{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_42466/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_42466","id":"gutenberg_42466","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/42466","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Category: Science - Physics","Evolution","Religion and science"],"text":"FACTS AND FANCIES\n\n                           IN\n\n                     MODERN SCIENCE:\n\n          STUDIES OF THE RELATIONS OF SCIENCE TO\n                PREVALENT SPECULATIONS AND\n                    RELIGIOUS BELIEF.\n\n  _BEING THE LECTURES ON THE SAMUEL A. CROZER FOUNDATION\n        IN CONNECTION WITH THE CROZER THEOLOGICAL\n                   SEMINARY, FOR 1881._\n\n                           BY\n            J. W. DAWSON, LL.D., F.R.S. ETC.\n\n                      PHILADELPHIA:\n          AMERICAN BAPTIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY,\n                  1420 CHESTNUT STREET.\n\n\n\n\n Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1882, by the\n          AMERICAN BAPTIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY,\n   In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.\n\n\n                   WESTCOTT & THOMSON,\n        _Stereotypers and Electrotypers, Philada_.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nThe object before the mind of the author in preparing these Lectures\nwas to present a distinct and rational view of the present relation of\nscientific thought to the religious beliefs of men, and especially to\nthe Christian revelation.\n\nThe attempt to make science, or speculations based on science,\nsupersede religion is one of the prevalent fancies of our time, and\npervades much of the popular literature of the day. That such attempts\ncan succeed the author does not believe. They have hitherto given\nbirth only to such abortions as Positivism, Nihilism, and Pessimism.\n\nThere is, however, a necessary relation and parallelism of all truths,\nphysical and spiritual; and it is useful to clear away the apparent\nantagonisms which proceed from partial and imperfect views, and to\npoint out the harmony which exists between the natural and the\nspiritual--between what man can learn from the physical creation, and\nwhat has been revealed to him by the Spirit of God. To do this with as\nmuch fairness as possible, and with due regard to the present state of\nknowledge and to the most important difficulties that are likely to be\nmet with by honest inquirers, is the purpose of the following pages.\n\nIt is proper to add that, in order to give completeness to the\ndiscussion, it has been necessary to introduce, in some of the\nlectures, topics previously treated of by the author, in a similar\nmanner, in publications bearing his name.\n\n                                                         J. W. D.\n\n     APRIL, 1882.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n                                                             PAGE\n     LECTURE I.\n     GENERAL RELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND AGNOSTIC SPECULATION      9\n\n\n     LECTURE II.\n     THE SCIENCE OF LIFE AND MONISTIC EVOLUTION                47\n\n\n     LECTURE III.\n     EVOLUTION AS TESTED BY THE RECORDS OF THE ROCKS          103\n\n\n     LECTURE IV.\n     THE ORIGIN AND ANTIQUITY OF MAN                          137\n\n\n     LECTURE V.\n     NATURE AS A MANIFESTATION OF MIND                        175\n\n\n     LECTURE VI.\n     SCIENCE AND REVELATION                                   219\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE I.\n\nGENERAL RELATIONS OF SCIENCE AND AGNOSTIC SPECULATION.\n\n\nThe infidelity and the contempt for sacred and spiritual things which\npervade so much of our modern literature are largely attributable to\nthe prevalence of that form of philosophy which may be designated as\nAgnostic Evolution, and this in its turn is popularly regarded as a\nresult of the pursuit of physical and natural science. The last\nconclusion is obviously only in part, if at all, correct, since it is\nwell known that atheistic philosophical speculations were pursued,\nquite as boldly and ably as now, long before the rise of modern\nscience. Still, it must be admitted that scientific discoveries and\nprinciples have been largely employed in our time to give form and\nconsistency to ideas otherwise very dim and shadowy, and thus to\nrehabilitate for our benefit the philosophical dreams of antiquity in\na more substantial shape. In this respect the natural sciences--or,\nrather, the facts and laws with which they are conversant--merely\nshare the fate of other things. Nothing, however indifferent in\nitself, can come into human hands without acquiring thereby an\nethical, social, political, or even religious, significance. An ounce\nof lead or a dynamite cartridge may be in itself a thing altogether\ndestitute of any higher significance than that depending on physical\nproperties; but let it pass into the power of man, and at once\ninfinite possibilities of good and of evil cluster round it according\nto the use to which it may be applied. This depends on essential\npowers and attributes of man himself, of which he can no more be\ndeprived than matter can be denuded of its inherent properties; and if\nthe evils arising from misuse of these powers trouble us, we may at\nleast console ourselves with the reflection that the possibility of\nsuch evils shows man to be a free agent, and not an automaton.\n\nAll this is eminently applicable to science in its relation to\nagnostic speculations. The material of the physical and natural\nsciences consists of facts ascertained by the evidence of our senses,\nand for which we depend on the truthfulness of those senses and the\nstability of external nature. Science proceeds, by comparison of\nthese facts and by inductive reasoning, to arrange them under certain\ngeneral expressions or laws. So far all is merely physical, and need\nhave no connection with our origin or destiny or relation to higher\npowers. But we ourselves are a part of the nature which we study; and\nwe cannot study it without more or less thinking our own thoughts into\nit. Thus we naturally begin to inquire as to origins and first causes,\nand as to the source of the energy and order which we perceive; and to\nthese questions the human mind demands some answer, either actual or\nspeculative. But here we enter into the domain of religious thought,\nor that which relates to a power or powers beyond and above nature.\nWhatever forms our thoughts on such subjects may take, these depend,\nnot directly on the facts of science, but on the reaction of our minds\non these facts. They are truly anthropomorphic. It has been well said\nthat it is as idle to inquire as to the origin of such religious ideas\nas to inquire as to the origin of hunger and thirst. Given the man,\nthey must necessarily exist. Now, whatever form these philosophical or\nreligious ideas may take--whether that of Agnosticism or Pantheism or\nTheism--science, properly so called, has no right to be either praised\nor blamed. Its material may be used, but the structure is the work of\nthe artificer himself.\n\nIt is well, however, to carry with us the truth that this border-land\nbetween science and religion is one which men cannot be prevented from\nentering; but what they may find therein depends very much on\nthemselves. Under wise guidance it may prove to us an Eden, the very\ngate of heaven, and we may acquire in it larger and more harmonious\nviews of both the seen and the unseen, of science and of religion.\nBut, on the other hand, it may be found to be a battle-field or a\nbedlam, a place of confused cries and incoherent ravings, and strewn\nwith the wrecks of human hopes and aspirations.\n\nThere can be no question that the more unpleasant aspect of the matter\nis somewhat prevalent in our time, and that we should, if possible,\nunderstand the causes of the conflict and the confusion that prevail,\nand the way out of them. To do this it will be necessary first to\nnotice some of the incidental or extraneous causes of difficulty and\nstrife, and then to inquire more in detail as to the actual bearing\nof the scientific knowledge of nature on Agnosticism.\n\nOne fruitful cause of difficulty in the relations of science and\nreligion is to be found in the narrowness and incapacity of\nwell-meaning Christians who unnecessarily bring the doctrines of\nnatural and revealed religion into conflict, by misunderstanding the\none or the other, or by attaching obsolete scientific ideas to Holy\nScripture, and identifying them with it in points where it is quite\nnon-committal. Much mischief is also done by a prevalent habit of\nspeaking of all, or nearly all, the votaries of science as if they\nwere irreligious.\n\nA second cause is to be found in the extravagant speculations indulged\nin by the adherents of certain philosophical systems. Such\nspeculations often far overpass the limits of actual scientific\nknowledge, and are yet paraded before the ignorant as if they were\nlegitimate results of science, and so become irretrievably confounded\nwith it in the popular mind.\n\nA third influence, more closely connected with science itself, arises\nfrom the rapidity of the progress of discovery and of the practical\napplications of scientific facts and principles. This has unsettled\nthe minds of men, and has given them the idea that nothing is beyond\ntheir reach. There is thus a vague notion that science has overcome so\nmany difficulties, and explained so many mysteries, that it may\nultimately satisfy all the wants of man and leave no scope for\nreligious belief. Those who know the limitations of our knowledge of\nmaterial things may not share this delusion; but there is reason to\nfear that many, even of scientific men, are carried away by it, and it\nwidely affects the minds of general readers.\n\nAgain, science has in the course of its growth become divided into a\ngreat number of small specialties, each pursued ardently by its own\nvotaries. This is beneficial in one respect; for much more can be\ngained by men digging downward, each on his own vein of valuable ore,\nthan by all merely scraping the surface. But the specialist, as he\ndescends fathom after fathom into his mine, however rich and rare the\ngems and metals he may discover, becomes more and more removed from\nthe ordinary ways of men, and more and more regardless of the products\nof other veins as valuable as his own. The specialist, however\nprofound he may become in the knowledge of his own limited subject, is\non that very account less fitted to guide his fellow-men in the\npursuit of general truth. When he ventures to the boundaries between\nhis own and other domains of truth, or when he conceives the idea that\nhis own little mine is the sole deposit of all that requires to be\nknown, he sometimes makes grave mistakes; and these pass current for a\ntime as the dicta of high scientific authority.\n\nLastly, the lowest influence of all is that which sometimes regulates\nwhat may be termed the commercial side of science. Here the demand is\nvery apt to control the supply. New facts and legitimate conclusions\ncannot be produced with sufficient rapidity to satisfy the popular\ncraving, or they are not sufficiently exciting to compete with other\nattractions. Science has then to enter the domain of imagination, and\nthe last new generalization--showy and specious, but perhaps baseless\nas the plot of the last new novel--brings grist to the mill of the\n\"scientist\" and his publisher.\n\nOnly one permanent and final remedy is possible for these evils, and\nthat is a higher moral tone and more thorough scientific education on\nthe part of the general public. Until this can be secured, true\nscience is sure to be surrounded with a mental haze of vague\nhypotheses clothed in ill-defined language, and which is mistaken by\nthe multitude for science itself. Yet true science should not be held\nresponsible for this, except in so far as its material is used to\nconstitute the substance of the pseudo-gnosis which surrounds it.\nScience is in this relation the honest householder whose goods may be\ntaken by thieves and applied to bad uses, or the careful amasser of\nwealth which may be dissipated by spendthrifts.\n\nIt may be said that if these statements are true, the ordinary reader\nis helpless. How can he separate the true from the false? Must he\nresign himself to the condition of one who either believes on mere\nauthority or refuses to believe anything? or must he adopt the\nattitude of the Pyrrhonist who thinks that anything may be either true\nor false? But it is true, nevertheless, that common sense may suffice\nto deliver us from much of the pseudo-science of our time, and to\nenable us to understand how little reason there is for the conflicts\npromoted by mere speculation between science and other departments of\nlegitimate thought and inquiry.\n\nIn illustrating this, we may in the present lecture consider that form\nof sceptical philosophy which in our time is the most prevalent, and\nwhich has the most specious air of dependence on science. This is the\nsystem of Agnosticism combined with evolution of which Mr. Herbert\nSpencer is the most conspicuous advocate in the English-speaking\nworld. This philosophy deals with two subjects--the cause or origin of\nthe universe and of things therein, and the method of the progress of\nall from the beginning until now. Spencer sees nothing in the first of\nthese but mere force or energy, nothing in the second but a\nspontaneous evolution. All beyond these is not only unknown, but\nunknowable. The theological and philosophical shortcomings of this\ndoctrine have been laid bare by a multitude of critics, and I do not\npropose to consider it in these relations so much as in relation to\nscience, which has much to say with respect to both force and\nevolution.\n\nAn agnostic is literally one who does not know; and, were the word\nused in its true and literal sense, Agnosticism would of necessity be\nopposed to science, since science is knowledge and quite incompatible\nwith the want of it. But the modern agnostic does not pretend to be\nignorant of the facts and principles of science. What he professes not\nto know is the existence of any power above and beyond material\nnature. He goes a little farther, however, than mere absence of\nknowledge. He holds that of God nothing can be known; or he may put it\na little more strongly, in the phrase of his peculiar philosophy, by\nsaying that the existence of a God or of creation by divine power is\n\"unthinkable.\" It is in this that he differs from the old-fashioned\nand now extinct atheist, who bluntly denied the existence of a God.\nThe modern agnostic assumes an attitude of greater humility and\ndisclaims the actual denial of God. Yet he practically goes farther,\nin asserting the impossibility of knowing the existence of a Divine\nBeing; and in taking this farther step Agnosticism does more to\ndegrade the human reason and to cut it off from all communion with\nanything beyond mere matter and force, than does any other form of\nphilosophy, ancient or modern.\n\nYet in this Agnosticism there is in one point an approximation to\ntruth. If there is a God, he cannot be known directly and fully, and\nhis plans and procedure must always be more or less incomprehensible.\nThe writer of the book of Job puts this as plainly as any modern\nagnostic in the passage beginning \"Canst thou by searching find out\nGod?\"--literally, \"Canst thou sound the depths of God?\"--and a still\nhigher authority informs us that \"no man hath seen God\"--that is,\nknown him as we know material things. In short, absolutely and\nessentially God is incomprehensible; but this is no new discovery, and\nthe mistake of the agnostic lies in failing to perceive that the same\ndifficulty stands in the way of our perfectly knowing anything\nwhatever. We say that we know things when we mean that we know them in\ntheir properties, relations, or effects. In this sense the knowledge\nof God is perfectly possible. It is impossible only in that other\nsense of the word \"know\"--if it can have such a sense--in which we are\nrequired to know things in their absolute essence and thoroughly. Thus\nthe term \"agnostic\" contains an initial fallacy in itself; and this\nphilosophy, like many others, rests, in the first instance, on a mere\njugglery of words. The real question is, \"Is there a God who manifests\nhimself to us mediately and practically?\" and this is a question which\nwe cannot afford to set aside by a mere play on the meanings of the\nverb \"to know.\"\n\nIf, however, any man takes this position and professes to be incapable\nof knowing whether or not there is any power above and behind\nmaterial things, it will be necessary to begin with the very elements\nof knowledge, and to inquire if there is anything whatever that he\nreally knows and believes.\n\nLet us ask him if he can subscribe to the simple creed expressed in\nthe words \"I am, I feel, I think.\" Should he deny these propositions,\nthen there is no basis left on which to argue. Should he admit this\nmuch of belief, he has abandoned somewhat of his agnostic position;\nfor it would be easy to show that in even uttering the pronoun \"I\" he\nhas committed himself to the belief in the unknowable. What is the\n_ego_ which he admits? Is it the material organism or any one of its\norgans or parts? or is it something distinct, of which the organism is\nmerely the garment, or outward manifestation? or is the organism\nitself anything more than a bundle of appearances partially known and\nscarcely understood by that which calls itself \"I\"? Who knows? And if\nour own personality is thus inscrutable, if we can conceive of it\nneither as identical with the whole or any part of the organism nor as\nexisting independently of the organism, we should begin our\nAgnosticism here, and decline to utter the pronoun \"I\" as implying\nwhat we cannot know. Still, as a matter of faith, we must hold fast to\nthe proposition \"I exist\" as the only standpoint for science,\nphilosophy, or common life. If we are asked for evidence of this\nfaith, we can appeal only to our consciousness of effects which imply\nthe existence of the _ego_, which we thus have to admit or suppose\nbefore we can begin to prove even its existence.\n\nThis fact of the mystery of our own existence is full of material for\nthought. It is in itself startling--even appalling. We feel that it is\na solemn, a dreadful, thing to exist, and to exist in that limitless\nspace and that eternal time which we can no more understand than we\ncan our own constitution, though our belief in their existence is\ninevitable. Nor can we divest ourselves of anxious thoughts as to the\nsource, tendencies, and end of our own being. Here, in short, we\nalready reach the threshold of that dread unknown future and its\npossibilities, the realization of which by hope, fear, and imagination\nconstitutes, perhaps, our first introduction to the unseen world as\ndistinguished from the present world of sense. The agnostic may smile\nif he pleases at religion as a puerile fancy, but he knows, like other\nmen, that the mere consciousness of existence necessarily links\nitself with a future--nay, unending--existence, and that any being\nwith this consciousness of futurity must have at least a religion of\nhope and fear. In this we find an intelligible reason for the\nuniversality of religious ideas in relation to a future life. Even\nwhere this leads to beliefs that may be called superstitious, it is\nmore reasonable than Agnosticism; for it is surely natural that a\nbeing inscrutable by himself should be led to believe in the existence\nof other things equally inscrutable, but apparently related to\nhimself.\n\nBut the thinking \"I\" dwells in the midst of what we term external\nobjects. In a certain sense it treats the parts of its own bodily\norganism as if they were things external to it, speaking of \"my hand,\"\n\"my head,\" as if they were its property. But there are things\npractically infinite beyond the organism itself. We call them objects\nor things, but they are only appearances; and we know only their\nrelations to ourselves and to each other. Their essence, if they have\nany, is inscrutable. We say that the appearances indicate matter and\nenergy, but what these are essentially we know not. We reduce matter\nto atoms, but it is impossible for us to have any conception of an\natom or of the supposed ether, whether itself in some sense atomic or\nnot, including such atoms. Our attempts to form rational conceptions\nof atoms resolve themselves into complex conjectures as to vortices of\nethers and the like, of which no one pretends to have any distinct\nmental picture; yet on this basis of the incomprehensible rests all\nour physical science, the first truths in which are really matters of\npure faith in the existence of that which we cannot understand. Yet\nall men would scoff at the agnostic who on this account should express\nunbelief in physical science.\n\nLet us observe here, further, that since the mysterious and\ninscrutable \"I\" is surrounded with an equally mysterious and\ninscrutable universe, and since the _ego_ and the external world are\nlinked together by indissoluble relations, we are introduced to\ncertain alternatives as to origins. Either the universe or \"nature\" is\na mere phantom conjured up by the _ego_, or the _ego_ is a product of\nthe universe, or both are the result of some equally mysterious power\nbeyond us and the material world. Neither of these suppositions is\nabsurd or unthinkable; and, whichever of them we adopt, we are again\nintroduced to what may be termed a religion as well as a philosophy.\nOn one view, man becomes a god to himself; on another, nature becomes\nhis god; on the third, a Supreme Being, the Creator of both. All three\nreligions exist in the world in a vast variety of forms, and it is\nquestionable if any human being does not more or less give credence to\none or the other.\n\nScientific men, even when they think proper to call themselves\nidealists, must reject the first of the above alternatives, since they\ncannot doubt the objective existence of external nature, and they know\nthat its existence dates from a time anterior to our possible\nexistence as human beings. They may hold to either of the others; and,\npractically, the minds of students of science are divided between the\nidea of a spontaneous evolution of all things from self-existent\nmatter and force, and that of the creation of all by a self-existent,\nomnipotent, and all-wise Creator. From certain points of view, it may\nbe of no consequence whether a scientific man holds one or other of\nthese views. Self-existent force or power, capable of spontaneous\ninception of change, and of orderly and infallible development\naccording to laws of its own imposition or enactment, which is\ndemanded on the one hypothesis, scarcely differs from the conception\nof an intelligent Creator demanded on the other, while it is, to say\nthe least, equally incomprehensible. It is, besides, objectionable to\nscience, on the ground that it requires us to assume properties in\nmatter and energy quite at variance with the results of experience.\nThe remarkable alternative presented by Tyndall in his Belfast Address\nwell expresses this: \"Either let us open our doors freely to the\nconception of creative acts, or, abandoning them, let us radically\nchange our notions of matter.\" The expression \"creative acts\" here is\na loose and not very accurate one for the operation of creative power.\nThe radical change in \"our notions of matter\" involves an entire\nreversal of all that science knows of its essential properties. This\nbeing understood, the sentence is a fair expression of the dilemma in\nwhich the agnostic and the materialist find themselves.\n\nBetween the two hypotheses above stated there is, however, one\nmaterial and vital difference, depending on the nature of man himself.\nThe universe does not consist merely of insensate matter and force and\nautomatic vitality; there happens to be in it the rational and\nconsciously responsible being man. To attribute to him an origin from\nmere matter and force is not merely to attach to them a fictitious\npower and significance: it is also to reject the rational probability\nthat the original cause must be at least equal to the effects\nproduced, and to deprive ourselves of all communion and sympathy with\nnature. Further, wherever the \"presence and potency\" of human reason\nresides, there seems no reason to prevent our searching for and\nfinding it in the only way in which we can know anything, in its\nproperties and effects. The dogma of Agnosticism, it is true, refuses\nto permit this search after God, but it does so with as little reason\nas any of those self-constituted authorities that demand belief\nwithout questioning. Nay, it has the offensive peculiarity that in the\nvery terms in which it issues its prohibition it contradicts itself.\nThe same oracle which asserts that \"the power which the universe\nmanifests to us is wholly inscrutable\" affirms also that \"we must\ninevitably commit ourselves to the hypothesis of a first cause.\" Thus\nwe are told that a power which is \"manifest\" is also \"inscrutable,\"\nand that we must \"commit ourselves\" to a belief in a \"first cause\"\nwhich on the hypothesis cannot be known to exist. This may be\nphilosophy of a certain sort, but it certainly should not claim\nkinship with science.\n\nPerhaps it may be well here to place in comparison with each other the\ndoctrine of the agnostic philosophy as expounded by Herbert Spencer,\nand that of Paul of Tarsus--an older, but certainly a not less acute,\nthinker--and we may refer to their utterances respecting the origin of\nthe universe.\n\nSpencer says: \"The verbally intelligent suppositions respecting the\norigin of the universe are three: (1) It is self-existent; (2) It is\nself-created; (3) It is created by an external agency.\" On these it\nmay be remarked that the second is scarcely even \"verbally\nintelligent;\" it seems to be a contradiction in terms. The third\nadmits of an important modification, which was manifest to Spinosa if\nnot to Spencer--namely, that the Creator may--nay, must--be not merely\n\"external,\" but within the universe as well. If there is a God, he\nmust be _in_ the universe as a pervading power, and in every part of\nit, and must not be shut out from his own work. This mistaken\nconception of God as building himself out of his own universe and\nacting on it by external force is both irrational and unscientific,\nbeing, for example, quite at variance with the analogy of force and\nlife. Rightly understood, therefore, Spencer's alternatives resolve\nthemselves into two--either the universe is self-existent, or it is\nthe work of a self-existent Creator pervading all things with his\npower. Of these, Spencer prefers the first. Paul, on the other hand,\nreferring to the mental condition of the civilized heathens of his\ntime, affirms that rationally they could believe only in the\nhypothesis of creation. He says of God: \"His invisible things, even\nhis eternal power and divinity, can be perceived (by the reason),\nbeing understood by the things that are made.\" Let us look at these\nrival propositions. Is the universe self-existent, or does it show\nevidence of creative power and divinity?\n\nThe doctrine that the universe is self-existent may be understood in\ndifferent ways. It may mean either an endless succession of such\nchanges as we now see in progress, or an eternity of successive cycles\nproceeding through the course of geological ages and ever returning\ninto themselves. The first is directly contrary to known facts in the\ngeological history of the earth, and cannot be maintained by any one.\nThe second would imply that the known geological history is merely a\npart of one great cycle of an endless series, and of which an infinite\nnumber have already passed away. It is evident that this infinite\nsuccession of cycles is quite as incomprehensible as any other\ninfinite succession of things or events. But, waiving this objection,\nwe have the alternative either that all the successive cycles are\nexactly alike--which could not be, in accordance with evolution, nor\nwith the analogy of other natural cycles--or there must have been a\nprogression in the successive cycles. But this last supposition would\ninvolve an uncaused beginning somewhere, and this of such a character\nas to determine all the successive cycles and their progress; which\nwould again be contrary to the hypothesis of self-existence. It is\nuseless, however, to follow such questions farther, since it is\nevident that this hypothesis accounts for nothing and would involve us\nin absolute confusion.\n\nLet us turn now to Paul's statement. This has the merit, in the first\nplace, of expressing a known fact--namely, that men do infer power and\ndivinity from nature. But is this a mere superstition, or have they\nreason for it? If the universe be considered as a vast machine\nexceeding all our powers of calculation in its magnitude and\ncomplexity, it seems in the last degree absurd to deny that it\npresents evidence of \"power.\" Dr. Carpenter, in a recent lecture,\nillustrates the position of the agnostic in this respect by supposing\nhim to examine the machinery of a great mill, and, having found that\nthis is all set in motion by a huge iron shaft proceeding from a brick\nwall, to suppose that this shaft is self-acting, and that there is no\ncause of motion beyond. But when we consider the variety and the\nintricacy of nature, the unity and the harmony of its parts, and the\nadaptation of these to an incalculable number of uses, we find\nsomething more than power. There is a fitting together of things in a\nmanner not only above our imitation, but above our comprehension. To\nrefer this to mere chance or to innate tendencies or potencies of\nthings we feel to be but an empty form of words; consequently, we are\nforced to admit superhuman contrivance in nature, or what Paul terms\n\"divinity.\" Further, since the history of the universe goes back\nfarther than we can calculate, and as we can know nothing beyond the\nFirst Cause, we infer that the Power and Divinity which we have\nascertained in nature must be \"eternal.\" Again, since the creative\npower must at some point in past time have spontaneously begun to act,\nwe regard it as a \"living\" power, which is the term elsewhere used by\nPaul in expressing the idea of \"personality\" as held by theologians.\nLastly, if everything that we know thus testifies to an eternal power\nand divinity, to maintain that we can know nothing of this First Cause\nmust be simply nonsense, unless we are content to fall back on\nabsolute nihilism, and hold that we know nothing whatever, either\nrelatively or absolutely; but in this case not only is science\ndethroned, but reason herself is driven from her seat, and there is\nnothing left for us to discuss. Paul's idea is thus perfectly clear\nand consistent, and it is not difficult to see that common sense must\naccept this doctrine of an Eternal Living Power and Divinity in\npreference to the hypothesis of Spencer.