{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_42931/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_42931","id":"gutenberg_42931","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/42931","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Plotinus"],"text":"VOLUME II.\n\nWORKS OF PLOTINOS.\n\n\n\n\n    PLOTINOS\n    Complete Works\n\n    In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods;\n\n    With\n    BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS,\n    COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY,\n    ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS,\n    STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence;\n    INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words.\n\n    by\n    KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE,\n\n    Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee;\n    A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia.\n    M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia.\n\n    VOL. II\n    Amelio-Porphyrian Books, 22-33.\n\n    COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS\n    P. O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A.\n\n\n\n\n    Copyright, 1918, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie.\n    All Rights, including that of Translation, Reserved.\n\n    Entered at Stationers' Hall, by\n    George Bell and Sons, Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn, London.\n\n\n\n\nSIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.\n\nThe One Identical Essence is Everywhere Entirely Present.\n\n\nWHY THE WORLD-SOUL IS EVERYWHERE ENTIRE IN THE WORLD-BODY.\n\n1. Is it because the body of the universe is so great that the Soul is\neverywhere present in the universe, though being naturally divisible in\n(human) bodies? Or it is by herself, that she is everywhere present? In\nthe latter case, she has not been drawn away everywhere by the body,\nbut the body found her everywhere in existence before it; thus, in\nwhatever place it may be, it found the Soul present before it itself\nwas part of the universe, and the total body of the universe was\nlocated in the Soul that existed already.\n\n\nHOW COULD THE SOUL HAVE NO MAGNITUDE, IF SHE ALREADY FILLED ALL SPACE?\n\nBut if the Soul had such an extension before the body approached\nher, if she already filled all space, how can she have no magnitude?\nBesides, how could she have been present in the universe when the\nlatter did not yet exist? Last, being considered indivisible and\nnon-extended, is she everywhere present without having any magnitude?\nIf the answer be that she extended herself throughout the body of the\nuniverse without herself being corporeal, the question is not yet\nresolved by thus accidentally attributing magnitude to the Soul; for\nit would then be reasonable to ask how she grew great by accident. The\nSoul could not extend herself in the entire body in the same manner as\nquality, as for instance, sweetness or color; for these are passive\nmodifications of the bodies, so that one must not be astonished to see\na modification spread all over the modified body, being nothing by\nitself, inhering in the body, and existing only within it; that is why\nthe soul necessarily has the same magnitude as the body. Besides, the\nwhiteness of one part of the body does not share the experience[1] (or,\n\"passion\") experienced by the whiteness of another part; the whiteness\nof one part is identical, in respect to species, to the whiteness of\nanother part; but it is not identical therewith in respect to number;\non the contrary, the part of the soul which is present in the foot is\nidentical with the portion of the soul present in the hand, as may be\nseen in the percepts thereof. Last, what is identical in the qualities\nis divisible, while that which is identical in the soul is indivisible;\nif it be said to divide, it is in this sense that it is present\neverywhere.\n\n\nTHE SOUL WAS CAPABLE OF EXTENSION BEFORE THE EXISTENCE OF THE BODY.\n\nIn view of these facts, let us, starting from the very beginning,\nexplain in a clear and plausible manner, how the soul, being\nincorporeal and extended, could, nevertheless, have assumed such an\nextension, either before the bodies, or in the bodies. If indeed one\nsee that she was capable of assuming extension before the bodies\nexisted, it will be easily understood that she could have done so\nwithin the bodies.\n\n\nDESCRIPTION OF THE UNIVERSAL BEING.\n\n2. There exists a genuinely universal (Being). The world that we\nsee is no more than its image. This veritably universal (Being) is\nin nothing; for nothing has proceeded from its existence. What is\nposterior to this universal (Being) must, to exist, be in it, since it\nwould depend on it, and without it could neither subsist nor move. Do\nnot therefore place our world in this genuinely universal (being) as in\na place, if by place you understand the limit of the body containing\nso far as it contains, or a space which before had, and which still\nhas emptiness for nature. Conceive of the foundation on which our\nworld rests as existing in the (Being) which exists everywhere, and\ncontains it. Conceive their relation exclusively by the mind, setting\naside all local nomenclature. Indeed, when one speaks of place, it is\nonly in relation with our visible world; but the universal (being),\nbeing the First, and possessing genuine existence, has no need of\nbeing in a place, nor in anything whatever. Being universal, it could\nnot fail to support itself, for it fills itself, equals itself, and\nis where is the universal because it is this itself. What has been\nbuilt on the universal, being other than it, participates in it, and\napproaches it, receives strength from it, not by dividing it, but\nbecause it finds it in itself, because it approaches it, since the\nuniversal (\"being\") is not outside of itself; for it is impossible for\nthe essence to be in non-essence; on the contrary, it is non-essence\nthat must subsist in essence, and consequently unite entirely with\nthe whole essence. We repeat, the universal could not separate itself\nfrom itself; and if we say that it is everywhere, it is only in this\nsense that it is in essence, that is, in itself. It is not surprising\nthat what is everywhere is in essence and in itself; for that which\nis everywhere is in the unity. We, however, positing that the (Being)\nin question is sense-(existence), believe that it is everywhere here\nbelow; and, as the sense-(existence) is great, we wonder how nature\n(that is, the intelligible essence) can extend in that which has so\ngreat a magnitude. In reality, the (Being) which is called great is\nsmall; the (Being) which is regarded as small is great, since the\nwhole of it penetrates in every part of all; or rather, our world,\nby its parts everywhere approaching the universal (Being), finds it\neverywhere entire, and greater than itself. Consequently, as it would\nreceive nothing more by a greater extension (for, if it were possible,\nit would thereby exclude itself from the universal Being), it circles\naround this Being. Not being able to embrace it, nor to pierce into\nits innermost, it contented itself with occupying a place, and with\nhaving a place where it might preserve existence while approaching the\nuniversal (Being), which in one sense is present to it, and in another,\nis not present; for the universal (Being) is in itself, even when\nsomething else wishes to unite itself to it. Therefore, approaching it,\nthe body of the universe finds the universal \"Being\"; having no need\nof going any farther, it turns around the same thing because the thing\naround which it turns is the veritably universal (Being), so that in\nall its parts it enjoys the presence of this whole entire Being. If\nthe universal (Being) were in a place, our world should (instead of\nhaving a circular motion), rush towards it in a straight line, touching\ndifferent parts of this Being by different parts of its own, and find\nitself on one side distant from it, and on the other side near it. But\nas the universal (Being) is neither near one place, nor distant from,\nanother, it is necessarily entirely present as soon as it is at all\npresent. Consequently, it is entirely present to each of these things\nfrom which it is neither near nor far; it is present to the things that\nare able to receive it.\n\n\nTHE UNIVERSAL BEING IS INDIVISIBLE.\n\n3. Is the universal (Being) by itself present everywhere? Or does it\nremain within itself, while from its innermost its powers descend on\nall things, and is it in this sense that it is regarded as everywhere\npresent? Yes, doubtless. That is why it is said that souls are the rays\nof this universal (Being), that it is built on itself, and that from\nit, souls descend into various animals. The things which participate\nin its unity, incapable as they are of possessing a complete nature\nconformed to its nature, enjoy the presence of the universal (Being) in\nthis sense that they enjoy the presence of some of its powers. They are\nnot, however, entirely separated from it, because it is not separated\nfrom the power which it communicates to each of them. If they do not\nhave more, it is only because they are not capable of receiving more\nfrom the presence of the entire whole (Being). Evidently it is always\nentirely present there where its powers are present. It however remains\nseparated, for if it became the form of any one particular being, it\nwould cease to be universal, to subsist everywhere in itself, and\nit would be the accident of some other \"being.\" Therefore, since it\nbelongs to none of these things, even of those that aspire to unite\nthemselves with it, it makes them enjoy its presence when they desire\nit, and in the measure in which they are capable thereof; but it\ndoes not belong to any of them in particular. It is not surprising,\ntherefore, that it should be present in all things, since it is not\npresent in any in a manner such as to belong to it alone. It is also\nreasonable to assert that, if the soul share the passions of the\nbodies, it is only by accident, that she dwells in herself, and belongs\nneither to matter nor to body, that the whole of her illuminates\nthe whole world-body. It is not a contradiction to say that the\n(Being) which is not present in any place is present to all things\neach of which is in a place. What, indeed, would be surprising and\nimpossible would be that the universal (Being) could, while occupying\na determinate place, be present to things which are in a place, and\ncould at all be present in the sense in which we have explained it.\nReason forces us, therefore, to admit that the universal (Being) must,\nprecisely because it does not occupy any place, be entirely present\nto the things to which it is present; and, since it is present to the\nuniverse, be entirely present to each thing; otherwise, one part of it\nwould be here, and another there; consequently, it would be divisible,\nit would be body. How otherwise could one divide the (\"Being\")? Is it\nits life that shall within it be divided? If it be the totality of the\n(being) that is life, no part of it would be that. Or will somebody\ntry to divide the Intelligence, so that one of its parts be here,\nand the other there? In this case, neither of the two parts would\nbe intelligence. Or will the (Being) itself be divided? But if the\ntotality be the (Being), no one part of it would be that. It might be\nobjected that the parts of the bodies are still bodies themselves. But\nthat which is divided is not the body (as such), but a certain body\nof a certain extent; now each of its parts possesses the form that\ncauses it to be named body; while the form not only does not have some\nparticular extension, but even any kind of extension at all.\n\n\nTHE UNITY OF BEING DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER BEINGS.\n\n4. How can there be a plurality of essences, intelligences and soul,\nif essence be one? The essence is one everywhere; but its unity does\nnot exclude the existence of other (beings), which may be said to\nconform thereto. It is so also with the unity of the intelligence, and\nof the soul, although the Soul of the universe be different from the\nparticular souls.\n\n\nESSENCE IS DIVISIBLE IF THEREBY NOT DIMINISHED.\n\nIt would seem as if there were a contradiction between the present\nassertions and other statements of ours; and perhaps our demonstration\nimposes rather than convinces. It is impossible to believe that the\nessence which is one be also everywhere identical; it would seem\npreferable to admit that essence, considered in its totality, is\nsusceptible of division, so long as this division does not diminish\nit; or, to use more careful terms, that it begets all things while\nremaining with itself; and that the souls that are born of it, and\nare its parts, fill up everything. But if it be admitted that the One\nessence remains in Himself because it seems incredible that a principle\ncould everywhere be present entire, the same difficulty would hinder us\nin regard to souls; for it will result that each of them will no longer\nbe entire in the whole body, but will be divided therein, or, if each\nindividual soul remain entire, that it is by remaining in one part of\nthe body, that the soul will communicate her power to it. These same\nquestions about the soul could be raised about the powers of the soul,\nand we might ask if they be all entire everywhere. Last, one could be\nled to believe that the soul was in one member, while her power was in\nanother.\n\n\nTHE SOUL, AS COMPRISING MANY SOULS, IS INFINITE.\n\nLet us first explain how there can be a plurality of intelligences,\nsouls, and essences. If we consider the things that proceed from the\nfirst principles, as they are numbers and not magnitudes, we shall\nalso have to ask ourselves how they fill the universe. This plurality\nwhich thus arises from the first principles does not in any way help us\nto solve our question, since we have granted that essence is multiple\nbecause of the difference (of the beings that proceed from it), and\nnot by place; for though it be multiple, it is simultaneously entire;\n\"essence everywhere touches essence,\"[2] and it is everywhere entirely\npresent. Intelligence likewise is manifold by the difference (of\nthe intelligences that proceed therefrom), and not by space; it is\nentire everywhere. It is so also with souls; even their part which is\ndivisible in the bodies is indivisible by its nature. But the bodies\npossess extension because the soul is present with them; or rather,\nit is because there are bodies in the sense-world; it is because the\npower of the Soul (that is universal) which is in them manifests itself\nin all their parts, that the Soul herself seems to have parts. What\nproves that she is not divided as they are, and with them, that she\nis entirely present everywhere, is that by nature she is essentially\none and indivisible. Thus, the unity of the Soul does not exclude the\nplurality of souls, any more than the unity of essence excludes the\nplurality of (beings), or that the plurality of intelligibles does\nnot disagree with the existence of the One. It is not necessary to\nadmit that the Soul imparts life to the bodies by the plurality of\nsouls, nor that that plurality derives from the extension of the body\n(of the world). Before there ever were any bodies, there was already\none (universal) Soul and several (individual) souls. The individual\nsouls existed already in the universal Soul, not potentially, but each\nin actuality. The unity of the universal Soul does not hinder the\nmultitude of the individual souls contained within her; the multitude\nof the individual souls does not hinder the unity of the universal\nSoul. They are distinct without being separated by any interval; they\nare present to each other instead of being foreign to each other; for\nthey are not separated from each other by any limits, any more than\ndifferent sciences are within a single soul. The Soul is such that in\nher unity she contains all the souls. Such a nature is, therefore,\ninfinite.\n\n\nTHE GREATNESS OF THE SOUL HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SIZE OF THE BODY.\n\n5. The magnitude of the Soul does not consist in being a corporeal\nmass; for every corporeal mass is small, and reduces to nothing, if\nit be made to undergo a diminution. As to the magnitude of the Soul,\nnothing can be removed from it; and if something were removed, she\nwould not lose anything. Since, therefore, she cannot lose anything,\nwhy fear that she should be far from something? How could she be far\nfrom something since she loses nothing, since she possesses an eternal\nnature, and is subject to no leakage? If she were subject to some\nleakage, she would advance till where she could leak; but as she cannot\nleak at all (for there is no place where or into which she could leak),\nshe has embraced the universe, or rather, she herself is the universe,\nand she is too great to be judged according to physical magnitude.\nWe may say that she gives little to the universe; but she gives it\nall it can receive. Do not consider the universal Being (Essence)\nas being smaller, or as having a smaller mass (than our universe);\notherwise, you would be led to ask yourself how that which is smaller\ncan unite with that which is greater. Besides, one should not predicate\ncomparative smallness of the universal Essence, nor compare, in regard\nto mass, that which has no mass with that which has; that would be\nas if somebody said that the science called medicine is smaller than\nthe body of the doctor. Neither attribute to the universal Essence an\nextent greater (than that of our universe); for it is not in extension\nthat the soul is greater than the body. What shows the veritable\nmagnitude of the soul, is that, when the body increases, the same soul\nwhich formerly existed in a smaller mass is present in this whole mass\nthat has become greater; now it would be ridiculous to suppose that\nthe soul increases in the same manner as a corporeal mass.\n\n\nTHE SOULS WILL DIFFER AS WILL THE SENSATIONS.\n\n6. Why (if the universal Soul possess the magnitude here attributed\nto her), does she not approach some other body (than that which she\nanimates; that is, some individual body)? It would be this body's\n(privilege or duty) to approach the universal Soul, if it be able to\ndo so; on approaching to her, it receives something, and appropriates\nit. But would this body, that would approach the universal Soul, not\nalready possess her simultaneously with the soul proper to itself,\nsince these souls (the universal Soul, and the individual soul) do not\nappear to differ from each other? The fact is, that as their sensations\ndiffer, so must the passions that they experience likewise differ. The\nthings are judged to be different, but the judge is the same principle\nsuccessively placed in presence of different passions, although it be\nnot he who experiences them, but the body disposed in some particular\nmanner. It is as if when some one of us judges both the pleasure\nexperienced by the finger, and the pain felt by the head. But why does\nnot our soul perceive judgments made by the universal Soul? Because\nthis is a judgment, and not a passion. Besides, the faculty that judged\nthe passion does not say, \"I have judged,\" but it limits itself to\njudging. Thus, in ourselves, it is not the sight which communicates its\njudgment to the hearing, although both of these senses made separate\njudgments; what presides over these two senses is reason, which\nconstitutes a different faculty. Often reason cognizes the judgment\nmade by some other (being), while being conscious simultaneously of the\npassion it experiences. But this question has been treated elsewhere.\n\n\nHOW CAN THE SAME PRINCIPLE EXIST IN ALL THINGS?\n\nLet us return to this question: How can the same principle exist\nin all things? This question amounts to asking how each of the\nsense-objects which form a plurality and which occupy different places,\ncan, nevertheless, participate in the same principle; for it is not\nallowable to divide unity into a multitude of parts; it would be more\nfitting to reduce the multitude of parts to unity, which could not\napproach them. But when these parts occupy different places, they have\nled us to believe that unity likewise is split up, as if the power\nwhich dominates and which contains were divided into as many parts as\nthat which is contained. The hand itself (though corporeal), may hold\nan entire body, such as a piece of wood several feet in length, and\nother objects. In this case, the force that holds makes itself felt in\nthe whole object that is felt, and does not distribute itself in as\nmany parts as it may contain, though it be circumscribed by the limit\nof the reach of the hand. Nevertheless, the hand is limited by its own\nextension, and not by that of the body which is held or suspended. Add\nto the suspended body some other length, and admitting that the hand\ncan carry it, its force will hold the entire body without dividing into\nas many parts as it may contain. Now suppose that the corporeal mass\nof the hand be annihilated, and, nevertheless, allow the force which,\nbefore, existed in the hand and held the weight, to persist; will not\nthis same force, indivisible in the totality, be equally indivisible in\neach of its parts?\n\n\nLIGHT EXISTS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITHIN AND WITHOUT.\n\n7. Imagine a luminous point which serves as centre, and imagine around\nit a transparent sphere, so that the clearness of the luminous point\nshines in the whole body that surrounds it without the exterior\nreceiving any light from elsewhere; you will surely have to acknowledge\nthat this interior light, by remaining impassible, penetrates the\nwhole surrounding mass, and that it embraces the whole sphere from\nthe central point in which it is seen to shine. The truth is that the\nlight did not emanate from the little body placed in the centre; for\nthis little body did not glow inasmuch as it was a body, but inasmuch\nas it was a luminous body; that means, by virtue of an incorporeal\npower. Now in thought annihilate the mass of the little luminous body,\nand preserve its luminous power; could you still say that light is\nsomewhere? Will it not be equally in the interior, and in the whole\nexterior sphere? You will no longer perceive where it was fixed before,\nand you will no longer say whence it comes, nor where it is; in this\nrespect you will remain uncertain and astonished; you will see the\nlight shine simultaneously in the interior and in the exterior sphere.\nAn example of this is the solar light that shines in the air when\nyou look at the body of the sun, at the same time that you perceive\neverywhere the same light without any division; that is demonstrated\nby objects that intercept the light; they reflect it nowhere else\nthan in the direction from which it came; they do not shatter it into\nfragments. But if the sun were an incorporeal power, you could not,\nwhen it would radiate light, tell where the light began, nor from where\nit was sent; there would be but a single light, the same everywhere,\nhaving neither point of beginning, nor principle from which it proceeds.\n\n\nUNITY IS IN THE MANIFOLD BY A MANNER OF EXISTENCE.\n\n8. When light emanates from a body it is easy to tell when it shines,\nbecause the location of that body is known. But if a being be\nimmaterial, if it have no need of a body, if it be anterior to all\nbodies, and be founded on itself, or rather if it have no need, as\nhas a body, or resting on any foundation--then, a being endowed with\nsuch a nature has no origin from which it is derived, resides in no\nplace, and depends on no body. How could you then say that one of its\nparts is here, and another is there? For thus it would have an origin\nfrom which it had issued, and it would depend from something. We must,\ntherefore, say that if something participate in this being by the\npower of the universe, it participates in this being entirely, without\nthereby being changed or divided; for it is a being united to a body\nthat suffers (although often that happens to it only accidentally),\nand in this respect it may be said that it is passive and divisible,\nsince it is some part of the body, either its passion, or form. As\nto the (being) which is united to any body, and to which the body\naspires to be united, it must in no manner share the passions of the\nbody, as such; for the essential passion of the body, as such, is\nto divide itself. If, therefore, the body be by nature inclined to\ndivide itself, then is the incorporeal, by nature, indivisible. How,\nin fact, could one divide that which has no extension? If, therefore,\nthe extended (being) participate in the (being) which has no extension,\nit participates in this (being) without dividing it; otherwise, this\n(being) would have extension. Consequently, when you say that the\nunity (of the universal essence) is in the manifold, you do not say\nthat unity has become manifoldness, but you refer to this unity the\nmanner of existence of the multitude, seeing it in this whole multitude\nsimultaneously. As to this Unity, it will have to be understood that\nit belongs to no individual, nor to the whole multitude, but that it\nbelongs to itself alone, that it is itself, and that, being itself,\nit does not fail to support itself. Nor does it possess a magnitude\nsuch as of our universe, nor, let alone, such as that of one of the\nparts of the universe; for it has absolutely no magnitude. How could\nit have any magnitude? It is the body that should have such magnitude.\nAs to the (being) whose nature is entirely different from that of the\nbody, no magnitude should be ascribed to it. If it have no magnitude,\nit is nowhere; it is neither here nor there; for if so, it would be in\nseveral places. If then the local division suits only the (being) of\nwhich one part is here, and the other there, how could the (being) that\nis neither here nor there be divided? Consequently, the incorporeal\n(being) must remain indivisible in itself, although the multitude of\nthings aspire to unite itself to it, and succeeds therein. If they\naspire to possess it, they aspire to possess it entire, so that if\nthey succeed in participating in that (being), they will participate\nin that entire (being) so far as their capacity reaches. Nevertheless,\nthe things that participate in this (being) must participate in it\nas if they did not participate in it, in this sense that it does not\nbelong exclusively to any of them. It is thus that this (being) dwells\nentirely in itself, and in the things in which it manifests; if it did\nnot remain entire, it would no more be itself, and things would no\nlonger participate in the (being) to which they aspire, but in some\nother (being) to which they did not aspire.\n\n\nPOTENTIALITIES ARE INSEPARABLE FROM THEIR BEINGS.\n\n9. If this unity (of the universal Soul) divided itself in a multitude\nof parts such that each would resemble the total unity, there would be\na multitude of primary (beings); for each one of these (beings) would\nbe primary. How then could one distinguish from each other all these\nprimary (beings), so that they might not all in confusion blend into a\nsingle one? They would not be separated by their bodies, for primary\n(beings) could not be forms of bodies; as they would be similar to\nthe primary (Being) which is their principle. On the other hand, if\nthe things named parts were potentialities of the universal (Being),\n(there would be two results). First, each thing would no longer be\nthe total unity. Then, one might wonder how these potentialities\nseparated from the universal (Being), and abandoned it; for if they\nabandoned it, it could evidently only be to go somewhere else. There\nmight also be reason to ask oneself if the potentialities which are\nin the sense-world are still or no longer in the universal (Being).\nIf they be no longer in it, it is absurd to suppose it diminished or\nbecame impotent, by being deprived of the powers it possessed before.\nIt is equally absurd to suppose that the potentialities would be\nseparated from the beings to which they belong. On the contrary, if\nthe potentialities exist simultaneously in the universal (Being) and\nelsewhere, they will, here below, be either wholes or parts; if they be\nparts, that part of them that will remain on high will also form parts;\nif they be wholes, they are here below the same as above; they are not\ndivided here below in any way, and thus the universal (Being) is still\nthe same without any division. Or again, the potentialities are the\nparticularized universal (Being), which has become the multitude of\nthe things of which each is the total unity; and these potentialities\nare mutually similar. In this way, with each being there will be but\na single potentiality, united to Being, and the other things will be\nno more than mere potentialities. But it is not easier to conceive of\na being without potentiality, than a potentiality without a being;\nfor above (among the ideas) the potentiality consists of hypostatic\nexistence and being; or rather, it is something greater than being.\nHere below there are other potentialities, less energetic or lively;\nthey emanate from the universal (Being) as from a brilliant light would\nemanate another less brilliant light; but the beings inhere in these\npotentialities, as there could be no potentiality without being.\n\n\nTHE UNIVERSAL SOUL IS EVERYWHERE ENTIRE, INCLUDING SOULS SPLIT\nINFINITELY.\n\nAmong such potentialities, which are necessarily conformable to each\nother, the universal Soul must be the same everywhere, or, if she be\nnot absolutely everywhere, she must, at least, in every place, be\nentire without division, as in one and the same body. In this case, why\ncould she not also be thus in the whole universe? If we were to suppose\nthat each particular soul were divided into infinity, the universal\nSoul will no longer be entire, and, as a result of this division,\nshe will become completely impotent. Then, as there will be entirely\ndifferent powers in different parts of the world, there will be no\nmore sympathy among souls. Last, the image, separated from the essence\nit represents, and the light, separated from the source of which it\nis only a weakened emanation, could no longer subsist; for in general\neverything that derives its existence from anything else and its image\ncould no longer subsist without its model. Likewise, these powers\nwhich radiate from the universal Soul would cease to be if they found\nthemselves separated from their principle. If so, the Principle which\nbegets these powers will exist everywhere they are; consequently, from\nthis standpoint also, the universal (Being) must be everywhere present\nas a whole, without undergoing any divisions.\n\n\nTHE IMAGE IS BOUND TO ITS MODEL BY RADIATION.\n\n10. It may be objected that the image need not necessarily be attached\nto its model; for there are images that subsist in the absence of their\nmodel from which they are derived. For instance, when the fire ceases,\nthe heat that proceeds from it does not any the less remain in the\nwarmed object. The relation between this image and its model should be\nunderstood as follows. Let us consider an image made by a painter. In\nthis case, it is not the model who made the image, but the painter;\nand even so it is not even the real image of the model, even if the\npainter had painted his own portrait; for this image did not arise from\nthe body of the painter, nor from the represented form, nor from the\npainter himself, but it is the product of a complex of colors arranged\nin a certain manner. We, therefore, do not really here have the\nproduction of an image, such as is furnished by mirrors, waters, and\nshadows. Here the image really emanates from the pre-existing model,\nand is formed by it, and could not exist without it. It is in this\nmanner that the inferior potentialities proceed from the superior ones.\n\n\nSOULS ARE AS IMMORTAL AS THE ONE FROM WHOM THEY PROCEED.\n\nLet us proceed to the objection drawn from the heat that remains\nafter the withdrawal of the fire. The heat is not the image of the\nfire, or at least, we may deny that there is always fire in heat;\nbut even so heat would not be independent of fire. Besides, when you\nwithdraw from a body the fire that heats it, this body grows cold,\nif not instantaneously, at least gradually. It would, however, be\nwrong to say that the powers that descend here below also gradually\ngrow extinct; for this would amount to stating that only the One is\nimmortal, while the souls and intelligences are mortal. Besides, it is\nnot reasonable to admit that even the things that derive from a \"being\"\nthat wastes away also gradually exhaust themselves; for even if you\nshould immobilize the sun, it would still shed the same light in the\nsame places. If it were objected that it would not be the same light,\nthe conclusion would be (the absurdity) that the body of the sun is in\na perpetual wastage. Last we have elsewhere demonstrated at length\nthat what proceeds from the One does not perish, but that all souls and\nintelligences are immortal.\n\n\nBEINGS PARTAKE OF THE ONE DIFFERENTLY ACCORDING TO THEIR CAPACITIES.\n\n11. But if (the intelligible Being) be present everywhere, why do not\nall (beings) participate in the intelligible (Being) entire? Why are\nthere several degrees amidst these (beings), one being the first, the\nother the second, and so on? Because the (beings) which are capable of\nabsorbing (intelligible Being) are counted as present thereto. Essence\nexists everywhere in that which is essence, thus never failing itself.\nEverything that can be present to it is present in reality, in the\nmeasure of its capacity, not in a local manner, as light is modified by\ntransparence; for participation takes place differently in an opaque\nbody. If we distinguish several degrees among beings, we shall surely\nhave to conceive that the first is separated from the second, and the\nsecond from the third, only by its order, its power, its (individual)\ndifferences, but not by its location. In the intelligible world nothing\nhinders different things from subsisting together, such as soul and\nintelligence, and all the sciences, superior or inferior. Thus also in\na single apple the eye sees color, the nostril smells perfume, and each\nother sense-organ perceives its individual quality. All these things\nsubsist together and are not separated from each other.\n\n\nTHE DIFFERENT KINDS OF PRESENCES.\n\nIs the intelligible (Being) then so varied and manifold? It is indeed\nvaried, but it is simultaneously simple; it is both one and manifold;\nfor reason (which is the essence of the universal Soul), is both one\nand manifold. The universal (Being) is also one; though any difference\nin it (in this sense, that it contains different essences), results\nfrom its own constitution; the difference inheres in its nature, for\nit could not belong to non-being. The constitution of Essence is such\nas to be inseparable from unity; unity is present wherever essence is,\nand the one Essence subsists in itself. It is indeed possible that an\nessence which in a certain respect is separated from another essence,\nis, however, entirely present with it. But there are different kinds\nof presence; first, when sense-things are present with intelligible\nthings, at least to those to which they can be present; second, when\nintelligible entities are present to each other; likewise, when the\nbody is present to the soul; another, when a science is present to\nthe soul; further, when a science is present to another science, and\nboth coexist in the same intelligence; last, when a body is present to\nanother body.\n\n\nHOW VARIOUS THINGS CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE SAME PRINCIPLE.\n\n12. When a sound resounds in the air, and when it constitutes a word,\nthe ear that is present hears and perceives this sound and this word,\nespecially if the place be quiet. If another ear should come to be in\nthis place, the sound and the word approach it likewise, or rather,\nthis ear will approach the word. Suppose also that several eyes\nconsider the same object; all are filled with its sight, although\nthis object occupy a determinate place. Thus the same object will\nimpress different organs with different perceptions, because the\none is an eye, and the other is an ear. Likewise, all the things\nthat can participate in the soul do participate therein, but each\nreceives a different power from one and the same principle. The sound\nis everywhere present in the air; it is not a divided unity, but a\nunity present everywhere, entirely. Likewise, if the air receive the\nform of the visible object, it possesses it without division, for, in\nwhatever place the eye should place itself, it perceives the form of\nthe visible object; at, least, according to our opinion, for not all\nphilosophers agree herewith. We give these examples to explain how\nseveral things may participate in one and the same principle. Besides,\nthe example of the sound suffices to demonstrate what we here wish to\nexplain; namely, that the entire form is present in the entire air;\nfor all men would not hear the same thing, if the word uttered by the\nsound were everywhere entire, and if each ear did not likewise hear it\nentire. Now if in this case the entire word spread in the entire air,\nwithout some definite part of the word being united to a certain part\nof the air, and some other part of the word being united with another\npart of the air, how could we refuse to admit that a single Soul\npenetrates everywhere without dividing herself with the things, that\nshe is entirely present everywhere where she is, that she is everywhere\nin the world without dividing into parts that correspond to those of\nthe world? When she has united with the bodies, in whatever kind of\nunion, she bears an analogy to the word which has been pronounced in\nthe air, while before uniting with the bodies, she resembles him who\npronounces, or is about to pronounce some word. Nevertheless, even when\nshe has united to the bodies, she does not really in certain respects\ncease resembling him who pronounces a word, and who, while pronouncing\nit, possesses it, and gives it at the same time. Doubtless the word\ndoes not have a nature identical with those things that we proposed to\nillustrate by this example; nevertheless, there is much analogy between\nthem.\n\n\nTHE BODY'S RELATION TO THE SOUL IS A PASSAGE INTO THE WORLD OF LIFE.\n\n(Let us study) the relation of the (world) Soul to bodies. As this\nrelation is of a different kind, it must be understood that the Soul\nis not partly in herself and partly in the bodies. Simultaneously she\ndwells entirely within herself, and also projects her image into the\nmultiplicity of the bodies (which reflect her, like mirrors). Suppose\nthat some definite body approach the Soul to receive life from her; it\nobtains life silently, and thus possesses what already was in other\nbodies. Indeed, conditions had not been arranged so that a part of the\nSoul, located in a certain place, should await a body, so as to enter\ninto it. But this part of the Soul which enters into a body, so to\nspeak, existed already in the universe, that is to say, in herself, and\nshe continued to exist in herself although she seemed to have descended\nhere below. How indeed should the Soul descend here below? Therefore,\nif she did not descend here below, if she only manifested her actual\npresence, without awaiting the body which was to participate in her,\nevidently the Soul dwells in herself simultaneously with becoming\npresent to this body. Now, if the Soul dwell in herself at the same\ntime as she becomes present to this body (for it is not the Soul that\ncame into this body), it is the body which entered into her; it is\nthe body which, being till then outside of veritable Essence, entered\ninto it, and passed into the world of life. Now the world of life was\nall in itself, without extension, and, therefore, without division.\nThe body has, therefore, not entered into it as in something that\npossesses extension. It commenced by participating, not in one of the\nparts of the world of life, but in this whole world, entirely. If an\nadditional body should also enter it, it will participate in it in the\nsame way (entirely). Consequently, if we said that the world of life is\nentire in these bodies, it is similarly entire in each of them. It is,\ntherefore everywhere the same, and numerically one, without dividing,\nbut always present entire.\n\n\nEXTENSION IS MERELY A SIGN OF PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD OF LIFE.\n\n13. Whence originates extension in our universe, and in the animals?\nThe world of life contains no extension. Sensation, whose testimony\nhinders us from believing what we are told in this respect, reveals\nto us here and there the world of life. But reason tells us that, if\nwe see it thus, it is not that it is really extended here and there,\nbut that all that possesses extension has participated in the world of\nlife, which, however, has no extension.\n\n\nPARTICIPATION CAN BE ONLY IN THE INTELLIGIBLE.\n\nWhen a being participates in something, evidently it does not\nparticipate in itself; for thus it would really participate in\nnothing, and would remain what it was. The body that participates in\nsomething must, therefore, not participate in corporeal nature, for\nit possesses it already. Consequently, the body will not participate\nin the corporeal nature, any more than a magnitude would participate\nin a magnitude, which it possesses already. Let us even admit that\na magnitude be increased, yet on that account alone it would not\nparticipate in magnitude; for a two-foot object does, not become a\nthree-foot object, but the object which first had a certain quantity\nmerely changes to some other quantity; otherwise two would become\nthree. Thus, since that which has extension and is divided participates\nin genus that is different, and even very different, the thing in\nwhich it participates must neither be divided, nor have extension;\nbut have absolutely no kind of quantity. Consequently, the (being)\nwhich everywhere is present entire must be present, though remaining\nindivisible. It is not indivisible merely because it is small, which\nwould not make it any less divisible; only, it would no more be\nproportioned to the universe, it would not spread in the corporeal mass\nin the degree that it increases. Neither does it resemble a point,\nbut it includes an infinity of points; consequently what you might\nsuppose was a point would include an infinity of (separate) points,\nand could not be continuous, nor, consequently, proportion itself to\nthe universe. If then every corporeal mass possess the (being) which\nis present everywhere, it must possess it entire in all the parts that\ncompose it.\n\n\nNOTHING IN THE UNIVERSAL SOUL IS BEGOTTEN; IT ONLY SEEMS SO.\n\n14. But if one and the single Soul be in each person, how does each\nhave his own soul? How then can one soul be good, while the other\nis evil? The universal Soul communicates her life to each, for she\ncontains all the souls and all the intelligences. She possesses\nsimultaneously unity and infinity; in her breast she contains all\nthe souls, each distinct from her, but not separated; otherwise how\ncould the Soul possess the infinite? It might still be objected that\nthe universal Soul simultaneously contains all things, all lives, all\nsouls, all the intelligences; that these are not each circumscribed by\nlimits, and that that is the reason they form a unity. Indeed, there\nhad to be in the universal Soul a life not only one, but infinite, and\nyet single; this one life had to be one so far as it was all lives,\nas these did not get confused in this unity, but that they should\noriginate there, while at the same time they should remain located in\nthe place from where they had started; or rather, they never left the\nwomb of the universal Soul, for they have always subsisted in the same\nstate. Indeed, nothing was begotten in the universal Soul; she did\nnot really divide herself, she only seems divided in respect to what\nreceives her; everything within her remains what it has always been.\nBut that which was begotten (namely, the body) approaches the Soul,\nand seems to unite with her, and depends on her.\n\n\nRELATION OF MAN TO THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.\n\nAnd what are we? Are we the universal Soul, or are we what approaches\nher, and what is begotten in time (that is, the body)? No: (we are not\nbodies). Before the generation of the bodies had been accomplished, we\nexisted already on high; some of us were men, others of us were even\ndivinities----that is, we were pure souls, intelligences connected with\nuniversal Being; we formed parts of the intelligible world, parts that\nwere neither circumscribed nor separated, but which belonged to the\nentire intelligible world. Even now, indeed, we are not separated from\nthe intelligible world; but the intelligible Man in us has received,\nand is joined by a man who desired to be different from the former\n(that is, the sense-man desired to be independent), and finding us,\nfor we were not outside of the universe, he surrounded us, and added\nhimself to the intelligible man who then was each one of us.\n\n\nWE ARE NOT ALWAYS BOTH MEN, AS WE SHOULD BE.\n\nNow suppose a single sound or word; those who listen to it hear it and\nreceive it, each in his own way; hearing passes into each of them in\nthe condition of an actualization, and perceives what is acting on it.\nWe thus became two men at once (the intelligible Man, and the sense-man\nwho added himself to the former); we are no longer, as before, only one\nof the two; or rather, we are sometimes still only one of them, the man\nwho added himself to the first. This occurs every time that the first\nMan slumbers in us, and is not present, in a certain sense (when we\nfail to reflect about the conceptions of intelligence).\n\n\nHOW THE BODY APPROACHED THE SOUL.\n\n15. But how did the body approach the universal Soul? As this body\nhad an aptitude for participation in the Soul, it received that for\nwhich it was fit; now it was disposed to receive a particular soul;\nthat is why it did not receive the universal Soul. Although the latter\nbe present with this body, she does not become entirely suitable to\nit; that is why plants and the non-human souls likewise possess only\nso much of the universal Soul, as they were able to receive from her.\nLikewise, when a voice challenges notice, so some (persons) grasp only\nthe sound, others grasp also the signification. As soon as the animal\nhas been begotten, it possesses within itself the presence of a soul\nderived from the universal (Being), and by which it remains united with\nthis (Being) because then it possesses a body that is neither empty nor\ninanimate. This body was not before in an inanimate place, and (when\nit was begotten), it only further reapproximated itself to the soul by\nits aptitude (to receive life); it became not only a body, but also\na living body; thanks to the neighborhood to the soul, it received a\ntrace (of the soul); and by that I do not mean a part of the soul, but\na kind of heat or light which emanated from the soul, and which, in\nthe body, begat desires, pleasures, and pains. The body of the thus\nbegotten animal was, therefore, not a body foreign (to life). The Soul,\nthat had issued from the divine principle, remained tranquil according\nto her own nature, and was subsisting in herself, when that part, which\nwas troubled by her own weakness, and was spontaneously fluctuating\naround when assailed by impulsions from without, first complained\naudibly by herself, and then in that part of the animal which is common\nto the soul and body, and communicated her disturbance to the entire\nliving being. Thus when a deliberative assembly calmly examines some\nquestion, a confused mob, driven by hunger or excited by some passion,\nmay come to spread trouble and disorder in the whole assembly. As long\nas such people keep quiet, the voice of the wise man may be heard by\nthem; and as a result the crowd retains orderliness, its worse part\nremaining subordinate; otherwise the worst part dominates, while the\nbetter part remains silent, because the trouble hinders the crowd\nfrom listening to reason. Thus does evil come to reign in a city and\nin an assembly. Likewise evil reigns in him who allows himself to be\ndominated by this disorderly crowd of fears, desires and passions\nthat he bears within his breast; and that will last until he reduce\nthat crowd to obedience, until he become again the man he formerly\nwas (before descending here below), and until he regulate his life\n(according to the better Man); what he then will grant to the body will\nbe granted as to something foreign. As to him who lives now in one\nmanner, and now in another, he is a man of mingled good and evil.\n\n\nTHIS DOCTRINE EXPLAINS THE MYTHS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS.\n\n16. If the soul could not become evil, and if there be but a single\nway for the soul to enter the body, and to remain present within it,\nthere would be no meaning in the periodical \"descents\" and \"ascents\"\nof the soul, the \"chastisements\" she undergoes, and the \"migration\"\ninto the bodies other (than human bodies, that is, animal ones). Such\n(mythological) teachings have indeed been handed down from the ancient\nphilosophers who best expounded the soul. Now it will be well to show\nthat our doctrine harmonizes with that which they have taught, or that\nat least there is no contradiction between them.\n\n\nTHE SOUL'S DESCENT INTO THE BODY.\n\nWe have just explained that, when the body participates in the soul,\nthe soul does not somehow go beyond herself to enter into the body,\nthat it is on the contrary the body which enters into the soul, on\nparticipating in life, or evidently, when the ancient philosophers say\nthat the soul comes into the body, this means that the body enters\ninto essence, and participates in the life and the soul; in one word,\nto \"come\" does not here signify passing from one place into another,\nbut indicates in what way the soul enters into dealings with the body.\nTherefore \"to descend\" means, for the soul, to grow into a body, in\nthe sense in which we have explained it; that means, to give the body\nsomething of the soul, and not for the soul to become (the property)\nof the body. Consequently, the soul's issuing from the body must again\nmean that the body ceases to participate in life.\n\n\nPROCEDURE OF THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL.\n\nThis is how this participation takes place for the parts of this\nuniverse (that is, the bodies). Being situated as it were on the\nconfines of the intelligible world, the soul often gives the body\nsomething of herself; for, by her power (or potentiality), she is the\nneighbor of the body; and finding herself close to it, she enters\ninto dealings therewith by virtue of a law of her nature; but this\nintercourse is of evil, and to enfranchise herself from the body is\ngood. Why? Because if the soul be not the (property or slave) of the\nbody in this intercourse, she, nevertheless, unites herself to it, and\nthough she were universal, she becomes individual; for her activity\nno longer is exclusively confined to the intelligible world, although\n(she still, by nature) belong thereto. It is as if someone, who was an\nexpert in a whole science, confined himself to a single proposition\nthereof; whereas a person who possesses a whole science should\nnaturally consider its entirety, and not a mere part of it. Likewise\nthe soul, which belonged entirely to the intelligible world, and which\npartially blended her particular essence with the total Essence,\nwithdrew out of the universal Essence, and became individual essence,\nbecause the body to which she confines her activities is only a part\nof this universe. It is as if the fire, endowed with the ability of\nburning everything, was reduced to burn out some small object, although\nit possessed power of universal scope. Indeed, when the particular\nsoul is separated from the body, she is no longer particular (in\nactualization); on the contrary, when she has separated herself from\nthe universal Soul, not by passing from one locality to another, but\nby applying her activity (to a part of this universe, to a body), she\nbecomes particular (in actualization), though she remain universal in\nanother manner (in potentiality); for when the soul presides over no\nbody she is truly universal, and is particular only in potentiality.\n\n\nWHAT HELL MEANS FOR THE CAREER OF THE SOUL.\n\nConsequently, when we say that the soul is in hell (Hades), if we mean\nby \"hades\" an invisible place, that means that the soul is separated\nfrom the body; if, on the contrary, we understand hell to mean a lower\nlocality, we may also offer a reasonable interpretation: for now our\nsoul is with our body and is located with it. But what is meant by\nsaying that the soul is in hell after the body no longer exists? If\nthe soul be not separated from her image, why should she not be where\nher image is? If the soul were separated from her image by philosophy,\nthis image will alone go to the lower locality, while the soul lives\npurely in the intelligible world, without any emanation. This is what\nwe had to teach about the image born of some particular individual. As\nto the soul, if she concentrate in her breast the light that radiates\naround her, then, turned towards the intelligible world, she entirely\nre-enters into this world; she is no longer in actualization. But this\ndoes not cause her to perish (for when she is incarnated in a body,\nand is particular, she exists only potentially; while she attains to\nactualization when she becomes universal). So much for this point; now\nlet us return to our subject.\n\n\n\n\nSIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE.\n\nThe One Identical Essence is Everywhere Entirely Present.\n\n\nUNITY MUST BE SOUGHT FOR IN ESSENCE.\n\n1. It is a common conception of human thought that a principle single\nin number and identical is everywhere present in its entirety; for it\nis an instinctive and universal truism that the divinity which dwells\nwithin each of us is single and identical in all.[3] It cannot be\nexpected that the men who will use this expression should be able to\nexplain how God is present in us, and without subjecting their opinion\nto the scrutiny of reason; they will only affirm that such is the state\nof the case; and resting in this conception which is the spontaneous\nresult of their understanding, they will all hold to this something\nthat is single and only, and will refuse to give up this unity.\nThat is the most solid principle of all, a principle that our souls\nwhisper instinctively, and which is not deduced from the observation\nof particular things, but which claims our attention far before them,\neven before the maxim that everything aspires to the Good. Now this\nprinciple is true if all the beings aspire to unity, form an unity and\ntend towards unity. This unity, advancing towards all other things, so\nfar as it can advance seems to be manifold, and indeed becomes so, in\ncertain respects, but the ancient nature which is the desire of the\nGood, that belongs to itself, really leads to unity; and every nature\naspires to possess this unity by turning towards itself; for the good\nof the nature which is One, is to belong to oneself, to be oneself;\nthat is, to unify oneself. That is why it is reasonably said that\nthe Good peculiarly belongs to (this nature), and must not be sought\noutside of it. How indeed could the Good have fallen outside of the\nessence, or be found in non-essence? It must evidently be sought in\nessence, since itself is not non-essence. If then the Good be essence,\nand may be found in essence, it must be within itself in each of us. We\ncannot, therefore, be far from essence, but we are in it. Neither is it\nfar from us. All (beings), therefore, constitute but a unity.\n\n\n\"BEING\" IS THE BASIS OF JUDGMENT IN THINGS PARTICIPATING IN BEING.\n\n2. As the human reason which undertakes to examine the question here\nraised is not one, but divided, it makes use of corporeal nature in its\nresearches, by borrowing its principles. That is why reason, thinking\nit intelligible being, similar to bodies, divides it, doubting its\nunity. It could not be otherwise, because its investigation was not\nfounded on the proper immanent principles. We must, therefore, in our\ndiscussion about the one universal Essence, choose principles capable\nof enlisting support, principles that would be intellectual, that is,\nwould connect with intelligible entities, and veritable being. For\nsince our sense-nature is agitated by continual flux, being subject\nto all kinds of changes, trending towards all directions of space;\nit should consequently be called not \"being,\" but generation, or\nbecoming. The eternal Essence, on the contrary, is not divided; it\nsubsists ever in the same manner and in the same state, neither is\nborn, nor perishes; occupies neither place nor space; does not reside\nin any determinate location; neither enters, nor issues, but remains\nin itself. A discussion about the nature of bodies begins with this\n(physical) nature, and the things that are related to it, which\n(deductively) give rise to probable proofs by the aid of syllogisms\nequally probable. But when we deal with intelligible entities, our\nstarting-point must be the nature of the being considered; principles\nhave to be legitimately derived therefrom; and then, without\nsurreptitiously substituting any other nature (inductively), borrow\nfrom the intelligible Being itself the conception formed about it; for\nbeing, or whatness, is everywhere taken as principle; and it is said\nthat the definition of an object, when well made, sets forth many of\nits accidents. Therefore, when we are dealing with things where being\nis everything, we must, so much the more, apply our whole attention to\nthis being; base all our (arguments) thereon, and refer everything to\nit.\n\n\nINTELLIGIBLE ESSENCE IS BOTH IN AND OUT OF ITSELF.\n\n3. If intelligible essence be essential essence; if it be immutable;\nif it never evade itself; if it admit of no generation; and be not\nin any place, the result is, that by virtue of its nature, it ever\nremains within itself, has no parts distant from each other, located\nin different places; that it does not issue from itself, which would\nlead it to inhere in different subjects, or at least to inhere in one\nsubject, and, consequently, no longer to dwell in itself, and no longer\nto remain impassible; for if it inhered in something different from\nitself, it would be exposed to suffering (passion, or, experience).\nAs, however, this is impossible, it can not inhere in anything other\nthan itself. Therefore, since it never departs from itself, as it\nis never divided, as it exists within several things simultaneously\nwithout undergoing any change, as it exists within itself one and\nsimultaneously entire, it must, while existing in several things,\nremain everywhere identical; that is, be everywhere entire both in\nitself, and out of itself. Consequently, it does not (exist) within any\ndeterminate thing, but the other things participate in it, so far as\nthey are capable of approaching it, and so far as they do approach it\nin the measure in which they are capable.\n\n\nTHAT ENTIRE BEING IS PRESENT EVERYWHERE IS THE ONLY SOLUTION OF THE\nPUZZLE.\n\nConsequently, it will be necessary either to reject the propositions\nset forth above, that is, the principles which have been established,\nand deny the existence of the intelligible entities; or, as this is\nimpossible, to recognize the truth of what has been advanced from the\nvery beginning (of this discussion): the Essence which is one and\nidentical is indivisible, and exists as single everywhere. It is not\ndistant from any of the other things; and, nevertheless, (to be near\nthem) it has no need of spreading, of letting certain portions of its\nessence flow.[4] It remains entire in itself, and though it produce\nsomething inferior, it does not, on that account, abandon itself, and\ndoes not extend itself hither and yon in other things; otherwise, it\nwould be on one side, while the things it produces would be on the\nother, and it would occupy a place, finding itself separated therefrom.\nAs to these (produced things), each of them is either a whole or a\npart. If it be a part, it will not preserve the nature of the all, as\nwe have already said; if, however, it be all, we shall have to divide\nit in as many parts as that in which it subsists--or, it will have to\nbe granted that the identical essence can simultaneously be everywhere\nentire. This is a demonstration drawn from the matter itself, which\ncontains nothing external to the being that we are examining, and\nwhich does not borrow anything from any other nature.\n\n\nGOD'S PRESENCE EVERYWHERE ENTIRE DESCRIBED AS INFINITE.\n\n4. Let us, therefore, contemplate this Divinity who is not present\nhere, and absent there, but who is everywhere. All those who have\nany idea of the divinities admit that they, as well as that supreme\nDivinity, are present everywhere. Reason compels this admission. Now,\nsince the Divinity is everywhere, He is not divided; otherwise, He\nwould not be present everywhere; He would have His parts, one here,\nand another there. He would no longer be a unity; He would resemble an\nexpanse divided into a number of parts; He would be annihilated in this\ndivision, and all His parts would no longer form the whole; in short,\nHe would have become body. If that be impossible, we shall have to\nadmit that to which before we refused assent, to which all human nature\ntestifies, namely, that the Divinity is everywhere simultaneously\npresent, entire, and identical. If we acknowledge such a nature as\ninfinite, since it has no limits, this will be granting that it lacks\nnothing. Now if it lack nothing, it must be present to every essence;\nif it could not be essence, there would be places, where it did not\nexist, and it would lack something. The essences which exist beneath\nthe One exist simultaneously with Him, are posterior to Him, refer\nto Him, and reattach themselves to Him as His creatures; so that to\nparticipate in what is posterior to Him is to participate in Himself.\nAs, in the intelligible world, there is a multitude of beings which\nthere occupy the first, second, or third ranks, in that they depend\nfrom that only centre of a single sphere; and as they coexist there\nwithout any separating distance between them, the result is that the\nessences which occupy the first or second ranks are present there even\nwhere are the beings that occupy the third rank.\n\n\nEXAMPLE OF THE SUN AND THE RAYS.\n\n5. In order to clear up this point, the following illustration has\nbeen much used. Let us imagine a multitude of rays, which start from\na single centre; and you will succeed in conceiving the multitude\nbegotten in the intelligible world. But, admitting this proposition,\nthat things begotten in the intelligible, and which are called\nmultitude, exist simultaneously, one observation must be added: in the\ncircle, the rays which are not distinct may be supposed to be distinct,\nbecause the circle is a plane. But there, where there is not even the\nextension proper to a plane, where there are only potentialities and\nbeings without extension, all things must be conceived as centres\nunited together in a single centre, as might be the rays considered\nbefore their development in space, and considered in their origin,\nwhere, with the centre, they form but a single and same point. If now\nyou imagine developed rays, they will depend from the points from where\nthey started, and every point will not be any the less a centre, as\nnothing will separate it from the first centre. Thus these centres,\nthough united to the first centre, will not any the less have their\nindividual existence, and will form a number equal to the rays of which\nthey are the origins. As many rays as will come to shine in the first\ncentre, so many centres will there seem to be; and, nevertheless, all\ntogether will form but a single one. Now if we compare all intelligible\nentities to centres, and I mean centres that coincide in a single\ncentre and unite therein, but which seem multiple because of the\ndifferent rays which manifest, without begetting them, such rays could\ngive us some idea of the things by the contact of which intelligible\nbeing seems to be manifold and present everywhere.\n\n\nTHE UNITY OF MANIFOLDNESS.\n\n6. Intelligible entities, indeed, though they form a manifold,\nnevertheless, form an unity. On the other hand, though they form\nan unity, yet by virtue of their infinite nature they also form a\nmanifold. They are the multitude in unity, and unity in multitude;\nthey all subsist together. They direct their actualization towards\nthe whole, with the whole, and it is still with the whole, that they\napply themselves to the part. The part receives within itself the first\naction, as if it were that of only a part; but, nevertheless, it is\nthe whole that acts. It is as if a Man-in-himself, on descending into\na certain man, became this man without, however, ceasing being the\nMan-in-himself. The material man, proceeding from the ideal Man, who\nis single, has produced a multitude of men, who are the same because\none and the same thing has impressed its seal on a multitude. Thus\nthe Man-in-himself, and every intelligible entity in itself, and then\nthe whole entire universal Essence is not in the multitude, but the\nmultitude is in the universal Essence, or rather, refers to it; for\nif whiteness be everywhere present in the body, it is not in the same\nmanner as the soul of an individual is present and identical in all\nthe organs. It is in this latter manner that the essence is present\neverywhere.\n\n\nPARABLE OF THE HEAD WITH FACES ALL AROUND.\n\n7. Our nature and we ourselves all depend on (cosmic) being; we aspire\nto it, we use it as principle, from the very beginning. We think\nthe intelligible (entities contained in essence) without having\neither images or impressions thereof. Consequently, when we think\nthe intelligible (entities), the truth is that we are these very\nintelligible entities themselves. Since we thus participate in the\ngenuine knowledge, we are the intelligible entities, not because we\nreceive them in us, but because we are in them. However, as beings\nother than we constitute intelligible entities, as well as we, we are\nall the intelligibles. We are intelligible entities so far as they\nsubsist simultaneously with all essences; consequently, all of us\ntogether form but a single unity. When we turn our gaze outside of Him\nfrom whom we depend, we no longer recognize that we are an unity; we\nthen resemble a multitude of faces which (being disposed in a circle)\nwould, as seen from the exterior, form a plurality, but which in the\ninterior would form but a single head. If one of these faces could\nturn around, either spontaneously, or by the aid of Minerva, it would\nsee that itself is the divinity, that it is the universal Essence. No\ndoubt, it would not at first see itself as universal, but later, not\nbeing able to find any landmarks by which to determine its own limits,\nand to determine the distance to which it extends, it would have to\ngive up the attempt to distinguish itself from the universal (Essence),\nand it would become the universal (Essence) without ever changing\nlocation, and by remaining in the very foundation of the universal\n(Essence).\n\n\nTHIS IS PROVED BY THE PARTICIPATION OF MATTER IN IDEAS.\n\n8. Whoever will consider the participation of matter in ideas will be\nimpressed with the above theory, will declare it not impossible, and\nexpress no further doubts. It is necessary to admit the impossibility\nof a conception such as the following: on one hand, the ideas\nseparate from matter; on the other hand, matter at a distance from\nthem, and then an irradiation from on high descending on matter.\nSuch a conception would be senseless. What meaning would lie in this\nseparation of the ideas, and this distance of matter? Would it not\nthen be very difficult to explain and to understand what is called\nthe participation of matter in ideas? Only by examples can we make\nour meaning clear. Doubtless, when we speak of an irradiation, we do\nnot, however, mean anything similar to the irradiation of some visible\nobject. But as the material forms are images, and as they have ideas,\nas archetypes, we say that they are \"illuminated by the ideas,\" so as\nto convey the idea that that which is illuminated is different from\nthat which illumines. Now, however, to express ourselves more exactly,\nwe shall have to enforce that the idea is not locally separated from\nmatter, and does not reflect itself therein as some object does in\nwater. On the contrary, matter surrounds the idea on all sides; touches\nit somehow without touching it; then, in its entirety, it receives\nwhat, it is capable of receiving from its vicinity (to the idea),\nwithout any intermediary, without the idea penetrating through the\nwhole of matter, or hovering above it, without ceasing to remain within\nitself.\n\n\nTHE SOUL, AS ENTIRE, FASHIONED THE WHOLE AND THE INDIVIDUALS.\n\nSince the idea of fire, for instance, is not in matter, let us imagine\nmatter serving as subject for the elements. The idea of fire, without\nitself descending into matter, will give the form of the fire to the\nwhole fiery matter, while the fire, first mingled with matter will\nconstitute a multiple mass. The same conception may be applied to the\nother elements. If then the intelligible fire appear in everything as\nproducing therein an image of itself, it does not produce this image\nin matter as if it had separated itself therefrom locally, as would\nhave occurred in the irradiation of a visible object; otherwise it\nwould be somewhere, and it would fall under the senses. Since the\nuniversal Fire is multiple, we must conclude that, while its idea\nremains in itself outside of all place, it itself has begotten the\nlocalities; otherwise we would have to think that, having become\nmultiple (by its parts), it would extend, by withdrawing from itself,\nto become multiple in this manner, and to participate several times\nin the same principle. Now, being indivisible, the idea has not given\na part of its being to matter; nevertheless, in spite of its unity,\nit has communicated a form to what was not contained in its unity; it\ngranted its presence to the universe without fashioning this by one\nof its parts, and that by some other part. It was as an entire whole\nthat it fashioned the whole and the individuals. It would indeed be\nridiculous to suppose that there was a multitude of the ideas of fire,\nso that each fire might be formed by its own particular idea; if that\nwere the case, the ideas would be innumerable. Further, how would we\ndivide the things that have been generated by the Fire, since it is\nsingle, and continuous? If we augment the material fire by adding to it\nanother fire, it is evidently the same idea which will produce in this\nportion of matter the same things as in the remainder; for it could not\nbe another idea.\n\n\nTHE UNITY OF THE SOUL PROVES THAT OF THE SUPREME.\n\n9. If all the elements, when begotten, were to be gathered into one\nsphere, (there would be an opportunity of observing and comparing them.\nThe result would be a conclusion that) this sphere does not have a\nplurality or a diversity of authors, one of whom would have created\none part, and another author, another. The production of this sphere\nwill imply a single Author, who created it by acting, as a whole; not\nproducing one part of creation by one part of Himself, and another part\nof creation, by another part of Himself. In the latter case, the sphere\nmight still have several authors, if the production of the totality\nwere not traced to a single, indivisible Principle. Though this single\nand indivisible Principle be the author of the entire sphere, it does\nnot interpenetrate the sphere; for it is the entire Sphere which\ndepends on its author. One only and single Life contains the entire\nSphere, because this is located in a single Life. All the things that\nare in the sphere may, therefore, be reduced to a single Life, and all\nthe souls form a Soul which is single, but which is simultaneously\ninfinite. That is why certain philosophers have said that the soul is\na number;[5] others, that the number produces increase in the soul, no\ndoubt meaning by that, that nothing is deficient in soul, that she is\neverywhere without ceasing to be herself. As to the expression, \"to\nproduce increase to the soul,\" this must not be taken literally, but so\nas to mean that the soul, in spite of her unity, is absent nowhere; for\nthe unity of the soul is not a unity that can be measured; that is the\npeculiarity of another being which falsely claims unity for itself, and\nwhich succeeds in gaining the appearance of unity only by participating\ntherein. The Essence which really is one is not a unity composed of\nseveral things; for the withdrawal of one of them would destroy the\ntotal unity. Nor is it separated from the other things by limits; for\nif the other things were assimilated thereto, it would become smaller\nin the case where these would be greater; either it would split itself\nup into fragments by seeking to penetrate all, and instead of being\npresent to all, as an entirety, it would be reduced to touching their\nparts by its own parts. If then this Essence may justly be called one,\nif unity may be predicated of its being, it must, in a certain manner,\nseem to contain the nature opposed to its own; that is, the manifold;\nit must not attract this manifoldness from without, but it must, from\nand by itself, possess this manifold; it must veritably be one, and\nby its own unity be infinite and manifold. Being such, it seems as\nif it were everywhere a Reason (a being), which is single, and which\ncontains itself. It is itself that which contains; and thus containing\nitself, it is no where distant from itself; it is everywhere in itself.\nIt is not separated from any other being by a local distance; for it\nexisted before all the things which are in a locality; it had no need\nof them; it is they, on the contrary, which need to be founded on it.\nEven though they should come to be founded on it, it would not, on that\naccount, cease resting on itself as a foundation. If this foundation\nwere to be shaken, immediately all other things would perish, since\nthey would have lost the base on which they rested. Now this Essence\ncould not lose reason to the point of dissolving itself by withdrawing\nfrom itself; and to be about to trust itself to the deceptive nature of\nspace which needs it for preservation.\n\n\nTHE BEING LOVES ESSENCE AS ENTIRE.\n\n10. Animated by wisdom, this Essence dwells in itself, and it could\nnever inhere in other things. It is these, on the contrary, that come\nto depend from it, as if with passion seeking where it may be. That\nis the love that watches at the door of the beloved, which remains\never near the beautiful, agitated with the desire of possessing it,\nand esteeming itself happy to share in its gifts. Indeed, the lover of\nthe celestial beauty does not receive Beauty itself, but, as he stands\nnear it, he shares in its favors, while the latter remains immovable in\nitself. There are, therefore, many beings which love one only and same\nthing, who love it entire, and who, when they possess it, possess it\nentire in the measure in which they are capable of doing so; for they\ndesire to possess it entire. Why then should not this Essence suffice\nto all by remaining within itself? It suffices precisely because it\nremains within itself; it is beautiful because it is present to all as\nan entire whole.\n\n\nREASON ALSO IS A WHOLE.\n\nFor us Wisdom also is a whole; it is common to all of us, because it\nis not different in different places; it would, indeed, be ridiculous\nfor it to need existence in some locality. Besides, wisdom does not\nresemble whiteness; for (whiteness is the quality of a body, while)\nWisdom does not at all belong to the body. If we really participate\nin Wisdom, we necessarily aspire to some thing single and identical,\nwhich exists in itself, as a whole, simultaneously. When we participate\nin this Wisdom, we do not receive it in fragments, but entire; and\nthe Wisdom which you possess entire is not different from that which\nI myself possess. We find an image of this unity of Wisdom in the\nassemblies and meetings of men, where all those present seem to help in\nmaking up a single Wisdom. It seems that each one, isolated from the\nothers, would be powerless to find wisdom; but when the same person\nis in a meeting, where all the minds agree together, in applying\nthemselves to a single object, he would produce, or rather discover,\nWisdom. What indeed hinders different minds from being united within\none same and single Intelligence? Although Intelligence be common to\nus and to other men, we do not notice this community. It is as if,\ntouching a single object with several fingers, one should later imagine\nhaving touched several objects; or as if one had struck a single\nchord of the lyre without seeing it (and thinking that one had struck\ndifferent chords).\n\n\nBY THE INTELLIGIBLE PARTS OF THEIR BEING, ALL MEN SHARE THE SAME\nINTELLIGIBLE.\n\nLet us return to our subject. We were seeking how we might attain the\nGood with our souls. The Good that you attain is not different from\nthe one that I myself attain; it is the same. And when I say that it\nis the same, I do not mean that from the Good descended upon us both\ndifferent things, so that the Good would remain somewhere on high,\nwhile His gifts descended down here; on the contrary, I mean that He\nwho gives is present to those who receive, so that these may veritably\nreceive; I mean besides that He gives His gifts to beings who are\nintimately united with Him, and not to beings who might be foreign to\nHim; for intellectual gifts cannot be communicated in a local manner.\nOne even sees different bodies, in spite of the distance that separates\nthem, receiving the same gifts, because the gift granted, and the\neffect produced tend to the same result; much more, all the actions\nand passions which produce themselves in the body of the universe are\ncontained within it, and nothing comes to it from without. Now if a\nbody, which by its nature as it were scatters itself (because it is\nin a perpetual flowing wastage), nevertheless, receives nothing from\nwithout, how would a being that has no extension retain nothing from\nwithout, how would a being that has no extension retain something\nfrom without? Consequently, as all are contained in one and the\nsame Principle, we see the good, and we altogether touch it by the\nintelligible part of our nature.\n\n\nTHE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD HAS MUCH MORE UNITY THAN THE SENSE-WORLD.\n\nBesides, the intelligible world has much more unity than the\nsense-world; otherwise, there would be two sense-worlds, since the\nintelligible sphere would not differ from the sense-sphere if the\nformer did not have more unity than the latter. In respect to unity,\ntherefore, the intelligible world would surpass the sense-sphere. It\nwould indeed be ridiculous to admit that one of the two spheres would\nhave an extension suitable to its nature; while the other, without any\nnecessity, would extend, and would withdraw from its centre. Why would\nnot all things conspire together to unity, in the intelligible world?\nThere, indeed, no one thing hinders another by impenetrability, any\nmore than the conception that you have of a notion or of a proposition\nin no wise hinders the one that I have in myself, any more than\ndifferent notions mutually hinder each other in the same soul. To the\nobjection that such a union could not take place for (separate) beings,\nan affirmative answer may be given, but only if one dare to suppose\nthat veritable beings are corporeal masses.