{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_42932/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_42932","id":"gutenberg_42932","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/42932","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Plotinus"],"text":"VOLUME III.\n\nWORKS OF PLOTINOS\n\n\n\n\n    PLOTINOS\n    Complete Works\n\n    In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods;\n\n    With\n    BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS,\n    COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY,\n    ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS,\n    STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence;\n    INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words.\n\n    by\n    KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE,\n\n    Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee;\n    A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia.\n    M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia.\n\n    VOL. III\n    Porphyrian Books, 34-45.\n\n    COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS\n    P. O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A.\n\n\n\n\n    Copyright, 1918, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie.\n    All Rights, including that of Translation, Reserved.\n\n    Entered at Stationers' Hall, by\n    George Bell and Sons, Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn, London.\n\n\n\n\nSIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK SIX.\n\nOf Numbers.\n\n\nMANIFOLDNESS IS DISTANCE FROM UNITY, AND EVIL.\n\n1. Does manifoldness consist in distance from unity? Is infinity\nthis distance carried to the extreme, because it is an innumerable\nmanifoldness? Is then infinity an evil, and are we ourselves evil when\nwe are manifold? (That is probable); or every being becomes manifold\nwhen, not being able to remain turned towards itself, it blossoms out;\nit extends while dividing; and thus losing all unity in its expansion,\nit becomes manifoldness, because there is nothing that holds its parts\nmutually united. If, nevertheless, there still remain something that\nholds its parts mutually united, then, though blossoming out, (the\nessence) remains, and becomes manifoldness.\n\n\nHOW MANIFOLDNESS IS AN EVIL.\n\nBut what is there to be feared in magnitude? If (the essence) that has\nincreased could feel (it would feel that which in itself has become\nevil; for) it would feel that it had issued from itself, and had even\ngone to a great distance (from itself). No (essence), indeed, seeks\nthat which is other than itself; every (essence) seeks itself. The\nmovement by which (an essence) issues from itself is caused either by\n\"audacity,\" or necessity. Every (being) exists in the highest degree\nnot when it becomes manifold or great, but when it belongs to itself;\nnow this occurs when it concentrates upon itself. That which desires to\nbecome great in some other manner is ignorant of that in which true\ngreatness consists; instead of proceeding towards its legitimate goal,\nit turns towards the outside. Now, on the contrary, to turn towards\noneself, is to remain in oneself. The demonstration of this may be seen\nin that which participates in greatness; if (the being) develop itself\nso that each of its parts exist apart, each part will indeed exist, but\n(the being) will no longer be what it originally was. To remain what it\nis, all its parts must converge towards unity; so that, to be what it\nwas in its being, it should not be large, but single. When it possesses\nmagnitude, and quantity inheres in it, it is destroyed, while when it\npossesses unity, it possesses itself. Doubtless the universe is both\ngreat and beautiful; but it is beautiful only so far as the unity holds\nit in from dissipating into infinity. Besides, if it be beautiful, it\nis not because it is great, but because it participates in beauty; now,\nif it need participation in beauty, it is only because it has become so\nlarge. Indeed, isolated from beauty, and considered in itself as great,\nit is ugly. From this point of view, what is great is with beauty in\nthe relation obtaining between matter and form, because what needs\nadornment is manifold; consequently, what is great has so much more\nneed of being adorned and is so much more ugly (as it is great).\n\n\nWHAT IS THE NUMBER OF THE INFINITE.\n\n2. What opinion should we hold of that which is called the number of\ninfinity? We must begin by examining how it can be a number, if it be\ninfinite. Indeed, sense-objects are not infinite; consequently, the\nnumber which inheres in them could not be infinite, and he who numbers\nthem, does not number infinity. Even if they were multiplied by two, or\nby more, they still could always be determined; if they were multiplied\nin respect of the past or the future, they would still be determined.\nIt might be objected that number is not infinite in an absolute manner,\nbut only (in a relative manner) in this sense, that it is always\npossible to add thereto. But he who numbers does not create numbers;\nthey were already determined, and they existed (before being conceived\nby him who was numbering them). As beings in the intelligible world are\ndetermined, their number is also determined by the quantity of beings.\nJust as we make man manifold by adding to him the beautiful, and other\nthings of the kind, we can make an image of number correspond to the\nimage of every intelligible being. Just as, in thought, we can multiply\na town that does not exist, so can we multiply numbers. When we number\nthe parts of time, we limit ourselves to applying to them the numbers\nthat we have in ourselves, and which, merely on that account, do not\ncease remaining in us.\n\n\nHOW THE INFINITE REACHED EXISTENCE.\n\n3. How did the infinite, in spite of its infiniteness, reach existence?\nFor the things which have arrived at existence, and which subsist,\nhave been preparatorily contained in a number. Before answering this\nquestion, we must examine whether, when it forms part of veritable\nessences, multitude can be evil. On high, the manifoldness remains\nunited, and is hindered from completely being manifoldness, because\nit is the one essence; but this is inferior to unity by this very\ncondition that it is manifoldness, and thus, is imperfect in respect\nto unity. Therefore, though not having the same nature as the One, but\na nature somewhat degraded (in comparison with unity), manifoldness is\ninferior to unity; but, by the effect of the unity which it derives\nfrom the One (since it is the one essence), it still possesses a\nvenerable character, reduces to unity the manifold it contains, and\nmakes it subsist in an immutable manner.\n\n\nHOW INFINITY CAN SUBSIST IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.\n\nHow can infinity subsist in the intelligible world? Either it exists\namong the genuine essences, and then is determined; or it is not\ndetermined, and then it does not exist among the veritable essences,\nbut it must be classified among the things which exist in perpetual\nbecoming, such as time.[1] The infinite is determinate, but it is not\nany the less infinite; for it is not the limit[2] which receives the\ndetermination, but the infinite[3]; and between the boundary and the\ninfinite there is no intermediary that could receive the determination.\nThis infinite acts as if it were the idea of the boundary, but it is\ncontained by what embraces it exteriorly. When I say that it flees, I\ndo not mean that it passes from one locality to another, for it has no\nlocality; but I mean that space has existed from the very moment that\nthis infinite was embraced.[4] We must not imagine that what is called\nthe movement of the infinite consists in a displacement, nor admit that\nthe infinite by itself possesses any other of the things that could be\nnamed; thus the infinite could neither move, nor remain still. Where\nindeed would it halt, since the place indicated by the word \"where\"\nis posterior to infinity? Movement is attributed to infinity only to\nexplain that the infinite has no permanency. Should we believe that the\ninfinite exists on high in one only and single place, or that it arises\nthere, and descends here below? No: for it is in respect to one only\nand single place that we are enabled to conceive both what has risen\nand does not descend, as well as that which descends.[5]\n\n\nINFINITE IS CONCEIVED BY THE THOUGHT'S MAKING ABSTRACTION OF THE FORM.\n\nHow then can we conceive the infinite? By making abstraction of form\nby thought. How will it be conceived? We may conceive of the infinite\nas simultaneously being the contraries, and not being them. It will\nhave to be conceived as being simultaneously great and small; for the\ninfinite becomes both of these.[6] It may also be conceived as both\nbeing moved, and being stable[7]; for the infinite becomes these two\nthings also. But before the infinite becomes these two contraries,\nit is neither of them in any determinate manner; otherwise, you\nwould have determined it. By virtue of its nature, the infinite is\nthese things therefore in an indeterminate and infinite manner;\nonly on this condition will it appear to be these contrary things.\nIf, by applying your thought to the infinite, you do not entice\nit into a determination, as into a net, you will see the infinite\nescaping you, and you will not find anything in it that would be a\nunity; otherwise, you would have determined it. If you represented\nto yourself the infinite as a unity, it would seem to you manifold;\nif you say that it is manifold, it will again make game of you; for,\nall things do not form a manifold where no one thing is one. From\nstill another standpoint, the nature of the infinite is movement, and\naccording to another nature, stability; for its property of being\ninvisible by itself constitutes a movement which distinguishes it from\nintelligence[8]; its property of not being able to escape, of being\nexteriorly embraced, of being circumscribed within an unescapable\ncircle constitutes a sort of stability. Movement therefore cannot be\npredicated of infinity, without also attributing stability to it.\n\n\nHOW OTHER NUMBERS FORM PART OF THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.\n\n4. Let us now examine how the numbers form part of the intelligible\nworld. Are they inherent in the other forms? Or are they, since all\neternity, the consequences of the existence of these forms? In the\nlatter case, as the very essence possessed primary existence, we would\nfirst conceive the monad; then, as movement and stability emanated from\nit, we would have the triad; and each one of the remaining intelligible\nentities would lead to the conception of some of the other numbers. If\nit were not so, if a unity were inherent in each intelligible entity,\nthe unity inherent in the first Essence would be the monad; the unity\ninherent in what followed it, if there be an order in the intelligible\nentities, would be the \"pair\"; last, the unity inhering in some other\nintelligible entity, such as, for instance, in ten, would be the decad.\nNevertheless this could not yet be so, each number being conceived as\nexisting in itself. In this case, will we be compelled to admit that\nnumber is anterior to the other intelligible entities, or posterior\nthereto? On this subject Plato[9] says that men have arrived to the\nnotion of number by the succession of days and nights, and he thus\nrefers the conception of number to the diversity of (objective) things.\nHe therefore seems to teach that it is first the numbered objects that\nby their diversity produce numbers, that number results from movement\nof the soul, which passes from one object to another, and that it is\nthus begotten when the soul enumerates; that is, when she says to\nherself, Here is one object, and there is another; while, so long as\nshe thinks of one and the same object, she affirms nothing but unity.\nBut when Plato says that being is in the veritable number, and that the\nnumber is in the being,[10] he intends to teach that by itself number\npossesses a hypostatic substantial existence, that it is not begotten\nin the soul which enumerates, but that the variety of sense-objects\nmerely recalls to the soul the notion of number.\n\n\nPYTHAGOREAN INTELLIGIBLE NUMBERS DISCUSSED.\n\n5. What then is the nature of number? Is it a consequence, and\npartially an aspect of each being, like man and one-man, essence and\none-essence? Can the same be said for all the intelligibles, and\nis that the origin of all numbers? If so, how is it that on high\n(in the intelligible world) the pair and triad exist? How are all\nthings considered within unity, and how will it be possible to reduce\nnumber to unity, since it has a similar nature? There would thus be a\nmultitude of unities, but no other number would be reduced to unity,\nexcept the absolute One. It might be objected that a pair is the\nthing, or rather the aspect of the thing which possesses two powers\njoined together, such as is a composite reduced to unity, or such as\nthe Pythagoreans conceived the numbers,[11] which they seem to have\npredicated of other objects, by analogy. For instance, they referred\nto justice as the (Tetrad, or) group-of-four,[12] and likewise for\neverything else. Thus a number, as for instance a group-of-ten, would\nbe considered as a single (group of) unity, and would be connected\nwith the manifold contained in the single object. This, however, is an\ninadequate account of our conception of \"ten\"; we speak of the objects\nafter gathering (ten) separate objects. Later, indeed, if these ten\nobjects constitute a new unity, we call the group a \"decad.\" The same\nstate of affairs must obtain with intelligible Numbers. If such were\nthe state of affairs (answers Plotinos), if number were considered only\nwithin objects, would it possess hypostatic existence? It might be\nobjected, What then would hinder that, though we consider white within\nthings, that nevertheless the White should (besides) have a hypostatic\nsubstantial existence? For movement is indeed considered within\nessence, and yet (it is agreed that) movement possesses a \"hypostatic\"\nsubstantial existence within essence. The case of number, however,\nis not similar to that of movement; for we have demonstrated that\nmovement thus considered in itself is something unitary.[13] Moreover,\nif no more than such a hypostatic substantial existence be predicated\nof number, it ceases to be a being, and becomes an accident, though\nit would not even then be a pure accident; for what is an accident\nmust be something before becoming the accident (of some substance).\nThough being inseparable therefrom, it must possess its own individual\nnature in itself, like whiteness; and before being predicated of\nsomething else, it already is what it is posited. Consequently, if\none be in every (being), one man is not identical with man; if \"one\"\nbe something different from \"man\"[14] and from every other (being),\nif it be something common to all (beings), one must be anterior to\nall men and to all other (beings), so that man and all other beings\nmay be one. The one is therefore anterior to movement, since movement\nis one, and likewise anterior to essence, to allow for essence also\nbeing one. This of course does not refer to the absolute Unity that is\nrecognized as superior to essence, but of the unity which is predicated\nof every intelligible form. Likewise, above that of which the decad is\npredicated subsists the \"Decad in itself,\" for that in which the decad\nis recognized could not be the Decad in itself.\n\n\nTHE INTELLIGIBLE UNITY AND DECAD EXIST BEFORE ALL NUMBERS ONE OR TEN.\n\nDoes unity therefore inhere in essences, and does it subsist with\nthem? If it inhere in essences, or if it be an accident, as health is\nan accident of man, it must be something individual (like health). If\nunity be an element of the composite, it will first have to exist\n(individually), and be an unity in itself, so as to be able to unify\nitself to something else; then, being blended with this other thing\nthat it has unified, it will not longer remain really one, and will\nthereby even become double. Besides, how would that apply to the decad?\nWhat need of the (intelligible) Decad has that which is already a\ndecad, by virtue of the power it possesses? Will it receive its form\nfrom that Decad? If it be its matter, if it be ten and decad only\nbecause of the presence of the Decad, the Decad will have first to\nexist in itself, in the pure and simple state of (being a) Decad.\n\n\nWHAT IS THE NATURE OF THESE INTELLIGIBLE NUMBERS?\n\n6. But if, independently of the things themselves, there be an One\nin itself, and a Decad in itself; and if the intelligible entities\nbe unities, pairs, or triads, independently of what they are by\ntheir being, what then is the nature of these Numbers? What is their\nconstitution? It must be admitted that a certain Reason presides over\nthe generation of these Numbers. It is therefore necessary clearly to\nunderstand that in general, if intelligible forms at all exist, it is\nnot because the thinking principle first thought each of them, and\nthereby gave them hypostatic existence. Justice, for instance, was\nnot born because the thinking principle thought what justice was; nor\nmovement, because it thought what movement was. Thus thought had to be\nposterior to the thing thought, and the thought of justice to justice\nitself. On the other hand, thought is anterior to the thing that owes\nits existence to thought, since this thing exists only because it is\nthought. If then justice were identical with such a thought, it would\nbe absurd that justice should be nothing else than its definition; for\nin this case, the thinking of justice or movement, would amount to\na conception of these objects (by a definition). Now this would be\ntantamount to conceiving the definition of a thing that did not exist,\nwhich is impossible.\n\n\nJUSTICE, LIKE AN INTELLECTUAL STATUE, WAS BORN OF ITSELF.\n\nThe statement that in what is immaterial, knowledge and the known thing\ncoincide,[15] must not be understood to mean that it is the knowledge\nof the thing which is the thing itself, nor that the reason which\ncontemplates an object is this object itself, but rather, conversely,\nthat it is the thing which, existing without matter, is purely\nintelligible and intellection. I do not here mean the intellection\nwhich is neither a definition nor an intuition of a thing; but I say\nthat the thing itself, such as it exists in the intelligible world,\nis exclusively intelligence and knowledge. It is not (the kind of)\nknowledge that applies itself to the intelligible, it is the (actual)\nthing itself which keeps that knowledge (thereof possessed by reason)\nfrom remaining different from it, just as the knowledge of a material\nobject remains different from that object; but it is a veritable (kind\nof) knowledge, that is, a knowledge which is not merely a simple\nimage of the known thing, but really is the thing itself. It is not\ntherefore the thought of the movement which produced movement in\nitself, but the movement in itself which produced the thought, so that\nthe thought thinks itself as movement, and as thought. On the one hand,\nintelligible movement is thought by the intelligible Essence; on the\nother hand, it is movement in itself because it is first--for there\nis no movement anterior thereto; it is real movement, because it is\nnot the accident of a subject, but because it is the actualization of\nthe essence which moves, and possesses actualized (existence); it is\ntherefore \"being,\" though it be conceived as different from essence.\nJustice, for instance, is not the simple thought of justice; it is a\ncertain disposition of Intelligence, or rather it is an actualization\nof a determinate nature. The face of Justice is more beautiful than the\nevening or morning stars, and than all visible beauty.[16] Justice may\nbe imagined as an intellectual statue which has issued from itself and\nwhich has manifested itself such as it is in itself; or rather, which\nsubsists essentially in itself.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE THINKS THINGS NOT BECAUSE THEY EXIST, BUT BECAUSE IT\nPOSSESSES THEM.\n\n7. We must, in fact, conceive intelligible essences as subsisting in\none nature, and one single nature as possessing and embracing all\n(things). There no one thing is separated from the others, as in the\nsense-world, where the sun, moon, and other objects each occupy a\ndifferent locality; but all things exist together in one unity; such\nis the nature of intelligence. The (universal) Soul imitates it,\nin this respect, as does also the power called Nature, conformably\nto which, and by virtue of which individuals are begotten each in\na different place, while she remains in herself. But, although all\nthings exist together (in the unity of Intelligence), each of them\nis none the less different from the others. Now, these things which\nsubsist in Intelligence and \"being,\" are seen by the Intelligence that\npossesses them, not because it observes them, but because it possesses\nthem without feeling the need of distinguishing them from each other;\nbecause from all eternity they have dwelt within it distinct from each\nother. We believe in the existence of these things on the faith of\nthose who admire them, because they have participated therein. As to\nthe magnitude and beauty of the intelligible world, we can judge of\nit by the love which the Soul feels for it, and if other things feel\nlove for the Soul, it is because she herself possesses an intellectual\nnature, and that by her the other things can, to some extent, become\nassimilated to Intelligence. How indeed could we admit that here below\nwas some organism gifted with beauty, without recognizing that the\nOrganism itself (the intelligible world[17]) possesses an admirable and\nreally unspeakable beauty? Further, the perfect Organism is composed of\nall the organisms; or rather it embraces all the organisms; just as our\nUniverse is one, yet simultaneously is visible, because it contains all\nthe things which are in the visible universe.\n\n\nWHAT AND HOW IS EVERY INTELLIGIBLE ENTITY.\n\n8. Since then the (universal) Organism possesses primary existence,\nsince it is simultaneously organism, intelligence, and veritable\n\"Being\"; and as we state that it contains all organisms, numbers,\njustice, beauty, and the other similar beings--for we mean something\ndifferent by the Man himself, and Number itself, and Justice itself--we\nhave to determine, so far as it is possible in such things, what is the\ncondition and nature of each intelligible entity.\n\n\nNUMBER MUST EXIST IN THE PRIMARY ESSENCE.\n\n(To solve this problem) let us begin by setting aside sensation, and\nlet us contemplate Intelligence by our intelligence exclusively. Above\nall, let us clearly understand that, as in us life and intelligence\ndo not consist of a corporeal mass, but in a power without mass,\nlikewise veritable \"Being\" is deprived of all corporeal extension,\nand constitutes a power founded on itself. It does not indeed consist\nin something without force, but in a power sovereignly vital and\nintellectual, which possesses life in the highest degree, intelligence,\nand being. Consequently, whatever touches this power participates in\nthe same characteristics according to the manner of its touch; in a\nhigher degree, if the touch be close; in a lower degree, if the touch\nbe distant. If existence be desirable, the completest existence (or,\nessence) is more desirable still. Likewise, if intelligence deserve\nto be desired, perfect Intelligence deserves to be desired above\neverything; and the same state of affairs prevails in respect to life.\nIf then we must grant that the Essence is the first, and if we must\nassign the first rank to Essence, the second to Intelligence, and the\nthird to the Organism,[18] as the latter seems already to contain all\nthings, and Intelligence justly occupies the second rank, because it\nis the actualization of \"Being\"--then number could not enter into the\nOrganism, for before the organism already existed one and two (\"Being\"\nand Intelligence). Nor could number exist in Intelligence, for before\nIntelligence was \"Being,\" which is both one and manifold. (Number\ntherefore must exist, or originate, in the primary Being.)\n\n\nNUMBER FOLLOWS AND PROCEEDS FROM ESSENCE.\n\n9. It remains for us to discover whether it were \"Being,\" in the\nprocess of division, that begat number, or whether it be the number\nthat divided \"Being.\" (This is the alternative:) either \"being,\"\nmovement, stability, difference and identity produced number, or it is\nnumber that produced all these (categories, or) genera. Our discussion\nmust start thus. Is it possible that number should exist in itself, or\nmust we contemplate two in two objects, three in three objects, and\nso forth? The same question arises about unity as considered within\nnumbers; for if number can exist in itself independently of numbered\nthings,[19] it can also exist previously to the essences. Can number\ntherefore exist before the essences? It might be well preliminarily to\nassert that number is posterior to the Essence, and proceeds therefrom.\nBut then if essence be one essence, and if two essences be two\nessences, one will precede essence, and the other numbers will precede\nthe essences. (Would number then precede the essences) only in thought\nand conception, or also in the hypostatic existence? We should think\nas follows. When you think of a man as being one, or the beautiful as\nbeing one, the one that is thus conceived in both (beings) is something\nthat is thought only afterward. Likewise, when you simultaneously\nconsider a dog and a horse, here also two is evidently something\nposterior. But if you beget the man, if you beget the horse or the dog,\nor if you produce them outside when they already exist in you, without\nbegetting them, nor producing them by mere chance (of seeing them), you\nwill say, \"We should go towards one (being), then pass to another, and\nthus get two; then make one more being, by adding my person.\" Likewise,\n(beings) were not numbered after they were created, but before they\nwere created, when (the creator) decided how many should be created.\n\n\nNUMBER SPLIT THE UNITY INTO PLURALITY; PYTHAGOREAN IDENTIFICATION OF\nIDEAS AND NUMBERS.\n\nThe universal Number therefore existed before the essences (were\ncreated); consequently, Number was not the essences. Doubtless, Number\nwas in Essence; but it was not yet the number of Essence; for Essence\nstill was one. But the power of Number, hypostatically existing within\nit, divided it, and made it beget the manifold. Number is either the\nbeing or actualization (of Essence); the very Organism and Intelligence\nare number. Essence is therefore the unified number, while the essences\nare developed number; Intelligence is the number which moves itself,\nand the Organism is the number that contains. Since therefore Essence\nwas born from Unity, Essence, as it existed within Unity, must be\nNumber. That is why (the Pythagoreans[20]) called the ideas unities and\nnumbers.\n\n\nTWO KINDS OF NUMBER: ESSENTIAL AND UNITARY.\n\nSuch then is \"essential\" Number (number that is \"Being\"). The other\nkind of number, which is called a number composed of digits, or\n\"unities,\" is only an image of the former. The essential Number is\ncontemplated in the intelligible forms, and assists in producing them;\non the other hand, it exists primitively in essence, with essence, and\nbefore the essences. The latter find therein their foundation, source,\nroot and principle.[21] Indeed, Number is the principle of Essence,\nand rests in it, otherwise it would split up. On the contrary, the\nOne does not rest upon essence; otherwise essence would be one before\nparticipating in the One; likewise, what participates in the decad\nwould be the decad already before participating in the decad.\n\n\nESSENCE IS A LOCATION FOR THE THINGS YET TO BE PRODUCED.\n\n10. Subsisting therefore in the manifold, Essence therefore became\nNumber when it was aroused to multiplicity, because it already\ncontained within itself a sort of preformation or representation of\nthe essences which it was ready to produce, offering the essences, as\nit were, a locality for the things whose foundation they were to be.\nWhen we say, \"so much gold,\" or, \"so many other objects,\" gold is one,\nand one does not thereby intend to make gold out of the number, but\nto make a number out of the gold; it is because one already possesses\nthe number that one seeks to apply it to gold, so as to determine\nits quality. If essences were anterior to Number, and if Number were\ncontemplated in them when the enumerating power enumerates the objects,\nthe number of the (beings), whatever it is, would be accidental,\ninstead of being determined in advance. If this be not the case, then\nmust number, preceding (the beings) determine how many of them must\nexist; which means that, by the mere fact of the primitive existence of\nthe Number, the (beings) which are produced undergo the condition of\nbeing so many, and each of them participates in unity whenever they are\none. Now every essence comes from Essence because essence, by itself,\nis Essence; likewise, the One is one by itself. If every (being) be\none, and if the multitude of (beings) taken together form the unity\nthat is in them, they are one as the triad is one, and all beings also\nare one; not as is the Monad (or Unity), but as is a thousand, or any\nother number. He who, while enumerating, produced things, proclaims\nthat there are a thousand of them, claims to do no more than to tell\nout what he learns from the things, as if he was indicating their\ncolors, while really he is only expressing a condition of his reason;\nwithout which, he would not know how much of a multitude was present\nthere. Why then does he speak so? Because he knows how to enumerate;\nwhich indeed he knows if he know the number, and this he can know only\nif the number exist. But not to know what is the number, at least under\nthe respect of quantity, would be ridiculous, and even impossible.\n\n\nAN OBJECT'S EXISTENCE IMPLIES A PREVIOUS MODEL IN ITSELF.\n\nWhen one speaks of good things, one either designates objects which are\nsuch by themselves, or asserts that the good is their attribute. If\none designate the goods of the first order,[22] one is speaking of the\nfirst Hypostasis, or rank of existence; if one designate the things of\nwhich the good is the attribute, this implies the existence of a nature\nof the good which has been attributed to them, or which produces this\ncharacteristic within them, or which is the Good in itself, or which,\nproducing the good, nevertheless dwells in its own nature. Likewise,\nwhen, in connection with (beings), we speak of a decad, (or, group of\nten), one is either referring to the Decad in itself, or, referring\nto the things of which the decad is an attribute, one is forced to\nrecognize the existence of a Decad in itself, whose being is that of a\ndecad. Consequently, the conferring of the name \"decad\" implies either\nthat these (beings) are the Decad in itself, or above them in another\nDecad whose being is that of being a Decad in itself.\n\n\nUNITY AND NUMBER PRECEDE THE ONE AND THE MANY BEINGS.\n\nIn general, everything which is predicated of an object either comes\nto it from without, or is its actualization. Unless by nature it\nbe inconstant, being present now, and absent then, if it be always\npresent, it is a being when the object is a being. If it be denied that\nits nature were that of a being, it will surely be granted that it is a\npart of the essences, and that it is an essence. Now, if the object can\nbe conceived without the thing which is its actualization, this thing\nnevertheless exists contemporaneously with it, even though in thought\nit be conceived posteriorily. If the object cannot be conceived without\nthis thing, as man cannot be conceived of without one, in this case\none is not posterior to man, but is simultaneous, or even anterior,\nsince the man's subsistence is entirely dependent thereon. As to us, we\nrecognize that Unity and Number precede (Essence and the essences).\n\n\nUNITY MUST EXIST IN THE INTELLIGIBLE BEFORE BEING APPLIED TO MULTIPLE\nBEINGS.\n\n11. It may be objected that the decad is nothing else than ten unities.\nIf the existence of the One be granted, why should we not also grant\nthe existence of ten unities? Since the supreme Unity (the unity of the\nfirst Essence), possesses hypostatic existence, why should the case\nnot be the same with the other unities (the complex unities contained\nwithin each of the essences)? It must not be supposed that the supreme\nUnity is bound up with a single essence; for in this case each of the\nother (beings) would no longer be one. If each of the other (beings)\nmust be one, then unity is common to all the (beings); that is that\nsingle nature which may be predicated of the multiple (beings), and\nwhich must, as we have explained it, subsist in itself (in the primary\nessence) before the unity which resides in the multiple (beings).\n\n\nTHE SUPREME UNITY ADJUSTS ALL LOWER GROUP UNITIES.\n\nAs unity is seen in some one (being), and then in some other, if the\nsecond unity possess hypostatic existence also, then the supreme Unity\n(of the first Essence) will not alone possess hypostatic existence,\nand there will be thus a multitude of unities (as there is a multitude\nof beings). If the hypostatic existence of the first Unity be alone\nacknowledged, this will exist either in the Essence in itself, or in\nthe One in itself. If it exist in the Essence in itself, the other\nunities (which exist in the other beings) will then be such merely by\nfigure of speech, and will no longer be subordinated to the primary\nunity; or number will be composed of dissimilar unities, and the\nunities will differ from each other in so far as they are unities.\nIf the primary unity exist already in the Unity in itself, what need\nwould that Unity in itself have of that unity to be one? If all that be\nimpossible, we shall have to recognize the existence of the One which\nis purely and simply one, which, by its \"being\" is entirely independent\nof all the other beings, which is named the chief Unity, and is\nconceived of as such. If unity exist on high (in the intelligible\nworld) without any object that may be called one, why might not another\nOne (the one of the first Being) subsist on high also? Why would\nnot all the (beings), each being a separate unity, not constitute a\nmultitude of unities, which might be the \"multiple unity\"? As the\nnature (of the first Being) begets, or rather, as it has begotten (from\nall eternity); or at least, as it has not limited itself to one of the\nthings it has begotten, thus rendering the unity (of the first Being)\nsomewhat continuous; if it circumscribe (what it produces) and promptly\nceases in its procession, it begets small numbers; if it advance\nfurther, moving alone not in foreign matters, but in itself, it begets\nlarge numbers. It thus harmonizes every plurality and every being with\nevery number, knowing well that, if each of the (beings) were not in\nharmony with some number, either they would not exist, or they would\nbear neither proportion, measure, nor reason.\n\n\nONE AND UNITY ARE WITHIN US; INDEPENDENTLY OF THE ONE OUTSIDE.\n\n12. (Aristotle[23]) objects that \"One\" and \"Unity\" have no hypostatic\n(or, genuine) existence. Everywhere the One is something that is one.\nThat is nothing but a simple modification experienced in our soul in\npresence of each essence. We might as easily affirm that when we assert\n\"essence,\" this is but a simple modification of our soul, Essence (in\nitself) being absolutely nothing. If it be insisted that Essence exists\nbecause it excites and strikes our soul, which then represents it to\nherself, we see that the soul is equally impressed by the One, and\nrepresents Him to herself. Besides, we should ask (Aristotle) if this\nmodification or conception of our soul do not bear to us the aspect of\nunity or the manifold? So much the more, we often say that an object\nis not one; evidently we then are not deriving the notion of unity from\nthe object, because we are affirming that there is no unity in it.\nUnity therefore dwells within us, and it is in us without the object of\nwhich we predicate that it is some one thing.\n\n\nTHERE IS INDEED A UNITARY MODE OF EXISTENCE IN OUTSIDE OBJECTS.\n\nIt may be objected that having this unity in our soul depends on\nreceiving from the exterior object a notion and an image, which is a\nconception furnished by this object. As the philosophers who profess\nthis opinion do not differentiate the species of one and of number,\nand as they allow them no other hypostatic existence (than to be\nconceived by our soul), if they (practically do) allow them any sort\nof hypostatic existence, it will be very interesting to scrutinize the\nopinions of these.[24] They then say that the notion or conception\nthat we have of the one or of the number derives from the objects\nthemselves, is a notion as much \"a posteriori\" as those of \"that,\"[25]\n\"something,\" \"crowd,\" \"festival,\" \"army,\" or of \"multitude\"; for, just\nas the manifold is nothing without the multiple objects, nor a festival\nwithout the men gathered to celebrate the religious ceremony, thus\n\"the One\" is nothing without the one object, when we posit the one,\nconceiving it alone, having made an abstraction of everything else. The\npartisans of this opinion will cite many examples of the same kind, as\nthe \"right hand side,\" \"the upper part,\" and their contraries. What\nreality indeed (to speak as they do), can the \"right hand side\" possess\noutside of a person who stands or sits here or there[26]? The case is\nsimilar with \"the upper side,\" which refers to a certain part of the\nuniverse, and the \"lower side\" to another.[27] Our first answer to\nthis argument is that we will allow that there is a certain kind of\nexistence in the things themselves of which we have just spoken; but\nthat this mode of existence is not identical in all things, considered\neither in respect to each other, or each in respect to the One which is\nin all. Further, we intend to refute one by one these arguments that\nhave been opposed to us.\n\n\nTHE NOTION OF THE SUBJECT ONE DOES NOT COME FROM THE SUBJECT ITSELF.\n\n13. To begin with, it is unreasonable to insist that the notion of\nthe subject one comes to us from the subject itself (which is one),\nfrom the visible man, for instance, or from some other animal, or\neven some stone. Evidently the visible man and the One are things\nentirely different, which could not be identified[28]; otherwise,\nour judgment would not be able (as it is) to predicate unity of the\nnon-man. Besides, as the judgment does not operate on emptiness for\nthe right side, and other such things, seeing a difference of position\nwhen it tells us that an object is here, or there; likewise, it also\nsees something when it says that an object is one; for it does not\nexperience there an affection that is vain, and it does not affirm\nunity without some foundation. It cannot be believed that the judgment\nsays that an object is one because it sees that it is alone, and that\nthere is no other; for, while saying that there is no other, the\njudgment implicitly asserts that the other is one. Further, the notions\nof \"other\" and \"different\" are notions posterior to that of unity;\nif the judgment did not rise to unity, it would not assert either\nthe \"other\" nor the \"different\"; when it affirms that an object is\nalone, it says, \"there is one only object\"; and therefore predicates\nunity before \"only.\" Besides, the judgment which affirms is itself a\nsubstantial (being) before affirming unity of some other (being); and\nthe (being) of which it speaks is one likewise before the judgment\neither asserts or conceives anything about it. Thus (being) must be one\nor many; if it be many, the one is necessarily anterior, since, when\nthe judgment asserts that plurality is present, it evidently asserts\nthat there is more than one; likewise, when it says that an army is\na multitude, it conceives of the soldiers as arranged in one single\ncorps. By this last example, it is plain that the judgment (in saying\none body), does not let the multitude remain multitude, and that it\nthus reveals the existence of unity; for, whether by giving to the\nmultitude a unity which it does not possess, or by rapidly revealing\nunity in the arrangement (which makes the body of the multitude), the\njudgment reduces multitude to unity. It does not err here about unity,\nany more than when it says of a building formed by a multitude of\nstones that it is a unity; for, besides, a building is more unified\nthan an army.[29] If, further, unity inhere in a still higher degree in\nthat which is continuous, and in a degree still higher in what is not\ndivisible,[30] evidently that occurs only because the unity has a real\nnature, and possesses existence; for there is no greater or less in\nthat which does not exist.\n\n\nUNITY, THOUGH BY PARTICIPATION EXISTING IN SENSE-OBJECTS, IS\nINTELLIGIBLE.\n\nJust as we predicate being of every sense-thing, as well as of every\nintelligible thing, we predicate it in a higher degree of intelligible\nthings, attributing a higher degree (of substantiality) to the (beings\nthat are veritable than to sense-objects), and to sense-objects than\nto other genera (of physical objects); likewise, clearly seeing\nunity in sense-objects in a degree higher than in the intelligible\n(essences), we recognize the existence of unity in all its modes, and\nwe refer them all to Unity in itself. Besides, just as \"being and\nessence\"[31] are nothing sensual, though sense-objects participate\ntherein, so unity, though by participation it inhere in sense-objects,\nis not any the less an intelligible Unity. Judgment grasps it by an\nintellectual conception; by seeing one thing (which is sensual) it also\nconceives another which it does not see (because it is intelligible);\nit therefore knew this thing in advance; and if judgment knew it in\nadvance, judgment was this thing, and was identical with that whose\nexistence it asserted. When it says, \"a certain\" object, it asserts the\nunity, as, when it speaks of \"certain\" objects, it says that they are\ntwo or more. If then one cannot conceive of any object whatever without\n\"one,\" \"two,\" or some other number, it becomes possible to insist that\nthe thing without which nothing can be asserted or conceived, does not\nat all exist. We cannot indeed deny existence to the thing without\nwhose existence we could not assert or conceive anything. Now that\nwhich is everywhere necessary to speak and to conceive must be anterior\nto speech and conception, so as to contribute to their production. If,\nbesides, this thing be necessary to the hypostatic existence of every\nessence--for there is no essence that lacks unity--it must be anterior\nto being, and being must be begotten by it. That is why we say \"an\nessence\" instead of first positing \"essence,\" and \"a\" only thereafter,\nfor there must be \"one\" in essence, to make \"several\" possible; but\n(the converse is not true; for) unity does not contain essence, unless\nunity itself produce it by applying itself to the begetting of it.\nLikewise, the word \"that\" (when employed to designate an object) is\nnot meaningless; for instead of naming the object, it proclaims its\nexistence, its presence, its \"being,\" or some other of its kinds of\n\"essence.\" The word \"that\" does not therefore express something without\nreality, it does not proclaim an empty conception, but it designates an\nobject as definitely as some proper name.\n\n\nUNITY ONLY AN ACCIDENT IN SENSE-THINGS, BUT SOMETHING IN ITSELF IN THE\nINTELLIGIBLE.\n\n14. As to those who consider unity as relative, they might be told\nthat unity could not lose its proper nature merely as a result of\nthe affection experienced by some other being without itself being\naffected. It cannot cease being one without experiencing the privation\nof unity by division into two or three. If, on being divided, a mass\nbecome double without being destroyed in respect to its being a mass,\nevidently, besides the subject, there existed unity; and the mass lost\nit because the unity was destroyed by the division. So this same thing\nwhich now is present, and now disappears, should be classified among\nessences wherever it be found; and we must recognize that, though it\nmay be an accident of other objects, it nevertheless exists by itself,\nwhether it manifest in sense-objects, or whether it be present in\nintelligent entities; it is only an accident in posterior (beings,\nnamely, the sense-objects); but it exists in itself in the intelligible\nentities, especially in the first Essence, which is One primarily, and\nonly secondarily essence.\n\n\nTWO IS NOT AN ADDITION TO ONE, BUT A CHANGE (REFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE).\n\nThe objection that unity, without itself experiencing anything, by the\nmere addition of something else, is no longer one, but becomes double,\nis a mistake.[32] The one has not become two, and is not that which\nhas been added to it, nor that to which something has been added. Each\nof them remains one, such as it was; but two can be asserted of their\ntotality, and one of each of them separately. Two therefore, not any\nmore than \"pair,\" is by nature a relation. If the pair consisted in\nthe union (of two objects), and if \"being united\" were identical with\n\"to duplicate,\" in this case the union, as well as the pair, would\nconstitute two. Now a \"pair\" appears likewise in a state contrary (to\nthat of the reunion of two objects); for two may be produced by the\ndivision of a single object. Two, therefore, is neither reunion nor\ndivision, as it would have to be in order to constitute a relation.\n\n\nOBJECTS PARTICIPATE IN NUMBERS JUST AS THEY PARTICIPATE IN ALL\nINTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES.\n\nWhat then is the principal cause (by virtue of which objects\nparticipate in numbers)? A being is one by the presence of one; double,\nbecause of the presence of the pair; just as it is white because of the\npresence of whiteness; beautiful, because of the presence of beauty;\nand just by that of justice. If that be not admitted, we shall be\nreduced to asserting that whiteness, beauty and justice are nothing\nreal, and that their only causes are simple relations; that justice\nconsists in some particular relation with some particular being; that\nbeauty has no foundation other than the affection that we feel; that\nthe object which seems beautiful possesses nothing capable of exciting\nthis affection either by nature, or by acquirement. When you see an\nobject that is one, and that you call single, it is simultaneously\ngreat, beautiful, and susceptible of receiving a number of other\nqualifications. Now why should unity not inhere in the object as\nwell as greatness and magnitude, sweetness and bitterness, and other\nqualities? We have no right to admit that quality, whatever it be,\nforms part of the number of beings, whilst quantity is excluded; nor\nto limit quantity to continuous quantity, while discrete quantity is\nexcluded from the conception of quantity; and that so much the less as\ncontinuous quantity is measured by discrete quantity. Thus, just as\nan object is great because of the presence of magnitude, as it is one\nby the presence of unity; so is it double because of the presence of\nbeing a pair, and so forth.[33]\n\n\nTHE VERITABLE NUMBERS ARE INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES.\n\nShould we be asked to describe the operation of the participation of\nobjects in unity and in numbers, we shall answer that this question\nconnects with the more general problem of the participation of objects\nin intelligible forms. Besides, we shall have to admit that the decad\npresents itself under different aspects, according as it is considered\nto exist either in discrete quantities, or in continuous quantities,\nor in the reduction of many great forces to unity, or, last, into\nthe intelligible entities to which we are later raised. It is among\nthem, indeed, that are found the veritable Numbers (spoken of by\nPlato,[10]) which, instead of being considered as discovered in other\n(beings), exist within themselves; such is the Decad-in-itself, which\nexists by itself, instead of simply being a decad[34] composed of some\nintelligible entities.\n\n\nNUMBER EXISTS BEFORE EVERY ANIMAL, AND THE UNIVERSAL ANIMAL.\n\n15. (From the above discussion about the intelligibility of numbers)\nlet us now return to what we said in the beginning. The universal\n(Being) is veritable Essence, Intelligence, and perfect living\nOrganism; and at the same time contains also all the living organisms.\nOur universe, which also is an organism, by its unity imitates so\nfar as it can the unity of the perfect living Organism. I say, to\nthe extent of its capacity, because, by its nature, the sense-world\nhas departed from the unity of the intelligible world; otherwise, it\nwould not be the sense-world. Moreover, the universal living Organism\nmust be the universal Number; for if it were not a perfect number,\nit would lack some number; and if it did not contain the total number\nof living organisms, it would not be the perfect living Organism.\nNumber therefore exists before every living organism, and before the\nuniversal living Organism. Man and the other living organisms are in\nthe intelligible world; so far as they are living organisms, and so far\nas the intelligible world is the universal living Organism; for man,\neven here below, is a part of the living Organism, so far as itself is\na living organism, and as the living Organism is universal; the other\nliving organisms are also in the living Organism, so far as each of\nthem is a living organism.\n\n\nTHE INTELLIGIBLE AS POTENTIAL AND ACTUALIZED IN THE SOUL.\n\nLikewise, Intelligence, as such, contains all the individual\nintelligences as its parts.[35] These, however, form a number.\nConsequently, the number which is in the Intelligence does not occupy\nthe first degree. So far as the number is in Intelligence, it is equal\nto the quantity of the actualizations of Intelligence. Now, these\nactualizations are wisdom, justice, and the other virtues, science,\nand all the (ideas) whose possession characterizes it as veritable\nIntelligence. (If then science exist in the Intelligence) how does it\nhappen that it is not there in some principle other than itself? In\nIntelligence the knower, the known, and science are one and the same\nthing; and with everything else within it. That is why every (entity)\nexists in the intelligible world in its highest degree. For instance,\nwithin it, Justice is no accident, though it be one in the soul, as\nsuch; for intelligible entities are in the soul (only in) potential\ncondition (so long as she remains no more than soul); and they are\nactualized when the soul rises to Intelligence and dwells with it.[36]\n\n\nNUMBER AS THE UNIVERSAL BOND OF THE UNIVERSE.\n\nBesides Intelligence, and anterior thereto, exists Essence. It contains\nNumber, with which it begets (beings); for it begets them by moving\naccording to number, determining upon the numbers before giving\nhypostatic existence to the (beings), just as the unity (of essence)\nprecedes its (existence), and interrelates it with the First (or,\nabsolute Unity). Numbers interrelate nothing else to the First; it\nsuffices for Essence to be interrelated with Him, because Essence, on\nbecoming Number, attaches all (beings) to itself. Essence is divided\nnot so far as it is a unity (for its unity is permanent); but having\ndivided itself conformably to its nature in as many things as it\ndecided on, it saw into how many things it had divided itself; and\nthrough this (process) it begat the number that exists within itself;\nfor it divided itself by virtue of the potentialities of number, and it\nbegat as many (beings) as number comported.\n\n\nTHE GENERATION OF EVERYTHING REGULATED BY NUMBER.\n\nThe first and veritable Number is therefore the source and\nprinciple[21] of hypostatic existence for beings. That is the reason\nthat even here below, the classified both discrete and continuous\nquantity[38] and, with a different number, it is some other thing that\nis begotten, or nothing more can be begotten. Such are the primary\nNumbers, so far as they can be numbered. The numbers that subsist in\nother things play two parts. So far as they proceed from the First,\nthey can be numbered; so far as they are below them, they measure other\nthings, they serve to enumerate both numbers and things which can be\nenumerated. How indeed could you even say \"ten\" without the aid of\nnumbers within yourself?\n\n\nDIFFICULTIES CONNECTED WITH THESE INTELLIGIBLE NUMBERS.\n\n16. The first objection might be, Where do you locate, or how do you\nclassify these primary and veritable Numbers? All the philosophers (who\nfollow Aristotle) classify numbers in the genus of quantity. It seems\nthat we have above treated of quantity, and classified both discrete\nand continuous quantity[38] among other \"beings.\" Here however we\nseem to say that these Numbers form part of the primary Essences, and\nadd that there are, in addition, numbers that serve for enumerations.\nWe are now asked how we make these statements agree, for they seem\nto give rise to several questions. Is the unity which is found among\nsense-beings a quantity? Or is unity a quantity when repeated, while,\nwhen considered alone and in itself, it is the principle of quantity,\nbut not a quantity itself? Besides, if unity be the principle of\nquantity, does it share the nature of quantity, or has it a different\nnature? Here are a number of points we ought to expound. We shall\nanswer these questions, and here is what we consider our starting-point.\n\n\nUNITY CONTAINED IN SENSE-OBJECTS IS NOT UNITY IN ITSELF.\n\nWhen, considering visible objects, by which we ought to begin, we\ncombine one (being) with another, as for instance, a horse and a dog,\nor two men, and say that they form two; or, when considering a greater\nnumber of men we say they are ten, and form a group of ten, this number\ndoes not constitute being, nor an (accident) among sense-objects; it is\npurely and simply a quantity. Dividing this group of ten by unity, and\nmaking unity of its parts, you obtain and constitute the principle of\nquantity (unity) for a unity thus derived from a group of ten.\n\n\nNUMERALS PREDICATED OF THE MAN IN HIMSELF ARE ESSENTIAL.\n\nBut when you say that the Man considered in himself is a number, as,\nfor instance, a pair, because he is both animal and reasonable, we\nhave here no more than a simple modality. For, while reasoning and\nenumerating we produce a quantity; but so far as there are here two\nthings (animal and reasonable), and as each of them is one, as each\ncompletes the being of the man, and possesses unity; we are here using\nand proclaiming another kind of number, the essential Number. Here the\npair is not posterior to things; it does not limit itself to expressing\na quantity which is exterior to essence; it expresses what is in the\nvery being of this essence, and contains its nature.\n\n\nCOLLECTIVE NOUNS USED AS PROOF OF INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE.\n\nIndeed, it is not you who here below produce number when you by\ndiscursive reason range through things that exist by themselves, and\nwhich do not depend for their existence on your enumeration; for you\nadd nothing to the being of a man by enumerating him with another. That\nis no unity, as in a \"choric ballet.\" When you say, ten men, \"ten\"\nexists only in you who are enumerating. We could not assert that \"ten\"\nexists in the ten men you are enumerating, because these men are not\nco-ordinated so as to form a unity; it is you yourself who produce ten\nby enumerating this group of ten, and by making up a quantity. But\nwhen you say, a \"choric ballet,\" an \"army,\" there is something which\nexists outside of these objects, and within yourself.[39] How are we\nto understand that the number exists in you? The number which existed\nin you before you made the enumeration has another mode (of existence)\n(than the number that you produce by enumeration). As to the number\nwhich manifests itself in exterior objects and refers to the number\nwithin yourself, it constitutes an actualization of the essential\nnumbers, or, is conformable to the essential Numbers; for, while\nenumerating you produce a number, and by this actualization you give\nhypostatic existence to quantity, as in walking you did to movement.\n\n\nTHE NUMBER WITHIN IS THE NUMBER CONSTITUTIVE OF OUR BEING.\n\nIn what sense does the number which is within us (before we enumerate)\nhave a mode (of existence) other (than the one we produce in\nenumeration)? Because it is the number constitutive of our being,\nwhich, as Plato says,[40] participates in number and harmony, and is a\nnumber and harmony; for the soul is said to be neither a body nor an\nextension; she therefore is a number, since she is a being. The number\nof the body is a being of the same nature as the body; the number of\nthe soul consists in the beings which are incorporeal like souls. Then,\nfor the intelligible entities, if the animal itself be plurality, if\nit be a triad, the triad that exists in the animal is essential. As to\nthe triad which subsists, not in the animal, but in essence, it is the\nprinciple of being. If you enumerate the animal and the beautiful, each\nof these two in itself is a unity; but (in enumerating them), you beget\nnumber in yourself, and you conceive a certain quantity, the pair. If\n(like the Pythagoreans) you say that virtue is a group of four, or\ntetrad, it is one so far as its parts (justice, prudence, courage, and\ntemperance) contribute to the formation of a unity; you may add that\nthis group of four, or tetrad, is a unity, so far as it is a kind of\nsubstrate; as to you, you connect this tetrad with the one that is\ninside of you.[41]\n\n\nHOW A NUMBER MAY BE CALLED INFINITE.[42]\n\n17. As the reasons here advanced would seem to imply that every number\nis limited, we may ask in which sense may a number be said to be\ninfinite? This conclusion is right, for it is against the nature of\nnumber to be infinite. Why do people then often speak of a number as\ninfinite? Is it in the same sense that one calls a line infinite? A\nline is said to be infinite, not that there really exists an infinite\nline of this kind, but to imply the conception of a line as great as\npossible, greater than any given line. Similarly with number. When\nwe know which is the number (of certain objects), we can double it\nby thought, without, on that account, adding any other number to the\nfirst. How indeed would it be possible to add to exterior objects the\nconception of our imagination, a conception that exists in ourselves\nexclusively? We shall therefore say that, among intelligible entities,\na line is infinite; otherwise, the intelligible line would be a simple\nquantative expression. If however the intelligible line be not this, it\nmust be infinite in number; but we then understand the word \"infinite\"\nin a sense other than that of having no limits that could not be\ntranscended. In what sense then is the word \"infinite\" here used? In\nthe sense that the conception of a limit is not implied in the being of\na line in itself.\n\n\nINTELLIGIBLE LINE POSTERIOR TO NUMBER, AND EXISTS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE.\n\nWhat then is the intelligible line, and where does it exist? It is\nposterior to number[43]; for unity appears in the line, since this\nstarts from the unity (of the point), and because it has but one\ndimension (length); now the measure of dimension is not a quantative\n(entity). Where then does the intelligible Line exist? It exists only\nin the intelligence that defines it; or, if it be a thing, it is but\nsomething intellectual. In the intelligible world, in fact, everything\nis intellectual, and such as the thing itself is. It is in this same\nworld, likewise, where is made the decision where and how the plane,\nthe solid, and all other figures are to be disposed. For it is not\nwe who create the figures by conceiving them. This is so because the\nfigure of the world is anterior to us, and because the natural figures\nwhich are suitable to the productions of nature, are necessarily\nanterior to the bodies, and in the intelligible world exist in the\nstate of primary figures, without determining limits, for these forms\nexist in no other subjects; they subsist by themselves, and have no\nneed of extension, because the extension is the attribute of a subject.\n\n\nTHE INTELLIGIBLE SPHERICAL FIGURE THE PRIMITIVE ONE.\n\nEverywhere, therefore, in essence, is a single (spherical) figure,[44]\nand each of these figures (which this single figure implicitly\ncontained) has become distinct, either in, or before the animal. When\nI say that each figure has become distinct, I do not mean that it has\nbecome an extension, but that it has been assigned to some particular\nanimal; thus, in the intelligible world, each body has been assigned\nits own characteristic figure, as, for instance, the pyramid to the\nfire.[45] Our world seeks to imitate this figure, although it cannot\naccomplish this, because of matter. There are other figures here below\nthat are analogous to the intelligible figures.\n\n\nFIGURES PRE-EXIST IN THE INTELLIGIBLE.\n\nBut are the figures in the living Organism as such, or, if it cannot\nbe doubted that they are in the living Organism, do they anteriorly\nexist in the Intelligence? If the Organism contained Intelligence,\nthe figures would be in the first degree in the Organism. But as it\nis the Intelligence that contains the Organism, they are in the first\ndegree in Intelligence. Besides, as the souls are contained in the\nperfect living Organism, it is one reason more for the priority of\nthe Intelligence. But Plato says,[46] \"Intelligence sees the Ideas\ncomprised within the perfect living Organism.\" Now, if it see the\nIdeas contained in the perfect living Organism, Intelligence must be\nposterior to the latter. By the words \"it sees\" it should be understood\nthat the existence of the living Organism itself is realized in this\nvision. Indeed, the Intelligence which sees is not something different\nfrom the Organism which is seen; but (in Intelligence) all things form\nbut one. Only, thought has a pure and simple sphere, while the Organism\nhas an animated sphere.[47]\n\n\nINFINITY IN NUMBER ARISES FROM POSSIBILITY OF INCREASING GREATEST\nIMAGINABLE PHYSICAL NUMBER.\n\n18. Thus, in the intelligible world, every number is finite. But we\ncan conceive of a number greater than any assigned number, and thus it\nis that our mind, while considering the numbers, produces the (notion\nof the) infinite. On the contrary, in the intelligible world, it is\nimpossible to conceive a number greater than the Number conceived (by\ndivine Intelligence); for on high Number exists eternally; no Number\nis lacking, or could ever lack, so that one could never add anything\nthereto.\n\n\nAS UNMEASURED THE INTELLIGIBLE NUMBER MIGHT BE CALLED INFINITE.\n\nNevertheless, the intelligible Number might be called infinite in the\nsense that it is unmeasured. By what, indeed, could it be measured?\nThe Number that exists on high is universal, simultaneous one and\nmanifold, constituting a whole circumscribed by no limit (a whole that\nis infinite); it is what it is by itself. None of the intelligible\nbeings, indeed, is circumscribed by any limit. What is really limited\nand measured is what is hindered from losing itself in the infinite,\nand demands measure. But all of the intelligible (beings) are measures;\nwhence it results that they are all beautiful. So far as it is a living\norganism, the living Organism in itself is beautiful, possessing an\nexcellent life, and lacking no kind of life; it does not have a life\nmingled with death, it contains nothing mortal nor perishable. The\nlife of the living Organism in itself has no fault; it is the first\nLife, full of vigor and energy, a primary Light whose rays vivify\nboth the souls that dwell on high, and those that descend here below.\nThis Life knows why it lives; it knows its principle and its goal;\nfor its principle is simultaneously its goal. Besides, universal\nWisdom, the universal Intelligence, which is intimately united to the\nliving Organism, which subsists in it and with it, still improves it;\nheightening its hues as it were by the splendor of its wisdom, and\nrendering its beauty more venerable. Even here below, a life full of\nwisdom is that which is most venerable and beautiful, though we can\nhardly catch a glimpse of such a life. On high, however, the vision of\nlife is perfectly clear; the (favored initiate) receives from Life both\ncapacity to behold and increased vitality; so that, thanks to a more\nenergetic life, the beholder receives a clearer vision, and he becomes\nwhat he sees. Here below, our glance often rests on inanimate things,\nand even when it turns towards living beings, it first notices in them\nthat which lacks life. Besides, the life which is hidden in them is\nalready mingled with other things. On high, on the contrary, all the\n(beings) are alive, entirely alive, and their life is pure. If at the\nfirst aspect you should look on something as deprived of life, soon the\nlife within it would burst out before your eyes.\n\n\nESSENCE ALONE POSSESSES SELF-EXISTENCE.\n\nContemplate therefore the Being that penetrates the intelligibles, and\nwhich communicates to them an immutable life; contemplate the Wisdom\nand Knowledge that resides within them, and you will not be able to\nkeep from deriding this inferior nature to which the vulgar human\nbeings attribute genuine \"being.\" It is in this supreme \"Being\" that\ndwell life and intelligence, and that the essences subsist in eternity.\nThere, nothing issues (from Essence), nothing changes or agitates it;\nfor there is nothing outside of it that could reach it; if a single\nthing existed outside of (\"being\"), (\"being\") would be dependent on it.\nIf anything opposed to (essence) existed, this thing would escape the\naction of (\"being\"); it would no longer owe its existence to (\"being\"),\nbut would constitute a common principle anterior to it, and would be\nessence. Parmenides[48] therefore was right in saying that the Essence\nwas one; that it was immutable, not because there was nothing else\n(that could modify it), but because it was essence. Alone, therefore,\ndoes Essence possess self-existence. How then could one, to Essence,\nrefuse to attribute existence, or any of the things of which it is an\nactualization, and which it constitutes? So long as it exists, it gives\nthem to itself; and since it exists always, these things therefore\neternally subsist within it.\n\n\nTHE POWER AND BEAUTY OF ESSENCE IS TO ATTRACT ALL THINGS.\n\nSuch are the power and beauty of Essence that it (charms and) attracts\nall things, holding them as it were suspended, so that these are\ndelighted to possess even a trace of its perfection, and seek nothing\nbeyond, except the Good. For Essence is anterior to the Good in respect\nto us (when we climb up from here below to the intelligible world).\nThe entire intelligible world aspires to the Life and Wisdom so as to\npossess existence; all the souls, all the intelligences likewise aspire\nto possess it; Essence alone is fully self-sufficient.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT.\n\nOf Sight; or of Why Distant Objects Seem Small.[49]\n\n(OF PERSPECTIVE.)\n\n\nVARIOUS THEORIES OF PERSPECTIVE.\n\n1. What is the cause that when distant visible objects seem smaller,\nand that, though separated by a great space, they seem to be close to\neach other, while if close, we see them in their true size, and their\ntrue distance? The cause of objects seeming smaller at a distance might\nbe that light needs to be focussed near the eye, and to be accommodated\nto the size of the pupils[50]; that the greater the distance of the\nmatter of the visible object, the more does its form seem to separate\nfrom it during its transit to the eyes; and that, as there is a form\nof quantity as well as of quality, it is the reason (or, form) of the\nlatter which alone reaches the eye. On the other hand, (Epicurus)\nthinks that we feel magnitude only by the passage and the successive\nintroduction of its parts, one by one; and that, consequently,\nmagnitude must be brought within our reach, and near us, for us to\ndetermine its quantity.\n\n\nQUALITY IS MORE ESSENTIAL THAN QUANTITY.\n\n(Do objects at a distance seem smaller) because we perceive magnitude\nonly by accident, and because color is perceived first? In this case,\nwhen an object is near, we perceive its colored magnitude; when at a\ndistance, we perceive first its color, not well enough distinguishing\nits parts to gather exact knowledge of its quantity, because its\ncolors are less lively. Why should we be surprised at magnitudes\nbeing similar to sounds, which grow weaker as their form decreases\nin distinctness? As to sounds, indeed, it is the form that is sought\nby the sense of hearing, and here intensity is noticed only as an\naccident. But if hearing perceive magnitude only by accident, to what\nfaculty shall we attribute the primitive perception of intensity\nin sound, just as primitive perception of magnitude in the visible\nobject is referable to the sense of touch? Hearing perceives apparent\nmagnitude by determining not the quantity but the intensity of sounds;\nthis very intensity of sounds, however, is perceived only by accident\n(because it is its proper object). Likewise, taste does not by accident\nfeel the intensity of a sweet savor. Speaking strictly, the magnitude\nof a sound is its extent. Now the intensity of a sound indicates its\nextent only by accident, and therefore in an inexact manner. Indeed a\nthing's intensity is identical with the thing itself. The multitude of\na thing's parts is known only by the extent of space occupied by the\nobject.\n\n\nDIFFERENCES OF COLOR AID IN THE PERCEPTION OF MAGNITUDE.\n\nIt may be objected that a color cannot be less large, and that it\ncan only be less vivid. However, there is a common characteristic in\nsomething smaller and less vivid; namely, that it is less than what\nit is its being to be. As to color, diminution implies weakness;\nas to size, smallness. Magnitude connected with color diminishes\nproportionally with it. This is evident in the perception of a varied\nobject, as, for instance, in the perception of mountains covered with\nhouses, forests, and many other objects; here the distinctness of\ndetail affords a standard by which to judge of the whole. But when the\nview of the details does not impress itself on the eye, the latter\nno longer grasps the extent of the whole through measurement of the\nextent offered to its contemplation by the details. Even in the case\nwhere the objects are near and varied, if we include them all in one\nglance without distinguishing all their parts, the more parts our\nglance loses, the smaller do the objects seem. On the contrary, if we\ndistinguish all their details, the more exactly do we measure them,\nand learn their real size. Magnitudes of uniform color deceive the eye\nbecause the latter can no longer measure their extent by its parts; and\nbecause, even if the eye attempt to do so, it loses itself, not knowing\nwhere to stop, for lack of difference between the parts.\n\n\nDISAPPEARANCE OF THE FORM IMPLIES THAT OF THE SIZE.\n\nThe distant object seems to us close because our inability to\ndistinguish the parts of the intervening space does not permit us to\ndetermine exactly its magnitude. When sight can no longer traverse the\nlength of an interval by determining its quality, in respect to its\nform, neither can it any longer determine its quantity in respect to\nmagnitude.\n\n\nREFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE'S \"VISUAL ANGLE\" THEORY.\n\n2. Some[51] hold that distant objects seem to us lesser only because\nthey are seen under a smaller visual angle. Elsewhere[52] we have shown\nthat this is wrong; and here we shall limit ourselves to the following\nconsiderations. The assertion that a distant object seems less because\nit is perceived under a smaller visual angle supposes that the rest\nof the eye still sees something outside of this object, whether this\nbe some other object, or something external, such as the air. But if\nwe suppose that the eye sees nothing outside of this object, whether\nthis object, as would a great mountain, occupy the whole extent of the\nglance, and permit nothing beyond it to be seen; or whether it even\nextend beyond the sweep of the glance on both sides, then this object\nshould not, as it actually does, seem smaller than it really is, even\nthough it fill the whole extension of the glance. The truth of this\nobservation can be verified by a mere glance at the sky. Not in a\nsingle glance can the whole hemisphere be perceived, for the glance\ncould not be extended widely enough to embrace so vast an expanse. Even\nif we grant the possibility of this, and that the whole glance embraces\nthe whole hemisphere; still the real magnitude of the heaven is greater\nthan its apparent magnitude. How then by the diminution of the visual\nangle could we explain the smallness of the apparent magnitude of the\nsky, on the hypothesis that it is the diminution of the visual angle\nwhich makes distant objects appear smaller?\n\n\n\n\nFIRST ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE.\n\nDoes Happiness Increase With Time?[53]\n\n\nHAPPINESS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH DURATION OF TIME.\n\n1. Does happiness increase with duration of time? No: for the feeling\nof happiness exists only in the present. The memory of past happiness\ncould not add anything to happiness itself. Happiness is not a word,\nbut a state of soul. But a state of soul is a present (experience),\nsuch as, for instance, the actualization of life.\n\n\nHAPPINESS IS NOT THE SATISFACTION OF THE DESIRE TO LIVE.\n\n2. Might happiness not be the satisfaction of the desire of living and\nactivity, inasmuch as this desire is ever present with us? (Hardly).\nFirst, according to this hypothesis, the happiness of to-morrow would\never be greater than that of to-day, and that of the following day\nthan that of the day before, and so on to infinity. In this case, the\nmeasure of happiness would no longer be virtue (but duration). Then,\nthe beatitude of the divinities will also have to become greater from\nday to day; it would no longer be perfect, and could never become\nso.[54] Besides, desire finds its satisfaction in the possession of\nwhat is present, both now, and in the future. So long as these present\ncircumstances exist, their possession constitutes happiness. Further,\nas the desire of living can be no more than the desire to exist, the\nlatter desire can refer to the present only, inasmuch as real existence\n(essence) inheres only in the present. Desire for a future time, or\nfor some later event, means no more than a desire to preserve what\none already possesses. Desire refers neither to the future nor the\npast, but to what exists at present. What is sought is not a perpetual\nprogression in the future, but the enjoyment of what exists from the\npresent moment onward.\n\n\nINCREASED HAPPINESS WOULD RESULT ONLY FROM MORE PERFECT GRASP.\n\n3. What shall be said of him who lived happily during a longer period,\nwho has longer contemplated the same spectacle? If such longer\ncontemplation resulted in a clearer idea thereof, the length of time\nhas served some useful purpose; but if the agent contemplated it in the\nsame manner for the whole extent of time, he possesses no advantage\nover him who contemplated it only once.\n\n\nPLEASURE IS UNCONNECTED WITH HAPPINESS.\n\n4. It might be objected that the former of these men enjoyed pleasure\nlonger than the other. This consideration has nothing to do with\nhappiness. If by this (enjoyed) pleasure we mean the free exercise\n(of intelligence), the pleasure referred to is then identical with\nthe happiness here meant. This higher pleasure referred to is only to\npossess what is here ever present; what of it is past is of no further\nvalue.\n\n\nLENGTH OF HAPPINESS DOES NOT AFFECT ITS QUALITY.\n\n5. Would equal happiness be predicated of three men, one who had been\nhappy from his life's beginning to its end, the other only at its end,\nand the third, who had been happy, but who ceased being such.[55] This\ncomparison is not between three men who are happy, but between one man\nwho is happy, with two who are deprived of happiness, and that at the\n(present moment) when happiness (counts most). If then one of them have\nany advantage, he possesses it as a man actually happy compared with\nsuch as are not; he therefore surpasses the two others by the actual\npossession of happiness.\n\n\nIF UNHAPPINESS INCREASE WITH TIME, WHY SHOULD NOT HAPPINESS DO SO?\n\n6. (It is generally agreed that) all calamities, sufferings, griefs\nand similar evils are aggravated in proportion to their duration. If\nthen, in all these cases, evil be increased with time, why should not\nthe same circumstance obtain in the contrary case? Why should happiness\nalso not be increased?[56] Referring to griefs and sufferings, it might\nreasonably be said that they are increased by duration. When, for\nexample, sickness is prolonged, and becomes a habitual condition, the\nbody suffers more and more profoundly as time goes on. If, however,\nevil ever remain at the same degree, it does not grow worse, and\nthere is no need of complaining but of the present. Consideration of\nthe past evil amounts to considering the traces left by evil, the\nmorbid disposition whose intensity is increased by time, because its\nseriousness is proportionate to its duration. In this case it is not\nthe length of time, but the aggravation of the evil which adds to\nthe misfortune. But the new degree (of intensity) does not subsist\nsimultaneously with the old, and it is unreasonable to predicate\nan increase as summation of what is no more to what now is. On the\ncontrary, it is the fixed characteristic of happiness to have a fixed\nterm, to remain ever the same. Here also the only increase possibly\ndue to duration of time depends on the relation between an increase\nin virtue and one in happiness; and the element to be reckoned with\nhere is not the number of years of happiness, but the degree of virtue\nfinally acquired.\n\n\nAS ADDITION IS POSSIBLE WITH TIME, WHY CANNOT HAPPINESS INCREASE?\n\n7. It might be objected that it is inconsistent to consider the present\nonly, exclusive of the past (as in the case of happiness), when we\ndo not do so in respect of time. For the addition of past to present\nunquestionably lengthens time. If then we may properly say that time\nbecomes longer, why may we not say the same of happiness?--Were we to\ndo so, we would be applying happiness to divisions of time, while it\nis precisely to bring out the indivisibility of happiness that it is\nconsidered to be measured by the present exclusively. While considering\ntime, in respect of things that have vanished, such as, for instance,\nthe dead, it is perfectly reasonable to reckon the past; but it would\nbe unreasonable to compare past happiness with present happiness\nin respect to duration, because it would be treating happiness as\nsomething accidental and temporary. Whatever might be the length of\ntime that preceded the present, all that can be said of it is, that\nit is no more. To regard duration while considering happiness is to\ntry to disperse and fraction something that is one and indivisible,\nsomething that exists only in the present. That is why time is called\nan image of eternity, inasmuch as it tends to destroy eternity's\npermanence through its own dispersion.[57] By abstracting permanence\nfrom eternity, and appropriating it, time destroys eternity; for a\nshort period, permanence may survive in association with time; but as\nsoon as it becomes fused with it, eternity perishes. Now as happiness\nconsists in the enjoyment of a life that is good, namely in that which\nis proper to Essence (in itself), because none better exists, it must,\ninstead of time, have, as a measure, eternity itself, a principle\nwhich admits neither increase nor diminution, which cannot be compared\nto any length, whose nature it is to be indivisible, and superior to\ntime. No comparison, therefore, should be instituted between essence\nand non-essence, eternity and time, the perpetual and the eternal;\nnor should extension be predicated of the indivisible. If we regard\nexistence of Essence in itself, it will be necessary to regard it\nentire; to consider it, not as the perpetuity of time, but as the very\nlife of eternity, a life which instead of consisting of a series of\ncenturies, exists entire since all centuries.\n\n\nNOT EVEN MEMORIES OF THE PAST INCREASE HAPPINESS.\n\n8. Somebody might object that by subsisting till the present, the\nmemory of the past adds something more to him who has long lived\nhappily. In this case it will be necessary to examine what is meant by\nthis memory. If it mean the memory of former wisdom, and if it mean\nthat he who would possess this memory would become wiser on account\nof it, then this memory differs from our question (which studies\nhappiness, and not wisdom). If it mean the memory of pleasure, it\nwould imply that the happy man has need of much pleasure, and cannot\nremain satisfied with what is present. Besides, there is no proof that\nthe memory of a past pleasure is at all pleasant; on the contrary, it\nwould be entirely ridiculous to remember with delight having tasted a\ndelicious dish the day before, and still more ridiculous remembering\nsuch an enjoyment ten years ago. It would be just as ridiculous to\npride one self on having been a wise man last year.\n\n\nNOT EVEN THE MEMORY OF VIRTUE INCREASES HAPPINESS.\n\n9. Could not the memory of virtuous actions contribute to happiness?\nNo: for such a memory cannot exist in a man who has no virtue at\npresent, and who thereby is driven to seek out the memory of past\nvirtues.\n\n\nLENGTH OF TIME IS OF NO IMPORTANCE, NOT EVEN AS OPPORTUNITY OF VIRTUE.\n\n10. Another objection is that length of time would give opportunity\nfor doing many beautiful deeds; while this opportunity is denied him\nwho lives happily only a short period. This may be answered by denying\nhappiness to a man on the grounds of having done many beautiful\ndeeds. If several parts of time and several actions are to constitute\nhappiness, then it would be constituted by things that are no more,\nthat are past, and by present things; whereas our definition of\nhappiness limits it exclusively to the present. Then we considered\nwhether length of time add to happiness. There remains only to examine\nwhether happiness of long duration be superior because of yielding\nopportunities of doing more beautiful deeds. To begin with, the man\nwho is inactive may be just as happy, if not more happy than he who is\nactive. Besides, it is not actions themselves which yield happiness;\n(the sources of happiness) are states of mind, which are the principles\nof beautiful actions. The wise man enjoys welfare while active, but not\nbecause of this activity; he derives (this welfare) not from contingent\nthings, but from what he possesses in himself. For it might happen even\nto a vicious man to save his fatherland, or to feel pleasure in seeing\nit saved by some other. It is not then these activities which are the\ncauses of the enjoyment of happiness. True beatitude and the joys it\nyields must be derived from the constant disposition of the soul. To\npredicate it of activity, would be to make it depend on things alien to\nvirtue and the soul. The soul's actualization consists in being wise,\nand in exercising her self-activity; this is true happiness.