\n\nSo far we have considered the general bearing of agnostic and theistic\ntheories on our relations to nature; but if we are to test these\ntheories fully by scientific considerations, we must look a little\nmore into details. The existences experimentally or inductively known\nto science may be grouped under three heads--matter, energy, and law;\nand each of these has an independent testimony to give with reference\nto its origin and its connection with a higher creative power.\n\nMatter, it is true, occupies a somewhat equivocal place in the\nagnostic philosophy. According to Spencer, it is \"built up or\nextracted from experiences of force,\" and it is only by force that it\n\"demonstrates itself to us as existing.\" This is true; but that which\n\"demonstrates itself to us as existing\" must exist, in whatever way\nthe demonstration is made, and Spencer does not, in consequence of the\nlack of direct evidence, extend his Agnosticism to matter, though he\nmight quite consistently do so. In any case, science postulates the\nexistence of matter. Further, science is obliged to conceive of matter\nas composed of atoms, and of atoms of different kinds; for atoms\ndiffer in weight and in chemical properties, and these differences are\nto us ultimate, for they cannot be changed. Thus science and practical\nlife are tied down to certain predetermined properties of matter. We\nmay, it is true, in future be able to reduce the number of kinds of\nmatter, by finding that some bodies believed to be simple are really\ncompound; but this does not affect the question in hand. As to the\norigin of the diverse properties of atoms, only two suppositions seem\npossible: either in some past period they agreed to differ and to\ndivide themselves into different kinds suitable in quantity and\nproperties to make up the universe, or else matter in its various\nkinds has been skilfully manufactured by a creative power.\n\nBut there is a scientific way in which matter may be resolved into\nforce. An iron knife passed through a powerful magnetic current is\nfelt to be resisted, as if passing through a solid substance, and this\nresistance is produced merely by magnetic attraction. Why may it not\nbe so with resistance in general? To give effect to such a\nsupposition, and to reconcile it with the facts of chemistry and of\nphysics, it is necessary to suppose that the atoms of matter are\nmerely minute vortices or whirlwinds set up in an ethereal medium,\nwhich in itself, and when at rest, does not possess any of the\nproperties of matter. That such an ethereal medium exists we have\nreason to believe from the propagation of light and heat through\nspace, though we know little, except negatively, of its properties.\nAdmitting, however, its existence, the setting up in it of the various\nkinds of vortices constituting the atoms of different kinds of matter\nis just as much in need of a creative power to initiate it as the\ncreation of matter out of nothing would be. Besides this, we now have\nto account for the existence of the ether itself; and here we have the\ndisadvantage that this substance possesses none of the properties of\nordinary matter except mere extension; that, in so far as we know, it\nis continuous, and not molecular; and that, while of the most\ninconceivable tenuity, it transmits vibrations in a manner similar to\nthat of a body of the extremest solidity. It would seem, also, to be\nindefinite in extent and beyond the control of the ordinary natural\nforces. In short, ether is as incomprehensible as Deity; and if we\nsuppose it to have instituted spontaneously the different kinds of\nmatter, we have really constituted it a god, which is what, in a loose\nway, some ancient mythologies actually did. We may, however, truly say\nthat this modern scientific conception of the practically infinite and\nall-pervading ether, the primary seat of force, brings us nearer than\never before to some realization of the Spiritual Creator.\n\nBut to ether both science and Agnosticism must superadd energy--the\nentirely immaterial something which moves ether itself. The rather\ncrude scientific notion that certain forces are \"modes of motion\"\nperhaps blinds us somewhat to the mystery of energy. Even if we knew\nno other form of force than heat, which moves masses of matter or\natoms, it would be in many respects an inscrutable thing. But as\ntraversing the subtle ether in such forms as radiant heat, light,\nchemical force, and electricity, energy becomes still more mysterious.\nPerhaps it is even more so in what seems to be one of its primitive\nforms--that of gravitation, where it connects distant bodies\napparently without any intervening medium. Facts of this kind appear\nto bring us still nearer to the conception of an all-pervading\nimmaterial creative power.\n\nBut perhaps what may be termed the determinations of force exhibit\nthis still more clearly, as a very familiar instance may show. Our\nsun--one of a countless number of similar suns--is to us the great\ncentre of light and heat, sustaining all processes, whether merely\nphysical or vital, on our planet. It was a grand conception of certain\nold religions to make the sun the emblem of God, though sun-worship\nwas a substitution of the creature for the Creator, and would have\nbeen dispelled by modern discovery. But our sun is not merely one of\ncountless suns, some of them of greater magnitude, but it is only a\ntemporary depository of a limited quantity of energy, ever dissipating\nitself into space, calculable as to its amount and duration, and known\nto depend for its existence on gravitative force. We may imagine the\nbeginning of such a luminary in the collision of great masses of\nmatter rushing together under the influence of gravitation, and\ncausing by their impact a conflagration capable of enduring for\nmillions of years. Yet our imagining such a rude process for the\nkindling of the sun will go a very little way in accounting for all\nthe mechanism of the solar system and things therein. Further, it\nraises new questions as to the original condition of matter. If it was\noriginally in one mass, whence came the incalculable power by which it\nwas rent into innumerable suns and systems? If it was once universally\ndiffused in boundless space, when and how was the force of gravity\nturned on, and what determined its action in such a way as to\nconstruct the existing universe? This is only one of the simplest and\nbaldest possible views of the intricate determinations of force\ndisplayed in the universe, yet it may suffice to indicate the\nnecessity of a living and determining First Cause.\n\nThe fact that all the manifestations of force are regulated by law by\nno means favors the agnostic view. The laws of nature are merely\nmental generalizations of our own, and, so far as they go, show a\nremarkable harmony between our mental nature and that manifested in\nthe universe. They are not themselves powers capable of producing\neffects, but merely express what we can ascertain of uniformity of\naction in nature. The law of gravitation, for example, gives no clew\nto the origin of that force, but merely expresses its constant mode of\naction, in whatever way that may have been determined at first. Nor\nare natural laws decrees of necessity. They might have been\notherwise--nay, many of them may be otherwise in parts of the universe\ninaccessible to us, or they may change in process of time; for the\nperiod over which our knowledge extends may be to the plans of the\nCreator like the lifetime of some minute insect which might imagine\nhuman arrangements of no great permanence to be of eternal duration.\n\nUnless the laws of nature were constant, in so far as our experience\nextends, we could have no certain basis either for science or for\npractical life. All would be capricious and uncertain, and we could\ncalculate on nothing. Law thus adapts the universe to be the residence\nof rational beings, and nothing else could. Viewed in this way, we see\nthat natural laws must be, in their relation to a Creator, voluntary\nlimitations of his power in certain directions for the benefit of his\ncreatures. To secure this end, nature must be a perfect machine, all\nthe parts of which are adjusted for permanent and harmonious action.\nIt may perhaps rather be compared to a vast series of machines, each\nrunning independently like the trains on a railway, but all connected\nand regulated by an invisible guidance which determines the time and\nthe distance of each, and the manner in which the less urgent and less\nimportant shall give place to others. Even this does not express the\nwhole truth; for the harmony of nature must be connected with constant\nchange and progress toward higher perfection. Does this conception of\nnatural law give us any warrant for the idea that the universe is a\nproduct of chance? Is it not the highest realization of all that we\ncan conceive of the plans of superhuman intelligence?\n\nThe stupid notion--still lingering in certain quarters--that when\nanything has been referred to a natural law or to a secondary cause\nunder law, God may be dispensed with in relation to that thing, is\nmerely a survival of the superstition that divine action must be of\nthe nature of a capricious interference. The true theistic conception\nof law is that already stated, of a voluntary limitation of divine\npower in the interest of a material cosmos and its intelligent\ninhabitants. Nor is the permanence of law dependent on necessity or on\nmere mechanical routine, but on the unchanging will of the Legislator;\nwhile the countless varieties and vicissitudes of nature depend, not\non caprice or on accidental interference, but on the interactions and\nadjustments of laws of different grades, and so numerous and varied in\ntheir scope and application and in the combinations of which they are\ncapable that it is often impossible for finite minds to calculate\ntheir results.\n\nIf, now, in conclusion, we are asked to sum up the hypotheses as to\nthe origin of natural laws and of the properties and determinations of\nmatter and force, we may do this under the following heads:\n\n1. Absolute creation by the will of a Supreme Intelligence,\nself-existent and omnipotent. This may be the ultimate fact lying\nbehind all materials, forces, and laws known to science.\n\n2. Mediate creation, or the making of new complex products with\nmaterial already created and under laws previously existing. This is\napplicable not so much to the primary origin of things as to their\nsubsequent determinations and modifications.\n\n3. Both of the above may be included under the expression \"creation by\nlaw,\" implying the institution from the first of fixed laws or modes\nof action not to be subsequently deviated from.\n\n4. Theistic evolution, or the gradual development of the divine plans\nby the apparently spontaneous interaction of things made. This is\nuniversally admitted to occur in the minor modifications of created\nthings, though of course it can have no place as a mode of explaining\nactual origins, and it must be limited within the laws of nature\nestablished by the Creator. Practically, it might be difficult to make\nany sharp distinctions between such evolution and mediate creation.\n\n5. Agnostic and monistic evolution, which hold the spontaneous\norigination and differentiation of things out of primitive matter and\nforce, self-existent or fortuitous. The monistic form of this\nhypothesis assumes one primary substance or existence potentially\nembracing all subsequent developments.\n\nThese theories are, of course, not all antagonistic to one another.\nThey resolve themselves into two groups, a theistic and an atheistic.\nThe former includes the first four; the latter, the fifth. Any one who\nbelieves in God may suppose a primary creation of matter and energy, a\nsubsequent moulding and fashioning of them mediately and under natural\nlaw, and also a gradual evolution of many new things by the\ninteraction of things previously made. This complex idea of the origin\nof things seems, indeed, to be the rational outcome of Theism. It is\nalso the idea which underlies the old record in the book of Genesis,\nwhere we have first an absolute creation, and then a series of\n\"makings\" and \"placings,\" and of things \"bringing forth\" other things,\nin the course of the creative periods.\n\nOn the other hand, Agnosticism postulates primary force or forces\nself-existent and including potentially all that is subsequently\nevolved from them. The only way in which it approximates to theism is\nin its extreme monistic form, where the one force or power supposed\nto underlie all existence is a sort of God shorn of personality, will,\nand reason.\n\nThe actual relations of these opposing theories to science cannot be\nbetter explained than by a reference to the words of a leading monist,\nwhose views we shall have to notice in the next lecture. \"If,\" says\nHaeckel, \"anybody feels the necessity of representing the origin of\nmatter as the work of a supernatural creative force independent of\nmatter itself, I would remind him that the idea of an immaterial force\ncreating matter in the first instance is an article of faith which has\nnothing to do with science. Where faith begins, science ends.\"\n\nPrecisely so, if only we invert the last sentence and say, \"Where\nscience ends, faith begins.\" It is only by faith that we know of any\nforce, or even of the atoms of matter themselves, and in like manner\nit is \"by faith we know that the creative ages have been constituted\nby the word of God.\"[1] The only difference is that the monist has\nfaith in the potency of nothing to produce something, or of something\nmaterial to exist for ever and to acquire at some point of time the\npower spontaneously to enter on the process of development; while the\ntheist has faith in a primary intelligent Will as the Author of all\nthings. The latter has this to confirm his faith--that it accords with\nwhat we know of the inertia of matter, of the constancy of forces, and\nof the permanence of natural law, and is in harmony with the powers of\nthe one free energy we know--that of the human will.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[1] Epistle to Hebrews, xi. 3.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE II.\n\nTHE SCIENCE OF LIFE AND MONISTIC EVOLUTION.\n\n\nIn the last lecture we have noticed the general relations of agnostic\nspeculations with natural science, and have exposed their failure to\naccount for natural facts and laws. We may now inquire into their mode\nof dealing with the phenomena of life, with regard to the supposed\nspontaneous evolution of which, and its development up to man himself,\nso many confident generalizations have been put forth by the agnostic\nand monistic philosophy.\n\nIn the earlier history of modern natural science, the tendency was to\ntake nature as we find it, without speculation as to the origin of\nliving things, which men were content to regard as direct products of\ncreative power. But at a very early period--and especially after the\nrevelations of geology had disclosed a succession of ascending\ndynasties of life--such speculations, which, independently of science,\nhad commended themselves to the poetical and philosophical minds of\nantiquity, were revived. In France more particularly, the theories of\nBuffon, Lamarck, and Geoffroy St. Hilaire opened up these exciting\nthemes, and they might even then have attained to the importance they\nhave since acquired but for the great and judicial intellect of\nCuvier, which perceived their futility and guided the researches of\nnaturalists into other and more profitable fields. The next stimulus\nto such hypotheses was given by the progress of physiology, and\nespecially by researches into the embryonic development of animals and\nplants. Here it was seen that there are homologies and likenesses of\nplan linking organisms with each other, and that in the course of\ntheir development the more complex creatures pass through stages\ncorresponding to the adult condition of lower forms. The questions\nraised by the geographical distribution of animals, as ascertained by\nthe numerous expeditions and scientific travellers of modern times,\ntended in the same direction. The way was thus prepared for the broad\ngeneralizations of Darwin, who, seizing on the idea of artificial\nselection as practised by breeders of animals and plants, and\nimagining that something similar takes place in the natural struggle\nfor existence, saw in this a plausible solution for the question of\nthe progress and the variety of organized beings.\n\nThe original Darwinian theory was soon found to be altogether\ninsufficient to account for the observed facts, because of the\ntendency of the bare struggle for existence to produce degradation\nrather than elevation; because of the testimony of geology to the fact\nthat introduction of new species takes place in times of expansion\nrather than of struggle; because of the manifest tendency of the\nbreeds produced by artificial selection to become infertile and die\nout in proportion to their deviation from the original types; and\nbecause of the difficulty of preventing such breeds from reverting to\nthe original forms, which seem in all cases to be perfectly\nequilibrated in their own parts and adapted to external nature, so\nthat varieties tend, as if by gravitative law, to fall back into the\noriginal moulds. A great variety of other considerations--as those of\nsexual selection, reproductive acceleration and retardation, periods\nof more and less rapid evolution, innate tendency to vary at\nparticular times and in particular circumstances--have been imported\ninto the original doctrine. Thus the original Darwinism is a thing of\nthe past, even in the mind of its great author, though it has proved\nthe fruitful parent of a manifold progeny of allied ideas which\ncontinue to bear its name. In this respect Darwinism is itself\namenable to the law of evolution, and has been continually changing\nits form under the influence of the controversial struggles which have\nrisen around it.\n\nDarwinism was not necessarily atheistic or agnostic. Its author was\ncontent to assume a few living beings or independent forms to begin\nwith, and did not propose to obtain them by any spontaneous action of\ndead matter, nor to account for the primary origin of life, still less\nof all material things. In this he was sufficiently humble and honest;\nbut the logical weakness of his position was at once apparent. If\ncreation was needed to give a few initial types, it might have\nproduced others also. The followers of Darwin, therefore, more\nespecially in Germany, at once pushed the doctrine back into\nAgnosticism and Monism, giving to it a greater logical consistency,\nbut bringing it into violent conflict with theism and with common\nsense.\n\nDarwin himself early perceived that his doctrine, if true, must apply\nto man--in so far, at least, as his bodily frame is concerned. Man is\nin this an animal, and closely related to other animals. To have\nclaimed for him a distinct origin would have altogether discredited\nthe theory, though it might be admitted that, man having appeared, his\nfree volition and his moral and social instincts would at once\nprofoundly modify the course of the evolution. On the other hand, the\ngulf which separates the reason and the conscience of man from\ninstinct and the animal intelligence of lower creatures opposed an\nalmost impassable barrier to the union of man with lower animals; and\nthe attempt to bridge this gulf threatened to bring the theory into a\ndeadly struggle with the moral, social, and religious instincts of\nmankind. In face of this difficulty, Darwin and most of his followers\nadopted the more daring course of maintaining the evolution of the\nwhole man from lower forms, and thereby entered into a warfare, which\nstill rages, with psychology, ethics, philology, and theology.\n\nIt is easy for shallow evolutionists unaware of the tendencies of\ntheir doctrine, or for latitudinarian churchmen careless as to the\nmaintenance of truth if only outward forms are preserved and\ncomprehension secured, to overlook or make light of these antagonisms,\nbut science and common sense alike demand a severe adherence to\ntruth. It becomes, therefore, very important to ascertain to what\nextent we are justified in adopting the agnostic evolution in its\nrelation to life and man on scientific grounds. Perhaps this may best\nbe done by reviewing the argument of Haeckel in his work on the\nevolution of man--one of the ablest, and at the same time most\nthorough, expositions of monistic evolution as applied to lower\nanimals and to men.\n\nErnst Haeckel is an eminent comparative anatomist and physiologist,\nwho has earned a wide and deserved reputation by his able and\nlaborious studies of the calcareous sponges, the radiolarians, and\nother low forms of life. In his work on _The Evolution of Man_ he\napplies this knowledge to the solution of the problem of the origin of\nhumanity, and sets himself not only to illustrate, but to \"prove,\" the\ndescent of our species from the simplest animal types, and even to\noverwhelm with scorn every other explanation of the appearance of man\nexcept that of spontaneous evolution. He is not merely an\nevolutionist, but what he terms a \"monist,\" and the monistic\nphilosophy, as defined by him, includes certain negations and certain\npositive principles of a most comprehensive and important character.\nIt implies the denial of all spiritual or immaterial existence. Man is\nto the monist merely a physiological machine, and nature is only a\ngreater self-existing and spontaneously-moving aggregate of forces.\nMonism can thus altogether dispense with a Creative Will as\noriginating nature, and adopts the other alternative of self-existence\nor causelessness for the universe and all its phenomena. Again, the\nmonistic doctrine necessarily implies that man, the animal, the plant,\nand the mineral are only successive stages of the evolution of the\nsame primordial matter, constituting thus a connected chain of being,\nall the parts of which sprang spontaneously from each other. Lastly,\nas the admixture of primitive matter and force would itself be a sort\nof dualism, Haeckel regards these as ultimately one, and apparently\nresolves the origin of the universe into the operation of a\nself-existing energy having in itself the potency of all things. After\nall, this may be said to be an approximation to the idea of a Creator,\nbut not a living and willing Creator. Monism is thus not identical\nwith pantheism, but is rather a sort of atheistic monotheism, if such\na thing is imaginable; and vindicates the assertion attributed to a\nlate lamented physical philosopher--that he had found no atheistic\nphilosophy which had not a God somewhere.\n\nHaeckel's own statement of this aspect of his philosophy is somewhat\ninteresting. He says: \"The opponents of the doctrine of evolution are\nvery fond of branding the monistic philosophy grounded upon it as\n'materialism' by comparing _philosophical_ materialism with the wholly\ndifferent and censurable _moral_ materialism. Strictly, however, our\n'monism' might as accurately or as inaccurately be called spiritualism\nas materialism. The real materialistic philosophy asserts that the\nphenomena of vital motion, like all other phenomena of motion, are\neffects or products of matter. The other opposite extreme,\nspiritualistic philosophy, asserts, on the contrary, that matter is\nthe product of motive force, and that all material forms are produced\nby free forces entirely independent of the matter itself. Thus,\naccording to the materialistic conception of the universe, matter\nprecedes motion or active force; according to the spiritualistic\nconception of the universe, on the contrary, active force or motion\nprecedes matter. Both views are dualistic, and we hold them both to be\nequally false. A contrast to both is presented in the _monistic_\nphilosophy, which can as little believe in force without matter as in\nmatter without force.\"\n\nIt is evident that if Haeckel limits himself and his opponents to\nmatter and force as the sole possible explanations of the universe, he\nmay truly say that matter is inconceivable without force and force\ninconceivable without matter. But the question arises, What is the\nmonistic power beyond these--the \"power behind nature\"? and as to the\ntrue nature of this the Jena philosopher gives us only vague\ngeneralities, though it is quite plain that he cannot admit a\nSpiritual Creator. Further, as to the absence of any spiritual element\nfrom the nature of man, he does not leave us in doubt as to what he\nmeans; for immediately after the above paragraph he informs us that\n\"the 'spirit' and the 'mind' of man are but forces which are\ninseparably connected with the material substance of our bodies. Just\nas the motive-power of our flesh is involved in the muscular\nform-element, so is the thinking force of our spirit involved in the\nform-element of the brain.\" In a note appended to the passage, he says\nthat monism \"conceives nature as one whole, and nowhere recognizes any\nbut mechanical causes.\" These assumptions as to man and nature\npervade the whole book, and of course greatly simplify the task of the\nwriter, as he does not require to account for the primary origin of\nnature, or for anything in man except his physical frame; and even\nthis he can regard as a thing altogether mechanical.\n\nIt is plain that we might here enter our dissent from Haeckel's\nmethod, for he requires us, before we can proceed a single step in the\nevolution of man, to assume many things which he cannot prove. What\nevidence is there, for example, of the possibility of the development\nof the rational and moral nature of man from the intelligence and the\ninstinct of the lower animals, or of the necessary dependence of the\nphenomena of mind on the structure of brain-cells? The evidence, so\nfar as it goes, seems to tend the other way. What proof is there of\nthe spontaneous evolution of living forms from inorganic matter?\nExperiment so far negatives the possibility of this. Even if we give\nHaeckel, to begin with, a single living cell or granule of protoplasm,\nwe know that this protoplasm must have been produced by the agency of\na living vegetable cell previously existing; and we have no proof\nthat it can be produced in any other way. Again, what particle of\nevidence have we that the atoms or the energy of an incandescent\nfire-mist have in them anything of the power or potency of life? We\nmust grant the monist all these postulates as pure matters of faith,\nbefore he can begin his demonstration; and, as none of them are\naxiomatic truths, it is evident that so far he is simply a believer in\nthe dogmas of a philosophic creed, and in this respect weak as other\nmen whom he affects to despise.\n\nWe may here place over against his authority that of another eminent\nphysiologist, of more philosophic mind, Dr. Carpenter, who has\nrecently said: \"As a physiologist I must fully recognize the fact that\nthe physical force exerted by the body of man is not generated _de\nnovo_ by his will, but is derived directly from the oxidation of the\nconstituents of his food. But, holding it as equally certain--because\nthe fact is capable of verification by every one as often as he\nchooses to make the experiment--that in the performance of every\nvolitional movement physical force is put in action, directed, and\ncontrolled by the individual personality or _ego_, I deem it as absurd\nand illogical to affirm that there is no place for a God in nature,\noriginating, directing, and controlling its forces by his will, as it\nwould be to assert that there is no place in man's body for his\nconscious mind.\"\n\nTaking Haeckel on his own ground, as above defined, we may next\ninquire as to the method which he employs in working out his argument.\nThis may be referred to three leading modes of treatment, which, as\nthey are somewhat diverse from those ordinarily familiar to logicians\nand are extensively used by evolutionists, deserve some illustration,\nmore especially as Haeckel is a master in their use.\n\nAn eminent French professor of the art of sleight-of-hand has defined\nthe leading principle of jugglers to be that of \"appearing and\ndisappearing things;\" and this is the best definition that occurs to\nme of one method of reasoning largely used by Haeckel, and of which we\nneed to be on our guard when we find him employing, as he does in\nalmost every page, such phrases as \"it cannot be doubted,\" \"we may\ntherefore assume,\" \"we may readily suppose,\" \"this afterward assumes\nor becomes,\" \"we may confidently assert,\" \"this developed directly,\"\nand the like, which in his usage are equivalent to the \"_Presto!_\" of\nthe conjurer, and which, while we are looking at one structure or\nanimal, enable him to persuade us that it has been suddenly\ntransformed into something else.\n\nIn tracing the genealogy of man he constantly employs this kind of\nsleight-of-hand in the most adroit manner. He is perhaps describing to\nus the embryo of a fish or an amphibian, and, as we become interested\nin the curious details, it is suddenly by some clever phrase\ntransformed into a reptile or a bird; and yet, without rubbing our\neyes and reflecting on the differences and difficulties which he\nneglects to state, we can scarcely doubt that it is the same animal,\nafter all.\n\nThe little lancelet, or _Amphioxus_ (see Fig. 1), of the European\nseas--a creature which was at one time thought to be a sea-snail, but\nis really more akin to fishes--forms his link of connection between\nour \"fish-ancestors\" and the invertebrate animals. So important is it\nin this respect that our author Waxes eloquent in exhorting us to\nregard it \"with special veneration\" as representing our \"earliest\nSilurian vertebrate ancestors,\" as being of \"our own flesh and blood,\"\nand as better worthy of being an object of \"devoutest reverence\" than\nthe \"worthless rabble of so-called 'saints.'\" In describing this\nanimal he takes pains to inform us that it is more different from an\nordinary fish than a fish is from a man. Yet, as he illustrates its\ncurious and unique structure, before we are aware, the lancelet is\ngone and a fish is in its place, and this fish with the potency to\nbecome a man in due time. Thus a creature intermediate in some\nrespects between fishes and mollusks, or between fishes and worms, but\nso far apart from either that it seems but to mark the width of the\ngap between them, becomes an easy stepping-stone from one to the\nother.\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 1.\n\n    The Lancelet (_Amphioxus_), the supposed earliest type of\n    vertebrate animal, and, according to Haeckel, the ancestor of\n    man. The figure is a section enlarged to twice the natural\n    size.\n\n    _a_, mouth;\n    _b_, anus;\n    _c_, gill-opening;\n    _d_, gill;\n    _e_, stomach;\n    _f_, liver;\n    _g_, intestine;\n    _h_, gill-cavity;\n    _i_, notochord, or rudimentary back-bone;\n    _k_, _l_, _m_, _n_, _o_, arteries and veins.]