\n\n\nHOW THE INTELLIGIBLE MAY REMAIN UNMOVED AND YET PENETRATE IN THE WORLD.\n\n11. How can the intelligible, which has no extension, penetrate into\nthe whole body of the universe, which has no such extension? How does\nit remain single and identical, and how does it not split up? This\nquestion has been raised several times, and we sought to answer it, so\nas to leave no uncertainty. We have often demonstrated that the things\nare thus; nevertheless, it will be well to give some further convincing\nproofs, although we have already given the strongest demonstration,\nand the most evident one, by teaching the quality of the nature of the\nintelligible, explaining that it is not a vast mass, some enormous\nstone which, located in space, might be said to occupy an extension\ndetermined by its own magnitude, and would be incapable of going beyond\nits limits; for its mass and its power would be measured by its own\nnature, which is that of a stone. (The intelligible Essence, on the\ncontrary,) being the primary nature, has no extension that is limited\nor measured, because it itself is the measure of the sense-nature; and\nbecause it is the universal power without any determinate magnitude.\nNor is it within time, because the time is continually divided into\nintervals, while eternity dwells in its own identity, dominating and\nsurpassing time by its perpetual power, though this seemed to have an\nunlimited course. Time may be compared to a line which, while extending\nindefinitely, ever depends from a point, and turns around it; so,\nthat, into whatever place it advances, it always reveals the immovable\npoint around which it moves in a circle. If, by nature, time be in the\nsame relation (as is this line with its centre), and if the identical\nEssence be infinite by its power as well as by its eternity, by virtue\nof its infinite power it will have to produce a nature which would in\nsome way be parallel to this infinite power, which rises with it, and\ndepends from it, and which finally, by the movable course of time,\ntries to equal this power which remains movable in itself.[6] But then\neven this power of the intelligible Essence remains superior to the\nuniverse, because the former determines the extension of the latter.\n\n\nHOW THE INFERIOR NATURE CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE INTELLIGIBLE.\n\nHow could then the inferior nature participate in the intelligible,\nat least to the extent of its capacity? Because the intelligible is\neverywhere present in its entirety, although, by the impotence of the\nthings that receive it, it be not perceived in its entirety in each of\nthese things. The identical essence is present everywhere, not indeed\nas the material triangle, which is multiple in respect to number in\nseveral subjects, although it be identical therein in respect to being;\nbut as the immaterial triangle from which depend material triangles.\n\nWhy then is the material triangle not everywhere, like the immaterial\ntriangle? Because matter does not entirely participate in the\nimmaterial triangle, as it also receives other forms, and since it does\nnot apply itself entirely to every intelligible entity. Indeed, the\nprimary Nature does not give itself as an entirety to every thing; but\nit communicates itself first to the primary genera (of essences;) then,\nthrough these, it communicates itself to the other essences; besides,\nit is not any the less from the very beginning present to the entire\nuniverse.\n\n\nLIFE INTERPENETRATES ALL; AND KNOWS NO LIMITS.\n\n12. But how does this (primary Nature) make itself present to the whole\nuniverse? It is present to the universe because it is the one Life.\nIndeed, in the world considered as a living being, the life does not\nextend to certain limits, beyond which it cannot spread; for it is\npresent everywhere.\n\nBut how can it be everywhere? Remember, the power of life is not a\ndeterminate quantity; if, by thought, it be infinitely divided, still\nit never alters its fundamental characteristic of infinity. This\nLife does not contain any matter; consequently, it cannot be split\nup like a mass, and end in being reduced to nothing. When you have\nsucceeded in gaining a conception of the inexhaustible and infinite\npower of the intelligent Essence; of its nature that is unceasing,\nindefatigable; that suffices itself completely, to the point that its\nlife, so to speak, overflows, whatever be the place on which you fix\nyour gaze, or direct your attention; where will you find absence of\nthat intelligible Essence? On the contrary, you can neither surpass\nits greatness, nor arrive at anything infinitely small, as if the\nintelligible Essence had nothing further to give, and as if it were\ngradually becoming exhausted.\n\n\nIF YOU SEE ANYTHING BEYOND IT, YOU DEPART FROM IT.\n\nWhen, therefore, you will have embraced the universal Essence and\nwill be resting within it, you must not seek anything beyond it.\nOtherwise, you will be withdrawing from it; and, directing your\nglance on something foreign, you will fail to see what is near you.\nIf, on the contrary, you seek nothing beyond it, you will be similar\nto a universal Essence. How? You will be entirely united to it, you\nwill not be held back by any of its parts, and you will not even be\nsaying, \"This is what I am!\" By forgetting the particular being that\nyou are, you will be becoming the universal Being. You had, indeed,\nalready been the universal Essence, but you were something besides;\nyou were inferior by that very circumstance; because that which you\npossessed beyond the universal Essence did not proceed from the\nuniversal Essence, for nothing can be added thereto; but rather had\ncome from that which is not universal. When you become a determined\nbeing, because you borrow something from non-essence, you cease being\nuniversal. But if you abandon non-essence, you will be increasing\nyourself. It is by setting aside all the rest that the universal\nEssence may be discovered; for essence does not reveal itself so long\nas one remains with the rest. It does not approach you to make you\nenjoy its presence; it is you who are straying from it, when it ceases\nto be present. Besides, when you stray away, you are not actually\nstraying away from it, as it continues to be present; you are not\ndistant from it, but, though being near Essence, you have turned away\nfrom it. Thus even the other divinities, though they be present to many\nhuman beings, often reveal themselves only to some one person, because\nhe alone is able (or, knows how) to contemplate them. These divinities\n(according to Homer),[7] assume many different forms, and haunt the\ncities. But it is to the supreme Divinity that all the cities, all the\nearth, and all the heavens turn; for the universe subsists by Him, and\nin Him. From Him also do all real essences derive their existence;\nit is from Him that all depend, even the (universal) Soul, and the\nuniversal Life; it is to His infinite unity that they all turn as to\ntheir goal; a unity which is infinite precisely because it has no\nextension.\n\n\n\n\nFIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK SIXTH.\n\nThe Superessential Principle Does Not Think; Which is the First\nThinking Principle, and Which is the Second?\n\n\nBY THINKING, INTELLIGENCE PASSES FROM UNITY TO DUALITY.\n\n1. One may think oneself, or some other object. What thinks itself\nfalls least into the duality (inherent to thought). That which thinks\nsome other object approaches identity less; for though it contain what\nit contemplates, it nevertheless differs therefrom (by its nature). On\nthe contrary, the principle that thinks itself is not, by its nature,\nseparated from the object thought. It contemplates itself, because it\nis intimately united to itself; the thinking subject, and the object\nthought form but a single being within it,[8] or, it thus becomes\ntwo, while it is only one. It thinks in a superior manner, because\nit possesses what it thinks; it occupies the first rank as thinking\nprinciple, because the thinking principle must simultaneously be unity\nand duality. If it were not unity, it would think some object other\nthan itself; it would no longer be the first thinking principle.\nIndeed, that which thinks an object other than itself could not be the\nfirst thinking principle, since it does not think the object of its\nthought as belonging to its essence; and, consequently, it does not\nthink itself. If, on the contrary, the thinking principle possess the\nobject, if it be thought as belonging to its \"being\" (or nature),\nthen the two terms of the thought (the object and the subject), will\nbe identical. The thinking principle, therefore, implies unity and\nduality simultaneously; for unless it join duality to unity, it will\nhave nothing to think, and, consequently, it will not think. It must,\ntherefore, be simple, and not simple simultaneously.[9] We better\nunderstand the necessity of this double condition when, starting\nfrom the Soul, we rise to intelligence, for within the latter it is\neasier to distinguish the subject from the object, and to grasp its\nduality.[10] We may imagine two lights of which the one, the soul\nherself, is less brilliant, and we may then posit as equal the light\nthat sees and the light that is seen. Both of them, having nothing\nfurther that distinguishes them, will form but a single thing, which\nthinks by virtue of its duality, and which sees by virtue of its unity.\nHere by reason (which is the characteristic faculty of the soul), we\nhave passed from duality to unity. But, while thinking, intelligence\npasses from unity to duality; it becomes, or rather is, duality,\nbecause it thinks; and is one, because it thinks itself.\n\n\nA SUPRA-THINKING PRINCIPLE IS NECESSARY TO THE WORKING OF INTELLIGENCE.\n\n2. Since we have distinguished two principles, the one which is the\nfirst thinking principle (the Intelligence), and the other which is\nthe second (the Soul), the Principle superior to the first thinking\nprinciple must itself not think. In order to think, it would have to\nbe Intelligence; to be Intelligence, it would have to think an object;\nto be the first thinking principle, it would have to contain this\nobject. Now it is not necessary that every intelligible entity should\npossess intelligence, and should think; otherwise it would not only be\nintelligible, but even Intelligence; being thus dual, it would not be\nthe first. On the other hand, intelligence cannot subsist, if there be\nnot a purely intelligible nature (\"being\"), which is intelligible for\nIntelligence, but which in itself should be neither intelligence nor\nintelligible. Indeed, that which is intelligible must be intelligible\nfor something else. As to Intelligence, its power is quite vain, if it\ndoes not perceive and does not grasp the intelligible that it thinks;\nfor it cannot think, if it have no object to think; and it is perfect\nonly when it possesses this. Now, before thinking, it must by itself\nbe perfect by nature (\"being\"). Therefore, the principle through which\nintelligence is perfect must itself be what it is before it thinks;\nconsequently, it has no need to think, since, before thinking, it\nsuffices to itself. It will, therefore, not think.[11]\n\n\nTHE FIRST THINKING PRINCIPLE IS THE SECOND PRINCIPLE.\n\nTherefore, the First principle (the One) does not think; the second\n(Intelligence) is the first thinking principle; the third (the Soul) is\nthe second thinking principle. If the first Principle thought, it would\npossess an attribute; consequently, instead of occupying the first\nrank, it would occupy only the second; instead of being One, it would\nbe manifold, and would be all the things that it thought; for it would\nalready be manifold, even if it limited itself to thinking itself.\n\n\nTHE FIRST MUST BE ONE EXCLUSIVELY, WHICH WOULD MAKE THOUGHT IMPOSSIBLE.\n\n3. It might be objected that nothing (in all this) would hinder the\nfirst Principle from being both single and manifold. We will answer\nthat the manifold needs a single subject. The manifold cannot exist\nwithout the One from which it comes, and in which it is; without the\nOne which is counted the first outside of other things, and which must\nbe considered only in itself. Even on the supposition that it co-exists\nwith other things, it must, none the less, while being taken with the\nother things with which it is supposed to co-exist, be considered\nas different from them. Consequently, it must not be considered as\nco-existing with other things, but be considered as their subject (or,\nsubstrate), and as existing in itself, instead of co-existing with the\nother things of which it is the subject.\n\n\nWITHOUT SOMETHING SIMPLE, NOTHING MANIFOLD COULD EXIST.\n\nIndeed, that which is identical in things other than the One, may no\ndoubt be similar to the One, but cannot be the One. The One must exist\nalone in itself, thus to be grasped in other things, unless we should\nclaim that its (nature) consists in subsisting with other things.\nUnder this hypothesis, there will not exist either anything absolutely\nsimple, nor anything composite. Nothing absolutely simple will exist,\nsince that which is simple could not subsist by itself; neither could\nanything composite exist, since nothing simple will exist. For if no\nsimple thing possess existence, if there be no simple unity, subsisting\nby itself, which could serve as support to the composite, if none of\nthese things be capable of existing by itself, let alone communicating\nto others, since it does not exist; we must conclude that that which,\nof all these things, is composite, could not exist, since it would be\nmade up out of elements that do not exist, and which are absolutely\nnothing. Therefore, if we insist on the existence of the manifold, we\nare implying the existence of the One before the manifold. Now since\nthat which thinks is multiple, the principle that is not manifold will\nnot think. But as this Principle is the first, then Intelligence and\nthought are entities later than the first.\n\n\nGOOD, INTELLIGENCE AND SOUL ARE LIKE LIGHT, SUN AND MOON.\n\n4. As the Good must be simple, and self-sufficient, it has no need\nto think. Now that which it does not need could not be within it,\nsince nothing (that is different from it) exists in it; consequently,\nthought does not exist in it (because it is essentially simple[12]).\nBesides, the Good is one thing, and Intelligence another; by thinking,\nIntelligence takes on the form of Good. Besides, when in two objects\nunity is joined to something other than itself, it is not possible that\nthis unity, which is joined to something else, should be Unity itself.\nUnity in itself should exist in itself before this unity was joined\nto anything else. For the same reason, unity joined to something else\npresupposes absolutely simple Unity, which subsists in itself, and has\nnothing of what is found in unity joined to other things. How could\none thing subsist in another if the principle, from which this other\nthing is derived, did not have an existence that was independent, and\nprior to the rest? What is simple cannot derive anything from any other\nsource; but what is manifold, or at least indicates plurality, is of\nderivative (nature). The Good may be compared to light, Intelligence\nto the sun, and the Soul to the moon that derives her light from the\nsun. The Soul's intelligence is only borrowed, which intellectualizes\nher by coloring her with its light. On the contrary, Intelligence,\nin itself, possesses its own light; it is not only light, but it is\nessentially luminous. The Principle that illuminates Intelligence and\nwhich is nothing but light, is absolutely simple light, and supplies\nIntelligence with the power to be what it is. How could it need\nanything else? It is not similar to what exists in anything else;\nfor what subsists in itself is very different from what subsists in\nsomething else.\n\n\nAS THOUGHT IS INSPIRATION TO THE GOOD, INTELLIGENCE IMPLIES THE LATTER.\n\n5. What is manifold needs to seek itself, and naturally desires\nto embrace itself, and to grasp itself by self-consciousness. But\nthat which is absolutely One could not reflect on itself, and need\nself-consciousness. The absolutely identical principle is superior\nto consciousness and thought. Intelligence is not the first; it is\nnot the first either by its essence, nor by the majestic value of its\nexistence. It occupies only the second rank. It existed only when the\nGood already existed; and as soon as it existed, it turned towards the\nGood. In turning towards the Good, Intelligence cognized the latter;\nfor thought consists of conversion towards the Good, and aspiration\nthereto. Aspiration towards the Good, therefore, produced thought,\nwhich identifies itself with the Good; for vision presupposes the\ndesire to see. The Good, therefore, cannot think; for it has no good\nother than itself. Besides, when something other than the Good thinks\nthe Good, it thinks the Good because it takes the form of the Good, and\nresembles the Good. It thinks, because itself becomes for itself a good\nand desirable object, and because it possesses an image of the Good. If\nthis thing always remain in the same disposition, it will always retain\nthis image of the Good. By thinking itself, Intelligence simultaneously\nthinks the Good; for it does not think itself as being actualized; yet\nevery actualization has the Good as its goal.\n\n\nTHE GOOD AS SUPRA-COGITATIVE IS ALSO SUPRA-ACTIVE.\n\n6. If the above arguments be worth while, the Good has no place for\nthought. What thinks must have its good outside of itself. The\nGood, therefore, is not active; for what need to actualize would\nactualization have? To say that actualization actualizes, is tautology.\nEven if we may be allowed to attribute something to actualizations\nwhich relate to some principle other than themselves, at least the\nfirst actualization to which all other actualizations refer, must be\nsimply what it is. This actualization is not thought; it has nothing to\nthink, as it is the First. Besides, that which thinks is not thought,\nbut what possesses thought. Thus there is duality in what thinks; but\nthere is no duality in the First.\n\n\nPRIMARY EXISTENCE WILL CONTAIN THOUGHT, EXISTENCE AND LIFE.\n\nThis may be seen still more clearly by considering how this double\nnature shows itself in all that thinks in a clearer manner. We assert\nthat all essences, as such, that all things that are by themselves, and\nthat possess true existence, are located in the intelligible world.\nThis happens not only because they always remain the same, while\nsense-objects are in a perpetual flow and change[13]--although, indeed,\nthere are sense-objects (such as the stars[14]), that remain the\nsame--but rather because they, by themselves, possess the perfection\nof their existence. The so-called primary \"being\" must possess an\nexistence which is more than an adumbration of existence, and which is\ncomplete existence. Now existence is complete when its form is thought\nand life. Primary \"being,\" therefore, will simultaneously contain\nthought, existence and life. Thus the existence of essence will imply\nthat of intelligence; and that of intelligence, that of essence; so\nthat thought is inseparable from existence, and is manifold instead of\nbeing one. That which is not manifold (the One), cannot, therefore,\nthink. In the intelligible world, we find Man, and the thought of\nman, Horse and the thought of horse, the Just Man and the thought of\nthe just man; everything in it is duality; even the unity within it\nis duality, and in it duality passes into unity. The First is neither\nall things that imply duality, nor any of them; it contains no duality\nwhatever.\n\n\nTHE FIRST, THEREFORE, BEING SUPRA-COGITATIVE, DOES NOT KNOW ITSELF.\n\nElsewhere we shall study how duality issues from unity. Here we merely\ninsist that as the One is superior to \"being,\" it must also be superior\nto thought. It is, therefore, reasonable to insist that it does not\nknow itself, that it does not contain anything to be known, because it\nis simple. Still less will it know other beings. It supplies them with\nsomething greater and more precious than knowledge of beings, since it\nis the Good of all beings; from it they derive what is more important\n(than mere cogitation), the faculty of identifying themselves with it\nso far as possible.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE.\n\nOf the Aristotelian Distinction Between Actuality and Potentiality.\n\n\nQUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED.\n\n1. (Aristotle) spoke of (things) existing \"potentially,\" and\n\"actually\"; and actuality is spoken of as a \"being.\" We shall, however,\nhave to examine this potential and actual existence; and whether\nthis actual existence be the same as actuality, and whether this\npotential existence be identical with potentiality; also, whether these\nconceptions differ so that what exists actually be not necessarily\nactuality. It is evident that among sense-objects there exist things\npotentially. Are there also such among the intelligibles? This then is\nthe problem: whether the intelligibles exist only actually; and on the\nhypothesis of the existence among intelligibles of something existing\npotentially, whether, because of its eternity, this always remains\nthere in potentiality; and, because it is outside of time, never\narrives to actuality.\n\n\nDEFINITION OF POTENTIALITY.\n\nLet us first define potentiality. When a thing is said to exist\npotentially, this means that it does not exist absolutely. Necessarily,\nwhat exists potentially is potential only in relation to something\nelse; for example, metal is the statue potentially. Of course, if\nnothing were to be done with this thing, or within it, if it were not\nto become something beyond itself, if there were no possibility of\nits becoming anything else, it would only be what it was already. How\ncould it then become something different from what it was? It did not,\ntherefore, exist potentially. Consequently, if, on considering what is\na thing that exists potentially, and one that exists actually, we say\nthat it exists potentially, we must mean that it might become different\nfrom what it is, whether, after having produced this different thing,\nit remain what it is, or whether, on becoming this different thing,\nwhich it is potentially, it ceases being what it is itself. Indeed, if\nmetal be a statue potentially, this is a relation different from water\nbeing metal potentially, as air is potentially fire.[15]\n\n\nDISTINCTION BETWEEN EXISTING POTENTIALITY AND POTENTIALITY.\n\nShall we say that what thus exists potentially is potentiality in\nrespect of what is to be; as, for instance, that the metal is the\npotentiality of a statue? Not so, if we refer to the producing\npotentiality; for the producing potentiality cannot be said to exist\npotentially. If, then, we identified existing potentially not only with\nexisting actually, but also with actuality, then potentiality would\ncoincide with potential existence. It would be better and clearer,\ntherefore, to contrast potential existence with actual existence, and\npotentiality with actuality. The thing which thus exists potentially is\nthe substance underlying the reactions, shapes and forms which it is\nnaturally fitted to receive, to which it aspires for their betterment\nor deterioration, and for the destruction of those whose actualization\nconstitutes differentiation.\n\n\nMATTER IS NOTHING ACTUALLY.\n\n2. As to matter, we shall have to examine whether it be something\nactually, while simultaneously it potentially is the shapes it\nreceives; or whether it be nothing at all actually. Everything else of\nwhich we predicate potentiality passes on to actuality on receiving its\nform, and remaining the same. We may call a statue an actual statue,\nthus contrasting with it a potential statue; but an actual statue will\nnot be implied by the metal which we called the potential statue.\nConsequently, what exists potentially does not become what exists\nactually; but from what was previously a potential (statue) proceeds\nwhat later is an actual (statue). Indeed, what exists actually is the\ncompound, and not the matter; it is the form added to matter; this\noccurs when there is produced another being; when, for example, from\nthe metal is made a statue; for the statue exists by this very being\nsomething other than the metal; namely, the compound.[17]\n\n\nIN PERMANENT THINGS, POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY MAY COINCIDE.\n\nIn non-permanent things, what exists potentially is evidently something\nquite different (from what is said to exist actually). But when the\npotential grammarian becomes an actual grammarian, why should not the\npotential and actual coincide? The potential wise Socrates is the\nsame as the actual Socrates. Is the ignorant man, who was potentially\nlearned, the same as the learned? No: only accident makes of the\nignorant man a learned one; for it was not his ignorance that made him\npotentially wise; with him, ignorance was only an accident; but his\nsoul, being by herself disposed (to be actually learned), still remains\npotentially learned, in so far as she was actually so, and still keeps\nwhat is called potential existence; thus the actual grammarian does\nnot cease being a potential grammarian.[18] Nothing hinders these two\ndifferent things (of being a potential and actual grammarian) from\ncoinciding; in the first case, the man is no more than a potential\ngrammarian; in the latter, the man is still a potential grammarian,\nbut this potentiality has acquired its form (that is, has become\nactual[19]).\n\n\nDIFFERENCE BETWEEN GENERAL AND PARTICULAR ACTUALITY.\n\nIf however what is potential be the substrate, while the actual is\nboth (potential and actual) at the same time, as in the (complete)\nstatue, what then shall we call the form in the metal? We might well\ncall the actuality by which some object exists actually, and not merely\npotentially, the form and shape; therefore not merely actuality, but\nthe actuality of this individual thing.\n\n\nTHE FORM ADDED TO MATTER IS THE SPECIFIC ACTUALITY.\n\nThe name actuality would better suit the (general) actuality rather\n(than the actuality of some one thing); the actuality corresponding\nto the potentiality which brings a thing to actuality. Indeed, when\nthat which was potential arrives at actuality, it owes the latter to\nsomething else.[20]\n\n\nWHAT IN THE BODY IS A PASSIVE CAPACITY, IN THE SOUL IS AN ACTIVE\nFACULTY.\n\nAs to the potentiality which by itself produces that of which it is\npotentiality, that is, which produces the actuality (corresponding to\nthis potentiality), it is a (Stoic) \"habituation;\" while the actuality\n(which corresponds to this habituation) owes its name thereto; for\ninstance, the \"habituation\" is courageousness; while the actuality is\nbeing brave.[21] But enough of this!\n\n\nINTELLIGIBLE MATTER IS NOT POTENTIAL.\n\n3. The purpose of the preceding considerations was to determine the\nmeaning of the statement that intelligibles are actual; to decide\nwhether every intelligible exist only actually, or whether it be only\nan actuality; and third, how even up there in the intelligible, where\nall things are actualities, there can also exist something potentially.\nIf, then, in the intelligible world, there be no matter which might\nbe called potential, if no being is to become something which it not\nyet is, nor transform itself, nor, while remaining what it is, beget\nsomething else, nor by altering, cause any substitution, then there\ncould not be anything potential in this World of eternal essence\noutside of time. Let us now address the following question to those\nwho admit the existence of matter, even in intelligible things: \"How\ncan we speak of matter in the intelligible world, if by virtue of this\nmatter nothing exists potentially? For even if in the intelligible\nworld matter existed otherwise than it does in the sense-world, still\nin every being would be the matter, the form and the compound which\nconstitutes it.\" They would answer that in intelligible things, what\nplays the part of matter is a form, and that the soul, by herself,\nis form; but, in relation to something else, is matter. Is the soul\nthen potential in respect of this other thing? Hardly, for the soul\npossesses the form, and possesses it at present, without regard to the\nfuture, and she is divisible in form and matter only for reason; if she\ncontain matter, it is only because thought conceives of her as double\n(by distinguishing form and matter in her). But these two things form\na single nature, as Aristotle also says that his \"quintessence\" is\nimmaterial.\n\n\nTHE SOUL IS THE PRODUCING POTENTIALITY; NOT THE POTENTIALITY OF\nBECOMING.\n\nWhat shall we say? Potentially, she is the animal, when it is unborn,\nthough to be born. Potentially she is the music, and all the things\nthat become, because they are transient. Thus in the intelligible world\nthere are things which exist, or do not exist potentially. But the soul\nis the potentiality of these things.[22]\n\n\nIN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD EVERYTHING IS ACTUAL.\n\nHow might one apply actual existence to intelligible things? Each\nof them exists actually because it has received form, as the statue\n(the compound) exists actually, or rather, because it is a form, and\nbecause its essence is a perfect form. The intelligence does not pass\nfrom the potentiality of thinking to the actuality of thinking.[23]\nOtherwise, it would imply an anterior intelligence which would not\npass from potentiality to actuality, which would possess everything by\nitself; for what exists potentially implies another principle whose\nintervention brings it to actuality, so as to be something existing\nactually. A being is an actuality when it always is what it is, by\nitself. Therefore, all first principles are actualities; for they\npossess all they should possess by themselves, eternally. Such is the\nstate of the soul which is not in matter, but in the intelligible\nworld. The soul which is in matter is another actuality; she is, for\ninstance, the vegetative soul; for she is in actuality what she is.\nWe shall, therefore, have to admit that (in the intelligible world)\neverything exists actually, and that thus everything is actuality,\nbecause it has rightly been said[24] that intelligible nature is always\nawake, that it is a life, an excellent life, and that there on high\nall actualities are perfect. Therefore, in the intelligible world,\neverything exists actually, and everything is actuality and life. The\nplace of intelligible things is the place of life, the principle and\nsource of the veritable soul, and of intelligence.\n\n\nMATTER IS NON-BEING, AND CAN NOT BE ANYTHING ACTUAL.\n\n4. All the other objects (the sense-objects), which are something\npotentially, are also actually something else, which, in regard to\nthe First, may be said to be potential existence. As to matter, which\nexists potentially in all beings, how could it actually be some\nof these beings? Evidently, it would then no longer be all beings\npotentially. If matter be none of the beings, it necessarily is not a\nbeing. If it be none of the beings, how could it actually be something?\nConsequently, matter is none of the beings that in it \"become.\" But\nmight it not be something else, since all things are not in matter? If\nmatter be none of the beings which are therein, and if these really\nare beings, matter must be non-being. Since, by imagination, it is\nconceived as something formless, it could not be a form; as being, it\ncould not be counted among the forms; which is an additional reason\nwhy it should be considered as non-being. As matter, therefore, is no\n\"being\" neither in respect of beings, nor of forms, matter is non-being\nin the highest degree. Since matter does not possess the nature of\nveritable beings, and since it cannot even claim a place among the\nobjects falsely called beings (for not even like these is matter an\nimage of reason), in what kind of being could matter be included? If it\ncannot be included in any, it can evidently not be something actually.\n\n\nARISTOTLE SAID, MATTER IS NOTHING REAL ACTUALLY, BUT ONLY POTENTIALLY.\n\n5. If this be so, what opinion shall we form of matter? How can it\nbe the matter of beings? Because matter potentially constitutes the\nbeings. But, since matter already exists potentially, may we not\nalready say that it exists, when we consider what it is to be? The\nbeing of matter is only what is to be; it consists of what is going to\nbe; therefore matter exists potentially; but it is potentially not any\ndeterminate thing, but all things. Therefore, being nothing by itself,\nand being what it is, namely, matter, it is nothing actually. If it\nwere something actually, what it would actually be would not be matter;\nconsequently, matter would no longer be absolutely matter; it would be\nmatter only relatively, like metal. Matter is, therefore, non-being; it\nis not something which merely differs from being, like movement, which\nrelates to matter because it proceeds from matter, and operates in it.\nMatter is denuded and despoiled of all properties; it can not transform\nitself, it remains ever what it was at the beginning, non-being. From\nthe very being it actually was no being, since it had withdrawn from\nall beings, and had never even become any of them; for never was it\nable to keep a reflection of the beings whose forms it ever aspired to\nassume. Its permanent condition is to trend towards something else,\nto exist potentially in respect of the things that are to follow. As\nit appears where ends the order of intelligible beings, and as it is\ncontained by the sense-beings which are begotten after it, it is their\nlast degree. Being contained in both intelligible and sense-things,\nit does not actually exist in respect of either of these classes\nof beings. It exists only potentially; it limits itself to being a\nfeeble and obscure image, which can not assume any form. May we not\nthence conclude that matter is the image actually; and consequently,\nis actually deception? Yes, it truly is deception, that is, it is\nessentially non-being. If then matter actually be non-being, it is the\nhighest degree of non-being, and thus again essentially is non-being.\nSince non-being is its real nature, it is, therefore, far removed from\nactually being any kind of a being. If it must at all be, it must\nactually be non-being, so that, far from real-being, its \"being\" (so\nto speak) consists in non-being. To remove the deception of deceptive\nbeings, is to remove their \"being.\" To introduce actuality in the\nthings which possess being and essence potentially, is to annihilate\ntheir reason for being, because their being consists in existing\npotentially.\n\n\nETERNAL MATTER EXISTS ONLY POTENTIALLY.\n\nTherefore, if matter were to be retained as unchangeable, it would be\nfirst necessary to retain it as matter; evidently, it will be necessary\nto insist that it exists only potentially, so that it may remain\nwhat it essentially is; the only alternative would be to refute the\narguments we have advanced.\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD ENNEAD, BOOK SIXTH.\n\nOf the Impassibility of Incorporeal Entities (Soul and and Matter).\n\n\nA. OF THE SOUL.\n\n\nQUESTIONS ABOUT THE PASSIBILITY OF JUDGMENT AND THE SOUL.\n\n1. Sensations are not affections,[25] but actualizations, and\njudgments, relative to passions. The affections occur in what is other\n(than the soul); that is, in the organized body, and the judgment\nin the soul. For if the judgment were an affection, it would itself\npresuppose another judgment, and so on to infinity.[26] Though\naccepting this statement, we must, nevertheless, examine whether\nthe judgment itself, as such, in nowise participates in the nature\nof its object; for if it receive the impression thereof,[27] it is\npassive. Besides, the \"images derived from the senses\"--to use the\npopular language--are formed in a manner entirely different from what\nis generally believed. They are in the same case as the intellectual\nconceptions, which are actualizations, and through which, without being\naffected, we know objects. In general, neither our reason nor our will\npermit us, in any way, to attribute to the soul modifications and\nchanges such as the heating or cooling of bodies. Further, we have to\nconsider whether that part of the soul, that is called the passive (or\naffective, or irrational), must also be be considered as unalterable,\nor as being affectible. But we will take up this question later; we\nmust begin by solving our earlier problems.\n\n\nHOW CAN THE SOUL REMAIN IMPASSIBLE, THOUGH GIVEN UP TO EMOTION?\n\nHow could that part of the soul that is superior to sensation and\npassion remain unalterable, while admitting vice, false opinions, and\nignorance (or folly); when it has desires or aversions; when it yields\nitself to joy or pain, to hate, jealousy, and appetite; when, in one\nword, it never remains calm, but when all the things that happen to it\nagitate it, and produce changes within it?\n\n\nON THE STOIC HYPOTHESIS OF CORPOREITY THE SOUL CANNOT REMAIN\nIMPASSIBLE; AS IT IS IMPASSIBLE ALL TERMS TO THE CONTRARY ARE ONLY\nFIGURATIVE.\n\nIf, (on the Stoic hypothesis) the soul were extended, and corporeal, it\nwould be difficult, or rather impossible for her to remain impassible\nand unalterable when the above-mentioned occurrences take place within\nher. If, on the contrary, she be a \"being\" that is unextended, and\nincorruptible, we must take care not to attribute to her affections\nthat might imply that she is perishable. If, on the contrary, her\n\"being\" be a number[28] or a reason,[29] as we usually say, how could\nan affection occur within a number or a reason? We must therefore\nattribute to the soul only irrational reasons, passions without\npassivity; that is, we must consider these terms as no more than\nmetaphors drawn from the nature of bodies, taking them in an opposite\nsense, seeing in them no more than mere analogies, so that we may say\nthat the soul experiences them without experiencing them, and that\nshe is passive without really being such (as are the bodies). Let us\nexamine how all this occurs.\n\n\nVIRTUE AS A HARMONY; VICE AS A DISHARMONY.\n\n2. What occurs in the soul when she contains a vice? We ask this\nbecause it is usual to say, \"to snatch a vice from the soul;\" \"to\nintroduce virtue into her,\" \"to adorn her,\" \"to replace ugliness by\nbeauty in her.\" Let us also premiss, following the opinions of the\nancients,[30] that virtue is a harmony, and wickedness the opposite.\nThat is the best means to solve the problem at issue. Indeed, when the\nparts of the soul (the rational part, the irascible part, and the part\nof appetite), harmonize with each other, we shall have virtue;[31] and,\nin the contrary case, vice. Still, in both cases, nothing foreign to\nthe soul enters into her; each of her parts remain what they are, while\ncontributing to harmony. On the other hand, when there is dissonance,\nthey could not play the same parts as the personnel of a choric ballet,\nwho dance and sing in harmony, though not all of them fill the same\nfunctions; though one sings while the remainder are silent; and though\neach sings his own part; for it does not suffice that they all sing\nin tune, they must each properly sing his own part. In the soul we\ntherefore have harmony when each part fulfils its functions. Still each\nmust have its own virtue before the existence of a harmony; or its\nvice, before there is disharmony. What then is the thing whose presence\nmakes each part of the soul good or evil? Evidently the presence of\nvirtue or vice. The mere statement that, for the rational part (of\nthe soul) vice consists in ignorance,[32] is no more than a simple\nnegation, and predicates nothing positive about reason.\n\n\nTHIS DEFINITION SUFFICES TO EXPLAIN THE FACTS OF EVIL IN THE SOUL.\n\nBut when the soul contains some of those false opinions which are\nthe principal cause of vice, must we not acknowledge that something\npositive occurs in her, and that one of her parts undergoes an\nalteration? Is not the disposition of the soul's irascible part\ndifferent according to its courage or cowardliness? And the soul's\nappetitive-part, according to whether it be temperate or intemperate?\nWe answer that a part of the soul is virtuous, when it acts in\nconformity with its \"being,\" or when it obeys reason; for reason\ncommands all the parts of the soul, and herself is subjected to\nintelligence. Now to obey reason is to see; it is not to receive\nan impression, but to have an intuition, to carry out the act of\nvision.[33] Sight is of the same (nature) when in potentiality, or\nin actualization; it is not altered in passing from potentiality to\nactualization,[34] she only applies herself to do what it is her\n(nature) to do, to see and know, without being affected. Her rational\npart is in the same relation with intelligence; she has the intuition\nthereof.[35] The nature of intelligence is not to receive an impression\nsimilar to that made by a seal, but in one sense to possess what it\nsees, and not to possess it in another; intelligence possesses it by\ncognizing it; but intelligence does not possess it in this sense that\nwhile seeing it intelligence does not receive from it a shape similar\nto that impressed on wax by a seal. Again, we must not forget that\nmemory does not consist in keeping impressions, but is the soul's\nfaculty of recalling and representing to herself the things that are\nnot present to her. Some objector might say that the soul is different\nbefore reawakening a memory, and after having reawakened it. She may\nindeed be different, but she is not altered, unless indeed, we call the\npassing from potentiality to actualization an alteration. In any case,\nnothing extraneous enters into her, she only acts according to her own\nnature.\n\n\nONLY THE PHYSICAL ORGANS, NOT THE IMMATERIAL NATURES, COULD BE AFFECTED.\n\nIn general, the actualizations of immaterial (natures) do not in any\nway imply that these (natures) were altered--which would imply their\ndestruction--but, on the contrary, they remain what they were. Only\nmaterial things are affected, while active. If an immaterial principle\nwere exposed to undergo affections, it would no longer remain what it\nis. Thus in the act of vision, the sight acts, but it is the eye that\nis affected. As to opinions, they are actualizations analogous to sight.\n\n\nPSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF ANGER-PART'S COURAGE OR COWARDLINESS.\n\nBut how can the soul's irascible-part[36] be at one time courageous,\nand at the other cowardly? When it is cowardly, it does not consider\nreason, or considers reason as having already become evil; or because\nthe deficiency of its instruments, that is, the lack of weakness of its\norgans, hinders it from acting, or feeling emotion, or being irritated.\nIn the contrary condition it is courageous. In either case, the soul\nundergoes no alteration, nor is affected.\n\n\nPSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION OF VIRTUE OR VICE OF APPETITE.\n\nFurther, the soul's appetite is intemperate when it alone is active;\nfor then, in the absence of the principles that ought to command or\ndirect her, it alone does everything. Besides, the rational part,\nwhose function it is to see (by considering the notions it receives\nfrom intelligence), is occupied with something else, for it does not\ndo everything simultaneously, being busy with some other action; it\nconsiders other than corporeal things, so far as it can.[37] Perhaps\nalso the virtue or vice of the appetite depend considerably on the\ngood or evil condition of the organs; so that, in either case, nothing\nis added to the soul.\n\n\nTHE SOUL ORIGINATES MOVEMENTS, BUT IS NOT ALTERED (AGAINST STOICS).\nPOLEMIC AGAINST THE STOIC THEORY OF PASSIONS.\n\n3. There are desires and aversions in the soul, which demand\nconsideration. It is impossible to deny that pain, anger, joy, appetite\nand fear are changes and affections which occur in the soul, and that\nmove her.[38] We must here draw a distinction, for it would be denying\nthe evidence to insist that there are in us no changes or perception\nof these changes. We cannot attribute them to the soul, which would\namount to the admission[39] that she blushes, or grows pale, without\nreflecting that these \"passions,\" though produced by the soul, occur\nin a different substance. For the soul, shame consists in the opinion\nthat something is improper; and, as the soul contains the body, or,\nto speak more exactly, as the body is a dependency of the animating\nsoul, the blood, which is very mobile, rushes to the face. Likewise,\nthe principle of fear is in the soul; paleness occurs in the body\nbecause the blood concentrates within the interior parts. In joy, the\nnoticeable dilation belongs to the body also; what the body feels is\nnot a \"passion.\" Likewise with pain and appetite; their principle is\nin the soul, where it remains in a latent condition; what proceeds\ntherefrom is perceived by sensation. When we call desires, opinions\nand reasonings \"movements of the soul,\" we do not mean that the soul\nbecomes excited in the production of these movements,[40] but that they\noriginate within her. When we call life a movement, we do not by this\nword mean an alteration; for to act according to one's nature is the\nsimple and indivisible life of each part of the soul.\n\n\nVIRTUE AND VICE AFFECT THE SOUL DIFFERENTLY FROM ALL THE OTHER PASSIONS.\n\nIn short, we insist that action, life and desire are not alterations,\nthat memories are not forms impressed on the soul, and that\nactualizations of the imagination are not impressions similar to those\nof a seal on wax.[41] Consequently in all that we call \"passions\" or\n\"movements,\" the soul undergoes no change in her substance (substrate)\nor \"being\" (nature); virtue and vice in the soul are not similar\nto what heat, cold, whiteness or blackness are in bodies; and the\nsoul's relation to vice and virtue is entirely different, as has been\nexplained.\n\n\nPASSIONAL CHANGES OCCUR IN THE BODY, NOT EVEN TO THE PASSIONAL PART OF\nTHE SOUL.\n\n4. Let us now pass to that part of the soul that is called the\n\"passional\" (or, affective). We have already mentioned it,[42] when\ntreating of all the \"passions\" (that is, affections), which were\nrelated to the irascible-part and appetitive part of the soul; but we\nare going to return to a study of this part, and explain its name, the\n\"passional\" (or, affective) part. It is so called because it seems\nto be the part affected by the \"passions;\"[43] that is, experiences\naccompanied by pleasure or pain.[44] Amidst these affections, some are\nborn of opinion; thus, we feel fear or joy, according as we expect\nto die, or as we hope to attain some good; then the \"opinion\" is in\nthe soul, and the \"affection\" in the body. On the contrary, other\npassions, occurring in an unforeseen way, give rise to opinion in that\npart of the soul to which this function belongs, but do not cause any\nalteration within her, as we have already explained. Nevertheless, if,\non examining unexpected fear, we follow it up higher, we discover that\nit still contains opinion as its origin, implying some apprehension in\nthat part of the soul that experiences fear, as a result of which occur\nthe trouble and stupor which accompany the expectation of evil. Now it\nis to the soul that belongs imagination, both the primary imagination\nthat we call opinion, and the (secondary) imagination that proceeds\nfrom the former; for the latter is no longer genuine opinion, but\nan inferior power, an obscure opinion, a confused imagination which\nresembles the action characteristic of nature, and by which this power\nproduces each thing, as we say, unimaginatively.[45] Its resulting\nsense-agitation occurs within the body. To it relate trembling,\npalpitation, paleness, and inability to speak. Such modifications,\nindeed, could not be referred to any part of the soul; otherwise, such\npart of the soul would be physical. Further, if such part of the soul\nunderwent such affections these modifications would not reach the body;\nfor that affected part of the soul would no longer be able to exercise\nits functions, being dominated by passion, and thus incapacitated.\n\n\nTHE SOUL'S AFFECTIVE PART MAY BE THE CAUSE OF AFFECTIONS; BUT IS\nINCORPOREAL.\n\nThe affective part of the soul, therefore, is not corporeal; it is a\nform indeed, but a form engaged in matter, such as the appetite, the\npower of growth, both nutritive and generative, a power which is the\nroot and principle of appetite, and the affective part of the soul.\nNow a form cannot undergo an affection or a passion, but must remain\nwhat it is. It is the matter (of a body) which is capable of being\naffected by a \"passion\" (an affection), when this affection is produced\nby the presence of the power which is its principle. Indeed it is\nneither the power of growth that grows, nor the nutritive power that\nis fed; in general, the principle that produces a motion is not itself\nmoved by the movement it produces; in case it were moved in any way,\nits movement and action would be of an entirely different nature.[46]\nNow the nature of a form is an actualization, by its mere presence\nproducing (something), just as if the harmony alone could cause the\nvibration of the strings of a lyre. Thus the affective part (of the\nsoul, without itself being affected) is the cause of the affections,\nwhether the movement proceed from it, that is, from sense-imagination,\nor whether they occur without (distinct) imagination.\n\n\nTHE AFFECTIONS OF THE SOUL COMPARED TO A MUSICIAN PLAYING THE LYRE.\n\nWe might further consider whether, inasmuch as opinion originates\nin a higher principle (of the soul), this principle does not remain\nimmovable because it is the form of harmony, while the cause of the\nmovement plays the role of the musician, and the parts caused to\nvibrate by the affection, that of the strings; for it is not the\nharmony, but the string that experiences the affection; and even if\nthe musician desired it, the string would not vibrate unless it were\nprescribed by the harmony.\n\n\nPASSIONS ARE PRODUCED BY EXTERNAL IMAGES; AND THEIR AVOIDANCE IS THE\nTASK OF PHILOSOPHY.\n\n5. If then, from the very start, the soul undergo no affections,\nwhat then is the use of trying to render her impassible by means of\nphilosophy? The reason is that when an image is produced in the soul\nby the affective part, there results in the body an affection and a\nmovement; and to this agitation is related the image of the evil which\nis foreseen by opinion. It is this affection that reason commands us to\nannihilate, and whose occurrence even we are to forestall, because when\nthis affection occurs, the soul is sick, and healthy when it does no\noccur. In the latter case, none of these images, which are the causes\nof affections, form within the soul. That is why, to free oneself\nfrom the images that obsess one during dreams, the soul that occupies\nherself therewith is to be wakened.[47] Again, that is why we can say\nthat affections are produced by representations of exterior entities,\nconsidering these representations as affections of the soul.\n\n\nPSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESS INVOLVED IN PURIFYING THE SOUL, AND SEPARATING\nSOUL FROM BODY.\n\nBut what do we mean by \"purifying the soul,\" inasmuch as she could not\npossibly be stained? What do we mean by separating (or, weaning) the\nsoul from the body? To purify the soul is to isolate her, preventing\nher from attaching herself to other things, from considering them, from\nreceiving opinions alien to her, whatever these (alien) opinions or\naffections might be, as we have said; it consequently means hindering\nher from consideration of these phantoms, and from the production of\ntheir related affections. To \"purify the soul,\" therefore, consists in\nraising her from the things here below to intelligible entities; also,\nit is to wean her from the body; for, in that case, she is no longer\nsufficiently attached to the body to be enslaved to it, resembling a\nlight which is not absorbed in the whirlwind (of matter[48]), though\neven in this case that part of the soul which is submerged does not,\non that account alone, cease being impassible. To purify the affective\npart of the soul is to turn her from a vision of deceitful images; to\nseparate her from the body, is to hinder her from inclining towards\nlower things, or from representing their images to herself; it means\nannihilating the things from which she thus is separated, so that she\nis no longer choked by the whirlwind of the spirit which breaks loose\nwhenever the body is allowed to grow too strong; the latter must be\nweakened so as to govern it more easily.\n\n\nB. OF MATTER.\n\n\nINTRODUCTION TO THE ESCOREAL NUMENIAN FRAGMENT.\n\n6. We have sufficiently demonstrated the impassibility of intelligible\n\"being\" which is entirely comprised within the genus of form. But as\nmatter also, though in another manner, is an incorporeal entity, we\nmust examine its nature also. We must see whether it may be affected,\nand undergo every kind of modification, as is the common opinion; or\nwhether, on the contrary, it be impassible; and in this case, what is\nthe nature of its impassibility.\n\n\nNONENTITY WILL HAVE INTELLIGENT LIFE ONLY AS BENEATH \"BEING.\"\n\nSince we are thus led to treat of the nature of matter, we must first\npremiss that the nature of existence, \"being\" and essence[49] are not\nwhat they are thought to be by people generally. Existence is; it \"is\"\nin the genuine meaning of that word; that is, it \"is\" essentially; it\nis absolutely, lacking nothing of existence. Fully being existence, its\nexistence and preservation are not dependent on anything else; so much\nthe more, if other things seem to be, they owe this thereto. If this\nbe true, existence must possess life, perfect life--for otherwise it\nwould not be existence any more than non-existence. Now perfect life\nis intelligence and perfect wisdom. Existence therefore is determinate\nand definite. Nothing outside of it exists even potentially; otherwise\nit would not fully satisfy itself. It is therefore eternal, immutable,\nincapable of receiving anything, or of adding anything to itself; for\nwhat it would receive would have to be foreign to it, and consequently\nbe nonentity. In order to exist by itself, existence must therefore\npossess all things within itself; it must be all things simultaneously,\nit must at the same time be one and all, since this is of what we\nconsider existence to consist; otherwise instead of emanating from\nexistence, intelligence and life would be incidental thereto. Therefore\nthey could not originate from nonentity; and, on its side, existence\ncould not be deprived of intelligence and life. True nonentity,\ntherefore, will have intelligence and life only as they must exist in\nobjects inferior and posterior to existence. The principle superior to\nexistence (the One), on the other hand, gives intelligence and life to\nexistence, without itself needing to possess them.[50]\n\n\nMATERIALISTS CANNOT UNDERSTAND HOW SOLID EARTH IS NEAREST NONENTITY;\nAND WHY GREATEST EXISTENCE IS LEAST MATERIAL.\n\nIf such be the nature of existence, it could be neither body, nor the\nsubstrate of bodies; for their existence is nonentity. (Materialists,\nhowever, object), How could we refuse to attribute \"being\" to the\nnature of bodies, such as these cliffs and rocks, to the solid earth,\nand in short, to all these impenetrable objects? When I am struck,\nam I not by the shock forced to acknowledge that these objects\nexist as (real) \"being\"? On the other hand, how does it happen that\nentities that are not impenetrable, which can neither shock others\nnor be shocked by them, which are completely invisible, like soul\nand intelligence, are genuine beings?[51] Our answer is that the\nearth, which possesses corporeal nature in the highest degree, is\ninert; the element that is less gross (the air) is already more\nmobile, and resides in a higher region; while fire withdraws still\nmore from corporeal nature. The things which best suffice themselves\nleast agitate and trouble the others; those that are heavier and more\nterrestrial, by the mere fact that they are incomplete, subject to\nfalling, and incapable of rising, fall by weakness, and shock the\nothers by virtue of their inertia, and their weight. Thus inanimate\nbodies fall more heavily, and shock and wound others more powerfully.\nOn the contrary, animated bodies, by the mere fact of greater\nparticipation in existence, strike with less harshness. That is why\nmovement, which is a kind of life, or at least an image of life, exists\nin a higher degree in things that are less corporeal.\n\n\nCORPOREITY IS NONENTITY BECAUSE OF LACK OF UNITY.\n\nIt is therefore an \"eclipse of existence\" which renders an object\nmore corporeal. While studying those psychoses called affections, we\ndiscover that the more corporeal an object is, the more is it likely\nto be affected; the earth is more so than other elements, and so on.\nIndeed, when other elements are divided, they immediately reunite their\nparts, unless there be some opposition; but when we separate parts\nof earth, they do not come together again. They thus seem to have no\nnatural earth; since, after a light blow, they remain in the state\nwhere they are left by the blow that struck or broke them. Therefore\nthe more corporeal a thing is, the more it approaches nonentity,\nreturning to unity with the greater difficulty. The heavy and violent\nblows by which bodies act on each other are followed by destruction.\nWhen even a weak thing falls on something weak, it may still be\nrelatively powerful; as is nonentity hitting nonentity.\n\n\nSENSATION AS THE DREAM OF THE SOUL FROM WHICH WE MUST WAKE.\n\nSuch are the objections that may be raised against those who consider\nall beings as corporeal; who wish to judge of their existence only by\nimpressions they receive therefrom, and who try to found the certitude\nof truth on the images of sensation.[73] They resemble sleeping men\nwho take as realities the visions they have in their dreams. Sensation\nis the dream of the soul;[52] so long as the soul is in the body, she\ndreams; the real awakening of the soul consists in genuine separation\nfrom the body, and not in rising along with the body. To rise with\nthe body is to pass from one sleep into another kind; from one bed\nto another; really to awake is to separate oneself completely from\nthe body. The body, whose nature is contrary to that of the soul,\nconsequently has a nature contrary to that of \"being.\" This is proved\nby the generation, flux, and decay of bodies, all processes contrary to\nthe nature of \"being.\"\n\n\nMATTER COMPARED TO A MIRROR WHICH REFLECTS EVERYTHING THOUGH REALLY\nEMPTY.\n\n7. Let us return to matter as a substrate, and then to what is said\nto exist within it. This will lead us to see that it consists of\nnonentity, and that it is impassible. Matter is incorporeal because\nthe body exists only as posterior thereto, because it is a composite\nof which it constitutes an element. It is called incorporeal because\nexistence and matter are two things equally distinct from the body. Not\nbeing soul, matter is neither intelligence, nor life, nor (\"seminal)\nreason,\" nor limit. It is a kind of infinity.[53] Neither is it an\n(active) power;[54] for what could it produce? Since matter is none\nof the above-mentioned things, it could not be called existence. It\ndeserves only the name \"nonentity\" yet not even in the sense in which\nwe may say that movement or rest are not existence;[55] matter is real\nnonentity. It is an image and phantom of extension, it is aspiration to\na form of hypostatic existence. Its perseverance is not in rest (but in\nchange). By itself, it is invisible, it escapes whoever wishes to see\nit. It is present when you do not look at it, it escapes the eye that\nseeks it. It seems to contain all the contraries: the large and small,\nthe more and the less, the lack and excess.[56] It is a phantom equally\nincapable of remaining or escaping; for matter does not even have\nthe strength of avoiding (form), because it has received no strength\nfrom intelligence, and it is the lack of all existence. Consequently,\nall its appearances are deceptions. If we represent matter as being\ngreatness, it immediately appears as smallness; if we represent it as\nthe more, we are forced to recognize it as the less. When we try to\nconceive of its existence, it appears as nonentity; like all the things\nit contains, it is a fugitive shadow, and a fleeting game, an image\nwithin an image. It resembles a mirror, in which one might see the\nreflections of objects external to it; the mirror seems to be filled,\nand to possess everything, though really containing nothing.\n\n\nAS OBJECTS ARE MERELY REFLECTIONS IN A MIRROR, MATTER IS NO MORE\nAFFECTED BY THEM THAN WOULD BE A MIRROR.\n\nThus matter is a shapeless image, into which enter, and out of which\nissue the images of beings. These appear in it precisely because\nmatter has no shape, though they seem to produce something in it, they\nreally produce nothing in it.[57] They have no consistence, strength,\nnor solidity; as matter has none either, they enter into it without\ndividing it, as if they would penetrate water, or as shapes might move\nin emptiness. If the images that appear in matter had the same nature\nas the objects they represent and from which they emanate, then, if\nwe attribute to the images a little of the power of the objects that\nproject them, we might be right in considering them able to affect\nmatter. But as the things that we see in matter do not have the same\nnature as the objects of which they are the images, it is not true\nthat matter suffers when receiving them; they are no more than false\nappearances without any resemblance to what produces them. Feeble and\nfalse by themselves, they enter into a thing that is equally false.[58]\nThey must therefore leave it as impassible as a mirror, or water;\nproducing on it no more effect than does a dream on the soul. These\ncomparisons, however, are yet imperfect, because in these cases there\nis still some resemblance between the images and the objects.\n\n\nSINCE MATTER CANNOT BE DESTROYED, IT CANNOT BE AFFECTED.\n\n8. (According to Aristotle[59]), it is absolutely necessary that what\ncan be affected must have powers and qualities opposed to the things\nthat approach it, and affect it. Thus, it is the cold that alters the\nheat of an object, and humidity that alters its dryness, and we say\nthat the substrate is altered, when it ceases being hot, and grows\ncold; and ceasing to be dry, becomes humid. Another proof of this truth\nis the destruction of the fire that, by changing, becomes another\nelement. Then we say that it is the fire, but not the matter that has\nbeen destroyed. What is affected is therefore that which is destroyed;\nfor it is always a passive modification that occasions destruction.\nConsequently being destroyed and being affected are inseparable\nnotions. Now it is impossible for matter to be destroyed; for how\ncould it be destroyed, and in what would it change?\n\n\nOBJECTION THAT MATTER MUST BE PASSIBLE IF ITS QUALITIES CHANGE AS THEY\nDO.\n\nIt may be objected that matter receives heat, cold, and numerous, or\neven innumerable qualities; it is characterized by them, it possesses\nthem as somehow inherent in its nature, and mingled with each other, as\nthey do not exist in isolated condition. How could nature avoid being\naffected along with them,[60] serving as it does as a medium for the\nmutual action of these qualities by their mixture?[61] If matter is\nto be considered impassible, we shall have to consider it as somehow\noutside of these qualities. But every quality which is present in a\nsubject cannot be present in it without communicating to it something\nof itself.\n\n\nDIFFERENT SENSES OF \"PARTICIPATION\" WILL ALLOW FOR MATTER TO REMAIN\nIMPASSIBLE.\n\n9. It must be noticed that the expressions: \"such a thing is present to\nsuch a thing\" and \"such a thing is in such other thing\" have several\nmeanings. Sometimes one thing improves or deteriorates some other\nthing by its presence, making it undergo a change; as may be seen in\nbodies, especially those of living beings. Again, one thing improves\nor deteriorates another without affecting it; this occurs with the\nsoul, as we have already seen.[62] Again, it is as when one impresses\na figure on a piece of wax; the presence of the figure adds nothing to\nthe (nature) of the wax, and its destruction makes it lose nothing.\nLikewise, light does not change the figure of the object which it\nenlightens with its rays. A cooled stone participates a little in\nthe nature characteristic of the thing that cools it; but none the\nless remains stone. What suffering can light inflict on a line or\na surface?[63] One might perhaps say that in this case corporeal\nsubstance is affected; but how can it suffer (or be affected) by the\naction of light? Suffering, in fact, is not to enjoy the presence\nof something, nor to receive something. Mirrors, and, in general,\ntransparent things, do not suffer (or are not affected) by the effect\nof images that form in them, and they offer a striking example of the\ntruth we are here presenting. Indeed, qualities inhere in matter like\nsimple images, and matter itself is more impassible than a mirror.\nHeat and cold occur in it without warming or cooling it; for heating\nand cooling consist in that one quality of the substrate gives place\nto another. In passing, we might notice that it would not be without\ninterest to examine whether cold is not merely absence of heat. On\nentering into matter, qualities mostly react on each other only when\nthey are opposite. What action, indeed, could be exercised by a smell\non a sweet taste? By a color on a figure? How, in general, could things\nthat belong to one genus act on another? This shows how one quality can\ngive place to another in a same subject, or how one thing can be in\nanother, without its presence causing any modification in the subject\nfor which or in which it is present. Just as a thing is not altered\nby the first comer, likewise that which is affected and which changes\ndoes not receive a passive modification, or change, from any kind of an\nobject. Qualities are affected only by the action of contraries. Things\nwhich are simply different cause no change in each other. Those which\nhave no contraries could evidently not be modified by the action of any\ncontrary. That which is affected, therefore, can not be matter; it must\nbe a composite (of form and matter), or something multiple. But that\nwhich is isolated or separated from the rest, what is quite simple must\nremain impassible in respect of all things, and remain as a kind of\nmedium in which other things may act on each other. Likewise, within\na house, several objects can shock each other without the house itself\nor the air within it being affected. It is therefore qualities gathered\nin matter that act on each other, so far as it belongs to their nature.\nMatter itself, however, is still far more impassible than the qualities\nare among each other, when they do not find themselves opposite.\n\n\nIF FORM BE UNCHANGEABLE, SO IS MATTER.\n\n10. If matter could be affected, it would have to preserve some of\nthe affection, retaining either the affection itself, or remain in a\nstate different from the one in which it was before it was affected.\nBut when one quality appears after another quality, it is no longer\nmatter that receives it, but matter as determined by a quality. If even\nthis quality should evanesce, though leaving some trace of itself by\nthe action it has exercised, the substrate will still more be altered;\nproceeding thus it will come to be something entirely different from\npure matter, it will be something multiple by its forms and by its\nmanners of existence. It will no longer be the common receptacle of all\nthings, since it will contain an obstacle to many things that could\nhappen to it; matter would no longer subsist within it, and would no\nlonger be incorruptible. Now if, by definition, matter always remains\nwhat it was since its origin, namely \"matter,\" then, if we insist\nthat it be altered, it is evident that matter no longer remains such.\nMoreover, if everything that is altered must remain unchanged in kind,\nso as not to be changed in itself, though changed in accidents; in one\nword, if that which is changed must be permanent, and if that which is\npermanent be not that which is affected, we come to a dilemma; either\nmatter is altered, and abandons its nature; or it does not abandon its\nnature, and is not changed. If we say that matter is changed, but not\nin so far as it is matter, it will, to begin with, be impossible to\nstate in what it is changed; and further, we would thereby be forced\nto insist it was not changed. Indeed, just as other things, which are\nforms, cannot be changed in their \"being\" (or, nature), because it is\nthis very unalterability which constitutes their \"being\" (or, nature),\nlikewise, as the \"being\" (or, nature) of matter is to exist in so far\nas it is matter, it cannot be altered in so far as it is matter, and\nit must necessarily be permanent in this respect. Therefore if form be\nunalterable, matter must be equally unalterable.\n\n\nMATTER PARTICIPATES IN THE INTELLIGIBLE ONLY BY APPEARANCE.\n\n11. This was no doubt the thought present to Plato when[64] he rightly\nsaid, \"These imitations of the eternal beings which enter into matter,\nand which issue therefrom.\" Not without good reason did he employ the\nterms \"enter\" and \"issue\"; he wanted us carefully to scrutinize the\nmanner in which matter participates in ideas. When Plato thus tries\nto clear up how matter participates in ideas, his object is to show,\nnot how ideas enter into matter, as before so many have believed, but\ntheir condition within it. Doubtless, it does seem astonishing that\nmatter remains impassible in respect to the ideas that are present\ntherein, while the things that enter in it are affected by each other.\nWe nevertheless have to acknowledge that the things which enter into\nmatter expel their predecessors, and that it is only the composite that\nis affected. Nevertheless it is not every kind of composite that is\naffected, but only that composite that happens to need the thing that\nwas introduced or expelled, so that its constitution becomes defective\nby the absence of that (quality), or more complete by its presence.\nNothing is added to the nature of matter, however, by the introduction\nof anything; the presence of that thing does not make matter what it\nis, and matter loses nothing by its absence; matter remains what it was\nsince its origin. To be ornamented is to the interest of something that\nadmits of order or ornament; it can receive that ornament without being\nchanged, when it only puts it on, so to speak. But if this ornament\npenetrate into it as something that forms part of its nature, it then\ncannot receive it without being altered, without ceasing to be what it\nwas before, as for instance, ceasing to be ugly; without, by that very\nfact, changing; without, for instance, becoming beautiful, though ugly\nbefore. Therefore if matter become beautiful, though before ugly, it\nceases to be what it was before; namely, ugly; so that on being adorned\nit loses its nature, so much the more as it was ugly only accidentally.\nBeing ugly enough to be ugliness itself, it could not participate in\nbeauty; being bad enough to be badness itself, it could not participate\nin goodness. Therefore matter participates in the ideas without being\naffected; and consequently, this participation must operate in another\nmanner; and, for instance, consist in appearance.[65] This kind of\nparticipation solves the problem we had set ourselves; it enables us\nto understand how, while being evil, matter can aspire to the Good\nwithout ceasing to be what it was, in spite of its participation in the\nGood. Indeed if this participation operate in a manner such that matter\nremains without alteration, as we say, and if it always continue to be\nwhat it was, there is no reason to be surprised if, though being evil,\nit can participate in the Good; it does not swerve from its manner of\nexistence. On one hand, as for her, this participation is unavoidable,\nit participates as long as it endures; on the other hand, as matter\ncontinues to be what it is, by virtue of the kind of participation\nwhich does not interfere with its nature, it undergoes no alteration\non the part of the principle which gives it something; it always\nremains as bad as it was, because its nature persists. If matter really\nparticipated in the Good, if matter were really modified thereby, its\nnature would no longer be evil. Therefore, the statement that matter is\nevil is true enough if it be considered to imply that it is impassible\nin respect to Good; and this really amounts to saying that it is\nentirely impassible.\n\n\nSENSE-OBJECTS ARE UNREAL AND ARE CHIEFLY MADE UP OF APPEARANCE.\n\n12. Plato[66] agreed with this, and being persuaded that, by\nparticipation, matter does not receive form and shape, as would some\nsubstrate that should constitute a composite of things intimately\nunited by their transformation, their mixture, and their common\naffections; in order to demonstrate the opposite, namely, that matter\nremains impassible while receiving forms, invented a most apposite\nillustration of a participation that operates without anything being\naffected (namely, that engravers, before using dies on the soft wax,\nclean them carefully). Almost any other kind of illustration would\nfail to explain how the substrate can remain the same in the presence\nof forms. While trying to achieve his purpose, Plato has raised\nmany questions; he has besides applied himself to demonstrate that\nsense-objects are devoid of reality, and that a large part of their\nhypostatic substance is constituted by appearance. Plato demonstrates\nthe permanence and identity of matter by showing that it is by the\nfigures with which it is endued that matter affects animated bodies,\nwithout itself suffering any of their affections. He wishes to convince\nus that in being endued with these figures, matter undergoes neither\naffection nor alteration. Indeed, in the bodies that successively\nassume different figures, we may, relying on analogy, call the change\nof figures an alteration; but since matter has neither figure nor\nexistence,[67] how could we, even by analogy, call the presence of a\nfigure an alteration? The only sure way of avoiding a misunderstanding\nin expression is to say that the substrate possesses nothing in the\nmanner it is usually supposed to possess it. How then could it possess\nthe things it contains, unless as a figure? Plato's illustration means\nthat matter is impassible, and that it contains the apparent presence\nof images which are not really present therein.\n\n\nPLATO'S FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE MIGHT LEAD TO ERRORS ABOUT HIS REAL\nOPINIONS.\n\nWe must still further preliminarily insist on the impassibility of\nmatter; for by using the usual terms we might be misled into wrongly\nthinking that matter could be affected. Thus Plato speaks[68] of matter\nbeing set on fire, being wetted, and so forth, as if it received\nthe shapes of air or water. However, Plato modifies the statement\nthat \"matter receives the shapes of air and water\" by the statement\nthat matter \"is set on fire and wetted,\" and he demonstrates that by\nreceiving these shapes it nevertheless has none of its own, and that\nforms do not more than enter into it. This expression \"matter is set on\nfire\" must not be taken literally; it means only that matter becomes\nfire. Now to become fire is not the same thing as being set on fire; to\nbe set on fire can achieve no more than what is different from fire,\nthan what can be affected; for that which itself is a part of fire\ncould not be set on fire. To insist on the opposite would amount to\nsaying that metal itself formed a statue, or that fire itself spread\ninto matter and set it on fire. The theory that a (\"seminal) reason\"\nhad approached matter, forces us to question how this reason could have\nset matter on fire. The theory that a figure had approached matter\nwould imply that that which is set on fire is already composed of\ntwo things (matter and a figure), and that these two entities form a\nsingle one. Although these two things would form a single one, they\nwould not affect each other, and would act only on other entities. Nor\nwould they even in this case act jointly; for one would effect no more\nthan to hinder the other from avoiding (form). The theory that when\nthe body is divided matter also must be divided, would have to answer\nthe question, How could matter on being divided, escape the affection\nundergone by the composite (of form and matter)? On such a theory, one\nmight even assert that matter was destroyed, and ask, Since the body is\ndestroyed, why should not matter also be destroyed? What is affected\nand divided must be a quantity or magnitude. What is not a magnitude\ncannot experience the same modifications as a body. Therefore those who\nconsider matter affectible would be forced to call it a body.\n\n\nMATTER AS THE ETERNAL LOCATION OR RESIDENCE OF GENERATION.\n\n13. They would further have to explain in what sense they say that\nmatter seeks to elude form. How can it be said to seek to elude\nthe stones and the solid objects which contain it? For it would be\nirrational to say that it seeks to elude form at certain times, but not\nat others. If matter seeks to elude form voluntarily, why does it not\nelude form continuously? If necessity keep matter (within form), there\ncan be no moment when it would not inhere in some form or other. The\nreason why matter is not always contained by the same form must not\nbe sought for within matter, but in the forms that matter receives.\nIn what sense then could it be said that matter eludes form? Does it\nalways and essentially elude form? This would amount to saying that\nmatter, never ceasing being itself, has form without ever having it.\nOtherwise, the statement would be meaningless.[69] (Plato) says that\nmatter is the \"nurse and residence of generation.\" If then matter be\nthe nurse and residence of generation, it is evidently distinct from\nthe latter. Only that which can be affected is within the domain of\ngeneration. Now as matter, being the nurse and residence of generation,\nexists before the latter, it must also exist before any alteration.\nTherefore to say that matter is the nurse and residence of generation\nis tantamount to saying that matter is impassible. The same meaning\nattaches to such other statements as that matter is that in which\nbegotten things appear, and from which they issue,[70] that matter is\nthe (eternal) location, and place (of all generation).[71]\n\n\nMATTER AS LOCATION OF FORMS REMAINS IMPASSIBLE.\n\nWhen Plato, rightfully, calls matter \"the location of forms,\" he is\nnot thereby attributing any passion to matter; he only indicates that\nmatters go on in a different manner. How? Since matter, however, by\nits nature, cannot be any of the beings, and as it must flee from\nthe \"being\" of all beings, and be entirely different from them--for\n(\"seminal) reasons\" are genuine beings--it must necessarily preserve\nits nature by virtue of this very difference. It must not only contain\nall beings, but also not appropriate what is their image; for this is\nthat by which matter differs from all beings. Otherwise, if the images\nthat fill a mirror were not transient, and if the mirror remained\ninvisible, evidently we would believe that the things the mirror\npresents to us existed really. If then there be something in a mirror,\nthat is that which sense-forms are in matter. If in a mirror there be\nnothing but appearance, then there is nothing in matter but appearance,\nrecognizing that this appearance is the cause of the existence of\nbeings, an existence in which the things that exist always really\nparticipate, and in which the things which do not really exist do not\nparticipate; for they could not be in the condition where they would be\nif they existed without the existence of existence in itself.