{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_42930/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_42930","id":"gutenberg_42930","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/42930","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Biographies","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Plotinus"],"text":"PLOTINOS\n    Complete Works\n\n    In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods;\n\n    With\n    BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS,\n    COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY,\n    ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS,\n    STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence;\n    INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words.\n\n    by\n    KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE,\n\n    Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee;\n    A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia.\n    M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia.\n\n    COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS\n    P. O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A.\n\n\n\n\n    Copyright, 1918, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie.\n    All Rights, including that of Translation, Reserved.\n\n    Entered at Stationers' Hall, by\n    George Bell and Sons, Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn, London.\n\n\n\n\n    PLOTINOS\n    Complete Works\n\n    In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods;\n\n    With\n    BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS,\n    COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY,\n    ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS,\n    STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence;\n    INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words.\n\n    by\n    KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE,\n\n    Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee;\n    A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia.\n    M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia.\n\n    VOL. I\n    Biographies; Amelian Books, 1-21.\n\n    COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS\n    P. O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A.\n\n\n\n\nFOREWORD\n\n\nIt is only with mixed feelings that such a work can be published.\nOvershadowing all is the supreme duty to the English-speaking world,\nand secondarily to the rest of humanity to restore to them in an\naccessible form their, till now, unexploited spiritual heritage, with\nits flood of light on the origins of their favorite philosophy. And\nthen comes the contrast--the pitiful accomplishment. Nor could it\nbe otherwise; for there are passages that never can be interpreted\nperfectly; moreover, the writer would gladly have devoted to it every\nother leisure moment of his life--but that was impossible. As a matter\nof fact, he would have made this translation at the beginning of his\nlife, instead of at its end, had it not been for a mistaken sense of\nmodesty; but as no one offered to do it, he had to do it himself. If he\nhad done it earlier, his \"Philosophy of Plotinos\" would have been a far\nbetter work.\n\nIndeed, if it was not for the difficulty and expense of putting it\nout, the writer would now add to the text an entirely new summary of\nPlotinos's views. The fairly complete concordance, however, should\nbe of service to the student, and help to rectify the latest German\nsummary of Plotinos, that by Drews, which in its effort to furnish a\nfoundation for Hartmann's philosophy of the unconscious, neglected both\norigins and spiritual aspects. However, the present genetic insight of\nPlotinos's development should make forever impossible that theory of\ncast-iron coherence, which is neither historical nor human.\n\nThe writer, having no thesis such as Drews' to justify, will\nwelcome all corrections and suggestions. He regrets the inevitable\nuncertainties of capitalization (as between the supreme One,\nIntelligence World-Soul and Daemon or guardian, and the lower\none, intelligence, soul and demon or guardian); and any other\ninconsistencies of which he may have been guilty; and he beseeches the\nmantle of charity in view of the stupendousness of the undertaking,\nin which he practically could get no assistance of any kind, and also\nin view of the almost insuperable difficulties of his own career. He,\nhowever, begs to assure the reader that he did everything \"ad majorem\nDei gloriam.\"\n\n\n\n\nINDEX.\n\n\n    PLOTINOS' COMPLETE WORKS.\n\n    Preface                                                  1\n\n    Concordance of Enneads and Chronological Numbers         2\n\n    Concordance of Chronological Numbers and Enneads         3\n\n    Biography of Plotinos, by Porphyry                       5\n\n    Biographies by Eunapius and Suidas                      39\n\n    Amelian Books, 1-21                                     40\n\n    Amelio-Porphyrian Books, 22-23                         283\n\n    Porphyrian Books, 34-45                                641\n\n    Eustochian Books, 46-54                               1017\n\n\n    PLOTINIC STUDIES\n\n    IN SOURCES, DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCE.\n\n    1.  Development in the Teachings of Plotinos          1269\n\n    2.  Platonism: Significance, Progress, and Results    1288\n\n    3.  Plotinos' View of Matter                          1296\n\n    4.  Plotinos' Creation of the Trinity                 1300\n\n    5.  Resemblances to Christianity                      1307\n\n    6.  Indebtedness to Numenius                          1313\n\n    7.  Value of Plotinos                                 1327\n\n        Concordance to Plotinos                              i\n\nAn outline of the doctrines of Plotinos is published under the title\n\"The Message of Plotinos.\"\n\n\n\n\nCONCORDANCE OF ENNEADS AND CHRONOLOGICAL NUMBERS\n\n\n     i.1  53    iii.1   3     v.1  10\n\n     i.2  19    iii.2  47     v.2  11\n\n     i.3  20    iii.3  48     v.3  49\n\n     i.4  46    iii.4  15     v.4   7\n\n     i.5  36    iii.5  50     v.5  32\n\n     i.6   1    iii.6  26     v.6  24\n\n     i.7  54    iii.7  45     v.7  18\n\n     i.8  51    iii.8  30     v.8  31\n\n     i.9  16    iii.9  13     v.9   5\n\n    ii.1  40     iv.1   4    vi.1  42\n\n    ii.2  14     iv.2  21    vi.2  43\n\n    ii.3  52     iv.3  27    vi.3  44\n\n    ii.4  12     iv.4  28    vi.4  22\n\n    ii.5  25     iv.5  29    vi.5  23\n\n    ii.6  17     iv.6  41    vi.6  34\n\n    ii.7  37     iv.7   2    vi.7  38\n\n    ii.8  35     iv.8   6    vi.8  39\n\n    ii.9  33     iv.9   8    vi.9   9\n\n\nCONCORDANCE OF CHRONOLOGICAL NUMBERS AND ENNEADS\n\n     1    i.6    19    i.2    37   ii.7\n\n     2   iv.7    20    i.3    38   vi.7\n\n     3  iii.1    21   iv.2    39   vi.8\n\n     4   iv.1    22   vi.4    40   ii.1\n\n     5    v.9    23   vi.5    41   iv.6\n\n     6   iv.8    24    v.6    42   vi.1\n\n     7    v.4    25   ii.5    43   vi.2\n\n     8   iv.9    26  iii.6    44   vi.3\n\n     9   vi.9    27   iv.3    45  iii.7\n\n    10    v.1    28   iv.4    46    i.4\n\n    11    v.2    29   iv.5    47  iii.2\n\n    12   ii.4    30  iii.8    48  iii.3\n\n    13  iii.9    31    v.8    49    v.3\n\n    14   ii.2    32    v.5    50  iii.5\n\n    15  iii.4    33   ii.9    51    i.8\n\n    16    i.9    34   vi.6    52   ii.3\n\n    17   ii.6    35   ii.8    53    i.1\n\n    18    v.7    36    i.5    54    i.7\n\n\n\n\nLife of Plotinos And Order of his Writings\n\nBy PORPHYRY. (_Written when about 70 years of age, see 23._)\n\n\n    I. PLOTINOS, LIKE PORPHYRY, DESPISED HIS PHYSICAL NATURE, BUT A\n    PICTURE OF HIM WAS SECURED.\n\nPlotinos the philosopher, who lived recently, seemed ashamed of having\na body. Consequently he never spoke of his family or home (Lycopolis,\nnow Syout, in the Thebaid, in Egypt). He never would permit anybody\nto perpetuate him in a portrait or statue. One day that Amelius[1]\nbegged him to allow a painting to be made of him, he said, \"Is it not\nenough for me to have to carry around this image[2], in which nature\nhas enclosed us? Must I besides transmit to posterity the image of this\nimage as worthy of attention?\" As Amelius never succeeded in getting\nPlotinos to reconsider his refusal, and to consent to give a sitting,\nAmelius begged his friend Carterius, the most famous painter of those\ntimes, to attend Plotinos's lectures, which were free to all. By dint\nof gazing at Plotinos, Carterius so filled his own imagination with\nPlotinos's features that he succeeded in painting them from memory.\nBy his advice, Amelius directed Carterius in these labors, so that\nthis portrait was a very good likeness. All this occurred without the\nknowledge of Plotinos.\n\n\nII. SICKNESS AND DEATH OF PLOTINOS; HIS BIRTHDAY UNKNOWN.\n\nPlotinos was subject to chronic digestive disorders; nevertheless,\nhe never was willing to take any remedies, on the plea that it was\nunworthy of a man of his age to relieve himself by such means. Neither\ndid he ever take any of the then popular \"wild animal remedy,\" because,\nsaid he, he did not even eat the flesh of domestic animals, let alone\nthat of savage ones. He never bathed, contenting himself, with daily\nmassage at home. But when at the period of the plague, which was most\nvirulent,[3] the man who rubbed him died of it, he gave up the massage.\nThis interruption in his habits brought on him a chronic quinsy, which\nnever became very noticeable, so long as I remained with him; but after\nI left him, it became aggravated to the point that his voice, formerly\nsonorous and powerful, became permanently hoarse; besides, his vision\nbecame disturbed, and ulcers appeared on his hands and feet. All this\nI learned on my return, from my friend Eustochius, who remained with\nhim until his end. These inconveniences hindered his friends from\nseeing him as often as they used to do, though he persisted in his\nformer custom of speaking to each one individually. The only solution\nof this difficulty was for him to leave Rome. He retired into Campania,\non an estate that had belonged to Zethus, one of his friends who had\ndied earlier. All he needed was furnished by the estate itself, or\nwas brought to him from the estate at Minturnae, owned by Castricius\n(author of a Commentary on Plato's Parmenides, to whom Porphyry\ndedicated his treatise on Vegetarianism). Eustochius himself told me\nthat he happened to be at Puzzoli at the time of Plotinos's death,\nand that he was slow in reaching the bedside of Plotinos. The latter\nthen said to him, \"I have been waiting for you; I am trying to unite\nwhat is divine in us[4] to that which is divine in the universe.\" Then\na serpent, who happened to be under Plotinos's death-bed slipped into\na hole in the wall (as happened at the death of Scipio Africanus,\nPliny, Hist. Nat. xv. 44), and Plotinos breathed his last. At that\ntime Plotinos was 66 years old (in 270, born in 205), according to the\naccount of Eustochius. The emperor Claudius II was then finishing the\nsecond year of his reign. I was at Lilybaeum; Amelius was at Apamaea\nin Syria, Castricius in Rome, and Eustochius alone was with Plotinos.\nIf we start from the second year of Claudius II and go back 66 years,\nwe will find that Plotinos's birth falls in the 18th year of Septimus\nSeverus (205). He never would tell the month or day of his birth,\nbecause he did not approve of celebrating his birth-day either by\nsacrifices, or banquets. Still he himself performed a sacrifice, and\nentertained his friends on the birth-days of Plato and Socrates; and on\nthose days those who could do it had to write essays and read them to\nthe assembled company.\n\n\nIII. PLOTINOS'S EARLY EDUCATION.\n\nThis is as much as we learned about him during various interviews\nwith him. At eight years of age he was already under instruction by a\ngrammarian, though the habit of uncovering his nurse's breast to suck\nher milk, with avidity, still clung to him. One day, however, she so\ncomplained of his importunity that he became ashamed of himself, and\nceased doing so. At 28 years of age he devoted himself entirely to\nphilosophy. He was introduced to the teachers who at that time were\nthe most famous in Alexandria. He would return from their lectures\nsad and discouraged. He communicated the cause of this grief to one\nof his friends, who led him to Ammonius, with whom Plotinos was not\nacquainted. As soon as he heard this philosopher, he said to his\nfriend, \"This is the man I was looking for!\" From that day forwards\nhe remained close to Ammonius. So great a taste for philosophy did he\ndevelop, that he made up his mind to study that which was being taught\namong the Persians, and among the Hindus. When emperor Gordian prepared\nhimself for his expedition against the Persians, Plotinos, then 39\nyears old, followed in the wake of the army. He had spent between 10\nto 11 years near Ammonius. After Gordian was killed in Mesopotamia,\nPlotinos had considerable trouble saving himself at Antioch. He reached\nRome while Philip was emperor, and when he himself was 50 years of age.\n\n\nTHE SCHOOL OF AMMONIUS.\n\nHerennius, (the pagan) Origen, and Plotinos had agreed to keep secret\nthe teachings they had received from Ammonius. Plotinos carried out his\nagreement. Herennius was the first one to break it, and Origen followed\nhis example. The latter limited himself to writing a book entitled,\n\"Of Daemons;\" and, under the reign of Gallienus, he wrote another one\nto prove that \"The Emperor alone is the Only Poet\" (if the book was\na flattery; which is not likely. Therefore it probably meant: \"The\nKing (of the universe, that is, the divine Intelligence), is the only\n'demiurgic' Creator.\")\n\n\nPLOTINOS AN UNSYSTEMATIC TEACHER.\n\nFor a long period Plotinos did not write anything. He contented himself\nwith teaching orally what he had learned from Ammonius. He thus passed\nten whole years teaching a few pupils, without committing anything to\nwriting. However, as he allowed his pupils to question him, it often\nhappened that his school was disorderly, and that there were useless\ndiscussions, as I later heard from Amelius.\n\n\nAMELIUS, PLOTINOS'S FIRST SECRETARY.\n\nAmelius enrolled himself among the pupils of Plotinos during the third\nyear of Plotinos's stay in Rome, which also was the third year of the\nreign of Claudius II, that is, 24 years. Amelius originally had been\na disciple of the Stoic philosopher Lysimachus.[5] Amelius surpassed\nall his fellow-pupils by his systematic methods of study. He had\ncopied, gathered, and almost knew by heart all the works of Numenius.\nHe composed a hundred copy-books of notes taken at the courses of\nPlotinos, and he gave them as a present to his adopted son, Hostilianus\nHesychius, of Apamea. (Fragments of Amelius's writings are found\nscattered in those of Proclus, Stobaeus, Olympiodorus, Damascius, and\nmany of the Church Fathers.)\n\n\nIV. HOW PORPHYRY CAME TO PLOTINOS FOR THE FIRST TIME, IN 253.\n\nIn the tenth year of the reign of Gallienus, I (then being twenty\nyears of age), left Greece and went to Rome with Antonius of Rhodes.\nI found there Amelius, who had been following the courses of Plotinos\nfor eighteen years. He had not yet dared to write anything, except a\nfew books of notes, of which there were not yet as many as a hundred.\nIn this tenth year of the reign of Gallienus, Plotinos was fifty-nine\nyears old. When I (for the second, and more important time) joined\nhim, I was thirty years of age. During the first year of Gallienus,\nPlotinos began to write upon some topics of passing interest, and in\nthe tenth year of Gallienus, when I visited him for the first time, he\nhad written twenty-one books, which had been circulated only among a\nvery small number of friends. They were not given out freely, and it\nwas not easy to go through them. They were communicated to students\nonly under precautionary measures, and after the judgment of those who\nreceived them had been carefully tested.\n\n\nPLOTINOS'S BOOKS OF THE FIRST PERIOD (THE AMELIAN PERIOD).\n\nI shall mention the books that Plotinos had already written at that\ntime. As he had prefixed no titles to them, several persons gave them\ndifferent ones. Here are those that have asserted themselves:\n\n     1.  Of the Beautiful.                                i. 6.\n\n     2.  Of the Immortality of the Soul.                 iv. 7.\n\n     3.  Of Fate.                                       iii. 1.\n\n     4.  Of the Nature of the Soul.                      iv. 1.\n\n     5.  Of Intelligence, of Ideas, and of Existence.     v. 9.\n\n     6.  Of the Descent of the Soul into the Body.       iv. 8.\n\n     7.  How does that which is Posterior to the First\n           Proceed from Him? Of the One.                  v. 4.\n\n     8.  Do all the Souls form but a Single Soul?        iv. 9.\n\n     9.  Of the Good, or of the One.                     vi. 9.\n\n    10.  Of the Three Principal Hypostatic Forms of\n           Existence,                                     v. 1.\n\n    11.  Of Generation, and of the Order of Things\n           after the First,                               v. 2.\n\n    12.  (Of the Two) Matters, (the Sensible and\n           Intelligible).                                ii. 4.\n\n    13.  Various Considerations,                        iii. 9.\n\n    14.  Of the (Circular) Motion of the Heavens.        ii. 2.\n\n    15.  Of the Daemon Allotted to Us,                  iii. 4.\n\n    16.  Of (Reasonable) Suicide,                         i. 9.\n\n    17.  Of Quality,                                     ii. 6.\n\n    18.  Are there Ideas of Individuals?                  v. 7.\n\n    19.  Of Virtues.                                      i. 2.\n\n    20.  Of Dialectics.                                   i. 3.\n\n    21.  (How does the Soul keep the Mean between\n           Indivisible Nature and Divisible Nature?)     iv. 2.\n\nThese twenty-one books were already written when I visited Plotinos; he\nwas then in the fifty-ninth year of his age.\n\n\nV. HOW PORPHYRY CAME TO PLOTINOS FOR THE SECOND TIME (A. D. 263-269).\n\nI remained with him this year, and the five following ones. I had\nalready visited Rome ten years previously; but at that time Plotinos\nspent his summers in vacation, and contented himself with instructing\nhis visitors orally.\n\nDuring the above-mentioned six years, as several questions had been\ncleared up in the lectures of Plotinos, and at the urgent request of\nAmelius and myself that he write them down, he wrote two books to prove\nthat\n\n\nPLOTINOS'S BOOKS OF THE SECOND PERIOD (THE PORPHYRIAN PERIOD).\n\n    22.  The One and Identical Existence is Everywhere\n           Entire, I,                                   vi. 4.\n\n    23.  Second Part Thereof.                           vi. 5.\n\nThen he wrote the book entitled:\n\n    24.  The Superessential Transcendent Principle\n           Does Not Think. Which is the First Thinking\n           Principle? And Which is the Second?           v. 6.\n\nHe also wrote the following books:\n\n    25.  Of Potentiality and Actualization.             ii. 5.\n\n    26.  Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal\n           Entities.                                   iii. 6.\n\n    27.  Of the Soul, First Part.                       iv. 3.\n\n    28.  Of the Soul, Second Part.                      iv. 4.\n\n    29.  (Of the Soul, Third; or, How do We See?)       iv. 5.\n\n    30.  Of Contemplation.                             iii. 8.\n\n    31.  Of Intelligible Beauty.                         v. 8.\n\n    32.  The Intelligible Entities are not Outside of\n           Intelligence. Of Intelligence and of Soul.    v. 5.\n\n    33.  Against the Gnostics.                          ii. 9.\n\n    34.  Of Numbers.                                    vi. 6.\n\n    35.  Why do Distant Objects Seem Small?             ii. 8.\n\n    36.  Does Happiness (Consist in Duration?)           i. 5.\n\n    37.  Of the Mixture with Total Penetration.         ii. 7.\n\n    38.  Of the Multitude of Ideas; Of the Good.        vi. 7.\n\n    39.  Of the Will.                                   vi. 8.\n\n    40.  (Of the World).                                ii. 1.\n\n    41.  Of Sensation, and of Memory.                   iv. 6.\n\n    42.  Of the Kinds of Existence, First.              vi. 1.\n\n    43.  Of the Kinds of Existence, Second.             vi. 2.\n\n    44.  Of the Kinds of Existence, Third.              vi. 3.\n\n    45.  Of Eternity and Time.                         iii. 7.\n\nPlotinos wrote these twenty-four books during the six years I spent\nwith him; as subjects he would take the problems that happened to come\nup, and which we have indicated by the titles of these books. These\ntwenty-four books, joined to the twenty-one Plotinos had written before\nI came to him, make forty-five.\n\n\nVI. PLOTINOS'S BOOKS OF THE THIRD PERIOD (THE EUSTOCHIAN PERIOD).\n\nWhile I was in Sicily, where I went in the fifteenth year of the reign\nof Gallienus, he wrote five new books that he sent me:\n\n    46.  Of Happiness.                                   i. 4.\n\n    47.  Of Providence, First.                         iii. 2.\n\n    48.  Of Providence, Second.                        iii. 3.\n\n    49.  Of the Hypostases that Act as Means of\n           Knowledge, and of the Transcendent.           v. 3.\n\n    50.  Of Love.                                      iii. 5.\n\nThese books he sent me in the last year of the reign of Claudius II,\nand at the beginning of the second.\n\nShortly before dying, he sent me the following four books:\n\n    51.  Of the Nature of Evils.                         i. 8.\n\n    52.  Of the Influence of the Stars.                 ii. 3.\n\n    53.  What is the Animal? What is Man?                i. 1.\n\n    54.  Of the First Good (or, of Happiness).           i. 7.\n\nThese nine books, with the forty-five previously written, make in all\nfifty-four.\n\nSome were composed during the youth of the author, others when in\nhis bloom, and finally the last, when his body was already seriously\nweakened; and they betray his condition while writing them. The\ntwenty-one first books seem to indicate a spirit which does not yet\npossess all its vigor and firmness. Those that he wrote during the\nmiddle of his life, show that his genius was then in its full form.\nThese twenty-four books may be considered to be perfect, with the\nexception of a few passages. The last nine are less powerful than the\nothers; and of these nine, the last four are the weakest.\n\n\nVII. VARIOUS DISCIPLES OF PLOTINOS.\n\nPlotinos had a great number of auditors and disciples, who were\nattracted to his courses by love of philosophy.\n\nAmong this number was Amelius of Etruria, whose true name was\nGentilianus. He did indeed insist that in his name the letter \"l\"\nshould be replaced by \"r,\" so that his name should read \"Amerius,\" from\n\"ameria\" (meaning indivisibility, though Suidas states that it was\nderived from the town of Ameria, in the province of Umbria), and not\nAmelius, from \"amellia\" (negligence).\n\nA very zealous disciple of Plotinos was a physician from Scythopolis\n(or, Bethshean, in Palestine), named Paulinus, whose mind was full of\nill-digested information and whom Amelius used to call Mikkalos (the\ntiny).\n\nEustochius of Alexandria, also a physician, knew Plotinos at the end\nof his life, and remained with him until his death, to care for him.\nExclusively occupied with the teachings of Plotinos, he himself became\na genuine philosopher.\n\nZoticus, also, attached himself to Plotinos. He was both critic and\npoet; he corrected the works of Antimachus, and beautifully versified\nthe fable of the Atlantidae. His sight gave out, however, and he died\nshortly before Plotinos. Paulinus also, died before Plotinos.\n\nZethus was one of the disciples of Plotinos. He was a native of Arabia,\nand had married the daughter of Theodosius, friend of Ammonius. He was\na physician, and much beloved by Plotinos, who sought to lead him to\nwithdraw from public affairs, for which he had considerable aptitude;\nand with which he occupied himself with zeal. Plotinos lived in very\nclose relations with him; he even retired to the country estate of\nZethus, distant six miles from Minturnae.\n\nCastricius, surnamed Firmus, had once owned this estate. Nobody, in our\ntimes, loved virtue more than Firmus. He held Plotinos in the deepest\nveneration. He rendered Amelius the same services that might have been\nrendered by a good servant, he displayed for me the attentions natural\ntowards a brother. Nevertheless this man, who was so attached to\nPlotinos, remained engaged in public affairs.\n\nSeveral senators, also, came to listen to Plotinos. Marcellus,\nOrontius, Sabinillus and Rogatianus applied themselves, under Plotinos,\nto the study of philosophy.\n\nThe latter, who also was a member of the senate, had so detached\nhimself from the affairs of life, that he had abandoned all his\npossessions, dismissed all his attendants, and renounced all his\ndignities. On being appointed praetor, at the moment of being\ninaugurated, while the lictors were already waiting for him, he refused\nto sally forth, and carry out any of the functions of this dignity.\nHe even failed to dwell in his own house (to avoid needless pomp); he\nvisited his friends, boarding and sleeping there; he took food only\nevery other day; and by this dieting, after having been afflicted\nwith gout to the point of having to be carried around in a litter, he\nrecovered his strength, and stretched out his hands as easily as any\nartisan, though formerly his hands had been incapacitated. Plotinos was\nvery partial to him; he used to praise him publicly, and pointed him\nout as a model to all who desired to become philosophers.\n\nAnother disciple of Plotinos was Serapion of Alexandria. At first he\nhad been a rhetorician, and only later applied himself to philosophy.\nNevertheless he never was able to cure himself of fondness for riches,\nor usury.\n\nMe also, Porphyry, a native of Tyre, Plotinos admitted to the circle of\nhis intimate friends, and he charged me to give the final revision to\nhis works.\n\n\nVIII. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PLOTINOS.\n\nOnce Plotinos had written something, he could neither retouch, nor even\nre-read what he had done, because his weak eyesight made any reading\nvery painful. His penmanship was poor. He did not separate words, and\nhis spelling was defective; he was chiefly occupied with ideas. Until\nhis death he continuously persisted in this habit, which was for us\nall a subject of surprise. When he had finished composing something in\nhis head, and when he then wrote what he had meditated on, it seemed\nas if he copied a book. Neither in conversation nor in discussion did\nhe allow himself to be distracted from the purpose of his thoughts,\nso that he was able at the same time to attend to the needs of\nconversation, while pursuing the meditation of the subject which busied\nhim. When the person who had been talking with him went away, he did\nnot re-read what he had written before the interruption, which, as has\nbeen mentioned above, was to save his eyesight; he could, later on,\ntake up the thread of his composition as if the conversation had been\nno obstacle to his attention. He therefore was able simultaneously to\nlive with others and with himself. He never seemed to need recuperation\nfrom this interior attention, which hardly ceased during his slumbers,\nwhich, however, were troubled both by the insufficiency of food,\nfor sometimes he did not even eat bread, and by this continuous\nconcentration of his mind.\n\n\nIX. PLOTINOS AS GUARDIAN AND ARBITRATOR.\n\nThere were women who were very much attached to him. There was his\nboarding house keeper Gemina, and her daughter, also called Gemina;\nthere was also Amphiclea, wife of Aristo, son of Jamblichus, all\nthree of whom were very fond of philosophy. Several men and women\nof substance, being on the point of death, entrusted him with their\nboys and girls, and all their possessions, as being an irreproachable\ntrustee; and the result was that his house was filled with young boys\nand girls. Among these was Polemo, whom Plotinos educated carefully;\nand Plotinos enjoyed hearing Polemo recite original verses (?).\nHe used to go through the accounts of the managers with care, and\nsaw to their economy; he used to say that until these young people\ndevoted themselves entirely to philosophy, their possessions should\nbe preserved intact, and see that they enjoyed their full incomes.\nThe obligation of attending to the needs of so many wards did not,\nhowever, hinder him from devoting to intellectual concerns a continuous\nattention during the nights. His disposition was gentle, and he was\nvery approachable by all who dwelt with him. Consequently, although he\ndwelt full twenty-six years in Rome, and though he was often chosen as\narbitrator in disputes, never did he offend any public personage.\n\n\nX. HOW PLOTINOS TREATED HIS ADVERSARY, OLYMPIUS.\n\nAmong those who pretended to be philosophers, there was a certain man\nnamed Olympius. He lived in Alexandria, and for some time had been a\ndisciple of Ammonius. As he desired to succeed better than Plotinos,\nhe treated Plotinos with scorn, and developed sufficient personal\nanimosity against Plotinos to try to bewitch him by magical operations.\nHowever, Olympius noticed that this enterprise was really turning\nagainst himself, and he acknowledged to his friends that the soul of\nPlotinos must be very powerful, since it was able to throw back upon\nhis enemies the evil practices directed against him. The first time\nthat Olympius attempted to harm him, Plotinos having noticed it, said,\n\"At this very moment the body of Olympius is undergoing convulsions,\nand is contracting like a purse.\" As Olympius several times felt\nhimself undergoing the very ills he was trying to get Plotinos to\nundergo, he finally ceased his practices.\n\n\nHOMAGE TO PLOTINOS FROM A VISITING EGYPTIAN PRIEST.\n\nPlotinos showed a natural superiority to other men. An Egyptian priest,\nvisiting Rome, was introduced to him by a mutual friend. Having decided\nto show some samples of his mystic attainments, he begged Plotinos to\ncome and witness the apparition of a familiar spirit who obeyed him on\nbeing evoked. The evocation was to occur in a chapel of Isis, as the\nEgyptian claimed that he had not been able to discover any other place\npure enough in Rome. He therefore evoked Plotinos's guardian spirit.\nBut instead of the spirit appeared a divinity of an order superior to\nthat of guardians, which event led the Egyptian to say to Plotinos,\n\"You are indeed fortunate, O Plotinos, that your guardian spirit is\na divinity, instead of a being of a lower order.\" The divinity that\nappeared could not be questioned or seen for as long a period as they\nwould have liked, as a friend who was watching over the sacrificed\nbirds choked them, either out of jealousy, or fear.\n\n\nPLOTINOS'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE PUBLIC MYSTERIES.\n\nAs Plotinos's guardian spirit was a divinity, Plotinos kept the eyes of\nhis own spirit directed on that divine guardian. That was the motive of\nhis writing his book[6] that bears the title \"Of the Guardian Allotted\nto Us.\" In it he tries to explain the differences between the various\nspirits that watch over mankind. Aurelius, who was very scrupulous\nin his sacrifices, and who carefully celebrated the Festivals of the\nNew Moon (as Numenius used to do?) (on the Calends of each month),\none day besought Plotinos to come and take part in a function of that\nkind. Plotinos, however, answered him, \"It is the business of those\ndivinities to come and visit me, and not mine to attend on them.\" We\ncould not understand why he should make an utterance that revealed so\nmuch pride, but we dared not question the matter.\n\n\nXI. PLOTINOS AS DETECTIVE AND AS PROPHET; PORPHYRY SAVED FROM SUICIDE.\n\nSo perfectly did he understand the character of men, and their methods\nof thought, that he could discover stolen objects, and foresaw what\nthose who resided with him should some day become. A magnificent\nnecklace had been stolen from Chione, an estimable widow, who resided\nwith him and the children (as matron?). All the slaves were summoned,\nand Plotinos examined them all. Then, pointing out one of them, he\nsaid, \"This is the culprit.\" He was put to the torture. For a long\nwhile, he denied the deed; but later acknowledged it, and returned the\nnecklace. Plotinos used to predict what each of the young people who\nwere in touch with him was to become. He insisted that Polemo would\nbe disposed to amorous relations, and would not live long; which also\noccurred. As to me, he noticed that I was meditating suicide. He came\nand sought me, in his house, where I was staying. He told me that this\nproject indicated an unsound mind, and that it was the result of a\nmelancholy disposition. He advised me to travel. I obeyed him. I went\nto Sicily,[7] to study under Probus, a celebrated philosopher, who\ndwelt in Lilybaeum. I was thus cured of the desire to die; but I was\ndeprived of the happiness of residing with Plotinos until his death.\n\n\nXII. THE PROJECT OF A PLATONOPOLIS COMES TO NAUGHT.\n\nThe emperor Gallienus and the empress Salonina, his wife, held Plotinos\nin high regard. Counting on their good will, he besought them to have a\nruined town in Campania rebuilt, to give it with all its territory to\nhim, that its inhabitants might be ruled by the laws of Plato. Plotinos\nintended to have it named Platonopolis, and to go and reside there\nwith his disciples. This request would easily have been granted but\nthat some of the emperor's courtiers opposed this project, either from\nspite, jealousy, or other unworthy motive.\n\n\nXIII. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PLOTINOS'S DELIVERY.\n\nIn his lectures his delivery was very good; he knew how to make\nimmediate apposite replies. Nevertheless, his language was not correct.\nFor instance, he used to say \"anamnemisketai\" for \"anamimnesketai\";\nand he made similar blunders in writing. But when he would speak, his\nintelligence seemed to shine in his face, and to illuminate it with\nits rays. He grew especially handsome in discussions; a light dew of\nperspiration appeared on his forehead, gentleness radiated in his\ncountenance, he answered kindly, but satisfactorily. For three days I\nhad to question him, to learn from him his opinions about the union\nof the body with the soul; he spent all that time in explaining to me\nwhat I wanted to know.[8] A certain Thaumasius, who had entered into\nthe school, said that he wanted to take down the arguments of the\ndiscussion in writing, and hear Plotinos himself speak; but that he\nwould not stand Porphyry's answering and questioning. \"Nevertheless,\"\nanswered Plotinos, \"if Porphyry does not, by his questions, bring up\nthe difficulties that we should solve (notice, in the course of the\nEnneads, the continual objections), we would have nothing to write.\"\n\n\nXIV. PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS OF PLOTINOS.\n\nThe style of Plotinos is vigorous and substantial, containing more\nthoughts than words, and is often full of enthusiasm and emotion.\nHe follows his own inspirations rather than ideas transmitted by\ntradition. The teachings of the Stoics and Peripatetics are secretly\nmingled among his works; the whole of Aristotle's Metaphysics is\ntherein condensed. Plotinos was fully up to the times in geometry,\narithmetic, mechanics, optics and music, although he did not take an\nover-weening interest in these sciences. At his lectures were read\nthe Commentaries of Severus, of Cronius;[9] of Numenius,[10] of Gaius\nand Atticus (Platonic Philosophers, the latter, setting forth the\ndifferences between Plato and Aristotle);[11] there were also readings\nof the works of the Peripatetics, of Aspasius, of Alexander (of\nAphrodisia, whose theory of Mixture in the Universe Plotinos studies\nseveral times), of Adrastus, and other philosophers of the day. None of\nthem, however, was exclusively admired by Plotinos. In his speculations\nhe revealed an original and independent disposition. In all his\nresearches he displayed the spirit of Ammonius. He could readily\nassimilate (what he read); then, in a few words, he summarized the\nideas aroused in him by profound meditation thereon. One day Longinus's\nbook \"On the Principles,\" and his \"On Antiquarians\" were read. Plotinos\nsaid, \"Longinus is a literary man, but not a philosopher.\" Origen (the\nPagan[12]) once came among his audience; Plotinos blushed, and started\nto rise. Origen, however, besought him to continue. Plotinos, however,\nanswered that it was only natural for lecturers to cease talking when\nthey were aware of the presence, in the audience, of people who already\nknew what was to be said. Then, after having spoken a little longer, he\nrose.\n\n\nXV. PORPHYRY EARNED RECOGNITION AT THE SCHOOL OF PLOTINOS.\n\nAt a celebration of Plato's birthday I was reading a poem about the\n\"Mystic Marriage\" (of the Soul) when somebody doubted my sanity,\nbecause it contained both enthusiasm and mysticism. Plotinos spoke\nup, and said to me, loud enough to be heard by everybody, \"You have\njust proved to us that you are at the same time poet, philosopher, and\nhierophant.\" On this occasion the rhetorician Diophanes read an apology\non the utterances of Alcibiades in Plato's \"Banquet,\" and he sought to\nprove that a disciple who seeks to exercise himself in virtue should\nshow unlimited \"complaisance\" for his teacher, even in case the latter\nwere in love with him. Plotinos rose several times, as if he wanted to\nleave the assembly; nevertheless, he restrained himself, and after the\naudience had dispersed, he asked me to refute the paper. As Diophanes\nwould not communicate it to me, I recalled his arguments, and refuted\nthem; and then I read my paper before the same auditors as those who\nhad heard what had been said by Diophanes. I pleased Plotinos so much,\nthat several times he interrupted me by the words, \"Strike that way,\nand you will become the light of men!\" When Eubulus, who was teaching\nPlatonism at Athens, sent to Plotinos some papers on Platonic subjects,\nPlotinos had them given to me to examine them and report to him about\nthem. He also studied the laws of astronomy, but not as a mathematician\nwould have done; he carefully studied astrology; but realizing that no\nconfidence could be placed in its predictions, he took the trouble to\nrefute them several times, in his work.[13]\n\n\nXVI. PLOTINOS'S POLEMIC AGAINST THE GNOSTICS.\n\nAt that time there were many Christians, among whom were prominent\nsectarians who had given up the ancient philosophy (of Plato and\nPythagoras), such as Adelphius and Aquilinus. They esteemed and\npossessed the greater part of the works of Alexander of Lybia,\nof Philocomus, of Demostrates and of Lydus. They advertised the\nRevelations of Zoroaster, of Zostrian, of Nicotheus, of Allogenes, of\nMesus, and of several others. These sectarians deceived a great number\nof people, and even deceived themselves, insisting that Plato had not\nexhausted the depths of intelligible \"being,\" or essence. That is why\nPlotinos refuted them at length in his lectures, and wrote the book\nthat we have named \"Against the Gnostics.\" The rest (of their books)\nhe left me to investigate. Amelius wrote as much as forty books to\nrefute the work of Zostrian; and as to me, I demonstrated by numerous\nproofs that this alleged Zoroastrian book was apocryphal, and had only\nrecently been written by those of that ilk who wished to make people\nbelieve that their doctrines had been taught by Zoroaster.\n\n\nXVII. START OF THE AMELIO-PORPHYRIAN CONTROVERSY, OVER NUMENIUS.\n\nThe Greeks insisted that Plotinos had appropriated the teachings of\nNumenius. Trypho, who was both a Stoic and a Platonist, insisted\non this to Amelius, who wrote a book that we have entitled, \"On\nthe Difference Between the Teachings of Plotinos and Numenius.\" He\ndedicated it to me under the title, \"To Basil\" (the King, recently used\nas a name, \"Royal\"). That was my name before I was called \"Porphyry,\"\nthe \"Purple One.\" In my own home language (Phoenician) I used to be\ncalled \"Malchus\"; that was my father's name, and in Greek \"Malchus\"\nis translated by \"Basileus\" (Basil, or King). Indeed, Longinus, who\ndedicated his book \"On Instinct\" to Cleodamus, and me jointly, there\ncalls me \"Malchus\"; and Amelius has translated this name in Greek, just\nas Numenius translated \"Maximus\" (from Latin into Greek by) \"Megaos\"\n(the great one). (I will quote the letter in full).\n\n\"Greetings from Amelius to Basil (Royal, or Purple One):\n\n\"You may be sure that I did not have the least inclination even\nto mention some otherwise respectable people who, to the point of\ndeafening you, insist that the doctrines of our friend (Plotinos) are\nnone other than those of Numenius of Apamea. It is evident enough that\nthese reproaches are entirely due to their desire to advertise their\noratorical abilities. Possessed with the desire to rend Plotinos to\npieces, they dare to go as far as to assert that he is no more than a\nbabbler, a forger, and that his opinions are impossible. But since you\nthink that it would be well for us to seize the occasion to recall\nto the public the teachings of which we approve (in Plotinos's system\nof philosophy), and in order to honor so great a man as our friend\nPlotinos by spreading his teachings--although this really is needless,\ninasmuch as they have long since become celebrated--I comply with your\nrequest, and, in accordance with my promise, I am hereby inscribing to\nyou this work which, as you well know, I threw together in three days.\nYou will not find in it that system and judiciousness natural to a book\ncomposed with care; they are only reflections suggested by the lectures\n(received from Plotinos), and arranged as they happened to come to\nmind. I, therefore, throw myself on your indulgence, especially as the\nthought of (Plotinos, that) philosopher whom some people are slandering\nto us, is not easy to grasp, because he expresses the same ideas in\ndifferent manners in accordance with the exigencies of the occasion.\nI am sure you will have the goodness to correct me, if I happen to\nstray from the opinions of Plotinos. As the tragic poet says somewhere,\nbeing overwhelmed with the pressure of duties, I find myself compelled\nto submit to criticism and correction if I am discovered in altering\nthe doctrines of our leader. You see how anxious I am to please you.\nFarewell!\"\n\n\nXVIII. POLEMIC BETWEEN AMELIUS AND PORPHYRY; AMELIUS TEACHES PORPHYRY.\n\nI have quoted this letter in full to show that, even in the times\nof Plotinos himself, it was claimed that Plotinos had borrowed and\nadvertised as his own teachings of Numenius; also that he was called\na trifler, and in short that he was scorned--which happened chiefly\nbecause he was not understood. Plotinos was far from the display and\nvanity of the Sophists. When lecturing, he seemed to be holding a\nconversation with his pupils. He did not try to convince you by a\nformal argument. This I realized from the first, when attending his\ncourses. I wished to make him explain himself more clearly by writing\nagainst him a work to prove that the intelligible entities subsist\noutside of intelligence.[14] Plotinos had Amelius read it to him; and\nafter the reading he laughingly said to him, \"It would be well for you\nto solve these difficulties that Porphyry has advanced against me,\nbecause he does not clearly understand my teachings.\" Amelius indeed\nwrote a rather voluminous work to answer my objections.[15] In turn,\nI responded. Amelius wrote again. This third work at last made me\nunderstand, but not without difficulty, the thought of Plotinos; and I\nchanged my views, reading my retraction at a meeting. Since that time,\nI have had complete confidence in the teachings of Plotinos. I begged\nhim to polish his writings, and to explain his system to me more at\nlength. I also prevailed upon Amelius to write some works.\n\n\nXIX. HOW THE WORKS OF PLOTINOS WERE PUT INTO SHAPE.\n\nYou may judge of the high opinion of Plotinos held by Longinus, from a\npart of a letter he addressed to me. I was in Sicily; he wished me to\nvisit him in Phoenicia, and desired me to bring him a copy of the works\nof that philosopher. This is what he wrote to me about the matter:\n\n\"Please send me the works; or rather, bring them with you; for I shall\nnever cease begging you to travel in this one of all other countries,\nwere it only because of our ancient friendship, and of the sweetness of\nthe air, which would so well suit your ruined health;[16] for you must\nnot expect to find any new knowledge here when you visit us. Whatever\nyour expectations may be, do not expect to find anything new here,\nnor even the ancient works (of myself, Longinus?) that you say are\nlost. There is such a scarcity of copyists here, that since I have been\nhere I have hardly been able to get what I lacked of Plotinos here, by\ninducing my copyist to abandon his usual occupations to devote himself\nexclusively to this work. Now that I have those works of Plotinos you\nsent me, I think I have them all; but these that I have are imperfect,\nbeing full of errors. I had supposed that our friend Amelius had\ncorrected the errors of the copyist; but his occupations have been too\npressing to allow of his attending to this. However passionately I\ndesire to examine what Plotinos has written about the soul, and about\nexistence, I do not know what use to make of his writings; these are\nprecisely those of his works that have been most mis-written by the\ncopyists. That is why I wish you would send them to me transcribed\nexactly; I would compare the copies and return them promptly. I repeat\nthat I beg you not to send them, but to bring them yourself with the\nother works of Plotinos, which might have escaped Amelius. All those he\nbrought here I have had transcribed exactly; for why should I not most\nzealously seek works so precious? I have often told you, both when we\nwere together, and apart, and when you were at Tyre, that Plotinos's\nworks contained reasonings of which I did not approve, but that I\nliked and admired his method of writing; his concise and forceful\nstyle, and the genuinely philosophical arrangement of his discussions.\nI am persuaded that those who seek the truth must place the works of\nPlotinos among the most learned.\"\n\n\nXX. OPINION OF LONGINUS, THE GREAT CRITIC, ABOUT PLOTINOS.\n\nI have made this rather long quotation only to show what was thought\nof Plotinos by the greatest critic of our days, the man who had\nexamined all the works of his time. At first Longinus had scorned\nPlotinos, because he had relied on the reports of people ignorant (of\nphilosophy). Moreover, Longinus supposed that the copy of the works of\nPlotinos he had received from Amelius was defective, because he was not\nyet accustomed to the style of Plotinos. Nevertheless, if any one had\nthe works of Plotinos in their purity, it was certainly Amelius, who\npossessed a copy made upon the originals themselves. I will further add\nwhat was written by Longinus about Plotinos, Amelius, and the other\nphilosophers of his time, so that the reader may better appreciate\nthis great critic's high opinion of them. This book, directed against\nPlotinos and Gentilianus Amelius, is entitled \"Of the Limit (of Good\nand Evil?)\" and begins as follows:\n\n\"There were, O Marcellus Orontius[17] many philosophers in our\ntime, and especially in the first years of our childhood--for it\nis useless to complain of their rarity at the present; but when I\nwas still a youth, there were still a rather goodly number of men\ncelebrated as philosophers. I was fortunate enough to get acquainted\nwith all of them, because I traveled early with our parents in many\ncountries. Visiting many nations and towns, I entered into personal\nrelations with such of these men as were still alive. Among these\nphilosophers, some committed their teachings to writings, with the\npurpose of being useful to posterity, while others thought that it\nwas sufficient for them to explain their opinions to their disciples.\nAmong the former are the Platonists Euclides, Democritus (who wrote\nCommentaries on the Alcibiades, on the Phaedo, and on the Metaphysics\nof Aristotle), Proclinus, who dwelt in the Troad, Plotinos and his\ndisciple Gentilianus Amelius, who are at present teaching at Rome;\nthe Stoics Themistocles, Phebion, and both Annius and Medius, who\nwere much talked of only recently, and the Peripatetician Heliodorus\nof Alexandria. Among those who did not write their teachings are the\nPlatonists Ammonius (Saccas) and (the pagan) Origen,[18] who lived\nwith him for a long while, and who excelled among the philosophers\nof that period; also Theodotus and Eubulus, who taught at Athens. Of\ncourse, they did write a little; Origen, for instance, wrote about \"The\nGuardian Spirits\"; and Eubulus wrote Commentaries on the Philebus,\nand on the Gorgias, and \"Observations on Aristotle's Objections\nagainst Plato's Republic.\" However, these works are not considerable\nenough to rank their authors among those who have seriously treated\nof philosophy; for these little works were by them written only\nincidentally, and they did not make writing their principal occupation.\nThe Stoics Herminus, Lysimachus,[19] Athenaeus and Musonius (author\nof \"Memorable Events,\" translated in Greek by Claudius Pollio),\nwho lived at Athens. The Peripateticians Ammonius and Ptolemy, who\nwere the most learned of their contemporaries, especially Ammonius,\nwhose erudition was unequalled, none of these philosophers wrote any\nimportant work; they limited themselves to writing poems, or festal\norations, which have been preserved in spite of them. I doubt very\nmuch that they wished to be known by posterity merely by books so\nsmall (and unrepresentative), since they had neglected to acquaint us\nwith their teachings in more significant works. Among those who have\nleft written works, some have done no more than gather or transcribe\nwhat has been left to us from the ancient (philosophers); among these\nare Euclides, Democritus and Proclinus. Others limited themselves to\nrecalling some details extracted from ancient histories, and they\ntried to compose books with the same materials as their predecessors,\nas did Annius, Medius, and Phebio; the latter one trying to make\nhimself famous by style, rather than by thought. To these we might\nadd Heliodorus, who has put in his writings nothing that had not been\nsaid by the ancients, without adding any philosophical explanation.\nBut Plotinos and Gentilianus Amelius, have shown that they really made\na profession of being writers, both by the great number of questions\nthey treated, and by the originality of their doctrines. Plotinos\nexplained the principles of Pythagoras and Plato more clearly than his\npredecessors; for neither Numenius, nor Cronius, nor Moderatus,[20] nor\nThrasyllus,[21] come anywhere near the precision of Plotinos when they\ntouch on the same topics. Amelius tried to follow in his footsteps,\nand adopted the greater part of his ideas; but differs from him in\nthe verbosity of his demonstrations, and the diffusion of his style.\nThe writings of these two men alone deserve special consideration;\nfor what is the use of criticizing the works of imitators; had we\nnot better study the authors whose works they copied, without any\nadditions, either in essential points, or in argumentation, doing no\nmore than choosing out the best? This has been our method of procedure\nin our controversy with Gentilianus Amelius's strictures on justice,\nin Plato's works; and in my examination of Plotinos's books on the\nIdeas.[22] So when our mutual friends Basil of Tyre, (Porphyry[23]),\nwho has written much on the lines of Plotinos, having even preferred\nthe teachings of Plotinos to my own (as he had been my pupil),\nundertook to demonstrate that Plotinos's views about the Ideas were\nbetter than my own, I have fully refuted his contentions, proving that\nhe was wrong in changing his views on the subject.[24] Besides, I have\ncriticized several opinions of Gentilianus Amelius and Plotinos,\nas for instance in the \"Letter to Amelius\" which is long enough to\nform a whole book. I wrote it to answer a letter sent me from Rome by\nAmelius, which was entitled \"The Characteristics of the Philosophy of\nPlotinos.\"[25] I, however, limited myself to entitling my little work,\n\"A Letter to Amelius.\"\n\n\nXXI. RESULTS OF LONGINUS'S CRITICISM AND VINDICATION OF PLOTINOS'S\nORIGINALITY.\n\nFrom the above it will be seen that Plotinos and Amelius are superior\nto all their contemporaries by the great number of questions they\nconsider, and by the originality of their system; that Plotinos had\nnot appropriated the opinions of Numenius, and that he did not even\nfollow them; that he had really profited by the opinions of the\nPythagoreans (and of Plato); further, that he was more precise than\nNumenius, Cronius, and Thrasyllus. After having said that Amelius\nfollowed in the footsteps of Plotinos, but that he was prolix and\ndiffuse in his expositions, which characteristic forms the difference\nbetween their styles, he speaks of me, who at that time had known\nPlotinos for only a short time, and says, \"Our mutual friends, Basil\n(King) of Tyre (Porphyry), who has written much, taking Plotinos\nas his model.\" By that he means that I have avoided the rather\nunphilosophical diffuseness of Amelius, and have imitated the (concise)\nstyle of Plotinos. The quotation of the judgment of this famous man,\nthe first critic of his day, should decide of the reverence due to\nour philosopher, Plotinos. If I had been able to visit Longinus when\nhe begged me to do so, he would not have undertaken the refutation he\nwrote, before having clearly understood Plotinos's system.\n\n\nXXII. THE APOLLONIAN ORACLE ABOUT PLOTINOS.\n\n(But when I have a long oracle of Apollo to quote, why should I delay\nover a letter of Longinus's, or, in the words of the proverb, quoted in\nIliad xxii. 126 and Hesiod Theogony 35), \"Why should I dally near the\noak-trees, or the rock?\" If the testimony of the wise is to be adduced,\nwho is wiser than Apollo, a deity who said of himself, \"I know the\nnumber of the grains of sand, and the extent of the ocean; I understand\nthe dust, and I hear him who does not speak!\" This was the divinity who\nhad said that Socrates was the wisest of men; and on being consulted by\nAmelius to discover what had become of the soul of Plotinos, said:\n\n        \"Let me sing an immortal hymn to my dear friend!\n        Drawing my golden bow, I will elicit melodious sounds from\n            my lyre.\n        I also invoke the symphonic voice of the choir of Muses,\n        Whose harmonious power raises exultant paeans,\n        As they once sang in chorus in praise of Achilles,\n        A Homeric song in divine inspiration.\n        Sacred choir of Muses, let us together celebrate this man,\n        For long-haired Apollo is among you!\n        \"O Deity, who formerly wert a man, but now approachest\n        The divine host of guardian spirits, delivered from the\n            narrowing bonds of necessity\n        That enchains man (while in the body), and from the tumult\n            caused by the\n        Confusing whirlwind of the passions of the body,\n        Sustained by the vigor of thy mind, thou hastenest to swim\n        (And like the sage Ulysses in Phaeacia), to land on a shore\n            not submerged by the waves,\n        With vigorous stroke, far from the impious crowds.\n        Persistently following the straightening path of the\n            purified soul,\n        Where the splendor of the divinity surrounds you, the home\n            of justice,\n        Far from contamination, in the holy sanctuary of initiation,\n        When in the past you struggled to escape the bitter\n            waves,[26]\n        When blood-stained life eddied around you with repulsive\n            currents,\n        In the midst of the waters dazed by frightening tumult,\n        Even then the divinities often showed you your end;[27]\n        And often, when your spirit was about to stray from the\n            right path,\n        The immortals beckoned you back to the real end; the eternal\n            path,\n        Enlightening your eyes with radiant beams in the midst of\n            gloomy darkness.\n        No deep slumber closed your eyelids, and when shaken by the\n            eddies (of matter),\n        You sought to withdraw your eyes from the night that pressed\n            down upon them;\n        You beheld beauties hidden from any who devote themselves to\n            the study of wisdom.\n        \"Now that you have discarded your cloak of mortality, and\n            ascended\n        Climbing out from the tombs of your angelic soul,\n        You have entered the choir of divinities, where breathes a\n            gentle zephyr.\n        There dwell friendship, and delightful desire, ever\n            accompanied by pure joy;\n        There may one quench one's thirst with divine ambrosia;\n        There bound by the ties of love, one breathes a gentle air,\n            under a tranquil sky.\n        There dwell the sons of Jupiter, who lived in the golden age;\n        The brothers Minos and Rhadamanthus, the just Aeacus,\n        The divine Plato, the virtuous Pythagoras,\n        And all those who formed the band of immortal love,\n        And who by birth belong to the most blessed of divinities.\n        Their soul tastes continual joy amidst perpetual feasts!\n        And you, blessed man, after having fought many a valiant\n            fight,\n        In the midst of chaste angels, you have achieved eternal\n            Felicity.\n        \"Here, O Muses, let us close this hymn in honor of Plotinos;\n        Cease the mazes of the dancing of the graceful choir;\n        This is what my golden lyre had to say of this eternally\n            blessed man!\"\n\n\nXXIII. PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PLOTINOS; THE ECSTATIC TRANCES.\n\nThis oracle (pieced out of numerous quotations) says (in some now lost\nlines, perhaps) that Plotinos was kindly, affable, indulgent, gentle,\nsuch as, indeed we knew him in personal intercourse. It also mentions\nthat this philosopher slept little, that his soul was pure, ever\naspiring to the divinity that he loved whole-heartedly, and that he did\nhis utmost to liberate himself (from terrestrial domination) \"to escape\nthe bitter waves of this cruel life.\"\n\nThat is how this divine man, who by his thoughts often aspired to the\nfirst (principle), to the divinity superior (to intelligence), climbing\nthe degrees indicated by Plato (in his Banquet), beheld the vision\nof the formless divinity, which is not merely an idea, being founded\non intelligence and the whole intelligible world. I, myself, had the\nblessed privilege of approaching this divinity, uniting myself to him,\nwhen I was about sixty-eight years of age.\n\nThat is how \"the goal (that Plotinos sought to achieve) seemed to\nhim located near him.\" Indeed, his goal, his purpose, his end was to\napproach the supreme divinity, and to unite himself with the divinity.\nWhile I dwelt with him, he had four times the bliss of reaching that\ngoal, not merely potentially, but by a real and unspeakable experience.\nThe oracle adds that the divinities frequently restored Plotinos to the\nright path when he strayed from it, \"enlightening his eyes by radiant\nsplendor.\" That is why it may truthfully be said that Plotinos composed\nhis works while in contemplation of the divinities, and enjoying that\nvision. \"Thanks to this sight that your 'vigilant' eyes had of both\ninterior and exterior things, you have,\" in the words of the oracle,\n\"gazed at many beauties that would hardly be granted to many of those\nwho study philosophy.\" Indeed, the contemplation of men may be superior\nto human contemplation; but, compared to divine knowledge, if it be of\nany value whatever, it, nevertheless, could not penetrate the depths\nreached by the glances of the divinities.\n\nTill here the oracle had limited itself to indicating what Plotinos\nhad accomplished while enclosed in the vesture of the body. It then\nproceeds to say that he arrived at the assembly of the divinities where\ndwell friendship, delightful desire, joy, and love communing with the\ndivinity, where the sons of God, Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus are\nestablished as the judges of souls. Plotinos joined them, not to be\njudged, but to enjoy their intimacy, as did the higher divinities.\nThere indeed dwell Plato, Pythagoras, and the other sages who formed\nthe choir of immortal love. Reunited with their families, the blessed\nangels spend their life \"in continued festivals and joys,\" enjoying the\nperpetual beatitude granted them by divine goodness.\n\n\nXXIV. CONTENTS OF THE VARIOUS ENNEADS.\n\nThis is what I have to relate of the life of Plotinos. He had, however,\nasked me to arrange and revise his works. I promised both him and his\nfriends to work on them. I did not judge it wise to arrange them in\nconfusion chronologically. So I imitated Apollodorus of Athens, and\nAndronicus the Peripatetician, the former collecting in ten volumes\nthe comedies of Epicharmus, and the latter dividing into treatises the\nworks of Aristotle and Theophrastus, gathering together the writings\nthat referred to the same subject. Likewise, I grouped the fifty-four\nbooks of Plotinos into six groups of nine (Enneads), in honor of the\nperfect numbers six and nine. Into each Ennead I have gathered the\nbooks that treat of the same matter, in each case prefixing the most\nimportant ones.\n\nThe First Ennead contains the writings that treat of Morals. They are:\n\n    1.  What is an Animal? What is a Man?                  53.\n    2.  Of the Virtues,                                    19.\n    3.  Of Dialectics,                                     20.\n    4.  Of Happiness,                                      46.\n    5.  Does Happiness (consist in Duration)?              36.\n    6.  Of Beauty,                                          1.\n    7.  