\n\nIn like manner, the ascidians, or sea-squirts--mollusks of low grade,\nor, as Haeckel prefers to regard them, allied to worms--are most\nremote in almost every respect from the vertebrates. But in the young\nstate of some of these creatures, and in the adult condition of one\nanimal referred to this group (_Appendicularia_), they have a sort of\nswimming tail, which is stiffened by a rod of cartilage to enable it\nto perform its function, and which for a time gives them a certain\nresemblance to the lancelet or to embryo fishes; and this usually\ntemporary contrivance--curious as an imitative adaptation, but of no\nother significance--becomes, by the art of \"appearing and\ndisappearing,\" a rudimentary backbone, and enables us at once to\nrecognize in the young ascidian an embryo man.\n\nA second method characteristic of the book, and furnishing, indeed,\nthe main basis of its argument, is that of considering analogous\nprocesses as identical, without regard to the difference of the\nconditions under which they may be carried on. The great leading use\nof this argument is in inducing us to regard the development of the\nindividual animal as the precise equivalent of the series of changes\nby which the species was developed in the course of geological time.\nThese two kinds of development are distinguished by appropriate names.\n_Ontogenesis_ is the embryonic development of the individual animal,\nand is, of course, a short process, depending on the production of a\ngerm by a parent animal or parent pair, and the further growth of this\ngerm in connection more or less with the parent or with provision made\nby it. This is, of course, a fact open to observation and study,\nthough some of its processes are mysterious and yet involved in doubt\nand uncertainty. _Phylogenesis_ is the supposed development of a\nspecies in the course of geological time and by the intervention of\nlong series of species, each in its time distinct and composed of\nindividuals each going regularly through a genetic circle of its own.\n\nThe latter is a process not open to observation within the time at our\ncommand--purely hypothetical, therefore, and of which the possibility\nremains to be proved; while the causes on which it must depend are\nnecessarily altogether different from those at work in ontogenesis,\nand the conditions of a long series of different kinds of animals,\neach perfect in its kind, are equally dissimilar from those of an\nanimal passing through the regular stages from infancy to maturity.\nThe similarity, in some important respects, of ontogenesis to\nphylogenesis was inevitable, provided that animals were to be of\ndifferent grades of complexity, since the development of the\nindividual must necessarily be from a more simple to a more complex\ncondition. On any hypothesis, the parallelism between embryological\nfacts and the history of animals in geological time affords many\ninteresting and important coincidences. Yet it is perfectly obvious\nthat the causes and the conditions of these two successions cannot\nhave been the same. Further, when we consider that the embryo-cell\nwhich develops into one animal must necessarily be originally\ndistinct in its properties from that which develops into another kind\nof animal, even though no obvious difference appears to us, we have no\nground for supposing that the early stages of all animals are alike;\nand when we rigorously compare the development of any animal whatever\nwith the successive appearance of animals of the same or similar\ngroups in geological time, we find many things which do not\ncorrespond--not merely in the want of links which we might expect to\nfind, but in the more significant appearance, prematurely or\ninopportunely, of forms which we would not anticipate. Yet the main\nargument of Haeckel's book is the quiet assumption that anything found\nto occur in ontogenetic development must also have occurred in\nphylogenesis, while manifest difficulties are got rid of by assuming\natavisms and abnormalities.\n\nA third characteristic of the method of the book is the use of certain\nterms in peculiar senses, and as implying certain causes which are\ntaken for granted, though their efficacy and their mode of operation\nare unknown. The chief of the terms so employed are \"heredity\" and\n\"adaptation.\" \"Heredity\" is usually understood as expressing the\npower of permanent transmission of characters from parents to\noffspring, and in this aspect it expresses the constancy of specific\nforms; but, as used by Haeckel, it means the transmission by a parent\nof any exceptional characters which the individual may have\naccidentally assumed. \"Adaptation\" has usually been supposed to mean\nthe fitting of animals for their place in nature, however that came\nabout; as used by Haeckel, it imports the power of the individual\nanimal to adapt itself to changed conditions and to transmit these\nchanges to its offspring. Thus in this philosophy the rule is made the\nexception and the exception the rule by a skilful use of familiar\nterms in new senses; and heredity and adaptation are constantly\nparaded as if they were two potent divinities employed in constantly\nchanging and improving the face of nature.\n\nIt is scarcely too much to say that the conclusions of the book are\nreached almost solely by the application of the above-mentioned\npeculiar modes of reasoning to the vast store of facts at command of\nthe author, and that the reader who would test these conclusions by\nthe ordinary methods of judgment must be constantly on his guard.\nStill, it is not necessary to believe that Haeckel is an intentional\ndeceiver. Such fallacies are those which are especially fitted to\nmislead enthusiastic specialists, to be identified by them with proved\nresults of science, and to be held in an intolerant and dogmatic\nspirit.\n\nHaving thus noticed Haeckel's assumptions and his methods, we may next\nshortly consider the manner in which he proceeds to work out the\nphylogeny of man. Here he pursues a purely physiological method, only\noccasionally and slightly referring to geological facts. He takes as a\nfirst principle the law long ago formulated by Hunter, _Omne vivum ex\novo_--a law which modern research has amply confirmed, showing that\nevery animal, however complex, can be traced back to an egg, which in\nits simplest state is no more than a single cell, though this cell\nrequires to be fertilized by the addition of the contents of another\ndissimilar cell, produced either in another organ of the same\nindividual or in a distinct individual. This process of fertilization\nHaeckel seems to regard as unnecessary in the lowest forms of life;\nbut, though there are some simple animals in which it has not been\nrecognized, analogy would lead us to believe that in some form it is\nnecessary in all. Haekel's monistic view, however, requires that in\nthe lowest forms it should be absent and should have originated\nspontaneously, though how does not seem to be very clear, as the\nexplanation given of it by him amounts to little more than the\nstatement that it must have occurred. Still, as a \"dualistic\" process\nit is very significant with reference to the monistic theory.\n\nMuch space is, of course, devoted to the tracing of the special\ndevelopment or ontogenesis of man, and to the illustration of the fact\nthat in the earlier stages of this development the human embryo is\nscarcely distinguishable from that of lower animals. We may, indeed,\naffirm that all animals start from cells which, in so far as we can\nsee, are similar to each other, yet which must include potentially the\nvarious properties of the animals which spring from them. As we trace\nthem onward in their development, we see these differences manifesting\nthemselves. At first all pass, according to Haeckel, through a stage\nwhich he calls the \"gastrula,\" in which the whole body is represented\nby a sort of sac, the cavity of which is the stomach and the walls of\nwhich consist of two layers of cells. It should be stated, however,\nthat many eminent naturalists dissent from this view, and maintain\nthat even in the earliest stages material differences can be observed.\nIn this they are probably right, as even Haeckel has to admit some\ndegree of divergence from this all-embracing \"gastr\u00e6a\" theory.\nAdmitting, however, that such early similarity exists within certain\nlimits, we find that, as the embryo advances, it speedily begins to\nindicate whether it is to be a coral-animal, a snail, a worm, or a\nfish. Consequently, the physiologist who wishes to trace the\nresemblances leading to mammals and to man has to lop off one by one\nthe several branches which lead in other directions, and to follow\nthat which conducts by the most direct course to the type which he has\nin view. In this way Haeckel can show that the embryo _Homo sapiens_\nis in successive stages so like to the young of the fish, the reptile,\nthe bird, and the ordinary quadruped that he can produce for\ncomparison figures in which the cursory observer can detect scarcely\nany difference.\n\nAll this has long been known, and has been regarded as a wonderful\nevidence of the homology or unity of plan which pervades nature, and\nas constituting man the archetype of the animal kingdom--the highest\nrealization of a plan previously sketched by the Creator in many ruder\nand humbler forms. It also teaches that it is not so much in the mere\nbodily organism that we are to look for the distinguishing characters\nof humanity as in the higher rational and moral nature.\n\nBut Haeckel, like other evolutionists of the monistic and agnostic\nschools, goes far beyond this. The ontogeny, on the evidence of\nanalogy, as already explained, is nothing less than a miniature\nrepresentation of the phylogeny. Man must in the long ages of\ngeological time have arisen from a monad, just as the individual man\nhas in his life-history arisen from an embryo-cell, and the several\nstages through which the individual passes must be parallel to those\nin the history of the race. True, the supposed monad must have been\nwanting in all the conditions of origin, sexual fertilization,\nparental influence, and surroundings. There is no perceptible relation\nof cause and effect, any more than between the rotation of a\ncarriage-wheel and that of the earth on its axis. The analogy might\nprompt to inquiries as to common laws and similarities of operation,\nbut it proves nothing as to causation.\n\nIn default of such proof, Haeckel favors us with another analogy,\nderived from the science of language. All the Indo-European languages\nare believed to be descended from a common ancestral tongue, and this\nis analogous to the descent of all animals from one primitive species.\nBut unfortunately the languages in question are the expressions of the\nvoice and the thought of one and the same species. The individuals\nusing them are known historically to have descended by ordinary\ngeneration from a common source, and the connecting-links of the\nvarious dialects are unbroken. The analogy fails altogether in the\ncase of species succeeding each other in geological time, unless the\nvery thing to be proved is taken for granted in the outset.\n\nThe actual proof that a basis exists in nature for the doctrine of\nevolution founded on these analogies, might be threefold. _First._\nThere might be changes of the nature of phylogenesis going on under\nour own observation, and even a very few of these would be sufficient\nto give some show of probability. Elaborate attempts have been made to\nshow that variations, as existing in the more variable of our\ndomesticated species, lead in the direction of such changes; but the\nresults have been unsatisfactory, and our author scarcely condescends\nto notice this line of proof. He evidently regards the time over which\nhuman history has extended as too short to admit of this kind of\ndemonstration. _Secondly._ There might be in the existing system of\nnature such a close connection or continuous chain of species as might\nat least strengthen the argument from analogy; and undoubtedly there\nare many groups of closely allied species, or of races confounded with\ntrue specific types, which it might not be unreasonable to suppose of\ncommon origin. These are, however, scattered widely apart; and the\ncontrary fact of extensive gaps in the series is so frequent, that\nHaeckel is constantly under the necessity of supposing that multitudes\nof species, and even of larger groups, have perished just where it is\nmost important to his conclusion that they should have remained. This\nis, of course, unfortunate for the theory; but then, as Haeckel often\nremarks, \"we must suppose\" that the missing links once existed. But,\n_thirdly_, these gaps which now unhappily exist may be filled up by\nfossil animals; and if in the successive geological periods we could\ntrace the actual phylogeny of even a few groups of living creatures,\nwe might have the demonstration desired. But here again the gaps are\nso frequent and so serious that Haeckel scarcely attempts to use this\nargument further than by giving a short and somewhat imperfect summary\nof the geological succession in the beginning of his second volume. In\nthis he attempts to give a continuous series of the ancestors of man\nas developed in geological time; but, of twenty-one groups which he\narranges in order from the beginning of the Laurentian to the modern\nperiod, at least ten are not known at all as fossils, and others do\nnot belong, so far as known, to the ages to which he assigns them.\nThis necessity of manufacturing facts does not speak well for the\ntestimony of geology to the supposed phylogeny of man.\n\nIn point of fact, it cannot be disguised that, though it is possible\nto pick out some series of animal forms, like the horses and camels\nreferred to by some pal\u00e6ontologists, which simulate a genetic order,\nthe general testimony of pal\u00e6ontology is, on the whole, adverse to the\nordinary theories of evolution, whether applied to the vegetable or to\nthe animal kingdom. This the writer has elsewhere endeavored to show;\nbut he may refer here to the labors of Barrande, perhaps unrivalled in\nextent and accuracy, which show that in the leading forms of life in\nthe older geological formations the succession is not such as to\ncorrespond with any of the received theories of derivation.[2] Even\nevolutionists, when sufficiently candid, admit their case not proven\nby geological evidence. Gaudry, one of the best authorities on the\nTertiary mammalia, admits the impossibility of suggesting any possible\nderivation for some of the leading groups, and Saporta, Mivart, and Le\nConte fall back on periods of rapid or paroxysmal evolution scarcely\ndiffering from the idea of creation by law, or mediate creation, as it\nhas been termed.\n\nThus the utmost value which can be attached to Haeckel's argument from\nanalogy would be that it suggests a possibility that the processes\nwhich we see carried on in the evolution of the individual may, in the\nlaws which regulate them, be connected in some way more or less close\nwith those creative processes which on the wider field of geological\ntime have been concerned in the production of the multitudinous forms\nof animal life. That Haeckel's philosophy goes but a very little way\ntoward any understanding of such relations, and that our present\ninformation, even within the more limited scope of biological science,\nis too meagre to permit of safe generalization, will appear from the\nconsideration of a few facts taken here and there from the multitude\nemployed by him to illustrate the monistic theory.\n\nWhen we are told that a moner or an embryo-cell is the early stage of\nall animals alike, we naturally ask, Is it meant that all these cells\nare really similar, or is it only that they appear similar to us, and\nmay actually be as profoundly unlike as the animals which they are\ndestined to produce? To make this question more plain, let us take the\ncase as formally stated: \"From the weighty fact that the egg of the\nhuman being, like the egg of all other animals, is a simple cell, it\nmay be quite certainly inferred that a one-celled parent-form once\nexisted, from which all the many-celled animals, man included,\ndeveloped.\"\n\nNow, let us suppose that we have under our microscope a one-celled\nanimalcule quite as simple in structure as our supposed ancestor.\nAlong with this we may have on the same slide another cell, which is\nthe embryo of a worm, and a third, which is the embryo of a man. All\nthese, according to the hypothesis, are similar in appearance; so that\nwe can by no means guess which is destined to continue always an\nanimalcule, or which will become a worm or may develop into a poet or\na philosopher. Is it meant that the things are actually alike or only\napparently so? If they are really alike, then their destinies must\ndepend on external circumstances. Put either of them into a pond, and\nit will remain a monad. Put either of them into the ovary of a complex\nanimal, and it will develop into the likeness of that animal. But such\nsimilarity is altogether improbable, and it would destroy the argument\nof the evolutionist. In this case he would be hopelessly shut up to\nthe conclusion that \"hens were before eggs;\" and Haeckel elsewhere\ninforms us that the exactly opposite view is necessarily that of the\nmonistic evolutionist. Thus, though it may often be convenient to\nspeak of these three kinds of cells as if they were perfectly similar,\nthe method of \"disappearance\" has immediately to be resorted to, and\nthey are shown to be, in fact, quite dissimilar. There is, indeed,\nthe best ground to suppose that the one-celled animals and the\nembryo-cells referred to, have little in common except their general\nform. We know that the most minute cell must include a sufficient\nnumber of molecules of protoplasm to admit of great varieties of\npossible arrangement, and that these may be connected with most varied\npossibilities as to the action of forces. Further, the embryo-cell\nwhich is produced by a particular kind of animal, and whose\ndevelopment results in the reproduction of a similar animal, must\ncontain potentially the parts and structures which are evolved from\nit; and fact shows that this may be affirmed of both the embryo and\nthe sperm-cells where there are two sexes. Therefore it is in the\nhighest degree probable that the eggs of a worm and those of man,\nthough possibly alike to our coarse methods of investigation, are as\ndissimilar as the animals that result from them. If so, the \"egg may\nbe before the hen;\" but it is as difficult to imagine the spontaneous\nproduction of the egg which is potentially the hen as of the hen\nitself. Thus the similarity of the eggs and early embryos of animals\nof different grades is apparent only; and this fact, which embodies a\ngreat, and perhaps insoluble, mystery, invalidates the whole of\nHaeckel's reasoning on the alleged resemblances of different kinds of\nanimals in their early stages.\n\nA second difficulty arises from the fact that the simple embryo-cell\nof any of the higher animals rapidly produces various kinds of\nspecialized cells different in structure and appearance and capable of\nperforming different functions, whereas in the lower forms of life\nsuch cells may remain simple or may merely produce several similar\ncells little or not at all differentiated. This objection, whenever it\noccurs, Haeckel endeavors to turn by the assertion that a complex\nanimal is merely an aggregate of independent cells, each of which is a\nsort of individual. He thus tries to break up the integrity of the\ncomplex organism and to reduce it to a mere swarm of monads. He\ncompares the cells of an organism to the \"individuals of a savage\ncommunity,\" who, at first separate and all alike in their habits and\noccupations, at length organize themselves into a community and assume\ndifferent avocations. Single cells, he says, at first were alike, and\neach performed the same simple offices of all the others. \"At a later\nperiod isolated cells gathered into communities; groups of simple\ncells which had arisen from the continued division of a single cell\nremained together, and now began gradually to perform different\noffices of life.\"\n\nBut this is a mere vague analogy. It does not represent anything\nactually occurring in nature, except in the case of an embryo produced\nby some animal which already shows all the tissues which its embryo is\ndestined to reproduce. Thus it establishes no probability of the\nevolution of complex tissues from simple cells, and leaves altogether\nunexplained that wonderful process by which the embryo-cell not only\ndivides into many cells, but becomes developed into all the variety of\ndissimilar tissues evolved from the homogeneous egg; but evolved from\nit, as we naturally suppose, because of the fact that the egg\nrepresents potentially all these tissues as existing previously in the\nparent organism.\n\nBut if we are content to waive these objections or to accept the\nsolutions given of them by the \"appearance-and-disappearance\"\nargument, we still find that the phylogeny, unlike the ontogenesis, is\nfull of wide gaps only to be passed _per saltum_ or to be accounted\nfor by the disappearance of a vast number of connecting-links. Of\ncourse, it is easy to suppose that these intermediate forms have been\nlost through time and accident, but why this has happened to some\nrather than to others cannot be explained. In the phylogeny of man,\nfor example, what a vast hiatus yawns between the ascidian and the\nlancelet, and another between the lancelet and the lamprey! It is true\nthat the missing links may have consisted of animals little likely to\nbe preserved as fossils; but why, if they ever existed, do not some of\nthem remain in the modern seas? Again, when we have so many species of\napes and so many races of men, why can we find no trace, recent or\nfossil, of that \"missing link\" which we are told must have existed,\nthe \"ape-like men,\" known to Haeckel as the \"Alali,\" or speechless\nmen?\n\nA further question which should receive consideration from the monist\nschool is that very serious one, Why, if all is \"mechanical\" in the\ndevelopment and actions of living beings, should there be any progress\nwhatever? Ordinary people fail to understand why a world of mere dead\nmatter should not go on to all eternity obeying physical and chemical\nlaws without developing life; or why, if some low form of life were\nintroduced capable of reproducing simple one-celled organisms, it\nshould not go on doing so.\n\nFurther, even if some chance deviations should occur, we fail to\nperceive why these should go on in a definite manner producing not\nonly the most complex machines, but many kinds of such machines--on\ndifferent plans, but each perfect in its way. Haeckel is never weary\nof telling us that to monists organisms are mere machines. Even his\nown mental work is merely the grinding of a cerebral machine. But he\nseems not to perceive that to such a philosophy the homely argument\nwhich Paley derived from the structure of a watch would be fatal: \"The\nquestion is whether machines (which monists consider all animals to\nbe, including themselves) infinitely more complicated than watches\ncould come into existence without design somewhere\"[3]--that is, by\nmere chance. Common sense is not likely to admit that this is\npossible.\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 2.\n\n    Impression of five fingers and five toes of an Amphibian of\n    the Lower Carboniferous Age, from the lowest Carboniferous\n    beds in Nova Scotia--an evidence of the fact that the number\n    five was already selected for the hands and feet of the\n    earliest known land vertebrates, and that the decimal system\n    of notation, with all that it involves to man, was determined\n    in the Pal\u00e6ozoic Age. The upper figure natural size, the lower\n    reduced.]\n\nThe difficulties above referred to relate to the introduction of life\nand of new species on the monistic view. Others might be referred to\nin connection with the production of new organs. An illustration is\nafforded, among others, by the discussion of the introduction of the\nfive fingers and toes of man, which appear to descend to us\nunchanged from the amphibians or batrachians of the Carboniferous\nperiod. In this ancient age of the earth's geological history, feet\nwith five toes appear in numerous species of reptilians of various\ngrades (Fig. 2). They are preceded by no other vertebrates than\nfishes, and these have numerous fin-rays instead of toes. There are no\nproperly transitional forms either fossil or recent. How were the\nfive-fingered limbs acquired in this abrupt way? Why were they five\nrather than any other number? Why, when once introduced, have they\ncontinued unchanged up to the present day? Haeckel's answer is a\ncurious example of his method: \"The great significance of the five\ndigits depends on the fact that this number has been transmitted from\nthe Amphibia to all higher vertebrates. It would be impossible to\ndiscover any reason why in the lowest Amphibia, as well as in reptiles\nand in higher vertebrates up to man, there should always originally be\nfive digits on each of the anterior and posterior limbs, if we denied\nthat heredity from a common five-fingered parent-form is the efficient\ncause of this phenomenon; heredity can alone account for it. In many\nAmphibia certainly, as well as in many higher vertebrates, we find\nless than five digits. But in all these cases it can be shown that\nseparate digits have retrograded, and have finally been completely\nlost. The causes which affected the development of the five-fingered\nfoot of the higher vertebrates in this amphibian form from the\nmany-fingered foot (or properly fin), must certainly be found in the\nadaptation to the totally altered functions which the limbs had to\ndischarge during the transition from an exclusively aquatic life to\none which was partially terrestrial. While the many-fingered fins of\nthe fish had previously served almost exclusively to propel the body\nthrough the water, they had now also to afford support to the animal\nwhen creeping on the land. This effected a modification both of the\nskeleton and of the muscles of the limbs. The number of fin-rays was\ngradually lessened, and was finally reduced to five. These five\nremaining rays were, however, developed more vigorously. The soft\ncartilaginous rays became hard bones. The rest of the skeleton also\nbecame considerably more firm. The movements of the body became not\nonly more vigorous, but also more varied;\" and the paragraph proceeds\nto state other ameliorations of muscular and nervous system supposed\nto be related to or caused by the improvement of the limbs.\n\nIt will be observed that in the above extract, under the formula \"the\ncauses which affected the development of the five-fingered foot ...\nmust certainly be found,\" all that other men would regard as demanding\nproof is quietly assumed, and the animal grows before our eyes from a\nfish to a reptile as under the wand of a conjurer. Further, the\ntransmission of the five toes is attributed to heredity or unchanged\nreproduction, but this, of course, gives no explanation of the\noriginal formation of the structure, nor of the causes which prevented\nheredity from applying to the fishes which became amphibians and\nacquired five toes, or to the amphibians which faithfully transmitted\ntheir five toes, but not their other characteristics.\n\nIt is perhaps scarcely profitable to follow further the criticism of\nthis extraordinary book. It may be necessary, however, to repeat that\nit contains clear, and in the main accurate, sketches of the\nembryology of a number of animals, only slightly colored by the\ntendency to minimize differences. It may also be necessary to say that\nin criticising Haeckel we take him on his own ground--that of a\nmonist--and have no special reference to those many phases which the\nphilosophy of evolution assumes in the minds of other naturalists,\nmany of whom accept it only partially or as a form of mediate creation\nmore or less reconcilable with theism. To these more moderate views no\nreference has been made, though there can be no doubt that many of\nthem are quite as assailable as the position of Haeckel in point of\nargument. It may also be observed that Haeckel's argument is almost\nexclusively biological and confined to the animal kingdom, and to the\nspecial line of descent attributed to man. The monistic hypothesis\nbecomes, as already stated, still less tenable when tested by the\nfacts of pal\u00e6ontology. Hence most of the pal\u00e6ontologists who favor\nevolution appear to shrink from the extreme position of Haeckel.\nGaudry, one of the ablest of this school, in his recent work on the\ndevelopment of the Mammalia, candidly admits the multitude of facts\nfor which derivation will not account, and perceives in the grand\nsuccession of animals in time the evidence of a wise and far-reaching\ncreative plan, concluding with the words: \"We may still leave out of\nthe question the processes by which the Author of the world has\nproduced the changes of which pal\u00e6ontology presents the picture.\" In\nlike manner, the Count de Saporta in his _World of Plants_ closes his\nsummary of the periods of vegetation with the words: \"But if we ascend\nfrom one phenomenon to another, beyond the sphere of contingent and\nchangeable appearance, we find ourselves arrested by a Being\nunchangeable and supreme, the first expression and absolute cause of\nall existence, in whom diversity unites with unity, an eternal\nproblem, insoluble to science, but ever present to the human\nconsciousness. Here we reach the true source of the idea of religion,\nand there presents itself distinctly to the mind that conception to\nwhich we apply instinctively the name of God.\"\n\nThus these evolutionists, like many others in this country and in\nEngland, find a _modus vivendi_ between evolution and theism. They\nhave committed themselves to an interpretation of nature which may\nprove fanciful and evanescent, and which certainly up to this time\nremains an hypothesis, ingenious and captivating, but not fortified by\nthe evidence of facts. But in doing so they are not prepared to\naccept the purely mechanical creed of the monist, or to separate\nthemselves from those ideas of morality, of religion, and of sonship\nto God which have hitherto been the brightest gems in the crown of man\nas the lord of this lower world. Whether they can maintain this\nposition against the monists, and whether they will be able in the end\nto retain any practical form of religion along with the doctrine of\nthe derivation of man from the lower animals, remains to be seen.\nPossibly before these questions come to a final issue the philosophy\nof evolution may itself have been \"modified\" or have given place to\nsome new phase of thought.