{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_41707/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_41707","id":"gutenberg_41707","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/41707","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Other","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Islamic philosophy","Islamic philosophy -- Iran","Philosophy, Iranian"],"text":"Transcriber's note:\n\n Some typographical and punctuation errors have been corrected.\n A complete list follows the text.\n\n Words italicized in the original are surrounded by\n _underscores_.\n\n Letters superscripted in the original have been placed in {}\n brackets.\n\n The Arabic letter Ain is represented by \u2018 and the Arabic letter\n Hamza is represented by \u2019.\n\n This text has a lot of Unicode characters, many fonts do not\n provide support for them. A list of these characters follows,\n separated by commas, if you do not see them properly please\n use a different font.\n\n Single letters: \u0101, \u0100, \u012b, \u012a, \u016b, \u016a, \u1e63, \u1e62, \u1e25, \u1e24, \u1e6d, \u1e6c, \u1e93, \u1e92, \u1e0d, \u015b,\n \u015a, \u2018, \u2019, \u2042.\n\n Combined Letters (macron or two dots below): \u1e0f, \u1e0e, g\u0331, G\u0331, \u1e96,\n \u1e35, \u1e34, s\u0331, S\u0331, d\u0324.\n\n\n\n\n THE\n DEVELOPMENT OF METAPHYSICS\n IN\n PERSIA:\n\n A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY\n OF MUSLIM PHILOSOPHY\n\n BY\n\n SHAIKH MUHAMMAD IQBAL\n B. A. (Cantab) M. A. (Pb.) Ph. D. (Munich).\n\n LONDON\n LUZAC & Co. 46, Great Russell Street W. C.\n 1908\n\n Printed by E. J. BRILL. \u2014 LEIDEN (Holland).\n\n\n\n\n DEDICATION\n TO\n Professor T. W. ARNOLD M. A.\n\n\n My dear MR. ARNOLD,\n\nThis little book is the first-fruit of that literary and philosophical\ntraining which I have been receiving from you for the last ten years,\nand as an expression of gratitude I beg to dedicate it to your name. You\nhave always judged me liberally; I hope you will judge these pages in\nthe same spirit.\n\n Your affectionate pupil\n\n IQBAL.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\nThe most remarkable feature of the character of the Persian people is\ntheir love of Metaphysical speculation. Yet the inquirer who approaches\nthe extant literature of Persia expecting to find any comprehensive\nsystems of thought, like those of Kapila or Kant, will have to turn back\ndisappointed, though deeply impressed by the wonderful intellectual\nsubtlety displayed therein. It seems to me that the Persian mind is\nrather impatient of detail, and consequently destitute of that\norganising faculty which gradually works out a system of ideas, by\ninterpreting the fundamental principles with reference to the ordinary\nfacts of observation. The subtle Brahman sees the inner unity of things;\nso does the Persian. But while the former endeavours to discover it in\nall the aspects of human experience, and illustrates its hidden presence\nin the concrete in various ways, the latter appears to be satisfied\nwith a bare universality, and does not attempt to verify the richness of\nits inner content. The butterfly imagination of the Persian flies,\nhalf-inebriated as it were, from flower to flower, and seems to be\nincapable of reviewing the garden as a whole. For this reason his\ndeepest thoughts and emotions find expression mostly in disconnected\nverses (G\u0331\u1e96azal) which reveal all the subtlety of his artistic soul.\nThe Hind\u016b, while admitting, like the Persian, the necessity of a higher\nsource of knowledge, yet calmly moves from experience to experience,\nmercilessly dissecting them, and forcing them to yield their underlying\nuniversality. In fact the Persian is only half-conscious of Metaphysics\nas a _system_ of thought; his Brahman brother, on the other hand, is\nfully alive to the need of presenting his theory in the form of a\nthoroughly reasoned out system. And the result of this mental difference\nbetween the two nations is clear. In the one case we have only partially\nworked out systems of thought; in the other case, the awful sublimity of\nthe searching Ved\u0101nta. The student of Islamic Mysticism who is anxious\nto see an all-embracing exposition of the principle of Unity, must look\nup the heavy volumes of the Andal\u016bsian Ibn al-\u2018Arab\u012b, whose profound\nteaching stands in strange contrast with the dry-as-dust Islam of his\ncountrymen.\n\nThe results, however, of the intellectual activity of the different\nbranches of the great Aryan family are strikingly similar. The outcome\nof all Idealistic speculation in India is Buddha, in Persia Bah\u0101ullah,\nand in the west Schopenhauer whose system, in Hegelian language, is the\nmarriage of free oriental universality with occidental determinateness.\n\nBut the history of Persian thought presents a phenomenon peculiar to\nitself. In Persia, due perhaps to semitic influences, philosophical\nspeculation has indissolubly associated itself with religion, and\nthinkers in new lines of thought have almost always been founders of new\nreligious movements. After the Arab conquest, however, we see pure\nPhilosophy severed from religion by the Neo-Platonic Aristotelians of\nIslam, but the severance was only a transient phenomenon. Greek\nphilosophy, though an exotic plant in the soil of Persia, eventually\nbecame an integral part of Persian thought; and later thinkers, critics\nas well as advocates of Greek wisdom, talked in the philosophical\nlanguage of Aristotle and Plato, and were mostly influenced by religious\npresuppositions. It is necessary to bear this fact in mind in order to\ngain a thorough understanding of post-Islamic Persian thought.\n\nThe object of this investigation is, as will appear, to prepare a\nground-work for a future history of Persian Metaphysics. Original\nthought cannot be expected in a review, the object of which is purely\nhistorical; yet I venture to claim some consideration for the following\ntwo points:--\n\n(a) I have endeavoured to trace the logical continuity of Persian\nthought, which I have tried to interpret in the language of modern\nPhilosophy. This, as far as I know, has not yet been done.\n\n(b) I have discussed the subject of \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism in a more scientific manner,\nand have attempted to bring out the intellectual conditions which\nnecessitated such a phenomenon. In opposition, therefore, to the\ngenerally accepted view I have tried to maintain that \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism is a\nnecessary product of the play of various intellectual and moral forces\nwhich would necessarily awaken the slumbering soul to a higher ideal of\nlife.\n\nOwing to my ignorance of Zend, my knowledge of Zoroaster is merely\nsecond-hand. As regards the second part of my work, I have been able to\nlook up the original Persian and Arabic manuscripts as well as many\nprinted works connected with my investigation. I give below the names of\nArabic and Persian manuscripts from which I have drawn most of the\nmaterial utilized here. The method of transliteration adopted is the one\nrecognised by the Royal Asiatic Society.\n\n 1. T\u0101r\u012b\u1e35\u1e96 al-\u1e24ukam\u0101, by Al-Baihaq\u012b.--Royal Library of Berlin.\n\n 2. S\u0331\u1e96ar\u1e25i Anw\u0101riyya, (with the original text) by Mu\u1e25ammad\n S\u0331\u1e96ar\u012bf of Her\u0101t. Royal Library of Berlin.\n\n 3. \u1e24ikmat al-\u2018Ain, by al-K\u0101tib\u012b. Royal Library of Berlin.\n\n 4. Commentary on \u1e24ikmat al-\u2018Ain, by Mu\u1e25ammad ibn Mub\u0101rak\n al-Bu\u1e35\u1e96\u0101r\u012b. India Office Library.\n\n 5. Commentary on \u1e24ikmat al-\u2018Ain by \u1e24usain\u012b. India Office\n Library.\n\n 6. \u2018Aw\u0101rif al-Ma\u2018\u0101rif, by S\u0331\u1e96ah\u0101b al-D\u012bn. India Office Library.\n\n\n 7. Mis\u0331\u1e96k\u0101t al-Anw\u0101r, by Al-G\u0331\u1e96az\u0101l\u012b. India Office Library.\n\n\n 8. Kas\u0331\u1e96f al-Ma\u1e25j\u016bb, by \u2018Al\u012b Hajver\u012b. India Office Library.\n\n 9. Ris\u0101lahi Nafs translated from Aristotle, by Af\u1e0dal K\u0101sh\u012b.\n India Office Library.\n\n 10. Ris\u0101lahi M\u012br Sayyid S\u0331\u1e96ar\u012bf. India Office Library.\n\n 11. \u1e34\u1e96\u0101tima, by Sayyid Mu\u1e25ammad Gis\u016bdar\u0101z. India Office\n Library.\n\n 12. Man\u0101zilal-s\u0101\u2019r\u012bn, by \u2018Abdullah Ism\u0101i\u2019l of Her\u0101t. India\n Office Library.\n\n 13. J\u0101wid\u0101n N\u0101ma, by Af\u1e0dal K\u0101s\u0331\u1e96\u012b. India Office Library.\n\n 14. T\u0101r\u012b\u1e35\u1e96 al-\u1e24ukam\u0101, by S\u0331\u1e96ahrz\u016br\u012b. British Museum Library.\n\n 15. Collected works of Avicenna. British Museum Library.\n\n 16. Risalah fi\u2019l-Wuj\u016bd, by M\u012br Jurj\u0101n\u012b. British Museum Library.\n\n 17. J\u0101wid\u0101ni Kab\u012br. Cambridge University Library.\n\n 18. J\u0101mi Jah\u0101n Num\u0101. Cambridge University Library.\n\n 19. Majmu\u2018ai F\u0101rs\u012b Ris\u0101lah No: 1, 2, of Al-Nasaf\u012b. Trinity\n College Library.\n\n S. M. IQBAL.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n PART I.\n Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy.\n Page\n Chapter I. Persian Dualism 1\n Sec: I. Zoroaster 1\n Sec: II. M\u0101n\u012b and Mazdak 12\n Sec: III. Retrospect 20\n\n PART II.\n Greek Dualism.\n\n Chapter II. Neo-Platonic Aristotelians of Persia 22\n Sec: I. Ibn Maskawaih 26\n Sec: II. Avicenna 38\n\n Chapter III. Islamic Rationalism 45\n Sec: I. Metaphysics of Rationalism--Materialism 45\n Sec: II. Contemporary movements of thought 55\n Sec: III. Reaction against Rationalism--The As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite 65\n\n Chapter IV. Controversy between Realism and Idealism 81\n\n Chapter V. \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism.\n Sec: I. The origin and Quranic justification of \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism 96\n Sec: II. Aspects of \u1e62\u016bf\u012b Metaphysics 111\n A. Reality as Self-conscious Will 112\n B. Reality as Beauty 112\n C. (1) Reality as Light 120\n (Return to Persian Dualism--Al-Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q\u012b).\n (2) Reality as Thought--Al-J\u012bl\u012b 121\n\n Chapter VI. Later Persian Thought 174\n\n Conclusion 192\n\n\n\n\nPART I.\n\nPre-Islamic Persian Philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nCHAP. I.\n\nPERSIAN DUALISM.\n\n\n\u00a7 I.\n\nZoroaster.\n\nTo Zoroaster--the ancient sage of Iran--must always be assigned the\nfirst place in the intellectual history of Iranian Aryans who, wearied\nof constant roaming, settled down to an agricultural life at a time when\nthe Vedic Hymns were still being composed in the plains of Central Asia.\nThis new mode of life and the consequent stability of the institution of\nproperty among the settlers, made them hated by other Aryan tribes who\nhad not yet shaken off their original nomadic habits, and occasionally\nplundered their more civilised kinsmen. Thus grew up the conflict\nbetween the two modes of life which found its earliest expression in the\ndenunciation of the deities of each other--the Devas and the Ahuras. It\nwas really the beginning of a long individualising process which\ngradually severed the Iranian branch from other Aryan tribes, and\nfinally manifested itself in the religious system of Zoroaster[2:1]--the\ngreat prophet of Iran who lived and taught in the age of Solon and\nThales. In the dim light of modern oriental research we see ancient\nIranians divided between two camps--partisans of the powers of good, and\npartisans of the powers of evil--when the great sage joins their furious\ncontest, and with his moral enthusiasm stamps out once for all the\nworship of demons as well as the intolerable ritual of the Magian\npriesthood.\n\n [2:1] Some European Scholars have held Zoroaster to be nothing\n more than a mythical personage. But since the publication of\n Professor Jackson's admirable Life of Zoroaster, the Iranian\n Prophet has, I believe, finally got out of the ordeal of modern\n criticism.\n\nIt is, however, beside our purpose to trace the origin and growth of\nZoroaster's religious system. Our object, in so far as the present\ninvestigation is concerned, is to glance at the metaphysical side of\nhis revelation. We, therefore, wish to fix our attention on the sacred\ntrinity of philosophy--God, Man and Nature.\n\nGeiger, in his \"Civilisation of Eastern Iranians in Ancient Times\",\npoints out that Zoroaster inherited two fundamental principles from his\nAryan ancestry.--(1) There is law in Nature. (2) There is conflict in\nNature. It is the observation of law and conflict in the vast panorama\nof being that constitutes the philosophical foundation of his system.\nThe problem before him was to reconcile the existence of evil with the\neternal goodness of God. His predecessors worshipped a plurality of good\nspirits all of which he reduced to a unity and called it Ahuramazda. On\nthe other hand he reduced all the powers of evil to a similar unity and\ncalled it Druj-Ahriman. Thus by a process of unification he arrived at\ntwo fundamental principles which, as Haug shows, he looked upon not as\ntwo independent activities, but as two parts or rather aspects of the\nsame Primary Being. Dr. Haug, therefore, holds that the Prophet of\nancient Iran was theologically a monotheist and philosophically a\ndualist.[4:1] But to maintain that there are \"twin\"[4:2]\nspirits--creators of reality and nonreality--and at the same time to\nhold that these two spirits are united in the Supreme Being,[4:3] is\nvirtually to say that the principle of evil constitutes a part of the\nvery essence of God; and the conflict between good and evil is nothing\nmore than the struggle of God against Himself. There is, therefore, an\ninherent weakness in his attempt to reconcile theological monotheism\nwith philosophical dualism, and the result was a schism among the\nprophet's followers. The Zendiks[4:4] whom Dr. Haug calls heretics, but\nwho were, I believe, decidedly more consistent than their opponents,\nmaintained the independence of the two original spirits from each other,\nwhile the Magi upheld their unity. The upholders of unity endeavoured,\nin various ways, to meet the Zendiks; but the very fact that they tried\ndifferent phrases and expressions to express the unity of the \"Primal\nTwins\", indicates dissatisfaction with their own philosophical\nexplanations, and the strength of their opponent's position.\nS\u0331\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b[5:1] describes briefly the different explanations of the\nMagi. The Zarw\u0101nians look upon Light and Darkness as the sons of\nInfinite Time. The Kiy\u016bmar\u1e6f\u1e96iyya hold that the original principle was\nLight which was afraid of a hostile power, and it was this thought of an\nadversary mixed with fear that led to the birth of Darkness. Another\nbranch of Zarw\u0101nians maintain that the original principle doubted\nconcerning something and this doubt produced Ahriman. Ibn \u1e24azm[5:2]\nspeaks of another sect who explained the principle of Darkness as the\nobscuration of a part of the fundamental principle of Light itself.\n\n [4:1] Essays, p. 303.\n\n [4:2] \"In the beginning there was a pair of twins, two spirits,\n each of a peculiar activity\". Yas. XXX. 1.\n\n [4:3] \"The more beneficial of my spirits has produced, by\n speaking it, the whole rightful creation\". Yas. XIX. 9.\n\n [4:4] The following verse from Buudahish Chap. I. will indicate\n the Zendik view:-- \"And between them (the two principles) there\n was empty space, that is what they call \"air\" in which is now\n their meeting\".\n\n [5:1] S\u0331\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b; ed. Cureton, London, 1846, pp. 182\u2013185.\n\n [5:2] Ibn \u1e24azm--Kit\u0101b al-Milal w\u2019al-Ni\u1e25al. Ed. Cairo. Vol. II,\n p. 34.\n\nWhether the philosophical dualism of Zoroaster can be reconciled with\nhis monotheism or not, it is unquestionable that, from a metaphysical\nstandpoint, he has made a profound suggestion in regard to the ultimate\nnature of reality. The idea seems to have influenced ancient Greek\nPhilosophy[6:1] as well as early Christian Gnostic speculation, and\nthrough the latter, some aspects of modern western thought.[6:2] As a\nthinker he is worthy of great respect not only because he approached the\nproblem of objective multiplicity in a philosophical spirit; but also\nbecause he endeavoured, having been led to metaphysical dualism, to\nreduce his Primary Duality to a higher unity. He seems to have\nperceived, what the mystic shoemaker of Germany perceived long after\nhim, that the diversity of nature could not be explained without\npostulating a principle of negativity or self-differentiation in the\nvery nature of God. His immediate successors did not, however, quite\nrealise the deep significance of their master's suggestions; but we\nshall see, as we advance, how Zoroaster's idea finds a more\nspiritualised expression in some of the aspects of later Persian\nthought.\n\n [6:1] In connection with the influence of Zoroastrian ideas on\n Ancient Greek thought, the following statement made by Erdmann\n is noteworthy, though Lawrence Mills (American Journal of\n Philology Vol. 22) regards such influence as improbable:--\"The\n fact that the handmaids of this force, which he (Heraclitus)\n calls the seed of all that happens and the measure of all order,\n are entitled the \"tongues\" has probably been slightly ascribed\n to the influence of the Persian Magi. On the other hand he\n connects himself with his country's mythology, not indeed\n without a change of exegesis when he places Apollo and Dionysus\n beside Zeus, i.e. The ultimate fire, as the two aspects of his\n nature\". History of Philosophy Vol. I, p. 50.\n\n It is, perhaps, owing to this doubtful influence of\n Zoroastrianism on Heraclitus that Lassalle (quoted by Paul Janet\n in his History of the Problems of Philosophy Vol. II, p. 147)\n looks upon Zoroaster as a precursor of Hegel.\n\n Of Zoroastrian influence on Pythagoras Erdmann says:--\n\n \"The fact that the odd numbers are put above the even has been\n emphasised by Gladisch in his comparison of the Pythagorian with\n the Chinese doctrine, and the fact, moreover, that among the\n oppositions we find those of light and darkness, good and evil,\n has induced many, in ancient and modern times, to suppose that\n they were borrowed from Zoroastrianism.\" Vol. I, p. 33.\n\n [6:2] Among modern English thinkers Mr. Bradley arrives at a\n conclusion similar to that of Zoroaster. Discussing the ethical\n significance of Bradley's Philosophy, Prof. Sorley says:--\"Mr.\n Bradley, like Green, has faith in an eternal reality which might\n be called spiritual, inasmuch as it is not material; like Green\n he looks upon man's moral activity as an appearance--what Green\n calls a reproduction--of this eternal reality. But under this\n general agreement there lies a world of difference. He refuses\n by the use of the term self-conscious, to liken his Absolute to\n the personality of man, and he brings out the consequence which\n in Green is more or less concealed, that the evil equally with\n the good in man and in the world are appearances of the\n Absolute\". Recent tendencies in Ethics, pp. 100\u2013101.\n\nTurning now to his Cosmology, his dualism leads him to bifurcate, as it\nwere, the whole universe into two departments of being--reality i.e.\nthe sum of all good creations flowing from the creative activity of the\nbeneficial spirit, and non-reality[8:1] i.e. the sum of all evil\ncreations proceeding from the hostile spirit. The original conflict of\nthe two spirits is manifested in the opposing forces of nature, which,\ntherefore, presents a continual struggle between the powers of Good and\nthe powers of Evil. But it should be remembered that nothing intervenes\nbetween the original spirits and their respective creations. Things are\ngood and bad because they proceed from good or bad creative agencies, in\ntheir own nature they are quite indifferent. Zoroaster's conception of\ncreation is fundamentally different from that of Plato and Schopenhauer\nto whom spheres of empirical reality reflect non-temporal or temporal\nideas which, so to speak, mediate between Reality and Appearance. There\nare, according to Zoroaster, only two categories of existence, and the\nhistory of the universe is nothing more than a progressive conflict\nbetween the forces falling respectively under these categories. We are,\nlike other things, partakers of this struggle, and it is our duty to\nrange ourselves on the side of Light which will eventually prevail and\ncompletely vanquish the spirit of Darkness. The metaphysics of the\nIranian Prophet, like that of Plato, passes on into Ethics, and it is in\nthe peculiarity of the Ethical aspect of his thought that the influence\nof his social environment is most apparent.\n\n [8:1] This should not be confounded with Plato's non-being. To\n Zoroaster all forms of existence proceeding from the creative\n agency of the spirit of darkness are unreal; because,\n considering the final triumph of the spirit of Light, they have\n a temporary existence only.\n\nZoroaster's view of the destiny of the soul is very simple. The soul,\naccording to him, is a creation, not a part of God as the votaries of\nMithra[9:1] afterwards maintained. It had a beginning in time, but can\nattain to everlasting life by fighting against Evil in the earthly scene\nof its activity. It is free to choose between the only two courses of\naction--good and evil; and besides the power of choice the spirit of\nLight has endowed it with the following faculties:--\n\n 1. Conscience[10:1].\n\n 2. Vital force.\n\n 3. The Soul--The Mind.\n\n 4. The Spirit--Reason.\n\n 5. The Far\u0101was\u0331\u1e96i[10:2].--A kind of tutelary spirit which acts\n as a protection of man in his voyage towards God.\n\nThe last three[10:3] faculties are united together after death, and form\nan indissoluble whole. The virtuous soul, leaving its home of flesh, is\nborne up into higher regions, and has to pass through the following\nplanes of existence:--\n\n 1. The Place of good thoughts.\n\n 2. The Place of good words.\n\n 3. The Place of good works.\n\n 4. The Place of Eternal Glory[11:1].--Where the individual soul\n unites with the principle of Light without losing its\n personality.\n\n [9:1] Mithraism was a phase of Zoroastrianism which spread over\n the Roman world in the second century. The partisans of Mithra\n worshipped the sun whom they looked upon as the great advocate\n of Light. They held the human soul to be a part of God, and\n maintained that the observance of a mysterious cult could bring\n about the souls' union with God. Their doctrine of the soul, its\n ascent towards God by torturing the body and finally passing\n through the sphere of Aether and becoming pure fire, offers some\n resemblance with views entertained by some schools of Persian\n \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism.\n\n [10:1] Geiger's Civilisation of Eastern Iranians, Vol. I,\n p. 124.\n\n [10:2] Dr. Haug (Essays p. 206) compares these protecting\n spirits with the ideas of Plato. They, however, are not to be\n understood as models according to which things are fashioned.\n Plato's ideas, moreover, are eternal, non-temporal and\n non-spatial. The doctrine that everything created by the spirit\n of Light is protected by a subordinate spirit has only an\n outward resemblance with the view that every spirit is fashioned\n according to a perfect supersensible model.\n\n [10:3] The \u1e62\u016bf\u012b conception of the soul is also tripartite.\n According to them the soul is a combination of Mind, heart and\n spirit (Nafs, Qalb, R\u016b\u1e25). The \"heart\" is to them both material\n and immaterial or, more properly, neither--standing midway\n between soul and mind (Nafs and R\u016b\u1e25), and acting as the organ of\n higher knowledge. Perhaps Dr. Schenkel's use of the word\n \"conscience\" would approach the \u1e63\u016bf\u012b idea of \"heart\".\n\n [11:1] Geiger Vol. I, p. 104. (The \u1e63\u016bf\u012b Cosmology has a similar\n doctrine concerning the different stages of existence through\n which the soul has to pass in its journey heavenward. They\n enumerate the following five Planes; but their definition of the\n character of each plane is slightly different:--\n\n 1. The world of body. (N\u0101s\u016bt).\n\n 2. The world of pure intelligence. (Malak\u016bt).\n\n 3. The world of power. (Jabr\u016bt).\n\n 4. The world of negation. (L\u0101h\u016bt).\n\n 5. The world of Absolute Silence. (H\u0101h\u016bt).\n\n The \u1e63\u016bf\u012bs probably borrowed this idea from the Indian Yog\u012bs who\n recognise the following seven Planes:--(Annie Besant:\n Reincarnation, p. 30).\n\n 1. The Plane of Physical Body.\n\n 2. The Plane of Etherial double.\n\n 3. The Plane of Vitality.\n\n 4. The Plane of Emotional Nature.\n\n 5. The Plane of Thought.\n\n 6. The Plane of Spiritual soul--Reason.\n\n 7. The Plane of Pure Spirit.)\n\n\n\n\n\u00a7 II.\n\nM\u0101n\u012b[12:1] and Mazdak[12:2].\n\nWe have seen Zoroaster's solution of the problem of diversity, and the\ntheological or rather philosophical controversy which split up the\nZoroastrian Church. The half-Persian M\u0101n\u012b--\"the founder of Godless\ncommunity\" as Christians styled him afterwards--agrees with those\nZoroastrians who held the Prophet's doctrine in its naked form, and\napproaches the question in a spirit thoroughly materialistic.\nOriginally Persian his father emigrated from Hamad\u0101n to Babylonia where\nM\u0101n\u012b was born in 215 or 216 A.D.--the time when Buddhistic Missionaries\nwere beginning to preach Nirv\u0101na to the country of Zoroaster. The\neclectic character of the religious system of M\u0101n\u012b, its bold extension\nof the Christian idea of redemption, and its logical consistency in\nholding, as a true ground for an ascetic life, that the world is\nessentially evil, made it a real power which influenced not only Eastern\nand Western Christian thought[13:1], but has also left some dim marks on\nthe development of metaphysical speculation in Persia. Leaving the\ndiscussion of the sources[13:2] of M\u0101n\u012b's religious system to the\norientalist, we proceed to describe and finally to determine the\nphilosophical value of his doctrine of the origin of the Phenomenal\nUniverse.\n\n [12:1] Sources used:--\n\n (a) The text of Mu\u1e25ammad ibn Is\u1e25\u0101q, edited by Fl\u00fcgel, pp.\n 52\u201356.\n\n (b) Al-Ya\u2018q\u016bb\u012b: ed. Houtsma, 1883, Vol. I, pp. 180\u2013181.\n\n (c) Ibn \u1e24azm: Kit\u0101b al-Milal w\u2019al-Ni\u1e25al: ed. Cairo, Vol. II,\n p. 36.\n\n (d) S\u0331\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b: ed. Cureton, London, 1846, pp. 188\u2013192.\n\n (e) Encyclopaedia Britannica, Article on M\u0101n\u012b.\n\n (f) Salemann: Bulletin de l'Acad\u00e9mie des Sciences de St.\n Petersburg Series IV, 15 April 1907, pp. 175--184. F. W.\n K. M\u00fcller: Handschriften--Reste in Estrangelo--Schrift\n aus Turfan, Chinesisch--Turkistan, Teil I, II; Sitzungen\n der K\u00f6niglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,\n 11 Feb. 1904, pp. 348\u2013352; und Abhandlungen etc. 1904.\n\n [12:2] Sources used:--\n\n (a) Siy\u0101sat N\u0101mah Niz\u0101m al-Mulk: ed. Charles Schefer,\n Paris, 1897, pp. 166\u2013181.\n\n (b) S\u0331\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b: ed. Cureton, pp. 192\u2013194.\n\n (c) Al-Ya\u2018q\u016bb\u012b: ed. Houtsma, 1883, Vol. I, p. 186.\n\n (d) Al-B\u012br\u016bn\u012b: Chronology of Ancient Nations: tr. E. Sachau,\n London, 1879, p. 192.\n\n [13:1] \"If I see aright, five different conceptions can be\n distinguished for the period about 400 A.D. First we have the\n Manichaean which insinuated its way in the darkness, but was\n widely extended even among the clergy\". (Harnack's History of\n Christian Dogma, Vol. V, p. 56). \"From the anti-Manichaean\n controversy sprang the desire to conceive all God's attributes\n as identical i.e. the interest in the indivisibility of God\",\n (Harnack's History of Christian Dogma, Vol V, p. 120).\n\n [13:2] Some Eastern sources of information about M\u0101n\u012b's\n Philosophy (e.g. Ephraim Syrus mentioned by Prof. A. A. Bevan in\n his Introduction to the Hymn of the Soul) tell us that he was a\n disciple of Bardesanes, the Syrian gnostic. The learned author\n of \"al-Fihrist\", however, mentions some books which M\u0101n\u012b wrote\n against the followers of the Syrian gnostic. Burkitt, in his\n lectures on Early Eastern Christianity, gives a free translation\n of Bardesanes' De Fato, the spirit of which I understand, is\n fully Christian, and thoroughly opposed to the teaching of M\u0101n\u012b.\n Ibn \u1e24azm, however, in his Kit\u0101b al-Milal w\u2019al-Ni\u1e25al (Vol. II, p.\n 36) says, \"Both agreed in other respects, except that M\u0101n\u012b\n believed darkness to be a living principle.\"\n\nThe Paganising gnostic, as Erdmann calls him, teaches that the variety\nof things springs from the mixture of two eternal Principles--Light and\nDarkness--which are separate from and independent of each other. The\nPrinciple of Light connotes ten ideas--Gentleness, Knowledge,\nUnderstanding, Mystery, Insight, Love, Conviction, Faith, Benevolence\nand Wisdom. Similarly the Principle of Darkness connotes five eternal\nideas--Mistiness, Heat, Fire, Venom, Darkness. Along with these two\nprimordial principles and connected with each, M\u0101n\u012b recognises the\neternity of space and earth, each connoting respectively the ideas of\nknowledge, understanding, mystery, insight, breath, air, water, light\nand fire. In darkness--the feminine Principle in Nature--were hidden\nthe elements of evil which, in course of time, concentrated and resulted\nin the composition, so to speak, of the hideous looking Devil--the\nprinciple of activity. This first born child of the fiery womb of\ndarkness, attacked the domain of the King of Light who, in order to ward\noff his malicious onslaught, created the Primal man. A serious conflict\nensued between the two creatures, and resulted in the complete\nvanquishment of the Primal Man. The evil one, then, succeeded in mixing\ntogether the five elements of darkness with the five elements of light.\nThereupon the ruler of the domain of light ordered some of his angels to\nconstruct the Universe out of these mixed elements with a view to free\nthe atoms of light from their imprisonment. But the reason why darkness\nwas the first to attack light, is that the latter, being in its essence\ngood, could not proceed to start the process of admixture which was\nessentially harmful to itself. The attitude of M\u0101n\u012b's Cosmology,\ntherefore, to the Christian doctrine of Redemption is similar to that of\nHegelian Cosmology to the doctrine of the Trinity. To him redemption is\na physical process, and all procreation, because it protracts the\nimprisonment of light, is contrary to the aim and object of the\nUniverse. The imprisoned atoms of light are continually set free from\ndarkness which is thrown down in the unfathomable ditch round the\nUniverse. The liberated light, however, passes on to the sun and the\nmoon whence it is carried by angels to the region of light--the eternal\nhome of the King of Paradise--\"P\u00eed i vazarg\u00ee\u00ee\"--Father of greatness.