nare secured: the wheel-work of the machine remains as it was. It is only\nthought which distinguishes this machine from every other; hence,\ntherefore, brutes which are not self-conscious nor thinking, must be\nranked with all other machines. From this standpoint arose especially\nthe question concerning the seat of the soul. If body and soul are\nindependent substances, each essentially opposed to the other, they\ncannot interpenetrate each other, but can touch only at one point when\nthey are powerfully brought together. This point where the soul has its\nseat, is, according to Descartes, not the whole brain but the pineal\ngland, a little kernel in the middle of the brain. The proof for this\nclaim, that the pineal gland is the only place where the soul\nimmediately exhibits its energy, is found in the circumstance that all\nother parts of the brain are twofold, which should not be in an organ\nwhere the soul has its seat, else objects would appear double. There is,\ntherefore, no other place in the body where impressions can be so well\nunited as in this gland. The pineal gland is, therefore, the chief seat\nof the soul, and the place where all our thoughts are formed.\n\nWe have thus developed the fundamental thoughts of the Cartesian system,\nand will now recapitulate in a few words the features characteristic of\nits standpoint and historic position. Descartes was the founder of a new\nepoch in philosophy, _first_, from his postulate of universal freedom\nfrom all preconceptions. His protesting against every thing which is not\nposited by the thought, against taking any thing for granted in respect\nof the truth, has remained from that time onward the fundamental\nprinciple of the new age. _Secondly._ Descartes has brought out the\nprinciple of self-consciousness (the mind or the thinking substance is\nregarded by him as an individual self, a particular Ego)\u2014a new\nprinciple, unknown in this view to the ancients. _Thirdly._ Descartes\nhas shown the opposition between being and thought, existence and\nconsciousness, and the mediation of this opposition, which has been the\nproblem of the whole modern philosophy, he first affirmed as the true\nphilosophical problem. But with these ideas, which make an epoch in the\nhistory of philosophy, there are at the same time connected the defects\nof the Cartesian philosophizing. _First._ Descartes gained the content\nof his system, namely his three substances, empirically. True, the\nsystem which begins with a protestation against all existence would seem\nto take nothing for granted, but to derive every thing from the\nthinking. But in fact this protesting is not thoroughly carried out.\nThat which seems to be cast aside is afterwards, when the principle of\ncertainty is gained, taken up again unchanged. And so it happens that\nDescartes finds at hand not only the idea of God, but his two substances\nas something _immediately given_. True, in order to reach them, he\nabstracts every thing which lies immediately before him, but in the end\nthe two substances are seen as that which remains when all else is\nabstracted. They are received _empirically_. The _second_ defect is,\nthat Descartes separates so wholly from each other the two sides of the\nopposition between thought and being. He posits both as \u201csubstances,\u201d\n_i. e._ as powers, which reciprocally exclude and negate each other. The\nessence of matter according to him consists _only_ in extension, _i. e._\nin the pure being _extra se_ (_Aussersichsein_), and that of mind _only_\nin thought, _i. e._ in the pure being _in se_ (_Insichsein_.) The two\nstand over against each other as centrifugal and centripetal. But with\nthis apprehension of mind and matter, an inner mediation of the two is\nan impossibility; there must be a powerful act of creation, there must\nbe the divine assistance in order that the two sides may ever come\ntogether, and be united as they are in man. Nevertheless Descartes\ndemands and attempts such a mediation of the two sides. But the\nimpossibility of truly overcoming the dualism of his standpoint is the\n_third_, and the chief defect of his system. In the proposition \u201cI\nthink, therefore I am,\u201d or \u201cI am thinking,\u201d the two sides, being and\nthought, are indeed connected together, but only that they may become\nfixed independently in respect of each other. If the question is asked,\nhow does the Ego stand related to the extended? the answer can only be:\nby thinking, _i. e._ negatively, by excluding it. The idea of God,\ntherefore, is all that remains for the mediation of these two sides. The\ntwo substances are created by God, and through the divine will may be\nbound together; through the idea of God, the Ego attains the certainty\nthat the extended exists. God is therefore in a certain degree a _Deus\nex machina_, necessary in order to mediate the conflict of the Ego with\nthe extended. It is obvious how external such a mediation is.\n\nThis defect of the Cartesian system operated as an impelling motive to\nthose which succeeded.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXV.\n\nGEULINCX AND MALEBRANCHE.\n\n\n1. Mind and matter, consciousness and existence, Descartes had fixed in\nthe farthest separation from each other. Both, with him, are substances,\nindependent powers, reciprocally excluding oppositions. Mind (_i. e._ in\nhis view the simple self, the Ego) he regarded as essentially the\nabstraction from the sensuous, the distinguishing itself from matter and\nthe separating of matter from itself; matter was essentially the\ncomplete opposition to thought. If the relation of these two powers be\nas has been given, then the question arises, how can there ever be a\nfiliation (_Rapport_) between them? How, on the one hand, can the\naffections of the body work upon the soul, and on the other hand, how\ncan the volition of the soul direct the body, if the two are absolutely\ndistinct and opposed to each other? At this point, _Arnold Geulincx_ (a\ndisciple of Descartes, born at Antwerp 1625, and died as professor of\nphilosophy at Leyden 1669) took up the Cartesian system, and endeavored\nto give it a greater logical perfection. According to Geulincx neither\nthe soul works immediately upon the body, nor the body immediately upon\nthe soul. Certainly not the former: for though _I_ can determine and\nmove my body in many respects arbitrarily, yet _I_ am not the cause of\nthis movement; for I know not how it happens, I know not in what manner\nmotion is communicated from my brain to the different parts of my body,\nand it is impossible that I should do that in respect of which I cannot\nsee how it is done. But if I cannot produce motion in my body, much less\ncan I do this outside of my body. I am therefore simply a contemplator\nof the world; the only act which is peculiarly mine is contemplation.\nBut even this contemplation arises in a singular manner. For if we ask\nhow we obtain our observations of the external world, we find it\nimpossible that the external world should directly give them to us. For\nhowever much we may say that, _e. g._ in the act of seeing, the external\nobjects produce an image in my eye or an impression in my brain as in\nwax, yet this impression or picture is after all only something\ncorporeal or material, and cannot therefore come into my mind, which is\nabsolutely distinct from every thing material. There remains, therefore,\nonly that we seek the mediation of the two sides in God. It is God alone\nwho can unite the outer with the inner, and the inner with the outer;\nwho can make the outer phenomena to become inner representations or\nnotions of the mind; who can thus bring the world within the mind\u2019s\nobservation, and the inner determinations of the will outward into deed.\nHence every working, every act which unites the outer and inner, which\nbrings the mind and the world into connection, is neither a working of\nthe mind nor of the world, but only an immediate working of God. The\nmovement of my limbs does not follow from my will, but only because it\nis the will of God that these movements should follow when I will. My\nwill is an _occasion_ by which God moves my body\u2014an affection of my body\nis an _occasion_ by which God brings within me a representation of the\nexternal world: the one is only the occasional cause of the other (hence\nthe name occasionalism). My will, however, does not move God to move my\nlimbs, but he who has imparted motion to matter and given it its laws,\ncreated also my will, and has so connected together the most diverse\nthings, the movement of matter and the arbitrium of my will, that when\nmy will puts forth a volition, such a motion follows as it wills, and\nthe motion follows the volition without any interaction or physical\ninfluence exerted by the one upon the other. But just as it is with two\nclocks which go exactly alike, the one striking precisely as the other,\ntheir harmony is not the result of any reciprocal interacting, but\nfollows because both have been fashioned and directed alike,\u2014so is it\nwith the movements of the body and the will, they harmonize only through\nthat exalted artist who has in this ineffable way connected them\ntogether. We see from this that Geulincx has carried to its limit the\ndualistic basis of Descartes. While Descartes called the union of mind\nand matter a conjunction through power, Geulincx named it a miracle.\nThere is consequently in this view no immanent, but only a transcendent\nmediation possible.\n\n2. Closely connected with this view of Geulincx, and at the same time a\nreal consequence and a wider development of the Cartesian\nphilosophizing, is the philosophic standpoint of _Nicolas Malebranche_.\nHe was born at Paris in 1638, chosen a member of the \u201c_Congr\u00e9gation de\nl\u2019oratoire_\u201d in his twenty-second year, won over to philosophy through\nthe writings of Descartes, and died, after numerous feuds with\ntheological opposers, in 1715.\n\nMalebranche started with the Cartesian view of the relation between mind\nand matter. Both are strictly distinct from each other, and in their\nessence opposed. How now does the mind, (_i. e._ the Ego) gain a\nknowledge of the external world and have ideas of corporeal things? For\nit comes to know things only by means of ideas,\u2014not through itself, not\nimmediately. Now the mind can neither gain these ideas from itself, nor\nfrom the things themselves. Not from itself, for it is absolutely\nopposed to the bodily world, and hence has no capacity to idealize, to\nspiritualize material things, though they must become spiritualized\nbefore they can be introduced to the mind; in a word, the mind, which in\nrelation to the material world is only an opposition, has no power to\ndestroy this opposition. Just as little has the mind derived these ideas\nfrom things: for matter is not visible through itself, but rather as\nantithetic to mind is it that which is absolutely unintelligible, and\nwhich cannot be idealized, that which is absolutely without light and\nclearness.\u2014It only remains, therefore, that the mind beholds things in a\nthird that stands above the opposition of the two, viz., God. God, as\nthe absolute substance, is the absolute ideality, the infinite power to\nspiritualize all things. Material things have no real opposition for\nGod, to him they are no impenetrable darkness, but an ideal existence;\nall things are in him spiritually and ideally; the whole world, as\nintellectual or ideal, is God. God is, therefore, the higher mean\nbetween the Ego and the external world. In him we behold ideas, we being\nso strictly united with him, that he may properly be called the place of\nminds.\n\nThe philosophy of Malebranche, whose simple thought is this, that we\nknow and see all things in God,\u2014shows itself, like the occasionalism of\nGeulincx, to be a peculiar attempt to stand upon the basis of the\nCartesian philosophy, and with its fundamental thought to overcome its\ndualism.\n\n3. Two defects or inner contradictions have manifested themselves in the\nphilosophy of Descartes. He had considered mind and matter as\nsubstances, each one of which excluded the other from itself, and had\nsought a mediation of the two. But with such conditions no mediation\nother than an external one is possible. If thought and existence are\neach one substance, then can they only negate and exclude each other.\nUnnatural theories, like those which have been mentioned, are the\ninevitable result of this. The simplest way out of the difficulty is to\ngive up the principle first assumed, to strip off their independence\nfrom the two opposites, and instead of regarding them as substances,\nview them as accidents of one substance. This way of escape is moreover\nindicated by a particular circumstance. According to Descartes, God is\nthe infinite substance, the peculiar substance in the proper sense of\nthe word. Mind and matter are indeed substances, but only in relation to\neach other; in relation to God they are dependent, and not substances.\nThis is, strictly taken, a contradiction. The true consequence were\nrather to say that neither the Ego (_i. e._ the individual thinking) nor\nthe material things are independent, but that this can be predicated\nonly of the one substance, God; this substance alone has a real being,\nand all the being which belongs to individual essences these latter\npossess not as a substantial being, but only as accidents of the one\nonly true and real substance. Malebranche approached this consequence.\nWith him the bodily world is ideally at least resolved and made to sink\nin God, in whom are the eternal archetypes of all things. But _Spinoza_\nhas most decidedly and logically adopted this consequence, and affirmed\nthe accidence of all individual being and the exclusive substantiality\nof God alone. His system is the perfection and the truth of the\nCartesian.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXVI.\n\nSPINOZA.\n\n\nBaruch or Benedict Spinoza was born at Amsterdam, Nov. 24, 1632. His\nparents were Jews of Portuguese descent, and being merchants of\nopulence, they gave him a finished education. He studied with great\ndiligence the Bible and the Talmud, but soon exchanged the pursuit of\ntheology for the study of physics and the works of Descartes. He early\nbecame dissatisfied with Judaism, and presently came to an open rupture\nwith it, though without going over formally to Christianity. In order to\nescape the persecutions of the Jews, who had excommunicated him, and who\neven went so far as to make an attempt upon his life, he left Amsterdam\nand betook himself to Rhynsberg, near Leyden. He finally settled down at\nthe Hague, where he spent his life in the greatest seclusion, devoted\nwholly to scientific pursuits. He supported himself by grinding optic\nglasses, which his friends sold for him. The Elector Palatine, Charles\nLouis, offered him a Professorship of Philosophy at Heidelberg, with the\nfull permission to teach as he chose, but Spinoza declined the post.\nNaturally of a weak constitution, which consumption had for many years\nbeen undermining, Spinoza died at the age of 44, on the 21st of\nFebruary, 1677. In his life there was mirrored the unclouded clearness\nand exalted serenity of the perfected sage. Abstemious in his habits,\nsatisfied with little, the master of his passions, never intemperately\nsad nor joyous, gentle and benevolent, with a character of singular\nexcellence and purity, he faithfully illustrated in his life, the\ndoctrines of his philosophy. His chief work, the _Ethica_, appeared the\nyear of his death. His design was probably to have published it during\nhis life, but the odious report that he was an atheist restrained him.\nThe friend he most trusted, Louis Mayer, a physician, attended to its\npublication after the author\u2019s death and according to his will.\n\nThe system of Spinoza rests upon three fundamental conceptions, from\nwhich all the rest may be derived with mathematical necessity. These\nconceptions are that of substance, of attribute, and of mode.\n\n1. Spinoza starts from the Cartesian conception of substance: substance\nis that which needs nothing other for its existence. But with such a\nconception there can exist only one single substance. A number of\nsubstances like that of Descartes is necessarily a contradiction. There\ncan be nothing which has a substantial being besides the one substance\nof all things. This one substance Spinoza calls God. Of course, with\nsuch a view, the Christian idea of God, the notion of a spiritual and\npersonal being, must be laid aside. Spinoza expressly declares, that his\nnotion of God is entirely different from that of the Christian; he\ndenied that understanding and will could be predicated of God; he\nridiculed those who supposed that God worked for an end, and even\nscorned the view which regarded the world as a product of the Divine\nwilling or thinking. God is, with him, only substance, and nothing more.\nThe propositions that there is only one God, and that the substance of\nall things is only one, are with him identical.\n\nWhat now peculiarly is this substance? What is positive being? This\nquestion it is very difficult to answer directly from the standpoint of\nSpinoza, partly because a definition, according to him, must contain\n(_i. e._ must be genetically) the immediate cause of that which is to be\nexplained, but substance is uncreated and can have no cause besides\nitself; but prominently because Spinoza held that every determination is\na negation, since it must indicate a want of existence, a relative\nnot-being. (_Omnis determinatio est negatio_ is an expression which,\nthough he uses it only occasionally, expresses the fundamental idea of\nhis whole system.) Hence, by setting up any positive determinations of\nbeing, we only take away from substance its infinity and make it finite.\nWhen we therefore affirm any thing concerning it, we can only speak\nnegatively, _e. g._ that it has no foreign cause, that it has no\nplurality, that it cannot be divided, etc. It is even reluctantly that\nSpinoza declares concerning it that it is one, for this predicate might\nreadily be taken numerically, as implying that others, the many, stood\nover against it. Thus there can remain only such positive affirmations\nrespecting it as express its absolute reference to itself. In this sense\nSpinoza says that substance is the cause of itself, _i. e._ its being\nconcludes existence in itself. When Spinoza calls it eternal, it is only\nanother expression for the same thought; for by eternity he understands\nexistence itself, so far as it is conceived to follow from the\ndefinition of the thing, in a sense similar to that in which\ngeometricians speak of the eternal properties of figures. Still farther\nhe calls substance infinite, because the conception of infinity\nexpressed to him the conception of true being, the absolute affirmation\nof existence. So also the expression, God is free, affirms nothing more\nthan those already mentioned, viz., negatively, that every foreign\nrestraint is excluded from him, and positively, that God is in harmony\nwith himself, that his being corresponds to the laws of his essence.\n\nThe comprehensive statement for the above is, that there is only one\ninfinite substance that excludes from itself all determination and\nnegation, and is named God, or nature.\n\n2. Besides the infinite substance or God, Descartes had assumed two\nother substances created by God, viz., mind (thought), and matter\n(extension). These two Spinoza considers in the light of attributes,\nthough, like Descartes, he receives them empirically. What, now, is the\nrelation of these attributes to the infinite substance? This is the\nsevere question, the tendon-Achilles of Spinoza\u2019s system. They cannot be\nessential forms in which the substance may manifest itself or appear,\nfor this would make them determine the essence of the substance, which\nwould contradict its conception as already given. Substance, as such, is\nneither understanding nor extension. If, then, the two attributes do not\nflow out of the essence of the substance, and do not constitute the\nsubstance, there remains only one other supposition, viz., that they are\nexternally attached to the substance; and this is, in fact, Spinoza\u2019s\nview. Attribute, according to him, is that which the understanding\nperceives in the substance as constituting its essence. But\nunderstanding, as Spinoza expressly says, does not belong to substance\nas such. Attributes, therefore, are those determinations which express\nthe essence of the substance only for the perceiving understanding;\nsince they express the essence of the substance in a determinate way,\nwhile substance itself has no determinate way of being, they can only\nfall outside the substance, viz., in the reflective understanding. To\nthe substance itself it is indifferent whether the understanding\ncontemplate it under these two attributes or not; the substance in\nitself has an infinity of attributes, _i. e._ every possible attribute\nwhich is not a limitation, may be predicated of it; it is only the human\nunderstanding which attaches these two attributes to the substance, and\nit affixes no more than these, because, among all the conceptions it can\nform, these alone are actually positive, or express a reality. God, or\nthe substance, is therefore thinking, in so far as the understanding\ncontemplates him under the attribute of thought, and is extended in so\nfar as the understanding contemplates him under the attribute of\nextension. It is, says Spinoza\u2014using a figure to express this relation\nof substance to attribute\u2014it is, like a surface reflecting the light,\nwhich (objectively taken) may be hot, though, in reference to the man\nlooking upon it, it is white. More accurately substance is a surface,\nstanding opposite to a beholder who can see only through yellow and blue\nglasses; to whom, therefore, the surface must appear either yellow or\nblue, though it is neither the one nor the other.\n\nIn relation to substance, therefore, the attributes must be apprehended\nas entirely independent: they must be conceived through themselves:\ntheir conception is not dependent upon that of substance. This is\nnecessarily true; for since the substance can have no determinateness,\nthen the attribute which is its determinate being, cannot be explained\nfrom the substance, but only through itself. Only by apprehending the\nattribute independently can the unity of the substance be maintained.\n\nIn relation to each other, the attributes are to be taken as opposites\nstrictly and determinately diverse. Between the bodily and the ideal\nworld there is no reciprocal influence nor interaction: a body can only\nspring from a body, and an idea can only have an idea for its source.\nHence, therefore, neither the mind can work upon the body nor the body\nupon the mind. Nevertheless there exists between the two worlds a\nperfect harmony and an entire parallelism. It is one and the same\nsubstance which is conceived under each of the two attributes, and under\nwhich one of the two we may contemplate it is indifferent to the\nsubstance itself, for each mode of contemplation is equally correct.\nFrom this follows at once the proposition of Spinoza, that the\nconnection of ideas and of things is the same. Hence the solution to the\nproblem of the relation of body and soul, so difficult to find from the\nCartesian standpoint, is readily seen from that of Spinoza. Body and\nsoul are one and the same thing, only viewed under different attributes.\nMind is nothing but the idea of body, _i. e._ it is the same thing as\nbody, only that it is viewed under the attribute of thought. In the same\nway is explained the apparent but not real influence of the body upon\nthe mind, and the mind upon the body. That which, in one point of view\nis bodily motion, in another is an act of thought. In short, the most\nperfect parallelism reigns between the world of bodily things and that\nof ideas.\n\n3. Individual beings, which considered under the attribute of thought\nare ideas, and under the attribute of extension are bodies, Spinoza\ncomprehends under the conception of accidence, or, as he calls it, mode.\nBy modes we are therefore to understand the changing forms of substance.\nThe modes stand related to the substance as the rippling waves of the\nsea to the water of the sea, as forms constantly disappearing and never\nhaving a real being. In fact this example goes too far, for the waves of\nthe sea are at least a part of the water of the sea, while the modes,\ninstead of being parts of the substance, are essentially nothing and\nwithout being. The finite has no existence as finite; only the infinite\nsubstance has actual existence. Substance, therefore, could not be\nregarded more falsely than if it should be viewed as made up of modes.\nThat would be, Spinoza remarks, as if one should say that the line is\nmade up out of points. It is just as false to affirm that Spinoza\nidentifies God and the world. He identifies them so little that he would\nrather say that the world, as world, _i. e._ as an aggregate of\nindividuals, does not at all exist; we might rather say with Hegel that\nhe denies the world (his system is an acosmism), than with Bayle, that\nhe makes every thing God, or that he ascribes divinity to every thing.\n\nWhence do finite things or individuals arise, if they can have no\nexistence by the side of substance? They are only the product of our\ndeceptive apprehension. There are two chief ways of knowledge\u2014the\nintuitive, through the reason, and the imaginative. To the latter belong\nthe knowledge of experience, and all that is abstract, superficial, and\nconfused; to the former, the collection of all fitting (adequate) ideas.\nIt is only the fault of the imagination that we should look upon the\nworld as a manifoldness of individuals; the manifoldness is only a form\nof representation. The imagination isolates and individualizes what the\nreason sees together in its unity. Hence it is only as considered\nthrough the imagination (experience or opinion) that modes are _things_;\nthe reason looks upon them as necessary, or, what is the same thing, as\neternal.\n\nSuch are the fundamental thoughts and features of Spinoza\u2019s system. His\n_practical philosophy_ yet remains to be characterized and in a few\nwords. Its chief propositions follow necessarily from the metaphysical\ngrounds already cited. First, it follows from these, that what is called\nfree will cannot be admitted. For since man is only a mode, he, like\nevery other mode, stands in an endless series of conditioning causes,\nand no free will can therefore be predicated of him. The will must thus,\nlike the body (and the resolution of the will is only a modification of\nthe body), be determined by something other than itself. Men regard\nthemselves as free only because they are conscious of their actions and\nnot of the determining causes. Just so the notions which one commonly\nconnects with the words good and evil, rest on an error as follows at\nonce from the conception of the absolute divine causality. Good and evil\nare not something actually in the things themselves, but only express\nrelative conceptions which we have formed from a comparison of things\nwith one another. Thus, by observing certain things we form a certain\nuniversal conception, which we thereupon treat as though it were the\nrule for the being and acting of all individuals, and if any individual\nvaries from this conception we fancy that it does not correspond to its\nnature, and is incomplete. Evil or sin is therefore only something\nrelative, for nothing happens against God\u2019s will. It is only a simple\nnegation or deprivation, which only seems to be a reality in our\nrepresentation. With God there is no idea of the evil. What is therefore\ngood and what evil? That is good which is useful to us, and that evil\nwhich hinders us from partaking of a good. That, moreover, is useful to\nus which brings us to a greater reality, which preserves and exalts our\nbeing. But our true being is knowledge, and hence that only is useful to\nus which aids us in knowing; the highest good is the knowledge of God;\nthe highest virtue of the mind is to know and love God. From the\nknowledge of God we gain the highest gladness and joy of the mind, the\nhighest blessedness. Blessedness, hence, is not the reward of virtue,\nbut virtue itself.\n\nThe grand feature of Spinoza\u2019s philosophy is that it buries every thing\nindividual and particular, as a finite, in the abyss of the divine\nsubstance. With its view unalterably fixed upon the eternal one, it\nloses sight of every thing which seems actual in the ordinary notions of\nmen. But its defect consists in its inability to transform this negative\nabyss of substance into the positive ground of all-being and becoming.\nThe substance of Spinoza, has been justly compared to the lair of a\nlion, which many footsteps enter, but from which none emerge. The\nexistence of the phenomenal world, though it be only the apparent and\ndeceptive reality of the finite, Spinoza does not explain. With his\nabstract conception of substance he cannot explain it. And yet the means\nto help him out of the difficulty lay near at hand. He failed to apply\nuniversally his fundamental principle that all determination is\nnegation; he applied it only to the finite, but the abstract infinite,\nin so far as it stands over against the finite, is also a determinate;\nthis infinite must be denied by its negation, which is the case when a\nfinite world is posited. Jacob Boehme rightly apprehended this, when he\naffirmed, that without a self-duplication, without an ingress into the\nlimited, the finite, the original ground of things is an empty nothing\n(_cf._ \u00a7 XXIII. 8). So the original ground of Spinoza is a nothing, a\npurely indeterminate, because with him substance was only a principle of\nunity and not also a principle of distinction, because its attributes,\ninstead of being an expression of an actual difference and a positive\ndistinction to itself, are rather wholly indifferent to itself. The\nsystem of Spinoza is the most abstract Monotheism that can be thought.\nIt is not accidental that its author, a Jew, should have brought out\nagain this view of the world, this view of absolute identity, for it is\nin a certain degree with him only a consequence of his national\nreligion\u2014an echo of the Orient.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXVII.\n\nIDEALISM AND REALISM.\n\n\nWe have now reached a point of divergence in the development of\nphilosophy. Descartes had affirmed and attempted to mediate the\nopposition, between thought and being, mind and matter. This mediation,\nhowever, was hardly successful, for the two sides of the opposition he\nhad fixed in their widest separation, when he posited them as two\nsubstances or powers, which reciprocally negated each other. The\nfollowers of Descartes sought a more satisfactory mediation, but the\ntheories to which they saw themselves driven, only indicated the more\nclearly that the whole premise from which they started must be given up.\nAt length Spinoza abandoned the false notion, and took away its\nsubstantiality from each of the two opposed principles. Mind and matter,\nthought and extension, are now one in the infinite substance. Yet they\nare not one _in themselves_, which would be the only true unity of the\ntwo. That they are one in the substance is of little avail, since they\nare indifferent to the substance, and are not immanent distinctions in\nit. Thus even with Spinoza the two remain strictly separate. The ground\nof this isolation we find in the fact that Spinoza himself did not\nsufficiently renounce the Cartesian notion, and thus could not escape\nthe Cartesian dualism. With him, as with Descartes, thought is _only_\nthought, and extension _only_ extension, and in such an apprehension of\nthe two, the one necessarily excludes the other. If we would find an\ninner mediation for the two, we must cease to abstract every thing\nessential from each. The opposite sides must be mediated even in their\nstrictest opposition. To do this, two ways alone were possible. A\nposition could be taken either on the material or on the ideal side, and\nthe attempt made to explain the ideal under the material, or the\nmaterial under the ideal, comprehending one through the other. Both\nthese attempts were in fact made, and at about the same time. The two\nparallel courses of a one-sided _idealism_, and a one-sided _realism_\n(Empiricism, Sensualism, Materialism), now begin their development.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXVIII.\n\nLOCKE.\n\n\nThe founder of the realistic course and the father of modern Empiricism\nand Materialism, is _John Locke_, an Englishman. _Thomas Hobbes_\n(1588-1679) was his predecessor and countryman, whose name we need here\nonly mention, as it has no importance except for the history of natural\nrights.\n\nJohn Locke was born at Wrington, 1632. His student years he devoted to\nphilosophy and prominently to medicine, though his weak health prevented\nhim from practising as a physician. Few cares of business interrupted\nhis leisure, and he devoted his time mostly to literary pursuits. His\nfriendly relations with Lord Anthony Ashley, afterwards Earl of\nShaftesbury, exerted a weighty influence upon his course in life. At the\nhouse of this distinguished statesman and author he always found the\nmost cordial reception, and an intercourse with the most important men\nof England. In the year 1670 he sketched for a number of friends the\nfirst plan of his famous _Essay on the Human Understanding_, though the\ncompleted work did not appear till 1689. Locke died aged 72 in the year\n1704. His writings are characterized by clearness and precision,\nopenness and determinateness. More acute than profound in his\nphilosophizing, he does not in this respect belie the characteristic of\nhis nation. The fundamental thoughts and results of his philosophy have\nnow become common property, especially among the English, though it\nshould not therefore be forgotten that he is the first who has\nscientifically established them, and is, on this account, entitled to a\ntrue place in the history of philosophy, even though his principle was\nwanting in an inner capacity for development.\n\nLocke\u2019s Philosophy (_i. e._ his theory of knowledge, for his whole\nphilosophizing expends itself in investigating the faculty of knowing)\nrests upon two thoughts, to which he never ceases to revert: first\n(negatively), there are no innate ideas; second (positively), all our\nknowledge arises from experience.\n\nMany, says Locke, suppose that there are innate ideas which the soul\nreceives coetaneous with its origin, and brings with it into the world.\nIn order to prove that these ideas are innate, it is said that they\nuniversally exist, and are universally valid with all men. But admitting\nthat this were so, such a fact would prove nothing if this universal\nharmony could be explained in any other way. But men mistake when they\nclaim such a fact. There is, in reality, no fundamental proposition,\ntheoretical or practical, which would be universally admitted. Certainly\nthere is no such practical principle, for the example of different\npeople as well as of different ages shows that there is no moral rule\nuniversally admitted as valid. Neither is there a theoretical one, for\neven those propositions which might lay the strongest claim to be\nuniversally valid, _e. g._ the proposition,\u2014\u201cwhat is, is,\u201d or\u2014\u201cit is\nimpossible that one and the same thing should be and not be at the same\ntime,\u201d\u2014receive by no means a universal assent. Children and idiots have\nno notion of these principles, and even uncultivated men know nothing of\nthese abstract propositions. They cannot therefore have been imprinted\non all men by nature. If ideas were innate, then they must be known by\nall from earliest childhood. For \u201cto be in the understanding,\u201d and \u201cto\nbecome known,\u201d is one and the same thing. The assertion therefore that\nthese ideas are imprinted on the understanding while it does not know\nit, is hence a manifest contradiction. Just as little is gained by the\nsubterfuge, that these principles come into the consciousness _so soon_\nas men use their reason. This affirmation is directly false, for these\nmaxims which are called universal come into the consciousness much later\nthan a great deal of other knowledge, and children, _e. g._ give many\nproofs of their use of reason before they know that it is impossible\nthat a thing should be and at the same time not be. It is only correct\nto say that no one becomes conscious of these propositions without\nreasoning,\u2014but to say that they are all known with the first reasoning\nis false. Moreover, that which is first known is not universal\npropositions, but relates to individual impressions. The child knows\nthat sweet is not bitter long before he understands the logical\nproposition of contradiction. He who carefully bethinks himself, will\nhesitate before he affirms that particular dicta as \u201csweet is not\nbitter,\u201d are derived from universal ones. If the universal propositions\nwere innate, then must they be the first in the consciousness of the\nchild; for that which nature has stamped upon the human soul must come\ninto consciousness antecedently to any thing which she has not written\nthere. Consequently, if there are no innate ideas, either theoretical or\npractical, there can be just as truly no innate art nor science. The\nunderstanding (or the soul) is essentially a _tabula rasa_,\u2014a blank and\nvoid space, a white paper on which nothing is written.\n\nHow now does the understanding become possessed of ideas? Only through\nexperience, upon which all knowledge rests, and on which as its\nprinciple all knowledge depends. Experience itself is twofold; either it\narises through the perception of external objects by means of the sense,\nin which case we call it sensation; or it is a perception of the\nactivities of our own understanding, in which case it is named the inner\nsense, or, better, reflection. Sensation and reflection give to the\nunderstanding all its ideas; they are the windows through which alone\nthe light of ideas falls upon the naturally dark space of the mind;\nexternal objects furnish us with the ideas of sensible qualities, and\nthe inner object, which is the understanding itself, offers us the ideas\nof its own activities. To show the derivation and to give an explanation\nof all the ideas derived from both is the problem of the Lockian\nphilosophy. For this end Locke divides ideas (representations or\nnotions) into _simple_ and _compound_. _Simple ideas_, he names those\nwhich are impressed from without upon the understanding while it remains\nwholly passive, just as the images of certain objects are represented in\na mirror. These simple ideas are _partly_ such as come to the\nunderstanding through an individual sense, _e. g._ the ideas of color,\nwhich are furnished to the mind through the eye, or those of sound,\nwhich come to it through the ear, or those of solidity or\nimpenetrability, which we receive through the touch; _partly_ such as a\nnumber of senses have combined to give us, as those of space and of\nmotion, of which we become conscious by means of the sense both of touch\nand of sight; _partly_ such as we receive through reflection, as the\nidea of thought and of will; and _partly_, in fine, such as arise from\nboth sensation and reflection combined, _e. g._ power, unity, &c. These\nsimple ideas form the material, as it were the letters of all our\nknowledge. But now as language arises from a manifold combination of\nletters, syllables and words, so the understanding forms complex ideas\nby the manifold combination of simple ideas with each other. The complex\nideas may be referred to three classes, viz.: the ideas of mode, of\nsubstance, and of relation. Under the ideas of mode, Locke considers the\nmodifications of space (as distance, measurement, immensity, surface,\nfigure, &c.), of time (as succession, duration, eternity), of thought\n(perception, memory, abstraction, &c.), of number, power, &c. Special\nattention is given by Locke to the conception of substance. He explains\nthe origin of this conception in this way, viz.: we find both in\nsensation and reflection, that a certain number of simple ideas seem\noften to be connected together. But as we cannot divest ourselves of the\nimpression that these simple ideas have not been produced through\nthemselves, we are accustomed to furnish them with a ground in some\nexisting substratum, which we indicate with the word substance.\nSubstance is something unknown, and is conceived of as possessing those\nqualities which are necessary to furnish us with simple ideas. But from\nthe fact that substance is a product of our subjective thinking, it does\nnot follow that it has no existence outside of ourselves. On the\ncontrary, this is distinguished from all other complex ideas in the fact\nthat this is an idea which has its archetype distinct from ourselves,\nand possesses objective reality, while other complex ideas are formed by\nthe mind at pleasure, and have no reality corresponding to them external\nto the mind. We do not know what is the archetype of substance, and of\nthe substance itself we are acquainted only with its attributes. From\nconsidering the conception of substance, Locke next passes over to the\nidea of _relation_. A relation arises when the understanding has\nconnected two things with each other, in such a way, that in considering\nthem it passes over from the one to the other. Every thing is capable of\nbeing brought by the understanding into relation, or what is the same\nthing, to be transformed into something relative. It is consequently\nimpossible to enumerate the sum of every possible relation. Hence Locke\ntreats only of some of the more weighty conceptions of relation, among\nothers, that of identity and difference, but especially that of cause\nand effect. The idea of cause and effect arises when our understanding\nperceives that any thing whatsoever, be it substance or quality, begins\nto exist through the activity of another. So much concerning ideas. The\ncombination of ideas among themselves gives the conception of knowing.\nHence knowledge stands in the same relation to the simple and complex\nideas as a proposition does to the letters, syllables and words which\ncompose it. From this it follows that our knowledge does not pass beyond\nthe compass of our ideas, and hence that it is bounded by experience.\n\nThese are the prominent thoughts in the Lockian philosophy. Its\nempiricism is clear as day. The mind, according to it, is in itself\nbare, and only a mirror of the outer world,\u2014a dark space which passively\nreceives the images of external objects; its whole content is made by\nthe impressions furnished it by material things. _Nihil est in\nintellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu_\u2014is the watchword of this\nstandpoint. While Locke, by this proposition, expresses the undoubted\npreponderance of the material over the intellectual, he does so still\nmore decisively when he declares that it is possible and even probable\nthat the mind is a material essence. He does not admit the reverse\npossibility, that material things may be classed under the intellectual\nas a special kind. Hence with him mind is the secondary to matter, and\nhence he is seen to take the characteristic standpoint of realism (_cf._\n\u00a7 XXVII). It is true that Locke was not always logically consistent, and\nin many points did not thoroughly carry out his empiricism: but we can\nclearly see that the road which will be taken in the farther development\nof this direction, will result in a thorough denial of the ideal factor.\n\nThe empiricism of Locke, wholly national as it is, soon became the\nruling philosophy in England. Standing on its basis we find _Isaac\nNewton_, the great mathematician (1642-1727), _Samuel Clarke_, a\ndisciple of Newton, whose chief attention was given to moral philosophy\n(1675-1729), the English moralists of this period, _William Wollaston_\n(1659-1724), the Earl of _Shaftesbury_ (1671-1713), _Francis Hutcheson_\n(1694-1746), and even some opponents of Locke, as _Peter Brown_, who\ndied 1735.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXIX.\n\nHUME.\n\n\nAs already remarked, Locke had not been wholly consistent with the\nstandpoint of empiricism. Though conceding to material objects a decided\nsuperiority above the thinking subject, there was yet one point, viz.,\nthe recognition of substance, where he claimed for the thinking a power\nabove the objective world. Among all the complex ideas which are formed\nby the subjective thinking, the idea of substance is, according to\nLocke, the only one which has objective reality; all the rest being\npurely subjective, with nothing actually corresponding to them in the\nobjective world. But in the very fact that the subjective thinking\nplaces the conception of substance, which it has formed, in the\nobjective world, it affirms an objective relation of things, an\nobjective connection of them among each other, and an existing\nrationality. The reason of the subject in this respect stands in a\ncertain degree above the objective world, for the relation of substance\nis not derived immediately from the world of sense, and is no product of\nsensation nor of perception through the sense. On a pure empirical\nstandpoint\u2014and such was Locke\u2019s\u2014it was therefore illogical to allow the\nconception of substance to remain possessed of objective being. If the\nunderstanding is essentially a bare and empty space, a white unwritten\npaper, if its whole content of objective knowledge consists in the\nimpressions made upon it by material things, then must the conception of\nsubstance also be explained as a mere subjective notion, a union of\nideas joined together at the mind\u2019s pleasure, and the subject itself,\nthus fully deprived of every thing to which it could lay claim, must\nbecome wholly subordinated to the material world. This stride to a\nlogical empiricism Hume has made in his criticism on the conception of\ncausality.\n\nDavid Hume was born at Edinburgh 1711. Devoted in youth to the study of\nlaw, then for some time a merchant, he afterwards gave his attention\nexclusively to philosophy and history. His first literary attempt was\nhardly noticed. A more favorable reception was, however, given to his\n\u201c_Essays_,\u201d\u2014of which he published different collections from 1742 to\n1757, making in all five volumes. In these Hume has treated\nphilosophical themes as a thoughtful and cultivated man of the world,\nbut without any strict systematic connection. In 1752 he was elected to\nthe care of a public library in Edinburgh, and began in this same year\nhis famous history of England. Afterwards he became secretary of\nlegation at Paris, where he became acquainted with Rousseau. In 1767 he\nbecame under secretary of state, an office, however, which he filled for\nonly a brief period. His last years were spent in Edinburgh, in a quiet\nand contented seclusion. He died 1776.\n\nThe centre of Hume\u2019s philosophizing is his criticism of the conception\nof cause. Locke had already expressed the thought that we attain the\nconception of substance only by the _habit_ of always seeing certain\nmodes together. Hume takes up this thought with earnestness. Whence do\nwe know, he asks, that two things stand to each other in the relation of\ncause and effect? We do not know it apriori, for since the effect is\nsomething other than the cause, while knowledge apriori embraces only\nthat which is identical, the effect cannot thus be discovered in the\ncause; neither do we know it through experience, for experience reveals\nto us only the succession in time of two facts. All our conclusions from\nexperience, therefore, rest simply upon habit. Because we are in the\nhabit of seeing that one thing is followed in time by another, do we\nform the notion that the latter _must_ follow out of the former: we make\nthe relation of causality out of the relation of succession; but a\nconnection in time is naturally something other than a causal\nconnection. Hence, with the conception of causality, we transcend that\nwhich is given in perception and form for ourselves, notions to which we\nare properly not entitled.\u2014That which belongs to causality belongs to\nevery necessary relation. We find within us conceptions, as those of\npower and expression, and in general that of necessary connection; but\nlet us note how we attain these: not through sensation, for though\nexternal objects seem to us to have coetaneousness of being, they show\nas no necessary connection. Do they then come through reflection? True,\nit seems as if we might get the idea of power by seeing that the organs\nof our body move in consequence of the dictate of our mind. But since we\ndo not know the means through which the mind works, and since all the\norgans of the body cannot be moved by the will, it follows, that we are\nindeed pointed to experience in reference to this activity; but since\nexperience can show us only a frequent conjunction, but no real\nconnection, it follows also that we come to the conception of power as\nof every necessary connection, only because we are _accustomed_ to a\ntranscending process in our notions. All conceptions which express a\nrelation of necessity, all knowledge presumptive of a real objective\nconnection of things, rests therefore ultimately only upon the\nassociation of ideas. Having denied the conception of substance, Hume\nwas led also to deny that of the Ego or self. If the Ego or self really\nexists, it must be a substance possessing inherent qualities. But since\nour conception of substance is purely subjective, without objective\nreality, it follows that there is no correspondent reality to our\nconception of the self or the Ego. The self or the Ego is, in fact,\nnothing other than a compound of many notions following rapidly upon\neach other; and under this compound we lay a conceived substratum, which\nwe call soul, self, Ego (I). The self, or the Ego, rests wholly on an\nillusion. Of course, with such premises, nothing can be said of the\nimmortality of the soul. If the soul is only the compound of our\nnotions, it necessarily ceases with the notions\u2014that which is compounded\nof the movements of the body dies with those movements.\n\nThere needs no further proof, than simply to utter these chief thoughts\nof Hume, to show that his scepticism is only a logical carrying out of\nLocke\u2019s empiricism. Every determination of universality and necessity\nmust fall away, if we derive our knowledge only from perceptions through\nthe sense; these determinations cannot be comprised in sensation.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXX.\n\nCONDILLAC.\n\n\nThe French took up the problem of carrying out the empiricism of Locke,\nto its ultimate consequences in sensualism and materialism. Although\nthis empiricism had sprung up on English soil, and had soon become\nuniversally prevalent there, it was reserved for France to push it to\nthe last extreme, and show that it overthrew all the foundations of\nmoral and religious life. This final consequence of empiricism did not\ncorrespond to the English national character. But on the contrary, both\nthe empiricism of Locke, and the scepticism of Hume, found themselves\nopposed in the latter half of the eighteenth century, by a reaction in\nthe Scotch philosophy (_Reid_ 1701-1799, _Beattie_, _Oswald_, _Dugald\nStewart_, 1753-1828). The attempt was here made to establish certain\nprinciples of truth as innate and immanent in the subject, which should\navail both against the _tabula rasa_ of Locke, and the scepticism of\nHume. These principles were taken in a thoroughly English way, as those\nof common sense, as facts of experience, as facts of the moral instinct\nand sound human understanding; as something empirically given, and found\nin the common consciousness by self-contemplation and reflection. But in\nFrance, on the other hand, there was such a public and social condition\nof things during the eighteenth century, that we can only regard the\nsystems of materialism and egoistic moralism which here appeared, as the\nlast practical consequences of the empirical standpoint,\u2014to be the\nnatural result of the universal desolation. The expression of a lady\nrespecting the system of Helvetius is well known, that it uttered only\nthe secret of all the world.\n\nMost closely connected with the empiricism of Locke, is the sensualism\nof the Abb\u00e9 _Condillac_. Condillac was born at Grenoble, 1715. In his\nfirst writings he adhered to Locke, but subsequently passed beyond him,\nand sought to ground a philosophical standpoint of his own. He was\nelected a member of the French Academy in 1768, and died in 1780. His\nwritings fill twenty-three volumes, and have their origin in a moral and\nreligious interest.\n\nCondillac, like Locke, started with the proposition that all our\nknowledge comes from experience. While, however, Locke had indicated two\nsources for this knowledge, sensation and reflection, the outer and the\ninner sense, Condillac referred reflection to sensation, and reduced the\ntwo sources to one. Reflection is, with him, only sensation; all\nintellectual occurrences, even the combination of ideas and volition,\nare to be regarded only as modified sensations. It is the chief problem\nand content of Condillac\u2019s philosophizing to carry out this thought, and\nderive the different functions of the soul out of the sensations of the\nouter sense. He illustrates this thought by a statue, which has been\nmade with a perfect internal organization like a man, but which\npossesses no ideas, and in which only gradually one sense after another\nawakens and fills the soul with impressions. In such a view man stands\non the same footing as the brute, for all his knowledge and all his\nincentives to action he receives from sensation. Condillac consequently\nnames men perfect animals, and brutes imperfect men. Still he revolts\nfrom affirming the materiality of the soul, and denying the existence of\nGod. These ultimate consequences of sensualism were first drawn by\nothers after him, as would naturally enough follow. As sensualism\naffirmed that truth or being could only be perceived through the sense,\nso we have only to reverse this proposition, and have the thesis of\nmaterialism, viz.: the sensible alone is, there is no other being but\nmaterial being.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXXI.\n\nHELVETIUS.\n\n\n_Helvetius_ has exhibited the moral consequences of the sensualistic\nstandpoint. While theoretical sensualism affirms that all our knowledge\nis determined by sensation, practical sensualism adds to this the\nanalogous proposition that all our volition springs from the same\nsource, and is regulated by the sensuous desire. Helvetius adopted it as\nthe principle of morals to satisfy this sensuous desire.\n\nHelvetius was born at Paris in 1715. Gaining a position in his\ntwenty-third year as farmer-general, he found himself early in the\npossession of a rich income, but after a few years he found this office\nso vexatious that he abandoned it. The study of Locke decided his\nphilosophic direction. Helvetius wrote his famed work, _de l\u2019Esprit_,\nafter he had given up his office and withdrawn himself in seclusion. It\nappeared in 1758, and attracted a great attention at home and abroad,\nthough it drew upon him a violent persecution, especially from the\nclergy. It was fortunate for him that the persecution satisfied itself\nwith suppressing his book. The repose in which he spent his later years\nwas interrupted only by two journeys which he made to Germany and\nEngland. He died in 1771. His personal character was wholly estimable,\nfull of kindness and generosity. Especially in his place as\nfarmer-general he showed himself benevolent towards the poor, and\nresolute against the encroachments of his subalterns. The style of his\nwritings is easy and elegant.\n\nSelf-love or interest, says Helvetius, is the lever of all our mental\nactivities. Even that activity which is purely intellectual, our\ninstinct towards knowledge, our forming of ideas, rests upon this. Since\nnow all self-love refers essentially only to bodily pleasure, it follows\nthat every mental occurrence within us has its peculiar source only in\nthe striving after this pleasure; but in saying this, we have only\naffirmed where the principle of all morality is to be sought. It is an\nabsurdity to require a man to do the good simply for its own sake. This\nis just as impracticable as that he should do the evil simply for the\nsake of the evil. Hence if morality would not be wholly fruitless, it\nmust return to its empirical basis, and venture to adopt the true\nprinciple of all acting, viz., sensuous pleasure and pain, or, in other\nwords, selfishness as an actual moral principle. Hence, as a correct\nlegislation is that which secures obedience to its laws through reward\nand punishment, _i. e._ through selfishness, so will a correct system of\nmorals be that which derives the duties of men from self-love, which\nshows that that which is forbidden is something which is followed by\ndisagreeable consequences. A system of ethics which does not involve the\nself-interest of men, or which wars against this, necessarily remains\nfruitless.