{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_4280/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_4280","id":"gutenberg_4280","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4280","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Causation","Knowledge, Theory of","Philosophy","Philosophy, German","Reason"],"text":"[Illustration]\n\n\nThe Critique of Pure Reason\n\nBy Immanuel Kant\n\nTranslated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn\n\n\n\n\nContents\n\n Preface to the First Edition (1781)\n\n Preface to the Second Edition (1787)\n\n Introduction\n\n I. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge\n\n II. The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State, is in\n Possession of Certain Cognitions \u201c\u00e0 priori\u201d.\n\n III. Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall Determine the\n Possibility, Principles, and Extent of Human Knowledge \u201c\u00e0 priori\u201d\n\n IV. Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements.\n\n V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements \u201c\u00e0\n priori\u201d are contained as Principles.\n\n VI. The Universal Problem of Pure Reason.\n\n VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the Name of a\n Critique of Pure Reason.\n\n\n I. Transcendental Doctrine of Elements\n\n\n First Part\u2014TRANSCENDENTAL \u00c6STHETIC\n\n\n \u00a7 1. Introductory\n\n\n SECTION I. OF SPACE\n\n\n \u00a7 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.\n\n \u00a7 3. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space.\n\n \u00a7 4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions.\n\n\n SECTION II. OF TIME\n\n\n \u00a7 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.\n\n \u00a7 6. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time.\n\n \u00a7 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions.\n\n \u00a7 8. Elucidation.\n\n \u00a7 9. General Remarks on Transcendental \u00c6sthetic.\n\n \u00a7 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental \u00c6sthetic.\n\n\n Second Part\u2014TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC\n\n\n Introduction. Idea of a Transcendental Logic\n\n\n I. Of Logic in General\n\n II. Of Transcendental Logic\n\n III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic\n\n IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental\n Analytic and Dialectic\n\n\n FIRST DIVISION\u2014TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC\n\n\n BOOK I. Analytic of Conceptions. \u00a7 2\n\n\n Chapter I. Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure\n Conceptions of the Understanding\n\n\n Introductory \u00a7 3\n\n Section I. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in General. \u00a7 4\n\n Section II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in\n Judgements. \u00a7 5\n\n Section III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or\n Categories. \u00a7 6\n\n\n Chapter II. Of the Deduction of the Pure Conception of the\n Understanding\n\n\n Section I. Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in general\n \u00a7 9\n\n Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. \u00a7 10\n\n Section II Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceptions of the\n Understanding.\n\n Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold representations\n given by Sense. \u00a7 11.\n\n Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. \u00a7 12\n\n The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the highest\n Principle of all exercise of the Understanding. \u00a7 13\n\n What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. \u00a7 14\n\n The Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the Objective Unity of\n Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein. \u00a7 15\n\n All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions\n under which alone the manifold Content of them can be united in one\n Consciousness. \u00a7 16\n\n Observation. \u00a7 17\n\n In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is the only\n legitimate use of the Category. \u00a7 18\n\n Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in\n general. \u00a7 20\n\n Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible employment in\n experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. \u00a7 22\n\n Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Understanding. \u00a7 23\n\n\n BOOK II. Analytic of Principles\n\n\n INTRODUCTION. Of the Transcendental Faculty of judgement in General.\n\n TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGEMENT OR, ANALYTIC OF\n PRINCIPLES.\n\n Chapter I. Of the Schematism at of the Pure Conceptions of the\n Understanding.\n\n Chapter II. System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding.\n\n\n Section I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgements.\n\n Section II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgements.\n\n Section III. Systematic Representation of all Synthetical Principles\n of the Pure Understanding.\n\n\n Chapter III Of the Ground of the Division of all Objects into\n Phenomena and Noumena.\n\n\n APPENDIX.\n\n\n SECOND DIVISION\u2014TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC\n\n\n TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. INTRODUCTION.\n\n\n I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.\n\n II. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.\n\n\n TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC\u2014BOOK I\u2014OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON.\n\n\n Section I\u2014Of Ideas in General.\n\n Section II. Of Transcendental Ideas.\n\n Section III. System of Transcendental Ideas.\n\n\n TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC\u2014BOOK II\u2014OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OF PURE\n REASON.\n\n\n Chapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.\n\n Chapter II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason.\n\n\n Section I. System of Cosmological Ideas.\n\n Section II. Antithetic of Pure Reason.\n\n Section III. Of the Interest of Reason in these Self-contradictions.\n\n Section IV. Of the necessity imposed upon Pure Reason of presenting a\n Solution of its Transcendental Problems.\n\n Section V. Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems presented\n in the four Transcendental Ideas.\n\n Section VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution of Pure\n Cosmological Dialectic.\n\n Section VII. Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problem.\n\n Section VIII. Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation to the\n Cosmological Ideas.\n\n Section IX. Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason\n with regard to the Cosmological Ideas.\n\n\n I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the\n Composition of Phenomena in the Universe.\n\n II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division\n of a Whole given in Intuition.\n\n III. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the\n Deduction of Cosmical Events from their Causes.\n\n IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the\n Dependence of Phenomenal Existences.\n\n\n Chapter III. The Ideal of Pure Reason.\n\n\n Section I. Of the Ideal in General.\n\n Section II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon Trancendentale).\n\n Section III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in Proof\n of the Existence of a Supreme Being.\n\n Section IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the\n Existence of God.\n\n Section V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the\n Existence of God.\n\n Section VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof.\n\n Section VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative\n Principles of Reason.\n\n\n Appendix. Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason.\n\n\n II. Transcendental Doctrine of Method\n\n\n Chapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason.\n\n\n Section I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dogmatism.\n\n Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics.\n\n Section III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis.\n\n Section IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs.\n\n\n Chapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason.\n\n\n Section I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason.\n\n Section II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground\n of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason.\n\n Section III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.\n\n\n Chapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason.\n\n Chapter IV. The History of Pure Reason.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION 1781\n\n\nHuman reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to\nconsider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by\nits own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every\nfaculty of the mind.\n\nIt falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins\nwith principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of\nexperience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same\ntime, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in\nobedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote\nconditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours\nmust remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to\npresent themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse\nto principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are\nregarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion\nand contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent\nerrors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the\nprinciples it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be\ntested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called\n_Metaphysic_.\n\nTime was, when she was the _queen_ of all the sciences; and, if we take\nthe will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the\nhigh importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is\nthe fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the\nmatron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba:\n\nModo maxima rerum,\nTot generis, natisque potens...\nNunc trahor exul, inops.\n\u2014Ovid, Metamorphoses. xiii\n\n\nAt first, her government, under the administration of the _dogmatists_,\nwas an absolute _despotism_. But, as the legislative continued to show\ntraces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and\nintestine wars introduced the reign of _anarchy;_ while the _sceptics_,\nlike nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode\nof living, attacked from time to time those who had organized\nthemselves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily,\nsmall; and thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of\nthose who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or\nuniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those\ndisputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a\nkind of _physiology_ of the human understanding\u2014that of the celebrated\nLocke. But it was found that\u2014although it was affirmed that this\nso-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than\nthat of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought\nsuspicion on her claims\u2014as this _genealogy_ was incorrect, she\npersisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus\nmetaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and rotten\nconstitution of _dogmatism_, and again became obnoxious to the contempt\nfrom which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all\nmethods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain,\nthere reigns nought but weariness and complete _indifferentism_\u2014the\nmother of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time\nthe source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and\nreinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion,\nobscurity, and disuse from ill directed effort.\n\nFor it is in reality vain to profess _indifference_ in regard to such\ninquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity.\nBesides, these pretended _indifferentists_, however much they may try\nto disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by\nchanges on the language of the schools, unavoidably fall into\nmetaphysical declarations and propositions, which they profess to\nregard with so much contempt. At the same time, this indifference,\nwhich has arisen in the world of science, and which relates to that\nkind of knowledge which we should wish to see destroyed the last, is a\nphenomenon that well deserves our attention and reflection. It is\nplainly not the effect of the levity, but of the matured _judgement_[1]\nof the age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with illusory\nknowledge, It is, in fact, a call to reason, again to undertake the\nmost laborious of all tasks\u2014that of self-examination, and to establish\na tribunal, which may secure it in its well-grounded claims, while it\npronounces against all baseless assumptions and pretensions, not in an\narbitrary manner, but according to its own eternal and unchangeable\nlaws. This tribunal is nothing less than the _Critical Investigation of\nPure Reason_.\n\n [1] We very often hear complaints of the shallowness of the present\n age, and of the decay of profound science. But I do not think that\n those which rest upon a secure foundation, such as mathematics,\n physical science, etc., in the least deserve this reproach, but that\n they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case,\n indeed, far surpass it. The same would be the case with the other\n kinds of cognition, if their principles were but firmly established.\n In the absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally,\n severe criticism are rather signs of a profound habit of thought. Our\n age is the age of criticism, to which everything must be subjected.\n The sacredness of religion, and the authority of legislation, are by\n many regarded as grounds of exemption from the examination of this\n tribunal. But, if they are exempted, they become the subjects of just\n suspicion, and cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which reason\n accords only to that which has stood the test of a free and public\n examination.\n\n\nI do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical\ninquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to\nwhich it strives to attain _without the aid of experience;_ in other\nwords, the solution of the question regarding the possibility or\nimpossibility of metaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as\nwell as of the extent and limits of this science. All this must be done\non the basis of principles.\n\nThis path\u2014the only one now remaining\u2014has been entered upon by me; and I\nflatter myself that I have, in this way, discovered the cause of\u2014and\nconsequently the mode of removing\u2014all the errors which have hitherto\nset reason at variance with itself, in the sphere of non-empirical\nthought. I have not returned an evasive answer to the questions of\nreason, by alleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of\nthe mind; I have, on the contrary, examined them completely in the\nlight of principles, and, after having discovered the cause of the\ndoubts and contradictions into which reason fell, have solved them to\nits perfect satisfaction. It is true, these questions have not been\nsolved as dogmatism, in its vain fancies and desires, had expected; for\nit can only be satisfied by the exercise of magical arts, and of these\nI have no knowledge. But neither do these come within the compass of\nour mental powers; and it was the duty of philosophy to destroy the\nillusions which had their origin in misconceptions, whatever darling\nhopes and valued expectations may be ruined by its explanations. My\nchief aim in this work has been thoroughness; and I make bold to say\nthat there is not a single metaphysical problem that does not find its\nsolution, or at least the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a\nperfect unity; and therefore, if the principle presented by it prove to\nbe insufficient for the solution of even a single one of those\nquestions to which the very nature of reason gives birth, we must\nreject it, as we could not be perfectly certain of its sufficiency in\nthe case of the others.\n\nWhile I say this, I think I see upon the countenance of the reader\nsigns of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when he hears\ndeclarations which sound so boastful and extravagant; and yet they are\nbeyond comparison more moderate than those advanced by the commonest\nauthor of the commonest philosophical programme, in which the dogmatist\nprofesses to demonstrate the simple nature of the soul, or the\nnecessity of a primal being. Such a dogmatist promises to extend human\nknowledge beyond the limits of possible experience; while I humbly\nconfess that this is completely beyond my power. Instead of any such\nattempt, I confine myself to the examination of reason alone and its\npure thought; and I do not need to seek far for the sum-total of its\ncognition, because it has its seat in my own mind. Besides, common\nlogic presents me with a complete and systematic catalogue of all the\nsimple operations of reason; and it is my task to answer the question\nhow far reason can go, without the material presented and the aid\nfurnished by experience.\n\nSo much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary in the\nexecution of the present task. The aims set before us are not\narbitrarily proposed, but are imposed upon us by the nature of\ncognition itself.\n\nThe above remarks relate to the _matter_ of our critical inquiry. As\nregards the _form_, there are two indispensable conditions, which any\none who undertakes so difficult a task as that of a critique of pure\nreason, is bound to fulfil. These conditions are _certitude_ and\n_clearness_.\n\nAs regards _certitude_, I have fully convinced myself that, in this\nsphere of thought, _opinion_ is perfectly inadmissible, and that\neverything which bears the least semblance of an hypothesis must be\nexcluded, as of no value in such discussions. For it is a necessary\ncondition of every cognition that is to be established upon _\u00e0 priori_\ngrounds that it shall be held to be absolutely necessary; much more is\nthis the case with an attempt to determine all pure _\u00e0 priori_\ncognition, and to furnish the standard\u2014and consequently an example\u2014of\nall apodeictic (philosophical) certitude. Whether I have succeeded in\nwhat I professed to do, it is for the reader to determine; it is the\nauthor\u2019s business merely to adduce grounds and reasons, without\ndetermining what influence these ought to have on the mind of his\njudges. But, lest anything he may have said may become the innocent\ncause of doubt in their minds, or tend to weaken the effect which his\narguments might otherwise produce\u2014he may be allowed to point out those\npassages which may occasion mistrust or difficulty, although these do\nnot concern the main purpose of the present work. He does this solely\nwith the view of removing from the mind of the reader any doubts which\nmight affect his judgement of the work as a whole, and in regard to its\nultimate aim.\n\nI know no investigations more necessary for a full insight into the\nnature of the faculty which we call _understanding_, and at the same\ntime for the determination of the rules and limits of its use, than\nthose undertaken in the second chapter of the \u201cTranscendental\nAnalytic,\u201d under the title of _Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the\nUnderstanding;_ and they have also cost me by far the greatest\nlabour\u2014labour which, I hope, will not remain uncompensated. The view\nthere taken, which goes somewhat deeply into the subject, has two\nsides. The one relates to the objects of the pure understanding, and is\nintended to demonstrate and to render comprehensible the objective\nvalidity of its _\u00e0 priori_ conceptions; and it forms for this reason an\nessential part of the Critique. The other considers the pure\nunderstanding itself, its possibility and its powers of cognition\u2014that\nis, from a subjective point of view; and, although this exposition is\nof great importance, it does not belong essentially to the main purpose\nof the work, because the grand question is what and how much can reason\nand understanding, apart from experience, cognize, and not, how is the\n_faculty of thought_ itself possible? As the latter is an inquiry into\nthe cause of a given effect, and has thus in it some semblance of an\nhypothesis (although, as I shall show on another occasion, this is\nreally not the fact), it would seem that, in the present instance, I\nhad allowed myself to enounce a mere _opinion_, and that the reader\nmust therefore be at liberty to hold a different _opinion_. But I beg\nto remind him that, if my subjective deduction does not produce in his\nmind the conviction of its certitude at which I aimed, the objective\ndeduction, with which alone the present work is properly concerned, is\nin every respect satisfactory.\n\nAs regards _clearness_, the reader has a right to demand, in the first\nplace, _discursive_ or logical clearness, that is, on the basis of\nconceptions, and, secondly, _intuitive_ or \u00e6sthetic clearness, by means\nof intuitions, that is, by examples or other modes of illustration _in\nconcreto_. I have done what I could for the first kind of\nintelligibility. This was essential to my purpose; and it thus became\nthe accidental cause of my inability to do complete justice to the\nsecond requirement. I have been almost always at a loss, during the\nprogress of this work, how to settle this question. Examples and\nillustrations always appeared to me necessary, and, in the first sketch\nof the Critique, naturally fell into their proper places. But I very\nsoon became aware of the magnitude of my task, and the numerous\nproblems with which I should be engaged; and, as I perceived that this\ncritical investigation would, even if delivered in the driest\n_scholastic_ manner, be far from being brief, I found it unadvisable to\nenlarge it still more with examples and explanations, which are\nnecessary only from a _popular_ point of view. I was induced to take\nthis course from the consideration also that the present work is not\nintended for popular use, that those devoted to science do not require\nsuch helps, although they are always acceptable, and that they would\nhave materially interfered with my present purpose. Abb\u00e9 Terrasson\nremarks with great justice that, if we estimate the size of a work, not\nfrom the number of its pages, but from the time which we require to\nmake ourselves master of it, it may be said of many a book\u2014_that it\nwould be much shorter, if it were not so short_. On the other hand, as\nregards the comprehensibility of a system of speculative cognition,\nconnected under a single principle, we may say with equal justice: many\na book would have been much clearer, if it had not been intended to be\nso very clear. For explanations and examples, and other helps to\nintelligibility, aid us in the comprehension of _parts_, but they\ndistract the attention, dissipate the mental power of the reader, and\nstand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the _whole;_ as\nhe cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the system, and the\ncolouring and embellishments bestowed upon it prevent his observing its\narticulation or organization\u2014which is the most important consideration\nwith him, when he comes to judge of its unity and stability.\n\nThe reader must naturally have a strong inducement to co-operate with\nthe present author, if he has formed the intention of erecting a\ncomplete and solid edifice of metaphysical science, according to the\nplan now laid before him. Metaphysics, as here represented, is the only\nscience which admits of completion\u2014and with little labour, if it is\nunited, in a short time; so that nothing will be left to future\ngenerations except the task of illustrating and applying it\n_didactically_. For this science is nothing more than the inventory of\nall that is given us by _pure reason_, systematically arranged. Nothing\ncan escape our notice; for what reason produces from itself cannot lie\nconcealed, but must be brought to the light by reason itself, so soon\nas we have discovered the common principle of the ideas we seek. The\nperfect unity of this kind of cognitions, which are based upon pure\nconceptions, and uninfluenced by any empirical element, or any peculiar\nintuition leading to determinate experience, renders this completeness\nnot only practicable, but also necessary.\n\nTecum habita, et n\u00f4ris quam sit tibi curta supellex.\n\u2014Persius. Satirae iv. 52.\n\n\nSuch a system of pure speculative reason I hope to be able to publish\nunder the title of _Metaphysic of Nature_[2]. The content of this work\n(which will not be half so long) will be very much richer than that of\nthe present Critique, which has to discover the sources of this\ncognition and expose the conditions of its possibility, and at the same\ntime to clear and level a fit foundation for the scientific edifice. In\nthe present work, I look for the patient hearing and the impartiality\nof a _judge;_ in the other, for the good-will and assistance of a\n_co-labourer_. For, however complete the list of _principles_ for this\nsystem may be in the Critique, the correctness of the system requires\nthat no _deduced_ conceptions should be absent. These cannot be\npresented _\u00e0 priori_, but must be gradually discovered; and, while the\n_synthesis_ of conceptions has been fully exhausted in the Critique, it\nis necessary that, in the proposed work, the same should be the case\nwith their _analysis_. But this will be rather an amusement than a\nlabour.\n\n [2] In contradistinction to the Metaphysic of Ethics. This work was\n never published.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION 1787\n\n\nWhether the treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies\nwithin the province of pure reason advances with that undeviating\ncertainty which characterizes the progress of _science_, we shall be at\nno loss to determine. If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical\npursuits, unable to come to an understanding as to the method which\nthey ought to follow; if we find them, after the most elaborate\npreparations, invariably brought to a stand before the goal is reached,\nand compelled to retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths, we\nmay then feel quite sure that they are far from having attained to the\ncertainty of scientific progress and may rather be said to be merely\ngroping about in the dark. In these circumstances we shall render an\nimportant service to reason if we succeed in simply indicating the path\nalong which it must travel, in order to arrive at any results\u2014even if\nit should be found necessary to abandon many of those aims which,\nwithout reflection, have been proposed for its attainment.\n\nThat _Logic_ has advanced in this sure course, even from the earliest\ntimes, is apparent from the fact that, since Aristotle, it has been\nunable to advance a step and, thus, to all appearance has reached its\ncompletion. For, if some of the moderns have thought to enlarge its\ndomain by introducing _psychological_ discussions on the mental\nfaculties, such as imagination and wit, _metaphysical_, discussions on\nthe origin of knowledge and the different kinds of certitude, according\nto the difference of the objects (idealism, scepticism, and so on), or\n_anthropological_ discussions on prejudices, their causes and remedies:\nthis attempt, on the part of these authors, only shows their ignorance\nof the peculiar nature of logical science. We do not enlarge but\ndisfigure the sciences when we lose sight of their respective limits\nand allow them to run into one another. Now logic is enclosed within\nlimits which admit of perfectly clear definition; it is a science which\nhas for its object nothing but the exposition and proof of the _formal_\nlaws of all thought, whether it be _\u00e0 priori_ or empirical, whatever be\nits origin or its object, and whatever the difficulties\u2014natural or\naccidental\u2014which it encounters in the human mind.\n\nThe early success of logic must be attributed exclusively to the\nnarrowness of its field, in which abstraction may, or rather must, be\nmade of all the objects of cognition with their characteristic\ndistinctions, and in which the understanding has only to deal with\nitself and with its own forms. It is, obviously, a much more difficult\ntask for reason to strike into the sure path of science, where it has\nto deal not simply with itself, but with objects external to itself.\nHence, logic is properly only a _prop\u00e6deutic_\u2014forms, as it were, the\nvestibule of the sciences; and while it is necessary to enable us to\nform a correct judgement with regard to the various branches of\nknowledge, still the acquisition of real, substantive knowledge is to\nbe sought only in the sciences properly so called, that is, in the\nobjective sciences.\n\nNow these sciences, if they can be termed rational at all, must contain\nelements of _\u00e0 priori_ cognition, and this cognition may stand in a\ntwofold relation to its object. Either it may have to _determine_ the\nconception of the object\u2014which must be supplied extraneously, or it may\nhave to _establish its reality_. The former is _theoretical_, the\nlatter _practical_, rational cognition. In both, the _pure_ or _\u00e0\npriori_ element must be treated first, and must be carefully\ndistinguished from that which is supplied from other sources. Any other\nmethod can only lead to irremediable confusion.\n\n_Mathematics_ and _physics_ are the two theoretical sciences which have\nto determine their objects _\u00e0 priori_. The former is purely _\u00e0 priori_,\nthe latter is partially so, but is also dependent on other sources of\ncognition.\n\nIn the earliest times of which history affords us any record,\n_mathematics_ had already entered on the sure course of science, among\nthat wonderful nation, the Greeks. Still it is not to be supposed that\nit was as easy for this science to strike into, or rather to construct\nfor itself, that royal road, as it was for logic, in which reason has\nonly to deal with itself. On the contrary, I believe that it must have\nremained long\u2014chiefly among the Egyptians\u2014in the stage of blind groping\nafter its true aims and destination, and that it was revolutionized by\nthe happy idea of one man, who struck out and determined for all time\nthe path which this science must follow, and which admits of an\nindefinite advancement. The history of this intellectual\nrevolution\u2014much more important in its results than the discovery of the\npassage round the celebrated Cape of Good Hope\u2014and of its author, has\nnot been preserved. But Diogenes Laertius, in naming the supposed\ndiscoverer of some of the simplest elements of geometrical\ndemonstration\u2014elements which, according to the ordinary opinion, do not\neven require to be proved\u2014makes it apparent that the change introduced\nby the first indication of this new path, must have seemed of the\nutmost importance to the mathematicians of that age, and it has thus\nbeen secured against the chance of oblivion. A new light must have\nflashed on the mind of the first man (_Thales_, or whatever may have\nbeen his name) who demonstrated the properties of the _isosceles_\ntriangle. For he found that it was not sufficient to meditate on the\nfigure, as it lay before his eyes, or the conception of it, as it\nexisted in his mind, and thus endeavour to get at the knowledge of its\nproperties, but that it was necessary to produce these properties, as\nit were, by a positive _\u00e0 priori construction;_ and that, in order to\narrive with certainty at _\u00e0 priori_ cognition, he must not attribute to\nthe object any other properties than those which necessarily followed\nfrom that which he had himself, in accordance with his conception,\nplaced in the object.\n\nA much longer period elapsed before _Physics_ entered on the highway of\nscience. For it is only about a century and a half since the wise BACON\ngave a new direction to physical studies, or rather\u2014as others were\nalready on the right track\u2014imparted fresh vigour to the pursuit of this\nnew direction. Here, too, as in the case of mathematics, we find\nevidence of a rapid intellectual revolution. In the remarks which\nfollow I shall confine myself to the _empirical_ side of natural\nscience.\n\nWhen GALILEI experimented with balls of a definite weight on the\ninclined plane, when TORRICELLI caused the air to sustain a weight\nwhich he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite\ncolumn of water, or when STAHL, at a later period, converted metals\ninto lime, and reconverted lime into metal, by the addition and\nsubtraction of certain elements;[3] a light broke upon all natural\nphilosophers. They learned that reason only perceives that which it\nproduces after its own design; that it must not be content to follow,\nas it were, in the leading-strings of nature, but must proceed in\nadvance with principles of judgement according to unvarying laws, and\ncompel nature to reply its questions. For accidental observations, made\naccording to no preconceived plan, cannot be united under a necessary\nlaw. But it is this that reason seeks for and requires. It is only the\nprinciples of reason which can give to concordant phenomena the\nvalidity of laws, and it is only when experiment is directed by these\nrational principles that it can have any real utility. Reason must\napproach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from\nit, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that\nhis master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the\nwitnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to\npropose. To this single idea must the revolution be ascribed, by which,\nafter groping in the dark for so many centuries, natural science was at\nlength conducted into the path of certain progress.\n\n [3] I do not here follow with exactness the history of the\n experimental method, of which, indeed, the first steps are involved in\n some obscurity.\n\n\nWe come now to _metaphysics_, a purely speculative science, which\noccupies a completely isolated position and is entirely independent of\nthe teachings of experience. It deals with mere conceptions\u2014not, like\nmathematics, with conceptions applied to intuition\u2014and in it, reason is\nthe pupil of itself alone. It is the oldest of the sciences, and would\nstill survive, even if all the rest were swallowed up in the abyss of\nan all-destroying barbarism. But it has not yet had the good fortune to\nattain to the sure scientific method. This will be apparent; if we\napply the tests which we proposed at the outset. We find that reason\nperpetually comes to a stand, when it attempts to gain _\u00e0 priori_ the\nperception even of those laws which the most common experience\nconfirms. We find it compelled to retrace its steps in innumerable\ninstances, and to abandon the path on which it had entered, because\nthis does not lead to the desired result. We find, too, that those who\nare engaged in metaphysical pursuits are far from being able to agree\namong themselves, but that, on the contrary, this science appears to\nfurnish an arena specially adapted for the display of skill or the\nexercise of strength in mock-contests\u2014a field in which no combatant\never yet succeeded in gaining an inch of ground, in which, at least, no\nvictory was ever yet crowned with permanent possession.\n\nThis leads us to inquire why it is that, in metaphysics, the sure path\nof science has not hitherto been found. Shall we suppose that it is\nimpossible to discover it? Why then should nature have visited our\nreason with restless aspirations after it, as if it were one of our\nweightiest concerns? Nay, more, how little cause should we have to\nplace confidence in our reason, if it abandons us in a matter about\nwhich, most of all, we desire to know the truth\u2014and not only so, but\neven allures us to the pursuit of vain phantoms, only to betray us in\nthe end? Or, if the path has only hitherto been missed, what\nindications do we possess to guide us in a renewed investigation, and\nto enable us to hope for greater success than has fallen to the lot of\nour predecessors?\n\nIt appears to me that the examples of mathematics and natural\nphilosophy, which, as we have seen, were brought into their present\ncondition by a sudden revolution, are sufficiently remarkable to fix\nour attention on the essential circumstances of the change which has\nproved so advantageous to them, and to induce us to make the experiment\nof imitating them, so far as the analogy which, as rational sciences,\nthey bear to metaphysics may permit. It has hitherto been assumed that\nour cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to\nascertain anything about these objects _\u00e0 priori_, by means of\nconceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge, have been\nrendered abortive by this assumption. Let us then make the experiment\nwhether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if we assume that\nthe objects must conform to our cognition. This appears, at all events,\nto accord better with the _possibility_ of our gaining the end we have\nin view, that is to say, of arriving at the cognition of objects _\u00e0\npriori_, of determining something with respect to these objects, before\nthey are given to us. We here propose to do just what COPERNICUS did in\nattempting to explain the celestial movements. When he found that he\ncould make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies\nrevolved round the spectator, he reversed the process, and tried the\nexperiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars\nremained at rest. We may make the same experiment with regard to the\nintuition of objects. If the intuition must conform to the nature of\nthe objects, I do not see how we can know anything of them _\u00e0 priori_.\nIf, on the other hand, the object conforms to the nature of our faculty\nof intuition, I can then easily conceive the possibility of such an _\u00e0\npriori_ knowledge. Now as I cannot rest in the mere intuitions, but\u2014if\nthey are to become cognitions\u2014must refer them, as _representations_, to\nsomething, as _object_, and must determine the latter by means of the\nformer, here again there are two courses open to me. _Either_, first, I\nmay assume that the conceptions, by which I effect this determination,\nconform to the object\u2014and in this case I am reduced to the same\nperplexity as before; _or_ secondly, I may assume that the objects, or,\nwhich is the same thing, that _experience_, in which alone as given\nobjects they are cognized, conform to my conceptions\u2014and then I am at\nno loss how to proceed. For experience itself is a mode of cognition\nwhich requires understanding. Before objects, are given to me, that is,\n_\u00e0 priori_, I must presuppose in myself laws of the understanding which\nare expressed in conceptions _\u00e0 priori_. To these conceptions, then,\nall the objects of experience must necessarily conform. Now there are\nobjects which reason _thinks_, and that necessarily, but which cannot\nbe given in experience, or, at least, cannot be given _so_ as reason\nthinks them. The attempt to think these objects will hereafter furnish\nan excellent test of the new method of thought which we have adopted,\nand which is based on the principle that we only cognize in things _\u00e0\npriori_ that which we ourselves place in them.[4]\n\n [4] This method, accordingly, which we have borrowed from the natural\n philosopher, consists in seeking for the elements of pure reason in\n that _which admits of confirmation or refutation by experiment_. Now\n the propositions of pure reason, especially when they transcend the\n limits of possible experience, do not admit of our making any\n experiment with their _objects_, as in natural science. Hence, with\n regard to those _conceptions_ and _principles_ which we assume _\u00e0\n priori_, our only course will be to view them from two different\n sides. We must regard one and the same conception, _on the one hand_,\n in relation to experience as an object of the senses and of the\n understanding, _on the other hand_, in relation to reason, isolated\n and transcending the limits of experience, as an object of mere\n thought. Now if we find that, when we regard things from this double\n point of view, the result is in harmony with the principle of pure\n reason, but that, when we regard them from a single point of view,\n reason is involved in self-contradiction, then the experiment will\n establish the correctness of this distinction.\n\n\nThis attempt succeeds as well as we could desire, and promises to\nmetaphysics, in its first part\u2014that is, where it is occupied with\nconceptions _\u00e0 priori_, of which the corresponding objects may be given\nin experience\u2014the certain course of science. For by this new method we\nare enabled perfectly to explain the possibility of _\u00e0 priori_\ncognition, and, what is more, to demonstrate satisfactorily the laws\nwhich lie _\u00e0 priori_ at the foundation of nature, as the sum of the\nobjects of experience\u2014neither of which was possible according to the\nprocedure hitherto followed. But from this deduction of the faculty of\n_\u00e0 priori_ cognition in the first part of metaphysics, we derive a\nsurprising result, and one which, to all appearance, militates against\nthe great end of metaphysics, as treated in the second part. For we\ncome to the conclusion that our faculty of cognition is unable to\ntranscend the limits of possible experience; and yet this is precisely\nthe most essential object of this science. The estimate of our rational\ncognition _\u00e0 priori_ at which we arrive is that it has only to do with\nphenomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing a real\nexistence, lie beyond its sphere. Here we are enabled to put the\njustice of this estimate to the test. For that which of necessity\nimpels us to transcend the limits of experience and of all phenomena is\nthe _unconditioned_, which reason absolutely requires in things as they\nare in themselves, in order to complete the series of conditions. Now,\nif it appears that when, on the one hand, we assume that our cognition\nconforms to its objects as things in themselves, _the unconditioned\ncannot be thought without contradiction_, and that when, on the other\nhand, we assume that our representation of things as they are given to\nus, does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but\nthat these objects, as phenomena, conform to our mode of\nrepresentation, _the contradiction disappears:_ we shall then be\nconvinced of the truth of that which we began by assuming for the sake\nof experiment; we may look upon it as established that the\nunconditioned does not lie in things as we know them, or as they are\ngiven to us, but in things as they are in themselves, beyond the range\nof our cognition.[5]\n\n [5] This experiment of pure reason has a great similarity to that of\n the _Chemists_, which they term the experiment of _reduction_, or,\n more usually, the _synthetic_ process. The _analysis_ of the\n metaphysician separates pure cognition _\u00e0 priori_ into two\n heterogeneous elements, viz., the cognition of things as phenomena,\n and of things in themselves. _Dialectic_ combines these again into\n harmony with the necessary rational idea of the unconditioned, and\n finds that this harmony never results except through the above\n distinction, which is, therefore, concluded to be just.\n\n\nBut, after we have thus denied the power of speculative reason to make\nany progress in the sphere of the supersensible, it still remains for\nour consideration whether data do not exist in _practical_ cognition\nwhich may enable us to determine the transcendent conception of the\nunconditioned, to rise beyond the limits of all possible experience\nfrom a _practical_ point of view, and thus to satisfy the great ends of\nmetaphysics. Speculative reason has thus, at least, made room for such\nan extension of our knowledge: and, if it must leave this space vacant,\nstill it does not rob us of the liberty to fill it up, if we can, by\nmeans of practical data\u2014nay, it even challenges us to make the\nattempt.[6]\n\n [6] So the central laws of the movements of the heavenly bodies\n established the truth of that which Copernicus, first, assumed only as\n a hypothesis, and, at the same time, brought to light that invisible\n force (Newtonian attraction) which holds the universe together. The\n latter would have remained forever undiscovered, if Copernicus had not\n ventured on the experiment\u2014contrary to the senses but still just\u2014of\n looking for the observed movements not in the heavenly bodies, but in\n the spectator. In this Preface I treat the new metaphysical method as\n a hypothesis with the view of rendering apparent the first attempts at\n such a change of method, which are always hypothetical. But in the\n Critique itself it will be demonstrated, not hypothetically, but\n apodeictically, from the nature of our representations of space and\n time, and from the elementary conceptions of the understanding.\n\n\nThis attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure of\nmetaphysics, after the _example_ of the geometricians and natural\nphilosophers, constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Speculative\nReason. It is a treatise on the method to be followed, not a system of\nthe science itself. But, at the same time, it marks out and defines\nboth the external boundaries and the internal structure of this\nscience. For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity, that, in\nchoosing the various objects of thought, it is able to define the\nlimits of its own faculties, and even to give a complete enumeration of\nthe possible modes of proposing problems to itself, and thus to sketch\nout the entire system of metaphysics. For, on the one hand, in\ncognition _\u00e0 priori_, nothing must be attributed to the objects but\nwhat the thinking subject derives from itself; and, on the other hand,\nreason is, in regard to the principles of cognition, a perfectly\ndistinct, independent unity, in which, as in an organized body, every\nmember exists for the sake of the others, and all for the sake of each,\nso that no principle can be viewed, with safety, in one relationship,\nunless it is, at the same time, viewed in relation to the total use of\npure reason. Hence, too, metaphysics has this singular advantage\u2014an\nadvantage which falls to the lot of no other science which has to do\nwith _objects_\u2014that, if once it is conducted into the sure path of\nscience, by means of this criticism, it can then take in the whole\nsphere of its cognitions, and can thus complete its work, and leave it\nfor the use of posterity, as a capital which can never receive fresh\naccessions. For metaphysics has to deal only with principles and with\nthe limitations of its own employment as determined by these\nprinciples. To this perfection it is, therefore, bound, as the\nfundamental science, to attain, and to it the maxim may justly be\napplied:\n\n Nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum.\n\n\nBut, it will be asked, what kind of a treasure is this that we propose\nto bequeath to posterity? What is the real value of this system of\nmetaphysics, purified by criticism, and thereby reduced to a permanent\ncondition? A cursory view of the present work will lead to the\nsupposition that its use is merely _negative_, that it only serves to\nwarn us against venturing, with speculative reason, beyond the limits\nof experience. This is, in fact, its primary use. But this, at once,\nassumes a _positive_ value, when we observe that the principles with\nwhich speculative reason endeavours to transcend its limits lead\ninevitably, not to the _extension_, but to the _contraction_ of the use\nof reason, inasmuch as they threaten to extend the limits of\nsensibility, which is their proper sphere, over the entire realm of\nthought and, thus, to supplant the pure (practical) use of reason. So\nfar, then, as this criticism is occupied in confining speculative\nreason within its proper bounds, it is only negative; but, inasmuch as\nit thereby, at the same time, removes an obstacle which impedes and\neven threatens to destroy the use of practical reason, it possesses a\npositive and very important value. In order to admit this, we have only\nto be convinced that there is an absolutely necessary use of pure\nreason\u2014the moral use\u2014in which it inevitably transcends the limits of\nsensibility, without the aid of speculation, requiring only to be\ninsured against the effects of a speculation which would involve it in\ncontradiction with itself. To deny the positive advantage of the\nservice which this criticism renders us would be as absurd as to\nmaintain that the system of police is productive of no positive\nbenefit, since its main business is to prevent the violence which\ncitizen has to apprehend from citizen, that so each may pursue his\nvocation in peace and security. That space and time are only forms of\nsensible intuition, and hence are only conditions of the existence of\nthings as phenomena; that, moreover, we have no conceptions of the\nunderstanding, and, consequently, no elements for the cognition of\nthings, except in so far as a corresponding intuition can be given to\nthese conceptions; that, accordingly, we can have no cognition of an\nobject, as a thing in itself, but only as an object of sensible\nintuition, that is, as phenomenon\u2014all this is proved in the analytical\npart of the Critique; and from this the limitation of all possible\nspeculative cognition to the mere objects of _experience_, follows as a\nnecessary result. At the same time, it must be carefully borne in mind\nthat, while we surrender the power of _cognizing_, we still reserve the\npower of _thinking_ objects, as things in themselves.[7] For,\notherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance,\nwithout something that appears\u2014which would be absurd. Now let us\nsuppose, for a moment, that we had not undertaken this criticism and,\naccordingly, had not drawn the necessary distinction between things as\nobjects of experience and things as they are in themselves. The\nprinciple of causality, and, by consequence, the mechanism of nature as\ndetermined by causality, would then have absolute validity in relation\nto all things as efficient causes. I should then be unable to assert,\nwith regard to one and the same being, e.g., the human soul, that its\nwill is _free_, and yet, at the same time, subject to natural\nnecessity, that is, _not free_, without falling into a palpable\ncontradiction, for in both propositions I should take the soul in _the\nsame signification_, as a thing in general, as a thing in itself\u2014as,\nwithout previous criticism, I could not but take it. Suppose now, on\nthe other hand, that we _have_ undertaken this criticism, and have\nlearnt that an object may be taken in _two senses_, first, as a\nphenomenon, secondly, as a thing in itself; and that, according to the\ndeduction of the conceptions of the understanding, the principle of\ncausality has reference only to things in the first sense. We then see\nhow it does not involve any contradiction to assert, on the one hand,\nthat the will, in the phenomenal sphere\u2014in visible action\u2014is\nnecessarily obedient to the law of nature, and, in so far, _not free;_\nand, on the other hand, that, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is\nnot subject to that law, and, accordingly, is _free_. Now, it is true\nthat I cannot, by means of speculative reason, and still less by\nempirical observation, _cognize_ my soul as a thing in itself and\nconsequently, cannot cognize liberty as the property of a being to\nwhich I ascribe effects in the world of sense. For, to do so, I must\ncognize this being as existing, and yet not in time, which\u2014since I\ncannot support my conception by any intuition\u2014is impossible. At the\nsame time, while I cannot _cognize_, I can quite well _think_ freedom,\nthat is to say, my representation of it involves at least no\ncontradiction, if we bear in mind the critical distinction of the two\nmodes of representation (the sensible and the intellectual) and the\nconsequent limitation of the conceptions of the pure understanding and\nof the principles which flow from them. Suppose now that morality\nnecessarily presupposed liberty, in the strictest sense, as a property\nof our will; suppose that reason contained certain practical, original\nprinciples _\u00e0 priori_, which were absolutely impossible without this\npresupposition; and suppose, at the same time, that speculative reason\nhad proved that liberty was incapable of being thought at all. It would\nthen follow that the moral presupposition must give way to the\nspeculative affirmation, the opposite of which involves an obvious\ncontradiction, and that _liberty_ and, with it, morality must yield to\nthe _mechanism of nature;_ for the negation of morality involves no\ncontradiction, except on the presupposition of liberty. Now morality\ndoes not require the speculative cognition of liberty; it is enough\nthat I can think it, that its conception involves no contradiction,\nthat it does not interfere with the mechanism of nature. But even this\nrequirement we could not satisfy, if we had not learnt the twofold\nsense in which things may be taken; and it is only in this way that the\ndoctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined within\ntheir proper limits. For this result, then, we are indebted to a\ncriticism which warns us of our unavoidable ignorance with regard to\nthings in themselves, and establishes the necessary limitation of our\ntheoretical _cognition_ to mere phenomena.\n\n [7] In order to _cognize_ an object, I must be able to prove its\n possibility, either from its reality as attested by experience, or _\u00e0\n priori_, by means of reason. But I can _think_ what I please, provided\n only I do not contradict myself; that is, provided my conception is a\n possible thought, though I may be unable to answer for the existence\n of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities. But something\n more is required before I can attribute to such a conception objective\n validity, that is real possibility\u2014the other possibility being merely\n logical. We are not, however, confined to theoretical sources of\n cognition for the means of satisfying this additional requirement, but\n may derive them from practical sources.\n\n\nThe positive value of the critical principles of pure reason in\nrelation to the conception of _God_ and of the _simple nature_ of the\n_soul_, admits of a similar exemplification; but on this point I shall\nnot dwell. I cannot even make the assumption\u2014as the practical interests\nof morality require\u2014of God, freedom, and immortality, if I do not\ndeprive speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insight.\nFor to arrive at these, it must make use of principles which, in fact,\nextend only to the objects of possible experience, and which cannot be\napplied to objects beyond this sphere without converting them into\nphenomena, and thus rendering the _practical extension_ of pure reason\nimpossible. I must, therefore, abolish _knowledge_, to make room for\n_belief_. The dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the presumption that\nit is possible to advance in metaphysics without previous criticism, is\nthe true source of the unbelief (always dogmatic) which militates\nagainst morality.\n\nThus, while it may be no very difficult task to bequeath a legacy to\nposterity, in the shape of a system of metaphysics constructed in\naccordance with the Critique of Pure Reason, still the value of such a\nbequest is not to be depreciated. It will render an important service\nto reason, by substituting the certainty of scientific method for that\nrandom groping after results without the guidance of principles, which\nhas hitherto characterized the pursuit of metaphysical studies. It will\nrender an important service to the inquiring mind of youth, by leading\nthe student to apply his powers to the cultivation of genuine science,\ninstead of wasting them, as at present, on speculations which can never\nlead to any result, or on the idle attempt to invent new ideas and\nopinions. But, above all, it will confer an inestimable benefit on\nmorality and religion, by showing that all the objections urged against\nthem may be silenced for ever by the _Socratic_ method, that is to say,\nby proving the ignorance of the objector. For, as the world has never\nbeen, and, no doubt, never will be without a system of metaphysics of\none kind or another, it is the highest and weightiest concern of\nphilosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources\nof error.\n\nThis important change in the field of the sciences, this loss of its\nfancied possessions, to which speculative reason must submit, does not\nprove in any way detrimental to the general interests of humanity. The\nadvantages which the world has derived from the teachings of pure\nreason are not at all impaired. The loss falls, in its whole extent, on\nthe _monopoly of the schools_, but does not in the slightest degree\ntouch the _interests of mankind_. I appeal to the most obstinate\ndogmatist, whether the proof of the continued existence of the soul\nafter death, derived from the simplicity of its substance; of the\nfreedom of the will in opposition to the general mechanism of nature,\ndrawn from the subtle but impotent distinction of subjective and\nobjective practical necessity; or of the existence of God, deduced from\nthe conception of an _ens realissimum_\u2014the contingency of the\nchangeable, and the necessity of a prime mover, has ever been able to\npass beyond the limits of the schools, to penetrate the public mind, or\nto exercise the slightest influence on its convictions. It must be\nadmitted that this has not been the case and that, owing to the\nunfitness of the common understanding for such subtle speculations, it\ncan never be expected to take place. On the contrary, it is plain that\n_the hope of a future life_ arises from the feeling, which exists in\nthe breast of every man, that the temporal is inadequate to meet and\nsatisfy the demands of his nature. In like manner, it cannot be doubted\nthat the clear exhibition of duties in opposition to all the claims of\ninclination, gives rise to the consciousness of _freedom_, and that the\nglorious order, beauty, and providential care, everywhere displayed in\nnature, give rise to the belief in a wise and great Author of the\nUniverse. Such is the genesis of these general convictions of mankind,\nso far as they depend on rational grounds; and this public property not\nonly remains undisturbed, but is even raised to greater importance, by\nthe doctrine that the schools have no right to arrogate to themselves a\nmore profound insight into a matter of general human concernment than\nthat to which the great mass of men, ever held by us in the highest\nestimation, can without difficulty attain, and that the schools should,\ntherefore, confine themselves to the elaboration of these universally\ncomprehensible and, from a moral point of view, amply satisfactory\nproofs. The change, therefore, affects only the arrogant pretensions of\nthe schools, which would gladly retain, in their own exclusive\npossession, the key to the truths which they impart to the public.\n\n Quod mecum nescit, solus vult scire videri.\n\n\nAt the same time it does not deprive the speculative philosopher of his\njust title to be the sole depositor of a science which benefits the\npublic without its knowledge\u2014I mean, the Critique of Pure Reason. This\ncan never become popular and, indeed, has no occasion to be so; for\nfinespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as little\nimpression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought\nagainst these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably force\nthemselves on every man who rises to the height of speculation, it\nbecomes the manifest duty of the schools to enter upon a thorough\ninvestigation of the rights of speculative reason and, thus, to prevent\nthe scandal which metaphysical controversies are sure, sooner or later,\nto cause even to the masses. It is only by criticism that\nmetaphysicians (and, as such, theologians too) can be saved from these\ncontroversies and from the consequent perversion of their doctrines.\nCriticism alone can strike a blow at the root of materialism, fatalism,\natheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which are\nuniversally injurious\u2014as well as of idealism and scepticism, which are\ndangerous to the schools, but can scarcely pass over to the public. If\ngovernments think proper to interfere with the affairs of the learned,\nit would be more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of\nscience, as well as for those of society, to favour a criticism of this\nkind, by which alone the labours of reason can be established on a firm\nbasis, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which\nraise a loud cry of danger to the public over the destruction of\ncobwebs, of which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss\nof which, therefore, it can never feel.\n\nThis critical science is not opposed to the _dogmatic procedure_ of\nreason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic,\nthat is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles _\u00e0\npriori_\u2014but to _dogmatism_, that is, to the presumption that it is\npossible to make any progress with a pure cognition, derived from\n(philosophical) conceptions, according to the principles which reason\nhas long been in the habit of employing\u2014without first inquiring in what\nway and by what right reason has come into the possession of these\nprinciples. Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason\n_without previous criticism of its own powers_, and in opposing this\nprocedure, we must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that\nloquacious shallowness which arrogates to itself the name of\npopularity, nor yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the\nwhole science of metaphysics. On the contrary, our criticism is the\nnecessary preparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics\nwhich must perform its task entirely _\u00e0 priori_, to the complete\nsatisfaction of speculative reason, and must, therefore, be treated,\nnot popularly, but scholastically. In carrying out the plan which the\nCritique prescribes, that is, in the future system of metaphysics, we\nmust have recourse to the strict method of the celebrated WOLF, the\ngreatest of all dogmatic philosophers. He was the first to point out\nthe necessity of establishing fixed principles, of clearly defining our\nconceptions, and of subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe\nscrutiny, instead of rashly jumping at conclusions. The example which\nhe set served to awaken that spirit of profound and thorough\ninvestigation which is not yet extinct in Germany. He would have been\npeculiarly well fitted to give a truly scientific character to\nmetaphysical studies, had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a\ncriticism of the _organum_, that is, of pure reason itself. That he\nfailed to perceive the necessity of such a procedure must be ascribed\nto the dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age, and on\nthis point the philosophers of his time, as well as of all previous\ntimes, have nothing to reproach each other with. Those who reject at\nonce the method of Wolf, and of the Critique of Pure Reason, can have\nno other aim but to shake off the fetters of _science_, to change\nlabour into sport, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into\nphilodoxy.\n\nIn this _second edition_, I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to\nremove the difficulties and obscurity which, without fault of mine\nperhaps, have given rise to many misconceptions even among acute\nthinkers. In the propositions themselves, and in the demonstrations by\nwhich they are supported, as well as in the form and the entire plan of\nthe work, I have found nothing to alter; which must be attributed\npartly to the long examination to which I had subjected the whole\nbefore offering it to the public and partly to the nature of the case.\nFor pure speculative reason is an organic structure in which there is\nnothing isolated or independent, but every Single part is essential to\nall the rest; and hence, the slightest imperfection, whether defect or\npositive error, could not fail to betray itself in use. I venture,\nfurther, to hope, that this system will maintain the same unalterable\ncharacter for the future. I am led to entertain this confidence, not by\nvanity, but by the evidence which the equality of the result affords,\nwhen we proceed, first, from the simplest elements up to the complete\nwhole of pure reason and, and then, backwards from the whole to each\npart. We find that the attempt to make the slightest alteration, in any\npart, leads inevitably to contradictions, not merely in this system,\nbut in human reason itself. At the same time, there is still much room\nfor improvement in the _exposition_ of the doctrines contained in this\nwork. In the present edition, I have endeavoured to remove\nmisapprehensions of the \u00e6sthetical part, especially with regard to the\nconception of time; to clear away the obscurity which has been found in\nthe deduction of the conceptions of the understanding; to supply the\nsupposed want of sufficient evidence in the demonstration of the\nprinciples of the pure understanding; and, lastly, to obviate the\nmisunderstanding of the paralogisms which immediately precede the\nRational Psychology. Beyond this point\u2014the end of the second main\ndivision of the \u201cTranscendental Dialectic\u201d\u2014I have not extended my\nalterations,[8] partly from want of time, and partly because I am not\naware that any portion of the remainder has given rise to\nmisconceptions among intelligent and impartial critics, whom I do not\nhere mention with that praise which is their due, but who will find\nthat their suggestions have been attended to in the work itself.\n\n [8] The only addition, properly so called\u2014and that only in the method\n of proof\u2014which I have made in the present edition, consists of a new\n refutation of psychological _Idealism_, and a strict demonstration\u2014the\n only one possible, as I believe\u2014of the objective reality of external\n intuition. However harmless idealism may be considered\u2014although in\n reality it is not so\u2014in regard to the essential ends of metaphysics,\n it must still remain a scandal to philosophy and to the general human\n reason to be obliged to assume, as an article of mere belief, the\n existence of things external to ourselves (from which, yet, we derive\n the whole material of cognition for the internal sense), and not to be\n able to oppose a satisfactory proof to any one who may call it in\n question. As there is some obscurity of expression in the\n demonstration as it stands in the text, I propose to alter the passage\n in question as follows: \u201cBut this permanent cannot be an intuition in\n me. For all the determining grounds of my existence which can be found\n in me are representations and, as such, do themselves require a\n permanent, distinct from them, which may determine my existence in\n relation to their changes, that is, my existence in time, wherein they\n change.\u201d It may, probably, be urged in opposition to this proof that,\n after all, I am only conscious immediately of that which is in me,\n that is, of my _representation_ of external things, and that,\n consequently, it must always remain uncertain whether anything\n corresponding to this representation does or does not exist externally\n to me. But I am conscious, through internal _experience_, of my\n _existence in time_ (consequently, also, of the determinability of the\n former in the latter), and that is more than the simple consciousness\n of my representation. It is, in fact, the same as the _empirical\n consciousness of my existence_, which can only be determined in\n relation to something, which, while connected with my existence, is\n _external to me_. This consciousness of my existence in time is,\n therefore, identical with the consciousness of a relation to something\n external to me, and it is, therefore, experience, not fiction, sense,\n not imagination, which inseparably connects the external with my\n internal sense. For the external sense is, in itself, the relation of\n intuition to something real, external to me; and the reality of this\n something, as opposed to the mere imagination of it, rests solely on\n its inseparable connection with internal experience as the condition\n of its possibility. If with the _intellectual consciousness_ of my\n existence, in the representation: _I am_, which accompanies all my\n judgements, and all the operations of my understanding, I could, at\n the same time, connect a determination of my existence by\n _intellectual intuition_, then the consciousness of a relation to\n something external to me would not be necessary. But the internal\n intuition in which alone my existence can be determined, though\n preceded by that purely intellectual consciousness, is itself sensible\n and attached to the condition of time. Hence this determination of my\n existence, and consequently my internal experience itself, must depend\n on something permanent which is not in me, which can be, therefore,\n only in something external to me, to which I must look upon myself as\n being related. Thus the reality of the external sense is necessarily\n connected with that of the internal, in order to the possibility of\n experience in general; that is, I am just as certainly conscious that\n there are things external to me related to my sense as I am that I\n myself exist as determined in time. But in order to ascertain to what\n given intuitions objects, external me, really correspond, in other\n words, what intuitions belong to the external sense and not to\n imagination, I must have recourse, in every particular case, to those\n rules according to which experience in general (even internal\n experience) is distinguished from imagination, and which are always\n based on the proposition that there really is an external\n experience.\u2014We may add the remark that the representation of something\n _permanent_ in existence, is not the same thing as the _permanent\n representation;_ for a representation may be very variable and\n changing\u2014as all our representations, even that of matter, are\u2014and yet\n refer to something permanent, which must, therefore, be distinct from\n all my representations and external to me, the existence of which is\n necessarily included in the determination of my own existence, and\n with it constitutes _one_ experience\u2014an experience which would not\n even be possible internally, if it were not also at the same time, in\n part, external. To the question _How?_ we are no more able to reply,\n than we are, in general, to think the stationary in time, the\n coexistence of which with the variable, produces the conception of\n change.\n\n\nIn attempting to render the exposition of my views as intelligible as\npossible, I have been compelled to leave out or abridge various\npassages which were not essential to the completeness of the work, but\nwhich many readers might consider useful in other respects, and might\nbe unwilling to miss. This trifling loss, which could not be avoided\nwithout swelling the book beyond due limits, may be supplied, at the\npleasure of the reader, by a comparison with the first edition, and\nwill, I hope, be more than compensated for by the greater clearness of\nthe exposition as it now stands.\n\nI have observed, with pleasure and thankfulness, in the pages of\nvarious reviews and treatises, that the spirit of profound and thorough\ninvestigation is not extinct in Germany, though it may have been\noverborne and silenced for a time by the fashionable tone of a licence\nin thinking, which gives itself the airs of genius, and that the\ndifficulties which beset the paths of criticism have not prevented\nenergetic and acute thinkers from making themselves masters of the\nscience of pure reason to which these paths conduct\u2014a science which is\nnot popular, but scholastic in its character, and which alone can hope\nfor a lasting existence or possess an abiding value. To these deserving\nmen, who so happily combine profundity of view with a talent for lucid\nexposition\u2014a talent which I myself am not conscious of possessing\u2014I\nleave the task of removing any obscurity which may still adhere to the\nstatement of my doctrines. For, in this case, the danger is not that of\nbeing refuted, but of being misunderstood. For my own part, I must\nhenceforward abstain from controversy, although I shall carefully\nattend to all suggestions, whether from friends or adversaries, which\nmay be of use in the future elaboration of the system of this\nProp\u00e6deutic. As, during these labours, I have advanced pretty far in\nyears this month I reach my sixty-fourth year\u2014it will be necessary for\nme to economize time, if I am to carry out my plan of elaborating the\nmetaphysics of nature as well as of morals, in confirmation of the\ncorrectness of the principles established in this Critique of Pure\nReason, both speculative and practical; and I must, therefore, leave\nthe task of clearing up the obscurities of the present work\u2014inevitable,\nperhaps, at the outset\u2014as well as, the defence of the whole, to those\ndeserving men, who have made my system their own. A philosophical\nsystem cannot come forward armed at all points like a mathematical\ntreatise, and hence it may be quite possible to take objection to\nparticular passages, while the organic structure of the system,\nconsidered as a unity, has no danger to apprehend. But few possess the\nability, and still fewer the inclination, to take a comprehensive view\nof a new system. By confining the view to particular passages, taking\nthese out of their connection and comparing them with one another, it\nis easy to pick out apparent contradictions, especially in a work\nwritten with any freedom of style. These contradictions place the work\nin an unfavourable light in the eyes of those who rely on the judgement\nof others, but are easily reconciled by those who have mastered the\nidea of the whole. If a theory possesses stability in itself, the\naction and reaction which seemed at first to threaten its existence\nserve only, in the course of time, to smooth down any superficial\nroughness or inequality, and\u2014if men of insight, impartiality, and truly\npopular gifts, turn their attention to it\u2014to secure to it, in a short\ntime, the requisite elegance also.\n\nK\u00d6NIGSBERG, _April_ 1787.\n\n\n\n\nIntroduction\n\nI. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge\n\n\nThat all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt.\nFor how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened\ninto exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our\nsenses, and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse\nour powers of understanding into activity, to compare to connect, or to\nseparate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous\nimpressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience? In\nrespect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to\nexperience, but begins with it.\n\nBut, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means\nfollows that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is\nquite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which\nwe receive through impressions, and that which the faculty of cognition\nsupplies from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion),\nan addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given\nby sense, till long practice has made us attentive to, and skilful in\nseparating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close\ninvestigation, and not to be answered at first sight, whether there\nexists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of\nall sensuous impressions? Knowledge of this kind is called \u00e0 priori, in\ncontradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources \u00e0\nposteriori, that is, in experience.\n\nBut the expression, \u201c\u00e0 priori,\u201d is not as yet definite enough\nadequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question above started.\nFor, in speaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience, we\nare wont to say, that this or that may be known \u00e0 priori, because we do\nnot derive this knowledge immediately from experience, but from a\ngeneral rule, which, however, we have itself borrowed from experience.\nThus, if a man undermined his house, we say, \u201che might know \u00e0 priori\nthat it would have fallen;\u201d that is, he needed not to have waited for\nthe experience that it did actually fall. But still, \u00e0 priori, he could\nnot know even this much. For, that bodies are heavy, and, consequently,\nthat they fall when their supports are taken away, must have been known\nto him previously, by means of experience.\n\nBy the term \u201cknowledge \u00e0 priori,\u201d therefore, we shall in the sequel\nunderstand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of\nexperience, but such as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to\nthis is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only \u00e0\nposteriori, that is, through experience. Knowledge \u00e0 priori is either\npure or impure. Pure knowledge \u00e0 priori is that with which no empirical\nelement is mixed up. For example, the proposition, \u201cEvery change has a\ncause,\u201d is a proposition \u00e0 priori, but impure, because change is a\nconception which can only be derived from experience.\n\nII. The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State, is in\nPossession of Certain Cognitions \u201c\u00e0 priori\u201d.\n\nThe question now is as to a criterion, by which we may securely\ndistinguish a pure from an empirical cognition. Experience no doubt\nteaches us that this or that object is constituted in such and such a\nmanner, but not that it could not possibly exist otherwise. Now, in the\nfirst place, if we have a proposition which contains the idea of\nnecessity in its very conception, it is priori. If, moreover, it is not\nderived from any other proposition, unless from one equally involving\nthe idea of necessity, it is absolutely priori. Secondly, an empirical\njudgement never exhibits strict and absolute, but only assumed and\ncomparative universality (by induction); therefore, the most we can say\nis\u2014so far as we have hitherto observed, there is no exception to this\nor that rule. If, on the other hand, a judgement carries with it strict\nand absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible exception, it\nis not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely \u00e0 priori.\n\nEmpirical universality is, therefore, only an arbitrary extension of\nvalidity, from that which may be predicated of a proposition valid in\nmost cases, to that which is asserted of a proposition which holds good\nin all; as, for example, in the affirmation, \u201cAll bodies are heavy.\u201d\nWhen, on the contrary, strict universality characterizes a judgement,\nit necessarily indicates another peculiar source of knowledge, namely,\na faculty of cognition \u00e0 priori. Necessity and strict universality,\ntherefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical\nknowledge, and are inseparably connected with each other. But as in the\nuse of these criteria the empirical limitation is sometimes more easily\ndetected than the contingency of the judgement, or the unlimited\nuniversality which we attach to a judgement is often a more convincing\nproof than its necessity, it may be advisable to use the criteria\nseparately, each being by itself infallible.\n\nNow, that in the sphere of human cognition we have judgements which are\nnecessary, and in the strictest sense universal, consequently pure \u00e0\npriori, it will be an easy matter to show. If we desire an example from\nthe sciences, we need only take any proposition in mathematics. If we\ncast our eyes upon the commonest operations of the understanding, the\nproposition, \u201cEvery change must have a cause,\u201d will amply serve our\npurpose. In the latter case, indeed, the conception of a cause so\nplainly involves the conception of a necessity of connection with an\neffect, and of a strict universality of the law, that the very notion\nof a cause would entirely disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume,\nfrom a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes;\nand the habit thence originating of connecting representations\u2014the\nnecessity inherent in the judgement being therefore merely subjective.\nBesides, without seeking for such examples of principles existing \u00e0\npriori in cognition, we might easily show that such principles are the\nindispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and\nconsequently prove their existence \u00e0 priori. For whence could our\nexperience itself acquire certainty, if all the rules on which it\ndepends were themselves empirical, and consequently fortuitous? No one,\ntherefore, can admit the validity of the use of such rules as first\nprinciples. But, for the present, we may content ourselves with having\nestablished the fact, that we do possess and exercise a faculty of pure\n\u00e0 priori cognition; and, secondly, with having pointed out the proper\ntests of such cognition, namely, universality and necessity.\n\nNot only in judgements, however, but even in conceptions, is an \u00e0\npriori origin manifest. For example, if we take away by degrees from\nour conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous\nexperience\u2014colour, hardness or softness, weight, even\nimpenetrability\u2014the body will then vanish; but the space which it\noccupied still remains, and this it is utterly impossible to annihilate\nin thought. Again, if we take away, in like manner, from our empirical\nconception of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties\nwhich mere experience has taught us to connect with it, still we cannot\nthink away those through which we cogitate it as substance, or adhering\nto substance, although our conception of substance is more determined\nthan that of an object. Compelled, therefore, by that necessity with\nwhich the conception of substance forces itself upon us, we must\nconfess that it has its seat in our faculty of cognition \u00e0 priori.\n\nIII. Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall Determine the\nPossibility, Principles, and Extent of Human Knowledge \u201c\u00e0 priori\u201d\n\nOf far more importance than all that has been above said, is the\nconsideration that certain of our cognitions rise completely above the\nsphere of all possible experience, and by means of conceptions, to\nwhich there exists in the whole extent of experience no corresponding\nobject, seem to extend the range of our judgements beyond its bounds.\nAnd just in this transcendental or supersensible sphere, where\nexperience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the\ninvestigations of reason, which, on account of their importance, we\nconsider far preferable to, and as having a far more elevated aim than,\nall that the understanding can achieve within the sphere of sensuous\nphenomena. So high a value do we set upon these investigations, that\neven at the risk of error, we persist in following them out, and permit\nneither doubt nor disregard nor indifference to restrain us from the\npursuit. These unavoidable problems of mere pure reason are God,\nfreedom (of will), and immortality. The science which, with all its\npreliminaries, has for its especial object the solution of these\nproblems is named metaphysics\u2014a science which is at the very outset\ndogmatical, that is, it confidently takes upon itself the execution of\nthis task without any previous investigation of the ability or\ninability of reason for such an undertaking.\n\nNow the safe ground of experience being thus abandoned, it seems\nnevertheless natural that we should hesitate to erect a building with\nthe cognitions we possess, without knowing whence they come, and on the\nstrength of principles, the origin of which is undiscovered. Instead of\nthus trying to build without a foundation, it is rather to be expected\nthat we should long ago have put the question, how the understanding\ncan arrive at these \u00e0 priori cognitions, and what is the extent,\nvalidity, and worth which they may possess? We say, \u201cThis is natural\nenough,\u201d meaning by the word natural, that which is consistent with a\njust and reasonable way of thinking; but if we understand by the term,\nthat which usually happens, nothing indeed could be more natural and\nmore comprehensible than that this investigation should be left long\nunattempted. For one part of our pure knowledge, the science of\nmathematics, has been long firmly established, and thus leads us to\nform flattering expectations with regard to others, though these may be\nof quite a different nature. Besides, when we get beyond the bounds of\nexperience, we are of course safe from opposition in that quarter; and\nthe charm of widening the range of our knowledge is so great that,\nunless we are brought to a standstill by some evident contradiction, we\nhurry on undoubtingly in our course. This, however, may be avoided, if\nwe are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which\nare not the less fictions on that account.\n\nMathematical science affords us a brilliant example, how far,\nindependently of all experience, we may carry our \u00e0 priori knowledge.\nIt is true that the mathematician occupies himself with objects and\ncognitions only in so far as they can be represented by means of\nintuition. But this circumstance is easily overlooked, because the said\nintuition can itself be given \u00e0 priori, and therefore is hardly to be\ndistinguished from a mere pure conception. Deceived by such a proof of\nthe power of reason, we can perceive no limits to the extension of our\nknowledge. The light dove cleaving in free flight the thin air, whose\nresistance it feels, might imagine that her movements would be far more\nfree and rapid in airless space. Just in the same way did Plato,\nabandoning the world of sense because of the narrow limits it sets to\nthe understanding, venture upon the wings of ideas beyond it, into the\nvoid space of pure intellect. He did not reflect that he made no real\nprogress by all his efforts; for he met with no resistance which might\nserve him for a support, as it were, whereon to rest, and on which he\nmight apply his powers, in order to let the intellect acquire momentum\nfor its progress. It is, indeed, the common fate of human reason in\nspeculation, to finish the imposing edifice of thought as rapidly as\npossible, and then for the first time to begin to examine whether the\nfoundation is a solid one or no. Arrived at this point, all sorts of\nexcuses are sought after, in order to console us for its want of\nstability, or rather, indeed, to enable Us to dispense altogether with\nso late and dangerous an investigation. But what frees us during the\nprocess of building from all apprehension or suspicion, and flatters us\ninto the belief of its solidity, is this. A great part, perhaps the\ngreatest part, of the business of our reason consists in the\nanalysation of the conceptions which we already possess of objects. By\nthis means we gain a multitude of cognitions, which although really\nnothing more than elucidations or explanations of that which (though in\na confused manner) was already thought in our conceptions, are, at\nleast in respect of their form, prized as new introspections; whilst,\nso far as regards their matter or content, we have really made no\naddition to our conceptions, but only disinvolved them. But as this\nprocess does furnish a real priori knowledge, which has a sure progress\nand useful results, reason, deceived by this, slips in, without being\nitself aware of it, assertions of a quite different kind; in which, to\ngiven conceptions it adds others, \u00e0 priori indeed, but entirely foreign\nto them, without our knowing how it arrives at these, and, indeed,\nwithout such a question ever suggesting itself. I shall therefore at\nonce proceed to examine the difference between these two modes of\nknowledge.\n\nIV. Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements.\n\nIn all judgements wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate is\ncogitated (I mention affirmative judgements only here; the application\nto negative will be very easy), this relation is possible in two\ndifferent ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as\nsomewhat which is contained (though covertly) in the conception A; or\nthe predicate B lies completely out of the conception A, although it\nstands in connection with it. In the first instance, I term the\njudgement analytical, in the second, synthetical. Analytical judgements\n(affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the\npredicate with the subject is cogitated through identity; those in\nwhich this connection is cogitated without identity, are called\nsynthetical judgements. The former may be called explicative, the\nlatter augmentative judgements; because the former add in the predicate\nnothing to the conception of the subject, but only analyse it into its\nconstituent conceptions, which were thought already in the subject,\nalthough in a confused manner; the latter add to our conceptions of the\nsubject a predicate which was not contained in it, and which no\nanalysis could ever have discovered therein. For example, when I say,\n\u201cAll bodies are extended,\u201d this is an analytical judgement. For I need\nnot go beyond the conception of body in order to find extension\nconnected with it, but merely analyse the conception, that is, become\nconscious of the manifold properties which I think in that conception,\nin order to discover this predicate in it: it is therefore an\nanalytical judgement. On the other hand, when I say, \u201cAll bodies are\nheavy,\u201d the predicate is something totally different from that which I\nthink in the mere conception of a body. By the addition of such a\npredicate, therefore, it becomes a synthetical judgement.\n\nJudgements of experience, as such, are always synthetical. For it would\nbe absurd to think of grounding an analytical judgement on experience,\nbecause in forming such a judgement I need not go out of the sphere of\nmy conceptions, and therefore recourse to the testimony of experience\nis quite unnecessary. That \u201cbodies are extended\u201d is not an empirical\njudgement, but a proposition which stands firm \u00e0 priori. For before\naddressing myself to experience, I already have in my conception all\nthe requisite conditions for the judgement, and I have only to extract\nthe predicate from the conception, according to the principle of\ncontradiction, and thereby at the same time become conscious of the\nnecessity of the judgement, a necessity which I could never learn from\nexperience. On the other hand, though at first I do not at all include\nthe predicate of weight in my conception of body in general, that\nconception still indicates an object of experience, a part of the\ntotality of experience, to which I can still add other parts; and this\nI do when I recognize by observation that bodies are heavy. I can\ncognize beforehand by analysis the conception of body through the\ncharacteristics of extension, impenetrability, shape, etc., all which\nare cogitated in this conception. But now I extend my knowledge, and\nlooking back on experience from which I had derived this conception of\nbody, I find weight at all times connected with the above\ncharacteristics, and therefore I synthetically add to my conceptions\nthis as a predicate, and say, \u201cAll bodies are heavy.\u201d Thus it is\nexperience upon which rests the possibility of the synthesis of the\npredicate of weight with the conception of body, because both\nconceptions, although the one is not contained in the other, still\nbelong to one another (only contingently, however), as parts of a\nwhole, namely, of experience, which is itself a synthesis of\nintuitions.\n\nBut to synthetical judgements \u00e0 priori, such aid is entirely wanting.\nIf I go out of and beyond the conception A, in order to recognize\nanother B as connected with it, what foundation have I to rest on,\nwhereby to render the synthesis possible? I have here no longer the\nadvantage of looking out in the sphere of experience for what I want.\nLet us take, for example, the proposition, \u201cEverything that happens has\na cause.\u201d In the conception of \u201csomething that happens,\u201d I indeed think\nan existence which a certain time antecedes, and from this I can derive\nanalytical judgements. But the conception of a cause lies quite out of\nthe above conception, and indicates something entirely different from\n\u201cthat which happens,\u201d and is consequently not contained in that\nconception. How then am I able to assert concerning the general\nconception\u2014\u201cthat which happens\u201d\u2014something entirely different from that\nconception, and to recognize the conception of cause although not\ncontained in it, yet as belonging to it, and even necessarily? what is\nhere the unknown = X, upon which the understanding rests when it\nbelieves it has found, out of the conception A a foreign predicate B,\nwhich it nevertheless considers to be connected with it? It cannot be\nexperience, because the principle adduced annexes the two\nrepresentations, cause and effect, to the representation existence, not\nonly with universality, which experience cannot give, but also with the\nexpression of necessity, therefore completely \u00e0 priori and from pure\nconceptions. Upon such synthetical, that is augmentative propositions,\ndepends the whole aim of our speculative knowledge \u00e0 priori; for\nalthough analytical judgements are indeed highly important and\nnecessary, they are so, only to arrive at that clearness of conceptions\nwhich is requisite for a sure and extended synthesis, and this alone is\na real acquisition.\n\nV. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements \u201c\u00e0\npriori\u201d are contained as Principles.\n\n1. Mathematical judgements are always synthetical. Hitherto this fact,\nthough incontestably true and very important in its consequences, seems\nto have escaped the analysts of the human mind, nay, to be in complete\nopposition to all their conjectures. For as it was found that\nmathematical conclusions all proceed according to the principle of\ncontradiction (which the nature of every apodeictic certainty\nrequires), people became persuaded that the fundamental principles of\nthe science also were recognized and admitted in the same way. But the\nnotion is fallacious; for although a synthetical proposition can\ncertainly be discerned by means of the principle of contradiction, this\nis possible only when another synthetical proposition precedes, from\nwhich the latter is deduced, but never of itself.\n\nBefore all, be it observed, that proper mathematical propositions are\nalways judgements \u00e0 priori, and not empirical, because they carry along\nwith them the conception of necessity, which cannot be given by\nexperience. If this be demurred to, it matters not; I will then limit\nmy assertion to pure mathematics, the very conception of which implies\nthat it consists of knowledge altogether non-empirical and \u00e0 priori.\n\nWe might, indeed at first suppose that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a\nmerely analytical proposition, following (according to the principle of\ncontradiction) from the conception of a sum of seven and five. But if\nwe regard it more narrowly, we find that our conception of the sum of\nseven and five contains nothing more than the uniting of both sums into\none, whereby it cannot at all be cogitated what this single number is\nwhich embraces both. The conception of twelve is by no means obtained\nby merely cogitating the union of seven and five; and we may analyse\nour conception of such a possible sum as long as we will, still we\nshall never discover in it the notion of twelve. We must go beyond\nthese conceptions, and have recourse to an intuition which corresponds\nto one of the two\u2014our five fingers, for example, or like Segner in his\nArithmetic five points, and so by degrees, add the units contained in\nthe five given in the intuition, to the conception of seven. For I\nfirst take the number 7, and, for the conception of 5 calling in the\naid of the fingers of my hand as objects of intuition, I add the units,\nwhich I before took together to make up the number 5, gradually now by\nmeans of the material image my hand, to the number 7, and by this\nprocess, I at length see the number 12 arise. That 7 should be added to\n5, I have certainly cogitated in my conception of a sum = 7 + 5, but\nnot that this sum was equal to 12. Arithmetical propositions are\ntherefore always synthetical, of which we may become more clearly\nconvinced by trying large numbers. For it will thus become quite\nevident that, turn and twist our conceptions as we may, it is\nimpossible, without having recourse to intuition, to arrive at the sum\ntotal or product by means of the mere analysis of our conceptions. Just\nas little is any principle of pure geometry analytical. \u201cA straight\nline between two points is the shortest,\u201d is a synthetical proposition.\nFor my conception of straight contains no notion of quantity, but is\nmerely qualitative. The conception of the shortest is therefore fore\nwholly an addition, and by no analysis can it be extracted from our\nconception of a straight line. Intuition must therefore here lend its\naid, by means of which, and thus only, our synthesis is possible.\n\nSome few principles preposited by geometricians are, indeed, really\nanalytical, and depend on the principle of contradiction. They serve,\nhowever, like identical propositions, as links in the chain of method,\nnot as principles\u2014for example, a = a, the whole is equal to itself, or\n(a+b) \u2014> a, the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these\nprinciples themselves, though they derive their validity from pure\nconceptions, are only admitted in mathematics because they can be\npresented in intuition. What causes us here commonly to believe that\nthe predicate of such apodeictic judgements is already contained in our\nconception, and that the judgement is therefore analytical, is merely\nthe equivocal nature of the expression. We must join in thought a\ncertain predicate to a given conception, and this necessity cleaves\nalready to the conception. But the question is, not what we must join\nin thought to the given conception, but what we really think therein,\nthough only obscurely, and then it becomes manifest that the predicate\npertains to these conceptions, necessarily indeed, yet not as thought\nin the conception itself, but by virtue of an intuition, which must be\nadded to the conception.\n\n2. The science of natural philosophy (physics) contains in itself\nsynthetical judgements \u00e0 priori, as principles. I shall adduce two\npropositions. For instance, the proposition, \u201cIn all changes of the\nmaterial world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged\u201d; or, that,\n\u201cIn all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be\nequal.\u201d In both of these, not only is the necessity, and therefore\ntheir origin \u00e0 priori clear, but also that they are synthetical\npropositions. For in the conception of matter, I do not cogitate its\npermanency, but merely its presence in space, which it fills. I\ntherefore really go out of and beyond the conception of matter, in\norder to think on to it something \u00e0 priori, which I did not think in\nit. The proposition is therefore not analytical, but synthetical, and\nnevertheless conceived \u00e0 priori; and so it is with regard to the other\npropositions of the pure part of natural philosophy.\n\n3. As to metaphysics, even if we look upon it merely as an attempted\nscience, yet, from the nature of human reason, an indispensable one, we\nfind that it must contain synthetical propositions \u00e0 priori. It is not\nmerely the duty of metaphysics to dissect, and thereby analytically to\nillustrate the conceptions which we form \u00e0 priori of things; but we\nseek to widen the range of our \u00e0 priori knowledge. For this purpose, we\nmust avail ourselves of such principles as add something to the\noriginal conception\u2014something not identical with, nor contained in it,\nand by means of synthetical judgements \u00e0 priori, leave far behind us\nthe limits of experience; for example, in the proposition, \u201cthe world\nmust have a beginning,\u201d and such like. Thus metaphysics, according to\nthe proper aim of the science, consists merely of synthetical\npropositions \u00e0 priori.\n\nVI. The Universal Problem of Pure Reason.\n\nIt is extremely advantageous to be able to bring a number of\ninvestigations under the formula of a single problem. For in this\nmanner, we not only facilitate our own labour, inasmuch as we define it\nclearly to ourselves, but also render it more easy for others to decide\nwhether we have done justice to our undertaking. The proper problem of\npure reason, then, is contained in the question: \u201cHow are synthetical\njudgements \u00e0 priori possible?\u201d\n\nThat metaphysical science has hitherto remained in so vacillating a\nstate of uncertainty and contradiction, is only to be attributed to the\nfact that this great problem, and perhaps even the difference between\nanalytical and synthetical judgements, did not sooner suggest itself to\nphilosophers. Upon the solution of this problem, or upon sufficient\nproof of the impossibility of synthetical knowledge \u00e0 priori, depends\nthe existence or downfall of the science of metaphysics. Among\nphilosophers, David Hume came the nearest of all to this problem; yet\nit never acquired in his mind sufficient precision, nor did he regard\nthe question in its universality. On the contrary, he stopped short at\nthe synthetical proposition of the connection of an effect with its\ncause (principium causalitatis), insisting that such proposition \u00e0\npriori was impossible. According to his conclusions, then, all that we\nterm metaphysical science is a mere delusion, arising from the fancied\ninsight of reason into that which is in truth borrowed from experience,\nand to which habit has given the appearance of necessity. Against this\nassertion, destructive to all pure philosophy, he would have been\nguarded, had he had our problem before his eyes in its universality.\nFor he would then have perceived that, according to his own argument,\nthere likewise could not be any pure mathematical science, which\nassuredly cannot exist without synthetical propositions \u00e0 priori\u2014an\nabsurdity from which his good understanding must have saved him.\n\nIn the solution of the above problem is at the same time comprehended\nthe possibility of the use of pure reason in the foundation and\nconstruction of all sciences which contain theoretical knowledge \u00e0\npriori of objects, that is to say, the answer to the following\nquestions:\n\nHow is pure mathematical science possible?\n\nHow is pure natural science possible?\n\nRespecting these sciences, as they do certainly exist, it may with\npropriety be asked, how they are possible?\u2014for that they must be\npossible is shown by the fact of their really existing.[9] But as to\nmetaphysics, the miserable progress it has hitherto made, and the fact\nthat of no one system yet brought forward, far as regards its true aim,\ncan it be said that this science really exists, leaves any one at\nliberty to doubt with reason the very possibility of its existence.\n\n [9] As to the existence of pure natural science, or physics, perhaps\n many may still express doubts. But we have only to look at the\n different propositions which are commonly treated of at the\n commencement of proper (empirical) physical science\u2014those, for\n example, relating to the permanence of the same quantity of matter,\n the vis inertiae, the equality of action and reaction, etc.\u2014to be soon\n convinced that they form a science of pure physics (physica pura, or\n rationalis), which well deserves to be separately exposed as a special\n science, in its whole extent, whether that be great or confined.\n\n\nYet, in a certain sense, this kind of knowledge must unquestionably be\nlooked upon as given; in other words, metaphysics must be considered as\nreally existing, if not as a science, nevertheless as a natural\ndisposition of the human mind (metaphysica naturalis). For human\nreason, without any instigations imputable to the mere vanity of great\nknowledge, unceasingly progresses, urged on by its own feeling of need,\ntowards such questions as cannot be answered by any empirical\napplication of reason, or principles derived therefrom; and so there\nhas ever really existed in every man some system of metaphysics. It\nwill always exist, so soon as reason awakes to the exercise of its\npower of speculation. And now the question arises: \u201cHow is metaphysics,\nas a natural disposition, possible?\u201d In other words, how, from the\nnature of universal human reason, do those questions arise which pure\nreason proposes to itself, and which it is impelled by its own feeling\nof need to answer as well as it can?\n\nBut as in all the attempts hitherto made to answer the questions which\nreason is prompted by its very nature to propose to itself, for\nexample, whether the world had a beginning, or has existed from\neternity, it has always met with unavoidable contradictions, we must\nnot rest satisfied with the mere natural disposition of the mind to\nmetaphysics, that is, with the existence of the faculty of pure reason,\nwhence, indeed, some sort of metaphysical system always arises; but it\nmust be possible to arrive at certainty in regard to the question\nwhether we know or do not know the things of which metaphysics treats.\nWe must be able to arrive at a decision on the subjects of its\nquestions, or on the ability or inability of reason to form any\njudgement respecting them; and therefore either to extend with\nconfidence the bounds of our pure reason, or to set strictly defined\nand safe limits to its action. This last question, which arises out of\nthe above universal problem, would properly run thus: \u201cHow is\nmetaphysics possible as a science?\u201d\n\nThus, the critique of reason leads at last, naturally and necessarily,\nto science; and, on the other hand, the dogmatical use of reason\nwithout criticism leads to groundless assertions, against which others\nequally specious can always be set, thus ending unavoidably in\nscepticism.\n\nBesides, this science cannot be of great and formidable prolixity,\nbecause it has not to do with objects of reason, the variety of which\nis inexhaustible, but merely with Reason herself and her problems;\nproblems which arise out of her own bosom, and are not proposed to her\nby the nature of outward things, but by her own nature. And when once\nReason has previously become able completely to understand her own\npower in regard to objects which she meets with in experience, it will\nbe easy to determine securely the extent and limits of her attempted\napplication to objects beyond the confines of experience.\n\nWe may and must, therefore, regard the attempts hitherto made to\nestablish metaphysical science dogmatically as non-existent. For what\nof analysis, that is, mere dissection of conceptions, is contained in\none or other, is not the aim of, but only a preparation for metaphysics\nproper, which has for its object the extension, by means of synthesis,\nof our \u00e0 priori knowledge. And for this purpose, mere analysis is of\ncourse useless, because it only shows what is contained in these\nconceptions, but not how we arrive, \u00e0 priori, at them; and this it is\nher duty to show, in order to be able afterwards to determine their\nvalid use in regard to all objects of experience, to all knowledge in\ngeneral. But little self-denial, indeed, is needed to give up these\npretensions, seeing the undeniable, and in the dogmatic mode of\nprocedure, inevitable contradictions of Reason with herself, have long\nsince ruined the reputation of every system of metaphysics that has\nappeared up to this time. It will require more firmness to remain\nundeterred by difficulty from within, and opposition from without, from\nendeavouring, by a method quite opposed to all those hitherto followed,\nto further the growth and fruitfulness of a science indispensable to\nhuman reason\u2014a science from which every branch it has borne may be cut\naway, but whose roots remain indestructible.\n\nVII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the Name of a\nCritique of Pure Reason.\n\nFrom all that has been said, there results the idea of a particular\nscience, which may be called the Critique of Pure Reason. For reason is\nthe faculty which furnishes us with the principles of knowledge \u00e0\npriori. Hence, pure reason is the faculty which contains the principles\nof cognizing anything absolutely \u00e0 priori. An organon of pure reason\nwould be a compendium of those principles according to which alone all\npure cognitions \u00e0 priori can be obtained. The completely extended\napplication of such an organon would afford us a system of pure reason.\nAs this, however, is demanding a great deal, and it is yet doubtful\nwhether any extension of our knowledge be here possible, or, if so, in\nwhat cases; we can regard a science of the mere criticism of pure\nreason, its sources and limits, as the prop\u00e6deutic to a system of pure\nreason. Such a science must not be called a doctrine, but only a\ncritique of pure reason; and its use, in regard to speculation, would\nbe only negative, not to enlarge the bounds of, but to purify, our\nreason, and to shield it against error\u2014which alone is no little gain. I\napply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much\noccupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these\nobjects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible \u00e0 priori. A\nsystem of such conceptions would be called transcendental philosophy.\nBut this, again, is still beyond the bounds of our present essay. For\nas such a science must contain a complete exposition not only of our\nsynthetical \u00e0 priori, but of our analytical \u00e0 priori knowledge, it is\nof too wide a range for our present purpose, because we do not require\nto carry our analysis any farther than is necessary to understand, in\ntheir full extent, the principles of synthesis \u00e0 priori, with which\nalone we have to do. This investigation, which we cannot properly call\na doctrine, but only a transcendental critique, because it aims not at\nthe enlargement, but at the correction and guidance, of our knowledge,\nand is to serve as a touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of all\nknowledge \u00e0 priori, is the sole object of our present essay. Such a\ncritique is consequently, as far as possible, a preparation for an\norganon; and if this new organon should be found to fail, at least for\na canon of pure reason, according to which the complete system of the\nphilosophy of pure reason, whether it extend or limit the bounds of\nthat reason, might one day be set forth both analytically and\nsynthetically. For that this is possible, nay, that such a system is\nnot of so great extent as to preclude the hope of its ever being\ncompleted, is evident. For we have not here to do with the nature of\noutward objects, which is infinite, but solely with the mind, which\njudges of the nature of objects, and, again, with the mind only in\nrespect of its cognition \u00e0 priori. And the object of our\ninvestigations, as it is not to be sought without, but, altogether\nwithin, ourselves, cannot remain concealed, and in all probability is\nlimited enough to be completely surveyed and fairly estimated,\naccording to its worth or worthlessness. Still less let the reader here\nexpect a critique of books and systems of pure reason; our present\nobject is exclusively a critique of the faculty of pure reason itself.\nOnly when we make this critique our foundation, do we possess a pure\ntouchstone for estimating the philosophical value of ancient and modern\nwritings on this subject; and without this criterion, the incompetent\nhistorian or judge decides upon and corrects the groundless assertions\nof others with his own, which have themselves just as little\nfoundation.\n\nTranscendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the\nCritique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan architectonically,\nthat is, from principles, with a full guarantee for the validity and\nstability of all the parts which enter into the building. It is the\nsystem of all the principles of pure reason. If this Critique itself\ndoes not assume the title of transcendental philosophy, it is only\nbecause, to be a complete system, it ought to contain a full analysis\nof all human knowledge \u00e0 priori. Our critique must, indeed, lay before\nus a complete enumeration of all the radical conceptions which\nconstitute the said pure knowledge. But from the complete analysis of\nthese conceptions themselves, as also from a complete investigation of\nthose derived from them, it abstains with reason; partly because it\nwould be deviating from the end in view to occupy itself with this\nanalysis, since this process is not attended with the difficulty and\ninsecurity to be found in the synthesis, to which our critique is\nentirely devoted, and partly because it would be inconsistent with the\nunity of our plan to burden this essay with the vindication of the\ncompleteness of such an analysis and deduction, with which, after all,\nwe have at present nothing to do. This completeness of the analysis of\nthese radical conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the\nconceptions \u00e0 priori which may be given by the analysis, we can,\nhowever, easily attain, provided only that we are in possession of all\nthese radical conceptions, which are to serve as principles of the\nsynthesis, and that in respect of this main purpose nothing is wanting.\n\nTo the Critique of Pure Reason, therefore, belongs all that constitutes\ntranscendental philosophy; and it is the complete idea of\ntranscendental philosophy, but still not the science itself; because it\nonly proceeds so far with the analysis as is necessary to the power of\njudging completely of our synthetical knowledge \u00e0 priori.\n\nThe principal thing we must attend to, in the division of the parts of\na science like this, is that no conceptions must enter it which contain\naught empirical; in other words, that the knowledge \u00e0 priori must be\ncompletely pure. Hence, although the highest principles and fundamental\nconceptions of morality are certainly cognitions \u00e0 priori, yet they do\nnot belong to transcendental philosophy; because, though they certainly\ndo not lay the conceptions of pain, pleasure, desires, inclinations,\netc. (which are all of empirical origin), at the foundation of its\nprecepts, yet still into the conception of duty\u2014as an obstacle to be\novercome, or as an incitement which should not be made into a\nmotive\u2014these empirical conceptions must necessarily enter, in the\nconstruction of a system of pure morality. Transcendental philosophy is\nconsequently a philosophy of the pure and merely speculative reason.\nFor all that is practical, so far as it contains motives, relates to\nfeelings, and these belong to empirical sources of cognition.\n\nIf we wish to divide this science from the universal point of view of a\nscience in general, it ought to comprehend, first, a Doctrine of the\nElements, and, secondly, a Doctrine of the Method of pure reason. Each\nof these main divisions will have its subdivisions, the separate\nreasons for which we cannot here particularize. Only so much seems\nnecessary, by way of introduction of premonition, that there are two\nsources of human knowledge (which probably spring from a common, but to\nus unknown root), namely, sense and understanding. By the former,\nobjects are given to us; by the latter, thought. So far as the faculty\nof sense may contain representations \u00e0 priori, which form the\nconditions under which objects are given, in so far it belongs to\ntranscendental philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of sense must\nform the first part of our science of elements, because the conditions\nunder which alone the objects of human knowledge are given must precede\nthose under which they are thought.\n\n\n\nI. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.\n\nFIRST PART. TRANSCENDENTAL \u00c6STHETIC.\n\n\u00a7 I. Introductory.\n\nIn whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to\nobjects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it\nimmediately relates to them is by means of an intuition. To this as the\nindispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can take\nplace only in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only\npossible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind\nin a certain manner. The capacity for receiving representations\n(receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by objects,\nobjects, is called sensibility. By means of sensibility, therefore,\nobjects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions; by\nthe understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. But\nan thought must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain signs,\nrelate ultimately to intuitions; consequently, with us, to sensibility,\nbecause in no other way can an object be given to us.\n\nThe effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as\nwe are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of\nintuition which relates to an object by means of sensation is called an\nempirical intuition. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition\nis called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the\nsensation, I term its matter; but that which effects that the content\nof the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations, I call its\nform. But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by\nwhich they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be itself\nsensation. It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us\n\u00e0 posteriori; the form must lie ready \u00e0 priori for them in the mind,\nand consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation.\n\nI call all representations pure, in the transcendental meaning of the\nword, wherein nothing is met with that belongs to sensation. And\naccordingly we find existing in the mind \u00e0 priori, the pure form of\nsensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of\nthe phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations.\nThis pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition. Thus, if I\ntake away from our representation of a body all that the understanding\nthinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and\nalso whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness,\ncolour, etc.; yet there is still something left us from this empirical\nintuition, namely, extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition,\nwhich exists \u00e0 priori in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and\nwithout any real object of the senses or any sensation.\n\nThe science of all the principles of sensibility \u00e0 priori, I call\ntranscendental \u00e6sthetic.[10] There must, then, be such a science\nforming the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in\ncontradistinction to that part which contains the principles of pure\nthought, and which is called transcendental logic.\n\n [10] The Germans are the only people who at present use this word to\n indicate what others call the critique of taste. At the foundation of\n this term lies the disappointed hope, which the eminent analyst,\n Baumgarten, conceived, of subjecting the criticism of the beautiful to\n principles of reason, and so of elevating its rules into a science.\n But his endeavours were vain. For the said rules or criteria are, in\n respect to their chief sources, merely empirical, consequently never\n can serve as determinate laws \u00e0 priori, by which our judgement in\n matters of taste is to be directed. It is rather our judgement which\n forms the proper test as to the correctness of the principles. On this\n account it is advisable to give up the use of the term as designating\n the critique of taste, and to apply it solely to that doctrine, which\n is true science\u2014the science of the laws of sensibility\u2014and thus come\n nearer to the language and the sense of the ancients in their\n well-known division of the objects of cognition into aiotheta kai\n noeta, or to share it with speculative philosophy, and employ it\n partly in a transcendental, partly in a psychological signification.\n\n\nIn the science of transcendental \u00e6sthetic accordingly, we shall first\nisolate sensibility or the sensuous faculty, by separating from it all\nthat is annexed to its perceptions by the conceptions of understanding,\nso that nothing be left but empirical intuition. In the next place we\nshall take away from this intuition all that belongs to sensation, so\nthat nothing may remain but pure intuition, and the mere form of\nphenomena, which is all that the sensibility can afford \u00e0 priori. From\nthis investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of\nsensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge \u00e0 priori, namely, space\nand time. To the consideration of these we shall now proceed.\n\nSECTION I. Of Space.\n\n\u00a7 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.\n\nBy means of the external sense (a property of the mind), we represent\nto ourselves objects as without us, and these all in space. Herein\nalone are their shape, dimensions, and relations to each other\ndetermined or determinable. The internal sense, by means of which the\nmind contemplates itself or its internal state, gives, indeed, no\nintuition of the soul as an object; yet there is nevertheless a\ndeterminate form, under which alone the contemplation of our internal\nstate is possible, so that all which relates to the inward\ndeterminations of the mind is represented in relations of time. Of time\nwe cannot have any external intuition, any more than we can have an\ninternal intuition of space. What then are time and space? Are they\nreal existences? Or, are they merely relations or determinations of\nthings, such, however, as would equally belong to these things in\nthemselves, though they should never become objects of intuition; or,\nare they such as belong only to the form of intuition, and consequently\nto the subjective constitution of the mind, without which these\npredicates of time and space could not be attached to any object? In\norder to become informed on these points, we shall first give an\nexposition of the conception of space. By exposition, I mean the clear,\nthough not detailed, representation of that which belongs to a\nconception; and an exposition is metaphysical when it contains that\nwhich represents the conception as given \u00e0 priori.\n\n1. Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward\nexperiences. For, in order that certain sensations may relate to\nsomething without me (that is, to something which occupies a different\npart of space from that in which I am); in like manner, in order that I\nmay represent them not merely as without, of, and near to each other,\nbut also in separate places, the representation of space must already\nexist as a foundation. Consequently, the representation of space cannot\nbe borrowed from the relations of external phenomena through\nexperience; but, on the contrary, this external experience is itself\nonly possible through the said antecedent representation.\n\n2. Space then is a necessary representation \u00e0 priori, which serves for\nthe foundation of all external intuitions. We never can imagine or make\na representation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we\nmay easily enough think that no objects are found in it. It must,\ntherefore, be considered as the condition of the possibility of\nphenomena, and by no means as a determination dependent on them, and is\na representation \u00e0 priori, which necessarily supplies the basis for\nexternal phenomena.\n\n3. Space is no discursive, or as we say, general conception of the\nrelations of things, but a pure intuition. For, in the first place, we\ncan only represent to ourselves one space, and, when we talk of divers\nspaces, we mean only parts of one and the same space. Moreover, these\nparts cannot antecede this one all-embracing space, as the component\nparts from which the aggregate can be made up, but can be cogitated\nonly as existing in it. Space is essentially one, and multiplicity in\nit, consequently the general notion of spaces, of this or that space,\ndepends solely upon limitations. Hence it follows that an \u00e0 priori\nintuition (which is not empirical) lies at the root of all our\nconceptions of space. Thus, moreover, the principles of geometry\u2014for\nexample, that \u201cin a triangle, two sides together are greater than the\nthird,\u201d are never deduced from general conceptions of line and\ntriangle, but from intuition, and this \u00e0 priori, with apodeictic\ncertainty.\n\n4. Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. Now every\nconception must indeed be considered as a representation which is\ncontained in an infinite multitude of different possible\nrepresentations, which, therefore, comprises these under itself; but no\nconception, as such, can be so conceived, as if it contained within\nitself an infinite multitude of representations. Nevertheless, space is\nso conceived of, for all parts of space are equally capable of being\nproduced to infinity. Consequently, the original representation of\nspace is an intuition \u00e0 priori, and not a conception.\n\n\u00a7 3. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space.\n\nBy a transcendental exposition, I mean the explanation of a conception,\nas a principle, whence can be discerned the possibility of other\nsynthetical \u00e0 priori cognitions. For this purpose, it is requisite,\nfirstly, that such cognitions do really flow from the given conception;\nand, secondly, that the said cognitions are only possible under the\npresupposition of a given mode of explaining this conception.\n\nGeometry is a science which determines the properties of space\nsynthetically, and yet \u00e0 priori. What, then, must be our representation\nof space, in order that such a cognition of it may be possible? It must\nbe originally intuition, for from a mere conception, no propositions\ncan be deduced which go out beyond the conception, and yet this happens\nin geometry. (Introd. V.) But this intuition must be found in the mind\n\u00e0 priori, that is, before any perception of objects, consequently must\nbe pure, not empirical, intuition. For geometrical principles are\nalways apodeictic, that is, united with the consciousness of their\nnecessity, as: \u201cSpace has only three dimensions.\u201d But propositions of\nthis kind cannot be empirical judgements, nor conclusions from them.\n(Introd. II.) Now, how can an external intuition anterior to objects\nthemselves, and in which our conception of objects can be determined \u00e0\npriori, exist in the human mind? Obviously not otherwise than in so far\nas it has its seat in the subject only, as the formal capacity of the\nsubject\u2019s being affected by objects, and thereby of obtaining immediate\nrepresentation, that is, intuition; consequently, only as the form of\nthe external sense in general.\n\nThus it is only by means of our explanation that the possibility of\ngeometry, as a synthetical science \u00e0 priori, becomes comprehensible.\nEvery mode of explanation which does not show us this possibility,\nalthough in appearance it may be similar to ours, can with the utmost\ncertainty be distinguished from it by these marks.\n\n\u00a7 4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions.\n\n(a) Space does not represent any property of objects as things in\nthemselves, nor does it represent them in their relations to each\nother; in other words, space does not represent to us any determination\nof objects such as attaches to the objects themselves, and would\nremain, even though all subjective conditions of the intuition were\nabstracted. For neither absolute nor relative determinations of objects\ncan be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they\nbelong, and therefore not \u00e0 priori.\n\n(b) Space is nothing else than the form of all phenomena of the\nexternal sense, that is, the subjective condition of the sensibility,\nunder which alone external intuition is possible. Now, because the\nreceptivity or capacity of the subject to be affected by objects\nnecessarily antecedes all intuitions of these objects, it is easily\nunderstood how the form of all phenomena can be given in the mind\nprevious to all actual perceptions, therefore \u00e0 priori, and how it, as\na pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined, can contain\nprinciples of the relations of these objects prior to all experience.\n\nIt is therefore from the human point of view only that we can speak of\nspace, extended objects, etc. If we depart from the subjective\ncondition, under which alone we can obtain external intuition, or, in\nother words, by means of which we are affected by objects, the\nrepresentation of space has no meaning whatsoever. This predicate is\nonly applicable to things in so far as they appear to us, that is, are\nobjects of sensibility. The constant form of this receptivity, which we\ncall sensibility, is a necessary condition of all relations in which\nobjects can be intuited as existing without us, and when abstraction of\nthese objects is made, is a pure intuition, to which we give the name\nof space. It is clear that we cannot make the special conditions of\nsensibility into conditions of the possibility of things, but only of\nthe possibility of their existence as far as they are phenomena. And so\nwe may correctly say that space contains all which can appear to us\nexternally, but not all things considered as things in themselves, be\nthey intuited or not, or by whatsoever subject one will. As to the\nintuitions of other thinking beings, we cannot judge whether they are\nor are not bound by the same conditions which limit our own intuition,\nand which for us are universally valid. If we join the limitation of a\njudgement to the conception of the subject, then the judgement will\npossess unconditioned validity. For example, the proposition, \u201cAll\nobjects are beside each other in space,\u201d is valid only under the\nlimitation that these things are taken as objects of our sensuous\nintuition. But if I join the condition to the conception and say, \u201cAll\nthings, as external phenomena, are beside each other in space,\u201d then\nthe rule is valid universally, and without any limitation. Our\nexpositions, consequently, teach the reality (i.e., the objective\nvalidity) of space in regard of all which can be presented to us\nexternally as object, and at the same time also the ideality of space\nin regard to objects when they are considered by means of reason as\nthings in themselves, that is, without reference to the constitution of\nour sensibility. We maintain, therefore, the empirical reality of space\nin regard to all possible external experience, although we must admit\nits transcendental ideality; in other words, that it is nothing, so\nsoon as we withdraw the condition upon which the possibility of all\nexperience depends and look upon space as something that belongs to\nthings in themselves.\n\nBut, with the exception of space, there is no representation,\nsubjective and referring to something external to us, which could be\ncalled objective \u00e0 priori. For there are no other subjective\nrepresentations from which we can deduce synthetical propositions \u00e0\npriori, as we can from the intuition of space. (See \u00a7 3.) Therefore, to\nspeak accurately, no ideality whatever belongs to these, although they\nagree in this respect with the representation of space, that they\nbelong merely to the subjective nature of the mode of sensuous\nperception; such a mode, for example, as that of sight, of hearing, and\nof feeling, by means of the sensations of colour, sound, and heat, but\nwhich, because they are only sensations and not intuitions, do not of\nthemselves give us the cognition of any object, least of all, an \u00e0\npriori cognition. My purpose, in the above remark, is merely this: to\nguard any one against illustrating the asserted ideality of space by\nexamples quite insufficient, for example, by colour, taste, etc.; for\nthese must be contemplated not as properties of things, but only as\nchanges in the subject, changes which may be different in different\nmen. For, in such a case, that which is originally a mere phenomenon, a\nrose, for example, is taken by the empirical understanding for a thing\nin itself, though to every different eye, in respect of its colour, it\nmay appear different. On the contrary, the transcendental conception of\nphenomena in space is a critical admonition, that, in general, nothing\nwhich is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not\na form which belongs as a property to things; but that objects are\nquite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects,\nare nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility, whose\nform is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not\nknown by means of these representations, nor ever can be, but\nrespecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made.\n\nSECTION II. Of Time.\n\n\u00a7 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.\n\n1. Time is not an empirical conception. For neither coexistence nor\nsuccession would be perceived by us, if the representation of time did\nnot exist as a foundation \u00e0 priori. Without this presupposition we\ncould not represent to ourselves that things exist together at one and\nthe same time, or at different times, that is, contemporaneously, or in\nsuccession.\n\n2. Time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation of all\nour intuitions. With regard to phenomena in general, we cannot think\naway time from them, and represent them to ourselves as out of and\nunconnected with time, but we can quite well represent to ourselves\ntime void of phenomena. Time is therefore given \u00e0 priori. In it alone\nis all reality of phenomena possible. These may all be annihilated in\nthought, but time itself, as the universal condition of their\npossibility, cannot be so annulled.\n\n3. On this necessity \u00e0 priori is also founded the possibility of\napodeictic principles of the relations of time, or axioms of time in\ngeneral, such as: \u201cTime has only one dimension,\u201d \u201cDifferent times are\nnot coexistent but successive\u201d (as different spaces are not successive\nbut coexistent). These principles cannot be derived from experience,\nfor it would give neither strict universality, nor apodeictic\ncertainty. We should only be able to say, \u201cso common experience teaches\nus,\u201d but not \u201cit must be so.\u201d They are valid as rules, through which,\nin general, experience is possible; and they instruct us respecting\nexperience, and not by means of it.\n\n4. Time is not a discursive, or as it is called, general conception,\nbut a pure form of the sensuous intuition. Different times are merely\nparts of one and the same time. But the representation which can only\nbe given by a single object is an intuition. Besides, the proposition\nthat different times cannot be coexistent could not be derived from a\ngeneral conception. For this proposition is synthetical, and therefore\ncannot spring out of conceptions alone. It is therefore contained\nimmediately in the intuition and representation of time.\n\n5. The infinity of time signifies nothing more than that every\ndetermined quantity of time is possible only through limitations of one\ntime lying at the foundation. Consequently, the original\nrepresentation, time, must be given as unlimited. But as the\ndeterminate representation of the parts of time and of every quantity\nof an object can only be obtained by limitation, the complete\nrepresentation of time must not be furnished by means of conceptions,\nfor these contain only partial representations. Conceptions, on the\ncontrary, must have immediate intuition for their basis.\n\n\u00a7 6 Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time.\n\nI may here refer to what is said above (\u00a7 5, 3), where, for or sake of\nbrevity, I have placed under the head of metaphysical exposition, that\nwhich is properly transcendental. Here I shall add that the conception\nof change, and with it the conception of motion, as change of place, is\npossible only through and in the representation of time; that if this\nrepresentation were not an intuition (internal) \u00e0 priori, no\nconception, of whatever kind, could render comprehensible the\npossibility of change, in other words, of a conjunction of\ncontradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object, for\nexample, the presence of a thing in a place and the non-presence of the\nsame thing in the same place. It is only in time that it is possible to\nmeet with two contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing, that\nis, after each other. Thus our conception of time explains the\npossibility of so much synthetical knowledge \u00e0 priori, as is exhibited\nin the general doctrine of motion, which is not a little fruitful.\n\n\u00a7 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions.\n\n(a) Time is not something which subsists of itself, or which inheres in\nthings as an objective determination, and therefore remains, when\nabstraction is made of the subjective conditions of the intuition of\nthings. For in the former case, it would be something real, yet without\npresenting to any power of perception any real object. In the latter\ncase, as an order or determination inherent in things themselves, it\ncould not be antecedent to things, as their condition, nor discerned or\nintuited by means of synthetical propositions \u00e0 priori. But all this is\nquite possible when we regard time as merely the subjective condition\nunder which all our intuitions take place. For in that case, this form\nof the inward intuition can be represented prior to the objects, and\nconsequently \u00e0 priori.\n\n(b) Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that is,\nof the intuitions of self and of our internal state. For time cannot be\nany determination of outward phenomena. It has to do neither with shape\nnor position; on the contrary, it determines the relation of\nrepresentations in our internal state. And precisely because this\ninternal intuition presents to us no shape or form, we endeavour to\nsupply this want by analogies, and represent the course of time by a\nline progressing to infinity, the content of which constitutes a series\nwhich is only of one dimension; and we conclude from the properties of\nthis line as to all the properties of time, with this single exception,\nthat the parts of the line are coexistent, whilst those of time are\nsuccessive. From this it is clear also that the representation of time\nis itself an intuition, because all its relations can be expressed in\nan external intuition.\n\n(c) Time is the formal condition \u00e0 priori of all phenomena whatsoever.\nSpace, as the pure form of external intuition, is limited as a\ncondition \u00e0 priori to external phenomena alone. On the other hand,\nbecause all representations, whether they have or have not external\nthings for their objects, still in themselves, as determinations of the\nmind, belong to our internal state; and because this internal state is\nsubject to the formal condition of the internal intuition, that is, to\ntime\u2014time is a condition \u00e0 priori of all phenomena whatsoever\u2014the\nimmediate condition of all internal, and thereby the mediate condition\nof all external phenomena. If I can say \u00e0 priori, \u201cAll outward\nphenomena are in space, and determined \u00e0 priori according to the\nrelations of space,\u201d I can also, from the principle of the internal\nsense, affirm universally, \u201cAll phenomena in general, that is, all\nobjects of the senses, are in time and stand necessarily in relations\nof time.\u201d\n\nIf we abstract our internal intuition of ourselves and all external\nintuitions, possible only by virtue of this internal intuition and\npresented to us by our faculty of representation, and consequently take\nobjects as they are in themselves, then time is nothing. It is only of\nobjective validity in regard to phenomena, because these are things\nwhich we regard as objects of our senses. It no longer objective we,\nmake abstraction of the sensuousness of our intuition, in other words,\nof that mode of representation which is peculiar to us, and speak of\nthings in general. Time is therefore merely a subjective condition of\nour (human) intuition (which is always sensuous, that is, so far as we\nare affected by objects), and in itself, independently of the mind or\nsubject, is nothing. Nevertheless, in respect of all phenomena,\nconsequently of all things which come within the sphere of our\nexperience, it is necessarily objective. We cannot say, \u201cAll things are\nin time,\u201d because in this conception of things in general, we abstract\nand make no mention of any sort of intuition of things. But this is the\nproper condition under which time belongs to our representation of\nobjects. If we add the condition to the conception, and say, \u201cAll\nthings, as phenomena, that is, objects of sensuous intuition, are in\ntime,\u201d then the proposition has its sound objective validity and\nuniversality \u00e0 priori.\n\nWhat we have now set forth teaches, therefore, the empirical reality of\ntime; that is, its objective validity in reference to all objects which\ncan ever be presented to our senses. And as our intuition is always\nsensuous, no object ever can be presented to us in experience, which\ndoes not come under the conditions of time. On the other hand, we deny\nto time all claim to absolute reality; that is, we deny that it,\nwithout having regard to the form of our sensuous intuition, absolutely\ninheres in things as a condition or property. Such properties as belong\nto objects as things in themselves never can be presented to us through\nthe medium of the senses. Herein consists, therefore, the\ntranscendental ideality of time, according to which, if we abstract the\nsubjective conditions of sensuous intuition, it is nothing, and cannot\nbe reckoned as subsisting or inhering in objects as things in\nthemselves, independently of its relation to our intuition. This\nideality, like that of space, is not to be proved or illustrated by\nfallacious analogies with sensations, for this reason\u2014that in such\narguments or illustrations, we make the presupposition that the\nphenomenon, in which such and such predicates inhere, has objective\nreality, while in this case we can only find such an objective reality\nas is itself empirical, that is, regards the object as a mere\nphenomenon. In reference to this subject, see the remark in Section I\n(\u00a7 4)\n\n\u00a7 8. Elucidation.\n\nAgainst this theory, which grants empirical reality to time, but denies\nto it absolute and transcendental reality, I have heard from\nintelligent men an objection so unanimously urged that I conclude that\nit must naturally present itself to every reader to whom these\nconsiderations are novel. It runs thus: \u201cChanges are real\u201d (this the\ncontinual change in our own representations demonstrates, even though\nthe existence of all external phenomena, together with their changes,\nis denied). Now, changes are only possible in time, and therefore time\nmust be something real. But there is no difficulty in answering this. I\ngrant the whole argument. Time, no doubt, is something real, that is,\nit is the real form of our internal intuition. It therefore has\nsubjective reality, in reference to our internal experience, that is, I\nhave really the representation of time and of my determinations\ntherein. Time, therefore, is not to be regarded as an object, but as\nthe mode of representation of myself as an object. But if I could\nintuite myself, or be intuited by another being, without this condition\nof sensibility, then those very determinations which we now represent\nto ourselves as changes, would present to us a knowledge in which the\nrepresentation of time, and consequently of change, would not appear.\nThe empirical reality of time, therefore, remains, as the condition of\nall our experience. But absolute reality, according to what has been\nsaid above, cannot be granted it. Time is nothing but the form of our\ninternal intuition.[11] If we take away from it the special condition\nof our sensibility, the conception of time also vanishes; and it\ninheres not in the objects themselves, but solely in the subject (or\nmind) which intuites them.\n\n [11] I can indeed say \u201cmy representations follow one another, or are\n successive\u201d; but this means only that we are conscious of them as in a\n succession, that is, according to the form of the internal sense.\n Time, therefore, is not a thing in itself, nor is it any objective\n determination pertaining to, or inherent in things.\n\n\nBut the reason why this objection is so unanimously brought against our\ndoctrine of time, and that too by disputants who cannot start any\nintelligible arguments against the doctrine of the ideality of space,\nis this\u2014they have no hope of demonstrating apodeictically the absolute\nreality of space, because the doctrine of idealism is against them,\naccording to which the reality of external objects is not capable of\nany strict proof. On the other hand, the reality of the object of our\ninternal sense (that is, myself and my internal state) is clear\nimmediately through consciousness. The former\u2014external objects in\nspace\u2014might be a mere delusion, but the latter\u2014the object of my\ninternal perception\u2014is undeniably real. They do not, however, reflect\nthat both, without question of their reality as representations, belong\nonly to the genus phenomenon, which has always two aspects, the one,\nthe object considered as a thing in itself, without regard to the mode\nof intuiting it, and the nature of which remains for this very reason\nproblematical, the other, the form of our intuition of the object,\nwhich must be sought not in the object as a thing in itself, but in the\nsubject to which it appears\u2014which form of intuition nevertheless\nbelongs really and necessarily to the phenomenal object.\n\nTime and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge, from which, \u00e0\npriori, various synthetical cognitions can be drawn. Of this we find a\nstriking example in the cognitions of space and its relations, which\nform the foundation of pure mathematics. They are the two pure forms of\nall intuitions, and thereby make synthetical propositions \u00e0 priori\npossible. But these sources of knowledge being merely conditions of our\nsensibility, do therefore, and as such, strictly determine their own\nrange and purpose, in that they do not and cannot present objects as\nthings in themselves, but are applicable to them solely in so far as\nthey are considered as sensuous phenomena. The sphere of phenomena is\nthe only sphere of their validity, and if we venture out of this, no\nfurther objective use can be made of them. For the rest, this formal\nreality of time and space leaves the validity of our empirical\nknowledge unshaken; for our certainty in that respect is equally firm,\nwhether these forms necessarily inhere in the things themselves, or\nonly in our intuitions of them. On the other hand, those who maintain\nthe absolute reality of time and space, whether as essentially\nsubsisting, or only inhering, as modifications, in things, must find\nthemselves at utter variance with the principles of experience itself.\nFor, if they decide for the first view, and make space and time into\nsubstances, this being the side taken by mathematical natural\nphilosophers, they must admit two self-subsisting nonentities, infinite\nand eternal, which exist (yet without there being anything real) for\nthe purpose of containing in themselves everything that is real. If\nthey adopt the second view of inherence, which is preferred by some\nmetaphysical natural philosophers, and regard space and time as\nrelations (contiguity in space or succession in time), abstracted from\nexperience, though represented confusedly in this state of separation,\nthey find themselves in that case necessitated to deny the validity of\nmathematical doctrines \u00e0 priori in reference to real things (for\nexample, in space)\u2014at all events their apodeictic certainty. For such\ncertainty cannot be found in an \u00e0 posteriori proposition; and the\nconceptions \u00e0 priori of space and time are, according to this opinion,\nmere creations of the imagination, having their source really in\nexperience, inasmuch as, out of relations abstracted from experience,\nimagination has made up something which contains, indeed, general\nstatements of these relations, yet of which no application can be made\nwithout the restrictions attached thereto by nature. The former of\nthese parties gains this advantage, that they keep the sphere of\nphenomena free for mathematical science. On the other hand, these very\nconditions (space and time) embarrass them greatly, when the\nunderstanding endeavours to pass the limits of that sphere. The latter\nhas, indeed, this advantage, that the representations of space and time\ndo not come in their way when they wish to judge of objects, not as\nphenomena, but merely in their relation to the understanding. Devoid,\nhowever, of a true and objectively valid \u00e0 priori intuition, they can\nneither furnish any basis for the possibility of mathematical\ncognitions \u00e0 priori, nor bring the propositions of experience into\nnecessary accordance with those of mathematics. In our theory of the\ntrue nature of these two original forms of the sensibility, both\ndifficulties are surmounted.\n\nIn conclusion, that transcendental \u00e6sthetic cannot contain any more\nthan these two elements\u2014space and time, is sufficiently obvious from\nthe fact that all other conceptions appertaining to sensibility, even\nthat of motion, which unites in itself both elements, presuppose\nsomething empirical. Motion, for example, presupposes the perception of\nsomething movable. But space considered in itself contains nothing\nmovable, consequently motion must be something which is found in space\nonly through experience\u2014in other words, an empirical datum. In like\nmanner, transcendental \u00e6sthetic cannot number the conception of change\namong its data \u00e0 priori; for time itself does not change, but only\nsomething which is in time. To acquire the conception of change,\ntherefore, the perception of some existing object and of the succession\nof its determinations, in one word, experience, is necessary.\n\n\u00a7 9. General Remarks on Transcendental \u00c6sthetic.\n\nI. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, it will be requisite, in\nthe first place, to recapitulate, as clearly as possible, what our\nopinion is with respect to the fundamental nature of our sensuous\ncognition in general. We have intended, then, to say that all our\nintuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the\nthings which we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our\nrepresentations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in\nthemselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take\naway the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our\nsenses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in\nspace and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and that\nthese, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What\nmay be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and\nwithout reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite\nunknown to us. We know nothing more than our mode of perceiving them,\nwhich is peculiar to us, and which, though not of necessity pertaining\nto every animated being, is so to the whole human race. With this alone\nwe have to do. Space and time are the pure forms thereof; sensation the\nmatter. The former alone can we cognize \u00e0 priori, that is, antecedent\nto all actual perception; and for this reason such cognition is called\npure intuition. The latter is that in our cognition which is called\ncognition \u00e0 posteriori, that is, empirical intuition. The former\nappertain absolutely and necessarily to our sensibility, of whatsoever\nkind our sensations may be; the latter may be of very diversified\ncharacter. Supposing that we should carry our empirical intuition even\nto the very highest degree of clearness, we should not thereby advance\none step nearer to a knowledge of the constitution of objects as things\nin themselves. For we could only, at best, arrive at a complete\ncognition of our own mode of intuition, that is of our sensibility, and\nthis always under the conditions originally attaching to the subject,\nnamely, the conditions of space and time; while the question: \u201cWhat are\nobjects considered as things in themselves?\u201d remains unanswerable even\nafter the most thorough examination of the phenomenal world.\n\nTo say, then, that all our sensibility is nothing but the confused\nrepresentation of things containing exclusively that which belongs to\nthem as things in themselves, and this under an accumulation of\ncharacteristic marks and partial representations which we cannot\ndistinguish in consciousness, is a falsification of the conception of\nsensibility and phenomenization, which renders our whole doctrine\nthereof empty and useless. The difference between a confused and a\nclear representation is merely logical and has nothing to do with\ncontent. No doubt the conception of right, as employed by a sound\nunderstanding, contains all that the most subtle investigation could\nunfold from it, although, in the ordinary practical use of the word, we\nare not conscious of the manifold representations comprised in the\nconception. But we cannot for this reason assert that the ordinary\nconception is a sensuous one, containing a mere phenomenon, for right\ncannot appear as a phenomenon; but the conception of it lies in the\nunderstanding, and represents a property (the moral property) of\nactions, which belongs to them in themselves. On the other hand, the\nrepresentation in intuition of a body contains nothing which could\nbelong to an object considered as a thing in itself, but merely the\nphenomenon or appearance of something, and the mode in which we are\naffected by that appearance; and this receptivity of our faculty of\ncognition is called sensibility, and remains toto caelo different from\nthe cognition of an object in itself, even though we should examine the\ncontent of the phenomenon to the very bottom.\n\nIt must be admitted that the Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy has assigned\nan entirely erroneous point of view to all investigations into the\nnature and origin of our cognitions, inasmuch as it regards the\ndistinction between the sensuous and the intellectual as merely\nlogical, whereas it is plainly transcendental, and concerns not merely\nthe clearness or obscurity, but the content and origin of both. For the\nfaculty of sensibility not only does not present us with an indistinct\nand confused cognition of objects as things in themselves, but, in\nfact, gives us no knowledge of these at all. On the contrary, so soon\nas we abstract in thought our own subjective nature, the object\nrepresented, with the properties ascribed to it by sensuous intuition,\nentirely disappears, because it was only this subjective nature that\ndetermined the form of the object as a phenomenon.\n\nIn phenomena, we commonly, indeed, distinguish that which essentially\nbelongs to the intuition of them, and is valid for the sensuous faculty\nof every human being, from that which belongs to the same intuition\naccidentally, as valid not for the sensuous faculty in general, but for\na particular state or organization of this or that sense. Accordingly,\nwe are accustomed to say that the former is a cognition which\nrepresents the object itself, whilst the latter presents only a\nparticular appearance or phenomenon thereof. This distinction, however,\nis only empirical. If we stop here (as is usual), and do not regard the\nempirical intuition as itself a mere phenomenon (as we ought to do), in\nwhich nothing that can appertain to a thing in itself is to be found,\nour transcendental distinction is lost, and we believe that we cognize\nobjects as things in themselves, although in the whole range of the\nsensuous world, investigate the nature of its objects as profoundly as\nwe may, we have to do with nothing but phenomena. Thus, we call the\nrainbow a mere appearance of phenomenon in a sunny shower, and the\nrain, the reality or thing in itself; and this is right enough, if we\nunderstand the latter conception in a merely physical sense, that is,\nas that which in universal experience, and under whatever conditions of\nsensuous perception, is known in intuition to be so and so determined,\nand not otherwise. But if we consider this empirical datum generally,\nand inquire, without reference to its accordance with all our senses,\nwhether there can be discovered in it aught which represents an object\nas a thing in itself (the raindrops of course are not such, for they\nare, as phenomena, empirical objects), the question of the relation of\nthe representation to the object is transcendental; and not only are\nthe raindrops mere phenomena, but even their circular form, nay, the\nspace itself through which they fall, is nothing in itself, but both\nare mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of our sensuous\nintuition, whilst the transcendental object remains for us utterly\nunknown.\n\nThe second important concern of our \u00e6sthetic is that it does not obtain\nfavour merely as a plausible hypothesis, but possess as undoubted a\ncharacter of certainty as can be demanded of any theory which is to\nserve for an organon. In order fully to convince the reader of this\ncertainty, we shall select a case which will serve to make its validity\napparent, and also to illustrate what has been said in \u00a7 3.\n\nSuppose, then, that space and time are in themselves objective, and\nconditions of the\u2014possibility of objects as things in themselves. In\nthe first place, it is evident that both present us, with very many\napodeictic and synthetic propositions \u00e0 priori, but especially\nspace\u2014and for this reason we shall prefer it for investigation at\npresent. As the propositions of geometry are cognized synthetically \u00e0\npriori, and with apodeictic certainty, I inquire: Whence do you obtain\npropositions of this kind, and on what basis does the understanding\nrest, in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary and universally\nvalid truths?\n\nThere is no other way than through intuitions or conceptions, as such;\nand these are given either \u00e0 priori or \u00e0 posteriori. The latter,\nnamely, empirical conceptions, together with the empirical intuition on\nwhich they are founded, cannot afford any synthetical proposition,\nexcept such as is itself also empirical, that is, a proposition of\nexperience. But an empirical proposition cannot possess the qualities\nof necessity and absolute universality, which, nevertheless, are the\ncharacteristics of all geometrical propositions. As to the first and\nonly means to arrive at such cognitions, namely, through mere\nconceptions or intuitions \u00e0 priori, it is quite clear that from mere\nconceptions no synthetical cognitions, but only analytical ones, can be\nobtained. Take, for example, the proposition: \u201cTwo straight lines\ncannot enclose a space, and with these alone no figure is possible,\u201d\nand try to deduce it from the conception of a straight line and the\nnumber two; or take the proposition: \u201cIt is possible to construct a\nfigure with three straight lines,\u201d and endeavour, in like manner, to\ndeduce it from the mere conception of a straight line and the number\nthree. All your endeavours are in vain, and you find yourself forced to\nhave recourse to intuition, as, in fact, geometry always does. You\ntherefore give yourself an object in intuition. But of what kind is\nthis intuition? Is it a pure \u00e0 priori, or is it an empirical intuition?