\n\nThis is a brief account of M\u0101n\u012b's fantastic Cosmology.[16:1] He rejects\nthe Zoroastrian hypothesis of creative agencies to explain the problem\nof objective existence. Taking a thoroughly materialistic view of the\nquestion, he ascribes the phenomenal universe to the _mixture_ of two\nindependent, eternal principles, one of which (darkness) is not only a\npart of the universe--stuff, but also the source wherein activity\nresides, as it were, slumbering, and starts up into being when the\nfavourable moment arrives. The essential idea of his cosmology,\ntherefore, has a curious resemblance with that of the great Hind\u016b\nthinker Kapila, who accounts for the production of the universe by the\nhypothesis of three gunas, i.e. Sattwa (goodness), Tamas (darkness), and\nRajas (motion or passion) which mix together to form Nature, when the\nequilibrium of the primordial matter (Prakrit\u012b) is upset. Of the various\nsolutions[17:1] of the problem of diversity which the Ved\u0101ntist solved\nby postulating the mysterious power of \"M\u0101y\u0101\", and Leibniz, long\nafterwards, explained by his doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles,\nM\u0101n\u012b's solution, though childish, must find a place in the historical\ndevelopment of philosophical ideas. Its philosophical value may be\ninsignificant; but one thing is certain, i.e. M\u0101n\u012b was the first to\nventure the suggestion that the Universe is due to the activity of the\nDevil, and hence essentially evil--a proposition which seems to me to be\nthe only logical justification of a system which preaches renunciation\nas the guiding principle of life. In our own times Schopenhauer has been\nled to the same conclusion; though, unlike M\u0101n\u012b, he supposes the\nprinciple of objectification or individuation--\"the sinful bent\" of the\nwill to life--to exist in the very nature of the Primal Will and not\nindependent of it.\n\n [16:1] It is interesting to compare M\u0101n\u012b's Philosophy of Nature\n with the Chinese notion of Creation, according to which all that\n exists flows from the Union of Yin and Yang. But the Chinese\n reduced these two principles to a higher unity:--Tai Keih. To\n M\u0101n\u012b such a reduction was not possible; since he could not\n conceive that things of opposite nature could proceed from the\n same principle.\n\n [17:1] Thomas Aquinas states and criticises M\u0101n\u012b's contrariety\n of Primal agents in the following manner:--\n\n (a) What all things seek even a principle of evil would seek.\n But all things seek their own self-preservation.\n \u2042 Even a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation.\n\n (b) What all things seek is good.\n But self-preservation is what all things seek.\n \u2042 Self-preservation is good.\n But a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation.\n \u2042 A principle of evil would seek some good--which shows that it\n is self-contradictory.\n\n God and His Creatures, Book II, p. 105. Rickaby's Tr.\n\nTurning now to the remarkable socialist of ancient Persia--_Mazdak_.\nThis early prophet of communism appeared during the reign of\nAn\u016bs\u0331\u1e96\u012brw\u0101n the Just (531\u2013578 A.D.), and marked another dualistic\nreaction against the prevailing Zarw\u0101nian doctrine[18:1]. Mazdak, like\nM\u0101n\u012b, taught that the diversity of things springs from the mixture of\ntwo independent, eternal principles which he called S\u0331\u1e96\u012bd (Light) and\nT\u0101r (Darkness). But he differs from his predecessor in holding that the\nfact of their mixture as well as their final separation, are quite\naccidental, and not at all the result of choice. Mazdak's God is endowed\nwith sensation, and has four principal energies in his eternal\npresence--power of discrimination, memory, understanding and bliss.\nThese four energies have four personal manifestations who, assisted by\nfour other persons, superintend the course of the Universe. Variety in\nthings and men is due to the various combinations of the original\nprinciples.\n\n [18:1] The Zarw\u0101nian doctrine prevailed in Persia in the 5th\n century B.C. (See Z. D. M. G., Vol. LVII, p. 562).\n\nBut the most characteristic feature of the Mazdakite teaching is its\ncommunism, which is evidently an inference from the cosmopolitan spirit\nof M\u0101n\u012b's Philosophy. All men, said Mazdak, are equal; and the notion of\nindividual property was introduced by the hostile demons whose object is\nto turn God's Universe into a scene of endless misery. It is chiefly\nthis aspect of Mazdak's teaching that was most shocking to the\nZoroastrian conscience, and finally brought about the destruction of his\nenormous following, even though the master was supposed to have\nmiraculously made the sacred Fire talk, and bear witness to the truth of\nhis mission.\n\n\n\u00a7 III.\n\nRetrospect.\n\nWe have seen some of the aspects of Pre-Islamic Persian thought; though,\nowing to our ignorance of the tendencies of S\u0101ss\u0101n\u012bde thought, and of\nthe political, social, and intellectual conditions that determined its\nevolution, we have not been able fully to trace the continuity of ideas.\nNations as well as individuals, in their intellectual history, begin\nwith the objective. Although the moral fervour of Zoroaster gave a\nspiritual tone to his theory of the origin of things, yet the net result\nof this period of Persian speculation is nothing more than a\nmaterialistic dualism. The principle of Unity as a philosophical ground\nof all that exists, is but dimly perceived at this stage of intellectual\nevolution in Persia. The controversy among the followers of Zoroaster\nindicates that the movement towards a monistic conception of the\nUniverse had begun; but we have unfortunately no evidence to make a\npositive statement concerning the pantheistic tendencies of Pre-Islamic\nPersian thought. We know that in the 6{th} century A.D., Diogenes,\nSimplicius and other Neo-Platonic thinkers, were driven by the\npersecution of Justinian, to take refuge in the court of the tolerant\nAn\u016bs\u0331\u1e96\u012brw\u0101n. This great monarch, moreover, had several works translated\nfor him from Sanskrit and Greek, but we have no historical evidence to\nshow how far these events actually influenced the course of Persian\nthought. Let us, therefore, pass on to the advent of Isl\u0101m in Persia,\nwhich completely shattered the old order of things, and brought to the\nthinking mind the new concept of an uncompromising monotheism as well as\nthe Greek dualism of God and matter, as distinguished from the purely\nPersian dualism of God and Devil.\n\n\n\n\nPART II.\n\nGreek Dualism.\n\n\n\n\nCHAP. II.\n\nTHE NEO-PLATONIC ARISTOTELIANS OF PERSIA.\n\n\nWith the Arab conquest of Persia, a new era begins in the history of\nPersian thought. But the warlike sons of sandy Arabia whose swords\nterminated, at Nah\u0101wand, the political independence of this ancient\npeople, could hardly touch the intellectual freedom of the converted\nZoroastrian.\n\nThe political revolution brought about by the Arab conquest marks the\nbeginning of interaction between the Aryan and the Semitic, and we find\nthat the Persian, though he lets the surface of his life become largely\nsemitised, quietly converts Isl\u0101m to his own Aryan habits of thought. In\nthe west the sober Hellenic intellect interpreted another Semitic\nreligion--Christianity; and the results of interpretation in both cases\nare strikingly similar. In each case the aim of the interpreting\nintellect is to soften the extreme rigidity of an absolute law imposed\non the individual from without; in one word it is an endeavour to\ninternalise the external. This process of transformation began with the\nstudy of Greek thought which, though combined with other causes,\nhindered the growth of native speculation, yet marked a transition from\nthe purely objective attitude of Pre-Islamic Persian Philosophy to the\nsubjective attitude of later thinkers. It is, I believe, largely due to\nthe influence of foreign thought that the old monistic tendency when it\nreasserted itself about the end of the 8{th} century, assumed a much\nmore spiritual aspect; and, in its later development, revivified and\nspiritualised the old Iranian dualism of Light and Darkness. The fact,\ntherefore, that Greek thought roused into fresh life the subtle Persian\nintellect, and largely contributed to, and was finally assimilated by\nthe general course of intellectual evolution in Persia, justifies us in\nbriefly running over, even though at the risk of repetition, the systems\nof the Persian Neo-Platonists who, as such, deserve very little\nattention in a history of purely Persian thought.\n\nIt must, however, be remembered that Greek wisdom flowed towards the\nMoslem east through \u1e24arr\u0101n and Syria. The Syrians took up the latest\nGreek speculation i.e. Neo-Platonism and transmitted to the Moslem what\nthey believed to be the real philosophy of Aristotle. It is surprising\nthat Mohammedan Philosophers, Arabs as well as Persians, continued\nwrangling over what they believed to be the real teaching of Aristotle\nand Plato, and it never occurred to them that for a thorough\ncomprehension of their Philosophies, the knowledge of Greek language was\nabsolutely necessary. So great was their ignorance that an epitomised\ntranslation of the Enneads of Plotinus was accepted as \"Theology of\nAristotle\". It took them centuries to arrive at a clear conception of\nthe two great masters of Greek thought; and it is doubtful whether they\never completely understood them. Avicenna is certainly clearer and more\noriginal than Al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b and Ibn Maskawaih; and the Andelusian Averroes,\nthough he is nearer to Aristotle than any of his predecessors, is yet\nfar from a complete grasp of Aristotle's Philosophy. It would, however,\nbe unjust to accuse them of servile imitation. The history of their\nspeculation is one continuous attempt to wade through a hopeless mass of\nabsurdities that careless translators of Greek Philosophy had\nintroduced. They had largely to rethink the Philosophies of Aristotle\nand Plato. Their commentaries constitute, so to speak, an effort at\ndiscovery, not exposition. The very circumstances which left them no\ntime to think out independent systems of thought, point to a subtle\nmind, unfortunately cabined and cribbed by a heap of obstructing\nnonsense that patient industry had gradually to eliminate, and thus to\nwinnow out truth from falsehood. With these preliminary remarks we\nproceed to consider Persian students of Greek Philosophy individually.\n\n\n\u00a7 I.\n\nIbn Maskawaih[26:1] (d. 1030).\n\nPassing over the names of Sara\u1e35\u1e96s\u012b[26:2], F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b who was a Turk, and\nthe Physician R\u0101z\u012b (d. 932 A.D.) who, true to his Persian habits of\nthought, looked upon light as the first creation, and admitted the\neternity of matter, space and time, we come to the illustrious name of\nAbu \u2018Al\u012b Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Ya\u2018q\u016bb, commonly known as _Ibn\nMaskawaih_--the treasurer of the Buwaihid Sult\u0101n \u2018Ad\u0324aduddaula--one of\nthe most eminent theistic thinkers, physicians, moralists and historians\nof Persia. I give below a brief account of his system from his well\nknown work Al-Fauz al-A\u1e63g\u0331\u1e96ar, published in Beir\u016bt.\n\n [26:1] Dr. Boer, in his Philosophy of Isl\u0101m, gives a full\n account of the Philosophy of Al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b and Avicenna; but his\n account of Ibn Maskawaih's Philosophy is restricted to the\n Ethical teaching of that Philosopher. I have given here his\n metaphysical views which are decidedly more systematic than\n those of Al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b. Instead of repeating Avicenna's\n Neo-Platonism I have briefly stated what I believe to be his\n original contribution to the thought of his country.\n\n [26:2] Sara\u1e35\u1e96s\u012b died in 899 A.D. He was a disciple of the\n Arabian Philosopher Al-Kind\u012b. His works, unfortunately, have not\n reached us.\n\n1. _The existence of the ultimate principle._\n\nHere Ibn Maskawaih follows Aristotle, and reproduces his argument based\non the fact of physical motion. All bodies have the inseparable property\nof motion which covers all forms of change, and does not proceed from\nthe nature of bodies themselves. Motion, therefore, demands an external\nsource or prime mover. The supposition that motion may constitute the\nvery essence of bodies, is contradicted by experience. Man, for\ninstance, has the power of free movement; but, on the supposition,\ndifferent parts of his body must continue to move even after they are\nsevered from one another. The series of moving causes, therefore, must\nstop at a cause which, itself immovable, moves everything else. The\nimmobility of the Primal cause is essential; for the supposition of\nmotion in the Primal cause would necessitate infinite regress, which is\nabsurd.\n\nThe immovable mover is one. A multiplicity of original movers must imply\nsomething common in their nature, so that they might be brought under\nthe same category. It must also imply some point of difference in order\nto distinguish them from each other. But this partial identity and\ndifference necessitate composition in their respective essences; and\ncomposition, being a form of motion, cannot, as we have shown, exist in\nthe first cause of motion. The prime mover again is eternal and\nimmaterial. Since transition from non-existence to existence is a form\nof motion; and since matter is always subject to some kind of motion, it\nfollows that a thing which is not eternal, or is, in any way, associated\nwith matter, must be in motion.\n\n2. _The Knowledge of the Ultimate._\n\nAll human knowledge begins from sensations which are gradually\ntransformed into perceptions. The earlier stages of intellection are\ncompletely conditioned by the presence of external reality. But the\nprogress of knowledge means to be able to think without being\nconditioned by matter. Thought begins with matter, but its object is to\ngradually free itself from the primary condition of its own\npossibility. A higher stage, therefore, is reached in imagination--the\npower to reproduce and retain in the mind the copy or image of a thing\nwithout reference to the external objectivity of the thing itself. In\nthe formation of concepts thought reaches a still higher stage in point\nof freedom from materiality; though the concept, in so far as it is the\nresult of comparison and assimilation of percepts, cannot be regarded as\nhaving completely freed itself from the gross cause of sensations. But\nthe fact that conception is based on perception, should not lead us to\nignore the great difference between the nature of the concept and the\npercept. The individual (percept) is undergoing constant change which\naffects the character of the knowledge founded on mere perception. The\nknowledge of individuals, therefore, lacks the element of permanence.\nThe universal (concept), on the other hand, is not affected by the law\nof change. Individuals change; the universal remains intact. It is the\nessence of matter to submit to the law of change: the freer a thing is\nfrom matter, the less liable it is to change. God, therefore, being\nabsolutely free from matter, is absolutely changeless; and it is His\ncomplete freedom from materiality that makes our conception of Him\ndifficult or impossible. The object of all philosophical training is to\ndevelop the power of \"ideation\" or contemplation on pure concepts, in\norder that constant practice might make possible the conception of the\nabsolutely immaterial.\n\n3. _How the one creates the many._\n\nIn this connection it is necessary, for the sake of clearness, to divide\nIbn Maskawaih's investigations into two parts:--\n\n(a) _That the ultimate agent or cause created the Universe out of\nnothing._ Materialists, he says, hold the eternity of matter, and\nattribute form to the creative activity of God. It is, however, admitted\nthat when matter passes from one form into another form, the previous\nform becomes absolutely non-existent. For if it does not become\nabsolutely non-existent, it must either pass off into some other body,\nor continue to exist in the same body. The first alternative is\ncontradicted by every day experience. If we transform a ball of wax\ninto a solid square, the original rotundity of the ball does not pass\noff into some other body. The second alternative is also impossible; for\nit would necessitate the conclusion that two contradictory forms e.g.\ncircularity and length, can exist in the same body. It, therefore,\nfollows that the original form passes into absolute non-existence, when\nthe new form comes into being. This argument proves conclusively that\nattributes i.e., form, color, etc., come into being from pure nothing.\nIn order to understand that the substance is also non-eternal like the\nattribute, we should grasp the truth of the following propositions:--\n\n1. The analysis of matter results in a number of different elements, the\ndiversity of which is reduced to one simple element.\n\n2. Form and matter are inseparable: no change in matter can annihilate\nform.\n\nFrom these two propositions, Ibn Maskawaih concludes that the substance\nhad a beginning in time. Matter like form must have begun to exist;\nsince the eternity of matter necessitates the eternity of form which,\nas we have seen, cannot be regarded as eternal.\n\n(b) _The process of creation._ What is the cause of this immense\ndiversity which meets us on all sides? How could the many be created by\none? When, says the Philosopher, one cause produces a number of\ndifferent effects, their multiplicity may depend on any of the following\nreasons:--\n\n1. The cause may have various powers. Man, for instance, being a\ncombination of various elements and powers, may be the cause of various\nactions.\n\n2. The cause may use various means to produce a variety of effects.\n\n3. The cause may work upon a variety of material.\n\nNone of these propositions can be true of the nature of the ultimate\ncause--God. That he possesses various powers, distinct from one another,\nis manifestly absurd; since his nature does not admit of composition. If\nhe is supposed to have employed different means to produce diversity,\nwho is the creator of these means? If these means are due to the\ncreative agency of some cause other than the ultimate cause, there\nwould be a plurality of ultimate causes. If, on the other hand, the\nUltimate Cause himself created these means, he must have required other\nmeans to create these means. The third proposition is also inadmissible\nas a conception of the creative act. The many cannot flow from the\ncausal action of one agent. It, therefore, follows that we have only one\nway out of the difficulty--that the ultimate cause created only one\nthing which led to the creation of another. Ibn Maskawaih here\nenumerates the usual Neo-Platonic emanations gradually growing grosser\nand grosser until we reach the primordial elements, which combine and\nrecombine to evolve higher and higher forms of life. S\u0331\u1e96ibl\u012b thus sums\nup Ibn Maskawaih's theory of evolution[33:1]:--\n\n\"The combination of primary substances produced the mineral kingdom, the\nlowest form of life. A higher stage of evolution is reached in the\nvegetable kingdom. The first to appear is spontaneous grass; then plants\nand various kinds of trees, some of which touch the border-land of\nanimal kingdom, in so far as they manifest certain animal\ncharacteristics. Intermediary between the vegetable kingdom and the\nanimal kingdom there is a certain form of life which is neither animal\nnor vegetable, but shares the characteristics of both (e.g. coral). The\nfirst step beyond this intermediary stage of life, is the development of\nthe power of movement, and the sense of touch in tiny worms which crawl\nupon the earth. The sense of touch, owing to the process of\ndifferentiation, develops other forms of sense, until we reach the plane\nof higher animals in which intelligence begins to manifest itself in an\nascending scale. Humanity is touched in the ape which undergoes further\ndevelopment, and gradually develops erect stature and power of\nunderstanding similar to man. Here animality ends and humanity begins\".\n\n [33:1] Maul\u0101n\u0101 S\u0331\u1e96ibl\u012b \u2018Ilm al-Kal\u0101m, p. 141. (Haidar\u0101b\u0101d).\n\n4. _The soul._\n\nIn order to understand whether the soul has an independent existence, we\nshould examine the nature of human knowledge. It is the essential\nproperty of matter that it cannot assume two different forms\nsimultaneously. To transform a silver spoon into a silver glass, it is\nnecessary that the spoon-form as such, should cease to exist. This\nproperty is common to all bodies, and a body that lacks it cannot be\nregarded as a body. Now when we examine the nature of perception, we see\nthat there is a principle in man which, in so far as it is able to know\nmore than one thing at a time, can assume, so to say, many different\nforms simultaneously. This principle cannot be matter, since it lacks\nthe fundamental property of matter. The essence of the soul consists in\nthe power of perceiving a number of objects at one and the same moment\nof time. But it may be objected that the soul-principle may be either\nmaterial in its essence, or a function of matter. There are, however,\nreasons to show that the soul cannot be a function of matter.\n\n(a). A thing which assumes different forms and states, cannot itself be\none of those forms and states. A body which receives different colors\nshould be, in its own nature, colorless. The soul, in its perception of\nexternal objects, assumes, as it were, various forms and states; it,\ntherefore, cannot be regarded as one of those forms. Ibn Maskawaih\nseems to give no countenance to the contemporary Faculty-Psychology; to\nhim different mental states are various transformations of the soul\nitself.\n\n(b). The attributes are constantly changing; there must be beyond the\nsphere of change, some permanent substratum which is the foundation of\npersonal identity.\n\nHaving shown that the soul cannot be regarded as a function of matter,\nIbn Maskawaih proceeds to prove that it is essentially immaterial. Some\nof his arguments may be noticed:--\n\n1. The senses, after they have perceived a strong stimulus, cannot, for\na certain amount of time, perceive a weaker stimulus. It is, however,\nquite different with the mental act of cognition.\n\n2. When we reflect on an abstruse subject, we endeavour to completely\nshut our eyes to the objects around us, which we regard as so many\nhindrances in the way of spiritual activity. If the soul is material in\nits essence, it need not, in order to secure unimpeded activity, escape\nfrom the world of matter.\n\n3. The perception of a strong stimulus weakens and sometimes injures the\nsense. The intellect, on the other hand, grows in strength with the\nknowledge of ideas and general notions.\n\n4. Physical weakness due to old age, does not affect mental vigour.\n\n5. The soul can conceive certain propositions which have no connection\nwith the sense-data. The senses, for instance, cannot perceive that two\ncontradictories cannot exist together.\n\n6. There is a certain power in us which rules over physical organs,\ncorrects sense-errors, and unifies all knowledge. This unifying\nprinciple which reflects over the material brought before it through the\nsense-channel, and, weighing the evidence of each sense, decides the\ncharacter of rival statements, must itself stand above the sphere of\nmatter.\n\nThe combined force of these considerations, says Ibn Maskawaih,\nconclusively establishes the truth of the proposition--that the soul is\nessentially immaterial. The immateriality of the soul signifies its\nimmortality; since mortality is a characteristic of the material.\n\n\n\u00a7 II.\n\nAvicenna (d. 1037).\n\nAmong the early Persian Philosophers, Avicenna alone attempted to\nconstruct his own system of thought. His work, called \"Eastern\nPhilosophy\" is still extant; and there has also come down to us a\nfragment[38:1] in which the Philosopher has expressed his views on the\nuniversal operation of the force of love in nature. It is something like\nthe contour of a system, and it is quite probable that ideas expressed\ntherein were afterwards fully worked out.\n\n [38:1] This fragment on love is preserved in the collected works\n of Avicenna in the British Museum Library and has been edited by\n N. A. F. Mehren. (Leiden, 1894.)\n\nAvicenna defines \"Love\" as the appreciation of Beauty; and from the\nstandpoint of this definition he explains that there are three\ncategories of being:--\n\n1. Things that are at the highest point of perfection.\n\n2. Things that are at the lowest point of perfection.\n\n3. Things that stand between the two poles of perfection. But the third\ncategory has no real existence; since there are things that have already\nattained the acme of perfection, and there are others still progressing\ntowards perfection. This striving for the ideal is love's movement\ntowards beauty which, according to Avicenna, is identical with\nperfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love\nwhich actualises all striving, movement, progress. Things are so\nconstituted that they hate non-existence, and love the joy of\nindividuality in various forms. The indeterminate matter, dead in\nitself, assumes, or more properly, is made to assume by the inner force\nof love, various forms, and rises higher and higher in the scale of\nbeauty. The operation of this ultimate force, in the physical plane, can\nbe thus indicated:--\n\n1. Inanimate objects are combinations of form, matter and quality. Owing\nto the working of this mysterious power, quality sticks to its subject\nor substance; and form embraces indeterminate matter which, impelled by\nthe mighty force of love, rises from form to form.\n\n2. The tendency of the force of love is to centralise itself. In the\nvegetable kingdom it attains a higher degree of unity or centralisation;\nthough the soul still lacks that unity of action which it attains\nafterwards. The processes of the vegetative soul are:--\n\n(a) Assimilation.\n\n(b) Growth.\n\n(c) Reproduction.\n\nThese processes, however, are nothing more than so many manifestations\nof love. Assimilation indicates attraction and transformation of what is\nexternal into what is internal. Growth is love of achieving more and\nmore harmony of parts; and reproduction means perpetuation of the kind,\nwhich is only another phase of love.\n\n3. In the animal kingdom, the various operations of the force of love\nare still more unified. It does preserve the vegetable instinct of\nacting in different directions; but there is also the development of\ntemperament which is a step towards more unified activity. In man this\ntendency towards unification manifests itself in self-consciousness. The\nsame force of \"natural or constitutional love\", is working in the life\nof beings higher than man. All things are moving towards the first\nBeloved--the Eternal Beauty. The worth of a thing is decided by its\nnearness to or distance from, this ultimate principle.\n\nAs a physician, however, Avicenna is especially interested in the nature\nof the Soul. In his times, moreover, the doctrine of metempsychosis was\ngetting more and more popular. He, therefore, discusses the nature of\nthe soul, with a view to show the falsity of this doctrine. It is\ndifficult, he says, to define the soul; since it manifests different\npowers and tendencies in different planes of being. His view of the\nvarious powers of the soul can be thus represented:--\n\n1. Manifestation as unconscious activity--\n\n (a). Working in different directions \u250c 1. Assimilation.\n (Vegetative soul) \u2502 2. Growth.\n \u2514 3. Reproduction.\n\n(b). Working in one direction and securing uniformity of action--growth\nof temperament.\n\n2. Manifestation as conscious activity--\n\n(a). As directed to more than one object--\n\n Animal soul.\n \u2502\n \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510\n \u2502 \u2502\n Lower Animals. Man.\n\n A. Perceptive powers. A. Perceptive powers.\n B. Motive powers (desire (a) Five external senses.\n of pleasure and avoidance (b) Five internal senses--\n of pain). 1. Sensorium.\n 2. Retention of images.\n 3. Conception.\n 4. Imagination.\n 5. Memory.\n\n These constitute the five internal\n senses of the soul which, in man,\n manifests itself as progressive\n reason, developing from human to\n angelic and prophetic reason.\n\n B. Motive powers--will.\n\n(b). As directed to one object--The soul of the spheres which continue\nin one uniform motion.\n\nIn his fragment on \"Nafs\" (soul) Avicenna endeavours to show that a\nmaterial accompaniment is not necessary to the soul. It is not through\nthe instrumentality of the body, or some power of the body, that the\nsoul conceives or imagines; since if the soul necessarily requires a\nphysical medium in conceiving other things, it must require a different\nbody in order to conceive the body attached to itself. Moreover, the\nfact that the soul is immediately self conscious--conscious of itself\nthrough itself--conclusively shows that in its essence the soul is quite\nindependent of any physical accompaniment. The doctrine of\nmetempsychosis implies, also, individual pre-existence. But supposing\nthat the soul did exist before the body, it must have existed either as\none or as many. The multiplicity of bodies is due to the multiplicity of\nmaterial forms, and does not indicate the multiplicity of souls. On the\nother hand, if it existed as one, the ignorance or knowledge of A must\nmean the ignorance or knowledge of B; since the soul is one in both.\nThese categories, therefore, cannot be applied to the soul. The truth\nis, says Avicenna, that body and soul are contiguous to each other, but\nquite opposite in their respective essences. The disintegration of the\nbody does not necessitate the annihilation of the soul. Dissolution or\ndecay is a property of compounds, and not of simple, indivisible, ideal\nsubstances. Avicenna, then denies pre-existence, and endeavours to show\nthe possibility of disembodied conscious life beyond the grave.\n\nWe have run over the work of the early Persian Neo-Platonists among\nwhom, as we have seen, Avicenna alone learned to think for himself. Of\nthe generations of his disciples--Behmeny\u0101r, Ab u\u2019l-Ma\u2019m\u016bm of Isfah\u0101n,\nMa\u2018\u1e63\u016bm\u012b, Ab u\u2019l-\u2018Abb\u0101s, Ibn T\u0101hir[44:1]--who carried on their master's\nPhilosophy, we need not speak. So powerful was the spell of Avicenna's\npersonality that, even long after it had been removed, any amplification\nor modification of his views was considered to be an unpardonable crime.