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN.\n\nAbout Mixture to the Point of Total Penetration.\n\n\nREFUTATION OF ANAXAGORAS AND DEMOCRITUS.\n\n1. The subject of the present consideration is mixture to the point\nof total penetration of the different bodies. This has been explained\nin two ways: that the two liquids are mingled so as mutually to\ninterpenetrate each other totally, or that only one of them penetrates\nthe other. The difference between these two theories is of small\nimportance. First we must set aside the opinion of (Anaxagoras and\nDemocritus[58]), who explain mixture as a juxtaposition, because this\nis a crude combination, rather than a mixture.[59] Mixture should\nrender the whole homogeneous, so that even the smallest molecules might\neach be composed of the various elements of the mixture.\n\n\nREFUTATION OF ARISTOTLE AND ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS.\n\nAs to the (Peripatetic) philosophers who assert that in a mixture only\nthe qualities mingle, while the material extension of both bodies are\nonly in juxtaposition, so long as the qualities proper to each of\nthem are spread throughout the whole mass, they seem to establish the\nrightness of their opinion by attacking the doctrine which asserts that\nthe two bodies mutually interpenetrate in mixture.[60] (They object)\nthat the molecules of both bodies will finally lose all magnitude\nby this continuous division which will leave no interval between the\nparts of either of the two bodies; for if the two bodies mutually\ninterpenetrate each other in every part, their division must become\ncontinuous. Besides, the mixture often occupies an extent greater than\neach body taken separately, and as great as if mere juxtaposition\nhad occurred. Now if two bodies mutually interpenetrate totally, the\nresulting mixture would occupy no more place than any one of them\ntaken separately. The case where two bodies occupy no more space than\na single one of them is by these philosophers explained by the air's\nexpulsion, which permits one of the bodies to penetrate into the\npores of the other. Besides, in the case of the mixture of two bodies\nof unequal extent, how could the body of the smaller extend itself\nsufficiently to spread into all the parts of the greater? There are\nmany other such reasons.\n\n\nREFUTATION OF THE STOICS.\n\nWe now pass to the opinions of (Zeno and the other Stoic)\nphilosophers,[61] who assert that two bodies which make up a mixture\nmutually interpenetrate each other totally. They support this view\nby observing that when the bodies interpenetrate totally, they are\ndivided without the occurrence of a continuous division (which would\nmake their molecules lose their magnitude). Indeed, perspiration\nissues from the human body without its being divided or riddled with\nholes. To this it may be objected that nature may have endowed our\nbody with a disposition to permit perspiration to issue easily. To\nthis (the Stoics) answer that certain substances (like ivory[62]),\nwhich when worked into thin sheets, admit, in all their parts, a liquid\n(oat-gruel) which passes from one surface to the other. As these\nsubstances are bodies, it is not easy to understand how one element\ncan penetrate into another without separating its molecules. On the\nother hand, total division must imply mutual destruction (because\ntheir molecules would lose all magnitude whatever). When, however, two\nmingled bodies do not together occupy more space than either of them\nseparately (the Stoics) seem forced to admit to their adversaries that\nthis phenomenon is caused by the displacement of air.\n\n\nEXPLANATION OF MIXTURE THAT OCCUPIES MORE SPACE THAN ITS ELEMENTS.\n\nIn the case where the compound occupies more space than each element\nseparately, it might (though with little probability), be asserted,\nthat, since every body, along with its other qualities, implies size, a\nlocal extension must take place. No more than the other qualities could\nthis increase perish. Since, out of both qualities, arises a new form,\nas a compound of the mixture of both qualities; so also must another\nsize arise, the mixture combining the size out of both. Here (the\nPeripatetics) might answer (the Stoics): \"If you assert a juxtaposition\nof substances, as well as of the masses which possess extension, you\nare actually adopting our opinions. If however one of the masses, with\nits former extension, penetrate the entire mass of the other, the\nextension, instead of increasing, as in the case where one line is\nadded to another by joining their extremities, will not increase any\nmore than when two straight lines are made to coincide by superimposing\none on the other.\"\n\n\nCASE OF MIXTURE OF UNEQUAL QUANTITIES.\n\nThe case of the mixture of a smaller quantity with a greater one, such\nas of a large body with a very small one, leads (the Peripatetics)\nto consider it impossible that the great body should spread in all\nthe parts of the small one. Where the mixture is not evident, the\n(Peripatetics) might claim that the smaller body does not unite with\nall the parts of the greater. When however the mixture is evident,\nthey can explain it by the extension of the masses, although it be\nvery doubtful that a small mass would assume so great an extension,\nespecially when we attribute to the composite body a greater extent,\nwithout nevertheless admitting its transformation, as when water\ntransforms itself into air.\n\n\nEVAPORATION MAY LEAD TO A THIRD THEORY OF MIXTURE.\n\n2. What happens when a mass of water transforms itself into air? This\nquestion demands particular treatment; for how can the transformed\nelement occupy a greater extension? (We shall not try to explain\nit on either the Peripatetic or Stoic principles) because we have\nsufficiently developed above the numerous reasons advanced by both\nthose schools. We had better now consider which of the two systems\nwe ourselves might adopt, and on which side lies reason. Besides, we\nshould consider whether, besides these both, there be not place for a\nthird opinion.\n\n\nREFUTATION OF STOIC EXPLANATION OF EVAPORATION.\n\nWhen water flows through wool, or when paper allows water to filter\nthrough it, why does not the whole of the water pass through these\nsubstances (without partly remaining within them)? If the water remain\ntherein partially, we shall not be able to unite the two substances\nor masses. Shall we say that the qualities alone are confused (or,\nmingled)? Water is not in juxtaposition with the paper, nor is lodged\nin its pores; for the whole paper is penetrated thereby, and no\nportion of the matter lacks that quality. If matter be united to\nquality everywhere, water must everywhere be present in the paper.\nIf it be not water that everywhere is present in the paper, but only\n(humidity which is) the quality of the water, where then is the water\nitself? Why is not the mass the same? The matter that has insinuated\nitself into the paper extends it, and increases its volume. Now this\naugmentation of volume implies augmentation of mass; and the latter\nimplies that the water has not been absorbed by the book, and that the\ntwo substances occupy different places (and do not interpenetrate each\nother). Since one body causes another to participate in its quality,\nwhy would it not also make it participate in its extension? By virtue\nof this union with a different quality, one quality, united with a\ndifferent one, cannot, either remain pure, or preserve its earlier\nnature; it necessarily becomes weaker. But one extension, added to\nanother extension, does not vanish.\n\n\nREFUTATION OF PERIPATETIC EXPLANATION OF EVAPORATION.\n\nOne body is said to divide another, by penetrating it. This\nassertion, however, demands demonstration, for it is more reasonable\nto suppose that qualities may penetrate a body without dividing\nit. Such demonstration is attempted by the claim that qualities\nare incorporeal.[63] But if matter itself be as incorporeal as the\nqualities, why could not some qualities along with the matter penetrate\ninto some other body? That some solids do not penetrate other bodies,\nis due to their possession of qualities incompatible with that of\npenetration. The objection that many qualities could not, along with\nmatter, penetrate some body, would be justified only if it were the\nmultitude of qualities that produced density; but if density be as much\nof a quality as corporeity, the qualities will constitute the mixture\nnot in themselves alone, but only as they happen to be determined.\nOn the other hand, when matter does not lend itself to mixture, this\noccurs not by virtue of its being matter, but as matter united to some\ndeterminative quality. That is all the truer as matter is receptive to\nany magnitude, not having any of its own. But enough of this.\n\n\nTHE BODY IS RATIONALIZED MATTER.\n\n3. Since we have spoken of corporeity, it must be analyzed. Is it a\ncomposite of all qualities, or does it constitute a form, a \"reason,\"\nwhich produces the body by presence in matter? If the body be the\ncomposite of all the qualities together with matter, this totality of\nqualities will constitute corporeity. But if corporeity be a reason\nwhich produces the body by approaching matter, doubtless it is a reason\nwhich contains all the qualities. Now, if this reason be not at all a\ndefinition of being, if it be a reason productive of the object, it\nwill not contain any matter. It is the reason which applies itself to\nmatter, and which, by its presence, produces the body there. Body is\nmatter with indwelling \"reason.\" This \"reason,\" being a form, may be\nconsidered separately from matter, even if it were entirely inseparable\ntherefrom. Indeed, \"reason\" separated (from matter), and residing\nin intelligence, is different (from \"reason\" united to matter); the\n\"Reason\" which abides within Intelligence is Intelligence itself. But\nthis subject (I shall) refer to elsewhere.[64]\n\n\n\n\nSIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN.\n\nHow Ideas Multiplied, and the Good.[65]\n\n\nA. HOW IDEAS MULTIPLY.\n\n\nTHE EYES WERE IMPLANTED IN MAN BY DIVINE FORESIGHT.\n\n1. When the (higher) Divinity, or (some lower) divinity,[66] sent\nsouls down into generation, He gave to the face of man eyes suitable\nto enlighten him,[67] and placed in the body the other organs suited\nto the senses, foreseeing that (a living organism) would be able to\npreserve itself only on condition of seeing, hearing and touching\ncontiguous objects, to enable it to select some, and to avoid others.\n\n\nSENSES NOT GIVEN TO MAN BECAUSE OF EXPERIENCE OF MISFORTUNES.\n\nBut can you explain this divine foresight? You must not believe that He\nwould have begun by making (animals) who perished for lack of senses,\nand that later (the divinity) gave senses to man and other animals so\nthat they could preserve themselves from death.[68]\n\n\nNOR BECAUSE OF GOD'S FORESIGHT OF THESE MISFORTUNES.\n\nIt might, indeed, be objected that (the divinity) knew that the living\norganism would be exposed to heat, cold, and other physical conditions;\nand that as a result of this knowledge, to keep them from perishing,\nHe granted them, as tools, senses and organs. In our turn we shall\nask whether the divinity gave the organs to the living organisms\nthat already possessed the senses, or whether, He endowed souls with\nsenses and organs simultaneously. In the latter case, though they were\nsouls, they did not previously possess the sensitive faculties. But if\nthe souls possessed the sensitive faculties since the time they were\nproduced, and if they were produced (with these faculties) in order\nto descend into generation, then it was natural for them to do so. In\nthis case it seems that it must be contrary to their nature to avoid\ngeneration, and to dwell in the intelligible world. They would seem\nmade to belong to the body, and to live in evil. Thus divine Providence\nwould retain them in evil, and the divinity would arrive at this result\nby reasoning; in any case, He would have reasoned.\n\n\nFORESIGHT OF CREATION IS NOT THE RESULT OF REASONING.\n\nIf the divinity reason, we are forced to wonder what are the principles\nof this reasoning; for, if it were objected that these principles are\nderived from some other reasoning, we shall, nevertheless, in the\nprocess of ascending, have to find something anterior to all reasoning;\nnamely, a point of departure. Now from whence are the principles of\nreasoning derived? Either from the senses or the intelligence. (Could\nthe divinity have made use of principles derived from the senses?)\n(When God created) there were no senses in existence yet; therefore\n(the divinity must have reasoned) from principles derived from\nIntelligence. But if the premises were conceptions of Intelligence,\nthen it was impossible for knowledge and reasoning to have some\nsense-thing as object, as reasoning that has intelligible principles\nand conclusion could not result in producing a conception of the\nsense-(world). Therefore the foresight which presided over the creation\nof a living being or of a whole world could not have been the result of\nreasoning.[69]\n\n\nBOTH REASONING AND FORESIGHT ARE ONLY FIGURATIVE EXPRESSIONS.\n\nThere is indeed no reasoning in the divinity. When we speak of it,\nin connection with the divinity, it is only to explain that He has\nregulated everything as might have been done by some wise man, who\nwould have reasoned about results. Attributing foresight to the\ndivinity indicates merely that He has disposed everything as might have\nbeen done by some wise man who had foreseen results.[70] Indeed the\nonly use of reasoning is to put in order things whose existence is not\nanterior to that of reasoning, every time that that (Intelligence),\nthe power superior to reasoning, is not strong enough. Likewise,\nprevision is necessary in this case, because he who makes use of it\ndoes not possess a power that would enable him to forego or do without\nit. Prevision proposes to effect some one thing instead of another,\nand seems to fear that that which it desires might not occur. But,\nfor a (being) which can do but one thing, both foresight and the\nreasoning that decides between contraries, are useless; for there is\nno need of reasoning when, of two contrary courses of action, one only\nis possible. How would the Principle which is single, unitary and\nsimple, have need to reflect that He must do one thing, so that some\nother might not take place, or to judge that the second would occur as\nalternative to the first? How could He say that experience has already\ndemonstrated the utility of some one thing, and that it is well to make\nuse of it? If the divinity acted thus, then indeed would He have had\nrecourse to prevision, and consequently, to reasoning. It is on this\nhypothesis that we said above that the divinity gave animals senses\nand faculties; but it is quite a problem to know what and how He really\ngave them.\n\n\nIN GOD ALL THINGS WERE SIMULTANEOUS, THOUGH WHEN REALIZED THEY\nDEVELOPED.\n\nIndeed, if it be admitted that in the divinity no actualization is\nimperfect, if it be impossible to conceive in Him anything that is not\ntotal or universal, each one of the things that He contains comprises\nwithin Himself all things. Thus as, to the divinity, the future is\nalready present, there could not be anything posterior to Him; but what\nis already present in Him becomes posterior in some other (being). Now\nif the future be already present in the divinity, it must be present\nin Him as if what will happen were already known; that is, it must be\nso disposed as to find itself sufficiently provided for, so as not to\nstand in need of anything. Therefore, as all things existed already\nwithin the divinity (when living beings were created), they had been\nthere from all eternity; and that in a manner such that it would later\nbe possible to say, \"this occurred after that.\" Indeed, when the things\nthat are in the divinity later develop and reveal themselves, then one\nsees that the one is after the other; but, so far as they exist all\ntogether, they constitute the universal (Being), that is, the principle\nwhich includes its own cause.\n\n\nIN THE INTELLIGIBLE, EVERYTHING POSSESSES ITS REASON AS WELL AS ITS\nFORM.\n\n2. (By this process) we also know the nature of Intelligence, which\nwe see still better than the other things, though we cannot grasp\nits magnitude. We admit, in fact, that it possesses the whatness\n(essence[71]), of everything, but not its \"whyness\" (its cause); or,\nif we grant (that this \"cause\" be in Intelligence), we do not think\nthat it is separated (from its \"whatness\" (or, essence[72]). Let\nus suppose that, for instance, the man, or, if possible, the eye,\nshould offer itself to our contemplation (in the intelligible world)\nas a statue, or as a part of it, would do. The man that we see on\nhigh is both essence[73] and cause. As well as the eye, he must be\nintellectual, and contain his cause. Otherwise, he could not exist in\nthe intelligible world. Here below, just as each part is separated from\nthe others, so is the cause separated (from the essence). On high, on\nthe contrary, all things exist in unity, and each thing is identical\nwith its cause. This identity may often be noticed even here below, as\nfor instance, in eclipses.[74] It would therefore seem probable that\nin the intelligible world everything would, besides the rest, possess\nits cause, and that its cause constitutes its essence. This must be\nadmitted; and that is the reason why those who apply themselves to\ngrasp the characteristic[75] of each being succeed (in also grasping\nits cause). Indeed that which each (being) is, depends on the \"cause of\nsuch a form.\"[76] To repeat: not only is a (being's) form its cause,\n(which is incontestable), but yet, if one analyses each form considered\nin itself, its cause will be found. The only things which do not\ncontain their causes are those whose life is without reality, and whose\nexistence is shadowy.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE CAUSE OF ALL ITS FORMS.\n\nWhat is the origin of the cause of what is a form, which is\ncharacteristic of Intelligence? It is not from Intelligence, because\nthe form is not separable from Intelligence, combining with it to form\none single and same thing. If then Intelligence possess the forms\nin their fulness, this fulness of forms implies that they contain\ntheir cause. Intelligence contains the cause of each of the forms it\ncontains. It consists of all these forms taken together, or separately.\nNone of them needs discovery of the cause of its production, for\nsimultaneously with its production, it has contained the cause of its\nhypostatic existence. As it was not produced by chance, it contains all\nthat belongs to its cause; consequently, it also possesses the whole\nperfection of its cause. Sense-things which participate in form do not\nonly receive their nature from it, but also the cause of this nature.\nIf all the things of which this universe is composed be intimately\nconcatenated; and if the universe, containing all things, also contain\nthe cause of each of them; if its relation with them be the same as\nthat of the body with its organs, which do not mature successively, but\nwhich, towards each other, are mutually related as cause and effect;\nso much the more, in the intelligible world, must things have their\n\"causes,\" all of them in general in respect to the totality, and each\nindependently in respect to itself.\n\n\nIN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD EACH BEING IS ACCOMPANIED BY ITS WHYNESS.\n\nSince all intelligible (entities) have a hypostatic consubstantial\nexistence affording no room for chance; and as they are not separated\nfrom each other, things that are caused must bear these their causes\nwithin themselves, and each of them has some sort of a cause, though\nwithout really possessing one. If there be no cause for the existence\nof the intelligibles; and if, though isolated from all causes, they be\nself-sufficient; it can only be because they carry their cause along\nwith them, when they are considered in themselves. As they contain\nnothing fortuitous, and as each of them is manifold, and as its cause\nis all that they contain, we might assign this cause to themselves.\nThus in the intelligible world \"being\" is preceded, or rather\naccompanied by its cause, which is still more \"being\" than cause,\nor rather which becomes identified with it. What superfluousness,\nindeed, could there be in intelligence, unless its conceptions\nresemble imperfect productions? If its conceptions be perfect, one\ncould neither discover what they lack, nor define their cause, and,\nsince they possess everything, they also possess their cause. There,\n\"being\" and cause are united; the presence of both is recognized\nin each conception, in each actualization of intelligence. Let us,\nfor instance, consider the intelligible Man; he seems complete, in\nhis totality; all his attributes were his simultaneously from the\nbeginning; he was always entirely complete. It is the characteristic\nof that which is generated not always to be what it ought to be, and\nto need to acquire something. The intelligible Man is eternal; he is\ntherefore always complete; but that which becomes man must be generated\n(being).\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE DID NOT DELIBERATE BEFORE MAKING SENSE-MAN.\n\n3. But why could Intelligence not have deliberated before producing\nthe sense-man? The (man we know by our senses) was (created) by\nsimilitude to the (intelligible Man), nothing can be added to him,\nnothing subtracted. It is a mere supposition to say that Intelligence\ndeliberates and reasons. The theory that things were created, implies\npreliminary deliberation and reasoning; but (the latter becomes\nimpossible) in the case of eternal generation, for that which\noriginates eternally,[77] cannot be the object of a deliberation.\nIntelligence could not deliberate without having forgotten the course\nit had followed before; it cannot improve later on without implying\nthat its beginnings were not perfectly beautiful; had they been this,\nthey would have remained so. If things be beautiful, it is that they\nrepresent their cause well; for even here below an object is beautiful\nonly if it possess all its legitimate possessions; that is, if it\npossess its proper form. It is the form that contains everything;\nthe form contains the matter, in the sense that it fashions matter,\nand leaves nothing formless therein. But it would contain something\nformless if a man lacked some part, as, for instance, an organ such as\nthe eye.\n\n\nBEING CONTAINS ITS CAUSE.\n\nThus, a thing is fully explained by the clearing up of its cause. Why\nshould there be eyebrows above the eye? That it may possess all that\nis implied in its being. Were these parts of the body given to man to\nprotect him from dangers? That would be to establish within being a\nprinciple charged to watch over being. The things of which we speak\nare implied in the being that existed before them. Consequently, being\ncontains within itself the cause which, if distinct from being, is\nnevertheless inseparable therefrom. All things are implied in each\nother[100]; taken together, they form the total, perfect and universal\nBeing; their perfection is bound up with, and is inherent in their\ncause; thus a (creature's) \"being,\" its \"characteristic\" (to ti \u00ean\neinai), and its \"cause\" (why-ness) fall together. (Before asking an\nimportant question we must premiss that) in the intelligible world\nthe cause that is complementary to a being is ultimately united to\nit. We must also premiss that, by virtue of its perfection, divine\nIntelligence contains the causes (as well as the beings[78]), so\nthat it is only \"a posteriori\" that we observe that things are well\nregulated. If then the possession of senses, and indeed of particular\nones, be implied in the form of man by the eternal necessity and\nperfection of divine Intelligence, then the intelligible Man was by\nno means mere intelligence, receiving the senses when descending into\ngeneration. (If then having senses be implied in the form of man), does\nnot Intelligence incline towards the things here below? In what do\nthese senses (which are attributed to the intelligible Man) consist?\nAre these senses the potentiality of perceiving sense-objects? But it\nwould be absurd that, on high, man should from all eternity possess\nthe potentiality of feeling, yet feel only here below, and that this\npotentiality should pass to actualization only when the soul became\nless good (by its union to the body).\n\n\nSUCH QUESTIONS DEMAND SCRUTINY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE MAN.\n\n4. To answer these questions, we would have to go back to the nature\nof the intelligible Man. Before defining the latter, however, it\nwould indeed be far better to begin by determining the nature of the\nsense-man, on the supposition that we know the latter very well, while\nperhaps of the former, we have only a very inexact notion.\n\n\nDIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE MAN KNOWN BY THE SENSES AND THE INTELLIGIBLE MAN.\n\nBut there are some (Aristotelians or Peripatetics) who might think\nthat the intelligible Man and the sense-man form but one. Let us first\ndiscuss this point. Does the sense-man have a being different from the\nsoul which produces him, and makes him live and reason? Is he the soul\nthat is disposed in some special manner? Is he the soul that uses the\nbody in some particular way? If man be a reasonable living organism,\nand if the latter be composed of soul and body, this definition of man\nwill not be identical with that of the soul. If the man be defined as\nbeing the composite of the reasonable soul and the body, how can he be\nan immortal hypostatic existence? This definition suits the sense-man\nonly from the moment that the union of the soul and the body has\noccurred; it expresses what will be, instead of setting forth what we\ncall the Man-in-himself; rather than being a real determination of his\ncharacteristics, it would be only a description which would not reveal\nthe original being. Instead of defining form engaged in matter, it\nindicates what is the composite of soul and body, after the union has\noccurred. In this case, we do not yet know what is man considered in\nhis being, which is intelligible. To the claim that the definition of\nsense-things should express something composite, it might be answered,\nthat we do acknowledge that we must not determine the consistence of\neach thing. Now if it be absolutely necessary to define the forms\nengaged in matter, we must also define the being that constitutes the\nman; that is necessary especially for those (Peripateticians) who, by a\ndefinition, mean a statement of a being's original \"characteristics.\"\n\n\nMAN DEFINED AS A REASONABLE SOUL.\n\nWhat then is the \"being\" of man? This really is asking for the\n\"man-ness\" of a man, something characteristic of him, and inseparable\nfrom him. Is the genuine definition of a man that \"he is a reasonable\nanimal\"? Would not this rather be the definition of the composite\nman? What is the being that produces the reasonable animal? In the\nabove definition of man, \"reasonable animal\" means \"reasonable life\";\nconsequently, man may be called the \"reasonable life.\" But can life\nexist without a soul? (No), for the soul will give the man reasonable\nlife; and in this case, instead of being a substance, man will be\nonly an actualization of the soul; or even, the man will be the soul\nherself. But if man be the reasonable soul, what objection will there\nbe to his remaining man even when his soul should happen to pass into a\ndifferent body (as that of a brute animal)?\n\n\nMAN AS A SOUL SUBSISTING IN A SPECIAL REASON.\n\n5. Man must therefore have as \"reason\" (or, as essence), something else\nthan the soul. Still, in this case, man might be something composite;\nthat is, the soul would subsist in a particular \"reason,\" admitting\nthat this \"reason\" was a certain actualization of the soul, though this\nactualization could not exist without its producing principle. Now such\nis the nature of the \"seminal reasons.\" They do not exist without the\nsoul; for the generating reasons are not inanimate; and nevertheless\nthey are not the soul purely and simply. There is therefore nothing\nsurprising in the statement that these (human) beings are (\"seminal)\nreasons.\"\n\n\nTHESE REASONS ARE THE ACTUALIZATIONS OF THE SOUL WHICH BEGETS THE\nANIMAL.\n\nOf which soul are these reasons,[79] which do not beget the man\n(though they do beget the animal), then the actualization? Not of the\nvegetative soul; they are the actualizations of the (reasonable) soul\nwhich begets the animal,[80] which is a more powerful, and therefore\na more living soul. Man is constituted[81] by the soul disposed in\nsome manner, when present to matter disposed in some particular\nfashion--since the soul is some particular thing, according as she is\nin some particular disposition--even in the body. In the bodies, she\nfashions a resembling form. So far as the nature of the body allows\nit, she thus produces an image of the man, as the painter himself\nmakes an image of the body; she produces, I repeat, an inferior man\n(the sense-man, the animal), which possesses the form of man, his\nreasons, morals, dispositions, faculties, although in an imperfect\nmanner, because he is not the first man (the intellectual man). He has\nsensations of another kind; sensations which, though they seem clear,\nare obscure, if they be compared to the superior sensations of which\nthey are the images. The superior man (the reasonable man) is better,\nhas a diviner soul, and clearer sensations. It is he doubtless to whom\nPlato refers (when he says, Man is the soul[82]); in his definition he\nadds, \"which makes use of the body,\" because the diviner man dominates\nthe soul which uses the body, and thus uses the body only in an\nindirect manner.[83]\n\n\nNATURE OF THE COMBINATION BEGOTTEN BY THE SOUL.\n\nIn fact, the soul attaches herself to the thing begotten by the soul,\nbecause she was capable of feeling. The soul does this by vivifying it\nmore; or rather, the soul does not attach herself thereto, but draws it\nto herself. She does not depart from the intelligible world, but even\nwhile remaining in contact with it, she holds the inferior soul (which\nconstitutes the sense-man) suspended to herself; and by her reason she\nblends herself with this reason (or, she unites herself to this being\nby her \"being\"). That is why this man (known by the senses), who by\nhimself is obscure, is enlightened by this illumination.\n\n\nTHE THREE MEN IN EACH OF US.\n\n6. What is the relation of the sense-power within the superior\nSoul (or, in the rational soul)? Intelligible sensation perceives\n(intelligible) objects that, speaking strictly, are not sensible,\nand corresponds to the (intelligible) manner in which they are\nperceivable. Thus (by this intelligible sense-power) the Soul perceives\nthe supersensual harmony and also the sensual, but in a manner such\nas the sense-man perceives it, relating it so far as possible to the\nsuperior harmony,[99] just as he relates the earthly fire to the\nintelligible Fire, which is above, and which the superior Soul felt in\na manner suitable to the nature of this fire. If the bodies which are\nhere below were up there also, the superior Soul would feel them and\nperceive them. The man who exists on high is a Soul disposed in some\nparticular manner, capable of perceiving these objects; hence the man\nof the last degree (the sense-man) being the image of the intelligible\nMan, has reasons (faculties) which are also images (faculties possessed\nby the superior Man). The man who exists in the divine Intelligence\nconstitutes the Man superior to all men. He illuminates the second\n(the reasonable man), who in his turn illuminates the third (the\nsense-man). The man of this last degree somewhat possesses the two\nothers; he is not produced by them, he is rather united to them. The\nman who constitutes us actualizes himself as the man of the last\ndegree. The third receives something of the second; and the second is\nthe actualization of the first.[84] Each man's nature depends on the\n\"man\" according to whom he acts (the man is intellectual, reasonable,\nor sensual according as he exercises intelligence, discursive reason,\nor sensibility). Each one of us possesses the three men in one sense\n(potentially); and does not possess them in another (in actualization;\nthat is, he does not simultaneously exercise intellect, reason, or\nsense).\n\n\nFATE OF THESE THREE MEN, IN BRUTALIZATION AND IN DIVINIZATION.\n\nWhen the third life (the sense-power) which constitutes the third\nman, is separated from the body, if the life that precedes it (the\ndiscursive reason) accompany it without nevertheless being separated\nfrom the intelligible world, then one may say that the second is\neverywhere the third is. It might seem surprising that the latter, when\npassing into the body of a brute, should drag along that part which\nis the being of man. This being was all beings (potentially); only, at\ndifferent times, it acts through different faculties. So far as it is\npure, and is not yet depraved, it wishes to constitute a man, and it\nis indeed a man that it constitutes; for to form a man is better (than\nto form a brute), and it does what is best. It also forms guardians\nof the superior order, but such as are still conformable to the being\nconstituent of manhood. The (intellectual) Man, who is anterior to this\nbeing, is of a nature still more like that of the guardians, or rather,\nhe is already a divinity. The guardian attached to a divinity is an\nimage of him, as the sense-man is the image of the intellectual man\nfrom whom he depends; for the principle to which man directly attaches\nhimself must not be considered as his divinity. There is a difference\nhere, similar to that existing between the souls, though they all\nbelong to the same order.[86] Besides, those guardians whom Plato\nsimply calls \"guardians\" (demons), should be called guardian-like, or\n\"demonic\" beings.[87] Last, when the superior Soul accompanies the\ninferior soul which has chosen the condition of a brute, the inferior\nsoul which was bound to the superior soul--even when she constituted\na man--develops the (\"seminal) reason\" of the animal (whose condition\nshe has chosen); for she possesses that \"reason\" in herself; it is her\ninferior actualization.\n\n\nANIMAL SEMINAL REASONS MAY BE CONTRARY TO SOUL'S NATURE; THOUGH NOT TO\nTHE SOUL HERSELF.\n\n7. It may however be objected that if the soul produce the nature of a\nbrute only when she is depraved and degraded, she was not originally\ndestined to produce an ox or a horse; then the (\"seminal) reason\" of\nthe horse, as well as the horse itself, will be contrary to the nature\n(of the soul). No: they are inferior to her nature, but they are not\ncontrary to her. From her very origin, the soul was (potentially) the\n(\"seminal) reason\" of a horse or a dog. When permitted, the soul which\nwas to beget an animal, produces something better; when hindered, she\n(only) produces what accords with the circumstances. She resembles the\nartists who, knowing how to produce several figures, create either\nthe one they have received the order to create, or the one that is\nmost suited to the material at hand. What hinders the (natural and\ngenerative) power of the universal Soul, in her quality of universal\n(\"seminal) Reason,\" from sketching out the outlines of the body, before\nthe soul powers (or, individual souls) should descend from her into\nmatter? What hinders this sketch from being a kind of preliminary\nillumination of matter? What would hinder the individual soul from\nfinishing (fashioning the body sketched by the universal Soul),\nfollowing the lines already traced, and organizing the members pictured\nby them, and becoming that which she approached by giving herself some\nparticular figure, just as, in a choric ballet, the dancer confines\nhimself to the part assigned to him?\n\n\nTHE SENSE-WORLD AND THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD ARE CONNECTED BY THE\nMANIFOLD TRIPLE NATURE OF MAN.\n\nSuch considerations have been arrived at merely as result of\nscrutiny of the consequences of the principles laid down. Our\npurpose was to discover how sensibility occurs in the man himself,\nwithout intelligible things falling into generation. We recognized\nand demonstrated that intelligible things do not incline towards\nsense-things, but that, on the contrary, it is the latter that aspire\nand rise to the former, and imitate them; that the sense-man derives\nfrom the intellectual man the power of contemplating intelligible\nentities, though the sense-man remain united to sense-things, as the\nintellectual man remains united to the intelligible entities. Indeed,\nintelligible things are in some respects sensual; and we may call them\nsuch because (ideally) they are Bodies, but they are perceived in a\nmanner different from bodies. Likewise, our sensations are less clear\nthan the perception which occurs in the intelligible world, and that\nwe also call Sensation, because it refers to Bodies (which exist on\nhigh only in an ideal manner). Consequently, we call the man here below\nsensual because he perceives less well things which themselves are less\ngood; that is, which are only images of intelligible things. We might\ntherefore say that sensations here below are obscure thoughts, and that\nthe Thoughts on high are distinct Sensations. Such are our views about\nsensibility.\n\n\nINTELLIGIBLE ANIMALS DO NOT INCLINE TOWARDS THE SENSE-WORLD FOR THEY\nARE PRE-EXISTING, AND ARE DISTINCT FROM THEIR CREATING IMAGE.\n\n8. (Now let us pass to the other question we asked). How does it\nhappen that all the Animals who, like the Horse itself, are contained\nin divine Intelligence, do not incline towards the things here below\n(by generating them)? Doubtless, to beget a horse, or any other animal\nhere below, divine Intelligence must hold its conception; nevertheless\nit must not be believed that it first had the volition of producing\nthe horse, and only later its conception. Evidently, it could not have\nwished to produce the horse, but because it already had the conception\nthereof; and it could not have had the conception thereof but because\nit had to produce the horse. Consequently, the Horse who was not\nbegotten preceded the horse who later was to be begotten. Since the\nfirst Horse has been anterior to all generation, and was not conceived\nto be begotten, it is not because the divine Intelligence inclines\ntowards the things here below, nor because it produces them, that it\ncontains the intelligible Horse and the other beings. The intelligible\nentities existed already in Intelligence (before it begat) and the\nsense-things were later begotten by necessary consequence; for it was\nimpossible that the procession should cease with the intelligibles. Who\nindeed could have stopped this power of the (Intelligence) which is\ncapable of simultaneous procession, and of remaining within itself?\n\n\nIRRATIONAL ANIMALS MUST EXIST WITHIN INTELLIGENCE, UNLESS MAN ALONE WAS\nTO EXIST.\n\nBut why should these Animals (devoid of reason) exist in the divine\nIntelligence? We might understand that animals endowed with reason\nmight be found within it; but does this multitude of irrational animals\nseem at all admirable? Does it not rather seem something unworthy of\nthe divine Intelligence? Evidently the essence which is one must be\nalso manifold, since it is posterior to the Unity which is absolutely\nsimple; otherwise, instead of being inferior to it, it would fuse\nwith it. Being posterior to that Unity, it could not be more simple,\nand must therefore be less so. Now as the unity was the One who is\nexcellent, essence had to be less unitary, since multiplicity is the\ncharacteristic of inferiority. But why should essence not be merely\nthe \"pair\" (instead of the manifold)? Neither of the elements of the\nPair could any longer be absolutely one, and each would itself become a\nfurther pair; and we might point out the same thing of each of the new\nelements (in which each element of the primary Pair would have split\nup). Besides, the first Pair contains both movement and stability; it\nis also intelligence and perfect life. The character of Intelligence\nis not to be one, but to be universal; it therefore contains all the\nparticular intelligences; it is all the intelligences, and at the\nsame time it is something greater than all. It possesses life not as\na single soul, but as a universal Soul, having the superior power of\nproducing individual souls. It is besides the universal living Organism\n(or, Animal); consequently, it should not contain man alone (but also\nall the other kinds of animals); otherwise, man alone would exist upon\nthe earth.\n\n\nMANY ANIMALS ARE NOT SO IRRATIONAL AS DIFFERENT.\n\n9. It may be objected that Intelligence might (well) contain the\nideas of animals of a higher order. But how can it contain the ideas\nof animals that are vile, or entirely without reason? For we should\nconsider vile every animal devoid of reason and intelligence, since it\nis to these faculties that those who possess them owe their nobility.\nIt is doubtless difficult to understand how things devoid of reason\nand intelligence can exist in the divine Intelligence, in which are\nall beings, and from which they all proceed. But before beginning the\ndiscussion of this question, let us assume the following verities as\ngranted: Man here below is not what is man in the divine Intelligence,\nany more than the other animals. Like them, in a higher form, he dwells\nwithin (the divine Intelligence); besides, no being called reasonable\nmay be found within it, for it is only here below that reason is\nemployed; on high the only acts are those superior to discursive\nreason.[88]\n\nWhy then is man here below the only animal who makes use of reason?\nBecause the intelligence of Man, in the intelligible world, is\ndifferent from that of other animals, and so his reason here below must\ndiffer from their reason; for it can be seen that many actions of other\nanimals imply the use of judgment.\n\n(In reply, it might be asked) why are not all animals equally\nrational? And why are not all men also equally rational? Let us\nreflect: all these lives, which represent as many movements; all\nthese intelligences, which form a plurality; could not be identical.\nTherefore they had to differ among each other, and their difference\nhad to consist in manifesting more or less clearly life and\nintelligence; those that occupy the first rank are distinguished by\nprimary differences; those that occupy the second rank, by secondary\ndifferences; and so forth. Thus, amidst intelligences, some constitute\nthe divinities, others the beings placed in the second rank, and\ngifted with reason; further, other beings that we here call deprived\nof reason and intelligence really were reason and intelligence in the\nintelligible world. Indeed, he who thinks the intelligible Horse, for\ninstance, is Intelligence, just as is the very thought of the horse.\nIf nothing but thought existed, there would be nothing absurd in that\nthis thought, while being intellectual, might, as object, have a being\ndevoid of intelligence. But since thought and the object thought fuse,\nhow could thought be intellectual unless the object thought were so\nlikewise? To effect this, Intelligence would, so to speak, have to\nrender itself unintelligent. But it is not so. The thing thought is\na determinate intelligence, just as it is a determinate life. Now,\njust as no life, whatever it be, can be deprived of vitality, so no\ndeterminate intelligence can be deprived of intellectuality. The very\nintelligence which is proper to an animal, such as, for instance, man,\ndoes not cease being intelligence of all things; whichever of its\nparts you choose to consider, it is all things, only in a different\nmanner; while it is a single thing in actualization, it is all things\nin potentiality. However, in any one particular thing, we grasp only\nwhat it is in actualization. Now what is in actualization (that is, a\nparticular thing), occupies the last rank. Such, in Intelligence, for\ninstance, is the idea of the Horse. In its procession, Intelligence\ncontinues towards a less perfect life, and at a certain degree\nconstitutes a horse, and at some inferior degree, constitutes some\nanimal still inferior; for the greater the development of the powers of\nIntelligence, the more imperfect these become. At each degree in their\nprocession they lose something; and as it is a lower degree of essence\nthat constitutes some particular animal, its inferiority is redeemed\nby something new. Thus, in the measure that life is less complete in\nthe animal, appear nails, claws, or horns, or teeth. Everywhere that\nIntelligence diminishes on one side, it rises on another side by the\nfulness of its nature, and it finds in itself the resources by which to\ncompensate for whatever it may lack.\n\n\nAPPARENT IMPERFECTIONS ARE ONLY LOWER FORMS OF PERFECTION.\n\n10. But how can there be anything imperfect in the intelligible world?\nWhy does the intelligible Animal have horns? Is it for its defense?[89]\nTo be perfect and complete. It is to be perfect as an animal, perfect\nas intelligence, and perfect as life; so that, if it lack one quality,\nit may have a substitute. The cause of the differences, is that\nwhat belongs to one being finds itself replaced in another being by\nsomething else; so that the totality (of the beings) may result in the\nmost perfect Life, and Intelligence, while all the particular beings\nwhich are thus found in the intelligible essence are perfect so far as\nthey are particular.\n\n\nCO-EXISTENCE OF UNITY AND MULTIPLICITY DEMANDS ORGANIZATION IN SYSTEM.\n\nThe essence must be simultaneously one and manifold. Now it cannot be\nmanifold if all the things that exist within it be equal; it would\nthen be an absolute unity. Since therefore (essence) forms a composite\nunity, it must be constituted by things which bear to each other\nspecific differences, such that its unity shall allow the existence of\nparticular things, such as forms and reasons (beings). The forms, such\nas those of man, must contain all the differences that are essential\nto them. Though there be a unity in all these forms, there are also\nthings more or less delicate (or highly organized), such as the eye or\nthe finger. All these organs, however, are implied in the unity of the\nanimal, and they are inferior only relatively to the totality. It was\nbetter that things should be such. Reason (the essence of the animal)\nis animal, and besides, is something different from the animal. Virtue\nalso bears a general character, and an individual one. The totality (of\nthe intelligible world) is beautiful, because what is common (to all\nbeings), does not offer any differences.\n\n\nBUT HOW COULD THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD CONTAIN VEGETABLES OR METALS?\n\n11. (The Timaeus of Plato[90]) states that heaven has not scorned to\nreceive any of the forms of the animals, of which we see so great\na number. The cause must be that this universe was to contain the\nuniversality of things. Whence does it derive all the things it\ncontains? From on high? Yes, it received from above all the things that\nwere produced by reason, according to an intelligible form. But, just\nas it contains fire and water, it must also contain plant-life. Now,\nhow could there be plant-life in the intelligible world? Are earth and\nfire living entities within it? For they must be either living or dead\nentities; in the latter case, not everything would be alive in the\nintelligible world. In what state then do the above-mentioned objects\nfind themselves on high (in the intelligible world)?\n\nFirst it can be demonstrated that plants contain nothing opposed to\nreason; since, even here below, a plant contains a \"reason\" which\nconstitutes its life.[91] But if the essential \"reason\" of the plant,\nwhich constitutes it, is a life of a particular kind, and a kind of\nsoul, and if this \"reason\" itself be a unity, is it the primary Plant?\nNo: the primary Plant, from which the particular plant is derived, is\nabove that \"reason.\" The primary Plant is unity; the other is multiple,\nand necessarily derives from this unity. If so, the primary Plant must\npossess life in a still higher degree, and be the Plant itself from\nwhich the plants here below proceed, which occupy the second or third\nrank, and which derive from the primary Plant the traces of the life\nthey reveal.\n\n\nHOW THE EARTH EXISTS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE.\n\nBut how does the earth exist in the intelligible world? What is its\nessence? How can the earth in the intelligible world be alive there?\nLet us first examine our earth, that is, inquire what is its essence?\nIt must be some sort of a shape, and a reason; for the reason of the\nplant is alive, even here below. Is there then a living (\"seminal)\nreason\" in the earth also? To discover the nature of the earth,\nlet us take essentially terrestrial objects, which are begotten or\nfashioned by it. The birth of the stones, and their increase, the\ninterior formation of mountains, could not exist unless an animated\nreason produced them by an intimate and secret work. This reason is\nthe \"form of the earth,\"[92] a form that is analogous to what is\ncalled nature in trees. The earth might be compared to the trunk of a\ntree, and the stone that can be detached therefrom to the branch that\ncan be separated from the trunk. Consideration of the stone which is\nnot yet dug out of the earth, and which is united to it as the uncut\nbranch is united to the tree, shows that the earth's nature, which\nis a productive force, constitutes a life endowed with reason; and\nit must be evident that the intelligible earth must possess life at\na still higher degree, that the rational life of the earth is the\nEarth-in-itself, the primary Earth, from which proceeds the earth here\nbelow.\n\n\nTHE FIRE AS IT IS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.\n\nIf fire also be a reason engaged in matter, and in this respect\nresemble the earth, it was not born by chance. Whence would it\ncome?[93] Lucretius thought it came from rubbing (sticks or stones).\nBut fire existed in the universe before one body rubbed another;\nbodies already possess fire when they rub up against one another; for\nit must not be believed that matter possesses fire potentially, so\nthat it is capable of producing it spontaneously. But what is fire,\nsince the principle which produces the fire, giving it a form, must\nbe a \"reason\"? It is a soul capable of producing the fire, that is, a\n\"reason\" and a life, which (fuse) into one thing. That is why Plato\nsays that in every object there is a soul[94]; that is, a power capable\nof producing the sense-fire. Thus the principle which produces the fire\nin our world is a \"fiery life,\" a fire that is more real than ours.\nSince then the intelligible Fire is a fire more real than ours, it also\npossesses a moral life. The Fire-in-itself therefore possesses life.\nThere is a similar \"reason\" in the other elements, air and water. Why\nshould not these things be as animated as earth is? They are evidently\ncontained in the universal living Organism, and they constitute parts\nthereof. Doubtless life is not manifest in them, any more than in the\nearth; but it can be recognized in them, as it is recognized in the\nearth, by its productions; for living beings are born in the fire, and\nstill more in the water, as is better known; others also are formed\nin the air. The flames that we daily see lit and extinguished do not\nmanifest in the universal Soul (because of the shortness of their\nduration); her presence is not revealed in the fire, because she does\nnot here below succeed in reaching a mass of sufficient permanency.\n\n\nWATER AND AIR AS INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES.\n\nIt is not otherwise with water and air. If by their nature these\nelements were more consistent, they would reveal the universal Soul;\nbut as their essence is dispersed, they do not reveal the power that\nanimates them. In a similar case are the fluids occurring in our body,\nas, for instance, the blood; the flesh, which seems animated, is formed\nat the expense of the blood.[95] The latter must therefore enjoy the\npresence of the soul, though it seem deprived of the (soul) because\n(the blood) manifests no sensibility, opposes no resistance, and by its\nfluidity easily separates itself from the soul that vivifies it, as\nhappens to the three elements already mentioned. Likewise the animals\nwhich Nature forms out of condensed air feel without suffering.[96] As\nfixed and permanent light penetrates the air so long as the air itself\nis permanent, the soul also penetrates the atmosphere surrounding her\nwithout being absorbed by it. Other elements are in the same case.\n\n\nTHE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD IS A COMPLETE MODEL OF THIS OUR UNIVERSE.\n\n12. We therefore repeat that since we admit that our universe is\nmodeled on the intelligible World, we should so much the more recognize\nthat the latter is the universal living Organism, which constitutes\nall things because it consists of perfect essence. Consequently in the\nintelligible world, the heavens also are an animated being, not even\nlacking what here below are called the stars; indeed the latter are\nwhat constitutes the heavens' essence. Neither is the Earth on high\nsomething dead; for it is alive, containing all the Animals that walk\non the ground, and that are named terrestrial, as well as Vegetation\nwhose foundation is life. On high exist also the Sea and the Water in\nuniversal condition, in permanent fluidity and animation, containing\nall the Animals that dwell in the water. Air also forms part of the\nintelligible world, with the Animals that inhabit the air, and which on\nhigh possess a nature in harmony with it. How indeed could the things\ncontained in a living being not also themselves be living beings?\nConsequently they are also such here below. Why indeed should not all\nthe animals necessarily exist in the intelligible World? The nature of\nthe great parts of this world indeed necessarily determines the nature\nof the animals that these parts contain. Thus from the \"having\" and\n\"being\" (existence and nature) of the intelligible world is derived\nthat of all the beings contained therein. These things imply each\nother. To ask the reason for the existence of the Animals contained in\nthe intelligible world, is to ask why exists this very world itself,\nor the universal living Organism, or, what amounts to the same thing,\nwhy exist the universal Life, the universal Soul, in which are found no\nfault, no imperfection, and from which everywhere overflows the fulness\nof life.\n\n\nALL THINGS UNITED BY A COMMON SOURCE.\n\nAll these things derive from one and the same source; it is neither a\nbreath nor a single heat; but rather a single quality, which contains\nand preserves within itself all the qualities, the sweetness of the\nmost fragrant perfumes, the flavor of the wine, and of the finest tasty\njuices, the gleam of the most flashing colors, the softness of the\nobjects which flatter touch with the greatest delicacy, the rhythm and\nharmony of all the kinds of sounds which can charm the hearing.\n\n\nSIMPLICITY OF THE INTELLIGIBLE DOES NOT DENY COMPOSITENESS, BUT INFERS\nHEIGHT OF SOURCE.\n\n13. Neither Intelligence, nor the Soul that proceeds therefrom, are\nsimple; both contain the universality of things with their infinite\nvariety, so far as these are simple, meaning that they are not\ncomposite, but that they are principles and actualizations; for, in\nthe intelligible world, the actualization of what occupies the last\nrank is simple; the actualization of what occupies the first rank is\nuniversal. Intelligence, in its uniform movement, always trends towards\nsimilar and identical things; nevertheless, each of them is identical\nand single, without being a part; it is on the contrary universal,\nbecause what, in the intelligible world, is a part, is not a simple\nunit, but a unity that is infinitely divisible. In this movement,\nIntelligence starts from one object, and goes to another object which\nis its goal. But does all that is intermediary resemble a straight\nline, or to a uniform and homogeneous body? There would be nothing\nremarkable about that; for if Intelligence did not contain differences,\nif no diversity awoke it to life, it would not be an actualization; its\nstate would not differ from inactivity. If its movement were determined\nin a single manner, it would possess but a single kind of (restricted)\nlife, instead of possessing the universal Life. Now it should contain\nan universal and omnipresent Life; consequently, it must move, or\nrather have been moved towards all (beings). If it were to move in a\nsimple and uniform manner, it would possess but a single thing, would\nbe identical with it, and no longer proceed towards anything different.\nIf however it should move towards something different, it would have\nto become something different, and be two things. If these two things\nwere then to be identical, Intelligence would still remain one, and\nthere would be no progress left; if, on the contrary, these two things\nwere to be different, it would be proceeding with this difference, and\nit would, by virtue of this difference joined to its divinity, beget\nsome third thing. By its origin, the latter is simultaneously identical\nand different; not of some particular difference, but of all kinds\nof difference, because the identity it contains is itself universal.\nThus being universal difference as well as universal identity, this\nthing possesses all that is said to be different; for its nature\nis to be universal differentiation (to spread over everything, to\nbecome everything else). If all these differences preceded this\n(Intelligence), the latter would be modified by them. If this be not\nthe case, Intelligence must have begotten all the differences, or\nrather, be their universality.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE EVOLVES OVER THE FIELD OF TRUTH.\n\nEssences (\"beings\") therefore cannot exist without an actualization\nof Intelligence. By this actualization, after having produced some\n(\"being\"), Intelligence always produces some other one, somehow\ncarrying out the career which it is natural for veritable Intelligence\nto carry out within itself; this career is that of the beings, of\nwhich each corresponds to one of its evolutions, (or, it roams around\namong beings, so that through its roaming around these beings unite\nand form.) Since Intelligence is everywhere identical, its evolutions\nimply permanence, and they make it move around the \"field of truth\"[97]\nwithout ever issuing therefrom. It occupies this whole field, because\nIntelligence has made itself the locality where its evolutions\noperate, a locality which is identical with what it contains. This\nfield is varied enough to offer a career to be fulfilled; if it were\nnot universally and eternally varied, there would be a stopping-place\nwhere variety would cease; and, were Intelligence to stop, it would\nnot think; and if it had never stopped, it would have existed without\nthought (or, it would not exist). This however, is not the case;\ntherefore thought exists, and its universal movement produces the\nfulness of universal \"Being.\" Universal \"Being,\" however, is the\nthought that embraces universal Life, and which, after each thing, ever\nconceives some other; because, since that which within it is identical\nis all so different. It continually divides and ever finds something\ndifferent from the others. In its march, Intelligence ever progresses\nfrom life to life, from animated (beings) to animated (beings); just\nas some traveller, advancing on the earth, finds all that he travels\nthrough to be earth, whatever variations thereof there may have been.\nIn the intelligible world, the life whose field one traverses is always\nself-identical, but it is also always different. The result is that\n(this sphere of operations) does not seem the same to us, because in\nits evolution, which is identical, life experiences (or, traverses)\nthings which are not the same. That however does not change this life,\nfor it passes through different things in a uniform and identical\nmanner. If this uniformity and identity of Intelligence were not\napplied to different things, Intelligence would remain idle; it would\nno longer exist in actualization, and no more be actualization. Now\nthese different things constitute Intelligence itself. Intelligence is\ntherefore universal, because this universality forms its very nature.\nBeing thus universal, Intelligence is all things; there is nothing in\nit which does not contribute to its universality; and everything is\ndifferent, so as to be able still to contribute to totality, by its\nvery difference. If there were no difference, if everything in it were\nidentical, the being of Intelligence would be diminished, inasmuch as\nits nature would no more co-operate towards its harmonic consummation.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE CONTAINS THE INFINITE AS SIMULTANEOUSNESS OF ONE AND MANY\nAND AS FRIENDSHIP.\n\n14. By intellectual examples we can understand the nature of\nIntelligence, and see that it could not be a unity which does not admit\nany kind of difference. As example, consider the (\"seminal) reason\" of\na plant, and that of an animal. If it be only a unity, without any kind\nof variety, it is not even a \"reason,\" and what is born will be no more\nthan matter. This \"reason\" must therefore contain all the organs; and,\nwhile embracing all matter, it must not leave any part of it to remain\nidentical with any other. For instance, the face does not form a single\nmass; it contains the nose and the eyes. Nor is even the nose something\nsimple; it contains different parts whose variety make of it an organ;\nif it were reduced to a state of absolute simplicity, it would be no\nmore than a mass. Thus Intelligence contains the infinite, because\nit is simultaneously one and manifold; not indeed like a house, but\nas is a (\"seminal) reason\" which is manifold interiorly. It contains\nwithin, therefore, a sort of figure (or scheme) or even a picture, on\nwhich are interiorly drawn or inscribed its powers and thoughts; their\ndivision does not take place exteriorly, for it is entirely interior.\nThus the universal living Organism embraces other living beings,\nwithin which may be discovered still smaller living beings, and still\nsmaller powers, and so on till we arrive at the \"atomic form.\"[98]\nAll these forms are distinguished from each other by their division,\nwithout ever having been confounded together, though they all occur in\nthe constitution of a single unity. Thus exists in the intelligible\nworld that union (by Empedocles) called \"friendship\"; but such union\nis very different from that which exists in the sense-world.[163] In\nfact, the latter is only the image of the first, because it is formed\nof completely disparate elements. Veritable union however consists\nin forming but a single (thing) without admitting of any separation\nbetween (elements). Here below, however, objects are separated from\neach other.\n\n\nB. A STUDY OF THE GOOD.\n\n\nALL SOULS ARE UNITED BY THEIR HIGHEST, WITH INTELLIGENCE SHINING DOWN\nFROM THE PEAK THEY FORM.\n\n15. Who then will be able to contemplate this multiple and universal\nLife, primary and one, without being charmed therewith, and without\nscorning every other kind of life? For our lives here below, that\nare so weak, impotent, incomplete, whose impurity soils other lives,\ncan be considered as nothing but tenebrous. As soon as you consider\nthese lives, you no longer see the others, you no longer live with\nthese other lives in which everything is living; which are relieved\nof all impurity, and of all contact with evil. Indeed, evil reigns\nhere below only[164]; here where we have but a trace of Intelligence\nand of the intelligible life. On the contrary, in the intelligible\nworld exists \"that archetype which is beneficent (which possesses the\nform of Good\"), as says Plato,[101] because it possesses good by the\nforms (that is, by the ideas). Indeed, the absolute Good is something\ndifferent from the Intelligence which is good only because its life\nis passed in contemplating the Good. The objects contemplated by\nIntelligence are the essences which have the form of Good, and which\nit possesses from the moment it contemplates the Good. Intelligence\nreceives the Good, not such as the Good is in itself, but such as\nIntelligence is capable of receiving it. The Good is indeed the\nsupreme principle. From the Good therefore, Intelligence derives its\nperfection; to the Good Intelligence owes its begetting of all the\nintelligible entities; on the one hand, Intelligence could not consider\nthe Good without thinking it; on the other, it must not have seen in\nthe Good the intelligible entities, otherwise, Intelligence itself\ncould not have begotten them. Thus Intelligence has, from the Good,\nreceived the power to beget, and to fill itself with that which it has\nbegotten.[102] The Good does not Himself possess the things which He\nthus donates; for He is absolutely one, and that which has been given\nto Intelligence is manifold. Incapable in its plenitude to embrace, and\nin its unity to possess the power it was receiving, Intelligence split\nit up, thus rendering it manifold, so as to possess it at least in\nfragments. Thus everything begotten by Intelligence proceeds from the\npower derived from the Good, and bears its form; as intelligence itself\nis good, and as it is composed of things that bear the form of Good, it\nis a varied good. The reader may be assisted in forming a conception of\nit by imagining a variegated living sphere, or a composite of animated\nand brilliant faces. Or again, imagine pure souls, pure and complete\n(in their essence), all united by their highest (faculties), and then\nuniversal Intelligence seated on this summit, and illuminating the\nwhole intelligible region. In this simile, the reader who imagines\nit considers it as something outside of himself; but (to contemplate\nIntelligence) one has to become Intelligence, and then give oneself a\npanorama of oneself.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE CONTAINS ALL THINGS THAT ARE CONFORMED TO THE GOOD.\n\n16. Instead of stopping at this multiple beauty, it must be abandoned\nto rise (to the Good), the supreme principle. By reasoning not\naccording to the nature of our world, but according to that of the\nuniversal Intelligence, we should with astonishment ask ourselves\nwhich is the principle that has begotten it, and how it did so.[103]\nEach one (of the essences contained in the Intelligence) is a\n(particular) form, and somehow has its own type. As their common\ncharacteristic is to be assimilated to the Good, the consequence is\nthat Intelligence contains all the things conformable to the Good. It\npossesses therefore the essence which is in all things; it contains all\nthe animals, as well as the universal Life within them, and all the\nrest.\n\n\nTHE GOOD IS NOT ONLY THE CAUSE OF BEING, BUT ITS INTUITION AS WELL.\n\nWhy must these things be considered as goods, when considered from\nthis point of view? The solution of this problem may be arrived at\nfrom the following consideration. When for the first time Intelligence\ncontemplated the Good, this its contemplation split the Good's unity\ninto multiplicity. Though itself were a single being, this its thought\ndivided the unity because of its inability to grasp it in its entirety.\nTo this it may be answered that Intelligence was not yet such the first\ntime it contemplated the Good. Did it then contemplate the Good without\nintelligence? Intelligence did not yet see the Good; but Intelligence\ndwelt near it, was dependent on it, and was turned towards it.[104]\nHaving arrived at its fulness, because it was operating on high, and\nwas trending towards the Good, the movement of Intelligence itself led\nit to its fulness; since then it was, no longer a single movement, but\na movement perfect and complete. It became all things, and possessing\nself-consciousness, it recognized that itself was all things. It thus\nbecame intelligence, which possesses its fulness so as to contain what\nit should see, and which sees by the light that it receives from Him\nfrom whom it derives what it sees. That is why the Good is said to be\nnot only the cause of \"being,\" but rather the cause of the vision of\n\"being.\" As for sense-objects, the sun is the cause that makes them\nexist, and renders them visible, as it is also the cause of vision,\nand as however the sun is neither the vision nor the visible objects,\nlikewise the Good is the cause of being and of intelligence,[105] it\nis a light in respect of the beings that are seen and the Intelligence\nthat sees them; but it is neither the beings nor the Intelligence; it\nis only their cause; it produces thought by shedding its light on the\nbeings and on Intelligence. It is thus that Intelligence has arrived\nto fulness, and that on arriving at fulness it has become perfect and\nhas seen. That which preceded its fulness is its principle. But it has\nanother principle (which is the Good), which is somewhat exterior to\nit, and which gave it its fulness, and while giving it this fulness\nimpressed on it the form (of itself, the Good).\n\n\nALL IS INTELLIGENCE; BUT THIS IS DIFFERENTIATED INTO UNIVERSAL AND\nINDIVIDUAL.\n\n17. How can (these beings) exist within Intelligence, and constitute\nit, if they were neither in that which has given, nor in that which\nhas received this fulness, since, before receiving its fulness from\nthe Good, Intelligence had not yet received (these beings)? It is\nnot necessary that a principle should itself possess what it gives;\nin intelligible things, it suffices to consider the giver superior,\nand the receiver inferior; that (giving and receiving) is the content\nof generation in the order of veritable beings.[106] What occupies\nthe front rank must be in actualization; posterior things must be\nin potentiality of what precedes them. What occupies the front rank\nis superior to what occupies the second rank; the giver, likewise\nis superior to the gift, because it is better. If then there be a\nPrinciple anterior to actualization, it must be superior both to\nactualization and to life; and because it gave life to Intelligence it\nis more beautiful, still more venerable than Life. Thus Intelligence\nreceived life, without necessity for the principle from which it\nreceived life having had to contain any variety. Life is the impress\nof Him who gave it, but it is not his life. When Intelligence\nglanced towards Him, it was indeterminate; as soon as it fixed its\nglance on Him, it was determined by Him, although He himself had no\ndetermination. As soon indeed as Intelligence contemplated the One,\nIntelligence was determined by Him, and from Him it received its\ndetermination, limit and form. The form exists in the receiver; the\ngiver has none of it. This determination has not been imposed from\nwithout on Intelligence as is the case for the limit imposed on some\nmagnitude; it is the determination characteristic of that Life, which\nis universal, multiple and infinite, because it has radiated from\nthe supreme Nature. That Life was not yet the life of any particular\nprinciple; otherwise, it would have been determined as an individual\nlife. Nevertheless it has been determined, and by virtue of that\ndetermination it is the life of a multiple unity. Each one of the\nthings that constitute its multiplicity has likewise been determined.\nIndeed, life has been determined as multiplicity (of beings) because of\nits own multiplicity; as unity, because of the very determination it\nhas received. What has been determined as unity? Intelligence, because\nit is the determined life. What was determined as multiplicity? The\nmultiplicity of intelligences. Everything therefore is intelligence;\nonly, the Intelligence that is one is universal; while the\nintelligences which form multiplicity are individual.\n\n\nMULTIPLICITY OF INTELLIGENCES IMPLIES THEIR MUTUAL DIFFERENCES.\n\nIf universal Intelligence comprises all the individual intelligences,\nmight not the latter all be identical? No, for then there would be but\none of them. The multiplicity of the intelligences implies therefore a\ndifference between them.[107] But how does each differ from the others?\nIts difference resides in its being one; for there is no identity\nbetween the universal Intelligence, and any particular intelligence.\nThus, in Intelligence, life is universal power; the vision which\nemanates from it is the power of all things; and then Intelligence\nitself, when it is formed, manifests all these things to us. He who\nis seated above all of them is their principle, though they do not\nserve Him as foundation; for, on the contrary, He is the foundation\nof the form of the first forms, without Himself having any forms. In\nrespect to the Soul, Intelligence plays the part that the First plays\nin respect to Intelligence; Intelligence sheds its light on the Soul,\nand, to determine her, rationalizes her by communicating that of which\nitself is the trace. The Intellect, therefore, is the trace of the\nFirst; and while it is a form which develops in plurality, the First\nhas no shape nor form, so as to give form to all the rest. If itself\nwere a form, Intelligence would be nothing more than the \"reason\"\n(the soul).[108] That is why the First could not have contained any\nmultiplicity; otherwise, its multiplicity itself would have had to be\ntraced to some superior principle.\n\n\nLIFE, INTELLIGENCE, AND IDEA BEAR THE FORM OF THE GOOD.\n\n18. In what respects do the (entities) which are contained by\nIntelligence seem to bear the form of the Good? Is it because each of\nthem is a form, or because each is beautiful, or perhaps for some other\nreason? All that proceeds from the Good bears its characteristics or\nimpressions, or at least bears something derived from it, just as that\nwhich is derived from the fire bears a trace of the fire,[109] and as\nthat which is derived from sweetness somehow betrays it. Now that,\nwhich, in Intelligence, is derived from the Good is life, for life is\nborn from the actualization of the Good, and from Him again is derived\nthe beauty of forms. Therefore all these things, life, intelligence,\nand idea will bear the form of Good.\n\n\nTHIS FORM OF THE GOOD MAY, HOWEVER, EXIST AT VARYING DEGREES.\n\nBut what element is common to them? It does not suffice for them to\nproceed from the Good to have something identical; they must also have\nsome common characteristic; for a same principle may give rise to\ndifferent things; or again, one and the same thing may become different\nwhile passing from the giving principle into the receivers; for there\nis a difference between that which constitutes the first actualization,\nand that which is given thereby. Thus, that which is in the things of\nwhich we speak is already different. Nothing hinders the characteristic\nof all these things (in life, intelligence and idea) from being the\nform of Good, but this form exists at different degrees in each of them.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE AND LIFE ARE ONLY DIFFERENT DEGREES OF THE SAME REALITY.\n\nIn which of these things does the form of the Good inhere in the\nhighest degree? The solution of this problem depends on the following\none. Is life a good merely as such, even if it were life pure and\nsimple? Should we not rather limit that word \"life\" to the life which\nderives from the Good, so that mere proceeding from the Good be a\nsufficient characterization of life? What is the nature of this life?\nIs it the life of the Good? No: life does not belong to the Good; it\nonly proceeds therefrom. If the characteristic of life be proceeding\nfrom the Good, and if it be real life, evidently the result would be\nthat nothing that proceeds from the Good would deserve scorn, that\nlife as life should be considered good, that the same condition of\naffairs obtains with the primary and veritable Intelligence, and that\nfinally each form is good and bears the form of Good. In this case,\neach of these (life, intelligence and idea) possess a good which is\neither common, or different, or which is of a different degree. Since\nwe have admitted that each of the above-mentioned things contains a\ngood in its being, then it is good chiefly because of this good. Thus\nlife is a good, not in so far as it is merely life, but in so far as\nit is real life and proceeds from the Good. Intelligence likewise is\na good so far as it essentially is intelligence; there is therefore\nsome common element in life and intelligence. Indeed, when one and the\nsame attribute is predicated of different beings, although it form\nan integral part of their being, it may be abstracted therefrom by\nthought; thus from \"man\" and \"horse\" may be abstracted \"animal\"; from\n\"water\" and \"fire,\" \"heat\"; but what is common in these beings is a\ngenus, while what is common in intelligence and life, is one and the\nsame thing which inheres in one in the first degree, and in the other\nin the second.\n\n\nIS THE WORD GOOD A COMMON LABEL OR A COMMON QUALITY?\n\nIs it by a mere play on words that life, intelligence and ideas are\ncalled good? Does the good constitute their being, or is each good\ntaken in its totality? Good could not constitute the being of each\nof them. Are they then parts of the Good? The Good, however, is\nindivisible. The things that are beneath it are good for different\nreasons. The primary actualization (that proceeds from the Good) is\ngood; likewise, the determination it receives is good, and the totality\nof both things is good. The actualization is good because it proceeds\nfrom the Good; the determination, because it is a perfection that\nhas emanated from the Good; and the combination of actualization and\ndetermination because it is their totality. All these things thus are\nderived from one and the same principle, but nevertheless they are\ndifferent. Thus (in a choric ballet) the voice and the step proceed\nfrom one and the same person, in that they are all perfectly regulated.\nNow they are well regulated because they contain order and rhythm.\nWhat then is the content in the above-mentioned things that would make\nthem good? But perhaps it may be objected that if the voice and step\nare well regulated, each one of them entirely owes it to some external\nprinciple, since the order is here applied to the things that differ\nfrom each other. On the contrary, the things of which we speak are each\nof them good in itself. And why are they good? It does not suffice to\nsay that they are good because they proceed from the Good. Doubtless we\nshall have to grant that they are precious from the moment that they\nproceed from the Good, but reason demands that we shall determine that\nof which their goodness consists.\n\n\nGOOD CANNOT BE A DESIRE OF THE SOUL.\n\n19. Shall the decision of what is good be entrusted to the desire\nof the soul?[110] If we are to trust this affection of the soul, we\nshall be declaring that whatever is desirable for her is good; but\nwe would not be seeking why the Good is desired. Thus, while we use\ndemonstrations to explain the nature of every entity, we would be\ntrusting to desire for the determination of the Good. Such a proceeding\nwould land us in several absurdities. First, the Good would only be an\nattribute. Then, since our soul has several desires, and each of the\nlatter has different objects, we would not be able to decide which\nof these objects would be the best, according to desire. It would be\nimpossible to decide what would be better before we know what is good.\n\n\nNO NEED TO SEEK THE CAUSE OF GOOD AS IN THE INTELLIGIBLE THE CAUSE\nCOINCIDES WITH THE NATURE.\n\nShall we then define the good as the virtue characteristic of each\nbeing (as say the Stoics)? In this case, by strictly following (the\ncourse of dialectics) we would reduce the Good to being a form and a\nreason. But, having arrived there, what should we answer if we were\nasked on what grounds these things themselves are good? In imperfect\nthings, it seems easy to distinguish the good, even though it be not\npure; but in intelligible things we may not immediately succeed in\ndiscovering the Good by comparison with the inferior things. As there\nis no evil on high (in the intelligible world), and as excellent\nthings exist in themselves, we find ourselves embarrassed. Perhaps we\nare embarrassed only because we seek the cause (\"whyness\") (of the\ngood), whereas the cause (\"whyness\") is here identical with the nature\n(\"whatness\"), as intelligible entities are good in themselves. Nor\nwould we have solved the problem if we were to assign some other cause\n(of the Good), such as the divinity, to which our reason has not yet\nforced us to repair. However, we cannot retire, and we must seek to\narrive by some other road to something satisfactory.\n\n\nPYTHAGOREAN OPPOSITIONS ARE ALSO WORTHLESS AS EXPLANATIONS OF GOOD.\n\n20. Since therefore we have given up desires as forms in the\ndetermination of the nature and quality (of the good), shall we have\nrecourse to other rules, such as, for instance (the Pythagorean[104])\n\"oppositions,\" such as order and disorder, proportion and\ndisproportion, health and sickness, form and formlessness, being and\ndestruction, consistence and its lack? Who indeed would hesitate to\nattribute to the form of good those characteristics which constitute\nthe first member of each of these opposition-pairs? If so, the\nefficient causes of these characteristics will also have to be traced\nto the good; for virtue, life, intelligence and wisdom are comprised\nwithin the form of good, as being things desired by the soul that is\nwise.\n\n\nGOOD NOT DEFINED BY INTELLIGENCE, AS THE SOUL HAS OTHER ASPIRATIONS.\n\nIt will further be suggested (by followers of Aristotle) that we\nstop at Intelligence, predicating goodness of it. For life and soul\nare images of Intelligence. It is to Intelligence that the soul\naspires, it is according to Intelligence that the soul judges, it is\non Intelligence that the soul regulates herself, when she pronounces\nthat justice is better than injustice, in preferring every kind of\nvirtue to every kind of vice, and in holding in high estimation what\nshe considers preferable. Unfortunately, the soul does not aspire\nto Intelligence exclusively. As might be demonstrated in a long\ndiscussion, Intelligence is not the supreme goal to which we aspire,\nand not everything aspires to Intelligence, whilst everything aspires\nto the Good. The (beings) which do not possess intelligence do not\nall seek to possess it, while those who do possess it, do not limit\nthemselves to it. Intelligence is sought only as the result of a train\nof reasoning, whilst Good is desired even before reason comes into\nplay. If the object of desire be to live, to exist always, and to be\nactive, this object is not desired because of Intelligence, but because\nof its being good, inasmuch as the Good is its principle and its goal.\nIt is only in this respect that life is desirable.\n\n\nTHE GOOD IS INTELLIGENCE AND PRIMARY LIFE.