{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_42933/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_42933","id":"gutenberg_42933","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/42933","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Plotinus"],"text":"VOLUME IV.\n\nWORKS OF PLOTINOS.\n\n\n\n\n    PLOTINOS\n    Complete Works\n\n    In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods;\n\n    With\n    BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS,\n    COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY,\n    ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS,\n    STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence;\n    INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words.\n\n    by\n    KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE,\n\n    Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee;\n    A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia.\n    M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia.\n\n    VOL. IV\n\n    Eustochian Books, 46-54; Comment.\n\n    COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS\n\n    P.O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A.\n\n\n\n\n    Copyright, 1918, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie.\n    All Rights, including that of Translation, Reserved.\n\n    Entered at Stationers' Hall, by\n    George Bell and Sons, Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn, London.\n\n\n\n\nFIRST ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.\n\nWhether Animals May Be Termed Happy.[1]\n\n\nDEFINITIONS OF HAPPINESS.\n\n1. The (Aristotelian) ideal of living well and happiness are\n(practically) identical. Should we, on that account, grant even to\nanimals the privilege of achieving happiness? Why might we not say\nthat they live well, if it be granted them, in their lives, to follow\nthe course of nature, without obstacles? For if to live well consist\neither in pleasure (pleasant passions, as the Epicureans taught), or in\nrealizing one's own individual aim (the Stoic ideal), then this living\nwell is, in either case, possible for animals, who can both enjoy\npleasure, and accomplish their peculiar aim. Thus singing birds live a\nlife desirable for them, if they enjoy pleasure, and sing conformably\nto their nature. If further we should define happiness as achieving\nthe supreme purpose towards which nature aspires (the Stoic ideal), we\nshould, even in this case, admit that animals share in happiness when\nthey accomplish this supreme purpose. Then nature arouses in them no\nfurther desires, because their whole career is completed, and their\nlife is filled from beginning to end.\n\n\nWHETHER PLANTS MAY BE TERMED HAPPY.\n\nThere are no doubt some who may object to our admitting to happiness\nliving beings other than man. They might even point out that on this\nbasis happiness could not be refused to even the lowest beings, such\nas plants: for they also live, their life also has a purpose, by\nwhich they seek to fulfil their development. However, it would seem\nrather unreasonable to say, that living beings other than humans\ncannot possess happiness by this mere reason that to us they seem\npitiable. Besides, it would be quite possible to deny to plants what\nmay be predicated of other living beings, on the grounds that plants\nlack emotion. Some might hold they are capable of happiness, on the\nstrength of their possessing life, for a being that lives can live\nwell or badly; and in this way we could say that they possess or\nlack well-being, and bear, or do not bear fruits. If (as Aristippus\nthought), pleasure is the goal of man, and if to live well is\nconstituted by enjoying it, it would be absurd to claim that no living\nbeings other than man could live well. The same argument applies if we\ndefine happiness as (a state of imperturbable tranquility, by Epicurus\ncalled) ataraxy;[2] or as (the Stoic ideal,[3] of) living conformably\nto nature.\n\n\nLIVING WELL NEED NOT BE EXTENDED EVEN TO ALL ANIMALS.\n\n2. Those who deny the privilege of living well to plants, because these\nlack sensation, are not on that account obliged to grant it to all\nanimals. For, if sensation consist in the knowledge of the experienced\naffection, this affection must already be good before the occurrence of\nthe knowledge. For instance, the being must be in a state conformable\nto nature even though ignorant thereof. He must fulfil his proper\nfunction even when he does not know it. He must possess pleasure before\nperceiving it. Thus if, by the possession of this pleasure, the being\nalready possesses the Good, he thereby possesses even well-being. What\nneed then is there to join thereto sensation, unless indeed well-being\nbe defined as sensation and knowledge (of an affection or state of the\nsoul) rather than in the latter affection and state of the soul itself?\n\n\nEVEN THEY WHO DEFINE HAPPINESS AS SENSATION SEEK HIGHER HAPPINESS.\n\nThe Good would thus be reduced to no more than sensation, or the\nactualization of the sense-life. In this case, to possess it, it is\nsufficient to perceive irrespective of the content of that perception.\nOther persons might assert that goodness results from the union of\nthese two things: of the state of the soul, and of the knowledge\nthe soul has of it. If then the Good consist in the perception of\nsome particular state, we shall have to ask how elements which, by\nthemselves, are indifferent could, by their union, constitute the\ngood. Other theories are that the Good consists in some particular\nstate, or in possession of some particular disposition, and conscious\nenjoyment of the presence of the Good. These would, however, still have\nto answer the question whether, for good living, it be sufficient that\nthe being knows he possesses this state; or must he know not only that\nthis state is pleasant, but also that it is the Good? If then it be\nnecessary to realize that it is the Good, the matter is one no longer\nof the function of sensation, but of a faculty higher than the senses.\nTo live well, in this case, it will no longer be sufficient to possess\npleasure, but we shall have to know that pleasure is the Good. The\ncause of happiness will not be the presence of pleasure itself, but\nthe power of judging that pleasure is a good. Now judgment is superior\nto affection; it is reason or intelligence, while pleasure is only an\naffection, and what is irrational could not be superior to reason. How\nwould reason forget itself to recognize as superior what is posited\nin a genus opposed to it? These men who deny happiness to plants,\nwho explain it as some form of sensation, seems to us, in spite of\nthemselves, to be really seeking happiness of a higher nature, and to\nconsider it as this better thing which is found only in a completer\nlife.\n\n\nNOT EVEN REASON IS A SUFFICIENT EXPLANATION OF LIVING WELL.\n\nThere is a greater chance of being right in the opinion that happiness\nconsists in the reasonable life, instead of mere life, even though\nunited to sensation. Still even this theory must explain why happiness\nshould be the privilege of the reasonable animal. Should we add to\nthe idea of an animal the quality of being reasonable, because reason\nis more sagacious, more skilful in discovering, and in procuring the\nobjects necessary to satisfy the first needs of nature? Would you\nesteem reason just as highly if it were incapable of discovering,\nor procuring these objects? If we value reason only for the objects\nit aids us in getting, happiness might very well belong to the very\nirrational beings, if they are, without reason, able to procure\nthemselves the things necessary to the satisfaction of the first\nneeds of their nature. In this case, reason will be nothing more than\nan instrument. It will not be worth seeking out for itself, and its\nperfection, in which virtue has been shown to consist, will be of\nlittle importance. The opposite theory would be that reason does not\nowe its value to its ability to procure for us objects necessary to\nthe satisfaction of the first needs of nature, but that it deserves\nto be sought out for itself. But even here we would have to explain\nits function, its nature, and set forth how it becomes perfect. If it\nwere to be improvable, it must not be defined as the contemplation\nof sense-objects, for its perfection and essence (being) consist in\na different (and higher) function. It is not among the first needs\nof nature, nor among the objects necessary to the satisfaction of its\nneeds; it has nothing to do with them, being far superior. Otherwise,\nthese philosophers would be hard pressed to explain its value. Until\nthey discover some nature far superior to the class of objects with\nwhich they at present remain, they will have to remain where it suits\nthem to be, ignorant of what good living is, and both how to reach that\ngoal, and to what beings it is possible.\n\n\nHAPPINESS DEPENDS EXCLUSIVELY ON INTERIOR CHARACTERISTICS.\n\n3. Dismissing these theories, we return to our own definition of\nhappiness. We do not necessarily make life synonymous with happiness\nby attributing happiness to a living being. Otherwise, we would be\nimplying that all living beings can achieve it, and we would be\nadmitting to real complete enjoyment thereof all those who possessed\nthat union and identity which all living beings are naturally capable\nof possessing. Finally, it would be difficult to grant this privilege\nto the reasonable being, while refusing it to the brute; for both\nequally possess life. They should, therefore, be capable of achieving\nhappiness--for, on this hypothesis, happiness could be no more than a\nkind of life. Consequently, the philosophers who make it consist in the\nrational life, not in the life common to all beings, do not perceive\nthat they implicitly suppose that happiness is something different\nfrom life. They are then obliged to say that happiness resides in a\npure quality, in the rational faculty. But the subject (to which they\nshould refer happiness) is the rational life, since happiness can\nbelong only to the totality (of life joined to reason). They therefore,\nreally limit the life they speak of to a certain kind of life; not\nthat they have the right to consider these two kinds of life (life in\ngeneral, and rational life) as being ranked alike, as both members of\na single division would be, but another kind of distinction might be\nestablished between them, such as when we say that one thing is prior,\nand the other posterior. Since \"life\" may be understood in different\nsenses, and as it possesses different degrees, and since by mere verbal\nsimilarity life may be equally predicated of plants and of irrational\nanimals, and since its differences consist in being more or less\ncomplete, analogy demands a similar treatment of \"living well.\" If, by\nits life, a being be the image of some other being, by its happiness\nit will also be the image of the happiness of this other being. If\nhappiness be the privilege of complete life, the being that possesses a\ncomplete life will also alone possess happiness; for it possesses what\nis best since, in the order of these existences, the best is possession\nof the essence (being) and perfection of life. Consequently, the Good\nis not anything incidental, for no subject could owe its good to a\nquality that would be derived from elsewhere. What indeed could be\nadded to complete life, to render it excellent?\n\n\nTHE GOOD CONSISTS IN INTELLIGENCE.\n\nOur own definition of the Good, interested as we are not in its cause,\nbut in its essence, is that the perfect life, that is genuine and real,\nconsists in intelligence. The other kinds of life are imperfect. They\noffer no more than the image of life. They are not Life in its fulness\nand purity. As we have often said they are not life, rather than its\ncontrary. In one word, since all living beings are derived from one\nand the same Principle, and since they do not possess an equal degree\nof life, this principle must necessarily be the primary Life, and\nperfectness.\n\n\nHAPPINESS MUST BE SOMETHING HUMAN.\n\n4. If man be capable of possessing perfect Life, he is happy as soon as\nhe possesses it. If it were otherwise, if the perfect life pertained\nto the divinities alone, to them alone also would happiness belong.\nBut since we attribute happiness to men, we shall have to set forth\nin what that which procures it consists. I repeat, what results from\nour former considerations, namely, that man has perfect Life when,\nbesides the sense-life, he possesses reason and true intelligence.\nBut is man as such stranger to the perfect Life, and does he possess\nit as something alien (to his essential being)? No, for no man lacks\nhappiness entirely, either actually or even potentially. But shall we\nconsider happiness as a part of the man, and that he in himself is the\nperfect form of life? We had better think that he who is a stranger to\nthe perfect Life possesses only a part of happiness, as he possesses\nhappiness only potentially; but that he who possesses the perfect Life\nin actuality, and he who has succeeded in identifying himself with it,\nalone is happy. All the other things, no more than envelope him (as\nthe Stoics would say), and could not be considered as parts of him,\nsince they surround him in spite of himself. They would belong to him\nas parts of himself, if they were joined to him by the result of his\nwill. What is the Good for a man who finds himself in this condition?\nBy the perfect life which he possesses, he himself is his own good. The\nprinciple (the Good in itself) which is superior (to the perfect Life)\nis the cause of the good which is in him; for we must not confuse the\nGood in itself--and the good in man.\n\n\nWE KNOW WE HAVE REACHED HAPPINESS WHEN WE NO MORE DESIRE ANYTHING.\n\nThat the man who has achieved perfect Life possesses happiness is\nproved by his no longer desiring anything. What more could he desire?\nHe could not desire anything inferior; he is united to the best; he,\ntherefore, has fulness of life. If he be virtuous he is fully happy,\nand fully possesses the Good, for no good thing escapes him. What he\nseeks is sought only by necessity, less for him than for some of the\nthings which belong to him. He seeks it for the body that is united to\nhim; and though this body be endowed with life, what relates to his\nneeds is not characteristic of the real man. The latter knows it, and\nwhat he grants to his body, he grants without in any way departing\nfrom his own characteristic life. His happiness will, therefore, not\nbe diminished in adversity, because he continues to possess veritable\nlife. If he lose relatives or friends, he knows the nature of death,\nand besides those whom it strikes down know it also if they were\nvirtuous. Though he may allow himself to be afflicted by the fate of\nthese relatives or friends, the affliction will not reach the intimate\npart of his nature; the affliction will be felt only by that part of\nthe soul which lacks reason, and whose suffering the man will not share.\n\n\nMEN MUST SEEK THEIR HAPPINESS IN THAT OF EACH OF THE PARTS OF THEIR\nNATURE.\n\n5. It has often been objected that we should reckon with the bodily\npains, the diseases, the obstacles which may hinder action, cases of\nunconsciousness, which might result from certain philtres and diseases\n(as the Peripatetics objected[4]). Under these conditions, they say,\nthe sage could not live well, and be happy--without either mentioning\npoverty and lack of recognition. All these evils, not forgetting the\nfamous misfortunes of Priam,[5] justify serious objections. Indeed,\neven if the sage endured all these evils (as indeed he easily does),\nthey would none the less be contrary to his will; and happy life must\nnecessarily be one that conforms to our will. The sage is not only\na soul endowed with particular dispositions; the body also must be\ncomprised within his personality (as also thought the Pythagorean\nArchytas[6]). This assertion seems reasonable so far as the passions\nof the body are felt by the man himself, and as they suggest desires\nand aversions to him. If then pleasure be an element of happiness, how\ncould the man afflicted by the blows of fate and by pains still be\nhappy, even if he were virtuous? To be happy, the divinities need only\nto enjoy perfect life; but men, having their soul united to a lower\npart, must seek their happiness in the life of each of these two parts\nthat compose him, and not exclusively in one of the two, even though\nit were the higher. Indeed, as soon as one of them suffers, the other\none, in spite of its superiority, finds its actions hindered. Otherwise\nwe shall have to regard neither the body, nor the sensations that flow\nfrom it; and to seek only what by itself could suffice to procure\nhappiness, independently of the body.\n\n\nNECESSARY THINGS ARE THOSE WHOSE POSSESSION IS UNCONSCIOUS.\n\n6. If our exposition of the subject had defined happiness as exemption\nfrom pain, sickness, reverses, and great misfortunes, (we would\nhave implied that) it would be impossible for us to taste happiness\nwhile exposed to one of those evils. But if happiness consist in the\npossession of the real good, why should we forget this good to consider\nits accessories? Why, in the appreciation of this good, should we\nseek things which are not among the number of its elements? If it\nconsisted in a union of the true goods with those things which alone\nare necessary to our needs, or which are so called, even without being\nsuch, we should have to strive to possess the latter also. But as the\ngoal of man must be single and not manifold--for otherwise it would\nbe usual to say that he seeks his ends, rather than the more common\nexpression, his end--we shall have to seek only what is most high and\nprecious, what the soul somehow wishes to include. Her inclination and\nwill cannot aspire to anything which is not the sovereign good. Reason\nonly avoids certain evils, and seeks certain advantages, because it\nis provoked by their presence; but it is not so led by nature. The\nprincipal tendency of the soul is directed towards what is best; when\nshe possesses it, she is satisfied, and stops; only then does she enjoy\na life really conformable to her will. Speaking of will strictly,[7]\nand not with unjustifiable license, the task of the will is not to\nprocure things necessary to our needs (?) Of course we judge that it is\nsuitable to procure things that are necessary, as we in general avoid\nevils. But the avoiding of them is no aim desirable in itself; such\nwould rather be not to need to avoid them. This, for instance, occurs\nwhen one possesses health and is exempt from suffering. Which of these\nadvantages most attracts us? So long as we enjoy health, so long as we\ndo not suffer, it is little valued. Now advantages which, when present,\nhave no attraction for the soul, and add nothing to her happiness, and\nwhich, when absent, are sought as causes of the suffering arising from\nthe presence of their contraries, should reasonably be called necessity\nrather than goods, and not be reckoned among the elements of our goal.\nWhen they are absent and replaced by their contraries, our goal remains\njust what it was.\n\n\nEVILS WHICH THE WISE MAN CAN SUPPORT WITHOUT DISTURBANCE OF HIS\nHAPPINESS.\n\n7. Why then does the happy man desire to enjoy the presence of\nthese advantages, and the absence of their contraries? It must be\nbecause they contribute, not to his happiness, but to his existence;\nbecause their contraries tend to make him lose existence, hindering\nthe enjoyment of the good, without however removing it. Besides,\nhe who possesses what is best wishes to possess it purely, without\nany mixture. Nevertheless, when a foreign obstacle occurs, the good\nstill persists even in spite of this obstacle. In short, if some\naccident happen to the happy man against his will, his happiness\nis in no way affected thereby. Otherwise, he would change and lose\nhis happiness daily; as if, for instance, he had to mourn a son, or\nif he lost some of his possessions. Many events may occur against\nhis wish without disturbing him in the enjoyment of the good he has\nattained. It may be objected that it is the great misfortunes, and\nnot trifling accidents (which can disturb the happiness of the wise\nman). Nevertheless, in human things, is there any great enough not to\nbe scorned by him who has climbed to a principle superior to all, and\nwho no longer depends on lower things? Such a man will not be able to\nsee anything great in the favors of fortune, whatever they be, as in\nbeing king, in commanding towns, or peoples; in founding or building\ncities, even though he himself should receive that glory; he will\nattach no importance to the loss of his power, or even to the ruin\nof his fatherland. If he consider all that as a great evil, or even\nonly as an evil, he will have a ridiculous opinion. He will no longer\nbe a virtuous man; for, as Jupiter is my witness, he would be highly\nvaluing mere wood, or stones, birth, or death; while he should insist\non the incontestable truth that death is better than the corporeal\nlife (as held by Herodotus). Even though he were sacrificed, he would\nnot consider death any worse merely because it occurred at the feet\nof the altars. Being buried is really of small importance, for his\nbody will rot as well above as below ground (as thought Theodorus of\nCyrene).[8] Neither will he grieve at being buried without pomp and\nvulgar ostentation, and to have seemed unworthy of being placed in a\nmagnificent tomb. That would be smallness of mind. If he were carried\noff as a captive, he would still have a road open to leave life, in the\ncase that he should no longer be allowed to hope for happiness. (Nor\nwould he be troubled if the members of his family, such as sons (?) and\ndaughters (and female relatives?) were carried off into captivity. If\nhe had arrived to the end of his life without seeing such occurrences\n(we would indeed be surprised). Would he leave this world supposing\nthat such things cannot happen? Such an opinion would be absurd. Would\nhe not have realized that his own kindred were exposed to such dangers?\nThe opinion that such things could happen will not make him any less\nhappy. No, he will be happy even with that belief. He would still be so\neven should that occur; he will indeed reflect that such is the nature\nof this world, that one must undergo such accidents, and submit. Often\nperhaps men dragged into captivity will live better (than in liberty);\nand besides, if their captivity be insupportable, it is in their power\nto release themselves. If they remain, it is either because their\nreason so induces them--and then their lot cannot be too hard; or it\nis against the dictates of their reason, in which case they have none\nbut themselves to blame. The wise man, therefore, will not be unhappy\nbecause of the folly of his own people; he will not allow his lot to\ndepend on the happiness or misfortunes of other people.\n\n\nNO MISFORTUNE IS TOO GREAT TO BE CONQUERED BY VIRTUE.\n\n8. If the griefs that he himself undergoes are great, he will support\nthem as well as he can; if they exceed his power of endurance, they\nwill carry him off (as thought Seneca[9]). In either case, he will\nnot, in the midst of his sufferings, excite any pity: (ever master\nof his reason) he will not allow his own characteristic light to be\nextinguished. Thus the flame in the lighthouse continues to shine, in\nspite of the raging of the tempest, in spite of the violent blowing\nof the winds. (He should not be upset) even by loss of consciousness,\nor even if pain becomes so strong that its violence could almost\nannihilate him. If pain become more intense, he will decide as to\nwhat to do; for, under these circumstances, freedom of will is not\nnecessarily lost (for suicide remains possible, as thought Seneca[10]).\nBesides, we must realize that these sufferings do not present\nthemselves to the wise man, under the same light as to the common man;\nthat all these need not penetrate to the sanctuary of the man's life;\nwhich indeed happens with the greater part of pains, griefs and evils\nthat we see being suffered by others; it would be proof of weakness to\nbe affected thereby. A no less manifest mark of weakness is to consider\nit an advantage to ignore all these evils, and to esteem ourselves\nhappy that they happen only after death,[11] without sympathizing with\nthe fate of others, and thinking only to spare ourselves some grief.\nThis would be a weakness that we should eliminate in ourselves, not\nallowing ourselves to be frightened by the fear of what might happen.\nThe objection that it is natural to be afflicted at the misfortunes\nof those who surround us, meets the answer that, to begin with, it is\nnot so with every person; then, that it is part of the duty of virtue\nto ameliorate the common condition of human nature, and to raise it\nto what is more beautiful, rising above the opinions of the common\npeople. It is indeed beautiful not to yield to what the common people\nusually consider to be evils. We should struggle against the blows of\nfortune not by affected ignoring (of difficulties, like an ostrich),\nbut as a skilful athlete who knows that the dangers he is incurring\nare feared by certain natures, though a nature such as his bears them\neasily, seeing in them nothing terrible, or at least considering them\nterrifying only to children. Certainly, the wise man would not have\ninvited these evils; but on being overtaken by them he opposes to them\nthe virtue which renders the soul unshakable and impassible.\n\n\nWISDOM IS NONE THE LESS HAPPY FOR BEING UNCONSCIOUS OF ITSELF.\n\n9. It may further be objected that the wise man might lose\nconsciousness, if overwhelmed by disease, or the malice of magic.\nWould he still remain happy? Either he will remain virtuous, being\nonly fallen asleep; in which case he might continue to be happy, since\nno one claims he must lose happiness because of sleep, inasmuch as\nno reckoning of the time spent in this condition is kept, and as he\nis none the less considered happy for life. On the other hand, if\nunconsciousness be held to terminate virtue, the question at issue is\ngiven up; for, supposing that he continues to be virtuous, the question\nat issue was, whether he remain happy so long as he remains virtuous.\nIt might indeed still be objected that he cannot be happy if he remain\nvirtuous without feeling it, without acting in conformity with virtue.\nOur answer is that a man would not be any less handsome or healthy for\nbeing so unconsciously. Likewise, he would not be any less wise merely\nfor lack of consciousness thereof.\n\n\nTHOUGH HAPPINESS IS ACTUALIZED WISDOM WE DO NOT LOSE IT WHEN\nUNCONSCIOUS. WE DO NOT LOSE IT BECAUSE WE OURSELVES ARE ACTUALIZATIONS\nOF INTELLIGENCE.\n\nOnce more it may be objected that it is essential to wisdom to be\nself-conscious, for happiness resides only in actualized wisdom. This\nobjection would hold if reason and wisdom were incidentals. But if\nthe hypostatic substance of wisdom consist in an essence (being),\nor rather, in being itself, and if this being do not perish during\nsleep, nor during unconsciousness, if consequently the activity of\nbeing continue to subsist in him; if by its very nature this (being)\nceaselessly watch, then the virtuous man must even in this state (of\nsleep or unconsciousness), continue to exercise his activity. Besides,\nthis activity is ignored only by one part of himself, and not by\nhimself entirely. Thus during the operation of the actualization of\ngrowth,[12] the perception of its activity is not by his sensibility\ntransmitted to the rest of the man. If our personality were constituted\nby this actualization of growth, we would act simultaneously with\nit; but we are not this actualization, but that of the intellectual\nprinciple, and that is why we are active simultaneously with this\n(divine intellectual activity).\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE IS NOT DEPENDENT ON CONSCIOUSNESS.\n\n10. The reason that intelligence remains hidden is just because it\nis not felt; only by the means of this feeling can this activity be\nfelt; but why should intelligence cease to act (merely because it\nwas not felt)? On the other hand, why could the soul not have turned\nher activity towards intelligence before having felt or perceived\nit? Since (for intelligence) thinking and existence are identical,\nperception must have been preceded by some actualization. It seems\nimpossible for perception to arise except when thought reflects upon\nitself, and when the principle whose activity constitutes the life of\nthe soul, so to speak, turns backwards, and reflects, as the image of\nan object placed before a brilliant polished mirror reflects itself\ntherein. Likewise, if the mirror be placed opposite the object, there\nis no more image; and if the mirror be withdrawn or badly adjusted,\nthere is no more image, though the luminous object continue to act.\nLikewise, when that faculty of the soul which represents to us the\nimages of discursive reason and of intelligence is in a suitable\ncondition of calm, we get an intuition--that is, a somewhat sensual\nperception thereof--with the prior knowledge of the activity of the\nintelligence, and of discursive reason. When, however, this image\nis troubled by an agitation in the mutual harmony of the organs,\nthe discursive reason, and the intelligence continue to act without\nany image, and the thought does not reflect in the imagination.\nTherefore we shall have to insist that thought is accompanied by an\nimage without, nevertheless, being one itself. While we are awake,\nit often happens to us to perform praiseworthy things, to meditate\nand to act, without being conscious of these operations at the moment\nthat we produce them. When for instance we read something, we are not\nnecessarily self-conscious that we are reading, especially if our\nattention be fully centered on what we read. Neither is a brave man\nwho is performing a courageous deed, self-conscious of his bravery.\nThere are many other such cases. It would therefore seem that the\nconsciousness of any deed weakens its energy, and that when the action\nis alone (without that consciousness) it is in a purer, livelier and\nmore vital condition. When virtuous men are in that condition (of\nabsence of self-consciousness), their life is more intense because it\nconcentrates in itself instead of mingling with feeling.\n\n\nTHE ONLY OBJECT OF THE VIRTUOUS WILL IS THE CONVERSION OF THE SOUL\nTOWARDS HERSELF.\n\n11. It has sometimes been said that a man in such a condition does\nnot really live. (If such be their honest opinion), they must be told\nthat he does live, even if they be incapable of understanding his\nhappiness and his life. If this seem to them incredible, they should\nreflect whether their own admission that such a man lives and is\nvirtuous, does not imply that under those circumstances he is happy.\nNeither should they begin by supposing that he is annihilated, only\nlater to consider whether he be happy. Neither should they confine\nthemselves to externalities after having admitted that he turns his\nwhole attention on things that he bears within himself; in short, not\nto believe that the goal of his will inheres in external objects.\nIndeed, such considering of external objects as the goal of the will of\nthe virtuous man, would be tantamount to a denial of the very essence\n(being) of happiness; likewise, insisting that those are the objects he\ndesires. His wish would undoubtedly be that all men should be happy,\nand that none of them should suffer any evil; but, nevertheless, he is\nnone the less happy when that does not happen. Other people, again,\nwould say that it was unreasonable for the virtuous man to form such\nan (impossible) wish, since elimination of evils here below is out of\nthe question.[13] This, however, would constitute an admission of our\nbelief that the only goal of the virtuous man's will is the conversion\nof the soul towards herself.[14]\n\n\nTHE PLEASURES CLAIMED FOR THE VIRTUOUS MAN ARE OF A HIGHER KIND.\n\n12. We grant, however, that the pleasures claimed for the virtuous man\nare neither those sought by debauchees, nor those enjoyed by the body.\nThose pleasures could not be predicated of him without degrading his\nfelicity. Nor can we claim for him raptures of delight--for what would\nbe their use? It is sufficient to suppose that the virtuous man tastes\nthe pleasures attached to the presence of goods, pleasures which must\nconsist neither in motions, nor be accidental. He enjoys the presence\nof those (higher) goods because he is present to himself; from that\ntime on he lingers in a state of sweet serenity. The virtuous man,\ntherefore, is always serene, calm, and satisfied. If he be really\nvirtuous, his state cannot be troubled by any of the things that we\ncall evils. Those who in the virtuous life are seeking for pleasures of\nanother kind are actually seeking something else than the virtuous life.\n\n\nIN THE VIRTUOUS MAN THE PART THAT SUFFERS IS THE HIGHER; THEREFORE HE\nREALLY DOES NOT SUFFER AS DO THOSE WHO SUFFER CHIEFLY PHYSICALLY.\n\n13. The actions of the virtuous man could not be hindered by fortune,\nbut they may vary with the fluctuations of fortune. All will be equally\nbeautiful, and, perhaps, so much the more beautiful as the virtuous\nman will find himself placed amidst more critical circumstances. Any\nacts that concern contemplation, which relate to particular things,\nwill be such that the wise man will be able to produce them, after\nhaving carefully sought and considered what he is to do. Within\nhimself he finds the most infallible of the rules of conduct, a rule\nthat will never fail him, even were he within the oft-discussed bull\nof Phalaris. It is useless for the vulgar man to repeat, even twice\nor thrice,[15] that such a fate is sweet; for if a man were to utter\nthose words, they are uttered by that very (animal) part that undergoes\nthose tortures. On the contrary, in the virtuous man, the part that\nsuffers is different from that which dwells within itself, and which,\nwhile necessarily residing within itself, is never deprived of the\ncontemplation of the universal Good.\n\n\nMAN BECOMES WISE BY ESTABLISHING A SPIRITUAL PREPONDERANCE.\n\n14. Man, and specially the virtuous man, is constituted not by the\ncomposite of soul and body,[16] as is proved by the soul's power to\nseparate herself from the body,[17] and to scorn what usually are\ncalled \"goods.\" It would be ridiculous to relate happiness to the\nanimal part of man, since happiness consists in living well, and living\nwell, being an actualization, belongs to the soul, exclusively. Not\neven does it extend to the entire soul, for happiness does not extend\nto that part of the soul concerned with growth, having nothing in\ncommon with the body, neither as to its size, nor its possible good\ncondition. Nor does it depend on the perfection of the senses, because\ntheir development, as well as that of the organs, weights man down,\nand makes him earthy. Doing good will be made easier by establishing a\nsort of counter-weight, weakening the body, and taming its motions, so\nas to show how much the real man differs from the foreign things that\n(to speak as do the Stoics), surround him. However much the (earthy)\ncommon man enjoy beauty, greatness, wealth, command over other men,\nand earthly luxuries, he should not be envied for the deceptive\npleasure he takes in all these advantages. To begin with, the wise\nman will probably not possess them; but if he do possess them, he\nwill voluntarily diminish them, if he take due care of himself. By\nvoluntary negligence he will weaken and disfigure the advantages of\nhis body. He will abdicate from dignities. While preserving the health\nof his body, he will not desire to be entirely exempt from disease and\nsufferings. If he never experienced these evils, he will wish to make\na trial of them during his youth. But when he has arrived at old age,\nhe will no longer wish to be troubled either by pains, or pleasures,\nor anything sad or agreeable that relates to the body; so as not to be\nforced to give it his attention. He will oppose the sufferings he will\nhave to undergo with a firmness that will never forsake him. He will\nnot believe that his happiness is increased by pleasures, health or\nrest, nor destroyed nor diminished by their contraries. As the former\nadvantages do not augment his felicity, how could their loss diminish\nit?\n\n\nTWO WISE MEN WILL BE EQUALLY HAPPY, IN SPITE OF DIFFERENCES OF FORTUNE.\n\n15. Let us now imagine two wise men, the first of whom possesses\neverything that heart can wish for, while the other is in a contrary\nposition. Shall they be said to be equally happy? Yes, if they be\nequally wise. Even if the one possessed physical beauty, and all\nthe other advantages that do not relate either to wisdom, virtue,\ncontemplation of the good, or perfect life; what would be the use of\nall that since he who possesses all these advantages is not considered\nas really being happier than he who lacks them? Such wealth would\nnot even help a flute-player to accomplish his object! We, however,\nconsider the happy man only from the standpoint of the weakness of our\nmind, considering as serious and frightful what the really happy man\nconsiders indifferent. For the man could not be wise, nor consequently\nhappy, so long as he has not succeeded in getting rid of all these\nvain ideas, so long as he has not entirely transformed himself, so\nlong as he does not within himself contain the confidence that he is\nsheltered from all evil. Only then will he live without being troubled\nby any fear. The only thing that should affect him, would be the fear\nthat he is not an expert in wisdom, that he is only partly wise. As to\nunforeseen fears that might get the better of him before he had had\nthe time to reflect, during a moment of abstraction of attention, the\nwise man will hasten to turn them away, treating that which within\nhimself becomes agitated as a child that has lost its way through\npain. He will tranquilize it either by reason, or even by a threat,\nthough uttered without passion. Thus the mere sight of a worthy person\nsuffices to calm a child. Besides, the wise man will not hold aloof\neither from friendship nor gratitude. He will treat his own people as\nhe treats himself; giving to his friends as much as to his own person;\nand he will give himself up to friendship, without ceasing to exercise\nintelligence therein.\n\n\nTHE WISE MAN REMAINS UNATTACHED.\n\n16. If the virtuous man were not located in this elevated life of\nintelligence; if on the contrary he were supposed to be subject to\nthe blows of fate, and if we feared that they would overtake him, our\nideal would no longer be that of the virtuous man such as we outline\nit; we would be considering a vulgar man, mingled with good and evil,\nof whom a life equally mingled with good and evil would be predicated.\nEven such a man might not easily be met with, and besides, if we did\nmeet him, he would not deserve to be called a wise man; for there would\nbe nothing great about him, neither the dignity of wisdom, nor the\npurity of good. Happiness, therefore, is not located in the life of\nthe common man. Plato rightly says that you have to leave the earth to\nascend to the good, and that to become wise and happy, one should turn\none's look towards the only Good, trying to acquire resemblance to Him,\nand to live a life conformable to Him.[18] That indeed must suffice\nthe wise man to reach his goal. To the remainder he should attach no\nmore value than to changes of location, none of which can add to his\nhappiness. If indeed he pay any attention to external things scattered\nhere and there around him, it is to satisfy the needs of his body so\nfar as he can. But as he is something entirely different from the\nbody, he is never disturbed at having to leave it; and he will abandon\nit whenever nature will have indicated the time. Besides, he always\nreserves to himself the right to deliberate about this (time to leave\nthe world by suicide).[19] Achievement of happiness will indeed be his\nchief goal; nevertheless, he will also act, not only in view of his\nultimate goal, or himself, but on the body to which he is united. He\nwill care for this body, and will sustain it as long as possible. Thus\na musician uses his lyre so long as he can; but as soon as it is beyond\nusing, he repairs it, or abandons playing the lyre, because he now can\ndo without it. Leaving it on the ground, he will look at it almost with\nscorn, and will sing without its accompaniment. Nevertheless it will\nnot have been in vain that this lyre will have been originally given to\nhim; for he will often have profited by its use.\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD ENNEAD, BOOK TWO.\n\nOf Providence.[20]\n\n\nEPICURUS TAUGHT CHANCE AND THE GNOSTICS AN EVIL CREATOR.\n\n1. When Epicurus[21] derives the existence and constitution of the\nuniverse from automatism and chance, he commits an absurdity, and\nstultifies himself. That is self-evident, though the matter have\nelsewhere been thoroughly demonstrated.[22] But (if the world do\nnot owe its origin to chance) we will be compelled to furnish an\nadequate reason for the existence and creation of all these beings.\nThis (teleological) question deserves the most careful consideration.\nThings that seem evil do indeed exist, and they do suggest doubts about\nuniversal Providence; so that some (like Epicurus[23]) insist there\nis no providence, while others (like the Gnostics[24]), hold that the\ndemiurgic creator is evil. The subject, therefore, demands thorough\ninvestigation of its first principles.\n\n\nPARTICULAR AND UNIVERSAL PROVIDENCE ASSUMED AS PREMISES.\n\nLet us leave aside this individual providence, which consists in\ndeliberating before an action, and in examining whether we should or\nshould not do something, or whether we should give or not give it. We\nshall also assume the existence of the universal Providence, and from\nthis principle we shall deduce the consequences.\n\n\nPROVIDENCE IS NOT PARTICULAR BECAUSE THE WORLD HAD NO BEGINNING.\n\nWe would acknowledge the existence of a particular Providence, such as\nwe mentioned above, if we thought that the world had had a beginning of\nexistence, and had not existed since all eternity. By this particular\nProvidence we mean a recognition, in the divinity, of a kind of\nprevision and reasoning (similar to the reasoning and prevision of the\nartist who, before carrying out a work, deliberates on each of the\nparts that compose it[25]). We would suppose that this prevision and\nreasoning were necessary to determine how the universe could have been\nmade, and on what conditions it should have been the best possible.\nBut as we hold that the world's existence had no beginning, and that\nit has existed since all time, we can, in harmony with reason and our\nown views, affirm that universal Providence consists in this that\nthe universe is conformed to Intelligence, and that Intelligence is\nprior to the universe, not indeed in time--for the existence of the\nIntelligence did not temporarily precede that of the universe--but (in\nthe order of things), because, by its nature, Intelligence precedes the\nworld that proceeds from it, of which it is the cause, type[26] and\nmodel, and cause of unchanged perpetual persistence.\n\n\nHOW INTELLIGENCE CONTINUES TO MAKE THE WORLD SUBSIST.\n\nThis is how Intelligence continues to make the world subsist. Pure\nIntelligence and Being in itself constitute the genuine (intelligible)\nWorld that is prior to everything, which has no extension, which\nis weakened by no division, which has no imperfection, even in its\nparts, for none of its parts are separated from its totality. This\nworld is the universal Life and Intelligence. Its unity is both\nliving and intelligent. In it each part reproduces the whole, its\ntotality consists of a perfect harmony, because nothing within it is\nseparate, independent, or isolated from anything else. Consequently,\neven if there were mutual opposition, there would be no struggle.\nBeing everywhere one and perfect, the intelligible World is permanent\nand immutable, for it contains no internal reaction of one opposite\non another. How could such a reaction take place in this world, since\nnothing is lacking in it? Why should Reason produce another Reason\nwithin it, and Intelligence produce another Intelligence[27] merely\nbecause it was capable of doing so? If so, it would not, before having\nproduced, have been in a perfect condition; it would produce and enter\nin motion because it contained something inferior.[28] But blissful\nbeings are satisfied to remain within themselves, persisting within\ntheir essence. A multiple action compromises him who acts by forcing\nhim to issue from himself. The intelligible World is so blissful that\neven while doing nothing it accomplishes great things, and while\nremaining within itself it produces important operations.\n\n\nTHE SENSE-WORLD CREATED NOT BY REFLECTION, BUT BY SELF-NECESSITY.\n\n2. The sense-world draws its existence from that intelligible World.\nThe sense-world, however, is not really unitary; it is indeed multiple,\nand divided into a plurality of parts which are separated from each\nother, and are mutually foreign. Not love reigns there, but hate,\nproduced by the separation of things which their state of imperfection\nrenders mutually inimical. None of its parts suffices to itself.\nPreserved by something else, it is none the less an enemy of the\npreserving Power. The sense-world has been created, not because the\ndivinity reflected on the necessity of creating, but because (in the\nnature of things) it was unavoidable that there be a nature inferior to\nthe intelligible World, which, being perfect, could not have been the\nlast degree of existence.[29] It occupied the first rank, it had great\npower, that was universal and capable of creating without deliberation.\nIf it had had to deliberate, it would not, by itself, have expressed\nthe power of creation. It would not have possessed it essentially.\nIt would have resembled an artisan, who, himself, does not have the\npower of creating, but who acquires it by learning how to work. By\ngiving something of itself to matter, Intelligence produced everything\nwithout issuing from its rest or quietness. That which it gives is\nReason, because reason is the emanation of Intelligence, an emanation\nthat is as durable as the very existence of Intelligence. In a seminal\nreason all the parts exist in an united condition, without any of\nthem struggling with another, without disagreement or hindrance. This\nReason then causes something of itself to pass into the corporeal mass,\nwhere the parts are separated from each other, and hinder each other,\nand destroy each other. Likewise, from this unitary Intelligence,\nand from the Reason that proceeds thence, issues this universe whose\nparts are separate and distinct from each other, some of the parts\nbeing friendly and allied, while some are separate and inimical. They,\ntherefore, destroy each other, either voluntarily or involuntarily,\nand through this destruction their generation is mutually operated.\nIn such a way did the divinity arrange their actions and experiences\nthat all concur in the formation of a single harmony,[30] in which\neach utters its individual note because, in the whole, the Reason that\ndominates them produces order and harmony. The sense-world does not\nenjoy the perfection of Intelligence and Reason: it only participates\ntherein. Consequently, the sense-world needed harmony, because it was\nformed by the concurrence of Intelligence and necessity.