\nThe old Iranian idea of the dualism of Light and Darkness, does not act\nas a determining factor in the progress of Neo-Platonic ideas in Persia,\nwhich borrowed independent life for a time, and eventually merged their\nseparate existence in the general current of Persian speculation. They\nare, therefore, connected with the course of indigenous thought only in\nso far as they contributed to the strength and expansion of that\nmonistic tendency, which manifested itself early in the Church of\nZoroaster; and, though for a time hindered by the Theological\ncontroversies of Isl\u0101m, burst out with redoubled force in later times,\nto extend its titanic grasp to all the previous intellectual\nachievements of the land of its birth.\n\n [44:1] Al-Baihaqi; fol. 28a et seqq.\n\n\n\n\nCHAP. III.\n\nTHE RISE AND FALL OF RATIONALISM IN ISL\u0100M.\n\n\n\u00a7 I.\n\nThe Metaphysics of Rationalism--Materialism.\n\nThe Persian mind, having adjusted itself to the new political\nenvironment, soon reasserts its innate freedom, and begins to retire\nfrom the field of objectivity, in order that it may come back to itself,\nand reflect upon the material achieved in its journey out of its own\ninwardness. With the study of Greek thought, the spirit which was almost\nlost in the concrete, begins to reflect and realise itself as the\narbiter of truth. Subjectivity asserts itself, and endeavours to\nsupplant all outward authority. Such a period, in the intellectual\nhistory of a people, must be the epoch of rationalism, scepticism,\nmysticism, heresy--forms in which the human mind, swayed by the growing\nforce of subjectivity, rejects all external standards of truth. And so\nwe find the epoch under consideration.\n\nThe period of Umayyad dominance is taken up with the process of\nco-mingling and adjustment to new conditions of life; but with the rise\nof the \u2018Abb\u0101sid Dynasty and the study of Greek Philosophy, the pent-up\nintellectual force of Persia bursts out again, and exhibits wonderful\nactivity in all the departments of thought and action. The fresh\nintellectual vigour imparted by the assimilation of Greek Philosophy\nwhich was studied with great avidity, led immediately to a critical\nexamination of Islamic Monotheism. Theology, enlivened by religious\nfervour, learned to talk the language of Philosophy earlier than cold\nreason began to seek a retired corner, away from the noise of\ncontroversy, in order to construct a consistent theory of things. In the\nfirst half of the 8{th} century we find W\u0101\u1e63il Ibn \u2018At\u0101--a Persian\ndisciple of the famous theologian \u1e24asan of Ba\u1e63ra--starting Mu\u2018tazilaism\n(Rationalism)--that most interesting movement which engaged some of the\nsubtlest minds of Persia, and finally exhausted its force in the keen\nmetaphysical controversies of Bag\u0331\u1e96d\u0101d and Ba\u1e63ra. The famous city of\nBa\u1e63ra had become, owing to its commercial situation, the playground of\nvarious forces--Greek Philosophy, Scepticism, Christianity, Buddhistic\nideas, Manichaeism[47:1]--which furnished ample spiritual food to the\ninquiring mind of the time, and formed the intellectual environment of\nIslamic Rationalism. What Spitta calls the Syrian period of Muhammadan\nHistory is not characterised with metaphysical subtleties. With the\nadvent of the Persian Period, however, Muhammadan students of Greek\nPhilosophy began properly to reflect on their religion; and the\nMu\u2018tazila thinkers[47:2], gradually drifted into metaphysics with which\nalone we are concerned here. It is not our object to trace the history\nof the Mu\u2018tazila Kal\u0101m; for present purposes it will be sufficient if we\nbriefly reveal the metaphysical implications of the Mu\u2018tazila view of\nIsl\u0101m. The conception of God, and the theory of matter, therefore, are\nthe only aspects of Rationalism which we propose to discuss here.\n\n [47:1] During the \u2018Abb\u0101sid Period there were many who secretly\n held Manichaean opinions. See Fihrist, Leipsig 1871, p. 338; See\n also Al-Mu\u2018tazila, ed. by T. W. Arnold, Leipsig 1902, p. 27,\n where the author speaks of a controversy between Abu\n \u2019l-Hu\u1e0f\u1e96ail and \u1e62\u0101lih, the Dualist. See also Macdonald's Muslim\n Theology, p. 133.\n\n [47:2] The Mu\u2018tazilas belonged to various nationalities, and\n many of them were Persians either by descent or domicile. W\u0101\u1e63il\n Ibn \u2018At\u0101--the reported founder of the sect--was a Persian\n (Browne, Lit. His., Vol I, p. 281). Von Kremer, however, traces\n their origin to the theological controversies of the Umayyad\n period. Mu\u2018tazilaism was not an essentially Persian movement;\n but it is true, as Prof. Browne observes (Lit. His., Vol. I, p.\n 283) that S\u0331\u1e96i\u2018ite and Q\u0101dar\u012b tenets, indeed, often went\n together, and the S\u0331\u1e96i\u2018ite doctrine current in Persia at the\n present day is in many respects Mu\u2018tazilite, while \u1e24asan\n Al-As\u0331\u1e96\u2018ar\u012b, the great opponent of the Mu\u2018tazilite, is by the\n S\u0331\u1e96i\u2018ites held in horror. It may also be added that some of the\n greater representatives of the Mu\u2018tazila opinion were S\u0331\u1e96i\u2018as\n by religion, e.g. Abu \u2019l-Hu\u1e0f\u1e96ail (Al-Mu\u2018tazila, ed. by T. W.\n Arnold, p. 28). On the other hand many of the followers of\n Al-As\u0331\u1e96\u2018ari were Persians (See extracts from Ibn \u2018As\u0101kir ed.\n Mehren), so that it does not seem to be quite justifiable to\n describe the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite mode of thought as a purely semitic\n movement.\n\nHis conception of the unity of God at which the Mu\u2018tazila eventually\narrived by a subtle dialectic is one of the fundamental points in which\nhe differs from the Orthodox Muhammadan. God's attributes, according to\nhis view, cannot be said to inhere in him; they form the very essence of\nHis nature. The Mu\u2018tazila, therefore, denies the separate reality of\ndivine attributes, and declares their absolute identity with the\nabstract divine Principle. \"God\", says Abu\u2019l-Hu\u1e0f\u1e96ail, \"is knowing,\nall-powerful, living; and his knowledge, power and life constitute His\nvery essence (\u1e0f\u1e96\u0101t)\"[49:1]. In order to explain the pure unity of God\nJoseph Al-Ba\u1e63\u012br[49:2] lays down the following five principles:--\n\n(1). The necessary supposition of atom and accident.\n\n(2). The necessary supposition of a creator.\n\n(3). The necessary supposition of the conditions (A\u1e25w\u0101l) of God.\n\n(4). The rejection of those attributes which do not befit God.\n\n(5). The unity of God in spite of the plurality of His attributes.\n\n [49:1] S\u0331\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b: Cureton's ed., p. 34.\n\n [49:2] Dr. Frankl: Ein Mu\u2018tazilitischer Kal\u0101m--Wien 1872, p. 13.\n\nThis conception of unity underwent further modifications; until in the\nhands of Mu\u2018ammar and Abu H\u0101s\u0331\u1e96im it became a mere abstract possibility\nabout which nothing could be predicated. We cannot, he says, predicate\nknowledge of God[50:1], for His knowledge must be of something in\nHimself. The first necessitates the identity of subject and object which\nis absurd; the second implicates duality in the nature of God which is\nequally impossible. A\u1e25mad and Fa\u1e0dl[50:2]--disciples of Nazz\u0101m, however,\nrecognised this duality in holding that the original creators are\ntwo--God--the eternal principle; and the word of God--Jesus Christ--the\ncontingent principle. But more fully to bring out the element of truth\nin the second alternative suggested by Mu\u2018ammar, was reserved, as we\nshall see, for later \u1e62\u016bf\u012b thinkers of Persia. It is, therefore, clear\nthat some of the rationalists almost unconsciously touched the outer\nfringe of later pantheism for which, in a sense, they prepared the way,\nnot only by their definition of God, but also by their common effort to\ninternalise the rigid externality of an absolute law.\n\n [50:1] S\u0331\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b: Cureton's ed., p. 48. See also\n Steiner--Die Mutaziliten, p. 59.\n\n [50:2] Ibn \u1e24azm (Cairo, ed. I) Vol. IV, p. 197. See also\n S\u0331\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b: Cureton's ed., p. 42.\n\nBut the most important contribution of the advocates of Rationalism to\npurely metaphysical speculation, is their explanation of matter, which\ntheir opponents--the Ash\u2018arite--afterwards modified to fit in with their\nown views of the nature of God. The interest of Nazz\u0101m chiefly consisted\nin the exclusion of all arbitrariness from the orderly course of\nnature[51:1]. The same interest in naturalism led Al-J\u0101\u1e25i\u1e93 to define\nWill in a purely negative manner[51:2]. Though the Rationalist thinkers\ndid not want to abandon the idea of a Personal Will, yet they\nendeavoured to find a deeper ground for the independence of individual\nnatural phenomena. And this ground they found in matter itself. Nazz\u0101m\ntaught the infinite divisibility of matter, and obliterated the\ndistinction between substance and accident[51:3]. Existence was regarded\nas a quality superimposed by God on the pre-existing material atoms\nwhich would have been incapable of perception without this quality.\nMu\u1e25ammad Ibn \u2018U\u1e6f\u1e96m\u0101n, one of the Mu\u2018tazila S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96s, says Ibn\n\u1e24azm,[51:4] maintained that the non-existent (atom in its\npre-existential state) is a body in that state; only that in its\npre-existential condition it is neither in motion, nor at rest, nor is\nit said to be created. Substance, then, is a collection of\nqualities--taste, odour, colour--which, in themselves, are nothing more\nthan material potentialities. The soul, too, is a finer kind of matter;\nand the processes of knowledge are mere mental motions. Creation is only\nthe actualisation of pre-existing potentialities[52:1] (\u1e6cafra). The\nindividuality of a thing which is defined as \"that of which something\ncan be predicated\"[52:2] is not an essential factor in its notion. The\ncollection of things we call the Universe, is externalised or\nperceptible reality which could, so to speak, exist independent of all\nperceptibility. The object of these metaphysical subtleties is purely\ntheological. God, to the Rationalist, is an absolute unity which can, in\nno sense, admit of plurality, and could thus exist without the\nperceptible plurality--the Universe.\n\n [51:1] Steiner: Die Mu\u2018taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p. 57.\n\n [51:2] Steiner: Die Mu\u2018taziliten; Leipzig, 1865, p. 59.\n\n [51:3] S\u0331\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b: Cureton's ed., p. 38.\n\n [51:4] Ibn \u1e24azm (ed. Cairo): Vol. V, p. 42.\n\n [52:1] S\u0331\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b: Cureton's ed, p. 38.\n\n [52:2] Steiner: Die Mu\u2018taziliten, p. 80.\n\nThe activity of God, then, consists only in making the atom perceptible.\nThe properties of the atom flow from its own nature. A stone thrown up\nfalls down on account of its own indwelling property[53:1]. God, says\nAl-\u2018A\u1e6d\u1e6d\u0101r of Ba\u1e63ra and Bis\u0331\u1e96r ibn al Mu\u2018tamir, did not create colour,\nlength, breadth, taste or smell--all these are activities of bodies\nthemselves[53:2]. Even the number of things in the Universe is not known\nto God[53:3]. Bishr ibn al-Mu\u2018tamir further explained the properties of\nbodies by what he called \"Tawallud\"--interaction of bodies[53:4]. Thus\nit is clear that the Rationalists were philosophically materialists, and\ntheologically deists.\n\n [53:1] S\u0331\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b: Cureton's ed., p. 38.\n\n [53:2] Ibn \u1e24azm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, pp. 194, 197.\n\n [53:3] Ibn \u1e24azm (ed. Cairo): Vol. IV, p. 194.\n\n [53:4] S\u0331\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b: Cureton's ed., p. 44.\n\nTo them substance and atom are identical, and they define substance as a\nspace-filling atom which, besides the quality of filling space, has a\ncertain direction, force and existence forming its very essence as an\nactuality. In shape it is squarelike; for if it is supposed to be\ncircular, combination of different atoms would not be possible[53:5].\nThere is, however, great difference of opinion among the exponents of\natomism in regard to the nature of the atom. Some hold that atoms are\nall similar to each other; while Abu\u2019l-Q\u0101sim of Bal\u1e35\u1e96 regards them as\nsimilar as well as dissimilar. When we say that two things are similar\nto each other, we do not necessarily mean that they are similar in all\ntheir attributes. Abu\u2019l-Q\u0101sim further differs from Nazz\u0101m in advocating\nthe indestructibility of the atom. He holds that the atom had a\nbeginning in time; but that it cannot be completely annihilated. The\nattribute of \"Baq\u0101\" (continued existence), he says, does not give to its\nsubject a new attribute other than existence; and the continuity of\nexistence is not an additional attribute at all. The divine activity\ncreated the atom as well as its continued existence. Abu\u2019l-Q\u0101sim,\nhowever, admits that some atoms may not have been created for continued\nexistence. He denies also the existence of any intervening space between\ndifferent atoms, and holds, unlike other representatives of the school,\nthat the essence or atom (M\u0101hiyyat) could not remain essence in a state\nof non-existence. To advocate the opposite is a contradiction in terms.\nTo say that the essence (which is essence because of the attribute of\nexistence) could remain essence in a state of non-existence, is to say\nthat the existent could remain existent in a state of non-existence. It\nis obvious that Abu\u2019l-Q\u0101sim here approaches the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite theory of\nknowledge which dealt a serious blow to the Rationalist theory of\nmatter.\n\n [53:5] In my treatment of the atomism of Islamic Rationalists, I\n am indebted to Arthur Biram's publication: \"Kit\u0101bul Mas\u0101\u2019il fil\n \u1e35\u1e96il\u0101f beyn al-Ba\u1e63riyy\u012bn wal Bag\u0331\u1e96d\u0101diyy\u012bn\".\n\n\n\u00a7 II.\n\nContemporary Movements of Thought.\n\nSide by side with the development of Mu\u2018tazilaism we see, as is natural\nin a period of great intellectual activity, many other tendencies of\nthought manifesting themselves in the philosophical and religious\ncircles of Islam. Let us notice them briefly:--\n\n1. Scepticism. The tendency towards scepticism was the natural\nconsequence of the purely dialectic method of Rationalism. Men such as\nIbn As\u0331\u1e96ras and Al-J\u0101hiz who apparently belonged to the Rationalist\ncamp, were really sceptics. The standpoint of Al-J\u0101hiz who inclined to\ndeistic naturalism[55:1], is that of a cultured man of the time, and\nnot of a professional theologian. In him is noticeable also a reaction\nagainst the metaphysical hairsplitting of his predecessors, and a desire\nto widen the pale of theology for the sake of the illiterate who are\nincapable of reflecting on articles of faith.\n\n [55:1] Macdonald's Muslim Theology, p. 161.\n\n2. \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism--an appeal to a higher source of knowledge which was first\nsystematised by \u1e0e\u1e96u\u2019l-N\u016bn, and became more and more deepened and\nantischolastic in contrast to the dry intellectualism of the\nAs\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite. We shall consider this interesting movement in the\nfollowing chapter.\n\n3. The revival of authority--Ism\u0101\u2018\u012blianism--a movement\ncharacteristically Persian which, instead of repudiating freethought,\nendeavours to come to an understanding with it. Though this movement\nseems to have no connection with the theological controversies of the\ntime, yet its connection with freethought is fundamental. The similarity\nbetween the methods practised by the Ism\u0101\u2018\u012blian missionaries and those\nof the partisans of the association called I\u1e35\u1e96w\u0101n al-Saf\u0101--Brethren of\nPurity--suggests some sort of secret relation between the two\ninstitutions. Whatever may be the motive of those who started this\nmovement, its significance as an intellectual phenomenon should not be\nlost sight of. The multiplicity of philosophical and religious views--a\nnecessary consequence of speculative activity--is apt to invoke forces\nwhich operate against this, religiously speaking, dangerous\nmultiplicity. In the 18th century history of European thought we see\nFichte, starting with a sceptical inquiry concerning the nature of\nmatter, and finding its last word in Pantheism. Schleiermacher appeals\nto Faith as opposed to Reason, Jacobi points to a source of knowledge\nhigher than reason, while Comte abandons all metaphysical inquiry, and\nlimits all knowledge to sensuous perception. De Maistre and Schlegel, on\nthe other hand, find a resting place in the authority of an absolutely\ninfallible Pope. The advocates of the doctrine of Im\u0101mat think in the\nsame strain as De Maistre; but it is curious that the Ism\u0101\u2018\u012blians, while\nmaking this doctrine the basis of their Church, permitted free play to\nall sorts of thinking.\n\nThe Ism\u0101\u2018\u012blia movement then is one aspect of the persistent\nbattle[57:1] which the intellectually independent Persian waged against\nthe religious and political ideals of Islam. Originally a branch of the\nSh\u012b\u2018ite religion, the Ism\u0101\u2018\u012blia sect assumed quite a cosmopolitan\ncharacter with \u2018Abdulla ibn Maim\u016bn--the probable progenitor of the\nF\u0101timid Caliphs of Egypt--who died about the same time when\nAl-As\u0331\u1e96\u2018ar\u012b, the great opponent of Freethought, was born. This curious\nman imagined a vast scheme in which he weaved together innumerable\nthreads of various hues, resulting in a cleverly constructed\nequivocation, charming to the Persian mind for its mysterious character\nand misty Pythagorean Philosophy. Like the Association of the Brethren\nof Purity, he made an attempt, under the pious cloak of the doctrine of\nIm\u0101mat (Authority), to synthesise all the dominating ideas of the time.\nGreek Philosophy, Christianity, Rationalism, S\u016bf\u012bism, Manichaeism,\nPersian heresies, and above all the idea of reincarnation, all came\nforward to contribute their respective shares to the boldly conceived\nIsm\u0101\u2018\u012blian whole, the various aspects of which were to be gradually\nrevealed to the initiated, by the \"Leader\"--the ever Incarnating\nUniversal Reason--according to the intellectual development of the age\nin which he incarnated himself. In the Ism\u0101\u2018\u012blian movement, Freethought,\napprehending the collapse of its ever widening structure, seeks to rest\nupon a stable basis, and, by a strange irony of fate, is led to find it\nin the very idea which is revolting to its whole being. Barren\nauthority, though still apt to reassert herself at times, adopts this\nunclaimed child, and thus permits herself to assimilate all knowledge\npast, present and future.\n\n [57:1] Ibn \u1e24azm in his Kit\u0101b al-Milal, looks upon the heretical\n sects of Persia as a continuous struggle against the Arab power\n which the cunning Persian attempted to shake off by these\n peaceful means. See Von Kremer's Geschichte der herrschenden\n Ideen des Islams, pp. 10, 11, where this learned Arab historian\n of Cordova is quoted at length.\n\nThe unfortunate connection, however, of this movement with the politics\nof the time, has misled many a scholar. They see in it (Macdonald, for\ninstance) nothing more than a powerful conspiracy to uproot the\npolitical power of the Arab from Persia. They have denounced the\nIsm\u0101\u2018\u012blian Church which counted among its followers some of the best\nheads and sincerest hearts, as a mere clique of dark murderers who were\never watching for a possible victim. We must always remember, while\nestimating the character of these people, the most barbarous\npersecutions which drove them to pay red-handed fanaticism in the same\ncoin. Assassinations for religious purposes were considered\nunobjectionable, and even perhaps lawful, among the whole Semite race.\nAs late as the latter half of the 16th century, the Pope of Rome could\napprove such a dreadful slaughter as the massacre of St. Bartholomew.\nThat assassination, even though actuated by religious zeal, is still a\ncrime, is a purely modern idea; and justice demands that we should not\njudge older generations with our own standards of right and wrong. A\ngreat religious movement which shook to its very foundations the\nstructure of a vast empire, and, having successfully passed through the\nvaried ordeals of moral reproach, calumny and persecution, stood up for\ncenturies as a champion of Science and Philosophy, could not have\nentirely rested on the frail basis of a political conspiracy of a mere\nlocal and temporary character. Ism\u0101\u2018\u012blianism, in spite of its almost\nentire loss of original vitality, still dominates the ethical ideal of\nnot an insignificant number in India, Persia, Central Asia, Syria and\nAfrica; while the last expression of Persian thought--B\u0101bism--is\nessentially Ism\u0101\u2018\u012blian in its character.\n\nTo return, however, to the Philosophy of the sect. From the later\nRationalists they borrowed their conception of Divinity. God, or the\nultimate principle of existence, they teach, has no attribute. His\nnature admits of no predication. When we predicate the attribute of\npower to him, we only mean that He is the giver of power; when we\npredicate eternity, we indicate the eternity of what the Qur\u2019\u0101n calls\n\"Amr\" (word of God) as distinguished from the \"\u1e34\u1e96alq\" (creation of\nGod) which is contingent. In His nature all contradictions melt away,\nand from Him flow all opposites. Thus they considered themselves to have\nsolved the problem which had troubled the mind of Zoroaster and his\nfollowers.\n\nIn order to find an answer to the question, \"What is plurality?\" the\nIsm\u0101\u2018\u012blia refer to what they consider a metaphysical axiom--\"that from\none only one can proceed\". But the one which proceeds, is not something\ncompletely different from which it proceeds. It is really the Primal one\ntransformed. The Primal Unity, therefore, transformed itself into the\nFirst Intellect (Universal Reason); and then, by means of this\ntransformation of itself, created the Universal soul which, impelled by\nits nature to perfectly identify itself with the original source, felt\nthe necessity of motion, and consequently of a body possessing the power\nof motion. In order to achieve its end, the soul created the heavens\nmoving in circular motion according to its direction. It also created\nthe elements which mixed together, and formed the visible Universe--the\nscene of plurality through which it endeavours to pass with a view to\ncome back to the original source. The individual soul is an epitome of\nthe whole Universe which exists only for its progressive education. The\nUniversal Reason incarnates itself from time to time, in the personality\nof the \"Leader\" who illuminates the soul in proportion to its experience\nand understanding, and gradually guides it through the scene of\nplurality to the world of eternal unity. When the Universal soul\nreaches its goal, or rather returns to its own deep being, the process\nof disintegration ensues. \"Particles constituting the Universe fall off\nfrom each other--those of goodness go to truth (God) which symbolises\nunity; those of evil go to untruth (Devil) which symbolises\ndiversity\"[63:1]. This is but briefly the Ism\u0101\u2018\u012blian Philosophy--a\nmixture, as S\u0331\u1e96arast\u0101n\u012b remarks, of Philosophical and Manichaean\nideas--which, by gradually arousing the slumbering spirit of scepticism,\nthey administered, as it were, in doses to the initiated, and finally\nbrought them to that stage of spiritual emancipation where solemn ritual\ndrops off, and dogmatic religion appears to be nothing more than a\nsystematic arrangement of useful falsehoods.\n\n [63:1] S\u0331\u1e96arast\u0101n\u012b: Cureton's ed: p. 149.\n\nThe Ism\u0101\u2018\u012blian doctrine is the first attempt to amalgamate contemporary\nPhilosophy with a really Persian view of the Universe, and to restate\nIslam, in reference to this synthesis, by allegorical interpretation of\nthe Qur\u2019\u0101n--a method which was afterwards adopted by \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism. With them\nthe Zoroastrian Ahriman (Devil) is not the malignant creator of evil\nthings but it is a principle which violates the eternal unity, and\nbreaks it up into visible diversity. The idea that some principle of\ndifference in the nature of the ultimate existence must be postulated in\norder to account for empirical diversity, underwent further\nmodifications; until in the \u1e24ur\u016bf\u012b sect (an offshoot of the Ism\u0101\u2018\u012blia),\nin the fourteenth century, it touched contemporary \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism on the one\nhand, and Christian Trinity on the other. The \"Be\", maintained the\n\u1e24ur\u016bf\u012bs, is the eternal word of God, which, itself uncreated, leads to\nfurther creation--the word externalised. \"But for the 'word' the\nrecognition of the essence of Divinity would have been impossible; since\nDivinity is beyond the reach of sense--perception\"[64:1]. The 'word',\ntherefore, became flesh in the womb of Mary[64:2] in order to manifest\nthe Father. The whole Universe is the manifestation of God's 'word', in\nwhich He is immanent[64:3]. Every sound in the Universe is within God;\nevery atom is singing the song of eternity[64:4]; all is life. Those\nwho want to discover the ultimate reality of things, let them seek \"the\nnamed\" through the Name[65:1], which at once conceals and reveals its\nsubject.\n\n [64:1] J\u0101wid\u0101n Kab\u012br, fol. 149a.\n\n [64:2] J\u0101wid\u0101n Kab\u012br, fol. 280a.\n\n [64:3] J\u0101wid\u0101n Kab\u012br, fol. 366b.\n\n [64:4] J\u0101wid\u0101n Kab\u012br, fol. 155b.\n\n [65:1] J\u0101wid\u0101n Kab\u012br, fol. 382a.\n\n\n\u00a7 III.\n\nReaction against Rationalism.\n\nThe As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite.\n\nPatronised by the early Caliphs of the House of \u2018Abb\u0101s, Rationalism\ncontinued to flourish in the intellectual centres of the Islamic world;\nuntil, in the first half of the 9th century, it met the powerful\northodox reaction which found a very energetic leader in Al-As\u0331\u1e96\u2018ar\u012b\n(b, 873 A.D.) who studied under Rationalist teachers only to demolish,\nby their own methods, the edifice they had so laboriously built. He was\na pupil of Al-Jubb\u0101\u2019\u012b[65:2]--the representative of the younger school of\nMu\u2018tazilaism in Ba\u1e63ra--with whom he had many controversies[65:3] which\neventually terminated their friendly relations, and led the pupil to bid\nfarewell to the Mu\u2018tazila camp. \"The fact\", says Spitta, \"that\nAl-As\u0331\u1e96\u2018ar\u012b was so thoroughly a child of his time with the successive\ncurrents of which he let himself go, makes him, in another relation, an\nimportant figure to us. In him, as in any other, are clearly reflected\nthe various tendencies of this politically as well as religiously\ninteresting period; and we seldom find ourselves in a position to weigh\nthe power of the orthodox confession and the Mu\u2018tazilite speculation,\nthe child-like helpless manner of the one, the immaturity and\nimperfection of the other, so completely as in the life of this man who\nwas orthodox as a boy and a Mu\u2018tazila as a young man\"[66:1]. The\nMu\u2018tazila speculation (e.g. Al-J\u0101\u1e25iz) tended to be absolutely\nunfettered, and in some cases led to a merely negative attitude of\nthought. The movement initiated by Al-As\u0331\u1e96\u2018ar\u012b was an attempt not only\nto purge Isl\u0101m of all non-Islamic elements which had quietly crept into\nit, but also to harmonize the religious consciousness with the\nreligious thought of Islam. Rationalism was an attempt to measure\nreality by reason alone; it implied the identity of the spheres of\nreligion and philosophy, and strove to express faith in the form of\nconcepts or terms of pure thought. It ignored the facts of human nature,\nand tended to disintegrate the solidarity of the Islamic Church. Hence\nthe reaction.\n\n [65:2] Extracts from Ibn \u2018As\u0101kir (Mehren)--Travaux de la\n troisi\u00e8me session du Congr\u00e8s International des Orientalistes--p.\n 261.\n\n [65:3] Spitta: Zur Geschichte Abul-\u1e24asan Al-As\u0331\u1e96\u2018ar\u012b, pp. 42,\n 43. See also Ibn \u1e34\u1e96allik\u0101n (Gottingen 1839)--Al-Jubb\u0101\u2019\u012b, where\n the story of their controversy is given.\n\n [66:1] Spitta: Vorwort, p. VII.\n\nThe orthodox reaction led by the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite then was, in reality,\nnothing more than the transfer of dialectic method to the defence of the\nauthority of Divine Revelation. In opposition to the Rationalists, they\nmaintained the doctrine of the Attributes of God; and, as regards the\nFree Will controversy, they adopted a course lying midway between the\nextreme fatalism of the old school, and the extreme libertarianism of\nthe Rationalists. They teach that the power of choice as well as all\nhuman actions are created by God; and that man has been given the power\nof acquiring[67:1] the different modes of activity. But Fa\u1e35\u1e96ral-D\u012bn\nR\u0101z\u012b, who in his violent attack on philosophy was strenuously opposed by\nT\u016bs\u012b and Qutbal-D\u012bn, does away with the idea of \"acquisition\", and\nopenly maintains the doctrine of necessity in his commentary on the\nQur\u2019\u0101n. The M\u0101tar\u012bdiyya--another school of anti-rationalist theology,\nfounded by Abu Man\u1e63\u016br M\u0101tar\u012bd\u012b a native of M\u0101tar\u012bd in the environs of\nSamarqand--went back to the old rationalist position, and taught in\nopposition to the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite, that man has absolute control over his\nactivity; and that his power affects the very nature of his actions.