Of the First Good, and of the Other Goods,         54.\n    8.  Of the Origin of Evils,                            51.\n    9.  Of (Reasonable) Suicide,                           16.\n\nSuch are the topics considered in the First Ennead; which thus contains\nwhat relates to morals.\n\nIn the Second Ennead are grouped the writings that treat of Physics, of\nthe World, and of all that it contains. They are:\n\n    1.  (Of the World),                                    40.\n    2.  Of the (Circular) Motion (of the Heavens),         14.\n    3.  Of the Influence of the Stars,                     52.\n    4.  (Of both Matters) (Sensible and Intelligible),     12.\n    5.  Of Potentiality and Actuality,                     25.\n    6.  Of Quality (and of Form),                          17.\n    7.  Of Mixture, Where there is Total Penetratration,   37.\n    8.  Of Vision. Why do Distant Objects Seem Smaller?    35.\n    9.  (Against Those Who say that the Demiurgic\n          Creator is Evil, as well as The World Itself),\n          Against the Gnostics,                            33.\n\nThe Third Ennead, which also relates to the world, contains the\ndifferent speculations referring thereto. Here are its component\nwritings:\n\n    1.  Of Destiny,                                         3.\n    2.  Of Providence, the First,                          47.\n    3.  Of Providence, the Second,                         48.\n    4.  Of the Guardian Spirit who was Allotted to Us,     15.\n    5.  Of Love,                                           50.\n    6.  Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Things,        26.\n    7.  Of Eternity of Time,                               45.\n    8.  Of Nature, of Contemplation, and of the One,       30.\n    9.  Different Speculations,                            13.\n\nWe have gathered these three Enneads into one single body. We have\nassigned the book on the Guardian Spirit Who has been Allotted to Us,\nin the Third Ennead, because this is treated in a general manner, and\nbecause it refers to the examination of conditions characteristic\nof the production of man. For the same reason the book on Love was\nassigned to the First Ennead. The same place has been assigned to the\nbook on Eternity and Time, because of the observations which, in this\nEnnead, refer to their nature. Because of its title, we have put in the\nsame group the book on Nature, Contemplation, and the One.\n\nAfter the books that treat of the world, the Fourth Ennead contains\nthose that refer to the soul. They are:\n\n    1.  Of the Nature of the Soul, the First,               4.\n    2.  Of the Nature of the Soul, the Second,             21.\n    3.  Problems about the Soul, the First,                27.\n    4.  Problems about the Soul, the Second,               28.\n    5.  (Problems about the Soul, the Third, or) Of\n          Vision,                                          29.\n    6.  Of Sensation, of Memory,                           41.\n    7.  Of the Immortality of the Soul,                     2.\n    8.  Of the Descent of the Soul into the Body,           6.\n    9.  Do not all Souls form a Single Soul?                8.\n\nThe Fourth Ennead, therefore, contains all that relates to Psychology.\n\nThe Fifth Ennead treats of Intelligence. Each book in it also contains\nsomething about the principle superior to intelligence, and also about\nthe intelligence characteristic of the soul, and about Ideas.\n\n    1.  About the three Principal Hypostatic Forms of\n           Existence,                                      10.\n    2.  Of Generation, and of the Order of Things\n           Posterior to the First,                         11.\n    3.  Of the Hypostatic Forms of Existence that Transmit\n           Knowledge, and of the Superior Principle,       49.\n    4.  How that which is Posterior to the First Proceeds\n           from it? Of the One,                             7.\n    5.  The Intelligibles are not Outside of Intelligence.\n           Of the Good,                                    32.\n    6.  The Super-essential Principle Does Not Think.\n           Which is the First Thinking Principle?\n           Which is the Second?                            24.\n    7.  Are there Ideas of Individuals?                    18.\n    8.  Of Intelligible Beauty,                            31.\n    9.  Of Intelligence, of Ideas, and of Existence,        5.\n\nWe have gathered the Fourth and Fifth Ennead into a single volume. Of\nthe Sixth Ennead, we have formed a separate volume, so that all the\nwritings of Plotinos might be divided into three parts, of which the\nfirst contains three Enneads, the second two; and the third, a single\nEnnead.\n\nHere are the books that belong to the Sixth Ennead, and to the Third\nVolume.\n\n    1.  Of the Kinds of Existence, the First,            42.\n    2.  Of the Kinds of Existence, the Second,           43.\n    3.  Of the Kinds of Existence, the Third,            44.\n    4.  The One Single Existence is everywhere Present\n            in its Entirety, First,                      22.\n    5.  The One Single Existence is everywhere Present\n            in its Entirety, Second,                     23.\n    6.  Of Numbers,                                      34.\n    7.  Of the Multitude of Ideas. Of the Good,          38.\n    8.  Of the Will, and of the Liberty of the One,      39.\n    9.  Of the Good, or of the One,                       9.\n\nThis is how we have distributed into six Enneads the fifty-four books\nof Plotinos. We have added to several of them, Commentaries, without\nfollowing any regular order, to satisfy our friends who desired to have\nexplanations of several points. We have also made headings of each\nbook, following the chronological order, with the exception of the book\non The Beautiful, whose date of composition we do not know. Besides,\nwe have not only written up separate summaries for each book, but also\nArguments, which are contained among the summaries.[28]\n\nNow we shall try to punctuate each book, and to correct the mistakes.\nWhatever else we may have to do besides, will easily be recognized by a\nreading of these books.\n\n\n\n\nLIFE OF PLOTINOS, BY EUNAPIUS.\n\nThe philosopher Plotinos came from Egypt; to be accurate, I will add\nthat his home was Lycopolis. This fact was not set down by the divine\nPorphyry, though he himself, as he reports, was a student of Plotinos,\nand had spent a great part of his life near him.\n\nThe altars dedicated to Plotinos are not yet cold; and not only are his\nbooks read by the learned more than are even those of Plato, but even\nthe multitude, though incapable of clearly understanding his doctrine,\nnevertheless conforms its conduct of life to his suggestions.\n\nPorphyry has set down all the details of the life of this philosopher,\nso that little can be added thereto; besides Porphyry seems to have\nclearly expounded many of Plotinos's writings.\n\n\n\n\nLIFE OF PLOTINOS, BY SUIDAS.\n\nPlotinos of Lycopolis, philosopher, disciple of that Ammonius who\nhad once been a porter, was the teacher of Amelius, who himself had\nPorphyry as pupil; the latter formed Jamblichus, and Jamblichus\nSopater. Plotinos prolonged his life till the seventh year of the reign\nof Gallienus. He composed fifty-four books, which are grouped in six\nenneads. His constitution was weakened by the effects of the sacred\ndisease (epilepsy). He wrote besides other works.\n\n\n\n\nFIRST ENNEAD, BOOK SIXTH.\n\nOf Beauty.\n\n\nREVIEW OF BEAUTY OF DAILY LIFE.\n\n1. Beauty chiefly affects the sense of sight. Still, the ear perceives\nit also, both in the harmony of words, and in the different kinds of\nmusic; for songs and verses are equally beautiful. On rising from the\ndomain of the senses to a superior region, we also discover beauty\nin occupations, actions, habits, sciences and virtues. Whether there\nexists a type of beauty still higher, will have to be ascertained by\ndiscussion.\n\n\nPROBLEMS CONCERNING HIGHER BEAUTY.\n\nWhat is the cause that certain bodies seem beautiful, that our ears\nlisten with pleasure to rhythms judged beautiful, and that we love the\npurely moral beauties? Does the beauty of all these objects derive\nfrom some unique, immutable principle, or will we recognize some one\nprinciple of beauty for the body, and some other for something else?\nWhat then are these principles, if there are several? Or which is this\nprinciple, if there is but one?\n\n\nWHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE BY PARTICIPATION IN WHICH THE BODY IS BEAUTIFUL?\n\nFirst, there are certain objects, such as bodies, whose beauty exists\nonly by participation, instead of being inherent in the very essence\nof the subject. Such are beautiful in themselves, as is, for example,\nvirtue. Indeed, the same bodies seem beautiful at one time, while at\nanother they lack beauty; consequently, there is a great difference\nbetween being a body and being beautiful. What then is the principle\nwhose presence in a body produces beauty therein? What is that element\nin the bodies which moves the spectator, and which attracts, fixes and\ncharms his glances? This is the first problem to solve; for, on finding\nthis principle, we shall use it as a means to resolve other questions.\n\n\nPOLEMIC AGAINST SYMMETRY, THE STOIC DEFINITION OF BEAUTY.\n\n(The Stoics), like almost everybody, insist that visual beauty consists\nin the proportion of the parts relatively to each other and to the\nwhole, joined to the grace of colors. If then, as in this case,\nthe beauty of bodies in general consists in the symmetry and just\nproportion of their parts, beauty could not consist of anything simple,\nand necessarily could not appear in anything but what was compound.\nOnly the totality will be beautiful; the parts by themselves will\npossess no beauty; they will be beautiful only by their relation with\nthe totality. Nevertheless, if the totality is beautiful, it would seem\nalso necessary that the parts be beautiful; for indeed beauty could\nnever result from the assemblage of ugly things. Beauty must therefore\nbe spread among all the parts. According to the same doctrine, the\ncolors which, like sunlight, are beautiful, are beautiful but simple,\nand those whose beauty is not derived from proportion, will also be\nexcluded from the domain of beauty. According to this hypothesis, how\nwill gold be beautiful? The brilliant lightning in the night, even\nthe stars, would not be beautiful to contemplate. In the sphere of\nsounds, also, it would be necessary to insist that what is simple\npossesses no beauty. Still, in a beautiful harmony, every sound, even\nwhen isolated, is beautiful. While preserving the same proportions, the\nsame countenance seems at one time beautiful, and at another ugly.\nEvidently, there is but one conclusion: namely, that proportion is\nnot beauty itself, but that it derives its beauty from some superior\nprinciple. (This will appear more clearly from further examples). Let\nus examine occupations and utterances. If also their beauty depended on\nproportion, what would be the function of proportion when considering\noccupations, laws, studies and sciences? Relations of proportion could\nnot obtain in scientific speculations; no, nor even in the mutual\nagreement of these speculations. On the other hand, even bad things may\nshow a certain mutual agreement and harmony; as, for instance, were we\nto assert that wisdom is softening of the brain, and that justice is a\ngenerous folly. Here we have two revoltingly absurd statements, which\nagree perfectly, and harmonize mutually. Further, every virtue is a\nsoul-beauty far truer than any that we have till now examined; yet it\ncould not admit of proportion, as it involves neither size nor number.\nAgain, granting that the soul is divided into several faculties, who\nwill undertake to decide which combination of these faculties, or of\nthe speculations to which the soul devotes itself, will produce beauty?\nMoreover (if beauty is but proportion), what beauty could be predicated\nof pure intelligence?\n\n\nBEAUTY CONSISTS IN KINSHIP TO THE SOUL.\n\n2. Returning to our first consideration, we shall examine the nature\nof the element of beauty in bodies. It is something perceivable at the\nvery first glance, something which the soul recognizes as kindred, and\nsympathetic to her own nature, which she welcomes and assimilates.\nBut as soon as she meets an ugly object, she recoils, repudiates it,\nand rejects it as something foreign, towards which her real nature\nfeels antipathy. That is the reason why the soul, being such as it is,\nnamely, of an essence superior to all other beings, when she perceives\nan object kindred to her own nature, or which reveals only some traces\nof it, rejoices, is transported, compares this object with her own\nnature, thinks of herself, and of her intimate being as it would be\nimpossible to fail to perceive this resemblance.\n\n\nBEAUTY CONSISTS IN PARTICIPATION IN A FORM.\n\nHow can both sensible and intelligible objects be beautiful? Because,\nas we said, sensible objects participate in a form. While a shapeless\nobject, by nature capable of receiving shape (physical) and form\n(intelligible), remains without reason or form, it is ugly. That which\nremains completely foreign to all divine reason (a reason proceeding\nfrom the universal Soul), is absolute ugliness. Any object should be\nconsidered ugly which is not entirely molded by informing reason,\nthe matter, not being able to receive perfectly the form (which the\nSoul gives it). On joining matter, form co-ordinates the different\nparts which are to compose unity, combines them, and by their harmony\nproduces something which is a unit. Since (form) is one, that which it\nfashions will also have to be one, as far as a composite object can\nbe one. When such an object has arrived at unity, beauty resides in\nit, and it communicates itself to the parts as well as to the whole.\nWhen it meets a whole, the parts of which are perfectly similar, it\ninterpenetrates it evenly. Thus it would show itself now in an entire\nbuilding, then in a single stone, later in art-products as well as in\nthe works of nature. Thus bodies become beautiful by communion with\n(or, participation in) a reason descending upon it from the divine\n(universal Soul).\n\n\nTHE SOUL APPRECIATES THE BEAUTIFUL BY AN AESTHETIC SENSE.\n\n3. The soul appreciates beauty by an especially ordered faculty, whose\nsole function it is to appreciate all that concerns beauty, even\nwhen the other faculties take part in this judgment. Often the soul\nmakes her (aesthetic) decisions by comparison with the form of the\nbeautiful which is within her, using this form as a standard by which\nto judge. But what agreement can anything corporeal have with what\nis incorporeal? For example, how can an architect judge a building\nplaced before him as beautiful, by comparing it with the Idea which he\nhas within himself? The only explanation can be that, on abstracting\nthe stones, the exterior object is nothing but the interior form, no\ndoubt divided within the extent of the matter, but still one, though\nmanifested in the manifold? When the senses perceive in an object the\nform which combines, unites and dominates a substance which lacks\nshape, and therefore is of a contrary nature; and if they also perceive\na shape which distinguishes itself from the other shapes by its\nelegance, then the soul, uniting these multiple elements, fuses them,\ncomparing them to the indivisible form which she bears within herself,\nthen she pronounces their agreement, kinship and harmony with that\ninterior type.\n\n\nINSTANCES OF CORRESPONDENCE OF OUTER SENSE BEAUTY WITH ITS IDEA.\n\nThus a worthy man, perceiving in a youth the character of virtue, is\nagreeably impressed, because he observes that the youth harmonizes\nwith the true type of virtue which he bears within himself. Thus also\nthe beauty of color, though simple in form, reduces under its sway\nthat obscurity of matter, by the presence of the light, which is\nsomething incorporeal, a reason, and a form. Likewise, fire surpasses\nall other bodies in beauty, because it stands to all other elements\nin the relation of a form; it occupies the highest regions;[29] it is\nthe subtlest of bodies because it most approaches the incorporeal\nbeings; without permitting itself to be penetrated by other bodies, it\npenetrates them all; without itself cooling, it communicates to them\nits heat; by its own essence it possesses color, and communicates it\nto others; it shines and coruscates, because it is a form. The body\nin which it does not dominate, shows but a discolored hue, and ceases\nbeing beautiful, merely because it does not participate in the whole\nform of color. Once more, thus do the hidden harmonies of sound produce\naudible harmonies, and also yield to the soul the idea of beauty,\nthough showing it in another order of things. Audible harmonies can be\nexpressed in numbers; not indeed in any kind of numbers, but only in\nsuch as can serve to produce form, and to make it dominate.\n\n\nTRANSITION FROM SENSE BEAUTY TO INTELLECTUAL BEAUTY.\n\nSo much then for sense-beauties which, descending on matter like images\nand shadows, beautify it and thereby compel our admiration. 4. Now we\nshall leave the senses in their lower sphere, and we shall rise to the\ncontemplation of the beauties of a superior order, of which the senses\nhave no intuition, but which the soul perceives and expresses.\n\n\nINTERIOR BEAUTIES COULD NOT BE APPRECIATED WITHOUT AN INTERIOR MODEL.\n\nJust as we could not have spoken of sense-beauties if we had never\nseen them, nor recognized them as such, if, in respect to them, we had\nbeen similar to persons born blind, likewise we would not know enough\nto say anything about the beauty either of the arts or sciences, or of\nanything of the kind, if we were not already in possession of this kind\nof beauty; nor of the splendor of virtue, if we had not contemplated\nthe (\"golden) face of Justice,\" and of temperance, before whose\nsplendor the morning and evening stars grow pale.\n\n\nMORAL BEAUTIES MORE DELIGHTFUL THAN SENSE-BEAUTIES.\n\nTo see these beauties, they must be contemplated by the faculty our\nsoul has received; then, while contemplating them, we shall experience\nfar more pleasure, astonishment and admiration, than in contemplation\nof the sense-beauties, because we will have the intuition of veritable\nbeauties. The sentiments inspired by beauty are admiration, a gentle\ncharm, desire, love, and a pleasurable impulse.\n\n\nTHEY WHO FEEL THESE SENTIMENTS MOST KEENLY ARE CALLED LOVERS.\n\nSuch are the sentiments for invisible beauties which should be felt,\nand indeed are experienced by all souls, but especially by the most\nloving. In the presence of beautiful bodies, all indeed see them; but\nnot all are equally moved. Those who are most moved are designated\n\"lovers.\"[30]\n\n\nTHE CAUSE OF THESE EMOTIONS IS THE INVISIBLE SOUL.\n\n5. Let us now propound a question about experiences to these men who\nfeel love for incorporeal beauties. What do you feel in presence of the\nnoble occupations, the good morals, the habits of temperance, and in\ngeneral of virtuous acts and sentiments, and of all that constitutes\nthe beauty of souls? What do you feel when you contemplate your inner\nbeauty? What is the source of your ecstasies, or your enthusiasms?\nWhence come your desires to unite yourselves to your real selves, and\nto refresh yourselves by retirement from your bodies? Such indeed are\nthe experiences of those who love genuinely. What then is the object\nwhich causes these, your emotions? It is neither a figure, nor a color,\nnor any size; it is that (colorless) invisible soul, which possesses\na wisdom equally invisible; this soul in which may be seen shining\nthe splendor of all the virtues, when one discovers in oneself, or\ncontemplates in others, the greatness of character, the justice of the\nheart, the pure temperance, the imposing countenance of valor, dignity\nand modesty, proceeding alone firmly, calmly, and imperturbably; and\nabove all, intelligence, resembling the divinity, by its brilliant\nlight. What is the reason that we declare these objects to be\nbeautiful, when we are transported with admiration and love for them?\nThey exist, they manifest themselves, and whoever beholds them will\nnever be able to restrain himself from confessing them to be veritable\nbeings. Now what are these genuine beings? They are beautiful.\n\n\nLOVE OF BEAUTY EXPLAINED BY AVERSION FOR OPPOSITE.\n\nBut reason is not yet satisfied; reason wonders why these veritable\nbeings give the soul which experiences them the property of exciting\nlove, from which proceeds this halo of light which, so to speak,\ncrowns all virtues. Consider the things contrary to these beautiful\nobjects, and with them compare what may be ugly in the soul. If we\ncan discover of what ugliness consists, and what is its cause, we\nshall have achieved an important element of the solution we are\nseeking. Let us picture to ourselves an ugly soul; she will be given\nup to intemperance; and be unjust, abandoned to a host of passions,\ntroubled, full of fears caused by her cowardliness, and of envy by her\ndegradation; she will be longing only for vile and perishable things;\nshe will be entirely depraved, will love nothing but impure wishes,\nwill have no life but the sensual, and will take pleasure in her\nturpitude. Would we not explain such a state by saying that under the\nvery mask of beauty turpitude had invaded this soul, brutalized her,\nsoiled her with all kinds of vices, rendering her incapable of a pure\nlife, and pure sentiments, and had reduced her to an existence obscure,\ninfected with evil, poisoned by lethal germs; that it had hindered her\nfrom contemplating anything she should, forcing her to remain solitary,\nbecause it misled her out from herself towards inferior and gloomy\nregions? The soul fallen into this state of impurity, seized with an\nirresistible inclination towards the things of sense, absorbed by her\nintercourse with the body, sunk into matter, and having even received\nit within herself, has changed form by her admixture with an inferior\nnature. Not otherwise would be a man fallen into slimy mud, who no\nlonger would present to view his primitive beauty, and would exhibit\nonly the appearance of the mud that had defiled him; his ugliness\nwould be derived from something foreign; and to recover his pristine\nbeauty he would have to wash off his defilement, and by purification be\nrestored to what he once was.\n\n\nUGLINESS IS ONLY A FOREIGN ACCRETION.\n\nWe have the right to say that the soul becomes ugly by mingling with\nthe body, confusing herself with it, by inclining herself towards it.\nFor a soul, ugliness consists in being impure, no longer unmingled,\nlike gold tarnished by particles of earth. As soon as this dross is\nremoved, and nothing but gold remains, then again it is beautiful,\nbecause separated from every foreign body, and is restored to its\nunique nature. Likewise the soul, released from the passions begotten\nby her intercourse with the body when she yields herself too much to\nit, delivered from exterior impressions, purified from the blemishes\ncontracted from her alliance with the body--that is, reduced to\nherself, she lays aside that ugliness which is derived from a nature\nforeign to her.\n\n\nVIRTUES ARE ONLY PURIFICATIONS.\n\n6. Thus, according to the ancient (Platonic or Empedoclean) maxim,\n\"courage, temperance, all the virtues, nay, even prudence, are but\npurifications.\" The mysteries were therefore wise in teaching that the\nman who has not been purified will, in hell, dwell at the bottom of a\nswamp; for everything that is not pure, because of its very perversity,\ndelights in mud, just as we see the impure swine wallow in the mud\nwith delight. And indeed, what would real temperance consist of, if it\nbe not to avoid attaching oneself to the pleasures of the body, and\nto flee from them as impure, and as only proper for an impure being?\nWhat else is courage, unless no longer to fear death, which is mere\nseparation of the soul from the body? Whoever therefore is willing to\nwithdraw from the body could surely not fear death. Magnanimity is\nnothing but scorn of things here below. Last, prudence is the thought\nwhich, detached from the earth, raises the soul to the intelligible\nworld. The purified soul, therefore, becomes a form, a reason, an\nincorporeal and intellectual essence; she belongs entirely to the\ndivinity, in whom resides the source of the beautiful, and of all the\nqualities which have affinity with it.\n\n\nTHE SOUL'S WELFARE IS TO RESEMBLE THE DIVINITY.\n\nRestored to intelligence, the soul sees her own beauty increase;\nindeed, her own beauty consists of the intelligence with its ideas;\nonly when united to intelligence is the soul really isolated from all\nthe remainder. That is the reason that it is right to say that \"the\nsoul's welfare and beauty lie in assimilating herself to the divinity,\"\nbecause it is the principle of beauty and of the essences; or rather,\nbeing is beauty, while the other nature (non-being, matter), is\nugliness. This is the First Evil, evil in itself, just as that one (the\nFirst Principle) is the good and the beautiful; for good and beauty\nare identical. Consequently, beauty or good, and evil or ugliness, are\nto be studied by the same methods. The first rank is to be assigned to\nbeauty, which is identical with the good, and from which is derived\nthe intelligence which is beautiful by itself. The soul is beautiful\nby intelligence, then, the other things, like actions, and studies,\nare beautiful by the soul which gives them a form. It is still the\nsoul which beautifies the bodies to which is ascribed this perfection;\nbeing a divine essence, and participating in beauty, when she seizes an\nobject, or subjects it to her dominion, she gives to it the beauty that\nthe nature of this object enables it to receive.\n\n\nAPPROACH TO THE GOOD CONSISTS IN SIMPLIFICATION.\n\nWe must still ascend to the Good to which every soul aspires. Whoever\nhas seen it knows what I still have to say, and knows the beauty of\nthe Good. Indeed, the Good is desirable for its own sake; it is the\ngoal of our desires. To attain it, we have to ascend to the higher\nregions, turn towards them, and lay aside the garment which we put on\nwhen descending here below; just as, in the (Eleusynian, or Isiac)\nmysteries, those who are admitted to penetrate into the recesses of the\nsanctuary, after having purified themselves, lay aside every garment,\nand advance stark naked.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME PURPOSE OF LIFE IS THE ECSTATICAL VISION OF GOD.\n\n7. Thus, in her ascension towards divinity, the soul advances until,\nhaving risen above everything that is foreign to her, she alone with\nHim who is alone, beholds, in all His simplicity and purity, Him from\nwhom all depends, to whom all aspires, from whom everything draws\nits existence, life and thought. He who beholds him is overwhelmed\nwith love; with ardor desiring to unite himself with Him, entranced\nwith ecstasy. Men who have not yet seen Him desire Him as the Good;\nthose who have, admire Him as sovereign beauty, struck simultaneously\nwith stupor and pleasure, thrilling in a painless orgasm, loving\nwith a genuine emotion, with an ardor without equal, scorning all\nother affections, and disdaining those things which formerly they\ncharacterized as beautiful. This is the experience of those to whom\ndivinities and guardians have appeared; they reck no longer of the\nbeauty of other bodies. Imagine, if you can, the experiences of those\nwho behold Beauty itself, the pure Beauty, which, because of its\nvery purity, is fleshless and bodiless, outside of earth and heaven.\nAll these things, indeed are contingent and composite, they are not\nprinciples, they are derived from Him. What beauty could one still wish\nto see after having arrived at vision of Him who gives perfection to\nall beings, though himself remains unmoved, without receiving anything;\nafter finding rest in this contemplation, and enjoying it by becoming\nassimilated to Him? Being supreme beauty, and the first beauty, He\nbeautifies those who love Him, and thereby they become worthy of love.\nThis is the great, the supreme goal of souls; this is the goal which\narouses all their efforts, if they do not wish to be disinherited of\nthat sublime contemplation the enjoyment of which confers blessedness,\nand privation of which is the greatest of earthly misfortunes. Real\nmisfortune is not to lack beautiful colors, nor beautiful bodies,\nnor power, nor domination, nor royalty. It is quite sufficient to\nsee oneself excluded from no more than possession of beauty. This\npossession is precious enough to render worthless domination of\na kingdom, if not of the whole earth, of the sea, or even of the\nheavens--if indeed it were possible, while abandoning and scorning all\nthat (natural beauty), to succeed in contemplating beauty face to face.\n\n\nTHE METHOD TO ACHIEVE ECSTASY IS TO CLOSE THE EYES OF THE BODY.\n\n8. How shall we start, and later arrive at the contemplation of this\nineffable beauty which, like the divinity in the mysteries, remains\nhidden in the recesses of a sanctuary, and does not show itself\noutside, where it might be perceived by the profane? We must advance\ninto this sanctuary, penetrating into it, if we have the strength to do\nso, closing our eyes to the spectacle of terrestrial things, without\nthrowing a backward glance on the bodies whose graces formerly charmed\nus. If we do still see corporeal beauties, we must no longer rush at\nthem, but, knowing that they are only images, traces and adumbrations\nof a superior principle, we will flee from them, to approach Him\nof whom they are merely the reflections. Whoever would let himself\nbe misled by the pursuit of those vain shadows, mistaking them for\nrealities, would grasp only an image as fugitive as the fluctuating\nform reflected by the waters, and would resemble that senseless\n(Narcissus) who, wishing to grasp that image himself, according to the\nfable, disappeared, carried away by the current. Likewise he would wish\nto embrace corporeal beauties, and not release them, would plunge,\nnot his body, but his soul into the gloomy abysses, so repugnant to\nintelligence; he would be condemned to total blindness; and on this\nearth, as well as in hell, he would see naught but mendacious shades.\n\n\nHOW TO FLY TO OUR FATHERLAND.\n\nThis indeed is the occasion to quote (from Homer) with peculiar force,\n\"Let us fly unto our dear fatherland!\" But how shall we fly? How escape\nfrom here? is the question Ulysses asks himself in that allegory\nwhich represents him trying to escape from the magic sway of Circe\nor Calypso, where neither the pleasure of the eyes, nor the view of\nfleshly beauty were able to hold him in those enchanted places. Our\nfatherland is the region whence we descend here below. It is there that\ndwells our Father. But how shall we return thither? What means shall\nbe employed to return us thither? Not our feet, indeed; all they could\ndo would be to move us from one place of the earth to another. Neither\nis it a chariot, nor ship which need be prepared. All these vain helps\nmust be left aside, and not even considered. We must close the eyes of\nthe body, to open another vision, which indeed all possess, but very\nfew employ.\n\n\nHOW TO TRAIN THIS INTERIOR VISION.\n\n9. But how shall we train this interior vision? At the moment of\nits (first) awakening, it cannot contemplate beauties too dazzling.\nYour soul must then first be accustomed to contemplate the noblest\noccupations of man, and then the beautiful deeds, not indeed those\nperformed by artists, but those (good deeds) done by virtuous men.\nLater contemplate the souls of those who perform these beautiful\nactions. Nevertheless, how will you discover the beauty which their\nexcellent soul possesses? Withdraw within yourself, and examine\nyourself. If you do not yet therein discover beauty, do as the artist,\nwho cuts off, polishes, purifies until he has adorned his statue\nwith all the marks of beauty. Remove from your soul, therefore, all\nthat is superfluous, straighten out all that is crooked, purify and\nilluminate what is obscure, and do not cease perfecting your statue\nuntil the divine resplendence of virtue shines forth upon your sight,\nuntil you see temperance in its holy purity seated in your breast.\nWhen you shall have acquired this perfection; when you will see it in\nyourself; when you will purely dwell within yourself; when you will\ncease to meet within yourself any obstacle to unity; when nothing\nforeign will any more, by its admixture, alter the simplicity of your\ninterior essence; when within your whole being you will be a veritable\nlight, immeasurable in size, uncircumscribed by any figure within\nnarrow boundaries, unincreasable because reaching out to infinity,\nand entirely incommensurable because it transcends all measure and\nquantity; when you shall have become such, then, having become sight\nitself, you may have confidence in yourself, for you will no longer\nneed any guide. Then must you observe carefully, for it is only by the\neye that then will open itself within you that you will be able to\nperceive supreme Beauty. But if you try to fix on it an eye soiled by\nvice, an eye that is impure, or weak, so as not to be able to support\nthe splendor of so brilliant an object, that eye will see nothing, not\neven if it were shown a sight easy to grasp. The organ of vision will\nfirst have to be rendered analogous and similar to the object it is to\ncontemplate. Never would the eye have seen the sun unless first it had\nassumed its form; likewise, the soul could never see beauty, unless she\nherself first became beautiful. To obtain the view of the beautiful,\nand of the divinity, every man must begin by rendering himself\nbeautiful and divine.\n\n\nTHE LANDMARKS OF THE PATH TO ECSTASY.\n\nThus he will first rise to intelligence, and he will there contemplate\nbeauty, and declare that all this beauty resides in the Ideas. Indeed,\nin them everything is beautiful, because they are the daughters and the\nvery essence of Intelligence.\n\nAbove intelligence, he will meet Him whom we call the nature of the\nGood, and who causes beauty to radiate around Him; so that, to repeat,\nthe first thing that is met is beauty. If a distinction is to be\nestablished among the intelligibles, we might say that intelligible\nbeauty is the locus of ideas, and that the Good, which is located above\nthe Beautiful, is its source and principle. If, however, we desire to\nlocate the Good and the Beautiful within one single principle, we might\nregard this one principle first as Good, and only afterwards, as Beauty.\n\n\nREFERENCES.\n\nPage 40, line 4, Equally Beautiful, Phaedrus p. 250, Cary 63-65;\nHippias Major, 295, Cary 44; Philebus p. 17, Cary 20, 21.\n\nPage 41, line 11, Stoic definition, Cicero, Tusculans, iv. 13.\n\nPage 44, line 30, Obscurity of Matter, Timaeus, p. 31, Cary 11;\nPhilebus, p. 29, Cary 52.\n\nPage 45, line 22, Superior Order, Banquet 210, Cary 34; Timaeus, p. 31,\nCary 11.\n\nPage 45, line 35, Golden Face of Justice, Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae,\nxii. 546.\n\nPage 46, line 10, Pleasurable Impulse, Banquet, p. 191, Cary 17, 18;\nCratylos, p. 420, Cary 78-80.\n\nPage 47, line 5, Justice of the Heart, Banquet, p. 209, Cary 33;\nRepublic, iii. 402, Cary 12.\n\nPage 48, line 23, Ugliness, Banquet, p. 215-217, Cary 39, 40; Philebus,\np. 66, Cary 158, 159.\n\nPage 49, line 4, Purifications, Phaedo, p. 69, Cary 37.\n\nPage 49, line 32, Assimilating to Divinity, Republic x. p. 613, Cary 12.\n\nPage 50, line 1, Good and Beautiful, Timaeus, p. 35, Cary 12.\n\nPage 50, line 5, Identical with Good, Philebus, p. 64, Cary 153-155;\nFirst Alcibiades, p. 115, Cary 23, 24.\n\nPage 51, line 1, 2, He who Beholds, Phaedrus, p. 278, Cary 145.\n\nPage 51, line 8, Ardor without Equal; line 15, Very Purity; Banquet, p.\n210, 211; Cary 34, 35.\n\nPage 51, line 29, Confers Blessedness, Phaedrus, p. 250, Cary 64.\n\nPage 53, line 16, Interior Vision, Republic, x., p. 533, Cary 13.\n\nPage 53, line 34, Temperance Seated, Phaedrus, p. 279, Cary 147.\n\nPage 54, line 19, Organ of Vision, Timaeus, p. 45, Cary 19.\n\nPage 54, line 23, Assumed its form, Republic, vi., p. 508, Cary 19.\n\nPage 54, line 29, Rise to Intelligence, Philebus, p. 64, Cary 153-155.\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN.\n\nOf the Immortality of the Soul: Polemic Against Materialism.\n\n\nIS THE SOUL IMMORTAL?\n\n1. Are we immortal, or does all of us die? (Another possibility would\nbe that) of the two parts of which we are composed, the one might be\nfated to be dissolved and perish, while the other, that constitutes our\nvery personality, might subsist perpetually. These problems must be\nsolved by a study of our nature.\n\n\nTHE BODY AS THE INSTRUMENT OF THE SOUL.\n\nMan is not a simple being; he contains a soul and a body, which is\nunited to this soul, either as tool, or in some other manner.[31] This\nis how we must distinguish the soul from the body, and determine the\nnature and manner of existence (\"being\") of each of them.\n\n\nTHE BODY IS COMPOSITE, AND THEREFORE PERISHABLE.\n\nAs the nature of the body is composite, reason convinces us that it\ncannot last perpetually, and our senses show it to us dissolved,\ndestroyed, and decayed, because the elements that compose it return\nto join the elements of the same nature, altering, destroying them\nand each other, especially when this chaos is abandoned to the soul,\nwhich alone keeps her parts combined. Even if a body were taken alone,\nit would not be a unity; it may be analyzed into form and matter,\nprinciples that are necessary to the constitution of all bodies, even\nof those that are simple.[32] Besides, as they contain extension,\nthe bodies can be cut, divided into infinitely small parts, and thus\nperish.[33] Therefore if our body is a part of ourselves,[34] not all\nof us is immortal; if the body is only the instrument of the soul, as\nthe body is given to the soul only for a definite period, it still is\nby nature perishable.\n\n\nTHE SOUL IS THE INDIVIDUALITY, AS ITS FORM, AND AS A SKILLED WORKMAN.\n\nThe soul, which is the principal part of man, and which constitutes man\nhimself,[35] should bear to the body the relation of form to matter, or\nof a workman to his tool;[36] in both cases the soul is the man himself.\n\n\nIF THE SOUL IS INCORPOREAL, WE MUST STUDY INCORPOREALITY.\n\n2. What then is the nature of the soul? If she is a body, she can be\ndecomposed, as every body is a composite. If, on the contrary, she is\nnot a body, if hers is a different nature, the latter must be examined;\neither in the same way that we have examined the body, or in some other\nway.\n\n\nA.--THE SOUL IS NOT CORPOREAL (AS THE STOICS THOUGHT).\n\n(a.) (Neither a material molecule, nor a material aggregation of\nmaterial atoms could possess life and intelligence.) First, let\nus consider the nature of this alleged soul-body. As every soul\nnecessarily possesses life, and as the body, considered as being the\nsoul, must obtain at least two molecules, if not more (there are three\npossibilities): either only one of them possesses life, or all of\nthem possess it, or none of them. If one molecule alone possesses\nlife, it alone will be the soul. Of what nature will be that molecule\nsupposed to possess life by itself? Will it be water (Hippo), air\n(Anaximenes, Archelaus, and Diogenes), earth, or fire (Heraclitus,\nStobaeus?[37]) But those are elements that are inanimate by themselves,\nand which, even when they are animated, possess but a borrowed life.\nStill there is no other kind of body. Even those (philosophers, like\nthe Pythagoreans) who posited elements other (than water, air, earth\nand fire) still considered them to be bodies, and not souls, not even\nattributing souls to them. The theory that life results from the union\nof molecules of which, nevertheless, none by itself possesses life, is\nan absurd hypothesis. If further any molecule possesses life, then a\nsingle one would be sufficient.\n\n\nNEITHER MIXTURE NOR ITS PRINCIPLE WILL EXPLAIN LIFE AS A BODY.\n\nThe most irrational theory of all is that an aggregation of molecules\nshould produce life, that elements without intelligence should beget\nintelligence. Others (like Alexander of Aphrodisia) insist that to\nproduce life these elements must be mingled in a certain manner. That\nwould, however, imply (as thought Gallen and Hippocrates[38]) the\nexistence of a principle which produces order, and which should be the\ncause of mixture or, temperament,[39] and that should alone deserve\nbeing considered as soul. No simple bodies could exist, much less\ncomposite bodies, unless there was a soul in the universe; for it is\n(seminal) reason which, in, adding itself to matter, produces body.[40]\nBut surely a (seminal) reason could proceed from nowhere except a soul.\n\n\nNO ATOMIC AGGREGATION COULD PRODUCE A SELF-HARMONIZING UNITY.\n\n3. (b.) (No aggregation of atoms could form a whole that would be one\nand sympathetic with itself.) Others, on the contrary, insist that the\nsoul is constituted by the union of atoms or indivisibles (as thought\nLeucippus, Democritus and Epicurus.[41]) To refute this error, we have\nto examine the nature of sympathy (or community of affection, a Stoic\ncharacteristic of a living being,[42]) and juxtaposition.[43] On the\none hand an aggregation of corporeal molecules which are incapable of\nbeing united, and which do not feel cannot form a single sympathetic\nwhole such as is the soul, which is sympathetic with herself. On\nthe other hand, how could a body or extension be constituted by (a\njuxtaposition of) atoms?\n\n\nSOUL IS A SIMPLE SUBSTANCE, WHILE EVERY BODY IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND\nFORM.\n\n(c.) (Every body is a composite of matter and form, while the soul is\na simple substance.) Inasmuch as matter possesses no quality,[44] the\nmatter of no simple body will be said to possess life in itself. That\nwhich imparts life to it must then be its form. If form is a \"being,\"\nthe soul cannot simultaneously be matter and form; it will be only\nmatter or form. Consequently, the soul will not be the body, since\nthe body is not constituted by matter exclusively, as could be proved\nanalytically, if necessary.\n\n\nIF SOUL IS ONLY AN AFFECTION OF MATTER, WHENCE THAT AFFECTION?\n\n(d.) (The soul is not a simple manner of being of matter, because\nmatter could not give itself a form.) Some Stoics might deny that form\nwas a \"being,\" asserting the soul to be a mere affection (or, manner\nof being) of matter.[45] From whence then did matter acquire this\naffection and animating life? Surely matter itself could not endow\nitself with a form and a soul. That which endows matter or any body\nwith life must then be some principle alien and superior to corporeal\nnature.\n\n\nNO BODY COULD SUBSIST WITHOUT THE POWER OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.\n\n(e.) (No body could subsist without the power of the universal soul.)\nBesides no body could subsist without the power of the universal Soul\n(from Numenius[46]). Every body, indeed, is in a perpetual flow and\nmovement (as thought Heraclitus, in Plato, Cratylus[47]), and the world\nwould soon perish if it contained nothing but bodies, even if some one\nof them were to be called soul; for such a soul, being composed of\nthe same matter as the other bodies, would undergo the same fate that\nthey do; or rather, there would not even be any body, everything would\nremain in the condition of shapeless matter, since there would exist\nno principle to fashion it. Why, there would not even be any matter,\nand the universe would be annihilated to nothingness, if the care of\nkeeping its parts united were entrusted to some body which would have\nnothing but the name of soul, as for instance, to air, or a breath\nwithout cohesion,[48] which could not be one, by itself. As all bodies\nare divisible, if the universe depended on a body, it would be deprived\nof intelligence and given up to chance. How, indeed, could there be\nany order in a spirit which itself would need to receive order from a\nsoul? How could this spirit contain reason and intelligence? On the\nhypothesis of the existence of the soul, all these elements serve to\nconstitute the body of the world, and of every animal, because all\ndifferent bodies together work for the end of all; but without the\nsoul, there is no order, and even nothing exists any more.\n\n\nIF THE SOUL IS NOT SIMPLE MATTER, SHE MUST BE A SUBSTANTIAL FORM.\n\n4. (f) (If the soul is anything but simple matter, she must be\nconstituted by a substantial form.) Those who claim that the soul\nis a body are, by the very force of the truth, forced to recognize\nthe existence, before and above them, of a form proper to the soul;\nfor they acknowledge the existence of an intelligent spirit, and an\nintellectual fire (as do the Stoics, following in the footsteps of\nHeraclitus, Stobaeus[49]). According to them, it seems that, without\nspirit or fire, there cannot be any superior nature in the order of\nbeings, and that the soul needs a location where she may be built\nup. On the contrary, it is bodies alone that need to be built up on\nsomething, and indeed, they are founded on the powers of the soul.\nIf really we do believe that the soul and life are no more than a\nspirit, why add the qualification \"of a certain characteristic,\"[50]\na meaningless term employed when forced to admit an active nature\nsuperior to that of bodies. As there are thousands of inanimate\nspirits, not every spirit is a soul. If only that spirit is a\nsoul which possesses that \"special characteristic,\" this \"special\ncharacteristic\" and this \"manner of being\" will either be something\nreal, or will be nothing. If they are nothing, there will be nothing\nreal but spirit, and this alleged \"manner of being\" is nothing more\nthan a word. In that system, therefore, nothing but matter really\nexists. God, the soul, and all other things are no more than a word;\nthe body alone really subsists. If, on the contrary, that \"manner of\nbeing\" is something real, if it is anything else than substrate or\nmatter, if it resides in matter without being material or composed of\nmatter, it must then be a nature different from the body, namely, a\nreason (by a pun).[51]\n\n\nTHE BODY EXERTS A UNIFORM ACTION, WHILE THE SOUL EXERTS A VARIED ONE.\n\n(g.) (The body exerts an uniform action, while the soul exerts a very\ndiverse action.) The following considerations further demonstrate the\nimpossibility of the soul being a body. A body must be hot or cold,\nhard or soft, liquid or solid, black or white, or qualities differing\naccording to its nature. If it is only hot or cold, light or heavy,\nblack or white, it communicates its only quality to what comes close\nto it; for fire could not cool, nor ice heat. Nevertheless, the soul\nproduces not only different effects in different animals, but contrary\neffects even in the same being; she makes certain things solid, dense,\nblack, light, and certain others liquid, sparse, white, or heavy.\nAccording to the different quality of the body, and according to its\ncolor, she should produce but a single effect; nevertheless, she exerts\na very diverse action.\n\n\nTHREE MORE PROOFS OF THE INCORPOREITY OF THE SOUL.\n\n5. (h.) (The body has but a single kind of motion while the soul has\ndifferent ones.) If the soul is a body, how does it happen that she\nhas different kinds of motion instead of a single one, as is the\ncase with the body? Will these movements be explained by voluntary\ndeterminations, and by (seminal) reasons? In this case neither the\nvoluntary determinations, nor these reasons, which differ from each\nother, can belong to a single and simple body; such a body does not\nparticipate in any particular reason except by the principle that made\nit hot or cold.\n\n\nBODIES CAN LOSE PARTS, NOT SO THE SOUL.\n\n(i.) (Souls cannot, as do bodies, lose or gain parts, ever remaining\nidentical.) The body has the faculty of making its organs grow within\na definite time and in fixed proportions. From where could the soul\nderive them? Its function is to grow, not to cause growth, unless\nthe principle of growth be comprehended within its material mass. If\nthe soul that makes the body grow was herself a body, she should, on\nuniting with molecules of a nature similar to hers, develop a growth\nproportional to that of the organs. In this case, the molecules that\nwill come to add themselves to the soul will be either animate or\ninanimate; if they are animate, how could they have become such, and\nfrom whom will they have received that characteristic? If they are not\nanimate, how will they become such, and how will agreement between\nthem and the first soul arise? How will they form but a single unity\nwith her, and how will they agree with her? Will they not constitute a\nsoul that will remain foreign to the former, who will not possess her\nrequirements of knowledge? This aggregation of molecules that would\nthus be called soul will resemble the aggregation of molecules that\nform our body. She would lose parts, she would acquire new ones; she\nwill not be identical. But if we had a soul that was not identical,\nmemory and self-consciousness of our own faculties would be impossible.\n\n\nTHE SOUL IS EVERYWHERE ENTIRE; THAT IS NOT THE CASE WITH THE BODY.\n\n(j.) (The soul, being one and simple, is everywhere entire, and has\nparts that are identical to the whole; this is not the case with\nthe body.) If the soul is a body, she will have parts that are not\nidentical with the whole, as every body is by nature divisible. If then\nthe soul has a definite magnitude of which she cannot lose anything\nwithout ceasing to be a soul, she will by losing her parts, change her\nnature, as happens to every quantity. If, on losing some part of its\nmagnitude, a body, notwithstanding, remains identical in respect to\nquality, it does not nevertheless become different from what it was,\nin respect to quantity, and it remains identical only in respect to\nquality, which differs from quantity. What shall we answer to those who\ninsist that the soul is a body? Will they say that, in the same body,\neach part possesses the same quality as the total soul, and that the\ncase is similar with the part of a part? Then quantity is no longer\nessential to the nature of the soul; which contradicts the hypothesis\nthat the soul needed to possess a definite magnitude. Besides the soul\nis everywhere entire; now it is impossible for a body to be entire in\nseveral places simultaneously, or have parts identical to the whole.\nIf we refuse the name of soul to each part, the soul is then composed\nof inanimate parts. Besides, if the soul is a definite magnitude, she\ncannot increase or diminish without ceasing to be a soul; but it often\nhappens that from a single conception or from a single germ are born\ntwo or more beings, as is seen in certain animals in whom the germs\ndivide;[52] in this case, each part is equal to the whole. However\nsuperficially considered, this fact demonstrates that the principle\nin which the part is equal to the whole is essentially superior to\nquantity, and must necessarily lack any kind of quantity. On this\ncondition alone can the soul remain identical when the body loses its\nquantity, because she has need of no mass, no quantity, and because her\nessence is of an entirely different nature. The soul and the (seminal)\nreasons therefore possess no extension.\n\n\nTHE BODY COULD NOT POSSESS SENSATION.\n\n6. (k.) (The body could not possess either sensation, thought, or\nvirtue.) If the soul were a body, she would not possess either\nsensation, thought, science, virtue, nor any of the perfections that\nrender her more beautiful. Here follows the proof.\n\n\nIMPOSSIBILITY FOR THE BODY TO HAVE SENSATION.\n\nThe subject that perceives a sense-object must itself be single, and\ngrasp this object in its totality, by one and the same power. This\nhappens when by several organs we perceive several qualities of a\nsingle object, or when, by a single organ, we embrace a single complex\nobject in its totality, as, for instance, a face. It is not one\nprinciple that sees the face, and another one that sees the eyes; it\nis the \"same principle\" which embraces everything at once. Doubtless\nwe do receive a sense-impression by the eyes, and another by the ears;\nbut both of them must end in some single principle. How, indeed, could\nany decision be reached about the difference of sense-impressions\nunless they all converged toward the same principle? The latter is\nlike a centre, and the individual sensations are like radii which\nfrom the circumference radiate towards the centre of a circle. This\ncentral principle is essentially single. If it was divisible, and if\nsense-impressions were directed towards two points at a distance from\neach other, such as the extremities of the same line, they would either\nstill converge towards one and the same point, as, for instance, the\nmiddle (of the line), or one part would feel one thing, and another\nsomething else. It would be absolutely as if I felt one thing, and you\nfelt another, when placed in the presence of one and the same thing (as\nthought Aristotle, de Anima[53]). Facts, therefore, demonstrate that\nsensations centre in one and the same principle; as visible images are\ncentred in the pupil of the eye; otherwise how could we, through the\npupil, see the greatest objects? So much the more, therefore, must\nthe sensations that centre in the (Stoic) \"directing principle\"[54]\nresemble indivisible intuitions and be perceived by an indivisible\nprinciple. If the latter possessed extension, it could, like the\nsense-object, be divided; each of its parts would thus perceive one\nof the parts of the sense-object, and nothing within us would grasp\nthe object in its totality. The subject that perceives must then be\nentirely one; otherwise, how could it be divided? In that case it could\nnot be made to coincide with the sense-object, as two equal figures\nsuperimposed on each other, because the directing principle does not\nhave an extension equal to that of the sense-object. How then will we\ncarry out the division? Must the subject that feels contain as many\nparts as there are in the sense-object? Will each part of the soul, in\nits turn, feel by its own parts, or will (we decide that) the parts of\nparts will not feel? Neither is that likely. If, on the other hand,\neach part feels the entire object, and if each magnitude is divisible\nto infinity, the result is that, for a single object, there will be an\ninfinity of sensations in each part of the soul; and, so much the more,\nan infinity of images in the principle that directs us. (This, however,\nis the opposite of the actual state of affairs.)\n\n\nAGAINST THE STOICS, SENSATIONS ARE NOT IMPRESSIONS OF A SEAL ON WAX.\n\nBesides, if the principle that feels were corporeal, it could feel only\nso long as exterior objects produced in the blood or in the air some\nimpression similar to that of a seal on wax.[55] If they impressed\ntheir images on wet substances, as is no doubt supposed, these\nimpressions would become confused as images in water, and memory would\nnot occur. If, however, these impressions persisted, they would either\nform an obstacle to subsequent ones, and no further sensation would\noccur; or they would be effaced by the new ones, which would destroy\nmemory. If then the soul is capable of recalling earlier sensations,\nand having new ones, to which the former would form no obstacle, it is\nbecause she is not corporeal.\n\n\nSENSATION CANNOT BE RELAYED FROM SENSE-ORGAN TO DIRECTING PRINCIPLE.\n\n7. The same reflections may be made about pain, and one's feeling of\nit. When a man's finger is said to give him pain, this, no doubt,\nis a recognition that the seat of the pain is in the finger, and\nthat the feeling of pain is experienced by the directing principle.\nConsequently, when a part of the spirit suffers, this suffering is felt\nby the directing principle, and shared by the whole soul.[56] How can\nthis sympathy be explained? By relay transmission, (the Stoic) will\nanswer; the sense-impression is felt first by the animal spirit that\nis in the finger, and then transmitted to the neighboring part, and\nso on till it reaches the directing part. Necessarily, if the pain is\nfelt by the first part that experiences it, it will also be felt by the\nsecond part to which it is transmitted; then by the third, and so on,\nuntil the one pain would have caused an infinite number of sensations.\nLast the directing principle will perceive all these sensations, adding\nthereto its own sensation. Speaking strictly, however, each of these\nsensations will not transmit the suffering of the finger, but the\nsuffering of one of the intermediate parts. For instance, the second\nsensation will relay the suffering of the hand. The third, that of\nthe arm, and so on, until there will be an infinity of sensations.\nThe directing principle, for its part, will not feel the pain of the\nfinger, but its own; it will know none but that, it will pay no\nattention to the rest, because it will ignore the pain suffered by the\nfinger. Therefore, relayed sensation is an impossibility, nor could\none part of the body perceive the suffering felt by another part; for\nthe body has extension, and, in every extension, parts are foreign to\neach other (the opposite of the opinion of Cleanthes, Nemesius).[57]\nConsequently, the principle that feels must everywhere be identical\nwith itself; and among all beings, the body is that which is least\nsuitable to this identity.\n\n\nTHE BODY CANNOT THINK.\n\n8. If, in any sense whatever, the soul were a body, we could not think.\nHere is the proof. If feeling[58] is explained as the soul's laying\nhold of perceptible things by making use of the body, thinking cannot\nalso of making use of the body. Otherwise, thinking and feeling would\nbe identical. Thus, thinking must consist in perceiving without the\nhelp of the body (as thought Aristotle[59]). So much the more, the\nthinking principle cannot be corporeal. Since it is sensation that\ngrasps sense-objects, it must likewise be thought, or intellection,\nthat grasps intelligible objects. Though this should be denied, it will\nbe admitted that we think certain intelligibles entities, and that we\nperceive entities that have no extension. How could an entity that\nhad extension think one that had no extension? Or a divisible entity,\nthink an indivisible one? Could this take place by an indivisible part?\nIn this case, the thinking subject will not be corporeal; for there\nis no need that the whole subject be in contact with the object; it\nwould suffice if one of its parts reached the object (as Aristotle said\nagainst Plato).[60] If then this truth be granted, that the highest\nthoughts must have incorporeal objects, the latter can be cognized only\nby a thinking principle that either is, or becomes independent of body.\nEven the objection that the object of thought is constituted by the\nforms inherent in matter, implies that these forces cannot be thought\nunless, by intelligence, they are separated from matter. It is not by\nmeans of the carnal mass of the body, nor generally by matter, that\nwe can effect the abstraction of triangle, circle, line or point. To\nsucceed in this abstraction, the soul must separate from the body, and\nconsequently, the soul cannot be corporeal.\n\n\nTHE BODY CANNOT POSSESS VIRTUE.\n\nNeither do beauty or justice possess extension, I suppose; and their\nconception must be similar. These things can be cognized or retained\nonly by the indivisible part of the soul. If the latter were corporeal,\nwhere indeed could virtues, prudence, justice and courage exist? In\nthis case, virtues (as Critias thought),[61] would be no more than\na certain disposition of the spirit, or blood (as Empedocles also\nthought).[62] For instance, courage and temperance would respectively\nbe no more than a certain irritability, and a fortunate temperament of\nthe spirit; beauty would consist in the agreeable shape of outlines,\nwhich cause persons, in whom they occur, to be called elegant and\nhandsome. Under this hypothesis, indeed, the types of spirit might\npossess vigor and beauty. But what need would it have of temperance?\nOn the contrary, the spirit would seek to be agreeably affected by the\nthings it touches and embraces, to enjoy a moderate heat, a gentle\ncoolness, and to be in contact only with sweet, tender, and smooth\nentities. What incentive would the spirit have to apportion rewards to\nthose who had deserved them?\n\n\nIF VIRTUE WERE CORPOREAL IT WOULD BE PERISHABLE.\n\nAre the notions of virtue, and other intelligible entities by the soul\nthought eternal, or does virtue arise and perish? If so, by what being,\nand how will it be formed? It is the same problem that remains to be\nsolved. Intelligible entities must therefore be eternal and immutable,\nlike geometrical notions, and consequently cannot be corporeal.\nFurther, the subject in whom they exist must be of a nature similar to\ntheirs, and therefore not be corporeal; for the nature of body is not\nto remain immutable, but to be in a perpetual flow.\n\n\nBODIES ARE ACTIVE ONLY BY MEANS OF INCORPOREAL POWERS.\n\n(9.) There are men who locate the soul in the body, so as to give her\na foundation in some sphere of activity, to account for the various\nphenomena in the body, such as getting hot or cold, pushing on or\nstopping, (and the like). They evidently do not realize that bodies\nproduce these effects only through incorporeal powers, and that those\nare not the powers that we attribute to the soul, which are thought,\nsensation, reasoning, desire, judiciousness, propriety and wisdom, all\nof them entities that cannot possible be attributes of a corporeal\nentity. Consequently, those (materialists) attribute to the body all\nthe faculties of incorporeal essences, and leave nothing for the latter.\n\n\nWHY BODIES ARE ACTIVATED BY INCORPOREAL POWERS.\n\nThe proof that bodies are activated only by incorporeal faculties may\nbe proved as follows: Quantity and quality are two different things.