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXXII.\n\nTHE FRENCH CLEARING UP (_Aufklaerung_) AND MATERIALISM.\n\n\n1. It has already been remarked (\u00a7 XXX.) that the carrying out of\nempiricism to its extremes, as was attempted in France, was most\nintimately connected with the general condition of the French people and\nstate, in the period before the revolution. The contradictory element in\nthe character of the Middle Ages, the external and dualistic relation to\nthe spiritual world, had developed itself in Catholic France till it had\ncorrupted and destroyed every condition. Morality, mainly through the\ninfluence of a licentious court, had become wholly corrupted; the state\nhad sunk to an unbridled despotism, and the church to a hierarchy as\nhypocritical as it was powerful. Thus, as every intellectual edifice was\nthreatened with ruin, nature, as matter without intellect, as the object\nof sensation and desire, alone remained. Yet it is not the materialistic\nextreme which constitutes the peculiar character and tendency of the\nperiod now before us. The common character of the philosophers of the\neighteenth century is rather, and most prominently, the opposition\nagainst every ruling restraint, and perversion in morals, religion, and\nthe state. Their criticism and polemics, which were much more ingenious\nand eloquent than strictly scientific, were directed against the whole\nrealm of traditional and given and positive notions. They sought to show\nthe contradiction between the existing elements in the state and the\nchurch, and the incontrovertible demands of the reason. They sought to\noverthrow in the faith of the world every fixed opinion which had not\nbeen established in the eye of reason, and to give the thinking man the\nfull consciousness of his pure freedom. In order that we may correctly\nestimate the merit of these men, we must bring before us the French\nworld of that age against which their attacks were directed; the\ndissoluteness of a pitiful court, the slavish obedience exacted by a\ncorrupt priesthood, a church sunken into decay yet seeking worldly\nhonor, a state constitution, a condition of rights and of society, which\nmust be profoundly revolting to every thinking man and every moral\nfeeling. It is the immortal merit of these men that they gave over to\nscorn and hatred the abjectness and hypocrisy which then reigned; that\nthey brought the minds of men to look with indifference upon the idols\nof the world, and awakened within them a consciousness of their own\nautonomy.\n\n2. The most famous and influential actor in this period of the French\nclearing up, is _Voltaire_ (1694-1778). Though a writer of great\nversatility, rather than a philosopher, there was yet no philosopher of\nthat time who exerted so powerful an influence upon the whole thinking\nof his country and his age. Voltaire was no atheist. On the contrary, he\nregarded the belief in a Supreme Being to be so necessary, that he once\nsaid that if there were no God we should be under the necessity of\ninventing one. He was just as little disposed to deny the immortality of\nthe soul, though he often expressed his doubts upon it. He regarded the\natheistic materialism of a La Mettrie as nothing but nonsense. In these\nrespects, therefore, he is far removed from the standpoint of the\nphilosophers who followed him. His whole hatred was expended against\nChristianity as a positive religion. To destroy this system he\nconsidered as his peculiar mission, and he left no means untried to\nattain this anxiously longed-for end. His unwearied warfare against\nevery positive religion prepared the way and gave weapons for the\nattacks against spiritualism which followed.\n\n3. The Encyclopedists had a more decidedly sceptical relation to the\nprinciples and the basis of spiritualism. The philosophical Encyclopedia\nestablished by _Diderot_ (1713-1784), and published by him in connection\nwith d\u2019Alembert, is a memorable monument of the ruling spirit in France\nin the time before the revolution. It was the pride of France at that\nage, because it expressed in a splendid and universally accessible form\nthe inner consciousness of the French people. With the keenest wit it\nreasoned away law from the state, and freedom from morality, and spirit\nand God from nature, though all this was done only in scattered, and,\nfor the most part, timorous intimations. In Diderot\u2019s independent\nwritings we find talent of much philosophic importance united with great\nearnestness. But it is very difficult to fix and accurately to limit his\nphilosophic views, since they were very gradually formed, and Diderot\nexpressed them always with some reserve and accommodation. In general,\nhowever, it may be remarked, that in the progress of his speculations he\nconstantly approached nearer the extreme of the philosophical direction\nof his age. In his earlier writings a Deist, he afterwards avowed the\nopinion that every thing is God. At first defending the immateriality\nand immortality of the soul, he expressed himself at a later period\ndecidedly against these doctrines, affirming that the species alone has\nan abiding being while the individual passes away, and that immortality\nis nothing other than to live in the thoughts of coming generations. But\nDiderot did not venture to the real extreme of logical materialism; his\nmoral earnestness restrained him from this.\n\n4. The last word of materialism was spoken with reckless audacity by _La\nMettrie_ (1709-1751), a contemporary of Diderot: every thing spiritual\nis a delusion, and physical enjoyment is the highest end of men. Faith\nin the existence of a God, says La Mettrie, is just as groundless as it\nis fruitless. The world will not be happy till atheism becomes\nuniversally established. Then alone will there be no more religious\nstrife, then alone will theologians, the most odious of combatants,\ndisappear, and nature, poisoned at present by their influence, will come\nagain to its rights. In reference to the human soul, there can be no\nphilosophy but materialism. All the observation and experience of the\ngreatest philosophers and physicians declare this. Soul is nothing but a\nmere name, which has a rational signification only when we understand by\nit that part of our body which thinks. This is the brain, which has its\nmuscles of thought, just as the limbs have their muscles of motion. That\nwhich gives man his advantage over the brutes is, first, the\norganization of his brain, and second, its capacity for receiving\ninstruction. Otherwise, is man a brute like the beasts around him,\nthough in many respects surpassed by these. Immortality is an absurdity.\nThe soul perishes with the body of which it forms a part. With death\nevery thing is over, _la farce est jou\u00e9e_! The practical and selfish\napplication of all this is\u2014let us enjoy ourselves as long as we exist,\nand not throw away any satisfaction we can attain.\n\n5. The _Syst\u00e9me de la Nature_ afterwards attempted to elaborate with\ngreater earnestness and scientific precision, that which had been\nuttered so superficially and so superciliously by La Mettrie, viz., the\ndoctrine that matter alone exists, while mind is nothing other than\nmatter refined.\n\nThe _Syst\u00e9me de la Nature_ appeared in London under a fictitious name in\n1770. It was then published as a posthumous work of Mirabaud, late\nsecretary of the Academy. It doubtless had its origin in the circle\nwhich was wont to assemble with Baron Holbach, and of which Diderot,\nGrimm, and others formed a part. Whether the Baron Holbach himself, or\nhis tutor Lagrange is the author of this work, or whether it is the\njoint production of a number, cannot now be determined. The _Syst\u00e9me de\nla Nature_ is hardly a French book: the style is too heavy and tedious.\n\nThere is, in fact, nothing but matter and motion, says this work. Both\nare inseparably connected. If matter is at rest, it is only because\nhindered in motion, for in its essence it is not a dead mass. Motion is\ntwofold, attraction and repulsion. The different motions which we see\nare the product of these two, and through these different motions arise\nthe different connections and the whole manifoldness of things. The laws\nwhich direct in all this are eternal and unchangeable.\u2014The most weighty\nconsequences of such a doctrine are:\n\n(1.) _The materiality of man._ Man is no twofold being compounded of\nmind and matter, as is erroneously believed. If the inquiry is closely\nmade what the mind is, we are answered, that the most accurate\nphilosophical investigations have shown, that the principle of activity\nin man is a substance whose peculiar nature cannot be known, but of\nwhich we can affirm that it is indivisible, unextended, invisible, &c.\nBut now, who should conceive any thing determinate in a substance which\nis only the negation of that which gives knowledge, an idea which is\npeculiarly only the absence of all ideas? Still farther, how can it be\nexplained upon such a hypothesis, that a substance which itself is not\nmaterial can work upon material things; and how can it set these in\nmotion, since there is no point of contact between the two? In fact,\nthose who distinguish their soul from their body, have only to make a\ndistinction between their brain and their body. Thought is only a\nmodification of our brain, just as volition is another modification of\nthe same bodily organ.\n\n(2.) Another chimera, the belief in the being of a God, is connected\nwith the twofold division of man into body and soul. This belief arises\nlike the hypothesis of a soul-substance, because mind is falsely divided\nfrom matter, and nature is thus made twofold. The evil which men\nexperienced, and whose natural cause they could not discover, they\nassigned to a deity which they imagined for the purpose. The first\nnotions of a God have their source therefore in sorrow, fear, and\nuncertainty. We tremble because our forefathers for thousands of years\nhave done the same. This circumstance awakens no auspicious\nprepossession. But not only the rude, but also the theological idea of\nGod is worthless, for it explains no phenomenon of nature. It is,\nmoreover, full of absurdities, for, since it ascribes moral attributes\nto God, it renders him human; while on the other hand, by a mass of\nnegative attributes, it seeks to distinguish him absolutely from every\nother being. The true system, the system of nature, is hence atheistic.\nBut such a doctrine requires a culture and a courage which neither all\nmen nor most men possess. If we understand by the word atheist one who\nconsiders only _dead_ matter, or who designates the _moving power_ in\nnature with the name God, then is there no atheist, or whoever would be\none is a fool. But if the word means one who denies the existence of a\nspiritual being, a being whose attributes can only be a source of\nannoyance to men, then are there indeed atheists, and there would be\nmore of them, if a correct knowledge of nature and a sound reason were\nmore widely diffused. But if atheism is true, then should it be\ndiffused. There are, indeed, many who have cast off the yoke of\nreligion, who nevertheless think it is necessary for the common people\nin order to keep them within proper limits. But this is just as if we\nshould determine to give a man poison lest he should abuse his strength.\nEvery kind of Deism leads necessarily to superstition, since it is not\npossible to continue on the standpoint of pure deism.\n\n(3.) With such premises the freedom and immortality of the soul both\ndisappear. Man, like every other substance in nature, is a link in the\nchain of necessary connection, a blind instrument in the hands of\nnecessity. If any thing should be endowed with self-motion, that is,\nwith a capacity to produce motion without any other cause, then would it\nhave the power to destroy motion in the universe; but this is contrary\nto the conception of the universe, which is only an endless series of\nnecessary motions spreading out into wider circles continually. The\nclaim of an individual immortality is absurd. For to affirm that the\nsoul exists after the destruction of the body, is to affirm that a\nmodification of a substance can exist after the substance itself has\ndisappeared. There is no other immortality than to live in the\nremembrance of posterity.\n\n(4.) The practical consequences of these principles are in the highest\ndegree favorable for the system of nature, the utility of any doctrine\nbeing ever the first criterion of its truth. While the ideas of\ntheologians are productive only of disquiet and anxiety to man, the\nsystem of nature frees him from all such unrest, teaches him to enjoy\nthe present moment, and to quietly yield to his destiny, while it gives\nhim that kind of apathy which every one must regard as a blessing. If\nmorality would be active, it can rest only upon self-love and\nself-interest; it must show man whither his well-considered interest\nwould lead him. He is a good man who gains his own interest in such a\nway that others will find it for their interest to assist him. The\nsystem of self-interest, therefore, demands the union of men among each\nother, and hence we have true morality.\n\nThe logical dogmatic materialism of the _Syst\u00e8me de la Nature_ is the\nfarthest limit of an empirical direction in philosophy, and consequently\ncloses that course of the development of a one-sided realism which had\nbegun with Locke. The attempt first made by Locke to explain and derive\nthe ideal world from the material, ended in materialism with the total\nreduction of every thing spiritual to the material, with the total\ndenial of the spiritual. We must now, before proceeding farther,\naccording to the classification made \u00a7 XXVII., consider the idealistic\ncourse of development which ran parallel with the systems of a partial\nrealism. At the head of this course stands _Leibnitz_.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXXIII.\n\nLEIBNITZ.\n\n\nAs empiricism sprang from the striving to subject the intellectual to\nthe material, to materialize the spiritual, so on the other hand,\nidealism had its source in the effort to spiritualize the material, or\nso to apprehend the conception of mind that matter could be subsumed\nunder it. To the empiric-sensualistic direction, mind was nothing but\nrefined matter, while to the idealistic direction matter was only\ndegenerated (_vergr\u00f6bert_) mind (\u201ca confused notion,\u201d as Leibnitz\nexpresses it). The former, in its logical development, was driven to the\nprinciple that only material things exist, the latter (as with Leibnitz\nand Berkeley) comes to the opposite principle, that there are only souls\nand their ideas. For the partial realistic standpoint, material things\nwere the truly substantial. But for the idealistic standpoint, the\nsubstantial belongs alone to the intellectual world, to the Egos. Mind,\nto the partial realism, was essentially void, a _tabula rasa_, its whole\ncontent came to it from the external world. But a partial idealism\nsought to carry out the principle that nothing can come into the mind\nwhich had not at least been preformed within it, that all its knowledge\nis furnished it by itself. According to the former view knowledge was a\npassive relation, according to the latter was it wholly active. While,\nin fine, a partial realism had attempted to explain the becoming in\nnature for the most part through real, _i. e._ through mechanical\nmotives (_l\u2019homme machine_ is the title of one of la Mettrie\u2019s\nwritings), idealism had sought an explanation of the same through ideal\nmotives, _i. e._ teleologically. While the former had made its prominent\ninquiry for moving causes, and had, indeed, often ridiculed the search\nfor a final cause; it is final causes toward which the latter directs\nits chief aim. The mediation between mind and matter, between thought\nand being, will now be sought in the final cause, in the teleological\nharmony of all things (_pre-established harmony_). The standpoint of\nLeibnitz may thus be characterized in a word.\n\n_Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz_ was born in 1646, at Leipsic, where his\nfather was professor. Having chosen the law as his profession, he\nentered the university in 1661, and in 1663 he defended for his degree\nof doctor in philosophy, his dissertation _de principio individui_, a\ntheme well characteristic of the direction of his later philosophizing.\nHe afterwards went to Jena, and subsequently to Altdorf, where he became\ndoctor of laws. At Altdorf he was offered a professorship of\njurisprudence, which he refused. The rest of his life was unsettled and\ndesultory, spent for the most part in courts, where, as a versatile\ncourtier, he was employed in the most varied duties of diplomacy. In the\nyear 1672 he went to Paris, in order to induce Louis XIV. to undertake\nthe conquest of Egypt. He subsequently visited London, whence he was\nafterwards called to Hanover, as councillor of the Duke of Brunswick. He\nreceived later a post as librarian at Wolfenb\u00fcttel, between which place\nand Hanover he spent the most of his subsequent life, though interrupted\nwith numerous journeys to Vienna, Berlin, etc. He was intimately\nassociated with the Prussian Electress, Maria Charlotte, a highly\ntalented woman, who surrounded herself with a circle of the most\ndistinguished scholars of the time, and for whom Liebnitz wrote, at her\nown request, his _Theodic\u00e9e_. In 1701, after Prussia had become a\nkingdom, an academy was established at Berlin, through, his efforts, and\nhe became its first president. Similar, but fruitless attempts were made\nby him to establish academies in Dresden and Vienna. In 1711 the title\nof imperial court councillor, and a baronage, was bestowed upon him by\nthe emperor Charles VI. Soon after, he betook himself to Vienna, where\nhe remained a considerable period, and wrote his Monadology, at the\nsolicitation of Prince Eugene. He died in 1716. Next to Aristotle,\nLeibnitz was the most highly gifted scholar that had ever lived; with\nthe richest and most extensive learning, he united the highest and most\npenetrating powers of mind. Germany has reason to be proud of him,\nsince, after Jacob Boehme, he is the first philosopher of any note among\nthe Germans. With him philosophy found a home in Germany. It is to be\nregretted that the great variety of his efforts and literary\nundertakings, together with his roving manner of life, prevented him\nfrom giving any connected exhibition of his philosophy. His views are\nfor the most part developed only in brief and occasional writings and\nletters, composed frequently in the French language. It is hence not\neasy to state his philosophy in its internal connection, though none of\nhis views are isolated, but all stand strictly connected with each\nother. The following are the chief points:\n\n1. THE DOCTRINE OF MONADS.\u2014The fundamental peculiarity of Leibnitz\u2019s\ntheory is its opposition to Spinozism. Substance, as the indeterminate\nuniversal, was with Spinoza the only positive. With Leibnitz also the\nconception of substance lay at the basis of his philosophy, but his\ndefinition of it was entirely different. While Spinoza had sought to\nexclude from his substance every positive determination, and especially\nall acting, and had apprehended it simply as pure being, Leibnitz viewed\nit as living activity and active energy, an example for which might be\nfound in a stretched bow, which moved and straightened itself through\nits own energy as soon as the external hindrance was removed. That this\nactive energy forms the essence of substance is a principle to which\nLeibnitz ever returns, and from which, in fact, all the other chief\npoints in his philosophy may be derived. From this there follow at the\noutset two determinations of substance directly opposed to Spinozism;\nfirst, that it is a single being, a monad; and second, that there are a\nmultiplicity of monads. The first follows because substance, in so far\nas it exercises an activity similar to an elastic body, is essentially\nan excluding activity, or repulsion; the conception of an individual or\na monad being that which excludes another from itself. The second\nfollows because the existence of one monad involves the existence of\nmany. The conception of one individual postulates other individuals,\nwhich stand over against the one as excluded from it. Hence the\nfundamental thesis of the Leibnitz philosophy in opposition to Spinozism\nis this, viz., there is a multiplicity of individual substances or\nmonads.\n\n2. THE MONADS MORE ACCURATELY DETERMINED.\u2014The monads of Leibnitz are\nsimilar to atoms in their general features. Like these they are\ncorpuscular units, independent of any external influence, and\nindestructible by any external power. But notwithstanding this\nsimilarity, there is an important and characteristic difference between\nthe two. First, the atoms are not distinguished from each other, they\nare all qualitatively alike; but each one of the monads is different in\nquality from every other, every one is a peculiar world for itself,\nevery one is different from every other. According to Leibnitz, there\nare no two things in the world which are exactly alike. Secondly, atoms\ncan be considered as extended and divisible, but the monads are\nmetaphysical points, and actually indivisible. Here, lest we should\nstumble at this proposition (for an aggregate of unextended monads can\nnever give an extended world), we must take into consideration\nLeibnitz\u2019s view of space, which, according to him, is not something\nreal, but only confused, subjective representation. Thirdly, the monad\nis a representative being. With the atomists such a determination would\namount to nothing, but with Leibnitz it has a very important part to\nplay. According to him, in every monad, every other is reflected; every\nmonad is a living mirror of the universe, and ideally contains the whole\nwithin itself as in a germ. In thus mirroring the world, however, the\nmonad is not passive but spontaneously self-active: it does not receive\nthe images which it mirrors, but produces them spontaneously itself, as\nthe soul does a dream. In every monad, therefore, the all-seeing and\nall-knowing one might read every thing, even the future, since this is\npotentially contained in the present. Every monad is a kind of God.\n(_Parvus in suo genere Deus._)\n\n3. THE PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY.\u2014The universe is thus the sum of all the\nmonads. Every thing, every composite, is an aggregate of monads. Thus\nevery bodily organism is not one substance, but many, it is a\nmultiplicity of monads, like a machine which is made up of a number of\ndistinct pieces of mechanism. Leibnitz compared bodies to a fish-pond,\nwhich might be full of living elements, though dead itself. The ordinary\nview of things is thus wholly set aside; the truly substantial does not\nbelong to bodies, _i. e._ to the aggregates, but to their original\nelements. Matter, in the vulgar sense, as something conceived to be\nwithout mind, does not at all exist. How now must the inner connection\nof the universe be conceived? In the following way. Every monad is a\nrepresentative being, and at the same time, each one is different from\nevery other. This difference, therefore, depends alone upon the\ndifference of representation: there are just as many different degrees\nof representation as there are monads, and these degrees may be fixed\naccording to some of their prominent stages. The representations may be\nclassified according to the distinction between confused and distinct\nknowledge. Hence a monad of the lowest rank (a monad _toute nue_) will\nbe one which _simply_ represents, _i. e._ which stands on the stage of\nmost confused knowledge. Leibnitz compares this state with a swoon, or\nwith our condition in a dreamy sleep, in which we are not without\nrepresentations, (notions)\u2014for otherwise we could have none when\nawaking\u2014but in which the representations are so numerous that they\nneutralize each other and do not come into the consciousness. This is\nthe stage of inorganic nature. In a higher rank are those monads in\nwhich the representation is active as a formative vital force, though\nstill without consciousness. This is the stage of the vegetable world.\nStill higher ascends the life of the monad when it attains to sensation\nand memory, as is the case in the animal kingdom. The lower monads may\nbe said to sleep, and the brute monads to dream. When still farther the\nsoul rises to reason or reflection, we call it mind, spirit.\u2014The\ndistinction of the monads from each other is, therefore, this, that each\none, though mirroring the whole and the same universe in itself, does it\nfrom a different point of view, and, therefore, differently, the one\nmore, and the rest less perfectly. Each one is a different centre of the\nworld which it mirrors. Each one contains the whole universe, the whole\ninfinity within itself, and in this respect is like God, the only\ndifference being that God knows every thing with perfect distinctness,\nwhile the monad represents it confusedly, though one monad may represent\nit more confusedly than another. The limitation of a monad does not,\ntherefore, consist in its containing less than another or than God, but\nonly in its containing more imperfectly or in its representing less\ndistinctly.\u2014Upon this standpoint the universe, in so far as every monad\nmirrors one and the same universe, though each in a different way,\nrepresents a drama of the greatest possible difference, as well as of\nthe greatest possible unity and order, _i. e._ of the greatest possible\nperfection, or the _absolute harmony_. For distinction in unity is\nharmony.\u2014But in still another respect the universe is a system of\nharmony. Since the monads do not work upon each other, but each one\nfollows only the law of its own being, there is danger lest the inner\nharmony of the universe may be disturbed. How is this danger removed?\nThus, viz., every monad mirrors the whole and the same universe. The\nchanges of the collected monads, therefore, run parallel with each\nother, and in this consists the harmony of all as pre-established by\nGod.\n\n4. THE RELATION OF THE DEITY TO THE MONADS.\u2014What part does the\nconception of God play in the system of Leibnitz? An almost idle one.\nFollowing the strict consequences of his system, Leibnitz should have\nheld to no proper theism, but the harmony of the universe should have\ntaken the place of the Deity. Ordinarily he considers God as the\nsufficient cause of all monads. But he was also accustomed to consider\nthe final cause of a thing as its sufficient cause. In this respect,\ntherefore, he almost identifies God and the absolute final cause.\nElsewhere he considers the Deity as a simple primitive substance, or as\nthe individual primitive unity. Again, he speaks of God as a pure\nimmaterial actuality, _actus purus_, while to the monads belongs matter,\n_i. e._ restrained actuality, striving, _appetitio_. Once he calls him a\nmonad, though this is in manifest contradiction with the determinations\notherwise assigned him. It was for Leibnitz a very difficult problem to\nbring his monadology and his theism into harmony with each other,\nwithout giving up the premises of both. If he held fast to the\nsubstantiality of the monads, he was in danger of making them\nindependent of the Deity, and if he did not, he could hardly escape\nfalling back into Spinozism.\n\n5. THE RELATION OF SOUL AND BODY is clearly explained on the standpoint\nof the pre-established harmony. This relation, taking the premises of\nthe monadology, might seem enigmatical. If no monad can work upon any\nother, how can the soul work upon the body to lead and move it? The\nenigma is solved by the pre-established harmony. While the body and\nsoul, each one independently of the other, follows the laws of its\nbeing, the body working mechanically, and the soul pursuing ends, yet\nGod has established such a concordant harmony of the two activities,\nsuch a parallelism of the two functions, that there is in fact a perfect\nunity for body and soul. There are, says Leibnitz, three views\nrespecting the relation of body and soul. The first and most common\nsupposes a reciprocal influence between the two, but such a view is\nuntenable, because there can be no interchange between mind and matter.\nThe second and occasional one (_cf._ \u00a7 XXV. 1), brings about this\ninterchange through the constant assistance of God, which is nothing\nmore nor less than to make God a _Deus ex machina_. Hence the only\nsolution for the problem is the hypothesis of a pre-established harmony.\nLeibnitz illustrates these three views in the following example. Let one\nconceive of two watches, whose hands ever accurately point to the same\ntime. This agreement may be explained, first (the common view), by\nsupposing an actual connection between the hands of each, so that the\nhand of the one watch might draw the hand of the other after it, or\nsecond (the occasional view), by conceiving of a watch-maker who\ncontinually keeps the hands alike, or in fine (the pre-established\nharmony), by ascribing to each a mechanism so exquisitely wrought that\neach one goes in perfect independence of the other, and at the same time\nin entire agreement with it.\u2014That the soul is immortal (indestructible),\nfollows at once from the doctrine of monads. There is no proper death.\nThat which is called death is only the soul losing a part of the monads\nwhich compose the mechanism of its body, while the living element goes\nback to a condition similar to that in which it was before it came upon\nthe theatre of the world.\n\n6. The monadology has very important consequences in reference to THE\nTHEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. As the philosophy of Leibnitz, by its opposition to\nSpinozism, had to do with the doctrine of being, so by its opposition to\nthe empiricism of Locke must it expound the theory of knowledge. Locke\u2019s\nEssay on the Human Understanding had attracted Leibnitz without\nsatisfying him, and he therefore attempted a new investigation in his\n_Nouveaux Essais_, in which he defended the doctrine of innate ideas.\nBut this hypothesis of innate ideas Leibnitz now freed from that\ndefective view which had justified the objections of Locke. The\ninnateness of the ideas must not be held as though they were explicitly\nand consciously contained in the mind, but rather the mind possesses\nthem potentially and only virtually, though with the capacity to produce\nthem out of itself. All thoughts are properly innate, _i. e._ they do\nnot come into the mind from without, but are rather produced by it from\nitself. Any external influence upon the mind is inconceivable, it even\nneeds nothing external for its sensations. While Locke had compared the\nmind to an unwritten piece of paper, Leibnitz likened it to a block of\nmarble, in which the veins prefigure the form of the statue. Hence the\ncommon antithesis between rational and empirical knowledge disappears\nwith Leibnitz in the degrees of greater or less distinctness.\u2014Among\nthese theoretically innate ideas, Leibnitz recognizes two of special\nprominence, which take the first rank as principles of all knowledge and\nall ratiocination,\u2014the principle of contradiction (_principium\ncontradictionis_), and the principle of sufficient cause (_principium\nrationis sufficientis_). To these, as a principle of the second rank,\nmust be added the _principium indiscernibilium_, or the principle that\nthere are in nature no two things wholly alike.\n\n7. The most elaborate exhibition of Leibnitz\u2019s theological views is\ngiven in his _Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e_. The Th\u00e9odic\u00e9e, is, however, his weakest work,\nand has but a loose connection with the rest of his philosophy. Written\nat the instigation of a woman, it belies this origin neither in its form\nnor in its content\u2014not in its form, for in its effort to be popular it\nbecomes diffuse and unscientific, and not in its content, for it\naccommodates itself to the positive dogmas and the premises of theology\nfarther than the scientific basis of the system of Leibnitz would\npermit. In this work, Leibnitz investigates the relation of God to the\nworld in order to show a conformity in this relation to a final cause,\nand to free God from the charge of acting without or contrary to an aim.\nWhy is the world as it is? God might have created it very differently.\nTrue, answers Leibnitz, God saw an infinite number of worlds as possible\nbefore him, but out of all these he chose the one which actually is as\nthe best. This is the famous doctrine of the best world, according to\nwhich no more perfect world is possible than the one which is.\u2014But how\nso? Is not the existence of evil at variance with this? Leibnitz answers\nthis objection by distinguishing three kinds of evil, the metaphysical,\nthe physical, and the moral. The metaphysical evil, _i. e._ the\nfiniteness and incompleteness of things, is necessary because\ninseparable from finite existence, and is thus independent of the will\nof God. Physical evil (pain, &c.), though not independent of the will of\nGod, is often a good conditionally, _i. e._ as a punishment or means of\nimprovement. Moral evil or wickedness can in no way be charged to the\nwill of God. Leibnitz took various ways to account for its existence,\nand obviate the contradiction lying between it and the conception of\nGod. At one time he says that wickedness is only permitted by God as a\n_conditio sine qua non_, because without wickedness there were no\nfreedom, and without freedom no virtue. Again, he reduces the moral evil\nto the metaphysical, and makes wickedness nothing but a want of\nperfection, a negation, a limitation, playing the same part as do the\nshadows in a painted picture, or the discords in a piece of music, which\ndo not diminish the beauty, but only increase it through contrast.\nAgain, he distinguishes between the material and the formal element in a\nwicked act. The material of sin, the power to act, is from God, but the\nformal element, the wickedness of the act, belongs wholly to man, and is\nthe result of his limitation, or, as Leibnitz here and there expresses\nit, of his eternal self-predestination. In no case can the harmony of\nthe universe be destroyed through such a cause.\n\nThese are the chief points of Leibnitz\u2019s philosophy. The general\ncharacteristic of it as given in the beginning of the present section,\nwill be found to have its sanction in the specific exhibition that has\nnow been furnished.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXXIV.\n\nBERKELEY.\n\n\nLeibnitz had not carried out the standpoint of idealism to its extreme.\nHe had indeed, on the one side, explained space and motion and bodily\nthings as phenomena which had their existence only in a confused\nrepresentation, but on the other side, he had not wholly denied the\nexistence of the bodily world, but had recognized as a reality lying at\nits basis, the world of monads. The phenomenal or bodily world had its\nfixed and substantial foundation in the monads. Thus Leibnitz, though an\nidealist, did not wholly break with realism. The ultimate consequence of\na subjective idealism would have been to wholly deny the reality of the\nobjective, sensible world, and explain corporeal objects as simply\nphenomena, as nothing but subjective notions without any objective\nreality as a basis. This consequence the idealistic counterpart to the\nultimate realistic result of materialism\u2014appears in _George Berkeley_,\nwho was born in Ireland, 1684, made bishop of the Anglican Church in\n1734, and died in 1753. Hence, though he followed the empiricism of\nLocke, and sustained no outward connection with Leibnitz, we must place\nhim in immediate succession to the latter as the perfecter of a\nsubjective idealism.\n\nOur sensations, says Berkeley, are entirely subjective. We are wholly in\nerror if we believe that we have a sensation of external objects or\nperceive them. That which we have and perceive is only our sensations.\nIt is _e. g._ clear, that by the sense of sight we can _see_ neither the\ndistance, the size, nor the form of objects, but that we only _conclude_\nthat these exist, because our experience has taught us that a certain\nsensation of sight is always attended by certain sensations of touch.\nThat which we see is only colors, clearness, obscurity, &c., and it is\ntherefore false to say that we see and feel the same thing. So also we\nnever go out of ourselves for those sensations to which we ascribe most\ndecidedly an objective character. The peculiar objects of our\nunderstanding are only our own affections; all ideas are hence only our\nown sensations. But just as there can be no sensations outside of the\nsensitive subject, so no idea can have existence outside of him who\npossesses it. The so-called objects exist only in our notion, and have a\nbeing only as they are perceived. It is the great error of most\nphilosophers that they ascribe to corporeal objects a being outside the\nconceiving mind, and do not see that they are only mental. It is not\npossible that material things should produce any thing so wholly\ndistinct from themselves as sensations and notions. There is no such\nthing as a material external world; _mind alone exists_ as thinking\nbeing, whose nature consists in thinking and willing. But whence then\narise all our sensations which come to us like the images of fancy,\nwithout our agency, and which are thus no products of our will? They\narise from a spirit superior to ourselves\u2014for only a spirit can produce\nwithin us notions\u2014even from God. God gives us ideas; but as it would be\ncontradictory to assert that a being could give what it does not\npossess, so ideas exist _in God_, and we derive them from him. These\nideas in God may be called archetypes, and those in us ectypes.\u2014In\nconsequence of this view, says Berkeley, we do not deny an independent\nreality of things, we only deny that they can exist elsewhere than in an\nunderstanding. Instead therefore of speaking of a nature in which, _e.\ng._ the sun is the cause of warmth, &c., the accurate expression would\nbe this: God announces to us through the sense of sight that we should\nsoon perceive a sensation of warmth. Hence by nature we are only to\nunderstand the succession or the connection of ideas, and by natural\nlaws the constant order in which they proceed, _i. e._ the laws of the\nassociation of ideas. This thorough-going subjective idealism, this\ncomplete denial of matter, Berkeley considered as the surest way to\noppose materialism and atheism.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXXV.\n\nWOLFF.\n\n\nThe idealism of Berkeley, as was to be expected from the nature of the\ncase, remained without any farther development, but the philosophy of\nLeibnitz was taken up and subjected to a farther revision by _Christian\nWolff_. He was born in Breslau in 1679. He was chosen professor at\nHalle, where he became obnoxious to the charge of teaching a doctrine at\nvariance with the Scriptures, and drew upon himself such a violent\nopposition from the theologians of the university, that a cabinet order\nwas issued for his dismissal on the 8th of November, 1723, and he was\nenjoined to leave Prussia within forty-eight hours on pain of being\nhung. He then became professor in Marburg, but was afterwards recalled\nto Prussia by Frederic II. immediately upon his accession to the throne.\nHe was subsequently made baron, and died 1754. In his chief thoughts he\nfollowed Leibnitz, a connection which he himself admitted, though he\nprotested against the identification of his philosophy with that of\nLeibnitz, and objected to the name, _Philosophia Leibnitio-Wolffiana_,\nwhich was taken by his disciple Bilfinger. The historical merit of Wolff\nis threefold. First, and most important, he laid claim again to the\nwhole domain of knowledge in the name of philosophy, and sought again to\nbuild up a systematic framework, and make an encyclopedia of philosophy\nin the highest sense of the word. Though he did not himself furnish much\nnew material for this purpose, yet he carefully elaborated and arranged\nthat which he found at hand. Secondly, he made again the philosophical\nmethod as such, an object of attention. His own method is, indeed, an\nexternal one as to its content, namely, the mathematical or the\nmathematico-syllogistical, recommended by Leibnitz, and by the\napplication of this his whole philosophizing sinks to a level formalism.\n(For instance, in his principles of architecture, the eighth proposition\nis\u2014\u201ca window must be wide enough for two persons to recline together\nconveniently,\u201d\u2014a proposition which is thus proved: \u201cwe are more\nfrequently accustomed to recline and look out at a window in company\nwith another person than alone, and hence, since the builder of the\nhouse should satisfy the owner in every respect (\u00a7 1), he must make a\nwindow wide enough for two persons conveniently to recline within it at\nthe same time\u201d.) Still this formalism is not without its advantage, for\nit subjects the philosophical content to a logical treatment. Thirdly,\nWolff has taught philosophy to speak German, an art which it has not\nsince forgotten. Next to Leibnitz, he is entitled to the merit of having\nmade the German language for ever the organ of philosophy.\n\nThe following remarks will suffice for the content and the scientific\nclassification of Wolff\u2019s philosophy. He defines philosophy to be the\nscience of the possible as such. But that is possible which contains no\ncontradiction. Wolff defends this definition against the charge of\npresuming too much. It is not affirmed, he says, with this definition\nthat either he or any other philosopher knows every thing which is\npossible. The definition only claims for philosophy the whole province\nof human knowledge, and it is certainly proper that philosophy should be\ndescribed according to the highest perfection which it can attain, even\nthough it has not yet actually reached it.\u2014In what parts now does this\nscience of the possible consist? Resting on the perception that there\nare within the soul two faculties, one of knowing and one of willing,\nWolff divides philosophy into two great parts, theoretical philosophy\n(an expression, however, which first appears among his followers), or\nmetaphysics, and practical philosophy. Logic precedes both as a\npreliminary training for philosophical study. Metaphysics are still\nfarther divided by Wolff into ontology, cosmology, psychology, and\nnatural theology; practical philosophy he divides into ethics, whose\nobject is man as man; economics, whose object is man as a member of the\nfamily; and politics, whose object is man as a citizen of the state.\n\n1. ONTOLOGY is the first part of Wolff\u2019s metaphysics. Ontology treats of\nwhat are now called categories, or those fundamental conceptions which\nare applied to every object, and must therefore at the outset be\ninvestigated. Aristotle had already furnished a table of categories, but\nhe had derived them wholly empirically. It is not much better with the\nontology of Wolff; it is laid out like a philosophical dictionary. At\nits head he places the principle of contradiction, viz.: it is not\npossible for any thing to be, and at the same time not to be. The\nconception of the possible at once follows from this principle. That is\npossible which contains no contradiction. That is necessary, the\nopposite of which contradicts itself, and that is accidental, the\nopposite of which is possible. Every thing which is possible is a thing,\nthough only an imaginary one; that which neither is, nor is possible, is\nnothing. When many things together compose a thing, this is a whole, and\nthe individual things comprehended by it are its parts. The greatness of\na thing consists in the multitude of its parts. If A contains that by\nwhich we can understand the being of B, then that in A by which B\nbecomes understood is the ground of B, and the whole A which contains\nthe ground of B is its cause. That which contains the ground of its\nproperties is the essence of a thing. Space is the arrangement of things\nwhich exist conjointly. Place is the determinate way in which a thing\nexists in conjunction with others. Movement is change of place. Time is\nthe arrangement of that which exists successively, etc.\n\n2. COSMOLOGY.\u2014Wolff defines the world to be a series of changing\nobjects, which exist conjointly and successively, but which are so\nconnected together that one ever contains the ground of the other.\nThings are connected in space and in time. By virtue of this universal\nconnection, the world is one united whole; the essence of the world\nconsists in the manner of its connection. But this manner cannot be\nchanged. It can neither receive any new ingredients nor lose any of\nthose it possesses. From the essence of the world spring all its\nchanges. In this respect the world is a machine. Events in the world are\nonly hypothetically necessary in so far as previous events have had a\ncertain character; they are accidental in so far as the world might have\nbeen directed otherwise. In respect to the question whether the world\nhad a beginning in time, Wolff does not express himself explicitly.\nSince God is independent of time, but the world has been from eternity\nin time, the world therefore is in no case eternal in any sense like\nGod. But according to Wolff, neither space nor time has any substantial\nbeing. Body is a connected thing composed of matter, and possessing a\nmoving power within itself. The powers of a body taken together are\ncalled its nature, and the comprehension of all being is called nature\nin general. That which has its ground in the essence of the world is\ncalled natural, and that which has not, is supernatural, or a wonder. At\nthe close of his cosmology, Wolff treats of the perfection and\nimperfection of the world. The perfection of a world consists in the\nharmony with each other of every thing which exists conjointly and\nsuccessively. But since every thing has its separate rules, the\nindividual must give up so much from its perfection as is necessary for\nthe symmetry of the whole.\n\n3. RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.--The soul is that within us which is\nself-conscious. In the self-consciousness of the soul are itself and\nother objects. Consciousness is either clear or indistinct. Clear\nconsciousness is thought. The soul is a simple incorporeal substance.\nThere dwells within it a power to represent to itself a world. In this\nsense brutes also may have a soul, but a soul which possesses\nunderstanding and will is mind, and mind belongs alone to men. The soul\nof man is a mind joined to a body, and this is the distinction between\nmen and superior spirits. The movements of the soul and of the body\nharmonize with each other by virtue of the pre\u00ebstablished harmony. The\nfreedom of the human soul is the power according to its own arbitrament,\nto choose of two possible things that which pleases it best. But the\nsoul does not decide without motives, it ever chooses that which it\nholds to be the best. Thus the soul would seem impelled to its action by\nits representations, but the understanding is not constrained to its\nrepresentations of that which is good and bad, and hence also the will\nis not constrained, but free. As a simple being the soul is indivisible,\nand hence incorruptible; the souls of brutes, however, have no\nunderstanding, and hence enjoy no conscious existence after death. This\nbelongs alone to the human soul, and hence the human soul alone is\nimmortal.\n\n4. NATURAL THEOLOGY.\u2014Wolff uses here the cosmological argument to\ndemonstrate the existence of a God. God might have made different\nworlds, but has preferred the present one as the best. This world has\nbeen called into being by the will of God. His aim in its creation was\nthe manifestation of his own perfection. Evil in the world does not\nspring from the Divine will, but from the limited being of human things.\nGod permits it only as a means of good.\n\nThis brief aphoristic exposition of Wolff\u2019s metaphysics, shows how\ngreatly it is related to the doctrine of Leibnitz. The latter, however,\nloses much of its speculative profoundness by the abstract and logical\ntreatment it receives in the hands of Wolff. For the most part, the\nspecific elements of the monadology remain in the background; with\nWolff, his simple beings are not representative like the Monads, but\nmore like the Atoms. Hence there is with him much that is illogical and\ncontradictory. His peculiar merit in metaphysics is ontology, which he\nhas elaborated far more strictly than his predecessors. A multitude of\nphilosophical terminations owe to him their origin, and their\nintroduction into philosophical language.\n\nThe philosophy of Wolff, comprehensible and distinct as it was, and by\nits composition in the German language more accessible than that of\nLeibnitz, soon became the popular philosophy, and gained an extensive\ninfluence. Among the names which deserve credit for their scientific\ntreatment of it, we may mention _Th\u00fcmming_, 1697-1728; _Bilfinger_,\n1693-1750; _Baumeister_, 1708-1785; _Baumgarten_ the esthetic,\n1714-1762; and his scholar _Meier_, 1718-1777.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXXVI.\n\nTHE GERMAN CLEARING UP.\n\n\nUnder the influence of the philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolff, though\nwithout any immediate connection with it, there arose in Germany during\nthe latter half of the eighteenth century, an eclectic popular\nphilosophy, whose different phases may be embraced under the name of the\nGerman clearing up. It has but little significance for the history of\nphilosophy, though not without importance in other respects. Its great\naim was to secure a higher culture, and hence a cultivated and polished\nstyle of reasoning is the form in which it philosophized. It is the\n_German_ counterpart of the _French_ clearing up. As the latter closed\nthe realistic period of development by drawing the ultimate consequence\nof materialism, so the former closed the idealistic series by its\ntendency to an extreme subjectivism. To the men of this direction, the\nempirical, individual Ego becomes the absolute; they forget every thing\nelse for it, or rather every thing else has a value in their eyes only\nin proportion as it refers and ministers to the subject by contributing\nto its demands and satisfying its inner cravings. Hence the question of\nimmortality becomes now the great problem of philosophy (in which\nrespect we may mention _Mendelssohn_, 1727-1786, the most important man\nin this direction); the eternal duration of the individual soul is the\nchief point of interest; objective ideas or truths of faith, _e. g._ the\npersonality of God, though not denied, cease to have an interest; it is\nheld as a standing article of belief that we can know nothing of God. In\nanother current of this direction, it is moral philosophy and esthetics\n(_Garvey_, 1742-1798; _Engel_, 1741-1802; _Abbt_, 1738-1766; _Sulzer_,\n1720-1779) which find a scientific treatment, because both these\npreserve a subjective interest. In general, every thing is viewed in its\nuseful relations; the useful becomes the peculiar criterion of truth;\nthat which is not useful to the subject, or which does not minister to\nhis subjective ends, is set aside. In connection with this turn of mind\nstands the prevailing teleological direction which the investigations of\nnature assumed (_Reimarus_, 1694-1765), and the utilitarian character\ngiven to ethics. The happiness of the individual was considered as the\nhighest principle and the supreme end (_Basedow_, 1723-1790). Even\nreligion is contemplated from this point of view. Reimarus wrote a\ntreatise upon the \u201c_advantages_\u201d of religion, in which he attempted to\nprove that religion was not subversive of earthly pleasure, but rather\nincreased it; and _Steinbart_ (1738-1809) elaborated, in a number of\ntreatises, the theme that all wisdom consists alone in attaining\nhappiness, _i. e._ enduring satisfaction, and that the Christian\nreligion, instead of forbidding this, was rather itself the true\ndoctrine of happiness. In other particulars Christianity received only a\ntemperate respect; wherever it laid claim to any authority disagreeable\nto the subject (as in individual doctrines like that of future\npunishment), it was opposed, and in general the effort was made to\ncounteract, as far as possible, the positive dogma by natural religion.\nReimarus, for example, the most zealous defender of theism and of the\nteleological investigation of nature, is at the same time the author of\nthe Wolfenb\u00fcttel fragments. By criticizing the Gospel history, and every\nthing positive and transmitted, and by rationalizing the supernatural in\nreligion, the subject displayed its new-found independence. In fine, the\nsubjective standpoint of this period exhibits itself in the numerous\nautobiographies and self-confessions then so prevalent; the isolated\nself is the object of admiring contemplation (_Rousseau_, 1712-1778, and\nhis confessions); it beholds itself mirrored in its particular\nconditions, sensations, and views\u2014a sort of flirtation with itself,\nwhich often rises to sickly sentimentality. According to all this, it is\nseen to be the extreme consequence of subjective idealism which\nconstitutes the character of the German clearing up period, which thus\ncloses the series of an idealistic development.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXXVII.\n\nTRANSITION TO KANT.\n\n\nThe idealistic and the realistic stage of development to which we have\nnow been attending, each ended with a one-sided result. Instead of\nactually and internally reconciling the opposition between thought and\nbeing, they both issued in denying the one or the other of these\nfactors. Realism, on its side, had made matter absolute; and idealism,\non its side, had endowed the empirical Ego with the same\nattribute\u2014extremes in which philosophy was threatened with total\ndestruction. It had, in fact, in Germany as in France, become merged in\nthe most superficial popular philosophy. Then _Kant_ arose, and brought\nagain into one channel the two streams which, when separate from each\nother, threatened to lose themselves amid the sands. Kant is the great\nrenovator of philosophy, who brought back to their point of divergence\nthe one-sided efforts which had preceded him, and embraced them in their\nunity and totality. He stands in some special and fitting relation\neither antagonistic or harmonious to all others\u2014to Locke no less than to\nHume, to the Scottish philosophers no less than to the English and\nFrench moralists, to the philosophy of Leibnitz and of Wolff, as well as\nto the materialism of the French and the utilitarianism of the German\nclearing up period. His relation to the development of a partial\nidealism and a one-sided realism is thus stated: Empiricism had made the\nEgo purely passive and subordinate to the sensible external\nworld\u2014idealism had made it purely active, and given it a sovereignty\nover the sensible world; Kant attempted to strike a balance between\nthese two claims, by affirming that the Ego as practical is free and\nautonomic, an unconditioned lawgiver for itself, while as theoretical it\nis receptive and conditioned by the phenomenal world; but at the same\ntime the theoretical Ego contains the two sides within itself, for if,\non the one side, empiricism may be justified upon the ground that the\nmaterial and only field of all our knowledge is furnished by experience,\nso on the other side, rationalism may be justified on the ground that\nthere is an apriori factor and basis to our knowledge, for in experience\nitself we make use of conceptions which are not furnished by experience,\nbut are contained apriori in our understanding.\n\nIn order, now, that we may bring the very elaborate framework of the\nKantian philosophy into a clearer outline, let us briefly glance at its\nfundamental conceptions, and notice its chief principles and results.