\n\n21. What then is the one and only cause to whose presence is due the\ngoodness (of life, intelligence and idea)? Let us not hesitate to say:\nIntelligence and primary Life bear the form of Good; it is on this\naccount alone that they are desirable; they bear the form of Good in\nthis respect, that the primary Life is the actualization of the Good,\nor rather the actualization that proceeds from the Good, and that\nintelligence is determination of this actualization. (Intelligence and\nprimary Life) are fascinating, and the soul seeks them because they\nproceed from the Good; nevertheless the soul aspires to them (only)\nbecause they fit her, and not because they are good in themselves. On\nthe other hand, the soul could not disdain them because they bear the\nform of good; though[112] we can disdain something even though it be\nsuitable to us, if it be not a good besides.[112] It is true that we\npermit ourselves to be allured by distant and inferior objects, and\nmay even feel for them a passionate love; but that occurs only when\nthey have something more than their natural condition, and when some\nperfection descends on them from on high. Just as the bodies, while\ncontaining a light mingled with their (substance), nevertheless need\nillumination by some other light to bring out their colors,[113] so the\nintelligible entities, in spite of the light that they contain, need to\nreceive some other more powerful light, so as to become visible, both\nfor themselves, and for others.\n\n\nGOOD CONSISTS IN ILLUMINATION BY THE EXTREME.\n\n22. When the soul perceives the light thus shed by the Good on\nthe intelligible entities, she flies towards them, tasting an\nindescribable bliss in the contemplation of the light that illuminates\nthem. Likewise here below, we do not like the bodies for themselves,\nbut for the beauty that shimmers in them.[114] Each intelligible entity\nowes its nature to none but to itself; but it only becomes desirable\nwhen the Good, so to speak, illuminates and colors it, breathing\ngrace into the desired object, and inspiring love into the desiring\nheart. As soon as the soul reacts to the influence of the Good, she\nfeels emotion, swells with fancy, is stung by desire, and love is born\nwithin her.[115] Before reacting to the influence of good she feels no\ntransports when facing the beauty of Intelligence; for this beauty is\ndead so long as it is not irradiated by the Good. Consequently the soul\nstill remains depressed and bowed down, cold and torpid, in front of\nIntelligence. But as soon as she feels the gentle warmth of the Good,\nshe is refreshed, she awakes, and spreads her wings; and instead of\nstopping to admire the Intelligence in front of her, she rises by the\naid of reminiscence to a still higher principle (the First). So long as\nthere is anything superior to what she possesses, she rises, allured\nby her natural leaning for the Inspirer of love; so she passes through\nthe region of Intelligence, and stops at the Good because there is\nnothing beyond. So long as she contemplates Intelligence, she surely\nenjoys a noble and magnificent spectacle, but she does not yet fully\npossess the object of her search. Such would be a human countenance,\nwhich, in spite of its beauty, is not attractive, for lack of the\ncharm of grace. Beauty is, indeed, rather the splendor that enhalos\nproportion, than proportion itself; and it is properly this splendor\nwhich challenges love. Why indeed does beauty shine radiantly on the\nface of a living person, and yet leave hardly a trace after death,\neven when the complexion and features are not yet marred? Why, among\ndifferent statues, do the most life-like ones seem more beautiful than\nothers that may be better proportioned? Why is a living being, though\nugly, more beautiful than a pictured one, even though the latter were\nthe most handsome imaginable? The secret is that the living form seems\nto us most desirable, because it possesses a living soul, because it is\nmost assimilated to the Good; because the soul is colored by the light\nof the Good, and because, enlightened by the Good she is more wakeful\nand lighter, and because in her turn she lightens the burdens, awakes,\nand causes participation of the Good, so far as she may be able, in the\nbody within which she resides.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME IS THE GOOD BECAUSE OF HIS SUPREMACY.\n\n23. Since it is this Principle which the soul pursues, which\nilluminates Intelligence, and whose least trace arouses in us so great\nan emotion, there is no ground for astonishment if it possess the power\nof exerting its fascination on all beings, and if all rest in Him\nwithout seeking anything beyond. If indeed everything proceeds from\nthis principle, then there is nothing better, and everything else is\nbelow Him. Now, how could the best of beings fail to be the Good? If\nthe Good be entirely self-sufficient, and have need of nothing else,\nwhat could it be except the One who was what He is before all other\nthings, when evil did not yet exist? If all evils be posterior to\nHim, if they exist only in the objects that in no way participate in\nthe Good, and which occupy the last rank, if no evil exist among the\nintelligibles, and if there be nothing worse than evil (just as there\nis nothing better than the Good), then evils are in complete opposition\nto this principle, and it could be nothing else. To deny the existence\nof the Good, we would also have to deny the existence of evil; and\nthe result would be a complete indifference of choice between any two\nparticular things; which is absurd. All other things called good refer\nto Him, while He refers to nothing else.\n\n\nTHE GOOD AS CREATOR AND PRESERVER.\n\nBut if this be the nature of the Good, what does He do? He made\nIntelligence, and life. By the intermediation of Intelligence, He made\nthe souls and all the other beings that participate in Intelligence,\nin Reason, or in Life. Moreover, who could express the goodness of Him\nwho is their source and principle? But what is He doing at the present\ntime? He preserves what He has begotten, He inspires the thought in\nthose who think, He vivifies the living, by His spirit,[116] He imparts\nto all (beings) intelligence and life, and to those who are unable to\nreceive life, at least existence.\n\n\nMANY FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE GOOD; FOR THE INDIVIDUAL IT IS\nILLUMINATION.\n\n24. And what is He doing for us? To answer this question, we would\nstill have to explain the light by which Intelligence is illuminated,\nand in which the Soul participates. But we shall have to postpone this\ndiscussion, and mention various other questions which may be asked.\nIs the Good goodness, and does it receive this name because it is\ndesirable for some being? Is that which is desirable for some being the\ngood of this being, and do we call the Good that which is desirable\nfor all beings? Is being desirable not rather a simple characteristic\nof the Good, and must not that which is desirable have a nature such\nthat it would deserve the name of Good?[117] Besides, do the beings\nthat desire the Good desire it because they receive from it something,\nor merely because possession thereof causes bliss? If they do receive\nsomething from it, what does it consist of? If the possession of the\nGood give them joy, why should their joy come from possession of the\nGood, rather than from possession of anything else? ls the Good such\nby what is characteristic of it, or by something else? Is the Good an\nattribute of some other being, or is the Good good for itself? Must not\nthe Good rather be good for others, without being good for itself? For\nwhom anyway is the Good good? For there is a certain nature (matter)\nfor which nothing is good.\n\n\nATTRIBUTING GOOD TO LIFE IS ONLY THE RESULT OF FEAR OF DEATH.\n\nNor can we ignore an objection raised by an opponent who is difficult\nto convince (Plato's Philebus): \"Well, my friends, what then is this\nentity that you celebrate in such pompous terms, ceaselessly repeating\nthat life and intelligence are goods, although you said that the\nGood is above them? What sort of a good might the Intellect be? What\nsort of a good should (a man) have, who thinks the Ideas themselves,\ncontemplating everything in itself? Perhaps, indeed, a man, when he\nenjoys these (Ideas and contemplations), might be deceived into calling\nthem a good merely because he happened to be in pleasant circumstances;\nbut should these circumstances become unpleasant, on what grounds would\nhe call them a good? Merely because they (possess) existence? But what\npleasure or benefit could this afford him? If he did not consider\nself-love as the foundation thereof, what difference could there be\nfor him between existence and non-existence? It is therefore to this\nnatural physical error (of self-love), and to the fear of death, that\nwe must trace the cause of the ascription of good to intelligence and\nlife.\"[118]\n\n\nPLATO'S ANSWER TO PHILEBUS: THERE ARE TWO GOODS, THE HUMAN AND THE\nUNIVERSAL.\n\n25. Plato therefore mingled the Good with pleasure, and did not\nposit the Good exclusively in Intelligence, as he wrote in the\nPhilebus.[119] Appreciating this difficulty, he very rightly decided\non one hand that good did not consist in pleasure alone, and on the\nother, that it did not consist in intelligence alone, inasmuch as he\nfailed to discover in it anything to arouse our desire. Perhaps Plato\nhad still another motive (in calling the Good a mixture), because he\nthought that, with such a nature, the Good is necessarily full of\ncharm, desirable both for the seeker and the finder; whence it would\nresult that he who is not charmed has not found the Good, and that,\nif he who desires be not happy, he evidently does not yet possess the\nGood. It is not without a reason (that Plato formed this conception of\nthe Good); for he was not seeking to determine the universal Good, but\nthe good of man; and as such human good refers to (man, who is) a being\ndifferent from the absolute Good, then it becomes for him something\ndifferent from the Good in itself; and would therefore be defective and\ncomposite. That is why (according to Plato), that which is alone and\nsingle has no good, but is good in another and a higher sense.\n\n\nTHE ARISTOTELIAN SUPREME GOOD.[120]\n\nThe good must then be desirable; but it is good not because it is\ndesirable, but it is desirable because it is good.[121] Thus in the\norder of beings, rising from the last to the First, it will be found\nthat the good of each of them is in the one immediately preceding,\nso long as this ascending scale remain proportionate and increasing.\nThen we will stop at Him who occupies the supreme rank, beyond which\nthere is nothing more to seek. That is the First, the veritable, the\nsovereign Good, the author of all goodness in other beings. The good\nof matter is form; for if matter became capable of sensation it would\nreceive it with pleasure. The good of the body is the soul; for without\nher it could neither exist nor last. The good of the soul is virtue;\nand then higher (waits), Intelligence. Last, the good of Intelligence\nis the principle called the Primary nature. Each of these goods\nproduces something within the object whose good it is. It confers order\nand beauty (as form does on matter); or life (as the soul does on the\nbody); or wisdom and happiness (as intelligence does on soul). Last,\nthe Good communicates to Intelligence its influx, and actualization\nemanating from the Good, and shedding on Intelligence what has been\ncalled the light of the Good. The nature of this we shall study later.\n\n\nTHE TRUE GOOD IMPLIES A COUNTERFEIT GOOD.\n\n26. Recognition of goodness and so-called \"possession\" thereof consist\nof enjoyment of the presence of good by the being who has received from\nnature the faculty of sensation. How could it make a mistake about the\nmatter? The possibility of its being deceived implies the existence\nof some counterfeit; in this case, the error of this being was caused\nby that which resembled its good; for this being withdraws from what\nhad deceived it as soon as the Good presents itself. The existence of\na particular good for each being is demonstrated by its desire and\ninclination. Doubtless, the inanimate being receives its good from\nwithout; but, in the animated being, the desire spontaneously starts\nto pursue the Good. That is why lifeless bodies are the objects of\nsolicitude and care of living beings, while the living beings watch\nover themselves.\n\n\nTHE GOOD CANNOT BE PLEASURE WHICH IS CHANGEABLE AND RESTLESS.\n\nNow when a being has attained the good it was pursuing it is sure of\npossessing it as soon as it feels that it is better, feels no regret,\nis satisfied, takes pleasure therein, and seeks nothing beyond. What\nshows the insufficiency of pleasure is that one does not always like\nthe same thing; doubtless pleasure ever charms, but the object which\nproduces it is not the same; it is always the newest object that\npleases most. Now the good to which we aspire must not be a simple\naffection, existing only in him who feels it; for he who mistakes\nthis affection for the Good remains unsatisfied, he has nothing but\nan affection that somebody else might equally feel in presence of\nthe Good. Consequently no one will succeed in making himself enjoy a\npleasure he has not achieved[122]; such as, for instance, rejoicing in\nthe presence of an absent son; or, for a glutton to relish imaginary\nfood; or, for a lover, to tremble at the touch of his absent mistress,\nor (to thrill in a theoretic) orgasm.\n\n\nA THING'S GOOD IS ITS FORM; OR, ITS INTIMACY WITH ITSELF.\n\n27. What is the essential of a being's nature? Form. Matter achieves\n(recognition) through its form; and a soul's destiny is realized by the\nvirtue which is its form. Next we may ask whether this form be a good\nfor a being merely because it suits its (nature)? Does desire pursue\nthat which is suitable to it, or not? No: a being is suited by its\nlike; now, though a being seek and love its like, its possession does\nnot imply the possession of its good. Are we then not implying that\nsomething is suitable to a being, on the strength of its being the good\nof that being? The determination of what is suitable to a being belongs\nto the superior Being of whom the lower being is a potentiality. When\na being is the potentiality of some other, the being needs the other;\nnow the Being which it needs because it is superior is, by that very\nfact, its good. Of all things matter is the most indigent, and the form\nsuitable to it is the last of all; but, above it, one may gradually\nascend. Consequently, if a being be good for itself, so much the more\nwill it consider good what is its perfection and form, namely, the\nbeing that is better than it, because of a superior nature, and of\nsupplying the good (of the lower being). But why should that which\na being receives from a superior Being be its good? Is it not this\nbecause it is eminently suited to it? No: It is so merely because it is\na portion of the Good. That is why the purest and best Beings are those\nthat have most intimacy with themselves.[124] Besides it is absurd to\nseek the cause why what is good, is good for itself; as if, by the mere\nfact of its being good, it should betray its own nature and not love\nitself. Nevertheless, speaking of simple beings, it might be asked\nwhether a being which does not contain several things different from\neach other either possesses intimacy with itself, or can be good for\nitself.\n\n\nPLEASURE MAY ACCOMPANY THE GOOD, BUT THE GOOD IS INDEPENDENT THEREOF.\n\nNow, if all that has been said be right, it is only a gradual upward\nanalysis that reveals the good that is suitable to the nature of\nany being. Desire does not constitute the good, but is born from\nits presence. Those who acquire the good receive something from it.\nPleasure accompanies the acquirement of good; but even should pleasure\nnot accompany the good, the good should, none the less be chosen, and\nsought for its own sake.\n\n\nMATTER IS IMPROVED BY FORM, THE DREAM OF THE GOOD.\n\n28. Let us consider the implications of the principles we have studied.\nIf that which a being receives as good be everywhere a form, if the\ngood of matter be a form, we might ask ourselves whether matter,\ngranting it here the faculty of volition, would even wish to be a\nform? Such a wish would be tantamount to a wish to be destroyed. (But\nmatter could not wish this), for every being seeks its own good. But\nperhaps matter might not wish to be matter, but simply to be essence;\npossessing which, matter would wish to free itself from all the evil\nwithin it. But how can that which is evil (for such is the nature of\nmatter) desire the good?[125] Besides, we are not attributing desire\nto matter itself. It was only to meet the exigencies of the discussion\nthat we employed the hypothesis which accorded sensibility to matter,\nif indeed it can be granted to matter without destroying its nature.\nWe have at least shown that when form has come, as a dream of the\nGood,[126] to unite itself to matter, the latter found itself in a\nbetter condition.\n\n\nMATTER IS NOT WICKEDNESS, BUT NEUTRAL EVIL.\n\nAll we have said above goes on the assumption that matter is the evil.\nBut if it were something else, as, for instance, malice, and if the\nessence of matter were to receive sensation, would intimacy with what\nis better still be the good of matter? But if it were not the malice\nitself of matter which choose the good, it was what had become evil in\nmatter. If the essence (of matter) were identical with evil, how could\nmatter wish to possess this good? Would evil love itself, if it had\nself-consciousness? But how could that which is not lovable be loved?\nFor we have demonstrated that a being's good does not consist in that\nwhich is suitable to it. Enough about this, however.\n\n\nTHE GOOD IS A NATURE WHICH POSSESSES NO KIND OF FORM ITSELF.\n\nBut if the good be everywhere a form; if, in the measure that one\nrises (along the ladder of beings), there is a progression in the\nform--for the soul is more of a form than the form of the body; in the\nsoul herself there are graduated forms, and intelligence is more of a\nform than the soul--the good follows a progression evidently inverse\nto that of matter; the Good exists in that which is purified and\nfreed from matter, and exists there in proportion to its purity (from\nmatter); so it exists in the highest degree in that which lays aside\nall materiality. Finally, the Good in itself, being entirely separated\nfrom all matter; or rather, never having had any contact with it,\nconstitutes a nature which has no kind of form, and from which proceeds\nthe first form (Intelligence). But of this more later.[127]\n\n\nTHE INDEPENDENCE OF THE GOOD FROM PLEASURE PROVED BY THE TEMPERATE MAN.\n\n29. Supposing then that the pleasure does not accompany the good, but\nthat anterior to pleasure there have existed something which would\nhave naturally given rise to it (because of its goodness); why then\nmight not the good be considered lovable? But the mere assertion that\ngood is lovable, already implies that it is accompanied by pleasure.\nBut supposing now that the good could exist without being lovable\n(and consequently not accompanied by pleasure). In that case, even in\npresence of the good, the being that possesses sensibility will not\nknow that the good is present. What would however hinder a being from\nknowing the presence of the good without feeling any emotion at its\npossession, which would exactly represent the case of the temperate\nman who lacks nothing? The result would be that pleasure could not be\nsuitable to the First (being), not only because He is simple, but also\nbecause pleasure results from the acquisition of what is lacking (and\nthe First lacks nothing, therefore could not feel pleasure).\n\n\nEVEN SCORN OF LIFE IMPLIES THE EXISTENCE OF THE GOOD.\n\nBut, in order that this truth may appear in its full light, we shall\nfirst have to clear away all the other opinions, and especially have\nto refute the teaching opposite to ours. This is the question asked of\nus: \"What will be the fruit gathered by him who has the intelligence\nnecessary to acquire one of these goods (such as existence and life),\nif on hearing them named, he be not impressed thereby, because he\ndoes not understand them, either because they seem to him no more\nthan words, or because his conception of each of these things should\ndiffer (from our view of them), or because in his search for the Good\nhe seeks some sense-object, such as wealth, or the like?\" The person\nwho thus scorns these things (existence and life), thereby implicitly\nrecognizes that there is within him a certain good, but that, without\nknowing in what it consists, he nevertheless values these things\naccording to his own notion of the Good; for it is impossible to say,\n\"that is not the good,\" without having some sort of knowledge of the\ngood,[128] or acquaintance therewith. The above speaker seems to betray\na suspicion that the Good in itself is above Intelligence. Besides, if\nin considering the Good in itself, or the good which most approaches\nit, he do not discern it, he will nevertheless succeed in getting a\nconception of it by its contraries; otherwise, he would not even know\nthat the lack of intelligence is an evil, though every man desire to\nbe intelligent, and glory in being such, as is seen by the sensations\nwhich aspire to become notions. If intelligence, and especially primary\nIntelligence, be beautiful and venerable, what admiration might not\nthen be felt by him who could contemplate the generating principle,\nthe Father of Intelligence?[129] Consequently, he who affects to scorn\nexistence and life receives a refutation from himself and from all\nthe affections he feels. They who are disgusted of life are those who\nconsider not the true life, but the life which is mingled with death.\n\n\nTWO INTERPRETATIONS OF PLATO'S OPINION ABOUT THE GOOD.\n\n30. Now, rising in thought to the Good, we must examine whether\npleasure must be mingled with the Good to keep life from remaining\nimperfect, even if we should, besides, contemplate the divine things,\nand even Him who is their principle. When (Plato[119]) seems to\nbelieve that the good is composed of intelligence, as subject, and\nalso of affection which wisdom makes the soul experience, he is not\nasserting that this blend (of intelligence and pleasure) is either\nthe goal (of the soul), or the Good in itself. He only means that\nintelligence is the good, and that we enjoy its possession. This is\na first interpretation of (Plato's) opinion about the Good. Another\ninterpretation is that to mingle intelligence with pleasure is to\nmake a single subject of both of them, so that in acquiring or in\ncontemplating such an intelligence we possess the good; for (according\nto the partisans of this opinion), one of these things could not exist\nin isolation, nor, supposing that it could so exist, it would not be\ndesirable as a good. But (shall we ask them), how can intelligence be\nmingled with pleasure so as to form a perfect fusion therewith? Nobody\ncould be made to believe that the pleasure of the body could be mingled\nwith Intelligence; such pleasure is incompatible even with the joys of\nthe soul.\n\n\nPLEASURE IS INDEED AN ACCESSORY TO ALL GOODS OF THE SOUL.\n\nThe element of truth in all this, however, is that every action,\ndisposition and life is joined by some accessory (pleasure or pain)\nthat unites with it. Indeed, sometimes action meets an obstacle to its\nnatural accomplishment, and life is affected by the mixture of a little\nof its contrary, which limits its independence; sometimes, however,\naction is produced without anything troubling its purity and serenity,\nand then life flows along a tranquil course. Those who consider that\nthis state of intelligence is desirable, and preferable to everything\nelse, in their inability to express their thoughts more definitely,\nsay that it is mingled with pleasure. Such likewise is the meaning of\nexpressions used by those who apply to divine things terms intended\nto express joy here below, and who say, \"He is intoxicated with\nnectar! Let us to the banquet! Jupiter smiles!\"[130] This happy state\nof intelligence is that which is the most agreeable, the most worthy\nof our wishes, and of our love; nor is it transitory, and does not\nconsist in a movement; its principle is that which colors intelligence,\nillumines it, and makes it enjoy a sweet serenity. That is why\nPlato[131] adds to the mixture truth, and puts above it that which\ngives measure. He also adds that the proportion and the beauty which\nare in the mixture pass from there into the beautiful. That is the\ngood that belongs to us, that is the fate that awaits us. That is the\nsupreme object of desire, an object that we will achieve on condition\nof drawing ourselves up to that which is best in us. Now this thing\nfull of proportion and beauty, this form composed (of the elements of\nwhich we have spoken), is nothing else but a life full of radiance,\nintelligence and beauty.\n\n\nTHE SOUL SCORNING ALL THINGS BELOW RISES TO THE GOOD.\n\n31. Since all things have been embellished by Him who is above them,\nand have received their light from Him; since Intelligence derives\nfrom Him the splendor of its intellectual actualization; by which\nsplendor it illuminates nature; since from Him also the soul derives\nher vital power, because she finds in Him an abundant source of life;\nconsequently, Intelligence has risen to Him, and has remained attached\nto Him, satisfied in the bliss of His presence; consequently also the\nsoul, to the utmost of her ability, turned towards Him, for, as soon as\nshe has known Him and seen Him, she was, by her contemplation, filled\nwith bliss; and, so far as she could see Him, she was overwhelmed\nwith reverence. She could not see Him without being impressed with\nthe feeling that she had within herself something of Him; it was this\ndisposition of hers that led her to desire to see Him, as the image\nof some lovable object makes one wish to be able to contemplate it\noneself. Here below, lovers try to resemble the beloved object, to\nrender their body more gracious, to conform their soul to their model,\nby temperance and the other virtues to remain as little inferior as\npossible to Him whom they love, for fear of being scorned by Him;\nand thus they succeed in enjoying intimacy with Him.[132] Likewise,\nthe soul loves the Good, because, from the very beginning she is\nprovoked to love Him. When she is ready to love, she does not wait\nfor the beauties here below to give her the reminiscence of the Good;\nfull of love, even when she does not know what she possesses, she is\never seeking; and inflamed with the desire to rise to the Good, she\nscorns the things here below. Considering the beauties presented by\nour universe, she suspects that they are deceptive, because she sees\nthem clothed upon with flesh, and united to our bodies, soiled by\nthe matter where they reside, divided by extension, and she does not\nrecognize them as real beauties, for she cannot believe that the latter\ncould plunge into the mire of these bodies, soiling and obscuring\nthemselves.[133] Last, when the soul observes that the beauties here\nbelow are in a perpetual flux, she clearly recognizes that they derive\nthis splendor with which they shine, from elsewhere.[134] Then she\nrises to the intelligible world; being capable of discovering what she\nloves, she does not stop before having found it, unless she be made\nto lose her love. Having arrived there, she contemplates all the true\nbeauties, the true realities[135]; she refreshes herself by filling\nherself up with the life proper to essence. She herself becomes genuine\nessence. She fuses with the Intelligible which she really possesses,\nand in its presence she has the feeling (of having found) what she was\nseeking so long.\n\n\nTHE AUTHOR OF THIS PERFECTION MUST BE ABOVE IT.\n\n32. Where then is He who has created this venerable beauty, and this\nperfect life? Where is He who has begotten \"being\"? Do you see the\nbeauty that shines in all these forms so various? It is well to dwell\nthere; but when one has thus arrived at beauty, one is forced to seek\nthe source of these essences and of their beauty. Their author Himself\ncannot be any of them; for then He would be no more than some among\nthem, and a part of the whole. He is therefore none of the particular\nforms, nor a particular power, nor all of the forms, nor all the powers\nthat are, or are becoming, in the universe; He must be superior to all\nthe forms and all the powers. The supreme Principle therefore has no\nform; not indeed that He lacks any; but because He is the principle\nfrom which all intellectual shapes are derived. Whatever is born--that\nis, if there be anything such as birth--must, at birth, have been some\nparticular being, and have had its particular shape; but who could have\nmade that which was not made by anybody? He therefore is all beings,\nwithout being any of them; He is none of the other beings because He is\nanterior to all of them; He is all other beings because He is their\nauthor. What greatness shall be attributed to the Principle who can do\nall things? Will He be considered infinite? Even if He be infinite,\nHe will have no greatness, for magnitude occurs only among beings\nof the lowest rank. The creator of magnitude could not himself have\nany magnitude; and even what is called magnitude in \"being\" is not a\nquantity. Magnitude can be found only in something posterior to being.\nThe magnitude of the Good is that there be nothing more powerful than\nHe, nothing that even equals Him. How indeed could any of the beings\ndependent on Him ever equal Him, not having a nature identical with\nHis? Even the statement that God is always and everywhere does not\nattribute to Him any measure, nor even, a lack of measure--otherwise,\nHe might be considered as measuring the rest; nor does it attribute to\nHim any figure (or, outward appearance).\n\n\nTHE SUPREME IS LIMITLESS.\n\nThus the Divinity, being the object of desire, must be the most desired\nand the most loved, precisely because He has no figure nor shape. The\nlove He inspires is immense; this love is limitless, because of the\nlimitlessness of its object. He is infinite, because the beauty of its\nobject surpasses all beauty. Not being any essence, how indeed could\nthe (divinity) have any determinate beauty? As supreme object of love,\nHe is the creator of beauty.[136] Being the generating power of all\nthat is beautiful, He is at the same time the flower in which beauty\nblooms[137]: for He produces it, and makes it more beautiful still by\nthe superabundance of beauty which He sheds on her. He is therefore\nsimultaneously the principle and goal of beauty.[138] As principle of\nbeauty, He beautifies all that of which He is the principle. It is not\nhowever by shape that He beautifies; what He produces has no shape, or,\nto speak more accurately, He has a shape in a sense different from the\nhabitual meaning of this term. The shape which is no more than a shape\nis a simple attribute of some substance, while the Shape that subsists\nin itself is superior to shape. Thus, that which participates in beauty\nwas a shape; but beauty itself has none.\n\n\nABSOLUTE BEAUTY IS A FORMLESS SHAPE.\n\n33. When we speak of absolute Beauty, we must therefore withdraw from\nall determinate shape, setting none before the eyes (of our mind);\notherwise, we would expose ourselves to descending from absolute\nbeauty to something which does not deserve the name of beauty but by\nvirtue of an obscure and feeble participation[139]; while absolute\nBeauty is a shapeless form, if it be at all allowed to be an idea (or\nform). Thus you may approach the universal Shape only by abstraction.\nAbstract even the form found in the reason (that is, the essence), by\nwhich we distinguish one action from another. Abstract, for instance,\nthe difference that separates temperance from justice, though both be\nbeautiful. For by the mere fact that intelligence conceives an object\nas something proper, the object that it conceives is diminished, even\nthough this object were the totality of intelligible entities; and,\non the other hand, if each of them, taken apart, have a single form,\nnevertheless all taken together will offer a certain variety.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME IS ESSENTIAL BEAUTY; THE SHAPELESS SHAPER; TRANSCENDENT.\n\nWe still have to study the proper conception of Him who is superior\nto the Intelligence that is so universally beautiful and varied, but\nwho Himself is not varied. To Him the soul aspires without knowing\nwhy she wishes to possess Him; but reason tells us He is essential\nbeauty, since the nature of Him who is excellent and sovereignly\nlovable cannot absolutely have any form. That is why the soul, whatever\nobject you may show her in your process of reducing an object to a\nform, ever seeks beyond the shaping principle. Now reason tells us\nin respect to anything that has a shape, that as a shape or form is\nsomething measured (or limited), (anything shaped) cannot be genuinely\nuniversal, absolute, and beautiful in itself, and that its beauty is\na mixture. Therefore though the intelligible entities be beautiful\n(they are limited); while He who is essential beauty, or rather the\nsuper-beautiful, must be unlimited, and consequently have no shape or\nform. He who then is beauty in the first degree, and primary Beauty, is\nsuperior to form, and the splendor of the intelligible (world) is only\na reflection of the nature of the Good.\n\n\nTHUS LOVE BEGINS PHYSICALLY BUT BECOMES SPIRITUAL.\n\nThis is proved by what happens to lovers; so far as their eyes remain\nfixed on a sense-object, they do not yet love genuinely. Love is born\nonly when they rise above the sense-object, and arrive at representing\nin their indivisible soul an image which has nothing more of sensation.\nTo calm the ardor that devours them they do indeed still desire to\ncontemplate the beloved object; but as soon as they come to understand\nthat they have to rise to something beyond the form, they desire the\nlatter; for since the very beginning they felt within themselves the\nlove for a great light inspired by a feeble glow. The Shape indeed is\nthe trace of the shapeless. Without himself having any shape, He begets\nshape whenever matter approaches Him. Now matter must necessarily be\nvery distant from Him, because matter does not possess forms of even\nthe last degree. Since form inherent in matter is derived from the\nsoul, not even mere form-fashioned matter is lovable in itself, as\nmatter; and as the soul herself is a still higher form, but yet is\ninferior to and less lovable than intelligence, there is no escape from\nthe conclusion that the primary nature of the Beautiful is superior to\nform.\n\n\nTHE FORMLESSNESS OF THE SUPREME IS PROVED BY THE FACT THAT THE SOUL\nWHEN APPROACHING HIM SPONTANEOUSLY RIDS HERSELF OF FORMS.\n\n34. We shall not be surprised that the soul's liveliest transports of\nlove are aroused by Him, who has no form, not even an intelligible one,\nwhen we observe that the soul herself, as soon as she burns with love\nfor Him, lays aside all forms soever, even if intelligible; for it is\nimpossible to approach Him so long as one considers anything else. The\nsoul must therefore put aside all evil, and even all good; in a word,\neverything, of whatever nature, to receive the divinity, alone with the\nalone. When the soul obtains this happiness, and when (the divinity)\ncomes to her, or rather, when He manifests His presence, because the\nsoul has detached herself from other present things, when she has\nembellished herself as far as possible, when she has become assimilated\nto Him by means known only to the initiated, she suddenly sees Him\nappear in her. No more interval between them, no more doubleness; the\ntwo fuse in one. It is impossible to distinguish the soul from the\ndivinity, so much does she enjoy His presence; and it is the intimacy\nof this union that is here below imitated by those who love and are\nloved, when they consummate union. In this condition the soul no longer\nfeels (her body); she no more feels whether she be alive, human,\nessence, universality, or anything else. Consideration of objects\nwould be a degradation, and the soul then has neither the leisure nor\nthe desire to busy herself with them. When, after having sought the\ndivinity, she finds herself in His presence, she rushes towards Him,\nand contemplates Him instead of herself.[140] What is her condition at\nthe time? She has not the leisure to consider it; but she would not\nexchange it for anything whatever, not even for the whole heaven; for\nthere is nothing superior or better; she could not rise any higher.\nAs to other things, however elevated they be, she cannot at that time\nstoop to consider them. It is at this moment that the soul starts to\nmove, and recognizes that she really possesses what she desired; she at\nlast affirms that there is nothing better than Him. No illusion could\noccur there; for where could she find anything truer than truth itself?\nThe soul then is what she affirms; (or rather), she asserts it (only),\nlater, and then she asserts it by keeping silence. While tasting this\nbeatitude she could not err in the assertion that she tastes it. If\nshe assert that she tastes it, it is not that her body experiences an\nagreeable titillation, for she has only become again what she formerly\nused to be when she became happy. All the things that formerly charmed\nher, such as commanding others, power, wealth, beauty, science, now\nseem to her despicable; she could not scorn them earlier, for she had\nnot met anything better. Now she fears nothing, so long as she is with\nHim, and contemplates Him. Even with pleasure would she witness the\ndestruction of everything, for she would remain alone with Him; so\ngreat is her felicity.\n\n\nTHE SOUL SCORNS EVEN THOUGHT: SHE IS INTELLECTUALIZED AND ENNOBLED.\n\n35. Such, then, is the state of the soul that she no longer values\neven thought, which formerly excited her admiration; for thought is a\nmovement, and the soul would prefer none. She does not even assert\nthat it is Intelligence that she sees, though she contemplate only\nbecause she has become intelligence, and has, so to speak, become\nintellectualized, by being established in the intelligible place.\nHaving arrived to Intelligence, and having become established therein,\nthe soul possesses the intelligible, and thinks; but as soon as she\nachieves the vision of the supreme Divinity, she abandons everything\nelse. She behaves as does the visitor who, on entering into a palace,\nwould first admire the different beauties that adorn its interior,\nbut who regards them no longer as soon as she perceives the master;\nfor the master, by his (living) nature, which is superior to all the\nstatues that adorn the palace, monopolizes the consideration, and\nalone deserves to be contemplated; consequently the spectator, with\nhis glance fixed on Him, henceforward observes Him alone. By dint of\ncontinual contemplation of the spectacle in front of him, the spectator\nsees the master no longer; in the spectator, vision confuses with the\nvisible object. What for the spectator first was a visible object,\nin him becomes vision, and makes him forget all that he saw around\nhimself. To complete this illustration, the master here presenting\nhimself to the visitor must be no man, but a divinity; and this\ndivinity must not content Himself with appearing to the eyes of him who\ncontemplates Him, but He must penetrate within the human soul, and fill\nher entirely.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE HAS THE TWO POWERS OF INTELLIGENCE AND LOVE.\n\nIntelligence has two powers: by the first, which is her own power of\nthinking, she sees what is within her. By the other she perceives\nwhat is above her by the aid of a kind of vision and perception;\nby the vision, she first saw simply; then, by (perceptive) seeing,\nshe received intellection and fused with the One. The first kind of\ncontemplation is suitable to the intelligence which still possesses\nreason; the second is intelligence transported by love. Now, it is\nwhen the nectar intoxicates her,[141] and deprives her of reason,\nthat the soul is transported with love, and that she blossoms into a\nfelicity that fulfils all her desires. It is better for her to abandon\nherself to this intoxication than to remain wise. In this state\ndoes intelligence successively see one thing, and then another? No:\nmethods of instruction (or, constructive speech) give out everything\nsuccessively; but it is eternally that intelligence possesses the\npower of thought, as well as the power not to think; that is, to see\nthe divinity otherwise than by thought. Indeed, while contemplating\nHim, she received within herself germs, she felt them when they were\nproduced and deposited within her breast; when she sees them, she is\nsaid to think; but when she sees the divinity, it is by that superior\npower by virtue of which she was to think later.\n\n\nTHE SOUL DOES NOT THINK GOD, FOR IN THAT CONDITION SHE DOES NOT THINK.\n\nAs to the soul, she sees the divinity only by growing confused, as it\nwere by exhausting the intelligence which resides in her; or rather,\nit is her first intelligence that sees; but the vision the latter\nhas of the divinity reaches down to the soul, which then fuses with\nintelligence. It is the Good, extending over intelligence and the soul,\nand condescending to their level, which spreads over them, and fuses\nthem; hovering above them, it bestows on them the happy vision, and the\nineffable feeling of itself. It raises them so high that they are no\nmore in any place, nor within anything whatever, in any of the senses\nin which one thing is said to be within another. For the Good is not\nwithin anything; the intelligible location is within it, but it is not\nin anything else. Then the soul moves no more, because the divinity is\nnot in motion. To speak accurately, she is no longer soul, because the\ndivinity does not live, but is above life; neither is she intelligence,\nbecause the divinity is above intelligence; because there must be\ncomplete assimilation (between the soul and the divinity). Finally, the\nsoul does not think even the divinity, because in this condition she\ndoes not think at all.\n\n\nTHE TOUCH WITH THE GOOD IS THE GREATEST OF SCIENCES.\n\n36. The remainder is plain. As to the last point, it has already been\ndiscussed. Still it may be well to add something thereto, starting from\nthe point reached, and proceeding by arguments. Knowledge, or, if it\nmay be so expressed, the \"touch of the Good,\" is the greatest thing\nin the world. Plato[142] calls it the greatest of sciences, and even\nso he here applies this designation not to the vision itself of the\nGood, but to the science of the Good that may be had before the vision.\nThis science is attained by the use of analogies,[143] by negations\n(made about the Good), by the knowledge of things that proceed from\nit, and last by the degrees that must be taken (or, upward steps that\nmust be climbed to reach up to Him.[165]) (These then are the degrees)\nthat lead up (to the divinity): purifications, virtues that adorn the\nsoul, elevation to the intelligible, settling in the intelligible, and\nthen the banquet at which nectar feeds him who becomes simultaneously\nspectator and spectacle, either for himself, or for others.[144]\nHaving become Being, Intelligence, and universal living Organism, (the\ninitiate) no longer considers these things as being outside of him;\nhaving arrived at that condition, she approaches Him who is immediately\nabove all the intelligible entities, and who already sheds His radiance\nover them. (The initiate) then leaves aside all the science that has\nled him till there; settled in the beautiful, he thinks, so long as he\ndoes not go beyond that (sphere of) being. But there, as it were raised\nby the very flood of intelligence, and carried away by the wave that\nswells, without knowing how, he suddenly sees. The contemplation which\nfills his eye with light does not reveal to him anything exterior;\nit is the light itself that he sees. It is not an opposition between\nlight on one side, and the visible object on the other; nor is there\non one side intelligence, and on the other the intelligible entity;\nthere is only the (radiation) which later begets these entities, and\npermits them to exist within it. (The divinity) is no more than the\nradiation that begets intelligence, begetting without being consumed,\nand remaining within itself. This radiation exists, and this existence\nalone begets something else. If this radiation were not what it was,\nneither would the latter thing subsist.\n\n\nGOD BEING ABOVE THOUGHT IGNORES EVERYTHING.\n\n37. They who attributed thought to the First Principle have at least\nnot attributed to Him the thought of things that are inferior to Him,\nor which proceed from Him.[145] Nevertheless some of them claimed that\nit was absurd to believe that the divinity ignored other things. As\nto the former, finding nothing greater than the Good, they attributed\nto (the divinity) the thought of Himself,[146] as if this could add\nto His majesty, as if even for Him, thinking were more than being\nwhat He is, and it were not the Good Himself which communicates His\nsublimity to intelligence. But from whom then will the Good derive\nHis greatness? Would it come from thought, or from Himself? If He\nderive it from thought, He is not great by himself; or at least, He\nis no more sovereignly great. If it be from Himself that He derives\nHis greatness, He is perfectly anterior to thought, and it is not\nthought that renders Him perfect. Is He forced to think because He is\nactualization, and not merely potentiality? If He is a being that ever\nthinks, and if this be the meaning of actualization,[147] we would be\nattributing to the Good two things simultaneously: \"being\" and thought;\ninstead of conceiving of Him as a simple Principle, something foreign\nis added to Him, as to eyes is added the actualization of sight,[148]\neven admitting that they see continually. (The divinity) is in\nactualization, in the sense that He is both actualization and thought,\nis He not? No, for being thought itself, He must not be thinking, as\nmovement itself does not move.[149] But do not you yourselves say that\n(the divinity) is both being and actualization? We think that being\nand actualization are multiple and different things, whilst the First\nis simple. To the principle that proceeds from the First alone belongs\nthought, a certain seeking out of its being, of itself, and of its\norigin. It deserves the name of intelligence only by turning towards\n(the First) in contemplation, and in knowing Him. As to the unbegotten\nPrinciple, who has nothing above Him, who is eternally what He is, what\nreason might He have to think?\n\n\nTHE FIRST PRINCIPLE HAS NO FUNCTION.\n\nThat is why Plato rightly says that the Good is above Intelligence. To\nspeak of an \"unthinking\" intelligence would be a self-contradiction;\nfor the principle whose nature it is to think necessarily ceases to be\nintelligent if it does not think. But no function can be assigned to a\nprinciple that has none, and we cannot blame it for idleness because it\ndoes not fulfil some function; this would be as silly as to reproach\nit for not possessing the art of healing. To the first Principle then\nshould be assigned no function, because there is none that would suit\nHim. He is (self) sufficient, and there is nothing outside of Him\nwho is above all; for, in being what He is, He suffices Himself and\neverything else.\n\n\nOF THE FIRST PRINCIPLE WE MAY NOT EVEN SAY THAT IT IS.\n\n38. Of the First we may not even say, \"He is.\" (He does not need this),\nsince we do not either say of Him, \"He is good.\" \"He is good\" is said\nof the same principle to which \"He is\" applies. Now \"He is\" suits\nthe (divinity) only on the condition that He be given no attribute,\nlimiting oneself to the assertion of His existence. He is spoken of\nas the Good, not as predicating an attribute or quality of Him, but\nto indicate that He is the Good itself. We do not even approve of\nthis expression, \"He is the Good,\" because we think that not even the\narticle should be prefixed thereto; but inasmuch as our language would\nfail to express an entire negation or deprivation, then, to avoid\nintroducing some diversity in it, we are forced to name it, but there\nis no need to say \"it is,\" we simply call it, \"the Good.\"\n\n\nTHE SELF-SUFFICIENT GOOD DOES NOT NEED SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS THEREOF.\n\nBut how could we admit (the existence of) a nature without feeling\nor consciousness of itself? We might answer this, What consciousness\nof self can (the divinity) have? Can He say, \"I am?\" But (in the\nabove-mentioned sense), He is not. Can He say, \"I am the Good\"? Then\nHe would still be saying of Himself \"I am\" (whereas we have just\nexplained that this He cannot do[150]). What then will He add (to\nhis simplicity) by limiting Himself to saying, \"The Good\"? For it is\npossible to think \"the Good\" apart from \"He is\" so long as the Good\nis not, as an attribute, applied to some other being. But whoever\nthinks himself good will surely say \"I am the good\"; if not, he will\nthink the predicate \"good,\" but he will not be enabled to think that\nhe is so himself. Thus, the thought of good will imply this thought,\n\"I am the good.\" If this thought itself be the Good, it will not be\nthe thought of Him, but of the good, and he will not be the Good, but\nthe thought.[151] If the thought of good is different from the Good\nitself, the Good will be prior to the thought of the good. If the Good\nbe self-sufficient before the thought, it suffices to itself to be the\nGood; and in this respect has no need of the thought that it is the\nGood.\n\n\nTHE GOOD IS A SIMPLE PERCEPTION OF ITSELF; A TOUCH.\n\n39. Consequently, the Good does not think itself either as good, nor\nas anything else; for it possesses nothing different from itself. It\nonly has \"a simple perception of itself in respect to itself\"; but as\nthere is no distance or difference in this perception it has of itself,\nwhat could this perception be but itself? That is why it perceives a\ndifference where being and intelligence appear. In order to think,\nintelligence must admit identity and difference simultaneously. On the\none hand, without the relation between the Intelligible and itself,\nthe (mind) will not distinguish itself from (the intelligible); and on\nthe other, without the arising of an \"otherness\" which would enable\nit to be everything, it would not contemplate all (earthly) entities.\n(Without this difference), intelligence would not even be a \"pair.\"\nThen, since intelligence thinks, if it think really, it will not think\nitself alone, for why should it not think all things? (Would it not do\nso) because it was impotent to do so? In short, the principle which\nthinks itself ceases to be simple, because in thinking itself it must\nthink itself as something different, which is the necessary condition\nof thinking itself.[152] We have already said that intelligence cannot\nthink itself without contemplating itself as something different.\nNow in thinking, intelligence becomes manifold (that is, fourfold):\nintelligible object (thing thought) and intelligent subject (thinker);\nmovement (or, moved[153]), and everything else that belongs to\nintelligence. Besides, it must be noticed, as we have pointed out\nelsewhere, that, to be thought, any thought, must offer variety[154];\nbut (in the divinity) this movement is so simple and identical that\nit may be compared to some sort of touch, and partakes in nothing of\nintellectual actualization (therefore, thought cannot be attributed\nto the divinity). What? Will (the divinity) know neither others nor\nHimself, and will He remain immovable in His majesty? (Surely). All\nthings are posterior to Him; He was what He is before them. The thought\nof these things is adventitious, changeable, and does not apply to\npermanent objects. Even if it did apply to permanent objects, it would\nstill be multiple, for we could not grant that in inferior beings\nthought was joined to being, while the thoughts of intelligence would\nbe empty notions. The existence of Providence is sufficiently accounted\nfor by its being that from which proceed all (beings). How then (in\nregard to all the beings that refer to Him) could (the divinity) think\nthem, since He does not even think Himself, but remains immovable in\nHis majesty? That is why Plato,[149] speaking of \"being,\" says that it\ndoubtless thinks, but that it does not remain immovable in its majesty.\nBy that he means that, no doubt, \"being\" thinks, but that that which\ndoes not think remains immovable in its majesty; using this expression\nfor lack of a better one. Thus Plato considers the Principle which is\nsuperior to thought as possessing more majesty, nay, sovereign majesty.\n\n\nTHE FIRST PRINCIPLE HAS NO THOUGHT AS THE FIRST ACTUALIZATION OF A\nHYPOSTASIS.\n\n40. That thought is incompatible with the first Principle is something\nwell known by all those who have (in ecstasy) risen to Him.[155] To\nwhat we have already said, we shall however add several arguments, if\nindeed we succeed in expressing thought comprehensibly; for conviction\nshould be fortified by demonstration.[156] In the first place, observe\nthat all thought exists within a subject, and proceeds from some\nobject. Thought that is connected with the object from which it is\nderived, has the being to which it belongs, as subject. It inheres in\nhim because it is his actualization, and completes his potentiality,\nwithout, itself, producing anything; for it belongs exclusively to the\nsubject whose complement it is. Thought that is hypostatically united\nwith \"being,\" and which underlies its existence, could not inhere in\nthe object from which it proceeds; for, had it remained in him, it\nwould not have produced anything. Now, having the potentiality of\nproducing, it produced within itself; its actualization was \"being,\"\nand it was united thereto. Thus thought is not something different\nfrom \"being\"; so far as this nature thinks itself, it does not think\nitself as being something different; for the only multiplicity therein\nis that which results from the logical distinction of intelligent\nsubject (thinker) and intelligible object (the being thought), as we\nhave often pointed out. That is the first actualization which produced\na hypostasis (or, form of existence), while constituting \"being\";\nand this actualization is the image of a Principle so great that\nitself has become \"being.\" If thought belonged to the Good, instead\nof proceeding therefrom, it would be no more than an attribute; it\nwould not, in itself, be a hypostatic form of existence. Being the\nfirst actualization and the first thought, this thought has neither\nactualization nor thought above it. Therefore, by rising above this\n\"being\" and this thought, neither further \"being\" nor thought will be\nmet with; we would arrive to the Principle superior to \"being,\" and\nthought, an admirable principle, which contains neither thought nor\nbeing, which in solitary guise dwells within itself, and which has no\nneed of the things which proceed from Him. He did not first act, and\nthen produce an actualization (he did not begin by thinking in order\nlater to produce thought); otherwise, he would have thought before\nthought was born. In short, thought, being the thought of good, is\nbeneath Him, and consequently does not belong to Him. I say: \"does not\nbelong to Him,\" not denying that the Good can be thought (for this, I\nadmit); but because thought could not exist in the Good; otherwise, the\nGood and that which is beneath it--namely, the thought of Good--would\nfuse. Now, if the good be something inferior, it will simultaneously be\nthought and being; if, on the contrary, good be superior to thought, it\nmust likewise belong to the Intelligible.[157]\n\n\nEVEN IF THE GOOD THOUGHT, THERE WOULD BE NEED OF SOMETHING SUPERIOR.\n\nSince therefore thought does not exist in the Good, and since, on\nthe contrary, it is inferior to the Good, and since it must thus\nworship its majesty, (thought) must constitute a different principle,\nand leaves the Good pure and disengaged from it, as well as from\nother things. Independent of thought, the Good is what it is without\nadmixture. The presence of the Good does not hinder it from being pure\nand single. If we were to suppose that Good is both thinking subject\nand thought object (thinker and thought) or \"being,\" and thought\nconnected with \"being,\" if thus we make it think itself,[158] it will\nneed something else, and thus things will be above it. As actualization\nand thought are the complement or the consubstantial hypostasis (or,\nform of existence) of another subject, thought implies above it another\nnature to which it owes the power of thinking; for thought cannot think\nanything without something above it. When thought knows itself, it\nknows what it received by the contemplation of this other nature. As\nto Him who has nothing above Him, who derives nothing from any other\nprinciple, what could He think, and how could He think himself? What\nwould He seek, and what would He desire? Would He desire to know the\ngreatness of His power? But by the mere fact of His thinking it, it\nwould have become external to Him; I call it exterior, if the cognizing\npower within Him differed from that which would be known; if on the\ncontrary they fuse, what would He seek?\n\n\nTHOUGHT IS A HELP FOR SUB-DIVINE NATURES.\n\n41. It would seem that thought was only a help granted to natures\nwhich, though divine, nevertheless do not occupy the first rank;\nit is like an eye given to the blind.[159] But what need would the\neye have to see essence, if itself were light? To seek light is the\ncharacteristic of him who needs it, because he finds in himself nothing\nbut darkness.[159] Since thought seeks light, while the light does not\nseek the light, the primary Nature, not seeking the light (since it is\nlight itself), could not any more seek thought (since it is thought\nthat seeks light); thinking could not suit it, therefore. What utility\nor advantage would thought bring him, inasmuch as thought itself needs\naid to think? The Good therefore has not self-consciousness, not having\nneed thereof; it is not doubleness; or rather, it is not double as is\nthought which implies (besides intelligence) a third term, namely, the\nintelligible (world). If thought, the thinking subject (the thinker)\nand the thought object (the thought) be absolutely identical, they form\nbut one, and are absolutely indistinguishable; if they be distinct,\nthey differ, and can no more be the Good. Thus we must put everything\naside when we think of this \"best Nature,\" which stands in need of no\nassistance. Whatever you may attribute to this Nature, you diminish\nit by that amount, since it stands in need of nothing. For us, on the\ncontrary, thought is a beautiful thing, because our soul has need of\nintelligence. It is similarly a beautiful thing for intelligence,\nbecause thought is identical with essence, and it is thought that gave\nexistence to intelligence.\n\n\nTHE GOOD IS NOT GOOD FOR ITSELF, BUT ONLY FOR THE NATURES BELOW IT.\n\nIntelligence must therefore fuse with thought, and must always be\nconscious of itself, knowing that each of the two elements that\nconstitute it is identical with the other, and that both form but a\nsingle one. If it were only unity, it would be self-sufficient, and\nwould have no further need of receiving anything. The precept \"know\nthyself\" applies only to natures which, because of their multiplicity,\nneed to give an account of themselves, to know the number and the\nquality of their component elements, because they either do not know\nthem entirely, or even not at all; not knowing what power in them\noccupies the first rank, and constitutes their being.[160] But if\nthere be a Principle which is one by itself, it is too great to know\nitself, to think itself, to be self-conscious, because it is nothing\ndeterminate for itself. It receives nothing within itself, sufficing\nitself. It is therefore the Good not for itself, but for other natures;\nthese indeed need the Good, but the Good has no need of itself; it\nwould be ridiculous, and would fail to stand up to itself. Nor does it\nview itself; for, from this look something would arise, or exist for\nHim. All such things He left to the inferior natures, and nothing that\nexists in them is found in Him; thus (the Good) is not even \"being.\"\nNor does (the Good) possess thought, since thought is united to being,\nand as primary and supreme thought coexisted with essence. Therefore,\none can not (as says Plato[150]), express (the divinity) by speech,\nnor have perception nor science of Him, since no attribute can be\npredicated of Him.\n\n\nTHE BEAUTIFUL THE SUPREME OF THREE RANKS OF EXISTENCE.\n\n42. When you are in doubt about this matter, and when you wonder how\nyou should classify these attributes to which reasoning has brought\nyou, reject from among the things of the second order what seems\nvenerable; attribute to the First none of the things that belong to the\nsecond order; neither attribute to those of the second order (that is,\nto Intelligence), what belongs to those of the third (that is, to the\nSoul); but subsume under the first Principle the things of the second\norder, and under the second principle the things of the third. That\nis the true means of allowing each being to preserve its nature, and\nat the same time to point out the bond that connects the lower things\nwith the higher, and showing thus that the inferior things depend on\nthe superior ones, while the superior ones remain in themselves. That\nis why (Plato) was right in saying,[161] \"All things surround the King\nof all, and exist on his account.\" \"All things\" means \"all beings.\"\n\"All things exist on his account\" means that He is the cause of their\nexistence, and the object of their desire, because His nature is\ndifferent from theirs, because in Him is nothing that is in them, since\nthey could not exist if the First possessed some attribute of what is\ninferior to Him. Therefore, if Intelligence be comprised within what\nis meant by \"all things,\" it could not belong to the First. When (in\nthe same place Plato calls the divinity) \"the cause of all beauty,\"\nhe seems to classify beauty among the Ideas, and the Good above the\nuniversal beauty.[162] After thus having assigned the intelligible\n(entities) to the second rank, he classifies, as dependent on them,\nthe things of the third order, which follow them. Last, to that which\noccupies the third rank, to the universal Soul, he subsumes the world\nthat is derived therefrom. As the Soul depends on the Intelligence, and\nas Intelligence depends on the Good, all things thus depend from the\nGood in different degrees, mediately or immediately. In this respect,\nthe things which are the most distant from the Good are the objects of\nsense, which are subsumed under the Soul.\n\n\n\n\nSIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT.\n\nOf the Will of the One.\n\n\nA. OF HUMAN FREE WILL.\n\n\nDOES FREE WILL BELONG TO GOD ONLY, OR TO OTHERS ONLY?\n\n1. Do the divinities themselves possess free will, or is this limited\nto human beings, because of their many weaknesses and uncertainties?\n(For we assume that) the divinities possess omnipotence, so that it\nwould seem likely that their actions were free and absolutely without\npetty restrictions. Or must we hold that the (supreme) One alone\npossesses omnipotence, and unhampered free will, while in other beings\n(free will and opportunity) either ignore each other, or conflict? We\nshall therefore have to determine the nature of free will in first\nrank beings (the divinities) and also the supreme Principle (the One),\nalthough we acknowledge that both of them are omnipotent. Besides, in\nrespect to this omnipotence, we shall have to distinguish possibility\nfrom actualization, present or future.\n\n\nFREE WILL MUST BE FOR MEN, IF IT IS TO BE FOR THE DIVINITIES.\n\nBefore attacking these questions, we must, as is usual, begin by\nexamining whether we ourselves possess freedom of will.[166] First\nthen, in what sense do we possess free will (or, responsibility, \"that\nsomething depends on us\"); or rather, what conception we should form\nof it? To answer this question will be the only means of arriving at\na conclusion about whether or not freedom of will should be ascribed\nto the divinities, let alone (the supreme) Divinity. Besides, while\nattributing to them freedom of will, we shall have to inquire to what\nit applies, either in the other beings, or in the Beings of the first\nrank.\n\n\nRESPONSIBILITY DEPENDS ON VOLUNTARINESS.\n\nWhat are our thoughts when we inquire whether something depends on us?\nUnder what circumstances do we question this responsibility? We ask\nourselves whether we are anything, and whether really anything depends\non us when undergoing the buffets of fortune, of necessity, of violent\npassions that dominate our souls, till we consider ourselves mastered,\nenslaved, and carried away by them? Therefore we consider as dependent\non ourselves what we do without the constraint of circumstances,\nnecessity, or violence of passions--that is, voluntarily, and without\nan obstacle to our will.[167] Hence the following definition: We are\nresponsible for that which depends on our will, which happens or which\nis omitted according to our volition.[168] We indeed call voluntary\nwhat we unconstrainedly do and consciously.[169] On us depends only\nthat of which we are the masters to do or not to do. These two notions\nare usually connected, though they differ theoretically. There are\ncases when one of them is lacking; one might, for instance, have the\npower to commit a murder; and nevertheless if it were one's own father\nthat he had ignorantly killed, it would not be a voluntary act.[170] In\nthis case, the action was free, but not voluntary. The voluntariness of\nan action depends on the knowledge, not only of the details, but also\nof the total relations of the act.[171] Otherwise, why should killing a\nfriend, without knowing it, be called a voluntary action? Would not the\nmurder be equally involuntary if one did not know that he was to commit\nit? On the contrary hypothesis, it may be answered that one had been\nresponsible for providing oneself with the necessary information[172];\nbut nevertheless it is not voluntarily that one is ignorant, or that\none was prevented from informing oneself about it.[173]\n\n\nON WHICH PSYCHOLOGICAL FACULTY IS THE FREEDOM OF WILL BASED?\n\n2. But to which part of ourselves should we refer free will? To\nappetite or desire, to anger or sex passion, for instance? Or shall it\nbe to the reason, engaged in search after utility, and accompanied by\ndesire? If to anger or sex passion,[174] we should be supposed to grant\nfreedom of will to brutes, to children, to the angry, to the insane,\nto those misled by magic charms, or suggestions of the imagination,\nthough none of such persons be master of himself? If again (we are to\nascribe freedom of will) to reason accompanied by desire, does this\nmean to reason even when misled, or only to right reason, and right\ndesire?[175] One might even ask whether reason be moved by desire, or\ndesire by reason.[176] For, admitting that desires arise naturally, a\ndistinction will nevertheless have to be established: if they belong\nto the animal part, and to the combination (of soul and body), the\nsoul will obey the necessity of nature; if they belong to the soul\nalone, many things which are generally attributed to the domain of our\nfree will will have to be withdrawn therefrom. Besides, passions are\nalways preceded by some sort of abstract reasoning. Further, how can\nimagination itself--which constrains us; and desire--which drags us\nwhither Necessity compels, make us \"masters of ourselves\"[177] under\nthese circumstances? Besides, how can we be \"masters of ourselves\"\nin general when we are carried away? That faculty of ours which\nnecessarily seeks to satisfy its needs, is not mistress of the things\ntowards which it is compelled to move.[177] How should we attribute\nfreedom of will to (a soul) that depends on something else? (To a soul)\nwhich, in this thing, holds the principle of her own determinations?\n(To a soul) that regulates her life thereby, and derives therefrom her\nnature? (To a soul) that lives according to the instructions received\ntherefrom? Freedom of will would then have to be acknowledged even in\ninanimate things; for even fire acts according to its inborn nature.\n\n\nPRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE DOES NOT SETTLE THE LIBERTARIAN PROBLEM.\n\nSome person might try to establish a distinction founded on the fact\nthat the animal and the soul do not act unconsciously. If they know\nit by mere sensation, how far does that sensation contribute to the\nfreedom of will? For sensation, limiting itself to perception, does not\nyield the percipient mastery over anything.[179] If they know it by\nknowledge, and if this knowledge contain only the accomplished fact,\ntheir actions are then determined by some other principle. If, even\nindependently of desire, reason or knowledge make us perform certain\nactions, or dominate us,[180] to what faculty shall the action be\nascribed, and how does it occur? If reason produce another desire, how\ndoes it do so? If reason manifest itself and liberate us by the process\nof calming our desires, the free will lies no longer in the action, but\nin intelligence; for every action, however much directed by reason,\nwould then be something mixed, not revealing an unconfused free will.\n\n\nLIBERTY REFERRED TO THE ACTION OF INTELLIGENCE.\n\n3. The question must be examined carefully, for it will later be\napplied to the divinities. Responsibility has been traced to the\nwill, and this to reason first, and later to right reason. Better, to\nreason enlightened by knowledge; for freedom of will is not possessed\nincontestably if one be ignorant of why his decision or action is\ngood, if one have been led to do the right thing by chance, or by some\nsensible representation. Since the latter is not within our power, we\ncould not impute to free will the actions it inspired. By \"sensible\nrepresentation,\" or, \"phantasy,\"[181] we mean the imagination excited\nwithin us by the passions of the body; for it offers us different\nimages according as the body has need of food, of drink, or of sensual\npleasures. Those who act according to the \"sensible representations\"\nexcited within them by divers qualities of the humors of the body are\nnot wholly responsible for their actions. That is why depraved men, who\nusually act according to these images, do not, according to us, perform\nactions that are free and voluntary. We ascribe free will only to him\nwho, enfranchised from the passions of the body, performs actions\ndetermined solely by intelligence. We refer liberty, therefore, to the\nnoblest principle, to the action of the intelligence[182]; we regard\nas free only the decisions whose principle it is, and as voluntary,\nonly the desires it inspires. This freedom is that which we ascribe to\nthe divinities, who live in conformity with Intelligence, and with the\nDesire of which it is the principle.[183]\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE HAS CONVERSION TO GOOD AND \"BEING IN ITSELF.\"\n\n4. We might ask how that which is produced by a desire could be\nautocratically free, since the desire implies a need, and drags us\ntowards something exterior; for whoever desires really yields to an\ninclination, even though the latter should lead him to the Good. We\nmight further ask whether intelligence, doing that which is in its\nnature to do, in a manner conformable to its nature, is free and\nindependent, since it could have done the opposite. Further, we may ask\nwhether we have the right to attribute free will to that which does not\ndo any deeds; last, whether that which does a deed, is not, by the mere\nfact that every action has a purpose, subject to an external necessity.\nHow indeed could one attribute freedom to a being that obeys its nature?\n\nWe (might answer), how can one say of this being that it obeys, if it\nbe not constrained to follow something external? How would the being\nthat directs itself towards the Good be constrained, if its desire be\nvoluntary, if it direct itself towards the Good, knowing that it is\nsuch? Only involuntarily does a being depart from the Good, only by\nconstraint does it direct itself towards that which is not its good;\nthat is the very nature of servitude, not to be able to reach one's\nown good, and to be thwarted by a superior power to which obedience\nis compulsory. Servitude displeases us, not because it deprives us of\nthe liberty to do evil, but because it hinders us going towards our\nown, from ensuing our own good, forced as we are to work at the good\nof someone else. When we speak of \"obeying our nature,\" we distinguish\n(in the being that obeys its nature) two principles, the one which\ncommands, and the other which obeys.[182]\n\nBut when a principle has a simple nature, when it is a single\nactualization, when it is not other in potentiality than it is in\nactualization, how would it not be free? It cannot be said to be acting\nconformably to its nature, because its actualization is not different\nfrom its being, and because, within it, essence and action coincide.\nIt surely is free, if it act neither for another, nor in dependence on\nanother. If the word \"independent\" be not suitable here, if it be too\nweak, we must at least understand that this Principle does not depend\non any other, does not recognize it as the ruler of its actions, any\nmore than of its being, since it itself is principle.\n\nIndeed, if Intelligence depend upon a further principle, at least this\none is not external, but is the Good itself. If then it be in the Good\nitself that it finds its welfare, so much the more does it itself\npossess independence and liberty, since it seeks them only in view\nof the Good. When therefore Intelligence acts in conformity with the\nGood, it has a higher degree of independence; for it possesses already\nthe \"conversion to the Good,\" inasmuch as it proceeds from the Good,\nand the privilege of being in itself, because Intelligence is turned\ntowards the Good; now it is better for Intelligence to remain within\nitself, since it is thus turned towards the Good.\n\n\nFREEDOM OF WILL AND VIRTUE ARE INDEPENDENT OF THE ACTIONS.\n\n5. Do autocratic freedom and independence inhere in pure and thinking\nIntelligence exclusively, or are they also found in the soul which\napplies its contemplative activity to intelligence, and its practical\nactivity to virtue? If we grant liberty to the practical activity of\nthe soul, we will not extend it to its results; for of this we are not\nalways masters. But if liberty is attributed to the soul which does\ngood, and which, in everything acts by herself, we are near the truth.\n\nHow would that depend on us? As it depends on us to be courageous when\nthere is a war. Nevertheless, admitting that it then depends on us\nto be courageous, I observe that, if there were no war, we could not\nperform any action of this nature. Likewise, in all other virtuous\ndeeds, virtue always depends on accidental circumstances which force\nus to do some particular thing.[182] Now if we were to give virtue\nthe liberty of deciding whether it desired a war, so as to be able to\noffer a proof of courage; or desired injustices, as opportunities to\ndefine and to respect rights; or wished that people might be poor to be\nable to show forth its liberality; or whether it preferred to remain\nat rest, because everything was in order; might virtue not prefer to\nremain inactive in case nobody needed her services.[183] Similarly a\ngood physician, such as Hippocrates, for instance, would wish that his\nprofessional services should not be needed by anybody. If then virtue\nwhen applied to actions be forced to engage in such activities, how\ncould it possess independence in all its purity? Should we not say\nthat actions are subject to Necessity, whilst the preliminary volition\nand reasoning are independent? If this be so, and since we locate free\nwill in that which precedes its execution, we shall also have to locate\nautocratic freedom and independence of virtue outside of the (actual)\ndeed.\n\n\nVIRTUE AS INTELLECTUALIZING HABIT LIBERATES THE SOUL.\n\nWhat shall we now say of virtue considered as \"habit\" or disposition?\nDoes it not occupy itself with regulating and moderating the passions\nand desires when the soul is not healthy? In what sense do we then say\nthat it depends on us to be good, and that \"virtue has no master?\"[184]\nIn this sense, that it is we who will and choose; more, in the sense\nthat virtue, by its assistance, yields us liberty and independence,\nand releases us from servitude. If then virtue be another kind of\nintelligence, \"a habit that intellectualizes the soul,\" even in this\nrespect must liberty be sought not in practical activity, but in the\nintelligence divorced from activity.\n\n\nLIBERTY REFERS TO THE INTERIOR LIFE, RATHER THAN TO THE EXTERIOR.\n\n6. How then did we previously refer liberty to volition, saying that\n\"that which depends on us, our responsibility, is that which occurs\naccording to our will\"? Yes, but we added, \"or does not occur.\" If\nindeed we be right, and if we continue to support our former opinion,\nwe shall have to recognize that virtue and intelligence are their\nown mistresses, and that it is to them that we must refer our free\nwill and independence. Since they have no master, we shall admit that\n(our) intelligence remains within itself, that virtue must equally\nremain calm in itself, regulating the soul so as to make her good,\nand that in this respect it itself is both free, and enfranchises the\nsoul. If passions or necessary actions arise, (virtue) directs them\nautomatically; nevertheless she still preserves her independence (or,\nfreedom) by getting into relations with everything. For instance,\n(virtue) does not engage in exterior things to save the body in times\nof danger; on the contrary, she abandons it, if it seem advisable;\nshe orders the man to renounce even life, wealth, children, and\nfatherland; for her object is to be honorable, relinquishing anything\nbeneath her dignity. This evidently shows that our liberty of action\nand independence do not refer to practical matters, nor to external\noccupations, but to interior activity, to thought, to the contemplation\nof virtue itself. This virtue must be considered as a kind of\nintelligence, and must not be confused with the passions that dominate\nand govern reason; for these, as (Plato[185]) says, seem to derive\nsomething from the body, though trained by exercise and habit.\n\n\nLIBERTY DEPENDS ON THE HIGHEST INTELLIGENCE.\n\nLiberty therefore belongs to the immaterial principle, and to this\nshould be traced our free will. This principle is the volition which\nrules itself, and which remains within itself; even when by necessity\ncompelled to take some resolution affecting external affairs. All that\nproceeds from (the immaterial principle) and exists by it, depends on\nus, and is free; what is outside of it, and with it; what it itself\nwills and carries out unhindered, also constitutes what primarily\ndepends on us. The contemplative and primary Intelligence therefore\npossesses independence, because in the accomplishment of its function\nit depends on no other being, because fulfilling (its function,\nIntelligence) remains entirely turned towards itself, exclusively\nengaged with itself, resting in the Good, living according to its\nwill, satisfied, and without needs. Besides, will is nothing more\nthan thought; but it was called \"will\" because it was conformed to\nintelligence; for will imitates what conforms to intelligence. On\nthe one hand, will desires the Good; on the other, for Intelligence\nto think truly, is to abide within the Good. Intelligence therefore\npossesses what the will desires, and, in attaining these its desires,\nwill becomes thought. Since, therefore, we define liberty as the will's\nachievement of the Good, why should not liberty also be predicated of\nthe Intelligence which is founded on (the Good) that is the object of\nthe desire of our will? If, however, there should still be objection\nto ascribing liberty to intelligence, this could be the case only by\nascribing it to something still higher (namely, super-Intelligence).\n\n\nTHE SOUL IS FREE BY INTELLIGENCE, WHICH IS FREE BY ITSELF.\n\n7. The soul therefore becomes free when, by the aid of intelligence,\nshe defies all obstacles in her ascent to the Good; and whatever she\ndoes for the sake of the Good is responsible action. Intelligence,\nhowever, is free by itself.\n\n\nB. OF THE FREE WILL OF THE SUPREME.\n\n(_Let us now consider the free will of the Good._)\n\n\nTHE GOOD IS THE DESIRABLE IN ITSELF.\n\n8. The nature of the Good is that which is desirable for its own sake.\nIt is by the Good that the Soul and Intelligence exercise liberty when\nthe Soul can attain the Good without obstacle, and when Intelligence\ncan enjoy its possession. Now since the Good's empire extends over all\nlower treasures; since He occupies the front rank; since He is the\nPrinciple to which all beings wish to rise, on whom they all depend,\nand from whom all derive their power and liberty; it would be difficult\nto attribute to Him a liberty similar to our human freedom of will,\nwhen we can hardly, with propriety, predicate such a human liberty of\nIntelligence.\n\n\nTHE GOOD IS FREE, BUT NOT MERELY BY CHANCE.\n\nHere some rash person,[186] drawing his arguments from some other\nschool of thought, may object that, \"If the Good be indeed good, this\noccurs only by chance. A man is not master of what he is (that is,\nof his own nature), because his own nature does not depend on himself\n(that is, is not due to self-determination). Consequently, he enjoys\nneither freedom nor independence, as he acts or withholds action as\nhe is forced by necessity.\" Such an assertion is gratuitous, and even\nself-contradictory. It destroys all conception of will, liberty and\nindependence, reducing these terms to being labels, and illusions. He\nwho advances such an opinion is forced to maintain not only that it\nis not within the power of anybody to do or not to do some thing, but\nalso that the word \"liberty\" arouses no conception in his mind, and is\nmeaningless. If however he insist that he does understand it, he will\nsoon be forced to acknowledge that the conception of liberty bears a\nconformity with the reality which he at first denied. The conception\nof a thing exerts no interference on its substance (\"being\"); it can\ndo nothing by itself, nor can it lead to hypostatic existence. It is\nlimited to pointing out to us which being obeys others, which being\npossesses free will, which being depends on no other, but is master of\nits own action, a privilege characteristic of eternal beings so far as\nthey are eternal, or to beings which attain the Good without obstacle\n(like the Soul), or possess it (like Intelligence). It is therefore\nabsurd to say that the Good, which is above them, seeks other higher\ngood beyond itself.\n\n\nBEING AND ACTUALIZATION CONSTITUTE ONE SELF-EXISTENT PRINCIPLE.\n\nNor is it any more accurate to insist that the Good exists by chance.\nChance occurs only in the lower and multiple things. We on the contrary\ninsist that the First does not exist by chance, and that one cannot\nsay that He is not master of His birth, since He was not born.