[31] Necessity\ndrives the sense-world to evil, and to what is irrational, because\nnecessity itself is irrational; but Intelligence dominates necessity.\nThe intelligible World is pure reason; none other could be such. The\nworld, which is born of it, had to be inferior to it, and be neither\npure reason, nor mere matter; for order would have been impossible\nin unmingled matter. The sense-world, therefore, is a mixture of\nmatter and Reason; those are the elements of which it is composed. The\nprinciple from which this mixture proceeds, and which presides over\nthe mixture, is the Soul. Neither must we imagine that this presiding\nover the mixture constitutes an effort for the Soul; for she easily\nadministers the universe, by her presence.[32]\n\n\nTHE WORLD SHOULD NOT BE BLAMED FOR ITS IMPERFECTIONS.\n\n3. For not being beautiful this world should not be blamed; neither\nfor not being the best of corporeal worlds; nor should the Cause,\nfrom which it derives its existence, be accused. To begin with,\nthis world exists necessarily. It is not the work of a reflecting\ndetermination. It exists because a superior Being naturally begets it\nin His own likeness. Even if its creation were the result of reflective\ndetermination, it could not shame its author; for the divinity made the\nuniverse beautiful, complete and harmonious. Between the greater and\nlesser parts He introduced a fortunate accord. A person who would blame\nthe totality of the world from consideration of its parts is therefore\nunjust. He should examine the parts in their relation to the totality,\nand see whether they be in accord and in harmony with it. Then the\nstudy of the whole should continue down to that of the least details.\nOtherwise criticism does not apply to the world as a whole, but only\nto some of its parts. For instance, we well know how admirable, as\na whole, is man; yet we grant that there would be justification for\ncriticism of a separate hair, or toe, or some of the vilest animals, or\nThersites, as a specimen of humanity.\n\n\nTHE WORLD'S TESTIMONY TO ITS CREATOR.\n\nSince the work under consideration is the entire world, we would, were\nour intelligence attentively to listen to its voice, hear it exclaim\nas follows: \"It is a divinity who has made Me, and from the divinity's\nhands I issued complete, including all animated beings, entire and\nself-sufficient, standing in need of nothing, since everything is\ncontained within Me; plants, animals, the whole of Nature, the\nmultitude of the divinities, the troupe of guardians, excellent souls,\nand the men who are happy because of virtue. This refers not only\nto the earth, which is rich in plants and animals of all kinds; the\npower of the Soul extends also to the sea. Nor are the air and entire\nheaven inanimate. They are the seat of all the excellent Souls, which\ncommunicate life to the stars, and which preside over the circular\nrevolution of the heaven, a revolution that is eternal and full of\nharmony, which imitates the movement of Intelligence by the eternal and\nregular movement of the stars around one and the same centre, because\nheaven has no need to seek anything outside of itself. All the beings\nI contain aspire to the Good; all achieve Him, each according to its\npotentiality. Indeed, from the Good depends the entire heaven,[33]\nmy whole Soul, the divinities that inhabit my various parts, all the\nanimals, all the plants, and all my apparently inanimate beings. In\nthis aggregation of beings some seem to participate only in existence,\nothers in life, others in sensation, others in intelligence, while\nstill others seem to participate in all the powers of life at one\ntime;[34] for we must not expect equal faculties for unequal things, as\nfor instance sight for the fingers, as it is suitable to the eye; while\nthe finger needs something else; it needs its own form, and has to\nfulfil its function.\"\n\n\nOPPOSITION AMONG INANIMATE BEINGS.\n\n4. We should not be surprised at water extinguishing fire, or at\nfire destroying some other element. Even this element was introduced\nto existence by some other element, and it is not surprising that\nit should be destroyed, since it did not produce itself, and was\nintroduced to existence only by the destruction of some other element\n(as thought Heraclitus and the Stoics[35]). Besides, the extinguished\nfire is replaced by another active fire. In the incorporeal heaven,\neverything is permanent; in the visible heaven, the totality, as well\nas the more important and the most essential parts, are eternal.\nThe souls, on passing through different bodies, (by virtue of their\ndisposition[36]), themselves change on assuming some particular form;\nbut, when they can do so, they stand outside of generation, remaining\nunited to the universal Soul. The bodies are alive by their form, and\nby the whole that each of them constitutes (by its union with a soul),\nsince they are animals, and since they nourish themselves; for in\nthe sense-world life is mobile, but in the intelligible world it is\nimmobile. Immobility necessarily begat movement, self-contained life\nwas compelled to produce other life, and calm being naturally exhaled\nvibrating spirit.\n\n\nOPPOSITION AMONG ANIMALS.\n\nMutual struggle and destruction among animals is necessary, because\nthey are not born immortal. Their origin is due to Reason's embracing\nall of matter, and because this Reason possessed within itself all the\nthings that subsist in the intelligible World. From what other source\nwould they have arisen?\n\n\nOPPOSITION AMONG HUMANS.\n\nThe mutual wrongs of human beings may however very easily all be caused\nby the desire of the Good (as had been thought by Democritus[37]).\nBut, having strayed because of their inability to reach Him, they\nturned against each other. They are punished for it by the degradation\nthese evil actions introduced within their souls, and, after death,\nthey are driven into a lower place, for none can escape the Order\nestablished by the Law of the universe (or, the law of Adrastea[38]).\nOrder does not, as some would think, exist because of disorder, nor\nlaw on account of lawlessness; in general, it is not the better that\nexists on account of the worse. On the contrary, disorder exists only\non account of order, lawlessness on account of law, irrationality on\naccount of reason, because order, law and reason, such as they are here\nbelow, are only imitations (or, borrowings). It is not that the better\nproduced the worse, but that the things which need participation in the\nbetter are hindered therefrom, either by their nature, by accident,\nor by some other obstacle (as Chrysippus thought that evils happen\nby consequence or concomitance). Indeed, that which succeeds only in\nacquiring a borrowed order, may easily fail to achieve it, either\nbecause of some fault inherent in its own nature, or by some foreign\nobstacle. Things hinder each other unintentionally, by following\ndifferent goals. Animals whose actions are free incline sometimes\ntowards good, sometimes towards evil (as the two horses in Plato's\nPhaedrus).[39] Doubtless, they do not begin by inclining towards evil;\nbut as soon as there is the least deviation at the origin, the further\nthe advance in the wrong road, the greater and more serious does the\ndivergence become. Besides, the soul is united to a body, and from\nthis union necessarily arises appetite. When something impresses us at\nfirst sight, or unexpectedly, and if we do not immediately repress the\nmotion which is produced within us, we allow ourselves to be carried\naway by the object towards which our inclination drew us. But the\npunishment follows the fault, and it is not unjust that the soul that\nhas contracted some particular nature should undergo the consequences\nof her disposition (by passing into a body which conforms thereto).\nHappiness need not be expected for those who have done nothing to\ndeserve it. The good alone obtain it; and that is why the divinities\nenjoy it.\n\n\nLACK OF HAPPINESS SHOULD BE BLAMED ON THE SOUL THAT DOES NOT DESERVE IT.\n\n5. If then, even here below, souls enjoy the faculty of arriving at\nhappiness, we should not accuse the constitution of the universe\nbecause some souls are not happy; the fault rather lies with their\nweakness, which hinders them from struggling courageously enough in\nthe career where prizes are offered to virtue. Why indeed should we\nbe astonished that the spirits which have not made themselves divine\nshould not enjoy divine life? Poverty and diseases are of no importance\nto the good, and they are useful to the evil (as thought Theognis).[40]\nBesides, we are necessarily subject to diseases, because we have a\nbody. Then all these accidents are not useless for the order and\nexistence of the universe. Indeed, when a being is dissolved into its\nelements, the Reason of the universe uses it to beget other beings,\nfor the universal Reason embraces everything within its sphere of\nactivity. Thus when the body is disorganized, and the soul is softened\nby her passions, then the body, overcome by sickness, and the soul,\novercome by vice, are introduced into another series and order. There\nare things, like poverty and sickness, which benefit the persons who\nundergo them. Even vice contributes to the perfection of the universe,\nbecause it furnishes opportunity for the exercise of the divine\njustice. It serves other purposes also; for instance, it increases the\nvigilance of souls, and excites the mind and intelligence to avoid the\npaths of perdition; it also emphasizes the value of virtue by contrast\nwith the evils that overtake the wicked. Of course, such utilities\nare not the cause of the existence of evils; we only mean that, since\nevils exist, the divinity made use of them to accomplish His purposes.\nIt would be the characteristic of a great power to make even evils\npromote the fulfilment of its purposes, to cause formless things to\nassist in the production of forms. In short, we assert that evil is\nonly an omission or failure of good. Now a coming short of good must\nnecessarily exist in the beings here below, because in them good is\nmingled with other things; for this thing to which the good is allied\ndiffers from the good, and thus produces the lack of good. That is why\n\"it is impossible for evil to be destroyed\":[41] because things are\nsuccessively inferior, relatively to the nature of the absolute Good;\nand because, being different from the Good from which they derive their\nexistence, they have become what they are by growing more distant from\ntheir principle.\n\n\nIN SPITE OF APPARENT MISFORTUNE TO THE GOOD NO HARM CAN HAPPEN TO THEM.\n\n6. It is constantly objected that fortune maltreats the good, and\nfavors the evil in opposition to the agreement that ought to exist\nbetween virtue and happiness. The true answer to this is that no\nharm can happen to the righteous man, and no good to the vicious\nman.[42] Other objectors ask why one man is exposed to what is contrary\nto nature, while the other obtains what conforms thereto. How can\ndistributive justice be said to obtain in this world? If, however, the\nobtaining of what conforms to nature do not increase the happiness of\nthe virtuous man, and if being exposed to what is contrary to nature\ndo not diminish the wickedness of the vicious man, of what importance\n(as thought Plato[43]), are either of these conditions? Neither will it\nmatter if the vicious man be handsome, or the virtuous man ugly.\n\n\nTHE SLAVERY OF THE GOOD AND VICTORY OF THE EVIL SEEM TO ACCUSE\nPROVIDENCE.\n\nFurther objections assert that propriety, order and justice demand the\ncontrary of the existing state of affairs in the world, and that we\ncould expect no less from a Providence that was wise. Even if it were\na matter of moment to virtue or vice, it is unsuitable that the wicked\nshould be the masters, and chiefs of state, and that the good should\nbe slaves; for a bad prince commits the worst crimes. Moreover, the\nwicked conquer in battles, and force their prisoners to undergo the\nextremities of torments. How could such facts occur if indeed a divine\nProvidence be in control? Although indeed in the production of some\nwork (of art), it be especially the totality that claims attention,\nnevertheless, the parts must also obtain their due, especially when\nthey are animated, living and reasonable; it is just that divine\nProvidence should extend to everything, especially inasmuch as its\nduty is precisely to neglect nothing. In view of these objections we\nshall be forced to demonstrate that really everything here below is\ngood, if we continue to insist that the sense-world depends on supreme\nIntelligence, and that its power penetrates everywhere.\n\n\nPERFECTION MUST NOT BE SOUGHT IN THINGS MINGLED WITH MATTER.\n\n7. To begin with, we must remark that to show that all is good in the\nthings mingled with matter (and therefore of sense), we must not expect\nto find in them the whole perfection of the World which is not soiled\nby matter, and is intelligible; nor should we expect to find in that\nwhich holds the second rank characteristics of that which is of the\nfirst. Since the world has a body, we must grant that this body will\nhave influence on the totality, and expect no more than that Reason\nwill give it that which this mixed nature was capable of receiving.\nFor instance, if we were to contemplate the most beautiful man here\nbelow, we would be wrong in believing that he was identical with the\nintelligible Man, and inasmuch as he was made of flesh, muscles and\nbones, we would have to be satisfied with his having received from\nhis creator all the perfection that could be communicated to him to\nembellish these bones, muscles and flesh, and to make the (\"seminal)\nreason\" in him predominate over the matter within him.\n\n\nEVIL IS ONLY A LOWER FORM OF GOOD.\n\nGranting these premises, we may start out on an explanation of the\nabove mentioned difficulties. For in the world we will find remarkable\ntraces of the Providence and divine Power from which it proceeds.\nLet us take first, the actions of souls who do evil voluntarily; the\nactions of the wicked who, for instance, harm virtuous men, or other\nmen equally evil. Providence need not be held responsible for the\nwickedness of these souls. The cause should be sought in the voluntary\ndeterminations of those souls themselves. For we have proved that the\nsouls have characteristic motions, and that while here below they are\nnot pure, but rather are animals (as would naturally be the case with\nsouls united to bodies).[44] Now, it is not surprising that, finding\nthemselves in such a condition, they would live conformably to that\ncondition.[45] Indeed, it is not the formation of the world that made\nthem descend here below. Even before the world existed, they were\nalready disposed to form part of it, to busy themselves with it, to\ninfuse it with life, to administer it, and in it to exert their power\nin a characteristic manner, either by presiding over its (issues),\nand by communicating to it something of their power, or by descending\ninto it, or by acting in respect to the world each in its individual\nmanner.[46] The latter question, however, does not refer to the subject\nwe are now considering; here it will be sufficient to show that,\nhowever these circumstances occur, Providence is not to be blamed.\n\n\nIT IS A MATTER OF FAITH THAT PROVIDENCE EMBRACES EVERYTHING HERE BELOW,\nEVEN THE MISFORTUNES OF THE JUST.\n\nBut how shall we explain the difference that is observed between the\nlot of the good and the evil? How can it occur that the former are\npoor, while others are rich, and possess more than necessary to satisfy\ntheir needs, being even powerful, and governing cities and nations?\n(The Gnostics and Manicheans) think that the sphere of activity of\nProvidence does not extend down to the earth.[47] No! For all of the\nrest (of this world) conforms to (universal) Reason, inasmuch as\nanimals and plants participate in Reason, Life and Soul. (The Gnostic)\nwill answer that if Providence do extend to this earth, it does not\npredominate therein. As the world is but a single organism, to advance\nsuch an objection is the part of somebody who would assert that the\nhead and face of man were produced by Nature, and that reason dominated\ntherein, while the other members were formed by other causes, such as\nchance or necessity, and that they were evil either on this account, or\nbecause of the importance of Nature. Wisdom and piety, however, would\nforbid the admission that here below not everything was well, blaming\nthe operation of Providence.\n\n\nHOW SENSE-OBJECTS ARE NOT EVIL.\n\n8. It remains for us to explain how sense-objects are good and\nparticipate in the (cosmic) Order; or at least, that they are not\nevil. In every animal, the higher parts, such as the face and head,\nare the most beautiful, and are not equalled by the middle or lower\nparts. Now men occupy the middle and lower region of the universe. In\nthe higher region we find the heaven containing the divinities; it is\nthey that fill the greater part of the world, with the vast sphere\nwhere they reside. The earth occupies the centre and seems to be one\nof the stars. We are surprised at seeing injustice reigning here below\nchiefly because man is regarded as the most venerable and wisest being\nin the universe. Nevertheless, this being that is so wise occupies but\nthe middle place between divinities and animals, at different times\ninclining towards the former or the latter. Some men resemble the\ndivinities, and others resemble animals; but the greater part continue\nmidway between them.\n\n\nTHE GOOD MAY NEGLECT NATURAL LAWS WHICH CARRY REWARDS.\n\nIt is those men who occupy this middle place who are forced to undergo\nthe rapine and violence of depraved men, who resemble wild beasts.\nThough the former are better than those whose violence they suffer,\nthey are, nevertheless, dominated by them because of inferiority in\nother respects, lacking courage, or preparedness.[48] It would be no\nmore than a laughing matter if children who had strengthened their\nbodies by exercise, while leaving their souls inviolate in ignorance,\nshould in physical struggle conquer those of their companions, who\nhad exercised neither body nor soul; if they stole their food or soft\nclothing. No legislator could hinder the vanquished from bearing the\npunishment of their cowardliness and effeminacy, if, neglecting the\ngymnastic exercises which had been taught them, they did not, by their\ninertia, effeminacy and laziness, fear becoming fattened sheep fit to\nbe the prey of wolves? They who commit this rapine and violence are\npunished therefor first because they thereby become wolves and noxious\nbeasts, and later because (in this or some subsequent existence) they\nnecessarily undergo the consequences of their evil actions (as thought\nPlato[49]). For men who here below have been evil do not die entirely\n(when their soul is separated from their bodies). Now in the things\nthat are regulated by Nature and Reason, that which follows is always\nthe result of that which precedes; evil begets evil, just as good\nbegets good. But the arena of life differs from a gymnasium, where the\nstruggles are only games. Therefore, the above-mentioned children which\nwe divided into two classes, after having grown up in ignorance, must\nprepare to fight, and take up arms, an display more energy than in the\nexercises of the gymnasium. As some, however, are well armed, while the\nothers are not, the first must inevitably triumph. The divinity must\nnot fight for the cowardly; for the (cosmic) law decrees that in war\nlife is saved by valor, and not by prayers.[50] Nor is it by prayers\nthat the fruits of the earth are obtained; they are produced only by\nlabor. Nor can one have good health without taking care of it. If\nthe evil cultivate the earth better, we should not complain of their\nreaping a better harvest.[51] Besides, in the ordinary conduct of life,\nit is ridiculous to listen only to one's own caprice, doing nothing\nthat is prescribed by the divinities, limiting oneself exclusively to\ndemanding one's conservation, without carrying out any of the actions\non which (the divinities) willed that our preservation should depend.\n\n\nDEATH IS BETTER THAN DISHARMONY WITH THE LAWS OF THE UNIVERSE.\n\nIndeed it would be better to be dead than to live thus in contradiction\nwith the laws that rule the universe. If, when men are in opposition\nto these laws, divine Providence preserved peace in the midst of\nall follies and vices, it would deserve the charge of negligence in\nallowing the prevalence of evil. The evil rule only because of the\ncowardice of those who obey them; this is juster than if it were\notherwise.\n\n\nPROVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO THE POINT OF SUPPRESSING OUR OWN\nINITIATIVE.\n\n9. Nor should the sphere of Providence be extended to the point of\nsuppressing our own action. For if Providence did everything, and\nProvidence alone existed, it would thereby be annihilated. To what,\nindeed, would it apply? There would be nothing but divinity! It\nis indeed incontestable that divinity exists, and that its sphere\nextends over other beings--but divinity does not suppress the latter.\nFor instance, divinity approaches man, and preserves in him what\nconstitutes humanity; that is, divinity makes him live in conformity\nto the law of Providence, and makes him fulfil the commandments of\nthat law. Now, this law decrees that the life of men who have become\nvirtuous should be good both here below and after their death; and\nthat the evil should meet an opposite fate. It would be unreasonable\nto expect the existence of men who forget themselves to come and save\nthe evil, even if the latter addressed prayers to the divinity. Neither\nshould we expect the divinities to renounce their blissful existence to\ncome and administer our affairs; nor that the virtuous men, whose life\nis holy and superior to human conditions, should be willing to govern\nthe wicked. The latter never busy themselves with promoting the good\nto the governing of other men, and themselves to be good (as thought\nPlato[52]). They are even jealous of the man who is good by himself;\nthere would indeed be more good people if virtuous men were chosen as\nchiefs.\n\n\nTHOUGH MEN ARE ONLY MEDIOCRE THEY ARE NEVER ABANDONED BY PROVIDENCE.\n\nMan is therefore not the best being in the universe; according to his\nchoice he occupies an intermediate rank. In the place he occupies,\nhowever, he is not abandoned by Providence, which ever leads him\nback to divine things by the numerous means it possesses to cause\nthe triumph of virtue. That is the reason why men have never lost\nrationality, and why, to some degree, they always participate in\nwisdom, intelligence, art, and the justice that regulates their mutual\nrelations. Even when one wrongs another, he is still given credit\nfor acting in justice to himself, and he is treated according to his\ndeserts.[53] Besides, man, as a creature, is handsome, as handsome as\npossible, and, by the part he plays in the universe, he is superior to\nall the animals that dwell here below.\n\n\nIT IS RIDICULOUS TO COMPLAIN OF THE LOWER NATURE OF ANIMALS.\n\nNo one in his senses would complain of the existence of animals\ninferior to man, if, besides, they contribute towards the embellishment\nof the universe. Would it not be ridiculous to complain that some\nof them bite men, as if the latter had an imprescriptible right to\ncomplete security? The existence of these animals is necessary; it\nprocures us advantages both evident and still unknown, but which will\nbe revealed in the course of time. Thus there is nothing useless\nin animals, either in respect to themselves, or to man.[54] It is,\nbesides, ridiculous to complain because many animals are wild, when\nthere are even men who are such; what should surprise us most is that\nmany animals are not submissive to man, and defend themselves against\nhim.[55]\n\n\nIF UNJUST ACTS ARE PRODUCED ASTROLOGICALLY THEN DIVINE REASON IS TO\nBLAME.\n\n10. But if men be evil only in spite of themselves, and involuntarily,\nit would be impossible to say that those who commit injustices, and\nthose who suffer them are responsible (the former for their ferocity,\nand the latter for their cowardice.[56] To this we answer that if the\nwickedness of the former (as well as the cowardice of the latter) be,\nnecessarily, produced by the course of the stars, or by the action of\na principle of which it is only the effect, then it is explained by\nphysical reasons. But if it be the very Reason of the universe that\nproduces such things, how does it not thereby commit an injustice?\n\n\nEVEN INVOLUNTARINESS DOES NOT AFFECT SPONTANEITY THAT IS RESPONSIBLE.\n\nUnjust actions are involuntary only in this sense that one does not\nhave the will to commit a fault; but this circumstance does not hinder\nthe spontaneity of the action. However, when one acts spontaneously,\none is responsible for the fault; one would avoid responsibility for\nthe fault only if one were not the author of the action. To say that\nthe wicked are such necessarily, does not mean that they undergo\nan external constraint, but that their character is constituted by\nwickedness. The influence of the course of the stars does not destroy\nour liberty, for, if every action in us were determined by the exterior\ninfluence of such agents, everything would go on as these agents\ndesired it; consequently, men would not commit any actions contrary\nto the will of these agents. If the divinities alone were the authors\nof all our actions, there would be no impious persons; therefore,\nimpiety is due to men. It is true that, once the cause is given, the\neffects will follow, if only the whole series of causes be given. But\nman himself is one of these causes; he therefore does good by his own\nnature, and he is a free cause.\n\n\nEVEN THE SHADOWS ARE NECESSARY TO THE PERFECTION OF A PICTURE.\n\n11. Is it true that all things are produced by necessity, and by the\nnatural concatenation of causes and effects, and that, thus, they are\nas good as possible? No! It is the Reason which, governing the world,\nproduces all things (in this sense that it contains all the \"seminal\nreasons\"), and which decrees that they shall be what they are. It is\nReason that, in conformity with its rational nature, produces what\nare called evils, because it does not wish everything to be equally\ngood. An artist would not cover the body of a pictured animal with\neyes.[57] Likewise, Reason did not limit itself to the creation of\ndivinities; it produced beneath them guardians, then men, then animals,\nnot by envy (as Plato remarks[58]); but because its rational essence\ncontains an intellectual variety (that is, contains the \"seminal\nreasons\" of all different beings). We resemble such men as know little\nof painting, and who would blame an artist for having put shadows in\nhis picture; nevertheless, he has only properly disposed the contrasts\nof light. Likewise, well-regulated states are not composed of equal\norders. Further, one would not condemn a tragedy, because it presents\npersonages other than heroes, such as slaves or peasants who speak\nincorrectly.[78] To cut out these inferior personages, and all the\nparts in which they appear, would be to injure the beauty of the\ncomposition.[59]\n\n\nIT IS REASONABLE FOR THE REASON TO ASSIGN SOULS TO DIFFERENT RANKS IN\nTHE UNIVERSE.\n\n12. Since it is the Reason (of the world) which produced all things\nby an alliance with matter, and by preserving its peculiar nature,\nwhich is to be composed of different parts, and to be determined by\nthe principle from which it proceeds (that is, by Intelligence), the\nwork produced by Reason under these conditions could not be improved\nin beauty. Indeed, the Reason (of the world) could not be composed of\nhomogeneous and similar parts; it must, therefore, not be accused,\nbecause it is all things, and because all its parts differ from others.\nIf it had introduced into the world things which it had not previously\ncontained, as for instance, souls, and had forced them to enter into\nthe order of the world without considering their nature, and if it\nhad made many become degraded, Reason would certainly be to blame.\nTherefore, we must acknowledge that the souls are parts of Reason,\nand that Reason harmonizes them with the world without causing their\ndegradation, assigning to each that station which is suitable to her.\n\n\nDIVINE JUSTICE EXTENDS ALSO INTO PAST AND FUTURE.\n\n13. There is a further consideration that should not be overlooked,\nnamely: that if you desire to discover the exercise of the distributive\nJustice of the divinity, it is not sufficient to examine only the\npresent; the past and future must also be considered. Those who, in a\nformer life, were slave-owners, if they abused their power, will be\nenslaved; and this change would be useful to them. It impoverishes\nthose who have badly used their wealth; for poverty is of service\neven to virtuous people. Likewise, those who kill will in their turn\nbe killed; he who commits homicide acts unjustly, but he who is its\nvictim suffers justly. Thus arises a harmony between the disposition\nof the man who is maltreated, and the disposition of him who maltreats\nhim as he deserved. It is not by chance that a man becomes a slave,\nis made prisoner, or is dishonored. He (must himself) have committed\nthe violence which he in turn undergoes. He who kills his mother will\nbe killed by his son; he who has violated a woman will in turn become\na woman in order to become the victim of a rape. Hence, the divine\nWord[80] called Adrastea.[60] The orderly system here mentioned really\nis \"unescapeable,\" truly a justice and an admirable wisdom. From the\nthings that we see in the universe we must conclude that the order\nwhich reigns in it is eternal, that it penetrates everywhere, even\nin the smallest thing; and that it reveals an admirable art not only\nin the divine things, but also in those that might be supposed to\nbe beneath the notice of Providence, on account of their minuteness.\nConsequently, there is an admirable variety of art in the vilest\nanimal. It extends even into plants, whose fruits and leaves are so\ndistinguished by the beauty of form, whose flowers bloom with so much\ngrace, which grow so easily, and which offer so much variety. These\nthings were not produced once for all; they are continually produced\nwith variety, because the stars in their courses do not always exert\nthe same influence on things here below. What is transformed is not\ntransformed and metamorphosed by chance, but according to the laws of\nbeauty, and the rules of suitability observed by divine powers. Every\ndivine Power acts according to its nature, that is, in conformity with\nits essence. Now its essence is to develop justice and beauty in its\nactualizations; for if justice and beauty did not exist here, they\ncould not exist elsewhere.\n\n\nTHE CREATOR IS SO WISE THAT ALL COMPLAINTS AMOUNT TO GROTESQUENESS.\n\n14. The order of the universe conforms to divine Intelligence without\nimplying that on that account its author needed to go through the\nprocess of reasoning. Nevertheless, this order is so perfect that he\nwho best knows how to reason would be astonished to see that even with\nreasoning one could not discover a plan wiser than that discovered as\nrealized in particular natures, and that this plan better conforms to\nthe laws of Intelligence than any that could result from reasoning.\nIt can never, therefore, be proper to find fault with the Reason\nthat produces all things because of any (alleged imperfections) of\nany natural object, nor to claim, for the beings whose existence has\nbegun, the perfection of the beings whose existence had no beginning,\nand which are eternal, both in the intelligible World, and in this\nsense-world. That would amount to wishing that every being should\npossess more good than it can carry, and to consider as insufficient\nthe form it received. It would, for instance, amount to complaining,\nthat man does not bear horns, and to fail to notice that, if Reason had\nto spread abroad everywhere, it was still necessary for something great\nto contain something less, that in everything there should be parts,\nand that these could not equal the whole without ceasing to be parts.\nIn the intelligible World every thing is all; but here below each thing\nis not all things. The individual man does not have the same properties\nas the universal Man. For if the individual beings had something which\nwas not individual, then they would be universal. We should not expect\nan individual being as such to possess the highest perfection; for\nthen it would no longer be an individual being. Doubtless, the beauty\nof the part is not incompatible with that of the whole; for the more\nbeautiful a part is, the more does it embellish the whole. Now the part\nbecomes more beautiful on becoming similar to the whole, or imitating\nits essence, and in conforming to its order. Thus a ray (of the supreme\nIntelligence) descends here below upon man, and shines in him like a\nstar in the divine sky. To imagine the universe, one should imagine a\ncolossal statue[79] that were perfectly beautiful, animated or formed\nby the art of Vulcan, whose ears, face and breast would be adorned with\nshimmering stars disposed with marvelous skill.[62]\n\n\nOBJECTION OF INTERNECINE WAR AMONG ANIMALS AND MEN.\n\n15. The above considerations suffice for things studied each in itself.\nThe mutual relation, however, between things already begotten, and\nthose that are still being begotten from time to time, deserves to\nattract attention, and may give rise to some objections, such as the\nfollowing: How does it happen that animals devour each other, that\nmen attack each other mutually, and that they are always in ceaseless\ninternecine warfare?[62] How could the reason (of the universe) have\nconstituted such a state of affairs, while still claiming that all is\nfor the best?\n\n\nRESPONSIBILITY CANNOT BE SHIFTED FROM REASON WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE.\n\nIt does not suffice here to answer:[63] \"Everything is for the\nbest possible. Matter is the cause that things are in a state of\ninferiority; evils could not be destroyed.\" It is true enough, indeed,\nthat things had to be what they are, for they are good. It is not\nmatter which has come to dominate the universe; it has been introduced\nin it so that the universe might be what it is, or rather, it is caused\nby reason (?). The principle of things is, therefore, the Logos, or\nReason[64] (of the universe), which is everything. By it were things\nbegotten, by it were they co-ordinated in generation.\n\n\nNECESSITY OF INTERNECINE WARFARE.\n\nWhat then (will it be objected) is the necessity of this natural\ninternecine warfare of animals, and also of men? First, animals have to\ndevour each other in order to renew themselves; they could not, indeed,\nlast eternally, even if they were not killed. Is there any reason to\ncomplain because, being already condemned to death, as they are, they\nshould find an end which is useful to other beings? What objection can\nthere be to their mutually devouring each other, in order to be reborn\nunder other forms? It is as if on the stage an actor who is thought to\nbe killed, goes to change his clothing, and returns under another mask.\nIs it objected that he was not really dead? Yes indeed, but dying\nis no more than a change of bodies, just as the comedian changes his\ncostume, or if the body were to be entirely despoiled, this is no more\nthan when an actor, at the end of a drama, lays aside his costume, only\nto take it up again when once more the drama begins. Therefore, there\nis nothing frightful in the mutual transformation of animals into each\nother. Is it not better for them to have lived under this condition,\nthan never to have lived at all? Life would then be completely absent\nfrom the universe, and life could no longer be communicated to other\nbeings. But as this universe contains a multiple life, it produces\nand varies everything during the course of its existence; as it were\njoking with them, it never ceases to beget living beings, remarkable\nby beauty and by the proportion of their forms. The combats in which\nmortal men continually fight against each other, with a regularity\nstrongly reminding of the Pyrrhic dances (as thought Plato[65]),\nclearly show how all these affairs, that are considered so serious, are\nonly children's games, and that their death was nothing serious. To die\nearly in wars and battles is to precede by only a very little time the\nunescapable fate of old age, and it is only an earlier departure for\na closer return. We may be comforted for the loss of our possessions\nduring our lifetime by observing that they have belonged to others\nbefore us, and that, for those who have deprived us thereof, they form\nbut a very fragile possession, since they, in turn, will be bereft\nthereof by others; and that, if they be not despoiled of their riches,\nthey will lose still more by keeping them.[66] Murders, massacres, the\ntaking and pillaging of towns should be considered as in the theatre we\nconsider changes of scene and of personages, the tears and cries of the\nactors.[67]\n\n\nALL THESE CHANGES OF FORTUNE AFFECT ONLY THE OUTER MAN IN ANY CASE.\n\nIn this world, indeed, just as in the theatre, it is not the soul,\nthe interior man, but his shadow, the exterior man, who gives himself\nup to lamentations and groans, who on this earth moves about so much,\nand who makes of it the scene of an immense drama with numberless\ndifferent acts (?) Such is the characteristic of the actions of a man\nwho considers exclusively the things placed at his feet, and outside\nof him, and who does not know that his tears and serious occupations\nare any more than games.[68] The really earnest man occupies himself\nseriously only with really serious affairs, while the frivolous man\napplies himself to frivolous things. Indeed, frivolous things become\nserious for him who does not know really serious occupations, and\nwho himself is frivolous. If, indeed, one cannot help being mixed up\nin this child's play, it is just as well to know that he has fallen\ninto child's play where one's real personality is not in question. If\nSocrates were to mingle in these games, it would only be his exterior\nman who would do so. Let us add that tears and groans do not prove that\nthe evils we are complaining of are very real evils; for often children\nweep and lament over imaginary grievances.\n\n\nDOES THIS POINT OF VIEW DESTROY SIN AND JUSTICE?\n\n16. If the above considerations be true, what about wickedness,\ninjustice, and sin? For if everything be well, how can there be\nagents who are unjust, and who sin? If no one be unjust, or sinful,\nhow can unhappy men exist? How can we say that certain things conform\nto nature, while others are contrary thereto, if everything that is\nbegotten, or that occurs, conforms to nature? Last, would that point\nof view not do away entirely with impiety towards the divinity, if it\nbe the divinity that makes things such as they are, if the divinity\nresemble a poet, who would in his drama introduce a character whose\nbusiness it was to ridicule and criticize the author?\n\n\nTHIS PROBLEM SOLVED BY REASON BEING DERIVED FROM INTELLIGENCE.\n\nLet us, therefore, more clearly define the Reason (of the universe),\nand let us demonstrate that it should be what it is. To reach our\nconclusion more quickly, let us grant the existence of this Reason.\nThis Reason (of the universe) is not pure, absolute Intelligence.\nNeither is it the pure Soul, but it depends therefrom. It is a ray of\nlight that springs both from Intelligence and from the Soul united to\nIntelligence. These two principles beget Reason, that is, a rational\nquiet life.[69] Now all life is an actualization, even that which\noccupies the lowest rank. But the actualization (which constitutes\nthe life of Reason) is not similar to the actualization of fire. The\nactualization of the life (peculiar to Reason), even without feeling,\nis not a blind movement. All things that enjoy the presence of Reason,\nand which participate therein in any manner soever, immediately receive\na rational disposition, that is, a form; for the actualization which\nconstitutes the life (of the Reason) can impart its forms, and for that\nactualization motion is to form beings. Its movement, like that of a\ndancer, is, therefore, full of art. A dancer, indeed, gives us the\nimage of that life full of art; it is the art that moves it, because\nthe art itself is its life. All this is said to explain the nature of\nlife, whatever it be.\n\n\nTHE UNITY OF REASON IS CONSTITUTED BY THE CONTRARIES IT CONTAINS.\n\nAs reason proceeds from Intelligence and Life, which possesses both\nfulness and unity, Reason does not possess the unity and fulness of\nIntelligence and Life. Consequently, Reason does not communicate the\ntotality and universality of its essence to the beings to which it\nimparts itself. It, therefore, opposes its parts to each other, and\ncreates them defective; whereby, Reason constitutes and begets war and\nstruggle. Thus Reason is the universal unity, because it could not be\nthe absolute unity. Though reason imply struggle, because it consists\nof parts, it also implies unity and harmony. It resembles the reason of\na drama, whose unity contains many diversities. In a drama, however,\nthe harmony of the whole results from its component contraries being\nco-ordinated in the unity of action, while, in universal Reason, it is\nfrom unity that the struggle of contraries arises. That is why we may\nwell compare universal Reason to the harmony formed by contrary sounds,\nand to examine why the reasons of the beings also contain contraries.\nIn a concert, these reasons produce low and high sounds, and, by\nvirtue of the harmony, that constitutes their essence, they make these\ndivers sounds contribute to unity, that is, to Harmony[70] itself,\nthe supreme Reason of which they are only parts.[71] In the same way\nwe must consider other oppositions in the universe, such as black and\nwhite, heat and cold, winged or walking animals, and reasonable and\nirrational beings. All these things are parts of the single universal\nOrganism. Now if the parts of the universal Organism were often in\nmutual disagreement, the universal Organism, nevertheless, remains\nin perfect accord with itself because it is universal, and it is\nuniversal by the Reason that inheres in it. The unity of this Reason\nmust therefore be composed of opposite reasons, because their very\nopposition somehow constitutes its essence. If the Reason (of the\nworld) were not multiple, it would no longer be universal, and would\nnot even exist any longer. Since it exists, Reason must, therefore,\ncontain within itself some difference; and the greatest difference is\nopposition. Now if Reason contain a difference, and produce different\nthings, the difference that exists in these things is greater than that\nwhich exists in Reason. Now difference carried to the highest degree is\nopposition. Therefore, to be perfect, Reason must from its very essence\nproduce things not only different, but even opposed.\n\n\nTHE WHOLE IS GOOD THOUGH COMPOSED OF GOOD AND EVIL PARTS.\n\n17. If Reason thus from its essence produce opposed things, the\nthings it will produce will be so much the more opposed as they are\nmore separated from each other. The sense-world is less unitary than\nits Reason, and consequently, it is more manifold, containing more\noppositions. Thus, in individuals, the love of life has greater force;\nselfishness is more powerful in them; and often, by their avidity,\nthey destroy what they love, when they love what is perishable. The\nlove which each individual has for himself, makes him appropriate all\nhe can in his relations with the universe. Thus the good and evil are\nled to do opposite things by the Art that governs the universe; just\nas a choric ballet would be directed. One part is good, the other\npoor; but the whole is good. It might be objected that in this case no\nevil person will be left. Still, nothing hinders the existence of the\nevil; only they will not be such as they would be taken by themselves.\nBesides, this will be a motive of leniency in regard to them, unless\nReason should decide that this leniency be not deserved, thereby making\nit impossible.[72]\n\n\nFOUNDED ON THE PUN ON LOGOS, AS CHARACTER, ROLE AND REASON, THE EVILS\nARE SHOWN TO PLAY THEIR PART BADLY IN THE DRAMA OF LIFE.\n\nBesides, if this world contain both bad and good people, and if the\nlatter play the greater part in the world, there will take place\nthat which is seen in dramas where the poet, at times, imposes his\nideas on the actors, and again at others relies on their ingenuity.\nThe obtaining of the first, second or third rank by an actor does\nnot depend on the poet. The poet only assigns to each the part he is\ncapable of filling, and assigns to him a suitable place. Likewise (in\nthe world), each one occupies his assigned place, and the bad man, as\nwell as the good one, has the place that suits him. Each one, according\nto his nature and character, comes to occupy the place that suits him,\nand that he had chosen, and then speaks and acts with piety if he be\ngood, and impiously, if he be evil. Before the beginning of the drama,\nthe actors already had their proper characters; they only developed\nit. In dramas composed by men, it is the poet who assigns their parts\nto the actors; and the latter are responsible only for the efficiency\nor inefficiency of their acting; for they have nothing to do but\nrepeat the words of the poet. But in this drama (of life), of which\nmen imitate certain parts when their nature is poetic, it is the soul\nthat is the actor. This actor receives his part from the creator, as\nstage-actors receive from the poet their masks, garments, their purple\nrobe, or their rags. Thus in the drama of the world it is not from\nchance that the soul receives her part.\n\n\nLIKE GOOD AND BAD ACTORS, SOULS ARE PUNISHED AND REWARDED BY THE\nMANAGER.\n\nIndeed, the fate of a soul conforms to her character, and, by going\nthrough with her part properly, the soul fulfils her part in the drama\nmanaged by universal Reason. The soul sings her part, that is, she\ndoes that which is in her nature to do. If her voice and features be\nbeautiful, by themselves, they lend charm to the poem, as would be\nnatural. Otherwise they introduce a displeasing element, but which\ndoes not alter the nature of the work.[73] The author of the drama\nreprimands the bad actor as the latter may deserve it, and thus fulfils\nthe part of a good judge. He increases the dignity of the good actor,\nand, if possible, invites him to play beautiful pieces, while he\nrelegates the bad actor to inferior pieces. Likewise, the soul which\ntakes part in the drama of which the world is the theatre, and which\nhas undertaken a part in it, brings with her a disposition to play well\nor badly. At her arrival she is classed with the other actors, and\nafter having been allotted to all the various gifts of fortune without\nany regard for her personality or activities, she is later punished or\nrewarded. Such actors have something beyond usual actors; they appear\non a greater scene; the creator of the universe gives them some of his\npower, and grants them the freedom to choose between a great number of\nplaces. The punishments and rewards are so determined that the souls\nthemselves run to meet them, because each soul occupies a place in\nconformity with her character, and is thus in harmony with the Reason\nof the universe.