\nEvery body has a quantity, but not always a quality, as in the case of\nmatter, (according to the Stoic definition, that it was a body without\nquality, but possessing magnitude[63]). Granting this, (you Stoic) will\nalso be forced to admit that as quality is something different from\nquantity, it must consequently be different from the body. Since then\nevery body has a quantity, how could quality, which is no quantity, be\na body? Besides, as we said above,[64] every body and mass is altered\nby division; nevertheless, when a body is cut into pieces, every\npart preserves the entire quality without undergoing alteration. For\ninstance, every molecule of honey, possesses the quality of sweetness\nas much as all the molecules taken together; consequently that\nsweetness cannot be corporeal; and other qualities must be in a similar\ncase. Moreover, if the active powers were corporeal, they would have to\nhave a material mass proportional to their strength or weakness. Now\nthere are great masses that have little force, and small ones that have\ngreat force; demonstrating that power does not depend on extension, and\nshould be attributed to some (substance) without extension. Finally,\nyou may say that matter is identical with body, and produces different\nbeings only by receiving different qualities (the Stoics considering\nthat even the divinity was no more than modified matter, their two\nprinciples being matter and quality;[65] the latter, however, was also\nconsidered as body). How do you (Stoics) not see that qualities thus\nadded to matter are reasons, that are primary and immaterial? Do not\nobject that when the spirit (breath) and blood abandon animals, they\ncease to live; for if these things are necessary to life, there are\nfor our life many other necessities, even during the presence of the\nsoul (as thought Nemesius).[66] Besides, neither spirit nor blood are\ndistributed to every part of the body.\n\n\nTHE SOUL CAN PENETRATE THE BODY; BUT TWO BODIES CANNOT PENETRATE EACH\nOTHER.\n\n(10). The soul penetrates the whole body, while an entire body cannot\npenetrate another entire body. Further, if the soul is corporeal, and\npervades the whole body, she will, with the body, form (as Alexander\nof Aphrodisia pointed out) a mixture,[67] similar to the other bodies\n(that are constituted by a mixture of matter and quality, as the Stoics\ntaught). Now as none of the bodies that enter into a mixture is in\nactualization[68] the soul, instead of being in actualization in the\nbodies, would be in them only potentially; consequently, she would\ncease to be a soul, as the sweet ceases to be sweet when mingled with\nthe bitter; we would, therefore, have no soul left. If, when one body\nforms a mixture with another body, total penetration occurs, so that\neach molecule contains equal parts of two bodies and that each body\nbe distributed equally in the whole space occupied by the mass of the\nother, without any increase of volume, nothing that is not divided will\nremain. Indeed, mixture operates not only between the larger parts\n(which would be no more than a simple juxtaposition); but the two\nbodies must penetrate each other mutually, even if smaller--it would\nindeed be impossible for the smaller to equal the greater; still, when\nthe smaller penetrates the larger it must divide it entirely. If the\nmixture operates in this manner in every part, and if no undivided\npart of the mass remain, the body must be divided into points, which\nis impossible. Indeed, were this division pushed to infinity, since\nevery body is fully divisible, bodies will have to be infinite not only\npotentially, but also in actuality. It is therefore impossible for\none entire body to penetrate another in its entirety. Now as the soul\npenetrates the entire body, the soul must be incorporeal (as thought\nNemesius).[69]\n\n\nTHE STOIC DEVELOPMENT FROM HABIT TO SOUL AND INTELLIGENCE WOULD MAKE\nTHE PERFECT ARISE FROM THE IMPERFECT, AN IMPOSSIBILITY.\n\n(11). (If, as Stoics claim, man first was a certain nature called\nhabit,[70] then a soul, and last an intelligence, the perfect would\nhave arisen from the imperfect, which is impossible). To say that\nthe first nature of the soul is to be a spirit, and that this spirit\nbecame soul only after having been exposed to cold, and as it were\nbecame soaked by its contact, because the cold subtilized it;[71] this\nis an absurd hypothesis. Many animals are born in warm places, and do\nnot have their soul exposed to action of cold. Under this hypothesis,\nthe primary nature of the soul would have been made dependent on the\nconcourse of exterior circumstances. The Stoics, therefore, posit as\nprinciple that which is less perfect (the soul), and trace it to a\nstill less perfect earlier thing called habit (or form of inorganic\nthings).[72] Intelligence, therefore, is posited in the last rank\nsince it is alleged to be born of the soul, while, on the contrary,\nthe first rank should be assigned to intelligence, the second to the\nsoul, the third to nature, and, following natural order, consider\nthat which is less perfect as the posterior element. In this system\nthe divinity, by the mere fact of his possessing intelligence, is\nposterior and begotten, possessing only an incidental intelligence.\nThe result would, therefore, be that there was neither soul, nor\nintelligence, nor divinity; for never can that which is potential pass\nto the condition of actualization, without the prior existence of some\nactualized principle. If what is potential were to transform itself\ninto actualization--which is absurd--its passage into actualization\nwill have to involve at the very least a contemplation of something\nwhich is not merely potential, but actualized. Nevertheless, on the\nhypothesis that what is potential can permanently remain identical, it\nwill of itself pass into actualization, and will be superior to the\nbeing which is potential only because it will be the object of the\naspiration of such a being. We must, therefore, assign the first rank\nto the being that has a perfect and incorporeal nature, which is always\nin actualization. Thus intelligence and soul are prior to nature; the\nsoul, therefore, is not a spirit, and consequently no body. Other\nreasons for the incorporeality of the soul have been advanced; but the\nabove suffices (as thought Aristotle).[73]\n\n\nII. THE SOUL IS NEITHER THE HARMONY NOR ENTELECHY OF THE BODY--THE SOUL\nIS THE HARMONY OF THE BODY; AGAINST THE PYTHAGOREANS.\n\n(12). a. Since the soul is not corporeal, its real nature must be\nascertained. Shall we assert that she is something distinct from the\nbody, but dependent thereon, as, for instance, a harmony? Pythagoras,\nindeed, used this word in a technical sense; and after him the harmony\nof the body has been thought to be something similar to the harmony\nof a lyre. As tension produces in the lyre-strings an affection\n(or, manner of being, or state) that is called harmony, likewise,\nas contrary elements are mingled in our body, an individual mixture\nproduces life and soul, which, therefore, is only an individual\naffection of this mixture.\n\n\nWHY THE SOUL IS NOT A HARMONY.\n\nAs has already been said above[74] this hypothesis is inadmissible for\nseveral reasons. To begin with, the soul is prior (to the body), and\nthe harmony is posterior thereto. Then the soul dominates the body,\ngoverns it, and often even resists it, which would be impossible if\nthe soul were only a harmony. The soul, indeed, is a \"being,\" which\nharmony is not. When the corporeal principles of which we are composed\nare mingled in just proportions, their temperament constitutes health\n(but not a \"being,\" such as the soul). Besides, every part of the body\nbeing mingled in a different manner should form (a different harmony,\nand consequently) a different soul, so that there would be several\nof them. The decisive argument, however, is that this soul (that\nconstitutes a harmony) presupposes another soul which would produce\nthis harmony, as a lyre needs a musician who would produce harmonic\nvibrations in the strings, because he possesses within himself the\nreason according to which he produces the harmony. The strings of the\nlyre do not vibrate of themselves, and the elements of our body cannot\nharmonize themselves. Nevertheless, under this hypothesis, animated and\norderly \"being\" would have been made up out of inanimate and disordered\nentities; and these orderly \"beings\" would owe their order and\nexistence to chance. That is as impossible for parts as for the whole.\nThe soul, therefore, is no harmony.\n\n\nTHE SOUL IS NOT THE ENTELECHY OF THE BODY (POLEMIC AGAINST ARISTOTLE).\nARISTOTLE'S STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.[75]\n\n(13). b. Now let us examine the opinion of those who call the soul an\nentelechy. They say that, in the composite, the soul plays the part of\nform in respect to matter, in the body the soul animates. The soul,\nhowever, is not said to be the form of any body, nor of the body as\nsuch; but of the natural body, that is organized, and which possesses\nlife potentially.[76]\n\n\nIF THE SOUL IS AN ENTELECHY, SHE IS A DIFFERENT ONE THAN ARISTOTLE'S.\n\nIf the soul's relation to the body is the same as that of the statue\nto the metal, the soul will be divided with the body, and on cutting\na member a portion of the soul would be cut along with it. According\nto this teaching, the soul separates from the body only during sleep,\nsince she must inhere in the body of which she is the entelechy, in\nwhich case sleep would become entirely inexplicable. If the soul be an\nentelechy, the struggle of reason against the passions would become\nentirely impossible. The entire human being will experience but one\nsingle sentiment, and never be in disagreement with itself. If the\nsoul be an entelechy, there will perhaps still be sensations, but mere\nsensations; pure thoughts will have become impossible. Consequently\nthe Peripateticians themselves are obliged to introduce (into human\nnature) another soul, namely, the pure intelligence, which they\nconsider immortal.[77] The rational soul, therefore, would have to be\nan entelechy in a manner different from their definition thereof, if\nindeed this name is at all to be used.\n\n\nIF AN ENTELECHY BE GRANTED, IT IS INSEPARABLE FROM THE BODY.\n\nThe sense-soul, which preserves the forms of sense-objects previously\nperceived, must preserve them without the body. Otherwise, these forms\nwould inhere in the body like figures and corporeal shapes. Now, if\nthe forms inhered in the sense-soul in this manner, they could not\nbe received therein otherwise (than as corporeal impressions). That\nis why, if we do grant the existence of an entelechy, it must be\ninseparable from the body. Even the faculty of appetite, not indeed\nthat which makes us feel the need of eating and drinking, but that\nwhich desires things that are independent of the body, could not either\nbe an entelechy.[78]\n\n\nNEITHER COULD THE SOUL OF GROWTH BE AN ENTELECHY.\n\nThe soul's faculty of growth remains to be considered. This at least\nmight be thought an inseparable entelechy. But neither does that suit\nher nature. For if the principle of every plant is in its root, and if\ngrowth takes place around and beneath it,[79] as occurs in many plants,\nit is evident that the soul's faculty of growth, abandoning all the\nother parts, has concentrated in the root alone; it, therefore, was not\ndistributed all around the soul, like an inseparable entelechy. Add\nthat this soul, before the plant grows, is already contained in the\nsmall body (of the seed). If then, after having vivified a great plant,\nthe soul's faculty of growth can condense into a small space, and if\nlater it can, from this small space, again spread over a whole plant,\nit is evidently entirely separable from the (plant's) matter.\n\n\nTHE ENTELECHY IS NOT A FORM OF THE BODY, AS THE SOUL TRANSMIGRATES.\n\nBesides, as the soul is indivisible, the entelechy of the divisible\nbody could not become divisible as is the body. Besides, the same soul\npasses from the body of one animal into the body of some other. How\ncould the soul of the first become that of the second, if she were only\nthe entelechy of a single one? The example of animals that metamorphose\ndemonstrates the impossibility of this theory. The soul, therefore, is\nnot the simple form of a body; she is a genuine \"being,\" which does\nnot owe its existence merely to her being founded on the body, but\nwhich, on the contrary, exists before having become the soul of some\nindividual animal. It is, therefore, not the body that begets the soul.\n\n\nTHE SOUL IS AN INCORPOREAL AND IMMORTAL ESSENCE. THE SOUL BEING NONE OF\nCORPOREAL POSSIBILITIES, MUST BE INCORPOREAL.\n\nc. What then can be the nature of the soul, if she is neither a\nbody, nor a corporeal affection, while, nevertheless, all the active\nforce, the productive power and the other faculties reside in her, or\ncome from her? What sort of a \"being,\" indeed, is this (soul) that\nhas an existence independent of the body? She must evidently be a\nveritable \"being.\" Indeed, everything corporeal must be classified as\ngenerated, and excluded from genuine \"being,\" because it is born, and\nperishes, never really exists, and owes its salvation exclusively to\nparticipation in the genuine existence, and that only in the measure of\nits participation therein.\n\n\nTHE PERSISTENCE OF THE CHANGEABLE IMPLIES THE ETERNAL IN THE\nBACKGROUND.[80]\n\n9. (14). It is absolutely necessary to postulate the existence of\na nature different from bodies, by itself fully possessing genuine\nexistence, which can neither be born nor perish. Otherwise, all other\nthings would hopelessly disappear, as a result of the destruction of\nthe existence which preserves both the individuals and the universe,\nas their beauty and salvation. The soul, indeed, is the principle of\nmovement (as Plato thought, in the Phaedrus); it is the soul that\nimparts movement to everything else; the soul moves herself. She\nimparts life to the body she animates; but alone she possesses life,\nwithout ever being subject to losing it, because she possesses it by\nherself. All beings, indeed, live only by a borrowed life; otherwise,\nwe would have to proceed from cause to cause unto infinity. There\nmust, therefore, exist a nature that is primarily alive, necessarily\nincorruptible and immortal because it is the principle of life for\neverything else. It is thereon that must be founded all that is divine\nand blessed, that lives and exists by itself, that lives and exists\nsupremely, which is immutable in its essence, and which can neither\nbe born nor perish. How indeed could existence be born or perish? If\nthe name of \"existence\" really suited it, it must exist forever, just\nas whiteness is not alternately black and white. If whiteness were\nexistence itself, it would, with its \"being\" (or nature) (which is, to\nbe whiteness), possess an eternal existence; but, in reality, it is no\nmore than whiteness. Therefore, the principle that possesses existence\nin itself and in a supreme degree will always exist. Now this primary\nand eternal existence can not be anything dead like a stone, or a piece\nof wood. It must live, and live with a pure life, as long as it exists\nwithin itself. If something of it mingles with what is inferior, this\npart meets obstacles in its aspiration to the good; but it does not\nlose its nature, and resumes its former condition on returning to a\nsuitable condition (as thought Plato, in his Phaedo[81]).\n\n\nTHE SOUL IS INCORPOREAL BECAUSE OF HER KINSHIP WITH THE DIVINE.\n\n10. (15). The soul has affinities with the divine and eternal nature.\nThis is evident, because, as we have demonstrated it, she is not a\nbody, has neither figure nor color, and is impalpable. Consider the\nfollowing demonstration. It is generally granted that everything that\nis divine and that possesses genuine existence enjoys a happy and wise\nlife. Now let us consider the nature of our soul, in connection with\nthat of the divine. Let us take a soul, not one inside of a body, which\nis undergoing the irrational motions of appetite and anger, and the\nother affections born of the body, but a soul that has eliminated all\nthat, and which, so far as possible, had no intercourse with the body.\nSuch a soul would show us that vices are something foreign to the\nnature of the soul, and come to her from elsewhere, and that, inasmuch\nas she is purified, she in her own right possesses the most eminent\nqualities, wisdom, and the other virtues (as thought Plato[82]). If\nthe soul, when re-entering into herself, is such, how could she not\nparticipate in this nature that we have acknowledged to be suitable\nto every thing that is eternal and divine? As wisdom and real virtue\nare divine things, they could not dwell in a vile and mortal entity;\nthe existence that receives them is necessarily divine, since it\nparticipates in divine things by their mutual affinity and community.\nAnyone who thus possesses wisdom and virtue in his soul differs little\nfrom the superior beings; he is inferior to them only by the fact of\nhis having a body. If all men, or at least, if many of them held their\nsoul in this disposition, no one would be sceptic enough to refuse to\nbelieve that the soul is immortal. But as we consider the soul in her\npresent condition of being soiled by vices, no one imagines that her\nnature is divine and immortal.\n\n\nTHE SOUL, LIKE OTHER THINGS, SHOULD BE JUDGED IN HER PUREST CONDITION.\n\nNow when we consider the nature of some being, it should be studied\nin its rarest condition, since extraneous additions hinder it from\nbeing rightly judged. The soul must be therefore considered only after\nabstraction of foreign things, or rather, he who makes this abstraction\nshould observe himself in that condition. He then will not doubt that\nhe is immortal, when he sees himself in the pure world of intelligence.\nHe will see his intelligence occupied, not in the observation of some\nsense-object that is mortal, but in thinking the eternal by an equally\neternal faculty.[83] He will see all the entities in the intelligible\nworld, and he will see himself become intelligible, radiant, and\nilluminated by the truth emanating from the Good, which sheds the light\nof truth on all intelligible entities.[84] Then (like Empedocles, in\nDiog. Laertes[85]), he will have the right to say:\n\n\"Farewell, I am now an immortal divinity.\"\n\nFor he has ascended to the divinity, and has become assimilated\nthereto. As purification permits one to know the better things, so the\nnotions we have within us, and which constitute real science, are made\nclear. Indeed, it is not by an excursion among external objects that\nthe soul attains the intuition of wisdom and virtue, but by re-entering\ninto herself, in thinking herself in her primitive condition. Then she\nclears up and recognizes in herself the divine statues, soiled by the\nrust of time. Likewise, if a piece of gold were animated and released\nitself from the earth by which it was covered, after first having been\nignorant of its real nature because it did not see its own splendor,\nit would admire itself when considering itself in its purity; it would\nfind that it had no need of a borrowed beauty, and would consider\nitself happy to remain isolated from everything else.[86]\n\n\nEVEN ON THE STOIC HYPOTHESIS THE SOUL MUST BE IMMORTAL.\n\n11. (16). What sensible man, after having thus considered the nature\nof the soul, could still doubt of the immortality of a principle which\nderives life from naught but itself, and which cannot lose it? How\ncould the soul lose life, since she did not borrow it from elsewhere,\nand since she does not possess it as fire possesses heat? For, without\nbeing an accident of fire, the heat, nevertheless, is an accident\nof its matter; for fire can perish. But, in the soul, life is not an\naccident that comes to add itself to a material subject to constitute a\nsoul. In fact, there is here an alternative: either life is a genuine\n\"being,\" which is alive by itself; in which case this \"being\" is\nthe soul that we are seeking to discover, and immortality cannot be\nrefused her; or the soul is a composite, and she must be decomposed\nuntil we arrive at something immortal which moves by itself; and such\na principle could not be subject to death. Further, when (Stoics)\nsay that life is only an accidental modification of matter, they are\nthereby forced to acknowledge that the principle that imparted this\nmodification to matter is immortal, and incapable of admitting anything\ncontrary to what it communicates (that is, life, as said Plato, in his\nPhaedo[87]), but there is only a single nature that possesses life in\nactualization.\n\n\nTHERE IS NO CONCEIVABLE WAY IN WHICH SOUL COULD PERISH.\n\n12. (17). (The Stoics), indeed, claim that every soul is perishable.\nIn this case, everything should long since have been destroyed. Others\nmight say that our soul were mortal, while the universal Soul were\nimmortal. On them, however, is the burden of proof of a difference\nbetween the individual and universal souls. Both of them, indeed,\nare a principle of movement; both live by themselves; both grasp\nthe same object by the same faculty, either by thinking the things\ncontained in heaven, or by considering the nature (\"being\") of each\nbeing, ascending unto the first principle. Since our soul thinks\nabsolute essences either by the notions she finds within herself, or by\nreminiscence, she evidently is prior to the body. Possessing knowledge\nof eternal entities, she herself must be eternal. All that dissolves,\nexisting only by its compositeness, can naturally dissolve in the\nsame manner that it became composite. But the soul is a single, simple\nactualization, whose essence is life; not in this manner therefore\ncan the soul perish. Neither could the soul perish by division into\na number of parts; for, as we have shown, the soul is neither a mass\nnor a quantity. As little could the soul perish by alteration; for\nwhen alteration destroys anything, it may remove its form, but leaves\nits matter; alteration, therefore, is a characteristic of something\ncomposite. Consequently as the soul cannot perish in any of these ways,\nshe is imperishable.\n\n\nDESCENT INTO THE BODY NEED NOT CONFLICT WITH THE ETERNITY OF SOUL.\n\n13. (18). If intelligible entities are separated from sense objects,\nhow does it happen that the soul descends into a body?[88] So long as\nthe soul is a pure and impassible intelligence, so long as she enjoys\na purely intellectual life like the other intelligible beings, she\ndwells among them; for she has neither appetite nor desire. But that\npart which is inferior to intelligence and which is capable of desires,\nfollows their impulsion, \"proceeds\" and withdraws from the intelligible\nworld. Wishing to ornament matter on the model of the Ideas she\ncontemplated in Intelligence, in haste to exhibit her fruitfulness,\nand to manifest the germs she bears within her (as said Plato, in the\nBanquet[89]), the soul applies herself to produce and create, and, as\nresult of this application, she is, as it were, orientated (or, in\n\"tension\") towards sense-objects. With the universal Soul, the human\nsoul shares the administration of the whole world, without, however,\nentering it; then, desiring to administer some portion of the world\non her own responsibility, she separates from the universal Soul, and\npasses into a body. But even when she is present with the body, the\nsoul does not devote herself entirely to it, as some part of her\nalways remains outside of it; that is how her intelligence remains\nimpassible.[90]\n\n\nTHE SOUL AS THE ARTIST OF THE UNIVERSE.\n\nThe soul is present in the body at some times, and at other times,\nis outside of it. When, indeed, following her own inclination, she\ndescends from first-rank entities (that is, intelligible entities) to\nthird-rank entities (that is, earthly entities), she \"proceeds\" by\nvirtue of the actualization of intelligence, which, remaining within\nherself, embellishes everything by the ministration of the soul, and\nwhich, itself being immortal, ordains everything with immortal power;\nfor intelligence exists continuously by a continuous actualization.[91]\n\n\nALL SOULS HAVE IMMORTALITY, EVEN IF SUNK INTO ANIMALS OR PLANTS.\n\n14. (19). What about the souls of animals inferior to man? The\n(rational) souls that have strayed so far as to descend into the bodies\nof animals are nevertheless still immortal.[92] Souls of a kind other\n(than rational souls), cannot proceed from anything else than the\nliving nature (of the universal Soul); and they necessarily are the\nprinciples of life for all animals. The case is the same with the souls\nthat inhere in plants. Indeed, all souls have issued from the same\nprinciple (the universal Soul), all have an individual life, and are\nindivisible and incorporeal essences (\"beings\").\n\n\nEVEN IF THE SOUL HAS DIFFERENT PARTS, THE ORIGINAL PARTS SURVIVE.\n\nTo the objection that the human soul must decompose because she\ncontains three parts, it may be answered that, when souls issue from\nhere below, those that are purified leave what had been added to them\nin generation (the irrational soul,[93]) while the other non-purified\nsouls do free themselves therefrom with time. Besides, this lower\npart of the soul does not itself perish, for it exists as long as\nthe principle from which it proceeds. Indeed, nothing that exists is\nannihilated.\n\n\nTHE HISTORIC EVIDENCE FOR IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.\n\n15. (20). This, then, is our answer to those who seek a philosophical\ndemonstration. Those who are satisfied with the testimony of faith and\nsense, may be referred to those extracts from history which furnish\nnumerous proofs thereof.[94] We may also refer to the oracles given by\nthe divinities who order an appeasement of the souls who were victims\nof some injustice, and to honor the dead,[95] and to the rites observed\nby all towards those who live no more;[96] which presupposes that their\nsouls are still conscious beyond. Even after leaving their bodies,\nmany souls who lived on the earth have continued to grant benefits to\nmen.[97] By revelation of the future;[98] and rendering other services,\nthey themselves prove that the other souls cannot have perished.\n\n    As the first book was evidently Platonic, the second seems\n    Numenian, reminding us of the latter's book on the Immortality\n    of the Soul, one of the arguments from which we find in 3 E.\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD ENNEAD, BOOK FIRST.\n\nConcerning Fate.\n\n\nPOSSIBLE THEORIES ABOUT FATE.\n\n1. The first possibility is that there is a cause both for the things\nthat become, and those that are; the cause of the former being their\nbecoming, and that of the latter, their existence. Again, neither of\nthem may have a cause. Or, in both cases, some may have a cause, and\nsome not. Further, those that become might have a cause, while, of\nthese that exist, some might partly have a cause. Contrariwise, all\nthings that exist may have a cause, while of those that become, parts\nmay have a cause, and part not. Last, none of the things that become\nmight have any cause.\n\n\nEXCEPT THE FIRST, ALL THINGS ARE CAUSED.\n\nSpeaking of eternal things, the first cannot be derived from other\ncauses, just because they are first. Things dependent from the first,\nhowever, may indeed thence derive their being. To each thing we should\nalso attribute the resultant action; for a thing's being is constituted\nby its displayed energy.\n\n\nSTOIC AND EPICUREAN CAUSELESS ORIGIN REALLY THE UTMOST DETERMINISM.\n\nNow among the things that become, or among those that although\nperpetually existent do not always result in the same actions, it may\nbe boldly asserted that everything has a cause. We should not admit\n(the Stoic contention[99]) that something happens without a cause,\nnor accept the (Epicurean[100]) arbitrary convergence of the atoms,\nnor believe that any body initiates a movement suddenly and without\ndetermining reason, nor suppose (with Epicurus again[101]) that the\nsoul undertakes some action by a blind impulse, without any motive.\nThus to suppose that a thing does not belong to itself, that it could\nbe carried away by involuntary movements, and act without motive, would\nbe to subject it to the most crushing determinism. The will must be\nexcited, or the desire awakened by some interior or exterior stimulus.\nNo determination (is possible) without motive.\n\n\nEVERY GOOD THING HAS SOME CAUSE; NATURE BEING THE ULTIMATE CAUSE.\n\nIf everything that happens has a cause, it is possible to discover\nsuch fact's proximate causes, and to them refer this fact. People go\ndowntown, for example, to see a person, or collect a bill. In all cases\nit is a matter of choice, followed by decision, and the determination\nto carry it out. There are, indeed, certain facts usually derived\nfrom the arts; as for instance the re-establishment of health may be\nreferred to medicine and the physician. Again, when a man has become\nrich, this is due to his finding some treasure, or receiving some\ndonation, to working, or exercising some lucrative profession. The\nbirth of a child depends on its father, and the concourse of exterior\ncircumstances, which, by the concatenation of causes and effects,\nfavored his procreation; for example, right food, or even a still more\ndistant cause, the fertility of the mother, or, still more generally,\nof nature (or, in general, it is usual to assign natural causes).\n\n\nPROXIMATE CAUSES ARE UNSATISFACTORY; WE MUST SEEK THE ULTIMATE ONES.\n\n2. To stop, on arriving at these causes, and to refuse further\nanalysis, is to exhibit superficiality. This is against the advice of\nthe sages, who advise ascending to the primary causes, to the supreme\nprinciples. For example, why, during the full moon, should the one man\nsteal, and the other one not steal? Or, why, under the same influence\nof the heavens, has the one, and not the other, been sick? Why, by use\nof the same means, has the one become rich, and the other poor? The\ndifference of dispositions, characters, and fortunes force us to seek\nulterior causes, as indeed the sages have always done.\n\n\nMATERIALISTS SUPPORT DETERMINISM.\n\nThose sages who (like Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus) assumed\nmaterial principles such as the atoms, and who explain everything by\ntheir motion, their shock and combinations, pretend that everything\nexistent and occurring is caused by the agency of these atoms, their\n\"actions and reactions.\" This includes, according to them, our\nappetites and dispositions. The necessity residing in the nature of\nthese principles, and in their effects, is therefore, by these sages,\nextended to everything that exists. As to the (Ionic Hylicists), who\nassume other physical (ultimate) principles, referring everything to\nthem, they thus also subject all beings to necessity.\n\n\nHERACLITUS, THOUGH MORE SPIRITUAL, IS ALSO DETERMINIST.\n\nThere are others (such as Heraclitus[102]), who, seeking the (supreme)\nprinciple of the universe, refer everything to it; saying that this\nprinciple penetrates, moves, and produces everything. This they\ncall Fate, and the Supreme Cause. From it they derive everything;\nits motions are said to give rise not only to the things that are\noccurring, but even our thought. That is how the members of an animal\ndo not move themselves, but receive the stimulus from the \"governing\nprinciple\" within them.\n\n\nTHE ASTROLOGERS MAKE COSMIC DEDUCTIONS FROM PROGNOSTICATION.\n\nSome (of the astrologers) explain everything by the circular motion of\nthe heavens, by the relative positions of the planets and stars, and by\ntheir mutual aspects (or, relations). They base this (principle) on the\nprevalent habit of deducing therefrom conjectures about futurity.\n\n\nTHE STOIC DETERMINISM IS BASED ON VARIOUS THEORIES.\n\nOthers (like the Stoic Chrysippus[103]) define Fate otherwise: it\nis \"the concatenation of causes\" in \"their connection towards the\ninfinite,\" by which every posterior fact is the consequence of an\nanterior one. Thus the things that follow relate to the things that\nprecede, and, as their effects, necessarily depend thereupon. Amidst\nthese (Stoic) philosophers there are two conceptions of Fate: some\nconsider that everything depends from a single principle, while others\ndo not. These views we shall study later.\n\nWe shall first examine the system with which we began; later we shall\nreview the others.\n\n\nTHE PHYSICAL THEORIES ARE ABSURD.\n\n3. To refer everything to physical causes, whether you call them\natoms or elements, and from their disordered motion to deduce order,\nreason and the soul that directs (the body), is absurd and impossible;\nnevertheless, to deduce everything from atoms, is, if possible, still\nmore impossible; and consequently many valid objections have been\nraised against this theory.\n\n\nTHE STOIC POLEMIC AGAINST THE EPICUREANS.\n\nTo begin with, even if we do admit such atomic principles, their\nexistence does not in any way inevitably lead to either the necessity\nof all things, or fatality. Let us, indeed, grant the existence of\natoms; now some will move downwards--that is, if there is an up\nand down in the universe--others obliquely, by chance, in various\ndirections. As there will be no order, there will be nothing\ndeterminate. Only what will be born of the atoms will be determinate.\nIt will therefore be impossible to guess or predict events, whether by\nart--and indeed, how could there be any art in the midst of orderless\nthings?--or by enthusiasm, or divine inspiration; for prediction\nimplies that the future is determined. True, bodies will obey the\nimpulses necessarily communicated to them by the atoms; but how could\nyou explain the operations and affections of the soul by movements of\natoms? How could atomic shock, whether vertical or oblique, produce\nin the soul these our reasonings, or appetites, whether necessarily,\nor in any other way? What explanation could they give of the soul's\nresistance to the impulsions of the body? By what concourse of atoms\nwill one man become a geometrician, another become a mathematician\nand astronomer, and the other a philosopher? For, according to that\ndoctrine we no longer produce any act for which we are responsible, we\nare even no longer living beings, since we undergo the impulsion of\nbodies that affect us just as they do inanimate things.\n\n\nAPPLICATION OF THIS POLEMIC TO THE PHYSICISTS.\n\nThe same objections apply to the doctrine of the philosophers who\nexplain everything by other physical causes (such as \"elements\").\nPrinciples of inferior nature might well warm us, cool us, or even make\nus perish; but they could not beget any of the operations which the\nsoul produces; these have an entirely different cause.\n\n\nRESTATEMENT OF HERACLITUS'S POSITION.\n\n4. But might (Heraclitus) suppose that a single Soul interpenetrating\nthe universe produces everything, and by supplying the universe with\nmotion supplies it simultaneously to all its constituent beings, so\nthat from this primary cause, would necessarily flow all secondary\ncauses, whose sequence and connection would constitute Fate? Similarly,\nin a plant, for instance, the plant's fate might be constituted by the\n(\"governing\") principle which, from the root, administers its other\nparts, and which organizes into a single system their \"actions\" and\n\"reactions.\"[104]\n\n\nTHIS WOULD INTERFERE WITH SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND RESPONSIBILITY.\n\nTo begin with, this Necessity and Fate would by their excess destroy\nthemselves, and render impossible the sequence and concatenation of\nthe causes. It is, indeed, absurd to insist that our members are moved\nby Fate when they are set in motion, or innervated, by the \"governing\nprinciple.\" It is a mistake to suppose that there is a part which\nimparts motion, and on the other hand, a part which receives it from\nthe former; it is the governing principle that moves the leg, as it\nwould any other part. Likewise, if in the universe exists but a single\nprinciple which \"acts and reacts,\" if things derive from each other\nby a series of causes each of which refers to the preceding one, it\nwill no longer be possible to say truly that all things arise through\ncauses, for their totality will constitute but a single being. In that\ncase, we are no longer ourselves; actions are no longer ours; it is no\nlonger we who reason; it is a foreign principle which reasons, wills,\nand acts in us, just as it is not our feet that walk, but we who walk\nby the agency of our feet. On the contrary, common sense admits that\nevery person lives, thinks, and acts by his own individual, proper\nlife, thought and action; to each must be left the responsibility of\nhis actions, good or evil, and not attribute shameful deeds to the\nuniversal cause.\n\n\nRESTATEMENT OF THE ASTROLOGICAL THEORY OF FATE.\n\n5. Others, again, insist that this is not the state of affairs. Their\ndisposition depends on the circular movement of the heaven which\ngoverns everything, on the course of the stars, of their mutual\nrelative position at the time of their rising, of their setting, of\ntheir zenith, or of their conjunction. Indeed, such are the signs\non which are founded prognostications and predictions of what is to\nhappen, not only to the universe, but also to each individual, both as\nto his fortunes and his thought. It is noticed that the other animals\nand vegetables increase or decrease according to the kind of sympathy\nexisting between them and the stars, that all other things experience\ntheir influence, that various regions of the earth differ according to\ntheir adjustment with the stars, and especially the sun; that from the\nnature of these regions depend not only the character of the plants\nand animals, but also human forms, size, color, affections, passions,\ntastes, and customs. In this system, therefore, the course of the stars\nis the absolute cause of everything.\n\n\nREFUTATION OF THE ASTROLOGICAL SYSTEM.\n\nTo this we answer that our astrologer attributes indirectly to the\nstars all our characteristics: will, passions, vices and appetites;\nhe allows us no r\u00f4le other than to turn like mills, instead of\nresponsibility, as befits men, producing actions that suit our nature.\nOn the contrary, we should be left in possession of what belongs to us\nby the observation that the universe limits itself to exercising some\ninfluence on what we possess already thanks to ourselves, and which\nis really characteristic of us. Moreover, one should distinguish the\ndeeds in which we are \"active,\" from those in which we are necessarily\n\"passive,\" and not deduce everything from the stars. Nobody, indeed,\ndoubts that the differences of place and climate exert an influence\nover us, imparting to us, for instance, a cool or warm-hearted\ndisposition. Heredity also should be considered; for children usually\nresemble their parents by their features, form, and some affections of\nthe irrational soul. Nevertheless, even though they resemble them by\ntheir facial features, because they are born in the same place, they\nmay differ in habits and thoughts, because these things depend on an\nentirely different principle. In addition, we can adduce to the support\nof this truth the resistance which the soul offers to the temperament\nand to the appetites. As to the claim that the stars are the causes of\neverything, because one can predict what is to happen to each man from\na consideration of their positions, it would be just as reasonable to\nassert that the birds and the other beings which the augurs consult as\nomens produce the events of which they are the signs.\n\n\nHOROSCOPES QUESTIONED; THEY DO NOT ACCOUNT FOR SIMULTANEOUS DIFFERENCES.\n\nThis leads us to consider, more in detail, what sort of facts may be\npredicted according to the inspection of the positions occupied by the\nstars presiding over the birth of a man. They who, from the assertion\nthat the stars indicate a man's future, draw the consequence that the\nstars produce them, are in error. In some person's horoscope which\nindicates birth from noble parents, on either maternal or paternal\nside, this nobility of birth cannot be attributed to the stars, as\nthis nobility subsisted already in the parents before the stars had\ntaken the position according to which the horoscope is cast. Besides,\nastrologers pretend they can discover the parent's fortune from the\nbirth of their children, and from the condition of the parents the\ndisposition and fate of the unborn offspring. From a child's horoscope,\nthey announce his brother's death; and from a woman's horoscope, the\nfortunes of her husband, and conversely. It is unreasonable to refer to\nthe stars things which evidently are necessary consequences of parental\nconditions. We then reach a dilemma: the cause lies either in these\nantecedent conditions, or in the stars. The beauty and ugliness of\nchildren, when they resemble their parents, must evidently be derived\nfrom them, and not from the course of the stars. Moreover, it is\nprobable that at any one moment are born a crowd of human and animal\nyoung; now, inasmuch as they are born under the same star, they all\nought to have the same nature. How does it then happen that, in the\nsame positions, stars produce men and other beings simultaneously (as\nCicero asks[105])?\n\n\nHEREDITY MORE IMPORTANT THAN STAR-INFLUENCE; CONTINUATION.\n\n6. Each being derives his character from his nature. One being is a\nhorse because he is born from a mare, while another is human, because\nborn from a human mother; and more: he is that particular horse, and\nthat particular man because he is born from such and such a horse, or\nwoman. Doubtless, the course of the stars may modify the result, but\nthe greatest part of the influence must be allowed to heredity.\n\n\nSTARS AFFECT THE PHYSICAL, NOT THE MENTAL BEING.\n\nThe stars act on the body only in a physical way, and thus impart\nto them heat, cold, and the variety of temperament which results\ntherefrom. But how could they endow the man with habits, tastes, and\ninclinations which do not seem to depend on the temperament, such as\nthe avocation of a surveyor, a grammarian, a gambler, or an inventor?\n\n\nIRRATIONAL CLAIMS OF ASTROLOGERS.\n\nBesides, nobody would admit that perversity could come from beings who\nare divinities. How could one believe that they are the authors of the\nevils attributed to them, and that they themselves become evil because\nthey set or pass under the earth, as if they could possibly be affected\nby the fact that, in regard to us, they seem to set; as if they did not\ncontinue to wander around the heavenly sphere, and remained in the same\nrelation to the earth? Besides it is incredible that because a star\nis in such or such a position in respect of another star, it becomes\nbetter or worse, and that it affects us with goodness when it is well\ndisposed, and evil in the contrary case.\n\n\nSTARS SERVE AS LETTERS IN WHICH TO READ NATURE.\n\nWe grant that by their movement the stars co-operate in the\nconservation of the universe, and that they simultaneously play in it\nanother part. They serve as letters for those skilled in deciphering\nthis kind of writing; and who, by the observation of the figures formed\nby the stars, read into them future events according to the laws of\nanalogy, as for instance, if one presaged high deeds from seeing a bird\nfly high.\n\n\nRESTATEMENT OF THE STOIC DOCTRINE, AND THE HERACLITIAN.\n\n7. There remains to be considered the (Stoic) doctrine which,\nconcatenating and interrelating all things among each other,\nestablishes \"a single cause which produces everything through seminal\nreasons.\" This doctrine reattaches itself to (Heraclitus's) which\ndeduces from the action of the universal Soul the constitution and the\nmovements of the individuals as well as those of the universe.\n\n\nALEXANDER OF APHRODISIA'S POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOICS.\n\nIn this case, even if we possessed the power of doing something by\nourselves, we would not be any the less than the remainder of the\nuniverse subjected to necessity, because Fate, containing the whole\nseries of causes, necessarily determines each event. Now since Fate\nincludes all causes, there is nothing which could hinder the occurrence\nof that event, or alter it. If then everything obeys the impulsion of\na single principle, nothing is left to us but to follow it. Indeed,\nin this case, the fancies of our imagination would result from\nanterior facts, and would in turn determine our appetites; our liberty\nwould then have become a mere word; nor would we gain any advantage\nfrom obeying our appetites, since our appetites themselves will be\ndetermined by anterior facts. We would have no more liberty than the\nother animals, than children, or the insane, who run hither and yon,\ndriven by blind appetites; for they also obey their appetites, as fire\nwould do, and as all the things which fatally follow the dispositions\nof their nature. These objections will be decisive for those capable of\napprehending them; and in the search for other causes of our appetites\nthey will not content themselves with the principles which we have\nexamined.\n\n\nTHE HUMAN SOUL AS AN INDEPENDENT PRINCIPLE.\n\n8. What other cause, besides the preceding, will we have to invoke\nso as to let nothing occur without a cause, to maintain order and\ninterdependence of things in the world, and in order to preserve the\npossibility of predictions and omens without destroying our personality?\n\nWe shall have to introduce among the number of beings another\nprinciple, namely: the soul; and not only the World-soul, but even the\nindividual soul of every person. In the universal concatenation of\ncauses and effects, this soul is a principle of no little importance,\nbecause, instead of, like all other things, being born of a \"seminal\nreason,\" it constitutes a \"primary cause.\" Outside of a body, she\nremains absolute mistress of herself, free and independent of the\ncause which administers the world. As soon as she has descended into\na body, she is no longer so independent, for she then forms part of\nthe order to which all things are subjected. Now, inasmuch as the\naccidents of fortune, that is to say, the surrounding circumstances,\ndetermine many events, the soul alternately yields to the influence\nof external circumstances, and then again she dominates them, and\ndoes what she pleases. This she does more or less, according as she\nis good or evil. When she yields to the corporeal temperament, she is\nnecessarily subjected to desire or anger, discouraged in poverty, or\nproud in prosperity, as well as tyrannical in the exercise of power.\nBut she can resist all these evil tendencies if her disposition is\ngood; she modifies her surroundings more than she is affected by them;\nsome things she changes, others she tolerates without herself incurring\nguilt.\n\n\nTHE SOUL IS FREE WHEN FOLLOWING REASON.\n\n9. All things therefore, which result either from a choice by the soul,\nor from exterior circumstances, are \"necessary,\" or determined by a\ncause. Could anything, indeed, be found outside of these causes? If we\ngather into one glance all the causes we admit, we find the principles\nthat produce everything, provided we count, amidst external causes,\nthe influence exercised by the course of the stars. When a soul makes\na decision, and carries it out because she is impelled thereto by\nexternal things, and yields to a blind impulse, we should not consider\nher determination and action to be free. The soul is not free when,\nperverting herself, she does not make decisions which direct her in the\nstraight path. On the contrary, when she follows her own guide, pure\nand impassible reason, her determination is really voluntary, free and\nindependent, and the deed she performs is really her own work, and not\nthe consequence of an exterior impulse; she derives it from her inner\npower, her pure being, from the primary and sovereign principle which\ndirects her, being deceived by no ignorance, nor vanquished by the\npower of appetites; for when the appetites invade the soul, and subdue\nher, they drag her with them by their violence, and she is rather\n\"passive\" than \"active\" in what she does.\n\n\nTHE SOUL OBEYS FATE ONLY WHEN EVIL.\n\n10. The conclusion of our discussion is that while everything is\nindicated and produced by causes, these are of two kinds: First the\nhuman soul, and then only exterior circumstances. When the soul acts\n\"conformably to right reason\" she acts freely. Otherwise, she is\ntangled up in her deeds, and she is rather \"passive\" than \"active.\"\nTherefore, whenever she lacks prudence, the exterior circumstances are\nthe causes of her actions; one then has good reason to say that she\nobeys Fate, especially if Fate is here considered as an exterior cause.\nOn the contrary, virtuous actions are derived from ourselves; for, when\nwe are independent, it is natural for us to produce them. Virtuous\nmen act, and do good freely. Others do good only in breathing-spells\nleft them in between by their passions. If, during these intervals,\nthey practice the precepts of wisdom, it is not because they receive\nthem from some other being, it is merely because their passions do not\nhinder them from listening to the voice of reason.\n\n    As the first book seemed Platonic, and the second Numenian, so\n    this third one seems called forth by the practical opposition\n    of astrologers or Gnostics. Later in life, his thirty-third\n    book, ii. 9, was to take up again this polemic in more extended\n    form. This chronologic arrangement of Plotinos's first three\n    books reveals his three chief sources of interest--devotion to\n    Plato, reliance on Numenius, and opposition to the Gnostics and\n    astrologers.\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIRST.\n\nOf the Being of the Soul.\n\n\nIt is in the intelligible world that dwells veritable being.\nIntelligence is the best that there is on high; but there are also\nsouls; for it is thence that they descended thither. Only, souls have\nno bodies, while here below they inhabit bodies and are divided there.\nOn high, all the intelligences exist together, without separation or\ndivision; all the souls exist equally together in that world which\nis one, and there is no local distance between them. Intelligence\ntherefore ever remains inseparable and indivisible; but the soul,\ninseparable so long as she resides on high, nevertheless possesses a\ndivisible nature. For her \"dividing herself\" consists in departing\nfrom the intelligible world, and uniting herself to bodies; it might\ntherefore be reasonably said that she becomes divisible in passing\ninto bodies, since she thus separates from the intelligible world,\nand divides herself somewhat. In what way is she also indivisible?\nIn that she does not separate herself entirely from the intelligible\nworld, ever residing there by her highest part, whose nature it is to\nbe indivisible. To say then that the soul is composed of indivisible\n(essence) and of (essence) divisible in bodies means then no more\nthan that the soul has an (essence) which dwells partly in the\nintelligible world, and partly descends into the sense-world, which\nis suspended from the first and extends downwards to the second, as\nthe ray goes from the centre to the circumference. When the soul\ndescended here below, it is by her superior part that she contemplates\nthe intelligible world, as it is thereby that she preserves the nature\nof the all (of the universal Soul). For here below she is not only\ndivisible, but also indivisible; her divisible part is divided in a\nsomewhat indivisible manner; she is indeed entirely present in the\nwhole body in an indivisible manner, and nevertheless she is said to\ndivide herself because she spreads out entirely in the whole body.\n\n\n\n\nFIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.\n\nOf Intelligence, Ideas and Essence.\n\n\nTHE SENSUAL MAN, THE MORAL, AND THE SPIRITUAL.\n\n1. From their birth, men exercise their senses, earlier than their\nintelligence,[106] and they are by necessity forced to direct their\nattention to sense-objects. Some stop there, and spend their life\nwithout progressing further. They consider suffering as evil, and\npleasure as the good, judging it to be their business to avoid the one\nand encompass the other. That is the content of wisdom for those of\nthem that pride themselves on being reasonable; like those heavy birds\nwho, having weighted themselves down by picking up too much from the\nearth, cannot take flight, though by nature provided with wings. There\nare others who have raised themselves a little above earthly objects\nbecause their soul, endowed with a better nature, withdraws from\npleasures to seek something higher;[107] but as they are not capable\nof arriving at contemplation of the intelligible, and as, after having\nleft our lower region here, they do not know where to lodge, they\nreturn to a conception of morality which considers virtue to consist\nin these common-place actions and occupations whose narrow sphere they\nhad at first attempted to leave behind. Finally a third kind is that\nof those divine men who are endowed with a piercing vision, and whose\npenetrating glance contemplates the splendor of the intelligible world,\nand rise unto it, taking their flight above the clouds and darkness of\nthis world. Then, full of scorn for terrestrial things, they remain up\nthere, and reside in their true fatherland with the unspeakable bliss\nof the man who, after long journeys, is at last repatriated.\n\n\nTHE HIGHER REGION REACHED ONLY BY THOSE WHO ARE BORN PHILOSOPHERS.\n\n2. Which is this higher region? What must be done to reach it? One must\nbe naturally disposed to love, and be really a born philosopher.[108]\nIn the presence of beauty, the lover feels something similar to the\npains of childbirth; but far from halting at bodily beauty, he rises\nto that aroused in the soul by virtue, duties, science and laws. Then\nhe follows them up to the cause of their beauty, and in this ascending\nprogress stops only when he has reached the Principle that occupies\nthe first rank, that which is beautiful in itself.[109] Then only does\nhe cease being driven by this torment that we compare to the pains of\nchildbirth.\n\n\nLOVE IS TRANSFORMED INTO PROGRESSIVELY HIGHER STAGES.\n\nBut how does he rise up thither? How does he have the power to do\nso? How does he learn to love? Here it is. The beauty seen in bodies\nis incidental; it consists in the shapes of which the bodies are\nthe matter.[110] Consequently the substance changes, and it is seen\nchanging from beauty to ugliness. The body has only a borrowed beauty.\nWho imparted that beauty to the body? On the one hand, the presence of\nbeauty; on the other, the actualization of the soul which fashioned the\nbody, and which gave it the shape it possesses. But is the soul, by\nherself, absolute beauty? No, since some souls are wise and beautiful,\nwhile some others are foolish and ugly. It is therefore only by wisdom\nthat the soul is beautiful. But from what is her wisdom derived?\nNecessarily from intelligence; not from the intelligence that is\nintelligent at some time, though not at others, but from the genuine\nIntelligence, which is beautiful on that very account.[111] Shall we\nstop at Intelligence, as a first principle? Or shall we on the contrary\nstill rise above it? Surely so, for Intelligence presents itself to us\nbefore the first Principle only because it is, so to speak, located in\nthe antechamber of the Good.[112] It bears all things within itself,\nand manifests them, so that it displays the image of the Good in\nmanifoldness, while the Good itself remains in an absolute simple unity.\n\n\nPROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE.\n\n3. Let us now consider the Intelligence which reason tells us is\nabsolute essence and genuine \"being,\" and whose existence we have\nalready established in a different manner. It would seem ridiculous\nto inquire whether Intelligence form part of the scale of beings; but\nthere are men who doubt it, or who at least are disposed to ask for a\ndemonstration that Intelligence possesses the nature we predicate of\nit, that it is separated (from matter), that it is identical with the\nessences, and that it contains the ideas. This is our task.\n\n\nIN THE HUMAN WORLD EVERYTHING IS A COMPOSITE OF FORM AND MATTER.\n\nAll things that we consider to be essences are composites; nothing\nis simple or single, either in works of art, or in the products of\nnature.[113] Works of art, indeed, contain metal, wood, stone, and are\nderived from these substances only by the labor of the artist, who, by\ngiving matter its form makes of it a statue, or bed, or house. Among\nthe products of nature, those that are compounds or mixtures may be\nanalyzed into the form impressed on the elements of the compound; so,\nfor instance, we may in a man, distinguish a soul and body, and in the\nbody four elements. Since the very matter of the elements, taken in\nitself, has no form, every object seems composed of matter and of some\nprinciple that supplies it with form.[114] So we are led to ask whence\nmatter derives its form, and to seek whether the soul is simple, or\nwhether it contains two parts, one of which plays the parts of matter,\nand the other of form,[115] so that the first part would be similar\nto the form received by the metal of a statue, and the latter to the\nprinciple which produces the form itself.\n\n\nTHE WORLD-SOUL ALSO IS A COMPOUND OF FORM AND MATTER.\n\nApplying this conception to the universe, we rise to Intelligence,\nrecognizing therein the demiurgic creator of the world. It was\nin receiving from it its shapes by the intermediation of another\nprinciple, the universal Soul, that the (material) substances became\nwater, air, earth and fire. On the one hand, the Soul shapes the\nfour elements of the world;[116] on the other, she receives from\nIntelligence the (seminal) reasons,[117] as the souls of the artists\nthemselves receive from the arts the reasons which they work out.[118]\nIn Intelligence, therefore, there is a part which is the form of the\nsoul; it is intelligence considered, as shape. There is another which\nimparts shape, like the sculptor who gives the metal the shape of\nthe statue, and which in itself possesses all it gives.[119] Now the\n(shapes) which the Intelligence imparts to the soul connect with the\ntruth as closely as possible, while those which the soul imparts to the\nbody are only images and appearances.[120]\n\n\nWHY OUR ASCENT CANNOT STOP WITH THE SOUL.\n\n4. Why should we not, on arriving at the Soul, stop there, and consider\nher the first principle? Because Intelligence is a power different\nfrom the Soul, and better than the Soul; and what is better must, by\nits very nature, precede (the worst). The Stoics[121] are wrong in\nthinking that it is the Soul which, on reaching her perfection, begets\nIntelligence. How could that which is potential pass into actualization\nunless there were some principle that effected that transition? If\nthis transition were due to chance, it could not have occurred at\nall. The first rank must therefore be assigned to that which is in\nactualization, which needs nothing, which is perfect, while imperfect\nthings must be assigned to the second rank. These may be perfected\nby the principles that begat them, which, in respect to them, play a\npaternal part, perfecting what they had originally produced that was\nimperfect. What is thus produced is matter, as regards the creating\nprinciple, and then becomes perfect, on receiving its form from it.\nBesides, the Soul is (often) affected; and we need to discover some\nthing that is impassible, without which everything is dissolved by\ntime; therefore there is need of some principle prior to the soul.\nFurther, the Soul is in the world; now there must be something that\nresides outside of the world, and which consequently would be superior\nto the Soul; for since that which inheres in the world resides within\nthe body, or matter, if nothing existed outside of the world, nothing\nwould remain permanent. In this case, the (seminal) reason of man,\nand all the other reasons could be neither permanent nor eternal. The\nresult of all these considerations, as well as of many others that\nwe could add thereto, is the necessary assertion of the existence of\nIntelligence beyond the Soul.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE IS IN ACTUALIZATION BECAUSE ITS THOUGHT IS IDENTICAL WITH\nITS ESSENCE OR EXISTENCE.\n\n5. Taking it in its genuine sense, Intelligence is not only\npotential, arriving at being intelligent after having been\nunintelligent--for otherwise, we would be forced to seek out some\nstill higher principle--but is in actualization, and is eternal. As\nit is intelligent by itself, it is by itself that it thinks what it\nthinks, and that it possesses what is possesses. Now since it thinks\nof itself and by itself, it itself is what it thinks. If we could\ndistinguish between its existence and its thought, its \"being\" would be\nunintelligent; it would be potential, not in actualization. Thought,\ntherefore, must not be separated from its object, although, from\nsense-objects, we have become accustomed to conceive of intelligible\nentities as distinct from each other.\n\n\nREASONS, AS ARCHETYPES, MUST HAVE EXISTED BEFORE STOIC \"HABIT,\" NATURE\nOR SOUL.\n\nWhich then is the principle that acts, that thinks, and what is the\nactualization and thought of Intelligence, necessary to justify the\nassertion that it is what it thinks? Evidently Intelligence, by its\nmere real existence, thinks beings, and makes them exist; it therefore\nis the beings. Indeed, the beings will either exist outside of it, or\nwithin it; and in the latter case they would have to be identical with\nit. That they should exist outside of Intelligence, is unthinkable;\nfor where would they be located? They must therefore exist within\nit, and be identical with it. They could not be in sense-objects, as\ncommon people think, because sense-objects could not be the first\nin any genus. The form which inheres in their matter is only the\nrepresentation of existence; now a form which exists in anything\nother than itself is put in it by a superior principle, and is its\nimage. Further, if Intelligence must be the creative power of the\nuniverse, it could not, while creating the universe, think beings as\nexistent in what does not yet exist. Intelligible entities, therefore,\nmust exist before the world, and cannot be images of sense-objects,\nbeing on the contrary, their archetypes, and constituting the \"being\"\nof Intelligence. It might be objected that the (seminal) reasons\nmight suffice. These reasons are, no doubt, eternal; and, if they be\neternal and impassible, they must exist within the Intelligence whose\ncharacteristics we have described, the Intelligence which precedes\nthe \"habit,\"[122] nature,[123] and the soul,[124] because here these\nentities are potential.