[187]\nIt is not any less absurd to assert that He is not free because He\nacts according to His nature; for such an assertion would seem to\nimply that freedom consists in actions contrary to one's nature. Last,\nHis solitariness (or, unity) does not deprive Him of liberty, because\nthis unity does not result from His being hindered by anybody else\n(from having anything else), but from His being what He is, from His\nsatisfying (or, pleasing) Himself, as He could not be any better;\notherwise, it would be implied that one would lose one's liberty on\nattaining the Good. If such an assertion be absurd, is it not the\nsummit of absurdity to refuse to predicate autocratic liberty of the\nGood because of His being good, because He remains within Himself and\nbecause since all beings aspire towards Him, He Himself aspires to\nnothing else than Himself, and has no need of anything? As His higher\nhypostatic existence is simultaneously His higher actualization--for\nin Him these two aspects fuse into one, since they do so even in\nIntelligence--His essence is no more conformed to His actualization,\nthan His actualization to His essence. He cannot be said to actualize\naccording to His nature, nor that His actualization and His higher life\nare traced up into His higher being (so to speak). But as His higher\nbeing and His higher (actualization) are intimately united, and coexist\nsince all eternity, the result is that these two entities constitute a\nsingle Principle, which depends on itself, and nothing else.\n\n\nPHYSICAL QUALITIES USED OF THE SUPREME ONLY BY ANALOGY.\n\n8. We conceive of the self-rule as no accident of the Good; but, from\nthe self-rule proper to (all) beings, we rise, by abstraction of the\ncontraries, to Him who Himself is liberty and independence, thus\napplying to this Principle the lower attributes that we borrow from\ninferior beings (that is, the Soul and Intelligence), because of our\nimpotence to speak properly of Him. Such indeed are the terms that we\ncould use in referring to Him, though it would be absolutely impossible\nto find the proper expression, not only to predicate anything of Him,\nbut even to say anything whatever about Him. For the most beautiful and\nvenerable things do no more than imitate Him, who is their principle.\nNevertheless, from another standpoint, He is not their principle, since\nthis their imitation must be denied, and we must withdraw, as too\ninferior, even the terms \"liberty\" and \"self-rule,\" for these terms\nseem to imply a tendency towards something else, an obstacle, even if\nonly to avoid it; the coexistence of other beings, even if only to\nimitate Him uninterruptedly. Now no tendency should be attributed to\nthe Good. He is what He is before all other things, since we do not\neven say of Him, \"He is,\" so as not to establish any connection between\nHim and \"beings.\" Neither can we say of Him, \"according to His nature\";\nfor this expression indicates some later relation. It is indeed applied\nto intelligible entities, but only so far as they proceed from some\nother principle; that is why it is applied to \"being,\" because it\nis born of the (Good). But if we refer \"nature\" to temporal things,\nit could not be predicated of \"being\"; for to say that \"being\" does\nnot exist by itself would be to affect its existence; to say that it\nderives its existence from something else is equivalent to asserting\nthat it does not exist by itself. Nor should we say of the Good that\n\"His nature is accidental,\" nor speak of contingency in connection with\n(the Divinity); for He is contingent neither for Himself nor for other\nbeings; contingency is found only in the multiple beings which, already\nbeing one thing, have accidentally become some other. How indeed\ncould the First exist accidentally? for He did not reach His present\ncondition fortuitously enough to enable us even to ask, \"How did He\nbecome what He is?\" No chance led Him (to become His present self),\nnor led Him to hypostatic existence; for chance and luck did not exist\nanteriorly to Him, since even they proceed from a cause, and exist only\nin things that grow[188] (or, \"become\").\n\n\n\"CONTINGENCE\" MIGHT BE APPLIED TO THE SUPREME, IF THE WORD BE\nRE-DEFINED.\n\n9. If however anybody applied the term \"contingency\" to the Divinity,\nwe should not dispute about the word, but go back of it to its\nunderlying meaning. Do you, by it, mean that the First is a principle\nof particular nature and power; and that if He had had a different\nnature, He would still, as principle, have conformed to the nature He\nwould have had? Also, that if He had been less perfect, He would still\nhave actualized in conformity with His being? We should answer such\nan assertion thus: it was impossible for the higher Principle of all\nthings to be contingent; or to be less perfect accidentally, or good\nin some other manner, as some higher thing that was less complete.\nAs the principle of all things must be better than they, He must be\ndeterminate; and by this is here meant that He exists in an unique\nmanner. This, however, not by necessity; for necessity did not exist\nbefore Him. Necessity exists only in the beings that follow the first\nPrinciple, though the latter impose no constraint upon them. It is by\nHimself that the First exists uniquely. He could not be anything but\nwhat He is; He is what He ought to have been; and not by accident.\nHe is that; He had to be what He was. So \"He who is what He ought to\nhave been\" is the principle of the things that ought to exist. Not by\naccident, nor contingently, therefore, is He what He is; He is what He\nhad to be; though here the term \"had to be\" is improper. (If we be\npermitted to explain what we mean by an illustration, we may say that)\nthe other beings have to await the appearance of their king--which\nmeans, that He shall posit Himself as what He really is, the true King,\nthe true Principle, the true Good. Of Him it must not even be said\nthat He actualizes in conformity with the Good, for then He would seem\nsubordinate to some other principle; we must say only that He is what\nHe is. He is not conformed to the Good, because He is the Good itself.\n\n\nNOT EVEN ESSENCE IS CONTINGENT, LET ALONE SUPER-ESSENCE.\n\nBesides, there is nothing contingent, even in (that which is beneath\nthe First), namely, Essence-in-itself; for if any contingency\ninhered in it, it itself would be contingent. But Essence cannot\nbe contingent, for not fortuitously is it what it is; nor does it\nderive what it is from anything else, because the very nature of\nEssence is to be Essence. This being the case, how could \"He who is\nabove Essence\" be considered as being what He is fortuitously? For He\nbegat Essence, and Essence is not what it is fortuitously, since it\nexists in the same manner as \"Being,\" which is what is \"Being\" and\nIntelligence--otherwise, one might even say that Intelligence was\ncontingent, as if it could have been anything but what is its nature.\nThus He who does not issue from Himself, and does not incline towards\nanything whatever, is what He is in the most special sense.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME IS THE POWER REALLY MASTER OF HIMSELF.\n\nWhat now could be said (to look down) from some (peak) overhanging\n(Essence and Intelligence), upon (their principle)? Could you\ndescribe what you saw from there as being what it is fortuitously?\nCertainly not! Neither His nature nor His manner would be contingent.\nHe is merely (an absolute, unexplainable) existence (a \"thus\"). Even\nthis term \"thus,\" however, would be improper, for, on applying it to\nthe First, it would become determinate, and become \"such a thing.\"\nWhoever has seen the First would not say He was, or was not that;\notherwise, you would be reducing Him to the class of things which may\nbe designated as this or that; but the First is above all these things.\nWhen you shall have seen Him who is infinite (\"indefinite\"), you will\nbe able to name all the things that are after Him (you will be able to\nname Him whom all things follow); but you must not classify Him among\nthese. Consider Him as the universal Power essentially master (of\nhimself), which is what He wishes; or rather, who has imposed His will\nupon (all) beings, but who Himself is greater than all volition, and\nwho classifies volition as below Himself. (To speak strictly therefore)\nHe did not even will to be what He is (he did not even say, I shall be\nthat); and no other principle made Him be what He is.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME BANISHES ALL CHANCE BY ASSIGNING LIMIT AND SHAPE TO EACH\nFORM.\n\n10. He (Strato the Peripatetic?) who insists that the Good is what it\nis by chance, should be asked how he would like to have it demonstrated\nto him that the hypothesis of chance is false--in case it be false--and\nhow chance could be made to disappear from the universe? If there be\na nature (such as the nature of the one Unity), which makes (chance)\ndisappear, it itself could not be subject to chance. If we subject\nto chance the nature which causes other beings not to be what they\nare by chance, nothing will be left that could have been derived\nfrom chance. But the principle of all beings banishes chance from the\nuniverse by giving to each (being) a form, a limitation, and a shape;\nand it is impossible to attribute to chance the production of beings\nthus begotten in a manner conforming to reason. A cause exists there.\nChance reigns only in things that do not result from a plan, which are\nnot concatenated, which are accidental. How indeed could we attribute\nto chance the existence of the principle of all reason, order, and\ndetermination? Chance no doubt sways many things[188]; but it could\nnot control the production of intelligence, reason, and order. Chance,\nin fact, is the contrary of reason; how then could (chance) produce\n(reason)? If chance do not beget Intelligence, so much the more could\nit not have begotten the still superior and better Principle; for\nchance had no resources from which to produce this principle; chance\nitself did not exist; and it would not have been in any manner able\nto impart eternal (qualities). Thus, since there is nothing anterior\nto the (Divinity), and as He is the First, we shall have to halt our\ninquiry about this Principle, and say nothing more about Him, rather\nexamining the production of the beings posterior to Him. As to Him\nhimself, there is no use considering how He was produced, as He really\nwas not produced.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME AS MASTER OF HIS OWN BEING.\n\nSince He was not produced, we must suppose that He is the master of\nHis own being. Even if He were not master of His own being, and if,\nbeing what He is, He did not endow Himself with \"hypostatic\" form\nof existence, and limited Himself to utilizing His resources, the\nconsequence is that He is what He is necessarily, and that He could\nnot have been different from what He is. He is what He is, not because\nHe could have been otherwise, but because His nature is excellent.\nIndeed, even if one be sometimes hindered from becoming better, no one\nis ever hindered by any other person from becoming worse. Therefore, if\nHe did not issue from Himself, He owes it to Himself, and not to any\noutside hindrance; He must essentially be that which has not issued\nfrom itself. The impossibility of becoming worse is not a mark of\nimpotence, because, if (the Divinity) do not degenerate, He owes it to\nHimself, (and derives it) from Himself. His not aspiring to anything\nother than Himself constitutes the highest degree of power, since He is\nnot subjected to necessity, but constitutes the law and necessity of\nother beings. Has necessity then caused its own (hypostatic) existence?\nNo, it has not even reached there, inasmuch as all that is after the\nFirst achieved (hypostatic) existence on His account. How then could\nHe who is before (hypostatic) existence (or, which has achieved a form\nof existence), have derived His existence from any other principle, or\neven from Himself?\n\n\nIT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TRANSCEND THE FIRST.\n\n11. What then is the Principle which one cannot even say that it is\n(hypostatically) existent? This point will have to be conceded without\ndiscussion, however, for we cannot prosecute this inquiry. What\nindeed would we be seeking, when it is impossible to go beyond, every\ninquiry leading to some one principle, and ceasing there? Besides, all\nquestions refer to one of four things: existence, quality, cause and\nessence. From the beings that follow Him, we conclude to the essence\nof the First, in that sense in which we say He exists. Seeking the\ncause of His existence, however, would amount to seeking an (ulterior)\nprinciple, and the Principle of all things cannot Himself have a\nprinciple. An effort to determine His quality would amount to seeking\nwhat accident inheres in Him in whom is nothing contingent; and there\nis still more clearly no possible inquiry as to His existence, as\nwe have to grasp it the best we know how, striving not to attribute\nanything to Him.\n\n\nTHE ORIGIN OF GOD PUZZLES US ONLY BECAUSE WE HABITUALLY START FROM SOME\nPRE-EXISTENT CHAOS.\n\n(Habitually) we are led to ask these questions about the nature (of\nthe divinity) chiefly because we conceive of space and location as\na chaos, into which space and location, that is either presented to\nus by our imagination, or that really exists, we later introduce the\nfirst Principle. This introduction amounts to a question whence and\nhow He came. We then treat Him as a stranger, and we wonder why He is\npresent there, and what is His being; we usually assume He came up\nout of an abyss, or that He fell from above. In order to evade these\nquestions, therefore, we shall have to remove from our conception\n(of the divinity) all notion of locality, and not posit Him within\nanything, neither conceiving of Him as eternally resting, and founded\nwithin Himself, nor as if come from somewhere. We shall have to content\nourselves with thinking that He exists in the sense in which reasoning\nforces us to admit His existence, or with persuading ourselves that\nlocation, like everything else, is posterior to the Divinity, and that\nit is even posterior to all things. Thus conceiving (of the Divinity)\nas outside of all place, so far as we can conceive of Him, we are not\nsurrounding Him as it were within a circle, nor are we undertaking to\nmeasure His greatness, nor are we attributing to Him either quantity\nor quality; for He has no shape, not even an intelligible one; He is\nnot relative to anything, since His hypostatic form of existence is\ncontained within Himself, and before all else.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME, BEING WHAT HE IS, IS NOT PRODUCED BY CHANCE.\n\nSince (the Divinity) is such, we certainly could not say that He is\nwhat He is by chance. Such an assertion about Him is impossible,\ninasmuch as we can speak of Him only by negations.[189] We shall\ntherefore have to say, not that He is what He is by chance; but that,\nbeing what He is, He is not that by chance, since there is within Him\nabsolutely nothing contingent.\n\n\nEVEN WE MAY BE SAID TO BE MASTERS OF OURSELVES; HOW MUCH MORE THE\nSUPREME!\n\n12. Shall we not even refuse to say that (the divinity) is what He is,\nand is the master of what He is, or of that which is still superior?\nOur soul still moots this problem, because she is not yet entirely\nconvinced by what we have said. Our considerations thereof are as\nfollows. By his body, each one of us is far separated from \"being\"; but\nby his soul, by which he is principally constituted, he participates\nin \"being,\" and is a certain being; that is, he is a combination\nof \"difference\" and \"being.\" Fundamentally, we are therefore not a\n\"being\"; we are not even \"being\"; consequently, we are not masters of\nour \"being\"; \"being\" itself rather is master of us, since it furnishes\nus with \"difference\" (which, joined with \"being,\" constitutes our\nnature). As, in a certain degree, we are nevertheless the \"being\" that\nis master of us, we may, in this respect, even here below, be called\nmasters of ourselves. As to the Principle which absolutely is what\nHe is, which is \"Being\" itself, so that He and His being fuse, He is\nmaster of Himself, and depends on nothing, either in His existence or\n\"being.\" He does not even need to be master of Himself since (He is\nbeing), and since all that occupies the first rank in the intelligible\nworld is classified as \"being.\"\n\n\nHOW THE SUPREME IS EVEN BEYOND HIS OWN MASTER.\n\nAs to Him who made \"being\" (equivalent to) freedom, whose nature it is\nto make free beings, and who (therefore) might be called the \"author of\nliberty\"--excuse the expression--to what could He be enslaved? It is\nHis being (or, nature) to be free; or rather, it is from Him that being\nderives its freedom; for (we must not forget that) \"being\" is posterior\nto Him, who Himself (being beyond it), \"has\" none. If then there be any\nactualization in Him, if we were to consider that He was constituted\nby an actualization, He would nevertheless contain no difference,\nHe will be master of His own self that produces the actualization,\nbecause He Himself and the actualization fuse (and are identical).\nBut if we acknowledge no actualization whatever (in the Divinity), if\nwe predicate actualization only of the things that tend towards Him,\nand from Him derive their hypostatic existence, we should still less\nrecognize in Him any element that is master, or that masters. We should\nnot even say that He was master of Himself, nor that He had a master,\nbut because we have already predicated of \"being\" what is meant by\nbeing master of oneself. We therefore classify (the Divinity) in a rank\nhigher still.\n\nBut how can there be a principle higher than the one that is master\nof Himself? In the Principle which is master of Himself, as being and\nactualization are two (separate) entities, it is actualization that\nfurnishes the notion of being master of oneself. As however we saw that\nactualization was identical with \"being,\" in order to be called master\nof itself, actualization must have differentiated itself from being.\nTherefore (the Divinity), which is not constituted by two things fused\ninto unity, but by absolute Unity, being either only actualization, or\nnot even mere actualization, could not be called \"master of Himself.\"\n\n\nALL SUCH LANGUAGE ABOUT THE DIVINITY IS METAPHORICAL.\n\n13. Although the above expressions, when applied to the (divinity), are\nreally not exact, we are nevertheless forced to use them in connection\nwith this disquisition. We therefore repeat what was above rightly\nstated, that no doubleness, not even if merely logical, should be\nadmitted to our idea of the Divinity. Nevertheless, that we may be\nbetter understood, we shall for a moment lay aside the strictness of\nlanguage demanded by reason.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME IS MASTER OF HIMSELF BECAUSE HIS VERY ESSENCE DEPENDS ON\nHIMSELF.\n\nNow supposing the existence of actualizations in the divinity, and that\nthese actualizations depend on His will--for he could not actualize\ninvoluntarily--and that simultaneously they constitute His being; in\nthis case, His will and His being will be identical (that is, will\nfuse). Such as He wished to be, He is. That He wills and actualizes in\nconformity to His nature, will not be said in preference to this, that\nHis being conforms to His will and His actualization. He is absolutely\nmaster of Himself, because His very essence depends on Himself.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME IS A UNITY OF WILL, BEING AND ACTUALIZATION.\n\nHere arises another consideration. Every being, that aspires to the\nGood, wishes to be the Good far more than to be what it is; and thinks\nitself as existing most, the more it participates in the Good. Its\npreference is to be in such a state, to participate in the Good as much\nas possible, because the nature of the Good is doubtless preferable in\nitself. The greater the portion of good possessed by a being, the freer\nand more conformable to its will is its nature (being); then it forms\nbut one and the same thing with its will, and by its will achieves\nhypostatic existence (or, a form of existence). So long as a being\ndoes not possess the Good, it wishes to be different from what it is;\nso soon as the being possesses it, the being wishes to be what it is.\nThis union, or presence of the Good in a being, is not fortuitous; its\n\"being\" is not outside of the Will (of the Good); by this presence of\nthe Good it is determined, and on that account, belongs to itself. If\nthen this presence of the Good cause every being to make and determine\nitself, then evidently (the Divinity) is primarily and particularly\nthe principle through which the rest may be itself. The \"being\" (of\nthe Good) is intimately united with the will (the Divinity) has to be\nsuch as He is--if I may be permitted to speak thus--and He cannot be\nunderstood unless He wishes to be what He is. As in Him everything\nconcurs (in a consummation), He wishes to be, and is what He wishes;\nHis will and Himself form but one (are identical, or, fuse). He is not\nany the less one, for He finds that He is precisely what He may have\nwished to be. What indeed could He have wished to be, if not what He is?\n\n\nTHE SUPREME WOULD WISH TO BE WHAT HE IS.\n\nNow supposing that (the divinity) were given the chance to choose what\nHe would like to be, and that He were permitted to change His nature,\nHe would not desire to become different from what He is; He would not\nfind in Himself anything that displeased Him, as if He had been forced\nto be what He is; for He as ever willed, and still wills to be what\nHe is. The nature of Good is really His will; He has neither yielded\nto a lure, nor (blindly) followed his own nature, but He preferred\nHimself, because there was nothing different that He could have wished\nto be. With this, contrast that other beings do not find implied in\ntheir own being the reason of pleasing themselves, and that some of\nthem are even dissatisfied with themselves. In the hypostatic existence\nof the Good, however, is necessarily contained self-choice, and\nself-desire; otherwise, there would be nothing in the whole universe\nthat could please itself, since one pleases himself only inasmuch as he\nparticipates in the Good, and possesses an image of it within oneself.\n\n\nEVERY TERM, WHEN APPLIED TO THE DIVINITY, SHOULD BE PRECEDED BY A\nPARTICLE REMINDING IT IS ONLY USED METAPHORICALLY.\n\nWe must, however, ask indulgence for our language; when speaking of the\n(divinity) we are, by the necessity of being understood, obliged to\nmake use of words which a meticulous accuracy would question. Each of\nthem should be prefixed by a (warning) particle, (meaning \"somewhat,\"\nor) \"higher.\"\n\n\nTHE SUPREME IS CHOICE, BEING, WILL, SELF-DIRECTION, AND SELF-EXISTENCE.\n\nThe subsistence of the Good implies that of choice and will, because\nHe could not exist without these two. But (in the Divinity) (these\nthree, choice, being and will) do not form a multiplicity; they must\nbe considered as having fused. Since He is the author of will, He must\nevidently also be the author of what is called self-direction (\"being\nfor oneself\"). This leads us to say that He made Himself; for, since He\nis the author of will, and as this will is more or less His work, and\nas it is identical with His essence, (we may say that) He gave himself\nthe form of (hypostatic) existence. Not by chance therefore is He what\nHe is; He is what He is because He wished to be such.\n\n\nIN ANALYSIS CONTINGENCY IS ELIMINATED.\n\n14. Here is still another point of view from which the subject under\ndiscussion may be regarded. Each one of the beings that are said to\nbe existent, is either identical with its essence, or differs from\nit. Thus, some particular man differs from the Man-essence, only\nparticipating therein. On the contrary, the soul is identical with\nthe Soul-essence, when she is simple, and when she is not predicated\nof anything else. Likewise, the Man-in-himself is identical with the\nMan-essence. The man who is other than the Man-essence is contingent;\nbut the Man-essence is not contingent; the Man-in-himself exists in\nhimself. If then the essence of man exist by itself, if it be neither\nfortuitous nor contingent, how could contingency be predicated of Him\nwho is superior to Man in himself, and who begat him, from whom all\nbeings are derived, since His is a nature simpler than the Man-essence,\nand even of essence in general? If, in ascending towards greater\nsimplicity, contingency decreases, so much the more impossible is\nit that contingency could extend to the Nature that is the simplest\n(namely, the Good).\n\n\nTHE SUPREME IS BOTH BEING AND CAUSE.\n\nLet us also remember that each of the beings which exist genuinely,\nas we have said, and which have received their form of hypostatic\nexistence from the Good, likewise owe it to Him that they are\nindividual, as are the similarly situated sense-beings. By such\nindividual beings is here meant having in one's own being the cause\nof his hypostatic existence. Consequently, He who then contemplates\nthings can give an account of each of their details, to give the\ncause of the individuality of eyes or feet, to show that the cause of\nthe generation of each part is found in its relations with the other\nparts, and that they have all been made for each other. Why are the\nfeet of a particular length? Because some other organ is \"such\"; for\ninstance, the face being such, the feet themselves must be such. In\none word, the universal harmony[190] is the cause on account of which\nall things were made for each other.[191] Why is the individual such\na thing? Because of the Man-essence. Therefore the essence and the\ncause coincide. They issued from the same source, from the Principle\nwhich, without having need of reasoning, produced together the essence\nand the cause. Thus the source of the essence and the cause produces\nthem both simultaneously. Such then are begotten things, such is their\nprinciple, but in a much superior and truer manner; for in respect of\nexcellence, it possesses an immense superiority over them. Now since\nit is not fortuitously, neither by chance, nor contingently, that\nthe things which bear their cause in themselves, are what they are;\nsince, on the other hand, (the Divinity) possesses all the entities of\nwhich He is the principle, evidently, being the Father of reason, of\ncause, and of causal being--all of them entities entirely free from\ncontingence--he is the Principle and type of all things that are not\ncontingent, the Principle which is really and in the highest degree\nindependent of chance, of fortune, and of contingency; He is the cause\nof Himself, He is He by virtue of Himself; for He is Self in a primary\nand transcendent manner.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME CO-EXISTS WITH HIMSELF, AND IS SUCH AS HE WISHES TO BE.\n\n15. He is simultaneously the lovable and love; He is love of himself;\nfor He is beautiful only by and in Himself. He coexists with Himself\nonly on condition that the thing, which exists in Himself, is identical\nwith Him. Now as in Him the thing that coexists is identical with Him,\nand as in Him also that which desires, and that which is desirable play\nthe part of hypostasis and subject, here once more appears the identity\nof desire and \"being.\" If this be so, it is evidently again He who is\nthe author of Himself, and the master of Himself; consequently, He was\nmade not such as some other being desired it, but He is such as He\nHimself desires.\n\n\nMEN ESCAPE CHANCE BY INFERIOR ISOLATION; THEREFORE THE SUPREME MUST BE\nFREE.\n\nWhen we assert that (the Divinity) Himself receives nothing, and is\nreceived by no other being, we thereby in another way prove that He\nis what He is, not by chance. This is the case because He isolates\nHimself, and preserves Himself uninfected from all things. Besides,\nwe sometimes see that our nature possesses something similar, when it\nfinds itself disengaged from all that is attached to us, and subjects\nus to the sway of fortune and fatality--for all the things that we call\nours are dependent, and undergo the law of fortune, happening to us\nfortuitously. Only in this manner is one master of himself, possessing\nfree will, by virtue of an actualization of the light which has the\nform of the Good, of an actualization of the Good, which is superior to\nintelligence; of an actualization which is not adventitious, and which\nis above all thought. When we shall have risen thither, when we shall\nhave become that alone, leaving all the rest, shall we not say that we\nare then above even liberty and free will? Who then could subject us\nto chance, to fortune, to contingency, since we shall have become the\ngenuine life, or rather, since we shall be in Him who derives nothing\nfrom any other being, who is solely himself? When other beings are\nisolated, they do not suffice themselves; but He is what He is, even\nwhen isolated.\n\n\nTHE ASCENT OF LIFE WITNESS TO THE DISAPPEARANCE OF CONTINGENCY.\n\nThe first hypostatic form of existence does not consist in an inanimate\nentity or in an irrational life; for an irrational life is but weak in\nessence, being a dispersion of reason, and something indeterminate. On\nthe contrary, the closer life approaches reason, the further is it from\ncontingency, for that which is rational has nothing to do with chance.\nAscending then (to the Divinity) He does not seem to us to be Reason,\nbut what is still more beautiful than Reason; so far is He from having\narisen by chance! Indeed, He is the very root of Reason, for it is the\ngoal at which all things find their consummation. He is the principle\nand foundation of an immense Tree which lives by reason; He remains in\nHimself, and imparts essence to the Tree by the reason He communicates.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME AS EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE; AS INCLINATION AND IMMANENCE.\n\n16. As we assert, and as it seems evident that (the Divinity) is\neverywhere and nowhere, it is necessary thoroughly to grasp and\nunderstand this conception, as it applies to the subject of our\nstudies. Since (the Divinity) is nowhere, He is nowhere fortuitously;\nsince He is everywhere, He is everywhere what He is. He himself is\ntherefore what is named omnipresence, and universality. He is not\ncontained within omnipresence, but is omnipresence itself, and He\nimparts essence to all the other beings because they are all contained\nwithin Him who is everywhere. Possessing the supreme rank, or rather\nHimself being supreme, He holds all things in obedience to Himself. For\nthem He is not contingent; it is they that are contingent to Him, or\nrather, that connect with Him; for it is not He who contemplates them,\nbut they who look at Him. On His part, He, as it were, moves towards\nthe most intimate depths within Himself, loving Himself, loving the\npure radiance of which He is formed, Himself being what He loves, that\nis, giving Himself a hypostatic form of existence, because He is an\nimmanent actualization, and what is most lovable in Him constitutes the\nhigher Intelligence. This Intelligence being an operation, He himself\nis an operation; but as He is not the operation of any other principle,\nHe is the operation of Himself; He therefore is not what chance makes\nof Him, but what He actualizes. He is the author of Himself, inasmuch\nas He exists particularly because He is His own foundation, because He\ncontemplates Himself, because, so to speak, He passes His existence\nin contemplating Himself. He therefore is, not what He fortuitously\nfound Himself to be, but what He himself wishes to be, and as His will\ncontains nothing fortuitous, He is even in this respect independent\nof contingency. For, since His will is the will of the Best that is\nin the universe, it could not be fortuitous. If one were to imagine\nan opposite movement, one will easily recognize that His inclination\ntowards Himself, which is His actualization, and His immanence in\nHimself make of Him what He is. Indeed, should (the divinity) incline\ntowards what is outside of Himself, He would cease being what He\nis. His actualization, in respect to Himself, is to be what He is;\nfor He and that actualization coincide. He therefore gives Himself\na hypostatic form of existence, because the actualization that He\nproduces is inseparable from Himself. If then the actualization of (the\ndivinity) did not merely commence, but if, on the contrary, it dated\nfrom all eternity; if it consist in an exciting action,[192] identical\nto Him who is excited; and if, besides this exciting action, He be\never-being super-intellection, then (the divinity) is what He makes\nhimself by His exciting action. The latter is superior to \"Being,\" to\nIntelligence, and to the Life of Wisdom; it is Himself. He therefore\nis an actualization superior to Life, Intelligence and Wisdom; these\nproceed from Him, and from Him alone. He therefore derives essence from\nHimself, and by Himself; consequently, He is, not what He fortuitously\nfound Himself to be, but what He willed to be.\n\n\nPROVIDENCE, THE PLAN OF THE UNIVERSE, IS FROM ETERNITY.\n\n17. Here is another proof of it. We have stated that the world and the\n\"being\" it contains are what they would be if their production had been\nthe result of a voluntary determination of their author, what they\nwould still be if the divinity exercising a prevision and prescience\nbased on reasoning, had done His work according to Providence. But\nas (these beings) are or become what they are from all eternity,\nthere must also, from eternity--within the coexistent beings, exist\n(\"seminal) reasons\" which subsist in a plan more perfect (than that\nof our universe); consequently, the intelligible entities are above\nProvidence, and choice; and all the things which exist in Essence\nsubsist eternally there, in an entirely intellectual existence. If the\nname \"Providence\" be applied to the plan of the universe, then immanent\nIntelligence certainly is anterior to the plan of the universe, and the\nlatter proceeds from immanent Intelligence, and conforms thereto.[193]\n\n\nTHE SUPREME, ASSISTED BY INTELLIGENCE, WOULD HAVE NO ROOM FOR CHANCE.\n\nSince Intelligence is thus anterior to all things, and since all\nthings are (rooted) in such an Intelligence as principle, Intelligence\ncannot be what it is as a matter of chance. For, if on one hand,\nIntelligence be multiple, on the other hand it is in perfect agreement\nwith itself, so that, by co-ordination of the elements it contains, it\nforms a unity. Once more, such a principle that is both multiple and\nco-ordinated manifoldness, which contains all (\"seminal) reasons\" by\nembracing them within its own universality, could not be what it is as\na result of fortune or chance. This principle must have an entirely\nopposite nature, as much differing from contingency, as reason from\nchance, which consists in the lack of reason. If the above Intelligence\nbe the (supreme) Principle, then Intelligence, such as it has been here\ndescribed, is similar to this Principle, conforms to it, participates\nin it, and is such as is wished by it and its power. (The Divinity)\nbeing indivisible, is therefore a (single) Reason that embraces\neverything, a single (unitary) Number, and a single (Divinity) that is\ngreater and more powerful than the generated (universe); than He, none\nis greater or better. From none other, therefore, can He have derived\nHis essence or qualities. What He is for and in Himself, is therefore\nderived from Himself; without any relation with the outside, nor with\nany other being, but entirely turned towards Himself.\n\n\nCHANCE COULD NOT CAUSE THE ONE THAT IS THE CENTRE OF THE CIRCULAR\nINTELLIGENCE.\n\n18. If then you seek this (Principle), do not expect to find anything\non the outside of Him; in Him seek all that is after Him, but do\nnot seek to penetrate within Him; for He is what is outside (of\neverything), the comprehension of all things, and their measure.[194]\nSimultaneously, He is the internal, being the most intimate depth of\nall things; (in which case) the external would be (represented by)\nReason and Intelligence, which like a circumference fit around Him and\ndepend from Him. Indeed, Intelligence is such only because it touches\nHim, and so far as it touches Him, and depends from Him[195]; for it is\nits dependence from Him that constitutes its intelligence. It resembles\na circle which is in contact with its centre. It would be universally\nacknowledged that such a circle would derive all its power from the\ncentre, and would, in a higher sense, be centriform. Thus the radii\nof such a circle unite in a single centre by extremities similar to\nthe distal and originating (extremities). These (distal) extremities,\nthough they be similar to the centric ones, are nevertheless but faint\ntraces thereof; for the latter's potentiality includes both the radii\nand their (distal) extremities; it is everywhere present in the radii,\nmanifests its nature therein, as an immature development. This is an\nillustration how Intelligence and Essence were born from (the divinity)\nas by effusion or development; and by remaining dependent from the\nintellectual nature of the Unity, it thereby manifests an inherent\nhigher Intelligence, which (speaking strictly), is not intelligence,\nsince it is the absolute Unity. A centre, even without radii or\ncircumference, is nevertheless the \"father\" of the circumference and\nthe radii, for it reveals traces of its nature, and by virtue of an\nimmanent potency, and individual force, it begets the circumference\nand the radii which never separate from it. Similarly, the One is the\nhigher archetype of the intellectual power which moves around Him,\nbeing His image. For in the Unity there is a higher Intelligence which,\nso to speak, moving in all directions and manners, thereby becomes\nIntelligence; while the Unity, dwelling above Intelligence, begets it\nby its power. How then could fortune, contingency and chance approach\nthis intelligence-begetting Power, a power that is genuinely and\nessentially creative? Such then is what is in Intelligence, and such is\nwhat is in Unity, though that which is in Him is far superior.\n\n\nAS CAUSE, SUITABILITY, AND OPPORTUNITY, THE SUPREME IS BEYOND CHANCE.\n\n(As illustration), consider the radiance shed afar by some luminous\nsource that remains within itself; the radiation would represent\nthe image, while the source from which it issues would be the\ngenuine light.[196] Nevertheless, the radiation, which represents\nthe intelligence, is not an image that has a form foreign (to its\nprinciple), for it does not exist by chance, being reason and cause\nin each of its parts. Unity then is the cause of the cause; He is, in\nthe truest sense, supreme causality, simultaneously containing all the\nintellectual causes He is to produce; this, His offspring, is begotten\nnot as a result of chance, but according to His own volition. His\nvolition, however, was not irrational, fortuitous, nor accidental;\nand as nothing is fortuitous in Him, His will was exactly suitable.\nTherefore Plato[197] called it the \"suitable,\" and the \"timely,\" to\nexpress as clearly as possible that the (Divinity) is foreign to all\nchance, and that He is that which is exactly suitable. Now if He be\nexactly suitable, He is so not irrationally. If He be timely, He must\n(by a Greek pun), also be \"supremely sovereign\" over the (beings)\nbeneath Him. So much the more will He be timely for Himself. Not by\nchance therefore is He what He is, for He willed to be what He is;\nHe wills suitable things, and in Him that which is suitable, and the\nactualization thereof, coincide. He is the suitable, not as a subject,\nbut as primary actualization manifesting Him such as it was suitable\nfor Him to be. That is the best description we can give of Him, in our\nimpotence to express ourselves about Him as we should like.[198]\n\n\nNO PERSON WHO HAS SEEN THE SUPREME COULD POSSIBLY CALL HIM CHANCE.\n\n19. By the use of the above indications (it is possible), to ascend to\nHim. Having done so, grasp Him. Then you will be able to contemplate\nHim, and you will find no terms to describe His (greatness). When you\nshall see Him, and resign any attempt at spoken description, you will\nproclaim that He exists by Himself in a way such that, if He had any\nbeing, it would be His servant, and would be derived from Him. No one\nwho has ever seen Him would have the audacity to maintain that He is\nwhat He is by chance; nor even to utter such a blasphemy, for He would\nbe confounded by his own temerity. Having ascended to Him, the (human\nobserver) could not even locate His presence, as it were rising up\neverywhere before the eyes of his soul. Whichever way the soul directs\nher glances, she sees Him, unless, on considering some other object,\nshe abandons the divinity by ceasing to think of Him.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME IS ABOVE BEING BECAUSE NOT DEPENDENT THEREON.\n\nThe ancient (philosophers), in enigmatical utterances, said that (the\ndivinity) is above \"being.\"[199] This must be understood to mean not\nonly that He begets being, but because He is not dependent on \"being\"\nor on Himself. Not even His own \"being\" is to Him a principle; for He\nhimself is the principle of \"being.\" Not for Himself did he make it;\nbut, having made it, He left it outside of Himself, because He has no\nneed of essence, since He himself made it. Thus, even though He exist,\nHe does not produce that which is meant by that verb.\n\n\nHAVING MADE HIMSELF DOES NOT IMPLY ANY PRIORITY IN THE DIVINITY.\n\n20. It will be objected that the above implies the existence (of the\nDivinity) before He existed; for, if He made Himself, on the one hand,\nHe did not yet exist, if it was Himself that He made; and on the other,\nso far as it was He who made, He already existed before Himself, since\nwhat has been made was Himself. However, (the Divinity) should be\nconsidered not so much as \"being made\" but as \"making,\" and we should\nrealize that the actualization by which He created Himself is absolute;\nfor His actualization does not result in the production of any other\n\"being.\" He produces nothing but Himself, He is entirely Himself;\nwe are not dealing here with two things, but with a single entity.\nNeither need we hesitate to admit that the primary actualization has no\n\"being\"; but that actualization should be considered as constituting\nHis hypostatic form of existence. If within Him these two were to be\ndistinguished, the superlatively perfect Principle would be incomplete\nand imperfect. To add actualization to Him would be to destroy His\nunity. Thus, since the actualization is more perfect than His being,\nand since that which is primary is the most perfect, that which is\nprimary must necessarily be actualization. He is what He is as soon\nas He actualizes. He cannot be said to have existed before He made\nHimself; for before He made Himself He did not exist; but (from the\nfirst actualization) He already existed in entirety. He therefore is an\nactualization which does not depend on being, (an actualization) that\nis clearly free; and thus He (originates) from Himself. If, as to His\nessence, He were preserved by some other principle, He himself would\nnot be the first proceeding from Himself. He is said to contain Himself\nbecause He produces (and parades) Himself; since it is from the very\nbeginning that He caused the existence of what He naturally contains.\nStrictly, we might indeed say, that He made Himself, if there existed a\ntime when He himself began to exist. But since He was what He is before\nall times, the statement that He made Himself means merely that \"having\nmade\" and \"himself\" are inseparable; for His essence coincides with\nHis creative act, and, if I may be permitted to speak thus, with his\n\"eternal generation.\"\n\n\nHOW THE SUPREME MAY BE SAID TO COMMAND HIMSELF.\n\nLikewise, the statement that the (divinity) commands Himself may be\ntaken strictly, if in Him be two entities (the commander and the\ncommanded); but if (we may not distinguish such a pair of entities)\nthere is only one entity within Him, and He is only the commander,\ncontaining nothing that obeys. How then, if He contain nothing that was\ncommanded, could He command Himself? The statement that He commands\nHimself means that, in this sense, there is nothing above Him; in which\ncase He is the First, not on account of the numerical order, but by His\nauthority and perfectly free power. If He be perfectly free, He cannot\ncontain anything that is not free; He must therefore be entirely free\nwithin Himself. Does He contain anything that is not Himself, that He\ndoes not do, that is not His work? If indeed He contained anything that\nwas not His work, He would be neither perfectly free nor omnipotent; He\nwould not be free, because He would not dominate this thing; nor would\nHe be omnipotent, because the thing whose making would not be in His\npower would even thereby evade His dominion.\n\n\nFURTHER OBJECTIONS TO THE SELF-AUTOCRACY OF THE DIVINITY.\n\n21. Could (the divinity) have made Himself different from what He made\nHimself? (If he could not, He would not have been omnipotent). If you\nremove from Him the power of doing evil, you thereby also remove the\npower of doing good. (In the divinity), power does not consist in the\nability to make contraries; it is a constant and immutable power whose\nperfection consisted precisely in not departing from unity; for the\npower to make contraries is a characteristic of a being incapable of\ncontinuously persisting in the best. Self-creation (the actualization\nby which the divinity created Himself) exists once for all, for it\nis perfect. Who indeed could change an actualization produced by the\nwill of the Divinity, an actualization that constitutes His very will?\nBut how then was this actualization produced by the volition (of the\ndivinity) which did not yet exist?\n\nWhat could be meant by the \"volition of (the Divinity\") if He had not\nyet willed hypostatic form of existence (for Himself)? Whence then\ncame His will? Would it have come from His being (which, according to\nthe above objection) was not yet actualized? But His will was already\nwithin His \"being.\" In the (Divinity), therefore, there is nothing\nwhich differs from His \"being.\" Otherwise, there would have been in\nHim something that would not have been His will. Thus, everything in\nHim was will; there was in Him nothing that did not exercise volition;\nnothing which, therefore, was anterior to His volition. Therefore,\nfrom the very beginning, the will was He; therefore, the (Divinity)\nis as and such as He willed it to be. When we speak of what was the\nconsequence of the will (of the Divinity), of what His will has\nproduced, (we must indeed conclude that) His will produced nothing that\nHe was not already. The statement that (the Divinity) contains Himself\nmeans (no more than that) all the other beings that proceed from Him\nare by Him sustained. They indeed exist by a sort of participation in\nHim, and they relate back to Him. (The Divinity) Himself does not need\nto be contained or to participate; He is all things for Himself; or\nrather, He is nothing for Himself, because He has no need of all the\nother things in respect to Himself.\n\n\nTHE OBSTACLE TO THE DIVINITY IS FAILURE TO ABSTRACT ENOUGH FROM HIM.\n\nThus, whenever you wish to speak of (the Divinity), or to gain a\nconception of Him, put aside all the rest. When you will have made\nabstraction of all the rest, and when you will thus have isolated\n(the Divinity), do not seek to add anything to Him; rather examine\nwhether, in your thought, you have not omitted to abstract something\nfrom Him. Thus you can rise to a Principle of whom you could not later\neither assert or conceive anything else. Classify in the supreme rank,\ntherefore, none but He who really is free, because He is not even\ndependence on Himself; and because he merely is Himself, essentially\nHimself, while each of the other beings is itself, and something else\nbesides.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND ENNEAD, BOOK ONE.\n\nOf the Heaven.[200]\n\n\nHEAVEN, THOUGH IN FLUX, PERPETUATES ITSELF BY FORM.\n\n1. Nothing will be explained by the perfectly true (Stoic) statement\nthat the world, as corporeal being that ever existed and that will ever\nexist, is indebted for the cause of its perpetuity to the volition\nof the divinity. We might find an analogy between the change of the\nelements, and the death of animals without the perishing of the form of\nthe species here below, and the universe above, whose body is subject\nto a perpetual flux and flow. Thus the divine volition could preserve\nfor it the same specific form in spite of successive alterations, so\nthat, without perpetually retaining numerical unity, it would ever\npreserve the specific unity of form. It would indeed be a remarkable\ndiscrepancy in the methods of nature that here below in animals the\nform alone should be perpetual, while in the heaven and the stars their\nindividuality should be considered as perpetual as their form.\n\n\nTHERE MUST INEVITABLY BE CHANGE IN HEAVEN.\n\nThe incorruptibility of the heaven has been ascribed to its containing\nwithin its breast all things,[201] and to the non-existence of any\nother thing into which it could change, as well as to the impossibility\nof its meeting anything exterior that could destroy it. These theories\nwould indeed, in a reasonable manner, explain the incorruptibility\nof heaven considered as totality, and universe; but would fail to\nexplain the perpetuity of the sun and of the other stars which are\nparts of heaven, instead of being the whole universe, as is the heaven.\nIt would seem more reasonable that, just like the fire and similar\nthings, the stars, and the world considered as universe would possess\na perpetuity chiefly of form. It is quite possible that the heaven,\nwithout meeting any destructive exterior thing, should be subjected to\na perpetual destruction such that it would preserve nothing identical\nbut the form, from the mere mutual destruction of its parts. In this\ncase its substrate, being in a perpetual flux, would receive its form\nfrom some other principle; and we would be driven to recognize in the\nuniversal living Organism what occurs in man, in the horse, and in\nother animals; namely, that the man or horse (considered as species)\nlasts forever, while the individual changes. (According to this view,\nthen) the universe will not be constituted by one ever permanent\npart, the heaven, and another ceaselessly changing one, composed of\nterrestrial things. All these things will then be subject to the same\ncondition though they might differ by longer or shorter duration, since\ncelestial bodies are more durable. Such a conception of the perpetuity\ncharacteristic of the universe and its parts contains less ambiguity\n(than the popular notion), and would be freed from all doubt if we\nwere to demonstrate that the divine power is capable of containing the\nuniverse in this manner. The theory that the world contains something\nperpetual in its individuality would demand not only a demonstration\nthat the divine volition can produce such an effect, but also an\nexplanation why certain things (according to that theory) are always\nidentical (in form and individuality), while other things are identical\nonly by their form. If the parts of the heaven alone remained\nidentical (by their individuality), all other things also should\nlogically remain (individually) identical.\n\n\nREJECTION OF THE OPINION OF HERACLITUS.\n\n2. An admission that the heaven and the stars are perpetual in their\nindividuality, while sublunary things are perpetual only in their form,\nwould demand demonstration that a corporeal being can preserve its\nindividuality as well as its form, even though the nature of bodies\nwere a continual fluctuation. Such is the nature that the physical\nphilosophers,[202] and even Plato himself, attribute not only to\nsublunar bodies, but even to celestial ones. \"For,\" asks (Plato[203]),\n\"how could corporeal and visible objects subsist ever immutable and\nidentical with themselves?\" (Plato) therefore admits the opinion of\nHeraclitus that \"the sun itself is in a state of perpetual becoming\n(or, growth).\"[204]\n\n\nARISTOTLE HAS TO DEPEND ON QUINTESSENCE.\n\nOn the contrary, in the system of Aristotle, the immutability of the\nstars is easily explained, but only after accepting his theory of a\nfifth element (the quintessence[205]). If, however, it be rejected,\nit would be impossible to demonstrate that the heaven, let alone its\nparts, the sun and the stars, do not perish, while (as Aristotle does)\nwe regard the body of the heaven as being composed of the same elements\nas terrestrial animals.\n\n\nPLOTINOS'S VIEWS SUPPORTED BY THE HEAVEN'S POSSESSION OF THE SOUL AND\nBODY.\n\nAs every animal is composed of soul and body, the heaven must owe the\npermanence of its individuality to the nature either of its soul, or\nof its body; or again, to that of both. On the hypothesis that its\nincorruptibility is due to the nature of its body, the Soul's only\nfunction will be to animate it (by uniting with the body of the world).\nOn the contrary hypothesis that the body, by nature corruptible,\nowes its incorruptibility exclusively to the Soul, there is need of\ndemonstration that the state of the body does not naturally oppose\nthis constitution and permanence (for, naturally constituted objects\nadmit of no disharmony); but that, on the contrary, here matter, by\nits predisposition, contributes to the accomplishment of the divine\nvolition.\n\n\nFLUCTUATION NEED NOT INTERFERE WITH CONTINUANCE.\n\n3. (It might however be objected) that the body of the world could\nnot contribute to the immortality of the world, since the body itself\nfluctuates perpetually. But this fluctuation does not take place in\nan outward direction, while the body (of the world) remains ever the\nsame because this fluctuation occurs so entirely within the world that\nnothing issues therefrom. The world therefore could neither increase\nnor diminish, nor further grow old. (As proof of this we may) consider\nhow, from all eternity, the earth constantly preserves the same shape\nand mass; similarly, the air never diminishes, any more than the water.\nThe changes within them do not affect the universal living Organism.\nEven we human beings subsist a long while, in spite of the perpetual\nchange of our constituent parts, and though some of these parts even\nissue from the body. So much the more will the world's nature, from\nwhich nothing issues, sufficiently harmonize with the nature of the\nuniversal Soul to form along with her an organism which ever remains\nthe same, and subsists for ever.\n\n\nFIRE, THOUGH AN APPARENT EXCEPTION, STILL CONFORMS TO THIS PROCEDURE.\n\nFor example, fire (as the principal element of the heaven), is both\nlively and swift, and cannot remain in the inferior regions, any more\nthan the earth can abide in the superior regions. When it has reached\nthese regions where it is to remain, it becomes established in the most\nsuitable place. But even so, like all other bodies, it still seeks to\nextend in all directions. However, it cannot ascend, since there is no\nplace higher than the one it occupies; nor can it descend, because of\nthe opposition of its own nature. The only thing left for it to do is\nto yield to the guidance and natural impulsion of the life-imparting\nuniversal Soul, that is, to move into the most beautiful place, in the\nuniversal Soul. Its falling from here is prevented by the universal\nSoul's circular movement which dominates and supports it, as well as\nby its innate indisposition to descend, so that its continuance in\nthe higher regions is unopposed. (The fire has no similarity with)\nthe constitutive parts of our body which are forced to derive their\nsuitable form from elsewhere. If unaided, they are not even capable of\npreserving their organization. Merely to subsist, they are forced to\nborrow parts from other objects. The case is entirely different with\nthe fire of the heaven, which needs no food because it loses nothing.\nIf indeed it allowed anything to escape, we might indeed be forced to\nstate that when in the heaven a fire is extinguished, a substitute must\nbe lit. But in such a case the universal living Organism would no more\nremain identical.\n\n\nTHE IMMORTALITY OF THE HEAVEN IS DUE TO RESIDENCE THERE OF THE\nUNIVERSAL SOUL.\n\n4. Apart from the exigencies of our argument, it may be interesting to\nconsider whether there be any wastage off from heaven, so as to create\na need of being (replenished or) fed, so to speak; or whether all its\ncontents, being once for all established, subsist there naturally,\nwithout allowing any of their substance to escape. In the latter case\nwe would be driven further to inquire whether the heaven be composed\nof fire exclusively or principally[213]; and whether, while dominating\nthe other elements, the fire engages them in its course. Were we to\nassociate (with fire) the Soul, which is the most powerful of all\ncauses, so as to unite her with elements so pure and excellent (just\nas, in other animals, the soul chooses the best parts of the body\nas dwelling-place), we would have produced a solid argument for the\nimmortality of the heaven. Aristotle indeed says that the flame surges,\nand that the fire devours everything with an insatiable avidity[206];\nbut he was evidently speaking only of the terrestrial fire, for the\ncelestial fire is calm, immovable, and in harmony with the nature of\nthe stars.\n\n\nTHE HEAVEN'S IMMORTALITY ALSO DUE TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL'S SPONTANEOUS\nMOTION.\n\nA still more important reason for the immortality of the heaven\nis that the universal Soul, moving with remarkable spontaneity,\nimmediately succeeds the most perfect principles (such as the Good,\nand Intelligence). She could not therefore allow the annihilation of\nanything which had once been posited within her. Ignorance of the cause\nthat contains the universe could alone permit denial that the universal\nSoul which emanates from the divinity excels all other bonds in\nstrength. It is absurd to believe that after having contained something\nduring a certain period, she could ever cease doing so. This would\nimply that she had done so till now by some violence; which would again\ninfer the existence of some plan more natural than the actual state,\nand actual admirable disposition of beings within the very constitution\nof the universe; which would lastly suggest a force capable of\ndestroying the organization of the universe, and of undermining the\nsovereignty of the governing Soul.\n\n\nTHE IMMORTALITY OF THE HEAVEN PROVED BY ITS NEVER HAVING HAD TO BEGIN.\n\nWe have elsewhere[207] shown that it would be absurd to suppose that\nthe world ever had a beginning. This however implies that it will\nnever cease to exist. Why indeed should it not continue to do so? Its\ncomponent elements are not, like wood, and similar things, exposed\nto wastage. Their continued subsistence, however, implies that the\nuniverse that they form must also ever subsist. On the other hand, even\nif they were subject to a perpetual change, the universe must still\nsubsist because the principle of this change subsists continually.\nMoreover, it has elsewhere been shown[224] that the universal Soul is\nnot subject to repentance, because she governs the universe without\ndifficulties or fatigue, and that even in the impossible case that the\nbody of the universe should happen to perish, she would not thereby be\naltered.\n\n\nWHY CELESTIAL THINGS LAST LONGER THAN TERRESTRIAL ONES.\n\n5. The reason why celestial things endure beyond terrestrial\nanimals and elements has been thus stated by Plato[225]: \"Divine\nanimals were formed by the divinity Himself, while the animals\nhere below were formed by the divinities, His offspring.\" What the\ndivinity (Himself) does could not possibly perish. This implies the\nexistence, below the demiurge (Intelligence), of the celestial Soul,\nwith our souls.[208] From the celestial Soul derives and flows an\napparent-form-of-an-image,[209] which forms terrestrial animals. This\ninferior soul imitates her intelligible principle (the celestial Soul),\nwithout, however, being able to resemble her completely--because she\nemploys elements which are less good (than the celestial elements);\nbecause the place where she operates with them is less good (than\nheaven)--and because the materials that she organizes could not remain\nunited. Consequently, terrestrial animals could not last for ever. For\nthe same reason this soul does not dominate terrestrial bodies with as\nmuch power (as the celestial Soul dominates celestial things), because\neach of them is governed by another (human) soul.\n\n\nIMMORTALITY DOES NOT EXTEND TO THE SUB-LUNAR SPHERE.\n\nIf we be right in attributing immortality to the heaven, we shall have\nto extend that conception to the stars it contains; for unless its\nparts endured, neither could the heaven. However, the things beneath\nthe heaven do not form part of it. The region which constitutes the\nheaven does not extend further down than the moon. As to us, having\nour organs formed by the (vegetative) soul which was given us by the\ncelestial divinities (the stars), and even the heaven itself,[210]\nwe are united to the body by that soul. Indeed, the other soul (the\nreasonable soul), which constitutes our person, our \"me,\"[211] is not\nthe cause of our being,[212] but of our well-being (which consists in\nour intellectual life). She comes to join our body when it is already\nformed (by the vegetative soul), and contributes to our being only by\none part, by giving us reason (in making of us reasonable beings, and\nmen).\n\n\nTHE STARS CONTAIN NOT ONLY FIRE, BUT TANGIBLE EARTH.\n\n6. Is the heaven composed exclusively of fire? Does the fire allow\nany of its substance to flow off, or escape? Does it, therefore, need\nbeing fed? (Plato[213]) thinks the body of the universe is composed of\nearth and fire; fire to explain its being visible, and earth to explain\nits being tangible. This would lead us to suppose that the stars are\ncomposed of fire not exclusively, but predominatingly, since they seem\nto possess a tangible element. This opinion is plausible because Plato\nsupports it with reasonable grounds. Sense, sight and touch would lead\nus to believe that the greater part, if not the whole, of the heaven,\nis fire. But reason suggests that the heaven also contains earth,\nbecause without earth it could not be tangible.[214] This however does\nnot imply that it contains also air and water. It would seem absurd\nto think that water could subsist in so great a fire; nor could air\nsurvive therein without immediately being transformed to steam. It\nmight be objected that two solids which play the parts of extremes in\na proportion, cannot be united without two means.[213] This objection,\nhowever, might have no cogency, for this mathematical relation might\nnot apply to natural things, as indeed we are led to surmise by the\npossibility of mingling earth and water without any intermediary.\nTo this it may be answered that earth and water already contain the\nother elements. Some persons might think that the latter could not\neffectually unite earth and water; but this would not disturb our\ncontention that the earth and water are related because each of these\ntwo elements contains all the others.\n\n\nEARTH CONTAINS ALL THE OTHER ELEMENTS.\n\nBesides, we shall have to examine whether the earth be invisible\nwithout fire, and the fire intangible without the earth. Were this the\ncase, nothing would possess its own proper being. All things would be\nmixed; each would reclaim its name only by the element preponderating\nin it; for it has been claimed that the earth could not exist without\nthe humidity of water, which alone keeps all its parts united. Even\nwere this granted, it would, none the less, remain absurd to say that\neach of these elements is something, while claiming that it does not\npossess any characteristically individual constitution, except by its\nunion with the other elements, which, nevertheless, would not, any\nthe more, exist individually, each in itself. What reality, indeed,\nwould inhere in the nature or being of the earth, if none of its parts\nwere earth except because the water that operated as a bond? Besides,\nwith what could water unite without the preliminary existence of an\nextension whose parts were to be bound together for the formation of\na continuous whole? The existence of an extension, however small it\nbe, will imply the self-existence of earth, without the assistance of\nwater; otherwise, there would be nothing for water to bind together.\nNor would the earth have any need of air, since the air exists before\nthe observation of any change within it. Nor is fire any more necessary\nto the constitution of the earth; fire only serves in making it\nvisible, like all other objects. It is indeed reasonable to assert that\nit is fire which renders objects visible, and it is a mistake[215] to\nstate that \"one sees darkness,\" which cannot be seen any more than\nsilence can be heard. Besides, there is no necessity for fire to be in\nearth; light suffices (to make it visible). Snow, and many other very\ncold substances are, without any fire, very brilliant--that is, unless\nwe say that the fire approached them, and colored them before leaving\nthem.\n\n\nELEMENTS ARE NEVERTHELESS INDIVIDUAL.\n\nAs to the other elements, could not water exist without participating\nin the earth? Air could certainly not be said to participate in earth,\nbecause of its penetrability. It is very doubtful that the fire\ncontains any earth, because it does not seem continuous, and does not,\nby itself, seem to be tri-dimensional. True, fire does seem to contain\nsolidity, but not of a tri-dimensional kind; it seems rather to be a\nsort of resistance corporeal nature[214]). Only of earth may hardness\nbe predicated; indeed, gold, in liquid state, is dense; not because it\nis earth, but because it possesses density, and is solidified. It would\ntherefore not be unreasonable that fire, apart by itself, could subsist\nby the power of the Soul which sustains it by her presence. The bodies\nof (certain among) the guardian spirits consist of fire.[216]\n\n\nTERRESTRIAL ELEMENTS, HOWEVER, DO NOT DEGRADE THE HEAVEN.\n\nIt is unlikely that the universal Organism is composed of universal\nelements. That terrestrial animals are thus composed is certain; but\nto introduce the terrestrial element into the composition of the\nheaven would be to admit something contrary to nature, and to the\norder thereby established. (Epicurus's opinion that) the stars carry\nterrestrial bodies along in their rapid flight is undemonstrable.\nBesides, the presence of the earth would be an obstacle to the shine\nand splendor of the celestial fire.\n\n\nPLATO POSTULATED THE EXISTENCE OF EARTH AS BASIS OF LIFE.\n\n7. Plato's view[217] is to be accepted. The universe must contain\nsomething solid, impenetrable, so that the earth, when established in\nthe middle of the universe, might offer a firm foundation for all the\nanimals that walk on it, and that these animals might possess a certain\nsolidity by the very fact of their terrestriality; so that the earth\nmight, by itself, possess the property of continuousness; that it might\nbe illuminated by fire, might also participate in water, so as not to\nbe desiccated, and so that its parts might unite, and that the air\nmight somewhat lighten its mass.\n\n\nELEMENTS ARE KINDRED THROUGH THEIR COMMON GROUND, THE UNIVERSE-BODY.\n\nThe earth was mingled with the upper fire not to produce the stars,\nbut because fire has something terrestrial, as earth has something\nigneous, as a result of all the bodies being contained within the\nbody of the universe. In short, every one of the elements includes\nmixture of itself and of the other with which it participates. This\nresults from the interrelating community existing within the universe\n(the \"sympathy\"). So each element, without combining with any other,\nborrows some of its properties. For example, water participates in the\nfluidity of the air, without however mingling therewith; so the earth\ndoes not possess the fire, but derives its brightness from it. On\nthe other hand, a mixture would render all properties common to both\nelements, confounding them together,[218] and would not limit itself\nto merely approximating earth and fire, that is, a certain solidity\nwith a certain density. On this subject we can invoke the authority of\n(Plato[219]), \"The divinity lit this light in the second circle above\nthe earth,\" thereby referring to the sun, which he elsewhere calls \"the\nmost brilliant star.\"\n\nBy these words he hinders us from admitting that the sun is anything\nelse than fire. He also indicates that fire has no quality other than\nlight, which he considers as distinct from flame, and as possessing\nonly a gentle heat. This light is a body. From it emanates another\nbeing that we, by verbal similarity, also call light, and which we\nacknowledge to be incorporeal. This second kind of light derives from\nthe former, being its flower and brightness, and constitutes the\nessentially white (that is, brilliant) body (of lightning, or comets).\n(Unfortunately, however), the word \"terrestrial\" (which designates the\nelement allied to the fire, as we have said above), we are wont to\nregard unfavorably because Plato makes the earth consist of solidity,\nwhile we speak of the earth as a unity, though (Plato) distinguishes\nseveral qualities within this element.\n\n\nNATURE OF THE CELESTIAL FIRE AND LIGHT.\n\nThe fire of which we speak above emits the purest light, and resides\nin the highest region, by virtue of its nature. These celestial flames\nare entirely distinct from the earthly flame, which after ascending\nto a certain height, and meeting a greater quantity of air, becomes\nextinguished. After ascending, it falls back on to the earth, because\n(as a comet) it cannot rise any further; it stops in the sublunar\nregions, though rendering the ambient air lighter. In those cases in\nwhich it continues to subsist in higher regions, it becomes weaker,\ngentler, and acquires a heatless glow, which is but a reflection of the\ncelestial light. The latter, on the other hand, is divided partly among\nthe stars in which it reveals great contrasts of magnitude and color,\nand partly in the atmosphere. Its invisibility to our eyes is caused\nboth by its tenuity, and transparence, which causes it to become as\ntangible as pure air, and also because of its distance from the earth.\n\n\nCELESTIAL LIGHT IS NOT EXPOSED TO ANY WASTAGE.\n\n8. Since this light subsists in elevated regions, because the purity of\nits nature forces it to remain in pure regions, it cannot be subject\nto any wastage (or, leakage). Such a nature could not allow any escape\neither downwards or upwards, nor could it meet anything that would\nforce it to descend. Moreover, it will be remembered that there is a\ngreat difference of condition in a body united to, or separated from a\nsoul; and in this case the body of the heaven is everywhere united to\nthe (universal) Soul.\n\n\nTHE HEAVEN DOES NOT NEED THE ACTION OF EITHER AIR OR FIRE.\n\nBesides, all that approaches the heaven is either air or fire. What\nof it is air cannot affect the heaven. What of it is fire can neither\ninfluence the heaven, nor touch it, to act on it. Before acting on the\nheaven, it would have to assume its nature; besides, fire is less great\nor powerful than the heaven. Moreover, the action of fire consists in\nheating; whereas, 1, that which is to be heated cannot have been hot by\nitself; and as, 2, that which is to be dissolved by fire must first be\nheated, inasmuch as it is this heating which causes a change of nature.\nNo other body is needed for either the subsistence of the heaven, or\nfor the functioning of its natural revolutions.[220] Moreover, the\nheaven does not move in a straight line, because it is in the nature of\ncelestial things to remain immovable, or to move in a circular orbit,\nand not to assume any other kind of movement without compulsion by some\nsuperior force.\n\n\nTHE STARS ARE INEXHAUSTIBLE. AND NEED NO REFRESHMENT.\n\nStars, therefore, stand in need of no feeding,[221] and we should not\njudge them according to our own circumstances. Indeed, our (human)\nsoul, which contains our bodies, is not identical with the Soul that\ncontains the heaven; our soul does not reside in the same place, while\nthe world-Soul does not, like our composite bodies lose (excreta). Not\nas our bodies do the stars need continual metabolic replacing food.\nFrom our conception of celestial bodies we should remove all ideas of\na change that could modify their constitution. Terrestrial bodies are\nanimated by an entirely different nature[222]; which though because\nof its weakness is incapable of insuring them a durable existence,\nnevertheless imitates the superior nature (of the celestial Soul) by\nbirth and generation. Elsewhere[223] we have shown that even this\nvery celestial Soul cannot partake of the perfect immutability of\nintelligible things.\n\n\n\n\nFOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK SIX.\n\nOf Sensation and Memory.\n\n\nSTOIC DOCTRINES OF SENSATIONS AND MEMORIES HANG TOGETHER.\n\nIf we deny that sensations are images impressed on the soul, similar\nto the impression of a seal,[226] we shall also, for the sake of\nconsistency, have to deny that memories are notions or sensations\npreserved in the soul by the permanence of the impression, inasmuch\nas, according to our opinion, the soul did not originally receive any\nimpression. The two questions, therefore, hang together. Either we\nshall have to insist that sensation consists in an image impressed on\nthe soul, and memory, in its preservation; or, if either one of these\nopinions be rejected, the other will have to be rejected also. However,\nsince we regard both of them as false, we shall have to consider the\ntrue operation of both sensation and memory; for we declare that\nsensation is as little the impression of an image as memory is its\npermanence. The true solution of the question, on the contrary, will\nbe disclosed by an examination of the most penetrating sense,[227] and\nthen by induction transferring the same laws to the other senses.\n\n\nA. OF SENSATION.\n\n\nTHE SENSE OF SIGHT DOES NOT POSSESS THE IMAGE SEEN WITHIN ITSELF.\n\nIn general the sensation of sight consists of perception of the visible\nobject, and by sight we attain it in the place where the object is\nplaced before our eyes, as if the perception operated in that very\nplace, and as if the soul saw outside of herself. This occurs, I\nthink, without any image being produced nor producing itself outside\nof the soul, without the soul receiving any impression similar to that\nimparted by the seal to the wax. Indeed, if the soul already in herself\npossessed the image of the visible object, the mere possession of this\nimage (or type) would free her from the necessity of looking outside\nof herself. The calculation of the distance of the object's location,\nand visibility proves that the soul does not within herself contain\nthe image of the object. In this case, as the object would not be\ndistant from her, the soul would not see it as located at a distance.\nBesides, from the image she would receive from within herself, the soul\ncould not judge of the size of the object, or even determine whether\nit possessed any magnitude at all. For instance, taking as an example\nthe sky, the image which the soul would develop of it would not be\nso great (as it is, when the soul is surprised at the sky's extent).\nBesides, there is a further objection, which is the most important of\nall. If we perceive only the images of the objects we see, instead of\nseeing the objects themselves, we would see only their appearances or\nadumbrations. Then the realities would differ from the things that we\nsee. The true observation that we cannot discern an object placed upon\nthe pupil, though we can see it at some little distance, applies with\ngreater cogency to the soul. If the image of the visible object be\nlocated within her, she will not see the object that yields her this\nimage. We have to distinguish two things, the object seen, and the\nseeing subject; consequently, the subject that sees the visible object\nmust be distinct from it, and see it as located elsewhere than within\nitself. The primary condition of the act of vision therefore is, not\nthat the image of the object be located in the soul, but that it be\nlocated outside of the soul.\n\n\nSENSATIONS ARE NOT EXPERIENCES, BUT RELATIVE ACTUALIZATIONS.\n\n2. After denying that sensation consists of such an operation, it is\nour duty to point out the true state of affairs. Though it be objected\nthat thus the soul would be considered as judging of things she does\nnot possess, it is nevertheless plain that it is the characteristic\nof a power, not to experience or suffer, but to develop its force,\nto carry out the function to which it is destined. If the soul is to\ndiscern a visible or audible object the latter must consist of neither\nimages nor experiences, but actualizations relative to the objects\nwhich naturally belong to the domain of these actualizations of the\nsoul. Those who deny that any faculty can know its object without\nreceiving some impulsion from it imply that the faculty suffers,\nwithout really cognizing the object before it; for this soul-faculty\nshould dominate the object instead of being thereby dominated.\n\n\nTHIS IS TRUE NOT ONLY OF SIGHT BUT OF HEARING, TASTE AND SMELL.\n\nThe case of hearing is similar to that of sight. The impression is\nin the air; the sounds consist in a series of distinct vibrations,\nsimilar to letters traced by some person who is speaking. By virtue\nof her power and her being, the soul reads the characters traced in\nthe air, when they present themselves to the faculty which is suitable\nto reception of them. As to taste and smell also, we must distinguish\nbetween the experience and the cognition of it; this latter cognition\nconstitutes sensation, or a judgment of the experience, and differs\ntherefrom entirely.[228]\n\n\nCOGNITION OF INTELLIGIBLE OBJECTS STILL LESS ADMITS OF AN IMPRESSION.\n\nThe cognition of intelligible things still less admits of an\nexperience or impression; for the soul finds the intelligible things\nwithin herself, while it is outside of herself that she contemplates\nsense-objects. Consequently the soul's notions of intelligible entities\nare actualizations of a nature superior to those of sense-objects,\nbeing the actualizations of the soul herself, that is, spontaneous\nactualizations. We shall however have to relegate to another\nplace[229] the question whether the soul sees herself as double,\ncontemplating herself as another object, so to speak, and whether she\nsees intelligence as single in a manner such that both herself and\nintelligence seem but one.\n\n\nB. OF MEMORY.\n\n\nMEMORY ACTS THROUGH THE SYMPATHY OF THE SOUL'S HIGHEST SELF.\n\n3. Treating of memory, we must begin by attributing to the soul a\npower which, though surprising, is perhaps really neither strange\nnor incredible. The soul, without receiving anything, nevertheless\nperceives the things she does not have. The (secret of this) is that\nby nature the soul is the reason of all things, the last reason of\nintelligible entities, and the first reason of sense-objects.[230]\nConsequently the soul is in relation with both (spheres); by the\nintelligible things the soul is improved and vivified; but she is\ndeceived by the resemblance which sense-objects bear to intelligible\nentities, and the soul descends here below as if drawn by her\nalluring charm. Because she occupies a position intermediary between\nintelligible entities and sense-objects, the soul occupies a position\nintermediary between them. She is said to think intelligible entities\nwhen, by applying herself to them, she recalls them. She cognizes them\nbecause, in a certain manner, she actually constitutes these entities;\nshe cognizes them, not because she posits them within herself, but\nbecause she somehow possesses them, and has an intuition of them;\nbecause, obscurely constituting these things, she awakes, passing\nfrom obscurity to clearness, and from potentiality to actualization.\nFor sense-objects she acts in the same way. By relating them to what\nshe possesses within herself, she makes them luminous, and has an\nintuition of them, possessing as she does a potentiality suitable to\n(a perception of) them; and, so to speak, to begetting them. When the\nsoul has applied the whole force of her attention to one of the objects\nthat offer themselves to her, she, for a long while, thereby remains\naffected as if this object were present; and the more attentively she\nconsiders it, the longer she sees it.[231] That is why children have a\nstronger memory; they do not quickly abandon an object, but lingeringly\nfix their gaze upon it; instead of allowing themselves to be distracted\nby a crowd of objects, they direct their attention exclusively to some\none of them. On the contrary, those whose thought and faculties are\nabsorbed by a variety of objects, do not rest with any one, and do no\nmore than look them over.\n\n\nMEMORY IS NOT AN IMAGE, BUT THE REAWAKENING OF A FACULTY.\n\nIf memory consisted in the preservation of images,[232] their\nnumerousness would not weaken memory. If memory kept these images\nstored within itself, it would have no need of reflection to recall\nthem, nor could memory recall them suddenly after having forgotten\nthem. Further, exercise does not weaken, but increases the energy\nand force of memory, just as the purpose of exercise of our feet or\nhands is only to put ourselves in a better condition more easily to\naccomplish certain things which are neither in our feet nor our hands,\nbut to which these members become better adapted by habit.\n\nBesides (if memory be only storage of images), why then does one not\nremember a thing when it has been heard but once or twice? Why, when\nit has been heard often, is it long remembered, although it was not\nretained at first? This can surely not be because at first only some\npart of the images had been retained; for in that case those parts\nwould be easily recalled. On the contrary, memory is produced suddenly\nas a result of the last hearing or reflexion. This clearly proves that,\nin the soul, we are only awaking the faculty of memory, only imparting\nto it new energy, either for all things in general, or for one in\nparticular.\n\nAgain, memory does not bring back to us only the things about which\nwe have reflected; (by association of ideas) memory suggests to us\nbesides a multitude of other memories through its habit of using\ncertain indices any one of which suffices easily to recall all the\nremainder[233]; how could this fact be explained except by admitting\nthat the faculty of memory had become strengthened?\n\nOnce more, the preservation of images in the soul would indicate\nweakness rather than strength, for the reception of several impressions\nwould imply an easy yielding to all forms. Since every impression is\nan experience, memory would be measured by passive receptivity; which,\nof course, is the very contrary of the state of affairs. Never did any\nexercise whatever render the exercising being more fitted to suffering\n(or, receptive experience).