[74]\n\n\nTHE SOUL MUST FIT HERSELF TO HER SPECIAL PART IN THE GREAT SCHEME.\n\nEvery individual, therefore, occupies, according to justice, the\nplace he deserves, just as each string of the lyre is fixed to the\nplace assigned to it by the nature of the sounds it is to render. In\nthe universe everything is good and beautiful if every being occupy\nthe place he deserves, if, for instance, he utter discordant sounds\nwhen in darkness and Tartarus; for such sounds fit that place. If the\nuniverse is to be beautiful, the individual must not behave \"like a\nstone\" in it; he must contribute to the unity of the universal harmony\nby uttering the sound suitable to him (as thought Epictetus[75]). The\nsound that the individual utters is the life he leads, a life which is\ninferior in greatness, goodness and power (to that of the universe).\nThe shepherd's pipe utters several sounds, and the weakest of them,\nnevertheless, contributes to the total Harmony, because this harmony\nis composed of unequal sounds whose totality constitutes a perfect\nharmony. Likewise, universal Reason though one, contains unequal parts.\nConsequently, the universe contains different places, some better, and\nsome worse, and their inequality corresponds to the inequality of the\nsoul. Indeed, as both places and souls are different, the souls that\nare different find the places that are unequal, like the unequal parts\nof the pipe, or any other musical instrument. They inhabit different\nplaces, and each utters sounds proper to the place where they are, and\nto the universe. Thus what is bad for the individual may be good for\nthe totality; what is against nature in the individual agrees with the\nnature in the whole. A sound that is feeble does not change the harmony\nof the universe, as--to use another example--one bad citizen does not\nchange the nature of a well-regulated city; for often there is need of\nsuch a man in a city; he therefore fits it well.\n\n\nUNIVERSAL REASON TRIES TO PATCH UP \"GAGS\" BY UNDISCIPLINED ACTORS.\n\n18. The difference that exists between souls in respect to vice and\nvirtue has several causes; among others, the inequality that exists\nbetween souls from the very beginning. This inequality conforms to the\nessence of universal Reason, of which they are unequal parts, because\nthey differ from each other. We must indeed remember that souls have\nthree ranks (the intellectual, rational, and sense lives), and that\nthe same soul does not always exercise the same faculties. But, to\nexplain our meaning, let us return to our former illustration. Let\nus imagine actors who utter words not written by the poet; as if the\ndrama were incomplete, they themselves supply what is lacking, and fill\nomissions made by the poet. They seem less like actors than like parts\nof the poet, who foresaw what they were to say, so as to reattach the\nremainder so far as it was in his power.[76] In the universe, indeed,\nall things that are the consequences and results of bad deeds are\nproduced by reasons, and conform to the universal Reason. Thus, from\nan illicit union, or from a rape, may be born natural children that\nmay become very distinguished men; likewise, from cities destroyed by\nperverse individuals, may rise other flourishing cities.\n\n\nTHIS ILLUSTRATION OF DRAMA ALLOWS BOTH GOOD AND EVIL TO BE ASCRIBED TO\nREASON.\n\nIt might indeed be objected that it is absurd to introduce into the\nworld souls some of which do good, and others evil; for when we\nabsolve universal Reason from the responsibility of evil, we are also\nsimultaneously taking from it the merit for the good. What, however,\nhinders us from considering deeds done by actors as parts of a drama,\nin the universe as well as on the stage, and thus to derive from\nuniversal Reason both the good and the evil that are done here below?\nFor universal Reason exercises its influence on each of the actors\nwith so much the greater force as the drama is more perfect, and as\neverything depends on it.[77]\n\n\nINTRODUCTION TO THE NEXT BOOK.\n\nBut why should we at all impute evil deeds to universal Reason? The\nsouls contained in the universe will not be any more divine for that.\nThey will still remain parts of the universal Reason (and consequently,\nremain souls): for we shall have to acknowledge that all reasons are\nsouls. Otherwise if the Reason of the universe be a Soul, why should\ncertain \"reasons\" be souls, and others only (\"seminal) reasons\"?\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD ENNEAD, BOOK THREE.\n\nContinuation of That on Providence.\n\n\nSOULS SHOW KINSHIP TO WORLD-SOUL BY FIDELITY TO THEIR OWN NATURE.\n\n1. The question (why some reasons are souls, while others are reasons\nmerely, when at the same time universal Reason is a certain Soul),\nmay be answered as follows. Universal Reason (which proceeds from the\nuniversal Soul) embraces both good and bad things, which equally belong\nto its parts; it does not engender them, but exists with them in its\nuniversality. In fact, these \"logoses\" (or reasons) (or, particular\nsouls), are the acts of the universal Soul; and these reasons being\nparts (of the universal Soul) have parts (of the operations) as their\nacts (or energies). Therefore, just as the universal Soul, which\nis one, has different parts, so this difference occurs again in\nthe reasons and in the operations they effect. Just as their works\n(harmonize), so do the souls themselves mutually harmonize; they\nharmonize in this, that their very diversity, or even opposition, forms\nan unity. By a natural necessity does everything proceed from, and\nreturn to unity; thus creatures which are different, or even opposed,\nare not any the less co-ordinated in the same system, and that because\nthey proceed from the same principle. Thus horses or human beings are\nsubsumed under the unity of the animal species, even though animals of\nany kind, such as horses, for example, bite each other, and struggle\nagainst each other with a jealousy which rises to fury; and though\nanimals of either species, including man, do as much. Likewise, with\ninanimate things; they form divers species, and should likewise be\nsubsumed under the genus of inanimate things; and, if you go further,\nto essence, and further still, to super-Essence (the One). Having\nthus related or subsumed everything to this principle, let us again\ndescend, by dividing it. We shall see unity splitting, as it penetrates\nand embraces everything simultaneously in a unique (or all-embracing\nsystem). Thus divided, the unity constitutes a multiple organism; each\nof its constituent parts acts according to its nature, without ceasing\nto form part of the universal Being; thus is it that the fire burns,\nthe horse behaves as a horse should, and men perform deeds as various\nas their characters. In short, every being acts, lives well or badly,\naccording to its own nature.\n\n\nAPPARENT CHANCE REALLY IS THE PLAN OF A DIVINE GENERAL PROVIDENCE.\n\n2. Circumstances, therefore, are not decisive of human fortune; they\nthemselves only derive naturally from superior principles, and result\nfrom the mutual concatenation of all things. This concatenation,\nhowever, derives from the (Stoic) \"predominant (element in the\nuniverse\"), and every being contributes to it according to its nature;\njust as, in an army, the general commands, and the soldiers carry out\nhis orders cooperatively. In the universe, in fact, everything has been\nstrategically ordered by Providence, like a general, who considers\neverything, both actions and experiences,[81] victuals and drink,\nweapons and implements, arranging everything so that every detail finds\nits suitable location. Thus nothing happens which fails to enter into\nthe general's plan, although his opponents' doings remain foreign to\nhis influence, and though he cannot command their army. If indeed,\nProvidence were[82] \"the great Chief over all,\" to whom the universe\nis subordinated, what could have disarranged His plans, and could have\nfailed to be intimately associated therewith?\n\n\nWE CANNOT QUESTION OUR ORDER IN THE HIERARCHY OF NATURE.\n\n3. Although I am able to make any desired decision, nevertheless my\ndecision enters into the plan of the universe, because my nature has\nnot been introduced into this plan subsequently; but it includes me and\nmy character. But whence originates my character? This includes two\npoints: is the cause of any man's character to be located in Him who\nformed him, or in that man himself? Must we, on the other hand, give\nup seeking its cause? Surely: just as it is hopeless to ask why plants\nhave no sensation, or why animals are not men; it would be the same as\nasking why men are not gods. Why should we complain that men do not\nhave a more perfect nature, if in the case of plants and animals nobody\nquestions or accuses either these beings themselves, nor the power\nwhich has made them? (This would be senseless, for two reasons): if we\nsay that they might have been better, we are either speaking of the\nqualities which each of them is capable of acquiring by himself; and\nin this case we should blame only him who has not acquired them--or,\nwe are speaking of those qualities which he should derive not from\nhimself, but from the Creator, in which case it would be as absurd to\nclaim for man more qualities than he has received, than it would be to\ndo so in the case of plants or animals. What we should examine is not\nif one being be inferior to another, but if it be complete within its\nown sphere; for evidently natural inequalities are unavoidable. This\nagain depends on conformity to nature, not that inequalities depend on\nthe will of the principle which has regulated all things.\n\n\nTHE CAUSE OF OUR IMPERFECTIONS IS DISTANCE FROM THE SUPREME.\n\nThe Reason of the Universe, indeed, proceeds from the universal Soul;\nand the latter, in turn, proceeds from Intelligence. Intelligence,\nhowever, is not a particular being; it consists of all (intelligible\nbeings),[83] and all the beings form a plurality. Now, a plurality of\nbeing implies mutual differences between them, consisting of first,\nsecond and third ranks. Consequently, the souls of engendered animals\nare rather degradations of souls, seeming to have grown weaker by\ntheir procession. The (generating) reason of the animal, indeed,\nalthough it be animated, is a soul other than that from which proceeds\nuniversal Reason. This Reason itself loses excellence in the degree\nthat it hastens down to enter into matter, and what it produces is\nless perfect. Nevertheless, we may well consider how admirable a work\nis the creature, although it be so far distant from the creator. We\nshould, therefore, not attribute to the creator the (imperfections of\nthe) creature; for any principle is superior to its product. So we may\nassert that (the principle even of imperfect things) is perfect; and,\n(instead of complaining), we should rather admire His communication of\nsome traits of His power to beings dependent from Him. We have even\nreason to be more than grateful for His having given gifts greater\nthan they can receive or assimilate; and as the gifts of Providence\nare superabundant, we can find the cause (of imperfection) only in the\ncreatures themselves.\n\n\nDOUBLENESS OF SOUL, REASONS AND PROVIDENCE.\n\n4. If man were simple--that is, if he were no more than what he had\nbeen created, and if all his actions and passions derived from the\nsame principle--we would no more exercise our reason to complain for\nhis behoof than we have to complain for that of other animals. But\nwe do have something to blame in the man, and that in the perverted\nman. We have good grounds for this blame, because man is not only that\nwhich he was created, but has, besides, another principle which is\nfree (intelligence, with reason). This free principle, however, is not\noutside of Providence, and the Reason of the universe, any more than\nit would be reasonable to suppose that the things above depended on\nthe things here below. On the contrary, it is superior things which\nshed their radiance on inferior ones, and this is the cause of the\nperfection of Providence. As to the Reason of the universe, it itself\nis double also; one produces things, while the other unites generated\nthings to intelligible ones. Thus are constituted two providences: a\nsuperior one, from above (intellectual Reason, the principal power of\nthe soul[84]), and an inferior one, the (natural and generative power,\ncalled) reason, which derives from the first; and from both results the\nconcatenation of things, and universal Providence (or, Providence, and\ndestiny).\n\n\nMEN'S BETTER NATURE IS NOT DOMINANT BECAUSE OF THEIR SUB-CONSCIOUS\nNATURE.\n\nMen (therefore, not being only what they were made) possess another\nprinciple (free intelligence with reason); but not all make use of\nall the principles they possess; some make use of the one principle\n(their intelligence), while others make use of the other (principle\nof reason), or even of the lower principle (of imagination and\nsensation).[85] All these principles are present in the man, even\nwhen they do not react on him; and even in this case, they are not\ninert; each fulfils its peculiar office; only they do not all act\nsimultaneously upon him (or, are not perceived by his consciousness).\nIt may seem difficult to understand how this may be the case with all\nof them present, and it might seem easier to consider them absent;\nbut they are present in us, in the sense that we lack none of them;\nalthough we might consider them absent in the sense that a principle\nthat does not react on a man might be considered absent from him. It\nmight be asked why these principles do not react on all men, since\nthey are part of them? We might, referring chiefly to this (free,\nintelligent, reasonable) principle, say that first, it does not belong\nto animals; second, it is not even (practiced) by all men. If it be not\npresent in all men, so much the more is it not alone in them, because\nthe being in whom this principle alone is present lives according to\nthis principle, and lives according to other principles only so far as\nhe is compelled by necessity. The cause (which hinders intelligence\nand reason from dominating us) will have to be sought in the (Stoic)\nsubstrate of the man, either because our corporeal constitution\ntroubles the superior principle (of reason and intelligence), or\nbecause of the predominance of our passions.\n\n(After all), we have not yet reached any conclusion, because this\nsubstrate of man is composed of two elements: the (\"seminal)\nreason,\"[86] and matter; (and either of them might be the cause). At\nfirst blush, it would seem that the cause (of the predominance of our\nlower natures) must be sought in matter, rather than in the (\"seminal)\nreason\"; and that which dominates in us is not (\"seminal) reason,\" but\nmatter and organized substrate. This, however, is not the case. What\nplays the part of substrate in respect of the superior principle (of\nfree intelligence and reason), is both the (\"seminal) reason,\" and that\nwhich is generated thereby, conforming to that reason; consequently,\nthe predominant element in us is not matter, any more than our\ncorporeal constitution.\n\n\nHUMAN CHARACTER MAY BE RESULT OF FORMER LIVES.\n\nBesides, our individual characters might be derived from\npre-existences. In this case we would say that our (\"seminal) reason\"\nhas degenerated as a result of our antecedents, that our soul has lost\nher force by irradiating what was below her. Besides, our (\"seminal)\nreason\" contains within itself the very reason of our constituent\nmatter, a matter which it discovered, or conformed to its own\nnature.[87] In fact, the (\"seminal) reason\" of an ox resides in no\nmatter other than that of an ox. Thus, as said (Plato[88]), the soul\nfinds herself destined to pass into the bodies of animals other than\nmen, because, just like the (\"seminal) reason,\" she has altered, and\nhas become such as to animate an ox, instead of a man. By this decree\nof divine justice she becomes still worse than she was.\n\n\nCAUSES OF DETERIORATION.\n\nBut why did the soul ever lose her way, or deteriorate? We have often\nsaid that not all souls belong to the first rank; some belong to a\nsecond, or even third rank, and who, consequently, are inferior to\nthose of the first. Further, leaving the right road may be caused\nby a trifling divergence. Third, the approximation of two differing\nthings produces a combination which may be considered a third\nsomewhat, different from the other two components. (Thus even in\nthis new element, or \"habituation\") the being does not lose the\nqualities he received with his existence; if he be inferior, he has\nbeen created inferior from the very origin; it is what he was created,\nhe is inferior by the very virtue of his nature; if he suffer the\nconsequences thereof, he suffers them justly. Fourth, we must allow for\nour anterior existence, because everything that happens to us to-day\nresults from our antecedents.\n\n\nTHIS PROVIDENCE IS THE NORMATIVE, CURATIVE, SANATIVE ELEMENT OF LIFE.\n\n5. From first to last Providence descends from on high, communicating\nits gifts not according to the law of an equality that would be\nnumeric, but proportionate, varying its operations according to\nlocality (or occasion). So, in the organization of an animal, from\nbeginning to end, everything is related; every member has its peculiar\nfunction, superior or inferior, according to the rank it occupies; it\nhas also its peculiar passions, passions which are in harmony with\nits nature, and the place it occupies in the system of things. So,\nfor instance, a blow excites responses that differ according to the\norgan that received it; the vocal organ will produce a sound; another\norgan will suffer in silence, or execute a movement resultant from\nthat passion; now, all sounds, actions and passions form in the animal\nthe unity of sound, life and existence.[89] The parts, being various,\nplay different roles; thus there are differing functions for the feet,\nthe eyes, discursive reason, and intelligence. But all things form\none unity, relating to a single Providence, so that destiny governs\nwhat is below, and providence reigns alone in what is on high. In\nfact, all that lies in the intelligible world is either rational or\nsuper-rational, namely: Intelligence and pure Soul. What derives\ntherefrom constitutes Providence, as far as it derives therefrom, as\nit is in pure Soul, and thence passes into the animals. Thence arises\n(universal) Reason, which, being distributed in unequal parts, produces\nthings unequal, such as the members of an animal. As consequences from\nProvidence are derived the human deeds which are agreeable to the\ndivinity. All such actions are related (to the plan of Providence);\nthey are not done by Providence; but when a man, or another animate or\ninanimate being performs some deeds, these, if there be any good in\nthem, enter into the plan of Providence, which everywhere establishes\nvirtue, and amends or corrects errors. Thus does every animal maintain\nits bodily health by the kind of providence within him; on the occasion\nof a cut or wound the (\"seminal) reason\" which administers the body of\nthis animal immediately draws (the tissues) together, and forms scars\nover the flesh, re-establishes health, and invigorates the members that\nhave suffered.\n\n\nTHE PLANS OF PROVIDENCE LIKENED TO THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF A PHYSICIAN.\n\nConsequently, our evils are the consequences (of our actions); they are\nits necessary effects, not that we are carried away by Providence, but\nin the sense that we obey an impulsion whose principle is in ourselves.\nWe ourselves then indeed try to reattach our acts to the plan of\nProvidence, but we cannot conform their consequences to its will; our\nacts, therefore, conform either to our will, or to other things in\nthe universe, which, acting on us, do not produce in us an affection\nconformed to the intentions of Providence. In fact, the same cause does\nnot act identically on different beings, for the effects experienced\nby each differ according to their nature. Thus Helena causes emotions\nin Paris which differ from those of Idumeneus.[90] Likewise, the\nhandsome man produces on a handsome man an effect different from that\nof the intemperate man on the intemperate; the handsome and temperate\nman acts differently on the handsome and temperate man than on the\nintemperate; and than the intemperate on himself. The deed done by\nthe intemperate man is done neither by Providence, nor according to\nProvidence.[91] Neither is the deed done by the temperate man done by\nProvidence; since he does it himself; but it conforms to Providence,\nbecause it conforms to the Reason (of the universe). Thus, when a man\nhas done something good for his health, it is he himself who has done\nit, but he thereby conforms to the reason of the physician; for it is\nthe physician who teaches him, by means of his art, what things are\nhealthy or unhealthy; but when a man has done something injurious to\nhis health, it is he himself who has done it, and he does it against\nthe providence of the physician.\n\n\nPREDICTION DOES NOT WORK BY PROVIDENCE, BUT BY ANALOGY.\n\n6. If then (the bad things do not conform to Providence), the diviners\nand astrologers predict evil things only by the concatenation which\noccurs between contraries, between form and matter, for instance, in a\ncomposite being. Thus in contemplating the form and (\"seminal) reason\"\none is really contemplating the being which receives the form; for one\ndoes not contemplate in the same way the intelligible animal, and the\ncomposite animal; what one contemplates in the composite animal is the\n(\"seminal) reason\" which gives form to what is inferior. Therefore,\nsince the world is an animal, when one contemplates its occurrences,\none is really contemplating the causes that make them arise, the\nProvidence which presides over them, and whose action extends in an\norderly manner to all beings and events; that is, to all animals, their\nactions and dispositions, which are dominated by Reason and mingled\nwith necessity. We thus contemplate what has been mingled since the\nbeginning, and what is still continually mingled. In this mixture,\nconsequently, it is impossible to distinguish Providence from what\nconforms thereto, nor what derives from the substrate (that is, from\nmatter, and which, consequently, is deformed, and evil). This is not\na human task, not even of a man who might be wise or divine; such a\nprivilege can be ascribed only to God.\n\n\nFACTS OF LIFE ARE LETTERS THAT CAN BE READ.\n\nIn fact, the function of the diviner is not to distinguish the cause,\nbut the fact; his art consists in reading the characters traced by\nnature, and which invariably indicate the order and concatenation of\nfacts; or rather, in studying the signs of the universal movement,\nwhich designate the character of each being before its revelation in\nhimself. All beings, in fact, exercise upon each other a reciprocal\ninfluence, and concur together in the constitution and perpetuity of\nthe world.[92] To him who studies, analogy reveals the march of events,\nbecause all kinds of divination are founded on its laws; for things\nwere not to depend on each other, but to have relations founded on\ntheir resemblance.[93] This no doubt is that which[94] is meant by the\nexpression that \"analogy embraces everything.\"\n\n\nANALOGY DEMANDED BY THE UNITY OF GOD.\n\nNow, what is this analogy? It is a relation between the worse and the\nworse, the better and the better, one eye and the other, one foot and\nthe other, virtue and justice, vice and injustice. The analogy which\nreigns in the universe is then that which makes divination possible.\nThe influence which one being exercises on another conforms to the\nlaws of influence which the members of the universal Organism must\nexercise upon each other. The one does not produce the other; for all\nare generated together; but each is affected according to its nature,\neach in its own manner. This constitutes the unity of the Reason of the\nuniverse.\n\n\nEVIL IS INSEPARABLE FROM THE GOOD.\n\n7. It is only because there are good things in the world, that there\nare worse ones. Granting the conception of variety, how could the\nworse exist without the better, or the better without the worse? We\nshould not, therefore, accuse the better because of the existence of\nthe worse; but rather we should rejoice in the presence of the better,\nbecause it communicates a little of its perfection to the worse. To\nwish to annihilate the worse in the world is tantamount to annihilating\nProvidence itself;[95] for if we annihilate the worse, to what could\nProvidence be applied? Neither to itself, nor to the better; for when\nwe speak of supreme Providence, we call it supreme in contrast with\nthat which is inferior to it.\n\n\nTHE PARABLE OF THE VINE AND THE BRANCHES.\n\nIndeed, the (supreme) Principle is that to which all other things\nrelate, that in which they all simultaneously exist, thus constituting\nthe totality. All things proceed from the Principle, while it remains\nwrapt in itself. Thus, from a single root, which remains wrapt in\nitself, issue a host of parts, each of which offers the image of their\nroot under a different form. Some of them touch the root; others\ntrend away from it, dividing and subdividing down to the branches,\ntwigs, leaves and fruits; some abide permanently (like the branches);\nothers swirl in a perpetual flux, like the leaves and fruits. These\nlatter parts which swirl in a perpetual flux contain within themselves\nthe (\"seminal) reasons\" of the parts from which they proceed (and\nwhich abide permanently); they themselves seem disposed to be little\nminiature trees; if they engendered before perishing, they would\nengender only that which is nearest to them. As to the parts (which\nabide permanently), and which are hollow, such as the branches, they\nreceive from the root the sap which is to fill them; for they have\na nature different (from that of the leaves, flowers, and fruits).\nConsequently, it is the branches' extremities that experience\n\"passions\" (or modifications) which they seem to derive only from the\ncontiguous parts. The parts contiguous to the Root are passive on one\nend, and active on the other; but the Principle itself is related to\nall. Although all the parts issue from the same Principle,[96] yet they\ndiffer from each other more as they are more distant from the root.\nSuch would be the mutual relations of two brothers who resemble each\nother because they are born from the same parents.\n\n\n\n\nFIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE.\n\nThe Self-Consciousnesses, and What is Above Them.[97]\n\n\nIS KNOWLEDGE DEPENDENT ON THE COMPOSITENESS OF THE KNOWER?\n\n1. Must thought, and self-consciousness imply being composed of\ndifferent parts, and on their mutual contemplation? Must that which is\nabsolutely simple be unable to turn towards itself, to know itself? ls\nit, on the contrary, possible that for that which is not composite to\nknow itself? Self-consciousness, indeed, does not necessarily result\nfrom a thing's knowing itself because it is composite, and that one of\nits parts grasps the other; as, for instance, by sensation we perceive\nthe form and nature of our body. In this case the whole will not be\nknown, unless the part that knows the others to which it is united also\nknows itself; otherwise, we would find the knowledge of one entity,\nthrough another, instead of one entity through itself.\n\n\nA SIMPLE PRINCIPLE CAN HAVE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.\n\nWhile, therefore, asserting that a simple principle does know itself,\nwe must examine into the possibility of this.[98] Otherwise, we would\nhave to give up hope of real self-knowledge. But to resign this would\nimply many absurdities; for if it be absurd to deny that the soul\npossesses self-knowledge, it would be still more absurd to deny it of\nintelligence. How could intelligence have knowledge of other beings,\nif it did not possess the knowledge and science of itself? Indeed,\nexterior things are perceived by sensation, and even, if you insist, by\ndiscursive reason and opinion; but not by intelligence. It is indeed\nworth examining whether intelligence does, or does not have knowledge\nof such external things. Evidently, intelligible entities are known\nby intelligence. Does intelligence limit itself to knowledge of these\nentities, or does it, while knowing intelligible entities, also know\nitself? In this case, does it know that it knows only intelligible\nentities, without being able to know what itself is? While knowing that\nit knows what belongs to it, is it unable to know what itself, the\nknower, is? Or can it at the same time know what belongs to it, and\nalso know itself? Then how does this knowledge operate, and how far\ndoes it go? This is what we must examine.\n\n\nTHE SENSE-POWER OF THE SOUL DEALS ONLY WITH EXTERIOR THINGS.\n\n2. Let us begin by a consideration of the soul. Does she possess\nself-consciousness? By what faculty? And how does she acquire it? It\nis natural for the sense-power to deal only with exterior objects; for\neven in the case in which it feels occurrences in the body, it is still\nperceiving things that are external to it, since it perceives passions\nexperienced by the body over which it presides.[99]\n\n\nFUNCTIONS OF THE DISCURSIVE REASON OF THE SOUL.\n\nBesides the above, the soul possesses the discursive reason, which\njudges of sense-representations, combining and dividing them. Under\nthe form of images, she also considers the conceptions received from\nintelligence, and operates on these images as on images furnished by\nsensation. Finally, she still is the power of understanding, since\nshe distinguishes the new images from the old, and harmonizes them by\ncomparing them; whence, indeed, our reminiscences are derived.\n\n\nCAN DISCURSIVE REASON TURN UPON ITSELF?\n\nThat is the limit of the intellectual power of the soul. Is it,\nbesides, capable of turning upon itself, and cognizing itself, or\nmust this knowledge be sought for only within intelligence? If we\nassign this knowledge to the intellectual part of the soul; we will\nbe making an intelligence out of it; and we will then have to study\nin what it differs from the superior Intelligence. If again, we\nrefuse this knowledge to this part of the soul, we will, by reason,\nrise to Intelligence, and we will have to examine the nature of\nself-consciousness. Further, if we attribute this knowledge both to\nthe inferior and to the superior intelligences, we shall have to\ndistinguish self-consciousness according as it belongs to the one\nor to the other; for if there were no difference between these two\nkinds of intelligence, discursive reason would be identical with pure\nIntelligence. Does discursive reason, therefore, turn upon itself?\nOr does it limit itself to the comprehension of the types received\nfrom both (sense and intelligence); and, in the latter case, how does\nit achieve such comprehension? This latter question is the one to be\nexamined here.\n\n\nTHE HIGHEST PART OF DISCURSIVE REASON RECEIVES IMPRESSIONS FROM\nINTELLIGENCE.\n\n3. Now let us suppose that the senses have perceived a man, and have\nfurnished an appropriate image thereof to discursive reason. What will\nthe latter say? It may say nothing, limiting itself to taking notice\nof him. However, it may also ask itself who this man is; and, having\nalready met him, with the aid of memory, decide that he is Socrates. If\nthen discursive reason develop the image of Socrates, then it divides\nwhat imagination has furnished. If discursive reason add that Socrates\nis good, it still deals with things known by the senses; but that which\nit asserts thereof, namely, his goodness, it has drawn from itself,\nbecause within itself it possesses the rule of goodness. But how does\nit, within itself, possess goodness? Because it conforms to the Good,\nand receives the notion of it from the Intelligence that enlightens\nitself; for (discursive reason), this part of the soul, is pure, and\nreceives impressions from Intelligence.[101]\n\n\nWHY DISCURSIVE REASON SHOULD BELONG TO THE SOUL RATHER THAN TO\nINTELLIGENCE.\n\nBut why should this whole (soul-) part that is superior to sensation\nbe assigned to the soul rather than to intelligence? Because the power\nof the soul consists in reasoning, and because all these operations\nbelong to the discursive reason. But why can we not simply assign to\nit, in addition, self-consciousness, which would immediately clear\nup this inquiry? Because the nature of discursive reason consists in\nconsidering exterior things, and in scrutinizing their diversity, while\nto intelligence we attribute the privilege of contemplating itself, and\nof contemplating its own contents. But what hinders discursive reason,\nby some other faculty of the soul, from considering what belongs to\nit? Because, in this case, instead of discursive reason and reasoning,\nwe would have pure Intelligence. But what then hinders the presence\nof pure Intelligence within the soul? Nothing, indeed. Shall we then\nhave a right to say that pure Intelligence is a part of the soul? No\nindeed; but still we would have the right to call it \"ours.\" It is\ndifferent from, and higher than discursive reason; and still it is\n\"ours,\" although we cannot count it among the parts of the soul. In one\nrespect it is \"ours,\" and in another, is not \"ours;\" for at times we\nmake use of it, and at other times we make use of discursive reason;\nconsequently, intelligence is \"ours\" when we make use of it; and it\nis not \"ours\" when we do not make use of it. But what is the meaning\nof \"making use of intelligence\"? Does it mean becoming intelligence,\nand speaking in that character, or does it mean speaking in conformity\nwith intelligence? For we are not intelligence; we speak in conformity\nwith intelligence by the first part of discursive reason, the part that\nreceives impressions from Intelligence. We feel through sensation, and\nit is we who feel. Is it also we who conceive and who simultaneously\nare conceived? Or is it we who reason, and who conceive the\nintellectual notions which enlighten discursive reason? We are indeed\nessentially constituted by discursive reason. The actualizations of\nIntelligence are superior to us, while those of sensation are inferior;\nas to us, \"we\" are the principal part of the soul, the part that forms\na middle power between these two extremes, now lowering ourselves\ntowards sensation, now rising towards Intelligence.[102] We acknowledge\nsensibility to be ours because we are continually feeling. It is not\nas evident that intelligence is ours, because we do not make use of it\ncontinuously, and because it is separated, in this sense, that it is\nnot intelligence that inclines towards us, but rather we who raise our\nglances towards intelligence. Sensation is our messenger, Intelligence\nis our king.[99]\n\n\nWE CAN THINK IN CONFORMITY WITH INTELLIGENCE IN TWO WAYS.\n\n4. We ourselves are kings when we think in conformity with\nintelligence. This, however, can take place in two ways. Either\nwe have received from intelligence the impressions and rules which\nare, as it were, engraved within us, so that we are, so to speak,\nfilled with intelligence; or we can have the perception and intuition\nof it, because it is present with us. When we see intelligence, we\nrecognize that by contemplation of it we ourselves are grasping other\nintelligible entities. This may occur in two ways; either because,\nby the help of this very power, we grasp the power which cognizes\nintelligible entities; or because we ourselves become intelligence.\nThe man who thus knows himself is double. Either he knows discursive\nreason, which is characteristic of the soul, or, rising to a superior\ncondition, he cognizes himself and is united with intelligence. Then,\nby intelligence, that man thinks himself; no more indeed as being man,\nbut as having become superior to man, as having been transported into\nthe intelligible Reason, and drawing thither with himself the best part\nof the soul, the one which alone is capable of taking flight towards\nthought, and of receiving the fund of knowledge resulting from his\nintuition. But does discursive reason not know that it is discursive\nreason, and that its domain is the comprehension of external objects?\nDoes it not, while doing so, know that it judges? Does it not know that\nit is judging by means of the rules derived from intelligence, which\nitself contains? Does it not know that above it is a principle which\npossesses intelligible entities, instead of seeking (merely) to know\nthem? But what would this faculty be if it did not know what it is,\nand what its functions are? It knows, therefore, that it depends on\nintelligence, that it is inferior to intelligence, and that it is the\nimage of intelligence, that it contains the rules of intelligence as\nit were engraved within itself, such as intelligence engraves them, or\nrather, has engraved them on it.\n\n\nMAN IS SELF-CONSCIOUS BY BECOMING INTELLIGENCE.\n\nWill he who thus knows himself content himself therewith? Surely\nnot. Exercising a further faculty, we will have the intuition of\nthe intelligence that knows itself; or, seizing it, inasmuch as it\nis \"ours\" and we are \"its,\" we will thus cognize intelligence, and\nknow ourselves. This is necessary for our knowledge of what, within\nintelligence, self-consciousness is. The man becomes intelligence when,\nabandoning his other faculties, he by intelligence sees Intelligence,\nand he sees himself in the same manner that Intelligence sees itself.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE IS NOT DIVISIBLE; AND, IN ITS EXISTENCE, IS IDENTICAL WITH\nTHOUGHT.\n\n5. Does pure Intelligence know itself by contemplating one of its\nparts by means of another part? Then one part will be the subject, and\nanother part will be the object of contemplation; intelligence will\nnot know itself. It may be objected that if intelligence be a whole\ncomposed of absolutely similar parts, so that the subject and the\nobject of contemplation will not differ from each other; then, by the\nvirtue of this similitude, on seeing one of its parts with which it is\nidentical, intelligence will see itself; for, in this case, the subject\ndoes not differ from the object. To begin with, it is absurd to suppose\nthat intelligence is divided into several parts. How, indeed, would\nsuch a division be carried out? Not by chance, surely. Who will carry\nit out? Will it be the subject or object? Then, how would the subject\nknow itself if, in contemplation, it located itself in the object,\nsince contemplation does not belong to that which is the object?\nWill it know itself as object rather than as subject? In that case\nit will not know itself completely and in its totality (as subject\nand object); for what it sees is the object, and not the subject of\ncontemplation; it sees not itself, but another. In order to attain\ncomplete knowledge of itself it will, besides, have to see itself\nas subject; now, if it see itself as subject, it will, at the same\ntime, have to see the contemplated things. But is it the (Stoic[104])\n\"types\" (or impressions) of things, or the things themselves, that\nare contained in the actualization of contemplation? If it be these\nimpressions, we do not possess the things themselves. If we do possess\nthese things, it is not because we separate ourselves (into subject\nand object). Before dividing ourselves in this way, we already saw and\npossessed these things. Consequently, contemplation must be identical\nwith that which is contemplated, and intelligence must be identical\nwith the intelligible. Without this identity, we will never possess\nthe truth. Instead of possessing realities, we will never possess any\nmore than their impressions, which will differ from the realities;\nconsequently, this will not be the truth. Truth, therefore, must not\ndiffer from its object; it must be what it asserts.\n\n\nTHOUGHT IS IDENTICAL WITH THE INTELLIGIBLE WHICH IS AN ACTUALIZATION.\n\nOn one hand, therefore, intelligence, and on the other the intelligible\nand existence form but one and the same thing, namely, the primary\nexistence and primary Intelligence, which possesses realities, or\nrather, which is identical with them. But if the thought-object and\nthe thought together form but a single entity, how will the thinking\nobject thus be able to think itself? Evidently thought will embrace\nthe intelligible, or will be identical therewith; but we still do not\nsee how intelligence is to think itself. Here we are: thought and the\nintelligible fuse into one because the intelligible is an actualization\nand not a simple power; because life is neither alien nor incidental\nto it; because thought is not an accident for it, as it would be for\na brute body, as for instance, for a stone; and, finally, because\nthe intelligible is primary \"being.\" Now, if the intelligible be an\nactualization, it is the primary actualization, the most perfect\nthought, or, \"substantial thought.\" Now, as this thought is supremely\ntrue, as it is primary Thought, as it possesses existence in the\nhighest degree, it is primary Intelligence. It is not, therefore,\nmere potential intelligence; there is no need to distinguish within\nit the potentiality from the actualization of thought; otherwise,\nits substantiality would be merely potential. Now since intelligence\nis an actualization, and as its \"being\" also is an actualization, it\nmust fuse with its actualization. But existence and the intelligible\nalso fuse with their actualization. Therefore[105] intelligence, the\nintelligible, and thought will form but one and the same entity.\nSince the thought of the intelligible is the intelligible, and as the\nintelligible is intelligence, intelligence will thus think itself.\nIntelligence will think, by the actualization of the thought to which\nit is identical, the intelligible to which it also is identical.\nIt will think itself, so far as it is thought; and in so far as it\nis the intelligible which it thinks by the thought to which it is\nidentical.[106]\n\n\nSELF-CONSCIOUSNESS MORE PERFECT IN INTELLIGENCE THAN IN THE SOUL.\n\n6. Reason, therefore, demonstrates that there is a principle which must\nessentially know itself. But this self-consciousness is more perfect in\nintelligence than in the soul. The soul knows herself in so far as she\nknows that she depends on another power; while intelligence, by merely\nturning towards itself, naturally cognizes its existence and \"being.\"\nBy contemplating realities, it contemplates itself; this contemplation\nis an actualization, and this actualization is intelligence; for\nintelligence and thought[107] form but a single entity. The entire\nintelligence sees itself entire, instead of seeing one of its parts\nby another of its parts. Is it in the nature of intelligence, such as\nreason conceives of it, to produce within us a simple conviction? No.\nIntelligence necessarily implies (certitude), and not mere persuasion;\nfor necessity is characteristic of intelligence, while persuasion is\ncharacteristic of the soul. Here below, it is true, we rather seek to\nbe persuaded, than to see truth by pure Intelligence. When we were in\nthe superior region, satisfied with intelligence, we used to think, and\nto contemplate the intelligible, reducing everything to unity. It was\nIntelligence which thought and spoke about itself; the soul rested, and\nallowed Intelligence free scope to act. But since we have descended\nhere below, we seek to produce persuasion in the soul, because we wish\nto contemplate the model in its image.\n\n\nTHE SOUL MUST BE TAUGHT SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS BY CONVERSION.\n\nWe must, therefore, teach our soul how Intelligence contemplates\nitself. This has to be taught to that part of our soul which,\nbecause of its intellectual character, we call reason, or discursive\nintelligence, to indicate that it is a kind of intelligence, that\nit possesses its power by intelligence, and that it derives it from\nintelligence. This part of the soul must, therefore, know that it\nknows what it sees, that it knows what it expresses, and that, if it\nwere identical with what it describes, it would thereby know itself.\nBut since intelligible entities come to it from the same principle\nfrom which it itself comes, since it is a reason, and as it receives\nfrom intelligence entities that are kindred, by comparing them with\nthe traces of intelligence it contains, it must know itself. This\nimage it contains must, therefore, be raised to true Intelligence,\nwhich is identical with the true intelligible entities, that is, to\nthe primary and really true Beings; for it is impossible that this\nintelligence should originate from itself. If then intelligence remain\nin itself and with itself, if it be what it is (in its nature) to be,\nthat is, intelligence--for intelligence can never be unintelligent--it\nmust contain within it the knowledge of itself, since it does not\nissue from itself, and since its function and its \"being\" (or, true\nnature) consist in being no more than intelligence.[106] It is not\nan intelligence that devotes itself to practical action, obliged\nto consider what is external to it, and to issue from itself to\nbecome cognizant of exterior things; for it is not necessary that an\nintelligence which devotes itself to action should know itself. As it\ndoes not give itself to action--for, being pure, it has nothing to\ndesire--it operates a conversion towards itself, by virtue of which\nit is not only probable, but even necessary for it to know itself.\nOtherwise, what would its life consist of, inasmuch as it does not\ndevote itself to action, and as it remains within itself?\n\n\nWHATEVER INTELLIGENCE MAY BE THOUGHT TO DO, IT MUST KNOW ITSELF.\n\n7. It may be objected that the Intelligence contemplates the divinity.\nIf, however, it be granted, that the Intelligence knows the divinity,\none is thereby forced to admit that it also knows itself; for it\nwill know what it derives from the divinity, what it has received\nfrom Him, and what it still may hope to receive from Him. By knowing\nthis, it will know itself, since it is one of the entities given\nby the divinity; or rather, since it is all that is given by the\ndivinity. If then, it know the divinity, it knows also the powers of\nthe divinity, it knows that itself proceeds from the divinity, and\nthat itself derives its powers from the divinity. If Intelligence\ncannot have a clear intuition of the divinity, because the subject and\nobject of an intuition must be the same, this will turn out to be a\nreason why Intelligence will know itself, and will see itself, since\nseeing is being what is seen. What else indeed could we attribute to\nIntelligence? Rest, for instance? For Intelligence, rest does not\nconsist in being removed from itself, but rather to act without being\ndisturbed by anything that is alien. The things that are not troubled\nby anything alien need only to produce their own actualization,\nespecially when they are in actualization, and not merely potential.