\nAl-As\u0331\u1e96\u2018ar\u012b's interest was purely theological; but it was impossible to\nharmonise reason and revelation without making reference to the ultimate\nnature of reality. B\u0101qil\u0101n\u012b[68:1] therefore, made use of some purely\nmetaphysical propositions (that substance is an individual unity; that\nquality cannot exist in quality; that perfect vacuum is possible.) in\nhis Theological investigation, and thus gave the school a metaphysical\nfoundation which it is our main object to bring out. We shall not,\ntherefore, dwell upon their defence of orthodox beliefs (e.g. that the\nQur\u2019\u0101n is uncreated; that the visibility of God is possible etc.); but\nwe shall endeavour to pick up the elements of metaphysical thought in\ntheir theological controversies. In order to meet contemporary\nphilosophers on their own ground, they could not dispense with\nphilosophising; hence willingly or unwillingly they had to develop a\ntheory of knowledge peculiar to themselves.\n\n [67:1] S\u0331\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b--ed. Cureton, p. 69.\n\n [68:1] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des Ash\u2018aritenthums.\n (Huiti\u00e8me Congr\u00e8s International des Orientalistes 1889, p. 82).\n\nGod, according to the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite, is the ultimate necessary existence\nwhich \"carries its attributes in its own being\"[69:1]; and whose\nexistence (wuj\u016bd) and essence (M\u0101hiyyat) are identical. Besides the\nargument from the contingent character of motion they used the following\narguments to prove the existence of this ultimate principle:--\n\n(1). All bodies, they argue, are one in so far as the phenomenal fact of\ntheir existence is concerned. But in spite of this unity, their\nqualities are different and even opposed to each other. We are,\ntherefore, driven to postulate an ultimate cause in order to account for\ntheir empirical divergence.\n\n [69:1] Martin Schreiner: Zur Geschichte des Ash\u2018aritenthums.\n (Huiti\u00e8me Congr\u00e8s International des Orientalistes II{me} Partie\n 1893, p. 113).\n\n(2). Every contingent being needs a cause to account for its existence.\nThe Universe is contingent; therefore it must have a cause; and that\ncause is God. That the Universe is contingent, they proved in the\nfollowing manner. All that exists in the Universe, is either substance\nor quality. The contingence of quality is evident, and the contingence\nof substance follows from the fact that no substance could exist apart\nfrom qualities. The contingence of quality necessitates the contingence\nof substance; otherwise the eternity of substance would necessitate the\neternity of quality. In order fully to appreciate the value of this\nargument, it is necessary to understand the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite theory of\nknowledge. To answer the question, \"What is a thing?\" they subjected to\na searching criticism the Aristotelian categories of thought, and\narrived at the conclusion that bodies have no properties in\nthemselves[70:1]. They made no distinction of secondary and primary\nqualities of a body, and reduced all of them to purely subjective\nrelations. Quality too became with them a mere accident without which\nthe substance could not exist. They used the word substance or atom with\na vague implication of externality; but their criticism, actuated by a\npious desire to defend the idea of divine creation, reduced the Universe\nto a mere show of ordered subjectivities which, as they maintained like\nBerkeley, found their ultimate explanation in the Will of God. In his\nexamination of human knowledge regarded as a product and not merely a\nprocess, Kant stopped at the idea of \"Ding an sich\", but the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite\nendeavoured to penetrate further, and maintained, against the\ncontemporary Agnostic-Realism, that the so called underlying essence\nexisted only in so far as it was brought in relation to the knowing\nsubject. Their atomism, therefore, approaches that of Lotze[71:1] who,\nin spite of his desire to save external reality, ended in its complete\nreduction to ideality. But like Lotze they could not believe their atoms\nto be the inner working of the Infinite Primal Being. The interest of\npure monotheism was too strong for them. The necessary consequence of\ntheir analysis of matter is a thorough going idealism like that of\nBerkeley; but perhaps their instinctive realism combined with the force\nof atomistic tradition, still compels them to use the word \"atom\" by\nwhich they endeavour to give something like a realistic coloring to\ntheir idealism. The interest of dogmatic theology drove them to maintain\ntowards pure Philosophy an attitude of criticism which taught her\nunwilling advocates how to philosophise and build a metaphysics of their\nown.\n\n [70:1] See Macdonald's admirable account of the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite\n Metaphysics: Muslim Theology p. 201 sq. See also Maul\u0101n\u0101\n S\u0331\u1e96ibl\u012b \u2018Ilmal Kal\u0101m pp. 60, 72.\n\n [71:1] \"Lotze is an atomist, but he does not conceive the atoms\n themselves as material; for extension, like all other sensuous\n qualities is explained through the reciprocal action of atoms;\n they themselves, therefore, cannot possess this quality. Like\n life and like all empirical qualities, the sensuous fact of\n extension is due to the cooperation of points of force, which,\n in time, must be conceived as starting points of the inner\n workings of the Infinite Primal Being.\" H\u00f6ffding Vol. II, p.\n 516.\n\nBut a more important and philosophically more significant aspect of the\nAs\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite Metaphysics, is their attitude towards the Law of\nCausation[72:1]. Just as they repudiated all the principles of\noptics[72:2] in order to show, in opposition to the Rationalists, that\nGod could be visible in spite of His being unextended, so with a view\nto defend the possibility of miracles, they rejected the idea of\ncausation altogether. The orthodox believed in miracles as well as in\nthe Universal Law of Causation; but they maintained that, at the time of\nmanifesting a miracle, God suspended the operation of this law. The\nAs\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite, however, starting with the supposition that cause and\neffect must be similar, could not share the orthodox view, and taught\nthat the idea of power is meaningless, and that we know nothing but\nfloating impressions, the phenomenal order of which is determined by\nGod.\n\n [72:1] S\u0331\u1e96ibl\u012b \u2018Ilmal-Kal\u0101m pp. 64, 72.\n\n [72:2] S\u0331\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b, ed. Cureton, p. 82.\n\nAny account of the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite metaphysics would be incomplete without a\nnotice of the work of Al-G\u0331\u1e96az\u0101l\u012b (d. 1111 A.D.) who though\nmisunderstood by many orthodox theologians, will always be looked upon\nas one of the greatest personalities of Islam. This sceptic of powerful\nability anticipated Descartes[73:1] in his philosophical method; and,\n\"seven hundred years before Hume cut the bond of causality with the\nedge of his dialectic\"[73:2]. He was the first to write a systematic\nrefutation of philosophy, and completely to annihilate that dread of\nintellectualism which had characterised the orthodox. It was chiefly his\ninfluence that made men study dogma and metaphysics together, and\neventually led to a system of education which produced such men as\nS\u0331\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b, Al-R\u0101z\u012b and Al-Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q\u012b. The following passage indicates\nhis attitude as a thinker:--\n\n\"From my childhood I was inclined to think out things for myself. The\nresult of this attitude was that I revolted against authority; and all\nthe beliefs that had fixed themselves in my mind from childhood lost\ntheir original importance. I thought that such beliefs based on mere\nauthority were equally entertained by Jews, Christians, and followers of\nother religions. Real knowledge must eradicate all doubt. For instance,\nit is self-evident that ten is greater than three. If a person, however,\nendeavours to prove the contrary by an appeal to his power of turning a\nstick into a snake, the performance would indeed be wonderful, though\nit cannot touch the certainty of the proposition in question\"[75:1]. He\nexamined afterwards, all the various claimants of \"Certain Knowledge\"\nand finally found it in \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism.\n\n [73:1] \"It (Al-Ghaz\u0101l\u012b's work on the Revivication of the\n sciences of religion) has so remarkable a resemblance to the\n _Discourse sur la methode_ of Descartes, that had any\n translation of it existed in the days of Descartes everyone\n would have cried against the plagiarism\". (Lewes's History of\n Philosophy: Vol. II. p. 50).\n\n [73:2] Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 20, p.\n 103.\n\n [75:1] Al-Munqi\u1e0f\u1e96 p. 3.\n\nWith their view of the nature of substance, the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite, rigid\nmonotheists as they were, could not safely discuss the nature of the\nhuman soul. Al-G\u0331\u1e96az\u0101l\u012b alone seriously took up the problem, and to\nthis day it is difficult to define, with accuracy, his view of the\nnature of God. In him, like Borger and Solger in Germany, \u1e62\u016bf\u012b pantheism\nand the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite dogma of personality appear to harmonise together, a\nreconciliation which makes it difficult to say whether he was a\nPantheist, or a Personal Pantheist of the type of Lotze. The soul,\naccording to Al-G\u0331\u1e96az\u0101l\u012b, perceives things. But perception as an\nattribute can exist only in a substance or essence which is absolutely\nfree from all the attributes of body. In his Al-Madn\u016bn[75:2], he\nexplains why the prophet declined to reveal the nature of the soul.\nThere are, he says, two kinds of men; ordinary men and thinkers. The\nformer who look upon materiality as a condition of existence, cannot\nconceive an immaterial substance. The latter are led, by their logic, to\na conception of the soul which sweeps away all difference between God\nand the individual soul. Al-G\u0331\u1e96az\u0101l\u012b, therefore, realised the\nPantheistic drift of his own inquiry, and preferred silence as to the\nultimate nature of the soul.\n\n [75:2] See Sir Sayyid A\u1e25mad's criticism of Al-G\u0331\u1e96az\u0101l\u012b's view\n of the soul, Al-Nazruf\u012b ba\u2019di Mas\u0101ili-l Im\u0101mi-l hum\u0101m Ab\u016b \u1e24\u0101mid\n Al-G\u0331\u1e96az\u0101l\u012b; No. 4, p. 3 sq. (ed. Agra).\n\nHe is generally included among the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite. But strictly speaking he\nis not an As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite; though he admitted that the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite mode of\nthought was excellent for the masses. \"He held\", says S\u0331\u1e96ibl\u012b\n(\u2018Ilmal-Kal\u0101m, p. 66.), \"that the secret of faith could not be revealed;\nfor this reason he encouraged exposition of the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite theology,\nand took good care in persuading his immediate disciples not to publish\nthe results of his private reflection\". Such an attitude towards the\nAs\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite theology, combined with his constant use of philosophical\nlanguage, could not but lead to suspicion. Ibn Jauz\u012b, Q\u0101\u1e0d\u012b \u2018Iy\u0101\u1e0d, and\nother famous theologians of the orthodox school, publicly denounced him\nas one of the \"misguided\"; and \u2018Iy\u0101\u1e0d went even so far as to order the\ndestruction of all his philosophical and theological writings that\nexisted in Spain.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that while the dialectic of Rationalism\ndestroyed the personality of God, and reduced divinity to a bare\nindefinable universality, the antirationalist movement, though it\npreserved the dogma of personality, destroyed the external reality of\nnature. In spite of Nazz\u0101m's theory of \"Atomic objectification\"[77:1],\nthe atom of the Rationalist possesses an independent objective reality;\nthat of the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite is a fleeting moment of Divine Will. The one\nsaves nature, and tends to do away with the God of Theology; the other\nsacrifices nature to save God as conceived by the orthodox. The\nGod-intoxicated \u1e62\u016bf\u012b who stands aloof from the Theological controversies\nof the age, saves and spiritualises both the aspects of existence, and\nlooks upon the whole Universe as the self-revelation of God--a higher\nnotion which synthesises the opposite extremes of his predecessors.\n\"Wooden-legged\" Rationalism, as the \u1e62\u016bf\u012b called it, speaks its last word\nin the sceptic Al-G\u0331\u1e96az\u0101l\u012b, whose restless soul, after long and\nhopeless wanderings in the desolate sands of dry intellectualism, found\nits final halting place in the still deep of human emotion. His\nscepticism is directed more to substantiate the necessity of a higher\nsource of knowledge than merely to defend the dogma of Islamic Theology,\nand, therefore, marks the quiet victory of \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism over all the rival\nspeculative tendencies of the time.\n\n [77:1] Ibn \u1e24azm, Vol. V, p. 63, 64, where the author states and\n criticises this theory.\n\nAl-G\u0331\u1e96az\u0101l\u012b's positive contribution to the Philosophy of his country,\nhowever, is found in his little book--Mis\u0331\u1e96k\u0101tal-Anw\u0101r--where he starts\nwith the Quranic verse, \"God is the light of heavens and earth\", and\ninstinctively returns to the Iranian idea, which was soon to find a\nvigorous expounder in Al-Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q\u012b. Light, he teaches in this book, is\nthe only real existence; and there is no darkness greater than\nnon-existence. But the essence of Light is manifestation: \"it is\nattributed to manifestation which is a relation\"[78:1]. The Universe\nwas created out of darkness on which God sprinkled[79:1] his own light,\nand made its different parts more or less visible according as they\nreceived more or less light. As bodies differ from one another in being\ndark, obscure, illuminated or illuminating, so men are differentiated\nfrom one another. There are some who illuminate other human beings; and,\nfor this reason, the Prophet is named \"The Burning Lamp\" in the Qur\u2019\u0101n.\n\n [78:1] Mis\u0331\u1e96k\u0101tal-Anw\u0101r, fol. 3a.\n\n [79:1] In support of this view Al-G\u0331\u1e96az\u0101l\u012b quotes a tradition\n of the prophet. Mis\u0331\u1e96k\u0101tal-Anw\u0101r, fol. 10a.\n\nThe physical eye sees only the external manifestation of the Absolute or\nReal Light. There is an internal eye in the heart of man which, unlike\nthe physical eye, sees itself as other things, an eye which goes beyond\nthe finite, and pierces the veil of manifestation. These thoughts are\nmerely germs, which developed and fructified in Al-Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q\u012b's\n\"Philosophy of Illumination\"--\u1e24ikmatal-Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q.\n\nSuch is the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite philosophy.\n\nOne great theological result of this reaction was that it checked the\ngrowth of freethought which tended to dissolve the solidarity of the\nChurch. We are, however, concerned more with the purely intellectual\nresults of the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite mode of thought, and these are mainly two:--\n\n(1). It led to an independent criticism of Greek philosophy as we shall\nsee presently.\n\n(2). In the beginning of the 10th century when the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite had\nalmost completely demolished the stronghold of Rationalism, we see a\ntendency towards what may be called Persian Positivism. Al-Bir\u016bn\u012b[80:1]\n(d. 1048) and Ibn Hai\u1e6f\u1e96am[80:2] (d. 1038) who anticipated modern\nempirical Psychology in recognising what is called reaction-time, gave\nup all inquiry concerning the nature of the supersensual, and maintained\na prudent silence about religious matters. Such a state of things could\nhave existed, but could not have been logically justified before\nAl-As\u0331\u1e96\u2018ar\u012b.\n\n [80:1] He (Al-Bir\u016bn\u012b) quotes with approval the following, as the\n teaching of the adherents of Aryabhatta: It is enough for us to\n know that which is lighted up by the sun's rays. Whatever lies\n beyond, though it should be of immeasurable extent, we cannot\n make use of; for what the sunbeam does not reach, the senses do\n not perceive, and what the senses do not perceive we cannot\n know. From this we gather what Al-Bir\u016bn\u012b's Philosophy was: only\n sense-perceptions, knit together by a logical intelligence,\n yield sure knowledge. (Boer's Philosophy in Isl\u0101m, p. 146).\n\n [80:2] \"Moreover truth for him (Ibn Hai\u1e6f\u1e96am) was only that\n which was presented as material for the faculties of\n sense-perception, and which received it from the understanding,\n being thus the logically elaborated perception\". (Boer's\n Philosophy in Isl\u0101m, p. 150).\n\n [80:2] \"Moreover truth for him (Ibn Hai\u1e6f\u1e96am) was only that\n which was presented as material for the faculties of\n sense-perception, and which received it from the understanding,\n being thus the logically elaborated perception\". (Boer's\n Philosophy in Isl\u0101m, p. 150).\n\n\n\n\nCHAP. IV.\n\nCONTROVERSY BETWEEN IDEALISM AND REALISM.\n\n\nThe As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite denial of Aristotle's Prima Materia, and their views\nconcerning the nature of space, time and causation, awakened that\nirrepressible spirit of controversy which, for centuries, divided the\ncamp of Muhammedan thinkers, and eventually exhausted its vigor in the\nmerely verbal subtleties of schools. The publication of Najm al-D\u012bn\nAl-K\u0101tib\u012b's (a follower of Aristotle whose disciples were called\nPhilosophers as distinguished from scholastic theologians) \u1e24ikmat\nal-\u2018Ain--\"Philosophy of Essence\", greatly intensified the intellectual\nconflict, and invoked keen criticism from a host of As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite as well\nas other idealist thinkers. I shall consider in order the principal\npoints on which the two schools differed from each other.\n\n\nA. _The Nature of the Essence._\n\nWe have seen that the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite theory of knowledge drove them to\nhold that individual essences of various things are quite different from\neach other, and are determined in each case by the ultimate cause--God.\nThey denied the existence of an everchanging primary stuff common to all\nthings, and maintained against the Rationalists that existence\nconstitutes the very being of the essence. To them, therefore, essence\nand existence are identical. They argued that the Judgment, \"Man is\nanimal\", is possible only on the ground of a fundamental difference\nbetween the subject and the predicate; since their identity would make\nthe Judgment nugatory, and complete difference would make the\npredication false. It is, therefore, necessary to postulate an external\ncause to determine the various forms of existence. Their opponents,\nhowever, admit the determination or limitation of existence, but they\nmaintain that all the various forms of existence, in so far as their\nessence is concerned, are identical--all being limitations of one\nPrimary substance. The followers of Aristotle met the difficulty\nsuggested by the possibility of synthetic predication, by advocating the\npossibility of compound essences. Such a judgment as \"Man is animal\",\nthey maintained, is true; because man is an essence composed of two\nessences, animality and humanity. This, retorted the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite, cannot\nstand criticism. If you say that the essence of man and animal is the\nsame, you in other words hold that the essence of the whole is the same\nas that of the part. But this proposition is absurd; since if the\nessence of the compound is the same as that of its constituents, the\ncompound will have to be regarded as one being having two essences or\nexistences.\n\nIt is obvious that the whole controversy turns on the question whether\nexistence is a mere idea or something objectively real. When we say that\na certain thing exists, do we mean that it exists only in relation to us\n(As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite position); or that it is an essence existing quite\nindependently of us (Realist position)? We shall briefly indicate the\narguments of either side. The Realist argued as follows:--\n\n(1). The conception of my existence is something immediate or intuitive.\nThe thought \"I exist\" is a \"concept\", and my body being an element of\nthis \"concept\", it follows that my body is intuitively known as\nsomething real. If the knowledge of the existent is not immediate, the\nfact of its perception would require a process of thought which, as we\nknow, it does not. The As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite Al-R\u0101z\u012b admits that the concept of\nexistence is immediate; but he regards the judgment--\"The concept of\nexistence is immediate\"--as merely a matter of acquisition. Mu\u1e25ammad ibn\nMub\u0101rak Bu\u1e35\u1e96\u0101r\u012b, on the other hand, says that the whole argument of\nthe realist proceeds on the assumption that the concept of my existence\nis something immediate--a position which can be controverted.[84:1] If,\nsays he, we admit that the concept of my existence is immediate,\nabstract existence cannot be regarded as a constitutive element of this\nconception. And if the realist maintains that the perception of a\nparticular object is immediate, we admit the truth of what he says; but\nit would not follow, as he is anxious to establish, that the so called\nunderlying essence is immediately known as objectively real. The\nrealist argument, moreover, demands that the mind ought not to be able\nto conceive the predication of qualities to things. We cannot conceive,\n\"snow is white\", because whiteness, being a part of this immediate\njudgment, must also be immediately known without any predication. Mulla\nMu\u1e25ammad H\u0101s\u0331\u1e96im \u1e24usain\u012b remarks[85:1] that this reasoning is\nerroneous. The mind in the act of predicating whiteness of snow is\nworking on a purely ideal existence--the quality of whiteness--and not\non an objectively real essence of which the qualities are mere facets or\naspects. \u1e24usain\u012b, moreover, anticipates Hamilton, and differs from other\nrealists in holding that the so-called unknowable essence of the object\nis also immediately known. The object, he says, is immediately perceived\nas one.[85:2] We do not successively perceive the various aspects of\nwhat happens to be the objects of our perception.\n\n [84:1] Mu\u1e25ammad ibn Mub\u0101rak's commentary on \u1e24ikmat al-\u2018Ain,\n fol. 5a.\n\n [85:1] \u1e24usain\u012b's commentary on \u1e24ikmat al-\u2018Ain, fol. 13a.\n\n [85:2] \u1e24usain\u012b's commentary on \u1e24ikmat al-\u2018Ain, fol. 14b.\n\n(2) The idealist, says the realist, reduces all quality to mere\nsubjective relations. His argument leads him to deny the underlying\nessence of things, and to look upon them as entirely heterogeneous\ncollections of qualities, the essence of which consists merely in the\nphenomenal fact of their perception. In spite of his belief in the\ncomplete heterogeneity of things, he applies the word existence to all\nthings--a tacit admission that there is some essence common to all the\nvarious forms of existence. Abu\u2019l-\u1e24asan al-As\u0331\u1e96\u2018ar\u012b replies that this\napplication is only a verbal convenience, and is not meant to indicate\nthe so-called internal homogeneity of things. But the universal\napplication of the word existence by the idealist, must mean, according\nto the realist, that the existence of a thing either constitutes its\nvery essence, or it is something superadded to the underlying essence of\nthe thing. The first supposition is a virtual admission as to the\nhomogeneity of things; since we cannot maintain that existence peculiar\nto one thing is fundamentally different from existence peculiar to\nanother. The supposition that existence is something superadded to the\nessence of a thing leads to an absurdity; since in this case the essence\nwill have to be regarded as something distinct from existence; and the\ndenial of essence (with the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite) would blot out the distinction\nbetween existence and non-existence. Moreover, what was the essence\nbefore existence was superadded to it? We must not say that the essence\nwas ready to receive existence before it actually did receive it; since\nthis statement would imply that the essence was non-existence before it\nreceived existence. Likewise the statement that the essence has the\npower of receiving the quality of non-existence, implies the absurdity\nthat it does already exist. Existence, therefore, must be regarded as\nforming a part of the essence. But if it forms a part of the essence,\nthe latter will have to be regarded as a compound. If, on the other\nhand, existence is external to the essence, it must be something\ncontingent because of its dependence on something other than itself. Now\neverything contingent must have a cause. If this cause is the essence\nitself, it would follow that the essence existed before it existed;\nsince the cause must precede the effect in the fact of existence. If,\nhowever, the cause of existence is something other than the essence, it\nfollows that the existence of God also must be explained by some cause\nother than the essence of God--an absurd conclusion which turns the\nnecessary into the contingent.[88:1] This argument of the realist is\nbased on a complete misunderstanding of the idealist position. He does\nnot see that the idealist never regarded the fact of existence as\nsomething superadded to the essence of a thing; but always held it to be\nidentical with the essence. The essence, says ibn Mub\u0101rak,[88:2] is the\ncause of existence without being chronologically before it. The\nexistence of the essence constitutes its very being; it is not dependent\nfor it on something other than itself.\n\n [88:1] Ibn Mub\u0101rak's Commentary, fol. 8b.\n\n [88:2] Ibn Mub\u0101rak's Commentary, fol. 9a.\n\nThe truth is that both sides are far from a true theory of knowledge.\nThe agnostic realist who holds that behind the phenomenal qualities of a\nthing, there is an essence operating as their cause, is guilty of a\nglaring contradiction. He holds that underlying the thing there is an\n_unknowable_ essence or substratum which is _known_ to exist. The\nAs\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite idealist, on the other hand, misunderstands the process of\nknowledge. He ignores the mental activity involved in the act of\nknowledge; and looks upon perceptions as mere presentations which are\ndetermined, as he says, by God. But if the order of presentations\nrequires a cause to account for it, why should not that cause be sought\nin the original constitution of matter as Locke did? Moreover, the\ntheory that knowledge is a mere passive perception or awareness of what\nis presented, leads to certain inadmissible conclusions which the\nAs\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite never thought of:--\n\n(a). They did not see that their purely subjective conception of\nknowledge swept away all possibility of error. If the existence of a\nthing is merely the fact of its being presented, there is no reason why\nit should be cognised as different from what it actually is.\n\n(b). They did not see that on their theory of knowledge, our\nfellow-beings like other elements of the physical order, would have no\nhigher reality than mere states of my consciousness.\n\n(c). If knowledge is a mere receptivity of presentations, God who, as\ncause of presentations, is active in regard to the act of our knowledge,\nmust not be aware of our presentations. From the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite point of\nview this conclusion is fatal to their whole position. They cannot say\nthat presentations on their ceasing to be my presentations, continue to\nbe presentations to God's consciousness.\n\nAnother question connected with the nature of the essence is, whether it\nis caused or uncaused. The followers of Aristotle, or philosophers as\nthey are generally called by their opponents, hold that the underlying\nessence of things is uncaused. The As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite hold the opposite view.\nEssence, says the Aristotelian, cannot be acted upon by any external\nagent.[90:1] Al-K\u0101tib\u012b argues that if, for instance, the essence of\nhumanity had resulted from the operation of an external activity, doubt\nas to its being the real essence of humanity would have been possible.\nAs a matter of fact we never entertain such a doubt; it follows,\ntherefore, that the essence is not due to the activity of an agency\nexternal to itself. The idealist starts with the realist distinction of\nessence and existence, and argues that the realist line of argument\nwould lead to the absurd proposition--that man is uncaused; since he\nmust be regarded, according to the realist, as a combination of two\nuncaused essences--existence and humanity.\n\n [90:1] Ibn Mub\u0101rak's Commentary, fol. 20a.\n\n\nB. _The Nature of Knowledge._\n\nThe followers of Aristotle, true to their position as to the independent\nobjective reality of the essence, define knowledge as \"receiving images\nof external things\".[91:1] It is possible to conceive, they argue, an\nobject which is externally unreal, and to which other qualities can be\nattributed. But when we attribute to it the quality of existence, actual\nexistence is necessitated; since the affirmation of the quality of a\nthing is a part of the affirmation of that thing. If, therefore, the\npredication of existence does not necessitate actual objective existence\nof the thing, we are driven to deny externality altogether, and to hold\nthat the thing exists in the mind as a mere idea. But the affirmation\nof a thing, says Ibn Mub\u0101rak, constitutes the very existence of the\nthing. The idealist makes no such distinction as affirmation and\nexistence. To infer from the above argument that the thing must be\nregarded as existing in the mind, is unjustifiable. \"Ideal\" existence\nfollows only from the denial of externality which the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite do not\ndeny; since they hold that knowledge is a relation between the knower\nand the known which is known as external. Al-K\u0101tib\u012b's proposition that\nif the thing does not exist as external existence, it must exist as\nideal or mental existence, is self-contradictory; since, on his\nprinciples, everything that exists in idea exists in externality.