\n\nOne curious point in this connection, to which little attention has\nbeen given by evolutionists, is that to which Herbert Spencer has\ngiven the name of \"direct equilibration,\" though he is sufficiently\nwise not to invite too much attention to it. This is the balance of\nparts and forces within the organism itself. The organism is a complex\nmachine; and if its parts have been put together by chance and are\ndrifting onward in the path of evolution, there must of necessity be a\ncontinual struggle going on between the different organs and\nfunctions, each tending to swallow up the others and each struggling\nfor its own existence. This resolution of the body of each animal into\na house divided against itself is at first sight so revolting to\ncommon sense and right feeling that few like to contemplate it. Roux\nand other recent writers, however, especially in Germany, have brought\nit into prominence, and it is no doubt a necessary consequence of the\nevolutionary idea, though altogether at variance with the theory of\nintelligent design, which supposes the animal machine put together\nwith care and for a purpose, and properly adjusted in all its parts.\nOn the hypothesis of evolution, the animal thus ceases to be, in the\nproper sense of the term, even a machine, and becomes a mere mass of\nconflicting parts depending for any constancy they may have on a\nchance balancing of hostile forces, without any compelling power to\nbring them together at first, or any means to bind them to joint\naction in the system. The more such a doctrine is considered, the more\ndifficult does it seem to believe in the possibility of its truth.\nEvolution has already reduced the cosmos into chaos, the harmony of\nthe universe into discord; but it seems past belief to introduce this\ninto the microcosm itself, and to see nothing in its exquisite\nadjustments except the momentary equilibrium of a well-balanced fight.\nGeological history also adds to the absurdity of such a view by\nshowing the marvellous permanence of many forms of life which have\ncontinued to perpetuate themselves through almost immeasurable ages\nwithout material changes, thus proving unanswerably the perfect\nadjustment of their parts.\n\nViewed rightly, this direct equilibration of the parts of the animal\nseems to throw the greatest possible doubt on the capacity of any form\nof evolution to produce new species. It is certain, from the facts\ncollected by Mr. Darwin himself in his work on animals under\ndomestication, that when man disturbs the balance of any organism by\nchanging in any way the relations of its parts, he introduces elements\nof instability and weakness, which, despite the efforts of nature to\ncorrect the evils resulting, speedily lead to degeneracy, infertility,\nand extinction. Mr. T. Warren O'Neil of Philadelphia has recently\nargued this point with much ability,[4] and has shown, on the\ntestimony of Darwin's facts, that unless \"natural selection\" is a\nmuch more skilful breeder than man, and possesses some secrets not yet\ndiscovered by us, the effects of this imaginary power would lead, not\nto the production of new species, but merely to the extinction of\nthose already existing. In short, all the evidence goes to show\nthat--so beautifully balanced are the parts of the organism--any\nexcess or deficiency in any of them, when artificially or accidentally\nintroduced, brings in elements not only of instability, but of decay\nand destruction. This subject is deserving of a more full treatment\nthan it can receive here, but enough has been said to show that in\nthis evolutionists have unwittingly furnished us with a new\nconfirmation of the theory of intelligent design.\n\nIn some places there are in Haeckel's book touches of a grim humor\nwhich are not without interest, as showing the subjective side of the\nmonistic theory and illustrating the attitude of its professors to\nthings held sacred by other men. For example, the following is the\nintroduction to the chapter headed \"From the Primitive Worm to the\nSkulled Animal,\" and which has for its motto the lines of Goethe\nbeginning:\n\n     \"Not like the gods am I! full well I know;\n     But like the worms which in the dust must go.\"\n\n\"Both in prose and poetry man is very often compared to a worm; 'a\nmiserable worm,' 'a poor worm,' are common and almost compassionate\nphrases. If we cannot detect any deep phylogenetic reference in this\nzoological metaphor, we might at least safely assert that it contains\nan unconscious comparison with a low condition of animal development\nwhich is interesting in its bearing on the pedigree of the human\nrace.\"\n\nIf Haeckel were well read in Scripture, he might have quoted here the\nmelancholy confession of the man of Uz: \"I have said to the worm, Thou\nart my mother and my sister.\" But, though Job, like the German\nprofessor, could humbly say to the worm, \"Thou art my mother,\" he\ncould still hold fast his integrity and believe in the fatherhood of\nGod.\n\nThe moral bearing of monism is further illustrated by the following\nextract, which refers to a more advanced step of the evolution--that\nfrom the ape to man--and which shows the honest pride of the worthy\nprofessor in his humble parentage: \"Just as most people prefer to\ntrace their pedigree from a decayed baron, or if possible from a\ncelebrated prince, rather than from an unknown humble peasant, so they\nprefer seeing the progenitor of the human race in an Adam degraded by\nthe fall, rather than in an ape capable of higher development and\nprogress. It is a matter of taste, and such genealogical preferences\ndo not, therefore, admit of discussion. It is more to my individual\ntaste to be the more highly-developed descendant of an ape, who in the\nstruggle for existence had developed progressively from lower mammals\nas they from still lower vertebrates, than the degraded descendant of\nan Adam, Godlike but debased by the fall, who was formed from a clod\nof earth, and of an Eve created from a rib of Adam. As regards the\ncelebrated 'rib,' I must here expressly add, as a supplement to the\nhistory of the development of the skeleton, that the number of ribs is\nthe same in man and in woman.[5] In the latter as well as in the\nformer the ribs originate from the skin-fibrous layer, and are to be\nregarded phylogenetically as lower or ventral vertebr\u00e6.\"[6]\n\nThere is no accounting for tastes, yet we may be pardoned for\nretaining some preference for the first link of the old Jewish\ngenealogical table: \"Which was the son of Adam, which was the son of\nGod.\" As to the \"debasement\" of the fall, it is to be feared that the\naboriginal ape would object to bearing the blame of existing human\niniquities as having arisen from any improvement in his nature and\nhabits; and it is scarcely fair to speak of Adam as \"formed from a\n_clod_ of earth,\" which is not precisely in accordance with the\nrecord. As to the \"rib,\" which seems so offensive to Haeckel, one\nwould have thought that he would, as an evolutionist, have had some\nfellow-feeling in this with the writer of Genesis. The origin of sexes\nis one of the acknowledged difficulties of the hypothesis, and, using\nhis method, we might surely \"assume,\" or even \"confidently assert,\"\nthe possibility that, in some early stage of the development, the\nunfinished vertebral arches of the \"skin-fibrous layer\" might have\nproduced a new individual by a process of budding or gemmation. Quite\nas remarkable suppositions are contained in some parts of his own\nvolumes, without any special divine power for rendering them\npracticable. Further, if only an individual man originated in the\nfirst instance, and if he were not provided with a suitable spouse, he\nmight have intermarried with the unimproved anthropoids, and the\nresults of the evolution would have been lost. Such considerations\nshould have weighed with Haeckel in inducing him to speak more\nrespectfully of Adam's rib, especially in view of the fact that in\ndealing with the hard question of human origin the author of Genesis\nhad not the benefit of the researches of Baer and Haeckel. He had, no\ndoubt, the advantage of a firm faith in the reality of that Creative\nWill which the monistic prophets of the nineteenth century have\nbanished from their calculations. Were Haeckel not a monist, he might\nalso be reminded of that grand doctrine of the lordship and\nsuperiority of man based on the fact that there was no \"help meet for\nhim;\" and the foundation of the most sacred bond of human society on\nthe saying of the first man: \"This is now bone of my bones, and flesh\nof my flesh.\" But monists probably attach little value to such ideas.\n\nIt may be proper to add here that in his references to Adam, Haeckel\nbetrays a weakness not unusual with his school, in putting a false\ngloss on the old record of Genesis. The statement that man was formed\nfrom the dust of the ground implies no more than the production of his\nbody from the common materials employed in the construction of other\nanimals; this also in contradistinction from the higher nature derived\nfrom the inbreathing or inspiration of God. The precise nature of the\nmethod by which man was made or created is not stated by the author of\nGenesis. Further, it would have been as easy for Divine Power to\ncreate a pair as an individual. If this was not done, and if after the\nlesson of superiority taught by the inspection of lower animals, and\nthe lesson of language taught by naming them, the first man in his\n\"deep sleep\" is conscious of the removal of a portion of his own\nflesh, and then on awaking has the woman \"brought\" to him, all this is\nto teach a lesson not to be otherwise learned. The Mosaic record is\nthus perfectly consistent with itself and with its own doctrine of\ncreation by Almighty Power.\n\nI have quoted the above passages as examples of the more jocose vein\nof the Jena physiologist; but they constitute also a serious\nrevelation of the influence of his philosophy on his own mind and\nheart, in lowering both to a cold, mechanical, and unsympathetic view\nof man and nature. This is especially serious when we remember how\nearnestly in a recent address he advocated the teaching of the methods\nand results of this book, as those which, in the present state of\nknowledge, should supersede the Bible in our schools. We may well say,\nwith his great opponent on that occasion, that if such doctrines\nshould be proved to be true, the teaching of them might become a\nnecessity, but one that would bring us face to face with the darkest\nand most dangerous moral problem that has ever beset humanity; and\nthat so long as they remain unproved it is both unwise and criminal to\npropagate them among the mass of men as conclusions which have been\ndemonstrated by science.\n\nIn conclusion, we may notice shortly a few of the consequences of the\nmonistic evolution as held by Haeckel and others. Doctrines are\nperhaps not to be judged by the consequences--at least, by the\nimmediate consequences--of their acceptance. Yet if their logical\nconsequences are such as to introduce confusion into our higher ideas\nand sentiments, we have reason to hesitate as to their adoption--if on\nno other ground, because we ourselves are a part of nature and should\nbe in harmony with any true explanation of it.\n\nWe may affirm in this connection that agnostic evolution reduces all\nour science to mere evanescent anthropomorphic fancies; so that, like\na parasite, it first supports itself on the strength and substance of\nscience, and then strangles it to death. Physical science is a product\nof our thinking as to external things. If, therefore, the thinking\nbrain and the external nature which it studies are both of them the\nfortuitous products of blind tendencies in a process of continuous\nflux and vicissitude, our science can embody no elements of eternal\ntruth nor any conceptions as to the plans of a higher creative reason.\nIn that case it is absolutely worthless, and a pure waste of time and\nenergy, except in so far as it may yield any temporary material\nadvantages.\n\nFurther, the agnostic evolution thus leaves us as orphans in the midst\nof a cold and insensate nature. We are no longer dwellers in our\nFather's house, beautiful and fitted for us, but are thrown into the\nmidst of a hideous conflict of dead forces, in which we must finally\nperish and be annihilated. In a struggle so hopeless it is a mere\nmockery to tell us that in millions of years something better may\ncome out of it, for we know that this will be of no avail to us, and\nwe feel that it is impossible. Thus the agnostic philosophy, if it be\nonce accepted as true, seriously raises the question whether life is\nworth living.\n\nBut if worth living, then it must be for the immediate and selfish\ngratification of our desires and passions; and since we are deprived\nof God and conscience, and right and wrong, and future reward or\npunishment, and all men are alike in this position, there can be\nnothing left for us but to rend and fight with our fellows for such\nshare of good as may fall to us in the deadly struggle, that we may\nreach such happiness as may be possible for us in such an existence,\nere we drift into nonentity. Here, again, we are told that the\nstruggle will some time lead to the survival of the fittest, and that\nthe fittest may inaugurate a new and better reign of peace. But the\nworld has already lasted countless ages without arriving at this\nresult. It cannot concern me individually, any more than what happens\nto-day concerns the extinct ichthyosaur or the megatherium. All that\nis left for me is to \"eat and drink, for to-morrow I die.\"\n\nIf any one thinks that this is an exaggerated picture of the effects\nof agnostic evolution as applied to man, I may refer him to the study\nof Herbert Spencer's recent work _The Data of Ethics_, which has\ncontributed very much to open the eyes of thoughtful men to the depth\nof spiritual, moral, and even social and political, ruin into which we\nshall drift under the guidance of this philosophy. In this work the\ndata of ethics are reduced to the one consideration of what is\n\"pleasurable\" to ourselves and others, and it is admitted that our\nideas of conscience, duty, and even of social obligation, are merely\nfictions of temporary use until the time shall come when what is\npleasurable to ourselves shall coincide with what is pleasurable to\nothers; and this is to come, not out of the love of God and the\ninfluence of his Spirit, but out of the blind struggle of opposing\ninterests. It has been well said that this system of morals--if it can\nbe dignified with such a name--is inferior, logically and practically,\nnot only to the \"supernatural ethics\" which it boastfully professes to\nreplace, but to the ethics of Aristotle and Cicero, and that \"it will\nnot supersede revelation, nor is it likely to displace the old data of\nethics, whether Greek, Roman, or English.\" Independently of its\nantagonism to theism and Christianity, it is foredoomed by the common\nsense and the right feeling of even imperfect human nature.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[2] Those who wish to understand the real bearings of pal\u00e6ontology on\nevolution should study Barrande's _Memoirs on the Silurian Trilobites,\nCephalopods, and Brachiopods_.\n\n[3] Beckett, _Origin of the Laws of Nature_.\n\n[4] _Refutation of Darwinism_, Philadelphia, 1880.\n\n[5] It was scarcely necessary to refer to this childish objection\nunless the individual skeleton of Adam had been in question.\n\n[6] Rather, \"vertebral arches.\"\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE III.\n\nEVOLUTION AS TESTED BY THE RECORDS OF THE ROCKS.\n\n\nHaving discussed those vague analogies and fanciful pedigrees by which\nit has been attempted to drag the science of Biology into the service\nof Agnostic Evolution, we may now turn to another science--that of the\nearth--and inquire how far it justifies us in affirming the\nspontaneous evolution of plants and animals in the progress of\ngeological time. This subject is one which would require a lengthy\ntreatise for its full development, and it cannot be pursued in the\nmost satisfactory way without much previous knowledge of geological\nfacts and principles, and of the classification of animals and plants.\nOn the present occasion it must therefore be treated in the most\ngeneral possible manner, and with reference merely to the results\nwhich have been reached. There is the more excuse for this mode of\ntreatment that, in works already published and widely circulated,[7]\nI have endeavored to present its details in a popular form to general\nreaders.\n\nGeological investigation has disclosed a great series of stratified\nrocks composing the crust of the earth, and formed at successive\ntimes, chiefly by the agency of water. These can be arranged in\nchronological order; and, so arranged, they constitute the physical\nmonuments of the earth's history. We must here take for granted, on\nthe testimony of geology, that the accumulation of this series of\ndeposits has extended over a vast lapse of time, and that the\nsuccessive formations contain remains of animals and plants from which\nwe can learn much as to the succession of life on the earth. Without\nentering into geological details, it may be sufficient to present in\ntabular form (see p. 107) the grand series of formations, with the\ngeneral history of life as ascertained from them.\n\n  TABULAR VIEW OF GEOLOGICAL PERIODS AND OF LIFE-EPOCHS.\n\n  +---------------------------------------+---------------+--------------+\n  |                                       |    ANIMAL     |  VEGETABLE   |\n  |       GEOLOGICAL PERIODS.             |     LIFE.     |    LIFE.     |\n  +---------------------------------------+---------------+--------------+\n  |                                       |               |              |\n  | CAINOZOIC or NEOZOIC.                 |               |              |\n  |                                       | Age of _Man_  |              |\n  | { _Post-       { Recent.              | and _Modern   |              |\n  | {  Tertiary_   { Post-Glacial.        |  Mammals_.    |              |\n  | {  or _Modern_                        |               |   Age of     |\n  | {                                     |Age of _Extinct|_Angiosperms_ |\n  | {              { Pleistocene, or      |   Mammals_.   | and _Palms_. |\n  | { _Tertiary_   { Pliocene.            |  (Earliest    |              |\n  | {              { Miocene.             |  Placental    |              |\n  | {              { Eocene.              |  Mammals.)    |              |\n  |                                       |               |              |\n  +---------------------------------------+---------------+--------------+\n  |                                       |               |              |\n  | MESOZOIC.                             |               |              |\n  | {              { Upper,               |               |  (Earliest   |\n  | { _Cretaceous_ { Lower, or Neocomian. |               |   Modern     |\n  | {                                     |    Age of     |   Trees.)    |\n  | {                                     |  _Reptiles_   |              |\n  | {              { Oolite.              | and _Birds_.  |              |\n  | { _Jurassic_   { Lias.                |               |    Age of    |\n  | {                                     |               | _Cycads_ and |\n  | {              { Upper,               |  (Earliest    |   _Pines_.   |\n  | { _Triassic_   { Middle, or           |   Marsupial   |              |\n  | {              {  Muschelkalk.        |   Mammals.)   |              |\n  | {              { Lower.               |               |              |\n  |                                       |               |              |\n  +---------------------------------------+---------------+--------------+\n  |                                       |               |              |\n  | PAL\u00c6OZOIC.                            |               |              |\n  | {              { Upper,               |               |              |\n  | {              { Middle, or Magnesian |               |              |\n  | { _Permian_    {  Limestone.          |(Earliest True |              |\n  | {              { Lower.               |  Reptiles.)   |              |\n  | {                                     |               |              |\n  | {              { Upper Coal-Formation.|               |              |\n  | { _Carboni-    { Coal-Formation.      |               |              |\n  | {  ferous_     { Carboniferous        |               |              |\n  | {              {  Limestone.          |               |              |\n  | {              { Lower Coal-Formation.|    Age of     |    Age of    |\n  | {                                     | _Amphibians_  |_Acrogens_ and|\n  | { _Erian_      { Upper.               | and _Fishes_. |_Gymnosperms_.|\n  | {   or         { Middle.              |               |              |\n  | { _Devonian_   { Lower.               |               |              |\n  | {                                     |               |              |\n  | {              { Upper,               |               |              |\n  | { _Silurian_   { Lower, or            |    Age of     |              |\n  | {              {  Siluro-Cambrian.    |  _Mollusks_,  |  (Earliest   |\n  | {                                     | _Corals_ and  |Land Plants.) |\n  | {              { Upper.               |_Crustaceans_. |Age of _Alg\u00e6_.|\n  | { _Cambrian_   { Middle.              |               |              |\n  | {              { Lower.               |               |              |\n  |                                       |               |              |\n  +---------------------------------------+---------------+--------------+\n  |                                       |               |              |\n  | EOZOIC.                               |               |              |\n  | { _Huronian_   { Upper.               |               |              |\n  | {              { Lower.               |    Age of     | Indications  |\n  | {                                     |  _Protozoa_.  | of Plants    |\n  | {              { Upper, or Norian.    | (First Animal |    not       |\n  | { _Laurentian_ { Middle,              |   Remains.)   | determinable.|\n  | {              { Lower, or Bojian.    |               |              |\n  |                                       |               |              |\n  +---------------------------------------+---------------+--------------+\n\nIn the oldest rocks known to geologists--those of the Eozoic\ntime--some indications of the presence of life are found. Great beds\nof limestone are contained in these formations, vast quantities of\ncarbon in the form of graphite, and thick beds of iron-ore. All these\nare known, from their mode of occurrence in later deposits, to be\nresults, direct or indirect, of the agency of life; and if they\nafforded no traces of organic forms, still their chemical character\nwould convey a presumption of their organic origin. But additional\nevidence has been obtained in the presence of certain remarkable\nlaminated forms penetrated by microscopic tubes and canals, and which\nare supposed to be the remains of the calcareous skeletons of\nhumbly-organized animals akin to the simplest of those now living in\nthe sea. Such animals--little more than masses of living animal\njelly--now abound in the waters, and protect themselves by secreting\ncalcareous skeletons, often complex and beautiful, and penetrated by\npores, through which the soft animal within can send forth minute\nthread-like extensions of its body, which serve instead of limbs. The\nLaurentian fossil known as _Eozoon Canadense_ (see Fig. 3) may have\nbeen the skeleton of such a lowly-organized animal; and if so, it is\nthe oldest living thing that we know. But if really the skeleton or\ncovering of such an animal, _Eozoon_ is larger than any of its\nsuccessors, and quite as complex as any of them. There is nothing to\nshow that it could have originated from dead matter by any\nspontaneous action, any more than its modern representatives could do\nso. There is no evidence of its progress by evolution into any higher\nform, and the group of animals to which it belongs has continued to\ninhabit the ocean throughout geological time without any perceptible\nadvance in rank or complexity of structure. If, then, we admit the\nanimal nature of this earliest fossil, we can derive from it no\nevidence of monistic evolution; and if we deny its animal nature, we\nare confronted with a still graver difficulty in the next succeeding\nformations.\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 3.\n\n    1. Small specimen of _Eozoon Canadense_, weathered out from\n    the containing rock, and showing its laminated structure.\n\n    2. Casts of irregular or acervaline chambers of upper part\n    (magnified).\n\n    3. Surface of a cast of a flat chamber, showing its\n    constituent chamberlets (magnified).\n\n    4. Section of casts of flat chambers (magnified). From the\n    Laurentian of Canada.]\n\nBetween the rocks which contain _Eozoon_ and the next in which we find\nany abundant remains of life, there is a gap in geological history,\neither destitute of evidence of life or showing nothing materially in\nadvance of _Eozoon_. In the Cambrian Age, however, we obtain a vast\nand varied accession of life. Here we find evidence that the sea\nswarmed with living creatures near akin to those which still inhabit\nit, and nearly as varied. Referring merely to leading groups, we have\nhere the soft shellfishes and the worms, the ordinary shellfishes, the\nsea-stars, and the corals, with the sponges. In short, had we been\nable to drop our dredge into the Cambrian or Lower Silurian ocean, we\nshould have brought up representatives of all the leading types of\ninvertebrate life that exist in the modern seas--different, it is\ntrue, in details of structure from those now existing, but constructed\non the same principles and filling the same places in nature.\n\nIf we inquire as to the history of this swarming marine life of the\nearly Pal\u00e6ozoic, we find that its several species, after enduring for\na longer or a shorter time, one by one became extinct and were\nreplaced by others belonging to the same groups. Thus there is in each\ngreat group a succession of new forms, distinct as species, but not\nperceptibly elevated in the scale of being. In many cases, indeed, the\nreverse seems to be the case; for it is not unusual to find the\nsuccessive dynasties of life in any one family manifesting degradation\nrather than elevation. New, and sometimes higher, forms, it is true,\nappear in the progress of time, but it is impossible, except by\nviolent suppositions, to connect them genetically with any\npredecessors. The succession throughout the Pal\u00e6ozoic presents the\nappearance rather of the unchanged persistence of each group under a\nsuccession of specific forms, and the introduction from time to time\nof new groups, as if to replace others which were in process of decay\nand disappearance.\n\nIn the later half of the Pal\u00e6ozoic we find a number of higher forms\nbreaking upon us with the same apparent suddenness as in the case of\nthe early Cambrian animals. Fishes appear, and soon abound in a great\nvariety of species, representing types of no mean rank, but,\nsingularly enough, belonging, in many cases, to groups now very rare;\nwhile the commoner tribes of modern fish do not appear. On the land,\nbatrachian reptiles now abound, some of them very high in the\nsub-class to which they belong. Scorpions, spiders, insects, and\nmillipedes appear, as well as land-snails, and this not in one\nlocality only, but over the whole northern hemisphere. At the same\ntime, the land appears clothed with an exuberant vegetation--not of\nthe lowest types nor of the highest, but of intermediate forms, such\nas those of the pines, the club-mosses, and the ferns, all of which\nattained in those days to magnitudes and numbers of species\nunsurpassed, and in some cases unequalled, in the modern world. Nor do\nthey show any signs of an unformed or imperfect state. Their seeds\nand spores, their fruits and spore-cases, are as elaborately\nconstructed, the tissues and forms of their stems and leaves as\ndelicate and beautiful, as in any modern plants. So with the compound\neyes and filmy wings of insects, the teeth, bones, and scales of\nbatrachians and fishes; all are as perfectly finished, and many quite\nas complex and elegant, as in the animals of the present day (Figure\n4).\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 4.\n\n    Restoration (by _G. F. Matthew_) of a Trilobite\n    (_Paradoxides_) from the Lower Cambrian, as an evidence of the\n    existence of crustacean animals of high type and great\n    complexity in this early age. If such animals were evolved\n    from Protozoa by slow and gradual changes, the time required\n    would be greater than that which intervened between the\n    Cambrian period and the present time.]\n\nThis wonderful Pal\u00e6ozoic Age was, however, but a temporary state of\nthe earth. It passed away, and was replaced by the Mesozoic,\nemphatically the reign of reptiles, when animals of that type attained\nto colossal magnitude, to variety of function and structure, to\ndiversity of habitat in sea and on land, altogether unexampled in\ntheir degraded descendants of modern times. Sea-lizards of gigantic\nsize swarmed everywhere in the waters. On land, huge quadrupeds, like\nAtlantosaurus and Iguanodon and Megalosaurus, greatly exceeded the\nelephants of later times; while winged reptiles--some of them of small\nsize, others with wings twenty feet in expanse--flitted in the air.\nStrangely enough, with these reptilian lords appeared a few small and\nlowly mammals, forerunners of the coming age. Birds also make their\nappearance, and at the close of the period forests of broad-leaved\ntrees altogether different from those of the Pal\u00e6ozoic Age, and\nresembling those of our modern woods, appear for the first time over\ngreat portions of the northern hemisphere.\n\nThe Cainozoic, or Tertiary, is the age of mammals and of man. In it\nthe great reptilian tyrants of the Mesozoic disappear, and are\nreplaced on land and sea by mammals or beasts of the same orders with\nthose now living, though differing as to genera and species (see Fig.\n5). So greatly, indeed, did mammalian life abound in this period that\nin the middle part of the Tertiary most of the leading groups were\nrepresented by more numerous species than at present; while many\ngroups then existing have now no representatives. At the close of this\ngreat and wonderful procession of living beings comes man himself--the\nlast and crowning triumph of creation; the head, thus far, of life on\nthe earth.