\n\n\nTHE MYTH OF POVERTY AND ABUNDANCE.\n\n14. What! Would nothing exist (in the sense-world) if matter did not\nexist? Nothing! It is as with a mirror; remove it, and the images\ndisappear. Indeed, that which by its nature is destined to exist in\nsomething else could not exist in that thing; now the nature of every\nimage is to exist in something else. If the image were an emanation\nof the causes themselves, it could exist without being in anything\nelse; but as these causes reside in themselves, so that their image\nmay reflect itself elsewhere, there must be something else destined\nto serve as location for that which does not really enter into it;\nsomething which by its presence, its audacity, its solicitations, and\nby its indigence, should as it were forcibly obtain (what it desires),\nbut which is deceived because it does not really obtain anything;\nso that it preserves its indigence, and continues to solicitate\n(satisfaction[72]). As soon as Poverty exists, it ceaselessly \"begs,\"\nas a (well-known Platonic) myth tells us;[97] that shows clearly enough\nthat it is naturally denuded of all good. It does not ask to obtain all\nthat the giver possesses; it is satisfied with the possession of some\nof it, thus revealing to us how much the images that appear in matter\nare different from real beings. Even the very name of Poverty, which is\ngiven to matter, indicates that it is insatiable. When Poverty is said\nto unite with Abundance, we do not mean that it unites with Existence\nor Fulness, but with a work of wonderful skill, namely, a thing that\nis nothing but specious appearance.[74],[98]\n\n\nTHE MIRACLE IS THAT MATTER PARTICIPATES IN EXISTENCE WITHOUT\nPARTICIPATING IN IT.\n\nIt is indeed impossible that that which is outside of existence should\nbe completely deprived of it; for the nature of existence is to produce\nbeings. On the other hand, absolute nonentity cannot mingle with\nexistence. The result is something miraculous: matter participates in\nexistence without really participating in it, and by approaching to\nit obtains something, though by its nature matter cannot unite with\nexistence. It therefore reflects what it receives from an alien nature\nas echo reflects sound in places that are symmetrical and continuous.\nThat is how things that do not reside in matter seem to reside in it,\nand to come from it.\n\n\nGENERATION ILLUSTRATED BY LIGHTING FIRE BY REFRACTION.\n\nIf matter participated in the existence of genuine beings and received\nthem within itself, as might easily be thought, that which would enter\ninto it would penetrate deeply into matter; but evidently matter is\nnot penetrated thereby, remaining unreceptive of any of it. On the\ncontrary, matter arrests their \"procession,\" as echo arrests and\nreflects sound-waves, matter being only the \"residence\" (or, \"jar\" or\nvase) of the things that enter within it, and there mingle with each\nother. Everything takes place there as in the case of persons who,\nwishing to light fire from the rays of the sun, should place in front\nof these rays polished jars filled with water, so that the flame,\narrested by the obstacles met within, should not be able to penetrate,\nand should concentrate on their outside. That is how matter becomes\nthe cause of generation; that is how things occur within it.\n\n\nTHE RELATION OF MATTER TO REASON ILLUSTRATED BY THAT OF OPINION AND\nIMAGINATION.\n\n15. The objects that concentrate the rays of the sun, are themselves\nvisible, by receiving from the fire of sensation what takes fire in\ntheir hearth. They appear because the images that form themselves are\naround and near them, and touch each other, and finally because there\nare two limits in these objects. But when the (\"seminal) reason\" is\nin matter, it remains exterior to matter in an entirely different\nmanner; it has a different nature. Here it is not necessary that\nthere be two limits; matter and reason are strangers to each other by\ndifference of nature, and by the difference between their natures that\nmakes any mixture of them impossible. The cause that each remains in\nitself is that what enters into matter does not possess it, any more\nthan matter possesses what enters into it. That is how opinion and\nimagination do not mingle in our soul,[75] and each remains what it\nwas, without entailing or leaving anything, because no mingling can\noccur. These powers are foreign to each other, not in that there is a\nmere juxtaposition, but because between them obtains a difference that\nis grasped by reason, instead of being seen by sight. Here imagination\nis a kind of phantom, though the soul herself be no phantom, and though\nshe seem to accomplish, and though she really accomplish many deeds as\nshe desires to accomplish them.\n\nThus imagination stands to the soul in about the same lation as (form)\nwith matter. Nevertheless (imagination) does not hide the soul, whose\noperations often disarrange and disturb it. Never could imagination\nhide the soul entirely, even if imagination should penetrate the soul\nentirely, and should seem to veil it completely. Indeed, the soul\ncontains operations and reasons contrary (to imagination), by which\nshe succeeds in putting aside the phantoms that besiege her.[76] But\nmatter, being infinitely feebler than the soul, possesses none of the\nbeings, either of the true or false, which characteristically belong\nto it. Matter has nothing that could show it off, being absolutely\ndenuded of all things. It is no more than a cause of appearance for\nother things; it could never say, \"I am here, or there!\" If, starting\nfrom other beings,[77] profound reasoning should succeed in discovering\nmatter, it ultimately declares that matter is something completely\nabandoned by true beings; but as the things that are posterior to true\nbeings themselves seem to exist, matter might, so to speak, be said to\nbe extended in all these things, seeming both to follow them, and not\nto follow them.\n\n\nTHE MAGNITUDE OF MATTER IS REALLY DERIVED FROM THE SEMINAL REASON.\n\n16. The (\"seminal) reason,\" on approaching matter, and giving it the\nextension it desired, made of it a magnitude. The \"reason\" drew from\nitself the magnitude to give it to the matter, which did not possess\nit, and which did not, merely on that account, acquire size; otherwise\nthe magnitude occurring within it would be magnitude itself. If we\nremove form from matter, the substrate that then remains neither seems\nnor is large (since magnitude is part of form). If what is produced\nin matter be a certain magnitude, as for instance a man or a horse,\nthe magnitude characteristic of the horse disappears with the form of\nthe horse.[78] If we say that a horse cannot be produced except in a\nmass of determined size, and that this magnitude remained (when the\nform of the horse disappeared), we would answer that what would then\nremain would not be the magnitude characteristic of the horse, but\nthe magnitude of mass. Besides, if this mass were fire or earth, when\nthe form of fire or that of earth disappeared, the magnitude of the\nfire or of the earth would simultaneously disappear. Matter therefore\npossesses neither figure nor quantity; otherwise, it would not have\nceased being fire to become something else, but, remaining fire, would\nnever \"become\" fire.[79] Now that it seems to have become as great as\nthis universe, if the heavens, with all they contain were annihilated,\nall quantity would simultaneously disappear out of matter, and with\nquantity also the other inseparable qualities will disappear. Matter\nwould then remain what it originally was by itself; it would keep\nnone of the things that exist within it. Indeed, the objects that can\nbe affected by the presence of contrary objects can, when the latter\nwithdraw, keep some trace of them; but that which is impassible retains\nnothing; for instance, the air, when penetrated by the light, retains\nnone of it when it disappears. That that which has no magnitude can\nbecome great is not any more surprising than that which has no heat\ncan become hot. Indeed, for matter to be matter is something entirely\ndifferent from its being magnitude; magnitude is as immaterial as\nfigure. Of matter such as it really is we should say that it is all\nthings by participation. Now magnitude forms part of what we call all\nthings. As the bodies are composite, magnitude is there among the\nother qualities, without however being determinate therein. Indeed,\nthe \"reason\" of the body also contains magnitude.[80] On the contrary,\nmatter does not even contain indeterminate magnitude, because it is not\na body.\n\n\nMAGNITUDE IS AN IMAGE FORMED BY THE UNIVERSAL REFLECTION OF UNIVERSAL\nBEINGS.\n\n17. Neither is matter magnitude itself; for magnitude is a form, and\nnot a residence; it exists by itself[81] (for matter cannot even\nappropriate the images of beings). Not even in this respect, therefore,\nis matter magnitude. But as that which exists in intelligence or in\nthe soul desired to acquire magnitude, it imparted to the things that\ndesired to imitate magnitude by their aspiration or movement, the power\nto impress on some other object a modification analogous to their\nown. Thus magnitude, by developing in the procession of imagination,\ndragged along with itself the smallness of matter, made it seem large\nby extending it along with itself, without becoming filled by that\nextension. The magnitude of matter is a false magnitude, since matter\ndoes not by itself possess magnitude, and by extending itself along\nwith magnitude, has shared the extension of the latter. Indeed as all\nintelligible beings are reflected, either in other things in general,\nor in one of them in particular, as each of them was large, the\ntotality also is, in this manner, great (?). Thus the magnitude of each\nreason constituted a particular magnitude, as, for instance, a horse,\nor some other being.[82] The image formed by the universal reflection\nof intelligible beings became a magnitude, because it was illuminated\nby magnitude itself. Every part of it became a special magnitude; and\nall things together seemed great by virtue of the universal form to\nwhich magnitude belongs. Thus occurred the extension of each thing\ntowards each of the others, and towards their totality. The amount of\nthis extension in form and in mass necessarily depended on the power,\nthat transformed what in reality was nothing to an appearance of being\nall things. In the same manner color, that arose out of what is not\ncolor, and quality, that arose out of what is not quality, here below\nwere referred to by the same name as the intelligible entities (of\nwhich they are the images). The case is similar for magnitude, which\narose out of that which has none, or at least out of that magnitude\nthat bears the same name (as intelligible magnitude).\n\n\nSENSE-OBJECTS APPEAR, AND ARE INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN FORM AND MATTER.\n\nSense-objects, therefore, occupy a rank intermediary between matter\nand form itself.[83] They no doubt appear, because they are derived\nfrom intelligible entities; but they are deceptive, because the matter\nin which they appear does not really exist.[84] Each of them becomes\na magnitude, because it is extended through the power of the entities\nthat appear here below, and which locate themselves here. Thus we\nhave, in every direction, the production of an extension; and that\nwithout matter undergoing any violence, because (potentially) it is all\nthings. Everything produces its own extension by the power it derives\nfrom the intelligible entities. What imparts magnitude to matter is\nthe appearance of magnitude, and it is this appearance that forms our\nearthly magnitude. Matter yields itself everywhere entirely to the\nextension it thus, by the universal appearance of magnitude, is forced\nto take on. Indeed, by its nature, matter is the matter of everything,\nand consequently is nothing determinate. Now that which is nothing\ndeterminate by itself could become its opposite (of what it is), and\neven after thus having become its own opposite, it is not yet really\nthis opposite; otherwise this opposite would be its nature.[85]\n\n\nMAGNITUDE IS ONLY APPEARANCE.\n\n18. Let us now suppose that a conception of magnitude were possessed\nby some being which would have the power not only to be in itself, but\nalso to produce itself externally; and that it should meet a nature\n(such as matter) that was incapable of existing within intelligence,\nof having a form, of revealing any trace of real magnitude, or any\nquality. What would such a being do with such a power? It would create\nneither a horse nor an ox; for other causes (the \"seminal) reasons\"\nwould produce them.[86] Indeed, that which proceeds from magnitude\nitself cannot be real magnitude; it must therefore be apparent\nmagnitude.[87] Thus, since matter has not received real magnitude,\nall it can do is to be as great as its nature will permit; that is,\nto seem great. To accomplish that, it must not fail anywhere; and, if\nit be extended, it cannot be a discrete quantity, but all its parts\nmust be united, and absent in no place. Indeed, it was impossible for\na small mass to contain an image of magnitude that would equal the\nreal magnitude, since it is only an image of magnitude; but, carried\naway with the hope of achieving the magnitude to which it aspired,\nthis image extended to its limit, along with matter, which shared its\nextension because matter could not follow it. That is how this image of\nmagnitude magnified what was not great, without however making it seem\nreally great, and produced the magnitude that appears in its mass. None\nthe less does matter preserve its nature, though it be veiled by this\napparent magnitude, as if by a garment with which it covered itself\nwhen it followed the magnitude that involved it in its extension.\nIf matter ever happened to be stripped of this garment, it would\nnevertheless remain what itself was before; for it possesses magnitude\nonly in so far as form by its presence makes it great.[88]\n\n\nIF MATTER WERE A PRIMARY PRINCIPLE, IT WOULD BE THE FORM OF THE\nUNIVERSE, SUCH AS SOUL IS.\n\nAs the soul possesses the forms of beings, and as she herself is a\nform, she possesses all things simultaneously.[89] Containing all the\nforms, and besides seeing the forms of sense-objects turning towards\nher, and approaching her, she is not willing to accept them, along with\ntheir manifoldness. She considers them only after making abstractions\nof their mass; for the soul could not become other than she is.[90]\nBut as matter does not have the strength to resist, possessing as it\ndoes no special characteristic activity, and being no more than an\nadumbration, matter yields to everything that active power proposes to\ninflict on it. Besides, that which proceeds from intelligible (nature)\npossesses already a trace of what is to be produced in matter. That is\nhow discursive reason which moves within the sphere of representative\nimagination, or the movement produced by reason, implies division; for\nif reason remained within unity and identity, it would not move, but\nremain at rest. Besides, not as the soul does, can matter receive all\nforms simultaneously; otherwise it would be a form. As it must contain\nall things, without however containing them in an indivisible manner,\nit is necessary that, serving as it does as location for all things,\nit should extend towards all of them, everywhere offering itself to\nall of them, avoiding no part of space, because it is not restricted\nwithin any boundary of space, and because it is always ready to receive\nwhat is to be. How then does it happen that one thing, on entering into\nmatter, does not hinder the entrance of other things, which, however,\ncannot co-exist with the former thing? The reason is that matter is\nnot a first principle. Otherwise, it would be the very form of the\nuniverse. Such a form, indeed, would be both all things simultaneously,\nand each thing in particular. Indeed the matter of the living being is\ndivided as are the very parts of the living being; otherwise nothing\nbut reason[91] would exist.\n\n\nMATTER AS MOTHER, NURSE, RESIDENCE, AND \"OTHER\" NATURE.\n\n19. When things enter into the matter that plays the part of mother\nto them, they neither hurt it, nor give it pleasure. Their blows\nare not felt by matter; they direct their blows only against each\nother, because the powers act upon their opposites, and not on their\nsubstrates, unless indeed we consider the substrates as united to\nthe things they contain. Heat makes cold disappear,[92] as whiteness\naffects blackness; or, if they mingle, they produce a new quality by\ntheir mixture.[93] What is affected is the things that mingle, and\ntheir being affected consists in ceasing to be what they were. Among\nanimate beings, it is the body that is affected by the alteration\nof the qualities, and of the forces possessed. When the qualities\nconstitutive of these beings are destroyed, or when they combine, or\nwhen they undergo some change contrary to their nature, the affections\nrelate to the body, as the perceptions do to the soul. The latter\nindeed knows all the affections that produce a lively impression.\nMatter, however, remains what it is; it could not be affected when it\nceases to contain heat or cold, since neither of these qualities is\neither characteristic or foreign. The name that best characterizes\nmatter, therefore, is nurse or residence.[94] But in what sense could\nmatter, that begets nothing, be called \"mother\"? Those who call it\nsuch consider a mother as playing the part of mere matter, towards her\nchild, merely receiving the germ, without contributing anything of\nitself, because the body of the child owes its growth to nourishment.\nIf however the mother does contribute anything (to the formation of the\nchild) she then plays the part of form, and does not restrict herself\nto the part of matter. Indeed, the form alone is fruitful, while the\n\"other nature\" (that is, matter), is unfruitful.\n\n\nTHE MYTH OF THE ITHYPHALLIC HERMES.\n\nThat no doubt was the meaning of those ancient sages who in mysteries\nand initiations symbolically represented the \"ancient Hermes\"[95] with\nthe generative organ in erection, to teach that it is intelligible\nreason that begets sense-objects. On the other hand, these same sages\nsignify the sterility of matter, condemned to perpetual self-identity,\nby the eunuchs who surround Rhea,[96] making of it the mother of all\nthings, to use the expression they employ in designating the principle\nthat plays the part of substrate.\n\n\nTHE STERILITY OF NATURE INDICATED BY CASTRATION.\n\nThat name indicates the difference between matter and a mother. To\nthose who, refusing to be satisfied with superficialities, insist on\nthoroughness, they thus signified in as precise a manner as possible\n(without lifting the veil of) obscurity, that matter was sterile,\nalthough feminine also to extent at least that matter receives, without\ncontributing to, the act of generation. They indicated it by this, that\nthe (Galli) who surround Cybele are not women, but neither are they\nmen, possessing no power of generation; for by castration they have\nlost a faculty that is characteristic only of a man whose virility is\nintact.\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE.\n\nPsychological Questions.\n\n\nA. ARE NOT ALL SOULS PARTS OR EMANATIONS OF A SINGLE SOUL?[99]\n\n\nPSYCHOLOGY OBEYS THE PRECEPT \"KNOW THYSELF,\" AND SHOWS HOW WE ARE\nTEMPLES OF THE DIVINITY.\n\n1. Among the questions raised about the soul, we purpose to solve\nhere not only such as may be solved with some degree of assurance,\nbut also such as may be considered matters of doubt, considering our\nresearches rewarded by even only a definition of this doubt. This\nshould prove an interesting study. What indeed better deserves careful\nexamination and close scrutiny than what refers to the soul? Among\nother advantages, the study of the soul has that of making known to us\ntwo order of things, those of which she is the principle, and those\nfrom which she herself proceeds. This examination will be in line with\nthe divine precept to \"know ourselves.\"[100] Before seeking to discover\nand understand the remainder, it is no more than right first to apply\nourselves to finding out the nature of the principle that embarks in\nthese researches[101]; and as we are seeking what is lovable, we will\ndo well to contemplate the most beautiful of spectacles (that of our\nown intellectual nature); for if there be a duality, in the universal\n(Soul), so much more likely will there be a duality in individual\nintelligences. We should also examine the sense in which it may be said\nthat souls are sanctuaries of the divinity; but this question will not\nadmit of solution till after we have determined how the soul descends\ninto the body.\n\n\nARE INDIVIDUAL SOULS EMANATIONS OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL?\n\nNow we must consider whether our souls themselves are (emanations) from\nthe universal Soul. It may be insisted that, to demonstrate that our\nsouls are not particles of the universal Soul, it does not suffice to\nshow that our souls go as far (in their procession) as the universal\nSoul, nor that they resemble (the universal Soul) in their intellectual\nfaculties, granting indeed that such a resemblance be admitted; for\nwe might say that parts conform to the whole they compose. We might\ninvoke Plato's authority, and insist that he teaches this opinion in\nthat (part of the Philebus[102]) where he affirms that the universe is\nanimate: \"As our body is a part of the universe, our soul is a part of\nthe Soul of the universe.\" We might add that (Plato) states and clearly\ndemonstrates that we follow the circular movement of heaven, that\nfrom it we receive, our moral habits and condition; that as we were\nbegotten in the universe, our soul must be derived from the surrounding\nuniverse[103]; and as each part of us participates in our soul, we\nourselves should participate in the Soul of the universe, of which we\nare parts in the same way as our members are parts of ourselves. Last,\nwe might quote the following words: \"The universal Soul takes care of\nall that is inanimate.\" This sentence seems to mean that there is no\nsoul outside of the universal Soul; for it is the latter that cares for\nall that is inanimate.\n\n\nCONFORMITY TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL IMPLIES THAT THEY ARE NOT PARTS OF HER.\n\n2. Consider the following answers. To begin with, the assertion that\nsouls conform (to each other), because they attain the same objects,\nand the reduction of them to a single kind, implicitly denies that\nthey are parts (of the universal Soul). We might better say that the\nuniversal Soul is one and identical, and that each soul is universal\n(that is, that she conforms to the universal Soul, because she\npossesses all the latter's powers). Now, assertion of the unity of\nthe universal Soul defines her as being something different (from\nindividual souls); namely, a principle which, specially belonging\nneither to one nor the other, neither to an individual, nor to a\nworld, nor to anything else, itself carries out what is carried out by\nthe world and every living being. It is right enough to say that the\nuniversal Soul does not belong to any individual being, inasmuch as she\nis (pure) being; it is right enough that there should be a Soul which\nis not owned by any being, and that only individual souls should belong\nto individual beings.\n\n\nLIMITATIONS TO THE USE OF THE TERM \"PARTS,\" IN PHYSICAL THINGS.\n\nBut we shall have to explain more clearly the sense in which the word\n\"parts\" must here be taken. To begin with, there is here no question of\nparts of a body, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous. We shall make\nbut a single observation, namely, that when treating of homogeneous\nbodies, parts refer to mass, and not to form. For instance, take\nwhiteness. The whiteness of one part of the milk, is not a part of the\nwhiteness of all the milk in existence; it is the whiteness of a part,\nand not the part of whiteness; for, taken in general, whiteness has\nneither size nor quantity. Only with these restrictions can we say that\nthere are parts in the forms suitable to corporeal things.\n\n\nWHEN APPLIED TO INCORPOREAL THINGS, \"PARTS\" HAVE DIFFERENT SENSES.\n\nFurther, treating of incorporeal things, \"parts\" is taken in several\nsenses. Speaking of numbers, we may say that two is a part of ten\n(referring exclusively to abstract numbers). We may also say that a\ncertain extension is a part of a circle or line. Further, a notion is\nsaid to be a part of science.\n\n\nSUCH MATHEMATICAL SENSES CANNOT BE APPLIED TO THE SOUL.\n\nWhen dealing with numbers and geometrical figures, as well as with\nbodies, it is evident that the whole is necessarily diminished by its\ndivision into parts, and that each part is smaller than the whole.\nRightly, these things should be susceptible to increase or diminution,\nas their nature is that of definite quantities, not quantity in itself.\nIt is surely not in this sense that, when referring to the soul, we\nspeak of quantities. The soul is not a quantity such as a \"dozen,\"\nwhich forms a whole divisible into unities; otherwise, we would end in\na host of absurdities, since a group of ten is not a genuine unity.\nEither each one of the unities would have to be soul, or the Soul\nherself result from a sum of inanimate unities.\n\n\nACTUAL DIVISION INTO PARTS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO A DENIAL OF THE WHOLE.\n\nBesides, our opponents have granted that every part of the universal\nSoul conforms to the whole. Now, in continuous quantities, it is by\nno means necessary that the part should resemble the whole. Thus,\nin the circle and the quadrilateral (the parts are not circles or\nquadrilaterals). All the parts of the divided object (from which a part\nis taken) are not even similar to each other, but vary in manifold\nways, such as the different triangles of which a single triangle might\nbe composed. Our opponents also acknowledge that the universal Soul is\ncomposed of parts that conform to the whole. Now, in a line, one part\nmight also be a line, while differing from the whole in magnitude.\nBut when we speak of the soul, if the difference of the part from\nthe whole consisted in a difference of size, the soul would be a\nmagnitude and a body; for then she would differentiate in quantity by\npsychic characteristics. But this would be impossible if all souls be\nconsidered similar and universal. It is evident that the soul cannot,\nlike magnitudes, be further divided; and even our opponents would not\nclaim that the universal Soul is thus divided into parts. This would\namount to destroying the universal Soul, and reducing her to a mere\nname, if indeed in this system a prior universal (Soul) can at all be\nsaid to exist. This would place her in the position of wine, which\nmight be distributed in several jars, saying that the part of the wine\ncontained in each of them is a portion of the whole.[104]\n\n\nNOR IS THE SOUL A PART IN THE SENSE THAT ONE PROPOSITION IS A PART OF A\nSCIENCE.\n\nNor should we (apply to the soul) the word \"part\" in the sense that\nsome single proposition is a part of the total science. In this\ncase the total science does not remain any less the same (when it\nis divided), and its division is only as it were the production and\nactualization of each of its component parts. Here each proposition\npotentially contains the total science, and (in spite of its division),\nthe total science remains whole.\n\n\nTHE DIFFERENCE OF FUNCTIONS OF THE WORLD-SOUL AND INDIVIDUAL SOULS\nMAKES ENTIRE DIVISION BETWEEN THEM IMPOSSIBLE.\n\nIf such be the relation of the universal Soul to the other souls, the\nuniversal Soul, whose parts are such, will not belong to any particular\nbeing, but will subsist in herself. No longer will she be the soul\nof the world. She will even rank with the number of souls considered\nparts. As all souls would conform to each other, they would, on the\nsame grounds, be parts of the Soul that is single and identical. Then\nit would be inexplicable that some one soul should be Soul of the\nworld, while some other soul should be one of the parts of the world.\n\n\nARE INDIVIDUAL SOULS PART OF THE WORLD-SOUL AS IS THE LOCAL\nCONSCIOUSNESS OF SOME PART OF THE BODY TO THE WHOLE CONSCIOUSNESS?\n\n3. Are individual souls parts of the universal Soul as, in any living\norganism, the soul that animates (or vivifies) the finger is a part of\nthe entire soul back of the whole animal? This hypothesis would force\nus to the conclusion either that there is no soul outside of the body,\nor that the whole universal Soul exists entire, not in a body, but\noutside of the body of the world. This question deserves consideration.\nLet us do so by an illustration.\n\n\nSTUDY OF THE QUESTION BY OBSERVATION OF THE HUMAN ORGANISM.\n\nIf the universal Soul communicate herself to all individual animals,\nand if it be in this sense that each soul is a part of the universal\nSoul--for as soon as she would be divided, the universal Soul\ncould not communicate herself to every part--the universal must be\nentire everywhere, and she must simultaneously be one and the same\nin different beings. Now this hypothesis no longer permits us to\ndistinguish on one hand the universal Soul, and on the other the parts\nof this soul, so much the more as these parts have the same power (as\nthe universal Soul); for even for organs whose functions are different,\nas the eyes and ears, it will not be claimed that there is one part of\nthe soul in the eyes, and another in the ears--such a division would\nsuit only things that have no relation with the soul. We should insist\nthat it is the same part of the soul which animates these two different\norgans, exercising in each of them a different faculty. Indeed, all\nthe powers of the soul are present in these two senses (of sight and\nhearing), and the only cause of the difference of their perceptions is\nthe differences of the organs. Nevertheless all perceptions belong to\nforms (that is, to faculties of the soul), and reduce to a form (the\nsoul) which can become all things (?).[153] This is further proved by\nthe fact that the impressions are forced to come and centre in an only\ncentre. Doubtless the organs by means of which we perceive cannot make\nus perceive all things, and consequently the impressions differ with\nthe organs. Nevertheless the judgment of these impressions belongs to\none and the same principle, which resembles a judge attentive to the\nwords and acts submitted to his consideration.[105] We have, however,\nsaid above that it is one and the same principle which produces acts\nbelonging to different functions (as are sight and hearing). If these\nfunctions be like the senses, it is not possible that each of them\nshould think; for the universal alone would be capable of this. If\nthought be a special independent function, every intelligence subsists\nby itself. Further, when the soul is reasonable, and when she is so in\na way such as to be called reasonable in her entirety, that which is\ncalled a part conforms to the whole, and consequently is not a part of\nthe whole.\n\n\nINTELLECTUAL DIFFICULTY OF THE SOUL BEING ONE AND YET IN ALL BEINGS.\n\n4. If the universal Soul be one in this manner, what about consequences\nof this (conception)? Might we not well doubt the possibility of the\nuniversal Soul's simultaneously being one, yet present in all beings?\nHow does it happen that some souls are in a body, while others are\ndiscarnate? It would seem more logical to admit that every soul is\nalways in some body, especially the universal Soul. For it is not\nclaimed, for the universal Soul, as it is for ours, that she ever\nabandons her body, and though it be by some asserted that the universal\nSoul may one day leave her body, it is never claimed that she would\never be outside of any body. Even admitting that some day she should\nbe divided from all body, how does it happen that a soul could thus\nseparate, while some other could not, if at bottom both are of the same\nnature? As to Intelligence, such a question would be impossible; the\nparts into which it is divided are not distinguished from each other by\ntheir individual difference, and they all exist together eternally, for\nIntelligence is not divisible. On the contrary, as the universal Soul\nis divisible within the bodies, as has been said, it is difficult to\nunderstand how all the souls proceed from the unitary (pure) Being.\n\n\nTHE HEALTHY SOUL CAN WORK, THE SICK SOUL IS DEVOTED TO HER BODY.\n\nThis question may be answered as follows. The unitary Being (that\nis Intelligence), subsists in itself without descending into the\nbodies. From unitary Being proceed the universal Soul and the other\nsouls, which, up to a certain point, exist all together, and form\nbut a single soul so far as they do not belong to any particular\nindividual (contained in the sense-world). If, however, by their\nsuperior extremities they attach themselves to Unity, if within it\nthey coincide, they later diverge (by their actualization), just as\non the earth light is divided between the various dwellings of men,\nnevertheless remaining one and indivisible. In this case, the universal\nSoul is ever elevated above the others because she is not capable of\ndescending, of falling, of inclining towards the sense-world. Our\nsouls, on the contrary, descend here below, because special place\nis assigned to them in this world, and they are obliged to occupy\nthemselves with a body which demands sustained attention. By her\nlower part, the universal Soul resembles the vital principle which\nanimates a great plant, and which there manages everything peaceably\nand noiselessly. By their lower part our souls are similar to those\nanimalcul\u00e6 born of the decaying parts of plants. That is the image\nof the living body of the universe. The higher part of our soul,\nwhich is similar to the higher part of the universal Soul, might be\ncompared to a farmer who, having noticed the worms by which the plant\nis being devoured, should apply himself to destroying them, and should\nsolicitously care for the plant. So we might say that the man in good\nhealth, and surrounded by healthy people, is entirely devoted to his\nduties or studies; the sick man, on the contrary, is entirely devoted\nto his body, and becomes dependent thereon.\n\n\nSOULS RETAIN BOTH THEIR UNITY AND DIFFERENCES ON DIFFERENT LEVELS.\n\n5. How could the universal Soul simultaneously be the soul of yourself\nand of other persons? Might she be the soul of one person by her lower\nstrata, and that of somebody else by her higher strata? To teach such\na doctrine would be equivalent to asserting that the soul of Socrates\nwould be alive while being in a certain body, while she would be\nannihilated (by losing herself within the universal Soul) at the very\nmoment when (as a result of separation of the body) she had come into\nwhat was best (in the intelligible world). No, none of the true beings\nperishes. Not even the intelligences lose themselves up there (in the\ndivine Intelligence), because they are not divided as are bodies,\nand each subsists in her own characteristics, to their differences\njoining that identity which constitutes \"being.\" Being located below\nthe individual intelligences to which they are attached, individual\nsouls are the \"reasons\" (born) of the intelligences, or more developed\nintelligences; from being but slightly manifold, they become very much\nso, while remaining in communion with the slightly manifold beings.\nAs however they tend to introduce separation in these less divisible\nbeings (that is, intelligences), and as nevertheless they cannot attain\nthe last limits of division, they simultaneously preserve both their\nidentity and difference. Each one remains single, and all together form\na unity.\n\n\nSOULS DEVELOP MANIFOLDNESS JUST AS INTELLIGENCE DOES.\n\nWe have thus succeeded in establishing the most important point of\nthe discussion, namely, that all souls proceed from a single Soul,\nthat from being one they become manifold, as is the case with the\nintelligences, divided in the same way, and similarly undivided.\nThe Soul that dwells in the intelligible world is the one and\nindivisible reason (born) of intelligence, and from this Soul proceed\nthe particular immaterial \"reasons,\" in the same manner as on high\n(the individual intelligences proceed from the one and absolute\nIntelligence).\n\n\nWHY SHOULD CREATION BE PREDICATED OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL AND NOT OF THE\nHUMAN?\n\n6. If there be similarity between the universal Soul and the individual\nsouls, how does it happen that the former created the world, while\nthe others did not do so, though each of them also contain all things\nwithin herself, and since we have already shown that the productive\npower can exist simultaneously in several beings? By explaining its\n\"reason\" we can thus examine and discover how the same nature (\"being\")\ncan act or experience, or act and experience, in a different manner in\ndifferent beings.\n\n\nTHE WORLD-SOUL ALONE CREATES BECAUSE SHE REMAINS NEAREST THE\nINTELLIGIBLE WORLD.\n\nHow and why did the universal Soul make the universe, while the\nindividual souls only manage a part thereof? That is not more\nsurprising than to see, among men who possess the same knowledge, some\ncommand a greater number, and others a lesser. This is the case because\nthere is a great difference between souls. Some, instead of separating\nfrom the universal Soul, have remained in the intelligible world,\nand still contain the body (of the universal), while others, when\nthe body (of the universe) already existed, and while the universal\nSoul, their sister, governed it, accepted destinies assigned them by\nfate, as if (the universal Soul) had prepared for them dwellings to\nreceive them.[106] Besides, the universal Soul contemplates universal\nIntelligence, and the individual souls rather contemplate individual\nintelligences. These souls might indeed possibly have also been capable\nof making the universe; but that is no longer possible to them now that\nthe universal Soul has already done it, and has preceded them. Besides,\nthe very same question would have arisen even if an entirely different\nsoul had first made the universe. Perhaps it is better to state that if\nthe universal Soul has created the universe, it is chiefly because she\nis more closely related to intelligible entities, for the souls that\nare nearest thereto are the most powerful. Maintaining themselves in\nthis quiet region, they act with greater facility; for to act without\nsuffering is the sign of a greater power. Thus the power depending on\nthe intelligible world abides within itself, and by abiding within\nitself, produces. The other souls, descending towards the body,\nwithdraw from the intelligible world, and fall into the abyss (of\nmatter). Perhaps also the element of manifoldness within them, finding\nitself drawn towards the lower regions, along with it dragged the\nconceptions of those souls, and made them descend hither. Indeed the\ndistinction of the second or third rank for souls must be understood in\nthis sense that some are nearer, and some further from the intelligible\nworld. Likewise, among us, all souls are not equally disposed in regard\nto this world. Some succeed in uniting with it, others approach it by\ntheir aspirations; others do not quite succeed, because they do not all\nuse the same faculties, and some use the first, others the second, and\nsome the third, though they all equally possess all faculties.\n\n\nDIFFERENCE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL SOULS.\n\n7. That is what seems true to us. As to the Philebus passage (quoted\nin the first section), it might mean that all souls were parts of the\nuniversal Soul. That, however, is not its true meaning, as held by\nsome. It only means what Plato desired to assert in this place, namely,\nthat heaven is animate. Plato proves this by saying that it would be\nabsurd to insist that heaven has no soul, when our body, which is only\na part of the body of the universe, nevertheless has a soul; but how\ncould a part be animate, unless the whole was so also? It is especially\nin the Timaeus[107] that Plato clearly expresses his thought. After\nhaving described the birth of the universal Soul, he shows the other\nsouls born later from the mixture made in the same vase from which\nthe universal Soul was drawn. He asserts that they are similar to the\nuniversal Soul, and that their difference consists in that they occupy\nthe second or third rank. That is further confirmed by this passage of\nthe Phaedrus[108]: \"The universal Soul cares for what is inanimate.\"\nOutside of the Soul, indeed, what power would manage, fashion, ordain\nand produce the body? It would be nonsense to attribute this power\nto one soul, and not to another. (Plato) adds (in substance): \"The\nPerfect Soul, the Soul of the universe, hovering in the ethereal\nregion, acts on the earth without entering into it, being borne above\nhim as in a chariot. The other souls that are perfect share with it\nthe administration of the world.\" When Plato speaks of the soul as\nhaving lost her wings, he is evidently distinguishing individual souls\nfrom the universal Soul. One might also conclude that our souls are\npart of the universal Soul from his statement that the souls follow\nthe circular movement of the universe, that from it they derive their\ncharacteristics, and that they undergo its influence. Indeed, they\nmight very easily undergo the influence exercised by the nature of\nthe special localities, of the waters and the air of the towns they\ninhabit, and the temperament of the bodies to which they are joined.\nWe have indeed acknowledged that, being contained in the universe, we\npossess something of the life-characteristic of the universal Soul, and\nthat we undergo the influence of the circular movement of the heavens.\nBut we have also shown that there is within us another (rational) soul,\nwhich is capable of resistance to these influences, and which manifests\nits different character precisely by the resistance she offers them.\nThe objection that we are begotten within the universe may be answered\nby the fact that the child is likewise begotten within its mother's\nwomb, and that nevertheless the soul that enters into its body is\ndistinct from that of its mother. Such is our solution of the problem.\n\n\nSYMPATHY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND UNIVERSAL SOUL COMES FROM COMMON SOURCE.\n\n8. The sympathy existing between souls forms no objection. For this\nsympathy might be explained by the fact that all souls are derived from\nthe same principle from which the universal Soul also is derived. We\nhave already shown that there is one Soul (the universal) and several\nsouls (human souls); and we have also defined the difference between\nthe parts and the whole. Last, we have also spoken of the difference\nexisting between souls. Let us now return to the latter point.\n\n\nDIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOULS.\n\nThis difference between souls is caused principally by the constitution\nof the bodies they animate; also by the moral habits, the activities,\nthe thoughts and behavior of these souls in earlier existence.\nAccording to Plato[109] the choice of the souls' condition depends on\ntheir anterior existence. On observing the nature of souls in general,\nwe find that Plato recognizes differences between them by saying that\nsome souls occupy the second or third ranks.[110] Now we have said that\nall souls are (potentially) all things,[111] that each is characterized\nby the faculty principally exercised thereby, that is, that some souls\nunite with the intelligible world by actualization, while others do so\nin thought or desire.[112] Souls, thus contemplating different objects,\nare and become all that they contemplate. Fulness and perfection\nalso belong to soul, but in this respect they are not all identical,\nbecause variety is the law that directs their co-ordination. Indeed,\nthe universal[113] reason is on the one hand manifold, and on the other\nvaried, like a being that is animate, and which possesses manifold\nforms.[114] In this case, there is co-ordination; beings are not\nentirely separated from each other, and there is no place for chance\neither in real beings, nor in bodies; consequently the number of beings\nis definite. To be individual, beings must first be stable, then they\nmust remain identical, and last, they must numerically be one in order\nto achieve individuality. Bodies which by nature perpetually ooze away,\nbecause for them form is something incidental, never possess formal\nexistence but by their participation in (and imitation of), genuine\n\"Beings.\" On the contrary, for the latter, that are not composite,\nexistence consists in each of them being numerically single, in\npossessing this unity which dates from the beginning, which does not\nbecome what it was not, and which will never cease being what it is.\nIf indeed they cannot exist without some producing principle, that\nprinciple will not derive them from matter. It will have to add to\nthem something from its own being. But if intelligible entities thus\nhave at times more, and at times less, perfection, they will change;\nwhich would contradict their (nature, or) \"being,\" which is to remain\nidentical. Why indeed should they become such as they are now, and why\nshould they not always have been such as they now are? Further, if\nthey be at times more or less perfect, if they \"become,\" they are not\neternal. But it is granted that the Soul (as an intelligible being) is\neternal.\n\n\nLIKE THE DIVINITY, THE SOUL IS ALWAYS ONE.\n\n(It might still be asked) whether what is stable can be called\ninfinite? That which is stable is potentially infinite, because its\npower is infinite without being also infinitely divided; for the\ndivinity too is infinite.[115] Thus each soul is what the divinity's\nnature is, without receiving from any other either limit or determinate\nquantity. The soul extends as far as she wishes. She is never forced\nto go further, but everywhere she descends towards bodies and\npenetrates into them, according to her nature. Besides, she never\nseparates from herself, though present in finger or in foot. Not\notherwise is it with the universe: wherever the Soul penetrates, she\never remains indivisible, as when she penetrates into the different\nparts of a plant. Then, if you cut a certain part, the principle which\ncommunicates life to it remains present both in the plant and in the\npart detached therefrom. The body of the universe is single, and the\nSoul is everywhere in her unity.\n\n\nSOUL POWERS REMAIN THE SAME THROUGHOUT ALL CHANGES OF BODY.\n\nWhen numberless vermin arise out of the putrefaction of a body, they do\nnot derive their life from the soul of the entire animal; the latter\nhas abandoned the body of the animal, and, being dead, no longer dwells\nin the body. But the matter derived from putrefaction, being well\nsuited for the generation of vermin, each receives a different soul,\nbecause the (universal) Soul is not lacking anywhere. Nevertheless,\nas one part of the body is capable of receiving her, while another is\nnot, the parts that thus become animated do not increase the number of\nsouls; for each of these little beings depends, as far as she remains\none, on the single Soul (that is, on the universal Soul). This state\nof affairs resembles that in us. When some parts of our bodies are cut\noff, and when others grow in their place, our soul abandons the former,\nand unites with the latter, in so far as she remains one. Now the Soul\nof the universe ever remains one; and though amidst things contained\nwithin this universe, some are animate, while others are inanimate, the\nsoul-powers nevertheless remain the same.\n\n\nB. WHY AND HOW DO SOULS DESCEND INTO BODIES?\n\n\nTWO KINDS OF TRANSMIGRATION.\n\n9. Let us now examine how it happens that the soul descends into\nthe body, and in what manner this occurs; for it is sufficiently\nastonishing and remarkable. For a soul, there are two kinds of entrance\ninto a body. The first occurs when the soul, already dwelling in a\nbody, undergoes a transmigration; that is, passes from an aerial or\nigneous body into a terrestrial body. This is not usually called a\ntransmigration, because the condition from which the soul comes is not\nvisible. The other kind occurs when the soul passes from an incorporeal\ncondition into any kind of a body, and thus for the first time enters\ninto relations with a body.[116]\n\n\nSTUDY OF FIRST INCARNATION.\n\nWe must here examine what, in the latter case, is experienced by the\nsoul which, till then pure from all dealings with the body, for the\nfirst time surrounds herself with that kind of a substance. Besides, it\nis not only just but even necessary for us to begin by a consideration\nof (this event in) the universal Soul. To say that the Soul enters\nthe body of the universe and comes to animate it, is no more than a\nstatement made to clarify our thoughts; for the succession in her\nactions thus established is purely verbal. There never was a moment\nwhen the universe was not animated, when its body existed without the\nSoul, or when matter existed without form.[117] But these things can be\nseparated in thought and speech, since as soon as an object is formed,\nit is always possible to analyse it by thought and speech. That is the\ntruth.\n\n\nHOW THE UNIVERSE IS ANIMATED BY THE WORLD SOUL.\n\nIf there were no body, the soul could not have any procession, since\nthe body is the natural locality of her development. As the soul must\nextend, she will beget a receiving locality, and will, consequently,\nproduce the body. The soul's rest is based, and depends for growth on\n(the intellectual category of) rest itself. The soul thus resembles\nan immense light which weakens as it becomes more distant from its\nsource, so that at the extremity of its radiation, it has become no\nmore than an adumbration. However, the soul evidently gave a form to\nthis adumbration from the very beginning of things. It was, indeed,\nby no means suitable that what approached the soul should in no\nway participate in reason[118]; consequently there came to be an\nadumbration of reason in (matter), this adumbration being the soul.\nThe universe thus became a beautiful and varied dwelling, which was\nnot deprived of the presence[119] of the universal Soul by her not\ntotally incorporating within it. She judged that the whole universe was\nworthy of her care, and she thus gave it as much \"being\" and beauty as\nit was able to receive, without herself losing any of it, because she\nmanages the world while herself remaining above it in the intelligible\nsphere. By so animating it, she thus grants it her presence, without\nbecoming its property; she dominates it, and possesses it, without\nbeing, thereby, dominated or possessed. The universe, indeed, is in the\ncontaining Soul, and participates therein entirely. (The universe is in\nthe Soul as is) a net in the sea, on all sides penetrated and enveloped\nby life, without ever being able to appropriate it. So far as it can,\nthis net extends along with the sea, for none of its parts could be\nelsewhere than it is. By nature the universal Soul is immense, because\nher magnitude is not definite; so that by one and the same power she\nembraces the entire body of the world, and is present throughout the\nwhole extension. Without it, the world-Soul would make no effort to\nproceed into extension, for by herself she is all that it is her nature\nto be. The magnitude of the universe therefore is determined by that\nof the location of the Soul; and the limits of its extent are those\nof the space within which it is animated by her. The extension of the\nadumbration of the Soul is therefore determined by that of the \"reason\"\nwhich radiates from this focus of light; and on the other hand, this\n\"reason\" was to produce such an extension as its nature urged it to\nproduce.[120]\n\n\nTHE WORLD-SOUL PROGRESSIVELY INFORMS ALL THINGS.\n\n10. Now let us return to that which has always been what it is. Let\nus, in thought, embrace all beings: air, light, sun, and moon. Let us\nthen consider the sun, the light, and so forth, as being all things,\nwithout ever forgetting that there are things that occupy the first\nrank, others the second, or the third. Let us, at the summit of\nthis series of beings, conceive of the universal Soul as subsisting\neternally. Let us then posit that which holds the first rank after her,\nand thus continue till we arrive at the things that occupy the last\nrank, and which, as it were, are the last glimmerings of the light shed\nby the soul. Let us represent these things as an extension first dark,\nand then later illuminated by the form which comes to impress itself\non an originally dark background. This background is embellished by\nreason in virtue of the entire universal Soul's independent power of\nembellishing matter by means of reasons, just as the \"seminal reasons\"\nthemselves fashion and form animals as microcosms. According to its\nnature, the Soul gives a form to everything she touches. She produces\nwithout casual conception, without the delays of deliberation, or of\nthose of voluntary determination. Otherwise, she would not be acting\naccording to her nature, but according to the precepts of a borrowed\nart. Art, indeed, is posterior to nature. Art imitates by producing\nobscure and feeble imitations of nature's works, toys without value or\nmerit; and besides, art makes use of a great battery of apparatus to\nproduce these images. On the contrary, the universal Soul, dominating\nbodies by virtue of her nature (\"being\") makes them become and be what\nshe desires; for the things themselves that exist since the beginning\ncannot raise resistance to her will. In inferior things, as the result\nof mutual obstruction, matter does not receive the exact form that the\n(\"seminal) reason\" contains in germ. But as the universal Soul produces\nthe universal form, and as all things are therein co-ordinated, the\nwork is beautiful because it is realized without trouble or obstacle.\nIn the universe there are temples for the divinities, houses for men,\nand other objects adapted to the needs of other beings. What indeed\ncould the Soul create if not what she has the power to create? As\nfire warms, as snow cools, the soul acts now within herself, and then\noutside of herself, and on other objects. The action which inanimate\nbeings elicit from themselves slumbers, as it were, within them; and\nthat which they exert on others consists in assimilating to themselves\nthat which is capable of an experience. To render the rest similar to\nitself, is indeed the common characteristic of every being. The soul's\npower of acting on herself and on others is a vigilant faculty. It\ncommunicates life to beings who do not have it in themselves, and the\nlife communicated to them is similar to the life of the soul herself.\nNow as the soul lives in reason, she imparts a reason to the body,\nwhich reason is an image of the one she herself possesses. Indeed, what\nshe communicates to the bodies is an image of life. She also imparts to\nthem the shapes whose reasons she contains. Now as she possesses the\nreasons of all things, even of the divinities, the world contains all\nthings.\n\n\nTHE UNIVERSAL SOUL AS MODEL OF REASON, AS INTERMEDIARY AND INTERPRETER.\n\n11. The ancient sages, who wished to materialize the divinities by\nmaking statues of them, seem to me to have well judged the nature of\nthe universe. They understood that the being of the universal Soul was\neasy to attract anywhere, that her presence can easily be summoned\nin everything suited to receive her action, and thus to participate\nsomewhat in her power. Now anything is suited to undergo the action of\nthe soul when it lends itself like a mirror to the reflection of any\nkind of an image. In the universe nature most artistically forms all\nbeings in the image of the reasons it contains. In each of (nature's)\nworks the (\"seminal) reason\" that is united to matter, being the image\nof the reason superior to the matter (of the idea), reattaches itself\nto divinity (to Intelligence), according to which it was begotten,\nand which the universal Soul contemplated while creating.[121] It was\ntherefore equally impossible that there should be here below anything\nwhich did not participate in the divinity, and which the latter brought\ndown here below; for (the divinity) is Intelligence, the sun that\nshines there on high. Let us consider (the universal Soul) as the\nmodel of reason. Below the Intelligence is the Soul, which depends\non it, which subsists by and with it. The Soul holds to this sun (of\nIntelligence); the Soul is the intermediary by which the beings here\nbelow are reattached to intelligible beings; she is the interpreter of\nthings which descend from the intelligible world into the sense-world,\nand of the things of the sense-world which return into the intelligible\nworld. Indeed, intelligible things are not separated from each other;\nthey are distinguished only by their difference and their constitution.\nEach of them remains within itself, without any relation to locality;\nthey are simultaneously united and separate. The beings that we call\ndivinities deserve to be considered such because they never swerve\nfrom intelligible entities, because they depend on the universal Soul\nconsidered in her principle, at the very moment of the Soul's issuing\nfrom Intelligence. Thus these beings are divinities by virtue of the\nvery principle to which they owe their existence, and because they\ndevote themselves to the contemplation of Intelligence, from which the\nuniversal Soul herself does not distract her gaze.\n\n\nSOULS ARE NOT CUT OFF FROM INTELLIGENCE DURING THEIR DESCENT AND ASCENT.\n\n12. Human souls rush down here below because they have gazed at their\nimages (in matter) as in the mirror of Bacchus. Nevertheless, they are\nnot separated from their principle, Intelligence. Their intelligence\ndoes not descend along with them, so that even if by their feet they\ntouch the earth, their head rises above the sky.[122] They descend\nall the lower as the body, over which their intermediary part is to\nwatch, has more need of care. But their father Jupiter, pitying their\ntroubles, made their bonds mortal. At certain intervals, he grants them\nrest, delivering them from the body, so that they may return to inhabit\nthe region where the universal Soul ever dwells, without inclining\ntowards things here below.[123] Indeed what the universe at present\npossesses suffices it both now and in the future, since its duration\nis regulated by eternal and immutable reasons, and because, when one\nperiod is finished, it again begins to run through another where all\nthe lives are determined in accordance with the ideas.[124] In that\nway all things here below are subjected to intelligible things, and\nsimilarly all is subordinated to a single reason, either in the descent\nor in the ascension of souls, or in their activities in general.\nThis is proved by the agreement between the universal order and the\nmovements of the souls which by descending here below, conform to\nthis order without depending on it; and perfectly harmonize with the\ncircular movement of heaven. Thus the actions, fortunes and destinies\never are prefigured in the figures formed by the stars.[125] That is\nthe symphony whose sound is so melodious that the ancients expressed\nit symbolically by musical harmony.[126] Now this could not be the\ncase unless all the actions and experiences of the universe were (well)\nregulated by reasons which determine its periods, the ranks of souls,\ntheir existences, the careers that they accomplish in the intelligible\nworld, or in heaven, or on the earth. The universal Intelligence\never remains above the heaven, and dwelling there entirely, without\never issuing from itself; it radiates into the sense-world by the\nintermediation of the Soul which, placed beside it, receives the\nimpression of the idea, and transmits it to inferior things, now\nimmutably, and then changeably, but nevertheless in a regulated manner.\n\n\nWHY SOULS TAKE ON DIFFERENT KINDS OF BODIES.\n\nSouls do not always descend equally; they descend sometimes lower,\nsometimes less low, but always in the same kind of beings (among living\nbeings). Each soul enters into the body prepared to receive her, which\ncorresponds to the nature to which the soul has become assimilated by\nits disposition; for, according as the soul has become similar to the\nnature of a man or of a brute, she enters into a corresponding body.\n\n\nHOW SOULS COME TO DESCEND.\n\n13. What is called inevitable necessity and divine justice consists\nin the sway of nature which causes each soul to proceed in an orderly\nmanner into the bodily image which has become the object of her\naffection, and of her predominating disposition. Consequently the\nsoul, by her form, entirely approaches the object towards which her\ninterior disposition bears her. Thus she is led and introduced where\nshe is to go; not that she is forced to descend at any particular\nmoment into any particular body; but, at a fixed moment, she descends\nas it were spontaneously where she ought to enter. Each (soul) has her\nown hour. When this hour arrives, the soul descends as if a herald\nwas calling her, and she penetrates into the body prepared to receive\nher, as if she had been mastered and set in motion by forces and\npowerful attractions exerted by magic.[127] Similarly in an animal,\nnature administers all the organs, solves or begets everything in its\nown time, grows the beard or the horns, gives special inclinations\nand powers to the being, whenever they become necessary. Similarly,\nin plants, (nature) produces flowers or fruits at the proper season.\nThe descent of souls into the bodies is neither voluntary nor forced;\nit is not voluntary, since it is not chosen or consented to by\nsouls. It is not compulsory, in the sense that the latter obey only\na natural impulsion, just as one might be led to marriage, or to the\naccomplishment of various honest actions, rather by instinct than by\nreasoning. Nevertheless, there is always something fatal for each soul.\nOne accomplishes her destiny at some one moment; the other soul at some\nother moment. Likewise, the intelligence that is superior to the world\nalso has something fatal in its existence, since itself has its own\ndestiny, which is to dwell in the intelligible world, and to make its\nlight radiate therefrom. Thus individuals come here below by virtue of\nthe common law to which they are subjected. Each one, indeed, bears\nwithin himself this common law, a law which does not derive its power\nfrom outside, but which depends on the nature of those who are subject\nto it, because it is innate in them. Consequently all voluntarily\ncarry out its decrees at the predestined time, because this law impels\nthem to their goal; and because, deriving its force from those whom it\ncommands, it presses and stimulates them and inspires them with the\ndesire to go whither their interior vocation calls them.\n\n\nBY A PUN ON \"WORLD\" AND \"ADORNMENT,\" PLOTINOS SHOWS MEN ADD TO THE\nBEAUTY OF THE WORLD.\n\n14. That is how this world, which already contains many lights, and\nwhich is illuminated by souls, finds itself still further adorned\nby the various beauties derived from different beings. It receives\nbeauties from the intelligible divinities and from the other\nintelligences which furnish it with souls. This is probably the\nallegorical intent of the following myth.\n\n\nBY A PUN ON \"PROMETHEUS\" AND \"PROVIDENCE,\" PLOTINOS EMPLOYS THE MYTH OF\nPANDORA.\n\n(Following both Hesiod and the Gnostics, Plotinos relates that) a woman\nwas formed by Prometheus, and adorned by the other divinities. This\npiece of clay, after having been kneaded with water, was endowed with\na human voice, and received a form similar to the deities. Then Venus,\nthe Graces and the other deities each gave her a gift. That is why this\nwoman was called Pandora, because (as her name implies, in Greek) she\nhad received gifts, which had been given by all the divinities. All, in\nfact, made some present to this piece of clay already fashioned by some\nkind of providence (\"Prometheia,\" or \"Prometheus\"). When Epimetheus\nrejects the gift of Prometheus, it only indicates that it is better to\nlive in the intelligible world.[128] The creator of Pandora, however,\nis bound because he seems attached to his work. But this bond is\nentirely exterior, and it is broken by Hercules, because the latter\npossesses a liberating power. Whatever other interpretation the myth of\nPandora may receive, it must still signify gifts received by the world,\nand its import must agree with our teaching.\n\n\nWHY MANY SOULS SUCCUMB TO THE LAW OF THE ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE.\n\n15. On descending from the intelligible world, souls first come into\nheaven, and they there take a body by means of which they pass even\ninto terrestrial bodies, according as they more or less advance\n(outside of the intelligible world). There are some who issue from\nheaven into the bodies of an inferior nature; there are some also who\npass from one body into another. The latter no longer have the power to\nreascend into the intelligible world because they have forgotten; they\nare weighted down by the burden they carry along with themselves. Now\nsouls differ either by the bodies to which they are united, or by their\ndifferent destinies, or by their kind of life, or by their primitive\nnature. Thus differing from each other in all these relations, or\nin only some, the souls here below either succumb to fate, or are\nalternately subjected to it, and liberated; or, while supporting what\nis necessary, preserve the liberty of devoting themselves to actions\nthat are characteristic of them, and live according to some other law,\nfollowing the order that rules the whole universe. This order embraces\nall the (\"seminal) reasons,\" and all the causes, the movements of the\nsouls, and the divine laws. It agrees with these laws, it borrows\nfrom them its principles, and relates thereto all things that are its\nconsequences. It preserves in an imperishable condition all the beings\nwhich are able to preserve themselves conformably to the constitution\nof the intelligible world. It leads the other beings whither their\nnature calls them, so that whithersoever they may descend, there is a\ncause which assigns to them some particular position or condition.\n\n\nTHE SIGNIFICANCE OF MISFORTUNES AND PUNISHMENTS.\n\n16. The punishments which justly overtake the evil must therefore be\nderived from that Order which rules all things with propriety. The\nunjust evils, accidents, misery and diseases which seem to overwhelm\nthe good, may all be said to be consequences of anterior faults.\nThese evils are intimately related to the course of events, and are\neven represented therein by their signs, so that they seem to happen\naccording to the Reason (of the universe). We must however acknowledge\nthat they are not produced by natural \"reasons,\" that they are not\nwithin the purview of Providence, and that they are only its accidental\nconsequences. Thus when a house happens to fall, it buries anybody\nbelow it, whoever he may happen to be; or again, whether some regular\nmovement drives on some one thing, or even several things, it breaks\nor crushes anything that happens to lie in its path. These accidents\nwhich seem unjust, are not evils for those who suffer them, if you\nconsider how they take their place within the legitimate order of the\nuniverse; perhaps even they constitute just chastisements and are the\nexpiations of earlier faults. It would be incredible that one series\nof beings in the universe should obey its order, while another series\nshould be subject to chance or caprice. If everything happen through\ncauses and natural consequences, in conformity with a single \"reason,\"\nand to a single order, the smallest things must form part of that\norder, and agree with it. Injustice practiced against somebody else\nis an injustice for him who commits it, and must attract a punishment\nto him; but by the place which it holds in the universal order, it is\nnot an injustice, even for him who suffers it. It had to be thus. If\nthe victim of this injustice was an honest man, for him it can have\nonly a happy ending. This universal order must not be accused of being\nundivine and unjust, but we should insist that distributive justice\nexercises itself with perfect propriety. If certain things seem worthy\nof blame, it is because they are due to secret causes that escape our\nknowledge.\n\n\nFROM THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD, SOULS FIRST GO INTO HEAVEN.\n\n17. From the intelligible world souls first descend into the heaven.\nFor if the heaven is the best part of the sense-world, it must be\nnearest to the limits of the intelligible world. The celestial bodies\nare therefore the first that receive the souls, being most fitted to\nreceive them. The terrestrial body is animated the last, and it is\nsuited to the reception of an inferior soul only, because it is more\ndistant from the incorporeal nature. All souls first illuminate the\nsky, and radiate from it their first and purest rays; the remainder is\nlit up by inferior powers. There are souls which, descending lower,\nilluminate inferior things; but they do not gain anything in getting so\nfar from their origin.\n\n\nTHE DESCENDING GRADUATIONS OF EXISTENCE.\n\nWe must imagine a centre, and around this centre a luminous sphere\nthat radiates from (Intelligence). Then, around this sphere, lies a\nsecond one that also is luminous, but only as a light lit from another\nlight (the universal Soul). Then, beyond and outside of these spheres\nlies a further one, which no more is light, but which is illuminated\nonly by an alien light, for lack of a light peculiar to (this world\nof ours). Outside of those two spheres there is indeed a rhomboid, or\nrather another sphere, that receives its light from the second sphere,\nand which receives it the more intensely, the closer it is thereto.\nThe great light (Intelligence) sheds its light though remaining within\nitself, and the brilliancy that radiates around it (on to the soul)\nis \"reason.\" Other souls radiate also, some by remaining united to\nthe universal Soul, others by descending lower in order better to\nilluminate the bodies to which they devote their care; but these cares\nare troublous. As the pilot who steers his ship over the troubled\nwaves forgets himself in the effort of his work,[129] to the point\nof forgetting that he exposes himself to perish with the ship in the\nshipwreck, likewise souls are dragged down (into the abyss of matter)\nby the attention they devote to the bodies that they govern. Then they\nare chained to their destiny, as if fascinated by a magic attraction,\nbut really retained by the potent bonds of nature. If every body were\nas perfect as the universe, it would completely suffice itself, it\nwould have no danger to fear, and the soul that is present within it,\ninstead of this, could communicate life to it without leaving the\nintelligible world.\n\n\nC. DOES THE SOUL EMPLOY DISCURSIVE REASON WHILE DISCARNATE?\n\nTHE SOUL DOES NOT USE DISCURSIVE REASON EXCEPT WHILE HINDERED BY THE\nOBSTACLES OF THE BODY.\n\n18. Does the soul ratiocinate before entering upon the body, and after\nhaving left it? No: she reasons only while in a body, because she is\nuncertain, embarrassed and weakened. To need to reason in order to\narrive at complete knowledge always betrays weakening of intellect. In\nthe arts reasoning occurs only when the artist hesitates before some\nobstacle. Where there is no difficulty in the matter, art masters it,\nand produces its work instantly.\n\n\nTHE SOUL CAN REASON INTUITIONALLY WITHOUT RATIOCINATION.\n\n(It might be objected) that if the souls on high do not reason,\nthey will no longer be reasonable. They remain reasonable, however,\nbecause they are well able to penetrate into the essence of something,\nwhenever the occasion demands it. Ratiocination should be considered\nas follows. If it consist in a disposition that is always derived\nfrom Intelligence, in an immanent act, a reflection of this power in\nsouls, these must also reason in the intelligible world; but then they\nhave no further need of language. Likewise, when they inhabit heaven,\nneither do they need to take recourse to speech, as do the souls here\nbelow, as a result of their needs and uncertainties. They act in an\norderly manner, and in conformity with nature, without premeditation\nor deliberation. They know each other by a simple intuition, as even\nhere below we know our like without their talking to us, by a mere\nglance. On high every body is pure and transparent. Each person there,\nis, as it were, an eye. Nothing is hidden or simulated. Before you have\nspoken, your thought is already known. It is probable that speech is\nused by the guardians and other living inhabitants of the air, for they\nare living beings.\n\n\nD. HOW CAN THE SOUL SIMULTANEOUSLY BE DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE?\n\nA DECISION WILL DEPEND ON THE MEANING OF THE TERMS.\n\n19. Must we consider that (in the soul), the indivisible and the\ndivisible are identical, as if they were mingled together? Or should\nwe consider the distinction between the indivisible and the divisible\nfrom some other point of view? Should the first be considered as the\nhigher part of the soul, and the latter as the lower, just exactly as\nwe say that one part of the soul is rational, and the other part is\nirrational? Such questions can be answered only by a close scrutiny of\nthe nature of the divisibility and indivisibility of the soul.\n\n\nTHE BODY NEEDS THE SOUL FOR LIFE.\n\nWhen Plato[130] says that the soul is indivisible, he speaks\nabsolutely. When he insists that she is divisible, it is always\nrelatively (to the body). He does indeed say that she becomes divisible\nin the bodies, but not that she has become such. Let us now examine\nhow, by her nature, the body needs the soul to live, and what necessity\nthere is for the soul to be present in the entire body.\n\n\nSENSE, GROWTH AND EMOTION TEND TOWARDS DIVISIBILITY.\n\nBy the mere fact that it feels by means of the entire body, every\nsense-power undergoes division. Since it is present everywhere, it may\nbe said to be divided. But as, on the other hand, it manifests itself\neverywhere as a whole, it cannot really be considered as divided. We\ncannot go further than the statement that it becomes divisible in\nbodies. Some might object that it was divided only in the sense of\ntouch. It is however also divided in the other senses, since it is\nalways the same body that receives it, but only less so. The case is\nthe same with the power of growth and nutrition; and if appetite have\nits seat in the liver, and anger in the heart, these appetites must\nbe subject to the same conditions. Besides, it is possible that the\nbody does not receive those appetites in a mixture, or that it receives\nthem in some other manner, so that they result from some of the\nthings that the body derives from the soul by participations. Reason\nand intelligence, however, are not communicated to the body because\nthey stand in no need of any organs to fulfil their functions. On the\ncontrary, they find in them only an obstacle to their operations.\n\n\nTHE SOUL AS A WHOLE OF TWO DISTINCT DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE PARTS.\n\nThus the indivisible and the divisible are in the soul two distinct\nparts, and not two things mingled together so as to constitute but a\nsingle one. They form a single whole composed of two parts, each of\nwhich is pure and separable from the other by its characteristic power.\nIf then the part which in the body becomes divisible receives from the\nsuperior part the power of being indivisible, this same part might\nsimultaneously be divisible and indivisible, as a mixture of divisible\nnature and of the (indivisible) power received by it from the higher\npart.\n\n\nE. RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY.\n\n\nIF FUNCTIONS ARE NOT LOCALIZED THE SOUL WILL NOT SEEM ENTIRELY WITHIN\nUS.\n\n20. Are the above-mentioned and other parts of the soul localized\nin the body, or are some localized, and others not? This must be\nconsidered, because if none of the parts of the soul are localized, and\nif we assert that they are nowhere either in or out of the body, the\nlatter will remain inanimate, and we will not be able to explain the\nmanner of the operations occurring by help of the organs. If, on the\nother hand, we assign a location in the body to certain parts of the\nsoul, without localizing other parts, the unlocalized parts will seem\nnot to be within us, and consequently not the whole of our soul will\nseem to be in the body.\n\n\nSPACE IS CORPOREAL; THE BODY IS WITHIN THE SOUL.\n\nOf the soul neither a part nor the whole is in the body as a locality.\nThe property of space is to contain some body. Where everything is\ndivided it is impossible for the whole to be in every part. But the\nsoul is not body, and the soul contains the body rather than the body\ncontains the soul.\n\n\nNOR IS THE BODY A VASE, FOR PROXIMATE TRANSMISSION OF THE SOUL.\n\nNor is the soul in the body as in a vase. In this case, the body would\nbe inanimate, and would contain the soul as in a vase or locality. If\nthe soul be considered as concentrated in herself and as communicating\nto the body something of herself by \"close transmission\" (as the Stoics\nwould say), that which the soul will transmit to this vase would for\nher become something lost.\n\n\nMANY METAPHYSICAL OBJECTIONS TO THE CONCEPTION OF SOUL AS LOCALIZED.\n\nConsidering location in the strict sense of the word, it is\nincorporeal, and consequently cannot be a body. It would no longer need\nthe soul. Besides (if the soul be in the body as if in a locality) the\nbody will approach the soul by its surface, and not by itself. Many\nother objections can be raised to the theory that localizes the soul in\nthe body. Under this hypothesis, indeed, place would have to be carried\naround along with the thing in which it will locate. But that which\nwould carry place around with it (would be a monstrosity). Moreover,\nif the body be defined as being an interval, it will be still less true\nto say that the soul is in the body as a locality; for an interval\nshould be empty; but the body is not empty, being within emptiness.\n\n\nNOR IS THE SOUL IN THE BODY AS A QUALITY IN A SUBSTRATE.\n\nNor will the soul be in the body as (a quality) is in a substrate. The\nattribute of being a substrate is a mere affection, like a color, or a\nfigure; but the soul is separable from the body.\n\n\nNOR IS THE SOUL IN THE BODY AS A PART IN THE WHOLE.\n\nNor will the soul be in the body as a part in the whole; for the soul\nis not a part of the body. Nor is it a part of the living whole; for\nthis would still demand explanation of the manner of this being within\nit. She will not be within it as wine in a jar, or as one jar in\nanother, nor as one thing is within itself (as the Manicheans thought).\n\n\nNOR IS THE SOUL IN THE BODY AS A WHOLE IN A PART.\n\nNor will the soul be in the body as a whole is in its parts; for it\nwould be ridiculous to call the soul a whole, and the body the parts of\nthat whole.