[92:1]\n\n [91:1] Ibn Mub\u0101rak, fol. 11a.\n\n [92:1] Ibn Mub\u0101rak, fol. 11b.\n\n\nC. _The Nature of Non-existence._\n\nAl-K\u0101tib\u012b explains and criticises the proposition, maintained by\ncontemporary philosophers generally--\"That the existent is good, and the\nnon-existent is evil\".[92:2] The fact of murder, he says, is not evil\nbecause the murderer had the power of committing such a thing; or\nbecause the instrument of murder had the power of cutting; or because\nthe neck of the murdered had the capacity of being cut asunder. It is\nevil because it signifies the negation of life--a condition which is\nnon-existential, and not existential like the conditions indicated\nabove. But in order to show that evil is non-existence, we should make\nan inductive inquiry, and examine all the various cases of evil. A\nperfect induction, however, is impossible, and an incomplete induction\ncannot prove the point. Al-K\u0101tib\u012b, therefore, rejects this proposition,\nand holds that \"non-existence is absolute nothing\".[93:1] The possible\n'_essences_', according to him, are not lying fixed in space waiting for\nthe attribute of existence; otherwise fixity in space would have to be\nregarded as possessing no existence. But his critics hold that this\nargument is true only on the supposition that fixity in space and\nexistence are identical. Fixity in externality, says Ibn Mub\u0101rak, is a\nconception wider than existence. All existence is external, but all that\nis external is not necessarily existent.\n\n [92:2] Ibn Mub\u0101rak, fol. 14a.\n\n [93:1] Ibn Mub\u0101rak's Commentary, fol. 14b.\n\nThe interest of the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite in the dogma of the Resurrection--the\npossibility of the reappearance of the non-existent as existent--led\nthem to advocate the apparently absurd proposition that \"non-existence\nor nothing _is_ something\". They argued that, since we make judgments\nabout the non-existent, it is, therefore, known; and the fact of its\nknowability indicates that \"the nothing\" is not absolutely nothing. The\nknowable is a case of affirmation and the non-existent being knowable,\nis a case of affirmation.[94:1] Al-K\u0101tib\u012b denies the truth of the Major.\nImpossible things, he says, are known, yet they do not externally exist.\nAl-R\u0101z\u012b criticises this argument accusing Al-K\u0101tib\u012b of the ignorance of\nthe fact that the '_essence_' exists in the mind, and yet is known as\nexternal. Al-K\u0101tib\u012b supposes that the knowledge of a thing necessitates\nits existence as an independent objective reality. Moreover it should be\nremembered that the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite discriminate between positive and\nexistent on the one hand, and non-existent and negative on the other.\nThey say that all existent is positive, but the converse of this\nproposition is not true. There is certainly a relation between the\nexistent and the non-existent, but there is absolutely no relation\nbetween the positive and the negative. We do not say, as Al-K\u0101tib\u012b\nholds, that the impossible is non-existent; we say that the impossible\nis only negative. Substances which do exist are something positive. As\nregards the attribute which cannot be conceived as existing apart from\nthe substance, it is neither existent nor non-existent, but something\nbetween the two. Briefly the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite position is as follows:--\n\n\"A thing has a proof of its existence or not. If not, it is called\nnegative. If it has a proof of its existence, it is either substance or\nattribute. If it is substance and has the attribute of existence or\nnon-existence, (i.e. it is perceived or not) it is existent or\nnon-existent accordingly. If it is attribute, it is neither existent nor\nnon-existent\".[95:1]\n\n [94:1] Ibn Mub\u0101rak's Commentary, fol. 15a.\n\n [95:1] Ibn Mub\u0101rak's Commentary, fol. 15b.\n\n\n\n\nCHAP. V.\n\n\u1e62\u016aF\u012aISM.\n\n\n\u00a7 I.\n\nThe origin and Qur\u0101nic Justification of \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism.\n\nIt has become quite a fashion with modern oriental scholarship to trace\nthe chain of influences. Such a procedure has certainly great historical\nvalue, provided it does not make us ignore the fundamental fact, that\nthe human mind possesses an independent individuality, and, acting on\nits own initiative, can gradually evolve out of itself, truths which may\nhave been anticipated by other minds ages ago. No idea can seize a\npeople's soul unless, in some sense, it is the people's own. External\ninfluences may wake it up from its deep unconscious slumber; but they\ncannot, so to speak, create it out of nothing.\n\nMuch has been written about the origin of Persian \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism; and, in\nalmost all cases, explorers of this most interesting field of research\nhave exercised their ingenuity in discovering the various channels\nthrough which the basic ideas of \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism might have travelled from one\nplace to another. They seem completely to have ignored the principle,\nthat the full significance of a phenomenon in the intellectual evolution\nof a people, can only be comprehended in the light of those pre-existing\nintellectual, political, and social conditions which alone make its\nexistence inevitable. Von Kremer and Dozy derive Persian \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism from\nthe Indian Vedanta; Merx and Mr. Nicholson derive it from Neo-Platonism;\nwhile Professor Browne once regarded it as Aryan reaction against an\nunemotional semitic religion. It appears to me, however, that these\ntheories have been worked out under the influence of a notion of\ncausation which is essentially false. That a fixed quantity A is the\ncause of, or produces another fixed quantity B, is a proposition which,\nthough convenient for scientific purposes, is apt to damage all inquiry,\nin so far as it leads us completely to ignore the innumerable conditions\nlying at the back of a phenomenon. It would, for instance, be an\nhistorical error to say that the dissolution of the Roman Empire was due\nto the barbarian invasions. The statement completely ignores other\nforces of a different character that tended to split up the political\nunity of the Empire. To describe the advent of barbarian invasions as\nthe cause of the dissolution of the Roman Empire which could have\nassimilated, as it actually did to a certain extent, the so-called\ncause, is a procedure that no logic would justify. Let us, therefore, in\nthe light of a truer theory of causation, enumerate the principal\npolitical, social, and intellectual conditions of Islamic life about the\nend of the 8{th} and the first half of the 9{th} century when, properly\nspeaking, the \u1e62\u016bf\u012b ideal of life came into existence, to be soon\nfollowed by a philosophical justification of that ideal.--\n\n(1). When we study the history of the time, we find it to be a time of\nmore or less political unrest. The latter half of the 8{th} century\npresents, besides the political revolution which resulted in the\noverthrow of the Umayyads (749 A.D.), persecutions of Zend\u012bks, and\nrevolts of Persian heretics (Sindb\u0101h 755\u20136; Ust\u0101dh\u012bs 766\u20138; the veiled\nprophet of \u1e34\u1e96ur\u0101s\u0101n 777\u201380) who, working on the credulity of the\npeople, cloaked, like Lamennais in our own times, political projects\nunder the guise of religious ideas. Later on in the beginning of the\n9{th} century we find the sons of H\u0101r\u016bn (Ma\u2019m\u016bn and Am\u012bn) engaged in a\nterrible conflict for political supremacy; and still later, we see the\nGolden Age of Islamic literature seriously disturbed by the persistent\nrevolt of the Mazdakite B\u0101bak (816\u2013838). The early years of Ma\u2019mun's\nreign present another social phenomenon of great political\nsignificance--the S\u0331\u1e96u\u2018\u016bbiyya controversy (815), which progresses with\nthe rise and establishment of independent Persian families, the T\u0101hir\u012bd\n(820), the \u1e62aff\u0101r\u012bd (868), and the S\u0101m\u0101n\u012bd Dynasty (874). It is,\ntherefore, the combined force of these and other conditions of a similar\nnature that contributed to drive away spirits of devotional character\nfrom the scene of continual unrest to the blissful peace of an\never-deepening contemplative life. The semitic character of the life and\nthought of these early Muhammadan ascetics is gradually followed by a\nlarge hearted pantheism of a more or less Aryan stamp, the development\nof which, in fact, runs parallel to the slowly progressing political\nindependence of Persia.\n\n(2). _The Sceptical tendencies of Islamic Rationalism_ which found an\nearly expression in the poems of Bas\u0331\u1e96s\u0331\u1e96\u0101r ibn Burd--the blind\nPersian Sceptic who deified fire, and scoffed at all non-Persian modes\nof thought. The germs of Scepticism latent in Rationalism ultimately\nnecessitated an appeal to a super-intellectual source of knowledge which\nasserted itself in the Ris\u0101la of Al-Qus\u0331\u1e96air\u012b (986). In our own times\nthe negative results of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason drove Jacobi and\nSchleiermacher to base faith on the feeling of the reality of the ideal;\nand to the 19{th} century sceptic Wordsworth uncovered that mysterious\nstate of mind \"in which we grow all spirit and see into the life of\nthings\".\n\n(3). The unemotional piety of the various schools of Islam--the \u1e24anafite\n(Abu \u1e24an\u012bfa d. 767), the S\u0331\u1e96\u0101fiite (Al-S\u0331\u1e96\u0101fi\u2018\u012b d. 820), the M\u0101likite\n(Al-M\u0101lik d. 795), and the anthropomorphic \u1e24ambalite (Ibn \u1e24ambal d.\n855)--the bitterest enemy of independent thought--which ruled the masses\nafter the death of Al-Ma\u2019m\u016bn.\n\n(4). The religious discussions among the representatives of various\ncreeds encouraged by Al-Ma\u2019m\u016bn, and especially the bitter theological\ncontroversy between the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arites, and the advocates of Rationalism\nwhich tended not only to confine religion within the narrow limits of\nschools, but also stirred up the spirit to rise above all petty\nsectarian wrangling.\n\n(5). The gradual softening of religious fervency due to the\nrationalistic tendency of the early \u2018Abb\u0101sid period, and the rapid\ngrowth of wealth which tended to produce moral laxity and indifference\nto religious life in the upper circles of Islam.\n\n(6). The presence of Christianity as a working ideal of life. It was,\nhowever, principally the actual life of the Christian hermit rather than\nhis religious ideas, that exercised the greatest fascination over the\nminds of early Islamic Saints whose complete unworldliness, though\nextremely charming in itself, is, I believe, quite contrary to the\nspirit of Islam.\n\nSuch was principally the environment of \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism, and it is to the\ncombined action of the above condition that we should look for the\norigin and development of \u1e62\u016bf\u012bistic ideas. Given these condition and the\nPersian mind with an almost innate tendency towards monism, the whole\nphenomenon of the birth and growth of \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism is explained. If we now\nstudy the principal pre-existing conditions of Neo-Platonism, we find\nthat similar conditions produced similar results. The barbarian raids\nwhich were soon to reduce Emperors of the Palace to Emperors of the\nCamp, assumed a more serious aspect about the middle of the third\ncentury. Plotinus himself speaks of the political unrest of his time in\none of his letters to Flaccus.[102:1] When he looked round himself in\nAlexandria, his birth place, he noticed signs of growing toleration and\nindifferentism towards religious life. Later on in Rome which had\nbecome, so to say, a pantheon of different nations, he found a similar\nwant of seriousness in life, a similar laxity of character in the upper\nclasses of society. In more learned circles philosophy was studied as a\nbranch of literature rather than for its own sake; and Sextus Empiricus,\nprovoked by Antiochus's tendency to fuse scepticism and Stoicism was\nteaching the old unmixed scepticism of Pyrrho--that intellectual despair\nwhich drove Plotinus to find truth in a revelation above thought itself.\nAbove all, the hard unsentimental character of Stoic morality, and the\nloving piety of the followers of Christ who, undaunted by long and\nfierce persecutions, were preaching the message of peace and love to the\nwhole Roman world, necessitated a restatement of Pagan thought in a way\nthat might revivify the older ideals of life, and suit the new spiritual\nrequirements of the people. But the ethical force of Christianity was\ntoo great for Neo-Platonism which, on account of its more\nmetaphysical[103:1] character, had no message for the people at large,\nand was consequently inaccessible to the rude barbarian who, being\ninfluenced by the actual life of the persecuted Christian adopted\nChristianity, and settled down to construct new empires out of the ruins\nof the old. In Persia the influence of culture-contacts and\ncross-fertilisation of ideas created in certain minds a vague desire to\nrealise a similar restatement of Islam, which gradually assimilated\nChristian ideals as well as Christian Gnostic speculation, and found a\nfirm foundation in the Qur\u2019\u0101n. The flower of Greek Thought faded away\nbefore the breath of Christianity; but the burning simoon of Ibn\nTaimiyya's invective could not touch the freshness of the Persian rose.\nThe one was completely swept away by the flood of barbarian invasions;\nthe other, unaffected by the Tartar revolution, still holds its own.\n\n [102:1] \"Tidings have reached us that Valerian has been\n defeated, and is now in the hands of Sapor. The threats of\n Franks and Allemanni, of Goths and Persians, are alike terrible\n by turns to our _degenerate_ Rome.\" (Plotinus to Flaccus; quoted\n by Vaughan in his Half hours with Mystics, p. 63.)\n\n [103:1] The element of ecstacy which could have appealed to some\n minds was thrown into the background by the later teachers of\n Neo-Platonism, so that it became a mere system of thought having\n no human interest. Says Whittaker:--\"The mystical ecstacy was\n not found by the later teachers of the school easier to attain,\n but more difficult; and the tendency became more and more to\n regard it as all but unattainable on earth.\" Neo-Platonism, p.\n 101.\n\nThis extraordinary vitality of the \u1e62\u016bf\u012b restatement of Islam, however,\nis explained when we reflect on the all-embracing structure of \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism.\nThe semitic formula of salvation can be briefly stated in the words,\n\"Transform your will\",--which signifies that the Semite looks upon will\nas the essence of the human soul. The Indian Vedantist, on the other\nhand, teaches that all pain is due to our mistaken attitude towards\nthe Universe. He, therefore, commands us to transform our\nunderstanding--implying thereby that the essential nature of man\nconsists in thought, not activity or will. But the \u1e62\u016bf\u012b holds that the\nmere transformation of will or understanding will not bring peace; we\nshould bring about the transformation of both by a complete\ntransformation of feeling, of which will and understanding are only\nspecialised forms. His message to the individual is--\"Love all, and\nforget your own individuality in doing good to others.\" Says R\u016bm\u012b:--\"To\nwin other people's hearts is the greatest pilgrimage; and one heart is\nworth more than a thousand Ka\u2018bahs. Ka\u2018bah is a mere cottage of Abraham;\nbut the heart is the very home of God.\" But this formula demands a _why_\nand a _how_--a metaphysical justification of the ideal in order to\nsatisfy the understanding; and rules of action in order to guide the\nwill. \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism furnishes both. Semitic religion is a code of strict rules\nof conduct; the Indian Vedanta, on the other hand, is a cold system of\nthought. \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism avoids their incomplete Psychology, and attempts to\nsynthesise both the Semitic and the Aryan formulas in the higher\ncategory of Love. On the one hand it assimilates the Buddhistic idea of\nNirw\u0101na (Fan\u0101-Annihilation), and seeks to build a metaphysical system in\nthe light of this idea; on the other hand it does not disconnect itself\nfrom Islam, and finds the justification of its view of the Universe in\nthe Qur\u2019\u0101n. Like the geographical position of its home, it stands midway\nbetween the Semitic and the Aryan, assimilating ideas from both sides,\nand giving them the stamp of its own individuality which, on the whole,\nis more Aryan than Semitic in character. It would, therefore, be evident\nthat the secret of the vitality of \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism is the complete view of human\nnature upon which it is based. It has survived orthodox persecutions and\npolitical revolutions, because it appeals to human nature in its\nentirety; and, while it concentrates its interest chiefly in a _life_ of\nself-denial, it allows free play to the speculative tendency as well.\n\nI will now briefly indicate how \u1e62\u016bf\u012b writers justify their views from\nthe Quranic standpoint. There is no historical evidence to show that the\nProphet of Arabia actually communicated certain esoteric doctrines to\n\u2018Al\u012b or Ab\u016b Bakr. The \u1e62\u016bf\u012b, however, contends that the Prophet had an\nesoteric teaching--\"wisdom\"--as distinguished from the teaching\ncontained in the Book, and he brings forward the following verse to\nsubstantiate his case:--\"As we have sent a prophet to you from among\nyourselves who reads our verses to you, purifies you, teaches you the\nBook and the _Wisdom_, and teaches you _what you did not know\nbefore_.\"[107:1] He holds that \"the wisdom\" spoken of in the verse, is\nsomething not incorporated in the teaching of the Book which, as the\nProphet repeatedly declared, had been taught by several prophets before\nhim. If, he says, the wisdom is included in the Book, the word \"Wisdom\"\nin the verse would be redundant. It can, I think, be easily shown that\nin the Qur\u2019\u0101n as well as in the authenticated traditions, there are\ngerms of \u1e62\u016bf\u012b doctrine which, owing to the thoroughly practical genius\nof the Arabs, could not develop and fructify in Arabia, but which grew\nup into a distinct doctrine when they found favourable circumstances in\nalien soils. The Qur\u2019\u0101n thus defines the Muslims:--\"Those who believe in\nthe Unseen, establish daily prayer, and spend out of what We have given\nthem.\"[108:1] But the question arises as to the _what_ and the _where_\nof the Unseen. The Qur\u2019\u0101n replies that the Unseen is in your own\nsoul--\"And in the earth there are signs to those who believe, and in\nyourself,--what! do you not then see!\"[108:2] And again--\"We are nigher\nto him (man) than his own jugular vein.\"[108:3] Similarly the Holy Book\nteaches that the essential nature of the Unseen is pure light--\"God is\nthe light of heavens and earth.\"[108:4] As regards the question whether\nthis Primal Light is personal, the Qur\u2019\u0101n, in spite of many expressions\nsignifying personality, declares in a few words--\"There is nothing like\nhim.\"[108:5]\n\n [107:1] Sura 2, v. 146.\n\n [108:1] Sura 2, v. 2.\n\n [108:2] Sura 51, v. 20, 21.\n\n [108:3] Sura 50, v. 15.\n\n [108:4] Sura 24, v. 35.\n\n [108:5] Sura 42, v. 9.\n\nThese are some of the chief verses out of which the various \u1e62\u016bf\u012b\ncommentators develop pantheistic views of the Universe. They enumerate\nthe following four stages of spiritual training through which the\nsoul--the order or reason of the Primal Light--(\"Say that the soul is\nthe order or reason of God.\")[109:1] has to pass, if it desires to rise\nabove the common herd, and realise its union or identity with the\nultimate source of all things:--\n\n(1). Belief in the Unseen.\n\n(2). Search after the Unseen. The spirit of inquiry leaves its slumber\nby observing the marvellous phenomena of nature. \"Look at the camel how\nit is created; the skies how they are exalted; the mountains how they\nare unshakeably fixed.\"[109:2]\n\n(3). The knowledge of the Unseen. This comes, as we have indicated\nabove, by looking into the depths of our own soul.\n\n(4). The Realisation--This results, according to the higher \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism\nfrom the constant practice of Justice and Charity--\"Verily God bids you\ndo justice and good, and give to kindred (their due), and He forbids you\nto sin, and do wrong, and oppress\".[110:1]\n\n [109:1] Sura 17; v. 87.\n\n [109:2] Sura 88; v. 20.\n\n [110:1] Sura 16; v. 92.\n\nIt must, however, be remembered that some later \u1e62\u016bf\u012b fraternities (e.g.\nNaqs\u0331\u1e96band\u012b) devised, or rather borrowed[110:2] from the Indian\nVedantist, other means of bringing about this Realisation. They taught,\nimitating the Hindu doctrine of Kundal\u012bn\u012b, that there are six great\ncentres of light of various colours in the body of man. It is the object\nof the \u1e62\u016bf\u012b to make them move, or to use the technical word, \"current\"\nby certain methods of meditation, and eventually to realise, amidst the\napparent diversity of colours, the fundamental colourless light which\nmakes everything visible, and is itself invisible. The continual\nmovement of these centres of light through the body, and the final\nrealisation of their identity, which results from putting the atoms of\nthe body into definite courses of motion by slow repetition of the\nvarious names of God and other mysterious expressions, illuminates the\nwhole body of the \u1e62\u016bf\u012b; and the perception of the same illumination in\nthe external world completely extinguishes the sense of \"otherness.\" The\nfact that these methods were known to the Persian \u1e62\u016bf\u012bs misled Von\nKremer who ascribed the whole phenomenon of \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism to the influence of\nVedantic ideas. Such methods of contemplation are quite unislamic in\ncharacter, and the higher \u1e62\u016bf\u012bs do not attach any importance to them.\n\n [110:2] Weber makes the following statement on the authority of\n Lassen:--\"Al-Bir\u016bn\u012b translated Pata\u00f1jal\u012b's work into Arabic at\n the beginning of the 11th century, and also, it would appear,\n the S\u0101nkhya s\u016btra, though the information we have as to the\n contents of these works does not harmonise with the Sanskrit\n originals.\" History of Indian Literature, p. 239.\n\n\n\u00a7 II.\n\nAspects of \u1e62\u016bf\u012b-Metaphysics.\n\nLet us now return to the various schools or rather the various aspects\nof \u1e62\u016bf\u012b Metaphysics. A careful investigation of \u1e62\u016bf\u012b literature shows\nthat \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism has looked at the Ultimate Reality from three standpoints\nwhich, in fact, do not exclude but complement each other. Some \u1e62\u016bf\u012bs\nconceive the essential nature of reality as self-conscious will, others\nbeauty; others again hold that Reality is essentially Thought, Light or\nKnowledge. There are, therefore, three aspects of \u1e62\u016bf\u012b thought:--\n\nA. _Reality as Self-conscious Will._\n\nThe first in historical order is that represented by S\u0331\u1e96aq\u012bq Bal\u1e35\u1e96\u012b,\nIbr\u0101him Adham, R\u0101bi\u2018a, and others. This school conceives the ultimate\nreality as \"Will\", and the Universe a finite activity of that will. It\nis essentially monotheistic and consequently more semitic in character.\nIt is not the desire of Knowledge which dominates the ideal of the \u1e62\u016bf\u012bs\nof this school, but the characteristic features of their life are piety,\nunworldliness, and an intense longing for God due to the consciousness\nof sin. Their object is not to philosophise, but principally to work out\na certain ideal of life. From our standpoint, therefore, they are not of\nmuch importance.\n\nB. _Reality as Beauty._\n\nIn the beginning of the 9{th} century Ma\u2018r\u016bf Kar\u1e35\u1e96\u012b defined \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism\nas \"Apprehension of Divine realities\"[113:1]--a definition which marks\nthe movement from Faith to Knowledge. But the method of apprehending the\nultimate reality was formally stated by Al-Qus\u0331\u1e96air\u012b about the end of\nthe 10{th} century. The teachers of this school adopted the Neo-Platonic\nidea of creation by intermediary agencies; and though this idea lingered\nin the minds of \u1e62\u016bf\u012b writers for a long time, yet their Pantheism led\nthem to abandon the Emanation theory altogether. Like Avicenna they\nlooked upon the ultimate Reality as \"Eternal Beauty\" whose very nature\nconsists in seeing its own \"face\" reflected in the Universe-mirror. The\nUniverse, therefore, became to them a reflected image of the \"Eternal\nBeauty\", and not an emanation as the Neo-Platonists had taught. The\ncause of creation, says M\u012br Sayyid S\u0331\u1e96ar\u012bf, is the manifestation of\nBeauty, and the first creation is Love. The realisation of this Beauty,\nis brought about by universal love, which the innate Zoroastrian\ninstinct of the Persian \u1e62\u016bf\u012b loved to define as \"the Sacred Fire which\nburns up everything other than God.\" Says R\u016bm\u012b:--\n\n \"O thou pleasant madness, Love!\n Thou Physician of all our ills!\n Thou healer of pride,\n Thou Plato and Galen of our souls!\"[114:1]\n\n [113:1] Mr. Nicholson has collected the various definitions of\n \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism. See J. R. A. S. April, 1906.\n\n [114:1] Ma\u1e6f\u1e96naw\u012b, Jal\u0101l al D\u012bn R\u016bm\u012b, with Ba\u1e25ral \u2018ul\u016bm's\n Commentary. Lucknow (India), 1877, p. 9.\n\nAs a direct consequence of such a view of the Universe, we have the idea\nof impersonal absorption which first appears in B\u0101yaz\u012bd of Bist\u0101m, and\nwhich constitutes the characteristic feature of the later development of\nthis school. The growth of this idea may have been influenced by Hindu\npilgrims travelling through Persia to the Buddhistic temple still\nexisting at B\u0101ku.[114:2] The school became wildly pantheistic in \u1e24usain\nMan\u1e63\u016br who, in the true spirit of the Indian Vedantist, cried out, \"I am\nGod\"--Aham Brahma asmi.\n\n [114:2] As regards the progress of Buddhism Geiger says:--\"We\n know that in the period after Alexander, Buddhism was powerful\n in Eastern Iran, and that it counted its confessors as far as\n Tabaristan. It is especially certain that many Buddhistic\n priests were found in Bactria. This state of things, which began\n perhaps in the first century before Christ, lasted till the\n 7{th} century A.D., when the appearance of Islamism alone cut\n short the development of Buddhism in Kabul and Bactria, and it\n is in that period that we will have to place the rise of the\n Zarathushtra legend in the form in which it is presented to us\n by Daq\u012bq\u012b.\"\n\n Civilisation of Eastern Iranians\n Vol. II, p. 170.\n\nThe ultimate Reality or Eternal Beauty, according to the \u1e62\u016bf\u012bs of this\nschool, is infinite in the sense that \"it is absolutely free from the\nlimitations of beginning, end, right, left, above, and below.\"[115:1]\nThe distinction of essence and attribute does not exist in the\nInfinite--\"Substance and quality are really identical.\"[115:2] We have\nindicated above that nature is the mirror of the Absolute Existence. But\naccording to Nasaf\u012b, there are two kinds of mirrors[115:3]--\n\n(a). That which shows merely a reflected image--this is external nature.\n\n(b). That which shows the real Essence--this is man who is a limitation\nof the Absolute, and erroneously thinks himself to be an independent\nentity.\n\n [115:1] Nasaf\u012b's Maq\u1e63adi Aq\u1e63\u0101: fol. 8b.\n\n [115:2] Nasaf\u012b's Maq\u1e63adi Aq\u1e63\u0101: fol. 10b.\n\n [115:3] Nasaf\u012b's Maq\u1e63adi Aq\u1e63\u0101: fol. 23b.\n\n\"O Derwish!\" says Nasaf\u012b \"dost thou think that thy existence is\nindependent of God? This is a great error.\"[116:1] Nasaf\u012b explains his\nmeaning by a beautiful parable.[116:2] The fishes in a certain tank\nrealised that they lived, moved, and had their being in water, but felt\nthat they were quite ignorant of the real nature of what constituted the\nvery source of their life. They resorted to a wiser fish in a great\nriver, and the Philosopher-fish addressed them thus:--\n\n\"O you who endeavour to untie the knot (of being)! You are born in\nunion, yet die in the thought of an unreal separation. Thirsty on the\nsea-shore! Dying penniless while master of the treasure!\"\n\n [116:1] Nasaf\u012b's Maq\u1e63adi Aq\u1e63\u0101: fol. 3b.\n\n [116:2] Nasaf\u012b's Maq\u1e63adi Aq\u1e63\u0101: fol. 15b.\n\nAll feeling of separation, therefore, is ignorance; and all \"otherness\"\nis a mere appearance, a dream, a shadow--a differentiation born of\nrelation essential to the self-recognition of the Absolute. The great\nprophet of this school is \"The excellent R\u016bm\u012b\" as Hegel calls him. He\ntook up the old Neo-Platonic idea of the Universal soul working through\nthe various spheres of being, and expressed it in a way so modern in\nspirit that Clodd introduces the passage in his \"Story of Creation\". I\nventure to quote this famous passage in order to show how successfully\nthe poet anticipates the modern concept of evolution, which he regarded\nas the realistic side of his Idealism.\n\n First man appeared in the clan of inorganic things,\n Next he passed therefrom into that of plants.\n For years he lived as one of the plants,\n Remembering nought of his inorganic state so different;\n And when he passed from the vegetive to the animal state,\n He had no remembrance of his state as a plant,\n Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants,\n Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers;\n Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers,\n Which know not the cause of their inclination to the breast.\n Again the great creator as you know,\n Drew man out of the animal into the human state.\n Thus man passed from one order of nature to another,\n Till he became wise and knowing and strong as he is now.\n Of his first soul he has now no remembrance,\n And he will be again changed from his present soul.\n\n (Ma\u1e6f\u1e96naw\u012b Book IV).