\nIf the latter, then neither an universally valid, much less an\napodeictic proposition can arise from it, for experience never can give\nus any such proposition. You must, therefore, give yourself an object \u00e0\npriori in intuition, and upon that ground your synthetical proposition.\nNow if there did not exist within you a faculty of intuition \u00e0 priori;\nif this subjective condition were not in respect to its form also the\nuniversal condition \u00e0 priori under which alone the object of this\nexternal intuition is itself possible; if the object (that is, the\ntriangle) were something in itself, without relation to you the\nsubject; how could you affirm that that which lies necessarily in your\nsubjective conditions in order to construct a triangle, must also\nnecessarily belong to the triangle in itself? For to your conceptions\nof three lines, you could not add anything new (that is, the figure);\nwhich, therefore, must necessarily be found in the object, because the\nobject is given before your cognition, and not by means of it. If,\ntherefore, space (and time also) were not a mere form of your\nintuition, which contains conditions \u00e0 priori, under which alone things\ncan become external objects for you, and without which subjective\nconditions the objects are in themselves nothing, you could not\nconstruct any synthetical proposition whatsoever regarding external\nobjects. It is therefore not merely possible or probable, but\nindubitably certain, that space and time, as the necessary conditions\nof all our external and internal experience, are merely subjective\nconditions of all our intuitions, in relation to which all objects are\ntherefore mere phenomena, and not things in themselves, presented to us\nin this particular manner. And for this reason, in respect to the form\nof phenomena, much may be said \u00e0 priori, whilst of the thing in itself,\nwhich may lie at the foundation of these phenomena, it is impossible to\nsay anything.\n\nII. In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the external as\nwell as internal sense, consequently of all objects of sense, as mere\nphenomena, we may especially remark that all in our cognition that\nbelongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations. (The\nfeelings of pain and pleasure, and the will, which are not cognitions,\nare excepted.) The relations, to wit, of place in an intuition\n(extension), change of place (motion), and laws according to which this\nchange is determined (moving forces). That, however, which is present\nin this or that place, or any operation going on, or result taking\nplace in the things themselves, with the exception of change of place,\nis not given to us by intuition. Now by means of mere relations, a\nthing cannot be known in itself; and it may therefore be fairly\nconcluded, that, as through the external sense nothing but mere\nrepresentations of relations are given us, the said external sense in\nits representation can contain only the relation of the object to the\nsubject, but not the essential nature of the object as a thing in\nitself.\n\nThe same is the case with the internal intuition, not only because, in\nthe internal intuition, the representation of the external senses\nconstitutes the material with which the mind is occupied; but because\ntime, in which we place, and which itself antecedes the consciousness\nof, these representations in experience, and which, as the formal\ncondition of the mode according to which objects are placed in the\nmind, lies at the foundation of them, contains relations of the\nsuccessive, the coexistent, and of that which always must be coexistent\nwith succession, the permanent. Now that which, as representation, can\nantecede every exercise of thought (of an object), is intuition; and\nwhen it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of the\nintuition, which, as it presents us with no representation, except in\nso far as something is placed in the mind, can be nothing else than the\nmode in which the mind is affected by its own activity, to wit\u2014its\npresenting to itself representations, consequently the mode in which\nthe mind is affected by itself; that is, it can be nothing but an\ninternal sense in respect to its form. Everything that is represented\nthrough the medium of sense is so far phenomenal; consequently, we must\neither refuse altogether to admit an internal sense, or the subject,\nwhich is the object of that sense, could only be represented by it as\nphenomenon, and not as it would judge of itself, if its intuition were\npure spontaneous activity, that is, were intellectual. The difficulty\nhere lies wholly in the question: How can the subject have an internal\nintuition of itself? But this difficulty is common to every theory. The\nconsciousness of self (apperception) is the simple representation of\nthe \u201cego\u201d; and if by means of that representation alone, all the\nmanifold representations in the subject were spontaneously given, then\nour internal intuition would be intellectual. This consciousness in man\nrequires an internal perception of the manifold representations which\nare previously given in the subject; and the manner in which these\nrepresentations are given in the mind without spontaneity, must, on\naccount of this difference (the want of spontaneity), be called\nsensibility. If the faculty of self-consciousness is to apprehend what\nlies in the mind, it must all act that and can in this way alone\nproduce an intuition of self. But the form of this intuition, which\nlies in the original constitution of the mind, determines, in the\nrepresentation of time, the manner in which the manifold\nrepresentations are to combine themselves in the mind; since the\nsubject intuites itself, not as it would represent itself immediately\nand spontaneously, but according to the manner in which the mind is\ninternally affected, consequently, as it appears, and not as it is.\n\nIII. When we say that the intuition of external objects, and also the\nself-intuition of the subject, represent both, objects and subject, in\nspace and time, as they affect our senses, that is, as they appear\u2014this\nis by no means equivalent to asserting that these objects are mere\nillusory appearances. For when we speak of things as phenomena, the\nobjects, nay, even the properties which we ascribe to them, are looked\nupon as really given; only that, in so far as this or that property\ndepends upon the mode of intuition of the subject, in the relation of\nthe given object to the subject, the object as phenomenon is to be\ndistinguished from the object as a thing in itself. Thus I do not say\nthat bodies seem or appear to be external to me, or that my soul seems\nmerely to be given in my self-consciousness, although I maintain that\nthe properties of space and time, in conformity to which I set both, as\nthe condition of their existence, abide in my mode of intuition, and\nnot in the objects in themselves. It would be my own fault, if out of\nthat which I should reckon as phenomenon, I made mere illusory\nappearance.[12] But this will not happen, because of our principle of\nthe ideality of all sensuous intuitions. On the contrary, if we ascribe\nobjective reality to these forms of representation, it becomes\nimpossible to avoid changing everything into mere appearance. For if we\nregard space and time as properties, which must be found in objects as\nthings in themselves, as sine quibus non of the possibility of their\nexistence, and reflect on the absurdities in which we then find\nourselves involved, inasmuch as we are compelled to admit the existence\nof two infinite things, which are nevertheless not substances, nor\nanything really inhering in substances, nay, to admit that they are the\nnecessary conditions of the existence of all things, and moreover, that\nthey must continue to exist, although all existing things were\nannihilated\u2014we cannot blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to\nmere illusory appearances. Nay, even our own existence, which would in\nthis case depend upon the self-existent reality of such a mere\nnonentity as time, would necessarily be changed with it into mere\nappearance\u2014an absurdity which no one has as yet been guilty of.\n\n [12] The predicates of the phenomenon can be affixed to the object\n itself in relation to our sensuous faculty; for example, the red\n colour or the perfume to the rose. But (illusory) appearance never can\n be attributed as a predicate to an object, for this very reason, that\n it attributes to this object in itself that which belongs to it only\n in relation to our sensuous faculty, or to the subject in general,\n e.g., the two handles which were formerly ascribed to Saturn. That\n which is never to be found in the object itself, but always in the\n relation of the object to the subject, and which moreover is\n inseparable from our representation of the object, we denominate\n phenomenon. Thus the predicates of space and time are rightly\n attributed to objects of the senses as such, and in this there is no\n illusion. On the contrary, if I ascribe redness of the rose as a thing\n in itself, or to Saturn his handles, or extension to all external\n objects, considered as things in themselves, without regarding the\n determinate relation of these objects to the subject, and without\n limiting my judgement to that relation\u2014then, and then only, arises\n illusion.\n\n\nIV. In natural theology, where we think of an object\u2014God\u2014which never\ncan be an object of intuition to us, and even to himself can never be\nan object of sensuous intuition, we carefully avoid attributing to his\nintuition the conditions of space and time\u2014and intuition all his\ncognition must be, and not thought, which always includes limitation.\nBut with what right can we do this if we make them forms of objects as\nthings in themselves, and such, moreover, as would continue to exist as\n\u00e0 priori conditions of the existence of things, even though the things\nthemselves were annihilated? For as conditions of all existence in\ngeneral, space and time must be conditions of the existence of the\nSupreme Being also. But if we do not thus make them objective forms of\nall things, there is no other way left than to make them subjective\nforms of our mode of intuition\u2014external and internal; which is called\nsensuous, because it is not primitive, that is, is not such as gives in\nitself the existence of the object of the intuition (a mode of\nintuition which, so far as we can judge, can belong only to the\nCreator), but is dependent on the existence of the object, is possible,\ntherefore, only on condition that the representative faculty of the\nsubject is affected by the object.\n\nIt is, moreover, not necessary that we should limit the mode of\nintuition in space and time to the sensuous faculty of man. It may well\nbe that all finite thinking beings must necessarily in this respect\nagree with man (though as to this we cannot decide), but sensibility\ndoes not on account of this universality cease to be sensibility, for\nthis very reason, that it is a deduced (intuitus derivativus), and not\nan original (intuitus originarius), consequently not an intellectual\nintuition, and this intuition, as such, for reasons above mentioned,\nseems to belong solely to the Supreme Being, but never to a being\ndependent, quoad its existence, as well as its intuition (which its\nexistence determines and limits relatively to given objects). This\nlatter remark, however, must be taken only as an illustration, and not\nas any proof of the truth of our \u00e6sthetical theory.\n\n\u00a7 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental \u00c6sthetic.\n\nWe have now completely before us one part of the solution of the grand\ngeneral problem of transcendental philosophy, namely, the question:\n\u201cHow are synthetical propositions \u00e0 priori possible?\u201d That is to say,\nwe have shown that we are in possession of pure \u00e0 priori intuitions,\nnamely, space and time, in which we find, when in a judgement \u00e0 priori\nwe pass out beyond the given conception, something which is not\ndiscoverable in that conception, but is certainly found \u00e0 priori in the\nintuition which corresponds to the conception, and can be united\nsynthetically with it. But the judgements which these pure intuitions\nenable us to make, never reach farther than to objects of the senses,\nand are valid only for objects of possible experience.\n\nSecond Part\u2014TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC\n\nINTRODUCTION. Idea of a Transcendental Logic.\n\nI. Of Logic in General.\n\nOur knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, first of which\nis the faculty or power of receiving representations (receptivity for\nimpressions); the second is the power of cognizing by means of these\nrepresentations (spontaneity in the production of conceptions). Through\nthe first an object is given to us; through the second, it is, in\nrelation to the representation (which is a mere determination of the\nmind), thought. Intuition and conceptions constitute, therefore, the\nelements of all our knowledge, so that neither conceptions without an\nintuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without\nconceptions, can afford us a cognition. Both are either pure or\nempirical. They are empirical, when sensation (which presupposes the\nactual presence of the object) is contained in them; and pure, when no\nsensation is mixed with the representation. Sensations we may call the\nmatter of sensuous cognition. Pure intuition consequently contains\nmerely the form under which something is intuited, and pure conception\nonly the form of the thought of an object. Only pure intuitions and\npure conceptions are possible \u00e0 priori; the empirical only \u00e0\nposteriori.\n\nWe apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for\nimpressions, in so far as it is in some way affected; and, on the other\nhand, we call the faculty of spontaneously producing representations,\nor the spontaneity of cognition, understanding. Our nature is so\nconstituted that intuition with us never can be other than sensuous,\nthat is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects.\nOn the other hand, the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous\nintuition is the understanding. Neither of these faculties has a\npreference over the other. Without the sensuous faculty no object would\nbe given to us, and without the understanding no object would be\nthought. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without\nconceptions, blind. Hence it is as necessary for the mind to make its\nconceptions sensuous (that is, to join to them the object in\nintuition), as to make its intuitions intelligible (that is, to bring\nthem under conceptions). Neither of these faculties can exchange its\nproper function. Understanding cannot intuite, and the sensuous faculty\ncannot think. In no other way than from the united operation of both,\ncan knowledge arise. But no one ought, on this account, to overlook the\ndifference of the elements contributed by each; we have rather great\nreason carefully to separate and distinguish them. We therefore\ndistinguish the science of the laws of sensibility, that is, \u00e6sthetic,\nfrom the science of the laws of the understanding, that is, logic.\n\nNow, logic in its turn may be considered as twofold\u2014namely, as logic of\nthe general, or of the particular use of the understanding. The first\ncontains the absolutely necessary laws of thought, without which no use\nwhatsoever of the understanding is possible, and gives laws therefore\nto the understanding, without regard to the difference of objects on\nwhich it may be employed. The logic of the particular use of the\nunderstanding contains the laws of correct thinking upon a particular\nclass of objects. The former may be called elemental logic\u2014the latter,\nthe organon of this or that particular science. The latter is for the\nmost part employed in the schools, as a prop\u00e6deutic to the sciences,\nalthough, indeed, according to the course of human reason, it is the\nlast thing we arrive at, when the science has been already matured, and\nneeds only the finishing touches towards its correction and completion;\nfor our knowledge of the objects of our attempted science must be\ntolerably extensive and complete before we can indicate the laws by\nwhich a science of these objects can be established.\n\nGeneral logic is again either pure or applied. In the former, we\nabstract all the empirical conditions under which the understanding is\nexercised; for example, the influence of the senses, the play of the\nfantasy or imagination, the laws of the memory, the force of habit, of\ninclination, etc., consequently also, the sources of prejudice\u2014in a\nword, we abstract all causes from which particular cognitions arise,\nbecause these causes regard the understanding under certain\ncircumstances of its application, and, to the knowledge of them\nexperience is required. Pure general logic has to do, therefore, merely\nwith pure \u00e0 priori principles, and is a canon of understanding and\nreason, but only in respect of the formal part of their use, be the\ncontent what it may, empirical or transcendental. General logic is\ncalled applied, when it is directed to the laws of the use of the\nunderstanding, under the subjective empirical conditions which\npsychology teaches us. It has therefore empirical principles, although,\nat the same time, it is in so far general, that it applies to the\nexercise of the understanding, without regard to the difference of\nobjects. On this account, moreover, it is neither a canon of the\nunderstanding in general, nor an organon of a particular science, but\nmerely a cathartic of the human understanding.\n\nIn general logic, therefore, that part which constitutes pure logic\nmust be carefully distinguished from that which constitutes applied\n(though still general) logic. The former alone is properly science,\nalthough short and dry, as the methodical exposition of an elemental\ndoctrine of the understanding ought to be. In this, therefore,\nlogicians must always bear in mind two rules:\n\n1. As general logic, it makes abstraction of all content of the\ncognition of the understanding, and of the difference of objects, and\nhas to do with nothing but the mere form of thought.\n\n2. As pure logic, it has no empirical principles, and consequently\ndraws nothing (contrary to the common persuasion) from psychology,\nwhich therefore has no influence on the canon of the understanding. It\nis a demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be certain\ncompletely \u00e0 priori.\n\nWhat I called applied logic (contrary to the common acceptation of this\nterm, according to which it should contain certain exercises for the\nscholar, for which pure logic gives the rules), is a representation of\nthe understanding, and of the rules of its necessary employment in\nconcreto, that is to say, under the accidental conditions of the\nsubject, which may either hinder or promote this employment, and which\nare all given only empirically. Thus applied logic treats of attention,\nits impediments and consequences, of the origin of error, of the state\nof doubt, hesitation, conviction, etc., and to it is related pure\ngeneral logic in the same way that pure morality, which contains only\nthe necessary moral laws of a free will, is related to practical\nethics, which considers these laws under all the impediments of\nfeelings, inclinations, and passions to which men are more or less\nsubjected, and which never can furnish us with a true and demonstrated\nscience, because it, as well as applied logic, requires empirical and\npsychological principles.\n\nII. Of Transcendental Logic.\n\nGeneral logic, as we have seen, makes abstraction of all content of\ncognition, that is, of all relation of cognition to its object, and\nregards only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to each\nother, that is, the form of thought in general. But as we have both\npure and empirical intuitions (as transcendental \u00e6sthetic proves), in\nlike manner a distinction might be drawn between pure and empirical\nthought (of objects). In this case, there would exist a kind of logic,\nin which we should not make abstraction of all content of cognition;\nfor or logic which should comprise merely the laws of pure thought (of\nan object), would of course exclude all those cognitions which were of\nempirical content. This kind of logic would also examine the origin of\nour cognitions of objects, so far as that origin cannot be ascribed to\nthe objects themselves; while, on the contrary, general logic has\nnothing to do with the origin of our cognitions, but contemplates our\nrepresentations, be they given primitively \u00e0 priori in ourselves, or be\nthey only of empirical origin, solely according to the laws which the\nunderstanding observes in employing them in the process of thought, in\nrelation to each other. Consequently, general logic treats of the form\nof the understanding only, which can be applied to representations,\nfrom whatever source they may have arisen.\n\nAnd here I shall make a remark, which the reader must bear well in mind\nin the course of the following considerations, to wit, that not every\ncognition \u00e0 priori, but only those through which we cognize that and\nhow certain representations (intuitions or conceptions) are applied or\nare possible only \u00e0 priori; that is to say, the \u00e0 priori possibility of\ncognition and the \u00e0 priori use of it are transcendental. Therefore\nneither is space, nor any \u00e0 priori geometrical determination of space,\na transcendental Representation, but only the knowledge that such a\nrepresentation is not of empirical origin, and the possibility of its\nrelating to objects of experience, although itself \u00e0 priori, can be\ncalled transcendental. So also, the application of space to objects in\ngeneral would be transcendental; but if it be limited to objects of\nsense it is empirical. Thus, the distinction of the transcendental and\nempirical belongs only to the critique of cognitions, and does not\nconcern the relation of these to their object.\n\nAccordingly, in the expectation that there may perhaps be conceptions\nwhich relate \u00e0 priori to objects, not as pure or sensuous intuitions,\nbut merely as acts of pure thought (which are therefore conceptions,\nbut neither of empirical nor \u00e6sthetical origin)\u2014in this expectation, I\nsay, we form to ourselves, by anticipation, the idea of a science of\npure understanding and rational cognition, by means of which we may\ncogitate objects entirely \u00e0 priori. A science of this kind, which\nshould determine the origin, the extent, and the objective validity of\nsuch cognitions, must be called transcendental logic, because it has\nnot, like general logic, to do with the laws of understanding and\nreason in relation to empirical as well as pure rational cognitions\nwithout distinction, but concerns itself with these only in an \u00e0 priori\nrelation to objects.\n\nIII. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic.\n\nThe old question with which people sought to push logicians into a\ncorner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or\nconfess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole\nart, is this: \u201cWhat is truth?\u201d The definition of the word truth, to\nwit, \u201cthe accordance of the cognition with its object,\u201d is presupposed\nin the question; but we desire to be told, in the answer to it, what is\nthe universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition.\n\nTo know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a strong\nevidence of sagacity and intelligence. For if a question be in itself\nabsurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer, it is attended with the\ndanger\u2014not to mention the shame that falls upon the person who proposes\nit\u2014of seducing the unguarded listener into making absurd answers, and\nwe are presented with the ridiculous spectacle of one (as the ancients\nsaid) \u201cmilking the he-goat, and the other holding a sieve.\u201d\n\nIf truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its object,\nthis object must be, ipso facto, distinguished from all others; for a\ncognition is false if it does not accord with the object to which it\nrelates, although it contains something which may be affirmed of other\nobjects. Now an universal criterion of truth would be that which is\nvalid for all cognitions, without distinction of their objects. But it\nis evident that since, in the case of such a criterion, we make\nabstraction of all the content of a cognition (that is, of all relation\nto its object), and truth relates precisely to this content, it must be\nutterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of\ncognition; and that, accordingly, a sufficient, and at the same time\nuniversal, test of truth cannot possibly be found. As we have already\ntermed the content of a cognition its matter, we shall say: \u201cOf the\ntruth of our cognitions in respect of their matter, no universal test\ncan be demanded, because such a demand is self-contradictory.\u201d\n\nOn the other hand, with regard to our cognition in respect of its mere\nform (excluding all content), it is equally manifest that logic, in so\nfar as it exhibits the universal and necessary laws of the\nunderstanding, must in these very laws present us with criteria of\ntruth. Whatever contradicts these rules is false, because thereby the\nunderstanding is made to contradict its own universal laws of thought;\nthat is, to contradict itself. These criteria, however, apply solely to\nthe form of truth, that is, of thought in general, and in so far they\nare perfectly accurate, yet not sufficient. For although a cognition\nmay be perfectly accurate as to logical form, that is, not\nself-contradictory, it is notwithstanding quite possible that it may\nnot stand in agreement with its object. Consequently, the merely\nlogical criterion of truth, namely, the accordance of a cognition with\nthe universal and formal laws of understanding and reason, is nothing\nmore than the conditio sine qua non, or negative condition of all\ntruth. Farther than this logic cannot go, and the error which depends\nnot on the form, but on the content of the cognition, it has no test to\ndiscover.\n\nGeneral logic, then, resolves the whole formal business of\nunderstanding and reason into its elements, and exhibits them as\nprinciples of all logical judging of our cognitions. This part of logic\nmay, therefore, be called analytic, and is at least the negative test\nof truth, because all cognitions must first of an be estimated and\ntried according to these laws before we proceed to investigate them in\nrespect of their content, in order to discover whether they contain\npositive truth in regard to their object. Because, however, the mere\nform of a cognition, accurately as it may accord with logical laws, is\ninsufficient to supply us with material (objective) truth, no one, by\nmeans of logic alone, can venture to predicate anything of or decide\nconcerning objects, unless he has obtained, independently of logic,\nwell-grounded information about them, in order afterwards to examine,\naccording to logical laws, into the use and connection, in a cohering\nwhole, of that information, or, what is still better, merely to test it\nby them. Notwithstanding, there lies so seductive a charm in the\npossession of a specious art like this\u2014an art which gives to all our\ncognitions the form of the understanding, although with respect to the\ncontent thereof we may be sadly deficient\u2014that general logic, which is\nmerely a canon of judgement, has been employed as an organon for the\nactual production, or rather for the semblance of production, of\nobjective assertions, and has thus been grossly misapplied. Now general\nlogic, in its assumed character of organon, is called dialectic.\n\nDifferent as are the significations in which the ancients used this\nterm for a science or an art, we may safely infer, from their actual\nemployment of it, that with them it was nothing else than a logic of\nillusion\u2014a sophistical art for giving ignorance, nay, even intentional\nsophistries, the colouring of truth, in which the thoroughness of\nprocedure which logic requires was imitated, and their topic employed\nto cloak the empty pretensions. Now it may be taken as a safe and\nuseful warning, that general logic, considered as an organon, must\nalways be a logic of illusion, that is, be dialectical, for, as it\nteaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions,\nbut merely the formal conditions of their accordance with the\nunderstanding, which do not relate to and are quite indifferent in\nrespect of objects, any attempt to employ it as an instrument (organon)\nin order to extend and enlarge the range of our knowledge must end in\nmere prating; any one being able to maintain or oppose, with some\nappearance of truth, any single assertion whatever.\n\nSuch instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy. For\nthese reasons we have chosen to denominate this part of logic\ndialectic, in the sense of a critique of dialectical illusion, and we\nwish the term to be so understood in this place.\n\nIV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental\nAnalytic and Dialectic.\n\nIn transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (as in\ntranscendental \u00e6sthetic the sensibility) and select from our cognition\nmerely that part of thought which has its origin in the understanding\nalone. The exercise of this pure cognition, however, depends upon this\nas its condition, that objects to which it may be applied be given to\nus in intuition, for without intuition the whole of our cognition is\nwithout objects, and is therefore quite void. That part of\ntranscendental logic, then, which treats of the elements of pure\ncognition of the understanding, and of the principles without which no\nobject at all can be thought, is transcendental analytic, and at the\nsame time a logic of truth. For no cognition can contradict it, without\nlosing at the same time all content, that is, losing all reference to\nan object, and therefore all truth. But because we are very easily\nseduced into employing these pure cognitions and principles of the\nunderstanding by themselves, and that even beyond the boundaries of\nexperience, which yet is the only source whence we can obtain matter\n(objects) on which those pure conceptions may be employed\u2014understanding\nruns the risk of making, by means of empty sophisms, a material and\nobjective use of the mere formal principles of the pure understanding,\nand of passing judgements on objects without distinction\u2014objects which\nare not given to us, nay, perhaps cannot be given to us in any way.\nNow, as it ought properly to be only a canon for judging of the\nempirical use of the understanding, this kind of logic is misused when\nwe seek to employ it as an organon of the universal and unlimited\nexercise of the understanding, and attempt with the pure understanding\nalone to judge synthetically, affirm, and determine respecting objects\nin general. In this case the exercise of the pure understanding becomes\ndialectical. The second part of our transcendental logic must therefore\nbe a critique of dialectical illusion, and this critique we shall term\ntranscendental dialectic\u2014not meaning it as an art of producing\ndogmatically such illusion (an art which is unfortunately too current\namong the practitioners of metaphysical juggling), but as a critique of\nunderstanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use. This\ncritique will expose the groundless nature of the pretensions of these\ntwo faculties, and invalidate their claims to the discovery and\nenlargement of our cognitions merely by means of transcendental\nprinciples, and show that the proper employment of these faculties is\nto test the judgements made by the pure understanding, and to guard it\nfrom sophistical delusion.\n\nFIRST DIVISION. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC. \u00a7 1\n\nTranscendental analytic is the dissection of the whole of our \u00e0 priori\nknowledge into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding.\nIn order to effect our purpose, it is necessary: (1) That the\nconceptions be pure and not empirical; (2) That they belong not to\nintuition and sensibility, but to thought and understanding; (3) That\nthey be elementary conceptions, and as such, quite different from\ndeduced or compound conceptions; (4) That our table of these elementary\nconceptions be complete, and fill up the whole sphere of the pure\nunderstanding. Now this completeness of a science cannot be accepted\nwith confidence on the guarantee of a mere estimate of its existence in\nan aggregate formed only by means of repeated experiments and attempts.\nThe completeness which we require is possible only by means of an idea\nof the totality of the \u00e0 priori cognition of the understanding, and\nthrough the thereby determined division of the conceptions which form\nthe said whole; consequently, only by means of their connection in a\nsystem. Pure understanding distinguishes itself not merely from\neverything empirical, but also completely from all sensibility. It is a\nunity self-subsistent, self-sufficient, and not to be enlarged by any\nadditions from without. Hence the sum of its cognition constitutes a\nsystem to be determined by and comprised under an idea; and the\ncompleteness and articulation of this system can at the same time serve\nas a test of the correctness and genuineness of all the parts of\ncognition that belong to it. The whole of this part of transcendental\nlogic consists of two books, of which the one contains the conceptions,\nand the other the principles of pure understanding.\n\nBOOK I. Analytic of Conceptions. \u00a7 2\n\nBy the term Analytic of Conceptions, I do not understand the analysis\nof these, or the usual process in philosophical investigations of\ndissecting the conceptions which present themselves, according to their\ncontent, and so making them clear; but I mean the hitherto little\nattempted dissection of the faculty of understanding itself, in order\nto investigate the possibility of conceptions \u00e0 priori, by looking for\nthem in the understanding alone, as their birthplace, and analysing the\npure use of this faculty. For this is the proper duty of a\ntranscendental philosophy; what remains is the logical treatment of the\nconceptions in philosophy in general. We shall therefore follow up the\npure conceptions even to their germs and beginnings in the human\nunderstanding, in which they lie, until they are developed on occasions\npresented by experience, and, freed by the same understanding from the\nempirical conditions attaching to them, are set forth in their\nunalloyed purity.\n\nChapter I. Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure\nConceptions of the Understanding\n\nIntroductory \u00a7 3\n\nWhen we call into play a faculty of cognition, different conceptions\nmanifest themselves according to the different circumstances, and make\nknown this faculty, and assemble themselves into a more or less\nextensive collection, according to the time or penetration that has\nbeen applied to the consideration of them. Where this process,\nconducted as it is mechanically, so to speak, will end, cannot be\ndetermined with certainty. Besides, the conceptions which we discover\nin this haphazard manner present themselves by no means in order and\nsystematic unity, but are at last coupled together only according to\nresemblances to each other, and arranged in series, according to the\nquantity of their content, from the simpler to the more complex\u2014series\nwhich are anything but systematic, though not altogether without a\ncertain kind of method in their construction.\n\nTranscendental philosophy has the advantage, and moreover the duty, of\nsearching for its conceptions according to a principle; because these\nconceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the understanding as an\nabsolute unity, and therefore must be connected with each other\naccording to one conception or idea. A connection of this kind,\nhowever, furnishes us with a ready prepared rule, by which its proper\nplace may be assigned to every pure conception of the understanding,\nand the completeness of the system of all be determined \u00e0 priori\u2014both\nwhich would otherwise have been dependent on mere choice or chance.\n\nSection I. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in General \u00a7 4\n\nThe understanding was defined above only negatively, as a non-sensuous\nfaculty of cognition. Now, independently of sensibility, we cannot\npossibly have any intuition; consequently, the understanding is no\nfaculty of intuition. But besides intuition there is no other mode of\ncognition, except through conceptions; consequently, the cognition of\nevery, at least of every human, understanding is a cognition through\nconceptions\u2014not intuitive, but discursive. All intuitions, as sensuous,\ndepend on affections; conceptions, therefore, upon functions. By the\nword function I understand the unity of the act of arranging diverse\nrepresentations under one common representation. Conceptions, then, are\nbased on the spontaneity of thought, as sensuous intuitions are on the\nreceptivity of impressions. Now, the understanding cannot make any\nother use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them. As no\nrepresentation, except an intuition, relates immediately to its object,\na conception never relates immediately to an object, but only to some\nother representation thereof, be that an intuition or itself a\nconception. A judgement, therefore, is the mediate cognition of an\nobject, consequently the representation of a representation of it. In\nevery judgement there is a conception which applies to, and is valid\nfor many other conceptions, and which among these comprehends also a\ngiven representation, this last being immediately connected with an\nobject. For example, in the judgement\u2014\u201cAll bodies are divisible,\u201d our\nconception of divisible applies to various other conceptions; among\nthese, however, it is here particularly applied to the conception of\nbody, and this conception of body relates to certain phenomena which\noccur to us. These objects, therefore, are mediately represented by the\nconception of divisibility. All judgements, accordingly, are functions\nof unity in our representations, inasmuch as, instead of an immediate,\na higher representation, which comprises this and various others, is\nused for our cognition of the object, and thereby many possible\ncognitions are collected into one. But we can reduce all acts of the\nunderstanding to judgements, so that understanding may be represented\nas the faculty of judging. For it is, according to what has been said\nabove, a faculty of thought. Now thought is cognition by means of\nconceptions. But conceptions, as predicates of possible judgements,\nrelate to some representation of a yet undetermined object. Thus the\nconception of body indicates something\u2014for example, metal\u2014which can be\ncognized by means of that conception. It is therefore a conception, for\nthe reason alone that other representations are contained under it, by\nmeans of which it can relate to objects. It is therefore the predicate\nto a possible judgement; for example: \u201cEvery metal is a body.\u201d All the\nfunctions of the understanding therefore can be discovered, when we can\ncompletely exhibit the functions of unity in judgements. And that this\nmay be effected very easily, the following section will show.\n\nSection II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgements\n\u00a7 5\n\nIf we abstract all the content of a judgement, and consider only the\nintellectual form thereof, we find that the function of thought in a\njudgement can be brought under four heads, of which each contains three\nmomenta. These may be conveniently represented in the following table:\n\n                                    1\n                         _Quantity of judgements_\n                                Universal\n                                Particular\n                                Singular\n\n                      2                           3\n                    _Quality                   Relation_\n                  Affirmative                Categorical\n                  Negative                   Hypothetical\n                  Infinite                   Disjunctive\n\n                                    4\n                                 _Modality_\n                               Problematical\n                               Assertorical\n                               Apodeictical\n\nAs this division appears to differ in some, though not essential\npoints, from the usual technique of logicians, the following\nobservations, for the prevention of otherwise possible\nmisunderstanding, will not be without their use.\n\n1. Logicians say, with justice, that in the use of judgements in\nsyllogisms, singular judgements may be treated like universal ones.\nFor, precisely because a singular judgement has no extent at all, its\npredicate cannot refer to a part of that which is contained in the\nconception of the subject and be excluded from the rest. The predicate\nis valid for the whole conception just as if it were a general\nconception, and had extent, to the whole of which the predicate\napplied. On the other hand, let us compare a singular with a general\njudgement, merely as a cognition, in regard to quantity. The singular\njudgement relates to the general one, as unity to infinity, and is\ntherefore in itself essentially different. Thus, if we estimate a\nsingular judgement (_judicium singulare_) not merely according to its\nintrinsic validity as a judgement, but also as a cognition generally,\naccording to its quantity in comparison with that of other cognitions,\nit is then entirely different from a general judgement (_judicium\ncommune_), and in a complete table of the momenta of thought deserves a\nseparate place\u2014though, indeed, this would not be necessary in a logic\nlimited merely to the consideration of the use of judgements in\nreference to each other.\n\n2. In like manner, in transcendental logic, infinite must be\ndistinguished from affirmative judgements, although in general logic\nthey are rightly enough classed under affirmative. General logic\nabstracts all content of the predicate (though it be negative), and\nonly considers whether the said predicate be affirmed or denied of the\nsubject. But transcendental logic considers also the worth or content\nof this logical affirmation\u2014an affirmation by means of a merely\nnegative predicate, and inquires how much the sum total of our\ncognition gains by this affirmation. For example, if I say of the soul,\n\u201cIt is not mortal\u201d\u2014by this negative judgement I should at least ward\noff error. Now, by the proposition, \u201cThe soul is not mortal,\u201d I have,\nin respect of the logical form, really affirmed, inasmuch as I thereby\nplace the soul in the unlimited sphere of immortal beings. Now, because\nof the whole sphere of possible existences, the mortal occupies one\npart, and the immortal the other, neither more nor less is affirmed by\nthe proposition than that the soul is one among the infinite multitude\nof things which remain over, when I take away the whole mortal part.\nBut by this proceeding we accomplish only this much, that the infinite\nsphere of all possible existences is in so far limited that the mortal\nis excluded from it, and the soul is placed in the remaining part of\nthe extent of this sphere. But this part remains, notwithstanding this\nexception, infinite, and more and more parts may be taken away from the\nwhole sphere, without in the slightest degree thereby augmenting or\naffirmatively determining our conception of the soul. These judgements,\ntherefore, infinite in respect of their logical extent, are, in respect\nof the content of their cognition, merely limitative; and are\nconsequently entitled to a place in our transcendental table of all the\nmomenta of thought in judgements, because the function of the\nunderstanding exercised by them may perhaps be of importance in the\nfield of its pure \u00e0 priori cognition.\n\n3. All relations of thought in judgements are those (a) of the\npredicate to the subject; (b) of the principle to its consequence; (c)\nof the divided cognition and all the members of the division to each\nother. In the first of these three classes, we consider only two\nconceptions; in the second, two judgements; in the third, several\njudgements in relation to each other. The hypothetical proposition, \u201cIf\nperfect justice exists, the obstinately wicked are punished,\u201d contains\nproperly the relation to each other of two propositions, namely,\n\u201cPerfect justice exists,\u201d and \u201cThe obstinately wicked are punished.\u201d\nWhether these propositions are in themselves true is a question not\nhere decided. Nothing is cogitated by means of this judgement except a\ncertain consequence. Finally, the disjunctive judgement contains a\nrelation of two or more propositions to each other\u2014a relation not of\nconsequence, but of logical opposition, in so far as the sphere of the\none proposition excludes that of the other. But it contains at the same\ntime a relation of community, in so far as all the propositions taken\ntogether fill up the sphere of the cognition. The disjunctive judgement\ncontains, therefore, the relation of the parts of the whole sphere of a\ncognition, since the sphere of each part is a complemental part of the\nsphere of the other, each contributing to form the sum total of the\ndivided cognition. Take, for example, the proposition, \u201cThe world\nexists either through blind chance, or through internal necessity, or\nthrough an external cause.\u201d Each of these propositions embraces a part\nof the sphere of our possible cognition as to the existence of a world;\nall of them taken together, the whole sphere. To take the cognition out\nof one of these spheres, is equivalent to placing it in one of the\nothers; and, on the other hand, to place it in one sphere is equivalent\nto taking it out of the rest. There is, therefore, in a disjunctive\njudgement a certain community of cognitions, which consists in this,\nthat they mutually exclude each other, yet thereby determine, as a\nwhole, the true cognition, inasmuch as, taken together, they make up\nthe complete content of a particular given cognition. And this is all\nthat I find necessary, for the sake of what follows, to remark in this\nplace.\n\n4. The modality of judgements is a quite peculiar function, with this\ndistinguishing characteristic, that it contributes nothing to the\ncontent of a judgement (for besides quantity, quality, and relation,\nthere is nothing more that constitutes the content of a judgement), but\nconcerns itself only with the value of the copula in relation to\nthought in general. Problematical judgements are those in which the\naffirmation or negation is accepted as merely possible (ad libitum). In\nthe assertorical, we regard the proposition as real (true); in the\napodeictical, we look on it as necessary.[13] Thus the two judgements\n(antecedens et consequens), the relation of which constitutes a\nhypothetical judgement, likewise those (the members of the division) in\nwhose reciprocity the disjunctive consists, are only problematical. In\nthe example above given the proposition, \u201cThere exists perfect\njustice,\u201d is not stated assertorically, but as an ad libitum judgement,\nwhich someone may choose to adopt, and the consequence alone is\nassertorical. Hence such judgements may be obviously false, and yet,\ntaken problematically, be conditions of our cognition of the truth.\nThus the proposition, \u201cThe world exists only by blind chance,\u201d is in\nthe disjunctive judgement of problematical import only: that is to say,\none may accept it for the moment, and it helps us (like the indication\nof the wrong road among all the roads that one can take) to find out\nthe true proposition. The problematical proposition is, therefore, that\nwhich expresses only logical possibility (which is not objective); that\nis, it expresses a free choice to admit the validity of such a\nproposition\u2014a merely arbitrary reception of it into the understanding.\nThe assertorical speaks of logical reality or truth; as, for example,\nin a hypothetical syllogism, the antecedens presents itself in a\nproblematical form in the major, in an assertorical form in the minor,\nand it shows that the proposition is in harmony with the laws of the\nunderstanding. The apodeictical proposition cogitates the assertorical\nas determined by these very laws of the understanding, consequently as\naffirming \u00e0 priori, and in this manner it expresses logical necessity.\nNow because all is here gradually incorporated with the\nunderstanding\u2014inasmuch as in the first place we judge problematically;\nthen accept assertorically our judgement as true; lastly, affirm it as\ninseparably united with the understanding, that is, as necessary and\napodeictical\u2014we may safely reckon these three functions of modality as\nso many momenta of thought.\n\n [13] Just as if thought were in the first instance a function of the\n understanding; in the second, of judgement; in the third, of reason. A\n remark which will be explained in the sequel.\n\nSection III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or\nCategories \u00a7 6\n\nGeneral logic, as has been repeatedly said, makes abstraction of all\ncontent of cognition, and expects to receive representations from some\nother quarter, in order, by means of analysis, to convert them into\nconceptions. On the contrary, transcendental logic has lying before it\nthe manifold content of \u00e0 priori sensibility, which transcendental\n\u00e6sthetic presents to it in order to give matter to the pure conceptions\nof the understanding, without which transcendental logic would have no\ncontent, and be therefore utterly void. Now space and time contain an\ninfinite diversity of determinations of pure \u00e0 priori intuition, but\nare nevertheless the condition of the mind\u2019s receptivity, under which\nalone it can obtain representations of objects, and which,\nconsequently, must always affect the conception of these objects. But\nthe spontaneity of thought requires that this diversity be examined\nafter a certain manner, received into the mind, and connected, in order\nafterwards to form a cognition out of it. This Process I call\nsynthesis.\n\nBy the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I understand\nthe process of joining different representations to each other and of\ncomprehending their diversity in one cognition. This synthesis is pure\nwhen the diversity is not given empirically but \u00e0 priori (as that in\nspace and time). Our representations must be given previously to any\nanalysis of them; and no conceptions can arise, quoad their content,\nanalytically. But the synthesis of a diversity (be it given \u00e0 priori or\nempirically) is the first requisite for the production of a cognition,\nwhich in its beginning, indeed, may be crude and confused, and\ntherefore in need of analysis\u2014still, synthesis is that by which alone\nthe elements of our cognitions are collected and united into a certain\ncontent, consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our\nattention, if we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge.\n\nSynthesis, generally speaking, is, as we shall afterwards see, the mere\noperation of the imagination\u2014a blind but indispensable function of the\nsoul, without which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the\nworking of which we are seldom even conscious. But to reduce this\nsynthesis to conceptions is a function of the understanding, by means\nof which we attain to cognition, in the proper meaning of the term.\n\nPure synthesis, represented generally, gives us the pure conception of\nthe understanding. But by this pure synthesis, I mean that which rests\nupon a basis of \u00e0 priori synthetical unity. Thus, our numeration (and\nthis is more observable in large numbers) is a synthesis according to\nconceptions, because it takes place according to a common basis of\nunity (for example, the decade). By means of this conception,\ntherefore, the unity in the synthesis of the manifold becomes\nnecessary.\n\nBy means of analysis different representations are brought under one\nconception\u2014an operation of which general logic treats. On the other\nhand, the duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions, not\nrepresentations, but the pure synthesis of representations. The first\nthing which must be given to us for the sake of the \u00e0 priori cognition\nof all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition; the synthesis\nof this diversity by means of the imagination is the second; but this\ngives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which give unity to this\npure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this\nnecessary synthetical unity, furnish the third requisite for the\ncognition of an object, and these conceptions are given by the\nunderstanding.\n\nThe same function which gives unity to the different representation in\na judgement, gives also unity to the mere synthesis of different\nrepresentations in an intuition; and this unity we call the pure\nconception of the understanding. Thus, the same understanding, and by\nthe same operations, whereby in conceptions, by means of analytical\nunity, it produced the logical form of a judgement, introduces, by\nmeans of the synthetical unity of the manifold in intuition, a\ntranscendental content into its representations, on which account they\nare called pure conceptions of the understanding, and they apply \u00e0\npriori to objects, a result not within the power of general logic.\n\nIn this manner, there arise exactly so many pure conceptions of the\nunderstanding, applying \u00e0 priori to objects of intuition in general, as\nthere are logical functions in all possible judgements. For there is no\nother function or faculty existing in the understanding besides those\nenumerated in that table. These conceptions we shall, with Aristotle,\ncall categories, our purpose being originally identical with his,\nnotwithstanding the great difference in the execution.\n\n                     TABLE OF THE CATEGORIES\n\n                    1                         2\n\n              _Of Quantity                Of Quality_\n              Unity                      Reality\n              Plurality                  Negation\n              Totality                   Limitation\n\n                           3\n                      _Of Relation_\n   Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens)\n   Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)\n   Of Community (reciprocity between the agent and patient)\n\n                           4\n                     _Of Modality_\n              Possibility—Impossibility\n              Existence—Non-existence\n              Necessity—Contingence\n\nThis, then, is a catalogue of all the originally pure conceptions of\nthe synthesis which the understanding contains \u00e0 priori, and these\nconceptions alone entitle it to be called a pure understanding;\ninasmuch as only by them it can render the manifold of intuition\nconceivable, in other words, think an object of intuition. This\ndivision is made systematically from a common principle, namely the\nfaculty of judgement (which is just the same as the power of thought),\nand has not arisen rhapsodically from a search at haphazard after pure\nconceptions, respecting the full number of which we never could be\ncertain, inasmuch as we employ induction alone in our search, without\nconsidering that in this way we can never understand wherefore\nprecisely these conceptions, and none others, abide in the pure\nunderstanding. It was a design worthy of an acute thinker like\nAristotle, to search for these fundamental conceptions. Destitute,\nhowever, of any guiding principle, he picked them up just as they\noccurred to him, and at first hunted out ten, which he called\ncategories (predicaments). Afterwards be believed that he had\ndiscovered five others, which were added under the name of post\npredicaments. But his catalogue still remained defective. Besides,\nthere are to be found among them some of the modes of pure sensibility\n(quando, ubi, situs, also prius, simul), and likewise an empirical\nconception (motus)\u2014which can by no means belong to this genealogical\nregister of the pure understanding. Moreover, there are deduced\nconceptions (actio, passio) enumerated among the original conceptions,\nand, of the latter, some are entirely wanting.\n\nWith regard to these, it is to be remarked, that the categories, as the\ntrue primitive conceptions of the pure understanding, have also their\npure deduced conceptions, which, in a complete system of transcendental\nphilosophy, must by no means be passed over; though in a merely\ncritical essay we must be contented with the simple mention of the\nfact.\n\nLet it be allowed me to call these pure, but deduced conceptions of the\nunderstanding, the predicables of the pure understanding, in\ncontradistinction to predicaments. If we are in possession of the\noriginal and primitive, the deduced and subsidiary conceptions can\neasily be added, and the genealogical tree of the understanding\ncompletely delineated. As my present aim is not to set forth a complete\nsystem, but merely the principles of one, I reserve this task for\nanother time. It may be easily executed by any one who will refer to\nthe ontological manuals, and subordinate to the category of causality,\nfor example, the predicables of force, action, passion; to that of\ncommunity, those of presence and resistance; to the categories of\nmodality, those of origination, extinction, change; and so with the\nrest. The categories combined with the modes of pure sensibility, or\nwith one another, afford a great number of deduced \u00e0 priori\nconceptions; a complete enumeration of which would be a useful and not\nunpleasant, but in this place a perfectly dispensable, occupation.\n\nI purposely omit the definitions of the categories in this treatise. I\nshall analyse these conceptions only so far as is necessary for the\ndoctrine of method, which is to form a part of this critique. In a\nsystem of pure reason, definitions of them would be with justice\ndemanded of me, but to give them here would only bide from our view the\nmain aim of our investigation, at the same time raising doubts and\nobjections, the consideration of which, without injustice to our main\npurpose, may be very well postponed till another opportunity.\nMeanwhile, it ought to be sufficiently clear, from the little we have\nalready said on this subject, that the formation of a complete\nvocabulary of pure conceptions, accompanied by all the requisite\nexplanations, is not only a possible, but an easy undertaking. The\ncompartments already exist; it is only necessary to fill them up; and a\nsystematic topic like the present, indicates with perfect precision the\nproper place to which each conception belongs, while it readily points\nout any that have not yet been filled up.\n\n\u00a7 7\n\n\nOur table of the categories suggests considerations of some importance,\nwhich may perhaps have significant results in regard to the scientific\nform of all rational cognitions. For, that this table is useful in the\ntheoretical part of philosophy, nay, indispensable for the sketching of\nthe complete plan of a science, so far as that science rests upon\nconceptions \u00e0 priori, and for dividing it mathematically, according to\nfixed principles, is most manifest from the fact that it contains all\nthe elementary conceptions of the understanding, nay, even the form of\na system of these in the understanding itself, and consequently\nindicates all the momenta, and also the internal arrangement of a\nprojected speculative science, as I have elsewhere shown.[14] Here\nfollow some of these observations.\n\n [14] In the \u201cMetaphysical Principles of Natural Science.\u201d\n\n\nI. This table, which contains four classes of conceptions of the\nunderstanding, may, in the first instance, be divided into two classes,\nthe first of which relates to objects of intuition\u2014pure as well as\nempirical; the second, to the existence of these objects, either in\nrelation to one another, or to the understanding.\n\nThe former of these classes of categories I would entitle the\nmathematical, and the latter the dynamical categories. The former, as\nwe see, has no correlates; these are only to be found in the second\nclass. This difference must have a ground in the nature of the human\nunderstanding.\n\nII. The number of the categories in each class is always the same,\nnamely, three\u2014a fact which also demands some consideration, because in\nall other cases division \u00e0 priori through conceptions is necessarily\ndichotomy. It is to be added, that the third category in each triad\nalways arises from the combination of the second with the first.\n\nThus totality is nothing else but plurality contemplated as unity;\nlimitation is merely reality conjoined with negation; community is the\ncausality of a substance, reciprocally determining, and determined by\nother substances; and finally, necessity is nothing but existence,\nwhich is given through the possibility itself. Let it not be supposed,\nhowever, that the third category is merely a deduced, and not a\nprimitive conception of the pure understanding. For the conjunction of\nthe first and second, in order to produce the third conception,\nrequires a particular function of the understanding, which is by no\nmeans identical with those which are exercised in the first and second.\nThus, the conception of a number (which belongs to the category of\ntotality) is not always possible, where the conceptions of multitude\nand unity exist (for example, in the representation of the infinite).\nOr, if I conjoin the conception of a cause with that of a substance, it\ndoes not follow that the conception of influence, that is, how one\nsubstance can be the cause of something in another substance, will be\nunderstood from that. Thus it is evident that a particular act of the\nunderstanding is here necessary; and so in the other instances.\n\nIII. With respect to one category, namely, that of community, which is\nfound in the third class, it is not so easy as with the others to\ndetect its accordance with the form of the disjunctive judgement which\ncorresponds to it in the table of the logical functions.\n\nIn order to assure ourselves of this accordance, we must observe that\nin every disjunctive judgement, the sphere of the judgement (that is,\nthe complex of all that is contained in it) is represented as a whole\ndivided into parts; and, since one part cannot be contained in the\nother, they are cogitated as co-ordinated with, not subordinated to\neach other, so that they do not determine each other unilaterally, as\nin a linear series, but reciprocally, as in an aggregate\u2014(if one member\nof the division is posited, all the rest are excluded; and conversely).\n\nNow a like connection is cogitated in a whole of things; for one thing\nis not subordinated, as effect, to another as cause of its existence,\nbut, on the contrary, is co-ordinated contemporaneously and\nreciprocally, as a cause in relation to the determination of the others\n(for example, in a body\u2014the parts of which mutually attract and repel\neach other). And this is an entirely different kind of connection from\nthat which we find in the mere relation of the cause to the effect (the\nprinciple to the consequence), for in such a connection the consequence\ndoes not in its turn determine the principle, and therefore does not\nconstitute, with the latter, a whole\u2014just as the Creator does not with\nthe world make up a whole. The process of understanding by which it\nrepresents to itself the sphere of a divided conception, is employed\nalso when we think of a thing as divisible; and in the same manner as\nthe members of the division in the former exclude one another, and yet\nare connected in one sphere, so the understanding represents to itself\nthe parts of the latter, as having\u2014each of them\u2014an existence (as\nsubstances), independently of the others, and yet as united in one\nwhole.\n\n\u00a7 8\n\n\nIn the transcendental philosophy of the ancients there exists one more\nleading division, which contains pure conceptions of the understanding,\nand which, although not numbered among the categories, ought, according\nto them, as conceptions \u00e0 priori, to be valid of objects. But in this\ncase they would augment the number of the categories; which cannot be.\nThese are set forth in the proposition, so renowned among the\nschoolmen\u2014\u2018_Quodlibet ens est UNUM, VERUM, BONUM_.\u2019 Now, though the\ninferences from this principle were mere tautological propositions, and\nthough it is allowed only by courtesy to retain a place in modern\nmetaphysics, yet a thought which maintained itself for such a length of\ntime, however empty it seems to be, deserves an investigation of its\norigin, and justifies the conjecture that it must be grounded in some\nlaw of the understanding, which, as is often the case, has only been\nerroneously interpreted. These pretended transcendental predicates are,\nin fact, nothing but logical requisites and criteria of all cognition\nof objects, and they employ, as the basis for this cognition, the\ncategories of quantity, namely, unity, plurality, and totality. But\nthese, which must be taken as material conditions, that is, as\nbelonging to the possibility of things themselves, they employed merely\nin a formal signification, as belonging to the logical requisites of\nall cognition, and yet most unguardedly changed these criteria of\nthought into properties of objects, as things in themselves. Now, in\nevery cognition of an object, there is unity of conception, which may\nbe called qualitative unity, so far as by this term we understand only\nthe unity in our connection of the manifold; for example, unity of the\ntheme in a play, an oration, or a story. Secondly, there is truth in\nrespect of the deductions from it. The more true deductions we have\nfrom a given conception, the more criteria of its objective reality.\nThis we might call the qualitative plurality of characteristic marks,\nwhich belong to a conception as to a common foundation, but are not\ncogitated as a quantity in it. Thirdly, there is perfection\u2014which\nconsists in this, that the plurality falls back upon the unity of the\nconception, and accords completely with that conception and with no\nother. This we may denominate qualitative completeness. Hence it is\nevident that these logical criteria of the possibility of cognition are\nmerely the three categories of quantity modified and transformed to\nsuit an unauthorized manner of applying them. That is to say, the three\ncategories, in which the unity in the production of the quantum must be\nhomogeneous throughout, are transformed solely with a view to the\nconnection of heterogeneous parts of cognition in one act of\nconsciousness, by means of the quality of the cognition, which is the\nprinciple of that connection. Thus the criterion of the possibility of\na conception (not of its object) is the definition of it, in which the\nunity of the conception, the truth of all that may be immediately\ndeduced from it, and finally, the completeness of what has been thus\ndeduced, constitute the requisites for the reproduction of the whole\nconception. Thus also, the criterion or test of an hypothesis is the\nintelligibility of the received principle of explanation, or its unity\n(without help from any subsidiary hypothesis)\u2014the truth of our\ndeductions from it (consistency with each other and with\nexperience)\u2014and lastly, the completeness of the principle of the\nexplanation of these deductions, which refer to neither more nor less\nthan what was admitted in the hypothesis, restoring analytically and \u00e0\nposteriori, what was cogitated synthetically and \u00e0 priori. By the\nconceptions, therefore, of unity, truth, and perfection, we have made\nno addition to the transcendental table of the categories, which is\ncomplete without them. We have, on the contrary, merely employed the\nthree categories of quantity, setting aside their application to\nobjects of experience, as general logical laws of the consistency of\ncognition with itself.\n\nChapter II. Of the Deduction of the Pure Conceptions of the\nUnderstanding\n\nSection I. Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in general \u00a7\n9\n\nTeachers of jurisprudence, when speaking of rights and claims,\ndistinguish in a cause the question of right (quid juris) from the\nquestion of fact (quid facti), and while they demand proof of both,\nthey give to the proof of the former, which goes to establish right or\nclaim in law, the name of deduction. Now we make use of a great number\nof empirical conceptions, without opposition from any one; and consider\nourselves, even without any attempt at deduction, justified in\nattaching to them a sense, and a supposititious signification, because\nwe have always experience at hand to demonstrate their objective\nreality. There exist also, however, usurped conceptions, such as\nfortune, fate, which circulate with almost universal indulgence, and\nyet are occasionally challenged by the question, \u201cquid juris?\u201d In such\ncases, we have great difficulty in discovering any deduction for these\nterms, inasmuch as we cannot produce any manifest ground of right,\neither from experience or from reason, on which the claim to employ\nthem can be founded.\n\nAmong the many conceptions, which make up the very variegated web of\nhuman cognition, some are destined for pure use \u00e0 priori, independent\nof all experience; and their title to be so employed always requires a\ndeduction, inasmuch as, to justify such use of them, proofs from\nexperience are not sufficient; but it is necessary to know how these\nconceptions can apply to objects without being derived from experience.\nI term, therefore, an examination of the manner in which conceptions\ncan apply \u00e0 priori to objects, the transcendental deduction of\nconceptions, and I distinguish it from the empirical deduction, which\nindicates the mode in which conception is obtained through experience\nand reflection thereon; consequently, does not concern itself with the\nright, but only with the fact of our obtaining conceptions in such and\nsuch a manner. We have already seen that we are in possession of two\nperfectly different kinds of conceptions, which nevertheless agree with\neach other in this, that they both apply to objects completely \u00e0\npriori. These are the conceptions of space and time as forms of\nsensibility, and the categories as pure conceptions of the\nunderstanding. To attempt an empirical deduction of either of these\nclasses would be labour in vain, because the distinguishing\ncharacteristic of their nature consists in this, that they apply to\ntheir objects, without having borrowed anything from experience towards\nthe representation of them. Consequently, if a deduction of these\nconceptions is necessary, it must always be transcendental.\n\nMeanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with respect to all\nour cognition, we certainly may discover in experience, if not the\nprinciple of their possibility, yet the occasioning causes of their\nproduction. It will be found that the impressions of sense give the\nfirst occasion for bringing into action the whole faculty of cognition,\nand for the production of experience, which contains two very\ndissimilar elements, namely, a matter for cognition, given by the\nsenses, and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter, arising\nout of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought; and these, on\noccasion given by sensuous impressions, are called into exercise and\nproduce conceptions. Such an investigation into the first efforts of\nour faculty of cognition to mount from particular perceptions to\ngeneral conceptions is undoubtedly of great utility; and we have to\nthank the celebrated Locke for having first opened the way for this\ninquiry. But a deduction of the pure \u00e0 priori conceptions of course\nnever can be made in this way, seeing that, in regard to their future\nemployment, which must be entirely independent of experience, they must\nhave a far different certificate of birth to show from that of a\ndescent from experience. This attempted physiological derivation, which\ncannot properly be called deduction, because it relates merely to a\nquaestio facti, I shall entitle an explanation of the possession of a\npure cognition. It is therefore manifest that there can only be a\ntranscendental deduction of these conceptions and by no means an\nempirical one; also, that all attempts at an empirical deduction, in\nregard to pure \u00e0 priori conceptions, are vain, and can only be made by\none who does not understand the altogether peculiar nature of these\ncognitions.\n\nBut although it is admitted that the only possible deduction of pure \u00e0\npriori cognition is a transcendental deduction, it is not, for that\nreason, perfectly manifest that such a deduction is absolutely\nnecessary. We have already traced to their sources the conceptions of\nspace and time, by means of a transcendental deduction, and we have\nexplained and determined their objective validity \u00e0 priori. Geometry,\nnevertheless, advances steadily and securely in the province of pure \u00e0\npriori cognitions, without needing to ask from philosophy any\ncertificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental\nconception of space. But the use of the conception in this science\nextends only to the external world of sense, the pure form of the\nintuition of which is space; and in this world, therefore, all\ngeometrical cognition, because it is founded upon \u00e0 priori intuition,\npossesses immediate evidence, and the objects of this cognition are\ngiven \u00e0 priori (as regards their form) in intuition by and through the\ncognition itself. With the pure conceptions of understanding, on the\ncontrary, commences the absolute necessity of seeking a transcendental\ndeduction, not only of these conceptions themselves, but likewise of\nspace, because, inasmuch as they make affirmations concerning objects\nnot by means of the predicates of intuition and sensibility, but of\npure thought \u00e0 priori, they apply to objects without any of the\nconditions of sensibility. Besides, not being founded on experience,\nthey are not presented with any object in \u00e0 priori intuition upon\nwhich, antecedently to experience, they might base their synthesis.\nHence results, not only doubt as to the objective validity and proper\nlimits of their use, but that even our conception of space is rendered\nequivocal; inasmuch as we are very ready with the aid of the\ncategories, to carry the use of this conception beyond the conditions\nof sensuous intuition\u2014and, for this reason, we have already found a\ntranscendental deduction of it needful. The reader, then, must be quite\nconvinced of the absolute necessity of a transcendental deduction,\nbefore taking a single step in the field of pure reason; because\notherwise he goes to work blindly, and after he has wondered about in\nall directions, returns to the state of utter ignorance from which he\nstarted. He ought, moreover, clearly to recognize beforehand the\nunavoidable difficulties in his undertaking, so that he may not\nafterwards complain of the obscurity in which the subject itself is\ndeeply involved, or become too soon impatient of the obstacles in his\npath; because we have a choice of only two things\u2014either at once to\ngive up all pretensions to knowledge beyond the limits of possible\nexperience, or to bring this critical investigation to completion.\n\nWe have been able, with very little trouble, to make it comprehensible\nhow the conceptions of space and time, although \u00e0 priori cognitions,\nmust necessarily apply to external objects, and render a synthetical\ncognition of these possible, independently of all experience. For\ninasmuch as only by means of such pure form of sensibility an object\ncan appear to us, that is, be an object of empirical intuition, space\nand time are pure intuitions, which contain \u00e0 priori the condition of\nthe possibility of objects as phenomena, and an \u00e0 priori synthesis in\nthese intuitions possesses objective validity.\n\nOn the other hand, the categories of the understanding do not represent\nthe conditions under which objects are given to us in intuition;\nobjects can consequently appear to us without necessarily connecting\nthemselves with these, and consequently without any necessity binding\non the understanding to contain \u00e0 priori the conditions of these\nobjects. Thus we find ourselves involved in a difficulty which did not\npresent itself in the sphere of sensibility, that is to say, we cannot\ndiscover how the subjective conditions of thought can have objective\nvalidity, in other words, can become conditions of the possibility of\nall cognition of objects; for phenomena may certainly be given to us in\nintuition without any help from the functions of the understanding. Let\nus take, for example, the conception of cause, which indicates a\npeculiar kind of synthesis, namely, that with something, A, something\nentirely different, B, is connected according to a law. It is not \u00e0\npriori manifest why phenomena should contain anything of this kind (we\nare of course debarred from appealing for proof to experience, for the\nobjective validity of this conception must be demonstrated \u00e0 priori),\nand it hence remains doubtful \u00e0 priori, whether such a conception be\nnot quite void and without any corresponding object among phenomena.\nFor that objects of sensuous intuition must correspond to the formal\nconditions of sensibility existing \u00e0 priori in the mind is quite\nevident, from the fact that without these they could not be objects for\nus; but that they must also correspond to the conditions which\nunderstanding requires for the synthetical unity of thought is an\nassertion, the grounds for which are not so easily to be discovered.\nFor phenomena might be so constituted as not to correspond to the\nconditions of the unity of thought; and all things might lie in such\nconfusion that, for example, nothing could be met with in the sphere of\nphenomena to suggest a law of synthesis, and so correspond to the\nconception of cause and effect; so that this conception would be quite\nvoid, null, and without significance. Phenomena would nevertheless\ncontinue to present objects to our intuition; for mere intuition does\nnot in any respect stand in need of the functions of thought.\n\nIf we thought to free ourselves from the labour of these investigations\nby saying: \u201cExperience is constantly offering us examples of the\nrelation of cause and effect in phenomena, and presents us with\nabundant opportunity of abstracting the conception of cause, and so at\nthe same time of corroborating the objective validity of this\nconception\u201d; we should in this case be overlooking the fact, that the\nconception of cause cannot arise in this way at all; that, on the\ncontrary, it must either have an \u00e0 priori basis in the understanding,\nor be rejected as a mere chimera. For this conception demands that\nsomething, A, should be of such a nature that something else, B, should\nfollow from it necessarily, and according to an absolutely universal\nlaw. We may certainly collect from phenomena a law, according to which\nthis or that usually happens, but the element of necessity is not to be\nfound in it. Hence it is evident that to the synthesis of cause and\neffect belongs a dignity, which is utterly wanting in any empirical\nsynthesis; for it is no mere mechanical synthesis, by means of\naddition, but a dynamical one; that is to say, the effect is not to be\ncogitated as merely annexed to the cause, but as posited by and through\nthe cause, and resulting from it. The strict universality of this law\nnever can be a characteristic of empirical laws, which obtain through\ninduction only a comparative universality, that is, an extended range\nof practical application. But the pure conceptions of the understanding\nwould entirely lose all their peculiar character, if we treated them\nmerely as the productions of experience.\n\nTransition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories \u00a7 10\n\nThere are only two possible ways in which synthetical representation\nand its objects can coincide with and relate necessarily to each other,\nand, as it were, meet together. Either the object alone makes the\nrepresentation possible, or the representation alone makes the object\npossible. In the former case, the relation between them is only\nempirical, and an \u00e0 priori representation is impossible. And this is\nthe case with phenomena, as regards that in them which is referable to\nmere sensation. In the latter case\u2014although representation alone (for\nof its causality, by means of the will, we do not here speak) does not\nproduce the object as to its existence, it must nevertheless be \u00e0\npriori determinative in regard to the object, if it is only by means of\nthe representation that we can cognize anything as an object. Now there\nare only two conditions of the possibility of a cognition of objects;\nfirstly, intuition, by means of which the object, though only as\nphenomenon, is given; secondly, conception, by means of which the\nobject which corresponds to this intuition is thought. But it is\nevident from what has been said on \u00e6sthetic that the first condition,\nunder which alone objects can be intuited, must in fact exist, as a\nformal basis for them, \u00e0 priori in the mind. With this formal condition\nof sensibility, therefore, all phenomena necessarily correspond,\nbecause it is only through it that they can be phenomena at all; that\nis, can be empirically intuited and given. Now the question is whether\nthere do not exist, \u00e0 priori in the mind, conceptions of understanding\nalso, as conditions under which alone something, if not intuited, is\nyet thought as object. If this question be answered in the affirmative,\nit follows that all empirical cognition of objects is necessarily\nconformable to such conceptions, since, if they are not presupposed, it\nis impossible that anything can be an object of experience. Now all\nexperience contains, besides the intuition of the senses through which\nan object is given, a conception also of an object that is given in\nintuition. Accordingly, conceptions of objects in general must lie as \u00e0\npriori conditions at the foundation of all empirical cognition; and\nconsequently, the objective validity of the categories, as \u00e0 priori\nconceptions, will rest upon this, that experience (as far as regards\nthe form of thought) is possible only by their means. For in that case\nthey apply necessarily and \u00e0 priori to objects of experience, because\nonly through them can an object of experience be thought.\n\nThe whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all \u00e0 priori\nconceptions is to show that these conceptions are \u00e0 priori conditions\nof the possibility of all experience. Conceptions which afford us the\nobjective foundation of the possibility of experience are for that very\nreason necessary. But the analysis of the experiences in which they are\nmet with is not deduction, but only an illustration of them, because\nfrom experience they could never derive the attribute of necessity.\nWithout their original applicability and relation to all possible\nexperience, in which all objects of cognition present themselves, the\nrelation of the categories to objects, of whatever nature, would be\nquite incomprehensible.\n\nThe celebrated Locke, for want of due reflection on these points, and\nbecause he met with pure conceptions of the understanding in\nexperience, sought also to deduce them from experience, and yet\nproceeded so inconsequently as to attempt, with their aid, to arrive it\ncognitions which lie far beyond the limits of all experience. David\nHume perceived that, to render this possible, it was necessary that the\nconceptions should have an \u00e0 priori origin. But as he could not explain\nhow it was possible that conceptions which are not connected with each\nother in the understanding must nevertheless be thought as necessarily\nconnected in the object\u2014and it never occurred to him that the\nunderstanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these conceptions, be\nthe author of the experience in which its objects were presented to\nit\u2014he was forced to drive these conceptions from experience, that is,\nfrom a subjective necessity arising from repeated association of\nexperiences erroneously considered to be objective\u2014in one word, from\nhabit. But he proceeded with perfect consequence and declared it to be\nimpossible, with such conceptions and the principles arising from them,\nto overstep the limits of experience. The empirical derivation,\nhowever, which both of these philosophers attributed to these\nconceptions, cannot possibly be reconciled with the fact that we do\npossess scientific \u00e0 priori cognitions, namely, those of pure\nmathematics and general physics.\n\nThe former of these two celebrated men opened a wide door to\nextravagance\u2014(for if reason has once undoubted right on its side, it\nwill not allow itself to be confined to set limits, by vague\nrecommendations of moderation); the latter gave himself up entirely to\nscepticism\u2014a natural consequence, after having discovered, as he\nthought, that the faculty of cognition was not trustworthy. We now\nintend to make a trial whether it be not possible safely to conduct\nreason between these two rocks, to assign her determinate limits, and\nyet leave open for her the entire sphere of her legitimate activity.\n\nI shall merely premise an explanation of what the categories are. They\nare conceptions of an object in general, by means of which its\nintuition is contemplated as determined in relation to one of the\nlogical functions of judgement. The following will make this plain. The\nfunction of the categorical judgement is that of the relation of\nsubject to predicate; for example, in the proposition: \u201cAll bodies are\ndivisible.\u201d But in regard to the merely logical use of the\nunderstanding, it still remains undetermined to which Of these two\nconceptions belongs the function Of subject and to which that of\npredicate. For we could also say: \u201cSome divisible is a body.\u201d But the\ncategory of substance, when the conception of a body is brought under\nit, determines that; and its empirical intuition in experience must be\ncontemplated always as subject and never as mere predicate. And so with\nall the other categories.\n\nSection II Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceptions of the\nUnderstanding\n\nOf the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold representations\ngiven by Sense \u00a7 11.\n\nThe manifold content in our representations can be given in an\nintuition which is merely sensuous\u2014in other words, is nothing but\nsusceptibility; and the form of this intuition can exist \u00e0 priori in\nour faculty of representation, without being anything else but the mode\nin which the subject is affected. But the conjunction (conjunctio) of a\nmanifold in intuition never can be given us by the senses; it cannot\ntherefore be contained in the pure form of sensuous intuition, for it\nis a spontaneous act of the faculty of representation. And as we must,\nto distinguish it from sensibility, entitle this faculty understanding;\nso all conjunction whether conscious or unconscious, be it of the\nmanifold in intuition, sensuous or non-sensuous, or of several\nconceptions\u2014is an act of the understanding. To this act we shall give\nthe general appellation of synthesis, thereby to indicate, at the same\ntime, that we cannot represent anything as conjoined in the object\nwithout having previously conjoined it ourselves. Of all mental\nnotions, that of conjunction is the only one which cannot be given\nthrough objects, but can be originated only by the subject itself,\nbecause it is an act of its purely spontaneous activity. The reader\nwill easily enough perceive that the possibility of conjunction must be\ngrounded in the very nature of this act, and that it must be equally\nvalid for all conjunction, and that analysis, which appears to be its\ncontrary, must, nevertheless, always presuppose it; for where the\nunderstanding has not previously conjoined, it cannot dissect or\nanalyse, because only as conjoined by it, must that which is to be\nanalysed have been given to our faculty of representation.\n\nBut the conception of conjunction includes, besides the conception of\nthe manifold and of the synthesis of it, that of the unity of it also.\nConjunction is the representation of the synthetical unity of the\nmanifold.[15] This idea of unity, therefore, cannot arise out of that\nof conjunction; much rather does that idea, by combining itself with\nthe representation of the manifold, render the conception of\nconjunction possible. This unity, which \u00e0 priori precedes all\nconceptions of conjunction, is not the category of unity (\u00a7 6); for all\nthe categories are based upon logical functions of judgement, and in\nthese functions we already have conjunction, and consequently unity of\ngiven conceptions. It is therefore evident that the category of unity\npresupposes conjunction. We must therefore look still higher for this\nunity (as qualitative, \u00a7 8), in that, namely, which contains the ground\nof the unity of diverse conceptions in judgements, the ground,\nconsequently, of the possibility of the existence of the understanding,\neven in regard to its logical use.\n\n [15] Whether the representations are in themselves identical, and\n consequently whether one can be thought analytically by means of and\n through the other, is a question which we need not at present\n consider. Our Consciousness of the one, when we speak of the manifold,\n is always distinguishable from our consciousness of the other; and it\n is only respecting the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness that\n we here treat.\n\nOf the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception \u00a7 12\n\nThe \u201cI think\u201d must accompany all my representations, for otherwise\nsomething would be represented in me which could not be thought; in\nother words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least\nbe, in relation to me, nothing. That representation which can be given\npreviously to all thought is called intuition. All the diversity or\nmanifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to\nthe \u201cI think,\u201d in the subject in which this diversity is found. But\nthis representation, \u201cI think,\u201d is an act of spontaneity; that is to\nsay, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it\npure apperception, in order to distinguish it from empirical; or\nprimitive apperception, because it is self-consciousness which, whilst\nit gives birth to the representation \u201cI think,\u201d must necessarily be\ncapable of accompanying all our representations. It is in all acts of\nconsciousness one and the same, and unaccompanied by it, no\nrepresentation can exist for me. The unity of this apperception I call\nthe transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate\nthe possibility of \u00e0 priori cognition arising from it. For the manifold\nrepresentations which are given in an intuition would not all of them\nbe my representations, if they did not all belong to one\nself-consciousness, that is, as my representations (even although I am\nnot conscious of them as such), they must conform to the condition\nunder which alone they can exist together in a common\nself-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without\nexception belong to me. From this primitive conjunction follow many\nimportant results.\n\nFor example, this universal identity of the apperception of the\nmanifold given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations and\nis possible only by means of the consciousness of this synthesis. For\nthe empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations\nis in itself fragmentary and disunited, and without relation to the\nidentity of the subject. This relation, then, does not exist because I\naccompany every representation with consciousness, but because I join\none representation to another, and am conscious of the synthesis of\nthem. Consequently, only because I can connect a variety of given\nrepresentations in one consciousness, is it possible that I can\nrepresent to myself the identity of consciousness in these\nrepresentations; in other words, the analytical unity of apperception\nis possible only under the presupposition of a synthetical unity.[16]\nThe thought, \u201cThese representations given in intuition belong all of\nthem to me,\u201d is accordingly just the same as, \u201cI unite them in one\nself-consciousness, or can at least so unite them\u201d; and although this\nthought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of\nrepresentations, it presupposes the possibility of it; that is to say,\nfor the reason alone that I can comprehend the variety of my\nrepresentations in one consciousness, do I call them my\nrepresentations, for otherwise I must have as many-coloured and various\na self as are the representations of which I am conscious. Synthetical\nunity of the manifold in intuitions, as given \u00e0 priori, is therefore\nthe foundation of the identity of apperception itself, which antecedes\n\u00e0 priori all determinate thought. But the conjunction of\nrepresentations into a conception is not to be found in objects\nthemselves, nor can it be, as it were, borrowed from them and taken up\ninto the understanding by perception, but it is on the contrary an\noperation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more than the\nfaculty of conjoining \u00e0 priori and of bringing the variety of given\nrepresentations under the unity of apperception. This principle is the\nhighest in all human cognition.\n\n [16] All general conceptions\u2014as such\u2014depend, for their existence, on\n the analytical unity of consciousness. For example, when I think of\n red in general, I thereby think to myself a property which (as a\n characteristic mark) can be discovered somewhere, or can be united\n with other representations; consequently, it is only by means of a\n forethought possible synthetical unity that I can think to myself the\n analytical. A representation which is cogitated as common to different\n representations, is regarded as belonging to such as, besides this\n common representation, contain something different; consequently it\n must be previously thought in synthetical unity with other although\n only possible representations, before I can think in it the analytical\n unity of consciousness which makes it a conceptas communis. And thus\n the synthetical unity of apperception is the highest point with which\n we must connect every operation of the understanding, even the whole\n of logic, and after it our transcendental philosophy; indeed, this\n faculty is the understanding itself.\n\n\nThis fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apperception is\nindeed an identical, and therefore analytical, proposition; but it\nnevertheless explains the necessity for a synthesis of the manifold\ngiven in an intuition, without which the identity of self-consciousness\nwould be incogitable. For the ego, as a simple representation, presents\nus with no manifold content; only in intuition, which is quite\ndifferent from the representation ego, can it be given us, and by means\nof conjunction it is cogitated in one self-consciousness. An\nunderstanding, in which all the manifold should be given by means of\nconsciousness itself, would be intuitive; our understanding can only\nthink and must look for its intuition to sense. I am, therefore,\nconscious of my identical self, in relation to all the variety of\nrepresentations given to me in an intuition, because I call all of them\nmy representations. In other words, I am conscious myself of a\nnecessary \u00e0 priori synthesis of my representations, which is called the\noriginal synthetical unity of apperception, under which rank all the\nrepresentations presented to me, but that only by means of a synthesis.\n\nThe Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the highest\nPrinciple of all exercise of the Understanding \u00a7 13\n\nThe supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation\nto sensibility was, according to our transcendental \u00e6sthetic, that all\nthe manifold in intuition be subject to the formal conditions of space\nand time. The supreme principle of the possibility of it in relation to\nthe understanding is that all the manifold in it be subject to\nconditions of the originally synthetical unity or apperception.[17] To\nthe former of these two principles are subject all the various\nrepresentations of intuition, in so far as they are given to us; to the\nlatter, in so far as they must be capable of conjunction in one\nconsciousness; for without this nothing can be thought or cognized,\nbecause the given representations would not have in common the act Of\nthe apperception \u201cI think\u201d and therefore could not be connected in one\nself-consciousness.\n\n [17] Space and time, and all portions thereof, are intuitions;\n consequently are, with a manifold for their content, single\n representations. (See the Transcendental \u00c6sthetic.) Consequently, they\n are not pure conceptions, by means of which the same consciousness is\n found in a great number of representations; but, on the contrary, they\n are many representations contained in one, the consciousness of which\n is, so to speak, compounded. The unity of consciousness is\n nevertheless synthetical and, therefore, primitive. From this peculiar\n character of consciousness follow many important consequences. (See \u00a7\n 21.)\n\n\nUnderstanding is, to speak generally, the faculty Of cognitions. These\nconsist in the determined relation of given representation to an\nobject. But an object is that, in the conception of which the manifold\nin a given intuition is united. Now all union of representations\nrequires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently,\nit is the unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the possibility\nof representations relating to an object, and therefore of their\nobjective validity, and of their becoming cognitions, and consequently,\nthe possibility of the existence of the understanding itself.\n\nThe first pure cognition of understanding, then, upon which is founded\nall its other exercise, and which is at the same time perfectly\nindependent of all conditions of mere sensuous intuition, is the\nprinciple of the original synthetical unity of apperception. Thus the\nmere form of external sensuous intuition, namely, space, affords us,\nper se, no cognition; it merely contributes the manifold in \u00e0 priori\nintuition to a possible cognition. But, in order to cognize something\nin space (for example, a line), I must draw it, and thus produce\nsynthetically a determined conjunction of the given manifold, so that\nthe unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness\n(in the conception of a line), and by this means alone is an object (a\ndeterminate space) cognized. The synthetical unity of consciousness is,\ntherefore, an objective condition of all cognition, which I do not\nmerely require in order to cognize an object, but to which every\nintuition must necessarily be subject, in order to become an object for\nme; because in any other way, and without this synthesis, the manifold\nin intuition could not be united in one consciousness.\n\nThis proposition is, as already said, itself analytical, although it\nconstitutes the synthetical unity, the condition of all thought; for it\nstates nothing more than that all my representations in any given\nintuition must be subject to the condition which alone enables me to\nconnect them, as my representation with the identical self, and so to\nunite them synthetically in one apperception, by means of the general\nexpression, \u201cI think.\u201d\n\nBut this principle is not to be regarded as a principle for every\npossible understanding, but only for the understanding by means of\nwhose pure apperception in the thought I am, no manifold content is\ngiven. The understanding or mind which contained the manifold in\nintuition, in and through the act itself of its own self-consciousness,\nin other words, an understanding by and in the representation of which\nthe objects of the representation should at the same time exist, would\nnot require a special act of synthesis of the manifold as the condition\nof the unity of its consciousness, an act of which the human\nunderstanding, which thinks only and cannot intuite, has absolute need.\nBut this principle is the first principle of all the operations of our\nunderstanding, so that we cannot form the least conception of any other\npossible understanding, either of one such as should be itself\nintuition, or possess a sensuous intuition, but with forms different\nfrom those of space and time.\n\nWhat Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is \u00a7 14\n\nIt is by means of the transcendental unity of apperception that all the\nmanifold, given in an intuition is united into a conception of the\nobject. On this account it is called objective, and must be\ndistinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a\ndetermination of the internal sense, by means of which the said\nmanifold in intuition is given empirically to be so united. Whether I\ncan be empirically conscious of the manifold as coexistent or as\nsuccessive, depends upon circumstances, or empirical conditions. Hence\nthe empirical unity of consciousness by means of association of\nrepresentations, itself relates to a phenomenal world and is wholly\ncontingent. On the contrary, the pure form of intuition in time, merely\nas an intuition, which contains a given manifold, is subject to the\noriginal unity of consciousness, and that solely by means of the\nnecessary relation of the manifold in intuition to the \u201cI think,\u201d\nconsequently by means of the pure synthesis of the understanding, which\nlies \u00e0 priori at the foundation of all empirical synthesis. The\ntranscendental unity of apperception is alone objectively valid; the\nempirical which we do not consider in this essay, and which is merely a\nunity deduced from the former under given conditions in concreto,\npossesses only subjective validity. One person connects the notion\nconveyed in a word with one thing, another with another thing; and the\nunity of consciousness in that which is empirical, is, in relation to\nthat which is given by experience, not necessarily and universally\nvalid.\n\nThe Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the Objective Unity of\nApperception of the Conceptions contained therein \u00a7 15\n\nI could never satisfy myself with the definition which logicians give\nof a judgement. It is, according to them, the representation of a\nrelation between two conceptions. I shall not dwell here on the\nfaultiness of this definition, in that it suits only for categorical\nand not for hypothetical or disjunctive judgements, these latter\ncontaining a relation not of conceptions but of judgements themselves\u2014a\nblunder from which many evil results have followed.[18] It is more\nimportant for our present purpose to observe, that this definition does\nnot determine in what the said relation consists.\n\n [18] The tedious doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns\n only categorical syllogisms; and although it is nothing more than\n an artifice by surreptitiously introducing immediate conclusions\n (consequentiae immediatae) among the premises of a pure syllogism,\n to give rise to an appearance of more modes of drawing a conclusion\n than that in the first figure, the artifice would not have had much\n success, had not its authors succeeded in bringing categorical\n judgements into exclusive respect, as those to which all others must\n be referred\u2014a doctrine, however, which, according to \u00a7 5, is utterly\n false.\n\nBut if I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions in\nevery judgement, and distinguish it, as belonging to the understanding,\nfrom the relation which is produced according to laws of the\nreproductive imagination (which has only subjective validity), I find\nthat judgement is nothing but the mode of bringing given cognitions\nunder the objective unit of apperception. This is plain from our use of\nthe term of relation is in judgements, in order to distinguish the\nobjective unity of given representations from the subjective unity. For\nthis term indicates the relation of these representations to the\noriginal apperception, and also their necessary unity, even although\nthe judgement is empirical, therefore contingent, as in the judgement:\n\u201cAll bodies are heavy.\u201d I do not mean by this, that these\nrepresentations do necessarily belong to each other in empirical\nintuition, but that by means of the necessary unity of appreciation\nthey belong to each other in the synthesis of intuitions, that is to\nsay, they belong to each other according to principles of the objective\ndetermination of all our representations, in so far as cognition can\narise from them, these principles being all deduced from the main\nprinciple of the transcendental unity of apperception. In this way\nalone can there arise from this relation a judgement, that is, a\nrelation which has objective validity, and is perfectly distinct from\nthat relation of the very same representations which has only\nsubjective validity\u2014a relation, to wit, which is produced according to\nlaws of association. According to these laws, I could only say: \u201cWhen I\nhold in my hand or carry a body, I feel an impression of weight\u201d; but I\ncould not say: \u201cIt, the body, is heavy\u201d; for this is tantamount to\nsaying both these representations are conjoined in the object, that is,\nwithout distinction as to the condition of the subject, and do not\nmerely stand together in my perception, however frequently the\nperceptive act may be repeated.\n\nAll Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions\nunder which alone the manifold Content of them can be united in one\nConsciousness \u00a7 16\n\nThe manifold content given in a sensuous intuition comes necessarily\nunder the original synthetical unity of apperception, because thereby\nalone is the unity of intuition possible (\u00a7 13). But that act of the\nunderstanding, by which the manifold content of given representations\n(whether intuitions or conceptions) is brought under one apperception,\nis the logical function of judgements (\u00a7 15). All the manifold,\ntherefore, in so far as it is given in one empirical intuition, is\ndetermined in relation to one of the logical functions of judgement, by\nmeans of which it is brought into union in one consciousness. Now the\ncategories are nothing else than these functions of judgement so far as\nthe manifold in a given intuition is determined in relation to them (\u00a7\n9). Consequently, the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily\nsubject to the categories of the understanding.\n\nObservation \u00a7 17\n\nThe manifold in an intuition, which I call mine, is represented by\nmeans of the synthesis of the understanding, as belonging to the\nnecessary unity of self-consciousness, and this takes place by means of\nthe category.[19] The category indicates accordingly that the empirical\nconsciousness of a given manifold in an intuition is subject to a pure\nself-consciousness \u00e0 priori, in the same manner as an empirical\nintuition is subject to a pure sensuous intuition, which is also \u00e0\npriori. In the above proposition, then, lies the beginning of a\ndeduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding. Now, as the\ncategories have their origin in the understanding alone, independently\nof sensibility, I must in my deduction make abstraction of the mode in\nwhich the manifold of an empirical intuition is given, in order to fix\nmy attention exclusively on the unity which is brought by the\nunderstanding into the intuition by means of the category. In what\nfollows (\u00a7 22), it will be shown, from the mode in which the empirical\nintuition is given in the faculty of sensibility, that the unity which\nbelongs to it is no other than that which the category (according to \u00a7\n16) imposes on the manifold in a given intuition, and thus, its \u00e0\npriori validity in regard to all objects of sense being established,\nthe purpose of our deduction will be fully attained.\n\n [19] The proof of this rests on the represented unity of intuition, by\n means of which an object is given, and which always includes in itself\n a synthesis of the manifold to be intuited, and also the relation of\n this latter to unity of apperception.\n\n\nBut there is one thing in the above demonstration of which I could not\nmake abstraction, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be\ngiven previously to the synthesis of the understanding, and\nindependently of it. How this takes place remains here undetermined.\nFor if I cogitate an understanding which was itself intuitive (as, for\nexample, a divine understanding which should not represent given\nobjects, but by whose representation the objects themselves should be\ngiven or produced), the categories would possess no significance in\nrelation to such a faculty of cognition. They are merely rules for an\nunderstanding, whose whole power consists in thought, that is, in the\nact of submitting the synthesis of the manifold which is presented to\nit in intuition from a very different quarter, to the unity of\napperception; a faculty, therefore, which cognizes nothing per se, but\nonly connects and arranges the material of cognition, the intuition,\nnamely, which must be presented to it by means of the object. But to\nshow reasons for this peculiar character of our understandings, that it\nproduces unity of apperception \u00e0 priori only by means of categories,\nand a certain kind and number thereof, is as impossible as to explain\nwhy we are endowed with precisely so many functions of judgement and no\nmore, or why time and space are the only forms of our intuition.\n\nIn Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is the only\nlegitimate use of the Category \u00a7 18\n\nTo think an object and to cognize an object are by no means the same\nthing. In cognition there are two elements: firstly, the conception,\nwhereby an object is cogitated (the category); and, secondly, the\nintuition, whereby the object is given. For supposing that to the\nconception a corresponding intuition could not be given, it would still\nbe a thought as regards its form, but without any object, and no\ncognition of anything would be possible by means of it, inasmuch as, so\nfar as I knew, there existed and could exist nothing to which my\nthought could be applied. Now all intuition possible to us is sensuous;\nconsequently, our thought of an object by means of a pure conception of\nthe understanding, can become cognition for us only in so far as this\nconception is applied to objects of the senses. Sensuous intuition is\neither pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition\u2014of that\nwhich is immediately represented in space and time by means of\nsensation as real. Through the determination of pure intuition we\nobtain \u00e0 priori cognitions of objects, as in mathematics, but only as\nregards their form as phenomena; whether there can exist things which\nmust be intuited in this form is not thereby established. All\nmathematical conceptions, therefore, are not per se cognition, except\nin so far as we presuppose that there exist things which can only be\nrepresented conformably to the form of our pure sensuous intuition. But\nthings in space and time are given only in so far as they are\nperceptions (representations accompanied with sensation), therefore\nonly by empirical representation. Consequently the pure conceptions of\nthe understanding, even when they are applied to intuitions \u00e0 priori\n(as in mathematics), produce cognition only in so far as these (and\ntherefore the conceptions of the understanding by means of them) can be\napplied to empirical intuitions. Consequently the categories do not,\neven by means of pure intuition afford us any cognition of things; they\ncan only do so in so far as they can be applied to empirical intuition.\nThat is to say, the categories serve only to render empirical cognition\npossible. But this is what we call experience. Consequently, in\ncognition, their application to objects of experience is the only\nlegitimate use of the categories.\n\n\u00a7 19\n\n\nThe foregoing proposition is of the utmost importance, for it\ndetermines the limits of the exercise of the pure conceptions of the\nunderstanding in regard to objects, just as transcendental \u00e6sthetic\ndetermined the limits of the exercise of the pure form of our sensuous\nintuition. Space and time, as conditions of the possibility of the\npresentation of objects to us, are valid no further than for objects of\nsense, consequently, only for experience. Beyond these limits they\nrepresent to us nothing, for they belong only to sense, and have no\nreality apart from it. The pure conceptions of the understanding are\nfree from this limitation, and extend to objects of intuition in\ngeneral, be the intuition like or unlike to ours, provided only it be\nsensuous, and not intellectual. But this extension of conceptions\nbeyond the range of our intuition is of no advantage; for they are then\nmere empty conceptions of objects, as to the possibility or\nimpossibility of the existence of which they furnish us with no means\nof discovery. They are mere forms of thought, without objective\nreality, because we have no intuition to which the synthetical unity of\napperception, which alone the categories contain, could be applied, for\nthe purpose of determining an object. Our sensuous and empirical\nintuition can alone give them significance and meaning.\n\nIf, then, we suppose an object of a non-sensuous intuition to be given\nwe can in that case represent it by all those predicates which are\nimplied in the presupposition that nothing appertaining to sensuous\nintuition belongs to it; for example, that it is not extended, or in\nspace; that its duration is not time; that in it no change (the effect\nof the determinations in time) is to be met with, and so on. But it is\nno proper knowledge if I merely indicate what the intuition of the\nobject is not, without being able to say what is contained in it, for I\nhave not shown the possibility of an object to which my pure conception\nof understanding could be applicable, because I have not been able to\nfurnish any intuition corresponding to it, but am only able to say that\nour intuition is not valid for it. But the most important point is\nthis, that to a something of this kind not one category can be found\napplicable. Take, for example, the conception of substance, that is,\nsomething that can exist as subject, but never as mere predicate; in\nregard to this conception I am quite ignorant whether there can really\nbe anything to correspond to such a determination of thought, if\nempirical intuition did not afford me the occasion for its application.\nBut of this more in the sequel.\n\nOf the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in\ngeneral \u00a7 20\n\nThe pure conceptions of the understanding apply to objects of intuition\nin general, through the understanding alone, whether the intuition be\nour own or some other, provided only it be sensuous, but are, for this\nvery reason, mere forms of thought, by means of which alone no\ndetermined object can be cognized. The synthesis or conjunction of the\nmanifold in these conceptions relates, we have said, only to the unity\nof apperception, and is for this reason the ground of the possibility\nof \u00e0 priori cognition, in so far as this cognition is dependent on the\nunderstanding. This synthesis is, therefore, not merely transcendental,\nbut also purely intellectual. But because a certain form of sensuous\nintuition exists in the mind \u00e0 priori which rests on the receptivity of\nthe representative faculty (sensibility), the understanding, as a\nspontaneity, is able to determine the internal sense by means of the\ndiversity of given representations, conformably to the synthetical\nunity of apperception, and thus to cogitate the synthetical unity of\nthe apperception of the manifold of sensuous intuition \u00e0 priori, as the\ncondition to which must necessarily be submitted all objects of human\nintuition. And in this manner the categories as mere forms of thought\nreceive objective reality, that is, application to objects which are\ngiven to us in intuition, but that only as phenomena, for it is only of\nphenomena that we are capable of \u00e0 priori intuition.\n\nThis synthesis of the manifold of sensuous intuition, which is possible\nand necessary \u00e0 priori, may be called figurative (synthesis speciosa),\nin contradistinction to that which is cogitated in the mere category in\nregard to the manifold of an intuition in general, and is called\nconnection or conjunction of the understanding (synthesis\nintellectualis). Both are transcendental, not merely because they\nthemselves precede \u00e0 priori all experience, but also because they form\nthe basis for the possibility of other cognition \u00e0 priori.\n\nBut the figurative synthesis, when it has relation only to the\noriginally synthetical unity of apperception, that is to the\ntranscendental unity cogitated in the categories, must, to be\ndistinguished from the purely intellectual conjunction, be entitled the\ntranscendental synthesis of imagination. Imagination is the faculty of\nrepresenting an object even without its presence in intuition. Now, as\nall our intuition is sensuous, imagination, by reason of the subjective\ncondition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to\nthe conceptions of the understanding, belongs to sensibility. But in so\nfar as the synthesis of the imagination is an act of spontaneity, which\nis determinative, and not, like sense, merely determinable, and which\nis consequently able to determine sense \u00e0 priori, according to its\nform, conformably to the unity of apperception, in so far is the\nimagination a faculty of determining sensibility \u00e0 priori, and its\nsynthesis of intuitions according to the categories must be the\ntranscendental synthesis of the imagination. It is an operation of the\nunderstanding on sensibility, and the first application of the\nunderstanding to objects of possible intuition, and at the same time\nthe basis for the exercise of the other functions of that faculty. As\nfigurative, it is distinguished from the merely intellectual synthesis,\nwhich is produced by the understanding alone, without the aid of\nimagination. Now, in so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes\ncall it also the productive imagination, and distinguish it from the\nreproductive, the synthesis of which is subject entirely to empirical\nlaws, those of association, namely, and which, therefore, contributes\nnothing to the explanation of the possibility of \u00e0 priori cognition,\nand for this reason belongs not to transcendental philosophy, but to\npsychology.\n\nWe have now arrived at the proper place for explaining the paradox\nwhich must have struck every one in our exposition of the internal\nsense (\u00a7 6), namely\u2014how this sense represents us to our own\nconsciousness, only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in\nourselves, because, to wit, we intuite ourselves only as we are\ninwardly affected. Now this appears to be contradictory, inasmuch as we\nthus stand in a passive relation to ourselves; and therefore in the\nsystems of psychology, the internal sense is commonly held to be one\nwith the faculty of apperception, while we, on the contrary, carefully\ndistinguish them.\n\nThat which determines the internal sense is the understanding, and its\noriginal power of conjoining the manifold of intuition, that is, of\nbringing this under an apperception (upon which rests the possibility\nof the understanding itself). Now, as the human understanding is not in\nitself a faculty of intuition, and is unable to exercise such a power,\nin order to conjoin, as it were, the manifold of its own intuition, the\nsynthesis of understanding is, considered per se, nothing but the unity\nof action, of which, as such, it is self-conscious, even apart from\nsensibility, by which, moreover, it is able to determine our internal\nsense in respect of the manifold which may be presented to it according\nto the form of sensuous intuition. Thus, under the name of a\ntranscendental synthesis of imagination, the understanding exercises an\nactivity upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is; and so we are\nright in saying that the internal sense is affected thereby.\nApperception and its synthetical unity are by no means one and the same\nwith the internal sense. The former, as the source of all our\nsynthetical conjunction, applies, under the name of the categories, to\nthe manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition\nof objects. The internal sense, on the contrary, contains merely the\nform of intuition, but without any synthetical conjunction of the\nmanifold therein, and consequently does not contain any determined\nintuition, which is possible only through consciousness of the\ndetermination of the manifold by the transcendental act of the\nimagination (synthetical influence of the understanding on the internal\nsense), which I have named figurative synthesis.\n\nThis we can indeed always perceive in ourselves. We cannot cogitate a\ngeometrical line without drawing it in thought, nor a circle without\ndescribing it, nor represent the three dimensions of space without\ndrawing three lines from the same point perpendicular to one another.\nWe cannot even cogitate time, unless, in drawing a straight line (which\nis to serve as the external figurative representation of time), we fix\nour attention on the act of the synthesis of the manifold, whereby we\ndetermine successively the internal sense, and thus attend also to the\nsuccession of this determination. Motion as an act of the subject (not\nas a determination of an object),[20] consequently the synthesis of the\nmanifold in space, if we make abstraction of space and attend merely to\nthe act by which we determine the internal sense according to its form,\nis that which produces the conception of succession. The understanding,\ntherefore, does by no means find in the internal sense any such\nsynthesis of the manifold, but produces it, in that it affects this\nsense. At the same time, how \u201cI who think\u201d is distinct from the \u201ci\u201d\nwhich intuites itself (other modes of intuition being cogitable as at\nleast possible), and yet one and the same with this latter as the same\nsubject; how, therefore, I am able to say: \u201cI, as an intelligence and\nthinking subject, cognize myself as an object thought, so far as I am,\nmoreover, given to myself in intuition\u2014only, like other phenomena, not\nas I am in myself, and as considered by the understanding, but merely\nas I appear\u201d\u2014is a question that has in it neither more nor less\ndifficulty than the question\u2014\u201cHow can I be an object to myself?\u201d or\nthis\u2014\u201cHow I can be an object of my own intuition and internal\nperceptions?\u201d But that such must be the fact, if we admit that space is\nmerely a pure form of the phenomena of external sense, can be clearly\nproved by the consideration that we cannot represent time, which is not\nan object of external intuition, in any other way than under the image\nof a line, which we draw in thought, a mode of representation without\nwhich we could not cognize the unity of its dimension, and also that we\nare necessitated to take our determination of periods of time, or of\npoints of time, for all our internal perceptions from the changes which\nwe perceive in outward things. It follows that we must arrange the\ndeterminations of the internal sense, as phenomena in time, exactly in\nthe same manner as we arrange those of the external senses in space.\nAnd consequently, if we grant, respecting this latter, that by means of\nthem we know objects only in so far as we are affected externally, we\nmust also confess, with regard to the internal sense, that by means of\nit we intuite ourselves only as we are internally affected by\nourselves; in other words, as regards internal intuition, we cognize\nour own subject only as phenomenon, and not as it is in itself.[21]\n\n [20] Motion of an object in space does not belong to a pure science,\n consequently not to geometry; because, that a thing is movable cannot\n be known \u00e0 priori, but only from experience. But motion, considered as\n the description of a space, is a pure act of the successive synthesis\n of the manifold in external intuition by means of productive\n imagination, and belongs not only to geometry, but even to\n transcendental philosophy.\n\n\n [21] I do not see why so much difficulty should be found in admitting\n that our internal sense is affected by ourselves. Every act of\n attention exemplifies it. In such an act the understanding determines\n the internal sense by the synthetical conjunction which it cogitates,\n conformably to the internal intuition which corresponds to the\n manifold in the synthesis of the understanding. How much the mind is\n usually affected thereby every one will be able to perceive in\n himself.\n\n\n\u00a7 21\n\n\nOn the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold\ncontent of representations, consequently in the synthetical unity of\napperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor\nas I am in myself, but only that \u201cI am.\u201d This representation is a\nthought, not an intuition. Now, as in order to cognize ourselves, in\naddition to the act of thinking, which subjects the manifold of every\npossible intuition to the unity of apperception, there is necessary a\ndeterminate mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is given; although\nmy own existence is certainly not mere phenomenon (much less mere\nillusion), the determination of my existence[22] Can only take place\nconformably to the form of the internal sense, according to the\nparticular mode in which the manifold which I conjoin is given in\ninternal intuition, and I have therefore no knowledge of myself as I\nam, but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of self is thus\nvery far from a knowledge of self, in which I do not use the\ncategories, whereby I cogitate an object, by means of the conjunction\nof the manifold in one apperception. In the same way as I require, for\nthe sake of the cognition of an object distinct from myself, not only\nthe thought of an object in general (in the category), but also an\nintuition by which to determine that general conception, in the same\nway do I require, in order to the cognition of myself, not only the\nconsciousness of myself or the thought that I think myself, but in\naddition an intuition of the manifold in myself, by which to determine\nthis thought. It is true that I exist as an intelligence which is\nconscious only of its faculty of conjunction or synthesis, but\nsubjected in relation to the manifold which this intelligence has to\nconjoin to a limitative conjunction called the internal sense. My\nintelligence (that is, I) can render that conjunction or synthesis\nperceptible only according to the relations of time, which are quite\nbeyond the proper sphere of the conceptions of the understanding and\nconsequently cognize itself in respect to an intuition (which cannot\npossibly be intellectual, nor given by the understanding), only as it\nappears to itself, and not as it would cognize itself, if its intuition\nwere intellectual.\n\n [22] The \u201cI think\u201d expresses the act of determining my own existence.\n My existence is thus already given by the act of consciousness; but\n the mode in which I must determine my existence, that is, the mode in\n which I must place the manifold belonging to my existence, is not\n thereby given. For this purpose intuition of self is required, and\n this intuition possesses a form given \u00e0 priori, namely, time, which is\n sensuous, and belongs to our receptivity of the determinable. Now, as\n I do not possess another intuition of self which gives the determining\n in me (of the spontaneity of which I am conscious), prior to the act\n of determination, in the same manner as time gives the determinable,\n it is clear that I am unable to determine my own existence as that of\n a spontaneous being, but I am only able to represent to myself the\n spontaneity of my thought, that is, of my determination, and my\n existence remains ever determinable in a purely sensuous manner, that\n is to say, like the existence of a phenomenon. But it is because of\n this spontaneity that I call myself an intelligence.\n\nTranscendental Deduction of the universally possible employment in\nexperience of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding \u00a7 22\n\nIn the metaphysical deduction, the \u00e0 priori origin of categories was\nproved by their complete accordance with the general logical of\nthought; in the transcendental deduction was exhibited the possibility\nof the categories as \u00e0 priori cognitions of objects of an intuition in\ngeneral (\u00a7 16 and 17).At present we are about to explain the\npossibility of cognizing, \u00e0 priori, by means of the categories, all\nobjects which can possibly be presented to our senses, not, indeed,\naccording to the form of their intuition, but according to the laws of\ntheir conjunction or synthesis, and thus, as it were, of prescribing\nlaws to nature and even of rendering nature possible. For if the\ncategories were inadequate to this task, it would not be evident to us\nwhy everything that is presented to our senses must be subject to those\nlaws which have an \u00e0 priori origin in the understanding itself.\n\nI premise that by the term synthesis of apprehension I understand the\ncombination of the manifold in an empirical intuition, whereby\nperception, that is, empirical consciousness of the intuition (as\nphenomenon), is possible.\n\nWe have \u00e0 priori forms of the external and internal sensuous intuition\nin the representations of space and time, and to these must the\nsynthesis of apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon be always\ncomformable, because the synthesis itself can only take place according\nto these forms. But space and time are not merely forms of sensuous\nintuition, but intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold), and\ntherefore contain \u00e0 priori the determination of the unity of this\nmanifold.[23] (See the Transcendent \u00c6sthetic.) Therefore is unity of\nthe synthesis of the manifold without or within us, consequently also a\nconjunction to which all that is to be represented as determined in\nspace or time must correspond, given \u00e0 priori along with (not in) these\nintuitions, as the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension of\nthem. But this synthetical unity can be no other than that of the\nconjunction of the manifold of a given intuition in general, in a\nprimitive act of consciousness, according to the categories, but\napplied to our sensuous intuition. Consequently all synthesis, whereby\nalone is even perception possible, is subject to the categories. And,\nas experience is cognition by means of conjoined perceptions, the\ncategories are conditions of the possibility of experience and are\ntherefore valid \u00e0 priori for all objects of experience.\n\n [23] Space represented as an object (as geometry really requires it to\n be) contains more than the mere form of the intuition; namely, a\n combination of the manifold given according to the form of sensibility\n into a representation that can be intuited; so that the form of the\n intuition gives us merely the manifold, but the formal intuition gives\n unity of representation. In the \u00e6sthetic, I regarded this unity as\n belonging entirely to sensibility, for the purpose of indicating that\n it antecedes all conceptions, although it presupposes a synthesis\n which does not belong to sense, through which alone, however, all our\n conceptions of space and time are possible. For as by means of this\n unity alone (the understanding determining the sensibility) space and\n time are given as intuitions, it follows that the unity of this\n intuition \u00e0 priori belongs to space and time, and not to the\n conception of the understanding (\u00a7 20).\n\n\nWhen, then, for example, I make the empirical intuition of a house by\napprehension of the manifold contained therein into a perception, the\nnecessary unity of space and of my external sensuous intuition lies at\nthe foundation of this act, and I, as it were, draw the form of the\nhouse conformably to this synthetical unity of the manifold in space.\nBut this very synthetical unity remains, even when I abstract the form\nof space, and has its seat in the understanding, and is in fact the\ncategory of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intuition; that is\nto say, the category of quantity, to which the aforesaid synthesis of\napprehension, that is, the perception, must be completely\nconformable.[24]\n\n [24] In this manner it is proved, that the synthesis of apprehension,\n which is empirical, must necessarily be conformable to the synthesis\n of apperception, which is intellectual, and contained \u00e0 priori in the\n category. It is one and the same spontaneity which at one time, under\n the name of imagination, at another under that of understanding,\n produces conjunction in the manifold of intuition.\n\n\nTo take another example, when I perceive the freezing of water, I\napprehend two states (fluidity and solidity), which, as such, stand\ntoward each other mutually in a relation of time. But in the time,\nwhich I place as an internal intuition, at the foundation of this\nphenomenon, I represent to myself synthetical unity of the manifold,\nwithout which the aforesaid relation could not be given in an intuition\nas determined (in regard to the succession of time). Now this\nsynthetical unity, as the \u00e0 priori condition under which I conjoin the\nmanifold of an intuition, is, if I make abstraction of the permanent\nform of my internal intuition (that is to say, of time), the category\nof cause, by means of which, when applied to my sensibility, I\ndetermine everything that occurs according to relations of time.\nConsequently apprehension in such an event, and the event itself, as\nfar as regards the possibility of its perception, stands under the\nconception of the relation of cause and effect: and so in all other\ncases.\n\nCategories are conceptions which prescribe laws \u00e0 priori to phenomena,\nconsequently to nature as the complex of all phenomena (natura\nmaterialiter spectata). And now the question arises\u2014inasmuch as these\ncategories are not derived from nature, and do not regulate themselves\naccording to her as their model (for in that case they would be\nempirical)\u2014how it is conceivable that nature must regulate herself\naccording to them, in other words, how the categories can determine \u00e0\npriori the synthesis of the manifold of nature, and yet not derive\ntheir origin from her. The following is the solution of this enigma.\n\nIt is not in the least more difficult to conceive how the laws of the\nphenomena of nature must harmonize with the understanding and with its\n\u00e0 priori form\u2014that is, its faculty of conjoining the manifold\u2014than it\nis to understand how the phenomena themselves must correspond with the\n\u00e0 priori form of our sensuous intuition. For laws do not exist in the\nphenomena any more than the phenomena exist as things in themselves.\nLaws do not exist except by relation to the subject in which the\nphenomena inhere, in so far as it possesses understanding, just as\nphenomena have no existence except by relation to the same existing\nsubject in so far as it has senses. To things as things in themselves,\nconformability to law must necessarily belong independently of an\nunderstanding to cognize them. But phenomena are only representations\nof things which are utterly unknown in respect to what they are in\nthemselves. But as mere representations, they stand under no law of\nconjunction except that which the conjoining faculty prescribes. Now\nthat which conjoins the manifold of sensuous intuition is imagination,\na mental act to which understanding contributes unity of intellectual\nsynthesis, and sensibility, manifoldness of apprehension. Now as all\npossible perception depends on the synthesis of apprehension, and this\nempirical synthesis itself on the transcendental, consequently on the\ncategories, it is evident that all possible perceptions, and therefore\neverything that can attain to empirical consciousness, that is, all\nphenomena of nature, must, as regards their conjunction, be subject to\nthe categories. And nature (considered merely as nature in general) is\ndependent on them, as the original ground of her necessary\nconformability to law (as natura formaliter spectata). But the pure\nfaculty (of the understanding) of prescribing laws \u00e0 priori to\nphenomena by means of mere categories, is not competent to enounce\nother or more laws than those on which a nature in general, as a\nconformability to law of phenomena of space and time, depends.\nParticular laws, inasmuch as they concern empirically determined\nphenomena, cannot be entirely deduced from pure laws, although they all\nstand under them. Experience must be superadded in order to know these\nparticular laws; but in regard to experience in general, and everything\nthat can be cognized as an object thereof, these \u00e0 priori laws are our\nonly rule and guide.\n\nResult of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Understanding \u00a7 23\n\nWe cannot think any object except by means of the categories; we cannot\ncognize any thought except by means of intuitions corresponding to\nthese conceptions. Now all our intuitions are sensuous, and our\ncognition, in so far as the object of it is given, is empirical. But\nempirical cognition is experience; consequently no \u00e0 priori cognition\nis possible for us, except of objects of possible experience.[25]\n\n [25] Lest my readers should stumble at this assertion, and the\n conclusions that may be too rashly drawn from it, I must remind them\n that the categories in the act of thought are by no means limited by\n the conditions of our sensuous intuition, but have an unbounded sphere\n of action. It is only the cognition of the object of thought, the\n determining of the object, which requires intuition. In the absence of\n intuition, our thought of an object may still have true and useful\n consequences in regard to the exercise of reason by the subject. But\n as this exercise of reason is not always directed on the determination\n of the object, in other words, on cognition thereof, but also on the\n determination of the subject and its volition, I do not intend to\n treat of it in this place.\n\n\nBut this cognition, which is limited to objects of experience, is not\nfor that reason derived entirely, from, experience, but\u2014and this is\nasserted of the pure intuitions and the pure conceptions of the\nunderstanding\u2014there are, unquestionably, elements of cognition, which\nexist in the mind \u00e0 priori. Now there are only two ways in which a\nnecessary harmony of experience with the conceptions of its objects can\nbe cogitated. Either experience makes these conceptions possible, or\nthe conceptions make experience possible. The former of these\nstatements will not hold good with respect to the categories (nor in\nregard to pure sensuous intuition), for they are \u00e0 priori conceptions,\nand therefore independent of experience. The assertion of an empirical\norigin would attribute to them a sort of generatio aequivoca.\nConsequently, nothing remains but to adopt the second alternative\n(which presents us with a system, as it were, of the epigenesis of pure\nreason), namely, that on the part of the understanding the categories\ndo contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience. But with\nrespect to the questions how they make experience possible, and what\nare the principles of the possibility thereof with which they present\nus in their application to phenomena, the following section on the\ntranscendental exercise of the faculty of judgement will inform the\nreader.\n\nIt is quite possible that someone may propose a species of\npreformation-system of pure reason\u2014a middle way between the two\u2014to wit,\nthat the categories are neither innate and first \u00e0 priori principles of\ncognition, nor derived from experience, but are merely subjective\naptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously with our\nexistence, which were so ordered and disposed by our Creator, that\ntheir exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws of nature which\nregulate experience. Now, not to mention that with such an hypothesis\nit is impossible to say at what point we must stop in the employment of\npredetermined aptitudes, the fact that the categories would in this\ncase entirely lose that character of necessity which is essentially\ninvolved in the very conception of them, is a conclusive objection to\nit. The conception of cause, for example, which expresses the necessity\nof an effect under a presupposed condition, would be false, if it\nrested only upon such an arbitrary subjective necessity of uniting\ncertain empirical representations according to such a rule of relation.\nI could not then say\u2014\u201cThe effect is connected with its cause in the\nobject (that is, necessarily),\u201d but only, \u201cI am so constituted that I\ncan think this representation as so connected, and not otherwise.\u201d Now\nthis is just what the sceptic wants. For in this case, all our\nknowledge, depending on the supposed objective validity of our\njudgement, is nothing but mere illusion; nor would there be wanting\npeople who would deny any such subjective necessity in respect to\nthemselves, though they must feel it. At all events, we could not\ndispute with any one on that which merely depends on the manner in\nwhich his subject is organized.\n\nShort view of the above Deduction.\n\nThe foregoing deduction is an exposition of the pure conceptions of the\nunderstanding (and with them of all theoretical \u00e0 priori cognition), as\nprinciples of the possibility of experience, but of experience as the\ndetermination of all phenomena in space and time in general\u2014of\nexperience, finally, from the principle of the original synthetical\nunity of apperception, as the form of the understanding in relation to\ntime and space as original forms of sensibility.\n\nI consider the division by paragraphs to be necessary only up to this\npoint, because we had to treat of the elementary conceptions. As we now\nproceed to the exposition of the employment of these, I shall not\ndesignate the chapters in this manner any further.\n\nBOOK II. Analytic of Principles\n\nGeneral logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides exactly with\nthe division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are,\nunderstanding, judgement, and reason. This science, accordingly, treats\nin its analytic of conceptions, judgements, and conclusions in exact\ncorrespondence with the functions and order of those mental powers\nwhich we include generally under the generic denomination of\nunderstanding.\n\nAs this merely formal logic makes abstraction of all content of\ncognition, whether pure or empirical, and occupies itself with the mere\nform of thought (discursive cognition), it must contain in its analytic\na canon for reason. For the form of reason has its law, which, without\ntaking into consideration the particular nature of the cognition about\nwhich it is employed, can be discovered \u00e0 priori, by the simple\nanalysis of the action of reason into its momenta.\n\nTranscendental logic, limited as it is to a determinate content, that\nof pure \u00e0 priori cognitions, to wit, cannot imitate general logic in\nthis division. For it is evident that the transcendental employment of\nreason is not objectively valid, and therefore does not belong to the\nlogic of truth (that is, to analytic), but as a logic of illusion,\noccupies a particular department in the scholastic system under the\nname of transcendental dialectic.\n\nUnderstanding and judgement accordingly possess in transcendental logic\na canon of objectively valid, and therefore true exercise, and are\ncomprehended in the analytical department of that logic. But reason, in\nher endeavours to arrive by \u00e0 priori means at some true statement\nconcerning objects and to extend cognition beyond the bounds of\npossible experience, is altogether dialectic, and her illusory\nassertions cannot be constructed into a canon such as an analytic ought\nto contain.\n\nAccordingly, the analytic of principles will be merely a canon for the\nfaculty of judgement, for the instruction of this faculty in its\napplication to phenomena of the pure conceptions of the understanding,\nwhich contain the necessary condition for the establishment of \u00e0 priori\nlaws. On this account, although the subject of the following chapters\nis the especial principles of understanding, I shall make use of the\nterm Doctrine of the faculty of judgement, in order to define more\nparticularly my present purpose.\n\nINTRODUCTION. Of the Transcendental Faculty of judgement in General\n\nIf understanding in general be defined as the faculty of laws or rules,\nthe faculty of judgement may be termed the faculty of subsumption under\nthese rules; that is, of distinguishing whether this or that does or\ndoes not stand under a given rule (casus datae legis). General logic\ncontains no directions or precepts for the faculty of judgement, nor\ncan it contain any such. For as it makes abstraction of all content of\ncognition, no duty is left for it, except that of exposing analytically\nthe mere form of cognition in conceptions, judgements, and conclusions,\nand of thereby establishing formal rules for all exercise of the\nunderstanding. Now if this logic wished to give some general direction\nhow we should subsume under these rules, that is, how we should\ndistinguish whether this or that did or did not stand under them, this\nagain could not be done otherwise than by means of a rule. But this\nrule, precisely because it is a rule, requires for itself direction\nfrom the faculty of judgement. Thus, it is evident that the\nunderstanding is capable of being instructed by rules, but that the\njudgement is a peculiar talent, which does not, and cannot require\ntuition, but only exercise. This faculty is therefore the specific\nquality of the so-called mother wit, the want of which no scholastic\ndiscipline can compensate.\n\nFor although education may furnish, and, as it were, engraft upon a\nlimited understanding rules borrowed from other minds, yet the power of\nemploying these rules correctly must belong to the pupil himself; and\nno rule which we can prescribe to him with this purpose is, in the\nabsence or deficiency of this gift of nature, secure from misuse.[26] A\nphysician therefore, a judge or a statesman, may have in his head many\nadmirable pathological, juridical, or political rules, in a degree that\nmay enable him to be a profound teacher in his particular science, and\nyet in the application of these rules he may very possibly\nblunder\u2014either because he is wanting in natural judgement (though not\nin understanding) and, whilst he can comprehend the general in\nabstracto, cannot distinguish whether a particular case in concreto\nought to rank under the former; or because his faculty of judgement has\nnot been sufficiently exercised by examples and real practice. Indeed,\nthe grand and only use of examples, is to sharpen the judgement. For as\nregards the correctness and precision of the insight of the\nunderstanding, examples are commonly injurious rather than otherwise,\nbecause, as casus in terminis they seldom adequately fulfil the\nconditions of the rule. Besides, they often weaken the power of our\nunderstanding to apprehend rules or laws in their universality,\nindependently of particular circumstances of experience; and hence,\naccustom us to employ them more as formulae than as principles.\nExamples are thus the go-cart of the judgement, which he who is\nnaturally deficient in that faculty cannot afford to dispense with.\n\n [26] Deficiency in judgement is properly that which is called\n stupidity; and for such a failing we know no remedy. A dull or\n narrow-minded person, to whom nothing is wanting but a proper degree\n of understanding, may be improved by tuition, even so far as to\n deserve the epithet of learned. But as such persons frequently labour\n under a deficiency in the faculty of judgement, it is not uncommon to\n find men extremely learned who in the application of their science\n betray a lamentable degree this irremediable want.\n\n\nBut although general logic cannot give directions to the faculty of\njudgement, the case is very different as regards transcendental logic,\ninsomuch that it appears to be the especial duty of the latter to\nsecure and direct, by means of determinate rules, the faculty of\njudgement in the employment of the pure understanding. For, as a\ndoctrine, that is, as an endeavour to enlarge the sphere of the\nunderstanding in regard to pure \u00e0 priori cognitions, philosophy is\nworse than useless, since from all the attempts hitherto made, little\nor no ground has been gained. But, as a critique, in order to guard\nagainst the mistakes of the faculty of judgement (lapsus judicii) in\nthe employment of the few pure conceptions of the understanding which\nwe possess, although its use is in this case purely negative,\nphilosophy is called upon to apply all its acuteness and penetration.\n\nBut transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity, that besides\nindicating the rule, or rather the general condition for rules, which\nis given in the pure conception of the understanding, it can, at the\nsame time, indicate \u00e0 priori the case to which the rule must be\napplied. The cause of the superiority which, in this respect,\ntranscendental philosophy possesses above all other sciences except\nmathematics, lies in this: it treats of conceptions which must relate \u00e0\npriori to their objects, whose objective validity consequently cannot\nbe demonstrated \u00e0 posteriori, and is, at the same time, under the\nobligation of presenting in general but sufficient tests, the\nconditions under which objects can be given in harmony with those\nconceptions; otherwise they would be mere logical forms, without\ncontent, and not pure conceptions of the understanding.\n\nOur transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgement will contain\ntwo chapters. The first will treat of the sensuous condition under\nwhich alone pure conceptions of the understanding can be employed\u2014that\nis, of the schematism of the pure understanding. The second will treat\nof those synthetical judgements which are derived \u00e0 priori from pure\nconceptions of the understanding under those conditions, and which lie\n\u00e0 priori at the foundation of all other cognitions, that is to say, it\nwill treat of the principles of the pure understanding.\n\nTRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGEMENT OR, ANALYTIC OF\nPRINCIPLES\n\nChapter I. Of the Schematism at of the Pure Conceptions of the\nUnderstanding\n\nIn all subsumptions of an object under a conception, the representation\nof the object must be homogeneous with the conception; in other words,\nthe conception must contain that which is represented in the object to\nbe subsumed under it. For this is the meaning of the expression: \u201cAn\nobject is contained under a conception.\u201d Thus the empirical conception\nof a plate is homogeneous with the pure geometrical conception of a\ncircle, inasmuch as the roundness which is cogitated in the former is\nintuited in the latter.\n\nBut pure conceptions of the understanding, when compared with empirical\nintuitions, or even with sensuous intuitions in general, are quite\nheterogeneous, and never can be discovered in any intuition. How then\nis the subsumption of the latter under the former, and consequently the\napplication of the categories to phenomena, possible?\u2014For it is\nimpossible to say, for example: \u201cCausality can be intuited through the\nsenses and is contained in the phenomenon.\u201d\u2014This natural and important\nquestion forms the real cause of the necessity of a transcendental\ndoctrine of the faculty of judgement, with the purpose, to wit, of\nshowing how pure conceptions of the understanding can be applied to\nphenomena. In all other sciences, where the conceptions by which the\nobject is thought in the general are not so different and heterogeneous\nfrom those which represent the object in concreto\u2014as it is given, it is\nquite unnecessary to institute any special inquiries concerning the\napplication of the former to the latter.\n\nNow it is quite clear that there must be some third thing, which on the\none side is homogeneous with the category, and with the phenomenon on\nthe other, and so makes the application of the former to the latter\npossible. This mediating representation must be pure (without any\nempirical content), and yet must on the one side be intellectual, on\nthe other sensuous. Such a representation is the transcendental schema.\n\nThe conception of the understanding contains pure synthetical unity of\nthe manifold in general. Time, as the formal condition of the manifold\nof the internal sense, consequently of the conjunction of all\nrepresentations, contains \u00e0 priori a manifold in the pure intuition.\nNow a transcendental determination of time is so far homogeneous with\nthe category, which constitutes the unity thereof, that it is universal\nand rests upon a rule \u00e0 priori. On the other hand, it is so far\nhomogeneous with the phenomenon, inasmuch as time is contained in every\nempirical representation of the manifold. Thus an application of the\ncategory to phenomena becomes possible, by means of the transcendental\ndetermination of time, which, as the schema of the conceptions of the\nunderstanding, mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former.\n\nAfter what has been proved in our deduction of the categories, no one,\nit is to be hoped, can hesitate as to the proper decision of the\nquestion, whether the employment of these pure conceptions of the\nunderstanding ought to be merely empirical or also transcendental; in\nother words, whether the categories, as conditions of a possible\nexperience, relate \u00e0 priori solely to phenomena, or whether, as\nconditions of the possibility of things in general, their application\ncan be extended to objects as things in themselves. For we have there\nseen that conceptions are quite impossible, and utterly without\nsignification, unless either to them, or at least to the elements of\nwhich they consist, an object be given; and that, consequently, they\ncannot possibly apply to objects as things in themselves without regard\nto the question whether and how these may be given to us; and, further,\nthat the only manner in which objects can be given to us is by means of\nthe modification of our sensibility; and, finally, that pure \u00e0 priori\nconceptions, in addition to the function of the understanding in the\ncategory, must contain \u00e0 priori formal conditions of sensibility (of\nthe internal sense, namely), which again contain the general condition\nunder which alone the category can be applied to any object. This\nformal and pure condition of sensibility, to which the conception of\nthe understanding is restricted in its employment, we shall name the\nschema of the conception of the understanding, and the procedure of the\nunderstanding with these schemata we shall call the schematism of the\npure understanding.\n\nThe schema is, in itself, always a mere product of the imagination.\nBut, as the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no single\nintuition, but merely unity in the determination of sensibility, the\nschema is clearly distinguishable from the image. Thus, if I place five\npoints one after another.... this is an image of the number five. On\nthe other hand, if I only think a number in general, which may be\neither five or a hundred, this thought is rather the representation of\na method of representing in an image a sum (e.g., a thousand) in\nconformity with a conception, than the image itself, an image which I\nshould find some little difficulty in reviewing, and comparing with the\nconception. Now this representation of a general procedure of the\nimagination to present its image to a conception, I call the schema of\nthis conception.\n\nIn truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the\nfoundation of our pure sensuous conceptions. No image could ever be\nadequate to our conception of a triangle in general. For the\ngeneralness of the conception it never could attain to, as this\nincludes under itself all triangles, whether right-angled,\nacute-angled, etc., whilst the image would always be limited to a\nsingle part of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can exist\nnowhere else than in thought, and it indicates a rule of the synthesis\nof the imagination in regard to pure figures in space. Still less is an\nobject of experience, or an image of the object, ever to the empirical\nconception. On the contrary, the conception always relates immediately\nto the schema of the imagination, as a rule for the determination of\nour intuition, in conformity with a certain general conception. The\nconception of a dog indicates a rule, according to which my imagination\ncan delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in general, without\nbeing limited to any particular individual form which experience\npresents to me, or indeed to any possible image that I can represent to\nmyself in concreto. This schematism of our understanding in regard to\nphenomena and their mere form, is an art, hidden in the depths of the\nhuman soul, whose true modes of action we shall only with difficulty\ndiscover and unveil. Thus much only can we say: \u201cThe image is a product\nof the empirical faculty of the productive imagination\u2014the schema of\nsensuous conceptions (of figures in space, for example) is a product,\nand, as it were, a monogram of the pure imagination \u00e0 priori, whereby\nand according to which images first become possible, which, however,\ncan be connected with the conception only mediately by means of the\nschema which they indicate, and are in themselves never fully adequate\nto it.\u201d On the other hand, the schema of a pure conception of the\nunderstanding is something that cannot be reduced into any image\u2014it is\nnothing else than the pure synthesis expressed by the category,\nconformably, to a rule of unity according to conceptions. It is a\ntranscendental product of the imagination, a product which concerns the\ndetermination of the internal sense, according to conditions of its\nform (time) in respect to all representations, in so far as these\nrepresentations must be conjoined \u00e0 priori in one conception,\nconformably to the unity of apperception.\n\nWithout entering upon a dry and tedious analysis of the essential\nrequisites of transcendental schemata of the pure conceptions of the\nunderstanding, we shall rather proceed at once to give an explanation\nof them according to the order of the categories, and in connection\ntherewith.\n\nFor the external sense the pure image of all quantities (quantorum) is\nspace; the pure image of all objects of sense in general, is time. But\nthe pure schema of quantity (quantitatis) as a conception of the\nunderstanding, is number, a representation which comprehends the\nsuccessive addition of one to one (homogeneous quantities). Thus,\nnumber is nothing else than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold\nin a homogeneous intuition, by means of my generating time itself in my\napprehension of the intuition.