[125]\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE IS POSTULATED BY THE GENERAL NECESSITIES OF THE WORLD.\n\nIntelligence, therefore, essentially constitutes all beings; and when\nIntelligence thinks them, they are not outside of Intelligence, and\nneither precede nor follow it. Intelligence is the first legislator,\nor rather, it is the very law of existence. Parmenides[126] therefore\nwas right in saying, \"Thought is identical with existence.\" The\nknowledge of immaterial things is therefore identical with those things\nthemselves. That is why I recognize myself as a being, and why I have\nreminiscences of intelligible entities. Indeed, none of those beings is\noutside of Intelligence, nor is contained in any location; all of them\nsubsist in themselves as immutable and indestructible. That is why they\nreally are beings. If they were born, or perished, they would possess\nexistence only in an incidental manner, they would no longer be beings;\nit would be the existence they possessed which would be essence. It\nis only by participation that sense-things are what they are said to\nbe; the nature that constitutes their substance derives its shape from\nelsewhere, as the metal receives its shape from the sculptor, and wood\nfrom the carpenter; while the image of art penetrates into the matter,\nthe art itself remains in its identity, and within itself possesses\nthe genuine existence of the statue or of the bed. That is how the\nbodies' general necessity of participating in images shows that they\nare different from the beings; for they change, while the entities are\nimmutable, possess within themselves their own foundation, and have\nno need of existing in any location, since they have no extension,\nand since they subsist in an intellectual and absolute existence.\nAgain,[127] the existence of the bodies needs to be guarded[128] by\nsome other principle, while intelligence, which furnishes the existence\nfor objects in themselves perishable, has need of nothing to make\nitself subsist.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE CONTAINS ALL BEINGS GENERATIVELY.\n\n6. Thus Intelligence actually constitutes all beings; it contains them\nall, but not locally; it contains them as it possesses itself; it is\nidentical with them. All entities are simultaneously contained within\nit, and in it remain distinct, as many kinds of knowledge may exist\nwithin the soul without their number causing any confusion; each of\nthem appears when needed, without involving the others. If in the soul\neach thought be an actualization independent of other thoughts, so much\nthe more must Intelligence be all things simultaneously, with this\nrestriction, however, that each of them is a special power. Considered\nin its universality, Intelligence contains all entities as the genus\ncontains all species, as the whole contains all parts. Even the seminal\npowers bear the impress of this universality. Each one, considered in\nits totality, is a centre which contains all the parts of the organism\nin an undivided condition; nevertheless in it the reason of the eyes\ndiffers from that of the hands, and this diversity is manifested by\nthat of the organs begotten (therefrom).[129] Each of the powers of\nthe seed, therefore, is the total unity of the seminal reason when this\npower is united to the others which are implied therein. What in the\nseed is corporeal contains matter, as, for instance, humidity; but the\nseminal reason is the entire form; it is identical with the generative\npower, a power which itself is the image of a superior power of the\nsoul. This generative power contained in seeds is[130] usually called\n\"nature.\" Proceeding from the superior powers as light radiates from\nthe fire, it tames and fashions matter, imparting thereto the seminal\nreason[131] without pushing it, or moving it as by levers.\n\n\nTHERE ARE SCIENTIFIC NOTIONS THAT ARE POSTERIOR, BUT SOME THAT ARE\nPRIOR.\n\n7. The scientific notions that the soul forms of sense-objects, by\ndiscursive reason, and which should rather be called opinions,[132]\nare posterior to the objects (they deal with); and consequently,\nare no more than images of them. But true scientific notions\nreceived from intelligence by discursive reasons do not contain any\nsense-conceptions. So far as they are scientific notions, they are\nthe very things of which they are the conceptions; they reveal the\nintimate union of intelligence and thought. Interior Intelligence,\nwhich consists of the primary (natures) possesses itself intimately,\nresides within itself since all eternity, and is an actualization. It\ndoes not direct its glances outside of itself, because it possesses\neverything within itself; it does not acquire, and does not reason to\ndiscover things that may not be present to them. Those are operations\ncharacteristic of the soul. Intelligence, remaining fixed within\nitself, is all things simultaneously. Nevertheless, it is not thought\nwhich makes each of them subsist; it is only because intelligence\nthought the divinity or movement, for instance, that the divinity\nor movement exists.[133] When we say that thoughts are forms, we\nare mistaken if thereby we mean that the intelligible exists only\nbecause Intelligence thinks it. On the contrary, it is only because\nthe intelligible exists, that Intelligence can think. Otherwise, how\nwould Intelligence come to think the intelligible? It cannot meet the\nintelligible by chance, nor waste itself in fruitless efforts.\n\n\nTHOUGHT IS THE FORM, SHAPE THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE BEING.\n\n8. Since the thought is something essentially one (?), the form, which\nis the object of thought, and the idea[134, 134a] are one and the same\nthing. Which is this thing? Intelligence and the intellectual \"being,\"\nfor no idea is foreign to intelligence; each form is intelligence, and\nthe whole intelligence is all the forms; every particular form is a\nparticular intelligence. Likewise science, taken in its totality,\nis all the notions it embraces; every notion is a part of the total\nscience; it is not separated from the science locally, and exists\npotentially in the whole science.[135] Intelligence resides within\nitself, and by possessing itself calmly, is the eternal fulness of\nall things. If we conceived it as being prior to essence, we would\nhave to say that it was the action and thought of Intelligence which\nproduced and begat all beings. But as, on the contrary, it is certain\nthat essence is prior to Intelligence, we should, within the thinking\nprinciple, first conceive the beings, then actualization and thought,\njust as (the nature) of fire is joined by the actualization of the\nfire, so that beings have innate intelligence (?[148]) as their\nactualization. Now essence is an actualization; therefore essence and\nintelligence are but a single actualization, or rather both of them\nfuse.[136] Consequently, they form but a single nature, as beings,\nthe actualization of essence, and intelligence. In this case the\nthought is the form, and the shape is the actualization of the being.\nWhen, however, in thought we separate essence from Intelligence, we\nmust conceive one of these principles as prior to the other. The\nIntelligence which operates this separation is indeed different from\nthe essence from which it separates;[137] but the Intelligence which\nis inseparable from essence and which does not separate thought from\nessence is itself essence and all things.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE UNIVERSAL ARCHETYPE.\n\n9. What then are the things contained within the unity of Intelligence\nwhich we separate in thinking of them? They must be expressed without\ndisturbing their rest, and we must contemplate the contents of\nIntelligence by a science that somehow remains within unity. Since\nthis sense-world is an animal which embraces all animals, since it\nderives both its general and special existence from a principle\ndifferent from itself,[138] a principle which, in turn, is derived\nfrom intelligence, therefore intelligence must itself contain the\nuniversal archetype, and must be that intelligible world of which\nPlato[139] (well) says; \"Intelligence sees the ideas contained within\nthe existing animal.\"[140] Since an animal, whose (seminal) reason\nexists with the matter fit to receive it, must of course be begotten,\nso the mere existence of a nature that is intellectual, all-powerful,\nand unhindered by any obstacle--since nothing can interpose between it\nand the (substance) capable of receiving the form--must necessarily be\nadorned (or, created) by intelligence, but only in a divided condition\ndoes it reveal the form it receives, so that, for instance, it shows\nus on one hand a man, and on the other the sun, while intelligence\npossesses everything in unity.\n\n\nIN THE SENSE-WORLD ONLY THOSE THINGS THAT ARE FORMS PROCEED FROM\nINTELLIGENCE.\n\n10. Therefore, in the sense-world, all the things that are forms\nproceed from intelligence; those which are not forms do not proceed\ntherefrom. That is, in the intelligible world we do not find any of\nthe things that are contrary to nature, any more than we find what is\ncontrary to the arts in the arts themselves. Thus the seminal reason\ndoes not contain the defects, such as limping would be in a body.\nCongenital lameness is due to the reason's failure to dominate matter,\nwhile accidental lameness is due to deterioration of the form (idea?).\n\n\nNATURAL CHARACTERISTICS ARE DERIVED FROM THE CATEGORIES IN THE\nINTELLIGIBLE.\n\nThe qualities that are natural, quantities, numbers, magnitudes,\nstates, actions and natural experiences, movements and recuperations,\neither general or particular, are among the contents of the\nintelligible world, where time is replaced by eternity,[141] and space\nis replaced by the \"telescoping\" of intelligible entities (that are\nwithin each other). As all entities are together in the intelligible\nworld, whatever entity you select (by itself) is intellectual and\nliving \"being,\" identity and difference, movement and rest;[142] it is\nwhat moves, and what is at rest; it is \"being,\" and quality; that is,\nit is all. There every essence is in actualization, instead of merely\nbeing in potentiality; consequently it is not separated from quality.\n\n\nTHE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD FAILS TO CONTAIN EARTHLY IMPERFECTIONS.\n\nDoes the intelligible world contain only what is found in the\nsense-world, or does it contain anything additional?... Let us consider\nthe arts, in this respect. To begin with, the intelligible world\ndoes not contain any imperfection. Evils here below come from lack,\nprivation, omission; it is a state of matter, or of anything similar to\nmatter, which failed to be completely assimilated.[143]\n\n\nSOME ARTS ARE PURELY EARTHLY; OTHERS, LIKE MUSIC, INTELLIGIBLE.\n\n11. Let us therefore consider the arts and their products. Unless as\nrepresented within human reason, we cannot refer to the intelligible\nworld arts of imitation such as painting, sculpture, dancing, or\nacting, because they are born here below, take sense-objects as models,\nrepresenting their forms, motions, and visible proportions.[144] If,\nhowever, we possess a faculty which, by studying the beauties offered\nby the symmetry of animals, considers the general characteristics of\nthis symmetry, it must form part of the intellectual power which, on\nhigh, contemplates universal symmetry. Music, however, which studies\nrhythm and harmony, is, so far as it studies what is intelligible in\nthese things, the image of the music that deals with intelligible\nrhythm.\n\n\nTHERE ARE MANY AUXILIARY ARTS WHICH HELP THE PROGRESS OF NATURE.\n\nThe arts which produce sense-objects, such as architecture and\ncarpentry, have their principles in the intelligible world, and\nparticipate in wisdom, so far as they make use of certain proportions.\nBut as they apply these proportions to sense-objects, they cannot\nwholly be referred to the intelligible world, unless in so far as\nthey are contained within human reason. The case is similar with\nagriculture, which assists the growth of plants; medicine, which\nincreases health, and (gymnastics) which supplies the body with\nstrength as well as vigor,[145] for on high there is another Power,\nanother Health, from which all living organisms derive their needed\nvigor.\n\n\nOTHER ARTS ARE INTELLIGIBLE WHEN APPLIED TO THE INTELLIGIBLE.\n\nLast, whenever rhetoric, strategy, private and public finance and\npolitics weave beauty in their deeds, and they glance above, they\n(discover) that they have added to their science a contribution from\nthe intelligible science.\n\nThe science of geometry, however, which deals (wholly) with\nintelligible entities, must be referred to the intelligible world. So\nalso with philosophy, which occupies the first rank among sciences\nbecause it studies essence. This is all we have to say about arts and\ntheir products.\n\n\nTHE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAINS ONLY UNIVERSAL IDEAS; PARTICULARITIES\nARE DERIVED FROM MATTER.\n\n12. If the intelligible world contains the idea of Man, it must also\ncontain that of the reasonable man, and of the artist; and consequently\nthe idea of the arts that are begotten by Intelligence. We must\ntherefore insist that the intelligible world contains the ideas of the\nuniversals, the idea of Man as such, and not, for instance, that of\nSocrates. Still we shall have to decide whether the intelligible world\ndoes not also contain the idea of the individual man, that is, of the\nman considered with the things that differ in each individual; for one\nmay have a Roman nose and the other a pug nose. These differences are\nindeed implied within the idea of man, just as there are differences\nwithin the idea of animal. But the differences between a Roman or a\nsnub nose are derived from matter. Likewise, amidst the varieties of\ncolors, some are contained within the seminal reason, while others are\nderived from matter and space.\n\n\nBESIDES IDEAS OF INDIVIDUAL SOULS AND INTELLIGENCE, THE INTELLIGIBLE\nWORLD CONTAINS THE SOUL ITSELF AND INTELLIGENCE ITSELF.\n\n13. It remains for us to study whether the intelligible world contains\nonly what is in the sense-world, or whether we should distinguish from\nthe individual soul the Soul itself, from the particular intelligence,\nIntelligence itself, as we have above distinguished the particular\nman from Man himself. We should not consider all things here below as\nimages of archetypes, for instance, the soul of a man as the image\nof the Soul herself. Only degrees of dignity differentiate souls;\nbut these souls are not the Soul itself. As the Soul itself exists\nreally, it must also contain a certain wisdom, justice and science,\nwhich are not images of wisdom, justice, and intelligible science, as\nsense-objects are images of intelligible entities, but which are these\nvery entities located here below in entirely different conditions of\nexistence; for they are not locally circumscribed. Therefore when the\nsoul issues from the body, she preserves these things within herself;\nfor the sense-world exists only in a determinate place, while the\nintelligible world exists everywhere; therefore all that the soul\ncontains here below is also in the intelligible world. Consequently if,\nby \"sense-objects\" we really mean \"visible\" things, then indeed the\nintelligible world contains entities not present in this sense-world.\nIf, on the contrary, we include within the \"sense-world\" the soul and\nall she implies, then all things that are above are present here below\nalso.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME BEING ENTIRELY ONE DOES NOT EXPLAIN THE ORIGIN OF THE\nMANIFOLD.\n\n14. Can we identify the nature that contains all the intelligibles\n(Intelligence) with the supreme Principle? Impossible, because the\nsupreme Principle must be essentially one, and simple, while essences\nform a multitude. But as these essences form a multitude, we are forced\nto explain how this multitude, and all these essences can exist. How\ncan (the single) Intelligence be all these things? Whence does it\nproceed? This we shall have to study elsewhere.[146]\n\n\nTHE SOUL RECEIVES ACCIDENTS FROM MATTER, BUT DEFECTS ARE NOT IN THE\nINTELLIGIBLE.\n\nIt may further be asked whether the intelligible world contains the\nideas of objects which are derived from decay, which are harmful or\ndisagreeable, such as, for instance, mud or excreta. We answer that\nall the things that universal Intelligence receives from the First\nare excellent. Among them are not found ideas of those dirty and vile\nobjects mentioned above; Intelligence does not contain them. But though\nreceiving from Intelligence ideas, the soul receives from matter\nother things, among which may be found the above-mentioned accidents.\nBesides, a more thorough answer to this question must be sought for in\nour book where we explain \"How the Multitude of Ideas Proceeds from the\nOne.\"[147]\n\n\nNOT ALL EARTHLY ENTITIES HAVE CORRESPONDING IDEAS.\n\nIn conclusion, the accidental composites in which Intelligence does not\nshare and which are formed by a fortuitous complex of sense-objects,\nhave no ideas corresponding to them in the intelligible world. Things\nthat proceed from decay are produced only because the Soul is unable to\nproduce anything better in this case; otherwise she would have rather\nproduced some object more agreeing with nature; she therefore produces\nwhat she can.\n\n\nEVEN THE ARTS ARE DEPENDENT ON THE SOUL.\n\nAll the arts concerned with things natural to man are contained within\nthe ideas of Man himself. The Art that is universal is prior to the\nother arts; but Art is posterior to the Soul herself, or rather, to\nthe life that is in Intelligence before becoming soul, and which, on\nbecoming soul, deserves to be called the Soul herself.\n\n\nDIFFICULT PASSAGES.\n\n(Transcriber's note: see footnotes 134a and 148.)\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHTH.\n\nOf the Descent of the Soul Into the Body.[149]\n\n\nTHE EXPERIENCE OF ECSTASY LEADS TO QUESTIONS.\n\n1. On waking from the slumber of the body to return to myself, and on\nturning my attention from exterior things so as to concentrate it on\nmyself, I often observe an alluring beauty, and I become conscious of\nan innate nobility. Then I live out a higher life, and I experience\natonement with the divinity. Fortifying myself within it, I arrive\nat that actualization which raises me above the intelligible. But\nif, after this sojourn with the divinity, I descend once more from\nIntelligence to the exercise of my reasoning powers, I am wont to ask\nmyself how I ever could actually again descend, and how my soul ever\ncould have entered into a body, since, although she actually abides\nin the body, she still possesses within herself all the perfection I\ndiscover in her.\n\n\nHERACLITUS, THE ORIGINATOR OF THESE QUESTIONS, ANSWERS THEM OBSCURELY.\n\nHeraclitus, who recommends this research, asserts that \"there are\nnecessary changes of contraries into each other;\" he speaks of\n\"ascenscions\" and of a \"descent,\" says that it is \"a rest to change,\na fatigue to continue unremittingly in the same kinds of work, and to\nbe overwrought. He thus reduces us to conjectures because he does not\nexplain himself definitely; and he would even force us to ask how he\nhimself came to discover what he propounds.\n\n\nEMPEDOCLES, AS A POET, TELLS OF PYTHAGOREAN MYTHS.\n\nEmpedocles teaches that \"it is a law for souls that have sinned to\nfall down here below;\" and that \"he himself, having withdrawn from\nthe divinity, came down to the earth to become the slave of furious\ndiscord.\" It would seem that he limited himself to advancing the ideas\nthat Pythagoras and his followers generally expressed by symbols, both\non this and other subjects. Besides Empedocles is obscure because he\nuses the language of poetry.\n\n\nPLATO SAYS MANY CONTRADICTORY THINGS THAT ARE BEAUTIFUL AND TRUE.\n\nLast, we have the divine Plato, who has said so many beautiful things\nabout the soul. In his dialogues he often spoke of the descent of\nthe soul into the body, so that we have the right to expect from him\nsomething clearer. Unfortunately, he is not always sufficiently in\nagreement with himself to enable one to follow his thought. In general,\nhe depreciates corporeal things; he deplores the dealings between the\nsoul and the body; insists[150] that the soul is chained down to it,\nand that she is buried in it as in a tomb. He attaches much importance\nto the maxim taught in the mysteries that the soul here below is as\nin a prison.[151] What Plato calls the \"cavern\"[152] and Empedocles\ncalls the \"grotto,\" means no doubt the sense-world.[153] To break her\nchains, and to issue from the cavern, means the soul's[154] rising to\nthe intelligible world. In the Phaedrus,[155] Plato asserts that the\ncause of the fall of the soul is the loss of her wings; that after\nhaving once more ascended on high, she is brought back here below by\nthe periods;[156] that there are souls sent down into this world by\njudgments, fates, conditions, and necessity; still, at the same time,\nhe finds fault with the \"descent\" of the soul into the body. But,\nspeaking of the universe in the Timaeus,[157] he praises the world, and\ncalls it a blissful divinity. He states that the demiurgic creator,\nbeing good, gave it a soul to make it intelligent, because without the\nsoul, the universe could not have been as intelligent as it ought to\nhave been.[158] Consequently, the purpose of the introduction of the\nuniversal Soul into the world, and similarly of each of our souls was\nonly to achieve the perfection of the world; for it was necessary for\nthe sense-world to contain animals equal in kind and numbers to those\ncontained in the intelligible world.\n\n\nQUESTIONS RAISED BY PLATO'S THEORIES.\n\n2. Plato's theories about the soul lead us to ask how, in general, the\nsoul has, by her nature, been led to enter into relations with the\nbody. Other questions arise: What is the nature of the world where the\nsoul lives thus, either voluntarily or necessarily, or in any other\nway? Does the Demiurge[159] act without meeting any obstacle, or is it\nwith him as with our souls?\n\n\nHUMAN BODIES ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE THAN THE WORLD-BODY.\n\nTo begin with, our souls, charged with the administration of bodies\nless perfect than the world, had to penetrate within them profoundly in\norder to manage them; for the elements of these bodies tend to scatter,\nand to return to their original location, while, in the universe, all\nthings are naturally distributed in their proper places.[160] Besides,\nour bodies demand an active and vigilant foresight, because, by the\nsurrounding objects they are exposed to many accidents; for they\nalways have a crowd of needs, as they demand continual protection\nagainst the dangers that threaten them.[161] But the body of the world\nis complete and perfect. It is self-sufficient; it has nothing to\nsuffer contrary to its nature; and consequently, it (acts) on a mere\norder of the universal Soul. That is why the universal Soul can remain\nimpassible, feeling no need, remaining in the disposition desired by\nher own nature. That is why Plato says that, when our soul dwells with\nthis perfect Soul, she herself becomes perfect, soaring in the ethereal\nregion, and governing the whole world.[162] So long as a human soul\ndoes not withdraw from the (universal) Soul to enter into a body, and\nto belong to some individual, she easily administers the world, in the\nsame manner, and together with the universal Soul. Communicating to the\nbody essence and perfection is therefore, for the soul, not an unmixed\nevil; because the providential care granted to an inferior nature does\nnot hinder him who grants it from himself remaining in a state of\nperfection.\n\n\nHOW THE TWO-FOLD SOUL EXERTS A TWO-FOLD PROVIDENCE.\n\nIn the universe there are, indeed, two kinds of providences.[163]\nThe first Providence regulates everything in a royal manner, without\nperforming any actions, or observing the details. The second, operating\nsomewhat like an artisan, adjusts its creative power to the inferior\nnature of creatures by getting in contact with them.[164] Now as the\ndivine Soul (or, the principal power,[165] always administers the\nwhole world in the first or regal way, dominating the world by her\nsuperiority, and by injecting into the world her lowest power (nature),\nwe could not accuse the divinity of having given a bad place to the\nuniversal Soul. Indeed, this universal Soul was never deprived of her\nnatural power, possessing it always, because this power is not contrary\nto her being, possessing it uninterruptedly from all eternity.\n\n\nSTAR-SOULS, LIKE UNINCARNATE SOULS, GOVERN THE WORLD UNTROUBLEDLY.\n\n(Plato) further states that the relation of the souls of the stars\nto their bodies is the same as that of the universal Soul to the\nuniverse,[166] where he makes the stars participate in the movements\nof the universal Soul. He thus grants to those souls the blessedness\nwhich is suitable to them. The intercourse of the soul with the body\nis usually blamed for two things: because it hinders the soul from\nbusying herself with the conceptions of intelligence, and then because\nit exposes her to agreeable or painful sensations which fill her with\ndesires. Now neither of these two results affect the soul that has not\nentered into a body, and which does not depend thereon by belonging\nto some particular individual. Then, on the contrary, she possesses\nthe body of the universe, which has no fault, no need, which can cause\nher neither fears nor desires, because she has nothing to fear. Thus\nno anxiety ever forces her to descend to terrestrial objects, or to\ndistract herself from her happy and sublime contemplation. Entirely\ndevoted to divine things, she governs the world by a single power,\nwhose exercise involves no anxiety.\n\n\nDIFFERENCES BETWEEN HUMAN AND COSMIC INCARNATION.\n\n3. Consider now the human soul which[167] undergoes numberless ills\nwhile in the body, eking out a miserable existence, a prey to griefs,\ndesires, fears, sufferings of all kinds, for whom the body is a tomb,\nand the sense-world a \"cave\" or \"grotto.\" This difference of opinions\nabout the condition of the universal Soul and the human soul is not\ncontradictory, because these two souls do not have the same reasons\nfor descent into a body. To begin with, the location of thought, that\nwe call the intelligible world,[168] contains not only the entire\nuniversal Intelligence, but also the intellectual powers, and the\nparticular intelligences comprised within the universal Intelligence;\nsince there is not only a single intelligence, but a simultaneously\nsingle and plural intelligence. Consequently, it must also have\ncontained a single Soul, and a plurality of souls; and it was from the\nsingle Soul, that the multiple particular and different souls had to be\nborn, as from one and the same genus are derived species that are both\nsuperior and inferior, and more or less intellectual. Indeed, in the\nintelligible world, there is, on one hand, the (universal) Intelligence\nwhich, like some great animal, potentially contains the other\nintelligences. On the other hand, are the individual intelligences,\neach of which possess in actualization what the former contains\npotentially. We may illustrate by a living city that would contain\nother living cities. The soul of the universal City would be more\nperfect and powerful; but nothing would hinder the souls of the other\ncities from being of the same kind. Similarly, in the universal Fire,\nthere is on one hand a great fire, and on the other small fires, while\nthe universal Being is the being of the universal Fire, or rather, is\nthe source from which the being of the universal Fire proceeds.\n\n\nTHE RATIONAL SOUL POSSESSES ALSO AN INDIVIDUALITY.\n\nThe function of the rational soul is to think, but she does not limit\nherself to thinking. Otherwise there would be no difference between her\nand intelligence. Besides her intellectual characteristics, the soul's\ncharacteristic nature, by virtue of which she does not remain mere\nintelligence, has a further individual function, such as is possessed\nby every other being. By raising her glance to what is superior to her,\nshe thinks; by bringing them down to herself, she preserves herself; by\nlowering them to what is inferior to her, she adorns it, administers\nit, and governs it. All these things were not to remain immovable in\nthe intelligible world, to permit of a successive issue of varied\nbeings, which no doubt are less perfect than that which preceded them,\nbut which, nevertheless, exist necessarily during the persistence of\nthe Principle from which they proceed.\n\n\nINCARNATE SOULS WEAKEN BECAUSE THEY CONTEMPLATE THE INDIVIDUAL.\n\n4. There are individual souls which, in their conversion[169] towards\nthe principle from which they proceed, aspire to the intelligible\nworld, and which also exercise their power on inferior things, just\nas light, which does not disdain to throw its rays down to us though\nremaining suspended to the sun on high. These souls must remain\nsheltered from all suffering so long as in the intelligible world they\nremain together with the universal Soul. They must besides, in heaven,\nshare with it the administration of the world; like kings who, being\ncolleagues of the great King of the universe, share the government with\nHim, without themselves descending from their thrones, without ceasing\nto occupy a place as elevated as He. But when they pass from this\nstate in which they live with the universal Soul to a particular and\nindependent existence, when they seem weary of dwelling with another,\nthen each of them returns to what belongs to her individually. Now\nwhen a soul has done that for a long while, when she withdraws from\nthe universal Soul, and distinguishes herself therefrom, when she\nceases to keep her glances directed towards the intelligible world;\nthen, isolating herself in her individual existence, she weakens, and\nfinds herself overwhelmed with a crowd of cares, because she directs\nher glance at something individual. Having therefore separated herself\nfrom the universal Soul as well as from the other souls that remain\nunited thereto, and having attached herself to an individual body, and\nconcentrating herself exclusively on this object, which is subjected to\nthe destructive action of all other beings, she ceases to govern the\nwhole to administer more carefully a part, the care of which forces\nher to busy herself, and mingle with external things, to be not only\npresent in the body, but also to interpenetrate it.\n\n\nTHIS PROCESS EXPLAINS THE CLASSIC EXPRESSIONS ABOUT HER CONDITION.\n\nThus, in the common expression, she has lost her wings, and is chained\nby the bonds of the body, because she gave up the calm existence she\nenjoyed when with the universal Soul she shared the administration\nof the world; for when she was above she spent a much happier life.\nThe fallen soul is therefore chained or imprisoned, obliged to\nhave recourse to the senses because she cannot first make use of\nintelligence. She is, as it is said, buried in a tomb, or cavern. But\nby her conversion towards thought, she breaks her bonds, she returns\nupwards towards higher regions, when, starting from the indications of\nreminiscence she rises to the contemplation of the essences;[170] for\neven after her fall she always preserves something superior to the body.\n\n\nSOULS AS AMPHIBIANS.\n\nSouls therefore are necessarily amphibians;[171] since they alternately\nlive in the intelligible world, and in the sense-world; staying longer\nin the intelligible world when they can remain united to supreme\nIntelligence more permanently, or staying longer or preponderatingly\nhere below when nature or destiny imposes on them a contrary fate. That\nis the secret meaning of Plato's words[172] to the effect that the\ndivinity divides the seeds of the souls formed by a second mixture in\nthe cup, and that He separates them into (two) parts. He also adds that\nthey must necessarily fall into generation after having been divided\ninto a definite number. Plato's statement that the divinity sowed the\nsouls,[173] as well as the divinity's address to the other deities,\nmust be taken figuratively. For, in reference to the things contained\nin the universe, this implies that they are begotten or produced; for\nsuccessive enumeration and description implies an eternal begetting,\nand that those objects exist eternally in their present state.\n\n\nSOULS DESCENDING TO HELP ARE SENT BY GOD.\n\n5. Without any inherent contradiction it may therefore be asserted\neither,[174] that the souls are sowed into generation, that they descend\nhere below for the perfection of the universe, or that they are shut up\nin a cavern as the result of a divine punishment, that their fall is\nsimultaneously an effect of their will and of necessity--as necessity\ndoes not exclude voluntariness--and that they are in evil so long as\nthey are incarnate in bodies. Again, as Empedocles says, they may\nhave withdrawn from the divinity, and have lost their way, and have\ncommitted some fault that they are expiating; or, as says Heraclitus,\nthat rest consists in flight (from heaven, and descent here below),\nand that the descent of souls is neither entirely voluntary, nor\ninvoluntary. Indeed, no being ever falls voluntarily; but as it is by\nhis own motion that he descends to lower things, and reaches a less\nhappy condition, it may be said that he bears the punishment of his\nconduct. Besides, as it is by an eternal law of nature that this being\nacts and suffers in that manner, we may, without contradiction or\nviolence to the truth, assert that the being who descends from his rank\nto assist some lower thing is sent by the divinity.[175] In spite of\nany number of intermediate parts (which separate) a principle from its\nlower part, the latter may still be ascribed to the former.[176]\n\n\nTHE TWO POSSIBLE FAULTS OF THE SOUL.\n\nHere there are two possible faults for the soul. The first consists in\nthe motive that determines her to descend. The second is the evil she\ncommits after having descended here below. The first fault is expiated\nby the very condition of the soul after she has descended here below.\nThe punishment of the latter fault, if not too serious, is to pass into\nother bodies more or less promptly according to the judgment delivered\nabout her deserts--and we speak of a \"judgment\" to show that it is the\nconsequence of the divine law. If however the perversity of the soul\npasses all measure, she undergoes, under the charge of guardians in\ncharge of her chastisement, the severe punishments she has incurred.\n\n\nPROMPT FLIGHT HERE BELOW LEAVES THE SOUL UNHARMED BY HER STAY HERE.\n\nThus, although the soul have a divine nature (or \"being\"), though she\noriginate in the intelligible world, she enters into a body. Being a\nlower divinity, she descends here below by a voluntary inclination, for\nthe purpose of developing her power, and to adorn what is below her. If\nshe flee promptly from here below, she does not need to regret having\nbecome acquainted with evil, and knowing the nature of vice,[177]\nnor having had the opportunity of manifesting her faculties, and to\nmanifest her activities and deeds. Indeed, the faculties of the soul\nwould be useless if they slumbered continuously in incorporeal being\nwithout ever becoming actualized. The soul herself would ignore what\nshe possesses if her faculties did not manifest by procession, for\neverywhere it is the actualization that manifests the potentiality.\nOtherwise, the latter would be completely hidden and obscured; or\nrather, it would not really exist, and would not possess any reality.\nIt is the variety of sense-effects which illustrates the greatness of\nthe intelligible principle, whose nature publishes itself by the beauty\nof its works.\n\n\nCONTINUOUS PROCESSION NECESSARY TO THE SUPREME.\n\n6. Unity was not to exist alone; for if unity remained self-enclosed,\nall things would remain hidden in unity without having any form, and no\nbeings would achieve existence. Consequently, even if constituted by\nbeings born of unity, plurality would not exist, unless the inferior\nnatures, by their rank destined to be souls, issued from those beings\nby the way of procession. Likewise, it was not sufficient for souls to\nexist, they also had to reveal what they were capable of begetting.\nIt is likewise natural for each essence to produce something beneath\nit, to draw it out from itself by a development similar to that of a\nseed, a development in which an indivisible principle proceeds to the\nproduction of a sense-object, and where that which precedes remains in\nits own place at the same time as it begets that which follows by an\ninexpressible power, which is essential to intelligible natures. Now\nas this power was not to be stopped or circumscribed in its actions by\njealousy, there was need of a continuous procession until, from degree\nto degree, all things had descended to the extreme limits of what was\npossible;[178] for it is the characteristic of an inexhaustible power\nto communicate all its gifts to everything, and not to permit any of\nthem to be disinherited, since there is nothing which hinders any of\nthem from participating in the nature of the Good in the measure that\nit is capable of doing so. Since matter has existed from all eternity,\nit was impossible that from the time since it existed, it should not\nparticipate in that which communicates goodness to all things according\nto their receptivity thereof.[179] If the generation of matter were\nthe necessary consequence of anterior principles, still it must not\nbe entirely deprived of the good by its primitive impotence, when\nthe cause which gratuitously communicated \"being\" to it remained\nself-enclosed.\n\n\nSENSE-OBJECTS ARE NECESSARY AS REVEALERS OF THE ETERNAL.\n\nThe excellence, power and goodness of intelligible (essences)\nare therefore revealed by sense-objects; and there is an eternal\nconnection between intelligible (entities) that are self-existent, and\nsense-objects, which eternally derive their existence therefrom by\nparticipation, and which imitate intelligible nature to the extent of\ntheir ability.\n\n\nTHE SOUL'S NATURE IS OF AN INTERMEDIATE KIND.\n\n7. As there are two kinds of being (or, existence), one of sensation,\nand the other intelligible, it is preferable for the soul to live in\nthe intelligible world; nevertheless, as a result of her nature, it\nis necessary for her also to participate in sense-affairs.[180] Since\nshe occupies only an intermediate rank, she must not feel wronged at\nnot being the best of beings.[181] Though on one hand her condition be\ndivine, on the other she is located on the limits of the intelligible\nworld, because of her affinity for sense-nature. She causes this\nnature to participate in her powers, and she even receives something\ntherefrom, when, instead of managing the body without compromising\nher own security, she permits herself to be carried away by her own\ninclination to penetrate profoundly within it, ceasing her complete\nunion with the universal Soul. Besides, the soul can rise above the\nbody after having learned to feel how happy one is to dwell on high, by\nthe experience of things seen and suffered here below, and after having\nappreciated the true Good by the comparison of contraries. Indeed\nthe knowledge of the good becomes clearer by the experience of evil,\nespecially among souls which are not strong enough to know evil before\nhaving experienced it.[182]\n\n\nTHE PROCESSION OF INTELLIGENCE IS AN EXCURSION DOWNWARDS AND UPWARDS.\n\nThe procession of intelligence consists in descending to things that\noccupy the lowest rank, and which have an inferior nature,[183] for\nIntelligence could not rise to the superior Nature. Obliged to act\noutside of itself, and not being able to remain self-enclosed, by a\nnecessity and by a law of its nature, intelligence must advance unto\nthe soul where it stops; then, after having communicated of itself to\nthat which immediately follows it, intelligence must return to the\nintelligible world. Likewise, the soul has a double action in her\ndouble relation with what is below and above her. By her first action,\nthe soul manages the body to which she is united; by the second, she\ncontemplates the intelligible entities. These alternatives work out,\nfor individual souls, with the course of time; and finally there occurs\na conversion which brings them back from the lower to the higher\nnatures.\n\n\nTHE UNIVERSAL SOUL, HOWEVER, IS NOT DISTURBED BY THE URGENCIES BELOW\nHER.\n\nThe universal Soul, however, does not need to busy herself with\ntroublesome functions, and remains out of the reach of evils. She\nconsiders what is below her in a purely contemplative manner, while at\nthe same time remaining related to what is above her. She is therefore\nenabled simultaneously on one side to receive, and on the other to\ngive, since her nature compels her to relate herself closely with the\nobjects of sense.[184]\n\n\nTHE SOUL DOES NOT ENTIRELY ENTER INTO THE BODY.\n\n8. Though I should set myself in opposition to popular views, I shall\nset down clearly what seems to me the true state of affairs. Not the\nwhole soul enters into the body. By her higher part, she ever remains\nunited to the intelligible world; as, by her lower part, she remains\nunited to the sense-world. If this lower part dominates, or rather, if\nit be dominated (by sensation) and troubled, it hinders us from being\nconscious of what the higher part of the soul contemplates. Indeed\nthat which is thought impinges on our consciousness only in case it\ndescends to us, and is felt. In general, we are conscious of what goes\non in every part of the soul only when it is felt by the entire soul.\nFor instance, appetite, which is the actualization of lustful desire,\nis by us cognized only when we perceive it by the interior sense or by\ndiscursive reason, or by both simultaneously. Every soul has a \u00b7 lower\npart turned towards the body, and a higher part turned towards divine\nIntelligence. The universal Soul manages the universe by her lower part\nwithout any kind of trouble, because she governs her body not as we do\nby any reasoning, but by intelligence, and consequently in a manner\nentirely different from that adopted by art. The individual souls,\neach of whom administers a part of the universe,[185] also have a part\nthat rises above their body; but they are distracted from thought\nby sensation, and by a perception of a number of things which are\ncontrary to nature, and which come to trouble them, and afflict them.\nIndeed, the body that they take care of constitutes but a part of the\nuniverse, is incomplete, and is surrounded by exterior objects. That\nis why it has so many needs, why it desires luxuriousness, and why it\nis deceived thereby. On the contrary, the higher part of the soul is\ninsensible to the attraction of these transitory pleasures, and leads\nan undisturbed life.\n\n\n\n\nFIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.\n\nHow What is After the First Proceeds Therefrom; of the One.\n\n\nNECESSITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST.\n\n1. Everything that exists after the First is derived therefrom, either\ndirectly or mediately, and constitutes a series of different orders\nsuch that the second can be traced back to the First, the third to the\nsecond, and so forth. Above all beings there must be Something simple\nand different from all the rest which would exist in itself, and which,\nwithout ever mingling with anything else, might nevertheless preside\nover everything, which might really be the One, and not that deceptive\nunity which is only the attribute of essence, and which would be a\nprinciple superior even to being, unreachable by speech, reason, or\nscience. For if it be not completely simple, foreign to all complexity\nand composition, and be not really one, it could not be a principle. It\nis sovereignly absolute only because it is simple and first. For what\nis not first, is in need of superior things; what is not simple has\nneed of being constituted by simple things. The Principle of everything\nmust therefore be one and only. If it were admitted that there was a\nsecond principle of that kind, both would constitute but a single one.\nFor we do not say that they are bodies, nor that the One and First is a\nbody; for every body is composite and begotten, and consequently is not\na principle; for a principle cannot be begotten.[186] Therefore, since\nthe principle of everything cannot be corporeal, because it must be\nessentially one, it must be the First.\n\n\nTHE FIRST NECESSARILY BEGETS A SECOND, WHICH MUST BE PERFECT.\n\nIf something after the One exist, it is no more the simple One, but\nthe multiple One. Whence is this derived? Evidently from the First,\nfor it could not be supposed that it came from chance; that would\nbe to admit that the First is not the principle of everything. How\nthen is the multiple One derived from the First? If the First be not\nonly perfect, but the most perfect, if it be the first Power, it must\nsurely, in respect to power, be superior to all the rest, and the other\npowers must merely imitate it to the limit of their ability. Now we\nsee that all that arrives to perfection cannot unfruitfully remain in\nitself, but begets and produces. Not only do beings capable of choice,\nbut even those lacking reflection or soul have a tendency to impart\nto other beings, what is in them; as, for instance, fire emits heat,\nsnow emits cold; and plant-juices (dye and soak) into whatever they\nhappen to touch. All things in nature imitate the First principle by\nseeking to achieve immortality by procreation, and by manifestation\nof their qualities. How then would He who is sovereignly perfect, who\nis the supreme Good, remain absorbed in Himself, as if a sentiment of\njealousy hindered Him from communicating Himself, or as if He were\npowerless, though He is the power of everything? How then would He\nremain principle of everything? He must therefore beget something, just\nas what He begets must in turn beget. There must therefore be something\nbeneath the First. Now this thing (which is immediately beneath the\nFirst), must be very venerable, first because it begets everything\nelse, then because it is begotten by the First, and because it must,\nas being the Second, rank and surpass everything else.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE CANNOT BE THE FIRST, AND RANKS ALL ELSE.\n\n2. If the generating principle were intelligence, what it begot would\nhave to be inferior to intelligence, and nevertheless approximate\nit, and resemble it more than anything else. Now as the generating\nprinciple is superior to intelligence, the first begotten thing is\nnecessarily intelligence. Why, however, is the generating principle not\nintelligence? Because the act of intelligence is thought, and thought\nconsists in seeing the intelligible; for it is only by its conversion\ntowards it that intelligence achieves a complete and perfect existence.\nIn itself, intelligence is only an indeterminate power to see; only by\ncontemplation of the intelligible does it achieve the state of being\ndetermined. This is the reason of the saying, \"The ideas and numbers,\nthat is, intelligence, are born from the indefinite doubleness, and the\nOne.\" Consequently, instead of being simple, intelligence is multiple.\nIt is composed of several elements; these are doubtless intelligible,\nbut what intelligence sees is none the less multiple. In any case,\nintelligence is simultaneously the object thought, and the thinking\nsubject; it is therefore already double.\n\n\nTHE FIRST AND SECOND AS HIGHER AND LOWER INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES.\n\nBut besides this intelligible (entity, namely, intelligence), there is\nanother (higher) intelligible (the supreme Intelligible, the First).\nIn what way does the intelligence, thus determined, proceed from the\n(First) Intelligible? The Intelligible abides in itself, and has need\nof nothing else, while there is a need of something else in that which\nsees and thinks (that is, that which thinks has need of contemplating\nthe supreme Intelligible). But even while remaining within Himself, the\nIntelligible (One) is not devoid of sentiment; all things belong to\nHim, are in Him, and with Him. Consequently, He has the conception of\nHimself, a conception which implies consciousness, and which consists\nin eternal repose, and in a thought, but in a thought different from\nthat of intelligence. If He begets something while remaining within\nHimself, He begets it precisely when He is at the highest point of\nindividuality. It is therefore by remaining in His own state that\nHe begets what He begets; He procreates by individualizing. Now as\nHe remains intelligible, what He begets cannot be anything else\nthan thought; therefore thought, by existing, and by thinking the\nPrinciple whence it is derived (for it could not think any other\nobject), becomes simultaneously intelligence and intelligible; but this\nsecond intelligible differs from the first Intelligible from which it\nproceeds, and of which it is but the image and the reflection.\n\n\nTHE SECOND IS THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE POTENTIALITY OF THE FIRST.\n\nBut how is an actualization begotten from that self-limited\n(intelligible)? We shall have to draw a distinction between an\nactualization of being, and an actualization out of the being of each\nthing (actualized being, and actualization emanating from being).\nActualized being cannot differ from being, for it is being itself. But\nthe actualization emanating from being--and everything necessarily has\nan actualization of this kind--differs from what produces it. It is as\nif with fire: there is a difference between the heat which constitutes\nits being, and the heat which radiates exteriorly, while the fire\ninteriorly realizes the actualization which constitutes its being,\nand which makes it preserve its nature. Here also, and far more so,\nthe First remains in His proper state, and yet simultaneously, by His\ninherent perfection, by the actualization which resides in Him, has\nbeen begotten the actualization which, deriving its existence from so\ngreat a power, nay, from supreme Power, has arrived at, or achieved\nessence and being. As to the First, He was above being; for He was the\npotentiality of all things, already being all things.\n\n\nHOW THE FIRST IS ABOVE ALL BEING.\n\nIf this (actualization begotten by the First, this external\nactualization) be all things, then that (One) is above all things,\nand consequently above being. If then (this external actualization)\nbe all things, and be before all things, it does not occupy the same\nrank as the remainder (of all other things); and must, in this respect\nalso, be superior to being, and consequently also to intelligence; for\nthere is Something superior to intelligence. Essence is not, as you\nmight say, dead; it is not devoid of life or thought; for intelligence\nand essence are identical. Intelligible entities do not exist before\nthe intelligence that thinks them, as sense-objects exist before the\nsensation which perceives them. Intelligence itself is the things that\nit thinks, since their forms are not introduced to them from without.\nFrom where indeed would intelligence receive these forms? Intelligence\nexists with the intelligible things; intelligence is identical with\nthem, is one with them. Reciprocally, intelligible entities do not\nexist without their matter (that is, Intelligence).\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.\n\nWhether All Souls Form a Single One?\n\n\nIF ALL SOULS BE ONE IN THE WORLD-SOUL, WHY SHOULD THEY NOT TOGETHER\nFORM ONE?\n\n1. Just as the soul of each animal is one, because she is entirely\npresent in the whole body, and because she is thus really one, because\nshe does not have one part in one organ, and some other part in\nanother; and just as the sense-soul is equally one in all the beings\nwhich feel, and just as the vegetative soul is everywhere entirely\none in each part of the growing plants; why then should your soul and\nmine not form a single unity? Why should not all souls form but a\nsingle one? Why should not the universal (Soul) which is present in\nall beings, be one because she is not divided in the manner of a body,\nbeing everywhere the same? Why indeed should the soul in myself form\nbut one, and the universal (Soul) likewise not be one, similarly, since\nno more than my own is this universal (Soul) either material extension,\nor a body? If both my soul and yours proceed from the universal (Soul),\nand if the latter be one, then should my soul and yours together form\nbut a single one. Or again, on the supposition that the universal\n(Soul) and mine proceed from a single soul, even on this hypothesis\nwould all souls form but a single one. We shall have to examine in what\n(this Soul which is but) one consists.\n\n\nSOULS MAY NOT FORM A NUMERIC UNITY, BUT MAY FORM A GENERIC UNITY.\n\nLet us first consider if it may be affirmed that all souls form but one\nin the sense in which it is said that the soul of each individual is\none. It seems absurd to pretend that my soul and yours form but one in\nthis (numerical) sense; for then you would be feeling simultaneously\nwith my feeling, and you would be virtuous when I was, and you would\nhave the same desires as I, and not only would we both have the same\nsentiments, but even the identical sentiments of the universal (Soul),\nso that every sensation felt by me would have been felt by the entire\nuniverse. If in this manner all the souls form but one, why is one soul\nreasonable, and the other unreasonable, why is the one in an animal,\nand the other in a plant? On the other hand, if we do not admit that\nthere is a single Soul, we will not be able to explain the unity of the\nuniverse, nor find a single principle for (human) souls.\n\n\nTHE UNITY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SEVERAL SOULS NEED NOT IMPLY THEIR BEING\nIDENTICAL.\n\n2. In the first place, if the souls of myself and of another man form\nbut one soul, this does not necessarily imply their being identical\nwith their principle. Granting the existence of different beings, the\nsame principle need not experience in each the same affections. Thus,\nhumanity may equally reside in me, who am in motion, as in you, who may\nbe at rest, although in me it moves, and it rests in you. Nevertheless,\nit is neither absurd nor paradoxical to insist that the same principle\nis both in you and in me; and this does not necessarily make us feel\nthe identical affections. Consider a single body: it is not the left\nhand which feels what the right one does, but the soul which is present\nin the whole body. To make you feel the same as I do, our two bodies\nwould have to constitute but a single one; then, being thus united, our\nsouls would perceive the same affections. Consider also that the All\nremains deaf to a multitude of impressions experienced by the parts\nof a single and same organism, and that so much the more as the body\nis larger. This is the state of affairs, for instance, with the large\nwhales which do not feel the impression received in some one part of\ntheir body, because of the smallness of the movement.\n\n\nSYMPATHY DOES NOT FORCE IDENTITY OF SENSATION.\n\nIt is therefore by no means necessary that when one member of the\nuniverse experiences an affection, the latter be clearly felt by the\nAll. The existence of sympathy is natural enough, and it could not\nbe denied; but this does not imply identity of sensation. Nor is it\nabsurd that our souls, while forming a single one should be virtuous\nand vicious, just as it would be possible that the same essence be at\nmotion in me, but at rest in you. Indeed, the unity that we attribute\nto the universal (Soul) does not exclude all multiplicity, such a\nunity as befits intelligence. We may however say that (the soul) is\nsimultaneously unity and plurality, because she participates not only\nin divisible essence in the bodies, but also in the indivisible,\nwhich consequently is one. Now, just as the impression perceived by\none of my parts is not necessarily felt all over my body, while that\nwhich happens to the principal organ is felt by all the other parts,\nlikewise, the impressions that the universe communicates to the\nindividual are clearer, because usually the parts perceive the same\naffections as the All, while it is not evident that the particular\naffections that we feel would be also experienced by the Whole.\n\n\nUNITY OF ALL BEINGS IMPLIED BY SYMPATHY, LOVE, AND MAGIC ENCHANTMENT.\n\n3. On the other hand, observation teaches us that we sympathize with\neach other, that we cannot see the suffering of another man without\nsharing it, that we are naturally inclined to confide in each other,\nand to love; for love is a fact whose origin is connected with the\nquestion that occupies us. Further, if enchantments and magic charms\nmutually attract individuals, leading distant persons to sympathize,\nthese effects can only be explained by the unity of soul. (It is well\nknown that) words pronounced in a low tone of voice (telepathically?)\naffect a distant person, and make him hear what is going on at a great\ndistance. Hence appears the unity of all beings, which demands the\nunity of the Soul.\n\n\nWHAT OF THE DIFFERENCES OF RATIONALITY, IF THE SOUL BE ONE?\n\nIf, however, the Soul be one, why is some one soul reasonable, another\nirrational, or some other one merely vegetative? The indivisible part\nof the soul consists in reason, which is not divided in the bodies,\nwhile the part of the divisible soul in the bodies (which, though being\none in herself, nevertheless divides herself in the bodies, because\nshe sheds sentiment everywhere), must be regarded as another power of\nthe soul (the sensitive power); likewise, the part which fashions and\nproduces the bodies is still another power (the vegetative power);\nnevertheless, this plurality of powers does not destroy the unity of\nthe soul. For instance, in a grain of seed there are also several\npowers; nevertheless this grain of seed is one, and from this unity is\nborn a multiplicity which forms a unity.\n\n\nTHE POWERS OF THE SOUL ARE NOT EXERCISED EVERYWHERE BECAUSE THEY DIFFER.\n\nBut why do not all the powers of the soul act everywhere? Now if we\nconsider the Soul which is one everywhere, we find that sensation is\nnot similar in all its parts (that is, in all the individual souls);\nthat reason is not in all (but in certain souls exclusively); and that\nthe vegetative power is granted to those beings who do not possess\nsensation, and that all these powers return to unity when they separate\nfrom the body.\n\n\nTHE BODY'S POWER OF GROWTH IS DERIVED FROM THE WHOLE, AND THE SOUL; BUT\nNOT FROM OUR SOUL.\n\nIf, however, the body derive its vegetative power from the Whole and\nfrom this (universal) Soul which is one, why should it not derive it\nalso from our soul? Because that which is nourished by this power forms\na part of the universe, which possesses sensation only at the price of\n\"suffering.\" As to the sense-power which rises as far as the judgment,\nand which is united to every intelligence, there was no need for it to\nform what had already been formed by the Whole, but it could have given\nits forms if these forms were not parts of the Whole which produces\nthem.\n\n\nTHE UNITY OF THE SOULS IS A CONDITION OF THEIR MULTIPLICITY.\n\n4. Such justifications will preclude surprise at our deriving all\nsouls from unity. But completeness of treatment demands explanation\nhow all souls are but a single one. Is this due to their proceeding\nfrom a single Soul, or because they all form a single one? If all\nproceed from a single one, did this one divide herself, or did she\nremain whole, while begetting the multitude of souls? In this case, how\ncould an essence beget a multitude like her, while herself remaining\nundiminished? We shall invoke the help of the divinity (in solving this\nproblem); and say that the existence of the one single Soul is the\ncondition of the existence of the multitude of souls, and that this\nmultitude must proceed from the Soul that is one.\n\n\nTHE SOUL CAN BEGET MANY BECAUSE SHE IS AN INCORPOREAL ESSENCE.\n\nIf the Soul were a body, then would the division of this body\nnecessarily produce the multitude of souls, and this essence would be\ndifferent in its different parts. Nevertheless, as this essence would\nbe homogeneous, the souls (between which it would divide itself) would\nbe similar to each other, because they would possess a single identical\nform in its totality, but they would differ by their body. If the\nessence of these souls consisted in the bodies which would serve them\nas subjects, they would be different from each other. If the essence\nof these souls consisted in their form, they would, in form, be but\none single form; in other terms, there would be but one same single\nsoul in a multitude of bodies. Besides, above this soul which would be\none, but which would be spread abroad in the multitude of bodies, there\nwould be another Soul which would not be spread abroad in the multitude\nof bodies; it would be from her that would proceed the soul which\nwould be the unity in plurality, the multiple image of the single Soul\nin a single body, like a single seal, by impressing the same figure\nto a multitude of pieces of wax, would be distributing this figure\nin a multitude of impressions. In this case (if the essence of the\nsoul consisted in her form) the soul would be something incorporeal,\nand as she would consist in an affection of the body, there would be\nnothing astonishing in that a single quality, emanating from a single\nprinciple, might be in a multitude of subjects simultaneously. Last,\nif the essence of the soul consisted in being both things (being\nsimultaneously a part of a homogeneous body and an affection of the\nbody), there would be nothing surprising (if there were a unity of\nessence in a multitude of subjects). We have thus shown that the soul\nis incorporeal, and an essence; we must now consider the results of\nthis view.