\n\n\nNOR WILL THE SOUL BE IN THE BODY AS FORM IN MATTER.\n\nNor will the soul be in the body as form is in matter; for the form\nthat is engaged in matter is not separable. Moreover, that form\ndescends upon matter implies the preliminary existence of matter; but\nit is the soul that produces form in matter; and therefore the soul\nmust be distinct from form. Though the soul be not form begotten in\nmatter, the soul might be a separable form; but this theory would still\nhave to explain how this form inheres in the body, since the soul is\nseparable from the body.\n\n\nTHE SOUL IS SAID TO BE IN THE BODY BECAUSE THE BODY ALONE IS VISIBLE.\n\nAll men say that the soul is in the body, however, because the soul is\nnot visible, while the body is. Observing the body, and judging that it\nis animated because it moves and feels, we say that it has a soul, and\nwe are thereby led to suppose that the soul is in the body. But if we\ncould see and feel the soul, and if we could realize that she surrounds\nthe whole body by the life she possesses, and that she extends around\nit equally on all sides till the extremities, we would say that the\nsoul is in no way in the body, but that on the contrary the accessory\nis within its principle, the contained within the container, what flows\nwithin the immovable.\n\n\nTHIS LEAVES THE QUESTION OF THE MANNER OF THE SOUL'S PRESENCE.\n\n21. How would we answer a person who, without himself making any\nstatements in regard to the matter, should ask us how the soul is\npresent to the body; whether the whole soul is present to the body in\nthe same manner, or whether one of her parts is present in one way, and\nanother in some other way?\n\nTHE SOUL IN A BODY AS A PILOT IN A SHIP.\n\nSince none of the comparisons that we have formerly examined seems\nto express the relation of the soul to the body, properly we might\nsay that the soul is in the body as the pilot is in the ship.[131]\nThis illustration is satisfactory in that it emphasizes the soul's\nbeing separable from the body; but it does not properly indicate the\npresence of the soul in the body. If the soul be present in the body\nas a passenger in a ship, it would be there only by accident, and the\nillustration is not yet satisfactory if changed to the pilot's presence\nin the ship he is steering; for the pilot is not present to the whole\nof the ship as the whole soul is in the body.[132] One might illustrate\nthe soul's presence in the body as an art inheres in its instruments;\nas, for instance, in the helm, which might be supposed to be alive,\ncontaining the power of steering the ship skilfully. This is still\nunsatisfactory, because such an art comes from without. The soul might\nindeed be compared to a pilot who should be incarnated in his helm; and\nthe soul might be in the body as in some natural instrument,[133] so\nthat the soul would move it at pleasure. This however might still fail\nto explain the manner in which the soul would exist in her instrument.\nTherefore, though the latter illustration is an improvement on the\nformer, we must still seek one which closer approaches reality.\n\n\nTHE SOUL PRESENT IN THE BODY AS LIGHT IN AIR.\n\n22. This is the better illustration: the soul is present in the body\nas light is present in air. Light is indeed present in air without\nbeing present to it; that is, light is present to the whole air without\nmingling with it, and light remains within itself while the air\nescapes. When the air, within which light radiates, withdraws from the\nlight, the air keeps none of the light; but it is illuminated so long\nas the air remains subject to the action of light. Air, therefore, is\nin light, rather than light is in air. While explaining the generation\nof the universe,[134] therefore, Plato properly locates the body\n(of the world) in the soul, and not the soul in the body.[135] He\nalso states that there is a part of the soul that contains the body,\nand another in which there is no body, in this sense, that there are\nsoul-powers of which the body has no need. The case is similar with the\nother souls. Their powers in general are not present to bodies, and\nonly those powers of which the body stands in need are present to it.\nThese however are present to the body without being built up either on\nthe members, or upon the body as a whole. For sensation, the faculty of\nfeeling is entirely present to the whole organ which is feeling (as,\nfor instance, to the whole brain); likewise for the other functions,\nthe different faculties are each present to a different organ. I shall\nexplain myself.\n\n\nWHILE THE SOUL-POWER IS EVERYWHERE, THE PRINCIPLE OF ACTION IS\nLOCALIZED IN THE SPECIAL ORGAN.\n\n23. Since, for the body, being animated amounts to being penetrated by\nthe light shed by the soul, every part of the body participates therein\nin some particular manner. Each organ, according to its fitness,\nreceives the power suitable to the function it fulfils. Thus we may say\nthat the power of sight resides in the eyes; that of hearing in the\nears; that of taste in the tongue; that of smell in the nose; that of\ntouch in the whole body, since, for the latter sense, the whole body\nis the organ of the soul. Now as the instruments for touch are the\nfirst nerves, which also possess the power of moving the organism, as\nthey are the seat of this power; as, besides, the nerves originate in\nthe brain, in the brain has been localized the principle of sensation\nand appetite--in short, the principle of the whole organism; no doubt\nbecause it was thought that the power which uses the organs is present\nin that part of the body where are the origins of these organs. It\nwould have been better to say that it is the action of the power that\nmakes use of the organs that originates in the brain; for that part of\nthe body from which starts the movement impressed on the organ had to\nserve somewhat as a foundation for the power of the workman, a power\nwhose nature is in harmony with that of the organ (it sets in motion);\nor rather, this part of the body does not serve as foundation for this\npower, for this power is everywhere, but the principle of the action is\nin that part of the body in which is the very principle of that organ.\n\n\nREASON IS IN THE HEAD, BUT NOT IN THE BRAIN, WHICH IS THE SEAT OF THE\nINTERMEDIARY, THE POWER OF SENSATION.\n\nOn the other hand, as the power of sensation and the power of appetite,\nwhich belong to the sensible and imaginative soul, are beneath\nreason, because they are related to what is inferior, while reason is\nabove,[136] the result was that the ancients localized reason in the\nhighest part of the animal, in the head; not that reason is in the\nbrain,[137] but because reason is seated in the sense-power, by the\nintermediation of which, only, reason may be said to reside in the\nbrain. The sense-power, surely, had to be attributed to the body, and,\nwithin the body, to the organs most capable of lending themselves to\nits action. Reason, which has no (direct) dealing with the body, had\nhowever to be in relation with the sense-power, which is a form of\nthe soul, and can participate in reason. The sense-power, does, to\na certain extent, judge; and the power of imagination has something\nintellectual. Last, the appetite, and the desire somehow connect with\nimagination and reason. Reason, therefore, is in the head, not as in\na locality, but because it is in relation with the sense-power which\nresides in that organ, as has been shown above.\n\n\nGROWTH IS LOCALIZED IN THE LIVER, ANGER IN THE HEART.\n\nAs the power of growth, nutrition, and generation operates all through\nthe entire body; and as it is by the blood that the body is nourished;\nas the blood is contained in the veins; and as the veins, as well as\nthe blood, originate in the liver; this organ has been assigned as the\nseat of that part of the soul called appetite; for appetite is involved\nin the power of begetting, of feeding and increasing the body. Further\nas the blood (purified by respiration) is subtle, light, mobile and\npure, the heart becomes a suitable instrument for the power of anger,\nfor the blood that possesses these qualities starts from the heart.\nTherefore, with good reason, the heart is assigned as the seat of the\nturbulent convulsions of the power of anger.\n\n\nF. WHERE GOES THE SOUL AFTER DEATH?\n\nTHE SOUL AFTER DEATH GOES TO THE PLACE SUITED TO IT BY RETRIBUTION.\n\n24. Whither will the soul pass when she shall have left the body?\nShe will not go where there is nothing suitable to receive her. She\ncould not pass into what is not naturally disposed to receive her,\nunless there be something that would attract a soul that had lost her\nprudence. In this case, the soul remains in whatever is capable of\nreceiving her, and follows it whither that (receptive matter) can exist\nand beget. Now as there are different places, it is necessary that\nthe difference (of the dwellings in which the souls come to dwell)\nshould be derived from the disposition of each soul, and of justice\nwhich reigns above beings. No one indeed could escape the punishment\nwhich unjust actions deserve. The divine law[138] is inevitable,\nand possesses the power of carrying out the judgments (according to\nits decrees). The man who is destined to undergo a punishment is,\nin spite of himself, dragged towards that punishment, and is driven\naround[139] by a movement that never stops. Then, as if wearied of\nstruggling against things to which he desired to offer resistance, he\nbetakes himself to the place that is suitable to him, and thus by a\nvoluntary movement undergoes involuntary suffering. The law prescribes\nthe greatness and duration of the punishment. Later, as a result of\nthe harmony that directs everything in the universe, the end of the\npunishment endured by the soul coincides with the soul's receiving\nstrength to leave those places.\n\n\nPURE INCORPOREAL SOULS DWELL WITHIN INTELLIGENCE IN DIVINITY.\n\nThe souls that have a body thereby feel the corporeal punishments they\nare undergoing. Pure souls, however, that do not carry along with them\nanything corporeal, necessarily enjoy the privilege of abiding in the\nincorporeal. Being free from having to dwell in anything corporeal as\nthey have no bodies, they reside where is being and essence, and the\ndivine; that is, in the divinity. There, in the divinity, with the\nintelligible beings, dwells the pure Soul. If you wish to locate the\nSoul still more exactly, go to where are the intelligible entities; and\nif you are looking for them, do not look for them with the eyes, as if\nthey were (physical) bodies.\n\n\nG. WHAT ARE THE CONDITIONS OF THE OPERATION OF MEMORY AND IMAGINATION?\n\nCOSMIC QUESTIONS ABOUT MEMORY DEPEND ON EXACT DEFINITION OF WHAT MEMORY\nIS.\n\n25. Memory raises the following questions. Does memory generally remain\nwith the bodies that have issued from here below? Does it subsist only\nin some of them? In this case is memory general or special, durable or\ntransitory? These questions cannot be answered until we define that\ninterior principle in us to which memory belongs. That is, we shall\nhave to determine, not what is memory, but in what kind of beings it\nmust exist by virtue of its nature, for elsewhere we have often defined\nand treated of memory itself. We must therefore exactly define that\nprinciple within us to which memory is natural.[140]\n\n\nMEMORY INAPPLICABLE EXCEPT TO BEINGS SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS OF TIME.\n\nAs memory presupposes a knowledge or casual experience, memory\ncannot be attributed to beings that are impassible, and outside of\nthe limitations of time. Memory is therefore inapplicable to the\nDivinity, to Essence, and to Intelligence, all of whom exist outside\nof time, as eternal and immutable, without a conception of priority\nor subsequentness, who ever abide in the same condition, without\never experiencing any change. How could that which is identical and\nimmutable make use of memory, since it could neither acquire nor keep\na disposition differing from the preceding one, nor have successive\nthoughts of which the one would be present, while the other had passed\ninto the condition of being remembered?\n\nTHERE IS A TIMELESS MEMORY CONSISTING OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.\n\nIt (may be objected) that nothing hinders Intelligence from knowing\nthe changes of other beings, such as, for instance, the periodical\nrevolutions of the world, without itself undergoing any change. But\nthen it would have to follow the changes of the moving object, as\nit would think first of one thing, and then of another. Besides,\nthought is something else than memory, and we must not apply to\nself-consciousness the name of memory. Indeed, intelligence does not\nbusy itself with retaining its thoughts, and with hindering them\nfrom escaping; otherwise it might also fear lest it lose its own\nnature (\"Being\"). For the soul herself, remembering is not the same\nas recalling innate notions. When the soul has descended here below,\nshe may possess these notions without thinking of them, especially if\nit be only recently that she entered into the body.[141] The ancient\nphilosophers seem to have applied the terms memory and reminiscence\nto the actualization by which the soul thinks of the entities she\npossesses; that (however) is a quite special kind of memory, entirely\nindependent of time.[142]\n\n\nDEFINITION OF MEMORY DEPENDS ON WHETHER IT BELONGS TO THE SOUL OR\nORGANISM.\n\nBut perhaps our solution seems superficial, and appears to rest on an\ninsufficient analysis. It might indeed be asked whether memory and\nreminiscence, instead of belonging to the rational soul, might not\ncharacterize the lower soul, or the composite of soul and body that\nwe call the organism? If indeed they belong to the lower soul, from\nwhere does the latter derive them, and how does she possess them?\nThe same question may further be asked in the case of the organism.\nTo answer all this, we shall, as said above, have to study our own\ninterior principle to which memory belongs. If it be the soul that\npossesses memory, we shall have to ask what faculty or part thereof\nis constituted by memory. If, as has been urged by some, it be the\norganism to which memory belongs, and considering the organism as the\nsentient principle, how could this faculty operate within it? Besides,\nwhat is it that we should call the organism? Further, is it the same\npower that perceives sense-objects, and intelligible entities, or are\nthere two distinct powers?\n\nTHE PSYCHOLOGY OF SENSATION.\n\n26. If the two elements which compose the animal share in the act of\nsensation, the sensation is common to the soul and the body, such as\nthe acts of piercing or weaving.[143] Thus, in sensation, the soul\nplays the part of the workman, and the body that of his tool; the body\nundergoes the experience, and serves as messenger to the soul; the soul\nperceives the impression produced in the body, or by the body; or she\nforms a judgment about the experience she has undergone. Consequently\nsensation is an operation common to the soul and body.\n\n\nIN ANY CASE MEMORY IS PECULIAR TO THE SOUL AND BODY.\n\nThis could not be the state of affairs with memory, by which the soul,\nhaving already through sensation perceived the impression produced\nin the body, preserves it, or dismisses it. It might be claimed that\nmemory also is common to the soul and body, because its efficiency\ndepends on the adjustments of the bodies. No doubt the body can hinder\nor promote the exercise of memory, without this faculty ceasing to be\npeculiar to the soul. How shall we try to prove that the memory of\nknowledge acquired by study, belongs to the compound, and not to the\nsoul alone? If the organism be the composite of soul and body, in the\nsense that it is some third object begotten by their union, it will be\nabsurd to say that it is neither soul nor body. Indeed, it could not be\nanything different from the soul and body, neither if the soul and body\nwere transformed into the composite of which they are the elements,\nnor if they formed a mixture, so that the soul would be no more than\npotentially in the organism. Even in this case, it is still the soul,\nand the soul alone, that would remember. Thus in a mixture of honey and\nwine, it is the honey alone that should be credited with any sweetness\nthat may be tasted.\n\n\nTHAT THE SOUL IS INCARNATE IS NOT THE CAUSE OF HER POSSESSING MEMORY.\n\nIt may again be objected that it is indeed the soul that remembers; but\nonly because she is resident in the body, and is not pure; she must be\naffected in some particular manner to be able to impress the body with\nthe forms of sense-objects; her seat must be in the body to receive\nthese forms, and to preserve them. But to begin with, these forms\ncould not have any extension; then they could not be either (Stoic)\nseal-imprints, or impressions; for in the soul there is no impulsion,\nnor any imprint similar to that of a seal on wax, and the operation\nitself by which it perceives sense-objects is a kind of thought\n(or intellection). Indeed, it would be impossible to speak of an\nimpression in the act of thought. Thought has no need of the body or a\ncorporeal quality. It is besides necessary for the soul to remember her\nmovements, as for instance, her desires which have not been satisfied,\nand whose object the body has not attained; for what could the body\ntell us of an object which the body has not yet reached?[144] (Speaking\nof thoughts), how could the soul, conjointly with the body, remember\nthings which the body, by its very nature, could absolutely not know?\n\nMEMORY BELONGS TO THE SOUL ALONE.\n\nDoubtless we will have to acknowledge that there are affections which\npass from the body into the soul; but there are also affections which\nbelong exclusively to the soul, because the soul is a real being, with\ncharacteristic nature and activities. In this case, the soul must have\ndesires, and recall them, remembering that they have, or have not\nbeen satisfied; because, by her nature, she does not form part of the\nthings which are (as Heraclitus said) in a perpetual flow. Otherwise,\nwe could not attribute to the soul coenesthesia (or, common feeling),\nconscience, reflection, or the intuition of herself. If she did not\npossess them by her nature, she would not acquire them by union with\nthe body. Doubtless there are activities which the soul cannot carry\nout without the assistance of the organs; but she herself possesses the\nfaculties (or \"powers\") from which these activities are outgrowths.\nBesides, she, by herself, possesses other faculties, whose operations\nare derived from her alone. Among these is memory, whose exercise\nis only hindered by the body. Indeed, when the soul unites with the\nbody, she forgets; when she separates from the body, and purifies\nherself, she often recovers memory. Since the soul possesses memory\nwhen she is alone, the body, with its changeable nature, that is ever\nsubject to a perpetual flow, is a cause of forgetfulness, and not of\nmemory; the body therefore is, for the soul, the stream of Lethe (or\nforgetfulness). To the soul alone, therefore, belongs memory.\n\n\nMEMORY BELONGS BOTH TO THE DIVINE SOUL, AND TO THAT DERIVED FROM THE\nWORLD-SOUL.\n\n27. To which soul, however, does memory belong? To the soul whose\nnature is more divine, and which constitutes us more essentially, or\nto the soul that we receive from the universal Soul (the rational\nand irrational souls)? Memory belongs to both; but in one case it is\ngeneral, and in the other particular. When both souls are united, they\ntogether possess both kinds of memory; if they both remain separate,\neach remembers longer what concerns herself, and remembers less long\nwhat concerns the other. That is the reason people talk of the image\nof Hercules being in the hells.[145] Now this image remembers all the\ndeeds committed in this life; for this life particularly falls to her\nlot. The other souls which (by uniting within themselves the rational\npart to the irrational) together possess both kinds of memory. They yet\ncannot remember anything but the things that concern this life, and\nwhich they have known here below, or even the actions which have some\nrelation with justice.\n\n\nWHAT THE RATIONAL SOUL, IF SEPARATED, WOULD REMEMBER OF LIFE.\n\nWe must still clear up what would be said by Hercules (that is, the\nman himself), alone, and separated from his image. What then would\nthe rational soul, if separated and isolated, say? The soul which has\nbeen attracted by the body knows everything that the man (speaking\nstrictly), has done or experienced here below. In course of time, at\ndeath, the memories of earlier existences are reproduced; but the soul,\nout of scorn, allows some to escape her. Having indeed purified herself\nfrom the body, she will remember the things that were not present to\nher during this life.[146] If, after having entered into another body,\nshe happen to consider the past, she will speak of this life which\nwill become foreign to her, of what she has recently abandoned, and\nof many other earlier facts. The circumstances which happen during a\nlong period will always remain buried in oblivion. But we have not yet\ndiscovered what the soul, when isolated from the body will remember. To\nsolve this question, we shall be forced to decide to which power of the\nsoul memory belongs.\n\n\nMEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO APPETITE, BECAUSE IT MAY BE REDUCED TO\nSENSATION.\n\n28. Does memory belong to the powers by which we feel and know? Is\nit by appetite that we remember the things that excite our desires,\nand by anger that we remember the things that irritate us? Some will\nthink so. It is indeed the same faculty which feels pleasure, and\nretains remembrance thereof. Thus when, for instance, appetite meets\nan object which has already made it experience pleasure, it remembers\nthis pleasure on seeing this object. Why indeed should appetite not\nbe similarly moved by some other object? Why is it not moved in some\nmanner by the same object? Why should we not thus attribute to it the\nsensation of things of this kind? Further, why should appetite itself\nnot be reduced to the power of sensation, and not do likewise for\neverything, naming each thing, by what predominates therein?\n\nWHAT APPETITE KEEPS IS AN AFFECTION, BUT NOT A MEMORY.\n\nMust we attribute sensation to each power, but in a different manner?\nIn this case, for instance, it will be sight, and not appetite, which\nwill perceive sense-objects; but appetite will be later wakened by\nsensation which will be \"relayed,\" (as the Stoics would say); and\nthough it does not judge of sensation, it will unconsciously feel the\ncharacteristic affection. The same state of affairs will obtain with\nanger. It will be sight which will show us an injustice, but it will\nbe anger which will resent it. Just so, when a shepherd notices a wolf\nnear his flock, the dog, though he have not yet observed anything, will\nbe excited by the smell or noise of the wolf. It certainly is appetite\nwhich experiences pleasure, and which keeps a trace of it; but this\ntrace constitutes an affection or disposition, and not a memory. It\nis another power which observes the enjoyment of pleasure, and which\nremembers what occurred. This is proved by the fact that memory is\noften ignorant of the things in which appetite has participated, though\nappetite still preserve traces thereof.\n\n\nMEMORY DOES NOT BELONG TO THE FACULTY OF SENSATION.\n\n29. Can memory be referred to sensibility? Is the faculty that feels\nalso the one that remembers? But if the image of the soul (the\nirrational soul) possess the memory, as we said above,[147] there\nwould be in us two faculties that will feel. Further, if sensibility\nbe capable of grasping notions, it will also have to perceive the\nconceptions of discursive reason, or it will be another faculty that\nwill perceive both.\n\n\nMEMORY DOES NOT BELONG EXCLUSIVELY TO THE POWER OF PERCEPTION.\n\nIs the power of perception common to the reasonable soul and to the\nirrational soul, and will we grant that it possesses the memory of\nsense-objects and of intelligible things? To recognize that it is one\nand the same power which equally perceives both kinds of things, is\nalready to take one step towards the solution of the problem. But if we\ndivide this power into two, there will nevertheless still be two kinds\nof memory; further, if we allow two kinds of memory to each of the two\nsouls (the rational and the irrational), there will be four kinds of\nmemory.\n\n\nMEMORY IS NOT IDENTICAL WITH FEELING OR REASONING.\n\nAre we compelled to remember sensations by sensibility, whether it be\nthe same power which feels sensation, and which remembers sensation,\nor is it also discursive reason which conceives and remembers\nconceptions. But the men who reason the best are not those who also\nremember the best; and those who have equally delicate senses, do not\nall, on that account, have an equally good memory. On the contrary,\nsome have delicate senses, while others have a good memory, without\nhowever being capable of perceiving equally well. On the other hand, if\nfeeling and remembering be mutually independent, there will be (outside\nof sensibility) another power which will remember things formerly\nperceived by sensation, and this power will have to feel what it is to\nremember.[148]\n\n\nMEMORY BELONGS TO IMAGINATION.\n\n(To solve all these difficulties) it may be stated that nothing\nhinders the admission that the actualization of the sensation produces\nin memory an image, and that the imagination, which differs (from\nsensation), possesses the power of preserving and recalling these\nimages. It is indeed imagination in which sensation culminates; and\nwhen sensation ceases, imagination preserves its representation.\nIf then this power preserve the image of the absent object, it\nconstitutes memory.[149] According as the image remains for a longer\nor shorter time, memory is or is not faithful; and our memories\nlast, or are effaced. Memory of sense-objects therefore belongs to\nthe imagination. If this faculty of memory be possessed by different\npersons in unequal degrees, this difference depends either on the\ndifference of forces, or on practice (or exercise), or on the absence\nor presence of certain bodily dispositions which may or may not\ninfluence memory, or disturb it.[150] But elsewhere we shall study the\nquestion further.\n\n\nINTELLECTUAL CONCEPTIONS ARE NOT ENTIRELY PRESERVED BY IMAGINATION.\n\n30. What about intellectual conceptions? Are they also preserved by\nimagination? If imagination accompany every thought, and if later it,\nas it were, preserves its image, we should thus have the memory of the\nknown object; otherwise some other solution will have to be sought.\nPerhaps reason, whose actualization always accompanies thought, has the\nfunction of receiving it and transmitting it to imagination. Indeed,\nthought is indivisible, and so long as it is not evoked from the\ndepths of intelligence, it remains as it were hidden within it. Reason\ndevelops it, and making it pass from the state of thought to that of\nimage, spreads it out as it were in a mirror, for our imagination.[151]\nThat is why we grasp (the thought) only when the soul, which always\ndesires rational thought, has achieved a thought. There is a difference\nbetween thought and the perception of thought. We are always thinking,\nbut we do not always perceive our thought. That comes from the fact\nthat the principle that perceives the thoughts also perceives the\nsensations, and occupies itself with both in turn.\n\n\nTHE TWO KINDS OF MEMORY IMPLY TWO KINDS OF IMAGINATION.\n\n31. If theory belong to imagination, and if both the rational and\nirrational souls possess memory, we will have two kinds of imagination\n(intellectual and sensual); and if both souls are separate, each of\nthem will possess one kind of imagination. The theory of two kinds\nof imagination within us in the same principle would not account for\nthere being two kinds of imagination; and it would leave unsolved\nthe question to which of them memory belongs. If memory belong\nto both kinds of imagination, there will always be two kinds of\nimagination--for it cannot be said that the memory of intelligible\nthings belongs to the one, and that of sense-things to the other;\notherwise we would have two animate beings with nothing in common. If\nthen memory equally belong to both imaginations, what difference is\nthere between them? Besides, why do we not notice this difference? Here\nis the cause.\n\n\nOF THE TWO IMAGINATIONS ONE ALWAYS PREDOMINATES OR OVERSHADOWS THE\nOTHER.\n\nWhen both kinds of imagination harmonize, they co-operate (in the\nproduction of a single act). The most powerful dominates, and only a\nsingle image is produced within us. The weaker follows the stronger,\nas the feeble reflection of a powerful light. On the contrary, when\nboth kinds of imagination disagree and struggle, then only one of them\nmanifests, and the other is entirely ignored, just as we always ignore\nthat we have two souls[152]; for both souls are melted into a single\none, and the one serves as vehicle for the other. The one sees all, but\npreserves only certain memories when she leaves the body, and leaves in\noblivion greater part of the things that relate to the other. Likewise,\nafter we have established relations with friends of an inferior order,\nwe may acquire more distinguished friendships, and we remember the\nformer but very little, though we remember the latter very distinctly.\n\n\nPARTITION OF THE FUND OF MEMORY BETWEEN THE TWO SOULS.\n\nWhat about (the memory) of friends, of parents, of a wife, of the\nfatherland, and of all that a virtuous man may properly remember?\nIn the image of the soul (the irrational soul) these memories will\nbe accompanied by a passive affection; but in the man (the rational\nsoul) they will not be so accompanied. The affections exist since the\nbeginning in the inferior soul; in the superior soul, as a result of\nher dealings with the other, there are also some affections, but only\nproper affections. The inferior soul may well seek to remember the\nactions of the superior soul, especially when she herself has been\nproperly cultivated; for she can become better from her very principle\nup, and through the education she receives from the other. The higher\nsoul must willingly forget what comes to her from the inferior\nsoul. When she is good, she can, besides, by her power contain the\nsubordinate soul. The more she desires to approach the intelligible\nworld, the more she must forget the things from here below, unless the\nwhole life she has led here below be such that she has entrusted to her\nmemory none but praiseworthy things. Even in our own world, indeed,\nit is a fine thing to release oneself from human preoccupations. It\nwould therefore be still finer to forget them all. In this sense we\nmight well say that the virtuous soul should be forgetful. She thus\nescapes manifoldness, reduces manifoldness to unity, and abandons the\nindeterminate. She therefore ceases to live with manifoldness, lightens\nher burdens, and lives for herself. Indeed, while remaining here below,\nshe desires to live in the intelligible world, and neglects all that is\nforeign to her nature. She therefore retains but few earthly things\nwhen she has arrived to the intelligible world; she has more of them\nwhen she inhabits the heavens. Hercules (in heaven) may well vaunt his\nvalor; but even this valor seems to him trifling when he has arrived at\na region still holier than heaven, when he dwells in the intelligible\nworld, when he has risen over Hercules himself by the force manifested\nin those struggles which are characteristic of veritable sages.\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.\n\nQuestions About the Soul.\n\n(Second Part.)\n\n\nSPEECH OF SOUL IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.\n\n1. When the soul will have risen to the intelligible world, what will\nshe say, and what will she remember? She will contemplate the beings\nto which she will be united and she will apply her whole attention\nthereto; otherwise, she would not be in the intelligible world.\n\n\nMEMORY OF SOUL IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.\n\nWill she have no memory of things here below? Will she not, for\ninstance, remember that she devoted herself to philosophy; and that,\nduring her residence on the earth, she contemplated the intelligible\nworld? No: for an intelligence entirely devoted to the object of its\nthought, cannot simultaneously contemplate the intelligible and think\nsomething else. The act of thought does not imply the memory of having\nthought.\n\n\nIN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD ALL THINGS ARE SIMULTANEOUS; HENCE NOT\nREMEMBERED.\n\nBut this memory is posterior to thought! In this case, the mind in\nwhich it occurs has changed condition. It is therefore impossible\nthat he who is entirely devoted to the pure contemplation of the\nintelligible should simultaneously remember the things that formerly\nhappened to him here below. If, as it seems, thought is outside of\ntime, because all the intelligible essences, being eternal, have no\nrelation with time, it is evidently impossible that the intelligence\nwhich has raised itself to the intelligible world should have any\nmemory of the things here below, or even have absolutely any memory\nwhatever; for each (of the essences of the intelligible world) are\nalways present to the intelligence which is not obliged to go through\nthem successively, passing from one to the other.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE UNITES AS IT RISES TO THE INTELLIGIBLE.\n\nWill not the intelligence divide itself in descending (from the genera)\nto the species (or forms)? No: for she reascends to the universal and\nthe superior Principle.\n\n\nNOT EVEN THE ASCENDED SOUL NEED BE DIVIDED.\n\nGranting then that there is no division in the intelligence which\npossesses everything simultaneously; will there not at least be\ndivision in the soul which has risen to the intelligible world? Nothing\nhowever forbids that the totality of the united intelligibles be\ngrasped by an intuition equally unitary and total.\n\n\nTHE UNITY OF APPERCEPTION IS MANIFOLD.\n\nIs this intuition similar to the intuition of an object grasped in its\nentirety by a single glance, or does it contain all the thoughts of\nthe intelligibles contemplated simultaneously? Since the intelligibles\noffer a varied spectacle, the thought which grasps them must evidently\nbe equally multiple and varied, comprehending several thoughts, like\nthe perception of a single sense-object, as for instance that of a face\ncomprehends several perceptions because the eye, on perceiving the\nface, simultaneously sees the nose and the other features.\n\n\nIN THE INTELLIGIBLE ANTERIORITY REFERS TO ORDER, NOT TO TIME.\n\nIt may be objected that it may happen that the soul will divide and\ndevelop something which was unitary. This thing must then already\nhave been divided in intelligence, but such a division is more like\nan impression. As anteriority or posteriority in ideas does not\nrefer to time, so also will the mental conception of anteriority and\nposteriority not be subject to temporal conditions, but refer to order\n(which presides over intelligible things). For instance, on considering\na tree's order that extends from the roots to the tree-top, priority\nand posteriority exists only under the relation of order, inasmuch as\nthe whole plant is perceived at one single glance.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE IS NOT A UNITY; BUT ITS MANIFOLD IS PRODUCED BY A UNITY.\n\nHow can things be prior or posterior, if the soul that contemplates the\nOne embrace all things? The potentiality which is One is one in such a\nmanner that it is multiple when it is contemplated by another principle\n(Intelligence), because then it is not simultaneously all things in one\nsingle thought. Indeed, the actualizations (of Intelligence) are not\na unity; but they are all produced by an ever permanent potentiality;\nthey therefore become multiple in the other principles (the\nintelligibles); for Intelligence, not being unity itself, can receive\nwithin its breast the nature of the multiple which did not formerly\nexist (in the One).\n\n\nTHE SOUL DOES NOT EVEN REMEMBER HERSELF.\n\n2. Granted. But does the soul remember herself? Probably not. He\nwho contemplates the intelligible world does not remember who he\nis; that, for instance, he is Socrates, that he is a soul or an\nintelligence. How indeed would he remember it? Entirely devoted to the\ncontemplation of the intelligible world, he does not by thought reflect\nback upon himself; he possesses himself, but he applies himself to\nthe intelligible, and becomes the intelligible, in respect to which\nhe plays the part of matter. He assumes the form of the object he is\ncontemplating, and he then is himself only potentially. Actually, he is\nhimself only when he thinks the intelligible. When he is himself only,\nhe is empty of all things, because he does not think the intelligible;\nbut if by nature he is such that he is all things, in thinking himself,\nhe thinks all things. In this state, seeing himself actually by the\nglance he throws on himself, he embraces all things in this intuition;\non the other hand, by the glance he throws on all things, he embraces\nhimself in the intuition of all things.\n\n\nIN THE INTELLIGIBLE SELF-DIRECTION OF THOUGHT IS NOT CHANGEABLENESS.\n\nUnder the above circumstances, the soul changes thoughts--something\nthat we above refused to admit. Intelligence is indeed immutable;\nbut the soul, situated on the extremities of the intelligible world,\nmay undergo some change when she reflects upon herself. Indeed, what\napplies to the immutable necessarily undergoes some change in respect\nto it, because it does not always remain applied to it. To speak\nexactly, there is no change when the soul detaches herself from the\nthings that belong to her to turn towards herself, and conversely;\nfor the soul is all things, and the soul forms but one thing with\nthe intelligible. But when the soul is in the intelligible world,\nshe becomes estranged from herself and from all that belongs to her;\nthen, living purely in the intelligible world, she participates in\nits immutability, and she becomes all that it is; for, as soon as\nshe has raised herself to this superior region, she must necessarily\nunite herself to Intelligence, towards which she has turned, and\nfrom which she is no longer separated by an intermediary. On rising\ntowards intelligence, the soul attunes herself to it, and consequently\nunites herself with it durably, in a manner such that both are\nsimultaneously single and double. In this state the soul cannot change;\nshe is immutably devoted to thought, and she simultaneously has\nself-consciousness, because she forms a unity with the intelligible\nworld.\n\n\nTHE SOUL BECOMES WHAT SHE REMEMBERS.\n\n3. When the soul departs from the intelligible world; when instead of\ncontinuing to form a unity with it, she wishes to become independent,\nto become distinct, and to belong to herself; when she inclines\ntowards the things here below, then she remembers herself. The memory\nof intelligible things hinders her from falling, that of terrestrial\nthings makes her descend here below, and that of celestial things makes\nher dwell in heaven. In general, the soul is and becomes what she\nremembers. Indeed, to remember is to think or imagine; now, to imagine\nis not indeed to possess a thing, but to see it and to conform to it.\nIf the soul see sense-things, by the very act of looking at them she\nsomehow acquires some extension. As she is things other than herself\nonly secondarily, she is none of them perfectly. Placed and established\non the confines of the sense and intelligible worlds, she may equally\nmove towards either.\n\n\nMEMORY IS NOT AS HIGH AS UNREFLECTIVE IDENTIFICATION.\n\n4. In the intelligible world, the soul sees the Good by intelligence;\nfor intelligence does not hinder her from arriving to the Good.\nBetween the soul and the Good, the intermediary is not the body, which\ncould be no more than an obstacle; for if the bodies can ever serve\nas intermediaries, it would only be in the process of descending\nfrom the first principles to third rank entities. When the soul\noccupies herself with inferior objects, she possesses what she wished\nto possess conformably to her memory and imagination. Consequently\nmemory, even should it apply itself to the very best things, is not\nthe best thing possible; for it consists not only in feeling that one\nremembers, but also in finding oneself in a disposition conformable to\nthe affections, to the earlier intuitions which are remembered. Now\nit may happen that a soul possesses something unconsciously, so that\nshe possesses it better than if she were conscious thereof. In fact,\nwhen she is conscious thereof, she possesses it like something foreign\nto her, and from which she is keeping herself distinct; when, on the\ncontrary, she is unconscious of it she becomes what she possesses; and\nit is especially this latter kind of memory which can most thoroughly\neffect her degradation (when she conforms herself to sense-objects, by\napplying her imagination thereto).\n\n\nINTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES ARE NOT MERELY IMAGES, BUT POTENTIALITIES FOR\nMEMORY.\n\nThat the soul, on leaving the intelligible world, brings away with her\nmemories thereof, implies that even in the (intelligible) world she\nto a certain degree already possessed memory; but this potentiality\nwas eclipsed by the thought of the intelligible entities. It would\nbe absurd to insist that the latter existed in the soul in the\ncondition of simple images; on the contrary, they there constituted an\n(intellectual) potentiality which later passed into the condition of\nactualization. Whenever the soul happens to cease applying herself to\nthe contemplation of intelligible entities she no longer sees what she\nformerly saw (that is, sense-objects).\n\n\nINTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES RETURN, NOT BY MEMORY, BUT BY FURTHER VISION.\n\n5. Are our notions of intellectual entities actualized by the\npotentiality which constitutes memory? If these notions be not\nintuitions, it is by memory that they become actualized; if they are\nintuitions, it is by the potentiality which has given them to us on\nhigh. This power awakes in us every time that we rise to intelligible\nthings, in it is that which sees what we later talk about. We do not\nperceive intelligible entities by imagination or reasoning, which\nitself is forced to draw its principles from elsewhere; it is by our\nfaculty of contemplation, which alone enables us to speak of them\nwhile we are here below. We see them by awaking in ourselves here\nbelow the same potentiality which we are to arouse when we are in the\nintelligible world. We resemble a man who, climbing the peak of a rock,\nshould, by his glance, discover objects invisible for those who have\nnot climbed with him.\n\n\nWHEN SOULS DESCEND FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE TO THE HEAVENS, THEY RECOGNIZE\nEACH OTHER.\n\nReasonable arguments therefore clearly demonstrate that memory\nmanifests in the soul only when she has descended from the intelligible\nworld into the (earthly) heavens. Likewise, it would not surprise us\nif, when she had risen from here below to the heavens, and had dwelt\nthere, she should remember a great number of things from here below,\nof which we have already spoken, and that she would recognize many\nsouls which she had known earlier, since these latter must necessarily\nbe joined to bodies with similar countenances. Even though the souls\nshould change the shapes of their bodies, making them spherical, they\nwould still be recognizable by their habits and individual character.\nThere is nothing incredible in this, for in admitting that these souls\nhave purified themselves from all these passions, nothing hinders them\nfrom preserving their character. Besides, if they can converse with\neach other, they have this as an additional means of recognizing each\nother.\n\n\nTRAINING HERE BELOW WILL HELP THE SOULS TO REMEMBER WHEN BEYOND.\n\nWhat happens when souls descend from the intelligible world into the\n(earthly) heavens? They then recover memory, but they possess it in a\ndegree less than the souls who have always occupied themselves with the\nsame objects. Besides, they have many other things to remember, and a\nlong space of time has made them forget many actions.\n\n\nFALL INTO GENERATION MAY BE PARTIAL; AND MAY BE RECOVERED FROM, BEFORE\nRUIN.\n\nBut if, after having descended into the sense-world they fall (from\nthe heavens) into generation, what will be the time when they will\nremember? It is not necessary that the souls (which depart from the\nintelligible world) should fall into the lowest regions. It is possible\nthat, after having descended only a little from the intelligible world\ntheir movement may be arrested, and nothing hinders them from returning\non high before they have become degraded in the lower regions of\ngeneration.\n\n\nMEMORY IS LIMITED TO SOULS THAT CHANGE THEIR CONDITION.\n\n6. It may therefore be fearlessly affirmed that the souls which\nexercise their discursive reason, and which change condition,\nremember; for memory is the characteristic of things that were, but no\nmore are.\n\n\nDO THE WORLD-SOUL AND THE STAR-SOULS EXERCISE MEMORY?\n\nBut evidently the souls which dwell in the same state could not\nexercise memory; for what would they have to remember? If (ignoring\nour arguments above) human reason should wish to attribute memory to\nthe souls of all the stars, especially to that of the moon and the\nsun, there is nothing to hinder it from doing the same with regard to\nthe universal Soul, and it would dare to attribute even to Jupiter\nmemories which would occupy him with a thousand different things. As\nsoon as it will have entered into this order of ideas, reason would\nproceed to speculate about the conceptions and ratiocinations of the\nstar-souls--that is, granting that they reason at all. (But that is a\ngratuitous assumption); for if these souls have nothing to discover,\nif they do not doubt, if they have no need of anything, if they do not\nlearn things that they have ignored before, what use would they make of\nreasoning, of arguments, or of the conceptions of discursive reason?\nThey have no need of seeking mechanical means of governing human\naffairs and events; for they enforce order in the universe in a totally\ndifferent manner.\n\n\nTHESE SOULS DO NOT REMEMBER GOD; FOR THEY CONTINUE TO SEE HIM.\n\n7. Will these souls not even remember that they have seen the divinity?\n(They have no need of doing so, for) they see Him all the time; as long\nas they continue to see Him they cannot say that they have seen Him,\nbecause such a statement would imply that they see Him no more.\n\n\nMEMORY IS IMPOSSIBLE TO THESE SOULS, FOR TO THEM THERE IS NO TIME, BUT\nONE SINGLE DAY.\n\nWill they not even remember that they performed their revolution\nyesterday, or the year before, that they lived yesterday, and since\nhave lived a long while? They still live continuously; now, what\nremains the same, is one. To try to distinguish yesterday and last year\nin the movement of the stars, is to do like a man who would divide into\nseveral parts the movement which forms one step, who would wish to\nreduce unity to multiplicity. Indeed, the movement of the stars is one,\nalthough it is by us subjected to a measure, as if it were multiple;\nso we count the days different one from the other because the nights\nseparate them from each other. But since there is but one single day in\nthe heavens, how could one count several? How could there be a \"last\nyear\"?\n\n\nBUT WHY COULD THE STAR-SOULS NOT BE CONSCIOUS OF OUR CHANGES?\n\nIt may be objected that the space transversed (by planets) is not a\nunity, but contains several parts, as notably in the zodiac. Why then\ncould the celestial Soul not say, \"I have passed this part, I have now\narrived at another\"? Besides, if the star-souls consider human things,\nhow would they not see that there are changes here below, that the\nmen existing to-day have succeeded others? If so, they must know that\nother men have already existed, that there have been other facts. They\ntherefore possess memory.\n\n\nMANY NEW THINGS ARE UNNOTICED; NOTHING FORCES THE PERCEPTION OF NEW\nTHINGS.\n\n8. It is not necessary to remember all one sees, nor by imagination to\nrepresent to oneself all the things that follow fortuitously. Besides,\nwhen the mind possesses a knowledge and a clear conception of certain\nobjects which later come to offer themselves to his senses, nothing\nforces him to abandon the knowledge he has acquired by intelligence, to\nlook at the particular sense-object which is in front of him, unless he\nbe charged to administer some of the particular things contained in the\nnotion of the all.\n\n\nMEMORY IS NOT COMPULSORY.\n\nNow, to enter into details, let us first say that one does not\nnecessarily retain all one has seen. When something is neither\ninteresting nor important, the senses, impressed by the diversity of\nobjects without our voluntary direction of consciousness, are alone\naffected; the soul does not perceive the impressions because there is\nno utility in them for her. When the soul is turned towards herself, or\ntowards other objects, and when she applies herself to them entirely,\nshe could not remember these indifferent things, for she does not even\nperceive them when they are present. Neither is it necessary that the\nimagination should represent to itself what is accidental; nor, if it\ndoes represent them to itself, that it should retain them faithfully.\nIt is easy to be convinced that a sense-impression of this kind is not\nperceived, on the ground of the following arguments. In the act of\nwalking we divide, or rather traverse the air, without any conscious\npurpose; consequently we neither notice it, nor think of it, while we\npress forward. Likewise, if we had not decided to take some particular\nroad, and unless we could fly through the air, we would not think of\nthe region of the earth where we are, nor of the distance we have\ntraveled. This is proved by the fact that when the mind possesses\nthe general knowledge of what occurs, and is sure that the things\nwill occur as planned, a man no longer attends to details. Besides,\nif a person continues to do the same thing, it would be useless to\ncontinue to observe the similar details. Consequently if the stars,\nwhile following their courses, carry out their duties without attending\nto the occurrence of what goes on; and unless their chief duty is to\nobserve occurrences or the occurrence itself; and if their progress is\nnothing more than accidental, while their attention is held by other\nand greater objects; and if they regularly continue to pass through\nthe same orbit without considering the calculation of time, even if it\nhad already been divided (under these four conditions); there is no\nneed to suppose that these stars would have a memory of the places they\npass by, or of their periods. Their life would be uniform; because they\nalways travel through the same places, so that their movement is, so to\nspeak, more vital than local, because it is produced by a single living\nbeing (the universe), which, realizing it within itself, is exteriorly\nat rest and interiorly in motion by its eternal life.\n\n\nSTAR-MOTIONS COMPARED TO A BALLET-CHORUS.\n\nThe movement of the stars might be compared to that of a choric ballet.\nLet us suppose that it had but a limited duration; its motion would be\nconsidered perfect, if viewed as a totality, from beginning to end;\nbut if considered in its parts only, it would be imperfect. Now if we\nsuppose that it exists always; then will it always be perfect. If it\nbe always perfect, there will be neither time nor place where it is\nbecoming perfect; consequently, it will not even have any desire, and\nit will measure nothing, neither by time nor place; and therefore will\nnot remember either.\n\n\nSTARS HAVE NO MEMORY BECAUSE THEY ARE UNIFORMLY BLISSFUL.\n\nBesides, the stars enjoy a blissful life because they contemplate the\nreal life in their own souls; because they all aspire to the One, and,\nradiating into the entire heavens, like cords that vibrate in unison,\nthey produce a kind of symphony by their natural harmony. Last, the\nentire heavens revolve; so also do their parts, which, in spite of\nthe diversity of their motions, and of their positions, all gravitate\ntowards a same centre. Now all these facts support the theory we have\nadvanced, since they show that the life of the universe is one system,\nand is uniform.\n\n\nQUESTION: DOES JUPITER'S ROYAL ADMINISTRATION IMPLY A USE OF MEMORY?\n\n9. Jupiter, who governs the world, and endues it with order and beauty,\npossesses from all eternity[154] a royal soul and intelligence; he\nproduces things by his providence, and regulates them by his power;\nin an orderly manner he disposes everything in the development and\nachievement of the numerous periods of the stars. Do not such acts on\nJupiter's part imply use of memory by which he may know what periods\nhave already been accomplished, and busy himself with the preparation\nof others by his combinations, his calculations, and reasonings? His\nbeing the most skilful administrator in the world would seem to imply\nthat he uses memory.\n\n\nTHE INFINITY OF JUPITER'S LIFE OPPOSES HIS USE OF MEMORY.\n\nWe might well, in respect to the memory of these periods, examine the\nnumber of these periods, and whether it is known to Jupiter; for if it\nbe a finite number, the universe will have had a commencement within\ntime; but if it be infinite, Jupiter will not have been able to know\nhow many things he has done. (To solve this problem) we must admit\nthat Jupiter ever enjoys knowledge, in a single and unitary life. It\nis in this sense that he must be infinite and possess unity, not by\na knowledge come to him from without, but interiorly, by his very\nnature, because the infinite ever remains entire in him, is inherent\nin him, is contemplated by him, and is not, for him, simply the object\nof an accidental knowledge. Indeed, while knowing the infinity of his\nlife, Jupiter simultaneously knows that the influence he exercises on\nthe universe is single; but his knowledge thereof is not due to his\nexercising it on the universe.\n\n\nJUPITER MAY BE TAKEN IN A DOUBLE SENSE.\n\n10. The principle which presides over the order of the universe\nis double; from one point of view he is the demiurge; from the\nother, the universal Soul. By the name of Jupiter, therefore, we\ndesignate both the demiurge, and the \"Governor of the universe.\" As\nto the demiurge, we must dismiss all notions of past or future, and\nattribute to him nothing but a life that is uniform, immutable, and\nindependent, of time. But the life of the governor of the universe\n(which is the universal Soul), raises the question whether she be\nalso free from any necessity of reasoning, and of planning what is\nto be done? Surely, for the order which is to rule has already been\ndevised and decided, and that without having been ordered; for that\nwhich is in order was that which became, and the process of becoming\neventuates in order. The latter is the activity of the Soul which\ndepends from an abiding wisdom, a wisdom whose image is the order\nexisting within the soul. As the wisdom contemplated by the soul does\nnot change, neither does its action. Indeed, the Soul contemplates\nwisdom perpetually; if she ceased, she would lapse into incertitude,\nfor the soul is as unitary as her work. This unitary principle that\ngoverns the world dominates perpetually, and not only occasionally;\nfor whence should there be several powers, to struggle among each\nother, or get into uncertainties? The principle that administers the\nuniverse is therefore unitary, and ever wills the same. Why, indeed,\nshould she desire now one thing, and then another, and thus involve\nherself in uncertainties? Still, even if she altered herself under\nunitary conditions, she would not be involved in difficulties. That\nthe universe contains a great number and kinds of parts opposed to\neach other is no reason that the Soul does not with certainty know how\nto arrange them. She does not begin by objects of lowest rank, nor by\nparts; she directs by the principles. Starting from these, she easily\nsucceeds in putting everything in order. She dominates because she\npersists in a single and identical function. What would induce her\nto wish first one thing, and then another? Besides, in such a state\nof affairs, she would hesitate about what she ought to do, and her\naction would be weakened, and this would result in a weakness of her\nactivities, while deliberating about still undecided plans.\n\n\nRATIOCINATION HAS NO PLACE IN THE WORLD-SOUL.\n\n11. The world is administered like a living being, namely, partly from\nthe outside, and from the resulting members, and partly from within,\nand from the principle. The art of the physician works from outside\nin, deciding which organ is at fault, operating only with hesitation\nand after groping around experimentally. Nature, however, starting\nwithin from the principle, has no need to deliberate. The power which\nadministers the universe proceeds not like the physician, but like\nnature. It preserves its simplicity so much the better as it comprises\neverything in its breast, inasmuch as all things are parts of the\nliving being which is one. Indeed, nature, which is unitary, dominates\nall individual natures; these proceed from it, but remain attached\nthereto, like branches of an immense tree, which is the universe.\nWhat would be the utility of reasoning, calculation, and memory in a\nprinciple that possesses an ever present and active wisdom, and which,\nby this wisdom, dominates the world and administers it in an immutable\nmanner? That its works are varied and changeful, does not imply that\nthis principle must itself participate in their mutability. It remains\nimmutable even while producing different things. Are not several\nstages produced successively in each animal, according to its various\nages? Are not certain parts born and increased at determinate periods,\nsuch as the horns, the beard, and the breasts? Does one not see each\nbeing begetting others? Thus, without the degeneration of the earlier\n(\"seminal) reasons,\" others develop in their turn. This is proved by\nthe (\"seminal) reason\" subsisting identical and entire within the same\nliving being.\n\n\nTHIS UNIVERSAL WISDOM IS PERMANENT BECAUSE TIMELESS.\n\nWe are therefore justified in asserting the rule of one and the same\nwisdom. This wisdom is universal; it is the permanent wisdom of the\nworld; it is multiple and varied, and at the same time it is one,\nbecause it is the wisdom of the living Being which is one, and is the\ngreatest of all. It is invariable, in spite of the multiplicity of\nits works; it constitutes the Reason which is one, and still is all\nthings simultaneously. If it were not all things, it would, instead of\nbeing the wisdom of the universe, be the wisdom of only the latter and\nindividual things.\n\n\nWISDOM, IN THE WORLD-SOUL DOES NOT IMPLY REASONING AND MEMORY.\n\n12. It may perhaps be objected that this might be true of nature, but\nthat whereas the Soul-of-the-universe contains wisdom, this implies\nalso reasoning and memory. This objection could be raised only by\npersons who by \"wisdom\" understand that which is its absence, and\nmistake the search for wisdom for reasonable thinking. For what can\nreasoning be but the quest of wisdom, the real reason, the intelligence\nof the real essence? He who exercises reason resembles a man who plays\nthe lyre to exercise himself, to acquire the habit of playing it, and,\nin general, to a man who learns in order to know. He seeks indeed to\nacquire science, whose possession is the distinguishing characteristic\nof a sage. Wisdom consists therefore in a stable condition. This is\nseen even in the conduct of the reasoner; as soon as he has found what\nhe sought, he ceases to reason, and rests in the possession of wisdom.\n\n\nOMNISCIENT INTUITION MAKES MEMORY AND REASONING SUPERFLUOUS.\n\nTherefore, if the governing Power of the world seems to resemble\nthose who learn, it will be necessary to attribute to it reasoning,\nreflection, and memory, so that it may compare the past with the\npresent or the future. But if, on the contrary, its knowledge be such\nas to have nothing more to learn, and to remain in a perfectly stable\ncondition, it evidently possesses wisdom by itself. If it know future\nthings--a privilege that could not be denied it under penalty of\nabsurdity--why would it not also know how they are to occur? Knowing\nall this, it would have no further need of comparing the past with\nthe present. Besides, this knowledge of its future will not resemble\nthe prevision of the foretellers, but to the certitude entertained by\nmakers about their handiwork. This certitude admits no hesitation,\nno ambiguity; it is absolute; as soon as it has obtained assent, it\nremains immutable. Consequently, the wisdom about the future is the\nsame as about the present, because it is immutable; that is, without\nratiocination. If, however, it did not know the future things it\nwas to produce, it would not know how to produce them, and it would\nproduce them without rule, accidentally, by chance. In its production,\nit remains immutable; consequently, it produces without changing, at\nleast as far as permitted by the model borne within it. Its action is\ntherefore uniform, ever the same; otherwise, the soul might err. If\nits work was to contain differences, it does not derive these from\nitself, but from the (\"seminal) reasons\" which themselves proceed\nfrom the creating principle. Thus the created things depend from the\nseries of reasons, and the creating principle has no need to hesitate,\nto deliberate, neither to support a painful work, as was thought by\nsome philosophers who considered the task of regulating the universe\nwearisome. It would indeed be a tiresome task to handle a strange\nmatter, that is, one which is unmanageable. But when a power by itself\ndominates (what it forms), it cannot have need of anything but itself\nand its counsel; that is, its wisdom, for in such a power the counsel\nis identical with wisdom. It therefore needs nothing for creation,\nsince the wisdom it possesses is not a borrowed wisdom. It needs\nnothing (extraneous or) adventitious; consequently, neither reasoning\nnor memory, which faculties yield us nothing but what is adventitious.\n\n\nIN THE WORLD-SOUL WISDOM IS THE HIGHEST AND NATURE THE LOWEST.\n\n13. How would such a wisdom differ from so-called nature? (In the Soul)\nwisdom occupies the first rank, and nature the last. Nature is only\nthe image of wisdom; now, if nature occupy no more than the last rank,\nshe must also have only the last degree of the reason that enlightens\nthe Soul. As illustration, take a piece of wax, on which the figure\nimpressed on one side penetrates to the other; and whose well-marked\ntraits on the upper face appear on the lower face only in a confused\nmanner. Such is the condition of nature. She does not know, she only\nproduces, blindly she transmits to matter the form she possesses, just\nas some warm object transmits to another, but in a lesser degree, the\nheat it itself possesses. Nature does not even imagine: for the act\nof imagining, inferior as it is to that of thinking, is nevertheless\nsuperior to that of impressing a form, as nature does it. Nature\ncan neither grasp nor understand anything; while imagination seizes\nthe adventitious object and permits the one who is imaging to know\nwhat he has experienced. As to nature, all it knows is to beget; it\nis the actualization of the active potentiality (of the universal\nSoul). Consequently, Intelligence possesses intelligible forms; the\n(universal) Soul has received them, and ceaselessly receives them from\nher; that is what her life consists of; the clearness which shines in\nher is the consciousness she has of her thought. The reflection which\n(the Soul herself projects on matter is nature, which terminates the\nseries of essences, and occupies the last rank in the intelligible\nworld; after her, there is nothing but imitations (of beings). Nature,\nwhile acting on matter is passive in respect (to the Soul). The (Soul),\nsuperior to nature, acts without suffering. Finally, the supreme\n(Intelligence) does not (itself) act on the bodies or on matter.\n\n\nTHERE IS CONTINUITY BETWEEN NATURE AND THE ELEMENTS.\n\n14. The bodies begotten by nature are the elements. As to the animals\nand the plants, do they possess nature as the air possesses the light\nwhich when retiring does not injure the air, because it never mingled\nwith the air, and remained separate from it? Or is nature's relation to\nanimals and plants the same as that of the fire with a heated body, to\nwhich, on retiring, it leaves a warmth which is different from the heat\ncharacteristic of the fire, and which constitutes a modification of the\nheated body? Surely this. To the essence which it moulds, nature gives\na shape, which is different from the form proper to nature herself. We\nmight however still consider whether there be any intermediary between\nnature and the essence which she moulds. However, we have sufficiently\ndetermined the difference that exists between nature and the wisdom\nwhich presides over the universe.\n\n\nHOW CAN TIME BE DIVIDED WITHOUT IMPLYING DIVISION OF THE SOUL'S ACTION?\n\n15. We still have to solve one question bearing on the above\ndiscussion. If eternity relate to Intelligence, and time to the\nSoul--for we have stated that the existence of time is related to\nthe actualization of the Soul, and depends therefrom--how can time\nbe divided, and have a past, without the Soul's action itself being\ndivided, without her reflection on the past constituting memory in\nher? Indeed, eternity implies identity, and time implies diversity;\notherwise, if we suppose there is no change in the actualizations of\nthe Soul, time will have nothing to distinguish it from eternity. Shall\nwe say that our souls, being subject to change and imperfection, are in\ntime, while the universal Soul begets time without herself being in it?\n\n\nIN TIME ARE ACTIONS AND REACTIONS OF THE SOUL; BUT NOT THE SOUL HERSELF.\n\nLet us admit that the universal Soul is not in time; why should she\nbeget time rather than eternity? Because the things she begets are\ncomprised within time, instead of being eternal. Neither are the\nother souls within time; nothing of them, except their \"actions and\nreactions\" (Stoic terms). Indeed, the souls themselves are eternal;\nand therefore time is subsequent to them. On the other hand, what is in\ntime is less than time, since time must embrace all that is within it,\nas Plato says, that time embraces all that is in number and place.\n\n\nQUESTION: EVEN THE PRIORITY OF ORDER IMPLIES A TEMPORAL CONCEPTION.\n\n16. It may however be objected that if the (universal Soul) contain\nthings in the order in which they were successively produced, she\nthereby contains them as earlier and later. Then, if she produce them\nwithin time, she inclines towards the future, and consequently, also\nconversely to the past.\n\n\nEARLIER AND LATER EXIST ONLY IN WHAT IS BEGOTTEN; NOT IN THEIR SEMINAL\nREASON.\n\nIt may be answered that the conceptions of earlier and later apply only\nto things which are becoming; in the Soul, on the contrary, there is no\npast; all the (\"seminal) reasons\" are simultaneously present to her, as\nhas already been said. On the contrary, in begotten things, the parts\ndo not exist simultaneously, because they do not all exist together,\nalthough they all exist together within the (\"seminal) reasons.\" For\ninstance, the feet or the hands exist together in the (\"seminal)\nreasons,\" but in the body they are separate. Nevertheless, these parts\nare equally separated, but in a different manner, in the (\"seminal)\nreason,\" as they are equally anterior to each other in a different\nmanner. If however they be thus separate in the (\"seminal) reason,\"\nthey then differ in nature.\n\n\nTHINGS WHICH ARE ANTERIOR CAN BE ONLY IN LOWER PRINCIPLES.\n\nBut how are they anterior to each other? It must be because here he\nwho commands is identical with him who is commanded. Now in commanding\nhe expresses one thing after another; for why are all things not\ntogether? (Not so). If the command and he who commands were separate\nentities, the things would have been produced in the same manner\nas they have been expressed (by speech); but as the commander is\nhimself the first command, he does not express things (by speech),\nhe only produces them one after the other. If he were (by speech)\nto express what he actually does, he would have to consider the\norder; consequently, he would have to be separate from it. Is it\nasked, how can the commander be identical with the command? He is not\nsimultaneously form and matter, but form alone (that is, the totality\nof the reasons which are simultaneously present to him). Thus, the Soul\nis both the potentiality and the actualization which occupy the second\nrank after Intelligence. To have parts some of which are prior to\nothers suits only such objects as cannot be everything simultaneously.\n\n\nDIAGRAM OF THE UNIVERSE.\n\nThe Soul, such as we are considering her here, is something venerable;\nshe resembles a circle which is united to the centre, and which\ndevelops without leaving (its base of operations, the centre), thus\nforming an undivided extension. To gain a conception of the order of\nthe three principles, the Good may be considered as a centre, the\nIntelligence as an immovable circle, and the Soul as an external\nmovable circle impelled by desire.\n\n\nCIRCULAR MOVEMENT OF THE SOUL.\n\nIndeed, intelligence possesses and embraces the Good immediately;\nwhile the Soul can only aspire to (the Good), which is located above\nthe Intelligence. The whole world-sphere possessing the Soul which\nthus aspires (to the Good), is moved by the promptings of its natural\naspirations. Its natural aspiration, however, is to rise in bodily\naspiration to the principle on the outside of which it is; namely, to\nextend around it, to turn, and consequently to move in a circle.\n\n\nTHE INTELLECTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE WORLD-SOUL, AND SOULS OF\nSTARS, EARTH AND MEN.\n\n17. Why are the thoughts and rational aspirations in us different (from\nwhat they are in the universal Soul)? Why is there in us posteriority\nin respect to time (as we conceive things in a successive manner,\nwhile the universal Soul conceives them simultaneously)? Why do we\nhave to question ourselves (about this)? Is it because several forces\nare active in us, and contend for mastery, and there is no single\none which alone commands? Is it because we successively need various\nthings to satisfy our needs, because our present is not determined by\nitself, but refers to things which vary continually, and which are\noutside of ourselves? Yes, that is the reason why our determinations\nchange according to the present occasion and need. Various things come\nfrom the outside to offer themselves to us successively. Besides,\nas several forces dominate in us, our imagination necessarily has\nrepresentations that are various, transient, modified by each other,\nand hindering the movements and actions characteristic of each power\nof the soul. Thus, when lust arises in us, imagination represents to\nus the desired object, warns us, and instructs us about the passion\nborn of lust, and at the same time begs of us to listen to it, and to\nsatisfy it. In this state, the soul floats in uncertainty, whether it\ngrant to the appetite the desired satisfaction, or whether she refuse\nit. Anger, for instance, excites us to vengeance, and thereby produces\nthe same uncertainty. The needs and passions of the body also suggest\nto us varying actions and opinions; as do also the ignorance of the\ntrue goods, the soul's inability to give a certain judgment, while in\nthis hesitating condition, and the consequences which result from the\nmingling of the things we have just mentioned. Still our own highest\npart makes judgments more certain than those reached by the part common\n(to the soul and to the body), a part that is very uncertain, being a\nprey to diversity of opinions.\n\n\nSOULS, ACCORDING TO MORALIZATION, RESEMBLE VARIOUS FORMS OF GOVERNMENT.\n\nRight reason, on descending from the higher realms of the soul into the\ncommon part, is by this mingling weakened, although it is not naturally\nweak; thus, in the tumult of a numerous assembly, it is not the wisest\ncounsellor whose word carries weight; but on the contrary, that of the\nmost turbulent and quarrelsome, and the tumult they make forces the\nwise man to stay seated, powerless and vanquished, by the noise. In\nthe perverse man, it is the animal part that rules; the diversity of\ninfluences which overcome this man represents the worst of governments\n(the rule of the mob). In the commonplace man, things happen as in\na republic where some good element dominates the remainder, which\ndoes not refuse to obey. In the virtuous man, there is a life which\nresembles the aristocracy, because he manages to withdraw from the\ninfluence of the commonplace part, and because he listens to what is\nbest in himself. Finally, in the best man, completely separated from\nthe common part, reigns one single principle from which proceeds the\norder to which the remainder is subject. It would seem therefore that\nthere were two cities, the one superior, and the other inferior, which\nlatter derives its order from the former. We saw that the universal\nSoul was a single identical principle which commands uniformly;\nbut other souls, as we have just explained, are in a very different\ncondition. Enough of this.\n\n\nTHE BODY IS NOT US, BUT OURS.\n\n18. Does the body, thanks to the presence of the soul that vivifies it,\npossess something which becomes characteristically its own, or is its\npossession nothing more than its nature, and is this the only thing\nadded to the body? Evidently, the body which enjoys the presence of the\nsoul, and of nature, would not resemble a corpse. It will be in the\ncondition of the air, not when the air is penetrated by the sun-light\n(for then it really receives nothing), but when it participates in\nthe heat. Therefore, plant and animal bodies that possess \"a nature,\"\nfind that it consists of the shadow of a soul. It is to this body,\nthus vivified by nature, that sufferings and pleasures relate; but\nit is for us to experience these sufferings and pleasures without\nourselves suffering. By us is here meant the reasonable soul, from\nwhich the body is distinct, without however being foreign to it, since\nit is ours (since it belongs to us). Only because of this, that it is\nours, do we care for it. We are not the body; but we are not entirely\nseparated from it; it is associated with us, it depends on us. When we\nsay \"we,\" we mean by this word what constitutes the principal part of\nour being; the body also is \"ours\": but in another sense. Therefore its\nsufferings and pleasures are not indifferent to us; the weaker we are,\nthe more we occupy ourselves with it. In it, so to speak, is plunged\nthe most precious part of ourselves, which essentially constitutes the\npersonality, the man.\n\n\nTHE SOUL AND BODY TOGETHER FORM A FUSION OF BOTH.\n\nThe passions do not really belong to the soul, but to the living body,\nwhich is the common part, or the fusion (of both, or the compound).\nThe body and soul, each taken separately, are self-sufficient. Isolated\nand inanimate, the body does not suffer. It is not the body that is\ndissolved, it is the unification of its parts. Isolated, the soul is\nimpassible, indivisible, and by her condition escapes all affections.\nBut the unification of two things is sure to be more or less unstable,\nand on its occurrence, it often happens that it is tested; hence the\npain. I say, \"two things,\" not indeed two bodies, because two bodies\nhave the same nature; the present is a case where one kind of being\nis to be united to one of a different kind, where the inferior being\nreceives something from the superior being, but receives only a trace\nof that something, because of its inability to receive her entirely.\nThen the whole comprises two elements, but nevertheless forms only a\nunity; which, becoming something intermediary between what it was, and\nwhat it has not been able to become, becomes seriously embarrassed,\nbecause it has formed an unfortunate alliance, not very solid, always\ndrawn into opposite directions by contrary influences. Thus it is at\none time elated, and at another, dejected; when it is dejected, it\nmanifests its suffering; when it is elated, it aspires to communion\nbetween the body and the soul.\n\n\nTHE SOUL FEELS THE PASSIONS WITHOUT EXPERIENCING THEM.\n\n19. That is why there is pleasure and pain. That is why grief is said\nto be a perception of dissolution, when the body is threatened with\nthe loss of the image of the soul (of being disorganized by losing the\nirrational soul). That is why it is said that pleasure is a perception\nproduced in the animal when the image of the soul reassumes its sway\nover the body. It is the body which undergoes passion; but it is\nthe sense-potentiality of the soul which perceives the passion by\nits relation with the organs; it is she to which all the sensations\nultimately report themselves. The body alone is injured and suffers;\nfor example, when one member is cut, it is the mass of the body which\nis cut; the soul feels pain not merely as a mass, but as a living\nmass. It is likewise with a burn: the soul feels it, because the\nsense-potentiality as it were receives its reaction by its relations\nwith the organs. The soul entire feels the passion produced in the body\nwithout however herself experiencing it.\n\n\nUNLESS THE SOUL WERE IMPASSIBLE SHE COULD NOT LOCALIZE AND MANAGE PAIN.\n\nIndeed, as the whole soul feels, she localizes the passion in the\norgan which has received the blow, and which suffers. If she herself\nexperienced the suffering, as the whole of her is present in the whole\nbody, she could not localize the suffering in one organ; the whole of\nher would feel the suffering; she would not relate it to any one part\nof the body, but to all in general: for she is present everywhere in\nthe body. The finger suffers, and the man feels this suffering, because\nit is his finger. It is generally said that the man suffers in his\nfinger, just as it is said that he is blond, because his eyes are blue.\nIt is therefore the same entity that undergoes passion' and suffering,\nunless the word \"suffering' should not here designate both the passion,\nand the sensation which follows it; in this case no more is meant than\nthat the state of suffering is accompanied by sensation. The sensation\nitself is not the suffering, but the knowledge of the suffering. The\npotentiality which knows must be impassible to know well, and well to\nindicate what is perceived. For if the faculty which is to indicate the\npassions itself suffer, it will either not indicate them, or it will\nindicate them badly.\n\n\nTHE APPETITES ARE LOCATED NEITHER IN BODY NOR SOUL, BUT IN THEIR\nCOMBINATION.\n\n20. Consequently, it may be said that the origin of the desires should\nbe located in the common (combination) and in the physical nature. To\ndesire and seek something would not be characteristic of a body in any\nstate whatever (which would not be alive). On the other hand, it is not\nthe soul which seeks after sweet or bitter flavors, but the body. Now\nthe body, by the very fact that it is not simply a body (that it is a\nliving body), moves much more than the soul, and is obliged to seek\nout a thousand objects to satisfy its needs: at times it needs sweet\nflavors, at others, bitter flavors; again humidity, and later, heat;\nall of them being things about which it would not care, were it alone.