\n\nI have merely glanced at the leading events of this wonderful history,\nbecause its details may be found in so many manuals and popular works\non geology. But if we imagine this great chain of life extending over\nperiods of enormous duration in comparison with the short span of\nhuman history, presenting to the naturalist hosts of strange forms\nwhich he could scarcely have imagined in his dreams, we may understand\nhow exciting have been these discoveries crowded within the lives of\ntwo generations of geologists. Further, when we consider that the\ngeneral course of this great development of life, beginning with\nProtozoa and ending with man, is from below upward--from the more\nsimple to the more complex--and that there is of necessity, in this\ngrand growth of life through the ages, a likeness or parallelism to\nthe growth of the individual animal from its more simple to its more\ncomplex state, we can understand how naturalists should fancy that\nhere they have been introduced to the workshop of Nature, and that\nthey can discover how one creature may have been developed from\nanother by spontaneous evolution.\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 5.\n\n    Skeleton of the American Mastodon, illustrating the number and\n    wide distribution of elephantine animals of the three genera\n    _Dinotherium_, _Mastodon_, and _Elephas_ in the later Tertiary\n    Age. Gaudry, the most eminent modern authority on these\n    animals, remarks that the facts at present known do not\n    \"permit us to indicate any relation of descent between the\n    elephantine animals and those of other orders known to us at\n    present.\"]\n\nMany naturalists like Darwin and Haeckel, as well as philosophers like\nHerbert Spencer, are quite carried away by this analogy, and appear\nunable to perceive that it is merely a general resemblance between\nprocesses altogether different in their nature, and therefore in\ntheir causes. The greater part, however, of the more experienced\npal\u00e6ontologists, or students of fossils, have long ago seen that in\nthe larger field of the earth's history there is very much that cannot\nbe found in the narrower field of the development of the individual\nanimal; and they have endeavored to reduce the succession of life to\nsuch general expressions as shall render it more comprehensible and\nmay at length enable us to arrive at explanations of its complex\nphenomena. Of these general expressions or conclusions I may state a\nfew here, as apposite to our present subject, and as showing how\nlittle of real support the facts of the earth's history give to the\npseudo-gnosis of monistic evolution.\n\n1. The chain of life in geological time presents a wonderful testimony\nto the reality of a beginning. Just as we know that any individual\nanimal must have had its birth, its infancy, its maturity, and will\nreach an end of life, so we trace species and groups of species to\ntheir beginning, watch their culmination, and perhaps follow them to\ntheir extinction. It is true that there is a sense in which geology\nshows \"no sign of a beginning, no prospect of an end;\" but this is\nmanifestly because it has reached only a little way back toward the\nbeginning of the earth as a whole, and can see in its present state no\nindication of the time or manner of the end. But its revelation of the\nfact that nearly all the animals and plants of the present day had a\nvery recent beginning in geological time, and its disclosure of the\ndisappearance of one form of life after another as we go back in time,\ntill we reach the comparatively few forms of life of the Lower\nCambrian, and finally have to rest over the solitary grandeur of\n_Eozoon_, oblige it to say that nothing known to it is self-existent\nand eternal.\n\n2. The geological record informs us that the general laws of nature\nhave continued unchanged from the earliest periods to which it relates\nuntil the present day. This is the true \"uniformitarianism\" of geology\nwhich holds to the dominion of existing causes from the first. But it\ndoes not refuse to admit variations in the intensity of these causes\nfrom time to time, and cycles of activity and repose, like those that\nwe see on a small scale in the seasons, the occurrence of storms, or\nthe paroxysms of volcanoes. When we find that the eyes of the old\ntrilobites have had lenses and tubes similar to those in the eyes of\nmodern crustaceans, we have evidence of the persistence of the laws of\nlight. When we see the structures of Pal\u00e6ozoic leaves identical with\nthose of our modern forests, we know that the arrangements of the\nsoil, the atmosphere, and the rain were the same at that ancient time\nas at present. Yet, with all this, we also find evidence that\nlong-continued periods of physical quiescence were followed by great\ncrumplings and foldings of the earth's crust, and we know that this\nalso is consistent with the operation of law; for it often happens\nthat causes long and quietly operating prepare for changes which may\nbe regarded as sudden and cataclysmic.\n\n3. Throughout the geological history there is progress toward greater\ncomplexity and higher grade, along with degradation and extinction.\nThough experience shows that it may be quite possible that new\ndiscoveries may enable us to trace some of the higher forms of life\nfarther back than we now find them, yet there can be no question that\nin the progress of geological time lower types have given place to\nhigher, less specialized to more specialized. Curiously enough, no\nevidence proves this more clearly than that which relates to the\ndegradation of old forms. When, for example, the reptiles of the\nMesozoic Age were the lords of creation, there was apparently no place\nfor the larger Mammalia which appear at the close of the reptile\ndynasty. So in the Pal\u00e6ozoic, when trees of the cryptogamous type\npredominated, there seems to have been no room in nature for the\nforests of modern type which succeeded them. Thus the earth at every\nperiod was fully peopled with living beings--at first with low and\ngeneralized structures which attained their maxima at early stages and\nthen declined, and afterward with higher forms which took the places\nof those that were passing away. These latter, again, though their\ndominion was taken from them, were continued in lower positions under\nthe new dynasties. Thus none of the lower types of life introduced was\nfinally abandoned, but, after culminating in the highest forms of\nwhich it was capable, each was still continued, though with fewer\nspecies and a lower place. Examples of this abound in the history of\nall the leading groups of animals and plants.\n\n4. There is thus a continued plan and order in the history of life\nwhich cannot be fortuitous. The chance interaction of organisms and\ntheir environment, even if we assume the organisms and environment as\ngiven to us, could never produce an orderly continuous progress of the\nutmost complexity in its detail, and extending through an enormous\nlapse of time. It has been well said that if a pair of dice were to\nturn up aces a hundred times in succession, any reasonable spectator\nwould conclude that they were loaded dice; so if countless millions of\natoms and thousands of species, each including within itself most\ncomplex arrangement of parts, turn up in geological time in perfectly\nregular order and a continued gradation of progress, something more\nthan chance must be implied. It is to be observed here that every\nspecies of animal or plant, of however low grade, consists of many\nco-ordinated parts in a condition of the nicest equilibrium. Any\nchange occurring which produces unequal or disproportionate\ndevelopment, as the experience of breeders of abnormal varieties of\nanimals and plants abundantly proves, imperils the continued existence\nof the species. Changes must, therefore, in order to be profitable,\naffect the parts of the organism simultaneously and symmetrically. The\nchances of this may well be compared to the casting of aces a\nhundred times in succession, and are so infinitely small as to be\nincredible under any other supposition than that of intelligent\ndesign.\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 6.\n\n    Group of Plants (restored) from the Devonian period,\n    illustrating the complexity and beauty of the earliest known\n    land vegetation, though many of the leading forms of modern\n    plants are unknown in this very ancient period.]\n\n5. The progress of life in geological time. Just as the growth of\ntrees is promoted or arrested by the vicissitudes of summer and\nwinter, so in the course of the geological history there have been\nperiods of pause and acceleration in the work of advancement. This is\nin accordance with the general analogy of the operations of nature,\nand is in no way at variance with the doctrine of uniformity already\nreferred to. Nor has it anything in common with the unfounded idea, at\none time entertained, of successive periods of entire destruction and\nrestoration of life. Prolific periods of this kind appear in the\nmarine invertebrates of the early Cambrian, the plants (Figure 6) and\nfishes of the Devonian, the batrachians of the Carboniferous, the\nreptiles of the Trias, the broad-leaved trees of the Cretaceous, and\nthe mammals of the early Tertiary. A remarkable contrast is afforded\nby the later Tertiary and modern time, in which, with the exception of\nman himself, and perhaps a very few other species, no new forms of\nlife have been introduced, while many old forms have perished. This\nis somewhat unfortunate, since, in such a period of stagnation as that\nin which we live, we can scarcely hope to witness either the creation\nor the evolution of a new species. Evolutionists themselves--those, at\nleast, who are willing to allow their theory to be at all modified by\nfacts--now perceive this; and hence we have the doctrine, advanced by\nMivart, Le Conte, and others, of \"critical periods,\" or periods of\nrapid evolution alternating with others of greater quiescence. It is\nfurther to be observed here that in a limited way and with reference\nto certain forms of life we can see a reason for these intermittent\ncreations. The greater part of the marine fossils known to us are from\nrocks now raised up in our continents, and they lived at periods when\nthe continents were submerged. Now, in geological time these periods\nof submergence alternated with others of elevation; and it is manifest\nthat each period of continental submergence gave scope for the\nintroduction of numbers of new marine species, while each continental\nelevation, on the other hand, gave opportunity for the increase of\nland-life. Further, periods when a warm climate prevailed in the\narctic regions--periods when plants such as now live in temperate\nregions could enjoy six months of continuous sunshine--were eminently\nfavorable to the development of such plants, and were utilized for the\nintroduction of new floras, which subsequently spread to the\nsouthward. Thus we see physical changes occurring in an orderly\nsuccession and made subservient to the progress of life.\n\n6. There is no direct evidence that in the course of geological time\none species has been gradually or suddenly changed into another. Of\nthe latter we could scarcely expect to find any evidence in fossils;\nbut of the former, if it had occurred, we might expect to find\nindications in the history of some of the numerous species which have\nbeen traced through successive geological formations. Species which\nthus continue for a great length of time usually present numerous\nvarietal forms which have sometimes been described as new species; but\nwhen carefully scrutinized they are found to be merely local and\ntemporary, and to pass into each other. On the other hand, we\nconstantly find species replaced by others entirely new, and this\nwithout any transition. The two classes of facts are essentially\ndifferent; and though it is possible to point out in the newer\ngeological formations some genera and species allied to others which\nhave preceded them, and to suppose that the later forms proceeded from\nthe earlier, still, when the connecting-links cannot be found, this is\nmere supposition, not scientific certainty. Further, it proceeds on\nthe principle of arbitrary choice of certain forms out of many without\nany evidence of genetic connection. The worthlessness of such\nderivation is well shown in a case which has often been paraded as an\nillustration of evolution--the supposed genealogy of the horse. In\nAmerica a series of horse-like animals has been selected, beginning\nwith the _Orohippus_ of the Eocene, and these have been marshalled as\nthe ancestors of the fossil horses of America; for there are no native\nhorses in America in the modern period. Yet this is purely arbitrary,\nand dependent merely on a succession of genera more and more closely\nresembling the modern horse being procurable from successive Tertiary\ndeposits, often widely separated in time and place. In Europe, on the\nother hand, the ancestry of the horse has been traced back to\n_Pal\u00e6otherium_--an entirely different form--by just as likely\nindications. Both genealogies can scarcely be true, and there is no\nactual proof of either. The existing American horses, which are of\nEuropean parentage, are, according to the theory, descendants of\n_Pal\u00e6otherium_, not of _Orohippus_; but if we had not known this on\nhistorical evidence, there would have been nothing to prevent us from\ntracing them to the latter animal. This simple consideration alone is\nsufficient to show that such genealogies are not of the nature of\nscientific evidence.\n\nIt is further to be observed that some of the ablest pal\u00e6ontologists,\nand those who have enjoyed the largest opportunities of observation\nand comparison, attach no value whatever to theories of evolution as\naccounting for the origin of species. One of these is Joachim\nBarrande, the pal\u00e6ontologist of Bohemia, and the first authority in\nEurope on the fossils of the older formations. Barrande, like some\nother eminent pal\u00e6ontologists, has the misfortune to be an unbeliever\nin the modern gospel of evolution, but he has certainly labored to\novercome his doubts with greater assiduity than even many of the\napostles of the new doctrine; and if he is not convinced, the\nstubbornness of the facts he has had to deal with must bear the\nblame. In connection with his great and classical work on the Silurian\nfossils of Bohemia, it has been necessary for him to study the similar\nremains of every other country; and he has used this immense mass of\nmaterial in preparing statistics of the population of the Pal\u00e6ozoic\nworld more perfect than any other naturalist has been able to produce.\nIn successive memoirs he has applied these statistical results to the\nelucidation of the history of the oldest group of crustaceans--the\ntrilobites--and the highest group of the mollusks--the cephalopods. In\nhis latest memoir of this kind he takes up the brachiopods, or\nlamp-shells, a group of bivalve shellfishes very ancient and very\nabundantly represented in all the older formations of every part of\nthe world, and which thus affords the most ample material for tracing\nits evolution, with the least possible difficulty in the nature of\n\"imperfection of the record.\"\n\nBarrande, in the publication before us, discusses the brachiopods with\nreference, first, to the variations observed within the limits of the\nspecies, eliminating in this way mere synonyms and varieties mistaken\nfor species. He also arrives at various important conclusions with\nreference to the origin of species and varietal forms, which apply to\nthe cephalopods and trilobites as well as to the brachiopods, and some\nof which, as the writer has elsewhere shown, apply very generally to\nfossil animals and plants. One of these is that different\ncontemporaneous species, living under the same conditions, exhibit\nvery different degrees of vitality and variability. Another is the\nsudden appearance at certain horizons of a great number of species,\neach manifesting its complete specific characters. With very rare\nexceptions, also, varietal forms are contemporaneous with the normal\nform of their specific type, and occur in the same localities. Only in\na very few cases do they survive it. This and the previous results, as\nwell as the fact that parallel changes go on in groups having no\ndirect reaction on each other, prove that variation is not a\nprogressive influence, and that specific distinctions are not\ndependent on it, but on the \"sovereign action of one and the same\ncreative cause,\" as Barrande expresses it. These conclusions, it may\nbe observed, are not arrived at by that \"slap-dash\" method of mere\nassertion so often followed on the other side of these questions, but\nby the most severe and painstaking induction, and with careful\nelaboration of a few apparent exceptions and doubtful cases.\n\nHis second heading relates to the distribution in time of the genera\nand species of brachiopods. This he illustrates with a series of\nelaborate tables, accompanied by explanation. He then proceeds to\nconsider the animal population of each formation, in so far as\nbrachiopods, cephalopods, and trilobites are concerned, with reference\nto the following questions: (1) How many species are continued from\nthe previous formation unchanged? (2) How many may be regarded as\nmodifications of previous species? (3) How many are migrants from\nother regions where they have been known to exist previously? (4) How\nmany are absolutely new species? These questions are applied to each\nof fourteen successive formations included in the Silurian of Bohemia.\nThe total number of species of brachiopods in these formations is six\nhundred and forty, giving an average of 45.71 to each, and the results\nof accurate study of each species in its characters, its varieties,\nits geographical and geological range, are expressed in the following\nshort statement, which should somewhat astonish those gentlemen who\nare so fond of asserting that derivation is \"demonstrated\" by\ngeological facts:\n\n     1. Species continued unchanged            28 per cent.\n     2. Species migrated from abroad            7    \"\n     3. Species continued with modification     0    \"\n     4. New species without known ancestors    65    \"\n                                              -------------\n                                              100 per cent.\n\nHe shows that the same or very similar proportions hold with respect\nto the cephalopods and trilobites, and, in fact, that the proportion\nof species in the successive Silurian faun\u00e6 which can be attributed to\ndescent with modification is absolutely _nil_. He may well remark that\nin the face of such facts the origin of species is not explained by\nwhat he terms _les \u00e9lans po\u00e9tiques de l'imagination_.\n\nThe third part of Barrande's memoir, relating to the comparison of the\nSilurian brachiopods of Bohemia with those of other countries, though\nof great scientific interest, and important in extending the\nconclusions of his previous chapters, does not so nearly concern our\npresent subject.\n\nI have thought it well to direct attention to these memoirs of\nBarrande, because they form a specimen of conscientious work with the\nview of ascertaining if there is any basis in nature for the doctrine\nof spontaneous evolution of species, and, I am sorry to say, a\nstriking contrast to the mixture of fact and fancy on this subject\nwhich too often passes current for science in England, America, and\nGermany. Barrande's studies are also well deserving the attention of\nour younger men of science, as they have before them, more especially\nin the widely-spread Pal\u00e6ozoic formations of America, an admirable\nfield for similar work. In an appendix to his first chapter Barrande\nmentions that the three men who in their respective countries are the\nhighest authorities on Pal\u00e6ozoic brachiopods, Hall, Davidson, and De\nKoninck, agree with him in the main in his conclusions, and he refers\nto an able memoir by D'Archiac in the same sense, on the cretaceous\nbrachiopods.\n\nIt should be especially satisfactory to those naturalists who, like\nthe writer, had failed to see in the pal\u00e6ontological record any good\nevidence for the production of species by those simple and ready\nmethods in vogue with most evolutionists, to note the extension of\nactual facts with respect to the geological dates and precise\nconditions of the introduction of new forms, and to find that these\nare more and more tending to prove the existence of highly complex\ncreative laws in connection with the great plan of the Creator as\ncarried out in geological time. These new facts should also warn the\nordinary reader of the danger of receiving without due caution those\ngeneral and often boastful assertions respecting these great and\nintricate questions made by persons not acquainted with their actual\ndifficulty, or by enthusiastic speculators disposed to overlook\neverything not in accordance with their preconceived ideas.\n\nIt may be asked, Is there, then, no place in the geological record\neven for theistic evolution? This it would be rash to affirm. We can\nonly say that up to this time there is no proof of it. If nature has\nfollowed this method, she seems carefully to have concealed the\nprocess. If such changes have occurred as to evolve from a species,\nsay of mollusk or coral, belonging to one geological period some form\nfound in another period, and recognized as a distinct species, we have\nto suppose that the capacity for such change was in some way implanted\nin the species on its creation, and ready to be developed under\nfavorable conditions or in the lapse of time. For example, we may\nsuppose that a plant originating in the long arctic summers of a warm\nperiod might, on migrating southward into the alternations of day and\nnight, undergo material changes. A marine animal long confined to a\nlimited sea-basin might, on being permitted to expand over a wide\nsubmerged continent, be greatly modified in its structure and habits.\nUp to a certain point we know that such changes have occurred, and\nBarrande himself has largely illustrated them. As an example which I\nhave myself studied, I may refer to the common shells known on our\ncoasts as sand-clams (_Mya truncata and Mya arenaria_). The former\nspecies, in the cold waters of the Glacial Age, assumed a short form\nwhich it still retains in the arctic regions, and occasionally in the\ncolder waters of the more temperate regions, though there a more\nelongated form prevails. Evidently the two forms are interchangeable\naccording to the temperature of the water. Still, if we could imagine\na permanent refrigeration over all the area occupied by the animal,\nthe short form only might survive, and might be supposed to be a\ndistinct species. This did not occur, however, even in the Glacial\nAge, and is not likely to occur. Further, the allied, though quite\ndistinct, species _Mya arenaria_ has lived with the other through all\nthe long duration of the Post-Pliocene and modern periods, and, though\nhaving its own range of varietal forms, has preserved its\ndistinctness. Cases of this kind are obviously of the nature of\nvarietal, not specific, change.\n\nIn conclusion, the whole of the facts and laws above detailed point to\na predetermined plan and to an intelligent Creator, of whose laws and\nmodes of procedure we may learn much by patient and careful study.\nThis surely gives a great additional interest to that marvellous story\nof the earth which in these last days has been revealed to us by the\nstudy of the rocks. We may also infer that not one method only but\nmany have been employed in replenishing the earth at first with living\nbeings, and in adding to these from time to time. To what extent we\nmay be able to understand these, time and future discoveries will\nshow. In the mean time, we can only suggest such general theories as\nthose referred to in the first of these lectures, but can affirm that\nAgnostic Evolution is altogether abortive in its attempts to solve the\nproblem of the chain of life in geological time.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[7] _Story of the Earth_, _Origin of the World_, _Chain of Life in\nGeological Time_.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE IV.\n\nTHE ORIGIN AND ANTIQUITY OF MAN.\n\n\nMan, when regarded merely as an organism, is closely related to the\nlower animals. His body is constructed on the same general plan with\ntheirs. More especially, he is near akin to the other members of the\nclass Mammalia. But we must not forget that even as an animal man is\nsomewhat widely separated from his humbler relations (see Fig. 7). It\nis easy to say that every bone, every muscle, every convolution of his\nbrain, has its counterpart in the corresponding parts of an orang or a\ngorilla. But, admitting this, it is also true that every one of these\nparts is different, and that the aggregate of all the differences\nmounts up to an enormous sum-total, more especially in relation to\nhabits and to capacities for action. Those remarkable homologies or\nlikenesses of plan which obtain in the animal kingdom are very\nwonderful, and the study of them greatly enlarges our conceptions of\nthe unity of nature; but we must never forget that such general\nagreements in plan cover the most profound differences in detail and\nin adaptation to use, and that, while they indicate a common type,\nthis may rather point to a unity of design than to a mere accidental\nunity of descent.\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 7.\n\n    Man and his \"poor relation,\" the gorilla. (_After Huxley._)\n    The head of the gorilla, with immense jaws and small\n    brain-case, its huge spines on the neck, its long arms, its\n    elongated pelvis, and its hand-like feet, with its incapacity\n    to assume the erect position, indicate its ordinal difference\n    from man, and the necessity of many intermediate forms, still\n    unknown, to connect the two species.]\n\nThere is a method, well known to natural science, for measuring and\nindicating the divergence of man from his nearest allies. This is the\napplication of those principles of classification which, though of\nessential importance in science, are by some modern students of nature\nstrangely overlooked or misunderstood. Perhaps in nothing has the\nprogress of ideas of evolution made a more injurious impress on the\nadvance of knowledge than in the manner in which it has caused many\neminent and able naturalists to diverge from all logical propriety in\ntheir ideas of classification. Still, in so far as man is concerned,\nthere are some facts of this kind which are indisputable. He certainly\nconstitutes a distinct species, including many races, which all,\nhowever, have common specific characters. On the other hand, no one\npretends that he is _conspecific_ with any lower animal. All\nnaturalists would now deride the stories, at one time current, that\ngorillas and chimpanzees are degraded races of men. On the other\nhand, even Haeckel admits that there is a wide gap, unfilled by any\nrecent or any fossil creature, between man and the highest apes.\nAgain, no _generic_ relationship can be claimed as between man and the\nlower animals. He presents such structural differences as entitle him\nto rank by himself in the genus _Homo_. Still further, the ablest\nnaturalists, before the rise of Darwinism, held that man was entitled\nto be placed in a separate family or order from the apes. Modern\nevolutionists prefer to fall back on the old arrangement of Linn\u00e6us,\nand to place man and apes together in the group of Primates, which,\nhowever, Linn\u00e6us would not have regarded as precisely of the same\nvalue with an order as now held. In this those of them who have\nsufficient ability to comprehend the facts of the case are undoubtedly\nwarped in judgment by the tendency of their philosophy to magnify\nresemblances and to minimize differences; while the herd of feebler\nmen have their ideas of classification thoroughly confused by the\ndoctrine which they have received as a creed dictated by authority,\nand to which they adhere under the influence of fear. In point of\nfact, the differences between man and any other animal are so wide\nthat they warrant a distinction, not merely specific and generic, but\nof a family and an ordinal character.\n\nPerhaps the best way to appreciate this will be to suppose that man\nhas become extinct, and that in some future geological period his\nfossil remains are studied by some new race of intelligent beings, and\ncompared with those of the lower animals his contemporaries. Let us\nsuppose that they have disinterred a human skull or the bones of a\nhuman foot. From the foot they would learn that man is not an arboreal\nanimal, but intended to walk erect on the ground. They could infer\nfrom this certain structures and uses of the vertebral column and of\nthe anterior limbs different from those found in apes, and which would\ncertainly induce them to conclude that they had obtained remains\nindicating a new order of mammals. If they had found the foot alone,\nthey might doubt whether the possessor of this strange and\nhighly-specialized organ had been carnivorous or herbivorous, more\nnearly allied to the bears or to the monkeys. Should they now find the\nskull, these doubts would be solved, and they would know that the new\nanimal was somewhat nearer to the apes than to the bears, but still\nat a very remote distance from them, and this indicated by\npeculiarities of brain-case, jaws, and teeth, proving divergences in\nfunction still wider than those apparent in the structures. They would\nalso plainly perceive that to link man with his nearest mammalian\nallies would require the discovery of several missing links.\n\nWhen we consider the psychological endowments of man, his divergence\nfrom lower animals becomes immensely greater. In his external senses\nand in the perceptions derived through them it is true he resembles\nthe brutes. There is also much in common with them in his appetites\nand emotions, and in some of the lower manifestations of intelligence.\nBut he adds to this a higher reason, which causes his actions to be\ndifferently determined from theirs; and this higher reason, or\nspiritual nature, leads him to abstract ideas, to consciousness, to\nnotions of right and of wrong, to ideas of higher spiritual beings and\nof futurity altogether unknown to lower animals. This divine reason,\nin connection with special vocal contrivances, also bestows on him the\ngift of speech. Nor can speech be reduced to a mere imitation of\nnatural sounds; for, granting that these sounds may be the raw\nmaterial of speech, yet man is enabled to apply this to the expression\nof ideas in a manner altogether peculiar to himself. Scientific\nprecision obliges us to recognize these differences, and to admit that\nthey place man on an entirely different plane from the lower animals.\n\nPerhaps the expression \"a different plane\" is scarcely correct, for\nman can exist on many different planes--a fact which has produced some\nconfusion in the minds of naturalists not versed in psychological\nquestions, though, when rightly considered, it marks very strongly the\ndistinction between the man and the mere animal.\n\nThe lower animals are tied up by invariable instincts to certain lines\nof action which keep all the individuals of any species on nearly the\nsame level, except where some little disturbance may be caused by man\nin his processes of domestication. But with man it is quite different.