\nThat which is in actualization, and which cannot be in actualization\nfor anything foreign, must be in actualization for itself. When\nthinking itself, Intelligence remains turned towards itself, referring\nits actualization to itself. If anything proceed from it, it is\nprecisely because it remains turned towards itself that it remains in\nitself. It had, indeed, to apply itself to itself, before applying\nitself to anything else, or producing something else that resembled it;\nthus fire must first be fire in itself, and be fire in actualization,\nin order later to impart some traces of its nature to other things.\nIntelligence, in itself, therefore, is an actualization. The soul,\non turning herself towards Intelligence, remains within herself; on\nissuing from Intelligence, the soul turns towards external things. On\nturning towards Intelligence, she becomes similar to the power from\nwhich she proceeds; on issuing from Intelligence, she becomes different\nfrom herself. Nevertheless, she still preserves some resemblance to\nIntelligence, both in her activity and productiveness. When active,\nthe soul still contemplates Intelligence; when productive, the soul\nproduces forms, which resemble distant thoughts, and are traces of\nthought and Intelligence, traces that conform to their archetype; and\nwhich reveal a faithful imitation thereof, or which, at least, still\npreserve a weakened image thereof, even if they do occupy only the last\nrank of beings.\n\n\nWHAT INTELLIGENCE LOOKS LIKE IN THE INTELLIGIBLE.\n\n8. What qualities does Intelligence display in the intelligible\nworld? What qualities does it discover in itself by contemplation? To\nbegin with, we must not form of Intelligence a conception showing a\nfigure, or colors, like bodies. Intelligence existed before bodies.\nThe \"seminal reasons\" which produce figure and color are not identical\nwith them; for \"seminal reasons\" are invisible. So much the more are\nintelligible entities invisible; their nature is identical with that\nof the principles in which they reside, just as \"seminal reasons\" are\nidentical with the soul that contains them. But the soul does not see\nthe entities she contains, because she has not begotten them; even\nshe herself, just like the \"reasons,\" is no more than an image (of\nIntelligence). The principle from which she comes possesses an evident\nexistence, that is genuine, and primary; consequently, that principle\nexists of and in itself. But this image (which is in the soul) is not\neven permanent unless it belong to something else, and reside therein.\nIndeed, the characteristic of an image is that it resides in something\nelse, since it belongs to something else, unless it remain attached to\nits principle. Consequently, this image does not contemplate, because\nit does not possess a light that is sufficient; and even if it should\ncontemplate, as it finds its perfection in something else, it would\nbe contemplating something else, instead of contemplating itself. The\nsame case does not obtain in Intelligence; there the contemplated\nentity and contemplation co-exist, and are identical. Who is it,\ntherefore, that declares the nature of the intelligible? The power\nthat contemplates it, namely, Intelligence itself. Here below our eyes\nsee the light because our vision itself is light, or rather because\nit is united to light; for it is the colors that our vision beholds.\nOn the contrary, Intelligence does not see through something else,\nbut through itself, because what it sees is not outside of itself.\nIt sees a light with another light, and not by another light; it,\nis therefore, a light that sees another; and, consequently, it sees\nitself. This light, on shining in the soul, illuminates her; that is,\nintellectualizes her; assimilates her to the superior light (namely,\nin Intelligence). If, by the ray with which this light enlightens\nthe soul, we judge of the nature of this light and conceive of it as\nstill greater, more beautiful, and more brilliant, we will indeed\nbe approaching Intelligence and the intelligible world; for, by\nenlightening the soul, Intelligence imparts to her a clearer life. This\nlife is not generative, because Intelligence converts the soul towards\nIntelligence; and, instead of allowing the soul to divide, causes the\nsoul to love the splendor with which she is shining. Neither is this\nlife one of the senses, for though the senses apply themselves to\nwhat is exterior, they do not, on that account, learn anything beyond\n(themselves). He who sees that superior light of the verities sees\nmuch better things that are visible, though in a different manner.\nIt remains, therefore, that the Intelligence imparts to the soul the\nintellectual life, which is a trace of her own life; for Intelligence\npossesses the realities. It is in the life and the actualization which\nare characteristic of Intelligence that here consists the primary\nLight, which from the beginning,[108] illumines itself, which reflects\non itself, because it is simultaneously enlightener and enlightened; it\nis also the true intelligible entity, because it is also at the same\ntime thinker and thought. It sees itself by itself, without having\nneed of anything else; it sees itself in an absolute manner, because,\nwithin it, the known is identical with the knower. It is not otherwise\nin us; it is by Intelligence that we know intelligence. Otherwise,\nhow could we speak of it? How could we say that it was capable of\nclearly grasping itself, and that, by it, we understand ourselves? How\ncould we, by these reasonings, to Intelligence reduce our soul which\nrecognizes that it is the image of Intelligence, which considers its\nlife a faithful imitation of the life of Intelligence, which thinks\nthat, when it thinks, it assumes an intellectual and divine form?\nShould one wish to know which is this Intelligence that is perfect,\nuniversal and primary, which knows itself essentially, the soul has to\nbe reduced to Intelligence; or, at least, the soul has to recognize\nthat the actualization by which the soul conceives the entities of\nwhich the soul has the reminiscence is derived from Intelligence. Only\nby placing herself in that condition, does the soul become able to\ndemonstrate that inasmuch as she is the image of Intelligence she, the\nsoul, can by herself, see it; that is, by those of her powers which\nmost exactly resemble Intelligence (namely, by pure thought); which\nresembles Intelligence in the degree that a part of the soul can be\nassimilated to it.\n\n\nWE CAN REACH A CONCEPTION OF INTELLIGENCE BY STRIPPING THE SOUL OF\nEVERY FACULTY EXCEPT HER INTELLECTUAL PART.\n\n9. We must, therefore, contemplate the soul and her divinest part\nin order to discover the nature of Intelligence. This is how we may\naccomplish it: From man, that is from yourself, strip off the body;\nthen that power of the soul that fashions the body; then sensation,\nappetite, and anger, and all the lower passions that incline you\ntowards the earth. What then remains of the soul is what we call the\n\"image of intelligence,\" an image that radiates from Intelligence, as\nfrom the immense globe of the sun radiates the surrounding luminary\nsphere. Of course, we would not say that all the light that radiates\nfrom the sun remains within itself around the sun; only a part of this\nlight remains around the sun from which it emanates; another part,\nspreading by relays, descends to us on the earth. But we consider\nlight, even that which surrounds the sun, as located in something else,\nso as not to be forced to consider the whole space between the sun and\nus as empty of all bodies. On the contrary, the soul is a light which\nremains attached to Intelligence, and she is not located in any space\nbecause Intelligence itself is not spatially located. While the light\nof the sun is in the air, on the contrary the soul, in the state in\nwhich we consider her here, is so pure that she can be seen in herself\nby herself, and by any other soul that is in the same condition.\nThe soul needs to reason, in order to conceive of the nature of\nIntelligence according to her own nature; but Intelligence conceives of\nitself without reasoning because it is always present to itself. We, on\nthe contrary, are present both to ourselves and to Intelligence when we\nturn towards it, because our life is divided into several lives. On the\ncontrary, Intelligence has no need of any other life, nor of anything\nelse; what Intelligence gives is not given to itself, but to other\nthings; neither does Intelligence have any need of what is inferior\nto it; nor could Intelligence give itself anything inferior, since\nIntelligence possesses all things; instead of possessing in itself the\nprimary images of things (as in the case of the soul), Intelligence is\nthese things themselves.\n\n\nELEVATION OF THE SOUL MAY BE GRADUAL, IF UNABLE TO ATTAIN IMMEDIATE\nELEVATION.\n\nIf one should find himself unable to rise immediately to pure thought,\nwhich is the highest, or first, part of the soul, he may begin by\nopinion, and from it rise to Intelligence. If even opinion be out\nof the reach of his ability, he may begin with sensation, which\nalready represents general forms; for sensation which contains the\nforms potentially may possess them even in actualization. If, on the\ncontrary, the best he can do is to descend, let him descend to the\ngenerative power, and to the things it produces; then, from the last\nforms, one may rise again to the higher forms, and so on to the primary\nforms.\n\n\nTHE TRANSCENDENT FIRST PRINCIPLE HAS NO NEED OF SEEING ITSELF.\n\n10. But enough of this. If the (forms) contained by Intelligence are\nnot created forms--otherwise the forms contained in us would no longer,\nas they should, occupy the lowest rank--if these forms in intelligence\nreally be creative and primary, then either these creative forms and\nthe creative principle fuse into one single entity, or intelligence\nneeds some other principle. But does the transcendent Principle, that\nis superior to Intelligence (the One), itself also need some other\nfurther principle? No, because it is only Intelligence that stands in\nneed of such an one. Does the Principle superior to Intelligence (the\ntranscendent One) not see Himself? No. He does not need to see Himself.\nThis we shall study elsewhere.\n\n\nTHE CONTEMPLATION OF INTELLIGENCE DEMANDS A HIGHER TRANSCENDING UNITY.\n\nLet us now return to our most important problem. Intelligence needs\nto contemplate itself, or rather, it continually possesses this\ncontemplation. It first sees that it is manifold, and then that it\nimplies a difference, and further, that it needs to contemplate,\nto contemplate the intelligible, and that its very essence is to\ncontemplate. Indeed, every contemplation implies an object; otherwise,\nit is empty. To make contemplation possible there must be more than\nan unity; contemplation must be applied to an object, and this object\nmust be manifold; for what is simple has no object on which it could\napply its action, and silently remains withdrawn in its solitude.\nAction implies some sort of difference. Otherwise, to what would\naction apply itself? What would be its object? The active principle,\nmust, therefore, direct its action on something else than itself, or\nmust itself be manifold to direct its action on itself. If, indeed,\nit direct its action on nothing, it will be at rest; and if at rest,\nit will not be thinking. The thinking principle, therefore, when\nthinking, implies duality. Whether the two terms be one exterior\nto the other, or united, thought always implies both identity and\ndifference. In general, intelligible entities must simultaneously be\nidentical with Intelligence, and different from Intelligence. Besides,\neach of them must also contain within itself identity and difference.\nOtherwise, if the intelligible does not contain any diversity, what\nwould be the object of thought? If you insist that each intelligible\nentity resembles a (\"seminal) reason,\" it must be manifold. Every\nintelligible entity, therefore, knows itself to be a compound, and\nmany-colored eye. If intelligence applied itself to something single\nand absolutely simple, it could not think. What would it say? What\nwould it understand? If the indivisible asserted itself it ought first\nto assert what it is not; and so, in order to be single it would have\nto be manifold. If it said, \"I am this,\" and if it did not assert that\n\"this\" was different from itself, it would be uttering untruth. If\nit asserted it as an accident of itself, it would assert of itself\na multitude. If it says, \"I am; I am; myself; myself;\" then neither\nthese two things will be simple, and each of them will be able to say,\n\"me;\" or there will be manifoldness, and, consequently, a difference;\nand, consequently, number and diversity. The thinking subject must,\ntherefore, contain a difference, just as the object thought must also\nreveal a diversity, because it is divided by thought. Otherwise, there\nwill be no other thought of the intelligible, but a kind of touch, of\nunspeakable and inconceivable contact, prior to intelligence, since\nintelligence is not yet supposed to exist, and as the possessor of\nthis contact does not think. The thinking subject, therefore, must\nnot remain simple, especially, when it thinks itself; it must split\nitself, even were the comprehension of itself silent. Last, that which\nis simple (the One) has no need of occupying itself with itself. What\nwould it learn by thinking? Is it not what it is before thinking\nitself? Besides, knowledge implies that some one desires, that some\none seeks, and that some one finds. That which does not within itself\ncontain any difference, when turned towards itself, rests without\nseeking anything within itself; but that which develops, is manifold.\n\n\nHOW INTELLIGENCE BECAME MANIFOLD.\n\n11. Intelligence, therefore, becomes manifold when it wishes to\nthink the Principle superior to it. By wishing to grasp Him in his\nsimplicity, it abandons this simplicity, because it continues to\nreceive within itself this differentiated and multiplied nature. It\nwas not yet Intelligence when it issued from Unity; it found itself\nin the state of sight when not yet actualized. When emanating from\nUnity, it contained already what made it manifold. It vaguely aspired\nto an object other than itself, while simultaneously containing a\nrepresentation of this object. It thus contained something that it\nmade manifold; for it contained a sort of impress produced by the\ncontemplation (of the One); otherwise it would not receive the One\nwithin itself. Thus Intelligence, on being born of Unity, became\nmanifold, and as it possessed knowledge, it contemplated itself. It\nthen became actualized sight. Intelligence is really intelligence\nonly when it possesses its object, and when it possesses it as\nintelligence. Formerly, it was only an aspiration, only an indistinct\nvision. On applying itself to the One, and grasping the One, it becomes\nintelligence. Now its receptivity to Unity is continuous, and it is\ncontinuously intelligence, \"being,\" thought, from the very moment it\nbegins to think. Before that, it is not yet thought, since it does not\npossess the intelligible, and is not yet Intelligence, since it does\nnot think.\n\n\nTHE ONE IS THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL WITHOUT BEING LIMITED THEREBY.\n\nThat which is above these things is their principle, without being\ninherent in them. The principle from which these things proceed cannot\nbe inherent in them; that is true only of the elements that constitute\nthem. The principle from which all things proceed (the One) is not\nany of them; it differs from all of them. The One, therefore, is not\nany of them; it differs from all of them. The One, therefore, is not\nany of the things of the universe: He precedes all these things, and\nconsequently, He precedes Intelligence, since the latter embraces all\nthings in its universality. On the other hand, as the things that are\nposterior to Unity are universal, and as Unity thus is anterior to\nuniversal things, it cannot be any one of them. Therefore, it should\nnot be called either intelligence or good, if by \"good\" you mean any\nobject comprised within the universe; this name suits it only, if\nit indicate that it is anterior to everything. If Intelligence be\nintelligence only because it is manifold; if thought, though found\nwithin Intelligence, be similarly manifold, then the First, the\nPrinciple that is absolutely simple, will be above Intelligence; for if\nHe think, He would be Intelligence; and if He be Intelligence, He would\nbe manifold.\n\n\nNO MANIFOLDNESS OF ANY KIND CAN EXIST IN THE FIRST.\n\n12. It may be objected, that nothing would hinder the existence of\nmanifoldness in the actualization of the First, so long as the \"being,\"\nor nature, remain unitary. That principle would not be rendered\ncomposite by any number of actualizations. This is not the case for\ntwo reasons. Either these actualizations are distinct from its nature\n(\"being\"), and the First would pass from potentiality to actuality; in\nwhich case, without doubt, the First is not manifold, but His nature\nwould not become perfect without actualization. Or the nature (\"being\")\nis, within Him identical to His actualization; in which case, as the\nactualization is manifold, the nature would be such also. Now we do\nindeed grant that Intelligence is manifold, since it thinks itself;\nbut we could not grant that the Principle of all things should also be\nmanifold. Unity must exist before the manifold, the reason of whose\nexistence is found in unity; for unity precedes all number. It may\nbe objected that this is true enough for numbers which follow unity,\nbecause they are composite; but what is the need of a unitary principle\nfrom which manifoldness should proceed when referring (not to numerals,\nbut) to beings? This need is that, without the One, all things would be\nin a dispersed condition, and their combinations would be no more than\na chaos.\n\n\nPERMANENT ACTUALIZATIONS ARE HYPOSTASES.\n\nAnother objection is, that from an intelligence that is simple,\nmanifold actualizations can surely proceed. This then admits the\nexistence of something simple before the actualizations. Later, as\nthese actualizations become permanent, they form hypostatic forms of\nexistence. Being such, they will have to differ from the Principle\nfrom which they proceed, since the Principle remains simple, and that\nwhich is born of it must in itself be manifold, and be dependent\nthereon. Even if these actualizations exist only because the Principle\nacted a single time, this already constitutes manifoldness. Though\nthese actualizations be the first ones, if they constitute second-rank\n(nature), the first rank will belong to the Principle that precedes\nthese actualizations; this Principle abides in itself, while these\nactualizations constitute that which is of second rank, and is composed\nof actualizations. The First differs from the actualizations He begets,\nbecause He begets them without activity; otherwise, Intelligence\nwould not be the first actualization. Nor should we think that the\nOne first desired to beget Intelligence, and later begat it, so that\nthis desire was an intermediary between the generating principle and\nthe generated entity. The One could not have desired anything; for\nif He had desired anything, He would have been imperfect, since He\nwould not yet have possessed what He desired. Nor could we suppose\nthat the One lacked anything; for there was nothing towards which He\ncould have moved. Therefore, the hypostatic form of existence which is\nbeneath Him received existence from Him, without ceasing to persist\nin its own condition. Therefore, if there is to be a hypostatic form\nof existence beneath Him He must have remained within Himself in\nperfect tranquility; otherwise, He would have initiated movement; and\nwe would have to conceive of a movement before the first movement,\na thought before the first thought, and its first actualization\nwould be imperfect, consisting in no more than a mere tendency.\nBut towards what can the first actualization of the One tend, and\nattain, if, according to the dictates of reason, we conceive of that\nactualization originating from Him as light emanates from the sun?\nThis actualization, therefore, will have to be considered as a light\nthat embraces the whole intelligible world; at the summit of which we\nshall have to posit, and over whose throne we shall have to conceive\nthe rule of the immovable One, without separating Him from the Light\nthat radiates from Him. Otherwise, above this Light we would have to\nposit another one, which, while remaining immovable, should enlighten\nthe intelligible. Indeed the actualization that emanates from the\nOne, without being separated from Him, nevertheless, differs from\nHim. Neither is its nature non-essential, or blind; it, therefore,\ncontemplates itself, and knows itself; it is, consequently, the first\nknowing principle. As the One is above Intelligence, it is also above\nconsciousness; as it needs nothing, neither has it any need of knowing\nanything. Cognition (or, consciousness), therefore, belongs only to the\nsecond-rank nature. Consciousness is only an individual unity, while\nthe One is absolute unity; indeed individual unity is not absolute\nUnity, because the absolute is (or, \"in and for itself\"), precedes the\n(\"somehow determined,\" or) individual.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME IS ABSOLUTELY INEFFABLE.\n\n13. This Principle, therefore, is really indescribable. We are\nindividualizing it in any statement about it. That which is above\neverything, even above the venerable Intelligence, really has no name,\nand all that we can state about Him is, that He is not anything. Nor\ncan He be given any name, since we cannot assert anything about Him.\nWe refer to Him only as best we can. In our uncertainty we say, \"What\ndoes He not feel? is He not self-conscious? does He not know Himself?\"\nThen we must reflect that by speaking thus we are thinking of things,\nthat are opposed to Him of whom we are now thinking. When we suppose\nthat He can be known, or that He possesses self-consciousness, we are\nalready making Him manifold. Were we to attribute to Him thought, it\nwould appear that He needed this thought. If we imagine thought as\nbeing within Him, thought seems to be superfluous. For of what does\nthought consist? Of the consciousness of the totality formed by the two\nterms that contribute to the act of thought, and which fuse therein.\nThat is thinking oneself, and thinking oneself is real thinking; for\neach of the two elements of thought is itself an unity to which nothing\nis lacking. On the contrary, the thought of objects exterior (to\nIntelligence) is not perfect, and is not true thought. That which is\nsupremely simple and supremely absolute stands in need of nothing. The\nabsolute that occupies the second rank needs itself, and, consequently,\nneeds to think itself. Indeed, since Intelligence needs something\nrelatively to itself, it succeeds in satisfying this need, and\nconsequently, in being absolute, only by possessing itself entirely.\nIt suffices itself only by uniting all the elements constituting its\nnature (\"being\"), only by dwelling within itself, only by remaining\nturned towards itself while thinking; for consciousness is the\nsensation of manifoldness, as is indicated by the etymology of the word\n\"con-scious-ness,\" or, \"conscience.\" If supreme Thought occur by the\nconversion of Intelligence towards itself, it evidently is manifold.\nEven if it said no more than \"I am existence,\" Intelligence would say\nit as if making a discovery, and Intelligence would be right, because\nexistence is manifold. Even though it should apply itself to something\nsimple, and should say, \"I am existence,\" this would not imply\nsuccessful grasp of itself or existence. Indeed, when Intelligence\nspeaks of existence in conformity with reality, intelligence does not\nspeak of it as of a stone, but, merely, in a single word expresses\nsomething manifold. The existence that really and essentially deserves\nthe name of existence, instead of having of it only a trace which\nwould not be existence, and which would be only an image of it, such\nexistence is a multiple entity. Will not each one of the elements of\nthis multiple entity be thought? No doubt you will not be able to think\nit if you take it alone and separated from the others; but existence\nitself is in itself something manifold. Whatever object you name, it\npossesses existence. Consequently, He who is supremely simple cannot\nthink Himself; if He did, He would be somewhere, (which is not the\ncase). Therefore He does not think, and He cannot be grasped by thought.\n\n\nWE COME SUFFICIENTLY NEAR TO HIM TO TALK ABOUT HIM.\n\n14. How then do we speak of Him? Because we can assert something about\nHim, though we cannot express Him by speech. We could not know Him, nor\ngrasp Him by thought. How then do we speak of Him, if we cannot grasp\nHim? Because though He does escape our knowledge, He does not escape us\ncompletely. We grasp Him enough to assert something about Him without\nexpressing Him himself, to say what He is not, without saying what He\nis; that is why in speaking of Him we use terms that are suitable to\ndesignate only lower things. Besides we can embrace Him without being\ncapable of expressing Him, like men who, transported by a divine\nenthusiasm, feel that they contain something superior without being\nable to account for it. They speak of what agitates them, and they thus\nhave some feeling of Him who moves them, though they differ therefrom.\nSuch is our relation with Him; when we rise to Him by using our pure\nintelligence, we feel that He is the foundation of our intelligence,\nthe principle that furnishes \"being\" and other things of the kind; we\nfeel that He is better, greater, and more elevated than we, because He\nis superior to reason, to intelligence, and to the senses, because He\ngives these things without being what they are.\n\n\nRADIATION OF MULTIPLE UNITY.\n\n15. How does He give them? Is it because He possesses them, or because\nHe does not possess them? If it be because He does not possess them,\nhow does He give what He does not possess? If it be because He does\npossess them, He is no longer simple. If He give what He does not\npossess, how is multiplicity born of Him? It would seem as if only\none single thing could proceed from Him, unity; and even so one might\nwonder how anything whatever could be born of that which is absolutely\none. We answer, in the same way as from a light radiates a luminous\nsphere (or, fulguration[109]). But how can the manifold be born from\nthe One? Because the thing that proceeds from Him must not be equal to\nHim, and so much the less, superior; for what is superior to unity,\nor better than Him? It must, therefore, be inferior to Him, and,\nconsequently, be less perfect. Now it cannot be less perfect, except\non condition of being less unitary, that is, more manifold. But as it\nmust aspire to unity, it will be the \"manifold one.\" It is by that\nwhich is single that that which is not single is preserved, and is\nwhat it is; for that which is not one, though composite, cannot receive\nthe name of existence. If it be possible to say what each thing is, it\nis only because it is one and identical. What is not manifold is not\none by participation, but is absolute unity; it does not derive its\nunity from any other principle; on the contrary it is the principle to\nwhich other things owe that they are more or less single, according as\nthey are more or less close to it. Since the characteristic of that\nwhich is nearest to unity is identity, and is posterior to unity,\nevidently the manifoldness contained therein, must be the totality of\nthings that are single. For since manifoldness is therein united with\nmanifoldness, it does not contain parts separated from each other,\nand all subsist together. Each of the things, that proceed therefrom,\nare manifold unity, because they cannot be universal unity. Universal\nunity is characteristic only of their principle (the intelligible\nBeing), because itself proceeds from a great Principle which is one,\nessentially, and genuinely. That which, by its exuberant fruitfulness,\nbegets, is all; on the other hand, as this totality participates\nin unity, it is single; and, consequently, it is single totality\n(universal unity).\n\n\nTHE SUPREME PRODUCES MANIFOLDNESS BECAUSE OF ITS CATEGORIES.\n\nWe have seen that existence is \"all these things;\" now, what are they?\nAll those of which the One is the principle. But how can the One be\nthe principle of all things? Because the One preserves their existence\nwhile effecting the individuality of each of them. Is it also because\nHe gives them existence? And if so, does He do so by possessing them?\nIn this case, the One would be manifold. No, it is by containing them\nwithout any distinction yet having arisen among them. On the contrary,\nin the second principle they are distinguished by reason; that is,\nthey are logically distinguished, because this second principle is an\nactualization, while the first Principle is the power-potentiality[107]\nof all things; not in the sense in which we say that matter is\npotential in that it receives, or suffers, but in the opposite sense\nthat the One produces. How then can the One produce what it does not\npossess, since unity produces that neither by chance nor by reflection?\nWe have already said that what proceeds from unity must differ from it;\nand, consequently, cannot be absolutely one; that it must be duality,\nand, consequently, multitude, since it will contain (the categories,\nsuch as) identity, and difference, quality, and so forth.[110] We have\ndemonstrated that that which is born of the One is not absolutely one.\nIt now remains for us to inquire whether it will be manifold, such as\nit is seen to be in what proceeds from the One. We shall also have to\nconsider why it necessarily proceeds from the One.\n\n\nTHE GOOD MUST BE SUPERIOR TO INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE.\n\n16. We have shown elsewhere that something must follow the One,\nand that the One is a power, and is inexhaustible; and this is so,\nbecause even the last-rank entities possess the power of begetting.\nFor the present we may notice that the generation of things reveals\na descending procession, in which, the further we go, the more does\nmanifoldness increase; and that the principle is always simpler than\nthe things it produces.[111] Therefore, that which has produced the\nsense world is not the sense-world itself, but Intelligence and the\nintelligible world; and that which has begotten Intelligence and\nthe intelligible world is neither Intelligence nor the intelligible\nworld, but something simpler than them. Manifoldness is not born of\nmanifoldness, but of something that is not manifold. If That which\nwas superior to Intelligence were manifold, it would no longer be the\n(supreme) Principle, and we would have to ascend further. Everything\nmust, therefore, be reduced to that which is essentially one, which\nis outside of all manifoldness; and whose simplicity is the greatest\npossible. But how can manifold and universal Reason be born of the One,\nwhen very evidently the One is not a reason? As it is not a reason,\nhow can it beget Reason? How can the Good beget a hypostatic form of\nexistence, which would be good in form? What does this hypostatic form\nof existence possess? Is it identity? But what is the relation between\nidentity and goodness? Because as soon as we possess the Good, we seek\nidentity and permanence; and because the Good is the principle from\nwhich we must not separate; for if it were not the Good, it would be\nbetter to give it up. We must, therefore, wish to remain united to the\nGood. Since that is the most desirable for Intelligence, it need seek\nnothing beyond, and its permanence indicates its satisfaction with\nthe entities it possesses. Enjoying, as it does, their presence in a\nmanner such that it fuses with them, it must then consider life as the\nmost precious entity of all. As Intelligence possesses life in its\nuniversality and fulness, this life is the fulness and universality of\nthe Soul and Intelligence. Intelligence, therefore, is self-sufficient,\nand desires nothing; it contains what it would have desired if it had\nnot already possessed such desirable object. It possesses the good that\nconsists in life and intelligence, as we have said, or in some one of\nthe connected entities. If Life and Intelligence were the absolute\nGood, there would be nothing above them. But if the absolute Good be\nabove them, the good of Intelligence is this Life, which relates to\nthe absolute Good, which connects with it, which receives existence\nfrom it, and rises towards it, because it is its principle. The Good,\ntherefore, must be superior to Life and Intelligence. On this condition\nonly does the life of Intelligence, the image of Him from whom all life\nproceeds, turn towards Him; on this condition only does Intelligence,\nthe imitation of the contents of the One, whatever be His nature, turn\ntowards Him.\n\n\nTHE SUPREME AS SUPERESSENTIAL AND SUPEREXISTENT.\n\n17. What better thing is there then than this supremely wise Life,\nexempt from all fault or error? What is there better than the\nIntelligence that embraces everything? In one word, what is there\nbetter than universal Life and universal Intelligence? If we answer\nthat what is better than these things is the Principle that begat\nthem, if we content ourselves with explaining how it begat them,\nand to show that one cannot discover anything better, we shall,\ninstead of progressing in this discussion, ever remain at the same\npoint. Nevertheless, we need to rise higher. We are particularly\nobliged to do this, when we consider that the principle that we seek\nmust be considered as the \"Self-sufficient supremely independent\nof all things;\" for no entity is able to be self-sufficient, and\nall have participated in the One; and since they have done so, none\nof them can be the One. Which then is this principle in which all\nparticipate, which makes Intelligence exist, and is all things? Since\nit makes Intelligence exist, and since it is all things, since it\nmakes its contained manifoldness self-sufficient by the presence of\nunity, and since it is thus the creative principle of \"being\" and\nself-sufficiency, it must, instead of being \"being,\" be super-\"being\"\nand super-existence.\n\n\nECSTASY IS INTELLECTUAL CONTACT WITH SUDDEN LIGHT.\n\nHave we said enough, and can we stop here? Or does our soul still feel\nthe pains of parturition? Let her, therefore, produce (activity),\nrushing towards the One, driven by the pains that agitate her. No,\nlet us rather seek to calm her by some magic charm, if any remedy\ntherefor exist. But to charm the soul, it may perhaps be sufficient to\nrepeat what we have already said. To what other charm, indeed, would\nit suffice to have recourse? Rising above all the truths in which we\nparticipate, this enchantment evanesces the moment we speak, or even\nthink. For, in order to express something, discursive reason is obliged\nto go from one thing to another, and successively to run through every\nelement of its object. Now what can be successively scrutinized in\nthat which is absolutely simple? It is, therefore, sufficient to reach\nHim by a sort of intellectual contact. Now at the moment of touching\nthe One, we should neither be able to say anything about Him, nor have\nthe leisure to speak of Him; only later is it possible to argue about\nHim. We should believe that we have seen Him when a sudden light has\nenlightened the soul; for this light comes from Him, and is Himself. We\nshould believe that He is present when, as another (lower) divinity,\nHe illumines the house of him who calls on this divinity,[112] for it\nremains obscure without the illumination of the divinity. The soul,\ntherefore, is without light when she is deprived of the presence of\nthis divinity, when illumined by this divinity, she has what she\nsought. The true purpose of the soul is to be in contact with this\nlight, to see this light in the radiance of this light itself, without\nthe assistance of any foreign light, to see this principle by the\nhelp of which she sees. Indeed, it is the principle by which she is\nenlightened that she must contemplate as one gazes at the sun only\nthrough its own light. But how shall we succeed in this? By cutting off\neverything else.[113]\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE.[114]\n\nOf Love, or \"Eros.\"\n\n\nLOVE AS GOD, GUARDIAN AND PASSION.\n\n1. Is Love a divinity, a guardian, or a passion of the human soul? Or\nis it all three under different points of view? In this case, what is\nit under each of these points of view? These are the questions we are\nto consider, consulting the opinions of men, but chiefly those of the\nphilosophers. The divine Plato, who has written much about love, here\ndeserves particular attention. He says that it is not only a passion\ncapable of being born in souls, but he calls it also a guardian, and he\ngives many details about its birth and parents.[115]\n\n\nPASSIONAL LOVE IS TWOFOLD.\n\nTo begin with passion, it is a matter of common knowledge that the\npassion designated as love is born in the souls which desire to unite\nthemselves to a beautiful object. But its object may be either a\nshameful practice, or one (worthy to be pursued by) temperate men,\nwho are familiar with beauty. We must, therefore, investigate in a\nphilosophical manner what is the origin of both kinds of love.\n\n\nLOVE IS RECOGNITION OF HIDDEN AFFINITY.\n\nThe real cause of love is fourfold: the desire of beauty; our soul's\ninnate notion of beauty; our soul's affinity with beauty, and our\nsoul's instinctive sentiment of this affinity.[116] (Therefore as\nbeauty lies at the root of love, so) ugliness is contrary to nature\nand divinity. In fact, when Nature wants to create, she contemplates\nwhat is beautiful, determinate, and comprehended within the\n(Pythagorean) \"sphere\" of the Good. On the contrary, the (Pythagorean)\n\"indeterminate\"[115] is ugly, and belongs to the other system.[117]\nBesides, Nature herself owes her origin to the Good, and, therefore,\nalso to the Beautiful. Now, as soon as one is attracted by an object,\nbecause one is united to it by a secret affinity, he experiences for\nthe images of this object a sentiment of sympathy. We could not explain\nits origin, or assign its cause on any other hypothesis, even were we\nto limit ourselves to the consideration of physical love. Even this\nkind of love is a desire to procreate beauty,[118] for it would be\nabsurd to insist that that Nature, which aspires to create beautiful\nthings, should aspire to procreate that which is ugly.\n\n\nEARTHLY BEAUTY IS AN IMAGE OF INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY.\n\nOf course, those who, here below, desire to procreate are satisfied in\nattaining that which is beautiful here below: namely, the beauty which\nshines in images and bodies; for they do not possess that intelligible\nBeauty which, nevertheless, inspires them with that very love which\nthey bear to visible beauty. That is the reason why those who ascend\nto the reminiscence of intelligible Beauty love that which they behold\nhere below only because it is an image of the other.[119] As to those\nwho fail to rise to the reminiscence of the intelligible Beauty,\nbecause they do not know the cause of their passion, they mistake\nvisible beauty for that veritable Beauty, and they may even love it\nchastely, if they be temperate: but to go as far as a carnal union is\nan error, in any case. Hence, it happens that only he who is inspired\nby a pure love for the beautiful really loves beauty, whether or not he\nhave aroused his reminiscence of intelligible Beauty.\n\n\nBEAUTY IS IMMORTAL.\n\nThey who join to this passion as much of a desire for immortality\nas our mortal nature admits, seek beauty in the perpetuity of the\nprocreation which renders man imperishable. They determine to\nprocreate and produce beauty according to nature; procreating because\ntheir object is perpetuity; and procreating beautifully because they\npossess affinity with it. In fact, perpetuity does bear affinity to\nbeauty; perpetual nature is beauty itself; and such also are all its\nderivatives.\n\n\nPASSIONAL LOVE MAY BE ELEVATING, THOUGH OPEN TO MISLEADING TEMPTATIONS.\n\nThus he who does not desire to procreate seems to aspire to the\npossession of the beautiful in a higher degree. He who desires to\nprocreate does no doubt desire to procreate the beautiful; but his\ndesire indicates in him the presence of need, and dissatisfaction with\nmere possession of beauty; He thinks he will be procreating beauty,\nif he begets on that which is beautiful. They who wish to satisfy\nphysical love against human laws, and nature, no doubt have a natural\ninclination as principle of a triple passion; but they lose their\nway straying from the right road for lack of knowledge of the end to\nwhich love was impelling them, of the goal of the aspiration (roused\nby) the desire of generation, and of the proper use of the image of\nbeauty.[120] They really do ignore Beauty itself. They who love\nbeautiful bodies without desiring to unite themselves to them, love\nthem for their beauty only. Those who love the beauty of women, and\ndesire union with them, love both beauty and perpetuity, so long as\nthis object is not lost from sight. Both of these are temperate, but\nthey who love bodies for their beauty only are the more virtuous. The\nformer admire sensual beauty, and are content therewith; the latter\nrecall intelligible beauty, but, without scorning visible beauty,\nregard it as an effect and image of the intelligible Beauty.[121] Both,\ntherefore, love beauty without ever needing to blush. But, as to those\n(who violate laws human and divine), love of beauty misleads them to\nfalling into ugliness; for the desire of good may often mislead to a\nfall into evil. Such is love considered as a passion of the soul.\n\n\nTHE PLATONIC MYTH OF LOVE.\n\n2. Now let us speak of the Love which is considered a deity not only\nby men in general, but also by the (Orphic) theologians, and by Plato.\nThe latter often speaks of Love, son of Venus, attributing to him the\nmission of being the chief of the beautiful children (or, boys); and\nto direct souls to the contemplation of intelligible Beauty, or, if\nalready present, to intensify the instinct to seek it. In his \"Banquet\"\nPlato says that Love is born (not of Venus, but) of Abundance and\nNeed,[122] ... on some birthday (?) of Venus.\n\n\nINTERPRETATION OF THE PLATONIC MYTH.\n\nTo explain if Love be born of Venus, or if he were only born\ncontemporaneously with his mother, we shall have to study something\nabout Venus. What is Venus? Is she the mother of Love, or only his\ncontemporary? As answer hereto we shall observe that there are two\nVenuses.[123] The second (or Popular Venus) is daughter of Jupiter\nand Dione, and she presides over earthly marriages. The first Venus,\nthe celestial one, daughter of Uranus (by Plato, in his Cratylus,\ninterpreted to mean \"contemplation of things above\"), has no mother,\nand does not preside over marriages, for the reason that there are none\nin heaven. The Celestial Venus, therefore, daughter of Kronos,[124]\nthat is, of Intelligence, is the divine Soul, which is born pure of\npure Intelligence, and which dwells above.[125] As her nature does not\nadmit of inclining earthward, she neither can nor will descend here\nbelow. She is, therefore, a form of existence (or, an hypostasis),\nseparated from matter, not participating in its nature. This is the\nsignificance of the allegory that she had no mother. Rather than a\nguardian, therefore, she should be considered a deity, as she is pure\nBeing unmingled (with matter), and abiding within herself.\n\n\nLOVE, LIKE HIGHER SOUL, OR LIGHT, IS INSEPARABLE FROM ITS SOURCE.\n\nIn fact, that which is immediately born of Intelligence is pure in\nitself, because, by its very proximity to Intelligence, it has more\ninnate force, desiring to unite itself firmly to the principle that\nbegat it, and which can retain it there on high. The soul which is thus\nsuspended to Intelligence could not fall down, any more than the light\nwhich shines around the sun could separate from the body from which it\nradiates, and to which it is attached.\n\n\nWHO CELESTIAL VENUS IS.\n\nCelestial Venus (the universal Soul, the third principle or\nhypostasis[126]), therefore, attaches herself to Kronos (divine\nIntelligence, the second principle), or, if you prefer to Uranos\n(the One, the Good, the first Principle), the father of Kronos. Thus\nVenus turns towards Uranos, and unites herself to him; and in the\nact of loving him, she procreates Love, with which she contemplates\nUranus. Her activity thus effects a hypostasis and being. Both of them\ntherefore fix their gaze on Uranus, both the mother and the fair child,\nwhose nature it is to be a hypostasis ever turned towards another\nbeauty, an intermediary essence between the lover and the beloved\nobject. In fact, Love is the eye by which the lover sees the beloved\nobject; anticipating her, so to speak; and before giving her the\nfaculty of seeing by the organ which he thus constitutes, he himself\nis already full of the spectacle offered to his contemplation. Though\nhe thus anticipates her, he does not contemplate the intelligible in\nthe same manner as she does, in that he offers her the spectacle of the\nintelligible, and that he himself enjoys the vision of the beautiful,\na vision that passes by him (or, that coruscates around him, as an\naureole).\n\n\nLOVE POSSESSES DIVINE BEING.\n\n3. We are therefore forced to acknowledge that Love is a hypostasis\nand is \"being,\" which no doubt is inferior to the Being from which it\n(emanates, that is, from celestial Venus, or the celestial Soul), but\nwhich, nevertheless, still possesses \"being.\" In fact, that celestial\nSoul is a being born of the activity which is superior to her (the\nprimary Being), a living Being, emanating from the primary Being, and\nattached to the contemplation thereof. In it she discovers the first\nobject of her contemplation, she fixes her glance on it, as her good;\nand finds in this view a source of joy. The seen object attracts her\nattention so that, by the joy she feels, by the ardent attention\ncharacterizing her contemplation of its object, she herself begets\nsomething worthy of her and of the spectacle she enjoys. Thus is\nLove born from the attention with which the soul applies herself to\nthe contemplation of its object, and from the very emanation of this\nobject; and so Love is an eye full of the object it contemplates, a\nvision united to the image which it forms. Thus Love (Eros) seems to\nowe its name to its deriving its existence from vision.[127] Even when\nconsidered as passion does Love owe its name to the same fact, for\nLove-that-is-a-being is anterior to Love-that-is-not-a-being. However\nmuch we may explain passion as love, it is, nevertheless, ever the love\nof some object, and is not love in an absolute sense.\n\n\nCELESTIAL LOVE MUST ABIDE IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WITH THE CELESTIAL SOUL.