\n\nStill another argument: in sensations, it is not the weak and impotent\norgan which perceives by itself; it is not, for instance, the eye that\nsees, but the active potentiality of the soul. That is why old people\nhave both sensations and memories that are weaker. Both sensation and\nmemory, therefore, imply some energy.\n\nLast, as we have seen that sensation is not the impression of an image\nin the soul, memory could not be the storage-place of images it could\nnot have received.\n\n\nMEMORY NEEDS TRAINING AND EDUCATION.\n\nIt may be asked however, why, if memory be a \"faculty\" (a potentiality)\nor disposition,[234] we do not immediately remember what we have\nlearned, and why we need some time to recall it? It is because we need\nto master our own faculty, and to apply it to its object. Not otherwise\nis it with our other faculties, which we have to fit to fulfil their\nfunctions, and though some of them may react promptly, others also may\nneed time to gather their forces together. The same man does not always\nsimultaneously exercise memory and judgment, because it is not the\nsame faculty that is active in both cases. Thus there is a difference\nbetween the wrestler and the runner. Different dispositions react\nin each. Besides, nothing that we have said would militate against\ndistinguishing between the man of strong and tenacious soul who would\nbe inclined to read over what is recalled by his memory, while he who\nlets many things escape him would by his very weakness be disposed to\nexperience and preserve passive affections. Again, memory must be a\npotentiality of the soul, inasmuch as the soul has no extension (and\ntherefore could not be a storage-place for images which imply three\ndimensions).\n\n\nSOUL EVENTS OCCUR VERY DIFFERENTLY FROM WHAT IS SUPPOSED BY THE\nUNOBSERVANT OR UNREFLECTIVE.\n\nIn general all the processes of the soul occur in a manner very\ndifferent from that conceived by unobservant men. Psychic phenomena\noccur very differently from sense-phenomena, the analogy of which may\nlead to very serious errors. Hence the above unobservant men imagine\nthat sensations and memories resemble characters inscribed on tablets\nor sheets of paper.[235] Whether they consider the soul material (as do\nthe Stoics), or as immaterial (as do the Peripatetics), they certainly\ndo not realize the absurd consequences which would result from the\nabove hypothesis.\n\n\n\n\nSIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK ONE.\n\nOf the Ten Aristotelian and Four Stoic Categories.\n\n\nHISTORICAL REVIEW OF CATEGORIES.\n\n1. Very ancient philosophers have investigated the number and kinds\nof essences. Some said there was but one;[296] others, that there was\na limited number of them; others still, an infinite number. Besides,\nthose who recognized but a single (essence) have advanced opinions very\ndifferent, as is also the case with those who recognized a limited or\nunlimited number of essences. As the opinions of these philosophers\nhave been sufficiently examined by their successors, we shall not\nbusy ourselves therewith. We shall study the doctrine of those who,\nafter having examined the opinions of their predecessors, decided on\ndeterminate numbers (of essences); admitting neither a single essence,\nbecause they recognized that there was a multiplicity even in the\nintelligibles; nor an infinite number of essences, because such an\ninfinity could not exist, and would render all science impossible; but\nwho, classifying the essences whose number is limited, and seeing that\nthese classifications could not be considered elements, looked on them\nas \"kinds.\" Of these, some (the Peripatetic Aristotelians) proposed\nten, while others proposed a lesser number (the Stoics taught four), or\na greater number (the Pythagorean \"oppositions,\" for instance). As to\nthe kinds, there is also difference of opinions: some looked upon the\nkinds as principle (Plotinos himself); while others (Aristotle) held\nthat they formed classes.\n\n\nOF THE TEN ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES.[236]\n\n\nSTATEMENT OF ARISTOTLE'S POSITION.\n\nLet us first examine the doctrine that classifies essence into ten\n(kinds). We shall have to investigate whether it be necessary to\nacknowledge that its partisans recognize ten kinds, all of which bear\nthe name of essence, or ten categories; for they say[237] that essence\nis not synonymous in everything, and they are right.\n\n\nARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES NEGLECT THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.\n\nLet us begin by asking these philosophers whether the ten kinds\napply equally to sense-(essences), and intelligible (essences), or\nwhether they all apply to the sense-(essences), and some only to\nthe intelligible (essences); for here there are no longer mutual\nrelations. We must therefore inquire which of those ten kinds apply to\nintelligible essences, and see whether intelligible essences can be\nreduced to one single kind, that would also apply to sense-essences;\nand whether the word \"being\"[238] can be applied simultaneously to\nintelligible and sense-entities, as a \"homonymous\" label. For if\n\"being\" be a homonym,[239] there are several different kinds. If,\nhowever, it be a synonym (or, name of common qualities) it would be\nabsurd that this word should bear the same meaning in the essences\nwhich possess the highest degree of existence, and in those which\npossess its lower degree; for the things among which it is possible to\ndistinguish both primary and lower degrees could not belong to a common\nkind. But these (Aristotelian) philosophers do not, in their division,\nregard the (Platonic) intelligible entities. They therefore did not\nmean to classify all beings; they passed by those that possess the\nhighest degree of existence.[295]\n\n\n1. Being.[240]\n\n2. Let us further examine if these ten divisions be kinds, and how\nbeing could form a kind; for we are forced to begin our study here.\n\n\nINTELLIGIBLE AND SENSE-BEING COULD NOT FORM A SINGLE KIND.\n\nWe have just said that intelligible being and sense-being could not\nform a single kind.[241] Otherwise, above both intelligible being,\nand sense-being, there might be some third entity which would apply\nto both, being neither corporeal nor incorporeal; for if it were\nincorporeal, the body would be incorporeal; and if it were corporeal,\nthe incorporeal would be corporeal.\n\n\nQUESTIONS RAISED BY ARISTOTELIAN THEORIES.\n\nIn the first place, what common element is there in matter, form, and\nthe concretion of matter and form? The (Aristotelians) give the name\nof \"being\" alike to these three entities, though recognizing that they\nare not \"being\" in the same degree. They say that form is more being\nthan is matter,[242] and they are right; they would not insist (as\ndo the Stoics) that matter is being in the greater degree. Further,\nwhat element is common to the primary and secondary beings, since the\nsecondary owe their characteristic title of \"being\" to the primary ones?\n\n\nWHAT IS \"BEING\" IN GENERAL?\n\nIn general, what is being? This is a question to which the\n(Aristotelians) could find no answer; for such mere indication of\nproperties is not an essential definition of what it is, and it would\nseem that the property of being a thing that is susceptible of\nsuccessively admitting their contraries, while remaining identical, and\nnumerically one,[243] could not apply to all (intelligible) beings.\n\n3. Can we assert that \"being\" is a category that embraces\nsimultaneously intelligible being, matter, form, and the concretion of\nform and matter, on the same justification that one may say that the\nrace of the Heraclidae form a kind, not because all its members possess\na common characteristic, but because they are all descended from a\ncommon ancestry? In such case, the first degree thereof will belong to\nthis being (from which all the rest is derived), and the second degree\nto the other things which are less beings. What then hinders that all\nthings form a single category, since all other things of which one may\nsay, \"they subsist,\" owe this property to \"being?\"\n\nMight it then be said that the other things are affections (or,\nmodifications),[232] and that the beings are (hierarchically)\nsubordinated to each other in a different manner? In this case,\nhowever, we could not stop at (the conception of) \"being,\" and\ndetermine its fundamental property so as to deduce from it other\nbeings. Beings would thus be of the same kind, but then would possess\nsomething which would be outside of the other beings.[244] Thus the\nsecondary substance would be attributed to something else, and leave\nno meaning to \"whatness\" (quiddity or quality), \"determinate form\"\n(thatness), \"being a subject,\" \"not being a subject,\" \"being in no\nsubject,\" and \"being attributed to nothing else,\"[245] (as, when one\nsays, whiteness is a quality of the body, quantity is something of\nsubstance, time is something of movement, and movement is something\nof mobility), since the secondary \"being\" is attributed to something\nelse.[246] Another objection would be, that the secondary being is\nattributed to the primary Being, in another sense (than quality is\nto being), as \"a kind,\" as \"constituting a part,\" as \"being thus\nthe essence of the subject,\" while whiteness would be attributed to\nsomething else in this sense that it is in a subject.[247] Our answer\nwould be that these things have properties which distinguish them from\nthe others; they will consequently be gathered into a unity, and be\ncalled beings. Nevertheless, no kind could be made up out of them, nor\nthus arrive at a definition of the notion and nature of being. Enough\nabout this; let us pass to quantity.\n\n\n2. QUANTITY.\n\n4. The Aristotelians call quantity first \"number,\" then \"continuous\nsize,\" \"space,\" and \"time.\"[248] To these concepts they apply the\nother kinds of quantity; as for instance, they say that movement is a\nquantity measured by time.[249] It might also be said reciprocally,\nthat time receives its continuity from movement.\n\n\nCONTINUOUS AND DEFINITE QUANTITY HAVE NOTHING IN COMMON.\n\nIf continuous quantity be quantity as far as it is continuous, then\ndefinite quantity will no longer be quantity. If, on the contrary,\ncontinuous quantity be quantity only accidentally, then there is\nnothing in common between continuous and definite quantity. We will\ngrant that numbers are quantities, although if their nature of being\nquantities were plain, one would not see why they should be given that\nname. As to the line, the surface, and the body, they are called sizes\nand not quantities; and the latter name is given them only when they\nare estimated numerically; as when, for instance, they are measured\nby two or three feet.[249] A body is a quantity only in so far as\nit is measured, just as space is a quantity only by accident, and\nnot by its spatiality. We must here not consider what is quantity by\naccident, but by its quantitativeness, quantity itself. Three oxen\nare not a quantity; in this case, the quantity is the number found in\nthem. Indeed, three oxen belong already to two categories. The case\nis similar with the line, and the surface, both of which possess such\nquantity. But if the quantity of surface be quantity itself, why would\nsurface itself be a quantity? It is no doubt only when determined by\nthree or four lines that the surface is called a quantity.\n\n\nNUMBERS ARE NOT QUANTITY IN ITSELF.\n\nShall we then say that numbers alone are quantity? Shall we attribute\nthis privilege to Numbers in themselves, which are beings, because\nthey exist in themselves?[250] Shall we grant the same privilege to\nnumbers existing in things which participate in them, and which serve\nto number, not unities, but ten oxen, for example, or ten horses?\nFirst, it would seem absurd that these numbers should not be beings,\nif the former ones be such. Then, it will seem equally absurd that\nthey should exist within the things they measure, without existing\noutside them,[251] as the rules and instruments which serve to measure\nexist outside of the objects they measure. On the other hand, if these\nnumbers that exist in themselves serve to measure, and nevertheless do\nnot exist within the objects that they measure, the result will be that\nthese objects will not be quantities since they will not participate in\nquantity itself.\n\n\nNUMBER IS NOT IN QUANTITY; BUT QUANTITY IS IN NUMBER.\n\nWhy should these numbers be considered quantities? Doubtless because\nthey are measures. But are these measures quantities, or quantity\nitself? As they are in the order of beings, even if they should not\napply to any of the other things, the numbers will nevertheless remain\nwhat they are, and they will be found in quantity. Indeed, their unity\ndesignates an object, since it applies to another; then the number\nexpresses how many objects there are, and the soul makes use of number\nto measure plurality. Now, when measuring thus, the soul does not\nmeasure the \"whatness\" (or, quality) of the object, since she says\n\"one,\" \"two,\" whatever be their objects, even if of opposite nature;\nshe does not determine the character of each thing, for instance, if it\nbe warm or beautiful; she limits herself to estimating its quantity.\nConsequently, whether we take Number in itself, or in the objects which\nparticipate therein, quantity exists not in these objects, but in the\nnumber; quantity finds itself not in the object three feet long, but in\nthe number three.\n\n\nMAGNITUDE AND NUMBERS WOULD BE OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OF QUANTITY.\n\nWhy then should sizes also be quantities? Probably because they\napproximate quantities, and because we call quantities all objects that\ncontain quantities, even though we do not measure them with quantity in\nitself. We call large what numerically participates in much; and small\nwhat participates in little. Greatness and smallness are quantities,\nnot absolute, but relative; nevertheless the Aristotelians say that\nthey are relative quantities so far as they seem to be quantities.[252]\nThat is a question to be studied; for, in this doctrine, number is a\nkind apart, while sizes would hold second rank; it is not exactly a\nkind, but a category which gathers things which are near each other,\nand which may hold first or second rank. As to us, we shall have to\nexamine if the Numbers which exist in themselves be only substances, or\nif they be also quantities. In either case, there is nothing in common\nbetween the Numbers of which we speak, and those which exist in things\nwhich participate therein.[253]\n\n\nSPEECH AS A QUANTITY.\n\n5. What relation to quantity exists in speech, time, and movement?\n\nFirst, let us consider speech. It can be measured.[254] In this\nrespect, speech is a quantity, but not in so far as it is speech, whose\nnature is to be significant, as the noun, or the verb.[255] The vocal\nair is the matter of the word, as it also is of the noun and the verb,\nall which constitute the language. The word is principally an impulse\nlaunched on the air, but it is not a simple impulse; because it is\narticulated it somehow fashions the air; consequently it is a deed,\nbut a significant one. It might be reasonably said that this movement\nand impulse constitute a deed, and that the movement which follows is\na modification, or rather that the first movement is the deed, and the\nsecond movement is the modification of another, or rather that the deed\nrefers to the subject, and the modification is in the subject. If the\nword consisted not in the impulse, but in the air, there would result\nfrom the significant characteristic of the expressive impulse two\ndistinct entities, and no longer a single category.\n\n\nNEITHER IS TIME A QUANTITY.\n\nLet us pass to time.[256] If it exist in what measures, that which\nmeasures must be examined; it is doubtless the soul, or the present\ninstant. If it exist in what is measured, it is a quantity so far as it\nhas a quantity; as, for instance, it may be a year. But, so far as it\nis time, it has another nature; for what has such a quantity, without\n(essentially) being a quantity, is not any the less such a quantity.\n\n\nQUANTITY AS EQUAL AND UNEQUAL DOES NOT REFER TO THE OBJECTS.\n\nAs to (Aristotle's) assertion that the property of quantity is to be\nboth equal and unequal,[257] this property belongs to quantity itself,\nand not to the objects which participate in quantity, unless it be by\naccident, so far as one does not consider these objects in themselves.\nA three foot object, for instance, is a quantity so far as it is taken\nin its totality; but it does not form a kind with quantity itself;\nonly, along with it, it is traced back to a kind of unity, a common\ncategory.\n\n\nRELATION.[258]\n\n6. Let us now consider relation. Let us see whether, in relative\nmatters, there be something common that constitutes a kind, or which is\na point of union in any other manner. Let us, before everything else,\nexamine whether relation (as, for example, left and right, double and\nhalf, and so forth) be a kind of \"hypostasis,\" or substantial act,\nor an habituation; or, whether it be a kind of hypostatic existence\nin certain things, while in others it is not so; or whether it be\nthis under no circumstances. What is there indeed that is particular\nin relations such as double and half; surpasser and surpassed; in\npossession, and in disposition; lying down, standing, sitting; in\nthe relation of father and son; of master and slave; in the like and\ndifferent; the equal and unequal; the active and passive; measurer and\nmeasured; sensation and knowledge? Knowledge, for instance, relates\nto the object which can be known, and sensation to sense-object; for\nthe relation of knowledge to the object which can be known has a kind\nof hypostatic existence in the actualization relative to the form of\nthe object which can be known; likewise with the relation of sensation\nto the sense-object. The same may be said about the relation of the\n\"active\" to the \"passive,\" which results in a single actualization,\nas well as about the relation between the measure and the measured\nobject, from which results mensuration. But what results from the\nrelation of the similar to the similar? If in this relation there be\nnothing begotten, one can at least discover there something which\nis its foundation, namely, the identity of quality; nevertheless,\nneither of these two terms would then have anything beside their proper\nquality. The same may be said of equal things, because the identity\nof quantity precedes the manner of being of both things; this manner\nof being has no foundation other than our judgment, when we say, This\none or that one are of the same size; this one has begotten that one,\nthis one surpasses that one. What are standing and sitting outside of\nhim who stands or sits? As to the possession, if it apply to him who\npossesses, it rather signifies the fact of possession; if it apply to\nwhat is possessed, it is a quality. As much can be said of disposition.\nWhat then exists outside of the two relative terms, but the comparison\nestablished by our judgment? In the relation of the thing which\nsurpasses the thing which is surpassed, the first is some one size,\nand the second is some other size; those are two independent things,\nwhile as to the comparison, it does not exist in them, except in our\njudgment. The relation of left to right and that of the former to the\nlatter consist in the different positions. It is we who have imagined\nthe distinction of right to left; there is nothing in the objects\nthemselves that answers thereto. The former and the latter are two\nrelations of time, but it is we who have established that distinction.\n\n\nWHETHER THESE RELATIONS ARE SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE.\n\n7. If, when we speak of things, we utter nothing true, then there is\nnothing real in the relation, and this kind of being has no foundation.\nBut if, when we compare two moments, we say, This one is anterior,\nand that one is posterior, we speak truly, then we conceive that the\nanterior and the posterior are something independent of the subjects in\nwhich they exist. Likewise with the left and the right, as well as with\nsizes; we admit that in these, besides the quantity which is suitable\nto them, there is a certain habituation, as far as the one surpasses\nand the other is surpassed. If, without our enunciating or conceiving\nanything, it be real that such a thing is the double of another; if the\none possess while the other is possessed, even if we had known nothing\nabout it; if the objects had been equal before we had noticed them; if\nthey be likewise identical in respect of quality; finally if, in all\nrelative things, there be a habituation which is independent of the\nsubjects in which it is found; and if we limit ourselves to noticing\nits existence (without creating it); if the same circumstances obtain\nin the relation of knowledge to what can be known, a relation which\nevidently constitutes a real habituation; if it be so, there is nothing\nleft to do but to ask whether this habituation (named a relation) be\nsomething real. We shall have to grant, however, that this habituation\nsubsists in certain subjects as long as these subjects remain such as\nthey were, and even if they were separate; while, in other subjects,\nthis habituation is born only when they are brought together. We shall\nalso have to grant that, in the very subjects that remain, there are\nsome in which this habituation is annihilated or altered (such as, for\nexample, the left direction, or proximity). This has led people to\nbelieve that in all these relations there is nothing real. This point\nhaving been granted, we shall have to seek what common element there\nis in all these relations, and to examine whether what is common to\nthem all constitutes a kind, or an accident; and last, we shall have to\nconsider how far that which we have discovered corresponds to reality.\n\n\nRELATIONS ARE SIMULTANEOUS EXISTENCES.\n\nWe should call relative not what is said absolutely of another thing,\nsuch as, for instance, the habits of the soul and the body; nor what\nbelongs to such a thing, nor what is in such a thing (as for instance\nthe soul is said to be the soul of such an individual, or to be in\nsuch a subject), but what wholly derives its existence from this\nhabit (called relation). By \"hypostatic existence\" I here mean not\nthe existence which is proper to subjects, but the existence which is\ncalled relative; as, for instance, the double causes the (correlative)\nexistence of the half; while it does not cause the existence of the\ntwo foot object, nor of two in general, nor the one foot object, nor\none in general. The manner of existence of these objects consists in\nthat this one is two, and that one one. As a result of this, when these\nobjects exist, the first is called double, and is such in reality; and\nthe second is half. These two objects have therefore simultaneously and\nspontaneously effected that the one was double, and the other half.\nThey have been correlatively begotten. Their only existence lies in\ntheir correlation, so that the existence of the double lies in its\nsurpassing the half, and the half derives its existence from its being\nsurpassed by the double. Consequently these two objects are not, the\none anterior, and the other posterior, but simultaneous.[259] We might\nalso examine whether or not other things do not also possess this\nsimultaneity of existence, as happens with father and son, and other\nsimilar cases. The son continues to exist, indeed, even after the death\nof the father; brother also survives brother, since we often say that\nsome one person resembles some other deceased person.\n\n\nDISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTIVE HABITUATION IMMEDIATE AND REMOTE.\n\n8. The above digression gives us the opportunity of investigating\nwhy there should be a difference between these relations, and those\nof which we spoke above. However, we should be glad to have the\nAristotelians first state what community of existence obtains in this\ncorrelation. It would be impossible to claim that this community was\nanything corporeal. If then it be corporeal, it must exist either\nwithin the very subjects, or without them. If such a habituation be\nidentical among all, it is a synonym. If it be a habituation which\ndiffers according to the subjects in which it exists, it is a homonym;\nfor the mere name of \"habituation\" (in different things) does not\nalways correspond to the existence of any genuine similarity. Should\nwe then divide the habituations into two classes, recognizing that\ncertain objects have an inert and inactive habituation, implying\nsimultaneity of existence, and that other objects have a habituation\nalways implying \"potentiality\" and \"actualization,\" so that before\n\"actualizing\" the \"potentiality\" be already ready to exert itself, and\nto pass from \"potentiality\" to \"actualization\" in the approximation\nof relative conditions? Must we assert that in general certain things\nactualize, while others limit themselves to existing? Must we also\nassert that that which limits itself to existence only gives its\ncorrelative a name, while that which actualizes gives it existence? Of\nthis latter kind of things are the father and son, the \"active\" and\n\"passive,\" for such things exert a kind of life and action. Must we\nthen divide habituation in several kinds, not as possessing something\nsimilar and common in the differences, but as having a nature different\nin each member of the division, and thus constituting a \"homonym\"\n(or, mere verbal label)? In this case, we would apply to the active\nhabituation the names of \"doing\" and \"suffering,\" because both imply an\nidentical action. Further, we will have to posit another \"habituation\"\nwhich, without itself actualizing, implies something which acts in\ntwo relative terms. For example, there is equality; which equates\ntwo objects; for it is equality which renders things equal, just as\nidentity makes them identical; just as the names \"great\" and \"small\"\nare derived one from the presence of greatness, and the other from\nthat of smallness. But if we should consider greatness and smallness\nin the individuals which participate therein, it must be acknowledged\nthat such individual is greater by the act of greatness which manifests\nin him, and that another is smaller because of the inherent act of\nlittleness.\n\n\nHABITUATIONS ARE REASONS THAT PARTICIPATE IN FORMS.\n\n9. It must therefore be granted that in the things of which we\nfirst spoke, such as knowing and doing (active being), there is an\nactualization, an habituation, and an actualizing reason; while in the\nother things there is a participation in form and reason. For indeed,\nif the bodies were the only essences, the relative habituations would\nbear no reality. If, on the contrary, we assign the first rank in\nexistence to incorporeal things, and to the reasons, and if we define\nthe habituations as reasons that participate in the forms, we should\nsay that what is double has the double for its cause, and what is\nhalf, has the half as its cause; and that other things are what they\nare named because of the presence of the same, or of the contrary\nform. Now either two things simultaneously receive one the double,\nand the other the half, and one greatness, and the other smallness;\nor contraries such as resemblance and dissimilarity are to be found\nin each thing, as well as identity and difference; and everything\nfinds itself simultaneously similar and dissimilar, identical and\ndifferent. It might be objected that if one object were ugly, and\nanother uglier still, they are such because they participate in a form.\nNot so; for if these two objects be equally ugly, they are equal in\nthe absence of the form. If they be unequally ugly, the least ugly is\nsuch because it participates in a form which does not sufficiently\nsubdue matter, and the uglier is such because it participates in a\nform which does so still less. They could, besides, be judged from the\nstandpoint of deprivation, comparing them to each other as if they\ncontained some form. The sensation is a form that results from two\nthings (of that which feels, and that which is felt); so also with\nknowledge. In respect to the thing possessed, possession is an act\nwhich contains, which has a kind of efficacy. As to mensuration, which\nis an actualization of measure, in respect of the measured object, it\nconsists in a reason.\n\n\nWHILE SOME ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES ARE LOGICALLY POSSIBLE, THE OBJECTS\nSUBSUMED ARE IMPOSSIBLE.\n\nIf then, considering the constitution of the relative relations as a\ngeneric form, it be admitted that it constitutes an unity, it forms\na classification; consequently it constitutes an existence and a\nform in all things. But if the reasons (or, relations) be opposed to\neach other, if the above-mentioned differences obtain among them,\nthey do not constitute a class, and everything must be reduced to a\nresemblance, or category. Now, even if we admit that the things of\nwhich we have spoken can be reduced to a unity, it does not follow that\nall the things gathered under the same category by the Aristotelians,\ncould be reduced to a single sort. Indeed, they lump together into\nthe same classification, both objects and mere statements of their\nabsence, as well as the objects which derive their appellation from\nthem; as, for instance, doubleness itself, and the double object.\nNow how is it possible to reduce to the same classification both a\nthing and the mere lack of it, as, for instance, doubleness and the\nnon-double, the relative and the non-relative? This is as absurd as it\nwould be to gather into the same classification the living \"being,\"\nand the non-living \"being.\" Worse yet, how could one assort together\nduplication and the double object, whiteness and the white object? Such\nthings could not possibly be identical.\n\n\n3. QUALITIES.[260]\n\n10. We are now to consider quality, on account of which a being is said\nto be \"such.\" What can be the nature of this quality that it exerts the\npower of deciding of the phenomena of objects? Is there a same, single\nquality which is something common to all qualities, and which, by its\ndifferences, forms classifications? Or are the qualities so different\nthat they could not constitute one and the same classification? What\nis there in common between capacity and disposition[261] (that is, the\nphysical power), the affective quality, the figure, and the exterior\nform?[262]\n\n\nTHE LACK OF POWERS CANNOT BE SUBSUMED UNDER THE SAME CATEGORY AS THE\nPOWERS.\n\nWhat shall be said of thickness and thinness, of fatness and leanness?\nIf the element common to these conceptions be a power belonging to\nthe capacities, dispositions, and physical powers, which gives to\neach object the power it possesses, the statements of the absence of\npower will no longer be classified along with (the powers). Besides,\nin what sense can we call the figure and form of each thing a \"power?\"\nFurther, essence would have been deprived of all powers that were\nessential, retaining only those it might have received. Then, quality\nwould comprehend all actualizations of the beings, which, properly,\nare actualizations only so far as they act spontaneously; and also\nall actualizations of these properties, but only so far as they\nreally exist. But quality consists in (unessential) powers (such\nas habituations and dispositions) classified below beings.[263]\nFor instance, boxing ability does not belong among necessary human\nqualifications, such as rational functions. The latter would not be\ncalled a quality (as we would speak of boxing ability); and reasoning\nwould be considered a quality only figuratively.\n\n\nMERE DIFFERENTIALS OF BEINGS ARE NOT GENUINE QUALITIES.\n\nA quality is therefore a power which adds (essential) characteristics\nto already existing beings. These characteristics which differentiate\nbeings can therefore be called qualities only figuratively. Qualities\nare, rather, actualizations and reasons, or parts of reasons, which\nproclaim the \"whatness,\" though the latter seem to qualify being.\nAs to the qualities which really deserve this name, which \"qualify\"\nthings, which we generally call \"potentialities,\" they are the\nreasons and shapes, either of the soul or the body, such as beauty or\nugliness.[264]\n\n\nNOT ALL QUALITIES ARE REASONS.\n\nHow can all qualities be potentialities? It is easy to see that beauty\nand health are qualities. But how could ugliness and sickness, weakness\nand general impotence, be qualities? Is it because they qualify certain\nthings? But what hinders the qualified things from being called\nsuch by mere nomenclature, as homonyms, and not because of a single\n(all-sufficient) reason? Besides, what would hinder them from being\nconsidered not only according to one of the four modes,[265] but even\nafter each one of the four, or at least after any two of them? First,\nthe quality does not consist in \"acting\" and \"experiencing\";[266] so\nthat it is only by placing oneself at different viewpoints that one\ncould call what \"acts\" and \"experiences\" a quality, in the same sense\nas health and sickness, disposition and habitude, force and weakness.\nThus power is no longer the common element in these qualities, and\nwe shall have to seek something else possessing this characteristic,\nand the qualities will no longer all be reasons. How indeed could a\nsickness, become a habituation, or be a reason?\n\n\nQUALITY IS NOT A POWER BUT DISPOSITION, FORM AND CHARACTER.\n\nShall the affections which consist in the forms and powers, and their\ncontraries, the privations, be called qualities?[267] If so, one kind\nwill no longer exist; and we shall have to reduce these things to\na unity, or category; that is why knowledge is called a form and a\npower, and ignorance a privation and impotence. Must we also consider\nimpotence and sickness a form, because sickness and vice can and do\naccomplish many things badly? Not so, for in this case he who missed\nhis aim would be exerting a power. Each one of these things exerts\nits characteristic activity in not inclining towards the good; for it\ncould not do what was not in its power. Beauty certainly does have some\npower; is it so also with triangularity? In general, quality should\nnot be made to consist in power, but rather in the disposition, and to\nconsider it as a kind of form of character. Thus the common element in\nall qualities is found to be this form, this classification, which no\ndoubt is inherent in being, but which certainly is derivative from it.\n\n\nQUALITY CONSISTS IN A NON-ESSENTIAL CHARACTER.\n\nWhat part do the powers (or, potentialities) play here? The man who is\nnaturally capable of boxing owes it to a certain disposition. It is so\nalso with somebody who is unskilful in something. In general, quality\nconsists in a non-essential characteristic; what seems to contribute to\nthe being, or to add to it, as color, whiteness, and color in general,\ncontributes to the beings as far as it constitutes something distinct\ntherefrom, and is its actualization; but it occupies a rank inferior\nto being; and though derived therefrom, it adds itself thereto as\nsomething foreign, as an image and adumbration.\n\n\nUGLY QUALITIES ARE IMPERFECT REASONS.\n\nIf quality consist in a form, in a character and a reason, how\ncould one thus explain impotence and ugliness? We shall have to do\nso by imperfect reasons, as is generally recognized in the case of\nugliness.[268] But how can a \"reason\" be said to explain sickness? It\ncontains the reason of health, but somewhat altered. Besides, it is\nnot necessary to reduce everything to a reason; it is sufficient to\nrecognize, as common characteristic, a certain disposition foreign to\nbeing, such that what is added to being be a quality of the subject.\nTriangularity is a quality of the subject in which it is located, not\nby virtue of its triangularity, but of its location in this subject,\nand of enduing it with its form. Humanity has also given to man his\nshape, or rather, his being.\n\n\nTHERE IS ONLY ONE KIND OF QUALITY; OF WHICH CAPACITY AND DISPOSITION\nPARTAKE.\n\n11. If this be so, why should we recognize several kinds of qualities?\nWhy should we distinguish capacity and disposition? Whether quality be\ndurable or not, it is always the same; for any kind of a disposition\nis sufficient to constitute a quality; permanence, however, is only\nan accident, unless it should be held that simple dispositions are\nimperfect forms, and that capacities are perfect forms. But if these\nforms be imperfect, they are not qualities; if they be already\nqualities, permanence is but an accident.\n\n\nPHYSICAL POWERS DO NOT FORM A SECONDARY KIND OF QUALITY.\n\nHow can physical powers form a secondary kind of qualities? If they\nbe qualities only so far as they are powers, this definition would\nnot suit all qualities, as has been said above. If boxing ability be\na quality as far as it is a disposition, it is useless to attribute\nto it a power, since power is implied in habituation. Further, how\nshould we distinguish the natural boxing ability from that which is\nscientifically acquired? If both be qualities, they do not imply any\ndifference so far as one is natural, and the other acquired; that is\nmerely an accident, since the capacity of boxing is the same form in\nboth cases.\n\n\nTHE DERIVATION OF QUALITIES FROM AFFECTION IS OF NO IMPORTANCE.\n\nWhat does it matter that certain qualities are derived from an\naffection, and that others are not derived therefrom? The origin of\nqualities contributes nothing to their distinction or difference. If\ncertain qualities be derived from an affection, and if others do not\nderive therefrom, how could they be classified as one kind? If it\nbe said that some imply \"experiencing\" while others imply \"action,\"\nthey can both be called qualities merely by similarity of appellation\n(homonymy).\n\n\nSHAPE IS NOT A QUALITY; BUT SPECIFIC APPEARANCE, OR REASON.\n\nWhat could be said of the shape of every thing? If we speak of the\nshape as far as something has a specific form, that has no regard to\nquality; if it be spoken of in respect to beauty or ugliness, together\nwith the form of the subject, we there have a reason.\n\n\nARISTOTLE WAS WRONG IN CALLING \"ROUGH,\" \"UNITED,\" \"RARE,\" AND \"DENSE\"\nQUALITIES.\n\nAs to rough, united, rare and dense[269] these could not be called\nqualities; for they do not consist only in a relative separation or\nreapproximation of the parts of a body, and do not proceed everywhere\nfrom the inequality or equality of position; if they did, they might be\nregarded as qualities. Lightness and weight, also, could be correctly\nclassified, if carefully studied. In any case, lightness is only a\nverbal similarity (a \"homonym\") unless it be understood to mean\ndiminution of weight. In this same class might also be found leanness\nand slimness, which form a class different from the four preceding\nideas.\n\n\nPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF QUALITY.\n\n12. What other scheme of analysis of quality could we find, if the\nabove were declared unsatisfactory? Must we distinguish first the\nqualities of the soul from those of the body, and then analyse the\nlatter according to the senses, relating them to sight, hearing, taste,\nsmell and touch?\n\nTo begin with, how can the qualities of the soul be divided? Will they\nbe related to the faculty of desire, to anger, or reason? Will they\nbe divided according to their suitable operations, or according to\ntheir useful or harmful character? In this case, would we distinguish\nseveral ways of being useful or harmful? Should we then likewise divide\nthe properties of the bodies according to the difference of their\neffects, or according to their useful or harmless character, since this\ncharacter is a property of quality? Surely; to be useful or harmful\nseems to be the property of both the quality, and the thing qualified.\nOtherwise, we should have to seek some other classification.\n\n\nRELATION BETWEEN THE THING QUALIFIED AND THE QUALITY.\n\nHow can the thing qualified by a quality refer to the quality? This\nmust be studied, because the thing qualified and the quality do not\nbelong to a common kind. If the man capable of boxing be related to\nthe quality, why should not the same quality obtain between the active\nman and activity? If then the active man be something qualified,\n\"activity\" and \"passivity\" should not be referred to relation. It would\nseem preferable to relate the active man to the quality if he be active\nby virtue of a power, for a power is a quality; but if the power be\nessential, in so far as it is a power, it is not something relative,\nnor even something qualified. We should not consider that activity\ncorresponds to increase; for the increase, so far as it increases,\nstands in relation only to the less; while activity is such by itself.\nTo the objection that activity, so far as it is such, is something\nqualified, it might be answered that, at the same time, as far as it\ncan act on something else, and that it is thus called active, it is\nsomething relative. In this case the man capable of boxing and the art\nof boxing itself must be in relation. For the art of boxing implies a\nrelation; all the knowledge it imparts is relative to something else.\nAs to the other arts, or at least, as to the greater number of other\narts, it may, after examination, be said that they are qualities, so\nfar as they give a disposition to the soul; as far as they act, they\nare active, and, from this standpoint, they refer to something else,\nand are relative; and besides, they are relative in the sense that they\nare habituations.\n\n\nACTIVITY DOES NOT ALTER THE QUALITY.\n\nWill we therefore have to admit that activity, which is activity only\nbecause it is a quality, is something substantially different from\nquality? In animated beings, especially in those capable of choice\nbecause they incline towards this or that thing, activity has a really\nsubstantial nature. What is the nature of the action exercised by the\ninanimate powers that we call qualities? Is it participation in their\nqualities by whatever approaches them? Further, if the power which\nacts on something else simultaneously experiences (or \"suffers\"),\nhow can it still remain active? For the greater thing, which by\nitself is three feet in size, is great or small only by the relation\nestablished between it, and something else (smaller). It might indeed\nbe objected that the greater thing and the smaller thing become such\nonly by participation in greatness or smallness. Likewise, what is both\n\"active\" and \"passive\" becomes such in participating in \"activity\" and\n\"passivity.\"\n\n\nARE THE SENSE-WORLD AND THE INTELLIGIBLE SEPARATE, OR CLASSIFIABLE\nTOGETHER?\n\nCan the qualities seen in the sense-world, and those that exist in\nthe intelligible world, be classified together in one kind? This\nquestion demands an answer from those[270] who claim that there are\nalso qualities in the intelligible world. Should it also be asked\nof those who do not admit of the existence on high of kinds, but\nwho limit themselves to attributing some habit to Intelligence? It\nis evident that Wisdom exists in Intelligence; if this Wisdom be\nhomonymous (similar in name only) with the wisdom which we know here\nbelow, it is not reckoned among sense-things; if, on the contrary it be\nsynonymous (similar in nature also) with the wisdom which we know here\nbelow, quality would be found in intelligible entities, as well as in\nsense-things (which is false); unless indeed it be recognized that all\nintelligible things are essences, and that thought belongs among them.\n\nBesides, this question applies also to the other categories. In\nrespect to each of them it might be asked whether the sensible and\nthe intelligible form two different kinds, or belong to a single\nclassification.\n\n\n4. WHEN.\n\n13. As to the category of time, \"when,\" the following thoughts are\nsuggested.\n\n\nIF TIME BE A QUANTITY; WHY SHOULD \"TIME WHEN\" FORM A SEPARATE CATEGORY?\n\nIf to-morrow, to-day, and yesterday, as well as other similar divisions\nof time, be parts of time, why should they not be classed in the same\nclassification as time itself, along with the ideas \"it has been,\"\n\"it is,\" and \"it will be?\" As they are kinds of time, it seems proper\nthat they should be classified along with time itself. Now time is\npart of quantity. What then is the use of another category? If the\nAristotelians say that not only \"it has been\" and \"it will be\" are\ntime-concepts, but \"yesterday\" and \"formerly,\" which are varieties\nof \"there has been\" are also time-concepts (for these terms are\nsubordinated to \"there has been\"), that it is not only \"now\" that is\ntime, but that \"when\" is such also, they will be forced to answer as\nfollows: First, if \"when\" be time, time exists; then, as \"yesterday\"\nis past time, it will be something composite, if the past be something\nelse than time; we will have to erect two categories, not merely a\nsimple category. For instance, they say both that \"when\" is in time,\nwithout being time, and say that \"when\" is that which is in time. An\nexample of this would be to say that Socrates existed \"formerly,\"\nwhereby Socrates would really be outside of (present) time. Therefore\nthey are no longer expressing something single. But what is meant by\nSocrates \"being in time,\" and that some fact \"is in time?\" Does it mean\nthat they are \"part of time?\" If, in saying \"a part of time,\" and \"so\nfar as it is a part of time,\" the Aristotelians believe that they are\nnot speaking of time absolutely, but only of a past part of time, they\nare really expressing several things. For this \"part,\" so far as it is\na part, is by them referred to something; and for them the past will be\nsome thing added (to Time), or it will become identified with \"there\nhas been,\" which is a kind of time. But if they say that there is a\ndifference, because \"there has been\" is indeterminate, while \"formerly\"\nand \"yesterday\" are determinate, we shall be deciding something about\n\"there has been;\" then \"yesterday\" will be the determination of \"there\nhas been,\" so that \"yesterday\" will be determined time. Now, that\nis a quantity of time; so that if time be a quantity, each one of\nthese two things will be a determined quantity. But, if, when they\nsay \"yesterday\" they mean thereby that such an event has happened in\na determined past time, they are still expressing several things.\nTherefore, if some new category is to be introduced whenever one thing\nacts in another, as here happened of what occurred in time, we might\nhave to introduce many additional categories, for in a different thing\nthe action is different. This will, besides, become clearer in what is\nto follow on the category of place.\n\n\n5. WHERE, OR, PLACE.\n\n\nIF \"WHERE\" AND \"PLACE\" ARE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES, MANY MORE MIGHT BE\nADDED.\n\n14. The Aristotelians (while treating of this category) say, Where? For\ninstance, \"to the Lyceum,\" or, \"to the Academy.\" The Academy and the\nLyceum are then places and parts of places, as the \"top,\" the \"bottom,\"\nand \"here\" are parts or classes of place. The only difference consists\nin a greater determination. If then the top, the bottom, and the middle\nbe places, as, for instance, \"Delphi is the middle of the earth,\" and,\n\"the Lyceum and other countries are near the middle of the earth,\" what\nelse but place do we have to seek, since we have just said that each\nof these things denotes a place? If, when we say \"where?\" we assert\nthat one thing is in another place, we are not expressing something\nsingle and simple. Besides, each time that we affirm that such a man\nis there, we are creating a double relation, namely, the relation of\nthe man who is there, with the place where he is, and the relation of\nthe containing place and the contained man. Why therefore should we not\nreduce this to the class of relations, since the relation of both terms\nwith each other produces something? Besides, what is the difference\nbetween \"here\" and \"at Athens?\" The Aristotelians grant that \"here\"\nindicates the place; consequently, the same is true of \"in Athens.\" If,\n\"in Athens\" be equivalent to \"being in Athens,\" this latter expression\ncontains two categories, that of place, and that of being. Now, this\nshould not be the case; for as one should not say \"Quality exists,\"\nbut only, \"quality.\" Besides, if being in place and being in time\npresuppose categories other than place and time, why would \"being in a\nvase\" not also constitute a separate category? Why would it not be so\nwith \"being in matter,\" with \"being in the subject,\" and in general of\na part \"being in the whole,\" or the \"whole in the parts,\" the \"genus in\nthe species,\" and the \"species in the genus?\" In this manner we would\nhave a far greater number of categories.\n\n\n6. ACTION AND EXPERIENCING?[271]\n\nThe subject of action gives rise to the following considerations.\n\n\nACTUALIZATION A FAR BETTER CATEGORY THAN DOING OR ACTING.\n\n15. The Aristotelians hold that number and quantity, and other things\nreferring to being should be subordinated to being; thus they classify\nquantity as in a genus different from being. Quality also refers to\nbeing, it also is erected into a separate genus. Consequently, as\naction also refers to being, it is also considered a separate genus.\nMust then \"acting,\" or rather \"action,\" from which \"acting\" is derived,\nbe considered a separate genus, as we consider that quality, from\nwhich qualification is derived, is a separate genus? (As to these\nderivations), it might be asked whether there were no distinction\nbetween \"action,\" \"to act,\" and \"active,\" or between \"to act,\" and\n\"action?\" \"To act\" expresses the idea of \"active,\" while \"action\" does\nnot express it. \"To act\" means \"to be in some action;\" or rather, \"in\nactualization.\" Consequently, \"actualization\" expresses a category\nrather than \"action;\" since actualization is predicated of being, like\nquality, as was said above; and actualization, like movement, also\nrelates to being; but movement necessarily constitutes a class of\nessence. How indeed could we admit that quantity, quality and relation\neach form a genus, in respect to being, and yet refuse to movement,\nwhich equally refers to being, the privilege of also forming a genus of\nbeing?\n\n\nHOW CAN MOVEMENT BE IN TIME, IF CHANGE BE OUTSIDE OF TIME?\n\n16. It may be objected that movement is an imperfect\nactualization.[272] In that case actualization should be given\nthe first rank; and under that genus would follow the species of\nmovement, with the quality of imperfection, by saying that movement\nis an actualization, and adding (the specific difference) that it is\nimperfect. To say that movement is an imperfect actualization does\nnot deprive it of being an actualization, but implies that though it\nbe actualization, there is in it succession, not to arrive at being\nactualization, (which it is already), but to accomplish something from\nwhich it is yet entirely distinct. Then (when that goal is reached),\nit is not the movement that becomes perfect, but the thing which was\nthe goal. For instance, walking is walking from the very first step;\nbut if there be a mile to go, and the mile be not yet finished, what\nis lacking of the mile is not lacking to the walking or to movement\n(taken absolutely), but to that particular walk. For the walk was\nwalking and movement from the very first step; consequently, he who\nis moving has already moved, and he who cuts has already cut.[273]\nJust as actualization, movement has no need of time; it needs time\nonly to become such an action. If then actualization be outside of\ntime, movement, taken absolutely, must also be outside of time. The\nobjection that movement is in time because it implies continuity\n(proves too much; for in that case) intuition itself, if prolonged,\nwould also imply continuity, and therefore would be in time. Reasoning\nby induction, it may be seen, 1, that one can always distinguish\nparts in any kind of movement; 2, that it would be impossible to\ndetermine when and since when the movement began, or to assign the\ndefinite point of departure; 3, that it is always possible to divide\nmovement by following it up to its origin, so that in this manner\nmovement that has just begun would find itself to have begun since\ninfinite time, and, 4, that movement would be infinite in regard to\nits beginning. The fact is that the Aristotelians distinguish movement\nfrom actualization; they affirm that actualization is outside of time,\nbut that time is necessary to movement; not indeed to some particular\nmovement, but to movement in itself, because, according to their\nviews, it is a quantity. Nevertheless, they themselves acknowledge\nthat movement is a quantity only by accident, as, for instance, when\nit is a daily movement, or when it has some particular duration. Just\nas actualization is outside of time, nothing hinders movement from\nhaving begun outside of time, and time from being connected with\nmovement only because the movement has a certain duration. Indeed, it\nis generally granted that changes occur outside of time, for it is\nusual to say, The changes occur either suddenly or successively. Now\nif change can occur outside of time, why should it not be so also with\nmovement? We here speak of change, and not of \"having changed;\" for\nchange does not necessarily have to be accomplished (while \"having\nchanged\" signifies an accomplished fact, and consequently implies the\nnotion of time).\n\n\nACTION AND EXPERIENCING MAY BE SUBSUMED UNDER MOVEMENT, BUT CANNOT BE\nCONSIDERED AS SEPARATE CATEGORIES.\n\n17. It may be objected that actualization and movement do not, by\nthemselves, form a genus, but belong to the genus of relation, because\nactualization exists through the power of something active, and\nmovement exists by the power of some motor, as such. We might answer\nthat relative conceptions are produced by habituation (the manner of\nbeing) even of things, and not only through the relation established\nbetween them by the mind. As the habituation is a mode of \"hypostatic\"\nexistence, although it be the \"thing of something else,\" or although\nit refer to something else,[274] it nevertheless possesses its nature\nbefore being a relation. Now this actualization, this movement, this\nhabituation, which is the \"thing of some other thing\" nevertheless\npossesses the property of existing and of being conceived by itself\nbefore being a relation; otherwise, all things would be relative\nconceptions; for there is nothing, not excluding the soul herself,\nwhich does not bear some relation to something else. Moreover, why are\n\"action\" and \"acting\" not relatives? For they necessarily are either a\nmovement or an actualization. If the Aristotelians consider \"action\" a\nrelative, and make a genus of \"acting,\" why then do they not also place\n\"movement\" among the relatives, and make a genus of \"moving?\" They\nmight, indeed, have subsumed under the genus \"movement\" the two species\n\"action\" and \"reaction\" (or, \"suffering\"); but they have no right to\nmake two distinct genera of \"acting\" and \"reacting,\" as they generally\ndo.\n\n\nON ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLES, EVEN INTELLECTION WOULD BE MOVEMENT OR\nACTUALIZATION.\n\n18. We must further examine if the Aristotelians have the right\nto say that acting contains both actualizations and movements,\nthe actualizations producing themselves instantaneously, and the\nmovements successively; as, for instance, dividing implies time.\nOr will they say that all actualizations are movements, or, at\nleast, are accompanied by movements? Will they trace all actions to\n\"experiencing\" (or, reactions), or will they acknowledge absolute\nactions, like walking or speaking? Or will they distinguish all actions\nthat relate to \"experiencing\" as movements, and all absolute actions\nas actualizations? Or will they place actions of both kinds among\nmovements, and among actualizations? They would no doubt classify\nwalking, which is an absolute thing, as movement; and thinking, which\nis a verb without passive voice, as an actualization.[275] Otherwise\nthe Aristotelians will be obliged to insist that there is nothing\nactive in walking or thinking. But if walking and thinking do not\nbelong to the category of acting, it will be necessary to explain to\nwhat they do belong. Will it be said that thinking relates to the\nthinkable (the intelligible), as intellection does,[276] because\nsensation relates to the sense-object? If sensation be related to\nthe sense-object, why do they not equally relate \"sensing\" (feeling)\nto the sense-object? Sensation, relating to something else, has a\nrelation with that thing; but, besides that relation, it has the\nproperty of being an \"action\" or an \"experience\" (or, reaction). If\ntherefore reaction (or, suffering), besides belonging to something\nelse, or depending on something else, has the property of itself\nbeing something, like actualization, then walking, besides belonging\nto something else (to the feet), and depending on something else (on\nthe motive power), nevertheless by itself possesses the property of\nbeing movement. In this case, it will have to be recognized that\nintellection, besides being a relation, by itself also is a movement or\nan actualization.\n\n\nDO CERTAIN ACTIONS APPEAR IMPERFECT WHEN NOT JOINED TO TIME?\n\n19. Let us now examine if certain actualizations seem to be imperfect\nwhen they are not joined to time, thus identifying themselves with\nmovements, as life identifies itself with living. For (according to\nthe Aristotelians) the life of each (being) is accomplished in a\nperfect time, and happiness is an actualization; not an individual\none, indeed, but a sort of movement.[277] Consequently we will have\nto call life and happiness movements, and movement will have to be\nmade a genus, though recognizing that movement forms a genus very\ndifferent from quantity and quality; and, like them, relates to being.\nThis genus could be divided into two species, movements of body and\nmovements of soul, or movements spontaneous and communicated; or\nagain, movements proceeding from the beings themselves, or movements\nproceeding from others. In this case, the movements proceeding from the\nbeings themselves are actions, whether they communicate to others, or\nremain absolute in themselves (and not communicating to others, like\nspeaking and walking); and the movements proceeding from others are\n\"reactions\" though the communicated movements seem to be identical with\nthe movements proceeding from others. For example, division is one and\nthe same thing, whether it be considered within him who divides, or in\nthat which is divided; nevertheless dividing is something different\nfrom being divided. Or again, division is not one and the same thing\naccording as it proceeds from him who divides, or as it is received\nby him who is divided; to divide means to cause in the divided thing\nanother movement, which is the result of the dividing action or\nmovement. Perhaps, indeed, the difference does not lie in the very fact\nof being divided, but in the movement which results from the division,\nas for instance, in suffering; for this is what constitutes reaction\n(or \"passion\").\n\nWhat are we to say if there be no suffering? We might answer that\nthe actualization of him who acts is simply present in such a thing\n(without correlative reaction). There are thus two manners of acting;\nto act within oneself, and to act outside of oneself. No more will\nit then be said that the first mode is proper acting, and the second\nreacting, but that there are two ways of acting outside of oneself,\nacting and reacting. For instance, writing is an operation in which\none acts on something else without a correlative reaction, because in\nwriting one produces nothing but the very actualization of writing,\nand not something else, like experiencing; for the quality of writing\nthat has been produced is nothing that reacts (or, experiences). As to\nwalking, though the earth be stepped on by the feet, it does not react\n(or, experience) as a consequence. On the contrary, if it be the body\nof an animal that is trod under feet, it may be conceived that there\nis reaction, because one then thinks of the suffering endured by the\nanimal thus trod on, and not of the walking; otherwise, this reaction\nwould have been conceived before (the notion of this reaction would\nhave been implied in the very notion of walking).\n\n\nACTION AND REACTION FORM BUT A SINGLE GENUS.\n\nThus, in everything, acting forms but a single genus along with\nreacting, which (by the Aristotelians) is considered its opposite.\nReacting is what follows acting, without being its contrary; to be\nburnt, for instance, follows burning, but is not its contrary. In\nthis case, the reaction is what results in the object itself from the\nfact of burning, or of being burnt, which form but one (process),\nwhether the result be suffering, or something else, as, for instance,\ndepreciation. It might be objected, When one (being) makes another\nsuffer, is it not true that the one acts, and the other reacts?\nHere from a single actualization result two facts, an action, and a\nreaction. Besides, it is not necessary to include in the action the\nwill to cause suffering; it has only produced something else as a\nresult of which it causes suffering, something which occurring in the\nbeing that suffers, and being one single (occurrence), that causes\nsuffering. What then is this one identical thing which is anterior to\nthe suffering? When there is no suffering, is there not nevertheless\na reaction in him in whom is the modification? For instance, in him\nwho hears? No: to hear is not to react, and sensation is not really\na reaction;[278] but to suffer is to experience a reaction, and the\nreaction is not the contrary of the action (in the sense we have\nexplained).\n\n\nREACTIONS NEED NOT BE PASSIVE, BUT MAY BE ACTIVE.\n\n20. Let it be granted, then, that reaction is not the contrary of\naction. Nevertheless, as it differs therefrom, it could not share\nthe same genus. If both reaction and action be movements, they share\nthe same genus, that of alteration, which is a movement, as respects\nquality.[279] When alteration proceeds from the being endowed with\nquality, is there any action, though this being remain impassible? Yes,\nfor though impassible, it is active. It may be asked, is this being no\nlonger active when it acts on some other object, as, for instance, by\nstriking it, and then reacts? The answer is, that it would be active\nand passive simultaneously. If it be active, when it reacts--when, for\ninstance, it rubs--why is it considered active rather than passive?\nBecause it reacts in being rubbed while it rubs. Could we say that,\nbecause it is moved while moving, there were in it two movements? But\nhow could there be two movements in it? Shall we assert that there\nis but one? In this case, how could the same movement be action and\nreaction simultaneously? Doubtless, it will be considered action, in\nso far as it proceeds from the mover; and reaction, inasmuch as it\npasses from the mover into the moved; and this, without ceasing to be\none and the same thing. Would you say that reaction was a movement of\na kind different from action? How then would the altering movement\nin a certain manner modify what reacts without an equal reaction in\nwhat is acting? But how (can we conceive) of reaction in that which\nacts on another object? Is the mere presence of the movement in the\nmoved sufficient to constitute reaction?[280] But if, on one hand, the\n(\"seminal) reason\" of the swan whitens, and on the other hand the swan\nthat is being born becomes white, shall we say that the swan is passive\nin becoming what it is his nature to be? If he becomes white even after\nhis birth, is he still passive? If one thing increase, and another\nthing be increased, will we admit that the thing that increases reacts?\nWill we rather attribute reaction to the thing qualified? If one thing\nbe embellished, and another thing embellishes it, could we say that\nthe embellished thing reacts?[281] If however, the embellishing thing\ndecreases, and, like tin, tarnishes, or on the contrary, like copper,\ntakes on polish; shall we say that the tin acts, and the copper reacts\n(that is, \"suffers\")? Besides, it would be impossible to say that that\nwhich learns is passive (suffering)? Would this be because the action\nof him who acts passes into him? But how could there be any reaction\n(\"suffering\") since there is nothing there but an act? This action,\nno doubt, is not a reaction (\"suffering\"); but he who receives it is\npassive, because he participates in passivity. Indeed, from the fact\nthat the learner does not himself act, it does not necessarily result\nthat he is passive; for learning is not being struck, but grasping and\ndiscerning, as takes place with the process of vision.\n\n\nDEFINITION OF REACTION OR SUFFERING.\n\n21. How may we define the fact of \"reaction\"? We do not approve of\nthe definition that it is the passing of the actualization from one\nbeing into another, if its receiver appropriate it. Shall we say that\na (being) reacts when there is no actualization, but only an effective\nexperience? But is it not possible that the being that reacts becomes\nbetter; while, on the contrary, the one who acts, loses? A (being)\nmay also act in an evil manner, and exercise on another a harmful\ninfluence; and the actualization may be shameful, and the affective\nexperience be honorable. What distinction shall we then establish\n(between action and reaction)? Shall we say that an action is to cause\n(an actualization) to pass from self into others, and that reaction\nis to receive in oneself (an action) from someone else? But then what\nabout the (actualizations) produced in oneself which do not pass into\nothers, such as thought and opinion? One can even excite oneself by a\nreflection or opinion of emotive value, without this emotion having\nbeen aroused by anybody else. We shall therefore define an action as\na spontaneous movement, whether this movement remain in the being who\nproduces it, or whether it pass into somebody else.\n\nWhat then are the faculty of desire, and desire in general? If desire\nbe excited by the desired thing (it is an experience, or passion), even\nif we should not take into consideration the cause of its excitement,\nand even if we only noticed that it arose later than the object; for\nthis desire does not differ from an impression or an impulsion.\n\nShall we then, among desires, distinguish actions when they proceed\nfrom intelligence, and experiences when they invoke and draw (on the\nsoul), so that the being be less passive by what it receives from\nothers, than by what it receives from itself? Doubtless a being can\nact upon itself. (We can then define) an affective experience, and a\nbeing's experience, as follows. They consist of undergoing, without any\ncontribution from oneself, a modification which does not contribute\nto \"being,\" and which, on the contrary, alters, or at least, does not\nimprove.\n\nTo this (definition) it may be objected that if warming oneself consist\nin receiving such heat as partially contributes to the subject's being,\nand partly does not do so, then we have here one and the same thing\nwhich both is, and is not an experience. To this it may be answered\nthat there are two ways of warming oneself. Besides, even when the\nheating contributes to the being, it does so only in the degree that\nsome other object experiences. For instance, the metal will have\nto be heated, and undergo an experience, for the production of the\nbeing called statue, although this statue itself be heated only\nincidentally. If then the metal become more beautiful by the effect\nof that which heats it, or by the effect of the heating itself, it\nundergoes an experience; for there are two manners of (undergoing an\nexperience, or) suffering: the one consists in becoming worse, and the\nother in becoming better--or at least, in not altering.\n\n\nTRANSMISSION, RECEPTION AND RELATION UNDERLIE ACTION AND EXPERIENCE.\n\n22. The cause that a being undergoes an experience is that it contains\nthe kind of movement called alteration, whichever way it modify him;\non the contrary, action means to have in oneself a definite movement,\nderived from oneself, or a movement which has its goal in some other\nbeing, and its origin in self. In both cases there is movement;\nbut with this distinction: that action, so far as it is action, is\nimpassible; while an experience consists in the experiencer's reception\nof a disposition new to him, without the reception of anything that\ncontributes towards his being; so as to avoid (the case of the statue,\nabove, where) the experience happened to one being (the metal), while\nit was another being that was produced (the statue). Consequently, the\nsame thing will in one state be an action, and in other, an experience.\nThus the same movement will in one being be an action, because it\nis considered from a certain viewpoint; and from another it will be\nan experience, because it is disposed some other way. Action and\nexperience seem therefore to be relative, if one consider the action\nin its relation with experience, since the same thing is action in the\none, and experience in the other. Also, because neither of these two\ncan be considered in itself, but only in him who acts, or experiences,\nwhen the one moves, and the other is moved. Each of these terms\ntherefore implies two categories; one gives the movement, the other\nreceives it; consequently we have transmission and reception, which\nresult in relation. If he who received the movement possesses it as\nhe possesses color, why could it not also be said that he possessed\nmovement? Absolute movements, such as walking (and thinking) possess\nsteps and thought.\n\n\nPREDICTION AND RESPONSIVENESS TO IT DO NOT FALL UNDER DEFINITION FOR\nACTION AND EXPERIENCE.\n\nLet us now consider whether prediction be an action, and whether\nadapting one's course to the prediction of somebody else would\nconstitute experiencing; for prediction comes from one being and\napplies to another. However, although prediction apply to some other,\nwe would not consider prediction an action, nor being directed by the\nprediction of somebody else an experience. In general, not even thought\nis an action; thought, indeed, does not pass in to the object thought,\nbut functions within itself; it is not at all an action. Actualizations\nare not at all actions, and not all of them perform actions; indeed,\nthey may do so only accidentally. It might be objected that a man who\nwas walking would certainly impress on the ground the trace of his\nsteps, and would thereby perform an action. Such an action would be the\nconsequence of something else, or the man would act accidentally; and\nit would be accidental, because the man was not thinking of it. It is\nin this way that even inanimate things perform some action, that fire\nheats, and medicine cures. But enough of this.\n\n\n7. POSSESSION.\n\n23. Let us now examine the category of \"having\" (possession).\n\n\nHAVING IS SO INDEFINITE AND VARIOUS THAT IT CANNOT BE A CATEGORY.\n\nIf the verb \"to have\" be used in several senses, why might we not\napply to this category all the various uses of the word; for instance,\nquantity, because quantity has size; quality, because it has color; the\nfather, because he has a son; the son, because he has a father; and, in\ngeneral, all kinds of possession? Will it be said that the other things\nthat can be possessed have already been classified under the categories\nconsidered above, and that the category of \"having\" comprises only\narms, foot-wear, and clothing? This might be answered by the question\nwhy \"having\" these objects should constitute a category, and why\nburning them, cutting them, burying them, or throwing them away, would\nnot equally constitute one or more categories? If the answer be that\nall these things form one category because they refer to the body,\nthis would then also make another category if we placed a garment\nover a litter; or likewise if someone were covered with clothing.\nIf another answer be that the category of \"having\" consists in the\n\"manner of containing,\"[282] and in possession,[283] then all things\nwhich are possessed will have to be reduced to this category, which\nwill thus contain all possession, whatever it be, since the nature of\nthe possessed object could not here prevail to form some distinction.\nOn the other hand, if the category of \"having\" must exclude having a\nquantity or quality, because the latter ideas already form their own\ncategories; nor having parts, because of the category of being (which\nincludes parts); why should this category contain having arms, when\narms, as well as foot-wear, belong to the category of being? In any\ncase, how could the statement, \"He has arms\" be considered something\nsimple, which could be reduced to any one category? That statement\nexpresses the same idea as \"He is armed.\" Can this expression (\"he\nhas arms\") refer only to a man, or even to his statue? The living man\npossesses very differently from possession by a statue, and the verb\n\"to have\" is used only as a verbal label (a homonym), just as the\nverb \"to stand up\" would mean something very different according as\nit referred to a man or a statue. Besides, is it reasonable to make a\ngeneric category of some merely incidental characteristic?\n\n\n8. SITUATION.\n\n24. As to the category of situation, it contains also such incidental\ncharacteristics as being raised, or seated. Here the Aristotelians\ndo not make a category of situation, by itself, but of the kind of\nsituation, as when it is said, \"He is placed in such a posture\"--a\nphrase in which \"to be placed\" and \"in such a posture\" express two\nentirely different ideas--or again, \"he is in such a place.\" Now, as\nposture and location have already been studied, what is the use in\nhere combining two categories into one? If, on the other hand, the\nexpression \"he is seated\" indicate an action or an experience, must it\nnot then be reduced to the category of action or experience? It would\nmoreover amount to the same thing to say \"he is raised,\" as to say, \"he\nis situated above;\" just as we say he is situated in the middle, or, he\nis situated below. Besides, being seated has already been treated of\nunder the category of relation; why should, \"being raised\" not also be\na relative entity, since the category of relation includes the thing\nto the left, and the thing to the right, as well as the left and right\nhand themselves?\n\nEnough of these reflections (about Aristotelian categories).\n\n\nB. CRITICISM OF THE STOIC CATEGORIES.\n\n25. Let us now pass to the (Stoic) philosophers[284] who, recognizing\nfour categories only, divide everything into \"substances,\" \"qualities,\"\n\"modes,\" and \"relations;\" and who, attributing to all (beings)\nsomething common, thus embrace them into a single genus.\n\n\nTHE CATEGORY OF SOMETHING COMMON IS ABSURD.\n\nThis doctrine raises a great number of objections, especially in that\nit attributes to all beings something in common, and thus embraces them\nin a single class. Indeed, this \"something\" of which they speak is\nquite incomprehensible; as also is how it could adapt itself equally to\nbodies and to incorporeal beings, between which they do not allow for\nsufficient distinction to establish a distinction in this \"something.\"\nBesides, this something either is, or is not an essence; if it be an\nessence, it must be a form; if it be not an essence, there result a\nthousand absurdities, among which would be that essence is not an\nessence. Let us therefore leave this point, and devote ourselves to the\ndivision into four categories.\n\n\n1. SUBSTANCE; ACCORDING TO THEM IT IS SPLIT UP.\n\nThe Stoics assign the first rank to substances, and place matter before\nthe other substances. From this it results that the Stoics assign to\nthe same rank their first Principle, and with it the things which are\ninferior thereto. First, they reduce to a single class both anterior\nand posterior things, though it be impossible to combine them in this\nmanner. In fact, every time that things differ from each other in that\nsome are anterior, and others posterior, those which are posterior owe\ntheir essence to those which are anterior. On the contrary, when things\nare comprised within one and the same class, all equally owe their\nessence to this class, since a class is \"what is affirmed of kinds of\nthings in regard to essence.\" The Stoics themselves recognize this by\nsaying that all things derive their essence from matter.\n\nBesides, when they count but a single substance, they do not enumerate\nthe beings themselves, but they seek their principles. Now there is a\ngreat difference between treating of principles and treating of beings.\nIf the Stoics recognize no essence other than matter, and think that\nother things are modifications of matter, they are wrong in reducing\nessence and other things to a common class; they should rather say\nthat essence is being, and that other things are modifications, and\nthen distinguish between these modifications. Further, it is absurd to\nassert that (among essences), some should be substances, and others\nshould be other things (such as qualities, modes and relations); for\nthe Stoics recognize but a single substance, which does not contain any\ndifference, unless by division as of mass into parts; besides, they\nshould not attribute divisibility to their substance, because they\nteach that it is continuous. They should therefore say, \"substance\"\n(and not \"substances\").\n\n\nMATTER CANNOT BE THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLE.\n\n26. What is most shocking in the Stoic doctrine, is that they assign\nthe first rank to what is only a potentiality, matter, instead of\nplacing actualization before potentiality.[285] It is impossible for\nthe potential to pass to actualization if the potential occupy the\nfirst rank among beings. Indeed, the potential could never improve\nitself; and it implies the necessary anteriority of actualization;\nin which case potentiality is no longer a principle. Or, if it be\ninsisted that actualization and potentiality must be simultaneous,\nboth principles will be found depending on chance. Besides, even if\nactualization be contemporaneous with potentiality, why should not the\nfirst rank be assigned to actualization? Why should this (matter) be\nan essence, rather than those (forms)? Whoever asserts that form is\nposterior bears the burden of proof; for matter does not beget form,\nand quality could not arise from what has no quality; nor actualization\nfrom what is potential; otherwise, actualization would have existed\nanteriorly, even in the system of the Stoics. According to them, even\nGod is no longer simple: He is posterior to matter; for He is a body\nconstituted by form and matter.[286] Whence then does He derive His\nform? If the divinity exist without matter, He is incorporeal, by\nvirtue of His being principle and reason, and the active principle\nwould thus be incorporeal. If, even without having matter, the divinity\nbe composite in essence, by virtue of His body, the Stoics will have to\npostulate some other kind of matter which may better suit the divinity.\n\n\nMATTER IS NOT A BODY \"WITHOUT QUALITY, BUT WITH MAGNITUDE\" (A STOIC\nDEFINITION).\n\nBesides, how could matter be the first Principle, if it be a body?\nIf the body of which the Stoics speak be of another nature, then\nmatter can be called a body only figuratively.[287] If they say that\nthe common property of the body is to have three dimensions, they\nare speaking of the mathematical body. If on the contrary they join\nimpenetrability to the three dimensions, they are no more talking about\nsomething simple. Besides, impenetrability is a quality, or is derived\nfrom a quality; but what is the source of impenetrability? Whence comes\ntri-dimensional extension? Who endued matter with extension? Matter,\nindeed, is not contained in the idea of tri-dimensional extension\nany more than the latter is contained in the notion of matter.\nConsequently, since matter thus participates in size,[288] it is no\nlonger a \"simple\" matter.\n\n\nABSOLUTE EXISTENCE PRECEDES CONTINGENT EXISTENCE.\n\nMoreover, whence is derived the unification of matter? Matter is not\nunity, but it participates in unity. They would have had to realize\nthat the material mass is not anterior to everything, and that the\nfirst rank pertains to what is not one mass, to Unity itself. Then\nthey would have to descend from Unity to multiplicity, from what is\nsize-less to actual sizes; since, if size be one, it is not because it\nis Unity itself, but only because it participates in unity. We must\ntherefore recognize that what possesses primary and absolute existence\nis anterior to what exists contingently. But how does contingency\nitself exist? What is its mode of existence? If the Stoics had examined\nthis point, they would have finally hit upon (the absolute Unity) which\nis not unity merely contingently. By this expression is here meant what\nis not one by itself, but by others.\n\n\nTHE STOIC GOD IS ONLY MODIFIED MATTER.\n\n27. The Stoics did well, indeed, to assign the principle of everything\nto the first rank; but they should not have recognized as principle,\nand accepted as \"being\" what was shapeless, passive, devoid of life\nand intelligence, dark, and indefinite. Because of the universe's\nbeauty, they are forced to introduce within it a divinity; but\nthe latter derives His very essence from matter; He is composite\nand posterior (to matter); rather, He is no more than \"modified\nmatter.\"[288] Consequently, if matter be the subject, there must\nnecessarily be outside of it some other principle which, acting upon\nmatter, makes of it the subject of the qualities which He imparts\nthereto. If this principle resided in matter, and Himself were the\nsubject; if, in other words, He were contemporaneous with matter, He\ncould not reduce matter to the state of a subject. Now it is entirely\nimpossible (for this principle) to constitute a subject concurrently\nwith matter; for in such a case both would have to serve as subject\nto something higher; and what could it be, since there could be no\nfurther principle to make a subject of them, if all things had already\nbeen absorbed into this (concurrent) subject? A subject is necessarily\nsubject to something; not to what it has in itself, but to that whose\naction it undergoes. Now, it undergoes the action of that which itself\nis not subject by itself; consequently, of that which is outside of\nitself. This point has evidently been overlooked by the Stoics.\n\n\nIF EVERYTHING BE DERIVED FROM MATTER, MATTER CAN NO LONGER BE THEIR\nSUBJECT.\n\nOn the other hand, if matter and the active principle need nothing\nexterior, if the subject that they constitute can itself become all\nthings by assuming different forms, as a dancer, who can assume all\npossible attitudes, this subject would no longer be a subject, but\nHe will be all things. Just as the dancer is not the subject of the\nattitudes (for they are his actualizations), likewise the \"matter\"\nof the Stoics will no longer be the subject of all things, if all\nthings proceed from matter; or rather, the other things will no longer\nreally exist, they will be nothing but \"modified matter,\" just as the\nattitudes are nothing but the \"modified dancer.