\n\nReality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that which\ncorresponds to a sensation in general; that, consequently, the\nconception of which indicates a being (in time). Negation is that the\nconception of which represents a not-being (in time). The opposition of\nthese two consists therefore in the difference of one and the same\ntime, as a time filled or a time empty. Now as time is only the form of\nintuition, consequently of objects as phenomena, that which in objects\ncorresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all objects as\nthings in themselves (Sachheit, reality). Now every sensation has a\ndegree or quantity by which it can fill time, that is to say, the\ninternal sense in respect of the representation of an object, more or\nless, until it vanishes into nothing (= 0 = negatio). Thus there is a\nrelation and connection between reality and negation, or rather a\ntransition from the former to the latter, which makes every reality\nrepresentable to us as a quantum; and the schema of a reality as the\nquantity of something in so far as it fills time, is exactly this\ncontinuous and uniform generation of the reality in time, as we descend\nin time from the sensation which has a certain degree, down to the\nvanishing thereof, or gradually ascend from negation to the quantity\nthereof.\n\nThe schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time; that is,\nthe representation of it as a substratum of the empirical determination\nof time; a substratum which therefore remains, whilst all else changes.\n(Time passes not, but in it passes the existence of the changeable. To\ntime, therefore, which is itself unchangeable and permanent,\ncorresponds that which in the phenomenon is unchangeable in existence,\nthat is, substance, and it is only by it that the succession and\ncoexistence of phenomena can be determined in regard to time.)\n\nThe schema of cause and of the causality of a thing is the real which,\nwhen posited, is always followed by something else. It consists,\ntherefore, in the succession of the manifold, in so far as that\nsuccession is subjected to a rule.\n\nThe schema of community (reciprocity of action and reaction), or the\nreciprocal causality of substances in respect of their accidents, is\nthe coexistence of the determinations of the one with those of the\nother, according to a general rule.\n\nThe schema of possibility is the accordance of the synthesis of\ndifferent representations with the conditions of time in general (as,\nfor example, opposites cannot exist together at the same time in the\nsame thing, but only after each other), and is therefore the\ndetermination of the representation of a thing at any time.\n\nThe schema of reality is existence in a determined time.\n\nThe schema of necessity is the existence of an object in all time.\n\nIt is clear, from all this, that the schema of the category of quantity\ncontains and represents the generation (synthesis) of time itself, in\nthe successive apprehension of an object; the schema of quality the\nsynthesis of sensation with the representation of time, or the filling\nup of time; the schema of relation the relation of perceptions to each\nother in all time (that is, according to a rule of the determination of\ntime): and finally, the schema of modality and its categories, time\nitself, as the correlative of the determination of an object\u2014whether it\ndoes belong to time, and how. The schemata, therefore, are nothing but\n\u00e0 priori determinations of time according to rules, and these, in\nregard to all possible objects, following the arrangement of the\ncategories, relate to the series in time, the content in time, the\norder in time, and finally, to the complex or totality in time.\n\nHence it is apparent that the schematism of the understanding, by means\nof the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, amounts to nothing\nelse than the unity of the manifold of intuition in the internal sense,\nand thus indirectly to the unity of apperception, as a function\ncorresponding to the internal sense (a receptivity). Thus, the schemata\nof the pure conceptions of the understanding are the true and only\nconditions whereby our understanding receives an application to\nobjects, and consequently significance. Finally, therefore, the\ncategories are only capable of empirical use, inasmuch as they serve\nmerely to subject phenomena to the universal rules of synthesis, by\nmeans of an \u00e0 priori necessary unity (on account of the necessary union\nof all consciousness in one original apperception); and so to render\nthem susceptible of a complete connection in one experience. But within\nthis whole of possible experience lie all our cognitions, and in the\nuniversal relation to this experience consists transcendental truth,\nwhich antecedes all empirical truth, and renders the latter possible.\n\nIt is, however, evident at first sight, that although the schemata of\nsensibility are the sole agents in realizing the categories, they do,\nnevertheless, also restrict them, that is, they limit the categories by\nconditions which lie beyond the sphere of understanding\u2014namely, in\nsensibility. Hence the schema is properly only the phenomenon, or the\nsensuous conception of an object in harmony with the category. (Numerus\nest quantitas phaenomenon\u2014sensatio realitas phaenomenon; constans et\nperdurabile rerum substantia phaenomenon\u2014aeternitas, necessitas,\nphaenomena, etc.) Now, if we remove a restrictive condition, we thereby\namplify, it appears, the formerly limited conception. In this way, the\ncategories in their pure signification, free from all conditions of\nsensibility, ought to be valid of things as they are, and not, as the\nschemata represent them, merely as they appear; and consequently the\ncategories must have a significance far more extended, and wholly\nindependent of all schemata. In truth, there does always remain to the\npure conceptions of the understanding, after abstracting every sensuous\ncondition, a value and significance, which is, however, merely logical.\nBut in this case, no object is given them, and therefore they have no\nmeaning sufficient to afford us a conception of an object. The notion\nof substance, for example, if we leave out the sensuous determination\nof permanence, would mean nothing more than a something which can be\ncogitated as subject, without the possibility of becoming a predicate\nto anything else. Of this representation I can make nothing, inasmuch\nas it does not indicate to me what determinations the thing possesses\nwhich must thus be valid as premier subject. Consequently, the\ncategories, without schemata are merely functions of the understanding\nfor the production of conceptions, but do not represent any object.\nThis significance they derive from sensibility, which at the same time\nrealizes the understanding and restricts it.\n\nChapter II. System of all Principles of the Pure Understanding\n\nIn the foregoing chapter we have merely considered the general\nconditions under which alone the transcendental faculty of judgement is\njustified in using the pure conceptions of the understanding for\nsynthetical judgements. Our duty at present is to exhibit in systematic\nconnection those judgements which the understanding really produces \u00e0\npriori. For this purpose, our table of the categories will certainly\nafford us the natural and safe guidance. For it is precisely the\ncategories whose application to possible experience must constitute all\npure \u00e0 priori cognition of the understanding; and the relation of which\nto sensibility will, on that very account, present us with a complete\nand systematic catalogue of all the transcendental principles of the\nuse of the understanding.\n\nPrinciples \u00e0 priori are so called, not merely because they contain in\nthemselves the grounds of other judgements, but also because they\nthemselves are not grounded in higher and more general cognitions. This\npeculiarity, however, does not raise them altogether above the need of\na proof. For although there could be found no higher cognition, and\ntherefore no objective proof, and although such a principle rather\nserves as the foundation for all cognition of the object, this by no\nmeans hinders us from drawing a proof from the subjective sources of\nthe possibility of the cognition of an object. Such a proof is\nnecessary, moreover, because without it the principle might be liable\nto the imputation of being a mere gratuitous assertion.\n\nIn the second place, we shall limit our investigations to those\nprinciples which relate to the categories. For as to the principles of\ntranscendental \u00e6sthetic, according to which space and time are the\nconditions of the possibility of things as phenomena, as also the\nrestriction of these principles, namely, that they cannot be applied to\nobjects as things in themselves\u2014these, of course, do not fall within\nthe scope of our present inquiry. In like manner, the principles of\nmathematical science form no part of this system, because they are all\ndrawn from intuition, and not from the pure conception of the\nunderstanding. The possibility of these principles, however, will\nnecessarily be considered here, inasmuch as they are synthetical\njudgements \u00e0 priori, not indeed for the purpose of proving their\naccuracy and apodeictic certainty, which is unnecessary, but merely to\nrender conceivable and deduce the possibility of such evident \u00e0 priori\ncognitions.\n\nBut we shall have also to speak of the principle of analytical\njudgements, in opposition to synthetical judgements, which is the\nproper subject of our inquiries, because this very opposition will free\nthe theory of the latter from all ambiguity, and place it clearly\nbefore our eyes in its true nature.\n\n\nSYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING\n\nSection I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgements\n\nWhatever may be the content of our cognition, and in whatever manner\nour cognition may be related to its object, the universal, although\nonly negative conditions of all our judgements is that they do not\ncontradict themselves; otherwise these judgements are in themselves\n(even without respect to the object) nothing. But although there may\nexist no contradiction in our judgement, it may nevertheless connect\nconceptions in such a manner that they do not correspond to the object,\nor without any grounds either \u00e0 priori or \u00e0 posteriori for arriving at\nsuch a judgement, and thus, without being self-contradictory, a\njudgement may nevertheless be either false or groundless.\n\nNow, the proposition: \u201cNo subject can have a predicate that contradicts\nit,\u201d is called the principle of contradiction, and is a universal but\npurely negative criterion of all truth. But it belongs to logic alone,\nbecause it is valid of cognitions, merely as cognitions and without\nrespect to their content, and declares that the contradiction entirely\nnullifies them. We can also, however, make a positive use of this\nprinciple, that is, not merely to banish falsehood and error (in so far\nas it rests upon contradiction), but also for the cognition of truth.\nFor if the judgement is analytical, be it affirmative or negative, its\ntruth must always be recognizable by means of the principle of\ncontradiction. For the contrary of that which lies and is cogitated as\nconception in the cognition of the object will be always properly\nnegatived, but the conception itself must always be affirmed of the\nobject, inasmuch as the contrary thereof would be in contradiction to\nthe object.\n\nWe must therefore hold the principle of contradiction to be the\nuniversal and fully sufficient Principle of all analytical cognition.\nBut as a sufficient criterion of truth, it has no further utility or\nauthority. For the fact that no cognition can be at variance with this\nprinciple without nullifying itself, constitutes this principle the\nsine qua non, but not the determining ground of the truth of our\ncognition. As our business at present is properly with the synthetical\npart of our knowledge only, we shall always be on our guard not to\ntransgress this inviolable principle; but at the same time not to\nexpect from it any direct assistance in the establishment of the truth\nof any synthetical proposition.\n\nThere exists, however, a formula of this celebrated principle\u2014a\nprinciple merely formal and entirely without content\u2014which contains a\nsynthesis that has been inadvertently and quite unnecessarily mixed up\nwith it. It is this: \u201cIt is impossible for a thing to be and not to be\nat the same time.\u201d Not to mention the superfluousness of the addition\nof the word impossible to indicate the apodeictic certainty, which\nought to be self-evident from the proposition itself, the proposition\nis affected by the condition of time, and as it were says: \u201cA thing =\nA, which is something = B, cannot at the same time be non-B.\u201d But both,\nB as well as non-B, may quite well exist in succession. For example, a\nman who is young cannot at the same time be old; but the same man can\nvery well be at one time young, and at another not young, that is, old.\nNow the principle of contradiction as a merely logical proposition must\nnot by any means limit its application merely to relations of time, and\nconsequently a formula like the preceding is quite foreign to its true\npurpose. The misunderstanding arises in this way. We first of all\nseparate a predicate of a thing from the conception of the thing, and\nafterwards connect with this predicate its opposite, and hence do not\nestablish any contradiction with the subject, but only with its\npredicate, which has been conjoined with the subject synthetically\u2014a\ncontradiction, moreover, which obtains only when the first and second\npredicate are affirmed in the same time. If I say: \u201cA man who is\nignorant is not learned,\u201d the condition \u201cat the same time\u201d must be\nadded, for he who is at one time ignorant, may at another be learned.\nBut if I say: \u201cNo ignorant man is a learned man,\u201d the proposition is\nanalytical, because the characteristic ignorance is now a constituent\npart of the conception of the subject; and in this case the negative\nproposition is evident immediately from the proposition of\ncontradiction, without the necessity of adding the condition \u201cthe same\ntime.\u201d This is the reason why I have altered the formula of this\nprinciple\u2014an alteration which shows very clearly the nature of an\nanalytical proposition.\n\nSection II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgements\n\nThe explanation of the possibility of synthetical judgements is a task\nwith which general logic has nothing to do; indeed she needs not even\nbe acquainted with its name. But in transcendental logic it is the most\nimportant matter to be dealt with\u2014indeed the only one, if the question\nis of the possibility of synthetical judgements \u00e0 priori, the\nconditions and extent of their validity. For when this question is\nfully decided, it can reach its aim with perfect ease, the\ndetermination, to wit, of the extent and limits of the pure\nunderstanding.\n\nIn an analytical judgement I do not go beyond the given conception, in\norder to arrive at some decision respecting it. If the judgement is\naffirmative, I predicate of the conception only that which was already\ncogitated in it; if negative, I merely exclude from the conception its\ncontrary. But in synthetical judgements, I must go beyond the given\nconception, in order to cogitate, in relation with it, something quite\ndifferent from that which was cogitated in it, a relation which is\nconsequently never one either of identity or contradiction, and by\nmeans of which the truth or error of the judgement cannot be discerned\nmerely from the judgement itself.\n\nGranted, then, that we must go out beyond a given conception, in order\nto compare it synthetically with another, a third thing is necessary,\nin which alone the synthesis of two conceptions can originate. Now what\nis this tertium quid that is to be the medium of all synthetical\njudgements? It is only a complex in which all our representations are\ncontained, the internal sense to wit, and its form \u00e0 priori, time.\n\nThe synthesis of our representations rests upon the imagination; their\nsynthetical unity (which is requisite to a judgement), upon the unity\nof apperception. In this, therefore, is to be sought the possibility of\nsynthetical judgements, and as all three contain the sources of \u00e0\npriori representations, the possibility of pure synthetical judgements\nalso; nay, they are necessary upon these grounds, if we are to possess\na knowledge of objects, which rests solely upon the synthesis of\nrepresentations.\n\nIf a cognition is to have objective reality, that is, to relate to an\nobject, and possess sense and meaning in respect to it, it is necessary\nthat the object be given in some way or another. Without this, our\nconceptions are empty, and we may indeed have thought by means of them,\nbut by such thinking we have not, in fact, cognized anything, we have\nmerely played with representation. To give an object, if this\nexpression be understood in the sense of \u201cto present\u201d the object, not\nmediately but immediately in intuition, means nothing else than to\napply the representation of it to experience, be that experience real\nor only possible. Space and time themselves, pure as these conceptions\nare from all that is empirical, and certain as it is that they are\nrepresented fully \u00e0 priori in the mind, would be completely without\nobjective validity, and without sense and significance, if their\nnecessary use in the objects of experience were not shown. Nay, the\nrepresentation of them is a mere schema, that always relates to the\nreproductive imagination, which calls up the objects of experience,\nwithout which they have no meaning. And so it is with all conceptions\nwithout distinction.\n\nThe possibility of experience is, then, that which gives objective\nreality to all our \u00e0 priori cognitions. Now experience depends upon the\nsynthetical unity of phenomena, that is, upon a synthesis according to\nconceptions of the object of phenomena in general, a synthesis without\nwhich experience never could become knowledge, but would be merely a\nrhapsody of perceptions, never fitting together into any connected\ntext, according to rules of a thoroughly united (possible)\nconsciousness, and therefore never subjected to the transcendental and\nnecessary unity of apperception. Experience has therefore for a\nfoundation, \u00e0 priori principles of its form, that is to say, general\nrules of unity in the synthesis of phenomena, the objective reality of\nwhich rules, as necessary conditions even of the possibility of\nexperience can which rules, as necessary conditions\u2014even of the\npossibility of experience\u2014can always be shown in experience. But apart\nfrom this relation, \u00e0 priori synthetical propositions are absolutely\nimpossible, because they have no third term, that is, no pure object,\nin which the synthetical unity can exhibit the objective reality of its\nconceptions.\n\nAlthough, then, respecting space, or the forms which productive\nimagination describes therein, we do cognize much \u00e0 priori in\nsynthetical judgements, and are really in no need of experience for\nthis purpose, such knowledge would nevertheless amount to nothing but a\nbusy trifling with a mere chimera, were not space to be considered as\nthe condition of the phenomena which constitute the material of\nexternal experience. Hence those pure synthetical judgements do relate,\nthough but mediately, to possible experience, or rather to the\npossibility of experience, and upon that alone is founded the objective\nvalidity of their synthesis.\n\nWhile then, on the one hand, experience, as empirical synthesis, is the\nonly possible mode of cognition which gives reality to all other\nsynthesis; on the other hand, this latter synthesis, as cognition \u00e0\npriori, possesses truth, that is, accordance with its object, only in\nso far as it contains nothing more than what is necessary to the\nsynthetical unity of experience.\n\nAccordingly, the supreme principle of all synthetical judgements is:\n\u201cEvery object is subject to the necessary conditions of the synthetical\nunity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience.\u201d\n\n\u00c0 priori synthetical judgements are possible when we apply the formal\nconditions of the \u00e0 priori intuition, the synthesis of the imagination,\nand the necessary unity of that synthesis in a transcendental\napperception, to a possible cognition of experience, and say: \u201cThe\nconditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same\ntime conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and\nhave, for that reason, objective validity in an \u00e0 priori synthetical\njudgement.\u201d\n\nSection III. Systematic Representation of all Synthetical Principles of\nthe Pure Understanding\n\nThat principles exist at all is to be ascribed solely to the pure\nunderstanding, which is not only the faculty of rules in regard to that\nwhich happens, but is even the source of principles according to which\neverything that can be presented to us as an object is necessarily\nsubject to rules, because without such rules we never could attain to\ncognition of an object. Even the laws of nature, if they are\ncontemplated as principles of the empirical use of the understanding,\npossess also a characteristic of necessity, and we may therefore at\nleast expect them to be determined upon grounds which are valid \u00e0\npriori and antecedent to all experience. But all laws of nature,\nwithout distinction, are subject to higher principles of the\nunderstanding, inasmuch as the former are merely applications of the\nlatter to particular cases of experience. These higher principles alone\ntherefore give the conception, which contains the necessary condition,\nand, as it were, the exponent of a rule; experience, on the other hand,\ngives the case which comes under the rule.\n\nThere is no danger of our mistaking merely empirical principles for\nprinciples of the pure understanding, or conversely; for the character\nof necessity, according to conceptions which distinguish the latter,\nand the absence of this in every empirical proposition, how extensively\nvalid soever it may be, is a perfect safeguard against confounding\nthem. There are, however, pure principles \u00e0 priori, which nevertheless\nI should not ascribe to the pure understanding\u2014for this reason, that\nthey are not derived from pure conceptions, but (although by the\nmediation of the understanding) from pure intuitions. But understanding\nis the faculty of conceptions. Such principles mathematical science\npossesses, but their application to experience, consequently their\nobjective validity, nay the possibility of such \u00e0 priori synthetical\ncognitions (the deduction thereof) rests entirely upon the pure\nunderstanding.\n\nOn this account, I shall not reckon among my principles those of\nmathematics; though I shall include those upon the possibility and\nobjective validity \u00e0 priori, of principles of the mathematical science,\nwhich, consequently, are to be looked upon as the principle of these,\nand which proceed from conceptions to intuition, and not from intuition\nto conceptions.\n\nIn the application of the pure conceptions of the understanding to\npossible experience, the employment of their synthesis is either\nmathematical or dynamical, for it is directed partly on the intuition\nalone, partly on the existence of a phenomenon. But the \u00e0 priori\nconditions of intuition are in relation to a possible experience\nabsolutely necessary, those of the existence of objects of a possible\nempirical intuition are in themselves contingent. Hence the principles\nof the mathematical use of the categories will possess a character of\nabsolute necessity, that is, will be apodeictic; those, on the other\nhand, of the dynamical use, the character of an \u00e0 priori necessity\nindeed, but only under the condition of empirical thought in an\nexperience, therefore only mediately and indirectly. Consequently they\nwill not possess that immediate evidence which is peculiar to the\nformer, although their application to experience does not, for that\nreason, lose its truth and certitude. But of this point we shall be\nbetter able to judge at the conclusion of this system of principles.\n\nThe table of the categories is naturally our guide to the table of\nprinciples, because these are nothing else than rules for the objective\nemployment of the former. Accordingly, all principles of the pure\nunderstanding are:\n\n                                1\n                              Axioms\n                           of Intuition\n\n               2                                    3\n          Anticipations                          Analogies\n          of Perception                        of Experience\n                                4\n                          Postulates of\n                        Empirical Thought\n                           in general\n\nThese appellations I have chosen advisedly, in order that we might not\nlose sight of the distinctions in respect of the evidence and the\nemployment of these principles. It will, however, soon appear that\u2014a\nfact which concerns both the evidence of these principles, and the \u00e0\npriori determination of phenomena\u2014according to the categories of\nquantity and quality (if we attend merely to the form of these), the\nprinciples of these categories are distinguishable from those of the\ntwo others, in as much as the former are possessed of an intuitive, but\nthe latter of a merely discursive, though in both instances a complete,\ncertitude. I shall therefore call the former mathematical, and the\nlatter dynamical principles.[27] It must be observed, however, that by\nthese terms I mean just as little in the one case the principles of\nmathematics as those of general (physical) dynamics in the other. I\nhave here in view merely the principles of the pure understanding, in\ntheir application to the internal sense (without distinction of the\nrepresentations given therein), by means of which the sciences of\nmathematics and dynamics become possible. Accordingly, I have named\nthese principles rather with reference to their application than their\ncontent; and I shall now proceed to consider them in the order in which\nthey stand in the table.\n\n [27] All combination (conjunctio) is either composition (compositio)\n or connection (nexus). The former is the synthesis of a manifold, the\n parts of which do not necessarily belong to each other. For example,\n the two triangles into which a square is divided by a diagonal, do not\n necessarily belong to each other, and of this kind is the synthesis of\n the homogeneous in everything that can be mathematically considered.\n This synthesis can be divided into those of aggregation and coalition,\n the former of which is applied to extensive, the latter to intensive\n quantities. The second sort of combination (nexus) is the synthesis of\n a manifold, in so far as its parts do belong necessarily to each\n other; for example, the accident to a substance, or the effect to the\n cause. Consequently it is a synthesis of that which though\n heterogeneous, is represented as connected \u00e0 priori. This\n combination\u2014not an arbitrary one\u2014I entitle dynamical because it\n concerns the connection of the existence of the manifold. This, again,\n may be divided into the physical synthesis, of the phenomena divided\n among each other, and the metaphysical synthesis, or the connection of\n phenomena \u00e0 priori in the faculty of cognition.\n\n\n1. AXIOMS OF INTUITION.\n\nThe principle of these is: All Intuitions are Extensive Quantities.\n\nPROOF.\n\nAll phenomena contain, as regards their form, an intuition in space and\ntime, which lies \u00e0 priori at the foundation of all without exception.\nPhenomena, therefore, cannot be apprehended, that is, received into\nempirical consciousness otherwise than through the synthesis of a\nmanifold, through which the representations of a determinate space or\ntime are generated; that is to say, through the composition of the\nhomogeneous and the consciousness of the synthetical unity of this\nmanifold (homogeneous). Now the consciousness of a homogeneous manifold\nin intuition, in so far as thereby the representation of an object is\nrendered possible, is the conception of a quantity (quanti).\nConsequently, even the perception of an object as phenomenon is\npossible only through the same synthetical unity of the manifold of the\ngiven sensuous intuition, through which the unity of the composition of\nthe homogeneous manifold in the conception of a quantity is cogitated;\nthat is to say, all phenomena are quantities, and extensive quantities,\nbecause as intuitions in space or time they must be represented by\nmeans of the same synthesis through which space and time themselves are\ndetermined.\n\nAn extensive quantity I call that wherein the representation of the\nparts renders possible (and therefore necessarily antecedes) the\nrepresentation of the whole. I cannot represent to myself any line,\nhowever small, without drawing it in thought, that is, without\ngenerating from a point all its parts one after another, and in this\nway alone producing this intuition. Precisely the same is the case with\nevery, even the smallest, portion of time. I cogitate therein only the\nsuccessive progress from one moment to another, and hence, by means of\nthe different portions of time and the addition of them, a determinate\nquantity of time is produced. As the pure intuition in all phenomena is\neither time or space, so is every phenomenon in its character of\nintuition an extensive quantity, inasmuch as it can only be cognized in\nour apprehension by successive synthesis (from part to part). All\nphenomena are, accordingly, to be considered as aggregates, that is, as\na collection of previously given parts; which is not the case with\nevery sort of quantities, but only with those which are represented and\napprehended by us as extensive.\n\nOn this successive synthesis of the productive imagination, in the\ngeneration of figures, is founded the mathematics of extension, or\ngeometry, with its axioms, which express the conditions of sensuous\nintuition \u00e0 priori, under which alone the schema of a pure conception\nof external intuition can exist; for example, \u201cbe tween two points only\none straight line is possible,\u201d \u201ctwo straight lines cannot enclose a\nspace,\u201d etc. These are the axioms which properly relate only to\nquantities (quanta) as such.\n\nBut, as regards the quantity of a thing (quantitas), that is to say,\nthe answer to the question: \u201cHow large is this or that object?\u201d\nalthough, in respect to this question, we have various propositions\nsynthetical and immediately certain (indemonstrabilia); we have, in the\nproper sense of the term, no axioms. For example, the propositions: \u201cIf\nequals be added to equals, the wholes are equal\u201d; \u201cIf equals be taken\nfrom equals, the remainders are equal\u201d; are analytical, because I am\nimmediately conscious of the identity of the production of the one\nquantity with the production of the other; whereas axioms must be \u00e0\npriori synthetical propositions. On the other hand, the self-evident\npropositions as to the relation of numbers, are certainly synthetical\nbut not universal, like those of geometry, and for this reason cannot\nbe called axioms, but numerical formulae. That 7 + 5 = 12 is not an\nanalytical proposition. For neither in the representation of seven, nor\nof five, nor of the composition of the two numbers, do I cogitate the\nnumber twelve. (Whether I cogitate the number in the addition of both,\nis not at present the question; for in the case of an analytical\nproposition, the only point is whether I really cogitate the predicate\nin the representation of the subject.) But although the proposition is\nsynthetical, it is nevertheless only a singular proposition. In so far\nas regard is here had merely to the synthesis of the homogeneous (the\nunits), it cannot take place except in one manner, although our use of\nthese numbers is afterwards general. If I say: \u201cA triangle can be\nconstructed with three lines, any two of which taken together are\ngreater than the third,\u201d I exercise merely the pure function of the\nproductive imagination, which may draw the lines longer or shorter and\nconstruct the angles at its pleasure. On the contrary, the number seven\nis possible only in one manner, and so is likewise the number twelve,\nwhich results from the synthesis of seven and five. Such propositions,\nthen, cannot be termed axioms (for in that case we should have an\ninfinity of these), but numerical formulae.\n\nThis transcendental principle of the mathematics of phenomena greatly\nenlarges our \u00e0 priori cognition. For it is by this principle alone that\npure mathematics is rendered applicable in all its precision to objects\nof experience, and without it the validity of this application would\nnot be so self-evident; on the contrary, contradictions and confusions\nhave often arisen on this very point. Phenomena are not things in\nthemselves. Empirical intuition is possible only through pure intuition\n(of space and time); consequently, what geometry affirms of the latter,\nis indisputably valid of the former. All evasions, such as the\nstatement that objects of sense do not conform to the rules of\nconstruction in space (for example, to the rule of the infinite\ndivisibility of lines or angles), must fall to the ground. For, if\nthese objections hold good, we deny to space, and with it to all\nmathematics, objective validity, and no longer know wherefore, and how\nfar, mathematics can be applied to phenomena. The synthesis of spaces\nand times as the essential form of all intuition, is that which renders\npossible the apprehension of a phenomenon, and therefore every external\nexperience, consequently all cognition of the objects of experience;\nand whatever mathematics in its pure use proves of the former, must\nnecessarily hold good of the latter. All objections are but the\nchicaneries of an ill-instructed reason, which erroneously thinks to\nliberate the objects of sense from the formal conditions of our\nsensibility, and represents these, although mere phenomena, as things\nin themselves, presented as such to our understanding. But in this\ncase, no \u00e0 priori synthetical cognition of them could be possible,\nconsequently not through pure conceptions of space and the science\nwhich determines these conceptions, that is to say, geometry, would\nitself be impossible.\n\n2. ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION.\n\nThe principle of these is: In all phenomena the Real, that which is an\nobject of sensation, has Intensive Quantity, that is, has a Degree.\n\nPROOF.\n\nPerception is empirical consciousness, that is to say, a consciousness\nwhich contains an element of sensation. Phenomena as objects of\nperception are not pure, that is, merely formal intuitions, like space\nand time, for they cannot be perceived in themselves.[28] They contain,\nthen, over and above the intuition, the materials for an object\n(through which is represented something existing in space or time),\nthat is to say, they contain the real of sensation, as a representation\nmerely subjective, which gives us merely the consciousness that the\nsubject is affected, and which we refer to some external object. Now, a\ngradual transition from empirical consciousness to pure consciousness\nis possible, inasmuch as the real in this consciousness entirely\nvanishes, and there remains a merely formal consciousness (\u00e0 priori) of\nthe manifold in time and space; consequently there is possible a\nsynthesis also of the production of the quantity of a sensation from\nits commencement, that is, from the pure intuition = 0 onwards up to a\ncertain quantity of the sensation. Now as sensation in itself is not an\nobjective representation, and in it is to be found neither the\nintuition of space nor of time, it cannot possess any extensive\nquantity, and yet there does belong to it a quantity (and that by means\nof its apprehension, in which empirical consciousness can within a\ncertain time rise from nothing = 0 up to its given amount),\nconsequently an intensive quantity. And thus we must ascribe intensive\nquantity, that is, a degree of influence on sense to all objects of\nperception, in so far as this perception contains sensation.\n\n [28] They can be perceived only as phenomena, and some part of them\n must always belong to the non-ego; whereas pure intuitions are\n entirely the products of the mind itself, and as such are cognized _in\n themselves.\u2014Tr_\n\n\nAll cognition, by means of which I am enabled to cognize and determine\n\u00e0 priori what belongs to empirical cognition, may be called an\nanticipation; and without doubt this is the sense in which Epicurus\nemployed his expression prholepsis. But as there is in phenomena\nsomething which is never cognized \u00e0 priori, which on this account\nconstitutes the proper difference between pure and empirical cognition,\nthat is to say, sensation (as the matter of perception), it follows,\nthat sensation is just that element in cognition which cannot be at all\nanticipated. On the other hand, we might very well term the pure\ndeterminations in space and time, as well in regard to figure as to\nquantity, anticipations of phenomena, because they represent \u00e0 priori\nthat which may always be given \u00e0 posteriori in experience. But suppose\nthat in every sensation, as sensation in general, without any\nparticular sensation being thought of, there existed something which\ncould be cognized \u00e0 priori, this would deserve to be called\nanticipation in a special sense\u2014special, because it may seem surprising\nto forestall experience, in that which concerns the matter of\nexperience, and which we can only derive from itself. Yet such really\nis the case here.\n\nApprehension[29], by means of sensation alone, fills only one moment,\nthat is, if I do not take into consideration a succession of many\nsensations. As that in the phenomenon, the apprehension of which is not\na successive synthesis advancing from parts to an entire\nrepresentation, sensation has therefore no extensive quantity; the want\nof sensation in a moment of time would represent it as empty,\nconsequently = 0. That which in the empirical intuition corresponds to\nsensation is reality (realitas phaenomenon); that which corresponds to\nthe absence of it, negation = 0. Now every sensation is capable of a\ndiminution, so that it can decrease, and thus gradually disappear.\nTherefore, between reality in a phenomenon and negation, there exists a\ncontinuous concatenation of many possible intermediate sensations, the\ndifference of which from each other is always smaller than that between\nthe given sensation and zero, or complete negation. That is to say, the\nreal in a phenomenon has always a quantity, which however is not\ndiscoverable in apprehension, inasmuch as apprehension take place by\nmeans of mere sensation in one instant, and not by the successive\nsynthesis of many sensations, and therefore does not progress from\nparts to the whole. Consequently, it has a quantity, but not an\nextensive quantity.\n\n [29] Apprehension is the Kantian word for preception, in the largest\n sense in which we employ that term. It is the genus which includes\n under i, as species, perception proper and sensation proper\u2014Tr\n\n\nNow that quantity which is apprehended only as unity, and in which\nplurality can be represented only by approximation to negation = 0, I\nterm intensive quantity. Consequently, reality in a phenomenon has\nintensive quantity, that is, a degree. If we consider this reality as\ncause (be it of sensation or of another reality in the phenomenon, for\nexample, a change), we call the degree of reality in its character of\ncause a momentum, for example, the momentum of weight; and for this\nreason, that the degree only indicates that quantity the apprehension\nof which is not successive, but instantaneous. This, however, I touch\nupon only in passing, for with causality I have at present nothing to\ndo.\n\nAccordingly, every sensation, consequently every reality in phenomena,\nhowever small it may be, has a degree, that is, an intensive quantity,\nwhich may always be lessened, and between reality and negation there\nexists a continuous connection of possible realities, and possible\nsmaller perceptions. Every colour\u2014for example, red\u2014has a degree, which,\nbe it ever so small, is never the smallest, and so is it always with\nheat, the momentum of weight, etc.\n\nThis property of quantities, according to which no part of them is the\nsmallest possible (no part simple), is called their continuity. Space\nand time are quanta continua, because no part of them can be given,\nwithout enclosing it within boundaries (points and moments),\nconsequently, this given part is itself a space or a time. Space,\ntherefore, consists only of spaces, and time of times. Points and\nmoments are only boundaries, that is, the mere places or positions of\ntheir limitation. But places always presuppose intuitions which are to\nlimit or determine them; and we cannot conceive either space or time\ncomposed of constituent parts which are given before space or time.\nSuch quantities may also be called flowing, because synthesis (of the\nproductive imagination) in the production of these quantities is a\nprogression in time, the continuity of which we are accustomed to\nindicate by the expression flowing.\n\nAll phenomena, then, are continuous quantities, in respect both to\nintuition and mere perception (sensation, and with it reality). In the\nformer case they are extensive quantities; in the latter, intensive.\nWhen the synthesis of the manifold of a phenomenon is interrupted,\nthere results merely an aggregate of several phenomena, and not\nproperly a phenomenon as a quantity, which is not produced by the mere\ncontinuation of the productive synthesis of a certain kind, but by the\nrepetition of a synthesis always ceasing. For example, if I call\nthirteen dollars a sum or quantity of money, I employ the term quite\ncorrectly, inasmuch as I understand by thirteen dollars the value of a\nmark in standard silver, which is, to be sure, a continuous quantity,\nin which no part is the smallest, but every part might constitute a\npiece of money, which would contain material for still smaller pieces.\nIf, however, by the words thirteen dollars I understand so many coins\n(be their value in silver what it may), it would be quite erroneous to\nuse the expression a quantity of dollars; on the contrary, I must call\nthem aggregate, that is, a number of coins. And as in every number we\nmust have unity as the foundation, so a phenomenon taken as unity is a\nquantity, and as such always a continuous quantity (quantum continuum).\n\nNow, seeing all phenomena, whether considered as extensive or\nintensive, are continuous quantities, the proposition: \u201cAll change\n(transition of a thing from one state into another) is continuous,\u201d\nmight be proved here easily, and with mathematical evidence, were it\nnot that the causality of a change lies, entirely beyond the bounds of\na transcendental philosophy, and presupposes empirical principles. For\nof the possibility of a cause which changes the condition of things,\nthat is, which determines them to the contrary to a certain given\nstate, the understanding gives us \u00e0 priori no knowledge; not merely\nbecause it has no insight into the possibility of it (for such insight\nis absent in several \u00e0 priori cognitions), but because the notion of\nchange concerns only certain determinations of phenomena, which\nexperience alone can acquaint us with, while their cause lies in the\nunchangeable. But seeing that we have nothing which we could here\nemploy but the pure fundamental conceptions of all possible experience,\namong which of course nothing empirical can be admitted, we dare not,\nwithout injuring the unity of our system, anticipate general physical\nscience, which is built upon certain fundamental experiences.\n\nNevertheless, we are in no want of proofs of the great influence which\nthe principle above developed exercises in the anticipation of\nperceptions, and even in supplying the want of them, so far as to\nshield us against the false conclusions which otherwise we might rashly\ndraw.\n\nIf all reality in perception has a degree, between which and negation\nthere is an endless sequence of ever smaller degrees, and if,\nnevertheless, every sense must have a determinate degree of receptivity\nfor sensations; no perception, and consequently no experience is\npossible, which can prove, either immediately or mediately, an entire\nabsence of all reality in a phenomenon; in other words, it is\nimpossible ever to draw from experience a proof of the existence of\nempty space or of empty time. For in the first place, an entire absence\nof reality in a sensuous intuition cannot of course be an object of\nperception; secondly, such absence cannot be deduced from the\ncontemplation of any single phenomenon, and the difference of the\ndegrees in its reality; nor ought it ever to be admitted in explanation\nof any phenomenon. For if even the complete intuition of a determinate\nspace or time is thoroughly real, that is, if no part thereof is empty,\nyet because every reality has its degree, which, with the extensive\nquantity of the phenomenon unchanged, can diminish through endless\ngradations down to nothing (the void), there must be infinitely\ngraduated degrees, with which space or time is filled, and the\nintensive quantity in different phenomena may be smaller or greater,\nalthough the extensive quantity of the intuition remains equal and\nunaltered.\n\nWe shall give an example of this. Almost all natural philosophers,\nremarking a great difference in the quantity of the matter of different\nkinds in bodies with the same volume (partly on account of the momentum\nof gravity or weight, partly on account of the momentum of resistance\nto other bodies in motion), conclude unanimously that this volume\n(extensive quantity of the phenomenon) must be void in all bodies,\nalthough in different proportion. But who would suspect that these for\nthe most part mathematical and mechanical inquirers into nature should\nground this conclusion solely on a metaphysical hypothesis\u2014a sort of\nhypothesis which they profess to disparage and avoid? Yet this they do,\nin assuming that the real in space (I must not here call it\nimpenetrability or weight, because these are empirical conceptions) is\nalways identical, and can only be distinguished according to its\nextensive quantity, that is, multiplicity. Now to this presupposition,\nfor which they can have no ground in experience, and which consequently\nis merely metaphysical, I oppose a transcendental demonstration, which\nit is true will not explain the difference in the filling up of spaces,\nbut which nevertheless completely does away with the supposed necessity\nof the above-mentioned presupposition that we cannot explain the said\ndifference otherwise than by the hypothesis of empty spaces. This\ndemonstration, moreover, has the merit of setting the understanding at\nliberty to conceive this distinction in a different manner, if the\nexplanation of the fact requires any such hypothesis. For we perceive\nthat although two equal spaces may be completely filled by matters\naltogether different, so that in neither of them is there left a single\npoint wherein matter is not present, nevertheless, every reality has\nits degree (of resistance or of weight), which, without diminution of\nthe extensive quantity, can become less and less ad infinitum, before\nit passes into nothingness and disappears. Thus an expansion which\nfills a space\u2014for example, caloric, or any other reality in the\nphenomenal world\u2014can decrease in its degrees to infinity, yet without\nleaving the smallest part of the space empty; on the contrary, filling\nit with those lesser degrees as completely as another phenomenon could\nwith greater. My intention here is by no means to maintain that this is\nreally the case with the difference of matters, in regard to their\nspecific gravity; I wish only to prove, from a principle of the pure\nunderstanding, that the nature of our perceptions makes such a mode of\nexplanation possible, and that it is erroneous to regard the real in a\nphenomenon as equal quoad its degree, and different only quoad its\naggregation and extensive quantity, and this, too, on the pretended\nauthority of an \u00e0 priori principle of the understanding.\n\nNevertheless, this principle of the anticipation of perception must\nsomewhat startle an inquirer whom initiation into transcendental\nphilosophy has rendered cautious. We must naturally entertain some\ndoubt whether or not the understanding can enounce any such synthetical\nproposition as that respecting the degree of all reality in phenomena,\nand consequently the possibility of the internal difference of\nsensation itself\u2014abstraction being made of its empirical quality. Thus\nit is a question not unworthy of solution: \u201cHow the understanding can\npronounce synthetically and \u00e0 priori respecting phenomena, and thus\nanticipate these, even in that which is peculiarly and merely\nempirical, that, namely, which concerns sensation itself?\u201d\n\nThe quality of sensation is in all cases merely empirical, and cannot\nbe represented \u00e0 priori (for example, colours, taste, etc.). But the\nreal\u2014that which corresponds to sensation\u2014in opposition to negation = 0,\nonly represents something the conception of which in itself contains a\nbeing (ein seyn), and signifies nothing but the synthesis in an\nempirical consciousness. That is to say, the empirical consciousness in\nthe internal sense can be raised from 0 to every higher degree, so that\nthe very same extensive quantity of intuition, an illuminated surface,\nfor example, excites as great a sensation as an aggregate of many other\nsurfaces less illuminated. We can therefore make complete abstraction\nof the extensive quantity of a phenomenon, and represent to ourselves\nin the mere sensation in a certain momentum, a synthesis of homogeneous\nascension from 0 up to the given empirical consciousness, All\nsensations therefore as such are given only \u00e0 posteriori, but this\nproperty thereof, namely, that they have a degree, can be known \u00e0\npriori. It is worthy of remark, that in respect to quantities in\ngeneral, we can cognize \u00e0 priori only a single quality, namely,\ncontinuity; but in respect to all quality (the real in phenomena), we\ncannot cognize \u00e0 priori anything more than the intensive quantity\nthereof, namely, that they have a degree. All else is left to\nexperience.\n\n3. ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE.\n\nThe principle of these is: Experience is possible only through the\nrepresentation of a necessary connection of Perceptions.\n\nPROOF.\n\nExperience is an empirical cognition; that is to say, a cognition which\ndetermines an object by means of perceptions. It is therefore a\nsynthesis of perceptions, a synthesis which is not itself contained in\nperception, but which contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of\nperception in a consciousness; and this unity constitutes the essential\nof our cognition of objects of the senses, that is, of experience (not\nmerely of intuition or sensation). Now in experience our perceptions\ncome together contingently, so that no character of necessity in their\nconnection appears, or can appear from the perceptions themselves,\nbecause apprehension is only a placing together of the manifold of\nempirical intuition, and no representation of a necessity in the\nconnected existence of the phenomena which apprehension brings\ntogether, is to be discovered therein. But as experience is a cognition\nof objects by means of perceptions, it follows that the relation of the\nexistence of the existence of the manifold must be represented in\nexperience not as it is put together in time, but as it is objectively\nin time. And as time itself cannot be perceived, the determination of\nthe existence of objects in time can only take place by means of their\nconnection in time in general, consequently only by means of \u00e0 priori\nconnecting conceptions. Now as these conceptions always possess the\ncharacter of necessity, experience is possible only by means of a\nrepresentation of the necessary connection of perception.\n\nThe three modi of time are permanence, succession, and coexistence.\nAccordingly, there are three rules of all relations of time in\nphenomena, according to which the existence of every phenomenon is\ndetermined in respect of the unity of all time, and these antecede all\nexperience and render it possible.\n\nThe general principle of all three analogies rests on the necessary\nunity of apperception in relation to all possible empirical\nconsciousness (perception) at every time, consequently, as this unity\nlies \u00e0 priori at the foundation of all mental operations, the principle\nrests on the synthetical unity of all phenomena according to their\nrelation in time. For the original apperception relates to our internal\nsense (the complex of all representations), and indeed relates \u00e0 priori\nto its form, that is to say, the relation of the manifold empirical\nconsciousness in time. Now this manifold must be combined in original\napperception according to relations of time\u2014a necessity imposed by the\n\u00e0 priori transcendental unity of apperception, to which is subjected\nall that can belong to my (i.e., my own) cognition, and therefore all\nthat can become an object for me. This synthetical and \u00e0 priori\ndetermined unity in relation of perceptions in time is therefore the\nrule: \u201cAll empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules of\nthe general determination of time\u201d; and the analogies of experience, of\nwhich we are now about to treat, must be rules of this nature.\n\nThese principles have this peculiarity, that they do not concern\nphenomena, and the synthesis of the empirical intuition thereof, but\nmerely the existence of phenomena and their relation to each other in\nregard to this existence. Now the mode in which we apprehend a thing in\na phenomenon can be determined \u00e0 priori in such a manner that the rule\nof its synthesis can give, that is to say, can produce this \u00e0 priori\nintuition in every empirical example. But the existence of phenomena\ncannot be known \u00e0 priori, and although we could arrive by this path at\na conclusion of the fact of some existence, we could not cognize that\nexistence determinately, that is to say, we should be incapable of\nanticipating in what respect the empirical intuition of it would be\ndistinguishable from that of others.\n\nThe two principles above mentioned, which I called mathematical, in\nconsideration of the fact of their authorizing the application of\nmathematic phenomena, relate to these phenomena only in regard to their\npossibility, and instruct us how phenomena, as far as regards their\nintuition or the real in their perception, can be generated according\nto the rules of a mathematical synthesis. Consequently, numerical\nquantities, and with them the determination of a phenomenon as a\nquantity, can be employed in the one case as well as in the other.\nThus, for example, out of 200,000 illuminations by the moon, I might\ncompose and give \u00e0 priori, that is construct, the degree of our\nsensations of the sun-light.[30] We may therefore entitle these two\nprinciples constitutive.\n\n [30] Kant\u2019s meaning is: The two principles enunciated under the heads\n of \u201cAxioms of Intuition,\u201d and \u201cAnticipations of Perception,\u201d authorize\n the application to phenomena of determinations of size and number,\n that is of mathematic. For example, I may compute the light of the\n sun, and say that its quantity is a certain number of times greater\n than that of the moon. In the same way, heat is measured by the\n comparison of its different effects on water, &c., and on mercury in a\n thermometer.\u2014Tr\n\n\nThe case is very different with those principles whose province it is\nto subject the existence of phenomena to rules \u00e0 priori. For as\nexistence does not admit of being constructed, it is clear that they\nmust only concern the relations of existence and be merely regulative\nprinciples. In this case, therefore, neither axioms nor anticipations\nare to be thought of. Thus, if a perception is given us, in a certain\nrelation of time to other (although undetermined) perceptions, we\ncannot then say \u00e0 priori, what and how great (in quantity) the other\nperception necessarily connected with the former is, but only how it is\nconnected, quoad its existence, in this given modus of time. Analogies\nin philosophy mean something very different from that which they\nrepresent in mathematics. In the latter they are formulae, which\nenounce the equality of two relations of quantity, and are always\nconstitutive, so that if two terms of the proportion are given, the\nthird is also given, that is, can be constructed by the aid of these\nformulae. But in philosophy, analogy is not the equality of two\nquantitative but of two qualitative relations. In this case, from three\ngiven terms, I can give \u00e0 priori and cognize the relation to a fourth\nmember, but not this fourth term itself, although I certainly possess a\nrule to guide me in the search for this fourth term in experience, and\na mark to assist me in discovering it. An analogy of experience is\ntherefore only a rule according to which unity of experience must arise\nout of perceptions in respect to objects (phenomena) not as a\nconstitutive, but merely as a regulative principle. The same holds good\nalso of the postulates of empirical thought in general, which relate to\nthe synthesis of mere intuition (which concerns the form of phenomena),\nthe synthesis of perception (which concerns the matter of phenomena),\nand the synthesis of experience (which concerns the relation of these\nperceptions). For they are only regulative principles, and clearly\ndistinguishable from the mathematical, which are constitutive, not\nindeed in regard to the certainty which both possess \u00e0 priori, but in\nthe mode of evidence thereof, consequently also in the manner of\ndemonstration.\n\nBut what has been observed of all synthetical propositions, and must be\nparticularly remarked in this place, is this, that these analogies\npossess significance and validity, not as principles of the\ntranscendental, but only as principles of the empirical use of the\nunderstanding, and their truth can therefore be proved only as such,\nand that consequently the phenomena must not be subjoined directly\nunder the categories, but only under their schemata. For if the objects\nto which those principles must be applied were things in themselves, it\nwould be quite impossible to cognize aught concerning them\nsynthetically \u00e0 priori. But they are nothing but phenomena; a complete\nknowledge of which\u2014a knowledge to which all principles \u00e0 priori must at\nlast relate\u2014is the only possible experience. It follows that these\nprinciples can have nothing else for their aim than the conditions of\nthe empirical cognition in the unity of synthesis of phenomena. But\nthis synthesis is cogitated only in the schema of the pure conception\nof the understanding, of whose unity, as that of a synthesis in\ngeneral, the category contains the function unrestricted by any\nsensuous condition. These principles will therefore authorize us to\nconnect phenomena according to an analogy, with the logical and\nuniversal unity of conceptions, and consequently to employ the\ncategories in the principles themselves; but in the application of them\nto experience, we shall use only their schemata, as the key to their\nproper application, instead of the categories, or rather the latter as\nrestricting conditions, under the title of \u201cformulae\u201d of the former.\n\nA. FIRST ANALOGY.\n\nPrinciple of the Permanence of Substance.\n\nIn all changes of phenomena, substance is permanent, and the quantum\nthereof in nature is neither increased nor diminished.\n\nPROOF.\n\nAll phenomena exist in time, wherein alone as substratum, that is, as\nthe permanent form of the internal intuition, coexistence and\nsuccession can be represented. Consequently time, in which all changes\nof phenomena must be cogitated, remains and changes not, because it is\nthat in which succession and coexistence can be represented only as\ndeterminations thereof. Now, time in itself cannot be an object of\nperception. It follows that in objects of perception, that is, in\nphenomena, there must be found a substratum which represents time in\ngeneral, and in which all change or coexistence can be perceived by\nmeans of the relation of phenomena to it. But the substratum of all\nreality, that is, of all that pertains to the existence of things, is\nsubstance; all that pertains to existence can be cogitated only as a\ndetermination of substance. Consequently, the permanent, in relation to\nwhich alone can all relations of time in phenomena be determined, is\nsubstance in the world of phenomena, that is, the real in phenomena,\nthat which, as the substratum of all change, remains ever the same.\nAccordingly, as this cannot change in existence, its quantity in nature\ncan neither be increased nor diminished.\n\nOur apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon is always successive,\nis Consequently always changing. By it alone we could, therefore, never\ndetermine whether this manifold, as an object of experience, is\ncoexistent or successive, unless it had for a foundation something\nfixed and permanent, of the existence of which all succession and\ncoexistence are nothing but so many modes (modi of time). Only in the\npermanent, then, are relations of time possible (for simultaneity and\nsuccession are the only relations in time); that is to say, the\npermanent is the substratum of our empirical representation of time\nitself, in which alone all determination of time is possible.\nPermanence is, in fact, just another expression for time, as the\nabiding correlate of all existence of phenomena, and of all change, and\nof all coexistence. For change does not affect time itself, but only\nthe phenomena in time (just as coexistence cannot be regarded as a\nmodus of time itself, seeing that in time no parts are coexistent, but\nall successive). If we were to attribute succession to time itself, we\nshould be obliged to cogitate another time, in which this succession\nwould be possible. It is only by means of the permanent that existence\nin different parts of the successive series of time receives a\nquantity, which we entitle duration. For in mere succession, existence\nis perpetually vanishing and recommencing, and therefore never has even\nthe least quantity. Without the permanent, then, no relation in time is\npossible. Now, time in itself is not an object of perception;\nconsequently the permanent in phenomena must be regarded as the\nsubstratum of all determination of time, and consequently also as the\ncondition of the possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions,\nthat is, of experience; and all existence and all change in time can\nonly be regarded as a mode in the existence of that which abides\nunchangeably. Therefore, in all phenomena, the permanent is the object\nin itself, that is, the substance (phenomenon); but all that changes or\ncan change belongs only to the mode of the existence of this substance\nor substances, consequently to its determinations.\n\nI find that in all ages not only the philosopher, but even the common\nunderstanding, has preposited this permanence as a substratum of all\nchange in phenomena; indeed, I am compelled to believe that they will\nalways accept this as an indubitable fact. Only the philosopher\nexpresses himself in a more precise and definite manner, when he says:\n\u201cIn all changes in the world, the substance remains, and the accidents\nalone are changeable.\u201d But of this decidedly synthetical proposition, I\nnowhere meet with even an attempt at proof; nay, it very rarely has the\ngood fortune to stand, as it deserves to do, at the head of the pure\nand entirely \u00e0 priori laws of nature. In truth, the statement that\nsubstance is permanent, is tautological. For this very permanence is\nthe ground on which we apply the category of substance to the\nphenomenon; and we should have been obliged to prove that in all\nphenomena there is something permanent, of the existence of which the\nchangeable is nothing but a determination. But because a proof of this\nnature cannot be dogmatical, that is, cannot be drawn from conceptions,\ninasmuch as it concerns a synthetical proposition \u00e0 priori, and as\nphilosophers never reflected that such propositions are valid only in\nrelation to possible experience, and therefore cannot be proved except\nby means of a deduction of the possibility of experience, it is no\nwonder that while it has served as the foundation of all experience\n(for we feel the need of it in empirical cognition), it has never been\nsupported by proof.\n\nA philosopher was asked: \u201cWhat is the weight of smoke?\u201d He answered:\n\u201cSubtract from the weight of the burnt wood the weight of the remaining\nashes, and you will have the weight of the smoke.\u201d Thus he presumed it\nto be incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) does\nnot perish, but that only the form of it undergoes a change. In like\nmanner was the saying: \u201cFrom nothing comes nothing,\u201d only another\ninference from the principle or permanence, or rather of the\never-abiding existence of the true subject in phenomena. For if that in\nthe phenomenon which we call substance is to be the proper substratum\nof all determination of time, it follows that all existence in past as\nwell as in future time, must be determinable by means of it alone.\nHence we are entitled to apply the term substance to a phenomenon, only\nbecause we suppose its existence in all time, a notion which the word\npermanence does not fully express, as it seems rather to be referable\nto future time. However, the internal necessity perpetually to be, is\ninseparably connected with the necessity always to have been, and so\nthe expression may stand as it is. \u201cGigni de nihilo nihil; in nihilum\nnil posse reverti,\u201d[31] are two propositions which the ancients never\nparted, and which people nowadays sometimes mistakenly disjoin, because\nthey imagine that the propositions apply to objects as things in\nthemselves, and that the former might be inimical to the dependence\n(even in respect of its substance also) of the world upon a supreme\ncause. But this apprehension is entirely needless, for the question in\nthis case is only of phenomena in the sphere of experience, the unity\nof which never could be possible, if we admitted the possibility that\nnew things (in respect of their substance) should arise. For in that\ncase, we should lose altogether that which alone can represent the\nunity of time, to wit, the identity of the substratum, as that through\nwhich alone all change possesses complete and thorough unity. This\npermanence is, however, nothing but the manner in which we represent to\nourselves the existence of things in the phenomenal world.\n\n [31] Persius, Satirae, iii.83-84.\n\n\nThe determinations of a substance, which are only particular modes of\nits existence, are called accidents. They are always real, because they\nconcern the existence of substance (negations are only determinations,\nwhich express the non-existence of something in the substance). Now, if\nto this real in the substance we ascribe a particular existence (for\nexample, to motion as an accident of matter), this existence is called\ninherence, in contradistinction to the existence of substance, which we\ncall subsistence. But hence arise many misconceptions, and it would be\na more accurate and just mode of expression to designate the accident\nonly as the mode in which the existence of a substance is positively\ndetermined. Meanwhile, by reason of the conditions of the logical\nexercise of our understanding, it is impossible to avoid separating, as\nit were, that which in the existence of a substance is subject to\nchange, whilst the substance remains, and regarding it in relation to\nthat which is properly permanent and radical. On this account, this\ncategory of substance stands under the title of relation, rather\nbecause it is the condition thereof than because it contains in itself\nany relation.\n\nNow, upon this notion of permanence rests the proper notion of the\nconception change. Origin and extinction are not changes of that which\noriginates or becomes extinct. Change is but a mode of existence, which\nfollows on another mode of existence of the same object; hence all that\nchanges is permanent, and only the condition thereof changes. Now since\nthis mutation affects only determinations, which can have a beginning\nor an end, we may say, employing an expression which seems somewhat\nparadoxical: \u201cOnly the permanent (substance) is subject to change; the\nmutable suffers no change, but rather alternation, that is, when\ncertain determinations cease, others begin.\u201d\n\nChange, when, cannot be perceived by us except in substances, and\norigin or extinction in an absolute sense, that does not concern merely\na determination of the permanent, cannot be a possible perception, for\nit is this very notion of the permanent which renders possible the\nrepresentation of a transition from one state into another, and from\nnon-being to being, which, consequently, can be empirically cognized\nonly as alternating determinations of that which is permanent. Grant\nthat a thing absolutely begins to be; we must then have a point of time\nin which it was not. But how and by what can we fix and determine this\npoint of time, unless by that which already exists? For a void\ntime\u2014preceding\u2014is not an object of perception; but if we connect this\nbeginning with objects which existed previously, and which continue to\nexist till the object in question in question begins to be, then the\nlatter can only be a determination of the former as the permanent. The\nsame holds good of the notion of extinction, for this presupposes the\nempirical representation of a time, in which a phenomenon no longer\nexists.\n\nSubstances (in the world of phenomena) are the substratum of all\ndeterminations of time. The beginning of some, and the ceasing to be of\nother substances, would utterly do away with the only condition of the\nempirical unity of time; and in that case phenomena would relate to two\ndifferent times, in which, side by side, existence would pass; which is\nabsurd. For there is only one time in which all different times must be\nplaced, not as coexistent, but as successive.\n\nAccordingly, permanence is a necessary condition under which alone\nphenomena, as things or objects, are determinable in a possible\nexperience. But as regards the empirical criterion of this necessary\npermanence, and with it of the substantiality of phenomena, we shall\nfind sufficient opportunity to speak in the sequel.\n\nB. SECOND ANALOGY.\n\nPrinciple of the Succession of Time According to the Law of Causality.\nAll changes take place according to the law of the connection of Cause\nand Effect.\n\nPROOF.\n\n(That all phenomena in the succession of time are only changes, that\nis, a successive being and non-being of the determinations of\nsubstance, which is permanent; consequently that a being of substance\nitself which follows on the non-being thereof, or a non-being of\nsubstance which follows on the being thereof, in other words, that the\norigin or extinction of substance itself, is impossible\u2014all this has\nbeen fully established in treating of the foregoing principle. This\nprinciple might have been expressed as follows: \u201cAll alteration\n(succession) of phenomena is merely change\u201d; for the changes of\nsubstance are not origin or extinction, because the conception of\nchange presupposes the same subject as existing with two opposite\ndeterminations, and consequently as permanent. After this premonition,\nwe shall proceed to the proof.)\n\nI perceive that phenomena succeed one another, that is to say, a state\nof things exists at one time, the opposite of which existed in a former\nstate. In this case, then, I really connect together two perceptions in\ntime. Now connection is not an operation of mere sense and intuition,\nbut is the product of a synthetical faculty of imagination, which\ndetermines the internal sense in respect of a relation of time. But\nimagination can connect these two states in two ways, so that either\nthe one or the other may antecede in time; for time in itself cannot be\nan object of perception, and what in an object precedes and what\nfollows cannot be empirically determined in relation to it. I am only\nconscious, then, that my imagination places one state before and the\nother after; not that the one state antecedes the other in the object.\nIn other words, the objective relation of the successive phenomena\nremains quite undetermined by means of mere perception. Now in order\nthat this relation may be cognized as determined, the relation between\nthe two states must be so cogitated that it is thereby determined as\nnecessary, which of them must be placed before and which after, and not\nconversely. But the conception which carries with it a necessity of\nsynthetical unity, can be none other than a pure conception of the\nunderstanding which does not lie in mere perception; and in this case\nit is the conception of \u201cthe relation of cause and effect,\u201d the former\nof which determines the latter in time, as its necessary consequence,\nand not as something which might possibly antecede (or which might in\nsome cases not be perceived to follow). It follows that it is only\nbecause we subject the sequence of phenomena, and consequently all\nchange, to the law of causality, that experience itself, that is,\nempirical cognition of phenomena, becomes possible; and consequently,\nthat phenomena themselves, as objects of experience, are possible only\nby virtue of this law.\n\nOur apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is always successive. The\nrepresentations of parts succeed one another. Whether they succeed one\nanother in the object also, is a second point for reflection, which was\nnot contained in the former. Now we may certainly give the name of\nobject to everything, even to every representation, so far as we are\nconscious thereof; but what this word may mean in the case of\nphenomena, not merely in so far as they (as representations) are\nobjects, but only in so far as they indicate an object, is a question\nrequiring deeper consideration. In so far as they, regarded merely as\nrepresentations, are at the same time objects of consciousness, they\nare not to be distinguished from apprehension, that is, reception into\nthe synthesis of imagination, and we must therefore say: \u201cThe manifold\nof phenomena is always produced successively in the mind.\u201d If phenomena\nwere things in themselves, no man would be able to conjecture from the\nsuccession of our representations how this manifold is connected in the\nobject; for we have to do only with our representations. How things may\nbe in themselves, without regard to the representations through which\nthey affect us, is utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition. Now\nalthough phenomena are not things in themselves, and are nevertheless\nthe only thing given to us to be cognized, it is my duty to show what\nsort of connection in time belongs to the manifold in phenomena\nthemselves, while the representation of this manifold in apprehension\nis always successive. For example, the apprehension of the manifold in\nthe phenomenon of a house which stands before me, is successive. Now\ncomes the question whether the manifold of this house is in itself\nsuccessive\u2014which no one will be at all willing to grant. But, so soon\nas I raise my conception of an object to the transcendental\nsignification thereof, I find that the house is not a thing in itself,\nbut only a phenomenon, that is, a representation, the transcendental\nobject of which remains utterly unknown. What then am I to understand\nby the question: \u201cHow can the manifold be connected in the phenomenon\nitself\u2014not considered as a thing in itself, but merely as a\nphenomenon?\u201d Here that which lies in my successive apprehension is\nregarded as representation, whilst the phenomenon which is given me,\nnotwithstanding that it is nothing more than a complex of these\nrepresentations, is regarded as the object thereof, with which my\nconception, drawn from the representations of apprehension, must\nharmonize. It is very soon seen that, as accordance of the cognition\nwith its object constitutes truth, the question now before us can only\nrelate to the formal conditions of empirical truth; and that the\nphenomenon, in opposition to the representations of apprehension, can\nonly be distinguished therefrom as the object of them, if it is subject\nto a rule which distinguishes it from every other apprehension, and\nwhich renders necessary a mode of connection of the manifold. That in\nthe phenomenon which contains the condition of this necessary rule of\napprehension, is the object.\n\nLet us now proceed to our task. That something happens, that is to say,\nthat something or some state exists which before was not, cannot be\nempirically perceived, unless a phenomenon precedes, which does not\ncontain in itself this state. For a reality which should follow upon a\nvoid time, in other words, a beginning, which no state of things\nprecedes, can just as little be apprehended as the void time itself.\nEvery apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which follows\nupon another perception. But as this is the case with all synthesis of\napprehension, as I have shown above in the example of a house, my\napprehension of an event is not yet sufficiently distinguished from\nother apprehensions. But I remark also that if in a phenomenon which\ncontains an occurrence, I call the antecedent state of my perception,\nA, and the following state, B, the perception B can only follow A in\napprehension, and the perception A cannot follow B, but only precede\nit. For example, I see a ship float down the stream of a river. My\nperception of its place lower down follows upon my perception of its\nplace higher up the course of the river, and it is impossible that, in\nthe apprehension of this phenomenon, the vessel should be perceived\nfirst below and afterwards higher up the stream. Here, therefore, the\norder in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is determined; and\nby this order apprehension is regulated. In the former example, my\nperceptions in the apprehension of a house might begin at the roof and\nend at the foundation, or vice versa; or I might apprehend the manifold\nin this empirical intuition, by going from left to right, and from\nright to left. Accordingly, in the series of these perceptions, there\nwas no determined order, which necessitated my beginning at a certain\npoint, in order empirically to connect the manifold. But this rule is\nalways to be met with in the perception of that which happens, and it\nmakes the order of the successive perceptions in the apprehension of\nsuch a phenomenon necessary.\n\nI must, therefore, in the present case, deduce the subjective sequence\nof apprehension from the objective sequence of phenomena, for otherwise\nthe former is quite undetermined, and one phenomenon is not\ndistinguishable from another. The former alone proves nothing as to the\nconnection of the manifold in an object, for it is quite arbitrary. The\nlatter must consist in the order of the manifold in a phenomenon,\naccording to which order the apprehension of one thing (that which\nhappens) follows that of another thing (which precedes), in conformity\nwith a rule. In this way alone can I be authorized to say of the\nphenomenon itself, and not merely of my own apprehension, that a\ncertain order or sequence is to be found therein. That is, in other\nwords, I cannot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in this order.\n\nIn conformity with this rule, then, it is necessary that in that which\nantecedes an event there be found the condition of a rule, according to\nwhich in this event follows always and necessarily; but I cannot\nreverse this and go back from the event, and determine (by\napprehension) that which antecedes it. For no phenomenon goes back from\nthe succeeding point of time to the preceding point, although it does\ncertainly relate to a preceding point of time; from a given time, on\nthe other hand, there is always a necessary progression to the\ndetermined succeeding time. Therefore, because there certainly is\nsomething that follows, I must of necessity connect it with something\nelse, which antecedes, and upon which it follows, in conformity with a\nrule, that is necessarily, so that the event, as conditioned, affords\ncertain indication of a condition, and this condition determines the\nevent.\n\nLet us suppose that nothing precedes an event, upon which this event\nmust follow in conformity with a rule. All sequence of perception would\nthen exist only in apprehension, that is to say, would be merely\nsubjective, and it could not thereby be objectively determined what\nthing ought to precede, and what ought to follow in perception. In such\na case, we should have nothing but a play of representations, which\nwould possess no application to any object. That is to say, it would\nnot be possible through perception to distinguish one phenomenon from\nanother, as regards relations of time; because the succession in the\nact of apprehension would always be of the same sort, and therefore\nthere would be nothing in the phenomenon to determine the succession,\nand to render a certain sequence objectively necessary. And, in this\ncase, I cannot say that two states in a phenomenon follow one upon the\nother, but only that one apprehension follows upon another. But this is\nmerely subjective, and does not determine an object, and consequently\ncannot be held to be cognition of an object\u2014not even in the phenomenal\nworld.\n\nAccordingly, when we know in experience that something happens, we\nalways presuppose that something precedes, whereupon it follows in\nconformity with a rule. For otherwise I could not say of the object\nthat it follows; because the mere succession in my apprehension, if it\nbe not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding, does\nnot authorize succession in the object. Only, therefore, in reference\nto a rule, according to which phenomena are determined in their\nsequence, that is, as they happen, by the preceding state, can I make\nmy subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective, and it is only\nunder this presupposition that even the experience of an event is\npossible.\n\nNo doubt it appears as if this were in thorough contradiction to all\nthe notions which people have hitherto entertained in regard to the\nprocedure of the human understanding. According to these opinions, it\nis by means of the perception and comparison of similar consequences\nfollowing upon certain antecedent phenomena that the understanding is\nled to the discovery of a rule, according to which certain events\nalways follow certain phenomena, and it is only by this process that we\nattain to the conception of cause. Upon such a basis, it is clear that\nthis conception must be merely empirical, and the rule which it\nfurnishes us with\u2014\u201cEverything that happens must have a cause\u201d\u2014would be\njust as contingent as experience itself. The universality and necessity\nof the rule or law would be perfectly spurious attributes of it.\nIndeed, it could not possess universal validity, inasmuch as it would\nnot in this case be \u00e0 priori, but founded on deduction. But the same is\nthe case with this law as with other pure \u00e0 priori representations\n(e.g., space and time), which we can draw in perfect clearness and\ncompleteness from experience, only because we had already placed them\ntherein, and by that means, and by that alone, had rendered experience\npossible. Indeed, the logical clearness of this representation of a\nrule, determining the series of events, is possible only when we have\nmade use thereof in experience. Nevertheless, the recognition of this\nrule, as a condition of the synthetical unity of phenomena in time, was\nthe ground of experience itself and consequently preceded it \u00e0 priori.\n\nIt is now our duty to show by an example that we never, even in\nexperience, attribute to an object the notion of succession or effect\n(of an event\u2014that is, the happening of something that did not exist\nbefore), and distinguish it from the subjective succession of\napprehension, unless when a rule lies at the foundation, which compels\nus to observe this order of perception in preference to any other, and\nthat, indeed, it is this necessity which first renders possible the\nrepresentation of a succession in the object.\n\nWe have representations within us, of which also we can be conscious.\nBut, however widely extended, however accurate and thoroughgoing this\nconsciousness may be, these representations are still nothing more than\nrepresentations, that is, internal determinations of the mind in this\nor that relation of time. Now how happens it that to these\nrepresentations we should set an object, or that, in addition to their\nsubjective reality, as modifications, we should still further attribute\nto them a certain unknown objective reality? It is clear that objective\nsignificancy cannot consist in a relation to another representation (of\nthat which we desire to term object), for in that case the question\nagain arises: \u201cHow does this other representation go out of itself, and\nobtain objective significancy over and above the subjective, which is\nproper to it, as a determination of a state of mind?\u201d If we try to\ndiscover what sort of new property the relation to an object gives to\nour subjective representations, and what new importance they thereby\nreceive, we shall find that this relation has no other effect than that\nof rendering necessary the connection of our representations in a\ncertain manner, and of subjecting them to a rule; and that conversely,\nit is only because a certain order is necessary in the relations of\ntime of our representations, that objective significancy is ascribed to\nthem.\n\nIn the synthesis of phenomena, the manifold of our representations is\nalways successive. Now hereby is not represented an object, for by\nmeans of this succession, which is common to all apprehension, no one\nthing is distinguished from another. But so soon as I perceive or\nassume that in this succession there is a relation to a state\nantecedent, from which the representation follows in accordance with a\nrule, so soon do I represent something as an event, or as a thing that\nhappens; in other words, I cognize an object to which I must assign a\ncertain determinate position in time, which cannot be altered, because\nof the preceding state in the object. When, therefore, I perceive that\nsomething happens, there is contained in this representation, in the\nfirst place, the fact, that something antecedes; because, it is only in\nrelation to this that the phenomenon obtains its proper relation of\ntime, in other words, exists after an antecedent time, in which it did\nnot exist. But it can receive its determined place in time only by the\npresupposition that something existed in the foregoing state, upon\nwhich it follows inevitably and always, that is, in conformity with a\nrule. From all this it is evident that, in the first place, I cannot\nreverse the order of succession, and make that which happens precede\nthat upon which it follows; and that, in the second place, if the\nantecedent state be posited, a certain determinate event inevitably and\nnecessarily follows. Hence it follows that there exists a certain order\nin our representations, whereby the present gives a sure indication of\nsome previously existing state, as a correlate, though still\nundetermined, of the existing event which is given\u2014a correlate which\nitself relates to the event as its consequence, conditions it, and\nconnects it necessarily with itself in the series of time.\n\nIf then it be admitted as a necessary law of sensibility, and\nconsequently a formal condition of all perception, that the preceding\nnecessarily determines the succeeding time (inasmuch as I cannot arrive\nat the succeeding except through the preceding), it must likewise be an\nindispensable law of empirical representation of the series of time\nthat the phenomena of the past determine all phenomena in the\nsucceeding time, and that the latter, as events, cannot take place,\nexcept in so far as the former determine their existence in time, that\nis to say, establish it according to a rule. For it is of course only\nin phenomena that we can empirically cognize this continuity in the\nconnection of times.\n\nFor all experience and for the possibility of experience, understanding\nis indispensable, and the first step which it takes in this sphere is\nnot to render the representation of objects clear, but to render the\nrepresentation of an object in general, possible. It does this by\napplying the order of time to phenomena, and their existence. In other\nwords, it assigns to each phenomenon, as a consequence, a place in\nrelation to preceding phenomena, determined \u00e0 priori in time, without\nwhich it could not harmonize with time itself, which determines a place\n\u00e0 priori to all its parts. This determination of place cannot be\nderived from the relation of phenomena to absolute time (for it is not\nan object of perception); but, on the contrary, phenomena must\nreciprocally determine the places in time of one another, and render\nthese necessary in the order of time. In other words, whatever follows\nor happens, must follow in conformity with a universal rule upon that\nwhich was contained in the foregoing state. Hence arises a series of\nphenomena, which, by means of the understanding, produces and renders\nnecessary exactly the same order and continuous connection in the\nseries of our possible perceptions, as is found \u00e0 priori in the form of\ninternal intuition (time), in which all our perceptions must have\nplace.\n\nThat something happens, then, is a perception which belongs to a\npossible experience, which becomes real only because I look upon the\nphenomenon as determined in regard to its place in time, consequently\nas an object, which can always be found by means of a rule in the\nconnected series of my perceptions. But this rule of the determination\nof a thing according to succession in time is as follows: \u201cIn what\nprecedes may be found the condition, under which an event always (that\nis, necessarily) follows.\u201d From all this it is obvious that the\nprinciple of cause and effect is the principle of possible experience,\nthat is, of objective cognition of phenomena, in regard to their\nrelations in the succession of time.\n\nThe proof of this fundamental proposition rests entirely on the\nfollowing momenta of argument. To all empirical cognition belongs the\nsynthesis of the manifold by the imagination, a synthesis which is\nalways successive, that is, in which the representations therein always\nfollow one another. But the order of succession in imagination is not\ndetermined, and the series of successive representations may be taken\nretrogressively as well as progressively. But if this synthesis is a\nsynthesis of apprehension (of the manifold of a given phenomenon), then\nthe order is determined in the object, or to speak more accurately,\nthere is therein an order of successive synthesis which determines an\nobject, and according to which something necessarily precedes, and when\nthis is posited, something else necessarily follows. If, then, my\nperception is to contain the cognition of an event, that is, of\nsomething which really happens, it must be an empirical judgement,\nwherein we think that the succession is determined; that is, it\npresupposes another phenomenon, upon which this event follows\nnecessarily, or in conformity with a rule. If, on the contrary, when I\nposited the antecedent, the event did not necessarily follow, I should\nbe obliged to consider it merely as a subjective play of my\nimagination, and if in this I represented to myself anything as\nobjective, I must look upon it as a mere dream. Thus, the relation of\nphenomena (as possible perceptions), according to which that which\nhappens is, as to its existence, necessarily determined in time by\nsomething which antecedes, in conformity with a rule\u2014in other words,\nthe relation of cause and effect\u2014is the condition of the objective\nvalidity of our empirical judgements in regard to the sequence of\nperceptions, consequently of their empirical truth, and therefore of\nexperience. The principle of the relation of causality in the\nsuccession of phenomena is therefore valid for all objects of\nexperience, because it is itself the ground of the possibility of\nexperience.\n\nHere, however, a difficulty arises, which must be resolved. The\nprinciple of the connection of causality among phenomena is limited in\nour formula to the succession thereof, although in practice we find\nthat the principle applies also when the phenomena exist together in\nthe same time, and that cause and effect may be simultaneous. For\nexample, there is heat in a room, which does not exist in the open air.\nI look about for the cause, and find it to be the fire, Now the fire as\nthe cause is simultaneous with its effect, the heat of the room. In\nthis case, then, there is no succession as regards time, between cause\nand effect, but they are simultaneous; and still the law holds good.\nThe greater part of operating causes in nature are simultaneous with\ntheir effects, and the succession in time of the latter is produced\nonly because the cause cannot achieve the total of its effect in one\nmoment. But at the moment when the effect first arises, it is always\nsimultaneous with the causality of its cause, because, if the cause had\nbut a moment before ceased to be, the effect could not have arisen.\nHere it must be specially remembered that we must consider the order of\ntime and not the lapse thereof. The relation remains, even though no\ntime has elapsed. The time between the causality of the cause and its\nimmediate effect may entirely vanish, and the cause and effect be thus\nsimultaneous, but the relation of the one to the other remains always\ndeterminable according to time. If, for example, I consider a leaden\nball, which lies upon a cushion and makes a hollow in it, as a cause,\nthen it is simultaneous with the effect. But I distinguish the two\nthrough the relation of time of the dynamical connection of both. For\nif I lay the ball upon the cushion, then the hollow follows upon the\nbefore smooth surface; but supposing the cushion has, from some cause\nor another, a hollow, there does not thereupon follow a leaden ball.\n\nThus, the law of succession of time is in all instances the only\nempirical criterion of effect in relation to the causality of the\nantecedent cause. The glass is the cause of the rising of the water\nabove its horizontal surface, although the two phenomena are\ncontemporaneous. For, as soon as I draw some water with the glass from\na larger vessel, an effect follows thereupon, namely, the change of the\nhorizontal state which the water had in the large vessel into a\nconcave, which it assumes in the glass.\n\nThis conception of causality leads us to the conception of action; that\nof action, to the conception of force; and through it, to the\nconception of substance. As I do not wish this critical essay, the sole\npurpose of which is to treat of the sources of our synthetical\ncognition \u00e0 priori, to be crowded with analyses which merely explain,\nbut do not enlarge the sphere of our conceptions, I reserve the\ndetailed explanation of the above conceptions for a future system of\npure reason. Such an analysis, indeed, executed with great\nparticularity, may already be found in well-known works on this\nsubject. But I cannot at present refrain from making a few remarks on\nthe empirical criterion of a substance, in so far as it seems to be\nmore evident and more easily recognized through the conception of\naction than through that of the permanence of a phenomenon.\n\nWhere action (consequently activity and force) exists, substance also\nmust exist, and in it alone must be sought the seat of that fruitful\nsource of phenomena. Very well. But if we are called upon to explain\nwhat we mean by substance, and wish to avoid the vice of reasoning in a\ncircle, the answer is by no means so easy. How shall we conclude\nimmediately from the action to the permanence of that which acts, this\nbeing nevertheless an essential and peculiar criterion of substance\n(phenomenon)? But after what has been said above, the solution of this\nquestion becomes easy enough, although by the common mode of\nprocedure\u2014merely analysing our conceptions\u2014it would be quite\nimpossible. The conception of action indicates the relation of the\nsubject of causality to the effect. Now because all effect consists in\nthat which happens, therefore in the changeable, the last subject\nthereof is the permanent, as the substratum of all that changes, that\nis, substance. For according to the principle of causality, actions are\nalways the first ground of all change in phenomena and, consequently,\ncannot be a property of a subject which itself changes, because if this\nwere the case, other actions and another subject would be necessary to\ndetermine this change. From all this it results that action alone, as\nan empirical criterion, is a sufficient proof of the presence of\nsubstantiality, without any necessity on my part of endeavouring to\ndiscover the permanence of substance by a comparison. Besides, by this\nmode of induction we could not attain to the completeness which the\nmagnitude and strict universality of the conception requires. For that\nthe primary subject of the causality of all arising and passing away,\nall origin and extinction, cannot itself (in the sphere of phenomena)\narise and pass away, is a sound and safe conclusion, a conclusion which\nleads us to the conception of empirical necessity and permanence in\nexistence, and consequently to the conception of a substance as\nphenomenon.\n\nWhen something happens, the mere fact of the occurrence, without regard\nto that which occurs, is an object requiring investigation. The\ntransition from the non-being of a state into the existence of it,\nsupposing that this state contains no quality which previously existed\nin the phenomenon, is a fact of itself demanding inquiry. Such an\nevent, as has been shown in No. A, does not concern substance (for\nsubstance does not thus originate), but its condition or state. It is\ntherefore only change, and not origin from nothing. If this origin be\nregarded as the effect of a foreign cause, it is termed creation, which\ncannot be admitted as an event among phenomena, because the very\npossibility of it would annihilate the unity of experience. If,\nhowever, I regard all things not as phenomena, but as things in\nthemselves and objects of understanding alone, they, although\nsubstances, may be considered as dependent, in respect of their\nexistence, on a foreign cause. But this would require a very different\nmeaning in the words, a meaning which could not apply to phenomena as\nobjects of possible experience.\n\nHow a thing can be changed, how it is possible that upon one state\nexisting in one point of time, an opposite state should follow in\nanother point of time\u2014of this we have not the smallest conception \u00e0\npriori. There is requisite for this the knowledge of real powers, which\ncan only be given empirically; for example, knowledge of moving forces,\nor, in other words, of certain successive phenomena (as movements)\nwhich indicate the presence of such forces. But the form of every\nchange, the condition under which alone it can take place as the coming\ninto existence of another state (be the content of the change, that is,\nthe state which is changed, what it may), and consequently the\nsuccession of the states themselves can very well be considered \u00e0\npriori, in relation to the law of causality and the conditions of\ntime.[32]\n\n [32] It must be remarked that I do not speak of the change of certain\n relations, but of the change of the state. Thus, when a body moves in\n a uniform manner, it does not change its state (of motion); but only\n when all motion increases or decreases.\n\n\nWhen a substance passes from one state, a, into another state, b, the\npoint of time in which the latter exists is different from, and\nsubsequent to that in which the former existed. In like manner, the\nsecond state, as reality (in the phenomenon), differs from the first,\nin which the reality of the second did not exist, as b from zero. That\nis to say, if the state, b, differs from the state, a, only in respect\nto quantity, the change is a coming into existence of b -a, which in\nthe former state did not exist, and in relation to which that state is\n= O.\n\nNow the question arises how a thing passes from one state = a, into\nanother state = b. Between two moments there is always a certain time,\nand between two states existing in these moments there is always a\ndifference having a certain quantity (for all parts of phenomena are\nin their turn quantities). Consequently, every transition from one\nstate into another, is always effected in a time contained between\ntwo moments, of which the first determines the state which the thing\nleaves, and the second determines the state into which the thing\npasses. Both moments, then, are limitations of the time of a change,\nconsequently of the intermediate state between both, and as such they\nbelong to the total of the change. Now every change has a cause, which\nevidences its causality in the whole time during which the charge takes\nplace. The cause, therefore, does not produce the change all at once or\nin one moment, but in a time, so that, as the time gradually increases\nfrom the commencing instant, a, to its completion at b, in like manner\nalso, the quantity of the reality (b - a) is generated through the\nlesser degrees which are contained between the first and last. All\nchange is therefore possible only through a continuous action of the\ncausality, which, in so far as it is uniform, we call a momentum. The\nchange does not consist of these momenta, but is generated or produced\nby them as their effect.\n\nSuch is the law of the continuity of all change, the ground of which is\nthat neither time itself nor any phenomenon in time consists of parts\nwhich are the smallest possible, but that, notwithstanding, the state\nof a thing passes in the process of a change through all these parts,\nas elements, to its second state. There is no smallest degree of\nreality in a phenomenon, just as there is no smallest degree in the\nquantity of time; and so the new state of reality grows up out of the\nformer state, through all the infinite degrees thereof, the differences\nof which one from another, taken all together, are less than the\ndifference between 0 and a.\n\nIt is not our business to inquire here into the utility of this\nprinciple in the investigation of nature. But how such a proposition,\nwhich appears so greatly to extend our knowledge of nature, is possible\ncompletely \u00e0 priori, is indeed a question which deserves investigation,\nalthough the first view seems to demonstrate the truth and reality of\nthe principle, and the question, how it is possible, may be considered\nsuperfluous. For there are so many groundless pretensions to the\nenlargement of our knowledge by pure reason that we must take it as a\ngeneral rule to be mistrustful of all such, and without a thoroughgoing\nand radical deduction, to believe nothing of the sort even on the\nclearest dogmatical evidence.\n\nEvery addition to our empirical knowledge, and every advance made in\nthe exercise of our perception, is nothing more than an extension of\nthe determination of the internal sense, that is to say, a progression\nin time, be objects themselves what they may, phenomena, or pure\nintuitions. This progression in time determines everything, and is\nitself determined by nothing else. That is to say, the parts of the\nprogression exist only in time, and by means of the synthesis thereof,\nand are not given antecedently to it. For this reason, every transition\nin perception to anything which follows upon another in time, is a\ndetermination of time by means of the production of this perception.\nAnd as this determination of time is, always and in all its parts, a\nquantity, the perception produced is to be considered as a quantity\nwhich proceeds through all its degrees\u2014no one of which is the smallest\npossible\u2014from zero up to its determined degree. From this we perceive\nthe possibility of cognizing \u00e0 priori a law of changes\u2014a law, however,\nwhich concerns their form merely. We merely anticipate our own\napprehension, the formal condition of which, inasmuch as it is itself\nto be found in the mind antecedently to all given phenomena, must\ncertainly be capable of being cognized \u00e0 priori.\n\nThus, as time contains the sensuous condition \u00e0 priori of the\npossibility of a continuous progression of that which exists to that\nwhich follows it, the understanding, by virtue of the unity of\napperception, contains the condition \u00e0 priori of the possibility of a\ncontinuous determination of the position in time of all phenomena, and\nthis by means of the series of causes and effects, the former of which\nnecessitate the sequence of the latter, and thereby render universally\nand for all time, and by consequence, objectively, valid the empirical\ncognition of the relations of time.\n\nC. THIRD ANALOGY.\n\nPrinciple of Coexistence, According to the Law of Reciprocity or\nCommunity.\n\nAll substances, in so far as they can be perceived in space at the same\ntime, exist in a state of complete reciprocity of action.\n\nPROOF.\n\nThings are coexistent, when in empirical intuition the perception of\nthe one can follow upon the perception of the other, and vice\nversa\u2014which cannot occur in the succession of phenomena, as we have\nshown in the explanation of the second principle. Thus I can perceive\nthe moon and then the earth, or conversely, first the earth and then\nthe moon; and for the reason that my perceptions of these objects can\nreciprocally follow each other, I say, they exist contemporaneously.\nNow coexistence is the existence of the manifold in the same time. But\ntime itself is not an object of perception; and therefore we cannot\nconclude from the fact that things are placed in the same time, the\nother fact, that the perception of these things can follow each other\nreciprocally. The synthesis of the imagination in apprehension would\nonly present to us each of these perceptions as present in the subject\nwhen the other is not present, and contrariwise; but would not show\nthat the objects are coexistent, that is to say, that, if the one\nexists, the other also exists in the same time, and that this is\nnecessarily so, in order that the perceptions may be capable of\nfollowing each other reciprocally. It follows that a conception of the\nunderstanding or category of the reciprocal sequence of the\ndeterminations of phenomena (existing, as they do, apart from each\nother, and yet contemporaneously), is requisite to justify us in saying\nthat the reciprocal succession of perceptions has its foundation in the\nobject, and to enable us to represent coexistence as objective. But\nthat relation of substances in which the one contains determinations\nthe ground of which is in the other substance, is the relation of\ninfluence. And, when this influence is reciprocal, it is the relation\nof community or reciprocity. Consequently the coexistence of substances\nin space cannot be cognized in experience otherwise than under the\nprecondition of their reciprocal action. This is therefore the\ncondition of the possibility of things themselves as objects of\nexperience.\n\nThings are coexistent, in so far as they exist in one and the same\ntime. But how can we know that they exist in one and the same time?\nOnly by observing that the order in the synthesis of apprehension of\nthe manifold is arbitrary and a matter of indifference, that is to say,\nthat it can proceed from A, through B, C, D, to E, or contrariwise from\nE to A. For if they were successive in time (and in the order, let us\nsuppose, which begins with A), it is quite impossible for the\napprehension in perception to begin with E and go backwards to A,\ninasmuch as A belongs to past time and, therefore, cannot be an object\nof apprehension.\n\nLet us assume that in a number of substances considered as phenomena\neach is completely isolated, that is, that no one acts upon another.\nThen I say that the coexistence of these cannot be an object of\npossible perception and that the existence of one cannot, by any mode\nof empirical synthesis, lead us to the existence of another. For we\nimagine them in this case to be separated by a completely void space,\nand thus perception, which proceeds from the one to the other in time,\nwould indeed determine their existence by means of a following\nperception, but would be quite unable to distinguish whether the one\nphenomenon follows objectively upon the first, or is coexistent with\nit.\n\nBesides the mere fact of existence, then, there must be something by\nmeans of which A determines the position of B in time and, conversely,\nB the position of A; because only under this condition can substances\nbe empirically represented as existing contemporaneously. Now that\nalone determines the position of another thing in time which is the\ncause of it or of its determinations. Consequently every substance\n(inasmuch as it can have succession predicated of it only in respect of\nits determinations) must contain the causality of certain\ndeterminations in another substance, and at the same time the effects\nof the causality of the other in itself. That is to say, substances\nmust stand (mediately or immediately) in dynamical community with each\nother, if coexistence is to be cognized in any possible experience.\nBut, in regard to objects of experience, that is absolutely necessary\nwithout which the experience of these objects would itself be\nimpossible. Consequently it is absolutely necessary that all substances\nin the world of phenomena, in so far as they are coexistent, stand in a\nrelation of complete community of reciprocal action to each other.\n\nThe word community has in our language[33] two meanings, and contains\nthe two notions conveyed in the Latin communio and commercium. We\nemploy it in this place in the latter sense\u2014that of a dynamical\ncommunity, without which even the community of place (communio spatii)\ncould not be empirically cognized. In our experiences it is easy to\nobserve that it is only the continuous influences in all parts of space\nthat can conduct our senses from one object to another; that the light\nwhich plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies produces a\nmediating community between them and us, and thereby evidences their\ncoexistence with us; that we cannot empirically change our position\n(perceive this change), unless the existence of matter throughout the\nwhole of space rendered possible the perception of the positions we\noccupy; and that this perception can prove the contemporaneous\nexistence of these places only through their reciprocal influence, and\nthereby also the coexistence of even the most remote objects\u2014although\nin this case the proof is only mediate. Without community, every\nperception (of a phenomenon in space) is separated from every other and\nisolated, and the chain of empirical representations, that is, of\nexperience, must, with the appearance of a new object, begin entirely\nde novo, without the least connection with preceding representations,\nand without standing towards these even in the relation of time. My\nintention here is by no means to combat the notion of empty space; for\nit may exist where our perceptions cannot exist, inasmuch as they\ncannot reach thereto, and where, therefore, no empirical perception of\ncoexistence takes place. But in this case it is not an object of\npossible experience.\n\n [33] German\n\n\nThe following remarks may be useful in the way of explanation. In the\nmind, all phenomena, as contents of a possible experience, must exist\nin community (communio) of apperception or consciousness, and in so far\nas it is requisite that objects be represented as coexistent and\nconnected, in so far must they reciprocally determine the position in\ntime of each other and thereby constitute a whole. If this subjective\ncommunity is to rest upon an objective basis, or to be applied to\nsubstances as phenomena, the perception of one substance must render\npossible the perception of another, and conversely. For otherwise\nsuccession, which is always found in perceptions as apprehensions,\nwould be predicated of external objects, and their representation of\ntheir coexistence be thus impossible. But this is a reciprocal\ninfluence, that is to say, a real community (commercium) of substances,\nwithout which therefore the empirical relation of coexistence would be\na notion beyond the reach of our minds. By virtue of this commercium,\nphenomena, in so far as they are apart from, and nevertheless in\nconnection with each other, constitute a compositum reale. Such\ncomposita are possible in many different ways. The three dynamical\nrelations then, from which all others spring, are those of inherence,\nconsequence, and composition.\n\nThese, then, are the three analogies of experience. They are nothing\nmore than principles of the determination of the existence of phenomena\nin time, according to the three modi of this determination; to wit, the\nrelation to time itself as a quantity (the quantity of existence, that\nis, duration), the relation in time as a series or succession, finally,\nthe relation in time as the complex of all existence (simultaneity).\nThis unity of determination in regard to time is thoroughly dynamical;\nthat is to say, time is not considered as that in which experience\ndetermines immediately to every existence its position; for this is\nimpossible, inasmuch as absolute time is not an object of perception,\nby means of which phenomena can be connected with each other. On the\ncontrary, the rule of the understanding, through which alone the\nexistence of phenomena can receive synthetical unity as regards\nrelations of time, determines for every phenomenon its position in\ntime, and consequently \u00e0 priori, and with validity for all and every\ntime.\n\nBy nature, in the empirical sense of the word, we understand the\ntotality of phenomena connected, in respect of their existence,\naccording to necessary rules, that is, laws. There are therefore\ncertain laws (which are moreover \u00e0 priori) which make nature possible;\nand all empirical laws can exist only by means of experience, and by\nvirtue of those primitive laws through which experience itself becomes\npossible. The purpose of the analogies is therefore to represent to us\nthe unity of nature in the connection of all phenomena under certain\nexponents, the only business of which is to express the relation of\ntime (in so far as it contains all existence in itself) to the unity of\napperception, which can exist in synthesis only according to rules. The\ncombined expression of all is this: \u201cAll phenomena exist in one nature,\nand must so exist, inasmuch as without this \u00e0 priori unity, no unity of\nexperience, and consequently no determination of objects in experience,\nis possible.\u201d\n\nAs regards the mode of proof which we have employed in treating of\nthese transcendental laws of nature, and the peculiar character of\nit we must make one remark, which will at the same time be important\nas a guide in every other attempt to demonstrate the truth of\nintellectual and likewise synthetical propositions \u00e0 priori. Had we\nendeavoured to prove these analogies dogmatically, that is, from\nconceptions; that is to say, had we employed this method in attempting\nto show that everything which exists, exists only in that which is\npermanent\u2014that every thing or event presupposes the existence of\nsomething in a preceding state, upon which it follows in conformity\nwith a rule\u2014lastly, that in the manifold, which is coexistent, the\nstates coexist in connection with each other according to a rule, all\nour labour would have been utterly in vain. For mere conceptions of\nthings, analyse them as we may, cannot enable us to conclude from the\nexistence of one object to the existence of another. What other course\nwas left for us to pursue? This only, to demonstrate the possibility\nof experience as a cognition in which at last all objects must be\ncapable of being presented to us, if the representation of them is\nto possess any objective reality. Now in this third, this mediating\nterm, the essential form of which consists in the synthetical unity\nof the apperception of all phenomena, we found \u00e0 priori conditions\nof the universal and necessary determination as to time of all\nexistences in the world of phenomena, without which the empirical\ndetermination thereof as to time would itself be impossible, and we\nalso discovered rules of synthetical unity \u00e0 priori, by means of\nwhich we could anticipate experience. For want of this method, and\nfrom the fancy that it was possible to discover a dogmatical proof\nof the synthetical propositions which are requisite in the empirical\nemployment of the understanding, has it happened that a proof of the\nprinciple of sufficient reason has been so often attempted, and always\nin vain. The other two analogies nobody has ever thought of, although\nthey have always been silently employed by the mind,[34] because the\nguiding thread furnished by the categories was wanting, the guide which\nalone can enable us to discover every hiatus, both in the system of\nconceptions and of principles.\n\n [34] The unity of the universe, in which all phenomena to be\n connected, is evidently a mere consequence of the admitted principle\n of the community of all substances which are coexistent. For were\n substances isolated, they could not as parts constitute a whole, and\n were their connection (reciprocal action of the manifold) not\n necessary from the very fact of coexistence, we could not conclude\n from the fact of the latter as a merely ideal relation to the former\n as a real one. We have, however, shown in its place that community is\n the proper ground of the possibility of an empirical cognition of\n coexistence, and that we may therefore properly reason from the latter\n to the former as its condition.\n\n\n4. THE POSTULATES OF EMPIRICAL THOUGHT.\n\n1. That which agrees with the formal conditions (intuition and\nconception) of experience, is possible.\n\n2. That which coheres with the material conditions of experience\n(sensation), is real.\n\n3. That whose coherence with the real is determined according to\nuniversal conditions of experience is (exists) necessary.\n\nExplanation.\n\nThe categories of modality possess this peculiarity, that they do not\nin the least determine the object, or enlarge the conception to which\nthey are annexed as predicates, but only express its relation to the\nfaculty of cognition. Though my conception of a thing is in itself\ncomplete, I am still entitled to ask whether the object of it is merely\npossible, or whether it is also real, or, if the latter, whether it is\nalso necessary. But hereby the object itself is not more definitely\ndetermined in thought, but the question is only in what relation it,\nincluding all its determinations, stands to the understanding and its\nemployment in experience, to the empirical faculty of judgement, and to\nthe reason of its application to experience.\n\nFor this very reason, too, the categories of modality are nothing more\nthan explanations of the conceptions of possibility, reality, and\nnecessity, as employed in experience, and at the same time,\nrestrictions of all the categories to empirical use alone, not\nauthorizing the transcendental employment of them. For if they are to\nhave something more than a merely logical significance, and to be\nsomething more than a mere analytical expression of the form of\nthought, and to have a relation to things and their possibility,\nreality, or necessity, they must concern possible experience and its\nsynthetical unity, in which alone objects of cognition can be given.\n\nThe postulate of the possibility of things requires also, that the\nconception of the things agree with the formal conditions of our\nexperience in general. But this, that is to say, the objective form of\nexperience, contains all the kinds of synthesis which are requisite for\nthe cognition of objects. A conception which contains a synthesis must\nbe regarded as empty and, without reference to an object, if its\nsynthesis does not belong to experience\u2014either as borrowed from it, and\nin this case it is called an empirical conception, or such as is the\nground and \u00e0 priori condition of experience (its form), and in this\ncase it is a pure conception, a conception which nevertheless belongs\nto experience, inasmuch as its object can be found in this alone. For\nwhere shall we find the criterion or character of the possibility of an\nobject which is cogitated by means of an \u00e0 priori synthetical\nconception, if not in the synthesis which constitutes the form of\nempirical cognition of objects? That in such a conception no\ncontradiction exists is indeed a necessary logical condition, but very\nfar from being sufficient to establish the objective reality of the\nconception, that is, the possibility of such an object as is thought in\nthe conception. Thus, in the conception of a figure which is contained\nwithin two straight lines, there is no contradiction, for the\nconceptions of two straight lines and of their junction contain no\nnegation of a figure. The impossibility in such a case does not rest\nupon the conception in itself, but upon the construction of it in\nspace, that is to say, upon the conditions of space and its\ndeterminations. But these have themselves objective reality, that is,\nthey apply to possible things, because they contain \u00e0 priori the form\nof experience in general.\n\nAnd now we shall proceed to point out the extensive utility and\ninfluence of this postulate of possibility. When I represent to myself\na thing that is permanent, so that everything in it which changes\nbelongs merely to its state or condition, from such a conception alone\nI never can cognize that such a thing is possible. Or, if I represent\nto myself something which is so constituted that, when it is posited,\nsomething else follows always and infallibly, my thought contains no\nself-contradiction; but whether such a property as causality is to be\nfound in any possible thing, my thought alone affords no means of\njudging. Finally, I can represent to myself different things\n(substances) which are so constituted that the state or condition of\none causes a change in the state of the other, and reciprocally; but\nwhether such a relation is a property of things cannot be perceived\nfrom these conceptions, which contain a merely arbitrary synthesis.\nOnly from the fact, therefore, that these conceptions express \u00e0 priori\nthe relations of perceptions in every experience, do we know that they\npossess objective reality, that is, transcendental truth; and that\nindependent of experience, though not independent of all relation to\nform of an experience in general and its synthetical unity, in which\nalone objects can be empirically cognized.\n\nBut when we fashion to ourselves new conceptions of substances, forces,\naction, and reaction, from the material presented to us by perception,\nwithout following the example of experience in their connection, we\ncreate mere chimeras, of the possibility of which we cannot discover\nany criterion, because we have not taken experience for our\ninstructress, though we have borrowed the conceptions from her. Such\nfictitious conceptions derive their character of possibility not, like\nthe categories, \u00e0 priori, as conceptions on which all experience\ndepends, but only, \u00e0 posteriori, as conceptions given by means of\nexperience itself, and their possibility must either be cognized \u00e0\nposteriori and empirically, or it cannot be cognized at all. A\nsubstance which is permanently present in space, yet without filling it\n(like that tertium quid between matter and the thinking subject which\nsome have tried to introduce into metaphysics), or a peculiar\nfundamental power of the mind of intuiting the future by anticipation\n(instead of merely inferring from past and present events), or,\nfinally, a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought\nwith other men, however distant they may be\u2014these are conceptions the\npossibility of which has no ground to rest upon. For they are not based\nupon experience and its known laws; and, without experience, they are a\nmerely arbitrary conjunction of thoughts, which, though containing no\ninternal contradiction, has no claim to objective reality, neither,\nconsequently, to the possibility of such an object as is thought in\nthese conceptions. As far as concerns reality, it is self-evident that\nwe cannot cogitate such a possibility in concreto without the aid of\nexperience; because reality is concerned only with sensation, as the\nmatter of experience, and not with the form of thought, with which we\ncan no doubt indulge in shaping fancies.\n\nBut I pass by everything which derives its possibility from reality in\nexperience, and I purpose treating here merely of the possibility of\nthings by means of \u00e0 priori conceptions. I maintain, then, that the\npossibility of things is not derived from such conceptions per se, but\nonly when considered as formal and objective conditions of an\nexperience in general.\n\nIt seems, indeed, as if the possibility of a triangle could be cognized\nfrom the conception of it alone (which is certainly independent of\nexperience); for we can certainly give to the conception a\ncorresponding object completely \u00e0 priori, that is to say, we can\nconstruct it. But as a triangle is only the form of an object, it must\nremain a mere product of the imagination, and the possibility of the\nexistence of an object corresponding to it must remain doubtful, unless\nwe can discover some other ground, unless we know that the figure can\nbe cogitated under the conditions upon which all objects of experience\nrest. Now, the facts that space is a formal condition \u00e0 priori of\nexternal experience, that the formative synthesis, by which we\nconstruct a triangle in imagination, is the very same as that we employ\nin the apprehension of a phenomenon for the purpose of making an\nempirical conception of it, are what alone connect the notion of the\npossibility of such a thing, with the conception of it. In the same\nmanner, the possibility of continuous quantities, indeed of quantities\nin general, for the conceptions of them are without exception\nsynthetical, is never evident from the conceptions in themselves, but\nonly when they are considered as the formal conditions of the\ndetermination of objects in experience. And where, indeed, should we\nlook for objects to correspond to our conceptions, if not in\nexperience, by which alone objects are presented to us? It is, however,\ntrue that without antecedent experience we can cognize and characterize\nthe possibility of things, relatively to the formal conditions, under\nwhich something is determined in experience as an object, consequently,\ncompletely \u00e0 priori. But still this is possible only in relation to\nexperience and within its limits.\n\nThe postulate concerning the cognition of the reality of things\nrequires perception, consequently conscious sensation, not indeed\nimmediately, that is, of the object itself, whose existence is to be\ncognized, but still that the object have some connection with a real\nperception, in accordance with the analogies of experience, which\nexhibit all kinds of real connection in experience.\n\nFrom the mere conception of a thing it is impossible to conclude its\nexistence. For, let the conception be ever so complete, and containing\na statement of all the determinations of the thing, the existence of it\nhas nothing to do with all this, but only with the question whether\nsuch a thing is given, so that the perception of it can in every case\nprecede the conception. For the fact that the conception of it precedes\nthe perception, merely indicates the possibility of its existence; it\nis perception which presents matter to the conception, that is the sole\ncriterion of reality. Prior to the perception of the thing, however,\nand therefore comparatively \u00e0 priori, we are able to cognize its\nexistence, provided it stands in connection with some perceptions\naccording to the principles of the empirical conjunction of these, that\nis, in conformity with the analogies of perception. For, in this case,\nthe existence of the supposed thing is connected with our perception in\na possible experience, and we are able, with the guidance of these\nanalogies, to reason in the series of possible perceptions from a thing\nwhich we do really perceive to the thing we do not perceive. Thus, we\ncognize the existence of a magnetic matter penetrating all bodies from\nthe perception of the attraction of the steel-filings by the magnet,\nalthough the constitution of our organs renders an immediate perception\nof this matter impossible for us. For, according to the laws of\nsensibility and the connected context of our perceptions, we should in\nan experience come also on an immediate empirical intuition of this\nmatter, if our senses were more acute\u2014but this obtuseness has no\ninfluence upon and cannot alter the form of possible experience in\ngeneral. Our knowledge of the existence of things reaches as far as our\nperceptions, and what may be inferred from them according to empirical\nlaws, extend. If we do not set out from experience, or do not proceed\naccording to the laws of the empirical connection of phenomena, our\npretensions to discover the existence of a thing which we do not\nimmediately perceive are vain. Idealism, however, brings forward\npowerful objections to these rules for proving existence mediately.\nThis is, therefore, the proper place for its refutation.\n\nREFUTATION OF IDEALISM.\n\nIdealism\u2014I mean material idealism\u2014is the theory which declares the\nexistence of objects in space without us to be either () doubtful and\nindemonstrable, or (2) false and impossible. The first is the\nproblematical idealism of Descartes, who admits the undoubted certainty\nof only one empirical assertion (assertio), to wit, \u201cI am.\u201d The second\nis the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley, who maintains that space,\ntogether with all the objects of which it is the inseparable condition,\nis a thing which is in itself impossible, and that consequently the\nobjects in space are mere products of the imagination. The dogmatical\ntheory of idealism is unavoidable, if we regard space as a property of\nthings in themselves; for in that case it is, with all to which it\nserves as condition, a nonentity. But the foundation for this kind of\nidealism we have already destroyed in the transcendental \u00e6sthetic.\nProblematical idealism, which makes no such assertion, but only alleges\nour incapacity to prove the existence of anything besides ourselves by\nmeans of immediate experience, is a theory rational and evidencing a\nthorough and philosophical mode of thinking, for it observes the rule\nnot to form a decisive judgement before sufficient proof be shown. The\ndesired proof must therefore demonstrate that we have experience of\nexternal things, and not mere fancies. For this purpose, we must prove,\nthat our internal and, to Descartes, indubitable experience is itself\npossible only under the previous assumption of external experience.\n\nTHEOREM.\n\nThe simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence\nproves the existence of external objects in space.\n\nPROOF\n\nI am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All\ndetermination in regard to time presupposes the existence of something\npermanent in perception. But this permanent something cannot be\nsomething in me, for the very reason that my existence in time is\nitself determined by this permanent something. It follows that the\nperception of this permanent existence is possible only through a thing\nwithout me and not through the mere representation of a thing without\nme. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible\nonly through the existence of real things external to me. Now,\nconsciousness in time is necessarily connected with the consciousness\nof the possibility of this determination in time. Hence it follows that\nconsciousness in time is necessarily connected also with the existence\nof things without me, inasmuch as the existence of these things is the\ncondition of determination in time. That is to say, the consciousness\nof my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of\nthe existence of other things without me.\n\nRemark I. The reader will observe, that in the foregoing proof the game\nwhich idealism plays is retorted upon itself, and with more justice. It\nassumed that the only immediate experience is internal and that from\nthis we can only infer the existence of external things. But, as always\nhappens, when we reason from given effects to determined causes,\nidealism has reasoned with too much haste and uncertainty, for it is\nquite possible that the cause of our representations may lie in\nourselves, and that we ascribe it falsely to external things. But our\nproof shows that external experience is properly immediate,[35] that\nonly by virtue of it\u2014not, indeed, the consciousness of our own\nexistence, but certainly the determination of our existence in time,\nthat is, internal experience\u2014is possible. It is true, that the\nrepresentation \u201cI am,\u201d which is the expression of the consciousness\nwhich can accompany all my thoughts, is that which immediately includes\nthe existence of a subject. But in this representation we cannot find\nany knowledge of the subject, and therefore also no empirical\nknowledge, that is, experience. For experience contains, in addition to\nthe thought of something existing, intuition, and in this case it must\nbe internal intuition, that is, time, in relation to which the subject\nmust be determined. But the existence of external things is absolutely\nrequisite for this purpose, so that it follows that internal experience\nis itself possible only mediately and through external experience.\n\n [35] The immediate consciousness of the existence of external things\n is, in the preceding theorem, not presupposed, but proved, by the\n possibility of this consciousness understood by us or not. The\n question as to the possibility of it would stand thus: \u201cHave we an\n internal sense, but no external sense, and is our belief in external\n perception a mere delusion?\u201d But it is evident that, in order merely\n to fancy to ourselves anything as external, that is, to present it to\n the sense in intuition we must already possess an external sense, and\n must thereby distinguish immediately the mere receptivity of an\n external intuition from the spontaneity which characterizes every act\n of imagination. For merely to imagine also an external sense, would\n annihilate the faculty of intuition itself which is to be determined\n by the imagination.\n\n\nRemark II. Now with this view all empirical use of our faculty of\ncognition in the determination of time is in perfect accordance. Its\ntruth is supported by the fact that it is possible to perceive a\ndetermination of time only by means of a change in external relations\n(motion) to the permanent in space (for example, we become aware of the\nsun\u2019s motion by observing the changes of his relation to the objects of\nthis earth). But this is not all. We find that we possess nothing\npermanent that can correspond and be submitted to the conception of a\nsubstance as intuition, except matter. This idea of permanence is not\nitself derived from external experience, but is an \u00e0 priori necessary\ncondition of all determination of time, consequently also of the\ninternal sense in reference to our own existence, and that through the\nexistence of external things. In the representation \u201cI,\u201d the\nconsciousness of myself is not an intuition, but a merely intellectual\nrepresentation produced by the spontaneous activity of a thinking\nsubject. It follows, that this \u201ci\u201d has not any predicate of intuition,\nwhich, in its character of permanence, could serve as correlate to the\ndetermination of time in the internal sense\u2014in the same way as\nimpenetrability is the correlate of matter as an empirical intuition.\n\nRemark III. From the fact that the existence of external things is a\nnecessary condition of the possibility of a determined consciousness of\nourselves, it does not follow that every intuitive representation of\nexternal things involves the existence of these things, for their\nrepresentations may very well be the mere products of the imagination\n(in dreams as well as in madness); though, indeed, these are themselves\ncreated by the reproduction of previous external perceptions, which, as\nhas been shown, are possible only through the reality of external\nobjects. The sole aim of our remarks has, however, been to prove that\ninternal experience in general is possible only through external\nexperience in general. Whether this or that supposed experience be\npurely imaginary must be discovered from its particular determinations\nand by comparing these with the criteria of all real experience.\n\nFinally, as regards the third postulate, it applies to material\nnecessity in existence, and not to merely formal and logical necessity\nin the connection of conceptions. Now as we cannot cognize completely \u00e0\npriori the existence of any object of sense, though we can do so\ncomparatively \u00e0 priori, that is, relatively to some other previously\ngiven existence\u2014a cognition, however, which can only be of such an\nexistence as must be contained in the complex of experience, of which\nthe previously given perception is a part\u2014the necessity of existence\ncan never be cognized from conceptions, but always, on the contrary,\nfrom its connection with that which is an object of perception. But the\nonly existence cognized, under the condition of other given phenomena,\nas necessary, is the existence of effects from given causes in\nconformity with the laws of causality. It is consequently not the\nnecessity of the existence of things (as substances), but the necessity\nof the state of things that we cognize, and that not immediately, but\nby means of the existence of other states given in perception,\naccording to empirical laws of causality. Hence it follows that the\ncriterion of necessity is to be found only in the law of possible\nexperience\u2014that everything which happens is determined \u00e0 priori in the\nphenomenon by its cause. Thus we cognize only the necessity of effects\nin nature, the causes of which are given us. Moreover, the criterion of\nnecessity in existence possesses no application beyond the field of\npossible experience, and even in this it is not valid of the existence\nof things as substances, because these can never be considered as\nempirical effects, or as something that happens and has a beginning.\nNecessity, therefore, regards only the relations of phenomena according\nto the dynamical law of causality, and the possibility grounded\nthereon, of reasoning from some given existence (of a cause) \u00e0 priori\nto another existence (of an effect). \u201cEverything that happens is\nhypothetically necessary,\u201d is a principle which subjects the changes\nthat take place in the world to a law, that is, to a rule of necessary\nexistence, without which nature herself could not possibly exist. Hence\nthe proposition, \u201cNothing happens by blind chance (in mundo non datur\ncasus),\u201d is an \u00e0 priori law of nature. The case is the same with the\nproposition, \u201cNecessity in nature is not blind,\u201d that is, it is\nconditioned, consequently intelligible necessity (non datur fatum).\nBoth laws subject the play of change to \u201ca nature of things (as\nphenomena),\u201d or, which is the same thing, to the unity of the\nunderstanding, and through the understanding alone can changes belong\nto an experience, as the synthetical unity of phenomena. Both belong to\nthe class of dynamical principles. The former is properly a consequence\nof the principle of causality\u2014one of the analogies of experience. The\nlatter belongs to the principles of modality, which to the\ndetermination of causality adds the conception of necessity, which is\nitself, however, subject to a rule of the understanding. The principle\nof continuity forbids any leap in the series of phenomena regarded as\nchanges (in mundo non datur saltus); and likewise, in the complex of\nall empirical intuitions in space, any break or hiatus between two\nphenomena (non datur hiatus)\u2014for we can so express the principle, that\nexperience can admit nothing which proves the existence of a vacuum, or\nwhich even admits it as a part of an empirical synthesis. For, as\nregards a vacuum or void, which we may cogitate as out and beyond the\nfield of possible experience (the world), such a question cannot come\nbefore the tribunal of mere understanding, which decides only upon\nquestions that concern the employment of given phenomena for the\nconstruction of empirical cognition. It is rather a problem for ideal\nreason, which passes beyond the sphere of a possible experience and\naims at forming a judgement of that which surrounds and circumscribes\nit, and the proper place for the consideration of it is the\ntranscendental dialectic. These four propositions, \u201cIn mundo non datur\nhiatus, non datur saltus, non datur casus, non datur fatum,\u201d as well as\nall principles of transcendental origin, we could very easily exhibit\nin their proper order, that is, in conformity with the order of the\ncategories, and assign to each its proper place. But the already\npractised reader will do this for himself, or discover the clue to such\nan arrangement. But the combined result of all is simply this, to admit\ninto the empirical synthesis nothing which might cause a break in or be\nforeign to the understanding and the continuous connection of all\nphenomena, that is, the unity of the conceptions of the understanding.\nFor in the understanding alone is the unity of experience, in which all\nperceptions must have their assigned place, possible.\n\nWhether the field of possibility be greater than that of reality, and\nwhether the field of the latter be itself greater than that of\nnecessity, are interesting enough questions, and quite capable of\nsynthetic solution, questions, however, which come under the\njurisdiction of reason alone. For they are tantamount to asking whether\nall things as phenomena do without exception belong to the complex and\nconnected whole of a single experience, of which every given perception\nis a part which therefore cannot be conjoined with any other\nphenomena\u2014or, whether my perceptions can belong to more than one\npossible experience? The understanding gives to experience, according\nto the subjective and formal conditions, of sensibility as well as of\napperception, the rules which alone make this experience possible.\nOther forms of intuition besides those of space and time, other forms\nof understanding besides the discursive forms of thought, or of\ncognition by means of conceptions, we can neither imagine nor make\nintelligible to ourselves; and even if we could, they would still not\nbelong to experience, which is the only mode of cognition by which\nobjects are presented to us. Whether other perceptions besides those\nwhich belong to the total of our possible experience, and consequently\nwhether some other sphere of matter exists, the understanding has no\npower to decide, its proper occupation being with the synthesis of that\nwhich is given. Moreover, the poverty of the usual arguments which go\nto prove the existence of a vast sphere of possibility, of which all\nthat is real (every object of experience) is but a small part, is very\nremarkable. \u201cAll real is possible\u201d; from this follows naturally,\naccording to the logical laws of conversion, the particular\nproposition: \u201cSome possible is real.\u201d Now this seems to be equivalent\nto: \u201cMuch is possible that is not real.\u201d No doubt it does seem as if we\nought to consider the sum of the possible to be greater than that of\nthe real, from the fact that something must be added to the former to\nconstitute the latter. But this notion of adding to the possible is\nabsurd. For that which is not in the sum of the possible, and\nconsequently requires to be added to it, is manifestly impossible. In\naddition to accordance with the formal conditions of experience, the\nunderstanding requires a connection with some perception; but that\nwhich is connected with this perception is real, even although it is\nnot immediately perceived. But that another series of phenomena, in\ncomplete coherence with that which is given in perception, consequently\nmore than one all-embracing experience is possible, is an inference\nwhich cannot be concluded from the data given us by experience, and\nstill less without any data at all. That which is possible only under\nconditions which are themselves merely possible, is not possible in any\nrespect. And yet we can find no more certain ground on which to base\nthe discussion of the question whether the sphere of possibility is\nwider than that of experience.\n\nI have merely mentioned these questions, that in treating of the\nconception of the understanding, there might be no omission of anything\nthat, in the common opinion, belongs to them. In reality, however, the\nnotion of absolute possibility (possibility which is valid in every\nrespect) is not a mere conception of the understanding, which can be\nemployed empirically, but belongs to reason alone, which passes the\nbounds of all empirical use of the understanding. We have, therefore,\ncontented ourselves with a merely critical remark, leaving the subject\nto be explained in the sequel.\n\nBefore concluding this fourth section, and at the same time the system\nof all principles of the pure understanding, it seems proper to mention\nthe reasons which induced me to term the principles of modality\npostulates. This expression I do not here use in the sense which some\nmore recent philosophers, contrary to its meaning with mathematicians,\nto whom the word properly belongs, attach to it\u2014that of a proposition,\nnamely, immediately certain, requiring neither deduction nor proof. For\nif, in the case of synthetical propositions, however evident they may\nbe, we accord to them without deduction, and merely on the strength of\ntheir own pretensions, unqualified belief, all critique of the\nunderstanding is entirely lost; and, as there is no want of bold\npretensions, which the common belief (though for the philosopher this\nis no credential) does not reject, the understanding lies exposed to\nevery delusion and conceit, without the power of refusing its assent to\nthose assertions, which, though illegitimate, demand acceptance as\nveritable axioms. When, therefore, to the conception of a thing an \u00e0\npriori determination is synthetically added, such a proposition must\nobtain, if not a proof, at least a deduction of the legitimacy of its\nassertion.\n\nThe principles of modality are, however, not objectively synthetical,\nfor the predicates of possibility, reality, and necessity do not in the\nleast augment the conception of that of which they are affirmed,\ninasmuch as they contribute nothing to the representation of the\nobject. But as they are, nevertheless, always synthetical, they are so\nmerely subjectively. That is to say, they have a reflective power, and\napply to the conception of a thing, of which, in other respects, they\naffirm nothing, the faculty of cognition in which the conception\noriginates and has its seat. So that if the conception merely agree\nwith the formal conditions of experience, its object is called\npossible; if it is in connection with perception, and determined\nthereby, the object is real; if it is determined according to\nconceptions by means of the connection of perceptions, the object is\ncalled necessary. The principles of modality therefore predicate of a\nconception nothing more than the procedure of the faculty of cognition\nwhich generated it. Now a postulate in mathematics is a practical\nproposition which contains nothing but the synthesis by which we\npresent an object to ourselves, and produce the conception of it, for\nexample\u2014\u201cWith a given line, to describe a circle upon a plane, from a\ngiven point\u201d; and such a proposition does not admit of proof, because\nthe procedure, which it requires, is exactly that by which alone it is\npossible to generate the conception of such a figure. With the same\nright, accordingly, can we postulate the principles of modality,\nbecause they do not augment[36] the conception of a thing but merely\nindicate the manner in which it is connected with the faculty of\ncognition.\n\n [36] When I think the reality of a thing, I do really think more than\n the possibility, but not in the thing; for that can never contain more\n in reality than was contained in its complete possibility. But while\n the notion of possibility is merely the notion of a position of thing\n in relation to the understanding (its empirical use), reality is the\n conjunction of the thing with perception.\n\n\nGENERAL REMARK ON THE SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES.\n\nIt is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a\nthing from the category alone, but must always have an intuition, by\nwhich to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception of\nthe understanding. Take, for example, the categories of relation. How\n(1) a thing can exist only as a subject, and not as a mere\ndetermination of other things, that is, can be substance; or how (2),\nbecause something exists, some other thing must exist, consequently how\na thing can be a cause; or how (3), when several things exist, from the\nfact that one of these things exists, some consequence to the others\nfollows, and reciprocally, and in this way a community of substances\ncan be possible\u2014are questions whose solution cannot be obtained from\nmere conceptions. The very same is the case with the other categories;\nfor example, how a thing can be of the same sort with many others, that\nis, can be a quantity, and so on. So long as we have not intuition we\ncannot know whether we do really think an object by the categories, and\nwhere an object can anywhere be found to cohere with them, and thus the\ntruth is established, that the categories are not in themselves\ncognitions, but mere forms of thought for the construction of\ncognitions from given intuitions. For the same reason is it true that\nfrom categories alone no synthetical proposition can be made. For\nexample: \u201cIn every existence there is substance,\u201d that is, something\nthat can exist only as a subject and not as mere predicate; or,\n\u201cEverything is a quantity\u201d\u2014to construct propositions such as these, we\nrequire something to enable us to go out beyond the given conception\nand connect another with it. For the same reason the attempt to prove a\nsynthetical proposition by means of mere conceptions, for example:\n\u201cEverything that exists contingently has a cause,\u201d has never succeeded.\nWe could never get further than proving that, without this relation to\nconceptions, we could not conceive the existence of the contingent,\nthat is, could not \u00e0 priori through the understanding cognize the\nexistence of such a thing; but it does not hence follow that this is\nalso the condition of the possibility of the thing itself that is said\nto be contingent. If, accordingly; we look back to our proof of the\nprinciple of causality, we shall find that we were able to prove it as\nvalid only of objects of possible experience, and, indeed, only as\nitself the principle of the possibility of experience, Consequently of\nthe cognition of an object given in empirical intuition, and not from\nmere conceptions. That, however, the proposition: \u201cEverything that is\ncontingent must have a cause,\u201d is evident to every one merely from\nconceptions, is not to be denied. But in this case the conception of\nthe contingent is cogitated as involving not the category of modality\n(as that the non-existence of which can be conceived) but that of\nrelation (as that which can exist only as the consequence of something\nelse), and so it is really an identical proposition: \u201cThat which can\nexist only as a consequence, has a cause.\u201d In fact, when we have to\ngive examples of contingent existence, we always refer to changes, and\nnot merely to the possibility of conceiving the opposite.[37] But\nchange is an event, which, as such, is possible only through a cause,\nand considered per se its non-existence is therefore possible, and we\nbecome cognizant of its contingency from the fact that it can exist\nonly as the effect of a cause. Hence, if a thing is assumed to be\ncontingent, it is an analytical proposition to say, it has a cause.\n\n [37] We can easily conceive the non-existence of matter; but the\n ancients did not thence infer its contingency. But even the\n alternation of the existence and non-existence of a given state in a\n thing, in which all change consists, by no means proves the\n contingency of that state\u2014the ground of proof being the reality of its\n opposite. For example, a body is in a state of rest after motion, but\n we cannot infer the contingency of the motion from the fact that the\n former is the opposite of the latter. For this opposite is merely a\n logical and not a real opposite to the other. If we wish to\n demonstrate the contingency of the motion, what we ought to prove is\n that, instead of the motion which took place in the preceding point of\n time, it was possible for the body to have been then in rest, not,\n that it is afterwards in rest; for in this case, both opposites are\n perfectly consistent with each other.\n\n\nBut it is still more remarkable that, to understand the possibility of\nthings according to the categories and thus to demonstrate the\nobjective reality of the latter, we require not merely intuitions, but\nexternal intuitions. If, for example, we take the pure conceptions of\nrelation, we find that (1) for the purpose of presenting to the\nconception of substance something permanent in intuition corresponding\nthereto and thus of demonstrating the objective reality of this\nconception, we require an intuition (of matter) in space, because space\nalone is permanent and determines things as such, while time, and with\nit all that is in the internal sense, is in a state of continual flow;\n(2) in order to represent change as the intuition corresponding to the\nconception of causality, we require the representation of motion as\nchange in space; in fact, it is through it alone that changes, the\npossibility of which no pure understanding can perceive, are capable of\nbeing intuited. Change is the connection of determinations\ncontradictorily opposed to each other in the existence of one and the\nsame thing. Now, how it is possible that out of a given state one quite\nopposite to it in the same thing should follow, reason without an\nexample can not only not conceive, but cannot even make intelligible\nwithout intuition; and this intuition is the motion of a point in\nspace; the existence of which in different spaces (as a consequence of\nopposite determinations) alone makes the intuition of change possible.\nFor, in order to make even internal change cognitable, we require to\nrepresent time, as the form of the internal sense, figuratively by a\nline, and the internal change by the drawing of that line (motion), and\nconsequently are obliged to employ external intuition to be able to\nrepresent the successive existence of ourselves in different states.\nThe proper ground of this fact is that all change to be perceived as\nchange presupposes something permanent in intuition, while in the\ninternal sense no permanent intuition is to be found. Lastly, the\nobjective possibility of the category of community cannot be conceived\nby mere reason, and consequently its objective reality cannot be\ndemonstrated without an intuition, and that external in space. For how\ncan we conceive the possibility of community, that is, when several\nsubstances exist, that some effect on the existence of the one follows\nfrom the existence of the other, and reciprocally, and therefore that,\nbecause something exists in the latter, something else must exist in\nthe former, which could not be understood from its own existence alone?\nFor this is the very essence of community\u2014which is inconceivable as a\nproperty of things which are perfectly isolated. Hence, Leibnitz, in\nattributing to the substances of the world\u2014as cogitated by the\nunderstanding alone\u2014a community, required the mediating aid of a\ndivinity; for, from their existence, such a property seemed to him with\njustice inconceivable. But we can very easily conceive the possibility\nof community (of substances as phenomena) if we represent them to\nourselves as in space, consequently in external intuition. For external\nintuition contains in itself \u00e0 priori formal external relations, as the\nconditions of the possibility of the real relations of action and\nreaction, and therefore of the possibility of community. With the same\nease can it be demonstrated, that the possibility of things as\nquantities, and consequently the objective reality of the category of\nquantity, can be grounded only in external intuition, and that by its\nmeans alone is the notion of quantity appropriated by the internal\nsense. But I must avoid prolixity, and leave the task of illustrating\nthis by examples to the reader\u2019s own reflection.\n\nThe above remarks are of the greatest importance, not only for the\nconfirmation of our previous confutation of idealism, but still more\nwhen the subject of self-cognition by mere internal consciousness and\nthe determination of our own nature without the aid of external\nempirical intuitions is under discussion, for the indication of the\ngrounds of the possibility of such a cognition.\n\nThe result of the whole of this part of the analytic of principles is,\ntherefore: \u201cAll principles of the pure understanding are nothing more\nthan \u00e0 priori principles of the possibility of experience, and to\nexperience alone do all \u00e0 priori synthetical propositions apply and\nrelate\u201d; indeed, their possibility itself rests entirely on this\nrelation.\n\nChapter III Of the Ground of the Division of all Objects into Phenomena\nand Noumena\n\nWe have now not only traversed the region of the pure understanding and\ncarefully surveyed every part of it, but we have also measured it, and\nassigned to everything therein its proper place. But this land is an\nisland, and enclosed by nature herself within unchangeable limits. It\nis the land of truth (an attractive word), surrounded by a wide and\nstormy ocean, the region of illusion, where many a fog-bank, many an\niceberg, seems to the mariner, on his voyage of discovery, a new\ncountry, and, while constantly deluding him with vain hopes, engages\nhim in dangerous adventures, from which he never can desist, and which\nyet he never can bring to a termination. But before venturing upon this\nsea, in order to explore it in its whole extent, and to arrive at a\ncertainty whether anything is to be discovered there, it will not be\nwithout advantage if we cast our eyes upon the chart of the land that\nwe are about to leave, and to ask ourselves, firstly, whether we cannot\nrest perfectly contented with what it contains, or whether we must not\nof necessity be contented with it, if we can find nowhere else a solid\nfoundation to build upon; and, secondly, by what title we possess this\nland itself, and how we hold it secure against all hostile claims?\nAlthough, in the course of our analytic, we have already given\nsufficient answers to these questions, yet a summary recapitulation of\nthese solutions may be useful in strengthening our conviction, by\nuniting in one point the momenta of the arguments.