\n\nIt would now be instructive if we compare this aspect of \u1e62\u016bf\u012b thought\nwith the fundamental ideas of Neo-Platonism. The God of Neo-Platonism is\nimmanent as well as transcendant. \"As being the cause of all things, it\nis everywhere. As being other than all things, it is nowhere. If it\nwere only \"everywhere\", and not also \"nowhere\", it would _be_ all\nthings.\"[118:1] The \u1e62\u016bf\u012b, however, tersely says that God _is_ all things.\nThe Neo-Platonist allows a certain permanence or fixity to\nmatter;[118:2] but the \u1e62\u016bf\u012bs of the school in question, regard all\nempirical experience as a kind of dreaming. Life in limitation, they\nsay, is sleep; death brings the awakening. It is, however, the doctrine\nof Impersonal immortality--\"genuinely eastern in spirit\"--which\ndistinguishes this school from Neo-Platonism. \"Its (Arabian Philosophy)\ndistinctive doctrine\", says Whittaker, \"of an Impersonal immortality of\nthe general human intellect is, however, as contrasted with\nAristotelianism and Neo-Platonism, essentially original.\"\n\n [118:1] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 58.\n\n [118:2] Whittaker's Neo-Platonism, p. 57.\n\nThe above brief exposition shows that there are three basic ideas of\nthis mode of thought:--\n\n(a). That the ultimate Reality is knowable through a supersensual state\nof consciousness.\n\n(b). That the ultimate Reality is impersonal.\n\n(c). That the ultimate Reality is one.\n\nCorresponding to these ideas we have:\n\n(I). The Agnostic reaction as manifested in the Poet \u2018Umar \u1e34\u1e96ayy\u0101m\n(12{th} century) who cried out in his intellectual despair:--\n\n The joyous souls who quaff potations deep,\n And saints who in the mosque sad vigils keep,\n Are lost at sea alike, and find no shore,\n One only wakes, all others are asleep.\n\n(II). The monotheistic reaction of Ibn Taimiyya and his followers in the\n13{th} century.\n\n(III). The Pluralistic reaction of W\u0101\u1e25id Ma\u1e25m\u016bd[119:1] in the 13{th}\ncentury.\n\n [119:1] Dabist\u0101n, Chap: 8.\n\nSpeaking from a purely philosophical standpoint, the last movement is\nmost interesting. The history of Thought illustrates the operation of\ncertain general laws of progress which are true of the intellectual\nannals of different peoples. The German systems of monistic thought\ninvoked the pluralism of Herbart; while the pantheism of Spinoza called\nforth the monadism of Leibniz. The operation of the same law led W\u0101\u1e25id\nMa\u1e25m\u016bd to deny the truth of contemporary monism, and declare that\nReality is not one but many. Long before Leibniz he taught that the\nUniverse is a combination of what he called \"Afr\u0101d\"--essential units, or\nsimple atoms which have existed from all eternity, and are endowed with\nlife. The law of the Universe is an ascending perfection of elemental\nmatter, continually passing from lower to higher forms determined by the\nkind of food which the fundamental units assimilate. Each period of his\ncosmogony comprises 8,000 years, and after eight such periods the world\nis decomposed, and the units re-combine to construct a new universe.\nW\u0101\u1e25id Ma\u1e25m\u016bd succeeded in founding a sect which was cruelly persecuted,\nand finally stamped out of existence by S\u0331\u1e96\u0101h \u2018Abb\u0101s. It is said that\nthe poet \u1e24\u0101fiz of S\u0331\u1e96\u012br\u0101z believed in the tenets of this sect.\n\n\nC. _Reality as Light or Thought._\n\nThe third great school of \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism conceives Reality as essentially Light\nor Thought, the very nature of which demands something to be thought or\nilluminated. While the preceding school abandoned Neo-Platonism, this\nschool transformed it into new systems. There are, however, two aspects\nof the metaphysics of this school. The one is genuinely Persian in\nspirit, the other is chiefly influenced by Christian modes of thought.\nBoth agree in holding that the fact of empirical diversity necessitates\na principle of difference in the nature of the ultimate Reality. I now\nproceed to consider them in their historical order.\n\n\nI. Reality as Light--Al-Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q\u012b.\n\nReturn to Persian Dualism.\n\nThe application of Greek dialectic to Islamic Theology aroused that\nspirit of critical examination which began with Al-As\u0331\u1e96\u2018ar\u012b, and found\nits completest expression in the scepticism of Al-G\u0331\u1e96az\u0101l\u012b. Even among\nthe Rationalists there were some more critical minds--such as\nNazz\u0101m--whose attitude towards Greek Philosophy was not one of servile\nsubmission, but of independent criticism. The defenders of\ndogma--Al-G\u0331\u1e96az\u0101l\u012b, Al-R\u0101z\u012b, Abul Barak\u0101t, and Al-\u0100mid\u012b, carried on a\npersistent attack on the whole fabric of Greek Philosophy; while Abu\nSa\u2018\u012bd \u1e62air\u0101f\u012b, Qa\u1e0d\u012b \u2018Abdal Jabb\u0101r, Abul Ma\u2018\u0101l\u012b, Abul Q\u0101sim, and finally\nthe acute Ibn Taimiyya, actuated by similar theological motives,\ncontinued to expose the inherent weakness of Greek Logic. In their\ncriticism of Greek Philosophy, these thinkers were supplemented by some\nof the more learned \u1e62\u016bf\u012bs, such as Shah\u0101bal D\u012bn Suhraward\u012b, who\nendeavoured to substantiate the helplessness of pure reason by his\nrefutation of Greek thought in a work entitled, \"The unveiling of Greek\nabsurdities\". The As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite reaction against Rationalism resulted not\nonly in the development of a system of metaphysics most modern in some\nof its aspects, but also in completely breaking asunder the worn out\nfetters of intellectual thraldom. Erdmann[122:1] seems to think that the\nspeculative spirit among the Muslims exhausted itself with Al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b and\nAvicenna, and that after them Philosophy became bankrupt in passing over\ninto scepticism and mysticism. Evidently he ignores the Muslim criticism\nof Greek Philosophy which led to the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite Idealism on the one\nhand, and a genuine Persian reconstruction on the other. That a system\nof thoroughly Persian character might be possible, the destruction of\nforeign thought, or rather the weakening of its hold on the mind, was\nindispensable. The As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite and other defenders of Islamic Dogma\ncompleted the destruction; Al-Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q\u012b--the child of emancipation--came\nforward to build a new edifice of thought; though, in his process of\nreconstruction, he did not entirely repudiate the older material. His is\nthe genuine Persian brain which, undaunted by the threats of narrow\nminded authority, asserts its right of free independent speculation. In\nhis philosophy the old Iranian tradition, which had found only a partial\nexpression in the writings of the Physician Al-R\u0101z\u012b, Al-G\u0331\u1e96az\u0101l\u012b, and\nthe Ism\u0101\u2018\u012blia sect, endeavours to come to a final understanding with the\nphilosophy of his predecessors and the theology of Islam.\n\n [122:1] Vol. I, p. 367.\n\nShaikh S\u0331\u1e96ah\u0101bal D\u012bn Suhraward\u012b, known as S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96al Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q Maqt\u016bl\nwas born about the middle of the 12{th} century. He studied philosophy\nwith Majd J\u012bl\u012b--the teacher of the commentator Al-R\u0101z\u012b--and, while\nstill a youth, stood unrivalled as a thinker in the whole Islamic world.\nHis great admirer Al-Malik-al-Z\u0101hir--the son of Sultan \u1e62al\u0101\u1e25-al\nD\u012bn--invited him to Aleppo, where the youthful philosopher expounded his\nindependent opinions in a way that aroused the bitter jealousy of\ncontemporary theologians. These hired slaves of bloodthirsty Dogmatism\nwhich, conscious of its inherent weakness, has always managed to keep\nbrute force behind its back, wrote to Sultan \u1e62al\u0101\u1e25-al D\u012bn, that the\nS\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96's teaching was a danger to Islam, and that it was necessary,\nin the interest of the Faith, to nip the evil in the bud. The Sultan\nconsented; and there, at the early age of 36, the young Persian thinker\ncalmly met the blow which made him a martyr of truth, and immortalised\nhis name for ever. Murderers have passed away, but the philosophy, the\nprice of which was paid in blood, still lives, and attracts many an\nearnest seeker after truth.\n\nThe principal features of the founder of the Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q\u012b Philosophy are\nhis intellectual independence, the skill with which he weaves his\nmaterials into a systematic whole, and above all his faithfulness to\nthe philosophic traditions of his country. In many fundamental points he\ndiffers from Plato, and freely criticises Aristotle whose philosophy he\nlooks upon as a mere preparation for his own system of thought. Nothing\nescapes his criticism. Even the logic of Aristotle, he subjects to a\nsearching examination, and shows the hollowness of some of its\ndoctrines. Definition, for instance, is genus plus differentia,\naccording to Aristotle. But Al-Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q\u012b holds that the distinctive\nattribute of the thing defined, which cannot be predicated of any other\nthing, will bring us no knowledge of the thing. We define \"horse\" as a\nneighing animal. Now we understand animality, because we know many\nanimals in which this attribute exists; but it is impossible to\nunderstand the attribute \"neighing\", since it is found nowhere except in\nthe thing defined. The ordinary definition of horse, therefore, would be\nmeaningless to a man who has never seen a horse. Aristotelian\ndefinition, as a scientific principle is quite useless. This criticism\nleads the S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96, to a standpoint very similar to that of Bosanquet\nwho defines definition, as \"Summation of qualities\". The S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96\nholds that a true definition would enumerate all the essential\nattributes which, taken collectively, exist nowhere except the thing\ndefined, though they may individually exist in other things.\n\nBut let us turn to his system of metaphysics, and estimate the worth of\nhis contribution to the thought of his country. In order fully to\ncomprehend the purely intellectual side of Transcendental philosophy,\nthe student, says the S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96, must be thoroughly acquainted with\nAristotelian philosophy, Logic, Mathematics, and \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism. His mind\nshould be completely free from the taint of prejudice and sin, so that\nhe may gradually develop that inner sense, which verifies and corrects\nwhat intellect understands only as theory. Unaided reason is\nuntrustworthy; it must always be supplemented by \"\u1e0e\u1e96auq\"--the\nmysterious perception of the essence of things--which brings knowledge\nand peace to the restless soul, and disarms Scepticism for ever. We are,\nhowever, concerned with the purely speculative side of this spiritual\nexperience--the results of the inner perception as formulated and\nsystematised by discursive thought. Let us, therefore, examine the\nvarious aspects of the Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q\u012b Philosophy--Ontology, Cosmology, and\nPsychology.\n\n\nOntology.\n\nThe ultimate principle of all existence is \"N\u016br-i-Q\u0101hir\"--the Primal\nAbsolute Light whose essential nature consists in perpetual\nillumination. \"Nothing is more visible than light, and visibility does\nnot stand in need of any definition.\"[127:1] The essence of Light,\ntherefore, is manifestation. For if manifestation is an attribute\nsuperadded to light, it would follow that in itself light possesses no\nvisibility, and becomes visible only through something else visible in\nitself; and from this again follows the absurd consequence, that\nsomething other than light is more visible than light. The Primal Light,\ntherefore, has no reason of its existence beyond itself. All that is\nother than this original principle is dependent, contingent, possible.\nThe \"not-light\" (darkness) is not something distinct proceeding from an\nindependent source. It is an error of the representatives of the Magian\nreligion to suppose that Light and Darkness are two distinct realities\ncreated by two distinct creative agencies. The ancient Philosophers of\nPersia were not dualists like the Zoroastrian priests who, on the ground\nof the principle that the one cannot cause to emanate from itself more\nthan one, assigned two independent sources to Light and Darkness. The\nrelation between them is not that of contrariety, but of existence and\nnon-existence. The affirmation of Light necessarily posits its own\nnegation--Darkness which it must illuminate in order to be itself. This\nPrimordial Light is the source of all motion. But its motion is not\nchange of place; it is due to the _love_ of illumination which\nconstitutes its very essence, and stirs it up, as it were, to quicken\nall things into life, by pouring out its own rays into their being. The\nnumber of illuminations which proceed from it is infinite. Illuminations\nof intenser brightness become, in their turn, the sources of other\nilluminations; and the scale of brightness gradually descends to\nilluminations too faint to beget other illuminations. All these\nilluminations are mediums, or in the language of Theology, angels\nthrough whom the infinite varieties of being receive life and sustenance\nfrom the Primal Light. The followers of Aristotle erroneously restricted\nthe number of original Intellects to ten. They likewise erred in\nenumerating the categories of thought. The possibilities of the Primal\nLight are infinite; and the Universe, with all its variety, is only a\npartial expression of the infinitude behind it. The categories of\nAristotle, therefore, are only relatively true. It is impossible for\nhuman thought to comprehend within its tiny grasp, all the infinite\nvariety of ideas according to which the Primal Light does or may\nilluminate that which is not light. We can, however, discriminate\nbetween the following two illuminations of the original Light:--\n\n [127:1] S\u0331\u1e96arh Anw\u0101riyya--Al-Haraw\u012b's commentary on\n Al-Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q\u012b's Hikmat al-Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q, fol. 10a.\n\n(1). The Abstract Light (e.g. Intellect Universal as well as\nindividual). It has no form, and never becomes the attribute of anything\nother than itself (Substance). From it proceed all the various forms of\npartly-conscious, conscious, or self-conscious light, differing from one\nanother in the amount of lustre, which is determined by their\ncomparative nearness or distance from the ultimate source of their\nbeing. The individual intellect or soul is only a fainter copy, or a\nmore distant reflection of the Primal Light. The Abstract Light knows\nitself through itself, and does not stand in need of a non-ego to reveal\nits own existence to itself. Consciousness or self-knowledge, therefore,\nis the very essense of Abstract light, as distinguished from the\nnegation of light.\n\n(2). The Accidental light (Attribute)--the light that has a form, and is\ncapable of becoming an attribute of something other than itself (e.g.\nthe light of the stars, or the visibility of other bodies). The\nAccidental light, or more properly sensible light, is a distant\nreflection of the Abstract light, which, because of its distance, has\nlost the intensity, or substance-character of its parent. The process of\ncontinuous reflection is really a softening process; successive\nilluminations gradually lose their intensity until, in the chain of\nreflections, we reach certain less intense illuminations which entirely\nlose their independent character, and cannot exist except in\nassociation with something else. These illuminations form the Accidental\nlight--the attribute which has no independent existence. The relation,\ntherefore, between the Accidental and the Abstract light is that of\ncause and effect. The effect, however, is not something quite distinct\nfrom its cause; it is a transformation, or a weaker form of the supposed\ncause itself. Anything other than the Abstract light (e.g. the nature of\nthe illuminated body itself) cannot be the cause of the Accidental\nlight; since the latter, being merely contingent and consequently\ncapable of being negatived, can be taken away from bodies, without\naffecting their character. If the essence or nature of the illuminated\nbody, had been the cause of the Accidental light, such a process of\ndisillumination could not have been possible. We cannot conceive an\ninactive cause.[131:1]\n\n [131:1] S\u0331\u1e96arh Anw\u0101riyya fol. 11b.\n\nIt is now obvious that the S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96 al-Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q agrees with the\nAs\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite thinkers in holding that there is no such thing as the Prima\nMateria of Aristotle; though he recognises the existence of a necessary\nnegation of Light--darkness, the object of illumination. He further\nagrees with them in teaching the relativity of all categories except\nSubstance and Quality. But he corrects their theory of knowledge, in so\nfar as he recognises an active element in human knowledge. Our relation\nwith the objects of our knowledge is not merely a passive relation; the\nindividual soul, being itself an illumination, illuminates the object in\nthe act of knowledge. The Universe to him is one great process of active\nillumination; but, from a purely intellectual standpoint, this\nillumination is only a partial expression of the infinitude of the\nPrimal Light, which may illuminate according to other laws not known to\nus. The categories of thought are infinite; our intellect works with a\nfew only. The S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96, therefore, from the standpoint of discursive\nthought, is not far from modern Humanism.\n\n\nCosmology.\n\nAll that is \"not-light\" is, what the Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q\u012b thinkers call, \"Absolute\nquantity\", or \"Absolute matter\". It is only another aspect of the\naffirmation of light, and not an independent principle, as the\nfollowers of Aristotle erroneously hold. The experimental fact of the\ntransformation of the primary elements into one another, points to this\nfundamental Absolute matter which, with its various degrees of\ngrossness, constitutes the various spheres of material being. The\nabsolute ground of all things, then, is divided into two kinds:--\n\n(1). That which is beyond space--the obscure substance or atoms\n(essences of the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite).\n\n(2). That which is necessarily in space--forms of darkness, e.g. weight,\nsmell, taste, etc.\n\nThe combination of these two particularises the Absolute matter. A\nmaterial body is forms of darkness plus obscure substance, made visible\nor illuminated by the Abstract light. But what is the cause of the\nvarious forms of darkness? These, like the forms of light, owe their\nexistence to the Abstract light, the different illuminations of which\ncause diversity in the spheres of being. The forms which make bodies\ndiffer from one another, do not exist in the nature of the Absolute\nmatter. The Absolute quantity and the Absolute matter being identical,\nif these forms do exist in the essence of the Absolute matter, all\nbodies would be identical in regard to the forms of darkness. This,\nhowever, is contradicted by daily experience. The cause of the forms of\ndarkness, therefore, is not the Absolute matter. And as the difference\nof forms cannot be assigned to any other cause, it follows that they are\ndue to the various illuminations of the Abstract light. Forms of light\nand darkness both owe their existence to the Abstract Light. The third\nelement of a material body--the obscure atom or essence--is nothing but\na necessary aspect of the affirmation of light. The body as a whole,\ntherefore, is completely dependent on the Primal Light. The whole\nUniverse is really a continuous series of circles of existence, all\ndepending on the original Light. Those nearer to the source receive more\nillumination than those more distant. All varieties of existence in each\ncircle, and the circles themselves, are illuminated through an infinite\nnumber of medium-illuminations, which preserve some forms of existence\nby the help of \"conscious light\" (as in the case of man, animal and\nplant), and some without it (as in the case of minerals and primary\nelements). The immense panorama of diversity which we call the Universe,\nis, therefore, a vast shadow of the infinite variety in intensity of\ndirect or indirect illuminations and rays of the Primary Light. Things\nare, so to speak, fed by their respective illuminations to which they\nconstantly move, with a lover's passion, in order to drink more and more\nof the original fountain of Light. The world is an eternal drama of\nlove. The different planes of being are as follow:--\n\n The Plane \u250c 1. The Plane of Intellects--the\n of Primal \u2502 parent of the heavens,\n Light. \u2502 2. The Plane of the Soul.\n \u2514 3. The Plane of Form.\n \u2502\n \u2502 \u250c 1. The Plane \u250c 1. The Plane of\n \u2502 \u2502 of ideal \u2502 the heavens.\n \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2524 form. \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2524\n \u2502 2. The Plane \u2502 2. The Plane of\n \u2502 of material \u2514 the elements:--\n \u2514 forms:--\n\n (a). The heavens (a). Simple elements.\n (b). The elements:-- (b). Compounds:--\n 1. Simple elements I. Mineral kingdom.\n 2. Compounds:-- II. Vegetable kingdom.\n I. Mineral kingdom. III. Animal kingdom.\n II. Vegetable kingdom.\n III. Animal kingdom.\n\nHaving briefly indicated the general nature of Being, we now proceed to\na more detailed examination of the world-process. All that is not-light\nis divided into:--\n\n(1). Eternal e.g., Intellects, Souls of heavenly bodies, heavens, simple\nelements, time, motion.\n\n(2). Contingent e.g., Compounds of various elements. The motion of the\nheavens is eternal, and makes up the various cycles of the Universe. It\nis due to the intense longing of the heaven-soul to receive illumination\nfrom the source of all light. The matter of which the heavens are\nconstructed, is completely free from the operation of chemical\nprocesses, incidental to the grosser forms of the not-light. Every\nheaven has its own matter peculiar to it alone. Likewise the heavens\ndiffer from one another in the direction of their motion; and the\ndifference is explained by the fact that the beloved, or the sustaining\nillumination, is different in each case. Motion is only an aspect of\ntime. It is the summing up of the elements of time, which, as\nexternalised, is motion. The distinction of past, present, and future\nis made only for the sake of convenience, and does not exist in the\nnature of time.[137:1] We cannot conceive the beginning of time; for the\nsupposed beginning would be a point of time itself. Time and motion,\ntherefore, are both eternal.\n\n [137:1] S\u0331\u1e96arh Anw\u0101riyya fol. 34a.\n\nThere are three primordial elements--water, earth, and wind. Fire,\naccording to the Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q\u012bs, is only burning wind. The combinations of\nthese elements, under various heavenly influences, assume various\nforms--fluidity, gaseousness, solidity. This transformation of the\noriginal elements, constitutes the process of \"making and unmaking\"\nwhich pervades the entire sphere of the not-light, raising the different\nforms of existence higher and higher, and bringing them nearer and\nnearer to the illuminating forces. All the phenomena of nature--rain,\nclouds, thunder, meteor--are the various workings of this immanent\nprinciple of motion, and are explained by the direct or indirect\noperation of the Primal Light on things, which differ from one another\nin their capacity of receiving more or less illumination. The Universe,\nin one word, is a petrified desire; a crystallised longing after light.\n\nBut is it eternal? The Universe is a manifestation of the illuminative\nPower which constitutes the essential nature of the Primal Light. In so\nfar, therefore, as it is a manifestation, it is only a dependent being,\nand consequently not eternal. But in another sense it is eternal. All\nthe different spheres of being exist by the illuminations and rays of\nthe Eternal light. There are some illuminations which are directly\neternal; while there are other fainter ones, the appearance of which\ndepends on the combination of other illuminations and rays. The\nexistence of these is not eternal in the same sense as the existence of\nthe pre-existing parent illuminations. The existence of colour, for\ninstance, is contingent in comparison to that of the ray, which\nmanifests colour when a dark body is brought before an illuminating\nbody. The Universe, therefore, though contingent as manifestation, is\neternal by the eternal character of its source. Those who hold the\nnon-eternity of the Universe argue on the assumption of the possibility\nof a complete induction. Their argument proceeds in the following\nmanner:--\n\n(1). Everyone of the Abyssinians is black.\n\n\u2042 All Abyssinians are black.\n\n(2). Every motion began at a definite moment.\n\n\u2042 All motion must begin so.\n\nBut this mode of argumentation is vicious. It is quite impossible to\nstate the major. One cannot collect all the Abyssinians past, present,\nand future, at one particular moment of time. Such a Universal,\ntherefore, is impossible. Hence from the examination of individual\nAbyssinians, or particular instances of motion which fall within the\npale of our experience, it is rash to infer, that all Abyssinians are\nblack, or all motion had a beginning in time.\n\n\nPsychology.\n\nMotion and light are not concomitant in the case of bodies of a lower\norder. A piece of stone, for instance, though illuminated and hence\nvisible, is not endowed with self-initiated movement. As we rise,\nhowever, in the scale of being, we find higher bodies, or organisms in\nwhich motion and light are associated together. The abstract\nillumination finds its best dwelling place in man. But the question\narises whether the individual abstract illumination which we call the\nhuman soul, did or did not exist before its physical accompaniment. The\nfounder of Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q\u012b Philosophy follows Avicenna in connection with this\nquestion, and uses the same arguments to show, that the individual\nabstract illuminations cannot be held to have pre-existed, as so many\nunits of light. The material categories of one and many cannot be\napplied to the abstract illumination which, in its essential nature, is\nneither one nor many; though it appears as many owing to the various\ndegrees of illuminational receptivity in its material accompaniments.\nThe relation between the abstract illumination, or soul and body, is not\nthat of cause and effect; the bond of union between them is love. The\nbody which longs for illumination, receives it through the soul; since\nits nature does not permit a direct communication between the source of\nlight and itself. But the soul cannot transmit the directly received\nlight to the dark solid body which, considering its attributes, stands\non the opposite pole of being. In order to be related to each other,\nthey require a medium between them, something standing midway between\nlight and darkness. This medium is the animal soul--a hot, fine,\ntransparent vapour which has its principal seat in the left cavity of\nthe heart, but also circulates in all parts of the body. It is because\nof the partial identity of the animal soul with light that, in dark\nnights, land-animals run towards the burning fire; while sea-animals\nleave their aquatic abodes in order to enjoy the beautiful sight of the\nmoon. The ideal of man, therefore, is to rise higher and higher in the\nscale of being, and to receive more and more illumination which\ngradually brings complete freedom from the world of forms. But how is\nthis ideal to be realised? By knowledge and action. It is the\ntransformation of both understanding and will, the union of action and\ncontemplation, that actualizes the highest ideal of man. Change your\nattitude towards the Universe, and adopt the line of conduct\nnecessitated by the change. Let us briefly consider these means of\nrealisation:--\n\nA. _Knowledge._ When the Abstract illumination associates itself with a\nhigher organism, it works out its development by the operation of\ncertain faculties--the powers of light, and the powers of darkness. The\nformer are the five external senses, and the five internal\nsenses--sensorium, conception, imagination, understanding, and memory;\nthe latter are the powers of growth, digestion, etc. But such a division\nof faculties is only convenient. \"One faculty can be the source of all\noperations.\"[142:1] There is only one power in the middle of the brain,\nthough it receives different names from different standpoints. The mind\nis a unity which, for the sake of convenience, is regarded as\nmultiplicity. The power residing in the middle of the brain must be\ndistinguished from the abstract illumination which constitutes the real\nessence of man. The Philosopher of illumination appears to draw a\ndistinction between the active mind and the essentially inactive soul;\nyet he teaches that in some mysterious way, all the various faculties\nare connected with the soul.\n\n [142:1] S\u0331\u1e96arh Anw\u0101riyya fol. 57b.\n\nThe most original point in his psychology of intellection, however, is\nhis theory of vision.[142:2] The ray of light which is supposed to come\nout of the eye must be either substance or quality. If quality, it\ncannot be transmitted from one substance (eye) to another substance\n(visible body). If, on the other hand, it is a substance, it moves\neither consciously, or impelled by its inherent nature. Conscious\nmovement would make it an animal perceiving other things. The perceiver\nin this case would be the ray, not man. If the movement of the ray is an\nattribute of its nature, there is no reason why its movement should be\npeculiar to one direction, and not to all. The ray of light, therefore,\ncannot be regarded as coming out of the eye. The followers of Aristotle\nhold that in the process of vision images of objects are printed on the\neye. This view is also erroneous; since images of big things cannot be\nprinted on a small space. The truth is that when a thing comes before\nthe eye, an illumination takes place, and the mind sees the object\nthrough that illumination. When there is no veil between the object and\nthe normal sight, and the mind is ready to perceive, the act of vision\nmust take place; since this is the law of things. \"All vision is\nillumination; and we see things in God\". Berkley explained the\nrelativity of our sight-perceptions with a view to show that the\nultimate ground of all ideas is God. The Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q\u012b Philosopher has the\nsame object in view, though his theory of vision is not so much an\nexplanation of the sight-process as a new way of looking at the fact of\nvision.