\nKant subjected the activity of the human mind in knowing, and the origin\nof our experience, to his critical investigation. Hence his philosophy\nis called critical philosophy, or criticism, because it aims to be\nessentially an examination of our faculty of knowledge; it is also\ncalled transcendental philosophy, since Kant calls the reflection of the\nreason upon its relation to the objective world, a transcendental\nreflection (transcendental must not be confounded with transcendent),\nor, in other words, a transcendental knowledge is one \u201cwhich does not\nrelate so much to objects of knowledge, as to our way of knowing them,\nso far as this is apriori possible.\u201d The examination of the faculty of\nknowledge, which Kant attempts in his \u201c_Critick of Pure Reason_,\u201d shows\nthe following results. All knowledge is a product of two factors, the\nknowing subject and the external world. Of these two factors, the latter\nfurnishes our knowledge with experience, as the matter, and the former\nwith the conceptions of the understanding, as the form, through which a\nconnected knowledge, or a synthesis of our perceptions in a whole of\nexperience first becomes possible. If there were no external world, then\nwould there be no phenomena; if there were no understanding, then these\nphenomena, or perceptions, which are infinitely manifold, would never be\nbrought into the unity of a notion, and thus no experience were\npossible. Thus, while intuitions without conceptions are blind, and\nconceptions without intuitions are empty, knowledge is a union of the\ntwo, since it requires that the form of conception should be filled with\nthe matter of experience, and that the matter of experience should be\napprehended in the net of the understanding\u2019s conceptions. Nevertheless,\nwe do not know things as they are in themselves. _First_, because the\ncategories, or the forms of our understanding prevent. By bringing that\nwhich is given as the material of knowledge into our own conceptions as\nthe form, there is manifestly a change in respect of the objects, which\nbecome thought of not as they are, but only as we apprehend them; they\nappear to us only as they are transmuted into categories. But besides\nthis subjective addition, there is yet another. _Secondly_, we do not\nknow things as they are in themselves, because even the intuitions which\nwe bring within the form of the understanding\u2019s conceptions, are not\npure and uncolored, but are already penetrated by a subjective medium,\nnamely, by the universal form of all objects of sense, space and time.\nSpace and time are also subjective additions, forms of sensuous\nintuition, which are just as originally present in our minds as the\nfundamental conceptions or categories of our understanding. That which\nwe would represent intuitively to ourselves we must place in space and\ntime, for without these no intuition is possible. From this it follows\nthat it is only phenomena which we know, and not things in themselves\nseparate from space and time.\n\nA superficial apprehension of these Kantian principles might lead one to\nsuppose that Kant\u2019s criticism did not essentially go beyond the\nstandpoint of Locke\u2019s empiricism. But such a supposition disappears upon\na careful scrutiny. Kant was obliged to recognize with Hume that the\nconceptions, cause and effect, substance and attribute, and the other\nconceptions which the human understanding sees itself necessitated to\nthink in the phenomena, and in which every one of its thoughts must be\nfound, do not arise from any experience of the sense. For instance, when\nwe become affected through different senses, and perceive a white color,\na sweet taste, a rough surface, &c., and predicate all these of one\nthing, as a piece of sugar, there come from without only the plurality\nof sensations, while the conception of unity cannot come through\nsensation, but is a category or conception borne over to the sensations\nfrom the mind itself. But instead of denying, for this reason, the\nreality of these conceptions of the understanding, Kant took a step in\nadvance, assigning a peculiar province to this activity of the\nunderstanding, and showing that these forms of thought thus furnished to\nthe matter of experience are immanent laws of the human faculty of\nknowledge, the peculiar laws of the understanding\u2019s operations, which\nmay be obtained by a perfect analysis of our thinking activity. (Of\nthese laws or conceptions there are twelve, viz., unity, plurality,\ntotality; reality, negation, limitation; substantiality, causality,\nreciprocal action; possibility, actuality, and necessity.)\n\nFrom what has been said we can see the three chief principles of the\nKantian theory of knowledge:\n\n1. WE KNOW ONLY PHENOMENA AND NOT THINGS IN THEMSELVES.\u2014The experience\nfurnished us by the external world becomes so adjusted and altered in\nits relations (for we apprehend it at first in the subjective framework\nof space and time, and then in the equally subjective forms of our\nunderstanding\u2019s conceptions), that it no longer represents the thing\nitself in its original condition, pure and unmixed.\n\n2. NEVERTHELESS EXPERIENCE IS THE ONLY PROVINCE OF OUR KNOWLEDGE, AND\nTHERE IS NO SCIENCE OF THE UNCONDITIONED.\u2014This follows of course, for\nsince every knowledge is the product of the matter of experience, and\nthe form of the understanding, and depends thus upon the co-working of\nthe sensory and the understanding, then no knowledge is possible of\nobjects for which one of these factors, experience, fails us; a\nknowledge alone from the understanding\u2019s conceptions of the\nunconditioned is illusory since the sensory can show no unconditioned\nobject corresponding to the conception. Hence the questions which Kant\nplaces at the head of his whole Critick; how are synthetical judgments\napriori possible? _i. e._ can we widen our knowledge apriori, by thought\nalone, beyond the sensuous experience? is a knowledge of the\nsupersensible possible? must be answered with an unconditional negative.\n\n3. Still, if the human knowledge makes no effort to stride beyond the\nnarrow limits of experience, _i. e._ to become transcendent, it involves\nitself in the greatest contradictions. The three ideas of the reason,\nthe psychological, the cosmological, and the theological, viz. (_a_) the\nidea of an absolute subject, _i. e._ of the soul, or of immortality,\n(_b_) the idea of the world as a totality of all conditions and\nphenomena, (_c_) the idea of a most perfect being\u2014are so wholly without\napplication to the empirical actuality, are so truly regulative, and not\nconstitutive principles, which are only the pure products of the reason,\nand are so entirely without a correspondent object in experience, that\nwhenever they are applied to experience, _i. e._ become conceived of as\nactually existing objects, they lead to pure logical errors, to the most\nobvious paralogisms and sophisms. These errors, which are partly false\nconclusions and paralogisms, and partly unavoidable contradictions of\nthe reason with itself, Kant undertook to show in reference to all the\nideas of the reason. Take, _e. g._ the cosmological idea. Whenever the\nreason posits any transcendental expressions in reference to the\nuniverse, _i. e._ attempts to apply the forms of the finite to the\ninfinite, it is at once evident that the antithesis of those expressions\ncan be proved just as well as the thesis. The affirmation that the world\nhas a beginning in time, and limits in space, can be proved as well as,\nand no better than its opposite, that the world has no beginning in\ntime, and no spacial limits. Whence it follows that all speculative\ncosmology is an assumption by the reason. So also with the theological\nidea; it rests on bare logical paralogisms, and false conclusions, as\nKant, with great acuteness, shows in reference to each of the proofs for\nthe being of a God, which previous dogmatic philosophies had attempted.\nIt is therefore impossible to prove and to conceive of the existence of\na God as a Supreme Being, or of the soul as a real subject, or of a\ncomprehending universe. The peculiar problems of metaphysics lie outside\nthe province of philosophical knowledge.\n\nSuch is the negative part of the Kantian philosophy; its positive\ncomplement is found in the \u201c_Critick of the Practical Reason_.\u201d While\nthe mind as theoretical and cognitive is wholly conditioned, and ruled\nby the objective and sensible world, and thus knowledge is only possible\nthrough intuition, yet as practical does it go wholly beyond the given\n(the sense impulse), and is determined only through the categorical\nimperative, and the moral law, which is itself, and is therefore free\nand autonomic; the ends which it pursues are those which itself, as\nmoral spirit, places before itself; objects are no more its masters and\nlawgivers, to which it must yield if it would know the truth, but its\nservants, which it may use for its own ends in actualizing its moral\nlaw. While the theoretical mind is united to a world of sense and\nphenomena, a world obedient to necessary laws, the practical mind, by\nvirtue of the freedom essential to it, by virtue of its direction\ntowards an absolute aim, belongs to a purely intelligible and\nsupersensible world. This is the practical idealism of Kant, from which\nhe derives the three practical postulates of the immortality of the\nsoul, moral freedom, and the being of a God, which, as theoretical\ntruths, had been before denied.\n\nWith this brief sketch for our guidance, let us now pass on to a more\nextended exposition of the Kantian Philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXXVIII.\n\nKANT.\n\n\nImmanuel Kant was born at K\u00f6nigsberg in Prussia, April 22, 1724. His\nfather an honest saddlemaker, and his mother a prudent and pious woman,\nexerted a good influence upon him in his earliest youth. In the year\n1740 he entered the university, where he connected himself with the\ntheological department, but devoted the most of his time to philosophy,\nmathematics, and physics. He commenced his literary career in his\ntwenty-third year, in 1747, with a treatise entitled \u201c_Thoughts\nconcerning the true estimate of Living Forces_.\u201d He was obliged by his\npecuniary circumstances to spend some years as a private tutor in\ndifferent families in the neighborhood of K\u00f6nigsberg. In 1755 he took a\nplace in the university as \u201c_privat-docent_,\u201d which position he held for\nfifteen years, during which time he gave lectures upon logic,\nmetaphysics, physics, mathematics, and also, during the latter part of\nthe time, upon ethics, anthropology, and physical geography. At this\nperiod he adhered for the most part to the school of Wolff, though early\nexpressing his doubts in respect of dogmatism. From the publication of\nhis first treatise he applied himself to writing with unwearied\nactivity, though his great work, the \u201c_Critick of pure Reason_,\u201d did not\nappear till his fifty-seventh year, 1781. His \u201c_Critick of the practical\nReason_,\u201d was issued in 1787, and his \u201c_Religion within the bounds of\npure Reason_,\u201d in 1793. In 1770, in his forty-sixth year, he was chosen\nordinary professor of logic and metaphysics, a chair which he continued\nto fill uninterruptedly till 1794, when the weakness of age obliged him\nto leave it. Invitations to professorships at Jena, Erlangen, and Halle,\nwere given him and rejected. As soon as he became known, the noblest and\nmost active minds flocked from all parts of Germany to K\u00f6nigsberg, to\nsit at the feet of the sage who was master there. One of his\nworshippers, Reuss, professor of philosophy at W\u00fcrzburg, who abode but a\nbrief time at K\u00f6nigsberg, entered his chamber, declaring that he had\ncome one hundred and sixty miles[3] in order to see Kant and to speak\nwith him.\u2014During the last seventeen years of his life he occupied a\nlittle house with a garden, in a quiet quarter of the city, where his\ncalm and regular mode of life might be undisturbed. His habits of life\nwere very simple. He never left his native province even to go as far as\nDantzic. His longest journeys were to visit some country-seats in the\nenvirons of K\u00f6nigsberg. Nevertheless, as his lectures upon physical\ngeography testify, he acquired by reading the most accurate knowledge of\nthe earth. He knew all of Rousseau\u2019s works, of which _Emile_ at its\nfirst appearance detained him for a number of days from his customary\nwalks. Kant died February 12, 1804, in the eightieth year of his life.\nHe was of medium stature, finely built, with blue eyes, and always\nenjoyed sound health till in his latter years, when he became childish.\nHe was never married. His character was marked by an earnest love of\ntruth, great candor, and simple modesty.\n\nThough Kant\u2019s great work, the \u201cCritick of pure Reason,\u201d which created an\nepoch in the history of philosophy, did not appear till 1781; yet had he\npreviously shown an approach towards the same standpoint in several\nsmaller treatises, and particularly in his inaugural dissertation which\nappeared in 1770, \u201c_Concerning the form and the principles of the\nSense-World and that of the Understanding_.\u201d Kant himself refers the\ninner genesis of his critical standpoint to Hume. \u201cI freely confess,\u201d he\nsays, \u201cthat it was David Hume who first roused me from my dogmatic\nslumber, and gave a different direction to my investigations in the\nfield of speculative philosophy.\u201d The critical view therefore first\nbecame developed in Kant as he left the dogmatic metaphysical school,\nthe Wolffian philosophy in which he had grown up, and went over to the\nstudy of a sceptical empiricism in Hume. \u201cHitherto,\u201d says Kant at the\nclose of his Critick of pure Reason, \u201cmen have been obliged to choose\neither a dogmatical direction, like Wolff, or a sceptical one, like\nHume. The critical road alone is yet open. If the reader has had\npleasure and patience in travelling along this in my company, let him\nnow contribute his aid in making this by-path into a highway, in order\nthat that which many centuries could not effect may now be attained\nbefore the expiration of the present, and the reason become perfectly\ncontent in respect of that which has hitherto, but in vain, engaged its\ncuriosity.\u201d Kant had the clearest consciousness respecting the relation\nof his criticism to the previous philosophy. He compares the revolution\nwhich he himself had brought about in philosophy with that wrought by\nCopernicus in astronomy, \u201cHitherto it has been assumed that all our\nknowledge must regulate itself according to the objects; but all\nattempts to make any thing out of them apriori, through notions whereby\nour knowledge might be enlarged, proved, under this supposition,\nabortive. Let us, then, try for once whether we do not succeed better\nwith the problems of metaphysics, by assuming that the objects must\nregulate themselves according to our knowledge, a mode of viewing the\nsubject which accords so much better with the desired possibility of a\nknowledge of them apriori, which must decide something concerning\nobjects before they are given us. The circumstances are in this case\nprecisely the same as with the first thoughts of Copernicus, who,\nfinding that his attempt to explain the motions of the heavenly bodies\ndid not succeed, when he assumed the whole starry host to revolve around\nthe spectator, tried whether he should not succeed better, if he left\nthe spectator himself to turn, and the stars on the contrary at rest.\u201d\nIn these words we have the principle of a subjective idealism, most\nclearly and decidedly expressed.\n\nIn the succeeding exposition of the Kantian philosophy we shall most\nsuitably follow the classification adopted by Kant himself. His\nprinciple of classification is a psychological one. All the faculties of\nthe soul, he says, may be referred to three, which are incapable of any\nfarther reduction; knowing, feeling, and desire. The first faculty\ncontains the principles, the governing laws for all the three. So far as\nthe faculty of knowledge contains the principles of knowledge itself, is\nit theoretical reason, and so far as it contains the principles of\ndesire and action, is it practical reason, while, so far as it contains\nthe principles which regulate the feelings of pleasure and pain, is it a\nfaculty of judgment. Thus the Kantian philosophy (on its critical side)\ndivides itself into three criticks, (1) Critick of pure _i. e._\ntheoretical reason, (2) Critick of practical reason, (3) Critick of the\njudgment.\n\nI. CRITICK OF PURE REASON.\u2014The critick of pure reason, says Kant, is the\ninventory in which all our possessions through pure reason are\nsystematically arranged. What are these possessions? When we have a\ncognition, what is it that we bring thereto? To answer these questions,\nKant explores the two chief fields of our theoretical consciousness, the\ntwo chief factors of all knowledge, the sensory and the understanding.\nFirstly: what does our sensory or our faculty of intuition possess\napriori? Secondly: what is the apriori possession of our understanding?\nThe first of these questions is discussed in the transcendental\n_\u00c6sthetics_ (a title which we must take not in the sense now commonly\nattached to the word, but in its etymological signification as the\n\u201cscience of the apriori principles of the sensory\u201d); and the second in\nthe transcendental _Logic_ or _Analytics_. Sense and understanding are\nthus the two factors of all knowledge, the two stalks\u2014as Kant expresses\nit\u2014of our knowledge, which may spring from a common root, though this is\nunknown to us: the sensory is the receptivity, and the understanding the\nspontaneity of our cognitive faculty; by the sensory, which can only\nfurnish intuitions, objects become _given_ to us; by the understanding,\nwhich forms conceptions, these objects become _thought_. Conceptions\nwithout intuitions are empty; intuitions without conceptions are blind.\nIntuitions and conceptions constitute the reciprocally complemental\nelements of our intellectual activity. What now are the apriori\nprinciples respectively of our knowledge, through the sense and through\nthe thought? The first of these questions, as already said, is answered\nby\n\n1. THE TRANSCENDENTAL \u00c6STHETICS.\u2014To anticipate at once the answer, we\nmay say that the apriori principles of our knowledge through the sense,\nthe original forms of sensuous intuition, are space and time. Space is\nthe form of the external sense, by means of which objects are given to\nus as existing outside of ourselves separately and conjointly; time is\nthe form of the inner sense, by means of which the circumstances of our\nown soul-life become objects to our consciousness. If we abstract every\nthing belonging to the matter of our sensations, space remains as the\nuniversal form in which all the materials of the external sense must be\narranged. If we abstract every thing which belongs to the matter of our\ninner sense, time remains as the form which the movement of the mind had\nfilled. Space and time are the highest forms of the outer and inner\nsense. That these forms lie apriori in the human mind, Kant proves,\nfirst, directly from the nature of these conceptions themselves; and,\nsecondly, indirectly by showing that without apriori presupposing these\nconceptions, it were not possible to have any certain science of\nundoubted validity. The first of these he calls the _metaphysical_, and\nthe second the _transcendental discussion_.\n\n(1.) In the _metaphysical discussion_ it is to be shown, (_a_) that\nspace and time are apriori given, (_b_) that these notions belong to the\nsensory (\u00e6sthetics) and not to the understanding (logic), _i. e._ that\nthey are intuitions and not conceptions, (_a_) That space and time are\napriori is clear from the fact that every experience, before it can be,\nmust presuppose already a space and time. I perceive something as\nexternal to me; but this external presupposes space. Again, I have two\nsensations at the same time and successively; this presupposes time,\n(_b_) Space and time, however, are by no means conceptions, but forms of\nintuition, or intuitions themselves. For in every universal conception\nthe individual is comprehended under it, and is not a part of it; but in\nspace and time, all individual spaces and times are parts of and\ncontained within the universal space and the universal time.\n\n(2.) In the _transcendental discussion_ Kant draws his proof indirectly\nby showing that certain sciences, universally recognized as such, can\nonly be conceived upon the supposition that space and time are apriori.\nA pure mathematics is only possible on the ground that space and time\nare pure and not empirical intuitions. Kant comprises the whole problem\nof the Transcendental \u00c6sthetics in the question\u2014how are pure\nmathematical sciences possible? The ground, says Kant, upon which pure\nmathematics moves, is space and time. But now mathematics utters its\nprinciples as universal and necessary. Universal and necessary\nprinciples, however, can never come from experience; they must have an\napriori ground; consequently it is impossible that space and time, out\nof which mathematics receives its principles, should be first given\naposteriori; they must be given apriori as pure intuitions. Hence we\nhave a knowledge apriori, and a science which rests upon apriori\ngrounds; and the matter simply resolves itself into this, viz.:\nwhosoever should deny that apriori knowledge can be, must also at the\nsame time deny the possibility of mathematics. But if the fundamental\ntruths of mathematics are intuitions apriori, we might conclude that\nthere may be also apriori conceptions, out of which, in connection with\nthese pure intuitions, a metaphysics could be formed. This is the\npositive result of the Transcendental \u00c6sthetics, though with this\npositive side the negative is closely connected. Intuition or immediate\nknowledge can be attained by man only through the sensory, whose\nuniversal intuitions are only space and time. But since these intuitions\nof space and time are no objective relations, but only subjective forms,\nthere is therefore something subjective mingled with all our intuitions,\nand we can know things not as they are in themselves, but only as they\nappear to us through this subjective medium of space and time. This is\nthe meaning of the Kantian principle, that we do not know things in\nthemselves, but only phenomena. But if on this account we should affirm\nthat all things are in space and time, this would be too much; they are\nin space and time only for us,\u2014all phenomena of the external sense\nappearing both in space and in time, and all phenomena of the inner\nsense appearing only in time. Notwithstanding this, Kant would in no\nways have admitted that the world of sense is mere appearance. He\naffirmed, that while he contended for a transcendental ideality, there\nwas, nevertheless, an empirical reality of space and time: things\nexternal to ourselves exist just as certainly as do we and the\ncircumstances within us, only they are not represented to us as they are\nin themselves and in their independence of space and of time. As to the\nquestion, whether there is any thing in the thing itself back of the\nphenomena, Kant intimates in the first edition of his Critick, that it\nis not impossible that the Ego and the thing-in-itself are one and the\nsame thinking substance. This thought, which Kant threw out as a mere\nconjecture, was the source of all the wider developments of the latest\nphilosophy. It was afterwards the fundamental idea of the Fichtian\nsystem, that the Ego does not become affected through a thing\nessentially foreign to it, but purely through itself. In the second\nedition of his Critick, however, Kant omitted this sentence.\n\nThe Transcendental \u00c6sthetics closes with the discussion of space and\ntime, _i. e._ with finding out what is in the sensory apriori. But the\nhuman mind cannot be satisfied merely with the receptive relation of the\nsensory; it does not simply receive objects, but it applies to these its\nown spontaneity, and attempts to think these through its conceptions,\nand embrace them in the forms of its understanding. It is the object of\nthe _Transcendental Analytic_ (which forms the first part of the\n_Transcendental Logic_), to examine these apriori conceptions or forms\nof thought which lie originally in the understanding, as the forms of\nspace and time do in the intuitive faculty.\n\n2. THE TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC.\u2014It is the first problem of the Analytic\nto attain the pure conceptions of the understanding. Aristotle had\nalready attempted to form a table of these conceptions or categories,\nbut he had collected them empirically instead of deriving them from a\ncommon principle, and had numbered among them space and time, though\nthese are no pure conceptions of the understanding, but only forms of\nintuition. But if we would have a perfect, pure, and regularly arranged\ntable of all the conceptions of the understanding, or all the apriori\nforms of thought, we must look for a principle out of which we may\nderive them. This principle is the judgment. The general fundamental\nconceptions of the understanding may be perfectly attained if we look at\nall the different modes or forms of the judgment. For this end Kant\nconsiders the different kinds of judgment as ordinarily pointed out to\nus by the science of logic. Now logic shows that there are four kinds of\njudgment, viz., judgments of\n\n _Quantity._ _Quality._ _Relation._ _Modality._\n Universal, Affirmative, Categorical, Problematical,\n Plurative, Negative, Hypothetical, Assertive,\n Singular. Illimitable. Disjunctive. Apodictic.\n\nFrom these judgments result the same number of fundamental conceptions\nor categories of the understanding, viz.:\n\n\n _Quantity._ _Quality._ _Relation._ _Modality._\n Totality, Reality, Substance and Possibility and\n inherence, impossibility,\n Multiplicity, Negation, Cause and Being and\n dependence, not-being,\n Unity. Limitation. Reciprocal action. Necessity and\n accidence.\n\nFrom these twelve categories all the rest may be derived by combination.\nFrom the fact that these categories are shown to belong apriori to the\nunderstanding, it follows, (1) that these conceptions are apriori, and\nhence have a necessary and universal validity, (2) that by themselves\nthey are empty forms, and attain a content only through intuitions. But\nsince our intuition is wholly through the sense, these categories have\ntheir validity only in their application to the sensuous intuition,\nwhich becomes a proper experience only when apprehended in the\nconceptions of the understanding.\u2014Here we meet a second question; how\ndoes this happen? How do objects become subsumed under these forms of\nthe understanding, which for themselves are so empty?\n\nThere would be no difficulty with this subsumption if the objects and\nthe conceptions of the understanding were the same in kind. But they are\nnot. Because the objects come to the understanding from the sensory,\nthey are of the nature of the sense. Hence the question arises: how can\nthese sensible objects be subsumed under pure conceptions of the\nunderstanding, and fundamental principles (judgments apriori), be formed\nfrom them? This cannot result immediately, but there must come in\nbetween the two, a third, which must have some thing in common with\neach, _i. e._ which is in one respect pure and apriori, and in another\nsensible. The two pure intuitions of the Transcendental \u00c6sthetics, space\nand time, especially the latter, are of such a nature. A transcendental\ntime determination, as the determination of coetaneousness, corresponds\non the one side to the categories, because it is apriori, and on the\nother side to the phenomenal objects, because every thing phenomenal can\nbe represented only in time. The transcendental time determination, Kant\ncalls in this respect the transcendental _schema_, and the use which the\nunderstanding makes of it, he calls the transcendental _schematism_ of\nthe pure understanding. The schema is a product of the imaginative\nfaculty, which self-actively determines the inner sense to this, though\nthe schema is something other than a mere image. An image is always\nmerely an individual and determinate intuition, but the schema merely\nrepresents the universal process of the imagination, by which it\nfurnishes for a conception a proper image. Hence the schema can only\nexist in the conception, and never suffers itself to be brought within\nthe sensuous intuition. If, now, we consider more closely the schematism\nof the understanding, and seek the transcendental time determination for\nevery category, we find that:\n\n(1) _Quantity_ has for a universal schema _the series of time_ or\nnumber, which represents the successive addition of one and one of the\nsame kind. I can only represent to myself the pure understanding\nconception of greatness, except as I bring into the imagination a number\nof units one after another. If I stop this process at its first\nbeginning, the result is unity; if I let it go on farther I have\nplurality; and if I suffer it to continue without limit, there is\ntotality. Whenever I meet with objects in the phenomenal world, which I\ncan only apprehend successively, I am directed to apply the conception\nof greatness, which would not be possible without the schema of _the\nseries of time_.\n\n(2) _Quality_ has for its schema _the content of time_. If I wish to\nrepresent to myself the understanding conception of reality, which\nbelongs to quality, I bring before me in thought a time filled up, or a\ncontent of time. That is real which fills a time. If also I would\nrepresent to myself the pure understanding conception of negation, I\nbring into thought a void time.\n\n(3) The categories of _relation_ take their schemata from _the order of\ntime_; for if I would represent to myself a determinate relation, I\nalways bring into thought a determinate order of things in time.\nSubstance appears as the persistence of the real in time; causality as\nregular succession in time; reciprocal action as the regular\ncoetaneousness of the determinations in the one substance, with the\ndeterminations in the other.\n\n(4) The categories of _modality_ take their schema from _the whole of\ntime_, _i. e._ from whether, and how, an object belongs to time. The\nschema of possibility is the general harmony of a representation with\nthe conditions of time; the schema of actuality is the existence of an\nobject in a determined time; that of necessity is the existence of an\nobject for all time.\n\nWe are thus furnished with all the means for forming metaphysical\nfundamental principles (judgments apriori); we have, _firstly_,\nconceptions apriori, and _secondly_, schemata through which we can apply\nthese conceptions to objects; for since every object which we can\nperceive, falls in time, so must it also fall under one of these\nschemata, which have been borrowed from time, and must consequently\npermit the corresponding category to be applied to it. The judgments\nwhich we here attain are synthetical. They are, corresponding to the\nfour classes of categories, the following: (1) All phenomena are,\naccording to intuition, extensive greatness, since they cannot be\napprehended otherwise than through space and time. On this principle the\naxioms of intuition rely. (2) All phenomena are, according to sensation,\nintensive greatness, since every sensation has a determined degree, and\nis capable of increase and diminution. On this principle the\nanticipations of perception rest. (3) The phenomena stand under\nnecessary time-determinations. They contain the substantial, which\nabides, and the accidental, which changes. In reference to the change of\naccidence, they are subject to the law of the following connection,\nthrough the relation of cause and effect: as substances they are, in\nrespect of their accidences, in a constant reciprocal action. From this\nprinciple spring the analogies of experience. (4) The postulates of\nempirical thinking are contained in the principles: (_a_) that which\ncoincides with the formal conditions of experience, is possible, and can\nbecome phenomenon; (_b_) that which agrees with the material conditions\nof experience is actual, and is phenomenon; (_c_) that, whose connection\nwith the actual is determined according to the universal conditions of\nexperience, is necessary, and must be phenomenon. Such are the possible\nand authorized synthetical judgments apriori. But it must not be\nforgotten that we are entitled to make only an empirical use of all\nthese conceptions and principles, and that we must ever apply them only\nto things as objects of a possible experience, and never to things in\nthemselves; for the conception without an object is an empty form, but\nthe object cannot be given to the conception except in intuition, and\nthe pure intuition of space and time needs to be filled by experience.\nHence, without reference to human experience, these apriori conceptions\nand principles are nothing but a sporting of the imagination and the\nunderstanding, with their representations. Their peculiar determination\nis only to enable us to spell perceptions, that we may read them as\nexperiences. But here one is apt to fall into a delusion, which can\nhardly be avoided. Since the categories are not grounded upon the\nsensory, but have an apriori origin, it would seem as though their\napplication would reach far beyond the sense; but such a view is a\ndelusion; our conceptions are not able to lead us to a knowledge of\nthings in themselves (_noumena_), since our intuition gives us only\nphenomena for the content of our conceptions, and the thing in itself\ncan never be given in a possible experience; our knowledge remains\nlimited to the phenomena. The source of all the confusions and errors\nand strife in previous metaphysics, was in confounding the phenomenal\nwith the noumenal world.\n\nBesides the categories or conceptions of the understanding, which have\nbeen considered, and which are especially important for experience,\nthough often applied erroneously beyond the province of experience,\nthere are other conceptions whose peculiar province is only to deceive;\nconceptions whose express determination is to pass beyond the province\nof experience, and which may consequently be called transcendent. These\nare the fundamental conceptions and principles of the previous\nmetaphysics. To examine these conceptions, and destroy the appearance of\nobjective science and knowledge, which they falsely exhibit, is the\nproblem of the _Transcendental Dialectics_ (the second part of the\ntranscendental logic).\n\n3. THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTICS.\u2014In a strict sense, the reason is\ndistinguished from the understanding. As the understanding has its\ncategories, the reason has its ideas; as the understanding forms\nfundamental maxims from conceptions, the reason forms principles from\nideas, in which the maxims of the understanding have their highest\nconfirmation. The peculiar work of the reason is, in general, to find\nthe unconditioned for the conditioned knowledge of the understanding,\nand to unify it. Hence the reason is the faculty of the unconditioned,\nor of principles; but since it has no immediate reference to objects,\nbut only to the understanding and its judgments, its activity must\nremain an immanent one. If it would take the highest unity of the reason\nnot simply in a transcendental sense, but exalt it to an actual object\nof knowledge, then it would become transcendent in that it applied the\nconceptions of the understanding to the knowledge of the unconditioned.\nFrom this transcending and false use of the categories, arises the\ntranscendental appearance which decoys us beyond experience, by the\ndelusive pretext of widening the domain of the pure understanding. It is\nthe problem of the transcendental logic to discover this transcendental\nappearance.\n\nThe speculative ideas of the reason, derived from the three kinds of\nlogical conclusion, the categorical, the hypothetical, and the\ndisjunctive, are threefold.\n\n(1.) The psychological idea, the idea of the soul, as a thinking\nsubstance (the object hitherto of rational psychology).\n\n(2.) The cosmological idea, the idea of the world as including all\nphenomena (the object hitherto of cosmology).\n\n(3.) The theological idea, the idea of God as the highest condition of\nthe possibility of all things (the object hitherto of rational\ntheology).\n\nBut with these ideas, in which the reason attempts to apply the\ncategories of the understanding to the unconditioned, the reason becomes\nunavoidably entangled in a semblance and an illusion. This\ntranscendental semblance, or this optical illusion of the reason,\nexhibits itself differently in each of the different ideas. With the\npsychological ideas the reason perpetrates a simple paralogism, while\nwith the cosmological it finds itself driven to contradictory\naffirmations or antinomies, and, with the theological, it wanders about\nin an empty ideal.\n\n(1.) _The psychological ideas, or the paralogisms of the pure reason._\n\nKant has attempted, under this rubric, to overthrow all rational\npsychology as this had been previously apprehended. Rational psychology\nhas considered the soul as a thing called by that name with the\nattribute of immateriality, as a simple substance with the attribute of\nincorruptibility, as a numerically identical, intellectual substance\nwith the predicate of personality, as an unextended and thinking being\nwith the predicate of immortality. All these principles of rational\npsychology, says Kant, are surreptitious; they are all derived from the\none premise, \u201cI think;\u201d but this premise is neither intuition nor\nconception, but a simple consciousness, an act of the mind which\nattends, connects, and bears in itself all representations and\nconceptions. This thinking is now falsely taken as a real thing; the\nbeing of the Ego as object is connected with the Ego as subject, and\nthat which is affirmed analytically of the latter is predicated\nsynthetically of the former. But in order to treat the Ego also as\nobject, and to be able to apply to it categories, it must be given\nempirically, in an intuition, which is not the case. From all this it\nfollows that the proofs for immortality rest upon false conclusions. I\ncan, indeed, separate my pure thinking _ideally_ from the body; but\nobviously, it does not follow from this that my thinking can exist\n_really_ when separate from the body. The result which Kant derives from\nhis critick of rational psychology is this, viz., there is no rational\npsychology as a _doctrine_ which can furnish us with any addition to our\nself-knowledge, but only as a _discipline_, which places impassable\nlimits to the speculative reason in this field, in order that it may\nneither throw itself into the bosom of a soulless materialism, nor lose\nitself in the delusion of a groundless spiritualism. In this respect\nrational psychology would rather remind us, that this refusal of our\nreason to give a satisfactory answer to the questions which stretch\nbeyond this life, should be regarded as an intimation of the reason for\nus to leave this fruitless and superfluous speculation, and apply our\nself-knowledge to some fruitful and practical use.\n\n(2.) _The Antinomies of Cosmology._\n\nThe cosmological ideas cannot be fully attained without the aid of the\ncategories. (1) So far as the quantity of the world is concerned, space\nand time are the original _quanta_ of all intuition. In a quantitative\nrespect, therefore, the cosmological idea must hold fast to something\nconcerning the totality of the times and spaces of the world. (2) In\nrespect of quality, the divisibility of matter must be regarded. (3) In\nrespect of relation, the complete series of causes must be sought for\nthe existing effects in the world. (4) In respect of modality, the\naccidental according to its conditions, or the complete dependence of\nthe accidental in the phenomenon must be conceived. When, now, the\nreason attempts to establish determinations respecting these problems,\nit finds itself at once entangled in a contradiction with itself.\nDirectly contrary affirmations can be made with equal validity in\nreference to each of these four points. We can show, upon grounds\nequally valid, (1) the _thesis_, the world has a beginning in time and\nlimits in space; and the _antithesis_, the world has neither beginning\nin time nor limit in space. (2) The thesis: every compound substance in\nthe world consists of simple parts, and there exists nothing else than\nthe simple and that which it composes; and the antithesis: no compound\nthing consists of simple parts, and there exists nothing simple in the\nworld. (3) The thesis: causality according to the laws of nature, is not\nthe only one from which the phenomena of the world may be deduced, but\nthese may be explained through a causality in freedom; and the\nantithesis: there is no freedom, but every thing in the world happens\nonly according to natural laws. Lastly, (4) the thesis: something\nbelongs to the world either as its part or its cause, which is an\nabsolutely necessary being; and the antithesis: there exists no\nabsolutely necessary being as cause of the world, either in the world or\nwithout it. From this dialectic conflict of the cosmological ideas,\nthere follows at once the worthlessness of the whole struggle.\n\n(3.) _The ideal of the pure Reason or the idea of God._\n\nKant shows at first how the reason comes to the idea of a most real\nbeing, and then turns himself against the efforts of previous\nmetaphysics to prove its valid existence. His critick of the arguments\nemployed to prove the existence of a God, is essentially the following.\n\n(_a._) _The Ontological proof._\u2014The argument here is as follows: it is\npossible that there is a most real being; now existence is implied in\nthe conception of all reality, and hence, existence necessarily belongs\nto the conception of the most real being. But, answers Kant, existence\nis not at all a reality, or real predicate which can be added to the\nconception of a thing, but it is the position of a thing with all its\nproperties. A thing, however, may lose its existence, and still be\ndeprived of none of its properties. Hence if it have any property, it\ndoes not at all follow that it possesses existence. Being is nothing but\nthe logical copula, which, does not in the least enlarge the content of\nthe subject. A hundred actual dollars, _e. g._ contain no more than a\nhundred possible ones; there is only a difference between them in\nreference to my own wealth. Thus the most real being may with perfect\npropriety be conceived of as the most real, while at the same time it\nshould only be conceived of as possible, and not as actual. It was\ntherefore wholly unnatural, and a simple play of school wit, to take an\nidea which had been arbitrarily formed, and deduce from it the existence\nof its corresponding object. Any effort and toil which might be spent\nupon this famous proof is thus only thrown away, and a man would become\nno richer in knowledge out of simple ideas than a merchant would\nincrease his property by adding a number of ciphers to the balance of\nhis accounts.\n\n(_b._) _The Cosmological proof._\u2014This, like the ontological, infers the\nexistence of an absolute being from the necessity of existence. If any\nthing exist there must also exist an absolutely necessary being as its\ncause. But now there exists at least I myself, and there must hence also\nexist an absolutely necessary being as my cause. The last cosmological\nantinomy is here brought in to criticise the argument at this stage. The\nconclusion is erroneous, because from the phenomenal and the accidental\na necessary being above experience is inferred. Moreover, if we allow\nthe conclusion to be valid, it is still no God which it gives us. Hence\nthe farther inference is made: that being can alone be necessary which\nincludes all reality within itself. If now this proposition should be\nreversed, and the affirmation made that that being which includes all\nreality is absolutely necessary, then have we again the ontological\nproof, and the cosmological falls with this. In the cosmological proof,\nthe reason uses the trick of bringing forth as a new argument an old one\nwith a changed dress, that it might seem to have the power of summoning\ntwo witnesses.\n\n(_c._) _The Physico-theological proof._\u2014If thus neither conception nor\nexperience can furnish a proof for the divine existence, there still\nremains a third attempt, viz., to start from a determinate experience,\nand endeavor to see whether the existence of a supreme being can not be\ninferred from the arrangement and condition of things in the world. Such\nis the physico-theological proof, which starts from the evidences of\ndesign in nature, and directs its argument as follows: there is\nevidently design in the universe; this is extraneous to the things of\nthe world, and adheres to them only contingently; there exists therefore\na necessary cause of this design which works with wisdom and\nintelligence; this necessary cause must be the most real being; the most\nreal being has therefore necessary existence.\u2014To this Kant answers: The\nphysico-theological proof is the oldest, clearest, and most conformable\nto the common reason. But it is not demonstration (apodictic). It\ninfers, from the form of the world, a proportionate and sufficient cause\nof this form; but in this way we only attain an originator of the form\nof the world, and not an originator of its matter, a world-builder, and\nnot a world-creator. To help out with this difficulty the cosmological\nproof is brought in, and the originator of the form becomes conceived as\nthe necessary being lying at the ground of the content. Thus we have an\nabsolute being whose perfection corresponds to that of the world. But in\nthe world there is no absolute perfection; we have therefore only a very\nperfect being; to get the most perfect, we must revert again to the\nontological proof. Thus the teleological proof rests upon the\ncosmological, while this in turn has its basis in the ontological, and\nfrom this circle the metaphysical modes of proof cannot escape.\n\nFrom these considerations, it would follow that the ideal of a supreme\nbeing is nothing other than a regulative principle of the reason, by\nwhich it looks upon every connection in the world _as if_ it sprang from\nan all-sufficient and necessary cause; in order that, in explaining this\nconnection, it may establish the rule of a systematic and necessary\nunity, it being also true that in this process the reason through a\ntranscendental subreption cannot avoid representing to itself this\nformal principle as constitutive, and this unity as personal. But in\ntruth this supreme being remains for the simply speculative use of the\nreason, a mere but faultless ideal, a conception which is the summit and\nthe crown of the whole human knowledge, whose objective reality, though\nit cannot be proved with apodictic certainty, can just as little be\ndisproved.\n\nWith this critick of the ideas of the reason there is still another\nquestion. If these ideas have no objective significance, why are they\nfound within us? Since they are necessary, they will doubtless have some\ngood purpose to subserve. What this purpose is, has already been\nindicated in speaking of the theological idea. Though not constitutive,\nyet are they regulative principles. We cannot better order the faculties\nof our soul, than by acting \u201c_as if_\u201d there were a soul. The\ncosmological idea leads us to consider the world \u201c_as if_\u201d the series of\ncauses were infinite, without, however, excluding an intelligent cause.\nThe theological idea enables us to look upon the world in all its\ncomplexity, as a regulated unity. Thus, while these ideas of the reason\nare not constitutive principles, by means of which our knowledge could\nbe widened beyond experience, they are regulative principles, by means\nof which our experience may be ordered, and brought under certain\nhypothetical unities. These three ideas, therefore, the psychological,\nthe cosmological, and the theological, do not form an organon for the\ndiscovery of truth, but only a canon for the simplification and\nsystematizing of our experiences.\n\nBesides their regulative significance, these ideas of the reason have\nalso a practical importance. There is a sufficient certainty, not\nobjective, but subjective, which is especially of a practical nature,\nand is called belief or confidence. If the freedom of the will, the\nimmortality of the soul, and the existence of a God, are three cardinal\nprinciples, which, though not in any way contributing to our knowledge,\nare yet pressed continually upon us by the reason, this difficulty is\nremoved in the practical field where these ideas have their peculiar\nsignificance for the moral confidence. This confidence is not logical,\nbut moral certainty. Since it rests wholly upon subjective grounds, upon\nthe moral character, I cannot say it is morally certain that there is a\nGod, but only I am morally certain, &c. That is, the belief in a God and\nin another world is so interwoven with my moral character, that I am in\njust as much danger of losing this character as of being deprived of\nthis belief. We are thus brought to the basis of the PRACTICAL REASON.\n\nII. CRITICK OF THE PRACTICAL REASON.\u2014With the Critick of the Practical\nReason, we enter a wholly different world, where the reason richly\nrecovers that of which it was deprived in the theoretical province. The\nessential problem of the Critick of the Practical Reason is almost\ndiametrically different from that of the critick of the theoretical\nreason. The object of investigation in the critick of the speculative\nreason, was,\u2014how can the pure reason know objects apriori; in the\npractical reason it is,\u2014how can the pure reason determine apriori the\nwill in respect of objects. The critick of the speculative reason\ninquired after the cognizableness of objects apriori: the practical\nreason has nothing to do with the cognizableness of objects, but only\nwith the determination of the will. Hence, in the latter critick, we\nhave an order directly the reverse of that which we find in the former.\nAs the original determinations of our theoretical knowledge are\nintuitions, so the original determinations of our will are principles\nand conceptions. The critick of the practical reason must, therefore,\nstart from moral principles, and only after these are firmly fixed, may\nwe inquire concerning the relation in which the practical reason stands\nto the sensory.\n\nFreedom, says Kant, is given to us apriori as an inner fact, it is a\nfact of the inner experience. While, therefore, the reason in the\ntheoretical field had only a negative result, because, when it would\nattain to a true thing in itself it became transcendent, yet now in the\npractical province it becomes positive through the idea of freedom,\nbecause with the fact of freedom we have no need to go out beyond\nourselves, but possess a principle immanent to the reason. But why then\ngive a critick of practical reason? In order to determine the relation\nof freedom to the sensory. Since the free will works through its acts\nupon the sensory, there must be a point of contact between the two. This\nis found in the sensuous motives of the will, which exist implanted in\nit by nature, in the impulses and inclinations which, as the principle\nof the empiric in opposition to the free or pure will, bear in\nthemselves the character of a want of freedom. Since, then, freedom\ncannot be touched, a critick of the practical reason can only relate to\nthese empirical motives, in the sense of divesting these from the claim\nof being exclusively the motives by which the will is determined. While,\ntherefore, in the theoretical reason the empirical element was immanent,\nand the intelligible transcendent, the reverse is the case in the\npractical reason, since here the empirical is transcendent, and the\nintelligible immanent. It is the object of the Analytic to show the\nrelation of these two momenta of the will, and the highest moral\nprinciple which springs therefrom, while it belongs to the Dialectic to\nsolve the antinomies which result from the contradiction of the pure and\nempiric will.\n\n(1.) _The Analytic._\u2014Freedom, as the one constituent element which shows\nitself in the activity of our will, is the simple _form_ of our actions.\nThe universal law binding the will, is that it should determine itself\npurely from itself, independently of every external incitement. This\ncapacity of self-lawgiving, or self-determining, Kant calls the\n_autonomy of the will_. The free autonomic will says to man: thou\noughtest! and since this moral ought commands to an unconditioned\nobedience, the moral imperative is a _categorical imperative_. What is\nit now which is categorically commanded by the practical reason? To\nanswer this question, we must first consider the empirical will, _i. e._\nthe nature-side of man.\n\nThe empirical, as the other constituent element of our will, first\nproduces a definite deed when it has filled the empty _form_ of action\nwith the _matter_ of action. The matter of the will is furnished by the\nsensory in the desire of pleasure and the dread of pain. Since this\nsecond principle of our actions does not find its seat in the freedom of\nthe will as the higher faculty of desire, but in the sensory, as the\nlower faculty of desire, and a foreign law is thus laid upon the\nwill,\u2014Kant calls it, in opposition to the autonomy of the reason, the\n_heteronomy of the will_.\n\nThe categorical imperative is the necessary law of freedom binding upon\nall men, and is distinguished from material motives, in that the latter\nhave no fixed character. For men are at variance in respect of pleasure\nand pain, since that which is disagreeable to one may seem pleasant to\nanother, and if they ever agree, this is simply accidental.\nConsequently, these material motives can never act the part of laws\nbinding upon every being, but each subject may find his end in a\ndifferent motive. Such rules of acting, Kant calls _maxims_ of the will.\nHe also censures those moralists who have exalted such maxims as\nuniversal principles of morality.\n\nNevertheless, these maxims, though not the highest principles of\nmorality, are yet necessary to the autonomy of the will, because they\nalone furnish for it a content. It is only by uniting the two sides,\nthat we gain the true principle of morality. To this end the maxims of\nacting must be freed from their limitation, and widened to the form of\nuniversal laws of the reason. Only those maxims should be chosen as\nmotives of action which are capable of becoming universal laws of the\nreason. _The highest principle of morality_ will therefore be this: act\nso that the maxims of thy will can at the same time be valid as the\nprinciple of a universal lawgiving, _i.e._ that no contradiction shall\narise in the attempt to conceive the maxims of thy acting as a law\nuniversally obeyed. Through this formal moral principle all material\nmoral principles which can only be of a heteronomic nature, are\nexcluded.\n\nThe question next arises\u2014what impels the will to act conformably to this\nhighest moral law? Kant answers: the moral law itself, apprehended and\nrevered, must be the only moving spring of the human will. If an act\nwhich in itself might be conformable to the moral law, be done only\nthrough some impulse to happiness arising simply from an inclination of\nthe sense, if it be not done purely for the sake of the law, then have\nwe simply _legality_ and not _morality_. That which is included in every\ninclination of the sense is self-love and self-conceit, and of these the\nformer is restricted by the moral law, and the latter wholly stricken\ndown. But that which strikes down our self-conceit and humbles us must\nappear to us in the highest degree worthy of esteem. But this is done by\nthe moral law. Consequently the positive feeling which we shall cherish\nin respect of the moral law will be reverence. This reverence, though a\nfeeling, is neither sensuous nor pathological, for it stands opposed to\nthese; but is rather an intellectual feeling, since it arises from the\nnotion of the practical law of the reason. On the one side as\nsubordination to law, the reverence includes pain; on the other side,\nsince the coercion can only be exercised through the proper reason, it\nincludes pleasure. Reverence is the single sensation befitting man in\nreference to the moral law. Man, as creature of sense, cannot rest on\nany inner inclination to the moral law, for he has ever inclinations\nwithin him which resist the law; love to the law can only be considered\nas something ideal.