\nAs the suffering is accompanied by knowledge, the soul, to avoid the\nobject which causes the suffering, makes an effort which constitutes\nflight, because she perceives the passion experienced by the organ,\nthat contracts to escape the harmful object. Thus everything that\noccurs in the body is known by sensation, and by that part of the soul\ncalled nature, and which gives the body a trace of the soul. On one\nhand, desire, which has its origin in the body, and reaches its highest\ndegree in nature, attaches itself thereto. On the other hand, sensation\nbegets imagination, as a consequence of which the soul satisfies her\nneed, or abstains, and restrains herself; without listening to the\nbody which gave birth to desire, nor the faculty which later felt its\nreaction.\n\n\nTWO KINDS OF DESIRES: OF THE BODY; AND OF THE COMBINATION, OR NATURE.\n\nWhy therefore should we recognize two kinds of desires, instead of\nacknowledging only one kind in the living body? Because nature differs\nfrom the body to which it gives life. Nature is anterior to the body\nbecause it is nature that organizes the body by moulding it, and\nshaping it; consequently, the origin of desire is not in nature, but\nin the passions of the living body. If the latter suffer, it aspires\nto possess things contrary to those that make it suffer, to make\npleasure succeed pain, and satisfaction succeed need. Nature, like a\nmother, guesses the desires of the body that has suffered, tries to\ndirect it, and to lure it back. While thus trying to satisfy it, she\nthereby shares in its desires, and she proposes to accomplish the same\nends. It might be said that the body, by itself, possesses desires and\ninclinations; that nature has some only as a result of the body, and\nbecause of it; that, finally the soul is an independent power which\ngrants or refuses what is desired by the organism.\n\n\nDESIRES ARE PHYSICAL, BECAUSE CHANGEABLE IN HARMONY WITH THE BODY.\n\n21. The observation of the different ages shows that it is indeed\nthe organism which is the origin of desires. Indeed, these change\naccording as the man is a child or a youth, sick or well. Nevertheless\nthat part of the soul which is the seat of desires ever remains the\nsame. Consequently the variations of desire must be traced back to the\nvariations of the organism. But this desiring faculty of the soul is\nnot always entirely wakened by the excitation of the body, although\nthis subsists to the end. Often even before having deliberated, the\nsoul will forbid the body to drink or eat, although the organism\ndesires it as keenly as possible. Nature herself also often forbids the\nsatisfaction of the bodily desire, because such desire may not seem to\nit natural, and because she alone has the right to decide what things\nare harmonious to or contrary to nature. The theory that the body, by\nits different states suggests different desires to the soul's faculty\nof desire, does not explain how the different states of the body can\ninspire different desires in the soul's faculty of desire, since then\nit is not itself that it seeks to satisfy. For it is not for itself,\nbut for the organism, that the soul's faculty of desire seeks foods,\nhumidity or heat, motion, agitation, or the satisfaction of hunger.\n\n\nRELATION OF DESIRE-FUNCTION TO THE VEGETATIVE POWERS.\n\n22. It is possible, even in plant-life, to distinguish something which\nis the characteristic property of their bodies, and a power that\nimparts it to them. What in us in the soul's faculty of desire, is in\nplant-life the natural element (or, vegetative power).\n\n\nPLATO IS IN DOUBT ABOUT THE EARTH'S SOUL; WHETHER SHE IS LIKE THOSE OF\nSTARS.\n\nThe earth also possesses a soul; and therefore also such a\npotentiality; and it is from the earth that the plants derive their\nvegetative potentiality. One might reasonably first ask which is this\nsoul that resides in the earth. Does she proceed from the sphere of\nthe universe (to which alone Plato seems to attribute a soul from the\nvery first), so as to make of her an irradiation of this sphere upon\nthe earth? Or should we on the contrary, attribute to the earth a soul\nsimilar to that of the stars, as Plato does when he calls the earth the\nfirst and most ancient of the divinities contained within the interior\nof the heavens? Could it, in this case, be a divinity, if it did not\nhave a soul? It is therefore difficult to determine the exact state of\naffairs, and the very words of Plato here instead of diminishing our\nembarrassment, only increase it.\n\nAt first, how will we manage to form a reasonable opinion on this\nsubject? Judging from what the earth causes to grow, one might\nconjecture that it possesses the vegetative potentiality. As many\nliving beings are seen to grow from the earth, why would it itself\nnot be a living being? Being besides a great living being, and a\nconsiderable part of the world, why should the earth not possess\nintelligence, and be a divinity? Since we consider every star as a\nliving being, why would we not similarly consider the earth, which is\na part of the universal living being? It would, indeed, be impossible\nto admit that it was exteriorly contained by a foreign soul, and\nthat interiorly it would have no soul, as if it were the only being\nincapable of having an individual soul. Why should we grant animation\nto the (starry) bodies of fire, while not to the earthly body of our\nearth? Indeed, bodies could as easily be of earth as of fire. Not\nin the stars, any more than in the earth, is there any nose, flesh,\nblood, or humours, although the earth is more varied than the stars,\nand although it be composed of all the other living bodies. As to its\ninability to move, this can be said only in reference to local motion.\n(For it is capable of motion in the respect that it can feel.)\n\n\nTHE EARTH CAN FEEL AS WELL AS ANY OF THE STARS.\n\nIt will be asked, But how can the earth feel? We shall answer in\nturn, How can stars feel? It is not the flesh that feels; a soul is\nnot dependent for feeling on a body; but the body is dependent on the\nsoul for self-preservation. As the soul possesses judgment, she should\nbe able to judge the passions of the body whenever she applies her\nattention thereto.\n\n\nQUESTION: WHAT PASSIONS WOULD BE SUITABLE TO THE EARTH?\n\nIt may however still be asked, What are the passions characteristic\nof the earth, and which may be objects of judgment for the soul? It\nmay besides be objected that the plants, considered in the terrestrial\nelement that constitutes them, do not feel.\n\n\nSENSATION WILL FIRST HAVE TO BE EXAMINED.\n\nLet us now examine to what beings sensation belongs, and whereby it\noperates. Let us see whether sensation can take place even without\norgans. Of what use to the earth could sensation be? For it does not\nserve the earth as means of knowledge; the knowledge which consists\nin wisdom suffices for the beings to whom sensation is of no use.\nThis consideration might however be denied, for the knowledge of\nsense-objects offers, besides utility, some of the charms of the Muses.\nSuch is, for example, the knowledge of the sun and the other stars,\nwhose contemplation itself is agreeable. This problem will therefore\ndemand solution.\n\n\nRESTATEMENT OF PROBLEMS INVOLVED.\n\nWe must therefore first investigate if the earth possess senses, to\nwhat animals sensation naturally belongs, and how sensation operates.\nIt will be necessary to begin by discussing the doubtful points\nthat we have indicated, and to examine in general if sensation can\noperate without organs, and if the senses have been given for utility,\nadmitting even that they can procure some other advantage.\n\n\nCONCEPTIVE THOUGHT DEMANDS THE INTERMEDIARY PROCESS OF SENSATION.\n\n23. Conception of sense-objects occurs when the soul or the living\nbeing experiences perceptions by grasping the bodies' inherent\nqualities, and by representing their forms to itself. The soul must\ntherefore perceive sense-objects either with or without the body. How\ncould the soul do so alone? Pure and isolated, she can conceive only\nwhat she has within herself; she can only think. But for conception\nof objects other than herself, she must previously have grasped them,\neither by becoming assimilated to them, or by finding herself united to\nsomething which may have become similar to them.\n\n\nTHE PURE SOUL WOULD REMAIN ISOLATED.\n\nIt is impossible for the soul to become similar to sense-objects (in\norder to grasp them), by remaining pure. How indeed could a point\nbecome similar to a line? The intelligible line itself could not become\nconformed to the sense-line, any more than intelligible fire to the\nsense-fire, or the intelligible man to the sense-man. Nature herself\nwhich begets man could not be identical with the begotten man. The\nisolated soul, even if she could grasp sense-objects, will finish by\napplying herself to the intuition of intelligible objects, because,\nhaving nothing by which to grasp the former, she will let them escape.\nIndeed, when the soul perceives from far a visible object, although\nonly the form reaches her, nevertheless what first began by being for\nher indivisible, finally constitutes a subject, whether it be color or\na figure, whose size is determined by the soul.\n\n\nSENSATION DEPENDS ON THE SENSE-SHAPE, WHICH, LIKE TOOLS, IS\nINTERMEDIATE.\n\nThe soul and the exterior object do not therefore suffice (to explain\nsensation); for there would be nothing that suffers. There must\ntherefore be a third term that suffers, that is, which receives the\nsense-form, or, shape. This third term must \"sympathize,\" or, share\nthe passion of the exterior object, it must also experience the same\npassion, and it must be of the same matter; and, on the other hand,\nits passion must be known by another principle; last, passion must\nkeep something of the object which produces it, without however being\nidentical with it. The organ which suffers must therefore be of a\nnature intermediary between the object which produces the passion\nand the soul, between the sensible and the intelligible, and thus\nplay the part of a term intermediary between the two extremes, being\nreceptive on one side, making announcements on the other, and becoming\nequally similar to both. The organ that is to become the instrument of\nknowledge must be identical neither with the subject that knows, nor\nwith the object that is known. It must become similar to both of them;\nto the exterior object because it suffers, and to the cognizing soul\nbecause the passion which it experiences becomes a form. Speaking more\naccurately, the sensations operate by the organs. This results from\nthe principle asserted above, that the soul isolated from the body can\ngrasp nothing in the sense-world. As used here, the word \"organ\" either\nrefers to the whole body, or to some part of the body fitted to fulfil\nsome particular function; as in the case of touch or sight. Likewise,\nit is easy to see that tools of artisans play a part intermediary\nbetween the mind which judges, and the object which is judged; and that\nthey serve to discover the properties of substances. For instance, a\n(foot) rule, which is equally conformed to the idea of straightness\nin the mind, and to the property of straightness in the wood, serves\nthe artisan's mind as intermediary to judge if the wood he works be\nstraight.\n\n\nEXCLUSION OF OTHER SIDE ISSUES.\n\nWe have just demonstrated that sensation belongs exclusively to an\nembodied soul, and that this implies organs. But we have nothing to\ndo with the question whether the perceived object must be in contact\nwith the organ, or whether the sensation can take place at a distance\nfrom the sense-object, by means of an intermediary; as the case of\nthe fire which is located at a distance from our body, without the\nintermediary's suffering in any manner. It happens again where, empty\nspace serving as intermediary between the eye and the color, one may\nwell ask whether, to see, it suffice to possess the potentiality proper\nto that organ. But it is sure that sensation is some activity of the\nsoul in a body, or through a body.\n\n\nARE THE SENSES GIVEN US ONLY FOR THE SAKE OF UTILITY?\n\n24. Whether the senses were given us for the sake of utility must be\nexamined as follows. If the soul were separated from the body, she\nwould not feel; she feels only when united to a body; therefore she\nfeels by and for the body. It is from the soul's intimacy with the\nbody that sensation results, either because all passions, when keen\nenough, reach the soul; or whether the senses were made for us to\ntake care that no object approaches too near us, or exercises on our\norgans an action strong enough to destroy them. If so, the senses\nwere given us for the sake of utility. Even if the senses do serve to\nacquire knowledge and information, they would be of no use to a being\nwho possesses knowledge, but only to one who needs to learn he has the\nmisfortune of being ignorant, or who needs to remember, because he is\nsubject to forgetfulness. They are therefore not found in the being who\nhas no need to learn, and who does not forget.\n\n\nARE SENSES GIVEN THE STARS FOR UTILITY?\n\nLet us consider what consequences may be drawn therefrom for the earth,\nthe stars, and especially for the heavens and the whole world. From\nwhat we have seen, the parts of the world which suffer may possess\nsensation in their relation with other parts. But is the entire world,\ncapable of feeling, as it is entirely impassible in its relations\nwith itself? If sensation demand on one hand an organ, and on the\nother the sense-object, the world which includes everything, can have\nneither organ to perceive, nor exterior object to be perceived. We may\ntherefore ascribe to the world a sort of intimate sensation, such as\nwe ourselves possess, and deny to it the perception of other objects.\nWhen we feel something unusual in our bodies, we perceive it as being\nexternal. Now as we perceive not only exterior objects, but even some\npart of our body through some other part of the body itself, similarly\nthe world might very well perceive the sphere of the planets by means\nof the sphere of the fixed stars; and perceive the earth with all the\nobjects it contains by means of the sphere of the planets? If these\nbeings (the stars and the planets) do not feel the passions felt\nby other beings, why might they not also possess different senses?\nMight not the sphere of the planets not only by itself possess sight\nby itself, but in addition be the eye destined to transmit what it\nsees to the universal Soul? Since she is luminous and animated, she\nmight see as does an eye, supposing that she did not feel the other\npassions.[155] (Plato), however, said, \"that the heavens have no need\nof eyes.\" Doubtless the heavens have nothing outside of themselves to\nsee; and consequently, they may not have need of eyes, as we have; but\nthey contain something to contemplate, namely, themselves. If it should\nbe objected that it is useless for them to see themselves, it may be\nanswered that they were not made principally for this purpose, and that\nif they see themselves, it is only a necessary consequence of their\nnatural constitution. Nothing therefore hinders them from seeing, as\ntheir body is diaphanous.\n\n\nIF SENSATION IS A SOUL-DISTRACTION, THE STARS A WOULD NOT INDULGE\nTHEREIN.\n\n25. It would seem that in order to see, and in general to feel, mere\npossession of the necessary organs by the soul, is not enough; the\nsoul must also be disposed to direct her attention to things of sense.\nBut it is usual for the (universal) Soul to be ever applied to the\ncontemplation of intelligible things; and mere possession of the\nfaculty of sensation would not necessarily imply its exercise, because\nit would be entirely devoted to objects of a higher nature. So when\nwe apply ourselves to the contemplation of intelligible things, we\nnotice neither the sensation of sight, nor those of other senses; and,\nin general, the attention that we give to one thing hinders us from\nseeing the others. Even among us human beings, to wish to perceive one\nof our members through another, as, for instance, looking at ourselves,\nis both superfluous and vain, unless this has some very good purpose.\nMoreover, it is a characteristic of an imperfect and fallible being to\ncontemplate some external thing, merely because it is beautiful. It may\ntherefore well be said that if to feel, hear and taste are distractions\nof a soul that attaches herself to outer objects, the sun and the other\nstars cannot see or hear, except accidentally. It would however not be\nunreasonable to admit that they turn towards us through the exercise of\nthe senses of sight or hearing. Now, if they turn towards us, they must\nbe mindful of human affairs. It would be absurd that they should not\nremember the men to whom they do so much good; how indeed would they do\ngood, if they had no memory?\n\n\nTHE EARTH FEELS AND DIRECTS BY THE LAWS OF SYMPATHETIC HARMONY.\n\n26. The stars know our desires through the agreement and sympathy\nestablished between them and us by the harmony reigning in the\nuniverse. Our desires are granted by the same method. Likewise, magic\nis founded on the harmony of the universe; it acts by means of the\nforces which are interconnected by sympathy. If so, why should we\nnot attribute to the earth the faculty of sensation? Granting this,\nwhat sort of sensations would we attribute to it? To begin with, why\nshould we not attribute to it touch, whether by one part feeling the\ncondition of another, and by the transmission of the sensation to the\ngoverning power, or by the whole earth feeling the fire, and other\nsimilar things; for if the terrestrial element is inert, it certainly\nis not insensible. The earth will therefore feel the great things,\nand not those of minor importance. Why should it feel? Surely if the\nearth have a soul, she will not ignore the strongest motions therein.\nThe earth must also be supposed to feel, in order to dispose all that\ndepends on her for the benefit of humanity. All these things she will\nsuitably dispose by the laws of harmony. She can hear and grant the\nprayers addressed to her, but in a manner other than we ourselves\nwould do. Besides, she might exercise other senses in her relations,\neither with herself, or with foreign things; as, for example, to have\nthe sensations of taste and smell perceived by other beings. Perhaps\neven she has need to perceive the odors of the liquids to fulfil her\nprovidential functions in respect to animals, and to take care of her\nown body.\n\n\nTHE EARTH'S SENSES MAY BE DIFFERENT FROM OURS.\n\nWe must however not insist on her organs being the same as ours. Not\neven in all animals are the senses similar. Thus, for instance, not all\nhave similar ears, and even those who have no ears at all nevertheless\nwill perceive sounds. How could the earth see, if light be necessary\nfor her vision? Nor must we claim for her the necessity of having\neyes. We have already above granted that she possesses the vegetative\npower; we should therefore thence draw the deduction that this power\nis primitively by its essence a sort of spirit. What objection then\ncould there be to assume that this spirit might be resplendent and\ntransparent? Arguing merely from its nature of being a spirit, we\nshould (potentially at least) conclude that it is transparent; and that\nit is actually transparent because it is illuminated by the celestial\nsphere. It is therefore neither impossible nor incredible that the soul\nof the earth should possess sight. Besides, we must remember that this\nsoul is not that of a vile body, and that consequently, she must be a\ngoddess. In any case, this soul must be eternally good.\n\n\nANALYSIS OF THE EARTH'S PSYCHOLOGY.\n\n27. If the earth communicate to plant-life the power of begetting and\ngrowing, it possesses this power within itself, and gives only a trace\nof it to the plants which derive from it all their fruitfulness, and\nas it were are the living flesh of its body. It gives to them what\nis best in them; this can be seen in the difference between a plant\ngrowing in the soil, and of a branch cut from it; the former is a real\nplant, the latter is only a piece of wood. What is communicated to the\nbody of the earth by the Soul which presides over it? To see this it is\nsufficient to notice the difference between some earth resting within\nthe soil, and a piece that is detached therefrom. It is likewise easy\nto recognize that stones increase in size as long as they are in the\nbosom of the earth, while they remain in the same state when they have\nbeen plucked out therefrom. Everything therefore bears within itself a\ntrace of the universal vegetative (power) shed abroad over the whole\nearth, and belonging particularly to no one of its parts. As to the\nearth's power of sensation, it is not (like its vegetative power)\nmingled with the body of the earth; it only hovers above and guides\nit. Moreover, the earth possesses also, higher than the above powers,\na soul and an intelligence. They bear respectively the names of Ceres\nand Vesta, according to the revelations of men of prophetic nature, who\nallow themselves to be inspired by the divine.\n\n\nDOES THE IRASCIBLE POWER ALSO ORIGINATE IN THE BODY?\n\n28. Enough of this. Let us return to the question from which we\ndigressed. We granted that the desires, pains and pleasures (considered\nnot only as sentiments, but as passions), originate in the constitution\nof the organized and living body. Must the same origin be assigned to\nthe irascible (power)? Were this so, we would have several questions to\nask: Does anger belong to the entire organism, or only to a particular\norgan, such as the heart when so disposed, or to the bile, as long as\nit is part of a living body? Is anger different from the principle\nwhich gives the body a trace of the soul, or is it an individual power,\nwhich depends on no other power, whether irascible or sensitive?\n\n\nTHE LIVER IS THE SEAT OF THE SOUL'S FACULTY OF DESIRE.\n\nThe vegetative power present in the whole body communicates to every\npart thereof a trace of the soul. It is therefore to the entire body\nthat we must refer suffering, pleasure, and the desire of food. Though\nnothing definite is ascertained about the seat of sexual desire, let us\ngrant that their seat is in the organs destined to its satisfaction.\nFurther, be it granted that the liver is the seat of the soul's faculty\nof desire, because that organ is particularly the theatre of the\nactivities of the vegetative power which impresses a trace of the soul\non the body; and further, because it is from the liver that the action\nit exercises starts.\n\n\nTHE HEART IS THE SEAT OF ANGER.\n\nAs to anger, we shall have to examine its nature, what power of the\nsoul it constitutes, whether it be anger that imparts to the heart\na trace of its own power; if there exist another force capable of\nproducing the movement revealed in the animal; and finally, if it be\nnot a trace of anger, but anger itself which resides in the heart.\n\n\nANGER ORIGINATES IN THE VEGETATIVE AND GENERATIVE POWER, AS TRACE OF\nTHE SOUL.\n\nFirst, what is the nature of anger? We grow irritated at maltreatment\nof ourselves or of a person dear to us; in general, when we witness\nsome outrage. Therefore anger implies a certain degree of sensation,\nor even intelligence, and we should have to suppose that anger\noriginates in some principle other than the vegetative power. Certain\nbodily conditions, however, predispose us to anger; such as being\nof a fiery disposition, and being bilious; for people are far less\ndisposed to anger if of a cold-blooded nature. Besides, animals grow\nirritated especially by the excitement of this particular part, and\nby threats of harm to their bodily condition. Consequently we would\nonce more be led to refer anger to the condition of the body and\nto the principle which presides over the constitution of organism.\nSince men are more irritable when sick than when well, when they are\nhungry, more than when well satisfied, anger or its principle should\nevidently be referred to the organized and living body; evidently,\nattacks of anger are excited by the blood or the bile, which are living\nparts of the animal. As soon as the body suffers, the blood as well\nas the bile boils, and there arises a sensation which arouses the\nimagination; the latter then instructs the soul of the state of the\norganism, and disposes the soul to attack what causes this suffering.\nOn the other hand, when the reasonable soul judges that we have been\ninjured, she grows excited, even if there were no disposition to anger\nin the body. This affection seems therefore to have been given to us\nby nature to make us, according to the dictates of our reasons, repel\nand threatens us. (There are then two possible states of affairs.)\nEither the irascible power first is moved in us without the aid of\nreason, and later communicates its disposition to reason by means of\nthe imagination; or, reason first enters into action, and then reason\ncommunicates its impulse to that part of our being which is disposed to\nanger. In either case, anger arises in the vegetative and generative\npower, which, in organizing the body, has rendered it capable to\nseek out what is agreeable, and to avoid what is painful; diffusing\nthe bitter bile through the organism, imparting to it a trace of the\nsoul, thus communicating to it the faculty of growing irritated in the\npresence of harmful objects, and, after having been harmed, of harming\nother things, and to render them similar to itself. Anger is a trace of\nthe soul, of the same nature as the soul's faculty of desire, because\nthose least seek objects agreeable to the body, and who even scorn the\nbody, are least likely to abandon themselves to the blind transports\nof anger. Although plant-life possesses the vegetative power, it does\nnot possess the faculty of anger because it has neither blood nor bile.\nThese are the two things which, in the absence of sensation, leads\none to boil with indignation. When however sensation joins these two\nelements, there arises an impulse to fight against the harmful object.\nIf the irrational part of the soul were to be divided into the faculty\nof desire, and that of anger, and if the former were to be considered\nthe vegetative power, and the other, on the contrary, as a trace of\nthe vegetative power, residing in either the heart or blood, or in\nboth; this division would not consist of opposed members, because the\nsecond would proceed from the first. But there is an alternative: both\nmembers of this division, the faculties of desire and anger, might be\nconsidered two powers derived from one and the same principle (the\nvegetative power). Indeed, when the appetites are divided, it is their\nnature, and not the being from which they depend, that is considered.\nThis essence itself, however, is not the appetite, but completes it,\nharmonizing with it the actions proceeding from the appetite. It is\nalso reasonable to assign the heart as seat of the trace of the soul\nwhich constitutes anger; for the heart is not the seat of the soul, but\nthe source of the (arterially) circulating blood.\n\n\nWHEN THE SOUL LEAVES THE BODY, SHE LEAVES A TRACE OF LIFE.\n\n29. If the body resemble an object warmed rather than illuminated, why\ndoes nothing vital remain after the reasonable soul has abandoned it?\nIt does preserve some vital element, but only for a short time; this\ntrace soon disappears, as vanishes the heat of an object when it is\nremoved from the fire. After death, some trace of life still remains.\nThis is proved by the growth of hair and nails on corpses; and it is\nwell known that animals, even after being cut in pieces, still move\nfor some time. Besides, the disappearance of the (vegetative) life\nsimultaneously with the reasonable soul, does not prove their identity,\nand that they (the reasonable soul, and the vegetative soul) are not\ndifferent. When the sun disappears, it causes the disappearance not\nonly of the light that surrounds it immediately, and as it were depends\nfrom it, but also of the brilliance which these objects receive from\nthis light, and which completely differs from it.\n\n\nDOES THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THESE THINGS NECESSARILY IMPLY THEIR\nDESTRUCTION?\n\nBut does that which disappears merely depart, or does it perish? Such\nis the question which applies both to the light which inheres in the\nilluminated objects (and colors them), as well as to the life inherent\nin the body, and which we call the characteristically bodily life.\nEvidently, there remains no light left in the objects which were\nilluminated. But the question is to decide whether the light that\ninhered in them returns to its source, or is annihilated. Annihilation\nis impossible if anteriorly it was something real. What was it really?\nSo-called color must depend on the very bodies from which light also\nemanates; and when these bodies perish, their coloring perishes with\nthem; nobody indeed asks after the fate of the color of the fire that\nhas gone out any more than one troubles oneself about what has become\nof its appearance. It may be objected that the appearance is only a\ncondition,[156] such as holding the hand open or closed, while the\ncolor, on the contrary, is the same sort of a quality as sweetness.\nNow, is there nothing to hinder the sweet or the fragrant body from\nperishing, without affecting the existence of the sweetness and\nfragrance? Could they subsist in other bodies without being felt,\nbecause the bodies which participate in the qualities, are such as not\nto allow the qualities they possess to be felt? What would hinder the\nunaffected existence of the light after the destruction of the body\nit colored, if it merely ceased to be reflected, unless one's mind\nshould see that those qualities subsist in no subject? If we were to\nadmit this opinion, we would also be obliged to admit that qualities\nare indestructible, that they are not produced in the constitution\nof the bodies, that their colors are not produced by the reasons in\nseed; that, as happens with the changing plumage of certain birds,\nthe (\"seminal) reasons\" not only gather or produce the colors of the\nobjects, but they besides make use of those that still fill the air,\nand that they remain in the air without being such as they appear to us\nwhen in bodies. Enough of this.\n\n\nTHREE POSSIBLE INTERRELATIONS OF THE SOUL'S SUPERIOR AND INFERIOR\nBODIES.\n\nIt may still be asked whether, if while the bodies subsist, the\nlight that colors them remains united to them, and does not separate\nfrom them, why then would not both it, together with its immediate\nemanations, move along with the body in which it inheres, although it\ncannot be seen going away any more than it is seen approaching? We\nshall therefore have to examine elsewhere if the second-rank powers\nof the soul always remain attached to the higher ones, and so on; or\nif each of them subsist by itself, and can continue to subsist in\nitself when it is separated from the higher ones; or if, inasmuch as no\npart of the soul can be separated from the others, all together form\na soul which is simultaneously one and manifold, but in some still\nundetermined manner.\n\n\nCAN THE PHYSICAL LIFE EXIST WITHOUT THE SOUL?\n\nWhat becomes of this trace of life that the soul impresses on the body,\nand that the latter appropriates? If it belong to the soul, it will\nfollow the latter, since it is not separated from the being of the\nsoul. If it be the life of the body, it must be subject to the same\nconditions as the luminous color of the bodies (and perish with them).\nIndeed, it will be well to examine if the life can subsist without the\nsoul, or if, on the contrary, the life exists no earlier than the soul\nis present, and acts on the body.\n\n\nSTARS, AS WELL AS THE SUN, HAVE PRAYERS ADDRESSED TO THEM.\n\n30. We have shown that memory is useless to the stars; we have agreed\nthat they have senses, namely, sight and hearing, and the power to\nhear the prayers addressed to the sun, and also those by many people\naddressed to the other stars, because these people are persuaded that\nthey receive from them many benefits; they think even that they will\nobtain them so easily that these men ask the stars to co-operate\nin actions not only such as are just, but even such as are unjust.\nQuestions raised by the latter point must still be considered.\n\n\nBENEFITS ARE GRANTED TO MEN THROUGH THE WORLD-SOUL'S MEDIATION.\n\nHere arise important questions which have been frequently considered\nespecially by such as will not allow the divinities to be regarded as\nthe accomplices or authors of shameful deeds, such as love-adventures\nand adulteries. For this reason, as well as on account of what was\nsaid above about the memory of the stars, we shall have to examine\nthe nature of the influence they exercise. Indeed, if they grant our\npetitions, though not immediately, and give us what we ask after a time\nthat sometimes is very long, they must necessarily exercise memory of\nthe prayers addressed to them; now, we have above denied that they\ncould have memory. As to the benefits that they grant to men, it has\nbeen said that it seemed as if they had been granted by Vesta, that is,\nthe earth, unless indeed it should be insisted that the earth alone\ngranted benefits to men.\n\n\nSTATEMENT OF THREE QUESTIONS.\n\nWe have therefore two points to examine: we first have to explain\nthat if we do attribute memory to the stars, it is only in a sense\nagreeing with our former statements, and not for the reason advanced\nby other people; we shall later have to show that it is a mistake to\nattribute evil actions to them. In view of this, we shall try, as is\nthe duty of the philosopher, to refute the complaints formed against\nthe divinities which reside in the heavens, and against the universe\nwhich is equally accused, in the case that any credence whatever is to\nbe attached to such as pretend that heaven can be magically swayed by\nthe arts of audacious men; last, we shall explain the administration of\nthe ministry of guardians, unless the latter point have been explained\nincidentally to the solution of the former problems.\n\n\nNATURAL ACTIONS ARE BOTH ON WHOLES AND ON PARTS.\n\n31. Let us in general consider the actions and reactions produced in\nthe universe either by nature or by art. In the works of nature, there\nis an action of the whole on the parts, of the parts on the whole,\nand of the parts on the parts. In the works of art, art either alone\naccomplishes what it has undertaken, or depends on natural forces to\neffect certain natural operations. We may call actions of the universe,\nall that the total circular expanse affects on itself or its part. For\nin fact, the heavens by moving themselves, somehow effect themselves\nand their parts, both those in its own revolutions, or on the earth.\nThe mutual reactions and passions of the parts of the universe are\neasy to recognize, such as the positions taken up by the sun, and\nthe influence the sun exercises on the other stars, and especially\nin regard to the earth; further, the processes in its own elements,\nas well as in those of the other constellations, and of objects on\nearth--all of which deserve separate consideration.\n\n\nMOST OF THE ARTS ACHIEVE THEIR OWN ENDS.\n\nArchitecture and the fine arts, fulfil themselves in such an object.\nMedicine, agriculture and similar professions, however, are auxiliary\narts, and obey the laws of nature, assisting their efficient production\nso as to make them as natural as possible. As to rhetoric, music,\nand other arts of refinement, which serve the education of souls in\nimproving or degrading men, it remains an open question how many there\nare of them, and what power they possess. In all these things, we will\nhave to examine what may be of use to us for the questions we are\ntreating, and we will have to discover the cause of the facts, as far\nas possible.\n\n\nABSURDITY OF PTOLEMEAN ASTROLOGY.\n\nIt is evident that the revolution of the stars exercises an influence\nfirst by disposing them in different arrangement; then the things\ncontained within its spheres; then terrestrial beings, not only\nin body, but in soul; further, each part of the heavens exercises\ninfluence on terrestrial and inferior things. We shall indeed inquire\nwhether the lower things in turn exercise some influence on the\nsuperior ones. For the present, however, granting that the facts\nadmitted by all, or at least a majority, are what they seem to be,\nwe shall have to try to explain how they are produced, by following\nthem up to their origins. We must indeed not say that all things are\ncaused exclusively by heat or cold, with possibly the other qualities\nnamed the \"primary qualities of the elements,\" or with those that\nderive from their mixture[157]; neither should we assert that the sun\nproduces everything by the heat, or some other star (like Saturn), by\ncold. For indeed what would cold amount to in the heavens, which are a\nfiery body, or in fire, which has no humidity? Moreover, in this manner\nit would be impossible to recognize the difference of the stars. Then\nthere are many facts that could not be traced to their influence. If\nthe influence of the stars is to be made to account for the differences\nof human character, which are supposed to correspond to mixtures of\ncorporeal elements, producing a temperament in which there is an excess\nof cold or heat, to which such causes would one trace hate, envy, and\nmalice? Granting even that this were possible, how would one then by\nthe same causes explain good and bad fortune, poverty and wealth,\nnobility of fathers and children, and the discovery of treasures? A\nthousand facts equally as foreign to the influence exercised by the\nphysical qualities of the elements on the bodies or souls of animals,\ncould be cited.\n\n\nNO CRIMES SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE INFLUENCE OF SUBLUNARY DIVINITIES.\n\nNeither should the things which happen to sublunary beings be\nattributed to either a voluntary decision, or to deliberations of\nthe universe, or the stars. It is not permissible to imagine that\nthe divinities sway events in a manner such that some should become\nthieves, others should enslave their fellow-beings, or capture cities,\nor commit sacrilege in temples, or be cowards, effeminate in their\nconduct, or infamous in their morals. To favor such crimes would be\nunworthy of men of the most commonplace virtue, let alone divinities.\nBesides, what beings would be likely to busy themselves favoring vices\nand outrages from which they were not to reap any advantage?\n\n\nHAVING CONFUTED ASTROLOGY AND DEVILTRY, WORLD INFLUENCE IS ATTRIBUTED\nTO THE WORLD-SOUL.\n\n32. Since the influence exteriorly exercised by the heavens on us, on\nanimals, and on human affairs generally has been excluded from physical\ncauses (of astrology) and from voluntary decisions of divinities,\nit remains for us to find some cause to which it may reasonably be\nattributed. First, we will have to admit that this universe is a\nsingle living being, which contains within its own organism all living\nbeings; and that it contains a single Soul, which is communicated to\nall its parts; namely, to all beings that form part of the universe.\nNow every being that is contained in the sense-world is a part of the\nuniverse. First, and unrestrictedly, it is a part of the universe by\nits body. Then, it is again part of the universe by its soul, but only\nso far as it participates (in the natural and vegetative power) of the\nuniversal Soul. The beings which only participate in (the natural and\nvegetative power) of the universal Soul are completely parts of the\nuniverse. Those who participate in another soul (the superior power of\nthe universal Soul), are not completely parts of the universe (because\nthey are independent by their rational souls); but they experience\npassions by the actions of the other beings, as far as they have\nsomething of the universe (so far as by their irrational souls, they\nparticipate in the natural and vegetative power of the universe), and\nin the proportion in which they possess some part of the universe. This\nuniverse is therefore a single living being that is self-sympathetic.\nThe parts that seem distant are not any the less near, as, in each\nanimal, the horns, nails, fingers, the organs at distance from each\nother, feel, in spite of the interval which separates them, the\naffection experienced by any other one of them. In fact, as soon as\nthe parts are similar, even when they are separated by an interval\ninstead of being placed by each others' side, they sympathize by virtue\nof this their similarity, and the action of the distant one is felt by\nall the others. Now in this universe which is a single living being,\nand which forms a single organism, there is nothing distant enough in\nplace not to be near because of the nature of this being whose unity\nmakes it self-sympathetic. When the suffering being resembles the\nacting one, it experiences a passion conformable to its nature; when\non the contrary it differs, it experiences a passion that is foreign\nto its nature, and painful. It is therefore not surprising that though\nthe universe be single, one of its parts can exert on another a harmful\ninfluence, since it often happens to ourselves that one of our parts\nwounds another by its action; as for instance, that the bile, setting\nanger in motion, should crush and tear some other part of the body.\nNow something analogous to this bile which excites anger, and to other\nparts that form the human body, is discovered in the universe. Even in\nplants there are certain things which form obstacles to others, and\neven destroy them. Now the world forms not only a single animal, but\nalso a plurality of animals; each of them, as far as it has a share\nin the singleness of the universe, is preserved thereby; but, in so\nfar as this animal enters into the multiplicity of some other animal,\nhe can wound it, or be wounded by it, make use of it, or feed on it,\nbecause it differs from itself as much as it resembles itself; because\nthe natural desire of self-preservation leads us to appropriate what is\nsuitable to itself, and in its own interest to destroy what is contrary\nthereto. Finally, each being, fulfilling its part in the universe, is\nuseful to those that can profit by its action, and wounds or destroys\nthose who cannot support it; thus plants are scorched by the passage\nof fire, and the little animals are dragged along or trampled by\nthe greater. This generation and this corruption, this betterment\nand deterioration of things render easy and natural the life of the\nuniverse considered as a single living being. Indeed, it would not\notherwise have been possible that the particular beings it contains\nshould have lived as if they were alone, should possess their ends in\nthemselves, and should live only for themselves; since they are only\nparts, they must, as such, concur in the ends of the whole of which\nthey are parts; and, so far as they are different, they could not\neach preserve its own life, because they are contained in the unity\nof the universal life; neither could they entirely remain in the same\nstate, because the universe must possess permanence, and because of the\nuniverse, permanence consists in ever remaining in motion.\n\n\nTHE STARS' MOTIONS COMPARED TO A PREARRANGED DANCE.\n\n33. As the circular movement of the world has nothing fortuitous,\ninasmuch as it is produced conformably to the reason of this great\nanimal, a perfect symphonic (co-operation) between what \"acts\" and\nwhat \"reacts\" must exist within it; and there must also have been an\norder which would co-ordinate things one with another, so that at\neach of the phases of the circular movement of the world there might\nbe a correspondence between the various beings subject to it, as if,\nin a varied choric ballet the dancers formed a single figure. As to\nour own modern dances, it is easy to explain the eternal things which\ncontribute thereto, and which differ for every motion, like the sounds\nof the flute, the songs, and the other circumstances which are thereto\nrelated. It is not however as easy to conceive the motions of a person\nwho conforms himself strictly to each figure, who accompanies, who\nraises one limb, or lowers another, who moves this limb, or holds\nthe other limb motionless in a different attitude. The dancer's eyes\nare doubtless fixed on some further aim while his limbs are still\nresponding to the motions inspired by the music, by co-operating in\nexpressing them, and in completing them symmetrically. Likewise, a man\nlearned in the art of dancing could explain the reason that, in such a\nfigure, such a limb is raised, such a limb is bent, while others are\nhidden or lowered; not indeed that the dancer deliberates about these\ndifferent attitudes, but because in the general movement of his body he\nconsiders such a posture suitable to such a limb to fulfil its proper\npart in the dance. Likewise do the stars produce certain facts, and\nannounce other ones. The entire world realizes its universal life by\ncausing the motion of the greater parts it comprises, by ceaselessly\nchanging the figures, so that the different positions of the parts,\nand their mutual relations may determine the rest, and that things may\noccur as in a movement executed by a single moving living organism.\nThus such a state is produced by such an attitude, such positions,\nsuch figures; while some other state is produced by some other kind\nof figures, and so forth. Consequently, the real authors of what is\noccurring do not seem to be those who carry out the figures, but He who\ncommands them; and He who plans the figures does not do one thing while\nbusying Himself with another, because He is not acting on something\ndifferent from Himself; He himself is all the things that are done;\nHe here is the figures (formed by the universal movement), He himself\nthere is the resultant passions in the animal so moved and constituted\nby nature, simultaneously \"active\" and \"passive\" as the result of\nnecessary laws.\n\n\nTHE INFLUENCE OF THE UNIVERSE SHOULD BE PARTIAL ONLY.\n\n34. Granting that men are influenced by the universe through one of the\nelements of their being, it must be by (their body), that which forms\npart of the body of the universe, not by all those of which they are\nconstituted. Consequently, the surrounding universe should exercise\non them only a limited influence. In this respect they resemble wise\nservants who know how to carry out the orders of their masters without\ninterfering with their own liberty, so that they are treated in a\nmanner less despotic, because they are not slaves, and do not entirely\ncease to belong to themselves.\n\n\nASTROLOGICAL INFLUENCE MERELY INDICATION.\n\nAs to the difference found in the figures formed by the stars, it\ncould not be other than it is, because the stars do not advance in\ntheir course with equal swiftness. As they move according to the laws\nof reason, and as their relative positions constitute the different\nattitudes of this great organism (which is the world), and as all the\nthings that occur here below are, by the laws of sympathy related\nto those that occur on high, it would be proper to inquire whether\nterrestrial things are the consequences of the celestial things to\nwhich they are similar, or whether the figures possess an efficacious\npower; and in the latter case, whether all figures possess this power,\nor if figures are formed by stars only; for the same figure does not\nbear the same significance, and does not exert the same action in\ndifferent things, because each being seems to have its own proper\nnature. It may be said that the configuration of certain things\namounts to no more than the mere disposition of things; and that the\nconfiguration of other things is the same disposition with another\nfigure. If so, influence should be attributed not to the figures, but\nto the prefigured realities; or rather, to things identical by their\nessence, and different by their figures; a different influence will\nalso have to be attributed to the object which differs from the others\nonly by the place it occupies.\n\n\nASTROLOGICAL INFLUENCE MAY BE PARTLY ACTION; PARTLY MERE SIGNIFICANCE.\n\nBut of what does this influence consist? In significance, or in\n(genuine effective) action? In many cases, the combination, or thing\nfigured, may be said to have both an action, and a significance; in\nother cases, however, a significance merely. In second place, both\nthe figures and the things figured should be credited with the powers\nsuitable to each; as with dancers, the hand exerts an influence similar\nto that of the other members; and, returning to figures, these would\nexert an influence far greater than a hand in dancing. Last, the third\n(or lowest) degree of power pertains to those things which follow\nthe lead of the figures, carrying out (their significance); just as,\nreturning to the dance-illustrations, the dancer's limbs, and the parts\nof those limbs, ultimately do follow the dance-figures; or (taking a\nmore physiological example), as when the nerves and veins of the hand\nare contracted by the hand's motions, and participate therein.\n\n\nEARTHLY EVENTS SHOULD NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE STARS' BODY OR WILL.\n\n35. How then do these powers exert themselves?--for we have to retrace\nour steps to give a clear explanation. What difference is exhibited by\nthe comparison of one triangle with another? What action does the one\nexert on another, how is it exerted, and how far does it go? Such are\nthe questions we have to study, since we do not refer the production\nof things here below to the stars, neither to their body, nor to their\nwill; not to their bodies, because the things which happen are not\nsimple physical effects; nor to their will, because it is absurd that\ndivinities should by their will produce absurd things.\n\n\nTHE INFLUENCE OF THE STARS CONSISTS IN THEIR CONTEMPLATION OF THE\nINTELLIGIBLE WORLD.\n\nLet us now recall what has already been established. The universe is\na single living being by virtue of its unity being sympathetic with\nitself. The course of its life is regulated by reason; it is entirely\nin agreement with itself; it has nothing fortuitous, it offers a single\norder, and a single harmony. Besides, all the (star) figures are each\nconformed to a reason and to a determinate number. The parts of the\nuniversal living beings which constitute this kind of a dance--we mean\nthe figures produced in it, of the parts figured therein, as well\nas the things derived therefrom--are the very actualization of the\nuniverse. Thus the universe lives in the manner we have determined,\nand its powers contribute to this state according to the nature they\nhave received from the reason that has produced them. The figures are,\nin some way, the reasons of the universal Living being, the intervals\nor contrasts (of the parts) of the Living being, the attitudes they\ntake according to the laws of rhythm, and according to the reason of\nthe universe. The beings which by their relative distances produce\nthese figures are the divers members of this living being. The\ndifferent powers of this living being act without deliberation, as its\nmembers, because deliberation is a process foreign to the nature of\nthemselves or to this living being. Aspiration to a single aim is the\ncharacteristic of the single living being; but it includes manifold\npowers. All these different wills aspire to the same end as the single\nwill of the organism, for each part desires some one of the different\nobjects that it contains. Each wishes to possess something of the\nother's possessions, and to obtain what it lacks; each experiences\na feeling of anger against another, when it is excited against that\nother; each increases at the expense of another, and begets another.\nThe universe produces all these actions in its parts, but at the same\ntime it seeks the Good, or rather, it contemplates it. It is always the\nGood that is sought by the right will, which is above passions, and\nthus accords with the will of the universe. Similarly, servants ascribe\nmany of their actions to the orders received from their master; but\nthe desire of the Good carries them where their own master is carried.\nConsequently, the sun and the other stars exert what influence they do\nexert on things here below through contemplation of the intelligible\nworld.\n\n\nSTAR INFLUENCE IS EXPLAINED BY THEIR NATURAL RADIATION OF GOOD.\n\nWe shall limit ourselves to the above illustration, which may easily\nbe applied to the rest. The sun does not limit itself to warming\nterrestrial beings. It makes them also participate in its soul, as\nfar as possible; for it possesses a powerful physical soul. Likewise,\nthe other stars, involuntarily, by a kind of irradiation, transmit to\ninferior beings somewhat of the (natural) power they possess. Although\ntherefore all things (in the universe) form but a single thing of a\nparticular figure, they offer manifold different dispositions; which\ndifferent figures themselves each have a characteristic power; for each\ndisposition results in appropriate action.\n\n\nSPECIAL FIGURES HAVE INDIVIDUAL EFFECTS, DUE TO THEIR CHARACTERISTICS.\n\nThings which appear as a figure themselves possess a characteristic\ninfluence, which changes according to the people with which they are\nbrought in contact. Examples of this may be seen daily. Why do certain\nfigures or appearances inspire us with terror, although they have\nnever done us any harm, while others do not produce the same effect on\nus? Why are some people frightened by certain figures or appearances,\nwhile others are frightened by different ones? Because the former's\nconstitution specially acts on the former people, and the latter on\nthe latter; they could only produce effects in harmony with their\nnature. One object attracts attention by a particular appearance,\nand would yet attract attention by a different constitution. If it\nwas its beauty that exerted the power of arousing emotion, why then\nwould this beautiful object move one man, while the other object would\nmove another, if there be no potency in the difference of figure or\nappearance? It would be unreasonable to admit that colors have a\ncharacteristic influence and action, yet deny the same power to figures\nor appearances. It would, besides, be absurd, to admit the existence of\nsomething, but to refuse it all potency. Every being, because of his\nmere existence, must \"act\" or \"suffer.\" Some indeed \"act\" exclusively,\nwhile others both \"act\" and \"suffer.\" Substances contain influences\nindependent of their figure or appearance. Terrestrial beings also\npossess many forces which are derived neither from heat nor cold. The\nreason is that these beings are endowed with different qualities, that\nthey receive their forms from (\"seminal) reasons,\" and participate in\nthe powers of nature; such are the peculiar virtues of natural stones,\nand the surprising effects produced by plants.\n\n\nNOTHING IN THE UNIVERSE IS ENTIRELY INANIMATE.\n\n36. The universe is full of variety; it contains all the \"reasons,\" and\nan infinite number of different powers. So, in the human body, the eye,\nthe bones, and the other organs each have their characteristic power;\nas, the bone in the hand does not have the same strength as the bone\nin the foot; and in general, each part has a power different from that\npossessed by every other part. But unless we observe very carefully,\nthis diversity escapes us in the case of (natural) objects. Much more\nwould it escape us in the world; for the forces that we see in it are\n(but) the traces of those that exist in the superior region. There\nmust then be in the world an inconceivable and admirable variety of\npowers, especially in the stars that wander through the heavens. The\nuniverse is not a great and vast edifice, inanimate, and composed of\nthings of which it would be easy to catalogue the different kinds, such\nas stones, lumber, and ornamental structures; it is a wakeful being,\nliving in all its parts, though differently so in each; in short, it\nincludes all that can ever be. This solves the problem, how inanimate\nmatter can exist within an animated living being. Our discussions\nhave therefore taught us that in the universe (nothing is inanimate;\nthat, on the contrary) everything it contains is alive; but each in a\ndifferent manner. We deny that there is life in objects that we do not\nsee moving; but nevertheless they do live, though only with a latent\nlife. Those whose life is visible are composed of those whose life is\ninvisible, but which nevertheless contribute to the life of this animal\nby furnishing it with admirable powers. It would therefore be equally\nimpossible that the universe should be alive unless each of the things\nit contained lived with its own life. Nevertheless the acts of the\nuniverse do not depend on choice; it acts without needing to choose,\nbecause it precedes any choice. Thus many things obey its forces.\n\n\nCONSCIOUSNESS DEPENDS ON CHOOSING; EVERYTHING HAS POWERS, THOUGH HIDDEN.\n\n37. The universe therefore (contains all that it needs), and rejects\n(or wastes) nothing. Study, therefore, the fire, and all the other\nthings considered capable of action. Satisfactory investigation\nof their action would demand recognition that these things derive\ntheir power from the universe, and a similar admission for all that\nbelongs to the domain of experience. But we do not usually examine the\nobjects to which we are accustomed, nor raise questions about them.\nWe investigate the nature of a power only when it seems unusual, when\nits novelty excites our astonishment. Nevertheless we would not be any\nless astonished at the objects that we see so often if their power\nwere explained to us at a time when we were not yet so thoroughly\naccustomed to it. Our conclusion therefore is that every thing has\na secret (sub-conscious) power inasmuch as it is moulded by, and\nreceives a shape in the universe; participating in the Soul of the\nuniverse, being embraced by her, as being a part of this animated All;\nfor there is nothing in this All which is not a part thereof. It is\ntrue that there are parts, both on the earth and in the heavens, that\nact more efficiently than do others; the heavenly things are more\npotent because they enjoy a better developed nature. These powers\nproduce many things devoid of choice, even in beings that seem to act\n(purposively); though they are also active in beings that lack that\nability to choose. (Even these powers themselves act unconsciously):\nthey do not even turn (towards themselves) while communicating power,\nwhen some part of their own soul is emanating (to that which they are\nbegetting). Similarly animals beget other animals without implying an\nact of choice, without any weakening on the part of the generator, and\neven without self-consciousness. Otherwise, if this act was voluntary,\nit would consist of a choice, or the choice would not be effective.\nIf then an animal lack the faculty of choice, much less will it have\nself-consciousness.\n\n\nPRODUCTION IS DUE TO SOME PHYSICAL SOUL, NOT TO ANY ASTROLOGICAL POWER.\n\n38. Things which arise from the universe without the incitation of\nsomebody are generally caused by the vegetative life of the universe.\nAs to the things whose production is due to somebody, either by simple\nwishes, or by cunning enchantments, they should be ascribed not to\nsome star, but to the very nature of that which is produced. 1. Of\ncourse, the necessaries of life, or what serves some other use, should\nbe attributed to the goodness of the stars; it is a gift made by a\nstronger part to a weaker one. Any harmful effect on the generation\nof animals exercised by the stars must depend on their substance's\ninability to receive what has been given them; for the effect is not\nproduced absolutely, but relatively to some subject or condition, for\nthat which \"suffers\" or is to \"suffer\" must have a determinate nature.\n2. Mixtures also exert a great influence, because each being furnishes\nsomething useful to life. Moreover, something good might happen to a\nperson without the assistance of beings which by nature would seem\nuseful. 3. The co-ordination of the universe does not always give to\neach person what he desires. 4. Besides, we ourselves add much to what\nhas been given to us. 5. All things are not any the less embraced in a\nsame unity; they form an admirable harmony; besides, they are derived\nfrom each other, though originating from contraries; for indeed all\nthings are parts of a single animal. If any one of these begotten\nthings is imperfect because it is not completely formed, the fact is\nthat matter not being entirely subdued, the begotten thing degenerates\nand falls into deformity. Thus some things are produced by the stars,\nothers are derived from the nature of substance, while others are added\nby the beings themselves.\n\n\nASTROLOGICAL SIGNS ARE ONLY CONCATENATIONS FROM UNIVERSAL REASON.\n\n39. Since all things are always co-ordinated in the universe, and\nsince all trend to one single and identical aim, it is not surprising\nthat all (events) are indicated by (astrological) signs. \"Virtue has\nno master,\" as Plato said[158]; \"she attaches herself to all who\nhonor her, and abandons those who neglect her; God is innocent.\"[159]\nNevertheless, her works are bound up with the universal order; for all\nthat is here below depends on a divine and superior principle, and\neven the universe participates therein. Thus all that happens in the\nuniverse is caused not only by the (\"seminal) reasons,\" but by reasons\nof a higher order, far superior to those (that is, the ideas). Indeed,\nthe seminal reasons contain the reasons of nothing produced outside of\nseminal reasons, neither of what is derived from matter, nor from the\nactions of begotten things exercised on each other. The Reason of the\nuniverse resembles a legislator who should establish order in a city.\nThe latter, knowing the probable actions of the citizens, and what\nmotives they would probably obey, regulates his institutions thereupon,\nintimately connects his laws with the conduct of the individuals\nsubject to them, establishes rewards and punishments for their deeds,\nso that automatically all things conspire in mutual harmony by an\ninerrant current. Each therefore is indicated by (astrological) signs,\nwithout this indication being an essential purpose of nature; it is\nonly the result of their concatenation. As all these things form but a\nsingle one, each of them is known by another, the cause by the effect,\nthe consequent by the antecedent, the compound by its elements.\n\n\nTHE GODS CANNOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR OUR ILLS.\n\nThe above consideration would clear up the problem set above. The gods\n(that is, the stars), cannot be held responsible for our ills because,\n1. things produced by the gods do not result from a free choice, but\nfrom a natural necessity; because, as parts of the universe, the gods\nact on other parts of the universe, and contribute to the life of the\nuniversal organism. 2. Terrestrial beings themselves add very much to\nthe things that are derived from the stars; 3. the things given us by\nthe stars are not evil, but are altered by being mingled; 4. the life\nof the universe is not regulated (in advance) for the individual, but\nonly for the totality; 5. matter does not experience modifications\ncompletely corresponding to the impressions it receives, and cannot\nentirely submit to the form given to it.\n\n\nMAGIC OCCURS BY LOVE WORKING AS SYMPATHY.\n\n40. But how shall we explain the enchantments of magic? By the sympathy\nthat things have for each other, the accord of those that are similar,\nthe struggle of those that are contrary, the variety of the powers\nof the various beings which contribute to the formation of a single\norganism; for many things are attracted towards each other and are\nmutually enchanted, without the intervention of a magician. The real\nmagic is the Love that reigns in the universe, with its contrary of\nHate. The first magician, him whom men consult to act by the means of\nhis philtres and enchantments, is Love; for it is from the natural\nmutual love of all things, and from the natural power they have to\ncompel each others' love, that is derived the efficaciousness of\nthe art of inspiring love by employing enchantments. By this art,\nmagicians bring together the natures which have an innate love for\neach other; they unite one soul to another as one cross-fertilizes\ndistant plants; by employing (symbolic) figures which possess special\nvirtues; by themselves taking certain attitudes, they noiselessly\nattract the powers of other beings, and induce them to conspire to\nunity so much the easier as they themselves are in unity. A being\nof the same disposition, but located outside of the universe, could\nneither by magic attractions fascinate, nor by his influence enchain\nany of the things contained in the world; on the contrary, from the\nmoment that he is not a stranger to the world, he can attract towards\nhimself other beings, knowing their mutual relations and attractions\nwithin the universal organism. There are indeed invocations, songs,\nwords, (symbolic) figures, and, for instance, certain sad attitudes\nand plaintive tones which exert a natural attraction. Their influence\nextends even to the soul--I mean, the irrational soul; for neither\nthe will nor the reason permit themselves to be subdued by the charms\nof music. This magic of music does not arouse any astonishment;\nnevertheless those who play or sing, charm and inspire love\nunintentionally. Nor does the virtue of prayers depend on their being\nheard by Beings that make free decisions; for these invocations do not\naddress themselves to free-will. Thus[160] when a man is fascinated\nby a serpent, he neither feels nor understands the influence exerted\non him; he perceives what he has felt only after having experienced\nit--the governing part of the soul cannot anyway experience anything of\nthe kind. Consequently when an invocation is addressed to a Being, some\nthing results; either for him who makes this invocation, or for some\nother person.\n\n\nHOW PRAYERS ARE ANSWERED.\n\n41. Neither the sun, nor any other star hears the prayers addressed\nto it. If they are granted, it is only by the sympathy felt by each\npart of the universe for every other; just as all parts of a cord are\ncaused to vibrate by excitation of any one part; or, just as causing\none string of a lyre to vibrate would cause all the others to vibrate\nin unison, because they all belong to the same system of harmony. If\nsympathy can go as far as making one lyre respond to the harmonies\nof another, so much the more must this sympathy be the law of the\nuniverse, where reigns one single harmony, although its register\ncontains contraries, as well as similar and analogous parts. The things\nwhich harm men, like anger, which, together with the bile, relate to\nthe liver, were not created for the purpose of harming men. It is as if\na person, in the act of taking fire from a hearth accidentally wounded\nanother. This person is doubtless the author of the wound because he\ntransferred the fire from one place to another; but the wound occurred\nonly because the fire could not be contained by the being to whom it\nhad been transmitted.\n\n\nAS THE STARS ANSWER PRAYERS UNCONSCIOUSLY, THEY DO NOT NEED MEMORIES\nTHEREFOR.\n\n42. The stars therefore have no need of memory to remember our prayers,\nnor senses to receive them; thus is solved the problem considered\nabove. Nor even, if our prayers are answered, is this due, as some\nthink, to any free will on their part. Whether or not we address\nprayers to them, they exercise over us a certain influence by the mere\nfact that, along with us, they form part of the universe.\n\n\nTHE PRAYERS OF EVEN THE EVIL ARE ANSWERED, IF MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH\nNATURAL LAW.\n\nThere are many forces that are exercised involuntarily, either\nautomatically, without any invitation, or with the assistance of\nskill. Thus, in an animal, one part is naturally favorable or harmful\nto another; that is why both physician and magician, each by his\ncharacteristic arts, force one thing to communicate its power to\nanother. Likewise, the universe communicates to its parts something of\nits own power, either automatically, or as a result of the attraction\nexercised by the individual. This is a natural process, since he who\nasks is not foreign to it. Neither should we be astonished if even an\nevil individual obtains his requests; for do not the evil drink from\nthe same streams as do the good? In this case, the granting is done\nunconsciously; it grants simply, and what is granted harmonizes with\nthe order of the universe. Consequently, if an evil individual asks and\nobtains what is within reach of all, there is no reason why he should\nbe punished.\n\n\nTHE WORLD-SOUL AND STARS ARE IMPASSIBLE.\n\nIt is therefore wrong to hold that the universe is subject to\nexperiencing passions. In the first place, the governing Soul is\nentirely impassible; then, if there be any passions in her, they are\nexperienced only by her parts; as to her, being unable to experience\nanything contrary to her nature, she herself remains impassible. To\nexperience passions seems suitable to stars considered as parts of the\nuniverse; but, considered in themselves, they are impassible, because\ntheir wills are impassible, and their bodies remain as unalterable\nas their nature, because their soul loses nothing, and their bodies\nremain the same, even if, by their soul, they communicate something of\nthemselves to inferior beings. If something issues from them, they do\nnot notice it; if some increase happens, they pay no attention.\n\n\nHOW THE WISE MAN ESCAPES ALL ENCHANTMENTS.\n\n43. How will the worthy man be able to escape the action of the\nenchantments and the philtres employed by magic? His soul escapes\nthem entirely; his reason is impassible, and cannot be led to change\nopinions. The worthy man, therefore, can suffer only through the\nirrational part that he receives from the universe; this part alone\n\"suffers.\" Nor will he be subdued by the loves inspired by philtres,\nbecause love presupposes a soul's inclination to experience what\nanother soul experiences. As enchantments act on the irrational part\nof the soul, their power will be destroyed by fighting them; and by\nresisting them by other enchantments. As a result of enchantments,\ntherefore, it is possible to experience sicknesses, and even death;\nand, in general, all the affections relative to the body. Every part of\nthe universe is subject to experiencing an affection caused in it by\nanother part or by the universe itself (with the exception of the wise\nman, who remains impassible); without there being anything contrary to\nnature it can also feel this affection only at the end of some time.\n\n\nTHE PSYCHOLOGY OF GUARDIANS.\n\nThe guardians themselves can \"suffer\" through their irrational part.\nThey must have memory and senses, by nature they must be susceptible to\nenchantments, of being induced to commit certain acts, and to hear the\nprayers addressed to them. The guardians subjected to this influence\nare those who approach men, and they are the more subdued thereby as\nthey approach to men closer.\n\n\nAN ACTIVE LIFE MAKES MEN MORE LIABLE TO ENCHANTMENTS.\n\nEvery being that has some relation with another can be bewitched by\nhim; he is bewitched and attracted by the being with whom he is in\nrelations. Only the being concentrated in himself (by the contemplation\nof the intelligible world) cannot be bewitched. Magic exercises its\ninfluence on every action, and on every active life; for active\nlife trends towards the things which charm it. Hence the (Platonic)\nexpression, \"The subjects of the magnanimous Erechtheus are remarkable\nby the beauty of their countenances.\" What indeed does one being feel\nin his relations with another? He is drawn towards him, not by the art\nof magic, but by the seduction exerted by nature, which harmonizes and\nunites two beings joining them one to the other, not by locality, but\nby the power of the philtres employed.\n\n\nMAGIC HAS POWER OVER MAN BY HIS AFFECTIONS AND WEAKNESSES.\n\n44. Only the man devoted to contemplation can defy enchantments,\ninasmuch as none can be bewitched by himself. The man who contemplates\nhas become unified; he has become what he contemplates, his reason is\nsheltered from all seductive influences. He does what he ought to do,\nhe accomplishes his life and his proper function. As to the remainder\nof humanity, the soul does not fulfil her characteristic function,\nnor does reason determine its action; the irrational soul becomes the\nprinciple of action, and the passions furnish men with directions.\nThe influence of a magic attraction manifests in the disposition to\nmarriage, in the care we take of our children, and, in general, in all\nthat the bait of pleasure leads us to do. Amidst our actions there\nare some that are provoked by an irrational power, either by anger,\nor the general faculty of desire of the soul. Other actions relate to\npolitical life, like the desire of obtaining office, and they spring\nfrom a desire to command. Those actions in which we propose to avoid\nsome evil, are inspired by fear; while those actions in relating to the\ndesire to possess more than others, are inspired by cupidity. Last,\nthose actions relating to utility, and to the satisfaction of our\nneeds, show with what force nature has attached us to life.\n\n\nHONESTY ESCAPES MAGIC ONLY BECAUSE IT RESULTS FROM CONTEMPLATION OF THE\nINTELLIGIBLE.\n\nIt may perhaps be said that the actions whose aim is noble and honest\nescape the influences of magic; otherwise contemplation itself would\nbe subject thereto. This is true, that the man who performs deeds of\nhonesty as being inevitable, with his eyes fixed on true Beauty, could\nnever be bewitched. He knows duty, and the aim of his life (which would\nlimit his efforts) is not anything on earth or in the (universe). It\nmay indeed be objected that he is bewitched and attached here below by\nthe magic force of human nature, which binds him to the lives of others\nand of himself. It would even be reasonable to say that we should not\nseparate ourselves from the body because of the attachment for him\ninspired by some magic charm. As to the man who (to contemplation)\nprefers practical activity, and who contents himself with the beauty\ndiscovered therein, he is evidently misled by the deceptive traces of\nthe Beautiful, since he seeks beauty in inferior things. Every activity\nunfolded in the domain of what has nothing but the appearance of\ntruth, every inclination for this kind of thing supposes that the soul\nis deceived by what attracts it. That is the way in which the magic\npower of nature is exercised.\n\n\nHOW TO AVOID MAGIC ENCHANTMENTS.\n\nIndeed, to follow what is not Good as if it was the Good, to let\noneself be misled by its appearance, and by irrational inclinations,\nthat is the characteristic of a man who in spite of himself is led\nwhither he does not wish to go. Now does this not really amount to\nyielding to a magic charm? He alone escapes every magic charm who,\nthough he be carried away by the lower faculties of his soul, considers\ngood none of the objects that seem such to these faculties, who calls\ngood only what he by himself knows to be such, without being misled by\nany deceptive appearance; and who regards as good not what he has to\nseek, but what he possesses veritably. Then only could he in no way be\nmisled by any magic charm.\n\n\nEVERY BEING THEREFORE IS A SPECIALIZED ORGAN OF THE UNIVERSE.\n\n45. This discussion teaches us that each one of the beings contained\nin the universe contributes to the purpose of the universe by its\n\"actions\" and \"passions\" according to its nature and dispositions, as,\nin an organism, each organ contributes to the final purpose of the\nentire body, by fulfilling the function assigned to it by its nature\nand constitution. From this each organ derives its place and role, and\nbesides communicates something else to the other organs, and from them\nreceives all that its nature would allow. Somehow, all the organs feel\nwhat is going on in the others, and if each of them became an organism,\nit would be quite ready to fulfil the function of an organism, which\nfunction differs from that of being merely an organ.\n\n\nHUMAN NATURE IS INTERMEDIATE, SUFFERING WITH THE WHOLE, BUT ALSO ACTING\nON IT.\n\nWe are thus shown our condition. On the one hand, we exercise a certain\naction on the whole; on the other, we not only experience the passions\nthat it is natural for our body to experience in its relations with\nother bodies, but we also introduce into these relations the soul\nwhich constitutes us, bound as we are to the kindred things which\nsurround us by our natural resemblance to them. Indeed, by our souls\nand dispositions we become, or rather, we already are similar on one\nhand to the inferior beings of the demonic world, and on the other, to\nthe superior beings of the intelligible world. Our nature cannot be\nignored, therefore. Not all of us receive, not all of us give the same\nthing. How indeed could we communicate to others the good, if we do not\npossess it? or receive it, if our nature was not capable of it?\n\n\nBY A SECRET ROAD EACH ONE IS LED TO DIVINE RETRIBUTION.\n\nThus the evil man shows what he is, and he is by his nature impelled\ntowards what already dominates him, both while he is here below, or\nafter he has left this place; when he passes into the place towards\nwhich his inclinations draw him. The virtuous man, on the contrary,\nhas, in all these respects, a different fate. Each one is thus driven\nby his nature, as by some occult force, towards the place whither he is\nto go. In this universe, therefore, there obtains an admirable power\nand order, since, by a secret, and hidden path, each one is led to\nthe unescapable condition assigned to him by divine justice. The evil\nman does not know this, and is, in spite of himself, conducted to the\nplace in the universe which he is to occupy. The wise man knows it,\nand himself proceeds to his destined abode. Before leaving this life,\nhe knows what residence inevitably awaits him, and the hope of dwelling\nthere some day in company with the divinities fills his life with\nhappiness.\n\n\nEXISTENCE OF HEAVEN; HELL'S TORMENTS ARE REFORMATORY.\n\nThe parts of each small organism undergo changes and sympathetic\naffections which are not much felt, because these parts are not\nindividual organisms (and they exist only for some time, and in some\nkinds of organisms). But in the universal organism, where the parts\nare separated by so great distances, where each one follows its own\ninclinations, where there is a multitude of different animals, the\nmovements and change of place must be more considerable. Thus the sun,\nthe moon and the other stars are seen successively to occupy different\nplaces, and to revolve regularly. It is not unreasonable therefore to\nsuppose that souls would change location, as they change character, and\nthat they would dwell in a place suitable to their dispositions. They\nwould thus contribute to the order of the universe by occupying some,\na place analogous to the head in the human body; and others, a place\nanalogous to the human feet; for the universe admits of place for all\ndegrees of perfection. When a soul does not choose the best (actions),\nand yet does not attach herself to what is worst, she would naturally\npass into some other place, which is indeed pure, but yet proportioned\nto the mediocrity she has chosen. As to the punishments, they resemble\nthe remedies applied by physicians to sickly organs. On some the\nphysician lays certain substances; in some he makes incisions, or he\nchanges the condition of some others, to reestablish the health of the\nwhole system, by giving to each organ the special treatment suitable\nto it. Likewise, the health of the universe demands that the one (soul)\nbe changed; that another be taken away from the locality where she\nlanguishes, and be located where she would recover from the disease.