\n\nWe have seen that everything which the understanding draws from itself,\nwithout borrowing from experience, it nevertheless possesses only for\nthe behoof and use of experience. The principles of the pure\nunderstanding, whether constitutive \u00e0 priori (as the mathematical\nprinciples), or merely regulative (as the dynamical), contain nothing\nbut the pure schema, as it were, of possible experience. For experience\npossesses its unity from the synthetical unity which the understanding,\noriginally and from itself, imparts to the synthesis of the imagination\nin relation to apperception, and in \u00e0 priori relation to and agreement\nwith which phenomena, as data for a possible cognition, must stand. But\nalthough these rules of the understanding are not only \u00e0 priori true,\nbut the very source of all truth, that is, of the accordance of our\ncognition with objects, and on this ground, that they contain the basis\nof the possibility of experience, as the ensemble of all cognition, it\nseems to us not enough to propound what is true\u2014we desire also to be\ntold what we want to know. If, then, we learn nothing more by this\ncritical examination than what we should have practised in the merely\nempirical use of the understanding, without any such subtle inquiry,\nthe presumption is that the advantage we reap from it is not worth the\nlabour bestowed upon it. It may certainly be answered that no rash\ncuriosity is more prejudicial to the enlargement of our knowledge than\nthat which must know beforehand the utility of this or that piece of\ninformation which we seek, before we have entered on the needful\ninvestigations, and before one could form the least conception of its\nutility, even though it were placed before our eyes. But there is one\nadvantage in such transcendental inquiries which can be made\ncomprehensible to the dullest and most reluctant learner\u2014this, namely,\nthat the understanding which is occupied merely with empirical\nexercise, and does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition, may\nexercise its functions very well and very successfully, but is quite\nunable to do one thing, and that of very great importance, to\ndetermine, namely, the bounds that limit its employment, and to know\nwhat lies within or without its own sphere. This purpose can be\nobtained only by such profound investigations as we have instituted.\nBut if it cannot distinguish whether certain questions lie within its\nhorizon or not, it can never be sure either as to its claims or\npossessions, but must lay its account with many humiliating\ncorrections, when it transgresses, as it unavoidably will, the limits\nof its own territory, and loses itself in fanciful opinions and\nblinding illusions.\n\nThat the understanding, therefore, cannot make of its \u00e0 priori\nprinciples, or even of its conceptions, other than an empirical use, is\na proposition which leads to the most important results. A\ntranscendental use is made of a conception in a fundamental proposition\nor principle, when it is referred to things in general and considered\nas things in themselves; an empirical use, when it is referred merely\nto phenomena, that is, to objects of a possible experience. That the\nlatter use of a conception is the only admissible one is evident from\nthe reasons following. For every conception are requisite, firstly, the\nlogical form of a conception (of thought) general; and, secondly, the\npossibility of presenting to this an object to which it may apply.\nFailing this latter, it has no sense, and utterly void of content,\nalthough it may contain the logical function for constructing a\nconception from certain data. Now, object cannot be given to a\nconception otherwise than by intuition, and, even if a pure intuition\nantecedent to the object is \u00e0 priori possible, this pure intuition can\nitself obtain objective validity only from empirical intuition, of\nwhich it is itself but the form. All conceptions, therefore, and with\nthem all principles, however high the degree of their \u00e0 priori\npossibility, relate to empirical intuitions, that is, to data towards a\npossible experience. Without this they possess no objective validity,\nbut are mere play of imagination or of understanding with images or\nnotions. Let us take, for example, the conceptions of mathematics, and\nfirst in its pure intuitions. \u201cSpace has three dimensions\u201d\u2014\u201cBetween two\npoints there can be only one straight line,\u201d etc. Although all these\nprinciples, and the representation of the object with which this\nscience occupies itself, are generated in the mind entirely \u00e0 priori,\nthey would nevertheless have no significance if we were not always able\nto exhibit their significance in and by means of phenomena (empirical\nobjects). Hence it is requisite that an abstract conception be made\nsensuous, that is, that an object corresponding to it in intuition be\nforthcoming, otherwise the conception remains, as we say, without\nsense, that is, without meaning. Mathematics fulfils this requirement\nby the construction of the figure, which is a phenomenon evident to the\nsenses. The same science finds support and significance in number; this\nin its turn finds it in the fingers, or in counters, or in lines and\npoints. The conception itself is always produced \u00e0 priori, together\nwith the synthetical principles or formulas from such conceptions; but\nthe proper employment of them, and their application to objects, can\nexist nowhere but in experience, the possibility of which, as regards\nits form, they contain \u00e0 priori.\n\nThat this is also the case with all of the categories and the\nprinciples based upon them is evident from the fact that we cannot\nrender intelligible the possibility of an object corresponding to them\nwithout having recourse to the conditions of sensibility, consequently,\nto the form of phenomena, to which, as their only proper objects, their\nuse must therefore be confined, inasmuch as, if this condition is\nremoved, all significance, that is, all relation to an object,\ndisappears, and no example can be found to make it comprehensible what\nsort of things we ought to think under such conceptions.\n\nThe conception of quantity cannot be explained except by saying that it\nis the determination of a thing whereby it can be cogitated how many\ntimes one is placed in it. But this \u201chow many times\u201d is based upon\nsuccessive repetition, consequently upon time and the synthesis of the\nhomogeneous therein. Reality, in contradistinction to negation, can be\nexplained only by cogitating a time which is either filled therewith or\nis void. If I leave out the notion of permanence (which is existence in\nall time), there remains in the conception of substance nothing but the\nlogical notion of subject, a notion of which I endeavour to realize by\nrepresenting to myself something that can exist only as a subject. But\nnot only am I perfectly ignorant of any conditions under which this\nlogical prerogative can belong to a thing, I can make nothing out of\nthe notion, and draw no inference from it, because no object to which\nto apply the conception is determined, and we consequently do not know\nwhether it has any meaning at all. In like manner, if I leave out the\nnotion of time, in which something follows upon some other thing in\nconformity with a rule, I can find nothing in the pure category, except\nthat there is a something of such a sort that from it a conclusion may\nbe drawn as to the existence of some other thing. But in this case it\nwould not only be impossible to distinguish between a cause and an\neffect, but, as this power to draw conclusions requires conditions of\nwhich I am quite ignorant, the conception is not determined as to the\nmode in which it ought to apply to an object. The so-called principle:\n\u201cEverything that is contingent has a cause,\u201d comes with a gravity and\nself-assumed authority that seems to require no support from without.\nBut, I ask, what is meant by contingent? The answer is that the\nnon-existence of which is possible. But I should like very well to know\nby what means this possibility of non-existence is to be cognized, if\nwe do not represent to ourselves a succession in the series of\nphenomena, and in this succession an existence which follows a\nnon-existence, or conversely, consequently, change. For to say, that\nthe non-existence of a thing is not self-contradictory is a lame appeal\nto a logical condition, which is no doubt a necessary condition of the\nexistence of the conception, but is far from being sufficient for the\nreal objective possibility of non-existence. I can annihilate in\nthought every existing substance without self-contradiction, but I\ncannot infer from this their objective contingency in existence, that\nis to say, the possibility of their non-existence in itself. As regards\nthe category of community, it may easily be inferred that, as the pure\ncategories of substance and causality are incapable of a definition and\nexplanation sufficient to determine their object without the aid of\nintuition, the category of reciprocal causality in the relation of\nsubstances to each other (commercium) is just as little susceptible\nthereof. Possibility, existence, and necessity nobody has ever yet been\nable to explain without being guilty of manifest tautology, when the\ndefinition has been drawn entirely from the pure understanding. For the\nsubstitution of the logical possibility of the conception\u2014the condition\nof which is that it be not self-contradictory, for the transcendental\npossibility of things\u2014the condition of which is that there be an object\ncorresponding to the conception, is a trick which can only deceive the\ninexperienced.[38]\n\n [38] In one word, to none of these conceptions belongs a corresponding\n object, and consequently their real possibility cannot be\n demonstrated, if we take away sensuous intuition\u2014the only intuition\n which we possess\u2014and there then remains nothing but the logical\n possibility, that is, the fact that the conception or thought is\n possible\u2014which, however, is not the question; what we want to know\n being, whether it relates to an object and thus possesses any meaning.\n\n\nIt follows incontestably, that the pure conceptions of the\nunderstanding are incapable of transcendental, and must always be of\nempirical use alone, and that the principles of the pure understanding\nrelate only to the general conditions of a possible experience, to\nobjects of the senses, and never to things in general, apart from the\nmode in which we intuite them.\n\nTranscendental analytic has accordingly this important result, to wit,\nthat the understanding is competent effect nothing \u00e0 priori, except the\nanticipation of the form of a possible experience in general, and that,\nas that which is not phenomenon cannot be an object of experience, it\ncan never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone\nobjects are presented to us. Its principles are merely principles of\nthe exposition of phenomena, and the proud name of an ontology, which\nprofesses to present synthetical cognitions \u00e0 priori of things in\ngeneral in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title\nof analytic of the pure understanding.\n\nThought is the act of referring a given intuition to an object. If the\nmode of this intuition is unknown to us, the object is merely\ntranscendental, and the conception of the understanding is employed\nonly transcendentally, that is, to produce unity in the thought of a\nmanifold in general. Now a pure category, in which all conditions of\nsensuous intuition\u2014as the only intuition we possess\u2014are abstracted,\ndoes not determine an object, but merely expresses the thought of an\nobject in general, according to different modes. Now, to employ a\nconception, the function of judgement is required, by which an object\nis subsumed under the conception, consequently the at least formal\ncondition, under which something can be given in intuition. Failing\nthis condition of judgement (schema), subsumption is impossible; for\nthere is in such a case nothing given, which may be subsumed under the\nconception. The merely transcendental use of the categories is\ntherefore, in fact, no use at all and has no determined, or even, as\nregards its form, determinable object. Hence it follows that the pure\ncategory is incompetent to establish a synthetical \u00e0 priori principle,\nand that the principles of the pure understanding are only of empirical\nand never of transcendental use, and that beyond the sphere of possible\nexperience no synthetical \u00e0 priori principles are possible.\n\nIt may be advisable, therefore, to express ourselves thus. The pure\ncategories, apart from the formal conditions of sensibility, have a\nmerely transcendental meaning, but are nevertheless not of\ntranscendental use, because this is in itself impossible, inasmuch as\nall the conditions of any employment or use of them (in judgements) are\nabsent, to wit, the formal conditions of the subsumption of an object\nunder these conceptions. As, therefore, in the character of pure\ncategories, they must be employed empirically, and cannot be employed\ntranscendentally, they are of no use at all, when separated from\nsensibility, that is, they cannot be applied to an object. They are\nmerely the pure form of the employment of the understanding in respect\nof objects in general and of thought, without its being at the same\ntime possible to think or to determine any object by their means. But\nthere lurks at the foundation of this subject an illusion which it is\nvery difficult to avoid. The categories are not based, as regards their\norigin, upon sensibility, like the forms of intuition, space, and time;\nthey seem, therefore, to be capable of an application beyond the sphere\nof sensuous objects. But this is not the case. They are nothing but\nmere forms of thought, which contain only the logical faculty of\nuniting \u00e0 priori in consciousness the manifold given in intuition.\nApart, then, from the only intuition possible for us, they have still\nless meaning than the pure sensuous forms, space and time, for through\nthem an object is at least given, while a mode of connection of the\nmanifold, when the intuition which alone gives the manifold is wanting,\nhas no meaning at all. At the same time, when we designate certain\nobjects as phenomena or sensuous existences, thus distinguishing our\nmode of intuiting them from their own nature as things in themselves,\nit is evident that by this very distinction we as it were place the\nlatter, considered in this their own nature, although we do not so\nintuite them, in opposition to the former, or, on the other hand, we do\nso place other possible things, which are not objects of our senses,\nbut are cogitated by the understanding alone, and call them\nintelligible existences (noumena). Now the question arises whether the\npure conceptions of our understanding do possess significance in\nrespect of these latter, and may possibly be a mode of cognizing them.\n\nBut we are met at the very commencement with an ambiguity, which may\neasily occasion great misapprehension. The understanding, when it terms\nan object in a certain relation phenomenon, at the same time forms out\nof this relation a representation or notion of an object in itself, and\nhence believes that it can form also conceptions of such objects. Now\nas the understanding possesses no other fundamental conceptions besides\nthe categories, it takes for granted that an object considered as a\nthing in itself must be capable of being thought by means of these pure\nconceptions, and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined\nconception of an intelligible existence, a something out of the sphere\nof our sensibility, for a determinate conception of an existence which\nwe can cognize in some way or other by means of the understanding.\n\nIf, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is not an\nobject of our sensuous intuition, thus making abstraction of our mode\nof intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the word.\nBut if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we in\nthis case assume a peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual\nintuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very\npossibility of which we have no notion\u2014and this is a noumenon in the\npositive sense.\n\nThe doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena in the\nnegative sense, that is, of things which the understanding is obliged\nto cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition,\nconsequently not as mere phenomena, but as things in themselves. But\nthe understanding at the same time comprehends that it cannot employ\nits categories for the consideration of things in themselves, because\nthese possess significance only in relation to the unity of intuitions\nin space and time, and that they are competent to determine this unity\nby means of general \u00e0 priori connecting conceptions only on account of\nthe pure ideality of space and time. Where this unity of time is not to\nbe met with, as is the case with noumena, the whole use, indeed the\nwhole meaning of the categories is entirely lost, for even the\npossibility of things to correspond to the categories is in this case\nincomprehensible. On this point, I need only refer the reader to what I\nhave said at the commencement of the General Remark appended to the\nforegoing chapter. Now, the possibility of a thing can never be proved\nfrom the fact that the conception of it is not self-contradictory, but\nonly by means of an intuition corresponding to the conception. If,\ntherefore, we wish to apply the categories to objects which cannot be\nregarded as phenomena, we must have an intuition different from the\nsensuous, and in this case the objects would be a noumena in the\npositive sense of the word. Now, as such an intuition, that is, an\nintellectual intuition, is no part of our faculty of cognition, it is\nabsolutely impossible for the categories to possess any application\nbeyond the limits of experience. It may be true that there are\nintelligible existences to which our faculty of sensuous intuition has\nno relation, and cannot be applied, but our conceptions of the\nunderstanding, as mere forms of thought for our sensuous intuition, do\nnot extend to these. What, therefore, we call noumenon must be\nunderstood by us as such in a negative sense.\n\nIf I take away from an empirical intuition all thought (by means of the\ncategories), there remains no cognition of any object; for by means of\nmere intuition nothing is cogitated, and, from the existence of such or\nsuch an affection of sensibility in me, it does not follow that this\naffection or representation has any relation to an object without me.\nBut if I take away all intuition, there still remains the form of\nthought, that is, the mode of determining an object for the manifold of\na possible intuition. Thus the categories do in some measure really\nextend further than sensuous intuition, inasmuch as they think objects\nin general, without regard to the mode (of sensibility) in which these\nobjects are given. But they do not for this reason apply to and\ndetermine a wider sphere of objects, because we cannot assume that such\ncan be given, without presupposing the possibility of another than the\nsensuous mode of intuition, a supposition we are not justified in\nmaking.\n\nI call a conception problematical which contains in itself no\ncontradiction, and which is connected with other cognitions as a\nlimitation of given conceptions, but whose objective reality cannot be\ncognized in any manner. The conception of a noumenon, that is, of a\nthing which must be cogitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing\nin itself (solely through the pure understanding), is not\nself-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that\nsensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this\nconception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the\nbounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of\nsensuous cognition; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its\nprovince, are called noumena for the very purpose of indicating that\nthis cognition does not extend its application to all that the\nunderstanding thinks. But, after all, the possibility of such noumena\nis quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phenomena, all is\nfor us a mere void; that is to say, we possess an understanding whose\nprovince does problematically extend beyond this sphere, but we do not\npossess an intuition, indeed, not even the conception of a possible\nintuition, by means of which objects beyond the region of sensibility\ncould be given us, and in reference to which the understanding might be\nemployed assertorically. The conception of a noumenon is therefore\nmerely a limitative conception and therefore only of negative use. But\nit is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion, but is connected with the\nlimitation of sensibility, without, however, being capable of\npresenting us with any positive datum beyond this sphere.\n\nThe division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world\ninto a mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis is therefore quite\ninadmissible in a positive sense, although conceptions do certainly\nadmit of such a division; for the class of noumena have no determinate\nobject corresponding to them, and cannot therefore possess objective\nvalidity. If we abandon the senses, how can it be made conceivable that\nthe categories (which are the only conceptions that could serve as\nconceptions for noumena) have any sense or meaning at all, inasmuch as\nsomething more than the mere unity of thought, namely, a possible\nintuition, is requisite for their application to an object? The\nconception of a noumenon, considered as merely problematical, is,\nhowever, not only admissible, but, as a limitative conception of\nsensibility, absolutely necessary. But, in this case, a noumenon is not\na particular intelligible object for our understanding; on the\ncontrary, the kind of understanding to which it could belong is itself\na problem, for we cannot form the most distant conception of the\npossibility of an understanding which should cognize an object, not\ndiscursively by means of categories, but intuitively in a non-sensuous\nintuition. Our understanding attains in this way a sort of negative\nextension. That is to say, it is not limited by, but rather limits,\nsensibility, by giving the name of noumena to things, not considered as\nphenomena, but as things in themselves. But it at the same time\nprescribes limits to itself, for it confesses itself unable to cognize\nthese by means of the categories, and hence is compelled to cogitate\nthem merely as an unknown something.\n\nI find, however, in the writings of modern authors, an entirely\ndifferent use of the expressions, mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis,\nwhich quite departs from the meaning of the ancients\u2014an acceptation in\nwhich, indeed, there is to be found no difficulty, but which at the\nsame time depends on mere verbal quibbling. According to this meaning,\nsome have chosen to call the complex of phenomena, in so far as it is\nintuited, mundus sensibilis, but in so far as the connection thereof is\ncogitated according to general laws of thought, mundus intelligibilis.\nAstronomy, in so far as we mean by the word the mere observation of the\nstarry heaven, may represent the former; a system of astronomy, such as\nthe Copernican or Newtonian, the latter. But such twisting of words is\na mere sophistical subterfuge, to avoid a difficult question, by\nmodifying its meaning to suit our own convenience. To be sure,\nunderstanding and reason are employed in the cognition of phenomena;\nbut the question is, whether these can be applied when the object is\nnot a phenomenon and in this sense we regard it if it is cogitated as\ngiven to the understanding alone, and not to the senses. The question\ntherefore is whether, over and above the empirical use of the\nunderstanding, a transcendental use is possible, which applies to the\nnoumenon as an object. This question we have answered in the negative.\n\nWhen therefore we say, the senses represent objects as they appear, the\nunderstanding as they are, the latter statement must not be understood\nin a transcendental, but only in an empirical signification, that is,\nas they must be represented in the complete connection of phenomena,\nand not according to what they may be, apart from their relation to\npossible experience, consequently not as objects of the pure\nunderstanding. For this must ever remain unknown to us. Nay, it is also\nquite unknown to us whether any such transcendental or extraordinary\ncognition is possible under any circumstances, at least, whether it is\npossible by means of our categories. Understanding and sensibility,\nwith us, can determine objects only in conjunction. If we separate\nthem, we have intuitions without conceptions, or conceptions without\nintuitions; in both cases, representations, which we cannot apply to\nany determinate object.\n\nIf, after all our inquiries and explanations, any one still hesitates\nto abandon the mere transcendental use of the categories, let him\nattempt to construct with them a synthetical proposition. It would, of\ncourse, be unnecessary for this purpose to construct an analytical\nproposition, for that does not extend the sphere of the understanding,\nbut, being concerned only about what is cogitated in the conception\nitself, it leaves it quite undecided whether the conception has any\nrelation to objects, or merely indicates the unity of thought\u2014complete\nabstraction being made of the modi in which an object may be given: in\nsuch a proposition, it is sufficient for the understanding to know what\nlies in the conception\u2014to what it applies is to it indifferent. The\nattempt must therefore be made with a synthetical and so-called\ntranscendental principle, for example: \u201cEverything that exists, exists\nas substance,\u201d or, \u201cEverything that is contingent exists as an effect\nof some other thing, viz., of its cause.\u201d Now I ask, whence can the\nunderstanding draw these synthetical propositions, when the conceptions\ncontained therein do not relate to possible experience but to things in\nthemselves (noumena)? Where is to be found the third term, which is\nalways requisite PURE site in a synthetical proposition, which may\nconnect in the same proposition conceptions which have no logical\n(analytical) connection with each other? The proposition never will be\ndemonstrated, nay, more, the possibility of any such pure assertion\nnever can be shown, without making reference to the empirical use of\nthe understanding, and thus, ipso facto, completely renouncing pure and\nnon-sensuous judgement. Thus the conception of pure and merely\nintelligible objects is completely void of all principles of its\napplication, because we cannot imagine any mode in which they might be\ngiven, and the problematical thought which leaves a place open for them\nserves only, like a void space, to limit the use of empirical\nprinciples, without containing at the same time any other object of\ncognition beyond their sphere.\n\nAPPENDIX\n\nOf the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection\nfrom the Confusion of the Transcendental with the Empirical use of the\nUnderstanding.\n\nReflection (reflexio) is not occupied about objects themselves, for the\npurpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them, but is that state of\nthe mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective\nconditions under which we obtain conceptions. It is the consciousness\nof the relation of given representations to the different sources or\nfaculties of cognition, by which alone their relation to each other can\nbe rightly determined. The first question which occurs in considering\nour representations is to what faculty of cognition do they belong? To\nthe understanding or to the senses? Many judgements are admitted to be\ntrue from mere habit or inclination; but, because reflection neither\nprecedes nor follows, it is held to be a judgement that has its origin\nin the understanding. All judgements do not require examination, that\nis, investigation into the grounds of their truth. For, when they are\nimmediately certain (for example: \u201cBetween two points there can be only\none straight line\u201d), no better or less mediate test of their truth can\nbe found than that which they themselves contain and express. But all\njudgement, nay, all comparisons require reflection, that is, a\ndistinction of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions\nbelong. The act whereby I compare my representations with the faculty\nof cognition which originates them, and whereby I distinguish whether\nthey are compared with each other as belonging to the pure\nunderstanding or to sensuous intuition, I term transcendental\nreflection. Now, the relations in which conceptions can stand to each\nother are those of identity and difference, agreement and opposition,\nof the internal and external, finally, of the determinable and the\ndetermining (matter and form). The proper determination of these\nrelations rests on the question, to what faculty of cognition they\nsubjectively belong, whether to sensibility or understanding? For, on\nthe manner in which we solve this question depends the manner in which\nwe must cogitate these relations.\n\nBefore constructing any objective judgement, we compare the conceptions\nthat are to be placed in the judgement, and observe whether there\nexists identity (of many representations in one conception), if a\ngeneral judgement is to be constructed, or difference, if a particular;\nwhether there is agreement when affirmative; and opposition when\nnegative judgements are to be constructed, and so on. For this reason\nwe ought to call these conceptions, conceptions of comparison\n(conceptus comparationis). But as, when the question is not as to the\nlogical form, but as to the content of conceptions, that is to say,\nwhether the things themselves are identical or different, in agreement\nor opposition, and so on, the things can have a twofold relation to our\nfaculty of cognition, to wit, a relation either to sensibility or to\nthe understanding, and as on this relation depends their relation to\neach other, transcendental reflection, that is, the relation of given\nrepresentations to one or the other faculty of cognition, can alone\ndetermine this latter relation. Thus we shall not be able to discover\nwhether the things are identical or different, in agreement or\nopposition, etc., from the mere conception of the things by means of\ncomparison (comparatio), but only by distinguishing the mode of\ncognition to which they belong, in other words, by means of\ntranscendental reflection. We may, therefore, with justice say, that\nlogical reflection is mere comparison, for in it no account is taken of\nthe faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong, and\nthey are consequently, as far as regards their origin, to be treated as\nhomogeneous; while transcendental reflection (which applies to the\nobjects themselves) contains the ground of the possibility of objective\ncomparison of representations with each other, and is therefore very\ndifferent from the former, because the faculties of cognition to which\nthey belong are not even the same. Transcendental reflection is a duty\nwhich no one can neglect who wishes to establish an \u00e0 priori judgement\nupon things. We shall now proceed to fulfil this duty, and thereby\nthrow not a little light on the question as to the determination of the\nproper business of the understanding.\n\n1. Identity and Difference. When an object is presented to us several\ntimes, but always with the same internal determinations (qualitas et\nquantitas), it, if an object of pure understanding, is always the same,\nnot several things, but only one thing (numerica identitas); but if a\nphenomenon, we do not concern ourselves with comparing the conception\nof the thing with the conception of some other, but, although they may\nbe in this respect perfectly the same, the difference of place at the\nsame time is a sufficient ground for asserting the numerical difference\nof these objects (of sense). Thus, in the case of two drops of water,\nwe may make complete abstraction of all internal difference (quality\nand quantity), and, the fact that they are intuited at the same time in\ndifferent places, is sufficient to justify us in holding them to be\nnumerically different. Leibnitz regarded phenomena as things in\nthemselves, consequently as intelligibilia, that is, objects of pure\nunderstanding (although, on account of the confused nature of their\nrepresentations, he gave them the name of phenomena), and in this case\nhis principle of the indiscernible (principium identatis\nindiscernibilium) is not to be impugned. But, as phenomena are objects\nof sensibility, and, as the understanding, in respect of them, must be\nemployed empirically and not purely or transcendentally, plurality and\nnumerical difference are given by space itself as the condition of\nexternal phenomena. For one part of space, although it may be perfectly\nsimilar and equal to another part, is still without it, and for this\nreason alone is different from the latter, which is added to it in\norder to make up a greater space. It follows that this must hold good\nof all things that are in the different parts of space at the same\ntime, however similar and equal one may be to another.\n\n2. Agreement and Opposition. When reality is represented by the pure\nunderstanding (realitas noumenon), opposition between realities is\nincogitable\u2014such a relation, that is, that when these realities are\nconnected in one subject, they annihilate the effects of each other and\nmay be represented in the formula 3 -3 = 0. On the other hand, the real\nin a phenomenon (realitas phaenomenon) may very well be in mutual\nopposition, and, when united in the same subject, the one may\ncompletely or in part annihilate the effect or consequence of the\nother; as in the case of two moving forces in the same straight line\ndrawing or impelling a point in opposite directions, or in the case of\na pleasure counterbalancing a certain amount of pain.\n\n3. The Internal and External. In an object of the pure understanding,\nonly that is internal which has no relation (as regards its existence)\nto anything different from itself. On the other hand, the internal\ndeterminations of a substantia phaenomenon in space are nothing but\nrelations, and it is itself nothing more than a complex of mere\nrelations. Substance in space we are cognizant of only through forces\noperative in it, either drawing others towards itself (attraction), or\npreventing others from forcing into itself (repulsion and\nimpenetrability). We know no other properties that make up the\nconception of substance phenomenal in space, and which we term matter.\nOn the other hand, as an object of the pure understanding, every\nsubstance must have internal determination and forces. But what other\ninternal attributes of such an object can I think than those which my\ninternal sense presents to me? That, to wit, which in either itself\nthought, or something analogous to it. Hence Leibnitz, who looked upon\nthings as noumena, after denying them everything like external\nrelation, and therefore also composition or combination, declared that\nall substances, even the component parts of matter, were simple\nsubstances with powers of representation, in one word, monads.\n\n4. Matter and Form. These two conceptions lie at the foundation of all\nother reflection, so inseparably are they connected with every mode of\nexercising the understanding. The former denotes the determinable in\ngeneral, the second its determination, both in a transcendental sense,\nabstraction being made of every difference in that which is given, and\nof the mode in which it is determined. Logicians formerly termed the\nuniversal, matter, the specific difference of this or that part of the\nuniversal, form. In a judgement one may call the given conceptions\nlogical matter (for the judgement), the relation of these to each other\n(by means of the copula), the form of the judgement. In an object, the\ncomposite parts thereof (essentialia) are the matter; the mode in which\nthey are connected in the object, the form. In respect to things in\ngeneral, unlimited reality was regarded as the matter of all\npossibility, the limitation thereof (negation) as the form, by which\none thing is distinguished from another according to transcendental\nconceptions. The understanding demands that something be given (at\nleast in the conception), in order to be able to determine it in a\ncertain manner. Hence, in a conception of the pure understanding, the\nmatter precedes the form, and for this reason Leibnitz first assumed\nthe existence of things (monads) and of an internal power of\nrepresentation in them, in order to found upon this their external\nrelation and the community their state (that is, of their\nrepresentations). Hence, with him, space and time were possible\u2014the\nformer through the relation of substances, the latter through the\nconnection of their determinations with each other, as causes and\neffects. And so would it really be, if the pure understanding were\ncapable of an immediate application to objects, and if space and time\nwere determinations of things in themselves. But being merely sensuous\nintuitions, in which we determine all objects solely as phenomena, the\nform of intuition (as a subjective property of sensibility) must\nantecede all matter (sensations), consequently space and time must\nantecede all phenomena and all data of experience, and rather make\nexperience itself possible. But the intellectual philosopher could not\nendure that the form should precede the things themselves and determine\ntheir possibility; an objection perfectly correct, if we assume that we\nintuite things as they are, although with confused representation. But\nas sensuous intuition is a peculiar subjective condition, which is \u00e0\npriori at the foundation of all perception, and the form of which is\nprimitive, the form must be given per se, and so far from matter (or\nthe things themselves which appear) lying at the foundation of\nexperience (as we must conclude, if we judge by mere conceptions), the\nvery possibility of itself presupposes, on the contrary, a given formal\nintuition (space and time).\n\nREMARK ON THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION.\n\nLet me be allowed to term the position which we assign to a conception\neither in the sensibility or in the pure understanding, the\ntranscendental place. In this manner, the appointment of the position\nwhich must be taken by each conception according to the difference in\nits use, and the directions for determining this place to all\nconceptions according to rules, would be a transcendental topic, a\ndoctrine which would thoroughly shield us from the surreptitious\ndevices of the pure understanding and the delusions which thence arise,\nas it would always distinguish to what faculty of cognition each\nconception properly belonged. Every conception, every title, under\nwhich many cognitions rank together, may be called a logical place.\nUpon this is based the logical topic of Aristotle, of which teachers\nand rhetoricians could avail themselves, in order, under certain titles\nof thought, to observe what would best suit the matter they had to\ntreat, and thus enable themselves to quibble and talk with fluency and\nan appearance of profundity.\n\nTranscendental topic, on the contrary, contains nothing more than the\nabove-mentioned four titles of all comparison and distinction, which\ndiffer from categories in this respect, that they do not represent the\nobject according to that which constitutes its conception (quantity,\nreality), but set forth merely the comparison of representations, which\nprecedes our conceptions of things. But this comparison requires a\nprevious reflection, that is, a determination of the place to which the\nrepresentations of the things which are compared belong, whether, to\nwit, they are cogitated by the pure understanding, or given by\nsensibility.\n\nConceptions may be logically compared without the trouble of inquiring\nto what faculty their objects belong, whether as noumena, to the\nunderstanding, or as phenomena, to sensibility. If, however, we wish to\nemploy these conceptions in respect of objects, previous transcendental\nreflection is necessary. Without this reflection I should make a very\nunsafe use of these conceptions, and construct pretended synthetical\npropositions which critical reason cannot acknowledge and which are\nbased solely upon a transcendental amphiboly, that is, upon a\nsubstitution of an object of pure understanding for a phenomenon.\n\nFor want of this doctrine of transcendental topic, and consequently\ndeceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection, the\ncelebrated Leibnitz constructed an intellectual system of the world, or\nrather, believed himself competent to cognize the internal nature of\nthings, by comparing all objects merely with the understanding and the\nabstract formal conceptions of thought. Our table of the conceptions of\nreflection gives us the unexpected advantage of being able to exhibit\nthe distinctive peculiarities of his system in all its parts, and at\nthe same time of exposing the fundamental principle of this peculiar\nmode of thought, which rested upon naught but a misconception. He\ncompared all things with each other merely by means of conceptions, and\nnaturally found no other differences than those by which the\nunderstanding distinguishes its pure conceptions one from another. The\nconditions of sensuous intuition, which contain in themselves their own\nmeans of distinction, he did not look upon as primitive, because\nsensibility was to him but a confused mode of representation and not\nany particular source of representations. A phenomenon was for him the\nrepresentation of the thing in itself, although distinguished from\ncognition by the understanding only in respect of the logical form\u2014the\nformer with its usual want of analysis containing, according to him, a\ncertain mixture of collateral representations in its conception of a\nthing, which it is the duty of the understanding to separate and\ndistinguish. In one word, Leibnitz intellectualized phenomena, just as\nLocke, in his system of noogony (if I may be allowed to make use of\nsuch expressions), sensualized the conceptions of the understanding,\nthat is to say, declared them to be nothing more than empirical or\nabstract conceptions of reflection. Instead of seeking in the\nunderstanding and sensibility two different sources of representations,\nwhich, however, can present us with objective judgements of things only\nin conjunction, each of these great men recognized but one of these\nfaculties, which, in their opinion, applied immediately to things in\nthemselves, the other having no duty but that of confusing or arranging\nthe representations of the former.\n\nAccordingly, the objects of sense were compared by Leibnitz as things\nin general merely in the understanding.\n\n1st. He compares them in regard to their identity or difference\u2014as\njudged by the understanding. As, therefore, he considered merely the\nconceptions of objects, and not their position in intuition, in which\nalone objects can be given, and left quite out of sight the\ntranscendental locale of these conceptions\u2014whether, that is, their\nobject ought to be classed among phenomena, or among things in\nthemselves, it was to be expected that he should extend the application\nof the principle of indiscernibles, which is valid solely of\nconceptions of things in general, to objects of sense (mundus\nphaenomenon), and that he should believe that he had thereby\ncontributed in no small degree to extend our knowledge of nature. In\ntruth, if I cognize in all its inner determinations a drop of water as\na thing in itself, I cannot look upon one drop as different from\nanother, if the conception of the one is completely identical with that\nof the other. But if it is a phenomenon in space, it has a place not\nmerely in the understanding (among conceptions), but also in sensuous\nexternal intuition (in space), and in this case, the physical locale is\na matter of indifference in regard to the internal determinations of\nthings, and one place, B, may contain a thing which is perfectly\nsimilar and equal to another in a place, A, just as well as if the two\nthings were in every respect different from each other. Difference of\nplace without any other conditions, makes the plurality and distinction\nof objects as phenomena, not only possible in itself, but even\nnecessary. Consequently, the above so-called law is not a law of\nnature. It is merely an analytical rule for the comparison of things by\nmeans of mere conceptions.\n\n2nd. The principle: \u201cRealities (as simple affirmations) never logically\ncontradict each other,\u201d is a proposition perfectly true respecting the\nrelation of conceptions, but, whether as regards nature, or things in\nthemselves (of which we have not the slightest conception), is without\nany the least meaning. For real opposition, in which A -B is = 0,\nexists everywhere, an opposition, that is, in which one reality united\nwith another in the same subject annihilates the effects of the other\u2014a\nfact which is constantly brought before our eyes by the different\nantagonistic actions and operations in nature, which, nevertheless, as\ndepending on real forces, must be called realitates phaenomena. General\nmechanics can even present us with the empirical condition of this\nopposition in an \u00e0 priori rule, as it directs its attention to the\nopposition in the direction of forces\u2014a condition of which the\ntranscendental conception of reality can tell us nothing. Although M.\nLeibnitz did not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of a\nnew principle, he yet employed it for the establishment of new\npropositions, and his followers introduced it into their\nLeibnitzio-Wolfian system of philosophy. According to this principle,\nfor example, all evils are but consequences of the limited nature of\ncreated beings, that is, negations, because these are the only opposite\nof reality. (In the mere conception of a thing in general this is\nreally the case, but not in things as phenomena.) In like manner, the\nupholders of this system deem it not only possible, but natural also,\nto connect and unite all reality in one being, because they acknowledge\nno other sort of opposition than that of contradiction (by which the\nconception itself of a thing is annihilated), and find themselves\nunable to conceive an opposition of reciprocal destruction, so to\nspeak, in which one real cause destroys the effect of another, and the\nconditions of whose representation we meet with only in sensibility.\n\n3rd. The Leibnitzian monadology has really no better foundation than on\nthis philosopher\u2019s mode of falsely representing the difference of the\ninternal and external solely in relation to the understanding.\nSubstances, in general, must have something inward, which is therefore\nfree from external relations, consequently from that of composition\nalso. The simple\u2014that which can be represented by a unit\u2014is therefore\nthe foundation of that which is internal in things in themselves. The\ninternal state of substances cannot therefore consist in place, shape,\ncontact, or motion, determinations which are all external relations,\nand we can ascribe to them no other than that whereby we internally\ndetermine our faculty of sense itself, that is to say, the state of\nrepresentation. Thus, then, were constructed the monads, which were to\nform the elements of the universe, the active force of which consists\nin representation, the effects of this force being thus entirely\nconfined to themselves.\n\nFor the same reason, his view of the possible community of substances\ncould not represent it but as a predetermined harmony, and by no means\nas a physical influence. For inasmuch as everything is occupied only\ninternally, that is, with its own representations, the state of the\nrepresentations of one substance could not stand in active and living\nconnection with that of another, but some third cause operating on all\nwithout exception was necessary to make the different states correspond\nwith one another. And this did not happen by means of assistance\napplied in each particular case (systema assistentiae), but through the\nunity of the idea of a cause occupied and connected with all\nsubstances, in which they necessarily receive, according to the\nLeibnitzian school, their existence and permanence, consequently also\nreciprocal correspondence, according to universal laws.\n\n4th. This philosopher\u2019s celebrated doctrine of space and time, in which\nhe intellectualized these forms of sensibility, originated in the same\ndelusion of transcendental reflection. If I attempt to represent by the\nmere understanding, the external relations of things, I can do so only\nby employing the conception of their reciprocal action, and if I wish\nto connect one state of the same thing with another state, I must avail\nmyself of the notion of the order of cause and effect. And thus\nLeibnitz regarded space as a certain order in the community of\nsubstances, and time as the dynamical sequence of their states. That\nwhich space and time possess proper to themselves and independent of\nthings, he ascribed to a necessary confusion in our conceptions of\nthem, whereby that which is a mere form of dynamical relations is held\nto be a self-existent intuition, antecedent even to things themselves.\nThus space and time were the intelligible form of the connection of\nthings (substances and their states) in themselves. But things were\nintelligible substances (substantiae noumena). At the same time, he\nmade these conceptions valid of phenomena, because he did not allow to\nsensibility a peculiar mode of intuition, but sought all, even the\nempirical representation of objects, in the understanding, and left to\nsense naught but the despicable task of confusing and disarranging the\nrepresentations of the former.\n\nBut even if we could frame any synthetical proposition concerning\nthings in themselves by means of the pure understanding (which is\nimpossible), it could not apply to phenomena, which do not represent\nthings in themselves. In such a case I should be obliged in\ntranscendental reflection to compare my conceptions only under the\nconditions of sensibility, and so space and time would not be\ndeterminations of things in themselves, but of phenomena. What things\nmay be in themselves, I know not and need not know, because a thing is\nnever presented to me otherwise than as a phenomenon.\n\nI must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other conceptions of\nreflection. Matter is substantia phaenomenon. That in it which is\ninternal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies,\nand in all the functions and operations it performs, and which are\nindeed never anything but phenomena of the external sense. I cannot\ntherefore find anything that is absolutely, but only what is\ncomparatively internal, and which itself consists of external\nrelations. The absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be\naccording to the pure understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter is\nnot an object for the pure understanding. But the transcendental\nobject, which is the foundation of the phenomenon which we call matter,\nis a mere nescio quid, the nature of which we could not understand,\neven though someone were found able to tell us. For we can understand\nnothing that does not bring with it something in intuition\ncorresponding to the expressions employed. If, by the complaint of\nbeing unable to perceive the internal nature of things, it is meant\nthat we do not comprehend by the pure understanding what the things\nwhich appear to us may be in themselves, it is a silly and unreasonable\ncomplaint; for those who talk thus really desire that we should be able\nto cognize, consequently to intuite, things without senses, and\ntherefore wish that we possessed a faculty of cognition perfectly\ndifferent from the human faculty, not merely in degree, but even as\nregards intuition and the mode thereof, so that thus we should not be\nmen, but belong to a class of beings, the possibility of whose\nexistence, much less their nature and constitution, we have no means of\ncognizing. By observation and analysis of phenomena we penetrate into\nthe interior of nature, and no one can say what progress this knowledge\nmay make in time. But those transcendental questions which pass beyond\nthe limits of nature, we could never answer, even although all nature\nwere laid open to us, because we have not the power of observing our\nown mind with any other intuition than that of our internal sense. For\nherein lies the mystery of the origin and source of our faculty of\nsensibility. Its application to an object, and the transcendental\nground of this unity of subjective and objective, lie too deeply\nconcealed for us, who cognize ourselves only through the internal\nsense, consequently as phenomena, to be able to discover in our\nexistence anything but phenomena, the non-sensuous cause of which we at\nthe same time earnestly desire to penetrate to.\n\nThe great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at by the\nprocesses of mere reflection consists in its clear demonstration of the\nnullity of all conclusions respecting objects which are compared with\neach other in the understanding alone, while it at the same time\nconfirms what we particularly insisted on, namely, that, although\nphenomena are not included as things in themselves among the objects of\nthe pure understanding, they are nevertheless the only things by which\nour cognition can possess objective reality, that is to say, which give\nus intuitions to correspond with our conceptions.\n\nWhen we reflect in a purely logical manner, we do nothing more than\ncompare conceptions in our understanding, to discover whether both have\nthe same content, whether they are self-contradictory or not, whether\nanything is contained in either conception, which of the two is given,\nand which is merely a mode of thinking that given. But if I apply these\nconceptions to an object in general (in the transcendental sense),\nwithout first determining whether it is an object of sensuous or\nintellectual intuition, certain limitations present themselves, which\nforbid us to pass beyond the conceptions and render all empirical use\nof them impossible. And thus these limitations prove that the\nrepresentation of an object as a thing in general is not only\ninsufficient, but, without sensuous determination and independently of\nempirical conditions, self-contradictory; that we must therefore make\nabstraction of all objects, as in logic, or, admitting them, must think\nthem under conditions of sensuous intuition; that, consequently, the\nintelligible requires an altogether peculiar intuition, which we do not\npossess, and in the absence of which it is for us nothing; while, on\nthe other hand phenomena cannot be objects in themselves. For, when I\nmerely think things in general, the difference in their external\nrelations cannot constitute a difference in the things themselves; on\nthe contrary, the former presupposes the latter, and if the conception\nof one of two things is not internally different from that of the\nother, I am merely thinking the same thing in different relations.\nFurther, by the addition of one affirmation (reality) to the other, the\npositive therein is really augmented, and nothing is abstracted or\nwithdrawn from it; hence the real in things cannot be in contradiction\nwith or opposition to itself\u2014and so on.\n\nThe true use of the conceptions of reflection in the employment of the\nunderstanding has, as we have shown, been so misconceived by Leibnitz,\none of the most acute philosophers of either ancient or modern times,\nthat he has been misled into the construction of a baseless system of\nintellectual cognition, which professes to determine its objects\nwithout the intervention of the senses. For this reason, the exposition\nof the cause of the amphiboly of these conceptions, as the origin of\nthese false principles, is of great utility in determining with\ncertainty the proper limits of the understanding.\n\nIt is right to say whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole of a\nconception can be affirmed or denied of any part of it (dictum de omni\net nullo); but it would be absurd so to alter this logical proposition\nas to say whatever is not contained in a general conception is likewise\nnot contained in the particular conceptions which rank under it; for\nthe latter are particular conceptions, for the very reason that their\ncontent is greater than that which is cogitated in the general\nconception. And yet the whole intellectual system of Leibnitz is based\nupon this false principle, and with it must necessarily fall to the\nground, together with all the ambiguous principles in reference to the\nemployment of the understanding which have thence originated.\n\nLeibnitz\u2019s principle of the identity of indiscernibles or\nindistinguishables is really based on the presupposition that, if in\nthe conception of a thing a certain distinction is not to be found, it\nis also not to be met with in things themselves; that, consequently,\nall things are completely identical (numero eadem) which are not\ndistinguishable from each other (as to quality or quantity) in our\nconceptions of them. But, as in the mere conception of anything\nabstraction has been made of many necessary conditions of intuition,\nthat of which abstraction has been made is rashly held to be\nnon-existent, and nothing is attributed to the thing but what is\ncontained in its conception.\n\nThe conception of a cubic foot of space, however I may think it,\nis in itself completely identical. But two cubic feet in space are\nnevertheless distinct from each other from the sole fact of their\nbeing in different places (they are numero diversa); and these places\nare conditions of intuition, wherein the object of this conception is\ngiven, and which do not belong to the conception, but to the faculty\nof sensibility. In like manner, there is in the conception of a thing\nno contradiction when a negative is not connected with an affirmative;\nand merely affirmative conceptions cannot, in conjunction, produce any\nnegation. But in sensuous intuition, wherein reality (take for example,\nmotion) is given, we find conditions (opposite directions)\u2014of which\nabstraction has been made in the conception of motion in general\u2014which\nrender possible a contradiction or opposition (not indeed of a logical\nkind)\u2014and which from pure positives produce zero = 0. We are therefore\nnot justified in saying that all reality is in perfect agreement\nand harmony, because no contradiction is discoverable among its\nconceptions.[39] According to mere conceptions, that which is internal\nis the substratum of all relations or external determinations. When,\ntherefore, I abstract all conditions of intuition, and confine myself\nsolely to the conception of a thing in general, I can make abstraction\nof all external relations, and there must nevertheless remain a\nconception of that which indicates no relation, but merely internal\ndeterminations. Now it seems to follow that in everything (substance)\nthere is something which is absolutely internal and which antecedes\nall external determinations, inasmuch as it renders them possible; and\nthat therefore this substratum is something which does not contain any\nexternal relations and is consequently simple (for corporeal things\nare never anything but relations, at least of their parts external to\neach other); and, inasmuch as we know of no other absolutely internal\ndeterminations than those of the internal sense, this substratum is not\nonly simple, but also, analogously with our internal sense, determined\nthrough representations, that is to say, all things are properly\nmonads, or simple beings endowed with the power of representation. Now\nall this would be perfectly correct, if the conception of a thing were\nthe only necessary condition of the presentation of objects of external\nintuition. It is, on the contrary, manifest that a permanent phenomenon\nin space (impenetrable extension) can contain mere relations, and\nnothing that is absolutely internal, and yet be the primary substratum\nof all external perception. By mere conceptions I cannot think anything\nexternal, without, at the same time, thinking something internal, for\nthe reason that conceptions of relations presuppose given things,\nand without these are impossible. But, as an intuition there is\nsomething (that is, space, which, with all it contains, consists of\npurely formal, or, indeed, real relations) which is not found in the\nmere conception of a thing in general, and this presents to us the\nsubstratum which could not be cognized through conceptions alone, I\ncannot say: because a thing cannot be represented by mere conceptions\nwithout something absolutely internal, there is also, in the things\nthemselves which are contained under these conceptions, and in their\nintuition nothing external to which something absolutely internal does\nnot serve as the foundation. For, when we have made abstraction of\nall the conditions of intuition, there certainly remains in the mere\nconception nothing but the internal in general, through which alone\nthe external is possible. But this necessity, which is grounded upon\nabstraction alone, does not obtain in the case of things themselves,\nin so far as they are given in intuition with such determinations as\nexpress mere relations, without having anything internal as their\nfoundation; for they are not things in themselves, but only phenomena.\nWhat we cognize in matter is nothing but relations (what we call its\ninternal determinations are but comparatively internal). But there are\nsome self-subsistent and permanent, through which a determined object\nis given. That I, when abstraction is made of these relations, have\nnothing more to think, does not destroy the conception of a thing as\nphenomenon, nor the conception of an object in abstracto, but it does\naway with the possibility of an object that is determinable according\nto mere conceptions, that is, of a noumenon. It is certainly startling\nto hear that a thing consists solely of relations; but this thing is\nsimply a phenomenon, and cannot be cogitated by means of the mere\ncategories: it does itself consist in the mere relation of something in\ngeneral to the senses. In the same way, we cannot cogitate relations\nof things in abstracto, if we commence with conceptions alone, in any\nother manner than that one is the cause of determinations in the other;\nfor that is itself the conception of the understanding or category of\nrelation. But, as in this case we make abstraction of all intuition, we\nlose altogether the mode in which the manifold determines to each of\nits parts its place, that is, the form of sensibility (space); and yet\nthis mode antecedes all empirical causality.\n\n [39] If any one wishes here to have recourse to the usual subterfuge,\n and to say, that at least realitates noumena cannot be in opposition\n to each other, it will be requisite for him to adduce an example of\n this pure and non-sensuous reality, that it may be understood whether\n the notion represents something or nothing. But an example cannot be\n found except in experience, which never presents to us anything more\n than phenomena; and thus the proposition means nothing more than that\n the conception which contains only affirmatives does not contain\n anything negative\u2014a proposition nobody ever doubted.\n\n\nIf by intelligible objects we understand things which can be thought\nby means of the pure categories, without the need of the schemata of\nsensibility, such objects are impossible. For the condition of the\nobjective use of all our conceptions of understanding is the mode of\nour sensuous intuition, whereby objects are given; and, if we make\nabstraction of the latter, the former can have no relation to an\nobject. And even if we should suppose a different kind of intuition\nfrom our own, still our functions of thought would have no use or\nsignification in respect thereof. But if we understand by the term,\nobjects of a non-sensuous intuition, in respect of which our categories\nare not valid, and of which we can accordingly have no knowledge\n(neither intuition nor conception), in this merely negative sense\nnoumena must be admitted. For this is no more than saying that our\nmode of intuition is not applicable to all things, but only to objects\nof our senses, that consequently its objective validity is limited,\nand that room is therefore left for another kind of intuition, and\nthus also for things that may be objects of it. But in this sense the\nconception of a noumenon is problematical, that is to say, it is the\nnotion of a thing of which we can neither say that it is possible,\nnor that it is impossible, inasmuch as we do not know of any mode of\nintuition besides the sensuous, or of any other sort of conceptions\nthan the categories\u2014a mode of intuition and a kind of conception\nneither of which is applicable to a non-sensuous object. We are on this\naccount incompetent to extend the sphere of our objects of thought\nbeyond the conditions of our sensibility, and to assume the existence\nof objects of pure thought, that is, of noumena, inasmuch as these\nhave no true positive signification. For it must be confessed of the\ncategories that they are not of themselves sufficient for the cognition\nof things in themselves and, without the data of sensibility, are\nmere subjective forms of the unity of the understanding. Thought is\ncertainly not a product of the senses, and in so far is not limited\nby them, but it does not therefore follow that it may be employed\npurely and without the intervention of sensibility, for it would then\nbe without reference to an object. And we cannot call a noumenon\nan object of pure thought; for the representation thereof is but\nthe problematical conception of an object for a perfectly different\nintuition and a perfectly different understanding from ours, both of\nwhich are consequently themselves problematical. The conception of a\nnoumenon is therefore not the conception of an object, but merely a\nproblematical conception inseparably connected with the limitation\nof our sensibility. That is to say, this conception contains the\nanswer to the question: \u201cAre there objects quite unconnected with,\nand independent of, our intuition?\u201d\u2014a question to which only an\nindeterminate answer can be given. That answer is: \u201cInasmuch as\nsensuous intuition does not apply to all things without distinction,\nthere remains room for other and different objects.\u201d The existence of\nthese problematical objects is therefore not absolutely denied, in the\nabsence of a determinate conception of them, but, as no category is\nvalid in respect of them, neither must they be admitted as objects for\nour understanding.\n\nUnderstanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same time\nenlarging its own field. While, moreover, it forbids sensibility to\napply its forms and modes to things in themselves and restricts it to\nthe sphere of phenomena, it cogitates an object in itself, only,\nhowever, as a transcendental object, which is the cause of a phenomenon\n(consequently not itself a phenomenon), and which cannot be thought\neither as a quantity or as reality, or as substance (because these\nconceptions always require sensuous forms in which to determine an\nobject)\u2014an object, therefore, of which we are quite unable to say\nwhether it can be met with in ourselves or out of us, whether it would\nbe annihilated together with sensibility, or, if this were taken away,\nwould continue to exist. If we wish to call this object a noumenon,\nbecause the representation of it is non-sensuous, we are at liberty to\ndo so. But as we can apply to it none of the conceptions of our\nunderstanding, the representation is for us quite void, and is\navailable only for the indication of the limits of our sensuous\nintuition, thereby leaving at the same time an empty space, which we\nare competent to fill by the aid neither of possible experience, nor of\nthe pure understanding.\n\nThe critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does not permit us\nto create for ourselves a new field of objects beyond those which are\npresented to us as phenomena, and to stray into intelligible worlds;\nnay, it does not even allow us to endeavour to form so much as a\nconception of them. The specious error which leads to this\u2014and which is\na perfectly excusable one\u2014lies in the fact that the employment of the\nunderstanding, contrary to its proper purpose and destination, is made\ntranscendental, and objects, that is, possible intuitions, are made to\nregulate themselves according to conceptions, instead of the\nconceptions arranging themselves according to the intuitions, on which\nalone their own objective validity rests. Now the reason of this again\nis that apperception, and with it thought, antecedes all possible\ndeterminate arrangement of representations. Accordingly we think\nsomething in general and determine it on the one hand sensuously, but,\non the other, distinguish the general and in abstracto represented\nobject from this particular mode of intuiting it. In this case there\nremains a mode of determining the object by mere thought, which is\nreally but a logical form without content, which, however, seems to us\nto be a mode of the existence of the object in itself (noumenon),\nwithout regard to intuition which is limited to our senses.\n\nBefore ending this transcendental analytic, we must make an addition,\nwhich, although in itself of no particular importance, seems to be\nnecessary to the completeness of the system. The highest conception,\nwith which a transcendental philosophy commonly begins, is the division\ninto possible and impossible. But as all division presupposes a divided\nconception, a still higher one must exist, and this is the conception\nof an object in general\u2014problematically understood and without its\nbeing decided whether it is something or nothing. As the categories are\nthe only conceptions which apply to objects in general, the\ndistinguishing of an object, whether it is something or nothing, must\nproceed according to the order and direction of the categories.\n\n1. To the categories of quantity, that is, the conceptions of all,\nmany, and one, the conception which annihilates all, that is, the\nconception of none, is opposed. And thus the object of a conception, to\nwhich no intuition can be found to correspond, is = nothing. That is,\nit is a conception without an object (ens rationis), like noumena,\nwhich cannot be considered possible in the sphere of reality, though\nthey must not therefore be held to be impossible\u2014or like certain new\nfundamental forces in matter, the existence of which is cogitable\nwithout contradiction, though, as examples from experience are not\nforthcoming, they must not be regarded as possible.\n\n2. Reality is something; negation is nothing, that is, a conception of\nthe absence of an object, as cold, a shadow (nihil privativum).\n\n3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no\nobject, but the merely formal condition of an object (as phenomenon),\nas pure space and pure time. These are certainly something, as forms of\nintuition, but are not themselves objects which are intuited (ens\nimaginarium).\n\n4. The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is nothing,\nbecause the conception is nothing\u2014is impossible, as a figure composed\nof two straight lines (nihil negativum).\n\nThe table of this division of the conception of nothing (the\ncorresponding division of the conception of something does not require\nspecial description) must therefore be arranged as follows:\n\n                      NOTHING\n                        AS\n\n                        1\n                As Empty Conception\n                 without object,\n                  _ens rationis_\n           2                               3\n     Empty object of               Empty intuition\n      a conception,                without object,\n     _nihil privativum_            _ens imaginarium_\n                        4\n                   Empty object\n                 without conception,\n                  _nihil negativum_\n\nWe see that the ens rationis is distinguished from the nihil negativum\nor pure nothing by the consideration that the former must not be\nreckoned among possibilities, because it is a mere fiction\u2014though not\nself-contradictory, while the latter is completely opposed to all\npossibility, inasmuch as the conception annihilates itself. Both,\nhowever, are empty conceptions. On the other hand, the nihil privativum\nand ens imaginarium are empty data for conceptions. If light be not\ngiven to the senses, we cannot represent to ourselves darkness, and if\nextended objects are not perceived, we cannot represent space. Neither\nthe negation, nor the mere form of intuition can, without something\nreal, be an object.\n\nSECOND DIVISION\u2014TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC\n\nTRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.\nINTRODUCTION.\n\nI. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance\n\nWe termed dialectic in general a logic of appearance. This does not\nsignify a doctrine of probability; for probability is truth, only\ncognized upon insufficient grounds, and though the information it\ngives us is imperfect, it is not therefore deceitful. Hence it must\nnot be separated from the analytical part of logic. Still less must\nphenomenon and appearance be held to be identical. For truth or\nillusory appearance does not reside in the object, in so far as it\nis intuited, but in the judgement upon the object, in so far as it\nis thought. It is, therefore, quite correct to say that the senses\ndo not err, not because they always judge correctly, but because\nthey do not judge at all. Hence truth and error, consequently also,\nillusory appearance as the cause of error, are only to be found in a\njudgement, that is, in the relation of an object to our understanding.\nIn a cognition which completely harmonizes with the laws of the\nunderstanding, no error can exist. In a representation of the senses\u2014as\nnot containing any judgement\u2014there is also no error. But no power of\nnature can of itself deviate from its own laws. Hence neither the\nunderstanding per se (without the influence of another cause), nor the\nsenses per se, would fall into error; the former could not, because,\nif it acts only according to its own laws, the effect (the judgement)\nmust necessarily accord with these laws. But in accordance with the\nlaws of the understanding consists the formal element in all truth. In\nthe senses there is no judgement\u2014neither a true nor a false one. But,\nas we have no source of cognition besides these two, it follows that\nerror is caused solely by the unobserved influence of the sensibility\nupon the understanding. And thus it happens that the subjective grounds\nof a judgement blend and are confounded with the objective, and cause\nthem to deviate from their proper determination,[40] just as a body\nin motion would always of itself proceed in a straight line, but if\nanother impetus gives to it a different direction, it will then start\noff into a curvilinear line of motion. To distinguish the peculiar\naction of the understanding from the power which mingles with it,\nit is necessary to consider an erroneous judgement as the diagonal\nbetween two forces, that determine the judgement in two different\ndirections, which, as it were, form an angle, and to resolve this\ncomposite operation into the simple ones of the understanding and the\nsensibility. In pure \u00e0 priori judgements this must be done by means of\ntranscendental reflection, whereby, as has been already shown, each\nrepresentation has its place appointed in the corresponding faculty of\ncognition, and consequently the influence of the one faculty upon the\nother is made apparent.\n\n [40] Sensibility, subjected to the understanding, as the object upon\n which the understanding employs its functions, is the source of real\n cognitions. But, in so far as it exercises an influence upon the\n action of the understanding and determines it to judgement,\n sensibility is itself the cause of error.\n\n\nIt is not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory\nappearance (for example, optical illusion), which occurs in the\nempirical application of otherwise correct rules of the understanding,\nand in which the judgement is misled by the influence of imagination.\nOur purpose is to speak of transcendental illusory appearance, which\ninfluences principles\u2014that are not even applied to experience, for in\nthis case we should possess a sure test of their correctness\u2014but which\nleads us, in disregard of all the warnings of criticism, completely\nbeyond the empirical employment of the categories and deludes us with\nthe chimera of an extension of the sphere of the pure understanding. We\nshall term those principles the application of which is confined\nentirely within the limits of possible experience, immanent; those, on\nthe other hand, which transgress these limits, we shall call\ntranscendent principles. But by these latter I do not understand\nprinciples of the transcendental use or misuse of the categories, which\nis in reality a mere fault of the judgement when not under due\nrestraint from criticism, and therefore not paying sufficient attention\nto the limits of the sphere in which the pure understanding is allowed\nto exercise its functions; but real principles which exhort us to break\ndown all those barriers, and to lay claim to a perfectly new field of\ncognition, which recognizes no line of demarcation. Thus transcendental\nand transcendent are not identical terms. The principles of the pure\nunderstanding, which we have already propounded, ought to be of\nempirical and not of transcendental use, that is, they are not\napplicable to any object beyond the sphere of experience. A principle\nwhich removes these limits, nay, which authorizes us to overstep them,\nis called transcendent. If our criticism can succeed in exposing the\nillusion in these pretended principles, those which are limited in\ntheir employment to the sphere of experience may be called, in\nopposition to the others, immanent principles of the pure\nunderstanding.\n\nLogical illusion, which consists merely in the imitation of the form of\nreason (the illusion in sophistical syllogisms), arises entirely from a\nwant of due attention to logical rules. So soon as the attention is\nawakened to the case before us, this illusion totally disappears.\nTranscendental illusion, on the contrary, does not cease to exist, even\nafter it has been exposed, and its nothingness clearly perceived by\nmeans of transcendental criticism. Take, for example, the illusion in\nthe proposition: \u201cThe world must have a beginning in time.\u201d The cause\nof this is as follows. In our reason, subjectively considered as a\nfaculty of human cognition, there exist fundamental rules and maxims of\nits exercise, which have completely the appearance of objective\nprinciples. Now from this cause it happens that the subjective\nnecessity of a certain connection of our conceptions, is regarded as an\nobjective necessity of the determination of things in themselves. This\nillusion it is impossible to avoid, just as we cannot avoid perceiving\nthat the sea appears to be higher at a distance than it is near the\nshore, because we see the former by means of higher rays than the\nlatter, or, which is a still stronger case, as even the astronomer\ncannot prevent himself from seeing the moon larger at its rising than\nsome time afterwards, although he is not deceived by this illusion.\n\nTranscendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing\nthe illusory appearance in transcendental judgements, and guarding us\nagainst it; but to make it, as in the case of logical illusion,\nentirely disappear and cease to be illusion is utterly beyond its\npower. For we have here to do with a natural and unavoidable illusion,\nwhich rests upon subjective principles and imposes these upon us as\nobjective, while logical dialectic, in the detection of sophisms, has\nto do merely with an error in the logical consequence of the\npropositions, or with an artificially constructed illusion, in\nimitation of the natural error. There is, therefore, a natural and\nunavoidable dialectic of pure reason\u2014not that in which the bungler,\nfrom want of the requisite knowledge, involves himself, nor that which\nthe sophist devises for the purpose of misleading, but that which is an\ninseparable adjunct of human reason, and which, even after its\nillusions have been exposed, does not cease to deceive, and continually\nto lead reason into momentary errors, which it becomes necessary\ncontinually to remove.\n\nII. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory Appearance\n\nA. OF REASON IN GENERAL.\n\nAll our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding,\nand ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in\nthe human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting\nit to the highest unity of thought. At this stage of our inquiry it is\nmy duty to give an explanation of this, the highest faculty of\ncognition, and I confess I find myself here in some difficulty. Of\nreason, as of the understanding, there is a merely formal, that is,\nlogical use, in which it makes abstraction of all content of cognition;\nbut there is also a real use, inasmuch as it contains in itself the\nsource of certain conceptions and principles, which it does not borrow\neither from the senses or the understanding. The former faculty has\nbeen long defined by logicians as the faculty of mediate conclusion in\ncontradistinction to immediate conclusions (consequentiae immediatae);\nbut the nature of the latter, which itself generates conceptions, is\nnot to be understood from this definition. Now as a division of reason\ninto a logical and a transcendental faculty presents itself here, it\nbecomes necessary to seek for a higher conception of this source of\ncognition which shall comprehend both conceptions. In this we may\nexpect, according to the analogy of the conceptions of the\nunderstanding, that the logical conception will give us the key to the\ntranscendental, and that the table of the functions of the former will\npresent us with the clue to the conceptions of reason.\n\nIn the former part of our transcendental logic, we defined the\nunderstanding to be the faculty of rules; reason may be distinguished\nfrom understanding as the faculty of principles.\n\nThe term principle is ambiguous, and commonly signifies merely a\ncognition that may be employed as a principle, although it is not in\nitself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled to the distinction.\nEvery general proposition, even if derived from experience by the\nprocess of induction, may serve as the major in a syllogism; but it is\nnot for that reason a principle. Mathematical axioms (for example,\nthere can be only one straight line between two points) are general \u00e0\npriori cognitions, and are therefore rightly denominated principles,\nrelatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. But I cannot\nfor this reason say that I cognize this property of a straight line\nfrom principles\u2014I cognize it only in pure intuition.\n\nCognition from principles, then, is that cognition in which I cognize\nthe particular in the general by means of conceptions. Thus every\nsyllogism is a form of the deduction of a cognition from a principle.\nFor the major always gives a conception, through which everything that\nis subsumed under the condition thereof is cognized according to a\nprinciple. Now as every general cognition may serve as the major in a\nsyllogism, and the understanding presents us with such general \u00e0 priori\npropositions, they may be termed principles, in respect of their\npossible use.\n\nBut if we consider these principles of the pure understanding in\nrelation to their origin, we shall find them to be anything rather than\ncognitions from conceptions. For they would not even be possible \u00e0\npriori, if we could not rely on the assistance of pure intuition (in\nmathematics), or on that of the conditions of a possible experience.\nThat everything that happens has a cause, cannot be concluded from the\ngeneral conception of that which happens; on the contrary the principle\nof causality instructs us as to the mode of obtaining from that which\nhappens a determinate empirical conception.\n\nSynthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot\nsupply, and they alone are entitled to be called principles. At the\nsame time, all general propositions may be termed comparative\nprinciples.\n\nIt has been a long-cherished wish\u2014that (who knows how late), may one\nday, be happily accomplished\u2014that the principles of the endless variety\nof civil laws should be investigated and exposed; for in this way alone\ncan we find the secret of simplifying legislation. But in this case,\nlaws are nothing more than limitations of our freedom upon conditions\nunder which it subsists in perfect harmony with itself; they\nconsequently have for their object that which is completely our own\nwork, and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means of these\nconceptions. But how objects as things in themselves\u2014how the nature of\nthings is subordinated to principles and is to be determined, according\nto conceptions, is a question which it seems well nigh impossible to\nanswer. Be this, however, as it may\u2014for on this point our investigation\nis yet to be made\u2014it is at least manifest from what we have said that\ncognition from principles is something very different from cognition by\nmeans of the understanding, which may indeed precede other cognitions\nin the form of a principle, but in itself\u2014in so far as it is\nsynthetical\u2014is neither based upon mere thought, nor contains a general\nproposition drawn from conceptions alone.\n\nThe understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of\nphenomena by virtue of rules; the reason is a faculty for the\nproduction of unity of rules (of the understanding) under principles.\nReason, therefore, never applies directly to experience, or to any\nsensuous object; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding, to\nthe manifold cognition of which it gives a unity \u00e0 priori by means of\nconceptions\u2014a unity which may be called rational unity, and which is of\na nature very different from that of the unity produced by the\nunderstanding.\n\nThe above is the general conception of the faculty of reason, in so far\nas it has been possible to make it comprehensible in the absence of\nexamples. These will be given in the sequel.\n\nB. OF THE LOGICAL USE OF REASON.\n\nA distinction is commonly made between that which is immediately\ncognized and that which is inferred or concluded. That in a figure\nwhich is bounded by three straight lines there are three angles, is an\nimmediate cognition; but that these angles are together equal to two\nright angles, is an inference or conclusion. Now, as we are constantly\nemploying this mode of thought and have thus become quite accustomed to\nit, we no longer remark the above distinction, and, as in the case of\nthe so-called deceptions of sense, consider as immediately perceived,\nwhat has really been inferred. In every reasoning or syllogism, there\nis a fundamental proposition, afterwards a second drawn from it, and\nfinally the conclusion, which connects the truth in the first with the\ntruth in the second\u2014and that infallibly. If the judgement concluded is\nso contained in the first proposition that it can be deduced from it\nwithout the meditation of a third notion, the conclusion is called\nimmediate (consequentia immediata); I prefer the term conclusion of the\nunderstanding. But if, in addition to the fundamental cognition, a\nsecond judgement is necessary for the production of the conclusion, it\nis called a conclusion of the reason. In the proposition: All men are\nmortal, are contained the propositions: Some men are mortal, Nothing\nthat is not mortal is a man, and these are therefore immediate\nconclusions from the first. On the other hand, the proposition: all the\nlearned are mortal, is not contained in the main proposition (for the\nconception of a learned man does not occur in it), and it can be\ndeduced from the main proposition only by means of a mediating\njudgement.\n\nIn every syllogism I first cogitate a rule (the major) by means of the\nunderstanding. In the next place I subsume a cognition under the\ncondition of the rule (and this is the minor) by means of the\njudgement. And finally I determine my cognition by means of the\npredicate of the rule (this is the conclusio), consequently, I\ndetermine it \u00e0 priori by means of the reason. The relations, therefore,\nwhich the major proposition, as the rule, represents between a\ncognition and its condition, constitute the different kinds of\nsyllogisms. These are just threefold\u2014analogously with all judgements,\nin so far as they differ in the mode of expressing the relation of a\ncognition in the understanding\u2014namely, categorical, hypothetical, and\ndisjunctive.\n\nWhen as often happens, the conclusion is a judgement which may follow\nfrom other given judgements, through which a perfectly different object\nis cogitated, I endeavour to discover in the understanding whether the\nassertion in this conclusion does not stand under certain conditions\naccording to a general rule. If I find such a condition, and if the\nobject mentioned in the conclusion can be subsumed under the given\ncondition, then this conclusion follows from a rule which is also valid\nfor other objects of cognition. From this we see that reason endeavours\nto subject the great variety of the cognitions of the understanding to\nthe smallest possible number of principles (general conditions), and\nthus to produce in it the highest unity.\n\nC. OF THE PURE USE OF REASON.\n\nCan we isolate reason, and, if so, is it in this case a peculiar source\nof conceptions and judgements which spring from it alone, and through\nwhich it can be applied to objects; or is it merely a subordinate\nfaculty, whose duty it is to give a certain form to given cognitions\u2014a\nform which is called logical, and through which the cognitions of the\nunderstanding are subordinated to each other, and lower rules to higher\n(those, to wit, whose condition comprises in its sphere the condition\nof the others), in so far as this can be done by comparison? This is\nthe question which we have at present to answer. Manifold variety of\nrules and unity of principles is a requirement of reason, for the\npurpose of bringing the understanding into complete accordance with\nitself, just as understanding subjects the manifold content of\nintuition to conceptions, and thereby introduces connection into it.\nBut this principle prescribes no law to objects, and does not contain\nany ground of the possibility of cognizing or of determining them as\nsuch, but is merely a subjective law for the proper arrangement of the\ncontent of the understanding. The purpose of this law is, by a\ncomparison of the conceptions of the understanding, to reduce them to\nthe smallest possible number, although, at the same time, it does not\njustify us in demanding from objects themselves such a uniformity as\nmight contribute to the convenience and the enlargement of the sphere\nof the understanding, or in expecting that it will itself thus receive\nfrom them objective validity. In one word, the question is: \u201cdoes\nreason in itself, that is, does pure reason contain \u00e0 priori\nsynthetical principles and rules, and what are those principles?\u201d\n\nThe formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms gives us\nsufficient information in regard to the ground on which the\ntranscendental principle of reason in its pure synthetical cognition\nwill rest.\n\n1. Reason, as observed in the syllogistic process, is not applicable to\nintuitions, for the purpose of subjecting them to rules\u2014for this is the\nprovince of the understanding with its categories\u2014but to conceptions\nand judgements. If pure reason does apply to objects and the intuition\nof them, it does so not immediately, but mediately\u2014through the\nunderstanding and its judgements, which have a direct relation to the\nsenses and their intuition, for the purpose of determining their\nobjects. The unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a possible\nexperience, but is essentially different from this unity, which is that\nof the understanding. That everything which happens has a cause, is not\na principle cognized and prescribed by reason. This principle makes the\nunity of experience possible and borrows nothing from reason, which,\nwithout a reference to possible experience, could never have produced\nby means of mere conceptions any such synthetical unity.\n\n2. Reason, in its logical use, endeavours to discover the general\ncondition of its judgement (the conclusion), and a syllogism is itself\nnothing but a judgement by means of the subsumption of its condition\nunder a general rule (the major). Now as this rule may itself be\nsubjected to the same process of reason, and thus the condition of the\ncondition be sought (by means of a prosyllogism) as long as the process\ncan be continued, it is very manifest that the peculiar principle of\nreason in its logical use is to find for the conditioned cognition of\nthe understanding the unconditioned whereby the unity of the former is\ncompleted.\n\nBut this logical maxim cannot be a principle of pure reason, unless we\nadmit that, if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions\nsubordinated to one another\u2014a series which is consequently itself\nunconditioned\u2014is also given, that is, contained in the object and its\nconnection.\n\nBut this principle of pure reason is evidently synthetical; for,\nanalytically, the conditioned certainly relates to some condition, but\nnot to the unconditioned. From this principle also there must originate\ndifferent synthetical propositions, of which the pure understanding is\nperfectly ignorant, for it has to do only with objects of a possible\nexperience, the cognition and synthesis of which is always conditioned.\nThe unconditioned, if it does really exist, must be especially\nconsidered in regard to the determinations which distinguish it from\nwhatever is conditioned, and will thus afford us material for many \u00e0\npriori synthetical propositions.\n\nThe principles resulting from this highest principle of pure reason\nwill, however, be transcendent in relation to phenomena, that is to\nsay, it will be impossible to make any adequate empirical use of this\nprinciple. It is therefore completely different from all principles of\nthe understanding, the use made of which is entirely immanent, their\nobject and purpose being merely the possibility of experience. Now our\nduty in the transcendental dialectic is as follows. To discover whether\nthe principle that the series of conditions (in the synthesis of\nphenomena, or of thought in general) extends to the unconditioned is\nobjectively true, or not; what consequences result therefrom affecting\nthe empirical use of the understanding, or rather whether there exists\nany such objectively valid proposition of reason, and whether it is\nnot, on the contrary, a merely logical precept which directs us to\nascend perpetually to still higher conditions, to approach completeness\nin the series of them, and thus to introduce into our cognition the\nhighest possible unity of reason. We must ascertain, I say, whether\nthis requirement of reason has not been regarded, by a\nmisunderstanding, as a transcendental principle of pure reason, which\npostulates a thorough completeness in the series of conditions in\nobjects themselves. We must show, moreover, the misconceptions and\nillusions that intrude into syllogisms, the major proposition of which\npure reason has supplied\u2014a proposition which has perhaps more of the\ncharacter of a petitio than of a postulatum\u2014and that proceed from\nexperience upwards to its conditions. The solution of these problems is\nour task in transcendental dialectic, which we are about to expose even\nat its source, that lies deep in human reason. We shall divide it into\ntwo parts, the first of which will treat of the transcendent\nconceptions of pure reason, the second of transcendent and dialectical\nsyllogisms.\n\nTRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC\u2014BOOK I\u2014OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON.\n\nThe conceptions of pure reason\u2014we do not here speak of the possibility\nof them\u2014are not obtained by reflection, but by inference or conclusion.\nThe conceptions of understanding are also cogitated \u00e0 priori\nantecedently to experience, and render it possible; but they contain\nnothing but the unity of reflection upon phenomena, in so far as these\nmust necessarily belong to a possible empirical consciousness. Through\nthem alone are cognition and the determination of an object possible.\nIt is from them, accordingly, that we receive material for reasoning,\nand antecedently to them we possess no \u00e0 priori conceptions of objects\nfrom which they might be deduced, On the other hand, the sole basis of\ntheir objective reality consists in the necessity imposed on them, as\ncontaining the intellectual form of all experience, of restricting\ntheir application and influence to the sphere of experience.\n\nBut the term, conception of reason, or rational conception, itself\nindicates that it does not confine itself within the limits of\nexperience, because its object-matter is a cognition, of which every\nempirical cognition is but a part\u2014nay, the whole of possible experience\nmay be itself but a part of it\u2014a cognition to which no actual\nexperience ever fully attains, although it does always pertain to it.\nThe aim of rational conceptions is the comprehension, as that of the\nconceptions of understanding is the understanding of perceptions. If\nthey contain the unconditioned, they relate to that to which all\nexperience is subordinate, but which is never itself an object of\nexperience\u2014that towards which reason tends in all its conclusions from\nexperience, and by the standard of which it estimates the degree of\ntheir empirical use, but which is never itself an element in an\nempirical synthesis. If, notwithstanding, such conceptions possess\nobjective validity, they may be called conceptus ratiocinati\n(conceptions legitimately concluded); in cases where they do not, they\nhave been admitted on account of having the appearance of being\ncorrectly concluded, and may be called conceptus ratiocinantes\n(sophistical conceptions). But as this can only be sufficiently\ndemonstrated in that part of our treatise which relates to the\ndialectical conclusions of reason, we shall omit any consideration of\nit in this place. As we called the pure conceptions of the\nunderstanding categories, we shall also distinguish those of pure\nreason by a new name and call them transcendental ideas. These terms,\nhowever, we must in the first place explain and justify.\n\nSection I\u2014Of Ideas in General\n\nDespite the great wealth of words which European languages possess, the\nthinker finds himself often at a loss for an expression exactly suited\nto his conception, for want of which he is unable to make himself\nintelligible either to others or to himself. To coin new words is a\npretension to legislation in language which is seldom successful; and,\nbefore recourse is taken to so desperate an expedient, it is advisable\nto examine the dead and learned languages, with the hope and the\nprobability that we may there meet with some adequate expression of the\nnotion we have in our minds. In this case, even if the original meaning\nof the word has become somewhat uncertain, from carelessness or want of\ncaution on the part of the authors of it, it is always better to adhere\nto and confirm its proper meaning\u2014even although it may be doubtful\nwhether it was formerly used in exactly this sense\u2014than to make our\nlabour vain by want of sufficient care to render ourselves\nintelligible.\n\nFor this reason, when it happens that there exists only a single word\nto express a certain conception, and this word, in its usual\nacceptation, is thoroughly adequate to the conception, the accurate\ndistinction of which from related conceptions is of great importance,\nwe ought not to employ the expression improvidently, or, for the sake\nof variety and elegance of style, use it as a synonym for other cognate\nwords. It is our duty, on the contrary, carefully to preserve its\npeculiar signification, as otherwise it easily happens that when the\nattention of the reader is no longer particularly attracted to the\nexpression, and it is lost amid the multitude of other words of very\ndifferent import, the thought which it conveyed, and which it alone\nconveyed, is lost with it.\n\nPlato employed the expression idea in a way that plainly showed he\nmeant by it something which is never derived from the senses, but which\nfar transcends even the conceptions of the understanding (with which\nAristotle occupied himself), inasmuch as in experience nothing\nperfectly corresponding to them could be found. Ideas are, according to\nhim, archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible\nexperiences, like the categories. In his view they flow from the\nhighest reason, by which they have been imparted to human reason,\nwhich, however, exists no longer in its original state, but is obliged\nwith great labour to recall by reminiscence\u2014which is called\nphilosophy\u2014the old but now sadly obscured ideas. I will not here enter\nupon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime\nphilosopher attached to this expression. I shall content myself with\nremarking that it is nothing unusual, in common conversation as well as\nin written works, by comparing the thoughts which an author has\ndelivered upon a subject, to understand him better than he understood\nhimself inasmuch as he may not have sufficiently determined his\nconception, and thus have sometimes spoken, nay even thought, in\nopposition to his own opinions.\n\nPlato perceived very clearly that our faculty of cognition has the\nfeeling of a much higher vocation than that of merely spelling out\nphenomena according to synthetical unity, for the purpose of being able\nto read them as experience, and that our reason naturally raises itself\nto cognitions far too elevated to admit of the possibility of an object\ngiven by experience corresponding to them\u2014cognitions which are\nnevertheless real, and are not mere phantoms of the brain.\n\nThis philosopher found his ideas especially in all that is\npractical,[41] that is, which rests upon freedom, which in its turn\nranks under cognitions that are the peculiar product of reason. He who\nwould derive from experience the conceptions of virtue, who would make\n(as many have really done) that, which at best can but serve as an\nimperfectly illustrative example, a model for or the formation of a\nperfectly adequate idea on the subject, would in fact transform virtue\ninto a nonentity changeable according to time and circumstance and\nutterly incapable of being employed as a rule. On the contrary, every\none is conscious that, when any one is held up to him as a model of\nvirtue, he compares this so-called model with the true original which\nhe possesses in his own mind and values him according to this standard.\nBut this standard is the idea of virtue, in relation to which all\npossible objects of experience are indeed serviceable as\nexamples\u2014proofs of the practicability in a certain degree of that which\nthe conception of virtue demands\u2014but certainly not as archetypes. That\nthe actions of man will never be in perfect accordance with all the\nrequirements of the pure ideas of reason, does not prove the thought to\nbe chimerical. For only through this idea are all judgements as to\nmoral merit or demerit possible; it consequently lies at the foundation\nof every approach to moral perfection, however far removed from it the\nobstacles in human nature\u2014indeterminable as to degree\u2014may keep us.\n\n [41] He certainly extended the application of his conception to\n speculative cognitions also, provided they were given pure and\n completely \u00e0 priori, nay, even to mathematics, although this science\n cannot possess an object otherwhere than in Possible experience. I\n cannot follow him in this, and as little can I follow him in his\n mystical deduction of these ideas, or in his hypostatization of them;\n although, in truth, the elevated and exaggerated language which he\n employed in describing them is quite capable of an interpretation more\n subdued and more in accordance with fact and the nature of things.\n\n\nThe Platonic Republic has become proverbial as an example\u2014and a\nstriking one\u2014of imaginary perfection, such as can exist only in the\nbrain of the idle thinker; and Brucker ridicules the philosopher for\nmaintaining that a prince can never govern well, unless he is\nparticipant in the ideas. But we should do better to follow up this\nthought and, where this admirable thinker leaves us without assistance,\nemploy new efforts to place it in clearer light, rather than carelessly\nfling it aside as useless, under the very miserable and pernicious\npretext of impracticability. A constitution of the greatest possible\nhuman freedom according to laws, by which the liberty of every\nindividual can consist with the liberty of every other (not of the\ngreatest possible happiness, for this follows necessarily from the\nformer), is, to say the least, a necessary idea, which must be placed\nat the foundation not only of the first plan of the constitution of a\nstate, but of all its laws. And, in this, it not necessary at the\noutset to take account of the obstacles which lie in our way\u2014obstacles\nwhich perhaps do not necessarily arise from the character of human\nnature, but rather from the previous neglect of true ideas in\nlegislation. For there is nothing more pernicious and more unworthy of\na philosopher, than the vulgar appeal to a so-called adverse\nexperience, which indeed would not have existed, if those institutions\nhad been established at the proper time and in accordance with ideas;\nwhile, instead of this, conceptions, crude for the very reason that\nthey have been drawn from experience, have marred and frustrated all\nour better views and intentions. The more legislation and government\nare in harmony with this idea, the more rare do punishments become and\nthus it is quite reasonable to maintain, as Plato did, that in a\nperfect state no punishments at all would be necessary. Now although a\nperfect state may never exist, the idea is not on that account the less\njust, which holds up this maximum as the archetype or standard of a\nconstitution, in order to bring legislative government always nearer\nand nearer to the greatest possible perfection. For at what precise\ndegree human nature must stop in its progress, and how wide must be the\nchasm which must necessarily exist between the idea and its\nrealization, are problems which no one can or ought to determine\u2014and\nfor this reason, that it is the destination of freedom to overstep all\nassigned limits between itself and the idea.\n\nBut not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal agent and\nwhere ideas are operative causes (of actions and their objects), that\nis to say, in the region of ethics, but also in regard to nature\nherself, Plato saw clear proofs of an origin from ideas. A plant, and\nanimal, the regular order of nature\u2014probably also the disposition of\nthe whole universe\u2014give manifest evidence that they are possible only\nby means of and according to ideas; that, indeed, no one creature,\nunder the individual conditions of its existence, perfectly harmonizes\nwith the idea of the most perfect of its kind\u2014just as little as man\nwith the idea of humanity, which nevertheless he bears in his soul as\nthe archetypal standard of his actions; that, notwithstanding, these\nideas are in the highest sense individually, unchangeably, and\ncompletely determined, and are the original causes of things; and that\nthe totality of connected objects in the universe is alone fully\nadequate to that idea. Setting aside the exaggerations of expression in\nthe writings of this philosopher, the mental power exhibited in this\nascent from the ectypal mode of regarding the physical world to the\narchitectonic connection thereof according to ends, that is, ideas, is\nan effort which deserves imitation and claims respect. But as regards\nthe principles of ethics, of legislation, and of religion, spheres in\nwhich ideas alone render experience possible, although they never\nattain to full expression therein, he has vindicated for himself a\nposition of peculiar merit, which is not appreciated only because it is\njudged by the very empirical rules, the validity of which as principles\nis destroyed by ideas. For as regards nature, experience presents us\nwith rules and is the source of truth, but in relation to ethical laws\nexperience is the parent of illusion, and it is in the highest degree\nreprehensible to limit or to deduce the laws which dictate what I ought\nto do, from what is done.\n\nWe must, however, omit the consideration of these important subjects,\nthe development of which is in reality the peculiar duty and dignity of\nphilosophy, and confine ourselves for the present to the more humble\nbut not less useful task of preparing a firm foundation for those\nmajestic edifices of moral science. For this foundation has been\nhitherto insecure from the many subterranean passages which reason in\nits confident but vain search for treasures has made in all directions.\nOur present duty is to make ourselves perfectly acquainted with the\ntranscendental use made of pure reason, its principles and ideas, that\nwe may be able properly to determine and value its influence and real\nworth. But before bringing these introductory remarks to a close, I beg\nthose who really have philosophy at heart\u2014and their number is but\nsmall\u2014if they shall find themselves convinced by the considerations\nfollowing as well as by those above, to exert themselves to preserve to\nthe expression idea its original signification, and to take care that\nit be not lost among those other expressions by which all sorts of\nrepresentations are loosely designated\u2014that the interests of science\nmay not thereby suffer. We are in no want of words to denominate\nadequately every mode of representation, without the necessity of\nencroaching upon terms which are proper to others. The following is a\ngraduated list of them. The genus is representation in general\n(representatio). Under it stands representation with consciousness\n(perceptio). A perception which relates solely to the subject as a\nmodification of its state, is a sensation (sensatio), an objective\nperception is a cognition (cognitio). A cognition is either an\nintuition or a conception (intuitus vel conceptus). The former has an\nimmediate relation to the object and is singular and individual; the\nlatter has but a mediate relation, by means of a characteristic mark\nwhich may be common to several things. A conception is either empirical\nor pure. A pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the\nunderstanding alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous\nimage, is called notio. A conception formed from notions, which\ntranscends the possibility of experience, is an idea, or a conception\nof reason. To one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions, it\nmust be quite intolerable to hear the representation of the colour red\ncalled an idea. It ought not even to be called a notion or conception\nof understanding.\n\nSection II. Of Transcendental Ideas\n\nTranscendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our\ncognition can contain the origin of pure conceptions \u00e0 priori,\nconceptions which represent objects antecedently to all experience, or\nrather, indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an\nempirical cognition of objects. The form of judgements\u2014converted into a\nconception of the synthesis of intuitions\u2014produced the categories which\ndirect the employment of the understanding in experience. This\nconsideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms, when\napplied to synthetical unity of intuitions, following the rule of the\ncategories, will contain the origin of particular \u00e0 priori conceptions,\nwhich we may call pure conceptions of reason or transcendental ideas,\nand which will determine the use of the understanding in the totality\nof experience according to principles.\n\nThe function of reason in arguments consists in the universality of a\ncognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is a\njudgement which is determined \u00e0 priori in the whole extent of its\ncondition. The proposition: \u201cCaius is mortal,\u201d is one which may be\nobtained from experience by the aid of the understanding alone; but my\nwish is to find a conception which contains the condition under which\nthe predicate of this judgement is given\u2014in this case, the conception\nof man\u2014and after subsuming under this condition, taken in its whole\nextent (all men are mortal), I determine according to it the cognition\nof the object thought, and say: \u201cCaius is mortal.\u201d\n\nHence, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a predicate to a\ncertain object, after having thought it in the major in its whole\nextent under a certain condition. This complete quantity of the extent\nin relation to such a condition is called universality (universalitas).\nTo this corresponds totality (universitas) of conditions in the\nsynthesis of intuitions. The transcendental conception of reason is\ntherefore nothing else than the conception of the totality of the\nconditions of a given conditioned. Now as the unconditioned alone\nrenders possible totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality\nof conditions is itself always unconditioned; a pure rational\nconception in general can be defined and explained by means of the\nconception of the unconditioned, in so far as it contains a basis for\nthe synthesis of the conditioned.\n\nTo the number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates by\nmeans of the categories, the number of pure rational conceptions will\ncorrespond. We must therefore seek for, first, an unconditioned of the\ncategorical synthesis in a subject; secondly, of the hypothetical\nsynthesis of the members of a series; thirdly, of the disjunctive\nsynthesis of parts in a system.\n\nThere are exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms, each of which\nproceeds through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned\u2014one to the subject\nwhich cannot be employed as predicate, another to the presupposition\nwhich supposes nothing higher than itself, and the third to an\naggregate of the members of the complete division of a conception.\nHence the pure rational conceptions of totality in the synthesis of\nconditions have a necessary foundation in the nature of human reason\u2014at\nleast as modes of elevating the unity of the understanding to the\nunconditioned. They may have no valid application, corresponding to\ntheir transcendental employment, in concreto, and be thus of no greater\nutility than to direct the understanding how, while extending them as\nwidely as possible, to maintain its exercise and application in perfect\nconsistence and harmony.\n\nBut, while speaking here of the totality of conditions and of the\nunconditioned as the common title of all conceptions of reason, we\nagain light upon an expression which we find it impossible to dispense\nwith, and which nevertheless, owing to the ambiguity attaching to it\nfrom long abuse, we cannot employ with safety. The word absolute is one\nof the few words which, in its original signification, was perfectly\nadequate to the conception it was intended to convey\u2014a conception which\nno other word in the same language exactly suits, and the loss\u2014or,\nwhich is the same thing, the incautious and loose employment\u2014of which\nmust be followed by the loss of the conception itself. And, as it is a\nconception which occupies much of the attention of reason, its loss\nwould be greatly to the detriment of all transcendental philosophy. The\nword absolute is at present frequently used to denote that something\ncan be predicated of a thing considered in itself and intrinsically. In\nthis sense absolutely possible would signify that which is possible in\nitself (interne)\u2014which is, in fact, the least that one can predicate of\nan object. On the other hand, it is sometimes employed to indicate that\na thing is valid in all respects\u2014for example, absolute sovereignty.\nAbsolutely possible would in this sense signify that which is possible\nin all relations and in every respect; and this is the most that can be\npredicated of the possibility of a thing. Now these significations do\nin truth frequently coincide. Thus, for example, that which is\nintrinsically impossible, is also impossible in all relations, that is,\nabsolutely impossible. But in most cases they differ from each other\ntoto caelo, and I can by no means conclude that, because a thing is in\nitself possible, it is also possible in all relations, and therefore\nabsolutely. Nay, more, I shall in the sequel show that absolute\nnecessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity, and that,\ntherefore, it must not be considered as synonymous with it. Of an\nopposite which is intrinsically impossible, we may affirm that it is in\nall respects impossible, and that, consequently, the thing itself, of\nwhich this is the opposite, is absolutely necessary; but I cannot\nreason conversely and say, the opposite of that which is absolutely\nnecessary is intrinsically impossible, that is, that the absolute\nnecessity of things is an internal necessity. For this internal\nnecessity is in certain cases a mere empty word with which the least\nconception cannot be connected, while the conception of the necessity\nof a thing in all relations possesses very peculiar determinations. Now\nas the loss of a conception of great utility in speculative science\ncannot be a matter of indifference to the philosopher, I trust that the\nproper determination and careful preservation of the expression on\nwhich the conception depends will likewise be not indifferent to him.\n\nIn this enlarged signification, then, shall I employ the word absolute,\nin opposition to that which is valid only in some particular respect;\nfor the latter is restricted by conditions, the former is valid without\nany restriction whatever.\n\nNow the transcendental conception of reason has for its object nothing\nelse than absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions and does not\nrest satisfied till it has attained to the absolutely, that is, in all\nrespects and relations, unconditioned. For pure reason leaves to the\nunderstanding everything that immediately relates to the object of\nintuition or rather to their synthesis in imagination. The former\nrestricts itself to the absolute totality in the employment of the\nconceptions of the understanding and aims at carrying out the\nsynthetical unity which is cogitated in the category, even to the\nunconditioned. This unity may hence be called the rational unity of\nphenomena, as the other, which the category expresses, may be termed\nthe unity of the understanding. Reason, therefore, has an immediate\nrelation to the use of the understanding, not indeed in so far as the\nlatter contains the ground of possible experience (for the conception\nof the absolute totality of conditions is not a conception that can be\nemployed in experience, because no experience is unconditioned), but\nsolely for the purpose of directing it to a certain unity, of which the\nunderstanding has no conception, and the aim of which is to collect\ninto an absolute whole all acts of the understanding. Hence the\nobjective employment of the pure conceptions of reason is always\ntranscendent, while that of the pure conceptions of the understanding\nmust, according to their nature, be always immanent, inasmuch as they\nare limited to possible experience.\n\nI understand by idea a necessary conception of reason, to which no\ncorresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense.\nAccordingly, the pure conceptions of reason at present under\nconsideration are transcendental ideas. They are conceptions of pure\nreason, for they regard all empirical cognition as determined by means\nof an absolute totality of conditions. They are not mere fictions, but\nnatural and necessary products of reason, and have hence a necessary\nrelation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understanding. And,\nfinally, they are transcendent, and overstep the limits of all\nexperiences, in which, consequently, no object can ever be presented\nthat would be perfectly adequate to a transcendental idea. When we use\nthe word idea, we say, as regards its object (an object of the pure\nunderstanding), a great deal, but as regards its subject (that is, in\nrespect of its reality under conditions of experience), exceedingly\nlittle, because the idea, as the conception of a maximum, can never be\ncompletely and adequately presented in concreto. Now, as in the merely\nspeculative employment of reason the latter is properly the sole aim,\nand as in this case the approximation to a conception, which is never\nattained in practice, is the same thing as if the conception were\nnon-existent\u2014it is commonly said of the conception of this kind, \u201cit is\nonly an idea.\u201d So we might very well say, \u201cthe absolute totality of all\nphenomena is only an idea,\u201d for, as we never can present an adequate\nrepresentation of it, it remains for us a problem incapable of\nsolution. On the other hand, as in the practical use of the\nunderstanding we have only to do with action and practice according to\nrules, an idea of pure reason can always be given really in concreto,\nalthough only partially, nay, it is the indispensable condition of all\npractical employment of reason. The practice or execution of the idea\nis always limited and defective, but nevertheless within indeterminable\nboundaries, consequently always under the influence of the conception\nof an absolute perfection. And thus the practical idea is always in the\nhighest degree fruitful, and in relation to real actions indispensably\nnecessary. In the idea, pure reason possesses even causality and the\npower of producing that which its conception contains. Hence we cannot\nsay of wisdom, in a disparaging way, \u201cit is only an idea.\u201d For, for the\nvery reason that it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible\naims, it must be for all practical exertions and endeavours the\nprimitive condition and rule\u2014a rule which, if not constitutive, is at\nleast limitative.\n\nNow, although we must say of the transcendental conceptions of reason,\n\u201cthey are only ideas,\u201d we must not, on this account, look upon them as\nsuperfluous and nugatory. For, although no object can be determined by\nthem, they can be of great utility, unobserved and at the basis of the\nedifice of the understanding, as the canon for its extended and\nself-consistent exercise\u2014a canon which, indeed, does not enable it to\ncognize more in an object than it would cognize by the help of its own\nconceptions, but which guides it more securely in its cognition. Not to\nmention that they perhaps render possible a transition from our\nconceptions of nature and the non-ego to the practical conceptions, and\nthus produce for even ethical ideas keeping, so to speak, and\nconnection with the speculative cognitions of reason. The explication\nof all this must be looked for in the sequel.\n\nBut setting aside, in conformity with our original purpose, the\nconsideration of the practical ideas, we proceed to contemplate reason\nin its speculative use alone, nay, in a still more restricted sphere,\nto wit, in the transcendental use; and here must strike into the same\npath which we followed in our deduction of the categories. That is to\nsay, we shall consider the logical form of the cognition of reason,\nthat we may see whether reason may not be thereby a source of\nconceptions which enables us to regard objects in themselves as\ndetermined synthetically \u00e0 priori, in relation to one or other of the\nfunctions of reason.\n\nReason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of\ncognition, is the faculty of conclusion, that is, of mediate\njudgement\u2014by means of the subsumption of the condition of a possible\njudgement under the condition of a given judgement. The given judgement\nis the general rule (major). The subsumption of the condition of\nanother possible judgement under the condition of the rule is the\nminor. The actual judgement, which enounces the assertion of the rule\nin the subsumed case, is the conclusion (conclusio). The rule\npredicates something generally under a certain condition. The condition\nof the rule is satisfied in some particular case. It follows that what\nwas valid in general under that condition must also be considered as\nvalid in the particular case which satisfies this condition. It is very\nplain that reason attains to a cognition, by means of acts of the\nunderstanding which constitute a series of conditions. When I arrive at\nthe proposition, \u201cAll bodies are changeable,\u201d by beginning with the\nmore remote cognition (in which the conception of body does not appear,\nbut which nevertheless contains the condition of that conception), \u201cAll\ncompound is changeable,\u201d by proceeding from this to a less remote\ncognition, which stands under the condition of the former, \u201cBodies are\ncompound,\u201d and hence to a third, which at length connects for me the\nremote cognition (changeable) with the one before me, \u201cConsequently,\nbodies are changeable\u201d\u2014I have arrived at a cognition (conclusion)\nthrough a series of conditions (premisses). Now every series, whose\nexponent (of the categorical or hypothetical judgement) is given, can\nbe continued; consequently the same procedure of reason conducts us to\nthe ratiocinatio polysyllogistica, which is a series of syllogisms,\nthat can be continued either on the side of the conditions (per\nprosyllogismos) or of the conditioned (per episyllogismos) to an\nindefinite extent.\n\nBut we very soon perceive that the chain or series of prosyllogisms,\nthat is, of deduced cognitions on the side of the grounds or conditions\nof a given cognition, in other words, the ascending series of\nsyllogisms must have a very different relation to the faculty of reason\nfrom that of the descending series, that is, the progressive procedure\nof reason on the side of the conditioned by means of episyllogisms.\nFor, as in the former case the cognition (conclusio) is given only as\nconditioned, reason can attain to this cognition only under the\npresupposition that all the members of the series on the side of the\nconditions are given (totality in the series of premisses), because\nonly under this supposition is the judgement we may be considering\npossible \u00e0 priori; while on the side of the conditioned or the\ninferences, only an incomplete and becoming, and not a presupposed or\ngiven series, consequently only a potential progression, is cogitated.\nHence, when a cognition is contemplated as conditioned, reason is\ncompelled to consider the series of conditions in an ascending line as\ncompleted and given in their totality. But if the very same condition\nis considered at the same time as the condition of other cognitions,\nwhich together constitute a series of inferences or consequences in a\ndescending line, reason may preserve a perfect indifference, as to how\nfar this progression may extend _a parte posteriori_, and whether the\ntotality of this series is possible, because it stands in no need of\nsuch a series for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion before it,\ninasmuch as this conclusion is sufficiently guaranteed and determined\non grounds a parte priori. It may be the case, that upon the side of\nthe conditions the series of premisses has a first or highest\ncondition, or it may not possess this, and so be a parte priori\nunlimited; but it must, nevertheless, contain totality of conditions,\neven admitting that we never could succeed in completely apprehending\nit; and the whole series must be unconditionally true, if the\nconditioned, which is considered as an inference resulting from it, is\nto be held as true. This is a requirement of reason, which announces\nits cognition as determined \u00e0 priori and as necessary, either in\nitself\u2014and in this case it needs no grounds to rest upon\u2014or, if it is\ndeduced, as a member of a series of grounds, which is itself\nunconditionally true.\n\nSection III. System of Transcendental Ideas\n\nWe are not at present engaged with a logical dialectic, which makes\ncomplete abstraction of the content of cognition and aims only at\nunveiling the illusory appearance in the form of syllogisms. Our\nsubject is transcendental dialectic, which must contain, completely \u00e0\npriori, the origin of certain cognitions drawn from pure reason, and\nthe origin of certain deduced conceptions, the object of which cannot\nbe given empirically and which therefore lie beyond the sphere of the\nfaculty of understanding. We have observed, from the natural relation\nwhich the transcendental use of our cognition, in syllogisms as well as\nin judgements, must have to the logical, that there are three kinds of\ndialectical arguments, corresponding to the three modes of conclusion,\nby which reason attains to cognitions on principles; and that in all it\nis the business of reason to ascend from the conditioned synthesis,\nbeyond which the understanding never proceeds, to the unconditioned\nwhich the understanding never can reach.\n\nNow the most general relations which can exist in our representations\nare: 1st, the relation to the subject; 2nd, the relation to objects,\neither as phenomena, or as objects of thought in general. If we connect\nthis subdivision with the main division, all the relations of our\nrepresentations, of which we can form either a conception or an idea,\nare threefold: 1. The relation to the subject; 2. The relation to the\nmanifold of the object as a phenomenon; 3. The relation to all things\nin general.\n\nNow all pure conceptions have to do in general with the synthetical\nunity of representations; conceptions of pure reason (transcendental\nideas), on the other hand, with the unconditional synthetical unity of\nall conditions. It follows that all transcendental ideas arrange\nthemselves in three classes, the first of which contains the absolute\n(unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject, the second the absolute\nunity of the series of the conditions of a phenomenon, the third the\nabsolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general.\n\nThe thinking subject is the object-matter of Psychology; the sum total\nof all phenomena (the world) is the object-matter of Cosmology; and the\nthing which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all\nthat is cogitable (the being of all beings) is the object-matter of all\nTheology. Thus pure reason presents us with the idea of a\ntranscendental doctrine of the soul (psychologia rationalis), of a\ntranscendental science of the world (cosmologia rationalis), and\nfinally of a transcendental doctrine of God (theologia\ntranscendentalis). Understanding cannot originate even the outline of\nany of these sciences, even when connected with the highest logical use\nof reason, that is, all cogitable syllogisms\u2014for the purpose of\nproceeding from one object (phenomenon) to all others, even to the\nutmost limits of the empirical synthesis. They are, on the contrary,\npure and genuine products, or problems, of pure reason.\n\nWhat modi of the pure conceptions of reason these transcendental ideas\nare will be fully exposed in the following chapter. They follow the\nguiding thread of the categories. For pure reason never relates\nimmediately to objects, but to the conceptions of these contained in\nthe understanding. In like manner, it will be made manifest in the\ndetailed explanation of these ideas\u2014how reason, merely through the\nsynthetical use of the same function which it employs in a categorical\nsyllogism, necessarily attains to the conception of the absolute unity\nof the thinking subject\u2014how the logical procedure in hypothetical ideas\nnecessarily produces the idea of the absolutely unconditioned in a\nseries of given conditions, and finally\u2014how the mere form of the\ndisjunctive syllogism involves the highest conception of a being of all\nbeings: a thought which at first sight seems in the highest degree\nparadoxical.\n\nAn objective deduction, such as we were able to present in the case of\nthe categories, is impossible as regards these transcendental ideas.\nFor they have, in truth, no relation to any object, in experience, for\nthe very reason that they are only ideas. But a subjective deduction of\nthem from the nature of our reason is possible, and has been given in\nthe present chapter.\n\nIt is easy to perceive that the sole aim of pure reason is the absolute\ntotality of the synthesis on the side of the conditions, and that it\ndoes not concern itself with the absolute completeness on the Part of\nthe conditioned. For of the former alone does she stand in need, in\norder to preposit the whole series of conditions, and thus present them\nto the understanding \u00e0 priori. But if we once have a completely (and\nunconditionally) given condition, there is no further necessity, in\nproceeding with the series, for a conception of reason; for the\nunderstanding takes of itself every step downward, from the condition\nto the conditioned. Thus the transcendental ideas are available only\nfor ascending in the series of conditions, till we reach the\nunconditioned, that is, principles. As regards descending to the\nconditioned, on the other hand, we find that there is a widely\nextensive logical use which reason makes of the laws of the\nunderstanding, but that a transcendental use thereof is impossible; and\nthat when we form an idea of the absolute totality of such a synthesis,\nfor example, of the whole series of all future changes in the world,\nthis idea is a mere ens rationis, an arbitrary fiction of thought, and\nnot a necessary presupposition of reason. For the possibility of the\nconditioned presupposes the totality of its conditions, but not of its\nconsequences. Consequently, this conception is not a transcendental\nidea\u2014and it is with these alone that we are at present occupied.\n\nFinally, it is obvious that there exists among the transcendental ideas\na certain connection and unity, and that pure reason, by means of them,\ncollects all its cognitions into one system. From the cognition of self\nto the cognition of the world, and through these to the supreme being,\nthe progression is so natural, that it seems to resemble the logical\nmarch of reason from the premisses to the conclusion.[42] Now whether\nthere lies unobserved at the foundation of these ideas an analogy of\nthe same kind as exists between the logical and transcendental\nprocedure of reason, is another of those questions, the answer to which\nwe must not expect till we arrive at a more advanced stage in our\ninquiries. In this cursory and preliminary view, we have, meanwhile,\nreached our aim. For we have dispelled the ambiguity which attached to\nthe transcendental conceptions of reason, from their being commonly\nmixed up with other conceptions in the systems of philosophers, and not\nproperly distinguished from the conceptions of the understanding; we\nhave exposed their origin and, thereby, at the same time their\ndeterminate number, and presented them in a systematic connection, and\nhave thus marked out and enclosed a definite sphere for pure reason.\n\n [42] The science of Metaphysics has for the proper object of its\n inquiries only three grand ideas: GOD, FREEDOM, and IMMORTALITY, and\n it aims at showing, that the second conception, conjoined with the\n first, must lead to the third, as a necessary conclusion. All the\n other subjects with which it occupies itself, are merely means for the\n attainment and realization of these ideas. It does not require these\n ideas for the construction of a science of nature, but, on the\n contrary, for the purpose of passing beyond the sphere of nature. A\n complete insight into and comprehension of them would render Theology,\n Ethics, and, through the conjunction of both, Religion, solely\n dependent on the speculative faculty of reason. In a systematic\n representation of these ideas the above-mentioned arrangement\u2014the\n synthetical one\u2014would be the most suitable; but in the investigation\n which must necessarily precede it, the analytical, which reverses this\n arrangement, would be better adapted to our purpose, as in it we\n should proceed from that which experience immediately presents to\n us\u2014psychology, to cosmology, and thence to theology.\n\nTRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC\u2014BOOK II\u2014OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OF PURE\nREASON\n\nIt may be said that the object of a merely transcendental idea is\nsomething of which we have no conception, although the idea may be a\nnecessary product of reason according to its original laws. For, in\nfact, a conception of an object that is adequate to the idea given by\nreason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of being\npresented and intuited in a Possible experience. But we should express\nour meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood, if we\nsaid that we can have no knowledge of an object, which perfectly\ncorresponds to an idea, although we may possess a problematical\nconception thereof.\n\nNow the transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the pure\nconceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas\nby a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be syllogisms\nwhich contain no empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude\nfrom something that we do know, to something of which we do not even\npossess a conception, to which we, nevertheless, by an unavoidable\nillusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are, as regards\ntheir result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms, although\nindeed, as regards their origin, they are very well entitled to the\nlatter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental products\nof reason, but are necessitated by its very nature. They are sophisms,\nnot of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the Wisest cannot\nfree himself. After long labour he may be able to guard against the\nerror, but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which\ncontinually mocks and misleads him.\n\nOf these dialectical arguments there are three kinds, corresponding\nto the number of the ideas which their conclusions present. In the\nargument or syllogism of the first class, I conclude, from the\ntranscendental conception of the subject which contains no manifold,\nthe absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I cannot in this\nmanner attain to a conception. This dialectical argument I shall\ncall the transcendental paralogism. The second class of sophistical\narguments is occupied with the transcendental conception of the\nabsolute totality of the series of conditions for a given phenomenon,\nand I conclude, from the fact that I have always a self-contradictory\nconception of the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series upon\none side, the truth of the opposite unity, of which I have nevertheless\nno conception. The condition of reason in these dialectical arguments,\nI shall term the antinomy of pure reason. Finally, according to the\nthird kind of sophistical argument, I conclude, from the totality of\nthe conditions of thinking objects in general, in so far as they can\nbe given, the absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the\npossibility of things in general; that is, from things which I do not\nknow in their mere transcendental conception, I conclude a being of all\nbeings which I know still less by means of a transcendental conception,\nand of whose unconditioned necessity I can form no conception whatever.\nThis dialectical argument I shall call the ideal of pure reason.\n\nChapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason\n\nThe logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in\nrespect of its form, be the content what it may. But a transcendental\nparalogism has a transcendental foundation, and concludes falsely,\nwhile the form is correct and unexceptionable. In this manner the\nparalogism has its foundation in the nature of human reason, and is the\nparent of an unavoidable, though not insoluble, mental illusion.\n\nWe now come to a conception which was not inserted in the general list\nof transcendental conceptions, and yet must be reckoned with them, but\nat the same time without in the least altering, or indicating a\ndeficiency in that table. This is the conception, or, if the term is\npreferred, the judgement, \u201cI think.\u201d But it is readily perceived that\nthis thought is as it were the vehicle of all conceptions in general,\nand consequently of transcendental conceptions also, and that it is\ntherefore regarded as a transcendental conception, although it can have\nno peculiar claim to be so ranked, inasmuch as its only use is to\nindicate that all thought is accompanied by consciousness. At the same\ntime, pure as this conception is from empirical content (impressions of\nthe senses), it enables us to distinguish two different kinds of\nobjects. \u201cI,\u201d as thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am\ncalled soul. That which is an object of the external senses is called\nbody. Thus the expression, \u201cI,\u201d as a thinking being, designates the\nobject-matter of psychology, which may be called \u201cthe rational doctrine\nof the soul,\u201d inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing of\nthe soul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me\nin concreto), may be concluded from this conception \u201cI,\u201d in so far as\nit appears in all thought.\n\nNow, the rational doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking of this\nkind. For if the smallest empirical element of thought, if any\nparticular perception of my internal state, were to be introduced among\nthe grounds of cognition of this science, it would not be a rational,\nbut an empirical doctrine of the soul. We have thus before us a\npretended science, raised upon the single proposition, \u201cI think,\u201d whose\nfoundation or want of foundation we may very properly, and agreeably\nwith the nature of a transcendental philosophy, here examine. It ought\nnot to be objected that in this proposition, which expresses the\nperception of one\u2019s self, an internal experience is asserted, and that\nconsequently the rational doctrine of the soul which is founded upon\nit, is not pure, but partly founded upon an empirical principle. For\nthis internal perception is nothing more than the mere apperception, \u201cI\nthink,\u201d which in fact renders all transcendental conceptions possible,\nin which we say, \u201cI think substance, cause, etc.\u201d For internal\nexperience in general and its possibility, or perception in general,\nand its relation to other perceptions, unless some particular\ndistinction or determination thereof is empirically given, cannot be\nregarded as empirical cognition, but as cognition of the empirical, and\nbelongs to the investigation of the possibility of every experience,\nwhich is certainly transcendental. The smallest object of experience\n(for example, only pleasure or pain), that should be included in the\ngeneral representation of self-consciousness, would immediately change\nthe rational into an empirical psychology.\n\n\u201cI think\u201d is therefore the only text of rational psychology, from which\nit must develop its whole system. It is manifest that this thought,\nwhen applied to an object (myself), can contain nothing but\ntranscendental predicates thereof; because the least empirical\npredicate would destroy the purity of the science and its independence\nof all experience.\n\nBut we shall have to follow here the guidance of the categories\u2014only,\nas in the present case a thing, \u201cI,\u201d as thinking being, is at first\ngiven, we shall\u2014not indeed change the order of the categories as it\nstands in the table\u2014but begin at the category of substance, by which at\nthe a thing in itself is represented and proceeds backwards through the\nseries. The topic of the rational doctrine of the soul, from which\neverything else it may contain must be deduced, is accordingly as\nfollows:\n\n            1                          2\n  The Soul is SUBSTANCE       As regards its quality\n                                it is SIMPLE\n\n                      3\n          As regards the different\n          times in which it exists,\n          it is numerically identical,\n          that is UNITY, not Plurality.\n\n                       4\n  It is in relation to possible objects in space[43]\n\n [43] The reader, who may not so easily perceive the psychological\n sense of these expressions, taken here in their transcendental\n abstraction, and cannot guess why the latter attribute of the soul\n belongs to the category of existence, will find the expressions\n sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. I have, moreover,\n to apologize for the Latin terms which have been employed, instead of\n their German synonyms, contrary to the rules of correct writing. But I\n judged it better to sacrifice elegance to perspicuity.\n\n\nFrom these elements originate all the conceptions of pure psychology,\nby combination alone, without the aid of any other principle. This\nsubstance, merely as an object of the internal sense, gives the\nconception of Immateriality; as simple substance, that of\nIncorruptibility; its identity, as intellectual substance, gives the\nconception of Personality; all these three together, Spirituality. Its\nrelation to objects in space gives us the conception of connection\n(commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking substance as the\nprinciple of life in matter, that is, as a soul (anima), and as the\nground of Animality; and this, limited and determined by the conception\nof spirituality, gives us that of Immortality.\n\nNow to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a transcendental\npsychology, which is falsely held to be a science of pure reason,\ntouching the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at the\nfoundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself\nperfectly contentless representation \u201ci\u201d which cannot even be called a\nconception, but merely a consciousness which accompanies all\nconceptions. By this \u201cI,\u201d or \u201cHe,\u201d or \u201cIt,\u201d who or which thinks,\nnothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought =\nx, which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its\npredicates, and of which, apart from these, we cannot form the least\nconception. Hence in a perpetual circle, inasmuch as we must always\nemploy it, in order to frame any judgement respecting it. And this\ninconvenience we find it impossible to rid ourselves of, because\nconsciousness in itself is not so much a representation distinguishing\na particular object, as a form of representation in general, in so far\nas it may be termed cognition; for in and by cognition alone do I think\nanything.\n\nIt must, however, appear extraordinary at first sight that the\ncondition under which I think, and which is consequently a property of\nmy subject, should be held to be likewise valid for every existence\nwhich thinks, and that we can presume to base upon a seemingly\nempirical proposition a judgement which is apodeictic and universal, to\nwit, that everything which thinks is constituted as the voice of my\nconsciousness declares it to be, that is, as a self-conscious being.\nThe cause of this belief is to be found in the fact that we necessarily\nattribute to things \u00e0 priori all the properties which constitute\nconditions under which alone we can cogitate them. Now I cannot obtain\nthe least representation of a thinking being by means of external\nexperience, but solely through self-consciousness. Such objects are\nconsequently nothing more than the transference of this consciousness\nof mine to other things which can only thus be represented as thinking\nbeings. The proposition, \u201cI think,\u201d is, in the present case, understood\nin a problematical sense, not in so far as it contains a perception of\nan existence (like the Cartesian \u201cCogito, ergo sum\u201d), but in regard to\nits mere possibility\u2014for the purpose of discovering what properties may\nbe inferred from so simple a proposition and predicated of the subject\nof it.\n\nIf at the foundation of our pure rational cognition of thinking beings\nthere lay more than the mere Cogito\u2014if we could likewise call in aid\nobservations on the play of our thoughts, and the thence derived\nnatural laws of the thinking self, there would arise an empirical\npsychology which would be a kind of physiology of the internal sense\nand might possibly be capable of explaining the phenomena of that\nsense. But it could never be available for discovering those properties\nwhich do not belong to possible experience (such as the quality of\nsimplicity), nor could it make any apodeictic enunciation on the nature\nof thinking beings: it would therefore not be a rational psychology.\n\nNow, as the proposition \u201cI think\u201d (in the problematical sense) contains\nthe form of every judgement in general and is the constant\naccompaniment of all the categories, it is manifest that conclusions\nare drawn from it only by a transcendental employment of the\nunderstanding. This use of the understanding excludes all empirical\nelements; and we cannot, as has been shown above, have any favourable\nconception beforehand of its procedure. We shall therefore follow with\na critical eye this proposition through all the predicaments of pure\npsychology; but we shall, for brevity\u2019s sake, allow this examination to\nproceed in an uninterrupted connection.\n\nBefore entering on this task, however, the following general remark may\nhelp to quicken our attention to this mode of argument. It is not\nmerely through my thinking that I cognize an object, but only through\nmy determining a given intuition in relation to the unity of\nconsciousness in which all thinking consists. It follows that I cognize\nmyself, not through my being conscious of myself as thinking, but only\nwhen I am conscious of the intuition of myself as determined in\nrelation to the function of thought. All the modi of self-consciousness\nin thought are hence not conceptions of objects (conceptions of the\nunderstanding\u2014categories); they are mere logical functions, which do\nnot present to thought an object to be cognized, and cannot therefore\npresent my Self as an object. Not the consciousness of the determining,\nbut only that of the determinable self, that is, of my internal\nintuition (in so far as the manifold contained in it can be connected\nconformably with the general condition of the unity of apperception in\nthought), is the object.\n\n1. In all judgements I am the determining subject of that relation\nwhich constitutes a judgement. But that the I which thinks, must be\nconsidered as in thought always a subject, and as a thing which cannot\nbe a predicate to thought, is an apodeictic and identical proposition.\nBut this proposition does not signify that I, as an object, am, for\nmyself, a self-subsistent being or substance. This latter statement\u2014an\nambitious one\u2014requires to be supported by data which are not to be\ndiscovered in thought; and are perhaps (in so far as I consider the\nthinking self merely as such) not to be discovered in the thinking self\nat all.\n\n2. That the I or Ego of apperception, and consequently in all thought,\nis singular or simple, and cannot be resolved into a plurality of\nsubjects, and therefore indicates a logically simple subject\u2014this is\nself-evident from the very conception of an Ego, and is consequently an\nanalytical proposition. But this is not tantamount to declaring that\nthe thinking Ego is a simple substance\u2014for this would be a synthetical\nproposition. The conception of substance always relates to intuitions,\nwhich with me cannot be other than sensuous, and which consequently lie\ncompletely out of the sphere of the understanding and its thought: but\nto this sphere belongs the affirmation that the Ego is simple in\nthought. It would indeed be surprising, if the conception of\n\u201csubstance,\u201d which in other cases requires so much labour to\ndistinguish from the other elements presented by intuition\u2014so much\ntrouble, too, to discover whether it can be simple (as in the case of\nthe parts of matter)\u2014should be presented immediately to me, as if by\nrevelation, in the poorest mental representation of all.\n\n3. The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the manifold\nrepresentations of which I am conscious, is likewise a proposition\nlying in the conceptions themselves, and is consequently analytical.\nBut this identity of the subject, of which I am conscious in all its\nrepresentations, does not relate to or concern the intuition of the\nsubject, by which it is given as an object. This proposition cannot\ntherefore enounce the identity of the person, by which is understood\nthe consciousness of the identity of its own substance as a thinking\nbeing in all change and variation of circumstances. To prove this, we\nshould require not a mere analysis of the proposition, but synthetical\njudgements based upon a given intuition.\n\n4. I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from\nthat of other things external to me\u2014among which my body also is\nreckoned. This is also an analytical proposition, for other things are\nexactly those which I think as different or distinguished from myself.\nBut whether this consciousness of myself is possible without things\nexternal to me; and whether therefore I can exist merely as a thinking\nbeing (without being man)\u2014cannot be known or inferred from this\nproposition.\n\nThus we have gained nothing as regards the cognition of myself as\nobject, by the analysis of the consciousness of my Self in thought. The\nlogical exposition of thought in general is mistaken for a metaphysical\ndetermination of the object.\n\nOur Critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous, if there\nexisted a possibility of proving \u00e0 priori, that all thinking beings are\nin themselves simple substances, as such, therefore, possess the\ninseparable attribute of personality, and are conscious of their\nexistence apart from and unconnected with matter. For we should thus\nhave taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have penetrated into\nthe sphere of noumena; and in this case the right could not be denied\nus of extending our knowledge in this sphere, of establishing\nourselves, and, under a favouring star, appropriating to ourselves\npossessions in it. For the proposition: \u201cEvery thinking being, as such,\nis simple substance,\u201d is an \u00e0 priori synthetical proposition; because\nin the first place it goes beyond the conception which is the subject\nof it, and adds to the mere notion of a thinking being the mode of its\nexistence, and in the second place annexes a predicate (that of\nsimplicity) to the latter conception\u2014a predicate which it could not\nhave discovered in the sphere of experience. It would follow that \u00e0\npriori synthetical propositions are possible and legitimate, not only,\nas we have maintained, in relation to objects of possible experience,\nand as principles of the possibility of this experience itself, but are\napplicable to things in themselves\u2014an inference which makes an end of\nthe whole of this Critique, and obliges us to fall back on the old mode\nof metaphysical procedure. But indeed the danger is not so great, if we\nlook a little closer into the question.\n\nThere lurks in the procedure of rational Psychology a paralogism, which\nis represented in the following syllogism:\n\nThat which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject, does not\nexist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance.\n\nA thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be cogitated\notherwise than as subject.\n\nTherefore it exists also as such, that is, as substance.\n\nIn the major we speak of a being that can be cogitated generally and in\nevery relation, consequently as it may be given in intuition. But in\nthe minor we speak of the same being only in so far as it regards\nitself as subject, relatively to thought and the unity of\nconsciousness, but not in relation to intuition, by which it is\npresented as an object to thought. Thus the conclusion is here arrived\nat by a Sophisma figurae dictionis.[44]\n\n [44] Thought is taken in the two premisses in two totally different\n senses. In the major it is considered as relating and applying to\n objects in general, consequently to objects of intuition also. In the\n minor, we understand it as relating merely to self-consciousness. In\n this sense, we do not cogitate an object, but merely the relation to\n the self-consciousness of the subject, as the form of thought. In the\n former premiss we speak of things which cannot be cogitated otherwise\n than as subjects. In the second, we do not speak of things, but of\n thought (all objects being abstracted), in which the Ego is always the\n subject of consciousness. Hence the conclusion cannot be, \u201cI cannot\n exist otherwise than as subject\u201d; but only \u201cI can, in cogitating my\n existence, employ my Ego only as the subject of the judgement.\u201d But\n this is an identical proposition, and throws no light on the mode of\n my existence.\n\n\nThat this famous argument is a mere paralogism, will be plain to any\none who will consider the general remark which precedes our exposition\nof the principles of the pure understanding, and the section on\nnoumena. For it was there proved that the conception of a thing, which\ncan exist per se\u2014only as a subject and never as a predicate, possesses\nno objective reality; that is to say, we can never know whether there\nexists any object to correspond to the conception; consequently, the\nconception is nothing more than a conception, and from it we derive no\nproper knowledge. If this conception is to indicate by the term\nsubstance, an object that can be given, if it is to become a cognition,\nwe must have at the foundation of the cognition a permanent intuition,\nas the indispensable condition of its objective reality. For through\nintuition alone can an object be given. But in internal intuition there\nis nothing permanent, for the Ego is but the consciousness of my\nthought. If then, we appeal merely to thought, we cannot discover the\nnecessary condition of the application of the conception of\nsubstance\u2014that is, of a subject existing per se\u2014to the subject as a\nthinking being. And thus the conception of the simple nature of\nsubstance, which is connected with the objective reality of this\nconception, is shown to be also invalid, and to be, in fact, nothing\nmore than the logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in\nthought; whilst we remain perfectly ignorant whether the subject is\ncomposite or not.\n\nRefutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Substantiality or\nPermanence of the Soul.