\u2014Thus the moral purism of Kant, or his effort to\nseparate every impulse of the sense from the motives to action, merges\ninto rigorism, or the dark view that duty can never be done except with\nresistance. A similar exaggeration belongs to the well-known epigram of\nSchiller, who answers the following scruple of conscience\u2014\n\n The friends whom I love, I gladly would serve,\n But to this inclination incites me;\n And so I am forced from virtue to swerve\n Since my act, through affection, delights me\u2014\n\nwith the following decision:\n\n The friends whom thou lov\u2019st, thou must first seek to scorn,\n For to no other way can I guide thee:\n \u2019Tis alone with disgust thou canst rightly perform\n The acts to which duty would lead thee.\n\n(2.) _The Dialectic._\u2014The pure reason has always its dialectics, since\nit belongs to the nature of the reason to demand the unconditioned for\nthe given conditioned. Hence also the practical reason seeks an\nunconditioned highest good for that conditioned good after which man\nstrives. What is this highest good? If we understand by the highest good\nthe fundamental condition of all other goods, then it is virtue. But\nvirtue is not the perfect good, since the finite reason as sensitive\nstands in need also of happiness. Hence the highest good is only perfect\nwhen the highest happiness is joined to the highest virtue. The question\nnow arises: what is the relation of these two elements of the highest\ngood to each other? Are they analytically or synthetically connected\ntogether? The former would be affirmed by most of the ancients,\nespecially by the Greek moral philosophers. We might allow with the\nStoics, that happiness is contained as an accidental element in virtue,\nor, with the Epicureans, that virtue is contained as an accidental\nelement in happiness. The Stoics said: to be conscious of one\u2019s virtue\nis happiness; the Epicureans said: to be conscious of the maxims leading\none to happiness is virtue. But, says Kant, an analytic connection\nbetween these two conceptions is not possible, since they are wholly\ndifferent in kind. Consequently there can be between them only a\nsynthetic unity, and this unity more closely scanned is seen to be a\ncausal one, so that the one element is cause, and the other effect. Such\na relation must be regarded as its highest good by the practical reason,\nwhose thesis must therefore be: virtue and happiness must be bound\ntogether in a correspondent degree as cause and effect. But this thesis\nis all thwarted by the actual fact. Neither of the two is the direct\ncause of the other. Neither is the striving after happiness a moving\nspring to virtue, nor is virtue the efficient cause of happiness. Hence\nthe antithesis: virtue and happiness do not necessarily correspond, and\nare not universally connected as cause and effect. The critical solution\nof this antinomy Kant finds in distinguishing between the sensible and\nthe intelligible world. In the world of sense, virtue and happiness do\nnot, it is true, correspond; but the reason as _noumenon_ is also a\ncitizen of a supersensible world, where the counter-strife between\nvirtue and happiness has no place. In this supersensible world virtue is\nalways adequate to happiness, and when man passes over into this he may\nlook for the actualization of the highest good. But the highest good\nhas, as already remarked, two elements, (1) highest virtue, (2) highest\nhappiness. The actualization demanded for the first of these elements\npostulates the _immortality of the soul_, and for the second, _the\nexistence of God_.\n\n(_a._) To the highest good belongs in the first place perfect virtue or\nholiness. But no creature of sense can be holy: reason united to sense\ncan only approximate holiness as an ideal in an endless progression. But\nsuch an endless progress is only possible in an endless continuance of\npersonal existence. If, therefore, the highest good shall ever be\nactualized, the immortality of the soul must be presupposed.\n\n(_b._) To the highest good belongs, in the second place, perfect\nhappiness. Happiness is that condition of a rational creature in the\nworld, to whom every thing goes according to his desire and will. This\ncan only occur when all nature is in accord with his ends. But this is\nnot the case; as acting beings we are not the cause of nature, and there\nis not the slightest ground in the moral law for connecting morality and\nhappiness. Notwithstanding this, we _ought_ to endeavor to secure the\nhighest good. It must therefore be possible. There is thus postulated\nthe necessary connection of these two elements, _i. e._ the existence of\na cause of nature distinct from nature, and which contains the ground of\nthis connection. There must be a being as the common cause of the\nnatural and moral world, a being who knows our characters of\nintelligence, and who, according to this intelligence imparts to us\nhappiness. Such a being is God.\n\nThus from the practical reason there issue the ideas of immortality and\nof God, as we have already seen to be the case with the idea of freedom.\nThe reality of the idea of freedom is derived from the possibility of a\nmoral law; that of the idea of immortality is borrowed from the\npossibility of a perfect virtue; that of the idea of a God follows from\nthe necessary demand of a perfect happiness. These three ideas,\ntherefore, which the speculative reason has treated as problems that\ncould not be solved, gain a firm basis in the province of the practical\nreason. Still they are not yet theoretical dogmas, but as Kant calls\nthem practical postulates, necessary premises of moral action. My\ntheoretical knowledge is not enlarged by them: I only know now that\nthere are objects corresponding to these ideas, but of these objects I\ncan know no more. Of God, for instance, we possess and know no more than\nthis very conception; and if we should attempt to establish the theory\nof the supersensible grounded upon such categories, this would be to\nmake theology like a magic lantern, with its phantasmagorical\nrepresentations. Yet has the practical reason acquired for us a\ncertainty respecting the objective reality of these ideas, which the\ntheoretical reason had been obliged to leave undecided, and in this\nrespect the practical reason has the primacy. This relation of the two\nfaculties of knowledge is wisely established in relation to the destiny\nof men. Since the ideas of God and immortality are theoretically obscure\nto us, they do not defile our moral motives by fear and hope, but leave\nus free space to act through reverence for the moral law.\n\nThus far Kant\u2019s Critick of the Practical Reason. In connection with this\nwe may here mention his _views of religion_ as they appear in his\ntreatise upon \u201c_Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason_.\u201d The chief\nidea of this treatise is the referring of religion to morality. Between\nmorality and religion there may be the twofold relation, that either\nmorality is founded upon religion, or else religion upon morality. If\nthe first relation were real, it would give us fear and hope as\nprinciples of moral action; but this cannot be, and we are therefore\nleft alone to the second. Morality leads necessarily to religion,\nbecause the highest good is a necessary ideal of the reason, and this\ncan only be realized through a God; but in no way may religion first\nincite us to virtue, for the idea of God may never become a moral\nmotive. Religion, according to Kant, is the recognition of all our\nduties as divine commands. It is revealed religion when I find in it the\ndivine command, and thus learn my duty; it is natural religion when I\nfind in it my duty, and thus learn the divine command. The Church is an\nethical community, which has for its end the fulfilment and the most\nperfect exhibition of moral commands,\u2014a union of those who with united\nenergies purpose to resist evil and advance morality. The Church, in so\nfar as it is no object of a possible experience, is called the invisible\nChurch, which, as such, is a simple idea of the union of all the\nrighteous under the divine moral government of the world. The visible\nChurch, on the other hand, is that which presents the kingdom of God\nupon earth, so far as this can be attained through men. The requisites,\nand hence also the characteristics of the true visible Church (which are\ndivided according to the table of the categories since this Church is\ngiven in experience) are the following: (_a_) In respect of _quantity_\nthe Church must be total or _universal_; and though it may be divided in\naccidental opinions, yet must it be instituted upon such principles as\nwill necessarily lead to a universal union in one single church. (_b_)\nThe _quality_ of the true visible Church is _purity_, as a union under\nno other than moral motives, since it is at the same time purified from\nthe stupidness of superstition and the madness of fanaticism. (_c_) The\n_relation_ of the members of the Church to each other rests upon the\nprinciple of freedom. The Church is, therefore, a _free state_, neither\na hierarchy nor a democracy, but a voluntary, universal, and enduring\nunion of heart. (_d_) In respect of _modality_ the Church demands that\nits constitution should not be changed. The laws themselves may not\nchange, though one may reserve to himself the privilege of changing some\naccidental arrangements which relate simply to the administration.\u2014That\nalone which can establish a universal Church is the moral faith of the\nreason, for this alone can be shared by the convictions of every man.\nBut, because of the peculiar weakness of human nature, we can never\nreckon enough on this pure faith to build a Church on it alone, for men\nare not easily convinced that the striving after virtue and an\nirreproachable life is every thing which God demands: they always\nsuppose that they must offer to God a special service prescribed by\ntradition, in which it only comes to this\u2014that he is served.\n\nTo establish a Church, we must therefore have a statutory faith\nhistorically grounded upon facts. This is the so-called faith of the\nChurch, In every Church there are therefore two elements\u2014the purely\nmoral, or the faith of reason, and the historico-statutory, or the faith\nof the Church. It depends now upon the relation of the two elements\nwhether a Church shall have any worth or not. The statutory element\nshould ever be only the vehicle of the moral. Just so soon as this\nelement becomes in itself an independent end, claiming an independent\nvalidity, will the Church become corrupt and irrational, and whenever\nthe Church passes over to the pure faith of reason, does it approximate\nto the kingdom of God. Upon this principle we may distinguish the true\nfrom the spurious service of the kingdom of God, religion from\npriestcraft. A dogma has worth alone in so far as it has a moral\ncontent. The apostle Paul himself would with difficulty have given\ncredit to the dicta of the faith of the Church without this moral faith.\nFrom the doctrine of the Trinity, _e. g._ taken literally, nothing\nactually practical can be derived. Whether we have to reverence in the\nGodhead three persons or ten makes no difference, if in both cases we\nhave the same rules for our conduct of life. The Bible also, with its\ninterpretation, must be considered in a moral point of view. The records\nof revelation must be interpreted in a sense which will harmonize with\nthe universal rules of the religion of reason. Reason is in religious\nthings the highest interpreter of the Bible. This interpretation in\nreference to some texts may seem forced, yet it must be preferred to any\nsuch literal interpretation as would contain nothing for morality, or\nperhaps go against every moral motive. That such a moral signification\nmay always be found without ever entirely repudiating the literal sense,\nresults from the fact that the foundation for a moral religion lay\noriginally in the human reason. We need only to divest the\nrepresentations of the Bible of their mythical dress (an attempt which\nKant has himself made, by moral explanation of some of the weightiest\ndoctrines), in order to attain a rational sense which shall be\nuniversally valid. The historical element of the sacred books is in\nitself of no account. The maturer the reason becomes, the more it can\nhold fast for itself the moral sense, so much the more unnecessary will\nbe the statutory institutions of the faith of the Church. The transition\nof the faith of the Church to the pure faith of reason is the\napproximation to the kingdom of God, to which, however, we can only\napproach nearer and nearer in an infinite progress. The actual\nrealization of the kingdom of God is the end of the world, the cessation\nof history.\n\nIII. CRITICK OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGMENT.\u2014The conception of this science\nKant gives in the following manner. The two faculties of the human mind\nhitherto considered were the faculty of knowledge and that of desire. It\nwas proved in the Critick of pure Reason, that the understanding only as\nfaculty of knowledge included constitutive principles apriori; and it\nwas shown in the Critick of Practical Reason, that the reason possesses\nconstitutive principles apriori, simply in reference to the faculty of\ndesire. Whether now the _faculty of judgment_, as the middle link\nbetween understanding and reason, can take its object\u2014the feeling of\npleasure and pain as the middle link between the faculty of knowledge\nand that of desire\u2014and furnish it apriori with principles which shall be\nfor themselves constitutive and not simply regulative: this is the point\nupon which the Critick of the Faculty of Judgment has to turn.\n\nThe faculty of judgment is the middle link between the understanding as\nthe faculty of conceptions, and the reason as the faculty of principles.\nIn this position it has the following functions: The speculative reason\nhad taught us to consider the world only according to natural laws; the\npractical reason had inferred for us a moral world, in which every thing\nis determined through freedom. There was thus a gulf between the kingdom\nof nature and that of freedom, which could not be passed unless the\nfaculty of judgment should furnish a conception which should unite the\ntwo sides. That it is entitled to do this lies in the very conception of\nthe faculty of judgment. Since it is the faculty of conceiving the\nparticular as contained under the universal, it thus refers the\nempirical manifoldness of nature to a supersensible, transcendental\nprinciple, which embraces in itself the ground for the unity of the\nmanifold. The object of the faculty of judgment is, therefore, the\nconception of _design_ in nature; for the evidence of this points to\nthat supersensible unity which contains the ground for the actuality of\nan object. And since all design and every actualization of an end is\nconnected with pleasure, we may farther explain the faculty of judgment\nby saying, that it contains the laws for the feeling of pleasure and\npain.\n\nThe evidence of design in nature can be represented either subjectively\nor objectively. In the first case I perceive pleasure and pain,\nimmediately through the representation of an object, before I have\nformed a conception of it; my delight, in this instance, can only be\nreferred to a designed harmony of relation, between the form of an\nobject, and my faculty of beholding. The faculty of judgment viewed thus\nsubjectively, is called the _\u00e6sthetic faculty_. In the second case, I\nform to myself at the outset, a conception of the object, and then judge\nwhether the form of the object corresponds to this conception. In order\nto find a flower that is beautiful to my beholding, I do not need to\nhave a conception of the flower; but, if I would see a design in it,\nthen a conception is necessary. The faculty of judgment, viewed as\ncapacity to judge of these objective designs, is called the\n_teleological faculty_.\n\n1. CRITICK OF THE \u00c6STHETIC FACULTY OF JUDGMENT. (1.) _Analytic._\u2014The\nanalytic of the \u00e6sthetic faculty of judgment is divided into two parts,\nthe analytic of the _beautiful_, and the analytic of the _sublime_.\n\nIn order to discover what is required in naming an object _beautiful_,\nwe must analyze the judgment of taste, as the faculty for deciding upon\nthe beautiful. (_a_) In respect of quality, the beautiful is the object\nof a pure, uninterested satisfaction. This disinterestedness enables us\nto distinguish between the satisfaction in the beautiful, and the\nsatisfaction in the agreeable and the good. In the agreeable and the\ngood I am interested; my satisfaction in the agreeable is connected with\na sensation of desire; my satisfaction in the good is, at the same time,\na motive for my will to actualize it. My satisfaction in the beautiful\nalone is without interest. (_b_) In respect of quantity, the beautiful\nis that which universally pleases. In respect of the agreeable, every\none decides that his satisfaction in it is only a personal one; but if\nany one should affirm of a picture, that it is beautiful, he would\nexpect that not only he, but every other one, would also find it so.\nNevertheless, this judgment of the taste does not arise from\nconceptions; its universal validity is therefore purely subjective. I do\nnot judge that all the objects of a species are beautiful, but only that\na certain specific object will appear beautiful to every beholder. All\nthe judgments of taste are individual judgments. (_c_) In respect of\nrelation, that is beautiful in which we find the form of design, without\nrepresenting to ourselves any specific design. (_d_) In respect of\nmodality, that is beautiful which is recognized without a conception, as\nthe object of a necessary satisfaction. Of every representation, it is\nat least possible, that it may awaken pleasure. The representation of\nthe agreeable awakens actual pleasure. The representation of the\nbeautiful, on the other hand, awakens pleasure necessarily. The\nnecessity which is conceived in an \u00e6sthetic judgment, is a necessity for\ndetermining every thing by a judgment, which can be viewed as an example\nof a universal rule, though the rule itself cannot be stated. The\nsubjective principle which lies at the basis of the judgment of taste,\nis therefore a common sense, which determines what is pleasing, and what\ndispleasing, only through feeling, and not through conception.\n\nThe _sublime_ is that which is absolutely, or beyond all comparison,\ngreat, compared with which every thing else is small. But now in nature\nthere is nothing which has no greater. The absolutely great is only the\ninfinite, and the infinite is only to be met with in ourselves, as idea.\nThe sublime, therefore, is not properly found in nature, but is only\ncarried over to nature from our own minds. We call that sublime in\nnature, which awakens within us the idea of the infinite. As in the\nbeautiful there is prominent reference to quality, so, in the sublime,\nthe most important element of all, is quantity; and this quantity is\neither greatness of extension (the mathematically sublime), or greatness\nof power (the dynamically sublime). In the sublime there is a greater\nsatisfaction in the formless, than in the form. The sublime excites a\nvigorous movement of the heart, and awakens pleasure only through pain,\n_i. e._ through the feeling that the energies of life are for the moment\nrestrained. The satisfaction in the sublime is hence not so much a\npositive pleasure, but rather an amazement and awe, which may be called\na negative pleasure. The elements for an \u00e6sthetic judgment of the\nsublime are the same as in the feeling of the beautiful. (_a_) In\nrespect of quantity, that is sublime which is absolutely great, in\ncomparison with which every thing else is small. The \u00e6sthetic estimate\nof greatness does not lie, however, in numeration, but in the simple\nintuition of the subject. The greatness of an object of nature, which\nthe imagination attempts in vain to comprehend, leads to a supersensible\nsubstratum, which is great beyond all the measures of the sense, and\nwhich has reference properly to the feeling of the sublime. It is not\nthe object itself, as the surging sea, which is sublime, but rather the\nsubject\u2019s frame of mind, in the estimation of this object. (_b_) In\nrespect of quality, the sublime does not awaken pure pleasure, like the\nbeautiful, but first pain, and through this, pleasure. The feeling of\nthe insufficiency of our imagination, in the \u00e6sthetic estimate of\ngreatness, gives rise to pain; but, on the other side, the consciousness\nof our independent reason, for which the faculty of imagination is\ninadequate, awakens pleasure. In this respect, therefore, that is\nsublime which immediately pleases us, through its opposition to the\ninterest of the sense. (_c_) In respect of relation, the sublime suffers\nnature to appear as a power, indeed, but in reference to which, we have\nthe consciousness of superiority. (_d_) In respect of modality, the\njudgments concerning the sublime are as necessarily valid, as those for\nthe beautiful; only with this difference, that our judgment of the\nsublime finds an entrance to some minds, with greater difficulty than\nour judgment of the beautiful, since to perceive the sublime, culture,\nand developed moral ideas, are necessary.\n\n(2.) _Dialectic._\u2014A dialectic of the \u00e6sthetic faculty of judgment, like\nevery dialectic, is only possible where we can meet with judgments which\nlay claim to universality apriori. For dialectics consists in the\nopposition of such judgments. The antinomy of the principles of taste\nrests upon the two opposite elements of the judgment of taste, that it\nis purely subjective, and at the same time, lays claim to universal\nvalidity. Hence, the two common-place sayings: \u201cthere is no disputing\nabout taste,\u201d and \u201cthere is a contest of taste.\u201d From these, we have the\nfollowing antinomy. (_a_) Thesis: the judgment of taste cannot be\ngrounded on conception, else might we dispute it. (_b_) Antithesis: the\njudgment of taste must be grounded on conception, else, notwithstanding\nits diversity, there could be no contest respecting it.\u2014This antinomy,\nsays Kant, is, however, only an apparent one, and disappears as soon as\nthe two propositions are more accurately apprehended. The thesis should\nbe: the judgment of taste is not grounded upon a definite conception,\nand is not strictly demonstrable; the antithesis should be: this\njudgment is grounded upon a conception, though an indefinite one, viz.,\nupon the conception of a supersensible substratum for the phenomenal.\nThus apprehended, there is no longer any contradiction between the two\npropositions.\n\nIn the conclusion of the \u00e6sthetic faculty of judgment, we can now answer\nthe question, whether the fitness of things to our faculty of judgment\n(their beauty and sublimity), lies in the things themselves, or in us?\nThe \u00e6sthetic realism claims that the supreme cause of nature designed to\nproduce things which should affect our imagination, as beautiful and\nsublime, and the organic forms of nature strongly support this view. But\non the other band, nature exhibits even in her merely mechanical forms,\nsuch a tendency to the beautiful, that we might believe that she could\nproduce also the most beautiful organic forms through mechanism alone;\nand that thus the design would lie not in nature, but in our soul. This\nis the standpoint of idealism, upon which it becomes explicable how we\ncan determine any thing apriori concerning beauty and sublimity. But the\nhighest view of the \u00e6sthetical, is to use it as a symbol of the moral\ngood. Thus Kant makes the theory of taste, like religion, to be a\ncorollary of morality.\n\n2. CRITICK OF THE TELEOLOGICAL FACULTY OF JUDGMENT.\u2014In the foregoing, we\nhave considered the subjective \u00e6sthetical design in the objects of\nnature. But the objects of nature have also a relation of design to each\nother. The teleological faculty of judgment has also to consider this\nfaculty of design.\n\n(1.) _Analytic of the Teleological Faculty of Judgment._\u2014The analytic\nhas to determine the kinds of objective design. Objective, material\ndesign, is of two kinds, external, and internal. The external design is\nonly relative, since it simply indicates a usefulness of one thing for\nanother. Sand, for instance, which borders the sea shore, is of use in\nbearing pine forests. In order that animals can live upon the earth, the\nearth must produce nourishment for them, etc. These examples of external\ndesign, show that here the design never belongs to the means in itself,\nbut only accidentally. We should never get a conception of the sand by\nsaying that it is a means for pine forests; it is conceivable for\nitself, without any reference to the conception of design. The earth\ndoes not produce nourishment, because it is necessary that men should\ndwell upon it. In brief, this external or relative design may be\nconceived from the mechanism of nature alone. Not so the inner design of\nnature, which shows itself prominently in the organic products of\nnature. In an organic product of nature, every one of its parts is end,\nand every one, means or instrument. In the process of generation, the\nnatural product appears as species, in growth it appears as individual,\nand in the process of complete formation, every part of the individual\nshows itself. This natural organism cannot be explained from mechanical\ncauses, but only through final causes, or teleologically.\n\n(2.) _Dialectic._\u2014The dialectic of the teleological faculty of judgment,\nhas to adjust this opposition between this mechanism of nature and\nteleology. On the one side we have the thesis: every production of\nmaterial things must be judged as possible, according to simple\nmechanical laws. On the other side we have the antithesis: certain\nproducts of material nature cannot be judged as possible, according to\nsimple mechanical laws, but demand the conception of design for their\nexplanation. If these two maxims are posited as constitutive (objective)\nprinciples for the possibility of the objects themselves, then do they\ncontradict each other, but as simply regulative (subjective) principles\nfor the investigation of nature, they are not contradictory. Earlier\nsystems treated the conception of design in nature dogmatically, and\neither affirmed or denied its essential existence in nature. But we,\nconvinced that teleology is only a regulative principle, have nothing to\ndo with the question whether an inner design belongs essentially to\nnature or not, but we only affirm that our faculty of judgment must look\nupon nature as designed. We envisage the conception of design in nature,\nbut leave it wholly undecided whether to another understanding, which\ndoes not think discursively like ours, nature may not be understood,\nwithout at all needing to bring in this conception of design. Our\nunderstanding thinks discursively: it proceeds from the parts, and\ncomprehends the whole as the product of its parts; it cannot, therefore,\nconceive the organic products of nature, where the whole is the ground\nand the prius of the parts, except from the point of view of the\nconception of design. If there were, on the other hand, an intuitive\nunderstanding, which could know the particular and the parts as\nco-determined in the universal and the whole; such an understanding\nmight conceive the whole of nature out of one principle, and would not\nneed the conception of end.\n\nIf Kant had thoroughly carried out this conception of an intuitive\nunderstanding as well as the conception of an immanent design in nature,\nhe would have overcome, in principle, the standpoint of subjective\nidealism, which he made numerous attempts, in his critick of the faculty\nof judgment, to break through; but these ideas he only propounded, and\nleft them to be positively carried out by his successors.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XXXIX.\n\nTRANSITION TO THE POST-KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY.\n\n\nThe Kantian philosophy soon gained in Germany an almost undisputed rule.\nThe imposing boldness of its standpoint, the novelty of its results, the\napplicability of its principles, the moral severity of its view of the\nworld, and above all, the spirit of freedom and moral autonomy which\nappeared in it, and which was so directly counter to the efforts of that\nage, gained for it an assent as enthusiastic as it was extended. It\naroused among all cultivated classes a wider interest and participation\nin philosophic pursuits, than had ever appeared in an equal degree among\nany people. In a short time it had drawn to itself a very numerous\nschool: there were soon few German universities in which it had not had\nits talented representatives, while in every department of science and\nliterature, especially in theology (it is the parent of theological\nrationalism), and in natural rights, as also in belles-lettres\n(_Schiller_), it began to exert its influence. Yet most of the writers\nwho appeared in the Kantian school, confined themselves to an exposition\nor popular application of the doctrine as Kant had given it, and even\nthe most talented and independent among the defenders and improvers of\nthe critical philosophy (_e. g. Reinhold_, 1758-1823; _Bardili_,\n1761-1808; _Schulze_, _Beck_, _Fries_, _Krug_, _Bouterweck_), only\nattempted to give a firmer basis to the Kantian philosophy as they had\nreceived it, to obviate some of its wants and deficiencies, and to carry\nout the standpoint of transcendental idealism more purely and\nconsistently. Among those who carried out the Kantian philosophy, only\ntwo men, _Fichte_ and _Herbart_, can be named, who made by their actual\nadvance an epoch in philosophy; and among its opposers (_e. g. Hamann_,\n_Herder_), only one, _Jacobi_, is of philosophic importance. These three\nphilosophers are hence the first objects for us to consider. In order to\na more accurate development of their principles, we preface a brief and\ngeneral characteristic of their relation to the Kantian philosophy.\n\n1. Dogmatism had been critically annihilated by Kant; his Critick of\npure Reason had for its result the theoretical indemonstrableness of the\nthree ideas of the reason, God, freedom, and immortality. True, these\nideas which, from the standpoint of theoretical knowledge, had been\nthrust out, Kant had introduced again as postulates of the practical\nreason; but as postulates, as only practical premises, they possess no\ntheoretic certainty, and remain exposed to doubt. In order to do away\nwith this uncertainty, and this despairing of knowledge which had seemed\nto be the end of the Kantian philosophy, _Jacobi_, a younger cotemporary\nof Kant, placed himself upon the standpoint of the faith philosophy in\nopposition to the standpoint of criticism. Though these highest ideas of\nthe reason, the eternal and the divine, cannot be reached and proved by\nmeans of demonstration, yet is it the very essence of the divine that it\nis indemonstrable and unattainable for the understanding. In order to be\ncertain of the highest, of that which lies beyond the understanding,\nthere is only one organ, viz., feeling. In feeling, therefore, in\nimmediate knowledge, in faith, Jacobi thought he had found that\ncertainty which Kant had sought in vain on the basis of discursive\nthinking.\n\n2. While Jacobi stood in an antithetic relation to the Kantian\nphilosophy, _Fichte_ appears as its immediate consequence. Fichte\ncarried out to its consequence the Kantian dualism, according to which\nthe Ego, as theoretic, is subjected to the external world, while as\npractical, it is its master, or, in other words, according to which the\nEgo stands related to the objective world, now receptively and again\nspontaneously. He allowed the reason to be exclusively practical, as\nwill alone, and spontaneity alone, and apprehended its theoretical and\nreceptive relation to the objective world as only a circumscribed\nactivity, as a limitation prescribed to itself by the reason. But for\nthe reason, so far as it is practical, there is nothing objective except\nas it is produced. The will knows no being but only an ought. Hence the\nobjective being of truth is universally denied, and the thing which is\nessentially unknown must fall away of itself as an empty shadow. \u201cEvery\nthing which is, is the Ego,\u201d is the principle of the Fichtian system,\nand represents at the same time the subjective idealism in its\nconsequence and completion.\n\n3. While the subjective idealism of Fichte was carried out in the\nobjective idealism of Schelling, and the absolute idealism of Hegel,\nthere arose cotemporaneously with these systems a third offshoot of the\nKantian criticism, viz., the philosophy of _Herbart_. It had its\nsubjective origin in the Kantian philosophy, but its objective and\nhistoric connection with Kant is slight. It breaks up all historic\ncontinuity, and holds an isolated position in the history of philosophy.\nIts general basis is Kantian, in so far as it makes for its problem a\ncritical investigation of the subjective experience. We place it between\nFichte and Schelling.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XL.\n\nJACOBI.\n\n\nFriedrich Heinrich Jacobi was born at D\u00fcsseldorf in 1743. His father\ndestined him for a merchant. After he had studied in Geneva and become\ninterested in philosophy, he entered his father\u2019s mercantile\nestablishment, but afterwards abandoned this business, having been made\nchancellor of the exchequer and customs commissioner for Cleves and\nBerg, and also privy councillor at D\u00fcsseldorf. In this city, or at his\nneighboring estate of Pempelfort, he spent a great part of his life\ndevoted to philosophy and his friends. In the year 1804 he was called to\nthe newly-formed Academy of Sciences in Munich. In 1807 he was chosen\npresident of this institution, a post which he filled till his death in\n1819. Jacobi had a rich intellect and an amiable character. Besides\nbeing a philosopher, he was also a poet and citizen of the world; and\nhence we find in his philosophizing an absence of strict logical\narrangement and precise expression of thought. His writings are no\nsystematic whole, but are occasional treatises written \u201crhapsodically\nand in grasshopper gait,\u201d for the most part in the form of letters,\ndialogues, and romances. \u201cIt was never my purpose,\u201d he says himself, \u201cto\nset up a system for the schools. My writings have sprung from my\ninnermost life, and were the result of that which had taken place within\nme. In a certain sense I did not make them voluntarily, but they were\ndrawn out of me by a higher power irresistible to myself.\u201d This want of\nan inner principle of classification and of a systematic arrangement,\nrenders a development of Jacobi\u2019s philosophy not easy. It may best be\nrepresented under the following three points of view:\u20141. Jacobi\u2019s\npolemic against mediate knowledge. 2. His principle of immediate\nknowledge. 3. His relation to the cotemporaneous philosophy, especially\nto the Kantian criticism.\n\n1. Spinoza was the negative starting point of Jacobi\u2019s philosophizing.\nIn his work \u201c_On the Doctrine of Spinoza, in letters to Moses\nMendelssohn_\u201d (1785), he directed public attention again to the almost\nwholly forgotten philosophy of Spinoza. The correspondence originated\nthus: Jacobi made the discovery that Lessing was a Spinozist, and\nannounces this to Mendelssohn. The latter will not believe it, and\nthence grew the farther historical and philosophical examination. The\npositive philosophic views which Jacobi exhibits in this treatise can be\nreduced to the following three principles: (1) Spinozism is fatalism and\natheism. (2) Every path of philosophic demonstration leads to fatalism\nand atheism. (3) In order that we may not fall into these, we must set a\nlimit to demonstrating, and recognize faith as the element of all\nmetaphysic knowledge.\n\n(1.) Spinozism is atheism, because, according to it, the cause of the\nworld is no person\u2014is no being working for an end, and endowed with\nreason and will\u2014and hence is no God. It is fatalism, for, according to\nit, the human will regards itself only falsely as free.\n\n(2.) This atheism and fatalism is, however, only the necessary\nconsequence of all strictly demonstrative philosophizing. To conceive a\nthing, says Jacobi, is to refer a thing to its nearest cause; it is to\nfind a possible for an actual, the condition for a conditioned, the\nmediation for an immediate. We conceive only that which we can explain\nout of another. Hence our conceiving moves in a chain of conditioned\nconditions, and this connection forms a mechanism of nature, in whose\ninvestigation our understanding has its immeasurable field. However far\nwe may carry conception and demonstration, we must hold, in reference to\nevery object, to a still higher one which conditions it; where this\nchain of the conditioned ceases, there do conception and demonstration\nalso cease; till we give up demonstrating we can reach no infinite. If\nphilosophy determines to apprehend the infinite with the finite\nunderstanding, then must it bring down the divine to the finite; and\nhere is where every preceding philosophy has been entangled, while it is\nobviously an absurd undertaking to attempt to discover the conditions of\nthe unconditioned, and make the absolutely necessary a possible, in\norder that we may be able to construct it. A God who could be proved is\nno God, for the ground of proof is ever above that which is to be\nproved; the latter has its whole reality from the former. If the\nexistence of God should be proved, then God would be derived from a\nground which were before and above him. Hence the paradox of Jacobi; it\nis for the interest of science that there be no God, no supernatural and\nno extra or supramundane being. Only upon the condition that nature\nalone is, and is therefore independent and all in all, can science hope\nto gain its goal of perfection, and become, like its object itself, all\nin all. Hence the result which Jacobi derives from the \u201cDrama of the\nhistory of philosophy\u201d is this:\u2014\u201cThere is no other philosophy than that\nof Spinoza. He who considers all the works and acts of men to be the\neffect of natural mechanism, and who believes that intelligence is but\nan accompanying consciousness, which has only to act the part of a\nlooker-on, cannot be contended with and cannot be helped till we set him\nfree from his philosophy. No philosophical conclusion can reach him, for\nwhat he denies cannot be philosophically proved, and what he proves\ncannot be philosophically denied.\u201d Whence then is help to come? \u201cThe\nunderstanding, taken by itself, is materialistic and irrational; it\ndenies spirit and God. The reason taken by itself is idealistic, and has\nnothing to do with the understanding; it denies nature and makes itself\nGod.\u201d\n\n(3.) Hence we must seek another way of knowing the supersensible, which\nis faith. Jacobi calls this flight from cognition through conception to\nfaith, the _salto mortale_ of the human reason. Every certainty through\na conception demands another certainty, but in faith we are led to an\nimmediate certainty which needs no ground nor proof, and which is in\nfact absolutely exclusive of all proof. Such a confidence which does not\narise from arguments, is called faith. We know the sensible as well as\nthe supersensible only through faith. All human knowledge springs from\nrevelation and faith.\n\nThese principles which Jacobi brought out in his letters concerning\nSpinoza, did not fail to arouse a universal opposition in the German\nphilosophical world. It was charged upon him that he was an enemy of\nreason, a preacher of blind faith, a despiser of science and of\nphilosophy, a fanatic and a papist. To rebut these attacks, and to\njustify his standpoint, he wrote in 1787, a year and a half after the\nfirst appearance of the work already named, his dialogue entitled\n\u201c_David Hume_, or _Faith, Idealism, and Realism_,\u201d in which he developes\nmore extensively and definitely his principle of faith or immediate\nknowledge.\n\n2. Jacobi distinguished his faith at the outset from a blind credence in\nauthority. A blind faith is that which supports itself on a foreign\nview, instead of on the grounds of reason. But this is not the case with\nhis faith, which rather rests upon the innermost necessity of the\nsubject itself. Still farther: his faith is not an arbitrary\nimagination: we can imagine to ourselves every thing possible, but in\norder to regard a thing as actual, there must be an inexplicable\nnecessity of our feeling, which we cannot otherwise name than faith.\nJacobi was not constant in his terminology, and hence did not always\nexpress himself alike in respect of the relation in which faith stood to\nthe different sides of the human faculty of knowledge. In his earlier\nterminology he placed faith (or as he also called it, the power of\nfaith), on the side of the sense or the receptivity, and let it stand\nopposed to the understanding and the reason, taking these two terms as\nequivalent expressions for the finite and immediate knowledge of\nprevious philosophy; afterwards he followed Kant, and, distinguishing\nbetween the reason and the understanding, he called that reason which he\nhad previously named sense and faith. According to him now, the faith or\nintuition of the reason is the organ for perceiving the supersensible.\nAs such, it stands opposed to the understanding. There must be a higher\nfaculty which can learn, in a way inconceivable to sense and the\nunderstanding, that which is true in and above the phenomena. Over\nagainst the explaining understanding stands the reason, or the natural\nfaith of the reason, which does not explain, but positively reveals and\nunconditionally decides. As there is an intuition of the sense, so is\nthere a rational intuition through the reason, and a demonstration has\nno more validity in respect of the latter than in respect of the former.\nJacobi justifies his use of the term, intuition of the reason, from the\nwant of any other suitable designation. Language has no other expression\nto indicate the way in which that, which is unattainable to the sense,\nbecomes apprehended in the transcendental feeling. If any one affirms\nthat he knows any thing, he may properly be required to state the origin\nof his knowledge, and in doing this, he must of necessity go back either\nto sensation or to feeling; the latter stands above the former as high\nas the human species above the brute. So I affirm, then, without\nhesitation, says Jacobi, that my philosophy starts from pure feeling,\nand declares the authority of this to be supreme. The faculty of feeling\nis the highest in man, and that alone which specifically distinguishes\nhim from the brute. This faculty is one and the same with reason; or,\nreason may be said to find in it its single and only starting point.\n\nJacobi had the clearest consciousness of the opposition in which he\nstood, with this principle of immediate knowledge, to previous\nphilosophy. In his introduction to his complete works, he says: \u201cThere\nhad arisen since the time of Aristotle an increasing effort in\nphilosophical schools, to subject the immediate knowledge to the\nmediate, to make that faculty of perception which originally establishes\nevery thing, dependent on the faculty of reflection, which is\nconditioned through abstraction; to subordinate the archetype to the\ncopy, the essence to the word, the reason to the understanding, and, in\nfact, to make the former wholly disappear in the latter. Nothing is\nallowed to be true which is not capable of a double demonstration, in\nthe intuition and in the conception, in the thing and in its image or\nword; the thing itself, it is said, must truly lie and actually be known\nonly in the word.\u201d But every philosophy which allows only the reflecting\nreason, must lose itself at length in an utter ignorance. Its end is\nnihilism.\n\n3. From what has been already said, the position of Jacobi with his\nprinciple of faith, in relation to the Kantian philosophy, can, partly\nat least, be seen. Jacobi had separated himself from this philosophy,\npartly in the above-named dialogue \u201cDavid Hume,\u201d (especially in an\nappendix to this, in which he discussed the transcendental Idealism),\nand partly in his essay \u201c_On the attempt of criticism to bring the\nreason to the understanding_\u201d (1801). His relation to it may be reduced\nto the following three general points:\n\n(1.) Jacobi does not agree with Kant\u2019s theory of sensuous knowledge. In\nopposition to this theory he defends the standpoint of empiricism,\naffirms the truthfulness of the sense-perception, and denies the\napriority of space and time, for which Kant contends in order to prove\nthat objects as well as their relations are simply determinations of our\nown self, and do not at all exist externally to us. For, however much it\nmay be affirmed that there is something corresponding to our notions as\ntheir cause, yet does it remain concealed what this something is.\nAccording to Kant, the laws of our beholding and thinking are without\nobjective validity, our knowledge has no objective significance. But it\nis wrong to claim that in the phenomena there is nothing revealed of the\nhidden truth which lies behind them. With such a claim, it were far\nbetter to give up completely the unknown thing-in-itself, and carry out\nto its results the consequent idealism. \u201cLogically, Kant is at fault,\nwhen he presupposes objects which make impressions on our soul. He is\nbound to teach the strictest idealism.\u201d\n\n(2.) Yet Jacobi essentially agrees with Kant\u2019s critick of the\nunderstanding. Jacobi affirmed, as Kant had done, that the understanding\nis insufficient to know the supersensible, and that the highest ideas of\nthe reason could be apprehended only in faith. Jacobi places Kant\u2019s\ngreat merit in having cleared away the ideas, which were simply the\nproducts of reflection and logical phantasms. \u201cIt is very easy for the\nunderstanding, when producing one notion from another, and thus\ngradually mounting up to ideas, to imagine that, by virtue of these,\nwhich, though they carry it beyond the intuitions of the sense, are\nnothing but logical phantasms, it has not only the faculty but the most\ndecided determination to fly truly above the world of sense, and to gain\nby its flight a higher science independent of the intuition, a science\nof the supersensible. Kant discovers and destroys this error and\nself-deception. Thus there is gained, at least, a clear place for a\n_genuine_ rationalism. This is Kant\u2019s truly great deed, his immortal\nmerit. But the sound sense of our sage did not allow him to hide from\nhimself that this clear place must disappear in a gulf, which would\nswallow up in itself all knowledge of the true, unless a God should\ninterpose to hinder it. Here Kant\u2019s doctrine and mine meet.\u201d\n\n(3.) But Jacobi does not fully agree with Kant, in wholly denying to the\ntheoretical reason the faculty of objective knowledge. He blames Kant\nfor complaining that the human reason cannot theoretically prove the\nreality of its ideas. He affirms that Kant is thus still entangled in\nthe delusion, that the only reason why these ideas cannot be proved, is\nfound in the nature of the ideas themselves, and not in the deficient\nnature of our knowledge. Kant therefore attempts to seek, in a practical\nway, a kind of scientific proof; a roundabout way, which, to every\nprofound seeker, must seem folly, since every proof is as impossible as\nit is unnecessary.\n\nJacobi agreed better with Kant, than with the post-Kantian philosophy.\nThe atheistic tendency of the latter was especially repulsive to him.\n\u201cTo Kant, that profound thinker and upright philosopher, the words God,\nfreedom, immortality, and religion, signified the same as they have ever\ndone to the sound human understanding; he in no way treats them as\nnothing but deception. He created offence by irresistibly showing the\ninsufficiency of all proofs of speculative philosophy for these ideas.\nThat which was wanting in the theoretical proof, he made up by the\nnecessary postulates of a pure practical reason. With these, according\nto Kant\u2019s assurance, philosophy was fully helped out of her difficulty,\nand the goal, which had been always missed, actually reached. But the\nfirst daughter of the critical philosophy (Fichte\u2019s system) makes the\nliving and working moral order itself to be God, a God expressly\ndeclared to be without consciousness and self-existence. These frank\nwords, spoken publicly and without restraint, roused some attention, but\nthe fear soon subsided. Presently astonishment ceased wholly, for the\nsecond daughter of the critical philosophy (Schelling\u2019s system) gave up\nentirely the distinction which the first had allowed to remain between\nnatural and moral philosophy, necessity and freedom, and without any\nfurther ado affirmed that the only existence is nature, and that there\nis nothing above; this second daughter is Spinozism transfigured and\nreversed, an ideal materialism.\u201d This latter allusion to Schelling,\nconnected as it was with other and harder thrusts in the same essay,\ncalled out from this philosopher the well-known answer: \u201c_Schelling\u2019s\nMonument to the Treatise on Divine Things_, 1812.\u201d\n\nIf we now take a critical survey of the philosophical standpoint of\nJacobi, we shall find its peculiarity to consist in the abstract\nseparation of understanding and feeling. These two Jacobi could not\nbring into harmony. \u201cThere is light in my heart,\u201d he says, \u201cbut it goes\nout whenever I attempt to bring it into the understanding. Which is the\ntrue luminary of these two? That of the understanding, which, though it\nreveals fixed forms, shows behind them only a baseless gulf? Or that of\nthe heart, which points its light promisingly upwards, though\ndeterminate knowledge escapes it? Can the human spirit grasp the truth\nunless it possesses these two luminaries united in one light? And is\nthis union conceivable except through a miracle?\u201d If now, in order to\nescape in a certain degree this contradiction between understanding and\nfeeling, Jacobi gave to immediate knowledge the place of mediate as\nfinite knowledge, this was a self-deception. Even that knowledge, which\nis supposed to be immediate, and which Jacobi regards as the peculiar\norgan for knowing the supersensible, is also mediate, obliged to go\nthrough a course of subjective mediations, and can only give itself out\nas immediate when it wholly forgets its own origin.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XLI.\n\nFICHTE\n\n\nJohann Gottlieb Fichte was born at Rammenau, in Upper Lusatia, 1762. A\nnobleman of Silesia became interested in the boy, and having committed\nhim first to the instruction of a clergyman, he afterwards placed him at\nthe high school at Schulpforte. In his eighteenth year, at Michaelmas,\n1780, Fichte entered the university at Jena to study theology. He soon\nfound himself attracted to philosophy, and became powerfully affected by\nthe study of Spinoza. His pecuniary circumstances were straitened, but\nthis only served to harden his will and his energy. In 1784 he became\nemployed as a teacher in a certain family, and spent some time in this\noccupation with different families in Saxony. In 1787 he sought a place\nas country clergyman, but was refused on account of his religious\nopinions. He was now obliged to leave his fatherland, to which he clung\nwith his whole soul. He repaired to Zurich, where, in 1788, he took a\npost as private tutor, and where also he became acquainted with his\nfuture wife, a sister\u2019s daughter of Klopstock. At Easter, 1790, he\nreturned to Saxony and taught privately at Leipsic, where he became\nacquainted with the Kantian philosophy, by means of lessons which he was\nobliged to give to a student. In the spring of 1791 we find him as\nprivate tutor at Warsaw, and soon after in Konigsberg, where he\nresorted, that he might become personally acquainted with the Kant he\nhad learned to revere. Instead of a letter of recommendation he\npresented him his \u201c_Critick of all Revelation_,\u201d a treatise which Fichte\ncomposed in eight days. In this he attempted to deduce, from the\npractical reason, the possibility of a revelation. This is not seen\npurely apriori, but only under an empirical condition; we must consider\nhumanity to be in a moral ruin so complete, that the moral law has lost\nall its influence upon the will and all morality is extinguished. In\nsuch a case we may expect that God, as moral governor of the world,\nwould give man, through the sense, some pure moral impulses, and reveal\nhimself as lawgiver to them through a special manifestation determined\nfor this end, in the world of sense. In such a case a particular\nrevelation were a postulate of the practical reason. Fichte sought also\nto determine apriori the possible content of such a revelation. Since we\nneed to know nothing but God, freedom, and immortality, the revelation\nwill contain naught but these, and these it must contain in a\ncomprehensible form, yet so that the symbolical dress may lay no claim\nto unlimited veneration. This treatise, which appeared anonymously in\n1792, at once attracted the greatest attention, and was at first\nuniversally regarded as a work of Kant. It procured for its author, soon\nafter, a call to the chair of philosophy at Jena, to succeed Reinhold,\nwho then went to Kiel. Fichte received this appointment in 1793 at\nZurich, where he had gone to consummate his marriage. At the same time\nhe wrote and published, also anonymously, his \u201c_Aids to correct views of\nthe French Revolution_,\u201d an essay which the governments never looked\nupon with favor. At Easter, 1794, he entered upon his new office, and\nsoon saw his public call confirmed. Taking now a new standpoint, which\ntranscended Kant, he sought to establish this, and carry it out in a\nseries of writings (the _Wissenschaftslehre_ appeared in 1794, the\n_Naturrecht_ in 1796, and the _Sittenlehre_ in 1798), by which he\nexerted a powerful influence upon the scientific movement in Germany,\naided as he was in this by the fact that Jena was then one of the most\nflourishing of the German universities, and the resort of every vigorous\nhead. With Goethe, Schiller, the brothers Schlegel, William von\nHumboldt, and Hufeland, Fichte was in close fellowship, though this was\nunfortunately broken after a few years. In 1795 he became associate\neditor of the \u201c_Philosophical Journal_,\u201d which had been established by\nNiethammer. A fellow-laborer, Rector Forberg, at Saalfeld, offered for\npublication in this journal an article \u201cto determine the conception of\nreligion.\u201d Fichte advised the author not to publish it, but at length\ninserted it in the journal, prefacing it, however, with an introduction\nof his own. \u201c_On the ground of our faith in a divine government of the\nworld_,\u201d in which he endeavored to remove, or at least soften, the views\nin the article which might give offence. Both the essays raised a great\ncry of atheism. The elector of Saxony confiscated the journal in his\nterritory, and sent a requisition to the dukes Ernest, who held in\ncommon the university of Jena, to summon the author to trial and\npunishment. Fichte answered the edict of confiscation and attempted to\njustify himself to the public (1799), by his \u201c_Appeal to the Public. An\nessay which it is requested may be read before it is confiscated_;\u201d\nwhile he defended his course to the government by an article entitled\n\u201c_The Publishers of the Philosophical Journal justified from the charge\nof Atheism_.\u201d The government of Weimar, being as anxious to spare him as\nit was to please the elector of Saxony, delayed its decision. But as\nFichte, either with or without reason, had privately learned that the\nwhole matter was to be settled by reprimanding the accused parties for\ntheir want of caution; and, desiring either a civil acquittal or an open\nand proper satisfaction, he wrote a private letter to a member of the\ngovernment, in which he desired his dismission in case of a reprimand,\nand which he closed with the intimation that many of his friends would\nleave the university with him, in order to establish together a new one\nin Germany. The government regarded this letter as an application for\nhis discharge, indirectly declaring that the reprimand was unavoidable.