\nHe is emancipated from the bond of instinct, and left free to follow\nthe guidance of his own will, determined by his own reason. It follows\nthat the habits and the actions of a man depend on what he knows and\nbelieves, and on the deductions of his reason from these premises.\nWithout knowledge, culture, and training, man is more helpless than\nany brute. With the noblest and highest capacities, he may devise and\nfollow habits of life more base than those of any mere animal. Thus\nthere is an almost immeasurable difference between the Godlike height\nto which man can attain by the right use of his powers and the depth\nto which ignorance and depravity may degrade him. It follows that the\ndegradation of the lower races of men is as strong a proof of the\ndifference between man and the lower animals as is the elevation of\nthe higher races. Both are characteristic of a being emancipated from\nthe control of instinct, knowing good and evil, free to choose, and\ndiffering in these respects from every other creature on earth. Such\nis man as we find him; and we may well ask by what process animal\ninstinct could ever spontaneously develop human freedom and human\nreason.\n\nBut we might have evidence of such a process, however strange and\nimprobable it might at first sight appear. We might be able to trace\nman back in history or by prehistoric remains to greater and greater\napproximation to the lower animals, and might thus bridge over the\ngreat chasm now existing between man and beast. It may be instructive,\ntherefore, to glance at what geology discloses as to the origin of man\nand his first appearance on the earth.\n\nIn the older geological formations no remains of man or of his works\nhave been found. Nor do we expect to find them, for none of the\nanimals more nearly related to man then existed, and the condition of\nthe earth was probably not suited to them. Nor do we find human\nremains even in the earlier Tertiary. Here also we do not expect them,\nfor the Mammalia of those times were all specifically distinct from\nthose of the modern world. It is only in the Pliocene period that we\nbegin to find modern species of mammals. Here, therefore, we may look\nfor human remains; but we do not find them as yet, and it is only at\nthe close of the Pliocene, or even after the succeeding Glacial\nperiod, that we find undoubted traces of man. Let us glance at the\nsignificance of this.\n\nMammalian life probably culminated or attained to its maximum in the\nMiocene and the early Pliocene periods. Then there were more numerous,\nlarger, and better-developed quadrupeds on our continents than we now\nfind. For example, the elephants, the noblest of the mammals, are at\npresent represented by two species confined to India and parts of\nAfrica.[8] In the Middle Tertiary there were, in addition to the\nordinary elephants, two other genera, Mastodon and Dinotherium, and\nthere were many species which were distributed over the whole northern\nhemisphere. The sub-Himalayan deposits of India alone have, I believe,\nafforded seven species, some of them of grander dimensions than either\nof those now existing. We have no trustworthy evidence as yet that man\nlived at this period. If he had, he either would have required the\nprotection of a special Eden, or would have needed superhuman strength\nand sagacity.\n\nBut the grand mammalian life of the Middle Tertiary was destined to\ndie out. At the close of the Pliocene came an age of refrigeration,\nwhen arctic cold crept down over our continents far to the south, and\nwhen most of the animals suited to temperate climates were either\nfrozen out or driven southward. During, or closing, this period was\nalso a great submergence of the continents, which must have been\nequally destructive to mammalian life, and which extended over both\nEurasia and America till the summits of some of the highest hills were\nunder water. Attempts have been made to show that man existed before\nor during the Glacial Age, but this is very unlikely, and, as I have\nelsewhere argued, the evidence adduced to prove so great antiquity of\nman, whether in America or Europe, has altogether broken down.[9]\n\nAt the close of the Glacial period the continents re-emerged and\nbecame more extensive than at present. Survivors of the Pliocene\nspecies, as well as other species not previously known, spread\nthemselves over this new land. It would appear that it was in this\n\"Post-Glacial\" period that man made his appearance, and that he was\nthen contemporary with many large animals now extinct, and was the\npossessor of wider continental areas than his descendants now enjoy.\nTo this age belong those human bones and implements found in the older\ncave and gravel deposits of Europe, and which are referred to those\npal\u00e6olithic or pal\u00e6ocosmic ages which preceded the dawn of history in\nEurope and the arrival therein of the present European races. The\noccupation of Europe, and probably of Western Asia, by these oldest\ntribes of men was closed by a subsidence or submergence at the end of\nthat \"second continental period,\" as it has been called by Lyell,[10]\nin which they lived. When the land was restored to its present\ncondition, they were replaced by the ancestors of the present European\nraces.\n\nIt may be well here to tabulate that later portion of the earth's\ngeological history in which man appeared, more especially as it is\nsometimes arranged in a manner not suited to convey a correct\nimpression of the actual succession. It will be seen by the general\ntable given in the last lecture that the latest of the Tertiary ages\nis that known as the Pleistocene or Post-Pliocene, and this, with the\nsucceeding modern period, may be best arranged as follows:\n\n     I. PLEISTOCENE, including--\n\n     (_a_) _Early Pleistocene_, or First Continental Period. Land\n     very extensive, moderate climate.\n\n     (_b_) _Later Pleistocene_, or Glacial (including Dawkins'\n     \"Mid-Pleistocene\"). In this there was a great prevalence of\n     cold and glacial conditions, and a great submergence of the\n     northern land.\n\n     II. MODERN, or Period of Man and Modern Mammals, including--\n\n     (_a_) _Post-Glacial_, or Second Continental Period, in which\n     the land was again very extensive, and pal\u00e6ocosmic man was\n     contemporary with some great mammals--as the mammoth, now\n     extinct--and the area of land in the northern hemisphere was\n     greater than at present. (This represents the Late\n     Pleistocene of Dawkins.) It was terminated by a great and\n     very general subsidence, accompanied by the disappearance of\n     pal\u00e6ocosmic man and some large Mammalia, and which may be\n     identical with the historical deluge.[11]\n\n     (_b_) _Recent_, when the continents attained their present\n     levels, existing races of men colonized Europe, and living\n     species of mammals. This includes both the Prehistoric and\n     the Historic Period.\n\nThe pal\u00e6ocosmic men of the above table are the oldest certainly known\nto us, and it has been truly said of them that they are so closely\nrelated to modern races that, on any hypothesis of gradual evolution,\nwe must look for the transition from apes to men not merely in the\nEocene Tertiary, but even in the Mesozoic--that is, in formations\nvastly older than any containing any remains so far as known either of\nman or of apes. That these most ancient men were in truth most truly\nhuman, and that they presented no transition to lower animals, will\nappear from the following notices, which I condense from a work of my\nown in which these subjects are more fully treated:\n\nThe beautiful work of Lartet and Christy has vividly portrayed to us\nthe antiquities of the limestone plateau of the Dordogne--the ancient\nAquitania--remains which recall to us a population of Horites, or\ncave-dwellers, of a time anterior to the dawn of history in France,\nliving much like the modern hunter-tribes of America, and, as already\nstated, possibly contemporary--in their early history, at least--with\nthe mammoth and its extinct companions of the later Post-Pliocene\nforests. We have already noticed the arts and implements of these\npeople, but what manner of people were they in themselves? The answer\nis given to us by the skeletons found in the cave of Cro-magnon. This\ncavern is a shelter or hollow under an overhanging ledge of limestone,\nand excavated originally by the action of the weather on a softer bed.\nIt fronts the south-west and the little river Vez\u00e8re; and, having\noriginally been about eight feet high and nearly twenty deep, must\nhave formed a cosey shelter from rain or cold or summer sun, and with\na pleasant outlook from its front. All rude races have much sagacity\nin making selections of this sort. Being nearly fifty feet wide, it\nwas capacious enough to accommodate several families, and when in use\nit no doubt had trees or shrubs in front, and may have been further\ncompleted by stones, poles, or bark placed across the opening. It\nseems, however, in the first instance to have been used only at\nintervals, and to have been left vacant for considerable portions of\ntime. Perhaps it was visited only by hunting-or war-parties. But\nsubsequently it was permanently occupied, and this for so long a time\nthat in some places ashes and carbonaceous matter a foot and a half\ndeep, with bones, implements, etc., were accumulated. By this time the\nheight of the cavern had been much diminished, and, instead of\nclearing it out for future use, it was made a place of burial, in\nwhich four or five individuals were interred. Of these, two were men,\none of great age, the other probably in the prime of life. A third was\na woman of about thirty or forty years of age. The other remains were\ntoo fragmentary to give very certain results.\n\nThese bones, with others to be mentioned in connection with them,\nunquestionably belong to the oldest human inhabitants known in Western\nEurope. They have been most carefully examined by several competent\nanatomists and arch\u00e6ologists, and the results have been published\nwith excellent figures in the _Reliqui\u00e6 Aquitanic\u00e6_. They are,\ntherefore, of the utmost interest for our present purpose, and I shall\ntry so to divest the descriptions of anatomical details as to give a\nclear notion of their character. The 'Old Man of Cro-magnon' was of\ngreat stature, being nearly six feet high. More than this, his bones\nshow that he was of the strongest and most athletic muscular\ndevelopment--a Samson in strength; and the bones of the limbs have the\npeculiar form which is characteristic of athletic men habituated to\nrough walking, climbing, and running, for this is, I believe, the real\nmeaning of the enormous strength of the thigh-bone and the flattened\ncondition of the leg in this and other old skeletons. It occurs to\nsome extent, though much less than in this old man, in American\nskeletons. His skull presents all the characters of advanced age,\nthough the teeth had been worn down to the sockets without being lost;\nwhich, again, is the character of some, though not of all, aged Indian\nskulls. The skull proper, or brain-case, is very long--more so than in\nordinary modern skulls--and this length is accompanied with a great\nbreadth; so that the brain was of greater size than in average modern\nmen, and the frontal region was largely and well developed. In this\nrespect this most ancient skull fails utterly to vindicate the\nexpectations of those who would regard prehistoric men as approaching\nto the apes. It is at the opposite extreme. The face, however,\npresented very peculiar characters. It was extremely broad, with\nprojecting cheek-bones and heavy jaw, in this resembling the coarse\ntypes of the American face, and the eye-orbits were square and\nelongated laterally. The nose was large and prominent, and the jaws\nprojected somewhat forward. This man, therefore, had, as to his\nfeatures, some resemblance to the harsher type of American\nphysiognomy, with overhanging brows, small and transverse eyes, high\ncheek-bones, and coarse mouth. He had not lived to so great an age\nwithout some rubs, for his thigh-bone showed a depression which must\nhave resulted from a severe wound--perhaps from the horn of some wild\nanimal or the spear of an enemy.\n\nThe woman presented similar characters of stature and cranial form\nmodified by her sex, and must in form and visage have been a veritable\nsquaw, who, if her hair and complexion were suitable, would have\npassed at once for an American Indian woman, of unusual size and\ndevelopment. Her head bears sad testimony to the violence of her age\nand people. She died from the effects of a blow from a stone-headed\npogamogan or spear, which has penetrated the right side of the\nforehead with so clean a fracture as to indicate the extreme rapidity\nand force of its blow. It is inferred from the condition of the edges\nof this wound that she may have survived its infliction for two weeks\nor more. If, as is most likely, the wound was received in some sudden\nattack by a hostile tribe, they must have been driven off or have\nretired, leaving the wounded woman in the hands of her friends to be\ntended for a time, and then buried, either with other members of her\nfamily or with others who had perished in the same skirmish. Unless\nthe wound was inflicted in sleep, during a night-attack, she must have\nfallen, not in flight, but with her face to the foe, perhaps aiding\nthe resistance of her friends or shielding her little ones from\ndestruction. With the people of Cro-magnon, as with the American\nIndians, the care of the wounded was probably a sacred duty, not to be\nneglected without incurring the greatest disgrace and the vengeance of\nthe guardian spirits of the sufferers.\n\nThe skulls of these people have been compared to those of the modern\nEsthonians or Lithuanians; but on the authority of M. Quatrefages it\nis stated that, while this applies to the probably later race of small\nmen found in some of the Belgian caves, it does not apply so well to\nthe people of Cro-magnon. Are, then, these people the types of any\nancient, or of the most ancient, European race? One answer is given by\nthe remarkable skeleton of Mentone, in the South of France, found\nunder circumstances equally suggestive of great antiquity (Figure 8).\nDr. Rivi\u00e8re, in a memoir on this skeleton illustrated by two beautiful\nphotographs, shows that the characters of the skull and of the bones\nof the limbs are precisely similar to those of the Cro-magnon\nskeleton, indicating a perfect identity of race, while the objects\nfound with the skeleton are similar in character.\n\nThe ornaments of Cro-magnon were perforated shells from the Atlantic\nand pieces of ivory. Those at Mentone were perforated Neritin\u00e6 from\nthe Mediterranean and canine-teeth of the deer. In both cases there\nwas evidence that these ancient people painted themselves with red\noxide of iron; and, as if to complete the similarity, the Mentone man\nhad an old healed-up fracture of the radius of the left arm, the\neffect of a violent blow or of a fall. Skulls found at Clichy and\nGrenelle in 1868 and 1869 are described by Professor Broca and Mr.\nFleurens as of the same general type, and the remains found at\nGibraltar and in the cave of Paviland, in England, seem also to have\nbelonged to the same race. The celebrated Engis skull, believed to\nhave belonged to a contemporary of the mammoth, is also precisely of\nthe same type, though less massive than that of Cro-magnon; and,\nlastly, even the somewhat degraded Neanderthal skull, found in a cave\nnear Dusseldorf, though, like that of Clichy, inferior in frontal\ndevelopment, is referable to the same peculiar long-headed style of\nman, in so far as can be judged from the portion that remains.\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 8.\n\n    Portion of the skeleton of the fossil man of Mentone. This\n    skeleton was discovered by Dr. Rivi\u00e8re under about twenty feet\n    of accumulated d\u00e9bris. It belongs to the pal\u00e6ocosmic age, and\n    illustrates the high type, physically, of the man of that\n    period. The skeleton, like others of that age, indicates a man\n    of great stature and muscular vigor, and with brain above the\n    average size. (_After Rivi\u00e8re._)]\n\nLet it be observed, then, that these skulls are probably the oldest\nknown in the world, and they are all referable to one race of men; and\nlet us ask what they tell as to the position and character of\npal\u00e6olithic man. The testimony is here fortunately wellnigh unanimous.\nHuxley, who well compares some of the peculiar features of these\nancient skulls and skeletons to those of Australians and other rude\ntribes, and of the ancient Danes of Borroby--a people not improbably\nallied to the Esthonians and Fins--remarks that the manner in which\nthe individual heads of the most homogeneous rude races differ from\neach other \"in the same characters, though perhaps not to the same\nextent with the Engis and Neanderthal skulls, seems to prohibit any\ncautious reasoner from affirming the latter to have necessarily been\nof distinct races.\" My own experience in American skulls, and the\nstill larger experience of Dr. Wilson, fully confirm the wisdom of\nthis caution.... He adds: \"Finally, the comparatively large cranial\ncapacity of the Neanderthal skull, overlaid though it may be by\npithecoid, bony walls, and the completely human proportions of the\naccompanying limb-bones, together with the very fair development of\nthe Engis skull, clearly indicate that the first traces of the\nprimordial stock whence man has been derived need no longer be sought\nby those who entertain any form of the doctrine of progressive\ndevelopment in the newest Tertiaries, but that they may be looked for\nin an epoch more distant from that of the _Elephas primigenius_ than\nthat is from us.\" If he had possessed the Cro-magnon and Mentone\nskulls at the time when this was written, he might well have said\nimmeasurably distant from the time of the _Elephas primigenius_.\nProfessor Broca, who seems by no means disinclined to favor a simian\norigin for men, has the following general conclusions, which refer to\nthe Cro-magnon skulls: \"The great volume of the brain, the development\nof the frontal region, the fine elliptical profile of the anterior\nportion of the skull, and the orthognathous form of the upper facial\nregion, are incontestably evidence of superiority which are met with\nusually only in the civilized races. On the other hand, the great\nbreadth of face, the alveolar prognathism, the enormous development of\nthe ascending ramus of the lower jaw, the extent and roughness of the\nmuscular insertions, especially of the masticatory muscles, give rise\nto the idea of a violent and brutal race.\"\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 9.\n\n    Three bone harpoons. The upper is from Kent's Cavern, Torquay,\n    and perhaps the oldest known, being of the mammoth age. The\n    second is from Denmark, and is neocosmic, though prehistoric.\n    The third is modern, from Tierra del Fuego. They show the\n    similarity of bone implements in all ages of the world. The\n    earliest had already attained as much perfection as the\n    material permitted with reference to the use intended.]\n\nHe adds that this apparent antithesis, seen also in the limbs as well\nas in the skull, accords with the evidence furnished by the associated\nweapons and implements of a rude hunter-life, and at the same time of\nno mean degree of taste and skill in carving and other arts (see Fig.\n9). He might have added that this is precisely the antithesis seen in\nthe American tribes, among whom art and taste of various kinds, and\nmuch that is high and spiritual even in thought, coexisted with\nbarbarous modes of life and intense ferocity and cruelty. The god and\nthe devil were combined in these races, but there was nothing of the\nmere brute.\n\nRivi\u00e8re remarks, with expressions of surprise, the same contradictory\npoints in the Mentone skeleton. Its grand development of brain-case\nand high facial angle--even higher, apparently, than in most of these\nancient skulls--combined with other characters which indicate a low\ntype and barbarous modes of life.\n\nAnother point which strikes us in reading the descriptions, and which\ndeserves the attention of those who have access to the skeletons, is\nthe indication which they seem to present of an extreme longevity. The\nmassive proportions of the body, the great development of the muscular\nprocesses, the extreme wearing of the teeth among a people who\npredominantly lived on flesh and not on grain, the obliteration of the\nsutures of the skull, along with indications of slow ossification of\nthe ends of the long bones, point in this direction, and seem to\nindicate a slow maturity and great length of life in this most\nprimitive race.\n\nThe picture would be incomplete did we not add that in France and\nBelgium, in the immediately succeeding or reindeer age, these gigantic\nand magnificent men seem to have been superseded by a feebler race of\nsmaller stature and with shorter heads; so that we have, even in these\noldest days, the same contrasts so plainly perceptible in the races of\nthe North of Europe and the North of America in historical times\n(Figure 10).\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 10.\n\n    Section of the cave of Frontal, in Belgium. (_After Dupont._)\n    _a_, limestone; _b_, deposit of mud of the mammoth age, on\n    which rests a bed of gravel, _c_, and above this there was, in\n    modern times, a mass of fallen d\u00e9bris, _d_, up to the dotted\n    line. On removing this, a hearth was found at _e_, on which\n    were numerous bones of modern animals, the remains of funeral\n    feasts. The cave was closed with a flat stone, and within were\n    skeletons, stone implements, ornaments, and pottery of the\n    \"neolithic\" age. Under these was undisturbed earth of the\n    pal\u00e6olithic, or mammoth age. The facts show the succession, in\n    Belgium, of pal\u00e6ocosmic or antediluvian men and of neocosmic\n    men allied to the Basques or to the Laps, and all this\n    previous to the advent of the modern races.]\n\nIt is further significant that there are some indications to show that\nthe larger and nobler race was that which inhabited Europe at the time\nof its greatest elevation above the sea and greatest horizontal\nextent, and when its fauna included many large quadrupeds now extinct.\nThis race of giants was thus in the possession of a greater\ncontinental area than that now existing, and had to contend with\ngigantic brute rivals for the possession of the world. It is also not\nimprobable that this early race became extinct in Europe in\nconsequence of the physical changes which occurred in connection with\nthe subsidence which reduced the land to its present limits, and\nthat the dwarfish race which succeeded came in as the appropriate\naccompaniment of a diminished land-surface and a less genial climate\nin the early modern period. Both of these races are properly\npal\u00e6olithic, and are supposed to antedate the period of polished\nstone; but this may, to a great extent, be a prejudice of collectors,\nwho have arrived at a foregone conclusion as to the distinctness of\nthese periods (Figure 11). Judging from the great cranial capacity of\nthe older race and the small number of their skeletons found, it would\nbe fair to suppose that they represent rude outlying tribes belonging\nto races which elsewhere had attained to greater culture.\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 11.\n\n    Flint arrow-heads found together in a modern Indian deposit in\n    Canada, and showing the coincidence in time of rude and\n    finished flint weapons, or that among all savages using\n    chipped flint, the pal\u00e6olithic and neolithic ages are\n    contemporaneous.]\n\nLastly, both of these old European races were Turanian, Mongolian, or\nAmerican in their head-forms and features, as well as in their habits,\nimplements, and arts. To illustrate this, in so far as the older of\nthe two races is concerned, I have carefully compared collections of\nAmerican Indian skulls with casts and figures representing the form\nand dimensions of some of the oldest European crania above referred\nto. Some of the American skulls may fairly be compared in their\ncharacters with the Mentone skull, and others with those of\nCro-magnon, Engis, and Neanderthal; and so like are some of the Huron,\nIroquois, and other northern American skulls to these ancient European\nrelics and others of their type, that it would be difficult to affirm\nthat they might not have belonged to near relatives. On the other\nhand, the smaller and shorter heads of the race of the reindeer age in\nEurope may be compared with the Laps, and with some of the more\ndelicately formed Algonquin and Chippewayan skulls in America. If,\ntherefore, the reader desires to realize the probable aspect of the\nmen of Cro-magnon, of Mentone, or of Engis, I may refer him to modern\nAmerican heads. So permanent is this great Turanian race, out of which\nall the other races now extant seem to have been developed, in the\nmilder and more hospitable regions of the Old World, while in northern\nAsia and in America it has retained to this day its primitive\ncharacters.\n\nThe reader, reflecting on what he has learned from history, may be\ndisposed here to ask, Must we suppose Adam to have been one of these\nTuranian men, like old men of Cro-magnon? In answer, I would say that\nthere is no good reason to regard the first man as having resembled a\nGreek Apollo or an Adonis. He was probably of sterner and more\nmuscular mould. But the gigantic pal\u00e6olithic men of the European caves\nare more probably representatives of that fearful and powerful race\nwho filled the antediluvian world with violence, and who reappear in\npostdiluvian times as the Anakim and traditional giants, who\nconstitute a feature in the early history of so many countries.\nPerhaps nothing is more curious in the revelations as to the most\nancient cave-men than that they confirm the old belief that there were\n'giants in those days.'\n\nAnd now let us pause for a moment to picture these so-called\npal\u00e6olithic men. What could the old man of Cro-magnon have told us had\nwe been able to sit by his hearth and listen understandingly to his\nspeech?--which, if we may judge from the form of his palate-bones,\nmust have resembled more that of the Americans or Mongolians than of\nany modern European people. He had, no doubt, travelled far, for to\nhis stalwart limbs a long journey through forests and over plains and\nmountains would be a mere pastime. He may have bestridden the wild\nhorse, which seems to have abounded at the time in France, and he may\nhave launched his canoe on the waters of the Atlantic. His experience\nand memory might extend back a century or more, and his traditional\nlore might go back to the times of the first mother of our race. Did\nhe live in that wide Post-Pliocene continent which extended westward\nthrough Ireland? Did he know and had he visited the nations that lived\nin the valley of the great Gihon, that ran down the Mediterranean\nValley, or on that nameless river which flowed through the Dover\nStraits? Had he visited or seen from afar the great island Atlantis,\nwhose inhabitants could almost see in the sunset sky the islands of\nthe blest? Or did he live at a later time, after the Post-Pliocene\nsubsidence, and when the land had assumed its present form? In that\ncase he could have told us of the great deluge, of the huge animals of\nthe antediluvian World--known to him only by tradition--and of the\ndiminished strength and longevity of men in his comparatively modern\ndays. We can but conjecture all this. But, mute though they may be as\nto the details of their lives, the man of Cro-magnon and his\ncontemporaries are eloquent of one great truth, in which they coincide\nwith the Americans and with the primitive men of all the early ages.\nThey tell us that primitive man had the same high cerebral\norganization which he possesses now, and, we may infer, the same high\nintellectual and moral nature, fitting him for communion with God and\nheadship over the lower world. They indicate, also, like the\nMound-builders, who preceded the North American Indian, that man's\nearlier state was the best--that he had been a high and noble creature\nbefore he became a savage. It is not conceivable that their high\ndevelopment of brain and mind could have spontaneously engrafted\nitself on a mere brutal and savage life. These gifts must be remnants\nof a noble organization degraded by moral evil. They thus justify the\ntradition of a Golden and Edenic Age, and mutely protest against the\nphilosophy of progressive development as applied to man, while they\nbear witness to the identity in all important characters of the oldest\nprehistoric men with that variety of our species which is at the\npresent day at once the most widely extended and the most primitive in\nits manners and usages.\n\nThus it would appear that these earliest known men are not\nspecifically distinct from ourselves, but are a distinct race, most\nnearly allied to that great Turanian stock which is at the present\nday, and has apparently from the earliest historic times been, the\nmost widely spread of all. Though rude and uncultured, they were not\neither physically or mentally inferior to the average men of to-day,\nand were indeed in several respects men of high type, whose great\ncranial capacity might lead us to suppose that their ancestors had\nrecently been in a higher state of civilization than themselves. It\nis, however, possible that this characteristic was rather connected\nwith great energy and physical development than with high mental\nactivity.\n\nTo the hypothesis of evolution, as applied to man, these facts\nevidently oppose great difficulties. They show that such modern\ndegraded races as the Fuegians or the Tasmanians cannot present to us\nthe types of our earlier ancestors, since the latter were men of a\ndifferent and higher style. Nor do these oldest known men present any\napproximation in physical characters to the lower animals. Further, we\nmay infer from their works, and from what we know of their beliefs\nand habits, that they were not creatures of instinct, but of thought\nlike ourselves, and that materialistic doctrines of automatism and\nbrain-force without mind would be quite as absurd in their application\nto them as to their modern representatives.\n\nIt is not too much to say that, in presence of these facts, the\nspontaneous origin of man from inferior animals cannot be held as a\nscientific conclusion. It may be an article of faith in authority, or\na superstition or an hypothesis, but is in no respect a result of\nscientific investigation into the fossil remains of man. But if man is\nnot such a product of spontaneous evolution, he must have been created\nby a Being having a higher reason and a greater power than his own;\nand the ancestry of the agnostic, and the rational powers which he\nexercises, constitute the best refutation of his own doctrine.