\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE.\n\nPsychological Questions--III.\n\nAbout the Process of Vision and Hearing.\n\n\nIT IS UNCERTAIN WHETHER AN INTERMEDIARY BODY BE IMPLIED BY VISION.\n\n1. Above[161] we suggested the question whether it be possible to see\nwithout some medium such as the air or a diaphanous body[162]; we\nshall now try to consider it. It has already been asserted that in\ngeneral the soul cannot see or feel without the intermediation of some\nbody; for, when completely separated from the body (the soul dwells\nin the intelligible world). But, as touch consists of perception,\nnot indeed of intelligible entities, but only of sense-objects, the\nsoul cannot see or feel without the intermediation of some body; for\nwhen completely separated from some body, the soul dwells in the\nintelligible world. But, as touch consists of perception, not indeed\nof intelligible entities, but only of sense-object, the soul in order\nto come in contact with these sense-objects, must enter into cognitive\nor affective relation with them by the means of intermediaries which\nmust possess an analogous nature; and that is why the knowledge of\nbodies must be acquired by the means of corporeal organs. Through these\norgans which are so interrelated as to form a sort of unity, the soul\napproaches sense-objects in a manner such as to establish effective\ncommunion. That contact between the organ and the cognized object must\nbe established is evident enough for tangible objects, but is doubtful\nfor visible objects. Whether contact be necessary for hearing is a\nquestion we shall have to discuss later.[163] Here we shall first\ndiscuss whether sight demand a medium between the eye and color.\n\n\nREFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE'S INSISTENCE ON A MEDIUM OF SIGHT.\n\nIf a medium of sight exist, it exists only by accident, and in no way\ncontributes to sight.[164] Since opaque and earthy bodies hinder sight,\nand as we see so much the better as the medium is more subtle, it may\nbe said, indeed, that mediums contribute to sight, or at least, if they\ndo not contribute such thereto, they may be hindrances as slight (as\npossible); but evidently a medium, however refined, is some sort of an\nobstacle, however slight.\n\n\nTHOUGH THE MEDIUM EXPERIENCE AFFECTION, THE ORGANS FEEL IT BETTER\nWITHOUT THE MEDIUM.\n\n(There is an opinion that) the medium first receives and then transmits\nthe affection, and impression. For instance, if some one stand in\nfront of us, and directs his gaze at some color, he also sees it;\nbut the color would not reach us unless the medium had experienced\nthe affection. To this it may be answered that there is no necessity\nfor the affections to be experienced by the medium, inasmuch as the\naffection is already experienced by the eye, whose function consists\nprecisely in being affected by color; or at least, if the medium be\naffected, its affection differs from that of the eye. For instance, a\nreed interposed between the hand and the fish called the \"torpedo,\" or\n\"electric ray,\" does not feel the same numbness which it nevertheless\ncommunicates to the holding hand; still, the hand would not be affected\nwith numbness unless the reed formed a communication between the fish\nand the hand.[165] However, the matter is not beyond discussion, for\n(even without any intermediary, if for instance) the fisher were in\n(direct contact) with the \"ray\" inside of the net, he would also feel\nthe electric numbness. This communication therefore seems based on\nsympathetic affections. That, by virtue of its nature, one being can\nbe sympathetically affected by some other being, does not necessarily\nimply that the medium, if different, shares that affection; at least\n(it is certain that) it is not affected in the same manner. In such a\ncase, the organ destined to experience the affection experiences it\nfar better when there is no medium, even when the medium itself is\nsusceptible to some affection.\n\n\nNECESSITY OF A MEDIUM IN THE THEORIES OF VARIOUS PHILOSOPHERS.\n\n2. If vision[166] presupposes the union of the \"light of the eye,\"[167]\nwith the light interposed (between the eye) and the sense-object\nitself, the interposed medium is the light, and this medium is\nnecessary, on this hypothesis. (On the theory of Aristotle) the colored\nsubstance produces a modification in the medium; but nothing here\nwould hinder this modification from reaching the eye itself, even\nwhen there is no medium. For, in this case, the medium is necessarily\nmodified before the eye is. (The Platonic philosophers) teach that\nvision operates by an effusion of the light of the eye. They have no\nneed to postulate a medium, unless indeed they should fear that the\nray of the eye should lose its way; but this ray is luminous, and\nthe light travels in a straight line. (The Stoics) explain vision by\nthe resistance experienced by the visual ray. They cannot do without\na medium.[168] (The Atomists and) the believers in \"images\" (such\nas Epicurus), insist that these images move in emptiness, thereby\nimplying the existence of a free space to avoid hindering the images.\nConsequently as they will be hindered in a direct ratio to the\nexistence of a medium, this opinion does not run counter to our own\nhypothesis (that there is no medium).\n\n\nA COSMOLOGICAL MEDIUM IS NECESSARY, BUT IT AFFECTS SIGHT ONLY\nACCIDENTALLY.\n\nThose who (with Plotinos himself) teach that vision operates by\nsympathy, assert that vision is poorer through a medium, because this\nmedium hinders, fetters, and weakens sympathy. In this case, indeed,\nthe medium necessarily weakens sympathy even though it shared the\nsame nature (as the eye and the object), and was affected in the same\nmanner. (It acts like the integument) of some body that is deeply\nburned by fire applied to it; the interior parts are less affected\nbecause they are protected by the exterior parts. There is no doubt\nthat the parts of one and the same animal will be less affected in\nexperiencing sympathy because of the existence of a medium. The\naffection will be weakened according to the nature of the medium,\nbecause such a medium would hinder excess of affection, unless indeed\nthat which is transmitted (by one part to another) is not such as to\nfail to affect the medium. But if the universe sympathize with itself\nbecause it constitutes a single organism, and if we are affected\nbecause we are contained within this single organism, and form part of\nit, why should any continuity be necessary for us to feel a distant\nobject? The single organism, indeed, could not be continuous without\nthe continuity of some medium; this continuous medium is affected only\nby accident; but otherwise we would have to admit that all can be\naffected by all. But if these two objects are affected in one manner,\nand other two objects are affected in another manner, there might not\nalways be need of a medium. Whoever asserts the need of a medium for\nvision will have to advance a very good argument, inasmuch as that\nwhich traverses the air does not always affect the air, and often\nlimits itself to dividing the air. Thus when a stone falls the only\nthing that happens to the air is that it fails to support the stone.\nAs falling is part of the stone's nature, it would be unreasonable to\nassert that its falling was due to the reaction exerted by the ambient\nair. Otherwise we would have to assert that it is this same reaction of\nthe ambient air that makes fire ascend, which is absurd; because the\nfire, by the rapidity of its motion, forestalls this reaction. That, by\nthe very rapidity of the motion, reaction is accelerated, takes place\nonly by accident, and has no relation to the upward impulsion; for\ntrees grow from above without receiving any (upward) impulsion. Even\nwe, when walking, divide the air without being pushed by the reaction\nof the air; the air behind us limits itself to filling the void we have\ncreated. If then the air allow itself to be divided by bodies without\nbeing affected by them, what would hinder the air from permitting free\ntransit for the images to reach the eye, without being thereby divided?\n\n\nIMAGES DO NOT REACH US BY EFFLUENCE.\n\nIf these images do not reach us by some sort of effluence, why should\nthe air be affected, and why should we ourselves be affected only as a\nresult of the affection experienced by the air? If we felt only because\nthe air had been affected before us, we would attribute the sensation\nof sight not to the visible object, but to the air located near us,\nas occurs with heat. In the latter case it is not the distant fire,\nbut the air located near us which, being heated, then warms us; for\nthe sensation of heat presupposes contact, which does not occur with\nvision. We see, not because the sense-object is imposed on the eye (but\nbecause the medium is illuminated); now it is necessary for the medium\nto be illuminated because the air by itself is dark. If the air were\nnot dark, it would have no need of light; for (to effectuate vision)\nthe obscurity, which forms an obstacle to vision, must be overcome\nby light. That is perhaps the reason why an object placed very near\nthe eye is not seen; for it brings with it the darkness of the air,\ntogether with its own.\n\n\nUSELESSNESS OF AIR AS TRANSMITTING MEDIUM PROVED FROM SIGHT OF OBJECTS\nAT NIGHT.\n\n3. A strong proof that the forms of sense-objects are not seen merely\nbecause the air, on being affected, transmits them by relays from point\nto point, is that even in darkness the fire, the stars, and their\nforms may be seen. In this case no one would claim that the forms of\nthe objects, being impressed on the obscure air, are transmitted to\nthe eye; otherwise, there would be no obscurity, as the fire, while\ntransmitting its form, would illuminate. Indeed, in the profound\nobscurity in which the light of the stars is not seen, the fire of\nsignals and of light-houses may be perceived. Should any one, in\nopposition to the testimony of his senses, claim that even in this case\nthe fire penetrates the air, he should be answered by having it pointed\nout to him that in that case human vision should distinguish the\nsmallest objects which are in the air, instead of being limited to the\nperception of the fire. If then we see what is beyond a dark medium, it\nwould be much better seen without any medium whatever.\n\n\nABSENCE OF MEDIUM WOULD INTERFERE WITH VISION ONLY BY DESTROYING\nSYMPATHY.\n\nIt might indeed be objected that without medium, vision ceases. This\noccurs not because of the lack of medium, but because the sympathy of\nthe (universal) organism is in such a case destroyed since a medium\npresupposes that all the parts of this organism together form but a\nsingle being. It would indeed seem to be a general condition necessary\nfor sensation that the universal organism be sympathetic with itself;\notherwise, no one thing could participate in the power of any other\nthing that might happen to be very distant.\n\n\nVISION IS NOT DEPENDENT ON THE AFFECTION OF THE MEDIUM.\n\nHere is another important (related) question. If there existed another\nworld and organism which had no relation with our world, and if on\nthe surface of the sky was an eye that was looking, would it perceive\nthis other world at a moderate distance, or would it have no relation\nthereto? This question will be considered later.[169] Now however we\nshall give a further proof that the medium has nothing to do with\nvision. If the air were affected, it would experience a material\naffection, similar to the figure impressed on wax. In this case, a\ncertain part of the object would be impressed on a certain part of the\nair; and consequently, the part of the air nearest to the eye would\nreceive a part of the visible object, and this part would be of a\nsize equal to that of the pupil. Now a visible object is seen in its\nentirety, and all those who are in the air equally see it, whether they\nbehold it from the front, or side, or whether they be one behind the\nother, without however forming mutual obstacles. This proves that every\npart of the air contains the entire visible object. This cannot be\nexplained by any corporeal affection, but by higher laws, suitable to\nthe soul, and to the (universal) organism which everywhere responds to\nitself.\n\n\nMUTUAL RELATION OF THE EYE'S LIGHT AND THE OBJECTIVE LIGHT.\n\n4. What is the mutual relation between the light that emanates from\nthe eye, and the light which is exterior to the eye, and which extends\nbetween the eye and the object?[170] Light has no need of air as a\nmedium, unless indeed somebody should undertake to say that there\nis no light without air, in which case air would be a medium only\naccidentally. Light itself, however, is an unaffected medium, for\nthere is no necessity here for an affection, but only for a medium;\nconsequently, if light be not a body, there is no need of a body (to\nact as medium). It might be objected that sight has no need either of a\nforeign light nor of a medium to see near by, but has need of them for\nvision at a distance. Later[171] we shall consider whether or not light\nwithout air be possible. Now let us consider the first point.\n\n\nINTERMEDIARY LIGHT IS UNNECESSARY, PARTLY BEING AN OBSTACLE.\n\nIf the light which is contiguous to the eye should become animated,\nand if the soul should, so to speak, interpenetrate it, uniting with\nit as she unites with the interior light, there would be no need\nof intermediary light for the perception of the visible object.\nSight resembles touch; it operates in light by somehow transferring\nitself to the object, without the medium experiencing any affection.\nNow consider: does the sight transfer itself to the visible object\nbecause of the existence of an interval between them, or because\nof the existence of some body in the interval? In the latter case,\nvision would occur by removing this obstacle. If, on the other hand,\nit be because of the existence of a mere interval, then the nature\nof the visible object must seem inert and entirely inactive. This is\nhowever impossible; not only does touch announce and experience the\nneighboring object but, by the affection it experiences, it proclaims\nthe differences of the tangible object, and even perceives it from\na distance, if nothing oppose it; for we perceive the fire at the\nsame time as the air that surrounds us, and before this air has been\nheated by the fire. A solid body heats better than does the air; and\nconsequently it receives heat through the air, rather than by the\nintermediation of air. If then the visible object have the power to\nact, and if the organ have the power of experiencing (or suffering),\nwhy should sight need any intermediary (besides light) to exert its\npower? This would really be needing an obstacle! When the light of the\nsun reaches us, it does not light up the air before lighting us, but\nlights both simultaneously; even before it has reached the eye, while\nit is still elsewhere, we have already seen, just as if the air was\nnot affected at all; that is the case, probably, because the medium\nhas undergone no modification, and because light has not yet presented\nitself to our view. Under this hypothesis (which asserts that the air\nreceives and transmits an affection) it would be difficult to explain\nwhy during the night we see the stars and, in general, any kind of fire.\n\n\nNOT EVEN THE LIGHT OF THE EYE IS TO BE CONSIDERED AS MEDIUM.\n\nOn the hypothesis that the soul remains within herself, while making\nuse of the light (emanated from the eye) as a rod to reach the visible\nobject, a very sharp perception would be caused by the resistance\nexperienced by the light in its tension[172] and sense-color. In\nso far as it is color, the light itself would possess the property\nof reflecting light. In this case, the contact would take place by\na medium. But already before this the light has reached the object\nwithout any medium; so that the later contact operated by a medium\nwould produce cognition by a sort of memory or reasoning--which is not\nthe case.\n\n\nTHE OBJECTIVE LIGHT DOES NOT TRANSMIT THE IMAGE BY RELAYS.\n\nThe hypothesis that the light contiguous to the visible object is\naffected, and transmits this affection by relays from point to point\ninto the eye, is essentially identical with that theory which supposes\nthat the medium must be preliminarily modified by the visible object; a\nhypothesis that has already been discussed above.\n\n\nNEITHER FOR HEARING IS THE AIR NECESSARY AS A MEDIUM.\n\n5. As to hearing, there are several theories. One is that the air is\nfirst set in motion, and that this motion, being transmitted unaltered\nfrom point to point from the (location of the) sound-producing air\nas far as the ear, causes the sound to arrive to the sense. Again,\nanother theory is that the medium is here affected accidentally, and\nonly because it happens to be interposed; so that, if the medium were\nannihilated, we would feel the sound immediately on its production by\nthe shock of two bodies. We might think that the air must first be set\nin motion, but the medium interposed (between the first moved air and\nthe ear) plays a different part. The air here seems to be the sovereign\ncondition of the production of sound; for, at the origin of the sound,\nthe shock of two bodies would produce no sound if the air, compressed\nand struck by their rapid concussion did not transmit the motion from\npoint to point as far as the ear.[173] But if the production of the\nsound depend on the impulsion impressed on the air, the (qualitative)\ndifference between voices and (instrumental) sounds will challenge\nexplanation; for there is great difference (of \"timbre\") between metal\nstruck by metal of the same kind, or another. These differences are\nnot merely quantitative, and cannot be attributed to the air which\n(everywhere) is the same, nor to the force of the stimulus (which may\nbe equal in intensity). Another theory (of Aristotle's) is that the\nproduction of voices and sound is due to the air, because the impulsion\nimpressed on the air is sonorous. (To this it should be answered\nthat) air, in so far as it is air, is not the cause of sound; for it\nresounds only in so far as it resembles some solid body, remaining in\nits situation, before it dilates, as if it were something solid.[174]\nThe (cause of the sound) then is the shock between objects, which forms\nthe sound that reaches the sense of hearing. This is demonstrated by\nthe sounds produced in the interior of animals, without the presence\nof any air, whenever one part is struck by some other. Such is the\nsound produced by certain articulations when they are bent (as, the\nknee); or certain bones, when they are struck against each other, or\nwhen they break; in this case air has nothing to do with the production\nof the sound. These considerations compel a theory of hearing similar\nto our conclusions about sight. The perception of audition, like\nthat of vision, therefore consists in a repercussion (an affection\nsympathetically felt) in the universal organism.\n\n\nTHE RELATION OF THE AIR TO THE LIGHT.\n\n6. Could light exist without air, if the sun illuminated the surface of\nbodies, and if there were a void in the interval which is accidentally\nilluminated by virtue of its location (between the sun and the bodies)?\nIt is certain that if the other things were affected because the air\nitself was affected, and if light were nothing more than an affection\nof the air, that is, its substance; then indeed this affection could\nnot exist without the experiencing subject (the air). But (in our\nview) light is not essentially characteristic of air as such; for all\nfiery and brilliant bodies, among which are precious stones, possess\na luminous color. Could that which passes from a brilliant body into\nsome other body exist without that other body? If light be but a simple\nquality of an object, and as every quality implies a subject on which\nit depends, light will have to be sought in the body in which it\nresides. If, on the contrary, light be only an actualization produced\nby some other thing, and if there be no body contiguous to the luminous\nobject, and it be entirely surrounded by a void, why could light\nnot exist, and radiate upwards (as well as downwards, and in every\ndirection)? Since light radiates, why should it not radiate without\nhindrance? If its nature be to fall, it will spontaneously descend; for\nneither the air nor any illuminated body will make it issue from the\nilluminating body, nor can force it to advance, since it is neither\nan accident that implies a subject, nor an affection that implies an\naffected object. Otherwise, the light would remain (in the illuminated\nbody) when the object from which it emanates should happen to withdraw;\nbut since the light withdraws with it, it radiates. In what direction\ndoes light radiate? (Its radiation) demands no more than the existence\nof sufficient space; otherwise the body of the sun would lose its\nactualization; that is, the light it radiates. In this case light would\nnot be the quality of a subject, but the actualization that emanates\nfrom a subject, but which does not pass into any other subject (as a\nkind of undulation); but if another subject be present, it will suffer\nan affection. As life, which constitutes an actualization of the soul,\naffects the body if it be present, and does not any the less constitute\nan actualization if the body be absent, likewise light constitutes an\nactualization subject to the same conditions. It is not the obscurity\nof the air that begets light, nor obscurity mingled with the earth\nwhich produces an impure light; otherwise one might produce something\nsweet by mingling some thing with what is bitter. The statement that\nlight is a modification of the air, is incomplete without the addition\nthat the air must itself be modified by this modification, and that the\nobscurity of the air is no longer obscure after having undergone that\nchange. The air itself, however, remains what it was, just as if it had\nnot been affected. The affection belongs only to that which has been\naffected. Color therefore does not belong to the air, but subsists in\nitself; the air's only function is its presence. But enough of this.\n\n\nDOES THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE LUMINOUS SOURCE ABANDON THE LIGHT TO\nDESTRUCTION; OR DOES THE LIGHT FOLLOW IT?\n\n7. It might be asked whether the withdrawal of the object from which\nlight emanates abandons the light to destruction, or does the light\nfollow the source into withdrawal? This question is related to the\nformer one; (and it may be said that) if the light inhere in the\nilluminated body in a manner such as to have become characteristic of\nit, the light perishes with it. The light is an immanent actualization,\nfor otherwise it would surround the object from which it emanates,\nand remain within it, accumulating there. If this were so, the light\ncould not vanish so long as the object from which it emanates itself\ncontinues to subsist. If this object pass from one place to another,\nlight would pass thither also, not because it turns back on itself or\nchanges locality, but because the actualization of the luminous object\nexists and is present as soon as nothing opposes it. If the distance\nfrom the sun to the earth were much more considerable than it really\nis, the light of the sun would nevertheless reach us, providing no\nobstacle were interposed. On the one hand, there is in the luminous\nbody an actualization, a kind of superabundant life, a principle\nand source of activity; on the other hand, beyond the limits of the\nluminous body, exists a second actualization which is the image of the\nactualization characteristic of this body, and which never separates\nitself from the body. Every being has an actualization which is its\nimage; so that, as soon as the being exists, its actualization exists\nalso; and so long as the being subsists, its actualization radiates\nnearer or further. Actualizations (differ indeed); some are feeble and\nobscure, others are secret or hidden, others are powerful and radiate\nafar. When an actualization radiates at a distance it must be admitted\nto exist there where it acts, where it exercises and manifests its\npower. Consequently one can see light shine from the eyes of animals\nwhose eyes are naturally brilliant[175]; likewise when the animals\nthat exert a concentrated interior fire happen to open their eyelids,\nthey radiate rays of light into the darkness; while, when they close\ntheir eyes, no more light exists outside them. The light therefore does\nnot perish; only, it is no longer produced exteriorly. It does not\nre-enter into the animal but merely ceases to exist exteriorly, for the\nvisual fire does not pass outside, remaining inside. Is light itself\nthen within? At least this light remains within; but (when the eye is\nclosed) the eyelid forms an obstacle to its diffusion.\n\n\nLIGHT AS ACTUALIZATION IS THE BEING OF THE LUMINOUS BODY, AND IS\nINCORPOREAL.\n\nThus the light that emanates from bodies is the actualization of the\nluminous body which is active exteriorly. The light in the bodies whose\noriginal nature is such, is the formal being of the originally luminous\nbody. When such a body has been mingled with matter, it produces color.\nThe actualization alone does not suffice to give color; it produces\nonly the hue, because the actualization is the property of a subject,\nand depends on it, so that nothing can be withdrawn from the subject\nwithout simultaneously being withdrawn from its actualization. Light\nis entirely incorporeal, though it be the actualization of a body.\nIt could not therefore properly be said of light that it withdraws\nor is present. The true state of affairs is entirely different; for\nthe light, so far as it is the actualization of the luminous body,\nis its very being. The image produced in a mirror is therefore an\nactualization of the visible object, which acts on anything that is\npassive (that can suffer, or experience), without letting any of its\nsubstance escape by any wastage. If the object be present, the image\nappears in the mirror; it is as it were the image of the color that\npossesses some particular figure. When the object withdraws, the\ndiaphanous body no longer possesses what it possessed while the visible\nobject was acting on the mirror. A similar condition is that of the\nsoul; her actualization dwells within the (world's) body so long as\nthis soul herself dwells within it.\n\n\nLIFE AND LIGHT DO NOT PERISH, BUT ARE NO MORE THERE.\n\n(Curiosity might lead some one to ask about) a force that were not\nthe actualization of the Soul, but which only proceeded from this\nactualization, such as the life which we say is proper to the body. Is\nthe case of such a force similar to that of the light characteristic\nof bodies? We said that the light inheres in colored bodies, so far as\nthat which produces the colors inheres in the bodies. As to the life\nproper to the bodies, we think that the body possesses it so far as the\nsoul is present; for nothing can be inanimate. When the body perishes,\nand when it is no longer assisted by the soul which communicated life\nto it, nor by the actualization of this soul, how should life remain in\nthe body? What! Has this life perished? No: this life itself has not\nperished, for it is only the image of an irradiation; it would not be\ncorrect to say more than that it is no more there.[176]\n\n\nA WORLD OUTSIDE OF OUR WORLD WOULD NOT BE VISIBLE.\n\n8. If there were a body outside of our world, and if an eye observed\nit from here without any obstacle, it is doubtful that the eye could\nsee that body, because the eye would have no affection common to it;\nfor community of affection is caused by the coherence of the single\norganism (that is, the unity of the world). Since this community of\naffection (or, sympathy), supposes that sense-objects and that the\nsenses belong to the single organism, a body located outside of the\nworld would not be felt, unless it were part of the world. In this\ncase, it would be felt. If it were not a part of the world, but yet\nby its color and other qualities it was conformed to the organ that\nwas to cognize it, would it be felt? No, it would not be felt, that\nis, if such a hypothesis (of a body located outside of the world)\nwere at all admissible. If however, anyone should refuse to admit\nsuch a hypothesis, he would pretend that it is absurd that the eye\nshould not see the color located in front of it, and that the other\nsenses do not perceive the qualities before them. That is the reason\nof its absurdity. For we are active or passive only because we are\nintegral parts of the single organism, and are located within it. Is\nanything still left to be considered? If what we have said suffices,\nour demonstration is finished; otherwise we shall have to give still\nfurther proofs to support our proposition.\n\n\nSENSATION IS LIMITED TO COMMON INTEGRAL PARTS OF THE UNIVERSE.\n\nEvery organism is coherent (that is, is sympathetic with itself). In\nthe case of a single organism, our demonstration suffices, and all\nthings will experience common affections so far as they constitute\nparts of the single organism. The plea that a body exterior to the\nworld could be felt because of its resemblance (is ill-founded because\nperception is characteristic of an organism and because it is the\norganism that possesses perception. For its organ resembles (the\nperceived object); thus sensation would be the perception presented to\nthe soul by means of organs similar to the perceived objects. If then\nthe organism feel not only its contents, but also objects resembling\nthem, it will perceive these things by virtue of its organic nature;\nand these things will be perceived not because they are contents\nthereof, but by virtue of their resemblance thereto. It seems rather\nthat perceived objects must be perceived in the measure of their\nresemblance, because the soul has familiarized herself with them, and\nhas assimilated them to herself. If then the soul which has assimilated\nthese objects to herself differ from them, the things which were\nsupposed to have become assimilated to her will remain entirely foreign\nto her. The absurdity of this consequence shows us that there is a\nflaw in the hypothesis; for it affirms simultaneously that the soul\nexists, and does not exist, that the things are both conformable and\ndifferent, similar and dissimilar. Since then this hypothesis implies\ncontradictories, it is not admissible; for it supposes that the soul\nexists in this world, as a result of the world, both being and not\nbeing universal, both being and not being different, both being and not\nbeing perfect. The above hypothesis must therefore be abandoned; and\nsince it implies a contradiction, no reasonable consequence could be\ndeduced therefrom.\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT.\n\nOf Nature, Contemplation and Unity.[177]\n\n(_These three subjects are discussed in paragraphs 1-4, 5-7, and 8-16.\nThe plain paragraph numbers are those of the Teubner edition; those in\nparenthesis are the Creuzer (Didot) edition._)\n\n\nA. OF NATURE.\n\n\nINTRODUCTION: AS A JOKE, IT MAY BE SAID THAT EVEN PLANTS ASPIRE TO\nCONTEMPLATION.\n\n1. If as a preliminary pleasantry, we said that all beings, not only\nreasonable ones, but even the irrational, plants as well as the earth\nthat begets them, aspire to contemplation, and are directed towards\nthat end; that, as a result of the difference existing between them,\nsome really achieve contemplation, while others only accomplish a\nreflection or image of it, we would no doubt be told that this was an\nabsurd paradox. But as we are here engaged in a private study, we may,\nas an indulgence, support this paradox. While thus trifling, are we\nourselves not actually engaging in contemplation? Besides, it would be\nnot only we, but any who thus trifle, who aspire to contemplation. We\nmight even say that a joking child, as well as a meditating man both\naim at reaching contemplation when the former jokes, and the later\nmeditates. Indeed, there is not a single action that does not tend\ntowards contemplation; more or less externalizing it according as it is\ncarried out strictly or freely. In any case its ultimate aim is always\ncontemplation; but of this later.[178]\n\n\nENUMERATION OF THE LOWER FORMS OF CONTEMPLATION.\n\n(1). Let us begin by explaining what could be the nature of\ncontemplation (thought) that we attribute to the earth, to the trees,\nand to the plants (as we promised), and how the things produced\nand begotten by these beings can be reduced to the actuality of\ncontemplation; how nature, that is usually considered to lack reason\nand imagination, nevertheless is quite capable of some kind of\ncontemplation, thereby producing all its works, although speaking\nstrictly, it is incapable thereof.\n\n\nNATURE ACTS ON MATTER NOT MECHANICALLY BUT BY ITS POTENCY.\n\n2. Evidently nature possesses neither hands, nor feet, nor any natural\nor artificial instrument. For production its only need is a matter on\nwhich to work, and which it forms. The works of nature exclude all\nideas of mechanical operation; not by any impelling force, nor by\nusing levers nor machines does it produce varied colors, nor draw the\noutlines of objects. Even the workmen who form wax figures, to whose\nwork the operations of nature are often compared, cannot endue objects\nwith colors without borrowing them from elsewhere. Besides, we must\nobserve that these workmen contain a power which remains immutable, and\nby the sole means of which they produce their works with their hands.\nLikewise, nature contains a power which remains immovable as a whole;\nit has no need of some parts that would remain immovable, and others\nthat move. It is matter alone that undergoes movement, for the forming\npower is in no way moved. Were the forming power moved, it would no\nlonger be the first motor[179]; the first motor would no longer be\nnature, but whatever might, in its totality, be immovable.\n\n\nNATURE IS IMMOVABLE AS A FORM, BUT NOT AS COMPOUND OF MATTER AND FORM.\n\nIt may be objected that the (\"seminal) reason\" may remain immutable,\nbut that nature is distinct from reason, and is mutable. Considering\nthe totality of nature, we include reason. Considering only one of\nits parts as immutable, this part still will be reason. Nature must\nbe a form, and not a composite of matter and form. What need would\nit have of a matter that might be either cold or hot, since matter,\nwhen subjected to form, either possesses these qualities, or receives\nthem, or rather undergoes the action of reason before having any\nqualities. Indeed, it is not by fire that matter becomes fire, but\nby reason. Consequently, in animals and plants, it is the \"reasons\"\nthat produce[180]; and nature is a reason that produces other reasons,\nimparting some of herself to the substance subjected to her influence,\nwhile remaining within herself. The reason that consists in a visible\nshape occupies the last rank; it is dead, and produces nothing. The\nliving \"reason\" (which administers the body of the living being), being\nsister to the \"reason\" that produced the visible form (in begetting\nthe body of the living being), and possessing the same power as this\nreason, alone produces within the begotten being.[181]\n\n\nBOTH NATURE AND REASON ARE CONTEMPLATION; WHILE UNIVERSAL REASON IS\nBOTH SOUL AND NATURE.\n\n3. (2). How does nature produce? And how, in producing, does she\narrive at contemplation? Since she produces while remaining immovable\nwithin herself, and as she is a \"reason,\" she is a contemplation\nalso. Indeed, every action is produced according to a \"reason,\" and\nconsequently differs from it. Reason assists and presides over action,\nand consequently is not an action. Since reason is not an action,\nit is a contemplation. In universal Reason, the reason which holds\nthe last rank itself proceeds from contemplation, and in this sense\nstill deserves the name of contemplation because it is produced by\nthe contemplation (of the soul). However universal Reason, which is\nsuperior to the latter reason, may be considered under two points of\nview, as soul and as nature. (Let us begin by nature.)\n\nTHE REASON OF NATURE IS THE RESULT OF AN IMMOVABLE CONTEMPLATION.\n\nDoes reason, considered as nature, also derive from contemplation?\nYes, but on condition that it has contemplated itself somewhat;\nfor it is produced by a contemplation and a principle which was\ncontemplated. How does it contemplate itself? It does not possess\nthis mode of contemplation which proceeds from (discursive) reason;\nthat is to say, which consists in discursively considering what one\nhas in himself. Being a living \"reason\" and a productive power, how\ncould it fail discursively to consider what it contains? Because one\nconsiders discursively only what he does not yet possess. Now as nature\npossesses, she produces by the mere fact that she possesses. To be what\nshe is and to produce what she produces are identical. Because she is\n\"reason,\" she simultaneously is contemplation and contemplated object.\nAs she is all three: contemplation, contemplated object, and \"reason,\"\nnature produces by the mere fact that it is in her essence to be these\nthings. As we have shown, evidently action is a sort of contemplation;\nfor it is the result of the contemplation that remains immutable,\nwhich does nothing but contemplate, and which produces by its mere\ncontemplation.\n\n\nNATURE'S CONFESSION THAT HER MOTHER IS UNIVERSAL REASON, AND HER FATHER\nTHE FORMAL REASONS.\n\n4. (3). If anybody were to ask nature why she produces, Nature, if\nat all willing to listen and answer would say, \"You should not have\nquestioned me; you should have tried to understand, keeping silence,\nas I do; for I am not in the habit of speaking. What were you to\nunderstand? Here it is. First, what is produced is the work of my\nsilent speculation, a contemplation effected by my nature; for, myself\nbeing born of contemplation, mine is a contemplative nature. Besides,\nthat which in me contemplates, produces a work of contemplation, like\ngeometricians who, while contemplating, describe figures. For it is\nnot in describing figures, but in contemplating, that I let drop from\nwithin me the lines which outline the forms of the bodies. I preserve\nwithin me the disposition of my mother (the universal Soul), and that\nof the principles that beget me (the formal 'reasons'). The latter,\nindeed, are born of contemplation: I was begotten in the same way.\nThese principles gave birth to me without any action, or the mere\nfact that they are more powerful reasons, and that they contemplate\nthemselves.\"\n\nDESCRIPTION OF NATURE AS A WEAKER CONTEMPLATION.\n\nThese words signify that nature is a soul begotten by a superior Soul\nthat possesses a more potent life, and contains her contemplation\nsilently within herself, without inclining towards that which is higher\nor lower. Abiding within her own essence (\"being\") that is, within her\nown rest and self-consciousness, having discovered, so far as it was\npossible for her, what was below her, without going out of her way to\nseek it, nature produced an agreeable and brilliant object. If it is\ndesired to attribute some sort of cognition or sensation to nature,\nthese will resemble true cognition and sensation only as those of a man\nwho is awake resemble those of a man who is asleep.[182] For nature\npeaceably contemplates her object, which was born in her as effect of\nnature's abiding within and with herself, of herself being an object of\ncontemplation, and herself being a silent, if weak contemplation. There\nis, indeed, another power that contemplates more strongly; the nature\nwhich is the image of another contemplation. Consequently, what she has\nproduced is very weak, because a weakened contemplation can beget a\nweak object only.\n\n\nIT IS MEN WHO ARE TOO WEAK FOR CONTEMPLATION THAT SEEK A REFUGE IN\nACTION.\n\nLikewise it is men too weak for speculation who, in action, seek a\nshadow of speculation and reason. Not being capable of rising to\nspeculation, and because of their soul-weakness not being able to grasp\nthat which in itself is intelligible, and to fill themselves therewith,\nthough however desiring to contemplate it, these men seek, by action,\nto achieve that which they could not obtain by thought alone. Thus we\nfind that action is a weakness or result of contemplation, when we act,\nor desire to see, or to contemplate, or to grasp the intelligible,\nor try to get others to grasp it, or propose to act to the extent of\nour ability. It is a weakness, for, after having acted, we possess\nnothing of what we have done; and a consequence, because we contemplate\nsomething better than we ourselves have made. What man indeed who\ncould contemplate truth would go and contemplate its image? This\nis the explanation of the taste for manual arts, and for physical\nactivity[183] (as thought Aristotle).\n\n\nB. CONTEMPLATION.\n\n\nTHE PROCESSION OF THE WORLD-SOUL.\n\n5. (4). After having spoken of nature, and having explained how\ngeneration is a sort of contemplation, let us pass to the Soul that\noccupies a rank superior to nature. This is what we have to say about\nher. By her contemplative action, by her ardent desire to learn and\nto discover, by the fruitfulness of her knowledge, and her resulting\nneed to produce, the Soul, her totality having become an object of\ncontemplation, gave birth to some other object; just as science, on\nfructifying, by instruction begets a lesser science in the soul of\nthe young disciple who possesses the images of all things, but only\nin the state of obscure theories, of feeble speculations, which are\nincapable of self-sufficiency. The higher and rational part of the\nSoul ever dwells in the higher region of the intelligible world, and\nis, by this intelligible world, ever illuminated and fructified[184];\nwhile the lower (\"natural and generative power\") participates in what\nthe superior part has received, by immediately participating in the\nintelligible; for life ever proceeds from life, and its actualization\nextends to everything, and is present everywhere. In her procession,\nthe universal Soul allows her superior part to remain in the\nintelligible world; for, if she detached herself from this superior\npart, she would no longer be present everywhere; she would subsist\nonly in her lower extremities. Besides, the part of the Soul that thus\nproceeds out of the intelligible world is inferior to what remains\nwithin it. Therefore, if the Soul must be present and must assert her\nsphere of activity everywhere, and if that which occupies the superior\nrank differs from that which occupies the inferior; if, besides, her\nactivity proceeds either from contemplation or action---though indeed\noriginally from contemplation--because contemplation precedes the\naction which could not exist without contemplation; in this state\nof affairs, though one actualization would be weaker than another,\nyet it would ever remain a contemplation, so that the action derived\nfrom contemplation seems to be no more than a weakened contemplation;\nfor that which is begotten must always remain consubstantial with\nits generating principle, though weaker, since of lower rank. All\nthings therefore silently proceed from the Soul, because they stand\nin no need of either contemplation or exterior visible action. Thus\nthe Soul contemplates, and the contemplating part of the Soul, being\nsomehow located outside of the superior part, and being different\ntherefrom, produces what is below it; thus it is that contemplation\nbegets contemplation.[185] No more than its object is contemplation\nlimited below; that is why it extends to everything. Where is it not?\nEvery soul contains the same object of contemplation. This object,\nwithout being circumscribed as a magnitude, does not equally inhere\nin all beings; consequently, it is not present in the same way to all\nparts of the Soul. That is why Plato[186] says that the charioteer\nof the soul communicates to his horses what he has seen. The latter\nreceive something from him only because they desire to possess what he\nhas seen; for they have not received the entire intelligible (world).\nThough they act because of a desire, they act only in view of what they\ndesire; that is, in view of contemplation, and of its object.\n\n\nPRACTICE IS ONLY A PREPARATION FOR CONTEMPLATION.\n\n6. (5). The purpose of action is to contemplate, and to possess\nthe contemplated object. The object or activity, therefore, is\ncontemplation. It seeks to achieve indirectly what it is unable to\naccomplish directly. It is not otherwise when one has achieved the\nobject of one's desires. One's real desire is not to possess the\ndesired object without knowing it, but to know it more thoroughly, to\npresent it to the sight of the soul, and to be able to contemplate it\ntherein. Indeed, activity always has in view some good; one desires\nto posses it interiorly, to appropriate it, and to possess the result\nof one's action. Now as Good can be possessed only by the soul,\nactivity once more brings us back to contemplation. Since the soul\nis a \"reason,\" what she is capable of possessing could be no more\nthan a silent \"reason,\" being so much the more silent as it is more\na \"reason,\" for perfect \"reason\" seeks nothing farther; it rests in\nthe manifestation of that with which it is filled; the completer the\nmanifestation, the calmer is the contemplation, and the more does it\nunite the soul. Speaking seriously, there is identity between knowing\nsubject and known object in the actualization of knowledge. If they\nwere not identical, they would be different, being alien to each other,\nwithout any real bond, just as reasons (are foreign to the soul) when\nthey slumber within her, without being perceived. The reason[187] must\ntherefore not remain alien to the learning soul, but become united\nthereto, and become characteristic of her. Therefore when the soul\nhas appropriated a \"reason,\" and has familiarized herself therewith,\nthe soul as it were draws it out of her (breast) to examine it. Thus\nshe observes the thing that she (unconsciously) possessed, and by\nexamining it, distinguishes herself therefrom, and by the conception\nshe forms of it, considers it as something foreign to her; for though\nthe soul herself be a \"reason\" and a kind of intelligence, nevertheless\nwhen she considers something, she considers it as something distinct\nfrom herself, because she does not possess the true fulness, and is\ndefective in respect to her principle (which is intelligence). Besides,\nit is with calmness that she observes what she has drawn from within\nherself; for she does not draw from within herself anything of which\nshe did not formerly have even a notion. But she only drew from within\nherself that of which her view was incomplete, and which she wished to\nknow better. In her actualizations (such as sensation), she adapts the\n\"reasons\" she possesses to exterior objects.[188] On one hand, as she\npossesses (the intelligible entities) better than does nature, she is\nalso calmer and more contemplative; on the other hand, as she does not\npossess (the intelligible entities) perfectly, more (than intelligence)\nshe desires to have direct experimental knowledge and contemplation of\nthe object she contemplates. After having (temporarily) withdrawn from\nher own higher part, and having (by discursive reason) run through the\nseries of differences, she returns to herself, and again gives herself\nup to contemplation by her higher part (intelligence) from which she\nhad withdrawn (to observe the differences); for the higher part does\nnot deal with differences, as it abides within herself. Consequently\nthe wise mind is identical with reason, and in itself possesses what it\nmanifests to others. It contemplates itself; it arrives at unity not\nonly in respect to exterior objects, but also in respect to itself; it\nrests in this unity, and finds all things within itself.\n\n\nTHIS CONTEMPLATION IS THE GOAL OF ALL KINDS AND GRADES OF EXISTENCE.\n\n7. (6). Thus everything (ultimately) derives from contemplation;\neverything (really) is contemplation, including the true beings, and\nthe beings by the former secondarily begotten by giving themselves up\nto contemplation, and which themselves are objects of contemplation\neither for sensation, or for knowledge or opinion. Actions, and also\ndesire, result in knowledge. Generation originates in speculation,\nand ends in the production of a form, that is: in an object of\ncontemplation. In general, all beings that are images of generating\nprinciples produce forms and objects of contemplation. Begotten\nsubstances, being imitations of beings, show that the purpose\nof generating principles is neither generation nor action, but\nthe production of works which themselves are to be contemplated.\nContemplation is aimed at by both discursive thought, and beneath\nit, by sensation, the end of both of which is knowledge. Further,\nbeneath discursive thought and sensation is the nature which, bearing\nwithin herself an object of contemplation, that is, a (\"seminal)\nreason,\" produces another \"reason.\"[189] Such are the truths that are\nself-evident, or that can be demonstrated by reasoning. Besides it\nis clear that, since the intelligible objects devote themselves to\ncontemplation, all other beings must aspire thereto; for the origin of\nbeings is also their end.\n\n\nEVEN LOWER FORMS OF BEGETTING ARE DUE TO SEMINAL REASONS.\n\nThe begetting of animals is entirely due to the activity within them\nof seminal reasons. Generation is an actualization of contemplation;\nit results from the need of producing multiple forms, from objects\nof contemplation, of filling everything with reasons, of ceaseless\ncontemplation; begetting is no more than producing a form, and\nto spread contemplation everywhere.[190] All the faults met with\nin begotten or manufactured things are no more than faults of\ncontemplation. The poor workman resembles the producer of bad form.\nBesides, lovers must be counted among those who study forms, and who\nconsequently give themselves up to contemplation. But enough of this.\n\n\nC. OF UNITY.\n\n\nTHE DIFFERENT GRADES OF THOUGHT AND LIFE.\n\n8. (7). Since contemplation rises by degrees, from nature to the Soul,\nfrom the Soul to Intelligence; and as within it thought becomes more\nand more (intimate or) interior, more and more united to the thinker;\nand as in the perfect Soul the things known are identical with the\nknower; and because they aspire to Intelligence, the subject must then\nevidently within Intelligence be identical with the object; not through\nany appropriation thereof, as the perfect Soul does indeed appropriate\nit, but because their essence (\"being\") is identical, because of the\nidentity between thinking and being (\"essence\"). Within intelligence no\nlonger do we have on one side the object, and on the other the subject;\notherwise we would need another principle where this difference would\nno longer exist. Within it, then, these two things, the subject and the\nobject, form but a single (entity). That is a living contemplation, and\nno longer an object of contemplation which seems to inhere in something\nelse; for existence within a living being is not identical with living\nby oneself. Therefore if it is to be alive, the object of contemplation\nand of thought must be life itself, and not the life of plants, that of\nsensation, or psychic life. Those are different thoughts, the one being\nthe thought of plants, the thought of sensation, and psychic thought.\nThey are thoughts because they are \"reasons.\"\n\n\"ALL BEINGS ARE CONTEMPLATIONS.\"\n\nEvery life is a thought which, like life itself, may be more or less\ntrue. The truest thought is also the first life; and the first life is\nidentical with the first Intelligence. Consequently, the first degree\nof life is also the first degree of thought; the second degree of\nlife is also the second degree of thought; and the third degree of\nlife is also the third degree of thought. Therefore every life of this\nkind is a thought. Nevertheless it is humanly possible to define the\ndifferences of the various degrees of life without being able to set\nforth clearly those of thought; men will limit themselves to saying\nthat some (of these degrees of thought) imply intelligence, while\nothers exclude it, because they do not seek to penetrate the essence\nof life. We may observe that the remainder of the discussion brings us\nback to this proposition, that \"all beings are contemplations.\"[191] If\nthe truest life be the life of thought, if the truest life and the life\nof thought be identical, then the truest thought must be alive. This\ncontemplation is life, the object of this contemplation is a living\nbeing and life, and both form but one.\n\n\nLIKE A CIRCLE, INTELLIGENCE IS INSEPARABLY SINGLE AND MANIFOLD.\n\nSince both are identical, the unity that they form became manifold\nbecause it does not contemplate unity, or it does not contemplate\nunity so far as it is one; otherwise it would not be intelligence.\nAfter having begun by being one, it ceased being one; unconsciously\nit became manifold as a result of the fruitful germs it contained.\nIt developed to become all things, though it would have been better\nfor it not to have desired this. Indeed, it thus became the second\nprinciple, as a circle which, by developing, becomes a figure and a a\nsurface, whose circumference, centre, and rays are distinct, occupying\ndifferent points. The origin of things is better than their goal. The\norigin is not equivalent to the origin and goal, and that which is\nboth origin and goal is not identical with that which is no more than\norigin. In other words, intelligence itself is not the intelligence\nof a single thing, but universal intelligence; being universal,\nit is the intelligence of all things.[192] If then intelligence be\nuniversal Intelligence, and the intelligence of all things, then\neach of its parts must also be universal, also possess all things.\nOtherwise, intelligence would contain a part that was not intelligence;\nintelligence would be composed of non-intelligences; and it would\nresemble a conglomeration of things which would form an intelligence\nonly by their union. Thus intelligence is infinite. When something\nproceeds from it, there is no weakening; neither for the things that\nproceed from it, for this is also all things, nor for the intelligence\nfrom which the thing proceeds, because it is not a summation of\nparts.[193]\n\n\nTO THE INTELLIGENCE THAT SIMULTANEOUSLY IS THE INTELLIGIBLE THERE MUST\nBE A SUPREME.\n\n9. (8). Such is the nature of Intelligence. Therefore it does not\noccupy the first rank. Above it must be a Principle, whose discovery is\nthe object of this discussion. Indeed, the manifold must be posterior\nto unity. Now intelligence is a number; and the principle of number\nis unity, and the principle of the number that constitutes unity\nis absolute Unity. Intelligence is simultaneously intelligence and\nthe intelligible; it is therefore two things at once. If then it be\ncomposed of two things, we must seek what is prior to this duality.\nCould this principle be Intelligence alone? But Intelligence is always\nbound to the intelligible. If the Principle we seek cannot be bound\nto the intelligible, neither will it be Intelligence. If then it be\nnot Intelligence, and transcend duality, it must be superior thereto,\nand thus be above Intelligence. Could it be the Intelligence alone?\nBut we have already seen that the intelligible is inseparable from\nIntelligence. If this Principle be neither Intelligence, nor the\nintelligible, what can it be? It must be the Principle from which are\nderived both Intelligence and its implied intelligible.\n\n\nTHE BEGETTER OF INTELLIGENCE MUST BE SIMPLER THAN IT, AND IS REACHED\nNOT BY INTELLIGENT REASONING BUT A SIMPLE INTUITION.\n\nBut what is this Principle, and how are we to conceive it? It must be\neither intelligent or not intelligent. If it be intelligent, it will\nalso be Intelligence. If it be not intelligent, it will be unconscious\nof itself, and will not be in any way venerable. Though true, it would\nnot be clear or perspicuous to say that it is the Good itself, since we\ndo not yet have an object on which we could fasten our thought when we\nspeak of it. Besides, since the knowledge of the other objects in all\nbeings who can know something intelligent, occurs through Intelligence\nand lies in Intelligence, by what rapid intellection (or intuition)\ncould we grasp this Principle that is superior to Intelligence? We\nmay answer, by that part of us which resembles it; for there is in\nus something of it; or rather, it is in all things that participate\nin Him. Everywhere you approach the Good, that which in you can\nparticipate receives something of it. Take the illustration of a voice\nin a desert, and the human ears that may be located there. Wherever\nyou listen to this voice, you will grasp it entirely in one sense,\nand not entirely in another sense. How then would we grasp something\nby approximating our intelligence (to the Good)? To see up there the\nPrinciple it seeks, Intelligence must, so to speak, return backwards,\nand, forming a duality, it must somehow exceed itself; that means, it\nwould have to cease being the Intelligence of all intelligible things.\nIndeed, intelligence is primary life, and penetration of all things,\nnot (as the soul does) by a still actualizing movement,[194] but by a\nmovement which is ever already accomplished and past.[195] Therefore,\nif Intelligence be life, which is the penetration of all things, if\nit possess all things distinctly, without confusion--for otherwise\nit would possess them in an imperfect and incomplete manner--it must\nnecessarily proceed from a superior Principle which, instead of being\nin motion, is the principle of motion (by which Intelligence runs\nthrough all things), of life, of intelligence, and of all things. The\nPrinciple of all things could not be all things, it is only their\norigin. Itself is neither all things, nor any particular thing,\nbecause it begets everything; neither is it a multitude, for it is the\nprinciple of multitude. Indeed that which begets is always simpler than\nthat which is begotten. Therefore if this principle beget Intelligence,\nit necessarily is simpler than Intelligence. On the theory that it is\nboth one and all, we have an alternative, that it is all things because\nit is all things at once, or that it is everything individually. On\nthe one hand, if it be all things at once, it will be posterior to\nall things; if on the contrary it be prior to all things, it will be\ndifferent from all things. For if the One co-existed with all things,\nthe One would not be a principle; but the One must be a principle, and\nmust exist anteriorly to all things, if all things are to originate\nfrom it. On the other hand, if we say that the One is each particular\nthing, it will thereby be identical with every particular thing; later\nit will be all things at once, without being able to discern anything.\nThus the One is none of these particular things, being prior to all\nthings.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME IS THE POTENTIALITY OF ALL THINGS, ABOVE ALL ACTUALIZATION.\n\n10. (9). This Principle then is the potentiality of all.[196] Without\nit, nothing would exist, not even Intelligence, which is the primary\nand universal life. Indeed what is above life is the cause of life. The\nactualization of life, being all things, is not the first Principle; it\nflows from this Principle as (water) from a spring.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME AS A SPRING OF WATER.\n\nThe first Principle may indeed be conceived of as a spring (of water)\nwhich is its own origin, and which pours its water into many streams\nwithout itself becoming exhausted by what it yields, or even without\nrunning low, because the streams that it forms, before flowing away\neach in its own direction, and while knowing which direction it is to\nfollow, yet mingles its waters with the spring.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME AS THE TREE OF THE UNIVERSE.\n\nAgain, (the Supreme may be compared to) the life that circulates in a\ngreat tree, without its principle issuing from the root, where is its\nseat, but which later divides among the branches. Though spreading\neverywhere a manifold life, the Principle still dwells in itself exempt\nfrom all manifoldness, though being only its origin.[197]\n\n\nIF UNITY PASSED INTO THE MANIFOLD, THE UNIVERSE WOULD BE DESTROYED.\n\nThis contains nothing surprising. Why should we be surprised at\nmanifoldness issuing from Him who is not manifold, or at the\nimpossibility of the existence of the manifold without the prior\nexistence of That which is not manifold? The Principle is not\ndistributed in the universe; far rather, if it were disturbed, the\nuniverse would be annihilated; for it cannot exist except in so far as\nits Principle abides within itself, without becoming confused with the\nrest.\n\n\nTHIS IS THE BASIS OF THE RETURN TO UNITY.\n\nConsequently, there is everywhere a return to unity--for there is\nfor everything a unity to which it may be reduced. Consequently, the\nuniverse must be derived from the unity that is superior to it; and as\nthis unity is not absolutely simple, it must itself be derived from\na still superior unity, and so on until we arrive at the absolutely\nsimple Unity, which cannot be reduced to any other. Therefore,\nconsidering what is in a tree--that is, its permanent principle--or\nwhat is unitary in an animal, in a soul, or in the universe, you will\neverywhere have that which is most powerful and precious. If, at last,\nyou consider that unity of the things that really exist, that is, their\nprinciple, their source, their (productive) power, can you doubt its\nreality, and believe that this principle amounts to nothing? Certainly\nthis principle is none of the things of which it is the principle; it\nis such that nothing could be predicated of it, neither essence, nor\nbeing, nor life, because it is superior to all of it. If you grasp it,\nby abstracting from it even being, you will be in ecstasy. By directing\nyour glance towards it, by reaching it, and resting in it, you will\nget a unitary and simple intuition thereof; you will conceive of its\ngreatness by both itself and its derivatives.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME IS NOT INTELLIGENCE, WHICH ASPIRES TO THE FORM OF THE GOOD.\n\n11. (10). A further consideration. Since intelligence is a sort of\nintuition, namely, a seeing (or actualizing) intuition (or vision), it\nreally consists of a potentiality that has passed into actualization.\nIt will therefore contain two elements, which will play the parts\nof (intelligible) matter,[198] and of form, just like actualized\nvision,[199] for actualized vision also implies duality. Therefore\nintuition, before being actualized, was unity. Thus unity has become\nduality, and duality has become unity. (Sense-) vision receives from\nsense-objects its fulness, and its perfection, so to speak. As to\nintellectual vision, however, its fulness comes from a principle that\nis the Good. Now if intelligence were the Good itself, what would be\nthe use of its intuition or its actualization? Other beings, indeed,\naspire to the Good, as the goal of their activity; but the Good itself\nhas need of nothing; and therefore possesses nothing but itself.[200]\nAfter having named it, nothing should be added thereto by thought;\nfor, to add something, is to suppose that He needs this attribute.\nNot even intelligence should be attributed to Him; that would be\nintroducing therein something alien, distinguishing in Him two things,\nIntelligence and the Good. Intelligence needs the Good, but the Good\nhas no need of Intelligence. On achieving the Good, Intelligence\ntakes its form, for it derives its form from the Good; and it becomes\nperfect, because it assumes the nature (of the Good). The model (or,\narchetype) must be judged by the trace it leaves in Intelligence,\nconceiving of its true character according to the impression it leaves.\nOnly by this impression does Intelligence behold and achieve the Good.\nThat is why Intelligence aspires to the Good; and as Intelligence ever\naspires to the Good, Intelligence ever achieves it. The Good itself,\nhowever, never aspires to anything; for what could He desire? Nor does\nHe achieve anything, since He desires nothing.[201] Therefore (the\nSupreme) is not Intelligence, which ever desires, and aspires to the\nform of Good.\n\n\nTHE GOOD AS SUPREME NEITHER NEEDS NOR POSSESSES INTELLECTION.\n\nNo doubt Intelligence is beautiful; it is the most beautiful of things,\nsince it is illuminated by a pure light, since it shines with a pure\nsplendor, and contains the intelligible beings of which our world, in\nspite of its beauty, is but an adumbration and image. The intelligible\nworld is located in a region resplendent with clearness, where is\nnothing either obscure or indefinite, where, within itself, it enjoys a\nblissful life. It entrances the human gaze, especially when one knows\nhow to commune with it. But just as a view of heaven, and the splendor\nof the stars leads one to seek and conceive their author, likewise the\ncontemplation of the intelligible world, and the fascination it exerts\nleads (the beholder) to seek its author. The question then arises, Who\nis He who has given existence to the intelligible world? Where and how\ndid He beget this so pure Intellect, this so beautiful son who derives\nall of his fulness from his father[202]? This supreme Principle itself\nis neither Intelligence nor son, but is superior to Intelligence, which\nis His son. Intelligence, His son, succeeds Him, because the son needs\nto receive from the father both intellection and fulness, which is\nhis food; so (the son) holds the first rank after Him who has need of\nnothing, not even intellection. Nevertheless Intelligence possesses\nfulness and true intellection, because it immediately participates in\nthe Good. Thus the Good, being above real fulness and intellection,\nneither possesses them, nor needs them; otherwise, He would not be the\nGood.\n\n\n\n\nFIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT.\n\nConcerning Intelligible Beauty.\n\n\nART MAKES A STATUE OUT OF ROUGH MARBLE.\n\n1. Since he who rises to the contemplation of the intelligible world,\nand who conceives the beauty of true intelligence, can also, as we\nhave pointed out, by intuition grasp the superior Principle,[203]\nthe Father of Intelligence, let us, so far as our strength allows\nus, try to understand and explain to ourselves how it is possible to\ncontemplate the beauty of Intelligence and of the intelligible world.\nLet us imagine two pieces of marble placed side by side, the one rough\nand inartistic, the other one fashioned by the sculptor's chisel, who\nmade of it the statue of a goddess, a grace, or a muse; or that of a\nman--but not that of any individual whatever, but that of a (cultured\ngentle) man in whom art would have gathered all the traits of beauty\noffered by different individuals. After having thus from art received\nthe beauty of the form, the second marble will appear beautiful, not\nby virtue of its essence, which is to be stone--for otherwise the\nother block would be as beautiful as this one--but because of the\nform received through art. The latter, however, did not exist in the\nmatter of the statue. It was in the thought of the artist that it\nexisted before passing into the marble; and it existed therein, not\nbecause it had eyes and hands, but because it participated in art. It\nwas therefore in art that this superior beauty existed. It could not\nhave become incorporated in stone. Dwelling within itself, it begat\nan inferior form, which, passing into matter, could neither preserve\nall its purity, nor completely respond to the will of the artist,\npossessing no perfection other than that allowed by matter. As the\nnature of art is to produce beauty, if art succeed in producing beauty\nwhich conforms to its constitutive essence, then, by the possession\nof the beauty essential to it, art possesses a beauty still greater\nand truer than that which passes into exterior objects. As all form\nextends by passing into matter, (this objectified form) is weaker than\nthat which remains one. All that extends abandons its own (nature),\nas do force, heat, and in general any property; likewise with beauty.\nEvery creating principle is always superior to the created thing. It\nis not the lack of musical ability, but the music itself that creates\nthe musician; while it is the intelligible music that creates the sense\nmusic. It has been attempted to degrade the arts by saying that to\ncreate they imitate nature. This may be answered by pointing out that\nthe natures of beings are themselves the images of other beings (or\nessences); besides, the arts do not limit themselves to the imitation\nof objects which offer themselves to our view, but that they go as\nfar back as the (ideal) reasons from which are derived the nature of\nobjects. Further the arts independently create many things, and to the\nperfection of the object they add what is lacking, because they possess\nbeauty in themselves. Phidias seems to have represented Jupiter without\ncopying any sense-objects, conceiving him such as he would appear to us\nif he ever revealed himself to our eyes.[204]\n\n\nBEAUTY INHERES NOT IN THE ORGANISM'S PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS, BUT IN\nITS COLOR AND FORM.\n\n2. Now let us turn away from the arts and consider the objects they\nimitate, such as natural beauties, namely, rational and irrational\ncreatures, especially the more perfect, in which the creator was\nable to master matter, and endue it with the desired form. What then\nconstitutes the beauty in these objects? Surely not (the physical\ncharacteristics, such as) blood or menstrual discharges, but the color\nand figure, which differ essentially therefrom; otherwise that which\nconstitutes beauty is something indifferent--either something formless,\nor something that contains a simple nature (that is, the \"seminal\nreason\"), as does matter, for instance.\n\n\nBEAUTY COMES FROM THE FORM IMPARTED BY THE ORIGINATOR.\n\nWhence came the beauty of that Helena about whom so many battles were\nfought? Whence comes the beauty of so many women comparable to Venus?\nWhence came the beauty of Venus herself? Whence comes the beauty of a\nperfect man, or that of one of those divinities who reveal themselves\nto our eyes, or who, without showing themselves, nevertheless possess\na visible beauty? Does it not everywhere originate from the creating\nprinciple that passes into the creature, just as, in the art considered\nabove, the beauty passes from the artist into the work? It would be\nunreasonable to assert that the creatures and the (\"seminal) reason\"\nunited to matter are beautiful, while denying beauty to the \"reason\"\nwhich is not united to matter while still residing in the creator in\na primary and incorporeal condition; and to assert that in order to\nbecome beautiful this reason must become united to matter. For if mass,\nas such, was beautiful, then the creative reason would be beautiful\nonly in so far as it was mass. If form, whether in a large or small\nobject, equally touches and moves the soul of the beholder, evidently\nbeauty does not depend on the size of the mass. Still another proof of\nthis is that so long as the form of the object remains exterior to\nthe soul, and as we do not perceive it, it leaves us insensible; but\nas soon as it penetrates into the soul, it moves us. Now form alone\ncan penetrate into the soul by the eyes; for great objects could not\nenter by so narrow a space. In this respect, the size of the object\ncontrasts, because that which is great is not mass, but form.[205]\n\n\nRECOGNITION OF BEAUTY DEPENDS ON PRELIMINARY INTERIOR BEAUTY.\n\nFurther, the cause of beauty must be either ugly, beautiful or\nindifferent. If it were ugly, it could not produce its opposite. If it\nwere indifferent, it would have no more reason to produce that which is\nbeautiful, than that which is ugly. Therefore nature which produces so\nmany beautiful objects must in herself possess a very superior beauty.\nBut as we do not have the habit of seeing the interior of things, which\nremains unknown, we attach ourselves only to their exterior, forgetting\nthat which moves us hides itself within them; and (in this habit of\nours) we resemble (Narcissus[206]), who, on seeing his image, and not\nknowing whence it came, would try to catch it. It is not the mass of\nan object that constitutes its attractiveness for us, for it is not in\nmass that beauty inheres.[207] This is revealed by the beauty found\nin the sciences, in the virtues, and in general in the souls, where\nit shines more truly and brilliantly on contemplation and admiration\nof its inherent wisdom. Then we do not regard the countenance, which\nmay be ugly; we leave aside the form of the body, to attach ourselves\nexclusively to interior beauty. If, carried away by the emotion that\nsuch a spectacle should cause, you should not proclaim its beauty; and\nif, on directing your gaze within yourself, you should not experience\nall the charm of beauty,[208] then you search for intelligible beauty,\nby such a method, would be vain; for you would seek it only with what\nis impure and ugly.[209] That is why these discussions are not intended\nfor all men. But if you have recognized beauty within yourself they you\nmay rise to the reminiscence (of intelligible beauty).\n\n\nBEAUTY IS THE CREATING PRINCIPLE OF THE PRIMARY REASON.\n\n3. The reason of the beauty in nature is the archetype of the beauty\nof the (bodily) organism. Nature herself, however (is the image\nof the) more beautiful archetypal \"reason\" which resides in the\n(universal) Soul, from which it is derived.[210] This latter shines\nmore brilliantly in the virtuous soul, whenever it develops therein.\nIt adorns the soul, and imparts to her a light itself derived from\na still higher Light, that is, primary Beauty. The universal Soul's\nbeauty thus inhering in the individual soul, explains the reason of the\nBeauty superior to it, a reason which is not adventitious, and which\nis not posited in any thing other than itself, but which dwells within\nitself. Consequently it is not a \"reason,\" but really the creating\nprinciple of the primary Reason, that is, the beauty of the soul, which\nin respect to the soul plays the part of matter.[211] It is, in the last\nanalysis, Intelligence, which is eternal and immutable because it is\nnot adventitious.\n\n\nOUR IMAGE OF INTELLIGENCE IS ONLY A SAMPLE THAT MUST BE PURIFIED.\n\nWhat sort of an image does Intelligence then afford? This is a material\nquestion because we know that any image of Intelligence supplied by\nanything else would be imperfect. Therefore this image of itself given\nby Intelligence also could not be a genuine image; it can be no more\nthan what is any stray piece of gold in respect to gold in general,\nnamely, a sample. But if the gold which falls under our perception be\nnot pure, we have to purify it either by our labor or by our thought,\nobserving that it can never be gold in general that we can examine, but\ngold in particular, considered in an individual mass.[212] Likewise (in\nthe subject we are studying) our starting-point must be our purified\nintelligence, or, if you prefer, the divinities themselves, considering\nthe kind of intelligence indwelling in them; for they are all venerable\nand unimaginably beautiful. To what do they owe their perfection? To\nIntelligence, which acts in them with sufficient force to manifest\nthem. They do not indeed owe it to the beauty of their body; for\ntheir divinity does not consist in the possession of a body[213]; the\ndivinities therefore owe their character to their intelligence. Now\nall divinities are beautiful, because they are not wise at certain\ntimes, and at other times unwise. They possess wisdom by an impassible\nintelligence, that is immutable and pure. They know everything; not\nindeed human things, but those which are proper to them, the things\nwhich are divine, and all those that intelligence contemplates.[214]\n\n\nDIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CELESTIAL AND INFERIOR DIVINITIES.\n\nAmidst the divinities, those who reside in the visible heaven, having\nmuch leisure, ever contemplate the things existing in the superior\nHeaven, but as it were from a distance, and \"by raising their\nhead.\"[215] On the contrary, those in the superior Heaven, and who\ndwell there, dwell there with their whole personality, because they\nreside everywhere. Everything on high, namely, earth, sea, plants,\nor animals, forms part of the heaven; now all that forms part of the\nheaven is celestial. The divinities that dwell there do not scorn\nmen, nor any of the other essences up there, because all are divine,\nand they traverse the whole celestial region without leaving their\nrest.[216]\n\n\nDESCRIPTION OF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.\n\n4. That is why the divinities in heaven lead an easy life, truth being\nmother, nurse, element and food. So they see everything; not the things\nwhich are subject to generation, but those which have the permanence\nof being, so that they see themselves in everything else. In this\nintelligible world everything is transparent. No shadow limits vision.\nAll the essences see each other and interpenetrate each other in the\nmost intimate depth of their nature. Light everywhere meets light.\nEvery being contains within itself the entire intelligible world, and\nalso beholds it entire in any particular being. All things there are\nlocated everywhere. Every thing there is all, and all is each thing;\ninfinite splendor radiates around. Everything is great, for there even\nthe small is great. This world has its sun and its stars; each star\nis a sun, and all suns are stars. Each of them, while shining with\nits own due splendor, reflects the light of the others. There abides\npure movement; for He who produces movement, not being foreign to it,\ndoes not disturb it in its production. Rest is perfect, because it\nis not mingled with any principle of disturbance. The beautiful is\ncompletely beautiful there, because it does not dwell in that which is\nnot beautiful (that is, in matter). Each one of the celestial things,\ninstead of resting on an alien foundation, has its own especial seat,\nits origin, and its principle, in its own being, and does not differ\nfrom the region within which it dwells, because it is Intelligence that\nis its substrate, and itself is intelligible.\n\n\nTHE INTELLIGIBLE COMPARED TO LYNCEUS WHOSE SIGHT PENETRATED ALL.\n\nIn order to conceive this better, we should imagine that this visible\nsky is a pure light which begets all the stars. Here below, doubtless,\nno one part could be begotten by any other, for each part has its\nown individual existence. On the contrary, in the intelligible world\nevery part is born from the whole, and is simultaneously the whole\nand a part; wherever is a part, the whole reveals itself. The fabled\nLynceus, whose glance penetrated the very bowels of the earth, is only\nthe symbol of the celestial life. There the eye contemplates without\nfatigue, and the desire of contemplating is insatiable, because it\ndoes not imply a void that needs filling, or a need whose satisfaction\nmight bring on disgust. In the intelligible world, the beings do not,\namong each other, differ so as that what is proper to the one would\nnot be proper to the other. Besides, they are all indestructible.