\nFichte, now an object of suspicion, both on account of his religious and\npolitical views, looked about him in vain for a place of refuge. The\nprince of Rudolstadt, to whom he turned, denied him his protection, and\nhis arrival in Berlin (1799) attracted great notice. In Berlin, where he\nhad much intercourse with Frederick Schlegel, and also with\nSchleiermacher and Novalis, his views became gradually modified; the\ncatastrophe at Jena had led him from the exclusive moral standpoint\nwhich he, resting upon Kant, had hitherto held, to the sphere of\nreligion; he now sought to reconcile religion with his standpoint of the\n_Wissenshaftslehre_, and turned himself to a certain mysticism (the\nsecond form of the Fichtian theory). After he had privately taught a\nnumber of years in Berlin, and had also held philosophical lectures for\nmen of culture, he was recommended (1805) by Beyme and Altenstein,\nchancellor of state of Hardenberg, to a professorship of philosophy in\nErlangen, an appointment which he received together with a permit to\nreturn to Berlin in the winter, and hold there his philosophical\nlectures before the public. Thus, in the winter of 1807-8, while a\nFrench marshal was governor of Berlin, and while his voice was often\ndrowned by the hostile tumults of the enemy through the streets, he\ndelivered his famous \u201c_Addresses to the German nation_.\u201d Fichte labored\nmost assiduously for the foundation of the Berlin university, for only\nby wholly transforming the common education did he believe the\nregeneration of Germany could be secured. As the new university was\nopened 1809, he was made in the first year dean of the philosophical\nfaculty, and in the second was invested with the dignity of rector. In\nthe \u201cwar of liberation,\u201d then breaking out, Fichte took the liveliest\nparticipation by word and deed. His wife had contracted a nervous fever\nby her care of the sick and wounded, and though she recovered, he fell a\nvictim to the same disease. He died Jan. 28, 1814, not having yet\ncompleted his fifty-second year.\n\nIn the following exposition of Fichte\u2019s philosophy, we distinguish\nbetween the two internally different periods of his philosophizing, that\nof Jena and that of Berlin. The first division will include two\nparts\u2014Fichte\u2019s theory of science and his practical philosophy.\n\nI. THE FICHTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN ITS ORIGINAL FORM. 1. THE THEORETICAL\nPHILOSOPHY OF FICHTE, HIS WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE, OR THEORY OF SCIENCE.\u2014It\nhas already been shown (\u00a7 39) that the thoroughly-going subjective\nidealism of Fichte was only the logical consequence of the Kantian\nstandpoint. It was wholly unavoidable that Fichte should entirely reject\nthe Kantian essentially thing (_thing in itself_), which Kant had\nhimself declared to be unrecognizable though real, and that he should\nposit as a proper act of the mind, that external influence which Kant\nhad referred to the essentially thing. That the Ego alone is, and that\nwhich we regard as a limitation of the Ego by external objects, is\nrather the proper self-limitation of the Ego; this is the grand feature\nof the Fichtian as of every idealism.\n\nFichte himself supported the standpoint of this Theory of Science as\nfollows: In every experience there is conjointly an Ego and a thing, the\nintelligence and its object. Which of these two sides must now be\nreduced to the other? If the philosopher abstracts the Ego, he has\nremaining an essentially thing, and must then apprehend his\nrepresentations or sensations as the products of this object; if he\nabstracts the object, he has remaining an essentially Ego (an Ego _in\nitself_). The former is dogmatism, the latter idealism. Both are\nirreconcilable with each other, and there is no third way possible. We\nmust therefore choose between the two. In order to decide between the\ntwo systems, we must note the following: (1) That the Ego appears in\nconsciousness, wherefore the essentially thing is a pure invention,\nsince in consciousness we have only that which is perceived; (2)\nDogmatism must account for the origin of its representation through some\nessentially object, it must start from something which does not lie in\nthe consciousness. But the effect of being is only being, and not\nrepresentation. Hence idealism alone can be correct which does not start\nfrom being, but from intelligence. According to idealism, intelligence\nis only active, not passive, because it is a first and absolute: and on\nthis account there belongs to it no being, but simply an acting. The\nforms of this acting, the system of the necessary mode in which\nintelligence acts, must be found from the essence of intelligence. If we\nshould take the laws of intelligence from experience, as Kant did his\ncategories, we fail in two respects: (1) We do not see why intelligence\nmust so act, nor whether these laws are immanent laws of intelligence;\n(2) We do not see how the object itself originates. Hence the\nfundamental principles of intelligence, as well as the objective world,\nmust be derived from the Ego itself.\n\nFichte supposed that in these results he only expressed the true sense\nof the Kantian philosophy. \u201cWhatever my system may properly be, whether\nthe genuine criticism thoroughly carried out, _as I believe it is_, or\nhowsoever it be named, is of no account.\u201d His system, Fichte affirms,\nhad the same view of the matter as Kant\u2019s, while the numerous followers\nof this philosopher had wholly mistaken and misunderstood their master\u2019s\nidealism. In the second introduction to the Theory of Science (1797),\nFichte grants to these expounders of the Critick of pure Reason that it\ncontains some passages where Kant would affirm that sensations must be\ngiven to the subject from without as the material conditions of\nobjective reality; but shows that the innumerably repeated declarations\nof the Critick, that there could be no influence upon us of a real\ntranscendental object outside of us, cannot at all be reconciled with\nthese passages, if any thing other than a simple thought be understood\nas the ground of the sensations. \u201cSo long,\u201d adds Fichte, \u201cas Kant does\nnot expressly declare that he derives sensations from an impression of\nsome essentially thing, or, to use his terminology, that sensation must\nbe explained from a transcendental object existing externally to us: so\nlong will I not believe what these expounders tell us of Kant. But if he\nshould give such an explanation, I should sooner regard the Critick of\nPure Reason to be a work of chance than of design.\u201d For such an\nexplanation the aged Kant did not suffer him long to wait. In the\n_Intelligenzblatt der Allgemeinen Litteraturzeitung_ (1799), he\nformally, and with much emphasis, rejects the Fichtian improvement of\nhis system, and protests against every interpretation of his writings\naccording to the conceit of any mind, while he maintains the literal\ninterpretation of his theory as laid down in the Critick of Reason.\nReinhold remarks upon all this: \u201cSince the well known and public\nexplanation of Kant respecting Fichte\u2019s philosophy, there can be no\nlonger a doubt that Kant himself would represent his own system, and\ndesire to have it represented by his readers, entirely otherwise than\nFichte had represented and interpreted it. But from this it irresistibly\nfollows, that Kant himself did not regard his system as illogical\nbecause it presupposed something external to the subjectivity.\nNevertheless, it does not at all follow that Fichte erred when he\ndeclared that this system, with such a presupposition, must be\nillogical.\u201d So much for Reinhold. That Kant himself did not fail to see\nthis inconclusiveness, is evident from the changes he introduced into\nthe second edition of the Critick of Pure Reason, where he suffered the\nidealistic side of his system to fall back decidedly behind the\nempirical.\n\nFrom what has been said, we can see the universal standpoint of the\nTheory of Science; the Ego is made a principle, and from the Ego every\nthing else is sought to be derived. It hardly needs to be remarked, that\nby this Ego we are to understand, not any individual, but the universal\nEgo, the universal rationality. The Ego and the individual, the pure and\nthe empirical Ego, are wholly different conceptions.\n\nWe have still the following preface to make concerning the form of the\nTheory of Science. A theory of science, according to Fichte, must posit\nsome supreme principle, from which every other must be derived. This\nsupreme principle must be absolutely, and through itself, certain. If\nour human knowledge should be any thing but fragmentary, there must be\nsuch a supreme principle. But now, since such a principle does not admit\nof proof, every thing depends upon giving it a trial. Its test and\ndemonstration can only be thus gained, viz., if we find a principle to\nwhich all science may be referred, then is this shown to be a\nfundamental principle. But besides the first fundamental principle,\nthere are yet two others to be considered, the one of which is\nunconditioned as to its content, but as to its form, conditioned through\nand derived from the first fundamental principle; the other the reverse.\nThe relation of these three principles to each other is, in fine, this,\nviz., that the second stands opposed to the first, while a third is the\nproduct of the two. Hence, according to this plan, the first absolute\nprinciple starts from the Ego, the second opposes to the Ego a thing or\na non-Ego, and the third brings forward the Ego again in reaction\nagainst the thing or the non-Ego. This method of Fichte\n(thesis,\u2014antithesis,\u2014synthesis) is the same as Hegel subsequently\nadopted, and applied to the whole system of philosophy, a union of the\nsynthetical and analytical methods. We start with a fundamental\nsynthesis, which we analyze to produce its antitheses, in order to unite\nthese antitheses again through a second synthesis. But in making this\nsecond synthesis, our analysis discovers still farther antitheses, which\nobliges us therefore to find another synthesis, and so onward in the\nprocess, till we come at length to antitheses which can no longer be\nperfectly but only approximately connected.\n\nWe stand now upon the threshold of the _Theory of Science_. It is\ndivided into three parts. (1) General principles of a theory of science.\n(2) Principles of theoretical knowledge. (3) Principles of practical\nscience.\n\nAs has already been said, there are three _supreme_ fundamental\nprinciples, one absolutely unconditioned, and two relatively\nunconditioned.\n\n(1.) _The absolutely first and absolutely unconditioned fundamental\nprinciple_ ought to express that act of the mind which lies at the basis\nof all consciousness, and alone makes consciousness possible. Such is\nthe principle of identity, A = A. This principle remains, and cannot be\nthought away, though every empirical determination be removed. It is a\nfact of consciousness, and must, therefore, be universally admitted: but\nat the same time it is by no means conditioned, like every other\nempirical fact, but unconditioned, because it is a free act. By\naffirming that this principle is certain without any farther ground, we\nascribe to ourselves the faculty of _positing_ something absolutely. We\ndo not, therefore, affirm that A is, but only that if A is, then it is\nequal to A. It is no matter now about the content of the principle, we\nneed only regard its form. The principle A = A is, therefore,\nconditioned (hypothetically) as to its content, and unconditioned only\nas to its form and its connection. If we would now have a principle\nunconditioned in its content as well as in its connection, we put Ego in\nthe place of A, as we are fully entitled to do, since the connection of\nsubject and predicate contained in the judgment A = A is posited in the\nEgo and through the Ego. Hence A = A becomes transformed into Ego = Ego.\nThis principle is unconditioned not only as to its connection, but also\nas to its content. While we could not, instead of A = A, say that A is,\nyet we can instead of Ego = Ego, say that Ego is. All the facts of the\nempirical consciousness find their ground of explanation in this, viz.,\nthat before any thing else is posited in the Ego, the Ego itself is\nthere. This fact, that the Ego is absolutely posited and grounded on\nitself, is the basis of all acting in the human mind, and shows the pure\ncharacter of activity in itself. The Ego _is_, because it posits itself,\nand it only is, because this simple positing of itself is wholly by\nitself. The being of the Ego is thus seen in the positing of the Ego,\nand on the other hand, the Ego is enabled _to posit_ simply by virtue of\nits being. It is at the same time the acting, and the product of the\naction. I am, is the expression of the only possible deed. Logically\nconsidered we have, in the first principle of a Theory of Science, A =\nA, the logical law of identity. From the proposition A = A, we arrive at\nthe proposition Ego = Ego. The latter proposition, however, does not\nderive its validity from the former, but contrarywise. The prius of all\njudgments is the Ego, which posits the connection of subject and\npredicate. The logical law of identity arises, therefore, from Ego =\nEgo. Metaphysically considered, we have in this same first principle of\na Theory of Science, the category of _reality_. We obtain this category\nby abstracting every thing from the content, and reflecting simply upon\nthe mode of acting of the human mind. From the Ego, as the absolute\nsubject, every category is derived.\n\n(2.) _The second fundamental principle_, conditioned in its content, and\nonly unconditioned in its form, which is just as incapable as the first\nof demonstration or derivation, is also a fact of the empirical\nconsciousness: it is the proposition non-A is not = A. This sentence is\nunconditioned in its form, because it is free act like the first, from\nwhich it cannot be derived; but in its content, as to its matter it is\nconditioned, because if a non-A is posited, there must have previously\nbeen posited an A. Let us examine this principle more closely. In the\nfirst principle, A = A, the form of the act was a positing, while in\nthis second principle it is an oppositing. There is an absolute\nopposition, and this opposition, in its simple form, is an act\nabsolutely possible, standing under no condition, limited by no higher\nground. But as to its matter, the opposition presupposes a position; the\nnon-A cannot be posited without the A. What non-A is, I do not through\nthat yet know: I only know concerning non-A that it is the opposite of\nA: hence I only know what non-A is under the condition that I know A.\nBut now A is posited through the Ego; there is originally nothing\nposited but the Ego, and nothing but this absolutely posited. Hence\nthere can be an absolute opposition only to the Ego. That which is\nopposed to the Ego is the non-Ego. A non-Ego is absolutely opposed to\nthe Ego, and this is the second fact of the empirical consciousness. In\nevery thing ascribed to the Ego, the contrary, by virtue of this simple\nopposition, must be ascribed to the non Ego.\u2014As we obtained from the\nfirst principle Ego = Ego, the logical law of identity, so now we have,\nfrom the second sentence Ego is not = non-Ego, the logical law of\ncontradiction. And metaphysically,\u2014since we wholly abstract the definite\nact of judgment, and, simply in the form of sequence, conclude not-being\nfrom opposite being,\u2014we possess from this second principle the category\nof _negation_.\n\n(3.) _The third principle_, conditioned in its form, is almost capable\nof proof, since it is determined by two others. At every step we\napproach the province where every thing can be proved. This third\nprinciple is conditioned in its form, and unconditioned only in its\ncontent: _i. e._ the problem, but not the solution of the act to be\nestablished through it, has been given through the two preceding\nprinciples. The solution is afforded unconditionally and absolutely by a\ndecisive word of the reason. The problem to be solved by this third\nprinciple is this, viz., to adjust the contradiction contained in the\ntwo former ones. On the one side, the Ego is wholly suppressed by the\nnon-Ego: there can be no positing of the Ego so far as the non-Ego is\nposited. On the other side, the non-Ego is only an Ego posited in the\nconsciousness, and hence the Ego is not suppressed by the non-Ego. The\nEgo appearing on the one side to be suppressed, is not really\nsuppressed. Such a result would be non-A = A. In order to remove this\ncontradiction, which threatens to destroy the identity of our\nconsciousness, and the only absolute foundation of our knowledge, we\nmust find in _x_ that which will justify both of the first two\nprinciples, and leave the identity of our consciousness undisturbed. The\ntwo opposites, the Ego and the non-Ego, should be united in the\nconsciousness, should be alike posited without either excluding the\nother; they should be received in the identity of the proper\nconsciousness. How shall being and not-being, reality and negation, be\nconceived together without destroying each other? They will reciprocally\n_limit_ each other. Hence the unknown quantity _x_, whose terms we are\nseeking, stands for these limits: limitation is the sought-for act of\nthe Ego, and as category in the thought, we have thus the category of\ndetermination or _limitation_. But in limitation, there is also given\nthe category of _quantity_, for when we say that any thing is limited,\nwe mean that its reality is through negation, not _wholly_, but only\n_partially_ suppressed. Thus the conception of limit contains also the\nconception of divisibility, besides the conceptions of reality and\nnegation. Through the act of limitation, the Ego as well as the non-Ego,\nis posited as divisible. Still farther, we see how a logical law follows\nfrom the third fundamental principle as well as from the first two. If\nwe abstract the definite content, the Ego and the non-Ego, and leave\nremaining the simple form of the union of opposites through the\nconception of divisibility, we have then the logical _principle of the\nground_, or foundation, which may be expressed in the formula: A in part\n= non-A, non-A in part = A. Wherever two opposites are alike in one\ncharacteristic, we consider the ground as a ground of relation, and\nwherever two similar things are opposite in one characteristic, we\nconsider the ground as a ground of distinction.\u2014With these three\nprinciples we have now exhausted the measure of that which is\nunconditioned and absolutely certain. We can embrace the three in the\nfollowing formula:\n\n_I posit in the Ego a divisible non Ego over against the divisible Ego._\nNo philosophy can go beyond this cognition, and every fundamental\nphilosophy should go back to this. Just so far as it does this, it\nbecomes science (_Wissenschaftslehre_). Every thing which can appear in\na system of knowledge, as well as a farther division of the Theory of\nScience itself, must be derived from this. The proposition that the Ego\nand the non-Ego reciprocally limit each other, may be divided into the\nfollowing two: (1) the Ego posits itself as limited through the non-Ego\n(_i. e._ the Ego is in a cognitive (or passive) relation); (2) the Ego\nposits the non-Ego as limited through the Ego (_i. e._ the Ego is in an\nactive relation). The former proposition is the basis of the\ntheoretical, and the latter of the practical part of the Theory of\nScience. The latter part cannot, at the outset, be brought upon the\nstage; for the non-Ego, which should be limited by the acting Ego, does\nnot at the outset exist, and we must wait and see whether it will find,\nin the theoretical part, a reality.\n\n_The groundwork of theoretical knowledge_ advances through an\nuninterrupted series of antitheses and syntheses. The fundamental\nsynthesis of the theoretical Theory of Science is the proposition: _the\nEgo posits itself as determined_ (limited) _by the non-Ego_. If we\nanalyze this sentence, we find in it two subordinate sentences which are\nreciprocally opposite. (1) The non-Ego as active determines the Ego,\nwhich thus far is passive; but since all activity must start from the\nEgo, so (2) the Ego determines itself through an absolute activity.\nHerein is a contradiction, that the Ego should be at the same time\nactive and passive. Since this contradiction would destroy the above\nproposition, and also suppress the unity of consciousness, we are forced\nto seek some point, some new synthesis, in which these given antitheses\nmay be united. This synthesis is attained when we find that the\nconceptions of action and passion, which are contained under the\ncategories of reality and negation, find their compensation and due\nadjustment in the conception of divisibility. The propositions: \u201cthe Ego\ndetermines,\u201d and \u201cthe Ego is determined,\u201d are reconciled in the\nproposition: \u201cthe Ego determines itself in part, and is determined in\npart.\u201d Both, however, should be considered as one and the same. Hence\nmore accurately: as many parts of reality as the Ego posits in itself,\nso many parts of negation does it posit in the non-Ego; and as many\nparts of reality as the Ego posits in the non-Ego, so many parts of\nnegation does it posit in itself. This determination is _reciprocal\ndetermination_, or _reciprocal action_. Thus Fichte deduces the last of\nthe three categories under Kant\u2019s general category of relation. In a\nsimilar way (viz., by finding a synthesis for apparent contradictions),\nhe deduces the two other categories of this class, viz., that of cause,\nand that of substance. The process is thus: So far as the Ego is\ndetermined, and therefore passive, has the non-Ego reality. The category\nof reciprocal determination, to which we may ascribe indifferently\neither of the two sides, reality or negation, may, more strictly taken,\nimply that the Ego is passive, and the non-Ego active. The notion which\nexpresses this relation is that of _causality_. That, to which activity\nis ascribed, is called _cause_ (primal reality), and that to which\npassiveness is ascribed, is called _effect_; both, conceived in\nconnection, may be termed a _working_. On the other side, the Ego\ndetermines itself. Herein is a contradiction; (1) the Ego determines\nitself; it is therefore that which determines, and is thus active; (2)\nit determines itself; it is therefore that which becomes determined, and\nis thus passive. Thus in one respect and in one action both reality and\nnegation are ascribed to it. To resolve this contradiction, we must find\na mode of action which is activity and passiveness in one; the Ego must\ndetermine its passiveness through activity, and its activity through\npassiveness. This solution is attained by aid of the conception of\nquantity. In the Ego all reality is first of all posited as absolute\nquantum, as absolute totality, and thus far the Ego may be compared to a\ngreatest circle which contains all the rest. A definite quantum of\nactivity, or a limited sphere within this greatest circle of activity,\nis indeed a _reality_; but when compared with the totality of activity,\nis it also a _negation_ of the totality or passiveness. Here we have\nfound the mediation sought for; it lies in the notion of _substance_. In\nso far as the Ego is considered as the whole circle, embracing the\ntotality of all realities, is it substance; but so far as it becomes\nposited in a determinate sphere of this circle, is it accidental. No\naccidence is conceivable without substance; for, in order to know that\nany thing is a definite reality, it must first be referred to reality in\ngeneral, or to substance. In every change we think of substance in the\nuniversal; accidence is something specific (determinate), which changes\nwith every changing cause. _There is originally but one substance, the\nEgo_; in this one substance all possible accidents, and therefore all\npossible realities, are posited. The Ego alone is the absolutely\ninfinite. The Ego, as thinking and as acting, indicates a limitation.\nThe Fichtian theory is accordingly Spinozism, only (as Jacobi strikingly\ncalled it) a reversed and idealistic Spinozism.\n\nLet us look back a moment. The objectivity which Kant had allowed to\nexist Fichte has destroyed. There is _only_ the Ego. But the Ego\npresupposes a non-Ego, and therefore a kind of object. How the Ego comes\nto posit such an object, must the theoretical Theory of Science now\nproceed to show.\n\nThere are two extreme views respecting the relation of the Ego to the\nnon-Ego, according as we start from the conception of cause, or that of\nsubstance. (1) Starting from the conception of cause, we have posited\nthrough the passiveness of the Ego an activity of the non-Ego. This\npassiveness of the Ego must have some ground. This cannot lie in the\nEgo, which in itself posits only activity. Consequently it lies in the\nnon-Ego. Here the distinction between action and passion is apprehended,\nnot simply as quantitative (_i. e._, viewing the passiveness as a\ndiminished activity), but the passion is in quality opposed to the\naction; a presupposed activity of the non-Ego is, therefore, a real\nground of the passiveness in the Ego. (2) Starting from the conception\nof substance, we have posited a passiveness of the Ego through its own\nactivity. Here the passiveness in respect of quality is the same as\nactivity, it being only a diminished activity. While, therefore,\naccording to the first view, the passive Ego has a ground distinct in\nquality from the Ego, and thus a real ground, yet here its ground is\nonly a diminished activity of the Ego, distinct only in quantity from\nthe Ego, and is thus an ideal ground. The former view is dogmatic\nrealism, the latter is dogmatic idealism. The latter affirms: all\nreality of the non-Ego is only a reality given it from the Ego; the\nformer declares: nothing can be given, unless there be something to\nreceive, unless an independent reality of the non-Ego, as thing in\nitself, be presupposed. Both views present thus a contradiction, which\ncan only be removed by a new synthesis. Fichte attempted this synthesis\nof idealism and realism, by bringing out a mediating system of critical\nidealism. For this purpose he sought to show that the ideal ground and\nthe real ground are one and the same. Neither is the simple activity of\nthe Ego a ground for the reality of the non-Ego, nor is the simple\nactivity of the non-Ego a ground for the passiveness in the Ego. Both\nmust be conceived together in this way, viz., the activity of the Ego\nmeets a _hindrance_, which is set up against it, not without some\nassistance of the Ego, and which circumscribes and reflects in itself\nthis activity of the Ego. The hindrance is found when the subjective can\nbe no farther extended, and the expanding activity of the Ego is driven\nback into itself, producing as its result self-limitation. What we call\nobjects are nothing other than the different impinging of the activity\nof the Ego on some inconceivable hindrance, and these determinations of\nthe Ego, we carry over to something external to ourselves, and represent\nthem to ourselves as space filling matter. That which Fichte calls a\nhindrance through the non-Ego, is thus in fact the same as Kant calls\nthing essentially, the only difference being that with Fichte it is made\nsubjective. From this point Fichte then deduces the subjective\nactivities of the Ego, which mediate, or seek to mediate, theoretically,\nthe Ego with the non-Ego\u2014as imagination, representation (sensation,\nintuition, feeling), understanding, faculty of judgment, reason; and in\nconnection with this he brought out the subjective projections of the\nintuition, space, and time.\n\nWe have now reached the third part of the Theory of Science, via., _the\nfoundation of the practical_. We have seen that the Ego represents. But\nthat it may represent does not depend upon the Ego alone, but is\ndetermined by something external to it. We could in no way conceive of a\nrepresentation, except through the presupposition that the Ego finds\nsome hindrance to its undetermined and unlimited activity. Accordingly\nthe Ego, as intelligence, is universally dependent upon an indefinite,\nand hitherto wholly indefinable non-Ego, and only through and by means\nof such non-Ego, is it intelligence. A finite being is only finite as\nintelligence. These limits, however, we shall break through. The\npractical law which unites the finite Ego with the infinite, can depend\nupon nothing external to ourselves. The Ego, according to all its\ndeterminations, should be posited absolutely through itself, and hence\nshould be wholly independent of every possible non-Ego. Consequently,\nthe absolute Ego and the intelligent Ego, both of which should\nconstitute but one, are opposed to each other. This contradiction is\nobviated, when we see that because the absolute Ego is capable of no\npassiveness, but is absolute activity, therefore the Ego determines,\nthrough itself, that hitherto unknown non-Ego, to which the hindrance\nhas been ascribed. The limits which the Ego, as theoretic, has set over\nagainst itself in the non-Ego, it must, as practical, seek to destroy,\nand absorb again the non-Ego in itself (or conceive it as the\nself-limitation of the Ego). The Kantian primacy of the practical reason\nis here made a truth. The transition of the theoretical part into the\npractical, the necessity of advancing from the one to the other, Fichte\nrepresents more closely thus:\u2014The theoretical Theory of Science had to\ndo with the mediation of the Ego, and the non-Ego. For this end it\nintroduced one connecting link after another, without ever attaining its\nend. Then enters the reason with the absolute and decisive word: \u201cthere\nought to be no non-Ego, since the non-Ego can in no way be united with\nthe Ego;\u201d and with this the knot is cut, though not untied. Thus it is\nthe incongruity between the absolute (practical) Ego, and the finite\n(intelligent) Ego, which is carried over beyond the theoretical province\ninto the practical. True, this incongruity does not wholly disappear,\neven in the practical province, where the act is only an infinite\nstriving to surpass the limits of the non-Ego. The Ego, so far as it is\npractical, has, indeed, the tendency to pass beyond the actual world,\nand establish an ideal world, as it would be were every reality posited\nby the absolute Ego; but this striving is always confined to the finite\npartly through itself, because it goes out towards objects, and objects\nare finite, and partly through the resistance of the sensible world. We\nought to seek to reach the infinite, but we cannot do it; this striving\nand inability is the impress of our destiny for eternity.\n\nThus\u2014and in these words Fichte brings together the result of the Theory\nof Science\u2014the whole being of finite rational natures is comprehended\nand exhausted: an original idea of our absolute being; an effort to\nreflect upon ourselves, in order to gain this idea; a limitation, not of\nthis striving, but of our own existence, which first becomes actual\nthrough this limitation, or through an opposite principle, a non-Ego, or\nour finiteness; a self-consciousness, and especially a consciousness of\nour practical strivings; a determination accordingly of our\nrepresentations, and through these of our actions; a constant widening\nof our limits into the infinite.\n\n2. FICHTE\u2019S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY.\u2014The principles which Fichte had\ndeveloped in his Theory of Science he applied to practical life,\nespecially to the theory of rights and morals. He sought to deduce here\nevery thing with methodical rigidness, without admitting any thing which\ncould not be proved from experience. Thus, in the theory of rights and\nof morals, he will not presuppose a plurality of persons, but first\ndeduces this: even that the man has a body is first demonstrated,\nthough, to be sure, not stringently.\n\n_The Theory of Rights_ (_the rights of nature_) Fichte founds upon the\nconception of the individual. First, he deduces the conception of\nrights, and as follows:\u2014A finite rational being cannot posit itself\nwithout ascribing to itself a free activity. Through this positing of\nits faculties to a free activity, this rational being posits an external\nworld of sense, for it can ascribe to itself no activity till it has\nposited an object towards which this activity may be directed. Still\nfarther, this free activity of a rational being presupposes other\nrational beings, for without these it would never be conscious that it\nwas free. We have therefore a plurality of free individuals, each one of\nwhom has a sphere of free activity. This co-existence of free\nindividuals is not possible without a relation of rights. Since no one\nwith freedom passes beyond his sphere, and each one therefore limits\nhimself, they recognize each other as rational and free. This relation\nof a reciprocal acting through intelligence and freedom between rational\nbeings, according to which each one has his freedom limited by the\nconception of the possibility of the other\u2019s freedom, under the\ncondition also that this other limits his own freedom also through that\nof the first, is called a _relation of rights_. The supreme maxim of a\ntheory of rights is therefore this: limit thy freedom through the\nconception of the freedom of every other person with whom thou canst be\nconnected. After Fichte has attempted the application of this conception\nof rights, and for this end has deduced the corporeity, the\nanthropological side of man, he passes over to a proper _theory of\nrights_. The theory of rights may be divided into three parts. (1)\nRights which belong to the simple conception of person are called\n_original rights_. The original right is the absolute right of the\nperson to be only a cause in the sensible world, though he may be\nabsolutely (in other relations than to the sense) an effect. In this are\ncontained, (_a_) the right of personal (bodily) freedom, and (_b_) the\nright of property. But every relation of rights between individual\npersons is conditioned through each one\u2019s recognition of the rights of\nthe other. Each one must limit the quantum of his free acts for the sake\nof the freedom of the other, and only so far as the other has respect to\nmy freedom need I have regard to his. In case, therefore, the other does\nnot respect my original rights, some mechanical necessity must be sought\nin order to secure the rights of person, and this involves (2) the\n_Right of Coercion_. The laws of punishment have their end in securing\nthat the opposite of that which is intended shall follow every\nunrighteous aim, that every vicious purpose shall be destroyed, and the\nright in its integrity be established. To establish such a law of\ncoercion, and to secure a universal coercive power, the free individuals\nmust enter into covenant among themselves. Such a covenant is only\npossible on the ground of a common nature. Natural right, _i. e._ the\nrightful relation between man and man, presupposes thus (3) a _civil\nright_, viz., (_a_) a free covenant, a compact of citizens by which the\nfree individuals guarantee to each other their reciprocal rights; (_b_)\npositive laws, a civil legislation, through which the common will of all\nbecomes law; (_c_) an executive force, a civil power which executes the\ncommon will, and in which, therefore, the private will and the common\nwill are synthetically united. The particular view of Fichte\u2019s theory of\nrights is this: on the one side there is the state as reason demands\n(philosophical theory of rights), and on the other side the state as it\nactually is (theory of positive rights and of the state). But now comes\nup the problem, to make the actual state ever more and more conformable\nto the state of reason. The science which has this approximation for its\naim, is polity. We can demand of no actual state a perfect conformity to\nthe idea of a state. Every state constitution is according to right, if\nit only leaves possible an advancement to a better state, and the only\nconstitution wholly contrary to right is that whose end is to hold every\nthing just as it is.\n\nThe absolute Ego of the Theory of Science is separated in the Theory of\nRights into an infinite number of persons with rights: to bring it out\nagain in its unity is the problem of _Ethics_. Right and morals are\nessentially different. Right is the external necessity to omit or to do\nsomething in order not to infringe upon the freedom of another; the\ninner necessity to do or omit something wholly independent of external\nends, constitutes the moral nature of man. And as the theory of rights\narose from the conflict of the impulse of freedom in one subject with\nthe impulse of freedom in another subject, so does the theory of morals\nor ethics arise from such a conflict, which, in the present case, is not\nexternal but internal, between two impulses in one and the same person.\n(1) The rational being is impelled towards absolute independence, and\nstrives after freedom for the sake of freedom. This fundamental impulse\nmay be called the pure impulse, and it furnishes the formal principle of\nethics, the principle of absolute autonomy, of absolute\nindeterminableness through anything external to the Ego. But (2) as the\nrational being is actually empirical and finite, as it by nature posits\nover against itself a non-Ego and posits itself as corporeal, so there\nis found beside the pure impulse another, the impulse of nature, which\nmakes for its end not freedom but enjoyment. This impulse of nature\nfurnishes the material, utilitarian (eud\u0153moniacal) principle of striving\nafter a connected enjoyment. Both impulses, which from a transcendental\nstandpoint are one and the same original impulse of the human being,\nstrive after unity, and furnish a third impulse which is a mingling of\nthe two. The pure impulse gives the form, and the natural impulse the\ncontent of an action. It is true that sensuous objects will be chosen,\nbut by virtue of the pure impulse these are modified so as to conform to\nthe absolute Ego. This mingled impulse is now the moral impulse. It\nmediates the pure and the natural impulse. But since these two lie\ninfinitely apart, the approximation of the natural to the pure impulse\nis an infinite progression. The intent in an action is directed towards\na complete freeing from nature, and it is only the result of our\nlimitation that the act should remain still conformable to the natural\nimpulse. Since the Ego can never be independent so long as it is Ego,\nthe final aim of the rational being lies in infinity. There must be a\ncourse in whose progress the Ego can conceive itself as approximating\ntowards absolute independence. This course is determined in infinity in\nthe idea; there is, therefore, no possible case in which it is not\ndetermined what the pure impulse should demand. We might name this\ncourse the moral determination (destiny) of the finite rational being.\n_The principle of ethics is, therefore: Always fulfil thy destiny!_ That\nwhich is in every moment conformable to our moral destiny, is at the\nsame time demanded by our natural impulse, though it does not follow\nthat every thing which the latter demands agrees therefore with the\nformer. I ought to act only when conscious that something is duty, and I\nought to discharge the duty for its own sake. The blind motives of\nsympathy, love of mankind, &c., have not, as mere impulses of nature,\nmorality. The moral impulse has causality as having none, for it demands\nbe free! Through the conception of the absolute ought, is the rational\nbeing absolutely independent, and is represented thus only when acting\nfrom duty. The formal condition of the morality of our actions, is: act\nalways according to the best conviction of thy duty; or, act according\nto thy conscience. The absolute criterion of the correctness of our\nconviction of duty is a feeling of truth and certainty. This immediate\nfeeling never deceives, for it only exists with the perfect harmony of\nour empirical Ego with that which is pure and original. From this point\nFichte developes his particular ethics, or theory of duties, which,\nhowever, we must here pass by.\n\nFichte\u2019s _theory of religion_ is developed in the above mentioned\ntreatise: \u201c_On the ground of our faith in a divine government of the\nworld_,\u201d and in the writings which he subsequently put forth in its\ndefence. The moral government of the world, says Fichte, we assume to be\nthe divine. This divine government becomes living and actual in us\nthrough right-doing: it is presupposed in every one of our actions which\nare only performed in the presupposition that the moral end is\nattainable in the world of sense. The faith in such an order of the\nworld comprises the whole of faith, for this living and active moral\norder is God; we need no other God, and can comprehend no other. There\nis no ground in the reason to go out of this moral order of the world,\nand by concluding from design to a designer, affirm a separate being as\nits cause. Is, then, this order an accidental one? It is the absolute\nFirst of all objective knowledge. But now if you should be allowed to\ndraw the conclusion that there is a God as a separate being, what have\nyou gained by this? This being should be distinct from you and the\nworld, it should work in the latter according to conceptions; it should,\ntherefore, be capable of conceptions, and possess personality and\nconsciousness. But what do you call personality and consciousness?\nCertainly that which you have found in yourself, which you have learned\nto know in yourself, and which you have characterized with such a name.\nBut that you cannot conceive of this without limitation and finiteness,\nyou might see by the slightest attention to the construction of this\nconception. By attaching, therefore, such a predicate to this being, you\nbring it down to a finite, and make it a being like yourself; you have\nnot conceived God as you intended to do, but have only multiplied\nyourself in thought. The conception of God, as a separate substance, is\nimpossible and contradictory. God has essential existence only as such a\nmoral order of the world. Every belief in a divine being, which contains\nany thing more than the conception of the moral order of the world, is\nan abomination to me, and in the highest degree unworthy of a rational\nbeing.\u2014Religion and morality are, on this standpoint, as on that of\nKant, naturally one; both are an apprehending of the supersensible, the\nformer through action and the latter through faith. This \u201cReligion of\njoyous right-doing,\u201d Fichte farther carried out in the writings which he\nput forth to rebut the charge of atheism. He affirms that nothing but\nthe principles of the new philosophy could restore the degenerate\nreligious sense among men, and bring to light the inner essence of the\nChristian doctrine. Especially he seeks to show this in his \u201cAppeal\u201d to\nthe public. In this he says: to furnish an answer to the questions: what\nis good? what is true? is the aim of my philosophical system. We must\nstart with the affirmation that there is something absolutely true and\ngood; that there is something which can hold and bind the free flight of\nthought. There is a voice in man which cannot be silenced, which affirms\nthat there is a duty, and that it must be done simply for its own sake.\nResting on this basis, there is opened to us an entirely new world in\nour being; we attain a higher existence, which is independent of all\nnature, and is grounded simply in ourselves. I would call this absolute\nself-satisfaction of the reason, this perfect freedom from all\ndependence, blessedness. As the single but unerring means of\nblessedness, my conscience points me to the fulfilment of duty. I am,\ntherefore, impressed by the unshaken conviction, that there is a rule\nand fixed order, according to which the purely moral disposition\nnecessarily makes blessed. It is absolutely necessary, and it is the\nessential element in religion, that the man who maintains the dignity of\nhis reason, will repose on the faith in this order of a moral world,\nwill regard each one of his duties as an enactment of this order, and\nwill joyfully submit himself to, and find bliss in, every consequence of\nhis duty. Thou shalt know God if I can only beget in thee a dutiful\ncharacter, and though to others of us thou mayest seem to be still in\nthe world of sense, yet for thyself art thou already a partaker of\neternal life.\n\nII. THE LATER FORM OF FICHTE\u2019S PHILOSOPHY.\u2014Every thing of importance\nwhich Fichte accomplished as a speculative philosopher, is contained in\nthe Theory of Science as above considered. Subsequently, after his\ndeparture from Jena, his system gradually became modified, and from\ndifferent causes. Partly, because it was difficult to maintain the rigid\nidealism of the Theory of Science; partly, because Schelling\u2019s natural\nphilosophy, which now appeared, was not without an influence upon\nFichte\u2019s thinking, though the latter denied this and became involved in\na bitter controversy with Schelling; and, partly, his outward relations,\nwhich were far from being happy, contributed to modify his view of the\nworld. Fichte\u2019s writings, in this second period, are for the most part\npopular, and intended for a mixed class of readers. They all bear the\nimpress of his acute mind, and of his exalted manly character, but lack\nthe originality and the scientific sequence of his earlier productions.\nThose of them which are scientific do not satisfy the demands which he\nhimself had previously laid down with so much strictness, both for\nhimself and others, in respect of genetic construction and philosophical\nmethod. His doctrine at this time seems rather as a web, of his old\nsubjective idealistic conceptions and the newly added objective\nidealism, so loosely connected that Schelling might call it the\ncompletest syncretism and eclecticism. His new standpoint is chiefly\ndistinguished from his old by his attempt to merge his subjective\nidealism into an objective pantheism (in accordance with the new\nPlatonism), to transmute the Ego of his earlier philosophy into the\nabsolute, or the thought of God. God, whose conception he had formerly\nplaced only at the end of his system, in the doubtful form of a moral\norder of the world, becomes to him now the absolute beginning, and\nsingle element of his philosophy. This gave to his philosophy an\nentirely new color. The moral severity gives place to a religious\nmildness; instead of the Ego and the Ought, life and love are now the\nchief features of his philosophy; in place of the exact dialectic of the\nTheory of Science, he now makes choice of mystical and metaphorical\nmodes of expression.\n\nThis second period of Fichte\u2019s philosophy is especially characterized by\nits inclination to religion and Christianity, as exhibited most\nprominently in the essay \u201c_Direction to a Blessed Life_.\u201d Fichte here\naffirms that his new doctrine is exactly that of Christianity, and\nespecially of the Gospel according to John. He would make this gospel\nalone the clear foundation of Christian truth, since the other apostles\nremained half Jews after their conversion, and adhered to the\nfundamental error of Judaism, that the world had a creation in time.\nFichte lays great weight upon the first part of John\u2019s prologue, where\nthe formation of the world out of nothing is confuted, and a true view\nlaid down of a revelation co-eternal with God, and necessarily given\nwith his being. That which this prologue says of the incarnation of the\nLogos in the person of Jesus, has, according to Fichte, only a historic\nvalidity. The absolute and eternally true standpoint is, that at all\ntimes, and in every one, without exception, who is vitally sensible of\nhis union with God, and who actually and in fact yields up his whole\nindividual life to the divine life within him,\u2014the eternal word becomes\nflesh in the same way as in Jesus Christ and holds a personal, sensible,\nand human existence. The whole communion of believers, the first-born\nalike with the later born, coincides in the Godhead, the common source\nof life for all. And so then, Christianity having gained its end,\ndisappears again in the eternal truth, and affirms that every man should\ncome to a union with God. So long as man desires to be himself any thing\nwhatsoever, God does not come to him, for no man can become God. But\njust so soon as he purely, wholly, and radically gives up himself, God\nalone remains, and is all and in all. The man himself can beget no God,\nbut he can give up himself as a proper negation, and thus he disappears\nin God.\n\nThe result of his advanced philosophizing, Fichte has briefly and\nclearly comprehended in the following lines, which we extract from two\nposthumous sonnets:\n\n The Eternal One\n Lives in my life and sees in my beholding.\n Nought is but God, and God is nought but life.\n Clearly the vail of things rises before thee;\n It is thyself, what though the mortal die\n And hence there lives but God in thine endeavors,\n If thou wilt look through that which lives beyond this death,\n The vail of things shall seem to thee as vail,\n And unveiled thou shalt look upon the life divine.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XLII.\n\nHERBART.\n\n\nA peculiar, and in many respects noticeable, carrying out of the Kantian\nphilosophy, was attempted by _Johann Friedrich Herbart_, who was born at\nOldenburg in 1776, chosen professor of philosophy in G\u00f6ttingen in 1805;\nmade Kant\u2019s successor at K\u00f6nigsberg in 1808, and recalled to G\u00f6ttingen\nin 1833, where he died in 1841. His philosophy, instead of making, like\nmost other systems, for its principle, an idea of the reason, followed\nthe direction of Kant, and expended itself mainly in a critical\nexamination of the subjective experience. It is essentially a criticism,\nbut with results which are peculiar, and which differ wholly from those\nof Kant. Its fundamental position in the history of philosophy is an\nisolated one; instead of regarding antecedent systems as elements of a\ntrue philosophy, it looks upon almost all of them as failures. It is\nespecially hostile to the post-Kantian German philosophy, and most of\nall to Schelling\u2019s philosophy of nature, in which it could only behold a\nphantom and a delusion; sooner than come in contact with this, it would\njoin Hegelianism, of which it is the opposite pole. We will give a brief\nexposition of its prominent thoughts.\n\n1. THE BASIS AND STARTING-POINT OF PHILOSOPHY is, according to Herbart,\nthe common view of things, or a knowledge which shall accord with\nexperience. A philosophical system is in reality nothing but an attempt\nby which a thinker strives to solve certain questions which present\nthemselves before him. Every question brought up in philosophy should\nrefer itself singly and solely to that which is given, and must arise\nfrom this source alone, because there is no other original field of\ncertainty, for men, than experience alone. Every philosophy should begin\nwith it. The thinking should yield itself to experience, which should\nlead it, and not be led by it. Experience, therefore, is the only object\nand basis of philosophy; that which is not given cannot be an object of\nthought, and it is impossible to establish any knowledge which\ntranscends the limits of experience.\n\n2. THE FIRST ACT OF PHILOSOPHY.\u2014Though the material furnished by\nexperience is the basis of philosophy, yet, since it is furnished, it\nstands outside of philosophy. The question arises, what is the first act\nor beginning of philosophy? The thinking should first separate itself\nfrom experience, that it may clearly see the difficulties of its\nundertaking. _The beginning of philosophy_, where the thinking rises\nabove that which is given, is accordingly doubt or _scepticism_.\nScepticism is twofold, a lower and a higher. The lower scepticism simply\ndoubts that things are so constituted as they appear to us to be; the\nhigher scepticism passes beyond the form of the phenomenon, and inquires\nwhether in reality any thing there exists. It doubts _e. g._ the\nsuccession in time; it asks in reference to the forms of the objects of\nnature which exhibit design, whether the design is perceived, or only\nattached to them in the thought, &c. Thus the problems which form the\ncontent of metaphysics, are gradually brought out. The result of\nscepticism is therefore not negative, but positive. Doubt is nothing but\nthe thinking upon those conceptions of experience which are the material\nof philosophy. Through this reflection, scepticism leads us to the\nknowledge that these conceptions of experience, though they refer to\nsomething given, yet contain no conceivable content free from logical\nincongruities.\n\n3. REMODELLING OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF EXPERIENCE.\u2014Metaphysics, according\nto Herbart, is the science of that which is conceivable in experience.\nOur view thus far has been a twofold one. On the one side we hold fast\nto the opinion that the single basis of philosophy is experience, and on\nthe other side, scepticism has shaken the credibility of experience. The\npoint now is to transform this scepticism into a definite knowledge of\nmetaphysical problems. Conceptions from experience crowd upon us, which\ncannot be thoughts, _i. e._ they may indeed be thought by the ordinary\nunderstanding, but this thinking is obscure and confused, and does not\nseparate nor compare opposing characteristics. But an acute process of\nthought, a logical analysis, will find in the conceptions of experience\n(_e. g._ space, time, becoming, motion, &c.) contradictions and\ncharacteristics, which are totally inconsistent with each other. What\nnow is to be done? We may not reject these conceptions, for they are\ngiven, and beyond the given we cannot step; we cannot retain them, for\nthey are inconceivable and cannot logically be established. The only way\nof escape which remains to us is to remodel them. _To remodel the\nconceptions of experience_, to eliminate their contradictions, is the\nproper act of speculation. Scepticism has brought to light the more\ndefinite problems which involve a contradiction, and whose solution it\ntherefore belongs to metaphysics to attempt; the most important of these\nare the problems of inherence, change, and the Ego.\n\nThe relation between Herbart and Hegel is very clear at this point. Both\nare agreed respecting the contradictory nature of the determinations of\nthought, and the conceptions of experience. But from this point they\nseparate. It is the nature of these conceptions as of every thing, says\nHegel, to be an inner contradiction; becoming, for instance, is\nessentially the unity of being, and not being, &c. This is impossible,\nsays Herbart, on the other side, so long as the principle of\ncontradiction is valid; if the conceptions of experience contain inner\ncontradictions, this is not the fault of the objective world, but of the\nrepresenting subject who must rectify his false apprehension by\nremodelling these conceptions, and eliminating the contradiction.\nHerbart thus charges the philosophy of Hegel with empiricism, because it\nreceives from experience these contradictory conceptions unchanged, and\nnot only regards these as established, but even goes so far as to\nmetamorphose logic on their account, and this simply because they are\ngiven in experience, though their contradictory nature is clearly seen.\nHegel and Herbart stand related to each other as Heraclitus and\nParmenides (_cf._ \u00a7 \u00a7 VI. and VII.)\n\n4. HERBART\u2019S REALS.\u2014From this point Herbart reaches his \u201creals\u201d\n(_Realen_) as follows: To discover the contradictions, he says, in all\nour conceptions of experience, might lead us to absolute scepticism, and\nto despair of the truth. But here we remember that if the existence of\nevery thing real be denied, then the appearance, sensation,\nrepresentation, and thought itself would be destroyed. We perceive,\ntherefore, just as strong an indication of being as of appearance. We\ncannot, indeed, ascribe to the given any true and essential being _per\nse_, it is not _per se_ alone, but only on, or in, or through something\nother. _The truly being_ is an absolute being, which as such excludes\nevery thing relative and dependent; it is _absolute position_, which it\nis not for us first to posit, but only to recognize. In so far as this\nbeing is attributed to any thing, this latter possesses reality. The\ntruly being is, therefore, ever a _quale_, a something which is\nconsidered as being. In order now that this posited may correspond to\nthe conditions which lie in the conception of absolute position, the\n_what_ of the real must be thought (_a_) as absolutely positive or\naffirmative, _i. e._ without any negation or limitation, which might\ndestroy again the absoluteness; (_b_) as absolutely simple, _i. e._ in\nno way, as a multiplicity or admitting of inner antitheses; (_c_) as\nindeterminate by any conceptions of greatness, _i. e._ not as a quantum\nwhich may be divided and extended in time and space; hence, also, not as\na constant greatness or continuity. But we must never forget that this\nbeing or this absolute reality is not simply something thought, but is\nsomething independent and resting on itself, and hence it is simply to\nbe recognized by the thinking. The conception of this thinking lies at\nthe basis of all Herbart\u2019s metaphysics. Take an example of this. The\nfirst problem to be solved in metaphysics is the problem of inherence,\nor the thing with its characteristics. Every perceptible thing\nrepresents itself to the senses as a complex of several characteristics.