\n\nThis acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of the common\nargument which attempts to prove that the soul\u2014it being granted that it\nis a simple being\u2014cannot perish by dissolution or decomposition; he saw\nit is not impossible for it to cease to be by extinction, or\ndisappearance. He endeavoured to prove in his Phaedo, that the soul\ncannot be annihilated, by showing that a simple being cannot cease to\nexist. Inasmuch as, he said, a simple existence cannot diminish, nor\ngradually lose portions of its being, and thus be by degrees reduced to\nnothing (for it possesses no parts, and therefore no multiplicity),\nbetween the moment in which it is, and the moment in which it is not,\nno time can be discovered\u2014which is impossible. But this philosopher did\nnot consider that, granting the soul to possess this simple nature,\nwhich contains no parts external to each other and consequently no\nextensive quantity, we cannot refuse to it any less than to any other\nbeing, intensive quantity, that is, a degree of reality in regard to\nall its faculties, nay, to all that constitutes its existence. But this\ndegree of reality can become less and less through an infinite series\nof smaller degrees. It follows, therefore, that this supposed\nsubstance\u2014this thing, the permanence of which is not assured in any\nother way, may, if not by decomposition, by gradual loss (remissio) of\nits powers (consequently by elanguescence, if I may employ this\nexpression), be changed into nothing. For consciousness itself has\nalways a degree, which may be lessened.[45] Consequently the faculty of\nbeing conscious may be diminished; and so with all other faculties. The\npermanence of the soul, therefore, as an object of the internal sense,\nremains undemonstrated, nay, even indemonstrable. Its permanence in\nlife is evident, per se, inasmuch as the thinking being (as man) is to\nitself, at the same time, an object of the external senses. But this\ndoes not authorize the rational psychologist to affirm, from mere\nconceptions, its permanence beyond life.[46]\n\n [45] Clearness is not, as logicians maintain, the consciousness of a\n representation. For a certain degree of consciousness, which may not,\n however, be sufficient for recollection, is to be met with in many dim\n representations. For without any consciousness at all, we should not\n be able to recognize any difference in the obscure representations we\n connect; as we really can do with many conceptions, such as those of\n right and justice, and those of the musician, who strikes at once\n several notes in improvising a piece of music. But a representation is\n clear, in which our consciousness is sufficient for the consciousness\n of the difference of this representation from others. If we are only\n conscious that there is a difference, but are not conscious of the\n difference\u2014that is, what the difference is\u2014the representation must be\n termed obscure. There is, consequently, an infinite series of degrees\n of consciousness down to its entire disappearance.\n\n\n [46] There are some who think they have done enough to establish a new\n possibility in the mode of the existence of souls, when they have\n shown that there is no contradiction in their hypotheses on this\n subject. Such are those who affirm the possibility of thought\u2014of which\n they have no other knowledge than what they derive from its use in\n connecting empirical intuitions presented in this our human life\u2014after\n this life has ceased. But it is very easy to embarrass them by the\n introduction of counter-possibilities, which rest upon quite as good a\n foundation. Such, for example, is the possibility of the division of a\n simple substance into several substances; and conversely, of the\n coalition of several into one simple substance. For, although\n divisibility presupposes composition, it does not necessarily require\n a composition of substances, but only of the degrees (of the several\n faculties) of one and the same substance. Now we can cogitate all the\n powers and faculties of the soul\u2014even that of consciousness\u2014as\n diminished by one half, the substance still remaining. In the same way\n we can represent to ourselves without contradiction, this obliterated\n half as preserved, not in the soul, but without it; and we can believe\n that, as in this case every thing that is real in the soul, and has a\n degree\u2014consequently its entire existence\u2014has been halved, a particular\n substance would arise out of the soul. For the multiplicity, which has\n been divided, formerly existed, but not as a multiplicity of\n substances, but of every reality as the quantum of existence in it;\n and the unity of substance was merely a mode of existence, which by\n this division alone has been transformed into a plurality of\n subsistence. In the same manner several simple substances might\n coalesce into one, without anything being lost except the plurality of\n subsistence, inasmuch as the one substance would contain the degree of\n reality of all the former substances. Perhaps, indeed, the simple\n substances, which appear under the form of matter, might (not indeed\n by a mechanical or chemical influence upon each other, but by an\n unknown influence, of which the former would be but the phenomenal\n appearance), by means of such a dynamical division of the\n parent-souls, as intensive quantities, produce other souls, while the\n former repaired the loss thus sustained with new matter of the same\n sort. I am far from allowing any value to such chimeras; and the\n principles of our analytic have clearly proved that no other than an\n empirical use of the categories\u2014that of substance, for example\u2014is\n possible. But if the rationalist is bold enough to construct, on the\n mere authority of the faculty of thought\u2014without any intuition,\n whereby an object is given\u2014a self-subsistent being, merely because the\n unity of apperception in thought cannot allow him to believe it a\n composite being, instead of declaring, as he ought to do, that he is\n unable to explain the possibility of a thinking nature; what ought to\n hinder the materialist, with as complete an independence of\n experience, to employ the principle of the rationalist in a directly\n opposite manner\u2014still preserving the formal unity required by his\n opponent?\n\n\nIf, now, we take the above propositions\u2014as they must be accepted as\nvalid for all thinking beings in the system of rational psychology\u2014in\nsynthetical connection, and proceed, from the category of relation,\nwith the proposition: \u201cAll thinking beings are, as such, substances,\u201d\nbackwards through the series, till the circle is completed; we come at\nlast to their existence, of which, in this system of rational\npsychology, substances are held to be conscious, independently of\nexternal things; nay, it is asserted that, in relation to the\npermanence which is a necessary characteristic of substance, they can\nof themselves determine external things. It follows that idealism\u2014at\nleast problematical idealism, is perfectly unavoidable in this\nrationalistic system. And, if the existence of outward things is not\nheld to be requisite to the determination of the existence of a\nsubstance in time, the existence of these outward things at all, is a\ngratuitous assumption which remains without the possibility of a proof.\n\nBut if we proceed analytically\u2014the \u201cI think\u201d as a proposition\ncontaining in itself an existence as given, consequently modality being\nthe principle\u2014and dissect this proposition, in order to ascertain its\ncontent, and discover whether and how this Ego determines its existence\nin time and space without the aid of anything external; the\npropositions of rationalistic psychology would not begin with the\nconception of a thinking being, but with a reality, and the properties\nof a thinking being in general would be deduced from the mode in which\nthis reality is cogitated, after everything empirical had been\nabstracted; as is shown in the following table:\n\n                        1\n                      I think,\n\n            2                             3\n        as Subject,              as simple Subject,\n\n                        4\n               as identical Subject,\n           in every state of my thought.\n\nNow, inasmuch as it is not determined in this second proposition,\nwhether I can exist and be cogitated only as subject, and not also as a\npredicate of another being, the conception of a subject is here taken\nin a merely logical sense; and it remains undetermined, whether\nsubstance is to be cogitated under the conception or not. But in the\nthird proposition, the absolute unity of apperception\u2014the simple Ego in\nthe representation to which all connection and separation, which\nconstitute thought, relate, is of itself important; even although it\npresents us with no information about the constitution or subsistence\nof the subject. Apperception is something real, and the simplicity of\nits nature is given in the very fact of its possibility. Now in space\nthere is nothing real that is at the same time simple; for points,\nwhich are the only simple things in space, are merely limits, but not\nconstituent parts of space. From this follows the impossibility of a\ndefinition on the basis of materialism of the constitution of my Ego as\na merely thinking subject. But, because my existence is considered in\nthe first proposition as given, for it does not mean, \u201cEvery thinking\nbeing exists\u201d (for this would be predicating of them absolute\nnecessity), but only, \u201cI exist thinking\u201d; the proposition is quite\nempirical, and contains the determinability of my existence merely in\nrelation to my representations in time. But as I require for this\npurpose something that is permanent, such as is not given in internal\nintuition; the mode of my existence, whether as substance or as\naccident, cannot be determined by means of this simple\nself-consciousness. Thus, if materialism is inadequate to explain the\nmode in which I exist, spiritualism is likewise as insufficient; and\nthe conclusion is that we are utterly unable to attain to any knowledge\nof the constitution of the soul, in so far as relates to the\npossibility of its existence apart from external objects.\n\nAnd, indeed, how should it be possible, merely by the aid of the unity\nof consciousness\u2014which we cognize only for the reason that it is\nindispensable to the possibility of experience\u2014to pass the bounds of\nexperience (our existence in this life); and to extend our cognition to\nthe nature of all thinking beings by means of the empirical\u2014but in\nrelation to every sort of intuition, perfectly\nundetermined\u2014proposition, \u201cI think\u201d?\n\nThere does not then exist any rational psychology as a doctrine\nfurnishing any addition to our knowledge of ourselves. It is nothing\nmore than a discipline, which sets impassable limits to speculative\nreason in this region of thought, to prevent it, on the one hand, from\nthrowing itself into the arms of a soulless materialism, and, on the\nother, from losing itself in the mazes of a baseless spiritualism. It\nteaches us to consider this refusal of our reason to give any\nsatisfactory answer to questions which reach beyond the limits of this\nour human life, as a hint to abandon fruitless speculation; and to\ndirect, to a practical use, our knowledge of ourselves\u2014which, although\napplicable only to objects of experience, receives its principles from\na higher source, and regulates its procedure as if our destiny reached\nfar beyond the boundaries of experience and life.\n\nFrom all this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in\na mere misunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies at the\nbasis of the categories, is considered to be an intuition of the\nsubject as an object; and the category of substance is applied to the\nintuition. But this unity is nothing more than the unity in thought, by\nwhich no object is given; to which therefore the category of\nsubstance\u2014which always presupposes a given intuition\u2014cannot be applied.\nConsequently, the subject cannot be cognized. The subject of the\ncategories cannot, therefore, for the very reason that it cogitates\nthese, frame any conception of itself as an object of the categories;\nfor, to cogitate these, it must lay at the foundation its own pure\nself-consciousness\u2014the very thing that it wishes to explain and\ndescribe. In like manner, the subject, in which the representation of\ntime has its basis, cannot determine, for this very reason, its own\nexistence in time. Now, if the latter is impossible, the former, as an\nattempt to determine itself by means of the categories as a thinking\nbeing in general, is no less so.[47]\n\n [47] The \u201cI think\u201d is, as has been already stated, an empirical\n proposition, and contains the proposition, \u201cI exist.\u201d But I cannot\n say, \u201cEverything, which thinks, exists\u201d; for in this case the property\n of thought would constitute all beings possessing it, necessary\n beings. Hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from\n the proposition, \u201cI think,\u201d as Descartes maintained\u2014because in this\n case the major premiss, \u201cEverything, which thinks, exists,\u201d must\n precede\u2014but the two propositions are identical. The proposition, \u201cI\n think,\u201d expresses an undetermined empirical intuition, that perception\n (proving consequently that sensation, which must belong to\n sensibility, lies at the foundation of this proposition); but it\n precedes experience, whose province it is to determine an object of\n perception by means of the categories in relation to time; and\n existence in this proposition is not a category, as it does not apply\n to an undetermined given object, but only to one of which we have a\n conception, and about which we wish to know whether it does or does\n not exist, out of, and apart from this conception. An undetermined\n perception signifies here merely something real that has been given,\n only, however, to thought in general\u2014but not as a phenomenon, nor as a\n thing in itself (noumenon), but only as something that really exists,\n and is designated as such in the proposition, \u201cI think.\u201d For it must\n be remarked that, when I call the proposition, \u201cI think,\u201d an empirical\n proposition, I do not thereby mean that the Ego in the proposition is\n an empirical representation; on the contrary, it is purely\n intellectual, because it belongs to thought in general. But without\n some empirical representation, which presents to the mind material for\n thought, the mental act, \u201cI think,\u201d would not take place; and the\n empirical is only the condition of the application or employment of\n the pure intellectual faculty.\n\n\nThus, then, appears the vanity of the hope of establishing a cognition\nwhich is to extend its rule beyond the limits of experience\u2014a cognition\nwhich is one of the highest interests of humanity; and thus is proved\nthe futility of the attempt of speculative philosophy in this region of\nthought. But, in this interest of thought, the severity of criticism\nhas rendered to reason a not unimportant service, by the demonstration\nof the impossibility of making any dogmatical affirmation concerning an\nobject of experience beyond the boundaries of experience. She has thus\nfortified reason against all affirmations of the contrary. Now, this\ncan be accomplished in only two ways. Either our proposition must be\nproved apodeictically; or, if this is unsuccessful, the sources of this\ninability must be sought for, and, if these are discovered to exist in\nthe natural and necessary limitation of our reason, our opponents must\nsubmit to the same law of renunciation and refrain from advancing\nclaims to dogmatic assertion.\n\nBut the right, say rather the necessity to admit a future life, upon\nprinciples of the practical conjoined with the speculative use of\nreason, has lost nothing by this renunciation; for the merely\nspeculative proof has never had any influence upon the common reason of\nmen. It stands upon the point of a hair, so that even the schools have\nbeen able to preserve it from falling only by incessantly discussing it\nand spinning it like a top; and even in their eyes it has never been\nable to present any safe foundation for the erection of a theory. The\nproofs which have been current among men, preserve their value\nundiminished; nay, rather gain in clearness and unsophisticated power,\nby the rejection of the dogmatical assumptions of speculative reason.\nFor reason is thus confined within her own peculiar province\u2014the\narrangement of ends or aims, which is at the same time the arrangement\nof nature; and, as a practical faculty, without limiting itself to the\nlatter, it is justified in extending the former, and with it our own\nexistence, beyond the boundaries of experience and life. If we turn our\nattention to the analogy of the nature of living beings in this world,\nin the consideration of which reason is obliged to accept as a\nprinciple that no organ, no faculty, no appetite is useless, and that\nnothing is superfluous, nothing disproportionate to its use, nothing\nunsuited to its end; but that, on the contrary, everything is perfectly\nconformed to its destination in life\u2014we shall find that man, who alone\nis the final end and aim of this order, is still the only animal that\nseems to be excepted from it. For his natural gifts\u2014not merely as\nregards the talents and motives that may incite him to employ them, but\nespecially the moral law in him\u2014stretch so far beyond all mere earthly\nutility and advantage, that he feels himself bound to prize the mere\nconsciousness of probity, apart from all advantageous consequences\u2014even\nthe shadowy gift of posthumous fame\u2014above everything; and he is\nconscious of an inward call to constitute himself, by his conduct in\nthis world\u2014without regard to mere sublunary interests\u2014the citizen of a\nbetter. This mighty, irresistible proof\u2014accompanied by an\never-increasing knowledge of the conformability to a purpose in\neverything we see around us, by the conviction of the boundless\nimmensity of creation, by the consciousness of a certain\nillimitableness in the possible extension of our knowledge, and by a\ndesire commensurate therewith\u2014remains to humanity, even after the\ntheoretical cognition of ourselves has failed to establish the\nnecessity of an existence after death.\n\nConclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralogism.\n\n\nThe dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from our\nconfounding an idea of reason (of a pure intelligence) with the\nconception\u2014in every respect undetermined\u2014of a thinking being in\ngeneral. I cogitate myself in behalf of a possible experience, at the\nsame time making abstraction of all actual experience; and infer\ntherefrom that I can be conscious of myself apart from experience and\nits empirical conditions. I consequently confound the possible\nabstraction of my empirically determined existence with the supposed\nconsciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self; and\nI believe that I cognize what is substantial in myself as a\ntranscendental subject, when I have nothing more in thought than the\nunity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of all determination of\ncognition.\n\nThe task of explaining the community of the soul with the body does not\nproperly belong to the psychology of which we are here speaking;\nbecause it proposes to prove the personality of the soul apart from\nthis communion (after death), and is therefore transcendent in the\nproper sense of the word, although occupying itself with an object of\nexperience\u2014only in so far, however, as it ceases to be an object of\nexperience. But a sufficient answer may be found to the question in our\nsystem. The difficulty which lies in the execution of this task\nconsists, as is well known, in the presupposed heterogeneity of the\nobject of the internal sense (the soul) and the objects of the external\nsenses; inasmuch as the formal condition of the intuition of the one is\ntime, and of that of the other space also. But if we consider that both\nkinds of objects do not differ internally, but only in so far as the\none appears externally to the other\u2014consequently, that what lies at the\nbasis of phenomena, as a thing in itself, may not be heterogeneous;\nthis difficulty disappears. There then remains no other difficulty than\nis to be found in the question\u2014how a community of substances is\npossible; a question which lies out of the region of psychology, and\nwhich the reader, after what in our analytic has been said of primitive\nforces and faculties, will easily judge to be also beyond the region of\nhuman cognition.\n\nGENERAL REMARK\n\nOn the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology.\n\nThe proposition, \u201cI think,\u201d or, \u201cI exist thinking,\u201d is an empirical\nproposition. But such a proposition must be based on empirical\nintuition, and the object cogitated as a phenomenon; and thus our\ntheory appears to maintain that the soul, even in thought, is merely a\nphenomenon; and in this way our consciousness itself, in fact, abuts\nupon nothing.\n\nThought, per se, is merely the purely spontaneous logical function\nwhich operates to connect the manifold of a possible intuition; and it\ndoes not represent the subject of consciousness as a phenomenon\u2014for\nthis reason alone, that it pays no attention to the question whether\nthe mode of intuiting it is sensuous or intellectual. I therefore do\nnot represent myself in thought either as I am, or as I appear to\nmyself; I merely cogitate myself as an object in general, of the mode\nof intuiting which I make abstraction. When I represent myself as the\nsubject of thought, or as the ground of thought, these modes of\nrepresentation are not related to the categories of substance or of\ncause; for these are functions of thought applicable only to our\nsensuous intuition. The application of these categories to the Ego\nwould, however, be necessary, if I wished to make myself an object of\nknowledge. But I wish to be conscious of myself only as thinking; in\nwhat mode my Self is given in intuition, I do not consider, and it may\nbe that I, who think, am a phenomenon\u2014although not in so far as I am a\nthinking being; but in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am\na being, though this consciousness does not present to me any property\nof this being as material for thought.\n\nBut the proposition, \u201cI think,\u201d in so far as it declares, \u201cI exist\nthinking,\u201d is not the mere representation of a logical function. It\ndetermines the subject (which is in this case an object also) in\nrelation to existence; and it cannot be given without the aid of the\ninternal sense, whose intuition presents to us an object, not as a\nthing in itself, but always as a phenomenon. In this proposition there\nis therefore something more to be found than the mere spontaneity of\nthought; there is also the receptivity of intuition, that is, my\nthought of myself applied to the empirical intuition of myself. Now, in\nthis intuition the thinking self must seek the conditions of the\nemployment of its logical functions as categories of substance, cause,\nand so forth; not merely for the purpose of distinguishing itself as an\nobject in itself by means of the representation \u201cI,\u201d but also for the\npurpose of determining the mode of its existence, that is, of cognizing\nitself as noumenon. But this is impossible, for the internal empirical\nintuition is sensuous, and presents us with nothing but phenomenal\ndata, which do not assist the object of pure consciousness in its\nattempt to cognize itself as a separate existence, but are useful only\nas contributions to experience.\n\nBut, let it be granted that we could discover, not in experience, but\nin certain firmly-established \u00e0 priori laws of the use of pure\nreason\u2014laws relating to our existence, authority to consider ourselves\nas legislating \u00e0 priori in relation to our own existence and as\ndetermining this existence; we should, on this supposition, find\nourselves possessed of a spontaneity, by which our actual existence\nwould be determinable, without the aid of the conditions of empirical\nintuition. We should also become aware that in the consciousness of our\nexistence there was an \u00e0 priori content, which would serve to determine\nour own existence\u2014an existence only sensuously determinable\u2014relatively,\nhowever, to a certain internal faculty in relation to an intelligible\nworld.\n\nBut this would not give the least help to the attempts of rational\npsychology. For this wonderful faculty, which the consciousness of the\nmoral law in me reveals, would present me with a principle of the\ndetermination of my own existence which is purely intellectual\u2014but by\nwhat predicates? By none other than those which are given in sensuous\nintuition. Thus I should find myself in the same position in rational\npsychology which I formerly occupied, that is to say, I should find\nmyself still in need of sensuous intuitions, in order to give\nsignificance to my conceptions of substance and cause, by means of\nwhich alone I can possess a knowledge of myself: but these intuitions\ncan never raise me above the sphere of experience. I should be\njustified, however, in applying these conceptions, in regard to their\npractical use, which is always directed to objects of experience\u2014in\nconformity with their analogical significance when employed\ntheoretically\u2014to freedom and its subject. At the same time, I should\nunderstand by them merely the logical functions of subject and\npredicate, of principle and consequence, in conformity with which all\nactions are so determined, that they are capable of being explained\nalong with the laws of nature, conformably to the categories of\nsubstance and cause, although they originate from a very different\nprinciple. We have made these observations for the purpose of guarding\nagainst misunderstanding, to which the doctrine of our intuition of\nself as a phenomenon is exposed. We shall have occasion to perceive\ntheir utility in the sequel.\n\nChapter II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason\n\nWe showed in the introduction to this part of our work, that all\ntranscendental illusion of pure reason arose from dialectical\narguments, the schema of which logic gives us in its three formal\nspecies of syllogisms\u2014just as the categories find their logical schema\nin the four functions of all judgements. The first kind of these\nsophistical arguments related to the unconditioned unity of the\nsubjective conditions of all representations in general (of the subject\nor soul), in correspondence with the categorical syllogisms, the major\nof which, as the principle, enounces the relation of a predicate to a\nsubject. The second kind of dialectical argument will therefore be\nconcerned, following the analogy with hypothetical syllogisms, with the\nunconditioned unity of the objective conditions in the phenomenon; and,\nin this way, the theme of the third kind to be treated of in the\nfollowing chapter will be the unconditioned unity of the objective\nconditions of the possibility of objects in general.\n\nBut it is worthy of remark that the transcendental paralogism produced\nin the mind only a one-third illusion, in regard to the idea of the\nsubject of our thought; and the conceptions of reason gave no ground to\nmaintain the contrary proposition. The advantage is completely on the\nside of Pneumatism; although this theory itself passes into naught, in\nthe crucible of pure reason.\n\nVery different is the case when we apply reason to the objective\nsynthesis of phenomena. Here, certainly, reason establishes, with much\nplausibility, its principle of unconditioned unity; but it very soon\nfalls into such contradictions that it is compelled, in relation to\ncosmology, to renounce its pretensions.\n\nFor here a new phenomenon of human reason meets us\u2014a perfectly natural\nantithetic, which does not require to be sought for by subtle\nsophistry, but into which reason of itself unavoidably falls. It is\nthereby preserved, to be sure, from the slumber of a fancied\nconviction\u2014which a merely one-sided illusion produces; but it is at the\nsame time compelled, either, on the one hand, to abandon itself to a\ndespairing scepticism, or, on the other, to assume a dogmatical\nconfidence and obstinate persistence in certain assertions, without\ngranting a fair hearing to the other side of the question. Either is\nthe death of a sound philosophy, although the former might perhaps\ndeserve the title of the euthanasia of pure reason.\n\nBefore entering this region of discord and confusion, which the\nconflict of the laws of pure reason (antinomy) produces, we shall\npresent the reader with some considerations, in explanation and\njustification of the method we intend to follow in our treatment of\nthis subject. I term all transcendental ideas, in so far as they relate\nto the absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena, cosmical\nconceptions; partly on account of this unconditioned totality, on which\nthe conception of the world-whole is based\u2014a conception, which is\nitself an idea\u2014partly because they relate solely to the synthesis of\nphenomena\u2014the empirical synthesis; while, on the other hand, the\nabsolute totality in the synthesis of the conditions of all possible\nthings gives rise to an ideal of pure reason, which is quite distinct\nfrom the cosmical conception, although it stands in relation with it.\nHence, as the paralogisms of pure reason laid the foundation for a\ndialectical psychology, the antinomy of pure reason will present us\nwith the transcendental principles of a pretended pure (rational)\ncosmology\u2014not, however, to declare it valid and to appropriate it,\nbut\u2014as the very term of a conflict of reason sufficiently indicates, to\npresent it as an idea which cannot be reconciled with phenomena and\nexperience.\n\nSection I. System of Cosmological Ideas\n\nThat we may be able to enumerate with systematic precision these ideas\naccording to a principle, we must remark, in the first place, that it\nis from the understanding alone that pure and transcendental\nconceptions take their origin; that the reason does not properly give\nbirth to any conception, but only frees the conception of the\nunderstanding from the unavoidable limitation of a possible experience,\nand thus endeavours to raise it above the empirical, though it must\nstill be in connection with it. This happens from the fact that, for a\ngiven conditioned, reason demands absolute totality on the side of the\nconditions (to which the understanding submits all phenomena), and thus\nmakes of the category a transcendental idea. This it does that it may\nbe able to give absolute completeness to the empirical synthesis, by\ncontinuing it to the unconditioned (which is not to be found in\nexperience, but only in the idea). Reason requires this according to\nthe principle: If the conditioned is given the whole of the conditions,\nand consequently the absolutely unconditioned, is also given, whereby\nalone the former was possible. First, then, the transcendental ideas\nare properly nothing but categories elevated to the unconditioned; and\nthey may be arranged in a table according to the titles of the latter.\nBut, secondly, all the categories are not available for this purpose,\nbut only those in which the synthesis constitutes a series\u2014of\nconditions subordinated to, not co-ordinated with, each other. Absolute\ntotality is required of reason only in so far as concerns the ascending\nseries of the conditions of a conditioned; not, consequently, when the\nquestion relates to the descending series of consequences, or to the\naggregate of the co-ordinated conditions of these consequences. For, in\nrelation to a given conditioned, conditions are presupposed and\nconsidered to be given along with it. On the other hand, as the\nconsequences do not render possible their conditions, but rather\npresuppose them\u2014in the consideration of the procession of consequences\n(or in the descent from the given condition to the conditioned), we may\nbe quite unconcerned whether the series ceases or not; and their\ntotality is not a necessary demand of reason.\n\nThus we cogitate\u2014and necessarily\u2014a given time completely elapsed up to\na given moment, although that time is not determinable by us. But as\nregards time future, which is not the condition of arriving at the\npresent, in order to conceive it; it is quite indifferent whether we\nconsider future time as ceasing at some point, or as prolonging itself\nto infinity. Take, for example, the series m, n, o, in which n is given\nas conditioned in relation to m, but at the same time as the condition\nof o, and let the series proceed upwards from the conditioned n to m\n(l, k, i, etc.), and also downwards from the condition n to the\nconditioned o (p, q, r, etc.)\u2014I must presuppose the former series, to\nbe able to consider n as given, and n is according to reason (the\ntotality of conditions) possible only by means of that series. But its\npossibility does not rest on the following series o, p, q, r, which for\nthis reason cannot be regarded as given, but only as capable of being\ngiven (dabilis).\n\nI shall term the synthesis of the series on the side of the\nconditions\u2014from that nearest to the given phenomenon up to the more\nremote\u2014regressive; that which proceeds on the side of the conditioned,\nfrom the immediate consequence to the more remote, I shall call the\nprogressive synthesis. The former proceeds in antecedentia, the latter\nin consequentia. The cosmological ideas are therefore occupied with the\ntotality of the regressive synthesis, and proceed in antecedentia, not\nin consequentia. When the latter takes place, it is an arbitrary and\nnot a necessary problem of pure reason; for we require, for the\ncomplete understanding of what is given in a phenomenon, not the\nconsequences which succeed, but the grounds or principles which\nprecede.\n\nIn order to construct the table of ideas in correspondence with the\ntable of categories, we take first the two primitive quanta of all our\nintuitions, time and space. Time is in itself a series (and the formal\ncondition of all series), and hence, in relation to a given present, we\nmust distinguish \u00e0 priori in it the antecedentia as conditions (time\npast) from the consequentia (time future). Consequently, the\ntranscendental idea of the absolute totality of the series of the\nconditions of a given conditioned, relates merely to all past time.\nAccording to the idea of reason, the whole past time, as the condition\nof the given moment, is necessarily cogitated as given. But, as regards\nspace, there exists in it no distinction between progressus and\nregressus; for it is an aggregate and not a series\u2014its parts existing\ntogether at the same time. I can consider a given point of time in\nrelation to past time only as conditioned, because this given moment\ncomes into existence only through the past time rather through the\npassing of the preceding time. But as the parts of space are not\nsubordinated, but co-ordinated to each other, one part cannot be the\ncondition of the possibility of the other; and space is not in itself,\nlike time, a series. But the synthesis of the manifold parts of\nspace\u2014(the syntheses whereby we apprehend space)\u2014is nevertheless\nsuccessive; it takes place, therefore, in time, and contains a series.\nAnd as in this series of aggregated spaces (for example, the feet in a\nrood), beginning with a given portion of space, those which continue to\nbe annexed form the condition of the limits of the former\u2014the\nmeasurement of a space must also be regarded as a synthesis of the\nseries of the conditions of a given conditioned. It differs, however,\nin this respect from that of time, that the side of the conditioned is\nnot in itself distinguishable from the side of the condition; and,\nconsequently, regressus and progressus in space seem to be identical.\nBut, inasmuch as one part of space is not given, but only limited, by\nand through another, we must also consider every limited space as\nconditioned, in so far as it presupposes some other space as the\ncondition of its limitation, and so on. As regards limitation,\ntherefore, our procedure in space is also a regressus, and the\ntranscendental idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in a\nseries of conditions applies to space also; and I am entitled to demand\nthe absolute totality of the phenomenal synthesis in space as well as\nin time. Whether my demand can be satisfied is a question to be\nanswered in the sequel.\n\nSecondly, the real in space\u2014that is, matter\u2014is conditioned. Its\ninternal conditions are its parts, and the parts of parts its remote\nconditions; so that in this case we find a regressive synthesis, the\nabsolute totality of which is a demand of reason. But this cannot be\nobtained otherwise than by a complete division of parts, whereby the\nreal in matter becomes either nothing or that which is not matter, that\nis to say, the simple. Consequently we find here also a series of\nconditions and a progress to the unconditioned.\n\nThirdly, as regards the categories of a real relation between\nphenomena, the category of substance and its accidents is not suitable\nfor the formation of a transcendental idea; that is to say, reason has\nno ground, in regard to it, to proceed regressively with conditions.\nFor accidents (in so far as they inhere in a substance) are\nco-ordinated with each other, and do not constitute a series. And, in\nrelation to substance, they are not properly subordinated to it, but\nare the mode of existence of the substance itself. The conception of\nthe substantial might nevertheless seem to be an idea of the\ntranscendental reason. But, as this signifies nothing more than the\nconception of an object in general, which subsists in so far as we\ncogitate in it merely a transcendental subject without any predicates;\nand as the question here is of an unconditioned in the series of\nphenomena\u2014it is clear that the substantial can form no member thereof.\nThe same holds good of substances in community, which are mere\naggregates and do not form a series. For they are not subordinated to\neach other as conditions of the possibility of each other; which,\nhowever, may be affirmed of spaces, the limits of which are never\ndetermined in themselves, but always by some other space. It is,\ntherefore, only in the category of causality that we can find a series\nof causes to a given effect, and in which we ascend from the latter, as\nthe conditioned, to the former as the conditions, and thus answer the\nquestion of reason.\n\nFourthly, the conceptions of the possible, the actual, and the\nnecessary do not conduct us to any series\u2014excepting only in so far as\nthe contingent in existence must always be regarded as conditioned, and\nas indicating, according to a law of the understanding, a condition,\nunder which it is necessary to rise to a higher, till in the totality\nof the series, reason arrives at unconditioned necessity.\n\nThere are, accordingly, only four cosmological ideas, corresponding\nwith the four titles of the categories. For we can select only such as\nnecessarily furnish us with a series in the synthesis of the manifold.\n\n                      1\n            The absolute Completeness\n                    of the\n                 COMPOSITION\n     of the given totality of all phenomena.\n\n                      2\n            The absolute Completeness\n                    of the\n                   DIVISION\n     of given totality in a phenomenon.\n\n                       3\n            The absolute Completeness\n                     of the\n                   ORIGINATION\n                  of a phenomenon.\n\n                       4\n            The absolute Completeness\n         of the DEPENDENCE of the EXISTENCE\n        of what is changeable in a phenomenon.\n\nWe must here remark, in the first place, that the idea of absolute\ntotality relates to nothing but the exposition of phenomena, and\ntherefore not to the pure conception of a totality of things. Phenomena\nare here, therefore, regarded as given, and reason requires the\nabsolute completeness of the conditions of their possibility, in so far\nas these conditions constitute a series\u2014consequently an absolutely\n(that is, in every respect) complete synthesis, whereby a phenomenon\ncan be explained according to the laws of the understanding.\n\nSecondly, it is properly the unconditioned alone that reason seeks in\nthis serially and regressively conducted synthesis of conditions. It\nwishes, to speak in another way, to attain to completeness in the\nseries of premisses, so as to render it unnecessary to presuppose\nothers. This unconditioned is always contained in the absolute totality\nof the series, when we endeavour to form a representation of it in\nthought. But this absolutely complete synthesis is itself but an idea;\nfor it is impossible, at least before hand, to know whether any such\nsynthesis is possible in the case of phenomena. When we represent all\nexistence in thought by means of pure conceptions of the understanding,\nwithout any conditions of sensuous intuition, we may say with justice\nthat for a given conditioned the whole series of conditions\nsubordinated to each other is also given; for the former is only given\nthrough the latter. But we find in the case of phenomena a particular\nlimitation of the mode in which conditions are given, that is, through\nthe successive synthesis of the manifold of intuition, which must be\ncomplete in the regress. Now whether this completeness is sensuously\npossible, is a problem. But the idea of it lies in the reason\u2014be it\npossible or impossible to connect with the idea adequate empirical\nconceptions. Therefore, as in the absolute totality of the regressive\nsynthesis of the manifold in a phenomenon (following the guidance of\nthe categories, which represent it as a series of conditions to a given\nconditioned) the unconditioned is necessarily contained\u2014it being still\nleft unascertained whether and how this totality exists; reason sets\nout from the idea of totality, although its proper and final aim is the\nunconditioned\u2014of the whole series, or of a part thereof.\n\nThis unconditioned may be cogitated\u2014either as existing only in the\nentire series, all the members of which therefore would be without\nexception conditioned and only the totality absolutely\nunconditioned\u2014and in this case the regressus is called infinite; or the\nabsolutely unconditioned is only a part of the series, to which the\nother members are subordinated, but which Is not itself submitted to\nany other condition.[48] In the former case the series is a parte\npriori unlimited (without beginning), that is, infinite, and\nnevertheless completely given. But the regress in it is never\ncompleted, and can only be called potentially infinite. In the second\ncase there exists a first in the series. This first is called, in\nrelation to past time, the beginning of the world; in relation to\nspace, the limit of the world; in relation to the parts of a given\nlimited whole, the simple; in relation to causes, absolute spontaneity\n(liberty); and in relation to the existence of changeable things,\nabsolute physical necessity.\n\n [48] The absolute totality of the series of conditions to a given\n conditioned is always unconditioned; because beyond it there exist no\n other conditions, on which it might depend. But the absolute totality\n of such a series is only an idea, or rather a problematical\n conception, the possibility of which must be investigated\u2014particularly\n in relation to the mode in which the unconditioned, as the\n transcendental idea which is the real subject of inquiry, may be\n contained therein.\n\n\nWe possess two expressions, world and nature, which are generally\ninterchanged. The first denotes the mathematical total of all phenomena\nand the totality of their synthesis\u2014in its progress by means of\ncomposition, as well as by division. And the world is termed\nnature,[49] when it is regarded as a dynamical whole\u2014when our attention\nis not directed to the aggregation in space and time, for the purpose\nof cogitating it as a quantity, but to the unity in the existence of\nphenomena. In this case the condition of that which happens is called a\ncause; the unconditioned causality of the cause in a phenomenon is\ntermed liberty; the conditioned cause is called in a more limited sense\na natural cause. The conditioned in existence is termed contingent, and\nthe unconditioned necessary. The unconditioned necessity of phenomena\nmay be called natural necessity.\n\n [49] Nature, understood adjective (formaliter), signifies the complex\n of the determinations of a thing, connected according to an internal\n principle of causality. On the other hand, we understand by nature,\n substantive (materialiter), the sum total of phenomena, in so far as\n they, by virtue of an internal principle of causality, are connected\n with each other throughout. In the former sense we speak of the nature\n of liquid matter, of fire, etc., and employ the word only adjective;\n while, if speaking of the objects of nature, we have in our minds the\n idea of a subsisting whole.\n\n\nThe ideas which we are at present engaged in discussing I have called\ncosmological ideas; partly because by the term world is understood the\nentire content of all phenomena, and our ideas are directed solely to\nthe unconditioned among phenomena; partly also, because world, in the\ntranscendental sense, signifies the absolute totality of the content of\nexisting things, and we are directing our attention only to the\ncompleteness of the synthesis\u2014although, properly, only in regression.\nIn regard to the fact that these ideas are all transcendent, and,\nalthough they do not transcend phenomena as regards their mode, but are\nconcerned solely with the world of sense (and not with noumena),\nnevertheless carry their synthesis to a degree far above all possible\nexperience\u2014it still seems to me that we can, with perfect propriety,\ndesignate them cosmical conceptions. As regards the distinction between\nthe mathematically and the dynamically unconditioned which is the aim\nof the regression of the synthesis, I should call the two former, in a\nmore limited signification, cosmical conceptions, the remaining two\ntranscendent physical conceptions. This distinction does not at present\nseem to be of particular importance, but we shall afterwards find it to\nbe of some value.\n\nSection II. Antithetic of Pure Reason\n\nThetic is the term applied to every collection of dogmatical\npropositions. By antithetic I do not understand dogmatical assertions\nof the opposite, but the self-contradiction of seemingly dogmatical\ncognitions (thesis cum antithesis), in none of which we can discover\nany decided superiority. Antithetic is not, therefore, occupied with\none-sided statements, but is engaged in considering the contradictory\nnature of the general cognitions of reason and its causes.\nTranscendental antithetic is an investigation into the antinomy of pure\nreason, its causes and result. If we employ our reason not merely in\nthe application of the principles of the understanding to objects of\nexperience, but venture with it beyond these boundaries, there arise\ncertain sophistical propositions or theorems. These assertions have the\nfollowing peculiarities: They can find neither confirmation nor\nconfutation in experience; and each is in itself not only\nself-consistent, but possesses conditions of its necessity in the very\nnature of reason\u2014only that, unluckily, there exist just as valid and\nnecessary grounds for maintaining the contrary proposition.\n\nThe questions which naturally arise in the consideration of this\ndialectic of pure reason, are therefore: 1st. In what propositions is\npure reason unavoidably subject to an antinomy? 2nd. What are the\ncauses of this antinomy? 3rd. Whether and in what way can reason free\nitself from this self-contradiction?\n\nA dialectical proposition or theorem of pure reason must, according to\nwhat has been said, be distinguishable from all sophistical\npropositions, by the fact that it is not an answer to an arbitrary\nquestion, which may be raised at the mere pleasure of any person, but\nto one which human reason must necessarily encounter in its progress.\nIn the second place, a dialectical proposition, with its opposite, does\nnot carry the appearance of a merely artificial illusion, which\ndisappears as soon as it is investigated, but a natural and unavoidable\nillusion, which, even when we are no longer deceived by it, continues\nto mock us and, although rendered harmless, can never be completely\nremoved.\n\nThis dialectical doctrine will not relate to the unity of understanding\nin empirical conceptions, but to the unity of reason in pure ideas. The\nconditions of this doctrine are\u2014inasmuch as it must, as a synthesis\naccording to rules, be conformable to the understanding, and at the\nsame time as the absolute unity of the synthesis, to the reason\u2014that,\nif it is adequate to the unity of reason, it is too great for the\nunderstanding, if according with the understanding, it is too small for\nthe reason. Hence arises a mutual opposition, which cannot be avoided,\ndo what we will.\n\nThese sophistical assertions of dialectic open, as it were, a\nbattle-field, where that side obtains the victory which has been\npermitted to make the attack, and he is compelled to yield who has been\nunfortunately obliged to stand on the defensive. And hence, champions\nof ability, whether on the right or on the wrong side, are certain to\ncarry away the crown of victory, if they only take care to have the\nright to make the last attack, and are not obliged to sustain another\nonset from their opponent. We can easily believe that this arena has\nbeen often trampled by the feet of combatants, that many victories have\nbeen obtained on both sides, but that the last victory, decisive of the\naffair between the contending parties, was won by him who fought for\nthe right, only if his adversary was forbidden to continue the tourney.\nAs impartial umpires, we must lay aside entirely the consideration\nwhether the combatants are fighting for the right or for the wrong\nside, for the true or for the false, and allow the combat to be first\ndecided. Perhaps, after they have wearied more than injured each other,\nthey will discover the nothingness of their cause of quarrel and part\ngood friends.\n\nThis method of watching, or rather of originating, a conflict of\nassertions, not for the purpose of finally deciding in favour of either\nside, but to discover whether the object of the struggle is not a mere\nillusion, which each strives in vain to reach, but which would be no\ngain even when reached\u2014this procedure, I say, may be termed the\nsceptical method. It is thoroughly distinct from scepticism\u2014the\nprinciple of a technical and scientific ignorance, which undermines the\nfoundations of all knowledge, in order, if possible, to destroy our\nbelief and confidence therein. For the sceptical method aims at\ncertainty, by endeavouring to discover in a conflict of this kind,\nconducted honestly and intelligently on both sides, the point of\nmisunderstanding; just as wise legislators derive, from the\nembarrassment of judges in lawsuits, information in regard to the\ndefective and ill-defined parts of their statutes. The antinomy which\nreveals itself in the application of laws, is for our limited wisdom\nthe best criterion of legislation. For the attention of reason, which\nin abstract speculation does not easily become conscious of its errors,\nis thus roused to the momenta in the determination of its principles.\n\nBut this sceptical method is essentially peculiar to transcendental\nphilosophy, and can perhaps be dispensed with in every other field of\ninvestigation. In mathematics its use would be absurd; because in it no\nfalse assertions can long remain hidden, inasmuch as its demonstrations\nmust always proceed under the guidance of pure intuition, and by means\nof an always evident synthesis. In experimental philosophy, doubt and\ndelay may be very useful; but no misunderstanding is possible, which\ncannot be easily removed; and in experience means of solving the\ndifficulty and putting an end to the dissension must at last be found,\nwhether sooner or later. Moral philosophy can always exhibit its\nprinciples, with their practical consequences, in concreto\u2014at least in\npossible experiences, and thus escape the mistakes and ambiguities of\nabstraction. But transcendental propositions, which lay claim to\ninsight beyond the region of possible experience, cannot, on the one\nhand, exhibit their abstract synthesis in any \u00e0 priori intuition, nor,\non the other, expose a lurking error by the help of experience.\nTranscendental reason, therefore, presents us with no other criterion\nthan that of an attempt to reconcile such assertions, and for this\npurpose to permit a free and unrestrained conflict between them. And\nthis we now proceed to arrange.[50]\n\n [50] The antinomies stand in the order of the four transcendental\n ideas above detailed.\n\n\nFIRST CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. THESIS.\n\nThe world has a beginning in time, and is also limited in regard to\nspace.\n\nPROOF.\n\nGranted that the world has no beginning in time; up to every given\nmoment of time, an eternity must have elapsed, and therewith passed\naway an infinite series of successive conditions or states of things in\nthe world. Now the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it\nnever can be completed by means of a successive synthesis. It follows\nthat an infinite series already elapsed is impossible and that,\nconsequently, a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its\nexistence. And this was the first thing to be proved.\n\nAs regards the second, let us take the opposite for granted. In this\ncase, the world must be an infinite given total of coexistent things.\nNow we cannot cogitate the dimensions of a quantity, which is not given\nwithin certain limits of an intuition,[51] in any other way than by\nmeans of the synthesis of its parts, and the total of such a quantity\nonly by means of a completed synthesis, or the repeated addition of\nunity to itself. Accordingly, to cogitate the world, which fills all\nspaces, as a whole, the successive synthesis of the parts of an\ninfinite world must be looked upon as completed, that is to say, an\ninfinite time must be regarded as having elapsed in the enumeration of\nall co-existing things; which is impossible. For this reason an\ninfinite aggregate of actual things cannot be considered as a given\nwhole, consequently, not as a contemporaneously given whole. The world\nis consequently, as regards extension in space, not infinite, but\nenclosed in limits. And this was the second thing to be proved.\n\n [51] We may consider an undetermined quantity as a whole, when it is\n enclosed within limits, although we cannot construct or ascertain its\n totality by measurement, that is, by the successive synthesis of its\n parts. For its limits of themselves determine its completeness as a\n whole.\n\n\nANTITHESIS.\n\nThe world has no beginning, and no limits in space, but is, in relation\nboth to time and space, infinite.\n\nPROOF.\n\nFor let it be granted that it has a beginning. A beginning is an\nexistence which is preceded by a time in which the thing does not\nexist. On the above supposition, it follows that there must have been a\ntime in which the world did not exist, that is, a void time. But in a\nvoid time the origination of a thing is impossible; because no part of\nany such time contains a distinctive condition of being, in preference\nto that of non-being (whether the supposed thing originate of itself,\nor by means of some other cause). Consequently, many series of things\nmay have a beginning in the world, but the world itself cannot have a\nbeginning, and is, therefore, in relation to past time, infinite.\n\nAs regards the second statement, let us first take the opposite for\ngranted\u2014that the world is finite and limited in space; it follows that\nit must exist in a void space, which is not limited. We should\ntherefore meet not only with a relation of things in space, but also a\nrelation of things to space. Now, as the world is an absolute whole,\nout of and beyond which no object of intuition, and consequently no\ncorrelate to which can be discovered, this relation of the world to a\nvoid space is merely a relation to no object. But such a relation, and\nconsequently the limitation of the world by void space, is nothing.\nConsequently, the world, as regards space, is not limited, that is, it\nis infinite in regard to extension.[52]\n\n [52] Space is merely the form of external intuition (formal\n intuition), and not a real object which can be externally perceived.\n Space, prior to all things which determine it (fill or limit it), or,\n rather, which present an empirical intuition conformable to it, is,\n under the title of absolute space, nothing but the mere possibility of\n external phenomena, in so far as they either exist in themselves, or\n can annex themselves to given intuitions. Empirical intuition is\n therefore not a composition of phenomena and space (of perception and\n empty intuition). The one is not the correlate of the other in a\n synthesis, but they are vitally connected in the same empirical\n intuition, as matter and form. If we wish to set one of these two\n apart from the other\u2014space from phenomena\u2014there arise all sorts of\n empty determinations of external intuition, which are very far from\n being possible perceptions. For example, motion or rest of the world\n in an infinite empty space, or a determination of the mutual relation\n of both, cannot possibly be perceived, and is therefore merely the\n predicate of a notional entity.\n\n\nOBSERVATIONS ON THE FIRST ANTINOMY. ON THE THESIS.\n\nIn bringing forward these conflicting arguments, I have not been on the\nsearch for sophisms, for the purpose of availing myself of special\npleading, which takes advantage of the carelessness of the opposite\nparty, appeals to a misunderstood statute, and erects its unrighteous\nclaims upon an unfair interpretation. Both proofs originate fairly from\nthe nature of the case, and the advantage presented by the mistakes of\nthe dogmatists of both parties has been completely set aside.\n\nThe thesis might also have been unfairly demonstrated, by the\nintroduction of an erroneous conception of the infinity of a given\nquantity. A quantity is infinite, if a greater than itself cannot\npossibly exist. The quantity is measured by the number of given\nunits\u2014which are taken as a standard\u2014contained in it. Now no number can\nbe the greatest, because one or more units can always be added. It\nfollows that an infinite given quantity, consequently an infinite world\n(both as regards time and extension) is impossible. It is, therefore,\nlimited in both respects. In this manner I might have conducted my\nproof; but the conception given in it does not agree with the true\nconception of an infinite whole. In this there is no representation of\nits quantity, it is not said how large it is; consequently its\nconception is not the conception of a maximum. We cogitate in it merely\nits relation to an arbitrarily assumed unit, in relation to which it is\ngreater than any number. Now, just as the unit which is taken is\ngreater or smaller, the infinite will be greater or smaller; but the\ninfinity, which consists merely in the relation to this given unit,\nmust remain always the same, although the absolute quantity of the\nwhole is not thereby cognized.\n\nThe true (transcendental) conception of infinity is: that the\nsuccessive synthesis of unity in the measurement of a given quantum can\nnever be completed.[53] Hence it follows, without possibility of\nmistake, that an eternity of actual successive states up to a given\n(the present) moment cannot have elapsed, and that the world must\ntherefore have a beginning.\n\n [53] The quantum in this sense contains a congeries of given units,\n which is greater than any number\u2014and this is the mathematical\n conception of the infinite.\n\n\nIn regard to the second part of the thesis, the difficulty as to an\ninfinite and yet elapsed series disappears; for the manifold of a world\ninfinite in extension is contemporaneously given. But, in order to\ncogitate the total of this manifold, as we cannot have the aid of\nlimits constituting by themselves this total in intuition, we are\nobliged to give some account of our conception, which in this case\ncannot proceed from the whole to the determined quantity of the parts,\nbut must demonstrate the possibility of a whole by means of a\nsuccessive synthesis of the parts. But as this synthesis must\nconstitute a series that cannot be completed, it is impossible for us\nto cogitate prior to it, and consequently not by means of it, a\ntotality. For the conception of totality itself is in the present case\nthe representation of a completed synthesis of the parts; and this\ncompletion, and consequently its conception, is impossible.\n\nON THE ANTITHESIS.\n\nThe proof in favour of the infinity of the cosmical succession and the\ncosmical content is based upon the consideration that, in the opposite\ncase, a void time and a void space must constitute the limits of the\nworld. Now I am not unaware, that there are some ways of escaping this\nconclusion. It may, for example, be alleged, that a limit to the world,\nas regards both space and time, is quite possible, without at the same\ntime holding the existence of an absolute time before the beginning of\nthe world, or an absolute space extending beyond the actual world\u2014which\nis impossible. I am quite well satisfied with the latter part of this\nopinion of the philosophers of the Leibnitzian school. Space is merely\nthe form of external intuition, but not a real object which can itself\nbe externally intuited; it is not a correlate of phenomena, it is the\nform of phenomena itself. Space, therefore, cannot be regarded as\nabsolutely and in itself something determinative of the existence of\nthings, because it is not itself an object, but only the form of\npossible objects. Consequently, things, as phenomena, determine space;\nthat is to say, they render it possible that, of all the possible\npredicates of space (size and relation), certain may belong to reality.\nBut we cannot affirm the converse, that space, as something\nself-subsistent, can determine real things in regard to size or shape,\nfor it is in itself not a real thing. Space (filled or void)[54] may\ntherefore be limited by phenomena, but phenomena cannot be limited by\nan empty space without them. This is true of time also. All this being\ngranted, it is nevertheless indisputable, that we must assume these two\nnonentities, void space without and void time before the world, if we\nassume the existence of cosmical limits, relatively to space or time.\n\n [54] It is evident that what is meant here is, that empty space, in so\n far as it is limited by phenomena\u2014space, that is, within the\n world\u2014does not at least contradict transcendental principles, and may\n therefore, as regards them, be admitted, although its possibility\n cannot on that account be affirmed.\n\n\nFor, as regards the subterfuge adopted by those who endeavour to evade\nthe consequence\u2014that, if the world is limited as to space and time, the\ninfinite void must determine the existence of actual things in regard\nto their dimensions\u2014it arises solely from the fact that instead of a\nsensuous world, an intelligible world\u2014of which nothing is known\u2014is\ncogitated; instead of a real beginning (an existence, which is preceded\nby a period in which nothing exists), an existence which presupposes no\nother condition than that of time; and, instead of limits of extension,\nboundaries of the universe. But the question relates to the mundus\nphaenomenon, and its quantity; and in this case we cannot make\nabstraction of the conditions of sensibility, without doing away with\nthe essential reality of this world itself. The world of sense, if it\nis limited, must necessarily lie in the infinite void. If this, and\nwith it space as the \u00e0 priori condition of the possibility of\nphenomena, is left out of view, the whole world of sense disappears. In\nour problem is this alone considered as given. The mundus\nintelligibilis is nothing but the general conception of a world, in\nwhich abstraction has been made of all conditions of intuition, and in\nrelation to which no synthetical proposition\u2014either affirmative or\nnegative\u2014is possible.\n\nSECOND CONFLICT OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. THESIS.\n\nEvery composite substance in the world consists of simple parts; and\nthere exists nothing that is not either itself simple, or composed of\nsimple parts.\n\nPROOF.\n\nFor, grant that composite substances do not consist of simple parts; in\nthis case, if all combination or composition were annihilated in\nthought, no composite part, and (as, by the supposition, there do not\nexist simple parts) no simple part would exist. Consequently, no\nsubstance; consequently, nothing would exist. Either, then, it is\nimpossible to annihilate composition in thought; or, after such\nannihilation, there must remain something that subsists without\ncomposition, that is, something that is simple. But in the former case\nthe composite could not itself consist of substances, because with\nsubstances composition is merely a contingent relation, apart from\nwhich they must still exist as self-subsistent beings. Now, as this\ncase contradicts the supposition, the second must contain the\ntruth\u2014that the substantial composite in the world consists of simple\nparts.\n\nIt follows, as an immediate inference, that the things in the world are\nall, without exception, simple beings\u2014that composition is merely an\nexternal condition pertaining to them\u2014and that, although we never can\nseparate and isolate the elementary substances from the state of\ncomposition, reason must cogitate these as the primary subjects of all\ncomposition, and consequently, as prior thereto\u2014and as simple\nsubstances.\n\nANTITHESIS.\n\nNo composite thing in the world consists of simple parts; and there\ndoes not exist in the world any simple substance.\n\nPROOF.\n\nLet it be supposed that a composite thing (as substance) consists of\nsimple parts. Inasmuch as all external relation, consequently all\ncomposition of substances, is possible only in space; the space,\noccupied by that which is composite, must consist of the same number of\nparts as is contained in the composite. But space does not consist of\nsimple parts, but of spaces. Therefore, every part of the composite\nmust occupy a space. But the absolutely primary parts of what is\ncomposite are simple. It follows that what is simple occupies a space.\nNow, as everything real that occupies a space, contains a manifold the\nparts of which are external to each other, and is consequently\ncomposite\u2014and a real composite, not of accidents (for these cannot\nexist external to each other apart from substance), but of\nsubstances\u2014it follows that the simple must be a substantial composite,\nwhich is self-contradictory.\n\nThe second proposition of the antithesis\u2014that there exists in the world\nnothing that is simple\u2014is here equivalent to the following: The\nexistence of the absolutely simple cannot be demonstrated from any\nexperience or perception either external or internal; and the\nabsolutely simple is a mere idea, the objective reality of which cannot\nbe demonstrated in any possible experience; it is consequently, in the\nexposition of phenomena, without application and object. For, let us\ntake for granted that an object may be found in experience for this\ntranscendental idea; the empirical intuition of such an object must\nthen be recognized to contain absolutely no manifold with its parts\nexternal to each other, and connected into unity. Now, as we cannot\nreason from the non-consciousness of such a manifold to the\nimpossibility of its existence in the intuition of an object, and as\nthe proof of this impossibility is necessary for the establishment and\nproof of absolute simplicity; it follows that this simplicity cannot be\ninferred from any perception whatever. As, therefore, an absolutely\nsimple object cannot be given in any experience, and the world of sense\nmust be considered as the sum total of all possible experiences:\nnothing simple exists in the world.\n\nThis second proposition in the antithesis has a more extended aim than\nthe first. The first merely banishes the simple from the intuition of\nthe composite; while the second drives it entirely out of nature. Hence\nwe were unable to demonstrate it from the conception of a given object\nof external intuition (of the composite), but we were obliged to prove\nit from the relation of a given object to a possible experience in\ngeneral.\n\nOBSERVATIONS ON THE SECOND ANTINOMY. THESIS.\n\nWhen I speak of a whole, which necessarily consists of simple parts, I\nunderstand thereby only a substantial whole, as the true composite;\nthat is to say, I understand that contingent unity of the manifold\nwhich is given as perfectly isolated (at least in thought), placed in\nreciprocal connection, and thus constituted a unity. Space ought not to\nbe called a compositum but a totum, for its parts are possible in the\nwhole, and not the whole by means of the parts. It might perhaps be\ncalled a compositum ideale, but not a compositum reale. But this is of\nno importance. As space is not a composite of substances (and not even\nof real accidents), if I abstract all composition therein\u2014nothing, not\neven a point, remains; for a point is possible only as the limit of a\nspace\u2014consequently of a composite. Space and time, therefore, do not\nconsist of simple parts. That which belongs only to the condition or\nstate of a substance, even although it possesses a quantity (motion or\nchange, for example), likewise does not consist of simple parts. That\nis to say, a certain degree of change does not originate from the\naddition of many simple changes. Our inference of the simple from the\ncomposite is valid only of self-subsisting things. But the accidents of\na state are not self-subsistent. The proof, then, for the necessity of\nthe simple, as the component part of all that is substantial and\ncomposite, may prove a failure, and the whole case of this thesis be\nlost, if we carry the proposition too far, and wish to make it valid of\neverything that is composite without distinction\u2014as indeed has really\nnow and then happened. Besides, I am here speaking only of the simple,\nin so far as it is necessarily given in the composite\u2014the latter being\ncapable of solution into the former as its component parts. The proper\nsignification of the word monas (as employed by Leibnitz) ought to\nrelate to the simple, given immediately as simple substance (for\nexample, in consciousness), and not as an element of the composite. As\nan element, the term atomus would be more appropriate. And as I wish to\nprove the existence of simple substances, only in relation to, and as\nthe elements of, the composite, I might term the antithesis of the\nsecond Antinomy, transcendental Atomistic. But as this word has long\nbeen employed to designate a particular theory of corporeal phenomena\n(moleculae), and thus presupposes a basis of empirical conceptions, I\nprefer calling it the dialectical principle of Monadology.\n\nANTITHESIS.\n\nAgainst the assertion of the infinite subdivisibility of matter whose\nground of proof is purely mathematical, objections have been alleged by\nthe Monadists. These objections lay themselves open, at first sight, to\nsuspicion, from the fact that they do not recognize the clearest\nmathematical proofs as propositions relating to the constitution of\nspace, in so far as it is really the formal condition of the\npossibility of all matter, but regard them merely as inferences from\nabstract but arbitrary conceptions, which cannot have any application\nto real things. Just as if it were possible to imagine another mode of\nintuition than that given in the primitive intuition of space; and just\nas if its \u00e0 priori determinations did not apply to everything, the\nexistence of which is possible, from the fact alone of its filling\nspace. If we listen to them, we shall find ourselves required to\ncogitate, in addition to the mathematical point, which is simple\u2014not,\nhowever, a part, but a mere limit of space\u2014physical points, which are\nindeed likewise simple, but possess the peculiar property, as parts of\nspace, of filling it merely by their aggregation. I shall not repeat\nhere the common and clear refutations of this absurdity, which are to\nbe found everywhere in numbers: every one knows that it is impossible\nto undermine the evidence of mathematics by mere discursive\nconceptions; I shall only remark that, if in this case philosophy\nendeavours to gain an advantage over mathematics by sophistical\nartifices, it is because it forgets that the discussion relates solely\nto Phenomena and their conditions. It is not sufficient to find the\nconception of the simple for the pure conception of the composite, but\nwe must discover for the intuition of the composite (matter), the\nintuition of the simple. Now this, according to the laws of\nsensibility, and consequently in the case of objects of sense, is\nutterly impossible. In the case of a whole composed of substances,\nwhich is cogitated solely by the pure understanding, it may be\nnecessary to be in possession of the simple before composition is\npossible. But this does not hold good of the Totum substantiale\nphaenomenon, which, as an empirical intuition in space, possesses the\nnecessary property of containing no simple part, for the very reason\nthat no part of space is simple. Meanwhile, the Monadists have been\nsubtle enough to escape from this difficulty, by presupposing intuition\nand the dynamical relation of substances as the condition of the\npossibility of space, instead of regarding space as the condition of\nthe possibility of the objects of external intuition, that is, of\nbodies. Now we have a conception of bodies only as phenomena, and, as\nsuch, they necessarily presuppose space as the condition of all\nexternal phenomena. The evasion is therefore in vain; as, indeed, we\nhave sufficiently shown in our \u00c6sthetic. If bodies were things in\nthemselves, the proof of the Monadists would be unexceptionable.\n\nThe second dialectical assertion possesses the peculiarity of having\nopposed to it a dogmatical proposition, which, among all such\nsophistical statements, is the only one that undertakes to prove in the\ncase of an object of experience, that which is properly a\ntranscendental idea\u2014the absolute simplicity of substance. The\nproposition is that the object of the internal sense, the thinking Ego,\nis an absolute simple substance. Without at present entering upon this\nsubject\u2014as it has been considered at length in a former chapter\u2014I shall\nmerely remark that, if something is cogitated merely as an object,\nwithout the addition of any synthetical determination of its\nintuition\u2014as happens in the case of the bare representation, _I_\u2014it is\ncertain that no manifold and no composition can be perceived in such a\nrepresentation. As, moreover, the predicates whereby I cogitate this\nobject are merely intuitions of the internal sense, there cannot be\ndiscovered in them anything to prove the existence of a manifold whose\nparts are external to each other, and, consequently, nothing to prove\nthe existence of real composition. Consciousness, therefore, is so\nconstituted that, inasmuch as the thinking subject is at the same time\nits own object, it cannot divide itself\u2014although it can divide its\ninhering determinations. For every object in relation to itself is\nabsolute unity. Nevertheless, if the subject is regarded externally, as\nan object of intuition, it must, in its character of phenomenon,\npossess the property of composition. And it must always be regarded in\nthis manner, if we wish to know whether there is or is not contained in\nit a manifold whose parts are external to each other.\n\nTHIRD CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. THESIS.\n\nCausality according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality\noperating to originate the phenomena of the world. A causality of\nfreedom is also necessary to account fully for these phenomena.\n\nPROOF.\n\nLet it be supposed, that there is no other kind of causality than that\naccording to the laws of nature. Consequently, everything that happens\npresupposes a previous condition, which it follows with absolute\ncertainty, in conformity with a rule. But this previous condition must\nitself be something that has happened (that has arisen in time, as it\ndid not exist before), for, if it has always been in existence, its\nconsequence or effect would not thus originate for the first time, but\nwould likewise have always existed. The causality, therefore, of a\ncause, whereby something happens, is itself a thing that has happened.\nNow this again presupposes, in conformity with the law of nature, a\nprevious condition and its causality, and this another anterior to the\nformer, and so on. If, then, everything happens solely in accordance\nwith the laws of nature, there cannot be any real first beginning of\nthings, but only a subaltern or comparative beginning. There cannot,\ntherefore, be a completeness of series on the side of the causes which\noriginate the one from the other. But the law of nature is that nothing\ncan happen without a sufficient \u00e0 priori determined cause. The\nproposition therefore\u2014if all causality is possible only in accordance\nwith the laws of nature\u2014is, when stated in this unlimited and general\nmanner, self-contradictory. It follows that this cannot be the only\nkind of causality.\n\nFrom what has been said, it follows that a causality must be admitted,\nby means of which something happens, without its cause being determined\naccording to necessary laws by some other cause preceding. That is to\nsay, there must exist an absolute spontaneity of cause, which of itself\noriginates a series of phenomena which proceeds according to natural\nlaws\u2014consequently transcendental freedom, without which even in the\ncourse of nature the succession of phenomena on the side of causes is\nnever complete.\n\nANTITHESIS.\n\nThere is no such thing as freedom, but everything in the world happens\nsolely according to the laws of nature.\n\nPROOF.\n\nGranted, that there does exist freedom in the transcendental sense, as\na peculiar kind of causality, operating to produce events in the\nworld\u2014a faculty, that is to say, of originating a state, and\nconsequently a series of consequences from that state. In this case,\nnot only the series originated by this spontaneity, but the\ndetermination of this spontaneity itself to the production of the\nseries, that is to say, the causality itself must have an absolute\ncommencement, such that nothing can precede to determine this action\naccording to unvarying laws. But every beginning of action presupposes\nin the acting cause a state of inaction; and a dynamically primal\nbeginning of action presupposes a state, which has no connection\u2014as\nregards causality\u2014with the preceding state of the cause\u2014which does not,\nthat is, in any wise result from it. Transcendental freedom is\ntherefore opposed to the natural law of cause and effect, and such a\nconjunction of successive states in effective causes is destructive of\nthe possibility of unity in experience and for that reason not to be\nfound in experience\u2014is consequently a mere fiction of thought.\n\nWe have, therefore, nothing but nature to which we must look for\nconnection and order in cosmical events. Freedom\u2014independence of the\nlaws of nature\u2014is certainly a deliverance from restraint, but it is\nalso a relinquishing of the guidance of law and rule. For it cannot be\nalleged that, instead of the laws of nature, laws of freedom may be\nintroduced into the causality of the course of nature. For, if freedom\nwere determined according to laws, it would be no longer freedom, but\nmerely nature. Nature, therefore, and transcendental freedom are\ndistinguishable as conformity to law and lawlessness. The former\nimposes upon understanding the difficulty of seeking the origin of\nevents ever higher and higher in the series of causes, inasmuch as\ncausality is always conditioned thereby; while it compensates this\nlabour by the guarantee of a unity complete and in conformity with law.\nThe latter, on the contrary, holds out to the understanding the promise\nof a point of rest in the chain of causes, by conducting it to an\nunconditioned causality, which professes to have the power of\nspontaneous origination, but which, in its own utter blindness,\ndeprives it of the guidance of rules, by which alone a completely\nconnected experience is possible.\n\nOBSERVATIONS ON THE THIRD ANTINOMY. ON THE THESIS.\n\nThe transcendental idea of freedom is far from constituting the entire\ncontent of the psychological conception so termed, which is for the\nmost part empirical. It merely presents us with the conception of\nspontaneity of action, as the proper ground for imputing freedom to the\ncause of a certain class of objects. It is, however, the true\nstumbling-stone to philosophy, which meets with unconquerable\ndifficulties in the way of its admitting this kind of unconditioned\ncausality. That element in the question of the freedom of the will,\nwhich has for so long a time placed speculative reason in such\nperplexity, is properly only transcendental, and concerns the question,\nwhether there must be held to exist a faculty of spontaneous\norigination of a series of successive things or states. How such a\nfaculty is possible is not a necessary inquiry; for in the case of\nnatural causality itself, we are obliged to content ourselves with the\n\u00e0 priori knowledge that such a causality must be presupposed, although\nwe are quite incapable of comprehending how the being of one thing is\npossible through the being of another, but must for this information\nlook entirely to experience. Now we have demonstrated this necessity of\na free first beginning of a series of phenomena, only in so far as it\nis required for the comprehension of an origin of the world, all\nfollowing states being regarded as a succession according to laws of\nnature alone. But, as there has thus been proved the existence of a\nfaculty which can of itself originate a series in time\u2014although we are\nunable to explain how it can exist\u2014we feel ourselves authorized to\nadmit, even in the midst of the natural course of events, a beginning,\nas regards causality, of different successions of phenomena, and at the\nsame time to attribute to all substances a faculty of free action. But\nwe ought in this case not to allow ourselves to fall into a common\nmisunderstanding, and to suppose that, because a successive series in\nthe world can only have a comparatively first beginning\u2014another state\nor condition of things always preceding\u2014an absolutely first beginning\nof a series in the course of nature is impossible. For we are not\nspeaking here of an absolutely first beginning in relation to time, but\nas regards causality alone. When, for example, I, completely of my own\nfree will, and independently of the necessarily determinative influence\nof natural causes, rise from my chair, there commences with this event,\nincluding its material consequences in infinitum, an absolutely new\nseries; although, in relation to time, this event is merely the\ncontinuation of a preceding series. For this resolution and act of mine\ndo not form part of the succession of effects in nature, and are not\nmere continuations of it; on the contrary, the determining causes of\nnature cease to operate in reference to this event, which certainly\nsucceeds the acts of nature, but does not proceed from them. For these\nreasons, the action of a free agent must be termed, in regard to\ncausality, if not in relation to time, an absolutely primal beginning\nof a series of phenomena.\n\nThe justification of this need of reason to rest upon a free act as the\nfirst beginning of the series of natural causes is evident from the\nfact, that all philosophers of antiquity (with the exception of the\nEpicurean school) felt themselves obliged, when constructing a theory\nof the motions of the universe, to accept a prime mover, that is, a\nfreely acting cause, which spontaneously and prior to all other causes\nevolved this series of states. They always felt the need of going\nbeyond mere nature, for the purpose of making a first beginning\ncomprehensible.\n\nON THE ANTITHESIS.\n\nThe assertor of the all-sufficiency of nature in regard to causality\n(transcendental Physiocracy), in opposition to the doctrine of freedom,\nwould defend his view of the question somewhat in the following manner.\nHe would say, in answer to the sophistical arguments of the opposite\nparty: If you do not accept a mathematical first, in relation to time,\nyou have no need to seek a dynamical first, in regard to causality. Who\ncompelled you to imagine an absolutely primal condition of the world,\nand therewith an absolute beginning of the gradually progressing\nsuccessions of phenomena\u2014and, as some foundation for this fancy of\nyours, to set bounds to unlimited nature? Inasmuch as the substances in\nthe world have always existed\u2014at least the unity of experience renders\nsuch a supposition quite necessary\u2014there is no difficulty in believing\nalso, that the changes in the conditions of these substances have\nalways existed; and, consequently, that a first beginning, mathematical\nor dynamical, is by no means required. The possibility of such an\ninfinite derivation, without any initial member from which all the\nothers result, is certainly quite incomprehensible. But, if you are\nrash enough to deny the enigmatical secrets of nature for this reason,\nyou will find yourselves obliged to deny also the existence of many\nfundamental properties of natural objects (such as fundamental forces),\nwhich you can just as little comprehend; and even the possibility of so\nsimple a conception as that of change must present to you insuperable\ndifficulties. For if experience did not teach you that it was real, you\nnever could conceive \u00e0 priori the possibility of this ceaseless\nsequence of being and non-being.\n\nBut if the existence of a transcendental faculty of freedom is\ngranted\u2014a faculty of originating changes in the world\u2014this faculty must\nat least exist out of and apart from the world; although it is\ncertainly a bold assumption, that, over and above the complete content\nof all possible intuitions, there still exists an object which cannot\nbe presented in any possible perception. But, to attribute to\nsubstances in the world itself such a faculty, is quite inadmissible;\nfor, in this case; the connection of phenomena reciprocally determining\nand determined according to general laws, which is termed nature, and\nalong with it the criteria of empirical truth, which enable us to\ndistinguish experience from mere visionary dreaming, would almost\nentirely disappear. In proximity with such a lawless faculty of\nfreedom, a system of nature is hardly cogitable; for the laws of the\nlatter would be continually subject to the intrusive influences of the\nformer, and the course of phenomena, which would otherwise proceed\nregularly and uniformly, would become thereby confused and\ndisconnected.\n\nFOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. THESIS.\n\nThere exists either in, or in connection with the world\u2014either as a\npart of it, or as the cause of it\u2014an absolutely necessary being.\n\nPROOF.\n\nThe world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena, contains a\nseries of changes. For, without such a series, the mental\nrepresentation of the series of time itself, as the condition of the\npossibility of the sensuous world, could not be presented to us.[55]\nBut every change stands under its condition, which precedes it in time\nand renders it necessary. Now the existence of a given condition\npresupposes a complete series of conditions up to the absolutely\nunconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. It follows that\nsomething that is absolutely necessary must exist, if change exists as\nits consequence. But this necessary thing itself belongs to the\nsensuous world. For suppose it to exist out of and apart from it, the\nseries of cosmical changes would receive from it a beginning, and yet\nthis necessary cause would not itself belong to the world of sense. But\nthis is impossible. For, as the beginning of a series in time is\ndetermined only by that which precedes it in time, the supreme\ncondition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the\ntime in which this series itself did not exist; for a beginning\nsupposes a time preceding, in which the thing that begins to be was not\nin existence. The causality of the necessary cause of changes, and\nconsequently the cause itself, must for these reasons belong to\ntime\u2014and to phenomena, time being possible only as the form of\nphenomena. Consequently, it cannot be cogitated as separated from the\nworld of sense\u2014the sum total of all phenomena. There is, therefore,\ncontained in the world, something that is absolutely necessary\u2014whether\nit be the whole cosmical series itself, or only a part of it.\n\n [55] Objectively, time, as the formal condition of the possibility of\n change, precedes all changes; but subjectively, and in consciousness,\n the representation of time, like every other, is given solely by\n occasion of perception.\n\n\nANTITHESIS.\n\nAn absolutely necessary being does not exist, either in the world, or\nout of it\u2014as its cause.\n\nPROOF.\n\nGrant that either the world itself is necessary, or that there is\ncontained in it a necessary existence. Two cases are possible. First,\nthere must either be in the series of cosmical changes a beginning,\nwhich is unconditionally necessary, and therefore uncaused\u2014which is at\nvariance with the dynamical law of the determination of all phenomena\nin time; or, secondly, the series itself is without beginning, and,\nalthough contingent and conditioned in all its parts, is nevertheless\nabsolutely necessary and unconditioned as a whole\u2014which is\nself-contradictory. For the existence of an aggregate cannot be\nnecessary, if no single part of it possesses necessary existence.\n\nGrant, on the other hand, that an absolutely necessary cause exists out\nof and apart from the world. This cause, as the highest member in the\nseries of the causes of cosmical changes, must originate or begin[56]\nthe existence of the latter and their series. In this case it must also\nbegin to act, and its causality would therefore belong to time, and\nconsequently to the sum total of phenomena, that is, to the world. It\nfollows that the cause cannot be out of the world; which is\ncontradictory to the hypothesis. Therefore, neither in the world, nor\nout of it (but in causal connection with it), does there exist any\nabsolutely necessary being.\n\n [56] The word begin is taken in two senses. The first is active\u2014the\n cause being regarded as beginning a series of conditions as its effect\n (infit). The second is passive\u2014the causality in the cause itself\n beginning to operate (fit). I reason here from the first to the\n second.\n\n\nOBSERVATIONS ON THE FOURTH ANTINOMY. ON THE THESIS.\n\nTo demonstrate the existence of a necessary being, I cannot be\npermitted in this place to employ any other than the cosmological\nargument, which ascends from the conditioned in phenomena to the\nunconditioned in conception\u2014the unconditioned being considered the\nnecessary condition of the absolute totality of the series. The proof,\nfrom the mere idea of a supreme being, belongs to another principle of\nreason and requires separate discussion.\n\nThe pure cosmological proof demonstrates the existence of a necessary\nbeing, but at the same time leaves it quite unsettled, whether this\nbeing is the world itself, or quite distinct from it. To establish the\ntruth of the latter view, principles are requisite, which are not\ncosmological and do not proceed in the series of phenomena. We should\nrequire to introduce into our proof conceptions of contingent\nbeings\u2014regarded merely as objects of the understanding, and also a\nprinciple which enables us to connect these, by means of mere\nconceptions, with a necessary being. But the proper place for all such\narguments is a transcendent philosophy, which has unhappily not yet\nbeen established.\n\nBut, if we begin our proof cosmologically, by laying at the foundation\nof it the series of phenomena, and the regress in it according to\nempirical laws of causality, we are not at liberty to break off from\nthis mode of demonstration and to pass over to something which is not\nitself a member of the series. The condition must be taken in exactly\nthe same signification as the relation of the conditioned to its\ncondition in the series has been taken, for the series must conduct us\nin an unbroken regress to this supreme condition. But if this relation\nis sensuous, and belongs to the possible empirical employment of\nunderstanding, the supreme condition or cause must close the regressive\nseries according to the laws of sensibility and consequently, must\nbelong to the series of time. It follows that this necessary existence\nmust be regarded as the highest member of the cosmical series.\n\nCertain philosophers have, nevertheless, allowed themselves the liberty\nof making such a saltus (metabasis eis allo gonos). From the changes in\nthe world they have concluded their empirical contingency, that is,\ntheir dependence on empirically-determined causes, and they thus\nadmitted an ascending series of empirical conditions: and in this they\nare quite right. But as they could not find in this series any primal\nbeginning or any highest member, they passed suddenly from the\nempirical conception of contingency to the pure category, which\npresents us with a series\u2014not sensuous, but intellectual\u2014whose\ncompleteness does certainly rest upon the existence of an absolutely\nnecessary cause. Nay, more, this intellectual series is not tied to any\nsensuous conditions; and is therefore free from the condition of time,\nwhich requires it spontaneously to begin its causality in time. But\nsuch a procedure is perfectly inadmissible, as will be made plain from\nwhat follows.\n\nIn the pure sense of the categories, that is contingent the\ncontradictory opposite of which is possible. Now we cannot reason from\nempirical contingency to intellectual. The opposite of that which is\nchanged\u2014the opposite of its state\u2014is actual at another time, and is\ntherefore possible. Consequently, it is not the contradictory opposite\nof the former state. To be that, it is necessary that, in the same time\nin which the preceding state existed, its opposite could have existed\nin its place; but such a cognition is not given us in the mere\nphenomenon of change. A body that was in motion = A, comes into a state\nof rest = non-A. Now it cannot be concluded from the fact that a state\nopposite to the state A follows it, that the contradictory opposite of\nA is possible; and that A is therefore contingent. To prove this, we\nshould require to know that the state of rest could have existed in the\nvery same time in which the motion took place. Now we know nothing more\nthan that the state of rest was actual in the time that followed the\nstate of motion; consequently, that it was also possible. But motion at\none time, and rest at another time, are not contradictorily opposed to\neach other. It follows from what has been said that the succession of\nopposite determinations, that is, change, does not demonstrate the fact\nof contingency as represented in the conceptions of the pure\nunderstanding; and that it cannot, therefore, conduct us to the fact of\nthe existence of a necessary being. Change proves merely empirical\ncontingency, that is to say, that the new state could not have existed\nwithout a cause, which belongs to the preceding time. This cause\u2014even\nalthough it is regarded as absolutely necessary\u2014must be presented to us\nin time, and must belong to the series of phenomena.\n\nON THE ANTITHESIS.\n\nThe difficulties which meet us, in our attempt to rise through the\nseries of phenomena to the existence of an absolutely necessary supreme\ncause, must not originate from our inability to establish the truth of\nour mere conceptions of the necessary existence of a thing. That is to\nsay, our objections not be ontological, but must be directed against\nthe causal connection with a series of phenomena of a condition which\nis itself unconditioned. In one word, they must be cosmological and\nrelate to empirical laws. We must show that the regress in the series\nof causes (in the world of sense) cannot conclude with an empirically\nunconditioned condition, and that the cosmological argument from the\ncontingency of the cosmical state\u2014a contingency alleged to arise from\nchange\u2014does not justify us in accepting a first cause, that is, a prime\noriginator of the cosmical series.\n\nThe reader will observe in this antinomy a very remarkable contrast.\nThe very same grounds of proof which established in the thesis the\nexistence of a supreme being, demonstrated in the antithesis\u2014and with\nequal strictness\u2014the non-existence of such a being. We found, first,\nthat a necessary being exists, because the whole time past contains the\nseries of all conditions, and with it, therefore, the unconditioned\n(the necessary); secondly, that there does not exist any necessary\nbeing, for the same reason, that the whole time past contains the\nseries of all conditions\u2014which are themselves, therefore, in the\naggregate, conditioned. The cause of this seeming incongruity is as\nfollows. We attend, in the first argument, solely to the absolute\ntotality of the series of conditions, the one of which determines the\nother in time, and thus arrive at a necessary unconditioned. In the\nsecond, we consider, on the contrary, the contingency of everything\nthat is determined in the series of time\u2014for every event is preceded by\na time, in which the condition itself must be determined as\nconditioned\u2014and thus everything that is unconditioned or absolutely\nnecessary disappears. In both, the mode of proof is quite in accordance\nwith the common procedure of human reason, which often falls into\ndiscord with itself, from considering an object from two different\npoints of view. Herr von Mairan regarded the controversy between two\ncelebrated astronomers, which arose from a similar difficulty as to the\nchoice of a proper standpoint, as a phenomenon of sufficient importance\nto warrant a separate treatise on the subject. The one concluded: the\nmoon revolves on its own axis, because it constantly presents the same\nside to the earth; the other declared that the moon does not revolve on\nits own axis, for the same reason. Both conclusions were perfectly\ncorrect, according to the point of view from which the motions of the\nmoon were considered.\n\nSection III. Of the Interest of Reason in these Self-contradictions\n\nWe have thus completely before us the dialectical procedure of the\ncosmological ideas. No possible experience can present us with an\nobject adequate to them in extent. Nay, more, reason itself cannot\ncogitate them as according with the general laws of experience. And yet\nthey are not arbitrary fictions of thought. On the contrary, reason, in\nits uninterrupted progress in the empirical synthesis, is necessarily\nconducted to them, when it endeavours to free from all conditions and\nto comprehend in its unconditioned totality that which can only be\ndetermined conditionally in accordance with the laws of experience.\nThese dialectical propositions are so many attempts to solve four\nnatural and unavoidable problems of reason. There are neither more, nor\ncan there be less, than this number, because there are no other series\nof synthetical hypotheses, limiting \u00e0 priori the empirical synthesis.\n\nThe brilliant claims of reason striving to extend its dominion beyond\nthe limits of experience, have been represented above only in dry\nformulae, which contain merely the grounds of its pretensions. They\nhave, besides, in conformity with the character of a transcendental\nphilosophy, been freed from every empirical element; although the full\nsplendour of the promises they hold out, and the anticipations they\nexcite, manifests itself only when in connection with empirical\ncognitions. In the application of them, however, and in the advancing\nenlargement of the employment of reason, while struggling to rise from\nthe region of experience and to soar to those sublime ideas, philosophy\ndiscovers a value and a dignity, which, if it could but make good its\nassertions, would raise it far above all other departments of human\nknowledge\u2014professing, as it does, to present a sure foundation for our\nhighest hopes and the ultimate aims of all the exertions of reason. The\nquestions: whether the world has a beginning and a limit to its\nextension in space; whether there exists anywhere, or perhaps, in my\nown thinking Self, an indivisible and indestructible unity\u2014or whether\nnothing but what is divisible and transitory exists; whether I am a\nfree agent, or, like other beings, am bound in the chains of nature and\nfate; whether, finally, there is a supreme cause of the world, or all\nour thought and speculation must end with nature and the order of\nexternal things\u2014are questions for the solution of which the\nmathematician would willingly exchange his whole science; for in it\nthere is no satisfaction for the highest aspirations and most ardent\ndesires of humanity. Nay, it may even be said that the true value of\nmathematics\u2014that pride of human reason\u2014consists in this: that she\nguides reason to the knowledge of nature\u2014in her greater as well as in\nher less manifestations\u2014in her beautiful order and regularity\u2014guides\nher, moreover, to an insight into the wonderful unity of the moving\nforces in the operations of nature, far beyond the expectations of a\nphilosophy building only on experience; and that she thus encourages\nphilosophy to extend the province of reason beyond all experience, and\nat the same time provides it with the most excellent materials for\nsupporting its investigations, in so far as their nature admits, by\nadequate and accordant intuitions.\n\nUnfortunately for speculation\u2014but perhaps fortunately for the practical\ninterests of humanity\u2014reason, in the midst of her highest\nanticipations, finds herself hemmed in by a press of opposite and\ncontradictory conclusions, from which neither her honour nor her safety\nwill permit her to draw back. Nor can she regard these conflicting\ntrains of reasoning with indifference as mere passages at arms, still\nless can she command peace; for in the subject of the conflict she has\na deep interest. There is no other course left open to her than to\nreflect with herself upon the origin of this disunion in reason\u2014whether\nit may not arise from a mere misunderstanding. After such an inquiry,\narrogant claims would have to be given up on both sides; but the\nsovereignty of reason over understanding and sense would be based upon\na sure foundation.\n\nWe shall at present defer this radical inquiry and, in the meantime,\nconsider for a little what side in the controversy we should most\nwillingly take, if we were obliged to become partisans at all. As, in\nthis case, we leave out of sight altogether the logical criterion of\ntruth, and merely consult our own interest in reference to the\nquestion, these considerations, although inadequate to settle the\nquestion of right in either party, will enable us to comprehend how\nthose who have taken part in the struggle, adopt the one view rather\nthan the other\u2014no special insight into the subject, however, having\ninfluenced their choice. They will, at the same time, explain to us\nmany other things by the way\u2014for example, the fiery zeal on the one\nside and the cold maintenance of their cause on the other; why the one\nparty has met with the warmest approbations, and the other has always\nbeen repulsed by irreconcilable prejudices.\n\nThere is one thing, however, that determines the proper point of view,\nfrom which alone this preliminary inquiry can be instituted and carried\non with the proper completeness\u2014and that is the comparison of the\nprinciples from which both sides, thesis and antithesis, proceed. My\nreaders would remark in the propositions of the antithesis a complete\nuniformity in the mode of thought and a perfect unity of principle. Its\nprinciple was that of pure empiricism, not only in the explication of\nthe phenomena in the world, but also in the solution of the\ntranscendental ideas, even of that of the universe itself. The\naffirmations of the thesis, on the contrary, were based, in addition to\nthe empirical mode of explanation employed in the series of phenomena,\non intellectual propositions; and its principles were in so far not\nsimple. I shall term the thesis, in view of its essential\ncharacteristic, the dogmatism of pure reason.\n\nOn the side of Dogmatism, or of the thesis, therefore, in the\ndetermination of the cosmological ideas, we find:\n\n1. A practical interest, which must be very dear to every\nright-thinking man. That the word has a beginning\u2014that the nature of my\nthinking self is simple, and therefore indestructible\u2014that I am a free\nagent, and raised above the compulsion of nature and her laws\u2014and,\nfinally, that the entire order of things, which form the world, is\ndependent upon a Supreme Being, from whom the whole receives unity and\nconnection\u2014these are so many foundation-stones of morality and\nreligion. The antithesis deprives us of all these supports\u2014or, at\nleast, seems so to deprive us.\n\n2. A speculative interest of reason manifests itself on this side. For,\nif we take the transcendental ideas and employ them in the manner which\nthe thesis directs, we can exhibit completely \u00e0 priori the entire chain\nof conditions, and understand the derivation of the\nconditioned\u2014beginning from the unconditioned. This the antithesis does\nnot do; and for this reason does not meet with so welcome a reception.\nFor it can give no answer to our question respecting the conditions of\nits synthesis\u2014except such as must be supplemented by another question,\nand so on to infinity. According to it, we must rise from a given\nbeginning to one still higher; every part conducts us to a still\nsmaller one; every event is preceded by another event which is its\ncause; and the conditions of existence rest always upon other and still\nhigher conditions, and find neither end nor basis in some\nself-subsistent thing as the primal being.\n\n3. This side has also the advantage of popularity; and this constitutes\nno small part of its claim to favour. The common understanding does not\nfind the least difficulty in the idea of the unconditioned beginning of\nall synthesis\u2014accustomed, as it is, rather to follow our consequences\nthan to seek for a proper basis for cognition. In the conception of an\nabsolute first, moreover\u2014the possibility of which it does not inquire\ninto\u2014it is highly gratified to find a firmly-established point of\ndeparture for its attempts at theory; while in the restless and\ncontinuous ascent from the conditioned to the condition, always with\none foot in the air, it can find no satisfaction.\n\nOn the side of the antithesis, or Empiricism, in the determination of\nthe cosmological ideas:\n\n1. We cannot discover any such practical interest arising from pure\nprinciples of reason as morality and religion present. On the contrary,\npure empiricism seems to empty them of all their power and influence.\nIf there does not exist a Supreme Being distinct from the world\u2014if the\nworld is without beginning, consequently without a Creator\u2014if our wills\nare not free, and the soul is divisible and subject to corruption just\nlike matter\u2014the ideas and principles of morality lose all validity and\nfall with the transcendental ideas which constituted their theoretical\nsupport.\n\n2. But empiricism, in compensation, holds out to reason, in its\nspeculative interests, certain important advantages, far exceeding any\nthat the dogmatist can promise us. For, when employed by the\nempiricist, understanding is always upon its proper ground of\ninvestigation\u2014the field of possible experience, the laws of which it\ncan explore, and thus extend its cognition securely and with clear\nintelligence without being stopped by limits in any direction. Here can\nit and ought it to find and present to intuition its proper object\u2014not\nonly in itself, but in all its relations; or, if it employ conceptions,\nupon this ground it can always present the corresponding images in\nclear and unmistakable intuitions. It is quite unnecessary for it to\nrenounce the guidance of nature, to attach itself to ideas, the objects\nof which it cannot know; because, as mere intellectual entities, they\ncannot be presented in any intuition. On the contrary, it is not even\npermitted to abandon its proper occupation, under the pretence that it\nhas been brought to a conclusion (for it never can be), and to pass\ninto the region of idealizing reason and transcendent conceptions,\nwhich it is not required to observe and explore the laws of nature, but\nmerely to think and to imagine\u2014secure from being contradicted by facts,\nbecause they have not been called as witnesses, but passed by, or\nperhaps subordinated to the so-called higher interests and\nconsiderations of pure reason.\n\nHence the empiricist will never allow himself to accept any epoch of\nnature for the first\u2014the absolutely primal state; he will not believe\nthat there can be limits to his outlook into her wide domains, nor pass\nfrom the objects of nature, which he can satisfactorily explain by\nmeans of observation and mathematical thought\u2014which he can determine\nsynthetically in intuition, to those which neither sense nor\nimagination can ever present in concreto; he will not concede the\nexistence of a faculty in nature, operating independently of the laws\nof nature\u2014a concession which would introduce uncertainty into the\nprocedure of the understanding, which is guided by necessary laws to\nthe observation of phenomena; nor, finally, will he permit himself to\nseek a cause beyond nature, inasmuch as we know nothing but it, and\nfrom it alone receive an objective basis for all our conceptions and\ninstruction in the unvarying laws of things.\n\nIn truth, if the empirical philosopher had no other purpose in the\nestablishment of his antithesis than to check the presumption of a\nreason which mistakes its true destination, which boasts of its insight\nand its knowledge, just where all insight and knowledge cease to exist,\nand regards that which is valid only in relation to a practical\ninterest, as an advancement of the speculative interests of the mind\n(in order, when it is convenient for itself, to break the thread of our\nphysical investigations, and, under pretence of extending our\ncognition, connect them with transcendental ideas, by means of which we\nreally know only that we know nothing)\u2014if, I say, the empiricist rested\nsatisfied with this benefit, the principle advanced by him would be a\nmaxim recommending moderation in the pretensions of reason and modesty\nin its affirmations, and at the same time would direct us to the right\nmode of extending the province of the understanding, by the help of the\nonly true teacher, experience. In obedience to this advice,\nintellectual hypotheses and faith would not be called in aid of our\npractical interests; nor should we introduce them under the pompous\ntitles of science and insight. For speculative cognition cannot find an\nobjective basis any other where than in experience; and, when we\noverstep its limits our synthesis, which requires ever new cognitions\nindependent of experience, has no substratum of intuition upon which to\nbuild.\n\nBut if\u2014as often happens\u2014empiricism, in relation to ideas, becomes\nitself dogmatic and boldly denies that which is above the sphere of its\nphenomenal cognition, it falls itself into the error of intemperance\u2014an\nerror which is here all the more reprehensible, as thereby the\npractical interest of reason receives an irreparable injury.\n\nAnd this constitutes the opposition between Epicureanism[57] and\nPlatonism.\n\n [57] It is, however, still a matter of doubt whether Epicurus ever\n propounded these principles as directions for the objective employment\n of the understanding. If, indeed, they were nothing more than maxims\n for the speculative exercise of reason, he gives evidence therein a\n more genuine philosophic spirit than any of the philosophers of\n antiquity. That, in the explanation of phenomena, we must proceed as\n if the field of inquiry had neither limits in space nor commencement\n in time; that we must be satisfied with the teaching of experience in\n reference to the material of which the world is posed; that we must\n not look for any other mode of the origination of events than that\n which is determined by the unalterable laws of nature; and finally,\n that we not employ the hypothesis of a cause distinct from the world\n to account for a phenomenon or for the world itself\u2014are principles for\n the extension of speculative philosophy, and the discovery of the true\n sources of the principles of morals, which, however little conformed\n to in the present day, are undoubtedly correct. At the same time, any\n one desirous of ignoring, in mere speculation, these dogmatical\n propositions, need not for that reason be accused of denying them.\n\n\nBoth Epicurus and Plato assert more in their systems than they know.\nThe former encourages and advances science\u2014although to the prejudice of\nthe practical; the latter presents us with excellent principles for the\ninvestigation of the practical, but, in relation to everything\nregarding which we can attain to speculative cognition, permits reason\nto append idealistic explanations of natural phenomena, to the great\ninjury of physical investigation.\n\n3. In regard to the third motive for the preliminary choice of a party\nin this war of assertions, it seems very extraordinary that empiricism\nshould be utterly unpopular. We should be inclined to believe that the\ncommon understanding would receive it with pleasure\u2014promising as it\ndoes to satisfy it without passing the bounds of experience and its\nconnected order; while transcendental dogmatism obliges it to rise to\nconceptions which far surpass the intelligence and ability of the most\npractised thinkers. But in this, in truth, is to be found its real\nmotive. For the common understanding thus finds itself in a situation\nwhere not even the most learned can have the advantage of it. If it\nunderstands little or nothing about these transcendental conceptions,\nno one can boast of understanding any more; and although it may not\nexpress itself in so scholastically correct a manner as others, it can\nbusy itself with reasoning and arguments without end, wandering among\nmere ideas, about which one can always be very eloquent, because we\nknow nothing about them; while, in the observation and investigation of\nnature, it would be forced to remain dumb and to confess its utter\nignorance. Thus indolence and vanity form of themselves strong\nrecommendations of these principles. Besides, although it is a hard\nthing for a philosopher to assume a principle, of which he can give to\nhimself no reasonable account, and still more to employ conceptions,\nthe objective reality of which cannot be established, nothing is more\nusual with the common understanding. It wants something which will\nallow it to go to work with confidence. The difficulty of even\ncomprehending a supposition does not disquiet it, because\u2014not knowing\nwhat comprehending means\u2014it never even thinks of the supposition it may\nbe adopting as a principle; and regards as known that with which it has\nbecome familiar from constant use. And, at last, all speculative\ninterests disappear before the practical interests which it holds dear;\nand it fancies that it understands and knows what its necessities and\nhopes incite it to assume or to believe. Thus the empiricism of\ntranscendentally idealizing reason is robbed of all popularity; and,\nhowever prejudicial it may be to the highest practical principles,\nthere is no fear that it will ever pass the limits of the schools, or\nacquire any favour or influence in society or with the multitude.\n\nHuman reason is by nature architectonic. That is to say, it regards all\ncognitions as parts of a possible system, and hence accepts only such\nprinciples as at least do not incapacitate a cognition to which we may\nhave attained from being placed along with others in a general system.\nBut the propositions of the antithesis are of a character which renders\nthe completion of an edifice of cognitions impossible. According to\nthese, beyond one state or epoch of the world there is always to be\nfound one more ancient; in every part always other parts themselves\ndivisible; preceding every event another, the origin of which must\nitself be sought still higher; and everything in existence is\nconditioned, and still not dependent on an unconditioned and primal\nexistence. As, therefore, the antithesis will not concede the existence\nof a first beginning which might be available as a foundation, a\ncomplete edifice of cognition, in the presence of such hypothesis, is\nutterly impossible. Thus the architectonic interest of reason, which\nrequires a unity\u2014not empirical, but \u00e0 priori and rational\u2014forms a\nnatural recommendation for the assertions of the thesis in our\nantinomy.\n\nBut if any one could free himself entirely from all considerations of\ninterest, and weigh without partiality the assertions of reason,\nattending only to their content, irrespective of the consequences which\nfollow from them; such a person, on the supposition that he knew no\nother way out of the confusion than to settle the truth of one or other\nof the conflicting doctrines, would live in a state of continual\nhesitation. Today, he would feel convinced that the human will is free;\nto-morrow, considering the indissoluble chain of nature, he would look\non freedom as a mere illusion and declare nature to be all-in-all. But,\nif he were called to action, the play of the merely speculative reason\nwould disappear like the shapes of a dream, and practical interest\nwould dictate his choice of principles. But, as it well befits a\nreflective and inquiring being to devote certain periods of time to the\nexamination of its own reason\u2014to divest itself of all partiality, and\nfrankly to communicate its observations for the judgement and opinion\nof others; so no one can be blamed for, much less prevented from,\nplacing both parties on their trial, with permission to end themselves,\nfree from intimidation, before intimidation, before a sworn jury of\nequal condition with themselves\u2014the condition of weak and fallible men.\n\nSection IV. Of the necessity imposed upon Pure Reason of presenting a\nSolution of its Transcendental Problems\n\nTo avow an ability to solve all problems and to answer all questions\nwould be a profession certain to convict any philosopher of extravagant\nboasting and self-conceit, and at once to destroy the confidence that\nmight otherwise have been reposed in him. There are, however, sciences\nso constituted that every question arising within their sphere must\nnecessarily be capable of receiving an answer from the knowledge\nalready possessed, for the answer must be received from the same\nsources whence the question arose. In such sciences it is not allowable\nto excuse ourselves on the plea of necessary and unavoidable ignorance;\na solution is absolutely requisite. The rule of right and wrong must\nhelp us to the knowledge of what is right or wrong in all possible\ncases; otherwise, the idea of obligation or duty would be utterly null,\nfor we cannot have any obligation to that which we cannot know. On the\nother hand, in our investigations of the phenomena of nature, much must\nremain uncertain, and many questions continue insoluble; because what\nwe know of nature is far from being sufficient to explain all the\nphenomena that are presented to our observation. Now the question is:\nWhether there is in transcendental philosophy any question, relating to\nan object presented to pure reason, which is unanswerable by this\nreason; and whether we must regard the subject of the question as quite\nuncertain, so far as our knowledge extends, and must give it a place\namong those subjects, of which we have just so much conception as is\nsufficient to enable us to raise a question\u2014faculty or materials\nfailing us, however, when we attempt an answer.\n\nNow I maintain that, among all speculative cognition, the peculiarity\nof transcendental philosophy is that there is no question, relating to\nan object presented to pure reason, which is insoluble by this reason;\nand that the profession of unavoidable ignorance\u2014the problem being\nalleged to be beyond the reach of our faculties\u2014cannot free us from the\nobligation to present a complete and satisfactory answer. For the very\nconception which enables us to raise the question must give us the\npower of answering it; inasmuch as the object, as in the case of right\nand wrong, is not to be discovered out of the conception.\n\nBut, in transcendental philosophy, it is only the cosmological\nquestions to which we can demand a satisfactory answer in relation to\nthe constitution of their object; and the philosopher is not permitted\nto avail himself of the pretext of necessary ignorance and impenetrable\nobscurity. These questions relate solely to the cosmological ideas. For\nthe object must be given in experience, and the question relates to the\nadequateness of the object to an idea. If the object is transcendental\nand therefore itself unknown; if the question, for example, is whether\nthe object\u2014the something, the phenomenon of which (internal\u2014in\nourselves) is thought\u2014that is to say, the soul, is in itself a simple\nbeing; or whether there is a cause of all things, which is absolutely\nnecessary\u2014in such cases we are seeking for our idea an object, of which\nwe may confess that it is unknown to us, though we must not on that\naccount assert that it is impossible.[58] The cosmological ideas alone\nposses the peculiarity that we can presuppose the object of them and\nthe empirical synthesis requisite for the conception of that object to\nbe given; and the question, which arises from these ideas, relates\nmerely to the progress of this synthesis, in so far as it must contain\nabsolute totality\u2014which, however, is not empirical, as it cannot be\ngiven in any experience. Now, as the question here is solely in regard\nto a thing as the object of a possible experience and not as a thing in\nitself, the answer to the transcendental cosmological question need not\nbe sought out of the idea, for the question does not regard an object\nin itself. The question in relation to a possible experience is not,\n\u201cWhat can be given in an experience in concreto\u201d but \u201cwhat is contained\nin the idea, to which the empirical synthesis must approximate.\u201d The\nquestion must therefore be capable of solution from the idea alone. For\nthe idea is a creation of reason itself, which therefore cannot\ndisclaim the obligation to answer or refer us to the unknown object.\n\n [58] The question, \u201cWhat is the constitution of a transcendental\n object?\u201d is unanswerable\u2014we are unable to say what it is; but we can\n perceive that the question itself is nothing; because it does not\n relate to any object that can be presented to us. For this reason, we\n must consider all the questions raised in transcendental psychology as\n answerable and as really answered; for they relate to the\n transcendental subject of all internal phenomena, which is not itself\n phenomenon and consequently not given as an object, in which,\n moreover, none of the categories\u2014and it is to them that the question\n is properly directed\u2014find any conditions of its application. Here,\n therefore, is a case where no answer is the only proper answer. For a\n question regarding the constitution of a something which cannot be\n cogitated by any determined predicate, being completely beyond the\n sphere of objects and experience, is perfectly null and void.\n\n\nIt is not so extraordinary, as it at first sight appears, that a\nscience should demand and expect satisfactory answers to all the\nquestions that may arise within its own sphere (questiones domesticae),\nalthough, up to a certain time, these answers may not have been\ndiscovered. There are, in addition to transcendental philosophy, only\ntwo pure sciences of reason; the one with a speculative, the other with\na practical content\u2014pure mathematics and pure ethics. Has any one ever\nheard it alleged that, from our complete and necessary ignorance of the\nconditions, it is uncertain what exact relation the diameter of a\ncircle bears to the circle in rational or irrational numbers? By the\nformer the sum cannot be given exactly, by the latter only\napproximately; and therefore we decide that the impossibility of a\nsolution of the question is evident. Lambert presented us with a\ndemonstration of this. In the general principles of morals there can be\nnothing uncertain, for the propositions are either utterly without\nmeaning, or must originate solely in our rational conceptions. On the\nother hand, there must be in physical science an infinite number of\nconjectures, which can never become certainties; because the phenomena\nof nature are not given as objects dependent on our conceptions. The\nkey to the solution of such questions cannot, therefore, be found in\nour conceptions, or in pure thought, but must lie without us and for\nthat reason is in many cases not to be discovered; and consequently a\nsatisfactory explanation cannot be expected. The questions of\ntranscendental analytic, which relate to the deduction of our pure\ncognition, are not to be regarded as of the same kind as those\nmentioned above; for we are not at present treating of the certainty of\njudgements in relation to the origin of our conceptions, but only of\nthat certainty in relation to objects.\n\nWe cannot, therefore, escape the responsibility of at least a critical\nsolution of the questions of reason, by complaints of the limited\nnature of our faculties, and the seemingly humble confession that it is\nbeyond the power of our reason to decide, whether the world has existed\nfrom all eternity or had a beginning\u2014whether it is infinitely extended,\nor enclosed within certain limits\u2014whether anything in the world is\nsimple, or whether everything must be capable of infinite\ndivisibility\u2014whether freedom can originate phenomena, or whether\neverything is absolutely dependent on the laws and order of nature\u2014and,\nfinally, whether there exists a being that is completely unconditioned\nand necessary, or whether the existence of everything is conditioned\nand consequently dependent on something external to itself, and\ntherefore in its own nature contingent. For all these questions relate\nto an object, which can be given nowhere else than in thought. This\nobject is the absolutely unconditioned totality of the synthesis of\nphenomena. If the conceptions in our minds do not assist us to some\ncertain result in regard to these problems, we must not defend\nourselves on the plea that the object itself remains hidden from and\nunknown to us. For no such thing or object can be given\u2014it is not to be\nfound out of the idea in our minds. We must seek the cause of our\nfailure in our idea itself, which is an insoluble problem and in regard\nto which we obstinately assume that there exists a real object\ncorresponding and adequate to it. A clear explanation of the dialectic\nwhich lies in our conception, will very soon enable us to come to a\nsatisfactory decision in regard to such a question.\n\nThe pretext that we are unable to arrive at certainty in regard to\nthese problems may be met with this question, which requires at least a\nplain answer: \u201cFrom what source do the ideas originate, the solution of\nwhich involves you in such difficulties? Are you seeking for an\nexplanation of certain phenomena; and do you expect these ideas to give\nyou the principles or the rules of this explanation?\u201d Let it be\ngranted, that all nature was laid open before you; that nothing was hid\nfrom your senses and your consciousness. Still, you could not cognize\nin concreto the object of your ideas in any experience. For what is\ndemanded is not only this full and complete intuition, but also a\ncomplete synthesis and the consciousness of its absolute totality; and\nthis is not possible by means of any empirical cognition. It follows\nthat your question\u2014your idea\u2014is by no means necessary for the\nexplanation of any phenomenon; and the idea cannot have been in any\nsense given by the object itself. For such an object can never be\npresented to us, because it cannot be given by any possible experience.\nWhatever perceptions you may attain to, you are still surrounded by\nconditions\u2014in space, or in time\u2014and you cannot discover anything\nunconditioned; nor can you decide whether this unconditioned is to be\nplaced in an absolute beginning of the synthesis, or in an absolute\ntotality of the series without beginning. A whole, in the empirical\nsignification of the term, is always merely comparative. The absolute\nwhole of quantity (the universe), of division, of derivation, of the\ncondition of existence, with the question\u2014whether it is to be produced\nby finite or infinite synthesis, no possible experience can instruct us\nconcerning. You will not, for example, be able to explain the phenomena\nof a body in the least degree better, whether you believe it to consist\nof simple, or of composite parts; for a simple phenomenon\u2014and just as\nlittle an infinite series of composition\u2014can never be presented to your\nperception. Phenomena require and admit of explanation, only in so far\nas the conditions of that explanation are given in perception; but the\nsum total of that which is given in phenomena, considered as an\nabsolute whole, is itself a perception\u2014and we cannot therefore seek for\nexplanations of this whole beyond itself, in other perceptions. The\nexplanation of this whole is the proper object of the transcendental\nproblems of pure reason.\n\nAlthough, therefore, the solution of these problems is unattainable\nthrough experience, we must not permit ourselves to say that it is\nuncertain how the object of our inquiries is constituted. For the\nobject is in our own mind and cannot be discovered in experience; and\nwe have only to take care that our thoughts are consistent with each\nother, and to avoid falling into the amphiboly of regarding our idea as\na representation of an object empirically given, and therefore to be\ncognized according to the laws of experience. A dogmatical solution is\ntherefore not only unsatisfactory but impossible. The critical\nsolution, which may be a perfectly certain one, does not consider the\nquestion objectively, but proceeds by inquiring into the basis of the\ncognition upon which the question rests.\n\nSection V. Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems presented\nin the four Transcendental Ideas\n\nWe should be quite willing to desist from the demand of a dogmatical\nanswer to our questions, if we understood beforehand that, be the\nanswer what it may, it would only serve to increase our ignorance, to\nthrow us from one incomprehensibility into another, from one obscurity\ninto another still greater, and perhaps lead us into irreconcilable\ncontradictions. If a dogmatical affirmative or negative answer is\ndemanded, is it at all prudent to set aside the probable grounds of a\nsolution which lie before us and to take into consideration what\nadvantage we shall gain, if the answer is to favour the one side or the\nother? If it happens that in both cases the answer is mere nonsense, we\nhave in this an irresistible summons to institute a critical\ninvestigation of the question, for the purpose of discovering whether\nit is based on a groundless presupposition and relates to an idea, the\nfalsity of which would be more easily exposed in its application and\nconsequences than in the mere representation of its content. This is\nthe great utility of the sceptical mode of treating the questions\naddressed by pure reason to itself. By this method we easily rid\nourselves of the confusions of dogmatism, and establish in its place a\ntemperate criticism, which, as a genuine cathartic, will successfully\nremove the presumptuous notions of philosophy and their consequence\u2014the\nvain pretension to universal science.\n\nIf, then, I could understand the nature of a cosmological idea and\nperceive, before I entered on the discussion of the subject at all,\nthat, whatever side of the question regarding the unconditioned of the\nregressive synthesis of phenomena it favoured\u2014it must either be too\ngreat or too small for every conception of the understanding\u2014I would be\nable to comprehend how the idea, which relates to an object of\nexperience\u2014an experience which must be adequate to and in accordance\nwith a possible conception of the understanding\u2014must be completely void\nand without significance, inasmuch as its object is inadequate,\nconsider it as we may. And this is actually the case with all\ncosmological conceptions, which, for the reason above mentioned,\ninvolve reason, so long as it remains attached to them, in an\nunavoidable antinomy. For suppose:\n\nFirst, that the world has no beginning\u2014in this case it is too large for\nour conception; for this conception, which consists in a successive\nregress, cannot overtake the whole eternity that has elapsed. Grant\nthat it has a beginning, it is then too small for the conception of the\nunderstanding. For, as a beginning presupposes a time preceding, it\ncannot be unconditioned; and the law of the empirical employment of the\nunderstanding imposes the necessity of looking for a higher condition\nof time; and the world is, therefore, evidently too small for this law.\n\nThe same is the case with the double answer to the question regarding\nthe extent, in space, of the world. For, if it is infinite and\nunlimited, it must be too large for every possible empirical\nconception. If it is finite and limited, we have a right to ask: \u201cWhat\ndetermines these limits?\u201d Void space is not a self-subsistent correlate\nof things, and cannot be a final condition\u2014and still less an empirical\ncondition, forming a part of a possible experience. For how can we have\nany experience or perception of an absolute void? But the absolute\ntotality of the empirical synthesis requires that the unconditioned be\nan empirical conception. Consequently, a finite world is too small for\nour conception.\n\nSecondly, if every phenomenon (matter) in space consists of an infinite\nnumber of parts, the regress of the division is always too great for\nour conception; and if the division of space must cease with some\nmember of the division (the simple), it is too small for the idea of\nthe unconditioned. For the member at which we have discontinued our\ndivision still admits a regress to many more parts contained in the\nobject.\n\nThirdly, suppose that every event in the world happens in accordance\nwith the laws of nature; the causality of a cause must itself be an\nevent and necessitates a regress to a still higher cause, and\nconsequently the unceasing prolongation of the series of conditions a\nparte priori. Operative nature is therefore too large for every\nconception we can form in the synthesis of cosmical events.\n\nIf we admit the existence of spontaneously produced events, that is, of\nfree agency, we are driven, in our search for sufficient reasons, on an\nunavoidable law of nature and are compelled to appeal to the empirical\nlaw of causality, and we find that any such totality of connection in\nour synthesis is too small for our necessary empirical conception.\n\nFourthly, if we assume the existence of an absolutely necessary\nbeing\u2014whether it be the world or something in the world, or the cause\nof the world\u2014we must place it in a time at an infinite distance from\nany given moment; for, otherwise, it must be dependent on some other\nand higher existence. Such an existence is, in this case, too large for\nour empirical conception, and unattainable by the continued regress of\nany synthesis.\n\nBut if we believe that everything in the world\u2014be it condition or\nconditioned\u2014is contingent; every given existence is too small for our\nconception. For in this case we are compelled to seek for some other\nexistence upon which the former depends.\n\nWe have said that in all these cases the cosmological idea is either\ntoo great or too small for the empirical regress in a synthesis, and\nconsequently for every possible conception of the understanding. Why\ndid we not express ourselves in a manner exactly the reverse of this\nand, instead of accusing the cosmological idea of over stepping or of\nfalling short of its true aim, possible experience, say that, in the\nfirst case, the empirical conception is always too small for the idea,\nand in the second too great, and thus attach the blame of these\ncontradictions to the empirical regress? The reason is this. Possible\nexperience can alone give reality to our conceptions; without it a\nconception is merely an idea, without truth or relation to an object.\nHence a possible empirical conception must be the standard by which we\nare to judge whether an idea is anything more than an idea and fiction\nof thought, or whether it relates to an object in the world. If we say\nof a thing that in relation to some other thing it is too large or too\nsmall, the former is considered as existing for the sake of the latter,\nand requiring to be adapted to it. Among the trivial subjects of\ndiscussion in the old schools of dialectics was this question: \u201cIf a\nball cannot pass through a hole, shall we say that the ball is too\nlarge or the hole too small?\u201d In this case it is indifferent what\nexpression we employ; for we do not know which exists for the sake of\nthe other. On the other hand, we cannot say: \u201cThe man is too long for\nhis coat\u201d; but: \u201cThe coat is too short for the man.\u201d\n\nWe are thus led to the well-founded suspicion that the cosmological\nideas, and all the conflicting sophistical assertions connected with\nthem, are based upon a false and fictitious conception of the mode in\nwhich the object of these ideas is presented to us; and this suspicion\nwill probably direct us how to expose the illusion that has so long led\nus astray from the truth.\n\nSection VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution of Pure\nCosmological Dialectic\n\nIn the transcendental \u00e6sthetic we proved that everything intuited in\nspace and time, all objects of a possible experience, are nothing but\nphenomena, that is, mere representations; and that these, as presented\nto us\u2014as extended bodies, or as series of changes\u2014have no\nself-subsistent existence apart from human thought. This doctrine I\ncall Transcendental Idealism.[59] The realist in the transcendental\nsense regards these modifications of our sensibility, these mere\nrepresentations, as things subsisting in themselves.\n\n [59] I have elsewhere termed this theory formal idealism, to\n distinguish it from material idealism, which doubts or denies the\n existence of external things. To avoid ambiguity, it seems advisable\n in many cases to employ this term instead of that mentioned in the\n text.\n\n\nIt would be unjust to accuse us of holding the long-decried theory of\nempirical idealism, which, while admitting the reality of space,\ndenies, or at least doubts, the existence of bodies extended in it, and\nthus leaves us without a sufficient criterion of reality and illusion.\nThe supporters of this theory find no difficulty in admitting the\nreality of the phenomena of the internal sense in time; nay, they go\nthe length of maintaining that this internal experience is of itself a\nsufficient proof of the real existence of its object as a thing in\nitself.\n\nTranscendental idealism allows that the objects of external\nintuition\u2014as intuited in space, and all changes in time\u2014as represented\nby the internal sense, are real. For, as space is the form of that\nintuition which we call external, and, without objects in space, no\nempirical representation could be given us, we can and ought to regard\nextended bodies in it as real. The case is the same with\nrepresentations in time. But time and space, with all phenomena\ntherein, are not in themselves things. They are nothing but\nrepresentations and cannot exist out of and apart from the mind. Nay,\nthe sensuous internal intuition of the mind (as the object of\nconsciousness), the determination of which is represented by the\nsuccession of different states in time, is not the real, proper self,\nas it exists in itself\u2014not the transcendental subject\u2014but only a\nphenomenon, which is presented to the sensibility of this, to us,\nunknown being. This internal phenomenon cannot be admitted to be a\nself-subsisting thing; for its condition is time, and time cannot be\nthe condition of a thing in itself. But the empirical truth of\nphenomena in space and time is guaranteed beyond the possibility of\ndoubt, and sufficiently distinguished from the illusion of dreams or\nfancy\u2014although both have a proper and thorough connection in an\nexperience according to empirical laws. The objects of experience then\nare not things in themselves, but are given only in experience, and\nhave no existence apart from and independently of experience. That\nthere may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one has ever observed\nthem, must certainly be admitted; but this assertion means only, that\nwe may in the possible progress of experience discover them at some\nfuture time. For that which stands in connection with a perception\naccording to the laws of the progress of experience is real. They are\ntherefore really existent, if they stand in empirical connection with\nmy actual or real consciousness, although they are not in themselves\nreal, that is, apart from the progress of experience.\n\nThere is nothing actually given\u2014we can be conscious of nothing as real,\nexcept a perception and the empirical progression from it to other\npossible perceptions. For phenomena, as mere representations, are real\nonly in perception; and perception is, in fact, nothing but the reality\nof an empirical representation, that is, a phenomenon. To call a\nphenomenon a real thing prior to perception means either that we must\nmeet with this phenomenon in the progress of experience, or it means\nnothing at all. For I can say only of a thing in itself that it exists\nwithout relation to the senses and experience. But we are speaking here\nmerely of phenomena in space and time, both of which are determinations\nof sensibility, and not of things in themselves. It follows that\nphenomena are not things in themselves, but are mere representations,\nwhich if not given in us\u2014in perception\u2014are non-existent.\n\nThe faculty of sensuous intuition is properly a receptivity\u2014a capacity\nof being affected in a certain manner by representations, the relation\nof which to each other is a pure intuition of space and time\u2014the pure\nforms of sensibility. These representations, in so far as they are\nconnected and determinable in this relation (in space and time)\naccording to laws of the unity of experience, are called objects. The\nnon-sensuous cause of these representations is completely unknown to us\nand hence cannot be intuited as an object. For such an object could not\nbe represented either in space or in time; and without these conditions\nintuition or representation is impossible. We may, at the same time,\nterm the non-sensuous cause of phenomena the transcendental object\u2014but\nmerely as a mental correlate to sensibility, considered as a\nreceptivity. To this transcendental object we may attribute the whole\nconnection and extent of our possible perceptions, and say that it is\ngiven and exists in itself prior to all experience. But the phenomena,\ncorresponding to it, are not given as things in themselves, but in\nexperience alone. For they are mere representations, receiving from\nperceptions alone significance and relation to a real object, under the\ncondition that this or that perception\u2014indicating an object\u2014is in\ncomplete connection with all others in accordance with the rules of the\nunity of experience. Thus we can say: \u201cThe things that really existed\nin past time are given in the transcendental object of experience.\u201d But\nthese are to me real objects, only in so far as I can represent to my\nown mind, that a regressive series of possible perceptions\u2014following\nthe indications of history, or the footsteps of cause and effect\u2014in\naccordance with empirical laws\u2014that, in one word, the course of the\nworld conducts us to an elapsed series of time as the condition of the\npresent time. This series in past time is represented as real, not in\nitself, but only in connection with a possible experience. Thus, when I\nsay that certain events occurred in past time, I merely assert the\npossibility of prolonging the chain of experience, from the present\nperception, upwards to the conditions that determine it according to\ntime.\n\nIf I represent to myself all objects existing in all space and time, I\ndo not thereby place these in space and time prior to all experience;\non the contrary, such a representation is nothing more than the notion\nof a possible experience, in its absolute completeness. In experience\nalone are those objects, which are nothing but representations, given.\nBut, when I say they existed prior to my experience, this means only\nthat I must begin with the perception present to me and follow the\ntrack indicated until I discover them in some part or region of\nexperience. The cause of the empirical condition of this\nprogression\u2014and consequently at what member therein I must stop, and at\nwhat point in the regress I am to find this member\u2014is transcendental,\nand hence necessarily incognizable. But with this we have not to do;\nour concern is only with the law of progression in experience, in which\nobjects, that is, phenomena, are given. It is a matter of indifference,\nwhether I say, \u201cI may in the progress of experience discover stars, at\na hundred times greater distance than the most distant of those now\nvisible,\u201d or, \u201cStars at this distance may be met in space, although no\none has, or ever will discover them.\u201d For, if they are given as things\nin themselves, without any relation to possible experience, they are\nfor me non-existent, consequently, are not objects, for they are not\ncontained in the regressive series of experience. But, if these\nphenomena must be employed in the construction or support of the\ncosmological idea of an absolute whole, and when we are discussing a\nquestion that oversteps the limits of possible experience, the proper\ndistinction of the different theories of the reality of sensuous\nobjects is of great importance, in order to avoid the illusion which\nmust necessarily arise from the misinterpretation of our empirical\nconceptions.\n\nSection VII. Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problem\n\nThe antinomy of pure reason is based upon the following dialectical\nargument: \u201cIf that which is conditioned is given, the whole series of\nits conditions is also given; but sensuous objects are given as\nconditioned; consequently...\u201d This syllogism, the major of which seems\nso natural and evident, introduces as many cosmological ideas as there\nare different kinds of conditions in the synthesis of phenomena, in so\nfar as these conditions constitute a series. These ideas require\nabsolute totality in the series, and thus place reason in inextricable\nembarrassment. Before proceeding to expose the fallacy in this\ndialectical argument, it will be necessary to have a correct\nunderstanding of certain conceptions that appear in it.\n\nIn the first place, the following proposition is evident, and\nindubitably certain: \u201cIf the conditioned is given, a regress in the\nseries of all its conditions is thereby imperatively required.\u201d For the\nvery conception of a conditioned is a conception of something related\nto a condition, and, if this condition is itself conditioned, to\nanother condition\u2014and so on through all the members of the series. This\nproposition is, therefore, analytical and has nothing to fear from\ntranscendental criticism. It is a logical postulate of reason: to\npursue, as far as possible, the connection of a conception with its\nconditions.\n\nIf, in the second place, both the conditioned and the condition are\nthings in themselves, and if the former is given, not only is the\nregress to the latter requisite, but the latter is really given with\nthe former. Now, as this is true of all the members of the series, the\nentire series of conditions, and with them the unconditioned, is at the\nsame time given in the very fact of the conditioned, the existence of\nwhich is possible only in and through that series, being given. In this\ncase, the synthesis of the conditioned with its condition, is a\nsynthesis of the understanding merely, which represents things as they\nare, without regarding whether and how we can cognize them. But if I\nhave to do with phenomena, which, in their character of mere\nrepresentations, are not given, if I do not attain to a cognition of\nthem (in other words, to themselves, for they are nothing more than\nempirical cognitions), I am not entitled to say: \u201cIf the conditioned is\ngiven, all its conditions (as phenomena) are also given.\u201d I cannot,\ntherefore, from the fact of a conditioned being given, infer the\nabsolute totality of the series of its conditions. For phenomena are\nnothing but an empirical synthesis in apprehension or perception, and\nare therefore given only in it. Now, in speaking of phenomena it does\nnot follow that, if the conditioned is given, the synthesis which\nconstitutes its empirical condition is also thereby given and\npresupposed; such a synthesis can be established only by an actual\nregress in the series of conditions. But we are entitled to say in this\ncase that a regress to the conditions of a conditioned, in other words,\nthat a continuous empirical synthesis is enjoined; that, if the\nconditions are not given, they are at least required; and that we are\ncertain to discover the conditions in this regress.\n\nWe can now see that the major, in the above cosmological syllogism,\ntakes the conditioned in the transcendental signification which it has\nin the pure category, while the minor speaks of it in the empirical\nsignification which it has in the category as applied to phenomena.\nThere is, therefore, a dialectical fallacy in the syllogism\u2014a sophisma\nfigurae dictionis. But this fallacy is not a consciously devised one,\nbut a perfectly natural illusion of the common reason of man. For, when\na thing is given as conditioned, we presuppose in the major its\nconditions and their series, unperceived, as it were, and unseen;\nbecause this is nothing more than the logical requirement of complete\nand satisfactory premisses for a given conclusion. In this case, time\nis altogether left out in the connection of the conditioned with the\ncondition; they are supposed to be given in themselves, and\ncontemporaneously. It is, moreover, just as natural to regard phenomena\n(in the minor) as things in themselves and as objects presented to the\npure understanding, as in the major, in which complete abstraction was\nmade of all conditions of intuition. But it is under these conditions\nalone that objects are given. Now we overlooked a remarkable\ndistinction between the conceptions. The synthesis of the conditioned\nwith its condition, and the complete series of the latter (in the\nmajor) are not limited by time, and do not contain the conception of\nsuccession. On the contrary, the empirical synthesis and the series of\nconditions in the phenomenal world\u2014subsumed in the minor\u2014are\nnecessarily successive and given in time alone. It follows that I\ncannot presuppose in the minor, as I did in the major, the absolute\ntotality of the synthesis and of the series therein represented; for in\nthe major all the members of the series are given as things in\nthemselves\u2014without any limitations or conditions of time, while in the\nminor they are possible only in and through a successive regress, which\ncannot exist, except it be actually carried into execution in the world\nof phenomena.\n\nAfter this proof of the viciousness of the argument commonly employed\nin maintaining cosmological assertions, both parties may now be justly\ndismissed, as advancing claims without grounds or title. But the\nprocess has not been ended by convincing them that one or both were in\nthe wrong and had maintained an assertion which was without valid\ngrounds of proof. Nothing seems to be clearer than that, if one\nmaintains: \u201cThe world has a beginning,\u201d and another: \u201cThe world has no\nbeginning,\u201d one of the two must be right. But it is likewise clear\nthat, if the evidence on both sides is equal, it is impossible to\ndiscover on what side the truth lies; and the controversy continues,\nalthough the parties have been recommended to peace before the tribunal\nof reason. There remains, then, no other means of settling the question\nthan to convince the parties, who refute each other with such\nconclusiveness and ability, that they are disputing about nothing, and\nthat a transcendental illusion has been mocking them with visions of\nreality where there is none. The mode of adjusting a dispute which\ncannot be decided upon its own merits, we shall now proceed to lay\nbefore our readers.\n\n\nZeno of Elea, a subtle dialectician, was severely reprimanded by Plato\nas a sophist, who, merely from the base motive of exhibiting his skill\nin discussion, maintained and subverted the same proposition by\narguments as powerful and convincing on the one side as on the other.\nHe maintained, for example, that God (who was probably nothing more, in\nhis view, than the world) is neither finite nor infinite, neither in\nmotion nor in rest, neither similar nor dissimilar to any other thing.\nIt seemed to those philosophers who criticized his mode of discussion\nthat his purpose was to deny completely both of two self-contradictory\npropositions\u2014which is absurd. But I cannot believe that there is any\njustice in this accusation. The first of these propositions I shall\npresently consider in a more detailed manner. With regard to the\nothers, if by the word of God he understood merely the Universe, his\nmeaning must have been\u2014that it cannot be permanently present in one\nplace\u2014that is, at rest\u2014nor be capable of changing its place\u2014that is, of\nmoving\u2014because all places are in the universe, and the universe itself\nis, therefore, in no place. Again, if the universe contains in itself\neverything that exists, it cannot be similar or dissimilar to any other\nthing, because there is, in fact, no other thing with which it can be\ncompared. If two opposite judgements presuppose a contingent\nimpossible, or arbitrary condition, both\u2014in spite of their opposition\n(which is, however, not properly or really a contradiction)\u2014fall away;\nbecause the condition, which ensured the validity of both, has itself\ndisappeared.\n\nIf we say: \u201cEverybody has either a good or a bad smell,\u201d we have\nomitted a third possible judgement\u2014it has no smell at all; and thus\nboth conflicting statements may be false. If we say: \u201cIt is either\ngood-smelling or not good-smelling (vel suaveolens vel\nnon-suaveolens),\u201d both judgements are contradictorily opposed; and the\ncontradictory opposite of the former judgement\u2014some bodies are not\ngood-smelling\u2014embraces also those bodies which have no smell at all. In\nthe preceding pair of opposed judgements (per disparata), the\ncontingent condition of the conception of body (smell) attached to both\nconflicting statements, instead of having been omitted in the latter,\nwhich is consequently not the contradictory opposite of the former.\n\nIf, accordingly, we say: \u201cThe world is either infinite in extension, or\nit is not infinite (non est infinitus)\u201d; and if the former proposition\nis false, its contradictory opposite\u2014the world is not infinite\u2014must be\ntrue. And thus I should deny the existence of an infinite, without,\nhowever affirming the existence of a finite world. But if we construct\nour proposition thus: \u201cThe world is either infinite or finite\n(non-infinite),\u201d both statements may be false. For, in this case, we\nconsider the world as per se determined in regard to quantity, and\nwhile, in the one judgement, we deny its infinite and consequently,\nperhaps, its independent existence; in the other, we append to the\nworld, regarded as a thing in itself, a certain determination\u2014that of\nfinitude; and the latter may be false as well as the former, if the\nworld is not given as a thing in itself, and thus neither as finite nor\nas infinite in quantity. This kind of opposition I may be allowed to\nterm dialectical; that of contradictories may be called analytical\nopposition. Thus then, of two dialectically opposed judgements both may\nbe false, from the fact, that the one is not a mere contradictory of\nthe other, but actually enounces more than is requisite for a full and\ncomplete contradiction.\n\nWhen we regard the two propositions\u2014\u201cThe world is infinite in\nquantity,\u201d and, \u201cThe world is finite in quantity,\u201d as contradictory\nopposites, we are assuming that the world\u2014the complete series of\nphenomena\u2014is a thing in itself. For it remains as a permanent quantity,\nwhether I deny the infinite or the finite regress in the series of its\nphenomena. But if we dismiss this assumption\u2014this transcendental\nillusion\u2014and deny that it is a thing in itself, the contradictory\nopposition is metamorphosed into a merely dialectical one; and the\nworld, as not existing in itself\u2014independently of the regressive series\nof my representations\u2014exists in like manner neither as a whole which is\ninfinite nor as a whole which is finite in itself. The universe exists\nfor me only in the empirical regress of the series of phenomena and not\nper se. If, then, it is always conditioned, it is never completely or\nas a whole; and it is, therefore, not an unconditioned whole and does\nnot exist as such, either with an infinite, or with a finite quantity.\n\nWhat we have here said of the first cosmological idea\u2014that of the\nabsolute totality of quantity in phenomena\u2014applies also to the others.\nThe series of conditions is discoverable only in the regressive\nsynthesis itself, and not in the phenomenon considered as a thing in\nitself\u2014given prior to all regress. Hence I am compelled to say: \u201cThe\naggregate of parts in a given phenomenon is in itself neither finite\nnor infinite; and these parts are given only in the regressive\nsynthesis of decomposition\u2014a synthesis which is never given in absolute\ncompleteness, either as finite, or as infinite.\u201d The same is the case\nwith the series of subordinated causes, or of the conditioned up to the\nunconditioned and necessary existence, which can never be regarded as\nin itself, and in its totality, either as finite or as infinite;\nbecause, as a series of subordinate representations, it subsists only\nin the dynamical regress and cannot be regarded as existing previously\nto this regress, or as a self-subsistent series of things.\n\nThus the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas disappears.\nFor the above demonstration has established the fact that it is merely\nthe product of a dialectical and illusory opposition, which arises from\nthe application of the idea of absolute totality\u2014admissible only as a\ncondition of things in themselves\u2014to phenomena, which exist only in our\nrepresentations, and\u2014when constituting a series\u2014in a successive\nregress. This antinomy of reason may, however, be really profitable to\nour speculative interests, not in the way of contributing any\ndogmatical addition, but as presenting to us another material support\nin our critical investigations. For it furnishes us with an indirect\nproof of the transcendental ideality of phenomena, if our minds were\nnot completely satisfied with the direct proof set forth in the\nTrancendental \u00c6sthetic. The proof would proceed in the following\ndilemma. If the world is a whole existing in itself, it must be either\nfinite or infinite. But it is neither finite nor infinite\u2014as has been\nshown, on the one side, by the thesis, on the other, by the antithesis.