\nTheir insatiability (in contemplation) is to be understood in the\nsense that satiety does not make them scorn what satiates them.\nThe more that each sees, the better he sees; each one follows its\nnature in seeing as infinite both itself and the objects that present\nthemselves to its view. On high, life, being pure, is not laborious.\nHow indeed could the best life imply fatigue? This life is wisdom\nwhich, being perfectly complete, demands no research. It is primary\nwisdom, which is not derived from any other, which is being, and which\nis not an adventitious quality of intelligence; consequently there\nis none superior to it. In the intelligible world absolute knowledge\naccompanies intelligence, because the former accompanies the latter, as\nJustice is enthroned by the side of Jupiter.[217] All the essences (or,\nbeings) in the intelligible Being resemble so many statues which are\nvisible by themselves, and the vision of which imparts an unspeakable\nhappiness to the spectators. The greatness and power of wisdom is\nrevealed in its containing all beings, and in its having produced them.\nIt is their origin; it is identical with them; it fuses with them;\nfor wisdom is very being. This we do not easily understand because by\nsciences[218] we mean groups of demonstrations and propositions, which\nis not true even of our sciences. However, if this point be contested,\nlet us drop this comparison with our sciences, and return to knowledge\nitself, of which Plato[219] says that \"it does not show itself\ndifferent in different objects.\" How can that be? Plato left that to\nbe explained by us, that we might show if we deserve to be called\nhis interpreters.[220] We shall undertake this interpretation by the\nfollowing observation.\n\n\nDEMONSTRATION THAT WISDOM IS VERITABLE BEING, AND THE CONVERSE.\n\n5. All the productions of nature or art are the works of a certain\nwisdom which ever presides over their creation. Art is made possible\nonly by the existence of this wisdom. The talent of the artist is\nderived from the wisdom of nature which presides over the production\nof every work. This wisdom is not a sequence of demonstrations, as the\nwhole of it forms a unity; it is not a plurality reduced to unity,\nbut a unity which is resolved into a plurality. If we admit that this\nwisdom is primary Wisdom, there is nothing to be sought beyond it,\nsince in this case it is independent of every principle, and is located\nwithin itself. If, on the contrary, we say that nature possesses the\n(\"seminal) reason,\" and is its principle, we shall have to ask whence\nnature derives it.[221] If it be called a superior principle, we\nstill have to ask the derivation of this principle; if it be derived\nfrom nothing, we need not go beyond it (but return to the above\ndemonstration). If, on the contrary, it be derived from Intelligence,\nwe shall have to examine whether Intelligence produced wisdom. The\nfirst objection here will be, how could it have done so? For if\nIntelligence itself produced it, Intelligence could not have produced\nit without itself being Wisdom. True Wisdom is therefore \"being\" and,\non the other hand, \"being\" is wisdom, and derives its dignity from\nWisdom; that is why \"being\" is veritable \"Being.\" Consequently, the\nbeing (essences) which do not possess wisdom are such beings only\nbecause they were created by a certain wisdom; but they are not true\nbeings (essences), because they do not in themselves possess Wisdom.\nIt would, therefore, be absurd to state that the divinities, or the\nblessed dwellers in the intelligible world, in that world are engaged\nin studying demonstrations. The entities that exist there are beautiful\nforms,[222] such as are conceived of as existing within the soul of\nthe wise man; I do not mean painted forms, but existing (substantial)\nforms. That is why the ancients[223] said that ideas are essences and\nbeings.\n\n\nBY A PUN, EGYPTIAN WISDOM IS ADDUCED AS A SYMBOL.\n\n6. The sages of Egypt seem to me to have shown either a consummate\ninsight or a marvellous instinct when, in order to reveal to us their\nwisdom, they did not, to express words and propositions, make use of\nletters representing sounds and expressions, but symbolized objects by\nhieroglyphics,[224] and in their mysteries symbolically designated each\nof them by a particular emblem. Thus each hieroglyphic sign constituted\na kind of science or wisdom; and without discursive conception or\nanalysis places the thing under the eyes in a synthetic manner. Later,\nthis synthetic notion was reproduced by other signs which developed\nit[225] expressing it discursively, declaring the causes of the\nconstitution of things, wherever their beautiful disposition excited\nadmiration. The wisdom of the Egyptians is best seen in this, that\nthough they did not possess the causes of (essential) beings, (their\nwriting) was able to express everything so as to harmonize with the\ncauses of essential \"Being.\"\n\n\nRESEMBLANCE OF EARTHLY THINGS TO THE INTELLIGIBLE IS THE BASIS OF THE\nRESEMBLANCE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE TO THE EARTHLY.\n\nIf therefore all (celestial) entities resemble earthly objects--a\ntruth[226] which is perhaps impossible to demonstrate, so much the\nmore must we, before any examination or discussion, premiss that all\n(earthly) objects resemble those which exist in the intelligible world.\nThis truth, which applies to everything, may perhaps best be understood\nby an important example.\n\n\nCONTROVERSY AGAINST THE GNOSTIC DIVINE PLANNING OF THE WORLD.\n\n7. It is then by all of us agreed that the universe proceeds from a\nsuperior Principle which possesses a certain perfection. The (Gnostic)\nquestion then arises whether this Principle, before creating, reflected\nthat it was necessary first to form the globe, and to suspend it to\nthe middle of the world; then, to produce the water, and to spread it\nover the surface of the earth; later creating successively the other\nthings contained in the space between the earth and heaven. Further,\ndid He give birth to all the animals only after having to Himself\nrepresented all their forms, and exterior parts? Did the Creator\nundertake the work only after having conceived the plan of the world\nin its totality and in its details? Certainly not; He cannot have\nsubmitted to all such considerations.[227] How could He, never having\nseen anything such, have been inclined to them? Neither could He have\nborrowed the idea of the things He was to produce, and then carried\nthem out as some workman, by the use of his hands and feet; for hands\nand feet are created entities. The only hypothesis left is that all\nthings were within some one other thing (that is, matter, which is\ntheir substrate). (\"Being\") was next to this other thing (matter),\nand as no interval separated them, He suddenly begot an image or\nrepresentation of Himself, either by Himself, or by the intermediation\nof the universal Soul, or of some particular soul--which detail does\nnot matter to our discussion here.\n\n\nHOW CREATION OF THE WORLD TOOK PLACE.\n\nTherefore, everything here below derives from above there, and is more\nbeautiful in the superior world; for forms here below are mingled with\nmatter; on high, they are pure. Thus this universe proceeds from the\nintelligible world, and is contained by the forms from beginning to\nend. First matter receives the forms of the elements, later receiving\ngradual accessions of other forms, so that ultimately matter becomes so\nburied under forms that it becomes difficult to recognize. It receives\nforms easily, because it (already) possesses a form which holds the\nlowest rank. Likewise, the producing Principle uses a form as model,\nand easily produces forms because it consists entirely of \"being\"\nand form; as a result, its work has been easy and universal, because\nitself was universal. Therefore it met no obstacle, and still exercises\nan absolute sovereignty. Even of the things that act as obstacles to\neach other, none, even until the present time, form an obstacle to the\ndemiurgic (Creator), because He preserves His universality. That is why\nI am convinced that if even we were simultaneously the models, forms\nand essence of things, and if the form which produces here below were\nour essence, (that is, being), we would accomplish our work without\ntrouble, though man, in his present state here below, produces (his\nindividual body which is) a form different from himself; indeed, on\nbecoming an individual, man ceased being universal. But on ceasing\nto be an individual, man, in the words of Plato,[228] \"soars in the\nethereal region, and governs the whole world.\" For, becoming universal,\nhe administers the universe.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME PRINCIPLE ADMITS OF NO REASONING, DEMONSTRATION, FAITH OR\nCAUSE.\n\nReturning to our subject, you can perhaps explain why the earth is\nlocated in the middle of the world, and why its form is spherical[229];\nyou may clear up why the equator is inclined towards the ecliptic; but\nyou would be wrong in thinking that the divine Intelligence proposed\nto achieve these objects because it judged them to be reasonable;\nthese things are good only because Intelligence is what it is. Its\nwork resembles the conclusion of a syllogism, whose premises had been\nwithdrawn, and that was based on the intuition of its causes. In divine\nIntelligence nothing is a consequence, nothing depends on a combination\nof means; its plan is conceived independently of such considerations.\nReasoning, demonstration, faith--all these are posterior things. The\nmere existence of the principle determines here below the existence\nand nature of the entities depending from it. Never is one more right\nin asserting that the causes of a principle should not be sought, than\nwhen referring to a Principle which is perfect, and is both principle\nand end. That which is simultaneously principle and end is all things\nat the same time, and consequently leaves nothing to be desired.\n\n\nIF THIS PRINCIPLE IS NOT BEAUTIFUL, NOTHING ELSE COULD BE THAT.\n\n8. This Principle is sovereignly beautiful; it is beautiful entirely\nand throughout, so that not a single one of its parts lacks beauty.\nWho could deny that this Principle is beautiful? Only such as do not\nentirely possess beauty, possessing it only partially, or even not at\nall. If this Principle were not sovereignly beautiful, surely none\nother could claim that distinction. As the superior Principle (the one,\nsuperior to Intelligence) is above beauty, that which first presents\nitself to our view, because it is a form, and the object of the\ncontemplation of intelligence, is that whose aspect is amiable.[230]\n\n\nPLATO SYMBOLIZES THIS BY MAKING THE CREATOR ADMIRE HIS HANDIWORK.\n\nIt was to express this idea strikingly that Plato[231] represents the\ndemiurgic creator as admiring his handiwork, which would lead us also\nto admire the beauty both of the model and of the idea. After all,\nadmiration of a work made to resemble a model amounts to admiration\nof the model itself. However there is no reason for astonishment at\npersons to whom this idea seems novel, for lovers, and in general all\nthose who admire visible beauty do not realize that they admire it only\nbecause (it is the image) of the intelligible beauty.[232] That Plato\nreferred to the model the admiration felt by the demiurgic (creator)\nfor his work is proved by his adding to the words \"he admired his work\"\nthe expression \"and he conceived the purpose of rendering it still more\nsimilar to its model.\" He betrays the beauty of the model by saying\nthat the work is beautiful, and that it is the image of the model;\nfor if this model were not sovereignly beautiful, and did not possess\nan unspeakable beauty, how could there be anything more beautiful than\nthis visible world? It is therefore wrong to criticize this world; all\nthat can be said of it, is that it is inferior to its model.[233]\n\n\nTHE POWER OF THE INFERIOR DIVINITIES DEPENDS ON THEIR INHERING IN THE\nSUPREME.\n\n9. (To explain our view we shall propose an experiment[234]). Let us\nimagine that in the sense-world every being should remain as it is,\nconfusing itself with the others in the unity of the whole, to the\nextent of its ability; so that all that we see is lost in this unity.\nImagine a transparent sphere exterior to the spectator, by looking\nthrough which one might see all that it contains, first the sun and\nthe other stars together, then the sea, the earth, and all living\nbeings. At the moment of picturing to yourself in thought a transparent\nsphere that would contain all moving, resting and changeable things,\npreserving the form of this sphere, and without diminishing the size\nof it, suppress mass, extent, and material conception. Then invoke\nthe divinity that created this world of which you have made yourself\nan image to invest it. His coming down into it may be conceived of as\nresulting from two causes. Either the Divinity that is simultaneously\nsingle and manifold will come to adorn this world in the company of the\nother inferior divinities which exist within Him. Each of these would\ncontain all the others that are manifold because of their powers; and\nnevertheless they would form a single divinity because their multiple\npowers are contained in unity. Or the Divinity will do this because the\nonly divinity contains all the inferior divinities within His breast.\n(Which is the more likely hypothesis?)\n\n\nALL THE INFERIOR DIVINITIES ARE CONTAINED WITHIN THE SUPREME.\n\nIndeed, this only Divinity loses none of His power by the birth of all\nthe divinities contained within Him. All co-exist, and their individual\ndistinctions obtain without their occupying separate localities or\naffecting a sense-form. Otherwise the one would be here, and the other\nthere; each one would be individual, without simultaneously being\nuniversal in itself. Neither have they any parts that differ in each of\nthem, or from each other; neither is the whole formed by each of them\na power divided in a multiplicity of parts, a power whose magnitude\nwould be measured by the number of its parts. Taken in its universality\nthe intelligible world possesses a universal Power, which penetrates\neverything in its infinite development without exhausting its infinite\nforce. He is so great that even His parts are infinite. There is no\nlocality that He does not interpenetrate. Even our world is great; it\nlikewise contains all the powers; but it would be much better, and its\nmagnitude would be inconceivable if it did not also contain physical\npowers, which are essentially small (because limited). Fire and the\nother bodies cannot be called great powers because they consist only\nof an image of the infinity of the genuine Power by burning, crushing,\ndestroying, and contributing to the generation of animals. They\ndestroy only because they themselves are destroyed; they contribute to\ngeneration only because they themselves are generated.\n\n\nBEING IS DESIRABLE BECAUSE BEAUTIFUL.\n\nThe Power which resides in the intelligible world is pure \"being,\"\nbut perfectly beautiful \"being.\" Without beauty, what would become\nof \"being\"? Without \"being,\" what would become of beauty? \"Being\"\nitself would be annihilated by the beauty of \"being.\" \"Being\"[211] is\ntherefore desirable, it is identical with beauty, and beauty is amiable\nbecause it is \"being.\" Seeing that both are of the same nature, it\nwould be useless to inquire which is the principle of the other. The\ndeceptive \"being\" (of bodies) needs to receive the image borrowed from\nbeauty to appear beautiful; and in general, to exist; it exists only in\nso far as it participates in the beauty found in \"being\"; the greater\nits participation, the more perfect is it, because it appropriates this\nbeautiful being[235] all the more.\n\n\nVISION OF THE SUPERCELESTIAL.\n\n10. That is why Jupiter, the most ancient of the other divinities,\nwhose chief he is, leads them in this divine spectacle of the\ncontemplation of the intelligible world.[236] He is followed by these\ndivinities, the guardians, and the souls who can support (the glory\nof) this vision. From an invisible place,[237] this divine world sheds\nlight on all. On rising above its sublime horizon, it scatters its\nrays everywhere, inundating everything with clearness. It dazzles all\nthose who are located at the foot of the peak where it shines; and,\nlike the sun, it often obliges them to turn away their sight, which\ncannot sustain its glory. Some however are forced to raise their eyes,\nimparting to them strength for this contemplation; others, who are at\na distance, are troubled. On perceiving it, those who can contemplate\nHim fix their gaze on it and all its contents. Not every one, however,\nsees in it the same thing. One discerns therein the source and being of\njustice; another is overwhelmed by the revelation of wisdom, of which\nmen here below scarcely possess an enfeebled image. Indeed, our vision\nis only an imitation of intelligible wisdom. The latter, spreading\nover all beings, and as it were embracing immensity, is the last to be\nperceived by those who have already long contemplated these brilliant\nlights.\n\n\nPSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT OF THIS VISION.\n\nSuch is the vision seen by the divinities, all together, and each\none separately. It is also beheld by the souls that see all the\nthings contained within the intelligible world. By this sight, souls\nthemselves become capable of containing, from beginning to end, all the\nentities within their intelligible world; they dwell within it by that\npart of theirs which is capable of doing so. Often, even, the whole\nof them dwells within it, at least so long as they do not withdraw\ntherefrom.\n\n\nTHIS VISION, WHEN TRANSFERRED WITHIN, BECOMES SWEET AS NECTAR.\n\nThis is what is beheld by Jupiter and by all those of us who share His\nlove for this revelation. The last thing which then appears is the\nbeauty that shines in its entirety in the essences (that is, beings),\nas well as in those who participate therein. In the intelligible world\neverything glows, and beautifies itself by shedding splendor on those\nwho gaze at it. Thus men who have climbed a high mountain on arriving\nat the summit suddenly shine with the golden color reflected by the\nground whereon they stand. Now the color that bathes the intelligible\nworld is the beauty that blooms within its flower; or rather there\neverything is color, everything is beauty, in its most intimate depths;\nfor beauty, in the intelligible world, is not a flower that blooms\nonly on the surface. Those who do not apprehend the totality of the\nview appreciate the beauty of only that which meets their gaze; but\nthose who, like men intoxicated with this sweet nectar,[238] are, to\nthe very soul, penetrated by the beauty of the intelligible world,\nare no longer mere spectators. No longer are the contemplated objects\nand the contemplated soul two things exterior to each other. If the\nsoul's gaze is piercing enough, she finds the object she contemplates\nwithin herself. Often she possesses it without knowing it. Then indeed\ndoes she contemplate it as she would contemplate some exterior object,\nbecause she seeks to see it in the same manner. Every time that one\nlooks at something as a spectacle, it is seen outside of oneself. Now\nthis spectacle of the intelligible world must be transferred within\noneself, and be contemplated as something with which one has fused, to\nthe point of identity. Thus a man, possessed by a divinity, whether\nby Phoebus or by some Muse, would contemplate this divinity within\nhimself, if he were at all able to contemplate a divinity.\n\n\nMECHANISM OF THE ECSTASY.\n\n11. (The ecstasy operates as follows.) When a man is entranced by the\ndivinity, he loses consciousness of himself. Then when he contemplates\nthe (divine) spectacle which he possesses within himself, he\ncontemplates himself and sees his image embellished. However beautiful\nit be, he must leave it aside, and concentrate upon the unity, without\ndividing any of it. Then he becomes simultaneously one and all with\nthis divinity which grants him His presence silently. Then is the man\nunited to the divinity to the extent of his desire and ability. If,\nwhile remaining pure, he return to duality, he remains as close as\npossible to the divinity, and he enjoys the divine presence as soon as\nhe turns towards the divinity.\n\n\nBENEFITS OF THIS CONVERSION TOWARDS THE DIVINITY.\n\nThe advantages derived from this conversion towards the divinity are\nfirst self-consciousness, so long as he remains distinct from the\ndivinity. If he penetrate into his interior sanctuary, he possesses all\nthings, and renouncing self-consciousness in favor of indistinction\nfrom the divinity, he fuses with it. As soon as he desires to see\nsomething, so to speak, outside of himself, it is he himself that he\nconsiders, even exteriorly. The soul that studies the divinity must\nform an idea of him while seeking to know him. Later, knowing how great\nis that divinity to which she desires to unite herself, and being\npersuaded that she will find beatitude in this union, she plunges\nherself into the depths of the divinity until, instead of contenting\nherself with contemplating the intelligible world, she herself becomes\nan object of contemplation, and shines with the clearness of the\nconceptions whose source is on high.\n\n\nHOW THE SOUL MAY BE UNITED TO THE DIVINITY WITHOUT SEEING HIM.\n\nBut how can one be united to beauty, without seeing it? If it be seen\nas some thing distinct from oneself, he is not yet fused with it. If\nthe act of vision imply a relation with an exterior object, we have\nno vision; or, at least, this vision consists in the identity of seer\nand seen. This vision is a kind of conscience, of self-consciousness;\nand if this feeling be too acute, there is even danger of breaking up\nthis unity. Besides, one must not forget that the sensations of evils\nmake stronger impressions, and yield feebler knowledge, because the\nlatter are frittered away by the force of impressions. Thus sickness\nstrikes sharply (but arouses only an obscure notion); health, on\nthe contrary, thanks to the calm that characterizes it, yields us a\nclearer notion of itself, for it remains quietly within us, because it\nis proper to us, and fuses with us. On the contrary, sickness is not\nproper to us, but foreign. Consequently it manifests itself vividly,\nbecause it is opposed to our nature; while we, on the contrary, enjoy\nbut a feeble feeling of ourselves and of what belongs to us. The state\nin which we grasp ourselves best is the one in which our consciousness\nof ourselves fuses with us. Consequently on high, at the very moment\nwhen our knowledge by intelligence is at its best, we believe that\nwe are ignorant of it, because we consult sensation, which assures\nus that it has seen nothing. Indeed it has not seen anything, and it\nnever could see anything such (as the intelligible beings). It is\ntherefore the sensation that doubts; but he who has the ability to\nsee differs therefrom. Before the seer could doubt, he would have to\ncease believing in his very existence; for he could not, so to speak,\nexternalize himself to consider himself with the eyes of the body.\n\n\nNATURE OF THE OBJECT OF SPIRITUAL VISION.\n\n12. We have just said that a man can see, either in differing from what\nhe sees, or in identifying himself with the object seen. Now, when he\nhas seen, either as being different, or as being identical, what does\nhe report? He tells us that he has seen the Divinity beget an offspring\nof an incomparable beauty, producing everything in Himself, and without\npain preserving within Himself what He has begotten. In fact, charmed\nwith the things He has begotten, and full of love for his works,\nthe Divinity retained them within Himself, congratulating Himself\nupon their splendor, as much as upon his own. In the midst of these\nbeauties, nevertheless inferior to those which have remained within the\nnature of the Divinity, alone of all these beings, his Son (Jupiter,\nthe son of Saturn, here representing the universal Soul born of divine\nIntelligence) has manifested himself externally. By him, as by an\nimage, you may judge of the greatness of his Father, and that of his\nbrothers still unissued from within their Father's nature. Besides, it\nis not in vain that Jupiter tells us that he proceeds from his Father;\nfor he constitutes another world that has become beautiful, because he\nis the image of beauty, and because it is impossible that the image of\nbeauty and being should not itself be beautiful. Jupiter, therefore,\neverywhere imitates his archetype. That is why, because he is an image,\nhe possesses life and constitutes being; and that is why, because he\nproceeds from his Father, he also possesses beauty. He likewise enjoys\nthe privilege of being the image of his eternity. Otherwise he would\nat one time reveal the image of his Father, and at other times he\nwould not; which is impossible, because he is not an artificial image.\nEvery natural image remains what it was, so long as its archetype\nsubsists.[239] It is therefore an error to believe that, while the\nintelligible world subsists, the visible world could perish, and that\nit was begotten in such a manner as that he who had created it, had\ndone so with deliberation. Whatever indeed might have been the manner\nof operation, these men[240] do not wish to conceive and believe that,\nso long as the intelligible world shines, other things that proceed\ntherefrom could not perish; and that they exist ever since (their\nmodel) existed. But the (intelligible world) has ever existed, and will\never exist; for (in spite of their impropriety), we are obliged to make\nuse of such terms to express our thought.\n\n\nSATURN IS SON OF COELUS, AND FATHER OF JUPITER.\n\n13. (Saturn) is always represented as chained, because He remains\nimmovable in his identity. It is said he gave up to his son, Jupiter,\nthe government of the universe, because such (an occupation) did not\nsuit Him, who possesses the fulness[241] of good things,[242] to\ndistract himself from the government of the intelligible world to\nundertake that of an empire younger and less exalted than himself.\nBesides, on one hand, (Saturn) fixed within himself, and raised himself\nup to his father (Coelus, or Uranus). On the other hand, he likewise\nfixed the inferior things which were begotten by his son (Jupiter).\nBetween both he (Saturn) therefore occupies a rank intermediary between\nhis Father, who is more perfect and his son, who is less so. On one\nhand he mutilates his Father, by splitting primitive unity into two\ndifferent elements. On the other, he raises himself above the being\nwhich is inferior to him, disengaging himself from the chains that\nmight tend to lower him. As (Coelus), the father of (Saturn), is too\ngreat to admit of having beauty attributed to him, (Saturn) occupies\nthe first rank of beauty.\n\n\nIF THE WORLD-SOUL AND VENUS BE BEAUTIFUL, HOW MUCH MORE THEIR SOURCE?\n\nThe universal Soul is beautiful also; but she is less beautiful than\n(Saturn), because she is his image, and because, however beautiful she\nmay by nature be, she is still more beautiful when contemplating her\nprinciple. Therefore if the universal Soul--to use clearer terms--and\nif even Venus (as subordinate to him, Jupiter), possess beauty, what\nmust be that of Intelligence? If by their nature the universal Soul and\nVenus receive their beauty from some other principle, from whom would\nthey derive the beauty they intrinsically possess, and that which they\nacquire? As to us, we are beautiful when we belong to ourselves; and we\nare ugly when we lower ourselves to an inferior nature. Again, we are\nbeautiful when we know ourselves, and ugly when we ignore ourselves. It\nis therefore in the intelligible world that beauty shines and radiates.\nAre these considerations sufficient for a clear knowledge of the\nintelligible world, or must we engage in a further effort to accomplish\nthis?\n\n\n\n\nFIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE.\n\nThat Intelligible Entities Are Not External to the Intelligence of the\nGood.\n\n(_The subject of the quarrel between Amelius and Porphyry._[243])\n\n\nKNOWLEDGE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES IMPLIES THEIR PRESENCE.\n\n1. Surely, nobody could believe that the veritable and real\nIntelligence could be deceived, and admit the existence of things that\ndo not exist? Its very name guarantees its intelligent nature. It\ntherefore possesses knowledge without being subject to forgetfulness,\nand its knowledge is neither conjectural, doubtful, nor borrowed,\nnor acquired by demonstration. Even if we did admit that some of its\nknowledge was derived from demonstration, no one will deny that it\npossesses certain knowledge from within itself. It would be wiser,\nhowever, to be entirely reasonable and say that it derives everything\nfrom within itself.[244] Without this, it would be difficult to\ndistinguish what knowledge it derived from itself, and what was\nderived from outside. Even the certainty of the knowledge derived\nfrom itself would vanish, and it would lose the right to believe that\nthings really are such as it imagines. Indeed, though the things whose\nknowledge we derive from the senses seem capable of producing in us\nthe highest evidential value, it may still be asked whether their\napparent nature do not derive more from modifications in us than from\nthe objects themselves. Even so, belief in them demands[245] assent of\nthe intelligence, or at least of the discursive reason, for though we\nadmit that things perceived by the senses exist in sensible objects,\nit is none the less recognized that what is perceived by sensation\nis only a representation of the exterior object, and that sensation\ndoes not reach to this object itself, since it remains exterior to\nsensation.[246] But when intelligence cognizes, and is cognizing\nintelligibles, intelligence could never even meet them if they are\ncognized as lying outside of Intelligence. One explanation would be\nthat intelligence does not at all meet them, nor cognize them. If it be\nby chance that intelligence meets them, the cognition of them will also\nbe accidental and transient. The explanation that cognition operates by\nunion of the intelligence with the intelligible depends on explanation\nof the bond that unites them. Under this hypothesis, the cognitions of\nthe intelligible gathered by intelligence will consist of impressions\n(or, types[247]) of reality, and will consequently be only accidental\nimpressions. Such, however, could not exist in Intelligence; for what\nwould be their form? As they would remain exterior to Intelligence,\ntheir knowledge would resemble sensation. The only distinction of\nthis knowledge from sensation would be that intelligence cognizes\nmore tenuous entities. Intelligence would never know that it really\nperceives them. It would never really know for certain that a thing\nwas good, just or beautiful. In this case the good, just and beautiful\nwould be exterior and foreign to it; Intelligence, in itself, will\nnot possess any forms to regulate its judgments, and deserve its\nconfidence; they, just as much as truth, would remain outside of it.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE IS ANNIHILATED BY THE THEORY THAT TRUTH IS EXTERNAL TO IT.\n\nOn the other hand, the intelligible entities are either deprived of\nfeeling, life and intelligence, or they are intelligent. If they\nbe intelligent, they, like truth, fuse with intelligence into the\nprimary Intelligence. In this case we shall have to inquire into\nthe mutual relations of intelligence, intelligible entity, and\ntruth. Do these constitute but one single entity, or two? What in\nthe world could intelligible entities be, if they be without life\nor intelligence? They are surely neither propositions, axioms, nor\nwords, because in this case they would be enunciating things different\nfrom themselves, and would not be things themselves; thus, when you\nsay that the good is beautiful, it would be understood that these\ntwo notions are foreign to each other. Nor can we think that the\nintelligibles--for instance, beauty and justice--are entities that\nare simple, but completely separate from each other; because the\nintelligible entity would have lost its unity, and would no longer\ndwell within a unitary subject. It would be dispersed into a crowd\nof particular entities, and we would be forced to consider into what\nlocalities these divers elements of the intelligible were scattered.\nBesides, how could intelligence embrace these elements and follow\nthem in their vicissitudes? How could intelligence remain permanent?\nHow could it fix itself on identical objects? What will be the forms\nor figures of the intelligibles? Will they be like statues of gold,\nor like images and effigies made of some other material? In this\ncase, the intelligence that would contemplate them would not differ\nfrom sensation. What would be the differentiating cause that would\nmake of one justice, and of the other something else? Last, and most\nimportant, an assertion that the intelligible entities are external to\nIntelligence would imply that in thus contemplating objects exterior\nto itself Intelligence will not gain a genuine knowledge of them,\nhaving only a false intuition of them. Since, under this hypothesis,\ntrue realities will remain exterior to Intelligence, the latter,\nwhile contemplating them, will not possess them; and in knowing them\nwill grasp only their images. Thus reduced to perceiving only images\nof truth, instead of possessing truth itself, it will grasp only\ndeceptions, and will not reach realities. In this case (intelligence\nwill be in the dilemma) of either acknowledging that it grasps only\ndeceptions, and thus does not possess truth; or intelligence will be\nignorant of this, being persuaded it possesses truth, when it really\nlacks it. By thus doubly deceiving itself, intelligence will by that\nvery fact be still further from the truth. That is, in my opinion, the\nreason why sensation cannot attain the truth. Sensation is reduced\nto opinion[248] because it is a receptive[249] power--as indeed is\nexpressed by the word \"opinion\"[250];--and because sensation receives\nsomething foreign, since the object, from which sensation receives what\nit possesses remains external to sensation. Therefore, to seek truth\noutside of intelligence is to deprive intelligence of truth or verity\nof intelligence. It would amount to annihilating Intelligence, and the\ntruth (which was to dwell within it) will no longer subsist anywhere.\n\n\nTHE NOTION OF INTELLIGENCE IMPLIES ITS POSSESSION OF ALL INTELLIGIBLES.\n\n2. Therefore intelligible entities must not be regarded as exterior to\nIntelligence, nor as impressions formed in it. Nor must we deny it the\nintimate possession of truth. Otherwise, any cognition of intelligibles\nis made impossible, and the reality of both them and Intelligence\nitself is destroyed. Intimate possession of all its essences is the\nonly possible condition that will allow knowledge and truth to remain\nwithin Intelligence, that will save the reality of the intelligibles,\nthat will make possible the knowledge of the essence of every thing,\ninstead of limiting us to the mere notion of its qualities, a notion\nwhich gives us only the image and vestige of the object, which does\nnot permit us to possess it, to unite ourselves with it, to become one\nwith it. On this condition only, can Intelligence know, and know truly\nwithout being exposed to forgetfulness or groping uncertainty; can it\nbe the location where truth will abide and essences will subsist; can\nit live and think--all of which should belong to this blessed nature,\nand without which nowhere could be found anything that deserved our\nesteem and respect. On this condition only will Intelligence be able to\ndispense with credulity or demonstration in believing realities; for\nIntelligence itself consists in these very realities, and possesses\na clear self-consciousness. Intelligence sees that which is its\nown principle, sees what is below it, and to what it gives birth.\nIntelligence knows that in order to know its own nature, it must not\nplace credence in any testimony except its own; that it essentially is\nintelligible reality. It therefore is truth itself, whose very being\nit is to conform to no foreign form, but to itself exclusively. Within\nIntelligence fuses both being, and that which affirms its existence;\nthus reality justifies itself. By whom could Intelligence be convinced\nof error? What demonstration thereof would be of any value? Since there\nis nothing truer than truth, any proof to the contrary would depend on\nsome preceding proof, and while seeming to declare something different,\nwould in reality be begging the question.\n\n\nSUPREME INTELLIGENCE IS DIVINITY AND SUPREME ROYALTY.\n\n3. Thus Intelligence, with the essences and truth, form but one and\nsingle nature for us. It forms some great divinity; or rather, it is\nnot some certain divinity, but total (divinity); for Intelligence\njudges it worthy of itself to constitute all these entities. Though\nthis nature be divine, it is nevertheless but the second divinity[252];\nwhich manifests itself to us before we see the (supreme divinity,\nUnity). Intelligence forms the magnificent throne which (the Supreme)\nformed for Himself, and whereon He is seated immovably. For it was not\nadequate that something inanimate should either develop within the\nbreast of the divinity, nor support the supreme Divinity when advancing\ntowards us.\n\n\nALLEGORY OF THE ROYAL PROCESSION.\n\nSo great a King deserved to have dazzling beauty as the (ostentatious)\nvan of his (royal) procession. In the course of rising towards Him are\nfirst met the things which by their inferior dignity are classed among\nthe first ranks of the procession; later those that are greater and\nmore beautiful; around the king stand those that are truly royal, while\neven those that follow Him are of value. Then, after all these things,\nsuddenly breaks in upon our view the King himself; and we who have\nremained behind after the departure of those who were satisfied with a\nview of the preliminaries, fall down and worship. A profound difference\ndistinguishes the great King from all that precedes Him. But it must\nnot be supposed that He governs them as one man governs another. He\npossesses the most just and natural sovereignty. He possesses real\nroyalty because He is the King of truth. He is the natural master of\nall these beings that He has begotten, and which compose His divine\nbody-guard. He is the king of the king and of the kings,[253] and is\njustly called Father of the divinities. Jupiter himself (who is the\nuniversal Soul), imitates Him in this respect that he does not stop at\nthe contemplation of his father, (who is Intelligence), and he rises to\nthe actualization of his grandfather,[254] and he penetrates into the\nhypostatic substance of His being.[255]\n\n\nTHE COURSE UPWARDS IS ONE OF UNIFICATION.\n\n4. It has already been said that we must rise to the Principle which\nis really one, and not one in the same way as are other things, which,\nbeing in themselves multiple, are one only by participation. On the\ncontrary, that Principle is not one by participation, as are all those\nthings which (being neutral) would just as lief be multiple as one.\nWe have also said that Intelligence and the intelligible world, are\nmore unitary than the remainder, that they approach Unity more than\nall other things, but that they are not purely one. To the extent of\nour ability we are now going to examine in what the Principle which is\npurely one consists, purely and essentially, and not (accidentally)\nfrom without.\n\n\nTHE THEORY OF THE UNIQUE; THE PAIR; AND THE GROUP.\n\nRising therefore to the One, we must add nothing to Him; we must\nrest in Him, and take care not to withdraw from Him, and fall into\nthe manifold. Without this precaution there will be an occurrence of\nduality,[256] which cannot offer us unity, because duality is posterior\nto Unity. The One cannot be enumerated along with anything, not\neven with uniqueness (the monad), nor with anything else. He cannot\nbe enumerated in any way; for He is measure, without Himself being\nmeasured; He is not in the same rank with other things, and cannot be\nadded to other things (being incommensurable). Otherwise, He would\nhave something in common with the beings along with which He would be\nenumerated; consequently, He would be inferior to this common element,\nwhile on the contrary He must have nothing above Him (if He is to be\nthe one first Being). Neither essential (that is, intelligible) Number,\nnor the lower number which refers to quantity, can be predicated of\nthe unique; I repeat, neither the essential intelligible Number, whose\nessence is identical with thought, nor the quantative number, which,\nbecause all number is quantity, constitutes quantity concurrently with,\nor independently of other genera.[257] Besides, quantative number, by\nimitating the former (essential intelligible) Numbers in their relation\nto the Unique, which is their principle, finds its existence in its\nrelation to real Unity, which it neither shares nor divides. Even\nwhen the dyad (or \"pair\") is born, (it does not alter) the priority\nof the Monad (or Uniqueness). Nor is this Uniqueness either of the\nunities that constitute the pair, nor either of them alone; for why\nshould it be one of them rather than the other? If then the Monad or\nUniqueness be neither of the two unities which constitute the pair, it\nmust be superior to them, and though abiding within itself, does not\ndo so. In what then do these unities differ from the Uniqueness (or\nMonad)? What is the unity of the \"pair\"? Is the unity formed by the\n\"pair\" the same as that which is contained in each of the two unities\nconstituting the \"pair\"? The unities (which constitute the \"pair\")\nparticipate in the primary Unity, but differ from it. So far as it is\none, the \"pair\" also participates in unity, but in different ways; for\nthere is no similarity between the unity of a house and the unity of\nan army. In its relation to continuity, therefore, the \"pair\" is not\nthe same so far as it is one, and so far as it is a single quantity.\nAre the unities contained in a group of five in a relation to unity\ndifferent from that of the unities contained in a group of ten? (To\nanswer this we must distinguish two kinds of unity.) The unity which\nobtains between a small and a great ship, and between one town and\nanother, and between one army and another, obtains also between these\ntwo groups of five and of ten. A unity which would be denied as between\nthese various objects would also have to be denied as obtaining between\nthese two groups. (Enough of this here); further considerations will be\nstudied later.\n\n\nPUNS ABOUT VESTA, TAKEN FROM THE CRATYLUS OF PLATO.\n\n5. Returning to our former assertion that the First ever remains\nidentical, even though giving birth to other beings, the generation of\nnumbers may be explained by the immanence of Unity, and by the action\nof another principle which forms them, as images of unity. So much\nthe more must the Principle superior to beings be immanent Unity; but\nhere it is the First himself who begets the beings, and not another\nprinciple who produces beings in the image of the First while this\nFirst would abide within Himself. Likewise the form of unity, which\nis the principle of numbers, exists within all in different degrees,\nbecause the numbers posterior to unity participate therein unequally.\nLikewise, the beings inferior to the First contain something of His\nnature, which something constitutes their form. Numbers derive their\nquantity from their participation in unity. Likewise here beings owe\ntheir being to their containing the trace of the One, so that their\nbeing is the trace of the One.[258] Not far from the truth would we\nbe in holding that essence, which is the (more common or) plainer\nnomenclature of being,[259] is derived from the word \"hen,\" which\nmeans one. Indeed essence proceeded immediately from the One,[273] and\nhas differentiated from Him but very little. Turning towards its own\nbasis, it has settled, and both became and is the \"being\" of all. When\na man pronounces essence (\"on\"), and emphasizes it, he unconsciously\napproximates the sound meaning one (\"hen\"), demonstrating that essence\nproceeds from unity, as indeed is indicated, so far as possible, by\nthe word \"on,\" which means essence. That is why \"being\" (\"ousia\") and\nessence (\"einai\"[260]) imitate so far as they can the principle of the\nPower from which they have emanated. The human mind, observing these\nsimilarities, and guided by their contemplation,[261] imitated what it\ngrasped by uttering the words \"on,\"[262] \"einai,\"[263] \"ousia,\"[264]\nand \"hestia.\"[265] Indeed, these sounds try to express the nature of\nwhat has been begotten by unity, by means of the very effort made by\nthe speaker so as to imitate as well as possible the generation of\nbeing.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME NAMED APOLLO.[266]\n\n6. Whatever be the value of these etymologies, as begotten being is a\nform--for it would be impossible to give any other designation to that\nwhich has been begotten by the One--as it is, not a particular form,\nbut all form, without exception, it evidently results that the One\nis formless. As it possesses no form, it cannot be \"being,\" for this\nmust be something individual, or determinate. Now the One could not\nbe conceived of as something determined; for then He would no longer\nbe a principle; He would only be the determined thing attributed to\nHim. If all things be in that which has been begotten, none of them\ncould be unity. If the One be none of them, He cannot be what is above\nthem; consequently, as these things are \"essences and essence,\" the\nOne must be above essence. Indeed, the mere statement that the One is\nabove essence, does not imply any determinateness on His part, affirms\nnothing concerning Him and does not even undertake to give Him a name.\nIt merely states that He is not this or that. It does not pretend to\nembrace Him, for it would be absurd to attempt to embrace an infinite\nnature. Mere attempt to do so would amount to withdrawing from Him, and\nlosing the slight trace of Him thereby implied. To see intelligible\nBeing, and to contemplate that which is above the images of the\nsense-objects, none of these must remain present to the mind. Likewise,\nto contemplate Him who is above the intelligible, even all intelligible\nentities must be left aside to contemplate the One. In this manner we\nmay attain knowledge of His existence, without attempting to determine\nwhat He is. Besides, when we speak of the One, it is not possible to\nindicate His nature without expressing its opposite.[267] It would\nindeed be impossible to declare what is a principle of which it is\nimpossible to say that it is this or that. All that we human beings can\ndo is to have doubts poignant enough to resemble pangs of childbirth.\nWe do not know how to name this Principle. We merely speak of the\nunspeakable, and the name we give Him is merely (for the convenience\nof) referring to Him as best we can. The name \"One\" expresses no more\nthan negation of the manifold. That is why the Pythagoreans[268]\nwere accustomed, among each other, to refer to this principle in a\nsymbolic manner, calling him Apollo,[269] which name means denial of\nmanifoldness. An attempt to carry out the name of \"One\" in a positive\nmanner would only result in a greater obscuration of the name and\nobject, than if we abstained from considering the name of \"One\" as the\nproper name of the first Principle. The object of the employment of\nthis name is to induce the mind that seeks the first Principle first\nto give heed to that which expresses the greatest simplicity, and\nconsequently to reject this name which has been proposed as only the\nbest possible. Indeed, this name is not adequate to designate this\nnature, which can neither be grasped by hearing, nor be understood by\nany who hears it named. If it could be grasped by any sense, it would\nbe by sight; though even so there must be no expectation of seeing any\nform; for thus one would not attain the first Principle.\n\n\nTWO METHODS OF SIGHT; THE FORM, AND THE LIGHT.\n\n7. When intelligence is in actualization it can see in two ways, as\ndoes the eye.[274] First, the eye may see the form of the visible\nobject; second, it may see the light by which this object is seen.\nThis light itself is visible, but it is different from the form of\nthe object; it reveals the form and is itself seen with this form, to\nwhich it is united. Consequently it itself is not seen distinctly,\nbecause the eye is entirely devoted to the illuminated object. When\nthere is nothing but light, it is seen in an intuitive manner, though\nit be still united to some other object. For if it were isolated from\nevery other thing, it could not be perceived. Thus the light of the\nsun would escape our eye if its seat were not a solid mass. My meaning\nwill best appear by considering the whole sun as light. Then light\nwill not reside in the form of any other visible object, and it will\npossess no property except that of being visible; for other visible\nobjects are not pure light. Likewise in intellectual intuition (sight\nof the mind) intelligence sees intelligible objects by means of the\nlight shed on them by the First; and the Intelligence, while seeing\nthese objects, really sees intelligible light. But, as Intelligence\ndirects its attention to the enlightened object, it does not clearly\nsee the Principle that enlightens them. If, on the contrary, it forget\nthe objects it sees, in the process of contemplating only the radiance\nthat renders them visible, it sees both the light itself, and its\nPrinciple. But it is not outside of itself that that Intelligence\ncontemplates intelligible light. It then resembles the eye which,\nwithout considering an exterior and foreign light, before even\nperceiving it, is suddenly struck by a radiance which is proper to it,\nor by a ray which radiates of itself, and which appears to it in the\nmidst of obscurity. The case is still similar when the eye, in order to\nsee no other objects, closes the eye-lids, so as to draw its light from\nitself; or when, pressed by the hand, it perceives the light which it\npossesses within itself. Then, without seeing anything exterior the eye\nsees, even more than at any other moment, for it sees the light. The\nother objects which the eye heretofore saw, though they were luminous,\nwere not light itself. Likewise, when Intelligence, so to speak, closes\nits eye to the other objects, concentrating in itself, and seeing\nnothing, it sees not a foreign light that shines in foreign forms, but\nits own light which suddenly radiates interiorly, with a clear radiance.\n\n\nINTELLIGIBLE LIGHT, NOT BEING SPATIAL, HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH PLACE.\n\n8. When intelligence thus perceives this divine light, it is impossible\nto discern whence this light comes, from within or from without; for\nwhen it has ceased shining the subject first thinks that it came from\nwithin, and later that it came from without. But it is useless to seek\nthe source of this light, for no question of location can be mooted\nin connection with it. Indeed, it could neither withdraw from us, nor\napproach us; it merely appears, or remains hidden. Therefore it cannot\nbe sought; we must restfully wait till it appears, while preparing\nourselves to contemplate it, just as the eye awaits the rising of\nthe sun which appears above the horizon, or, as the poets say, which\nsprings up from the ocean.\n\n\nGOD ARISES ABOVE THE HORIZON OF INTELLIGENCE.\n\nWhence rises He whose image is our sun? Above what horizon must\nHe rise, or appear, to enlighten us? He must appear above the\ncontemplating Intelligence. Thus, Intelligence must remain immovable\nin contemplation, concentrated and absorbed in the spectacle of pure\nbeauty which elevates and invigorates it. Then Intelligence feels\nthat it is more beautiful and more brilliant, merely because it has\napproached the First. The latter does not come, as might be thought;\nHe comes without really coming, in the proper sense of the word; He\nappears without coming from any place, because He is already present\nabove all things before Intelligence approaches Him. In fact, it\nis Intelligence which approaches and withdraws from the First; it\nwithdraws when it does not know where it should be, or where is\nthe First. The First is nowhere; and if Intelligence could also be\nnowhere--I do not wish to say \"in no place,\" for itself is outside\nof all place, that is, absolutely nowhere--it would always perceive\nthe First; or rather, it would not perceive Him, it would be within\nthe First, and fusing with Him. By the mere fact that Intelligence\nis intelligence, it perceives the First only by that part of itself\nwhich is not intelligence (that is, which is above Intelligence). It\ndoubtless seems surprising that the One could be present to us without\napproaching us; and be everywhere, though being nowhere. This surprise\nis based on the weakness of our nature; but the man who knows the\nFirst would much more likely be surprised were the state of affairs\ndifferent. It cannot indeed be otherwise. Wonder at it, if you please;\nbut what has been said nevertheless represents the real state of the\ncase.\n\n\nOMNIPRESENCE IS EXPLAINED BY POSSESSION OF ALL THINGS WITHOUT BEING\nPOSSESSED BY THEM.\n\n9. All that is begotten by anything else resides either in the\nbegetting Principle, or in some other being, in the case of the\nexistence of any being after or below the generating principle; for\nthat which was begotten by something else, and which, to exist, needs\nsomething else, needs something else everywhere, and must consequently\nbe contained within something else. It is therefore natural that the\nthings which contain the last rank should be contained in the things\nwhich precede them immediately, and that the superior things should\nbe contained in those which occupy a still more elevated rank, and\nso on till the first Principle. As there is nothing above Him, He\ncould not be contained within anything. Since He is not contained in\nanything, and as each other thing is contained in the one immediately\npreceding it, the first Principle contains all the other beings; He\nembraces them without sharing Himself with them, and possesses them\nwithout being shared by them. Since He possesses them without being\npossessed by them, He is everywhere; for, unless He be present, He\ndoes not possess; on the other hand, if He be not possessed, He is not\npresent. Consequently He both is, and is not present in this sense\nthat, not being possessed, He is not present; and that, finding Himself\nindependent of everything, He is not hindered from being nowhere. If\nindeed He were hindered from being somewhere, He would be limited\nby some other principle, and the things beneath Him could no longer\nparticipate in Him; consequently the divinity would be limited, He\nwould no longer exist within Himself, and would depend from inferior\nbeings. All things contained within anything else are in the principle\nfrom which they depend. It is the contrary with those which are\nnowhere; there is no place where they are not. If indeed there be a\nplace lacking the divinity, evidently this place must be embraced\nby some other divinity, and the divinity is in some other; whence,\naccording to this hypothesis, it is false that the divinity is nowhere.\nBut as, on the contrary, it is true that the divinity is nowhere, and\nfalse that He is anywhere, because He could not be contained in any\nother divinity, the result is that the divinity is not distant from\nanything. If then He, being nowhere, be not distant from anything, then\nHe will in himself be everywhere. One of his parts will not be here,\nwhile another is there; the whole of Him will not be only in one or\nanother place. The whole of Him will therefore be everywhere; for there\nis no one thing which exclusively possesses Him, or does not possess\nHim; everything is therefore possessed by Him. Look at the world: as\nthere is no other world but Him, He is not contained in a world, nor\nin any place. No place, indeed, could exist anteriorly to the world.\nAs to its parts, they depend from it, and are contained within it. The\nSoul is not contained in the world; on the contrary, it is the Soul\nthat contains the world; for the locus of the Soul is not the body, but\nIntelligence. The body of the world is therefore in the Soul, the Soul\nin Intelligence, and Intelligence itself in some other Principle. But\nthis Principle Himself could not be (contained) in any other principle,\nfrom which He would depend; He is therefore not within anything, and\nconsequently He is nowhere. Where then are the other things? They\nare in the first Principle. He is therefore not separated from other\nthings, nor is He in them; there is nothing that possesses Him, on the\ncontrary, it is He who possesses all. That is why He is the good of all\nthings, because all things exist by Him, and are related to Him each in\na different manner. That is why there are things which are better, one\nthan the other; for some exist more intensely than others (in relation\nwith the Good).\n\n\nTHE MANNER OF PERCEIVING THE SUPREME.\n\n10. Do not seek to see this Principle by the aid of other things;\notherwise, instead of seeing Him himself, you will see no more than His\nimage. Try rather to conceive the nature of the Principle that must be\ngrasped in Himself, that is, pure and without any admixture, because\nall beings participate in Him, without any of them possessing Him. No\nother thing indeed could be such as He; but nevertheless such a Being\nmust exist. Who indeed could all at once embrace the totality of the\npower of this Principle? If a being did so, how could this being differ\nfrom Him? Would the being limit itself to embracing only a part of Him?\nYou might grasp this Principle by an intuitive, simple intellection,\nbut you will not be able to represent Him to yourself in His totality.\nOtherwise it is you who would be the thinking intelligence, if indeed\nyou have reached that principle; but He is more likely to flee you,\nor more likely still, you will flee from Him. When you consider the\ndivinity, consider Him in His totality. When you think Him, know that\nwhat you remember of Him is the Good; for He is the cause of the\nwise intellectual life, because He is the power from which life and\nintelligence proceed. He is the cause of \"being\" and essence, because\nHe is one; He is simple and first, because He is principle. It is from\nHim that everything proceeds. It is from Him that the first movement\nproceeds, without being in Him; it is from Him also that proceeds the\nfirst rest, because He himself has no need of it; He himself is neither\nin movement nor rest; for He has nothing in which He could rest or\nmove. By His relation to what, towards what, or in what could He move\nor rest? Neither is He limited, for by what could He be limited?\nNeither is He infinite in the manner suggested by an enormous mass;\nfor whither would He have any need of extending Himself? Would He do\nso to get something? But He has need of nothing! It is His power that\nis infinite. He could neither change nor lack anything; for the beings\nwhich lack nothing owe this to Him only.\n\n\nPROGRESS TOWARDS HIM IS WAKENING TO TRUE REALITY.\n\n11. The first Principle is infinite because He is one, and nothing in\nHim could be limited by anything whatever. Being one, He is not subject\nto measure or number. He is limited neither by others nor by Himself,\nsince He would thus be double. Since He has neither parts nor form,\nHe has no figure. Not by mortal eyes therefore must you seek to grasp\nthis principle such as reason conceives of Him. Do not imagine that He\ncould be seen in the way that would be imagined by a man who believes\nthat everything is perceived by the senses, and thus annihilate the\nprinciple which is the supreme reality. The things to which the\ncommon people attribute reality do not possess it; for that which has\nextension has less reality (than that which has no extension); now the\nFirst is the principle of existence, and is even superior to \"being.\"\nYou must therefore admit the contrary of that which is asserted by\nthose commonplace persons; otherwise, you will be deprived of the\ndivinity. You would resemble such men as in the sacred festivals gorge\nthemselves with the foods from which one should abstain on approaching\nthe divinities, and who, regarding this enjoyment as more certain than\nthe contemplation of the divinity whose festival is being celebrated,\ndepart without having participated in the mysteries. Indeed as the\ndivinity does not reveal Himself in these mysteries, these gross men\ndoubt His existence, because they consider real only what is visible\nby the physical eyes. Thus people who would spend their whole life in\nslumber would consider as certain and real the things they would see in\ntheir dreams; if they were to be waked and forced to open their eyes,\nthey would place no credence in the testimony of their eyes, and would\nplunge themselves again into their somnolence.\n\n\nTHE GOOD IS SUPERIOR TO THE BEAUTIFUL, AND IS COGNIZED BY THE MIND AS\nITS SENSE.\n\n12. We should not seek to perceive an object otherwise than by the\nfaculty that is suitable to cognize it. Thus colors are perceived by\nthe eyes, sounds by the ears, and other qualities by other senses.\nAnalogy would assign to intelligence its proper function, so that\nthinking should not be identified with seeing and hearing. To act\notherwise would be to resemble a man who would try to perceive colors\nby the ears, and who would deny the existence of sounds because he\ncould not see them. We must never forget that men have forgotten the\nPrinciple which from the beginning until this day has excited their\ndesires and wishes. Indeed all things aspire to the first Principle,\ntend thither by a natural necessity, and seem to divine that they\ncould not exist without Him. The notion of the beautiful is given only\nto souls that are awake, and that already possess some knowledge;\nat sight of Him they are simultaneously dazed with His sublimity,\nand spurred on by love.[270] From His very origin, on the contrary,\nthe Good excites in us an innate desire; He is present with us even\nin sleep; His view never dazes us with stupor, because He is always\nwith us. Enjoyment of His presence demands neither reminiscence nor\nattention, because one is not deprived thereof even in sleep. When the\nlove of the beautiful overwhelms us, it causes us anxieties, because\nthe sight of the beautiful makes us desire it. As the love excited\nby the beautiful is only secondary, and as it exists only in such\npersons as possess already some knowledge, the beautiful evidently\noccupies only the second rank. On the contrary, the desire of the Good\nis more original, and demands no preliminary knowledge. That surely\ndemonstrates that the Good is anterior and superior to the beautiful.\nBesides, all men are satisfied as soon as they possess the Good; they\nconsider that they have reached their goal. But not all think that the\nbeautiful suffices them; they think that the beautiful is beautiful\nfor itself, rather than for them; as the beauty of an individual is\nan advantage only for himself. Last, the greater number of people are\nsatisfied with seeming beautiful, even if they are not so in reality;\nbut they are not satisfied with seeming to possess the Good, which\nthey desire to possess in reality. Indeed, all desire to have that\nwhich occupies the front rank; but they struggle, they engage in\nrivalry about the beautiful in the opinion that it is born just as\nthey are (from development of circumstances). They resemble a person\nwho would claim equality with another person who holds the first rank\nafter the king, because both depend from the king; such a person does\nnot realize that though both are subject to the king, yet there is a\ngreat difference in hierarchical rank between them[271]; the cause of\nthis error is that both participate in a same principle, that the One\nis superior to both of them, and that lastly the Good has no need of\nthe beautiful, while the beautiful is in need of the Good.[272] The\nGood is sweet, calm, and full of delights; we enjoy it at will. On the\ncontrary, the beautiful strikes the soul with amazement, agitates it,\nand mingles pains with pleasures. In spite of ourselves we are thereby\noften separated from the Good, like a beloved object separates a son\nfrom the father. The Good is more ancient than the beautiful, not in\ntime, but in reality; besides, it exerts superior power, because it is\nunlimited. That which is inferior to it, possesses only an inferior and\ndependent power, instead of having a limitless power (as belongs to\nIntelligence, which is inferior to the Good). The Divinity therefore\nis master of the power which is inferior to His own; He has no need of\nthings that are begotten; for it is from Him that all their contents\nare derived. Besides, He had no need of begetting; He still is such as\nHe was before; nothing would have been changed for Him if He had not\nbegotten; if it had been possible for other things to receive existence\n(independently of Himself) He would not have opposed it through\njealousy. It is now no longer possible for anything to be begotten,\nfor the divinity has begotten all that He could beget. Nor is He the\nuniversality of things, for thus He would stand in need of them. Raised\nabove all things, He has been able to beget them, and to permit them to\nexist for themselves by dominating all.\n\n\nTHE SUPREMACY OF THE GOOD IMPLIES HE IS SUPERIOR TO ALL POSSESSIONS.\n\n13. Being the Good Himself, and not simply something good, the Divinity\ncannot possess anything, not even the quality of being good. If He\npossessed anything, this thing would either be good, or not good;\nnow in the principle which is good in Himself and in the highest\ndegree, there cannot be anything which is not good. On the other hand,\nthe statement that the Good possesses the quality of being good is\nimpossible. Since therefore (the Good) can possess neither the quality\nof being good, or of not being good, the result is that He cannot\npossess anything; that He is unique, and isolated from everything\nelse. As all other things either are good without being the Good, or\nare not good, and as the Good has neither the quality of being good,\nor of not being good, He has nothing, and this is the very thing that\nconstitutes His goodness. To attribute to Him anything, such as being,\nintelligence, or beauty, would be to deprive Him of the privilege of\nbeing the Good. Therefore when we deprive Him of all attributes, when\nwe affirm nothing about Him, when one does not commit the error of\nsupposing anything within Him, He is left as simple essence, without\nattribution of things He does not possess. Let us not imitate those\nignorant panegyrists who lower the glory of those they praise by\nattributing to them qualities inferior to their dignity, because they\ndo not know how to speak properly of the persons they are trying to\npraise. Likewise, we should not attribute to the Divinity any of the\nthings beneath and after Him; we should recognize Him as their eminent\ncause, but without being any of them. The nature of the Good consists\nnot in being all things in general, nor in being any of them in\nparticular. In this case, indeed, the Good would form no more than one\nwith all beings; consequently, He would differ from them only by His\nown character; that is, by some difference, or by the addition of some\nquality. Instead of being one, He would be two things, of which the\none--namely, what in Him was common with the other beings--would not be\nthe Good, while the other would be the Good (and would leave all beings\nevil). Under this hypothesis, He would be a mixture of good and of not\ngood; he would no longer be the pure and primary Good. The primary Good\nwould be that in which the other thing would particularly participate,\na participation by virtue of which it would become the good. This thing\nwould be the good only by participation, whilst that in which it would\nparticipate would be nothing in particular; which would demonstrate\nthat the good was nothing in particular. But if, in the principle under\ndiscussion, the good be such--that is, if there be a difference whose\npresence gives the character of goodness to the composite--this good\nmust derive from some other principle which must be the Good uniquely\nand simply. Such a composite, therefore, depends on the pure and simple\nGood. Thus the First, the absolute Good, dominates all beings, is\nuniquely the Good, possesses nothing within Himself, is mingled with\nnothing, is superior to all things, and is the cause of all things. The\nbeautiful and that which is \"being\" could not derive from evil, or from\nindifferent principles; for the cause being more perfect, is always\nbetter than its effects.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.\n\nAgainst the Gnostics; or, That the Creator and the World are Not\nEvil.[275]\n\n\nTHE SUPREME PRINCIPLES MUST BE SIMPLE AND NOT COMPOUND.\n\n1. We have already seen[276] that the nature of the Good is simple and\nprimary, for nothing that is not primary could be simple. We have also\ndemonstrated that the nature of the Good contains nothing in itself,\nbut is something unitary, the very nature of the One; for in itself\nthe One is not some thing to which unity could be added, any more than\nthe Good in itself is some thing to which goodness could be added.\nConsequently, as both the One and the Good are simplicity itself, when\nwe speak of the One and the Good, these two words express but one and\nthe same nature; they affirm nothing, and only represent it to us so\nfar as possible. This nature is called the First, because it is very\nsimple, and not composite; it is the absolute as self-sufficient,\nbecause it is not composite; otherwise it would depend on the things\nof which it was composed. Neither is it predicable of anything (as an\nattribute in a subject) for all that is in another thing comes from\nsomething else. If then this nature be not in anything else, nor is\nderived from anything else, if it contain nothing composite, it must\nnot have anything above it.\n\n\nTHE ONLY SUPREME PRINCIPLES MUST THEN BE UNITY, INTELLIGENCE AND SOUL.\n\nConsequently there are no principles other (than the three divine\nhypostatic substances); and the first rank will have to be assigned\nto Unity, the second to Intelligence, as the first thinking\nprinciple,[277] and the third to the Soul. Such indeed is the natural\norder, which admits of no further principles, in the intelligible\nworld. If less be claimed, it is because of a confusion between the\nSoul and Intelligence, or Intelligence with the First; but we have\noften pointed out their mutual differences.[278] The only thing left\nis to examine if there might not be more than these three hypostatic\nsubstances; and in this case, what their nature might be.\n\n\nTHE ARISTOTELIAN DISTINCTION OF POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY IS NOT\nAPPLICABLE TO DIVINITY.\n\nThe Principle of all things, such as we have described it, is the\nmost simple and elevated possible. The (Gnostics) are wrong in\ndistinguishing within that (supreme Principle[279]) potentiality\nfrom actualization[280]; for it would be ridiculous to seek to apply\nto principles that are immaterial and are actualizations, that\n(Aristotelian) distinction, and thus to increase the number (of the\ndivine hypostatic substances.[281])\n\n\nTHE DISTINCTION OF REST AND MOVEMENT ALSO INAPPLICABLE.\n\nNeither could we, below the Supreme, distinguish two intelligences, one\nat rest, and the other in motion.[282] We should have to define the\nresting of the First, and the movement or utterance[283] of the second.\nThe inaction of the one and the action of the other would be equally\nmysterious. By its being (or, nature), Intelligence is eternally and\nidentically a permanent actualization. To rise to Intelligence and to\nmove around it is the proper function of the soul.\n\n\nAN INTERMEDIARY LOGOS (OR AEON JESUS), ALSO UNACCOUNTABLE.\n\nReason (logos) which descends from Intelligence into the Soul, and\nintellectualizes her, does not constitute a nature distinct from the\nSoul and Intelligence, and intermediary between them.\n\n\nCONSCIOUSNESS IS UNITARY THOUGH CONTAINING THINKER, OBJECT AND THOUGHT.\n\nNor should we admit the existence of several intelligences, merely\nbecause we distinguish a thinker from a consciousness of the thinker.\nThough there be a difference between thinking, and thinking that\none thinks, these two nevertheless constitute a single intuitive\nconsciousness of its actualizations. It would be ridiculous to deny\nsuch a consciousness to veritable Intelligence. It is therefore\nthe same Intelligence that thinks, and that thinks that it thinks.\nOtherwise there would be two principles, of which the one would have\nthought, and the other consciousness of thought. The second would\ndoubtless differ from the first, but would not be the real thinking\nprinciple. A mere logical distinction between thought and consciousness\nof thought would not establish the (actual) differences between two\n(hypostatic substances). Further, we shall have to consider whether\nit be possible to conceive of an Intelligence which would exclusively\nthink, without any accompanying consciousness of its thought.[284]\nIf we ourselves who are entirely devoted to practical activity and\ndiscursive reason were in such a condition,[285] we would, even if\notherwise considered sensible, be insane. But as true Intelligence\nthinks itself in its thoughts, and as the intelligible, far from\nbeing outside of Intelligence, is Intelligence itself, Intelligence,\nby thinking, possesses itself, and necessarily sees itself.[286] When\nIntelligence sees itself, it does not see itself as unintelligent,\nbut as intelligent. Therefore in the first actualization of thought,\nIntelligence has the thought and consciousness of thought, two things\nthat form but a single one; not even logically is this a duality. If\nIntelligence always thinks what it is, is there any reason to separate,\neven by a simple logical distinction, thought from the consciousness\nof thought? The absurdity of the doctrine we are controverting will be\nstill more evident if we suppose that a third intelligence is conscious\nthat the second intelligence is conscious of the thought of the first;\nwe might thus go on to infinity.[287]\n\n\nA DIFFERENTIATED REASON WOULD DEPRIVE THE SOUL OF CONSCIOUSNESS.\n\nLast, if we suppose that Reason is derived from Intelligence, and then\nfrom reason in the soul derive another reason which would be derived\nfrom Reason in itself, so as to constitute a principle intermediary\nbetween Intelligence and Soul, the Soul would be deprived of the\npower of thought. For thus the Soul, instead of receiving reason from\nIntelligence, would receive reason from an intermediary principle.\nInstead of possessing Reason itself, the Soul would possess only an\nadumbration of Reason; the Soul would not know Intelligence, and would\nnot be able to think.[288]\n\n\nNO MORE THAN THREE PRINCIPLES ADMITTED BECAUSE OF THE UNITY OF\nCONSCIOUSNESS.\n\n2. In the intelligible world, therefore, we shall not recognize more\nthan three principles (Unity, Intelligence, and Soul), without those\nsuperfluous and incongruous fictions. We shall insist that there is a\nsingle Intelligence that is identical, and immutable, which imitates\nits Father so far as it can. Then there is our soul, of which one\npart ever remains among the intelligibles, while one part descends to\nsense-objects, and another abides in an intermediary region.[289] As\nour soul is one nature in several powers, she may at times entirely\nrise to the intelligible world, with the best part of herself and of\nessence; at other times the soul's lower part allows itself to be\ndragged down to the earth, carrying with it the intermediate portion;\nfor the soul cannot be entirely dragged down.[290] This being dragged\ndown occurs only because the soul does not abide in the better\nregion.[291] While dwelling in it, the Soul, which is not a part (of\nit) and of which we are not a part,[292] has given to the body of the\nuniverse all the perfections of which she was capable. The Soul governs\nit by remaining quiet, without reasoning, without having to correct\nanything. With wonderful power she beautifies the universe by the\ncontemplation of the intelligible world. The more the Soul attaches\nherself to contemplation, the more powerful and beautiful she is; what\nshe receives from above, she communicates to the sense-world, and\nilluminates because she herself is always illuminated (by Intelligence).\n\n\nTHE WORLD AS ETERNALLY BEGOTTEN--GOD'S NEED TO GIVE.\n\n3. Thus the Soul, ever being illuminated, in turn herself illuminates\nlower things that subsist only through her, like plants that feed on\ndew, and which participate in life, each according to its capacity.\nLikewise a fire heats the objects that surround it, each in proportion\nto its nature. Now if such is the effect of fire whose power is\nlimited, while intelligible beings exert unlimited powers, how would\nit be possible for these beings to exist without causing anything to\nparticipate in their nature? Each of them must therefore communicate\nsome degree of its perfection to other beings. The Good would no longer\nbe the good, Intelligence would no longer be intelligence, the Soul\nwould no longer be soul, if, beneath that which possesses the first\ndegree of life, there was not some other thing which possessed the\nsecond degree of life, and which subsisted only so long as subsists\nHe who occupies the first rank. It is therefore unavoidable that all\nthings (inferior to the First) must always exist in mutual dependence,\nand that they be begotten, because they derive their existence from\nsome other source. They were not begotten at a definite moment. When\nwe affirm that they are begotten, we should say, they were begotten,\nor, they shall be begotten. Nor will they be destroyed, unless they\nare composed of elements in which they could be dissolved. Those\nthat are indissoluble will not perish. It may be objected that they\ncould be resolved into matter. But why should matter also not be\nliable to be destroyed? If it were granted that matter was liable to\ndestruction, there was no necessity for its existence.[293] It may\nbe further objected that the existence of matter necessarily results\nfrom the existence of other principles. In this case, this necessity\nstill subsists. If matter is to be considered as isolated (from the\nintelligible world), then the divine principles also, instead of being\npresent everywhere,[294] will, as it were, be walled up in a limited\nplace.[295] But if the latter be impossible, then must matter be\nilluminated (by the intelligible world).\n\n\nBY A PUN ON INCLINATION, PLOTINOS SHOWS THAT THE WORLD-SOUL COULD\nNOT HAVE GONE THROUGH THE DRAMA OF CREATION ATTRIBUTED TO SOPHIA AND\nACHAMOTH.\n\n4. But in that case, the Soul created only because[296] she had lost\nher wings. The universal Soul, however, could not have been subject to\nsuch an accident. Those (Gnostics) who claim that she committed a fault\nshould explain the nature of that fault.[297] Why did this fall occur?