\n\n\nHOW AN ESSENCE CAN BE ONE IN A MULTITUDE OF SOULS IS ILLUSTRATED BY\nSEED.\n\n5. How can an essence be single in a multitude of souls? Either this\none essence is entire in all souls, or this one and entire essence\nbegets all souls while remaining (undiminished) in itself. In either\ncase, the essence is single. It is the unity to which the individual\nsouls are related; the essence gives itself to this multitude, and yet\nsimultaneously the essence does not give itself; it can give of itself\nto all individual souls, and nevertheless remain single; it is powerful\nenough to pass into all simultaneously, and to be separated from none;\nthus its essence remains identical, while being present in a multitude\nof souls. This is nothing astonishing; all of science is entirely in\neach of its parts, and it begets them without itself ceasing to remain\nentire within itself. Likewise, a grain of seed is entire in each of\nits parts in which it naturally divides itself; each of its parts has\nthe same properties as the whole seed; nevertheless the seed remains\nentire, without diminution; and if the matter (in which the seed\nresides) offer it any cause of division, all the parts will not any the\nless form a single unity.\n\n\nTHIS MIRACLE IS EXPLAINED BY THE USE OF THE CONCEPTION OF POTENTIALITY.\n\nIt may be objected that in science a part is not the total science.\nDoubtless, the notion which is actualized, and which is studied to\nthe exclusion of others, because there is special need of it, is\nonly partially an actualization. Nevertheless, in a latent manner it\npotentially comprises all the other notions it implies. Thus, all the\nnotions are contained in each part of the science, and in this respect\neach part is the total science; for what is only partially actualized\n(potentially) comprises all the notions of science. Each notion that\none wishes to render explicit is at one's disposition; and this in\nevery part of the science that is considered; but if it be compared\nwith the whole science, it seems to be there only potentially. It\nmust not, however, be thought that the particular notion does not\ncontain anything of the other notions; in this case, there would\nbe nothing systematic or scientific about it; it would be nothing\nmore than a sterile conception. Being a really scientific notion, it\npotentially contains all the notions of the science; and the genuine\nscientist knows how to discover all its notions in a single one, and\nhow to develop its consequences. The geometrical expert shows in his\ndemonstrations how each theorem contains all the preceding ones, to\nwhich he harks back by analysis, and how each theorem leads to all the\nfollowing ones, by deduction.\n\n\nDIFFICULT AS THESE EXPLANATIONS ARE, THEY ARE CLEAR INTELLIGIBLY.\n\nThese truths excite our incredulity, because here below our reason\nis weak, and it is confused by the body. In the intelligible world,\nhowever, all the verities are clear, and each is evident, by itself.\n\n\n\n\nSIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.\n\nOf the Good and the One.\n\n\nUNITY NECESSARY TO EXISTENCE OF ALL BEINGS.\n\n1. All beings, both primary, as well as those who are so called on any\npretext soever, are beings only because of their unity. What, indeed\nwould they be without it? Deprived of their unity, they would cease to\nbe what they are said to be. No army can exist unless it be one. So\nwith a choric ballet or a flock. Neither a house nor a ship can exist\nwithout unity; by losing it they would cease to be what they are.[187]\nSo also with continuous quantities which would not exist without unity.\nOn being divided by losing their unity, they simultaneously lose their\nnature. Consider farther the bodies of plants and animals, of which\neach is a unity. On losing their unity by being broken up into several\nparts, they simultaneously lose their nature. They are no more what\nthey were, they have become new beings, which themselves exist only so\nlong as they are one. What effects health in us, is that the parts of\nour bodies are co-ordinated in unity. Beauty is formed by the unity of\nour members. Virtue is our soul's tendency to unity, and becoming one\nthrough the harmony of her faculties.\n\n\nTHE SOUL MAY IMPART UNITY, BUT IS NOT UNITY.\n\nThe soul imparts unity to all things when producing them, fashioning\nthem, and forming them. Should we, therefore, after rising to the\nSoul, say that she not only imparts unity, but herself is unity in\nitself? Certainly not. The soul that imparts form and figure to\nbodies is not identical with form, and figure. Therefore the soul\nimparts unity without being unity. She unifies each of her productions\nonly by contemplation of the One, just as she produces man only\nby contemplating Man-in-himself, although adding to that idea the\nimplied unity. Each of the things that are called \"one\" have a unity\nproportionate to their nature (\"being\"); so that they participate in\nunity more or less according as they share essence[188] (being). Thus\nthe soul is something different from unity; nevertheless, as she exists\nin a degree higher (than the body), she participates more in unity,\nwithout being unity itself; indeed she is one, but the unity in her\nis no more than contingent. There is a difference between the soul\nand unity, just as between the body and unity. A discrete quantity\nsuch as a company of dancers, or choric ballet, is very far from being\nunity; a continuous quantity approximates that further; the soul gets\nstill nearer to it, and participates therein still more. Thus from the\nfact that the soul could not exist without being one, the identity\nbetween the soul and unity is suggested. But this may be answered\nin two ways. First, other things also possess individual existence\nbecause they possess unity, and nevertheless are not unity itself; as,\nthough the body is not identical with unity, it also participates in\nunity. Further, the soul is manifold as well as one, though she be not\ncomposed of parts. She possesses several faculties, discursive reason,\ndesire, and perception--all of them faculties joined together by unity\nas a bond. Doubtless the soul imparts unity to something else (the\nbody), because she herself possesses unity; but this unity is by her\nreceived from some other principle (namely, from unity itself).\n\n\nBEING AND ESSENCE IDENTICAL WITH UNITY.\n\n2. (Aristotle[189]) suggests that in each of the individual beings\nwhich are one, being is identical with unity. Are not being and essence\nidentical with unity, in every being and in every essence, in a manner\nsuch that on discovering essence, unity also is discovered? Is not\nbeing in itself unity in itself, so that if being be intelligence,\nunity also must be intelligence, as intelligence which, being essence\nin the highest degree, is also unity in the first degree, and which,\nimparting essence to other things, also imparts unity to them? What\nindeed could unity be, apart from essence and being? As \"man,\" and \"a\nman\" are equivalent,[190] essence must be identical with unity; or,\nunity is the number of everything considered individually; and as one\nobject joined to another is spoken of as two, so an object alone is\nreferred to as one.\n\n\nUNITY IS NOT A NUMBERING DEVICE, BUT IS IDENTICAL WITH EXISTENCE.\n\nIf number belongs to the class of beings, evidently the latter must\ninclude unity also; and we shall have to discover what kind of a being\nit is. If unity be no more than a numbering device invented by the\nsoul, then unity would possess no real existence. But we have above\nobserved that each object, on losing unity, loses existence also. We\nare therefore compelled to investigate whether essence and unity be\nidentical either when considered in themselves, or in each individual\nobject.\n\n\nEVEN UNIVERSAL ESSENCE CONTAINS MANIFOLDNESS.\n\nIf the essence of each thing be manifoldness, and as unity cannot be\nmanifoldness, unity must differ from essence. Now man, being both\nanimal and rational, contains a manifoldness of elements of which\nunity is the bond. There is therefore a difference between man and\nunity; man is divisible, while unity is indivisible. Besides, universal\nEssence, containing all essences, is still more manifold. Therefore\nit differs from unity; though it does possess unity by participation.\nEssence possesses life and intelligence, for it cannot be considered\nlifeless; it must therefore be manifold. Besides, if essence be\nintelligence, it must in this respect also be manifold, and must be\nmuch more so if it contain forms; for the idea[191] is not genuinely\none. Both as individual and general it is rather a number; it is one\nonly as the world is one.\n\n\nBESIDES, ABSOLUTE UNITY IS THE FIRST, WHICH INTELLIGENCE IS NOT.\n\nBesides, Unity in itself is the first of all; but intelligence, forms\nand essence are not primary. Every form is manifold and composite, and\nconsequently must be something posterior; for parts are prior to the\ncomposite they constitute. Nor is intelligence primary, as appears from\nthe following considerations. For intelligence existence is necessarily\nthought and the best intelligence which does not contemplate exterior\nobjects, must think what is above it; for, on turning towards itself,\nit turns towards its principle. On the one hand, if intelligence be\nboth thinker and thought, it implies duality, and is not simple or\nunitary. On the other hand, if intelligence contemplate some object\nother than itself, this might be nothing more than some object better\nthan itself, placed above it. Even if intelligence contemplate itself\nsimultaneously with what is better than it, even so intelligence is\nonly of secondary rank. We may indeed admit that the intelligence which\nhas such a nature enjoys the presence of the Good, of the First, and\nthat intelligence contemplates the First; but nevertheless at the same\ntime intelligence is present to itself, and thinks itself as being all\nthings. Containing such a diversity, intelligence is far from unity.\n\n\nUNITY AS ABOVE ALL THINGS, INTELLIGENCE AND ESSENCE.\n\nThus Unity is not all things, for if so, it would no longer be unity.\nNor is it Intelligence, for since intelligence is all things, unity\ntoo would be all things. Nor is it essence, since essence also is all\nthings.\n\n\nUNITY IS DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN BECAUSE THE SOUL IS FEARFUL OF SUCH\nABSTRUSE RESEARCHES.\n\n3. What then is unity? What is its nature? It is not surprising that\nit is so difficult to say so, when it is difficult to explain of what\neven essence or form consist. But, nevertheless, forms are the basis\nof our knowledge. Everything that the soul advances towards what is\nformless, not being able to understand it because it is indeterminate,\nand so to speak has not received the impression of a distinctive type,\nthe soul withdraws therefrom, fearing she will meet nonentity. That is\nwhy, in the presence of such things she grows troubled, and descends\nwith pleasure. Then, withdrawing therefrom, she, so to speak, lets\nherself fall till she meets some sense-object, on which she pauses, and\nrecovers; just as the eye which, fatigued by the contemplation of small\nobjects, gladly turns back to large ones. When the soul wishes to see\nby herself, then seeing only because she is the object that she sees,\nand, further, being one because she forms but one with this object, she\nimagines that what she sought has escaped, because she herself is not\ndistinct from the object that she thinks.\n\n\nTHE PATH OF SIMPLIFICATION TO UNITY.\n\nNevertheless a philosophical study of unity will follow the following\ncourse. Since it is Unity that we seek, since it is the principle\nof all things, the Good, the First that we consider, those who will\nwish to reach it must not withdraw from that which is of primary rank\nto decline to what occupies the last, but they must withdraw their\nsouls from sense-objects, which occupy the last degree in the scale\nof existence, to those entities that occupy the first rank. Such a\nman will have to free himself from all evil, since he aspires to\nrise to the Good. He will rise to the principle that he possesses\nwithin himself. From the manifold that he was he will again become\none. Only under these conditions will he contemplate the supreme\nprinciple, Unity. Thus having become intelligence, having trusted his\nsoul to intelligence, educating and establishing her therein, so that\nwith vigilant attention she may grasp all that intelligence sees,\nhe will, by intelligence, contemplate unity, without the use of any\nsenses, without mingling any of their perceptions with the flashes\nof intelligence. He will contemplate the purest Principle, through\nthe highest degree of the purest Intelligence. So when a man applies\nhimself to the contemplation of such a principle and represents it to\nhimself as a magnitude, or a figure, or even a form, it is not his\nintelligence that guides him in this contemplation for intelligence\nis not destined to see such things; it is sensation, or opinion, the\nassociate of sensation, which is active in him. Intelligence is only\ncapable of informing us about things within its sphere.\n\n\nUNITY AS THE UNIFORM IN ITSELF AND FORMLESS SUPERFORM.\n\nIntelligence can see both the things that are above it, those which\nbelong to it, and the things that proceed from it. The things that\nbelong to intelligence are pure; but they are still less pure and less\nsimple than the things that are above Intelligence, or rather than what\nis above it; this is not Intelligence, and is superior to Intelligence.\nIntelligence indeed is essence, while the principle above it is not\nessence, but is superior to all beings. Nor is it essence, for essence\nhas a special form, that of essence, and the One is shapeless even\nintelligible. As Unity is the nature that begets all things, Unity\ncannot be any of them. It is therefore neither any particular thing,\nnor quantity, nor quality, nor intelligence, nor soul, nor what is\nmovable, nor what is stable; it is neither in place nor time; but it\nis the uniform in itself, or rather it is formless, as it is above all\nform, above movement and stability. These are my views about essence\nand what makes it manifold.[192]\n\n\nWHY IT IS NOT STABLE, THOUGH IT DOES NOT MOVE.\n\nBut if it does not move, why does it not possess stability? Because\neither of these things, or both together, are suitable to nothing but\nessence. Besides, that which possesses stability is stable through\nstability, and is not identical with stability itself; consequently it\npossesses stability only by accident, and would no longer remain simple.\n\n\nBEING A PRIMARY CAUSE, UNITY IS NOTHING CONTINGENT.\n\nNor let anybody object that something contingent is attributed to Unity\nwhen we call it the primary cause. It is to ourselves that we are then\nattributing contingency, since it is we who are receiving something\nfrom Unity, while Unity remains within itself.\n\n\nUNITY CANNOT BE DEFINED; WE CAN ONLY REFER TO IT BY OUR FEELINGS OF IT.\n\nSpeaking strictly, we should say that the One is this or that (that is,\nwe should not apply any name to it). We can do no more than turn around\nit, so to speak, trying to express what we feel (in regard to it); for\nat times we approach Unity, and at times withdraw from it as a result\nof our uncertainty about it.\n\n\nWE CANNOT COMPREHEND UNITY, WHICH WE APPROACH ONLY BY A PRESENCE.\n\n4. The principal cause of our uncertainty is that our comprehension of\nthe One comes to us neither by scientific knowledge, nor by thought, as\nthe knowledge of other intelligible things, but by a presence which is\nsuperior to science. When the soul acquires the scientific knowledge\nof something, she withdraws from unity and ceases being entirely one;\nfor science implies discursive reason and discursive reason implies\nmanifoldness. (To attain Unity) we must therefore rise above science,\nand never withdraw from what is essentially One; we must therefore\nrenounce science, the objects of science, and every other right (except\nthat of the One); even to that of beauty; for beauty is posterior to\nunity, and is derived therefrom, as the day-light comes from the sun.\nThat is why Plato[193] says of (Unity) that it is unspeakable and\nundescribable. Nevertheless we speak of it, we write about it, but only\nto excite our souls by our discussions, and to direct them towards this\ndivine spectacle, just as one might point out the road to somebody who\ndesired to see some object. Instruction, indeed, goes as far as showing\nthe road, and guiding us in the way; but to obtain the vision (of the\ndivinity), is the work suitable to him who has desired to obtain it.\n\n\nTHOSE WHO SEE GOD WITHOUT EMOTION HAVE FAILED TO RID THEMSELVES OF\nPHYSICAL HINDRANCES, AND HAVE NOT BECOME UNIFIED.\n\nIf your soul does not succeed in enjoying this spectacle, if she does\nnot have the intuition of the divine light, if she remains cold and\ndoes not, within herself, feel a rapture such as that of a lover who\nsees the beloved object, and who rests within it, a rapture felt by him\nwho has seen the true light, and whose soul has been overwhelmed with\nbrilliance on approaching this light, then you have tried to rise to\nthe divinity without having freed yourself from the hindrances which\narrest your progress, and hinder your contemplation. You did not rise\nalone, and you retained within yourself something that separated you\nfrom Him; or rather, you were not yet unified. Though He be absent\nfrom all beings, He is absent from none, so that He is present (to\nall) without being present (to them). He is present only for those\nwho are able to receive Him, and who are prepared for Him, and who\nare capable of harmonizing themselves with Him, to reach Him, and as\nit were to touch Him by virtue of the conformity they have with Him,\nand also by virtue of an innate power analogous to that which flows\nfrom Him, when at last their souls find themselves in the state where\nthey were after having communicated with Him; then they can see Him\nso far as his nature is visible. I repeat: if you have not yet risen\nso far, the conclusion must be that you are still at a distance from\nHim, either by the obstacles of which we spoke above, or by the lack\nof such instruction as would have taught you the road to follow, and\nwhich would have imbued you with faith in things divine. In any case,\nyou have no fault to find with any but yourself; for, to be alone, all\nyou need to do is to detach yourself from everything. Lack of faith in\narguments about it may be remedied by the following considerations.\n\n\nHOW SUCH AS RISE AS FAR AS THE SOUL MAY ACHIEVE FAITH IN THE\nINTELLIGIBLE.\n\n5. Such as imagine that beings are governed by luck or chance, and\nthat they depend on material causes are far removed from the divinity,\nand from the conception of unity. It is not such men that we are\naddressing, but such as admit the existence of a nature different from\nthe corporeal one, and who at least rise (to an acknowledgment of the\nexistence of) the Soul. These should apply themselves to the study of\nthe nature of the soul, learning, among other truths, that she proceeds\nfrom Intelligence, and that she can achieve virtue by participating in\nIntelligence through reason. They must then acknowledge the existence\nof an Intelligence superior to the intelligence that reasons, namely,\nto discursive reason. They must (also realize) that reasonings imply\nan interval (between notions), and a movement (by which the soul\nbridges this interval). They must be brought to see that scientific\nknowledge consists also of reasons of the same nature (namely, rational\nnotions), reasons suitable to the soul, but which have become clear,\nbecause the soul has received the succession of intelligence which is\nthe source of scientific knowledge. By intelligence (which belongs to\nher), the soul sees the divine Intellect, which to it seems sensual,\nin this sense that it is perceptible by intelligence, which dominates\nthe soul, and is her father;[194] that is, the intelligible world, a\ncalm intellect which vibrates without issuing from its tranquility,\nwhich contains everything, and which is all. It is both definite and\nindefinite manifoldness, for the ideas it contains are not distinct\nlike the reasons (the rational notions), which are conceived one by\none. Nevertheless, they do not become confused. Each of them becomes\ndistinct from the others, just as in a science all the notions,\nthough forming an indivisible whole, yet each has its own separate\nindividual existence.[195] This multitude of ideas taken together\nconstitutes the intelligible world. This is the (entity) nearest\nto the First. Its existence is inevitably demonstrated by reason,\nas much as the necessity of the existence of the Soul herself; but\nthough the intelligible world is something superior to the Soul, it is\nnevertheless not yet the First, because it is neither one, nor simple,\nwhile the one, the principle of all beings, is perfectly simple.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME IS ONE ONLY IN A FIGURATIVE SENSE.\n\nThe principle that is superior to what is highest among beings, to\nIntelligence (or intellect, or intelligible world) (may well be sought\nafter). There must indeed be some principle above Intelligence; for\nintelligence does indeed aspire to become one, but it is not one,\npossessing only the form of unity. Considered in itself, Intelligence\nis not divided, but is genuinely present to itself. It does not\ndismember itself because it is next to the One, though it dared to\nwithdraw therefrom. What is above Intelligence is Unity itself, an\nincomprehensible miracle, of which it cannot even be said that it\nis essence, lest we make of it the attribute of something else, and\nto whom no name is really suitable. If however He must be named, we\nmay indeed call Him in general Unity, but only on the preliminary\nunderstanding that He was not first something else, and then only\nlater became unity. That is why the One is so difficult to understand\nin Himself; He is rather known by His offspring; that is, by Being,\nbecause Intelligence leads up to Being. The nature of the One, indeed,\nis the source of excellent things, the power which begets beings, while\nremaining within Himself, without undergoing any diminution, without\npassing into the beings to which He gives birth.[196] If we call this\nprinciple Unity, it is only for the mutual convenience of rising to\nsome indivisible conception, and in unifying our soul. But when we say\nthat this principle is one and indivisible, it is not in the same sense\nthat we say it of the (geometric) point, and of the (arithmetical unity\ncalled the) monad. What is one in the sense of the unity of the point\nor the monad, is a principle of quantity, and would not exist unless\npreceded by being and the principle which precedes even that being. It\nis not of this kind of unity that we must think; still we believe that\nthe point and the monad have analogy with the One by their simplicity\nas well as by the absence of all manifoldness and of all division.\n\n\nTHE ONE MAY BE CONCEIVED OF AS INDIVISIBLE AND INFINITE.\n\n6. In what sense do we use the name of unity, and how can we conceive\nof it? We shall have to insist that the One is a unity much more\nperfect than the point of the monad; for in these, abstracting\n(geometric) magnitude, and numerical plurality, we do indeed stop\nat that which is most minute, and we come to rest in something\nindivisible; but this existed already in a divisible being, in a\nsubject other than itself, while the One is neither in a subject other\nthan itself, nor in anything divisible. If it be indivisible, neither\nis it of the same kind as that which is most minute. On the contrary,\nit is that which is greatest, not by (geometric) magnitude, but by\npower; possessing no (geometric) magnitude, it is indivisible in its\npower; for the beings beneath it are indivisible in their powers, and\nnot in their mass (since they are incorporeal). We must also insist\nthat the One is infinite, not as would be a mass of a magnitude which\ncould be examined serially, but by the incommensurability of its power.\nEven though you should conceive of it as of intelligence or divinity,\nit is still higher. When by thought you consider it as the most perfect\nunity, it is still higher. You try to form for yourself an idea of a\ndivinity by rising to what in your intelligence is most unitary (and\nyet He is still simpler); for He dwells within Himself, and contains\nnothing that is contingent.\n\n\nTHE ONE IS SELF-SUFFICIENT AND NEEDS NOTHING FOR ESTABLISHMENT.\n\nHis sovereign unity may best be understood by His being\nself-sufficient; for the most perfect principle is necessarily that\nwhich best suffices Himself, and which least needs anything else. Now\nanything that is not one, but manifold, needs something else. Not\nbeing one, but being composed of multiple elements, its being demands\nunification; but as the One is already one, He does not even need\nHimself. So much the more, the being that is manifold needs as many\nthings as it contains; for each of the contained things exists only by\nits union with the others, and not in itself, and finds that it needs\nthe others. Therefore such a being needs others, both for the things\nit contains, as for their totality. If then there must be something\nthat fully suffices itself, it must surely be the One, which alone\nneeds nothing either relatively to Himself, or to the other things. It\nneeds nothing either to exist, or to be happy, or to be composed. To\nbegin with, as He is the cause of the other beings, He does not owe His\nexistence to them. Further, how could He derive His happiness from\noutside Himself? Within Him, happiness is not something contingent, but\nis His very nature. Again, as He does not occupy any space, He does not\nneed any foundation on which to be edified, as if He could not sustain\nHimself. All that needs compounding is inanimate; without support it is\nno more than a mass ready to fall. (Far from needing any support) the\nOne is the foundation of the edification of all other things; by giving\nthem existence, He has at the same time given them a location. However,\nthat which needs a location is not (necessarily) self-sufficient.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME, AS SUPERGOODNESS, COULD NOT ASPIRE TO ANYTHING ELSE.\n\nA principle has no need of anything beneath it. The Principle of all\nthings has no need of any of them. Every non-self-sufficient being is\nnot self-sufficient chiefly because it aspires to its principle. If the\nOne aspired to anything, His aspiration would evidently tend to destroy\nHis unity, that is, to annihilate Himself. Anything that aspires\nevidently aspires to happiness and preservation. Thus, since for the\nOne there is no good outside of Himself, there is nothing that He could\nwish. He is the super-good; He is the good, not for Himself, but for\nother beings, for those that can participate therein.\n\n\nTHE ONE IS NOT THINKER BUT THOUGHT ITSELF.\n\nWithin the One, therefore, is no thought, because there can be no\ndifference within Him; nor could He contain any motion, because the\nOne is prior to motion, as much as to thought. Besides, what would\nHe think? Would He think Himself? In this case, He would be ignorant\nbefore thinking, and thought would be necessary to Him, who fully\nsuffices to Himself. Neither should He be thought to contain ignorance,\nbecause He does not know Himself, and does not think Himself. Ignorance\npresupposes a relation, and consists in that one thing does not know\nanother. But the One, being alone, can neither know nor be ignorant\nof anything. Being with Himself, He has no need of self-knowledge.\nWe should not even predicate of Him presence with Himself, if we are\nto conceive of Him Unity in sheer purity. On the contrary, we should\nhave to leave aside intelligence, consciousness, and knowledge of\nself and of other beings. We should not conceive of Him as being that\nwhich thinks, but rather as of thought. Thought does not think; but\nis the cause which makes some other being think; now the cause cannot\nbe identical with that which is caused. So much the more reason is\nthere then to say that that which is the cause of all these existing\nthings cannot be any one of them. This Cause, therefore, must not be\nconsidered identical with the good He dispenses, but must be conceived\nas the Good in a higher sense, the Good which is above all other goods.\n\n\nTHE SOUL MUST BE STRIPPED OF FORM TO BE ILLUMINATED BY PRIMARY NATURE.\n\n7. Your mind remains in uncertainty because the divinity is none of\nthese things (that you know). Apply it first to these things, and\nlater fix it on the divinity. While doing so, do not let yourself\nbe distracted by anything exterior for the divinity is not in any\ndefinite place, depriving the remainder of its presence, but it is\npresent wherever there is any person who is capable of entering into\ncontact therewith. It is absent only for those who cannot succeed\ntherein. Just as, for other objects, one could not discover what one\nseeks by thinking of something else, and as one should not add any\nalien thing to the object that is thought if one wishes to identify\noneself therewith; likewise here one must be thoroughly convinced that\nit is impossible for any one whose soul contains any alien image to\nconceive of the divinity so long as such an image distracts the soul's\nattention. It is equally impossible that the soul, at the moment that\nshe is attentive, and attached to other things, should assume the form\nof what is contrary to them. Just as it is said of matter that it must\nbe absolutely deprived of all qualities to be susceptible of receiving\nall forms; likewise, and for a stronger reason, the soul must be\nstripped of all form, if she desire to be filled with and illuminated\nby the primary nature without any interior hindrance. Thus, having\nliberated herself from all exterior things, the soul will entirely\nturn to what is most intimate in her; she will not allow herself to be\nturned away by any of the surrounding objects and she will put aside\nall things, first by the very effect of the state in which she will\nfind herself, and later by the absence of any conception of form. She\nwill not even know that she is applying herself to the contemplation of\nthe One, or that she is united thereto. Then, after having sufficiently\ndwelt with it, she will, if she can, come to reveal to others this\nheavenly communion. Doubtless it was enjoyment of this communion\nthat was the basis of the traditional conversation of Minos with\nJupiter.[197] Inspired with the memories of this interview, he made\nlaws which represented it, because, while he was drawing them up, he\nwas still under the influence of his union with the divinity. Perhaps\neven, in this state, the soul may look down on civil virtues as hardly\nworthy of her,[198] inasmuch as she desires to dwell on high; and this\ndoes indeed happen to such as have long contemplated the divinity.\n\n\nON SELF-KNOWLEDGE DEPENDS RECOGNITION OF DIVINE KINSHIP.\n\n(In short), the divinity is not outside of any being. On the contrary,\nHe is present to all beings, though these may be ignorant thereof.\nThis happens because they are fugitives, wandering outside of Him or\nrather, outside of themselves. They cannot reach Him from whom they\nare fleeing, nor, having lost themselves, can they find another being.\nA son, if angry, and beside himself, is not likely to recognize his\nfather. But he who will have learnt to know himself will at the same\ntime discover from where he hails.[199]\n\n\nTO BE ATTACHED TO THE CENTRE CONSTITUTES DIVINITY.\n\n8. Self-knowledge reveals the fact that the soul's natural movement is\nnot in a straight line, unless indeed it have undergone some deviation.\nOn the contrary, it circles around something interior, around a centre.\nNow the centre is that from which proceeds the circle, that is, the\nsoul.[200] The soul will therefore move around the centre, that is,\naround the principle from which she proceeds; and, trending towards it,\nshe will attach herself to it, as indeed all souls should do. The souls\nof the divinities ever direct themselves towards it; and that is the\nsecret of their divinity; for divinity consists in being attached to\nthe Centre (of all souls). Anyone who withdraws much therefrom is a man\nwho has remained manifold (that is, who has never become unified), or\nwho is a brute.[201]\n\n\nTHE CELEBRATED SIMILE OF THE MAN WHOSE FEET ARE IN A BATH-TUB.\n\nIs the centre of the soul then the principle that we are seeking?\nOr must we conceive some other principle towards which all centres\nradiate? To begin with, it is only by analogy that the words \"centre\"\nand \"circle\" are used. By saying that the soul is a circle, we do not\nmean that she is a geometrical figure, but that in her and around her\nsubsists primordial nature.[202] (By saying that she has a centre, we\nmean that) the soul is suspended from the primary Principle (by the\nhighest part of her being), especially when she is entirely separated\n(from the body). Now, however, as we have a part of our being contained\nin the the body, we resemble a man whose feet are plunged in water,\nwith the rest of his body remaining above it. Raising ourselves above\nthe body by the whole part which is not immerged, we are by our own\ncentre reattaching ourselves to the Centre common to all beings, just\nin the same way as we make the centres of the great circles coincide\nwith that of the sphere that surrounds them. If the circles of the\nsoul were corporeal, the common centre would have to occupy a certain\nplace for them to coincide with it, and for them to turn around it. But\nsince the souls are of the order of intelligible (essences), and as\nthe One is still above Intelligence, we shall have to assert that the\nintercourse of the soul with the One operates by means different from\nthose by which Intelligence unites with the intelligible. This union,\nindeed, is much closer than that which is realized between Intelligence\nand the intelligible by resemblance or identity; it takes place by the\nintimate relationship that unites the soul with unity, without anything\nto separate them. Bodies cannot unite mutually;[203] but they could\nnot hinder the mutual union of incorporeal (essences) because that\nwhich separates them from each other is not a local distance, but their\ndistinction and difference. When there is no difference between them,\nthey are present in each other.\n\n\nTHE FAMOUS ILLUSTRATION OF THE COSMIC CHORAL BALLET.\n\nAs the One does not contain any difference, He is always present; and\nwe are ever present to Him as soon as we contain no more difference.\nIt is not He who is aspiring to us, or who is moving around us; on\nthe contrary, it is we who are aspiring to Him. Though we always move\naround Him, we do not always keep our glance fixed on Him. We resemble\na chorus which always surrounds its leader, but (the members of) which\ndo not always sing in time because they allow their attention to be\ndistracted to some exterior object; while, if they turned towards the\nleader, they would sing well, and really be with him. Likewise, we\nalways turn around the One, even when we detach ourselves from Him, and\ncease knowing Him. Our glance is not always fixed on the One; but when\nwe contemplate Him, we attain the purpose of our desires, and enjoy the\nrest taught by Heraclitus.[204] Then we disagree no more, and really\nform a divine choric ballet around Him.\n\n\nFOLLOWING NUMENIUS, PLOTINOS DESCRIBES THE SUPREME AS GIVER.\n\n9. In this choric ballet, the soul sees the source of life, the source\nof intelligence, the principle of being, the cause of the good, and\nthe root of love. All these entities are derived from the One without\ndiminishing Him. He is indeed no corporeal mass; otherwise the things\nthat are born of Him would be perishable. However, they are eternal,\nbecause their principle ever remains the same, because[205] He does\nnot divide Himself to produce them, but remains entire. They persist,\njust as the light persists so long as the sun remains.[206] Nor are we\nseparated from the One; we are not distant from Him, though corporeal\nnature, by approaching us, has attracted us to it (thus drawing us\naway from the One).[207] But it is in the One that we breathe and have\nour being.[208] He gave us life not merely at a given moment, only to\nleave us later; but His giving is perpetual, so long as He remains what\nHe is, or rather, so long as we turn towards Him. There it is that\nwe find happiness, while to withdraw from Him is to fall. It is in\nHim that our soul rests; it is by rising to that place free from all\nevil that she is delivered from evils; there she really thinks, there\nshe is impassible, there she really lives. Our present life, in which\nwe are not united with the divinity, is only a trace or adumbration\nof real life. Real life (which is presence with the divinity) is the\nactualization of intelligence. It is this actualization of intelligence\nwhich begets the divinities by a sort of silent intercourse with the\nOne; thereby begetting beauty, justice and virtue. These are begotten\nby the soul that is filled with divinity. In Him is her principle\nand goal; her principle, because it is from there that she proceeds;\nher goal, because there is the good to which she aspires, so that by\nreturning thither she again becomes what she was. Life here below, in\nthe midst of sense-objects, is for the soul a degradation, an exile, a\nloss of her wings.[209]\n\n\nTHE PARABLE OF CUPID AND PSYCHE, LEADING UP TO DIVINIZATION.\n\nAnother proof that our welfare resides up there is the love that is\ninnate in our souls, as is taught in the descriptions and myths which\nrepresent love as the husband of the soul.[210] In fact, since the\nsoul, which is different from the divinity, proceeds from Him, she\nmust necessarily love Him; but when she is on high[211] her love is\ncelestial; here below, her love is only commonplace; for it is on high\nthat dwells the celestial Venus (Urania); while here below resides\nthe vulgar and adulterous Venus.[212] Now every soul is a Venus, as\nis indicated by the myth of the birth of Venus and Cupid, who is\nsupposed to be born simultaneously with her.[213] So long as she\nremains faithful to her nature, the soul therefore loves the divinity,\nand desires to unite herself to Him, who seems like the noble father\nof a bride who has fallen in love with some handsome lover. When\nhowever the soul has descended into generation, deceived by the false\npromises of an adulterous lover, she has exchanged her divine love for\na mortal one. Then, at a distance from her father, she yields to all\nkinds of excesses. Ultimately, however, she grows ashamed of these\ndisorders; she purifies herself, she returns to her father, and finds\ntrue happiness with Him. How great her bliss then is can be conceived\nby such as have not tasted it only by comparing it somewhat to earthly\nlove-unions, observing the joy felt by the lover who succeeds in\nobtaining her whom he loves. But such mortal and deceptive love is\ndirected only to phantoms; it soon disappears because the real object\nof our love is not these sense-presentations, which are not the good\nwe are really seeking. On high only is the real object of our love;\nthe only one with which we could unite or identify ourselves, which we\ncould intimately possess, because it is not separated from our soul\nby the covering of our flesh. This that I say will be acknowledged by\nany one who has experienced it; he will know that the soul then lives\nanother life, that she advances towards the Divinity, that she reaches\nHim, possesses Him, and in his condition recognizes the presence of\nthe Dispenser of the true life. Then she needs nothing more. On the\ncontrary, she has to renounce everything else to fix herself in the\nDivinity alone, to identify herself with Him, and to cut off all that\nsurrounds Him. We must therefore hasten to issue from here below,\ndetaching ourselves so far as possible from the body to which we still\nhave the regret of being chained, making the effort to embrace the\nDivinity by our whole being, without leaving in us any part that is not\nin contact with Him. Then the soul can see the Divinity and herself, so\nfar as is possible to her nature. She sees herself shining brilliantly,\nfilled with intelligible light; or rather, she sees herself as a pure\nlight, that is subtle and weightless. She becomes divinity, or, rather,\nshe is divinity. In this condition, the soul is a shining light. If\nlater she falls back into the sense-world, she is plunged into darkness.\n\n\nWHY DOES THE SOUL AFTER REACHING YONDER NOT STAY THERE?\n\n10. Why does the soul which has risen on high not stay there? Because\nshe has not yet entirely detached herself from things here below. But\na time will come when she will uninterruptedly enjoy the vision of the\ndivinity, that is, when she will no longer be troubled by the passions\nof the body. The part of the soul that sees the divinity is not the\none that is troubled (the irrational soul), but the other part (the\nrational soul). Now she loses the sight of the divinity when she does\nnot lose this knowledge which consists in demonstratings, conjectures\nand reasonings. In the vision of the divinity, indeed, that which sees\nis not the reason, but something prior and superior to reason; if that\nwhich sees be still united to reason, it then is as that which is seen.\nWhen he who sees himself sees, he will see himself as simple, being\nunited to himself as simple, and will feel himself as simple. We should\nnot even say that he will see, but only that he will be what he sees,\nin case that it would still here be possible to distinguish that which\nsees from that which is seen, or to assert that these two things do\nnot form a single one. This assertion, however, would be rash, for in\nthis condition he who sees does not, in the strict sense of the word,\nsee; nor does he imagine two things. He becomes other, he ceases to be\nhimself, he retains nothing of himself. Absorbed in the divinity, he is\none with it, like a centre that coincides with another centre. While\nthey coincide, they form but one, though they form two in so far as\nthey remain distinct. In this sense only do we here say that the soul\nis other than the divinity. Consequently this manner of vision is very\ndifficult to describe. How indeed could we depict as different from\nus Him who, while we were contemplating Him, did not seem other than\nourselves, having come into perfect at-one-ment with us?\n\n\nILLUSTRATION FROM THE SECRECY OF THE MYSTERY-RITES.\n\n11. That, no doubt, is the meaning of the mystery-rites' injunction not\nto reveal their secrets to the uninitiated. As that which is divine is\nunspeakable, it is ordered that the initiate should not talk thereof to\nany (uninitiated person) who have not had the happiness of beholding it\n(the vision).\n\n\nTHE TRANCE OR ENTHEASM OF ECSTASY.\n\nAs (this vision of the divinity) did not imply (the existence of) two\nthings, and as he who was identical to Him whom he saw, so that he\ndid not see Him, but was united thereto, if anyone could preserve the\nmemory of what he was while thus absorbed into the Divinity, he would\nwithin himself have a faithful image of the Divinity. Then indeed had\nhe attained at-one-ment, containing no difference, neither in regard\nto himself, nor to other beings. While he was thus transported into\nthe celestial region, there was within him no activity, no anger, nor\nappetite, nor reason, nor even thought. So much the more, if we dare\nsay so, was he no longer himself, but sunk in trance or enthusiasm,\ntranquil and solitary with the divinity, he enjoyed an the calm.\nContained within his own \"being,\" (or, essence), he did not incline to\neither side, he did not even turn towards himself, he was indeed in a\nstate of perfect stability, having thus, so to speak, become stability\nitself.\n\n\nABOVE BEAUTY AND ABOVE VIRTUE THIS ECSTATIC SIMPLIFICATION IS A\nCOMMUNION.\n\nIn this condition, indeed, the soul busies herself not even with\nthe beautiful things, for she rises above beauty, and passes beyond\neven the (Stoic) \"choir of virtues.\" Thus he who penetrates into\nthe interior of a sanctuary leaves behind him the statues placed\n(at the entrance) of the temple. These indeed are the first objects\nthat will strike his view on his exit from the sanctuary, after he\nshall have enjoyed the interior spectacle, after having entered into\nintimate communion, not indeed with an image or statue, which would\nbe considered only when he comes out, but with the divinity. The very\nword \"divine spectacle\" does not, here, seem sufficient (to express the\ncontemplation of the soul); it is rather an ecstasy, a simplification,\na self-abandonment, a desire for intercourse, a perfect quietude, and\nlast, a wish to become indistinguishable from what was contemplated in\nthe sanctuary.[214] Any one who would seek to see the Divinity in any\nother way would be incapable of enjoying His presence.\n\n\nTHE SPIRITUAL TRUTH OF THE ANCIENT MYSTERIES.\n\nBy making use of these mysterious figures, wise interpreters wished\nto indicate how the divinity might be seen. But the wise hierophant,\npenetrating the mystery, may, when he has arrived thither, enjoy\nthe veritable vision of what is in the sanctuary. If he have not\nyet arrived thither, he can at least conceive the invisibility (for\nphysical sight) of That which is in the sanctuary; he can conceive the\nsource and principle of everything, and he recognizes it as the one\nparticular principle worthy of the name. (But when he has succeeded\nin entering into the sanctuary) he sees the Principle, enters into\ncommunication with it, unites like to like, leaving aside no divine\nthing the soul is capable of acquiring.\n\n\nSUBSEQUENT ECSTATIC EXPERIENCES OF THE SOUL.\n\nBefore obtaining the vision of the divinity, the soul desires what\nyet remains to be seen. For him, however, who has risen above all\nthings, what remains to be seen is He who is above all other things.\nIndeed, the nature of the soul will never reach absolute nonentity.\nConsequently, when she descends, she will fall into evil, that is,\nnonentity, but not into absolute nonentity. Following the contrary\npath, she will arrive at something different, namely, herself. From\nthe fact that she then is not in anything different from herself,\nit does not result that she is within anything, for she remains in\nherself. That which, without being in essence, remains within itself,\nnecessarily resides in the divinity. Then it ceases to be \"being,\"\nand so far as it comes into communion with the Divinity it grows\nsuperior to \"being\" (it becomes supra-being). Now he who sees himself\nas having become divinity, possesses within himself an image of the\ndivinity. If he rise above himself, he will achieve the limit of his\nascension, becoming as it were an image that becomes indistinguishable\nfrom its model. Then, when he shall have lost sight of the divinity,\nhe may still, by arousing the virtue preserved within himself, and\nby considering the perfections that adorn his soul, reascend to the\ncelestial region, by virtue rising to Intelligence, and by wisdom to\nthe Divinity Himself.\n\n\nTHE SOUL'S ULTIMATE FATE IS DETACHMENT AND FLIGHT.\n\nSuch is the life of the divinities; such is also that of divine and\nblessed men; detachment from all things here below, scorn of all\nearthly pleasures, and flight of the soul towards the Divinity that she\nshall see face to face (that is, \"alone with the alone,\" as thought\nNumenius).[215]\n\n\n\n\nFIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK ONE.\n\nThe Three Principal Hypostases, or Forms of Existence.\n\n\nAUDACITY THE CAUSE OF HUMAN APOSTASY FROM THE DIVINITY.\n\n1. How does it happen that souls forget their paternal divinity? Having\na divine nature, and having originated from the divinity, how could\nthey ever misconceive the divinity or themselves? The origin of their\nevil is \"audacity,\"[216] generation, the primary diversity, and the\ndesire to belong to none but themselves.[217] As soon as they have\nenjoyed the pleasure of an independent life, and by largely making use\nof their power of self-direction, they advanced on the road that led\nthem astray from their principle, and now they have arrived at such an\n\"apostasy\" (distance) from the Divinity, that they are even ignorant\nthat they derive their life from Him. Like children that were separated\nfrom their family since birth, and that were long educated away from\nhome finally lose knowledge of their parents and of themselves, so our\nsouls, no longer seeing either the divinity or themselves, have become\ndegraded by forgetfulness of their origin, have attached themselves\nto other objects, have admired anything rather than themselves, have\nlike prodigals scattered their esteem and love on exterior objects,\nand have, by breaking the bond that united them to the divinities,\ndisdainfully wandered away from it. Their ignorance of the divinity\nis therefore caused by excessive valuation of external objects, and\ntheir scorn of themselves. The mere admiration and quest after\nwhat is foreign implies, on the soul's part, an acknowledgment of\nself-depreciation. As soon as a soul thinks that she is worth less than\nthat which is born and which perishes, and considers herself as more\ndespicable and perishable than the object she admires, she could no\nlonger even conceive of the nature and power of the divinity.\n\n\nCONVERSION IS EFFECTED BY DEPRECIATION OF EXTERNALITIES, AND\nAPPRECIATION OF THE SOUL HERSELF.\n\nSouls in such conditions may be converted to the Divinity, and raised\nto the supreme Principle, to the One, to the First, by being reasoned\nwith in two ways. First, they may be led to see the worthlessness of\nthe objects they at present esteem;[218] then they must be reminded of\nthe origin and dignity of the soul. The demonstration of the latter\npoint logically precedes that of the former; and if clearly done,\nshould support it.\n\n\nKINSHIP OF THE HUMAN SOUL WITH THE DIVINE.\n\nIt is the second point, therefore, that we shall here discuss. It is\nrelated to the study of the object we desire to know; for it is the\nsoul that desires to know that object. Now the soul must first examine\nher own nature in order to know whether she possess the faculty of\ncontemplating the divinity, if this study be suited to her, and if she\nmay hope for success therein. For indeed if the soul be foreign to\ndivine things, the soul has no business to ferret out their nature. If\nhowever a close kinship obtains between them, she both can and should\nseek to know them.\n\n\nSOULS ARE DIVINE BECAUSE THE WORLD WAS CREATED BY THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.\n\n2. This is the first reflection of every soul.[219] By an influx of\nthe spirit of life, the universal Soul produced all the animals upon\nearth, in the air and in the sea, as well as the divine stars, the\nsun, and the immense heaven. It was the universal Soul that gave form\nto the heavens, and which presides over their regular revolutions;\nand she effects all that without mingling with the being to whom\nshe communicates form, movement and life. The universal Soul is far\nsuperior to all created things. While the latter are born or die in\nthe measure that she imparts to them, or withdraws from them their\nlife, she herself is \"being\" and eternal life, because she could not\ncease being herself. To understand how life can simultaneously be\nimparted to the universe and to each individual, we must contemplate\nthe universal Soul. To rise to this contemplation, the soul must be\nworthy of it by nobility, must have liberated herself from error, and\nmust have withdrawn from the objects that fascinate the glances of\nworldly souls, must have immersed herself in a profound meditation,\nand she must have succeeded in effecting the silence not only of the\nagitations of the body that enfolds her, and the tumult of sensations,\nbut also of all that surrounds her. Therefore let silence be kept\nby all--namely, earth, air, sea, and even heaven. Then let the soul\nrepresent to herself the great Soul which, from all sides, overflows\ninto this immovable mass, spreading within it, penetrating into it\nintimately, illuminating it as the rays of the sun light and gild a\ndark cloud. Thus the universal Soul, by descending into this world\nredeemed this great body from the inertia in which it lay, imparting to\nit movement, life and immortality. Eternally moved by an intelligent\npower, heaven became a being full of life and felicity. The presence\nof the Soul made an admirable whole from what before was no more than\nin inert corpse, water and earth, or rather, darkness of matter, which,\nas Homer[220] says, was an \"object of horror for the divinities.\"\n\n\nSOUL-POWER REVEALED IN THE SIMULTANEITY OF CONTROL OVER THE WORLD.\n\nThe nature and power of the Soul reveal themselves still more\ngloriously in the way she embraces and governs the world at will. She\nis present in every point of this immense body, she animates all its\nparts, great and small. Though these may be located in different parts,\nshe does not divide as they do, she does not split up to vivify each\nindividual. She vivifies all things simultaneously, ever remaining\nwhole and indivisible, resembling the intelligence from which she was\nbegotten by her unity and universality.[221] It is her power which\ncontains this world of infinite magnitude and variety within the bonds\nof unity. Only because of the presence of the Soul are heaven, sun, and\nstars divinities; only because of her are we anything; for \"a corpse is\nviler than the vilest dung-hill.\"[222]\n\n\nAS LIFE TRANSFIGURES MATTER, SO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL GLORIFIES US.\n\nBut if the deities owe their divinity to the universal Soul, she\nherself must be a divinity still more venerable. Now our soul is\nsimilar to the universal Soul. Strip her of all coverings, consider her\nin her pristine purity, and you will see how precious is the nature of\nthe soul, how superior she is to everything that is body.[223] Without\nthe soul, no body is anything but earth. Even if you add to earth fire,\nwater and air, still there is nothing that need claim your veneration.\nIf it be the Soul that imparts beauty to the body, why should we\nforget the souls within ourselves, while prostituting our admiration on\nother objects? If it be the soul that you admire in them, why do you\nnot admire her within yourselves?\n\n\nTHE SOUL AS THE HYPOSTATIC ACTUALIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE.\n\n3. Since the nature of the Soul is so divine and precious, you may\nbe assured of being able to reach the divinity through her; with her\nyou can ascend to Him. You will not need to search for Him far from\nyourself; nor will there be several intermediaries between yourself and\nHim. To reach Him, take as guide the divinest and highest part of the\nSoul, the power from which she proceeds, and by which she impinges on\nthe intelligible world. Indeed, in spite of the divinity which we have\nattributed to her, the Soul is no more than an image of Intelligence.\nAs the exterior word (speech) is the image of the (interior) word (of\nthought?) of the soul, the Soul herself is the word and actualization\nof Intelligence.[224] She is the life which escapes from Intelligence\nto form another hypostatic form of existence, just as the fire contains\nthe latent heat which constitutes its essence (\"being\"), and also\nthe heat that radiates from it outside. Nevertheless, the Soul does\nnot entirely issue from within Intelligence; she does partly reside\ntherein, but also forms (a nature) distinct therefrom. As the Soul\nproceeds from Intelligence, she is intelligible; and the manifestation\nof her intellectual power is discursive reason. From Intelligence\nthe Soul derives her perfection, as well as her existence; only in\ncomparison with Intelligence does the Soul seem imperfect. The Soul,\ntherefore, is the hypostatic substance that proceeds from Intelligence,\nand when the Soul contemplates Intelligence the soul is reason\nactualized. Indeed, while the soul contemplates Intelligence, the Soul\nintimately possesses the things she thinks; from her own resources she\ndraws the actualizations she produces; these intellectual and pure\nactualizations are indeed the Soul's only characteristic activities.\nThose of an inferior nature really proceed from a foreign principle;\nthey are passions.\n\n\nTHE SOUL'S RELATION TO INTELLIGENCE IS THAT OF MATTER TO FORM.\n\nIntelligence therefore, makes the Soul diviner, because Intelligence\n(as a father) begets the Soul, and grants its (helpful) presence to\nthe Soul. Nothing intervenes between them but the distinction between\ntheir natures. The Soul is to Intelligence in the same relation as\nthat obtaining between form and matter.[225] Now the very matter of\nIntelligence is beautiful, because it has an intellectual form, and is\nsimple. How great then, must Intelligence be, if it be still greater\nthan the Soul.\n\n\nTHE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD IS THE ARCHETYPE OF OURS.\n\n4. The dignity of Intelligence may be appreciated in still another way.\nAfter having admired the magnitude and beauty of the sense-world, the\neternal regularity of its movement, the visible or hidden divinities,\nthe animals and plants it contains, we may (taking our direction from\nall this), rise to this world's archetype, a more real World. There\nwe may contemplate all the intelligible entities which are as eternal\nas the intelligible world, and which there subsist within perfect\nknowledge and life. There preside pure intelligence and ineffable\nwisdom; there is located the real Saturnian realm,[226] which is\nnothing else than pure intelligence. This indeed embraces every\nimmortal essence, every intelligence, every divinity, every soul;\neverything there is eternal and immutable. Since its condition is\nblissful, why should Intelligence change? Since it contains everything,\nwhy should it aspire to anything? Since it is sovereignly perfect,\nwhat need of development would it have? Its perfection is so much\ncompleter, since it contains nothing but perfect things, and since\nit thinks them; it thinks them, not because it seeks to know them,\nbut because it possesses them.[227] Its felicity is not in any way\ncontingent on anything else; itself is true eternity, of which time\nfurnishes a moving image of the sphere of the soul. Indeed, the soul's\naction is successive, and divided by the different objects that attract\nits attention. Now it thinks Socrates, and then it thinks a horse;\nnever does it grasp but one part of reality, while intelligence always\nembraces all things simultaneously. Intelligence, therefore, possesses\nall things immovable in identity. It is; it never has anything but the\npresent;[228] it has no future, for it already is all it could ever\nlater become; it has no past, for no intelligible entity ever passes\naway; all of them subsist in an eternal present, all remain identical,\nsatisfied with their present condition. Each one is both intelligence\nand existence; all together, they are universal Intelligence, universal\nExistence.\n\n\nABOVE INTELLIGENCE AND EXISTENCE IS THEIR SIMULTANEOUS PRINCIPLE.\n\nIntelligence exists (as intelligence) because it thinks existence.\nExistence exists (as existence) because, on being thought, it makes\nintelligence exist and thinks.[229] There must therefore exist\nsomething else which makes intelligence think, and existence exist,\nand which consequently is their common principle. In existence they\nare contemporaneous and substantial, and can never fail each other.\nAs intelligence and existence constitute a duality, their common\nprinciple in this consubstantial unity that they form, and which is\nsimultaneously existence and intelligence, the thinking subject and\nthe object thought; intelligence as thinking subject, and existence\nas object thought; for thought simultaneously implies difference and\nidentity.\n\n\nTHE SIX CATEGORIES FROM WHICH ALL THINGS ARE DERIVED.\n\nThe first principles, therefore, are existence and intelligence,\nidentity and difference, movement and rest.[230] Rest is the condition\nof identity; movement is the condition of thought, since the latter\npresupposes the differences of the thinking subject and of the object\nthought, and because it is silent if reduced to unity. The elements\nof thought (subject and object) must thus stand in the relation\nof differences, but also in that of unity, because they form a\nconsubstantial unity, and because there is a common element in all that\nis derived therefrom. Besides, here difference is nothing else than\ndistinction. The plurality formed by elements of thought constitutes\nquantity and number;[231] and the characteristic of every element,\nquality.[232] From these first principles (the categories, that are the\ngenera of being) all things are derived.\n\n\nTHE SOUL AS NUMBER CONNECTED WITH INTELLIGENCE.\n\n5. Thus the human soul is full of this divinity (of Intelligence);\nshe is connected therewith by these (categories), unless the soul\n(purposely) withdraws from (that intelligence). The Soul approaches\nIntelligence, and thus having been unified, the Soul wonders, 'Who\nhas begotten this unity?' It must be He who is simple, who is prior\nto all multiplicity, who imparts to Intelligence its existence and\nmanifoldness, and who consequently produces number. Number, indeed,\nis not something primitive; for the One is prior to the \"pair.\" The\nlatter ranks only second, being begotten and defined by unity, by\nitself being indefinite. As soon as it is defined, it is a number in\nso far as it is a \"being\"; for these are the grounds on which the Soul\nalso is a number.