\nTherefore the world\u2014the content of all phenomena\u2014is not a whole\nexisting in itself. It follows that phenomena are nothing, apart from\nour representations. And this is what we mean by transcendental\nideality.\n\nThis remark is of some importance. It enables us to see that the proofs\nof the fourfold antinomy are not mere sophistries\u2014are not fallacious,\nbut grounded on the nature of reason, and valid\u2014under the supposition\nthat phenomena are things in themselves. The opposition of the\njudgements which follow makes it evident that a fallacy lay in the\ninitial supposition, and thus helps us to discover the true\nconstitution of objects of sense. This transcendental dialectic does\nnot favour scepticism, although it presents us with a triumphant\ndemonstration of the advantages of the sceptical method, the great\nutility of which is apparent in the antinomy, where the arguments of\nreason were allowed to confront each other in undiminished force. And\nalthough the result of these conflicts of reason is not what we\nexpected\u2014although we have obtained no positive dogmatical addition to\nmetaphysical science\u2014we have still reaped a great advantage in the\ncorrection of our judgements on these subjects of thought.\n\nSection VIII. Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation to the\nCosmological Ideas\n\nThe cosmological principle of totality could not give us any certain\nknowledge in regard to the maximum in the series of conditions in the\nworld of sense, considered as a thing in itself. The actual regress in\nthe series is the only means of approaching this maximum. This\nprinciple of pure reason, therefore, may still be considered as\nvalid\u2014not as an axiom enabling us to cogitate totality in the object as\nactual, but as a problem for the understanding, which requires it to\ninstitute and to continue, in conformity with the idea of totality in\nthe mind, the regress in the series of the conditions of a given\nconditioned. For in the world of sense, that is, in space and time,\nevery condition which we discover in our investigation of phenomena is\nitself conditioned; because sensuous objects are not things in\nthemselves (in which case an absolutely unconditioned might be reached\nin the progress of cognition), but are merely empirical representations\nthe conditions of which must always be found in intuition. The\nprinciple of reason is therefore properly a mere rule\u2014prescribing a\nregress in the series of conditions for given phenomena, and\nprohibiting any pause or rest on an absolutely unconditioned. It is,\ntherefore, not a principle of the possibility of experience or of the\nempirical cognition of sensuous objects\u2014consequently not a principle of\nthe understanding; for every experience is confined within certain\nproper limits determined by the given intuition. Still less is it a\nconstitutive principle of reason authorizing us to extend our\nconception of the sensuous world beyond all possible experience. It is\nmerely a principle for the enlargement and extension of experience as\nfar as is possible for human faculties. It forbids us to consider any\nempirical limits as absolute. It is, hence, a principle of reason,\nwhich, as a rule, dictates how we ought to proceed in our empirical\nregress, but is unable to anticipate or indicate prior to the empirical\nregress what is given in the object itself. I have termed it for this\nreason a regulative principle of reason; while the principle of the\nabsolute totality of the series of conditions, as existing in itself\nand given in the object, is a constitutive cosmological principle. This\ndistinction will at once demonstrate the falsehood of the constitutive\nprinciple, and prevent us from attributing (by a transcendental\nsubreptio) objective reality to an idea, which is valid only as a rule.\n\nIn order to understand the proper meaning of this rule of pure reason,\nwe must notice first that it cannot tell us what the object is, but\nonly how the empirical regress is to be proceeded with in order to\nattain to the complete conception of the object. If it gave us any\ninformation in respect to the former statement, it would be a\nconstitutive principle\u2014a principle impossible from the nature of pure\nreason. It will not therefore enable us to establish any such\nconclusions as: \u201cThe series of conditions for a given conditioned is in\nitself finite,\u201d or, \u201cIt is infinite.\u201d For, in this case, we should be\ncogitating in the mere idea of absolute totality, an object which is\nnot and cannot be given in experience; inasmuch as we should be\nattributing a reality objective and independent of the empirical\nsynthesis, to a series of phenomena. This idea of reason cannot then be\nregarded as valid\u2014except as a rule for the regressive synthesis in the\nseries of conditions, according to which we must proceed from the\nconditioned, through all intermediate and subordinate conditions, up to\nthe unconditioned; although this goal is unattained and unattainable.\nFor the absolutely unconditioned cannot be discovered in the sphere of\nexperience.\n\nWe now proceed to determine clearly our notion of a synthesis which can\nnever be complete. There are two terms commonly employed for this\npurpose. These terms are regarded as expressions of different and\ndistinguishable notions, although the ground of the distinction has\nnever been clearly exposed. The term employed by the mathematicians is\nprogressus in infinitum. The philosophers prefer the expression\nprogressus in indefinitum. Without detaining the reader with an\nexamination of the reasons for such a distinction, or with remarks on\nthe right or wrong use of the terms, I shall endeavour clearly to\ndetermine these conceptions, so far as is necessary for the purpose in\nthis Critique.\n\nWe may, with propriety, say of a straight line, that it may be produced\nto infinity. In this case the distinction between a progressus in\ninfinitum and a progressus in indefinitum is a mere piece of subtlety.\nFor, although when we say, \u201cProduce a straight line,\u201d it is more\ncorrect to say in indefinitum than in infinitum; because the former\nmeans, \u201cProduce it as far as you please,\u201d the second, \u201cYou must not\ncease to produce it\u201d; the expression in infinitum is, when we are\nspeaking of the power to do it, perfectly correct, for we can always\nmake it longer if we please\u2014on to infinity. And this remark holds good\nin all cases, when we speak of a progressus, that is, an advancement\nfrom the condition to the conditioned; this possible advancement always\nproceeds to infinity. We may proceed from a given pair in the\ndescending line of generation from father to son, and cogitate a\nnever-ending line of descendants from it. For in such a case reason\ndoes not demand absolute totality in the series, because it does not\npresuppose it as a condition and as given (datum), but merely as\nconditioned, and as capable of being given (dabile).\n\nVery different is the case with the problem: \u201cHow far the regress,\nwhich ascends from the given conditioned to the conditions, must\nextend\u201d; whether I can say: \u201cIt is a regress in infinitum,\u201d or only \u201cin\nindefinitum\u201d; and whether, for example, setting out from the human\nbeings at present alive in the world, I may ascend in the series of\ntheir ancestors, in infinitum\u2014or whether all that can be said is, that\nso far as I have proceeded, I have discovered no empirical ground for\nconsidering the series limited, so that I am justified, and indeed,\ncompelled to search for ancestors still further back, although I am not\nobliged by the idea of reason to presuppose them.\n\nMy answer to this question is: \u201cIf the series is given in empirical\nintuition as a whole, the regress in the series of its internal\nconditions proceeds in infinitum; but, if only one member of the series\nis given, from which the regress is to proceed to absolute totality,\nthe regress is possible only in indefinitum.\u201d For example, the division\nof a portion of matter given within certain limits\u2014of a body, that\nis\u2014proceeds in infinitum. For, as the condition of this whole is its\npart, and the condition of the part a part of the part, and so on, and\nas in this regress of decomposition an unconditioned indivisible member\nof the series of conditions is not to be found; there are no reasons or\ngrounds in experience for stopping in the division, but, on the\ncontrary, the more remote members of the division are actually and\nempirically given prior to this division. That is to say, the division\nproceeds to infinity. On the other hand, the series of ancestors of any\ngiven human being is not given, in its absolute totality, in any\nexperience, and yet the regress proceeds from every genealogical member\nof this series to one still higher, and does not meet with any\nempirical limit presenting an absolutely unconditioned member of the\nseries. But as the members of such a series are not contained in the\nempirical intuition of the whole, prior to the regress, this regress\ndoes not proceed to infinity, but only in indefinitum, that is, we are\ncalled upon to discover other and higher members, which are themselves\nalways conditioned.\n\nIn neither case\u2014the regressus in infinitum, nor the regressus\nin indefinitum, is the series of conditions to be considered as\nactually infinite in the object itself. This might be true of things\nin themselves, but it cannot be asserted of phenomena, which, as\nconditions of each other, are only given in the empirical regress\nitself. Hence, the question no longer is, \u201cWhat is the quantity of\nthis series of conditions in itself\u2014is it finite or infinite?\u201d for\nit is nothing in itself; but, \u201cHow is the empirical regress to be\ncommenced, and how far ought we to proceed with it?\u201d And here a signal\ndistinction in the application of this rule becomes apparent. If the\nwhole is given empirically, it is possible to recede in the series of\nits internal conditions to infinity. But if the whole is not given, and\ncan only be given by and through the empirical regress, I can only say:\n\u201cIt is possible to infinity, to proceed to still higher conditions in\nthe series.\u201d In the first case, I am justified in asserting that more\nmembers are empirically given in the object than I attain to in the\nregress (of decomposition). In the second case, I am justified only\nin saying, that I can always proceed further in the regress, because\nno member of the series is given as absolutely conditioned, and thus\na higher member is possible, and an inquiry with regard to it is\nnecessary. In the one case it is necessary to find other members of the\nseries, in the other it is necessary to inquire for others, inasmuch as\nexperience presents no absolute limitation of the regress. For, either\nyou do not possess a perception which absolutely limits your empirical\nregress, and in this case the regress cannot be regarded as complete;\nor, you do possess such a limitative perception, in which case it is\nnot a part of your series (for that which limits must be distinct from\nthat which is limited by it), and it is incumbent on you to continue\nyour regress up to this condition, and so on.\n\nThese remarks will be placed in their proper light by their application\nin the following section.\n\nSection IX. Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason\nwith regard to the Cosmological Ideas\n\nWe have shown that no transcendental use can be made either of the\nconceptions of reason or of understanding. We have shown, likewise,\nthat the demand of absolute totality in the series of conditions in the\nworld of sense arises from a transcendental employment of reason,\nresting on the opinion that phenomena are to be regarded as things in\nthemselves. It follows that we are not required to answer the question\nrespecting the absolute quantity of a series\u2014whether it is in itself\nlimited or unlimited. We are only called upon to determine how far we\nmust proceed in the empirical regress from condition to condition, in\norder to discover, in conformity with the rule of reason, a full and\ncorrect answer to the questions proposed by reason itself.\n\nThis principle of reason is hence valid only as a rule for the\nextension of a possible experience\u2014its invalidity as a principle\nconstitutive of phenomena in themselves having been sufficiently\ndemonstrated. And thus, too, the antinomial conflict of reason with\nitself is completely put an end to; inasmuch as we have not only\npresented a critical solution of the fallacy lurking in the opposite\nstatements of reason, but have shown the true meaning of the ideas\nwhich gave rise to these statements. The dialectical principle of\nreason has, therefore, been changed into a doctrinal principle. But in\nfact, if this principle, in the subjective signification which we have\nshown to be its only true sense, may be guaranteed as a principle of\nthe unceasing extension of the employment of our understanding, its\ninfluence and value are just as great as if it were an axiom for the \u00e0\npriori determination of objects. For such an axiom could not exert a\nstronger influence on the extension and rectification of our knowledge,\notherwise than by procuring for the principles of the understanding the\nmost widely expanded employment in the field of experience.\n\nI. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Composition\nof Phenomena in the Universe\n\nHere, as well as in the case of the other cosmological problems, the\nground of the regulative principle of reason is the proposition that in\nour empirical regress no experience of an absolute limit, and\nconsequently no experience of a condition, which is itself absolutely\nunconditioned, is discoverable. And the truth of this proposition\nitself rests upon the consideration that such an experience must\nrepresent to us phenomena as limited by nothing or the mere void, on\nwhich our continued regress by means of perception must abut\u2014which is\nimpossible.\n\nNow this proposition, which declares that every condition attained in\nthe empirical regress must itself be considered empirically\nconditioned, contains the rule in terminis, which requires me, to\nwhatever extent I may have proceeded in the ascending series, always to\nlook for some higher member in the series\u2014whether this member is to\nbecome known to me through experience, or not.\n\nNothing further is necessary, then, for the solution of the first\ncosmological problem, than to decide, whether, in the regress to the\nunconditioned quantity of the universe (as regards space and time),\nthis never limited ascent ought to be called a regressus in infinitum\nor indefinitum.\n\nThe general representation which we form in our minds of the series of\nall past states or conditions of the world, or of all the things which\nat present exist in it, is itself nothing more than a possible\nempirical regress, which is cogitated\u2014although in an undetermined\nmanner\u2014in the mind, and which gives rise to the conception of a series\nof conditions for a given object.[60] Now I have a conception of the\nuniverse, but not an intuition\u2014that is, not an intuition of it as a\nwhole. Thus I cannot infer the magnitude of the regress from the\nquantity or magnitude of the world, and determine the former by means\nof the latter; on the contrary, I must first of all form a conception\nof the quantity or magnitude of the world from the magnitude of the\nempirical regress. But of this regress I know nothing more than that I\nought to proceed from every given member of the series of conditions to\none still higher. But the quantity of the universe is not thereby\ndetermined, and we cannot affirm that this regress proceeds in\ninfinitum. Such an affirmation would anticipate the members of the\nseries which have not yet been reached, and represent the number of\nthem as beyond the grasp of any empirical synthesis; it would\nconsequently determine the cosmical quantity prior to the regress\n(although only in a negative manner)\u2014which is impossible. For the world\nis not given in its totality in any intuition: consequently, its\nquantity cannot be given prior to the regress. It follows that we are\nunable to make any declaration respecting the cosmical quantity in\nitself\u2014not even that the regress in it is a regress in infinitum; we\nmust only endeavour to attain to a conception of the quantity of the\nuniverse, in conformity with the rule which determines the empirical\nregress in it. But this rule merely requires us never to admit an\nabsolute limit to our series\u2014how far soever we may have proceeded in\nit, but always, on the contrary, to subordinate every phenomenon to\nsome other as its condition, and consequently to proceed to this higher\nphenomenon. Such a regress is, therefore, the regressus in indefinitum,\nwhich, as not determining a quantity in the object, is clearly\ndistinguishable from the regressus in infinitum.\n\n [60] The cosmical series can neither be greater nor smaller than the\n possible empirical regress, upon which its conception is based. And as\n this regress cannot be a determinate infinite regress, still less a\n determinate finite (absolutely limited), it is evident that we cannot\n regard the world as either finite or infinite, because the regress,\n which gives us the representation of the world, is neither finite nor\n infinite.\n\n\nIt follows from what we have said that we are not justified in\ndeclaring the world to be infinite in space, or as regards past time.\nFor this conception of an infinite given quantity is empirical; but we\ncannot apply the conception of an infinite quantity to the world as an\nobject of the senses. I cannot say, \u201cThe regress from a given\nperception to everything limited either in space or time, proceeds in\ninfinitum,\u201d for this presupposes an infinite cosmical quantity; neither\ncan I say, \u201cIt is finite,\u201d for an absolute limit is likewise impossible\nin experience. It follows that I am not entitled to make any assertion\nat all respecting the whole object of experience\u2014the world of sense; I\nmust limit my declarations to the rule according to which experience or\nempirical knowledge is to be attained.\n\nTo the question, therefore, respecting the cosmical quantity, the first\nand negative answer is: \u201cThe world has no beginning in time, and no\nabsolute limit in space.\u201d\n\nFor, in the contrary case, it would be limited by a void time on the\none hand, and by a void space on the other. Now, since the world, as a\nphenomenon, cannot be thus limited in itself for a phenomenon is not a\nthing in itself; it must be possible for us to have a perception of\nthis limitation by a void time and a void space. But such a\nperception\u2014such an experience is impossible; because it has no content.\nConsequently, an absolute cosmical limit is empirically, and therefore\nabsolutely, impossible.[61]\n\n [61] The reader will remark that the proof presented above is very\n different from the dogmatical demonstration given in the antithesis of\n the first antinomy. In that demonstration, it was taken for granted\n that the world is a thing in itself\u2014given in its totality prior to all\n regress, and a determined position in space and time was denied to\n it\u2014if it was not considered as occupying all time and all space. Hence\n our conclusion differed from that given above; for we inferred in the\n antithesis the actual infinity of the world.\n\n\nFrom this follows the affirmative answer: \u201cThe regress in the series of\nphenomena\u2014as a determination of the cosmical quantity, proceeds in\nindefinitum.\u201d This is equivalent to saying: \u201cThe world of sense has no\nabsolute quantity, but the empirical regress (through which alone the\nworld of sense is presented to us on the side of its conditions) rests\nupon a rule, which requires it to proceed from every member of the\nseries, as conditioned, to one still more remote (whether through\npersonal experience, or by means of history, or the chain of cause and\neffect), and not to cease at any point in this extension of the\npossible empirical employment of the understanding.\u201d And this is the\nproper and only use which reason can make of its principles.\n\nThe above rule does not prescribe an unceasing regress in one kind of\nphenomena. It does not, for example, forbid us, in our ascent from an\nindividual human being through the line of his ancestors, to expect\nthat we shall discover at some point of the regress a primeval pair, or\nto admit, in the series of heavenly bodies, a sun at the farthest\npossible distance from some centre. All that it demands is a perpetual\nprogress from phenomena to phenomena, even although an actual\nperception is not presented by them (as in the case of our perceptions\nbeing so weak as that we are unable to become conscious of them), since\nthey, nevertheless, belong to possible experience.\n\nEvery beginning is in time, and all limits to extension are in space.\nBut space and time are in the world of sense. Consequently phenomena in\nthe world are conditionally limited, but the world itself is not\nlimited, either conditionally or unconditionally.\n\nFor this reason, and because neither the world nor the cosmical series\nof conditions to a given conditioned can be completely given, our\nconception of the cosmical quantity is given only in and through the\nregress and not prior to it\u2014in a collective intuition. But the regress\nitself is really nothing more than the determining of the cosmical\nquantity, and cannot therefore give us any determined conception of\nit\u2014still less a conception of a quantity which is, in relation to a\ncertain standard, infinite. The regress does not, therefore, proceed to\ninfinity (an infinity given), but only to an indefinite extent, for or\nthe of presenting to us a quantity\u2014realized only in and through the\nregress itself.\n\nII. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Division\nof a Whole given in Intuition\n\nWhen I divide a whole which is given in intuition, I proceed from a\nconditioned to its conditions. The division of the parts of the whole\n(subdivisio or decompositio) is a regress in the series of these\nconditions. The absolute totality of this series would be actually\nattained and given to the mind, if the regress could arrive at simple\nparts. But if all the parts in a continuous decomposition are\nthemselves divisible, the division, that is to say, the regress,\nproceeds from the conditioned to its conditions in infinitum; because\nthe conditions (the parts) are themselves contained in the conditioned,\nand, as the latter is given in a limited intuition, the former are all\ngiven along with it. This regress cannot, therefore, be called a\nregressus in indefinitum, as happened in the case of the preceding\ncosmological idea, the regress in which proceeded from the conditioned\nto the conditions not given contemporaneously and along with it, but\ndiscoverable only through the empirical regress. We are not, however,\nentitled to affirm of a whole of this kind, which is divisible in\ninfinitum, that it consists of an infinite number of parts. For,\nalthough all the parts are contained in the intuition of the whole, the\nwhole division is not contained therein. The division is contained only\nin the progressing decomposition\u2014in the regress itself, which is the\ncondition of the possibility and actuality of the series. Now, as this\nregress is infinite, all the members (parts) to which it attains must\nbe contained in the given whole as an aggregate. But the complete\nseries of division is not contained therein. For this series, being\ninfinite in succession and always incomplete, cannot represent an\ninfinite number of members, and still less a composition of these\nmembers into a whole.\n\nTo apply this remark to space. Every limited part of space presented to\nintuition is a whole, the parts of which are always spaces\u2014to whatever\nextent subdivided. Every limited space is hence divisible to infinity.\n\nLet us again apply the remark to an external phenomenon enclosed in\nlimits, that is, a body. The divisibility of a body rests upon the\ndivisibility of space, which is the condition of the possibility of the\nbody as an extended whole. A body is consequently divisible to\ninfinity, though it does not, for that reason, consist of an infinite\nnumber of parts.\n\nIt certainly seems that, as a body must be cogitated as substance in\nspace, the law of divisibility would not be applicable to it as\nsubstance. For we may and ought to grant, in the case of space, that\ndivision or decomposition, to any extent, never can utterly annihilate\ncomposition (that is to say, the smallest part of space must still\nconsist of spaces); otherwise space would entirely cease to exist\u2014which\nis impossible. But, the assertion on the other hand that when all\ncomposition in matter is annihilated in thought, nothing remains, does\nnot seem to harmonize with the conception of substance, which must be\nproperly the subject of all composition and must remain, even after the\nconjunction of its attributes in space\u2014which constituted a body\u2014is\nannihilated in thought. But this is not the case with substance in the\nphenomenal world, which is not a thing in itself cogitated by the pure\ncategory. Phenomenal substance is not an absolute subject; it is merely\na permanent sensuous image, and nothing more than an intuition, in\nwhich the unconditioned is not to be found.\n\nBut, although this rule of progress to infinity is legitimate and\napplicable to the subdivision of a phenomenon, as a mere occupation or\nfilling of space, it is not applicable to a whole consisting of a\nnumber of distinct parts and constituting a quantum discretum\u2014that is\nto say, an organized body. It cannot be admitted that every part in an\norganized whole is itself organized, and that, in analysing it to\ninfinity, we must always meet with organized parts; although we may\nallow that the parts of the matter which we decompose in infinitum, may\nbe organized. For the infinity of the division of a phenomenon in space\nrests altogether on the fact that the divisibility of a phenomenon is\ngiven only in and through this infinity, that is, an undetermined\nnumber of parts is given, while the parts themselves are given and\ndetermined only in and through the subdivision; in a word, the infinity\nof the division necessarily presupposes that the whole is not already\ndivided in se. Hence our division determines a number of parts in the\nwhole\u2014a number which extends just as far as the actual regress in the\ndivision; while, on the other hand, the very notion of a body organized\nto infinity represents the whole as already and in itself divided. We\nexpect, therefore, to find in it a determinate, but at the same time,\ninfinite, number of parts\u2014which is self-contradictory. For we should\nthus have a whole containing a series of members which could not be\ncompleted in any regress\u2014which is infinite, and at the same time\ncomplete in an organized composite. Infinite divisibility is applicable\nonly to a quantum continuum, and is based entirely on the infinite\ndivisibility of space, But in a quantum discretum the multitude of\nparts or units is always determined, and hence always equal to some\nnumber. To what extent a body may be organized, experience alone can\ninform us; and although, so far as our experience of this or that body\nhas extended, we may not have discovered any inorganic part, such parts\nmust exist in possible experience. But how far the transcendental\ndivision of a phenomenon must extend, we cannot know from experience\u2014it\nis a question which experience cannot answer; it is answered only by\nthe principle of reason which forbids us to consider the empirical\nregress, in the analysis of extended body, as ever absolutely complete.\n\nConcluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcendental Mathematical\nIdeas\u2014and Introductory to the Solution of the Dynamical Ideas.\n\nWe presented the antinomy of pure reason in a tabular form, and we\nendeavoured to show the ground of this self-contradiction on the part\nof reason, and the only means of bringing it to a conclusion\u2014namely, by\ndeclaring both contradictory statements to be false. We represented in\nthese antinomies the conditions of phenomena as belonging to the\nconditioned according to relations of space and time\u2014which is the usual\nsupposition of the common understanding. In this respect, all\ndialectical representations of totality, in the series of conditions to\na given conditioned, were perfectly homogeneous. The condition was\nalways a member of the series along with the conditioned, and thus the\nhomogeneity of the whole series was assured. In this case the regress\ncould never be cogitated as complete; or, if this was the case, a\nmember really conditioned was falsely regarded as a primal member,\nconsequently as unconditioned. In such an antinomy, therefore, we did\nnot consider the object, that is, the conditioned, but the series of\nconditions belonging to the object, and the magnitude of that series.\nAnd thus arose the difficulty\u2014a difficulty not to be settled by any\ndecision regarding the claims of the two parties, but simply by cutting\nthe knot\u2014by declaring the series proposed by reason to be either too\nlong or too short for the understanding, which could in neither case\nmake its conceptions adequate with the ideas.\n\nBut we have overlooked, up to this point, an essential difference\nexisting between the conceptions of the understanding which reason\nendeavours to raise to the rank of ideas\u2014two of these indicating a\nmathematical, and two a dynamical synthesis of phenomena. Hitherto, it\nwas necessary to signalize this distinction; for, just as in our\ngeneral representation of all transcendental ideas, we considered them\nunder phenomenal conditions, so, in the two mathematical ideas, our\ndiscussion is concerned solely with an object in the world of\nphenomena. But as we are now about to proceed to the consideration of\nthe dynamical conceptions of the understanding, and their adequateness\nwith ideas, we must not lose sight of this distinction. We shall find\nthat it opens up to us an entirely new view of the conflict in which\nreason is involved. For, while in the first two antinomies, both\nparties were dismissed, on the ground of having advanced statements\nbased upon false hypothesis; in the present case the hope appears of\ndiscovering a hypothesis which may be consistent with the demands of\nreason, and, the judge completing the statement of the grounds of\nclaim, which both parties had left in an unsatisfactory state, the\nquestion may be settled on its own merits, not by dismissing the\nclaimants, but by a comparison of the arguments on both sides. If we\nconsider merely their extension, and whether they are adequate with\nideas, the series of conditions may be regarded as all homogeneous. But\nthe conception of the understanding which lies at the basis of these\nideas, contains either a synthesis of the homogeneous (presupposed in\nevery quantity\u2014in its composition as well as in its division) or of the\nheterogeneous, which is the case in the dynamical synthesis of cause\nand effect, as well as of the necessary and the contingent.\n\nThus it happens that in the mathematical series of phenomena no other\nthan a sensuous condition is admissible\u2014a condition which is itself a\nmember of the series; while the dynamical series of sensuous conditions\nadmits a heterogeneous condition, which is not a member of the series,\nbut, as purely intelligible, lies out of and beyond it. And thus reason\nis satisfied, and an unconditioned placed at the head of the series of\nphenomena, without introducing confusion into or discontinuing it,\ncontrary to the principles of the understanding.\n\nNow, from the fact that the dynamical ideas admit a condition of\nphenomena which does not form a part of the series of phenomena, arises\na result which we should not have expected from an antinomy. In former\ncases, the result was that both contradictory dialectical statements\nwere declared to be false. In the present case, we find the conditioned\nin the dynamical series connected with an empirically unconditioned,\nbut non-sensuous condition; and thus satisfaction is done to the\nunderstanding on the one hand and to the reason on the other.[62]\nWhile, moreover, the dialectical arguments for unconditioned totality\nin mere phenomena fall to the ground, both propositions of reason may\nbe shown to be true in their proper signification. This could not\nhappen in the case of the cosmological ideas which demanded a\nmathematically unconditioned unity; for no condition could be placed at\nthe head of the series of phenomena, except one which was itself a\nphenomenon and consequently a member of the series.\n\n [62] For the understanding cannot admit among phenomena a condition\n which is itself empirically unconditioned. But if it is possible to\n cogitate an intelligible condition\u2014one which is not a member of the\n series of phenomena\u2014for a conditioned phenomenon, without breaking the\n series of empirical conditions, such a condition may be admissible as\n empirically unconditioned, and the empirical regress continue regular,\n unceasing, and intact.\n\nIII. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Deduction\nof Cosmical Events from their Causes\n\nThere are only two modes of causality cogitable\u2014the causality of nature\nor of freedom. The first is the conjunction of a particular state with\nanother preceding it in the world of sense, the former following the\nlatter by virtue of a law. Now, as the causality of phenomena is\nsubject to conditions of time, and the preceding state, if it had\nalways existed, could not have produced an effect which would make its\nfirst appearance at a particular time, the causality of a cause must\nitself be an effect\u2014must itself have begun to be, and therefore,\naccording to the principle of the understanding, itself requires a\ncause.\n\nWe must understand, on the contrary, by the term freedom, in the\ncosmological sense, a faculty of the spontaneous origination of a\nstate; the causality of which, therefore, is not subordinated to\nanother cause determining it in time. Freedom is in this sense a pure\ntranscendental idea, which, in the first place, contains no empirical\nelement; the object of which, in the second place, cannot be given or\ndetermined in any experience, because it is a universal law of the very\npossibility of experience, that everything which happens must have a\ncause, that consequently the causality of a cause, being itself\nsomething that has happened, must also have a cause. In this view of\nthe case, the whole field of experience, how far soever it may extend,\ncontains nothing that is not subject to the laws of nature. But, as we\ncannot by this means attain to an absolute totality of conditions in\nreference to the series of causes and effects, reason creates the idea\nof a spontaneity, which can begin to act of itself, and without any\nexternal cause determining it to action, according to the natural law\nof causality.\n\nIt is especially remarkable that the practical conception of freedom is\nbased upon the transcendental idea, and that the question of the\npossibility of the former is difficult only as it involves the\nconsideration of the truth of the latter. Freedom, in the practical\nsense, is the independence of the will of coercion by sensuous\nimpulses. A will is sensuous, in so far as it is pathologically\naffected (by sensuous impulses); it is termed animal (arbitrium\nbrutum), when it is pathologically necessitated. The human will is\ncertainly an arbitrium sensitivum, not brutum, but liberum; because\nsensuousness does not necessitate its action, a faculty existing in man\nof self-determination, independently of all sensuous coercion.\n\nIt is plain that, if all causality in the world of sense were\nnatural\u2014and natural only\u2014every event would be determined by another\naccording to necessary laws, and that, consequently, phenomena, in so\nfar as they determine the will, must necessitate every action as a\nnatural effect from themselves; and thus all practical freedom would\nfall to the ground with the transcendental idea. For the latter\npresupposes that although a certain thing has not happened, it ought to\nhave happened, and that, consequently, its phenomenal cause was not so\npowerful and determinative as to exclude the causality of our will\u2014a\ncausality capable of producing effects independently of and even in\nopposition to the power of natural causes, and capable, consequently,\nof spontaneously originating a series of events.\n\nHere, too, we find it to be the case, as we generally found in the\nself-contradictions and perplexities of a reason which strives to pass\nthe bounds of possible experience, that the problem is properly not\nphysiological, but transcendental. The question of the possibility of\nfreedom does indeed concern psychology; but, as it rests upon\ndialectical arguments of pure reason, its solution must engage the\nattention of transcendental philosophy. Before attempting this\nsolution, a task which transcendental philosophy cannot decline, it\nwill be advisable to make a remark with regard to its procedure in the\nsettlement of the question.\n\nIf phenomena were things in themselves, and time and space forms of the\nexistence of things, condition and conditioned would always be members\nof the same series; and thus would arise in the present case the\nantinomy common to all transcendental ideas\u2014that their series is either\ntoo great or too small for the understanding. The dynamical ideas,\nwhich we are about to discuss in this and the following section,\npossess the peculiarity of relating to an object, not considered as a\nquantity, but as an existence; and thus, in the discussion of the\npresent question, we may make abstraction of the quantity of the series\nof conditions, and consider merely the dynamical relation of the\ncondition to the conditioned. The question, then, suggests itself,\nwhether freedom is possible; and, if it is, whether it can consist with\nthe universality of the natural law of causality; and, consequently,\nwhether we enounce a proper disjunctive proposition when we say: \u201cEvery\neffect must have its origin either in nature or in freedom,\u201d or whether\nboth cannot exist together in the same event in different relations.\nThe principle of an unbroken connection between all events in the\nphenomenal world, in accordance with the unchangeable laws of nature,\nis a well-established principle of transcendental analytic which admits\nof no exception. The question, therefore, is: \u201cWhether an effect,\ndetermined according to the laws of nature, can at the same time be\nproduced by a free agent, or whether freedom and nature mutually\nexclude each other?\u201d And here, the common but fallacious hypothesis of\nthe absolute reality of phenomena manifests its injurious influence in\nembarrassing the procedure of reason. For if phenomena are things in\nthemselves, freedom is impossible. In this case, nature is the complete\nand all-sufficient cause of every event; and condition and conditioned,\ncause and effect are contained in the same series, and necessitated by\nthe same law. If, on the contrary, phenomena are held to be, as they\nare in fact, nothing more than mere representations, connected with\neach other in accordance with empirical laws, they must have a ground\nwhich is not phenomenal. But the causality of such an intelligible\ncause is not determined or determinable by phenomena; although its\neffects, as phenomena, must be determined by other phenomenal\nexistences. This cause and its causality exist therefore out of and\napart from the series of phenomena; while its effects do exist and are\ndiscoverable in the series of empirical conditions. Such an effect may\ntherefore be considered to be free in relation to its intelligible\ncause, and necessary in relation to the phenomena from which it is a\nnecessary consequence\u2014a distinction which, stated in this perfectly\ngeneral and abstract manner, must appear in the highest degree subtle\nand obscure. The sequel will explain. It is sufficient, at present, to\nremark that, as the complete and unbroken connection of phenomena is an\nunalterable law of nature, freedom is impossible\u2014on the supposition\nthat phenomena are absolutely real. Hence those philosophers who adhere\nto the common opinion on this subject can never succeed in reconciling\nthe ideas of nature and freedom.\n\n_Possibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Universal Law of Natural\nNecessity._\n\nThat element in a sensuous object which is not itself sensuous, I may\nbe allowed to term intelligible. If, accordingly, an object which must\nbe regarded as a sensuous phenomenon possesses a faculty which is not\nan object of sensuous intuition, but by means of which it is capable of\nbeing the cause of phenomena, the causality of an object or existence\nof this kind may be regarded from two different points of view. It may\nbe considered to be intelligible, as regards its action\u2014the action of a\nthing which is a thing in itself, and sensuous, as regards its\neffects\u2014the effects of a phenomenon belonging to the sensuous world. We\nshould accordingly, have to form both an empirical and an intellectual\nconception of the causality of such a faculty or power\u2014both, however,\nhaving reference to the same effect. This twofold manner of cogitating\na power residing in a sensuous object does not run counter to any of\nthe conceptions which we ought to form of the world of phenomena or of\na possible experience. Phenomena\u2014not being things in themselves\u2014must\nhave a transcendental object as a foundation, which determines them as\nmere representations; and there seems to be no reason why we should not\nascribe to this transcendental object, in addition to the property of\nself-phenomenization, a causality whose effects are to be met with in\nthe world of phenomena, although it is not itself a phenomenon. But\nevery effective cause must possess a character, that is to say, a law\nof its causality, without which it would cease to be a cause. In the\nabove case, then, every sensuous object would possess an empirical\ncharacter, which guaranteed that its actions, as phenomena, stand in\ncomplete and harmonious connection, conformably to unvarying natural\nlaws, with all other phenomena, and can be deduced from these, as\nconditions, and that they do thus, in connection with these, constitute\na series in the order of nature. This sensuous object must, in the\nsecond place, possess an intelligible character, which guarantees it to\nbe the cause of those actions, as phenomena, although it is not itself\na phenomenon nor subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense.\nThe former may be termed the character of the thing as a phenomenon,\nthe latter the character of the thing as a thing in itself.\n\nNow this active subject would, in its character of intelligible\nsubject, be subordinate to no conditions of time, for time is only a\ncondition of phenomena, and not of things in themselves. No action\nwould begin or cease to be in this subject; it would consequently be\nfree from the law of all determination of time\u2014the law of change,\nnamely, that everything which happens must have a cause in the\nphenomena of a preceding state. In one word, the causality of the\nsubject, in so far as it is intelligible, would not form part of the\nseries of empirical conditions which determine and necessitate an event\nin the world of sense. Again, this intelligible character of a thing\ncannot be immediately cognized, because we can perceive nothing but\nphenomena, but it must be capable of being cogitated in harmony with\nthe empirical character; for we always find ourselves compelled to\nplace, in thought, a transcendental object at the basis of phenomena\nalthough we can never know what this object is in itself.\n\nIn virtue of its empirical character, this subject would at the same\ntime be subordinate to all the empirical laws of causality, and, as a\nphenomenon and member of the sensuous world, its effects would have to\nbe accounted for by a reference to preceding phenomena. Eternal\nphenomena must be capable of influencing it; and its actions, in\naccordance with natural laws, must explain to us how its empirical\ncharacter, that is, the law of its causality, is to be cognized in and\nby means of experience. In a word, all requisites for a complete and\nnecessary determination of these actions must be presented to us by\nexperience.\n\nIn virtue of its intelligible character, on the other hand (although we\npossess only a general conception of this character), the subject must\nbe regarded as free from all sensuous influences, and from all\nphenomenal determination. Moreover, as nothing happens in this\nsubject\u2014for it is a noumenon, and there does not consequently exist in\nit any change, demanding the dynamical determination of time, and for\nthe same reason no connection with phenomena as causes\u2014this active\nexistence must in its actions be free from and independent of natural\nnecessity, for this necessity exists only in the world of phenomena. It\nwould be quite correct to say that it originates or begins its effects\nin the world of sense from itself, although the action productive of\nthese effects does not begin in itself. We should not be in this case\naffirming that these sensuous effects began to exist of themselves,\nbecause they are always determined by prior empirical conditions\u2014by\nvirtue of the empirical character, which is the phenomenon of the\nintelligible character\u2014and are possible only as constituting a\ncontinuation of the series of natural causes. And thus nature and\nfreedom, each in the complete and absolute signification of these\nterms, can exist, without contradiction or disagreement, in the same\naction.\n\n_Exposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony with the\nUniversal Law of Natural Necessity._\n\nI have thought it advisable to lay before the reader at first merely a\nsketch of the solution of this transcendental problem, in order to\nenable him to form with greater ease a clear conception of the course\nwhich reason must adopt in the solution. I shall now proceed to exhibit\nthe several momenta of this solution, and to consider them in their\norder.\n\nThe natural law that everything which happens must have a cause, that\nthe causality of this cause, that is, the action of the cause (which\ncannot always have existed, but must be itself an event, for it\nprecedes in time some effect which it has originated), must have itself\na phenomenal cause, by which it is determined and, and, consequently,\nall events are empirically determined in an order of nature\u2014this law, I\nsay, which lies at the foundation of the possibility of experience, and\nof a connected system of phenomena or nature is a law of the\nunderstanding, from which no departure, and to which no exception, can\nbe admitted. For to except even a single phenomenon from its operation\nis to exclude it from the sphere of possible experience and thus to\nadmit it to be a mere fiction of thought or phantom of the brain.\n\nThus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of causes,\nin which, however, absolute totality cannot be found. But we need not\ndetain ourselves with this question, for it has already been\nsufficiently answered in our discussion of the antinomies into which\nreason falls, when it attempts to reach the unconditioned in the series\nof phenomena. If we permit ourselves to be deceived by the illusion of\ntranscendental idealism, we shall find that neither nature nor freedom\nexists. Now the question is: \u201cWhether, admitting the existence of\nnatural necessity in the world of phenomena, it is possible to consider\nan effect as at the same time an effect of nature and an effect of\nfreedom\u2014or, whether these two modes of causality are contradictory and\nincompatible?\u201d\n\nNo phenomenal cause can absolutely and of itself begin a series. Every\naction, in so far as it is productive of an event, is itself an event\nor occurrence, and presupposes another preceding state, in which its\ncause existed. Thus everything that happens is but a continuation of a\nseries, and an absolute beginning is impossible in the sensuous world.\nThe actions of natural causes are, accordingly, themselves effects, and\npresuppose causes preceding them in time. A primal action which forms\nan absolute beginning, is beyond the causal power of phenomena.\n\nNow, is it absolutely necessary that, granting that all effects are\nphenomena, the causality of the cause of these effects must also be a\nphenomenon and belong to the empirical world? Is it not rather possible\nthat, although every effect in the phenomenal world must be connected\nwith an empirical cause, according to the universal law of nature, this\nempirical causality may be itself the effect of a non-empirical and\nintelligible causality\u2014its connection with natural causes remaining\nnevertheless intact? Such a causality would be considered, in reference\nto phenomena, as the primal action of a cause, which is in so far,\ntherefore, not phenomenal, but, by reason of this faculty or power,\nintelligible; although it must, at the same time, as a link in the\nchain of nature, be regarded as belonging to the sensuous world.\n\nA belief in the reciprocal causality of phenomena is necessary, if we\nare required to look for and to present the natural conditions of\nnatural events, that is to say, their causes. This being admitted as\nunexceptionably valid, the requirements of the understanding, which\nrecognizes nothing but nature in the region of phenomena, are\nsatisfied, and our physical explanations of physical phenomena may\nproceed in their regular course, without hindrance and without\nopposition. But it is no stumbling-block in the way, even assuming the\nidea to be a pure fiction, to admit that there are some natural causes\nin the possession of a faculty which is not empirical, but\nintelligible, inasmuch as it is not determined to action by empirical\nconditions, but purely and solely upon grounds brought forward by the\nunderstanding\u2014this action being still, when the cause is phenomenized,\nin perfect accordance with the laws of empirical causality. Thus the\nacting subject, as a causal phenomenon, would continue to preserve a\ncomplete connection with nature and natural conditions; and the\nphenomenon only of the subject (with all its phenomenal causality)\nwould contain certain conditions, which, if we ascend from the\nempirical to the transcendental object, must necessarily be regarded as\nintelligible. For, if we attend, in our inquiries with regard to causes\nin the world of phenomena, to the directions of nature alone, we need\nnot trouble ourselves about the relation in which the transcendental\nsubject, which is completely unknown to us, stands to these phenomena\nand their connection in nature. The intelligible ground of phenomena in\nthis subject does not concern empirical questions. It has to do only\nwith pure thought; and, although the effects of this thought and action\nof the pure understanding are discoverable in phenomena, these\nphenomena must nevertheless be capable of a full and complete\nexplanation, upon purely physical grounds and in accordance with\nnatural laws. And in this case we attend solely to their empirical and\nomit all consideration of their intelligible character (which is the\ntranscendental cause of the former) as completely unknown, except in so\nfar as it is exhibited by the latter as its empirical symbol. Now let\nus apply this to experience. Man is a phenomenon of the sensuous world\nand, at the same time, therefore, a natural cause, the causality of\nwhich must be regulated by empirical laws. As such, he must possess an\nempirical character, like all other natural phenomena. We remark this\nempirical character in his actions, which reveal the presence of\ncertain powers and faculties. If we consider inanimate or merely animal\nnature, we can discover no reason for ascribing to ourselves any other\nthan a faculty which is determined in a purely sensuous manner. But\nman, to whom nature reveals herself only through sense, cognizes\nhimself not only by his senses, but also through pure apperception; and\nthis in actions and internal determinations, which he cannot regard as\nsensuous impressions. He is thus to himself, on the one hand, a\nphenomenon, but on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties, a\npurely intelligible object\u2014intelligible, because its action cannot be\nascribed to sensuous receptivity. These faculties are understanding and\nreason. The latter, especially, is in a peculiar manner distinct from\nall empirically-conditioned faculties, for it employs ideas alone in\nthe consideration of its objects, and by means of these determines the\nunderstanding, which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its own\nconceptions, which, like the ideas of reason, are pure and\nnon-empirical.\n\nThat reason possesses the faculty of causality, or that at least we are\ncompelled so to represent it, is evident from the imperatives, which in\nthe sphere of the practical we impose on many of our executive powers.\nThe words I ought express a species of necessity, and imply a\nconnection with grounds which nature does not and cannot present to the\nmind of man. Understanding knows nothing in nature but that which is,\nor has been, or will be. It would be absurd to say that anything in\nnature ought to be other than it is in the relations of time in which\nit stands; indeed, the ought, when we consider merely the course of\nnature, has neither application nor meaning. The question, \u201cWhat ought\nto happen in the sphere of nature?\u201d is just as absurd as the question,\n\u201cWhat ought to be the properties of a circle?\u201d All that we are entitled\nto ask is, \u201cWhat takes place in nature?\u201d or, in the latter case, \u201cWhat\nare the properties of a circle?\u201d\n\nBut the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action, the\nground of which is a pure conception; while the ground of a merely\nnatural action is, on the contrary, always a phenomenon. This action\nmust certainly be possible under physical conditions, if it is\nprescribed by the moral imperative ought; but these physical or natural\nconditions do not concern the determination of the will itself, they\nrelate to its effects alone, and the consequences of the effect in the\nworld of phenomena. Whatever number of motives nature may present to my\nwill, whatever sensuous impulses\u2014the moral ought it is beyond their\npower to produce. They may produce a volition, which, so far from being\nnecessary, is always conditioned\u2014a volition to which the ought\nenunciated by reason, sets an aim and a standard, gives permission or\nprohibition. Be the object what it may, purely sensuous\u2014as pleasure, or\npresented by pure reason\u2014as good, reason will not yield to grounds\nwhich have an empirical origin. Reason will not follow the order of\nthings presented by experience, but, with perfect spontaneity,\nrearranges them according to ideas, with which it compels empirical\nconditions to agree. It declares, in the name of these ideas, certain\nactions to be necessary which nevertheless have not taken place and\nwhich perhaps never will take place; and yet presupposes that it\npossesses the faculty of causality in relation to these actions. For,\nin the absence of this supposition, it could not expect its ideas to\nproduce certain effects in the world of experience.\n\nNow, let us stop here and admit it to be at least possible that reason\ndoes stand in a really causal relation to phenomena. In this case it\nmust\u2014pure reason as it is\u2014exhibit an empirical character. For every\ncause supposes a rule, according to which certain phenomena follow as\neffects from the cause, and every rule requires uniformity in these\neffects; and this is the proper ground of the conception of a cause\u2014as\na faculty or power. Now this conception (of a cause) may be termed the\nempirical character of reason; and this character is a permanent one,\nwhile the effects produced appear, in conformity with the various\nconditions which accompany and partly limit them, in various forms.\n\nThus the volition of every man has an empirical character, which is\nnothing more than the causality of his reason, in so far as its effects\nin the phenomenal world manifest the presence of a rule, according to\nwhich we are enabled to examine, in their several kinds and degrees,\nthe actions of this causality and the rational grounds for these\nactions, and in this way to decide upon the subjective principles of\nthe volition. Now we learn what this empirical character is only from\nphenomenal effects, and from the rule of these which is presented by\nexperience; and for this reason all the actions of man in the world of\nphenomena are determined by his empirical character, and the\nco-operative causes of nature. If, then, we could investigate all the\nphenomena of human volition to their lowest foundation in the mind,\nthere would be no action which we could not anticipate with certainty,\nand recognize to be absolutely necessary from its preceding conditions.\nSo far as relates to this empirical character, therefore, there can be\nno freedom; and it is only in the light of this character that we can\nconsider the human will, when we confine ourselves to simple\nobservation and, as is the case in anthropology, institute a\nphysiological investigation of the motive causes of human actions.\n\nBut when we consider the same actions in relation to reason\u2014not for the\npurpose of explaining their origin, that is, in relation to speculative\nreason, but to practical reason, as the producing cause of these\nactions\u2014we shall discover a rule and an order very different from those\nof nature and experience. For the declaration of this mental faculty\nmay be that what has and could not but take place in the course of\nnature, ought not to have taken place. Sometimes, too, we discover, or\nbelieve that we discover, that the ideas of reason did actually stand\nin a causal relation to certain actions of man; and that these actions\nhave taken place because they were determined, not by empirical causes,\nbut by the act of the will upon grounds of reason.\n\nNow, granting that reason stands in a causal relation to phenomena; can\nan action of reason be called free, when we know that, sensuously, in\nits empirical character, it is completely determined and absolutely\nnecessary? But this empirical character is itself determined by the\nintelligible character. The latter we cannot cognize; we can only\nindicate it by means of phenomena, which enable us to have an immediate\ncognition only of the empirical character.[63] An action, then, in so\nfar as it is to be ascribed to an intelligible cause, does not result\nfrom it in accordance with empirical laws. That is to say, not the\nconditions of pure reason, but only their effects in the internal\nsense, precede the act. Pure reason, as a purely intelligible faculty,\nis not subject to the conditions of time. The causality of reason in\nits intelligible character does not begin to be; it does not make its\nappearance at a certain time, for the purpose of producing an effect.\nIf this were not the case, the causality of reason would be subservient\nto the natural law of phenomena, which determines them according to\ntime, and as a series of causes and effects in time; it would\nconsequently cease to be freedom and become a part of nature. We are\ntherefore justified in saying: \u201cIf reason stands in a causal relation\nto phenomena, it is a faculty which originates the sensuous condition\nof an empirical series of effects.\u201d For the condition, which resides in\nthe reason, is non-sensuous, and therefore cannot be originated, or\nbegin to be. And thus we find\u2014what we could not discover in any\nempirical series\u2014a condition of a successive series of events itself\nempirically unconditioned. For, in the present case, the condition\nstands out of and beyond the series of phenomena\u2014it is intelligible,\nand it consequently cannot be subjected to any sensuous condition, or\nto any time-determination by a preceding cause.\n\n [63] The real morality of actions\u2014their merit or demerit, and even\n that of our own conduct, is completely unknown to us. Our estimates\n can relate only to their empirical character. How much is the result\n of the action of free will, how much is to be ascribed to nature and\n to blameless error, or to a happy constitution of temperament (merito\n fortunae), no one can discover, nor, for this reason, determine with\n perfect justice.\n\n\nBut, in another respect, the same cause belongs also to the series of\nphenomena. Man is himself a phenomenon. His will has an empirical\ncharacter, which is the empirical cause of all his actions. There is no\ncondition\u2014determining man and his volition in conformity with this\ncharacter\u2014which does not itself form part of the series of effects in\nnature, and is subject to their law\u2014the law according to which an\nempirically undetermined cause of an event in time cannot exist. For\nthis reason no given action can have an absolute and spontaneous\norigination, all actions being phenomena, and belonging to the world of\nexperience. But it cannot be said of reason, that the state in which it\ndetermines the will is always preceded by some other state determining\nit. For reason is not a phenomenon, and therefore not subject to\nsensuous conditions; and, consequently, even in relation to its\ncausality, the sequence or conditions of time do not influence reason,\nnor can the dynamical law of nature, which determines the sequence of\ntime according to certain rules, be applied to it.\n\nReason is consequently the permanent condition of all actions of the\nhuman will. Each of these is determined in the empirical character of\nthe man, even before it has taken place. The intelligible character, of\nwhich the former is but the sensuous schema, knows no before or after;\nand every action, irrespective of the time-relation in which it stands\nwith other phenomena, is the immediate effect of the intelligible\ncharacter of pure reason, which, consequently, enjoys freedom of\naction, and is not dynamically determined either by internal or\nexternal preceding conditions. This freedom must not be described, in a\nmerely negative manner, as independence of empirical conditions, for in\nthis case the faculty of reason would cease to be a cause of phenomena;\nbut it must be regarded, positively, as a faculty which can\nspontaneously originate a series of events. At the same time, it must\nnot be supposed that any beginning can take place in reason; on the\ncontrary, reason, as the unconditioned condition of all action of the\nwill, admits of no time-conditions, although its effect does really\nbegin in a series of phenomena\u2014a beginning which is not, however,\nabsolutely primal.\n\nI shall illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an example,\nfrom its employment in the world of experience; proved it cannot be by\nany amount of experience, or by any number of facts, for such arguments\ncannot establish the truth of transcendental propositions. Let us take\na voluntary action\u2014for example, a falsehood\u2014by means of which a man has\nintroduced a certain degree of confusion into the social life of\nhumanity, which is judged according to the motives from which it\noriginated, and the blame of which and of the evil consequences arising\nfrom it, is imputed to the offender. We at first proceed to examine the\nempirical character of the offence, and for this purpose we endeavour\nto penetrate to the sources of that character, such as a defective\neducation, bad company, a shameless and wicked disposition, frivolity,\nand want of reflection\u2014not forgetting also the occasioning causes which\nprevailed at the moment of the transgression. In this the procedure is\nexactly the same as that pursued in the investigation of the series of\ncauses which determine a given physical effect. Now, although we\nbelieve the action to have been determined by all these circumstances,\nwe do not the less blame the offender. We do not blame him for his\nunhappy disposition, nor for the circumstances which influenced him,\nnay, not even for his former course of life; for we presuppose that all\nthese considerations may be set aside, that the series of preceding\nconditions may be regarded as having never existed, and that the action\nmay be considered as completely unconditioned in relation to any state\npreceding, just as if the agent commenced with it an entirely new\nseries of effects. Our blame of the offender is grounded upon a law of\nreason, which requires us to regard this faculty as a cause, which\ncould have and ought to have otherwise determined the behaviour of the\nculprit, independently of all empirical conditions. This causality of\nreason we do not regard as a co-operating agency, but as complete in\nitself. It matters not whether the sensuous impulses favoured or\nopposed the action of this causality, the offence is estimated\naccording to its intelligible character\u2014the offender is decidedly\nworthy of blame, the moment he utters a falsehood. It follows that we\nregard reason, in spite of the empirical conditions of the act, as\ncompletely free, and therefore, as in the present case,\nculpable.\n\nThe above judgement is complete evidence that we are accustomed to\nthink that reason is not affected by sensuous conditions, that in it no\nchange takes place\u2014although its phenomena, in other words, the mode in\nwhich it appears in its effects, are subject to change\u2014that in it no\npreceding state determines the following, and, consequently, that it\ndoes not form a member of the series of sensuous conditions which\nnecessitate phenomena according to natural laws. Reason is present and\nthe same in all human actions and at all times; but it does not itself\nexist in time, and therefore does not enter upon any state in which it\ndid not formerly exist. It is, relatively to new states or conditions,\ndetermining, but not determinable. Hence we cannot ask: \u201cWhy did not\nreason determine itself in a different manner?\u201d The question ought to\nbe thus stated: \u201cWhy did not reason employ its power of causality to\ndetermine certain phenomena in a different manner?\u201d But this is a\nquestion which admits of no answer. For a different intelligible\ncharacter would have exhibited a different empirical character; and,\nwhen we say that, in spite of the course which his whole former life\nhas taken, the offender could have refrained from uttering the\nfalsehood, this means merely that the act was subject to the power and\nauthority\u2014permissive or prohibitive\u2014of reason. Now, reason is not\nsubject in its causality to any conditions of phenomena or of time; and\na difference in time may produce a difference in the relation of\nphenomena to each other\u2014for these are not things and therefore not\ncauses in themselves\u2014but it cannot produce any difference in the\nrelation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason.\n\nThus, then, in our investigation into free actions and the causal power\nwhich produced them, we arrive at an intelligible cause, beyond which,\nhowever, we cannot go; although we can recognize that it is free, that\nis, independent of all sensuous conditions, and that, in this way, it\nmay be the sensuously unconditioned condition of phenomena. But for\nwhat reason the intelligible character generates such and such\nphenomena and exhibits such and such an empirical character under\ncertain circumstances, it is beyond the power of our reason to decide.\nThe question is as much above the power and the sphere of reason as the\nfollowing would be: \u201cWhy does the transcendental object of our external\nsensuous intuition allow of no other form than that of intuition in\nspace?\u201d But the problem, which we were called upon to solve, does not\nrequire us to entertain any such questions. The problem was merely\nthis\u2014whether freedom and natural necessity can exist without opposition\nin the same action. To this question we have given a sufficient answer;\nfor we have shown that, as the former stands in a relation to a\ndifferent kind of condition from those of the latter, the law of the\none does not affect the law of the other and that, consequently, both\ncan exist together in independence of and without interference with\neach other.\n\nThe reader must be careful to remark that my intention in the above\nremarks has not been to prove the actual existence of freedom, as a\nfaculty in which resides the cause of certain sensuous phenomena. For,\nnot to mention that such an argument would not have a transcendental\ncharacter, nor have been limited to the discussion of pure\nconceptions\u2014all attempts at inferring from experience what cannot be\ncogitated in accordance with its laws, must ever be unsuccessful. Nay,\nmore, I have not even aimed at demonstrating the possibility of\nfreedom; for this too would have been a vain endeavour, inasmuch as it\nis beyond the power of the mind to cognize the possibility of a reality\nor of a causal power by the aid of mere \u00e0 priori conceptions. Freedom\nhas been considered in the foregoing remarks only as a transcendental\nidea, by means of which reason aims at originating a series of\nconditions in the world of phenomena with the help of that which is\nsensuously unconditioned, involving itself, however, in an antinomy\nwith the laws which itself prescribes for the conduct of the\nunderstanding. That this antinomy is based upon a mere illusion, and\nthat nature and freedom are at least not opposed\u2014this was the only\nthing in our power to prove, and the question which it was our task to\nsolve.\n\nIV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the Dependence\nof Phenomenal Existences\n\nIn the preceding remarks, we considered the changes in the world of\nsense as constituting a dynamical series, in which each member is\nsubordinated to another\u2014as its cause. Our present purpose is to avail\nourselves of this series of states or conditions as a guide to an\nexistence which may be the highest condition of all changeable\nphenomena, that is, to a necessary being. Our endeavour to reach, not\nthe unconditioned causality, but the unconditioned existence, of\nsubstance. The series before us is therefore a series of conceptions,\nand not of intuitions (in which the one intuition is the condition of\nthe other).\n\nBut it is evident that, as all phenomena are subject to change and\nconditioned in their existence, the series of dependent existences\ncannot embrace an unconditioned member, the existence of which would be\nabsolutely necessary. It follows that, if phenomena were things in\nthemselves, and\u2014as an immediate consequence from this\nsupposition\u2014condition and conditioned belonged to the same series of\nphenomena, the existence of a necessary being, as the condition of the\nexistence of sensuous phenomena, would be perfectly impossible.\n\nAn important distinction, however, exists between the dynamical and the\nmathematical regress. The latter is engaged solely with the combination\nof parts into a whole, or with the division of a whole into its parts;\nand therefore are the conditions of its series parts of the series, and\nto be consequently regarded as homogeneous, and for this reason, as\nconsisting, without exception, of phenomena. If the former regress, on\nthe contrary, the aim of which is not to establish the possibility of\nan unconditioned whole consisting of given parts, or of an\nunconditioned part of a given whole, but to demonstrate the possibility\nof the deduction of a certain state from its cause, or of the\ncontingent existence of substance from that which exists necessarily,\nit is not requisite that the condition should form part of an empirical\nseries along with the conditioned.\n\nIn the case of the apparent antinomy with which we are at present\ndealing, there exists a way of escape from the difficulty; for it is\nnot impossible that both of the contradictory statements may be true in\ndifferent relations. All sensuous phenomena may be contingent, and\nconsequently possess only an empirically conditioned existence, and yet\nthere may also exist a non-empirical condition of the whole series, or,\nin other words, a necessary being. For this necessary being, as an\nintelligible condition, would not form a member\u2014not even the highest\nmember\u2014of the series; the whole world of sense would be left in its\nempirically determined existence uninterfered with and uninfluenced.\nThis would also form a ground of distinction between the modes of\nsolution employed for the third and fourth antinomies. For, while in\nthe consideration of freedom in the former antinomy, the thing\nitself\u2014the cause (substantia phaenomenon)\u2014was regarded as belonging to\nthe series of conditions, and only its causality to the intelligible\nworld\u2014we are obliged in the present case to cogitate this necessary\nbeing as purely intelligible and as existing entirely apart from the\nworld of sense (as an ens extramundanum); for otherwise it would be\nsubject to the phenomenal law of contingency and dependence.\n\nIn relation to the present problem, therefore, the regulative principle\nof reason is that everything in the sensuous world possesses an\nempirically conditioned existence\u2014that no property of the sensuous\nworld possesses unconditioned necessity\u2014that we are bound to expect,\nand, so far as is possible, to seek for the empirical condition of\nevery member in the series of conditions\u2014and that there is no\nsufficient reason to justify us in deducing any existence from a\ncondition which lies out of and beyond the empirical series, or in\nregarding any existence as independent and self-subsistent; although\nthis should not prevent us from recognizing the possibility of the\nwhole series being based upon a being which is intelligible, and for\nthis reason free from all empirical conditions.\n\nBut it has been far from my intention, in these remarks, to prove the\nexistence of this unconditioned and necessary being, or even to\nevidence the possibility of a purely intelligible condition of the\nexistence of all sensuous phenomena. As bounds were set to reason, to\nprevent it from leaving the guiding thread of empirical conditions and\nlosing itself in transcendent theories which are incapable of concrete\npresentation; so it was my purpose, on the other hand, to set bounds to\nthe law of the purely empirical understanding, and to protest against\nany attempts on its part at deciding on the possibility of things, or\ndeclaring the existence of the intelligible to be impossible, merely on\nthe ground that it is not available for the explanation and exposition\nof phenomena. It has been shown, at the same time, that the contingency\nof all the phenomena of nature and their empirical conditions is quite\nconsistent with the arbitrary hypothesis of a necessary, although\npurely intelligible condition, that no real contradiction exists\nbetween them and that, consequently, both may be true. The existence of\nsuch an absolutely necessary being may be impossible; but this can\nnever be demonstrated from the universal contingency and dependence of\nsensuous phenomena, nor from the principle which forbids us to\ndiscontinue the series at some member of it, or to seek for its cause\nin some sphere of existence beyond the world of nature. Reason goes its\nway in the empirical world, and follows, too, its peculiar path in the\nsphere of the transcendental.\n\nThe sensuous world contains nothing but phenomena, which are mere\nrepresentations, and always sensuously conditioned; things in\nthemselves are not, and cannot be, objects to us. It is not to be\nwondered at, therefore, that we are not justified in leaping from some\nmember of an empirical series beyond the world of sense, as if\nempirical representations were things in themselves, existing apart\nfrom their transcendental ground in the human mind, and the cause of\nwhose existence may be sought out of the empirical series. This would\ncertainly be the case with contingent things; but it cannot be with\nmere representations of things, the contingency of which is itself\nmerely a phenomenon and can relate to no other regress than that which\ndetermines phenomena, that is, the empirical. But to cogitate an\nintelligible ground of phenomena, as free, moreover, from the\ncontingency of the latter, conflicts neither with the unlimited nature\nof the empirical regress, nor with the complete contingency of\nphenomena. And the demonstration of this was the only thing necessary\nfor the solution of this apparent antinomy. For if the condition of\nevery conditioned\u2014as regards its existence\u2014is sensuous, and for this\nreason a part of the same series, it must be itself conditioned, as was\nshown in the antithesis of the fourth antinomy. The embarrassments into\nwhich a reason, which postulates the unconditioned, necessarily falls,\nmust, therefore, continue to exist; or the unconditioned must be placed\nin the sphere of the intelligible. In this way, its necessity does not\nrequire, nor does it even permit, the presence of an empirical\ncondition: and it is, consequently, unconditionally necessary.\n\nThe empirical employment of reason is not affected by the assumption of\na purely intelligible being; it continues its operations on the\nprinciple of the contingency of all phenomena, proceeding from\nempirical conditions to still higher and higher conditions, themselves\nempirical. Just as little does this regulative principle exclude the\nassumption of an intelligible cause, when the question regards merely\nthe pure employment of reason\u2014in relation to ends or aims. For, in this\ncase, an intelligible cause signifies merely the transcendental and to\nus unknown ground of the possibility of sensuous phenomena, and its\nexistence, necessary and independent of all sensuous conditions, is not\ninconsistent with the contingency of phenomena, or with the unlimited\npossibility of regress which exists in the series of empirical\nconditions.\n\nConcluding Remarks on the Antinomy of Pure Reason.\n\nSo long as the object of our rational conceptions is the totality of\nconditions in the world of phenomena, and the satisfaction, from this\nsource, of the requirements of reason, so long are our ideas\ntranscendental and cosmological. But when we set the\nunconditioned\u2014which is the aim of all our inquiries\u2014in a sphere which\nlies out of the world of sense and possible experience, our ideas\nbecome transcendent. They are then not merely serviceable towards the\ncompletion of the exercise of reason (which remains an idea, never\nexecuted, but always to be pursued); they detach themselves completely\nfrom experience and construct for themselves objects, the material of\nwhich has not been presented by experience, and the objective reality\nof which is not based upon the completion of the empirical series, but\nupon pure \u00e0 priori conceptions. The intelligible object of these\ntranscendent ideas may be conceded, as a transcendental object. But we\ncannot cogitate it as a thing determinable by certain distinct\npredicates relating to its internal nature, for it has no connection\nwith empirical conceptions; nor are we justified in affirming the\nexistence of any such object. It is, consequently, a mere product of\nthe mind alone. Of all the cosmological ideas, however, it is that\noccasioning the fourth antinomy which compels us to venture upon this\nstep. For the existence of phenomena, always conditioned and never\nself-subsistent, requires us to look for an object different from\nphenomena\u2014an intelligible object, with which all contingency must\ncease. But, as we have allowed ourselves to assume the existence of a\nself-subsistent reality out of the field of experience, and are\ntherefore obliged to regard phenomena as merely a contingent mode of\nrepresenting intelligible objects employed by beings which are\nthemselves intelligences\u2014no other course remains for us than to follow\nanalogy and employ the same mode in forming some conception of\nintelligible things, of which we have not the least knowledge, which\nnature taught us to use in the formation of empirical conceptions.\nExperience made us acquainted with the contingent. But we are at\npresent engaged in the discussion of things which are not objects of\nexperience; and must, therefore, deduce our knowledge of them from that\nwhich is necessary absolutely and in itself, that is, from pure\nconceptions. Hence the first step which we take out of the world of\nsense obliges us to begin our system of new cognition with the\ninvestigation of a necessary being, and to deduce from our conceptions\nof it all our conceptions of intelligible things. This we propose to\nattempt in the following chapter.\n\nChapter III. The Ideal of Pure Reason\n\nSection I. Of the Ideal in General\n\nWe have seen that pure conceptions do not present objects to the mind,\nexcept under sensuous conditions; because the conditions of objective\nreality do not exist in these conceptions, which contain, in fact,\nnothing but the mere form of thought. They may, however, when applied\nto phenomena, be presented in concreto; for it is phenomena that\npresent to them the materials for the formation of empirical\nconceptions, which are nothing more than concrete forms of the\nconceptions of the understanding. But ideas are still further removed\nfrom objective reality than categories; for no phenomenon can ever\npresent them to the human mind in concreto. They contain a certain\nperfection, attainable by no possible empirical cognition; and they\ngive to reason a systematic unity, to which the unity of experience\nattempts to approximate, but can never completely attain.\n\nBut still further removed than the idea from objective reality is the\nIdeal, by which term I understand the idea, not in concreto, but in\nindividuo\u2014as an individual thing, determinable or determined by the\nidea alone. The idea of humanity in its complete perfection supposes\nnot only the advancement of all the powers and faculties, which\nconstitute our conception of human nature, to a complete attainment of\ntheir final aims, but also everything which is requisite for the\ncomplete determination of the idea; for of all contradictory\npredicates, only one can conform with the idea of the perfect man. What\nI have termed an ideal was in Plato\u2019s philosophy an idea of the divine\nmind\u2014an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most\nperfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all\nphenomenal existences.\n\nWithout rising to these speculative heights, we are bound to confess\nthat human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals, which possess,\nnot, like those of Plato, creative, but certainly practical power\u2014as\nregulative principles, and form the basis of the perfectibility of\ncertain actions. Moral conceptions are not perfectly pure conceptions\nof reason, because an empirical element\u2014of pleasure or pain\u2014lies at the\nfoundation of them. In relation, however, to the principle, whereby\nreason sets bounds to a freedom which is in itself without law, and\nconsequently when we attend merely to their form, they may be\nconsidered as pure conceptions of reason. Virtue and wisdom in their\nperfect purity are ideas. But the wise man of the Stoics is an ideal,\nthat is to say, a human being existing only in thought and in complete\nconformity with the idea of wisdom. As the idea provides a rule, so the\nideal serves as an archetype for the perfect and complete determination\nof the copy. Thus the conduct of this wise and divine man serves us as\na standard of action, with which we may compare and judge ourselves,\nwhich may help us to reform ourselves, although the perfection it\ndemands can never be attained by us. Although we cannot concede\nobjective reality to these ideals, they are not to be considered as\nchimeras; on the contrary, they provide reason with a standard, which\nenables it to estimate, by comparison, the degree of incompleteness in\nthe objects presented to it. But to aim at realizing the ideal in an\nexample in the world of experience\u2014to describe, for instance, the\ncharacter of the perfectly wise man in a romance\u2014is impracticable. Nay\nmore, there is something absurd in the attempt; and the result must be\nlittle edifying, as the natural limitations, which are continually\nbreaking in upon the perfection and completeness of the idea, destroy\nthe illusion in the story and throw an air of suspicion even on what is\ngood in the idea, which hence appears fictitious and unreal.\n\nSuch is the constitution of the ideal of reason, which is always based\nupon determinate conceptions, and serves as a rule and a model for\nlimitation or of criticism. Very different is the nature of the ideals\nof the imagination. Of these it is impossible to present an\nintelligible conception; they are a kind of monogram, drawn according\nto no determinate rule, and forming rather a vague picture\u2014the\nproduction of many diverse experiences\u2014than a determinate image. Such\nare the ideals which painters and physiognomists profess to have in\ntheir minds, and which can serve neither as a model for production nor\nas a standard for appreciation. They may be termed, though improperly,\nsensuous ideals, as they are declared to be models of certain possible\nempirical intuitions. They cannot, however, furnish rules or standards\nfor explanation or examination.\n\nIn its ideals, reason aims at complete and perfect determination\naccording to \u00e0 priori rules; and hence it cogitates an object, which\nmust be completely determinable in conformity with principles, although\nall empirical conditions are absent, and the conception of the object\nis on this account transcendent.\n\nSection II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon Trancendentale)\n\nEvery conception is, in relation to that which is not contained in it,\nundetermined and subject to the principle of determinability. This\nprinciple is that, of every two contradictorily opposed predicates,\nonly one can belong to a conception. It is a purely logical principle,\nitself based upon the principle of contradiction; inasmuch as it makes\ncomplete abstraction of the content and attends merely to the logical\nform of the cognition.\n\nBut again, everything, as regards its possibility, is also subject to\nthe principle of complete determination, according to which one of all\nthe possible contradictory predicates of things must belong to it. This\nprinciple is not based merely upon that of contradiction; for, in\naddition to the relation between two contradictory predicates, it\nregards everything as standing in a relation to the sum of\npossibilities, as the sum total of all predicates of things, and, while\npresupposing this sum as an \u00e0 priori condition, presents to the mind\neverything as receiving the possibility of its individual existence\nfrom the relation it bears to, and the share it possesses in, the\naforesaid sum of possibilities.[64] The principle of complete\ndetermination relates the content and not to the logical form. It is\nthe principle of the synthesis of all the predicates which are required\nto constitute the complete conception of a thing, and not a mere\nprinciple analytical representation, which enounces that one of two\ncontradictory predicates must belong to a conception. It contains,\nmoreover, a transcendental presupposition\u2014that, namely, of the material\nfor all possibility, which must contain \u00e0 priori the data for this or\nthat particular possibility.\n\n [64] Thus this principle declares everything to possess a relation to\n a common correlate\u2014the sum-total of possibility, which, if discovered\n to exist in the idea of one individual thing, would establish the\n affinity of all possible things, from the identity of the ground of\n their complete determination. The determinability of every conception\n is subordinate to the universality (Allgemeinheit, universalitas) of\n the principle of excluded middle; the determination of a thing to the\n totality (Allheit, universitas) of all possible predicates.\n\n\nThe proposition, everything which exists is completely determined,\nmeans not only that one of every pair of given contradictory\nattributes, but that one of all possible attributes, is always\npredicable of the thing; in it the predicates are not merely compared\nlogically with each other, but the thing itself is transcendentally\ncompared with the sum-total of all possible predicates. The proposition\nis equivalent to saying: \u201cTo attain to a complete knowledge of a thing,\nit is necessary to possess a knowledge of everything that is possible,\nand to determine it thereby in a positive or negative manner.\u201d The\nconception of complete determination is consequently a conception which\ncannot be presented in its totality in concreto, and is therefore based\nupon an idea, which has its seat in the reason\u2014the faculty which\nprescribes to the understanding the laws of its harmonious and perfect\nexercise.\n\nNow, although this idea of the sum-total of all possibility, in so far\nas it forms the condition of the complete determination of everything,\nis itself undetermined in relation to the predicates which may\nconstitute this sum-total, and we cogitate in it merely the sum-total\nof all possible predicates\u2014we nevertheless find, upon closer\nexamination, that this idea, as a primitive conception of the mind,\nexcludes a large number of predicates\u2014those deduced and those\nirreconcilable with others, and that it is evolved as a conception\ncompletely determined \u00e0 priori. Thus it becomes the conception of an\nindividual object, which is completely determined by and through the\nmere idea, and must consequently be termed an ideal of pure reason.\n\nWhen we consider all possible predicates, not merely logically, but\ntranscendentally, that is to say, with reference to the content which\nmay be cogitated as existing in them \u00e0 priori, we shall find that some\nindicate a being, others merely a non-being. The logical negation\nexpressed in the word not does not properly belong to a conception, but\nonly to the relation of one conception to another in a judgement, and\nis consequently quite insufficient to present to the mind the content\nof a conception. The expression not mortal does not indicate that a\nnon-being is cogitated in the object; it does not concern the content\nat all. A transcendental negation, on the contrary, indicates non-being\nin itself, and is opposed to transcendental affirmation, the conception\nof which of itself expresses a being. Hence this affirmation indicates\na reality, because in and through it objects are considered to be\nsomething\u2014to be things; while the opposite negation, on the other hand,\nindicates a mere want, or privation, or absence, and, where such\nnegations alone are attached to a representation, the non-existence of\nanything corresponding to the representation.\n\nNow a negation cannot be cogitated as determined, without cogitating at\nthe same time the opposite affirmation. The man born blind has not the\nleast notion of darkness, because he has none of light; the vagabond\nknows nothing of poverty, because he has never known what it is to be\nin comfort;[65] the ignorant man has no conception of his ignorance,\nbecause he has no conception of knowledge. All conceptions of negatives\nare accordingly derived or deduced conceptions; and realities contain\nthe data, and, so to speak, the material or transcendental content of\nthe possibility and complete determination of all things.\n\n [65] The investigations and calculations of astronomers have taught us\n much that is wonderful; but the most important lesson we have received\n from them is the discovery of the abyss of our ignorance in relation\n to the universe\u2014an ignorance the magnitude of which reason, without\n the information thus derived, could never have conceived. This\n discovery of our deficiencies must produce a great change in the\n determination of the aims of human reason.\n\n\nIf, therefore, a transcendental substratum lies at the foundation of\nthe complete determination of things\u2014a substratum which is to form the\nfund from which all possible predicates of things are to be supplied,\nthis substratum cannot be anything else than the idea of a sum-total of\nreality (omnitudo realitatis). In this view, negations are nothing but\nlimitations\u2014a term which could not, with propriety, be applied to them,\nif the unlimited (the all) did not form the true basis of our\nconception.\n\nThis conception of a sum-total of reality is the conception of a thing\nin itself, regarded as completely determined; and the conception of an\nens realissimum is the conception of an individual being, inasmuch as\nit is determined by that predicate of all possible contradictory\npredicates, which indicates and belongs to being. It is, therefore, a\ntranscendental ideal which forms the basis of the complete\ndetermination of everything that exists, and is the highest material\ncondition of its possibility\u2014a condition on which must rest the\ncogitation of all objects with respect to their content. Nay, more,\nthis ideal is the only proper ideal of which the human mind is capable;\nbecause in this case alone a general conception of a thing is\ncompletely determined by and through itself, and cognized as the\nrepresentation of an individuum.\n\nThe logical determination of a conception is based upon a disjunctive\nsyllogism, the major of which contains the logical division of the\nextent of a general conception, the minor limits this extent to a\ncertain part, while the conclusion determines the conception by this\npart. The general conception of a reality cannot be divided \u00e0 priori,\nbecause, without the aid of experience, we cannot know any determinate\nkinds of reality, standing under the former as the genus. The\ntranscendental principle of the complete determination of all things is\ntherefore merely the representation of the sum-total of all reality; it\nis not a conception which is the genus of all predicates under itself,\nbut one which comprehends them all within itself. The complete\ndetermination of a thing is consequently based upon the limitation of\nthis total of reality, so much being predicated of the thing, while all\nthat remains over is excluded\u2014a procedure which is in exact agreement\nwith that of the disjunctive syllogism and the determination of the\nobjects in the conclusion by one of the members of the division. It\nfollows that reason, in laying the transcendental ideal at the\nfoundation of its determination of all possible things, takes a course\nin exact analogy with that which it pursues in disjunctive syllogisms\u2014a\nproposition which formed the basis of the systematic division of all\ntranscendental ideas, according to which they are produced in complete\nparallelism with the three modes of syllogistic reasoning employed by\nthe human mind.\n\nIt is self-evident that reason, in cogitating the necessary complete\ndetermination of things, does not presuppose the existence of a being\ncorresponding to its ideal, but merely the idea of the ideal\u2014for the\npurpose of deducing from the unconditional totality of complete\ndetermination, The ideal is therefore the prototype of all things,\nwhich, as defective copies (ectypa), receive from it the material of\ntheir possibility, and approximate to it more or less, though it is\nimpossible that they can ever attain to its perfection.\n\nThe possibility of things must therefore be regarded as derived\u2014except\nthat of the thing which contains in itself all reality, which must be\nconsidered to be primitive and original. For all negations\u2014and they are\nthe only predicates by means of which all other things can be\ndistinguished from the ens realissimum\u2014are mere limitations of a\ngreater and a higher\u2014nay, the highest reality; and they consequently\npresuppose this reality, and are, as regards their content, derived\nfrom it. The manifold nature of things is only an infinitely various\nmode of limiting the conception of the highest reality, which is their\ncommon substratum; just as all figures are possible only as different\nmodes of limiting infinite space. The object of the ideal of reason\u2014an\nobject existing only in reason itself\u2014is also termed the primal being\n(ens originarium); as having no existence superior to him, the supreme\nbeing (ens summum); and as being the condition of all other beings,\nwhich rank under it, the being of all beings (ens entium). But none of\nthese terms indicate the objective relation of an actually existing\nobject to other things, but merely that of an idea to conceptions; and\nall our investigations into this subject still leave us in perfect\nuncertainty with regard to the existence of this being.\n\nA primal being cannot be said to consist of many other beings with an\nexistence which is derivative, for the latter presuppose the former,\nand therefore cannot be constitutive parts of it. It follows that the\nideal of the primal being must be cogitated as simple.\n\nThe deduction of the possibility of all other things from this primal\nbeing cannot, strictly speaking, be considered as a limitation, or as a\nkind of division of its reality; for this would be regarding the primal\nbeing as a mere aggregate\u2014which has been shown to be impossible,\nalthough it was so represented in our first rough sketch. The highest\nreality must be regarded rather as the ground than as the sum-total of\nthe possibility of all things, and the manifold nature of things be\nbased, not upon the limitation of the primal being itself, but upon the\ncomplete series of effects which flow from it. And thus all our powers\nof sense, as well as all phenomenal reality, may be with propriety\nregarded as belonging to this series of effects, while they could not\nhave formed parts of the idea, considered as an aggregate. Pursuing\nthis track, and hypostatizing this idea, we shall find ourselves\nauthorized to determine our notion of the Supreme Being by means of the\nmere conception of a highest reality, as one, simple, all-sufficient,\neternal, and so on\u2014in one word, to determine it in its unconditioned\ncompleteness by the aid of every possible predicate. The conception of\nsuch a being is the conception of God in its transcendental sense, and\nthus the ideal of pure reason is the object-matter of a transcendental\ntheology.\n\nBut, by such an employment of the transcendental idea, we should be\nover stepping the limits of its validity and purpose. For reason placed\nit, as the conception of all reality, at the basis of the complete\ndetermination of things, without requiring that this conception be\nregarded as the conception of an objective existence. Such an existence\nwould be purely fictitious, and the hypostatizing of the content of the\nidea into an ideal, as an individual being, is a step perfectly\nunauthorized. Nay, more, we are not even called upon to assume the\npossibility of such an hypothesis, as none of the deductions drawn from\nsuch an ideal would affect the complete determination of things in\ngeneral\u2014for the sake of which alone is the idea necessary.\n\nIt is not sufficient to circumscribe the procedure and the dialectic of\nreason; we must also endeavour to discover the sources of this\ndialectic, that we may have it in our power to give a rational\nexplanation of this illusion, as a phenomenon of the human mind. For\nthe ideal, of which we are at present speaking, is based, not upon an\narbitrary, but upon a natural, idea. The question hence arises: How\nhappens it that reason regards the possibility of all things as deduced\nfrom a single possibility, that, to wit, of the highest reality, and\npresupposes this as existing in an individual and primal being?\n\nThe answer is ready; it is at once presented by the procedure of\ntranscendental analytic. The possibility of sensuous objects is a\nrelation of these objects to thought, in which something (the empirical\nform) may be cogitated \u00e0 priori; while that which constitutes the\nmatter\u2014the reality of the phenomenon (that element which corresponds to\nsensation)\u2014must be given from without, as otherwise it could not even\nbe cogitated by, nor could its possibility be presentable to the mind.\nNow, a sensuous object is completely determined, when it has been\ncompared with all phenomenal predicates, and represented by means of\nthese either positively or negatively. But, as that which constitutes\nthe thing itself\u2014the real in a phenomenon, must be given, and that, in\nwhich the real of all phenomena is given, is experience, one, sole, and\nall-embracing\u2014the material of the possibility of all sensuous objects\nmust be presupposed as given in a whole, and it is upon the limitation\nof this whole that the possibility of all empirical objects, their\ndistinction from each other and their complete determination, are\nbased. Now, no other objects are presented to us besides sensuous\nobjects, and these can be given only in connection with a possible\nexperience; it follows that a thing is not an object to us, unless it\npresupposes the whole or sum-total of empirical reality as the\ncondition of its possibility. Now, a natural illusion leads us to\nconsider this principle, which is valid only of sensuous objects, as\nvalid with regard to things in general. And thus we are induced to hold\nthe empirical principle of our conceptions of the possibility of\nthings, as phenomena, by leaving out this limitative condition, to be a\ntranscendental principle of the possibility of things in general.\n\nWe proceed afterwards to hypostatize this idea of the sum-total of all\nreality, by changing the distributive unity of the empirical exercise\nof the understanding into the collective unity of an empirical whole\u2014a\ndialectical illusion, and by cogitating this whole or sum of experience\nas an individual thing, containing in itself all empirical reality.\nThis individual thing or being is then, by means of the above-mentioned\ntranscendental subreption, substituted for our notion of a thing which\nstands at the head of the possibility of all things, the real\nconditions of whose complete determination it presents.[66]\n\n [66] This ideal of the ens realissimum\u2014although merely a mental\n representation\u2014is first objectivized, that is, has an objective\n existence attributed to it, then hypostatized, and finally, by the\n natural progress of reason to the completion of unity, personified, as\n we shall show presently. For the regulative unity of experience is not\n based upon phenomena themselves, but upon the connection of the\n variety of phenomena by the understanding in a consciousness, and thus\n the unity of the supreme reality and the complete determinability of\n all things, seem to reside in a supreme understanding, and,\n consequently, in a conscious intelligence.\n\nSection III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason in Proof\nof the Existence of a Supreme Being\n\nNotwithstanding the pressing necessity which reason feels, to form some\npresupposition that shall serve the understanding as a proper basis for\nthe complete determination of its conceptions, the idealistic and\nfactitious nature of such a presupposition is too evident to allow\nreason for a moment to persuade itself into a belief of the objective\nexistence of a mere creation of its own thought. But there are other\nconsiderations which compel reason to seek out some resting place in\nthe regress from the conditioned to the unconditioned, which is not\ngiven as an actual existence from the mere conception of it, although\nit alone can give completeness to the series of conditions. And this is\nthe natural course of every human reason, even of the most uneducated,\nalthough the path at first entered it does not always continue to\nfollow. It does not begin from conceptions, but from common experience,\nand requires a basis in actual existence. But this basis is insecure,\nunless it rests upon the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary.\nAnd this foundation is itself unworthy of trust, if it leave under and\nabove it empty space, if it do not fill all, and leave no room for a\nwhy or a wherefore, if it be not, in one word, infinite in its reality.\n\nIf we admit the existence of some one thing, whatever it may be, we\nmust also admit that there is something which exists necessarily. For\nwhat is contingent exists only under the condition of some other thing,\nwhich is its cause; and from this we must go on to conclude the\nexistence of a cause which is not contingent, and which consequently\nexists necessarily and unconditionally. Such is the argument by which\nreason justifies its advances towards a primal being.\n\nNow reason looks round for the conception of a being that may be\nadmitted, without inconsistency, to be worthy of the attribute of\nabsolute necessity, not for the purpose of inferring \u00e0 priori, from the\nconception of such a being, its objective existence (for if reason\nallowed itself to take this course, it would not require a basis in\ngiven and actual existence, but merely the support of pure\nconceptions), but for the purpose of discovering, among all our\nconceptions of possible things, that conception which possesses no\nelement inconsistent with the idea of absolute necessity. For that\nthere must be some absolutely necessary existence, it regards as a\ntruth already established. Now, if it can remove every existence\nincapable of supporting the attribute of absolute necessity, excepting\none\u2014this must be the absolutely necessary being, whether its necessity\nis comprehensible by us, that is, deducible from the conception of it\nalone, or not.\n\nNow that, the conception of which contains a therefore to every\nwherefore, which is not defective in any respect whatever, which is\nall-sufficient as a condition, seems to be the being of which we can\njustly predicate absolute necessity\u2014for this reason, that, possessing\nthe conditions of all that is possible, it does not and cannot itself\nrequire any condition. And thus it satisfies, in one respect at least,\nthe requirements of the conception of absolute necessity. In this view,\nit is superior to all other conceptions, which, as deficient and\nincomplete, do not possess the characteristic of independence of all\nhigher conditions. It is true that we cannot infer from this that what\ndoes not contain in itself the supreme and complete condition\u2014the\ncondition of all other things\u2014must possess only a conditioned\nexistence; but as little can we assert the contrary, for this supposed\nbeing does not possess the only characteristic which can enable reason\nto cognize by means of an \u00e0 priori conception the unconditioned and\nnecessary nature of its existence.\n\nThe conception of an ens realissimum is that which best agrees with the\nconception of an unconditioned and necessary being. The former\nconception does not satisfy all the requirements of the latter; but we\nhave no choice, we are obliged to adhere to it, for we find that we\ncannot do without the existence of a necessary being; and even although\nwe admit it, we find it out of our power to discover in the whole\nsphere of possibility any being that can advance well-grounded claims\nto such a distinction.\n\nThe following is, therefore, the natural course of human reason. It\nbegins by persuading itself of the existence of some necessary being.\nIn this being it recognizes the characteristics of unconditioned\nexistence. It then seeks the conception of that which is independent of\nall conditions, and finds it in that which is itself the sufficient\ncondition of all other things\u2014in other words, in that which contains\nall reality. But the unlimited all is an absolute unity, and is\nconceived by the mind as a being one and supreme; and thus reason\nconcludes that the Supreme Being, as the primal basis of all things,\npossesses an existence which is absolutely necessary.\n\nThis conception must be regarded as in some degree satisfactory, if we\nadmit the existence of a necessary being, and consider that there\nexists a necessity for a definite and final answer to these questions.\nIn such a case, we cannot make a better choice, or rather we have no\nchoice at all, but feel ourselves obliged to declare in favour of the\nabsolute unity of complete reality, as the highest source of the\npossibility of things. But if there exists no motive for coming to a\ndefinite conclusion, and we may leave the question unanswered till we\nhave fully weighed both sides\u2014in other words, when we are merely called\nupon to decide how much we happen to know about the question, and how\nmuch we merely flatter ourselves that we know\u2014the above conclusion does\nnot appear to be so great advantage, but, on the contrary, seems\ndefective in the grounds upon which it is supported.\n\nFor, admitting the truth of all that has been said, that, namely, the\ninference from a given existence (my own, for example) to the existence\nof an unconditioned and necessary being is valid and unassailable;\nthat, in the second place, we must consider a being which contains all\nreality, and consequently all the conditions of other things, to be\nabsolutely unconditioned; and admitting too, that we have thus\ndiscovered the conception of a thing to which may be attributed,\nwithout inconsistency, absolute necessity\u2014it does not follow from all\nthis that the conception of a limited being, in which the supreme\nreality does not reside, is therefore incompatible with the idea of\nabsolute necessity. For, although I do not discover the element of the\nunconditioned in the conception of such a being\u2014an element which is\nmanifestly existent in the sum-total of all conditions\u2014I am not\nentitled to conclude that its existence is therefore conditioned; just\nas I am not entitled to affirm, in a hypothetical syllogism, that where\na certain condition does not exist (in the present, completeness, as\nfar as pure conceptions are concerned), the conditioned does not exist\neither. On the contrary, we are free to consider all limited beings as\nlikewise unconditionally necessary, although we are unable to infer\nthis from the general conception which we have of them. Thus conducted,\nthis argument is incapable of giving us the least notion of the\nproperties of a necessary being, and must be in every respect without\nresult.\n\nThis argument continues, however, to possess a weight and an authority,\nwhich, in spite of its objective insufficiency, it has never been\ndivested of. For, granting that certain responsibilities lie upon us,\nwhich, as based on the ideas of reason, deserve to be respected and\nsubmitted to, although they are incapable of a real or practical\napplication to our nature, or, in other words, would be\nresponsibilities without motives, except upon the supposition of a\nSupreme Being to give effect and influence to the practical laws: in\nsuch a case we should be bound to obey our conceptions, which, although\nobjectively insufficient, do, according to the standard of reason,\npreponderate over and are superior to any claims that may be advanced\nfrom any other quarter. The equilibrium of doubt would in this case be\ndestroyed by a practical addition; indeed, Reason would be compelled to\ncondemn herself, if she refused to comply with the demands of the\njudgement, no superior to which we know\u2014however defective her\nunderstanding of the grounds of these demands might be.\n\nThis argument, although in fact transcendental, inasmuch as it rests\nupon the intrinsic insufficiency of the contingent, is so simple and\nnatural, that the commonest understanding can appreciate its value. We\nsee things around us change, arise, and pass away; they, or their\ncondition, must therefore have a cause. The same demand must again be\nmade of the cause itself\u2014as a datum of experience. Now it is natural\nthat we should place the highest causality just where we place supreme\ncausality, in that being, which contains the conditions of all possible\neffects, and the conception of which is so simple as that of an\nall-embracing reality. This highest cause, then, we regard as\nabsolutely necessary, because we find it absolutely necessary to rise\nto it, and do not discover any reason for proceeding beyond it. Thus,\namong all nations, through the darkest polytheism glimmer some faint\nsparks of monotheism, to which these idolaters have been led, not from\nreflection and profound thought, but by the study and natural progress\nof the common understanding.\n\nThere are only three modes of proving the existence of a Deity, on the\ngrounds of speculative reason.\n\nAll the paths conducting to this end begin either from determinate\nexperience and the peculiar constitution of the world of sense, and\nrise, according to the laws of causality, from it to the highest cause\nexisting apart from the world\u2014or from a purely indeterminate\nexperience, that is, some empirical existence\u2014or abstraction is made of\nall experience, and the existence of a supreme cause is concluded from\n\u00e0 priori conceptions alone. The first is the physico-theological\nargument, the second the cosmological, the third the ontological. More\nthere are not, and more there cannot be.\n\nI shall show it is as unsuccessful on the one path\u2014the empirical\u2014as on\nthe other\u2014the transcendental, and that it stretches its wings in vain,\nto soar beyond the world of sense by the mere might of speculative\nthought. As regards the order in which we must discuss those arguments,\nit will be exactly the reverse of that in which reason, in the progress\nof its development, attains to them\u2014the order in which they are placed\nabove. For it will be made manifest to the reader that, although\nexperience presents the occasion and the starting-point, it is the\ntranscendental idea of reason which guides it in its pilgrimage and is\nthe goal of all its struggles. I shall therefore begin with an\nexamination of the transcendental argument, and afterwards inquire what\nadditional strength has accrued to this mode of proof from the addition\nof the empirical element.\n\nSection IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the\nExistence of God\n\nIt is evident from what has been said that the conception of an\nabsolutely necessary being is a mere idea, the objective reality of\nwhich is far from being established by the mere fact that it is a need\nof reason. On the contrary, this idea serves merely to indicate a\ncertain unattainable perfection, and rather limits the operations than,\nby the presentation of new objects, extends the sphere of the\nunderstanding. But a strange anomaly meets us at the very threshold;\nfor the inference from a given existence in general to an absolutely\nnecessary existence seems to be correct and unavoidable, while the\nconditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in forming any\nconception of such a being.\n\nPhilosophers have always talked of an absolutely necessary being, and\nhave nevertheless declined to take the trouble of conceiving\nwhether\u2014and how\u2014a being of this nature is even cogitable, not to\nmention that its existence is actually demonstrable. A verbal\ndefinition of the conception is certainly easy enough: it is something\nthe non-existence of which is impossible. But does this definition\nthrow any light upon the conditions which render it impossible to\ncogitate the non-existence of a thing\u2014conditions which we wish to\nascertain, that we may discover whether we think anything in the\nconception of such a being or not? For the mere fact that I throw away,\nby means of the word unconditioned, all the conditions which the\nunderstanding habitually requires in order to regard anything as\nnecessary, is very far from making clear whether by means of the\nconception of the unconditionally necessary I think of something, or\nreally of nothing at all.\n\nNay, more, this chance-conception, now become so current, many have\nendeavoured to explain by examples which seemed to render any inquiries\nregarding its intelligibility quite needless. Every geometrical\nproposition\u2014a triangle has three angles\u2014it was said, is absolutely\nnecessary; and thus people talked of an object which lay out of the\nsphere of our understanding as if it were perfectly plain what the\nconception of such a being meant.\n\nAll the examples adduced have been drawn, without exception, from\njudgements, and not from things. But the unconditioned necessity of a\njudgement does not form the absolute necessity of a thing. On the\ncontrary, the absolute necessity of a judgement is only a conditioned\nnecessity of a thing, or of the predicate in a judgement. The\nproposition above-mentioned does not enounce that three angles\nnecessarily exist, but, upon condition that a triangle exists, three\nangles must necessarily exist\u2014in it. And thus this logical necessity\nhas been the source of the greatest delusions. Having formed an \u00e0\npriori conception of a thing, the content of which was made to embrace\nexistence, we believed ourselves safe in concluding that, because\nexistence belongs necessarily to the object of the conception (that is,\nunder the condition of my positing this thing as given), the existence\nof the thing is also posited necessarily, and that it is therefore\nabsolutely necessary\u2014merely because its existence has been cogitated in\nthe conception.\n\nIf, in an identical judgement, I annihilate the predicate in thought,\nand retain the subject, a contradiction is the result; and hence I say,\nthe former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if I suppress both\nsubject and predicate in thought, no contradiction arises; for there is\nnothing at all, and therefore no means of forming a contradiction. To\nsuppose the existence of a triangle and not that of its three angles,\nis self-contradictory; but to suppose the non-existence of both\ntriangle and angles is perfectly admissible. And so is it with the\nconception of an absolutely necessary being. Annihilate its existence\nin thought, and you annihilate the thing itself with all its\npredicates; how then can there be any room for contradiction?\nExternally, there is nothing to give rise to a contradiction, for a\nthing cannot be necessary externally; nor internally, for, by the\nannihilation or suppression of the thing itself, its internal\nproperties are also annihilated. God is omnipotent\u2014that is a necessary\njudgement. His omnipotence cannot be denied, if the existence of a\nDeity is posited\u2014the existence, that is, of an infinite being, the two\nconceptions being identical. But when you say, God does not exist,\nneither omnipotence nor any other predicate is affirmed; they must all\ndisappear with the subject, and in this judgement there cannot exist\nthe least self-contradiction.\n\nYou have thus seen that when the predicate of a judgement is\nannihilated in thought along with the subject, no internal\ncontradiction can arise, be the predicate what it may. There is no\npossibility of evading the conclusion\u2014you find yourselves compelled to\ndeclare: There are certain subjects which cannot be annihilated in\nthought. But this is nothing more than saying: There exist subjects\nwhich are absolutely necessary\u2014the very hypothesis which you are called\nupon to establish. For I find myself unable to form the slightest\nconception of a thing which when annihilated in thought with all its\npredicates, leaves behind a contradiction; and contradiction is the\nonly criterion of impossibility in the sphere of pure \u00e0 priori\nconceptions.\n\nAgainst these general considerations, the justice of which no one can\ndispute, one argument is adduced, which is regarded as furnishing a\nsatisfactory demonstration from the fact. It is affirmed that there is\none and only one conception, in which the non-being or annihilation of\nthe object is self-contradictory, and this is the conception of an ens\nrealissimum. It possesses, you say, all reality, and you feel\nyourselves justified in admitting the possibility of such a being.\n(This I am willing to grant for the present, although the existence of\na conception which is not self-contradictory is far from being\nsufficient to prove the possibility of an object.)[67] Now the notion\nof all reality embraces in it that of existence; the notion of\nexistence lies, therefore, in the conception of this possible thing. If\nthis thing is annihilated in thought, the internal possibility of the\nthing is also annihilated, which is self-contradictory.\n\n [67] A conception is always possible, if it is not self-contradictory.\n This is the logical criterion of possibility, distinguishing the\n object of such a conception from the nihil negativum. But it may be,\n notwithstanding, an empty conception, unless the objective reality of\n this synthesis, but which it is generated, is demonstrated; and a\n proof of this kind must be based upon principles of possible\n experience, and not upon the principle of analysis or contradiction.\n This remark may be serviceable as a warning against concluding, from\n the possibility of a conception\u2014which is logical\u2014the possibility of a\n thing\u2014which is real.\n\n\nI answer: It is absurd to introduce\u2014under whatever term disguised\u2014into\nthe conception of a thing, which is to be cogitated solely in reference\nto its possibility, the conception of its existence. If this is\nadmitted, you will have apparently gained the day, but in reality have\nenounced nothing but a mere tautology. I ask, is the proposition, this\nor that thing (which I am admitting to be possible) exists, an\nanalytical or a synthetical proposition? If the former, there is no\naddition made to the subject of your thought by the affirmation of its\nexistence; but then the conception in your minds is identical with the\nthing itself, or you have supposed the existence of a thing to be\npossible, and then inferred its existence from its internal\npossibility\u2014which is but a miserable tautology. The word reality in the\nconception of the thing, and the word existence in the conception of\nthe predicate, will not help you out of the difficulty. For, supposing\nyou were to term all positing of a thing reality, you have thereby\nposited the thing with all its predicates in the conception of the\nsubject and assumed its actual existence, and this you merely repeat in\nthe predicate. But if you confess, as every reasonable person must,\nthat every existential proposition is synthetical, how can it be\nmaintained that the predicate of existence cannot be denied without\ncontradiction?\u2014a property which is the characteristic of analytical\npropositions, alone.\n\nI should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this\nsophistical mode of argumentation, by a strict definition of the\nconception of existence, did not my own experience teach me that the\nillusion arising from our confounding a logical with a real predicate\n(a predicate which aids in the determination of a thing) resists almost\nall the endeavours of explanation and illustration. A logical predicate\nmay be what you please, even the subject may be predicated of itself;\nfor logic pays no regard to the content of a judgement. But the\ndetermination of a conception is a predicate, which adds to and\nenlarges the conception. It must not, therefore, be contained in the\nconception.\n\nBeing is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of\nsomething which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is\nmerely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it.\nLogically, it is merely the copula of a judgement. The proposition, God\nis omnipotent, contains two conceptions, which have a certain object or\ncontent; the word is, is no additional predicate\u2014it merely indicates\nthe relation of the predicate to the subject. Now, if I take the\nsubject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one), and say:\nGod is, or, There is a God, I add no new predicate to the conception of\nGod, I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its\npredicates\u2014I posit the object in relation to my conception. The content\nof both is the same; and there is no addition made to the conception,\nwhich expresses merely the possibility of the object, by my cogitating\nthe object\u2014in the expression, it is\u2014as absolutely given or existing.\nThus the real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real\ndollars contain no more than a hundred possible dollars. For, as the\nlatter indicate the conception, and the former the object, on the\nsupposition that the content of the former was greater than that of the\nlatter, my conception would not be an expression of the whole object,\nand would consequently be an inadequate conception of it. But in\nreckoning my wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred real\ndollars than in a hundred possible dollars\u2014that is, in the mere\nconception of them. For the real object\u2014the dollars\u2014is not analytically\ncontained in my conception, but forms a synthetical addition to my\nconception (which is merely a determination of my mental state),\nalthough this objective reality\u2014this existence\u2014apart from my\nconceptions, does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid\nhundred dollars.\n\nBy whatever and by whatever number of predicates\u2014even to the complete\ndetermination of it\u2014I may cogitate a thing, I do not in the least\naugment the object of my conception by the addition of the statement:\nThis thing exists. Otherwise, not exactly the same, but something more\nthan what was cogitated in my conception, would exist, and I could not\naffirm that the exact object of my conception had real existence. If I\ncogitate a thing as containing all modes of reality except one, the\nmode of reality which is absent is not added to the conception of the\nthing by the affirmation that the thing exists; on the contrary, the\nthing exists\u2014if it exist at all\u2014with the same defect as that cogitated\nin its conception; otherwise not that which was cogitated, but\nsomething different, exists. Now, if I cogitate a being as the highest\nreality, without defect or imperfection, the question still\nremains\u2014whether this being exists or not? For, although no element is\nwanting in the possible real content of my conception, there is a\ndefect in its relation to my mental state, that is, I am ignorant\nwhether the cognition of the object indicated by the conception is\npossible \u00e0 posteriori. And here the cause of the present difficulty\nbecomes apparent. If the question regarded an object of sense merely,\nit would be impossible for me to confound the conception with the\nexistence of a thing. For the conception merely enables me to cogitate\nan object as according with the general conditions of experience; while\nthe existence of the object permits me to cogitate it as contained in\nthe sphere of actual experience. At the same time, this connection with\nthe world of experience does not in the least augment the conception,\nalthough a possible perception has been added to the experience of the\nmind. But if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone, it is\nnot to be wondered at, that we should find ourselves unable to present\nany criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility.\n\nWhatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary\nto go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object. In\nthe case of sensuous objects, this is attained by their connection\naccording to empirical laws with some one of my perceptions; but there\nis no means of cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought,\nbecause it must be cognized completely \u00e0 priori. But all our knowledge\nof existence (be it immediately by perception, or by inferences\nconnecting some object with a perception) belongs entirely to the\nsphere of experience\u2014which is in perfect unity with itself; and\nalthough an existence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely declared\nto be impossible, it is a hypothesis the truth of which we have no\nmeans of ascertaining.\n\nThe notion of a Supreme Being is in many respects a highly useful idea;\nbut for the very reason that it is an idea, it is incapable of\nenlarging our cognition with regard to the existence of things. It is\nnot even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being\nwhich we do not know to exist. The analytical criterion of possibility,\nwhich consists in the absence of contradiction in propositions, cannot\nbe denied it. But the connection of real properties in a thing is a\nsynthesis of the possibility of which an \u00e0 priori judgement cannot be\nformed, because these realities are not presented to us specifically;\nand even if this were to happen, a judgement would still be impossible,\nbecause the criterion of the possibility of synthetical cognitions must\nbe sought for in the world of experience, to which the object of an\nidea cannot belong. And thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed\nin his attempt to establish upon \u00e0 priori grounds the possibility of\nthis sublime ideal being.\n\nThe celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a\nSupreme Being is therefore insufficient; and we may as well hope to\nincrease our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as the\nmerchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his cash\naccount.\n\nSection V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the\nExistence of God\n\nIt was by no means a natural course of proceeding, but, on the\ncontrary, an invention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools, to\nattempt to draw from a mere idea a proof of the existence of an object\ncorresponding to it. Such a course would never have been pursued, were\nit not for that need of reason which requires it to suppose the\nexistence of a necessary being as a basis for the empirical regress,\nand that, as this necessity must be unconditioned and \u00e0 priori, reason\nis bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy, if possible,\nthis requirement, and enable us to attain to the \u00e0 priori cognition of\nsuch a being. This conception was thought to be found in the idea of an\nens realissimum, and thus this idea was employed for the attainment of\na better defined knowledge of a necessary being, of the existence of\nwhich we were convinced, or persuaded, on other grounds. Thus reason\nwas seduced from her natural courage; and, instead of concluding with\nthe conception of an ens realissimum, an attempt was made to begin with\nit, for the purpose of inferring from it that idea of a necessary\nexistence which it was in fact called in to complete. Thus arose that\nunfortunate ontological argument, which neither satisfies the healthy\ncommon sense of humanity, nor sustains the scientific examination of\nthe philosopher.\n\nThe cosmological proof, which we are about to examine, retains the\nconnection between absolute necessity and the highest reality; but,\ninstead of reasoning from this highest reality to a necessary\nexistence, like the preceding argument, it concludes from the given\nunconditioned necessity of some being its unlimited reality. The track\nit pursues, whether rational or sophistical, is at least natural, and\nnot only goes far to persuade the common understanding, but shows\nitself deserving of respect from the speculative intellect; while it\ncontains, at the same time, the outlines of all the arguments employed\nin natural theology\u2014arguments which always have been, and still will\nbe, in use and authority. These, however adorned, and hid under\nwhatever embellishments of rhetoric and sentiment, are at bottom\nidentical with the arguments we are at present to discuss. This proof,\ntermed by Leibnitz the argumentum a contingentia mundi, I shall now lay\nbefore the reader, and subject to a strict examination.\n\nIt is framed in the following manner: If something exists, an\nabsolutely necessary being must likewise exist. Now I, at least, exist.\nConsequently, there exists an absolutely necessary being. The minor\ncontains an experience, the major reasons from a general experience to\nthe existence of a necessary being.[68] Thus this argument really\nbegins at experience, and is not completely \u00e0 priori, or ontological.\nThe object of all possible experience being the world, it is called the\ncosmological proof. It contains no reference to any peculiar property\nof sensuous objects, by which this world of sense might be\ndistinguished from other possible worlds; and in this respect it\ndiffers from the physico-theological proof, which is based upon the\nconsideration of the peculiar constitution of our sensuous world.\n\n [68] This inference is too well known to require more detailed\n discussion. It is based upon the spurious transcendental law of\n causality, that everything which is contingent has a cause, which, if\n itself contingent, must also have a cause; and so on, till the series\n of subordinated causes must end with an absolutely necessary cause,\n without which it would not possess completeness.\n\n\nThe proof proceeds thus: A necessary being can be determined only in\none way, that is, it can be determined by only one of all possible\nopposed predicates; consequently, it must be completely determined in\nand by its conception. But there is only a single conception of a thing\npossible, which completely determines the thing \u00e0 priori: that is, the\nconception of the ens realissimum. It follows that the conception of\nthe ens realissimum is the only conception by and in which we can\ncogitate a necessary being. Consequently, a Supreme Being necessarily\nexists.\n\nIn this cosmological argument are assembled so many sophistical\npropositions that speculative reason seems to have exerted in it all\nher dialectical skill to produce a transcendental illusion of the most\nextreme character. We shall postpone an investigation of this argument\nfor the present, and confine ourselves to exposing the stratagem by\nwhich it imposes upon us an old argument in a new dress, and appeals to\nthe agreement of two witnesses, the one with the credentials of pure\nreason, and the other with those of empiricism; while, in fact, it is\nonly the former who has changed his dress and voice, for the purpose of\npassing himself off for an additional witness. That it may possess a\nsecure foundation, it bases its conclusions upon experience, and thus\nappears to be completely distinct from the ontological argument, which\nplaces its confidence entirely in pure \u00e0 priori conceptions. But this\nexperience merely aids reason in making one step\u2014to the existence of a\nnecessary being. What the properties of this being are cannot be\nlearned from experience; and therefore reason abandons it altogether,\nand pursues its inquiries in the sphere of pure conception, for the\npurpose of discovering what the properties of an absolutely necessary\nbeing ought to be, that is, what among all possible things contain the\nconditions (requisita) of absolute necessity. Reason believes that it\nhas discovered these requisites in the conception of an ens\nrealissimum\u2014and in it alone, and hence concludes: The ens realissimum\nis an absolutely necessary being. But it is evident that reason has\nhere presupposed that the conception of an ens realissimum is perfectly\nadequate to the conception of a being of absolute necessity, that is,\nthat we may infer the existence of the latter from that of the former\u2014a\nproposition which formed the basis of the ontological argument, and\nwhich is now employed in the support of the cosmological argument,\ncontrary to the wish and professions of its inventors. For the\nexistence of an absolutely necessary being is given in conceptions\nalone. But if I say: \u201cThe conception of the ens realissimum is a\nconception of this kind, and in fact the only conception which is\nadequate to our idea of a necessary being,\u201d I am obliged to admit, that\nthe latter may be inferred from the former. Thus it is properly the\nontological argument which figures in the cosmological, and constitutes\nthe whole strength of the latter; while the spurious basis of\nexperience has been of no further use than to conduct us to the\nconception of absolute necessity, being utterly insufficient to\ndemonstrate the presence of this attribute in any determinate existence\nor thing. For when we propose to ourselves an aim of this character, we\nmust abandon the sphere of experience, and rise to that of pure\nconceptions, which we examine with the purpose of discovering whether\nany one contains the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely\nnecessary being. But if the possibility of such a being is thus\ndemonstrated, its existence is also proved; for we may then assert\nthat, of all possible beings there is one which possesses the attribute\nof necessity\u2014in other words, this being possesses an absolutely\nnecessary existence.\n\nAll illusions in an argument are more easily detected when they are\npresented in the formal manner employed by the schools, which we now\nproceed to do.\n\nIf the proposition: \u201cEvery absolutely necessary being is likewise an\nens realissimum,\u201d is correct (and it is this which constitutes the\nnervus probandi of the cosmological argument), it must, like all\naffirmative judgements, be capable of conversion\u2014the conversio per\naccidens, at least. It follows, then, that some entia realissima are\nabsolutely necessary beings. But no ens realissimum is in any respect\ndifferent from another, and what is valid of some is valid of all. In\nthis present case, therefore, I may employ simple conversion, and say:\n\u201cEvery ens realissimum is a necessary being.\u201d But as this proposition\nis determined \u00e0 priori by the conceptions contained in it, the mere\nconception of an ens realissimum must possess the additional attribute\nof absolute necessity. But this is exactly what was maintained in the\nontological argument, and not recognized by the cosmological, although\nit formed the real ground of its disguised and illusory reasoning.\n\nThus the second mode employed by speculative reason of demonstrating\nthe existence of a Supreme Being, is not only, like the first, illusory\nand inadequate, but possesses the additional blemish of an ignoratio\nelenchi\u2014professing to conduct us by a new road to the desired goal, but\nbringing us back, after a short circuit, to the old path which we had\ndeserted at its call.\n\nI mentioned above that this cosmological argument contains a perfect\nnest of dialectical assumptions, which transcendental criticism does\nnot find it difficult to expose and to dissipate. I shall merely\nenumerate these, leaving it to the reader, who must by this time be\nwell practised in such matters, to investigate the fallacies residing\ntherein.\n\nThe following fallacies, for example, are discoverable in this mode of\nproof: 1. The transcendental principle: \u201cEverything that is contingent\nmust have a cause\u201d\u2014a principle without significance, except in the\nsensuous world. For the purely intellectual conception of the\ncontingent cannot produce any synthetical proposition, like that of\ncausality, which is itself without significance or distinguishing\ncharacteristic except in the phenomenal world. But in the present case\nit is employed to help us beyond the limits of its sphere. 2. \u201cFrom the\nimpossibility of an infinite ascending series of causes in the world of\nsense a first cause is inferred\u201d; a conclusion which the principles of\nthe employment of reason do not justify even in the sphere of\nexperience, and still less when an attempt is made to pass the limits\nof this sphere. 3. Reason allows itself to be satisfied upon\ninsufficient grounds, with regard to the completion of this series. It\nremoves all conditions (without which, however, no conception of\nNecessity can take place); and, as after this it is beyond our power to\nform any other conceptions, it accepts this as a completion of the\nconception it wishes to form of the series. 4. The logical possibility\nof a conception of the total of reality (the criterion of this\npossibility being the absence of contradiction) is confounded with the\ntranscendental, which requires a principle of the practicability of\nsuch a synthesis\u2014a principle which again refers us to the world of\nexperience. And so on.\n\nThe aim of the cosmological argument is to avoid the necessity of\nproving the existence of a necessary being priori from mere\nconceptions\u2014a proof which must be ontological, and of which we feel\nourselves quite incapable. With this purpose, we reason from an actual\nexistence\u2014an experience in general, to an absolutely necessary\ncondition of that existence. It is in this case unnecessary to\ndemonstrate its possibility. For after having proved that it exists,\nthe question regarding its possibility is superfluous. Now, when we\nwish to define more strictly the nature of this necessary being, we do\nnot look out for some being the conception of which would enable us to\ncomprehend the necessity of its being\u2014for if we could do this, an\nempirical presupposition would be unnecessary; no, we try to discover\nmerely the negative condition (conditio sine qua non), without which a\nbeing would not be absolutely necessary. Now this would be perfectly\nadmissible in every sort of reasoning, from a consequence to its\nprinciple; but in the present case it unfortunately happens that the\ncondition of absolute necessity can be discovered in but a single\nbeing, the conception of which must consequently contain all that is\nrequisite for demonstrating the presence of absolute necessity, and\nthus entitle me to infer this absolute necessity \u00e0 priori. That is, it\nmust be possible to reason conversely, and say: The thing, to which the\nconception of the highest reality belongs, is absolutely necessary. But\nif I cannot reason thus\u2014and I cannot, unless I believe in the\nsufficiency of the ontological argument\u2014I find insurmountable obstacles\nin my new path, and am really no farther than the point from which I\nset out. The conception of a Supreme Being satisfies all questions \u00e0\npriori regarding the internal determinations of a thing, and is for\nthis reason an ideal without equal or parallel, the general conception\nof it indicating it as at the same time an ens individuum among all\npossible things. But the conception does not satisfy the question\nregarding its existence\u2014which was the purpose of all our inquiries;\nand, although the existence of a necessary being were admitted, we\nshould find it impossible to answer the question: What of all things in\nthe world must be regarded as such?\n\nIt is certainly allowable to admit the existence of an all-sufficient\nbeing\u2014a cause of all possible effects\u2014for the purpose of enabling\nreason to introduce unity into its mode and grounds of explanation with\nregard to phenomena. But to assert that such a being necessarily\nexists, is no longer the modest enunciation of an admissible\nhypothesis, but the boldest declaration of an apodeictic certainty; for\nthe cognition of that which is absolutely necessary must itself possess\nthat character.\n\nThe aim of the transcendental ideal formed by the mind is either to\ndiscover a conception which shall harmonize with the idea of absolute\nnecessity, or a conception which shall contain that idea. If the one is\npossible, so is the other; for reason recognizes that alone as\nabsolutely necessary which is necessary from its conception. But both\nattempts are equally beyond our power\u2014we find it impossible to satisfy\nthe understanding upon this point, and as impossible to induce it to\nremain at rest in relation to this incapacity.\n\nUnconditioned necessity, which, as the ultimate support and stay of all\nexisting things, is an indispensable requirement of the mind, is an\nabyss on the verge of which human reason trembles in dismay. Even the\nidea of eternity, terrible and sublime as it is, as depicted by Haller,\ndoes not produce upon the mental vision such a feeling of awe and\nterror; for, although it measures the duration of things, it does not\nsupport them. We cannot bear, nor can we rid ourselves of the thought\nthat a being, which we regard as the greatest of all possible\nexistences, should say to himself: I am from eternity to eternity;\nbeside me there is nothing, except that which exists by my will; whence\nthen am I? Here all sinks away from under us; and the greatest, as the\nsmallest, perfection, hovers without stay or footing in presence of the\nspeculative reason, which finds it as easy to part with the one as with\nthe other.\n\nMany physical powers, which evidence their existence by their effects,\nare perfectly inscrutable in their nature; they elude all our powers of\nobservation. The transcendental object which forms the basis of\nphenomena, and, in connection with it, the reason why our sensibility\npossesses this rather than that particular kind of conditions, are and\nmust ever remain hidden from our mental vision; the fact is there, the\nreason of the fact we cannot see. But an ideal of pure reason cannot be\ntermed mysterious or inscrutable, because the only credential of its\nreality is the need of it felt by reason, for the purpose of giving\ncompleteness to the world of synthetical unity. An ideal is not even\ngiven as a cogitable object, and therefore cannot be inscrutable; on\nthe contrary, it must, as a mere idea, be based on the constitution of\nreason itself, and on this account must be capable of explanation and\nsolution. For the very essence of reason consists in its ability to\ngive an account, of all our conceptions, opinions, and assertions\u2014upon\nobjective, or, when they happen to be illusory and fallacious, upon\nsubjective grounds.\n\nDetection and Explanation of the Dialectical Illusion in all\nTranscendental Arguments for the Existence of a Necessary Being.\n\nBoth of the above arguments are transcendental; in other words, they do\nnot proceed upon empirical principles. For, although the cosmological\nargument professed to lay a basis of experience for its edifice of\nreasoning, it did not ground its procedure upon the peculiar\nconstitution of experience, but upon pure principles of reason\u2014in\nrelation to an existence given by empirical consciousness; utterly\nabandoning its guidance, however, for the purpose of supporting its\nassertions entirely upon pure conceptions. Now what is the cause, in\nthese transcendental arguments, of the dialectical, but natural,\nillusion, which connects the conceptions of necessity and supreme\nreality, and hypostatizes that which cannot be anything but an idea?\nWhat is the cause of this unavoidable step on the part of reason, of\nadmitting that some one among all existing things must be necessary,\nwhile it falls back from the assertion of the existence of such a being\nas from an abyss? And how does reason proceed to explain this anomaly\nto itself, and from the wavering condition of a timid and reluctant\napprobation\u2014always again withdrawn\u2014arrive at a calm and settled insight\ninto its cause?\n\nIt is something very remarkable that, on the supposition that something\nexists, I cannot avoid the inference that something exists necessarily.\nUpon this perfectly natural\u2014but not on that account reliable\u2014inference\ndoes the cosmological argument rest. But, let me form any conception\nwhatever of a thing, I find that I cannot cogitate the existence of the\nthing as absolutely necessary, and that nothing prevents me\u2014be the\nthing or being what it may\u2014from cogitating its non-existence. I may\nthus be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary\nbasis, while I cannot cogitate any single or individual thing as\nnecessary. In other words, I can never complete the regress through the\nconditions of existence, without admitting the existence of a necessary\nbeing; but, on the other hand, I cannot make a commencement from this\nbeing.\n\nIf I must cogitate something as existing necessarily as the basis of\nexisting things, and yet am not permitted to cogitate any individual\nthing as in itself necessary, the inevitable inference is that\nnecessity and contingency are not properties of things\nthemselves\u2014otherwise an internal contradiction would result; that\nconsequently neither of these principles are objective, but merely\nsubjective principles of reason\u2014the one requiring us to seek for a\nnecessary ground for everything that exists, that is, to be satisfied\nwith no other explanation than that which is complete \u00e0 priori, the\nother forbidding us ever to hope for the attainment of this\ncompleteness, that is, to regard no member of the empirical world as\nunconditioned. In this mode of viewing them, both principles, in their\npurely heuristic and regulative character, and as concerning merely the\nformal interest of reason, are quite consistent with each other. The\none says: \u201cYou must philosophize upon nature,\u201d as if there existed a\nnecessary primal basis of all existing things, solely for the purpose\nof introducing systematic unity into your knowledge, by pursuing an\nidea of this character\u2014a foundation which is arbitrarily admitted to be\nultimate; while the other warns you to consider no individual\ndetermination, concerning the existence of things, as such an ultimate\nfoundation, that is, as absolutely necessary, but to keep the way\nalways open for further progress in the deduction, and to treat every\ndetermination as determined by some other. But if all that we perceive\nmust be regarded as conditionally necessary, it is impossible that\nanything which is empirically given should be absolutely necessary.\n\nIt follows from this that you must accept the absolutely necessary as\nout of and beyond the world, inasmuch as it is useful only as a\nprinciple of the highest possible unity in experience, and you cannot\ndiscover any such necessary existence in the would, the second rule\nrequiring you to regard all empirical causes of unity as themselves\ndeduced.\n\nThe philosophers of antiquity regarded all the forms of nature as\ncontingent; while matter was considered by them, in accordance with the\njudgement of the common reason of mankind, as primal and necessary. But\nif they had regarded matter, not relatively\u2014as the substratum of\nphenomena, but absolutely and in itself\u2014as an independent existence,\nthis idea of absolute necessity would have immediately disappeared. For\nthere is nothing absolutely connecting reason with such an existence;\non the contrary, it can annihilate it in thought, always and without\nself-contradiction. But in thought alone lay the idea of absolute\nnecessity. A regulative principle must, therefore, have been at the\nfoundation of this opinion. In fact, extension and\nimpenetrability\u2014which together constitute our conception of matter\u2014form\nthe supreme empirical principle of the unity of phenomena, and this\nprinciple, in so far as it is empirically unconditioned, possesses the\nproperty of a regulative principle. But, as every determination of\nmatter which constitutes what is real in it\u2014and consequently\nimpenetrability\u2014is an effect, which must have a cause, and is for this\nreason always derived, the notion of matter cannot harmonize with the\nidea of a necessary being, in its character of the principle of all\nderived unity. For every one of its real properties, being derived,\nmust be only conditionally necessary, and can therefore be annihilated\nin thought; and thus the whole existence of matter can be so\nannihilated or suppressed. If this were not the case, we should have\nfound in the world of phenomena the highest ground or condition of\nunity\u2014which is impossible, according to the second regulative\nprinciple. It follows that matter, and, in general, all that forms part\nof the world of sense, cannot be a necessary primal being, nor even a\nprinciple of empirical unity, but that this being or principle must\nhave its place assigned without the world. And, in this way, we can\nproceed in perfect confidence to deduce the phenomena of the world and\ntheir existence from other phenomena, just as if there existed no\nnecessary being; and we can at the same time, strive without ceasing\ntowards the attainment of completeness for our deduction, just as if\nsuch a being\u2014the supreme condition of all existences\u2014were presupposed\nby the mind.\n\nThese remarks will have made it evident to the reader that the ideal of\nthe Supreme Being, far from being an enouncement of the existence of a\nbeing in itself necessary, is nothing more than a regulative principle\nof reason, requiring us to regard all connection existing between\nphenomena as if it had its origin from an all-sufficient necessary\ncause, and basing upon this the rule of a systematic and necessary\nunity in the explanation of phenomena. We cannot, at the same time,\navoid regarding, by a transcendental subreptio, this formal principle\nas constitutive, and hypostatizing this unity. Precisely similar is the\ncase with our notion of space. Space is the primal condition of all\nforms, which are properly just so many different limitations of it; and\nthus, although it is merely a principle of sensibility, we cannot help\nregarding it as an absolutely necessary and self-subsistent thing\u2014as an\nobject given \u00e0 priori in itself. In the same way, it is quite natural\nthat, as the systematic unity of nature cannot be established as a\nprinciple for the empirical employment of reason, unless it is based\nupon the idea of an ens realissimum, as the supreme cause, we should\nregard this idea as a real object, and this object, in its character of\nsupreme condition, as absolutely necessary, and that in this way a\nregulative should be transformed into a constitutive principle. This\ninterchange becomes evident when I regard this supreme being, which,\nrelatively to the world, was absolutely (unconditionally) necessary, as\na thing per se. In this case, I find it impossible to represent this\nnecessity in or by any conception, and it exists merely in my own mind,\nas the formal condition of thought, but not as a material and\nhypostatic condition of existence.\n\nSection VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof\n\nIf, then, neither a pure conception nor the general experience of an\nexisting being can provide a sufficient basis for the proof of the\nexistence of the Deity, we can make the attempt by the only other\nmode\u2014that of grounding our argument upon a determinate experience of\nthe phenomena of the present world, their constitution and disposition,\nand discover whether we can thus attain to a sound conviction of the\nexistence of a Supreme Being. This argument we shall term the\nphysico-theological argument. If it is shown to be insufficient,\nspeculative reason cannot present us with any satisfactory proof of the\nexistence of a being corresponding to our transcendental idea.\n\nIt is evident from the remarks that have been made in the preceding\nsections, that an answer to this question will be far from being\ndifficult or unconvincing. For how can any experience be adequate with\nan idea? The very essence of an idea consists in the fact that no\nexperience can ever be discovered congruent or adequate with it. The\ntranscendental idea of a necessary and all-sufficient being is so\nimmeasurably great, so high above all that is empirical, which is\nalways conditioned, that we hope in vain to find materials in the\nsphere of experience sufficiently ample for our conception, and in vain\nseek the unconditioned among things that are conditioned, while\nexamples, nay, even guidance is denied us by the laws of empirical\nsynthesis.\n\nIf the Supreme Being forms a link in the chain of empirical conditions,\nit must be a member of the empirical series, and, like the lower\nmembers which it precedes, have its origin in some higher member of the\nseries. If, on the other hand, we disengage it from the chain, and\ncogitate it as an intelligible being, apart from the series of natural\ncauses\u2014how shall reason bridge the abyss that separates the latter from\nthe former? All laws respecting the regress from effects to causes, all\nsynthetical additions to our knowledge relate solely to possible\nexperience and the objects of the sensuous world, and, apart from them,\nare without significance.\n\nThe world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle of\norder, variety, beauty, and conformity to ends, that whether we pursue\nour observations into the infinity of space in the one direction, or\ninto its illimitable divisions in the other, whether we regard the\nworld in its greatest or its least manifestations\u2014even after we have\nattained to the highest summit of knowledge which our weak minds can\nreach, we find that language in the presence of wonders so\ninconceivable has lost its force, and number its power to reckon, nay,\neven thought fails to conceive adequately, and our conception of the\nwhole dissolves into an astonishment without power of expression\u2014all\nthe more eloquent that it is dumb. Everywhere around us we observe a\nchain of causes and effects, of means and ends, of death and birth;\nand, as nothing has entered of itself into the condition in which we\nfind it, we are constantly referred to some other thing, which itself\nsuggests the same inquiry regarding its cause, and thus the universe\nmust sink into the abyss of nothingness, unless we admit that, besides\nthis infinite chain of contingencies, there exists something that is\nprimal and self-subsistent\u2014something which, as the cause of this\nphenomenal world, secures its continuance and preservation.\n\nThis highest cause\u2014what magnitude shall we attribute to it? Of the\ncontent of the world we are ignorant; still less can we estimate its\nmagnitude by comparison with the sphere of the possible. But this\nsupreme cause being a necessity of the human mind, what is there to\nprevent us from attributing to it such a degree of perfection as to\nplace it above the sphere of all that is possible? This we can easily\ndo, although only by the aid of the faint outline of an abstract\nconception, by representing this being to ourselves as containing in\nitself, as an individual substance, all possible perfection\u2014a\nconception which satisfies that requirement of reason which demands\nparsimony in principles, which is free from self-contradiction, which\neven contributes to the extension of the employment of reason in\nexperience, by means of the guidance afforded by this idea to order and\nsystem, and which in no respect conflicts with any law of experience.\n\nThis argument always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the\noldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the common\nreason of humanity. It animates the study of nature, as it itself\nderives its existence and draws ever new strength from that source. It\nintroduces aims and ends into a sphere in which our observation could\nnot of itself have discovered them, and extends our knowledge of\nnature, by directing our attention to a unity, the principle of which\nlies beyond nature. This knowledge of nature again reacts upon this\nidea\u2014its cause; and thus our belief in a divine author of the universe\nrises to the power of an irresistible conviction.\n\nFor these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob this\nargument of the authority it has always enjoyed. The mind, unceasingly\nelevated by these considerations, which, although empirical, are so\nremarkably powerful, and continually adding to their force, will not\nsuffer itself to be depressed by the doubts suggested by subtle\nspeculation; it tears itself out of this state of uncertainty, the\nmoment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms of nature and the\nmajesty of the universe, and rises from height to height, from\ncondition to condition, till it has elevated itself to the supreme and\nunconditioned author of all.\n\nBut although we have nothing to object to the reasonableness and\nutility of this procedure, but have rather to commend and encourage it,\nwe cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances to\ndemonstrative certainty and to a reception upon its own merits, apart\nfrom favour or support by other arguments. Nor can it injure the cause\nof morality to endeavour to lower the tone of the arrogant sophist, and\nto teach him that modesty and moderation which are the properties of a\nbelief that brings calm and content into the mind, without prescribing\nto it an unworthy subjection. I maintain, then, that the\nphysico-theological argument is insufficient of itself to prove the\nexistence of a Supreme Being, that it must entrust this to the\nontological argument\u2014to which it serves merely as an introduction, and\nthat, consequently, this argument contains the only possible ground of\nproof (possessed by speculative reason) for the existence of this\nbeing.