\nIf she fell from all eternity, she must similarly remain in her fault;\nif only at a determinate time, why not earlier? We however believe\nthat the Soul created the world not by inclining (towards matter), but\nrather because she did not incline towards it. Thus to incline towards\nmatter the Soul would have forgotten the intelligible entities; but if\nshe had forgotten them, she could not have created the world (using\nthem as models). From what (models) would the soul have created the\nworld? She must have formed it according to the intelligible models\nshe had contemplated above. If she remembered them while creating, she\nhad not inclined (away from them towards matter). Neither did the Soul\nhave an obscure notion of the intelligibles; otherwise she would have\ninclined herself towards them, to get a clear intuition of them. For if\nshe kept some memory of the intelligible world, why would she not have\nwished to reascend therein?\n\n\nMOST GENERALLY ASSIGNED MOTIVES OF CREATION ARE RIDICULOUS, OR WORSE.\n\nBesides, what advantage could the (world-Soul) have imagined she\nwas gaining by creating the world? That she did so in order to be\nhonored[298] seems unworthy, for it would be attributing to her the\ndesires of a sculptor. Another theory is that the (world-Soul) created\nthe world by virtue of a rational conception, and she thus exercised\nher power, though creating did not inhere in her nature. If so, how did\nshe make the world? When will she destroy it? If she repented, what\nis she waiting for (before she destroys her handiwork)? If, however,\nshe has not yet repented, she could not repent after time will have\naccustomed her to her work, and will have made her more kindly disposed\nthereto. If however she be awaiting individual souls, the latter should\nnot have returned into generation, since, in the former generation,\nthey have already experienced evils here below, and consequently, they\nshould long since have ceased to descend upon this earth.\n\n\nTHE WORLD SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED EVIL BECAUSE OF OUR SUFFERINGS;\nNOTHING MORE BEAUTIFUL COULD BE IMAGINED.\n\nNor should the world be considered badly made, merely because we suffer\nso much therein. This idea results from entertaining unjustifiable\nexpectations of its perfections, and from confusing it with the\nintelligible world of which it is an image. Could a more beautiful\nimage, indeed, be imagined? After the celestial fire could we imagine\na better fire than our own? After the intelligible earth, could we\nimagine a better earth than ours? After the actualization by which the\nintelligible world embraces itself, could we imagine a sphere more\nperfect, more wonderful, or better ordered in its movements[299]? After\nthe intelligible sun, how could we imagine any sun different from the\none that we see?\n\n\nIT IS CONTRADICTORY TO CONSIDER ONESELF CAPABLE OF PERFECTION, BUT TO\nDENY IMPASSIBILITY TO THE BEAUTIFUL WORKS OF NATURE.\n\n5. Is it not absurd to see those (Gnostics) who, like everybody\nelse, possess a body, passions, fears, and excitements, holding an\nidea of their own powers high enough to make them believe themselves\ncapable of attaining the intelligible,[300] while to the sun, though\nit be immutable and perfect,[301] and though it be impassible power,\nrefusing a wisdom superior to ours, we who were born only yesterday,\nand who find so many obstacles in our search after truth? We certainly\nare surprised to see these (Gnostics) considering the souls of both\nthemselves and of the vilest men immortal and divine, while refusing\nimmortality to the entire heaven, to all the stars it contains, though\nthey be composed of elements more beautiful and purer[302] (than we),\nthough they manifest a marvellous beauty and order, while (these\nGnostics) themselves acknowledge that disorder is observed here below?\nAccording to their theories, however, the immortal Soul would have\npicked out the worst part of the world, while giving up the best to\nmortal souls.[303]\n\n\nAN INTERMEDIARY ELEMENTAL SOUL IS ALSO INADMISSIBLE.\n\nIt is also absurd to see them introduce into the world, after the\nuniversal Soul, another soul said to be composed of elements. How could\na composition of elements possess life? A mixture of elements does not\nproduce heat or cold, humidity or dryness, or any combination thereof.\nBesides, how could this soul (that is inferior to the universal\nSoul), hold in union together the four elements, if she herself were\ncomposed of them, and therefore were posterior to them? We may also\nrightfully demand of the (Gnostics) an explanation of their predicating\nperception, reflection, and other faculties to this (mythical) soul.\n\n\nTHE GNOSTICS' NEW EARTH, THAT IS MODEL OF THE OLD IS UNREASONABLE.\n\nBesides, as the (Gnostics) have no appreciation of the work of the\ndemiurgic creator, nor for this earth, they insist that the divinity\nhas created for them a new earth, which is destined to receive them\nwhen they shall have left here below, and which is the reason of the\nworld. But what need do they have of inhabiting the model of this world\nthat they pretend to hate? In any case, from where does this model\ncome? According to them, the model was created only when its author\ninclined towards things here below. But what was the use of the model,\nif its creator busied himself considerably with the world to make a\nworld inferior to the intelligible world which he possessed? If (the\nmodel were created) before the world, what could have been its use? Was\nit for the saved souls?[304] Why therefore were those souls not saved\n(by remaining within the model)? Under this hypothesis the creation\nof the model was useless. If (the model, however, was created) after\nthis world, its author derived it from this world, stealing the form\naway from matter; the experience that the souls had acquired in their\nearlier trials sufficed to teach them to seek their salvation.[305]\nLast, if the (Gnostics) pretend to have, in their souls, received the\nform of the world,[306] we have a new incomprehensible language.[307]\n\n\nEXILES, REPENTANCES, ANTITYPES, AND OTHER GNOSTIC INVENTIONS.\n\n6. We hardly know what to say of the other new conceptions they have\ninjected into the universe, such as exiles,[308] antitypes,[309] and\nrepentances.[310] If by \"repentances\" and \"exiles\" they mean certain\nstates of the Soul (in the normal meaning of the word, where a soul)\nyields to repentance; and if by \"antitypes\" they mean the images of the\nintelligible beings that the Soul contemplates before contemplating\nthe intelligible beings themselves, they are using meaningless words,\ninvented merely as catchwords and terms for their individual sect; for\nthey imagine such fictions merely because they have failed clearly to\nunderstand the ancient wisdom of the Greeks. Before them the Greeks,\nclearly and simply, had spoken of \"ascensions\" of souls that issued\nfrom the \"cavern,\" and which insensibly rise to a truer contemplation.\nThe doctrines of these (Gnostics) are partly stolen from Plato, while\nthe remainder, which were invented merely to form their own individual\nsystem, are innovations contrary to truth. It is from Plato that they\nborrowed their judgments, the rivers of Hades.[311] They do speak of\nseveral intelligible principles, such as essence, intelligence, the\nsecond demiurgic creator or universal Soul; but all that comes from\nPlato's Timaeus,[312] which says, \"Likewise as the ideas contained in\nthe existing Organism were seen by Intelligence, so he [the creator of\nthis universe[313]] thought that the latter should contain similar and\nequally numerous (natures).\" But, not clearly understanding Plato, the\nGnostics here imagined (three principles), an intelligence at rest,\nwhich contains all (beings), a second intelligence that contemplates\nthem (as they occur) in the first intelligence, and a third\nintelligence that thinks them discursively. They often consider this\ndiscursive intelligence as the creative soul, and they consider this to\nbe the demiurgic creator mentioned by Plato, because they were entirely\nignorant of the true nature of this demiurgic creator. In general, they\nalter entirely the idea of creation, as well as many other doctrines of\nPlato, and they give out an entirely erroneous interpretation thereof.\nThey imagine that they alone have rightly conceived of intelligible\nnature, while Plato and many other divine intellects never attained\nthereto. By speaking of a multitude of intelligible principles, they\nthink that they seem to possess an exact knowledge thereof, while\nreally they degrade them, assimilating them to lower, and sensual\nbeings, by increasing their number.[314] The principles that exist on\nhigh must be reduced to the smallest number feasible; we must recognize\nthat the principle below the First contains all (the essences), and\nso deny the existence of any intelligible (entities) outside of it,\ninasmuch as it contains all beings, by virtue of its being primary\n\"Being,\" of primary Intelligence, and of all that is beautiful beneath\nthe First Himself. The Soul must be assigned to the third rank. The\ndifferences obtaining between souls must further be explained by the\ndifference of their conditions or nature.[315]\n\n\nTHE GNOSTICS MAY WELL BORROW FROM THE GREEKS, BUT SHOULD NOT DEPRECIATE\nTHEM.\n\nInstead of besmirching the reputation of divine men,[316] the\n(Gnostics) should interpret the doctrines of the ancient sages in a\nfriendly way, borrowing from them such as they are right in professing,\nas, for instance, the immortality of the soul, the existence of the\nintelligible world, and of the first Divinity (who is the Good), the\nnecessity for the soul to flee from intercourse with the body, and\nthe belief that separation of the soul from body is equivalent to a\nreturn from generation to \"being.\"[317] They do well indeed if they\nborrow these ideas from Plato, for the purpose of developing them. They\nare even at liberty to express any opinion they please in diverging\nfrom his views; but their own doctrine should not be established in\nthe minds of their followers by insults and sarcasms against Greek\nsages. They could only do so by demonstrating the propriety of their\ndistinctive tenets, whenever they differ from those of the ancient\nphilosophers, and by expounding their own tenets with a really\nphilosophic reserve and equanimity. Even when they controvert a system\nthey are still bound to consider nothing but the truth, without any\nattempt at self-glorification, either by attacking men whose teachings\nhave long since been approved by worthy philosophers, or by claims of\nsuperiority to the latter. For that which the ancients taught on the\nsubject of the intelligible world will always be considered as the best\nand wisest by all who do not permit themselves to be misled by the\nerrors that to-day mislead so many.[318]\n\n\nGNOSTIC ADDITIONS TO PLATONISM ARE THEIR POOREST DOCTRINES.\n\nIf from the doctrines of the (Gnostics) we remove what they have\nborrowed from the teachings of the ancients, their remaining additions\nwill be discovered as very unfortunate. Their polemic against\n(Greek philosophy) consists of an introduction of a great number of\ngenealogies,[319] and destructions, blaming the intercourse of the\nsoul with the body,[320] complaining of the universe, criticising\nits administration, identifying the demiurgic creator (that is,\nIntelligence) with the universal souls.[321]\n\n\nTHE UNIVERSAL SOUL MAY NOT BE JUDGED BY THE HUMAN STANDARD.\n\n7. Elsewhere we have demonstrated[322] that this world never\nbegan, and will never end; and that it must last as long as the\nintelligible entities. We have also shown,[323] and that earlier than\nthese (Gnostics), that the soul's intercourse with the body is not\nadvantageous to her. But to judge the universal Soul according to ours\nis to resemble a man who would blame the totality of a well governed\ncity by an examination limited to the workers in earth or metal.\n\n\nDIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE UNIVERSAL SOUL AND THE HUMAN SOUL.\n\nThe differences between the universal Soul and our (human) souls are\nvery important. To begin with, the universal Soul does not govern\nthe world in the same manner (as our soul governs the body); for she\ngoverns the world without being bound thereto. Besides many other\ndifferences elsewhere noted,[324] we were bound to the body after the\nformation of a primary bond.[325] In the universal Soul the nature\nthat is bound to the body (of the world) binds all that it embraces;\nbut the universal Soul herself is not bound by the things she binds.\nAs she dominates them, she is impassible in respect to them, while we\nourselves do not dominate exterior objects. Besides, that part of the\nuniversal Soul which rises to the intelligible world remains pure and\nindependent; even that[326] which communicates life to the body (of the\nworld) receives nothing therefrom. In general what is in another being\nnecessarily participates in the state of that being; but a principle\nwhich has its own individual life would not receive anything from\nany other source.[327] That is why, when one thing is located within\nanother, it feels the experiences of the latter, but does not any the\nless retain its individual life in the event of the destruction of the\nlatter. For instance, if the fire within yourself be extinguished,\nthat would not extinguish the universal fire; even if the latter were\nextinguished, the universal Soul would not feel it, and only the\nconstitution of the body (of the world) would be affected thereby. If\na world exclusively composed of the remaining three elements were a\npossibility, that would be of no importance to the universal Soul,\nbecause the world does not have a constitution similar that of each\nof the contained organisms. On high, the universal Soul soars above\nthe world, and thereby imposes on it a sort of permanence; here below,\nthe parts, which as it were flow off, are maintained in their place by\na second bond.[328] As celestial entities have no place (outside of\nthe world), into which they might ooze out,[329] there is no need of\ncontaining them from the interior, nor of compressing them from without\nto force them back within; they subsist in the location where the\nuniversal Soul placed them from the beginning. Those which naturally\nmove modify the beings which possess no natural motion.[330] They carry\nout well arranged revolutions because they are parts of the universe.\nHere below there are beings which perish because they cannot conform to\nthe universal order. For instance, if a tortoise happened to be caught\nin the midst of a choric ballet that was dancing in perfect order, it\nwould be trodden under foot because it could not withdraw from the\neffects of the order that regulated the feet of the dancers; on the\ncontrary, if it conformed to that order, it would suffer no harm.\n\n\nGNOSTIC DEMANDS FOR REASON OF WORLD'S CREATION ARE IDLE, AND INVOLVE\nSTILL LARGER QUESTIONS.\n\n8. To ask (as do the Gnostics) why the world was created, amounts\nto asking the reason of the existence of the universal Soul, and\nof the creation of the demiurgic creator himself. To ask such a\nquestion well characterizes men who first wish to find a principle\nof that which (in the world) is eternal, but who later opine that\nthe demiurgic creator became the creating cause only as a result of\nan inclination or alteration.[331] If indeed they be at all willing\nto listen to us fairly, we shall have to teach them the nature of\nthese intelligible principles, to end their habit of scorning (those)\nvenerable (intelligible) beings, and (to induce them to) pay these a\ndeserved respect. No one, indeed, has the right to find fault with the\nconstitution of the world, which reveals the greatness of intelligible\nnature. We are forced[332] to recognize that the world is a beautiful\nand brilliant statue of the divinities, from the fact that the world\nachieved existence without beginning with an obscure life, such as that\nof the little organisms it contains, and which the productiveness of\nuniversal life never ceases to bring forth, by day or night; on the\ncontrary, its life is continuous, clear, manifold, extended everywhere,\nand illustrating marvellous wisdom. It would be no more than natural\nthat the world should not equal the model it imitates; otherwise, it\nwould no longer be an imitation. It would be an error, however, to\nthink that the world imitates its model badly; it lacks none of the\nthings that could be contained by a beautiful and natural image; for it\nwas necessary for this image to exist, without implying reasoning or\nskill.[333]\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE LAST DEGREE OF EXISTENCE.\n\nIntelligence, indeed, could not be (the last degree of existence). It\nwas necessarily actualization of a double nature, both within itself,\nand for other beings.[334] It was inevitable that it should be followed\nby other beings, for only the most impotent being would fail to produce\nsomething that should proceed from it,[335] while (it is granted that)\nthe intelligible possesses a wonderful power[336]; wherefore, it could\nnot help creating.\n\n\nTHIS IS THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS BECAUSE WE CAN ACHIEVE VIRTUE.\n\nWhat would be the nature of a world better than the present one, if\nit were possible? The present one must be a faithful image of the\nintelligible world, if the existence of the world be necessary, and\nif there be no better possible world. The whole earth is peopled with\nanimate and even immortal beings; from here below up to the heaven\n(the world) is full of them.[337] Why should the stars in the highest\nsphere (the fixed stars), and those in the lower spheres (the planets),\nnot be divinities, in view of their regular motion, and their carrying\nout a magnificent revolution around the world[338]? Why should they\nnot possess virtue? What obstacle could hinder them from acquiring\nit? Not on high are found the things which here below make men evil;\nnamely, that evil nature which both is troubled, and troubles. With\ntheir perpetual leisure why should not the stars possess intelligence,\nand be acquainted with the divinity and all the other intelligible\ndeities[339]? How should we possess a wisdom greater than theirs? Only\na foolish man would entertain such thoughts. How could our souls be\nsuperior to the stars when at the hands of the universal Soul they\nundergo the constraint of descending here below[340]? For the best\npart of souls is that which commands.[341] If, on the contrary, the\nsouls descend here below voluntarily, why should the (Gnostics) find\nfault with this sphere whither they came voluntarily, and from which\nthey can depart whenever it suits them[342]? That everything here\nbelow depends on the intelligible principles is proved by the fact\nthat the organization of the world is such that, during this life, we\nare able to acquire wisdom, and live out a life similar to that of the\ndivinities.[343]\n\n\nTHE INEQUALITY OF RICHES IS OF NO MOMENT TO AN ETERNAL BEING.\n\n9. No one would complain of poverty and the unequal distribution\nof wealth if one realized that the sage does not seek equality in\nsuch things, because he does not consider that the rich man has any\nadvantage over the poor man, the prince over the subject.[344] The sage\nleaves such opinions to commonplace people, for he knows that there are\ntwo kinds of life; that of the virtuous who achieve the supreme degree\n(of perfection) and the intelligible world, and that of common earthly\nmen. Even the latter life is double; for though at times they do think\nof virtue, and participate somewhat in the good, at other times they\nform only a vile crowd, and are only machines, destined to satisfy\nthe primary needs of virtuous people.[345] There is no reason to be\nsurprised at a man committing a murder, or, through weakness, yielding\nto his passions, when souls, that behave like young, inexperienced\npersons, not indeed like intelligences, daily behave thus. It has been\nsaid[346] that this life is a struggle in which one is either victor or\nvanquished. But is not this very condition a proof of good arrangement?\nWhat does it matter if you are wronged, so long as you are immortal?\nIf you be killed, you achieve the fate that you desired. If you have\nreason to complain of how you are treated in some particular city,\nyou can leave it.[347] Besides, even here below, there evidently are\nrewards and punishments. Why then complain of a society within which\ndistributive justice is exercised, where virtue is honored, and where\nvice meets its deserved punishment[348]?\n\n\nMOREOVER THIS WORLD CONTAINS TRADITIONS OF DIVINITY.\n\nNot only are there here below statues of the divinities, but even the\ndivinities condescend to look on us, leading everything in an orderly\nmanner from beginning to end, and they apportion to each the fate that\nsuits him, and which harmonizes with his antecedents in his successive\nexistences.[349] This is unknown only to persons who are most vulgarly\nignorant of divine things. Try therefore to become as good as you\ncan, but do not on that account imagine that you alone are capable of\nbecoming good[350]; for then you would no longer be good. Other men\n(than you) are good; there are most excellent (ministering spirits\ncalled) guardians; further, there are deities who, while inhabiting\nthis world, contemplate the intelligible world,[351] and are still\nbetter than the guardians. Further still is the blissful (universal)\nSoul that manages the universe. Honor therefore the intelligible\ndivinities, and above all the great King of the intelligible\nworld,[352] whose greatness is especially manifested in the multitude\nof the divinities.\n\n\nTRUE KNOWLEDGE SHOWN NOT BY UNIFICATION, BUT REVELATION OF DIVINE POWER.\n\nIt is not by reducing all things to unity, but by setting forth the\ngreatness developed by the divinity itself, that one manifests his\nknowledge of divine power. The Divinity (manifests His power) when,\nthough remaining what He is, He produces many divinities which depend\non Him, which proceed from Him, and exist by Him. In this way this\nworld holds existence from Him, and contemplates Him along with all the\ndivinities which announce to men the divine decrees, and who reveal to\nthem whatever pleases them.[353] These stars must not be blamed for not\nbeing what the divinity is, for they only represent their nature.\n\n\nMODESTY IS A PART OF GOODNESS; PRIDE IS FOLLY.\n\nIf, however, you pretend to scorn these (stars that are considered)\ndivinities, and if you hold yourself in high esteem, on the plea that\nyou are not far inferior to them, learn first that the best man is he\nwho is most modest in his relations with divinities and men. In the\nsecond place, learn that one should think of the divinity only within\nlimits, without insolence, and not to seek to rise to a condition\nthat is above human possibilities. It is unreasonable to believe that\nthere is no place by the side of the divinity for all other men,\nwhile impudently proposing alone to aspire to that dignity. This by\nitself would deprive the Soul of the possibility of assimilation to\nthe Divinity to the limit of her receptivity.[354] This the Soul\ncannot attain unless guided by Intelligence. To pretend to rise above\nIntelligence,[355] is to fall short of it. There are people insane\nenough to believe, without reflection, claims such as the following\n(\"By initiation into secret knowledge, or gnosis), you will be better,\nnot only than all men, but even than all the deities.\" These people are\nswollen with pride[356]; and men who before were modest, simple and\nhumble, become arrogant on hearing themselves say, \"You are a child\nof the divinity; the other men that you used to honor are not his\nchildren, any more than the stars who were worshipped by the ancients.\nYou yourself, without working, are better than heaven itself.\" Then\ncompanions crowd around him, and applaud his utterance. He resembles\na man who, though not knowing how to count, should, in the midst of a\ncrowd of men, equally ignorant with him, hear it said by somebody that\nhe was a thousand feet high while others were only five feet high.\nHe would not realize what was meant by a thousand feet, but he would\nconsider this measure very great.\n\n\nOTHER GNOSTIC INCONSISTENCIES.\n\n(Gnostics) admit that the Divinity interests Himself in men. How then\ncould He (as they insist), neglect the world that contains them? Could\nthis be the case because He lacked the leisure to look after it? In\nthis case He would lack the leisure to look after anything beneath\nHim (including men also). On the other hand, if He do care for men,\nthat care would include the world that surrounds and contains them.\nIf He ignored what surrounded men, in order to ignore the world, He\nwould thereby also ignore the men themselves. The objection that men\ndo need that the Divinity should care for the world (is not true), for\nthe world does need the care of the Divinity. The Divinity knows the\narrangement of the world, the men it contains, and their condition\ntherein.[357] The friends of the Divinity support meekly all that\nresults necessarily therefrom. (They are right), for that which happens\nshould be considered not only from one's own standpoint, but also from\nthat of the totality of circumstances. Each (person or thing) should\nbe considered from his place (in the scale of existence); one should\never aspire to Him to whom aspire all beings capable of (the Good);\none should be persuaded that many beings, or rather that all beings,\naspire thereto; that those who attain to Him are happy, while the\nothers achieve a fate suitable to their nature; finally, one should\nnot imagine oneself alone capable of attaining happiness.[358] Mere\nassertion of possession does not suffice for real possession thereof.\nThere are many men who, though perfectly conscious that they do not\npossess some good, nevertheless boast of its possession, or who really\nbelieve they do possess it, when the opposite is the true state of\naffairs; or that they exclusively possess it when they are the only\nones who do not possess it.\n\n\nPLOTINOS ADDRESSES HIMSELF TO THOSE OF HIS FRIENDS WHO WERE FORMERLY\nGNOSTIC, NOT TO THE LATTER WHO ARE HOPELESS.\n\n10. On examining many other assertions (of the Gnostics), or rather,\nall of their assertions, we find more than enough to come to some\nconclusion concerning the details of their doctrines. We cannot,\nindeed, help blushing when we see some of our friends, who had imbued\nthemselves with (Gnostic) doctrines before becoming friends of ours,\nsomehow or another persevere therein, working zealously to try to\nprove that they deserved full confidence, or speaking as if they were\nstill convinced that they were based on good grounds.[385] We are here\naddressing our friends, not the partisans (of the Gnostics). Vainly\nindeed would we try to persuade the latter not to let themselves be\ndeceived by men who furnish no proofs--what proofs indeed could they\nfurnish?--but who only impose on others by their boastfulness.[359]\n\n\nPLOTINOS HAS NO INTENTION OF WRITING A FULL CONFUTATION.\n\nFollowing another kind of discussion, we might write a refutation of\nthese men who are impudent enough to ridicule the teachings of those\ndivine men who taught in ancient times, and who conformed entirely to\ntruth. We shall not however embark on this, for whoever understands\nwhat we have already said will from that (sample) be able to judge of\nthe remainder.\n\n\nGNOSTIC THEORY OF CREATION BY MERE ILLUMINATION.[386]\n\nNeither will we controvert an assertion which overtops all their others\nin absurdity--we use this term for lack of a stronger. Here it is:\n\"The Soul and another Wisdom inclined downwards towards things here\nbelow, either because the Soul first inclined downwards spontaneously,\nor because she was misled by Wisdom; or because (in Gnostic view),\nSoul and Wisdom were identical. The other souls descended here below\ntogether (with the Soul), as well as the \"members of Wisdom,\" and\nentered into bodies, probably human. Nevertheless the Soul, on account\nof which the other soul descended here below, did not herself descend.\nShe did not incline, so to speak, but only illuminated the darkness.\nFrom this illumination was born in matter an image (Wisdom, the image\nof the Soul). Later was formed (the demiurgic creator, called) an image\nof the image, by means of matter or materiality, or of a principle by\n(Gnostics) designated by another name (the \"Fruit of the fall\")--for\nthey make use of many other names, for the purpose of increasing\nobscurity. This is how they derive their demiurgic creator. They also\nsuppose that this demiurgic creator separated himself from his mother,\nWisdom, and from him they deduce the whole world even to the extremity\nof the images.\" The perpetration of such assertions amounts to a bitter\nsarcasm of the power that created the world.\n\n\nTHE NUMBERLESS INTELLECTUAL DIFFICULTIES OF SUCH A THEORY.\n\n11. To begin with, if the Soul did not descend, if she limited herself\nto illuminating the darkness (which is synonymous with matter), by\nwhat right could it be asserted that the Soul inclined (downwards)?\nIf indeed a kind of light issued from the Soul, this does not\njustify an inclination of the Soul, unless we admit the existence\nof something (darkness) beneath her, that the Soul approached the\ndarkness by a local movement, and that, on arriving near it, the\nSoul illuminated it. On the contrary, if the Soul illuminated it\nwhile remaining self-contained, without doing anything to promote\nthat illumination,[360] why did the Soul alone illuminate the\ndarkness? (According to the Gnostics) this occurred only after the\nSoul had conceived the Reason of the universe. Then only could the\nSoul illuminate the darkness, by virtue of this rational conception.\nBut then, why did the Soul not create the world at the same time\nshe illuminated the darkness, instead of waiting for the generation\nof (\"psychic) images\"? Further, why did this Reason of the world,\nwhich (the Gnostics) call the \"foreign land,\" and which was produced\nby the superior powers, as they say, not move its authors to that\ninclination? Last, why does this illuminated matter produce psychic\nimages, and not bodies? (Wisdom, or) the image of the Soul does not\nseem to stand in need of darkness or matter. If the Soul create, then\nher image (Wisdom) should accompany her, and remain attached to her.\nBesides, what is this creature of hers? Is it a being, or is it, as\nthe (Gnostics) say, a conception? If it be a being, what difference is\nthere between it and its principle? If it be some other kind of a soul,\nit must be a \"soul of growth and generation,\" since its principle is a\nreasonable soul.[361] If however (this Wisdom) be a \"soul of growth and\ngeneration,\" how could it be said to have created for the purpose of\nbeing honored[362]? In short, how could it have been created by pride,\naudacity, and imagination? Still less would we have the right to say\nthat it had been created by virtue of a rational conception. Besides,\nwhat necessity was there for the mother of the demiurgic creator to\nhave formed him of matter and of an image? Speaking of conception, it\nwould be necessary to explain the origin of this term; then, unless a\ncreative force be predicated of this conception, it would be necessary\nto show how a conception can constitute a real being. But what creative\nforce can be inherent in this imaginary being? The (Gnostics) say that\nthis image (the demiurgic creator) was produced first, and that only\nafterwards other images were created; but they permit themselves to\nassert that without any proof. For instance, how could it be said that\nfire was produced first (and other things only later)?\n\n\nHOW THE GNOSTIC DEMIURGE CREATED.\n\n12. How could this newly formed image (the demiurgic creator) have\nundertaken to create by memory of the things he knew? As he did not\nexist before, he could not have known anything, any more than the\nmother (Wisdom) which is attributed to him. Besides, it is quite\nsurprising that, though the (Gnostics) did not descend upon this world\nas images of souls, but as veritable, genuine souls, nevertheless\nhardly one or two of them succeeds in detaching themselves from the\n(sense) world and by gathering together their memories, to remember\nsome of the things they previously knew, while this image (the\ndemiurgical creator), as well as his mother (Wisdom), which is a\nmaterial image, was capable of conceiving intelligible entities in a\nfeeble manner, indeed, as say the Gnostics, but after all from her\nvery birth. Not only did she conceive intelligible things, and formed\nan idea of the sense-world from the intelligible world, but she also\ndiscovered with what elements she was to produce the sense-world. Why\ndid she first create the fire? Doubtless because she judged she would\nbegin thereby; for why did she not begin with some other element? If\nshe could produce fire because she had the conception thereof, why,\nas she had the conception of the world--as she must have begun by a\nconception of the totality--did she not create the whole at one single\nstroke[363]? Indeed, this conception of the world embraced all its\nparts. It would also have been more natural, for the demiurgical\ncreator should not have acted like a workman, as all the arts are\nposterior to nature and to the creation of the world. Even to-day, we\ndo not see the natures[364] when they beget individuals, first produce\nthe fire, then the other elements successively, and finally mingle\nthem. On the contrary, the outline and organization of the entire\norganism are formed at once in the germ born at the monthly periods in\nthe womb of the mother. Why then, in creation, should matter not have\nbeen organized at one stroke by the type of the world, a type that\nmust have contained fire, earth, and all the rest of them? Perhaps the\n(Gnostics) would have thus conceived of the creation of the world, if\n(instead of an image) they had had in their system a genuine Soul. But\ntheir demiurgic creator could not have proceeded thus. To conceive of\nthe greatness, and especially of the dimension of the heavens, of the\nobliquity of the zodiac, of the course of the stars, the form of the\nearth, and to understand the reason of each of these things, would not\nhave been the work of an image, but rather of a power that proceeded\nfrom the better principles, as the (Gnostics) in spite of themselves\nacknowledge.\n\n\nTHE NECESSITY OF THE ILLUMINATION OF THE DARKNESS MUST HAVE BEEN\nETERNAL.\n\nIndeed, if we examine attentively that in which this illumination of\nthe darkness consists, the (Gnostics) may be led to a recognition\nof the true principles of the world. Why was the production of this\nillumination of the darkness necessary, if its existence was not\nabsolutely unavoidable? This necessity (of an illumination of the\ndarkness) was either in conformity with, or in opposition to nature. If\nit conformed thereto, it must have been so from all time; if it were\ncontrary thereto, something contrary to nature would have happened to\nthe divine powers, and evil would be prior to the world. Then it would\nno longer be the world that was the cause of evil (as the Gnostics\nclaim), but the divine powers. The world is not the principle of evil\nfor the soul, but it is the soul that is the principle of evil for the\nworld. Ascending from cause to cause, reason will relate this world to\nthe primary principles.\n\n\nEVEN THE EXISTENCE OF THE DARKNESS MUST BE RELATED TO THE SOUL.\n\nIf matter is also said to be the cause of evil, where does it\noriginate? For the darkness existed already, as say (the Gnostics),\nwhen the soul has seen and illuminated them. From whence (comes\ndarkness)? If (the Gnostics) answer that it is the soul herself that\ncreated (darkness) by inclining (downwards to matter), then evidently\n(the darkness) did not exist before the inclination of the soul.\nDarkness therefore is not the cause of this inclination; the cause is\nin the nature of the soul. This cause may thus be related to preceding\nnecessities, and as a result to first principles.[365]\n\n\nINSTEAD OF COMPLAINING OF THE WORLD, UNDERSTAND IT AND FIT YOURSELF TO\nIT.\n\n13. Those who complain of the nature of the world do not know what they\nare doing, nor the extent of their audacity. Many men are ignorant of\nthe close concatenation which unites the entities of the first, second,\nand third ranks,[366] and which descends even to those of the lowest\ndegree. Instead of blaming what is subordinate to first principles,\nwe should gently submit to the laws of the universe, rise to first\nprinciples, not undergo those tragic terrors,[367] inspired in certain\npeople by the spheres of the world which exert on us nothing but a\nbeneficent influence.[368] What is so terrible in them? Why should they\nbe feared by these men foreign to philosophy and all sound learning?\nThough celestial spheres do have fiery bodies, they should not inspire\nus with any fear, because they are perfectly harmonious with the\nuniverse and with the earth. We must besides consider the souls of\nthe stars to which those (Gnostics) consider themselves so superior,\nwhile their bodies, which surpass ours so much in size and beauty,\nefficaciously concur in the production of things that are conformed to\nthe order of nature[369]; for such things could not be born if first\nprinciples alone existed. Finally the stars complete the universe, and\nare important members thereof. If even man holds a great superiority\nover animals, there must be a far greater superiority in those stars\nwhich exist as ornaments to the universe, and to establish order\ntherein, and not to exert thereover a tyrannical influence.[370] The\nevents that are said to flow from the stars are rather signs thereof\nthan causes.[371] Besides, the events that really do flow from the\nstars differ among each other by circumstances. It is not therefore\npossible that the same things should happen to all men, separated as\nthey are by their times of birth, the places of their residence, and\nthe dispositions of their souls. It is just as unreasonable to expect\nthat all would be good, nor, because of the impossibility of this, to\ngo and complain on the grounds that all sense-objects should be similar\nto intelligible objects. Moreover,[372] evil is nothing but what is\nless complete in respect to wisdom, and less good, in a decreasing\ngradation. For instance, nature (that is, the power of growth and\ngeneration) should not be called evil because she is not sensation; nor\nsensation be called evil, because it is not reason. Otherwise, we might\nbe led to think that there was evil in the intelligible world. Indeed,\nthe Soul is inferior to Intelligence, and Intelligence is inferior to\nthe One.\n\n\nGNOSTICS WRONGLY IMAGINE INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES CAN BE BEWITCHED.[387]\n\n14. Another error of the (Gnostics) is their teaching that intelligible\nbeings are not beyond the reach of being affected by human beings.\nWhen the (Gnostics) utter magic incantations, addressing them to\n(intelligible beings), not only to the Soul, but to the Principles\nsuperior thereto, what are they really trying to do? To bewitch them?\nTo charm them? Or, to influence them[373]? They therefore believe\nthat divine beings listen to us, and that they obey him who skilfully\npronounces these songs, cries, aspirations and whistlings, to all of\nwhich they ascribe magic power.[374] If they do not really mean this,\nif they by sounds only claim to express things which do not fall under\nthe senses, then, through their effort to make their art more worthy\nof respect, they unconsciously rob it of all claim to respect, in our\nestimation.\n\n\nTHEIR EXPLANATION OF DISEASE AS DEMONIACAL POSSESSION IS WRONG.\n\nThey also pride themselves on expelling diseases. If this were done\nthrough temperance, by a well regulated life, as do the philosophers,\nthis claim might be respected. But they insist that diseases are\ndemons, which they can expel by their words, and they boast of this\nin order to achieve reputation among the common people, that is\nalways inclined to stand in awe of magic. They could not persuade\nrational individuals that diseases do not have natural causes, such as\nfatigue, satiety, lack of food, corruption, or some change depending\non an interior or exterior principle. This is proved by the nature\nof diseases. Sometimes a disease is expelled by moving the bowels,\nor by the administration of some potion; diet and bleeding are also\noften resorted to. Is this because the demon is hungry, or the potion\ndestroys him? When a person is healed on the spot, the demon either\nremains or departs. If he remain, how does his presence not hinder\nrecovery? If he depart, why? What has happened to him? Was he fed by\nthe disease? In this case, the disease was something different from\nthe demon. If he enter without any cause for the disease, why is the\nindividual into whose body he enters not always sick? If he enter\ninto a body that contains already a natural cause of disease, how far\ndoes he contribute to the disease? The natural cause is sufficient to\nproduce the disease. It would be ridiculous to suppose that the disease\nwould have a cause, but that, as soon as this cause is active there\nwould be a demon ready to come and assist it.\n\n\nTHE GENUINE VALUE OF GNOSTICISM SEEN IN ITS LOW MORAL ASPECTS.\n\nThe reader must now clearly see the kind of assertions given out by\nthe (Gnostics), and what their purpose must be. What they say about\ndemons (or guardians) has here been mentioned only as a commentary on\ntheir vain pretenses. Other opinions of the (Gnostics) may best be\njudged by a perusal of their books, by each individual for himself.\nRemember always that our system of philosophy contains, beside the\nother good (reasons), the simplicity of moral habits, the purity of\nintelligence, and that instead of vain boasting it recommends the care\nof personal dignity, rational self-confidence, prudence, reserve,\nand circumspection. The remainder (of Gnostic philosophy) may well\nbe contrasted with ours. As all that is taught by the Gnostics is\nvery different (from our teachings), we would have no advantage in a\nfurther detailed contrast; and it would be unworthy of us to pursue the\nmatter(?).\n\n\nTHE GNOSTIC DESTINY OF MAN IS DEMORALIZING.\n\n15. We should however observe the moral effect produced in the soul\nof those who listen to the speeches of these men who teach scorn of\nthe world and its contents. About the destiny of man there are two\nprincipal doctrines. The one assigns as our end the pleasures of the\nbody, the other suggests honesty and virtue, the love of which comes\nfrom the divinity, and leads back to the Divinity, as we have shown\nelsewhere.[375] Epicurus, who denies divine Providence, advises us to\nseek the only thing that remains, the enjoyments of pleasure. Well, the\n(Gnostics) hold a still more pernicious doctrine; they blame the manner\nin which divine Providence operates, and they accuse Providence itself;\nthey refuse respect to laws established here below, and the virtue\nwhich has been honored by all centuries. To destroy the last vestiges\nof honor, they destroy temperance by joking at it; they attack justice,\nwhether natural, or acquired by reason or exercise; in one word, they\nannihilate everything that could lead to virtue. Nothing remains\nbut to seek out pleasure, to profess selfishness, to renounce all\nsocial relations with men, to think only of one's personal interest,\nunless indeed one's own innate disposition be good enough to resist\ntheir pernicious doctrines. Nothing that we regard as good is by them\nesteemed, for they seek entirely different objects.\n\n\nTHE GNOSTICS IGNORE VIRTUE WITHOUT WHICH GOD IS A MERE WORD.\n\nNevertheless, those who know the Divinity should attach themselves\nto Him even here below, and by devoting themselves to His first\nprinciples, correct earthly things by applying their divine nature\nthereto. Only a nature that disdains physical pleasure can understand\nthat of which honor consists; those who have no virtue could never rise\nto intelligible entities. Our criticism of the (Gnostics) is justified\nby this that they never speak of virtue, never study it, give no\ndefinition of it, do not make out its kinds, and never repeat anything\nof the beautiful discussions thereof left to us by the ancient sages.\nThe (Gnostics) never tell how one could acquire or preserve moral\nqualities, how one should cultivate or purify the soul.[376] Their\nprecept, \"Contemplate the divinity,\"[377] is useless if one does not\nalso teach how this contemplation is to take place. One might ask the\n(Gnostics) if such contemplation of the divinity would be hindered by\nany lust or anger? What would hinder one from repeating the name of the\ndivinity, while yielding to the domination of the passions, and doing\nnothing to repress them? Virtue, when perfected, and by wisdom solidly\nestablished in the soul, is what shows us the divinity. Without real\nvirtue, God is no more than a name.\n\n\nSCORN OF THIS WORLD IS NO GUARANTEE OF GOODNESS.\n\n16. One does not become a good man merely by scorning the divinities,\nthe world, and the beauties it contains. Scorn of the divinities is the\nchief characteristic of the evil. Perversity is never complete until\nscorn of the divinities is reached; and if a man were not otherwise\nperverse, this vice would be sufficient to make him such. The respect\nwhich the (Gnostic) pretend to have for the intelligible divinities\n(the aeons) is an illogical accident. For when one loves a being,\nhe loves all that attaches thereto; he extends to the children the\naffection for the parent. Now every soul is a daughter of the heavenly\nFather. The souls that preside over the stars are intellectual, good,\nand closer to the divinity than ours. How could this sense-world, with\nthe divinities it contains, be separated from the intelligible world?\nWe have already shown above the impossibility of such a separation.\nHere we insist that when one scorns beings so near to those that hold\nthe front rank, it can only be that one knows them by name only.\n\n\nTO EXCEPT CERTAIN CLASSES OF BEING FROM DIVINE CARE IS TO SHOW\nCALLOUSNESS OF DISPOSITION.\n\nHow could it ever be considered pious to claim that divine Providence\ndoes not extend to sense-objects, or at least interests itself only in\nsome of them (the spiritual men, not the psychical)? Such an assertion\nmust surely be illogical. The (Gnostics) claim that divine Providence\ninterests itself only in them. Was this the case while they were living\non high, or only since they live here below? In the first case, why\ndid they descend onto this earth? In the second, why do they remain\nhere below? Besides, why should the Divinity not be present here\nbelow also? Otherwise how could He know that the (Gnostics), who are\nhere below, have not forgotten Him, and have not become perverse? If\nHe know those that have not become perverse, He must also know those\nwho have become perverse, to distinguish the former from the latter.\nHe must therefore be present to all men, and to the entire world, in\nsome manner or other. Thus the world will participate in the Divinity.\nIf the Divinity deprived the world of His presence, He would deprive\nyou also thereof, and you could not say anything of Him or of the\nbeings below Him. The world certainly derives its existence from Him\nwhether the divinity protect you by His providence or His help, and\nwhatever be the name by which you refer to Him. The world never was\ndeprived of the Divinity, and never will be. The world has a better\nright than any individuals to the attentions of Providence, and to\nparticipation in divine perfections. This is particularly true in\nrespect to the universal Soul, as is proved by the existence and wise\narrangement of the world. Which of these so proud individuals is as\nwell arranged, and as wise as the universe, and could even enter into\nsuch a comparison without ridicule or absurdity? Indeed, unless made\nmerely in the course of a discussion, such a comparison is really an\nimpiety. To doubt such truths is really the characteristic of a blind\nand senseless man, without experience or reason, and who is so far\nremoved from knowledge of the intelligible world that he does not\neven know the sense-world? Could any musician who had once grasped\nthe intelligible harmonies hear that of sense-sounds without profound\nemotion? What skilful geometrician or arithmetician will fail to enjoy\nsymmetry, order and proportion, in the objects that meet his view?\nThough their eyes behold the same objects as common people, experts see\nin them different things; when, for instance, with practiced glance,\nthey examine some picture. When recognizing in sense-objects an image\nof intelligible (essence), they are disturbed and reminded of genuine\nbeauty: that is the origin of love.[378] One rises to the intelligible\nby seeing a shining image of beauty glowing in a human face. Heavy and\nsenseless must be that mind which could contemplate all the visible\nbeauties, this harmony, and this imposing arrangement, this grand\npanoramic view furnished by the stars in spite of their distance,\nwithout being stirred to enthusiasm, and admiration of their splendor\nand magnificence. He who can fail to experience such feelings must have\nfailed to observe sense-objects, or know even less the intelligible\nworld.\n\n\nGNOSTICS JUSTIFY THEIR HATE OF THE BODY BY PLATO; IN THIS CASE THEY\nSHOULD FOLLOW HIM ALSO IN ADMIRATION OF THE WORLD.\n\n17. Some (Gnostics) object that they hate the body because Plato[379]\ncomplains much of it, as an obstacle to the soul, and as something\nfar inferior to her. In this case, they should, making abstraction\nof the body of the world by thought, consider the rest; that is,\nthe intelligible sphere which contains within it the form of the\nworld, and then the incorporeal souls which, in perfect order,\ncommunicate greatness to matter by modeling it in space according to an\nintelligible model, so that what is begotten might, so far as possible,\nby its greatness, equal the indivisible nature of its model; for the\ngreatness of sense-mass here below corresponds to the greatness of\nintelligible power. Let the (Gnostics) therefore consider the celestial\nsphere, whether they conceive of it as set in motion by the divine\npower that contains its principle, middle and end, or whether they\nimagine it as immovable, and not yet exerting its action on any of the\nthings it governs by its revolution. In both ways they will attain a\nproper idea of the Soul that presides over this universe. Let them then\nconceive of this soul as united to a body, though remaining impassible,\nand still communicating to this body so far as the latter is capable of\nparticipating therein,[380] some of its perfections, for the divinity\nis incapable of jealousy.[381] Then they will form a proper idea of\nthe world. They will understand how great is the power of the Soul,\nsince she makes the body participate in her beauty to the limit of\nher receptivity. This body has no beauty by nature, but when (it is\nbeautified by the Soul) it entrances divine souls.\n\n\nGNOSTICS BOAST OF LACK OF APPRECIATION OF BEAUTY ALREADY RECOGNIZED.\n\nThe (Gnostics) pretend that they have no appreciation for the beauty of\nthe world, and that they make no distinction between beautiful and ugly\nbodies. In this case they should not distinguish good from bad taste,\nnor recognize beauty in the sciences, in contemplation, nor in the\ndivinity itself; for sense-beings possess beauty only by participation\nin first principles. If they be not beautiful, neither could those\nfirst principles be such. Consequently sense-beings are beautiful,\nthough less beautiful than intelligible beings. The scorn professed by\n(Gnostics) for sense-beauty is praiseworthy enough if it refer only\nto the beauty of women and of young boys, and if its only purpose be\nto lead to chastity. But you may be sure that they do not boast of\nscorning what is ugly, they only boast of scorning what they had at\nfirst recognized and loved as being beautiful.\n\n\nEVEN EXTERIOR OR PARTIAL BEAUTY NEED NOT CONFLICT WITH THE BEAUTY OF\nTHE UNIVERSE; AND IN ANY CASE THERE WOULD BE NO EVIL IN IT.\n\nWe must further observe that it is not the same beauty that is seen in\nthe parts and in the whole, in individuals and in the universe; that\nthere are beauties great enough in sense-objects and in individuals,\nfor instance, in the guardians, to lead us to admire their creator,\nand to prove to us that they indeed are works of his. In this way we\nmay attain a conception of the unspeakable beauty of the universal\nSoul, if we do not attach ourselves to sense-objects, and if, without\nscorning them, we know how to rise to intelligible entities. If the\ninterior of a sense-being be beautiful, we shall judge that it is\nin harmony with its exterior beauty. If it be ugly we will consider\nthat it is inferior to its principle. But it is impossible for a\nbeing really to be beautiful in its exterior while ugly within; for\nthe exterior is beautiful only in so far as it is dominated by the\ninterior.[382] Those who are called beautiful, but who are ugly within,\nare externally beautiful only deceptively. In contradiction to those\nwho claim that there are men who possess a beautiful body and an ugly\nsoul, I insist that such never existed, and that it was a mistake to\nconsider them beautiful. If such men were ever seen, their interior\nugliness was accidental, and also their soul was, by nature, beautiful;\nfor we often meet here below obstacles which hinder us from reaching\nour goal. But the universe cannot by any obstacle be hindered from\npossessing interior beauty in the same way that it possesses exterior\nbeauty. The beings to whom nature has not, from the beginning, given\nperfection, may indeed not attain their goal, and consequently may\nbecome perverted; but the universe never was a child, nor imperfect;\nit did not develop, and received no physical increase. Such a physical\nincrease would have been impossible inasmuch as it already possessed\neverything. Nor could we admit that its Soul had ever, in the course\nof time, gained any increase. But even if this were granted to the\n(Gnostics), this could not constitute any evil.\n\n\nRECOGNITION OF THE BEAUTY OF THE BODY NEED NOT IMPLY ATTACHMENT\nTHERETO; IT IS COMPATIBLE WITH RESIGNATION.\n\n18. (Gnostics) however might object that their doctrine inspired\nrevulsion from, and hate for the body, while (that of Plotinos) really\nattached the soul to the body (by recognition of its beauty). Hardly.\nWe may illustrate by two guests who dwelt together in a beautiful\nhouse. The first guest blamed the disposition of the plan, and the\narchitect who constructed it, but nevertheless remained within it.\nThe other guest, instead of blaming the architect, praised his skill,\nand awaited the time when he might leave this house, when he should no\nlonger need it. The first guest would think himself wiser and better\nprepared to leave because he had learned to repeat that walls are\ncomposed of lifeless stones and beams, and that this house was far\nfrom truly representing the intelligible house. He would however not\nknow that the only difference obtaining between him and his companion,\nis that he did not know how to support necessary things, while his\ncompanion (who did not blame the house) will be able to leave it\nwithout regret because he loved stone-buildings only very moderately.\nSo long as we have a body we have to abide in these houses constructed\nby the (world) Soul, who is our beneficent sister, and who had the\npower to do such great things without any effort.[383]\n\n\nGNOSTICS ACKNOWLEDGE KINSHIP WITH DEPRAVED MEN, BUT REFUSE IT TO THE\nBEAUTIFUL UNIVERSE, OF WHICH WE SHOULD BE FAR PROUDER.\n\nThe Gnostics do not hesitate to call the most abandoned men their\n\"brothers,\" but refuse this name to the sun, and the other deities\nof heaven, and to the very Soul of the world, fools that they are!\nDoubtless, to unite ourselves thus to the stars by the bonds of\nkindred, we must no longer be perverse, we must have become good, and\ninstead of being bodies, we must be souls in these bodies; and, so far\nas possible, we must dwell within our bodies in the same manner as the\nuniversal Soul dwells within the body of the universe. To do this, one\nhas to be firm, not allow oneself to be charmed by the pleasures of\nsight or hearing, and to remain untroubled by any reverse. The Soul\nof the world is not troubled by anything, because she is outside\nof the reach of all. We, however, who here below are exposed to the\nblows of fortune, must repel them by our virtue, weakening some, and\nfoiling others by our constancy and greatness of soul.[384] When we\nshall thus have approached this power which is out of the reach (of\nall exigencies), having approached the Soul of the universe and of\nthe stars, we shall try to become her image, and even to increase\nthis resemblance to the assimilation of fusion. Then, having been\nwell disposed by nature and exercised, we also will contemplate what\nthese souls have been contemplating since the beginning. We must also\nremember that the boast of some men that they alone have the privilege\nof contemplating the intelligible world does not mean that they really\ncontemplate this world any more than any other men.\n\n\nGNOSTICS WHO BOAST SUPERIORITY TO THE DIVINITIES WHO CANNOT LEAVE THEIR\nBODIES ARE IN REALITY IGNORANT OF THE TRUE STATE OF AFFAIRS.\n\nVainly also do some (Gnostics) boast of having to leave their bodies\nwhen they will have ceased to live, while this is impossible to the\ndivinities because they always fill the same function in heaven. They\nspeak thus only because of their ignorance of what it is to be outside\nof the body, and of how the universal Soul in her entirety wisely\ngoverns what is inanimate.\n\n\nTHE JEALOUS DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SPIRITUAL, PSYCHIC AND MATERIAL IS\nDUE CHIEFLY TO IGNORANCE OF OTHER PEOPLE'S ATTAINMENTS.\n\nWe ourselves may very well not love the body, we may become pure,\nscorn death, and both recognize and follow spiritual things that are\nsuperior to earthly things. But on this account we should not be\njealous of other men, who are not only capable of following the same\ngoal, but who do constantly pursue it. Let us not insist that they are\nincapable of doing so. Let us not fall into the same error as those\nwho deny the movement of the stars, because their senses show them to\nremain immovable. Let us not act as do the (Gnostics), who believe that\nthe nature of the stars does not see what is external, because they\nthemselves do not see that their own souls are outside.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n\n[1] A Stoic term.\n\n[2] As says Parmenides, verse 80.\n\n[3] Cicero, Tusc. i. 16; Nat. Deor. i. 1; Maxim. Tyr. xvii. 5.\n\n[4] As wastage, see 6.4, 10; as Numenius might have said in 12, 22.\n\n[5] As said Numenius fr. 46.\n\n[6] See Plato's Timaeus 37.\n\n[7] Od. xvii. 486.\n\n[8] See v. 3.5, 6.\n\n[9] See v. 3.10.\n\n[10] See v. 3.8, 9.\n\n[11] See v. 3.12-17.\n\n[12] See v. 5.13.\n\n[13] See ii. 1.2.\n\n[14] ii 1.1.\n\n[15] Aristotle, Met. v. 4.\n\n[16] Aristotle, Met. xii. 2.\n\n[17] Aristotle, Met. vii. 8.\n\n[18] Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 5.\n\n[19] Aristotle, Met. xii. 5.\n\n[20] Aristotle, Met. ix. 8.\n\n[21] Aristotle, Met. ix. 5.\n\n[22] That is, their producing potentiality, and not the potentiality of\nbecoming these things, as thought Aristotle. Met. ix. 2.\n\n[23] As thought Aristotle, Soul, iii. 7; Met. xii.\n\n[24] By Plato in the Timaeus 52.\n\n[25] See iv. 6. A polemic against Aristotle, de Anima ii. 5, and\nthe Stoics, Cleanthes, Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. vii. 288, and\nChrysippus, Diog. Laert. vii. 50.\n\n[26] As thought Chrysippus, Diog. Laert. vii. 111.\n\n[27] See iv. 6.\n\n[28] See vi. 6.16.\n\n[29] See ii. 6.2.\n\n[30] Plato, in his Phaedo 127.\n\n[31] See i. 2.1.\n\n[32] See i. 2.1, the Socratic definition.\n\n[33] See i. 1.2.4.\n\n[34] See ii. 5.2.\n\n[35] See i. 2.4.\n\n[36] A term of Stoic psychology.\n\n[37] See i. 2.4.\n\n[38] These are the so-called \"passions\" of the Stoic Chrysippus, Diog.\nLaert. vii. 111.\n\n[39] Of the Stoic contention, Tert. de Anima, 5.\n\n[40] See i. 1.13.\n\n[41] As was taught by Cleanthes, Sext. Empir. adv. Math. vii. 288.\n\n[42] See iii. 6.3.\n\n[43] Or, \"affections,\" as we shall in the future call them, in English.\n\n[44] See i. 8.15.\n\n[45] Or, blindly, see iii. 8.1-3; iv. 4.13, 14.\n\n[46] See iii. 6.3, and i. 1.13.\n\n[47] See iii. 6.6.\n\n[48] See i. 4.8.\n\n[49] Notice this Numenian name for the divinity used at the beginning\nof the Escoreal Numenius fragment.\n\n[50] See iii. 8.9.\n\n[51] As Plato asked in his Sophist 246; Cxi. 252.\n\n[52] As thought Philo in Leg. Alleg. i.\n\n[53] See ii. 4.15.\n\n[54] See ii. 5.3-5.\n\n[55] See vi. 2.\n\n[56] See ii. 4.11.\n\n[57] As thought Plato in the Timaeus 49-52.\n\n[58] See ii. 5.5.\n\n[59] de Gen. et Corr. ii. 2, 3.\n\n[60] As objected Aristotle, in de Gen. et Corr. i. 7.\n\n[61] See ii. 7.1.\n\n[62] iii. 6.2.\n\n[63] As asked Aristotle, de Gen. i. 7.\n\n[64] In his Timaeus 50.\n\n[65] See iii 6.12, 13.\n\n[66] In his Timaeus 51.\n\n[67] See ii. 4.11.\n\n[68] In his Timaeus 51.\n\n[69] In his Timaeus 49.\n\n[70] See iii. 6.11.\n\n[71] As said Plato, in his Timaeus 52.\n\n[72] See ii. 8.14.\n\n[73] See iii. 5.9.\n\n[74] The myth of Pandora, see iv. 3.14.\n\n[75] See iii. 6.4.\n\n[76] See iii. 6.5, 6.\n\n[77] By a \"bastard\" reasoning,\" see ii. 4.10.\n\n[78] See ii. 4.9-12.\n\n[79] See iii. 6.12.\n\n[80] See ii. 7.2.\n\n[81] See iii. 6.13.\n\n[82] See ii. 4.8.\n\n[83] See ii. 6.3.\n\n[84] See ii. 4.5.\n\n[85] See iii. 4.6.\n\n[86] It would create the magnitude that exists in matter; that is,\napparent magnitude.\n\n[87] ii. 4.11; against Moderatus of Gades.\n\n[88] See ii. 4.11.\n\n[89] See iv. 6.3.\n\n[90] See ii. 4.12.\n\n[91] That is, intelligible \"being.\"\n\n[92] See iii. 6.8.\n\n[93] See ii. 7.1.\n\n[94] As was suggested by Plato in the Timaeus 49-52.\n\n[95] As was suggested by Herodotus, ii. 51, and Cicero, de Nat. Deor.\niii. 22.\n\n[96] That is, Cybele, see v. 1.7.\n\n[97] The Stoics.\n\n[98] We have here another internal proof of the rightness of our\npresent chronological order of Plotinos's Enneads. The myth of Pandora\noccurs in iv. 3.14, which follows this book.\n\n[99] Against the Manicheans.\n\n[100] See vi. 7.41.\n\n[101] See i. 1.13.\n\n[102] In that port of the Philebus, 29; C ii. 345.\n\n[103] As thought Plato, in the Phaedrus, 246-248.\n\n[104] As was taught by the Manicheans.\n\n[105] As thought Cicero, Tusculans, i. 20; and Aristotle, de Anima,\niii. 1-3.\n\n[106] See ii. 9.18.\n\n[107] 42; 69.\n\n[108] 264; C vi. 48.\n\n[109] Rep. x. C 287.\n\n[110] See iv. 3.7.\n\n[111] See iv. 3.6.\n\n[112] See iv. 3.6.\n\n[113] Generative.\n\n[114] See iii. 2.16.\n\n[115] In the sense that it has no limits.\n\n[116] See iv. 3.15.\n\n[117] As thought Xenocrates and Aristotle, de Coelo, i. 10.\n\n[118] See iv. 3.10.\n\n[119] Philo, de Sommis, M 648, de Monarchia, M 217.\n\n[120] See iii. 6.16, 17.\n\n[121] As said Numenius, fr. 32.\n\n[122] As did Discord, in Homer's Iliad, iv. 443.\n\n[123] See ii. 9.7.\n\n[124] See v. 7.1.\n\n[125] See ii. 3.7.\n\n[126] Plato, Rep. x. C 617; C x. 286.\n\n[127] See iv. 4, 24, 40, 43; iv. 9.3.\n\n[128] As was taught by Himerius; see also Plutarch and Themistius.\n\n[129] As Numenius said, fr. 26.3.\n\n[130] In his Timaeus, 35.\n\n[131] As said Numenius, fr. 32.\n\n[132] See Aristotle, Plato's Critias, Numenius, 32, and Proclus.\n\n[133] As thought Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1.4.\n\n[134] In his Timaeus, 34; 30.\n\n[135] Plato does just the opposite.\n\n[136] Being the power which directs the animal from above, see i. 1.7.\n\n[137] As thought Plato in the Timaeus, 73.\n\n[138] iv. 3.13.\n\n[139] As thought Plato in the Menexenus, 248.\n\n[140] As Aristotle asked, de Memoria et Remin. 1.\n\n[141] See i. 1.11.\n\n[142] Plato, Philebus, C ii. 359.\n\n[143] As thought Plato, in the Philebus, C ii. 357.\n\n[144] As thought Plato in his Philebus, C ii. 363.\n\n[145] See i. 1.12; iv. 3.32; the irrational soul, which is an image of\nthe rational soul, is plunged in the darkness of sense-life.\n\n[146] As thought Plato in his Philebus, C ii. 359.\n\n[147] In iv. 3.27.\n\n[148] As thought Aristotle, de Mem. 1.\n\n[149] As thought Aristotle.\n\n[150] As thought Aristotle.\n\n[151] See i. 4.10.\n\n[152] As Numenius said, fr. 32.\n\n[153] Another reading is: \"All perceptions belong to forms which can\nreduce to all things.\" But this does not connect with the next sentence.\n\n[154] According to Plato Phaedrus, 246; C vi. 40, and Philebus, 30; C\nii. 347.\n\n[155] Timaeus, 33.\n\n[156] A pun on \"sch\u00eama\" and \"sch\u00easis.\"\n\n[157] As thought Aristotle, de Gen. et Corr. ii. 2-8.\n\n[158] Rep. x. 617; C x. 287; see 2.3.9.\n\n[159] Rep. x.\n\n[160] According to Aristotle.\n\n[161] iv. 4.23.\n\n[162] Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 7.\n\n[163] See section 5.\n\n[164] As thought Aristotle, de Anim. ii. 7.\n\n[165] As Plato pointed out in his Meno, 80.\n\n[166] As Plato teaches.\n\n[167] A mistaken notion of Plato's, then common; see Matth. 6.23.\n\n[168] Diog. Laert. vii. 157.\n\n[169] Section 8.\n\n[170] Section 2.\n\n[171] Section 6.\n\n[172] This Stoic theory is set forth by Diogenes Laertes in vii. 157.\n\n[173] As thought Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 8.\n\n[174] As Aristotle again thought.\n\n[175] As thought Aristotle, de Gener. Anim. v. 1.\n\n[176] See iv. 4.29.\n\n[177] This book sounds more Numenian or Amelian, than the former three,\nwhich seem to have been written to answer questions of Porphyry's.\n\n[178] See section 1-7.\n\n[179] As thought Aristotle in his Physics, viii.\n\n[180] iv. 3.10.\n\n[181] See ii. 3.13.\n\n[182] iii. 6.6.\n\n[183] Children, whose minds are still weak, and cannot understand the\ntheories of speculative sciences exhibited by Nic. Eth. x. 7.\n\n[184] This upper part of the universal Soul is the principal power of\nthe soul; see ii. 3.17.\n\n[185] See ii. 3.18.\n\n[186] In his Phaedrus, 272, Cary, 75.\n\n[187] That is, the essence of the known object, a pun on \"reason,\" as\nin ii. 6.2.\n\n[188] see iv. 6.3.\n\n[189] Which is the visible form; see iii. 8.1.\n\n[190] As thought Plato, Banquet, Cary, 31, and Aristotle in Aristotle,\nde Anima, ii. 4.\n\n[191] This sounds as if it were a quotation from Numenius, though it\ndoes not appear in the latter's fragments.\n\n[192] See i. 8.2.\n\n[193] See v. 1.4.\n\n[194] See iii. 7.2.\n\n[195] See iii. 7.10.\n\n[196] Notice the connection between this thought and ii. 5, written in\nthe same period of his life; see vi. 8.18.\n\n[197] See iii. 3.7 and vi. 8.15.\n\n[198] That is, the intelligible matter of ii. 4.3.\n\n[199] As thought Aristotle, in Nic. Eth. i. 7; de Anima, ii. 1.\n\n[200] See vi. 8.16.\n\n[201] vi. 8.15.\n\n[202] A pun on \"koros,\" meaning both fulness and son.\n\n[203] Another proof of the chronological order; see 3.8.9.\n\n[204] Cicero, Orator 2; Seneca, Controversiae v. 36.\n\n[205] ii. 8.1.\n\n[206] See i. 6.8.\n\n[207] i. 6.2.\n\n[208] i. 6.9.\n\n[209] i. 6.8.\n\n[210] i. 6.2.\n\n[211] i. 6.6.\n\n[212] i. 6.5.\n\n[213] iii. 5.6.\n\n[214] As thought Plato, in Phaedrus, Cary, 58.\n\n[215] Phaedrus, Cary, 59, 62; Numenius, 32.\n\n[216] See ii. 2.1.\n\n[217] In Sophocles Oedipus Coloneus, 1375; a pun on \"d\u00fc\" and \"dik\u00ean.\"\n\n[218] A pun between \"science\" and \"knowledge.\"\n\n[219] In his Phaedrus; Cary, 58.\n\n[220] See v. 1.8.\n\n[221] See iv. 4.11, 12.\n\n[222] A pun on the word meaning \"forms\" and \"statues,\" mentioned above.\n\n[223] Such as Numenius fr. 20.\n\n[224] Pun on \"agalmata,\" which has already done duty for \"statues\" and\n\"forms.\"\n\n[225] Here Plotinos refers to the hieratic writing, which differed from\nboth the hieroglyphic and demotic.\n\n[226] See iii. 2 and 3.\n\n[227] See ii. 9.12; iii. 2.1.\n\n[228] In his Phaedrus, 246; Cary, 55.\n\n[229] As was taught by Cleomedes, Meteora viii, and Ptolemy, Almagest\ni, Geogr. i. 7; vii. 5.\n\n[230] See i. 6.9.\n\n[231] In his Timaeus, 37; Cary, c. 14.\n\n[232] See i. 3.2; i. 6.8.\n\n[233] Referring to the Gnostics; see ii. 9.17; this is another proof of\nthe chronological order.\n\n[234] As proposed in ii. 9.17.\n\n[235] See i. 8.15.\n\n[236] As thought Plato in his Phaedrus; Cary, 56.\n\n[237] The \"infra-celestial vault,\" of Theodor of Asine.\n\n[238] As said Plato, in his Phaedrus; Cary, 59.\n\n[239] See v. 1.6.\n\n[240] Gnostics.\n\n[241] Pun on \"koros,\" fulness, or son.\n\n[242] Or, being satiated with good things.\n\n[243] See Life of Plotinos, 18. Notice how well the chronological\norder works out. The former book (31) and the next (33) treat of the\nGnostics, while this book treats of the philosophical principle of\ntheir practical aspect. Besides, it explains the Amelio-Porphyrian\nquarrel. Like all other difficulties of the time, it was about\nGnosticism, and Amelius's dismissal meant that Plotinos rejected\nEgyptian Gnosticism, and Numenius's true position as a dualist stands\nrevealed; but after Porphyry's departure, Plotinos harked back to it.\n\n[244] We see here an assertion of the standpoint later asserted by\nBerkeley, Kant and Hegel that the mind cannot go outside itself,\nand that consequently it is the measure of all things. Kant's\n\"thing-in-itself,\" a deduction from this, was already discovered by\nPlotinos in the result of the \"bastard reasoning\" process, which Hegel\ncalled \"dialectic.\"\n\n[245] See iii. 6.1.\n\n[246] The Kantian \"thing-in-itself.\" See Porphyry, Principles of\nIntelligibles, 33.\n\n[247] See iii. 6.1.\n\n[248] Here is a pun based on \"doxa.\"\n\n[249] \"Paradechomen\u00ea.\"\n\n[250] \"Doxa,\" which is derived from \"dechesthai,\" to receive.\n\n[251] We would, in other words, become pessimists.\n\n[252] This is Philo's secondary divinity, p. 27, Guthrie's \"Message of\nPhilo Judaeus.\"\n\n[253] That is, of the Intelligence and of the intelligible entities.\n\n[254] Who is the Unity; a Numenian conception, fr. 36.\n\n[255] A term reminiscent of the famous Christian Nicene formulation.\n\n[256] That is we will form a \"pair.\" Numenius, 14, also taught the\nPythagorean \"pair or doubleness.\"\n\n[257] See vi. 6.16.\n\n[258] Pun between essences, \"einai,\" and one, or \"henos.\"\n\n[259] \"Ousia.\"\n\n[260] Notice the two words for \"essence.\" Plato Cratylus, 424; Cary, 87.\n\n[261] As Plato in his Cratylus suggests.\n\n[262] Or, essence.\n\n[263] Or, essence, to be.\n\n[264] Being.\n\n[265] The goddess Hestia in Greek, or Vesta in Latin; but \"hestia\" also\nmeant a \"stand.\" P. 401, Cratylus, Cary, 40.\n\n[266] See Numenius, 67, 42.\n\n[267] See ii. 9.1; iii. 9.9.\n\n[268] Such as Numenius, 42, and Plutarch, de Isis et Osiris, Fr. Tr.\n381.\n\n[269] From \"a-polus.\"\n\n[270] See i. 6.4; iii. 5.1.\n\n[271] See v. 5.1.\n\n[272] See i. 6, end.\n\n[273] Pun between \"on\" and \"hen.\"\n\n[274] See Plato, Rep. vi., Cary, 13.\n\n[275] Mentioned in Biography of Plotinos, 16.\n\n[276] See vi. 9. Another proof of the chronological arrangement.\n\n[277] See v. 6.\n\n[278] See v. 1, 2, 3, 6; vi. 7, 9.\n\n[279] Of Bythos.\n\n[280] Ennoia and Thelesis.\n\n[281] By distinguishing within each of them potentiality and\nactualization, Numenius, 25, multiplied them.\n\n[282] Nous, and Logos or Achamoth; see ii. 9.6.\n\n[283] The prophoric logos, see i. 2.3; and Philo. de Mosis Vita 3.\n\n[284] See v. 3.4.\n\n[285] See i. 1.7.\n\n[286] This is a mingling of Platonic and Aristotelic thought, see\nRavaisson, Essay on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, ii. 407.\n\n[287] Which would be nonsense; the Gnostics (Valentinus) had gone as\nfar as 33 aeons.\n\n[288] See ii. 9.11.\n\n[289] Between the sense-world, and the intelligible world, see iv.\n3.5-8; v. 2.3. Plotinos is followed by Jamblichus and Damascius, but\nProclus and Hermias denied that the soul did not entirely enter into\nthe body, Stobaeus, Ecl. i. 52.\n\n[290] See iv. 3.18; iv. 4.3.\n\n[291] The intelligible world.\n\n[292] See iv. 3.1-8; iv. 9.\n\n[293] Thus Plotinos opposes the Gnostic belief that the world was\ncreated, and will perish.\n\n[294] See ii. 9, 9, 16.\n\n[295] The Gnostic Horos.\n\n[296] As Plato said Phaedrus, 246; Cary, 55.\n\n[297] The Gnostic theory of creation by the fall of Sophia and Achamoth.\n\n[298] See ii. 9.11. Valentinus however said only that Achamoth had\ncreated all things in honor of the aeons; only the later theologians\nheld this view mentioned by Plotinos.\n\n[299] See i. 2.1, 2.\n\n[300] See I. Tim. vi. 20, 21; and ii. 9.9.\n\n[301] See ii. 3.9.\n\n[302] See ii. 1.4.\n\n[303] This, however, is a mistake of Plotinos's, as the Gnostics held\nnot this, but that the pneumatic or spiritual humans dwell on earth,\nand the psychic in heaven, as Bouillet remarks.\n\n[304] So that they should remain in the model instead of descending\nhere below?\n\n[305] By remaining in the model, instead of descending here below.\n\n[306] That is, the spiritual germs emanating from the \"pler\u00f4ma.\"\n\n[307] Plotinos here treats as synonymous \"new earth,\" \"reason of the\nworld,\" \"model of the world,\" and \"form of the world;\" but Bouillet\nshows that there is reason to believe he was in error in the matter.\n\n[308] From the pler\u00f4ma, whose \"seeds of election\" they were, and which\nnow become to them a foreign country.\n\n[309] Of the aeons, from whom souls, as intelligible beings, had\nemanated.\n\n[310] As in the famous drama of Sophia and Achamoth.\n\n[311] The unseen place; the transmigrations of Basilides, Valentinus,\nCarpocrates, and the others.\n\n[312] P. 39. Cary, 15.\n\n[313] Added to Plato by Plotinos.\n\n[314] Plotinos had done so himself (Intelligence, and the intelligible\nworld); Numenius (25) also did so.\n\n[315] See iv. 3.8, 15.\n\n[316] Such as Pythagoras and Plato, Life of Plot. 23.\n\n[317] See ii. 9.17.\n\n[318] The doctrine of the Gnostics.\n\n[319] Or, generations, the \"syzygies\" of the aeons, see Titus iii. 9.\n\n[320] ii. 9.17.\n\n[321] As in the drama of the fall of Sophia and Achamoth.\n\n[322] See ii. 1.1; iii. 2.1; iv. 3.9.\n\n[323] See i. 2.\n\n[324] iv. 3.\n\n[325] For the descending souls enter bodies already organized by the\nuniversal Soul, see iv. 3.6; ii. 1.5; ii. 3.9; ii. 9.18.\n\n[326] Lower part, see ii. 1.5; ii. 3.5, 18.\n\n[327] See ii. 1, 3, 4, 5.\n\n[328] The first \"bond\" is nature, the second is the human soul.\n\n[329] See ii. 1.3.\n\n[330] That is, the stars, ii. 3.7-13.\n\n[331] See ii. 9.5.\n\n[332] With Plato's Timaeus, 29, Cary, 9.\n\n[333] In the universal Soul, ii. 3.16, 17.\n\n[334] By existing and creating, see ii. 5.2.\n\n[335] See i. 8.7, for matter.\n\n[336] See ii. 9.3.\n\n[337] See Philo, de Gigant. i.\n\n[338] See ii. 2.1.\n\n[339] See ii. 3.9-13.\n\n[340] See iv. 8.\n\n[341] See ii. 3.9.\n\n[342] See i. 4.8.\n\n[343] See i. 2.\n\n[344] See i. 4.7.\n\n[345] See ii. 3.13.\n\n[346] See i. 4.8.\n\n[347] See i. 4.14-16.\n\n[348] See ii. 3.8, 16.\n\n[349] See ii. 3.9.\n\n[350] See below.\n\n[351] The stars, see ii. 3.9.\n\n[352] That is, Intelligence, see i. 8.2.\n\n[353] The stars prognosticate events, see ii. 3.9.\n\n[354] See i. 2.\n\n[355] To the perfect Father, Bythos, Irenaeus, ii. 18.\n\n[356] See Irenaeus, iii. 15.\n\n[357] See ii. 9.16.\n\n[358] See Irenaeus. i. 21.\n\n[359] See Irenaeus, iii. 15.\n\n[360] See i. 1.12.\n\n[361] Thus identifying the \"reasonable soul\" with Sophia, and \"the soul\nof growth and generation\" with Achamoth.\n\n[362] See ii. 9.4.\n\n[363] ii. 3.16.\n\n[364] Or \"seminal reasons,\" ii. 3.13.\n\n[365] See iii. 4.1.\n\n[366] As wrote Plato in his second Letter, 2, 312, Cary, 482.\n\n[367] Jeremiah x. 2.\n\n[368] Pindar, Olymp. i. 43.\n\n[369] See ii. 3.9.\n\n[370] See ii. 3.7.\n\n[371] See ii. 3.7.\n\n[372] As thought Plato, Laws, x, p. 897, Cviii. 265; Cary, C8, that\nevil is only negative.\n\n[373] See Irenaeus, i. 25.\n\n[374] See Origen, c. Cels. i. 24.\n\n[375] See i. 2.\n\n[376] This is, however, extreme, as Clement of Alexandria hands down\nhelpful extracts from Valentinus, Strom. iv.; etc.\n\n[377] See ii. 9.9\n\n[378] See i. 6.7.\n\n[379] In his Phaedo, pp. 66, 67; Cary, 29-32.\n\n[380] That is, according to its receptivity.\n\n[381] As thought Plato in the Timaeus, p. 29; C xi. 110, Cary, 10.\n\n[382] By the soul that gives it form, see i. 6.2.\n\n[383] See iii. 4.6; v. 1.2-6.\n\n[384] See i.4.8-14.\n\n[385] This was evidently a rebuke to Amelius, for his faithfulness to\nNumenius; and it is at this time that Amelius left Plotinos.\n\n[386] This may refer to Numenius's views, see fr. 27 b. 10.\n\n[387] Compare Numenius, fr. 61, 62a.\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\n\nPunctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant\npreference was found in this four-volume set; otherwise they were not\nchanged.\n\nSimple typographical errors were corrected.\n\nAmbiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.\n\nInfrequent spelling of \"Plotinus\" changed to the predominant \"Plotinos.\"\n\nSeveral opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are\nunmatched; Transcriber has not attempted to determine where they belong.\n\nThis four-volume set contains fifty-four \"Books,\" each of which\ncontains several Sections. Some of the \"Books\" group those Sections\ninto sub-Chapters whose headings begin with a letter: \"A.\", \"B.\", etc.\n(see page 387 as an example). In this plain text version of this eBook,\nthe Sections and the sub-Chapters are preceded by two blank lines.\n\nSection headings beginning with letter enumerations, such as A. B. C.\nwere printed larger than normal Section headings.\n\nPage 377: \"lation as (form)\" perhaps should be \"relation as (form)\";\nunchanged here.\n\nPage 387: \"two order of things\" perhaps should be \"two orders of\nthings\".\n\nPage 459: \"who is imaging to know\" probably should be who is \"imagining\nto know\".\n\nPage 459: the opening parenthesis in \"which (the Soul herself\" has no\nmatching closing parenthesis; it probably belongs after \"Soul\".\n\nPage 467: incorrect/inconsistent single and double quotation marks in\nthe following line have not been changed:\n\n    passion' and suffering, unless the word \"suffering'\n\nPage 470: \"What in us in the soul's\" perhaps should be \"What in us is\nthe soul's\".\n\nPage 494: in the source, the last line, \"who assumes the various poses\nsuggested by the music,\" was out of place; no suitable place for it was\nfound, so it has been removed for continuity and now appears only in\nthis note.\n\nPage 530: the closing parenthesis after \"perceived object\" also is\nthe closing parenthesis for the phrase beginning \"is ill-founded\".\nThere are other instances in this four-volume set in which closing\nparentheses and quotation marks are shared.\n\nPage 555: \"within yourself they you may\" perhaps should be \"within\nyourself then you may\".\n\nPage 613: \"a constitution similar that of each\" probably should be \"a\nconstitution similar to that of each\".\n\n\nFootnote Issues:\n\nIn these notes, \"anchor\" means the reference to a footnote, and\n\"footnote\" means the information to which the anchor refers. Anchors\noccur within the main text, while footnotes are grouped in sequence at\nthe end of this eBook. The structure of the original book required two\nexceptions to this, as explained below.\n\nThe original text used chapter endnotes. In this eBook, they have been\ncombined into a single, ascending sequence based on the sequence in\nwhich the footnotes occurred in the original book, and placed at the\nend of the eBook. Several irregularities are explained below.\n\n1. Some footnotes are referenced by more than one anchor, so two or\nmore anchors may refer to the same footnote.\n\n2. Some anchors were out of sequence, apparently because they were\nadded afterwards or because they are share a footnote with another\nanchor. They have been renumbered to match the numbers of the footnotes\nto which they refer.\n\nPage 349: Footnote 16 (originally 2) has no anchor.\n\nPage 597: Footnote 251 (originally 9) has no anchor.","title":"Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":108244}