\" Now if the other\nthings no longer really exist, matter is no longer a subject; it is\nno longer the matter of the essences, but is matter exclusively. It\nwill no longer even be matter, because what is matter must be matter\nof something; but that which refers to something else belongs to the\nsame classification as that thing, just as half belongs to the same\nclassification as the double, and is not the being of the double. But\nhow could non-essence, except by accident, refer to essence? But the\nabsolute Essence and matter itself refer to essence by virtue of being\nessence. Now if that which is to be is a simple potentiality, it cannot\nconstitute \"being,\" which consequently matter could not be.[289]\n\n\nTHE MONISM OF THE STOICS BREAKS DOWN, JUST LIKE DUALISM.\n\nConsequently, the Stoics, who reproach other philosophers (such as\nPlato) for making up beings out of non-beings,[290] themselves make up\na non-being out of a being.[291] Indeed (in the system of the Stoics),\nthe world, such as it is, is not being. It is certainly unreasonable\nto insist that matter, which is a subject, should nevertheless be\n\"being,\" and that bodies should not, any more than matter be \"being\";\nbut it is still more unreasonable to insist that the world is \"being,\"\nnot by itself, but only by one of its parts (namely, matter); that the\norganism does not owe its being to the soul, but only to matter; and\nlast, that the soul is only a modification of matter, and is something\nposterior to others. From whom then did matter receive animation?\nWhence comes the hypostatic existence of the soul? How does, matter\nreceive form? For, since matter becomes the bodies, the soul is\nsomething else than matter. If the form came from something else than\nthe soul, quality, on uniting to matter, would produce not the soul,\nbut inanimate bodies. If something fashion matter and create the soul,\nthe created soul would have to be preceded by a \"creating soul.\"\n\n\nTHE FAULT OF THE STOICS IS TO HAVE TAKEN SENSATION AS GUIDE.\n\n28. The Stoic theory raises numberless further objections; but we\nhalt here lest we ourselves incur ridicule in combating so evident an\nabsurdity. It suffices if we have demonstrated that these philosophers\nmistake non-essence for absolute essence; (putting the cart before\nthe horse), they assign the First rank to what should occupy the\nlast. The cause of their error is that they have chosen sensation\nas guide, and have consulted nothing else in determining both their\nprinciples, and consequences. Being persuaded that the bodies are\ngenuine essences,[292] and refusing to believe that they transform\nthemselves into each other, they believed that what subsisted in\nthem (in the midst of their changes) is the real essence, just as\none might imagine that place, because it is indestructible, is more\nessential than (metabolic) bodies. Although in the system of the\nStoics place remain unaltered, these philosophers should not have\nregarded as essence that which subsists in any manner soever; they\nshould, first, have considered what are the characteristics necessarily\npossessed by essence, the presence of which (characteristics) makes\nit subsist without undergoing any alteration. Let us indeed suppose\nthat a shadow would continuously subsist by following something which\nchanges continuously; the shadow, however, would not be no more\nreal than the object it follows. The sense-world, taken together\nwith its multiple objects, is more of an essence than the things it\ncontains, merely because it is their totality. Now if this subject,\ntaken in its totality, be non-essence, how could it be a subject? The\nmost surprising thing, however, is that the (Stoics), in all things\nfollowing the testimony of sensation, should not also have affirmed\nthat essence can be perceived by sensation; for, to matter, they do\nnot attribute impenetrability, because it is a quality (and because,\naccording to them, matter has no quality). If they insist that matter\nis perceived by intelligence,[293] it could only be an irrational\nintelligence which would consider itself inferior to matter, and\nattribute to it, rather than to itself, the privilege of constituting\ngenuine essence. Since in their system intelligence is non-essence, how\ncould any credibility attach to that intelligence when it speaks of\nthings superior to it, and with which it possesses no affinity? But we\nhave said enough of the nature of these subjects, elsewhere.[294]\n\n\n2. QUALITY.\n\n\nQUALITIES ARE INCORPOREAL.\n\n29. Since the Stoics speak of qualities, they must consider these as\ndistinct from subjects; otherwise, they would not assign them to the\nsecond rank. Now, to be anything else than the subjects, qualities must\nbe simple, and consequently, not composite; that is, they must not,\nin so far as they are qualities, contain any matter. In this case,\nthe qualities must be incorporeal and active; for, according to the\nStoics, matter is a passive subject. If, on the contrary, the qualities\nthemselves be passive, the division into subjects and qualities is\nabsurd, because it would classify separately simple and composite\nthings, and then reunite them into one single classification. Further,\nit is faulty in that it locates one of the species in another (matter\nin the qualities), as if science were divided into two kinds, of which\none would comprise grammar, and the other grammar with something\nadditional.\n\n\n\"SEMINAL REASONS,\" AS QUALIFIED MATTER, WOULD BE COMPOSITE; AND\nSECONDARY.\n\nIf the Stoics say that the qualities are \"qualified matter,\" then their\n(\"seminal) reasons\" being not merely united to nature, but (fully)\nmaterial, will no doubt form a composite; but before forming this\ncomposite they themselves will already be composed of matter and forms;\nthey themselves will therefore be neither reasons nor forms.\n\n\nTHE FOUR STOIC CATEGORIES EVAPORATE, LEAVING MATTER ALONE AS BASIS.\n\nIf the (Stoics) say that the \"reasons\" are only modified matter, they\nthen admit that qualities are modes, and the (Stoics) should locate\nthe reasons in the fourth category, of relation. If however relation\nbe something different from modality, in what does that difference\nconsist? Is it that modality here possesses greater reality? But if\nmodality, taken in itself, be not a reality, why then make of it a\ncategory? Surely it would be impossible to gather in a single category\nboth essence and non-essence. In what then does this modification of\nmatter consist? It must be either essence or non-essence. If it be\nessence, it is necessarily incorporeal. If it be non-essence, it is\nnothing but a word, and matter alone exists. In this case, quality\nis nothing real, and modality still less. As to the fourth category,\nrelation, absolutely no reality whatever will inhere in it. This Stoic\nsystem, therefore, contains nothing else but matter.\n\n\nTHE CULT OF MATTER IMPLIES IGNORING SOUL AND INTELLIGENCE.\n\nBut on whose authority do we learn this? Surely, not on that of\nmatter itself, unless that, because of its modification, it becomes\nintelligence; but this (alleged) modification is but a meaningless\naddition; it must therefore be matter which perceives these things,\nand expresses them. If we should ask whether matter utter sensible\nthings, we might indeed ask ourselves how matter thinks and fulfils\nthe functions of the soul, although matter lacks both soul and\nintelligence. If, on the contrary, matter utter something nonsensical,\ninsisting that it is what it is not, and what it could not be, to whom\nshould this silly utterance be ascribed? Surely only to matter, if it\ncould speak. But matter does not speak; and he who speaks thus does\nso only because he has borrowed much from matter, that he has become\nits slave, though he have a soul. The fact is that he is ignorant of\nhimself, as well as of the nature of the faculty which can divulge the\ntruth about this subject (intelligence).\n\n\n3. MODALITY.\n\n\nMODALITY SHOULD NOT OCCUPY EVEN THE THIRD RANK OF EXISTENCE.\n\n30. It is absurd to assign the third rank to modalities, and even\nassign to them any place whatever; for all modalities refer to matter.\nIt may however be objected to this that there are differences between\nthe modalities; the various modifications that matter undergoes are\nnot the same thing as the modalities; the qualities are doubtless\nmodalities of matter, but the modalities, in the strict sense of\nthe word, refer to qualities. (The answer to this is that) since the\nqualities are only modalities of matter, the technical modalities\nmentioned by the (Stoics) themselves reduce to matter, and necessarily\nrelate thereto. In view of the many differences obtaining between them,\nhow otherwise could modalities form a category? How could one reduce to\na single classification the length of three feet, and whiteness--since\none is a quantity, and the other a quality? How could time and place\nbe reduced thereto? Besides, how would it be possible to consider\nas modalities such expressions as \"yesterday,\" \"formerly,\" \"in the\nLyceum,\" and, \"in the Academy\"? How could time be explained as a\nmodality? Neither time, nor things which are in time, nor place, nor\nthe things which are in place, could be modalities. How is \"to act\" a\nmodality, since he who acts is not himself a modality, but rather acts\nwithin some modality, or even, acts simply? Nor is he who undergoes an\nexperience any more of a modality; he experiences something rather in\na modality, or rather, he undergoes some experience in such a manner.\nModality rather suits the (Aristotelian) categories of situation and\npossession; and as to possession, no man even possesses \"in such or\nsuch a modality,\" but possesses purely and simply.\n\n\n4. RELATION; THE STOICS CONFUSE THE NEW WITH THE ANTERIOR.\n\n31. If the Stoics did not, along with the other discussed categories,\nreduce relation to a common kind, there might be good grounds to\nexamine whether they attributed substantial (or, hypostatic) reality\nto these manners of \"being\"; for often, they do not attribute to them\nany. But what is to be said of their confusing things new and anterior\nin one same classification? This is evidently an absurdity; for surely\none and two must exist before the half or the double.\n\nAs to the philosophers (Plato, for instance), who have taught other\nopinions about essences and their principles, considered as finite or\ninfinite, corporeal or incorporeal, or both simultaneously corporeal\nor incorporeal, we will examine each of these opinions separately,\nconsidering also the historic objections of the ancient (philosophers).\n\n\n\n\nSIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO.\n\nThe Categories of Plotinos.[297]\n\n1. After having discussed the doctrine of the ten categories (of\nAristotle), and spoken of the (Stoics) who reduce all things to a\nsingle genus, and then distribute them in four species, we must still\nset forth our own opinion on the subject, striving however to conform\nourselves to the doctrine of Plato.\n\n\nPLOTINOS IS FORCED TO DEMONSTRATION OF HIS DIVERGENCE FROM PLATO.\n\nIf it were our opinion that essence was one, we would not need to study\nwhether there was one single genus for all things, whether all genera\ncould not be reduced to a single one; whether there were principles;\nwhether the genera were at the same time principles; or whether all\nprinciples are genera, without saying conversely that all genera are\nprinciples; or, if we must distinguish between them, say that some\nprinciples are simultaneously genera, or some genera are principles,\nor, finally, whether all principles be genera without the genera being\nprinciples, and conversely. But, since we do not acknowledge that\nessence is one, the reasons[298] for which were advanced by Plato\nand other philosophers, we find ourselves forced to treat all these\nquestions, and first to explain why we recognize genera of essences,\nand what number we decide on.\n\n\nPLOTINOS ADDS TO ESSENCE ETERNITY, TO MAKE ESSENCE INTELLIGIBLE.\n\nAs we are going to treat of essence or essences, we must before\neverything else clear up the significance of essence, which we are\nnow considering, and distinguish it from what other people mean by\nthat word, which we would more likely call that which becomes, what\nis never genuine essence. And besides, it must be clearly understood\nthat in making this distinction, we do not intend to divide a genus\nin species of the same nature; as Plato tried to do.[299] For it\nwould be ridiculous to subsume under the same genus both essence and\nnon-essence, or Socrates, and the image of Socrates. The kind of\ndivisions here attempted will therefore only consist in separating\nthings essentially different, as, for instance, explaining that\napparent essence is not the same as the veritable Essence, by\ndemonstrating that the latter's nature is entirely different. To\nclarify this its nature, it will be necessary to add to the idea of\nessence that of eternity, and thus to demonstrate that the nature of\nbeing could never be deceptive. It is of this kind of essence (that is,\nof the intelligible Essence), that we are going to treat, admitting\nthat it is not single. Later[300] we shall speak of generation, of what\nbecomes, and of the sense-world.\n\n\nHIERARCHICAL CONSTITUTION OF THE UNIVERSE.\n\n2. Holding as we do that the world-Essence is not one, we must face\nthe question whether the number of beings is determinate, or infinite.\nTo say that world-Essence is not one, however, is to say that it is\nboth one and multiple, a varied unity that embraces a multitude. It is\ntherefore necessary that the One, so conceived, be one so far as it\nforms a single genus, containing as species the essences by which it is\nsimultaneously one and multiple; or there must be several genera, but\nthat they all be subsumed under the single one; or again, that there\nbe several genera which however be not mutually subsumed, of which\neach, being independent of the others, may contain what is below it,\nconsisting of less extended genera, or species below which there are no\nmore than individuals; so that all these things may contribute to the\nconstitution of a single nature, together making up the organization of\nthe intelligible world, which we call world-Essence (or \"being\").\n\n\nTHE ELEMENTS OF THE UNIVERSE ARE PRINCIPLES AND GENERA SIMULTANEOUSLY.\n\nUnder these circumstances, the divisions that we establish are\nno more only genera, they are simultaneously the very principles\nof world-Essence; on the one hand they are genera, because they\ncontain less extended genera, beneath which are species, which end\nin individuals; they are also principles, because world-Essence is\ncomposed of multiple elements, and because these elements constitute\nthe totality of Essence. If it were only stated that world-Essence is\ncomposed of several elements, and that these elements, by co-operation,\nconstitute the All, without adding that they branch out into lower\nspecies, our divisions would indeed be principles, but they would no\nlonger be genera. For instance, if it be said that the sense-world\nis composed of four elements, such as fire, or other elements, these\nelements are indeed principles, but not genera, unless this name be\nused as a verbal similarity (or, homonym, or pun).\n\n\nBEING ACTUALIZATIONS, BOTH GENERA AND INDIVIDUALS WILL BE DISTINCT.\n\nAdmitting therefore the existence of certain genera, which are\nsimultaneously principles, we must still consider whether they should\nbe conceived so that these genera, along with the things contained by\neach of them, commingle, fuse, and form the whole by their blending. If\nso, the genera would exist potentially, but not in actualization; none\nwould have anything characteristic. Further, granting the distinctness\nof the genera, can we grant that the individuals blend? But what then\nwould become of the genera themselves? Will they subsist by themselves,\nand will they remain pure, without mutual destruction of the mingled\nindividuals? Later we shall indicate how such things could take place.\n\n\nFUNDAMENTAL UNITY OF GENERA WOULD DESTROY SPECIES; MANIFOLDNESS MUST\nPRE-EXIST.\n\nNow that we have explained the existence of genera, which, besides,\nare principles of being, and that from another point of view there are\nprinciples (or elements), and compounds, we shall have to set forth the\ncriterion by which we constitute these genera; we shall have to ask how\nthey may be distinguished from each other, instead of reducing them to\na single (principle), as if they had been united by chance, although it\ndoes indeed seem more rational to reduce them to a single (principle).\nIt would be possible to reduce them in this way if all things were\nspecies of essence, if the individuals were contained within these\nspecies, and if there were nothing outside of these species. But such a\nsupposition would destroy the species--for such species would no longer\nbe species, or forms;--and from that moment there would be no further\nneed for reducing plurality to unity, and everything forming a single\nunity; so that, all things belonging to this One, no being outside of\nthe One would exist, as far as it was something else.\n\nHow indeed could the One have become manifold, and how could it have\nbegotten the species, if nothing but it existed? For it would not be\nmanifold if there were not something to divide it, such as a size; now\nthat which divides is other than that which is divided. The mere fact\nthat it divides itself, or imparts itself to others, shows that it was\nalready divisible before the division.\n\n\nTHERE IS MORE THAN ONE GENUS, FOR NOT EVERYTHING CAN BE SUBSUMED UNDER\nBEING AND ESSENCE.\n\nFor this and other reasons, therefore, we must take good care to\navoid assertion of a single genus; for it would be impossible to\napply to everything the denominations of \"being\" and essence.[342]\nIf indeed there be very different objects called essence, this is\nonly accidentally, just as if one called the color white a being; for\nstrictly we cannot apply \"being\" to white, as considered alone.[301]\n\n\nTHE ONE IS SO FAR ABOVE ALL THE GENERA AS NOT TO BE COUNTED.\n\n3. We therefore assert the existence of several genera, and that this\nplurality is not accidental. These divers genera, however, depend from\nthe One. But even though they do depend from the One, if the One be not\nsomething which may be affirmed of each of them as considered in its\nbeing, then nothing hinders each of them, having nothing similar to\nthe others, from constituting a genus apart. We also grant that the\nOne, existing outside of the genera which are begotten of Him, is their\ncause, although the other essences considered in their being do not\nproclaim this. Yes indeed, the One is outside of the other essences.\nBesides, He is above them; so much so, that He is not counted as one of\nthem; for it is through Him that the other essences exist, which, so\nfar as they are genera, are equal.\n\n\nWE ARE DISCUSSING HERE NOT THE ABSOLUTE ONE, BUT THE ESSENTIAL RELATED\nONE.\n\nStill, it will be asked, Of what nature is the One which does not\ncount among the genera? This (absolute One) is outside of our present\nconsideration; for we are not studying Him who is above essence,[342]\nbut the essences themselves. We must therefore pass by the absolute\nOne, and seek the one which is counted among the genera.\n\n\nTHE RELATED ONE IS IN SOME GENERA, BUT NOT IN OTHERS.\n\nTo begin with (if we consider the related One from this point of view),\nit will seem astonishing to see the cause numbered along with the\neffects. It would indeed be unreasonable to cram into a single genus\nboth superior and inferior things. If nevertheless, on counting the one\namidst the essences of which He is the cause, He was to be considered\nas a genus to which the other essences were to be subordinated,\nand from which they differed; if, besides, the one was not to be\npredicated of the other essences either as genus, or in any other\nrespect, it would still be necessary that the genera which possessed\nessence subsume species under them; since, for instance, by moving,\nyou produce walking, and yet walking cannot be considered a genus\nsubordinate to you; but above the walking there existed nothing else\nthat could, in respect to it, operate as a genus; and if nevertheless\nthere existed things beneath walking, walking would, in respect to\nthem, be a genus of the essences.\n\n\nTHE PARTS OF A MANIFOLD UNITY ARE APART ONLY FOR EXAMINATION.\n\nPerhaps, instead of saying that the one is the cause of the other\nthings, we would have to admit that these things are as parts and\nelements of the one; and that all things form a single nature in\nwhich only our thought establishes divisions; so that, by virtue of\nits admirable power, this nature be unity distributed in all things,\nappearing and becoming manifold, as if it were in movement, and that\nthe one should cease being unity as a result of the fruitfulness of\nits nature. If we were to enumerate successively the parts of such a\nnature, we would grant to each of them a separate existence, ignoring\nthat we had not seen the whole together. But after thus having\nseparated the parts, we would soon reapproximate them, not for long\nbeing able to keep apart the isolated elements which tend to reunite.\nThat is why we could not help making a whole out of them, letting\nthem once more become unity, or rather, be unity. Besides, this will\nbe easier to understand when we shall know what these essences are,\nand how many are the genera of essences; for we shall then be able to\nconceive their mode of existence. And as, in these matters, it is not\nwell to limit oneself to negations, but to aim at positive knowledge,\nand at the full intelligence of the subject here treated, we shall have\nto make this inquiry.\n\n\nTHE GENERA OF ESSENCE WILL BE DETERMINED BY AN EXAMINATION OF THE\nPROBLEM OF THE ONE AND MANY.\n\n4. If, on occupying ourselves with this sense-world, we wished to\ndetermine the nature of bodies, would we not begin by studying some\npart thereof, such as a stone? We could then distinguish therein\nsubstance, quantity--such as dimension--and quality, such as color;\nand after having discovered these same elements in other bodies,\nwe could say that the elements of the corporeal nature are being,\nquantity, and quality; but that these three coexist; and that, though\nthought distinguish them, all three form but one and the same body.\nIf, besides, we were to recognize that movement is proper to this\nsame organization, would we not add it to the three elements already\ndistinguished? These four elements, however, would form but a single\none, and the body, though one, would, in its nature, be the reunion\nof all four. We shall have to take the same course with our present\nsubject, intelligible Being, and its genera and principles. Only,\nin this comparison, we shall have to make abstraction of all that\nis peculiar to bodies, such as generation, sense-perception, and\nextension. After having established this separation, and having thus\ndistinguished essentially different things, we shall arrive at the\nconception of a certain intelligible existence, which possesses real\nessence, and unity in a still higher degree. From this standpoint,\none might be surprised how the (substance which is thus) one can be\nboth one and many. In respect to bodies, it is generally recognized\nthat the same thing is both one and many; the body can indeed be\ndivided infinitely; color and appearance, for instance, are therein\nvery differing properties, since they are separated here below. But\nin respect to the soul, if she be conceived as one, without extent,\ndimension and absolutely simple, as it appears at first sight, how\ncould we, after that, believe that the soul were manifold? We should\nhave here expected to reach unity, all the more as, after having\ndivided the animal in body and soul, and after having demonstrated that\nthe body is multiform, composite and diverse, one might well, on the\ncontrary, have expected to find the soul simple; and to have accepted\nthis conclusion as final, as the end of our researches. We would thus\nhave taken the soul as a sample of the intelligible world, just as the\nbody represents the sense-world. Having thus considered this soul,\nlet us examine how this unity can be manifold; how, in its turn, the\nmanifold can be unity; not indeed a composite formed of separable\nparts, but a single nature simultaneously one and manifold. For, as\nwe have already said, it is only by starting from this point and\ndemonstrating it, that we will establish solidly the truth about the\ngenera of essence.\n\n\nTHE SOUL IS A PLURAL UNITY OF SEMINAL REASONS.\n\n5. The first consideration that meets us is that each body, whether\nof animals or plants, is multiple, by virtue of its colors, forms,\ndimensions, the kinds of parts, and diversity of their position; and\nthat nevertheless all things derive from unity, whether from the\nabsolutely simple Unity, or from the habituation of the universal\nUnity, or from some principle having more unity--and consequently\nmore essence--than the things it produces; because, the further the\ndistance from unity, the less the essence. The principle which forms\nthe bodies must therefore be one, without either being absolutely\none, nor identical with the One; otherwise, it would not produce a\nplurality that was distant from unity; consequently, it must be a\nplural-unity. Now this principle is the soul; therefore she must be\na plural unity. This plurality, however, consists of the (\"seminal)\nreasons\" which proceed from the soul. The reasons, indeed, are not\nother than the soul; for the soul herself is reason, being the\nprinciple of the reasons; the reasons are the actualization of the soul\nwhich acts according to her being; and this being is potentiality of\nthe reasons.[303] The soul is therefore plurality simultaneously with\nunity; which is clearly demonstrated by the action she exerts on other\nthings.\n\n\nTHE SOUL IS A DEFINITE ESSENCE AS PARTICULAR BEING.\n\nBut what is the soul considered apart from all action, if we examine in\nher the part which does not work at formation of the bodies?[304] Will\nnot a plurality of powers still be found therein? As to world-Essence,\nnobody even thinks of depriving the soul of it. But is her acknowledged\nessence the same as that predicated of a stone? Surely not. Besides,\neven in the essence of the stone, \"being\" and \"being a stone\" are\ninseparable concepts, just as \"being\" and \"being a soul\" are, in the\nsoul, but one and the same thing.[305] Must we then regard as different\nin her essence on one side, and on the other the remainder (what\nconstitutes the being); so that it would be the difference (proper to\nbeing) which, by being added to her, constituted the soul? No: the soul\nis no doubt a determinate essence; not as a \"white man,\" but only as\na particular being; in other words, she has what she has by her very\nbeing.\n\n\nTHE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL DERIVES FROM ITS BEING; ADDING LIFE TO ESSENCE.\n\n6. However, could we not say that the soul does not have all that she\nhas through her being, in this sense, that in her we must distinguish\non one hand essence, and on the other some kind of essence? If the soul\npossess such a kind of essence, and if this kind of essence come to her\nfrom without, the whole will no longer be the being of the soul so far\nas she is soul; only partially will it be the being of the soul, and\nnot in totality. Besides, what would be the essence of the soul without\nthe other things which constitute her being? Will the essence be the\nsame for the soul as for the stone? Will we not rather have to insist\nthat this essence of the soul derives from her very being; that this\nessence is her source and principle; or rather, that it is all that the\nsoul is, and consequently is life; and finally that in the soul life\nand essence fuse?\n\n\nSOUL UNITY DOES NOT RESEMBLE THE UNITY OF A REASON, INCLUDING PLURALITY.\n\nShall we say that this unity resembles that of a \"reason\" (of a\nform)? No. The substance of the soul is one; but such unity does not\nexclude duality or even plurality; for it admits of all the attributes\nessential to the soul.\n\n\nTHE SOUL IS BOTH BEING AND LIFE.\n\nShould we say that the soul is both being and life, or that she\npossesses life? To say that the soul possesses life would mean that the\npossessor is not inherently alive, or that life does not inhere in her\n\"being.\" If then we cannot say that one of the two possesses the other,\nwe shall have to recognize that both are identical, or that the soul is\nboth one and manifold, in her unity embracing all that appears in her;\nthat in herself she is one, but manifold in respect to other things;\nthat, although she be one by herself, she makes herself multiple by\nher movement; that, while forming a whole which is one, she seeks to\nconsider herself in her multiplicity. So Essence also does not remain\nunitary, because its potentiality extends to all it has become. It is\ncontemplation that makes it appear manifold, the necessary thought has\nmultiplied it. If it appear as one only, it is only because it has not\nyet thought, and it really is still only one.\n\n\nTHE FIRST TWO GENERA ARE BEING AND MOVEMENT.\n\n7. What and how much can be seen in the soul? Since we have found\nin the soul both being and life, and as both being and life are\nwhat is common in every soul, and as life resides in intelligence,\nrecognizing that there is (besides the soul and her being) intelligence\nand its life, we shall posit as a genus what is common in all life;\nnamely, movement; consequently, being and movement, which constitute\nprimary life, will be our first two categories. Although (in reality)\nthey fuse, they are distinguished by thought, which is incapable\nof approaching unity exclusively; and whose exercise compels this\ndistinction. Besides, it is possible, you can, in other objects,\nclearly see essence, as distinct from movement or life, although their\nessence be not real, and only shadowy or figurative.[306] Just as\nthe image of a man lacks several things, and, among others, the most\nimportant, life; likewise, the essence of sense-objects is only an\nadumbration of the veritable essence, lacking as it does the highest\ndegree of essence, namely, vitality, which appears in its archetype.\nSo you see it is quite easy to distinguish, on one hand, essence from\nlife, and, on the other, life from essence. Essence is a genus, and\ncontains several species; now movement must not be subsumed under\nessence, nor be posited within essence, but should be equated with\nessence. When we locate movement within essence, it is not that we\nconsider life is the subject of movement, but because movement is\nlife's actualization; only in thought can either exist separately.\nThese two natures, therefore, form but a single one; for essence exists\nnot in potentiality, but in actualization; and if we conceive of these\ntwo genera as separated from each other it will still be seen that\nmovement is within essence, and essence within movement. In the unity\nof essence, the two elements, when considered separately, imply each\nother reciprocally; but thought affirms their duality, and shows that\neach of the two series is a double unity.\n\n\nANOTHER GENUS IS STABILITY, WHICH IS ONLY ANOTHER KIND OF MOVEMENT.\n\nSince then it is in the sphere of essence that movement appears, and\nsince movement manifests its perfection far rather than it divides\nits being; and since essence, in order to carry out the nature here\nassigned to it, must always persevere in movement, it would be still\nmore absurd to deny it stability, than to refuse it movement. The\nnotion and the conception of stability are still more in harmony\nwith the nature of essence than are those of movement; for it is in\nessence that may be found what is called \"remaining in the same state,\"\n\"existing in the same manner,\" and \"being uniform.\" Let us therefore\nassert that stability is a genus different from movement, of which it\nseems to be the opposite.\n\n\nDISTINCTION BETWEEN STABILITY AND ESSENCE.\n\nIn many ways it can be shown that stability must be kept apart\nfrom essence. In the first place, if stability were identical with\nessence, why should it be so, rather than movement, which is life,\nthe actualization of being, and of essence itself? Since we have\ndistinguished between movement and essence, and since we have said that\nit is both identical therewith, and still at the same time different\nfrom it; and because essence and movement are different from each other\nfrom one viewpoint, but from another, are identical; we must also (in\nthought) distinguish stability from essence without separating it\n(in existence); and by separating it in thought, we shall be making\na distinct genus of it. Indeed, if stability and essence were to\nbe confused together in a perfect union, if we were to acknowledge\nno difference between them, we would still be obliged to identify\nstability with movement by the intermediation of essence; in this\nway stability and movement would together form but one and the same\nthing.[307]\n\n\nESSENCE, STABILITY AND MOVEMENT EXIST BECAUSE THOUGHT BY INTELLIGENCE.\n\n8. We must posit these three genera (essence, movement, and stability)\nbecause intelligence thinks each of them separately. By thinking\nthem simultaneously, Intelligence posits them; and, as soon as\nIntelligence thinks them, they are (in existence). The things whose\nexistence (\"essence\") implies matter do not exist in Intelligence;\nfor otherwise they would be immaterial. On the contrary, immaterial\nthings come into existence by merely being thought. So then contemplate\npure Intelligence, instead of seeking it with your bodily eyes, fix\non it your interior gaze. Then will you see the hearth of \"Being,\"\nwhere shines an unsleeping light; you will see therein how essences\nsubsist as simultaneously divided and united; you will see in it an\nabiding life, the thought which applies not to the future, but to the\npresent; which possesses it already, and possesses it for ever; which\nthinks what is intimate to it, and not what is foreign. Intelligence\nthinks: and you have actualization and movement. Intelligence thinks\nwhat is in itself: and you have \"being\" and essence; for, by merely\nexisting, Intelligence thinks: Intelligence thinks itself as existing,\nand the object to which Intelligence applies its thought exists also.\nThe actualization of Intelligence on itself is not \"being\"; but the\nobject to which it refers, the Principle from which it derives, is\nessence. Essence, indeed, is the object of intuition, but not intuition\nitself; the latter exists (has \"essence\") only because it starts from,\nand returns thereto. Now as essence is an actualization, and not a\npotentiality, it unites both terms (existence and intuition, object and\nsubject), and, without separating them, it makes of intuition essence,\nand of essence intuition. Essence is the unshakable foundation of all\nthings, and support of their existence; it derives its possessions from\nno foreign source, holding them from itself, and within itself. It is\nsimultaneously the goal of thought, because it is stability that never\nneeded a beginning, and the principle from which thought was born,\nbecause it is unborn stability; for movement can neither originate\nfrom, nor tend towards movement. The idea also belongs to the genus of\nstability, because it is the goal (or limit) of intelligence; but the\nintellectual actualization by which it is thought constitutes movement.\nThus all these things form but one thing; and movement, stability,\nand the things which exist in all essences constitute genera (or\nclassifications). Moreover, every essence posterior to these genera is,\nin its turn, also definite essence, definite stability, and definite\nmovement.\n\n\nTHIS TRIUNE PLAY IMPLIES ALSO IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE.\n\nSumming up what we have discovered about the nature of Essence, we find\nfirst three genera. Then, these three, Essence, Movement and Stability\nwere contemplated respectively by the essence, movement and stability\nwithin ourselves, which we also harmonized with those intelligibles.\nThen again we lost the power of distinguishing them by uniting,\nconfusing, and blending these three genera. But a little later we\ndivided, extricated and distinguished them so as again to see essence,\nmovement and stability; three things, of which each exists apart. The\nresult of this process then is that they are regarded as different,\ndiscerning them by their differences, and recognizing difference in\nessence by positing three things each of which exists apart. On the\nother hand, if they be considered in their relation with unity and in\nunity, if they be all reduced to being something single and identical,\none may see the arising, or rather the existing of identity. To the\nthree genera already recognized, therefore, we shall have to add\nidentity or difference, or (in Platonic language[308]), \"sameness and\nother-ness.\" These two classifications added to the three others,\nwill in all make five genera for all things. Identity and difference\n(are genuine genera, indeed, because they) also communicate their\ncharacteristics to inferior (beings), each of which manifests some such\nelement.\n\n\nTHESE FIVE GENERA ARE PRIMARY BECAUSE NOTHING CAN BE AFFIRMED OF THEM.\n\nThese five genera that we thus recognize are primary, because nothing\ncan be predicated of them in the category of existence (being). No\ndoubt, because they are essences, essence might be predicated of them;\nbut essence would not be predicated of them because \"being\" is not a\nparticular essence. Neither is essence to be predicated of movement\nor stability, for these are species of essence. Neither does essence\nparticipate in these four genera as if they were superior genera\nunder which essence itself would be subsumed; for stability, movement,\nidentity and difference do not protrude beyond the sphere of essence,\nand are not anterior thereto.\n\n\nWHY NOT ADD OTHERS SUCH AS UNITY, QUANTITY, QUALITY, OR RELATION?\n\n9. These and similar (Platonic) arguments demonstrate that those are\ngenuinely primary genera; but how are we to prove they are exclusive?\nWhy, for example, should not unity, quantity, quality, relation, and\nfurther (Aristotelian) categories, be added thereto?\n\n\nNEITHER ABSOLUTE NOR RELATIVE UNITY CAN BE A CATEGORY.\n\nUnity (may mean two things). The absolute Unity, to which nothing may\nbe added, neither Soul, nor Intelligence, nor anything else, cannot be\npredicated as attribute of anything, and therefore cannot be a genus.\nBut if we are referring to the unity which we attribute to essence,\nwhen we say that essence is one, it is no longer the original Unity.\nBesides, how could the absolute One, which within itself admits of no\ndifference, beget species? If it cannot do this, it cannot be a genus.\nHow indeed could you divide unity? By dividing it, you would multiply\nit; and thus Unity-in-itself would be manifold, and in aspiring to\nbecome a genus it would annihilate itself. Besides, in order to divide\nthis unity into species, you would have to add something to unity,\nbecause it does not contain differences such as exist in being.\nIntelligence might well admit differences between essences, but this\ncould not possibly be the case with unity. The moment you add a single\ndifference, you posit duality, and consequently destroy unity; for\neverywhere the addition of a single unity causes any previously\nposited number to disappear.\n\n\nUNITY IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH ESSENCE.\n\nIt may be objected that the unity which is in essence, in movement,\nand the remainder of the genera, is common to all of them, and that\none might therefore identify unity with essence.[309] It must then be\nanswered that, just as essence was not made a genus of other things\nbecause they were not what was essence, but that they were called\nessences in another sense, here likewise unity could not be a common\nattribute of other things, because there must be a primary Unity,\nand a unity taken in a secondary sense. If, on the other hand, it\nbe said that unity should not be made a genus of all things, but\nsomething which exists in itself like the others, if afterwards unity\nbe identified with essence, then, as essence has already been listed\nas one of the genera, we would be merely uselessly introducing a\nsuperfluous name.[310] Distinguishing between unity and essence is an\navowal that each has its separate nature; the addition of \"something\"\nto \"one\" makes a \"certain one\"; addition of nothing, on the other\nhand, allows unity to remain absolute, which cannot be predicated of\nanything. But why could this unity not be the First Unity, ignoring\nthe absolute Unity? For we use \"first Unity\" as a designation of the\nessence which is beneath the \"absolute Unity.\" Because the Principle\nanterior to the first Essence (that is, the first and absolute Unity)\nis not essence; otherwise, the essence below Him would no longer be\nthe first Essence; here, on the contrary, the unity which is above\nthis unity is the absolute Unity. Besides, this unity which would\nbe separated from essence only in thought, would not admit of any\ndifferences.\n\nBesides, there are three alternatives. Either this unity alleged to\ninhere in essence will be, just like all other essences, a consequence\nof the existence of essence; and consequently, would be posterior\nto it. Or, it will be contemporaneous with essence and the other\n(categories); but a genus cannot be contemporaneous with the things of\nwhich it is the genus. The third possibility is that it may be anterior\nto essence; in which case its relation to Essence will be that of a\nprinciple, and no longer a genus containing it. If then unity be not a\ngenus in respect to essence, neither can it be a genus in respect of\nother things; otherwise, we would have to say of essence also that it\nwas a genus embracing everything else.\n\n\nESSENCE CANNOT BECOME A GENUS SO LONG AS IT REMAINS ONE.\n\nConsidering unity according to its essence, it seems to fuse and\ncoincide with absolute Essence, for essence, so far as it trends\ntowards unity, is a single essence; but in so far as it is posterior to\nunity, it becomes all things it can be, and becomes manifold. Now, so\nfar as essence remains one and does not divide, it could not constitute\na genus.\n\n\nELEMENTS OF ESSENCE CAN BE SAID TO BE ONE ONLY FIGURATIVELY.\n\n10. In what sense, therefore, could each of the elements of essence\nbe called \"one\"? In that it is something unitary, without being unity\nitself; for what is a \"certain one\" is already manifold. No species is\n\"one\" except figuratively[306]; for in itself it is manifold. It is\nin the same sense that, in this sense-world, we say that an army, or\na choric ballet, constitute a unity. Not in such things is absolute\nunity; and therefore it may not be said that unity is something common.\nNeither does unity reside in essence itself, nor in the individual\nessences; therefore, it is not a genus. When a genus is predicated of\nsomething, it is impossible to predicate of the same thing contrary\nproperties; but of each of the elements of universal essence it is\npossible to assert both unity and its opposite. Consequently (if we\nhave called unity a genus), after having predicated of some essence\nunity as a genus, we would have affirmed, of the same essence, that\nunity was not a genus. Unity, therefore, could not be considered one\nof the primary genera; for essence is no more one than it is manifold.\nAs to the other genera, none of them is one without being manifold;\nmuch less could unity be predicated of the secondary genera of which\neach is quite manifold. Besides, no genus, considered in its totality,\nis unitary; so that if unity were a genus, it would merely thereby\ncease being unity; for unity is not a number, and nevertheless it would\nbecome a number in becoming a genus. Of course, numbers include an\nalleged unity, as soon as we try to erect it into a genus, it is no\nlonger a unity, in a strict sense. Among numbers unity is not applied\nto them as would have been a genus; of such unity it is merely said\nthat it is among numbers, not that it is a genus; likewise, if unity\nwere among the essences, it would not be there as genus of essence, nor\nof anything else, nor of all things. Again, just as the simple is the\nprinciple of the composite without being considered a genus in respect\nto it--then it would be simultaneously simple and composite--so, if one\nwere considered to be a principle, it could not be a genus in respect\nto things subsumed under it; and therefore will be a genus neither for\nessence, nor for other (categories or things).\n\n\nVARIOUS ARGUMENTS AGAINST UNITY AS A CATEGORY.\n\nIf unity were to be considered a genus, it could be that only in\nrespect to the things of which each is said to be one;[309] as if,\nfor instance, one should, from \"being,\" deduce the unity contained\nwithin it. Unity would then be the genus of certain things; for just\nas essence is a genus, not in respect to all things, but in respect\nto those species that possess essence, so unity would be a genus\nin respect to the species that possess unity. This, however, is\nimpossible; for things do not differ in respect to unity, as they do in\nrespect to essence.\n\nIt might further be objected that if the same divisions which were\napplied to essence were applied to unity, and if essence be a genus\nbecause it divides itself, and manifests itself as the same in a\nnumber of things, why then should unity also not be a genus, since it\nappears in as many things as essence, and similarly divides itself?\nMere recurrence of something in several essences is no proof it is a\ngenus; whether in respect to the essences in which it occurs, or to\nothers. Merely being common to several essences by no means constitutes\na genus. No one will claim that a point is a genus for lines or for\nanything else, though points be found in all lines. As said, unity\nis found in every number, and nevertheless it is not a genus for\nany number, or for anything else. The formation of a genus demands\nthat what is common to several things show specific differences,\nconstituting species, and be predicated of what exists. But what are\nthe specific differences within unity? What species does it form? If to\nthis it be answered that it forms the same species as essence, then it\nblends with essence, and (unity) is (as said above), only another name\nfor essence; and essence, as category, suffices.\n\n\nGENUINE RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITY AND ESSENCE.\n\n11. The questions here to be solved are, how unity subsists within\nessence, how they both divide, and in general how any genera divide;\nand whether their two divisions be identical, or different. To solve\nthese questions, we shall first have to ask how in general any thing\nwhatever is said to be one, and is one; then, if it can be said in the\nsame sense that essence is one, in what sense this is said. Evidently,\nunity is not the same for everything. It cannot even be understood in\nthe same sense in respect to sense-things, and intelligible things; not\nany more than essence is identical for these two order of (beings),\nor even for sense-things compared to each other. The idea of unity is\nnot the same in reference to a choric ballet, an army, a vessel or a\nhouse; it is even less so in respect of one of these things, and when\nit deals with continuous objects. And nevertheless, by their unity all\nthese things imitate the same archetype, some from far, some from near.\nIntelligence, surely, is assuredly that which most approaches absolute\nUnity; for although the soul already possess unity, Intelligence\npossesses it far more intensely; for it is the one essence.\n\n\nUNITY REIGNS STILL MORE IN THE GOOD.\n\nIs the expression of the essence of something simultaneously the\nexpression of its unity, so that it possesses as much unity as it\npossesses essence? Or does this simultaneousness exist without any\ndirect proportion between the amount of unity and essence? Yes; for it\nis possible that something have less unity without, on that account,\nhaving any the less essence; an army, a choric ballet have not less\nessence than a house, though far less unity. The unity present in\neach thing seems therefore to aspire to the Good, which has the most\nunity;[311] for the closer something approaches the Good, the greater\nunity does it achieve; that is the criterion of greater or less unity.\nIndeed, every (being) desires not only merely to be (alive), but to\nenjoy the Good. That is why everything, so far as it can, hastens to\nbecome one, and those (beings) which by nature possess unity naturally\ntrend towards Him by desiring to unite with themselves. For every\n(being) hastens not to separate from others, but on the contrary their\ntendency is to tend towards each other and themselves. That is why all\nsouls, while preserving their individual nature, would like to fuse\ninto a single soul. The One reigns everywhere in the sense-world, as\nwell as in the Intelligible. It is from Him that everything originates,\nit is towards Him that everything trends. In Him do all (beings) seek\ntheir principle and their goal; for only therein do they find their\ngood; only by that does each (being) subsist, and occupies its place\nin the universe; once that it exists, no (being) could help trending\ntowards the One. This occurs not only in nature, but even in the arts;\nwhere each art seeks, to the extent of its ability, to conform its\nworks to unity, to the extent of its ability, and to the possibilities\nof its works. But that which succeeds best, is Essence itself, which is\nquite close to unity.\n\n\nFURTHER REASONS WHY UNITY IS NOT A CATEGORY.\n\nConsequently, in speaking of (beings) other than (essence itself), as,\nfor instance, of man, we say simply \"man\" (without adding to it the\nidea of unity[312]); if however we say \"a man,\" it is to distinguish\nhim from two; if however we use the word one in still another sense, it\nis by adding to it \"some\" (as, \"someone\"). Not so is it with essence;\nwe say, \"being one,\" conceiving of \"being\" (\"essence\") and one, as if\nforming a single whole, and in positing essence as one, we emphasize\nits narrow affinity with the Good. Thus conceived, essence becomes\none;[313] and in the one finds its origin and goal. Nevertheless it is\nnot one as unity itself, but rather in a different manner, in this\nsense that the (unity of essence) admits priority and posteriority.\nWhat then is (the unity of essence)? Must it not then be considered\nsimilar in all the parts (of essence), as something common to all (and\nconsequently, as forming a genus)? But in the first place, the point is\nalso something common to all the lines, and nevertheless it is not a\ngenus; in the numbers, unity is something common to all, and is not any\nmore of a genus. Indeed, the unity which is found in the monad, in the\ndyad (or pair), and in other numbers, cannot be confused with unity in\nitself. Then, nothing hinders there being in essence some anterior, and\nother posterior parts, both simple and compound ones (which would be\nimpossible for the One in itself). Even if the unity found everywhere\nin all the parts of essence were everywhere identical, by the mere fact\nthat it would offer no difference, it could not give rise to species,\nand consequently, it could not be a genus.\n\n\nBY TENDING TOWARDS THE ONE, EVERYTHING TENDS TOWARDS THE GOOD.\n\n12. We therefore assert (that by moving towards unity everything moves\ntowards the Good). How can it be, however, that Goodness should consist\nin coming closer to unity, even for number, which is inanimate?[314]\nThis question might as well be asked about any inanimate object\nwhatever. If we were told that such (beings) do not enjoy (existence),\nwe might answer that we are here treating of beings according to\ntheir proximity to unity only. If, for instance, we were asked how\na point can participate in the Good, we might answer by a retort,\nasking whether we are dealing with the Point in itself. Then we would\nanswer by the observation that the state of affairs was the same for\nall things of the same kind. If however we were pressed about the\npoint considered as existing in some object, as, for instance, in the\ncircle, we would answer that for such a point, the Good is the good\nof the circle (of which it forms part); that such is the Good towards\nwhich it aspires, and that it seeks that as far as possible through the\nintermediation of the circle.\n\n\nTHESE GENERA EXIST IN BOTH THE SUBORDINATE OBJECTS, AND THEMSELVES.\n\nBut how could we realize such genera? Are all these genera susceptible\nof division, or do they lie entire within each of the objects they\ncomprehend? If so, how does this unity find itself? Unity exists\ntherein as a genus, just as the whole exists within the plurality.\n\nDoes unity exist only in the objects that participate therein? Not only\nin these objects, but also in itself. This point will be studied later.\n\n\nQUANTITY IS A SECONDARY GENUS, THEREFORE NOT A FIRST.\n\n13. Now why should we not posit quantity among the primary genera? And\nwhy not also quality? Quantity is not one of the primary genera like\nthose we have posited, because the primary genera coexist with essence\n(which is not the case with quantity). Indeed, movement is inseparable\nfrom essence; being its actualization and life. Stability is implied in\nbeing; while identity and difference are still more inseparable from\nessence; so that all these (categories) appear to us simultaneously. As\nto number (which is discrete quantity), it is something posterior. As\nto (mathematical) numbers, far more are they posterior both to these\ngenera, and themselves; for the numbers follow each other; the second\ndepends on the first, and so forth; the last are contained within the\nfirst. Number, therefore, cannot be posited among the primary genera.\nIndeed, it is permissible to doubt whether quantity may be posited\nas any kind of a genus. More even than number, extension (which is\ncontinuous quantity), shows the characteristics of compositeness, and\nof posteriority. Along with number, the line enters into the idea of\nextension. This would make two elements. Then comes surface, which\nmakes three. If then it be from number that continuous dimension\nderives its quantitativeness, how could this dimension be a genus, when\nnumber is not? On the other hand, anteriority and posteriority exist\nin dimension as well as in numbers. But if both kinds of quantities\nhave in common this, that they are quantities, it will be necessary to\ndiscover the nature of quantity. When this will have been found, we\nshall be able to make of it a secondary genus; but it could not rank\nwith the primary genera. If, then, quantity be a genus without being a\nprimary one, it will still remain for us to discover to which higher\ngenus, whether primary or secondary, it should be subsumed.\n\n\nNUMBER AND DIMENSION DIFFER SO MUCH AS TO SUGGEST DIFFERENT\nCLASSIFICATION.\n\nIt is evident that quantity informs us of the amount of a thing,\nand permits us to measure this; therefore itself must be an amount.\nThis then is the element common to number (the discrete quantity),\nand to continuous dimension. But number is anterior, and continuous\ndimension proceeds therefrom; number consists in a certain blending\nof movement and stability; continuous dimension is a certain movement\nor proceeds from some movement; movement produces it in its progress\ntowards infinity, but stability arrests it in its progress, limits\nit, and creates unity. Besides, we shall in the following explain the\ngeneration of number and dimension; and, what is more, their mode of\nexistence, and how to conceive of it rightly. It is possible that we\nmight find that number should be posited among the primary genera, but\nthat, because of its composite nature, continuous dimension should\nbe posited among the posterior or later genera; that number is to be\nposited among stable things, while dimension belongs among those in\nmovement. But, as said above, all this will be treated of later.\n\n\nQUALITY IS NOT A PRIMARY GENUS BECAUSE IT IS POSTERIOR TO BEING.\n\n14. Let us now pass on to quality. Why does quality also fail to\nappear among the primary genera? Because quality also is posterior\nto them; it does indeed follow after being. The first Being must\nhave these (quantity and quality) as consequences, though being is\nneither constituted nor completed thereby; otherwise, being would be\nposterior to them. Of course, as to the composite beings, formed of\nseveral elements, in which are both numbers and qualities, they indeed\nare differentiated by those different elements which then constitute\nqualities, though they simultaneously contain common (elements). As to\nthe primary genera, however, the distinction to be established does\nnot proceed from simpleness or compositeness, but of simpleness and\nwhat completes being. Notice, I am not saying, \"of what completes 'some\none' being\"; for if we were dealing with some one being, there would\nbe nothing unreasonable in asserting that such a being was completed\nby a quality, since this being would have been in existence already\nbefore having the quality, and would receive from the exterior only the\nproperty of being such or such. On the contrary, absolute Being must\nessentially possess all that constitutes it.\n\n\nCOMPLEMENT OF BEING IS CALLED QUALITY ONLY BY COURTESY.\n\nBesides, we have elsewhere pointed out[315] that what is a complement\nof being is called a quality figuratively only;[306] and that what is\ngenuinely quality comes from the exterior, posteriorly to being. What\nproperly belongs to being is its actualization; and what follows it is\nan experience (or, negative modification). We now add that what refers\nto some being, cannot in any respect be the complement of being. There\nis no need of any addition of \"being\" (existence) to man, so far as\nhe is a man, to make of him a (human) being. Being exists already in\na superior region before descending to specific difference; thus the\nanimal exists (as being) before one descends to the property of being\nreasonable, when one says: \"Man is a reasonable animal.\"[316]\n\n\nTHE FOUR OTHER CATEGORIES DO NOT TOGETHER FORM QUALITY.\n\n15. However, how do four of these genera complete being, without\nnevertheless constituting the suchness (or, quality) of being? for they\ndo not form a \"certain being.\" The primary Essence has already been\nmentioned; and it has been shown that neither movement, difference, nor\nidentity are anything else. Movement, evidently, does not introduce any\nquality in essence; nevertheless it will be wise to study the question\na little more definitely. If movement be the actualization of being, if\nessence, and in general all that is in the front rank be essentially an\nactualization, movement cannot be considered as an accident. As it is,\nhowever, the actualization of the essence which is in actualization,\nit can no longer be called a simple complement of \"being,\" for it is\n\"being\" itself. Neither must it be ranked amidst things posterior\nto \"being,\" nor amidst the qualities; it is contemporaneous with\n\"being,\" for you must not suppose that essence existed first, and then\nmoved itself (these being contemporaneous events). It is likewise\nwith stability; for one cannot say that essence existed first, and\nthen later became stable. Neither are identity or difference any\nmore posterior to essence; essence was not first unitary, and then\nlater manifold; but by its essence it is one manifold. So far as it\nis manifold, it implies difference; while so far as it is a manifold\nunity, it implies identity. These categories, therefore, suffice to\nconstitute \"being.\" When one descends from the intelligible world\nto inferior things, he meets other elements which indeed no longer\nconstitute absolute \"being,\" but only a \"certain being,\" that possesses\nsome particular quantity or quality; these are indeed genera, but\ngenera inferior to the primary genera.\n\n\nRELATION IS AN APPENDAGE EXISTING ONLY AMONG DEFINITE OBJECTS.\n\n16. As to relation, which, so to speak, is only an offshoot or\nappendage,[317] it could certainly not be posited amidst the primary\ngenera. Relation can exist only between one thing and another; it is\nnothing which exists by itself; every relation presupposes something\nforeign.\n\n\nNEITHER CAN PLACE OR TIME FIGURE AMONG THEM.[318]\n\nThe categories of place and time are just as unable to figure among the\nprimary genera. To be in a place, is to be in something foreign; which\nimplies two consequences:[319] a genus must be single, and admits of\nno compositeness. Place, therefore, is no primary genus. For here we\nare dealing only with veritable essences.\n\nAs to time, does it possess a veritable characteristic? Evidently\nnot. If time be a measure, and not a measure pure and simple, but the\nmeasure of movement,[320] it also is something double, and consequently\ncomposite. (This, as with place, would debar it from being ranked\namong the primary genera, which are simple). Besides, it is something\nposterior to movement; so that it could not even be ranked along with\nmovement.\n\n\nACTION, EXPERIENCE, POSSESSION AND LOCATION ARE SIMILARLY\nUNSATISFACTORY.\n\nAction and experience equally depend on movement. Now, as each of\nthem is something double, each of them, consequently, is something\ncomposite. Possession also is double. Location, which consists in\nsomething's being in some definite way in something else, actually\ncomprises three elements. (Therefore possession and location, because\ncomposite, are not simple primary genera).\n\n\nNEITHER ARE GOOD, BEAUTY, VIRTUE, SCIENCE, OR INTELLIGENCE.\n\n17. But why should not the Good, beauty, virtues, science, or\nintelligence be considered primary genera? If by \"good\" we understand\nthe First, whom we call the Good itself, of whom indeed we could not\naffirm anything, but whom we call by this name, because we have none\nbetter to express our meaning, He is not a genus; for He cannot be\naffirmed of anything else. If indeed there were things of which He\ncould be predicated, each of them would be the Good Himself. Besides,\nthe Good does not consist in \"being,\" and therefore is above it. But if\nby \"good\" we mean only the quality (of goodness), then it is evident\nthat quality cannot be ranked with primary genera. Does this imply that\nEssence is not good? No; it is good, but not in the same manner as the\nFirst, who is good, not by a quality, but by Himself.\n\nIt may however be objected that, as we saw above, essence contains\nother genera, and that each of these is a genus because it has\nsomething in common, and because it is found in several things. If then\nthe Good be found in each part of \"being\" or essence, or at least, in\nthe greater number of them, why would not also the Good be a genus, and\none of the first genera? Because the Good is not the same in all parts\nof Essence, existing within it in the primary or secondary degree; and\nbecause all these different goods are all subordinate to each other,\nthe last depending on the first, and all depending from a single Unity,\nwhich is the supreme Good; for if all participate in the Good, it is\nonly in a manner that varies according to the nature of each.\n\n\nIF THE GOOD BE A GENUS, IT MUST BE ONE OF THE POSTERIOR ONES.\n\nIf you insist that the Good must be genus, we will grant it, as a\nposterior genus; for it will be posterior to being. Now the existence\nof (the Aristotelian) \"essence,\"[321] although it be always united to\nEssence, is the Good itself; while the primary genera belong to Essence\nfor its own sake, and form \"being.\" Hence we start to rise up to the\nabsolute Good, which is superior to Essence; for it is impossible for\nessence and \"being\" not to be manifold; essence necessarily includes\nthe above-enumerated primary genera; it is the manifold unity.\n\n\nIF THE EXCLUSIVE GOOD MEAN UNITY, A NEW GENUS WOULD BE UNNECESSARY.\n\nBut if by Good we here mean the unity which lies in Essence, we would\nnot hesitate to acknowledge that the actualization by which Essence\naspires to Unity is its true good, and that that is the means by\nwhich it receives the form of Good. Then the good of Essence is the\nactualization by which it aspires to the Good; that act constitutes its\nlife; now this actualization is a movement, and we have already ranked\nmovement among the primary genera. (It is therefore useless to make a\nnew genus of \"Good conceived as unity\").\n\n\nBEAUTY IS TREATED SIMILARLY TO THE GOOD.\n\n18. As to the beautiful, if that be taken to mean the primary and\nsupreme Beauty, we would answer as about the Good, or at least, we\nwould make an analogous answer. If however we mean only the splendor\nwith which the Idea shines, it may be answered that that splendor\nis not the same everywhere; and that, besides, it is something\nposterior.[322] If the beautiful be considered as absolute Being, it\nis then already comprised with the \"Being\" already considered (and\nconsequently does not form a separate genus[323]). If it be considered\nin respect to us human beings, who are spectators, and if it be\nexplained as producing in us a certain emotion, such an actualization\nis a movement; but if, on the contrary, it be explained as that\ntendency which draws us to the beautiful, this still is a movement.\n\n\nKNOWLEDGE IS EITHER A MOVEMENT OR SOMETHING COMPOSITE.\n\nKnowledge is pre-eminently movement; for it is the intuition of\nessence; it is an actualization, and not a simple habit. It should,\ntherefore, also be reduced to movement.[299] It may also be reduced to\nstability (if considered as a durable actualization); or rather, it\nbelongs to both genera. But if it belong to two different genera, it is\nsomething of a blend; but anything blended is necessarily posterior (to\nthe elements which enter into the blend, and it cannot therefore either\nbe a primary genus).\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE, JUSTICE, VIRTUES AND TEMPERANCE ARE NO GENERA.\n\nIntelligence is thinking essence, a composite of all genera, and not a\nsingle genus. Veritable Intelligence is indeed essence connected with\nall things; consequently it is all essence. As to essence considered\nalone, it constitutes a genus, and is an element of Intelligence.\nLast, justice, temperance, and in general all the virtues are so many\nactualizations of Intelligence. They could not, therefore, rank amidst\nthe primary genera. They are posterior to a genus, and constitute\nspecies.\n\n\nESSENCE DERIVES ITS DIFFERENCES FROM THE OTHER CO-ORDINATE CATEGORIES.\n\n19. Since these four categories (which complete essence, namely,\nmovement, stability, identity and difference) (with Essence as a fifth)\nconstitute the primary genera, it remains to be examined whether each\nof them, by itself, can beget species; for instance, whether Essence,\nentirely by itself, could admit divisions in which the other categories\nwould have no share whatever. No: for, in order to beget species, the\ngenus would have to admit differences derived from outside; these\ndifferences would have to be properties belonging to Essence as such,\nwithout however being Essence. But from where then would Essence have\nderived them? Impossibly from what does not exist. If then they were\nnecessarily derived from that which exists, as only three other genera\nof essences remain,[324] evidently, Essence must have derived its\ndifferences from these genera, which associate themselves with Essence,\nwhile yet enjoying a simultaneous existence. But from this very fact\nthat these genera enjoy an existence simultaneous (with Essence), they\nserve to constitute it, as it is composed of the gathering of these\nelements. How then could they be different from the whole that they\nconstitute? How do these genera make species out of all (these beings)?\nHow, for instance, could pure movement produce species of movement?\nThe same question arises in connection with the other genera. Besides,\nwe must avoid (two dangers:) losing each genus in its species, and,\non the other hand, reducing it to the state of a simple predicate,\nby considering it only in its species. The genus must exist both in\nits species and in itself. While blending (with the species), it must\nin itself remain pure and unblended; for, if it should contribute to\n\"being\" otherwise (by blending with its species), it would annihilate\nitself. Such are the questions that must be examined.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE AS A COMPOSITE IS POSTERIOR TO THE CATEGORIES.\n\nNow, we have above posited certain premises. Intelligence, and even\nevery intelligence, includes within itself all (essences). We ranked\n(Essence or Being) above all species that are parts thereof. Essence\nis not yet Intelligence. From these it results that already developed\nIntelligence is already something posterior. We shall therefore make\nuse of this study to achieve the goal we had set ourselves (namely,\nto determine the relation of the genus to its contained species). We\nshall therefore make use of Intelligence as an example to extend our\nknowledge of this subject.\n\n\nKNOWLEDGE IS THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE NOTIONS WHICH ARE POTENTIAL\nSCIENCE.\n\n20. Let us, therefore, suppose that Intelligence was in a state in\nwhich it did not yet attach itself to anything in particular, so that\nit had not yet become an individual intelligence. Let us conceive it\nsimilar to knowledge considered by itself before the notions of the\nparticular species, or to the knowledge of a species taken before\nthe notions of the contained parts. Universal Knowledge, without (in\nactualization) being any particular notion, potentially lies within\nall notions, and reciprocally, each particular notion is one single\nthing in actualization, but all things in potentiality; likewise\nwith universal Knowledge. The notions which thus refer to a species\nexist potentially in universal Knowledge, because, while applying\nitself to a species, they potentially are also universal Knowledge.\nUniversal Knowledge is predicated of each particular notion, without\nthe particular notion being predicated of universal Knowledge; but\nuniversal Knowledge must none the less subsist in itself without\nblending (with anything else[325]).\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE IS THE POTENTIALITY OF THE INTELLIGENCES WHICH ARE ITS\nACTUALIZATIONS.\n\nThe case is similar with Intelligence. There is a kind of existence\nof universal Intelligence, which is located above the particular\nactualized intelligences, and is different from that of the particular\nintelligences. These are filled with universal notions: universal\nIntelligence furnishes to the particular intelligences the notions\nthey possess. It is the potentiality of these intelligences all of\nwhich it contains in its universality; on their side, these, in their\nparticularity, contain universal Intelligence just as a particular\nscience implies universal science. The great Intelligence exists in\nitself, and the particular intelligences also exist in themselves;\nthey are implied in universal Intelligence, just as this one is\nimplied in the particular intelligences. Each one of the particular\nintelligences exists simultaneously in itself, and in something else\n(in the universal Intelligence), just as universal Intelligence\nexists simultaneously in itself and in all the others. In universal\nIntelligence, which exists in itself, all particular intelligences\nexist potentially, because it actually is all the intelligences,\nand potentially each of them separately. On the contrary, these are\nactualizations of the particular intelligences, and potentially\nuniversal Intelligence. Indeed, so far as they are what is predicated\nof them, they are actualizations of what is predicated; so far as\nthey exist in the genus that contains them, they are this genus\npotentially.[326] Genus, as such, is potentially all the species it\nembraces; it is none of them in actuality; but all are implied therein.\nSo far as genus is in actualization what exists before the species, it\nis the actualization of the things which are not particular. As occurs\nin the species, these particular things achieve such actualization only\nby the actualization which emanates from the genus, and which, with\nregard to them, acts as cause.\n\n\nHOW INTELLIGENCE, THOUGH ONE, PRODUCES PARTICULAR THINGS.\n\n21. How then does Intelligence, though remaining one, by Reason produce\nparticular things? This really amounts to asking how the inferior\ngenera derive from the four Genera. We shall then have to scrutinize\nhow this great and ineffable Intelligence, which does not make use\nof speech, but which is entire intelligence, intelligence of all,\nuniversal, and not particular or individual intelligence, contains all\nthe things which proceed therefrom.\n\n(Of the essences it contains) it possesses the number, as it is both\none and many. It is many, that is, (it is) many potentialities, which\nare admirable powers, full of force and greatness, because they are\npure; powers that are vigorous and veritable because they have no goal\nat which they are forced to stop; consequently being infinite, that\nis, supreme Infinity, and Greatness. If then we were to scrutinize\nthis greatness and beauty of being, if by the splendor and light\nwhich surround it, we were to distinguish what Intelligence contains,\nthen would we see the efflorescing of quality. With the continuity\nof actualization we would behold greatness, in quiescent condition.\nAs we have seen one (number), two (quality), and three (greatness),\ngreatness, as the third thing, presents itself with universal quantity.\nNow, as soon as quality and quantity show themselves to us, they unite,\nblend into one and the same figure (outward appearance). Then comes\ndifference, which divides quality and quantity, whence arise different\nqualities, and differences of figure. The presence of identity produces\nequality, and that of difference, inequality, both in quantity, number,\nand dimension; hence the circle, the quadrilateral, and the figures\ncomposed of unequal things; hence numbers that are similar, and\ndifferent, even and uneven.\n\n\nTHIS INTELLECTUAL LIFE POSSESSES THE REASONS OR IDEAS.\n\nThus intellectual Life, which is the perfect actualization, embraces\nall the things that our mind now conceives, and all intellectual\noperations. In its potentiality it contains all things as essences,\nin the same manner as Intelligence does. Now Intelligence possesses\nthem by thought, a thought which is not discursive (but intuitive).\nThe intellectual life therefore possesses all the things of which\nthere are \"reasons\" (that is, ideas); itself is a single Reason,\ngreat, perfect, which contains all reasons,[327] which examines them\nin an orderly fashion, beginning with the first, or rather, which has\never examined them, so that one could never really tell that it was\nexamining them.[328] For all things that we grasp by ratiocination,\nin whatever part soever of the universe they may be located, are\nfound as intuitively possessed by Intelligence. It would seem as if\nit was Essence itself which, (being identical with Intelligence), had\nmade Intelligence reason thus (by producing its conceptions),[329]\nas appears to happen in the (\"seminal) reasons\" which produce the\nanimals.[330] In the (ideas, that is in the \"seminal) reasons\" which\nare anterior to ratiocination, all things are found to possess a\nconstitution such that the most penetrating intelligence would have\nconsidered best, by reasoning.[331] We should therefore expect (great\nand wonderful things) of these Ideas, superior and anterior to Nature\nand (\"seminal) reasons.\" There Intelligence fuses with \"Being;\"[329]\nneither in essence nor intelligence is there anything adventitious.\nThere everything is smoothly perfect, since everything there is\nconformable to intelligence. All Essence is what Intelligence demands;\nit is consequently veritable primary Essence; for if it proceeded from\nsome other (source), this also would be Intelligence.\n\n\nFROM ESSENCE ARE BORN ALL LIVING ORGANISMS.\n\nThus Essence reveals within itself all the Forms and universality. This\ncould not have been particular; for it could not be single, the double\npresence of difference and identity demanding it to be simultaneously\none and many. Since, from its very origin, Essence is one and many, all\nthe species it contains must consequently simultaneously contain unity\nand plurality, revealing dimensions, qualities, and different figures;\nfor it is impossible that Essence should lack anything, or should\nnot be complete universality; for it would no longer be universal,\nif it were not complete. Life, therefore, penetrates every thing; is\neverywhere present within it. Hence results that from that Life must\nhave been born all living organisms, for since matter and quality are\nfound within their bodies, these also are not lacking. Now, as all\nliving organisms are born within it, and have ever subsisted within it,\nthey were essentially embraced within eternity, yet, taken separately,\neach of them is a different essence. Taken together they form a unity.\nConsequently, the complex and synthetic totality of all these living\norganisms is Intelligence, which, thus containing all (beings), is the\nperfect and essential living Organism. When Intelligence allows itself\nto be contemplated by what derives existence from it, Intelligence\nappears thereto as the intelligible, and receives this predicate\nproperly and truly.[332]\n\n\nTHUS INTELLIGENCE BEGETS WORLD SOUL AND INDIVIDUAL SOULS.\n\n22. This was what Plato meant, when he said, enigmatically,\n\"Intelligence contemplates the Ideas contained within the perfect\nliving Organism; it sees what they are, and to how many they\namount.\"[333] Indeed, the (universal) Soul, which ranks immediately\nafter Intelligence, possesses the Ideas in herself inasmuch as she is\na soul; but she sees them better in the Intelligence which is above\nher.[334] Likewise, our own intelligence, which also contains the\nideas, sees them better when it contemplates them in the superior\nIntelligence; for, in itself, it can only see; but in the superior\nIntelligence it sees that it sees.[335] Now this intelligence that\ncontemplates the ideas is not separated from the superior Intelligence,\nfor it proceeds therefrom; but as it is the plurality that has\nproceeded from the unity, because it adds difference (to identity),\nit becomes manifold unity. Being thus both unity and plurality,\nIntelligence, by virtue of its multiple nature, produces the plurality\n(of beings). Besides, it would be impossible to discover therein\nanything that was numerically unitary, or anything that might be called\nindividual. Whatever be contemplated in it, it is always a form, for\nit contains no matter. That is why, again, Plato, referring to this\ntruth, said that \"being\" was divided to infinity.[336] Descending from\ngenus to species, we have not yet arrived at infinity; for that which\nthus arises is defined by the species that have been begotten by a\ngenus; the name of infinity applies better to the last species, which\ncan no longer be divided into species. That is why (as Plato teaches),\n\"when one has arrived at individuals, they must be abandoned to\ninfinity.\"[337] Thus, the individuals are infinite so far as they are\nconsidered in themselves; but, in so far as they are embraced by unity,\nthey are reduced to a number.\n\nIntelligence therefore embraces what comes after it, the Soul; so that\nthe Soul, till the last of her powers, is contained by a number; as to\nthe last power (matter), it is entirely infinite[338] Considered in\nthis condition (where, turning towards what is below it, it begets the\nSoul), Intelligence is a part (because it applies itself to something\nparticular), though it possess all things, and though, in itself, it\nbe universal; the intelligences which compose it are each a part (each\nconstituting a particular intelligence by virtue of the actualization\nof Intelligence which exists (and thus exists in itself). As to the\nSoul, she is the part of a part (that is, a part of the Intelligence\nwhich itself is a part, as has just been said), but exists by virtue\nof the actualization of the Intelligence which acts outside of itself.\nIndeed, when Intelligence acts in itself, the actualizations it\nproduces are the other intelligences; when it acts outside of itself,\nit produces the Soul. When in her turn, the Soul acts as genus or\nspecies, she begets the other souls which are her species. These souls\nthemselves have two actualizations; the one, directed towards what is\nabove them, constitutes their intelligence; the other, directed towards\nwhat is below them, gives birth to the other rational powers, and even\nto a last power which is in contact with matter, and which fashions\nit.[339] The inferior part of the soul does not hinder the whole\nremainder from remaining in the superior region.[340] Besides, this\ninferior part is only the very image of the soul; it is not separated\nfrom her,[341] but it resembles the image reflected by a mirror, an\nimage which persists only so long as the model remains before the\nmirror. What should be our conception of the model placed before the\nmirror? Down through what is immediately above the image (that is, down\nthrough the soul herself), we have the intelligible world, composed\nof all the intelligible entities, where everything is perfect. The\nsense-world is no more than the imitation thereof, and it imitates\nthat intelligible world so far as it can, in that it itself is a\nliving organism which is the image of the perfect living Organism. The\nsense-world imitates it as the portrait that is painted, or reflected\nby the surface of water reproduces the person situated before the\npainter, or above the water. This portrait obtained by the painting, or\nreflected by the surface of the water is not the image of the composite\nwhich constitutes the man (the soul and body), but of one or two parts\nonly, the body which was fashioned by the soul. Likewise, therefore,\nthe sense-world, which was made to resemble the intelligible world,\noffers us images, not of its creator, but of the (essences) contained\nwithin its creator, among which is man, along with all other animals.\nNow, in common with its creator, each living organism possesses life,\nthough each possess it differently; both, besides, equally form part of\nthe intelligible world.\n\n\n\n\nSIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE.\n\nPlotino's Own Sense-Categories.\n\n\nGENERA OF THE PHYSICAL ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE.\n\n1. We have thus declared our views about (intelligible) Being, and\nshown how they agree with the doctrines of Plato. Now we have to study\nthe \"other nature\" (the Being of the sense-world); and we shall have\nto consider whether it be proper to establish here the same genera as\nfor the intelligible world, or to posit a greater number, by adding\nsome to those already recognized; or whether the genera differ in each\nbeing entirely, or only partially, some remaining identical, while\nothers differ. If any of them be identical in both beings, that can be\nunderstood only by analogy;[343] that is what will become evident when\neach of these beings are fully understood.\n\n\nTHE WORLD MUST BE STUDIED, JUST AS ONE WOULD ANALYZE THE VOICE.