[233]\n\n\nTHOUGHT IS ACTUALIZATION OF SIGHT, AND BOTH FORM BUT ONE THING.\n\nBesides everything that is a mass or a magnitude could not occupy\nthe first rank in nature; those gross objects which are by sensation\nconsidered beings must be ranked as inferior. In seeds, it is not the\nmoist element that should be valued, but the invisible principle,\nnumber, and the (seminal) reason. Number and \"pair\" are only names\nfor the reasons (ideas) and intelligence. The \"pair\" is indeterminate\nso far as it plays the part of substrate (in respect to unity). The\nnumber that is derived from the pair, and the one, constitute every\nkind of form, so that Intelligence has a shape which is determined by\nthe ideas[234] begotten within it. Its shape is derived in one respect\nfrom the one, and in another respect, from itself, just like actualized\nsight. Thought, indeed, is actualized sight, and both these entities\n(the faculty and the actualization) form but one.\n\n\nMYSTERY OR DERIVATION OF SECOND FROM FIRST.\n\n6. How does Intelligence see, and what does it see? How did the Second\nissue from the First, how was it born from the First, so as that the\nSecond might see the First? For the soul now understands that these\nprinciples must necessarily exist. She seeks to solve the problem often\nmooted by ancient philosophers. \"If the nature of the One be such as\nwe have outlined, how does everything derive its hypostatic substance\n(or, form of existence), manifoldness, duality, and number from the\nFirst? Why did the First not remain within Himself, why did He allow\nthe leakage of manifoldness seen in all beings, and which we are\nseeking to trace back to the First?\" We shall tell it. But we must, to\nbegin with, invoke the Divinity, not by the utterance of words, but by\nraising our souls to Him in prayer. Now the only way to pray is (for\na person), when alone, to advance towards the One, who is entirely\nalone. To contemplate Unity, we must retire to our inner sanctuary,\nand there remain tranquil above all things (in ecstasy); then we must\nobserve the statues which as it were are situated outside of (soul and\nintelligence), and in front of everything, the statue that shines in\nthe front rank (Unity), contemplating it in a manner suitable to its\nnature (in the mysteries).[235]\n\n\nGENERATION IS THE RADIATION OF AN IMAGE.\n\nAll that is moved must have a direction towards which it is moved; we\nmust therefore conclude that that which has no direction towards which\nit is moved must be at a stand-still, and that anything born of this\nprinciple must be born without causing this principle to cease being\nturned towards itself. We must, however, remove from our mind the idea\nof a generation operated within time, for we are here treating of\neternal things. When we apply to them the conception of generation,\nwe mean only a relation of causality and effect. What is begotten by\nthe One must be begotten by Him without any motion on the part of\nthe One; if He were moved, that which was begotten from Him would,\nbecause of this movement, be ranked third, instead of second.[236]\nTherefore, since the One is immovable, He produces the hypostatic\n(form of existence) which is ranked second, without volition, consent,\nor any kind of movement. What conception are we then to form of this\ngeneration of Intelligence by this immovable Cause? It is a radiation\nof light which escapes without disturbing its quietness, like the\nsplendor which emanates perpetually from the sun, without affecting\nits quietness, which surrounds it without leaving it. Thus all things,\nin so far as they remain within existence, necessarily draw from\ntheir own essence (\"being\") and produce externally a certain nature\nthat depends on their power, and that is the image of the archetype\nfrom which it is derived.[237] Thus does fire radiate heat; thus snow\nspreads cold. Perfumes also furnish a striking example of this process;\nso long as they last, they emit exhalations in which everything that\nsurrounds them participates. Everything that has arrived to its point\nof perfection begets something. That which is eternally perfect begets\neternally; and that which it begets is eternal though inferior to\nthe generating principle. What then should we think of Him who is\nsupremely perfect? Does He not beget? On the contrary, He begets that\nwhich, after Him, is the greatest. Now that which, after Him, is the\nmost perfect, is the second rank principle, Intelligence. Intelligence\ncontemplates Unity, and needs none but Him; but the Unity has no need\nof Intelligence. That which is begotten by the Principle superior\nto Intelligence can be nothing if not Intelligence; for it is the\nbest after the One, since it is superior to all other beings. The\nSoul, indeed, is the word and actualization of Intelligence, just as\nIntelligence is word and actualization of the One. But the Soul is an\nobscure word. Being an image of Intelligence, she must contemplate\nIntelligence, just as the latter, to subsist, must contemplate the\nOne. Intelligence contemplates the One, not because of any separation\ntherefrom, but only because it is after the One. There is no\nintermediary between the One and Intelligence, any more than between\nIntelligence and the Soul. Every begotten being desires to unite\nwith the principle that begets it, and loves it, especially when the\nbegetter and the begotten are alone. Now when the begetter is supremely\nperfect, the begotten must be so intimately united to Him as to be\nseparated from Him only in that it is distinct from Him.\n\n\nINTELLIGIBLE REST IS THE DETERMINATION AND FORM BY WHICH THEY SUBSIST.\n\n7. We call Intelligence the image of the One. Let us explain this.\nIt is His image because Intelligence is, in a certain respect,\nbegotten by Unity, because Intelligence possesses much of the nature\nof its father, and because Intelligence resembles Him as light\nresembles the sun. But the One is not Intelligence; how then can the\nhypostatic (form of existence) begotten by the One be Intelligence?\nBy its conversion towards the One, Intelligence sees Him; now it is\nthis vision[238] which constitutes Intelligence. Every faculty that\nperceives another being is sensation or intelligence; but sensation\nis similar to a straight line, while intelligence resembles a\ncircle.[239] Nevertheless, the circle is divisible, while Intelligence\nis indivisible; it is one, but, while being one, it also is the\npower of all things. Now thought considers all these things (of\nwhich Intelligence is the power), by separating itself, so to speak,\nfrom this power; otherwise, Intelligence would not exist. Indeed,\nIntelligence has a consciousness of the reach of its power, and this\nconsciousness constitutes its nature. Consequently, Intelligence\ndetermines its own nature by the means of the power it derived from\nthe One; and at the same time Intelligence sees that its nature\n(\"being\") is a part of the entities which belong to the One, and that\nproceed from Him. Intelligence sees that it owes all its force to the\nOne, and that it is due to Him that Intelligence has the privilege of\nbeing a \"being\" (or, essence). Intelligence sees that, as it itself\nis divisible, it derives from the One, which is indivisible, all the\nentities it possesses, life and thought; because the One is not any of\nthese things. Everything indeed is derived from the One, because it is\nnot contained in a determinate form; it simply is the One, while in the\norder of beings Intelligence is all things. Consequently the One is not\nany of the things that Intelligence contains; it is only the principle\nfrom which all of them are derived. That is why they are \"being,\" for\nthey are already determined, and each has a kind of shape. Existence\nshould be contemplated, not in indetermination, but on the contrary in\ndetermination and rest. Now, for Intelligible entities, rest consists\nin determination, and shape by which they subsist.\n\n\nMYTHS OF SATURN, JUPITER AND RHEA.\n\nThe Intelligence that deserves to be called the purest intelligence,\ntherefore, cannot have been born from any source, other than the first\nPrinciple. It must, from its birth, have begotten all beings, all the\nbeauty of ideas, all the intelligible deities; for it is full of the\nthings it has begotten; it devours them in the sense that it itself\nretains all of them, that it does not allow them to fall into matter,\nnor be born of Rhea.[240] That is the meaning of the mysteries and\nmyths; \"Saturn, the wisest of the divinities, was born before Jupiter,\nand devoured his children.\" Here Saturn represents intelligence, big\nwith its conceptions, and perfectly pure.[241] They add, \"Jupiter, as\nsoon as he was grown, in his turn begat.\" As soon as Intelligence is\nperfect, it begets the Soul, by the mere fact of its being perfect,\nand because so great a power cannot remain sterile. Here again the\nbegotten being had to be inferior to its principle, had to represent\nits image, had, by itself, to be indeterminate, and had later to be\ndetermined and formed by the principle that begat it. What Intelligence\nbegets is a reason, a hypostatic form of existence whose nature it\nis to reason. The latter moves around Intelligence; is the light that\nsurrounds it, the ray that springs from it. On the one hand it is bound\nto Intelligence, fills itself with it; enjoys it, participates in it,\nderiving its intellectual operations from it. On the other hand, it is\nin contact with inferior things, or rather, begets them. Being thus\nbegotten by the Soul, these things are necessarily less good than the\nSoul, as we shall further explain. The sphere of divine things ends\nwith the Soul.\n\n\nPLATO TEACHES THREE SPHERES OF EXISTENCE.[242]\n\n8. This is how Plato establishes three degrees in the hierarchy\nof being[243]: \"Everything is around the king of all.\" He is here\nspeaking of first rank entities. He adds, \"What is of the second order\nis around the second principle; and what is of the third order is\naround the third principle.\" Plato[244] further says that \"God is the\nfather of the cause.\" By cause, he means Intelligence; for, in the\nsystem of Plato, it is Intelligence which plays the part of demiurgic\ncreator. Plato adds that it is this power that forms the Soul in the\ncup.[245] As the cause is intelligence, Plato applies the name of\nfather to the absolute Good, the principle superior to Intelligence and\nsuperior to \"Being.\" In several passages he calls the Idea \"existence\nand intelligence.\" He therefore really teaches that Intelligence is\nbegotten from the Good, and the Soul from Intelligence. This teaching,\nindeed, is not new; it has been taught from the most ancient times, but\nwithout being brought out in technical terms. We claim to be no more\nthan the interpreters of the earlier philosophers, and to show by the\nvery testimony of Plato that they held the same views as we do.\n\n\nTHIS DOCTRINE TAUGHT BY PARMENIDES.\n\nThe first philosopher who taught this was Parmenides, who identified\nExistence and Intelligence, and who does not place existence among\nsense-objects, \"for, thought is the same thing as existence.\"[246]\nHe adds[247] that existence is immovable, although being thought.\nParmenides thus denies all corporeal movement in existence, so as that\nit might always remain the same. Further, Parmenides[248] compares\nexistence to a sphere, because it contains everything, drawing thought\nnot from without, but from within itself. When Parmenides, in his\nwritings, mentions the One, he means the cause, as if he recognized\nthat this unity (of the intelligible being) implied manifoldness.\nIn the dialogue of Plato he speaks with greater accuracy, and\ndistinguishes three principles: the First, the absolute One; the\nsecond, the manifold one; the third, the one and the manifold. He\ntherefore, as we do, reaches three natures.\n\n\nANAXAGORAS TEACHES THE SAME THING.\n\n9. Anaxagoras, who teaches a pure and unmingled Intelligence[249]\nalso insists that the first Principle is simple, and that the One is\nseparated from sense-objects. But, as he lived in times too ancient, he\nhas not treated this matter in sufficient detail.\n\n\nHERACLITUS ALSO TAUGHT THE SAME THING.\n\nHeraclitus also taught the eternal and intelligible One; for Heraclitus\nholds that bodies are ceaselessly \"becoming\" (that is, developing), and\nthat they are in a perpetual state of flux.[250]\n\n\nEMPEDOCLES TAUGHT THE SAME THING.\n\nIn the system of Empedocles, discord divides, and concord unites; now\nthis second principle is posited as incorporeal, and the elements play\nthe part of matter.[251]\n\n\nARISTOTLE TAUGHT THE SAME THING.\n\nAristotle, who lived at a later period, says that the First Principle\nis separated from (sense-objects), and that it is intelligible.[252]\nBut when Aristotle says that He thinks himself, Aristotle degrades Him\nfrom the first rank. Aristotle also asserts the existence of other\nintelligible entities in a number equal to the celestial spheres,\nso that each one of them might have a principle of motion. About\nthe intelligible entities, therefore, Aristotle advances a teaching\ndifferent from that of Plato, and as he has no plausible reason for\nthis change, he alleges necessity. A well-grounded objection might here\nbe taken against him. It seems more reasonable to suppose that all the\nspheres co-ordinated in a single system should, all of them, stand\nin relation to the One and the First. About Aristotle's views this\nquestion also might be raised: do the intelligible entities depend on\nthe One and First, or are there several principles for the intelligible\nentities? If the intelligible entities depend on the One, they will\nno doubt be arranged symmetrically, as, in the sense-sphere, are the\nspheres, each of which contains another, and of which a single One,\nexterior to the others, contains them, and dominates them all. Thus, in\nthis case, the first intelligible entity will contain all entities up\nthere, and will be the intelligible world. Just as the spheres are not\nempty, as the first is full of stars, and as each of the others also\nis full of them, so above their motors will contain many entities, and\neverything will have a more real existence. On the other hand, if each\nof the intelligible entities is a principle, all will be contingent.\nHow then will they unite their action, and will they, by agreement,\ncontribute in producing a single effect, which is the harmony of\nheaven? Why should sense-objects, in heaven, equal in number their\nintelligible motors? Again, why are there several of these, since they\nare incorporeal, and since no matter separates them from each other?\n\n\nWHAT THE PYTHAGOREANS TAUGHT ON THE SUBJECT.\n\nAmong ancient philosophers, those who most faithfully followed the\ndoctrine of Pythagoras, of his disciples, and of Pherecydes, have\nspecially dealt with the intelligible.[253] Some of them have committed\ntheir opinions to their written works; others have set them forth only\nin discussions that have not been preserved in writing. There are\nothers of them, also, who have left us nothing on the subject.\n\n\nTO THE THREE PRINCIPLES IN THE UNIVERSE MUST CORRESPOND THREE\nPRINCIPLES IN US.\n\n10. Above existence, therefore, is the One. This has by us been\nproved as far as could reasonably be expected, and as far as such\nsubjects admit of demonstration. In the second rank are Existence and\nIntelligence; in the third, the Soul. But if these three principles,\nthe One, Intelligence, and the Soul, as we have said, obtain in nature,\nthree principles must also obtain within us. I do not mean that\nthese three principles are in sense-objects, for they are separate\ntherefrom; they are outside of the sense-world, as the three divine\nprinciples are outside of the celestial sphere, and, according to\nPlato's expression,[254] they constitute the \"the interior man.\"\nOur soul, therefore, is something divine; it has a nature different\n(from sense-nature), which conforms to that of the universal Soul.\nNow the perfect Soul possesses intelligence; but we must distinguish\nbetween the intelligence that reasons (the discursive reason), and\nthe Intelligence that furnishes the principles of reasoning (pure\nintelligence). The discursive reason of the soul has no need, for\noperation, of any bodily organ;[255] in its operations, it preserves\nall its purity, so that it is capable of reasoning purely. When\nseparated from the body, it must, without any hesitation, be ranked\nwith highest intellectual entities. There is no need of locating it\nin space; for, if it exist within itself, outside of body, in an\nimmaterial condition, it is evidently not mingled with the body, and\nhas none of its nature. Consequently Plato[256] says, \"The divinity\nhas spread the Soul around the world.\" What he here means is that\na part of the Soul remains in the intelligible world. Speaking of\nour soul he also says, \"she hides her head in heaven.\"[257] He also\nadvises us to wean the soul from the body; and he does not refer to\nany local separation, which nature alone could establish. He means\nthat the soul must not incline towards the body, must not abandon\nherself to the phantoms of imagination, and must not, thus, become\nalienated from reason. He means that the soul should try to elevate\nto the intelligible world her lower part which is established in the\nsense-world, and which is occupied in fashioning the body.[258]\n\n\nTHERE MUST BE AN OBJECTIVE JUSTICE AND BEAUTY TO WHICH WE ARE\nINTIMATELY UNITED.\n\n11. Since the rational soul makes judgments about what is just or\nbeautiful, and decides whether some object is beautiful, whether such\nan action be just, there must exist an immutable justice and beauty\nfrom which discursive reason draws its principles.[259] Otherwise, how\ncould such reasonings take place? If the soul at times reasons about\njustice and beauty, but at times does not reason about them, we must\npossess within ourselves the intelligence which, instead of reasoning,\never possesses justice and beauty; further, we must within us possess\nthe cause and Principle of Intelligence, the Divinity, which is not\ndivisible, which subsists, not in any place, but in Himself; who is\ncontemplated by a multitude of beings, by each of the beings fitted\nto receive Him, but which remains distinct from these beings, just as\nthe centre subsists within itself, while all the radii come from the\ncircumference to centre themselves in it.[260] Thus we ourselves, by\none of the parts of ourselves, touch the divinity, unite ourselves with\nHim and are, so to speak, suspended from Him; and we are founded upon\nHim (we are \"edified\" by Him) when we turn towards Him.\n\n\nTHESE PRINCIPLES LAST EVER; EVEN THOUGH WE ARE DISTRACTED FROM THEM.\n\n12. How does it happen that we possess principles that are so elevated,\nalmost in spite of ourselves, and for the most part without busying\nourselves about them? For there are even men who never notice them.\nNevertheless these principles, that is, intelligence, and the principle\nsuperior to intelligence, which ever remains within itself (that is,\nthe One), these two principles are ever active. The case is similar\nwith the soul. She is always in motion; but the operations that go\non within her are not always perceived; they reach us only when they\nsucceed in making themselves felt. When the faculty that is active\nwithin us does not transmit its action to the power that feels, this\naction is not communicated to the entire soul; however, we may not be\nconscious thereof because, although we possess sensibility, it is not\nthis power, but the whole soul that constitutes the man.[261] So long\nas life lasts, each power of the soul exercises its proper function by\nitself; but we know it only when communication and perception occur. In\norder to perceive the things within us, we have to turn our perceptive\nfaculties towards them, so that (our soul) may apply her whole\nattention thereto.[262] The person that desires to hear one sound\nmust neglect all others, and listen carefully on its approach. Thus we\nmust here close our senses to all the noises that besiege us, unless\nnecessity force us to hear them, and to preserve our perceptive faculty\npure and ready to listen to the voices that come from above.\n\n\n\n\nFIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO.\n\nOf Generation, and of the Order of things that Rank Next After the\nFirst.\n\n\nWHY FROM UNITY THIS MANIFOLD WORLD WAS ABLE TO COME FORTH.\n\n1. The One is all things, and is none of these things. The Principle\nof all things cannot be all things.[263] It is all things only in the\nsense that all things coexist within it. But in it, they \"are\" not yet,\nbut only \"will be.\"[264] How then could the manifoldness of all beings\nissue from the One, which is simple and identical, which contains no\ndiversity or duality? It is just because nothing is contained within\nit, that everything can issue from it.[265] In order that essence\nmight exist, the One could not be (merely) essence, but had to be the\n'father' of essence, and essence had to be its first-begotten. As the\nOne is perfect, and acquires nothing, and has no need or desire, He\nhas, so to speak, superabounded, and this superabundance has produced a\ndifferent nature.[266] This different nature of the One turned towards\nHim, and by its conversion, arrived at the fulness (of essence). Then\nit had the potentiality of contemplating itself, and thus determined\nitself as Intelligence. Therefore, by resting near the One, it became\nEssence; and by contemplating itself, became Intelligence. Then by\nfixing itself within itself to contemplate itself, it simultaneously\nbecame Essence-and-Intelligence.\n\n\nBY SIMILAR EFFUSION OF SUPERABUNDANCE INTELLIGENCE CREATED THE SOUL.\n\nJust like the One, it was by effusion of its power that Intelligence\nbegat something similar to itself. Thus from Intelligence emanated an\nimage, just as Intelligence emanated from the One. The actualization\nthat proceeds from Essence (and Intelligence) is the universal\nSoul. She is born of Intelligence, and determines herself without\nIntelligence issuing from itself, just as Intelligence itself proceeded\nfrom the One without the One ceasing from His repose.\n\n\nSIMILARLY THE UNIVERSAL SOUL, BY PROCESSION, BEGETS NATURE.\n\nNor does the universal Soul remain at rest, but enters in motion to\nbeget an image of herself. On the one hand, it is by contemplation of\nthe principle from which she proceeds that she achieves fulness; on the\nother hand, it is by advancing on a path different from, and opposed\nto (the contemplation of Intelligence), that she begets an image of\nherself, sensation, and the nature of growth.[268] Nevertheless,\nnothing is detached or separated from the superior principle which\nbegets her. Thus the human soul seems to reach down to within that\nof (plant) growth.[269] She descends therein inasmuch as the plant\nderives growth from her. Nevertheless it is not the whole soul that\npasses into the plant. Her presence there is limited to her descent\ntowards the lower region, and in so far as she produces another\nhypostatic substance, by virtue of her procession, which occurs by her\ncondescension to care for the things below her. But the higher part of\nthe Soul, that which depends on Intelligence, allows the Intelligence\nto remain within itself....\n\nWhat[270] then does the soul which is in the plant do? Does she not\nbeget anything? She begets the plant in which she resides. This we\nshall have to study from another standpoint.\n\n\nPROCESSION IS UNIVERSAL FROM HIGHEST TO LOWEST.\n\n2. We may say that there is a procession from the First to the last;\nand in this procession each occupies its proper place. The begotten\n(being) is subordinated to the begetting (being). On the other hand,\nit becomes similar to the thing to which it attaches, so long as it\nremains attached thereto. When the soul passes into the plant, there\nis one of her parts that unites thereto (the power of growth); but\nbesides, it is only the most audacious[271] and the most senseless\npart of her that descends so low. When the soul passes into the brute,\nit is because she is drawn thereto by the predominance of the power\nof sensation.[272] When she passes into man, it is because she is led\nto do so by the exercise of discursive reason, either by the movement\nby which she proceeds from Intelligence, because the soul has a\ncharacteristic intellectual power, and consequently has the power to\ndetermine herself to think, and in general, to act.\n\n\nTHE SOUL IS NOWHERE BUT IN A PRINCIPLE THAT IS EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE.\n\nNow, let us retrace our steps. When we cut the twigs or the branches\nof a tree, where goes the plant-soul that was in them? She returns to\nher principle,[273] for no local difference separates her therefrom.\nIf we cut or burn the root, whither goes the power of growth present\ntherein? It returns to the plant-power of the universal Soul, which\ndoes not change place, and does not cease being where it was. It ceases\nto be where it was only when returning to its principle; otherwise, it\npasses into another plant; for it is not obliged to contract, or to\nretire within itself. If, on the contrary, it retire, it retires within\nthe superior power.[274] Where, in her turn, does the latter reside?\nWithin Intelligence, and without changing, location; for the Soul is\nnot within any location, and Intelligence still less. Thus the Soul is\nnowhere; she is in a principle which, being nowhere, is everywhere.[275]\n\n\nTHE SOUL MAY REMAIN IN AN INTERMEDIATE LIFE.\n\nIf, while returning to superior regions, the soul stops before reaching\nthe highest, she leads a life of intermediary nature.[276]\n\n\nALL THESE THINGS ARE IN INTELLIGENCE, WITHOUT CONSTITUTING IT.\n\nAll these entities (the universal Soul and her images) are\nIntelligence, though none of them constitutes Intelligence. They are\nIntelligence in this respect, that they proceed therefrom. They are\nnot Intelligence in this respect that only by dwelling within itself\nIntelligence has given birth to them.[277]\n\n\nTHE WHOLE UNIVERSE IS ONE IMMENSE CONCATENATION OF ALL THINGS.\n\nThus, in the universe, life resembles an immense chain in which every\nbeing occupies a point, begetting the following being, and begotten by\nthe preceding one, and ever distinct, but not separate from the (upper)\ngenerating Being, and the (lower) begotten being into which it passes\nwithout being absorbed.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.\n\nOf Matter.\n\n\nMATTER AS SUBSTRATE AND RESIDENCE OF FORMS.\n\n1. Matter is a substrate (or subject) underlying nature, as thought\nAristotle,[278] and a residence for forms. Thus much is agreed upon by\nall authors who have studied matter, and who have succeeded in forming\na clear idea of this kind of nature; but further than this, there is no\nagreement. Opinions differ as to whether matter is an underlying nature\n(as thought Aristotle),[279] as to its receptivity, and to what it is\nreceptive.\n\n\nTHE STOIC CONCEPTION OF MATTER.\n\n(The Stoics, who condensed Aristotle's categories to four, substrate,\nquality-mode and relation),[280] who admit the existence of nothing\nelse than bodies, acknowledge no existence other than that contained\nby bodies. They insist that there is but one kind of matter, which\nserves as substrate to the elements, and that it constitutes \"being\";\nthat all other things are only affections (\"passions\") of matter, or\nmodified matter: as are the elements. The teachers of this doctrine do\nnot hesitate to introduce this matter into the (very nature of the)\ndivinities, so that their supreme divinity is no more than modified\nmatter.[281] Besides, of matter they make a body, calling it a\n\"quantityless body,\" still attributing to it magnitude.\n\n\nMATTER ACCORDING TO THE PYTHAGOREANS, PLATONISTS AND ARISTOTELIANS.\n\nOthers (Pythagoreans, Platonists and Aristotelians) insist that matter\nis incorporeal. Some even distinguish two kinds of matter, first, the\n(Stoic) substrate of bodies, mentioned above; the other matter being of\na superior nature, the substrate of forms and incorporeal beings.\n\n\nTHE ARISTOTELIAN INTELLIGIBLE MATTER.\n\n2. Let us first examine whether this (latter intelligible) matter\nexists, how it exists, and what it is. If (the nature) of matter\nbe something indeterminate, and shapeless, and if in the perfect\n(intelligible beings) there must not be anything indeterminate or\nshapeless, it seems as if there could not be any matter in the\nintelligible world. As every (being) is simple, it could not have any\nneed of matter which, by uniting with something else, constitutes\nsomething composite. Matter is necessary in begotten beings, which make\none thing arise out of another; for it is such beings that have led to\nthe conception of matter (as thought Aristotle).[282] It may however be\nobjected that in unbegotten beings matter would seem useless. Whence\ncould it have originated to enter in (among intelligible beings),\nand remain there? If it were begotten, it must have been so by some\nprinciple; if it be eternal, it must have had several principles; in\nwhich case the beings that occupy the first rank would seem to be\ncontingent. Further, if (in those beings) form come to join matter,\ntheir union will constitute a body, so that the intelligible (entities)\nwill be corporeal.\n\n\nINTELLIGIBLE MATTER IS NOT SHAPELESS.\n\n3. To this it may first be answered that the indeterminate should not\nbe scorned everywhere, nor that which is conceived of as shapeless,\neven if this be the substrate of the higher and better entities; for\nwe might call even the soul indeterminate, in respect to intelligence\nand reason, which give it a better shape and nature. Besides, when\nwe say that intelligible things are composite (of matter and form),\nthis is not in the sense in which the word is used of bodies. Even\nreasons would thus be called composite, and by their actualization\nform another alleged composite, nature, which aspires to form. If,\nin the intelligible world, the composite tend toward some other\nprinciple, or depend thereon, the difference between this composite\nand bodies is still better marked. Besides, the matter of begotten\nthings ceaselessly changes form, while the matter of the intelligible\nentities ever remains identical. Further, matter here below is subject\nto other conditions (than in the intelligible world). Here below,\nindeed, matter is all things only partly, and is all things only\nsuccessively; consequently, amidst these perpetual changes nothing is\nidentical, nothing is permanent. Above, on the contrary, matter is all\nthings simultaneously, and possessing all things, could not transform\nitself. Consequently, matter is never shapeless above; for it is not\neven shapeless here below. Only the one (intelligible matter) is\nsituated differently from the other (sense-matter). Whether, however,\n(intelligible matter) be begotten, or be eternal, is a question that\ncannot be determined until we know what it is.\n\n\nTHE NATURE OF IDEAS IMPLIES AN INDIVIDUAL FORM, WHICH AGAIN IMPLIES A\nSUBSTRATE.\n\n4. Granting now the existence of ideas, whose reality has been\ndemonstrated elsewhere,[283] we must draw their legitimate\nconsequences. Necessarily ideas have something in common, inasmuch as\nthey are manifold; and since they differ from each other, they must\nalso have something individual. Now the individuality of any idea,\nthe difference that distinguishes it from any other, consists of its\nparticular shape. But form, to be received, implies a substrate, that\nmight be determined by the difference. There is therefore always a\nmatter that receives form, and there is always a substrate (even in\nideas, whose matter is genus, and whose form is its difference).\n\n\nRELYING ON THE PUN BETWEEN WORLD AND ADORNMENT, PLOTINOS CONCLUDES\nTHAT IF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD BE THE IMAGE OF THIS, IT MUST ALSO BE A\nCOMPOSITE OF FORM AND MATTER.\n\nBesides, our world is an image of the intelligible world. Now as our\nworld is a composite of matter (and form), there must be matter also on\nhigh (that is, in the intelligible world). Otherwise, how could we call\nthe intelligible world \"kosmos\" (that is, either world, or adornment),\nunless we see matter (receiving) form therein? How could we find form\nthere, without (a residence) that should receive it? That world is\nindivisible, taken in an absolute sense; but in a relative sense, is it\ndivisible? Now if its parts be distinct from each other, their division\nor distinction is a passive modification of matter; for what can be\ndivided, must be matter. If the multitude of ideals constitute an\nindivisible being, this multitude, which resides in a single being, has\nthis single being as substrate, that is, as matter and is its shapes.\nThis single, yet varied substrate conceives of itself as shapeless,\nbefore conceiving of itself as varied. If then by thought you abstract\nfrom it variety, forms, reasons, and intelligible characteristics, that\nwhich is prior is indeterminate and shapeless; then there will remain\nin this (subject) none of the things that are in it and with it.\n\n\nTHE BOTTOM OF EVERYTHING IS MATTER, WHICH IS RELATIVE DARKNESS.\n\n5. If, we were to conclude that there were no matter in intelligible\nentities, because they were immutable, and because, in them, matter is\nalways combined with (shape), we would be logically compelled to deny\nthe existence of matter in bodies; for the matter of bodies always\nhas a form, and every body is always complete (containing a form\nand a matter). Each body, however, is none the less composite, and\nintelligence observes its doubleness; for it splits until it arrives to\nsimplicity, namely, to that which can no longer be decomposed; it does\nnot stop until it reaches the bottom things. Now the bottom of each\nthing is matter. Every matter is dark, because the reason (the form)\nis the light, and because intelligence is the reason.[284] When, in an\nobject, intelligence considers the reason, it considers as dark that\nwhich is below reason, or light. Likewise, the eye, being luminous,\nand directing its gaze on light and on the colors which are kinds of\nlight, considers what is beneath, and hidden by the colors, as dark and\nmaterial.\n\n\nINTELLIGIBLE MATTER CONSISTS OF REAL BEING, ESPECIALLY AS SHAPED.\n\nBesides, there is a great difference between the dark bottom of\nintelligible things and that of sense-objects; there is as much\ndifference between the matter of the former and of the latter as there\nis between their form. The divine matter, on receiving the form that\ndetermines it, possesses an intellectual and determinate life. On\nthe contrary, even when the matter of the bodies becomes something\ndeterminate, it is neither alive nor thinking; it is dead, in spite\nof its borrowed beauty.[285] As the shape (of sense-objects) is only\nan image, their substrate also is only an image. But as the shape (of\nintelligible entities) possesses veritable (reality), their substrate\nis of the same nature. We have, therefore, full justification for\ncalling matter \"being,\" that is, when referring to intelligible\nmatter; for the substrate of intelligible entities really is \"being,\"\nespecially if conceived of together with its inherent (form). For\n\"being\" is the luminous totality (or complex of matter and form).\nTo question the eternity of intelligible matter is tantamount to\nquestioning that of ideas; indeed, intelligible entities are begotten\nin the sense that they have a principle; but they are non-begotten in\nthe sense that their existence had no beginning, and that, from all\neternity, they derive their existence from their principle. Therefore\nthey do not resemble the things that are always becoming, as our world;\nbut, like the intelligible world, they ever exist.\n\n\nTHE CATEGORIES OF MOVEMENT AND DIFFERENCE APPLIED TO INTELLIGIBLES.\n\nThe difference that is in the intelligible world ever produces matter;\nfor, in that world, it is the difference that is the principle of\nmatter, as well as of primary motion. That is why the latter is also\ncalled difference, because difference and primary motion were born\nsimultaneously.[286]\n\nThe movement and difference, that proceed from the First (the Good),\nare indeterminate, and need it, to be determinate. Now they determine\neach other when they turn towards it. Formerly, matter was as\nindeterminate as difference; it was not good because it was not yet\nilluminated by the radiance of the First. Since the First is the source\nof all light, the object that receives light from the First does not\nalways possess light; this object differs from light, and possesses\nlight as something alien, because it derives light from some other\nsource. That is the nature of matter as contained in intelligible\n(entities). Perhaps this treatment of the subject is longer than\nnecessary.\n\n\nSUBSTRATE IS DEMANDED BY TRANSFORMATION OF ELEMENTS, BY THEIR\nDESTRUCTION AND DISSOLUTION.\n\n6. Now let us speak of bodies. The mutual transformation of elements\ndemonstrates that they must have a substrate. Their transformation is\nnot a complete destruction; otherwise (a general) \"being\"[287] would\nperish in nonentity. Whereas, what is begotten would have passed\nfrom absolute nonentity to essence; and all change is no more than\nthe passing of one form into another (as thought Aristotle).[288] It\npresupposes the existence of permanent (subject) which would receive\nthe form of begotten things only after having lost the earlier form.\nThis is demonstrated by destruction, which affects only something\ncomposite; therefore every dissolved object must have been a composite.\nDissolution proves it also. For instance, where a vase is dissolved,\nthe result is gold; on being dissolved, gold leaves water; and so\nanalogy would suggest that the dissolution of water would result in\nsomething else, that is analogous to its nature. Finally, elements\nnecessarily are either form, or primary matter, or the composites\nof form and matter. However, they cannot be form, because, without\nmatter, they could not possess either mass nor magnitude. Nor can\nthey be primary matter, because they are subject to destruction. They\nmust therefore be composites of form and matter; form constituting\ntheir shape and quality, and matter a substrate that is indeterminate,\nbecause it is not a form.\n\n\nTHE VIEWS OF EMPEDOCLES AND ANAXAGORAS ON MATTER.\n\n7. (According to Aristotle),[289] Empedocles thinks matter consists\nof elements; but this opinion is refuted by the decay to which they\nare exposed. (According to Aristotle),[290] Anaxagoras supposes\nthat matter is a mixture and, instead of saying that this (mixture)\nis capable of becoming all things, he insists that it contains all\nthings in actualization. Thus he annihilates the intelligence that\nhe had introduced into the world; for, according to him, it is not\nintelligence that endows all the rest with shape and form; it is\ncontemporaneous with matter, instead of preceding it.[291] Now it is\nimpossible for intelligence to be the contemporary of matter, for if\nmixture participate in essence, then must essence precede it; if,\nhowever, essence itself be the mixture, they will need some third\nprinciple. Therefore if the demiurgic creator necessarily precede,\nwhat need was there for the forms in miniature to exist in matter,\nfor intelligence to unravel their inextricable confusion, when it is\npossible to predicate qualities of matter, because matter had none of\nits own, and thus to subject matter entirely to shape? Besides, how\ncould (the demiurgic creator) then be in all?\n\n\nREFUTATION OF ANAXIMANDER'S VIEWS ABOUT MATTER.\n\n(Anaximander)[292] had better explain the consistence of the infinity\nby which he explains matter. Does he, by infinity, mean immensity? In\nreality this would be impossible. Infinity exists neither by itself,\nnor in any other nature, as, for instance, the accident of a body. The\ninfinite does not exist by itself, because each of its parts would\nnecessarily be infinite. Nor does the infinite exist as an accident,\nbecause that of which it would be an accident would, by itself, be\nneither infinite, nor simple; and consequently, would not be matter.\n\n\nREFUTATION OF DEMOCRITUS'S ATOMS AS EXPLANATIONS OF MATTER.\n\n(According to Aristotle's account of Democritus),[293] neither could\nthe atoms fulfil the part of matter because they are nothing (as before\nthought Cicero).[294] Every body is divisible to infinity. (Against\nthe system of the atoms) might further be alleged the continuity and\nhumidity of bodies. Besides nothing can exist without intelligence\nand soul, which could not be composed of atoms. Nothing with a nature\ndifferent from the atoms could produce anything with the atoms, because\nno demiurgic creator could produce something with a matter that lacked\ncontinuity. Many other objections against this system have and can be\nmade; but further discussion is unnecessary.\n\n\nMATTER IS NOTHING COMPOSITE, BUT BY NATURE SIMPLE AND ONE.\n\n8. What then is this matter which is one, continuous, and without\nqualities? Evidently, it could not be a body, since it has no quality;\nif it were a body, it would have a quality. We say that it is the\nmatter of all sense-objects, and not the matter of some, and the form\nof others, just as clay is matter, in respect to the potter, without\nbeing matter absolutely (as thought Aristotle).[295] As we are not\nconsidering the matter of any particular object, but the matter of all\nthings, we would not attribute to its nature anything of what falls\nunder our senses--no quality, color, heat, cold, lightness, weight,\ndensity, sparseness, figure or magnitude; for magnitude is something\nentirely different from being large, and figure from the figured\nobject. Matter therefore is not anything composite, but something\nsimple, and by nature one (according to the views of Plato and\nAristotle combined).[296] Only thus could matter be deprived of all\nproperties (as it is).\n\n\nMATTER AND THE INFORMING PRINCIPLE MUST BE CONTEMPORARIES TO ACCOUNT\nFOR THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS.\n\nThe principle which informs matter will give it form as something\nforeign to its nature; it will also introduce magnitude and all the\nreal properties. Otherwise, it would be enslaved to the magnitude\nof matter, and could not decide of the magnitude of matter, and\nmagnitude would be dependent on the disposition of matter. A theory\nof a consultation between it and the magnitude of matter would be\nan absurd fiction. On the contrary, if the efficient cause precede\nmatter, matter will be exactly as desired by the efficient cause, and\nbe capable of docilely receiving any kind of form, including magnitude.\nIf matter possessed magnitude, it would also possess figure, and\nwould thus be rather difficult to fashion. Form therefore enters into\nmatter by importing into it (what constitutes corporeal being); now\nevery form contains a magnitude and a quantity which are determined by\nreason (\"being\"), and with reason. That is why in all kinds of beings,\nquantity is determined only along with form; for the quantity (the\nmagnitude) of man is not the quantity of the bird. It would be absurd\nto insist on the difference between giving to matter the quantity of a\nbird, and impressing its quality on it, that quality is a reason, while\nquantity is not a form; for quantity is both measure and number.\n\n\nANTI-STOIC POLEMIC, AGAINST THE CORPOREITY OF MATTER AND QUANTITY.\n\n9. It may be objected that it would be impossible to conceive of\nsomething without magnitude. The fact is that not everything is\nidentical with quantity. Essence is distinct from quantity; for many\nother things beside it exist. Consequently no incorporeal nature has\nany quantity. Matter, therefore, is incorporeal. Besides, even quantity\nitself is not quantative, which characterizes only what participates\nin quantity (in general); a further proof that quantity is a form,\nas an object becomes white by the presence of whiteness; and as that\nwhich, in the animal, produces whiteness and the different colors, is\nnot a varied color, but a varied reason; likewise that which produces a\nquantity is not a definite quantity, but either quantity in itself, or\nquantity as such, or the reason of quantity. Does quantity, on entering\ninto matter extend matter, so as to give it magnitude? By no means, for\nmatter had not been condensed. Form therefore imparts to matter the\nmagnitude which it did not possess, just as form impresses on matter\nthe quality it lacked.[297]\n\n\nBY ABSTRACTION, THE SOUL CAN FIND AND DESCRY THE QUALITY-LESS\nTHING-IN-ITSELF: THIS PROCESS IS CALLED \"BASTARD REASONING.\"\n\n10. (Some objector) might ask how one could conceive of matter without\nquantity? This might be answered by a retort. How then do you (as you\ndo) manage to conceive of it without quality? Do you again object,\nby what conception or intelligence could it be reached? By the very\nindetermination of the soul. Since that which knows must be similar to\nthat which is known (as Aristotle[298] quotes from Empedocles), the\nindeterminate must be grasped by the indeterminate. Reason, indeed,\nmay be determined in respect to the indeterminate; but the glance\nwhich reason directs on the indeterminate itself is indeterminate.\nIf everything were known by reason and by intelligence, reason here\ntells us about matter what reason rightly should tell us about it. By\nwishing to conceive of matter in an intellectual manner, intelligence\narrives at a state which is the absence of intelligence, or rather,\nreason forms of matter a \"bastard\" or \"illegitimate\" image, which is\nderived from the other, which is not true, and which is composed of the\nother (deceptive material called) reason. That is why Plato[299] said\nthat matter is perceived by a \"bastard reasoning.\" In what does the\nindetermination of the soul consist? In an absolute ignorance, or in\na complete absence of all knowledge? No: the indeterminate condition\nof the soul implies something positive (besides something negative).\nAs for the eye, darkness is the matter of all invisible color, so\nthe soul, by making abstraction in sense-objects of all things that\nsomehow are luminous, cannot determine what then remains; and likewise,\nas the eye, in darkness (becomes assimilated to darkness), the soul\nbecomes assimilated to what she sees. Does she then see anything else?\nDoubtless, she sees something without figure, without color, without\nlight, or even without magnitude.[300] If this thing had any magnitude,\nthe soul would lend it a form.\n\n\nDIFFERENCE BETWEEN MENTAL BLANK AND IMPRESSION OF THE SHAPELESS.\n\n(An objector might ask) whether there be identity of conditions\nbetween the soul's not thinking, and her experience while thinking of\nmatter? By no means; when the soul is not thinking of anything, she\nneither asserts anything, nor experiences anything. When she thinks\nof matter, she experiences something, she receives the impression of\nthe shapeless. When she presents to herself objects that possess shape\nand magnitude, she conceives of them as composite; for she sees them\nas distinct (or, colored?) and determined by qualities they contain.\nShe conceives of both the totality and its two constituent elements.\nShe also has a clear perception, a vivid sensation of properties\ninherent (in matter). On the contrary, the soul receives only an\nobscure perception of the shapeless subject, for there is no form\nthere. Therefore, when the soul considers matter in general, in the\ncomposite, with the qualities inherent in this composite, she separates\nthem, analyzes them, and what is left (after this analysis), the soul\nperceives it vaguely, and obscurely, because it is something vague and\nobscure; she thinks it, without really thinking it. On the other hand,\nas matter does not remain shapeless, as it is always shaped, within\nobjects, the soul always imposes on matter the form of things, because\nonly with difficulty does she support the indeterminate, since she\nseems to fear to fall out of the order of beings, and to remain long in\nnonentity.\n\n\nTHE COMPOSITION OF A BODY NEEDS A SUBSTRATE.\n\n11. (Following the ideas of Aristotle,[301] Plotinos wonders whether\nsome objector) will ask whether the composition of a body requires\nanything beyond extension and all the other qualities? Yes: it demands\na substrate to receive them (as a residence). This substrate is not a\nmass; for in this case, it would be an extension. But if this substrate\nhave no extension, how can it be a residence (for form)? Without\nextension, it could be of no service, contributing neither to form\nnor qualities, to magnitude nor extension. It seems that extension,\nwherever it be, is given to bodies by matter. Just as actions, effects,\ntimes and movements, though they do not imply any matter, nevertheless\nare beings, it would seem that the elementary bodies do not necessarily\nimply matter (without extension), being individual beings, whose\ndiverse substance is constituted by the mingling of several forms.\nMatter without extension, therefore, seems to be no more than a\nmeaningless name.\n\n\nMATTER AS THE IMAGE OF EXTENSION, CAN YET BE RESIDENCE OF FORM.\n\n(Our answer to the above objection is this:) To begin with, not every\nresidence is necessarily a mass, unless it have already received\nextension. The soul, which possesses all things, contains them all\nsimultaneously. If it possessed extension, it would possess all\nthings in extension. Consequently matter receives all it contains in\nextension, because it is capable thereof. Likewise in animals and\nplants there is a correspondence between the growth and diminution of\ntheir magnitude, with that of their quality. It would be wrong to claim\nthat magnitude is necessary to matter because, in sense-objects, there\nexists a previous magnitude, on which is exerted the action of the\nforming principle; for the matter of these objects is not pure matter,\nbut individual matter (as said Aristotle).[302] Matter pure and simple\nmust receive its extension from some other principle. Therefore the\nresidence of form could not be a mass; for in receiving extension, it\nwould also receive the other qualities. Matter therefore, is the image\nof extension, because as it is primary matter, it possesses the ability\nto become extended. People often imagine matter as empty extension;\nconsequently several philosophers have claimed that matter is identical\nwith emptiness. I repeat: matter is the image of extension because the\nsoul, when considering matter, is unable to determine anything, spreads\ninto indetermination, without being able to circumscribe or mark\nanything; otherwise, matter would determine something. This substrate\ncould not properly be called big or little; it is simultaneously big\nand little (as said Aristotle).[303] It is simultaneously extended\nand non-extended, because it is the matter of extension. If it were\nenlarged or made smaller, it would somehow move in extension. Its\nindetermination is an extension which consists in being the very\nresidence of extension, but really in being only imaginary extension,\nas has been explained above. Other beings, that have no extension,\nbut which are forms, are each of them determinate, and consequently\nimply no other idea of extension. On the contrary, matter, being\nindeterminate, and incapable of remaining within itself, being moved to\nreceive all forms everywhere, ever being docile, by this very docility,\nand by the generation (to which it adapts itself), becomes manifold. It\nis in this way its nature seems to be extension.\n\n\nPOLEMIC AGAINST MODERATUS OF GADES, FORMS DEMAND A RESIDENCE, VASE, or\nLOCATION.\n\n12. Extensions therefore contribute to the constitutions of bodies;\nfor the forms of bodies are in extensions. These forms produce\nthemselves not in extension (which is a form), but in the substrate\nthat has received extension. If they occurred in extension, instead of\noccurring in matter, they would nevertheless have neither extension\nnor (hypostatic) substance; for they would be no more than reasons.\nNow as reasons reside in the soul, there would be no body. Therefore,\nin the sense-world, the multiplicity of forms must have a single\nsubstrate which has received extension, and therefore must be other\nthan extension. All things that mingle form a mixture, because they\ncontain matter; they have no need of any other substrate, because each\nof them brings its matter along with it. But (forms) need a receptacle\n(a residence), a \"vase\" (or stand), a location (this in answer to\nthe objection at the beginning of the former section). Now location\nis posterior to matter and to bodies. Bodies, therefore, presuppose\nmatter. Bodies are not necessarily immaterial, merely because actions\nand operations are. In the occurrence of an action, matter serves as\nsubstrate to the agent; it remains within him without itself entering\ninto action; for that is not that which is sought by the agent. One\naction does not change into another, and consequently has no need\nof containing matter; it is the agent who passes from one action to\nanother, and who, consequently, serves as matter to the actions (as\nthought Aristotle).[304]\n\n\nNOT EVEN CORPOREITY INHERES IN MATTER WHICH IS REACHED BY BASTARD\nREASONING.\n\nMatter, therefore, is necessary to quality as well as to quantity,\nand consequently, to bodies. In this sense, matter is not an empty\nname, but a substrate, though it be neither visible nor extended.\nOtherwise, for the same reason, we would be obliged also to deny\nqualities and extension; for you might say that each of these things,\ntaken in itself, is nothing real. If these things possess existence,\nthough their existence be obscure, so much the more must matter possess\nexistence, though its existence be neither clear nor evident to the\nsenses. Indeed, matter cannot be perceived by sight, since it is\ncolorless; nor by hearing, for it is soundless; nor by smell or taste,\nbecause it is neither volatile nor wet. It is not even perceived by\ntouch, for it is not a body. Touch cognizes only body, recognizes that\nit is dense or sparse, hard or soft, wet or dry; now none of these\nattributes is characteristic of matter. The latter therefore can be\nperceived only by a reasoning which does not imply the presence of\nintelligence, which, on the contrary, implies the complete absence of\nmatter; which (unintelligent reasoning therefore) deserves the name of\n\"bastard\" (or, illegitimate) reasoning.[305] Corporeity itself,[306] is\nnot characteristic of matter. If corporeity be a reason (that is, by a\npun, a 'form'), it certainly differs from matter, both being entirely\ndistinct. If corporeity be considered when it has already modified\nmatter and mingled with it, it is a body; it is no longer matter pure\nand simple.\n\n\nTHE SUBSTRATE IS NOT A QUALITY COMMON TO ALL ELEMENTS; FOR THUS IT\nWOULD NOT BE INDETERMINATE.\n\n13. Those who insist that the substrate of things is a quality common\nto all elements are bound to explain first the nature of this quality;\nthen, how a quality could serve as substrate; how an unextended,\nimmaterial (?) quality could be perceived in something that lacked\nextension; further, how, if this quality be determinate, it can be\nmatter; for if it be something indeterminate, it is no longer a\nquality, but matter itself that we seek.\n\n\nEVEN THIS PRIVATION MIGHT BE CONSIDERED A QUALITY; BUT SUCH A USE OF\nTHE TERM WOULD DESTROY ALL COHERENT REASONING.\n\nLet us grant that matter has no quality, because, by virtue of its\nnature, it does not participate in a quality of any other thing. What,\nhowever, would hinder this property, because it is a qualification in\nmatter, from participating in some quality? This would be a particular\nand distinctive characteristic, which consists of the privation of all\nother things (referring to Aristotle)?[307] In man, the privation of\nsomething may be considered a quality; as, for instance, the privation\nof sight is blindness. If the privation of certain things inhere in\nmatter, this privation is also a qualification for matter. If further\nthe privation in matter extend to all things, absolutely, our objection\nis still better grounded, for privation is a qualification. Such an\nobjection, however, amounts to making qualities and qualified things\nof everything. In this case quantity, as well as \"being,\" would be\na quality. Every qualified thing must possess some quality. It is\nridiculous to suppose that something qualified is qualified by what\nitself has no quality, being other than quality.\n\n\nBY A PUN BETWEEN \"DIFFERENCE\" AND \"OTHERNESS,\" PLOTINOS DEFINES THE\nCHARACTERISTIC OF MATTER AS BEING A DISPOSITION TO BECOME SOMETHING\nELSE.\n\nSome one may object that that is possible, because \"being something\nelse\" is a quality. We would then have to ask whether the thing that\nis other be otherness-in-itself? If it be otherness-in-itself, it\nis so not because it is something qualified, because quality is not\nsomething qualified. If this thing be only other, it is not such by\nitself, it is so only by otherness, as a thing that is identical\nby identity. Privation, therefore, is not a quality, nor anything\nqualified, but the absence of quality or of something else, as silence\nis the absence of sound. Privation is something negative; qualification\nis something positive. The property of matter is not a form; for its\nproperty consists precisely in having neither qualification nor form.\nIt is absurd to insist that it is qualified, just because it has no\nquality; this would be tantamount to saying that it possessed extension\nby the very fact of its possessing no extension. The individuality\n(or, property) of matter is to be what it is. Its characteristic\nis not an attribute; it consists in a disposition to become other\nthings. Not only are these other things other than matter, but besides\neach of them possesses an individual form. The only name that suits\nmatter is \"other,\" or rather, \"others,\" because the singular is too\ndeterminative, and the plural better expresses indetermination.\n\n\nPRIVATION IS A FORM OF MATTER.\n\n14. Let us now examine if matter be privation, or if privation be\nan attribute of matter. If you insist that privation and matter are\nthough logically distinct, substantially one and the same thing, you\nwill have to explain the nature of these two things, for instance,\ndefining matter without defining privation, and conversely. Either,\nneither of these two things implies the other, or they imply each other\nreciprocally, or only one of them implies the other. If each of them\ncan be defined separately, and if neither of them imply the other,\nboth will form two distinct things, and matter will be different from\nprivation, though privation be an accident of matter. But neither of\nthe two must even potentially be present in the definition of the\nother. Is their mutual relation the same as that of a stub nose, and\nthe man with the stub nose (as suggested by Aristotle)?[308] Then each\nof these is double, and there are two things. Is their relation that\nbetween fire and heat? Heat is in fire, but fire is not necessarily\ncontained in heat; thus matter, having privation (as a quality), as\nfire has heat (as a quality), privation will be a form of matter, and\nhas a substrate different from itself, which is matter.[309] Not in\nthis sense, therefore, is there a unity (between them).\n\n\nPRIVATION IS NONENTITY, AND ADDS NO NEW CONCEPT.\n\nAre matter and privation substantially identical, yet logically\ndistinct, in this sense that privation does not signify the presence of\nanything, but rather its absence? That it is the negation of beings,\nand is synonymous with nonentity? Negation adds no attribute; it limits\nitself to the assertion that something is not. In a certain sense,\ntherefore, privation is nonentity.\n\n\nBEING SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL, BUT LOGICALLY DISTINCT IS NONSENSE.\n\nIf matter be called nonentity in this sense that it is not essence,\nbut something else than essence, there is still room to draw up two\ndefinitions, of which one would apply to the substrate, and the other\nto the privation, merely to explain that it is a disposition to become\nsomething else? It would be better to acknowledge that matter, like the\nsubstrate, should be defined a disposition to become other things. If\nthe definition of privation shows the indetermination of matter, it can\nat least indicate its nature. But we could not admit that matter and\nprivation are one thing in respect to their substrate, though logically\ndistinct; for how could there be a logical distinction into two things,\nif a thing be identical with matter as soon as it is indeterminate,\nindefinite, and lacking quality?\n\n\nMATTER AS THE INFINITE IN ITSELF.\n\n15. Let us further examine if the indeterminate, or infinite, be an\naccident, or an attribute of some other nature; how it comes to be an\naccident, and whether privation ever can become an accident. The things\nthat are numbers and reasons are exempt from all indetermination,\nbecause they are determinations, orders, and principles of order for\nthe rest. Now these principles do not order objects already ordered,\nnor do they order orders. The thing that receives an order is different\nfrom that which gives an order, and the principles from which the order\nis derived are determination, limitation and reason. In this case, that\nwhich receives the order and the determination must necessarily be the\ninfinite (as thought Plato).[310] Now that which receives the order is\nmatter, with all the things which, without being matter, participate\ntherein, and play the part of matter. Therefore matter is the infinite\nitself.[311] Not accidentally is it the infinite; for the infinite is\nno accident. Indeed, every accident must be a reason; now of what being\ncan the infinite be an accident? Of determination, or of that which is\ndetermined? Now matter is neither of these two. Further, the infinite\ncould not unite with the determinate without destroying its nature.\nThe infinite, therefore, is no accident of matter (but is its nature,\nor \"being\"). Matter is the infinite itself. Even in the intelligible\nworld, matter is the infinite.