\n\nThe chief momenta in the physico-theological argument are as follow: 1.\nWe observe in the world manifest signs of an arrangement full of\npurpose, executed with great wisdom, and argument in whole of a content\nindescribably various, and of an extent without limits. 2. This\narrangement of means and ends is entirely foreign to the things\nexisting in the world\u2014it belongs to them merely as a contingent\nattribute; in other words, the nature of different things could not of\nitself, whatever means were employed, harmoniously tend towards certain\npurposes, were they not chosen and directed for these purposes by a\nrational and disposing principle, in accordance with certain\nfundamental ideas. 3. There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause\n(or several), which is not merely a blind, all-powerful nature,\nproducing the beings and events which fill the world in unconscious\nfecundity, but a free and intelligent cause of the world. 4. The unity\nof this cause may be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relation\nexisting between the parts of the world, as portions of an artistic\nedifice\u2014an inference which all our observation favours, and all\nprinciples of analogy support.\n\nIn the above argument, it is inferred from the analogy of certain\nproducts of nature with those of human art, when it compels Nature to\nbend herself to its purposes, as in the case of a house, a ship, or a\nwatch, that the same kind of causality\u2014namely, understanding and\nwill\u2014resides in nature. It is also declared that the internal\npossibility of this freely-acting nature (which is the source of all\nart, and perhaps also of human reason) is derivable from another and\nsuperhuman art\u2014a conclusion which would perhaps be found incapable of\nstanding the test of subtle transcendental criticism. But to neither of\nthese opinions shall we at present object. We shall only remark that it\nmust be confessed that, if we are to discuss the subject of cause at\nall, we cannot proceed more securely than with the guidance of the\nanalogy subsisting between nature and such products of design\u2014these\nbeing the only products whose causes and modes of organization are\ncompletely known to us. Reason would be unable to satisfy her own\nrequirements, if she passed from a causality which she does know, to\nobscure and indemonstrable principles of explanation which she does not\nknow.\n\nAccording to the physico-theological argument, the connection and\nharmony existing in the world evidence the contingency of the form\nmerely, but not of the matter, that is, of the substance of the world.\nTo establish the truth of the latter opinion, it would be necessary to\nprove that all things would be in themselves incapable of this harmony\nand order, unless they were, even as regards their substance, the\nproduct of a supreme wisdom. But this would require very different\ngrounds of proof from those presented by the analogy with human art.\nThis proof can at most, therefore, demonstrate the existence of an\narchitect of the world, whose efforts are limited by the capabilities\nof the material with which he works, but not of a creator of the world,\nto whom all things are subject. Thus this argument is utterly\ninsufficient for the task before us\u2014a demonstration of the existence of\nan all-sufficient being. If we wish to prove the contingency of matter,\nwe must have recourse to a transcendental argument, which the\nphysico-theological was constructed expressly to avoid.\n\nWe infer, from the order and design visible in the universe, as a\ndisposition of a thoroughly contingent character, the existence of a\ncause proportionate thereto. The conception of this cause must contain\ncertain determinate qualities, and it must therefore be regarded as the\nconception of a being which possesses all power, wisdom, and so on, in\none word, all perfection\u2014the conception, that is, of an all-sufficient\nbeing. For the predicates of very great, astonishing, or immeasurable\npower and excellence, give us no determinate conception of the thing,\nnor do they inform us what the thing may be in itself. They merely\nindicate the relation existing between the magnitude of the object and\nthe observer, who compares it with himself and with his own power of\ncomprehension, and are mere expressions of praise and reverence, by\nwhich the object is either magnified, or the observing subject\ndepreciated in relation to the object. Where we have to do with the\nmagnitude (of the perfection) of a thing, we can discover no\ndeterminate conception, except that which comprehends all possible\nperfection or completeness, and it is only the total (omnitudo) of\nreality which is completely determined in and through its conception\nalone.\n\nNow it cannot be expected that any one will be bold enough to declare\nthat he has a perfect insight into the relation which the magnitude of\nthe world he contemplates bears (in its extent as well as in its\ncontent) to omnipotence, into that of the order and design in the world\nto the highest wisdom, and that of the unity of the world to the\nabsolute unity of a Supreme Being. Physico-theology is therefore\nincapable of presenting a determinate conception of a supreme cause of\nthe world, and is therefore insufficient as a principle of theology\u2014a\ntheology which is itself to be the basis of religion.\n\nThe attainment of absolute totality is completely impossible on the\npath of empiricism. And yet this is the path pursued in the\nphysico-theological argument. What means shall we employ to bridge the\nabyss?\n\nAfter elevating ourselves to admiration of the magnitude of the power,\nwisdom, and other attributes of the author of the world, and finding we\ncan advance no further, we leave the argument on empirical grounds, and\nproceed to infer the contingency of the world from the order and\nconformity to aims that are observable in it. From this contingency we\ninfer, by the help of transcendental conceptions alone, the existence\nof something absolutely necessary; and, still advancing, proceed from\nthe conception of the absolute necessity of the first cause to the\ncompletely determined or determining conception thereof\u2014the conception\nof an all-embracing reality. Thus the physico-theological, failing in\nits undertaking, recurs in its embarrassment to the cosmological\nargument; and, as this is merely the ontological argument in disguise,\nit executes its design solely by the aid of pure reason, although it at\nfirst professed to have no connection with this faculty and to base its\nentire procedure upon experience alone.\n\nThe physico-theologians have therefore no reason to regard with such\ncontempt the transcendental mode of argument, and to look down upon it,\nwith the conceit of clear-sighted observers of nature, as the\nbrain-cobweb of obscure speculatists. For, if they reflect upon and\nexamine their own arguments, they will find that, after following for\nsome time the path of nature and experience, and discovering themselves\nno nearer their object, they suddenly leave this path and pass into the\nregion of pure possibility, where they hope to reach upon the wings of\nideas what had eluded all their empirical investigations. Gaining, as\nthey think, a firm footing after this immense leap, they extend their\ndeterminate conception\u2014into the possession of which they have come,\nthey know not how\u2014over the whole sphere of creation, and explain their\nideal, which is entirely a product of pure reason, by illustrations\ndrawn from experience\u2014though in a degree miserably unworthy of the\ngrandeur of the object, while they refuse to acknowledge that they have\narrived at this cognition or hypothesis by a very different road from\nthat of experience.\n\nThus the physico-theological is based upon the cosmological, and this\nupon the ontological proof of the existence of a Supreme Being; and as\nbesides these three there is no other path open to speculative reason,\nthe ontological proof, on the ground of pure conceptions of reason, is\nthe only possible one, if any proof of a proposition so far\ntranscending the empirical exercise of the understanding is possible at\nall.\n\nSection VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative Principles\nof Reason\n\nIf by the term theology I understand the cognition of a primal being,\nthat cognition is based either upon reason alone (theologia rationalis)\nor upon revelation (theologia revelata). The former cogitates its\nobject either by means of pure transcendental conceptions, as an ens\noriginarium, realissimum, ens entium, and is termed transcendental\ntheology; or, by means of a conception derived from the nature of our\nown mind, as a supreme intelligence, and must then be entitled natural\ntheology. The person who believes in a transcendental theology alone,\nis termed a deist; he who acknowledges the possibility of a natural\ntheology also, a theist. The former admits that we can cognize by pure\nreason alone the existence of a Supreme Being, but at the same time\nmaintains that our conception of this being is purely transcendental,\nand that all we can say of it is that it possesses all reality, without\nbeing able to define it more closely. The second asserts that reason is\ncapable of presenting us, from the analogy with nature, with a more\ndefinite conception of this being, and that its operations, as the\ncause of all things, are the results of intelligence and free will. The\nformer regards the Supreme Being as the cause of the world\u2014whether by\nthe necessity of his nature, or as a free agent, is left undetermined;\nthe latter considers this being as the author of the world.\n\nTranscendental theology aims either at inferring the existence of a\nSupreme Being from a general experience, without any closer reference\nto the world to which this experience belongs, and in this case it is\ncalled cosmotheology; or it endeavours to cognize the existence of such\na being, through mere conceptions, without the aid of experience, and\nis then termed ontotheology.\n\nNatural theology infers the attributes and the existence of an author\nof the world, from the constitution of, the order and unity observable\nin, the world, in which two modes of causality must be admitted to\nexist\u2014those of nature and freedom. Thus it rises from this world to a\nsupreme intelligence, either as the principle of all natural, or of all\nmoral order and perfection. In the former case it is termed\nphysico-theology, in the latter, ethical or moral-theology.[69]\n\n [69] Not theological ethics; for this science contains ethical laws,\n which presuppose the existence of a Supreme Governor of the world;\n while moral-theology, on the contrary, is the expression of a\n conviction of the existence of a Supreme Being, founded upon ethical\n laws.\n\n\nAs we are wont to understand by the term God not merely an eternal\nnature, the operations of which are insensate and blind, but a Supreme\nBeing, who is the free and intelligent author of all things, and as it\nis this latter view alone that can be of interest to humanity, we\nmight, in strict rigour, deny to the deist any belief in God at all,\nand regard him merely as a maintainer of the existence of a primal\nbeing or thing\u2014the supreme cause of all other things. But, as no one\nought to be blamed, merely because he does not feel himself justified\nin maintaining a certain opinion, as if he altogether denied its truth\nand asserted the opposite, it is more correct\u2014as it is less harsh\u2014to\nsay, the deist believes in a God, the theist in a living God (summa\nintelligentia). We shall now proceed to investigate the sources of all\nthese attempts of reason to establish the existence of a Supreme Being.\n\nIt may be sufficient in this place to define theoretical knowledge or\ncognition as knowledge of that which is, and practical knowledge as\nknowledge of that which ought to be. In this view, the theoretical\nemployment of reason is that by which I cognize \u00e0 priori (as necessary)\nthat something is, while the practical is that by which I cognize \u00e0\npriori what ought to happen. Now, if it is an indubitably certain,\nthough at the same time an entirely conditioned truth, that something\nis, or ought to happen, either a certain determinate condition of this\ntruth is absolutely necessary, or such a condition may be arbitrarily\npresupposed. In the former case the condition is postulated (per\nthesin), in the latter supposed (per hypothesin). There are certain\npractical laws\u2014those of morality\u2014which are absolutely necessary. Now,\nif these laws necessarily presuppose the existence of some being, as\nthe condition of the possibility of their obligatory power, this being\nmust be postulated, because the conditioned, from which we reason to\nthis determinate condition, is itself cognized \u00e0 priori as absolutely\nnecessary. We shall at some future time show that the moral laws not\nmerely presuppose the existence of a Supreme Being, but also, as\nthemselves absolutely necessary in a different relation, demand or\npostulate it\u2014although only from a practical point of view. The\ndiscussion of this argument we postpone for the present.\n\nWhen the question relates merely to that which is, not to that which\nought to be, the conditioned which is presented in experience is always\ncogitated as contingent. For this reason its condition cannot be\nregarded as absolutely necessary, but merely as relatively necessary,\nor rather as needful; the condition is in itself and \u00e0 priori a mere\narbitrary presupposition in aid of the cognition, by reason, of the\nconditioned. If, then, we are to possess a theoretical cognition of the\nabsolute necessity of a thing, we cannot attain to this cognition\notherwise than \u00e0 priori by means of conceptions; while it is impossible\nin this way to cognize the existence of a cause which bears any\nrelation to an existence given in experience.\n\nTheoretical cognition is speculative when it relates to an object or\ncertain conceptions of an object which is not given and cannot be\ndiscovered by means of experience. It is opposed to the cognition of\nnature, which concerns only those objects or predicates which can be\npresented in a possible experience.\n\nThe principle that everything which happens (the empirically\ncontingent) must have a cause, is a principle of the cognition of\nnature, but not of speculative cognition. For, if we change it into an\nabstract principle, and deprive it of its reference to experience and\nthe empirical, we shall find that it cannot with justice be regarded\nany longer as a synthetical proposition, and that it is impossible to\ndiscover any mode of transition from that which exists to something\nentirely different\u2014termed cause. Nay, more, the conception of a cause\nlikewise that of the contingent\u2014loses, in this speculative mode of\nemploying it, all significance, for its objective reality and meaning\nare comprehensible from experience alone.\n\nWhen from the existence of the universe and the things in it the\nexistence of a cause of the universe is inferred, reason is proceeding\nnot in the natural, but in the speculative method. For the principle of\nthe former enounces, not that things themselves or substances, but only\nthat which happens or their states\u2014as empirically contingent, have a\ncause: the assertion that the existence of substance itself is\ncontingent is not justified by experience, it is the assertion of a\nreason employing its principles in a speculative manner. If, again, I\ninfer from the form of the universe, from the way in which all things\nare connected and act and react upon each other, the existence of a\ncause entirely distinct from the universe\u2014this would again be a\njudgement of purely speculative reason; because the object in this\ncase\u2014the cause\u2014can never be an object of possible experience. In both\nthese cases the principle of causality, which is valid only in the\nfield of experience\u2014useless and even meaningless beyond this region,\nwould be diverted from its proper destination.\n\nNow I maintain that all attempts of reason to establish a theology by\nthe aid of speculation alone are fruitless, that the principles of\nreason as applied to nature do not conduct us to any theological\ntruths, and, consequently, that a rational theology can have no\nexistence, unless it is founded upon the laws of morality. For all\nsynthetical principles of the understanding are valid only as immanent\nin experience; while the cognition of a Supreme Being necessitates\ntheir being employed transcendentally, and of this the understanding is\nquite incapable. If the empirical law of causality is to conduct us to\na Supreme Being, this being must belong to the chain of empirical\nobjects\u2014in which case it would be, like all phenomena, itself\nconditioned. If the possibility of passing the limits of experience be\nadmitted, by means of the dynamical law of the relation of an effect to\nits cause, what kind of conception shall we obtain by this procedure?\nCertainly not the conception of a Supreme Being, because experience\nnever presents us with the greatest of all possible effects, and it is\nonly an effect of this character that could witness to the existence of\na corresponding cause. If, for the purpose of fully satisfying the\nrequirements of Reason, we recognize her right to assert the existence\nof a perfect and absolutely necessary being, this can be admitted only\nfrom favour, and cannot be regarded as the result of irresistible\ndemonstration. The physico-theological proof may add weight to\nothers\u2014if other proofs there are\u2014by connecting speculation with\nexperience; but in itself it rather prepares the mind for theological\ncognition, and gives it a right and natural direction, than establishes\na sure foundation for theology.\n\nIt is now perfectly evident that transcendental questions admit only of\ntranscendental answers\u2014those presented \u00e0 priori by pure conceptions\nwithout the least empirical admixture. But the question in the present\ncase is evidently synthetical\u2014it aims at the extension of our cognition\nbeyond the bounds of experience\u2014it requires an assurance respecting the\nexistence of a being corresponding with the idea in our minds, to which\nno experience can ever be adequate. Now it has been abundantly proved\nthat all \u00e0 priori synthetical cognition is possible only as the\nexpression of the formal conditions of a possible experience; and that\nthe validity of all principles depends upon their immanence in the\nfield of experience, that is, their relation to objects of empirical\ncognition or phenomena. Thus all transcendental procedure in reference\nto speculative theology is without result.\n\nIf any one prefers doubting the conclusiveness of the proofs of our\nanalytic to losing the persuasion of the validity of these old and time\nhonoured arguments, he at least cannot decline answering the\nquestion\u2014how he can pass the limits of all possible experience by the\nhelp of mere ideas. If he talks of new arguments, or of improvements\nupon old arguments, I request him to spare me. There is certainly no\ngreat choice in this sphere of discussion, as all speculative arguments\nmust at last look for support to the ontological, and I have,\ntherefore, very little to fear from the argumentative fecundity of the\ndogmatical defenders of a non-sensuous reason. Without looking upon\nmyself as a remarkably combative person, I shall not decline the\nchallenge to detect the fallacy and destroy the pretensions of every\nattempt of speculative theology. And yet the hope of better fortune\nnever deserts those who are accustomed to the dogmatical mode of\nprocedure. I shall, therefore, restrict myself to the simple and\nequitable demand that such reasoners will demonstrate, from the nature\nof the human mind as well as from that of the other sources of\nknowledge, how we are to proceed to extend our cognition completely \u00e0\npriori, and to carry it to that point where experience abandons us, and\nno means exist of guaranteeing the objective reality of our\nconceptions. In whatever way the understanding may have attained to a\nconception, the existence of the object of the conception cannot be\ndiscovered in it by analysis, because the cognition of the existence of\nthe object depends upon the object\u2019s being posited and given in itself\napart from the conception. But it is utterly impossible to go beyond\nour conception, without the aid of experience\u2014which presents to the\nmind nothing but phenomena, or to attain by the help of mere\nconceptions to a conviction of the existence of new kinds of objects or\nsupernatural beings.\n\nBut although pure speculative reason is far from sufficient to\ndemonstrate the existence of a Supreme Being, it is of the highest\nutility in correcting our conception of this being\u2014on the supposition\nthat we can attain to the cognition of it by some other means\u2014in making\nit consistent with itself and with all other conceptions of\nintelligible objects, clearing it from all that is incompatible with\nthe conception of an ens summun, and eliminating from it all\nlimitations or admixtures of empirical elements.\n\nTranscendental theology is still therefore, notwithstanding its\nobjective insufficiency, of importance in a negative respect; it is\nuseful as a test of the procedure of reason when engaged with pure\nideas, no other than a transcendental standard being in this case\nadmissible. For if, from a practical point of view, the hypothesis of a\nSupreme and All-sufficient Being is to maintain its validity without\nopposition, it must be of the highest importance to define this\nconception in a correct and rigorous manner\u2014as the transcendental\nconception of a necessary being, to eliminate all phenomenal elements\n(anthropomorphism in its most extended signification), and at the same\ntime to overflow all contradictory assertions\u2014be they atheistic,\ndeistic, or anthropomorphic. This is of course very easy; as the same\narguments which demonstrated the inability of human reason to affirm\nthe existence of a Supreme Being must be alike sufficient to prove the\ninvalidity of its denial. For it is impossible to gain from the pure\nspeculation of reason demonstration that there exists no Supreme Being,\nas the ground of all that exists, or that this being possesses none of\nthose properties which we regard as analogical with the dynamical\nqualities of a thinking being, or that, as the anthropomorphists would\nhave us believe, it is subject to all the limitations which sensibility\nimposes upon those intelligences which exist in the world of\nexperience.\n\nA Supreme Being is, therefore, for the speculative reason, a mere\nideal, though a faultless one\u2014a conception which perfects and crowns\nthe system of human cognition, but the objective reality of which can\nneither be proved nor disproved by pure reason. If this defect is ever\nsupplied by a moral theology, the problematic transcendental theology\nwhich has preceded, will have been at least serviceable as\ndemonstrating the mental necessity existing for the conception, by the\ncomplete determination of it which it has furnished, and the ceaseless\ntesting of the conclusions of a reason often deceived by sense, and not\nalways in harmony with its own ideas. The attributes of necessity,\ninfinitude, unity, existence apart from the world (and not as a world\nsoul), eternity (free from conditions of time), omnipresence (free from\nconditions of space), omnipotence, and others, are pure transcendental\npredicates; and thus the accurate conception of a Supreme Being, which\nevery theology requires, is furnished by transcendental theology alone.\n\nAPPENDIX. Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason\n\nThe result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not only\nconfirms the truth of what we have already proved in our Transcendental\nAnalytic, namely, that all inferences which would lead us beyond the\nlimits of experience are fallacious and groundless, but it at the same\ntime teaches us this important lesson, that human reason has a natural\ninclination to overstep these limits, and that transcendental ideas are\nas much the natural property of the reason as categories are of the\nunderstanding. There exists this difference, however, that while the\ncategories never mislead us, outward objects being always in perfect\nharmony therewith, ideas are the parents of irresistible illusions, the\nseverest and most subtle criticism being required to save us from the\nfallacies which they induce.\n\nWhatever is grounded in the nature of our powers will be found to be in\nharmony with the final purpose and proper employment of these powers,\nwhen once we have discovered their true direction and aim. We are\nentitled to suppose, therefore, that there exists a mode of employing\ntranscendental ideas which is proper and immanent; although, when we\nmistake their meaning, and regard them as conceptions of actual things,\ntheir mode of application is transcendent and delusive. For it is not\nthe idea itself, but only the employment of the idea in relation to\npossible experience, that is transcendent or immanent. An idea is\nemployed transcendently, when it is applied to an object falsely\nbelieved to be adequate with and to correspond to it; immanently, when\nit is applied solely to the employment of the understanding in the\nsphere of experience. Thus all errors of subreptio\u2014of misapplication,\nare to be ascribed to defects of judgement, and not to understanding or\nreason.\n\nReason never has an immediate relation to an object; it relates\nimmediately to the understanding alone. It is only through the\nunderstanding that it can be employed in the field of experience. It\ndoes not form conceptions of objects, it merely arranges them and gives\nto them that unity which they are capable of possessing when the sphere\nof their application has been extended as widely as possible. Reason\navails itself of the conception of the understanding for the sole\npurpose of producing totality in the different series. This totality\nthe understanding does not concern itself with; its only occupation is\nthe connection of experiences, by which series of conditions in\naccordance with conceptions are established. The object of reason is,\ntherefore, the understanding and its proper destination. As the latter\nbrings unity into the diversity of objects by means of its conceptions,\nso the former brings unity into the diversity of conceptions by means\nof ideas; as it sets the final aim of a collective unity to the\noperations of the understanding, which without this occupies itself\nwith a distributive unity alone.\n\nI accordingly maintain that transcendental ideas can never be employed\nas constitutive ideas, that they cannot be conceptions of objects, and\nthat, when thus considered, they assume a fallacious and dialectical\ncharacter. But, on the other hand, they are capable of an admirable and\nindispensably necessary application to objects\u2014as regulative ideas,\ndirecting the understanding to a certain aim, the guiding lines towards\nwhich all its laws follow, and in which they all meet in one point.\nThis point\u2014though a mere idea (focus imaginarius), that is, not a point\nfrom which the conceptions of the understanding do really proceed, for\nit lies beyond the sphere of possible experience\u2014serves,\nnotwithstanding, to give to these conceptions the greatest possible\nunity combined with the greatest possible extension. Hence arises the\nnatural illusion which induces us to believe that these lines proceed\nfrom an object which lies out of the sphere of empirical cognition,\njust as objects reflected in a mirror appear to be behind it. But this\nillusion\u2014which we may hinder from imposing upon us\u2014is necessary and\nunavoidable, if we desire to see, not only those objects which lie\nbefore us, but those which are at a great distance behind us; that is\nto say, when, in the present case, we direct the aims of the\nunderstanding, beyond every given experience, towards an extension as\ngreat as can possibly be attained.\n\nIf we review our cognitions in their entire extent, we shall find that\nthe peculiar business of reason is to arrange them into a system, that\nis to say, to give them connection according to a principle. This unity\npresupposes an idea\u2014the idea of the form of a whole (of cognition),\npreceding the determinate cognition of the parts, and containing the\nconditions which determine \u00e0 priori to every part its place and\nrelation to the other parts of the whole system. This idea,\naccordingly, demands complete unity in the cognition of the\nunderstanding\u2014not the unity of a contingent aggregate, but that of a\nsystem connected according to necessary laws. It cannot be affirmed\nwith propriety that this idea is a conception of an object; it is\nmerely a conception of the complete unity of the conceptions of\nobjects, in so far as this unity is available to the understanding as a\nrule. Such conceptions of reason are not derived from nature; on the\ncontrary, we employ them for the interrogation and investigation of\nnature, and regard our cognition as defective so long as it is not\nadequate to them. We admit that such a thing as pure earth, pure water,\nor pure air, is not to be discovered. And yet we require these\nconceptions (which have their origin in the reason, so far as regards\ntheir absolute purity and completeness) for the purpose of determining\nthe share which each of these natural causes has in every phenomenon.\nThus the different kinds of matter are all referred to earths, as mere\nweight; to salts and inflammable bodies, as pure force; and finally, to\nwater and air, as the vehicula of the former, or the machines employed\nby them in their operations\u2014for the purpose of explaining the chemical\naction and reaction of bodies in accordance with the idea of a\nmechanism. For, although not actually so expressed, the influence of\nsuch ideas of reason is very observable in the procedure of natural\nphilosophers.\n\nIf reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from the general,\nand if the general be certain in se and given, it is only necessary\nthat the judgement should subsume the particular under the general, the\nparticular being thus necessarily determined. I shall term this the\ndemonstrative or apodeictic employment of reason. If, however, the\ngeneral is admitted as problematical only, and is a mere idea, the\nparticular case is certain, but the universality of the rule which\napplies to this particular case remains a problem. Several particular\ncases, the certainty of which is beyond doubt, are then taken and\nexamined, for the purpose of discovering whether the rule is applicable\nto them; and if it appears that all the particular cases which can be\ncollected follow from the rule, its universality is inferred, and at\nthe same time, all the causes which have not, or cannot be presented to\nour observation, are concluded to be of the same character with those\nwhich we have observed. This I shall term the hypothetical employment\nof the reason.\n\nThe hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas employed as\nproblematical conceptions is properly not constitutive. That is to say,\nif we consider the subject strictly, the truth of the rule, which has\nbeen employed as an hypothesis, does not follow from the use that is\nmade of it by reason. For how can we know all the possible cases that\nmay arise? some of which may, however, prove exceptions to the\nuniversality of the rule. This employment of reason is merely\nregulative, and its sole aim is the introduction of unity into the\naggregate of our particular cognitions, and thereby the approximating\nof the rule to universality.\n\nThe object of the hypothetical employment of reason is therefore the\nsystematic unity of cognitions; and this unity is the criterion of the\ntruth of a rule. On the other hand, this systematic unity\u2014as a mere\nidea\u2014is in fact merely a unity projected, not to be regarded as given,\nbut only in the light of a problem\u2014a problem which serves, however, as\na principle for the various and particular exercise of the\nunderstanding in experience, directs it with regard to those cases\nwhich are not presented to our observation, and introduces harmony and\nconsistency into all its operations.\n\nAll that we can be certain of from the above considerations is that\nthis systematic unity is a logical principle, whose aim is to assist\nthe understanding, where it cannot of itself attain to rules, by means\nof ideas, to bring all these various rules under one principle, and\nthus to ensure the most complete consistency and connection that can be\nattained. But the assertion that objects and the understanding by which\nthey are cognized are so constituted as to be determined to systematic\nunity, that this may be postulated \u00e0 priori, without any reference to\nthe interest of reason, and that we are justified in declaring all\npossible cognitions\u2014empirical and others\u2014to possess systematic unity,\nand to be subject to general principles from which, notwithstanding\ntheir various character, they are all derivable,\u2014such an assertion can\nbe founded only upon a transcendental principle of reason, which would\nrender this systematic unity not subjectively and logically\u2014in its\ncharacter of a method, but objectively necessary.\n\nWe shall illustrate this by an example. The conceptions of the\nunderstanding make us acquainted, among many other kinds of unity, with\nthat of the causality of a substance, which is termed power. The\ndifferent phenomenal manifestations of the same substance appear at\nfirst view to be so very dissimilar that we are inclined to assume the\nexistence of just as many different powers as there are different\neffects\u2014as, in the case of the human mind, we have feeling,\nconsciousness, imagination, memory, wit, analysis, pleasure, desire and\nso on. Now we are required by a logical maxim to reduce these\ndifferences to as small a number as possible, by comparing them and\ndiscovering the hidden identity which exists. We must inquire, for\nexample, whether or not imagination (connected with consciousness),\nmemory, wit, and analysis are not merely different forms of\nunderstanding and reason. The idea of a fundamental power, the\nexistence of which no effort of logic can assure us of, is the problem\nto be solved, for the systematic representation of the existing variety\nof powers. The logical principle of reason requires us to produce as\ngreat a unity as is possible in the system of our cognitions; and the\nmore the phenomena of this and the other power are found to be\nidentical, the more probable does it become, that they are nothing but\ndifferent manifestations of one and the same power, which may be\ncalled, relatively speaking, a fundamental power. And so with other\ncases.\n\nThese relatively fundamental powers must again be compared with each\nother, to discover, if possible, the one radical and absolutely\nfundamental power of which they are but the manifestations. But this\nunity is purely hypothetical. It is not maintained, that this unity\ndoes really exist, but that we must, in the interest of reason, that\nis, for the establishment of principles for the various rules presented\nby experience, try to discover and introduce it, so far as is\npracticable, into the sphere of our cognitions.\n\nBut the transcendental employment of the understanding would lead us to\nbelieve that this idea of a fundamental power is not problematical, but\nthat it possesses objective reality, and thus the systematic unity of\nthe various powers or forces in a substance is demanded by the\nunderstanding and erected into an apodeictic or necessary principle.\nFor, without having attempted to discover the unity of the various\npowers existing in nature, nay, even after all our attempts have\nfailed, we notwithstanding presuppose that it does exist, and may be,\nsooner or later, discovered. And this reason does, not only, as in the\ncase above adduced, with regard to the unity of substance, but where\nmany substances, although all to a certain extent homogeneous, are\ndiscoverable, as in the case of matter in general. Here also does\nreason presuppose the existence of the systematic unity of various\npowers\u2014inasmuch as particular laws of nature are subordinate to general\nlaws; and parsimony in principles is not merely an economical principle\nof reason, but an essential law of nature.\n\nWe cannot understand, in fact, how a logical principle of unity can of\nright exist, unless we presuppose a transcendental principle, by which\nsuch a systematic unit\u2014as a property of objects themselves\u2014is regarded\nas necessary \u00e0 priori. For with what right can reason, in its logical\nexercise, require us to regard the variety of forces which nature\ndisplays, as in effect a disguised unity, and to deduce them from one\nfundamental force or power, when she is free to admit that it is just\nas possible that all forces should be different in kind, and that a\nsystematic unity is not conformable to the design of nature? In this\nview of the case, reason would be proceeding in direct opposition to\nher own destination, by setting as an aim an idea which entirely\nconflicts with the procedure and arrangement of nature. Neither can we\nassert that reason has previously inferred this unity from the\ncontingent nature of phenomena. For the law of reason which requires us\nto seek for this unity is a necessary law, inasmuch as without it we\nshould not possess a faculty of reason, nor without reason a consistent\nand self-accordant mode of employing the understanding, nor, in the\nabsence of this, any proper and sufficient criterion of empirical\ntruth. In relation to this criterion, therefore, we must suppose the\nidea of the systematic unity of nature to possess objective validity\nand necessity.\n\nWe find this transcendental presupposition lurking in different forms\nin the principles of philosophers, although they have neither\nrecognized it nor confessed to themselves its presence. That the\ndiversities of individual things do not exclude identity of species,\nthat the various species must be considered as merely different\ndeterminations of a few genera, and these again as divisions of still\nhigher races, and so on\u2014that, accordingly, a certain systematic unity\nof all possible empirical conceptions, in so far as they can be deduced\nfrom higher and more general conceptions, must be sought for, is a\nscholastic maxim or logical principle, without which reason could not\nbe employed by us. For we can infer the particular from the general,\nonly in so far as general properties of things constitute the\nfoundation upon which the particular rest.\n\nThat the same unity exists in nature is presupposed by philosophers in\nthe well-known scholastic maxim, which forbids us unnecessarily to\naugment the number of entities or principles (entia praeter\nnecessitatem non esse multiplicanda). This maxim asserts that nature\nherself assists in the establishment of this unity of reason, and that\nthe seemingly infinite diversity of phenomena should not deter us from\nthe expectation of discovering beneath this diversity a unity of\nfundamental properties, of which the aforesaid variety is but a more or\nless determined form. This unity, although a mere idea, thinkers have\nfound it necessary rather to moderate the desire than to encourage it.\nIt was considered a great step when chemists were able to reduce all\nsalts to two main genera\u2014acids and alkalis; and they regard this\ndifference as itself a mere variety, or different manifestation of one\nand the same fundamental material. The different kinds of earths\n(stones and even metals) chemists have endeavoured to reduce to three,\nand afterwards to two; but still, not content with this advance, they\ncannot but think that behind these diversities there lurks but one\ngenus\u2014nay, that even salts and earths have a common principle. It might\nbe conjectured that this is merely an economical plan of reason, for\nthe purpose of sparing itself trouble, and an attempt of a purely\nhypothetical character, which, when successful, gives an appearance of\nprobability to the principle of explanation employed by the reason. But\na selfish purpose of this kind is easily to be distinguished from the\nidea, according to which every one presupposes that this unity is in\naccordance with the laws of nature, and that reason does not in this\ncase request, but requires, although we are quite unable to determine\nthe proper limits of this unity.\n\nIf the diversity existing in phenomena\u2014a diversity not of form (for in\nthis they may be similar) but of content\u2014were so great that the\nsubtlest human reason could never by comparison discover in them the\nleast similarity (which is not impossible), in this case the logical\nlaw of genera would be without foundation, the conception of a genus,\nnay, all general conceptions would be impossible, and the faculty of\nthe understanding, the exercise of which is restricted to the world of\nconceptions, could not exist. The logical principle of genera,\naccordingly, if it is to be applied to nature (by which I mean objects\npresented to our senses), presupposes a transcendental principle. In\naccordance with this principle, homogeneity is necessarily presupposed\nin the variety of phenomena (although we are unable to determine \u00e0\npriori the degree of this homogeneity), because without it no empirical\nconceptions, and consequently no experience, would be possible.\n\nThe logical principle of genera, which demands identity in phenomena,\nis balanced by another principle\u2014that of species, which requires\nvariety and diversity in things, notwithstanding their accordance in\nthe same genus, and directs the understanding to attend to the one no\nless than to the other. This principle (of the faculty of distinction)\nacts as a check upon the reason and reason exhibits in this respect a\ndouble and conflicting interest\u2014on the one hand, the interest in the\nextent (the interest of generality) in relation to genera; on the\nother, that of the content (the interest of individuality) in relation\nto the variety of species. In the former case, the understanding\ncogitates more under its conceptions, in the latter it cogitates more\nin them. This distinction manifests itself likewise in the habits of\nthought peculiar to natural philosophers, some of whom\u2014the remarkably\nspeculative heads\u2014may be said to be hostile to heterogeneity in\nphenomena, and have their eyes always fixed on the unity of genera,\nwhile others\u2014with a strong empirical tendency\u2014aim unceasingly at the\nanalysis of phenomena, and almost destroy in us the hope of ever being\nable to estimate the character of these according to general\nprinciples.\n\nThe latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical principle,\nthe aim of which is the systematic completeness of all cognitions. This\nprinciple authorizes me, beginning at the genus, to descend to the\nvarious and diverse contained under it; and in this way extension, as\nin the former case unity, is assured to the system. For if we merely\nexamine the sphere of the conception which indicates a genus, we cannot\ndiscover how far it is possible to proceed in the division of that\nsphere; just as it is impossible, from the consideration of the space\noccupied by matter, to determine how far we can proceed in the division\nof it. Hence every genus must contain different species, and these\nagain different subspecies; and as each of the latter must itself\ncontain a sphere (must be of a certain extent, as a conceptus\ncommunis), reason demands that no species or sub-species is to be\nconsidered as the lowest possible. For a species or sub-species, being\nalways a conception, which contains only what is common to a number of\ndifferent things, does not completely determine any individual thing,\nor relate immediately to it, and must consequently contain other\nconceptions, that is, other sub-species under it. This law of\nspecification may be thus expressed: entium varietates non temere sunt\nminuendae.\n\nBut it is easy to see that this logical law would likewise be without\nsense or application, were it not based upon a transcendental law of\nspecification, which certainly does not require that the differences\nexisting in phenomena should be infinite in number, for the logical\nprinciple, which merely maintains the indeterminateness of the logical\nsphere of a conception, in relation to its possible division, does not\nauthorize this statement; while it does impose upon the understanding\nthe duty of searching for subspecies to every species, and minor\ndifferences in every difference. For, were there no lower conceptions,\nneither could there be any higher. Now the understanding cognizes only\nby means of conceptions; consequently, how far soever it may proceed in\ndivision, never by mere intuition, but always by lower and lower\nconceptions. The cognition of phenomena in their complete determination\n(which is possible only by means of the understanding) requires an\nunceasingly continued specification of conceptions, and a progression\nto ever smaller differences, of which abstraction had been made in the\nconception of the species, and still more in that of the genus.\n\nThis law of specification cannot be deduced from experience; it can\nnever present us with a principle of so universal an application.\nEmpirical specification very soon stops in its distinction of\ndiversities, and requires the guidance of the transcendental law, as a\nprinciple of the reason\u2014a law which imposes on us the necessity of\nnever ceasing in our search for differences, even although these may\nnot present themselves to the senses. That absorbent earths are of\ndifferent kinds could only be discovered by obeying the anticipatory\nlaw of reason, which imposes upon the understanding the task of\ndiscovering the differences existing between these earths, and supposes\nthat nature is richer in substances than our senses would indicate. The\nfaculty of the understanding belongs to us just as much under the\npresupposition of differences in the objects of nature, as under the\ncondition that these objects are homogeneous, because we could not\npossess conceptions, nor make any use of our understanding, were not\nthe phenomena included under these conceptions in some respects\ndissimilar, as well as similar, in their character.\n\nReason thus prepares the sphere of the understanding for the operations\nof this faculty: 1. By the principle of the homogeneity of the diverse\nin higher genera; 2. By the principle of the variety of the homogeneous\nin lower species; and, to complete the systematic unity, it adds, 3. A\nlaw of the affinity of all conceptions which prescribes a continuous\ntransition from one species to every other by the gradual increase of\ndiversity. We may term these the principles of the homogeneity, the\nspecification, and the continuity of forms. The latter results from the\nunion of the two former, inasmuch as we regard the systematic\nconnection as complete in thought, in the ascent to higher genera, as\nwell as in the descent to lower species. For all diversities must be\nrelated to each other, as they all spring from one highest genus,\ndescending through the different gradations of a more and more extended\ndetermination.\n\nWe may illustrate the systematic unity produced by the three logical\nprinciples in the following manner. Every conception may be regarded as\na point, which, as the standpoint of a spectator, has a certain\nhorizon, which may be said to enclose a number of things that may be\nviewed, so to speak, from that centre. Within this horizon there must\nbe an infinite number of other points, each of which has its own\nhorizon, smaller and more circumscribed; in other words, every species\ncontains sub-species, according to the principle of specification, and\nthe logical horizon consists of smaller horizons (subspecies), but not\nof points (individuals), which possess no extent. But different\nhorizons or genera, which include under them so many conceptions, may\nhave one common horizon, from which, as from a mid-point, they may be\nsurveyed; and we may proceed thus, till we arrive at the highest genus,\nor universal and true horizon, which is determined by the highest\nconception, and which contains under itself all differences and\nvarieties, as genera, species, and subspecies.\n\nTo this highest standpoint I am conducted by the law of homogeneity, as\nto all lower and more variously-determined conceptions by the law of\nspecification. Now as in this way there exists no void in the whole\nextent of all possible conceptions, and as out of the sphere of these\nthe mind can discover nothing, there arises from the presupposition of\nthe universal horizon above mentioned, and its complete division, the\nprinciple: Non datur vacuum formarum. This principle asserts that there\nare not different primitive and highest genera, which stand isolated,\nso to speak, from each other, but all the various genera are mere\ndivisions and limitations of one highest and universal genus; and hence\nfollows immediately the principle: Datur continuum formarum. This\nprinciple indicates that all differences of species limit each other,\nand do not admit of transition from one to another by a saltus, but\nonly through smaller degrees of the difference between the one species\nand the other. In one word, there are no species or sub-species which\n(in the view of reason) are the nearest possible to each other;\nintermediate species or sub-species being always possible, the\ndifference of which from each of the former is always smaller than the\ndifference existing between these.\n\nThe first law, therefore, directs us to avoid the notion that there\nexist different primal genera, and enounces the fact of perfect\nhomogeneity; the second imposes a check upon this tendency to unity and\nprescribes the distinction of sub-species, before proceeding to apply\nour general conceptions to individuals. The third unites both the\nformer, by enouncing the fact of homogeneity as existing even in the\nmost various diversity, by means of the gradual transition from one\nspecies to another. Thus it indicates a relationship between the\ndifferent branches or species, in so far as they all spring from the\nsame stem.\n\nBut this logical law of the continuum specierum (formarum logicarum)\npresupposes a transcendental principle (lex continui in natura),\nwithout which the understanding might be led into error, by following\nthe guidance of the former, and thus perhaps pursuing a path contrary\nto that prescribed by nature. This law must, consequently, be based\nupon pure transcendental, and not upon empirical, considerations. For,\nin the latter case, it would come later than the system; whereas it is\nreally itself the parent of all that is systematic in our cognition of\nnature. These principles are not mere hypotheses employed for the\npurpose of experimenting upon nature; although when any such connection\nis discovered, it forms a solid ground for regarding the hypothetical\nunity as valid in the sphere of nature\u2014and thus they are in this\nrespect not without their use. But we go farther, and maintain that it\nis manifest that these principles of parsimony in fundamental causes,\nvariety in effects, and affinity in phenomena, are in accordance both\nwith reason and nature, and that they are not mere methods or plans\ndevised for the purpose of assisting us in our observation of the\nexternal world.\n\nBut it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to which\nno adequate object can be discovered in experience. And this for two\nreasons. First, because the species in nature are really divided, and\nhence form quanta discreta; and, if the gradual progression through\ntheir affinity were continuous, the intermediate members lying between\ntwo given species must be infinite in number, which is impossible.\nSecondly, because we cannot make any determinate empirical use of this\nlaw, inasmuch as it does not present us with any criterion of affinity\nwhich could aid us in determining how far we ought to pursue the\ngraduation of differences: it merely contains a general indication that\nit is our duty to seek for and, if possible, to discover them.\n\nWhen we arrange these principles of systematic unity in the order\nconformable to their employment in experience, they will stand thus:\nVariety, Affinity, Unity, each of them, as ideas, being taken in the\nhighest degree of their completeness. Reason presupposes the existence\nof cognitions of the understanding, which have a direct relation to\nexperience, and aims at the ideal unity of these cognitions\u2014a unity\nwhich far transcends all experience or empirical notions. The affinity\nof the diverse, notwithstanding the differences existing between its\nparts, has a relation to things, but a still closer one to the mere\nproperties and powers of things. For example, imperfect experience may\nrepresent the orbits of the planets as circular. But we discover\nvariations from this course, and we proceed to suppose that the planets\nrevolve in a path which, if not a circle, is of a character very\nsimilar to it. That is to say, the movements of those planets which do\nnot form a circle will approximate more or less to the properties of a\ncircle, and probably form an ellipse. The paths of comets exhibit still\ngreater variations, for, so far as our observation extends, they do not\nreturn upon their own course in a circle or ellipse. But we proceed to\nthe conjecture that comets describe a parabola, a figure which is\nclosely allied to the ellipse. In fact, a parabola is merely an\nellipse, with its longer axis produced to an indefinite extent. Thus\nthese principles conduct us to a unity in the genera of the forms of\nthese orbits, and, proceeding farther, to a unity as regards the cause\nof the motions of the heavenly bodies\u2014that is, gravitation. But we go\non extending our conquests over nature, and endeavour to explain all\nseeming deviations from these rules, and even make additions to our\nsystem which no experience can ever substantiate\u2014for example, the\ntheory, in affinity with that of ellipses, of hyperbolic paths of\ncomets, pursuing which, these bodies leave our solar system and,\npassing from sun to sun, unite the most distant parts of the infinite\nuniverse, which is held together by the same moving power.\n\nThe most remarkable circumstance connected with these principles is\nthat they seem to be transcendental, and, although only containing\nideas for the guidance of the empirical exercise of reason, and\nalthough this empirical employment stands to these ideas in an\nasymptotic relation alone (to use a mathematical term), that is,\ncontinually approximate, without ever being able to attain to them,\nthey possess, notwithstanding, as \u00e0 priori synthetical propositions,\nobjective though undetermined validity, and are available as rules for\npossible experience. In the elaboration of our experience, they may\nalso be employed with great advantage, as heuristic[70] principles. A\ntranscendental deduction of them cannot be made; such a deduction being\nalways impossible in the case of ideas, as has been already shown.\n\n [70] From the Greek, eurhioko.\n\n\nWe distinguished, in the Transcendental Analytic, the dynamical\nprinciples of the understanding, which are regulative principles of\nintuition, from the mathematical, which are constitutive principles of\nintuition. These dynamical laws are, however, constitutive in relation\nto experience, inasmuch as they render the conceptions without which\nexperience could not exist possible \u00e0 priori. But the principles of\npure reason cannot be constitutive even in regard to empirical\nconceptions, because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can be\ndiscovered, and they cannot therefore have an object in concreto. Now,\nif I grant that they cannot be employed in the sphere of experience, as\nconstitutive principles, how shall I secure for them employment and\nobjective validity as regulative principles, and in what way can they\nbe so employed?\n\nThe understanding is the object of reason, as sensibility is the object\nof the understanding. The production of systematic unity in all the\nempirical operations of the understanding is the proper occupation of\nreason; just as it is the business of the understanding to connect the\nvarious content of phenomena by means of conceptions, and subject them\nto empirical laws. But the operations of the understanding are, without\nthe schemata of sensibility, undetermined; and, in the same manner, the\nunity of reason is perfectly undetermined as regards the conditions\nunder which, and the extent to which, the understanding ought to carry\nthe systematic connection of its conceptions. But, although it is\nimpossible to discover in intuition a schema for the complete\nsystematic unity of all the conceptions of the understanding, there\nmust be some analogon of this schema. This analogon is the idea of the\nmaximum of the division and the connection of our cognition in one\nprinciple. For we may have a determinate notion of a maximum and an\nabsolutely perfect, all the restrictive conditions which are connected\nwith an indeterminate and various content having been abstracted. Thus\nthe idea of reason is analogous with a sensuous schema, with this\ndifference, that the application of the categories to the schema of\nreason does not present a cognition of any object (as is the case with\nthe application of the categories to sensuous schemata), but merely\nprovides us with a rule or principle for the systematic unity of the\nexercise of the understanding. Now, as every principle which imposes\nupon the exercise of the understanding \u00e0 priori compliance with the\nrule of systematic unity also relates, although only in an indirect\nmanner, to an object of experience, the principles of pure reason will\nalso possess objective reality and validity in relation to experience.\nBut they will not aim at determining our knowledge in regard to any\nempirical object; they will merely indicate the procedure, following\nwhich the empirical and determinate exercise of the understanding may\nbe in complete harmony and connection with itself\u2014a result which is\nproduced by its being brought into harmony with the principle of\nsystematic unity, so far as that is possible, and deduced from it.\n\nI term all subjective principles, which are not derived from\nobservation of the constitution of an object, but from the interest\nwhich Reason has in producing a certain completeness in her cognition\nof that object, maxims of reason. Thus there are maxims of speculative\nreason, which are based solely upon its speculative interest, although\nthey appear to be objective principles.\n\nWhen principles which are really regulative are regarded as\nconstitutive, and employed as objective principles, contradictions must\narise; but if they are considered as mere maxims, there is no room for\ncontradictions of any kind, as they then merely indicate the different\ninterests of reason, which occasion differences in the mode of thought.\nIn effect, Reason has only one single interest, and the seeming\ncontradiction existing between her maxims merely indicates a difference\nin, and a reciprocal limitation of, the methods by which this interest\nis satisfied.\n\nThis reasoner has at heart the interest of diversity\u2014in accordance with\nthe principle of specification; another, the interest of unity\u2014in\naccordance with the principle of aggregation. Each believes that his\njudgement rests upon a thorough insight into the subject he is\nexamining, and yet it has been influenced solely by a greater or less\ndegree of adherence to some one of the two principles, neither of which\nare objective, but originate solely from the interest of reason, and on\nthis account to be termed maxims rather than principles. When I observe\nintelligent men disputing about the distinctive characteristics of men,\nanimals, or plants, and even of minerals, those on the one side\nassuming the existence of certain national characteristics, certain\nwell-defined and hereditary distinctions of family, race, and so on,\nwhile the other side maintain that nature has endowed all races of men\nwith the same faculties and dispositions, and that all differences are\nbut the result of external and accidental circumstances\u2014I have only to\nconsider for a moment the real nature of the subject of discussion, to\narrive at the conclusion that it is a subject far too deep for us to\njudge of, and that there is little probability of either party being\nable to speak from a perfect insight into and understanding of the\nnature of the subject itself. Both have, in reality, been struggling\nfor the twofold interest of reason; the one maintaining the one\ninterest, the other the other. But this difference between the maxims\nof diversity and unity may easily be reconciled and adjusted; although,\nso long as they are regarded as objective principles, they must\noccasion not only contradictions and polemic, but place hinderances in\nthe way of the advancement of truth, until some means is discovered of\nreconciling these conflicting interests, and bringing reason into union\nand harmony with itself.\n\nThe same is the case with the so-called law discovered by Leibnitz, and\nsupported with remarkable ability by Bonnet\u2014the law of the continuous\ngradation of created beings, which is nothing more than an inference\nfrom the principle of affinity; for observation and study of the order\nof nature could never present it to the mind as an objective truth. The\nsteps of this ladder, as they appear in experience, are too far apart\nfrom each other, and the so-called petty differences between different\nkinds of animals are in nature commonly so wide separations that no\nconfidence can be placed in such views (particularly when we reflect on\nthe great variety of things, and the ease with which we can discover\nresemblances), and no faith in the laws which are said to express the\naims and purposes of nature. On the other hand, the method of\ninvestigating the order of nature in the light of this principle, and\nthe maxim which requires us to regard this order\u2014it being still\nundetermined how far it extends\u2014as really existing in nature, is beyond\ndoubt a legitimate and excellent principle of reason\u2014a principle which\nextends farther than any experience or observation of ours and which,\nwithout giving us any positive knowledge of anything in the region of\nexperience, guides us to the goal of systematic unity.\n\n_Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason._\n\nThe ideas of pure reason cannot be, of themselves and in their own\nnature, dialectical; it is from their misemployment alone that\nfallacies and illusions arise. For they originate in the nature of\nreason itself, and it is impossible that this supreme tribunal for all\nthe rights and claims of speculation should be itself undeserving of\nconfidence and promotive of error. It is to be expected, therefore,\nthat these ideas have a genuine and legitimate aim. It is true, the mob\nof sophists raise against reason the cry of inconsistency and\ncontradiction, and affect to despise the government of that faculty,\nbecause they cannot understand its constitution, while it is to its\nbeneficial influences alone that they owe the position and the\nintelligence which enable them to criticize and to blame its procedure.\n\nWe cannot employ an \u00e0 priori conception with certainty, until we have\nmade a transcendental deduction therefore. The ideas of pure reason do\nnot admit of the same kind of deduction as the categories. But if they\nare to possess the least objective validity, and to represent anything\nbut mere creations of thought (entia rationis ratiocinantis), a\ndeduction of them must be possible. This deduction will complete the\ncritical task imposed upon pure reason; and it is to this part Of our\nlabours that we now proceed.\n\nThere is a great difference between a thing\u2019s being presented to the\nmind as an object in an absolute sense, or merely as an ideal object.\nIn the former case I employ my conceptions to determine the object; in\nthe latter case nothing is present to the mind but a mere schema, which\ndoes not relate directly to an object, not even in a hypothetical\nsense, but which is useful only for the purpose of representing other\nobjects to the mind, in a mediate and indirect manner, by means of\ntheir relation to the idea in the intellect. Thus I say the conception\nof a supreme intelligence is a mere idea; that is to say, its objective\nreality does not consist in the fact that it has an immediate relation\nto an object (for in this sense we have no means of establishing its\nobjective validity), it is merely a schema constructed according to the\nnecessary conditions of the unity of reason\u2014the schema of a thing in\ngeneral, which is useful towards the production of the highest degree\nof systematic unity in the empirical exercise of reason, in which we\ndeduce this or that object of experience from the imaginary object of\nthis idea, as the ground or cause of the said object of experience. In\nthis way, the idea is properly a heuristic, and not an ostensive,\nconception; it does not give us any information respecting the\nconstitution of an object, it merely indicates how, under the guidance\nof the idea, we ought to investigate the constitution and the relations\nof objects in the world of experience. Now, if it can be shown that the\nthree kinds of transcendental ideas (psychological, cosmological, and\ntheological), although not relating directly to any object nor\ndetermining it, do nevertheless, on the supposition of the existence of\nan ideal object, produce systematic unity in the laws of the empirical\nemployment of the reason, and extend our empirical cognition, without\never being inconsistent or in opposition with it\u2014it must be a necessary\nmaxim of reason to regulate its procedure according to these ideas. And\nthis forms the transcendental deduction of all speculative ideas, not\nas constitutive principles of the extension of our cognition beyond the\nlimits of our experience, but as regulative principles of the\nsystematic unity of empirical cognition, which is by the aid of these\nideas arranged and emended within its own proper limits, to an extent\nunattainable by the operation of the principles of the understanding\nalone.\n\nI shall make this plainer. Guided by the principles involved in these\nideas, we must, in the first place, so connect all the phenomena,\nactions, and feelings of the mind, as if it were a simple substance,\nwhich, endowed with personal identity, possesses a permanent existence\n(in this life at least), while its states, among which those of the\nbody are to be included as external conditions, are in continual\nchange. Secondly, in cosmology, we must investigate the conditions of\nall natural phenomena, internal as well as external, as if they\nbelonged to a chain infinite and without any prime or supreme member,\nwhile we do not, on this account, deny the existence of intelligible\ngrounds of these phenomena, although we never employ them to explain\nphenomena, for the simple reason that they are not objects of our\ncognition. Thirdly, in the sphere of theology, we must regard the whole\nsystem of possible experience as forming an absolute, but dependent and\nsensuously-conditioned unity, and at the same time as based upon a\nsole, supreme, and all-sufficient ground existing apart from the world\nitself\u2014a ground which is a self-subsistent, primeval and creative\nreason, in relation to which we so employ our reason in the field of\nexperience, as if all objects drew their origin from that archetype of\nall reason. In other words, we ought not to deduce the internal\nphenomena of the mind from a simple thinking substance, but deduce them\nfrom each other under the guidance of the regulative idea of a simple\nbeing; we ought not to deduce the phenomena, order, and unity of the\nuniverse from a supreme intelligence, but merely draw from this idea of\na supremely wise cause the rules which must guide reason in its\nconnection of causes and effects.\n\nNow there is nothing to hinder us from admitting these ideas to possess\nan objective and hyperbolic existence, except the cosmological ideas,\nwhich lead reason into an antinomy: the psychological and theological\nideas are not antinomial. They contain no contradiction; and how, then,\ncan any one dispute their objective reality, since he who denies it\nknows as little about their possibility as we who affirm? And yet, when\nwe wish to admit the existence of a thing, it is not sufficient to\nconvince ourselves that there is no positive obstacle in the way; for\nit cannot be allowable to regard mere creations of thought, which\ntranscend, though they do not contradict, all our conceptions, as real\nand determinate objects, solely upon the authority of a speculative\nreason striving to compass its own aims. They cannot, therefore, be\nadmitted to be real in themselves; they can only possess a comparative\nreality\u2014that of a schema of the regulative principle of the systematic\nunity of all cognition. They are to be regarded not as actual things,\nbut as in some measure analogous to them. We abstract from the object\nof the idea all the conditions which limit the exercise of our\nunderstanding, but which, on the other hand, are the sole conditions of\nour possessing a determinate conception of any given thing. And thus we\ncogitate a something, of the real nature of which we have not the least\nconception, but which we represent to ourselves as standing in a\nrelation to the whole system of phenomena, analogous to that in which\nphenomena stand to each other.\n\nBy admitting these ideal beings, we do not really extend our cognitions\nbeyond the objects of possible experience; we extend merely the\nempirical unity of our experience, by the aid of systematic unity, the\nschema of which is furnished by the idea, which is therefore valid\u2014not\nas a constitutive, but as a regulative principle. For although we posit\na thing corresponding to the idea\u2014a something, an actual existence\u2014we\ndo not on that account aim at the extension of our cognition by means\nof transcendent conceptions. This existence is purely ideal, and not\nobjective; it is the mere expression of the systematic unity which is\nto be the guide of reason in the field of experience. There are no\nattempts made at deciding what the ground of this unity may be, or what\nthe real nature of this imaginary being.\n\nThus the transcendental and only determinate conception of God, which\nis presented to us by speculative reason, is in the strictest sense\ndeistic. In other words, reason does not assure us of the objective\nvalidity of the conception; it merely gives us the idea of something,\non which the supreme and necessary unity of all experience is based.\nThis something we cannot, following the analogy of a real substance,\ncogitate otherwise than as the cause of all things operating in\naccordance with rational laws, if we regard it as an individual object;\nalthough we should rest contented with the idea alone as a regulative\nprinciple of reason, and make no attempt at completing the sum of the\nconditions imposed by thought. This attempt is, indeed, inconsistent\nwith the grand aim of complete systematic unity in the sphere of\ncognition\u2014a unity to which no bounds are set by reason.\n\nHence it happens that, admitting a divine being, I can have no\nconception of the internal possibility of its perfection, or of the\nnecessity of its existence. The only advantage of this admission is\nthat it enables me to answer all other questions relating to the\ncontingent, and to give reason the most complete satisfaction as\nregards the unity which it aims at attaining in the world of\nexperience. But I cannot satisfy reason with regard to this hypothesis\nitself; and this proves that it is not its intelligence and insight\ninto the subject, but its speculative interest alone which induces it\nto proceed from a point lying far beyond the sphere of our cognition,\nfor the purpose of being able to consider all objects as parts of a\nsystematic whole.\n\nHere a distinction presents itself, in regard to the way in which we\nmay cogitate a presupposition\u2014a distinction which is somewhat subtle,\nbut of great importance in transcendental philosophy. I may have\nsufficient grounds to admit something, or the existence of something,\nin a relative point of view (suppositio relativa), without being\njustified in admitting it in an absolute sense (suppositio absoluta).\nThis distinction is undoubtedly requisite, in the case of a regulative\nprinciple, the necessity of which we recognize, though we are ignorant\nof the source and cause of that necessity, and which we assume to be\nbased upon some ultimate ground, for the purpose of being able to\ncogitate the universality of the principle in a more determinate way.\nFor example, I cogitate the existence of a being corresponding to a\npure transcendental idea. But I cannot admit that this being exists\nabsolutely and in itself, because all of the conceptions by which I can\ncogitate an object in a determinate manner fall short of assuring me of\nits existence; nay, the conditions of the objective validity of my\nconceptions are excluded by the idea\u2014by the very fact of its being an\nidea. The conceptions of reality, substance, causality, nay, even that\nof necessity in existence, have no significance out of the sphere of\nempirical cognition, and cannot, beyond that sphere, determine any\nobject. They may, accordingly, be employed to explain the possibility\nof things in the world of sense, but they are utterly inadequate to\nexplain the possibility of the universe itself considered as a whole;\nbecause in this case the ground of explanation must lie out of and\nbeyond the world, and cannot, therefore, be an object of possible\nexperience. Now, I may admit the existence of an incomprehensible being\nof this nature\u2014the object of a mere idea, relatively to the world of\nsense; although I have no ground to admit its existence absolutely and\nin itself. For if an idea (that of a systematic and complete unity, of\nwhich I shall presently speak more particularly) lies at the foundation\nof the most extended empirical employment of reason, and if this idea\ncannot be adequately represented in concreto, although it is\nindispensably necessary for the approximation of empirical unity to the\nhighest possible degree\u2014I am not only authorized, but compelled, to\nrealize this idea, that is, to posit a real object corresponding\nthereto. But I cannot profess to know this object; it is to me merely a\nsomething, to which, as the ground of systematic unity in cognition, I\nattribute such properties as are analogous to the conceptions employed\nby the understanding in the sphere of experience. Following the analogy\nof the notions of reality, substance, causality, and necessity, I\ncogitate a being, which possesses all these attributes in the highest\ndegree; and, as this idea is the offspring of my reason alone, I\ncogitate this being as self-subsistent reason, and as the cause of the\nuniverse operating by means of ideas of the greatest possible harmony\nand unity. Thus I abstract all conditions that would limit my idea,\nsolely for the purpose of rendering systematic unity possible in the\nworld of empirical diversity, and thus securing the widest possible\nextension for the exercise of reason in that sphere. This I am enabled\nto do, by regarding all connections and relations in the world of\nsense, as if they were the dispositions of a supreme reason, of which\nour reason is but a faint image. I then proceed to cogitate this\nSupreme Being by conceptions which have, properly, no meaning or\napplication, except in the world of sense. But as I am authorized to\nemploy the transcendental hypothesis of such a being in a relative\nrespect alone, that is, as the substratum of the greatest possible\nunity in experience\u2014I may attribute to a being which I regard as\ndistinct from the world, such properties as belong solely to the sphere\nof sense and experience. For I do not desire, and am not justified in\ndesiring, to cognize this object of my idea, as it exists in itself;\nfor I possess no conceptions sufficient for this task, those of\nreality, substance, causality, nay, even that of necessity in\nexistence, losing all significance, and becoming merely the signs of\nconceptions, without content and without applicability, when I attempt\nto carry them beyond the limits of the world of sense. I cogitate\nmerely the relation of a perfectly unknown being to the greatest\npossible systematic unity of experience, solely for the purpose of\nemploying it as the schema of the regulative principle which directs\nreason in its empirical exercise.\n\nIt is evident, at the first view, that we cannot presuppose the reality\nof this transcendental object, by means of the conceptions of reality,\nsubstance, causality, and so on, because these conceptions cannot be\napplied to anything that is distinct from the world of sense. Thus the\nsupposition of a Supreme Being or cause is purely relative; it is\ncogitated only in behalf of the systematic unity of experience; such a\nbeing is but a something, of whose existence in itself we have not the\nleast conception. Thus, too, it becomes sufficiently manifest why we\nrequired the idea of a necessary being in relation to objects given by\nsense, although we can never have the least conception of this being,\nor of its absolute necessity.\n\nAnd now we can clearly perceive the result of our transcendental\ndialectic, and the proper aim of the ideas of pure reason\u2014which become\ndialectical solely from misunderstanding and inconsiderateness. Pure\nreason is, in fact, occupied with itself, and not with any object.\nObjects are not presented to it to be embraced in the unity of an\nempirical conception; it is only the cognitions of the understanding\nthat are presented to it, for the purpose of receiving the unity of a\nrational conception, that is, of being connected according to a\nprinciple. The unity of reason is the unity of system; and this\nsystematic unity is not an objective principle, extending its dominion\nover objects, but a subjective maxim, extending its authority over the\nempirical cognition of objects. The systematic connection which reason\ngives to the empirical employment of the understanding not only\nadvances the extension of that employment, but ensures its correctness,\nand thus the principle of a systematic unity of this nature is also\nobjective, although only in an indefinite respect (principium vagum).\nIt is not, however, a constitutive principle, determining an object to\nwhich it directly relates; it is merely a regulative principle or\nmaxim, advancing and strengthening the empirical exercise of reason, by\nthe opening up of new paths of which the understanding is ignorant,\nwhile it never conflicts with the laws of its exercise in the sphere of\nexperience.\n\nBut reason cannot cogitate this systematic unity, without at the same\ntime cogitating an object of the idea\u2014an object that cannot be\npresented in any experience, which contains no concrete example of a\ncomplete systematic unity. This being (ens rationis ratiocinatae) is\ntherefore a mere idea and is not assumed to be a thing which is real\nabsolutely and in itself. On the contrary, it forms merely the\nproblematical foundation of the connection which the mind introduces\namong the phenomena of the sensuous world. We look upon this\nconnection, in the light of the above-mentioned idea, as if it drew its\norigin from the supposed being which corresponds to the idea. And yet\nall we aim at is the possession of this idea as a secure foundation for\nthe systematic unity of experience\u2014a unity indispensable to reason,\nadvantageous to the understanding, and promotive of the interests of\nempirical cognition.\n\nWe mistake the true meaning of this idea when we regard it as an\nenouncement, or even as a hypothetical declaration of the existence of\na real thing, which we are to regard as the origin or ground of a\nsystematic constitution of the universe. On the contrary, it is left\ncompletely undetermined what the nature or properties of this so-called\nground may be. The idea is merely to be adopted as a point of view,\nfrom which this unity, so essential to reason and so beneficial to the\nunderstanding, may be regarded as radiating. In one word, this\ntranscendental thing is merely the schema of a regulative principle, by\nmeans of which Reason, so far as in her lies, extends the dominion of\nsystematic unity over the whole sphere of experience.\n\nThe first object of an idea of this kind is the ego, considered merely\nas a thinking nature or soul. If I wish to investigate the properties\nof a thinking being, I must interrogate experience. But I find that I\ncan apply none of the categories to this object, the schema of these\ncategories, which is the condition of their application, being given\nonly in sensuous intuition. But I cannot thus attain to the cognition\nof a systematic unity of all the phenomena of the internal sense.\nInstead, therefore, of an empirical conception of what the soul really\nis, reason takes the conception of the empirical unity of all thought,\nand, by cogitating this unity as unconditioned and primitive,\nconstructs the rational conception or idea of a simple substance which\nis in itself unchangeable, possessing personal identity, and in\nconnection with other real things external to it; in one word, it\nconstructs the idea of a simple self-subsistent intelligence. But the\nreal aim of reason in this procedure is the attainment of principles of\nsystematic unity for the explanation of the phenomena of the soul. That\nis, reason desires to be able to represent all the determinations of\nthe internal sense as existing in one subject, all powers as deduced\nfrom one fundamental power, all changes as mere varieties in the\ncondition of a being which is permanent and always the same, and all\nphenomena in space as entirely different in their nature from the\nprocedure of thought. Essential simplicity (with the other attributes\npredicated of the ego) is regarded as the mere schema of this\nregulative principle; it is not assumed that it is the actual ground of\nthe properties of the soul. For these properties may rest upon quite\ndifferent grounds, of which we are completely ignorant; just as the\nabove predicates could not give us any knowledge of the soul as it is\nin itself, even if we regarded them as valid in respect of it, inasmuch\nas they constitute a mere idea, which cannot be represented in\nconcreto. Nothing but good can result from a psychological idea of this\nkind, if we only take proper care not to consider it as more than an\nidea; that is, if we regard it as valid merely in relation to the\nemployment of reason, in the sphere of the phenomena of the soul. Under\nthe guidance of this idea, or principle, no empirical laws of corporeal\nphenomena are called in to explain that which is a phenomenon of the\ninternal sense alone; no windy hypotheses of the generation,\nannihilation, and palingenesis of souls are admitted. Thus the\nconsideration of this object of the internal sense is kept pure, and\nunmixed with heterogeneous elements; while the investigation of reason\naims at reducing all the grounds of explanation employed in this sphere\nof knowledge to a single principle. All this is best effected, nay,\ncannot be effected otherwise than by means of such a schema, which\nrequires us to regard this ideal thing as an actual existence. The\npsychological idea is, therefore, meaningless and inapplicable, except\nas the schema of a regulative conception. For, if I ask whether the\nsoul is not really of a spiritual nature\u2014it is a question which has no\nmeaning. From such a conception has been abstracted, not merely all\ncorporeal nature, but all nature, that is, all the predicates of a\npossible experience; and consequently, all the conditions which enable\nus to cogitate an object to this conception have disappeared. But, if\nthese conditions are absent, it is evident that the conception is\nmeaningless.\n\nThe second regulative idea of speculative reason is the conception of\nthe universe. For nature is properly the only object presented to us,\nin regard to which reason requires regulative principles. Nature is\ntwofold\u2014thinking and corporeal nature. To cogitate the latter in regard\nto its internal possibility, that is, to determine the application of\nthe categories to it, no idea is required\u2014no representation which\ntranscends experience. In this sphere, therefore, an idea is\nimpossible, sensuous intuition being our only guide; while, in the\nsphere of psychology, we require the fundamental idea (I), which\ncontains \u00e0 priori a certain form of thought namely, the unity of the\nego. Pure reason has, therefore, nothing left but nature in general,\nand the completeness of conditions in nature in accordance with some\nprinciple. The absolute totality of the series of these conditions is\nan idea, which can never be fully realized in the empirical exercise of\nreason, while it is serviceable as a rule for the procedure of reason\nin relation to that totality. It requires us, in the explanation of\ngiven phenomena (in the regress or ascent in the series), to proceed as\nif the series were infinite in itself, that is, were prolonged in\nindefinitum; while on the other hand, where reason is regarded as\nitself the determining cause (in the region of freedom), we are\nrequired to proceed as if we had not before us an object of sense, but\nof the pure understanding. In this latter case, the conditions do not\nexist in the series of phenomena, but may be placed quite out of and\nbeyond it, and the series of conditions may be regarded as if it had an\nabsolute beginning from an intelligible cause. All this proves that the\ncosmological ideas are nothing but regulative principles, and not\nconstitutive; and that their aim is not to realize an actual totality\nin such series. The full discussion of this subject will be found in\nits proper place in the chapter on the antinomy of pure reason.\n\nThe third idea of pure reason, containing the hypothesis of a being\nwhich is valid merely as a relative hypothesis, is that of the one and\nall-sufficient cause of all cosmological series, in other words, the\nidea of God. We have not the slightest ground absolutely to admit the\nexistence of an object corresponding to this idea; for what can empower\nor authorize us to affirm the existence of a being of the highest\nperfection\u2014a being whose existence is absolutely necessary\u2014merely\nbecause we possess the conception of such a being? The answer is: It is\nthe existence of the world which renders this hypothesis necessary. But\nthis answer makes it perfectly evident that the idea of this being,\nlike all other speculative ideas, is essentially nothing more than a\ndemand upon reason that it shall regulate the connection which it and\nits subordinate faculties introduce into the phenomena of the world by\nprinciples of systematic unity and, consequently, that it shall regard\nall phenomena as originating from one all-embracing being, as the\nsupreme and all-sufficient cause. From this it is plain that the only\naim of reason in this procedure is the establishment of its own formal\nrule for the extension of its dominion in the world of experience; that\nit does not aim at an extension of its cognition beyond the limits of\nexperience; and that, consequently, this idea does not contain any\nconstitutive principle.\n\nThe highest formal unity, which is based upon ideas alone, is the unity\nof all things\u2014a unity in accordance with an aim or purpose; and the\nspeculative interest of reason renders it necessary to regard all order\nin the world as if it originated from the intention and design of a\nsupreme reason. This principle unfolds to the view of reason in the\nsphere of experience new and enlarged prospects, and invites it to\nconnect the phenomena of the world according to teleological laws, and\nin this way to attain to the highest possible degree of systematic\nunity. The hypothesis of a supreme intelligence, as the sole cause of\nthe universe\u2014an intelligence which has for us no more than an ideal\nexistence\u2014is accordingly always of the greatest service to reason.\nThus, if we presuppose, in relation to the figure of the earth (which\nis round, but somewhat flattened at the poles),[71] or that of\nmountains or seas, wise designs on the part of an author of the\nuniverse, we cannot fail to make, by the light of this supposition, a\ngreat number of interesting discoveries. If we keep to this hypothesis,\nas a principle which is purely regulative, even error cannot be very\ndetrimental. For, in this case, error can have no more serious\nconsequences than that, where we expected to discover a teleological\nconnection (nexus finalis), only a mechanical or physical connection\nappears. In such a case, we merely fail to find the additional form of\nunity we expected, but we do not lose the rational unity which the mind\nrequires in its procedure in experience. But even a miscarriage of this\nsort cannot affect the law in its general and teleological relations.\nFor although we may convict an anatomist of an error, when he connects\nthe limb of some animal with a certain purpose, it is quite impossible\nto prove in a single case that any arrangement of nature, be it what it\nmay, is entirely without aim or design. And thus medical physiology, by\nthe aid of a principle presented to it by pure reason, extends its very\nlimited empirical knowledge of the purposes of the different parts of\nan organized body so far that it may be asserted with the utmost\nconfidence, and with the approbation of all reflecting men, that every\norgan or bodily part of an animal has its use and answers a certain\ndesign. Now, this is a supposition which, if regarded as of a\nconstitutive character, goes much farther than any experience or\nobservation of ours can justify. Hence it is evident that it is nothing\nmore than a regulative principle of reason, which aims at the highest\ndegree of systematic unity, by the aid of the idea of a causality\naccording to design in a supreme cause\u2014a cause which it regards as the\nhighest intelligence.\n\n [71] The advantages which a circular form, in the case of the earth,\n has over every other, are well known. But few are aware that the\n slight flattening at the poles, which gives it the figure of a\n spheroid, is the only cause which prevents the elevations of\n continents or even of mountains, perhaps thrown up by some internal\n convulsion, from continually altering the position of the axis of the\n earth\u2014and that to some considerable degree in a short time. The great\n protuberance of the earth under the Equator serves to overbalance the\n impetus of all other masses of earth, and thus to preserve the axis of\n the earth, so far as we can observe, in its present position. And yet\n this wise arrangement has been unthinkingly explained from the\n equilibrium of the formerly fluid mass.\n\n\nIf, however, we neglect this restriction of the idea to a purely\nregulative influence, reason is betrayed into numerous errors. For it\nhas then left the ground of experience, in which alone are to be found\nthe criteria of truth, and has ventured into the region of the\nincomprehensible and unsearchable, on the heights of which it loses its\npower and collectedness, because it has completely severed its\nconnection with experience.\n\nThe first error which arises from our employing the idea of a Supreme\nBeing as a constitutive (in repugnance to the very nature of an idea),\nand not as a regulative principle, is the error of inactive reason\n(ignava ratio).[72] We may so term every principle which requires us to\nregard our investigations of nature as absolutely complete, and allows\nreason to cease its inquiries, as if it had fully executed its task.\nThus the psychological idea of the ego, when employed as a constitutive\nprinciple for the explanation of the phenomena of the soul, and for the\nextension of our knowledge regarding this subject beyond the limits of\nexperience\u2014even to the condition of the soul after death\u2014is convenient\nenough for the purposes of pure reason, but detrimental and even\nruinous to its interests in the sphere of nature and experience. The\ndogmatizing spiritualist explains the unchanging unity of our\npersonality through all changes of condition from the unity of a\nthinking substance, the interest which we take in things and events\nthat can happen only after our death, from a consciousness of the\nimmaterial nature of our thinking subject, and so on. Thus he dispenses\nwith all empirical investigations into the cause of these internal\nphenomena, and with all possible explanations of them upon purely\nnatural grounds; while, at the dictation of a transcendent reason, he\npasses by the immanent sources of cognition in experience, greatly to\nhis own ease and convenience, but to the sacrifice of all, genuine\ninsight and intelligence. These prejudicial consequences become still\nmore evident, in the case of the dogmatical treatment of our idea of a\nSupreme Intelligence, and the theological system of nature\n(physico-theology) which is falsely based upon it. For, in this case,\nthe aims which we observe in nature, and often those which we merely\nfancy to exist, make the investigation of causes a very easy task, by\ndirecting us to refer such and such phenomena immediately to the\nunsearchable will and counsel of the Supreme Wisdom, while we ought to\ninvestigate their causes in the general laws of the mechanism of\nmatter. We are thus recommended to consider the labour of reason as\nended, when we have merely dispensed with its employment, which is\nguided surely and safely only by the order of nature and the series of\nchanges in the world\u2014which are arranged according to immanent and\ngeneral laws. This error may be avoided, if we do not merely consider\nfrom the view-point of final aims certain parts of nature, such as the\ndivision and structure of a continent, the constitution and direction\nof certain mountain-chains, or even the organization existing in the\nvegetable and animal kingdoms, but look upon this systematic unity of\nnature in a perfectly general way, in relation to the idea of a Supreme\nIntelligence. If we pursue this advice, we lay as a foundation for all\ninvestigation the conformity to aims of all phenomena of nature in\naccordance with universal laws, for which no particular arrangement of\nnature is exempt, but only cognized by us with more or less difficulty;\nand we possess a regulative principle of the systematic unity of a\nteleological connection, which we do not attempt to anticipate or\npredetermine. All that we do, and ought to do, is to follow out the\nphysico-mechanical connection in nature according to general laws, with\nthe hope of discovering, sooner or later, the teleological connection\nalso. Thus, and thus only, can the principle of final unity aid in the\nextension of the employment of reason in the sphere of experience,\nwithout being in any case detrimental to its interests.\n\n [72] This was the term applied by the old dialecticians to a\n sophistical argument, which ran thus: If it is your fate to die of\n this disease, you will die, whether you employ a physician or not.\n Cicero says that this mode of reasoning has received this appellation,\n because, if followed, it puts an end to the employment of reason in\n the affairs of life. For a similar reason, I have applied this\n designation to the sophistical argument of pure reason.\n\n\nThe second error which arises from the misconception of the principle\nof systematic unity is that of perverted reason (perversa ratio,\nusteron roteron rationis). The idea of systematic unity is available as\na regulative principle in the connection of phenomena according to\ngeneral natural laws; and, how far soever we have to travel upon the\npath of experience to discover some fact or event, this idea requires\nus to believe that we have approached all the more nearly to the\ncompletion of its use in the sphere of nature, although that completion\ncan never be attained. But this error reverses the procedure of reason.\nWe begin by hypostatizing the principle of systematic unity, and by\ngiving an anthropomorphic determination to the conception of a Supreme\nIntelligence, and then proceed forcibly to impose aims upon nature.\nThus not only does teleology, which ought to aid in the completion of\nunity in accordance with general laws, operate to the destruction of\nits influence, but it hinders reason from attaining its proper aim,\nthat is, the proof, upon natural grounds, of the existence of a supreme\nintelligent cause. For, if we cannot presuppose supreme finality in\nnature \u00e0 priori, that is, as essentially belonging to nature, how can\nwe be directed to endeavour to discover this unity and, rising\ngradually through its different degrees, to approach the supreme\nperfection of an author of all\u2014a perfection which is absolutely\nnecessary, and therefore cognizable \u00e0 priori? The regulative principle\ndirects us to presuppose systematic unity absolutely and, consequently,\nas following from the essential nature of things\u2014but only as a unity of\nnature, not merely cognized empirically, but presupposed \u00e0 priori,\nalthough only in an indeterminate manner. But if I insist on basing\nnature upon the foundation of a supreme ordaining Being, the unity of\nnature is in effect lost. For, in this case, it is quite foreign and\nunessential to the nature of things, and cannot be cognized from the\ngeneral laws of nature. And thus arises a vicious circular argument,\nwhat ought to have been proved having been presupposed.\n\nTo take the regulative principle of systematic unity in nature for a\nconstitutive principle, and to hypostatize and make a cause out of that\nwhich is properly the ideal ground of the consistent and harmonious\nexercise of reason, involves reason in inextricable embarrassments. The\ninvestigation of nature pursues its own path under the guidance of the\nchain of natural causes, in accordance with the general laws of nature,\nand ever follows the light of the idea of an author of the universe\u2014not\nfor the purpose of deducing the finality, which it constantly pursues,\nfrom this Supreme Being, but to attain to the cognition of his\nexistence from the finality which it seeks in the existence of the\nphenomena of nature, and, if possible, in that of all things to cognize\nthis being, consequently, as absolutely necessary. Whether this latter\npurpose succeed or not, the idea is and must always be a true one, and\nits employment, when merely regulative, must always be accompanied by\ntruthful and beneficial results.\n\nComplete unity, in conformity with aims, constitutes absolute\nperfection. But if we do not find this unity in the nature of the\nthings which go to constitute the world of experience, that is, of\nobjective cognition, consequently in the universal and necessary laws\nof nature, how can we infer from this unity the idea of the supreme and\nabsolutely necessary perfection of a primal being, which is the origin\nof all causality? The greatest systematic unity, and consequently\nteleological unity, constitutes the very foundation of the possibility\nof the most extended employment of human reason. The idea of unity is\ntherefore essentially and indissolubly connected with the nature of our\nreason. This idea is a legislative one; and hence it is very natural\nthat we should assume the existence of a legislative reason\ncorresponding to it, from which the systematic unity of nature\u2014the\nobject of the operations of reason\u2014must be derived.\n\nIn the course of our discussion of the antinomies, we stated that it is\nalways possible to answer all the questions which pure reason may\nraise; and that the plea of the limited nature of our cognition, which\nis unavoidable and proper in many questions regarding natural\nphenomena, cannot in this case be admitted, because the questions\nraised do not relate to the nature of things, but are necessarily\noriginated by the nature of reason itself, and relate to its own\ninternal constitution. We can now establish this assertion, which at\nfirst sight appeared so rash, in relation to the two questions in which\nreason takes the greatest interest, and thus complete our discussion of\nthe dialectic of pure reason.\n\nIf, then, the question is asked, in relation to transcendental\ntheology,[73] first, whether there is anything distinct from the world,\nwhich contains the ground of cosmical order and connection according to\ngeneral laws? The answer is: Certainly. For the world is a sum of\nphenomena; there must, therefore, be some transcendental basis of these\nphenomena, that is, a basis cogitable by the pure understanding alone.\nIf, secondly, the question is asked whether this being is substance,\nwhether it is of the greatest reality, whether it is necessary, and so\nforth? I answer that this question is utterly without meaning. For all\nthe categories which aid me in forming a conception of an object cannot\nbe employed except in the world of sense, and are without meaning when\nnot applied to objects of actual or possible experience. Out of this\nsphere, they are not properly conceptions, but the mere marks or\nindices of conceptions, which we may admit, although they cannot,\nwithout the help of experience, help us to understand any subject or\nthing. If, thirdly, the question is whether we may not cogitate this\nbeing, which is distinct from the world, in analogy with the objects of\nexperience? The answer is: Undoubtedly, but only as an ideal, and not\nas a real object. That is, we must cogitate it only as an unknown\nsubstratum of the systematic unity, order, and finality of the world\u2014a\nunity which reason must employ as the regulative principle of its\ninvestigation of nature. Nay, more, we may admit into the idea certain\nanthropomorphic elements, which are promotive of the interests of this\nregulative principle. For it is no more than an idea, which does not\nrelate directly to a being distinct from the world, but to the\nregulative principle of the systematic unity of the world, by means,\nhowever, of a schema of this unity\u2014the schema of a Supreme\nIntelligence, who is the wisely-designing author of the universe. What\nthis basis of cosmical unity may be in itself, we know not\u2014we cannot\ndiscover from the idea; we merely know how we ought to employ the idea\nof this unity, in relation to the systematic operation of reason in the\nsphere of experience.\n\n [73] After what has been said of the psychological idea of the ego and\n its proper employment as a regulative principle of the operations of\n reason, I need not enter into details regarding the transcendental\n illusion by which the systematic unity of all the various phenomena of\n the internal sense is hypostatized. The procedure is in this case very\n similar to that which has been discussed in our remarks on the\n theological ideal.\n\n\nBut, it will be asked again, can we on these grounds, admit the\nexistence of a wise and omnipotent author of the world? Without doubt;\nand not only so, but we must assume the existence of such a being. But\ndo we thus extend the limits of our knowledge beyond the field of\npossible experience? By no means. For we have merely presupposed a\nsomething, of which we have no conception, which we do not know as it\nis in itself; but, in relation to the systematic disposition of the\nuniverse, which we must presuppose in all our observation of nature, we\nhave cogitated this unknown being in analogy with an intelligent\nexistence (an empirical conception), that is to say, we have endowed it\nwith those attributes, which, judging from the nature of our own\nreason, may contain the ground of such a systematic unity. This idea is\ntherefore valid only relatively to the employment in experience of our\nreason. But if we attribute to it absolute and objective validity, we\noverlook the fact that it is merely an ideal being that we cogitate;\nand, by setting out from a basis which is not determinable by\nconsiderations drawn from experience, we place ourselves in a position\nwhich incapacitates us from applying this principle to the empirical\nemployment of reason.\n\nBut, it will be asked further, can I make any use of this conception\nand hypothesis in my investigations into the world and nature? Yes, for\nthis very purpose was the idea established by reason as a fundamental\nbasis. But may I regard certain arrangements, which seemed to have been\nmade in conformity with some fixed aim, as the arrangements of design,\nand look upon them as proceeding from the divine will, with the\nintervention, however, of certain other particular arrangements\ndisposed to that end? Yes, you may do so; but at the same time you must\nregard it as indifferent, whether it is asserted that divine wisdom has\ndisposed all things in conformity with his highest aims, or that the\nidea of supreme wisdom is a regulative principle in the investigation\nof nature, and at the same time a principle of the systematic unity of\nnature according to general laws, even in those cases where we are\nunable to discover that unity. In other words, it must be perfectly\nindifferent to you whether you say, when you have discovered this\nunity: God has wisely willed it so; or: Nature has wisely arranged\nthis. For it was nothing but the systematic unity, which reason\nrequires as a basis for the investigation of nature, that justified you\nin accepting the idea of a supreme intelligence as a schema for a\nregulative principle; and, the farther you advance in the discovery of\ndesign and finality, the more certain the validity of your idea. But,\nas the whole aim of this regulative principle was the discovery of a\nnecessary and systematic unity in nature, we have, in so far as we\nattain this, to attribute our success to the idea of a Supreme Being;\nwhile, at the same time, we cannot, without involving ourselves in\ncontradictions, overlook the general laws of nature, as it was in\nreference to them alone that this idea was employed. We cannot, I say,\noverlook the general laws of nature, and regard this conformity to aims\nobservable in nature as contingent or hyperphysical in its origin;\ninasmuch as there is no ground which can justify us in the admission of\na being with such properties distinct from and above nature. All that\nwe are authorized to assert is that this idea may be employed as a\nprinciple, and that the properties of the being which is assumed to\ncorrespond to it may be regarded as systematically connected in analogy\nwith the causal determination of phenomena.\n\nFor the same reasons we are justified in introducing into the idea of\nthe supreme cause other anthropomorphic elements (for without these we\ncould not predicate anything of it); we may regard it as allowable to\ncogitate this cause as a being with understanding, the feelings of\npleasure and displeasure, and faculties of desire and will\ncorresponding to these. At the same time, we may attribute to this\nbeing infinite perfection\u2014a perfection which necessarily transcends\nthat which our knowledge of the order and design in the world authorize\nus to predicate of it. For the regulative law of systematic unity\nrequires us to study nature on the supposition that systematic and\nfinal unity in infinitum is everywhere discoverable, even in the\nhighest diversity. For, although we may discover little of this\ncosmical perfection, it belongs to the legislative prerogative of\nreason to require us always to seek for and to expect it; while it must\nalways be beneficial to institute all inquiries into nature in\naccordance with this principle. But it is evident that, by this idea of\na supreme author of all, which I place as the foundation of all\ninquiries into nature, I do not mean to assert the existence of such a\nbeing, or that I have any knowledge of its existence; and,\nconsequently, I do not really deduce anything from the existence of\nthis being, but merely from its idea, that is to say, from the nature\nof things in this world, in accordance with this idea. A certain dim\nconsciousness of the true use of this idea seems to have dictated to\nthe philosophers of all times the moderate language used by them\nregarding the cause of the world. We find them employing the\nexpressions wisdom and care of nature, and divine wisdom, as\nsynonymous\u2014nay, in purely speculative discussions, preferring the\nformer, because it does not carry the appearance of greater pretensions\nthan such as we are entitled to make, and at the same time directs\nreason to its proper field of action\u2014nature and her phenomena.\n\nThus, pure reason, which at first seemed to promise us nothing less\nthan the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of experience, is\nfound, when thoroughly examined, to contain nothing but regulative\nprinciples, the virtue and function of which is to introduce into our\ncognition a higher degree of unity than the understanding could of\nitself. These principles, by placing the goal of all our struggles at\nso great a distance, realize for us the most thorough connection\nbetween the different parts of our cognition, and the highest degree of\nsystematic unity. But, on the other hand, if misunderstood and employed\nas constitutive principles of transcendent cognition, they become the\nparents of illusions and contradictions, while pretending to introduce\nus to new regions of knowledge.\n\nThus all human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence\nto conceptions, and ends with ideas. Although it possesses, in relation\nto all three elements, \u00e0 priori sources of cognition, which seemed to\ntranscend the limits of all experience, a thoroughgoing criticism\ndemonstrates that speculative reason can never, by the aid of these\nelements, pass the bounds of possible experience, and that the proper\ndestination of this highest faculty of cognition is to employ all\nmethods, and all the principles of these methods, for the purpose of\npenetrating into the innermost secrets of nature, by the aid of the\nprinciples of unity (among all kinds of which teleological unity is the\nhighest), while it ought not to attempt to soar above the sphere of\nexperience, beyond which there lies nought for us but the void inane.\nThe critical examination, in our Transcendental Analytic, of all the\npropositions which professed to extend cognition beyond the sphere of\nexperience, completely demonstrated that they can only conduct us to a\npossible experience. If we were not distrustful even of the clearest\nabstract theorems, if we were not allured by specious and inviting\nprospects to escape from the constraining power of their evidence, we\nmight spare ourselves the laborious examination of all the dialectical\narguments which a transcendent reason adduces in support of its\npretensions; for we should know with the most complete certainty that,\nhowever honest such professions might be, they are null and valueless,\nbecause they relate to a kind of knowledge to which no man can by any\npossibility attain. But, as there is no end to discussion, if we cannot\ndiscover the true cause of the illusions by which even the wisest are\ndeceived, and as the analysis of all our transcendent cognition into\nits elements is of itself of no slight value as a psychological study,\nwhile it is a duty incumbent on every philosopher\u2014it was found\nnecessary to investigate the dialectical procedure of reason in its\nprimary sources. And as the inferences of which this dialectic is the\nparent are not only deceitful, but naturally possess a profound\ninterest for humanity, it was advisable at the same time, to give a\nfull account of the momenta of this dialectical procedure, and to\ndeposit it in the archives of human reason, as a warning to all future\nmetaphysicians to avoid these causes of speculative error.\n\n\n\nII. Transcendental Doctrine of Method\n\n\nIf we regard the sum of the cognition of pure speculative reason as an\nedifice, the idea of which, at least, exists in the human mind, it may\nbe said that we have in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements\nexamined the materials and determined to what edifice these belong, and\nwhat its height and stability. We have found, indeed, that, although we\nhad purposed to build for ourselves a tower which should reach to\nHeaven, the supply of materials sufficed merely for a habitation, which\nwas spacious enough for all terrestrial purposes, and high enough to\nenable us to survey the level plain of experience, but that the bold\nundertaking designed necessarily failed for want of materials\u2014not to\nmention the confusion of tongues, which gave rise to endless disputes\namong the labourers on the plan of the edifice, and at last scattered\nthem over all the world, each to erect a separate building for himself,\naccording to his own plans and his own inclinations. Our present task\nrelates not to the materials, but to the plan of an edifice; and, as we\nhave had sufficient warning not to venture blindly upon a design which\nmay be found to transcend our natural powers, while, at the same time,\nwe cannot give up the intention of erecting a secure abode for the\nmind, we must proportion our design to the material which is presented\nto us, and which is, at the same time, sufficient for all our wants.\n\nI understand, then, by the transcendental doctrine of method, the\ndetermination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure\nreason. We shall accordingly have to treat of the discipline, the\ncanon, the architectonic, and, finally, the history of pure reason.\nThis part of our Critique will accomplish, from the transcendental\npoint of view, what has been usually attempted, but miserably executed,\nunder the name of practical logic. It has been badly executed, I say,\nbecause general logic, not being limited to any particular kind of\ncognition (not even to the pure cognition of the understanding) nor to\nany particular objects, it cannot, without borrowing from other\nsciences, do more than present merely the titles or signs of possible\nmethods and the technical expressions, which are employed in the\nsystematic parts of all sciences; and thus the pupil is made acquainted\nwith names, the meaning and application of which he is to learn only at\nsome future time.\n\nChapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason\n\nNegative judgements\u2014those which are so not merely as regards their\nlogical form, but in respect of their content\u2014are not commonly held in\nespecial respect. They are, on the contrary, regarded as jealous\nenemies of our insatiable desire for knowledge; and it almost requires\nan apology to induce us to tolerate, much less to prize and to respect\nthem.\n\nAll propositions, indeed, may be logically expressed in a negative\nform; but, in relation to the content of our cognition, the peculiar\nprovince of negative judgements is solely to prevent error. For this\nreason, too, negative propositions, which are framed for the purpose of\ncorrecting false cognitions where error is absolutely impossible, are\nundoubtedly true, but inane and senseless; that is, they are in reality\npurposeless and, for this reason, often very ridiculous. Such is the\nproposition of the schoolman that Alexander could not have subdued any\ncountries without an army.\n\nBut where the limits of our possible cognition are very much\ncontracted, the attraction to new fields of knowledge great, the\nillusions to which the mind is subject of the most deceptive character,\nand the evil consequences of error of no inconsiderable magnitude\u2014the\nnegative element in knowledge, which is useful only to guard us against\nerror, is of far more importance than much of that positive instruction\nwhich makes additions to the sum of our knowledge. The restraint which\nis employed to repress, and finally to extirpate the constant\ninclination to depart from certain rules, is termed discipline. It is\ndistinguished from culture, which aims at the formation of a certain\ndegree of skill, without attempting to repress or to destroy any other\nmental power, already existing. In the cultivation of a talent, which\nhas given evidence of an impulse towards self-development, discipline\ntakes a negative,[74] culture and doctrine a positive, part.\n\n [74] I am well aware that, in the language of the schools, the term\n discipline is usually employed as synonymous with instruction. But\n there are so many cases in which it is necessary to distinguish the\n notion of the former, as a course of corrective training, from that of\n the latter, as the communication of knowledge, and the nature of\n things itself demands the appropriation of the most suitable\n expressions for this distinction, that it is my desire that the former\n terms should never be employed in any other than a negative\n signification.\n\n\nThat natural dispositions and talents (such as imagination and wit),\nwhich ask a free and unlimited development, require in many respects\nthe corrective influence of discipline, every one will readily grant.\nBut it may well appear strange that reason, whose proper duty it is to\nprescribe rules of discipline to all the other powers of the mind,\nshould itself require this corrective. It has, in fact, hitherto\nescaped this humiliation, only because, in presence of its magnificent\npretensions and high position, no one could readily suspect it to be\ncapable of substituting fancies for conceptions, and words for things.\n\nReason, when employed in the field of experience, does not stand in\nneed of criticism, because its principles are subjected to the\ncontinual test of empirical observations. Nor is criticism requisite in\nthe sphere of mathematics, where the conceptions of reason must always\nbe presented in concreto in pure intuition, and baseless or arbitrary\nassertions are discovered without difficulty. But where reason is not\nheld in a plain track by the influence of empirical or of pure\nintuition, that is, when it is employed in the transcendental sphere of\npure conceptions, it stands in great need of discipline, to restrain\nits propensity to overstep the limits of possible experience and to\nkeep it from wandering into error. In fact, the utility of the\nphilosophy of pure reason is entirely of this negative character.\nParticular errors may be corrected by particular animadversions, and\nthe causes of these errors may be eradicated by criticism. But where we\nfind, as in the case of pure reason, a complete system of illusions and\nfallacies, closely connected with each other and depending upon grand\ngeneral principles, there seems to be required a peculiar and negative\ncode of mental legislation, which, under the denomination of a\ndiscipline, and founded upon the nature of reason and the objects of\nits exercise, shall constitute a system of thorough examination and\ntesting, which no fallacy will be able to withstand or escape from,\nunder whatever disguise or concealment it may lurk.\n\nBut the reader must remark that, in this the second division of our\ntranscendental Critique the discipline of pure reason is not directed\nto the content, but to the method of the cognition of pure reason. The\nformer task has been completed in the doctrine of elements. But there\nis so much similarity in the mode of employing the faculty of reason,\nwhatever be the object to which it is applied, while, at the same time,\nits employment in the transcendental sphere is so essentially different\nin kind from every other, that, without the warning negative influence\nof a discipline specially directed to that end, the errors are\nunavoidable which spring from the unskillful employment of the methods\nwhich are originated by reason but which are out of place in this\nsphere.\n\nSection I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of Dogmatism\n\nThe science of mathematics presents the most brilliant example of the\nextension of the sphere of pure reason without the aid of experience.\nExamples are always contagious; and they exert an especial influence on\nthe same faculty, which naturally flatters itself that it will have the\nsame good fortune in other case as fell to its lot in one fortunate\ninstance. Hence pure reason hopes to be able to extend its empire in\nthe transcendental sphere with equal success and security, especially\nwhen it applies the same method which was attended with such brilliant\nresults in the science of mathematics. It is, therefore, of the highest\nimportance for us to know whether the method of arriving at\ndemonstrative certainty, which is termed mathematical, be identical\nwith that by which we endeavour to attain the same degree of certainty\nin philosophy, and which is termed in that science dogmatical.\n\nPhilosophical cognition is the cognition of reason by means of\nconceptions; mathematical cognition is cognition by means of the\nconstruction of conceptions. The construction of a conception is the\npresentation \u00e0 priori of the intuition which corresponds to the\nconception. For this purpose a non-empirical intuition is requisite,\nwhich, as an intuition, is an individual object; while, as the\nconstruction of a conception (a general representation), it must be\nseen to be universally valid for all the possible intuitions which rank\nunder that conception. Thus I construct a triangle, by the presentation\nof the object which corresponds to this conception, either by mere\nimagination, in pure intuition, or upon paper, in empirical intuition,\nin both cases completely \u00e0 priori, without borrowing the type of that\nfigure from any experience. The individual figure drawn upon paper is\nempirical; but it serves, notwithstanding, to indicate the conception,\neven in its universality, because in this empirical intuition we keep\nour eye merely on the act of the construction of the conception, and\npay no attention to the various modes of determining it, for example,\nits size, the length of its sides, the size of its angles, these not in\nthe least affecting the essential character of the conception.\n\nPhilosophical cognition, accordingly, regards the particular only in\nthe general; mathematical the general in the particular, nay, in the\nindividual. This is done, however, entirely \u00e0 priori and by means of\npure reason, so that, as this individual figure is determined under\ncertain universal conditions of construction, the object of the\nconception, to which this individual figure corresponds as its schema,\nmust be cogitated as universally determined.\n\nThe essential difference of these two modes of cognition consists,\ntherefore, in this formal quality; it does not regard the difference of\nthe matter or objects of both. Those thinkers who aim at distinguishing\nphilosophy from mathematics by asserting that the former has to do with\nquality merely, and the latter with quantity, have mistaken the effect\nfor the cause. The reason why mathematical cognition can relate only to\nquantity is to be found in its form alone. For it is the conception of\nquantities only that is capable of being constructed, that is,\npresented \u00e0 priori in intuition; while qualities cannot be given in any\nother than an empirical intuition. Hence the cognition of qualities by\nreason is possible only through conceptions. No one can find an\nintuition which shall correspond to the conception of reality, except\nin experience; it cannot be presented to the mind \u00e0 priori and\nantecedently to the empirical consciousness of a reality. We can form\nan intuition, by means of the mere conception of it, of a cone, without\nthe aid of experience; but the colour of the cone we cannot know except\nfrom experience. I cannot present an intuition of a cause, except in an\nexample which experience offers to me. Besides, philosophy, as well as\nmathematics, treats of quantities; as, for example, of totality,\ninfinity, and so on. Mathematics, too, treats of the difference of\nlines and surfaces\u2014as spaces of different quality, of the continuity of\nextension\u2014as a quality thereof. But, although in such cases they have a\ncommon object, the mode in which reason considers that object is very\ndifferent in philosophy from what it is in mathematics. The former\nconfines itself to the general conceptions; the latter can do nothing\nwith a mere conception, it hastens to intuition. In this intuition it\nregards the conception in concreto, not empirically, but in an \u00e0 priori\nintuition, which it has constructed; and in which, all the results\nwhich follow from the general conditions of the construction of the\nconception are in all cases valid for the object of the constructed\nconception.\n\nSuppose that the conception of a triangle is given to a philosopher and\nthat he is required to discover, by the philosophical method, what\nrelation the sum of its angles bears to a right angle. He has nothing\nbefore him but the conception of a figure enclosed within three right\nlines, and, consequently, with the same number of angles. He may\nanalyse the conception of a right line, of an angle, or of the number\nthree as long as he pleases, but he will not discover any properties\nnot contained in these conceptions. But, if this question is proposed\nto a geometrician, he at once begins by constructing a triangle. He\nknows that two right angles are equal to the sum of all the contiguous\nangles which proceed from one point in a straight line; and he goes on\nto produce one side of his triangle, thus forming two adjacent angles\nwhich are together equal to two right angles. He then divides the\nexterior of these angles, by drawing a line parallel with the opposite\nside of the triangle, and immediately perceives that he has thus got an\nexterior adjacent angle which is equal to the interior. Proceeding in\nthis way, through a chain of inferences, and always on the ground of\nintuition, he arrives at a clear and universally valid solution of the\nquestion.\n\nBut mathematics does not confine itself to the construction of\nquantities (quanta), as in the case of geometry; it occupies itself\nwith pure quantity also (quantitas), as in the case of algebra, where\ncomplete abstraction is made of the properties of the object indicated\nby the conception of quantity. In algebra, a certain method of notation\nby signs is adopted, and these indicate the different possible\nconstructions of quantities, the extraction of roots, and so on. After\nhaving thus denoted the general conception of quantities, according to\ntheir different relations, the different operations by which quantity\nor number is increased or diminished are presented in intuition in\naccordance with general rules. Thus, when one quantity is to be divided\nby another, the signs which denote both are placed in the form peculiar\nto the operation of division; and thus algebra, by means of a\nsymbolical construction of quantity, just as geometry, with its\nostensive or geometrical construction (a construction of the objects\nthemselves), arrives at results which discursive cognition cannot hope\nto reach by the aid of mere conceptions.\n\nNow, what is the cause of this difference in the fortune of the\nphilosopher and the mathematician, the former of whom follows the path\nof conceptions, while the latter pursues that of intuitions, which he\nrepresents, \u00e0 priori, in correspondence with his conceptions? The cause\nis evident from what has been already demonstrated in the introduction\nto this Critique. We do not, in the present case, want to discover\nanalytical propositions, which may be produced merely by analysing our\nconceptions\u2014for in this the philosopher would have the advantage over\nhis rival; we aim at the discovery of synthetical propositions\u2014such\nsynthetical propositions, moreover, as can be cognized \u00e0 priori. I must\nnot confine myself to that which I actually cogitate in my conception\nof a triangle, for this is nothing more than the mere definition; I\nmust try to go beyond that, and to arrive at properties which are not\ncontained in, although they belong to, the conception. Now, this is\nimpossible, unless I determine the object present to my mind according\nto the conditions, either of empirical, or of pure, intuition. In the\nformer case, I should have an empirical proposition (arrived at by\nactual measurement of the angles of the triangle), which would possess\nneither universality nor necessity; but that would be of no value. In\nthe latter, I proceed by geometrical construction, by means of which I\ncollect, in a pure intuition, just as I would in an empirical\nintuition, all the various properties which belong to the schema of a\ntriangle in general, and consequently to its conception, and thus\nconstruct synthetical propositions which possess the attribute of\nuniversality.\n\nIt would be vain to philosophize upon the triangle, that is, to reflect\non it discursively; I should get no further than the definition with\nwhich I had been obliged to set out. There are certainly transcendental\nsynthetical propositions which are framed by means of pure conceptions,\nand which form the peculiar distinction of philosophy; but these do not\nrelate to any particular thing, but to a thing in general, and enounce\nthe conditions under which the perception of it may become a part of\npossible experience. But the science of mathematics has nothing to do\nwith such questions, nor with the question of existence in any fashion;\nit is concerned merely with the properties of objects in themselves,\nonly in so far as these are connected with the conception of the\nobjects.\n\nIn the above example, we merely attempted to show the great difference\nwhich exists between the discursive employment of reason in the sphere\nof conceptions, and its intuitive exercise by means of the construction\nof conceptions. The question naturally arises: What is the cause which\nnecessitates this twofold exercise of reason, and how are we to\ndiscover whether it is the philosophical or the mathematical method\nwhich reason is pursuing in an argument?\n\nAll our knowledge relates, finally, to possible intuitions, for it is\nthese alone that present objects to the mind. An \u00e0 priori or\nnon-empirical conception contains either a pure intuition\u2014and in this\ncase it can be constructed; or it contains nothing but the synthesis of\npossible intuitions, which are not given \u00e0 priori. In this latter case,\nit may help us to form synthetical \u00e0 priori judgements, but only in the\ndiscursive method, by conceptions, not in the intuitive, by means of\nthe construction of conceptions.\n\nThe only \u00e0 priori intuition is that of the pure form of phenomena\u2014space\nand time. A conception of space and time as quanta may be presented \u00e0\npriori in intuition, that is, constructed, either alone with their\nquality (figure), or as pure quantity (the mere synthesis of the\nhomogeneous), by means of number. But the matter of phenomena, by which\nthings are given in space and time, can be presented only in\nperception, \u00e0 posteriori. The only conception which represents \u00e0 priori\nthis empirical content of phenomena is the conception of a thing in\ngeneral; and the \u00e0 priori synthetical cognition of this conception can\ngive us nothing more than the rule for the synthesis of that which may\nbe contained in the corresponding \u00e0 posteriori perception; it is\nutterly inadequate to present an \u00e0 priori intuition of the real object,\nwhich must necessarily be empirical.\n\nSynthetical propositions, which relate to things in general, an \u00e0\npriori intuition of which is impossible, are transcendental. For this\nreason transcendental propositions cannot be framed by means of the\nconstruction of conceptions; they are \u00e0 priori, and based entirely on\nconceptions themselves. They contain merely the rule, by which we are\nto seek in the world of perception or experience the synthetical unity\nof that which cannot be intuited \u00e0 priori. But they are incompetent to\npresent any of the conceptions which appear in them in an \u00e0 priori\nintuition; these can be given only \u00e0 posteriori, in experience, which,\nhowever, is itself possible only through these synthetical principles.\n\nIf we are to form a synthetical judgement regarding a conception,\nwe must go beyond it, to the intuition in which it is given. If we\nkeep to what is contained in the conception, the judgement is merely\nanalytical\u2014it is merely an explanation of what we have cogitated in\nthe conception. But I can pass from the conception to the pure or\nempirical intuition which corresponds to it. I can proceed to examine\nmy conception in concreto, and to cognize, either \u00e0 priori or \u00e0\nposteriori, what I find in the object of the conception. The former\u2014\u00e0\npriori cognition\u2014is rational-mathematical cognition by means of the\nconstruction of the conception; the latter\u2014\u00e0 posteriori cognition\u2014is\npurely empirical cognition, which does not possess the attributes\nof necessity and universality. Thus I may analyse the conception I\nhave of gold; but I gain no new information from this analysis, I\nmerely enumerate the different properties which I had connected with\nthe notion indicated by the word. My knowledge has gained in logical\nclearness and arrangement, but no addition has been made to it. But\nif I take the matter which is indicated by this name, and submit\nit to the examination of my senses, I am enabled to form several\nsynthetical\u2014although still empirical\u2014propositions. The mathematical\nconception of a triangle I should construct, that is, present \u00e0 priori\nin intuition, and in this way attain to rational-synthetical cognition.\nBut when the transcendental conception of reality, or substance, or\npower is presented to my mind, I find that it does not relate to or\nindicate either an empirical or pure intuition, but that it indicates\nmerely the synthesis of empirical intuitions, which cannot of course\nbe given \u00e0 priori. The synthesis in such a conception cannot proceed \u00e0\npriori\u2014without the aid of experience\u2014to the intuition which corresponds\nto the conception; and, for this reason, none of these conceptions can\nproduce a determinative synthetical proposition, they can never present\nmore than a principle of the synthesis[75] of possible empirical\nintuitions. A transcendental proposition is, therefore, a synthetical\ncognition of reason by means of pure conceptions and the discursive\nmethod, and it renders possible all synthetical unity in empirical\ncognition, though it cannot present us with any intuition \u00e0 priori.\n\n [75] In the case of the conception of cause, I do really go beyond the\n empirical conception of an event\u2014but not to the intuition which\n presents this conception in concreto, but only to the time-conditions,\n which may be found in experience to correspond to the conception. My\n procedure is, therefore, strictly according to conceptions; I cannot\n in a case of this kind employ the construction of conceptions, because\n the conception is merely a rule for the synthesis of perceptions,\n which are not pure intuitions, and which, therefore, cannot be given \u00e0\n priori.\n\n\nThere is thus a twofold exercise of reason. Both modes have the\nproperties of universality and an \u00e0 priori origin in common, but are,\nin their procedure, of widely different character. The reason of this\nis that in the world of phenomena, in which alone objects are presented\nto our minds, there are two main elements\u2014the form of intuition (space\nand time), which can be cognized and determined completely \u00e0 priori,\nand the matter or content\u2014that which is presented in space and time,\nand which, consequently, contains a something\u2014an existence\ncorresponding to our powers of sensation. As regards the latter, which\ncan never be given in a determinate mode except by experience, there\nare no \u00e0 priori notions which relate to it, except the undetermined\nconceptions of the synthesis of possible sensations, in so far as these\nbelong (in a possible experience) to the unity of consciousness. As\nregards the former, we can determine our conceptions \u00e0 priori in\nintuition, inasmuch as we are ourselves the creators of the objects of\nthe conceptions in space and time\u2014these objects being regarded simply\nas quanta. In the one case, reason proceeds according to conceptions\nand can do nothing more than subject phenomena to these\u2014which can only\nbe determined empirically, that is, \u00e0 posteriori\u2014in conformity,\nhowever, with those conceptions as the rules of all empirical\nsynthesis. In the other case, reason proceeds by the construction of\nconceptions; and, as these conceptions relate to an \u00e0 priori intuition,\nthey may be given and determined in pure intuition \u00e0 priori, and\nwithout the aid of empirical data. The examination and consideration of\neverything that exists in space or time\u2014whether it is a quantum or not,\nin how far the particular something (which fills space or time) is a\nprimary substratum, or a mere determination of some other existence,\nwhether it relates to anything else\u2014either as cause or effect, whether\nits existence is isolated or in reciprocal connection with and\ndependence upon others, the possibility of this existence, its reality\nand necessity or opposites\u2014all these form part of the cognition of\nreason on the ground of conceptions, and this cognition is termed\nphilosophical. But to determine \u00e0 priori an intuition in space (its\nfigure), to divide time into periods, or merely to cognize the quantity\nof an intuition in space and time, and to determine it by number\u2014all\nthis is an operation of reason by means of the construction of\nconceptions, and is called mathematical.\n\nThe success which attends the efforts of reason in the sphere of\nmathematics naturally fosters the expectation that the same good\nfortune will be its lot, if it applies the mathematical method in other\nregions of mental endeavour besides that of quantities. Its success is\nthus great, because it can support all its conceptions by \u00e0 priori\nintuitions and, in this way, make itself a master, as it were, over\nnature; while pure philosophy, with its \u00e0 priori discursive\nconceptions, bungles about in the world of nature, and cannot accredit\nor show any \u00e0 priori evidence of the reality of these conceptions.\nMasters in the science of mathematics are confident of the success of\nthis method; indeed, it is a common persuasion that it is capable of\nbeing applied to any subject of human thought. They have hardly ever\nreflected or philosophized on their favourite science\u2014a task of great\ndifficulty; and the specific difference between the two modes of\nemploying the faculty of reason has never entered their thoughts. Rules\ncurrent in the field of common experience, and which common sense\nstamps everywhere with its approval, are regarded by them as axiomatic.\nFrom what source the conceptions of space and time, with which (as the\nonly primitive quanta) they have to deal, enter their minds, is a\nquestion which they do not trouble themselves to answer; and they think\nit just as unnecessary to examine into the origin of the pure\nconceptions of the understanding and the extent of their validity. All\nthey have to do with them is to employ them. In all this they are\nperfectly right, if they do not overstep the limits of the sphere of\nnature. But they pass, unconsciously, from the world of sense to the\ninsecure ground of pure transcendental conceptions (instabilis tellus,\ninnabilis unda), where they can neither stand nor swim, and where the\ntracks of their footsteps are obliterated by time; while the march of\nmathematics is pursued on a broad and magnificent highway, which the\nlatest posterity shall frequent without fear of danger or impediment.\n\nAs we have taken upon us the task of determining, clearly and\ncertainly, the limits of pure reason in the sphere of\ntranscendentalism, and as the efforts of reason in this direction are\npersisted in, even after the plainest and most expressive warnings,\nhope still beckoning us past the limits of experience into the\nsplendours of the intellectual world\u2014it becomes necessary to cut away\nthe last anchor of this fallacious and fantastic hope. We shall,\naccordingly, show that the mathematical method is unattended in the\nsphere of philosophy by the least advantage\u2014except, perhaps, that it\nmore plainly exhibits its own inadequacy\u2014that geometry and philosophy\nare two quite different things, although they go hand in hand in the\nfield of natural science, and, consequently, that the procedure of the\none can never be imitated by the other.\n\nThe evidence of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms, and\ndemonstrations. I shall be satisfied with showing that none of these\nforms can be employed or imitated in philosophy in the sense in which\nthey are understood by mathematicians; and that the geometrician, if he\nemploys his method in philosophy, will succeed only in building\ncard-castles, while the employment of the philosophical method in\nmathematics can result in nothing but mere verbiage. The essential\nbusiness of philosophy, indeed, is to mark out the limits of the\nscience; and even the mathematician, unless his talent is naturally\ncircumscribed and limited to this particular department of knowledge,\ncannot turn a deaf ear to the warnings of philosophy, or set himself\nabove its direction.\n\nI. Of Definitions. A definition is, as the term itself indicates, the\nrepresentation, upon primary grounds, of the complete conception of a\nthing within its own limits.[76] Accordingly, an empirical conception\ncannot be defined, it can only be explained. For, as there are in such\na conception only a certain number of marks or signs, which denote a\ncertain class of sensuous objects, we can never be sure that we do not\ncogitate under the word which indicates the same object, at one time a\ngreater, at another a smaller number of signs. Thus, one person may\ncogitate in his conception of gold, in addition to its properties of\nweight, colour, malleability, that of resisting rust, while another\nperson may be ignorant of this quality. We employ certain signs only so\nlong as we require them for the sake of distinction; new observations\nabstract some and add new ones, so that an empirical conception never\nremains within permanent limits. It is, in fact, useless to define a\nconception of this kind. If, for example, we are speaking of water and\nits properties, we do not stop at what we actually think by the word\nwater, but proceed to observation and experiment; and the word, with\nthe few signs attached to it, is more properly a designation than a\nconception of the thing. A definition in this case would evidently be\nnothing more than a determination of the word. In the second place, no\n\u00e0 priori conception, such as those of substance, cause, right, fitness,\nand so on, can be defined. For I can never be sure, that the clear\nrepresentation of a given conception (which is given in a confused\nstate) has been fully developed, until I know that the representation\nis adequate with its object. But, inasmuch as the conception, as it is\npresented to the mind, may contain a number of obscure representations,\nwhich we do not observe in our analysis, although we employ them in our\napplication of the conception, I can never be sure that my analysis is\ncomplete, while examples may make this probable, although they can\nnever demonstrate the fact. Instead of the word definition, I should\nrather employ the term exposition\u2014a more modest expression, which the\ncritic may accept without surrendering his doubts as to the\ncompleteness of the analysis of any such conception. As, therefore,\nneither empirical nor \u00e0 priori conceptions are capable of definition,\nwe have to see whether the only other kind of conceptions\u2014arbitrary\nconceptions\u2014can be subjected to this mental operation. Such a\nconception can always be defined; for I must know thoroughly what I\nwished to cogitate in it, as it was I who created it, and it was not\ngiven to my mind either by the nature of my understanding or by\nexperience. At the same time, I cannot say that, by such a definition,\nI have defined a real object. If the conception is based upon empirical\nconditions, if, for example, I have a conception of a clock for a ship,\nthis arbitrary conception does not assure me of the existence or even\nof the possibility of the object. My definition of such a conception\nwould with more propriety be termed a declaration of a project than a\ndefinition of an object. There are no other conceptions which can bear\ndefinition, except those which contain an arbitrary synthesis, which\ncan be constructed \u00e0 priori. Consequently, the science of mathematics\nalone possesses definitions. For the object here thought is presented \u00e0\npriori in intuition; and thus it can never contain more or less than\nthe conception, because the conception of the object has been given by\nthe definition\u2014and primarily, that is, without deriving the definition\nfrom any other source. Philosophical definitions are, therefore, merely\nexpositions of given conceptions, while mathematical definitions are\nconstructions of conceptions originally formed by the mind itself; the\nformer are produced by analysis, the completeness of which is never\ndemonstratively certain, the latter by a synthesis. In a mathematical\ndefinition the conception is formed, in a philosophical definition it\nis only explained. From this it follows:\n\n [76] The definition must describe the conception completely that is,\n omit none of the marks or signs of which it composed; within its own\n limits, that is, it must be precise, and enumerate no more signs than\n belong to the conception; and on primary grounds, that is to say, the\n limitations of the bounds of the conception must not be deduced from\n other conceptions, as in this case a proof would be necessary, and the\n so-called definition would be incapable of taking its place at the\n head of all the judgements we have to form regarding an object.\n\n\n(a) That we must not imitate, in philosophy, the mathematical usage of\ncommencing with definitions\u2014except by way of hypothesis or experiment.\nFor, as all so-called philosophical definitions are merely analyses of\ngiven conceptions, these conceptions, although only in a confused form,\nmust precede the analysis; and the incomplete exposition must precede\nthe complete, so that we may be able to draw certain inferences from\nthe characteristics which an incomplete analysis has enabled us to\ndiscover, before we attain to the complete exposition or definition of\nthe conception. In one word, a full and clear definition ought, in\nphilosophy, rather to form the conclusion than the commencement of our\nlabours.[77] In mathematics, on the contrary, we cannot have a\nconception prior to the definition; it is the definition which gives us\nthe conception, and it must for this reason form the commencement of\nevery chain of mathematical reasoning.\n\n [77] Philosophy abounds in faulty definitions, especially such as\n contain some of the elements requisite to form a complete definition.\n If a conception could not be employed in reasoning before it had been\n defined, it would fare ill with all philosophical thought. But, as\n incompletely defined conceptions may always be employed without\n detriment to truth, so far as our analysis of the elements contained\n in them proceeds, imperfect definitions, that is, propositions which\n are properly not definitions, but merely approximations thereto, may\n be used with great advantage. In mathematics, definition belongs ad\n esse, in philosophy ad melius esse. It is a difficult task to\n construct a proper definition. Jurists are still without a complete\n definition of the idea of right.\n\n\n(b) Mathematical definitions cannot be erroneous. For the conception is\ngiven only in and through the definition, and thus it contains only\nwhat has been cogitated in the definition. But although a definition\ncannot be incorrect, as regards its content, an error may sometimes,\nalthough seldom, creep into the form. This error consists in a want of\nprecision. Thus the common definition of a circle\u2014that it is a curved\nline, every point in which is equally distant from another point called\nthe centre\u2014is faulty, from the fact that the determination indicated by\nthe word curved is superfluous. For there ought to be a particular\ntheorem, which may be easily proved from the definition, to the effect\nthat every line, which has all its points at equal distances from\nanother point, must be a curved line\u2014that is, that not even the\nsmallest part of it can be straight. Analytical definitions, on the\nother hand, may be erroneous in many respects, either by the\nintroduction of signs which do not actually exist in the conception, or\nby wanting in that completeness which forms the essential of a\ndefinition. In the latter case, the definition is necessarily\ndefective, because we can never be fully certain of the completeness of\nour analysis. For these reasons, the method of definition employed in\nmathematics cannot be imitated in philosophy.\n\n2. Of Axioms. These, in so far as they are immediately certain, are \u00e0\npriori synthetical principles. Now, one conception cannot be connected\nsynthetically and yet immediately with another; because, if we wish to\nproceed out of and beyond a conception, a third mediating cognition is\nnecessary. And, as philosophy is a cognition of reason by the aid of\nconceptions alone, there is to be found in it no principle which\ndeserves to be called an axiom. Mathematics, on the other hand, may\npossess axioms, because it can always connect the predicates of an\nobject \u00e0 priori, and without any mediating term, by means of the\nconstruction of conceptions in intuition. Such is the case with the\nproposition: Three points can always lie in a plane. On the other hand,\nno synthetical principle which is based upon conceptions, can ever be\nimmediately certain (for example, the proposition: Everything that\nhappens has a cause), because I require a mediating term to connect the\ntwo conceptions of event and cause\u2014namely, the condition of\ntime-determination in an experience, and I cannot cognize any such\nprinciple immediately and from conceptions alone. Discursive principles\nare, accordingly, very different from intuitive principles or axioms.\nThe former always require deduction, which in the case of the latter\nmay be altogether dispensed with. Axioms are, for this reason, always\nself-evident, while philosophical principles, whatever may be the\ndegree of certainty they possess, cannot lay any claim to such a\ndistinction. No synthetical proposition of pure transcendental reason\ncan be so evident, as is often rashly enough declared, as the\nstatement, twice two are four. It is true that in the Analytic I\nintroduced into the list of principles of the pure understanding,\ncertain axioms of intuition; but the principle there discussed was not\nitself an axiom, but served merely to present the principle of the\npossibility of axioms in general, while it was really nothing more than\na principle based upon conceptions. For it is one part of the duty of\ntranscendental philosophy to establish the possibility of mathematics\nitself. Philosophy possesses, then, no axioms, and has no right to\nimpose its \u00e0 priori principles upon thought, until it has established\ntheir authority and validity by a thoroughgoing deduction.\n\n3. Of Demonstrations. Only an apodeictic proof, based upon intuition,\ncan be termed a demonstration. Experience teaches us what is, but it\ncannot convince us that it might not have been otherwise. Hence a proof\nupon empirical grounds cannot be apodeictic. \u00c0 priori conceptions, in\ndiscursive cognition, can never produce intuitive certainty or\nevidence, however certain the judgement they present may be.\nMathematics alone, therefore, contains demonstrations, because it does\nnot deduce its cognition from conceptions, but from the construction of\nconceptions, that is, from intuition, which can be given \u00e0 priori in\naccordance with conceptions. The method of algebra, in equations, from\nwhich the correct answer is deduced by reduction, is a kind of\nconstruction\u2014not geometrical, but by symbols\u2014in which all conceptions,\nespecially those of the relations of quantities, are represented in\nintuition by signs; and thus the conclusions in that science are\nsecured from errors by the fact that every proof is submitted to ocular\nevidence. Philosophical cognition does not possess this advantage, it\nbeing required to consider the general always in abstracto (by means of\nconceptions), while mathematics can always consider it in concreto (in\nan individual intuition), and at the same time by means of \u00e0 priori\nrepresentation, whereby all errors are rendered manifest to the senses.\nThe former\u2014discursive proofs\u2014ought to be termed acroamatic proofs,\nrather than demonstrations, as only words are employed in them, while\ndemonstrations proper, as the term itself indicates, always require a\nreference to the intuition of the object.\n\nIt follows from all these considerations that it is not consonant with\nthe nature of philosophy, especially in the sphere of pure reason, to\nemploy the dogmatical method, and to adorn itself with the titles and\ninsignia of mathematical science. It does not belong to that order, and\ncan only hope for a fraternal union with that science. Its attempts at\nmathematical evidence are vain pretensions, which can only keep it back\nfrom its true aim, which is to detect the illusory procedure of reason\nwhen transgressing its proper limits, and by fully explaining and\nanalysing our conceptions, to conduct us from the dim regions of\nspeculation to the clear region of modest self-knowledge. Reason must\nnot, therefore, in its transcendental endeavours, look forward with\nsuch confidence, as if the path it is pursuing led straight to its aim,\nnor reckon with such security upon its premisses, as to consider it\nunnecessary to take a step back, or to keep a strict watch for errors,\nwhich, overlooked in the principles, may be detected in the arguments\nthemselves\u2014in which case it may be requisite either to determine these\nprinciples with greater strictness, or to change them entirely.\n\nI divide all apodeictic propositions, whether demonstrable or\nimmediately certain, into dogmata and mathemata. A direct synthetical\nproposition, based on conceptions, is a dogma; a proposition of the\nsame kind, based on the construction of conceptions, is a mathema.\nAnalytical judgements do not teach us any more about an object than\nwhat was contained in the conception we had of it; because they do not\nextend our cognition beyond our conception of an object, they merely\nelucidate the conception. They cannot therefore be with propriety\ntermed dogmas. Of the two kinds of \u00e0 priori synthetical propositions\nabove mentioned, only those which are employed in philosophy can,\naccording to the general mode of speech, bear this name; those of\narithmetic or geometry would not be rightly so denominated. Thus the\ncustomary mode of speaking confirms the explanation given above, and\nthe conclusion arrived at, that only those judgements which are based\nupon conceptions, not on the construction of conceptions, can be termed\ndogmatical.\n\nThus, pure reason, in the sphere of speculation, does not contain a\nsingle direct synthetical judgement based upon conceptions. By means of\nideas, it is, as we have shown, incapable of producing synthetical\njudgements, which are objectively valid; by means of the conceptions of\nthe understanding, it establishes certain indubitable principles, not,\nhowever, directly on the basis of conceptions, but only indirectly by\nmeans of the relation of these conceptions to something of a purely\ncontingent nature, namely, possible experience. When experience is\npresupposed, these principles are apodeictically certain, but in\nthemselves, and directly, they cannot even be cognized \u00e0 priori. Thus\nthe given conceptions of cause and event will not be sufficient for the\ndemonstration of the proposition: Every event has a cause. For this\nreason, it is not a dogma; although from another point of view, that of\nexperience, it is capable of being proved to demonstration. The proper\nterm for such a proposition is principle, and not theorem (although it\ndoes require to be proved), because it possesses the remarkable\npeculiarity of being the condition of the possibility of its own ground\nof proof, that is, experience, and of forming a necessary\npresupposition in all empirical observation.\n\nIf then, in the speculative sphere of pure reason, no dogmata are to be\nfound; all dogmatical methods, whether borrowed from mathematics, or\ninvented by philosophical thinkers, are alike inappropriate and\ninefficient. They only serve to conceal errors and fallacies, and to\ndeceive philosophy, whose duty it is to see that reason pursues a safe\nand straight path. A philosophical method may, however, be\nsystematical. For our reason is, subjectively considered, itself a\nsystem, and, in the sphere of mere conceptions, a system of\ninvestigation according to principles of unity, the material being\nsupplied by experience alone. But this is not the proper place for\ndiscussing the peculiar method of transcendental philosophy, as our\npresent task is simply to examine whether our faculties are capable of\nerecting an edifice on the basis of pure reason, and how far they may\nproceed with the materials at their command.\n\nSection II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics\n\nReason must be subject, in all its operations, to criticism, which must\nalways be permitted to exercise its functions without restraint;\notherwise its interests are imperilled and its influence obnoxious to\nsuspicion. There is nothing, however useful, however sacred it may be,\nthat can claim exemption from the searching examination of this supreme\ntribunal, which has no respect of persons. The very existence of reason\ndepends upon this freedom; for the voice of reason is not that of a\ndictatorial and despotic power, it is rather like the vote of the\ncitizens of a free state, every member of which must have the privilege\nof giving free expression to his doubts, and possess even the right of\nveto.\n\nBut while reason can never decline to submit itself to the tribunal of\ncriticism, it has not always cause to dread the judgement of this\ncourt. Pure reason, however, when engaged in the sphere of dogmatism,\nis not so thoroughly conscious of a strict observance of its highest\nlaws, as to appear before a higher judicial reason with perfect\nconfidence. On the contrary, it must renounce its magnificent\ndogmatical pretensions in philosophy.\n\nVery different is the case when it has to defend itself, not before a\njudge, but against an equal. If dogmatical assertions are advanced on\nthe negative side, in opposition to those made by reason on the\npositive side, its justification kat authrhopon is complete, although\nthe proof of its propositions is kat aletheian unsatisfactory.\n\nBy the polemic of pure reason I mean the defence of its propositions\nmade by reason, in opposition to the dogmatical counter-propositions\nadvanced by other parties. The question here is not whether its own\nstatements may not also be false; it merely regards the fact that\nreason proves that the opposite cannot be established with\ndemonstrative certainty, nor even asserted with a higher degree of\nprobability. Reason does not hold her possessions upon sufferance; for,\nalthough she cannot show a perfectly satisfactory title to them, no one\ncan prove that she is not the rightful possessor.