\n\nThis is by what we must begin. Having to speak of sense-objects, and\nknowing that all of them are contained in this world here below,\nwe must first scrutinize this world, establish within it divisions\naccording to the nature of the (beings) which compose it, and then\ndistribute them into genera, just as we would do if we had to analyze\nthe voice whose nature is infinite (by the diversity of sounds it\nproduces), reducing it to a definite number of kinds.[344] Observing\nthe elements common to many sounds, we would reduce them to one unity,\nthen, to a superior unity, further to a supreme unity, in which these\nsounds appear as a small number of classes. Then, the elements common\nto these individuals would be called \"species,\" and that common to\nvarious species would be called a genus. As to the voice, it is easy\nenough to discover each species, to reduce all the species to unity,\nand to predicate of all of them (as highest genus or category) the\ngeneral element, the voice. But an analysis as summary as this is\nimpossible with the (more complicated universe). In the sense-world we\nwill have to recognize several genera, which will differ from those of\nthe intelligible world, since the sense-world itself differs from the\nintelligible world so much that it is not its counterpart, but only its\nimage, whose only element common (to its model) is the name.\n\n\nWE MUST FIRST DISSECT AWAY THE SOUL FROM THE BODY, TO EXAMINE IT.\n\nAs here below in the \"mixture\" (or blend, the soul), and the\ncomposition (the body) (which form our nature) there are two parts,\nsoul and body, the totality of which forms the living organism;[345]\nas the nature of the soul belongs to the intelligible world, and\nconsequently does not belong to the same order of things as the\nsense-world, we shall, however difficult it may be, have to separate\nthe soul[346] from the sense-objects which we are here alone to\nconsider. (We shall illustrate this by a parable). He who would wish\nto classify the inhabitants of a town according to their dignities and\nprofessions, would have to leave aside the foreign residents. As to the\npassions which arise from the union of the soul with the body, or, that\nthe soul experiences because of the body,[347] we shall later examine\nhow they should be classified.[348] This however must follow our study\nof the sense-objects.\n\n\nWHAT IS BEING IN THE INTELLIGIBLE IS GENERATION IN THE SENSE-WORLD.\n\n2. First let us consider what mundane name \"Being\" must be applied to.\nTo begin with, it must be explained that physical nature can receive\nthe name of \"being\" only as a figure of speech;[343] or rather, should\nnot receive it at all, since it implies the idea of perpetual flowing\n(that is, change[349]); so, the more suitable denomination would be\n\"generation.\"[350] We shall also have to acknowledge that the things\nthat belong to generation are very different; nevertheless all bodies,\nsome simple (such, as elements), the others composite as mixtures),\ntogether with their accidents and effects, must, during the process of\nclassification, be reduced to a single genus.\n\nIn bodies, one may besides distinguish on one hand matter, on the\nother, the form imprinted thereon; and we designate each of these\nseparately as a genus, or subsume both under a unity, inasmuch as\nwe designate both by the common label[343] of \"being,\" or rather,\n\"generation.\" But what is the common element in matter and form?\nIn what manner, and of what is matter a genus? For what difference\ninheres in matter? In what sequence could we incorporate that which is\ncomposed of both? But in the case that that which is composed of both\nbe itself corporeal being, while neither of the two is a body, how then\ncould either be incorporated in a single genus, or within the same\ngenus along with the compound of both? How (could this incorporation\ninto a single genus be effected with) the elements of some object and\nthe object itself? To answer that we should begin by the (composite)\nbodies: which would be tantamount to learning to read by beginning with\nsyllables (and not with letters).\n\n\nCAN WE ANALYZE THIS WORLD BY ANALOGY WITH THE INTELLIGIBLE?\n\nLet us now grant that symmetrical analysis by individual objects is\nimpossible. Might we not, as a means of classification, then employ\nanalogy? In this case the (intelligible, higher) \"being\" would here be\nrepresented by matter; and movement above, by form here, which would\nthus quicken and perfect matter. The inertia of matter would correspond\nto rest above, while the (intelligible) identity and difference would\ncorrespond to our earthly manifold resemblance and differences.[351]\n(Such an analogic method would misrepresent the state of affairs\nin this world). To begin with, matter does not receive form as its\nlife or actualization, but (form) approaches and informs (matter) as\nsomething foreign (form deriving from being, while matter is only a\ndeception; so that there is no kinship between them). Then in the\n(intelligible world) form is an actualization and motion, while here\nbelow movement is different, being accidental; we might far rather\ncall form the halting or rest of matter, for form defines that which\nin itself is indefinite (unlimited). There (in the intelligible world)\nidentity and difference refer to a single essence, which is both\nidentical and different. Here below, essence differs only relatively,\nby participation (in the difference) for it is something identical and\ndifferent, not by consequence, as above, but here below, by nature. As\nto stability, how could it be attributed to matter, which assumes all\ndimensions, which receives all its forms from without, without itself\never being able to beget anything by means of these forms? Such a\ndivision, therefore, will have to be given up.\n\n\nPHYSICAL CATEGORIES ARE MATTER, FORM, COMBINATION, ATTRIBUTES AND\nACCIDENTS.\n\n3. What classification shall we adopt? There is first matter, then\nform, and further the combination which results from their blending.\nThen we have a number of conceptions which refer to the three preceding\nclasses, and are predicated of them; the first, simply, as attributes;\nthe others, besides, as accidents. Among the latter, some are contained\nwithin the things, while others contain them; some of them are actions,\nand the others experiences (passions) or their consequences.\n\n\nTHE THREE FIRST PHYSICAL CATEGORIES OF MATTER, FORM AND COMBINATION.\n\nMatter is something common which is found in all things;[352]\nnevertheless it does not form a genus because it does not admit of any\ndifferences, unless its differences consist in appearing in different\nforms; as, here, fire, and there, air. Philosophers who consider that\nmatter is a genus base this opinion on the fact that matter is common\nto all the things in which it exists, or that it stands in the relation\nof the whole to the parts of particular objects (or, \"matters\"). In\nthis case, however, the term \"genus\" would be used in a sense differing\nfrom the one it bears usually. It would then be no more than an only\nor single element, if we admit that an element can be a genus. If,\nconceiving that matter is united to matter, or exists within it, we add\nform to matter, matter would thereby be differentiated from the other\nforms, but it will not comprehend every being-like form. Were we to\ncall the generating principle of being \"form,\" and were we to call the\nreason which constitutes the form \"being-like reason,\" we shall not\nyet have clearly defined the nature of \"being.\" Finally, if we give the\nname of \"being\" only to the combination of matter and form, the result\nwill be that neither of these two (matter or form taken separately)\nwill themselves be \"being.\" If, however, we were to assert that not\nonly their combination, but also each of them separately were \"being,\"\nwe then would be faced with the problem of what is common to all three.\n\n\nDIFFERENT PHYSICAL CATEGORIES.\n\nAs to the things which are simply posited as attributes, they should,\nas principles or elements, be classified under relation. Among the\naccidents of things, some, like quantity and quality, are contained\nwithin them; while others contain them, as time and place. Then there\nare actions and experiences, as movements; then their consequences, as\n\"being in time,\" and \"being in place\"; the latter is the consequence of\nthe combination, the former is the consequence of movement.\n\n\nFIVE PHYSICAL CATEGORIES.\n\nWe decide, therefore, that the three first things (matter, form, and\ntheir combination) contribute to the formation of a single genus,\nwhich, by a figure of speech, we call (\"corporeal) Being,\" a genus\nwhich is common to them, and whose name applies to all three. Then\ncome the other genera; such as relation, quantity and quality; the\n(relation of) being \"contained in place,\" and \"in time\"; movement; and\nplace and time. But as the category of \"time\" and \"place\" would render\nsuperfluous that of \"being in place\" and of \"being in time,\"[353] we\nshould limit ourselves to the recognition of five genera, of which the\nfirst (\"being\") comprises matter, form and the combination.[354] If,\nhowever, we should not count matter, form and combination as a single\ngenus, our analysis will assume the following shape: matter, form,\ncombination, relation, quantity, quality, and movement. Otherwise, the\nlatter three might be subsumed under relation, which possesses more\nextension than they.\n\n\nSENSE-BEING.\n\n4. What is the common element in these three things (matter, form and\ntheir combination)? What constitutes their (sublunary, mundane or)\nearthly \"being\"? Is it because matter, form and their combination\nform a foundation for other things? In that case, as matter is the\nfoundation, or seat of form, then form will not be in the genus of\n\"being.\" But, as the combination also forms foundation for other\nthings, then form united to matter will be the subject of the\ncombinations, or rather, of all the things which are posterior to the\ncombination, as quantity, quality, and movement.\n\n\nBEING IS THAT WHICH IS PREDICATED OF NOTHING ELSE.\n\nIt would seem that (physical) \"being\" is that which is not predicated\nof anything else;[355] for whiteness and blackness may, for instance,\nbe predicated of some white or black subject. Likewise with the idea\nof \"doubleness\";--I mean here not the doubleness which is the opposite\nof one half, but the doubleness predicated of some subject, as when\none says \"this wood is double.\" So also paternity, and science, are\nattributes of another subject, of which that is said. So space is that\nwhich limits, and time that which measures something else. But fire,\nor wood considered as such, are not attributes. Neither are Socrates,\nnor composite being (composed of matter and form), nor form which is\nin the \"being,\" because it is not a modification of any other subject.\nIndeed, form is not an attribute of matter; it is an element of the\ncombination. \"Man\" and \"form of man\" are one and the same thing.[356]\nMatter also is an element of the combination; under this respect, it\nmay be predicated of a subject, but this subject is identical with\nitself. On the contrary, whiteness, considered in itself, exists only\nin the subject of which it may be predicated. Consequently, the thing\nwhich exists only in the subject of which it is predicated is not\n(physical) \"being.\"[356] \"Being,\" on the contrary, is that which is\nwhat it is by itself. In case it form part of some subject, then it\ncompletes the combination; whose elements exist each in itself, and\nwhich are predicated of the combination only in a condition other than\nthat of existing in it. Considered as a part, \"being\" is relative to\nsomething other than itself; but considered in itself, in its nature,\nin what it is, it is not predicable of anything.[357]\n\n\nPHYSICAL BEING IS THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL OTHER THINGS.\n\nTo be a subject is then a property common to matter, to form, and\nto the combination. But this function of subject is fulfilled\ndifferently by matter in respect to form, and by form in respect to\nthe modifications, and by the combination; or rather, matter is not a\nsubject in respect to form; form is the complement which completes it\nwhen it still is only matter, and when it exists only potentially.[358]\nTo speak strictly, form is not in matter; for when one thing forms only\na unity with something else, one cannot say that one is in the other\n(as some accident in its subject). Only when both are taken together\ndo matter and form form a subject for other things;[359] thus Man\nin general, and a particular man constitute the subject of passive\nmodifications; they are anterior to the actions and consequences which\nrelate to them. \"Being\" therefore is the principle from which all other\nthings derive, and by which they exist; that to which all passive\nmodifications relate, and from which all actions proceed.[360]\n\n\nRELATION BETWEEN PHYSICAL AND INTELLIGIBLE TERMS ARE MERELY VERBAL.\n\n5. Such are the characteristics of sense-being. If in any way they also\nsuit intelligible \"being,\" it is only by analogy,[343] or by figure\nof speech (homonymy).[361] So, for instance, the \"first\" is so called\nin respect of the remainder; for it is not absolutely first, but only\nin respect to the things which hold an inferior rank; far more, the\nthings which follow the first are also called first in respect to those\nwhich follow. Likewise, in speaking of intelligible things, the word\n\"subject\" is used in a different sense. It may also be doubted that\nthey suffer (\"experience\"), and it is evident that if they do suffer,\nit is in an entirely different manner.[362]\n\n\nPHYSICAL BEING IS THAT WHICH IS NOT IN A SUBJECT.\n\nNot to be in a subject is then the common characteristic of all\n\"being,\" if, by \"not being in a subject,\" we mean \"not to form part\nof any subject,\" and \"not to contribute to the formation of a unity\ntherewith.\" Indeed, that which contributes to the formation of a\ncomposite being, with something else, could not be in that thing as\nin a subject; form therefore is not in matter as in a subject, and\nneither is \"man\" in Socrates as in a subject, because \"man\" forms part\nof Socrates.[363] Thus, \"being\" is that which is not in a subject.\nIf we add that \"being\" is not predicated of any subject, we must also\nadd, \"insofar as this subject is something different from itself;\"\notherwise \"man,\" predicated of some one man, would not be comprised\nwithin the definition of \"being,\" if (in asserting that \"being\" is not\npredicated of any subject), we did not add, \"so far as this subject\nis something different from itself.\" When I say, \"Socrates is a man,\"\nI am practically saying, \"White is white,\" and not, \"wood is white.\"\nWhile actually asserting that \"Socrates is a man,\" I am asserting that\na particular man is a man, and to say \"The man who is in Socrates is a\nman,\" amounts to saying \"Socrates is Socrates,\" or, \"that particular\nreasonable living organism is a living organism.\"\n\n\nALL THE OTHER PHYSICAL CATEGORIES REFER TO MATTER, FORM OR COMBINATION.\n\nIt might however be objected that the property of \"being\" does not\nconsist in being a subject; for the difference (as, for instance, a\nbiped), is also one of those things which are not in a subject.[363] If\n\"biped\" be considered as a part of being, we are compelled to recognize\nthat \"biped\" is not in a subject; but if by \"biped\" we do not mean some\nparticular \"being\" but the property of being a biped, then we are no\nlonger speaking of a being, but of a quality, and \"biped\" will be in a\nsubject.\n\nBut time and place do not seem to be in a subject! If we define time as\n\"the measure of movement,\"[364] (there are two possibilities). First,\ntime might be measured movement; and then it will be in movement as in\na subject, while movement itself will be in the moved thing. Or, time\nwill be what measures (the soul, or the present moment), and then it\nwill be in what measures as in a subject. As to space, as it is the\nlimit of what contains, it will also reside in what contains.[365] It\nis otherwise with the \"being\" that we are here considering. \"Being,\"\nthen, will have to be considered as consisting in either one, or in\nseveral, or in all the properties of which we are speaking; because\nthese properties simultaneously suit matter, form, and the combination.\n\n\nBEING DRAWS ITS EXISTENCE FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE.\n\n6. It may perhaps be objected that we have here indicated the\nproperties of \"being,\" but we have not described its nature. Such a\nrequest amounts to asking to see what sense-being is; now sense-being\nis, and \"being\" is not something which can be seen.\n\nWhat then? Are fire and water not beings? Doubtless, they are. But are\nthey beings merely because they are visible? No. Is it because they\ncontain matter? No. Is it because they have a form? No. Is it because\nthey are combinations? No. They are \"beings,\" because they \"are.\"\n\nBut one can also say that quantity, as well as that quality \"is!\" Yes,\ndoubtless, but if we speak thus about quantity and quality, it is only\nby a figure of speech.[343],[361], [366]\n\nThen, in what consists the being of earth, fire, and other similar\nthings? What is the difference between the being of these things and\nof others? The essence of the earth, of the fire, and so forth, exists\nin an absolute manner, while the essence of other things (is relative)\nand for instance, means merely being white. \"Is\" added to white is not\nthe same thing as \"essence\" taken absolutely; is it? Certainly not.\nEssence taken absolutely is essence in the first degree; \"to be\" added\nto white, is essence by participation, essence in the second degree;\nfor \"to be,\" added to white, makes white an essence; and white added\nto essence makes the being white; that is why white is an accident for\nessence, and \"to be\" an accident to white. It is not the same thing as\nif we said, Socrates is white, and, the White is Socrates; for in both\ncases Socrates is the same being; but it is not thus with whiteness;\nfor, in the second case, Socrates is contained in the white, and in\nthe first case, white is a pure accident. When we say, the being is\nwhite, the white is an accident of being; but when we say, the White\nis essence, the white contains essence. In short, white possesses\nexistence only because it refers to \"being,\" and is in \"being.\" It\nis therefore from \"being\" that it receives its existence. On the\ncontrary, essence draws its existence from itself; and from white it\nreceives whiteness, not because it is in the white, but because the\nwhite is within it.[366] As the essence which is in the sense-world is\nnot Essence by itself, we must say that it draws its existence from\nthe veritable Essence, in itself; and, finally, the White in itself\npossesses essence because it participates in the intelligible Essence.\n\n\nBEING CANNOT BE ASCRIBED TO MATTER, WHICH DERIVES ITS BEING FROM THE\nINTELLIGIBLE.\n\n7. If somebody should object that material things derive their essence\nfrom matter, we should have to ask from whence matter itself draws its\nessence and existence; for we have elsewhere demonstrated that matter\ndoes not hold the first rank.[367]\n\nIf, however, it be further objected, that the other things could not\nexist without being in matter, we will answer that that is true only\nfor sense-things. But if matter be anterior to sense-things, that does\nnot hinder itself being posterior to many other things, and to all\nintelligible things; for the existence of matter is far more obscure\nthan the things in matter, if these things be (\"seminal) reasons,\"\nwhich participate deeper in essence, while matter is completely\nirrational, being an adumbration, and a decay of reason.[368]\n\nIt may further be objected that matter gives essence to material\nthings, as Socrates gives essence to the white that is in him. We will\nanswer that what possesses a superior degree of Essence may well confer\na lesser degree of essence to what possesses a still inferior degree\nthereof, but that the reciprocal or converse condition is impossible.\nNow, as form is more essence than matter,[369] essence cannot be\npredicated equally of matter and form, and \"being\" is not a genus whose\nspecies is matter, form and the combination.[370] These three things\nhave several common characteristics, as we have already said, but\nthey differ in respect to essence; for when something which possesses\na superior degree of essence approaches something which possesses an\ninferior degree (as when form approaches matter), this thing, although\nanterior in (the ontological) order, is posterior in respect to being;\nconsequently, if matter, form and the combination be not \"beings\"\nequally, no longer is being for them something common, like a genus.\nNevertheless, \"being\" will be in a less narrow relation with things\nwhich are posterior to matter, to form, and to the combination, though\nit gives each of them the property of belonging to themselves. It is\nthus that life has different degrees, one stronger, the other weaker,\nand that the images of a same object are some more lively, others more\nobscure.[371] If essence be measured by a lower degree of essence, and\nif the superior degree which exists in other things be omitted, essence\nthus considered will be a common element. But that is not a good way of\nprocedure. Indeed, each whole differs from the others, and the lesser\ndegree of essence does not constitute something that was common to all;\njust as, for life, there is not something common to vegetative life, to\nsensitive life, and rational life.[371]\n\n\nESSENCES DIFFER ACCORDING TO PARTICIPATION IN FORM.\n\nConsequently, essence differs both in matter and in form; and these two\n(entities) depend from a third (intelligible Being), which communicates\nitself to them unequally. The anterior Being possesses a better nature\n(\"essence\") than any posterior being, not only when the second proceeds\nfrom the first, and the third from the second; but when two things\nproceed from one and the same thing, the same (condition of affairs)\nmay be observed. Thus does the clay (when fashioned by the potter)\nbecome a tile not only according as it participates in the fire more\nor less (is more or less thoroughly baked). Besides, matter and form\ndo not proceed from the same intelligible principle;[372] for the\nintelligibles also differ among each other.\n\n\nDIFFERENCE BETWEEN MATTER AND FORM DUE TO THAT OF INTELLIGIBLE ENTITIES\nFROM WHICH THEY DEPEND.\n\n8. Besides, it is not necessary to divide the combination in form and\nmatter, now that we speak of sense-being, a \"being\" which has to be\nperceived by the senses, rather than by reason. Neither is it necessary\nto add of what this being is composed; for the elements which compose\nit are not beings, or at least not sense-beings. What has to be done\nhere is to embrace in a single genus what is common to stone, to earth,\nto water, and to the things compounded of them; namely, to plants and\nanimals so far as they respond to sensation. In this way, we shall\nconsider both form and matter; for sense-being contains them both. Thus\nfire, earth, and their intermediaries are both matter and form; as to\nthe combinations, they contain several beings united together. What\nthen is the common characteristic of all these beings, which separates\nthem from other things? They serve as subjects to other things, and are\nnot contained in one subject, and do not belong to something else;[373]\nin short, all the characteristics we have enumerated above suit\nsense-being.\n\n\nSENSE-BEING CONSISTS IN THE REUNION OF QUALITIES AND MATTER.\n\nBut how shall we separate the accidents from sense-being, if it have\nno existence without dimension or quality? Of what will sense-being\nconsist, if we remove from it dimension, figure (or outward\nappearance), color, dryness, and humidity? For sense-beings are\nqualified. The qualities which change simple into qualified \"being\"\nrefer to something. Thus, it is not the entire fire which is being,\nbut something of the fire, one of its parts. Now what is this part, if\nit be not matter? Sense-being, therefore, consists in the reunion of\nquality and matter; and being is constituted by the totality of these\nthings blended in a single matter. Each thing taken separately will be\nquality or quantity, and so forth; but the thing whose absence makes\n\"being\" incomplete is a part of that being. As to the thing which is\nadded to already complete being, it has its own place;[374] and it is\nnot lost in the blending which constitutes \"being.\" I do not say that\nsuch a thing, taken with others, is a being when it completes a matter\nof some particular size and quality, and that it is no more than a\nquality when it does not complete this mass; I say that even here below\nnot everything is \"being,\" and that only the totality which embraces\neverything is \"being.\" Let none complain that we are constituting\n\"being\" as of that which is not being; for even the totality is not\na veritable \"being.\" (Here this word is used in both sensual and\nintelligible senses, as a pun), and only offers the image of the\nveritable (Being), which possesses essence independently of all that\nrefers to it, and itself produces the other things because it possesses\nveritable (Existence). Here below the substrate possesses essence only\nincompletely, and, far from producing other things, is sterile; it is\nonly an adumbration, and onto this adumbration are reflected images\nwhich have only the appearance (instead of real existence.)[375]\n\n\nCLASSIFICATION OF BODIES.\n\n9. So much then for what we had to say of sense-being, and the genus it\nconstitutes. It remains to analyze it into species. Every sense-being\nis a body; but there are elementary and organized bodies; the former\nare fire, earth, water and air; the organized bodies are those of\nplants and animals, which are distinguished from each other by their\nforms. The earth and the other elements may be divided into species.\nPlants and bodies of animals may be classified according to their\nforms; or we could classify apart the terrestrial animals, that inhabit\nthe earth, and those which belong to some other element. We might also\nanalyze bodies into those that are light, heavy, or intermediary; the\nheavy bodies remaining in the middle of the world, the light bodies in\nthe superior region which surrounds the world, and the intermediary\nbodies dwelling in the intermediary region. In each one of these\nregions the bodies are distinguished by their exterior appearance (or,\nfigure); thus there exist the bodies of the (stars, or) celestial\nbodies, and then those that belong to particular elements. After having\ndistributed the bodies according to the four elements, they could be\nblended together in some other manner, and thus beget their mutual\ndifferences of location, forms, and mixtures. Bodies could also be\ndistinguished as fiery, terrestrial, and so forth, according to their\npredominating element.\n\n\nPRIMARY AND SECONDARY BEINGS ARE DIVIDED BY NO SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE.\n\nAs to the distinction drawn between primary and secondary being,[376]\nit must be admitted that some particular fire, and the universal Fire\ndiffer from each other in this, that the one is individual, and the\nother universal; but the difference between them does not seem to\nbe essential. Indeed, does the genus of quality contain both White,\nand a particular white; or Grammar, and some particular grammatical\nscience? How far does Grammatical science then have less reality than\nsome particular grammatical science, and Science, than some particular\nscience? Grammatical science is not posterior to some particular\ngrammatical science; Grammatical science must already have existed\nbefore the existence of the grammatical science in you, since the\nlatter is some grammatical science because it is found in you; it is\nbesides identical with universal Grammatical science. Likewise, it\nis not Socrates that caused him who was not a man to become a man;\nit is rather the universal Man who enabled Socrates to be a man; for\nthe individual man is man by participation in the universal Man. What\nthen is Socrates, if not some man? In what does such a man contribute\nto render \"being\" more \"being\"? If the answer be that he contributes\nthereto by the fact that the universal Man is only a form, while a\nparticular man is a form in matter, the result will only be that a\nparticular man will be less of a man; for reason (that is, essence) is\nweaker when it is in matter. If the universal Man consist not only in\nform itself, but is also in matter, in what will he be inferior to the\nform of the man who is in matter, since it will be the reason of the\nman which is in matter? By its nature the universal is anterior, and\nconsequently the form is anterior to the individual. Now that which\nby its nature is anterior is an absolute anterior. How then would the\nuniversal be less in being? Doubtless the individual, being better\nknown to us, is anterior for us; but no difference in the things\nthemselves results.[377] Besides, if we were to admit the distinction\nbetween primary and secondary beings, the definition of \"being\" would\nno longer be one; for that which is first and that which is second are\nnot comprised under one single definition, and do not form a single and\nsame genus.\n\n\nBODIES MAY BE CLASSIFIED NOT ONLY BY FORMS; BUT BY QUALITIES; ETC.\n\n10. Bodies may also be distinguished by heat or dryness, wetness\nor cold, or in any other desired manner, by taking two qualities\nsimultaneously, then considering these things as a composition and\nmixture, and ceasing at the combination thereof. Or, bodies may be\ndivided in terrestrial bodies, that dwell on the earth, or distribute\nthem according to their forms, and the differences of animals; by\nclassifying not the animals themselves, but their bodies, which are\ntheir instruments,[378] as it were. It is proper to establish a\nclassification according to the forms, as it is equally reasonable\nto classify bodies according to their qualities, such as heat, cold,\nand so forth. If it be objected that bodies are constituted rather\nby their qualities, it may be answered that they are just as much\nclassified by their blends, their colors, and their figures. When\nanalyzing sense-being, it is not unreasonable to classify it according\nto the differences that appear to the senses.[379] This (\"being\") does\nnot possess absolute (Essence); it is the totality of the matter and\nqualities which constitutes the sense-being, since we have said that\nits hypostatic existence consists in the union of the things perceived\nby the senses, and that it is according to the testimony of their\nsenses that men believe in the existence of things.\n\n\nBODIES ARE CLASSIFIABLE ACCORDING TO SPECIFIC FORMS.\n\nThe composition of the bodies being varied, they may also be classified\naccording to the specific forms of the animals. Such, for instance,\nwould be the specific form of a man united to a body; for this form\nis a quality of body, and it is reasonable to analyze it according to\nthe qualities. If it should be objected that we have said above that\nsome bodies are simple, while others are composite, thus contrasting\nthe simple and the composite, we shall answer that, without regarding\ntheir composition, we have also said that they are either brute or\norganized. The classification of bodies should not be founded on the\ncontrast between the simple and the composite, but, as we first did, we\nmay classify the simple bodies in the first rank. Then, by considering\ntheir blendings, one may start from another principle to determine the\ndifferences offered by the composites under the respect of their figure\nor their location; thus, for instance, bodies might be classified\nin celestial and terrestrial. This may close our consideration of\nsense-being, or generation.\n\n\nDEFINITION OF QUANTITY.\n\n11. Let us now pass to quantity and quantitatives. When treating\nof quantity, we have already said that it consists in number and\ndimension, in so far as some thing possesses such a quantity, that\nis, in the number of material things, and in the extension of the\nsubject.[380] Here indeed we are not treating of abstract quantity,\nbut of a quantity which causes a piece of wood to measure three feet,\nor that horses are five in number. Consequently, as we have said,\nwe should call extension and number (considered from the concrete\nviewpoint) \"quantitatives\"; but this name could could be applied\nneither to time nor space; time, being the measure of movement,[381]\nre-enters into relation; and place, being that which contains\nthe body,[382] consists of a manner of being, and consequently,\nin a relation. (So much the less should we call time and place\n\"quantitatives,\" as) movement, though continuous, does not either\nbelong to the genus of quantity.\n\n\nLARGE AND SMALL ARE CONCEPTIONS BELONGING TO QUANTITY.\n\nShould \"large\" and \"small\" be classified within the genus of quantity?\nYes: for the large is large by a certain dimension, and dimension is\nnot a relation. As to \"greater\" and \"smaller,\" they belong to relation;\nfor a thing is greater or smaller in relation to something else, just\nas when it is double. Why then do we sometimes say that a mountain is\nlarge, and that a grain of millet is small? When we say that a mountain\nis small, we use the latter term instead of smaller; for they who\nuse this expression themselves acknowledge that they call a mountain\nsmall only by comparing it to other mountains, which implies that here\n\"little\" stands for \"smaller.\" Likewise, when we say that a grain of\nmillet is large, this does not mean \"large\" in any absolute sense, but\nlarge only for a grain of millet; which implies that one compares it to\nthings of the same kind, and that here \"large\" means \"larger.\"[383]\n\n\nBEAUTY IS CLASSIFIED ALONG WITH THE RELATIVES.\n\nWhy then do we not also classify the beautiful among the relatives?\nBecause beauty is such by itself, because it constitutes a quality,\nwhile \"more beautiful\" is a relative. Nevertheless the thing which is\ncalled beautiful would sometimes appear ugly, if it were compared to\nsome other, as, for instance, if we were to contrast the beauty of men\nwith that of the gods; hence the expression (of Heraclitus's[384]):\n\"The most beautiful of monkeys would be ugly if compared with an animal\nof a different kind.\" When beauty is predicated of something, it is\nconsidered in itself; it might perhaps be called more beautiful or more\nugly if it were compared to another. Hence it results that, in the\ngenus of which we are treating, an object is in itself great because of\nthe presence of greatness, but not in respect to some other. Otherwise,\nwe would be obliged to deny that a thing was beautiful because of\nthe existence of some more beautiful one. Neither therefore must we\ndeny that a thing is great because there is only one greater than it;\nfor \"greater\" could not exist without \"great,\" any more than \"more\nbeautiful\" without \"beautiful.\"\n\n\nQUANTITY ADMITS OF CONTRARIES (POLEMIC AGAINST ARISTOTLE).[385]\n\n12. It must therefore be admitted that quantity admits of contraries.\nEven our thought admits of contraries when we say \"great\" and \"small,\"\nsince we then conceive of contraries, as when we say, \"much and\nlittle\"; for much and little are in the same condition as great and\nsmall. Sometimes it is said, \"At home there are many people,\" and by\nthis is intended a (relatively) great number; for in the latter case\nit is a relative. Likewise it is said, \"There are few people in the\ntheatre,\" instead of saying, \"there are less people,\" (relatively);\nbut when one uses the word \"many\" a great multitude in number must be\nunderstood.\n\n\nHOW MULTITUDE IS CLASSIFIED WITH RELATIVES.\n\nHow then is multitude classified among relatives? It forms part of\nrelatives in that multitude is an extension of number, while its\ncontrary is a contraction. Likewise is it with continuous dimension; we\nconceive of it as prolonged. Quantity therefore has a double origin:\nprogression of unity, and of the point. If either progression cease\npromptly, the first one produces \"little,\" and the second, \"small.\"\nIf both be prolonged, they produce \"much,\" and \"large.\" What then is\nthe limit that determines these things? The same question may be asked\nabout the beautiful, and about warmth; for there is also \"warmer\";\nonly, the latter is a relative, while Warm, taken absolutely, is a\nquality. As there is a \"reason\" of the beautiful (a reason that would\nproduce and determine the beautiful), likewise there must be a reason\nfor the Great, a reason by participation in which an object becomes\ngreat, as the reason of the Beautiful makes beautiful. Such are the\nthings for which quantity admits contraries.\n\n\nTHERE IS NO CONTRARY FOR PLACE.\n\nFor space, there is no contrary, because strictly space does not belong\nto the genus of quantity. Even if space were part of quantity, \"high\"\nwould not be the contrary of anything unless the universe contained\nalso \"low.\" The terms high and low, applied to parts, signify only\nhigher and lower than something else. It is so also with right and\nleft, which are relatives.\n\n\nCLASSIFICATION OF SYLLABLES AND SPEECH.\n\nSyllables and speech are quantitatives; they might be subjects in\nrespect to quantity, but only so by accident. Indeed, the voice, by\nitself, is a movement,[386] it must therefore be reduced to movement\nand action.\n\n\nDISCRETE QUANTITY QUITE DISTINCT FROM CONTINUOUS QUANTITY.\n\n13. We have already explained that discrete quantity is clearly\ndistinguished from continuous quantity, both by its own definition, and\nthe general definition (for quantity).[387] We may add that numbers are\ndistinguished from each other by being even and odd. If besides there\nbe other differences amidst the even and odd numbers, these differences\nwill have to be referred to the objects in which are the numbers, or to\nthe numbers composed of unities, and not any more to those which exist\nin sense-beings. If reason separate sense-things from the numbers they\ncontain, nothing hinders us then from attributing to these numbers the\nsame differences (as to the numbers composed of unities).[388]\n\n\nELEMENTS OF CONTINUOUS QUANTITY.\n\nWhat distinctions are admitted by continuous quantity? There is the\nline, the surface, and the solid; for extension may exist in one,\ntwo or three dimensions (and thus count the numerical elements of\ncontinuous size) instead of establishing species.[389] In numbers thus\nconsidered as anterior or posterior to each other, there is nothing in\ncommon, which would constitute a genus. Likewise in the first, second\nand third increases (of a line, surface, and solid) there is nothing in\ncommon; but as far as quantity is found, there is also equality (and\ninequality), although there be no extension which is quantitative more\nthan any other.[390] However, one may have dimensions greater than\nanother. It is therefore only in so far as they are all numbers, that\nnumbers can have anything in common. Perhaps, indeed, it is not the\nmonad that begets the pair, nor the pair that begets the triad, but it\nmay be the same principle which begets all the numbers. If numbers be\nnot derivative, but exist by themselves, we may, at least within our\nown thought, consider them as begotten (or, derivative). We conceive\nof the smaller number as the anterior, the greater as posterior. But\nnumbers, as such, may all be reduced to unity.\n\n\nSTUDY OF GEOMETRICAL FIGURES.\n\nThe method of classification adopted for numbers may be applied to\nsizes, and thus distinguish the line, the surface, and the solid or\nbody, because those are sizes which form different species. If besides\neach of these species were to be divided, lines might be subdivided\ninto straight, curved and spiral; surfaces into straight and curved;\nsolids into round or polyhedral bodies. Further, as geometers do, may\ncome the triangle, the quadrilateral, and others.\n\n\nSTUDY OF THE STRAIGHT LINE.\n\n14. But what about the straight line? Is it not a magnitude? Possibly;\nbut if it be a magnitude, it is a qualified one.[391] It is even\npossible that straightness constitutes a difference of the (very nature\nof the) line, as line, for straightness refers solely to a line;\nand besides, we often deduce the differences of \"Essence\" from its\nqualities. That a straight line is a quantity added to a difference\ndoes not cause its being composed of the line, and of the property of\nstraightness; for, were it thus composed, straightness would be its\nchief difference.\n\n\nSTUDY OF THE TRIANGLE.\n\nNow let us consider the triangle, which is formed of three lines. Why\nshould it not belong to quantity? Would it be so, because it is not\nconstituted by three lines merely, but by three lines arranged in some\nparticular manner? But a quadrilateral would also be constituted by\nfour lines arranged in some particular manner. (But being arranged in\nsome particular manner does not hinder a figure from being a quantity).\nThe straight line, indeed, is arranged in some particular manner, and\nis none the less a quantity. Now if the straight line be not simply a\nquantity, why could this not also be said of a limited line? For the\nlimit of the line is a point, and the point does not belong to any\ngenus other than the line. Consequently, a limited surface is also\na quantity, because it is limited by lines, which even more belong\nto quantity. If then the limited surface be contained in the genus\nof quantity, whether the surface be a triangle, a quadrilateral, a\nhexagon, or any other polygon, all figures whatever will belong to the\ngenus of quantity. But if we assigned the triangle or quadrilateral\nto the genus of quality merely because we are speaking of some one\ndefinite triangle or quadrilateral, nothing would hinder one and the\nsame thing from being subsumed under several categories. A triangle\nwould then be a quantity so far as it was both a general and particular\nmagnitude, and would be a quality by virtue of its possessing a\nparticular form. The same might be predicated of the Triangle in\nitself because of its possessing a particular form; and so also with\nthe sphere. By following this line of argument, geometry would be\nturned into a study of qualities, instead of that of quantities,\nwhich of course it is. The existing differences between magnitudes\ndo not deprive them of their property of being magnitudes, just as\nthe difference between essences does not affect their essentiality.\nBesides, every surface is limited, because an infinite surface is\nimpossible. Further, when I consider a difference that pertains to\nessence, I call it an essential difference. So much the more, on\nconsidering figures, I am considering differences of magnitude. For\nif the differences were not of magnitude, of what would they be\ndifferences? If then they be differences of magnitude, the different\nmagnitudes which are derived from differences of magnitude should\nbe classified according to the species constituted by them (when\nconsidered in the light of being magnitudes).\n\n\nGEOMETRY STUDIES QUANTITIES, NOT QUALITIES.\n\n15. But how can you qualify the properties of quantity so as to call\nthem equal or unequal?[392] Is it not usual to say of two triangles\nthat they are similar? Could we not also predicate similarity of\ntwo magnitudes? Doubtless, for what is called similarity,[393]\ndoes not conflict with similarity or dissimilarity in the genus of\nquantity.[394] Here, indeed, the word \"similarity\" is applied to\nmagnitudes in a sense other than to quality. Besides, if (Aristotle)\nsaid that the property characteristic of quantities is to enable them\nto be called equal or unequal, this does not conflict with predicating\nsimilarity of some of them. But as it has been said that the special\ncharacteristic of qualities is to admit of being called similar\nor dissimilar, we must, as has already been explained, understand\nsimilarity in a sense other than when it is applied to magnitudes.\nIf similar magnitudes be identical, we must then consider the other\nproperties of quantity and quality which might be present in them\n(so as clearly to contrast their differences). It may also be said\nthat the term \"similarity\" applies to the genus of quantity so far as\nthis contains differences (which distinguish from each other similar\nmagnitudes).\n\n\nDIFFERENCES WHICH COMPLETE THE BEING MUST BE PREFIXED TO THAT TO WHICH\nTHEY REFER.\n\nIn general, the differences which complete a being should be classified\nalong with that of which they are the differences, especially when a\ndifference belongs to a single subject. If a difference complete the\nbeing of a subject, and do not complete the being of another, this\ndifference should be classified along with the subject whose being it\ncompletes, leaving that whose being it does not complete for separate\nconsideration. By this we do not mean completing the Being in general,\nbut completing some particular being, so that the subject spoken of as\na particular one admits no further essential addition. We therefore\nhave the right to say that triangles, or that quadrilaterals, as\nwell as surfaces and solids, are equal, and to predicate equality or\ninequality of quantitative entities. But we yet have to study whether\nquality only can be said to be similar or dissimilar.[395]\n\n\nWHETHER QUALITY ONLY CAN BE CALLED SIMILAR OR DISSIMILAR.\n\nWhen we were treating of things that were qualified, we had already\nexplained that matter, united to quantity, and taken with other things,\nconstitutes sense-being; that this \"being\" seems to be a composite\nof several things, that it is not properly a \"whatness,\"[396] but\nrather qualification (or, qualified thing). The (\"seminal) reason,\"\nfor instance that of fire, has more of a reference to \"whatness,\"\nwhile the form that the reason begets is rather a qualification.\nLikewise, the (\"seminal) reason\" of man is a \"whatness,\" whilst the\nform that this reason gives to the body, being only an image of reason,\nis rather a qualification. Thus if the Socrates that we see was the\ngenuine Socrates, his mere portrait composed of no more than colors\nwould also be called Socrates. Likewise, although this (\"seminal)\nreason\" of Socrates be that which constitutes the genuine Socrates, we\nnevertheless also apply the name of Socrates to the man that we see;\nyet the colors, or the figure of the Socrates we see, are only the\nimage of those which are contained by his (\"seminal) reason.\" Likewise,\nthe reason of Socrates is itself only an image of the veritable reason\n(of the idea) of the man. This is our solution of the problem.[397]\n\n\nTHE VARIOUS TERMS EXPRESSING QUALITY.\n\n16. When we separately consider each of the things which compose\nsense-being and when we wish to designate the quality which exists\namong them, we must not call it \"whatness,\" any more than quantity\nor movement, but rather name it a characteristic, employing the\nexpressions \"such,\" \"as,\" and \"this kind.\" We are thus enabled to\nindicate beauty and ugliness, such as they are in the body. Indeed,\nsense-beauty is no more than a figure of speech,[343] in respect to\nintelligible beauty; it is likewise with quality, since black and white\nare also completely different (from their \"reason,\" or their idea).\n\n\nTHE SEMINAL REASON HARMONIZES WITH ITS APPEARING ACTUALIZATION.\n\nIs the content of (\"seminal) reason\" and of a particular reason,\nidentical with what appears, or does it apply thereto only by a\nfigure of speech?[343] Should it properly be classified among the\nintelligible, or the sense-objects? Sensual beauty of course evidently\ndiffers from intelligible beauty; but what of ugliness--in which\nclassification does it belong? Must virtue be classified among\nintelligible or sensual qualities, or should we locate some in each\nclass? (All this uncertainty is excusable, inasmuch) as it may be asked\nwhether even the arts, which are \"reasons,\" should be classified among\nsense-qualities? If these reasons be united to a matter, they must have\nmatter as their very soul. But what is their condition here below, when\nunited to some matter? These reasons are in a case similar to song\naccompanied by a lyre;[398] this song, being uttered by a sense-voice,\nis in relation with the strings of the lyre, while simultaneously being\npart of the art (which is one of these \"seminal reasons\"). Likewise,\nit might be said that virtues are actualizations, and not parts (of\nthe soul). Are they sense-actualizations? (This seems probable), for\nalthough the beauty contained in the body be incorporeal, we still\nclassify it among the things which refer to the body, and belong\nto it. As to arithmetic, and geometry, two different kinds must be\ndistinguished: the first kind deals with visible objects, and must\nbe classified among sense-objects; but the second kind deals with\nstudies suitable to the soul, and should therefore be classified among\nintelligible entities. Plato[399] considers that music and astronomy\nare in the same condition.\n\n\nMANY OTHER CONCEPTIONS BELONG AMONG SENSE-QUALITIES.\n\nThus the arts which relate to the body, which make use of the organs,\nand which consult the senses, are really dispositions of the soul, but\nonly of the soul as applied to corporeal objects; and consequently,\nthey should be classified among sense-qualities.[400] Here also belong\npractical virtues, such as are implied by civil duties, and which,\ninstead of raising the soul to intelligible entities, fructify in the\nactions of political life, and refer to them, not as a necessity of our\ncondition, but as an occupation preferable to everything else.[401]\nAmong these qualities we shall have to classify the beauty contained in\nthe (\"seminal) reason,\" and, so much the more, black and white.\n\n\nIN SPITE OF THIS CLASSIFICATION THE SOUL HERSELF REMAINS INCORPOREAL.\n\nBut is the soul herself a sense-being, if she be disposed in a\nparticular way, and if she contain particular \"reasons\" (that is,\nfaculties, virtues, sciences and arts, all of which refer to the body,\nand which have been classified as sense-qualities)?[402] It has already\nbeen explained that these \"reasons\" themselves are not corporeal; but\nthat they have been classified among sense-qualities only because they\nreferred to the body, and to the actions thereby produced. On the other\nhand, as sense-quality has been defined as the meeting of all the\nabove enumerated entities, it is impossible to classify incorporeal\nBeing in the same genus as the sensual being. As to the qualities\nof the soul, they are all doubtless incorporeal, but as they are\nexperiences (or, sufferings, or, passions) which refer to terrestrial\nthings, they must be classified in the genus of quality, just as the\nreasons of the individual soul. Of the soul we must therefore predicate\nexperience, however dividing the latter in two elements, one of which\nwould refer to the object to which it is applied, and the other to\nthe subject in which it exists.[403] Though then these experiences\ncannot be considered as corporeal qualities, yet it must be admitted\nthey relate to the body.[404] On the other hand, although we classify\nthese experiences in the genus of quality, still the soul herself\nshould not be reduced to the rank of corporeal being. Last, when we\nconceive of the soul as without experiences, and without the \"reasons\"\nabove-mentioned, we are thereby classifying her along with the World\nfrom which she descends,[405] and we leave here below no intelligible\nbeing, of any kind whatever.\n\n\nQUALITIES ARE CLASSIFIED AS CORPOREAL AND OF THE SOUL.\n\n17. Qualities, therefore, should be classified as of the body, and of\nthe soul.[406] Even though all the souls, as well as their immaterial\nqualities, be considered as existing on high, yet their inferior\nqualities must be divided according to the senses, referring these\nqualities either to sight, hearing, feeling, taste, or smell. Under\nsight, we will classify the differences of colors; under hearing,\nthat of the sounds; and likewise, with the other senses. As to the\nsounds, inasmuch as they have but a single quality, they will have to\nbe classified according to their being soft, harsh, agreeable, and the\nlike.\n\n\nDIFFERENCES OF BEING SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED ACCORDING TO QUALITY.\n\nIt is by quality that we distinguish the differences which inhere in\nbeing, as well as the actualizations, the beautiful or ugly actions,\nand in general, all that is particular. Only very rarely do we discover\nin quantity differences which constitute species; so much is this the\ncase, that it is generally divided by its characteristic qualities. We\nmust therefore leave quantity aside, and that leads us to wonder how we\nmay divide quality itself (since it is made use of to distinguish other\nthings).[407]\n\n\nDIFFERENCE OF QUALITY CANNOT BE DISTINGUISHED BY SENSATION.\n\nWhat sort of differences, indeed, might we use to establish such\ndivisions, and from what genus would we draw them? It seems absurd to\nclassify quality by quality itself. This is just as if the difference\nof \"beings\" were to be called \"beings.\" By what indeed could one\ndistinguish white from black, and colors from tastes and sensations\nof touch? If we distinguish the difference of these qualities by the\nsense-organs, these differences would no longer exist in the subjects.\nHow indeed could one and the same sense distinguish the difference of\nthe qualities it perceives? Is it because certain things exercise an\naction that is constructive or destructive on the eyes, or the tongue?\nWe would then have to ask what is the constructive or destructive\nelement in the sensations thus excited? Yet, even were this answered,\nsuch an answer would not explain wherein these things differ.[407]\n\n\nDIFFERENCE IN EFFECTS IS LIMITED TO THE INTELLIGIBLES.\n\nA further possibility is that these things should be classified\naccording to their effects, and that it is reasonable to do so with\ninvisible entities, such as sciences; but this would not be applicable\nto sense-objects. When indeed we divide sciences by their effects, and\nwhen, in general, we classify them according to the powers of the soul,\nby concluding from the diversity of their effects that they differ,\nour mind grasps the difference of these powers, and it determines not\nonly with what objects they deal, but it also defines their reason (or,\nessence). Let us admit that it is easy to distinguish arts according\nto their reasons, and according to the notions they include; but is it\npossible to divide corporeal qualities in that manner? Even when one\nstudies the intelligible world, there is room for doubt as to how the\ndifferent reasons distinguish themselves from each other; it is easy\nenough to see that white differs from black; but in what does it do so?\n\n\nIT IS ABSURD TO DISTINGUISH BEING, QUALITIES AND DIFFERENCES BY\nTHEMSELVES.\n\n18. All the questions we have asked show that we doubtless must\nseek to discover the differences of the various (beings), so as to\ndistinguish them from each other; but that it is as impossible as it\nis unreasonable to inquire what are the differences of the differences\nthemselves.[408] Being of beings, quantities of quantities, qualities\nof qualities, differences of differences cannot be discovered; but we\nshould, wherever possible, classify exterior objects, either according\nto their effects, or according to salient characteristics. When this is\nimpossible, objects should be distinguished, as for instance dark from\nlight green.\n\nBut how is white distinguished from black? Sensation or intelligence\ntell us that those things are different without informing us of their\nreason; either sensation, because its function is not to set forth the\nreason of things, but only to bring them somehow to our attention; or\nintelligence, because it discerns things that are simple by intuition,\nwithout having to resort to ratiocination, and limits itself to the\nstatement that something is such or such. Besides, in each one of the\noperations of intelligence there is a difference (a special distinctive\ncharacteristic) which enables it to distinguish different things,\nwithout this difference (which is proper to each of the operations of\nintelligence) itself having need to be discerned by the help of some\nother difference.\n\n\nSOME QUALITIES ARE DIFFERENCES.\n\nAre all qualities differences, or not? Whiteness, colors, qualities\nperceived by touch and taste, may become differences between different\nobjects, though they themselves be species. But how do the sciences\nof grammar or of music constitute differences? The science of grammar\nrenders the mind grammatical, and the science of music renders the mind\nmusical, especially if they be untaught; and these thus become specific\ndifferences. Besides, we have to consider whether a difference be drawn\nfrom the same genus (from which the considered things are drawn), or\nfrom some other genus. If it be drawn from the same genus, it fulfils,\nfor the things of this genus, the same function as does a quality to\nthe quality to which it serves as difference. Such are virtue and\nvice; virtue is a particular habit, and vice is also a particular\nhabit; consequently, as habits are qualities, the differences of these\nhabits (either of virtue or vice) will be qualities. It may perhaps be\nobjected that a habit without difference is not a quality, and that it\nis the difference alone which constitutes the quality.[409] We will\nanswer that it is (commonly) said that sweet is good, and that bitter\nis bad; this then implies a recognition of their difference by a habit\n(a manner of being), and not by a quality.\n\nWhat if sweet be said to be \"crude,\" or thick and bitter, thin or\nrefined? The answer is that coarseness does not inform us of the nature\nof sweetness, but indicates a manner of being of what is sweet; and\nsimilarly, with what is refined.\n\n\nTHERE ARE DIFFERENCES WHICH ARE NOT QUALITIES.\n\nThere remains for us to examine if a difference of a quality never be a\nquality, as that of a being is not a being, nor that of a quantity, a\nquantity. Does five differ from three by two? No: five does not differ\nfrom three, it only exceeds it by two. How indeed could five differ\nfrom three by two, when five contains two? Likewise, a movement does\nnot differ from a movement by a movement. As to virtue and vice, here\nis one whole opposed to another whole, and it is thus that the wholes\nare distinguished. If a distinction were drawn from the same genus,\nthat is, from quality, instead of founding itself on another genus; as,\nfor instance, if one said that such a vice referred to pleasures, some\nother to anger, some other to acquisitiveness, and if one were to admit\nthat such a classification was good; it would evidently result that\nthere are differences that are not qualities.\n\n\nVARIOUS DERIVATIVES OF THE CATEGORY OF QUALITY.\n\n19. As has been indicated above, the genus of quality contains the\n(beings) which are said to be qualified (qualitative entities),\ninasmuch as they contain some quality (as, for instance, the handsome\nman, so far as he is endowed with beauty).[410] These (beings) however\ndo not properly belong to this genus, for otherwise there would here\nbe two categories. It suffices to reduce them to the quality which\nsupplies their name.\n\nSo non-whiteness, if it indicate some color other than white, is a\nquality; if it express merely a negation, or an enumeration, it is\nonly a word, or a term which recalls the object; if it be a word,\nit constitutes a movement (so far as it is produced by the vocal\norgan); if it be a name or a term, it constitutes, so far as it is a\nsignificative, a relative. If things be classed not only by genera, if\nit be admitted that each assertion and expression proclaim a genus, our\nanswer must be that some affirm things by their mere announcement, and\nthat others deny them. It may perhaps be best not to include negations\nin the same genus as things themselves, since, to avoid mingling\nseveral genera, we often do not include affirmations.\n\nAs to privations, it may be remarked that if the things of which\nthere are privations are qualities, then the privations themselves\nare qualities, as \"toothless,\" or \"blind.\"[411] But \"naked\" and\n(its contrary) \"clothed\" are neither of them qualities; they rather\nconstitute habits, and thus belong among relatives.\n\nPassion, at the moment it is felt, does not constitute a quality, but\na movement; when it has been experienced, and has become durable, it\nforms a quality;[410] further, if the (being) which has experienced\nthe passion have kept none of it, it will have to be described as\nhaving been moved, which amounts to the same thing as really being\nmoved. However, in this case, the conception of time will have to be\nabstracted from that of movement; for we must not add the conception of\nthe present to that of movement.[412]\n\nFinally, (the adverb) \"well,\" and the other analogous terms may be\nreduced to the simple notion of the genus of quality.\n\nIt remains to examine if we must refer to the genus of quality \"being\nred\" without also doing so for \"reddening\"[410] for \"blushing\" does\nnot belong to it, because he who blushes suffers (experiences), or is\nmoved. But as soon as he ceases blushing, if he have already blushed,\nthis is a quality; for quality does not depend on time, but consists\nin being such or such; whence it follows that \"having blushed\" is a\nquality. Therefore we shall regard as qualities only habits, and not\nmere dispositions;[410] being warm, for instance, and not warming up;\nbeing sick, but not becoming sick.\n\n\nCONTRARINESS IS NOT THE GREATEST POSSIBLE DIFFERENCE.\n\n20. Does every quality have an opposite?[410] As to vice and virtue,\nthere is, between the extremes, an intermediary quality which is\nthe opposite of both,[411] but, with colors, the intermediaries\nare not contraries. This might be explained away on the ground that\nthe intermediary colors are blends of the extreme colors. However,\nwe ought not to have divided colors in extremes and intermediaries,\nand opposed them to each other; but rather have divided the genus of\ncolor into black and white, and then have shown that other colors are\ncomposed of these two, or differentiated another color that would be\nintermediate, even though composite. If it be said that intermediary\ncolors are not opposite to the extremes because opposition is not\ncomposed of a simple difference, but of a maximal difference,[413] it\nwill have to be answered that this maximal difference results from\nhaving interposed intermediaries; if these were removed, the maximal\ndifference would have no scale of comparison. To the objection that\nyellow approximates white more than black, and that the sense of sight\nsupports this contention; that it is the same with liquids where there\nis no intermediary between cold and hot; it must be answered that\nwhite and yellow and other colors compared to each other similarly\nlikewise differ completely; and, because of this their difference,\nconstitute contrary qualities; they are contrary, not because they\nhave intermediaries, but because of their characteristic nature. Thus\nhealth and sickness are contraries, though they have no intermediaries.\nCould it be said that they are contraries because their effects differ\nmaximally? But how could this difference be recognized as maximal since\nthere are no intermediaries which show the same characteristics at\na less degree? The difference between health and sickness could not\ntherefore be demonstrated to be maximal. Consequently, oppositeness\nwill have to be analyzed as something else than maximal difference.\nDoes this mean only a great difference? Then we must in return ask\nwhether this \"great\" mean \"greater by opposition to something\nsmaller,\" or \"great absolutely\"? In the first case, the things which\nhave no intermediary could not be opposites; in the second, as it is\neasily granted that there is a great difference between one nature and\nanother, and as we have nothing greater to serve as measure for this\ndistance, we shall have to examine by what characteristics oppositeness\nmight be recognized.\n\n\nCONTRARIES ARE THOSE THINGS THAT LACK RESEMBLANCE.\n\nTo begin with, resemblance does not mean only belonging to the same\ngenus, nor mere confusion from more or less numerous characteristics,\nas, for instance, by their forms. Things that possess resemblance,\ntherefore, are not opposites. Only things which have nothing identical\nin respect to species are opposites;[414] though we must add that they\nmust belong to the same genus of quality. Thus, though they have no\nintermediaries, we can classify as opposites the things which betray\nno resemblance to each other; in which are found only characteristics\nwhich do not approximate each other, and bear no kind of analogy to\neach other. Consequently, objects which have something in common in the\nrespect of colors could not be contraries. Besides, not everything is\nthe contrary of every other thing; but one thing is only the contrary\nof some other; and this is the case with tastes as well as with colors.\nBut enough of all this.\n\n\nQUALITIES ADMIT OF DEGREE.\n\nDoes a quality admit of more or less?[410] Evidently the objects which\nparticipate in qualities participate therein more or less. But the\nchief question is whether there be degrees in virtue or justice? If\nthese habits possess a certain latitude, they have degrees. If they\nhave no latitude, they are not susceptible of more or less.\n\n\nREASONS WHY MOVEMENT IS A CATEGORY.\n\n21. Let us pass to movement.[415] Admittedly movement is a genus with\nthe following characteristics: first, movement cannot be reduced to\nany other genus; then, nothing higher in the scale of being can be\npredicated of it; last, it reveals a great number of differences which\nconstitute species.\n\n\nMOVEMENT CANNOT BE REDUCED TO ANY HIGHER GENUS.\n\nTo what genus could (movement) be reduced? It constitutes neither the\nbeing nor the quality of the (being) in which it exists. It is not\neven reducible to action, for in passion (or, experience) there are\nseveral kinds of movements; and it is the actions and passions which\nare reducible to movement. Further, movement need not necessarily be\na relative merely because movement does not exist in itself, that it\nbelongs to some being, and that it exists in a subject; otherwise, we\nshould have to classify quality also as a relation; for quality belongs\nto some (being) and exists in a subject; it is not so however, with\na quantity. It might be objected that, though each of them exist in\nsome subject, the one by virtue of its being a quality, and the other,\nof being a quantity, they themselves are not any the less species of\nessences. The same argument would apply to movement; though it belong\nto some subject, it is something before belonging to a subject, and\nwe must consider what it is in itself. Now what is relative is not\nat first something by itself, and then the predicate of something\nelse;[416] but what is born of the relation existing between two\nobjects, is nothing else outside the relation to which it owes its\nname; thus the double, so far as it is called doubleness, is neither\nbegotten, nor exists except in the comparison established between it\nand a half, since, not being conceived of before, it owes its name and\nits existence to the comparison thus established.\n\n\nIS CHANGE ANTERIOR TO MOVEMENT?\n\nWhat then is movement? While belonging to a subject, it is something\nby itself before belonging to a subject, as are quality, quantity,\nand being. To begin with, nothing is predicated before it, and of\nit, as a genus. Is change[417] anterior to movement? Here change is\nidentical with movement, or if change is to be considered a genus, it\nwill form a genus to be added to those already recognized. Besides, it\nis evident that, on this hypothesis, movement will become a species,\nand to it will be opposed, as another species, \"generation,\" as,\nfor instance, \"generation\" is a change, but not a movement.[418]\nWhy then should generation not be a movement? Is it because what is\ngenerated does not yet exist, and because movement could not exist in\nnon-being? Consequently, neither will generation be a change. Or is\nthis so because generation is an alteration and increase, and because\nit presupposes that certain things are altered, and increase? To\nspeak thus is to busy ourselves with things that precede generation.\nGeneration presupposes production of some other form; for generation\ndoes not consist in an alteration passively undergone, such as being\nwarmed, or being whitened; such effects could be produced before\nrealization of the generation. What then occurs in generation? There\nis alteration. Generation consists in the production of an animal or\nplant, in the reception of a form. Change is much more reasonably to\nbe considered a species, than movement; because the word change means\nthat one thing takes the place of another, while movement signifies\nthe actualization by which a being passes from what is proper to it,\nto what is not, as in the translation from one place to another. If\nthat be not admitted (to define movement), it will at least have to be\nacknowledged that the action of studying it, as that of playing the\nlyre, and in general, all the movements that modify a habit, would\nbe subsumed within our definition. Alteration therefore could not be\nanything else but a species of movement; since it is a movement which\nproduces passage from one state to another.[419]\n\n\nDEFINITION OF ALTERATION.\n\n22. Granting that alteration is the same thing as movement, so far as\nthe result of movement is to render something other than it was, (we\nstill have to ask) what then is movement? To indulge in a figurative\nexpression,[343] it is the passage of potentiality to the actualization\nof which it is the potentiality.[420]\n\n\nMOVEMENT AS A FORM OF POWER.\n\nLet us, indeed, suppose, that something which formerly was a\npotentiality succeeds in assuming a form, as \"potentiality that becomes\na statue,\" or that passes to actualization, as a man's walk.[421] In\nthe case where the metal becomes a statue, this passage is a movement;\nin the case of the walking, the walk itself is a movement, like the\ndance, with one who is capable of it. In the movement of the first\nkind, where the metal passes into the condition of being a statue,\nthere is the production of another form which is realized by the\nmovement.[422] The movement of the second kind, the dance, is a simple\nform of the potentiality, and, when it has ceased, leaves nothing that\nsubsists after it.[423]\n\n\nMOVEMENT IS ACTIVE FORM, AND CAUSE OF OTHER FORMS.\n\nWe are therefore justified in calling movement \"an active form that\nis aroused,\" by opposition to the other forms which remain inactive.\n(They may be so named), whether or not they be permanent. We may add\nthat it is \"the cause of the other forms,\" when it results in producing\nsomething else. This (sense-) movement may also be called the \"life of\nbodies.\" I say \"this movement,\" because it bears the same name as the\nmovements of the intelligence, and those of the soul.\n\n\nQUESTIONS ABOUT MOVEMENT.\n\nWhat further proves that movement is a genus, is that it is very\ndifficult, if not impossible, to grasp it by a definition. But how can\nit be called a form when its result is deterioration, or something\npassive? It may then be compared to the warming influence of the rays\nof the sun, which exerts on some things an influence that makes them\ngrow, while other things it shrivels. In both cases, the movement has\nsomething in common, and is identical, so far as it is a movement; the\ndifference of its results is due to the difference of the beings in\nwhich it operates. Are then growing sick and convalescence identical?\nYes, so far as they are movements. Is their difference then due to\ntheir subjects, or to anything else? This question we will consider\nfurther on, while studying alteration. Now let us examine the elements\ncommon to all movements; in that way we shall be able to prove that\nmovement is a genus.\n\n\nCOMMON ELEMENT IN GROWTH, INCREASE AND GENERATION.\n\nFirst, the word \"movement\" can be used in different senses, just as\nessence, when considered a genus. Further, as we have already said,\nall the movements by which one thing arrives at a natural state, or\nproduces an action suitable to its nature, constitute so many species.\nThen, the movements by which one thing arrives at a state contrary to\nits nature, have to be considered as analogous to that to which they\nlead.\n\nBut what common element is there in alteration, growth and generation,\nand their contraries? What is there in common between these movements,\nand the displacement in space, when you consider the four movements,\nas such?[425] The common element is that the moved thing, after the\nmovement, is no longer in the former state; that it no more remains\nquiet, and does not rest so long as the movement lasts. It ceaselessly\npasses to another state, alters, and does not remain what it was; for\nthe movement would be vain if it did not make one thing other than it\nwas. Consequently \"otherness\" does not consist in one thing becoming\nother than it was, and then persisting in this other state, but in\nceaseless alteration. Thus, time is always different from what it was\nbecause it is produced by movement; for it is movement measured in its\nmarch and not in its limit of motion, or stopping point; it follows,\ncarried away in its course. Further, one characteristic common to\nall kinds of movement is that it is the march (or process) by which\npotentiality and possibility pass into actualization; for every object\nin movement, whatever be the nature of this movement, succeeds in\nmoving only because it formerly possessed the power of producing an\naction, or of experiencing the passion of some particular nature.\n\n\nMOVEMENT FOR SENSE-OBJECTS.\n\n23. For sense-objects, which receive their impulse from without,\nmovement is a stimulus which agitates them, excites them, presses them,\nprevents them from slumbering in inertia, from remaining the same, and\nmakes them present an image of life by their agitation and continual\nmutations. Besides, one must not confuse the things that move with\nmovement; walking is not the feet, but an actualization of the power\nconnected with the feet. Now as this power is invisible, we perceive\nonly the agitation of the feet; we see that their present state is\nquite different from that in which they would have been, had they\nremained in place, and that they have some addition, which however, is\ninvisible. Thus, being united to objects other than itself, the power\nis perceived only accidentally, because one notices that the feet\nchange place, and do not rest. Likewise, alteration in the altered\nobject, is recognized only by failure to discover in it the same\nquality as before.\n\n\nMOVEMENT AS INFLUX.\n\nWhat is the seat of a movement acting on an object by passing from\ninternal power to actualization? Is it in the motor? How will that\nwhich is moved and which suffers be able to receive it? Is it in the\nmovable element? Why does it not remain in the mover? Movement must\ntherefore be considered as inseparable from the mover, although not\nexclusively; it must pass from the mover into the mobile (element)\nwithout ceasing to be connected with the mover, and it must pass\nfrom the mover to the moved like a breath (or influx).[426] When the\nmotive power produces locomotion, it gives us an impulse and makes\nus change place ceaselessly; when it is calorific, it heats; when,\nmeeting matter, it imparts thereto its natural organization, and\nproduces increase; when it removes something from an object, this\nobject decreases because it is capable thereof; last, when it is the\ngenerative power which enters into action, generation occurs; but if\nthis generative power be weaker than the destructive power, there\noccurs destruction, not of what is already produced, but of what was\nin the process of production. Likewise, convalescence takes place as\nsoon as the force capable of producing health acts and dominates; and\nsickness occurs, when the opposite power produces a contrary effect.\nConsequently, movement must be studied not only in the things in\nwhich it is produced, but also in those that produce it or transmit\nit. The property of movement consists therefore in being a movement\nendowed with some particular quality, or being something definite in a\nparticular thing.\n\n\nMOVEMENT OF DISPLACEMENT IS SINGLE.\n\n24. As to movement of displacement, we may ask if ascending be the\nopposite of descending, in what the circular movement differs from the\nrectilinear movement, what difference obtains in throwing an object\nat the head or at the feet. The difference is not very clear, for in\nthese cases the motive power is the same. Shall we say that there is\none power which causes raising, and another that lowers, especially\nif these movements be natural, and if they be the result of lightness\nor heaviness? In both cases, there is something in common, namely,\ndirection towards its natural place, so that the difference is derived\nfrom exterior circumstances. Indeed, in circular and rectilinear\nmovement, if someone move the same object in turn circularly and\nin a straight line, what difference is there in the motive power?\nThe difference could be derived only from the figure (or outward\nappearance) of the movement, unless it should be said that the\ncircular movement is composite, that it is not a veritable movement,\nand that it does not produce any change by itself. In all of these\ncases, the movement of displacement is identical, and presents only\nadventitious differences.\n\n\nEXPLANATION OF COMPOSITION AND DECOMPOSITION.\n\n25. Of what do composition (blending, or mixture) and decomposition\nconsist? Do they constitute other kinds of movement than those already\nnoticed, generation and destruction, growth and decrease, movement\nof displacement and alteration? Shall composition and decomposition\nbe reduced to some one of these kinds of motion, or shall we look\nat this process inversely? If composition consist in approximating\none thing to another, and in joining them together; and if, on the\nother hand, decomposition consist in separating the things which were\njoined, we have here only two movements of displacement, a uniting,\nand a separating one. We should be able to reduce composition and\ndecomposition to one of the above recognized kinds of motion, if\nwe were to acknowledge that this composition was mingling,[427]\ncombination, fusion, and union--a union which consists in two things\nuniting, and not in being already united. Indeed, composition includes\nfirst the movement of displacement, and then an alteration; just as,\nin increase, there was first the movement of displacement, and then\nmovement in the kind of the quality.[428] Likewise, here there is first\nthe movement of displacement, then the composition or decomposition,\naccording as things approximate or separate.[429] Often also\ndecomposition is accompanied or followed by a movement of displacement,\nbut the things which separate undergo a modification different from\nthe movement of displacement; similarly, composition is a modification\nwhich follows the movement of displacement, but which has a different\nnature.\n\n\nCOMPOSITION AND DECOMPOSITION ARE NOT ALTERATIONS.\n\nShall we have to admit that composition and decomposition are\nmovements which exist by themselves, and analyze alteration into them?\nCondensation is explained as undergoing an alteration; that means, as\nbecoming composite. On the other hand, rarefaction is also explained\nas undergoing an alteration, namely, that of decomposition; when, for\ninstance, one mingles water and wine, each of these two things becomes\nother than it was, and it is the composition which has operated the\nalteration. We will answer that here composition and decomposition no\ndoubt precede certain alterations, but these alterations are something\ndifferent than compositions and decompositions. Other alterations\n(certainly) are not compositions and decompositions, for neither can\ncondensation nor rarefaction be reduced to these movements, nor are\nthey composed of them. Otherwise, it would be necessary to acknowledge\nthe (existence of) emptiness. Besides, how could you explain blackness\nand whiteness, as being composed of composition and decomposition?\nThis doctrine would destroy all colors and qualities, or at least,\nthe greater part of them; for if all alteration, that means, all\nchange of quality, consisted in a composition or decomposition, the\nresult would not be the production of a quality, but an aggregation or\ndisaggregation. How indeed could you explain the movements of teaching\nand studying by mere \"composition\"?\n\n\nMOVEMENTS DIVIDED IN NATURAL, ARTIFICIAL, AND VOLUNTARY.\n\n26. Let us now examine the different kinds of movements. Shall we\nclassify movements of displacement in movements upwards and downwards,\nrectilinear or curvilinear, or in movements of animate and inanimate\nbeings? There is indeed a difference between the movement of inanimate\nbeings, and that of animate beings; and these latter have different\nkinds of motion, such as walking, flying, and swimming. Their movements\ncould also be analyzed in two other ways, according as it was\nconformable to, or against their nature; but this would not explain\nthe outer differences of movements. Perhaps the movements themselves\nproduce these differences, and do not exist without them; nevertheless,\nit is nature that seems to be the principle of the movements, and of\ntheir exterior differences. It would further be possible to classify\nmovements as natural, artificial, and voluntary; of the natural, there\nare alteration and destruction; of the artificial, there are the\nbuilding of houses, and construction of vessels; of the voluntary,\nthere are meditation, learning, devoting oneself to political\noccupations, and, in general, speaking and acting. Last, we might, in\ngrowth, alteration and generation, distinguish the natural movement,\nand that contrary to nature; or even establish a classification founded\non the nature of the subjects in which these movements occur.\n\n\nDISTINCTION BETWEEN STABILITY AND STILLNESS.\n\n27. Let us now study stability or stillness, which is the contrary of\nmovement.[425] Are we to consider it itself a genus, or to reduce it\nto some one of the known genera? First, stability rather suits the\nintelligible world, and stillness the sense-world. Let us now examine\nstillness. If it be identical with stability, it is useless to look for\nit here below where nothing is stable, and where apparent stability\nis in reality only a slower movement. If stillness be different from\nstability, because the latter refers to what is completely immovable,\nand stillness to what is actually fixed, but is naturally movable\neven when it does not actually move, the following distinction should\nbe established. If stillness here below be considered, this rest is\na movement which has not yet ceased, but which is imminent; if by\nstillness is understood the complete cessation of movement in the\nmoved, it will be necessary to examine whether there be anything here\nbelow that is absolutely without movement. As it is impossible for one\nthing to possess simultaneously all the species of movement, and as\nthere are necessarily movements that are not realized in it--since it\nis usual to say that some particular movement is in something--when\nsomething undergoes no displacement, and seems still in respect to\nthis movement, should one not say about it that in this respect it is\nnot moving? Stillness is therefore the negation of movement. Now no\nnegation constitutes a genus. The thing we are considering is at rest\nonly in respect to local movement; stillness expresses therefore only\nthe negation of this movement.