\n\nSuch is the love that characterizes the superior Soul (the celestial\nSoul). It contemplates the intelligible world with it, because Love\nis the Soul's companion, being born of the Soul, and abiding in the\nSoul, and with her enjoys contemplation of the divinities. Now as we\nconsider the Soul which first radiates its light on heaven as separate\nfrom matter, we must admit that the love which is connected with her,\nis likewise separate from matter. If we say that this pure Soul really\nresides in heaven, it is in the sense in which we say that that which\nis most precious in us (the reasonable soul) resides in our body, and,\nnevertheless, is separate from matter. This love must, therefore,\nreside only there where resides this pure Soul.\n\n\nTHERE IS A LOWER LOVE, CORRESPONDING TO THE WORLD-SOUL.\n\nBut as it was similarly necessary that beneath the celestial Soul there\nshould exist the world-Soul,[128] there must exist with it another\nlove, born of her desire, and being her eye.[129] As this Venus belongs\nto this world, and as it is not the pure soul, nor soul in an absolute\nsense, it has begotten the Love which reigns here below, and which,\nwith her, presides over marriages. As far as this Love himself feels\nthe desire for the intelligible, he turns towards the intelligible the\nsouls of the young people, and he elevates the soul to which he may be\nunited, as far as it is naturally disposed to have reminiscence of the\nintelligible. Every soul, indeed, aspires to the Good, even that soul\nthat is mingled with matter, and that is the soul of some particular\nbeing; for it is attached to the superior Soul, and proceeds therefrom.\n\n\nALL SOULS HAVE THEIR LOVE, WHICH IS THEIR GUARDIAN.\n\n4. Does each soul include such a love in her being, and possess it\nas a hypostatic (form of existence)? Since the world-Soul possesses,\nas hypostasis (form of existence), the Love which is inherent in her\nbeing, our soul should also similarly possess, as hypostatic (form of\nexistence), a love equally inherent in our being. Why should the same\nnot obtain even with animals? This love inherent to the being of every\nsoul is the guardian considered to be attached to each individual.[130]\nIt inspires each soul with the desires natural for her to experience;\nfor, according to her nature, each soul begets a love which harmonizes\nwith her dignity and being. As the universal Soul possesses universal\nLove, so do individual souls each possess her individual love. But as\nthe individual souls are not separated from the universal Soul, and\nare so contained within her that their totality forms but a single\nsoul,[131] so are individual loves contained within the universal Love.\nOn the other hand, each individual love is united to an individual\nsoul, as universal Love is united to the universal Soul. The latter\nexists entire everywhere in the universe, and so her unity seems\nmultiple; she appears anywhere in the universe that she pleases, under\nthe various forms suitable to her parts, and she reveals herself, at\nwill, under some visible form.\n\n\nTHE HIGHER LOVE IS DEITY, THE LOWER IS A GUARDIAN.\n\nWe shall have to assume also a multiplicity of Venuses, which, born\nwith Love, occupy the rank of guardians. They originate from the\nuniversal Venus, from which derive all the individual \"venuses,\" with\nthe loves peculiar to each. In fact, the soul is the mother of love;\nnow Venus is the Soul, and Love is the Soul's activity in desiring\nthe Good. The love which leads each soul to the nature of the Good,\nand which belongs to her most exalted part, must also be considered\na deity, inasmuch as it unites the soul to the Good. The love which\nbelongs to the soul mingled (with matter), is to be considered a\nGuardian only.\n\n\nIT IS AN ERROR TO CONSIDER THE LOVE AS IDENTICAL WITH THE WORLD.\n\n5. What is the nature of this Guardian, and what is, in general, the\nnature of guardians, according to (Plato's treatment of the subject in)\nhis \"Banquet\"? What is the nature of guardians? What is the nature of\nthe Love born of Need (Penia) and Abundance (Poros), son of Prudence\n(Metis), at the birth of Venus?[132]\n\n(Plutarch)[133] held that Plato, by Love, meant the world. He should\nhave stated that Love is part of the world, and was born in it. His\nopinion is erroneous, as may be demonstrated by several proofs. First,\n(Plato) calls the world a blessed deity, that is self-sufficient;\nhowever, he never attributes these characteristics to Love, which\nhe always calls a needy being. Further, the world is composed of a\nbody and a Soul, the latter being Venus; consequently, Venus would\nbe the directing part of Love; or, if we take the world to mean\nthe world-Soul, just as we often say \"man\" when we mean the human\nsoul,[134] Love would be identical with Venus. Third, if Love, which\nis a Guardian, is the world, why should not the other Guardians (who\nevidently are of the same nature) not also be the world? In this case,\nthe world would be composed of Guardians. Fourth, how could we apply to\nthe world that which (Plato) says of Love, that it is the \"guardian of\nfair children\"? Last, Plato describes Love as lacking clothing, shoes,\nand lodging. This could not be applied to the world without absurdity\nor ridicule.\n\n\nALL GUARDIANS ARE BORN OF NEED AND ABUNDANCE.\n\n6. To explain the nature and birth of Love, we shall have to expound\nthe significance of his mother Need to his father Abundance, and to\nshow how such parents suit him. We shall also have to show how such\nparents suit the other Guardians, for all Guardians, by virtue of their\nbeing Guardians, must have the same nature, unless, indeed, Guardians\nhave only that name in common.\n\n\nDIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEITIES AND GUARDIANS.\n\nFirst, we shall have to consider the difference between deities and\nguardians. Although it be common to call Guardians deities, we are here\nusing the word in that sense it bears when one says that Guardians and\ndeities belong to different species. The deities are impassible, while\nthe Guardians, though eternal, can experience passions; placed beneath\nthe deities, but next to us, they occupy the middle place between\ndeities and men.[135]\n\n\nA GUARDIAN IS THE VESTIGE OF A SOUL DESCENDED INTO THE WORLD.\n\nBut how did the Guardians not remain impassible? How did they\ndescend to an inferior nature? This surely is a question deserving\nconsideration. We should also inquire whether there be any Guardian in\nthe intelligible world, whether there be Guardians only here below,\nand if deities exist only in the intelligible world. (We shall answer\nas follows.) There are deities also here below; and the world is,\nas we habitually say, a deity of the third rank, inasmuch as every\nsupra-lunar being is a divinity. Next, it would be better not to call\nany being belonging to the intelligible world a Guardian; and if we\nlocate the chief Guardian (the Guardian himself) in the intelligible\nworld, we had better consider him a deity. In the world of sense, all\nthe visible supra-lunar deities should be called second-rank deities,\nin that they are placed below the intelligible deities, and depend\non them as the rays of light from the star from which they radiate.\nLast, a Guardian should be defined as the vestige of a soul that had\ndescended into the world. The latter condition is necessary because\nevery pure soul begets a deity, and we have already said[136] that the\nlove of such a soul is a deity.\n\n\nWHY ALL GUARDIANS ARE NOT LOVES.\n\nBut why are not all the Guardians Loves? Further, why are they not\ncompletely pure from all matter? Among Guardians, those are Loves,\nwhich owe their existence to a soul's desire for the good and the\nbeautiful; therefore, all souls that have entered into this world each\ngenerate a Love of this kind. As to the other Guardians, which are\nnot born of human souls, they are engendered by the different powers\nof the universal Soul, for the utility of the All; they complete and\nadminister all things for the general good. The universal Soul, in\nfact, was bound to meet the needs of the universe by begetting Guardian\npowers which would suit the All of which she is the soul.\n\n\nWHY THE GUARDIANS ARE NOT FREE FROM MATTER.\n\nHow do Guardians participate in matter, and of what matter are they\nformed? This their matter is not corporeal, otherwise they would be\nanimals with sensation. In fact, whether they have aerial or fire-like\nbodies,[137] they must have had a nature primitively different (from\npure Intelligence) to have ultimately united each with his own body,\nfor that which is entirely pure could not have immediately united\nwith a body, although many philosophers think that the being of every\nGuardian, as guardian, is united to an air-like or fire-like body. But\nwhy is the being of every Guardian mingled with a body, while the being\nof every deity is pure, unless in the first case there be a cause which\nproduces the mingling (with matter)? This cause must be the existence\nof an intelligible matter,[138] so that whatever participates in it\nmight, by its means, come to unite with sense-matter.\n\n\nSOUL IS A MIXTURE OF REASON AND INDETERMINATION.\n\n7. Plato's account of the birth of Love[132] is that Abundance\nintoxicated himself with nectar, this happening before the day of\nwine, which implies that Love was born before the sense-world's\nexistence. Then Need, the mother of Love, must have participated in\nthe intelligible nature itself, and not in a simple image of the\nintelligible nature; she, therefore, approached (the intelligible\nnature) and found herself to be a mixture of form and indeterminateness\n(or, intelligible matter).[139] The soul, in fact, containing a\ncertain indeterminateness before she had reached the Good, but\nfeeling a premonition of her existence, formed for herself a confused\nand indeterminate image, which became the very hypostasis (or,\nform of existence) of Love. Thus, as here, reason mingles with the\nunreasonable, with an indeterminate desire, with an indistinct (faint\nor obscure) hypostatic (form of existence). What was born was neither\nperfect nor complete; it was something needy, because it was born from\nan indeterminate desire, and a complete reason. As to (Love, which is)\nthe thus begotten reason, it is not pure, since it contains a desire\nthat is indeterminate, unreasonable, indefinite; nor will it ever be\nsatisfied so long as it contains the nature of indetermination. It\ndepends on the soul, which is its generating principle; it is a mixture\neffected by a reason which, instead of remaining within itself, is\nmingled with indetermination. Besides, it is not Reason itself, but its\nemanation which mingles with indetermination.\n\n\nLOVE IS A GADFLY.\n\nLove, therefore, is similar to a gad-fly;[140] needy by nature,\nit still remains needy, whatever it may obtain; it could never be\nsatisfied, for this would be impossible for a being that is a mixture;\nno being could ever be fully satisfied if by its nature it be incapable\nof attaining fulness; even were it satisfied for a moment, it could\nnot retain anything if its nature made it continue to desire.\nConsequently, on one side, Love is deprived of all resources[141]\nbecause of its neediness; and on the other, it possesses the faculty of\nacquisition, because of the reason that enters into its constitution.\n\n\nGUARDIANS, AS WELL AS MEN, ARE URGED BY DIVINE DISCONTENT.\n\nAll other Guardians have a similar constitution. Each of them desires,\nand causes the acquisition of the good he is destined to procure; that\nis the characteristic they have in common with Love. Neither could they\never attain satisfaction; they still desire some particular good. The\nresult of this is that the men who here below are good are inspired\nby the love of the true, absolute Good, and not by the love of such\nand such a particular good.[142] Those who are subordinated to divers\nGuardians are successively subordinated to such or such a Guardian;\nthey let the simple and pure love of the absolute Good rest within\nthemselves, while they see to it that their actions are presided over\nby another Guardian, that is, another power of their soul, which is\nimmediately superior to that which directs them, or is active within\nthem.[143] As to the men who, driven by evil impulses, desire evil\nthings, they seem to have chained down all the loves in their souls,\njust as, by false opinions, they darken the right reason which is\ninnate within them. Thus all the loves implanted in us by nature,\nand which conform to nature, are all good; those that belong to the\ninferior part of the soul are inferior in rank and power; those that\nbelong to the superior part are superior; all belong to the being of\nthe soul. As to the loves which are contrary to nature, they are the\npassions of strayed souls, having nothing essential or substantial; for\nthey are not engendered by the pure Soul; they are the fruits of the\nfaults of the soul which produces them according to her vicious habits\nand dispositions.\n\n\nRIGHT THOUGHTS POSSESS REAL EXISTENCE.\n\nIn general, we might admit that the true goods which are possessed by\nthe soul when she acts conformably to her nature, by applying herself\nto things determined (by reason), constitute real being; that the\nothers, on the contrary, are not engendered by the very action of\nthe soul, and are only passions.[144] Likewise, false intellections\nlack real being, such as belongs to true intellections, which are\neternal and determinate, possessing simultaneously the intellectual\nact, the intelligible existence and essence; and this latter not\nonly in general, but in each real intelligible being (manifesting?)\nIntelligence in each idea. As to us, we must acknowledge that we\npossess only intellection and the intelligible; we do not possess them\ntogether (or completely), but only in general; and hence comes our love\nfor generalities. Our conceptions, indeed, usually trend towards the\ngeneral. It is only by accident that we conceive something particular;\nwhen, for instance, we conceive that some particular triangle's angles\namount to two right angles, it is only as a result of first having\nconceived that the triangle in general possesses this property.\n\n\nJUPITER, THE GREAT CHIEF, OR THIRD GOD, IS THE SOUL, OR VENUS.\n\n8. Finally, who is this Jupiter into whose gardens (Plato said that)\nAbundance entered? What are these gardens? As we have already agreed,\nVenus is the Soul, and Abundance is the Reason of all things. We still\nhave to explain the significance of Jupiter and his gardens.\n\nJupiter cannot well signify anything else than the soul, since we\nhave already admitted that the soul was Venus. We must here consider\nJupiter as that deity which Plato, in his Phaedrus, calls the Great\nChief;[145] and, elsewhere, as I think, the Third God. He explains\nhimself more clearly in this respect in the Philebus,[146] where he\nsays that Jupiter \"has a royal soul, a royal intelligence.\" Since\nJupiter is, therefore, both an intelligence and a soul, since he\nforms part of the order of causes, since we must assign him his\nrank according to what is best in him; and for several reasons,\nchiefly because he is a cause, a royal and directing cause, he must\nbe considered as the Intelligence. Venus (that is, Aphrodite) which\nbelongs to him, which proceeds from him, and accompanies him, occupies\nthe rank of a soul, for she represents in the soul that which is\nbeautiful, brilliant, pure, and delicate (\"abron\"); and that is why she\nis called \"Aphrodite.\"[147] In fact, if we refer the male deities to\nthe intellect, and if we consider the female deities as souls--because\na soul is attached to each intelligence--we shall have one more reason\nto relate Venus to Jupiter. Our views upon this point are confirmed by\nthe teachings of the priests and the (Orphic) Theologians, who always\nidentify Venus and Juno, and who call the evening star, or Star of\nVenus, the Star of Juno.[148]\n\n\nJUPITER'S GARDEN IS THE FRUITFUL REASON THAT BEGETS EVERY OBJECT.\n\n9. Abundance, being the reason of the things that exist in Intelligence\nand in the intelligible world--I mean the reason which pours itself\nout and develops--trends towards the soul, and exists therein. Indeed,\nthe (Being) which remains united in Intelligence does not emanate\nfrom a foreign principle, while the intoxication of Abundance is only\na factitious fulness. But what is that which is intoxicated with\nnectar? It is Reason that descends from the superior principle to the\ninferior; the Soul receives it from Intelligence at the moment of\nthe birth of Venus; that is why it is said that the nectar flows in\nthe garden of Jupiter. This whole garden is the glory and splendor\nof the wealth (of Intelligence);[149] this glory originates in the\nreason of Jupiter; this splendor is the light which the intelligence\nof this Deity sheds on the soul. What else but the beauties and\nsplendors of this deity could the \"gardens of Jupiter\" signify? On\nthe other hand, what else can the beauties and splendors of Jupiter\nbe, if not the reasons[150] that emanate from him? At the same time,\nthese reasons are called Abundance (Poros, or \"euporia\"), the wealth\nof the beauties which manifest; that is the nectar which intoxicates\nAbundance.[151] For indeed what else is the nectar among the deities,\nbut that which each of them receives? Now Reason is that which is\nreceived from Intelligence by its next inferior principle. Intelligence\npossesses itself fully; yet this self-possession does not intoxicate\nit, as it possesses nothing foreign thereto. On the contrary, Reason\nis engendered by Intelligence. As it exists beneath Intelligence, and\ndoes not, as Intelligence does, belong to itself, it exists in another\nprinciple; consequently, we say that Abundance is lying down in the\ngarden of Jupiter, and that at the very moment when Venus, being born,\ntakes her place among living beings.\n\n\nTHE OBJECT OF MYTHS IS TO ANALYSE; AND TO DISTINGUISH.\n\n10. If myths are to earn their name (of something \"reserved,\" or\n\"silent\") they must necessarily develop their stories under the\ncategory of time, and present as separate many things, that are\nsimultaneous, though different in rank or power. That is the reason\nthey so often mention the generation of ungenerated things, and that\nthey so often separate simultaneous things.[152] But after having thus\n(by this analysis) yielded us all the instruction possible to them,\nthese myths leave it to the reader to make a synthesis thereof. Ours is\nthe following:\n\n\nSIGNIFICANCE OF THE PLATONIC MYTH OF THE GARDEN OF JUPITER.\n\nVenus is the Soul which coexists with Intelligence, and subsists by\nIntelligence. She receives from Intelligence the reasons[150] which\nfill her,[153] and embellishes her, and whose abundance makes us see\nin the Soul the splendor and image of all beauties. The reasons which\nsubsist in the Soul are Abundance[154] of the nectar which flows down\nfrom above. Their splendors which shine in the Soul, as in life,\nrepresent the Garden of Jupiter. Abundance falls asleep in this garden,\nbecause he is weighted down by the fulness contained within him. As\nlife manifests and ever exists in the order of beings, (Plato) says\nthat the deities are seated at a feast, because they ever enjoy this\nbeatitude.\n\n\nSIGNIFICANCE OF THE PLATONIC MYTH OF THE BIRTH OF LOVE.\n\nSince the Soul herself exists, Love also must necessarily exist, and\nit owes its existence to the desire of the Soul which aspires to the\nbetter and the Good. Love is a mixed being: it participates in need,\nbecause it needs satisfaction; it also participates in abundance,\nbecause it struggles to acquire good which it yet lacks, inasmuch as\nonly that which lacked good entirely would cease to seek it. It is,\ntherefore, correct to call Love the son of Abundance and Need, which\nare constituted by lack, desire, and reminiscence of the reasons--or\nideas--which, reunited in the soul, have therein engendered that\naspiration towards the good which constitutes love. Its mother is\nNeed, because desire belongs only to need, and \"need\" signifies matter,\nwhich is entire need.[155] Even indetermination, which characterizes\nthe desire of the good, makes the being which desires the Good play\nthe part of matter--since such a being would have neither form nor\nreason, considered only from its desiring. It is a form only inasmuch\nas it remains within itself. As soon as it desires to attain a new\nperfection, it is matter relatively to the being from whom it desires\nto receive somewhat.\n\n\nLOVE IS BOTH MATERIAL AND A GUARDIAN.\n\nThat is why Love is both a being which participates in matter, and is\nalso a Guardian born of the soul; it is the former, inasmuch as it\ndoes not completely possess the good; it is the latter, inasmuch as it\ndesires the Good from the very moment of its birth.\n\n\n\n\nFIRST ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT.\n\nOf the Nature and Origin of Evils.[156]\n\n\nQUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED.\n\n1. Studying the origin of evils that might affect all beings in\ngeneral, or some one class in particular, it is reasonable to begin by\ndefining evil, from a consideration of its nature. That would be the\nbest way to discover whence it arises, where it resides, to whom it may\nhappen, and in general to decide if it be something real. Which one of\nour faculties then can inform us of the nature of evil? This question\nis not easy to solve, because there must be an analogy between the\nknower and the known.[157] The Intelligence and the Soul may indeed\ncognize forms and fix their desires on them, because they themselves\nare forms; but evil, which consists in the absence of all goods, could\nnot be described as a form.[158] But inasmuch as there can be but one\nsingle science, to embrace even contraries, and as the evil is the\ncontrary of the good, knowledge of the good implies that of evil.\nTherefore, to determine the nature of evil, we shall first have to\ndetermine that of good, for the higher things must precede the lower,\nas some are forms and others are not, being rather a privation of the\ngood. Just in what sense evil is the contrary of the good must also be\ndetermined; as for instance, if the One be the first, and matter the\nlast;[159] or whether the One be form, and matter be its absence. Of\nthis further.[160]\n\n\nA. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIL.\n\n\nA DEFINITION OF EVIL BY CONTRAST WITH THE GOOD.\n\n2. Let us now determine the nature of the Good, at least so far as is\ndemanded by the present discussion. The Good is the principle on which\nall depends, to which everything aspires, from which everything issues,\nand of which everything has need. As to Him, He suffices to himself,\nbeing complete, so He stands in need of nothing; He is the measure[161]\nand the end of all things; and from Him spring intelligence, being,\nsoul, life, and intellectual contemplation.\n\n\nNATURE OF DIVINE INTELLIGENCE.\n\nAll these beautiful things exist as far as He does; but He is the\none Principle that possesses supreme beauty, a principle that is\nsuperior to the things that are best. He reigns royally,[162] in\nthe intelligible world, being Intelligence itself, very differently\nfrom what we call human intelligences. The latter indeed are all\noccupied with propositions, discussions about the meanings of words,\nreasonings, examinations of the validity of conclusions, observing\nthe concatenation of causes, being incapable of possessing truth \"a\npriori,\" and though they be intelligences, being devoid of all ideas\nbefore having been instructed by experience; though they, nevertheless,\nwere intelligences. Such is not the primary Intelligence. On the\ncontrary, it possesses all things. Though remaining within itself, it\nis all things; it possesses all things, without possessing them (in\nthe usual acceptation of that term); the things that subsist in it not\ndiffering from it, and not being separated from each other. Each one of\nthem is all the others,[163] is everything and everywhere, although not\nconfounded with other things, and remaining distinct therefrom.\n\n\nNATURE OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.\n\nThe power which participates in Intelligence (the universal Soul) does\nnot participate in it in a manner such as to be equal to it, but only\nin the measure of her ability to participate therein. She is the first\nactualization of Intelligence, the first being that Intelligence,\nthough remaining within itself, begets. She directs her whole activity\ntowards supreme Intelligence, and lives exclusively thereby. Moving\nfrom outside Intelligence, and around it, according to the laws\nof harmony,[164] the universal Soul fixes her glance upon it. By\ncontemplation penetrating into its inmost depths, through Intelligence\nshe sees the divinity Himself. Such is the nature of the serene and\nblissful existence of the divinities, a life where evil has no place.\n\n\nEVIL EXISTS AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE DERIVATIVE GOODS OF THE THIRD RANK.\n\nIf everything stopped there (and if there were nothing beyond the three\nprinciples here described), evil would not exist (and there would be\nnothing but goods). But there are goods of the first, second and third\nranks. Though all relate to the King of all things,[165] who is their\nauthor, and from whom they derive their goodness, yet the goods of the\nsecond rank relate more specially to the second principle; and to the\nthird principle, the goods of the third rank.\n\n\nNATURE OF EVIL.\n\n3. As these are real beings, and as the first Principle is their\nsuperior, evil could not exist in such beings, and still less in Him,\nwho is superior to them; for all these things are good. Evil then must\nbe located in non-being, and must, so to speak, be its form, referring\nto the things that mingle with it, or have some community with it. This\n\"non-being,\" however, is not absolute non-being.[166] Its difference\nfrom being resembles the difference between being and movement or\nrest; but only as its image, or something still more distant from\nreality. Within this non-being are comprised all sense-objects, and\nall their passive modifications; or, evil may be something still more\ninferior, like their accident or principle, or one of the things that\ncontribute to its constitution. To gain some conception of evil it may\nbe represented by the contrast between measure and incommensurability;\nbetween indetermination and its goal; between lack of form and the\ncreating principle of form; between lack and self-sufficiency; as the\nperpetual unlimited and changeableness; as passivity, insatiableness,\nand absolute poverty.[167] Those are not the mere accidents of evil,\nbut its very essence; all of that can be discovered when any part of\nevil is examined. The other objects, when they participate in the evil\nand resemble it, become evil without however being absolute Evil.\n\n\nEVIL POSSESSES A LOWER FORM OF BEING.\n\nAll these things participate in a being; they do not differ from it,\nthey are identical with it, and constitute it. For if evil be an\naccident in something, then evil, though not being a real being, must\nbe something by itself. Just as, for the good, there is the Good in\nitself, and the good considered as an attribute of a foreign subject,\nlikewise, for evil, one may distinguish Evil in itself, and evil as\naccident.\n\n\nEVIL AS INFINITE AND FORMLESSNESS IN ITSELF.\n\nIt might be objected that it is impossible to conceive of\nindetermination outside of the indeterminate, any more than\ndetermination outside of the determinate; or measure outside of\nthe measured. (We shall have to answer that) just as determination\ndoes not reside in the determined (or measure in the measured), so\nindetermination cannot exist within the indeterminate. If it can exist\nin something other than itself, it will be either in the indeterminate,\nor in the determinate. If in the indeterminate, it is evident that it\nitself is indeterminate, and needs no indetermination to become such.\nIf, on the other hand (it be claimed that indetermination exist), in\nthe determinate, (it is evident that) the determinate cannot admit\nindetermination. This, therefore, demands the existence of something\ninfinite in itself, and formless in itself, which would combine all the\ncharacteristics mentioned above as the characteristics of evil.[168] As\nto evil things, they are such because evil is mingled with them, either\nbecause they contemplate evil, or because they fulfil it.\n\n\nTHE PRIMARY EVIL IS EVIL IN ITSELF.\n\nReason, therefore, forces us to recognize as the primary evil, Evil\nin itself.[169] (This is matter which is) the subject of figure,\nform, determination, and limitation; which owes its ornaments to\nothers, which has nothing good in itself, which is but a vain image by\ncomparison with the real beings--in other word, the essence of evil, if\nsuch an essence can exist.\n\n\nMATTER AS THE SECONDARY EVIL.\n\n4. So far as the nature of bodies participates in matter, it is an\nevil; yet it could not be the primary Evil, for it has a certain form.\nNevertheless, this form possesses no reality, and is, besides, deprived\nof life (?); for bodies corrupt each other mutually. Being agitated\nby an unregulated movement, they hinder the soul from carrying out\nher proper movement. They are in a perpetual flux, contrary to the\nimmutable nature of essences; therefore, they constitute the secondary\nevil.\n\n\nTHE SOUL IS NOT EVIL BY HERSELF, BUT MAY DEGENERATE BY LOOKING AT\nDARKNESS.\n\nBy herself, the soul is not evil, and not every soul is evil. What\nsoul deserves to be so considered? That of the man who, according to\nthe expression of Plato,[170] is a slave to the body. In this man it\nis natural for the soul to be evil. It is indeed the irrational part\nof the soul which harbors all that constitutes evil: indetermination,\nexcess, and need, from which are derived intemperance, cowardliness,\nand all the vices of the soul, the involuntary passions, mothers\nof false opinions, which lead us to consider the things we seek or\navoid as goods or evils. But what produces this evil? How shall\nwe make a cause or a principle of it? To begin with, the soul is\nneither independent of matter, nor, by herself, perverse. By virtue\nof her union with the body, which is material, she is mingled with\nindetermination, and so, to a certain point, deprived of the form which\nembellishes and which supplies measure. Further, that reason should be\nhindered in its operations, and cannot see well, must be due to the\nsoul's being hindered by passions, and obscured by the darkness with\nwhich matter surrounds her. The soul inclines[171] towards matter.\nThus the soul fixes her glance, not on what is essence, but on what\nis simple generation.[172] Now the principle of generation is matter,\nwhose nature is so bad that matter communicates it to the beings\nwhich, even without being united thereto, merely look at it. Being\nthe privation of good, matter contains none of it, and assimilates to\nitself all that touches it. Therefore, the perfect Soul, being turned\ntowards ever pure Intelligence, repels matter, indeterminateness, the\nlack of measure, and in short, evil. The perfect Soul does not approach\nto it, does not lower her looks; she remains pure and determined by\nIntelligence. The soul which does not remain in this state, and which\nissues from herself (to unite with the body), not being determined by\nthe First, the Perfect, is no more than an image of the perfect Soul\nbecause she lacks (good), and is filled with indetermination. The soul\nsees nothing but darkness. The soul already contains matter because she\nlooks at what she cannot see; or, in the every-day expression, because\nthe soul looks at darkness.[173]\n\n\nPRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIL FOR THE SOUL.\n\n5. Since the lack of good is the cause that the soul looks at darkness,\nand mingles therewith, the lack of good and darkness is primary Evil\nfor the soul. The secondary evil will be the darkness, and the nature\nof evil, considered not in matter, but before matter. Evil consists\nnot in the lack of any particular thing, but of everything in general.\nNothing is evil merely because it lacks a little of being good; its\nnature might still be perfect. But what, like matter, lacks good\nentirely, is essentially evil, and possesses nothing good? Nature,\nindeed, does not possess essence, or it would participate in the good;\nonly by verbal similarity can we say that matter \"is,\" while we can\ntruly say that matter \"is\" absolute \"nonentity.\" A mere lack (of good)\ntherefore, may be characterized as not being good; but complete lack is\nevil; while a lack of medium intensity consists in the possibility of\nfalling into evil, and is already an evil. Evil, therefore, is not any\nparticular evil, as injustice, or any special vice; evil is that which\nis not yet anything of that, being nothing definite. Injustice and the\nother vices must be considered as kinds of evil, distinguished from\neach other by mere accidents; as for instance, what occurs by malice.\nBesides, the different kinds of evil differ among each other either by\nthe matter in which evil resides, or by the parts of the soul to which\nit refers, as sight, desire, and passion.\n\n\nRELATION BETWEEN EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL EVIL.\n\nIf we grant the existence of evils external to the soul, we shall\nbe forced to decide about their relation to sickness, ugliness, or\npoverty. Sickness has been explained as a lack or excess of material\nbodies which fail to support order or measure. The cause of ugliness,\nalso, has been given as deficient adjustment of matter to form. Poverty\nhas been described as the need or lack of objects necessary to life as\na result of our union with matter, whose nature is (the Heraclitian and\nStoic) \"indigence.\" From such definitions it would follow that we are\nnot the principle of evil, and are not evil in ourselves, for these\nevils existed before us. Only in spite of themselves would men yield\nto vice. The evils of the soul are avoidable, but not all men possess\nthe necessary firmness. Evil, therefore, is caused by the presence\nof matter in sense-objects, and is not identical with the wickedness\nof men. For wickedness does not exist in all men; some triumph over\nwickedness, while they who do not even need to triumph over it, are\nstill better. In all cases men triumph over evil by those of their\nfaculties that are not engaged in matter.\n\n\nIN WHAT SENSE EVILS ARE UNIVERSAL AND UNAVOIDABLE.\n\n6. Let us examine the significance of the doctrine[174] that evils\ncannot be destroyed, that they are necessary, that they do not exist\namong the divinities, but that they ever besiege our mortal nature, and\nthe place in which we dwell.[175] Surely heaven is free from all evil\nbecause it moves eternally with regularity, in perfect order; because\nin the stars is neither injustice nor any other kind of evil, because\nthey do not conflict with each other in their courses; and because\ntheir revolutions are presided over by the most beautiful harmony.[164]\nOn the contrary, the earth reveals injustice and disorder, (chiefly)\nbecause our nature is mortal, and we dwell in a lower place. But when\nPlato,[176] says, that we must flee from here below, he does not mean\nthat we should leave the earth, but, while remaining therein, practice\njustice, piety, and wisdom. It is wickedness that must be fled from,\nbecause wickedness and its consequences are the evil of man.\n\n\nEVIL IS NOT GOOD'S QUALITATIVE, BUT ONLY FIGURATIVE ANTAGONIST.\n\nWhen[176] (Theodor) tells (Socrates) that evils would be annihilated\nif men practised (Socrates') teachings, the latter answers that that\nis impossible, for evil is necessary even if only as the contrary of\ngood. But how then can wickedness, which is the evil of man, be the\ncontrary of good? Because it is the contrary of virtue. Now virtue,\nwithout being Good in itself, is still a good, a good which makes us\ndominate matter. But how can Good in itself, which is not a quality,\nhave a contrary? Besides, why need the existence of one thing imply\nits contrary? Though we may grant that there is a possibility of the\nexistence of the contrary of some things--as for instance, that a man\nin good health might become sick--there is no such necessity. Nor does\nPlato assert that the existence of each thing of this kind necessarily\nimplies that of its contrary; he makes this statement exclusively of\nthe Good. But how can there be a contrary to good, if the good be\n\"being,\" let alone \"above being\"?[177] Evidently, in reference to\nparticular beings, there can be nothing contrary to \"being.\" This is\nproved by induction; but the proposition has not been demonstrated\nas regards universal Being. What then is the contrary of universal\nBeing, and first principles in general? The contrary of \"being\" must\nbe nonentity; the contrary of the nature of the Good is the nature\nand principle of Evil. These two natures are indeed respectively the\nprinciples of goods and of evils. All their elements are mutually\nopposed, so that both these natures, considered in their totality,\nare still more opposed than the other contraries. The latter, indeed,\nbelong to the same form, to the same kind, and they have something in\ncommon in whatever subjects they may be. As to the Contraries that are\nessentially distinguished from each other, whose nature is constituted\nof elements opposed to the constitutive elements of the other, those\nContraries are absolutely opposed to each other, since the connotation\nof that word implies things as opposite to each other as possible.\nMeasure, determination, and the other characteristics of the divine\nnature[178] are the opposites of incommensurability, indefiniteness,\nand the other contrary things that constitute the nature of evil. Each\none of these wholes, therefore, is the contrary of the other. The being\nof the one is that which is essentially and absolutely false; that of\nthe other is genuine Being; the falseness of the one is, therefore, the\ncontrary of the truth of the other. Likewise what pertains to the being\nof the one is the contrary of what belongs to the being of the other.\nWe also see that it is not always true to say that there is no contrary\nto \"being,\" for we acknowledge that water and fire are contraries, even\nif they did not contain the common element of matter, of which heat and\ncold, humidity and dryness, are accidents. If they existed alone by\nthemselves, if their being were complete without any common subject,\nthere would still be an opposition, and an opposition of \"being.\"\nTherefore the things that are completely separate, which have nothing\nin common, which are as distant as possible, are by nature contrary.\nThis is not an opposition of quality, nor of any kinds of beings; it is\nan opposition resulting from extreme distance, and from being composed\nof contraries, thereby communicating this characteristic to their\nelements.\n\n\nGOOD IMPLIES EVIL BECAUSE MATTER IS NECESSARY TO THE WORLD.\n\n7. Why is the existence of both good and evil necessary? Because\nmatter is necessary to the existence of the world. The latter is\nnecessarily composed of contraries, and, consequently, it could not\nexist without matter. In this case the nature of this world is a\nmixture of intelligence and necessity.[179] What it receives from\ndivinity are goods; its evils derive from the primordial nature,[180]\nthe term used (by Plato) to designate matter as a simple substance yet\nunadorned by a divinity. But what does he mean by \"mortal nature?\"\nWhen he says that \"evils besiege this region here below,\" he means the\nuniverse, as appears from the following quotations[181]: \"Since you\nare born, you are not immortal, but by my help you shall not perish.\"\nIn this case it is right to say that evils cannot be annihilated. How\nthen can one flee from them?[182] Not by changing one's locality, (as\nPlato) says, but by acquiring virtue, and by separating from the body,\nwhich, simultaneously, is separation from matter; for being attached\nto the body is also attachment to matter. It is in the same sense that\n(Plato) explains being separated from the body, or not being separated\nfrom it. By dwelling with the divinities he means being united to the\nintelligible objects; for it is in them that inheres immortality.\n\n\nEXISTENCE OF EVIL IS NECESSARY AS LAST MATERIAL DEGREE OF BEING.\n\nHere follows still another demonstration of the necessity of evil.\nSince good does not remain alone, evil must necessarily exist by\nissuing from the good.[183] We might express this differently, as\nthe degradation and exhaustion (of the divine power, which, in the\nwhole hierarchic series of successive emanations weakens from degree\nto degree). There must, therefore, be a last degree of being, beyond\nwhich nothing further can be begotten, and that is evil. Just as the\nexistence of something after a first (Good) is necessary, so must also\na last degree (of being) be necessary. Now the last degree is matter,\nand contains nothing more of the First; (and, as matter and evil are\nidentical,) the existence of evil is necessary.\n\n\nMATTER IS CAUSE OF EVIL, EVEN IF CORPOREAL.\n\n8. It may still be objected that it is not matter that makes us wicked;\nfor it is not matter that produces ignorance and perverted appetites.\nIf, indeed, these appetites mislead us to evil as a result of the\nperversity of the body, we must seek its cause, not in matter, but in\nform (in the qualities of the bodies). These, for instance, are heat,\ncold, bitterness, pungency, and the other qualities of the bodily\nsecretions; or, the atonic condition or inflammation of certain organs;\nor, certain dispositions which produce the difference of appetites;\nand, if you please, false opinions. Evil, therefore, is form rather\nthan matter. Even under this (mistaken) hypothesis we are none the\nless driven to acknowledge that matter is the evil. A quality does not\nalways produce the same results within or outside of matter; thus the\nform of the axe without iron does not cut. The forms that inhere in\nmatter are not always what they would be if they were outside of it.\nThe (\"seminal) reasons\" when inhering in matter are by it corrupted\nand filled with its nature. As fire, when separate from matter, does\nnot burn; so form, when remaining by itself, effects what it would if\nit were in matter. Matter dominates any principle that appears within\nit, alters it, and corrupts it by imparting thereto its own nature,\nwhich is contrary to the Good. It does not indeed substitute cold\nfor heat, but it adds to the form--as, for instance, to the form of\nfire--its formless substance; to figure adding its shapelessness; to\nmeasure, its excess and lack, proceeding thus until it has degraded\nthings, transubstantiating them into its own nature. That is the reason\nthat, in the nutrition of animals, what has been ingested does not\nremain what it was before. The foods that enter into the body of a dog,\nfor instance, are by assimilation transformed into blood and canine\nsecretions, and, in general, are transformed according to the animal\nthat receives them. Thus even under the hypothesis that evils are\nreferred to the body, matter is the cause of evils.\n\n\nMASTERY OF THESE CORPOREAL DISPOSITIONS IS NOT EASY.\n\nIt may be objected that one ought to master these dispositions of the\nbody. But the principle that could triumph over them is pure only if it\nflee from here below. The appetites which exercise the greatest force\ncome from a certain complexion of the body, and differ according to\nits nature. Consequently, it is not easy to master them. There are men\nwho have no judgment, because they are cold and heavy on account of\ntheir bad constitution. On the contrary, there are others who, because\nof their temperament, are light and inconstant. This is proved by the\ndifference of our own successive dispositions. When we are gorged, we\nhave appetites and thoughts that differ from those we experience when\nstarved; and our dispositions vary even according to the degrees of\nsatiety.\n\n\nDEFINITION OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EVIL.\n\nIn short, the primary Evil is that which by itself lacks measure. The\nsecondary evil is that which accidentally becomes formless, either by\nassimilation or participation. In the front rank is the darkness; in\nthe second that which has become obscured. Thus vice, being in the soul\nthe result of ignorance and formlessness, is of secondary rank. It is\nnot absolute Evil, because, on its side, virtue is not absolute Good;\nit is good only by its assimilation and participation with the Good.\n\n\nB. BY WHAT PART OF OUR NATURE WE COME TO KNOW EVIL.\n\n\nHOW THE SOUL COMES TO KNOW VICE.[184]\n\n9. How do we get to know vice and virtue? As to virtue, we know it\nby the very intelligence and by wisdom; for wisdom knows itself.\nBut how can we know vice? Just as we observe that an object is not\nin itself straight, by applying a rule, so we discern vice by this\ncharacteristic, that it does not comport itself with virtue. But do\nwe, or do we not have direct intuition thereof? We do not have the\nintuition of absolute vice, because it is indeterminate. We know it,\ntherefore, by a kind of abstraction, observing that virtue is entirely\nlacking. We cognize relative vice by noticing that it lacks some part\nof virtue. We see a part of virtue, and, by this part, judging what is\nlacking in order completely to constitute the form (of virtue), we\ncall vice what is lacking to it; defining as the indeterminate (evil)\nwhat is deprived of virtue. Similarly with matter. If, for instance,\nwe notice a figure that is ugly because its (\"seminal) reason,\" being\nunable to dominate matter, has been unable to hide its deformity, we\nnotice ugliness by what is lacking to form.\n\n\nHOW TO SEE MATTER: BY DIALECTIC ABSTRACTION.\n\nBut how do we know that which is absolutely formless (matter)? We make\nabstraction of all kinds of form, and what remains we call matter. We\nallow ourselves to be penetrated by a kind of shapelessness by the\nmere fact that we make abstraction of all shape in order to be able\nto represent matter (by a \"bastard reasoning\").[185] Consequently,\nintelligence becomes altered, and ceases to be genuine intelligence\nwhen it dares in this way to look at what does not belong to its\ndomain.[186] It resembles the eye, which withdraws from light to see\ndarkness, and which on that very account does not see. Thus, in not\nseeing, the eye sees darkness so far as it is naturally capable of\nseeing it. Thus intelligence which hides light within itself, and\nwhich, so to speak, issues from itself, by advancing towards things\nalien to its nature, without bringing along its own light, places\nitself in a state contrary to its being to cognize a nature contrary to\nits own.[165] But enough of this.\n\n\nMATTER IS BOTH WITHOUT QUALITIES AND EVIL.\n\n10. It may well be asked (by Stoics) how matter can be evil, as it is\nwithout quality?[187] That matter possesses no qualities can be said\nin the sense that by itself it has none of the qualities it is to\nreceive, or to which matter is to serve as substrate; but cannot be\nsaid in the sense that it will possess no nature. Now, if it have a\nnature, what hinders this nature from being bad, without this being bad\nbeing a quality? Nothing indeed is a quality but what serves to qualify\nsomething different from itself; a quality is, therefore, an accident;\na quality is that which can be mentioned as the attribute of a subject\nother than itself.