\n\n\nTHE INFINITE MAY BE EITHER IDEAL OR REAL, INFINITE OR INDEFINITE.\n\nThe infinite seems born of the infinity of the One, either of its\npower, or eternity; there is no infinity in the One, but the One is\ncreator of the infinite. How can there be infinity simultaneously above\nand below (in the One and in matter)? Because there are two infinities\n(the infinite and the indefinite; the infinite in the One, the\nindefinite in matter). Between them obtains the same difference as the\narchetype and its image.[312] Is the infinite here below less infinite?\nOn the contrary, it is more so. By the mere fact that the image is\nfar from veritable \"being,\" it is more infinite. Infinity is greater\nin that which is less determinate (as thought Aristotle).[313] Now\nthat which is more distant from good is further in evil. Therefore the\ninfinite on high, possessing the more essence, is the ideal infinite;\nhere below, as the infinite possesses less essence, because it is far\nfrom essence and truth, it degenerates into the image of essence, and\nis the truer (indefinite) infinite.\n\n\nMATTER AS THE INFINITE IN ITSELF.\n\nIs the infinite identical with the essence of the infinite? There is\na distinction between them where there is reason and matter; where\nhowever matter is alone, they must be considered identical; or, better,\nwe may say absolutely that here below the infinite does not occur;\notherwise it would be a reason, which is contrary to the nature of the\ninfinite. Therefore matter in itself is the infinite, in opposition\nto reason. Just as reason, considered in itself, is called reason,\nso matter, which is opposed to reason by its infinity, and which is\nnothing else (than matter), must be called infinite.\n\n\nMATTER IS NONESSENTIAL OTHERNESS.\n\n16. Is there any identity between matter and otherness? Matter is not\nidentical with otherness itself, but with that part of otherness which\nis opposed to real beings, and to reasons. It is in this sense that\none can say of nonentity that it is something, that it is identical\nwith privation, if only privation be the opposition to things that\nexist in reason. Will privation be destroyed by its union with the\nthing of which it is an attribute? By no means. That in which a (Stoic)\n\"habit\" occurs is not itself a \"habit,\" but a privation. That in\nwhich determination occurs is neither determination, nor that which\nis determined, but the infinite, so far as it is infinite. How could\ndetermination unite with the infinite without destroying its nature,\nsince this infinite is not such by accident? It would destroy this\ninfinite, if it were infinite in quantity; but that is not the case. On\nthe contrary, it preserves its \"being\" for it, realizes and completes\nits nature; as the earth which did not contain seeds (preserves its\nnature) when it receives some of them; or the female, when she is\nmade pregnant by the male. The female, then, does not cease being a\nfemale; on the contrary she is so far more, for she realizes her nature\n(\"being\").\n\n\nINDIGENCE IS NECESSARILY EVIL.\n\nDoes matter continue to be evil when it happens to participate in\nthe good? Yes, because it was formerly deprived of good, and did not\npossess it. That which lacks something, and obtains it, holds the\nmiddle between good and evil, if it be in the middle between the two.\nBut that which possesses nothing, that which is in indigence, or rather\nthat which is indigence itself, must necessarily be evil; for it is not\nindigence of wealth, but indigence of wisdom, of virtue, of beauty, of\nvigor, of shape, of form, of quality. How, indeed, could such a thing\nnot be shapeless, absolutely ugly and evil?\n\n\nTHE RELATION OF BOTH KINDS OF MATTER TO ESSENCE.\n\nIn the intelligible world, matter is essence; for what is above it (the\nOne), is considered as superior to essence. In the sense-world, on the\ncontrary, essence is above matter; therefore matter is nonentity, and\nthereby is the only thing foreign to the beauty of essence.\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.\n\nFragments About the Soul, the Intelligence, and the Good.\n\n\nDIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE EXISTING ANIMAL.\n\n1. Plato says, \"The intelligence sees the ideas comprised within\nthe existing animal.\" He adds, \"The demiurge conceived that this\nproduced animal was to comprise beings similar and equally numerous\nto those that the intelligence sees in the existing animal.\" Does\nPlato mean that the ideas are anterior to intelligence, and that they\nalready exist when intelligence thinks them? We shall first have to\nexamine whether the animal is identical with intelligence, or is\nsomething different. Now that which observes is intelligence; so\nthe Animal himself should then be called, not intelligence, but the\nintelligible. Shall we therefrom conclude that the things contemplated\nby intelligence are outside of it? If so, intelligence possesses only\nimages, instead of the realities themselves--that is, if we admit that\nthe realities exist up there; for, according to Plato, the veritable\nreality is up there within the essence, in which everything exists in\nitself.\n\n\nRELATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTELLIGIBLE.\n\n(This consequence is not necessary). Doubtless Intelligence and the\nintelligible are different; they are nevertheless not separated.\nNothing hinders us from saying that both form but one, and that they\nare separated only by thought; for essence is one, but it is partly\nthat which is thought, and partly that which thinks. When Plato says\nthat intelligence sees the ideas, he means that it contemplates the\nideas, not in another principle, but in itself, because it possesses\nthe intelligible within itself. The intelligible may also be the\nintelligence, but intelligence in the state of repose, of unity, of\ncalm, while Intelligence, which perceives this Intelligence which has\nremained within itself, is the actuality born therefrom, and which\ncontemplates it. By contemplating the intelligible, intelligence is\nassimilated thereto and is its intelligence, because Intelligence\nthinks the intelligible it itself becomes intelligible by becoming\nassimilated thereto, and on the other hand also something thought.\n\nIt is (intelligence), therefore, which conceived the design in\nproducing in the universe the four kinds of living beings (or\nelements), which it beholds up there. Mysteriously, however, Plato here\nseems to present the conceiving-principle as different from the other\ntwo principles, while others think that these three principles, the\nanimal itself (the universal Soul), Intelligence and the conceiving\nprinciple form but a single thing. Shall we here, as elsewhere, admit\nthat opinions differ, and that everybody conceives the three principles\nin his own manner?\n\n\nTHE WORLD-SOUL IS THE CONCEIVING-PRINCIPLE.\n\nWe have already noticed two of these principles (namely, intelligence,\nand the intelligible, which is called the Animal-in-itself, or\nuniversal Soul). What is the third? It is he who has resolved to\nproduce, to form, to divide the ideas that intelligence sees in\nthe Animal. Is it possible that in one sense intelligence is the\ndividing principle, and that in another the dividing principle is not\nintelligence? As far as divided things proceed from intelligence,\nintelligence is the dividing principle. As far as intelligence itself\nremains undivided, and that the things proceeding from it (that is,\nthe souls) are divided, the universal Soul is the principle of this\ndivision into several souls. That is why Plato says that division is\nthe work of a third principle, and that it resides in a third principle\nthat has conceived; now, to conceive is not the proper function of\nintelligence; it is that of the Soul which has a dividing action in a\ndivisible nature.\n\n\nHOW THE SOUL ASCENDS TO THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD. THE INTELLIGIBLE IS\nPOSSESSED BY TOUCHING IT WITH THE BEST PART OF ONESELF.\n\n2. (As Nicholas of Damascus used to say) the totality of a science\nis divided into particular propositions, without, however, thereby\nbeing broken up into fragments, inasmuch as each proposition contains\npotentially the whole science, whose principle and goal coincide.\nLikewise, we should so manage ourselves that each of the faculties we\npossess within ourselves should also become a goal and a totality; and\nthen so arrange all the faculties that they will be consummated in\nwhat is best in our nature (that is, intelligence). Success in this\nconstitutes \"dwelling on high\" (living spiritually); for, when one\npossesses the intelligible, one touches it by what is best in oneself.\n\n\nOF THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL INTO THE BODY. THE SOUL IS NOT IN THE BODY;\nBUT THE BODY IS IN THE SOUL.\n\n3. The universal Soul has not come into any place, nor gone into any;\nfor no such place could have existed. However, the body, which was in\nits neighborhood, participated in her, consequently, she is not inside\na body. Plato, indeed, does not say that the soul is in a body; on the\ncontrary, he locates the body in the soul.\n\n\nINDIVIDUAL SOULS, HOWEVER, MAY BE SAID TO COME AND GO.\n\nAs to individual souls, they come from somewhere, for they proceed from\nthe universal Soul; they also have a place whither they may descend,\nor where they may pass from one body into another; they can likewise\nreascend thence to the intelligible world.\n\n\nTHE UNIVERSAL SOUL EVER REMAINS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE.\n\nThe universal Soul, on the contrary, ever resides in the elevated\nregion where her nature retains her; and the universe located below her\nparticipates in her just as the object which receives the sun's rays\nparticipates therein.\n\n\nHOW THE SOUL INCARNATES.\n\nThe individual soul is therefore illuminated when she turns towards\nwhat is above her; for then she meets the essence; on the contrary,\nwhen she turns towards what is below her, she meets non-being. This\nis what happens when she turns towards herself; on wishing to belong\nto herself, she somehow falls into emptiness, becomes indeterminate,\nand produces what is below her, namely, an image of herself which\nis non-being (the body). Now the image of this image (matter), is\nindeterminate, and quite obscure; for it is entirely unreasonable,\nunintelligible, and as far as possible from essence itself. (Between\nintelligence and the body) the soul occupies an intermediary region,\nwhich is her own proper domain; when she looks at the inferior region,\nthrowing a second glance thither, she gives a form to her image (her\nbody); and, charmed by this image, she enters therein.\n\n\nBY ITS POWER, THE ONE IS EVERYWHERE.\n\n4. How does manifoldness issue from Unity? Unity is everywhere; for\nthere is no place where it is not; therefore it fills everything.\nBy Him exists manifoldness; or rather, it is by Him that all things\nexist. If the One were only everywhere, He would simply be all things;\nbut, as, besides, He is nowhere, all things exist by Him, because He\nis everywhere; but simultaneously all things are distinct from Him,\nbecause He is nowhere. Why then is Unity not only everywhere, but also\nnowhere? The reason is, that Unity must be above all things, He must\nfill everything, and produce everything, without being all that He\nproduces.\n\n\nTHE SOUL RECEIVES HER FORM FROM INTELLIGENCE.\n\n5. The soul's relation to intelligence is the same as that of sight to\nthe visible object; but it is the indeterminate sight which, before\nseeing, is nevertheless disposed to see and think; that is why the soul\nbears to intelligence the relation of matter to form.\n\n\nWE THINK AN INTELLECTUAL NATURE BY THINKING OURSELVES.\n\n6. When we think, and think ourselves, we see a thinking nature;\notherwise, we would be dupes of an illusion in believing we were\nthinking. Consequently, if we think ourselves, we are, by thinking\nourselves, thinking an intellectual nature. This thought presupposes\nan anterior thought which implies no movement. Now, as the objects\nof thought are being and life, there must be, anterior to this\nbeing, another being; and anterior to this life, another life.\nThis is well-known to all who are actualized intelligences. If the\nintelligences be actualizations which consist in thinking themselves,\nwe ourselves are the intelligible by the real foundation of our\nessence, and the thought that we have of ourselves gives us its image.\n\n\nTHE ONE IS SUPERIOR TO REST AND MOTION.\n\n7. The First (or One) is the potentiality of movement and of rest;\nconsequently, He is superior to both things. The Second principle\nrelates to the First by its motion and its rest; it is Intelligence,\nbecause, differing from the First, it directs its thought towards Him,\nwhile the First does not think (because He comprises both the thinking\nthing, and the thing thought); He thinks himself, and, by that very\nthing, He is defective, because His good consists in thinking, not in\nits \"hypostasis\" (or existence).\n\n\nOF ACTUALITY AND POTENTIALITY.\n\n8. What passes from potentiality to actuality, and always remains\nthe same so long as it exists, approaches actuality. It is thus that\nthe bodies such as fire may possess perfection. But what passes from\npotentiality to actuality cannot exist always, because it contains\nmatter. On the contrary, what exists actually, and what is simple,\nexists always. Besides, what is actual may also in certain respects\nexist potentially.\n\n\nTHE GOOD IS SUPERIOR TO THOUGHT; THE HIGHEST DIVINITIES ARE NOT THE\nSUPREME.\n\n9. The divinities which occupy the highest rank are nevertheless\nnot the First; for Intelligence (from which proceed the divinities\nof the highest rank, that is, the perfect intelligences) is (or, is\nconstituted by) all the intelligible essences, and, consequently,\ncomprises both motion and rest. Nothing like this is in the First.\nHe is related to nothing else, while the other things subsist in Him\nin their rest, and direct their motion towards Him. Motion is an\naspiration, and the First aspires to nothing. Towards what would He,\nin any case, aspire? He does not think himself; and they who say that\nHe thinks Himself mean by it only that He possesses Himself. But when\none says that a thing thinks, it is not because it possesses itself,\nit is because it contemplates the First; that is the first actuality,\nthought itself, the first thought, to which none other can be anterior;\nonly, it is inferior to the principle from which it derives its\nexistence, and occupies the second rank after it. Thought is therefore\nnot the most sacred thing; consequently, not all thought is sacred; the\nonly sacred thought is that of the Good, and this (Good) is superior to\nthought.\n\n\nTHE GOOD IS SUPERIOR EVEN TO SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND LIFE.\n\nWill the Good not be self-conscious? It is claimed by some that the\nGood would be good only if it possessed self-consciousness. But if it\nbe Goodness, it is goodness before having self-consciousness. If the\nGood be good only because it has self-consciousness, it was not good\nbefore having self-consciousness; but, on the other hand, if there be\nno goodness, no possible consciousness can therefore exist. (Likewise,\nsomeone may ask) does not the First live? He cannot be said to live,\nbecause He Himself gives life.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME IS THEREFORE ABOVE THOUGHT.\n\nThus the principle which is self-conscious, which thinks itself (that\nis, Intelligence), occupies only the second rank. Indeed, if this\nprinciple be self-conscious, it is only to unite itself to itself by\nthis act of consciousness; but if it study itself, it is the result\nof ignoring itself, because its nature is defective, and it becomes\nperfect only by thought. Thought should therefore not be attributed to\nthe First; for, to attribute something to Him would be to imply that He\nhad been deprived thereof, and needed it.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND ENNEAD, BOOK TWO.\n\nAbout the Movement of the Heavens.\n\n\nQUESTIONS ABOUT THE MOVEMENTS OF THE HEAVENS.\n\n1. Why do the heavens move in a circle? Because they imitate\nIntelligence. But to what does this movement belong? To the Soul, or\nto the body? Does it occur because the Soul is within the celestial\nsphere, which tends to revolve about her? Is the Soul within this\nsphere without being touched thereby? Does she cause this sphere to\nmove by her own motion? Perhaps the Soul which moves this sphere should\nnot move it in the future, although she did so in the past; that is,\nthe soul made it remain immovable, instead of ceaselessly imparting\nto it a circular movement. Perhaps the Soul herself might remain\nimmovable; or, if she move at all, it will at least not be a local\nmovement.\n\n\nTHREE KINDS OF MOVEMENT.\n\nHow can the Soul impart to the heavens a local movement, herself\npossessing a different kind of motion? Perhaps the circular movement,\nwhen considered by itself, may not seem a local movement. If then it be\na local movement only by accident, what is its own nature, by itself?\nIt is the reflection upon itself, the movement of consciousness, of\nreflection, of life; it withdraws nothing from the world, it changes\nthe location of nothing, while embracing all. Indeed, the power which\ngoverns the universal Animal (or world) embraces everything, and\nunifies everything. If then it remained immovable, it would not embrace\neverything either vitally or locally; it would not preserve the life of\nthe interior parts of the body it possesses, because the bodily life\nimplies movement. On the contrary, if it be a local movement, the Soul\nwill possess a movement only such as it admits of. She will move, not\nonly as soul, but as an animated body, and as an animal; her movement\nwill partake both of the movement proper to the soul, and proper to the\nbody. Now the movement proper to the body is to mobilize in a straight\nline; the movement proper to the Soul, is to contain; while both of\nthese movements result in a third, the circular movement which includes\nboth transportation and permanence.\n\n\nFIRE MOVES STRAIGHT ONLY PRELIMINARILY.\n\nTo the assertion that the circular movement is a corporeal movement,\nit might be objected that one can see that every body, even fire,\nmoves in a straight line. However, the fire moves in a straight line\nonly till it reaches the place assigned to it by the universal order\n(it constitutes the heavens, which are its proper place). By virtue of\nthis order its nature is permanent, and it moves towards its assigned\nlocation. Why then does the fire as soon as it has arrived there, not\nabide there quiescently? Because its very nature is constant movement;\nif it went in a straight line, it would dissipate; consequently, it\nnecessarily possesses a circular motion. That is surely a providential\narrangement. Providence placed fire within itself (because it\nconstitutes the heavens, which are its location); so that, as soon as\nit finds itself in the sky it must spontaneously move in a circle.\n\n\nWHY SOUL ASSUMES A CIRCULAR MOTION.\n\nWe might further say that, if the fire tended to move in a straight\nline, it must effect a return upon itself in the only place where it is\npossible (in the heavens), inasmuch as there is no place outside of the\nworld where it could go. In fact there is no further place, beyond the\ncelestial fire, for itself constitutes the last place in the universe;\nit therefore moves in a circle in the place at its disposal; it is its\nown place, but not to remain immovable, but to move. In a circle, the\ncentre is naturally immovable; and were the circumference the same, it\nwould be only an immense centre. It is therefore better that the fire\nshould turn around the centre in this living and naturally organized\nbody. Thus the fire will tend towards the centre, not in stopping, for\nit would lose its circular form, but in moving itself around it; thus\nonly will it be able to satisfy its tendency (towards the universal\nSoul). However, if this power effect the movement of the body of the\nuniverse, it does not drag it like a burden, nor give it an impulsion\ncontrary to its nature. For nature is constituted by nothing else\nthan the order established by the universal Soul. Besides, as the\nwhole Soul is everywhere, and is not divided into parts, it endows the\nsky with all the ubiquity it can assimilate, which can occur only by\ntraversing all of it. If the Soul remained immovable in one place, she\nwould remain immovable as soon as the heavens reached this place; but\nas the Soul is everywhere, they would seek to reach her everywhere.\nCan the heavens never reach the Soul? On the contrary, they reach her\nceaselessly; for the Soul, in ceaselessly attracting them to herself,\nendues them with a continual motion by which she carries them, not\ntowards some other place, but towards herself, and in the same place,\nnot in a straight line, but in a circle, and thus permits them to\npossess her in all the places which she traverses.\n\n\nWHY THE HEAVENS DO NOT REMAIN STILL.\n\nThe heavens would be immovable if the Soul rested, that is, if she\nremained only in the intelligible world, where everything remains\nimmovable. But because the Soul is in no one determinate place, and\nbecause the whole of her is everywhere, the heavens move through the\nwhole of space; and as they cannot go out of themselves, they must move\nin a circle.\n\n\nHOW OTHER BEINGS MOVE.[314]\n\n2. How do the other beings move? As none of them is the whole, but\nonly a part, consequently, each finds itself situated in a particular\nplace. On the contrary, the heavens are the whole; they constitute the\nplace which excludes nothing, because it is the universe. As to the law\naccording to which men move, each of them, considered in his dependence\ntowards the universe, is a part of all; considered in himself, he is a\nwhole.\n\n\nWHY THE HEAVENS MOVE IN A CIRCLE.\n\nNow, if the heavens possess the Soul, wherever they are, what urges\nthem to move in a circle? Surely because the Soul is not exclusively in\na determinate place (and the world does not exclusively in one place\ndesire to possess her). Besides, if the power of the Soul revolve\naround the centre, it is once more evident that the heavens would move\nin a circle.\n\n\nDIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CENTRE OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY.\n\nBesides, when we speak of the Soul, we must not understand the term\n\"centre\" in the same sense as when it is used of the body. For the\nSoul, the centre is the focus of (the intelligence) whence radiates a\nsecond life (that is, the Soul); as to the body, it is a locality (the\ncentre of the world). Since, however, both soul and body need a centre,\nwe are forced to use this word in an analogous meaning which may suit\nboth of them. Speaking strictly, however, a centre can exist only for\na spherical body, and the analogy consists in this, that the latter,\nlike the Soul, effects a reflection upon itself. In this case, the Soul\nmoves around the divinity, embraces Him, and clings to Him with all\nher might; for everything depends from Him. But, as she cannot unite\nherself to Him, she moves around Him.\n\n\nTHE ADDITION OF OUR BODIES INTRODUCES CONFLICTING MOTIONS.\n\nWhy do not all souls act like the universal Soul? They do act like\nher, but do so only in the place where they are. Why do our bodies not\nmove in a circle, like the heavens? Because they include an element\nwhose natural motion is rectilinear; because they trend towards other\nobjects, because the spherical element[315] in us can no longer easily\nmove in a circle, because it has become terrestrial, while in the\ncelestial region is was light and movable enough. How indeed could it\nremain at rest, while the Soul was in motion, whatever this movement\nwas? This spirit(ual body) which, within us, is spread around the soul,\ndoes the same thing as do the heavens. Indeed, if the divinity be in\neverything, the Soul, which desires to unite herself to Him, must move\naround Him, since He resides in no determinate place. Consequently,\nPlato attributes to the stars, besides the revolution which they\nperform in common with the universe, a particular movement of rotation\naround their own centre. Indeed, every star, in whatever place it may\nbe, is transported with joy while embracing the divinity; and this\noccurs not by reason, but by a natural necessity.\n\n\nHOW MOTION IS IMPARTED TO LOWER EXISTENCES.\n\n3. One more subject remains to be considered. The lowest power of\nthe universal Soul (the inferior soul),[316] rests on the earth,\nand thence radiates abroad throughout the universe. The (higher, or\ncelestial) power (of the world-Soul) which, by nature, possesses\nsensation, opinion, and reasoning, resides in the celestial spheres,\nwhence it dominates the inferior power, and communicates life to it.\nIt thereby moves the inferior power, embracing it in a circle; and\nit presides over the universe as it returns (from the earth) to the\ncelestial spheres. The inferior power, being circularly embraced by\nthe superior power, reflects upon itself, and thus operates on itself\na conversion by which it imparts a movement of rotation to the body\nwithin which it reacts. (This is how motion starts) in a sphere that\nis at rest: as soon as a part moves, the movement spreads to the rest\nof it, and the sphere begins to revolve. Not otherwise is our body;\nwhen our soul begins to move, as in joy, or in the expectation of\nwelfare, although this movement be of a kind very different from that\nnatural to a body, this soul-movement produces local motion in the\nbody. Likewise the universal Soul, on high, while approaching the Good,\nand becoming more sensitive (to its proximity), thereby impresses the\nbody with the motion proper to it, namely, the local movement. (Our own\nhuman) sense-(faculty), while receiving its good from above, and while\nenjoying the pleasures proper to its nature, pursues the Good, and,\ninasmuch as the Good is everywhere present, it is borne everywhere.\nThe intelligence is moved likewise; it is simultaneously at rest and\nin motion, reflecting upon itself. Similarly the universe moves in a\ncircle, though simultaneously standing still.\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.\n\nOf Our Individual Guardian.\n\n\nOUTLINE OF NATURES IN THE UNIVERSE.\n\nOther principles remain unmoved while producing and exhibiting\ntheir (\"hypostases,\" substantial acts, or) forms of existence. The\n(universal) Soul, however, is in motion while producing and exhibiting\nher (\"substantial act,\" or) forms of existence, namely, the functions\nof sensation and growth, reaching down as far as (the sphere of the)\nplants. In us also does the Soul function, but she does not dominate\nus, constituting only a part of our nature. She does, however,\ndominate in plants, having as it were remained alone there. Beyond\nthat sphere, however, nature begets nothing; for beyond it exists no\nlife, begotten (matter) being lifeless. All that was begotten prior\nto this was shapeless, and achieved form only by trending towards its\nbegetting principle, as to its source of life. Consequently, that\nwhich is begotten cannot be a form of the Soul, being lifeless, but\nmust be absolute in determination. The things anterior (to matter,\nnamely, the sense-power and nature), are doubtless indeterminate,\nbut only so within their form; the are not absolutely indeterminate;\nthey are indeterminate only in respect of their perfection. On the\ncontrary, that which exists at present, namely, (matter), is absolutely\nindeterminate. When it achieves perfection, it becomes body, on\nreceiving the form suited to its power. This (form) is the receptacle\nof the principle which has begotten it, and which nourishes it. It is\nthe only trace of the higher things in the body, which occupies the\nlast rank amidst the things below.\n\n\nAFTER DEATH, MAN BECOMES WHAT HE HAS LIVED.\n\n2. It is to this (universal) Soul especially that may be applied\nthese words of Plato:[317] \"The general Soul cares for all that is\ninanimate.\" The other (individual) souls are in different conditions.\n\"The Soul (adds Plato), circulates around the heavens successively\nassuming divers forms\"; that is, the forms of thought, sense or growth.\nThe part which dominates in the soul fulfills its proper individual\nfunction; the others remain inactive, and somehow seem exterior to\nthem. In man, it is not the lower powers of the soul that dominate.\nThey do indeed co-exist with the others. Neither is it always the\nbest power (reason), which always dominates; for the inferior powers\nequally have their place. Consequently, man (besides being a reasonable\nbeing) is also a sensitive being, because he possesses sense-organs.\nIn many respects, he is also a vegetative being; for his body feeds\nand grows just like a plant. All these powers (reason, sensibility,\ngrowth), therefore act together in the man; but it is the best of them\nthat characterizes the totality of the man (so that he is called a\n\"reasonable being\"). On leaving the body the soul becomes the power she\nhad preponderatingly developed. Let us therefore flee from here below,\nand let us raise ourselves to the intelligible world, so as not to fall\ninto the pure sense-life, by allowing ourselves to follow sense-images,\nor into the life of growth, by abandoning ourselves to the pleasures\nof physical love, and to gormandizing; rather, let us rise to the\nintelligible world, to the intelligence, to the divinity!\n\n\nLAWS OF TRANSMIGRATION.\n\nThose who have exercised their human faculties are re-born as men.\nThose who have made use of their senses only, pass into the bodies of\nbrutes, and particularly into the bodies of wild animals, if they have\nyielded themselves to the transports of anger; so that, even in this\ncase, the difference of the bodies they animate is proportioned to the\ndifference of their inclinations. Those whose only effort it was to\nsatisfy their desires and appetites pass into the bodies of lascivious\nand gluttonous animals.[318] Last, those who instead of following\ntheir desires or their anger, have rather degraded their senses by\ntheir inertia, are reduced to vegetate in plants; for in their former\nexistence they exercised nothing but their vegetative power, and they\nworked at nothing but to make trees of themselves.[319] Those who\nhave loved too much the enjoyments of music, and who otherwise lived\npurely, pass into the bodies of melodious birds. Those who have reigned\ntyrannically, become eagles, if they have no other vice.[320] Last,\nthose who spoke lightly of celestial things, having kept their glance\ndirected upwards, are changed into birds which usually fly towards the\nhigh regions of the air.[321] He who has acquired civil virtues again\nbecomes a man; but if he does not possess them to a sufficient degree,\nhe is transformed into a sociable animal, such as the bee, or other\nanimal of the kind.\n\n\nOUR GUARDIAN IS THE NEXT HIGHER FACULTY OF OUR BEING.\n\n3. What then is our guardian? It is one of the powers of our soul.\nWhat is our divinity? It is also one of the powers of our soul. (Is it\nthe power which acts principally in us as some people think?) For the\npower which acts in us seems to be that which leads us, since it is\nthe principle which dominates in us. Is that the guardian to which we\nhave been allotted during the course of our life?[323] No: our guardian\nis the power immediately superior to the one that we exercise, for it\npresides over our life without itself being active. The power which\nis active in us is inferior to the one that presides over our life,\nand it is the one which essentially constitutes us. If then we live\non the plane of the sense-life, our guardian is reason; if we live on\nthe rational plane, our guardian will be the principal superior to\nreason (namely, intelligence); it will preside over our life, but it\nitself does not act, leaving that to the inferior power. Plato truly\nsaid that \"we choose our guardian\"; for, by the kind of life that we\nprefer, we choose the guardian that presides over our life. Why then\ndoes He direct us? He directs us during the course of our mortal life\n(because he is given to us to help us to accomplish our (destiny); but\nhe can no longer direct us when our destiny is accomplished, because\nthe power over the exercise of which he presided allows another power\nto act in his place (which however is dead, since the life in which it\nacted is terminated). This other power wishes to act in its turn, and,\nafter having established its preponderance, it exercises itself during\nthe course of a new life, itself having another guardian. If then we\nshould chance to degrade ourselves by letting an inferior power prevail\nin us, we are punished for it. Indeed, the evil man degenerates because\nthe power which he has developed in his life makes him descend to the\nexistence of the brute, by assimilating him to it by his morals. If\nwe could follow the guardian who is superior to him, he himself would\nbecome superior by sharing his life. He would then take as guide a\npart of himself superior to the one that governs him, then another\npart, still more elevated until he had arrived at the highest. Indeed,\nthe soul is several things, or rather, the soul is all things; she\nis things both inferior and superior; she contains all the degrees\nof life. Each of us, in a certain degree, is the intelligible world;\nby our inferior part we are related to the sense-world, and by our\nsuperior part, to the intelligible world; we remain there on high by\nwhat constitutes our intelligible essence; we are attached here below\nby the powers which occupy the lowest rank in the soul. Thus we cause\nan emanation, or rather an actualization which implies no loss to the\nintelligible, to pass from the intelligible into the sense-world.\n\n\nTHE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DESCEND; IT IS THE SENSE-WORLD THAT RISES.\n\n4. Is the power which is the act of the soul always united to a body?\nNo; for when the soul turns towards the superior regions, she raises\nthis power with her. Does the universal (Soul) also raise with herself\nto the intelligible world the inferior power which is her actualization\n(nature)? No: for she does not incline towards her low inferior\nportion, because she neither came nor descended into the world; but,\nwhile she remains in herself, the body of the world comes to unite with\nher, and to offer itself to receive her light's radiation; besides, her\nbody does not cause her any anxiety, because it is not exposed to any\nperil. Does not the world, then, possess any senses? \"It has no sight\"\n(says Plato[324]) \"for it has no eyes. Neither has it ears, nostrils,\nnor tongue.\" Does it, then, as we, possess the consciousness of what is\ngoing on within it? As, within the world, all things go on uniformly\naccording to nature, it is, in this respect, in a kind of repose;\nconsequently, it does not feel any pleasure. The power of growth\nexists within it without being present therein; and so also with the\nsense-power. Besides, we shall return to a study of the question. For\nthe present, we have said all that relates to the question in hand.\n\n\nTHE GUIDANCE OF THE GUARDIAN DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH MORAL\nRESPONSIBILITY.\n\n5. But if (before coming on to the earth) the soul chooses her life\nand her guardian, how do we still preserve our liberty? Because what\nis called \"choice\" designates in an allegorical manner the character\nof the soul, and her general disposition everywhere. Again, it is\nobjected that if the character of the soul preponderate, if the soul\nbe dominated by that part which her former life rendered predominantly\nactive, it is no longer the body which is her cause of evil; for if\nthe character of the soul be anterior to her union with the body; if\nshe have the character she has chosen; if, as said (Plato), she do not\nchange her guardian, it is not here below that a man may become good or\nevil. The answer to this is, that potentially man is equally good or\nevil. (By his choices) however he may actualize one or the other.\n\n\nTHE SOUL HAS THE POWER TO CONFORM TO HER CHARACTER THE DESTINY ALLOTTED\nTO HER.\n\nWhat then would happen if a virtuous man should have a body of evil\nnature, or a vicious man a body of a good nature? The goodness of the\nsoul has more or less influence on the goodness of the body. Exterior\ncircumstances cannot thus alter the character chosen by the soul. When\n(Plato) says that the lots are spread out before the souls, and that\nlater the different kinds of conditions are displayed before them,\nand that the fortune of each results from the choice made amidst the\ndifferent kinds of lives present--a choice evidently made according to\nher character--(Plato) evidently attributes to the soul the power of\nconforming to her character the condition allotted to her.\n\n\nOUR GUARDIAN IS BOTH RELATED TO US, AND INDEPENDENT OF US.\n\nBesides, our guardian is not entirely exterior to us; and, on the\nother hand, he is not bound to us, and is not active in us; he is\nours, in the sense that he has a certain relation with our soul; he is\nnot ours, in the sense that we are such men, living such a life under\nhis supervision. This is the meaning of the terms used (by Plato) in\nthe Timaeus.[325] If these be taken in the above sense, all explains\nitself; if not, Plato contradicts himself.\n\n\nOUR GUARDIAN HELPS US TO CARRY OUT THE DESTINY WE HAVE CHOSEN.\n\nOne can still understand thus why he says that our guardian helps us\nto fulfil the destiny we have chosen. In fact, presiding over our\nlife, he does not permit us to descend very far below the condition we\nhave chosen. But that which then is active is the principle below the\nguardian and which can neither transcend him, nor equal him; for he\ncould not become different from what he is.\n\n\nTHAT MAN IS VIRTUOUS WHOSE HIGHEST PRINCIPLE IS ACTIVE WITHIN HIM.\n\n6. Who then is the virtuous man? He in whom is active the highest part\nof the soul. If his guardian contributed to his actions, he would not\ndeserve being called virtuous. Now it is the Intelligence which is\nactive in the virtuous man. It is the latter, then, who is a guardian,\nor lives according to one; besides, his guardian is the divinity.\nIs this guardian above Intelligence? Yes, if the guardian have, as\nguardian, the principle superior to Intelligence (the Good). But why\ndoes the virtuous man not enjoy this privilege since the beginning?\nBecause of the trouble he felt in falling into generation. Even before\nthe exercise of reason, he has within him a desire which leads him\nto the things which are suitable to him. But does this desire direct\nwith sovereign influence? No, not with sovereignty; for the soul is so\ndisposed that, in such circumstances becoming such, she adopts such a\nlife, and follows such an inclination.\n\n\nBETWEEN INCARNATIONS IS THE TIME OF JUDGMENT AND EXPIATION.\n\n(Plato) says that the guardian leads the soul to the hells,[326]\nand that he does not remain attached to the same soul, unless this\nsoul should again choose the same condition. What does the guardian\ndo before this choice? Plato teaches us that he leads the soul to\njudgment, that after the generation he assumes again the same form\nas before; and then as if another existence were then beginning,\nduring the time between generations, the guardian presides over the\nchastisements of the souls, and this period is for them not so much a\nperiod of life, as a period of expiation.\n\n\nEVEN THE SOULS ENTERING INTO ANIMAL BODIES HAVE A GUARDIAN.\n\nDo the souls that enter into the bodies of brutes also have a guardian?\nYes, doubtless, but an evil or stupid one.\n\n\nCONDITION OF SOULS IN THE HIGHER REGIONS.\n\nWhat is the condition of the souls that have raised themselves on high?\nSome are in the sensible world, others are outside of it. The souls\nthat are in the sense-world dwell in the sun, or in some other planet,\nor in the firmament, according as they have more or less developed\ntheir reason. We must, indeed, remember that our soul contains in\nherself not only the intelligible world, but also a disposition\nconformable to the Soul of the world. Now as the latter is spread out\nin the movable spheres and in the immovable sphere by her various\npowers, our soul must possess powers conformable to these, each of\nwhich exercise their proper function. The souls which rise from here\nbelow into the heavens go to inhabit the star which harmonizes with\ntheir moral life, and with the power which they have developed; with\ntheir divinity, or their guardian. Then they will have either the same\nguardian, or the guardian which is superior to the power which they\nexert. This matter will have to be considered more minutely.\n\n\nFATE OF THE DIVISIBLE HUMAN SOUL.\n\nAs to the souls which have left the sense-world, so long as they remain\nin the intelligible world, they are above the guardian condition,\nand the fatality of generation. Souls bring with them thither that\npart of their nature which is desirous of begetting, and which may\nreasonably be regarded as the essence which is divisible in the body,\nand which multiplies by dividing along with the bodies. Moreover, if\na soul divide herself, it is not in respect to extension; because she\nis entirely in all the bodies. On the other hand, the Soul is one; and\nfrom a single animal are ceaselessly born many young. This generative\nelement splits up like the vegetative nature in plants; for this nature\nis divisible in the bodies. When this divisible essence dwells in the\nsame body, it vivifies the body, just as the vegetative power does for\nplants. When it retires, it has already communicated life, as is seen\nin cut trees, or in corpses where putrefaction has caused the birth of\nseveral animals from a single one. Besides, the vegetative power of the\nhuman soul is assisted by the vegetative power that is derived from the\nuniversal (Soul), and which here below is the same (as on high).\n\n\nFATE CONSISTS IN THE UNPREDICTABLE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ALTER THE\nLIFE-CURRENTS.\n\nIf the soul return here below, she possesses, according to the life\nwhich she is to lead, either the same guardian, or another. With her\nguardian she enters into this world as if in a skiff. Then she is\nsubjected to the power (by Plato) called the Spindle of Necessity;[327]\nand, embarking in this world, she takes the place assigned to her by\nfortune. Then she is caught by the circular movement of the heavens,\nwhose action, as if it were the wind, agitates the skiff in which the\nsoul is seated; or rather, is borne along. Thence are born varied\nspectacles, transformations and divers incidents for the soul which\nis embarked in this skiff; whether because of the agitation of the\nsea which bears it, or because of the conduct of the passenger who is\nsailing in the bark, and who preserves her freedom of action therein.\nIndeed, not every soul placed in the same circumstances makes the same\nmovements, wills the same volitions, or performs the same actions. For\ndifferent beings, therefore, the differences arise from circumstances\neither similar or different, or even the same events may occur to\nthem under different circumstances. It is this (uncertainty) that\nconstitutes Providence.\n\n\n\n\nFIRST ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.\n\nOf Suicide.\n\n\nEVIL EFFECTS OF SUICIDE ON THE SOUL HERSELF.\n\n1. (As says pseudo-Zoroaster, in his Magic Oracles), \"The soul should\nnot be expelled from the body by violence, lest she go out (dragging\nalong with her something foreign,\" that is, corporeal). In this case,\nshe will be burdened with this foreign element whithersoever she may\nemigrate. By \"emigrating,\" I mean passing into the Beyond. On the\ncontrary, one should wait until the entire body naturally detaches\nitself from the soul; in which case she no longer needs to pass into\nany other residence, being completely unburdened of the body.\n\n\nHOW TO DETACH THE SOUL FROM THE BODY NATURALLY.\n\nHow will the body naturally detach itself from the soul? By the\ncomplete rupture of the bonds which keep the soul attached to the body,\nby the body's impotence to fetter the soul, on account of the complete\ndestruction of the harmony which conferred this power on it.\n\n\nVOLUNTARY SOUL-DETACHMENT IS FORBIDDEN.\n\nOne may not voluntarily disengage oneself from the fetters of the body.\nWhen violence is employed, it is not the body which disengages itself\nfrom the soul, it is the soul which makes an effort to snatch herself\nfrom the body, and that by an action which accomplishes itself not in\nthe state of impassibility (which suits a sage), but as the result of\ngrief, or suffering, or of anger. Now such an action is forbidden, or\nunworthy.\n\n\nSUICIDE UNAVAILABLE EVEN TO AVOID INSANITY.\n\nMay one not forestall delirium or insanity, if one become aware of\ntheir approach? To begin with, insanity does not happen to a sage, and\nif it does, this accident should be considered one of those inevitable\nthings which depend from fatality, and in which case one should direct\none's path less according to his intrinsic quality than according to\ncircumstances; for perhaps the poison one might select to eject the\nsoul from the body might do nothing but injure the soul.\n\n\nSUICIDE IS UNADVISABLE, FOR TWO REASONS.\n\nIf there be an appointed time for the life of each of us, it is\nnot well to forestall the decree of Providence, unless, as we have\nsaid,[328] under absolute compulsion.\n\nLast, if rank obtained above depend on the state obtaining at the time\nof exit from the body, no man should separate himself from it so long\nas he might still achieve progress.[329]\n\n\n\n\nSECOND ENNEAD, BOOK SIX.\n\nOf Essence and Being.\n\n\nDISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND BEING.\n\n1. Is \"essence\" something different from \"being\"? Does essence indicate\nan abstraction of the other (four categories), and is being, on the\ncontrary, essence with the other (four categories), motion and rest,\nidentity and difference? Are these the elements of being? Yes: \"being\"\nis the totality of these things, of which one is essence, the other is\nmotion, and so forth. Motion, therefore, is accidental essence. Is it\nalso accidental \"being?\" Or is it being completely? Motion is being,\nbecause all intelligible things are beings. But why is not each of the\nsense-things a being? The reason is, that on high all things form only\na single group of totality, while here below they are distinct one from\nanother because they are images that have been distinguished. Likewise,\nin a seminal (reason), all things are together, and each of them is\nall the others; the hand is not distinct from the head; while, on the\ncontrary, in a body all the organs are separate, because they are\nimages instead of being genuine beings.\n\n\nDISTINCTION BETWEEN COMPLEMENTS OF BEING, AND QUALITIES.\n\nWe may now say that, in the intelligible world, qualities are the\ncharacteristic differences in being or essence. These differences\neffect distinction between the beings; in short, they cause them to\nbe beings. This definition seems reasonable. But it does not suit the\nqualities below (in the sense-world); some are differences of being,\nas biped, or quadruped (as thought Aristotle);[330] others are not\ndifferences, and on that very account are called qualities. Still,\nthe same thing may appear a difference when it is a complement of\nthe being, and again it may not seem a difference when it is not a\ncomplement of the being, but an accident: as, for instance, whiteness\nis a complement of being in a swan, or in white lead; but in a human\nbeing like you, it is only an accident (as thought Aristotle).[331] So\nlong as the whiteness is in the (\"seminal) reason,\" it is a complement\nof being, and not a quality; if it be on the surface of a being, it is\na quality.\n\n\nDISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENTIAL AND MODAL QUALITIES.\n\nTwo kinds of qualities must be distinguished; the essential quality,\nwhich is a peculiarity of its being, and the mere quality, which\naffects the being's classification. The mere quality introduces no\nchange in the essence, and causes none of its characteristics to\ndisappear; but, when the being exists already, and is complete,\nthis quality gives it a certain exterior disposition; and, whether\nin the case of a soul or body, adds something to it. Thus visible\nwhiteness, which is of the very being of white lead, is not of the\nbeing of the swan, because a swan may be of some color other than\nwhite. Whiteness then completes the being of white lead, just as heat\ncompletes the being of fire. If igneousness is said to be the being\nof fire, whiteness is also the being of white lead. Nevertheless,\nthe igneousness of the visible fire is heat, which constitutes the\ncomplement of its being; and whiteness plays the same part with respect\nto white lead. Therefore (differing according to the difference of\nvarious beings) the same things will be complements of being, and\nwill not be qualities, or they will not be complements of being, and\nwill be qualities; but it would not be reasonable to assert that\nthese qualities are different according to whether or not they are\ncomplements of being, since their nature is the same.\n\n\nDISTINCTION BETWEEN WHATNESS AND AFFECTIONS OF BEING.\n\nWe must acknowledge that the reasons which produce these things (as\nheat, and whiteness) are beings, if taken in their totality; but on\nconsidering their production, we see that what constitutes a whatness\nor quiddity (the Aristotelian \"what it were to be\") in the intelligible\nworld, becomes a quality in the sense-world. Consequently, we always\nerr on the subject of the quiddity, when we try to determine it,\nmistaking the simple quality for it (as thought Plato),[332] for, when\nwe perceive a quality, the fire is not what we call fire, but a being.\nAs to the things which arrest our gaze, we should distinguish them from\nthe quiddity, and define them by the qualities of sense (objects); for\nthey do not constitute the being, but the affections of being.\n\n\nACTUALIZED BEING LESS PERFECT THAN ESSENCE.\n\nWe are thus led to ask how a being can be composed of non-beings? It\nhas already been pointed out that the things subject to generation\ncould not be identical with the principles from which they proceed. Let\nus now add that they could not be beings. But still, how can one say\nthat the intelligible being is constituted by a non-being? The reason\nis that in the intelligible world since being forms a purer and more\nrefined essence, being really is somehow constituted by the differences\nof essence; or rather, we feel it ought to be called being from\nconsidering it together with its energies (or, actualizations). This\nbeing seems to be a perfecting of essence; but perhaps being is less\nperfect when it is thus considered together with its actualizations;\nfor, being less simple, it veers away from essence.\n\n\nSUCHNESS IS LATER THAN BEING AND QUIDDITY.\n\n2. Let us now consider what quality in general is; for when we shall\nknow this, our doubts will cease. First, must it be admitted that one\nand the same thing is now a quality, and then a complement of being?\nCan one say that quality is the complement of being, or rather of such\na being? The suchness of being implies a previously existing being and\nquiddity.\n\n\nBEING CANNOT PRECEDE SUCH BEING.\n\nTaking the illustration of fire, is it \"mere being\" before it is \"such\nbeing?\" In this case, it would be a body. Consequently, the body will\nbe a being; fire will be a hot body. Body and heat combined will not\nconstitute being; but heat will exist in the body as in you exists the\nproperty of having a stub nose (as said Aristotle).[333] Consequently,\nif we abstract heat, shine and lightness, which seem to be qualities,\nand also impenetrability, nothing will remain but tridimensional\nextension, and matter will be \"being.\" But this hypothesis does not\nseem likely; it is rather form which will be \"being.\"\n\n\nFORM IS NOT A QUALITY; BUT A REASON.\n\nIs form a quality? No: form is a reason. Now what is constituted by\n(material) substance, and reason? (In the warm body) it is neither what\nburns, nor what is visible; it is quality. If, however, it be said that\ncombustion is an act emanating from reason, that being hot and white\nare actualities, we could not find anything to explain quality.\n\n\nQUALITIES ARE ACTS OF BEING, PROCEEDING FROM REASONS AND ESSENTIAL\nPOTENTIALITIES.\n\nWhat we call a complement of being should not be termed a quality,\nbecause they are actualizations of being, actualizations which proceed\nfrom the reasons and the essential potentialities. Qualities are\ntherefore something outside of being; something which does not at times\nseem to be, and at other times does not seem not to be qualities;\nsomething which adds to being something that is not necessary; for\nexample, virtues and vices, ugliness and beauty, health, and individual\nresemblance. Though triangle, and tetragon, each considered by itself,\nare not qualities; yet being \"transformed into triangular appearance\"\nis a quality; it is not therefore triangularity, but triangular\nformation, which is a quality. The same could be said of the arts\nand professions. Consequently, quality is a disposition, either\nadventitious or original, in already existing beings. Without it,\nhowever, being would exist just as much. It might be said that quality\nis either mutable or immutable; for it forms two kinds, according to\nwhether it be permanent or changeable.\n\n\nDIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTELLIGIBLE AND SENSE-QUALITY.\n\n3. The whiteness that I see in you is not a quality, but an\nactualization of the potentiality of whitening. In the intelligible\nworld all the things that we call qualities are actualizations.\nThey are called qualities because they are properties, because they\ndifferentiate the beings from each other, because in respect to\nthemselves they bear a particular character. But since quality in\nthe sense-world is also an actualization, in what does it differ\nfrom the intelligible quality? The sense-quality does not show the\nessential quality of every being, nor the difference or character of\nsubstances, but simply the thing that we properly call quality, and\nwhich is an actualization in the intelligible world. When the property\nof something is to be a being, this thing is not a quality. But when\nreason separates beings from their properties, when it removes nothing\nfrom them, when it limits itself to conceiving and begetting different\nfrom these beings, it begets quality, which it conceives of as the\nsuperficial part of being. In this case, nothing hinders the heat of\nthe fire, so far as it is natural to it, from constituting a form, an\nactualization, and not a quality of the fire; it is a quality when it\nexists in a substance where it no longer constitutes the form of being,\nbut only a trace, an adumbration, an image of being, because it finds\nitself separated from the being whose actualization it is.\n\n\nQUALITIES ARE ACCIDENTAL SHAPES OF BEING.\n\nQualities, therefore, are everything that, instead of being\nactualizations and forms of beings, are only its accidents, and only\nreveal its shapes. We will therefore call qualities the habituations\nand the dispositions which are not essential to substances. The\narchetypes (or models) of qualities are the actualizations of the\nbeings, which are the principles of these qualities. It is impossible\nfor the same thing at one time to be, and at another not to be a\nquality. What can be separated from being is quality; what remains\nunited to being is being, form, and actualization. In fact, nothing can\nbe the same in itself, and in some other condition where it has ceased\nto be form and an actualization. What, instead of being the form of a\nbeing, is always its accident, is purely and exclusively a quality.\n\n\n\n\nFIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN.\n\nDo Ideas of Individuals Exist?\n\n\nTWO POSSIBLE HYPOTHESES OF IDEAS OF INDIVIDUALS.\n\n1. Do ideas of individuals (as well as of classes of individuals),\nexist? This means that if I, in company with some other man, were to\ntrace ourselves back to the intelligible world, we would there find\nseparate individual principles corresponding to each of us. (This might\nimply either of two theories.) Either, if the individual named Socrates\nbe eternal, and if the soul of Socrates be Socrates himself, then the\nsoul of each individual is contained in the intelligible world. Or\nif, on the contrary, the individual named Socrates be not eternal, if\nthe same soul can belong successively to several individuals, such as\nSocrates or Pythagoras, then (as Alcinoous, e. g., and other Platonists\ninsist), each individual does not have his idea in the intelligible\nworld.\n\n\nTHE FIRST (NON-PLATONIC) HYPOTHESIS ALONE RIGHT.\n\nIf the particular soul of each man contains (\"seminal) reasons\" of\nall the things she does, then each individual corresponds to his idea\nin the intelligible world, for we admit that each soul contains as\nmany (\"seminal) reasons\" as the entire world. In this case, the soul\nwould contain not only the (\"seminal) reasons\" of men but also those\nof all animals, the number of these reasons will be infinite, unless\n(as the Stoics teach) the world does not re-commence the identical\nseries of existences in fixed periods; for the only means of limiting\nthe infinity of reasons, is that the same things should reproduce\nthemselves.\n\n\nDIFFERENCE OF THINGS DEPEND ON THEIR SEMINAL REASONS.\n\nBut, if produced things may be more numerous than their specimens,\nwhat would be the necessity for the \"reasons\" and specimens of all\nindividuals begotten during some one period? It would seem that the\n(idea of) the \"man himself\" to explain the existence of all men, and\nthat the souls of a finite number of them could successively animate\nmen of an infinite number. (To this contention we demur: for) it\nis impossible for different things to have an identical (\"seminal)\nreason.\" The (idea of) the man himself would not, as model, suffice\n(to account) for men who differ from each other not only by matter,\nbut also by specific differences. They cannot be compared to the\nimages of Socrates which reproduce their model. Only the difference\nof the (\"seminal) reasons\" could give rise to individual differences.\n(As Plato said),[334] the entire period contains all the (\"seminal)\nreasons.\" When it recommences, the same things rearise through the same\n\"reasons.\" We need not fear that, as a consequence, there would be an\ninfinite (number or variety) of them in the intelligible world; for the\nmultitude (of the seminal reasons) constitutes an indivisible principle\nfrom which each issues forth whenever active.\n\n\nSEX ALONE WOULD NOT ACCOUNT FOR THIS DIVERSITY.\n\n2. (First objection): The manner in which the (\"seminal) reasons\"\nof the male and female unite, in the act of generation, suffices to\naccount for the diversity of individuals, without implying that each\nof them possesses its own (\"seminal) reason.\" The generating principle,\nthe male, for example, will not propagate according to different\n(\"seminal) reasons,\" since it possesses all of them, but only according\nto its own, or those of its father. Since it possesses all of the\n(\"seminal) reasons,\" nothing would hinder it from begetting according\nto different \"reasons,\" only, there are always some which are more\ndisposed to act than are others.\n\n\nEXPLANATION OF THE DIVERSITY FROM SAME PARENTS\n\n(Second objection): Please explain how differing individuals are\nborn from the same parents. This diversity, if it be anything\nmore than merely apparent, depends on the manner in which the two\ngenerating principles concur in the act of generation; at one time\nthe male predominates, at other times, the female; again, they may\nboth act equally. In either case, the (\"seminal) reason\" is given in\nits entirety, and dominates the matter furnished by either of the\ngenerating principles.\n\n\nVARIETY MAY DEPEND ON THE LATENCY OF PART OF SEMINAL REASONS.\n\n(Third objection): What then is the cause of the difference of the\nindividuals conceived in some other place (than the womb, as in the\nmouth), (as Aristotle[335] and Sextus Empiricus[336] asked)? Would\nit arise from matter being penetrated by the (\"seminal) reason\" in\ndiffering degrees? In this case, all the individuals, except one, would\nbe beings against nature (which, of course, is absurd). The varieties\nof the individuals are a principle of beauty; consequently, form cannot\nbe one of them; ugliness alone should be attributed to the predominance\nof matter. In the intelligible world, the (\"seminal) reasons\" are\nperfect, and they are not given any less entirely for being hidden.\n\n\nLEIBNITZ'S DOCTRINE OF THE INDISCERNIBLES.\n\n(Fourth objection): Granting that the (\"seminal) reasons\" of the\nindividuals are different, why should there be as many as there are\nindividuals which achieve existence in any one period? It is possible\nthat identical \"reasons\" might produce individuals differing in\nexternal appearance; and we have even granted that this may occur\nwhen the (\"seminal) reasons\" are given entirely. It is asked, is\nthis possible when the same \"reasons\" are developed? We teach that\nabsolutely similar things might be reproduced in different periods;\nbut, within the same period, there is nothing absolutely identical.\n\n\nTHERE ARE DIFFERENT IDEAS FOR TWINS, BRETHREN, OR WORKS OF ART.\n\n3. (Fifth objection): But how could (\"seminal) reasons\" be different in\nthe conception of twins, and in the act of generation in the case of\nanimals who procreate multiple offspring? Here it would seem that when\nthe individuals are similar, there could be but one single \"reason.