\nBut all the attributes of a thing which are given in perception are\nrelative. We say _e. g._ that sound is a property of a certain body. It\nsounds\u2014but it cannot-do this without air; what now becomes of this\nproperty in a space without air? Again, we say that a body is heavy, but\nit is only so on the earth. Or again, that a body is colored, but light\nis necessary for this; what now becomes of such a property in darkness?\nStill farther, a multiplicity of properties is incompatible with the\nunity of an object. If you ask _what_ is this thing, you are answered\nwith the sum of its characteristics; it is soft, white, full-sounding,\nheavy,\u2014but your question was of one, not of many. The answer only\naffirms what the thing has, not what it is. Moreover, the list of\ncharacteristics is always incomplete. The what of a thing can therefore\nlie neither in the individual given properties, nor in their unity. In\ndetermining what a thing is, we have only this answer remaining, viz.,\nthe thing is that unknown, which we must posit before we can posit any\nthing as lying in the given properties; in a word, it is the substance.\nFor if, in order to see what the thing purely and essentially is, we\ntake away the characteristics which it may have, we find that nothing\nmore remains, and we perceive that what we considered as the real thing\nwas only a complex of characteristics, and the union of these in one\nwhole. But since every appearance indicates a definite reality, and thus\nsince there must be as much reality as there is appearance, we have to\nconsider the reality, which lies at the basis of the thing, with its\ncharacteristics, as a complex of many simple substances or monads, and\nwhose quality is different in different instances. When our experience\nhas led us to a repeated grouping together of these monads, we call the\ngroup a thing. Let us now briefly look at the formation of those\nfundamental conceptions of metaphysics, which involve the same thoughts\nthrough the fundamental conception of being. First, there is the\nconception of causality, which cannot be maintained in its ordinary\nform. All that we can perceive in the act is succession in time, and not\nthe necessary connection of cause with effect. The cause in itself can\nbe neither transcendent nor immanent; it cannot be transcendent, because\na real influence of one real thing upon another, contradicts the\nconception of the absolute reality; nor immanent, for then the substance\nmust be thought as one with its characteristics, which contradicts the\ninvestigations concerning a thing with its characteristics. We can just\nas little find in the conception of the real an answer to the question,\nhow one determinate being can be brought into contact with another, for\nthe real is the absolute unchangeable. We can therefore only explain the\nconception of causality on the ground that the different reals which lie\nat the basis of the characteristics are conceived, each one for itself,\nas cause of the phenomenon, there being just as many causes as there are\nphenomena. The problem of change, is intimately connected with the\nconception of cause. Since, however, according to Herbart, there is no\ninner change, no self-determination, no becoming and no life; since the\nmonads are, and remain in themselves unchangeable, they do not therefore\n_become_ different in respect of quality, but they _are_ originally\ndifferent one from another, and each one exhibits its equality without\never any change. The problem of change can thus only be solved through\nthe theory of the disturbance and self-preservation of these essences.\nBut if that which we call not simply an apparent but an actual event, in\nthe essence of the monads, may be reduced to a \u201cself-preservation,\u201d as\nthe last gleam of an activity and life, still we have the question ever\nremaining, how to explain the appearance of change. For this it is\nnecessary to bring in two auxiliary conceptions; first, that of\naccidental views, and second, that of intellectual spaces. The\naccidental views, an expression taken from mathematics, signify, in\nreference to the problem before us this much, viz., one and the same\nconception may often be considered in very different relations to some\nother essence, without the slightest change in its own essence, _e. g._\na straight line may be considered as radius or as tangent, and a tone as\nharmonious or discordant. By help of these accidental views, we may now\nregard that which actually results in the monad, when other monads,\nopposite in quality, come in contact with it, as on the one side an\nactual occurrence, though on the other side, no actual change can be\nimputed to the original condition of the monads (a gray color, _e. g._\nseems comparatively white by the side of black, and comparatively black\nby the side of white, without changing at all its quality). A further\nauxiliary conception is that of intellectual space, which, arises when\nwe must consider these essences as at the same time together and not\ntogether. By means of this conception we can eliminate the\ncontradictions from the conception of movement. Lastly, it can be seen\nthat the conception of matter and that of the Ego (in psychologically\nexplaining which, the rest of the metaphysics is occupied) are, like the\npreceding ones, no less contradictory in themselves than they are\nirreconcilable with the fundamental conception of the real; for neither\ncan an extended being, like matter, be formed out of spaceless\nmonads\u2014and with matter, therefore, fall also the ordinary conceptions of\nspace and time\u2014nor can we admit, without transformation, the conception\nof the Ego, since it exhibits the contradictory conception of a thing\nwith many and changing characteristics (conditions, powers, faculties,\n&c.)\n\nWe are reminded by Herbart\u2019s \u201c_reals_\u201d of the atomic theory of the\natomists (_cf._ \u00a7 IX. 2), of the Eleatic theory of the one being (_cf._\n\u00a7 VI.), and of Leibnitz\u2019s monadology. His reals however are\ndistinguished from the atoms by not possessing impenetrability. The\nmonads of Herbart may be just as well represented in the same space as a\nmathematical point may be conceived as accurately coexisting with\nanother in the same place. In this respect the \u201creal\u201d of Herbart has a\nfar greater similarity to the \u201cone\u201d of the Eleatics. Both are simple,\nand to be conceived in intellectual spaces, but the essential difference\nis, that Herbart\u2019s substances exist in numbers distinct from one\nanother, and even from opposites among themselves. Herbart\u2019s simple\nquantities have already been compared to the monads of Leibnitz, but\nthese latter have essentially a power of representation; they are\nessences with inner circumstances, while, according to Herbart,\nrepresentation, just as little as every other circumstance, belongs to\nthe essence itself.\n\n5. PSYCHOLOGY is connected with metaphysics. The Ego is primarily a\nmetaphysical problem, and comes in this respect under the category of\nthe thing with its characteristics. It is a real with many properties\nchanging circumstances, powers, faculties, activities, &c., and thus is\nnot without contradictions. But then the Ego is a psychological\nprinciple, and here those contradictions may be considered which lie in\nthe ideality of subject and object. The subject posits itself and is\ntherefore itself object. But this posited object is nothing other than\nthe positing subject. Thus the Ego is, as Fichte says, subject-object,\nand, as such, full of the hardest contradictions, for subject and object\nwill never be affirmed as one and the same without contradiction. But\nnow if the Ego is given it cannot be thrown away, but must be purified\nfrom its contradictions. This occurs whenever the Ego is conceived as\nthat which represents, and the different sensations, thoughts, &c. are\nembraced under the common conception of changing appearance. The\nsolution of this problem is similar to that of inherence. As in the\nlatter problem the thing was apprehended as a complex of as many reals\nas it has characteristics, just so here the Ego; but with the Ego inner\ncircumstances and representations correspond to the characteristics.\nThus that which we are accustomed to name Ego is nothing other than the\nsoul. The soul as a monad, as absolutely being, is therefore simple,\neternal, indissoluble, from which we may conclude its eternal existence.\nFrom this standpoint Herbart combats the ordinary course of psychology\nwhich ascribes certain powers and faculties to the soul. That which\nstands out in the soul is nothing other than self-preservation, which\ncan only be manifold and changing in opposition to other reals. The\ncauses of changing circumstances are therefore these other reals, which\ncome variously in conflict with the soul-monad, and thus produce that\napparently infinite manifoldness of sensations, representations, and\naffections. This theory of self-preservation lies at the basis of all\nHerbart\u2019s psychology. That which psychology ordinarily calls feeling,\nthinking, representing, &c., are only specific differences in the\nself-preservation of the soul; they indicate no proper condition of the\ninner real essence itself, but only relations between the reals,\nrelations, which, coming up together at the same time from different\nsides, are partly suppressed, partly forwarded, and partly modified.\nConsciousness is the sum of those relations in which the soul stands to\nother essences. But the relations to the objects, and hence to the\nrepresentations corresponding to these, are not all equally strong; one\npresses, restricts, and obscures another, a relation of equilibrium\nwhich can be calculated according to the doctrine of statics. But the\nsuppressed representations do not wholly disappear, but waiting on the\nthreshold of consciousness for the favorable moment when they shall be\npermitted again to arise, they join themselves with kindred\nrepresentations, and press forward with united energies. This movement\nof the representations (sketched in a masterly manner by Herbart) may be\ncalculated according to the rules of mathematics, and this is Herbart\u2019s\nwell known application of mathematics to the empirical theory of the\nsoul. The representations which were pressed back, which wait on the\nthreshold of consciousness and only work in the darkness, and of which\nwe are only half conscious, are feelings. They express themselves as\ndesires, according as their struggle forward is more or less successful.\nDesire becomes will when united with the hope of success. The will is no\nseparate faculty of the mind, but consists only in the relation of the\ndominant representations to the others. The power of deciding and the\ncharacter of a man, prominently depend upon the constant presence in the\nconsciousness of a certain number of representations, while other\nrepresentations are weakened, or denied an entrance over the threshold\nof consciousness.\n\n6. THE IMPORTANCE OF HERBART\u2019S PHILOSOPHY.\u2014Herbart\u2019s philosophy is\nimportant mainly for its metaphysics and psychology. In the other\nspheres and activities of the human mind, _e. g._ rights, morality, the\nstate, art, religion, his philosophy is mostly barren of results, and\nthough there are not wanting here striking observations, yet these have\nno connection with the speculative principles of the system. Herbart\nfundamentally isolates the different philosophical sciences,\ndistinguishing especially and in the strictest manner between\ntheoretical and practical philosophy. He charges the effort after unity\nin philosophy, with occasioning the greatest errors; for logical,\nmetaphysical, and \u00e6sthetic forms are entirely diverse. Ethics and\n\u00e6sthetics have to do with objects in which an immediate evidence\nappears, but this is foreign to the whole nature of metaphysics, which\ncan only gain its knowledge as errors have been removed. \u00c6sthetic\njudgments on which practical philosophy rests, are independent of the\nreality of any object, and appear with immediate certainty in the midst\nof the strongest metaphysical doubts. Moral elements, says Herbart, are\npleasing and displeasing relations of the will. He thus grounds the\nwhole practical philosophy upon \u00e6sthetic judgments. The \u00e6sthetic\njudgment is an involuntary and immediate judgment, which attaches to\ncertain objects, without proof, the predicates of goodness and\nbadness.\u2014Here is seen the greatest difference between Herbart and Kant.\n\nWe may characterize, on the whole, the philosophy of Herbart as a\ncarrying out of the monadology of Leibnitz, full of enduring acuteness,\nbut without any inner fruitfulness or capacity of development.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XLIII.\n\nSCHELLING.\n\n\n_Schelling_ sprang from _Fichte_. We may pass on to an exposition of his\nphilosophy without any farther introduction, since that which it\ncontains from Fichte forms a part of its historical development, and\nwill therefore be treated of as this is unfolded.\n\nFriedrich Wilhelm Joseph _Schelling_ was born at Leonberg, in\nW\u00fcrtemberg, January 27th, 1775. With a very precocious development, he\nentered the theological seminary at T\u00fcbingen in his fifteenth year, and\ndevoted himself partly to philology and mythology, but especially to\nKant\u2019s philosophy. During his course as a student, he was in personal\nconnection with H\u00f6lderlin and Hegel. Schelling came before the world as\nan author very early. In 1792 appeared his graduating treatise on the\nthird chapter of Genesis, in which he gave an interesting philosophical\nsignification to the Mosaic account of the fall. In the following year,\n1793, he published in _Paulus\u2019_ Memorabilia an essay of a kindred nature\n\u201c_On the Myths and Philosophemes of the Ancient World_.\u201d To the last\nyear of his abode at T\u00fcbingen belong the two philosophical writings:\n\u201c_On the Possibility of a Form for Philosophy_\u201d and \u201c_On the Ego as a\nPrinciple of Philosophy, or on the Unconditioned in Human Knowledge_.\u201d\nAfter completing his university studies, Schelling went to Leipsic as\ntutor to the Baron von Riedesel, but soon afterwards repaired to Jena,\nwhere he became the pupil and co-laborer of Fichte. After Fichte\u2019s\ndeparture from Jena, he became himself, 1798, teacher of philosophy\nthere, and now began, removing himself from Fichte\u2019s standpoint, to\ndevelope more and more his own peculiar views. He published in Jena the\n_Journal of Speculative Physics_, and also in company with Hegel, _the\nCritical Journal_. In the year 1803 he went to W\u00fcrzburg as professor\n_ordinarius_ of philosophy. In 1807 he repaired to Munich as member\n_ordinarius_ of the newly established academy of sciences there. The\nyear after he became general secretary of the Academy of the plastic\narts, and subsequently, when the university professorship was\nestablished at Munich, he became its incumbent. After the death of\nJacobi, he was chosen president of the Munich Academy. In 1841 he\nremoved to Berlin, where he has sometimes held lectures. For the last\nten years Schelling has written nothing of importance, although he has\nrepeatedly promised an exposition of his present system. By far the\ngreater portion of his writings belongs to his early life. Schelling\u2019s\nphilosophy is no completed system of which his separate works are the\nconstituent elements; but, like Plato\u2019s, it has a historical\ndevelopment, a course of formative steps which the philosopher has\npassed through in his own life. Instead of systematically elaborating\nthe separate sciences from the standpoint of his principle, Schelling\nhas gone back repeatedly to the beginning again, seeking ever for new\nfoundations and new standpoints, connecting these for the most part\n(like Plato) with some antecedent philosophemes, (Fichte, Spinoza, New\nPlatonism, Leibnitz, Jacob B\u0153hme, Gnosticism,) which in their order he\nattempted to interweave with his system. We must modify accordingly our\nexposition of Schelling\u2019s Philosophy, and take up its different periods,\nseparated according to the different groups of his writings.[4]\n\nI. FIRST PERIOD. SCHELLING\u2019S PROCESSION FROM FICHTE.\n\nSchelling\u2019s starting point was Fichte, whom he decidedly followed in his\nearliest writings. In his essay, \u201c_On the Possibility of a Form of\nPhilosophy_\u201d he shows the necessity of that supreme principle which\nFichte had first propounded. In his essay, \u201c_On the Ego_\u201d Schelling\nshows that the ultimate ground of our knowledge can only lie in the Ego,\nand hence that every true philosophy must be idealism. If our knowledge\nshall possess reality, there must be one point in which ideality and\nreality, thought and being, can identically coincide; and if outside of\nour knowledge, there were something higher which conditioned it, if\nitself were not the highest, then it could not be absolute. Fichte\nregarded this essay as a commentary on his _Theory of Science_; yet it\ncontains already indications of Schelling\u2019s subsequent standpoint, in\nits expressly affirming the unity of all knowledge, the necessity that\nin the end all the different sciences shall become merged into one. In\nthe \u201c_Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism_,\u201d 1795, Schelling combatted\nthe notions of those Kantians who had left the critical and idealistic\nstandpoint of their master, and fallen back again into the old\ndogmatism. It was also on the standpoint of Fichte that Schelling\npublished in Niethammer\u2019s and Fichte\u2019s Journal, 1797-98, a series of\narticles, in which he gave a survey of the recent philosophical\nliterature. Here he begins to turn his attention towards a philosophical\ndeduction of nature, though he still remains on the standpoint of Fichte\nwhen he deduces nature wholly from the essence of the Ego. In the essay\nwhich was composed soon after, and entitled \u201c_Ideas for a philosophy of\nNature_,\u201d 1797, and the one \u201c_On the World-soul_,\u201d 1798, he gradually\nunfolded more clearly his views. The chief points which are brought out\nin the two last named essays are the following: The first origin of the\nconception of matter springs from nature and the intuition of the human\nmind. The mind is the union of an unlimited and a limiting energy. If\nthere were no limit to the mind, consciousness would be just as\nimpossible as if the mind were totally and absolutely limited. Feeling,\nperception and knowledge are only conceivable, as the energy which\nstrives for the unlimited becomes limited through its opposite, and as\nthis latter becomes itself freed from its limitations. The actual mind\nor heart consists only in the antagonism of these two energies, and\nhence only in their ever approximate or relative unity. Just so is it in\nnature. Matter as such is not the first, for the forces of which it is\nthe unity are before it. Matter is only to be apprehended as the ever\nbecoming product of attraction and repulsion; it is not, therefore, a\nmere inert grossness, as we are apt to represent it, but these forces\nare its original. But force in the material is like something\nimmaterial. Force in nature is that which we may compare to mind. Since\nnow the mind or heart exhibits precisely the same conflict, as matter,\nof opposite forces, we must unite the two in a higher identity. But the\norgan of the mind for apprehending nature is the intuition which takes,\nas object of the external sense, the space which has been filled and\nlimited by the attracting and repelling forces. Thus Schelling was led\nto the conclusion that _the same absolute_ appears in nature as in mind,\nand that the harmony of these is something more than a thought in\nreference to them. \u201cOr if you affirm that we only _carry over_ such an\nidea to nature, then have you utterly failed to apprehend the only\nnature which there can be to us. For our view of nature is not that it\naccidentally meets the laws of our mind\u2014(perhaps through the mediation\nof a third)\u2014but that it necessarily and originally not only expresses,\nbut itself realizes, the laws of our mind, and that it is nature, and is\ncalled such only in so far as it does this.\u201d \u201cNature should be the\nvisible mind, and mind invisible nature. Here, therefore, in the\nabsolute ideality of the mind _within_ us, and nature _without_ us, must\nwe solve the problem how it is possible for a nature outside of us to\nbe.\u201d This thought, that nature or matter is just as much the actual\nunity of an attracting and a repelling force, as the mind or heart is\nthe unity of an unlimited and a limiting tendency, and that the\nrepelling force in matter corresponds to the positive or unlimited\nactivity of the mind, while the attracting force corresponds to the\nmind\u2019s negative or limiting activity\u2014this identical deduction of matter\nfrom the essence of the Ego, is very prominent in all that Schelling\nwrote upon natural philosophy during this period. Nature thus appears as\na copy (_Doppelbild_) of the mind, which the mind itself produces, in\norder to return, by its means, to pure self-intuition, to\nself-consciousness. Hence we have the successive stages of nature, in\nwhich all the stations of the mind in its way to self-consciousness are\nexternally established. It is especially in the organic world that the\nmind can behold its own self-production. Hence, in every thing organic,\nthere is something symbolical, every plant bears some feature of the\nsoul. The chief characteristics of an organic formation,\u2014the\nself-forming process from within outwards, the conformity to some end,\nthe change of interpenetration of form and matter\u2014are equally chief\nfeatures of the mind. Since now there exists in our mind an endless\nstriving to organize itself, so there must also be manifested in the\nexternal world a universal tendency to organization. The whole universe\nmay thus be called a kind of organization which has formed itself from a\ncentre, rising ever from a lower to a higher stage. From such a point of\nview, the natural philosopher will make it his chief effort to bring to\na unity in his contemplations that life of nature, which by many\nresearches into physical science had been separated into numberless\ndifferent powers. \u201cIt is a needless trouble which many have given\nthemselves, to show how very different is the working of fire and\nelectricity, for every one knows this who has ever seen or heard of the\ntwo. But our mind strives after unity in the system of its knowledge; it\nwill not endure that there should be pressed upon it a separate\nprinciple for every single phenomenon, and it will only believe that it\nsees nature where it can discover the greatest simplicity of laws in the\ngreatest multiplicity of phenomena, and the highest frugality of means\nin the highest prodigality of effects. Therefore, every thought, even\nthat which is now rough and crude, merits attention so soon as it tends\ntowards the simplifying of principles, and if it serves no other end, it\nat least strengthens the impulse to investigate and trace out the hidden\nprocess of nature.\u201d The special tendency of the scientific investigation\nof nature which prevailed at that time, was to make a duality of forces\nthe predominant element in the life of nature. In mechanics, the Kantian\ntheory of the opposition of attraction and repulsion was adopted; in\nchemistry, by apprehending electricity as positive and negative, its\nphenomenon was brought near that of magnetism; in physiology there was\nthe opposition of irritability and sensibility, &c. In opposition to\nthese dualities, Schelling now insisted upon the unity of every thing\nopposite, the unity of all dualities, and this not simply as an abstract\nunity, but as a concrete identity, as the harmonious co-working of the\nheterogeneous. The world is the actual unity of a positive and a\nnegative principle, \u201cand these two conflicting forces taken together, or\nrepresented in their conflict, lead to the idea of an organizing\nprinciple which makes of the world a system, in other words, to the idea\nof a world-soul.\u201d\n\nIn his above-cited essay on \u201c_the world-soul_,\u201d Schelling took the great\nstep forward of apprehending nature as entirely autonomic. In the\nworld-soul nature has a peculiar principle which dwells within it, and\nworks according to conception. In this way the objective world was\nrecognized as the independent life of nature in a manner which the\nlogical idealism of Fichte would not permit. Schelling proceeded still\nfarther in this direction, and distinguished definitely, as the two\nsides of philosophy, the philosophy of nature and a transcendental\nphilosophy. By placing a philosophy of nature by the side of idealism,\nSchelling passed decidedly beyond the standpoint of science, and we thus\nenter a second stadium of his philosophizing, though his method still\nremained that of Fichte, and he continued to believe that he was\nspeculating in the spirit of the _Theory of Science_.\n\nII. SECOND PERIOD. STANDPOINT OF THE DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE\nPHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND OF MIND.\n\nThis standpoint of Schelling is chiefly carried out in the following\nworks:\u2014\u201c_First Draft of a System of Natural Philosophy_,\u201d 1799; an\nintroduction to this, 1799; articles in the \u201c_Journal of Speculative\nPhysics_,\u201d 1800, 1801; \u201c_System of Transcendental Idealism_,\u201d 1800.\nSchelling thus distinguishes the two sides of philosophy. All knowledge\nrests upon the harmony of a subject with an object. That which is simply\nobjective is natural, and that which is simply subjective is the Ego or\nintelligence. There are two possible ways of uniting these two sides: we\nmay either make nature first, and inquire how it is that intelligence is\nassociated with it (natural philosophy); or we may make the subject\nfirst, and inquire how do objects proceed from the subject\n(transcendental philosophy). The end of all philosophy must be to make\neither an intelligence out of nature, or a nature out of intelligence.\nAs the transcendental philosophy has to subject the real to the ideal,\nso must natural philosophy attempt to explain the ideal from the real.\nBoth, however, are only the two poles of one and the same knowledge\nwhich reciprocally attract each other; hence, if we start from either\npole, we are necessarily drawn towards the other.\n\n1. NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.\u2014To philosophize concerning nature is, in a\ncertain sense, to create nature\u2014to raise it from the dead mechanism in\nwhich it had seemed confined, to inspire it with freedom, and transpose\nit into a properly free development. And what, then, is matter, other\nthan mind which has become extinct? According to this view, since nature\nis only the visible organism of our understanding, it can produce\nnothing but what is conformable to a rule and an end. But you radically\ndestroy every idea of nature just so soon as you allow its design to\nhave come to it from without, by passing over from the understanding of\nany being. The complete exhibition of the intellectual world in the laws\nand forms of the phenomenal world, and, on the other hand, the complete\nconception of these laws and forms from the intellectual world, and\ntherefore the exhibition of the ideality of nature with the ideal world,\nis the work of natural philosophy. Immediate experience is indeed its\nstarting point; we know originally nothing except through experience;\nbut just as soon as I gain an insight into the inner necessity of a\nprinciple of experience, it becomes a principle apriori. Natural\nphilosophy is empiricism extended until it becomes absolute.\n\nSchelling expresses himself as follows, concerning the chief principles\nof a philosophy of nature. Nature is a suspension (_Schweben_) between\nproductivity and product, which is always passing over into definite\nforms and products, just as it is always productively passing beyond\nthese. This suspension indicates a duality of principles, through which\nnature is held in a constant activity, and hindered from exhausting\nitself in its products. A universal duality is thus the principle of\nevery explanation of nature; it is the first principle of a philosophic\ntheory of nature, to end in all nature with polarity and dualism. On the\nother hand, the final cause of all our contemplation of nature is to\nknow that absolute unity which comprehends the whole, and which suffers\nonly one side of itself to be known in nature. Nature is, as it were,\nthe instrument of this absolute unity, through which it eternally\nexecutes and actualizes that which is prefigured in the absolute\nunderstanding. The whole absolute is therefore cognizable in nature,\nthough phenomenal nature only exhibits in a succession, and produces in\nan endless development, that which the true or real nature eternally\npossesses. Schelling treats of natural philosophy in three sections: (1)\nthe proof that nature, in its original products, is _organic_; (2) the\nconditions of an _inorganic_ nature; (3) the reciprocal determination of\norganic and inorganic nature.\n\n(1.) _Organic nature_ Schelling thus deduces: Nature absolutely\napprehended is nothing other than infinite activity, infinite\nproductivity. If this were unhindered in expressing itself, it would at\nonce, with infinite celerity, produce an absolute product, which would\nallow no explanation for empirical nature. If this latter may be\nexplained\u2014if there may be finite products, we must consider the\nproductive activity of nature as restrained by an opposite, a retarding\nactivity, which lies in nature itself. Thus arises a series of finite\nproducts. But since the absolute productivity of nature tends towards an\nabsolute product, these individual products are only apparent ones,\nbeyond each one of which nature herself advances, in order to satisfy\nthe absoluteness of her inner productivity through an infinite series of\nindividual products. In this eternal producing of finite products,\nnature shows itself as a living antagonism of two opposite forces, a\nproductive and a retarding tendency. And, indeed, the working of this\nlatter is infinitely manifold; the original productive impulse of nature\nhas not only to combat a simple restraint, but it must struggle with an\ninfinity of reactions, which may be called original qualities. Hence\nevery organic being is the permanent expression for a conflict of\nreciprocally destroying and limiting actions of nature. And from this,\nviz., from the original limitation and infinite restraint of the\nformative impulse of nature, we see the reason why every organization,\ninstead of attaining to an absolute product, only reproduces itself _ad\ninfinitum_. Upon this rests the special significance for the organic\nworld, of the distinction of sex. The distinction of sex fixes the\norganic products of nature, it restrains them within their own processes\nof development, and suffers them only to produce the same again. But in\nthis production nature has no regard for the individual, but only for\nthe species. The individual is contrary to nature; nature desires the\nabsolute, and its constant effort is to represent this. Individual\nproducts, therefore, in which the activity of nature is brought to a\nstand, can only be regarded as abortive attempts to represent the\nabsolute. Hence the individual must be the means, and the species the\nend of nature. Just so soon as the species is secured, nature abandons\nthe individuals and labors for their destruction. Schelling divides the\ndynamic scale of organic nature according to the three grand functions\nof the organic world: (_a_) Formative impulse (reproductive energy);\n(_b_) Irritability; (_c_) Sensibility. Highest in rank are those\norganisms in which sensibility has the preponderance over irritability;\na lower rank is held by those where irritability preponderates, and\nlower still are those where reproduction first comes out in its entire\nperfection, while sensibility and irritability are almost extinct. Yet\nthese three powers are interwoven together in all nature, and hence\nthere is but one organization, descending through all nature from man to\nthe plant.\n\n(2.) _Inorganic nature_ offers the antithesis to organic. The existence\nand essence of inorganic nature are conditioned through the existence\nand essence of organic nature. While the powers of organic nature are\nproductive, those of inorganic nature are not productive. While organic\nnature aims only to establish the species, inorganic nature regards only\nthe individual, and offers no reproduction of the species through the\nindividual. It possesses a great multitude of materials, but can only\nuse these materials in the way of conjoining or separating. In a word,\ninorganic nature is simply a mass held together by some external cause\nas gravity. Yet it, like organic nature, has its gradations. The power\nof reproduction in the latter has its counterpart in the chemical\nprocess in the former; that which in the one case is irritability, in\nthe other is electricity; and sensibility, which is the highest stage of\norganic life, corresponds to the universal magnetism, the highest stage\nof the inorganic.\n\n(3.) _The reciprocal determination of the organic and inorganic world_,\nis made clear by what has already been said. The result to which every\ngenuine philosophy of nature must come, is that the distinction between\norganic and inorganic nature is only in nature as object, and that\nnature, as originally productive, waves over both. If the functions of\nan organism are only possible on the condition that there is a definite\nexternal world, and an organic world, then must the external world and\nthe organic world have a common origin. This can only be explained on\nthe ground that inorganic nature presupposes in order to its existence a\nhigher dynamical order of things, to which it is subject. There must be\na third, which can unite again organic and inorganic nature; which can\nbe a medium, holding the continuity between the two. Both must be\nidentified in some ultimate cause, through which, as through one common\nsoul of nature (world-soul), both the organic and inorganic, _i. e._\nuniversal nature, is inspired; in some common principle, which,\nfluctuating between inorganic and organic nature, and maintaining the\ncontinuity of the two, contains the first cause of all changes in the\none, and the ultimate ground of all activity in the other. We have here\nthe idea of a universal organism. That it is one and the same\norganization which unites in one the organic and inorganic world, would\nappear from what has already been said of the parallel gradations of the\ntwo worlds. That which in universal nature is the cause of magnetism, is\nin organic nature the cause of sensibility, and the latter is only a\nhigher potency of the former. Just as in the organic world through\nsensibility, so in universal nature through magnetism, there arises a\nduality from the ideality. In this way organic nature appears only as a\nhigher stage of the inorganic; the very same dualism which is seen in\nmagnetic polarity, electrical phenomena, and chemical differences,\ndisplays itself also in the organic world.\n\n2. TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY.\u2014Transcendental philosophy is the\nphilosophy of nature become subjective. The whole succession of objects\nthus far described, becomes now repeated as a successive development of\nthe beholding subject. It is the peculiarity of transcendental idealism,\nthat so soon as it is once admitted, it requires that the origin of all\nknowledge shall be sought for anew; that the truth which has long been\nconsidered as established, should be subjected to a new examination, and\nthat this examination should proceed under at least an entirely new\nform. All parts of philosophy must be exhibited in one continuity, and\nthe whole of philosophy must be regarded as that which it is, viz., the\nadvancing history of consciousness, which can use only as monuments or\ndocuments that which is laid down in experience. (Schelling\u2019s\ntranscendental idealism is, in this respect, the forerunner to Hegel\u2019s\n_Ph\u0153nomenology_, which pursues a similar course). The exhibition of this\nconnection is properly a succession of intuitions through which the Ego\nraises itself to consciousness in the highest potency. Neither\ntranscendental philosophy nor the philosophy of nature, can alone\nrepresent the parallelism between nature and intelligence; but, in order\nto this, both sciences must be united, the former being considered as a\nnecessary counterpart to the other. The division of transcendental\nphilosophy follows from its problem, to seek anew the origin of all\nknowledge, and to subject to a new examination every previous judgment\nwhich had been held to be established truth. The pre-judgments of the\ncommon understanding are principally two: (1) That a world of objects\nexist independent of, and outside of, ourselves, and are represented to\nus just as they are. To explain this pre-judgment, is the problem of the\nfirst part of the transcendental philosophy (_theoretical philosophy_).\n(2) That we can produce an effect upon the objective world according to\nrepresentations which arise freely within us. The solution of this\nproblem is _practical philosophy_. But, with these two problems we find\nourselves entangled, (3) in a contradiction. How is it possible that our\nthought should ever rule over the world of sense, if the representation\nis conditional in its origin by the objective? The solution of this\nproblem, which is the highest of transcendental philosophy, is the\nanswer to the question: how can the representations be conceived as\ndirecting themselves according to the objects, and at the same time the\nobjects be conceived as directing themselves according to the\nrepresentations? This is only conceivable on the ground that the\nactivity through which the objective world is produced, is originally\nidentical with that which utters itself in the will. To show this\nidentity of conscious and unconscious activity, is the problem of the\nthird part of transcendental philosophy, or the science of ends in\nnature and of art. The three parts of the transcendental philosophy\ncorrespond thus entirely to the three criticks of Kant.\n\n(1.) _The theoretical philosophy_ starts from the highest principle of\nknowledge, the self-consciousness, and from this point developes the\nhistory of self-consciousness, according to its most prominent epochs\nand stations, viz., sensation, intuition, productive intuition (which\nproduces matter)\u2014outer and inner intuition (from which space and time,\nand all Kant\u2019s categories may be derived), abstraction (by which the\nintelligence distinguishes itself from its products)\u2014absolute\nabstraction, or absolute act of will. With the act of the will there is\nspread before us,\n\n(2.) _The Field of Practical Philosophy._\u2014In practical philosophy the\nEgo is no longer beholding, _i. e._ consciousless, but is consciously\nproducing, _i. e._ realizing. As a whole, nature developes itself from\nthe original act of self-consciousness, so from the second act, or the\nact of free self-determination, there is produced a second nature, to\nfind the origin for which is the object of practical philosophy. In his\nexposition of the practical philosophy, Schelling follows almost wholly\nthe theory of Fichte, but closes this section with some remarkable\nexpressions respecting the philosophy of history. History, as a whole,\nis, according to him, a gradual and self-disclosing revelation of the\nabsolute, a progressing demonstration of the existence of a God. The\nhistory of this revelation may be divided into three periods. The first\nis that in which the overruling power was apprehended only as destiny,\n_i. e._ as a blind power, cold and consciousless, which brings the\ngreatest and most glorious things of earth to ruin; it is marked by the\ndecay of the magnificence and wonders of the ancient world, and the fall\nof the noblest manhood that has ever bloomed. The second period of\nhistory is that in which this destiny manifests itself as nature, and\nthe hidden law seems changed into a manifest law of nature, which\ncompels freedom and every choice to submit to and serve a plan of\nnature. This period seems to begin with the spread of the great Roman\nrepublic. The third period will be that where what has previously been\nregarded as destiny and nature, will develope itself as Providence. When\nthis period shall begin, we cannot say; we can only affirm that if it\nbe, then God will be seen also to be.\n\n(3.) _Philosophy of Art._\u2014The problem of transcendental philosophy is to\nharmonize the subjective and the objective. In history, with which\npractical philosophy closes, the identity of the two is not exhibited,\nbut only approximated in an infinite progress. But now the Ego must\nattain a position where it can actually look upon this identity, which\nconstitutes its inner essence. If now all conscious activity exhibits\ndesign, then a conscious and consciousless activity can only coincide in\na product, which, though it exhibits design, was yet produced without\ndesign. Such a product is nature; we have here the principle of all\n_teleology_, in which alone the solution of the given problem can be\nsought. The peculiarity of nature is this, viz., that though it exhibits\nitself as nothing but a blind mechanism, it yet displays design, and\nrepresents an identity of the conscious subjective, and the\nconsciousless objective activity; in it the Ego beholds its own most\npeculiar essence, which consists alone in this identity. But in nature\nthe Ego beholds this identity, not as something objective, which has a\nbeing only outside of it, but also as that whose principle lies within\nthe Ego itself. This beholding is the art-intuition. As the production\nof nature is consciousless, though similar to that which is conscious,\nso the \u00e6sthetic production of the artist is a conscious production,\nsimilar to that which is consciousless. _\u00c6sthetics_ must therefore be\njoined to teleology. That contradiction between the conscious and the\nconsciousless, which moves forward untiringly in history, and which is\nunconsciously reconciled in nature, finds its conscious reconciliation\nin a work of art. In a work of art, the intelligence attains a perfect\nintuition of itself. The feeling which accompanies this intuition, is\nthe feeling of an endless satisfaction; all contradictions being\nresolved, and every riddle explained. The unknown, which unexpectedly\nharmonizes the objective and the conscious activity, is nothing other\nthan that absolute and unchangeable identity, to which every existence\nmust be referred. In the artist it lays aside the veil, which elsewhere\nsurrounds it, and irresistibly impels him to complete his work. Thus\nthere is no other eternal revelation but art, and this is also the\nmiracle which should convince us of the reality of that supreme, which\nis never itself objective, but is the cause of all objective. Hence art\nholds a higher rank than philosophy, for only in art has the\nintellectual intuition objectivity. There is nothing, therefore, higher\nto the philosopher than art, because this opens before him, as it were,\nthe holy of holies, where that which is separate in nature and history,\nand which in life and action, as in thought, must ever diverge, burns,\nas it were, in one flame, in an eternal and original union. From this we\nsee also both the fact and the reason for it, that philosophy, as\nphilosophy, can never be universally valid. Art is that alone to which\nis given, an absolute objectivity, and it is through this alone that\nnature, consciously productive, concludes and completes itself within\nitself.\n\nThe \u201c_Transcendental Idealism_\u201d is the last work which Schelling wrote\nafter the method of Fichte. In its principle he goes decidedly beyond\nthe standpoint of Fichte. That which was with Fichte the inconceivable\nlimit of the Ego, Schelling derives as a necessary duality, from the\nsimple essence of the Ego. While Fichte had regarded the union of\nsubject and object, only as an infinite progression towards that which\nought to be, Schelling looked upon it as actually accomplished in a work\nof art. With Fichte God was apprehended only as the object of a moral\nfaith, but with Schelling he was looked upon as the immediate object of\nthe \u00e6sthetic intuition. This difference between the two could not long\nbe concealed from Schelling. He was obliged to see that he no longer\nstood upon the basis of subjective idealism, but that his real position\nwas that of objective idealism. If he had already gone beyond Fichte in\nsetting the philosophy of nature and transcendental philosophy opposite\nto each other, it was perfectly consistent for him now to go one step\nfarther, and, placing himself on the point of indifference between the\ntwo, make the identity of the ideal and the real, of thought and being,\nas his principle. This principle _Spinoza_ had already possessed before\nhim. To this philosophy of identity Schelling now found himself\npeculiarly attracted. Instead of following Fichte\u2019s method, he now\navailed himself of that of Spinoza, the mathematical, to which he\nascribed the greatest evidence of proof.\n\nIII. THIRD PERIOD: PERIOD OF SPINOZISM, OR THE INDIFFERENCE OF THE IDEAL\nAND THE REAL.\n\nThe principal writings of this period are:\u2014\u201c_Exposition of my System of\nPhilosophy_\u201d (Journal for Speculative Physics, ii. 2); the second\nedition, with additions, of the \u201c_Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature_\u201d\n1803; the dialogue, \u201c_Bruno, or concerning the Divine and the Natural\nPrinciple of Things_\u201d 1802; \u201c_Lectures on the Method of Academical\nStudy_,\u201d 1803; three numbers of a \u201c_New Journal for Speculative\nPhysics_,\u201d 1802-3. The characteristic of the new standpoint of\nSchelling, to which we now arrive, is perfectly exhibited in the\ndefinition of reason, which he places at the head of the first of the\nabove-named writings; I give to reason the name absolute, or the reason\nin so far as it is conceived as the total _indifference of the\nsubjective and the objective_. To think of reason is demanded of every\nman; to think of it as absolute, and thus to reach the standpoint which\nI require, every thing must be abstracted from the thinking subject. To\nhim who makes this abstraction, reason immediately ceases to be\nsomething subjective, as most men represent it; neither can it be\nconceived as something objective, since an objective, or that which is\nthought, is only possible in opposition to that which thinks. We thus\nrise through this abstraction to the reality of things (_zum wahren\nan-sich_), which reality is precisely in the indifference point of the\nsubjective and the objective. The standpoint of philosophy is the\nstandpoint of reason; its knowledge is a knowledge of things as they are\nin themselves, _i. e._ as they are in the reason. It is the nature of\nphilosophy to destroy every distinction which the imagination has\nmingled with the thinking, and to see in things only that through which\nthey express the absolute reason, not regarding in them that which is\nsimply an object for that reflection which expends itself on the laws of\nmechanism and in time. Besides reason there is nothing, and in it is\nevery thing. Reason is the absolute. All objections to this principle\ncan only arise from the fact, that men are in the habit of looking at\nthings not as they are in reason, but as they appear. Every thing which\nis, is in essence like the reason, and is one with it. It is not the\nreason which posits something external to itself, but only the false use\nof reason, which is connected with the incapacity of forgetting the\nsubjective in itself. The reason is absolutely _one_ and like itself.\nThe highest law for the being of reason, and since there is nothing\nbesides reason, the highest law for all being, is the law of identity.\nBetween subject and object therefore\u2014since it is one and the same\nabsolute identity which displays itself in both\u2014there can be no\ndifference except a _quantitative_ difference (a difference of more or\nless), so that nothing is either simple object or simple subject, but in\nall things subject and object are united, this union being in different\nproportions, so that sometimes the subject and sometimes the object has\nthe preponderance. But since the absolute is pure identity of subject\nand object, there can be no quantitative difference except outside of\nthe identity, _i. e._ in the finite. As the fundamental form of the\nInfinite is A = A, so the scheme of the finite is A = B (_i. e._ the\nunion of a subjective with another objective in a different proportion).\nBut, in reality, nothing is finite, because the identity is the only\nreality. So far as there is difference in individual things, the\nidentity exists in the form of indifference. If we could see together\nevery thing which is, we should find in all the pure identity, because\nwe should find in all a perfect quantitative equilibrium of subjectivity\nand objectivity. True, we find, in looking at individual objects, that\nsometimes the preponderance is on one side and sometimes on the other,\nbut in the whole this is compensated. The absolute identity is the\nabsolute totality, the universe itself. There is in reality (_an-sich_)\nno individual being or thing. There is in reality nothing beyond the\ntotality; and if any thing beyond this is beheld, this can only happen\nby virtue of arbitrary separation of the individual from the whole,\nwhich is done through reflection, and is the source of every error. The\nabsolute identity is essentially the same in every part of the universe.\nHence the universe may be conceived under the figure of a line, in the\ncentre of which is the A = A, while at the end on one side is A\u207a = B, _i.\ne._ a transcendence of the subjective, and at the end on the other side\nis A = B\u207a, _i. e._ a transcendence of the objective, though this must\nbe conceived so that a relative identity may exist even in these\nextremes. The one side is the real or nature, the other side is the\nideal. The real side developes itself according to three potences (a\npotence, or power, indicates a definite quantitative difference of\nsubjectivity and objectivity). (1) The first potence is matter and\nweight\u2014the greatest preponderance of the object. (2) The second potence\nis light (A\u00b2), an inner\u2014as weight is an outer\u2014intuition of nature. The\nlight is a higher rising of the subjective. It is the absolute identity\nitself. (3) The third potence is organism (A\u00b3), the common product of\nlight and weight. Organism is just as original as matter. Inorganic\nnature, as such, does not exist: it is actually organized, and is, as it\nwere, the universal germ out of which organization proceeds. The\norganization of every globe is but the inner evolution of the globe\nitself; the earth itself, by its own evolving, becomes animal and plant.\nThe organic world has not formed itself out of the inorganic, but has\nbeen at least potentially present in it from the beginning. That matter\nwhich lies before us, apparently inorganic, is the residuum of organic\nmetamorphoses, which could not become organic. The human brain is the\nhighest bloom of the whole organic metamorphosis of the earth. From the\nabove, Schelling adds, it must be perceived that we affirm an inner\nidentity of all things, and a potential presence of every thing in every\nother, and therefore even the so-called dead matter may be viewed only\nas a sleeping-world of animals and plants, which, in some period, the\nabsolute identity may animate and raise to life. At this point Schelling\nstops suddenly, without developing further the three potences of the\nideal series, corresponding to those of the real. Elsewhere he completes\nthe work by setting up the following three potences of the ideal series:\n(1) Knowledge, the potence of reflection; (2) Action, the potence of\nsubsumption; (3) the Reason as the unity of reflection and subsumption.\nThese three potences represent themselves: (1) as the true, the\nimprinting of the matter in the form; (2) as the good, or the imprinting\nof the form in the matter; (3) as the beautiful, or the work of art, the\nabsolute blending together of form and matter.\n\nSchelling sought also to furnish himself with a new method for knowing\nthe absolute identity. Neither the analytic nor the synthetical method\nseems to him suitable for this, since both are only a finite knowledge.\nGradually, also, he abandoned the mathematical method. The logical forms\nof the ordinary method of knowledge, and even the ordinary metaphysical\ncategories, were now insufficient for him. Schelling now places the\nintellectual intuition as the starting point of true knowledge.\nIntuition, in general, is an equal positing of thought and being. When I\nbehold an object, the being of the object and my thought of the object\nis for me absolutely the same. But in the ordinary intuition, some\nseparate sensible being is posited as one with the thought. But in the\nintellectual or rational intuition, being in general, and every being is\nmade identical with the thought, and the absolute _subject-object_ is\nbeheld. The intellectual intuition is absolute knowledge, and as such it\ncan only be conceived as that in which thought and being are not opposed\nto each other. It is the beginning and the first step towards philosophy\nto behold, immediately and intellectually within thyself, that same\nindifference of the ideal and the real which thou beholdest projected as\nit were from thyself in space and time. This absolutely absolute mode of\nknowledge is wholly and entirely in the absolute itself. That it can\nnever become taught is clear. It cannot, moreover, be seen why\nphilosophy is bound to have special regard to the unattainable. It seems\nmuch more fitting to make so complete a separation on every side between\nthe entrance to philosophy and the common knowledge, that no road nor\ntrack shall lead from the latter to the former. The absolute mode of\nknowledge, like the truth which it contains, has no true opposition\noutside of itself, and as it cannot be demonstrated by any intelligent\nbeing, so nothing can be set up in opposition to it by any.\u2014Schelling\nhas attempted to bring the intellectual intuition into a method, and has\nnamed this method construction. The possibility and the necessity of the\nconstructive method is based upon the fact that the absolute is in all,\nand that all is the absolute. Construction is nothing other than the\nproving that the whole is absolutely expressed in every particular\nrelation and object. To construe an object, philosophically, is to prove\nthat in this object the whole inner structure of the absolute repeats\nitself.\n\nIn Schelling\u2019s \u201c_Lectures on the Method of Academical Study_\u201d (delivered\nin 1802, and published in 1803), he sought to treat encyclop\u00e6diacally,\nevery philosophical discipline from the given standpoint of identity or\nindifference. They furnish a connected and popular exposition of the\noutlines of his philosophy, in the form of a critical modelling of the\nstudies of the university course. The most noticeable feature in them is\nSchelling\u2019s attempt at a historical construction of Christianity. The\nincarnation of God is an incarnation from eternity. The eternal Son of\nGod, born from the essence of the father of all things, is the finite\nitself, as it is in the eternal intuition of God. Christ is only the\nhistorical and phenomenal pinnacle of the incarnation; as an individual,\nhe is a person wholly conceivable from the circumstances of the age in\nwhich he appeared. Since God is eternally outside of all time, it is\ninconceivable that he should have assumed a human nature at any definite\nmoment of time. The temporal form of Christianity, the exoteric\nChristianity does not correspond to its idea, and has its perfection yet\nto be hoped for. A chief hindrance to the perfection of Christianity,\nwas, and is the so-called Bible, which, moreover, is far inferior to\nother religious writings, in a genuine religious content. The future\nmust bring a new birth of the esoteric Christianity, or a new and higher\nform of religion, in which philosophy, religion and poesy shall melt\ntogether in unity.