\n\n\nMOVEMENT IS MORE THAN THE NEGATION OF REST.\n\nIt may perhaps be asked, why is movement not rather the negation of\nrest? We shall then answer that movement (is something positive), that\nit brings something with it; that it has some efficiency, that it\ncommunicates an impulsion to the subject, that produces or destroys\nmany things; stillness, on the contrary, is nothing outside of the\nsubject which is still, and means no more than that the latter is still.\n\n\nIN THE INTELLIGIBLE STABILITY DOES NOT IMPLY STILLNESS.\n\nBut why should we not regard the stability of intelligible things also\nas a negation of movement? Because stability is not the privation of\nmovement; it does not begin to exist when movement ceases, and it does\nnot hinder it from simultaneous existence with it. In intelligible\nbeing, stability does not imply the cessation of movement of that whose\nnature it is to move.[430] On the contrary, so far as intelligible\nbeing is contained in (or, expressed by) stability, it is stable;\nso far as it moves, it will ever move; it is therefore stable by\nstability, and movable by movement. The body, however, is no doubt\nmoved by movement, but it rests only in the absence of movement, when\nit is deprived of the movement that it ought to have. Besides, what\nwould stability be supposed to imply (if it were supposed to exist\nin sense-objects)? When somebody passes from sickness to health, he\nenters on convalescence. What kind of stillness shall we oppose to\nconvalescence? Shall we oppose to it that condition from which that man\nhad just issued? That state was sickness, and not stability. Shall we\noppose to it the state in which that man has just entered? That state\nis health, which is not identical with stability. To say that sickness\nand health are each of them a sort of stability, is to consider\nsickness and health as species of stability, which is absurd. Further,\nif it were said that stability is an accident of health, it would\nresult that before stability health would not be health. As to such\narguments, let each reason according to his fancy!\n\n\nCONCLUSION OF THE STUDY.\n\n28. We have demonstrated that acting and experiencing were movements;\nthat, among the movements, some are absolute, while others constitute\nactions or passions.[431]\n\nWe have also demonstrated that the other things that are called genera\nmust be reduced to the genera we have set forth.[432]\n\nWe have also studied relation, defining it as a habit, a \"manner of\nbeing\" of one thing in respect of another, which results from the\nco-operation of two things; we have explained that, when a habit of\nbeing constitutes a reference, this thing is something relative, not\nso much as it is being, but as far as it is a part of this being, as\nare the hand, the head, the cause, the principle, or the element.[433]\nThe relatives might be divided according to the scheme of the ancient\n(philosophers), by saying that some of them are efficient causes, while\nothers are measures, that the former distinguish themselves by their\nresemblances and differences, while the latter consist in excess or in\nlack.\n\nSuch are our views about the (categories, or) genera (of existence).\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN.\n\nOf Time and Eternity.[435]\n\n\nA. ETERNITY.\n\n\nINTRODUCTION. ETERNITY EXISTS PERPETUALLY, WHILE TIME BECOMES.\n\n(1.)[436] When saying that eternity and time differ, that eternity\nrefers to perpetual existence, and time to what \"becomes\" (this visible\nworld), we are speaking off-hand, spontaneously, intuitionally, and\ncommon language supports these forms of expression. When however we\ntry to define our conceptions thereof in greater detail, we become\nembarrassed; the different opinions of ancient philosophers, and often\neven the same opinions, are interpreted differently. We however shall\nlimit ourselves to an examination of these opinions, and we believe\nthat we can fulfil our task of answering all questions by explaining\nthe teachings of the ancient philosophers, without starting any minute\ndisquisition of our own. We do indeed insist that some of these ancient\nphilosophers, these blessed men[437] have achieved the truth. It\nremains only to decide which of them have done so, and how we ourselves\ncan grasp their thought.\n\n\nETERNITY IS THE MODEL OF ITS IMAGE, TIME.\n\nFirst, we have to examine that of which eternity consists, according\nto those who consider it as different from time; for, by gaining a\nconception of the model (eternity), we shall more clearly understand\nits image called time.[438] If then, before observing eternity, we form\na conception of time, we may, by reminiscence, from here below, rise to\nthe contemplation of the model to which time, as its image, resembles.\n\n\nRELATION BETWEEN THE AEON AND INTELLIGIBLE BEING.\n\n1. (2). How shall we define the aeon (or, eternity)? Shall we say\nthat it is the intelligible \"being\" (or, nature) itself, just as\nwe might say that time is the heaven and the universe, as has been\ndone, it seems, by certain (Pythagorean) philosophers?[439] Indeed,\nas we conceive and judge that the aeon (eternity) is something very\nvenerable, we assert the same of intelligible \"being,\" and yet it is\nnot easy to decide which of the two should occupy the first rank;\nas, on the other hand, the principle which is superior to them (the\nOne) could not be thus described, it would seem that we would have\nthe right to identify intelligible \"being\" (or, nature), and the aeon\n(or, eternity), so much the more as the intelligible world and the\naeon (age, or eternity), comprise the same things. Nevertheless, were\nwe to place one of these principles within the other, we would posit\nintelligible nature (\"being\") within the aeon (age, or eternity).\nLikewise, when we say that an intelligible entity is eternal, as\n(Plato) does:[346] \"the nature of the model is eternal,\" we are\nthereby implying that the aeon (age or eternity) is something distinct\nfrom intelligible nature (\"being\"), though referring thereto, as\nattribute or presence. The mere fact that both the aeon (eternity) and\nintelligible nature (\"being\"), are both venerable does not imply their\nidentity; the venerableness of the one may be no more than derivative\nfrom that of the other. The argument that both comprise the same\nentities would still permit intelligible nature (\"being\") to contain\nall the entities it contains as parts, while the aeon (or age, or\neternity) might contain them as wholes, without any distinctions as\nparts; it contains them, in this respect, that they are called eternal\non its account.\n\n\nFAULTS OF THE DEFINITION THAT ETERNITY IS AT REST, WHILE TIME IS IN\nMOTION.\n\nSome define eternity as the \"rest\"[440] of intelligible nature\n(\"being\"), just like time is defined as \"motion\" here below. In this\ncase we should have to decide whether eternity be identical with\nrest in general, or only in such rest as would be characteristic of\nintelligible nature (\"being\"). If indeed eternity were to be identified\nwith rest in general, we would first have to observe that rest could\nnot be said to be eternal, any more than we can say that eternity is\neternal, for we only call eternal that which participates in eternity;\nfurther, under this hypothesis, we should have to clear up how movement\ncould ever be eternal; for if it were eternal, it would rest (or, it\nwould stop). Besides, how could the idea of rest thus imply the idea\nof perpetuity, not indeed of that perpetuity which is in time, but of\nthat of which we conceive when speaking of the aeonial (or, eternal)?\nBesides, if the rest characteristic of intelligible \"being\" in itself\nalone contain perpetuity, this alone would exclude from eternity the\nother genera (or categories) of existence. Further yet, eternity has to\nbe conceived of as not only in rest, but (according to Plato[438]) also\nin unity, which is something that excludes every interval--otherwise,\nit would become confused with time;--now rest does not imply the idea\nof unity, nor that of an interval. Again, we assert that eternity\nresides in unity; and therefore participates in rest without being\nidentified therewith.\n\n\nETERNITY AS A UNION OF THE FIVE CATEGORIES.\n\n2. (3). What then is that thing by virtue of which the intelligible\nworld is eternal and perpetual? Of what does perpetuity consist?\nEither perpetuity and eternity are identical, or eternity is related\nto perpetuity. Evidently, however, eternity consists in an unity, but\nin an unity formed by multiple elements, in a conception of nature\nderived from intelligible entities, or which is united to them, or\nis perceived in them, so that all these intelligible entities form\nan unity, though this unity be at the same time manifold in nature\nand powers. Thus contemplating the manifold power of the intelligible\nworld, we call \"being\" its substrate; movement its life; rest its\npermanence; difference the manifoldness of its principles; and\nidentity, their unity.[441] Synthesizing these principles, they fuse\ninto one single life, suppressing their difference, considering\nthe inexhaustible duration, the identity and immutability of their\naction, of their life and thought, for which there is neither change\nnor interval. The contemplation of all these entities constitutes\nthe contemplation of eternity; and we see a life that is permanent\nin its identity, which ever possesses all present things, which does\nnot contain them successively, but simultaneously; whose manner of\nexistence is not different at various times, but whose perfection is\nconsummate and indivisible. It therefore contains all things at the\nsame time, as in a single point, without any of them draining off; it\nresides in identity, that is, within itself, undergoing no change. Ever\nbeing in the present, because it never lost anything, and will never\nacquire anything, it is always what it is. Eternity is not intelligible\nexistence; it is the (light) that radiates from this existence, whose\nidentity completely excludes the future and admits nothing but present\nexistence, which remains what it is, and does not change.\n\n\nTHE LIFE OF THE INTELLIGENCE IS EVER CONTEMPORANEOUS.\n\nWhat that it does not already possess could (intelligible existence)\npossess later? What could it be in the future, that it is not now?\nThere is nothing that could be added to or subtracted from its\npresent state; for it was not different from what it is now; and it\nis not to possess anything that it does not necessarily possess now,\nso that one could never say of it, \"it was\"; for what did it have\nthat it does not now have? Nor could it be said of it, \"it will be\";\nfor what could it acquire? It must therefore remain what it is. (As\nPlato thought[438]), that possesses eternity of which one cannot say\neither \"it was,\" or \"will be,\" but only, \"it is;\" that whose existence\nis immutable, because the past did not make it lose anything, and\nbecause the future will not make it acquire anything. Therefore, on\nexamining the existence of intelligible nature, we see that its life is\nsimultaneously entire, complete, and without any kind of an interval.\nThat is the eternity we seek.\n\n\nETERNITY IS NOT AN ACCIDENT OF THE INTELLIGIBLE, BUT AN INTIMATE PART\nOF ITS NATURE.\n\n3. (4). Eternity is not an extrinsic accident of (intelligible) nature,\nbut is in it, of it, and with it. We see that it is intimately inherent\nin (intelligible nature) because we see that all other things, of which\nwe say that they exist on high, are of and with this (intelligible)\nnature; for the things that occupy the first rank in existence must be\nunited with the first Beings, and subsist there. Thus the beautiful\nis in them, and comes from them; thus also does truth dwell in them.\nThere the whole in a certain way exists within the part; the parts\nalso are in the whole; because this whole, really being the whole, is\nnot composed of parts, but begets the parts themselves, a condition\nnecessary to its being a whole. In this whole, besides, truth does\nnot consist in the agreement of one notion with another, but is the\nvery nature of each of the things of which it is the truth. In order,\nreally to be a whole, this real whole must be all not only in the sense\nthat it is all things, but also in the sense that it lacks nothing. In\nthis case, nothing will, for it, be in the future; for to say that,\nfor it, something \"will be\" for it implies that it lacked something\nbefore that, that it was not yet all; besides, nothing can happen to it\nagainst nature, because it is impassible. As nothing could happen to\nit, for it nothing \"is to be,\" \"will be,\" or \"has been.\"\n\n\nTO BEGOTTEN THINGS THE FUTURE IS NECESSARY; BUT NOT TO THE INTELLIGIBLE.\n\nAs the existence of begotten things consists in perpetually acquiring\n(something or another), they will be annihilated by a removal of their\nfuture. An attribution of the future to the (intelligible) entities of\na nature contrary (to begotten things), would degrade them from the\nrank of existences. Evidently they will not be consubstantial with\nexistence, if this existence of theirs be in the future or past. The\nnature (\"being\") of begotten things on the contrary consists in going\nfrom the origin of their existence to the last limits of the time\nbeyond which they will no longer exist; that is in what their future\nconsists.[442] Abstraction of their future diminishes their life, and\nconsequently their existence. That is also what will happen to the\nuniverse, in so far as it will exist; it aspires to being what it\nshould be, without any interruption, because it derives existence from\nthe continual production of fresh actualizations; for the same reason,\nit moves in a circle because it desires to possess intelligible nature\n(\"being\"). Such is the existence that we discover in begotten things,\nsuch is the cause that makes them ceaselessly aspire to existence\nin the future. The Beings that occupy the first rank and which are\nblessed, have no desire of the future, because they are already all\nthat it lies in them to be, and because they possess all the life they\nare ever to possess. They have therefore nothing to seek, since there\nis no future for them; neither can they receive within themselves\nanything for which there might be a future. Thus the nature (\"being\")\nof intelligible existence is absolute, and entire, not only in its\nparts, but also in its totality, which reveals no fault, which lacks\nnothing, and to which nothing that in any way pertains to nonentity\ncould be added; for intelligible existence must not only embrace in\nits totality and universality all beings, but it must also receive\nnothing that pertains to nonentity. It is this disposition and nature\nof intelligible existence that constitutes the aeon (or eternity);\nfor (according to Aristotle)[443] this word is derived from \"aei on,\"\n\"being continually.\"\n\n\nDIFFERENCE BETWEEN ETERNITY AND PERPETUITY.\n\n4. (5). That this is the state of affairs appears when, on applying\none's intelligence to the contemplation of some of the intelligible\nEntities, it becomes possible to assert, or rather, to see that it is\nabsolutely incapable of ever having undergone any change; otherwise, it\nwould not always exist; or rather, it would not always exist entirely.\nIs it thus perpetual? Doubtless; its nature is such that one may\nrecognize that it is always such as it is, and that it could never be\ndifferent in the future; so that, should one later on again contemplate\nit, it will be found similar to itself (unchanged). Therefore, if\nwe should never cease from contemplation, if we should ever remain\nunited thereto while admiring its nature, and if in that actualization\nwe should show ourselves indefatigable, we would succeed in raising\nourselves to eternity; but, to be as eternal as existence, we must not\nallow ourselves to be in anyway distracted from contemplating eternity,\nand eternal nature in the eternal itself. If that which exists thus be\neternal, and exists ever, evidently that which never lowers itself to\nan inferior nature; which possesses life in its fulness, without ever\nhaving received, receiving, or being about to receive anything; this\nnature would be \"aidion,\" or perpetual. Perpetuity is the property\nconstitutive of such a substrate; being of it, and in it.[443] Eternity\nis the substrate in which this property manifests. Consequently reason\ndictates that eternity is something venerable, identical with the\ndivinity.[444] We might even assert that the age (\"aion,\" or eternity)\nis a divinity that manifests within itself, and outside of itself in\nits immutable and identical existence, in the permanence of its life.\nBesides, there is nothing to surprise any one if in spite of that we\nassert a manifoldness in the divinity. Every intelligible entity is\nmanifoldness because infinite in power, infinite in the sense that it\nlacks nothing; it exercises this privilege peculiarly because it is not\nsubject to losing anything.\n\n\nETERNITY IS INFINITE UNIVERSAL LIFE THAT CANNOT LOSE ANYTHING.\n\nEternity, therefore, may be defined as the life that is at present\ninfinite because it is universal and loses nothing, as it has no past\nnor future; otherwise it would no longer be whole. To say that it is\nuniversal and loses nothing explains the expression: \"the life that is\nat present infinite.\"\n\n\nETERNITY IS SEMPITERNAL EXISTENCE.\n\n5. (6). As this nature that is eternal and radiant with beauty refers\nto the One, issues from Him, and returns to Him, as it never swerves\nfrom Him, ever dwelling around Him and in Him, and lives according\nto Him, Plato was quite right[438] in saying not casually, but with\ngreat profundity of thought, that \"eternity is immutable in unity.\"\nThereby Plato not only reduces the eternity to the unity that it is\nin itself, but also relates the life of existence to the One itself.\nThis life is what we seek; its permanence is eternity. Indeed that\nwhich remains in that manner, and which remains the same thing, that\nis, the actualization of that life which remains turned towards, and\nunited with the One, that whose existence and life are not deceptive,\nthat truly is eternity. (For intelligible or) true existence is to\nhave no time when it does not exist, no time when it exists in a\ndifferent manner; it is therefore to exist in an immutable manner\nwithout any diversity, without being first in one, and then in\nanother state. To conceive of (existence), therefore, we must neither\nimagine intervals in its existence, nor suppose that it develops or\nacquires, nor believe that it contains any succession; consequently\nwe could neither distinguish within it, or assert within it either\nbefore or after. If it contain neither \"before\" nor \"after,\" if the\ntruest thing that can be affirmed of it be that it is, if it exist as\n\"being\" and life, here again is eternity revealed. When we say that\nexistence exists always, and that there is not one time in which it\nis, and another in which it is not, we speak thus only for the sake\nof greater clearness; for when we use the word \"always,\" we do not\ntake it in an absolute sense; but if we use it to show that existence\nis incorruptible, it might well mislead the mind in leading it to\nissue out from the unity (characteristic of eternity) to make it run\nthrough the manifold (which is foreign to eternity). \"Always\" further\nindicates that existence is never defective. It might perhaps be better\nto say simply \"existence.\" But though the word \"existence\" suffices to\ndesignate \"being,\" as several philosophers have confused \"being\" with\ngeneration, it was necessary to clear up the meaning of existence by\nadding the term \"always.\" Indeed, though we are referring only to one\nand the same thing by \"existence\" and \"existing always,\" just as when\nwe say \"philosopher,\" and \"the true philosopher,\" nevertheless, as\nthere are false philosophers, it has been necessary to add to the term\n\"philosophers\" the adjective \"true.\" Likewise, it has been necessary to\nadd the term \"always\" to that of \"existing,\" and that of \"existing\" to\nthat of \"always;\" that is the derivation of the expression \"existing\nalways,\" and consequently (by contraction), \"aion,\" or, eternity.\nTherefore the idea \"always\" must be united to that of \"existing,\" so as\nto designate the \"real being.\"\n\n\nTHE CREATOR, BEING OUTSIDE OF TIME, PRECEDES THE UNIVERSAL ONLY AS ITS\nCAUSE.\n\n\"Always\" must therefore be applied to the power which contains no\ninterval in its existence, which has need of nothing outside of what\nit possesses, because it possesses everything, because it is every\nbeing, and thus lacks nothing. Such a nature could not be complete\nin one respect, but incomplete in another. Even if what is in time\nshould appear complete, as a body that suffices the soul appears\ncomplete, though it be complete only for the soul; that which is in\ntime needs the future, and consequently is incomplete in respect to\nthe time it stands in need of; when it succeeds in enjoying the time\nto which it aspires, and succeeds in becoming united thereto, even\nthough it still remain imperfect it still is called perfect by verbal\nsimilarity. But the existence whose characteristic it is not to need\nthe future, not to be related to any other time--whether capable\nof being measured, or indefinite, and still to be indefinite--the\nexistence that already possesses all it should possess is the very\nexistence that our intelligence seeks out; it does not derive its\nexistence from any particular quality, but exists before any quantity.\nAs it is not any kind of quantity, it could not admit within itself\nany kind of quantity. Otherwise, as its life would be divided, it\nwould itself cease to be absolutely indivisible; but existence must\nbe as indivisible in its life as in its nature (\"being\"). (Plato's\nexpression,[446]) \"the Creator was good\" does indeed refer to the\nnotion of the universe, and indicates that, in the Principle superior\nto the universe, nothing began to exist at any particular time. Never,\ntherefore, did the universe begin to exist within time, because though\nits Author existed \"before\" it, it was only in the sense that its\nauthor was the cause of its existence. But, after having used the word\n\"was,\" to express this thought, Plato immediately corrects himself,\nand he demonstrates that this word does not apply to the Things that\npossess eternity.\n\n\nTO STUDY TIME WE HAVE TO DESCEND FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.\n\n6. (7). Speaking thus of eternity, it is not anything foreign to us,\nand we do not need to consult the testimony of anybody but ourselves.\nFor indeed, how could we understand anything that we could not\nperceive? How could we perceive something that would be foreign to us?\nWe ourselves, therefore, must participate in eternity. But how can we\ndo so, since we are in time? To understand how one can simultaneously\nbe in time and in eternity, it will be necessary to study time. We\nmust therefore descend from eternity to study time. To find eternity,\nwe have been obliged to rise to the intelligible world; now we are\nobliged to descend therefrom to treat of time; not indeed descending\ntherefrom entirely, but only so far as time itself descended therefrom.\n\n\nB. TIME.\n\n\nTHE OPINIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS ABOUT TIME MUST BE STUDIED.\n\nIf those blessed ancient philosophers had not already uttered their\nviews about time, we would only need to add to the idea of eternity\nwhat we have to say of the idea of time, and to set forth our opinion\non the subject, trying to make it correspond with the already expressed\nnotion of eternity. But we now must examine the most reasonable\nopinions that have been advanced about time, and observe how far our\nown opinion may conform thereto.\n\n\nTIME CONSIDERED EITHER AS MOTION; AS SOMETHING MOVABLE; OR SOMETHING OF\nMOTION.\n\nTo begin with, we may divide the generally accepted opinions about\ntime into three classes: time as movement, as something movable, or\nas some part of movement. It would be too contrary to the notion of\ntime to try to define it as rest, as being at rest, or as some part of\nrest; for time is incompatible with identity (and consequently with\nrest, and with what is at rest). Those who consider time as movement,\nclaim that it is either any kind of movement, or the movement of the\nuniverse. Those who consider it as something movable are thinking of\nthe sphere of the universe; while those who consider time as some part\nof movement consider it either as the interval of movement, or as its\nmeasure, or as some consequence of movement in general, or regular\nmovement.\n\n\nPOLEMIC AGAINST THE STOICS; TIME IS NOT MOVEMENT.\n\n7. (8). Time cannot (as the Stoics claim,[447]) be movement. Neither\ncan we gather together all movements, so as to form but a single one,\nnor can we consider the regular movement only; for these two kinds of\nmotion are within time. If we were to suppose that there was a movement\nthat did not operate within time, such a movement would still be far\nremoved from being time, since, under this hypothesis, the movement\nitself is entirely different from that in which the movement occurs.\nAmidst the many reasons which, in past and present, have been advanced\nto refute this opinion, a single one suffices: namely, that movement\ncan cease and stop, while time never suspends its flight. To the\nobjection that the movement of the universe never stops, we may answer\nthat this movement, if it consist in the circular movement (of the\nstars, according to Hestius of Perinthus; or of the sun, according to\nEratosthenes[447]) operates within a definite time, at the end of which\nit returns to the same point of the heavens, but it does not accomplish\nthis within the same space of time taken up in fulfilling the half of\nits course. One of these movements is only half of the other, and the\nsecond is double. Besides, both, the one that runs through half of\nspace, and the one that runs through the whole of it, are movements of\nthe universe. Besides, it has been noticed that the movement of the\nexterior sphere is the swiftest. This distinction supports our view,\nfor it implies that the movement of this sphere, and the time used to\noperate it, are different entities; the most rapid movement is the one\nthat takes up the least time, and runs through the greatest amount of\nspace; the slowest movements are those that employ the longest time,\nand run through only a part of that space.[448]\n\n\nPOLEMIC AGAINST THE PYTHAGOREANS: TIME IS NOT WHAT IS MOVABLE.\n\nOn the other hand, if time be not the movement of the sphere,\nevidently it is far less (than that which is movable, as thought the\nPythagoreans,[449]) or (as Pythagoras thought), the sphere (of heaven)\nitself, as some have thought, because it moves. (This fact alone is\nsufficient to refute the opinion that confuses time with that which is\nmovable).\n\n\nPOLEMIC AGAINST THE STOIC ZENO: TIME IS NO INTERVAL OF MOVEMENT.\n\nIs time then some part of movement? (Zeno[450]) calls it the interval\nof movement; but the interval is not the same for all movements, even\nif the latter were of similar nature; for movements that operate within\nspace may be swifter or slower. It is possible that the intervals of\nthe most rapid and of the slowest movement might be measured by some\nthird interval, which might far more reasonably be considered time. But\nwhich of these three intervals shall be called time? Rather, which of\nall the intervals, infinite in number as they are, shall time be? If\ntime be considered the interval of the regular movement, it will not be\nthe particular interval of every regular movement; otherwise, as there\nare several regular movements, there would be several kinds of time. If\ntime be defined as the interval of movement of the universe, that is,\nthe interval contained within this movement, it will be nothing else\nthan this movement itself.\n\n\nPERSISTENT MOVEMENT AND ITS INTERVAL ARE NOT TIME, BUT ARE WITHIN IT.\n\nBesides, this movement is a definite quantity. Either this quantity\nwill be measured by the extension of the space traversed, and the\ninterval will consist in that extension; but that extension is space,\nand not time. Or we shall say that movement has a certain interval\nbecause it is continuous, and that instead of stopping immediately it\nalways becomes prolonged; but this continuity is nothing else than the\nmagnitude (that is, the duration) of the movement. Even though after\nconsideration of a movement it be estimated as great, as might be said\nof a \"great heat\"--this does not yet furnish anything in which time\nmight appear and manifest; we have here only a sequence of movements\nwhich succeed one another like waves, and only the observed interval\nbetween them; now the sequence of movements forms a number, such as\ntwo or three; and the interval is an extension. Thus the magnitude of\nthe movement will be a number, say, such as ten; or an interval that\nmanifests in the extension traversed by the movement. Now the notion\nof time is not revealed herein, but we find only a quantity that is\nproduced within time. Otherwise, time, instead of being everywhere,\nwill exist only in the movement as an attribute in a substrate, which\namounts to saying that time is movement; for the interval (of the\nmovement) is not outside of movement, and is only a non-instantaneous\nmovement. If then time be a non-instantaneous movement, just as we\noften say that some particular instantaneous fact occurs within time,\nwe shall be forced to ask the difference between what is and what is\nnot instantaneous. Do these things differ in relation to time? Then the\npersisting movement and its interval are not time, but within time.\n\n\nPOLEMIC AGAINST STRATO: TIME IS NOT MOTION AND REST.\n\nSomebody might object that time is indeed the interval of movement, but\nthat it is not the characteristic interval of movement itself, being\nonly the interval in which movement exerts its extension, following\nalong with it. All these terms lack definition. This (extension) is\nnothing else than the time within which the movement occurs. But\nthat is precisely the question at issue, from the very start. It is\nas if a person who had been asked to define time should answer \"time\nis the interval of the movement produced within time.\" What then is\nthis interval called time, when considered outside of the interval\ncharacteristic of movement? If the interval characteristic of time\nbe made to consist in movement, where shall the duration of rest be\nposited? Indeed, for one object to be in motion implies that another\n(corresponding object) is at rest; now the time of these objects is the\nsame, though for one it be the time of movement, and for the other the\ntime of rest (as thought Strato[451]). What then is the nature of this\ninterval? It cannot be an interval of space, since space is exterior\n(to the movements that occur within it).\n\n\nPOLEMIC AGAINST ARISTOTLE: TIME IS NOT THE NUMBER AND MEASURE OF\nMOVEMENT.\n\n8. (9). Let us now examine in what sense it may be said (by\nAristotle[452]) that time is the number and measure of movement,\nwhich definition seems more reasonable, because of the continuity\nof movement. To begin with, following the method adopted with the\ndefinition of time as \"the interval of movement,\" we might ask whether\ntime be the measure and number of any kind of movement.[453] For how\nindeed could we give a numerical valuation of unequal or irregular\nmovement. What system of numbering or measurement shall we use for\nthis? If the same measure be applied to slow or to swift movement,\nin their case measure and number will be the same as the number ten\napplied equally to horses and oxen; and further, such measure might\nalso be applied to dry and wet substances. If time be a measure of\nthis kind, we clearly see that it is the measure of movements, but we\ndo not discover what it may be in itself. If the number ten can be\nconceived as a number, after making abstraction of the horses it served\nto measure, if therefore a measure possess its own individuality,\neven while no longer measuring anything, the case must be similar\nwith time, inasmuch as it is a measure. If then time be a number in\nitself, in what does it differ from the number ten, or from any other\nnumber composed of unities? As it is a continuous measure, and as it\nis a quantity, it might, for instance, turn out to be something like\na foot-rule. It would then be a magnitude, as, for instance, a line,\nwhich follows the movement; but how will this line be able to measure\nwhat it follows? Why would it measure one thing rather than another?\nIt seems more reasonable to consider this measure, not as the measure\nof every kind of movement, but only as the measure of the movement it\nfollows.[452] Then that measure is continuous, so far as the movement\nit follows itself continue to exist. In this case, we should not\nconsider measure as something exterior, and separated from movement,\nbut as united to the measured movement. What then will measure? Is it\nthe movement that will be measured, and the extension that will measure\nit? Which of these two things will time be? Will it be the measuring\nmovement, or the measuring extension? Time will be either the movement\nmeasured by extension, or the measuring extension; or some third thing\nwhich makes use of extension, as one makes use of a foot-rule, to\nmeasure the quantity of movement. But in all these cases, we must, as\nhas already been noticed, suppose that movement is uniform; for unless\nthe movement be uniform, one and universal, the theory that movement is\na measure of any kind whatever will become almost impossible. If time\nbe \"measured movement,\" that is, measured by quantity--besides granting\nthat it at all needs to be measured--movement must not be measured by\nitself, but by something different. On the other hand, if movement\nhave a measure different from itself, and if, consequently, we need a\ncontinuous measure to measure it, the result would be that extension\nitself would need measure, so that movement, being measured, may have\na quantity which is determined by that of the thing according to which\nit is measured. Consequently, under this hypothesis, time would be\nthe number of the extension which follows movement, and not extension\nitself which follows movement.\n\n\nNOR CAN TIME BE A NUMBERED NUMBER (AS ARISTOTLE CLAIMED[452]).\n\nWhat is this number? Is it composed of unities? How does it measure?\nThat would still have to be explained. Now let us suppose that we had\ndiscovered how it measures; we would still not have discovered the time\nthat measures, but a time that was such or such an amount. Now that is\nnot the same thing as time; there is a difference between time and some\nparticular quantity of time. Before asserting that time has such or\nsuch a quantity, we have to discover the nature of that which has that\nquantity. We may grant that time is the number which measures movement,\nwhile remaining exterior thereto, as \"ten\" is in \"ten horses\" without\nbeing conceived with them (as Aristotle claimed, that it was not a\nnumbering, but a numbered number). But in this case, we still have to\ndiscover the nature of this number that, before numbering, is what it\nis, as would be \"ten\" considered in itself.[454] It may be said that it\nis that number which, by following number, measures according to the\npriority and posteriority of that movement.[452] Nor do we yet perceive\nthe nature of that number which measures by priority and posteriority.\nIn any case, whatever measures by priority or posteriority, or by\na present moment,[455] or by anything else, certainly does measure\naccording to time. Thus this number (?) which measures movement\naccording to priority or posteriority, must touch time, and, to measure\nmovement, be related thereto. Prior and posterior necessarily designate\neither different parts of space, as for instance the beginning of a\nstadium, or parts of time. What is called priority is time that ends\nwith the present; what is called posteriority, is the time that begins\nat the present. Time therefore is something different from the number\nthat measures movement according to priority or posteriority,--I do\nnot say, any kind of movement, but still regular movement. Besides,\nwhy should we have time by applying number either to what measures, or\nto what is measured? For in this case these two may be identical. If\nmovement exist along with the priority and posteriority which relate\nthereto, why will we not have time without number? This would amount\nto saying that extension has such a quantity only in case of the\nexistence of somebody who recognizes that it possesses that quantity.\nSince (Aristotle[456]) says that time is infinite, and that it is such\neffectually, how can it contain number without our taking a portion of\ntime to measure it? From that would result that time existed before\nit was measured. But why could time not exist before the existence\nof a soul to measure it? (Aristotle) might have answered that it was\nbegotten by the soul. The mere fact that the soul measures time need\nnot necessarily imply that the soul produced the time; time, along\nwith its suitable quantity, would exist even if nobody measured it. If\nhowever it be said that it is the soul that makes use of extension to\nmeasure time, we will answer that this is of no importance to determine\nthe notion of time.\n\n\nPOLEMIC AGAINST EPICURUS: TIME IS NOT AN ACCIDENT OR CONSEQUENCE OF\nMOVEMENT.\n\n9. (10). When (Epicurus[457]) says that time is a consequence of\nmovement, he is not explaining the nature of time; this would demand a\npreliminary definition of the consequence of movement. Besides, this\nalleged consequence of movement--granting the possibility of such\na consequence--must be prior, simultaneous, or posterior. For, in\nwhatever way we conceive of it, it is within time. Consequently, if the\nconsequence of movement be time, the result would be that time is a\nconsequence of movement in time (which is nonsense).\n\n\nPLOTINOS CAN GO NO FURTHER IN REFUTING ENDLESS DEFINITIONS OF TIME.\n\nNow, as our purpose is to discover, not what time is not, but what\nit really is, we notice that this question has been treated at great\nlength by many thinkers before us; and if we were to undertake to\nconsider all existing opinions on the subject, we would be obliged to\nwrite a veritable history of the subject. We have here, however, gone\nto the limit of our ability in treating it without specializing in it.\nAs has been seen, it is easy enough to refute the opinion that time\nis the measure of the movement of the universe, and to raise against\nthis opinion the objections that we have raised against the definition\nof time as the measure of movement in general, opposing thereto the\nirregularity of movement, and the other points from which suitable\narguments may be drawn. We are therefore free to devote ourselves to an\nexplanation of what time really is.\n\n\nTHE NATURE OF TIME WILL BE REVEALED BY ITS ORIGIN.\n\n10. (11). To accomplish this we shall have to return to the nature\nwhich, as we pointed out above, was essential to eternity; that\nimmutable life, wholly realized all at once, infinite and perfect,\nsubsisting in, and referring to unity. Time was not yet, or at least,\nit did not yet exist for the intelligible entities. Only, it was yet\nto be born of them,[458] because (as was the world), time, by both its\nreason and nature, was posterior to the (intelligible entities[459]).\nAre we trying to understand how time issued from among intelligible\nentities while these were resting within themselves? Here it would be\nuseless to call upon the Muses, for they did not yet exist. Still this\nmight perhaps not be useless; for (in a certain sense, that time had\nalready begun, then, so far as they existed within the sense-world)\nthey existed already. In any case, the birth of time will be plain\nenough if we consider it only as it is born and manifested. Thus much\ncan be said about it.\n\n\nTIME AROSE AS MEASUREMENT OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.\n\nBefore priority and posteriority, time, which did not yet exist,\nbrooded within existence itself. But an active nature (the universal\nSoul), which desired to be mistress of herself, to possess herself, and\nceaselessly to add to the present, entered into motion, as did time,\nalong with (the Soul). We achieve a representation of the time that\nis the image of eternity, by the length that we must go through with\nto reach what follows, and is posterior, towards one moment, and then\ntowards another.[460]\n\n\nLIKE TIME, SPACE IS THE RESULT OF THE PROCESSION OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.\n\nAs the universal Soul contained an activity that agitated her, and\nimpelled her to transport into another world what she still saw on\nhigh, she was willing to retain all things that were present at the\nsame time. (Time arose not by a single fiat, but as the result of a\nprocess. This occurred within the universal Soul, but may well be\nfirst illustrated by the more familiar process within) Reason, which\ndistributes unity, not indeed That which remains within itself, but\nthat which is exterior to itself. Though this process seem to be a\nstrengthening one, reason developing out of the seed in which it\nbrooded unto manifoldness, it is really a weakening (or destructive\none), inasmuch as it weakened manifoldness by division, and weakened\nreason by causing it to extend. The case was similar with the universal\nSoul. When she produced the sense-world, the latter was animated by\na movement which was only an image of intelligible movement. (While\ntrying to strengthen) this image-movement to the extent of the\nintelligible movement, she herself (weakened), instead of remaining\nexclusively eternal, became temporal and (involuntarily) subjected what\nshe had produced to the conditions of time, transferring entirely into\ntime not only the universe, but also all its revolutions. Indeed, as\nthe world moves within the universal Soul, which is its location, it\nalso moves within the time that this Soul bears within herself.[461]\nManifesting her power in a varied and successive manner, by her mode\nof action, the universal Soul begat succession. Indeed, she passes\nfrom one conception to another, and consequently to what did not exist\nbefore, since this conception was not effective, and since the present\nlife of the soul does not resemble her former life. Her life is varied,\nand from the variety of her life results the variety of time.[462]\n\n\nTIME IS THE LIFE OF THE SOUL CONSIDERED IN THE MOVEMENT BY WHICH SHE\nPASSES FROM ONE ACTUALIZATION TO ANOTHER.\n\nThus, the extension of the life of the soul produces time, and the\nperpetual progression of her life produces the perpetuity of time, and\nher former life constitutes the past. We may therefore properly define\ntime as the life of the soul considered in the movement by which she\npasses from one actualization to another.\n\n\nWHAT ETERNITY IS TO INTELLIGENCE, TIME IS TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.\n\nWe have already decided that eternity is life characterized by rest,\nidentity, immutability and infinity (in intelligence). It is, further,\n(admitted that) this our world is the image of the superior World\n(of intelligence). We have also come to the conclusion that time\nis the image of eternity. Consequently, corresponding to the Life\ncharacteristic of Intelligence, this world must contain another life\nwhich bears the same name, and which belongs to that power of the\nuniversal Soul. Instead of the movement of Intelligence, we will have\nthe movement characteristic of a part of the soul (as the universal\nSoul ceaselessly passes from one thought to another). Corresponding to\nthe permanence, identity, and immutability (of Intelligence), we will\nhave the mobility of a principle which ceaselessly passes from one\nactualization to another. Corresponding to the unity and the absence\nof all extension, we will have a mere image of unity, an image which\nexists only by virtue of continuity. Corresponding to an infinity\nalready entirely present, we will have a progression towards infinity\nwhich perpetually tends towards what follows. Corresponding to what\nexists entirely at the same time, we will have what exists by parts,\nand what will never exist entire at the same time. The soul's existence\nwill have to be ceaseless acquiring of existence; if it is to reveal an\nimage of the complete, universal and infinite existence of the soul;\nthat is the reason its existence is able to represent the intelligible\nexistence.\n\n\nTIME IS AS INTERIOR TO THE SOUL AS ETERNITY IS TO EXISTENCE.\n\nTime, therefore, is not something external to the soul, any more than\neternity is exterior to existence. It is neither a consequence nor a\nresult of it, any more than eternity is a consequence of existence. It\nappears within the soul, is in her and with her, as eternity is in and\nwith existence.\n\n\nTIME IS THE LENGTH OF THE LIFE OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.\n\n11. (12). The result of the preceding considerations is that time\nmust be conceived of as the length of the life characteristic of the\nuniversal Soul; that her course is composed of changes that are equal,\nuniform, and insensible, so that that course implies a continuity of\naction. Now let us for a moment suppose that the power of the Soul\nshould cease to act, and to enjoy the life she at present possesses\nwithout interruption or limit, because this life is the activity\ncharacteristic of an eternal Soul, an action by which the Soul does\nnot return upon herself, and does not concentrate on herself, though\nenabling her to beget and produce. Now supposing that the Soul\nshould cease to act, that she should apply her superior part to the\nintelligible world, and to eternity, and that she should there remain\ncalmly united--what then would remain, unless eternity? For what room\nfor succession would that allow, if all things were immovable in unity?\nHow could she contain priority, posteriority, or more or less duration\nof time? How could the Soul apply herself to some object other than\nthat which occupies her? Further, one could not then even say that\nshe applied herself to the subject that occupied her; she would have\nto be separated therefrom in order to apply herself thereto. Neither\nwould the universal Sphere exist, since it does not exist before\ntime, because it exists and moves within time. Besides, even if this\nSphere were at rest during the activity of the Soul, we could measure\nthe duration of her rest because this rest is posterior to the rest\nof eternity. Since time is annihilated so soon as the Soul ceases to\nact, and concentrates in unity, time must be produced by the beginning\nof the Soul's motion towards sense-objects, by the Soul's life.\nConsequently (Plato[463]) says that time is born with the universe,\nbecause the Soul produced time with the universe; for it is this very\naction of the Soul which has produced this universe. This action\nconstitutes time, and the universe is within time. Plato does indeed\ncall the movements of the stars, time; but evidently only figuratively,\nas (Plato) subsequently says that the stars were created to indicate\nthe divisions of time, and to permit us to measure it easily.\n\n\nTIME IS NOT BEGOTTEN BY MOVEMENT, BUT ONLY INDICATED THEREBY.\n\nIndeed, as it was not possible to determine the time itself of the\nSoul, and to measure within themselves the parts of an invisible and\nuncognizable duration, especially for men who did not know how to\ncount, the (world) Soul created day and night so that their succession\nmight be the basis of counting as far as two, by the aid of this\nvariety. Plato[464] indicates that as the source of the notion of\nnumber. Later, observing the space of time which elapses from one dawn\nto another, we were able to discover an interval of time determined by\nan uniform movement, so far as we direct our gaze thereupon, and as\nwe use it as a measure by which to measure time. The expression \"to\nmeasure time\" is premeditated, because time, considered in itself, is\nnot a measure. How indeed could time measure, and what would time,\nwhile measuring, say? Would time say of anything, \"Here is an extension\nas large as myself?\" What indeed could be the nature of the entity that\nwould speak of \"myself\"? Would it be that according to which quantity\nis measured? In this case, time would have to be something by itself,\nto measure without itself being a measure. The movement of the universe\nis measured according to time, but it is not the nature of time to be\nthe measure of movement; it is such only accidentally; it indicates\nthe quantity of movement, because it is prior to it, and differs from\nit. On the other hand, in the case of a movement produced within a\ndeterminate time, and if a number be added thereto frequently enough,\nwe succeed in reaching the knowledge of how much time has elapsed.\nIt is therefore correct to say that the movement of the revolution\noperated by the universal Sphere measures time so far as possible, by\nits quantity indicating the corresponding quantity of time, since it\ncan neither be grasped nor conceived otherwise. Thus what is measured,\nthat is, what is indicated by the revolution of the universal Sphere,\nis time. It is not begotten, but only indicated by movement.\n\n\nMOVEMENT IS SAID TO BE MEASURED BY SPACE, BECAUSE OF ITS\nINDETERMINATION.\n\nThe measure of movement, therefore, seems to be what is measured by\na definite movement, but which is other than this movement. There is\na difference, indeed, between that which is measured, and that which\nmeasures; but that which is measured is measured only by accident.\nThat would amount to saying that what is measured by a foot-rule is\nan extension, without defining what extension in itself is. In the\nsame way, because of the inability to define movement more clearly\nbecause of its indeterminate nature, we say that movement is that which\nis measured by space; for, by observation of the space traversed by\nmovement, we can judge of the quantity of the movement.\n\n\nTIME IS MEASURED BY MOVEMENT, AND IN THAT SENSE IT IS THE MEASURE OF\nMOVEMENT.\n\n12. (13). The revolution of the universal Sphere leads us therefore to\nthe recognition of time, within which it occurs. Not only is time that\nin which (all things \"become,\" that is, grow), but time has to be what\nit is even before all things, being that within which everything moves,\nor rests with order and uniformity. This is discovered and manifested\nto our intelligence, but not produced by regular movement and rest,\nespecially by movement. Better than rest, indeed, does movement lead us\nto a conception of time, and it is either to appreciate the duration\nof movement than that of rest. That is what led philosophers to define\ntime as the measure \"of\" movement, instead of saying, what probably\nlay within their intention, that time is measured \"by\" movement. Above\nall, we must not consider that definition as adequate, adding to it\nthat which the measured entity is in itself, not limiting ourselves\nto express what applies to it only incidentally. Neither did we ever\ndiscern that such was their meaning, and we were unable to understand\ntheir teachings as they evidently posited the measure in the measured\nentity. No doubt that which hindered us from understanding them was\nthat they were addressing their teachings to learned (thinkers), or\nwell prepared listeners, and therefore, in their writings, they failed\nto explain the nature of time considered in itself, whether it be\nmeasure or something measured.\n\n\nPLATO DOES MAKE SOME STATEMENTS THAT ALLOW OF BEING JUSTIFIED.\n\nPlato himself, indeed, does say, not that the nature of time is to\nbe a measure or something measured, but that to make it known there\nis, in the circular movement of the universe, a very short element\n(the interval of a day), whose object is to demonstrate the smallest\nportion of time, through which we are enabled to discover the nature\nand quantity of time. In order to indicate to us its nature (\"being\"),\n(Plato[438]) says that it was born with the heavens, and that it is\nthe mobile image of eternity. Time is mobile because it has no more\npermanence than the life of the universal Soul, because it passes on\nand flows away therewith; it is born with the heavens, because it is\none and the same life that simultaneously produces the heavens and\ntime. If, granting its possibility, the life of the Soul were reduced\nto the unity (of the Intelligence), there would be an immediate\ncessation of time, which exists only in this life, and the heavens,\nwhich exist only through this life.\n\n\nTIME AS THE PRIOR AND POSTERIOR OF THE MOVEMENT OF THIS LIFE WOULD BE\nABSURD.\n\nThe theory that time is the priority and posteriority of this (earthly)\nmovement, and of this inferior life, is ridiculous in that it\nwould imply on one hand that (the priority and posteriority of this\nsense-life) are something; and on the other, refusing to recognize\nas something real a truer movement, which includes both priority and\nposteriority. It would, indeed, amount to attributing to an inanimate\nmovement the privilege of containing within itself priority with\nposteriority, that is, time; while refusing it to the movement (of the\nSoul), whose movement of the universal Sphere is no more than an image.\nStill it is from the movement (of the Soul) that originally emanated\npriority and posteriority, because this movement is efficient by\nitself. By producing all its actualizations it begets succession, and,\nat the same time that it begets succession, it produces the passing\nfrom one actualization to another.\n\n\nTHE PRIMARY MOVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE THE INFORMING POWER OF TIME.\n\n(Some objector might ask) why we reduce the movement of the universe\nto the movement of the containing Soul, and admit that she is within\ntime, while we exclude from time the (universal) Soul's movement, which\nsubsists within her, and perpetually passes from one actualization\nto another? The reason is that above the activity of the Soul there\nexists nothing but eternity, which shares neither her movement nor her\nextension. Thus the primary movement (of Intelligence) finds its goal\nin time, begets it, and by its activity informs its duration.\n\n\nWHY TIME IS PRESENT EVERYWHERE; POLEMIC AGAINST ANTIPHANES AND\nCRITOLAUS.\n\nHow then is time present everywhere? The life of the Soul is present in\nall parts of the world, as the life of our soul is present in all parts\nof our body. It may indeed be objected,[465] that time constitutes\nneither a hypostatic substance, nor a real existence, being, in\nrespect to existence, a deception, just as we usually say that the\nexpressions \"He was\" and \"He will be\" are a deception in respect to\nthe divinity; for then He will be and was just as is that, in which,\naccording to his assertion, he is going to be.\n\nTo answer these objections, we shall have to follow a different method.\nHere it suffices to recall what was said above, namely, that by seeing\nhow far a man in motion has advanced, we can ascertain the quantity\nof the movement; and that, when we discern movement by walking, we\nsimultaneously concede that, before the walking, movement in that man\nwas indicated by a definite quantity, since it caused his body to\nprogress by some particular quantity. As the body was moved during\na definite quantity of time, its quantity can be expressed by some\nparticular quantity of movement--for this is the movement that causes\nit--and to its suitable quantity of time. Then this movement will be\napplied to the movement of the soul, which, by her uniform action,\nproduces the interval of time.\n\n\nTHE MOVEMENT OF THE SOUL IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE PRIMARY MOVEMENT.\n\nTo what shall the movement of the (universal) Soul be attributed?\nTo whatever we may choose to attribute it. This will always be some\nindivisible principle, such as primary Motion, which within its\nduration contains all the others, and is contained by none other;[466]\nfor it cannot be contained by anything; it is therefore genuinely\nprimary. The same obtains with the universal Soul.\n\n\nAPPROVAL OF ARISTOTLE: TIME IS ALSO WITHIN US.\n\nIs time also within us?[467] It is uniformly present in the universal\nSoul, and in the individual souls that are all united together.[468]\nTime, therefore, is not parcelled out among the souls, any more than\neternity is parcelled out among the (Entities in the intelligible\nworld) which, in this respect, are all mutually uniform.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n\n[1] Arist. Physics, iii. 7.\n\n[2] Or, the finished, the boundary, the Gnostic Horos.\n\n[3] Plato, Philebus, 24; Cary, 37.\n\n[4] Plato, Timaeus, p. 52; Cary, 26.\n\n[5] See vi. 3.13.\n\n[6] See Plato, Philebus, Cary, 40; see ii. 4.11.\n\n[7] See vi. 3.27.\n\n[8] See ii. 4.10.\n\n[9] Timaeus, 39; Cary, 14; see iii. 7.11.\n\n[10] Parmenides, 144; Cary, 37.\n\n[11] Possibly a reference to Numenius' book thereon.\n\n[12] Aristotle, Met. i. 5; Jamblichus, de Vita. Pyth. 28.150; and\n29.162; found in their oath; also Numenius, 60.\n\n[13] See vi. 2.7.\n\n[14] See vi. 6.5.\n\n[15] As thought Plato and Aristotle combined, see Ravaisson, Essay, ii.\n407.\n\n[16] Atheneus, xii. 546; see i. 6.4.\n\n[17] Plato, Timaeus, 39e, Cary, 15.\n\n[18] See iii. 8.7.\n\n[19] As thought the Pythagoreans; see Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes\nPyrrh. 3.18, p. 165.\n\n[20] Olympiodorus, Comm. I Alcibiades, x. p. 95; Arist. Met., i. 5;\nSextus Emp., H. P., iii. 152; Porphyry; Vit. Pyth., 48.\n\n[21] As said Theon of Smyrna, of the Pythagoreans, ii. p. 23;\nJamblichus, Vit. Porph. 28.150; 29.162.\n\n[22] See i. 8.2.\n\n[23] Met. x. 2; iv. 2; v.\n\n[24] Peripatetic commentators on Aristotle's Metaphysics, which was\nused as a text-book in Plotinos's school.\n\n[25] See end of Sec. 13.\n\n[26] See vi. 1.6.\n\n[27] See Aristotle, Categories, ii. 6.\n\n[28] As Aristotle thought, Met. x. 2.\n\n[29] See vi. 9.2.\n\n[30] Met. x. 1.\n\n[31] The Numenian secret name of the divinity, fr. 20.\n\n[32] Met. xiii. 7.\n\n[33] Aristotle, Met. x. 2.\n\n[34] Aristotle, Metaph. xiii. 7.\n\n[35] See iv. 8.3.\n\n[36] See iv. 4.5.\n\n[37] See v. 7.3.\n\n[38] See vi. 3.13.\n\n[39] See vi. 9.1.\n\n[40] See Timaeus, 35; Cary, 12. Jamblichus, On the Soul, 2; Macrobius,\nDream of Scipio, i. 5.\n\n[41] See Jamblichus, About Common Knowledge of Mathematics.\n\n[42] See Sec. 2.\n\n[43] Macrobius, Dream of Scipio, 1.5.\n\n[44] Parmenides quoted in Plato's Theataetus, 180 E. Jowett, iii. 383.\n\n[45] Plato, Timaeus, 56; Cary, 30.\n\n[46] In the Timaeus, 39; Cary, 14.\n\n[47] Parmenides, quoted by Plato, in the Sophists, 244; Cary, 61.\n\n[48] In Plato's Theataetus, 180; Jowett Tr. iii. 383.\n\n[49] Evidently Porphyry had advanced new objections that demanded an\naddition to the former book on the theory of vision; see iv. 5.\n\n[50] As thought the Stoics.\n\n[51] Like Aristotle, de Sensu et Sensili, 2.\n\n[52] iv. 5.\n\n[53] These ten disjointed reflections on happiness remind us of\nPorphyry's questioning habit, without which, Plotinos said, he might\nhave had nothing to write; see Biography, 13.\n\n[54] As Epicurus thought the divinities alone enjoyed perfect\nhappiness, Diog. Laert. x. 121.\n\n[55] See Aristotle, Nic. Ethics, 1.10.\n\n[56] See Cicero, de Finibus, ii. 27-29.\n\n[57] See iii. 7.\n\n[58] Plutarch, Dogm. Philos. i. 17; Stob. Eclog. i. 18.\n\n[59] Arist. Topic. iv. 2; de Gener. et Cor. i. 10; Ravaisson, EMA, i.\n422.\n\n[60] As did Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his treatise on \"Mixture;\"\nRavaisson, EMA, ii. 297.\n\n[61] Stob. Eclog. i. 18.\n\n[62] See Plutarch, \"Whether Wickedness Renders One Unhappy.\"\n\n[63] As said Numenius, 44.\n\n[64] See vi. 7. This is another proof of the chronological order, as\nvi. 7 follows this book.\n\n[65] Bouillet explains that in this book Plotinos summated all that\nPlato had to say of the Ideas and of their dependence on the Good, in\nthe Timaeus, Philebus, Phaedrus, the Republic, the Banquet, and the\nAlcibiades; correcting this summary by the reflections of Aristotle,\nin Met. xii. But Plotinos advances beyond both Plato and Aristotle in\ngoing beyond Intelligence to the supreme Good. (See Sec. 37.) This\ntreatise might well have been written at the instigation of Porphyry,\nwho desired to understand Plotinos's views on this great subject.\n\n[66] The famous Philonic distinction between \"ho theos,\" and \"theos.\"\n\n[67] Plato, Timaeus, p. 45, Cary, 19.\n\n[68] See iii. 2.\n\n[69] See iii. 2.1.\n\n[70] Plato's Timaeus, pp. 30-40, Cary, 10-15.\n\n[71] An Aristotelian idea, from Met. vii. 1.\n\n[72] Aristotle, Met. vii. 17.\n\n[73] Met. vii. 1.\n\n[74] Met. vii. 7.\n\n[75] Aristotle, Met. v. 8.\n\n[76] Met. 1.3.\n\n[77] See ii. 9.3.\n\n[78] Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 2; Met. vii. 17.\n\n[79] Porphyry, Of the Faculties of the Soul, fr. 5.\n\n[80] See ii. 5.3.\n\n[81] Aristotle, de Anima, i. 3; ii. 2-4.\n\n[82] Plato, I Alcibiades, p. 130, Cary, 52.\n\n[83] See i. 1.3.\n\n[84] Bouillet explains this as follows: Discursive reason, which\nconstitutes the real man, begets sensibility, which constitutes the\nanimal; see i. 1.7.\n\n[85] See iii. 4.3-6.\n\n[86] See iii. 4.6.\n\n[87] These demons are higher powers of the human soul.\n\n[88] See iv. 3.18.\n\n[89] Plato, Timaeus, p. 76, Cary, 54.\n\n[90] p. 39, Cary, 15.\n\n[91] Plato, Timaeus, p. 77, Cary, 55.\n\n[92] See iv. 4.22.\n\n[93] Lucretius, v. 1095.\n\n[94] Diogenes Laertes, iii. 74.\n\n[95] Plato, Timaeus, p. 80, Cary, 61.\n\n[96] See iv. 3.18.\n\n[97] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 248, Cary, 60; see i. 3.4.\n\n[98] See v. 7.\n\n[99] See v. 1.9.\n\n[100] See i. 8.6, 7.\n\n[101] Rep. vi. p. 509, Cary, 19.\n\n[102] See v. 1.7.\n\n[103] See v. 1.5.\n\n[104] See v. 1.7.\n\n[105] Plato, Rep. vi. p. 509, Cary, 19.\n\n[106] See v. 1.6.\n\n[107] See iv. 8.3.\n\n[108] See v. 1.4.\n\n[109] See v. 1.6.\n\n[110] Arist. Nic. Eth. 1.1.\n\n[111] See Arist., Met. i. 5.\n\n[112] According to Plato's Banquet, p. 206, Cary, 31.\n\n[113] See iv. 5.7.\n\n[114] See 1.6.\n\n[115] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 249, Cary, 63.\n\n[116] See v. 1.2.\n\n[117] See vi. 7.25.\n\n[118] Plato, Philebus, p. 60, Cary, 141; Gorgias, p. 474, Cary, 66.\n\n[119] p. 61, Cary, 144.\n\n[120] See Met. xii.\n\n[121] Met xii. 7.\n\n[122] Plato, Rep. vi., p. 505, Cary, 17.\n\n[123] According to the proverb, like seeks its like, mentioned by\nPlato, in his Banquet; p. 195, Cary, 21.\n\n[124] Plato, Gorgias, p. 507, Cary, 136.\n\n[125] See i. 8.5.\n\n[126] Plato, Timaeus, p. 52, Cary, 26.\n\n[127] See below, Sec. 32.\n\n[128] Plato, Rep. vi., p. 506, Cary 17.\n\n[129] As said Plato, Republic vi., p. 508, Cary, 19.\n\n[130] See iii. 5.9.\n\n[131] In his Philebus, p. 65, Cary, 155.\n\n[132] As Plato said, in his Banquet, p. 184, Cary, 12.\n\n[133] See i. 6.5.\n\n[134] See i. 6.7.\n\n[135] As says Plato, in his Banquet, p. 210, Cary, 35.\n\n[136] As Plato says, in his Phaedrus, p. 250, Cary, 65.\n\n[137] As Plato says, in his Banquet, p. 183, Cary, 11.\n\n[138] See i. 6.9.\n\n[139] See i. 6.8.\n\n[140] As Plato said, in his Banquet, p. 211, Cary, 35.\n\n[141] See iii. 5.9.\n\n[142] Rep. vi., p. 505, Cary, 16.\n\n[143] See iii. 3.6.\n\n[144] As thought Plato, in the Banquet, p. 210, Cary, 35.\n\n[145] Arist. Met. xii. 9; see v. 1.9.\n\n[146] Met. xii. 7.\n\n[147] Met. xii. 9.\n\n[148] See iv. 6.3.\n\n[149] Met. xii. 8.\n\n[150] Plato, Rep. vi. p. 509, Cary, 19.\n\n[151] Met. xii. 7.\n\n[152] See v. 3.10.\n\n[153] See vi. 2.7.\n\n[154] See v. 3.11.\n\n[155] See iii. 9.6.\n\n[156] See vi. 5.11.\n\n[157] See v. 3.13.\n\n[158] Arist. Met. xii. 7.\n\n[159] As thought Plato, Rep. vi., p. 508, Cary, 19.\n\n[160] See iv. 3.1.\n\n[161] Letter ii. 312; Cary, p. 482.\n\n[162] See i. 6, end.\n\n[163] Numenius, fr. 32.\n\n[164] See Numenius, fr. 48.\n\n[165] Banquet, p. 211, Cary, 35.\n\n[166] As Aristotle asks, Eth. Nic. iii.\n\n[167] Arist. Nic. Eth. iii. 1.\n\n[168] Eud. Eth. ii. 6.\n\n[169] Nic. Eth. iii. 2.\n\n[170] Eud. Mor. ii. 9.\n\n[171] Nic. Eth. iii. 2.\n\n[172] Nic. Eth. iii. 6.\n\n[173] Plato, Alcinous, 31; this is opposed by Aristotle, Nic. Eth. iii.\n2.6.\n\n[174] Aristotle, Eud. Eth. ii. 10.\n\n[175] Aristotle, Mor. Magn. i. 32; Nic. Eth. iii. 6.\n\n[176] Aristotle, Nic. Eth. iii. 4.\n\n[177] Arist. de Anim. iii. 10.\n\n[178] de Anim. iii. 9.\n\n[179] Magn. Mor. i. 17.\n\n[180] de Anim. iii. 9.\n\n[181] This Stoic term had already been noticed and ridiculed by\nNumenius, 2.8, 13; 3.4, 5; Guthrie, Numenius, p. 141. He taught that\nit was a casual consequence of the synthetic power of the soul (52).\nIts relation to free-will and responsibility, here considered, had been\nwith Numenius the foundation of the ridicule heaped on Lacydes.\n\n[182] Nic. Eth. x. 8.\n\n[183] Nic. Eth. x. 7.\n\n[184] Plato, Republic, x. p. 617; Cary, 15.\n\n[185] In his Phaedo, p. 83; Cary, 74.\n\n[186] Such as Strato the Peripatetic, and the Epicureans.\n\n[187] Plato, Rep. x. p. 596c; Cary, 1.\n\n[188] See Jamblichus's Letter to Macedonius, on Destiny, 5.\n\n[189] See iii. 9, end.\n\n[190] Numenius, 32.\n\n[191] See vi. 7.2.\n\n[192] Aris. Met. ix. 1; xii. 9; Nic. Eth. x. 8; Plato Timaeus, p. 52;\nCary, 26; Plotinos, Enn. ii. 5.3.\n\n[193] This etymology of \"providence\" applies in English as well as in\nGreek; see iii. 2.1.\n\n[194] Plato, Laws, iv., p. 716; Cary, 8.\n\n[195] Arist. Met. xii. 7.\n\n[196] See iii. 8.9.\n\n[197] In his Cratylos, p. 419; Cary, 76.\n\n[198] See iii. 9, end.\n\n[199] As said Plato in the Timaeus, p. 42; Cary, 18; see Numenius, 10,\n32.\n\n[200] In this book Plotinos uses synonymously the \"Heaven,\" the\n\"World,\" the \"Universal Organism or Animal,\" the \"All\" (or universe),\nand the \"Whole\" (or Totality). This book as it were completes the\nformer one on the Ideas and the Divinity, thus studying the three\nprinciples (Soul, Intelligence and Good) cosmologically. We thus have\nhere another proof of the chronological order. In it Plotinos defends\nPlato's doctrine against Aristotle's objection in de Anima i. 3.\n\n[201] As thought Heraclitus, Diog. Laert. ix. 8; Plato, Timaeus, p. 31;\nCary, 11; Arist. Heaven, 1, 8, 9.\n\n[202] Such as Heraclitus.\n\n[203] In the Cratylus, p. 402; Cary, 41.\n\n[204] Rep. vi., p. 498; Cary, 11.\n\n[205] See Apuleius, de Mundo, p. 708; Ravaisson, E.M.A. ii. 150; Plato,\nEpinomis, c. 5.\n\n[206] Which would render it unfit for fusion with the Soul, Arist.,\nMeteorology, i. 4; Plato, Tim., p. 58; Cary, 33.\n\n[207] See ii. 9.3; iii. 2.1; iv. 3.9.\n\n[208] Phaedo, p. 109; Cary, 134; that is, the universal Soul is here\ndistinguished into the celestial Soul, and the inferior Soul, which is\nnature, the generative power.\n\n[209] The inferior soul, or nature.\n\n[210] See ii. 3.9-15.\n\n[211] See i. 1.7-10.\n\n[212] As is the vegetative soul, which makes only the animal part of\nus; see i. 1.7-10.\n\n[213] In his Timaeus, p. 31; Cary, 11.\n\n[214] Timaeus, p. 56; Cary, 30.\n\n[215] See i. 8.9.\n\n[216] Plato, Epinomis, p. 984; Cary, 8.\n\n[217] In the Timaeus, p. 31, 51; Cary 11, 24, 25.\n\n[218] See ii. 7.\n\n[219] Who in his Timaeus says, p. 39; Cary, 14.\n\n[220] See ii. 2.\n\n[221] As thought Heraclitus and the Stoics, who thought that the stars\nfed themselves from the exhalations of the earth and the waters; see\nSeneca, Nat. Quest. vi. 16.\n\n[222] See ii. 1.5.\n\n[223] See iii. 7; Plotinos may have already sketched the outline of\nthis book (number 45), and amplified it only later.\n\n[224] See ii. 9.6, or 33; another proof of the chronological order.\n\n[225] In his Timaeus, p. 69; Cary, 44.\n\n[226] As the Stoics think, Plutarch, Plac. Phil. iv. 11.\n\n[227] As Aristotle would say, de Anima, iii. 3.\n\n[228] Aristotle, de Sensu, 6.\n\n[229] v. 3.\n\n[230] Porphyry, Principles, 24.\n\n[231] Arist., Mem. et Rec., 2.\n\n[232] Porphyry, Principles, 25.\n\n[233] Aristotle, Mem. et Rec., 2.\n\n[234] Porphyry, Treatise, Psych.\n\n[235] Locke's famous \"tabula rasa.\"\n\n[236] Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, When, Where,\nAction-and-Reaction, to Have, and Location. Aristotle's treatment\nthereof in his Categories, and Metaphysics.\n\n[237] Met. v. 7.\n\n[238] Or, substance, \"ousia.\"\n\n[239] Cat. i. 1, 2; or, mere label in common.\n\n[240] Aristotle, Met. vii. 3, distinguished many different senses of\nBeing; at least four principal ones: what it seems, or the universal,\nthe kind, or the subject. The subject is that of which all the rest is\nan attribute, but which is not the attribute of anything. Being must be\nthe first subject. In one sense this is matter; in another, form; and\nin the third place, the concretion of form and matter.\n\n[241] See ii. 4.6-16, for intelligible matter, and ii. 4.2-5 for\nsense-matter.\n\n[242] Arist., Met. vii. 3.\n\n[243] Arist., Cat. 2.5.25.\n\n[244] Arist., Cat. ii. 5.15.\n\n[245] Arist., Met. vii. 1; Cat. ii. 5.\n\n[246] Categ. ii. 5.1, 2.\n\n[247] Cat. ii. 5.16, 17.\n\n[248] Cat. ii. 6.1, 2.\n\n[249] Met. v. 13.\n\n[250] Met. xiii. 6.\n\n[251] Met. xiii. 3.\n\n[252] Categ. ii. 6.18-23.\n\n[253] See vi. 6.\n\n[254] Categ. ii. 6.4.\n\n[255] Arist., Hermeneia, 4.\n\n[256] See iii. 7.8.\n\n[257] Categ. ii. 6.26.\n\n[258] Categ. ii. 7.1; Met. v. 15.\n\n[259] Categ. ii. 7.17-19.\n\n[260] See Categ. viii.\n\n[261] Arist., Categ. ii. 8.3, 7, 8, 13, 14.\n\n[262] See ii. 6.3.\n\n[263] See ii. 6.3.\n\n[264] See ii. 6.1.\n\n[265] These are: 1, capacity and disposition; 2, physical power or\nimpotence; 3, affective qualities; 4, the figure and exterior form.\n\n[266] Met. v. 14.\n\n[267] Categ. ii. 8.\n\n[268] See i. 6.2.\n\n[269] Categ. ii. 8.15.\n\n[270] Among whom Plotinos is not; see vi. 1.10.\n\n[271] The reader is warned that the single Greek word \"paschein\" is\ncontinually played upon in meanings \"experiencing,\" \"suffering,\"\n\"reacting,\" or \"passion.\"\n\n[272] Met. xi. 9.\n\n[273] That is, \"to move\" and \"to cut\" express an action as perfect as\n\"having moved\" and \"having cut.\"\n\n[274] As Aristotle says, Categ. ii. 7.1.\n\n[275] Plotinos proposes to divide verbs not as transitive and\nintransitive, but as verbs expressing a completed action or state, (as\nto think), and those expressing successive action, (as, to walk). The\nFrench language makes this distinction by using with these latter the\nauxiliary \"\u00eatre.\" Each of these two classes are subdivided into some\nverbs expressing an absolute action, by which the subject alone is\nmodified; and into other verbs expressing relative action, referring\nto, or modifying an exterior object. These alone are used to form the\npassive voice, and Plotinos does not want them classified apart.\n\n[276] In Greek the three words are derived from the same root.\n\n[277] See i. v.\n\n[278] See iii. 6.1.\n\n[279] Categ. iii. 14.\n\n[280] For this movement did not constitute reaction in the mover.\n\n[281] That is, the Greek word for \"suffering.\"\n\n[282] A Greek pun, \"kathexis.\"\n\n[283] A Greek pun, \"hexis\" also translated \"habit,\" and \"habitude.\"\n\n[284] See Chaignet, Hist. of Greek Psychology, and Simplicius,\nCommentary on Categories.\n\n[285] See iv. 7.14. This is an Aristotelian distinction.\n\n[286] See ii. 4.1.\n\n[287] By verbal similarity, or homonymy, a pun.\n\n[288] See ii. 4.1.\n\n[289] See ii. 5.5.\n\n[290] For Plato placed all reality in the Ideas.\n\n[291] Logically, their conception of matter breaks down.\n\n[292] Cicero, Academics, i. 11.\n\n[293] See ii. 4.10.\n\n[294] See Enn. ii. 4, 5; iii. 6. Another proof of the chronological\norder.\n\n[295] Plotinos was here in error; Aristotle ignored them, because he\ndid not admit existence.\n\n[296] This refers to the Hylicists, who considered the universe as\nfounded on earth, water, air or fire; or, Anaxagoras, who introduced\nthe category of mind.\n\n[297] Plotinos's own categories are developed from the thought of\nPlato, found in his \"Sophists,\" for the intelligible being; and yet\nhe harks back to Aristotle's Categories and Metaphysics, for his\nclassification of the sense-world.\n\n[298] See vi. 4, 6, 9.\n\n[299] In his \"Sophist.\" p. 248 e-250; Cary, 72-76.\n\n[300] In vi. 3.\n\n[301] See vi. 3.6.\n\n[302] See vi. 3.3.\n\n[303] See iii. 2.16.\n\n[304] That is, the higher part, the principal power of the soul; see\nii. 3.17, 18.\n\n[305] Here \"being\" and \"essence\" have had to be inverted.\n\n[306] Verbal similarity, homonymy, or pun.\n\n[307] See Plato's Sophists, p. 250 c; Cary, 75.\n\n[308] Sophists, p. 254 d; Cary, 86.\n\n[309] As said Aristotle, Met. iv. 2.\n\n[310] Plato, Sophist, p. 245; Cary, 63.\n\n[311] See vi. 9.1.\n\n[312] See vi. 4.\n\n[313] Arist., Met. xiv. 6.\n\n[314] Aristotle. Met. xiv. 6.\n\n[315] See ii. 6.2.\n\n[316] See vi. 7.3-6.\n\n[317] As said Aristotle. Eth. Nic. i. 6.2.\n\n[318] Against Aristotle.\n\n[319] See vi. 1.14.\n\n[320] See iii. 7.11.\n\n[321] To ti \u00ean einai.\n\n[322] See i. 6.\n\n[323] See v. 8.\n\n[324] Counting identity and difference as a composite one? See note 11.\n\n[325] See iv. 9.5.\n\n[326] See iv. 8.3.\n\n[327] See iii. 2.16.\n\n[328] See iv. 8.8.\n\n[329] See iii. 8.7.\n\n[330] See iii. 8.2.\n\n[331] See iii. 2.2.\n\n[332] See iii. 9.1.\n\n[333] See 3.9.1; Timaeus, p. 39; Cary, 14.\n\n[334] See ii. 9.1.\n\n[335] See v. 3.4.\n\n[336] Plato, Philebus, p. 18; Cary, 23.\n\n[337] Plato, Philebus, p. 17 e; Cary, 21.\n\n[338] See iii. 4.1.\n\n[339] See iv. 8.3-7.\n\n[340] See iv. 8.8.\n\n[341] See iv. 4.29.\n\n[342] Here Plotinos purposely mentions Numenius's name for the divinity\n(fr. 20.6), and disagrees with it, erecting above it a supreme Unity.\nThis, however, was only Platonic, Rep. vi. 19, 509 b., so that Plotinos\nshould not be credited with it as is done by the various histories of\nphilosophy. Even Numenius held the unity, fr. 14.\n\n[343] This means, by mere verbal similarity, \"homonymy,\" or, punning.\n\n[344] As said Plato, in his Philebus, p. 18, Cary, 23.\n\n[345] See i. 1.7.\n\n[346] See Bouillet, vol. 1, p. 380.\n\n[347] See iii. 6.1-5.\n\n[348] See sect. 16.\n\n[349] See ii. 1.2.\n\n[350] Or, mortal nature, or, decay; see i. 8.4; ii. 4.5-6.\n\n[351] See vi. 2.7, 8.\n\n[352] See ii. 4.6.\n\n[353] See vi. 1.13, 14.\n\n[354] In vi. 3.11, and vi. 1.13, 14, he however subsumes time and place\nunder relation.\n\n[355] According to Aristotle, Met. vii. 3.\n\n[356] Aristotle, Met. viii. 5.6.\n\n[357] Aristotle, Categ. ii. 5.\n\n[358] See ii. 5.4.\n\n[359] Met. vii. 11.\n\n[360] Met. vii. 17.\n\n[361] See ii. 4.3-5.\n\n[362] See iii. 6.\n\n[363] Categ. ii. 5.\n\n[364] See iii. 7.8.\n\n[365] See sect. 11.\n\n[366] Arist. Met. vii. 1.\n\n[367] See vi. 1.26.\n\n[368] See ii. 4.10.\n\n[369] See Met. vii. 3.\n\n[370] See vi. 1.2, 3.\n\n[371] See iii. 8.7.\n\n[372] Matter is begotten by nature, which is the inferior power of the\nuniversal Soul, iii. 4.1.; and the form derives from Reason, which is\nthe superior power of the same Soul, ii. 3.17.\n\n[373] Met. v. 8.\n\n[374] Being an accident, Met. v. 30, see[434].\n\n[375] See iii. 6.12.\n\n[376] See Categ. ii. 5.1-2.\n\n[377] Plotinos is here defending Plato's valuation of the universal,\nagainst Aristotle, in Met. vii. 13.\n\n[378] Arist. de Anima, ii. 1.\n\n[379] See sect. 8.\n\n[380] Plotinos follows Aristotle in his definition of quantity, but\nsubsumes time and place under relation. Plot., vi. 1.4; Arist. Categ.\nii. 6.1, 2.\n\n[381] Arist. Met. v. 13.\n\n[382] See vi. 3.5; iii. 6.17.\n\n[383] Categ. ii. 6.\n\n[384] Quoted by Plato in his Hippias, p. 289, Cary, 20.\n\n[385] See Categ. 2.6.\n\n[386] See vi. 1.5.\n\n[387] See sect. 11.\n\n[388] See vi. 6.\n\n[389] Met. v. 6.\n\n[390] Categ. iii. 6.26.\n\n[391] Met. v. 14.\n\n[392] Categ. ii. 6.26.\n\n[393] In speaking of quality, Categ. ii. 8.30.\n\n[394] Following the Latin version of Ficinus.\n\n[395] Bouillet remarks that Plotinos intends to demonstrate this by\nexplaining the term \"similarity\" not only of identical quality, but\nalso of two beings of which one is the image of the other, as the\nportrait is the image of the corporeal form, the former that of the\n\"seminal reason,\" and the latter that of the Idea.\n\n[396] By this Plotinos means the essence, or intelligible form, vi. 7.2.\n\n[397] See vi. 7.3-6.\n\n[398] See iii. 6.4.\n\n[399] In his Banquet, p. 186-188; Cary, 14, 15.\n\n[400] See v. 9.11.\n\n[401] See i. 2.1.\n\n[402] See vi. 7.5.\n\n[403] See iii. 6.4.\n\n[404] Categ. ii. 8.3, 7, 8, 13, 14.\n\n[405] See i. 1.2.\n\n[406] Arist. Categ. ii. 8.8-13.\n\n[407] Met. v. 14.\n\n[408] Met. vii. 12.\n\n[409] Met. v. 14.\n\n[410] Categ. ii. 8.\n\n[411] Arist. Categ. iii. 10.\n\n[412] See vi. 1.17.\n\n[413] Met. v. 10.\n\n[414] Categ. iii. 11.\n\n[415] Categ. iii. 14.\n\n[416] Categ. ii. 7.\n\n[417] By a pun, this \"change\" is used as synonymous with the\n\"alteration\" used further on.\n\n[418] Arist. de Gen. i. 4.\n\n[419] Alteration is change in the category of quality, Arist. de Gen.\ni. 4; Physics, vii. 2.\n\n[420] Arist. Metaph. ix. 6; xi. 9.\n\n[421] Met. xi. 9.\n\n[422] See ii. 5.1, 2.\n\n[423] See ii. 5.2.\n\n[424] See ii. 5.2.\n\n[425] Categ. iii. 14.\n\n[426] Arist. Met. xi. 9.\n\n[427] See ii. 7.\n\n[428] Arist. de Gen. i. 5.\n\n[429] Arist. de Gen. i. 10.\n\n[430] Here we have Numenius's innate motion of the intelligible, fr.\n30.21.\n\n[431] See vi. 1.15-22.\n\n[432] Namely, time, vi. 1.13; place, vi. 1.14; possession, vi. 1.23;\nlocation, vi. 1.24.\n\n[433] For relation, see vi. 1.6-9.\n\n[434] For Aristotle says that an accident is something which exists in\nan object without being one of the distinctive characteristics of its\nessence.\n\n[435] In this book Plotinos studies time and eternity comparatively;\nfirst considering Plato's views in the Timaeus, and then the views of\nPythagoras (1), Epicurus (9), the Stoics (7), and Aristotle (4, 8, 12).\n\n[436] The bracketed numbers are those of the Teubner edition; the\nunbracketed, those of the Didot edition.\n\n[437] See ii. 9.6.\n\n[438] As thought Plato, in his Timaeus, p. 37, Cary, 14.\n\n[439] Stobaeus. Ecl. Phys. i. 248.\n\n[440] A category, see vi. 2.7.\n\n[441] See vi. 2.7.\n\n[442] Or, with Mueller, \"therefore, in a permanent future.\"\n\n[443] De Caelo, i. 9.\n\n[444] That is, with this divinity that intelligible existence is.\n\n[445] Arist. Met. iii. 2.\n\n[446] In the Timaeus, p. 29, Cary 10.\n\n[447] Stob. Ecl. Physic. ix. 40.\n\n[448] Porphyry, Principles, 32, end.\n\n[449] Especially Archytas, Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. Aristot. 165;\nStob. Ecl. Physic. Heeren, 248-250.\n\n[450] Stobaeus, 254.\n\n[451] See Stobaeus, 250.\n\n[452] Aristotle, Physica, iv. 12.\n\n[453] Mueller: \"Whether this may be predicated of the totality of the\nmovement.\"\n\n[454] See vi. 6.4-10.\n\n[455] As Aristotle, Phys. iv. 11, claimed.\n\n[456] In Physica, iii. 7.\n\n[457] Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys. ix. 40.\n\n[458] When collectively considered as \"A-pollo,\" following Numenius,\n42, 67, Plotinos, v. 5.6.\n\n[459] See ii. 9.3.\n\n[460] See iii. 7.1, Introd.\n\n[461] See iii. 6.16, 17.\n\n[462] Porphyry, Principles, 32.\n\n[463] In the Timaeus, p. 38, Cary, 14.\n\n[464] In his Timaeus, p. 39, Cary, 14, 15.\n\n[465] As by Antiphanes and Critolaus, Stobaeus, Eclog. Phys. ix. 40, p.\n252, Heeren.\n\n[466] See iii. 7.2.\n\n[467] As thought Aristotle, de Mem. et Remin. ii. 12.\n\n[468] See iv. 9.\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\n\nPunctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant\npreference was found in this four-volume set; otherwise they were not\nchanged.\n\nSimple typographical errors were corrected. Inconsistent capitalization\nhas not been changed.\n\nAmbiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.\n\nInfrequent spelling of \"Plotinus\" changed to the predominant \"Plotinos.\"\n\nSeveral opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are\nunmatched; Transcriber has not attempted to determine where they belong.\n\nPage 678: A line containing \"How then could one,\" appears to have been\npartly duplicated in the original. The duplicate text, which has been\nremoved here, was: \"Essence sence possess self-existence. How then\ncould\".\n\nPage 690, footnote 53 (originally 1): \"he might have had noth-\" does\nnot complete on the next line and has been changed here to \"he might\nhave had nothing\".\n\nPage 700: The two opening parentheses in '(from its \"whatness\" (or,\nessence[72]).' share the one closing parenthesis; unchanged.\n\nPage 744: unmatched closing quotation mark removed after \"a being is\nsuited by its like\".\n\nPage 804: Closing parenthesis added after \"single (unitary\".\n\nPage 823: \"resistance corporeal nature[15]).\" has no matching opening\nparenthesis; unchanged here.\n\nPage 930: Phrase beginning \"(each constituting a particular\nintelligence\" appears to share its closing parenthesis with the phrase\n\"(and thus exists in itself).\"\n\nPage 935: Closing parenthesis in phrase \"composite as mixtures),\" does\nnot have a matching opening parenthesis; unchanged.\n\nPage 984: Footnote 395 (originally 53), \"corporeal form, the former\nthat of\" originally was \"corporeal form, the latter that of\".\n\n\nFootnote Issues:\n\nIn these notes, \"anchor\" means the reference to a footnote, and\n\"footnote\" means the information to which the anchor refers. Anchors\noccur within the main text, while footnotes are grouped in sequence at\nthe end of this eBook. The structure of the original book required some\nexceptions to this, as explained below.\n\nThe original text used chapter endnotes. In this eBook, they have been\ncombined into a single, ascending sequence based on the sequence in\nwhich the footnotes (not the anchors) occurred in the original book,\nand placed at the end of the eBook.\n\nThree kinds of irregularities occurred in the footnotes:\n\n1. Some footnotes are referenced by more than one anchor, so two or\nmore anchors may refer to the same footnote.\n\n2. Some anchors were out of sequence, apparently because they were\nadded afterwards or because they are share a footnote with another\nanchor. They have been renumbered to match the numbers of the footnotes\nto which they refer.\n\n3. Some footnotes have no anchors. These are noted below.\n\nPage 679: Footnote 37 has no anchor. The missing anchor would be on\npage 670.\n\nPage 771: Footnote 85 (originally 21) has no anchor. The missing anchor\nwould be on page 709 or 710.\n\nPage 772: Footnote 111 (originally 47) has no anchor. The missing anchor\nwould be on page 736.\n\nPage 772: Footnote 123 (originally 59) has no anchor. The missing\nanchor would be on page 744 or 745.\n\nPage 811: Footnote 178 (originally 13) has no anchor. The missing\nanchor would be on page 776.\n\nPage 932: Footnote 302 (originally 6) has no anchor. The missing anchor\nwould be on page 895 or 896.\n\nPage 984: Footnote 424 (originally 82) has no anchor. The missing\nanchor would be on page 974 or 975.\n\nPage 1015: Footnote 445 (originally 11) has no anchor. The missing\nanchor would be in page range 992-995.","title":"Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 3: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":112172}