\"\nNo so; for in that case there would not be so many \"reasons\" as there\nare individuals; and, on the contrary, it will have to be granted that\nthere are as many as there are individuals that differ by specific\ndifferences, and not by a mere lack of form. Nothing therefore hinders\nus from admitting that there are different \"reasons,\" even for animal\noffspring which show no difference, if there were such. An artist\nwho produces similar works cannot produce this resemblance without\nintroducing in it some difference which depends on reasoning; so that\nevery work he produces differs from the others, because he adds some\ndifference to the similarity. In nature, where the difference does not\nderive from reasoning, but only from differing (\"seminal) reasons\" the\n(individual) difference will have to be added to the specific form,\neven though we may not be able to discern it. The (\"seminal) reason\"\nwould be different if generation admitted chance as to quantity (the\nnumber of offspring begotten). But if the number of things to be born\nis determinate, the quantity will be limited by the evolution and\ndevelopment of all the \"reasons,\" so that, when the series of all\nthings will be finished, another period may recommence. The quantity\nsuitable to the world, and the number of beings who are to exist\ntherein, are things regulated and contained in the principle which\ncontains all the \"reasons\" (that is, the universal Soul), from the very\nbeginning.\n\n\n\n\nFIRST ENNEAD, BOOK TWO.\n\nConcerning Virtue.\n\n\nVIRTUE THE ROAD TO ESCAPE EVILS.\n\n1. Man must flee from (this world) here below (for two reasons):\nbecause it is the nature of the soul to flee from evil, and because\ninevitable evil prevails and dominates this world here below. What\nis this flight (and how can we accomplish it)? (Plato),[337] tells\nus it consists in \"being assimilated to divinity.\" This then can be\naccomplished by judiciously conforming to justice, and holiness; in\nshort, by virtue.\n\n\nCAN THESE VIRTUES BE ASCRIBED TO THE DIVINITY?\n\nIf then it be by virtue that we are assimilated (to divinity), does\nthis divinity to whom we are trying to achieve assimilation, Himself\npossess virtue? Besides, what divinity is this? Surely it must be He\nwho must most seem to possess virtue, the world-Soul, together with the\nprinciple predominating in her, whose wisdom is most admirable (supreme\nIntelligence)--for it is quite reasonable that we should be assimilated\nto Him. Nevertheless, one might, unreflectingly, question whether all\nvirtues might suit this divinity; whether, for instance, moderation in\nhis desires, or courage could be predicated of Him; for, as to courage,\nnothing can really harm Him, and He therefore has nothing to fear; and\nas to moderation, no pleasant object whose presence would excite His\ndesires, or whose absence would in Him awaken regrets, could possibly\nexist. But inasmuch as the divinity, just as we ourselves, aspires to\nintelligible things, He is evidently the source of our gracious sanity\nand virtues. So we are forced to ask ourselves, \"Does the divinity\npossess these virtues?\"\n\n\nHOMELY VIRTUES ASSIMILATE US TO DIVINITY ONLY PARTIALLY.\n\nIt would not be proper to attribute to Him the homely (or, civil)\nvirtues, such as prudence, which \"relates to the rational part of our\nnature\"; courage, which \"relates to our irascible part\"; temperance,\nwhich consists of the harmonious consonance of our desires and our\nreason; last, of justice, which \"consists in the accomplishment by all\nthese faculties of the function proper to each of them,\" \"whether to\ncommand, or to obey,\" (as said Plato[338]). But if we cannot become\nassimilated to the divinity by these homely virtues, that process\nmust demand similarly named virtues of a superior order. However,\nthese homely virtues would not be entirely useless to achieve that\nresult, for one cannot say that while practising them one does not at\nall resemble the divinity as they who practise them are reputed to be\ngodlike. These lower virtues do therefore yield some resemblance to the\ndivinity, but complete assimilation can result only from virtues of a\nhigher order.\n\n\nTHE DIVINE NEED NOT POSSESS THE LOWER VIRTUES BY WHICH WE ARE\nASSIMILATED TO HIM.\n\nVirtues, even if they be not homely, are therefore ultimately ascribed\n(to the divinity). Granting that the divinity does not possess the\nhomely virtues, we may still become assimilated to Him by other virtues\nfor with virtues of another order the case might differ. Therefore,\nwithout assimilating ourselves to the divinity by homely virtues we\nmight nevertheless by means of virtues which still are ours, become\nassimilated to the Being which does not possess virtue.\n\nThis may be explained by an illustration. When a body is warmed by the\npresence of fire, the fire itself need not be heated by the presence of\nanother fire. It might be argued that there was heat in the fire, but\na heat that is innate. Reasoning by analogy, the virtue, which in the\nsoul is only adventitious, is innate in Him from whom the soul derives\nit by imitation; (in other words, the cause need not necessarily\npossess the same qualities as the effect).\n\nOur argument from heat might however be questioned, inasmuch as the\ndivinity really does possess virtue, though it be of a higher nature.\nThis observation would be correct, if the virtue in which the soul\nparticipates were identical with the principle from which she derives\nit. But there is a complete opposition; for when we see a house, the\nsense-house is not identical with the intelligible House, though\npossessing resemblance thereto. Indeed, the sense-house participates in\norder and proportion, though neither order, proportion, nor symmetry\ncould be attributed to the idea of the House. Likewise, we derived\nfrom the divinity order, proportion and harmony, which, here below,\nare conditions of virtue, without thereby implying that the divinity\nHimself need possess order, proportion, or harmony. Similarly, it is\nnot necessary that He possess virtue, although we become assimilated to\nHim thereby.\n\nSuch is our demonstration that human assimilation to the divine\nIntelligence by virtue does not (necessarily imply) (in the divine\nIntelligence itself) possession of virtue. Mere logical demonstration\nthereof is not, however, sufficient; we must also convince.\n\n\nTHERE ARE TWO KINDS OF RESEMBLANCE.\n\n2. Let us first examine the virtues by which we are assimilated to\nthe divinity, and let us study the identity between our soul-image\nwhich constitutes virtue, and supreme Intelligence's principle\nwhich, without being virtue, is its archetype. There are two kinds\nof resemblance: the first entails such identity of nature as exists\nwhen both similar things proceed from a same principle; the second is\nthat of one thing to another which precedes it, as its principle. In\nthe latter case, there is no reciprocity, and the principle does not\nresemble that which is inferior to it; or rather, the resemblance must\nbe conceived entirely differently. It does not necessitate that the\nsimilar objects be of the same kind; it rather implies that they are of\ndifferent kinds, inasmuch as they resemble each other differently.\n\n\nHOW HOMELY VIRTUES MAY ASSIMILATE MAN TO THE SUPREME.\n\n(It is difficult to define) what is virtue, in general or in\nparticular. To clear up the matter, let us consider one particular\nkind of virtue: then it will be easy to determine the common essence\nunderlying them all.\n\nThe above-mentioned homely virtues really render our souls gracious,\nand improve them, regulating and moderating our appetites, tempering\nour passions, delivering us from false opinions, limiting us within\njust bounds, and they themselves must be determined by some kind of\nmeasure. This measure given to our souls resembles the form given to\nmatter, and the proportion of intelligible things; it is as it were\na trace of what is most perfect above. What is unmeasured, being no\nmore than formless matter, cannot in any way resemble divinity. The\ngreater the participation in form, the greater the assimilation to the\nformless; and the closer we get to form, the greater the participation\ntherein. Thus our soul, whose nature is nearer to divinity and more\nkindred to it than the body is, thereby participates the more in the\ndivine, and increases that resemblance enough to make it seem that the\ndivinity is all that she herself is. Thus arises the deception, which\nrepresents her as the divine divinity, as if her quality constituted\nthat of the divinity. Thus are men of homely virtues assimilated to the\ndivinity.\n\n\nPLATO DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN THE HOMELY AND THE HIGHER VIRTUES.\n\n3. We will now, following (Plato),[339] speak of another kind of\nassimilation as the privilege of a higher virtue. We will thus better\nunderstand the nature of homely virtues, and the higher virtues,\nand the difference between them. Plato is evidently distinguishing\ntwo kinds of virtues when he says that assimilation to the divinity\nconsists in fleeing from (the world) here below; when he adds the\nqualification \"homely\" to the virtues relating to social life; and when\nin another place he asserts[340] that all virtues are processes of\npurification; and it is not to the homely virtues that he attributes\nthe power of assimilating us to the divinity.\n\n\nHOW VIRTUES PURIFY.\n\nHow then do the virtues purify? How does this process of purification\nbring us as near as possible to the divinity? So long as the soul is\nmingled with the body, sharing its passions and opinions, she is evil.\nShe becomes better, that is, she acquires virtues, only when, instead\nof agreeing with the body, she thinks by herself (this is true thought,\nand constitutes prudence); when she ceases to share its passions (in\nother words, temperance); when she no longer fears separation from the\nbody (a state called courage); and last, when reason and intelligence\ncan enforce their command (or justice).\n\n\nSELF-CONTROL IS ASSIMILATION TO THE DIVINITY.\n\nWe may therefore unhesitatingly state that the resemblance to the\ndivinity lies in such regulation, in remaining impassible while\nthinking intelligible things; for what is pure is divine and the\nnature of the divine action is such that whatever imitates it thereby\npossesses wisdom. But it is not the divinity that possesses such a\ndisposition, for dispositions are the property of souls only. Besides,\nthe soul does not think intelligible objects in the same manner as the\ndivinity; what is contained in the divinity is contained within us in\na manner entirely different, or even perhaps is not at all contained.\nFor instance, the divinity's thought is not at all identical with\nours; the divinity's thought is a primary principle from which our\nthought is derived and differs. As the vocal word is only the image\nof the interior reason[341] of the soul, so also is the word of the\nsoul only the image of the Word of a superior principle; and as the\nexterior word, when compared to the interior reason of the soul, seems\ndiscrete, or divided, so the reason of the soul, which is no more than\nthe interpreter of the intelligible word, is discrete, in comparison\nwith the latter. Thus does virtue belong to the soul without belonging\neither to absolute Intelligence, nor to the Principle superior to\nIntelligence.\n\n\nPURIFICATION PRODUCES CONVERSION; AND VIRTUE MAKES USE OF THIS.\n\n4. Purification may be either identical with the above-defined virtue,\nor virtue may be the result of purification. In this case, does virtue\nconsist of the actual process of purification, or in the already\npurified condition? This is our problem here.\n\nThe process of purification is inferior to the already purified\ncondition; for purity is the soul's destined goal. (Negative) purity\nis mere separation from extraneous things; it is not yet (positive)\npossession of its prize. If the soul had possessed goodness before\nlosing her purity, mere purification would be sufficient; and even in\nthis case the residuum of the purification would be the goodness, and\nnot the purification. What is the residuum? Not goodness; otherwise,\nthe soul would not have fallen into evil. The soul therefore possesses\nthe form of goodness, without however being able to remain solidly\nattached thereto, because her nature permits her to turn either to the\ngood, or the evil. The good of the soul is to remain united to her\nsister intelligence; her evil, is to abandon herself to the contrary\nthings. After purifying the soul, therefore, she must be united to the\ndivinity; but this implies turning her towards Him. Now this conversion\ndoes not begin to occur after the purification, but is its very result.\nThe virtue of the soul, therefore, does not consist in her conversion,\nbut in that which she thereby obtains. This is the intuition of her\nintelligible object; its image produced and realized within herself; an\nimage similar to that in the eye, an image which represents the things\nseen. It is not necessary to conclude that the soul did not possess\nthis image, nor had any reminiscence thereof; she no doubt possessed\nit, but inactively, latently, obscurely. To clarify it, to discover her\npossessions, the soul needs to approach the source of all clearness.\nAs, however, the soul possesses only the images of the intelligibles,\nwithout possessing the intelligibles themselves, she will be compelled\nto compare with them her own image of them. Easily does the soul\ncontemplate the intelligibles, because the intelligence is not foreign\nto her; when the soul wishes to enter in relations with them, all the\nsoul needs to do is to turn her glance towards them. Otherwise, the\nintelligence, though present in the soul, will remain foreign to her.\nThis explains how all our acquisitions of knowledge are foreign to us\n(as if non-existent), while we fail to recall them.\n\n\nTHE LIMIT OF PURIFICATION IS THAT OF THE SOUL'S SELF-CONTROL.\n\n5. The limit of purification decides to which (of the three hypostases\nof) divinity the soul may hope to assimilate and identify herself;\ntherefore we shall have to consider that limit. To decide that would\nbe to examine the limit of the soul's ability to repress anger,\nappetites, and passions of all kinds, to triumph over pain and similar\nfeelings--in short, to separate her from the body. This occurs when,\nrecollecting herself from the various localities over which she had, as\nit were, spread herself, she retires within herself; when she estranges\nherself entirely from the passions, when she allows the body only such\npleasures as are necessary or suitable to cure her pains, to recuperate\nfrom its fatigues, and in avoiding its becoming importunate; when she\nbecomes insensible to sufferings; or, if that be beyond her power, in\nsupporting them patiently, and in diminishing them by refusing to share\nthem; when she appeases anger as far as possible, even suppressing\nit entirely, if possible; or at least, if that be impossible, not\nparticipating therein; abandoning to the animal nature all unthinking\nimpulses, and even so reducing to a minimum all reflex movements;\nwhen she is absolutely inaccessible to fear, having nothing left to\nrisk; and when she represses all sudden movements, except nature's\nwarning of dangers. Evidently, the purified soul will have to desire\nnothing shameful. In eating and drinking, she will seek only the\nsatisfaction of a need, while remaining foreign to it; nor will she\nseek the pleasures of love; or, if she does, she will not go beyond the\nexactions of nature, resisting every unconsidered tendency, or even in\nremaining within the involuntary flights of fancy.\n\n\nTHE INFLUENCE OF REASON IS SUGGESTIVE.\n\nIn short, the soul will be pure from all these passions, and will\neven desire to purify our being's irrational part so as to preserve\nit from emotions, or at least to moderate their number and intensity,\nand to appease them promptly by her presence. So would a man, in the\nneighborhood of some sage, profit thereby, either by growing similar\nto him, or in refraining from doing anything of which the sage might\ndisapprove. This (suggestive) influence of reason will exert itself\nwithout any struggle; its mere presence will suffice. The inferior\nprinciple will respect it to the point of growing resentful against\nitself, and reproaching itself for its weakness, if it feel any\nagitation which might disturb its master's repose.\n\n\nTHE GOAL OF PURIFICATION IS SECOND DIVINITY, INTELLIGENCE.\n\n6. A man who has achieved such a state no longer commits such faults;\nfor he has become corrected. But his desired goal is not to cease\nfailing, but to be divine. In case he still allows within himself\nthe occurrence of some of the above-mentioned unreflecting impulses,\nhe will be simultaneously divinity and guardian, a double being; or\nrather, he will contain a principle of another nature (Intelligence),\nwhose virtue will likewise differ from his. If, however, he be not\ntroubled by any of those motions, he will be wholly divine; he will be\none of those divinities \"who (as Plato said)[342] form the attending\nescort of the First.\" It is a divinity of such a nature that has\ncome down from above to dwell in us. To become again what one was\noriginally, is to live in this superior world. He who has achieved that\nheight dwells with pure Intelligence, and assimilates himself thereto\nas far as possible. Consequently, he feels none of those emotions, nor\ndoes he any more commit any actions, which would be disapproved of by\nthe superior principle who henceforth is his only master.\n\n\nTHE HIGHER VIRTUES MERGE INTO WISDOM.\n\nFor such a being the separate virtues merge. For him, wisdom consists\nin contemplating the (essences) possessed by Intelligence, and with\nwhich Intelligence is in contact. There are two kinds of wisdom, one\nbeing proper to intelligence, the other to the soul; only in the latter\nmay we speak of virtue. In the Intelligence exists only the energy (of\nthought), and its essence. The image of this essence, seen here below\nin a being of another nature, is the virtue which emanates from it.\nIn Intelligence, indeed, resides neither absolute justice, nor any of\nthose genuinely so-called virtues; nothing is left but their type. Its\nderivative in the soul is virtue; for virtue is the attribute of an\nindividual being. On the contrary, the intelligible belongs to itself\nonly, and is the attribute of no particular being.\n\n\nINCARNATE JUSTICE IS INDIVIDUAL; IF ABSOLUTE, IT IS INDIVISIBLE.\n\nMust justice ever imply multiplicity if it consist in fulfilling its\nproper function? Surely, as long as it inheres in a principle with\nseveral parts (such as a human soul, in which several functions may\nbe distinguished); but its essence lies in the accomplishment of\nthe function proper to every being, even when inhering in a unitary\nprinciple (such as Intelligence). Absolute and veritable Justice\nconsists in the self-directed action of an unitary Principle, in which\nno parts can be distinguished.\n\n\nTHE HIGHER FORMS OF THE VIRTUES.\n\nIn this higher realm, justice consists in directing the action of the\nsoul towards intelligence; temperance is the intimate conversion of\nthe soul towards intelligence; courage is the (suggestive fascination)\nor impassibility, by which the soul becomes similar to that which it\ncontemplates; since it is natural for intelligence to be impassible.\nNow the soul derives this impassibility from the virtue which hinders\nher from sharing the passions of the lower principle with which she is\nassociated.\n\n\nEVEN THE LOWER VIRTUES ARE MUTUALLY RELATED.\n\n7. Within the soul the virtues have the same interconnection obtaining\nwithin Intelligence between the types superior to virtue. For\nIntelligence, it is thought that constitutes wisdom and prudence;\nconversion towards oneself is temperance; the fulfillment of one's\nproper function is justice, and the intelligence's perseverance in\nremaining within itself, in maintaining itself pure and separated from\nmatter, is analogous to courage. To contemplate intelligence will\ntherefore, for the soul, constitute wisdom and prudence, which then\nbecome virtues, and no longer remain mere intellectual types. For the\nsoul is not identical with the essences she thinks, as is intelligence.\nSimilarly, the other soul-virtues will correspond to the superior\ntypes. It is not otherwise with purification, for since every virtue is\na purification, virtue exacts preliminary purification; otherwise, it\nwould not be perfect.\n\n\nTHE HIGHER VIRTUES IMPLY THE LOWER; BUT NOT CONVERSELY.\n\nThe possessor of the higher virtues necessarily possesses the\npotentiality for the inferior virtues; but the possessor of the lower\ndoes not, conversely, possess the higher. Such are the characteristics\nof the virtuous man.\n\n\nPRUDENCE TO DECIDE WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO POSSESS VIRTUES\nUNSYMMETRICALLY?\n\n(Many interesting questions remain). Is it possible for a man to\npossess the higher or lower virtues in accomplished reality, or\notherwise (merely theoretically)? To decide that, we would have\nindividually to examine each, as, for example, prudence. How could\nsuch a virtue exist merely potentially, borrowing its principles\nfrom elsewhere? What would happen if one virtue advanced naturally\nto a certain degree, and another virtue to another? What would you\nthink of a temperance which would moderate certain (impulses), while\nentirely suppressing others? Similar questions might be raised about\nother virtues, and the arbiter of the degree to which the virtues have\nattained would have to be prudence.\n\n\nTHE HOMELY VIRTUES MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED BY DIVINE DISCONTENT.\n\nNo doubt, under certain circumstances, the virtuous man, in his\nactions, will make use of some of the lower, or homely virtues;\nbut even so he will supplement them by standards or ideas derived\nfrom higher virtues. For instance, he will not be satisfied with\na temperance which would consist in mere moderation, but he will\ngradually seek to separate himself more and more from matter. Again, he\nwill supplement the life of a respectable man, exacted by common-sense\nhomely virtues; he will be continually aspiring higher, to the life of\nthe divinities; for our effort at assimilation should be directed not\nat mere respectability, but to the gods themselves. To seek no more\nthan to become assimilated to respectable individuals would be like\ntrying to make an image by limiting oneself to copying another image,\nitself modelled after another image (but not copying the original).\nThe assimilation here recommended results from taking as model a\nsuperior being.\n\n\n\n\nFIRST ENNEAD, BOOK THREE.\n\nOf Dialectic, or the Means of Raising the Soul to the Intelligible\nWorld.\n\n\nSEARCH FOR A DEMONSTRATION OF DIVINITY SUCH THAT THE DEMONSTRATION\nITSELF WILL DEIFY.\n\n1. What method, art or study will lead us to the goal we are to\nattain, namely, the Good, the first Principle, the Divinity,[343] by a\ndemonstration which itself can serve to raise the soul to the superior\nworld?\n\n\nMETHODS DIFFER ACCORDING TO INDIVIDUALS; BUT THERE ARE CHIEFLY TWO.\n\nHe who is to be promoted to that world should know everything, or at\nleast, as says (Plato),[344] he should be as learned as possible. In\nhis first generation he should have descended here below to form a\nphilosopher, a musician, a lover. That is the kind of men whose nature\nmakes them most suitable to be raised to the intelligible world. But\nhow are we going to raise them? Does a single method suffice for all?\nDoes not each of them need a special method? Doubtless. There are two\nmethods to follow: the one for those who rise to the intelligible world\nfrom here below, and the other for those who have already reached\nthere. We shall start by the first of these two methods; then comes\nthat of the men who have already achieved access to the intelligible\nworld, and who have, so to speak, already taken root there. Even these\nmust ceaselessly progress till they have reached the summit; for one\nmust stop only when one has reached the supreme term.\n\n\nRETURN OF THE SOUL OF THE PHILOSOPHER, MUSICIAN AND LOVER.\n\nThe latter road of progress must here be left aside (to be taken up\nlater),[345] to discuss here fully the first, explaining the operation\nof the return of the soul to the intelligible world. Three kinds of men\noffer themselves to our examination: the philosopher, the musician,\nand the lover. These three must clearly be distinguished, beginning by\ndetermining the nature and character of the musician.\n\n\nHOW THE MUSICIAN RISES TO THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.\n\nThe musician allows himself to be easily moved by beauty, and admires\nit greatly; but he is not able by himself to achieve the intuition of\nthe beautiful. He needs the stimulation of external impressions. Just\nas some timorous being is awakened by the least noise, the musician is\nsensitive to the beauty of the voice and of harmonies. He avoids all\nthat seems contrary to the laws of harmony and of unity, and enjoys\nrhythm and melodies in instrumental and vocal music. After these purely\nsensual intonations, rhythm and tunes, he will surely in them come to\ndistinguish form from matter, and to contemplate the beauty existing in\ntheir proportions and relations. He will have to be taught that what\nexcites his admiration in these things, is their intelligible harmony,\nthe beauty it contains, and, in short, beauty absolute, and not\nparticular. He will have to be introduced to philosophy by arguments\nthat will lead him to recognize truths that he ignored, though he\npossessed them instinctively. Such arguments will be specified\nelsewhere.[346]\n\n\nHOW THE LOVER RISES TO THE INTELLIGIBLE.\n\n2. The musician can rise to the rank of the lover, and either remain\nthere, or rise still higher. But the lover has some reminiscence of the\nbeautiful; but as here below he is separated (from it, he is incapable\nof clearly knowing what it is). Charmed with the beautiful objects\nthat meet his views, he falls into an ecstasy. He must therefore be\ntaught not to content himself with thus admiring a single body, but,\nby reason, to embrace all bodies that reveal beauty; showing him what\nis identical in all, informing him that it is something alien to the\nbodies, which comes from elsewhere, and which exists even in a higher\ndegree in the objects of another nature; citing, as examples, noble\noccupations, and beautiful laws. He will be shown that beauty is found\nin the arts, the sciences, the virtues, all of which are suitable means\nof familiarizing the lover with the taste of incorporeal things. He\nwill then be made to see that beauty is one, and he will be shown the\nelement which, in every object, constitutes beauty. From virtues he\nwill be led to progress to intelligence and essence, while from there\nhe will have nothing else to do but to progress towards the supreme\ngoal.\n\n\nHOW THE PHILOSOPHER RISES TO THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.\n\n3. The philosopher is naturally disposed to rise to the intelligible\nworld. Borne on by light wings, he rushes thither without needing to\nlearn to disengage himself from sense-objects, as do the preceding men.\nHis only uncertainty will concern the road to be followed, all he will\nneed will be a guide. He must therefore be shown the road; he must be\nhelped to detach himself entirely from sense-objects, himself already\npossessing, as he does, the desire, being since a long while already\ndetached therefrom by his nature. For this purpose he will be invited\nto apply himself to mathematics, so as to accustom him to think of\nincorporeal things, to believe in their existence. Being desirous\nof instruction, he will learn them easily; as, by his nature, he is\nalready virtuous, he will need no more than promotion to the perfection\nof virtue. After mathematics, he will be taught dialectics, which will\nperfect him.\n\n\nWHAT DIALECTICS IS.\n\n4. What then is this dialectics, knowledge of which must be added\nto mathematics? It is a science which makes us capable of reasoning\nabout each thing, to say what it is, in what it differs from the\nothers, in what it resembles them, where it is, whether it be one of\nthe beings, to determine how many veritable beings there are, and\nwhich are the objects that contain nonentity instead of veritable\nessence. This science treats also of good and evil; of everything that\nis subordinated to (being), the Good, and to its contrary; of the\nnature of what is eternal, and transitory. It treats of each matter\nscientifically, and not according to mere opinion. Instead of wandering\naround the sense-world, it establishes itself in the intelligible\nworld; it concentrates its whole attention on this world, and after\nhaving saved our soul from deceit, dialectics \"pastures our soul in the\nmeadow of truth,\"[347] (as thought Plato). Then it makes use of the\nPlatonic method of division to discern ideas, to define each object,\nto rise to the several kinds of essences[348] (as thought Plato);\nthen, by thought concatenating all that is thence derived, dialectics\ncontinues its deductions until it has gone through the whole domain\nof the intelligible. Then, by reversing, dialectics returns to the\nvery Principle from which first it had started out.[349] Resting\nthere, because it is only in the intelligible world that it can find\nrest, no longer needing to busy itself with a multitude of objects,\nbecause it has arrived at unity, dialectics considers its logic, which\ntreats of propositions and arguments. This logic is an art subordinate\nto dialectics just as writing is subordinate to thought. In logic,\ndialectics recognizes some principles as necessary, and others as\nconstituting preparatory exercises. Then, along with everything else,\nsubjecting these principles to its criticism, it declares some of them\nuseful, and others superfluous, or merely technical.\n\n\nDIALECTICS IS THE HIGHEST PART OF PHILOSOPHY.\n\n5. Whence does this science derive its proper principles? Intelligence\nfurnishes the soul with the clear principles she is capable of\nreceiving. Having discovered and achieved these principles, dialectics\nputs their consequences in order. Dialectics composes, and divides,\ntill it has arrived at a perfect intelligence of things; for according\nto (Plato),[350] dialectics is the purest application of intelligence\nand wisdom. In this case, if dialectics be the noblest exercise of\nour faculties, it must exercise itself with essence and the highest\nobjects. Wisdom studies existence, as intelligence studies that\nwhich is still beyond existence (the One, or the Good). But is not\nphilosophy also that which is most eminent? Surely. But there is no\nconfusion between philosophy and dialectics, because dialectics is the\nhighest part of philosophy. It is not (as Aristotle thought) merely\nan instrument for philosophy, nor (as Epicurus thought) made up of\npure speculations and abstract rules. It studies things themselves,\nand its matter is the (real) beings. It reaches them by following a\nmethod which yields reality as well as the idea. Only accidentally\ndoes dialectics busy itself with error and sophisms. Dialectics\nconsiders them alien to its mission, and as produced by a foreign\nprinciple. Whenever anything contrary to the rule of truth is advanced,\ndialectics recognizes the error by the light of the truths it contains.\nDialectics, however, does not care for propositions, which, to it,\nseem only mere groupings of letters. Nevertheless, because it knows\nthe truth, dialectics also understands propositions, and, in general,\nthe operations of the soul. Dialectics knows what it is to affirm, to\ndeny, and how to make contrary or contradictory assertions. Further,\ndialectics distinguishes differences from identities, grasping the\ntruth by an intuition that is as instantaneous as is that of the\nsenses; but dialectics leaves to another science, that enjoys those\ndetails, the care of treating them with exactness.\n\n\nTHE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHY CROWNED BY DIALECTICS.\n\n6. Dialectics, therefore, is only one part of philosophy, but the most\nimportant. Indeed, philosophy has other branches. First, it studies\nnature (in physics), therein employing dialectics, as the other arts\nemploy arithmetic, though philosophy owes far more to dialectics. Then\nphilosophy treats of morals, and here again it is dialectics that\nascertains the principles; ethics limits itself to building good habits\nthereon, and to propose the exercises that shall produce those good\nhabits. The (Aristotelian) rational virtues also owe to dialectics the\nprinciples which seem to be their characteristics; for they chiefly\ndeal with material things (because they moderate the passions). The\nother virtues[351] also imply the application of reason to the passions\nand actions which are characteristic of each of them. However, prudence\napplies reason to them in a superior manner. Prudence deals rather\nwith the universal, considering whether the virtues concatenate, and\nwhether an action should be done now, or be deferred, or be superseded\nby another[352] (as thought Aristotle). Now it is dialectics, or its\nresultant science of wisdom which, under a general and immaterial form,\nfurnishes prudence with all the principles it needs.\n\n\nWITHOUT DIALECTICS LOWER KNOWLEDGE WOULD BE IMPERFECT.\n\nCould the lower knowledge not be possessed without dialectics or\nwisdom? They would, at least, be imperfect and mutilated. On the other\nhand, though the dialectician, that is, the true sage, no longer\nneed these inferior things, he never would have become such without\nthem; they must precede, and they increase with the progress made in\ndialectics. Virtues are in the same case. The possessor of natural\nvirtues may, with the assistance of wisdom, rise to perfect virtues.\nWisdom, therefore, only follows natural virtues. Then wisdom perfects\nthe morals. Rather, the already existing natural virtues increase and\ngrow perfect along with wisdom. Whichever of these two things precedes,\ncomplements the other. Natural virtues, however, yield only imperfect\nviews and morals; and the best way to perfect them, is philosophic\nknowledge of the principles from which they depend.\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO.\n\nHow the Soul Mediates Between Indivisible and Divisible Essence.\n\n\nOUTLINE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF IV. 7.\n\n1. While studying the nature (\"being\") of the soul, we have shown\n(against the Stoics) that she is not a body; that, among incorporeal\nentities, she is not a \"harmony\" (against the Pythagoreans); we have\nalso shown that she is not an \"entelechy\" (against Aristotle), because\nthis term, as its very etymology implies, does not express a true idea,\nand reveals nothing about the soul's (nature itself); last, we said\nthat the soul has an intelligible nature, and is of divine condition;\nthe \"being\" or nature of the soul we have also, it would seem, clearly\nenough set forth. Still, we have to go further. We have formerly\nestablished a distinction between intelligible and sense nature,\nassigning the soul to the intelligible world. Granting this, that the\nsoul forms part of the intelligible world, we must, in another manner,\nstudy what is suitable to her nature.\n\n\nEXISTENCE OF DIVISIBLE BEINGS.\n\nTo begin with, there are (beings) which are quite divisible and\nnaturally separable. No one part of any one of them is identical with\nany other part, nor with the whole, of which each part necessarily is\nsmaller than the whole. Such are sense-magnitudes, or physical masses,\nof which each occupies a place apart, without being able to be in\nseveral places simultaneously.\n\n\nDESCRIPTION OF INDIVISIBLE ESSENCE.\n\nOn the other hand, there exists another kind of essence (\"being\"),\nwhose nature differs from the preceding (entirely divisible beings),\nwhich admits of no division, and is neither divided nor divisible.\nThis has no extension, not even in thought. It does not need to be\nin any place, and is not either partially or wholly contained in any\nother being. If we dare say so, it hovers simultaneously over all\nbeings, not that it needs to be built up on them,[353] but because\nit is indispensable to the existence of all. It is ever identical\nwith itself, and is the common support of all that is below it. It is\nas in the circle, where the centre, remaining immovable in itself,\nnevertheless is the origin of all the radii originating there, and\ndrawing their existence thence. The radii by thus participating in\nthe existence of the centre, the radii's principle, depend on what is\nindivisible, remaining attached thereto, though separating in every\ndirection.[354]\n\n\nBETWEEN THEM IS AN INDIVISIBLE ESSENCE WHICH BECOMES DIVISIBLE WITHIN\nBODIES.\n\nNow between entirely indivisible (\"Being\") which occupies the first\nrank amidst intelligible beings, and the (essence) which is entirely\ndivisible in its sense-objects, there is, above the sense-world,\nnear it, and within it, a \"being\" of another nature, which is not,\nlike bodies, completely divisible, but which, nevertheless, becomes\ndivisible within bodies. Consequently, when you separate bodies, the\nform within them also divides, but in such a way that it remains entire\nin each part. This identical (essence), thus becoming manifold, has\nparts that are completely separated from each other; for it then is a\ndivisible form, such as colors, and all the qualities, like any form\nwhich can simultaneously remain entire in several things entirely\nseparate, at a distance, and foreign to each other because of the\ndifferent ways in which they are affected. We must therefore admit that\nthis form (that resides in bodies) is also divisible.\n\n\nBY PROCESSION THE SOUL CONNECTS THE TWO.\n\nThus the absolutely divisible (essence) does not exist alone; there is\nanother one located immediately beneath it, and derived from it. On\none hand, this inferior (essence) participates in the indivisibility\nof its principle; on the other, it descends towards another nature by\nits procession. Thereby it occupies a position intermediary between\nindivisible and primary (essence), (that is, intelligence), and the\ndivisible (essence) which is in the bodies. Besides it is not in the\nsame condition of existence as color and the other qualities; for\nthough the latter be the same in all corporeal masses, nevertheless the\nquality in one body is completely separate from that in another, just\nas physical masses themselves are separate from each other. Although\n(by its essence) the magnitude of these bodies be one, nevertheless\nthat which thus is identical in each part does not exert that community\nof affection which constitutes sympathy,[355] because to identity is\nadded difference. This is the case because identity is only a simple\nmodification of bodies, and not a \"being.\" On the contrary, the nature\nthat approaches the absolutely indivisible \"Being\" is a genuine \"being\"\n(such as is the soul). It is true that she unites with the bodies and\nconsequently divides with them; but that happens to her only when she\ncommunicates herself to the bodies. On the other hand, when she unites\nwith the bodies, even with the greatest and most extended of all (the\nworld), she does not cease to be one, although she yield herself up to\nit entirely.\n\n\nDIVISION AS THE PROPERTY OF BODIES, BUT NOT THE CHARACTERISTIC OF SOUL.\n\nIn no way does the unity of this essence resemble that of the body;\nfor the unity of the body consists in the unity of parts, of which\neach is different from the others, and occupies a different place. Nor\ndoes the unity of the soul bear any closer resemblance to the unity of\nthe qualities. Thus this nature that is simultaneously divisible and\nindivisible, and that we call soul is not one in the sense of being\ncontinuous (of which each part is external to every other); it is\ndivisible, because it animates all the parts of the body it occupies,\nbut is indivisible because it entirely inheres in the whole body, and\nin each of its parts.[356] When we thus consider the nature of the\nsoul, we see her magnitude and power, and we understand how admirable\nand divine are these and superior natures. Without any extension, the\nsoul is present throughout the whole of extension; she is present in a\nlocation, though she be not present therein.[357] She is simultaneously\ndivided and undivided, or rather, she is never really divided, and she\nnever really divides; for she remains entire within herself. If she\nseem to divide, it is not in relation with the bodies, which, by virtue\nof their own divisibility, cannot receive her in an indivisible manner.\nThus division is the property of the body, but not the characteristic\nof the soul.\n\n\nSOUL AS BOTH ESSENTIALLY DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE.\n\n2. Such then the nature of the soul had to be. She could not be either\npurely indivisible, nor purely divisible, but she necessarily had to be\nboth indivisible and divisible, as has just been set forth. This is\nfurther proved by the following considerations. If the soul, like the\nbody, have several parts differing from each other, the sensation of\none part would not involve a similar sensation in another part. Each\npart of the soul, for instance, that which inheres in the finger, would\nfeel its individual affections, remaining foreign to all the rest,\nwhile remaining within itself. In short, in each one of us would inhere\nseveral managing souls (as said the Stoics).[358] Likewise, in this\nuniverse, there would be not one single soul (the universal Soul), but\nan infinite number of souls, separated from each other.\n\n\nPOLEMIC AGAINST THE STOIC PREDOMINATING PART OF THE SOUL.\n\nShall we have recourse to the (Stoic) \"continuity of parts\"[359]\nto explain the sympathy which interrelates all the organs? This\nhypothesis, however, is useless, unless this continuity eventuate\nin unity. For we cannot admit, as do certain (Stoic) philosophers,\nwho deceive themselves, that sensations focus in the \"predominating\nprinciple\" by \"relayed transmission.\"[360] To begin with, it is a wild\nventure to predicate a \"predominating principle\" of the soul. How\nindeed could we divide the soul and distinguish several parts therein?\nBy what superiority, quantity or quality are we going to distinguish\nthe \"predominating part\" in a single continuous mass? Further, under\nthis hypothesis, we may ask, Who is going to feel? Will it be the\n\"predominating part\" exclusively, or the other parts with it? If that\npart exclusively, it will feel only so long as the received impression\nwill have been transmitted to itself, in its particular residence; but\nif the impression impinge on some other part of the soul, which happens\nto be incapable of sensation, this part will not be able to transmit\nthe impression to the (predominating) part that directs, and sensation\nwill not occur. Granting further that the impression does reach the\npredominating part itself, it might be received in a twofold manner;\neither by one of its (subdivided) parts, which, having perceived the\nsensation, will not trouble the other parts to feel it, which would be\nuseless; or, by several parts simultaneously, and then we will have\nmanifold, or even infinite sensations which will all differ from each\nother. For instance, the one might say, \"It is I who first received\nthe impression\"; the other one might say, \"I received the impression\nfirst received by another\"; while each, except the first, will be\nin ignorance of the location of the impression; or again, each part\nwill make a mistake, thinking that the impression occurred where\nitself is. Besides, if every part of the soul can feel as well as the\npredominating part, why at all speak of a \"predominating part?\" What\nneed is there for the sensation to reach through to it? How indeed\nwould the soul recognize as an unity the result of multiple sensations;\nfor instance, of such as come from the ears or eyes?\n\n\nTHE SOUL HAS TO BE BOTH ONE AND MANIFOLD, EVEN ON THE STOIC HYPOTHESES.\n\nOn the other hand, if the soul were absolutely one, essentially\nindivisible and one within herself, if her nature were incompatible\nwith manifoldness and division, she could not, when penetrating into\nthe body, animate it in its entirety; she would place herself in its\ncentre, leaving the rest of the mass of the animal lifeless. The\nsoul, therefore, must be simultaneously one and manifold, divided and\nundivided, and we must not deny, as something impossible, that the\nsoul, though one and identical, can be in several parts of the body\nsimultaneously. If this truth be denied, this will destroy the \"nature\nthat contains and administers the universe\" (as said the Stoics); which\nembraces everything at once, and directs everything with wisdom; a\nnature that is both manifold, because all beings are manifold; and\nsingle, because the principle that contains everything must be one. It\nis by her manifold unity that she vivifies all parts of the universe,\nwhile it is her indivisible unity that directs everything with wisdom.\nIn the very things that have no wisdom, the unity that in it plays the\npredominating \"part,\" imitates the unity of the universal Soul. That is\nwhat Plato wished to indicate allegorically by these divine words[361]:\n\"From the \"Being\" that is indivisible and ever unchanging; and from\nthe \"being\" which becomes divisible in the bodies, the divinity formed\na mixture, a third kind of \"being.\" The (universal) Soul, therefore,\nis (as we have just said) simultaneously one and manifold; the forms\nof the bodies are both manifold and one; the bodies are only manifold;\nwhile the supreme Principle (the One), is exclusively an unity.\n\nParagraph 3 of this book (iv. 2,--21) will be found in its logical\nposition--judging by the subject matter,--on pages 75 to 78, in the\nmiddle of iv. 7,--2.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] See 7.\n\n[2] See vi. 7, 8.\n\n[3] A.D. 262.\n\n[4] See vi. 5, 1.\n\n[5] See 20.\n\n[6] iii. 4.\n\n[7] See above, 6.\n\n[8] See iv. 2.\n\n[9] Often quoted by Porphyry in his Cave of the Nymphs.\n\n[10] See 3.\n\n[11] Euseb. Prep. Ev. xi. 2; xv. 4-9, 12-13.\n\n[12] See 3.\n\n[13] See ii. 3; iii. 1, 2, 4.\n\n[14] See v. 5.\n\n[15] This suggests that Suidas was right in claiming that Amelius was\nthe teacher of Porphyry.\n\n[16] See 11.\n\n[17] See 7.\n\n[18] See 3.\n\n[19] See 3.\n\n[20] Mentioned in Porphyry's Life of Pythagoras, 48, living under Nero.\n\n[21] Living under Tiberius, see Suetonius, Life of Tiberius, 14.\n\n[22] See vi. 5.\n\n[23] See 17.\n\n[24] See 18.\n\n[25] See 17.\n\n[26] See ii. 3. 17.\n\n[27] See 23.\n\n[28] The fragments of all this are probably the Principles of the\nTheory of the Intelligibles, by Porphyry.\n\n[29] See ii. 1.\n\n[30] See i. 3.\n\n[31] As pilot, perhaps, iv. 3. 21.\n\n[32] See ii., 4. 6.\n\n[33] See ii. 7. 1.\n\n[34] See i. 1. 10.\n\n[35] See i. 9. 8. 10.\n\n[36] See iv. 3. 20, 21.\n\n[37] Ecl. Phys., p. 797, Heeren and Aristotle, de Anima, i. 2.\n\n[38] See Nemesius, de Nat. Hom. 2.\n\n[39] See ii. 7, 1.\n\n[40] See ii. 7, 3.\n\n[41] Stob. Ecl. Phys. 797.\n\n[42] See ii. 3, 5.\n\n[43] See ii. 7, 1.\n\n[44] ii. 4, 7.\n\n[45] See iv. 7, 8.\n\n[46] Euseb., Prep. Ev. xv. 17.\n\n[47] p. 54, Cousin.\n\n[48] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 9.\n\n[49] Ecl. Phys. 797, Cicero, de Nat. Deor. iii. 14.\n\n[50] See ii. 4, 1. 'p\u00f4s echon.' of Dikearchus and Aristoxenus.\n\n[51] See ii. 6, on 'logos.'\n\n[52] See v. 7, 3.\n\n[53] iii. 2.\n\n[54] See iv. 2, 2.\n\n[55] iv. 2, 1.\n\n[56] Plutarch, de Placitis Philosoph, iii. 8. The Stoic definition\nof sensation being that senses are spirits stretched (by relays with\n\"tension\") from the directing principle to the organs.\n\n[57] de Nat. Hom. 2.\n\n[58] See iv. 4, 23. In the words of Zeno, as, for the Stoics, the\nprincipal act of the intelligence was comprehensive vision, \"phantasia\nkataleptike.\"\n\n[59] de Anima, iii. 4, 5.\n\n[60] de Anima, i. 3.\n\n[61] de Anim. Arist. i. 2.\n\n[62] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 9.\n\n[63] See ii. 4, 1.\n\n[64] See iv. 7, 5.\n\n[65] See ii. 4, 1.\n\n[66] de Nat. Hom. 2.\n\n[67] See ii. 7.\n\n[68] See ii. 7, 1.\n\n[69] Nat. Hom. 2.\n\n[70] See ii. 4, 16.\n\n[71] As thought Chrysippus, in Plutarch, de Stoic. Repugnant.\n\n[72] See ii. 4, 16.\n\n[73] Met. xii. 6; see ii. 5, 3.\n\n[74] iv. 7, 3.\n\n[75] From end of iv. 2, 3.\n\n[76] Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1.\n\n[77] Arist. de Anima, ii. 2; iii. 5.\n\n[78] See Aristotle, de Anima, i. 5.\n\n[79] See Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 2.\n\n[80] Here we resume Ennead IV. Book 7. The bracketed numbers are those\nof the Teubner text; the unbracketed those of the Didot edition.\n\n[81] Page 299, Cousin.\n\n[82] Quoted in i. 1, 12, in Republic x.\n\n[83] See i. 1, 11.\n\n[84] See i. 6, 9.\n\n[85] See viii. 62.\n\n[86] See i. 6, 5.\n\n[87] Page 297, Cousin.\n\n[88] See iv. 8, 5.\n\n[89] Pages 206, 312, 313, Cousin.\n\n[90] See iv. 8, 8.\n\n[91] See iv. 8, 6, 7.\n\n[92] See i. 1, 11.\n\n[93] See iv. 5, 7.\n\n[94] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 12-16.\n\n[95] Such as Porphyry's \"Philosophy derived from Oracles.\"\n\n[96] Plato, in Diog. Laert., iii. 83.\n\n[97] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 18, 37.\n\n[98] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 12, 18; de Divinat, i. 58.\n\n[99] Chrysippus, in Cicero, de Fato, 10.\n\n[100] Cicero, de Finibus, i. 6.\n\n[101] Cicero, de Natura Deorum, i. 25.\n\n[102] Stobeus, Ecl. Phys. i. 6, p. 178.\n\n[103] Aulus Gellius, Noctes Attic\u00e6, vi. 2.\n\n[104] As thought the Stoics, Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 11.\n\n[105] Cicero, de Divinatione, ii. 44.\n\n[106] As thought Plato, in the Phaedo, C81.\n\n[107] See i. 6.8.\n\n[108] See i. 3.1.\n\n[109] See i. 3.\n\n[110] See i. 6.2.\n\n[111] See i. 6.6.\n\n[112] See i. 6.9, and the Philebus of Plato, C64.\n\n[113] As suggested in the Phaedo of Plato.\n\n[114] See ii. 4.6.\n\n[115] The rational soul and intelligence, see iii. 9.5.\n\n[116] See ii. 9.12; iv. 4.14.\n\n[117] See ii. 3.17. 18; ii. 9.2, 3; vi. 4.9.\n\n[118] A pun on \"reason,\" or \"logos,\" i. 6.2; ii. 3.16; ii. 4.3; ii.\n6.2; ii. 7.3.\n\n[119] See iv. 4.1012.\n\n[120] Far from the truth; see iii. 8.3. 7.\n\n[121] Stoics, see iv. 7.8.\n\n[122] Or Stoic form of inorganic objects.\n\n[123] The form of lower living beings.\n\n[124] The form of human nature.\n\n[125] See iv. 7.14.\n\n[126] Parmenides, see v. 1.8.\n\n[127] As Plato hints in his Cratylos, C50, by a pun between \"soma\" and\n\"sozesthai.\"\n\n[128] The later theological \"saved.\"\n\n[129] See Aristotle, de Gen. i. 18.\n\n[130] By Stoics.\n\n[131] See iii. 8.1-3.\n\n[132] See v. 5.1.\n\n[133] See v. 1.4.\n\n[134] In Greek a pun on \"eidos\" and \"idea.\"\n\n[134a] This sentence might well be translated as follows: \"When\ntherefore thought (meets) the essentially one, the latter is the form,\nand the former the idea.\" While this version seems more literal, it\nmakes no connected sense with what follows.\n\n[135] See iv. 9.5.\n\n[136] See iii. 9.1.\n\n[137] See iii. 9.1.\n\n[138] The universal Soul.\n\n[139] Timaeus, C39.\n\n[140] See iii. 9.1.\n\n[141] See iii. 7.10.\n\n[142] See ii. 7.2.\n\n[143] To form, see i. 6.2.\n\n[144] As thought Plato, in his Republic, x.\n\n[145] As thought Plato in Gorgias, C464.\n\n[146] vi. 7.\n\n[147] vi. 7.\n\n[148] Or, \"so that it may contain the intelligence which is\none, as its own actualization.\"\n\n[149] See iv. 3.9-17.\n\n[150] In the Cratylus, C400.\n\n[151] As in the Phaedo, C62.\n\n[152] Republic, vii, C514.\n\n[153] See Jamblichus, Cave of the Nymphs, 8.\n\n[154] Procession, or rising.\n\n[155] C246.\n\n[156] Of the universe.\n\n[157] C34.\n\n[158] Timaeus, C30.\n\n[159] The Creator, who is the universal Soul.\n\n[160] See iv. 3.9-11.\n\n[161] See iv. 3.17.\n\n[162] As thought Plato in his Phaedrus, C246.\n\n[163] The First belongs to the principal power of the universal Soul,\nthe second to its natural and plant power, see iii, 8.1 and iv. 4.13.\n\n[164] See iv. 4.13.\n\n[165] See ii. 3.18.\n\n[166] As in the Timaeus, C42.\n\n[167] iv. 8.1.\n\n[168] See iv. 2.2.\n\n[169] See iv. 3.6.7.\n\n[170] As thought Plato in his Phaedrus, C249 and Phaedo, C72.\n\n[171] That lead an alternate or double life.\n\n[172] In his Timaeus, C42, 69.\n\n[173] In the stars.\n\n[174] As does Plato, see iv. 8.1.\n\n[175] As a messenger, see iv. 3.12.13.\n\n[176] See ii. 9.2.\n\n[177] Without having given herself up to it.\n\n[178] See i. 8.7.\n\n[179] That is, of form, ii. 4.4.\n\n[180] See iv. 6.3.\n\n[181] See iii. 2.8.\n\n[182] See iv. 8.5.\n\n[183] See iv. 3.18.\n\n[184] See ii. 9.2.\n\n[185] That is, the body to which she is united.\n\n[186] As thought Plato in his Parmenides, C154.\n\n[187] See vi. 6.13.\n\n[188] \"Being.\" It has been found impossible, in order to preserve\ngood English idiom, to translate \"ousia\" by \"being,\" and \"to on\" by\n\"essence,\" with uniformity. Where the change has been made, the proper\nword has been added in parentheses, as here.\n\n[189] In his Metaphysics, iv. 2.\n\n[190] Aristotle, Met. iv. 2.\n\n[191] Evidently a pun on forms and ideas.\n\n[192] See vi. 2.7.\n\n[193] In the Timaeus not accurately quoted.\n\n[194] As Plato said in the Timaeus, 37.\n\n[195] See iv. 9.5.\n\n[196] See vi. 8.11.\n\n[197] Odyss. xix. 178.\n\n[198] See i. 2.2.\n\n[199] See iv. 3.1.\n\n[200] See ii. 2.2.\n\n[201] See the beginning of Plato's Republic, ix.\n\n[202] See i. 8.7.\n\n[203] Because they do not allow of mutual penetration.\n\n[204] See iv. 8.5.\n\n[205] As thought Numenius 29.\n\n[206] See ii. 3.\n\n[207] See i. 8.14.\n\n[208] See Acts, xvii. 25, 27, 28.\n\n[209] See iv. 3.7, following the Phaedrus of Plato.\n\n[210] Cupid and Psyche, as interpreted by Apuleius.\n\n[211] See iii. 5.2.\n\n[212] See iii. 5.4.\n\n[213] See iii. 5.7-9.\n\n[214] See v. 5.11; i. 6.7, 8; v. 8.4; vi. 9.11. It has been contended\nthat this was a description of the Isiac temple in Rome.\n\n[215] Num. 10.\n\n[216] By virtue of which, according to the Pythagoreans, the dyad\n\"dared\" to issue from the unity.\n\n[217] That is the desire which leads souls to separate themselves\nprimitively from the divinity, and to unite themselves to bodies.\n\n[218] We have seen this elsewhere, i. 3.1.\n\n[219] See ii. 2.3.\n\n[220] Iliad xx. 65.\n\n[221] See vi. 4.4.\n\n[222] As said Heraclitus, Plutarch, Banquet, iv. 4.\n\n[223] See iv. 7.10.\n\n[224] See i. 2.3; iv. 3.11.\n\n[225] See iii. 9.5.\n\n[226] As thought Plato in his Cratylus, C. xi. 39, and Macrobins, in\nhis Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, i. 11.\n\n[227] See i. 8.2; ii. 9.2.\n\n[228] See iii. 7.2-4.\n\n[229] See v. 9.2, 7.\n\n[230] See vi. 2.\n\n[231] See vi. 8.\n\n[232] See vi. 3.\n\n[233] See iii. 6.1.\n\n[234] Pun on \"ideas\" and \"forms.\"\n\n[235] vi. 9. 11. This seems to refer to the Roman temple of Isis in\nfront of which stood the statues of the divinities, vi. 9.11.\n\n[236] Would be soul, instead of intelligence.\n\n[237] See v. 4.1.\n\n[238] See iii. 8.10.\n\n[239] As thought Plato, Laws, x.; see ii. 2.3.\n\n[240] See iii. 6.19.\n\n[241] As thought Plato, in the Cratylos, C. xi. 39.\n\n[242] This paragraph is founded on Numenius 36, 39.\n\n[243] See Plato's Second Letter, 312; in English, Burges, p. 482; i.\n8.2.\n\n[244] In Timaeus, 34.\n\n[245] In his Timaeus, C43.\n\n[246] As quoted by Clemens Al. Strom. vi. p. 627.\n\n[247] In Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. Arist., 9.\n\n[248] See Plato's Sophists, C244.\n\n[249] See ii. 7.7.\n\n[250] See ii. 1.2.\n\n[251] See ii. 4.7.\n\n[252] See Metaph. xii. 7.8.\n\n[253] Referring to Numenius's work on \"The Good,\" and on the\n\"Immateriality of the Soul.\"\n\n[254] In the Acibiades, C36.\n\n[255] See i. 1.9.\n\n[256] In his Timaeus, C30.\n\n[257] In the Phaedrus.\n\n[258] See iii. 6.5.\n\n[259] See v. 3.3.\n\n[260] From the circumference, see iii. 8.7.\n\n[261] Cicero, Tusculans, i. 22.\n\n[262] See i. 4.9.\n\n[263] See iii. 9.9.\n\n[264] See iii. 8.9.\n\n[265] iii. 9.4.\n\n[266] iii. 8.9.\n\n[267] See v. 1.7.\n\n[268] See i. 1.8; iv. 9.3.\n\n[269] See iii. 4.1, 2.\n\n[270] Fragment belonging here, apparently, but misplaced at end of next\nparagraph.\n\n[271] See v. 1.1.\n\n[272] See iii. 4.2.\n\n[273] See iv. 4.29; iv. 5.7.\n\n[274] That is, in the principal power of the universal soul, see ii.\n3.18.\n\n[275] See vi. 5; that is, within intelligence.\n\n[276] Between celestial and terrestrial life; see iii. 4.6.\n\n[277] See iii. 8.7.\n\n[278] Met. vii. 3.\n\n[279] Met. v. 8.\n\n[280] Diog. Laertes vii. 61.\n\n[281] See Cicero, de Nat. Deor. i. 15.\n\n[282] Met. viii. 1.\n\n[283] See vi. 7.\n\n[284] See i. 8.4.\n\n[285] See i. 8.15.\n\n[286] Plotinos's six categories are identity, difference, being, life,\nmotion and rest. See v. 1; v. 2; vi. 2.\n\n[287] Not the absolute eternal existence, nor the totality of the\nconstitutive qualities of a thing, as in ii. 6.\n\n[288] Met. xii. 2.\n\n[289] Met. i. 3.\n\n[290] Met. xi. 6.\n\n[291] See v. 1.9.\n\n[292] As reported by Diog. Laert. ii. 2.\n\n[293] Met. i. 4; vii. 13.\n\n[294] de Nat. Deor. i. 24.\n\n[295] Met. viii. 4.\n\n[296] In the Timaeus, C49-52, Met. vii. 3.\n\n[297] See ii. 7.3.\n\n[298] In Met. iii. 4 and de Anima i. 2.5; ii. 5.\n\n[299] In the Timaeus.\n\n[300] See i. 8.9; ii. 4.12.\n\n[301] Met. vii. 3, see iii. 6.7-19.\n\n[302] Met. viii. 4.\n\n[303] Met. i. 6.\n\n[304] Met. vii. 7.\n\n[305] See ii. 4.10.\n\n[306] See ii. 7.3.\n\n[307] Met. xii. 2.\n\n[308] Met. vi. 1; vii. 5.\n\n[309] See i. 2.1.\n\n[310] In the Philebus, 252.\n\n[311] The same definition is given of \"evil\" in i. 8.10-14.\n\n[312] See i. 8.8.\n\n[313] Physics. iii. 7.\n\n[314] This paragraph interrupts the argument.\n\n[315] Plato's spirit in the Timaeus, C79.\n\n[316] The inferior soul, see ii. 3.18.\n\n[317] In his Phaedrus, C246.\n\n[318] Plato, Phaedo, C. i. 242.\n\n[319] Plato, Tim. C77.\n\n[320] Plato, Rep. x. p. 291.\n\n[321] Plato, Tim. 91.\n\n[322] The text is very difficult.\n\n[323] Plato, Rep. x. p. 617-620.\n\n[324] In the Timaeus.\n\n[325] C90.\n\n[326] Phaedo, p. 107, c. i. p. 300.\n\n[327] Rep. x. 616, p. 234.\n\n[328] In i. 2.8, 16.\n\n[329] See ii. 9.18.\n\n[330] As thought Aristotle, Met. v. 14.\n\n[331] As thought Aristotle, Met. v. 30.\n\n[332] As thought Plato, Letter 7, 343.\n\n[333] As said Aristotle, Met. vii. 5.\n\n[334] Phaedros C1,217.\n\n[335] de Gen. An. 4.2.\n\n[336] Adv. Math. 5.102 p. 355.\n\n[337] Theataetus, C2,132.\n\n[338] Rep. iv. E3,434.\n\n[339] Theataetus, 176.\n\n[340] Plato, Phaedo, 69.\n\n[341] Pun on the word \"logos,\" which means both reason and word.\n\n[342] Plato, Phaedrus, 246.\n\n[343] v. 1.1.\n\n[344] In his Phaedrus, Et. 266.\n\n[345] In v. 1.1.\n\n[346] i. 3. 4, 5, 6; i. 6.\n\n[347] In his Phaedrus, p. 248.\n\n[348] In his Politician, p. 262.\n\n[349] v. 1.\n\n[350] In his Sophist., p. 253.\n\n[351] See i. 2.3-6.\n\n[352] Morals i. 34, 35; Nicom. Eth., vi. 8, 11.\n\n[353] See iv. 1.22.\n\n[354] See iii. 8.7.\n\n[355] See iv. 2.2.\n\n[356] See iv. 3.19, 22, 23; iv. 4.28.\n\n[357] See iv. 3.20-22.\n\n[358] Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 31-33.\n\n[359] See 4.7.6, 7.\n\n[360] Plutarch, de Plac. Phil. v. 21; Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 11. The\n\"predominating principle\" had appeared in Plato's Timaeus, p. 41.\n\n[361] Of the Timaeus, p. 35.\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\n\nPunctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant\npreference was found in this four-volume set; otherwise they were not\nchanged.\n\nSimple typographical errors were corrected. Inconsistent capitalization\nhas not been changed.\n\nAmbiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.\n\nInfrequent spelling of \"Plotinus\" changed to the predominant \"Plotinos.\"\n\nSeveral opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are\nunmatched; Transcriber has not attempted to remedy them.\n\nThe \"Index\" near the beginning of the book actually is a Table of\nContents for the four-volume set.\n\nPage 11: the last paragraph seems to end abruptly: \"to prove that\"\n\nPage 94: \"parent's\" probably should be \"parents'\", but is unchanged\nhere.\n\nPage 236: the closing parenthesis for \"(destiny)\" also seems to be\nthe closing parenthesis for the phrase beginning \"(because he is\ngiven ...\". There are several instances in this text where a closing\nquotation mark is shared in a similar manner.\n\n\nFootnote Issues:\n\nIn these notes, \"anchor\" means the reference to a footnote, and\n\"footnote\" means the information to which the anchor refers. Anchors\noccur within the main text, while footnotes are grouped in sequence at\nthe end of this eBook. The structure of the original book required two\nexceptions to this, as explained below.\n\nThe original text used a combination of footnotes (indicated by\nsymbols) and endnotes (indicated by numbers). In this eBook, they have\nbeen combined into a single, ascending sequence based on the sequence\nin which the footnotes occurred in the original book, and placed at the\nend of the eBook. Several irregularities are explained below.\n\nFootnotes sometimes were printed in a different sequence than their\nanchors (as on page 60: third and fourth footnotes were printed in\nincorrect sequence). and the symbols used for the anchors sometimes\nwere in a different sequence than the footnotes (as on page 72, second\nand third symbols). Except as noted below, all footnotes have been\nresequenced to match the sequence of their anchors.\n\nPage 85: The last footnote is printed out of sequence and followed by\na paragraph that appears to be a final comment. In this eBook, that\nfootnote has been repositioned to be in the sequence of its anchor.\n\nPages 111 and 118: Anchor 134 (originally 29) originally referred to two\nfootnotes. In this eBook, they are footnotes 134 and 134a.\n\nPages 186 and 192: section \"PLATO TEACHES THREE SPHERES OF\nEXISTENCE.[242]\" (originally 47) used an out-of-sequence endnote number\nthat matched the last endnote in the chapter; that endnote has been\nrepositioned to be in the overall footnote sequence.\n\nPage 196: Footnote 267 (originally 5) has no anchor; the missing anchor\nwould be on page 193 or 194.\n\nPage 242: Footnote 322 (originally 6) has no anchor; the missing anchor\nwould be on page 235.","title":"Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":81970}