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[8] The Ceylon elephant is by some believed to be distinct, but is\nprobably a variety of the Indian species.\n\n[9] _Fossil Men_ (London, 1880), Appendix.\n\n[10] The first continental period was that of the earlier Pliocene.\n\n[11] The precise date in years assignable to this event geology cannot\ndetermine; but I have elsewhere shown that the actual antiquity of the\npal\u00e6ocosmic or antediluvian man has been greatly exaggerated.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE V.\n\nNATURE AS A MANIFESTATION OF MIND.\n\n\nThe subjects already discussed should have prepared us to regard\nnature as not a merely fortuitous congeries of matter and forces, but\nas embodying plan, design, and contrivance; and we may now inquire as\nto the character of these, considered as possible manifestations of\nmind in nature. The idea that nature is a manifestation of mind, is\nancient, and probably universal. It proceeds naturally from the\nanalogy between the operations of nature and those which originate in\nour own will and contrivance. When men begin to think more accurately,\nthis idea acquires a deeper foundation in the conclusion that nature,\nin all its varied manifestations, is one vast machine too great and\ncomplex for us to comprehend, and implying a primary energy infinitely\nbeyond that of man; and thus the unity of nature points to one\nCreative Mind.\n\nEven to savage peoples, in whose minds the idea of unity has not\ngerminated, or from whose traditions it has been lost, a spiritual\nessence appears to underlie all natural phenomena, though they may\nregard this as consisting of a separate spirit or manitou for every\nmaterial thing. In all the more cultivated races the ideas of natural\nreligion have taken more definite forms in their theology and\nphilosophy. Dugald Stewart has well expressed the more scientific form\nof this idea in two short statements:\n\n\"1. Every effect implies a cause.\n\n\"2. Every combination of means to an end implies intelligence.\"\n\nThe theistic aspect of the doctrine had, as we have seen in a previous\nlecture, been already admirably expressed by Paul in his Epistle to\nthe Romans. Writing of what every heathen must know of mind in nature,\nhe says: \"The invisible things of him since the creation of the world\nare clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made,\neven his eternal power and divinity.\" The two things which, according\nto him, every intelligent man must perceive in nature are, first,\npower above and beyond that of man, and, secondly, superhuman\nintelligence. Even Agnostic Evolution cannot wholly divest itself of\nthe idea of mind in nature. Its advocates continually use terms\nimplying contrivance and plan when speaking of nature; and Spencer\nappears explicitly to admit that we cannot divest ourselves of the\nnotion of a First Cause. Even those writers who seek to shelter\nthemselves under such vague and unmeaning statements as that human\nintelligence must be potentially present in atoms or in the solar\nenergy, are merely attributing superhuman power and divinity to atoms\nand forces.\n\nNor can they escape by the magisterial denunciation of such ideas as\n\"anthropomorphic\" fancies. All science must in this sense be\nanthropomorphic, for it consists of what nature appears to us to be\nwhen viewed through the medium of our senses, and of what we think of\nnature as so presented to us. The only difference is this--that if\nAgnostic Evolution is true, Science itself only represents a certain\nstage of the development, and can have no actual or permanent truth;\nwhile, if the theistic view is correct, then the fact that man himself\nbelongs to the unity of nature and is in harmony with its other parts\ngives us some guarantee for the absolute truth of scientific facts and\nprinciples.\n\nWe may now consider more in detail some of the aspects under which\nmind presents itself in nature.\n\n1. It may be maintained that nature is an exhibition of regulated and\ndetermined power. The first impression of nature presented to a mind\nuninitiated in its mysteries is that it is a mere conflict of opposing\nforces; but so soon as we study any natural phenomena in detail, we\nsee that this is an error, and that everything is balanced in the\nnicest way by the most subtle interactions of matter and force. We\nfind also that, while forces are mutually convertible and atoms\nsusceptible of vast varieties of arrangement, all this is determined\nby fixed law and carried out with invariable regularity and constancy.\n\nThe vapor of water, for example, diffused in the atmosphere, is\ncondensed by extreme cold and falls to the ground in snowflakes. In\nthese, particles of water previously kept asunder by heat are united\nby cohesive force; and the heat has gone on other missions. But these\nparticles do not merely unite: they geometrize. Like well-drilled\nsoldiers arranging themselves in ranks, they form themselves,\naccording to regular axes of attraction, in lines diverging at an\nangle of sixty degrees; and thus the snowflakes are hexagonal plates\nand six-rayed stars, the latter often growing into very complex\nshapes, but all based on the law of attraction under angles of sixty\ndegrees (see Fig. 12). The frost on the window-panes observes the same\nlaw, and so does every crystallization of water where it has scope to\narrange itself in accordance with its own geometry. But this law of\ncrystallization gives to snow and ice their mechanical properties, and\nis connected with a multitude of adjustments of water in the solid\nstate to its place in nature. The same law, varied in a vast number of\nways in every distinct substance, builds up crystals of all kinds and\ncrystalline rocks, and is connected with countless adaptations of\ndifferent kinds of matter to mechanical and chemical uses in the arts.\nIt is easy to see that all this might have been otherwise--nay, that\nit must have been otherwise--but for the institution of many and\ncomplex laws.\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 12.\n\n    Snowflakes copied from nature under the microscope, and\n    serving to illustrate the geometrical arrangement of molecules\n    of water in crystallizing. _a_, _b_, simple stars; _c_, _d_,\n    hexagonal plates; _e_, _f_, rays of large and complex\n    star-shaped flakes. The law of arrangement of the molecules is\n    that of attraction in the lines of three axes at angles of\n    sixty degrees, and the varieties are produced by differences\n    in temperature and rate of supply of material.]\n\nA lump of coal at first suggests little to excite interest or\nimagination; but the student of its composition and microscopic\nstructure finds that it is an accumulation of vegetable matter\nrepresenting the action of the solar light on the leaves of trees of\nthe Pal\u00e6ozoic Age. It thus calls up images of these perished forests\nand of the causes concerned in their production and growth, and in the\naccumulation and preservation of their buried remains. It further\nsuggests the many ways in which this solar energy, so long sealed up,\ncan be recalled to activity in heat, gaslight, steam, and electric\nlight, and how remarkably these things have been related to the wealth\nand the civilization of modern nations. An able writer of the agnostic\nschool, in a popular lecture on coal, has his imagination so\nstimulated by these thoughts that he apostrophizes \"Nature\" as the\ncunning contriver who stored up this buried sunlight by her strange\nand mysterious alchemy, kept it quietly to herself through all the\nlong geological periods when reptiles and brute mammals were lords of\ncreation, and through those centuries of barbarism when savage men\nroamed over the productive coal-districts in ignorance of their\ntreasures, and then revealed her long-hidden stores of wealth and\ncomfort to the admiring study of science and civilization, and for the\nbenefit of the millions belonging to densely-peopled and progressive\nnations; It is plain that \"Nature\" in such a connection represents\neither a poetical fiction, a superstitious fancy, or an intelligent\nCreative Mind. It is further evident that such Creative Mind must be\nin harmony with that of man, though vastly greater in its scope and\ngrasp in time and space.\n\nEven the numerical relations observed in nature teach the same lesson.\nThe leaves of plants are not arranged at random, but in a series of\ncuriously-related spirals, differing in different plants, but always\nthe same in the same species and regulated by definite laws. Similar\ndefiniteness regulates the ramification of plants, which depends\nprimarily on the arrangement of the leaves. The angle of ramification\nof the veins of the leaf is settled for each species of plant; so are\nthe numbers of parts in the flower and the angular arrangement of\nthese parts. It is the same in the animal kingdom, such numbers as 5,\n6, 8, 10 being selected to determine the parts in particular animals\nand portions of animals. Once settled, these numbers are wonderfully\npermanent in geological time. The first known land reptiles appear in\nthe Carboniferous period, and they have normally five toes; these\nappear in the earliest known species in the lowest beds of the\nCarboniferous. Their predecessors, the fishes, had numerous fin-rays;\nbut when limbs for locomotion on land were contrived, the number five\nwas adopted as the typical one. It still persists in the five toes and\nfingers of man himself. From these, as is well known, our decimal\nnotation is derived. It did not originate in any special fitness of\nthe number ten, but in the fact that men began to reckon by counting\ntheir ten fingers. Thus the decimal system of arithmetic, with all\nthat follows from it, was settled millions of years ago, in the\nCarboniferous period, either by certain low-browed and unintelligent\nbatrachians or by their Maker.\n\n2. Nature presents to us very remarkable revelations of dissimilar and\nwidely-separated matters and forces. I have referred to the numerical\narrangement of the leaves of plants; but the leaf itself, in its\nstructure and functions, is one of the most remarkable things in\nnature. Composed of layers of loosely-placed living cells with\nair-spaces between them; enclosed above and below with a transparent\nepidermis, the spaces between the cells communicating with the\natmosphere without by means of microscopic pores guarded by\ncunningly-contrived valves opening or closing according to the\nhygrometric state of the air; connected with the stem of the plant by\na system of tubes strengthened with spiral fibres within,--the\nstructure of the leaf is, mechanically considered, of extreme beauty\nand complexity. But its living functions are still more wonderful.\nReceiving the water from the soil with such materials as it brings\nthence in solution, and absorbing carbonic dioxide and ammonia from\nthe air, the living protoplasm of the leaf-cells has the power of\nchemically changing all these substances, and of producing from them\nthose complicated and otherwise inimitable organic compounds of which\nthe tissues of the plant are built up. The force by which this is done\nis that of the solar heat and light, both admitted freely into the\ninterior of the leaf through the transparent epidermis, and therein\nimprisoned, so as to constitute a powerful storehouse of evaporation\nand chemical energy. In this way all the materials available for the\nmaintenance of life, whether vegetable or animal, are produced, and no\nother structure than the living vegetable cell, as it exists in the\nleaf, has the power to effect these miracles of transmutation. Here,\nlet it be observed, we have the vegetable cell placed in relation with\nthe system of the plant, with the soil, with the atmosphere and its\nwaters, with the distant sun itself and the properties of its emitted\nenergies. Let it further be observed that, on the one hand, the\nchemistry involved in this is of a character altogether different from\nthat which applies to inorganic matter, and, on the other, the\nproducts derived from a very few elements embrace all that vast\nvariety of compounds which we observe in plants and animals, and which\nconstitute the material of one of the most complex of sciences--that\nof organic chemistry. Finally, these complicated structures were\nproduced and all their relations set up at a very early geological\nperiod. In so far as we can judge from their remains and the results\neffected, the leaves of the Pal\u00e6ozoic period were functionally as\nperfect as their modern successors (see Figs. 13, 14). Of course, the\nagnostic evolutionist may, if he pleases, attribute all this to\nfortuitous interactions of the sun, the atmosphere, and the earth, and\nmay provide for what these fail to explain by the assumption of\npotentialities equivalent to the things produced. But the\nprobability of such an hypothesis becomes infinitely small when we\nconsider the variety and the diversity of things and forces which must\nhave conspired to produce the results observed, and to maintain them\nso constantly, and yet with so much difference in circumstances and\ndetails. It is a relief to turn from such bewildering and gratuitous\nsuppositions to the theory which supposes a designing Creative Mind.\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 13.\n\n    Section of the leaf of a Cycad, being one of the most ancient\n    styles of leaf of which the structure is known. _a_, upper\n    epidermis; _b_, upper layer of cells, with grains of\n    chlorophyll; _c_, lower layer of cells, with chlorophyll; _d_,\n    lower epidermis; _e_, stomata, or breathing-pores, with\n    contractile cells for opening and closing.]\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 14.\n\n    Foliage from the coal-formation, showing some of the forms of\n    leaves instrumental in accumulating the carbon of our\n    coal-beds, by their action on the atmosphere under the\n    influence of sunlight.]\n\nFrom the boundless variety of illustrations which the animal kingdom\npresents I may select one--the contrivances by means of which marine\nanimals are enabled to float or balance themselves in the waters. The\n_Pearly Nautilus_ (see Fig. 15) is one of the most familiar, and also\none of the most curious. Its coiled shell is divided by partitions\ninto air-chambers so proportioned that the buoyancy of the air is\nsufficient to counterpoise in sea-water the weight of the animal.\nThere are also contrivances by which the density of the contained air\nand of the body of the animal can be so modified as slightly to\ndisturb this equilibrium, and to enable the creature to rise or sink\nin the waters. It would be tedious to describe, without adequate\nillustrations, all the machinery connected with these adjustments.\nIt is sufficient for our purpose to know that they are provided in\nsuch a manner that the animal is practically exempted from the\noperation of the force of gravity. In the modern seas these provisions\nare enjoyed by only a few species of the genera _Nautilus_ and\n_Spirula_; but in former geological ages, more numerous, as well as\nlarger and more complex, forms existed. Further, this contrivance is\nvery old. We find in the _Orthoceratites_ and their allies of the\nearliest Silurian formations these arrangements in their full\nperfection, and in some forms[12] even more complex than in later\ntypes.\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 15.\n\n    Section of the Pearly Nautilus and its shell, showing that the\n    animal occupies only the outer chamber, the others being\n    filled with air and acting as a float whose buoyancy can be\n    modified by the action of the tube, or siphuncle, passing\n    through the chambers.]\n\nThe peculiar contrivances observed in the nautilus and its allies are\npossessed by no other mollusks, but there is another group of somewhat\nlower grade, that of the _Ianthin\u00e6_, or violet snails, in which\nflotation is provided for in another way (see Fig. 16). In these\nanimals the shell is perfectly simple, though light, and the floating\napparatus consists in a series of horny air-vesicles attached to what\nis termed the \"foot\" of the animal, and which are increased in number\nto suit its increasing weight as it grows in size. There are some\nreasons to believe that this entirely different contrivance is as\nold in geological time as the chambered shell of the nautiloid\nanimals. It was, indeed, in all probability, more common and adapted\nto larger animals in the Silurian period than at present.\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 16.\n\n    _Ianthina_, or Violet Snail, attached to a float composed of\n    horny hollow vesicles, to the under side of which its eggs are\n    attached. When hatched, each young animal develops a small\n    float similar to that of the parent.]\n\nAnother curious instance--not, so far as yet known, existing at all in\nthe modern world--is that of the remarkable stalked star-fish\ndescribed by Professor Hall under the name _Camerocrinus_, and whose\nremains are found in the Upper Silurian rocks. The Crinoids, or\nfeather-stars, are well-known inhabitants of the seas, in both ancient\nand modern times; but previous to Professor Hall's discovery they were\nknown only as animals attached by flexible stems to the sea-bottom or\ncreeping slowly by means of their radiating arms. It was not suspected\nthat any of them had committed themselves to the mercy of the\ncurrents, suspended from floats. It appears, however, that this was\nactually realized in the Upper Silurian period, when certain animals\nof this group developed a hollow calcareous vesicle forming a\nballoon-shaped float, from which they could hang suspended in the\nwater and float freely (see Fig. 17). So far as known, this\nremarkable contrivance was temporary, and probably adapted to some\npeculiarities of the habits and food of these animals occurring only\nin the geological period in which they existed.\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 17.\n\n    _Camerocrinus_, reduced in size (as restored by Hall). This is\n    a crinoid, or feather-star, of the Upper Silurian period,\n    floating by means of a hollow balloon-shaped structure divided\n    into chambers and formed of calcareous plates.]\n\nExamples of this sort of adjustment are found in other types of animal\nlife. In the beautiful Portuguese man-of-war (_Physalia_) and its\nallies flotation is provided for by membranous or cartilaginous sacs\nor vesicles filled with air, and which are the common support of\nnumerous individuals which hang from them (see Fig. 18). In some\nallied creatures the buoyancy required is secured by little vesicles\nfilled with oil secreted by the animals themselves.\n\nIn each of these cases we have a skilful adaptation of means to ends.\nThe float is so constructed as to avail itself of the properties of\ngases and liquids, and the apparatus is framed on the most scientific\nprinciples and in the most artistic manner. That this apparatus grows\nand is not mechanically put together, and that in each case the\ninstincts and the habits of the animal have been correlated with it,\ncan scarcely be held by the most obtuse intellect to invalidate the\nevidence of intelligent design.\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 18.\n\n    The _Physalia_, or \"Portuguese man-of-war\" of the Atlantic,\n    being a colony of animals provided with long tentacles used as\n    fishing-lines, and hanging from a membranous float with a\n    crest, or \"sail,\" on the top, and a pointed end which, being\n    turned from side to side, serves as a rudder.]\n\n3. Structures apparently the most simple, and often heedlessly spoken\nof as if they involved no complexity, prove, on examination, to be\nintricate and complex almost beyond conception. In nothing, perhaps,\nis this better seen than in that much-abused protoplasm which has been\nmade to do duty for God in the origination of life, but which is\nitself a most laboriously manufactured material. Albumen, or white of\negg--which is otherwise named \"protoplasm\"--is a very complicated\nsubstance both chemically and in its molecular arrangements, and when\nendowed with life it presents properties altogether inscrutable. It is\neasy to say that the protoplasm of an egg or of some humble animalcule\nor microscopic embryo is little more than a mass of structureless\njelly; yet, in the case of the embryo, a microscopic dot of this\napparently structureless jelly must contain all the parts of the\nfuture animal, however complex; but how we may never know, and\ncertainly cannot yet comprehend.\n\nThere are minute animalcules belonging to the group of flagellate\nInfusoria, some of which, under ordinary microscopic powers, appear\nmerely as moving specks, and show their actual structures only under\npowers of two thousand diameters, or more; yet these animals can be\nseen to have an outer skin and an inner mass, to have pulsating sacs\nand reproductive organs, and threadlike flagella wherewith to swim.\nTheir eggs are, of course, much smaller than themselves--so much so\nthat some of them are probably invisible under the highest powers yet\nemployed. Each of them, however, is potentially an animal, with all\nits parts represented structurally in some way. Nor need we wonder at\nthis. It has been calculated that a speck scarcely visible under the\nmost powerful microscope may contain two million four hundred thousand\nmolecules of protoplasm.[13] If each of these molecules were a brick,\nthere would be enough of them to build a terrace of twenty-five good\ndwelling-houses. But this is supposing them to be all alike; whereas\nwe know that the molecules of albumen are capable of being of very\nvarious kinds. Each of these molecules really contains eight hundred\nand eighty-two ultimate atoms--namely, four hundred of carbon, three\nhundred and ten of hydrogen, one hundred and twenty of oxygen, fifty\nof nitrogen, and two of sulphur and phosphorus. Now, we know that\nthese atoms may be differently arranged in different molecules,\nproducing considerable difference of properties. Let us try, then, to\ncalculate of how many differences of arrangement the atoms of one\nmolecule of protoplasm are susceptible, and then to calculate of how\nmany changes these different assemblages are capable in a microscopic\ndot composed of two million four hundred thousand of them. It is\nscarcely necessary to say that such a calculation, in the multitudes\nof possibilities involved, transcends human powers of imagination; yet\nit answers questions of mechanical and chemical grouping merely,\nwithout any reference to the additional mystery of life. Let it be\nobserved that this vastly complex material is assumed as if there were\nnothing remarkable in it, by many of those theorists who plausibly\nexplain to us the spontaneous origin of living things. But nature, in\narranging all the parts of a complicated animal beforehand in an\napparently structureless microscopic ovum, has all these vast numbers\nto deal with in working out the exact result; and this not in one case\nmerely, but in multitudes of cases involving the most varied\ncombinations. We can scarcely suppose the atoms themselves to have the\npower of thus unerringly marshalling themselves to work out the\nstructures of organisms infinitely varied, yet all alike after their\nkinds. If not, then \"Nature\" must be a goddess gifted with superhuman\npowers of calculation and marvellous deftness in arranging invisible\natoms.\n\n4. The beauty of form, proportion, and coloring that abounds in nature\naffords evidence of mind. Herculean efforts have been made by modern\nevolutionists to eliminate altogether the idea of beauty from nature,\nby theories of sexual selection and the like, and to persuade us that\nbeauty is merely utility in disguise, and even then only an accidental\ncoincidence between our perceptions and certain external things. But\nin no part of their argument have they more signally failed in\naccounting for the observed facts, and in no part have they more\nseriously outraged the common sense and natural taste of men. In point\nof fact, we have here one of those great correlations belonging to the\nunity of nature--that indissoluble connection which has been\nestablished between the senses and the \u00e6sthetic sentiments of man and\ncertain things in the external world. But there is more in beauty than\nthis merely anthropological relation. Certain forms, for example,\nadopted in the skeletons of the lower animals are necessarily\nbeautiful because of their geometrical proportions. Certain styles of\ncoloring are necessarily beautiful because of harmonies and contrasts\nwhich depend on the essential properties of the waves of light. Beauty\nis thus in a great measure independent of the taste of the spectator.\nIt is also independent of mere utility, since, even if we admit that\nall these combinations of forms, motions, and colors which we call\nbeautiful are also useful, it is easy to perceive that the end could\noften be attained without the beauty.\n\nIt is a curious fact that some of the simplest animals--as, for\nexample, sponges and Foraminifera,--are furnished with the most\nbeautiful skeletons. Nothing can exceed the beauty of form and\nproportions in the shells of some Foraminifera and Polycistina, or in\nthe skeletons of some silicious sponges (see Fig. 19), while it is\nobvious that these humble creatures, without brains and external\nsenses, can neither contrive nor appreciate the beauty with which they\nare clothed. Further, some of these structures are very old\ngeologically. The sponge whose skeleton his known as \"Venus's\nflower-basket\" produces a structure of interwoven silicious threads\nexquisite in its beauty and perfect in its mechanical arrangements\nfor strength (Figure 20). Even in the old Cambrian rocks there are\nremains of sponges which seem already to have practically solved the\ngeometrical problems involved in the production of these wonderful\nskeletons; and with a Chinese-like persistency, having attained to\nperfection, they have adhered to it throughout geological time. Nor is\nthere anything of mere inorganic crystallization in this. The silica\nof which the skeletons are made is colloidal, not crystalline, and the\nforms themselves have no relations to the crystalline axes of silica.\nSuch illustrations might be multiplied to any extent, and apply to all\nthe beauties of form, structure, and coloring which abound around us\nand far excel our artificial imitations of them.\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 19.\n\n    Magnified portion of a silicious sponge, showing the principle\n    of construction of the hexactinellid sponges, with six-rayed\n    spicules joined together and strengthened with diagonal\n    braces. (_After Zittel._)]\n\n    [Illustration: FIG. 20.\n\n    _Euplectella_, or \"Venus's flower-basket,\" a silicious sponge,\n    showing its general form. (Reduced, from _Am. Naturalist_,\n    vol. iv.)]\n\n5. The instincts of the lower animals imply a Higher Intelligence.\nInstinct, in the theistic view of nature, can be nothing less than a\ndivine inspiration placing the animal in relation with other things\nand processes, often of the most complex character, and which it could\nby no means have devised for itself. Further, instinct is in its very\nessence a thing unimprovable. Like the laws of nature, it operates\ninvariably; and if diminished or changed, it would prove useless for\nits purpose. It is not, like human inventions, slowly perfected under\nthe influence of thought and imagination, and laboriously taught by\neach generation to its successors: it is inherited by each generation\nin all its perfection, and from the first goes directly to its end as\nif it were a merely physical cause.\n\nThe favorite explanation of instinct from the side of Agnostic\nEvolution is that it originated in the struggle for existence of some\nprevious generation, and was then perpetuated as an inheritance. But,\nlike most of the other explanations of this school, this quietly takes\nfor granted what should be proved. That instinct is hereditary is\nevident; but the question is, How did it begin? and to say simply that\nit did begin at some former period is to tell us nothing. From a\nscientific point of view, the invariable operation of any natural law\naffords no evidence of any gradual or sudden origination of it at any\npoint of past time; and when such law is connected with a complicated\norganism and various other laws and processes of the external world,\nthe supposition of its slowly arising from nothing through many\ngenerations of animals becomes too intricate to be credible. Instinct\nmust have originated in a perfect condition, and with the organism and\nits environment already established. I may borrow here an apposite\nillustration from recent papers on the unity of nature by the Duke of\nArgyll, which deserve careful study by any one who values common-sense\nviews of this subject. The example which I select is that of the\naction of a young merganser in its effort to elude pursuit:\n\n\"On a secluded lake in one of the Hebrides, I observed a dun-diver, or\nfemale of the red-breasted merganser (_Mergus serrator_), with her\nbrood of young ducklings. On giving chase in the boat we soon found\nthat the young, although not above a fortnight old, had such\nextraordinary powers of swimming and diving that it was almost\nimpossible to capture them. The distance they went under water, and\nthe unexpected places in which they emerged, baffled all our efforts\nfor a considerable time. At last one of the brood made for the shore,\nwith the object of hiding among the grass and heather which fringed\nthe margin of the lake. We pursued it as closely as we could; but when\nthe little bird gained the shore, our boat was still about twenty\nyards off. Long drought had left a broad margin of small flat stones\nand mud between the water and the usual bank. I saw the little bird\nrun up about a couple of yards from the water, and then suddenly\ndisappear. Knowing what was likely to be enacted, I kept my eye fixed\non the spot; and when the boat was run upon the beach, I proceeded to\nfind and pick up the chick. But, on reaching the place of\ndisappearance, no sign of the young merganser was to be seen. The\nclosest scrutiny, with the certain knowledge that it was there, failed\nto enable me to detect it. Proceeding cautiously forward, I soon\nbecame convinced that I had already overshot the mark; and, on turning\nround, it was only to see the bird rise like an apparition from the\nstones and, dashing past the stranded boat, regain the lake, where,\nhaving now recovered its wind, it instantly dived and disappeared. The\ntactical skill of the whole of this manoeuvre, and the success with\nwhich it was executed, were greeted with loud cheers from the whole\nparty; and our admiration was not diminished when we remembered that,\nsome two weeks before that time, the little performer had been coiled\nup inside the shell of an egg, and that about a month before it was\napparently nothing but a mass of albumen and of fatty oils.