[188] But matter is not the attribute of something\nalien; it is the subject to which accidents are related. Therefore,\nsince every quality is an accident, matter, whose nature is not to be\nan accident, is without quality.[189] If, besides, quality (taken in\ngeneral), itself be without quality, how could one say of matter, so\nfar as it has not yet received any quality, that it is in some manner\nqualified? It is, therefore, possible to assert of matter that, it both\nhas no quality, and yet is evil. Matter is not evil because it has a\nquality, but just because it has none. If, indeed, matter possessed a\nform, it might indeed be bad; but it would not be a nature contrary to\nall form.\n\n\nMATTER AS DEPRIVATION IS STILL WITHOUT QUALITIES.\n\n11. It may be further objected that nature, independent of all form, is\ndeprivation. Now deprivation is always the attribute of some hypostatic\nsubstance, instead of itself being substance. If then evil consist in\nprivation, it is the attribute of the substrate deprived of form; and\non that account it could not exist by itself. If it be in the soul\nthat we consider evil, privation in the soul will constitute vice and\nwickedness, and there will be no need to have recourse to anything\nexternal to explain it.\n\n\nMATTER MAY EXIST AND YET BE EVIL.\n\nElsewhere[190] it is objected that matter does not exist; here the\nattempt is to show that matter is not evil in so far as it exists. (If\nthis were the case), we should not seek the origin of evil outside of\nthe soul, but it would be located within the soul herself; there evil\nconsists in the absence of good. But, evidently, the soul would have\nnothing good on the hypothesis that privation of form is an accident\nof the being, which desires to receive form; that, consequently, the\nprivation of good is an accident of the soul; and that the latter\nproduces within herself wickedness by her (\"seminal) reason.\" Another\nresult would be that the soul would have no life, and be inanimate;\nwhich would lead to the absurdity that the soul is no soul.\n\n\nTHE SOUL CANNOT POSSESS EVIL WITHIN HERSELF.\n\nWe are thus forced to assert, that the soul possesses life by virtue\nof her (\"seminal) reason,\" so that she does not, by herself, possess\nprivation of good. Then she must from intelligence derive a trace of\ngood, and have the form of good. The soul, therefore, cannot by herself\nbe evil. Consequently, she is not the first Evil, nor does she contain\nit as an accident, since she is not absolutely deprived of good.\n\n\nRELATIVE PRIVATION IS IMPOSSIBLE.\n\n12. To the objection that in the soul wickedness and evil are not an\nabsolute privation, but only a relative privation of good, it may\nbe answered that in this case, if the soul simultaneously, contain\npossession and privation of the good, she will have possessed a feeling\nmingled of good and evil, and not of unmingled evil. We will still\nnot have found the first evil, the absolute Evil. The good of the\nsoul will reside in her essence (being); evil will only be an accident\nthereof.\n\n\nEVIL AS AN OBSTACLE TO THE SOUL.\n\n13. Another hypothesis is that evil owes its character only to its\nbeing an obstacle for the soul, as certain objects are bad for the\neye, because they hinder it from seeing. In this case, the evil of the\nsoul would be the cause that produces the evil, and it would produce\nit without being absolute Evil. If, then, vice be an obstacle for the\nsoul, it will not be absolute Evil, but the cause of evil, as virtue is\nnot the good, and only contributes to acquiring it. If virtue be not\ngood, and vice be not evil, the result is that since virtue is neither\nabsolute beauty nor goodness, vice is neither absolute ugliness nor\nevil. We hold that virtue is neither absolute beauty, nor absolute\ngoodness, because above and before it is absolute Beauty and Goodness.\nOnly because the soul participates in these, is virtue or beauty\nconsidered a good. Now as the soul, by rising above virtue, meets\nabsolute Beauty and Goodness, thus in descending below wickedness the\nsoul discovers absolute Evil. To arrive at the intuition of evil the\nsoul, therefore, starts from wickedness, if indeed an intuition of evil\nbe at all possible. Finally, when the soul descends, she participates\nin evil. She rushes completely into the region of diversity,[191]\nand, plunging downwards she falls into a murky mire. If she fell into\nabsolute wickedness, her characteristic would no longer be wickedness,\nand she would exchange it for a still lower nature. Even though mingled\nwith a contrary nature, wickedness, indeed, still retains something\nhuman. The vicious man, therefore, dies so far as a soul can die. Now\nwhen, in connection with the soul, we speak of dying, we mean that\nwhile she is engaged in the body, she penetrates (further) into matter,\nand becomes saturated with it. Then, when the soul has left the body,\nshe once more falls into the same mud until she have managed to return\ninto the intelligible world, and weaned her glance from this mire. So\nlong as she remains therein, she may be said to have descended into\nhell, and to be slumbering there.[192]\n\n\nWEAKNESS OF THE SOUL AS AN EXPLANATION OF EVIL.\n\n14. Wickedness is by some explained as weakness of the soul, because\nthe wicked soul is impressionable, mobile, easy to lead to evil,\ndisposed to listen to her passions, and equally likely to become angry,\nand to be reconciled; she yields inconsiderately to vain ideas, like\nthe weakest works of art and of nature, which are easily destroyed by\nwinds and storms. This theory (is attractive, but implies a totally\nnew conception, that of \"weakness\" of soul, and it would have) to\nexplain this \"weakness,\" and whence it is derived; for weakness in a\nsoul is very different from weakness in a body, but just as in the\nbody weakness consists in inability to fulfil a function, in being\ntoo impressionable, the same fault in the soul might, by analogy, be\ncalled by the same name, unless matter be equally the cause of both\nweaknesses. Reason, however, will have to explore the problem further,\nand seek the cause of the soul-fault here called weakness.\n\n\nWEAKNESS OF THE SOUL OCCURS CHIEFLY IN SOULS FALLEN INTO MATTER.\n\nIn the soul weakness does not derive from an excess of density or\nrarefaction of leanness or stoutness, nor of any sickness such as\nfever. It must be met in souls which are either entirely separated from\nmatter, or in those joined to matter, or in both simultaneously. Now,\nas it does not occur in souls separated from matter, which are entirely\npure, and \"winged,\"[193] and which, as perfect, carry out their\nfunctions without any obstacle; it remains, that this weakness occurs\nin fallen souls, which are neither pure nor purified. For them weakness\nconsists not in the privation of anything, but in the presence of\nsomething alien, just as, for instance, weakness of the body consists\nin the presence of slime or bile. We shall, therefore, be able to\nunderstand clearly the weakness of the soul by ferreting out the cause\nof the \"fall\" of the soul.\n\n\nTHE FALL OF THE SOUL AS DESCENT INTO MATTER.\n\nJust as much as the soul, matter is included within the order of\nbeings. For both, so to speak, there is but a single locality; for it\nwould be an error to imagine two different localities, one for matter,\nand the other for the soul; such as, for instance, earth might be for\nmatter, and air for the soul. The expression that \"soul occupies a\nlocality different from matter\" means only that the soul is not in\nmatter; that is, that the soul is not united to matter; that the soul\ndoes not together with matter constitute something unitary; and that\nfor the soul matter is not a substrate that could contain the soul.\nThat is how the soul is separated from matter. But the soul possesses\nseveral powers, since she contains the principle (intelligence), the\nmedium (the discursive reason), and the goal (the power of sensation)\n(united to the generative and growing powers). Now, just like the\nbeggar who presents himself at the door of the banquet-hall, and with\nimportunity asks to be admitted,[194] matter tries to penetrate into\nthe place occupied by the soul. But every place is sacred, because\nnothing in it is deprived of the presence of the soul. Matter, on\nexposing itself to its rays is illuminated by it, but it cannot harbor\nthe principle that illuminates her (the soul). The latter indeed, does\nnot sustain matter,[195] although she be present, and does not even see\nit, because it is evil. Matter obscures, weakens the light that shines\ndown upon her, by mingling its darkness with her. To the soul, matter\naffords the opportunity of producing generation, by clearing free\naccess towards matter; for if matter were not present, the soul would\nnot approach it. The fall of the soul is, therefore, a descent into\nmatter; hence comes her \"weakness,\" which means, that not all of the\nsoul's faculties are exercised; because matter hinders their action,\nintruding on the place occupied by the soul and forcing her, so to\nspeak, to retrench. Until the soul can manage to accomplish her return\ninto the intelligible world, matter degrades what it has succeeded in\nabstracting from the soul. For the soul, therefore, matter is a cause\nof weakness and vice. Therefore, by herself, the soul is primitively\nevil, and is the first evil. By its presence, matter is the cause\nof the soul's exerting her generative powers, and being thus led to\nsuffering; it is matter that causes the soul to enter into dealings\nwith matter, and thus to become evil. The soul, indeed, would never\nhave approached matter unless the latter's presence had not afforded\nthe soul an opportunity to produce generation.\n\n\nNO MORE THAN THE EXISTENCE OF THE GOOD CAN THAT OF MATTER BE DENIED.\n\n15. Those who claim that matter does not exist, will have to be\nreferred to our extended discussion[196] where we have demonstrated\nthe necessity of its hypostatic existence. Those who would assert that\nevil does not belong among beings would, if logical, thereby also\ndeny the existence of the good, and of anything that was desirable;\nthereby annihilating desire, as well as aversion, and even thought;\nfor everybody shares desire for the good, and aversion for the evil.\nThought and knowledge, simultaneously, apply to good and evil; thought\nitself is a good.\n\n\nEXPLANATION OF THE EVIL OF THE SOUL.\n\nWe must, therefore, acknowledge the existence first of Good,\nunmixed, and then the nature mingled of good and evil; but what most\nparticipates in evil thereby trends towards absolute Evil; and what\nparticipates in it to a less degree thereby trends towards good. For\nwhat is evil to soul? It is being in contact with inferior nature;\notherwise the soul would not have any appetite, pain, or fear. Indeed\nfear is felt by us only for the composite (of soul and body), fearing\nits dissolution, which thus is the cause of our pains and sufferings.\nThe end of every appetite is to put aside what troubles it, or to\nforestall what might do so. As to sense-representations (fancy[197]),\nit is the impression made by an exterior object on the irrational part\nof the soul, a part which can receive this impression only because it\nis not indivisible. False opinion rises within the soul because it is\nno longer within truth, and this occurs because the soul is no longer\npure. On the contrary, the desire of the intelligible leads the soul\nto unite intimately with intelligence, as she should, and there remain\nsolidly entrenched, without declining towards anything inferior. It is\nonly because of the nature and power of the Good that evil does not\nremain pure Evil. (Matter, which is synonymous with evil) is like a\ncaptive which beauty covers with golden chains, so that the divinities\nmight not see its nakedness, and that men might not be intruded on by\nit; or that men, if they must see it, shall be reminded of beauty on\nobserving an even weakened image thereof.\n\n\n\n\nSECOND ENNEAD, BOOK THREE.\n\nWhether Astrology is of any Value.[198]\n\n\nOF THE INFLUENCE OF THE STARS.\n\n1. It has been said[199] that the course of the stars indicates what is\nto happen to each being; though, it does not, as many persons think,\ncause every event. To the supporting proofs hereof we are to add now\nmore precise demonstrations, and new considerations, for the opinion\nheld about this matter is no trifle.\n\n\nVARIOUS PRETENSIONS OF ASTROLOGY.\n\nSome people hold that, by their movements, the planets produce not only\npoverty and wealth, health and sickness, but even beauty and ugliness;\nand, what is more, vices and virtues. At every moment the stars, as if\nthey were irritated against men, (are said to) force them to commit\nactions concerning which no blame attaches to the men who commit them,\nsince they are compelled thereto by the influence of the planets. It\nis even believed that the cause of the planets' doing us evil or good\nis not that they love or hate us; but that their dispositions towards\nus is good or evil according to the localities through which they\ntravel. Towards us they change their disposition according as they are\non the cardinal points or in declination therefrom. It is even held\nthat while certain stars are maleficent, others are beneficent, and\nthat, nevertheless, the former frequently grant us benefits, while the\nlatter often become harmful. Their effects differ according to their\nbeing in opposition,[200] just as if they were not self-sufficient,\nand as if their quality depended on whether or not they looked at each\nother. Thus a star's (influence) may be good so long as it regards\nanother, and evil when it does so no longer. A star may even consider\nanother in different manners,[201] when it is in such or such an\naspect.[202] Moreover, the totality of the stars exercises a mingled\ninfluence which differs from the individual influences, just as several\nliquors may form a compound possessing qualities differing from either\nof the component elements. As these and similar assertions are freely\nmade, it becomes important to examine each one separately. This would\nform a proper beginning for our investigation.\n\n\nARE STARS INANIMATE?\n\n2. Should we consider the stars to be animated, or not? If they be\ninanimate, they will be able to communicate only cold and heat; that\nis, if[203] we grant the existence of cold influences. In this case,\nthey will limit themselves to modifying the nature of our body,\nexercising on us a merely corporeal influence. They will not produce a\ngreat diversity among the bodies, since each of them exercises the same\ninfluence, and since, on the earth, their diverse actions are blended\ninto a single one, which varies only by the diversity of locality, or\nby the proximity or distance of the objects. The same argument would\nhold on the hypothesis that the stars spread cold. But I could not\nunderstand how they could render some learned, others ignorant, making\nof some grammarians, others orators, musicians or experts in various\narts. How could they exercise an action which would have no relation\nto the constitution of the bodies, such as giving us a father, a\nbrother, a son, or a wife of such or such characteristics, or to make\nus successful, or make of us generals or kings?[204]\n\n\nARE STARS ANIMATED?\n\nOn the contrary hypothesis, that the stars are animated, and act with\nreflection, what have we done to them that they should desire to harm\nus? Are they not dwellers of a divine region? Are they not themselves\ndivine? Nor are they subjected to the influences that make men good\nor evil, nor could they experience good or evil as a result of our\nprosperity or our misfortunes.\n\n\nCOULD \"CARDINAL POINTS\" OR \"DECLINATIONS\" POSSESS ANY INFLUENCE?\n\n3. In case, however, that the stars injure us only involuntarily, they\nare constrained thereunto by the aspects,[205] and their localities. If\nso, they should, all of them, produce the same effects when they find\nthemselves in the same localities or aspects. But what difference can\noccur in a planet according to its location in the zodiac? What does\nthe zodiac itself experience? In fact, the planets are not located in\nthe zodiac itself, but above or below it, at great distances. Besides,\nin whatever location they are, they all are ever in the heaven. Now it\nwould be ridiculous to pretend that their effects differed according to\ntheir location in the heaven, and that they have an action differing\naccording as they rise, culminate, or decline. It would be incredible\nthat such a planet would feel joy when it culminates, sadness or\nfeebleness when declining, anger at the rising of some other planet,\nor satisfaction at the latter's setting. Can a star be better when\nit declines? Now a star culminates for some simultaneously with its\ndeclination for others; and it could not at the same time experience\njoy and sadness, anger and benevolence. It is sheer absurdity to\nassert that a star feels joy at its rising, while another feels the\nsame at its setting; for this would really mean that the stars felt\nsimultaneous joy and sadness. Besides, why should their sadness injure\nus? Nor can we admit that they are in turn joyous and sad, for they\never remain tranquil, content with the goods they enjoy, and the\nobjects of their contemplation. Each of them lives for itself, finding\nits welfare in its own activity, without entering into relations with\nus. As they have no dealing with us, the stars exert their influence on\nus only incidentally, not as their chief purpose; rather, they bear no\nrelation whatever to us; they announce the future only by coincidence,\nas birds announce it to the augurs.\n\n\nABSURDITY OF \"ASPECTS,\" AND \"HOUSES.\"\n\n4. Nor is it any more reasonable to assert that the aspect of one\nplanet makes one joyous, or the other sad. What animosity could obtain\nbetwixt the stars? What could be its reason? Why should their condition\nbe different when they are in trine aspect, or in opposition, or in\nquadrature? What reason have we to suppose that one star regards the\nother when it is in some particular aspect to it, or that it no more\nregards it when it is in the next zodiacal sign, though thus really\ncloser to it?\n\nBesides, what is the manner in which the planets exert the influence\nattributed to them? How does each exercise its own particular\ninfluence? How do they all, in combination, exert an influence that\ndiffers from this (particular influence)? In fact, they do not hold\ndeliberations to carry out their decisions on us, each of them yielding\na little of its individual influence. The one does not violently hinder\nthe action of the other, nor does it condescendingly make concessions\nto it. To say that the one is joyous when it is in the \"house\" of the\nother, and that the latter is sad when it is in \"house\" of the former,\namounts to saying that two men are united by mutual friendship, though\nthe former love the latter, while the latter hate the former.\n\n\nTHE RELATIONS OF SATURN AND MARS QUITE ILLOGICAL.\n\n5. The cold planet (Saturn) is said to be more beneficent for us when\nit is distant, because the evil that it produces on us is said to\nconsist of its cold effluence; in which case our good should consist\nin the zodiacal signs opposite to us. It is also asserted that when\nthe cold planet (Saturn) is in opposition to the warm planet (Mars),\nboth become harmful; yet it would seem that their influences should\nneutralize each other. Besides, it is held that (Saturn) likes the day,\nwhose heat renders it favorable to men, while (Mars) likes the night,\nbecause it is fiery, as if in heaven there did not reign a perpetual\nday, that is, a continual light; or as if a star could be plunged into\nthe shadow (projected by the earth) when it is very distant from the\nearth.\n\n\nFABULOUS INFLUENCES OF THE MOON.\n\nIt is said that the moon, in conjunction with (Saturn) is favorable\nwhen full, but harmful when otherwise. The opposite, however, ought\nto be the truth if the moon possess any influence. In fact, when it\npresents a full face, it presents its dark face to the planet above it\n(Saturn or Mars); when its disk decreases on our side, it increases on\nthe other; therefore, it ought to exert a contrary influence when it\ndecreases on our side, and when it increases on the side of the planet\nabove it. These phases are of no importance for the moon, inasmuch as\none of its sides is always lit. Nothing can result from it but for\nthe planet which receives heat from it (Saturn); now this one will be\nheated whenever the moon turns towards us its dark side. Therefore,\nthe moon is good for this planet when it is full towards it, but dark\ntowards us. Besides, this obscurity of the moon for us can be of\nimportance only for terrestrial things, not for the celestial[203] ...\n(?)[206] ... but if, because of its distance, it does not support the\nmoon, then it must be in a worse predicament; when the moon is full, it\nis sufficient for terrestrial things, even when the moon is distant....\nFinally, when the moon presents its obscure side to the fiery planet\n(Mars), it seems beneficent towards us; for the power of this planet,\nmore fiery than (Saturn), is then sufficient by itself.\n\n\nJUPITER, VENUS, AND MERCURY ALSO CONSIDERED ASTROLOGICALLY.\n\nBesides, the bodies of the animated beings which move in the heaven may\nbe of different degrees of heat; none of them is cold, as is witnessed\nto by their location. The planet named Jupiter is a suitable mixture of\nfire; likewise with Venus. That is why they seem to move harmoniously.\nAs to the fiery planet Mars, it contributes its share to the mixture\n(of the general action of the stars). As to Saturn, its case is\ndifferent, because of its distance. Mercury is indifferent, because it\nassimilates itself easily to all.\n\n\nTHE UNIVERSE AS A SINGLE HARMONY.[207]\n\nAll these planets contribute to the Whole. Their mutual relation,\ntherefore, is one suitable to the universe, just as the organs of an\nanimal are shaped to take part in the organism they constitute.[208]\nTake, for instance, a part of the body, such as the bile, which serves\nboth the whole animal that contains it, and its special organ, inasmuch\nas it was necessary to arouse courage, and to oppose the injury of\nboth the whole body, and its special organ. There had to be something\nsimilar (to bile) in the universe; that something sweet should soften\nit, that there be parts that would play the role of eyes, and that all\nthings should possess mutual sympathy by their irrational life.[209]\nThus only is the universe one, and thus only is it constituted by a\nsingle harmony. How then could it be denied that all these things might\nbe signs, resulting from the laws of analogy?\n\n\nABSURDITY OF VARIOUS ASTROLOGICAL THEORIES.\n\n6. Is it not unreasonable to assert that Mars, or Venus, in a certain\nposition, should produce adulteries? Such a statement attributes to\nthem incontinence such as occurs only among man, and human passion\nto satisfy unworthy impulses. Or again, how could we believe that\nthe aspects of planets is favorable when they regard each other in\na certain manner? How can we avoid believing that their nature is\ndeterminate? What sort of an existence would be led by the planets\nif they occupied themselves with each single one of the innumerable\never-arising and passing beings, giving them each glory, wealth,\npoverty, or incontinence, and impelling all their actions? How could\nthe single planets effect so many simultaneous results? Nor is it any\nmore rational to suppose that the planets' actions await the ascensions\nof the signs, nor to say that the ascension of a sign contains as many\nyears as there are degrees of ascension in it. Absurd also is the\ntheory that the planets calculate, as it were on their fingers, the\nperiod of time when they are to accomplish something, which before was\nforbidden. Besides, it is an error not to trace to a single principle\nthe government of the universe, attributing everything to the stars,\nas if there were not a single Chief from which depends the universe,\nand who distributes to every being a part and functions suitable to\nits nature. To fail to recognize Him, is to destroy the order of\nwhich we form a part, it is to ignore the nature of the world, which\npresupposes a primary cause, a principle by whose activity everything\nis interpenetrated.[211]\n\n\nTHE STARS ARE CHANGING SIGNS BETRAYING THE UNIVERSAL CONSPIRACY OF\nPURPOSE.\n\n7. In fact, we would still have to ask ourselves for the cause of the\nevents (in our world) even if the stars, like many other things, really\nprognosticated future events. We would still have to wonder at the\nmaintenance of the order without which no events could be prefigured.\nWe might, therefore, liken the stars to letters, at every moment flung\nalong the heavens, and which, after having been displayed, continued\nin ceaseless motion, so that, while exercising another function in\nthe universe, they would still possess significance.[212] Thus in\na being animated by a single principle it is possible to judge one\npart by another; as it is possible, by the study of the eyes or some\nother organ of an individual, to conclude as to his characters, to the\ndangers to which he is exposed, and how he may escape them. Just as\nour members are parts of our bodies, so are we ourselves parts of the\nuniverse. Things, therefore, are made for each other. Everything is\nsignificant, and the wise man can conclude from one thing to another.\nIndeed many habitual occurrences are foreseen by men generally. In\nthe universe everything is reduced to a single system.[213] To this\nco-ordination is due the possibility of birds furnishing us with omens,\nand other animals furnishing us with presages. All things mutually\ndepend from each other. Everything conspires to a single purpose,[214]\nnot only in each individual, whose parts are perfectly related; but\nalso in the universe, and that in a higher degree, and far earlier.\nThis multiple being could be turned into a single universal Living\norganism only by a single principle. As in the human body every organ\nhas its individual function, likewise in the universe each being plays\nits individual part; so much the more that they not only form part\nof the universe, but that they themselves also form universes not\nwithout importance.[215] All things, therefore, proceed from a single\nprinciple, each plays its individual part, and lends each other mutual\nassistance. Neither are they separate from the universe, but they act\nand react on each other, each assisting or hindering the other. But\ntheir progress is not fortuitous, nor is it the result of chance. They\nform a series, where each, by a natural bond, is the effect of the\npreceding one, and the cause of the following one.[216]\n\n\nTHERE IS A NATURAL LAW WHICH DIRECTS THE SOUL.\n\n8. When the soul applies herself to carry out her proper\nfunction[217]--for the soul effects everything, as far as she plays\nthe part of a principle--she follows the straight road;[218] when she\nloses her way[219] the divine justice subjugates her to the physical\norder which reigns in the universe,[220] unless the soul succeed in\nliberating herself. The divine justice[221] reigns ever, because\nthe universe is directed by the order and power of the dominating\nprinciple (the universal Soul).[222] To this is joined the co-operation\nof the planets which are important parts of the heaven, either by\nembellishing it, or by serving as signs. Now they serve as signs for\nall things that occur in the sense-world. As to their potency, they\nshould be credited only with what they effect indisputably.\n\n\nWEALTH, POVERTY, AND VICES ARE THE RESULT OF EXTERNAL CIRCUMSTANCES.\n\nAs to us, we fill the functions of the soul in accordance with nature\nwhen we do not stray into the multiplicity contained in the universe.\nWhen we do stray therein, we are punished for it both by the straying\nitself, and by a less happy fate thereafter. Wealth and poverty,\ntherefore, happen to us as effects of the operation of exterior things.\nAs to the virtues and vices, virtues are derived from the primitive\nnature of the soul, while the vices result from dealings of the soul\nwith exterior things. But this has been treated of elsewhere.[223]\n\n\nSIGNIFICANCE OF THE SPINDLE OF THE FATES.\n\n9. This brings us to a consideration of the spindle, which, according\nto the ancients, is turned by the Fates, and by which Plato\nsignifies[224] that which, in the evolution of the world, moves, and\nthat which is immovable. According to (Plato), it is the Fates, and\ntheir mother Necessity, which turn this spindle, and which impress it\nwith a rotary motion in the generation of each being. It is by this\nmotion that begotten beings arrive at generation. In the Timaeus[225]\nthe (Intelligence, or) divinity which has created the universe gives\nthe (immortal) principle of the soul, (the reasonable soul), and the\ndeities which revolve in the heaven add (to the immortal principle of\nthe soul) the violent passions which subject us to Necessity, namely,\nangers, desires, sufferings, and pleasures; in short, they furnish us\nwith that other kind of soul (the animal nature, or vegetable soul)\nfrom which they derive these passions. Plato thus seems to subject us\nto the stars, by hinting that we receive from them our souls,[227]\nsubordinating to the sway of Necessity when we descend here below,\nboth ourselves and our morals, and through these, the \"actions\" and\n\"passions\"[228] which are derived from the passional habit[215] of the\nsoul (the animal nature).[229]\n\n\nWHICH OF OUR TWO SOULS IS THE GENUINE INDIVIDUALITY?\n\nOur genuine selves are what is essentially \"us\"; we are the principle\nto which Nature has given the power to triumph over the passions. For,\nif we be surrounded by evils because of the body, nevertheless, the\ndivinity has given us virtue, which \"knows of no master\"[223] (is not\nsubject to any compulsion). Indeed we need virtue not so much when we\nare in a calm state, but when its absence exposes us to evils. We must,\ntherefore, flee from here below;[230] we must divorce ourselves from\nthe body added to us in generation, and apply ourselves to the effort\nto cease being this animal, this composite in which the predominant\nelement is the nature of the body, a nature which is only a trace of\nthe soul, and which causes animal life[231] to pertain chiefly to the\nbody. Indeed, all that relates to this life is corporeal. The other\nsoul (the reasonable soul, which is superior to the vegetative soul),\nis not in the body; she rises to the beautiful, to the divine, and to\nall the intelligible things, which depend on nothing else. She then\nseeks to identify herself with them, and lives conformably to the\ndivinity when retired within herself (in contemplation). Whoever is\ndeprived of this soul (that is, whoever does not exercise the faculties\nof the reasonable soul), lives in subjection to fatality.[222] Then\nthe actions of such a being are not only indicated by the stars, but\nhe himself becomes a part of the world, and he depends on the world of\nwhich he forms a part. Every man is double,[232] for every man contains\nboth the composite (organism), and the real man (which constitutes the\nreasonable soul).\n\n\nNUMENIAN DOUBLENESS, MIXTURE, AND DIVISIBLE SOUL.\n\nLikewise the universe is a compound of a body and of a Soul intimately\nunited to it, and of the universal Soul, which is not in the Body, and\nwhich irradiates the Soul united to the Body.[233] There is a similar\ndoubleness in the sun and the other stars, (having a soul united to\ntheir body, and a soul independent thereof). They do nothing that is\nshameful for the pure soul. The things they produce are parts of the\nuniverse, inasmuch as they themselves are parts of the universe, and\ninasmuch as they have a body, and a soul united to this body; but their\nwill and their real soul apply themselves to the contemplation of the\ngood Principle. It is from this Principle, or rather from that which\nsurrounds it, that other things depend, just as the fire radiates its\nheat in all directions, and as the superior Soul (of the universe)\ninfuses somewhat of her potency into the lower connected soul. The evil\nthings here below originate in the mixture inhering in the nature of\nthis world. After separating the universal Soul out of the universe,\nthe remainder would be worthless. Therefore, the universe is a deity if\nthe Soul that is separable from it be included within its substance.\nThe remainder constitutes the guardian which (Plato) names the Great\nGuardian,[234] and which, besides, possesses all the passions proper to\nguardians.\n\n\nSTARS ANNOUNCE EVENTS BECAUSE OF THE SOUL'S MANY IMPERFECTIONS, AND\nACCIDENTS.\n\n10. Under these circumstances, we must acknowledge that events are, by\nthe stars, announced, though not produced, not even by their (lower)\ncorporeal soul. By their lower part, their body,[235] they produce only\nthe things which are passions of the universe. Besides, we shall have\nto acknowledge, that the soul, even before entering into generation,\nwhile descending here below, brings something which she has by herself;\nfor she would not enter into a body unless she had a great disposition\nto suffer.[236] We must also admit that while passing into a body the\nsoul is exposed to accidents, inasmuch as she is subjected to the\ncourse of the universe, and as this very course contributes to the\nproduction of what the universe is to accomplish; for the things which\nare comprised in the course of the universe act as its parts.\n\n\nTHE INFLUENCES OF THE STARS DEGENERATE AS THEY REACH US.\n\n11. We must also reflect that the impressions which we derive from\nthe stars do not reach us in the same condition in which they leave\nthem. Just as fire in us is much degenerated from that in the heaven,\nso sympathy, degenerating within the receiving person, begets an\nunworthy affection. Courage produces in those who do not possess it in\nthe proper proportions, either violence or cowardliness. Love of the\nbeautiful and good thus becomes the search for what only appears so.\nDiscernment, in undergoing this degradation, becomes the trickiness\nwhich seeks to equal it, without succeeding in doing so. Thus all these\nqualities become evil in us, without being such in the stars. All the\nimpressions we receive thereof are in us not such as they are in the\nstars; besides they are still further degraded by mingling with the\nbodies, with matter, and with each other.[237]\n\n\nMINGLED STAR ACTION ONLY PROMOTES OR RETARDS PROCESSES ALREADY NATURAL.\n\n12. The influences proceeding from the stars commingle; and this\nmixture modifies all generated things, determining their nature and\nqualities.[238] It is not the celestial influence which produces the\nhorse, it is limited to exercising an influence upon him; for,[239]\nthe horse is begotten from horse, man from man; the sun can only\ncontribute to their formation. Man is born from the (seminal logos), or\nreason of man; but the circumstances may be favorable or unfavorable\nto him. In fact, a son resembles the father, though he may be formed\nbetter or worse; but never does he entirely detach himself from matter.\nSometimes, however, the matter so prevails over nature that the being\nis imperfect because the form does not dominate.[240]\n\n\nDISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT IS AND WHAT IS NOT PRODUCED BY THE STARS.\n\n13. We must now distinguish, decide and express the origin of various\nthings, inasmuch as there are some things that are produced by the\ncourse of the stars, and others that are not. Our principle is that the\nSoul governs the universe by Reason, just as each animal is governed by\nthe principle (the reason) which fashions his organs, and harmonizes\nthem with the whole of which they are parts;[241] now the All contains\neverything, while the parts contain only what is individual to them. As\nto exterior influences, some assist, while others oppose the tendency\nof nature. All things are subordinated to the All because they are\nparts of it; by their co-operation, each with its own nature and their\nparticular tendencies they form the total life of the universe.[242]\nThe inanimate beings serve as instruments for the others that set them\nin motion by a mechanical impulse. Irrational animated beings move\nindeterminately; such as horses attached to a chariot before the driver\nindicates which direction they are to follow; for they need the whip to\nbe directed. The nature of the reasonable animal contains the directing\ndriver;[243] if the driver be skilful, it follows the straight road,\ninstead of going blindly at chance, as often happens. Beings gifted\nwith reason and those that lack it are both contained within the\nuniverse, and contribute to the formation of the whole. Those which are\nmore powerful, and which occupy a more elevated rank do many important\nthings, and co-operate in the life of the universe where their part is\nactive, rather than passive. The passive ones act but little. Those of\nintermediary rank are passive in regard to some, and often active in\nregard to others, because they themselves possess the power of action\nand production (the stars, the brutes, and men.[244]).\n\n\nTHE STARS AS THE FOLLOWERS OF THE UNIVERSAL KING.\n\nThe universe leads an universal and perfect life, because the good\nprinciples (the star-Souls) produce excellency, that is, the more\nexcellent part in every object.[245] These principles are subordinate\nto the Soul that governs the universe, as soldiers are to their\ngeneral; consequently, (Plato) describes this by the figure of\nthe attendants of Jupiter (the universal Soul) advancing to the\ncontemplation of the intelligible world.\n\n\nMEN AS SOULS OF THE SECOND RANK.\n\nThe beings which possess a nature inferior to the star-Souls, that\nis, men, occupy the second rank in the universe, and play in it the\nsame part played in us by the second power of the soul (the discursive\nreason). The other beings, that is, the animals, occupy about the same\nrank occupied in us by the lowest (or vegetative) power of the soul;\nfor all these powers in us are not of equal rank.[246] Consequently,\nall the beings which are in the heaven, or which are distributed in\nthe universe are animated beings, and derive their life from the total\nReason of the universe (because it contains the \"seminal reasons\"\nof all living beings). None of the parts of the universe, whatever\nbe its greatness, possesses the power of altering the reasons, nor\nthe beings engendered with the co-operation of these reasons. It may\nimprove or degrade these beings, but cannot deprive them of their\nindividual nature. It degrades them by injuring either their body or\ntheir soul; which occurs when an accident becomes a cause of vice for\nthe soul which partakes of the passions of the body (the sensitive and\nvegetative soul) and which is given over to the inferior principle (to\nthe animal) by the superior principle (the reasonable soul); or when\nthe body, by its poor organization, hinders the actions in which the\nsoul needs its co-operation; then it resembles a badly attuned lyre,\nwhich is incapable of producing sounds which could form a perfect\nharmony.[247]\n\n\nANY OCCURRENCE MAY BE DUE TO MANY DIFFERENT CAUSES.\n\n14. Poverty, wealth, glory, and authoritative positions may have\nmany different causes. If a man derive his wealth from his parents,\nthe stars have only announced that he would be rich; and they would\nhave only announced his nobility if he owed his wealth to his birth.\nIf a man acquire wealth by his merit, in some way in which his body\ncontributed thereto, the causes of his bodily vigor co-operated in his\nfortune; first his parents, then his fatherland, if it be possessed of\na good climate, and last the fertility of the soil.[248] If this man\nowe his wealth to virtue, this source should be considered exclusive;\nand likewise with the transitory advantages he may by divine favor\npossess. Even if his wealth be derived from virtuous persons, still,\nin another way, his fortune is due to virtue. If his wealth were\nderived from evil men, though by a just means, yet the wealth proceeds\nfrom a good principle which was active in them. Finally, if a man who\nhas amassed wealth be evil, the cause of his fortune is this very\nwickedness, and the principle from which it derives; even those who may\nhave given him money must be included in the order of its causes. If a\nman owe his wealth to labor, such as agricultural work, the causes of\nthe wealth include the care of the ploughman and the co-operation of\nexterior circumstances. Even if he found a treasure, it is something\nin the universe which contributed thereto. Besides, this discovery may\nhave been foretold; for all things concatenate with everything else,\nand, consequently, announce each other. If a man scatter his wealth,\nhe is the cause of their loss; if his wealth be taken from him, the\ncause is the man who takes it. Many are the contributory causes of a\nshipwreck. Glory may be acquired justly or unjustly. Just glory is due\nto services rendered, or to the esteem of other people. Unjust glory\nis caused by the injustice of those who glorify that man. Deserved\npower is due to the good sense of the electors, or to the activity of\nthe man who acquired it by the co-operation of his friends, or to\nany other circumstance. A marriage is determined by a preference, or\nby some accidental circumstance, or by the co-operation of several\ncircumstances. The procreation of children is one of its consequences;\nit occurs in accordance with the (\"seminal) reason,\" in case it meet no\nobstacle; if it be defective, there must be some interior defect in the\npregnant mother, or the fault lies in the impotence of the father.\n\n\nA SOUL'S DESTINY DEPENDS ON THE CONDITION OF THE UNIVERSE AT BIRTH.\n\n15. Plato[249] speaks of the lots, and conditions chosen by one turn\nof the spindle (of Clotho); he speaks also of a guardian who helps\neach man to fulfil his destiny. These conditions are the disposition\nof the universe at the time of the soul's entrance into the body, the\nnature of their body, parents and fatherland; in short, the aggregate\nof external circumstances. Evidently all these things, in detail as\nwell as in totality, are simultaneously produced and related by one\nof the Fates, namely Clotho. Lachesis then presents the conditions\nto the souls. Finally Atropos renders the accomplishment of all the\ncircumstances of each destiny irrevocable.\n\n\nHOW SOME MEN MAY MASTER THEIR FATE: BY SELF-VICTORY.\n\nSome men, fascinated by the universe and exterior objects, completely\nor partially abdicate their freedom.[250] Others, dominating their\nenvironment, raise their head to the sky, and freeing themselves from\nexterior circumstances, release that better part of their souls which\nforms their primitive being. As to the latter point, it would be wrong\nto think that the nature of the soul was determined by the passions\naroused in her by external objects, and that she did not possess her\nown individual nature. On the contrary, as she plays the part of a\nprinciple, she possesses, much more than other things, faculties\nsuitable to accomplish actions suitable to her nature. Since she is\na being, the soul necessarily possesses appetites, active faculties,\nand the power of living well.[251] The aggregate (of the soul and\nbody, the organism) depends on the nature which formed it, and from\nit receives its qualities and actions. If the soul separate from the\nbody, she produces actions which are suitable to her nature, and which\ndo not depend from the body; she does not appropriate the credit for\nthe passions of the body, because she recognizes the difference of her\nnature.[252]\n\n\nEXACT PSYCHOLOGY AT THE ROOT OF PHILOSOPHY.\n\n16. What is the mingled, and what is the pure part of the soul? What\npart of the soul is separable? What part is not separable so long as\nthe soul is in a body? What is the animal? This subject will have to be\nstudied elsewhere,[253] for there is practically no agreement on the\nsubject. For the present, let us explain in which sense we above said\nthat the soul governs the universe by Reason.\n\n\nIS THE UNIVERSAL SOUL CREATIVE, BUT NOT PRESERVATIVE?\n\nDoes the universal Soul form all the beings successively, first man,\nthen the horse, then some other animal, and last the wild beasts?[254]\nDoes she begin by producing earth and fire; then, seeing the\nco-operation of all these things which mutually destroy or assist each\nother, does she consider only their totality and their connections,\nwithout regarding the accidents which occur to them later? Does she\nlimit herself to the reproduction of preceding generations of animals,\nand does she leave these exposed to the passions with which they\ninspire each other?\n\n\nDETERMINISM IMPLIES DEGENERATION OF RACES.\n\nDoes the \"reason\" of each individual contain both his \"actions\" and\n\"reactions\"[215] in a way such that these are neither accidental nor\nfortuitous, but necessary?[255] Are these produced by the reasons? Or\ndo the reasons know them, without producing them? Or does the soul,\nwhich contains the generative \"reasons,\"[256] know the effects of all\nher works by reasoning according to the following principle, that the\nconcourse of the same circumstances must evidently produce the same\neffects? If so, the soul, understanding or foreseeing the effects of\nher works, by them determines and concatenates all the events that\nare to happen. She, therefore, considers all the antecedents and\nconsequents, and foresees what is to follow from what precedes.[257]\nIt is (because the beings thus proceed from each other) that the\nraces continually degenerate. For instance, men degenerate because in\ndeparting continually and unavoidably (from the primitive type) the\n(\"seminal) reasons\" yield to the \"passions\" of matter.[258]\n\n\nTHE SOUL DOES NOT CAUSE PASSIONS, WHICH ARISE FROM THE SEMINAL REASONS.\n\nIs the soul the cause of these passions, because she begets the beings\nthat produce them? Does the soul then consider the whole sequence\nof events, and does she pass her existence watching the \"passions\"\nexperienced by her works? Does she never cease thinking of the latter,\ndoes she never put on them the finishing touch, regulating them so that\nthey should always go well?[259] Does she resemble some farmer who,\ninstead of limiting himself to sowing and planting, should ceaselessly\nlabor to repair the damage caused by the rains, the winds, and the\nstorms? Unless this hypothesis be absurd, it must be admitted that\nthe soul knows in advance, or even that the (\"seminal)[260] reasons\"\ncontain accidents which happen to begotten beings, that is, their\ndestruction and all the effects of their faults.[261] In this case,\nwe are obliged to say that the faults are derived from the (\"seminal)\nreasons\", although the arts and their reasons contain neither error,\nfault, nor destruction of a work of art.[262]\n\n\nTHE UNIVERSE IS HARMONY,[207] IN SPITE OF THE FAULTS IN THE DETAILS.