\u2014This latter remark contains already an intimation of\nthe \u201c_Philosophy of Revelation_,\u201d a work subsequently written by\nSchelling, and which exhibited many of the principles current in the age\nof the apostle John. In the work we are now considering, there are also\nmany other points which correspond to this later standpoint of\nSchelling. Thus he places at the summit of history a kind of golden age.\nIt is inconceivable, he says, that man as he now appears, should have\nraised himself through himself from instinct to consciousness, from\nanimality to rationality. Another human race, must, therefore, have\npreceded the present, which the old saga have immortalized under the\nform of gods and heroes. The first origin of religion and culture is\nonly conceivable through the instruction of higher natures. I hold the\ncondition of culture as the first condition of the human race, and\nconsidere the first foundation of states, sciences, religion and arts as\ncotemporary, or rather as one thing: so that all these were not truly\nseparate, but in the completest interpenetration, as it will be again in\nthe final consummation. Schelling is no more than consistent when he\naccordingly apprehends the symbols of mythology which we meet with at\nthe beginning of history, as disclosures of the highest wisdom. There is\nhere also a step towards his subsequent \u201c_Philosophy of Mythology_.\u201d\n\nThe mystical element revealed in these expressions of Schelling gained\ncontinually a greater prominence with him. Its growth was partly\nconnected with his fruitless search after an absolute method, and a\nfitting form in which he might have satisfactorily expressed his\nphilosophic intuitions. All noble mysticism rests on the incapacity of\nadequately expressing an infinite content in the form of a conception.\nSo Schelling, after he had been restlessly tossed about in every method,\nsoon gave up also his method of construction, and abandoned himself\nwholly to the unlimited current of his fancy. But though this was partly\nthe cause of his mysticism, it is also true that his philosophical\nstandpoint was gradually undergoing a change. From the speculative\nscience of nature, he was gradually passing over more and more into the\nphilosophy of mind, by which the determination of the absolute in his\nconception became changed. While he had previously determined the\nabsolute as the indifference of the ideal and the real, he now gives a\npreponderance to the ideal over the real, and makes ideality the\nfundamental determination of the absolute. The first is the ideal;\nsecondly, the ideal determines itself in itself to the real, and the\nreal as such is the third. The earlier harmony of mind and matter is\ndissolved: matter appears now as the negative of mind. Since Schelling\nin this way distinguishes the universe from the absolute as its\ncounterpart, we see that he leaves decidedly the basis of Spinozism on\nwhich he had previously stood, and places himself on a new standpoint.\n\nIV. FOURTH PERIOD: THE DIRECTION OF SCHELLING\u2019S PHILOSOPHY AS MYSTICAL\nAND ALLIED TO NEW-PLATONISM.\n\nThe writings of this period are:\u2014\u201c_Philosophy and Religion_,\u201d 1804.\n\u201c_Exposition of the true relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the\nimproved Theory of Fichte_,\u201d 1806; \u201c_Medical Annual_\u201d (published in\ncompany with _Marcus_) 1805-1808.\u2014As has already been said, the absolute\nand the universe were, on the standpoint of indifference, identical.\nNature and history were immediate manifestations of the absolute. But\nnow Schelling lays stress upon the difference between the two, and the\nindependence of the world. This he expresses in a striking way in the\nfirst of the above named writings, by placing the origin of the world\nwholly after the manner of New-Platonism, in a breaking away or a\nfalling off from the absolute. From the absolute to the actual, there is\nno abiding transition; the origin of the sensible world is only\nconceivable as a complete breaking off _per saltum_ from the absolute.\nThe absolute is the only real, finite things are not real; they can,\ntherefore, have their ground in no reality imparted to them from the\nabsolute, but only in a separation and complete falling away from the\nabsolute. The reconciliation of this fall, and the manifestation of God\nmade complete, is the final cause of history. With this idea there are\nalso connected other representations borrowed from New-Platonism, which\nSchelling brings out in the same work. He speaks in it of the descent of\nthe soul from intellectuality, to the world of sense, and like the\nPlatonic myth he allows this fall of souls to be a punishment for their\nselfhood (pride); he speaks also in connection with this of a\nregeneration, or transmigration of souls, by which they either begin a\nhigher life on a better sphere, or intoxicated with matter, they are\ndriven down to a still lower abode, according as they have in the\npresent life laid aside more or less of their selfhood, and become\npurified in a greater or less degree, to an identity with the infinite;\nbut we are especially reminded of New-Platonism by the high place and\nthe mystical and symbolical significance, which Schelling gives in this\nwork to the Greek mysteries (as did Bruno), and the view that if\nreligion would be held in its pure ideality, it can only exist as\nexoteric, or in the form of mysteries.\u2014This notion of a higher blending\ntogether of religion and philosophy goes through all the writings of\nthis period. All true experience, says Schelling in the \u201c_Medical\nAnnual_,\u201d is religious. The existence of God is an empirical truth, and\nthe ground of all experience. True, religion is not philosophy, but the\nphilosophy which does not unite in sacred harmony, religion with\nscience, were unworthy of the name. True, I know something higher than\nscience. And if science has only these two ways open before it to\nknowledge, viz., that of analysis or abstraction, and that of synthetic\nderivation, then we deny all science of the absolute. Speculation is\nevery thing, _i. e._ a beholding, a contemplation of that which is in\nGod. Science itself has worth only so far as it is speculative, _i. e._\nonly so far as it is a contemplation of God as he is. But the time will\ncome when the sciences shall more and more cease, and immediate\nknowledge take their place. The mortal eye closes only in the highest\nscience, where it is no longer the man who sees, but the eternal\nbeholding which has now become seeing in him.\n\nWith this theosophic view of the world, Schelling was led to pay\nattention to the earlier mystics. He began to study their writings. He\nanswered the charge of mysticism in his controversy with Fichte as\nfollows:\u2014Among the learned of the last century, there was a tacit\nagreement never to go beyond a certain height, and, therefore, the\ngenuine spirit of science was given up to the unlearned. These, because\nthey were uneducated and had drawn upon themselves the jealousy of the\nlearned, were called fanatics. But many a philosopher by profession\nmight well have exchanged all his rhetoric for the fulness of mind and\nheart which abound in the writings of such fanatics. Therefore I am not\nashamed of the name of such a fanatic. I will even seek to make this\nreproach true; if I have not hitherto studied the writings of these men\ncorrectly, it has been owing to negligence.\n\nSchelling did not omit to verify these words. There were some special\nmental affinities between himself and _Jacob Boehme_, with whom he now\nbecame more and more closely joined. A study of his writings is indeed\nindicated in Schelling\u2019s works of the present period. One of the most\nfamous of Schelling\u2019s writings, his theory of freedom, which appeared\nafter this (\u201c_Philosophische Untersuchungen \u00fcber das Wesen der\nmenschlichen Freiheit_,\u201d 1809), is composed entirely in the spirit of\nJacob Boehme. We begin with it a new period of Schelling\u2019s\nphilosophizing, where _the will_ is affirmed as the essence of God, and\nwe have thus a new definition of the absolute differing from every\nprevious one.\n\nV. FIFTH PERIOD:\u2014ATTEMPT AT A THEOGONY AND COSMOGONY AFTER THE MANNER OF\nJACOB BOEHME.\n\nSchelling had much in common with Jacob Boehme. Both considered the\nspeculative cognition as a kind of immediate intuition. Both made use of\nforms which mingled the abstract and the sensuous, and interpenetrated\nthe definiteness of logic with the coloring of fancy. Both, in fine,\nwere speculatively in close contact. The self-duplication of the\nabsolute was a fundamental thought of Boehme. He started with the\nprinciple, that the divine essence was the indeterminable, infinite, and\ninconceivable, the absence of ground (_Ungrund_). This absence of ground\nnow projects itself in a proper feeling of its abstract and infinite\nessence, into the finite, _i. e._ into a ground, or the centre of\nnature, in the dark womb of which qualities are produced, from whose\nharsh collision the lightning streams forth, which, as mind or principle\nof light, is destined to rule and explain the struggling powers of\nnature, so that the God who has been raised from the absence of ground\nthrough a ground to the light of the mind, may henceforth move in an\neternal kingdom of joy. This theogony of Jacob Boehme is in striking\naccord with the present standpoint of Schelling. As Boehme had\napprehended the absolute as the indeterminable absence of ground, so had\nSchelling in his earlier writings apprehended it as indifference. As\nBoehme had distinguished this absence of ground from a ground, or from\nnature and from God, as the light of minds, so had Schelling, in the\nwritings of the last period, apprehended the absolute as a\nself-renunciation, and a return back from this renunciation into a\nhigher unity with itself. We have here the three chief elements of that\nhistory of God, around which Schelling\u2019s essay on freedom turns: (1) God\nas indifference, or the absence of ground; (2) God as duplication into\nground and existence, real and ideal; (3) Reconciliation of this\nduplication, and elevation of the original indifference to identity. The\nfirst element of the divine life is that of pure indifference, or\nindistinguishableness. This, which precedes every thing existing, may be\ncalled the original ground, or the absence of ground. The absence of\nground is not a product of opposites, nor are they contained _implicite_\nin it, but it is a proper essence separate from every opposite, and\nhaving no predicate but that of predicatelessness. Real and ideal,\ndarkness and light, can never be predicated of the absence of ground as\nopposites; they can only be affirmed of it as not-opposites in a\nneither-nor. From this indifference now rises the duality: the absence\nof ground separates into two co-eternal beginnings, so that ground and\nexistence may become one through love, and the indeterminable and\nlifeless indifference may rise to a determinate and living identity.\nSince nothing is before or external to God, he must have the ground of\nhis existence in himself. But this ground is not simply logical, as\nconception, but real, as something which is actually to be distinguished\nin God from existence; it is nature in God, an essence inseparable\nindeed from him, but yet distinct. Hence we cannot assign to this ground\nunderstanding and will, but only desire after this; it is the longing to\nproduce itself. But in that this ground moves in its longing according\nto obscure and uncertain laws like a swelling sea, there is,\nself-begotten in God, another and reflexive motion, an inner\nrepresentation by which he beholds himself in his image. This\nrepresentation is the eternal word in God, which rises as light in the\ndarkness of the ground, and endows its blind longing with understanding.\nThis understanding, united with the ground, becomes pre-creating will.\nIts work is to give order to nature, and to regulate the hitherto\nunregulated ground; and from this explanation of the real through the\nideal, comes the creation of the world. The development of the world has\ntwo stadia: (1) the travail of light, or the progressive development of\nnature to man; (2) the travail of mind, or the development of mind in\nhistory.\n\n(1.) The progressive development of nature proceeds from a conflict of\nthe ground with the understanding. The ground originally sought to\nproduce every thing solely from itself, but its products had no\nconsistence without the understanding, and went again to the ground, a\ncreation which we see exhibited in the extinct classes of animals and\nplants of the pre-Adamite world. But consecutively and gradually, the\nground admitted the work of the understanding, and every such step\ntowards light is indicated by a new class of nature\u2019s beings. In every\ncreature of nature we must, therefore, distinguish two principles:\nfirst, the obscure principle through which the creatures of nature are\nseparate from God, and have a particular will; second, the divine\nprinciple of the understanding, of the universal will. With irrational\ncreatures of nature, however, these two principles are not yet brought\nto unity; but the particular will is simple seeking and desire, while\nthe universal will, without the individual will, reigns as an external\npower of nature, as controlling instinct.\n\n(2.) The two principles, the particular and the universal will, are\nfirst united in man as they are in the absolute: but in God they are\nunited inseparably, and in man separably, for otherwise God could not\nreveal himself in man. It is even this separableness of the universal\nwill, and the particular will, which makes good and evil possible. The\ngood is the subjection of the particular will to the universal will, and\nthe reverse of this right relation is evil. Human freedom consists in\nthis possibility of good and evil. The empirical man, however, is not\nfree, but his whole empirical condition is posited by a previous act of\nintelligence. The man must act just as he does, but is nevertheless\nfree, because he has from eternity freely made himself that which he now\nnecessarily is. The history of the human race is founded for the most\npart on the struggle of the individual will with the universal will, as\nthe history of nature is founded on the struggle of the ground with the\nunderstanding. The different stages through which evil, as a historical\npower, takes its way in conflict with love, constitute the periods of\nthe world\u2019s history. Christianity is the centre of history: in Christ,\nthe principle of love came in personal contact with incarnate evil:\nChrist was the mediator to reconcile on the highest stage the creation\nwith God; for that which is personal can alone redeem the personal. The\nend of history is the reconciliation of the particular will and love,\nthe prevalence of the universal will, so that God shall be all in all.\nThe original indifference is thus elevated to identity.\n\nSchelling has given a farther justification of this his idea of God, in\nhis controversial pamphlet against Jacobi, (1812). The charge of\nnaturalism which Jacobi made against him, he sought to refute by showing\nhow the true idea of God was a union of naturalism and theism.\nNaturalism seeks to conceive of God as ground of the world (immanent),\nwhile theism would view him as the world\u2019s cause (transcendent): the\ntrue course is to unite both determinations. God is at the same time\nground and cause. It no way contradicts the conception of God to affirm\nthat, so far as he reveals himself, he developes himself from himself,\nadvancing from the imperfect to the perfect: the imperfect is in fact\nthe perfect itself, only in a state of becoming. It is necessary that\nthis becoming should be by stages, in order that the fulness of the\nperfect may appear on all sides. If there were no obscure ground, no\nnature, no negative principle in God, we could not speak of a\nconsciousness of God. So long as the God of modern theism remains the\nsimple essence which ought to be purely essential, but which in fact is\nwithout essence, so long as an actual twofoldness is not recognized in\nGod, and a limiting and denying energy (a nature, a negative principle)\nis not placed in opposition to the extending and affirming energy in\nGod, so long will science be entitled to make its denial of a personal\nGod. It is universally and essentially impossible to conceive of a being\nwith consciousness, which has not been brought into limit by some\ndenying energy within himself\u2014as universally and essentially impossible\nas to conceive of a circle without a centre.\n\nVI. Since the essay against Jacobi, which in its philosophical content\naccords mainly with his theory of freedom, Schelling has not made public\nany thing of importance. He has often announced a work entitled \u201c_Die\nWeltalter_,\u201d which should contain a complete and elaborate exposition of\nhis philosophy, but has always withdrawn it before its appearance.\n_Paulus_ has surreptitiously brought his later Berlin lectures before\nthe public in a manner for which he has been greatly blamed: but since\nthis publication is not recognized by Schelling himself, it cannot be\nused as an authentic source of knowledge of his philosophy. During this\nlong period, Schelling has published only two articles of a\nphilosophical content: \u201c_On the Deities of Samothracos_,\u201d 1815, and a\n\u201c_Critical Preface_\u201d to _Becker\u2019s_ translation of a preface of _Cousin_,\n1834. Both articles are very characteristic of the present standpoint of\nSchelling\u2019s philosophizing\u2014he himself calls his present philosophy\n_Positive Philosophy, or the Philosophy of Mythology and\nRevelation_,\u2014but as they give only intimations of this, and do not reach\na complete exposition, they do not admit of being used for our purpose.\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XLIV.\n\nTRANSITION TO HEGEL.\n\n\nThe great want of Schelling\u2019s philosophizing, was its inability to\nfurnish a suitable form for the philosophic content. Schelling went\nthrough the list of all methods, and at last abandoned all. But this\nabsence of method into which he ultimately sank, contradicted the very\nprinciple of his philosophizing. If thought and being are identical, yet\nform and content cannot be indifferent in respect to each other. On the\nstandpoint of absolute knowledge, there must be found for the absolute\ncontent an absolute form, which shall be identical with the content.\nThis is the position assumed by _Hegel_. Hegel has fused the content of\nSchelling\u2019s philosophy by means of the _absolute method_. Hegel sprang\nas truly from Fichte as from Schelling; the origin of his system is\nfound in both. His method is essentially that of Fichte, but his general\nphilosophical standpoint is Schelling\u2019s. He has combined both Fichte and\nSchelling.\n\nHegel has himself, in his \u201c_Phenomenology_,\u201d the first work in which he\nappeared as a philosopher on his own hook, having previously been\nconsidered as an adherent of Schelling\u2014clearly expressed his difference\nfrom Schelling, which he comprehensively affirms in the following three\nhits (_Schlagworte_):\u2014In Schelling\u2019s philosophy, the absolute is, as it\nwere, shot out of a pistol; it is only the night in which every cow\nlooks black; when it is widened to a system, it is like the course of a\npainter, who has on his palette but two colors, red and green, and who\nwould cover a surface with the former when a historical piece was\ndemanded, and with the latter when a landscape was required. The first\nof these charges refers to the mode of attaining the idea of the\nabsolute, viz., immediately, through intellectual intuition; this leap\nHegel changes, in his _Phenomenology_, to a regular transit, proceeding\nstep by step. The second charge relates to the way in which the absolute\nthus gained is conceived and expressed, viz., simply as the absence of\nall finite distinctions, and not as the immanent positing of a system of\ndistinctions within itself. Hegel declares that every thing depends upon\napprehending and expressing the true not as substance (_i. e._ as\nnegation of determinateness), but as subject (as a positing and\nproducing of finite distinction). The third charge has to do with\nSchelling\u2019s manner of carrying out his principle through the concrete\ncontent of the facts given in the natural and intellectual worlds, viz.,\nby the application of a ready-made schema (the opposition of the ideal\nand the real) to the objects, instead of suffering them to unfold and\nseparate themselves from themselves. The school of Schelling was\nespecially given to this schematizing formalism, and that which Hegel\nremarks, in the introduction to his _Phenomenology_, may very well be\napplied to it: \u201cIf the formalism of a philosophy of nature should happen\nto teach that the understanding is electricity, or that the animate is\nnitrogen, the inexperienced might look upon such instructions with deep\namazement, and perhaps revere them as displaying the marks of profound\ngenius. But the trick of such a wisdom is as readily learned as it is\neasily practised; its repetition is as insufferable as the repetition of\na discovered feat of legerdemain. This method of affixing to every thing\nheavenly and earthly, to all natural and intellectual forms, the two\ndeterminations of the universal scheme, makes the universe like a\ngrocer\u2019s shop, in which a row of closed jars stand with their labels\npasted on them.\u201d\n\nThe point, therefore, of greatest difference between Schelling and Hegel\nis their philosophical method, and this at the same time forms the bond\nof close connection which unites Hegel with Fichte. Thesis, antithesis,\nsynthesis\u2014this was the method by which Fichte had sought to deduce all\nbeing from the Ego, and in precisely the same way Hegel deduces all\nbeing\u2014the intellectual and natural universe\u2014from the thought, only with\nthis difference, that with him that which was idealistically deduced had\nat the same time an objective reality. While the practical idealism of\nFichte stood related to the objective world as a producer, and the\nordinary empiricism as a beholder, yet with Hegel the speculative\n(conceiving) reason is at the same time productive and beholding. I\nproduce (for myself) that which is (in itself) without my producing. The\nresult of philosophy, says Hegel, is the thought which is by itself, and\nwhich comprehends in itself the universe, and changes it into an\nintelligent world. To raise all being to being in the consciousness, to\nknowledge, is the problem and the goal of philozophizing, and this goal\nis reached when the mind has become able to beget the whole objective\nworld from itself.\n\nIn his first great work, the \u201c_Phenomenology of the Mind_,\u201d Hegel sought\nto establish the standpoint of absolute knowledge or absolute idealism.\nHe furnishes in this work a history of the phenomenal consciousness\n(whence its title), a development of the formative epochs of the\nconsciousness in its progress to philosophical knowledge. The inner\ndevelopment of consciousness consists in this, viz., that the peculiar\ncondition in which it finds itself becomes objectified (or conscious),\nand through this knowledge of its own being the consciousness rises ever\na new step to a higher condition. The \u201c_Phenomenology_\u201d seeks to show\nhow, and out of what necessity the consciousness advances from step to\nstep, from reality to being _per se_ (_vom Ansich zum F\u00fcrsich_), from\nbeing to knowledge. The author begins with the immediate consciousness\nas the lowest step. He entitled this section: \u201c_The Sensuous Certainty,\nor the This and the Mine_.\u201d At this stage the question is asked the Ego:\nwhat is _this_, or what is _here_? and it answers, _e. g._ the tree; and\nto the question, what is _now_? it answers now is the night. But if we\nturn ourselves around, _here_ is not a tree but a house; and if we write\ndown the second answer, and look at it again after a little time, we\nfind that _now_ is no longer night but mid-day. The _this_ becomes,\ntherefore, a not-this, _i. e._ a universal. And very naturally; for if I\nsay: this piece of paper, yet each and every paper is a this piece of\npaper, and I have only said the universal. By such inner dialectics the\nwhole field of the immediate certainty of the sense in perception is\ngone over. In this way\u2014since every formative step (every form) of the\nconsciousness of the philosophizing subject is involved in\ncontradictions, and is carried by this immanent dialectics to a higher\nform of consciousness\u2014this process of development goes on till the\ncontradiction is destroyed, _i. e._ till all strangeness between subject\nand object disappears, and the mind rises to a perfect self-knowledge\nand self-certainty. To characterize briefly the different steps of this\nprocess, we might say that the consciousness is first found as a\ncertainty of the sense, or as the _this_ and the _mine_; next as\nperception, which apprehends the objective as a thing with its\nproperties; and then as understanding, _i. e._ apprehending the objects\nas being reflected in itself, or distinguishing between power and\nexpression, being and manifestation, outer and inner. From this point\nthe consciousness, which has only recognized itself, its own pure being\nin its objects and their determinations, and for which therefore every\nother thing than itself has, as such, no significance, becomes the\nself-like Ego, and rises to the truth and certainty of itself to\nself-consciousness. The self-consciousness become universal, or as\nreason, now traverses also a series of development-steps, until it\nmanifests itself as spirit, as the reason which, in accord with all\nrationality, and satisfied with the rational world without, extends\nitself over the natural and intellectual universe as _its_ kingdom, in\nwhich it finds itself at home. Mind now passes through its stages of\nunconstrained morality, culture and refinement, ethics and the ethical\nview of the world to religion; and religion itself in its perfection, as\nrevealed religion becomes absolute knowledge. At this last stage being\nand thought are no more separate, being is no longer an object for the\nthought, but the thought itself is the object of the thought. Science is\nnothing other than the true knowledge of the mind concerning itself. In\nthe conclusion of the \u201c_Phenomenology_,\u201d Hegel casts the following\nretrospect on the course which he has laid down: \u201cThe goal which is to\nbe reached, viz., absolute knowledge, or the mind knowing itself as\nmind, requires us to take notice of minds as they are in themselves, and\nthe organization of their kingdom. These elements are preserved, and\nfurnished to us either by history, where we look at the side of the\nmind\u2019s free existence as it accidentally appears, or by the science of\nphenomenal knowledge, where we look at the side of the mind\u2019s ideal\norganization. These two sources taken together, as the ideal history,\ngive us the real history and the true being of the absolute spirit, the\nactuality, truth, and certainty of his throne, without which he were\nlifeless and alone; only \u2018from the cup of this kingdom of minds does\nthere stream forth for him his infinity.\u2019\u201d\n\n\n\n\nSECTION XLV.\n\nHEGEL.\n\n\n_George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel_ was born at Stuttgart, the 27th of\nAugust, 1770. In his eighteenth year he entered the university of\nT\u00fcbingen, in order to devote himself to the study of theology. During\nhis course of study here, he attracted no marked attention; Schelling,\nwho was his junior in years, shone far beyond all his contemporaries.\nAfter leaving T\u00fcbingen, he took a situation as private tutor, first in\nSwitzerland, and afterwards in Frankfort-on-the-Main till 1801, when he\nsettled down at Jena. At first he was regarded as a disciple, and\ndefender of Schelling\u2019s philosophy, and as such he wrote in 1801 his\nfirst minor treatise on the \u201c_Difference between Fichte and Schelling_.\u201d\nSoon afterwards he became associated with Schelling in publishing the\n\u201c_Critical Journal of Philosophy_,\u201d 1802-3, for which he furnished a\nnumber of important articles. His labors as an academical teacher met at\nfirst with but little encouragement; he gave his first lecture to only\nfour hearers. Yet in 1806 he became professor in the university, though\nthe political catastrophe in which the country was soon afterwards\ninvolved, deprived him again of the place. Amid the cannon\u2019s thunder of\nthe battle of Jena he finished \u201c_the Phenomenology of the Mind_,\u201d his\nfirst great and independent work, the crown of his Jena labors. He was\nsubsequently in the habit of calling this book which appeared in 1807,\nhis \u201cvoyage of discovery.\u201d From Jena, Hegel for want of the means of\nsubsistence went to Bamberg, where for two years he was editor of a\npolitical journal published there. In the fall of 1808, he became rector\nof the gymnasium at Nuremberg. In this situation he wrote his _Logic_,\n1812-16. All his works were produced slowly, and he first properly began\nhis literary activity as Schelling finished his. In 1816, he received a\ncall to a professorship of philosophy at Heidelberg, where in 1817 he\npublished his \u201c_Encyclop\u00e6dia of the philosophical sciences_,\u201d in which\nfor the first time he showed the whole circuit of his system. But his\npeculiar fame, and his far-reaching activity, dates first from his call\nto Berlin in 1818. It was at Berlin that he surrounded himself with an\nextensive and very actively scientific school, and where through his\nconnection with the Prussian government he gained a political influence\nand acquired a reputation for his philosophy, as _the_ philosophy of the\nState, though this neither speaks favorably for its inner purity, nor\nits moral credit. Yet in his \u201c_Philosophy of Rights_,\u201d which appeared in\n1821 (a time, to be sure, when the Prussian State had not yet shown any\ndecidedly anti-constitutional tendency), Hegel does not deny the\npolitical demands of the present age; he declares in favor of popular\nrepresentation, freedom of the press, and publicity of judicial\nproceedings, trial by jury, and an administrative independence of\ncorporations.\n\nIn Berlin, Hegel gave lectures upon almost every branch of philosophy,\nand these have been published by his disciples and friends after his\ndeath. His manner as a lecturer was stammering, clumsy, and unadorned,\nbut was still not without a peculiar attraction as the immediate\nexpression of profound thoughtfulness. His social intercourse was more\nwith the uncultivated than with the learned; he was not fond of shining\nas a genius in social circles. In 1829 he became rector of the\nuniversity, an office which he administered in a more practical manner\nthan Fichte had done. Hegel died with the cholera, Nov. 14th, 1831, the\nday also of Leibnitz\u2019s death. He rests in the same churchyard with\nSolger and Fichte, near by the latter, and not far from the former. His\nwritings and lectures form seventeen volumes which have appeared since\n1882: Vol. I. Minor Articles; II. Phenomenology; III-V. Logic; VI.-VII.\nEncyclop\u00e6dia; VIII. Philosophy of Rights; IX. Philosophy of History; X.\n\u00c6sthetics; XI.-XII. Philosophy of Religion; XIII.-XV. History of\nPhilosophy; XVI.-XVII. Miscellanies. His life has been written by\nRosenkranz.\n\nHegel\u2019s system may be divided in a number of ways. The best mode is by\nconnecting it with Schelling. Schellings\u2019s absolute was the identity or\nthe indifference point of the ideal and the real. From this Hegel\u2019s\nthreefold division immediately follows. (1) The exposition of the\nindifference point, the development of the pure conceptions or\ndeterminations in thought, which lie at the basis of all natural and\nintellectual life; in other words, the logical unfolding of the\nabsolute,\u2014_the science of logic_. (2) The development of the real world\nor of nature\u2014_natural philosophy_. (3) The development of the ideal\nworld, or of mind as it shows itself concretely in right, morals, the\nstate, art, religion, and science.\u2014_Philosophy of Mind_. These three\nparts of the system represent the three elements of the absolute method,\nthesis, antithesis, synthesis. The absolute is at first pure, and\nimmaterial thought; secondly, it is differentiation (_Andersseyn_) of\nthe pure thought or its diremption (_Verzerrung_) in space and\ntime\u2014nature; thirdly, it returns from this self-estrangement to itself,\ndestroys the differentiation of nature, and thus becomes actual\nself-knowing thought or mind.\n\nI. SCIENCE OF LOGIC.\u2014The Hegelian logic is the scientific exposition and\ndevelopment of the pure conceptions of reason, those conceptions or\ncategories which lie at the basis of all thought and being, and which\ndetermine the subjective knowledge as truly as they form the indwelling\nsoul of the objective reality; in a word, those ideas in which the ideal\nand the real have their point of coincidence. The domain of logic, says\nHegel, is the truth, as it is _per se_ in its native character. It is as\nHegel himself figuratively expresses it, the representation of God as he\nis in his eternal being, before the creation of the world or a finite\nmind. In this respect it is, to be sure, a domain of shadows; but these\nshadows are, on the other hand, those simple essences freed from all\nsensuous matters, in whose diamond net the whole universe is\nconstructed.\n\nDifferent philosophers had already made a thankworthy beginning towards\ncollecting and examining the pure conceptions of the reason, as\nAristotle in his categories, Wolff in his ontology, and Kant in his\ntranscendental analytics. But they had neither completely collected, nor\ncritically sifted, nor (Kant excepted) derived them from one principle,\nbut had only taken them up empirically, and treated them\nlexicologically. But in opposition to this course, Hegel attempted, (1)\nto completely collect the pure art-conceptions; (2) to critically sift\nthem (_i. e._ to exclude every thing but pure thought); and (3)\u2014which is\nthe most characteristic peculiarity of the Hegelian logic\u2014to derive\nthese dialectically from one another, and carry them out to an\ninternally connected system of pure reason. Hegel starts with the view,\nthat in every conception of the reason, every other is contained\n_implicite_, and may be dialectically developed from it. Fichte had\nalready claimed that the reason must deduce the whole system of\nknowledge purely from itself, without any thing taken for granted; that\nsome principle must be sought which should be of itself certain, and\nneed no farther proof, and from which every thing else could be derived.\nHegel holds fast to this thought. Starting from the simplest conception\nof reason, that of pure being, which needs no farther establishing, he\nseeks from this, by advancing from one conception ever to another and a\nricher one, to deduce the whole system of the pure knowledge of reason.\nThe lever of this development is the dialectical method.\n\nHegel\u2019s dialectical method is partly taken from Plato, and partly from\nFichte. The conception of negation is Platonic. All negation, says\nHegel, is position, affirmation. If a conception is negated, the result\nis not the pure nothing\u2014a pure negative, but a concrete positive; there\nresults a new conception which extends around the negation of the\npreceding one. The negation of the one _e. g._ is the conception of the\nmany. In this way Hegel makes negation a vehicle for dialectical\nprogress. Every presupposed conception is denied, and from its negation\na higher and richer conception is gained. This is connected with the\nmethod of Fichte, which posits a fundamental synthesis; and by analyzing\nthis, seeks its antitheses, and then unites again these antitheses\nthrough a second synthesis,\u2014_e. g._ being, nothing, becoming, quality,\nquantity, measure, &c. This method, which is at the same time analytical\nand synthetical, Hegel has carried through the whole system of science.\n\nWe now proceed to a brief survey of the Hegelian Logic. It is divided\ninto three parts; the doctrine of _being_, the doctrine of _essence_,\nand the doctrine of _conception_.\n\n1. THE DOCTRINE OF BEING. (1.) _Quality._\u2014Science begins with the\nimmediate and indeterminate conception of _being_. This, in its want of\ncontent and emptiness, is nothing more than a pure negation, a\n_nothing_. These two conceptions are thus as absolutely identical as\nthey are absolutely opposed; each of the two disappears immediately in\nits contrary. This oscillation of the two is the pure _becoming_, which,\nif it be a transition from nothing to being, we call _arising_, or, in\nthe reverse case, we call it a _departing_. The still and simple\nprecipitate of this process of arising and departing, is _existence_\n(_Daseyn_). Existence is being with a determinateness, or it is\n_quality_; more closely, it is _reality_ or limited existence. Limited\nexistence excludes every other from itself. This reference to itself,\nwhich is seen through its negative relation to every other, we call\nbeing _per se_ (_F\u00fcrsichseyn_). Being _per se_ which refers itself only\nto itself, and repels every other from itself, is _the one_. But, by\nmeans of this repelling, the one posits immediately _many_ ones. But the\nmany ones are not distinguished from each other. One is what the other\nis. The many are therefore one. But the one is just as truly the\nmanifold. For its exclusion is the positing of its contrary, or it\nposits itself thereby as manifold. By this dialectic of _attraction_ and\n_repulsion_, quality passes over into quantity: for indifference in\nrespect of distinction or qualitative determinateness is _quantity_.\n\n(2.) _Quantity._\u2014Quantity is determination of greatness, which, as such,\nis indifferent in respect of quality. In so far as the _greatness_\ncontains many ones distinguishably within itself, it is a _discrete_, or\nhas the element of _discretion_; but on the other hand, in so far as the\nmany ones are similar, and the greatness is thus indistinguishable, it\nis _continuous_, or has the element of _continuity_. Each of these two\ndeterminations is at the same time identical with the other; discretion\ncannot be conceived without continuity, nor continuity without\ndiscretion. The existence of quantity, or the limited quantity, is the\n_quantum_. The quantum has also manifoldness and unity in itself; it is\nthe enumeration of the unities, _i. e._ _number_. Corresponding to the\nquantum or the extensive greatness, is the intensive greatness or _the\ndegree_. With the conception of degree, so far as degree is simple\ndeterminateness, quantity approaches quality again. The unity of\nquantity and quality is _the measure_.\n\n(3.) _The measure_ is a qualitative quantum, a quantum on which the\nquality is dependent. An example of quantity determining the quality of\na definite object is found in the temperature of water, which decides\nwhether the water shall remain water or turn to ice or steam. Here the\nquantum of heat actually constitutes the quality of the water. Quality\nand quantity are, therefore, ideal determinations, perpetually turning\naround _on_ one being, on a _third_, which, is distinguished from the\nimmediate what and how much (quality and quantity) of a thing. This\nthird is the _essence_, which is the negation of every thing immediate,\nor quality independent of the immediate being. Essence is being in se,\nbeing divided in itself, a self-separation of being. Hence the\ntwofoldness of all determinations of essence.\n\n2. THE DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE. (1.) _The Essence as such._ The essence as\nreflected being is the reference to itself only as it is a reference to\nsomething other. We apply to this being the term reflected analogously\nwith the reflection of light, which, when it falls on a mirror, is\nthrown back by it. As now the reflected light is, through its reference\nto another object, something mediated or posited, so the reflected being\nis that which is shown to be mediated or grounded through another. From\nthe fact that philosophy makes its problem to know the essence of\nthings, the immediate being of things is represented as a covering or\ncurtain behind which the essence is concealed. If, therefore, we speak\nof the essence of an object, the immediate being standing over against\nthe essence (for without this the essence cannot be conceived), is set\ndown to a mere negative, to an _appearance_. The being appears in the\nessence. The essence is, therefore, the being as _appearance in itself_.\nThe essence when conceived in distinction from the appearance, gives the\nconception of the _essential_, and that which only appears in the\nessence, is the essenceless, or the _unessential_. But since the\nessential has a being only in distinction from the unessential, it\nfollows that the latter is essential to the former, which needs its\nunessential just as much as the unessential needs it. Each of the two,\ntherefore, appears in the other, or there takes place between them a\nreciprocal reference which we call _reflection_. We have, therefore, to\ndo in this whole sphere with determinations of reflection, with\ndeterminations, each one of which refers to the other, and cannot be\nconceived without it (_e. g._ positive and negative, ground and\nsequence, thing and properties, content and form, power and expression).\nWe have, therefore, in the development of the essence, those same\ndeterminations which we found in the development of being, only no\nlonger in an immediate, but in a reflected form. Instead of being and\nnothing, we have now the forms of the positive and negative; instead of\nthe there-existent (_Daseyn_), we now have existence.\n\nEssence is reflected being, a reference to itself, which, however, is\nmediated through a reference to something other which appears in it.\nThis reflected reference to itself we call _identity_ (which is\nunsatisfactorily and abstractly expressed in the so-called first\nprinciple of thought, that A = A). This identity, as a negativity\nreferring itself to itself, as a repulsion of its own from itself,\ncontains essentially the determination of _distinction_. The immediate\nand external distinction is the _difference_. The essential distinction,\nthe distinction in itself, is the _antithesis_ (_positive and\nnegative_). The self-opposition of the essence is the _contradiction_.\nThe antithesis of identity and distinction is put in agreement in the\nconception of the ground. Since now the essence distinguishes itself\nfrom itself, there is the essence as identical with itself or the\n_ground_, and the essence as distinguished from itself or the\n_sequence_. In the category of ground and sequence the same thing, _i.\ne._ the essence, is twice posited; the grounded and the ground are one\nand the same content, which makes it difficult to define the ground\nexcept through the sequence, or the sequence except through the ground.\nThe two can, therefore, be divided only by a powerful abstraction; but\nbecause the two are identical, it is peculiarly a formalism to apply\nthis category. If reflection would inquire after a ground, it is because\nit would see the thing as it were in a twofold relation, once in its\nimmediateness, and then as posited through a ground.\n\n(2.) _Essence and Phenomenon._\u2014The _phenomenon_ is the appearance which\nthe essence fills, and which is hence no longer essenceless. There is no\nappearance without essence, and no essence which may not enter into\nphenomenon. It is one and the same content which at one time is taken as\nessence, and at another as phenomenon. In the phenomenal essence we\nrecognize the positive element which has hitherto been called ground,\nbut which we now name _content_, and the negative element which we call\nthe _form_. Every essence is a unity of content and form, _i. e._ _it\nexists_. In distinction from immediate being, we call that being which\nhas proceeded from some ground, _existence_, _i. e._ grounded being.\nWhen we view the essence as existing, we call it _thing_. In the\nrelation of a thing to its _properties_ we have a repetition of the\nrelation of form and content. The properties show us the thing in\nrespect of its form, but it is thing in respect of its content. The\nrelation between the thing and its properties is commonly indicated by\nthe verb _to have_ (_e. g._ the thing _has_ properties), in order to\ndistinguish between the two. The essence as a negative reference to\nitself, and as repelling itself from itself in order to a reflection in\nan _alterum_, is _power_ and _expression_. In this category, like all\nthe other categories of essence, one and the same content is posited\ntwice. The power can only be explained from the expression, and the\nexpression only from the power; consequently every explanation of which\nthis category avails itself, is tautological. To regard power as\nuncognizable, is only a self-deception of the understanding respecting\nits own doing.\u2014A higher expression for the category of power and\nexpression is the category of _inner_ and _outer_. The latter category\nstands higher than the former, because power needs some solicitation to\nexpress itself, but the inner is the essence spontaneously manifesting\nitself. Both of these, the inner and the outer, are also identical;\nneither is without the other. That, _e. g._ which the man is internally\nin respect of his character, is he also externally in his action. The\ntruth of this relation will be, therefore, the identity of inner and\nouter, of essence and phenomenon, viz.:\n\n(3.) _Actuality._\u2014Actuality must be added as a _third_ to being and\nexistence. In the actuality, the phenomenon is a complete and adequate\nmanifestation of the essence. The true actuality is, therefore (in\nopposition to _possibility_ and _contingency_), a necessary being, a\nrational _necessity_. The well-known Hegelian sentence that every thing\nis rational, and every thing rational is actual, is seen in this\napprehension of \u201cactuality\u201d to be a simple tautology. The necessary,\nwhen posited as its own ground, identical with itself, is _substance_.\nThe phenomenal side, the unessential in the substance, and the\ncontingent in the necessary, are _accidences_. These are no longer\nrelated to the substance, as the phenomenon to the essence, or the outer\nto the inner, _i. e._ as an adequate manifestation; they are only\ntransitory affections of the substance, accidentally changing phenomenal\nforms, like sea waves on the water of the sea. They are not produced by\nthe substance, but are rather destroyed in it. The relation of substance\nleads to the relation of _cause_. In the relation of cause there is one\nand the same thing posited on the one side as _cause_, and on the other\nside as _effect_. The cause of warmth is warmth, and its effect is again\nwarmth. The effect is a higher conception than the accidence, since it\nactually stands over against the cause, and the cause itself passes over\ninto effect. So far, however, as each side in the relation of cause\npresupposes the other, we shall find the true relation one in which each\nside is at the same time cause and effect, _i. e._ _reciprocal action_.\nReciprocal action is a higher relation than causality, because there is\nno pure causality. There is no effect without counteraction. We leave\nthe province of essence with the category of reciprocal action. All the\ncategories of essence had shown themselves as a duplex of two sides, but\nwhen we come to the category of reciprocal action, the opposition\nbetween cause and effect is destroyed, and they meet together; unity\nthus takes again the place of duplicity. We have, therefore, again a\nbeing which coincides with mediate being. This unity of being and\nessence, this inner or realized necessity, is the conception.\n\n3. THE DOCTRINE OF THE CONCEPTION.\u2014A conception is a rational necessity.\nWe can only have a conception of that whose true necessity we have\nrecognized. The conception is, therefore, the truly actual, the peculiar\nessence; because it states as well that which is actual as that which\nshould be.\n\n(1.) _The subjective conception_ contains the elements of _universality_\n(the conception of species), _particularity_ (ground of classification,\nlogical difference), and _individuality_ (species\u2014logical difference).\nThe conception is therefore a unity of that which is distinct. The\nself-separation of the conception is the _judgment_. In the judgment,\nthe conception appears as self-excluding duality. The twofoldness is\nseen in the difference between subject and predicate, and the unity in\nthe copula. Progress in the different forms of judgment, consists in\nthis, viz., that the copula fills itself more and more with the\nconception. But thus the judgment passes over into the _conclusion_ or\ninference, _i. e._ to the conception which is identical with itself\nthrough the conception. In the inference one conception is concluded\nwith a third through a second. The different figures of the conclusion\nare the different steps in the self-mediation of the conception. The\nconception is when it mediates itself with itself and the conclusion is\nno longer subjective; it is no longer my act, but an objective relation\nis fulfilled in it.\n\n(2.) _Objectivity_ is a reality _only_ of the conception. The objective\nconception has three steps,\u2014_Mechanism_, or the indifferent relation of\nobjects to each other; _Chemism_, or the interpenetration of objects and\ntheir neutralization; _Teleology_, or the inner design of objects. The\nend accomplishing itself or the self-end is,\n\n(3.) _The idea._\u2014The idea is the highest logical definition of the\nabsolute. The immediate existence of the idea, we call _life_, or\nprocess of life. Every thing living is self-end immanent-end. The idea\nposited in its difference as a relation of objective and subjective, is\nthe _true_ and _good_. The true is the objective rationality\nsubjectively posited; the good is the subjective rationality carried\ninto the objectivity. Both conceptions together constitute the _absolute\nidea_, which is just as truly as it _should_ be, _i. e._ the good is\njust as truly actualized as the true is living and self-realizing.\n\nThe absolute and full idea _is in space_, because it discharges itself\nfrom itself, as its reflection; this its being in space is _Nature_.\n\nII. THE SCIENCE OF NATURE.\u2014Nature is the idea in the form of\ndifferentiation. It is the idea externalizing itself; it is the mind\nestranged from itself. The unity of the conception is therefore\nconcealed in nature, and since philosophy makes it its problem to seek\nout the intelligence which is hidden in nature, and to pursue the\nprocess by which nature loses its own character and becomes mind, it\nshould not forget that the essence of nature consists in being which has\nexternalized itself, and that the products of nature neither have a\nreference to themselves, nor correspond to the conception, but grow up\nin unrestrained and unbridled contingency. Nature is a bacchanalian god\nwho neither bridles nor checks himself. It therefore represents no ideal\nsuccession, rising ever in regular order, but, on the contrary, it every\nwhere obliterates all essential limits by its doubtful structures, which\nalways defy every fixed classification. Because it is impossible to\nthrow the determinations of the conception over nature, natural\nphilosophy is forced at every point, as it were, to capitulate between\nthe world of concrete individual structures, and the regulative of the\nspeculative idea.\n\nNatural philosophy has its beginning, its course, and its end. It begins\nwith the first or immediate determination of nature, with the abstract\nuniversality of its being _extra se_, space and matter; its end is the\ndissevering of the mind from nature in the form of a rational and\nself-conscious individuality\u2014man; the problem which it has to solve is,\nto show the intermediate link between these two extremes, and to follow\nout successively the increasingly successful struggles of nature to\nraise itself to self-consciousness, to man. In this process, nature\npasses through three principal stages.\n\n1. MECHANICS, or matter and an ideal system of matter. Matter is the\nbeing _extra se_ (_Aussersichseyn_) of nature, in its most universal\nform. Yet it shows at the outset that tendency to being _per se_ which\nforms the guiding thread of natural philosophy\u2014gravity. Gravity is the\nbeing _in se_ (_Insichseyn_) of matter; it is the desire of matter to\ncome to itself, and shows the first trace of subjectivity. The centre of\ngravity of a body is _the one_ which it seeks. This same tendency of\nbringing all the manifold unto being _per se_ lies at the basis of the\nsolar system and of universal gravitation. The centrality which is the\nfundamental conception of gravity, becomes here a system, which is in\nfact a rational system so far as the form of the orbit, the rapidity of\nmotion, or the time of revolution may be referred to mathematical laws.\n\n2. PHYSICS.\u2014But matter possesses no individuality. Even in astronomy it\nis not the bodies themselves, but only their geometrical relations which\ninterest us. We have here at the outset to treat of quantitative and not\nyet of qualitative determinations. Yet in the solar system, matter has\nfound its centre, itself. Its abstract and hollow being _in se_ has\nresolved itself into form. Matter now, as possessing a quality, is an\nobject of _physics_. In physics we have to do with matter which has\nparticularized itself in a body, in an individuality. To this province\nbelongs inorganic nature, its forms and reciprocal references.\n\n3. ORGANICS.\u2014Inorganic nature, which was the object of physics, destroys\nitself in the chemical process. In the chemical process, the inorganic\nbody loses all its properties (cohesion, color, shining, sound,\ntransparency, &c.), and thus shows the evanescence of its existence and\nthat relativity which is its being. This chemical process is overcome by\nthe organic, the living process of nature. True, the living body is ever\non the point of passing over to the chemical process; oxygen, hydrogen\nand salt, are always entering into a living organism, but their chemical\naction is always overcome; the living body resists the chemical process\ntill it dies. Life is self-preservation, self-end. While therefore\nnature in physics had risen to individuality, in organics, it progresses\nto subjectivity. The idea, as life, represents itself in three stages.\n\n(1.) The general image of life in _geological_ organism, or the _mineral\nkingdom_. Yet the mineral kingdom is the result, and the residuum of a\nprocess of life and formation already passed. The primitive rock is the\nstiffened crystal of life, and the geological earth is a giant corpse.\nThe present life which produces itself eternally anew, breaks forth as\nthe first moving of subjectivity,\n\n(2.) In the organism of _plants_ or the _vegetable kingdom_. The plant\nrises indeed to a formative process, to a process of assimilation, and\nto a process of species. But it is not yet a totality perfectly\norganized in itself. Each part of the plant is the whole individual,\neach twig is the whole tree. The parts are related indifferently to each\nother; the crown can become a root, and the root a crown. The plant,\ntherefore, does not yet attain a true being _in se_ of individuality;\nfor, in order that this may be attained, an absolute unity of the\nindividual is necessary. This unity, which constitutes an individual and\nconcrete subjectivity, is first seen in\n\n(3.) The _animal_ organism, the _animal kingdom_. An uninterrupted\nintus-susception, free motion and sensation, are first found in the\nanimal organism. In its higher forms we find an inner warmth and a\nvoice. In its highest form, man, nature, or rather the spirit, which\nworks through nature, apprehends itself as conscious individuality, as\nEgo. The spirit thus become a free and rational self, has now completed\nits self-emancipation from nature.