\"\n\nOn this the duke very properly remarks that any idea of training and\nexperience is absolutely excluded, because it \"assumes the\npre-existence of the very powers for which it professes to account.\"\nHe then turns to the idea that animals are merely automata or\n\"machines.\" Here it is to be observed that the essential idea of a\nmachine is twofold. First, it is a merely mechanical structure put\ntogether to do certain things; secondly, it must be related to a\ncontriver and constructor. If we think proper to call the young\nmerganser a machine, we must admit both of these characters, more\nespecially as the bird is in every way a more marvellous machine than\nany of human construction. He concludes his notice of this case with\nthe following suggestive words:\n\n\"This is a method of escape which cannot be resorted to successfully\nexcept by birds whose coloring is adapted to the purpose by a close\nassimilation with the coloring of surrounding objects. The old bird\nwould not have been concealed on the same ground, and would never\nitself resort to the same method of escape. The young, therefore,\ncannot have been instructed in it by the method of example. But\nthe small size of the chick, together with its obscure and\ncuriously-mottled coloring, are specially adapted to this mode of\nconcealment. The young of all birds which breed upon the ground are\nprovided with a garment in such perfect harmony with surrounding\neffects of light as to render this manoeuvre easy. It depends, however,\nwholly for its success upon absolute stillness. The slightest motion at\nonce attracts the eye of any enemy which is searching for the young.\nAnd this absolute stillness must be preserved amidst all the emotions\nof fear and terror which the close approach of the object of alarm\nmust, and obviously does, inspire. Whence comes this splendid, even if\nit be unconscious, faith in the sufficiency of a defence which it must\nrequire such nerve and strength of will to practise? No movement, not\neven the slightest, though the enemy should seem about to trample on\nit,--such is the terrible requirement of nature, and by the child of\nnature implicitly obeyed. Here, again, beyond all question, we have an\ninstinct as much born with the creature as the harmonious tinting of\nits plumage, the external furnishing being inseparably united with the\ninternal furnishing of mind which enables the little creature in very\ntruth to 'walk by faith, and not by sight.' Is this automatism? Is this\nmachinery? Yes, undoubtedly, in the sense explained before--that the\ninstinct has been given to the bird in precisely the same sense in\nwhich its structure has been given to it; so that anterior to all\nexperience, and without the aid of instruction or of example, it is\ninspired to act in this manner on the appropriate occasion arising.\"\n\nLastly, the reason of man himself is an actual illustration of mind in\nnature. Here we raise a question which should perhaps have been\nconsidered earlier: Is man himself actually a part of what we call\nnature? We are so accustomed to the distinction between things natural\nand things artificial that we are liable to overlook this essential\nquestion. Is nature the universe outside of us, containing the things\nthat we study and which constitute our environment? Are we elevated on\na pedestal, so to speak, above nature? or, on the other hand, does\nnature include man himself? In that haze or fog of ideas which\nenvirons modern evolutionism, it is not wonderful that this question\nescapes notice, and that the most contradictory utterances are given\nforth. Tyndall--by no means the most foggy of the agnostics--may\nafford an instance. He remarks respecting the philosophers of\nantiquity:[14] \"The experiences which formed the weft and woof of\ntheir theories were drawn, not from the study of nature, but from that\nwhich lay much closer to them-the observation of man.... Their\ntheories accordingly took an anthropomorphic form.\" Here we see that\nin the view of the writer man is distinct from and outside of nature,\nand so much out of harmony with it that the observation of him leads\nto false conclusions, stigmatized, accordingly, as \"anthropomorphic.\"\nIn this case man must be supernatural, and preternatural as well. But\nit is Tyndall's precise object to show us that there is nothing\nsupernatural either in man or elsewhere. The contradiction is an\ninstructive example of the delusions which sometimes pass for science.\n\nIf, with Tyndall, we are to place man outside of nature, then the\nhuman mind at once becomes to us a supernatural intelligence. But\ntruth forbids such a conclusion. The reason of man, however beyond the\nintelligence of lower animals, so harmonizes with natural laws that\nit is evidently a part of the great unity of nature, and we can no\nmore dissociate the mind of man from nature than from his own animal\nbody. If we could do so, we might have ground to distrust the validity\nof all our conclusions as to nature, and thus to cut away the\nfoundations of science; and what remained of philosophy and religion\nwould be preternatural, in the bad sense of destroying the unity of\nnature and imperilling our confidence in the unity of the Creator\nhimself.\n\nIn connection with this we have cause to consider the true meaning and\nuse of two terms often hurled at theists as weapons of attack.\n\nThe word \"anthropomorphic\" is a term of reproach for our interpreting\nnature in harmony with our own thoughts or our own constitution. But\nif man is a part of nature, he must be a competent interpreter of it.\nIf he is not a part of nature, then, whether we make him godlike or a\ndemon, we have, in him, to deal with something supernatural. It is\ntrue that in a certain sense he is above nature, but not in any sense\nwhich so dissociates him from it as to prevent him from rationally\nthinking of it in his own thoughts and speaking of it in his own form\nof words. So true is this that no writers are more anthropomorphic in\ntheir modes of speaking of nature than those who most strongly\ndenounce anthropomorphism. Even the celebrated definition of life by\nHerbert Spencer cannot escape this tincture. \"Life,\" he says, \"is the\ncontinuous adjustment of internal to external conditions.\" Now, the\nessence of this definition lies in the word \"adjustment.\" But to\nadjust is to arrange, adapt, or fit--all purely human and intelligent\nactions. Nothing, therefore, could be more anthropomorphic than such a\nstatement. As theists we need not complain of this, but surely as\nagnostics we should decidedly object to it.\n\nThe other word whose meaning it is necessary to consider is\n\"supernatural,\" which it might be well, perhaps, to follow the example\nof the New Testament in avoiding altogether as a misleading term. If\nby supernatural we mean something outside of and above nature and\nnatural law, there is really no such thing in the universe. There may\nbe that which is \"spiritual,\" as distinguished from that which is\nnatural in the material sense; but the spiritual has its own laws,\nwhich are not in conflict with those of the natural. Even God cannot\nin this sense be said to be supernatural, since his will is\nnecessarily in conformity with natural law. Yet this absurd sense of\nthe term \"supernatural\" is constantly forced upon us by so-called\nadvanced thinkers, and employed as an argument against theism. The\nonly true sense in which any being or any thing can be said to be\nsupernatural is that in which we use it with reference to the original\ncreation of matter and force and the institution of natural law. The\npower which can do these things is above nature, but not outside of\nit; for matter, energy, and law must be included in, and in harmony\nwith, the Creative Will.\n\nTo return from this digression. If man is a part of nature, we can see\nhow it is that he conforms to natural law, not merely in his bodily\norganization and capabilities, but in his mind and habits of thought,\nso that he can comprehend nature and employ it for his purposes. Even\nhis moral and his religious ideas must in this case be conformed to\nhis conditions of existence as a part of nature. We have here also the\nsurest guarantee of the correctness of our conclusions respecting the\nlaws of nature. In like manner, there is here a sense in which man is\nabove nature, because he is placed at the head of it. In another\nsense he is inferior to the aggregate of nature, because, as Agassiz\nwell puts it, there is in the universe a \"wealth of endowment of the\nmost comprehensive mental manifestations which man can never fully\ncomprehend.\"\n\nStill further, if the universe has been created, then, just as its\nlaws must be in harmony with the will of the Creator, so must our\nmental constitution; and man, as a reasoning and conscious being, must\nbe made in the image of his Maker. If we discard the idea of an\nintelligent Creator, then mind and all its powers must be potentially\nin the atoms of matter or in the forces which move them; but this is a\nmere form of words signifying nothing, or, if it has any significance,\nthis is contrary to science, since it bestows on matter properties\nwhich experiment does not show it to possess. Thus the existence of\nman is not only a positive proof of the presence of mind in nature,\nbut affords the strongest possible proof of a higher Creative Mind,\nfrom which that of man emanates. The power which originated and\nsustains the universe must be at least as much greater and more\nintelligent than man as the universe is greater than man in the power\nand the contrivance which it indicates. Thus we return to the Pauline\nidea--that the power and the divinity of the Creator are shown by the\nthings he has made. Legitimate science can say nothing more, and can\nsay nothing less.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[12] As _Piloceras_, for example.\n\n[13] I am indebted for these figures to my friend Dr. S. P. Robins of\nMontreal.\n\n[14] Belfast Address.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE VI.\n\nSCIENCE AND REVELATION.\n\n\nThus far we have proceeded solely on scientific grounds, and have seen\nthat Monism and Agnosticism fail to account for nature. We may\ntherefore feel ourselves justified in assuming, as the only promising\nsolution of the enigma of existence, the being of a Divine Creator.\nBut this does not wholly exhaust the relations of science to religion.\nWhen Science has led us into the presence of the Creator, she has\nbrought us to the threshold of religion, and there she suggests the\npossibility that the spirit of man may have other relations with God\nbeyond those established by merely physical law. Science may venture\nto say: \"If all nature expresses the will of the Creator as carried\nout in his laws, if the instinct of lower animals is an inspiration of\nGod, should we not expect that there will be laws of a higher order\nregulating the free moral nature of man, and that there will be\npossibilities of the reason of man communicating with, or receiving\naid from, the Supreme Intelligence?\" Science undoubtedly suggests this\nmuch to our reason, and the suggestion has commended itself to most of\nthe greater and clearer minds that have studied nature, whatever their\nreligious beliefs or their want of them.\n\nIt may thus be allowable for us, without encroaching on the domain of\ntheology, to inquire to what extent scientific principles and\nscientific habits of thought agree with or diverge from the religious\nbeliefs of men. I do not propose to enter here into the inquiry as to\nthe accordance of the Bible with the earth's geological history, or\nthat of its representations of nature with the facts as held by\nscience. These subjects I have fully discussed in other works, which\nare sufficiently accessible.[15] I shall merely refer to certain\ngeneral relations of science to the probability of a divine\nrevelation, and to the character of such revelation.\n\nAs to what is termed natural religion, enough has already been said.\nIf nature testifies to the being of God, and if the reason and the\nconscience implanted in man, \"accusing and excusing\" one another,\nconstitute a law of God within him, regulating in some degree his\nrelations to God and to his fellow-men, we have a sufficient basis for\nthe natural religion which more or less actuates the conduct of every\nhuman being. The case is different with revealed religion. Here we\nhave an apparent interference on the part of the Creator with his own\nwork, an additional intervention in one department to effect results\nwhich elsewhere are worked out by the ordinary operation of natural\nlaw. In revelation, therefore, we may have something, quite out of the\nordinary course of nature. On the other hand, it is possible that even\nhere we may have something more in harmony with natural laws than at\nfirst sight appears.\n\nIt cannot truly be said that a revelation from God to man is\nimprobable from the point of view of science. Physical laws and brute\ninstincts are in their nature unvarying, and neither require nor admit\nof intervention. But the reason and the will of free agents are in\nthis respect different. Though necessarily under law, they can judge\nand decide between one law and another, and can even evade or\ncounteract one law by employing another, or can resolve to be\ndisobedient. Rational free agents may thus enter into courses not in\nharmony with their own interests or their relations to their\nsurroundings. Hence, so soon as it pleased God to introduce in any\npart of the universe a free rational will gifted with certain powers\nover lower nature, only two courses were possible: either God must\nleave such free agent wholly to his own devices, making him a god on a\nsmall scale, and so far practically abdicating in his favor, or he\nmust place him under some law, and this not of the nature of mere\nphysical compulsion--which, on the hypothesis, would be\ninadmissible--but in the nature of requirements addressed to his\nreason and his conscience. Hence we might infer _a priori_ the\nprobability of some sort of communication between God and man.\nFurther, did we find such rational creature beginning, on his\nintroduction into the world, to mar the face of nature, to inflict\nunnecessary suffering or injury on lower creatures or on members of\nhis own species, to disregard the moral instincts implanted in him, or\nto disown the God who had created him, we should still more distinctly\nperceive the need of revelation. This would in such case be no more\nat variance with science or with natural law than the education given\nby wise parents to their children, or the laws promulgated by a wise\ngovernment for the guidance of its subjects, both of which are, and\nare intended to be, interventions affecting the ordinary course of\naffairs.\n\nOf necessity, all this proceeds on the supposition that there is a\nGod. But in certain discussions now prevalent as to the \"origin of\nreligion,\" it is customary quietly to assume that there is no God to\nbe known, and consequently that religion must be a mere gratuitous\ninvention of man. It is not too much to say, however, that any\nscientific conception of the unity of nature and of man's place in it\nmust forbid our making atheistic assumptions. If man were a mere\nproduct of blind, unintelligent chance, the idea of a God was not\nlikely ever to have occurred to him, still less to have become the\ncommon property of all races of men. In like manner, there is no\nscientific basis for the assumption that man originated in a low and\nbestial type, and that his religion developed itself by degrees from\nthe instincts of lower animals, from which man is supposed to have\noriginated. Such suppositions are unscientific (1) because no ancient\nremains of such low forms of man are known; (2) because the lowest\ntypes of man now extant can be proved to be degraded descendants of\nhigher types; (3) because, if man had originated in a low condition,\nthis would not have diminished the probability of a divine revelation\nbeing given to promote his elevation.\n\nOn the other hand, it is a sad reality that man tends to sink from\nhigh ideal morality and reason into debasing vices and gross\nsuperstitions that are not natural, but which, on the contrary, place\nhim at variance with natural as well as with moral law. Thus the\nactual and the possible debasement of man, instead of proving his\nbestial origin, only increases the need of a divine revelation for his\nimprovement.\n\nBut, supposing the need of a revelation to be admitted, other\nquestions might arise as to its mode. Here the anticipations of\nscience would be guided by the analogy of nature. We should suppose\nthat the revelation would be made through the medium of the beings it\nwas intended to affect. It would be a revelation impressed on human\nminds and expressed in human language. It might be in the form of\nlaws with penalties attached, or in that of persuasions addressed to\nthe reason and the sentiments. It would probably be gradual and\nprogressive--at first simple, and later more complex and complete. It\nwould thus become historical, and would be related to the stages of\nthat progress which it was intended to promote. It would necessarily\nbe incomplete, more especially in its earlier portions, and it would\nalways be under the necessity of more or less rudely representing\ndivine and heavenly things by earthly figures. Being human in its\nmedium, it would have the characteristics and the idiosyncrasies of\nman to a certain extent, except in so far as it might please God to\ncommunicate it directly through a perfect humanity identified with\ndivinity, or through higher and more perfect intelligences than man.\n\nWe should further expect that such revelation would not conflict with\nwhat is good in natural religion or in the natural emotions and\nsentiments of man; that it would not contradict natural facts or laws;\nand that it would take advantage of the familiar knowledge of mankind\nin order to illustrate such higher spiritual truths as cannot be\nexpressed in human language. Such a revelation would of necessity\nrequire that we should receive it in faith, but faith resting on\nevidence derived from things known, and from the analogy of the\nrevelation itself with what God reveals in nature. It would be no valid\nobjection to such a revelation to say that it is anthropomorphic,\nsince, in the nature of the case, it must come through man and be\nsuited to man; nor would it be any valid objection that it is\nfigurative, for truth as to spiritual realities must always be\nexpressed in terms of known phenomena of the natural world.\n\nIt has been objected, though not on behalf of science, that such a\nrevelation, if it related to things discoverable by man, would be\nuseless, while, if it related to things not discoverable, it could not\nbe understood. This is, however, a mere play upon words, and reminds\none of the doctrine attributed to the Arabian caliph with reference to\nthe Alexandrian Library: If its books contain what is written in the\nKoran, they are useless; if anything different, they are injurious;\ntherefore let them be destroyed. It would indeed be subversive of all\neducation, human as well as divine; for the essence of this is to take\nadvantage of what the pupil knows, and to build on it acquirements\nwhich, unaided, he could not have attained.\n\nBut, though all may agree as to the possibility, or even the\nprobability, of a revelation, many may dissent from particular dogmas\ncontained in or implied by the particular form of revelation in which\nChristians believe. It is true that this dissent is based, not so much\non science as on alleged opposition to human sentiments; but it is\nmore or less supposed to be reinforced by scientific facts and laws.\nOf doctrines supposed to be objectionable from these points of view, I\nmay name the reality of miracles and of prophecy; the efficacy of\nprayer and of atonement or sacrifice; and the permanence of the\nconsequences of sin. Admitting that these doctrines are not original\ndiscoveries of man, but revealed to him, and that they are not founded\non science, it may nevertheless be easily shown that they are in\nharmony with the analogy of nature in a greater degree than either\ntheir friends or their opponents usually suppose.\n\nMiracles--or \"signs,\" as they are more properly called in the New\nTestament--are sometimes stated to imply suspension of natural law. If\nthey were such, and were alleged to be produced by any power short of\nthat of the Lawmaker himself, they would be incredible; and if\nasserted to be by his power, they would be so far incredible as\nimplying changeableness, and therefore imperfection. It may be\naffirmed, however, of the miracles recorded in Scripture, that they do\nnot require suspension of natural laws, but merely modifications of\nthe operation and peculiar interactions of these. Many of them,\nindeed, profess to be merely unusual natural effects arranged for\nspecial purposes, and depending for their miraculous character on\ntheir appositeness in time to certain circumstances. This is the case,\nfor instance, with the plagues of Egypt, the crossing of the Red Sea,\nand the supply of quails to the Israelites. Miracles, whether\nperformed as attestations of revelation or as works of mercy or of\njudgment, belong to the domain of natural law, but to those operations\nof it which are beyond human control or foresight. Their nature in\nthis respect we can understand by considering the many operations\npossible to civilized men which may appear miraculous to a savage, and\nwhich, from his point of view, may be amply sufficient as evidence of\nthe superior knowledge and power of him who performs them. That one\nman should be able instantaneously to transmit his thoughts to another\nsituated a thousand miles away was, until the invention of the\nelectric telegraph, impossible. The actual performance of such an\noperation would have been as much a miracle as the communication of\nthought from one planet to another would be now. But if man can thus\nwork miracles, why should not the Almighty do so, when higher moral\nends are to be served by apparent interference with the ordinary\ncourse of matter and force? Admitting the existence of God, physical\nscience can have nothing to say against miracles. On the contrary, it\ncan assure us of the probability that if God reveals himself to us at\nall by natural means, such revelation will probably be miraculous.\n\nIf the possibility of God communicating with his rational creatures be\nconceded, then the objections taken to prophecy lose all value. If\nanything known to God and unknown to man can be revealed, things past\nand future may be revealed as well as things present. Science abounds\nin prophecy. All through the geological history there have been\nprophetic types, mute witnesses to coming facts. Minute disturbances\nof heavenly bodies, altogether inappreciable by the ordinary\nobserver, enable the astronomer to predict the discovery of new\nplanets. A line in a spectrum, without significance to the\nuninitiated, foretells a new element. The merest fragment, sufficient\nonly for microscopic examination, enables the pal\u00e6ontologist to\ndescribe to incredulous auditors some organism altogether unknown in\nits entire structures. What possible reason can there be for excluding\nsuch indications of the past and the future from a revelation made by\nhim who knows perfectly the end from the beginning, and to whom the\nfuture results of human actions to the end of time must be as evident\nas the simplest train of causes and effects is to us? It is Huxley, I\nthink, who says that if the laws affecting human conduct were fully\nknown to us, it would have been possible to calculate a thousand years\nago the exact state of affairs in Britain at this moment. Probably\nsuch a calculation might be too complicated for us, even if the data\nwere given; but it cannot be too complicated for the Divine Mind, and\npossibly might even be mastered by some intelligences in the universe\nsubject to God, but higher than man.\n\nThat there should be suffering at all in the universe is, no doubt, a\nmysterious thing; but the fact is evident, and certain benefits which\nflow from it are also evident. Indeed, we fail to see how a world of\nsentient beings could continue to exist, unless the penalty of\nsuffering were attached to natural law. Further, all such penalties\nare, in consequence of the permanence of matter and the conservation\nof force, necessarily permanent, unless in cases where some reaction\nsets in under the influence of some other law or force than that which\nbrings the penalty. Even in this case, the effect of any violation of\nany natural law is eternal and infinite. No sane man doubts this in\nthe case of what may be called sins against natural laws; but many,\nwith strange inconsistency, doubt and disbelieve it in the higher\ndomain of morals. If we were for a moment to admit the materialist's\ndoctrine that appetites, passions, and sentiments are merely effects\nof physical changes in nerve-cells, then we should be shut up to the\nconclusion that the effects of any derangement of these must be\nperpetual and coextensive with the universe. Why should it be\notherwise in things belonging to the domains of reason and conscience?\nFurther, if natural laws are the expression of the will of the\nCreator, and if these unfailingly assert themselves, and must do so,\nin order to the permanence of the material universe, would not analogy\nteach that, unless the Supreme Being is wholly bound up in material\nprocesses, and is altogether indifferent to moral considerations, the\nsame regularity and constancy must prevail in the spiritual world?\n\nThis question is closely connected with the ideas of sacrifice and\natonement. Nothing is more certain in physics than that action and\nreaction are equal, and that no effect can be produced without an\nadequate cause. It results from this that every action must involve a\ncorresponding expenditure of matter and force. Anything else would be\npure magic; which, we know, is nonsense. Thus every intervention on\nbehalf of others must imply a corresponding sacrifice. We cannot raise\na fallen child or aid the poor or the hungry without a sacrifice of\npower or means proportioned to the result. So, in the moral world,\ndegradation cannot be remedied nor punishment averted without\ncorresponding sacrifice; and this, it may be, on the part of those who\nare in no degree blameworthy. If men have fallen into moral evil and\nGod proposes to elevate them from this condition, this must be done\nby some corresponding expenditure of force, else we have one of those\nmiracles which would imply a subversion of law of the most portentous\nkind. The moral stimulus given by the sacrifice itself is a secondary\nconsideration to this great law of equivalency of cause and effect.\nThere is, therefore, a perfect conformity to natural analogy in the\nChristian idea of the substitution of the pure and perfect Man for the\nsinner, as well as in that of the putting forth of the divine power\nmanifested in him to raise and restore the fallen.\n\nThe efficacy of prayer is one of the last things that a scientific\nnaturalist should question, if he is at the same time a theist. Prayer\nis itself one of the laws of nature, and one of those that show in the\nfinest way how higher laws override and modify those that are lower.\nThe young ravens, we are told, cry to God; and so they literally do;\nand their cry is answered, for the parent-ravens, cruel and voracious,\nunder the impulse of a God-given instinct range over land and water\nand exhaust every energy that they may satisfy that cry. The bleat of\nthe lamb will not only meet with response from the mother-ewe, but\nwill even exercise a physiological effect in promoting the secretion\nof milk in her udder. The mother who hears the cry of her child,\ncrushed under some weighty thing which has fallen on it, will never\npause to consider that it is the law of gravitation which has caused\nthe accident; she will defy the law of gravitation, and if necessary\nwill pray any one who is near to help her. Prayer, in short, is a\nnatural power so important that without it the young of most of the\nhigher animals would have little chance of life; and it triumphs over\nalmost every other natural law which may stand in its way. If, then,\nirrational animals can overcome the forces of dead nature in answer to\nprayer; if man himself, in answer to the cry of distress, can do\nthings in ordinary circumstances almost impossible,--how foolish is it\nto suppose that this link of connection cannot subsist between God and\nhis rational offspring! One wonders that any man of science should for\na moment entertain such an idea, if, indeed, he has any belief\nwhatever in the existence of a God.\n\nThere is another aspect of prayer insisted on in revelation on which\nthe observation of nature throws some light. In the case of animals,\nthere must be a certain relation between the one that prays and the\none that answers--a filial relation, perhaps--and in any case there\nmust be a correspondence between the language of prayer and the\nemotions of the creature appealed to. Except in a few cases where\nhuman training has modified instinct, the cry of one species of animal\nawakes no response in another of a different kind. So prayer to God\nmust be in the Spirit of God. It must also be the cry of real need,\nand with reference to needs which have his sympathy. There is a prayer\nwhich never reaches God, or which is even an abomination to him; and\nthere is prayer prompted by the indwelling Spirit of God, which cannot\nbe uttered in human words, yet will surely be answered. All this is so\nperfectly in accordance with natural analogies, that it strikes one\nacquainted with nature as almost a matter of course.\n\nIn tracing these analogies, I do not desire to imply that natural\nscience can itself teach us religion, or that it is to afford the test\nof what is true in spiritual things. I have merely wished to direct\nattention to obvious analogies between things natural and things\nspiritual, which show that there is no such antagonism between\nscience and revelation as many suppose, and that, in grand essential\nlaws and principles, it may be true that earth is\n\n     \"But the shadow of heaven, and things therein\n     Each to the other like more than on earth is thought.\"\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[15] More especially in _The Origin of the World_ (London and New\nYork, 1877).\n\n\nTHE END.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\nObvious typographical errors were repaired. Hyphenation variants used\nequally were retained (back-bone and backbone, thread-like and\nthreadlike).\n\nOriginal had chapter title pages before the start of each chapter,\nresulting in duplication of chapter titles. Those duplications have\nbeen removed.\n\nOriginal contents erroneously indicated Lecture VI began on page 217.\nThis has been corrected to page 219.","title":"Facts and fancies in modern science: Studies of the relations of science to prevalent speculations and religious belief","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":40880}