\n\nIt might here be objected that there could not be in the universe\nanything bad or contrary to nature; and it must be acknowledged that\neven what seems less good still has its utility. If this seem to\nadmit that things that are less good contribute to the perfection\nof the universe, and that there is no necessity that all things be\nbeautiful,[263] it is only because the very contraries contribute\nto the perfection of the universe, and so the world could not exist\nwithout them. It is likewise with all living beings. The (\"seminal)\nreason\" necessarily produces and forms what is better; what is\nless good is contained in the \"potentiality\" of the \"reasons,\" and\n\"actualized\" in the begotten beings. The (universal) Soul has,\ntherefore, no need to busy herself therewith, nor to cause the\n\"reasons\" to become active. For the \"reasons\" successfully subdue\nmatter to what is better (the forms), even though matter alters what it\nreceives by imparting a shock to the \"reasons\" that proceed from the\nhigher principles. All things, therefore, form a harmonious totality\nbecause they simultaneously proceed from matter, and the \"reasons\"\nwhich beget them.\n\n\nTHE METHOD OF CREATION.\n\n17. Let us examine if the \"reasons\" contained in the Soul are\nthoughts. How could the Soul produce by thoughts? It is the Reason\nwhich produces in matter; but the principle that produces naturally is\nneither a thought nor an intuition, but a power that fashions matter\nunconsciously, just as a circle gives water a circular figure and\nimpression. Indeed, the natural generative power has the function of\nproduction; but it needs the co-operation of the governing (principle)\nof the Soul, which forms and which causes the activity of the\ngenerative soul engaged in matter. If the governing power of the Soul\nform the generative soul by reasoning, it will be considering either\nanother object, or what it possesses in herself. If the latter be the\ncase, she has no need of reasoning,[264] for it is not by reasoning\nthat the Soul fashions matter, but by the power which contains the\nreasons, the power which alone is effective, and capable of production.\nThe Soul, therefore, produces by the forms. The forms she transmits\nare by her received from the Intelligence. This Intelligence, however,\ngives the forms to the universal Soul which is located immediately\nbelow her, and the universal Soul transmits them to the inferior soul\n(the natural generative power), fashioning and illuminating her. The\ninferior soul then produces, at one time without meeting any obstacles,\nat others, when doing so, although, in the latter case, she produces\nthings less perfect. As she has received the power of production, and\nas she contains the reasons which are not the first (the \"seminal\nreasons,\" which are inferior to the Ideas) not only does she, by virtue\nof what she has received, produce, but she also draws from herself\nsomething which is evidently inferior (matter).[265] It doubtless\nproduces a living being (the universe), but a living being which is\nless perfect, and which enjoys life much less, because it occupies\nthe last rank, because it is coarse and hard to manage, because\nthe matter which composes it is, as it were, the bitterness or the\nsuperior principles, because it spreads its bitterness around her, and\ncommunicates some of it to the universe.\n\n\nEVILS ARE NECESSARY TO THE PERFECTION OF THE UNIVERSE.\n\n18. Must the evils in the universe be considered as necessary,[266]\nbecause they are the consequences of the superior principles? Yes,\nfor without them the universe would be imperfect. The greater number\nof evils, if not all of them, are useful to the universe; such as\nthe venomous animals; though they often ignore their real utility.\nEven wickedness is useful in certain respects, and can produce many\nbeautiful things; for example, it leads to fine inventions, it forces\nmen to prudence, and does not let them fall asleep in an indolent\nsecurity.[267]\n\n\nPICTURE OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSE.\n\nUnder these circumstances, it is plain that the universal Soul ever\ncontemplates the better principles, because it is turned towards the\nintelligible world, and towards the divinity. As she fills herself with\nGod, and is filled with God, she, as it were, overflows over her image,\nnamely, the power which holds the last rank (the natural generative\npower), and which, consequently, is the last creative power. Above\nthis creative power is the power of the Soul which immediately receives\nthe forms from the Intelligence. Above all is the Intelligence, the\nDemiurge, who gives the forms to the universal Soul, and the latter\nimpresses its traces on the third-rank power (the natural generative\npower).[268] This world, therefore, is veritably a picture which\nperpetually pictures itself. The two first principles are immovable;\nthe third is also immovable (in essence); but it is engaged in matter,\nand becomes immovable (only) by accident. As long as the Intelligence\nand the Soul subsist, the \"reasons\" flow down into this image of the\nSoul (the natural generative power); likewise, so long as the sun\nsubsists, all light emanates therefrom.[269]\n\n\n\n\nFIRST ENNEAD, BOOK ONE.\n\nThe Organism and the Self.[270]\n\n\nPSYCHOLOGIC DISTINCTIONS IN SOUL.\n\n1. To what part of our nature do pleasure and grief, fear and\nboldness desire and aversion, and, last, pain, belong? Is it to\nthe soul (herself),[271] or to the soul when she uses the body as an\ninstrument,[272] or to some third (combination) of both? Even the\nlatter might be conceived of in a double sense: it might be either\nthe simple mixture of the soul and the body,[273] or some different\nproduct resulting therefrom.[274] The same uncertainty obtains\nabout the products of the above mentioned experiences: namely,\npassions,[275] actions, and opinions. For example, we may ask whether\nratiocination[276] and opinion both, belong to the same principle as\nthe passions; or whether only one of them does; in which case the\nother would belong to some other principle. We should also inquire\nconcerning the nature and classification of thought.[277] Last we\nshould study the principle that undertakes this inquiry and which comes\nto some conclusion about it. But, first of all, who is the agent, who\nfeels? This is the real starting point: for even passions are modes of\nfeeling, or at least they do not exist without it.[278]\n\n\nTHE SOUL AS A COMPOSITE AGGREGATE.\n\n2. Let us first examine the soul (herself). Is there any difference\nbetween the soul and the soul-essence? If there be a difference,\nthe soul must be a composite aggregate: and it should no longer be a\nmatter of surprise that both she and her essence, at least so far as\nshe admits thereof, together experience the above mentioned passions,\nand in general the habits, and better or worse dispositions. But, on\nthe contrary, if, soul and soul-essence be identical, then the soul\nshould be a form which would be unreceptive for all these energies of\nessence, which on the contrary she imparts to other things, possessing\nin herself a connate energy which our reason reveals in her. In this\ncase we must acknowledge that she is immortal, inasmuch as the immortal\nand undecaying must be impassible, giving to others without receiving\nanything in return from them; or at least, deriving nothing but from\nthe superior (or anterior) principles, from which she is not cut off,\ninasmuch as they are better.\n\n\nTHE SOUL IS NOT ESSENCE.\n\nA being that were so unreceptive to anything external would have no\nground for fear of anything external. Fear might indeed be natural\nto something. Neither would she be bold, for this sentiment, implies\nshelter from what is terrifying. As to such desires which are satisfied\nby the emptying or filling of the body, they belong only to some nature\nforeign enough to be emptied or filled. How could she participate in a\nmixture, inasmuch as the essential is unmingled? Further she would not\nwish to have anything introduced (in herself), for this would imply\nstriving to become something foreign to herself. She would also be far\nfrom suffering, for how could she grieve, and about what? For that\nwhich is of simple being is self-sufficient, in that she remains in her\nown being. Neither will she rejoice at any increase, as not even the\ngood could happen to her. What she is, she ever will be. Nor could we\nattribute to the pure soul sensation, ratiocination or opinion; for\nsensation is the perception, of a form or of an impassible body; and\nbesides ratiocination and opinion (depend) on sensation. We shall,\nhowever, have to examine whether or no we should attribute to the\nsoul thought; also, whether pure pleasure can affect a soul while she\nremains alone.[279]\n\n\nTHE SOUL USES THE BODY AS TOOL.\n\n3. Whether the soul, according to her being, be located in the body,\nabove or within this latter, the soul forms with the body an entity\ncalled (a \"living being\" or) organism.[280] In this case, the soul\nusing the body as a tool is not forced to participate in its passions,\nany more than workmen participate in the experiences of their tools. As\nto sensations, of course, the soul must perceive them, since in order\nto use her instrument, the soul must, by means of sensation, cognize\nthe modifications that this instrument may receive from without. Thus\nseeing consists of using the eyes; and the soul at the same time feels\nthe evils which may affect the sight. Similar is the case with griefs,\npains and any corporeal exigency; also with the desires which arise\nfrom the soul's need to take recourse to the ministry of the body. But\nhow do passions from the body penetrate into the soul? For a body could\ncommunicate her own properties to some other body; but how could she do\nso to a soul?\n\n\nSEPARATION OF SOUL FROM BODY.\n\nSuch a process would imply that one individual suffers when an entirely\ndifferent individual is affected. There must be a distinction between\nthem so long as we consider the former the user, and the latter the\nused; and it is philosophy,[281] that produces this separation by\ngiving to the soul the power of using the body as a tool.\n\n\nPRIMITIVE RELATION BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY.\n\nBut what was the condition of the soul before her separation from the\nbody by philosophy? Was she mingled with the body? If she were mingled\nwith it, she must either have been formed[282] by mixing;[271] or she\nwas spread all over the body; or she was[283] a form interwoven with\nthe body; or she was a form governing the body[284] as a pilot governs\nthe ship;[285] or[286] was partly mingled with, and partly separated\nfrom, the body. (In the latter case) I would call the independent\npart that which uses the body as a tool, while the mingled part is\nthat which lowers itself to the classification or rank of instrument.\nNow philosophy raises the latter to the rank of the former; and the\ndetached part turns her away, as far as our needs allow, from the body\nshe uses, so that she may not always have to use the body.\n\n\nCONSEQUENCES OF MIXTURE OF SOUL AND BODY.\n\n4. Now let us suppose the soul is mingled with the body. In this\nmixture, the worse part, or body, will gain, while the soul will lose.\nThe body will improve by participation with the soul; and the soul will\ndeteriorate by association with death and irrationality. Well, does\nthe soul, in somewhat losing life, gain the accession of sensation?\nOn the other hand, would not the body, by participation in life, gain\nsensation and its derived passions? It is the latter, then, which will\ndesire, inasmuch as it will enjoy the desired objects, and will feel\nfear about them. It is the latter which may be exposed to the escape of\nthe objects of its desire, and to decay.[287]\n\n\nMIXTURE OF SOUL AND BODY.\n\nWe will set aside as impossible the mixture of two incommensurables,\nsuch as a line and the color called white. A mixture of the soul\nand body, which must imply their commensurability, would demand\nexplanation. Even if the soul interpenetrate the body, the soul\nneed not share the body's passions, for the interpenetrating medium\nmay remain impassible; as light, which remains such in spite of its\ndiffusion.[288] Thus the soul might remain a stranger to the body's\npassions, though diffused through it, and need not necessarily undergo\nits passions.\n\n\nARISTOTELIAN HYPOTHESIS CONSIDERED.\n\nShould we say that the soul is in the body, as form in matter? In this\ncase, she is \"being,\" and she would be a separable form. If then[289]\nshe be in the body as, in the case of the axe, the schematic figure is\nin the iron, so as by her own proper virtue, to form the power of doing\nwhat iron thus formed accomplishes, we will have all the more reason to\nattribute the common passions to the body, which is[290] an organized\nphysical tool possessing potential life. For if as (Plato) says[291]\nit be absurd to suppose that it is the soul that weaves, it is not\nany more reasonable to attribute the desires and griefs to the soul;\nrather, by far, to the living organism.\n\n\nTHE LIVING ORGANISM.\n\n5. The \"living organism\" must mean either the thus organized body,\nor the common mixture of soul and body, or some third thing which\nproceeds from the two first. In either of these three cases the soul\nwill have to be considered impassible, while the power of experiencing\npassions will inhere in something else; or the soul will have to share\nthe body's passions, in which case the soul will have to experience\npassions either identical or analogous to those of the body, so that to\na desire of the animal there will correspond an act or a passion of the\nconcupiscible appetite.\n\n\nREFUTATION OF THE (JAMES-LANGE) THEORY OF EMOTIONS.\n\nWe shall later on consider the organized body; here we must find how\nthe conjunction of soul and body could experience suffering. The\ntheory that the affection of the body modifies it so as to produce a\nsensation which itself would end in the soul, leaves unexplained the\norigin of sensation. To the theory that suffering has its principle in\nthis opinion or judgment, that a misfortune is happening to ourselves\nor some one related to us, whence results disagreeable emotion first\nin the body, and then in the whole living organism,[292] there is this\nobjection, that it is yet uncertain to which opinion belongs; to the\nsoul, or to the conjunction of soul and body. Besides, the opinion\nof the presence of an evil does not always entail suffering; it is\npossible that, in spite of such an opinion, one feels no affliction;\nas, for instance, one may not become irritated at believing oneself\nscorned; or in experiencing no desire even in the expectation of some\ngood.\n\n\nNOT ALL AFFECTIONS COMMON TO SOUL AND BODY.\n\nHow then arise these affections common to the soul and the body? Shall\nwe then say that desire derives from the desire-appetite,[293] anger\nfrom the anger-appetite, or in short, every emotion or affliction from\nthe corresponding appetite? But even so, they will not be common, and\nthey will belong exclusively to the soul, or to the body. There are\nsome whose origin needs the excitation of blood and bile, and that the\nbody be in some certain state which excites desire, as in physical\nlove. On the contrary, however, the desire of goodness is no common\naffection; it is an affection peculiar to the soul, as are several\nothers. Reason, therefore, does not allow us to consider all affections\nas common to soul and body.\n\n\nDESIRE, NOT SIMULTANEOUS WITH APPETITE.\n\nIs it possible, however, that for example, in physical love, the\nman[294] may experience a desire simultaneously with the corresponding\nappetite? This is impossible, for two reasons. If we say that the man\nbegins to experience the desire, while the corresponding appetite\ncontinues it, it is plain the man cannot experience a desire without\nthe activity of the appetite. If on the other hand it be the appetite\nthat begins, it is clear that it cannot begin being excited unless the\nbody first find itself in suitable circumstances, which is unreasonable.\n\n\nSOUL AND BODY, BY UNITING, FORM AN INDIVIDUAL AGGREGATE.\n\n6. It would, however, probably be better to put the matter thus: by\ntheir presence, the faculties of the soul cause reaction in the organs\nwhich possess them, so that while they themselves remain unmoved, they\ngive them the power to enter into movement.[295] In this case, however,\nwhen the living organism experiences suffering, the life-imparting\ncause must itself remain impassible, while the passions and energies\nbelong wholly to that which receives life. In this case, therefore, the\nlife will not belong exclusively to the soul, but to the conjunction\nof the soul and body; or, at least, the latter's life will not be\nidentical with the soul's, nor will it be the faculty of sensation,\nwhich will feel, but the being in whom that faculty inheres.\n\n\nSENSATION IMPLIES FEELING SOUL.\n\nIf, however, sensation, which is no more than a corporeal emotion,\nfinds its term in the soul, the soul must surely feel sensation;\ntherefore it does not occur as an effect of the presence of the faculty\nof sensation, for this ignores the feeling agent back of it. Nor is it\nthe conjunction of soul and body, for unless the faculty of sensation\noperate, that aggregate could not feel, and it would then no longer\ninclude as elements either the soul, or the faculty of sensation.\n\n\nSOUL-LIGHT FORMS ANIMAL NATURE.\n\n7. The aggregate results from the presence of the soul, not indeed that\nthe soul enters into the aggregate, or constitutes one of its elements.\nOut of this organized body, and of a kind of light furnished by\nherself, the soul forms the animal nature, which differs both from soul\nand body, and to which belongs sensation, as well as all the passions\nattributed to the animal.[296]\n\n\nRELATION OF ANIMAL TO HUMAN NATURE.\n\nIf now we should be asked how it happened that \"we\" feel, we answer:\nWe are not separated from the organism, although within us exist\nprinciples[297] of a higher kind which concur in forming the manifold\ncomplex of human nature.\n\n\nEXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SENSATION.\n\nAs to the faculty of sensation which is peculiar to the soul, it cannot\nbe the power of perceiving the sense-objects themselves, but only\ntheir typical forms, impressed on the animal by sensation. These have\nalready somewhat of the intelligible nature; the exterior sensation\npeculiar to the animal is only the image of the sensation peculiar to\nthe soul; which, by its very essence is truer and more real, since it\nconsists only in contemplating images while remaining impassible.[298]\nRatiocination, opinion and thought, which principally constitute\nus,[299] deal exclusively with these images, by which the soul has the\npower of directing the organism.\n\n\nDISTINCTION IN THE WHOLE ORGANISM.\n\nNo doubt these faculties are \"ours,\" but \"we\" are the superior\nprinciple which, from above, directs the organising but in this whole\nwe shall have to distinguish an inferior part, mingled with the body,\nand a superior part, which is the true man. The former (irrational\nsoul) constitutes the beast, as for instance, the lion; the latter is\nthe rational soul, which constitutes man. In every ratiocination, it is\n\"we\" who reason, because ratiocination is the peculiar activity (or,\nenergy) of the soul.[300]\n\n\nINDIVIDUAL RELATION WITH COSMIC INTELLECT.\n\n8. What is our relation with the Intelligence? I mean not the\nhabit imparted to the soul by the intellect, but the absolute\nIntelligence;[301] which, though above us, is also common to all men,\nor peculiar to each of them; in other words, is simultaneously common\nand individual. Common because it is indivisible, one and everywhere\nthe same; particular because each soul possesses it entirely in the\nfirst or rational soul. Likewise, we possess the ideas in a double\nmanner; in the soul they appear developed and separate; in the\nintelligence they exist all together.[302]\n\n\nINDIVIDUAL RELATION WITH GOD AND COSMIC SOUL.\n\nWhat is our relation with God? He hovers over the intelligible nature,\nand real being; while we, being on the third rank as counted from\nthence, are of the undivided universal Soul, which[303] is indivisible\nbecause she forms part of the upper world, while she is divisible in\nregard to the bodies. She is indeed divisible in regard to the bodies,\nsince she permeates each of them as far as they live; but at the same\ntime she is indivisible because she is one in the universe.\n\n\nSOUL GIVES LIFE TO PSYCHOLOGIC ELEMENTS.\n\nShe seems to be present in the bodies, and illuminates them, making\nliving beings out of them. This occurs not as a mixture of herself and\nbodies, but by remaining individual, giving out images of herself,[304]\njust as a single face in several mirrors. Of these, the first is\nsensation, which resides in the common part, the organism; then come\nall the other forms of the soul--forms which successively derive each\nfrom the other, down to the faculties of generation and increase,\nand generally, the power of producing and fashioning that which is\ndifferent from self--which indeed the soul does as soon as she turns\ntowards the object she fashions.[305]\n\n\nORIGIN OF EVILS, SINS, AND ERRORS.\n\n9. In this conception of the soul, she will be foreign to the cause of\nthe evils which the man does and suffers. These refer to the organism,\nthat common part, understood as above. Although opinion be deceptive,\nand makes us commit much evil, and although opinion and ratiocination\nboth belong to the soul, yet the soul may be sinless, inasmuch as we\nare only mastered by the worse part of our nature.[306] Often, indeed,\nwe yield to appetite, to anger, and we are the dupes of some imperfect\nimage. The conception of false things, the imagination[307] does not\nawait the judgment of discursive reason. There are still other cases\nwhere we yield to the lower part of ourselves; in sensation, for\ninstance, we see things that do not exist, because we rely on the\ncommon sensation of soul and body, before having discerned its objects\nby discursive reason.\n\n\nINTELLECT DID NOT GRASP THE OBJECT ITSELF.\n\nIn this case did the intellect grasp the object itself? Certainly\nnot; and, therefore, it is not the intellect that is responsible\nfor the error. We say as much for the \"we,\" according as we will or\nwill not have perceived the object, either in the intellect, or in\nourselves;--for it is possible to possess an object without having it\nactually present.\n\n\nTRUE CONCEPTION ACT OF INTUITION.\n\nWe have distinguished from things common to soul and body, those\npeculiar to the soul. The former are corporeal, and cannot be produced\nwithout the organs, while the latter's occurrence is independent of\nthe body. Ratiocination[276] is the essential and constitutive faculty\nof the real soul, because it determines the typical forms derived from\nsensation, it looks, it somehow feels the images, and really is the\ndominating part of the soul. The conception of true things is the act\nof intuitive thoughts.\n\n\nMODIFICATIONS DERIVE FROM FOREIGN SOURCES.\n\nThere is often a resemblance and community between exterior and\ninterior things; in this case the soul will not any the less exercise\nherself on herself, will not any the less remain within herself,\nwithout feeling any passive modification. As to the modifications and\ntroubles which may arise in us, they derive from foreign elements,\nattached to the soul, as well as from passions experienced by the above\ndescribed common part.\n\n\nDISTINCTIONS IN \"WE\" AND THE \"REAL MAN.\"\n\n10. But if \"we\" are the \"soul,\" we must admit that when we experience\npassions, the soul experiences them also; that when we act, the soul\nacts. We may even say that the common part is also \"ours,\" especially\nbefore philosophy separated the soul from the body;[308] in fact, we\neven say \"we\" suffer, when our body suffers. \"We\" is, therefore, taken\nin a double sense: either the soul with the animal part, or living\nbody; or simply the upper part; while the vivified body is a wild\nbeast.\n\n\nREAL MAN DIFFERS FROM BODY.\n\nThe real Man differs from the body; pure from every passion, he\npossesses the intellectual virtues, virtues which reside in the soul,\neither when she is separated from the body, or when she is--as usually\nhere below--only separable by philosophy; for even when she seems to\nus entirely separated, the soul is, in this life, ever accompanied\nby a lower[309] sensitive part, or part of growth, which she\nilluminates.[310]\n\n\nFUNCTION OF THE COMMON PART.\n\nAs to the virtues which consist not in wisdom, but in ethical habits\nand austerities, they belong to the common part. To it alone, also,\nare vices to be imputed, inasmuch as it exclusively experiences envy,\njealousy and cowardly pity. Friendships, however, should be referred\nsome to the common part, and others to the pure Soul or inner Man. In\nchildhood, the faculties of the composite common part are exercised,\nbut rarely is it illuminated from above. When this superior principle\nseems inactive in relation to us, it is actively engaged towards the\nupper intelligible world; and it only begins to be active towards us\nwhen it advances as far as[311] (fancy or representation), the middle\npart of our being.\n\n\nTHE SUPERIOR PRINCIPLE NOT ALWAYS UTILIZED.\n\nBut is the superior principle not \"ours\" also? Surely, but only when we\nare conscious thereof; for we do not always utilize our possessions.\nThis utilization, however, takes place when we direct this middle\npart of our being towards either the upper or lower worlds, and when\nwe actualize into energies what before was only an (Aristotelian)\n\"potentiality\" or a (Stoic) \"habit.\"\n\n\nTHE ANIMATING PRINCIPLE OF ANIMALS.\n\nWe might define the animating principle of animals. If it be true,\naccording to common opinion, that animal bodies contain human souls\nthat have sinned, the separable part of these souls does not properly\nbelong to these bodies; although these souls assist these bodies, the\nsouls are not actually present to them.[312] In them the sensation is\ncommon to the image of the soul and to the body;--but to the latter\nonly in so far as it is organized and fashioned by the image of the\nsoul. As to the animals into whose bodies no human soul entered, they\nare produced by an illumination of the universal Soul.\n\n\nTHE SOUL BOTH IMPASSIBLE AND PUNISHABLE.\n\n12. There is a contradiction between our own former opinion that the\nsoul cannot sin, and the universally admitted belief that the soul\ncommits sins, expiates them, undergoes punishments in Hades, and that\nshe passes into new bodies. Although we seem to be in a dilemma,\nforcing us to choose between them, it might be possible to show they\nare not incompatible.\n\n\nPHILOSOPHIC SEPARATION REFERS NOT ONLY TO BODY, BUT TO PASSIBLE\nACCRETIONS.\n\nWhen we attribute infallibility to the soul, we are supposing her to be\none and simple, identifying the soul with soul essence. When, however,\nwe consider her capable of sin, we are looking at her as a complex, of\nher essence and of another kind of soul which can experience brutal\npassions. The soul, thus, is a combination of various elements; and it\nis not the pure soul, but this combination, which experiences passions,\ncommits sins, and undergoes punishments. It was this conception of the\nsoul Plato was referring to when he said:[313] \"We see the soul as we\nsee Glaucus, the marine deity,\" and he adds, \"He who would know the\nnature of the soul herself should, after stripping her of all that is\nforeign to her, in her, especially consider her philosophic love for\ntruth; and see to what things she attaches herself, and by virtue of\nwhose affinities she is what she is.\" We must, therefore, differentiate\nthe soul's life acts from that which is punished, and when we speak of\nphilosophy's separation of the soul, we mean a detaching not only from\nthe body, but also from what has been added to the soul.\n\n\nHOW THE ANIMAL NATURE IS GENERATED.\n\nThis addition occurs during her generation, or rather in the generation\nof another ideal form of soul, the \"animal nature.\" Elsewhere[314] this\ngeneration has been explained thus. When the soul descends, at the very\nmoment when she inclines towards the body, she produces an image of\nherself. The soul, however, must not be blamed for sending this image\ninto the body. For the soul to incline towards the body is for the\nsoul to shed light on what is below her; and this is no more sinful\nthan to produce a shadow. That which is blamable is the illuminated\nobject; for if it did not exist, there would be nothing to illuminate.\nThe descent of the soul, or her inclination to the body, means only\nthat she communicates life to what she illuminates. She drives away her\nimage, or lets it vanish, if nothing receptive is in its vicinity; the\nsoul lets the image vanish, not because she is separated--for to speak\naccurately, she is not separated from the body--but because she is no\nlonger here below; and she is no longer below when she is entirely\noccupied in contemplating the intelligible world.\n\n\nTHE DOUBLE HERCULES SYMBOLIZES THE SOUL.\n\n(Homer) seems to admit this distinction in speaking of Hercules, when\nhe sends the image of this hero into Hades, and still he locates him\nwithin the abode of the deities[315];--it is at least the idea implied\nin this double assertion that Hercules is in Hades and that he is in\nOlympus. The poet, therefore, distinguished in him two elements. We\nmight perhaps expound the passage as follows: Hercules had an active\nvirtue, and because of his great qualities was judged worthy of being\nclassified with the deities, but as he possessed only the active\nvirtue, and not the contemplative virtue, he could not be admitted into\nHeaven entirely; while he is in heaven, there is something of him in\nHades.[316]\n\n\nRELATION OF THE \"WE\" AND THE \"SOUL.\"\n\n13. Is it \"we\" or the \"soul\" which makes these researches? It is we, by\nmeans of the soul. The cause of this is, not we who consider the soul\nbecause we possess her, but that the soul considers herself. This need\nnot imply motion, as it is generally understood, but a motion entirely\ndifferent from that of the bodies, and which is its own life.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE NOT OURS, BUT WE.\n\nIntelligence[277] also is ours, but only in the sense that the soul is\nintelligent; for us, the (higher) life consists in a better thinking.\nThe soul enjoys this life either when she thinks intelligible objects,\nor when the intellect is both a part of ourselves, and something\nsuperior towards which we ascend.\n\n\n\n\nFIRST ENNEAD, BOOK SEVEN.\n\nOf the First Good, and of the Other Goods.[317]\n\n\nTHE SUPREME GOOD AS END OF ALL OTHER GOODS.\n\n1. Could any one say that there was, for any being, any good but the\nactivity of \"living according to nature?\"[318] For a being composed\nof several parts, however, the good will consist in the activity of\nits best part, an action which is peculiar, natural, and unfailing.\nFurther: as the soul is an excellent being, and directs her activity\ntowards something excellent, this excellent aim is not merely excellent\nrelatively to the soul, but is the absolute Good. If then there be a\nprinciple which does not direct its action towards any other thing,\nbecause it is the best of beings, being above them all, it can be this\nonly because all other beings trend towards it. This then, evidently,\nis the absolute Good by virtue of which all other beings participate\ntherein.\n\n\nPARTICIPATION IN GOOD. TWO METHODS.\n\nNow there are two methods of participation in the Good: the first, is\nto become similar to it; the second is to direct one's activity towards\nit. If then the direction of one's desire and one's action towards the\nbetter principle be a good, then can the absolute good itself neither\nregard nor desire any other thing, remaining in abiding rest, being the\nsource and principle of all actions conforming to nature, giving to\nother things the form of the Good, without acting on them, as they, on\nthe contrary, direct their actions thereto.\n\n\nPERMANENCE THE CHIEF NOTE OF ABSOLUTE GOOD.\n\nOnly by permanence--not by action, nor even by thought--is this\nprinciple the Good. For if it be super-Being, it must also be\nsuper-Activity, super-Intelligence, and Thought. The principle from\nwhich everything depends, while itself depending on nothing else, must,\ntherefore, be recognized as the Good. (This divinity) must, therefore,\npersist in His condition, while everything turns towards Him, just as,\nin a circle, all the radii meet in the centre. An example of this is\nthe sun, which is a centre of the light that is, as it were, suspended\nfrom that planet. The light accompanies the sun everywhere, and never\nparts from it; and even if you wished to separate it on one side, it\nwould not any the less remain concentrated around it.\n\n\nALL THINGS DEPEND ON THE GOOD BY UNITY, ESSENCE, AND QUALITY.\n\n2. Let us study the dependence of everything on the Good. The inanimate\ntrends toward the Soul, while the animate Soul trends towards the Good\nthrough Intelligence. As far as anything possesses unity, essence or\nform, it participates in the Good. By its participation in unity,\nessence and form each being participates in the Good, even though the\nlatter be only an image, for the things in which it participates are\nonly images of unity, essence, and form. For the (first) Soul[319]\nas she approaches Intelligence, she acquires a life which approaches\ncloser to truth; and she owes this to Intelligence; thus (by virtue\nof Intelligence) she possesses the form of the Good. To possess the\nlatter, all she needs to do is to turn her looks towards it; for\nIntelligence is the next after the Good. Therefore, to those to whom\nit is granted to live, life is the good. Likewise, for those who\nparticipate in intelligence, Intelligence is the good. Consequently,\nsuch (a being as) joins intelligence to life possesses a double good.\n\n\nTHERE IS NO UNALLOYED EVIL FOR THE LIVING BEING.\n\n3. Though life be a good, it does not belong to all beings. Life\nis incomplete for the evil person, as for an eye that does not see\ndistinctly; neither accomplish their purpose. If, for us, life, though\nmingled as it is, be a good, even if an imperfect one, how shall we\ncontinue to assert that death is not an evil? But for whom would it be\nan evil? This we must ask because evil must necessarily be an attribute\nof somebody. Now there is no more evil for a being which, though\neven existing, is deprived of life, any more than for a stone (as\nthey say). But if, after death, the being still live, if it be still\nanimate, it will possess good, and so much the more as it exercises\nits faculties without the body. If it be united to the universal Soul,\nevidently there can be no evil for it, any more than for the gods who\npossess good unmingled with evil. Similar is the case of the soul which\npreserves her purity, inasmuch as he who loses her finds that life, and\nnot death, is the real Evil. If there be chastisements in Hades, again\nis life an evil for the soul, because she is not pure. If, further, we\ndefine life as the union of the soul with the body, and death as their\nseparation, the soul can pass through both these conditions (without,\non that account, being unhappy, or losing her hold on the Good).\n\n\nBY VIRTUE, LIFE CHANGES FROM AN EVIL TO A GOOD.\n\nHow is death not an evil, if life be a good? Certainly life is a good\nfor such as possess the Good, (it is a good) not because the soul is\nunited to the body, but because she repels evil by virtue. (Without\nthe latter) death would rather be a good (because it delivers us from\nthe body[320]). To resume: by itself, life in a body is evil; but, by\nvirtue, the soul locates herself in the good, not by perpetuating the\nexisting corporeal union, but by separating herself from the body.\n\n\n\n\nPORPHYRY, COMMENTARIES OR OUTLINES OF THE ENNEADS OF PLOTINOS.\n\nPSYCHOLOGICAL FRAGMENTS BY PORPHYRY, JAMBLICHUS, NEMESIUS, AND AMMONIUS\nSACCAS.\n\n\n\n\nCONCORDANCE OF THE NUMBERS OF THE 44 PARAGRAPHS OF PORPHYRY'S\nPRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF INTELLIGIBLES IN THE EDITIONS OF BOUILLET,\nCREUZER, AND HOLSTENIUS\n\n\n    Bouillet. Creuzer. Holstenius.\n       =1=       34        34\n       =2=        8         8\n       =3=        9         9\n       =4=       27        28\n       =5=       20        20\n       =6=       18        18\n       =7=       24        25\n       =8=       19        19\n       =9=        7         7\n      =11=       22        23\n      =12=       10        10\n      =13=       12        12\n      =14=       26        27\n      =15=        1         1\n      =16=        2         2\n      =17=        3         3\n      =18=        4         4\n      =19=        5         5\n      =20=        6         6\n      =21=       28        29\n      =22=       29        30\n      =23=       22        23\n      =24=       17        17\n      =25=       16        16\n      =26=       11        11\n      =27=       25        26\n      =28=       14        14\n      =29=       13        13\n      =30=       30        31\n      =31=       42        43\n      =32=       44        45\n      =33=       15        15\n      =34=       23        24\n      =35=       43        44\n      =36=       35        35\n      =37=       36        37\n      =38=       37        38\n      =39=       39        40\n      =40=       40        41\n      =41=       33        36\n      =42=       38        39\n      =43=       31        32\n      =44=       41        42\n\nThe order of Bouillet has been left, because the other orders differ\nanyway, and because this is the one that Porphyry introduced into the\nworks of Plotinos. It must, therefore, have been of most significance\nto him.\n\n\n\n\nPRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF THE INTELLIGIBLES, BY PORPHYRY.[321]\n\n\nFIRST ENNEAD,[322] BOOK TWO.\n\nOf Virtues.\n\nI.--There is a difference between the virtues of the citizen, those\nof the man who essays to rise to contemplation, and who, on this\naccount, is said to possess a contemplative mind; those of him who\ncontemplates intelligence; and finally those of pure Intelligence,\nwhich is completely separated from the soul.\n\n1. The civil virtues consist of moderation in passions, and in\nletting one's actions follow the rational laws of duty. The object\nof these virtues being to make us benevolent in our dealings with\nour fellow-human beings, they are called civil virtues because they\nmutually unite citizens. \"Prudence refers to the rational part of our\nsoul; courage, to that part of the soul subject to anger; temperance\nconsists in the agreement and harmony of appetite and reason; finally\njustice, consists in the accomplishment, by all these faculties, of the\nfunction proper to each of them, either to command, or to obey.\"\n\n2. The virtues of the man who tries to rise to contemplation consist in\ndetaching oneself from things here below; that is why they are called\n\"purifications.\"[323] They command us to abstain from activities which\ninnervate the organs, and which excite the affections that relate to\nthe body. The object of these virtues is to raise the soul to genuine\nexistence. While the civil virtues are the ornament of mortal life,\nand prepare the soul for the purificatory virtues, the latter direct\nthe man whom they adorn to abstain from activities in which the body\npredominates. Thus, in the purificatory virtues, \"prudence consists\nin not forming opinions in harmony with the body, but in acting by\noneself, which is the work of pure thought. Temperance consists in not\nsharing the passions of the body; courage, in not fearing separation\ntherefrom, as if death drove man into emptiness and annihilation; while\njustice exacts that reason and intelligence command and be obeyed.\"\nThe civil virtues moderate the passions; their object is to teach us\nto live in conformity with the laws of human nature. The contemplative\nvirtues obliterate the passions from the soul; their object is to\nassimilate man to the divinity.\n\nThere is a difference between purifying oneself, and being pure.\nConsequently the purificatory virtues may, like purification itself,\nbe considered in two lights; they purify the soul, and they adorn the\npurified soul, because the object of purification is purity. But \"since\npurification and purity consist in being separated from every foreign\nentity, the good is something different from the soul that purifies\nitself. If the soul that purifies herself had possessed the good before\nlosing her purity, it would be sufficient for the soul to purify\nherself; but in this very case, what would remain to her after the\npurification would be the good, but not the purification. But the soul\nis not the good; she can only participate therein, and have its form;\notherwise the soul would not have fallen into evil. For the soul, good\nconsists in being united to her author, and her evil is to unite with\nlower things.\"[324]\n\nOf evil, there are two kinds; the one, is to unite with lower things;\nthe other is to abandon oneself to the passions. The civil virtues\nowe their name of virtues and their value to their releasing the soul\nfrom one of these two kinds of evil (of the passions). The purificatory\nvirtues are superior to the former, in that they free the soul from\nher characteristic form of evil (that is, union with lower things).\nTherefore, when the soul is pure, she must be united to her author; her\nvirtue, after her \"conversion,\" consists in her knowledge and science\nof veritable existence; not that the soul lacks this knowledge, but\nbecause without her superior principle, without intelligence, she does\nnot see what she possesses.[325]\n\n3. There is a third kind of virtues, which are superior to the civil\nand purificatory virtues, the \"virtues of the soul that contemplates\nintelligence.\" \"Here prudence and wisdom consist in contemplating\nthe \"beings\" or essences contained by intelligence; justice consists\nin the soul's fulfilling of her characteristic function; that is, in\nattaching herself to intelligence and to direct her activity thither.\nTemperance is the intimate conversion of the soul towards Intelligence,\nwhile courage is the impassibility by which the soul becomes\nassimilated to what she contemplates, since the soul's nature is to be\nimpassible.[326] These virtues are as intimately concatenated as the\nother (lower forms).\"\n\n4. There is a fourth kind of virtues, the \"exemplary virtues,\" which\nreside within intelligence. Their superiority to the virtues of the\nsoul is the same as that of the type to the image; for intelligence\ncontains simultaneously all the \"beings\" or essences which are the\ntypes of lower things. \"Within intelligence, prudence is the science;\nwisdom is the thought, temperance is the conversion towards oneself;\njustice is the accomplishment of one's characteristic function;\ncourage is the identity of intelligence, its perseverance in purity,\nconcentrated within itself, in virtue of its superiority.\"[327]\n\nWe thus have four kinds of virtues: 1, the exemplary virtues,\ncharacteristic of intelligence, and of the \"being\" or nature to which\nthey belong; 2, the virtues of the soul turned towards intelligence,\nand filled with her contemplation; 3, the virtues of the soul that\npurifies herself, or which has purified herself from the brutal\npassions characteristic of the body; 4, the virtues that adorn the\nman by restraining within narrow limits the action of the irrational\npart, and by moderating the passions. \"He who possesses the virtues of\nthe superior order necessarily (potentially) possesses the inferior\nvirtues. But the converse does not occur.\"[328] \"He who possesses\nthe superior virtues will not prefer to practice the lower virtues\nbecause of the mere possession thereof; he will practice them only\nwhen circumstances will invite (it). The objects, indeed, differ with\nthe kind of virtues. The object of the civil virtues is to moderate\nour passions so as to conform our conduct to the laws of human nature.\nThat of the purificatory virtues is to detach the soul completely from\nthe passions. That of the contemplative virtues is to apply the soul\nto intellectual operations, even to the extent of no longer having to\nthink of the need of freeing oneself from the passions. Last, that of\nthe exemplary virtues is similar to that of the other virtues. Thus\nthe practical virtues make man virtuous; the purificatory virtues\nmake man divine, or make of the good man, a protecting deity; the\ncontemplative virtues deify; while the exemplary virtues make a man\nthe parent of divinities. We should specially apply ourselves to\npurificatory virtues believing that we can acquire them even in this\nlife; and that possession of them leads to superior virtues. We must\npush purification as far as possible, as it consists in separating (the\nsoul) from the body, and in freeing oneself from any passional movement\nof the irrational part. But how can one purify the soul? To what limit\nmay purification be pushed? These are two questions that demand\nexamination.\n\nTo begin with, the foundation of purification is to know oneself, to\nrealize that he is a soul bound to a foreign being, of a different\nnature (or, \"being\").\n\nFurther, when one is convinced of this truth, one should gather\noneself together within himself, detaching himself from the body,\nand freeing himself entirely from the passions. He who makes use\nof his senses too often, though it be done without devotion or\npleasure, is, nevertheless, distracted by the care of the body, and\nis chained thereto by sensation. The pains and the pleasures produced\nby sense-objects exercise a great influence on the soul, and inspire\nthe soul with an inclination for the body. It is important to remove\nsuch a disposition from the soul. \"To achieve this purpose, the soul\nwill allow the body only necessary pleasures, that serve to cure her\nof her sufferings, to refresh her from her exhaustions, to hinder her\nfrom being importunate. The soul will free herself from pains;[327]\nif this be beyond her powers, the soul will support them patiently,\nand will diminish them, while refusing to share them. The soul will\nappease anger so far as possible; she will even try to suppress them\nentirely; at least, if that be impossible, she will not voluntarily\nparticipate therein, leaving the non-reflective excitement to another\n(animal) nature, reducing the involuntary motions as far as possible.\nThe soul will be inaccessible to fear--having nothing further to\nrisk; even so, she will restrain every sudden movement; she will pay\nattention to fear only insofar as it may be nature's warning at the\napproach of danger. Absolutely nothing shameful will be desired; in\neating and drinking, she will seek only the satisfaction of a need,\nwhile remaining essentially alien thereto. The pleasures of love will\nnot even involuntarily be tasted, at least, she will not allow herself\nto be drawn beyond the flights of fancy that occur in dreams. In the\npurified man, the intellectual part of the soul will be pure of all\nthese passions. She will even desire that the part that experiences\nthe irrational passions of the body should take notice of them without\nbeing agitated thereby, and without yielding to them. In this way, if\nthe irrational part should itself happen to experience emotions, the\nlatter will be promptly calmed by the presence of reason. Struggles\nwill have been left behind before any headway will have been made\nto purification. The presence of reason will suffice; the inferior\nprinciple, indeed, will respect the higher one to the extent of being\nangry with itself, and reproaching itself for weakness, in case it\nfeels any agitation that disturbs its master's rest.