\n\n [142:2] S\u0331\u1e96arh Anw\u0101riyya fol. 60b.\n\nBesides sense and reason, however, there is another source of knowledge\ncalled \"\u1e0e\u1e96auq\"--the inner perception which reveals non-temporal and\nnon-spatial planes of being. The study of philosophy, or the habit of\nreflecting on pure concepts, combined with the practice of virtue, leads\nto the upbringing of this mysterious sense, which corroborates and\ncorrects the conclusions of intellect.\n\nB. _Action._ Man as an active being has the following motive powers:\n\n(a). Reason or the Angelic soul--the source of intelligence,\ndiscrimination, and love of knowledge.\n\n(b). The beast-soul which is the source of anger, courage, dominance,\nand ambition.\n\n(c). The animal soul which is the source of lust, hunger, and sexual\npassion.\n\nThe first leads to wisdom; the second and third, if controlled by\nreason, lead respectively to bravery and chastity. The harmonious use of\nall results in the virtue of justice. The possibility of spiritual\nprogress by virtue, shows that this world is the best possible world.\nThings as existent are neither good nor bad. It is misuse or limited\nstandpoint that makes them so. Still the fact of evil cannot be denied.\nEvil does exist; but it is far less in amount than good. It is peculiar\nonly to a part of the world of darkness; while there are other parts of\nthe Universe which are quite free from the taint of evil. The sceptic\nwho attributes the existence of evil to the creative agency of God,\npresupposes resemblance between human and divine action, and does not\nsee that nothing existent is free in his sense of the word. Divine\nactivity cannot be regarded as the creator of evil in the same sense as\nwe regard some forms of human activity as the cause of evil.[145:1]\n\n [145:1] S\u0331\u1e96arh Anw\u0101riyya fol. 92b.\n\nIt is, then, by the union of knowledge and virtue that the soul frees\nitself from the world of darkness. As we know more and more of the\nnature of things, we are brought closer and closer to the world of\nlight; and the love of that world becomes more and more intense. The\nstages of spiritual development are infinite, since the degrees of love\nare infinite. The principal stages, however, are as follows:--\n\n(1). The stage of \"_I_\". In this stage the feeling of personality is\nmost predominant, and the spring of human action is generally\nselfishness.\n\n(2). The stage of \"_Thou art not_\". Complete absorption in one's own\ndeep self to the entire forgetfulness of everything external.\n\n(3). The stage of \"_I am not_\". This stage is the necessary result of\nthe second.\n\n(4). The stage of \"_Thou art_\". The absolute negation of \"_I_\", and the\naffirmation of \"_Thou_\", which means complete resignation to the will of\nGod.\n\n(5). The stage of \"_I am not; and thou art not_\". The complete negation\nof both the terms of thought--the state of cosmic consciousness.\n\nEach stage is marked by more or less intense illuminations, which are\naccompanied by some indescribable sounds. Death does not put an end to\nthe spiritual progress of the soul. The individual souls, after death,\nare not unified into one soul, but continue different from each other in\nproportion to the illumination they received during their companionship\nwith physical organisms. The Philosopher of illumination anticipates\nLeibniz's doctrine of the Identity of Indiscernibles, and holds that no\ntwo souls can be completely similar to each other.[147:1] When the\nmaterial machinery which it adopts for the purpose of acquiring gradual\nillumination, is exhausted, the soul probably takes up another body\ndetermined by the experiences of the previous life; and rises higher and\nhigher in the different spheres of being, adopting forms peculiar to\nthose spheres, until it reaches its destination--the state of absolute\nnegation. Some souls probably come back to this world in order to make\nup their deficiencies.[147:2] The doctrine of trans-migration cannot be\nproved or disproved from a purely logical standpoint; though it is a\nprobable hypothesis to account for the future destiny of the soul. All\nsouls are thus constantly journeying towards their common source, which\ncalls back the whole Universe when this journey is over, and starts\nanother cycle of being to reproduce, in almost all respects, the history\nof the preceding cycles.\n\n [147:1] S\u0331\u1e96arh Anw\u0101riyya fol. 82.\n\n [147:2] S\u0331\u1e96arh Anw\u0101riyya fol. 87b.\n\nSuch is the philosophy of the great Persian martyr. He is, properly\nspeaking, the first Persian systematiser who recognises the elements of\ntruth in all the aspects of Persian speculation, and skilfully\nsynthesises them in his own system. He is a pantheist in so far as he\ndefines God as the sum total of all sensible and ideal existence.[148:1]\nTo him, unlike some of his \u1e62\u016bf\u012b predecessors, the world is something\nreal, and the human soul a distinct individuality. With the orthodox\ntheologian, he maintains that the ultimate cause of every phenomenon,\nis the absolute light whose illumination forms the very essence of the\nUniverse. In his psychology he follows Avicenna, but his treatment of\nthis branch of study is more systematic and more empirical. As an\nethical philosopher, he is a follower of Aristotle whose doctrine of the\nmean he explains and illustrates with great thoroughness. Above all he\nmodifies and transforms the traditional Neo-Platonism, into a thoroughly\nPersian system of thought which, not only approaches Plato, but also\nspiritualises the old Persian Dualism. No Persian thinker is more alive\nto the necessity of explaining all the aspects of objective existence in\nreference to his fundamental principles. He constantly appeals to\nexperience, and endeavours to explain even the physical phenomena in the\nlight of his theory of illumination. In his system objectivity, which\nwas completely swallowed up by the exceedingly subjective character of\nextreme pantheism, claims its due again, and, having been subjected to a\ndetailed examination, finds a comprehensive explanation. No wonder then\nthat this acute thinker succeeded in founding a system of thought,\nwhich has always exercised the greatest fascination over minds--uniting\nspeculation and emotion in perfect harmony. The narrow-mindedness of his\ncontemporaries gave him the title of \"Maqt\u016bl\" (the killed one),\nsignifying that he was not to be regarded as \"S\u0331\u1e96ah\u012bd\" (Martyr); but\nsucceeding generations of \u1e62\u016bf\u012bs and philosophers have always given him\nthe profoundest veneration.\n\n [148:1] S\u0331\u1e96arh Anw\u0101riyya fol. 81b.\n\nI may here notice a less spiritual form of the Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q\u012b mode of\nthought. Nasaf\u012b[150:1] describes a phase of \u1e62\u016bf\u012b thought which reverted\nto the old materialistic dualism of M\u0101n\u012b. The advocates of this view\nhold, that light and darkness are essential to each other. They are, in\nreality, two rivers which mix with each other like oil and milk,[150:2]\nout of which arises the diversity of things. The ideal of human action\nis freedom from the taint of darkness; and the freedom of light from\ndarkness means the self-consciousness of light as light.\n\n [150:1] Maqsadi Aqs\u0101; fol. 21a.\n\n [150:2] Maqsadi Aqs\u0101; fol. 21a.\n\n\nII. Reality as Thought--Al-J\u012bl\u012b.\n\nAl-J\u012bl\u012b was born in 767 A.H., as he himself says in one of his verses,\nand died in 811 A.H. He was not a prolific writer like S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96 Mu\u1e25y\nal-D\u012bn ibn \u2018Arab\u012b whose mode of thought seems to have greatly influenced\nhis teaching. He combined in himself poetical imagination and\nphilosophical genius, but his poetry is no more than a vehicle for his\nmystical and metaphysical doctrines. Among other books he wrote a\ncommentary on S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96 Mu\u1e25y al-D\u012bn ibn \u2018Arab\u012b's al-Fut\u016b\u1e25\u0101t al-Makkiya,\na commentary on Bismill\u0101h, and the famous work Ins\u0101n al-K\u0101mil (printed\nin Cairo).\n\nEssence pure and simple, he says, is the thing to which names and\nattributes are given, whether it is existent actually or ideally. The\nexistent is of two species:--\n\n(1). The Existent in Absoluteness or Pure existence--Pure Being--God.\n\n(2). The existence joined with non-existence--Creation--Nature.\n\nThe Essence of God or Pure Thought cannot be understood; no words can\nexpress it, for it is beyond all relation and knowledge is relation. The\nintellect flying through the fathomless empty space pierces through the\nveil of names and attributes, traverses the vasty sphere of time, enters\nthe domain of the non-existent and finds the Essence of Pure Thought to\nbe an existence which is non-existence--a sum of contradictions.[152:1]\nIt has two (accidents); eternal life in all past time and eternal life\nin all future time. It has two (qualities), God and creation. It has two\n(definitions), uncreatableness and creatableness. It has two names, God\nand man. It has two faces, the manifested (this world) and the\nunmanifested (the next world). It has two effects, necessity and\npossibility. It has two points of view; from the first it is\nnon-existent for itself but existent for what is not itself; from the\nsecond it is existent for itself and non-existent for what is not\nitself.\n\n [152:1] Ins\u0101n al-K\u0101mil, Vol. I, p. 10.\n\nName, he says, fixes the named in the understanding, pictures it in the\nmind, presents it in the imagination and keeps it in the memory. It is\nthe outside or the husk, as it were, of the named; while the named is\nthe inside or the pith. Some names do not exist in reality but exist in\nname only as \"\u2018Anq\u0101\" (a fabulous bird). It is a name the object of which\ndoes not exist in reality. Just as \"\u2018Anq\u0101\" is absolutely non-existent,\nso God is absolutely present, although He cannot be touched and seen.\nThe \"\u2018Anq\u0101\" exists only in idea while the object of the name \"All\u0101h\"\nexists in reality and can be known like \"\u2018Anq\u0101\" only through its names\nand attributes. The name is a mirror which reveals all the secrets of\nthe Absolute Being; it is a light through the agency of which God sees\nHimself. Al-J\u012bl\u012b here approaches the Isma\u2018\u012blia view that we should seek\nthe Named through the Name.\n\nIn order to understand this passage we should bear in mind the three\nstages of the development of Pure Being, enumerated by him. He holds\nthat the Absolute existence or Pure Being when it leaves its\nabsoluteness undergoes three stages:--(1) Oneness. (2) He-ness. (3)\nI-ness. In the first stage there is an absence of all attributes and\nrelations, yet it is called one, and therefore oneness marks one step\naway from the absoluteness. In the second stage Pure Being is yet free\nfrom all manifestation, while the third stage, I-ness, is nothing but an\nexternal manifestation of the He-ness; or, as Hegel would say, it is the\nself-diremption of God. This third stage is the sphere of the name\nAll\u0101h; here the darkness of Pure Being is illuminated, nature comes to\nthe front, the Absolute Being has become conscious. He says further that\nthe name All\u0101h is the stuff of all the perfections of the different\nphases of Divinity, and in the second stage of the progress of Pure\nBeing, all that is the result of Divine self-diremption was potentially\ncontained within the titanic grasp of this name which, in the third\nstage of the development, objectified itself, became a mirror in which\nGod reflected Himself, and thus by its crystallisation dispelled all the\ngloom of the Absolute Being.\n\nIn correspondence with these three stages of the absolute development,\nthe perfect man has three stages of spiritual training. But in his case\nthe process of development must be the reverse; because his is the\nprocess of ascent, while the Absolute Being had undergone essentially a\nprocess of descent. In the first stage of his spiritual progress he\nmeditates on the name, studies nature on which it is sealed; in the\nsecond stage he steps into the sphere of the Attribute, and in the third\nstage enters the sphere of the Essence. It is here that he becomes the\nPerfect Man; his eye becomes the eye of God, his word the word of God\nand his life the life of God--participates in the general life of Nature\nand \"sees into the life of things\".\n\nTo turn now to the nature of the attribute. His views on this most\ninteresting question are very important, because it is here that his\ndoctrine fundamentally differs from Hindu Idealism. He defines attribute\nas an agency which gives us a knowledge of the state of things.[155:1]\nElsewhere he says that this distinction of attribute from the underlying\nreality is tenable only in the sphere of the manifested, because here\nevery attribute is regarded as the other of the reality in which it is\nsupposed to inhere. This otherness is due to the existence of\ncombination and disintegration in the sphere of the manifested. But the\ndistinction is untenable in the domain of the unmanifested, because\nthere is no combination or disintegration there. It should be observed\nhow widely he differs from the advocates of the Doctrine of \"M\u0101y\u0101\". He\nbelieves that the material world has real existence; it is the outward\nhusk of the real being, no doubt, but this outward husk is not the less\nreal. The cause of the phenomenal world, according to him, is not a real\nentity hidden behind the sum of attributes, but it is a conception\nfurnished by the mind so that there may be no difficulty in\nunderstanding the material world. Berkeley and Fichte will so far agree\nwith our author, but his view leads him to the most characteristically\nHegelian doctrine--identity of thought and being. In the 37{th} chapter\nof the 2{nd} volume of Ins\u0101n al-K\u0101mil, he clearly says that idea is the\nstuff of which this universe is made; thought, idea, notion is the\nmaterial of the structure of nature. While laying stress on this\ndoctrine he says, \"Dost thou not look to thine own belief? Where is the\nreality in which the so-called Divine attributes inhere? It is but the\nidea.\"[157:1] Hence nature is nothing but a crystallised idea. He gives\nhis hearty assent to the results of Kant's _Critique of Pure Reason_;\nbut, unlike him, he makes this very idea the essence of the Universe.\nKant's _Ding an sich_ to him is a pure nonentity; there is nothing\nbehind the collection of attributes. The attributes are the real things,\nthe material world is but the objectification of the Absolute Being; it\nis the other self of the Absolute--another which owes its existence to\nthe principle of difference in the nature of the Absolute itself. Nature\nis the idea of God, a something necessary for His knowledge of Himself.\nWhile Hegel calls his doctrine the identity of thought and being,\nAl-J\u012bl\u012b calls it the identity of attribute and reality. It should be\nnoted that the author's phrase, \"world of attributes\", which he uses for\nthe material world is slightly misleading. What he really holds is that\nthe distinction of attribute and reality is merely phenomenal, and does\nnot at all exist in the nature of things. It is useful, because it\nfacilitates our understanding of the world around us, but it is not at\nall real. It will be understood that Al-J\u012bl\u012b recognises the truth of\nEmpirical Idealism only tentatively, and does not admit the absoluteness\nof the distinction. These remarks should not lead us to understand that\nAl-J\u012bl\u012b does not believe in the objective reality of the thing in\nitself. He does believe in it, but then he advocates its unity, and says\nthat the material world is the thing in itself; it is the \"other\", the\nexternal expression of the thing in itself. The _Ding an sich_ and its\nexternal expression or the production of its self-diremption, are really\nidentical, though we discriminate between them in order to facilitate\nour understanding of the universe. If they are not identical, he says,\nhow could one manifest the other? In one word, he means by _Ding an\nsich_, the Pure, the Absolute Being, and seeks it through its\nmanifestation or external expression. He says that as long as we do not\nrealise the identity of attribute and reality, the material world or the\nworld of attributes seems to be a veil; but when the doctrine is\nbrought home to us the veil is removed; we see the Essence itself\neverywhere, and find that all the attributes are but ourselves. Nature\nthen appears in her true light; all otherness is removed and we are one\nwith her. The aching prick of curiosity ceases, and the inquisitive\nattitude of our minds is replaced by a state of philosophic calm. To the\nperson who has realised this identity, discoveries of science bring no\nnew information, and religion with her _role_ of supernatural authority\nhas nothing to say. This is the spiritual emancipation.\n\n [155:1] Ins\u0101n al-K\u0101mil; Vol. I, p. 22.\n\n [157:1] Ins\u0101n al-K\u0101mil, Vol. II, p. 26.\n\nLet us now see how he classifies the different divine names and\nattributes which have received expression in nature or crystallised\nDivinity. His classification is as follows:--\n\n(1). The names and attributes of God as He is in Himself (All\u0101h, The\nOne, The Odd, The Light, The Truth, The Pure, The Living.)\n\n(2). The names and attributes of God as the source of all glory (The\nGreat and High, The All-powerful).\n\n(3). The names and attributes of God as all Perfection (The Creator, The\nBenefactor, The First, The Last).\n\n(4). The names and attributes of God as all Beauty (The Uncreatable, The\nPainter, The Merciful, The Origin of all). Each of these names and\nattributes has its own particular effect by which it illuminates the\nsoul of the perfect man and Nature. How these illuminations take place,\nand how they reach the soul is not explained by Al-J\u012bl\u012b. His silence\nabout these matters throws into more relief the mystical portion of his\nviews and implies the necessity of spiritual Directorship.\n\nBefore considering Al-J\u012bl\u012b's views of particular Divine Names and\nAttributes, we should note that his conception of God, implied in the\nabove classification, is very similar to that of Schleiermacher. While\nthe German theologian reduces all the divine attributes to one single\nattribute of Power, our author sees the danger of advancing a God free\nfrom all attributes, yet recognises with Schleiermacher that in Himself\nGod is an unchangeable unity, and that His attributes \"are nothing more\nthan views of Him from different human standpoints, the various\nappearances which the one changeless cause presents to our finite\nintelligence according as we look at it from different sides of the\nspiritual landscape.\"[161:1] In His absolute existence He is beyond the\nlimitation of names and attributes, but when He externalises Himself,\nwhen He leaves His absoluteness, when nature is born, names and\nattributes appear sealed on her very fabric.\n\n [161:1] Matheson's _Aids to the Study of German Theology_, p.\n 43.\n\nWe now proceed to consider what he teaches about particular Divine Names\nand Attributes. The first Essential Name is All\u0101h (Divinity) which means\nthe sum of all the realities of existence with their respective order in\nthat sum. This name is applied to God as the only necessary existence.\nDivinity being the highest manifestation of Pure Being, the difference\nbetween them is that the latter is visible to the eye, but its _where_\nis invisible; while the traces of the former are visible, itself is\ninvisible. By the very fact of her being crystallised divinity, Nature\nis not the real divinity; hence Divinity is invisible, and its traces in\nthe form of Nature are visible to the eye. Divinity, as the author\nillustrates, is water; nature is crystallised water or ice; but ice is\nnot water. The Essence is visible to the eye, (another proof of our\nauthor's Natural Realism or Absolute Idealism) although all its\nattributes are not known to us. Even its attributes are not known as\nthey are in themselves, their shadows or effects only are known. For\ninstance, charity itself is unknown, only its effect or the fact of\ngiving to the poor, is known and seen. This is due to the attributes\nbeing incorporated in the very nature of the Essence. If the expression\nof the attributes in its real nature had been possible, its separation\nfrom the Essence would have been possible also. But there are some other\nEssential Names of God--The Absolute Oneness and Simple Oneness. The\nAbsolute Oneness marks the first step of Pure Thought from the darkness\nof Cecity (the internal or the original M\u0101y\u0101 of the Ved\u0101nta) to the\nlight of manifestation. Although this movement is not attended with any\nexternal manifestations, yet it sums up all of them under its hollow\nuniversality. Look at a wall, says the author, you see the whole wall;\nbut you cannot see the individual pieces of the material that\ncontribute to its formation. The wall is a unity--but a unity which\ncomprehends diversity, so Pure Being is a unity but a unity which is the\nsoul of diversity.\n\nThe third movement of the Absolute Being is Simple Oneness--a step\nattended with external manifestation. The Absolute Oneness is free from\nall particular names and attributes. The Oneness Simple takes on names\nand attributes, but there is no distinction between these attributes,\none is the essence of the other. Divinity is similar to Simple Oneness,\nbut its names and attributes are distinguished from one another and even\ncontradictory, as generous is contradictory to revengeful.[163:1] The\nthird step, or as Hegel would say, Voyage of the Being, has another\nappellation (Mercy). The First Mercy, the author says, is the evolution\nof the Universe from Himself and the manifestation of His own Self in\nevery atom of the result of His own self-diremption. Al-J\u012bl\u012b makes this\npoint clearer by an instance. He says that nature is frozen water and\nGod is water. The real name of nature is God (All\u0101h); ice or condensed\nwater is merely a borrowed appellation. Elsewhere he calls water the\norigin of knowledge, intellect, understanding, thought and idea. This\ninstance leads him to guard against the error of looking upon God as\nimmanent in nature, or running through the sphere of material existence.\nHe says that immanence implies disparity of being; God is not immanent\nbecause He is Himself the existence. Eternal existence is the other self\nof God, it is the light through which He sees Himself. As the originator\nof an idea is existent in that idea, so God is present in nature. The\ndifference between God and man, as one may say, is that His ideas\nmaterialise themselves, ours do not. It will be remembered here that\nHegel would use the same line of argument in freeing himself from the\naccusation of Pantheism.\n\n [163:1] This would seem very much like the idea of the\n phenomenal Brahma of the Ved\u0101nta. The Personal Creator or the\n Praj\u0101pati of the Ved\u0101nta makes the third step of the Absolute\n Being or the Noumenal Brahma. Al-J\u012bl\u012b seems to admit two kinds\n of Brahma--with or without qualities like the \u015aamkara and\n B\u0101darayana. To him the process of creation is essentially a\n lowering of the Absolute Thought, which is Asat, in so far as it\n is absolute, and Sat, in so far as it is manifested and hence\n limited. Notwithstanding this Absolute Monism, he inclines to a\n view similar to that of R\u0101m\u0101nuja. He seems to admit the reality\n of the individual soul and seems to imply, unlike \u015aamkara, that\n \u012a\u015bwara and His worship are necessary even after the attainment\n of the Higher Knowledge.\n\nThe attribute of Mercy is closely connected with the attribute of\nProvidence. He defines it as the sum of all that existence stands in\nneed of. Plants are supplied with water through the force of this name.\nThe natural philosopher would express the same thing differently; he\nwould speak of the same phenomena as resulting from the activity of a\ncertain force of nature; Al-J\u012bl\u012b would call it a manifestation of\nProvidence; but, unlike the natural philosopher, he would not advocate\nthe unknowability of that force. He would say that there is nothing\nbehind it, it is the Absolute Being itself.\n\nWe have now finished all the essential names and attributes of God, and\nproceed to examine the nature of what existed before all things. The\nArabian Prophet, says Al-J\u012bl\u012b, was once questioned about the place of\nGod before creation. He said that God, before the creation, existed in\n\"\u2018Am\u0101\" (Blindness). It is the nature of this Blindness or primal\ndarkness which we now proceed to examine. The investigation is\nparticularly interesting, because the word translated into modern\nphraseology would be \"_The Unconsciousness_\". This single word impresses\nupon us the foresightedness with which he anticipates metaphysical\ndoctrines of modern Germany. He says that the Unconsciousness is the\nreality of all realities; it is the Pure Being without any descending\nmovement; it is free from the attributes of God and creation; it does\nnot stand in need of any name or quality, because it is beyond the\nsphere of relation. It is distinguished from the Absolute Oneness\nbecause the latter name is applied to the Pure Being in its process of\ncoming down towards manifestation. It should, however, be remembered\nthat when we speak of the priority of God and posteriority of creation,\nour words must not be understood as implying time; for there can be no\nduration of time or separateness between God and His creation. Time,\ncontinuity in space and time, are themselves creations, and how can\npiece of creation intervene between God and His creation. Hence our\nwords before, after, where, whence, etc., in this sphere of thought,\nshould not be construed to imply time or space. The real thing is beyond\nthe grasp of human conceptions; no category of material existence can be\napplicable to it; because, as Kant would say, the laws of phenomena\ncannot be spoken of as obtaining in the sphere of noumena.\n\nWe have already noticed that man in his progress towards perfection has\nthree stages: the first is the meditation of the name which the author\ncalls the illumination of names. He remarks that \"When God illuminates a\ncertain man by the light of His names, the man is destroyed under the\ndazzling splendour of that name; and \"when thou calleth God, the call is\nresponded to by the man\". The effect of this illumination would be, in\nSchopenhauer's language, the destruction of the individual will, yet it\nmust not be confounded with physical death; because the individual goes\non living and moving like the spinning wheel, as Kapila would say, after\nhe has become one with Prakriti. It is here that the individual cries\nout in pantheistic mood:--She was I and I was she and there was none to\nseparate us.\"[167:1]\n\n [167:1] Ins\u0101n al-K\u0101mil, Vol. I, p. 40.\n\nThe second stage of the spiritual training is what he calls the\nillumination of the Attribute. This illumination makes the perfect man\nreceive the attributes of God in their real nature in proportion to the\npower of receptivity possessed by him--a fact which classifies men\naccording to the magnitude of this light resulting from the\nillumination. Some men receive illumination from the divine attribute of\nLife, and thus participate in the soul of the Universe. The effect of\nthis light is soaring in the air, walking on water, changing the\nmagnitude of things (as Christ so often did). In this wise the perfect\nman receives illumination from all the Divine attributes, crosses the\nsphere of the name and the attribute, and steps into the domain of the\nEssence--Absolute Existence.\n\nAs we have already seen, the Absolute Being, when it leaves its\nabsoluteness, has three voyages to undergo, each voyage being a process\nof particularisation of the bare universality of the Absolute Essence.\nEach of these three movements appears under a new Essential Name which\nhas its own peculiar illuminating effect upon the human soul. Here is\nthe end of our author's spiritual ethics; _man has become perfect_, he\nhas amalgamated himself with the Absolute Being, or _has learnt what\nHegel calls The Absolute Philosophy_. \"He becomes the paragon of\nperfection, the object of worship, the preserver of the\nUniverse\".[169:1] He is the point where Man-ness and God-ness become\none, and result in the birth of the god-man.\n\n [169:1] Ins\u0101n al-K\u0101mil, Vol. I, p. 48.\n\nHow the perfect man reaches this height of spiritual development, the\nauthor does not tell us; but he says that at every stage he has a\npeculiar experience in which there is not even a trace of doubt or\nagitation. The instrument of this experience is what he calls the _Qalb_\n(heart), a word very difficult of definition. He gives a very mystical\ndiagram of the Qalb, and explains it by saying that it is the eye which\nsees the names, the attributes and the Absolute Being successively. It\nowes its existence to a mysterious combination of soul and mind; and\nbecomes by its very nature the organ for the recognition of the\nultimate realities of existence. All that the \"heart\", or the source of\nwhat the Ved\u0101nta calls the Higher Knowledge, reveals is not seen by the\nindividual as something separate from and heterogeneous to himself; what\nis shown to him through this agency is his own reality, his own deep\nbeing. This characteristic of the agency differentiates it from the\nintellect, the object of which is always different and separate from the\nindividual exercising that faculty. But the spiritual experience,\naccording to the \u1e62\u016bf\u012bs of this school, is not permanent; moments of\nspiritual vision, says Matthew Arnold,[170:1] cannot be at our command.\nThe god-man is he who has known the mystery of his own being, who has\nrealised himself as god-man; but when that particular spiritual\nrealisation is over man is man and God is God. Had the experience been\npermanent, a great moral force would have been lost and society\noverturned.\n\n [170:1] \"We cannot kindle when we will\n The fire which in the heart resides\".