\n\nIII. PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.\u20141. THE SUBJECTIVE MIND.\u2014The mind is the truth\nof nature; it is being removed from its estrangement, and become\nidentical with itself. Its formal essence, therefore, is freedom, the\npossibility of abstracting itself from every thing else; its material\nessence is the capacity of manifesting itself as mind, as a conscious\nrationality,\u2014of positing the intellectual universe as its kingdom, and\nof building a structure of objective rationality. In order, however, to\nknow itself, and every thing rational,\u2014in order to posit nature more and\nmore negatively, the mind, like nature, must pass through a series of\nstages or emancipative acts. As it comes from nature and rises from its\nexternality to being, _per se_, it is at first soul or spirit of nature,\nand as such, it is an object of _anthropology_ in a strict sense. As\nthis spirit of nature, it sympathizes with the general planetary life of\nthe earth, and is in this respect subject to diversity of climate, and\nchange of seasons and days; it sympathizes with the geographical portion\nof the world which it occupies, _i. e._, it is related to a diversity of\nrace; still farther, it bears a national type, and is moreover\ndetermined by mode of life, formation of the body, &c., while these\nnatural conditions work also upon its intelligent and moral character.\nLastly, we must here take notice of the way in which nature has\ndetermined the individual subject, _i. e._ his natural temperament,\ncharacter, idiosyncrasy, &c. To this belong the natural changes of life,\nage, sexual relation, sleep, and waking. In all this the mind is still\nburied in nature, and this middle condition between being _per se_ and\nthe sleep of nature, is sensation, the hollow forming of the mind in its\nunconscious and unenlightened (_verstandlos_) individuality. A higher\nstage of sensation is feeling, _i. e._ sensation _in se_, where being\n_per se_ appears; feeling in its completed form is self-feeling. Since\nthe subject, in self-feeling, is buried in the peculiarity of his\nsensations, but at the same time concludes himself with himself, as a\nsubjective one, the self-feeling is seen to be the preliminary step to\nconsciousness. The Ego now appears as the shaft in which all these\nsensations, representations, cognitions and thoughts are preserved,\nwhich is with them all, and constitutes the centre in which they all\ncome together. The mind as conscious, as a conscious being _per se_, as\nEgo, is the object of the _phenomenology_ of consciousness.\n\nThe mind was individual, so long as it was interwoven with nature; it\nis consciousness or Ego when it has divested itself of nature. When\ndistinguishing itself from nature, the mind withdraws itself into\nitself, and that with which it was formerly interwoven, and which gave\nit a peculiar (earthly, national, &c.) determination, stands now\ndistinct from it, as its external world (earth, people, &c). The awaking\nof the Ego is thus the act by which the objective world, as such, is\ncreated; while on the other hand, the Ego awakens to a conscious\nsubjectivity only _in_ the objective world, and in distinction from it.\nThe Ego, over against the objective world, is consciousness in the\nstrict sense of the word. Consciousness becomes self-consciousness by\npassing through the stages of immediate sensuous consciousness,\nperception, and understanding, and convincing itself in this its\nformative history, that it has only to do with itself, while it believed\nthat it had to do with something objective. Again, self-consciousness\nbecomes universal or rational self-consciousness, as follows: In its\nstrivings to stamp the impress of the Ego upon the objective, and thus\nmake the objective subjective, it falls in conflict with other\nself-consciousnesses, and begins a war of extermination against them,\nbut rises from this _bellum omnium contra omnes_, as common\nconsciousness, as the finding of the proper mean between command and\nobedience, _i. e._ as truly universal, _i. e._ rational\nself-consciousness. The rational self-consciousness is actually free,\nbecause, when related to another, it is really related to itself, and in\nall is still with itself; it has emancipated itself from nature. We have\nnow mind as mind, divested of its naturalness and subjectivity, and as\nsuch, it is an object of _Pneumatology_.\n\nMind is at first theoretical mind, or intelligence, and then practical\nmind, or will. It is theoretical in that it has to do with the rational\nas something given, and now posits it as its own; it is practical in\nthat it immediately wills the subjective content (truth), which it has\nas its own, to be freed from its one-sided subjective form, and\ntransformed into an objective. The practical mind is, so far, the truth\nof the theoretical. The theoretical mind, in its way to the practical,\npasses through the stages of intuition, representation, and thought; and\nthe will on its side forms itself into a free will through impulse,\ndesire, and inclination. The free will, as having a being in space\n(_Daseyn_), is the _objective mind_, right, and the state. In right,\nmorals and the state, the freedom and rationality, which are chosen by\nthe will, take on an objective form. Every natural determination and\nimpulse now becomes moralized, and comes up to view again as ethical\ninstitute, as right and duty (the sexual impulse now appears as\nmarriage, and the impulse of revenge as civil punishment, &c.)\n\n2. THE OBJECTIVE MIND.\u2014(1.) The immediate objective being (_Daseyn_) of\nthe free will is _the right_. The individual, so far as he is capable of\nrights, so far as he has rights and exercises them, is a person. The\nmaxim of right is, therefore, be a person and have respect to other\npersons. The person allows himself an external sphere for his freedom, a\nsubstratum in which he can exercise his will: as property, possession.\nAs person I have the right of possession, the absolute right of\nappropriation, the right to cast my will over every thing, which thereby\nbecomes mine. But there exist other persons besides myself. My right is,\ntherefore, limited through the right of others. There thus arises a\nconflict between will and will, which is settled in a compact, in a\ncommon will. The relation of compact is the first step towards the\nstate, but only the _first_ step, for if we should define the state as a\ncompact of all with all, this would sink it in the category of private\nrights and private property. It does not depend upon the will of the\nindividual whether he will live in the state or not. The relation of\ncompact refers to private property. In a compact, therefore, two wills\nmerge themselves in a common will, which as such becomes a right. But\njust here lies also the possibility of a conflict between the individual\nwill and the right or the universal will. The separation of the two is a\nwrong (civil wrong, fraud, crime). This separation demands a\nreconciliation, a restoration of the right or the universal will from\nits momentary suppression or negation, by the particular will. The right\nrestoring itself in respect of the particular will, and establishing a\nnegation of the wrong, is punishment. Those theories, which found the\nright of punishment in some end of warning or improvement, mistake the\nessence of punishment. Threatening, warning, &c., are finite ends, _i.\ne._ means, and moreover uncertain means: but an act of righteousness\nshould not be made a means; righteousness is not exercised in order that\nany thing other than itself shall be gained. The fulfilment and\nself-manifestation of righteousness is absolute end, self-end. The\nparticular views we have mentioned, can only be considered in reference\nto the mode of punishment. The punishment which is inflicted on a\ncriminal, is _his_ right, _his_ rationality, _his_ law, beneath which he\nshould be subsumed. His act comes back upon himself. Hegel also defends\ncapital punishment whose abolition seemed to him as an untimely\nsentimentalism.\n\n(2.) The removal of the opposition of the universal and particular will\nin the subject constitutes _morality_. In morality the freedom of the\nwill is carried forward to a self-determination of the subjectivity, and\nthe abstract right becomes duty and virtue. The moral standpoint is the\nstandpoint of conscience, it is the right of the subjective will, the\nright of a free ethical decision. In the consideration of strict right,\nit is no inquiry what my principle or my view might be, but in morality\nthe question is at once directed towards the purpose and moving spring\nof the will. Hegel calls this standpoint of moral reflection and dutiful\naction for a reason\u2014morality, in distinction from a substantial,\nunconditioned and unreflecting ethics. This standpoint has three\nelements; (1) the element of resolution (_vorsatz_), where we consider\nthe inner determination of the acting subject, that which allows an act\nto be ascribed only to me, and the blame of it to rest only on my will\n(imputation); (2) the element of purpose, where the completed act is\nregarded not according to its consequences, but according to its\nrelative worth in reference to myself. The resolution was still\ninternal; but now the act is completed, and I must suffer myself to\njudge according to the constituents of the act, because I must have\nknown the circumstances under which I acted; (3) the element of the\ngood, where the act is judged according to its universal worth. The good\nis peculiarly the reconciliation of the particular subjective will with\nthe universal will, or with the conception of the will; in other words,\nto will the rational is good. Opposed to this is evil, or the elevation\nof the subjective will against the universal, the attempt to set up the\npeculiar and individual choice as absolute; in other words, to will the\nirrational is evil.\n\n(3.) In morality we had conscience and the abstract good (the good which\nought to be) standing over against each other. The concrete identity of\nthe two, the union of subjective and objective good, is _ethics_. In the\nethical the good has become actualized in an existing world, and a\nnature of self-consciousness.\n\nThe ethical mind is seen at first immediately, or in a natural form, as\nmarriage and the _family_. Three elements meet together in marriage,\nwhich should not be separated, and which are so often and so wrongly\nisolated. Marriage is (1) a sexual relation, and is founded upon a\ndifference of sex; it is, therefore, something other than Platonic love\nor monkish asceticism; (2) it is a civil contract; (3) it is love. Yet\nHegel lays no great stress upon this subjective element in concluding\nupon marriage, for a reciprocal affection will spring up in the married\nlife. It is more ethical when a determination to marry is first, and a\ndefinite personal affection follows afterwards, for marriage is most\nprominently duty. Hegel would, therefore, place the greatest obstacles\nin the way of a dissolution of marriage. He has also developed and\ndescribed in other respects the family state with a profound ethical\nfeeling.\n\nSince the family becomes separated into a multitude of families, it is a\n_civil society_, in which the members, though still independent\nindividuals, are bound in unity by their wants, by the constitution of\nrights as a means of security for person and property, and by an outward\nadministrative arrangement. Hegel distinguished the civil society from\nthe state in opposition to most modern theorists upon the subject, who,\nregarding it as the great end of the state to give security of property\nand of personal freedom, reduced the state to a civil society. But on\nsuch a standpoint which would make the state wholly of wants and of\nrights, it is impossible, _e. g._ to conceive of war. On the ground of\ncivil society each one stands for himself, is independent, and makes\nhimself as end, while every thing else is a means for him. But the\nstate, on the contrary, knows no independent individuals, each one of\nwhom may regard and pursue only his own well-being; but in the state,\nthe whole is the end, and the individual is the means.\u2014For the\nadministration of justice, Hegel, in opposition to those of our time who\ndeny the right of legislation, would have written and intelligible laws,\nwhich should be within reach of every one; still farther, justice should\nbe administered by a public trial by jury.\u2014In respect of the\norganization of civil society, Hegel expresses a great preference for a\ncorporation. Sanctity of marriage, he says, and honor in corporations,\nare the two elements around which the disorganization of civil society\nturns.\n\nCivil society passes over into the _state_ since the interest of the\nindividual loses itself in the idea of an ethical whole. The state is\nthe ethical idea actualized, it is the ethical mind as it rules over the\naction and knowledge of the individuals conceived in it. Finally the\nstates themselves, since they appear as individuals in an attracting or\nrepelling relation to each other, represent, in their destiny, in their\nrise and fall, the process of the _world\u2019s history_.\n\nIn his apprehension of the state, Hegel approached very near the ancient\nnotion, which merged the individual and the right of individuality,\nwholly in the will of the state. He held fast to the omnipotence of the\nstate in the ancient sense. Hence his resistance to modern liberalism,\nwhich would allow individuals to postulate, to criticize, and to will\naccording to their improved knowledge. The state is with Hegel the\nrational and ethical substance in which the individual has to live, it\nis the existing reason to which the individual has to submit himself\nwith a free view. He regarded a limited monarchy as the best form of\ngovernment, after the manner of the English constitution, to which Hegel\nwas especially inclined, and in reference to which he uttered his\nwell-known saying that the king was but the dot upon the i. There must\nbe an individual, Hegel supposes, who can _affirm_ for the state, who\ncan prefix an \u201c_I will_\u201d to the resolves of the state, and who can be\nthe head of a formal decision. The personality of a state, he says, \u201cis\nonly actual as a person, as monarch.\u201d Hence Hegel defends hereditary\nmonarchy, but he places the nobility by its side as a mediating element\nbetween people and prince\u2014not indeed to control or limit the government,\nnor to maintain the rights of the people, but only that the people may\nexperience that there is a good rule, that, the consciousness of the\npeople may be with the government and that the state may enter into the\nsubjective consciousness of the people.\n\nStates and the minds of individual races pour their currents into the\nstream of the world\u2019s history. The strife, the victory, and the\nsubjection of the spirits of individual races, and the passing over of\nthe world spirit from one people to another, is the content of the\nworld\u2019s history. The development of the world\u2019s history is generally\nconnected with some ruling race, which carries in itself the world\nspirit in its present stage of development, and in distinction from\nwhich the spirits of other races have no rights. Thus these race-spirits\nstand around the throne of the absolute spirit, as the executors of its\nactualization, as the witnesses and adornment of its glory.\n\n3. THE ABSOLUTE MIND.\u2014(1.) _\u00c6sthetics_. The absolute mind is immediately\npresent to the sensuous intuition as the beautiful or as art. The\nbeautiful is the appearance of the idea through a sensible medium (a\ncrystal, color, tone, poetry); it is the idea actualized in the form of\na limited phenomenon. To the beautiful (and to its subordinate kinds,\nthe simply beautiful, the sublime, and the comical) two factors always\nbelong, thought and matter; but both these are inseparable from each\nother; the matter is the outer phenomenon of the thought, and should\nexpress nothing but the thought which inspires it and shines through it.\nThe different ways in which matter and form are connected, furnish the\ndifferent forms of art. In the symbolic form of art the matter\npreponderates; the thought presses through it, and brings out the ideal\nonly with difficulty. In the classic form of art, the ideal has attained\nits adequate existence in the matter; content and form are absolutely\nbefitting each other. Lastly, in romantic art, the mind preponderates,\nand the matter is a mere appearance and sign through which the mind\nevery where breaks out, and struggles up above the material. The system\nof particular arts is connected with the different forms of art; but the\ndistinction of one particular art from another, depends especially upon\nthe difference of the material.\n\n(_a._) The beginning of art is _Architecture_. It belongs essentially to\nthe symbolic form of art, since in it the sensible matter far\npreponderates, and it first seeks the true conformity between content\nand form. Its material is stone, which it fashions according to the laws\nof gravity. Hence it has the character of magnitude, of silent\nearnestness, of oriental sublimity.\n\n(_b._) _Sculpture._\u2014The material of this art is also stone, but it\nadvances from the inorganic to the organic. It gives the stone a bodily\nform, and makes it only a serving vehicle of the thought. In sculpture,\nthe material, the stone, since it represents the body, that building of\nthe soul, in its clearness and beauty, disappears wholly in the ideal;\nthere is nothing left of the material which does not serve the idea.\n\n(_c._) _Painting._\u2014This is preeminently a romantic art. It represents,\nas sculpture cannot do, the life of the soul, the look, the disposition,\nthe heart. Its medium is no longer a coarse material substratum, but the\ncolored surface, and the soul-like play of light; it gives the\n_appearance_ only of complete spacial dimension. Hence it is able to\nrepresent in a complete dramatic movement the whole scale of feelings,\nconditions of heart, and actions.\n\n(_d._) _Music._\u2014This leaves out all relation of space. Its material is\nsound, the vibration of a sonorous body. It leaves, therefore, the field\nof sensuous intuition, and works exclusively upon the sensation. Its\nbasis is the breast of the sensitive soul. Music is the most subjective\nart.\n\n(_e._) Lastly in _Poetry_, or the speaking art, is the tongue of art\nloosed; poetry can represent every thing. Its material is not the mere\nsound, but the sound as word, as the sign of a representation, as the\nexpression of reason. But this material cannot be formed at random, but\nonly in verse according to certain rhythmical and musical laws. In\npoetry, all other arts return again; as epic, representing in a pleasing\nand extended narrative the figurative history of races, it corresponds\nto the plastic arts; as lyric, expressing some inner condition of soul,\nit corresponds to music; as dramatic poetry, exhibiting the struggles\nbetween characters acting out of directly opposite interests, it is the\nunion of both these arts.\n\n(2.) _Philosophy of Religion._\u2014Poetry forms the transition from art to\nreligion. In art the idea was present for the intuition, in religion it\nis present for the representation. The content of every religion is the\nreconciliation of the finite with the infinite, of the subject with God.\nAll religions seek a union of the divine and the human. This was done in\nthe crudest form by\n\n(_a._) The natural religions of the oriental world. God is, with them,\nbut a power of nature, a substance of nature, in comparison with which\nthe finite and the individual disappear as nothing.\n\n(_b._) A higher idea of God is attained by the religions of spiritual\nindividuality, in which the divine is looked upon as subject,\u2014as an\nexalted subjectivity, full of power and wisdom in Judaism, the religion\nof sublimity; as a circle of plastic divine forms in the Grecian\nreligion, the religion of beauty; as an absolute end of the state in the\nRoman religion, the religion of the understanding or of design.\n\n(_c._) The revealed or Christian religion first establishes a positive\nreconciliation between God and the world, by beholding the actual unity\nof the divine and the human in the person of Christ, the God-man, and\napprehending God as triune, _i. e._ as Himself, as incarnate, and as\nreturning from this incarnation to Himself. The intellectual content of\nrevealed religion, or of Christianity, is thus the same as that of\nspeculative philosophy; the only difference being, that in the one case\nthe content is represented in the form of the representation, in the\nform of a history; while, in the other, it appears in the form of the\nconception. Stripped of its form of religious representation, we have\nnow the standpoint of\n\n(3.) _The Absolute Philosophy_, or the thought knowing itself as all\ntruth, and reproducing the whole natural and intellectual universe from\nitself, having the system of philosophy for its development\u2014a closed\ncircle of circles.\n\n\n\nWith Hegel closes the history of philosophy. The philosophical\ndevelopments which have succeeded him, and which are partly a carrying\nout of his system, and partly the attempt to lay a new basis for\nphilosophy, belong to the present, and not yet to history.\n\nTHE END.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 1: This word literally means _clearing up_, but has a\nphilosophical sense for which no precise equivalent is found in the\nEnglish language. When used physically, it denotes that every\nobstruction which prevented the clear sight of the bodily eye is\nremoved, and when used psychologically it implies the same fact in\nreference to our mental vision. The _Aufkl\u00e4rung_ in philosophy is hence\nthe clearing up of difficulties which have hindered a true philosophical\ninsight. To express this, I know of no better word than the literal\nrendering, \u201c_up-clearing_\u201d or \u201c_clearing up_\u201d which the reader will find\nadopted in the following pages.\u2014TRANSLATOR.]\n\n[Footnote 2: The article on Socrates, from page 52 to page 64, was\ntranslated by Prof. N. G. Clark, of the University of Vermont.]\n\n[Footnote 3: A German mile is about four and a half English miles.\u2014TR.]\n\n[Footnote 4: Schelling died August 20th, 1854, at Ragaz, Switzerland,\nwhither he had gone for the benefit of his health, which had long been\ndeclining.\u2014TRANSLATOR.]\n\n\nD. APPLETON & CO.\u2019S PUBLICATIONS.\n\n THE\n TWO GREAT ANSWERS\n TO THE\n RECENT ATTACK ON THE BIBLE.\n\n\nI.\u2014REPLIES TO \u201cESSAYS AND REVIEWS.\u201d\n\n_With a Preface by the Lord Bishop of Oxford. 1 Vol., 12mo, Cloth_,\n$1.50.\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n I.\u2014THE EDUCATION OF THE WORLD. By the Rev. E. M. GOULBURN.\n\n II.\u2014BUNSEN, the CRITICAL SCHOOL, and Dr. WILLIAMS. By the Rev.\n J. H. ROSE.\n\n III.\u2014MIRACLES. By the Rev. C. A. HEURTLEY, D.D.\n\n IV.\u2014THE IDEA OF THE NATIONAL CHURCH. By the Rev. W. J. IRONS,\n D.D.\n\n V.\u2014THE CREATIVE WEEK. By the Rev. G. ROBINSON, M.A.\n\n VI.\u2014RATIONALISM. By the Rev. A. W. HADDAN.\n\n VII.\u2014ON THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE. By the Rev. CHR.\n WORDSWORTH, D.D.\n\n\nAPPENDIX:\n\n I.\u2014LETTER FROM THE REV. ROBERT MAIN, M.A., Pembroke College,\n Radcliffe Observer.\n\n II.\u2014LETTER FROM JOHN PHILLIPS, M.A., Magdalen College, Reader\n in Geology in the University of Oxford.\n\n\nII.\u2014AIDS TO FAITH.\n\n_A Series of Theological Essays by Various Writers, 1 Volume, 12mo, 538\npages_, $1.50.\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n I.\u2014ON MIRACLES AS EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY. By H. L. MANSEL,\n B.D.\n\n II.\u2014ON THE STUDY OF THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY. By WILLIAM\n FITZGERALD, D.D.\n\n III.\u2014PROPHECY. By A. MCCAUL, D.D.\n\n IV.\u2014IDEOLOGY AND SUBSCRIPTION. By F. C. CROOKE, M.A.\n\n V.\u2014THE MOSAIC RECORD OF CREATION. By A. MCCAUL, D.D.\n\n VI.\u2014ON THE GENUINENESS AND AUTHENTICITY OF THE PENTATEUCH. By\n GEO. RAWLINSON, M.A.\n\n VII.\u2014INSPIRATION. By EDWARD HAROLD BROWNE, B.D.\n\n VIII.\u2014THE DEATH OF CHRIST. By WM. THOMSON, Bishop of\n Gloucester and Bristol.\n\n IX.\u2014SCRIPTURE AND ITS INTERPRETATION. By CHAS. JOHN ELLICOTT,\n B.D.\n\n\n ON\n\n THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES\n\n by\n\n Means of Natural Selection;\n\n OR,\n\n THE PRESERVATION OF FAVORED RACES\n\n IN THE\n\n STRUGGLE FOR LIFE.\n\n BY\n\n CHARLES DARWIN, A. M.\n\n _One Volume. 12mo. Cloth_, $1.50.\n\n\n \u201cHis first point is to show that species are in many cases not\n well defined, and that the whole order of natural history\n seems to be in a state of mutation, by reason of constant\n variations. Thus even under domestication, important changes\n may be introduced by intercrossing, by selection of the best\n individuals for propagation, by crossing parents marked by\n however slight, but favorable peculiarities.\n\n \u201cHis second point is what he terms the universal and necessary\n struggle for existence. This follows from the high geometrical\n ratio of increase common to all beings. If there were no\n catastrophes, any one of the existing species would be\n sufficiently numerous in a few thousand years to cover the\n whole earth, to the exclusion of everything else.\n\n \u201cHis third point is to prove that this struggle is directed by\n the law of natural selection. Even the races of domestic\n animals may be constantly improved and modified by choosing\n the best individuals for propagation. Nature brings the same\n discipline to bear upon the whole domain of animal and\n vegetable life. She seizes at once upon any slight variation\n that is favorable, and perpetuates it; in the universal\n pressure, any variation that is injurious is immediately\n extinguished.\u201d\n\nAny of the above sent free by mail on receipt of price.\n\n NEW PUBLICATIONS\n\n OF\n\n D. APPLETON & CO.,\n\n 443 and 445 Broadway, New York.\n\n Evidence as to Man\u2019s Place in Nature.\n\n By THOMAS H. HUXLEY, F. R. S., F. L. S. 1 Vol. 12mo. Cloth. Illustrated,\n $1.25.\n\n CONTENTS:\n\n I. On the Natural History of Man-like Apes.\n II. On the Relation of Man to the Lower Animals.\n III. On some Fossil Remains of Man.\n\n\n Money.\n\n By CHAS. MORAN. 1 Vol. 12mo. Cloth, $1.25.\n\n \u201cThe constantly increasing division of labor daily increases\n the exchange of commodities and services, in which money plays\n so important a part. The subject of money is, therefore,\n supposed by the writer to be of sufficient general interest to\n warrant the publication of the present work. If it shall aid\n in dissipating any of the numerous errors and prejudices so\n long connected with money, and thus increase the power of this\n instrument to further the well-being and progress of humanity,\n the object of the writer will be attained and his labors amply\n compensated.\u201d\n\n\n The Gentle Skeptic;\n\nOr, Essays and Conversations of a Country Justice on the Authenticity\nand Truthfulness of the Old Testament Records. Edited by the Rev. C.\nWALWORTH. 1 Vol. 12mo. Cloth, $1.25.\n\n \u201cThis is one of those books that require not only reading but\n _studying_, and yet it can be read with interest even by those\n who never study. It is a book rich in scholarly research,\n masterly in argument, admirable in methodical\n arrangement.\u201d\u2014_The Tablet._\n\n\nThe American Annual Encyclop\u00e6dia,\n\n And Register of Important Events of the year 1862. Embracing\n Political, Civil, Military, and Social Affairs; Public\n Documents; Biography, Statistics, Commerce, Finance,\n Literature, Science, Agriculture, and Mechanical Industry. 1\n Vol. 8vo. Cloth, $4.00; Library Leather, $4.75; Half Mor.,\n $5.50; Half Russia, $6.00.\n\n The favorable reception given to the volume for the preceding\n year, has induced us to make special efforts in the\n preparation of this one. Its contents embrace the material and\n intellectual progress of the year, particularly in this\n country; the important civil and political measures of the\n Federal and State Governments; an accurate and minute history\n of the struggles of the great armies and their battles,\n illustrated with maps and plans of actions taken from official\n copies; the debates of the Federal and Confederate Congresses;\n financial measures of the Government, commerce, &c., &c.; the\n proceedings in the Confederate States to maintain the war and\n establish their government; also, the progress of foreign\n nations; the developments in the physical sciences; the\n progress of literature; mechanical inventions and\n improvements, embracing the results of the British Industrial\n Exhibition; the principles involved, and the developments in\n plating ships with iron; descriptions of the most useful\n patents; the present statistics of the religious\n denominations; and biographical sketches of the eminent\n persons deceased in 1862, &c.\n\n\nThe United States Bank Law:\n\n An Act to Provide a National Currency, secured by a pledge of\n United States Stocks, and to provide for the circulation and\n Redemption thereof. Paper covers, 25 cents.\n\nThe Pentateuch and Book of Joshua,\n\n Critically examined. By the Right Rev. JOHN WM. COLENSO,\n Bishop of Natal. 2 Vols., 12mo. $1.25 each.\n\n\n \u201cBishop Colenso\u2019s books, in which the genuineness and\n authenticity of the earlier portions of the Old Testament are\n doubted, or, as he expresses it, his \u2018arguments to prove the\n non-Mosaic and unhistorical character of the Pentateuch,\u2019 have\n created intense interest in England.\u201d\u2014_Chicago Post._\n\n\nMan\u2019s Cry, and God\u2019s Gracious Answer,\n\n A Contribution Toward the Defence of the Faith. By Rev. B.\n FRANKLIN. Cloth, crimped, 50 cents.\n\n \u201cA thoughtful discussion of theism\u2014or man\u2019s need of a God, and\n what kind of a God; and of Christianity\u2014or God\u2019s gracious\n answer to that need, and how it is an\n answer.\u201d\u2014_Congregationalist._\n\n\nProf. Huxley\u2019s Lectures \u201cOn the Origin of Species.\u201d\n\n 1 Vol. 12mo. $1.\n\n 1. The Present Condition of Organic Nature.\u20142. The Past\n Condition of Organic Nature.\u20143. The Method by which the Causes\n of the Present and Past Conditions of Organic Nature are to be\n discovered. The Origination of Living Beings.\u20144. The\n Perpetuation of Living Beings, Hereditary Transmission and\n Variation.\u20145. The Condition of Existence as affecting the\n Perpetuation of Living Beings.\u20146. A Critical Examination of\n the Position of Mr. Darwin\u2019s Work \u201cOn the Origin of Species,\u201d\n in relation to the complete Theory of the Causes of the\n Phenomena of Organic Nature.\n\n\n \u201cReaders who cannot accept Mr. Darwin\u2019s doctrines and\n conclusions will still be delighted with these lectures, since\n they embody so much curious information and so many important\n principles of biological science, expressed so clearly as to\n render the book, even to readers possessing scarcely any\n previous knowledge of the subject, not only intelligible but\n more interesting than any romance.\u201d\u2014_Weldon\u2019s Register_.\n\n\nLectures on the Symbolic Character of the Scriptures.\n\n By Rev. ARIEL SILVER, Minister of the New Jerusalem Church. 1\n Vol., 12mo. 286 pages. $1.25.\n\n\n These lectures, delivered to a mixed congregation during the\n past winter, are now given to the public.\n\n \u201cThe author assures the reader, who has not looked into the\n spiritual sense of the Holy Word, that if he has a desire to\n do so, and will study the science of correspondences, and read\n these simple illustrations of the sacred Scriptures, with a\n sincere desire to become acquainted with the Word of God that\n he may the better know his Heavenly Father, his own soul, and\n the true way of life, that he may walk in it, the Lord will\n open to his mind a new field of thought and lead him to a\n fountain of heavenly wisdom which he will prize as more\n valuable than all things else; for he will find therein the\n true life of Heaven.\u201d\u2014_Extract from Preface._\n\n\nThe New and Complete Taxpayer\u2019s Manual,\n\n Containing the Direct and Excise Taxes; with the Recent\n Amendments of Congress, and the Decisions of the Commissioner.\n Also, complete Marginal References, and an analytical index,\n showing all the Items of Taxation, the Mode of Proceeding, and\n the Duties of the Officers, with an Explanatory Preface. 1\n Vol. 8vo, 184 pages. Paper covers, 50 cents; cloth, 75 cents.\n\n An indispensable book for every citizen.\n\n\nThe Crisis.\n\n 1 Vol., 8vo. Paper covers, 95 pages, 50 cents.\n\nMadge;\n\n Or, Night and Morning. By H. G. B. 1 Vol., 12mo. $1.25.\n\n _From the Congregationalist._\n\n\n \u201cIt contains the story of a young girl \u2018bound out,\u2019 as the\n custom is in the New England villages. Her Northern mistress\n was a harsh, selfish and unfeeling woman, and the \u2018bound\n girl\u2019s\u2019 character is pleasantly and interestingly portrayed,\n as it becomes moulded and hewn out by the hard circumstances\n of her lot, till she becomes \u2018purified by suffering,\u2019 a\n perfect woman.\u201d\n\n\nThe New American Cyclop\u00e6dia.\n\n Edited by GEORGE RIPLEY and CHARLES A. DANA. Now complete, in\n 16 vols. 8vo, double columns, 750 pages each. Cloth, $4;\n Sheep, $4.75; Half Mor., $5.50; Half Russia, $6 per volume.\n\n The leading claims to public consideration which the _New\n American Cyclop\u00e6dia_ possesses may be thus briefly stated:\n\n \u201c1. It surpasses all other similar works in the fulness and\n ability of the articles relating to the United States.\n\n \u201c2. No other work contains so many reliable biographies of the\n leading men of this and other nations. In this respect it is\n far superior even to the more bulky Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica.\n\n \u201c3. The best minds of this country have been employed in\n enriching its pages with the latest data, and the most recent\n discoveries in every branch of manufactures, mechanics, and\n general science.\n\n \u201c4. It is a library in itself, where every topic is treated,\n and where information can be gleaned which will enable a\n student, if he is so disposed, to consult other authorities,\n thus affording him an invaluable key to knowledge.\n\n \u201c5. It is neatly printed with readable type on good paper, and\n contains a most copious index.\n\n \u201c6. It is the only work which gives anything approaching\n correct descriptions of cities and towns of America, or\n embraces reliable statistics showing the wonderful growth of\n all sections.\u201d\n\n\nTwo Pictures;\n\n Or, What We Think of Ourselves, and What the World Thinks of\n Us. By MARIA J. MCINTOSH, author of \u201cTwo Lives,\u201d \u201cCharms and\n Countercharms,\u201d etc. 1 vol., 12mo., 476 pages. $1.50.\n\n \u201cThe previous works of Miss McIntosh have been popular in the\n best sense of the word. The simple beauty of her narratives,\n combining pure sentiment with high principle, and noble views\n of life and its duties, ought to win for them a hearing at\n every fireside in our land. The lapse of time since we have\n had any work of fiction from her pen, has only served to\n increase her power.\u201d\n\n\nA Glimpse of the World.\n\n By Miss SEWELL, author of \u201cAmy Herbert,\u201d etc. 1 vol., 12mo.\n Cloth, $1.25.\n\n \u201cOf the authoress\u2019s style and language it would be superfluous\n to speak. The simplicity of a refined nature, the ease of a\n skilled writer, and the correctness of an industrious one, are\n conspicuous in every page. There is no straining at effect, no\n distortion of English palmed off as originality, no distrust\n of native vigor evinced by a recourse to artificial.\u201d\u2014_The\n Press._\n\n\nThe History of Civilization in England.\n\n By HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE.\u20142 vols. 8vo. Cloth, $6.\n\n Whoever misses reading this book, will miss reading what is,\n in various respects, to the best of our judgment and\n experience, the most remarkable book of the day\u2014one, indeed,\n that no thoughtful, inquiring mind would miss reading for a\n good deal. Let the reader be as adverse as he may to the\n writer\u2019s philosophy, let him be as devoted to the obstructive\n as Mr. Buckle is to the progress party, let him be as orthodox\n in church creed as the other is heterodox, as dogmatic as his\n author is skeptical\u2014let him, in short, find his prejudices\n shocked at every turn of the argument, and all his\n prepossessions whistled down the wind\u2014still there is so much\n in this extraordinary volume to stimulate reflection, and\n excite to inquiry, and provoke to earnest investigation,\n perhaps (to this or that reader) on a track hitherto\n untrodden, and across the virgin soil of untilled fields,\n fresh woods and pastures new\u2014that we may fairly defy the most\n hostile spirit, the most mistrustful and least sympathetic, to\n read it through without being glad of having done so, or,\n having begun it, or even glanced at almost any one of its 854\n pages, to pass it away unread.\u2014_New Monthly (London)\n Magazine_.\n\n\nHistory of the Romans under the Empire.\n\n By CHARLES MERIVALE, B.D., late Fellow of St. John\u2019s College.\n 7 Vols. small 8vo. Handsomely printed on tinted paper. Price,\n $2 per Vol. (Nearly ready.)\n\n CONTENTS:\n\n Vols. I and II.\u2014Comprising the History to the Fall of Julius\n C\u00e6sar.\n\n Vol. III.\u2014To the Establishment of the Monarchy by Augustus.\n\n Vols. IV. and V.\u2014From Augustus to Claudius, B.C. 27 to A.D.\n 54.\n\n Vol. VI.\u2014From the Reign of Nero, A.D. 54, to the Fall of\n Jerusalem, A.D. 70.\n\n Vol. VII.\u2014From the Destruction of Jerusalem, A.D. 70, to the\n Death of M. Aurelius.\n\n This valuable work terminates at the point where the narrative\n of Gibbon commences.\n\n ... \u201cWhen we enter on a more searching criticism of the two\n writers, it must be admitted that Merivale has as firm a grasp\n of his subject as Gibbon, and that his work is characterized\n by a greater freedom from prejudice, and a sounder philosophy.\n\n ... \u201cThis history must always stand as a splendid monument of\n his learning, his candor, and his vigorous grasp of intellect.\n Though he is in some respects inferior to Macaulay and Grote,\n he must still be classed with them as one of the second great\n triumvirate of English historians.\u201d\u2014_North American Review.\n April, 1863._\n\n\n NEW VIEWS OF HEAT AND OF THE FORCES.\n\n HEAT,\n\n CONSIDERED AS A MODE OF MOTION,\n\n Being a Course of Twelve Lectures delivered before the Royal\n Institution of Great Britain.\n\n BY JOHN TYNDALL, F. R. S.\n\n PROFESSOR OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE ROYAL\n INSTITUTION\u2014AUTHOR OF THE \u201cGLACIERS OF THE ALPS.\u201d\n\n With One Hundred Illustrations. 8vo., 480 pages. Price, $2.00.\n\n This volume is by the gifted successor of Faraday, the young\n Professor of Natural Philosophy in the Royal Institution of\n England. The author, himself celebrated as a discoverer, an\n ingenious and fertile experimenter, a bold but disciplined\n thinker, a vivid and imaginative speaker, and dealing with the\n most splendid generalizations and the grandest phenomena of\n nature, was listened to with the profoundest attention. The\n new views of the nature of heat, its connections with the\n other forms of force, and the sublime part it plays in the\n scheme of Nature\u2014views which have but recently been adopted in\n the scientific world\u2014are here for the first time brought\n forward, and illustrated with a resource of experiment, a\n brilliancy of illustration, and a clearness and eloquence of\n style for which Professor Tyndall is unequalled.\n\n From the American Journal of Science.\u2014With all the skill which\n has made Faraday the master of experimental science in Great\n Britain, Professor Tyndall enjoys the advantage of a superior\n general culture, and is thus enabled to set forth his\n philosophy with all the graces of eloquence and the finish of\n superior diction. With a simplicity, and absence of\n technicalities which render his explanations lucid to\n unscientific minds, and at the same time a thoroughness and\n originality by which he instructs the most learned, he unfolds\n all the modern philosophy of heat.\n\n New York Times.\u2014Professor Tyndall\u2019s course of lectures on heat\n is one of the most beautiful illustrations of a mode of\n handling scientific subjects, which is comparatively new, and\n which promises the best results, both to science and to\n literature generally; we mean the treatment of subjects in a\n style at once _profound_ and _popular_. The title of Professor\n Tyndall\u2019s work indicates the theory of heat held by him, and\n indeed the only one now held by scientific men\u2014_it is a mode\n of motion_.\n\n Boston Journal.\u2014He exhibits the curious and beautiful workings\n of nature in a most delightful manner. Before the reader\n particles of water lock themselves or fly asunder with a\n movement regulated like a dance. They form themselves into\n liquid flowers with fine serrated petals, or into rosettes of\n frozen gauze, they bound upward in boiling fountains, or creep\n slowly onward in stupendous glaciers. Flames burst into music\n and sing, or cease to sing, as the experimenter pleases, and\n metals paint themselves upon a screen in dazzling hues as the\n painter touches his canvas.\n\n New York Tribune.\u2014The most original and important contribution\n that has yet been made to the theory and literature of\n thermotics.\n\n Scientific American.\u2014The work is written in a charming style,\n and is the most valuable contribution to scientific literature\n that has been published in many years. It is the most popular\n exposition of the dynamical theory of heat that has yet\n appeared. The old material theory of heat may be said to be\n defunct.\n\n Louisville Democrat.\u2014This is one of the most delightful\n scientific works we have ever met. The lectures are so full of\n life and spirit that we can almost imagine the lecturer before\n us, and see his brilliant experiments in every stage of their\n progress. The theory is so carefully and thoroughly explained\n that no one can fail to understand it. Such books as these\n create a love for science.\n\n Troy Whig.\u2014No one can take up these lectures and pursue the\n general train and scope of thought which they compel, without\n having attained already to a love of practical science which\n will inevitably impress itself on his mental habits hereafter.\n\n Independent.\u2014Professor Tyndall\u2019s expositions and experiments\n are remarkably thoughtful, ingenious, clear and convincing;\n portions of the book have almost the interest of a romance, so\n startling are the descriptions and elucidations.\n\n\n_Any of these Books sent free by mail to any address on receipt of\nPrice._\n\n RECENT PUBLICATIONS\n\n OF\n\n D. APPLETON & CO.,\n\n 443 & 445 BROADWAY, NEW YORK.\n\n The Life and Correspondence of THEODORE PARKER, Minister of\n the Twenty-eighth Congregational Society, Boston. By JOHN\n WEISS. With two Portraits on Steel, fac-simile of Handwriting,\n and nineteen Wood Engravings. 2 vols., 8vo. 1,008 pages.\n Price, $6.\n\n \u201cThese volumes contain an account of Mr. Parker\u2019s childhood\n and self-education; of the development of his theological\n ideas; of his scholarly and philosophical pursuits; and of his\n relation to the Anti-Slavery cause, and to the epoch in\n America which preceded the civil war. His two visits to Europe\n are described in letters and extracts from his journal. An\n autobiographical fragment is introduced in relation to Mr.\n Parker\u2019s early life, and his letters of friendship on\n literary, speculative, and political topics are freely\n interspersed. The illustrations represent scenes connected\n with various periods of Mr. Parker\u2019s life, the houses he dwelt\n in, his country haunts, the meeting house, his library, and\n the Music Hall in which he preached.\u201d\n\n\n Catechism of the Steam Engine,\n\n In its various Applications to Mines, Mills, Steam Navigation,\n Railways, and Agriculture. With Practical Instructions for the\n Manufacture and Management of Engines of every Class. By JOHN\n BOURNE, C. E. New and Revised Edition. 1 vol., 12mo.\n Illustrated. Cloth. $2.\n\n \u201cIn offering to the American public a reprint of a work on the\n Steam Engine so deservedly successful, and so long considered\n standard, the Publishers have not thought it necessary that it\n should be an exact copy of the English edition. There were\n some details in which they thought it could be improved and\n better adapted to the use of American Engineers. On this\n account the size of the page has been increased to a full\n 12mo, to admit of larger illustrations, which, in the English\n edition, are often on too small a scale, and some of the\n illustrations themselves have been supplied by others equally\n applicable, more recent, and to us more familiar examples. The\n first part of Chapter XI., devoted in the English edition to\n English portable and fixed agricultural engines, in this\n edition gives place entirely to illustrations from American\n practice, of steam engines as applied to different purposes,\n and of appliances and machines necessary to them. But with the\n exception of some of the illustrations and the description of\n them, and the correction of a few typographical errors, this\n edition is a faithful transcript of the latest English\n edition.\u201d\n\n\n D. APPLETON & CO.\u2019S PUBLICATIONS.\n\n History of the Romans under the Empire. By CHARLES MERIVALE,\n B. D., late Fellow of St. John\u2019s College. 7 vols., small 8vo.\n Handsomely printed on tinted paper. Price, in cloth, $2 per\n vol. Half Morocco extra, $3 50.\n\n CONTENTS:\n\n Vols. I. and II.\u2014Comprising the History to the Fall of Julius\n C\u00e6sar.\n\n Vol. III.\u2014To the Establishment of the Monarchy by Augustus.\n\n Vols. IV. and V.\u2014From Augustus to Claudius, B. C. 27 to A. D.\n 54.\n\n Vol. VI.\u2014From the Reign of Nero, A. D. 54, to the Fall of\n Jerusalem, A. D. 70.\n\n Vol. VII.\u2014From the Destruction of Jerusalem, A. D. 70, to the\n Death of M. Aurelius.\n\n This valuable work terminates at the point where the narrative\n of Gibbon commences.\n\n ... \u201cWhen we enter on a more searching criticism of the two\n writers, it must be admitted that Merivale has as firm a grasp\n of his subject as Gibbon, and that his work is characterized\n by a greater freedom from prejudice, and a sounder philosophy.\n\n ... \u201cThis history must always stand as a splendid monument of\n his learning, his candor, and his vigorous grasp of intellect.\n Though he is in some respects inferior to Macaulay and Grote,\n he must still be classed with them, as one of the second great\n triumvirate of English historians.\u201d\u2014_North American Review,\n April, 1863._\n\n\n Practice in the Executive Department of the Government, under\n the Pension, Bounty, and Prize Laws of the United States, with\n Forms and Instructions for Collecting Arrears of Pay, Bounty,\n and Prize Money, and for Obtaining Pensions. By ROBERT SEWELL,\n Counsellor at Law. 1 vol., 8vo. Sheep. Price, $3 50.\n\n \u201cI offer this little book with confidence to the profession,\n as certain to save lawyers, in one case, if they never have\n any more, more time and trouble than its cost. To the public\n generally, the book is offered as containing a large amount of\n useful information on a subject now, unfortunately, brought\n home to half the families in the land. To the officers and\n soldiers of the Army it will also be found a useful companion;\n and it is hoped that by it an amount of information of great\n value to the soldiers, and to their families at home, will be\n disseminated, and the prevailing ignorance respecting the\n subject treated of in a great degree removed.\u201d\u2014_Extract from\n Preface._\n\n\n Hints to Riflemen.\n\n By H. W. S. CLEVELAND. 1 vol., 12mo. Illustrated, with\n numerous Designs of Rifles and Rifle Practice. Cloth. Price,\n $1 50.\n\n \u201cI offer these hints as the contribution of an old sportsman,\n and if I succeed in any degree in exciting an interest in the\n subject, my end will be accomplished, even if the future\n investigations of those who are thus attracted should prove\n any of my opinions to be erroneous.\u201d\u2014_Extract from Preface._\n\n\n Laws and Principles of Whist, Stated and Explained, and its\n Practice Illustrated on an Original System, by means of hands\n played completely through. By CAVENDISH. From the fifth London\n edition. 1 vol., square 16mo. Gilt edge. $1 25.\n\n \u201cAn excellent and very clearly written treatise; the rules of\n the game thoroughly explained; its practice illustrated by\n means of hands played completely through, and much of the\n minuti\u00e6 and finesse of the game given that we have never seen\n in any other volume of the kind. Whist players will recognize\n it as an authority; and that it is a success is proved by its\n having already gone through five editions. It is got out very\n neatly, in blue and gold, by the publishers.\u201d\u2014_Com. Bulletin._\n\n\n Roba di Roma.\n\n By W. W. STORY. 2 vols., 12mo. Cloth, $3.\n\n \u201cTill Rome shall fall, the City of the Seven Hills will be\n inexhaustible as a subject of interest. \u2018Roba di Roma\u2019\n contains the gatherings of an honest observer and a real\n artist.... It has permanent value to entitle it to a place of\n honor on the shelf which contains every lover of Italy\u2019s\n Rome-books.\u201d\u2014_Athen\u00e6um._\n\n\n Heat considered as a Mode of Motion. Being a Course of Twelve\n Lectures delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain.\n By JOHN TYNDALL, F.R.S. Author of \u201cThe Glaciers of the Alps.\u201d\n 1 vol., 12mo. With 101 illustrations. Cloth. $2.\n\n \u201cNo one can rend Dr. Tyndall\u2019s book without being impressed\n with the intensity of the author\u2019s conviction of the truth of\n the theory which it is his object to illustrate, or with the\n boldness with which he confronts the difficulties which lie\n encounters.... Dr. Tyndall\u2019s is the first work in which the\n undulatory or mechanical theory of heat has been placed in a\n popular light; but we are sure that no one, however profound\n his knowledge upon the subject of which it treats, will rise\n from its perusal without a feeling that he has been both\n gratified and instructed in a high degree while reading its\n pages.\u201d\u2014_London Reader._\n\n\n Life of Edward Livingston, Mayor of the City of New York;\n Member of Congress; Senator of the United States; Secretary of\n State; Minister to France; Author of a System of Penal Law for\n Louisiana; Member of the Institute of France, etc. By CHARLES\n H. HUNT, with an Introduction by GEORGE BANCROFT. 1 vol., 8vo.\n Cloth, $3.50.\n\n \u201cOne of the purest of statesmen and the most genial of men,\n was Edward Livingston, whose career is presented in this\n volume....\n\n \u201cThe author of this volume has done the country a service. He\n has given us in a becoming form an appropriate memorial of one\n whom succeeding generations will be proud to name as an\n American jurist and statesman.\u201d\u2014_Evangelist._\n\n\n Round the Block. An American Novel. With Illustrations. 1\n vol., 12mo. Cloth. Price, $1 50.\n\n \u201cThe story is remarkably clever. It presents the most vivid\n and various pictures of men and manners in the great\n Metropolis. Unlike most novels that now appear, it has no\n \u2018mission,\u2019 the author being neither a politician nor a\n reformer, but a story teller, according to the old pattern,\n and a capital story he has produced, written in the happiest\n style, and full of wit and action. He evidently knows his\n ground, and moves over it with the foot of a master. It is a\n work that will be read and admired, unless all love for good\n novels has departed from us; and we know that such is not the\n case.\u201d\u2014_Boston Traveler._\n\n\n The History of Civilization in England. By HENRY THOMAS\n BUCKLE. 2 vols., 8vo. Cloth. $6.\n\n \u201cWhoever misses reading this book, will miss reading what is,\n in various respects, to the best of our judgment and\n experience, the most remarkable book of the day\u2014one, indeed,\n that no thoughtful, inquiring mind would miss reading for a\n good deal. Let the reader be as averse as he may to the\n writer\u2019s philosophy, let him be as devoted to the obstructive\n as Mr. Buckle is to the progress party, let him be as orthodox\n in church creed as the other is heterodox, as dogmatic as his\n author is skeptical\u2014let him, in short, find his prejudices\n shocked at every turn of the argument, and all his\n prepossessions whistled down the wind\u2014still there is so much\n in this extraordinary volume to stimulate reflection, and\n excite to inquiry, and provoke to earnest investigation,\n perhaps (to this or that reader) on a track hitherto\n untrodden, and across the virgin soil of untilled fields,\n fresh woods and pastures new\u2014that we may fairly defy the most\n hostile spirit, the most mistrustful and least sympathetic, to\n read it through without being glad of having done so, or\n having begun it, or even glanced at almost any one of its\n pages, to pass it away unread.\u201d\u2014_New Monthly (London)\n Magazine._\n\n\n Illustrations of Universal Progress.\n\n A Series of Essays. By HERBERT SPENCER, Author of \u201cThe\n Principles of Psychology;\u201d \u201cSocial Statics;\u201d \u201cEducation.\u201d 1\n vol., 12mo. Cloth, $1 75.\n\n \u201cThe readers who have made the acquaintance of Mr. Herbert\n Spencer through his work on Education, and are interested in\n his views upon a larger range of subjects, will welcome this\n new volume of \u2018Essays.\u2019 Passing by the more scientific and\n philosophical speculations, we may call attention to a group\n of articles upon moral and political subjects, which are very\n pertinent to the present condition of affairs.\u201d\u2014_Tribune._\n\n\n Thirty Poems.\n\n BY WM. CULLEN BRYANT. 1 vol., 12mo. Cloth, $1.25; cloth gilt,\n $1.75; mor., $3.50.\n\n \u201cNo English poet surpasses him in knowledge of nature, and but\n few are his equals. He is better than Cowper and Thomson in\n their special walks of poetry, and the equal of Wordsworth,\n that great high priest of nature.\u201d\u2014_The World._\n\n\n An Introduction to Municipal Law, designed for General\n Readers, and for Students in Colleges and High Schools. By\n JOHN NORTON POMEROY. 1 vol., 8vo. 544 pages. Cloth, $3.\n\n \u201cI have spent nearly four days in reading your book, and am\n willing to say, in reference to it, that, when considered in\n reference to its scope and the design had in view in entering\n upon it, it is a work of great merit. The topics are presented\n clearly, discussed with ability, and in the main satisfactory\n results arrived at. Parts I. and II., I think, may prove very\n useful to students at law and young lawyers, as there is a\n great deal in the history of the law, and especially in its\n sources, both common and civil, that is very clearly, briefly,\n and logically stated, and more available in the manner\n presented in your work than in any other that I am acquainted\n with.\u201d\u2014_From_ AMOS DEAN, _Esq., Albany Law School_.\n\n\n Thackeray; The Humorist and Man of Letters, the Story of his\n Life, with particulars of his early career never before made\n public. By THEODORE TAYLOR, Esq. Illustrated with a Portrait,\n one of the latest taken from life; View of Thackeray\u2019s House;\n Facsimile of his Handwriting; Humorous Illustrations by George\n Cruikshank; and other Pictures and Sketches. One vol., 12mo.\n Cloth. Price, $1 25.\n\n \u201cThe author, Mr. T. Taylor, long resident in Paris, has been\n collecting information for many years, and has much to say of\n Mr. Thackeray\u2019s artist life in that city. The book is\n illustrated with a portrait and some curious original\n sketches.\u201d\u2014_From the Guardian._\n\n\n The Iron Manufacture of Great Britain. Theoretically and\n Practically considered: Including Descriptive Details of the\n Ores, Fuels, and Fluxes employed; the Preliminary Operation of\n Calcination; the Blast, Refining, and Puddling Furnaces;\n Engines and Machinery; and the Various Processes in Union,\n etc., etc. By W. TRURAN, C. E., formerly Engineer at the\n Dowlais Iron Works, under the late Sir John Guest, Bart.\n Second Edition, revised from the manuscripts of the late Mr.\n Truran, by J. ARTHUR PHILLIPS, Author of \u201cA Manual of\n Metallurgy,\u201d \u201cRecords of Mining,\u201d etc., and WM. H. DORMAN. One\n vol., imperial 8vo. Containing 84 Plates. Price, $10.","title":"A History of Philosophy in Epitome","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":136957}