\n\nIt is a melancholy reflection that reason, in its highest exercise,\nfalls into an antithetic; and that the supreme tribunal for the\nsettlement of differences should not be at union with itself. It is\ntrue that we had to discuss the question of an apparent antithetic, but\nwe found that it was based upon a misconception. In conformity with the\ncommon prejudice, phenomena were regarded as things in themselves, and\nthus an absolute completeness in their synthesis was required in the\none mode or in the other (it was shown to be impossible in both); a\ndemand entirely out of place in regard to phenomena. There was, then,\nno real self-contradiction of reason in the propositions: The series of\nphenomena given in themselves has an absolutely first beginning; and:\nThis series is absolutely and in itself without beginning. The two\npropositions are perfectly consistent with each other, because\nphenomena as phenomena are in themselves nothing, and consequently the\nhypothesis that they are things in themselves must lead to\nself-contradictory inferences.\n\nBut there are cases in which a similar misunderstanding cannot be\nprovided against, and the dispute must remain unsettled. Take, for\nexample, the theistic proposition: There is a Supreme Being; and on the\nother hand, the atheistic counter-statement: There exists no Supreme\nBeing; or, in psychology: Everything that thinks possesses the\nattribute of absolute and permanent unity, which is utterly different\nfrom the transitory unity of material phenomena; and the\ncounter-proposition: The soul is not an immaterial unity, and its\nnature is transitory, like that of phenomena. The objects of these\nquestions contain no heterogeneous or contradictory elements, for they\nrelate to things in themselves, and not to phenomena. There would\narise, indeed, a real contradiction, if reason came forward with a\nstatement on the negative side of these questions alone. As regards the\ncriticism to which the grounds of proof on the affirmative side must be\nsubjected, it may be freely admitted, without necessitating the\nsurrender of the affirmative propositions, which have, at least, the\ninterest of reason in their favour\u2014an advantage which the opposite\nparty cannot lay claim to.\n\nI cannot agree with the opinion of several admirable thinkers\u2014Sulzer\namong the rest\u2014that, in spite of the weakness of the arguments hitherto\nin use, we may hope, one day, to see sufficient demonstrations of the\ntwo cardinal propositions of pure reason\u2014the existence of a Supreme\nBeing, and the immortality of the soul. I am certain, on the contrary,\nthat this will never be the case. For on what ground can reason base\nsuch synthetical propositions, which do not relate to the objects of\nexperience and their internal possibility? But it is also\ndemonstratively certain that no one will ever be able to maintain the\ncontrary with the least show of probability. For, as he can attempt\nsuch a proof solely upon the basis of pure reason, he is bound to prove\nthat a Supreme Being, and a thinking subject in the character of a pure\nintelligence, are impossible. But where will he find the knowledge\nwhich can enable him to enounce synthetical judgements in regard to\nthings which transcend the region of experience? We may, therefore,\nrest assured that the opposite never will be demonstrated. We need not,\nthen, have recourse to scholastic arguments; we may always admit the\ntruth of those propositions which are consistent with the speculative\ninterests of reason in the sphere of experience, and form, moreover,\nthe only means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest.\nOur opponent, who must not be considered here as a critic solely, we\ncan be ready to meet with a non liquet which cannot fail to disconcert\nhim; while we cannot deny his right to a similar retort, as we have on\nour side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of\nreason, and can therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with\ncalm indifference.\n\nFrom this point of view, there is properly no antithetic of pure\nreason. For the only arena for such a struggle would be upon the field\nof pure theology and psychology; but on this ground there can appear no\ncombatant whom we need to fear. Ridicule and boasting can be his only\nweapons; and these may be laughed at, as mere child\u2019s play. This\nconsideration restores to Reason her courage; for what source of\nconfidence could be found, if she, whose vocation it is to destroy\nerror, were at variance with herself and without any reasonable hope of\never reaching a state of permanent repose?\n\nEverything in nature is good for some purpose. Even poisons are\nserviceable; they destroy the evil effects of other poisons generated\nin our system, and must always find a place in every complete\npharmacopoeia. The objections raised against the fallacies and\nsophistries of speculative reason, are objections given by the nature\nof this reason itself, and must therefore have a destination and\npurpose which can only be for the good of humanity. For what purpose\nhas Providence raised many objects, in which we have the deepest\ninterest, so far above us, that we vainly try to cognize them with\ncertainty, and our powers of mental vision are rather excited than\nsatisfied by the glimpses we may chance to seize? It is very doubtful\nwhether it is for our benefit to advance bold affirmations regarding\nsubjects involved in such obscurity; perhaps it would even be\ndetrimental to our best interests. But it is undoubtedly always\nbeneficial to leave the investigating, as well as the critical reason,\nin perfect freedom, and permit it to take charge of its own interests,\nwhich are advanced as much by its limitation, as by its extension of\nits views, and which always suffer by the interference of foreign\npowers forcing it, against its natural tendencies, to bend to certain\npreconceived designs.\n\nAllow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable, and combat him\nonly with the weapons of reason. Have no anxiety for the practical\ninterests of humanity\u2014these are never imperilled in a purely\nspeculative dispute. Such a dispute serves merely to disclose the\nantinomy of reason, which, as it has its source in the nature of\nreason, ought to be thoroughly investigated. Reason is benefited by the\nexamination of a subject on both sides, and its judgements are\ncorrected by being limited. It is not the matter that may give occasion\nto dispute, but the manner. For it is perfectly permissible to employ,\nin the presence of reason, the language of a firmly rooted faith, even\nafter we have been obliged to renounce all pretensions to knowledge.\n\nIf we were to ask the dispassionate David Hume\u2014a philosopher endowed,\nin a degree that few are, with a well-balanced judgement: What motive\ninduced you to spend so much labour and thought in undermining the\nconsoling and beneficial persuasion that reason is capable of assuring\nus of the existence, and presenting us with a determinate conception of\na Supreme Being?\u2014his answer would be: Nothing but the desire of\nteaching reason to know its own powers better, and, at the same time, a\ndislike of the procedure by which that faculty was compelled to support\nforegone conclusions, and prevented from confessing the internal\nweaknesses which it cannot but feel when it enters upon a rigid\nself-examination. If, on the other hand, we were to ask Priestley\u2014a\nphilosopher who had no taste for transcendental speculation, but was\nentirely devoted to the principles of empiricism\u2014what his motives were\nfor overturning those two main pillars of religion\u2014the doctrines of the\nfreedom of the will and the immortality of the soul (in his view the\nhope of a future life is but the expectation of the miracle of\nresurrection)\u2014this philosopher, himself a zealous and pious teacher of\nreligion, could give no other answer than this: I acted in the interest\nof reason, which always suffers, when certain objects are explained and\njudged by a reference to other supposed laws than those of material\nnature\u2014the only laws which we know in a determinate manner. It would be\nunfair to decry the latter philosopher, who endeavoured to harmonize\nhis paradoxical opinions with the interests of religion, and to\nundervalue an honest and reflecting man, because he finds himself at a\nloss the moment he has left the field of natural science. The same\ngrace must be accorded to Hume, a man not less well-disposed, and quite\nas blameless in his moral character, and who pushed his abstract\nspeculations to an extreme length, because, as he rightly believed, the\nobject of them lies entirely beyond the bounds of natural science, and\nwithin the sphere of pure ideas.\n\nWhat is to be done to provide against the danger which seems in the\npresent case to menace the best interests of humanity? The course to be\npursued in reference to this subject is a perfectly plain and natural\none. Let each thinker pursue his own path; if he shows talent, if he\ngives evidence of profound thought, in one word, if he shows that he\npossesses the power of reasoning\u2014reason is always the gainer. If you\nhave recourse to other means, if you attempt to coerce reason, if you\nraise the cry of treason to humanity, if you excite the feelings of the\ncrowd, which can neither understand nor sympathize with such subtle\nspeculations\u2014you will only make yourselves ridiculous. For the question\ndoes not concern the advantage or disadvantage which we are expected to\nreap from such inquiries; the question is merely how far reason can\nadvance in the field of speculation, apart from all kinds of interest,\nand whether we may depend upon the exertions of speculative reason, or\nmust renounce all reliance on it. Instead of joining the combatants, it\nis your part to be a tranquil spectator of the struggle\u2014a laborious\nstruggle for the parties engaged, but attended, in its progress as well\nas in its result, with the most advantageous consequences for the\ninterests of thought and knowledge. It is absurd to expect to be\nenlightened by Reason, and at the same time to prescribe to her what\nside of the question she must adopt. Moreover, reason is sufficiently\nheld in check by its own power, the limits imposed on it by its own\nnature are sufficient; it is unnecessary for you to place over it\nadditional guards, as if its power were dangerous to the constitution\nof the intellectual state. In the dialectic of reason there is no\nvictory gained which need in the least disturb your tranquility.\n\nThe strife of dialectic is a necessity of reason, and we cannot but\nwish that it had been conducted long ere this with that perfect freedom\nwhich ought to be its essential condition. In this case, we should have\nhad at an earlier period a matured and profound criticism, which must\nhave put an end to all dialectical disputes, by exposing the illusions\nand prejudices in which they originated.\n\nThere is in human nature an unworthy propensity\u2014a propensity which,\nlike everything that springs from nature, must in its final purpose be\nconducive to the good of humanity\u2014to conceal our real sentiments, and\nto give expression only to certain received opinions, which are\nregarded as at once safe and promotive of the common good. It is true,\nthis tendency, not only to conceal our real sentiments, but to profess\nthose which may gain us favour in the eyes of society, has not only\ncivilized, but, in a certain measure, moralized us; as no one can break\nthrough the outward covering of respectability, honour, and morality,\nand thus the seemingly-good examples which we see around us form an\nexcellent school for moral improvement, so long as our belief in their\ngenuineness remains unshaken. But this disposition to represent\nourselves as better than we are, and to utter opinions which are not\nour own, can be nothing more than a kind of provisionary arrangement of\nnature to lead us from the rudeness of an uncivilized state, and to\nteach us how to assume at least the appearance and manner of the good\nwe see. But when true principles have been developed, and have obtained\na sure foundation in our habit of thought, this conventionalism must be\nattacked with earnest vigour, otherwise it corrupts the heart, and\nchecks the growth of good dispositions with the mischievous weed of\nfair appearances.\n\nI am sorry to remark the same tendency to misrepresentation and\nhypocrisy in the sphere of speculative discussion, where there is less\ntemptation to restrain the free expression of thought. For what can be\nmore prejudicial to the interests of intelligence than to falsify our\nreal sentiments, to conceal the doubts which we feel in regard to our\nstatements, or to maintain the validity of grounds of proof which we\nwell know to be insufficient? So long as mere personal vanity is the\nsource of these unworthy artifices\u2014and this is generally the case in\nspeculative discussions, which are mostly destitute of practical\ninterest, and are incapable of complete demonstration\u2014the vanity of the\nopposite party exaggerates as much on the other side; and thus the\nresult is the same, although it is not brought about so soon as if the\ndispute had been conducted in a sincere and upright spirit. But where\nthe mass entertains the notion that the aim of certain subtle\nspeculators is nothing less than to shake the very foundations of\npublic welfare and morality\u2014it seems not only prudent, but even praise\nworthy, to maintain the good cause by illusory arguments, rather than\nto give to our supposed opponents the advantage of lowering our\ndeclarations to the moderate tone of a merely practical conviction, and\nof compelling us to confess our inability to attain to apodeictic\ncertainty in speculative subjects. But we ought to reflect that there\nis nothing, in the world more fatal to the maintenance of a good cause\nthan deceit, misrepresentation, and falsehood. That the strictest laws\nof honesty should be observed in the discussion of a purely speculative\nsubject is the least requirement that can be made. If we could reckon\nwith security even upon so little, the conflict of speculative reason\nregarding the important questions of God, immortality, and freedom,\nwould have been either decided long ago, or would very soon be brought\nto a conclusion. But, in general, the uprightness of the defence stands\nin an inverse ratio to the goodness of the cause; and perhaps more\nhonesty and fairness are shown by those who deny than by those who\nuphold these doctrines.\n\nI shall persuade myself, then, that I have readers who do not wish to\nsee a righteous cause defended by unfair arguments. Such will now\nrecognize the fact that, according to the principles of this Critique,\nif we consider not what is, but what ought to be the case, there can be\nreally no polemic of pure reason. For how can two persons dispute about\na thing, the reality of which neither can present in actual or even in\npossible experience? Each adopts the plan of meditating on his idea for\nthe purpose of drawing from the idea, if he can, what is more than the\nidea, that is, the reality of the object which it indicates. How shall\nthey settle the dispute, since neither is able to make his assertions\ndirectly comprehensible and certain, but must restrict himself to\nattacking and confuting those of his opponent? All statements enounced\nby pure reason transcend the conditions of possible experience, beyond\nthe sphere of which we can discover no criterion of truth, while they\nare at the same time framed in accordance with the laws of the\nunderstanding, which are applicable only to experience; and thus it is\nthe fate of all such speculative discussions that while the one party\nattacks the weaker side of his opponent, he infallibly lays open his\nown weaknesses.\n\nThe critique of pure reason may be regarded as the highest tribunal for\nall speculative disputes; for it is not involved in these disputes,\nwhich have an immediate relation to certain objects and not to the laws\nof the mind, but is instituted for the purpose of determining the\nrights and limits of reason.\n\nWithout the control of criticism, reason is, as it were, in a state of\nnature, and can only establish its claims and assertions by war.\nCriticism, on the contrary, deciding all questions according to the\nfundamental laws of its own institution, secures to us the peace of law\nand order, and enables us to discuss all differences in the more\ntranquil manner of a legal process. In the former case, disputes are\nended by victory, which both sides may claim and which is followed by a\nhollow armistice; in the latter, by a sentence, which, as it strikes at\nthe root of all speculative differences, ensures to all concerned a\nlasting peace. The endless disputes of a dogmatizing reason compel us\nto look for some mode of arriving at a settled decision by a critical\ninvestigation of reason itself; just as Hobbes maintains that the state\nof nature is a state of injustice and violence, and that we must leave\nit and submit ourselves to the constraint of law, which indeed limits\nindividual freedom, but only that it may consist with the freedom of\nothers and with the common good of all.\n\nThis freedom will, among other things, permit of our openly stating the\ndifficulties and doubts which we are ourselves unable to solve, without\nbeing decried on that account as turbulent and dangerous citizens. This\nprivilege forms part of the native rights of human reason, which\nrecognizes no other judge than the universal reason of humanity; and as\nthis reason is the source of all progress and improvement, such a\nprivilege is to be held sacred and inviolable. It is unwise, moreover,\nto denounce as dangerous any bold assertions against, or rash attacks\nupon, an opinion which is held by the largest and most moral class of\nthe community; for that would be giving them an importance which they\ndo not deserve. When I hear that the freedom of the will, the hope of a\nfuture life, and the existence of God have been overthrown by the\narguments of some able writer, I feel a strong desire to read his book;\nfor I expect that he will add to my knowledge and impart greater\nclearness and distinctness to my views by the argumentative power shown\nin his writings. But I am perfectly certain, even before I have opened\nthe book, that he has not succeeded in a single point, not because I\nbelieve I am in possession of irrefutable demonstrations of these\nimportant propositions, but because this transcendental critique, which\nhas disclosed to me the power and the limits of pure reason, has fully\nconvinced me that, as it is insufficient to establish the affirmative,\nit is as powerless, and even more so, to assure us of the truth of the\nnegative answer to these questions. From what source does this\nfree-thinker derive his knowledge that there is, for example, no\nSupreme Being? This proposition lies out of the field of possible\nexperience, and, therefore, beyond the limits of human cognition. But I\nwould not read at, all the answer which the dogmatical maintainer of\nthe good cause makes to his opponent, because I know well beforehand,\nthat he will merely attack the fallacious grounds of his adversary,\nwithout being able to establish his own assertions. Besides, a new\nillusory argument, in the construction of which talent and acuteness\nare shown, is suggestive of new ideas and new trains of reasoning, and\nin this respect the old and everyday sophistries are quite useless.\nAgain, the dogmatical opponent of religion gives employment to\ncriticism, and enables us to test and correct its principles, while\nthere is no occasion for anxiety in regard to the influence and results\nof his reasoning.\n\nBut, it will be said, must we not warn the youth entrusted to\nacademical care against such writings, must we not preserve them from\nthe knowledge of these dangerous assertions, until their judgement is\nripened, or rather until the doctrines which we wish to inculcate are\nso firmly rooted in their minds as to withstand all attempts at\ninstilling the contrary dogmas, from whatever quarter they may come?\n\nIf we are to confine ourselves to the dogmatical procedure in the\nsphere of pure reason, and find ourselves unable to settle such\ndisputes otherwise than by becoming a party in them, and setting\ncounter-assertions against the statements advanced by our opponents,\nthere is certainly no plan more advisable for the moment, but, at the\nsame time, none more absurd and inefficient for the future, than this\nretaining of the youthful mind under guardianship for a time, and thus\npreserving it\u2014for so long at least\u2014from seduction into error. But when,\nat a later period, either curiosity, or the prevalent fashion of\nthought places such writings in their hands, will the so-called\nconvictions of their youth stand firm? The young thinker, who has in\nhis armoury none but dogmatical weapons with which to resist the\nattacks of his opponent, and who cannot detect the latent dialectic\nwhich lies in his own opinions as well as in those of the opposite\nparty, sees the advance of illusory arguments and grounds of proof\nwhich have the advantage of novelty, against as illusory grounds of\nproof destitute of this advantage, and which, perhaps, excite the\nsuspicion that the natural credulity of his youth has been abused by\nhis instructors. He thinks he can find no better means of showing that\nhe has out grown the discipline of his minority than by despising those\nwell-meant warnings, and, knowing no system of thought but that of\ndogmatism, he drinks deep draughts of the poison that is to sap the\nprinciples in which his early years were trained.\n\nExactly the opposite of the system here recommended ought to be pursued\nin academical instruction. This can only be effected, however, by a\nthorough training in the critical investigation of pure reason. For, in\norder to bring the principles of this critique into exercise as soon as\npossible, and to demonstrate their perfect even in the presence of the\nhighest degree of dialectical illusion, the student ought to examine\nthe assertions made on both sides of speculative questions step by\nstep, and to test them by these principles. It cannot be a difficult\ntask for him to show the fallacies inherent in these propositions, and\nthus he begins early to feel his own power of securing himself against\nthe influence of such sophistical arguments, which must finally lose,\nfor him, all their illusory power. And, although the same blows which\noverturn the edifice of his opponent are as fatal to his own\nspeculative structures, if such he has wished to rear; he need not feel\nany sorrow in regard to this seeming misfortune, as he has now before\nhim a fair prospect into the practical region in which he may\nreasonably hope to find a more secure foundation for a rational system.\n\nThere is, accordingly, no proper polemic in the sphere of pure reason.\nBoth parties beat the air and fight with their own shadows, as they\npass beyond the limits of nature, and can find no tangible point of\nattack\u2014no firm footing for their dogmatical conflict. Fight as\nvigorously as they may, the shadows which they hew down, immediately\nstart up again, like the heroes in Walhalla, and renew the bloodless\nand unceasing contest.\n\nBut neither can we admit that there is any proper sceptical employment\nof pure reason, such as might be based upon the principle of neutrality\nin all speculative disputes. To excite reason against itself, to place\nweapons in the hands of the party on the one side as well as in those\nof the other, and to remain an undisturbed and sarcastic spectator of\nthe fierce struggle that ensues, seems, from the dogmatical point of\nview, to be a part fitting only a malevolent disposition. But, when the\nsophist evidences an invincible obstinacy and blindness, and a pride\nwhich no criticism can moderate, there is no other practicable course\nthan to oppose to this pride and obstinacy similar feelings and\npretensions on the other side, equally well or ill founded, so that\nreason, staggered by the reflections thus forced upon it, finds it\nnecessary to moderate its confidence in such pretensions and to listen\nto the advice of criticism. But we cannot stop at these doubts, much\nless regard the conviction of our ignorance, not only as a cure for the\nconceit natural to dogmatism, but as the settlement of the disputes in\nwhich reason is involved with itself. On the contrary, scepticism is\nmerely a means of awakening reason from its dogmatic dreams and\nexciting it to a more careful investigation into its own powers and\npretensions. But, as scepticism appears to be the shortest road to a\npermanent peace in the domain of philosophy, and as it is the track\npursued by the many who aim at giving a philosophical colouring to\ntheir contemptuous dislike of all inquiries of this kind, I think it\nnecessary to present to my readers this mode of thought in its true\nlight.\n\n_Scepticism not a Permanent State for Human Reason._\n\nThe consciousness of ignorance\u2014unless this ignorance is recognized to\nbe absolutely necessary ought, instead of forming the conclusion of my\ninquiries, to be the strongest motive to the pursuit of them. All\nignorance is either ignorance of things or of the limits of knowledge.\nIf my ignorance is accidental and not necessary, it must incite me, in\nthe first case, to a dogmatical inquiry regarding the objects of which\nI am ignorant; in the second, to a critical investigation into the\nbounds of all possible knowledge. But that my ignorance is absolutely\nnecessary and unavoidable, and that it consequently absolves from the\nduty of all further investigation, is a fact which cannot be made out\nupon empirical grounds\u2014from observation\u2014but upon critical grounds\nalone, that is, by a thoroughgoing investigation into the primary\nsources of cognition. It follows that the determination of the bounds\nof reason can be made only on \u00e0 priori grounds; while the empirical\nlimitation of reason, which is merely an indeterminate cognition of an\nignorance that can never be completely removed, can take place only \u00e0\nposteriori. In other words, our empirical knowledge is limited by that\nwhich yet remains for us to know. The former cognition of our\nignorance, which is possible only on a rational basis, is a science;\nthe latter is merely a perception, and we cannot say how far the\ninferences drawn from it may extend. If I regard the earth, as it\nreally appears to my senses, as a flat surface, I am ignorant how far\nthis surface extends. But experience teaches me that, how far soever I\ngo, I always see before me a space in which I can proceed farther; and\nthus I know the limits\u2014merely visual\u2014of my actual knowledge of the\nearth, although I am ignorant of the limits of the earth itself. But if\nI have got so far as to know that the earth is a sphere, and that its\nsurface is spherical, I can cognize \u00e0 priori and determine upon\nprinciples, from my knowledge of a small part of this surface\u2014say to\nthe extent of a degree\u2014the diameter and circumference of the earth; and\nalthough I am ignorant of the objects which this surface contains, I\nhave a perfect knowledge of its limits and extent.\n\nThe sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems to us to be\na level surface, with an apparent horizon\u2014that which forms the limit of\nits extent, and which has been termed by us the idea of unconditioned\ntotality. To reach this limit by empirical means is impossible, and all\nattempts to determine it \u00e0 priori according to a principle, are alike\nin vain. But all the questions raised by pure reason relate to that\nwhich lies beyond this horizon, or, at least, in its boundary line.\n\nThe celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers of human reason\nwho believe that they have given a sufficient answer to all such\nquestions by declaring them to lie beyond the horizon of our\nknowledge\u2014a horizon which, however, Hume was unable to determine. His\nattention especially was directed to the principle of causality; and he\nremarked with perfect justice that the truth of this principle, and\neven the objective validity of the conception of a cause, was not\ncommonly based upon clear insight, that is, upon \u00e0 priori cognition.\nHence he concluded that this law does not derive its authority from its\nuniversality and necessity, but merely from its general applicability\nin the course of experience, and a kind of subjective necessity thence\narising, which he termed habit. From the inability of reason to\nestablish this principle as a necessary law for the acquisition of all\nexperience, he inferred the nullity of all the attempts of reason to\npass the region of the empirical.\n\nThis procedure of subjecting the facta of reason to examination, and,\nif necessary, to disapproval, may be termed the censura of reason. This\ncensura must inevitably lead us to doubts regarding all transcendent\nemployment of principles. But this is only the second step in our\ninquiry. The first step in regard to the subjects of pure reason, and\nwhich marks the infancy of that faculty, is that of dogmatism. The\nsecond, which we have just mentioned, is that of scepticism, and it\ngives evidence that our judgement has been improved by experience. But\na third step is necessary\u2014indicative of the maturity and manhood of the\njudgement, which now lays a firm foundation upon universal and\nnecessary principles. This is the period of criticism, in which we do\nnot examine the facta of reason, but reason itself, in the whole extent\nof its powers, and in regard to its capability of \u00e0 priori cognition;\nand thus we determine not merely the empirical and ever-shifting bounds\nof our knowledge, but its necessary and eternal limits. We demonstrate\nfrom indubitable principles, not merely our ignorance in respect to\nthis or that subject, but in regard to all possible questions of a\ncertain class. Thus scepticism is a resting place for reason, in which\nit may reflect on its dogmatical wanderings and gain some knowledge of\nthe region in which it happens to be, that it may pursue its way with\ngreater certainty; but it cannot be its permanent dwelling-place. It\nmust take up its abode only in the region of complete certitude,\nwhether this relates to the cognition of objects themselves, or to the\nlimits which bound all our cognition.\n\nReason is not to be considered as an indefinitely extended plane, of\nthe bounds of which we have only a general knowledge; it ought rather\nto be compared to a sphere, the radius of which may be found from the\ncurvature of its surface\u2014that is, the nature of \u00e0 priori synthetical\npropositions\u2014and, consequently, its circumference and extent. Beyond\nthe sphere of experience there are no objects which it can cognize;\nnay, even questions regarding such supposititious objects relate only\nto the subjective principles of a complete determination of the\nrelations which exist between the understanding-conceptions which lie\nwithin this sphere.\n\nWe are actually in possession of \u00e0 priori synthetical cognitions, as is\nproved by the existence of the principles of the understanding, which\nanticipate experience. If any one cannot comprehend the possibility of\nthese principles, he may have some reason to doubt whether they are\nreally \u00e0 priori; but he cannot on this account declare them to be\nimpossible, and affirm the nullity of the steps which reason may have\ntaken under their guidance. He can only say: If we perceived their\norigin and their authenticity, we should be able to determine the\nextent and limits of reason; but, till we can do this, all propositions\nregarding the latter are mere random assertions. In this view, the\ndoubt respecting all dogmatical philosophy, which proceeds without the\nguidance of criticism, is well grounded; but we cannot therefore deny\nto reason the ability to construct a sound philosophy, when the way has\nbeen prepared by a thorough critical investigation. All the conceptions\nproduced, and all the questions raised, by pure reason, do not lie in\nthe sphere of experience, but in that of reason itself, and hence they\nmust be solved, and shown to be either valid or inadmissible, by that\nfaculty. We have no right to decline the solution of such problems, on\nthe ground that the solution can be discovered only from the nature of\nthings, and under pretence of the limitation of human faculties, for\nreason is the sole creator of all these ideas, and is therefore bound\neither to establish their validity or to expose their illusory nature.\n\nThe polemic of scepticism is properly directed against the dogmatist,\nwho erects a system of philosophy without having examined the\nfundamental objective principles on which it is based, for the purpose\nof evidencing the futility of his designs, and thus bringing him to a\nknowledge of his own powers. But, in itself, scepticism does not give\nus any certain information in regard to the bounds of our knowledge.\nAll unsuccessful dogmatical attempts of reason are facia, which it is\nalways useful to submit to the censure of the sceptic. But this cannot\nhelp us to any decision regarding the expectations which reason\ncherishes of better success in future endeavours; the investigations of\nscepticism cannot, therefore, settle the dispute regarding the rights\nand powers of human reason.\n\nHume is perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of all sceptical\nphilosophers, and his writings have, undoubtedly, exerted the most\npowerful influence in awakening reason to a thorough investigation into\nits own powers. It will, therefore, well repay our labours to consider\nfor a little the course of reasoning which he followed and the errors\ninto which he strayed, although setting out on the path of truth and\ncertitude.\n\nHume was probably aware, although he never clearly developed the\nnotion, that we proceed in judgements of a certain class beyond our\nconception of the object. I have termed this kind of judgement\nsynthetical. As regard the manner in which I pass beyond my conception\nby the aid of experience, no doubts can be entertained. Experience is\nitself a synthesis of perceptions; and it employs perceptions to\nincrement the conception, which I obtain by means of another\nperception. But we feel persuaded that we are able to proceed beyond a\nconception, and to extend our cognition \u00e0 priori. We attempt this in\ntwo ways\u2014either, through the pure understanding, in relation to that\nwhich may become an object of experience, or, through pure reason, in\nrelation to such properties of things, or of the existence of things,\nas can never be presented in any experience. This sceptical philosopher\ndid not distinguish these two kinds of judgements, as he ought to have\ndone, but regarded this augmentation of conceptions, and, if we may so\nexpress ourselves, the spontaneous generation of understanding and\nreason, independently of the impregnation of experience, as altogether\nimpossible. The so-called \u00e0 priori principles of these faculties he\nconsequently held to be invalid and imaginary, and regarded them as\nnothing but subjective habits of thought originating in experience, and\ntherefore purely empirical and contingent rules, to which we attribute\na spurious necessity and universality. In support of this strange\nassertion, he referred us to the generally acknowledged principle of\nthe relation between cause and effect. No faculty of the mind can\nconduct us from the conception of a thing to the existence of something\nelse; and hence he believed he could infer that, without experience, we\npossess no source from which we can augment a conception, and no ground\nsufficient to justify us in framing a judgement that is to extend our\ncognition \u00e0 priori. That the light of the sun, which shines upon a\npiece of wax, at the same time melts it, while it hardens clay, no\npower of the understanding could infer from the conceptions which we\npreviously possessed of these substances; much less is there any \u00e0\npriori law that could conduct us to such a conclusion, which experience\nalone can certify. On the other hand, we have seen in our discussion of\ntranscendental logic, that, although we can never proceed immediately\nbeyond the content of the conception which is given us, we can always\ncognize completely \u00e0 priori\u2014in relation, however, to a third term,\nnamely, possible experience\u2014the law of its connection with other\nthings. For example, if I observe that a piece of wax melts, I can\ncognize \u00e0 priori that there must have been something (the sun\u2019s heat)\npreceding, which this law; although, without the aid of experience, I\ncould not cognize \u00e0 priori and in a determinate manner either the cause\nfrom the effect, or the effect from the cause. Hume was, therefore,\nwrong in inferring, from the contingency of the determination according\nto law, the contingency of the law itself; and the passing beyond the\nconception of a thing to possible experience (which is an \u00e0 priori\nproceeding, constituting the objective reality of the conception), he\nconfounded with our synthesis of objects in actual experience, which is\nalways, of course, empirical. Thus, too, he regarded the principle of\naffinity, which has its seat in the understanding and indicates a\nnecessary connection, as a mere rule of association, lying in the\nimitative faculty of imagination, which can present only contingent,\nand not objective connections.\n\nThe sceptical errors of this remarkably acute thinker arose principally\nfrom a defect, which was common to him with the dogmatists, namely,\nthat he had never made a systematic review of all the different kinds\nof \u00e0 priori synthesis performed by the understanding. Had he done so,\nhe would have found, to take one example among many, that the principle\nof permanence was of this character, and that it, as well as the\nprinciple of causality, anticipates experience. In this way he might\nhave been able to describe the determinate limits of the \u00e0 priori\noperations of understanding and reason. But he merely declared the\nunderstanding to be limited, instead of showing what its limits were;\nhe created a general mistrust in the power of our faculties, without\ngiving us any determinate knowledge of the bounds of our necessary and\nunavoidable ignorance; he examined and condemned some of the principles\nof the understanding, without investigating all its powers with the\ncompleteness necessary to criticism. He denies, with truth, certain\npowers to the understanding, but he goes further, and declares it to be\nutterly inadequate to the \u00e0 priori extension of knowledge, although he\nhas not fully examined all the powers which reside in the faculty; and\nthus the fate which always overtakes scepticism meets him too. That is\nto say, his own declarations are doubted, for his objections were based\nupon facta, which are contingent, and not upon principles, which can\nalone demonstrate the necessary invalidity of all dogmatical\nassertions.\n\nAs Hume makes no distinction between the well-grounded claims of the\nunderstanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason, against which,\nhowever, his attacks are mainly directed, reason does not feel itself\nshut out from all attempts at the extension of \u00e0 priori cognition, and\nhence it refuses, in spite of a few checks in this or that quarter, to\nrelinquish such efforts. For one naturally arms oneself to resist an\nattack, and becomes more obstinate in the resolve to establish the\nclaims he has advanced. But a complete review of the powers of reason,\nand the conviction thence arising that we are in possession of a\nlimited field of action, while we must admit the vanity of higher\nclaims, puts an end to all doubt and dispute, and induces reason to\nrest satisfied with the undisturbed possession of its limited domain.\n\nTo the uncritical dogmatist, who has not surveyed the sphere of his\nunderstanding, nor determined, in accordance with principles, the\nlimits of possible cognition, who, consequently, is ignorant of his own\npowers, and believes he will discover them by the attempts he makes in\nthe field of cognition, these attacks of scepticism are not only\ndangerous, but destructive. For if there is one proposition in his\nchain of reasoning which he cannot prove, or the fallacy in which he\ncannot evolve in accordance with a principle, suspicion falls on all\nhis statements, however plausible they may appear.\n\nAnd thus scepticism, the bane of dogmatical philosophy, conducts us to\na sound investigation into the understanding and the reason. When we\nare thus far advanced, we need fear no further attacks; for the limits\nof our domain are clearly marked out, and we can make no claims nor\nbecome involved in any disputes regarding the region that lies beyond\nthese limits. Thus the sceptical procedure in philosophy does not\npresent any solution of the problems of reason, but it forms an\nexcellent exercise for its powers, awakening its circumspection, and\nindicating the means whereby it may most fully establish its claims to\nits legitimate possessions.\n\nSection III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis\n\nThis critique of reason has now taught us that all its efforts to\nextend the bounds of knowledge, by means of pure speculation, are\nutterly fruitless. So much the wider field, it may appear, lies open to\nhypothesis; as, where we cannot know with certainty, we are at liberty\nto make guesses and to form suppositions.\n\nImagination may be allowed, under the strict surveillance of reason, to\ninvent suppositions; but, these must be based on something that is\nperfectly certain\u2014and that is the possibility of the object. If we are\nwell assured upon this point, it is allowable to have recourse to\nsupposition in regard to the reality of the object; but this\nsupposition must, unless it is utterly groundless, be connected, as its\nground of explanation, with that which is really given and absolutely\ncertain. Such a supposition is termed a hypothesis.\n\nIt is beyond our power to form the least conception \u00e0 priori of the\npossibility of dynamical connection in phenomena; and the category of\nthe pure understanding will not enable us to excogitate any such\nconnection, but merely helps us to understand it, when we meet with it\nin experience. For this reason we cannot, in accordance with the\ncategories, imagine or invent any object or any property of an object\nnot given, or that may not be given in experience, and employ it in a\nhypothesis; otherwise, we should be basing our chain of reasoning upon\nmere chimerical fancies, and not upon conceptions of things. Thus, we\nhave no right to assume the existence of new powers, not existing in\nnature\u2014for example, an understanding with a non-sensuous intuition, a\nforce of attraction without contact, or some new kind of substances\noccupying space, and yet without the property of impenetrability\u2014and,\nconsequently, we cannot assume that there is any other kind of\ncommunity among substances than that observable in experience, any kind\nof presence than that in space, or any kind of duration than that in\ntime. In one word, the conditions of possible experience are for reason\nthe only conditions of the possibility of things; reason cannot venture\nto form, independently of these conditions, any conceptions of things,\nbecause such conceptions, although not self-contradictory, are without\nobject and without application.\n\nThe conceptions of reason are, as we have already shown, mere ideas,\nand do not relate to any object in any kind of experience. At the same\ntime, they do not indicate imaginary or possible objects. They are\npurely problematical in their nature and, as aids to the heuristic\nexercise of the faculties, form the basis of the regulative principles\nfor the systematic employment of the understanding in the field of\nexperience. If we leave this ground of experience, they become mere\nfictions of thought, the possibility of which is quite indemonstrable;\nand they cannot, consequently, be employed as hypotheses in the\nexplanation of real phenomena. It is quite admissible to cogitate the\nsoul as simple, for the purpose of enabling ourselves to employ the\nidea of a perfect and necessary unity of all the faculties of the mind\nas the principle of all our inquiries into its internal phenomena,\nalthough we cannot cognize this unity in concreto. But to assume that\nthe soul is a simple substance (a transcendental conception) would be\nenouncing a proposition which is not only indemonstrable\u2014as many\nphysical hypotheses are\u2014but a proposition which is purely arbitrary,\nand in the highest degree rash. The simple is never presented in\nexperience; and, if by substance is here meant the permanent object of\nsensuous intuition, the possibility of a simple phenomenon is perfectly\ninconceivable. Reason affords no good grounds for admitting the\nexistence of intelligible beings, or of intelligible properties of\nsensuous things, although\u2014as we have no conception either of their\npossibility or of their impossibility\u2014it will always be out of our\npower to affirm dogmatically that they do not exist. In the explanation\nof given phenomena, no other things and no other grounds of explanation\ncan be employed than those which stand in connection with the given\nphenomena according to the known laws of experience. A transcendental\nhypothesis, in which a mere idea of reason is employed to explain the\nphenomena of nature, would not give us any better insight into a\nphenomenon, as we should be trying to explain what we do not\nsufficiently understand from known empirical principles, by what we do\nnot understand at all. The principles of such a hypothesis might\nconduce to the satisfaction of reason, but it would not assist the\nunderstanding in its application to objects. Order and conformity to\naims in the sphere of nature must be themselves explained upon natural\ngrounds and according to natural laws; and the wildest hypotheses, if\nthey are only physical, are here more admissible than a hyperphysical\nhypothesis, such as that of a divine author. For such a hypothesis\nwould introduce the principle of ignava ratio, which requires us to\ngive up the search for causes that might be discovered in the course of\nexperience and to rest satisfied with a mere idea. As regards the\nabsolute totality of the grounds of explanation in the series of these\ncauses, this can be no hindrance to the understanding in the case of\nphenomena; because, as they are to us nothing more than phenomena, we\nhave no right to look for anything like completeness in the synthesis\nof the series of their conditions.\n\nTranscendental hypotheses are therefore inadmissible; and we cannot use\nthe liberty of employing, in the absence of physical, hyperphysical\ngrounds of explanation. And this for two reasons; first, because such\nhypothesis do not advance reason, but rather stop it in its progress;\nsecondly, because this licence would render fruitless all its exertions\nin its own proper sphere, which is that of experience. For, when the\nexplanation of natural phenomena happens to be difficult, we have\nconstantly at hand a transcendental ground of explanation, which lifts\nus above the necessity of investigating nature; and our inquiries are\nbrought to a close, not because we have obtained all the requisite\nknowledge, but because we abut upon a principle which is\nincomprehensible and which, indeed, is so far back in the track of\nthought as to contain the conception of the absolutely primal being.\n\nThe next requisite for the admissibility of a hypothesis is its\nsufficiency. That is, it must determine \u00e0 priori the consequences which\nare given in experience and which are supposed to follow from the\nhypothesis itself. If we require to employ auxiliary hypotheses, the\nsuspicion naturally arises that they are mere fictions; because the\nnecessity for each of them requires the same justification as in the\ncase of the original hypothesis, and thus their testimony is invalid.\nIf we suppose the existence of an infinitely perfect cause, we possess\nsufficient grounds for the explanation of the conformity to aims, the\norder and the greatness which we observe in the universe; but we find\nourselves obliged, when we observe the evil in the world and the\nexceptions to these laws, to employ new hypothesis in support of the\noriginal one. We employ the idea of the simple nature of the human soul\nas the foundation of all the theories we may form of its phenomena; but\nwhen we meet with difficulties in our way, when we observe in the soul\nphenomena similar to the changes which take place in matter, we require\nto call in new auxiliary hypotheses. These may, indeed, not be false,\nbut we do not know them to be true, because the only witness to their\ncertitude is the hypothesis which they themselves have been called in\nto explain.\n\nWe are not discussing the above-mentioned assertions regarding the\nimmaterial unity of the soul and the existence of a Supreme Being as\ndogmata, which certain philosophers profess to demonstrate \u00e0 priori,\nbut purely as hypotheses. In the former case, the dogmatist must take\ncare that his arguments possess the apodeictic certainty of a\ndemonstration. For the assertion that the reality of such ideas is\nprobable is as absurd as a proof of the probability of a proposition in\ngeometry. Pure abstract reason, apart from all experience, can either\ncognize nothing at all; and hence the judgements it enounces are never\nmere opinions, they are either apodeictic certainties, or declarations\nthat nothing can be known on the subject. Opinions and probable\njudgements on the nature of things can only be employed to explain\ngiven phenomena, or they may relate to the effect, in accordance with\nempirical laws, of an actually existing cause. In other words, we must\nrestrict the sphere of opinion to the world of experience and nature.\nBeyond this region opinion is mere invention; unless we are groping\nabout for the truth on a path not yet fully known, and have some hopes\nof stumbling upon it by chance.\n\nBut, although hypotheses are inadmissible in answers to the questions\nof pure speculative reason, they may be employed in the defence of\nthese answers. That is to say, hypotheses are admissible in polemic,\nbut not in the sphere of dogmatism. By the defence of statements of\nthis character, I do not mean an attempt at discovering new grounds for\ntheir support, but merely the refutation of the arguments of opponents.\nAll \u00e0 priori synthetical propositions possess the peculiarity that,\nalthough the philosopher who maintains the reality of the ideas\ncontained in the proposition is not in possession of sufficient\nknowledge to establish the certainty of his statements, his opponent is\nas little able to prove the truth of the opposite. This equality of\nfortune does not allow the one party to be superior to the other in the\nsphere of speculative cognition; and it is this sphere, accordingly,\nthat is the proper arena of these endless speculative conflicts. But we\nshall afterwards show that, in relation to its practical exercise,\nReason has the right of admitting what, in the field of pure\nspeculation, she would not be justified in supposing, except upon\nperfectly sufficient grounds; because all such suppositions destroy the\nnecessary completeness of speculation\u2014a condition which the practical\nreason, however, does not consider to be requisite. In this sphere,\ntherefore, Reason is mistress of a possession, her title to which she\ndoes not require to prove\u2014which, in fact, she could not do. The burden\nof proof accordingly rests upon the opponent. But as he has just as\nlittle knowledge regarding the subject discussed, and is as little able\nto prove the non-existence of the object of an idea, as the philosopher\non the other side is to demonstrate its reality, it is evident that\nthere is an advantage on the side of the philosopher who maintains his\nproposition as a practically necessary supposition (melior est conditio\npossidentis). For he is at liberty to employ, in self-defence, the same\nweapons as his opponent makes use of in attacking him; that is, he has\na right to use hypotheses not for the purpose of supporting the\narguments in favour of his own propositions, but to show that his\nopponent knows no more than himself regarding the subject under\ndiscussion and cannot boast of any speculative advantage.\n\nHypotheses are, therefore, admissible in the sphere of pure reason only\nas weapons for self-defence, and not as supports to dogmatical\nassertions. But the opposing party we must always seek for in\nourselves. For speculative reason is, in the sphere of\ntranscendentalism, dialectical in its own nature. The difficulties and\nobjections we have to fear lie in ourselves. They are like old but\nnever superannuated claims; and we must seek them out, and settle them\nonce and for ever, if we are to expect a permanent peace. External\ntranquility is hollow and unreal. The root of these contradictions,\nwhich lies in the nature of human reason, must be destroyed; and this\ncan only be done by giving it, in the first instance, freedom to grow,\nnay, by nourishing it, that it may send out shoots, and thus betray its\nown existence. It is our duty, therefore, to try to discover new\nobjections, to put weapons in the bands of our opponent, and to grant\nhim the most favourable position in the arena that he can wish. We have\nnothing to fear from these concessions; on the contrary, we may rather\nhope that we shall thus make ourselves master of a possession which no\none will ever venture to dispute.\n\nThe thinker requires, to be fully equipped, the hypotheses of pure\nreason, which, although but leaden weapons (for they have not been\nsteeled in the armoury of experience), are as useful as any that can be\nemployed by his opponents. If, accordingly, we have assumed, from a\nnon-speculative point of view, the immaterial nature of the soul, and\nare met by the objection that experience seems to prove that the growth\nand decay of our mental faculties are mere modifications of the\nsensuous organism\u2014we can weaken the force of this objection by the\nassumption that the body is nothing but the fundamental phenomenon, to\nwhich, as a necessary condition, all sensibility, and consequently all\nthought, relates in the present state of our existence; and that the\nseparation of soul and body forms the conclusion of the sensuous\nexercise of our power of cognition and the beginning of the\nintellectual. The body would, in this view of the question, be\nregarded, not as the cause of thought, but merely as its restrictive\ncondition, as promotive of the sensuous and animal, but as a hindrance\nto the pure and spiritual life; and the dependence of the animal life\non the constitution of the body, would not prove that the whole life of\nman was also dependent on the state of the organism. We might go still\nfarther, and discover new objections, or carry out to their extreme\nconsequences those which have already been adduced.\n\nGeneration, in the human race as well as among the irrational animals,\ndepends on so many accidents\u2014of occasion, of proper sustenance, of the\nlaws enacted by the government of a country of vice even, that it is\ndifficult to believe in the eternal existence of a being whose life has\nbegun under circumstances so mean and trivial, and so entirely\ndependent upon our own control. As regards the continuance of the\nexistence of the whole race, we need have no difficulties, for accident\nin single cases is subject to general laws; but, in the case of each\nindividual, it would seem as if we could hardly expect so wonderful an\neffect from causes so insignificant. But, in answer to these\nobjections, we may adduce the transcendental hypothesis that all life\nis properly intelligible, and not subject to changes of time, and that\nit neither began in birth, nor will end in death. We may assume that\nthis life is nothing more than a sensuous representation of pure\nspiritual life; that the whole world of sense is but an image, hovering\nbefore the faculty of cognition which we exercise in this sphere, and\nwith no more objective reality than a dream; and that if we could\nintuite ourselves and other things as they really are, we should see\nourselves in a world of spiritual natures, our connection with which\ndid not begin at our birth and will not cease with the destruction of\nthe body. And so on.\n\nWe cannot be said to know what has been above asserted, nor do we\nseriously maintain the truth of these assertions; and the notions\ntherein indicated are not even ideas of reason, they are purely\nfictitious conceptions. But this hypothetical procedure is in perfect\nconformity with the laws of reason. Our opponent mistakes the absence\nof empirical conditions for a proof of the complete impossibility of\nall that we have asserted; and we have to show him that he has not\nexhausted the whole sphere of possibility and that he can as little\ncompass that sphere by the laws of experience and nature, as we can lay\na secure foundation for the operations of reason beyond the region of\nexperience. Such hypothetical defences against the pretensions of an\nopponent must not be regarded as declarations of opinion. The\nphilosopher abandons them, so soon as the opposite party renounces its\ndogmatical conceit. To maintain a simply negative position in relation\nto propositions which rest on an insecure foundation, well befits the\nmoderation of a true philosopher; but to uphold the objections urged\nagainst an opponent as proofs of the opposite statement is a proceeding\njust as unwarrantable and arrogant as it is to attack the position of a\nphilosopher who advances affirmative propositions regarding such a\nsubject.\n\nIt is evident, therefore, that hypotheses, in the speculative sphere,\nare valid, not as independent propositions, but only relatively to\nopposite transcendent assumptions. For, to make the principles of\npossible experience conditions of the possibility of things in general\nis just as transcendent a procedure as to maintain the objective\nreality of ideas which can be applied to no objects except such as lie\nwithout the limits of possible experience. The judgements enounced by\npure reason must be necessary, or they must not be enounced at all.\nReason cannot trouble herself with opinions. But the hypotheses we have\nbeen discussing are merely problematical judgements, which can neither\nbe confuted nor proved; while, therefore, they are not personal\nopinions, they are indispensable as answers to objections which are\nliable to be raised. But we must take care to confine them to this\nfunction, and guard against any assumption on their part of absolute\nvalidity, a proceeding which would involve reason in inextricable\ndifficulties and contradictions.\n\nSection IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to Proofs\n\nIt is a peculiarity, which distinguishes the proofs of transcendental\nsynthetical propositions from those of all other \u00e0 priori synthetical\ncognitions, that reason, in the case of the former, does not apply its\nconceptions directly to an object, but is first obliged to prove, \u00e0\npriori, the objective validity of these conceptions and the possibility\nof their syntheses. This is not merely a prudential rule, it is\nessential to the very possibility of the proof of a transcendental\nproposition. If I am required to pass, \u00e0 priori, beyond the conception\nof an object, I find that it is utterly impossible without the guidance\nof something which is not contained in the conception. In mathematics,\nit is \u00e0 priori intuition that guides my synthesis; and, in this case,\nall our conclusions may be drawn immediately from pure intuition. In\ntranscendental cognition, so long as we are dealing only with\nconceptions of the understanding, we are guided by possible experience.\nThat is to say, a proof in the sphere of transcendental cognition does\nnot show that the given conception (that of an event, for example)\nleads directly to another conception (that of a cause)\u2014for this would\nbe a saltus which nothing can justify; but it shows that experience\nitself, and consequently the object of experience, is impossible\nwithout the connection indicated by these conceptions. It follows that\nsuch a proof must demonstrate the possibility of arriving,\nsynthetically and \u00e0 priori, at a certain knowledge of things, which was\nnot contained in our conceptions of these things. Unless we pay\nparticular attention to this requirement, our proofs, instead of\npursuing the straight path indicated by reason, follow the tortuous\nroad of mere subjective association. The illusory conviction, which\nrests upon subjective causes of association, and which is considered as\nresulting from the perception of a real and objective natural affinity,\nis always open to doubt and suspicion. For this reason, all the\nattempts which have been made to prove the principle of sufficient\nreason, have, according to the universal admission of philosophers,\nbeen quite unsuccessful; and, before the appearance of transcendental\ncriticism, it was considered better, as this principle could not be\nabandoned, to appeal boldly to the common sense of mankind (a\nproceeding which always proves that the problem, which reason ought to\nsolve, is one in which philosophers find great difficulties), rather\nthan attempt to discover new dogmatical proofs.\n\nBut, if the proposition to be proved is a proposition of pure reason,\nand if I aim at passing beyond my empirical conceptions by the aid of\nmere ideas, it is necessary that the proof should first show that such\na step in synthesis is possible (which it is not), before it proceeds\nto prove the truth of the proposition itself. The so-called proof of\nthe simple nature of the soul from the unity of apperception, is a very\nplausible one. But it contains no answer to the objection, that, as the\nnotion of absolute simplicity is not a conception which is directly\napplicable to a perception, but is an idea which must be inferred\u2014if at\nall\u2014from observation, it is by no means evident how the mere fact of\nconsciousness, which is contained in all thought, although in so far a\nsimple representation, can conduct me to the consciousness and\ncognition of a thing which is purely a thinking substance. When I\nrepresent to my mind the power of my body as in motion, my body in this\nthought is so far absolute unity, and my representation of it is a\nsimple one; and hence I can indicate this representation by the motion\nof a point, because I have made abstraction of the size or volume of\nthe body. But I cannot hence infer that, given merely the moving power\nof a body, the body may be cogitated as simple substance, merely\nbecause the representation in my mind takes no account of its content\nin space, and is consequently simple. The simple, in abstraction, is\nvery different from the objectively simple; and hence the Ego, which is\nsimple in the first sense, may, in the second sense, as indicating the\nsoul itself, be a very complex conception, with a very various content.\nThus it is evident that in all such arguments there lurks a paralogism.\nWe guess (for without some such surmise our suspicion would not be\nexcited in reference to a proof of this character) at the presence of\nthe paralogism, by keeping ever before us a criterion of the\npossibility of those synthetical propositions which aim at proving more\nthan experience can teach us. This criterion is obtained from the\nobservation that such proofs do not lead us directly from the subject\nof the proposition to be proved to the required predicate, but find it\nnecessary to presuppose the possibility of extending our cognition \u00e0\npriori by means of ideas. We must, accordingly, always use the greatest\ncaution; we require, before attempting any proof, to consider how it is\npossible to extend the sphere of cognition by the operations of pure\nreason, and from what source we are to derive knowledge, which is not\nobtained from the analysis of conceptions, nor relates, by\nanticipation, to possible experience. We shall thus spare ourselves\nmuch severe and fruitless labour, by not expecting from reason what is\nbeyond its power, or rather by subjecting it to discipline, and\nteaching it to moderate its vehement desires for the extension of the\nsphere of cognition.\n\nThe first rule for our guidance is, therefore, not to attempt a\ntranscendental proof, before we have considered from what source we are\nto derive the principles upon which the proof is to be based, and what\nright we have to expect that our conclusions from these principles will\nbe veracious. If they are principles of the understanding, it is vain\nto expect that we should attain by their means to ideas of pure reason;\nfor these principles are valid only in regard to objects of possible\nexperience. If they are principles of pure reason, our labour is alike\nin vain. For the principles of reason, if employed as objective, are\nwithout exception dialectical and possess no validity or truth, except\nas regulative principles of the systematic employment of reason in\nexperience. But when such delusive proof are presented to us, it is our\nduty to meet them with the non liquet of a matured judgement; and,\nalthough we are unable to expose the particular sophism upon which the\nproof is based, we have a right to demand a deduction of the principles\nemployed in it; and, if these principles have their origin in pure\nreason alone, such a deduction is absolutely impossible. And thus it is\nunnecessary that we should trouble ourselves with the exposure and\nconfutation of every sophistical illusion; we may, at once, bring all\ndialectic, which is inexhaustible in the production of fallacies,\nbefore the bar of critical reason, which tests the principles upon\nwhich all dialectical procedure is based. The second peculiarity of\ntranscendental proof is that a transcendental proposition cannot rest\nupon more than a single proof. If I am drawing conclusions, not from\nconceptions, but from intuition corresponding to a conception, be it\npure intuition, as in mathematics, or empirical, as in natural science,\nthe intuition which forms the basis of my inferences presents me with\nmaterials for many synthetical propositions, which I can connect in\nvarious modes, while, as it is allowable to proceed from different\npoints in the intention, I can arrive by different paths at the same\nproposition.\n\nBut every transcendental proposition sets out from a conception, and\nposits the synthetical condition of the possibility of an object\naccording to this conception. There must, therefore, be but one ground\nof proof, because it is the conception alone which determines the\nobject; and thus the proof cannot contain anything more than the\ndetermination of the object according to the conception. In our\nTranscendental Analytic, for example, we inferred the principle: Every\nevent has a cause, from the only condition of the objective possibility\nof our conception of an event. This is that an event cannot be\ndetermined in time, and consequently cannot form a part of experience,\nunless it stands under this dynamical law. This is the only possible\nground of proof; for our conception of an event possesses objective\nvalidity, that is, is a true conception, only because the law of\ncausality determines an object to which it can refer. Other arguments\nin support of this principle have been attempted\u2014such as that from the\ncontingent nature of a phenomenon; but when this argument is\nconsidered, we can discover no criterion of contingency, except the\nfact of an event\u2014of something happening, that is to say, the existence\nwhich is preceded by the non-existence of an object, and thus we fall\nback on the very thing to be proved. If the proposition: \u201cEvery\nthinking being is simple,\u201d is to be proved, we keep to the conception\nof the ego, which is simple, and to which all thought has a relation.\nThe same is the case with the transcendental proof of the existence of\na Deity, which is based solely upon the harmony and reciprocal fitness\nof the conceptions of an ens realissimum and a necessary being, and\ncannot be attempted in any other manner.\n\nThis caution serves to simplify very much the criticism of all\npropositions of reason. When reason employs conceptions alone, only one\nproof of its thesis is possible, if any. When, therefore, the dogmatist\nadvances with ten arguments in favour of a proposition, we may be sure\nthat not one of them is conclusive. For if he possessed one which\nproved the proposition he brings forward to demonstration\u2014as must\nalways be the case with the propositions of pure reason\u2014what need is\nthere for any more? His intention can only be similar to that of the\nadvocate who had different arguments for different judges; this\navailing himself of the weakness of those who examine his arguments,\nwho, without going into any profound investigation, adopt the view of\nthe case which seems most probable at first sight and decide according\nto it.\n\nThe third rule for the guidance of pure reason in the conduct of a\nproof is that all transcendental proofs must never be apagogic or\nindirect, but always ostensive or direct. The direct or ostensive proof\nnot only establishes the truth of the proposition to be proved, but\nexposes the grounds of its truth; the apagogic, on the other hand, may\nassure us of the truth of the proposition, but it cannot enable us to\ncomprehend the grounds of its possibility. The latter is, accordingly,\nrather an auxiliary to an argument, than a strictly philosophical and\nrational mode of procedure. In one respect, however, they have an\nadvantage over direct proofs, from the fact that the mode of arguing by\ncontradiction, which they employ, renders our understanding of the\nquestion more clear, and approximates the proof to the certainty of an\nintuitional demonstration.\n\nThe true reason why indirect proofs are employed in different sciences\nis this. When the grounds upon which we seek to base a cognition are\ntoo various or too profound, we try whether or not we may not discover\nthe truth of our cognition from its consequences. The modus ponens of\nreasoning from the truth of its inferences to the truth of a\nproposition would be admissible if all the inferences that can be drawn\nfrom it are known to be true; for in this case there can be only one\npossible ground for these inferences, and that is the true one. But\nthis is a quite impracticable procedure, as it surpasses all our powers\nto discover all the possible inferences that can be drawn from a\nproposition. But this mode of reasoning is employed, under favour, when\nwe wish to prove the truth of an hypothesis; in which case we admit the\ntruth of the conclusion\u2014which is supported by analogy\u2014that, if all the\ninferences we have drawn and examined agree with the proposition\nassumed, all other possible inferences will also agree with it. But, in\nthis way, an hypothesis can never be established as a demonstrated\ntruth. The modus tollens of reasoning from known inferences to the\nunknown proposition, is not only a rigorous, but a very easy mode of\nproof. For, if it can be shown that but one inference from a\nproposition is false, then the proposition must itself be false.\nInstead, then, of examining, in an ostensive argument, the whole series\nof the grounds on which the truth of a proposition rests, we need only\ntake the opposite of this proposition, and if one inference from it be\nfalse, then must the opposite be itself false; and, consequently, the\nproposition which we wished to prove must be true.\n\nThe apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences where\nit is impossible to mistake a subjective representation for an\nobjective cognition. Where this is possible, it is plain that the\nopposite of a given proposition may contradict merely the subjective\nconditions of thought, and not the objective cognition; or it may\nhappen that both propositions contradict each other only under a\nsubjective condition, which is incorrectly considered to be objective,\nand, as the condition is itself false, both propositions may be false,\nand it will, consequently, be impossible to conclude the truth of the\none from the falseness of the other.\n\nIn mathematics such subreptions are impossible; and it is in this\nscience, accordingly, that the indirect mode of proof has its true\nplace. In the science of nature, where all assertion is based upon\nempirical intuition, such subreptions may be guarded against by the\nrepeated comparison of observations; but this mode of proof is of\nlittle value in this sphere of knowledge. But the transcendental\nefforts of pure reason are all made in the sphere of the subjective,\nwhich is the real medium of all dialectical illusion; and thus reason\nendeavours, in its premisses, to impose upon us subjective\nrepresentations for objective cognitions. In the transcendental sphere\nof pure reason, then, and in the case of synthetical propositions, it\nis inadmissible to support a statement by disproving the\ncounter-statement. For only two cases are possible; either, the\ncounter-statement is nothing but the enouncement of the inconsistency\nof the opposite opinion with the subjective conditions of reason, which\ndoes not affect the real case (for example, we cannot comprehend the\nunconditioned necessity of the existence of a being, and hence every\nspeculative proof of the existence of such a being must be opposed on\nsubjective grounds, while the possibility of this being in itself\ncannot with justice be denied); or, both propositions, being\ndialectical in their nature, are based upon an impossible conception.\nIn this latter case the rule applies: non entis nulla sunt predicata;\nthat is to say, what we affirm and what we deny, respecting such an\nobject, are equally untrue, and the apagogic mode of arriving at the\ntruth is in this case impossible. If, for example, we presuppose that\nthe world of sense is given in itself in its totality, it is false,\neither that it is infinite, or that it is finite and limited in space.\nBoth are false, because the hypothesis is false. For the notion of\nphenomena (as mere representations) which are given in themselves (as\nobjects) is self-contradictory; and the infinitude of this imaginary\nwhole would, indeed, be unconditioned, but would be inconsistent (as\neverything in the phenomenal world is conditioned) with the\nunconditioned determination and finitude of quantities which is\npresupposed in our conception.\n\nThe apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illusions which\nhave always had so strong an attraction for the admirers of dogmatical\nphilosophy. It may be compared to a champion who maintains the honour\nand claims of the party he has adopted by offering battle to all who\ndoubt the validity of these claims and the purity of that honour; while\nnothing can be proved in this way, except the respective strength of\nthe combatants, and the advantage, in this respect, is always on the\nside of the attacking party. Spectators, observing that each party is\nalternately conqueror and conquered, are led to regard the subject of\ndispute as beyond the power of man to decide upon. But such an opinion\ncannot be justified; and it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners\nthe remark:\n\n_Non defensoribus istis\nTempus eget._\n\n\nEach must try to establish his assertions by a transcendental deduction\nof the grounds of proof employed in his argument, and thus enable us to\nsee in what way the claims of reason may be supported. If an opponent\nbases his assertions upon subjective grounds, he may be refuted with\nease; not, however to the advantage of the dogmatist, who likewise\ndepends upon subjective sources of cognition and is in like manner\ndriven into a corner by his opponent. But, if parties employ the direct\nmethod of procedure, they will soon discover the difficulty, nay, the\nimpossibility of proving their assertions, and will be forced to appeal\nto prescription and precedence; or they will, by the help of criticism,\ndiscover with ease the dogmatical illusions by which they had been\nmocked, and compel reason to renounce its exaggerated pretensions to\nspeculative insight and to confine itself within the limits of its\nproper sphere\u2014that of practical principles.\n\nChapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason\n\nIt is a humiliating consideration for human reason that it is\nincompetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation, but, on the\ncontrary, stands in need of discipline to check its deviations from the\nstraight path and to expose the illusions which it originates. But, on\nthe other hand, this consideration ought to elevate and to give it\nconfidence, for this discipline is exercised by itself alone, and it is\nsubject to the censure of no other power. The bounds, moreover, which\nit is forced to set to its speculative exercise, form likewise a check\nupon the fallacious pretensions of opponents; and thus what remains of\nits possessions, after these exaggerated claims have been disallowed,\nis secure from attack or usurpation. The greatest, and perhaps the\nonly, use of all philosophy of pure reason is, accordingly, of a purely\nnegative character. It is not an organon for the extension, but a\ndiscipline for the determination, of the limits of its exercise; and\nwithout laying claim to the discovery of new truth, it has the modest\nmerit of guarding against error.\n\nAt the same time, there must be some source of positive cognitions\nwhich belong to the domain of pure reason and which become the causes\nof error only from our mistaking their true character, while they form\nthe goal towards which reason continually strives. How else can we\naccount for the inextinguishable desire in the human mind to find a\nfirm footing in some region beyond the limits of the world of\nexperience? It hopes to attain to the possession of a knowledge in\nwhich it has the deepest interest. It enters upon the path of pure\nspeculation; but in vain. We have some reason, however, to expect that,\nin the only other way that lies open to it\u2014the path of practical\nreason\u2014it may meet with better success.\n\nI understand by a canon a list of the \u00e0 priori principles of the proper\nemployment of certain faculties of cognition. Thus general logic, in\nits analytical department, is a formal canon for the faculties of\nunderstanding and reason. In the same way, Transcendental Analytic was\nseen to be a canon of the pure understanding; for it alone is competent\nto enounce true \u00e0 priori synthetical cognitions. But, when no proper\nemployment of a faculty of cognition is possible, no canon can exist.\nBut the synthetical cognition of pure speculative reason is, as has\nbeen shown, completely impossible. There cannot, therefore, exist any\ncanon for the speculative exercise of this faculty\u2014for its speculative\nexercise is entirely dialectical; and, consequently, transcendental\nlogic, in this respect, is merely a discipline, and not a canon. If,\nthen, there is any proper mode of employing the faculty of pure\nreason\u2014in which case there must be a canon for this faculty\u2014this canon\nwill relate, not to the speculative, but to the practical use of\nreason. This canon we now proceed to investigate.\n\nSection I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason\n\nThere exists in the faculty of reason a natural desire to venture\nbeyond the field of experience, to attempt to reach the utmost bounds\nof all cognition by the help of ideas alone, and not to rest satisfied\nuntil it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of its cognitions\ninto a self-subsistent systematic whole. Is the motive for this\nendeavour to be found in its speculative, or in its practical interests\nalone?\n\nSetting aside, at present, the results of the labours of pure reason in\nits speculative exercise, I shall merely inquire regarding the problems\nthe solution of which forms its ultimate aim, whether reached or not,\nand in relation to which all other aims are but partial and\nintermediate. These highest aims must, from the nature of reason,\npossess complete unity; otherwise the highest interest of humanity\ncould not be successfully promoted.\n\nThe transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things: the\nfreedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of\nGod. The speculative interest which reason has in those questions is\nvery small; and, for its sake alone, we should not undertake the labour\nof transcendental investigation\u2014a labour full of toil and ceaseless\nstruggle. We should be loth to undertake this labour, because the\ndiscoveries we might make would not be of the smallest use in the\nsphere of concrete or physical investigation. We may find out that the\nwill is free, but this knowledge only relates to the intelligible cause\nof our volition. As regards the phenomena or expressions of this will,\nthat is, our actions, we are bound, in obedience to an inviolable\nmaxim, without which reason cannot be employed in the sphere of\nexperience, to explain these in the same way as we explain all the\nother phenomena of nature, that is to say, according to its\nunchangeable laws. We may have discovered the spirituality and\nimmortality of the soul, but we cannot employ this knowledge to explain\nthe phenomena of this life, nor the peculiar nature of the future,\nbecause our conception of an incorporeal nature is purely negative and\ndoes not add anything to our knowledge, and the only inferences to be\ndrawn from it are purely fictitious. If, again, we prove the existence\nof a supreme intelligence, we should be able from it to make the\nconformity to aims existing in the arrangement of the world\ncomprehensible; but we should not be justified in deducing from it any\nparticular arrangement or disposition, or inferring any where it is not\nperceived. For it is a necessary rule of the speculative use of reason\nthat we must not overlook natural causes, or refuse to listen to the\nteaching of experience, for the sake of deducing what we know and\nperceive from something that transcends all our knowledge. In one word,\nthese three propositions are, for the speculative reason, always\ntranscendent, and cannot be employed as immanent principles in relation\nto the objects of experience; they are, consequently, of no use to us\nin this sphere, being but the valueless results of the severe but\nunprofitable efforts of reason.\n\nIf, then, the actual cognition of these three cardinal propositions is\nperfectly useless, while Reason uses her utmost endeavours to induce us\nto admit them, it is plain that their real value and importance relate\nto our practical, and not to our speculative interest.\n\nI term all that is possible through free will, practical. But if the\nconditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical, reason can\nhave only a regulative, and not a constitutive, influence upon it, and\nis serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its empirical\nlaws. In the moral philosophy of prudence, for example, the sole\nbusiness of reason is to bring about a union of all the ends, which are\naimed at by our inclinations, into one ultimate end\u2014that of\nhappiness\u2014and to show the agreement which should exist among the means\nof attaining that end. In this sphere, accordingly, reason cannot\npresent to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action, for our\nguidance towards the aims set up by the senses, and is incompetent to\ngive us laws which are pure and determined completely \u00e0 priori. On the\nother hand, pure practical laws, the ends of which have been given by\nreason entirely \u00e0 priori, and which are not empirically conditioned,\nbut are, on the contrary, absolutely imperative in their nature, would\nbe products of pure reason. Such are the moral laws; and these alone\nbelong to the sphere of the practical exercise of reason, and admit of\na canon.\n\nAll the powers of reason, in the sphere of what may be termed pure\nphilosophy, are, in fact, directed to the three above-mentioned\nproblems alone. These again have a still higher end\u2014the answer to the\nquestion, what we ought to do, if the will is free, if there is a God\nand a future world. Now, as this problem relates to our in reference to\nthe highest aim of humanity, it is evident that the ultimate intention\nof nature, in the constitution of our reason, has been directed to the\nmoral alone.\n\nWe must take care, however, in turning our attention to an object which\nis foreign[78] to the sphere of transcendental philosophy, not to\ninjure the unity of our system by digressions, nor, on the other hand,\nto fail in clearness, by saying too little on the new subject of\ndiscussion. I hope to avoid both extremes, by keeping as close as\npossible to the transcendental, and excluding all psychological, that\nis, empirical, elements.\n\n [78] All practical conceptions relate to objects of pleasure and pain,\n and consequently\u2014in an indirect manner, at least\u2014to objects of\n feeling. But as feeling is not a faculty of representation, but lies\n out of the sphere of our powers of cognition, the elements of our\n judgements, in so far as they relate to pleasure or pain, that is, the\n elements of our practical judgements, do not belong to transcendental\n philosophy, which has to do with pure \u00e0 priori cognitions alone.\n\n\nI have to remark, in the first place, that at present I treat of the\nconception of freedom in the practical sense only, and set aside the\ncorresponding transcendental conception, which cannot be employed as a\nground of explanation in the phenomenal world, but is itself a problem\nfor pure reason. A will is purely animal (arbitrium brutum) when it is\ndetermined by sensuous impulses or instincts only, that is, when it is\ndetermined in a pathological manner. A will, which can be determined\nindependently of sensuous impulses, consequently by motives presented\nby reason alone, is called a free will (arbitrium liberum); and\neverything which is connected with this free will, either as principle\nor consequence, is termed practical. The existence of practical freedom\ncan be proved from experience alone. For the human will is not\ndetermined by that alone which immediately affects the senses; on the\ncontrary, we have the power, by calling up the notion of what is useful\nor hurtful in a more distant relation, of overcoming the immediate\nimpressions on our sensuous faculty of desire. But these considerations\nof what is desirable in relation to our whole state, that is, is in the\nend good and useful, are based entirely upon reason. This faculty,\naccordingly, enounces laws, which are imperative or objective laws of\nfreedom and which tell us what ought to take place, thus distinguishing\nthemselves from the laws of nature, which relate to that which does\ntake place. The laws of freedom or of free will are hence termed\npractical laws.\n\nWhether reason is not itself, in the actual delivery of these laws,\ndetermined in its turn by other influences, and whether the action\nwhich, in relation to sensuous impulses, we call free, may not, in\nrelation to higher and more remote operative causes, really form a part\nof nature\u2014these are questions which do not here concern us. They are\npurely speculative questions; and all we have to do, in the practical\nsphere, is to inquire into the rule of conduct which reason has to\npresent. Experience demonstrates to us the existence of practical\nfreedom as one of the causes which exist in nature, that is, it shows\nthe causal power of reason in the determination of the will. The idea\nof transcendental freedom, on the contrary, requires that reason\u2014in\nrelation to its causal power of commencing a series of phenomena\u2014should\nbe independent of all sensuous determining causes; and thus it seems to\nbe in opposition to the law of nature and to all possible experience.\nIt therefore remains a problem for the human mind. But this problem\ndoes not concern reason in its practical use; and we have, therefore,\nin a canon of pure reason, to do with only two questions, which relate\nto the practical interest of pure reason: Is there a God? and, Is there\na future life? The question of transcendental freedom is purely\nspeculative, and we may therefore set it entirely aside when we come to\ntreat of practical reason. Besides, we have already discussed this\nsubject in the antinomy of pure reason.\n\nSection II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground of\nthe Ultimate End of Pure Reason\n\nReason conducted us, in its speculative use, through the field of\nexperience and, as it can never find complete satisfaction in that\nsphere, from thence to speculative ideas\u2014which, however, in the end\nbrought us back again to experience, and thus fulfilled the purpose of\nreason, in a manner which, though useful, was not at all in accordance\nwith our expectations. It now remains for us to consider whether pure\nreason can be employed in a practical sphere, and whether it will here\nconduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure reason,\nas we have just stated them. We shall thus ascertain whether, from the\npoint of view of its practical interest, reason may not be able to\nsupply us with that which, on the speculative side, it wholly denies\nus.\n\nThe whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is\ncentred in the three following questions:\n\n1. WHAT CAN I KNOW?\n2. WHAT OUGHT I TO DO?\n3. WHAT MAY I HOPE?\n\n\nThe first question is purely speculative. We have, as I flatter myself,\nexhausted all the replies of which it is susceptible, and have at last\nfound the reply with which reason must content itself, and with which\nit ought to be content, so long as it pays no regard to the practical.\nBut from the two great ends to the attainment of which all these\nefforts of pure reason were in fact directed, we remain just as far\nremoved as if we had consulted our ease and declined the task at the\noutset. So far, then, as knowledge is concerned, thus much, at least,\nis established, that, in regard to those two problems, it lies beyond\nour reach.\n\nThe second question is purely practical. As such it may indeed fall\nwithin the province of pure reason, but still it is not transcendental,\nbut moral, and consequently cannot in itself form the subject of our\ncriticism.\n\nThe third question: If I act as I ought to do, what may I then hope?\u2014is\nat once practical and theoretical. The practical forms a clue to the\nanswer of the theoretical, and\u2014in its highest form\u2014speculative\nquestion. For all hoping has happiness for its object and stands in\nprecisely the same relation to the practical and the law of morality as\nknowing to the theoretical cognition of things and the law of nature.\nThe former arrives finally at the conclusion that something is (which\ndetermines the ultimate end), because something ought to take place;\nthe latter, that something is (which operates as the highest cause),\nbecause something does take place.\n\nHappiness is the satisfaction of all our desires; extensive, in regard\nto their multiplicity; intensive, in regard to their degree; and\nprotensive, in regard to their duration. The practical law based on the\nmotive of happiness I term a pragmatical law (or prudential rule); but\nthat law, assuming such to exist, which has no other motive than the\nworthiness of being happy, I term a moral or ethical law. The first\ntells us what we have to do, if we wish to become possessed of\nhappiness; the second dictates how we ought to act, in order to deserve\nhappiness. The first is based upon empirical principles; for it is only\nby experience that I can learn either what inclinations exist which\ndesire satisfaction, or what are the natural means of satisfying them.\nThe second takes no account of our desires or the means of satisfying\nthem, and regards only the freedom of a rational being, and the\nnecessary conditions under which alone this freedom can harmonize with\nthe distribution of happiness according to principles. This second law\nmay therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure reason, and may be cognized\n\u00e0 priori.\n\nI assume that there are pure moral laws which determine, entirely \u00e0\npriori (without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness),\nthe conduct of a rational being, or in other words, to use which it\nmakes of its freedom, and that these laws are absolutely imperative\n(not merely hypothetically, on the supposition of other empirical\nends), and therefore in all respects necessary. I am warranted in\nassuming this, not only by the arguments of the most enlightened\nmoralists, but by the moral judgement of every man who will make the\nattempt to form a distinct conception of such a law.\n\nPure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative, but in its\npractical, or, more strictly, its moral use, principles of the\npossibility of experience, of such actions, namely, as, in accordance\nwith ethical precepts, might be met with in the history of man. For\nsince reason commands that such actions should take place, it must be\npossible for them to take place; and hence a particular kind of\nsystematic unity\u2014the moral\u2014must be possible. We have found, it is true,\nthat the systematic unity of nature could not be established according\nto speculative principles of reason, because, while reason possesses a\ncausal power in relation to freedom, it has none in relation to the\nwhole sphere of nature; and, while moral principles of reason can\nproduce free actions, they cannot produce natural laws. It is, then, in\nits practical, but especially in its moral use, that the principles of\npure reason possess objective reality.\n\nI call the world a moral world, in so far as it may be in accordance\nwith all the ethical laws\u2014which, by virtue of the freedom of reasonable\nbeings, it can be, and according to the necessary laws of morality it\nought to be. But this world must be conceived only as an intelligible\nworld, inasmuch as abstraction is therein made of all conditions\n(ends), and even of all impediments to morality (the weakness or\npravity of human nature). So far, then, it is a mere idea\u2014though still\na practical idea\u2014which may have, and ought to have, an influence on the\nworld of sense, so as to bring it as far as possible into conformity\nwith itself. The idea of a moral world has, therefore, objective\nreality, not as referring to an object of intelligible intuition\u2014for of\nsuch an object we can form no conception whatever\u2014but to the world of\nsense\u2014conceived, however, as an object of pure reason in its practical\nuse\u2014and to a corpus mysticum of rational beings in it, in so far as the\nliberum arbitrium of the individual is placed, under and by virtue of\nmoral laws, in complete systematic unity both with itself and with the\nfreedom of all others.\n\nThat is the answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason\nwhich relate to its practical interest: Do that which will render thee\nworthy of happiness. The second question is this: If I conduct myself\nso as not to be unworthy of happiness, may I hope thereby to obtain\nhappiness? In order to arrive at the solution of this question, we must\ninquire whether the principles of pure reason, which prescribe \u00e0 priori\nthe law, necessarily also connect this hope with it.\n\nI say, then, that just as the moral principles are necessary according\nto reason in its practical use, so it is equally necessary according to\nreason in its theoretical use to assume that every one has ground to\nhope for happiness in the measure in which he has made himself worthy\nof it in his conduct, and that therefore the system of morality is\ninseparably (though only in the idea of pure reason) connected with\nthat of happiness.\n\nNow in an intelligible, that is, in the moral world, in the conception\nof which we make abstraction of all the impediments to morality\n(sensuous desires), such a system of happiness, connected with and\nproportioned to morality, may be conceived as necessary, because\nfreedom of volition\u2014partly incited, and partly restrained by moral\nlaws\u2014would be itself the cause of general happiness; and thus rational\nbeings, under the guidance of such principles, would be themselves the\nauthors both of their own enduring welfare and that of others. But such\na system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the carrying out\nof which depends upon the condition that every one acts as he ought; in\nother words, that all actions of reasonable beings be such as they\nwould be if they sprung from a Supreme Will, comprehending in, or\nunder, itself all particular wills. But since the moral law is binding\non each individual in the use of his freedom of volition, even if\nothers should not act in conformity with this law, neither the nature\nof things, nor the causality of actions and their relation to morality,\ndetermine how the consequences of these actions will be related to\nhappiness; and the necessary connection of the hope of happiness with\nthe unceasing endeavour to become worthy of happiness, cannot be\ncognized by reason, if we take nature alone for our guide. This\nconnection can be hoped for only on the assumption that the cause of\nnature is a supreme reason, which governs according to moral laws.\n\nI term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most perfect\nwill, united with supreme blessedness, is the cause of all happiness in\nthe world, so far as happiness stands in strict relation to morality\n(as the worthiness of being happy), the ideal of the supreme Good. It\nis only, then, in the ideal of the supreme original good, that pure\nreason can find the ground of the practically necessary connection of\nboth elements of the highest derivative good, and accordingly of an\nintelligible, that is, moral world. Now since we are necessitated by\nreason to conceive ourselves as belonging to such a world, while the\nsenses present to us nothing but a world of phenomena, we must assume\nthe former as a consequence of our conduct in the world of sense (since\nthe world of sense gives us no hint of it), and therefore as future in\nrelation to us. Thus God and a future life are two hypotheses which,\naccording to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the\nobligation which this reason imposes upon us.\n\nMorality per se constitutes a system. But we can form no system of\nhappiness, except in so far as it is dispensed in strict proportion to\nmorality. But this is only possible in the intelligible world, under a\nwise author and ruler. Such a ruler, together with life in such a\nworld, which we must look upon as future, reason finds itself compelled\nto assume; or it must regard the moral laws as idle dreams, since the\nnecessary consequence which this same reason connects with them must,\nwithout this hypothesis, fall to the ground. Hence also the moral laws\nare universally regarded as commands, which they could not be did they\nnot connect \u00e0 priori adequate consequences with their dictates, and\nthus carry with them promises and threats. But this, again, they could\nnot do, did they not reside in a necessary being, as the Supreme Good,\nwhich alone can render such a teleological unity possible.\n\nLeibnitz termed the world, when viewed in relation to the rational\nbeings which it contains, and the moral relations in which they stand\nto each other, under the government of the Supreme Good, the kingdom of\nGrace, and distinguished it from the kingdom of Nature, in which these\nrational beings live, under moral laws, indeed, but expect no other\nconsequences from their actions than such as follow according to the\ncourse of nature in the world of sense. To view ourselves, therefore,\nas in the kingdom of grace, in which all happiness awaits us, except in\nso far as we ourselves limit our participation in it by actions which\nrender us unworthy of happiness, is a practically necessary idea of\nreason.\n\nPractical laws, in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions,\nthat is, subjective principles, are termed maxims. The judgements of\nmoral according to in its purity and ultimate results are framed\naccording ideas; the observance of its laws, according to maxims.\n\nThe whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims; but this\nis impossible, unless with the moral law, which is a mere idea, reason\nconnects an efficient cause which ordains to all conduct which is in\nconformity with the moral law an issue either in this or in another\nlife, which is in exact conformity with our highest aims. Thus, without\na God and without a world, invisible to us now, but hoped for, the\nglorious ideas of morality are, indeed, objects of approbation and of\nadmiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose and action. For they\ndo not satisfy all the aims which are natural to every rational being,\nand which are determined \u00e0 priori by pure reason itself, and necessary.\n\nHappiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from being the complete\ngood. Reason does not approve of it (however much inclination may\ndesire it), except as united with desert. On the other hand, morality\nalone, and with it, mere desert, is likewise far from being the\ncomplete good. To make it complete, he who conducts himself in a manner\nnot unworthy of happiness, must be able to hope for the possession of\nhappiness. Even reason, unbiased by private ends, or interested\nconsiderations, cannot judge otherwise, if it puts itself in the place\nof a being whose business it is to dispense all happiness to others.\nFor in the practical idea both points are essentially combined, though\nin such a way that participation in happiness is rendered possible by\nthe moral disposition, as its condition, and not conversely, the moral\ndisposition by the prospect of happiness. For a disposition which\nshould require the prospect of happiness as its necessary condition\nwould not be moral, and hence also would not be worthy of complete\nhappiness\u2014a happiness which, in the view of reason, recognizes no\nlimitation but such as arises from our own immoral conduct.\n\nHappiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of rational\nbeings (whereby they are made worthy of happiness), constitutes alone\nthe supreme good of a world into which we absolutely must transport\nourselves according to the commands of pure but practical reason. This\nworld is, it is true, only an intelligible world; for of such a\nsystematic unity of ends as it requires, the world of sense gives us no\nhint. Its reality can be based on nothing else but the hypothesis of a\nsupreme original good. In it independent reason, equipped with all the\nsufficiency of a supreme cause, founds, maintains, and fulfils the\nuniversal order of things, with the most perfect teleological harmony,\nhowever much this order may be hidden from us in the world of sense.\n\nThis moral theology has the peculiar advantage, in contrast with\nspeculative theology, of leading inevitably to the conception of a\nsole, perfect, and rational First Cause, whereof speculative theology\ndoes not give us any indication on objective grounds, far less any\nconvincing evidence. For we find neither in transcendental nor in\nnatural theology, however far reason may lead us in these, any ground\nto warrant us in assuming the existence of one only Being, which stands\nat the head of all natural causes, and on which these are entirely\ndependent. On the other hand, if we take our stand on moral unity as a\nnecessary law of the universe, and from this point of view consider\nwhat is necessary to give this law adequate efficiency and, for us,\nobligatory force, we must come to the conclusion that there is one only\nsupreme will, which comprehends all these laws in itself. For how,\nunder different wills, should we find complete unity of ends? This will\nmust be omnipotent, that all nature and its relation to morality in the\nworld may be subject to it; omniscient, that it may have knowledge of\nthe most secret feelings and their moral worth; omnipresent, that it\nmay be at hand to supply every necessity to which the highest weal of\nthe world may give rise; eternal, that this harmony of nature and\nliberty may never fail; and so on.\n\nBut this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences\u2014which,\nas mere nature, is only a world of sense, but, as a system of freedom\nof volition, may be termed an intelligible, that is, moral world\n(regnum gratiae)\u2014leads inevitably also to the teleological unity of all\nthings which constitute this great whole, according to universal\nnatural laws\u2014just as the unity of the former is according to universal\nand necessary moral laws\u2014and unites the practical with the speculative\nreason. The world must be represented as having originated from an\nidea, if it is to harmonize with that use of reason without which we\ncannot even consider ourselves as worthy of reason\u2014namely, the moral\nuse, which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme good. Hence the\ninvestigation of nature receives a teleological direction, and becomes,\nin its widest extension, physico-theology. But this, taking its rise in\nmoral order as a unity founded on the essence of freedom, and not\naccidentally instituted by external commands, establishes the\nteleological view of nature on grounds which must be inseparably\nconnected with the internal possibility of things. This gives rise to a\ntranscendental theology, which takes the ideal of the highest\nontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity; and this\nprinciple connects all things according to universal and necessary\nnatural laws, because all things have their origin in the absolute\nnecessity of the one only Primal Being.\n\nWhat use can we make of our understanding, even in respect of\nexperience, if we do not propose ends to ourselves? But the highest\nends are those of morality, and it is only pure reason that can give us\nthe knowledge of these. Though supplied with these, and putting\nourselves under their guidance, we can make no teleological use of the\nknowledge of nature, as regards cognition, unless nature itself has\nestablished teleological unity. For without this unity we should not\neven possess reason, because we should have no school for reason, and\nno cultivation through objects which afford the materials for its\nconceptions. But teleological unity is a necessary unity, and founded\non the essence of the individual will itself. Hence this will, which is\nthe condition of the application of this unity in concreto, must be so\nlikewise. In this way the transcendental enlargement of our rational\ncognition would be, not the cause, but merely the effect of the\npractical teleology which pure reason imposes upon us.\n\nHence, also, we find in the history of human reason that, before the\nmoral conceptions were sufficiently purified and determined, and before\nmen had attained to a perception of the systematic unity of ends\naccording to these conceptions and from necessary principles, the\nknowledge of nature, and even a considerable amount of intellectual\nculture in many other sciences, could produce only rude and vague\nconceptions of the Deity, sometimes even admitting of an astonishing\nindifference with regard to this question altogether. But the more\nenlarged treatment of moral ideas, which was rendered necessary by the\nextreme pure moral law of our religion, awakened the interest, and\nthereby quickened the perceptions of reason in relation to this object.\nIn this way, and without the help either of an extended acquaintance\nwith nature, or of a reliable transcendental insight (for these have\nbeen wanting in all ages), a conception of the Divine Being was arrived\nat, which we now hold to be the correct one, not because speculative\nreason convinces us of its correctness, but because it accords with the\nmoral principles of reason. Thus it is to pure reason, but only in its\npractical use, that we must ascribe the merit of having connected with\nour highest interest a cognition, of which mere speculation was able\nonly to form a conjecture, but the validity of which it was unable to\nestablish\u2014and of having thereby rendered it, not indeed a demonstrated\ndogma, but a hypothesis absolutely necessary to the essential ends of\nreason.\n\nBut if practical reason has reached this elevation, and has attained to\nthe conception of a sole Primal Being as the supreme good, it must not,\ntherefore, imagine that it has transcended the empirical conditions of\nits application, and risen to the immediate cognition of new objects;\nit must not presume to start from the conception which it has gained,\nand to deduce from it the moral laws themselves. For it was these very\nlaws, the internal practical necessity of which led us to the\nhypothesis of an independent cause, or of a wise ruler of the universe,\nwho should give them effect. Hence we are not entitled to regard them\nas accidental and derived from the mere will of the ruler, especially\nas we have no conception of such a will, except as formed in accordance\nwith these laws. So far, then, as practical reason has the right to\nconduct us, we shall not look upon actions as binding on us, because\nthey are the commands of God, but we shall regard them as divine\ncommands, because we are internally bound by them. We shall study\nfreedom under the teleological unity which accords with principles of\nreason; we shall look upon ourselves as acting in conformity with the\ndivine will only in so far as we hold sacred the moral law which reason\nteaches us from the nature of actions themselves, and we shall believe\nthat we can obey that will only by promoting the weal of the universe\nin ourselves and in others. Moral theology is, therefore, only of\nimmanent use. It teaches us to fulfil our destiny here in the world, by\nplacing ourselves in harmony with the general system of ends, and warns\nus against the fanaticism, nay, the crime of depriving reason of its\nlegislative authority in the moral conduct of life, for the purpose of\ndirectly connecting this authority with the idea of the Supreme Being.\nFor this would be, not an immanent, but a transcendent use of moral\ntheology, and, like the transcendent use of mere speculation, would\ninevitably pervert and frustrate the ultimate ends of reason.\n\nSection III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief\n\nThe holding of a thing to be true is a phenomenon in our understanding\nwhich may rest on objective grounds, but requires, also, subjective\ncauses in the mind of the person judging. If a judgement is valid for\nevery rational being, then its ground is objectively sufficient, and it\nis termed a conviction. If, on the other hand, it has its ground in the\nparticular character of the subject, it is termed a persuasion.\n\nPersuasion is a mere illusion, the ground of the judgement, which lies\nsolely in the subject, being regarded as objective. Hence a judgement\nof this kind has only private validity\u2014is only valid for the individual\nwho judges, and the holding of a thing to be true in this way cannot be\ncommunicated. But truth depends upon agreement with the object, and\nconsequently the judgements of all understandings, if true, must be in\nagreement with each other (consentientia uni tertio consentiunt inter\nse). Conviction may, therefore, be distinguished, from an external\npoint of view, from persuasion, by the possibility of communicating it\nand by showing its validity for the reason of every man; for in this\ncase the presumption, at least, arises that the agreement of all\njudgements with each other, in spite of the different characters of\nindividuals, rests upon the common ground of the agreement of each with\nthe object, and thus the correctness of the judgement is established.\n\nPersuasion, accordingly, cannot be subjectively distinguished from\nconviction, that is, so long as the subject views its judgement simply\nas a phenomenon of its own mind. But if we inquire whether the grounds\nof our judgement, which are valid for us, produce the same effect on\nthe reason of others as on our own, we have then the means, though only\nsubjective means, not, indeed, of producing conviction, but of\ndetecting the merely private validity of the judgement; in other words,\nof discovering that there is in it the element of mere persuasion.\n\nIf we can, in addition to this, develop the subjective causes of the\njudgement, which we have taken for its objective grounds, and thus\nexplain the deceptive judgement as a phenomenon in our mind, apart\naltogether from the objective character of the object, we can then\nexpose the illusion and need be no longer deceived by it, although, if\nits subjective cause lies in our nature, we cannot hope altogether to\nescape its influence.\n\nI can only maintain, that is, affirm as necessarily valid for every\none, that which produces conviction. Persuasion I may keep for myself,\nif it is agreeable to me; but I cannot, and ought not, to attempt to\nimpose it as binding upon others.\n\nHolding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgement in relation\nto conviction (which is, at the same time, objectively valid), has the\nthree following degrees: opinion, belief, and knowledge. Opinion is a\nconsciously insufficient judgement, subjectively as well as\nobjectively. Belief is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as\nbeing objectively insufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and\nobjectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction\n(for myself); objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for all). I\nneed not dwell longer on the explanation of such simple conceptions.\n\nI must never venture to be of opinion, without knowing something, at\nleast, by which my judgement, in itself merely problematical, is\nbrought into connection with the truth\u2014which connection, although not\nperfect, is still something more than an arbitrary fiction. Moreover,\nthe law of such a connection must be certain. For if, in relation to\nthis law, I have nothing more than opinion, my judgement is but a play\nof the imagination, without the least relation to truth. In the\njudgements of pure reason, opinion has no place. For, as they do not\nrest on empirical grounds and as the sphere of pure reason is that of\nnecessary truth and \u00e0 priori cognition, the principle of connection in\nit requires universality and necessity, and consequently perfect\ncertainty\u2014otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at all. Hence\nit is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics; we must know, or\nabstain from forming a judgement altogether. The case is the same with\nthe maxims of morality. For we must not hazard an action on the mere\nopinion that it is allowed, but we must know it to be so. In the\ntranscendental sphere of reason, on the other hand, the term opinion is\ntoo weak, while the word knowledge is too strong. From the merely\nspeculative point of view, therefore, we cannot form a judgement at\nall. For the subjective grounds of a judgement, such as produce belief,\ncannot be admitted in speculative inquiries, inasmuch as they cannot\nstand without empirical support and are incapable of being communicated\nto others in equal measure.\n\nBut it is only from the practical point of view that a theoretically\ninsufficient judgement can be termed belief. Now the practical\nreference is either to skill or to morality; to the former, when the\nend proposed is arbitrary and accidental, to the latter, when it is\nabsolutely necessary.\n\nIf we propose to ourselves any end whatever, the conditions of its\nattainment are hypothetically necessary. The necessity is subjectively,\nbut still only comparatively, sufficient, if I am acquainted with no\nother conditions under which the end can be attained. On the other\nhand, it is sufficient, absolutely and for every one, if I know for\ncertain that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions under\nwhich the attainment of the proposed end would be possible. In the\nformer case my supposition\u2014my judgement with regard to certain\nconditions\u2014is a merely accidental belief; in the latter it is a\nnecessary belief. The physician must pursue some course in the case of\na patient who is in danger, but is ignorant of the nature of the\ndisease. He observes the symptoms, and concludes, according to the best\nof his judgement, that it is a case of phthisis. His belief is, even in\nhis own judgement, only contingent: another man might, perhaps come\nnearer the truth. Such a belief, contingent indeed, but still forming\nthe ground of the actual use of means for the attainment of certain\nends, I term Pragmatical belief.\n\nThe usual test, whether that which any one maintains is merely his\npersuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that is, his firm\nbelief, is a bet. It frequently happens that a man delivers his\nopinions with so much boldness and assurance, that he appears to be\nunder no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error. The\noffer of a bet startles him, and makes him pause. Sometimes it turns\nout that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat, but not at ten. For\nhe does not hesitate, perhaps, to venture a ducat, but if it is\nproposed to stake ten, he immediately becomes aware of the possibility\nof his being mistaken\u2014a possibility which has hitherto escaped his\nobservation. If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the\nhappiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposition, our\njudgement drops its air of triumph, we take the alarm, and discover the\nactual strength of our belief. Thus pragmatical belief has degrees,\nvarying in proportion to the interests at stake.\n\nNow, in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in\nreference to some object, and where, accordingly, our judgement is\npurely theoretical, we can still represent to ourselves, in thought,\nthe possibility of a course of action, for which we suppose that we\nhave sufficient grounds, if any means existed of ascertaining the truth\nof the matter. Thus we find in purely theoretical judgements an\nanalogon of practical judgements, to which the word belief may properly\nbe applied, and which we may term doctrinal belief. I should not\nhesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition\u2014if there were\nany possibility of bringing it to the test of experience\u2014that, at\nleast, some one of the planets, which we see, is inhabited. Hence I say\nthat I have not merely the opinion, but the strong belief, on the\ncorrectness of which I would stake even many of the advantages of life,\nthat there are inhabitants in other worlds.\n\nNow we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to\ndoctrinal belief. For, although in respect to the theoretical cognition\nof the universe I do not require to form any theory which necessarily\ninvolves this idea, as the condition of my explanation of the phenomena\nwhich the universe presents, but, on the contrary, am rather bound so\nto use my reason as if everything were mere nature, still teleological\nunity is so important a condition of the application of my reason to\nnature, that it is impossible for me to ignore it\u2014especially since, in\naddition to these considerations, abundant examples of it are supplied\nby experience. But the sole condition, so far as my knowledge extends,\nunder which this unity can be my guide in the investigation of nature,\nis the assumption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things\naccording to the wisest ends. Consequently, the hypothesis of a wise\nauthor of the universe is necessary for my guidance in the\ninvestigation of nature\u2014is the condition under which alone I can fulfil\nan end which is contingent indeed, but by no means unimportant.\nMoreover, since the result of my attempts so frequently confirms the\nutility of this assumption, and since nothing decisive can be adduced\nagainst it, it follows that it would be saying far too little to term\nmy judgement, in this case, a mere opinion, and that, even in this\ntheoretical connection, I may assert that I firmly believe in God.\nStill, if we use words strictly, this must not be called a practical,\nbut a doctrinal belief, which the theology of nature (physico-theology)\nmust also produce in my mind. In the wisdom of a Supreme Being, and in\nthe shortness of life, so inadequate to the development of the glorious\npowers of human nature, we may find equally sufficient grounds for a\ndoctrinal belief in the future life of the human soul.\n\nThe expression of belief is, in such cases, an expression of modesty\nfrom the objective point of view, but, at the same time, of firm\nconfidence, from the subjective. If I should venture to term this\nmerely theoretical judgement even so much as a hypothesis which I am\nentitled to assume; a more complete conception, with regard to another\nworld and to the cause of the world, might then be justly required of\nme than I am, in reality, able to give. For, if I assume anything, even\nas a mere hypothesis, I must, at least, know so much of the properties\nof such a being as will enable me, not to form the conception, but to\nimagine the existence of it. But the word belief refers only to the\nguidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence on the\nconduct of my reason, which forces me to hold it fast, though I may not\nbe in a position to give a speculative account of it.\n\nBut mere doctrinal belief is, to some extent, wanting in stability. We\noften quit our hold of it, in consequence of the difficulties which\noccur in speculation, though in the end we inevitably return to it\nagain.\n\nIt is quite otherwise with moral belief. For in this sphere action is\nabsolutely necessary, that is, I must act in obedience to the moral law\nin all points. The end is here incontrovertibly established, and there\nis only one condition possible, according to the best of my perception,\nunder which this end can harmonize with all other ends, and so have\npractical validity\u2014namely, the existence of a God and of a future\nworld. I know also, to a certainty, that no one can be acquainted with\nany other conditions which conduct to the same unity of ends under the\nmoral law. But since the moral precept is, at the same time, my maxim\n(as reason requires that it should be), I am irresistibly constrained\nto believe in the existence of God and in a future life; and I am sure\nthat nothing can make me waver in this belief, since I should thereby\noverthrow my moral maxims, the renunciation of which would render me\nhateful in my own eyes.\n\nThus, while all the ambitious attempts of reason to penetrate beyond\nthe limits of experience end in disappointment, there is still enough\nleft to satisfy us in a practical point of view. No one, it is true,\nwill be able to boast that he knows that there is a God and a future\nlife; for, if he knows this, he is just the man whom I have long wished\nto find. All knowledge, regarding an object of mere reason, can be\ncommunicated; and I should thus be enabled to hope that my own\nknowledge would receive this wonderful extension, through the\ninstrumentality of his instruction. No, my conviction is not logical,\nbut moral certainty; and since it rests on subjective grounds (of the\nmoral sentiment), I must not even say: It is morally certain that there\nis a God, etc., but: I am morally certain, that is, my belief in God\nand in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature that I am\nunder as little apprehension of having the former torn from me as of\nlosing the latter.\n\nThe only point in this argument that may appear open to suspicion is\nthat this rational belief presupposes the existence of moral\nsentiments. If we give up this assumption, and take a man who is\nentirely indifferent with regard to moral laws, the question which\nreason proposes, becomes then merely a problem for speculation and may,\nindeed, be supported by strong grounds from analogy, but not by such as\nwill compel the most obstinate scepticism to give way.[79] But in these\nquestions no man is free from all interest. For though the want of good\nsentiments may place him beyond the influence of moral interests, still\neven in this case enough may be left to make him fear the existence of\nGod and a future life. For he cannot pretend to any certainty of the\nnon-existence of God and of a future life, unless\u2014since it could only\nbe proved by mere reason, and therefore apodeictically\u2014he is prepared\nto establish the impossibility of both, which certainly no reasonable\nman would undertake to do. This would be a negative belief, which could\nnot, indeed, produce morality and good sentiments, but still could\nproduce an analogon of these, by operating as a powerful restraint on\nthe outbreak of evil dispositions.\n\n [79] The human mind (as, I believe, every rational being must of\n necessity do) takes a natural interest in morality, although this\n interest is not undivided, and may not be practically in\n preponderance. If you strengthen and increase it, you will find the\n reason become docile, more enlightened, and more capable of uniting\n the speculative interest with the practical. But if you do not take\n care at the outset, or at least midway, to make men good, you will\n never force them into an honest belief.\n\n\nBut, it will be said, is this all that pure reason can effect, in\nopening up prospects beyond the limits of experience? Nothing more than\ntwo articles of belief? Common sense could have done as much as this,\nwithout taking the philosophers to counsel in the matter!\n\nI shall not here eulogize philosophy for the benefits which the\nlaborious efforts of its criticism have conferred on human reason\u2014even\ngranting that its merit should turn out in the end to be only\nnegative\u2014for on this point something more will be said in the next\nsection. But, I ask, do you require that that knowledge which concerns\nall men, should transcend the common understanding, and should only be\nrevealed to you by philosophers? The very circumstance which has called\nforth your censure, is the best confirmation of the correctness of our\nprevious assertions, since it discloses, what could not have been\nforeseen, that Nature is not chargeable with any partial distribution\nof her gifts in those matters which concern all men without distinction\nand that, in respect to the essential ends of human nature, we cannot\nadvance further with the help of the highest philosophy, than under the\nguidance which nature has vouchsafed to the meanest understanding.\n\nChapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason\n\nBy the term architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system.\nWithout systematic unity, our knowledge cannot become science; it will\nbe an aggregate, and not a system. Thus architectonic is the doctrine\nof the scientific in cognition, and therefore necessarily forms part of\nour methodology.\n\nReason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an unconnected and\nrhapsodistic state, but requires that the sum of our cognitions should\nconstitute a system. It is thus alone that they can advance the ends of\nreason. By a system I mean the unity of various cognitions under one\nidea. This idea is the conception\u2014given by reason\u2014of the form of a\nwhole, in so far as the conception determines \u00e0 priori not only the\nlimits of its content, but the place which each of its parts is to\noccupy. The scientific idea contains, therefore, the end and the form\nof the whole which is in accordance with that end. The unity of the\nend, to which all the parts of the system relate, and through which all\nhave a relation to each other, communicates unity to the whole system,\nso that the absence of any part can be immediately detected from our\nknowledge of the rest; and it determines \u00e0 priori the limits of the\nsystem, thus excluding all contingent or arbitrary additions. The whole\nis thus an organism (articulatio), and not an aggregate (coacervatio);\nit may grow from within (per intussusceptionem), but it cannot increase\nby external additions (per appositionem). It is, thus, like an animal\nbody, the growth of which does not add any limb, but, without changing\ntheir proportions, makes each in its sphere stronger and more active.\n\nWe require, for the execution of the idea of a system, a schema, that\nis, a content and an arrangement of parts determined \u00e0 priori by the\nprinciple which the aim of the system prescribes. A schema which is not\nprojected in accordance with an idea, that is, from the standpoint of\nthe highest aim of reason, but merely empirically, in accordance with\naccidental aims and purposes (the number of which cannot be\npredetermined), can give us nothing more than technical unity. But the\nschema which is originated from an idea (in which case reason presents\nus with aims \u00e0 priori, and does not look for them to experience), forms\nthe basis of architectonical unity. A science, in the proper\nacceptation of that term, cannot be formed technically, that is, from\nobservation of the similarity existing between different objects, and\nthe purely contingent use we make of our knowledge in concreto with\nreference to all kinds of arbitrary external aims; its constitution\nmust be framed on architectonical principles, that is, its parts must\nbe shown to possess an essential affinity, and be capable of being\ndeduced from one supreme and internal aim or end, which forms the\ncondition of the possibility of the scientific whole. The schema of a\nscience must give \u00e0 priori the plan of it (monogramma), and the\ndivision of the whole into parts, in conformity with the idea of the\nscience; and it must also distinguish this whole from all others,\naccording to certain understood principles.\n\nNo one will attempt to construct a science, unless he have some idea to\nrest on as a proper basis. But, in the elaboration of the science, he\nfinds that the schema, nay, even the definition which he at first gave\nof the science, rarely corresponds with his idea; for this idea lies,\nlike a germ, in our reason, its parts undeveloped and hid even from\nmicroscopical observation. For this reason, we ought to explain and\ndefine sciences, not according to the description which the originator\ngives of them, but according to the idea which we find based in reason\nitself, and which is suggested by the natural unity of the parts of\nthe science already accumulated. For it will often be found that the\noriginator of a science and even his latest successors remain attached\nto an erroneous idea, which they cannot render clear to themselves, and\nthat they thus fail in determining the true content, the articulation\nor systematic unity, and the limits of their science.\n\nIt is unfortunate that, only after having occupied ourselves for a long\ntime in the collection of materials, under the guidance of an idea\nwhich lies undeveloped in the mind, but not according to any definite\nplan of arrangement\u2014nay, only after we have spent much time and labour\nin the technical disposition of our materials, does it become possible\nto view the idea of a science in a clear light, and to project,\naccording to architectonical principles, a plan of the whole, in\naccordance with the aims of reason. Systems seem, like certain worms,\nto be formed by a kind of generatio aequivoca\u2014by the mere confluence of\nconceptions, and to gain completeness only with the progress of time.\nBut the schema or germ of all lies in reason; and thus is not only\nevery system organized according to its own idea, but all are united\ninto one grand system of human knowledge, of which they form members.\nFor this reason, it is possible to frame an architectonic of all human\ncognition, the formation of which, at the present time, considering the\nimmense materials collected or to be found in the ruins of old systems,\nwould not indeed be very difficult. Our purpose at present is merely to\nsketch the plan of the architectonic of all cognition given by pure\nreason; and we begin from the point where the main root of human\nknowledge divides into two, one of which is reason. By reason I\nunderstand here the whole higher faculty of cognition, the rational\nbeing placed in contradistinction to the empirical.\n\nIf I make complete abstraction of the content of cognition, objectively\nconsidered, all cognition is, from a subjective point of view, either\nhistorical or rational. Historical cognition is cognitio ex datis,\nrational, cognitio ex principiis. Whatever may be the original source\nof a cognition, it is, in relation to the person who possesses it,\nmerely historical, if he knows only what has been given him from\nanother quarter, whether that knowledge was communicated by direct\nexperience or by instruction. Thus the person who has learned a system\nof philosophy\u2014say the Wolfian\u2014although he has a perfect knowledge of\nall the principles, definitions, and arguments in that philosophy, as\nwell as of the divisions that have been made of the system, possesses\nreally no more than an historical knowledge of the Wolfian system; he\nknows only what has been told him, his judgements are only those which\nhe has received from his teachers. Dispute the validity of a\ndefinition, and he is completely at a loss to find another. He has\nformed his mind on another\u2019s; but the imitative faculty is not the\nproductive. His knowledge has not been drawn from reason; and although,\nobjectively considered, it is rational knowledge, subjectively, it is\nmerely historical. He has learned this or that philosophy and is merely\na plaster cast of a living man. Rational cognitions which are\nobjective, that is, which have their source in reason, can be so termed\nfrom a subjective point of view, only when they have been drawn by the\nindividual himself from the sources of reason, that is, from\nprinciples; and it is in this way alone that criticism, or even the\nrejection of what has been already learned, can spring up in the mind.\n\nAll rational cognition is, again, based either on conceptions, or on\nthe construction of conceptions. The former is termed philosophical,\nthe latter mathematical. I have already shown the essential difference\nof these two methods of cognition in the first chapter. A cognition may\nbe objectively philosophical and subjectively historical\u2014as is the case\nwith the majority of scholars and those who cannot look beyond the\nlimits of their system, and who remain in a state of pupilage all their\nlives. But it is remarkable that mathematical knowledge, when committed\nto memory, is valid, from the subjective point of view, as rational\nknowledge also, and that the same distinction cannot be drawn here as\nin the case of philosophical cognition. The reason is that the only way\nof arriving at this knowledge is through the essential principles of\nreason, and thus it is always certain and indisputable; because reason\nis employed in concreto\u2014but at the same time \u00e0 priori\u2014that is, in pure\nand, therefore, infallible intuition; and thus all causes of illusion\nand error are excluded. Of all the \u00e0 priori sciences of reason,\ntherefore, mathematics alone can be learned. Philosophy\u2014unless it be in\nan historical manner\u2014cannot be learned; we can at most learn to\nphilosophize.\n\nPhilosophy is the system of all philosophical cognition. We must use\nthis term in an objective sense, if we understand by it the archetype\nof all attempts at philosophizing, and the standard by which all\nsubjective philosophies are to be judged. In this sense, philosophy is\nmerely the idea of a possible science, which does not exist in\nconcreto, but to which we endeavour in various ways to approximate,\nuntil we have discovered the right path to pursue\u2014a path overgrown by\nthe errors and illusions of sense\u2014and the image we have hitherto tried\nin vain to shape has become a perfect copy of the great prototype.\nUntil that time, we cannot learn philosophy\u2014it does not exist; if it\ndoes, where is it, who possesses it, and how shall we know it? We can\nonly learn to philosophize; in other words, we can only exercise our\npowers of reasoning in accordance with general principles, retaining at\nthe same time, the right of investigating the sources of these\nprinciples, of testing, and even of rejecting them.\n\nUntil then, our conception of philosophy is only a scholastic\nconception\u2014a conception, that is, of a system of cognition which we are\ntrying to elaborate into a science; all that we at present know being\nthe systematic unity of this cognition, and consequently the logical\ncompleteness of the cognition for the desired end. But there is also a\ncosmical conception (conceptus cosmicus) of philosophy, which has\nalways formed the true basis of this term, especially when philosophy\nwas personified and presented to us in the ideal of a philosopher. In\nthis view philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to\nthe ultimate and essential aims of human reason (teleologia rationis\nhumanae), and the philosopher is not merely an artist\u2014who occupies\nhimself with conceptions\u2014but a lawgiver, legislating for human reason.\nIn this sense of the word, it would be in the highest degree arrogant\nto assume the title of philosopher, and to pretend that we had reached\nthe perfection of the prototype which lies in the idea alone.\n\nThe mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the logician\u2014how far\nsoever the first may have advanced in rational, and the two latter in\nphilosophical knowledge\u2014are merely artists, engaged in the arrangement\nand formation of conceptions; they cannot be termed philosophers. Above\nthem all, there is the ideal teacher, who employs them as instruments\nfor the advancement of the essential aims of human reason. Him alone\ncan we call philosopher; but he nowhere exists. But the idea of his\nlegislative power resides in the mind of every man, and it alone\nteaches us what kind of systematic unity philosophy demands in view of\nthe ultimate aims of reason. This idea is, therefore, a cosmical\nconception.[80]\n\n [80] By a cosmical conception, I mean one in which all men necessarily\n take an interest; the aim of a science must accordingly be determined\n according to scholastic conceptions, if it is regarded merely as a\n means to certain arbitrarily proposed ends.\n\n\nIn view of the complete systematic unity of reason, there can only be\none ultimate end of all the operations of the mind. To this all other\naims are subordinate, and nothing more than means for its attainment.\nThis ultimate end is the destination of man, and the philosophy which\nrelates to it is termed moral philosophy. The superior position\noccupied by moral philosophy, above all other spheres for the\noperations of reason, sufficiently indicates the reason why the\nancients always included the idea\u2014and in an especial manner\u2014of moralist\nin that of philosopher. Even at the present day, we call a man who\nappears to have the power of self-government, even although his\nknowledge may be very limited, by the name of philosopher.\n\nThe legislation of human reason, or philosophy, has two objects\u2014nature\nand freedom\u2014and thus contains not only the laws of nature, but also\nthose of ethics, at first in two separate systems, which, finally,\nmerge into one grand philosophical system of cognition. The philosophy\nof nature relates to that which is, that of ethics to that which ought\nto be.\n\nBut all philosophy is either cognition on the basis of pure reason, or\nthe cognition of reason on the basis of empirical principles. The\nformer is termed pure, the latter empirical philosophy.\n\nThe philosophy of pure reason is either prop\u00e6deutic, that is, an\ninquiry into the powers of reason in regard to pure \u00e0 priori cognition,\nand is termed critical philosophy; or it is, secondly, the system of\npure reason\u2014a science containing the systematic presentation of the\nwhole body of philosophical knowledge, true as well as illusory, given\nby pure reason\u2014and is called metaphysic. This name may, however, be\nalso given to the whole system of pure philosophy, critical philosophy\nincluded, and may designate the investigation into the sources or\npossibility of \u00e0 priori cognition, as well as the presentation of the \u00e0\npriori cognitions which form a system of pure philosophy\u2014excluding, at\nthe same time, all empirical and mathematical elements.\n\nMetaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and that of the\npractical use of pure reason, and is, accordingly, either the\nmetaphysic of nature, or the metaphysic of ethics. The former contains\nall the pure rational principles\u2014based upon conceptions alone (and thus\nexcluding mathematics)\u2014of all theoretical cognition; the latter, the\nprinciples which determine and necessitate \u00e0 priori all action. Now\nmoral philosophy alone contains a code of laws\u2014for the regulation of\nour actions\u2014which are deduced from principles entirely \u00e0 priori. Hence\nthe metaphysic of ethics is the only pure moral philosophy, as it is\nnot based upon anthropological or other empirical considerations. The\nmetaphysic of speculative reason is what is commonly called metaphysic\nin the more limited sense. But as pure moral philosophy properly forms\na part of this system of cognition, we must allow it to retain the name\nof metaphysic, although it is not requisite that we should insist on so\nterming it in our present discussion.\n\nIt is of the highest importance to separate those cognitions which\ndiffer from others both in kind and in origin, and to take great care\nthat they are not confounded with those with which they are generally\nfound connected. What the chemist does in the analysis of substances,\nwhat the mathematician in pure mathematics, is, in a still higher\ndegree, the duty of the philosopher, that the value of each different\nkind of cognition, and the part it takes in the operations of the mind,\nmay be clearly defined. Human reason has never wanted a metaphysic of\nsome kind, since it attained the power of thought, or rather of\nreflection; but it has never been able to keep this sphere of thought\nand cognition pure from all admixture of foreign elements. The idea of\na science of this kind is as old as speculation itself; and what mind\ndoes not speculate\u2014either in the scholastic or in the popular fashion?\nAt the same time, it must be admitted that even thinkers by profession\nhave been unable clearly to explain the distinction between the two\nelements of our cognition\u2014the one completely \u00e0 priori, the other \u00e0\nposteriori; and hence the proper definition of a peculiar kind of\ncognition, and with it the just idea of a science which has so long and\nso deeply engaged the attention of the human mind, has never been\nestablished. When it was said: \u201cMetaphysic is the science of the first\nprinciples of human cognition,\u201d this definition did not signalize a\npeculiarity in kind, but only a difference in degree; these first\nprinciples were thus declared to be more general than others, but no\ncriterion of distinction from empirical principles was given. Of these\nsome are more general, and therefore higher, than others; and\u2014as we\ncannot distinguish what is completely \u00e0 priori from that which is known\nto be \u00e0 posteriori\u2014where shall we draw the line which is to separate\nthe higher and so-called first principles, from the lower and\nsubordinate principles of cognition? What would be said if we were\nasked to be satisfied with a division of the epochs of the world into\nthe earlier centuries and those following them? \u201cDoes the fifth, or the\ntenth century belong to the earlier centuries?\u201d it would be asked. In\nthe same way I ask: Does the conception of extension belong to\nmetaphysics? You answer, \u201cYes.\u201d Well, that of body too? \u201cYes.\u201d And that\nof a fluid body? You stop, you are unprepared to admit this; for if you\ndo, everything will belong to metaphysics. From this it is evident that\nthe mere degree of subordination\u2014of the particular to the\ngeneral\u2014cannot determine the limits of a science; and that, in the\npresent case, we must expect to find a difference in the conceptions of\nmetaphysics both in kind and in origin. The fundamental idea of\nmetaphysics was obscured on another side by the fact that this kind of\n\u00e0 priori cognition showed a certain similarity in character with the\nscience of mathematics. Both have the property in common of possessing\nan \u00e0 priori origin; but, in the one, our knowledge is based upon\nconceptions, in the other, on the construction of conceptions. Thus a\ndecided dissimilarity between philosophical and mathematical cognition\ncomes out\u2014a dissimilarity which was always felt, but which could not be\nmade distinct for want of an insight into the criteria of the\ndifference. And thus it happened that, as philosophers themselves\nfailed in the proper development of the idea of their science, the\nelaboration of the science could not proceed with a definite aim, or\nunder trustworthy guidance. Thus, too, philosophers, ignorant of the\npath they ought to pursue and always disputing with each other\nregarding the discoveries which each asserted he had made, brought\ntheir science into disrepute with the rest of the world, and finally,\neven among themselves.\n\nAll pure \u00e0 priori cognition forms, therefore, in view of the peculiar\nfaculty which originates it, a peculiar and distinct unity; and\nmetaphysic is the term applied to the philosophy which attempts to\nrepresent that cognition in this systematic unity. The speculative part\nof metaphysic, which has especially appropriated this appellation\u2014that\nwhich we have called the metaphysic of nature\u2014and which considers\neverything, as it is (not as it ought to be), by means of \u00e0 priori\nconceptions, is divided in the following manner.\n\nMetaphysic, in the more limited acceptation of the term, consists of\ntwo parts\u2014transcendental philosophy and the physiology of pure reason.\nThe former presents the system of all the conceptions and principles\nbelonging to the understanding and the reason, and which relate to\nobjects in general, but not to any particular given objects\n(Ontologia); the latter has nature for its subject-matter, that is, the\nsum of given objects\u2014whether given to the senses, or, if we will, to\nsome other kind of intuition\u2014and is accordingly physiology, although\nonly rationalis. But the use of the faculty of reason in this rational\nmode of regarding nature is either physical or hyperphysical, or, more\nproperly speaking, immanent or transcendent. The former relates to\nnature, in so far as our knowledge regarding it may be applied in\nexperience (in concreto); the latter to that connection of the objects\nof experience, which transcends all experience. Transcendent physiology\nhas, again, an internal and an external connection with its object,\nboth, however, transcending possible experience; the former is the\nphysiology of nature as a whole, or transcendental cognition of the\nworld, the latter of the connection of the whole of nature with a being\nabove nature, or transcendental cognition of God.\n\nImmanent physiology, on the contrary, considers nature as the sum of\nall sensuous objects, consequently, as it is presented to us\u2014but still\naccording to \u00e0 priori conditions, for it is under these alone that\nnature can be presented to our minds at all. The objects of immanent\nphysiology are of two kinds: 1. Those of the external senses, or\ncorporeal nature; 2. The object of the internal sense, the soul, or, in\naccordance with our fundamental conceptions of it, thinking nature. The\nmetaphysics of corporeal nature is called physics; but, as it must\ncontain only the principles of an \u00e0 priori cognition of nature, we must\nterm it rational physics. The metaphysics of thinking nature is called\npsychology, and for the same reason is to be regarded as merely the\nrational cognition of the soul.\n\nThus the whole system of metaphysics consists of four principal parts:\n1. Ontology; 2. Rational Physiology; 3. Rational cosmology; and 4.\nRational theology. The second part\u2014that of the rational doctrine of\nnature\u2014may be subdivided into two, physica rationalis[81] and\npsychologia rationalis.\n\n [81] It must not be supposed that I mean by this appellation what is\n generally called physica general is, and which is rather mathematics\n than a philosophy of nature. For the metaphysic of nature is\n completely different from mathematics, nor is it so rich in results,\n although it is of great importance as a critical test of the\n application of pure understanding\u2014cognition to nature. For want of its\n guidance, even mathematicians, adopting certain common notions\u2014which\n are, in fact, metaphysical\u2014have unconsciously crowded their theories\n of nature with hypotheses, the fallacy of which becomes evident upon\n the application of the principles of this metaphysic, without\n detriment, however, to the employment of mathematics in this sphere of\n cognition.\n\n\nThe fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason of necessity\ndictates this division; it is, therefore, architectonical\u2014in accordance\nwith the highest aims of reason, and not merely technical, or according\nto certain accidentally-observed similarities existing between the\ndifferent parts of the whole science. For this reason, also, is the\ndivision immutable and of legislative authority. But the reader may\nobserve in it a few points to which he ought to demur, and which may\nweaken his conviction of its truth and legitimacy.\n\nIn the first place, how can I desire an \u00e0 priori cognition or\nmetaphysic of objects, in so far as they are given \u00e0 posteriori? and\nhow is it possible to cognize the nature of things according to \u00e0\npriori principles, and to attain to a rational physiology? The answer\nis this. We take from experience nothing more than is requisite to\npresent us with an object (in general) of the external or of the\ninternal sense; in the former case, by the mere conception of matter\n(impenetrable and inanimate extension), in the latter, by the\nconception of a thinking being\u2014given in the internal empirical\nrepresentation, I think. As to the rest, we must not employ in our\nmetaphysic of these objects any empirical principles (which add to the\ncontent of our conceptions by means of experience), for the purpose of\nforming by their help any judgements respecting these objects.\n\nSecondly, what place shall we assign to empirical psychology, which has\nalways been considered a part of metaphysics, and from which in our\ntime such important philosophical results have been expected, after the\nhope of constructing an \u00e0 priori system of knowledge had been\nabandoned? I answer: It must be placed by the side of empirical physics\nor physics proper; that is, must be regarded as forming a part of\napplied philosophy, the \u00e0 priori principles of which are contained in\npure philosophy, which is therefore connected, although it must not be\nconfounded, with psychology. Empirical psychology must therefore be\nbanished from the sphere of metaphysics, and is indeed excluded by the\nvery idea of that science. In conformity, however, with scholastic\nusage, we must permit it to occupy a place in metaphysics\u2014but only as\nan appendix to it. We adopt this course from motives of economy; as\npsychology is not as yet full enough to occupy our attention as an\nindependent study, while it is, at the same time, of too great\nimportance to be entirely excluded or placed where it has still less\naffinity than it has with the subject of metaphysics. It is a stranger\nwho has been long a guest; and we make it welcome to stay, until it can\ntake up a more suitable abode in a complete system of anthropology\u2014the\npendant to empirical physics.\n\nThe above is the general idea of metaphysics, which, as more was\nexpected from it than could be looked for with justice, and as these\npleasant expectations were unfortunately never realized, fell into\ngeneral disrepute. Our Critique must have fully convinced the reader\nthat, although metaphysics cannot form the foundation of religion, it\nmust always be one of its most important bulwarks, and that human\nreason, which naturally pursues a dialectical course, cannot do without\nthis science, which checks its tendencies towards dialectic and, by\nelevating reason to a scientific and clear self-knowledge, prevents the\nravages which a lawless speculative reason would infallibly commit in\nthe sphere of morals as well as in that of religion. We may be sure,\ntherefore, whatever contempt may be thrown upon metaphysics by those\nwho judge a science not by its own nature, but according to the\naccidental effects it may have produced, that it can never be\ncompletely abandoned, that we must always return to it as to a beloved\none who has been for a time estranged, because the questions with which\nit is engaged relate to the highest aims of humanity, and reason must\nalways labour either to attain to settled views in regard to these, or\nto destroy those which others have already established.\n\nMetaphysic, therefore\u2014that of nature, as well as that of ethics, but in\nan especial manner the criticism which forms the prop\u00e6deutic to all\nthe operations of reason\u2014forms properly that department of knowledge\nwhich may be termed, in the truest sense of the word, philosophy. The\npath which it pursues is that of science, which, when it has once been\ndiscovered, is never lost, and never misleads. Mathematics, natural\nscience, the common experience of men, have a high value as means, for\nthe most part, to accidental ends\u2014but at last also, to those which are\nnecessary and essential to the existence of humanity. But to guide them\nto this high goal, they require the aid of rational cognition on the\nbasis of pure conceptions, which, be it termed as it may, is properly\nnothing but metaphysics.\n\nFor the same reason, metaphysics forms likewise the completion of the\nculture of human reason. In this respect, it is indispensable, setting\naside altogether the influence which it exerts as a science. For its\nsubject-matter is the elements and highest maxims of reason, which form\nthe basis of the possibility of some sciences and of the use of all.\nThat, as a purely speculative science, it is more useful in preventing\nerror than in the extension of knowledge, does not detract from its\nvalue; on the contrary, the supreme office of censor which it occupies\nassures to it the highest authority and importance. This office it\nadministers for the purpose of securing order, harmony, and well-being\nto science, and of directing its noble and fruitful labours to the\nhighest possible aim\u2014the happiness of all mankind.\n\nChapter IV. The History of Pure Reason\n\nThis title is placed here merely for the purpose of designating a\ndivision of the system of pure reason of which I do not intend to treat\nat present. I shall content myself with casting a cursory glance, from\na purely transcendental point of view\u2014that of the nature of pure\nreason\u2014on the labours of philosophers up to the present time. They have\naimed at erecting an edifice of philosophy; but to my eye this edifice\nappears to be in a very ruinous condition.\n\nIt is very remarkable, although naturally it could not have been\notherwise, that, in the infancy of philosophy, the study of the nature\nof God and the constitution of a future world formed the commencement,\nrather than the conclusion, as we should have it, of the speculative\nefforts of the human mind. However rude the religious conceptions\ngenerated by the remains of the old manners and customs of a less\ncultivated time, the intelligent classes were not thereby prevented\nfrom devoting themselves to free inquiry into the existence and nature\nof God; and they easily saw that there could be no surer way of\npleasing the invisible ruler of the world, and of attaining to\nhappiness in another world at least, than a good and honest course of\nlife in this. Thus theology and morals formed the two chief motives, or\nrather the points of attraction in all abstract inquiries. But it was\nthe former that especially occupied the attention of speculative\nreason, and which afterwards became so celebrated under the name of\nmetaphysics.\n\nI shall not at present indicate the periods of time at which the\ngreatest changes in metaphysics took place, but shall merely give a\nhasty sketch of the different ideas which occasioned the most important\nrevolutions in this sphere of thought. There are three different ends\nin relation to which these revolutions have taken place.\n\n1. In relation to the object of the cognition of reason, philosophers\nmay be divided into sensualists and intellectualists. Epicurus may be\nregarded as the head of the former, Plato of the latter. The\ndistinction here signalized, subtle as it is, dates from the earliest\ntimes, and was long maintained. The former asserted that reality\nresides in sensuous objects alone, and that everything else is merely\nimaginary; the latter, that the senses are the parents of illusion and\nthat truth is to be found in the understanding alone. The former did\nnot deny to the conceptions of the understanding a certain kind of\nreality; but with them it was merely logical, with the others it was\nmystical. The former admitted intellectual conceptions, but declared\nthat sensuous objects alone possessed real existence. The latter\nmaintained that all real objects were intelligible, and believed that\nthe pure understanding possessed a faculty of intuition apart from\nsense, which, in their opinion, served only to confuse the ideas of the\nunderstanding.\n\n2. In relation to the origin of the pure cognitions of reason, we find\none school maintaining that they are derived entirely from experience,\nand another that they have their origin in reason alone. Aristotle\nmay be regarded as the head of the empiricists, and Plato of the\nnoologists. Locke, the follower of Aristotle in modern times, and\nLeibnitz of Plato (although he cannot be said to have imitated him in\nhis mysticism), have not been able to bring this question to a settled\nconclusion. The procedure of Epicurus in his sensual system, in which\nhe always restricted his conclusions to the sphere of experience, was\nmuch more consequent than that of Aristotle and Locke. The latter\nespecially, after having derived all the conceptions and principles\nof the mind from experience, goes so far, in the employment of these\nconceptions and principles, as to maintain that we can prove the\nexistence of God and the immortality of the soul\u2014both of them objects\nlying beyond the limits of possible experience\u2014with the same force of\ndemonstration, as any mathematical proposition.\n\n3. In relation to method. Method is procedure according to principles.\nWe may divide the methods at present employed in the field of inquiry\ninto the naturalistic and the scientific. The naturalist of pure reason\nlays it down as his principle that common reason, without the aid of\nscience\u2014which he calls sound reason, or common sense\u2014can give a more\nsatisfactory answer to the most important questions of metaphysics than\nspeculation is able to do. He must maintain, therefore, that we can\ndetermine the content and circumference of the moon more certainly by\nthe naked eye, than by the aid of mathematical reasoning. But this\nsystem is mere misology reduced to principles; and, what is the most\nabsurd thing in this doctrine, the neglect of all scientific means is\nparaded as a peculiar method of extending our cognition. As regards\nthose who are naturalists because they know no better, they are\ncertainly not to be blamed. They follow common sense, without parading\ntheir ignorance as a method which is to teach us the wonderful secret,\nhow we are to find the truth which lies at the bottom of the well of\nDemocritus.\n\nQuod sapio satis est mihi, non ego curo Esse quod\nArcesilas aerumnosique Solones. PERSIUS\n\u2014Satirae, iii. 78-79.\n\nis their motto, under which they may lead a pleasant and praiseworthy\nlife, without troubling themselves with science or troubling science\nwith them.\n\nAs regards those who wish to pursue a scientific method, they have now\nthe choice of following either the dogmatical or the sceptical, while\nthey are bound never to desert the systematic mode of procedure. When I\nmention, in relation to the former, the celebrated Wolf, and as regards\nthe latter, David Hume, I may leave, in accordance with my present\nintention, all others unnamed. The critical path alone is still open.\nIf my reader has been kind and patient enough to accompany me on this\nhitherto untravelled route, he can now judge whether, if he and others\nwill contribute their exertions towards making this narrow footpath a\nhigh road of thought, that which many centuries have failed to\naccomplish may not be executed before the close of the present\u2014namely,\nto bring Reason to perfect contentment in regard to that which has\nalways, but without permanent results, occupied her powers and engaged\nher ardent desire for knowledge.","title":"The Critique of Pure Reason","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":209061}