\n\nLet us now sum up Al-J\u012bl\u012b's _Doctrine of the Trinity_. We have seen the\nthree movements of the Absolute Being, or the first three categories of\nPure Being; we have also seen that the third movement is attended with\nexternal manifestation, which is the self-diremption of the Essence into\nGod and man. This separation makes a gap which is filled by the perfect\nman, who shares in both the Divine and the human attributes. He holds\nthat the perfect man is the preserver of the Universe; hence in his\nview, the appearance of the perfect man is a necessary condition for the\ncontinuation of nature. It is easy, therefore, to understand that in the\ngod-man, the Absolute Being which has left its absoluteness, returns\ninto itself; and, but for the god-man, it could not have done so; for\nthen there would have been no nature, and consequently no light through\nwhich God could have seen Himself. The light through the agency of which\nGod sees Himself is due to the principle of difference in the nature of\nthe Absolute Being itself. He recognises this principle in the following\nverses:--\n\n If you say that God is one, you are right; but if you say that He\n is two, this is also true.\n\n If you say no, but He is three, you are right, for this is the\n real nature of man.[171:1]\n\n [171:1] Ins\u0101n al-K\u0101mil, Vol. I, p. 8.\n\nThe _perfect man_, then, is the joining link. On the one hand he\nreceives illumination from all the Essential names, on the other hand\nall Divine attributes reappear in him. These attributes are:--\n\n1. Independent life or existence.\n\n2. Knowledge which is a form of life, as he proves from a verse from the\nQur\u2019an.\n\n3. Will--the principle of particularisation, or the manifestation of\nBeing. He defines it as the illumination of the knowledge of God\naccording to the requirements of the Essence; hence it is a particular\nform of knowledge. It has nine manifestations, all of which are\ndifferent names for love; the last is the love in which the lover and\nthe beloved, the knower and the known merge into each other, and become\nidentical. This form of love, he says, is the Absolute Essence; as\nChristianity teaches, God is love. He guards, here, against the error of\nlooking upon the individual act of will as uncaused. Only the act of the\nuniversal will is uncaused; hence he implies the Hegelian Doctrine of\nFreedom, and holds that the acts of man are both free and determined.\n\n4. Power, which expresses itself in self-diremption i.e. creation. He\ncontroverts S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96 Mu\u1e25y al-D\u012bn ibn \u2018Arab\u012b's position that the\nUniverse existed before the creation in the knowledge of God. He says,\nthis would imply that God did not create it out of nothing, and holds\nthat the Universe, before its existence as an idea, existed in the self\nof God.\n\n5. The word or the reflected being. Every possibility is the word of\nGod; hence nature is the materialisation of the word of God. It has\ndifferent names--The tangible word, The sum of the realities of man, The\narrangement of the Divinity, The spread of Oneness, The expression of\nthe Unknown, The phases of Beauty, The trace of names and attributes,\nand the object of God's knowledge.\n\n6. The Power of hearing the inaudible.\n\n7. The Power of seeing the invisible.\n\n8. Beauty--that which seems least beautiful in nature (the reflected\nbeauty) is in its real existence, beauty. Evil is only relative, it has\nno real existence; sin is merely a relative deformity.\n\n9. Glory or beauty in its intensity.\n\n10. Perfection, which is the unknowable essence of God and therefore\nUnlimited and Infinite.\n\n\n\n\nCHAP. VI.\n\nLATER PERSIAN THOUGHT.\n\n\nUnder the rude Tartar invaders of Persia, who could have no sympathy\nwith independent thought, there could be no progress of ideas. \u1e62\u016bf\u012bism,\nowing to its association with religion, went on systematising old and\nevolving new ideas. But philosophy proper was distasteful to the Tartar.\nEven the development of Islamic law suffered a check; since the \u1e24anafite\nlaw was the acme of human reason to the Tartar, and further subtleties\nof legal interpretation were disagreeable to his brain. Old schools of\nthought lost their solidarity, and many thinkers left their native\ncountry to find more favourable conditions elsewhere. In the 16{th}\ncentury we find Persian Aristotelians--Dast\u016br Isfah\u0101n\u012b, H\u012br Bud, Mun\u012br,\nand K\u0101mr\u0101n--travelling in India, where the Emperor Akbar was drawing\nupon Zoroastrianism to form a new faith for himself and his courtiers,\nwho were mostly Persians. No great thinker, however, appeared in Persia\nuntil the 17{th} century, when the acute Mulla \u1e62adra of S\u0331\u1e96\u012br\u0101z upheld\nhis philosophical system with all the vigour of his powerful logic. With\nMulla \u1e62adra Reality is all things yet is none of them, and true\nknowledge consists in the identity of the subject and the object. De\nGobineau thinks that the philosophy of \u1e62adra is a mere revival of\nAvicennaism. He, however, ignores the fact that Mulla \u1e62adra's doctrine\nof the identity of subject and object constitutes the final step which\nthe Persian intellect took towards complete monism. It is moreover the\nPhilosophy of \u1e62adra which is the source of the metaphysics of early\nB\u0101bism.\n\nBut the movement towards Platonism is best illustrated in Mulla H\u0101d\u012b of\nSabzw\u0101r who flourished in the 18{th} century, and is believed by his\ncountrymen to be the greatest of modern Persian thinkers. As a specimen\nof comparatively recent Persian speculation, I may briefly notice here\nthe views of this great thinker, as set forth in his Asr\u0101r al-\u1e24ikam\n(published in Persia). A glance at his philosophical teaching reveals\nthree fundamental conceptions which are indissolubly associated with the\nPost-Islamic Persian thought:--\n\n1. The idea of the Absolute Unity of the Real which is described as\n\"Light\".\n\n2. The idea of evolution which is dimly visible in Zoroaster's doctrine\nof the destiny of the human soul, and receives further expansion and\nsystematisation by Persian Neo-Platonists and \u1e62\u016bf\u012b thinkers.\n\n3. The idea of a medium between the Absolute Real and the Not-real.\n\nIt is highly interesting to note how the Persian mind gradually got rid\nof the Emanation theory of Neo-Platonism, and reached a purer notion of\nPlato's Philosophy. The Arab Muhammadans of Spain, by a similar process\nof elimination reached, through the same medium (Neo-Platonism) a truer\nconception of the Philosophy of Aristotle--a fact which illustrates the\ngenius of the two races. Lewes in his Biographical History of Philosophy\nremarks that the Arabs eagerly took up the study of Aristotle simply\nbecause Plato was not presented to them. I am, however, inclined to\nthink that the Arab genius was thoroughly practical; hence Plato's\nphilosophy would have been distasteful to them even if it had been\npresented in its true light. Of the systems of Greek philosophy\nNeo-Platonism, I believe, was the only one which was presented in its\ncompleteness to the Muslim world; yet patient critical research led the\nArab from Plotinus to Aristotle, and the Persian to Plato. This is\nsingularly illustrated in the Philosophy of Mulla H\u0101d\u012b, who recognises\nno Emanations, and approaches the Platonic conception of the Real. He\nillustrates, moreover, how philosophical speculation in Persia, as in\nall countries where Physical science either does not exist or is not\nstudied, is finally absorbed by religion. The \"Essence\", i.e. the\nmetaphysical cause as distinguished from the scientific cause, which\nmeans the sum of antecedent conditions, must gradually be transformed\ninto \"Personal Will\" (cause, in a religious sense) in the absence of any\nother notion of cause. And this is perhaps the deeper reason why\nPersian philosophies have always ended in religion.\n\nLet us now turn to Mulla H\u0101d\u012b's system of thought. He teaches that\nReason has two aspects:--(a) Theoretical, the object of which is\nPhilosophy and Mathematics, (b) Practical, the object of which is\nDomestic Economy, Politics, etc. Philosophy proper comprises the\nknowledge of the beginning of things, the end of things, and the\nknowledge of the Self. It also includes the knowledge of the law of\nGod--which is identical with religion. In order to understand the origin\nof things, we should subject to a searching analysis the various\nphenomena of the Universe. Such an analysis reveals that there are three\noriginal principles.[178:1]\n\n(1). The Real--Light.\n\n(2). The Shadow.\n\n(3). The not-Real--Darkness.\n\n [178:1] Asr\u0101r al-\u1e24ikam; p. 6.\n\nThe Real is absolute, and necessary as distinguished from the \"Shadow\",\nwhich is relative and contingent. In its nature it is absolutely good;\nand the proposition that it is good, is self-evident.[178:2] All forms\nof potential existence, before they are actualised by the Real, are open\nto both existence or non-existence, and the possibilities of their\nexistence or non-existence are exactly equal. It, therefore, follows\nthat the Real which actualises the potential is not itself\nnon-existence; since non-existence operating on non-existence cannot\nproduce actuality.[179:1] Mulla H\u0101d\u012b, in his conception of the Real as\nthe operator, modifies Plato's statical conception of the Universe, and,\nfollowing Aristotle, looks upon his Real as the immovable source and the\nobject of all motion. \"All things in the Universe,\" he says, \"love\nperfection, and are moving towards their final ends--minerals towards\nvegetables, vegetables towards animals, and animals towards man. And\nobserve how man passes through all these stages in the mother's\nwomb.\"[179:2] The mover as mover is either the source or the object of\nmotion or both. In any case the mover must be either movable or\nimmovable. The proposition that all movers must be themselves movable,\nleads to infinite regress--which must stop at the immovable mover, the\nsource and the final object of all motion. The Real, moreover, is a pure\nunity; for if there is a plurality of Reals, one would limit the other.\nThe Real as creator also cannot be conceived as more than one; since a\nplurality of creators would mean a plurality of worlds which must be\ncircular touching one another, and this again implies vacuum which is\nimpossible.[180:1] Regarded as an essence, therefore, the Real is one.\nBut it is also many, from a different standpoint. It is life, power,\nlove; though we cannot say that these qualities inhere in it--they are\nit, and it is them. Unity does not mean oneness, its essence consists in\nthe \"dropping of all relations.\" Unlike the \u1e62\u016bf\u012bs and other thinkers,\nMulla H\u0101d\u012b holds and tries to show that belief in multiplicity is not\ninconsistent with belief in unity; since the visible \"many\" is nothing\nmore than a manifestation of the names and attributes of the Real.\nThese attributes are the various forms of a \"Knowledge\" which\nconstitutes the very essence of the Real. To speak, however, of the\nattributes of the Real is only a verbal convenience; since \"defining the\nReal is applying the category of number to it\"--an absurd process which\nendeavours to bring the unrelated into the sphere of the related. The\nUniverse, with all its variety, is the shadow of the various names and\nattributes of the Real or the Absolute Light. It is Reality unfolded,\nthe \"Be\", or the word of Light.[181:1] Visible multiplicity is the\nillumination of Darkness, or the actualisation of Nothing. Things are\ndifferent because we see them, as it were, through glasses of different\ncolours--the Ideas. In this connection H\u0101d\u012b approvingly quotes the poet\nJ\u0101m\u012b who has given the most beautiful poetic expression to Plato's\nDoctrine of Ideas in verses which can be thus translated:--\n\n\"The ideas are glasses of various colours in which the Sun of Reality\nreflects itself, and makes itself visible through them according as they\nare red, yellow or blue.\"[181:2]\n\n [178:2] Asr\u0101r al-\u1e24ikam; p. 8.\n\n [179:1] Asr\u0101r al-\u1e24ikam; p. 8.\n\n [179:2] Asr\u0101r al-\u1e24ikam; p. 10.\n\n [180:1] Asr\u0101r al-\u1e24ikam; pp. 28, 29.\n\n [181:1] Asr\u0101r al-\u1e24ikam; p. 151.\n\n [181:2] Asr\u0101r al-\u1e24ikam; p. 6.\n\nIn his Psychology he mostly follows Avicenna, but his treatment of the\nsubject is more thorough and systematic. He classifies the soul in the\nfollowing manner:--\n\n The Soul\n \u2502\n \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510\n \u2502 \u2502\n Heavenly Earthly\n \u2502\n \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510\n \u2502 \u2502 \u2502\n Human Animal Vegetative\n\n Powers:--\n\n 1. Preserving the individual.\n 2. Perfecting the individual.\n 3. Perpetuating the species.\n\nThe animal soul has three powers:--\n\n 1. External senses\u2510 Perception.\n 2. Internal senses\u2518\n 3. Power of motion which includes.\n (a) Voluntary motion.\n (b) Involuntary motion.\n\nThe external senses are taste, touch, smell, hearing and sight. The\nsound exists outside the ear, and not inside as some thinkers have held.\nFor if it does not exist outside the ear, it is not possible to perceive\nits direction and distance. Hearing and sight are superior to other\nsenses, and sight is superior to hearing; since:--\n\n I. The eye can perceive distant things.\n\n II. Its perception is light, which is the best of all\n attributes.\n\n III. The construction of the eye is more complicated and\n delicate than that of the ear.\n\n IV. The perceptions of sight are things which actually exist,\n while those of hearing resemble non-existence.\n\nThe internal senses are as follow:--\n\n(1). The Common Sense--the tablet of the mind. It is like the Prime\nMinister of the mind sending out five spies (external senses) to bring\nin news from the external world. When we say \"this white thing is\nsweet\", we perceive whiteness and sweetness by sight and taste\nrespectively, but that both the attributes exist in the same thing is\ndecided by the Common Sense. The line made by a falling drop, so far as\nthe eye is concerned, is nothing but the drop. But what is the line\nwhich we see? To account for such a phenomenon, says H\u0101d\u012b, it is\nnecessary to postulate another sense which perceives the lengthening of\nthe falling drop into a line.\n\n(2). The faculty which preserves the perceptions of the Common\nSense--images and not ideas like the memory. The judgment that whiteness\nand sweetness exist in the same thing is completed by this faculty;\nsince, if it does not preserve the image of the subject, Common Sense\ncannot perceive the predicate.\n\n(3). The power which perceives individual ideas. The sheep thinks of the\nenmity of the wolf, and runs away from him. Some forms of life lack this\npower, e.g. the moth which hurls itself against the candle-flame.\n\n(4). Memory--the preserver of ideas.\n\n(5). The power of combining images and ideas, e.g. the winged man. When\nthis faculty works under the guidance of the power which perceives\nindividual ideas, it is called Imagination; when it works under the\ncontrol of Intellect, it is called Conception.\n\nBut it is the spirit which distinguishes man from other animals. This\nessence of humanity is a \"unity\", not oneness. It perceives the\nUniversal by itself, and the particular through the external and the\ninternal senses. It is the shadow of the Absolute Light, and like it\nmanifests itself in various ways--comprehending multiplicity in its\nunity. There is no necessary relation between the spirit and the body.\nThe former is non-temporal and non-spatial; hence it is changeless, and\nhas the power of judging the visible multiplicity. In sleep the spirit\nuses the \"ideal body\" which functions like the physical body; in waking\nlife it uses the ordinary physical body. It follows, therefore, that the\nspirit stands in need of neither, and uses both at will. H\u0101d\u012b does not\nfollow Plato in his doctrine of transmigration, the different forms of\nwhich he refutes at length. The spirit to him is immortal, and reaches\nits original home--Absolute Light--by the gradual perfection of its\nfaculties. The various stages of the development of reason are as\nfollows:--\n\n A. Theoretical or Pure Reason--\n\n 1{st} Potential Reason.\n 2{nd} Perception of self-evident propositions.\n 3{rd} Actual Reason.\n 4{th} Perception of Universal concepts.\n\n B. Practical Reason--\n\n 1{st} External Purification.\n 2{nd} Internal Purification.\n 3{rd} Formation of virtuous habits.\n 4{th} Union with God.\n\nThus the spirit rises higher and higher in the scale of being, and\nfinally shares in the eternity of the Absolute Light by losing itself in\nits universality. \"In itself non-existent, but existent in the eternal\nFriend: how wonderful that it _is_ and _is not_ at the same time\". But\nis the spirit free to choose its course? H\u0101d\u012b criticises the\nRationalists for their setting up man as an independent creator of evil,\nand accuses them of what he calls \"veiled dualism\". He holds that every\nobject has two sides--\"bright\" side, and \"dark\" side. Things are\ncombinations of light and darkness. All good flows from the side of\nlight; evil proceeds from darkness. Man, therefore, is both free and\ndetermined.\n\nBut all the various lines of Persian thought once more find a synthesis\nin that great religious movement of Modern Persia--B\u0101bism or Bah\u0101ism,\nwhich began as a S\u0331\u1e96\u012b\u2018ah sect, with Mirz\u0101 \u2018Al\u012b Mu\u1e25ammad B\u0101b of S\u0331\u1e96\u012br\u0101z\n(b. 1820), and became less and less Islamic in character with the\nprogress of orthodox persecutions. The origin of the philosophy of this\nwonderful sect must be sought in the S\u0331\u1e96\u012b\u2018ah sect of the S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96\u012bs,\nthe founder of which, S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96 A\u1e25mad, was an enthusiastic student of\nMulla \u1e62adr\u0101's Philosophy, on which he had written several commentaries.\nThis sect differed from the ordinary S\u0331\u1e96\u012b\u2018ahs in holding that belief in\nan ever present Medium between the absent Im\u0101m (the 12{th} Head of the\nChurch, whose manifestation is anxiously expected by the S\u0331\u1e96\u012b\u2018ahs), and\nthe church is a fundamental principle of the S\u0331\u1e96\u012b\u2018ah religion.\nS\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96 A\u1e25mad claimed to be such a Medium; and when, after the death\nof the second S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96\u012b Medium--\u1e24\u0101j\u012b K\u0101zim, the S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96\u012bs were anxiously\nexpecting the manifestation of the new Medium, Mirz\u0101 \u2018Al\u012b Mu\u1e25ammad B\u0101b,\nwho had attended the lectures of \u1e24\u0101j\u012b K\u0101zim at Karbal\u0101, proclaimed\nhimself the expected Medium, and many S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96\u012bs accepted him.\n\nThe young Persian seer looks upon Reality as an essence which brooks no\ndistinction of substance and attribute. The first bounty or\nself-expansion of the Ultimate Essence, he says, is Existence.\n\"Existence\" is the \"known\", the \"known\" is the essence of \"knowledge\";\n\"knowledge\" is \"will\"; and \"will\" is \"love\". Thus from Mulla \u1e62adr\u0101's\nidentity of the known and the knower, he passes to his conception of the\nReal as Will and Love. This Primal Love, which he regards as the essence\nof the Real, is the cause of the manifestation of the Universe which is\nnothing more than the self-expansion of Love. The word creation, with\nhim, does not mean creation out of nothing; since, as the S\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96\u012bs\nmaintain, the word creator is not peculiarly applicable to God alone.\nThe Quranic verse, that \"God is the best of creators\",[188:1] implies\nthat there are other self-manifesting beings like God.\n\n [188:1] S\u016bra 23; v. 14.\n\nAfter the execution of \u2018Al\u012b Mu\u1e25ammad B\u0101b, Bah\u0101ull\u0101h, one of his\nprincipal disciples who were collectively called \"The First Unity\", took\nup the mission, and proclaimed himself the originator of the new\ndispensation, the absent Im\u0101m whose manifestation the B\u0101b had foretold.\nHe freed the doctrine of his master from its literalistic mysticism, and\npresented it in a more perfected and systematised form. The Absolute\nReality, according to him, is not a person; it is an eternal living\nEssence, to which we apply the epithets Truth and Love only because\nthese are the highest conceptions known to us. The Living Essence\nmanifests itself through the Univere with the object of creating in\nitself atoms or centres of consciousness, which as Dr. McTaggart would\nsay, constitute a further determination of the Hegelian Absolute. In\neach of these undifferentiated, simple centres of consciousness, there\nis hidden a ray of the Absolute Light itself, and the perfection of the\nspirit consists in gradually actualising, by contact with the\nindividualising principle--matter, its emotional and intellectual\npossibilities, and thus discovering its own deep being--the ray of\neternal Love which is concealed by its union with consciousness. The\nessence of man, therefore, is not reason or consciousness; it is this\nray of Love--the source of all impulse to noble and unselfish action,\nwhich constitutes the real man. The influence of Mulla \u1e62adr\u0101's doctrine\nof the incorporeality of Imagination is here apparent. Reason, which\nstands higher than Imagination in the scale of evolution, is not a\nnecessary condition, according to Mulla \u1e62adr\u0101, of immortality. In all\nforms of life there is an immortal spiritual part, the ray of Eternal\nLove, which has no necessary connection with self-consciousness or\nreason, and survives after the death of the body. Salvation, then, which\nto Buddha consists in the starving out of the mind-atoms by\nextinguishing desire, to Bah\u0101ull\u0101h lies in the discovery of the essence\nof love which is hidden in the atoms of consciousness themselves.[190:1]\nBoth, however, agree that after death thoughts and characters of men\nremain, subject to other forces of a similar character, in the spiritual\nworld, waiting for another opportunity to find a suitable physical\naccompaniment in order to continue the process of discovery (Bah\u0101ull\u0101h)\nor destruction (Buddha). To Bah\u0101ull\u0101h the conception of Love is higher\nthan the conception of Will. Schopenhauer conceived reality as Will\nwhich was driven to objectification by a sinful bent eternally existing\nin its nature. Love or Will, according to both, is present in every atom\nof life; but the cause of its being there is the joy of self-expansion\nin the one case, and the inexplicable evil inclination in the other. But\nSchopenhauer postulates certain temporal ideas in order to account for\nthe objectification of the Primordial Will; Bah\u0101ull\u0101h, as far as I can\nsee, does not explain the principle according to which the\nself-manifestation of the Eternal Love is realised in the Universe.\n\n [190:1] See Phelp's \u2018Abb\u0101s Effend\u012b, chapter, \"Philosophy and\n Psychology\".\n\n\n\n\nCONCLUSION.\n\n\nLet us now briefly sum up the results of our survey. We have seen that\nthe Persian mind had to struggle against two different kinds of\nDualism--pre-Islamic Magian Dualism, and post-Islamic Greek Dualism,\nthough the fundamental problem of the diversity of things remains\nessentially the same. The attitude of the pre-Islamic Persian thinkers\nis thoroughly objective, and hence the results of their intellectual\nefforts are more or less materialistic. The Pre-Islamic thinkers,\nhowever, clearly perceived that the original Principle must be\ndynamically conceived. With Zoroaster both the primary spirits are\n\"active\", with M\u0101n\u012b the principle of Light is passive, and the principle\nof Darkness is aggressive. But their analysis of the various elements\nwhich constitute the Universe is ridiculously meagre; their conception\nof the Universe is most defective on its statical side. There are,\ntherefore, two weak points in their systems:--\n\n 1. Naked Dualism.\n\n 2. Lack of analysis.\n\nThe first was remedied by Isl\u0101m; the second by the introduction of Greek\nPhilosophy. The advent of Isl\u0101m and the study of Greek philosophy,\nhowever, checked the indigenous tendency towards monistic thought; but\nthese two forces contributed to change the objective attitude\ncharacteristic of early thinkers, and aroused the slumbering\nsubjectivity, which eventually reached its climax in the extreme\nPantheism of some of the \u1e62\u016bf\u012b schools. Al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b endeavoured to get rid\nof the dualism between God and matter, by reducing matter to a mere\nconfused perception of the spirit; the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite denied it altogether,\nand maintained a thoroughgoing Idealism. The followers of Aristotle\ncontinued to stick to their master's Prima Materia; the \u1e62\u016bf\u012bs looked\nupon the material universe as a mere illusion, or a necessary \"other,\"\nfor the self-knowledge of God. It can, however, be safely stated that\nwith the As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite Idealism, the Persian mind got over the foreign\ndualism of God and matter, and, fortified with new philosophical\nideas, returned to the old dualism of light and darkness. The\nS\u0331\u1e96ai\u1e35\u1e96-al-Is\u0331\u1e96r\u0101q combines the objective attitude of Pre-Islamic\nPersian thinkers with the subjective attitude of his immediate\npredecessors, and restates the Dualism of Zoroaster in a much more\nphilosophical and spiritualised form. His system recognises the claims\nof both the subject and the object. But all these monistic systems of\nthought were met by the Pluralism of W\u0101\u1e25id Ma\u1e25m\u016bd, who taught that\nreality is not one, but many--primary living units which combine in\nvarious ways, and gradually rise to perfection by passing through an\nascending scale of forms. The reaction of W\u0101\u1e25id Ma\u1e25m\u016bd was, however, an\nephemeral phenomenon. The later S\u016bf\u012bs as well as philosophers proper\ngradually transformed or abandoned the Neo-Platonic theory of Emanation,\nand in later thinkers we see a movement through Neo-Platonism towards\nreal Platonism which is approached by Mulla H\u0101d\u012b's Philosophy. But pure\nspeculation and dreamy mysticism undergo a powerful check in B\u0101bism\nwhich, unmindful of persecution, synthesises all the inherited\nphilosophical and religious tendencies, and rouses the spirit to a\nconsciousness of the stern reality of things. Though extremely\ncosmopolitan and hence quite unpatriotic in character, it has yet had a\ngreat influence over the Persian mind. The unmystic character and the\npractical tone of B\u0101bism may have been a remote cause of the\nprogress of recent political reform in Persia.\n\n\n\n\nERRATA\n\n P. 4, Note 4, l. 1, read Buudahish for Buudadis\u1e25.\n\n P. 9, l. 10, read environment for environments.\n\n P. 56, l. 1, read reaction for reation.\n\n P. 61, l. 18, read considered for consided.\n\n P. 73, l. 21, read full stop after dialectic.\n\n P. 102, l. 1, read conditions for condition.\n\n P. 123, l. 19, read predecessors for precessor.\n\n P. 153, l. 21, read He-ness for an He-ness.\n\n P. 166, l. 21, read a piece for pieee.\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\nMany words appear in the text with different transcription or mark-up.\nThey have been left as in the original.\n\nAll occurrences of e. g., i. e., B. C., A. D. and A. H. have been\nreplaced with e.g., i.e., B.C., A.D. and A.H. Other initials have been\nleft as in the original.\n\nAll ditto marks, ibid. and Sh. An. (S\u0331\u1e96arh Anw\u0101riyya) entries replaced\nwith their full references.\n\nPrinted Errata has been moved to the end of the text.\n\nThe underlined letter pairs (Dh, dh, Gh, Gh, Kh, kh, Sh and sh) have\nbeen transcribed with a macron below each letter.\n\nThe following corrections have been made to the text:\n\n Page IX--due perhaps to semitic [original has samitic] influences,\n\n Page CONTENTS--Reality as [original has as as] Beauty\n\n Page 25--introduced [original has intruduced]\n\n Page 33, footnote 33:1--Maul\u0101n\u0101 [original has Maul\u0101na]\n\n Page 54--necessarily [original has necssarily]\n\n Page 54--Nazz\u0101m [original has Nazz\u0101n]\n\n Page 57--Ism\u0101\u2018\u012blians [original has Ism\u0101\u2018\u012bliams]\n\n Page 61--metaphysical [original has netaphysical]\n\n Page 63--which,[original has period] by gradually\n\n Page 65--As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite.[original has As\u0331\u1e96\u2018ar\u012bte]\n\n Page 68, footnote 68:1--Ash\u2018aritenthums [original has\n Ash\u2019aritenthums]\n\n Page 69--philosophising [original has plilosophising]\n\n Page 69, footnote 69:1--Ash\u2018aritenthums [original has As\u2018aritenthums]\n\n Page 74--S\u0331\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b [original has S\u1e96ahrast\u0101n\u012b]\n\n Page 75--As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite [original has As\u0331\u1e96\u2019arite]\n\n Page 76--As\u0331\u1e96\u2018arite [original has As\u0331\u1e96\u2018\u0101rite]\n\n Page 81--seem to [original has the letter t missing] be\n\n Page 81--\u1e24ikmat al-\u2018Ain--\"Philosophy of Essence\",\n [original has single hyphen]\n\n Page 85--objectively [original has objectivily]\n\n Page 95, footnote 95:1--Commentary [original has Comentary]\n\n Page 104--restatement [original has restatemet]\n\n Page 105--Ka\u2018bahs [original has Ka\u2018b\u0101hs]\n\n Page 111--self-conscious [original has self-consious]\n\n Page 124--the son of Sultan \u1e62al\u0101\u1e25 [original has \u1e62al\u0101-\u1e62al\u0101\u1e25]-al D\u012bn\n\n Page 127--visible [original has visibile]\n\n Page 136--is motion.[original has comma] The distinction of past,\n\n Page 142--theory of [original has theoryof]\n\n Page 148--maintains [original has mantains]\n\n Page 152, footnote 152:1--Ins\u0101n al-K\u0101mil [original has Ins\u0101nul K\u0101mul]\n\n Page 158--identical [original has indentical]\n\n Page 162--marks the [original has the the] first step\n\n Page 163, footnote 163:1--Notwithstanding [original has\n Nowithstanding]\n\n Page 171, footnote 171:1--Ins\u0101n al-K\u0101mil [original has Ins\u0101nul K\u0101mil]\n\n Page 180--standpoint [original has staindpoint]\n\n Page 187--S\u0331\u1e96\u012b\u2018ahs [original has S\u0331\u1e96\u012b\u2019ahs]","title":"The Development of Metaphysics in Persia: A Contribution to the History of Muslim Philosophy","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":36902}