\" So long as the\nsoul experiences even moderate passions, the soul's progress towards\nimpassibility remains in need of improvement. The soul is impassible\nonly when she has entirely ceased to participate in the passions of the\nbody. Indeed, that which permitted the passions to rule was that reason\nrelaxed the reins as a result of her own inclination.\n\n\nFIRST ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.\n\nOf Suicide.\n\nOF THE SEPARATION OF THE SOUL AND BODY.\n\n2. Nature releases what nature has bound. The soul releases what the\nsoul has bound. Nature binds the body to the soul, but it is the soul\nherself that has bound herself to the body. It, therefore, belongs to\nnature to detach the body from the soul, while it is the soul herself\nthat detaches herself from the body.\n\n3. There is a double death. One, known by all men, consists in the\nseparation of the body with the soul; the other, characteristic of\nphilosophers, results in the separation of the soul from the body. The\nlatter is consequence of the former.\n\n\nSECOND ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.\n\nOf Matter.\n\nOF THE CONCEPTION OF MATTER (10).\n\n4. While separating ourselves from existence we by thought beget\nnonentity (matter). While remaining united with existence, we also\nconceive of nonentity (the one). Consequently, when we separate\nourselves from existence, we do not conceive of the nonentity which is\nabove existence (the one), but we beget by thought something that is\ndeceptive, and we put ourselves in the condition (of indetermination)\nin which one is when outside of oneself. Just as each one can really,\nand by himself, raise himself to the non-existence which is above\nexistence (the One); so (by separating oneself from existence by\nthought), we may reach the nonentity beneath existence.\n\n\nTHIRD ENNEAD, BOOK SIX.\n\nOf the Impassibility of Incorporeal Things.\n\nOF THE INCORPOREAL (3).\n\n5. The name \"incorporeal\" does not designate one and the same genus,\nas does the word \"body.\" Incorporeal entities derive their name from\nthe fact that they are conceived of by abstraction from the body.\nConsequently, some of them (like intelligence and discursive reason)\nare genuine beings, existing as well without as within the body,\nsubsisting by themselves, by themselves being actualizations and\nlives; other beings (such as matter, sense-form without matter, place,\ntime, and so forth), do not constitute real beings, but are united to\nthe body, and depend therefrom, live through others, possess only a\nrelative life, and exist only through certain actualizations. Indeed,\nwhen we apply to them the name of incorporeal entities (it is merely a\nnegative designation), indicating only what they are not, but not what\nthey are.\n\n\nOF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THE SOUL.\n\n6. (1) The soul is a \"being\" or essence, without extension, immaterial\nand incorruptible; her nature consists in a life which is life in\nitself.\n\n7. (3, end) When the existence of some being is life itself, and when\nthe passions are lives, its death consists in a life of a certain\nnature, and not in entire privation of life; for the \"passion\"\nexperienced by this \"being\" or essence, does not force it into complete\nloss of life.\n\n8. (2, 3) There is a difference between the affections of the bodies,\nand those of incorporeal things. The affection of bodies consists in\nchange. On the contrary, the affections and experiences characteristic\nof the soul are actualizations that have nothing in common with the\ncooling or heating up of the bodies. Consequently if, for bodies,\nan affection ever implies a change, we may say that all incorporeal\n(beings) are impassible. Indeed, immaterial and incorporeal beings\nare always identical in their actualization; but those that impinge\non matter and bodies, though in themselves impassible, allow the\nsubjects in which they reside to be affected. So when an animal feels,\nthe soul resembles a harmony separated from its instrument, which\nitself causes the vibration of the strings that have been tuned to\nunison herewith; while the body resembles a harmony inseparable from\nthe strings. The reason why the soul moves the living being is that\nthe latter is animated. We, therefore, find an analogy between the\nsoul and the musician who causes his instrument to produce sounds\nbecause he himself contains a harmonic power. The body, struck by a\nsense-impression, resembles strings tuned in unison. In the production\nof sound, it is not the harmony itself but the string that is affected.\nThe musician causes it to resound because he contains a harmonic power.\nNevertheless, in spite of the will of the musician, the instrument\nwould produce no harmonies that conformed to the laws of music, unless\nharmony itself dictated them.\n\n9. (5) The soul binds herself to the body by a conversion toward the\naffections experienced by the body. She detaches herself from the body\nby \"apathy,\" (turning away from the body's affections.)\n\n\nOF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF MATTER.\n\n10. (7) According to the ancient (sages) such are the properties of\nmatter. \"Matter is incorporeal because it differs from bodies. Matter\nis not lifeless, because it is neither intelligence, nor soul, nor\nanything that lives by itself. It is formless, variable, infinite,\nimpotent; consequently, matter cannot be existence, but nonentity. Of\ncourse it is not nonentity in the same way that movement is nonentity;\nmatter is nonentity really. It is an image and a phantom of extension,\nbecause it is the primary substrate of extension. It is impotence, and\nthe desire for existence. The only reason that it persists is not rest\n(but change); it always seems to contain contraries, the great and\nsmall, the less and more, lack and excess. It is always \"becoming,\"\nwithout ever persisting in its condition, or being able to come out of\nit. Matter is the lack of all existence; and, consequently, what matter\nseems to be is a deception. If, for instance, matter seems to be large,\nit really is small; like a mere phantom, it escapes and evanesces into\nnonentity, not by any change of place, but by its lack of reality.\nConsequently, the substrate of the images in matter consists of a lower\nimage. That in which objects present appearances that differ according\nto their positions is a mirror, a mirror that seems crowded, though it\npossesses nothing, and which yet seems to be everything.\"\n\n\nOF THE PASSIBILITY OF THE BODY (8-19).\n\n11. Passions (or, affections) refer to something destructible; for it\nis passion that leads to destruction; it is the same sort of being\nthat can be affected, and can be destroyed. Incorporeal entities,\nhowever, are not subject to destruction; they either exist or not; in\neither case they are non-affectible. That which can be affected need\nnot have this impassible nature, but must be subject to alteration or\ndestruction by the qualities of things that enter into it and affect\nit; for that which in it subsists is not altered by the first chance\nentity. Consequently, matter is impassible, as by itself it possesses\nno quality. The forms that enter into and issue from matter (as a\nsubstrate) are equally impassible. That which is affected is the\ncomposite of form and matter, whose existence consists in the union\nof these two elements; for it is evidently subject to the action of\ncontrary powers, and of the qualities of things which enter into it,\nand affect it. That is why the beings that derive their existence from\nsomething else, instead of possessing it by themselves, can likewise\nby virtue of their passivity, either live or not. On the contrary,\nthe beings whose existence consists in an impassible life necessarily\nlive permanently; likewise the things that do not live are equally\nimpassible inasmuch as they do not live. Consequently, being changed\nand being affected refer only to the composite of form and matter, to\nthe body, and not to matter. Likewise, to receive life and to lose\nit, to feel passions that are its consequence, can refer only to the\ncomposite of soul and body. Nothing similar could happen to the soul;\nfor she is not something compounded out of life and lifelessness;\nshe is life itself, because her \"being\" or nature is simple, and is\nautomatic.\n\n\nTHIRD ENNEAD, BOOK EIGHT.\n\nOf Nature, Contemplation, and of the One.\n\nOF THOUGHT.\n\n12. (1) Thought is not the same everywhere; it differs according to the\nnature of every \"being.\" In intelligence, it is intellectual; in the\nsoul it is rational; in the plant it is seminal; last, it is superior\nto intelligence and existence in the principle that surpasses all these.\n\n\nOF LIFE.\n\n13. (7) The word \"body\" is not the only one that may be taken in\ndifferent senses; such is also the case with \"life.\" There is a\ndifference between the life of the plant, of the animal, of the soul,\nof intelligence, and of super-intelligence. Indeed, intelligible\nentities are alive though the things that proceed therefrom do not\npossess a life similar to theirs.\n\n\nOF THE ONE.\n\n14. (8) By (using one's) intelligence one may say many things about the\nsuper-intellectual (principle). But it can be much better viewed by an\nabsence of thought, than by thought. This is very much the same case as\nthat of sleep, of which one can speak, up to a certain point, during\nthe condition of wakefulness; but of which no knowledge of perception\ncan be acquired except by sleeping. Indeed, like is known only by like;\nthe condition of all knowledge is for the subject to be assimilated to\nthe subject.[330]\n\n\nFOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO.\n\nOf the Nature of the Soul.\n\n15. (1) Every body is in a place; the incorporeal in itself is not in a\nplace, any more than the things which have the same nature as it.\n\n16. (1) The incorporeal in itself, by the mere fact of its being\nsuperior to every body and to every place, is present everywhere\nwithout occupying extension, in an indivisible manner.\n\n17. (1) The incorporeal in itself, not being present to the body in a\nlocal manner, is present to the body whenever it pleases, that is, by\ninclining towards it so far as it is within its nature to do so. Not\nbeing present to the body in a local manner, it is present to the body\nby its disposition.\n\n18. (1) The incorporeal in itself does not become present to the body\nin \"being\" nor in hypostatic form of existence. It does not mingle with\nthe body. Nevertheless, by its inclination to the body, it begets and\ncommunicates to it a potentiality capable of uniting with the body.\nIndeed the inclination of the incorporeal constitutes a second nature\n(the irrational soul), which unites with the body.\n\n19. (1) The soul has a nature intermediary between the \"being\" that is\nindivisible, and the \"being\" that is divisible by its union with the\nbodies. Intelligence is a \"being\" absolutely indivisible; the bodies\nalone are divisible; but the qualities and the forms engaged in matter\nare divisible by their union with the bodies.\n\n20. (2) The things that act upon others do not act by approximation and\nby contact. It is only accidentally when this occurs (that they act by\nproximity and contact).\n\n\nFOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE.\n\nProblems About the Soul.\n\nUNION OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY.\n\n21. (20) The hypostatic substance of the body does not hinder the\nincorporeal in itself from being where and as it wishes; for just as\nthat which is non-extended cannot be contained by the body, so also\nthat which has extension forms no obstacle for the incorporeal, and\nin relation to it is as nonentity. The incorporeal does not transport\nitself where it wishes by a change of place; for only extended\nsubstance occupies a place. Neither is the incorporeal compressed\nby the body; for only that which is extended can be compressed and\ndisplaced. That which has neither extension nor magnitude, could not\nbe hindered by that which has extension, nor be exposed to a change\nof place. Being everywhere and nowhere, the incorporeal, wherever\nit happens to be, betrays its presence only by a certain kind of\ndisposition. It is by this disposition that it rises above heaven, or\ndescends into a corner of the world. Not even this residence makes it\nvisible to our eyes. It is only by its works that it manifests its\npresence.\n\n22. (21-24) If the incorporeal be contained within the body, it is\nnot contained within it like an animal in a zo\u00f6logical garden; for\nit can neither be included within, nor embraced by the body. Nor\nis it, compressed like water or air in a bag of skins. It produces\npotentialities which from within its unity (?) radiate outwards; it is\nby them that it descends into the body and penetrates it.[331] It is by\nthis indescribable extension of itself that it enters into the body,\nand shuts itself up within it. Except itself nothing retains it. It is\nnot the body that releases the incorporeal as result of a lesion, or of\nits decay; it is the incorporeal that detaches itself by turning away\nfrom the passions of the body.\n\n\nOF THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL INTO THE BODY, AND OF THE SPIRIT.\n\n23. (9) Just as \"being on the earth,\" for the soul, is not to tread\non the ground, as does the body, but only to preside over the body\nthat treads on the ground; likewise, \"to be in hell\" for the soul,\nis to preside over an image whose nature is to be in a place, and\nto have an obscure hypostatic form of existence. That is why if the\nsubterranean hell be a dark place, the soul, without separating from\nexistence, descends into hell when she attaches herself to some\nimage. Indeed, when the soul abandons the solid body over which she\npresided she remains united to the spirit which she has received from\nthe celestial spheres. Since, as a result of her affection for matter,\nshe has developed particular faculties by virtue of which she had a\nsympathetic habit for some particular body during life, as a result\nof this disposition, she impresses a form on the spirit by the power\nof her imagination, and thus she acquires an image. The soul is said\nto be in hell because the spirit that surrounds her also happens to\nhave a formless and obscure nature; and as the heavy and moistened\nspirit descends down into subterranean localities, the soul is said\nto descend underground. Not indeed that the very \"being\" of the soul\nchanges place, or is in a locality, but because she contracts the\nhabits of the bodies whose nature it is to change location, and to be\nlocated somewhere. That is why the soul according to her disposition,\nacquires some one body rather than some other; for the rank and the\nspecial characteristics of the body into which she enters depend on her\ndisposition.\n\nTherefore, when in a condition of superior purity, she unites with a\nbody that is close to immaterial nature, that is, an ethereal body.\nWhen she descends from the development of reason to that of the\nimagination, she receives a solar body. If she becomes effeminate, and\nfalls in love with forms, she puts on a lunar body. Finally, when she\nfalls into the terrestrial bodies, which, resembling her shapeless\ncharacter, are composed of moist vapors, there results for her a\ncomplete ignorance of existence, a sort of eclipse, and a veritable\nchildhood. When the soul leaves an earthly body, having her spirit\nstill troubled by these moist vapors, she develops a shadow that\nweights her down; for a spirit of this kind naturally tends to descend\ninto the depths of the earth, unless it be held up and raised by a\nhigher cause. Just as the soul is attached to the earth by her earthly\nvesture, so the moist spirit(ual body) to which the soul is united\nmakes her drag after her an image which weights down the soul. The soul\nsurrounds herself with moist vapors when she mingles with a nature that\nin its operations is moist or subterranean. But if the soul separate\nfrom this nature, immediately around her shines a dry light, without\nshade or shadow. In fact it is humidity which forms clouds in the air;\nthe dryness of the atmosphere produces a dry and serene clearness.\n\n\nFOURTH ENNEAD, BOOK SIX.\n\nOf Sensation and Memory.\n\nOF SENSATION.\n\n24. (3) The soul contains the reasons of all things. The soul operates\naccording to these reasons, whether incited to activity by some\nexterior object, or whether the soul be turned towards these reasons\nby folding back on herself. When the soul is incited to this activity\nby some exterior object, she applies her senses thereto; when she\nfolds back on herself, she applies herself to thoughts. It might be\nobjected that the result is that there is neither sensation nor thought\nwithout imagination; for just as in the animal part, no sensation\noccurs without an impression produced on the organs of sense; likewise\nthere is no thought without imagination. Certainly, an analogy obtains\nbetween both cases. Just as the sense-image (type) results from the\nimpression experienced by sensation, likewise the intellectual image\n(phantasm) results from thought.\n\n\nOF MEMORY.\n\n25. (2) Memory does not consist in preserving images. It is the faculty\nof reproducing the conceptions with which our soul has been occupied.\n\n\nFIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK TWO.\n\nOf Generation and of the Order of Things that Follow the First.\n\nOF THE PROCESSION OF BEINGS.\n\n26. When incorporeal hypostatic substances descend, they split up\nand multiply, their power weakening as they apply themselves to the\nindividual. When, on the contrary, they rise, they simplify, unite, and\ntheir power intensifies.\n\n27. In the life of incorporeal entities, the procession operates in a\nmanner such that the superior principle remains firm and substantial\nin its nature, imparting its existence to what is below it, without\nlosing anything, or transforming itself into anything. Thus that which\nreceives existence does not receive existence with decay or alteration;\nit is not begotten like generation (that is, the being of sense), which\nparticipates in decay and change. It is, therefore, non-begotten and\nincorruptible, because it is produced without generation or corruption.\n\n28. Every begotten thing derives the cause of its generation from some\nother (being); for nothing is begotten causelessly. But, among begotten\nthings, those which owe their being to a union of elements are on\nthat very account perishable. As to those which, not being composite,\nowe their being to the simplicity of their hypostatic substances,\nthey are imperishable, inasmuch as they are indissoluble. When we say\nthat they are begotten, we do not mean that they are composite, but\nonly that they depend on some cause. Thus bodies are begotten doubly,\nfirst because they depend on a cause, and then because they are\ncomposite. Souls and intelligence, indeed, are begotten in the respect\nthat they depend on a cause; but not in the respect that they are\ncomposite. Therefore, bodies, being doubly begotten, are dissoluble and\nperishable. The Soul and Intelligence, being unbegotten in the sense\nthat they are not composite, are indissoluble and imperishable; for\nthey are begotten only in the sense that they depend on a cause.\n\n29. Every principle that generates, by virtue of its \"being,\" is\nsuperior to the product it generates. Every generated being naturally\nturns towards its generating principle. Of the generating principles,\nsome (the universal and perfect substances) do not turn towards their\nproduct; while others (the substances that are individual, and subject\nto conversion towards the manifold) partly turn towards their product,\nand remain partly turned towards themselves; while others entirely turn\ntowards their product, and do not turn at all towards themselves.\n\n\nOF THE RETURN OF BEINGS TO THE FIRST.\n\n30. Of the universal and perfect hypostatic substances, none turns\ntowards its product. All perfect hypostatic substances return to the\nprinciples that generated them. The very body of the world, by the\nmere fact of its perfection, is converted to the intelligent Soul, and\nthat is the cause of its motion being circular. The Soul of the world\nis converted to Intelligence, and this to the First.[332] All beings,\ntherefore, aspire to the First, each in the measure of its ability,\nfrom the very lowest in the ranks of the universe up. This anagogical\nreturn of beings to the First is necessary, whether it be mediate or\nimmediate. So we may say that beings not only aspire to the First,\nbut that each being enjoys the First according to its capacity.[333]\nThe individual hypostatic substances, however, that are subject to\ndeclining towards manifoldness, naturally turn not only towards their\nauthor, but also towards their product. That is the cause of (any\nsubsequent) fall and unfaithfulness. Matter perverts them because they\npossess the possibility of inclining towards it, though they are also\nable to turn towards the divinity. That is how perfection makes second\nrank beings be born of the first principles, and then be converted\ntowards them. It is, on the contrary, the result of imperfection, to\nturn higher entities to lower things, inspiring them with love for that\nwhich, before them, withdrew from the first principles (in favor of\nmatter).\n\n\nFIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE.\n\nOf the Hypostases that Mediate Knowledge, and of the Superior Principle.\n\nINTELLIGENCE KNOWS ITSELF BY A CONVERSION TO HERSELF.\n\n31. (1) When one being subsists by dependence on any other, and not\nby self-dependence and withdrawal from any other, it could not turn\nitself towards itself to know itself by separating from (the substrate)\nby which it subsists. By withdrawing from its own existence it would\nalter and perish. But when one being cognizes itself by withdrawal\nfrom that to which it is united, when it grasps itself as independent\nof that being, and succeeds in doing so without exposing itself\nto destruction, it evidently does not derive its \"being\" or nature\nfrom the being from which it can, without perishing, withdraw, to\nface itself, and know itself independently. If sight, and in general\nall sensation do not feel itself, nor perceive itself on separating\nfrom the body, and do not subsist by itself; if, on the contrary,\nintelligence think better by separating from the body, and can be\nconverted to itself without perishing, evidently sense-faculties are\nactualized only by help of the body, while intelligence actualizes and\nexists by itself, and not by the body.\n\n\nTHE ACTUALIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE IS ETERNAL AND INDIVISIBLE.\n\n32. (3, 5-7) There is a difference between intelligence and the\nintelligible, between sensation and that which can be sensed. The\nintelligible is united to intelligence as that which can be sensed is\nconnected with sensation. But sensation cannot perceive itself....\nAs the intelligible is united to Intelligence, it is grasped by\nintelligence and not by sensation. But intelligence is intelligible for\nintelligence. Since then intelligence is intelligible for intelligence,\nintelligence is its own object. If intelligence be intelligible, but\nnot \"sensible,\" it is an intelligible object. Being intelligible\nby intelligence, but not by sensation, it will be intelligent.\nIntelligence, therefore, is simultaneously thinker and thought, all\nthat thinks and all that is thought. Its operation, besides, is not\nthat of an object that rubs and is rubbed: \"It is not a subject in some\none part of itself, and in some other, object of thought; it is simple,\nit is entirely intelligible for itself as a whole.\"[334] The whole of\nintelligence excludes any idea of unintelligence. It does not contain\none part that thinks, while another would not think; for then, in so\nfar as it would not think, \"it would be unintelligent.\" It does not\nabandon one object to think of another; for it would cease to think the\nobject it abandoned. If, therefore, intelligence do not successively\npass from one object to another, it thinks simultaneously; it does not\nthink first one (thought) and then another; it thinks everything as in\nthe present, and as always....\n\nIf intelligence think everything as at present, if it know no past nor\nfuture, its thought is a simple actualization, which excludes every\ninterval of time. It, therefore, contains everything together, in\nrespect to time. Intelligence, therefore, thinks, all things according\nto unity, and in unity, without anything falling in in time or in\nspace. If so, intelligence is not discursive, and is not (like the\nsoul) in motion; it is an actualization, which is according to unity,\nand in unity, which shuns all chance development and every discursive\noperation.[335] If, in intelligence, manifoldness be reduced to unity,\nand if the intellectual actualization be indivisible, and fall not\nwithin time, we shall have to attribute to such a \"being\" eternal\nexistence in unity. Now that happens to be \"aeonial\" or everlasting\nexistence.[336] Therefore, eternity constitutes the very \"being\" (or\nnature) of intelligence. The other kind of intelligence, that does\nnot think according to unity, and in unity, which falls into change,\nand into movement, which abandons one object to think another, which\ndivides, and gives itself up to a discursive action, has time as\n\"being\" (or nature).\n\nThe distinction of past and future suits its action. When passing from\none object to another, the soul changes thoughts; not indeed that\nthe former perish, or that the latter suddenly issue from some other\nsource; but the former, while seeming to have disappeared, remain in\nthe soul; and the latter, while seeming to come from somewhere else, do\nnot really do so, but are born from within the soul, which moves only\nfrom one object to another, and which successively directs her gaze\nfrom one to another part of what she possesses. She resembles a spring\nwhich, instead of flowing outside, flows back into itself in a circle.\nIt is this (circular) movement of the soul that constitutes time, just\nas the permanence of intelligence in itself constitutes (aeonial)\neternity. Intelligence is not separated from eternity, any more than\nthe soul is from time. Intelligence and eternity form but a single\nhypostatic form of existence. That which moves simulates eternity by\nthe indefinite perpetuity of its movement, and that which remains\nimmovable, simulates time by seeming to multiply its continual present,\nin the measure that time passes. That is why some have believed that\ntime manifested in rest as well as in movement, and that eternity was\nno more than the infinity of time. To each of these two (different\nthings) the attributes of the other were mistakenly attributed. The\nreason of this is that anything that ever persists in an identical\nmovement gives a good illustration of eternity by the continuousness of\nits movement; while that which persists in an identical actualization\nrepresents time by the permanence of its actualization. Besides, in\nsense-objects, duration differs according to each of them. There is a\ndifference between the duration of the course of the sun, and that of\nthe moon, as well as that of Venus, and so on. There is a difference\nbetween the solar year, and the year of each of these stars. Different,\nfurther, is the year that embraces all the other years, and which\nconforms to the movement of the soul, according to which the stars\nregulate their movements. As the movement of the soul differs from the\nmovement of the stars, so also does its time differ from that of the\nstars; for the divisions of this latter kind of time correspond to\nthe spaces travelled by each star, and by its successive passages in\ndifferent places.\n\n\nINTELLIGENCE IS MANIFOLD.\n\n33. (10-12) Intelligence is not the principle of all things; for it\nis manifold. Now the manifold presupposes the One. Evidently, it is\nintelligence that is manifold; the intelligibles that it thinks do\nnot form unity, but manifoldness, and they are identical therewith.\nTherefore, since intelligence and the intelligible entities are\nidentical, and as the intelligible entities form a manifoldness,\nintelligence itself is manifold.\n\nThe identity of intelligence and of intelligible entities may be\ndemonstrated as follows. The object that intelligence contemplates\nmust be in it, or exist outside of itself. It is, besides, evident,\nthat intelligence contemplates; since, for intelligence, to think is\nto be intelligence,[337] therefore, to abstract its thought would be\nto deprive it of its \"being.\" This being granted, we must determine in\nwhat manner intelligence contemplates its object. We shall accomplish\nthis by examining the different faculties by which we acquire various\nkinds of knowledge, namely, sensation, imagination and intelligence.\n\nThe principle which makes use of the senses contemplates only by\ngrasping exterior things, and far from uniting itself to the objects\nof its contemplation, from this perception it gathers no more than\nan image. Therefore when the eye sees the visible object, it cannot\nidentify itself with this object; for it would not see it, unless it\nwere at a certain distance therefrom. Likewise if the object of touch\nconfused itself with the organ that touches it, it would disappear.\nTherefore the senses, and the principle that makes use of the\nsenses, apply themselves to what is outside of them to perceive this\nsense-object.\n\nLikewise imagination applies its attention to what is outside of it to\nform for itself an image of it; it is by this very attention to what\nis outside of it that it represents to itself the object of which it\nforms an image as exterior.\n\nThat is how sensation and imagination perceive their objects. Neither\nof these two faculties folds itself back on itself, nor concentrates\non itself, whether the object of their perception be a corporeal or\nincorporeal form.\n\nNot in this manner is intelligence perceived; this can occur only by\nturning towards itself, and by contemplating itself. If it left the\ncontemplation of its own actualizations, if it ceased to be their\ncontemplation (or, intuition), it would no longer think anything.\nIntelligence perceives the intelligible entity as sensation perceives\nthe sense-object, by intuition. But in order to contemplate the\nsense-object, sensation applies to what is outside of it, because\nits object is material. On the contrary, in order to contemplate the\nintelligible entity, intelligence concentrates in itself, instead of\napplying itself to what is outside of it. That is why some philosophers\nhave thought that there was only a nominal difference between\nintelligence and imagination; for they believed that intelligence\nwas the imagination of the reasonable animal; as they insisted that\neverything should depend on matter and on corporeal nature, they\nnaturally had to make intelligence also depend therefrom. But our\nintelligence contemplates natures (or, \"beings\"). Therefore, (according\nto the hypothesis of these philosophers) our intelligence will\ncontemplate these natures as located in some place. But these natures\nare outside of matter; consequently, they could not be located in any\nplace. It is therefore evident that the intelligible entities had to be\nposited as within intelligence.\n\nIf the intelligible entities be within intelligence, intelligence will\ncontemplate intelligible entities and will contemplate itself while\ncontemplating them; by understanding itself, it will think, because it\nwill understand intelligible entities. Now intelligible entities form\na multitude, for[338] intelligence thinks a multitude of intelligible\nentities, and not a unity; therefore, intelligence is manifold. But\nmanifoldness presupposes unity; consequently, above intelligence, the\nexistence of unity will be necessary.\n\n34. (5) Intellectual being is composed of similar parts, so that\nexisting beings exist both in individual intelligence, and in universal\nIntelligence. But, in universal Intelligence, individual (entities) are\nthemselves conceived universally; while in individual intelligence,\nuniversal beings as well as individual beings are conceived\nindividually.\n\n\nSIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.\n\nThe One and Identical Being Is Everywhere Present As a Whole.\n\nOF THE INCORPOREAL.\n\n35. The incorporeal is that which is conceived of by abstraction\nof the body; that is the derivation of its name. To this genus,\naccording to ancient sages, belong matter, sense-form, when conceived\nof apart from matter, natures, faculties, place, time, and surface.\nAll these entities, indeed, are called incorporeal because they are\nnot bodies. There are other things that are called incorporeal by a\nwrong use of the word, not because they are not bodies, but because\nthey cannot beget bodies. Thus the incorporeal first mentioned above\nsubsists within the body, while the incorporeal of the second kind\nis completely separated from the body, and from the incorporeal that\nsubsists within the body. The body, indeed, occupies a place, and the\nsurface does not exist outside of the body. But intelligence and\nintellectual reason (discursive reason), do not occupy any place, do\nnot subsist in the body, do not constitute any body, and do not depend\non the body, nor on any of the things that are called incorporeal by\nabstraction of the body. On the other hand, if we conceive of the void\nas incorporeal, intelligence cannot exist within the void. The void,\nindeed, may receive a body, but it cannot contain the actualization of\nintelligence, nor serve as location for that actualization. Of the two\nkinds of the incorporeal of which we have just spoken, the followers of\nZeno reject the one (the incorporeal that exists outside of the body)\nand insist on the other (the incorporeal that is separated from the\nbody by abstraction, and which has no existence outside of the body);\nnot seeing that the first kind of incorporeality is not similar to\nthe second, they refuse all reality to the former, though they ought,\nnevertheless, to acknowledge that the incorporeal (which subsists\noutside of the body), is of another kind (than the incorporeal that\ndoes not subsist outside of the body), and not to believe that, because\none kind of incorporeality has no reality, neither can the other have\nany.\n\n\nRELATION BETWEEN THE INCORPOREAL AND THE CORPOREAL.\n\n34. (2, 3, 4) Everything, if it be somewhere, is there in some manner\nthat conforms to its nature. For a body that is composed of matter,\nand possesses volume, to be somewhere, means that it is located in\nsome place. On the contrary, the intelligible world, and in general\nthe existence that is immaterial, and incorporeal in itself, does not\noccupy any place, so that the ubiquity of the incorporeal is not a\nlocal presence. \"It does not have one part here, and another there;\"\nfor, if so, it would not be outside of all place, nor be without\nextension; \"wherever it is, it is entire; it is not present here\nand absent there;\" for in this way it would be contained in some one\nplace, and excluded from some other. \"Nor is it nearer one place, and\nfurther from some other,\" for only things that occupy place stand\nin relations of distance. Consequently, the sense-world is present\nto the intelligible in space; but the intelligible is present to\nthe sense-world in space; but the intelligible is present to the\nsense-world without having any parts, nor being in space. When the\nindivisible is present in the divisible, \"it is entire in each part,\"\nidentically and numerically one. \"If simple and indivisible existence\nbecome extended and manifold, it is not in respect to the extended\nand manifold existence which possesses it, not such as it really is,\nbut in the manner in which (simple existence) can possess (manifold\nexistence).\" Extended and manifold existence has to become unextended\nand simple in its relation with naturally extended and simple\nexistence, to enjoy its presence. In other terms, it is conformable to\nits nature, without dividing, nor multiplying, nor occupying space,\nthat intelligible existence is present to existence that is naturally\ndivisible, manifold, and contained within a locality; but it is in\na manifold, divisible and local manner that a located existence is\npresent to \"the existence that has no relation to space.\" In our\nspeculations on corporeal and incorporeal existence, therefore, we must\nnot confuse their characteristics, preserving the respective nature of\neach, taking good care not to let our imagination or opinion attribute\nto the incorporeal certain corporeal qualities. Nobody attributes to\nbodies incorporeal characteristics, because everybody lives in daily\ntouch with bodies; but as it is so difficult to cognize incorporeal\nnatures (\"beings\"), only vague conceptions are formed of it, and they\ncannot be grasped so long as one lets oneself be guided by imagination.\nOne has to say to oneself, a being known by the senses is located\nin space, and is outside of itself because it has a volume; \"the\nintelligible being is not located in space, but in itself,\" because\nit has no volume. The one is a copy, the other is an archetype; the\none derives its existence from the intelligible, the other finds it in\nitself; for every image is an image of intelligence. The properties of\nthe corporeal and the incorporeal must be clearly kept in mind so as to\navoid surprise at their difference, in spite of their union, if indeed\nit be permissible to apply the term \"union\" to their mutual relation;\nfor we must not think of the union of corporeal substances, but of\nthe union of substances whose properties are completely incompatible,\naccording to the individuality of their hypostatic form of existence.\nSuch union differs entirely from that of \"homoousian\" substances of\nthe same nature; consequently, it is neither a blend, nor a mixture,\nnor a real union, nor a mere collocation. The relation between the\ncorporeal and the incorporeal is established in a different manner,\nwhich manifests in the communication of \"homoousian\" substances of the\nsense nature, of which, however, no corporeal operation can give any\nidea. The incorporeal being is wholly without extension in all the\nparts of the extended being, even though the number of these parts were\ninfinite. \"It is present in an indivisible manner, without establishing\na correspondence between each of its parts with the parts of the\nextended being;\" it does not become manifold merely because, in a\nmanifold manner, it is present to a multitude of parts. The whole of it\nis entire in all the parts of the extended being, in each of them, and\nin the whole mass, without dividing or becoming manifold to enter into\nrelations with the manifold, preserving its numerical identity.[339] It\nis only to beings whose power is dispersed that it belongs to possess\nthe intelligible by parts and by fractions. Often these beings, on\nchanging from their nature, imitate intelligible beings by a deceptive\nappearance, and we are in doubt about their nature (\"being\"), for they\nseem to have exchanged it for that of incorporeal \"being,\" or essence.\n\n\nTHE INCORPOREAL HAS NO EXTENSION.\n\n37. (5) That which really exists has neither great nor small. Greatness\nand smallness are attributes of corporeal mass. By its identity and\nnumerical unity, real existence is neither great nor small, neither\nvery large nor very small, though it cause even greatest and smallest\nto participate in its nature. It must not, therefore, be represented\nas great, for in that case we could not conceive how it could be\nlocated in the smallest space without being diminished or condensed.\nNor should it be represented as small, which conception of it would\nhinder our understanding how it could be present in a whole large body\nwithout being increased or extended. We must try to gain a simultaneous\nconception of both that which is very large and very small, and realize\nreal existence as preserving its identity and its indwelling in itself\nin any chance body whatever, along with an infinity of other bodies of\ndifferent sizes. It is united to the extension of the world, without\nextending itself, or uniting, and it exceeds the extension of the world\nas well as that of its parts, by embracing them within its unity.\nLikewise, the world unites with real existence by all its parts, so far\nas its nature allows it to do so, though it cannot, however, embrace\nit entirely, nor contain its whole power. Real existence is infinite\nand incomprehensible for the world because, among other attributes, it\npossesses that of having no extension.\n\n38. Great[340] magnitude is a hindrance for a body, if, instead of\ncomparing it to things of the same kind, it is considered in relation\nwith things of a different nature; for volume is, as it were, a kind\nof procession of existence outside of itself, and a breaking up of\nits power. That which possesses a superior power is alien to all\nextension; for potentiality does not succeed in realizing its fulness\nuntil it concentrates within itself; it needs to fortify itself to\nacquire all its energy. Consequently the body, by extending into\nspace, loses its energy, and withdraws from the potency that belongs\nto real and incorporeal existence; but real existence does not weaken\nin extension, because, having no extension, it preserves the greatness\nof its potency. Just as, in relation to the body, real existence has\nneither extension nor volume, likewise corporeal existence, in relation\nto real existence, is weak and impotent. The existence that possesses\nthe greatest power does not occupy any extension. Consequently, though\nthe world fill space, though it be everywhere united to real extension,\nit could not, nevertheless, embrace the greatness of its potency. It\nis united to real existence, not by parts, but in an indivisible and\nindefinite manner. Therefore, the incorporeal is present to the body,\nnot in a local manner, but by assimilation, so far as the body is\ncapable of being assimilated to the incorporeal, and as the incorporeal\ncan manifest in it. The incorporeal is not present to the material,\nin so far as the material is incapable of being assimilated to a\ncompletely immaterial principle; however, the incorporeal is present to\nthe corporeal in so far as the corporeal can be assimilated thereto.\nNor is the incorporeal present to the material by receptivity (in\nthe sense that one of these two substances would receive something\nfrom the other); otherwise the material and the immaterial would be\naltered; the former, on receiving the immaterial, into which it would\nbe transformed, and the latter, on becoming material. Therefore, when\na relation is established between two substances that are as different\nas the corporeal and the incorporeal, an assimilation and participation\nthat is reciprocal to the power of the one, and the impotence of\nthe other, occurs. That is why the world always remains very distant\nfrom the power of real existence, and the latter from the impotence\nof material nature. But that which occupies the middle, that which\nsimultaneously assimilates and is assimilated, that which unites the\nextremes, becomes a cause of error in respect to them, because the\nsubstances it brings together by assimilation are very different.\n\n\nRELATION OF INDIVIDUAL SOULS TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.\n\n39. \"It[341] would be wrong to suppose that the manifoldness of souls\nwas derived from the manifoldness of bodies. The individual souls,\nas well as the universal Soul, subsist independently of the bodies,\nwithout the unity of the universal Soul absorbing the manifoldness of\nindividual souls, and without the manifoldness of the latter splitting\nup the unity of the universal Soul.\" Individual souls are distinct\nwithout being separated from each other, and without dividing the\nuniversal Soul into a number of parts; they are united to each other\nwithout becoming confused, and without making the universal Soul a\nmere total; \"for they are not separated by limits,\" and they are not\nconfused with each other; \"they are as distinct from each other as\ndifferent sciences in a single soul.\" Further, individual souls are\nnot contained in the universal Soul as if they were bodies, that\nis, like really different substances (?), for they are qualitative\nactualizations of the soul. Indeed, \"the power of the universal Soul\nis infinite,\" and all that participates in her is soul; all the souls\nform the universal Soul, and, nevertheless, the universal Soul exists\nindependently of all individual souls. Just as one does not arrive\nat the incorporeal by infinite division of bodies, seeing that such\na division would modify them only in respect to magnitude, likewise,\non infinitely dividing the soul, which is a living form, we reach\nnothing but species (not individuals); for the Soul contains specific\ndifferences, and she exists entire with them as well as without\nthem. Indeed, though the Soul should be divided within herself, her\ndiversity does not destroy her identity. If the unity of bodies, in\nwhich manifoldness prevails over identity, is not broken up by their\nunion with an incorporeal principle; if, on the contrary, all of them\npossess the unity of \"being\" or substance, and are divided only by\nqualities and other forms; what shall we say or think of the species\nof incorporeal life, where identity prevails over manifoldness, and\nwhere there is no substrate alien to form, and from which bodies might\nderive their unity? The unity of the Soul could not be split up by\nher union with a body, though the body often hinder her operations.\nBeing identical, the Soul discovers everything by herself, because her\nactualizations are species, however far the division be carried. When\nthe Soul is separated from bodies, each of her parts possesses all\nthe powers possessed by the Soul herself, just as an individual seed\nhas the same properties as the universal Seed (seminal reason). As\nan individual seed, being united to matter, preserves the properties\nof the universal Seed (seminal reason), and as, on the other hand,\nuniversal Seed possesses all the properties of the individual seeds\ndispersed within matter, thus the parts which we conceive of in the\n(universal) Soul that is separated from matter, possess all the powers\nof the universal Soul.[342] The individual soul, which declines towards\nmatter, is bound to the matter by the form which her disposition has\nmade her choose; but she preserves the powers of the universal Soul,\nand she unites with her when the (individual soul) turns away from the\nbody, to concentrate within herself.\n\nNow as in the course of her declination towards matter, the soul is\nstripped entirely bare by the total exhaustion of her own faculties;\nand as, on the contrary, on rising towards intelligence, she recovers\nthe fulness of the powers of the universal Soul,[343] the ancient\nphilosophers were right, in their mystic phrasing, to describe these\ntwo opposite conditions of the Soul by the names of Penia and Poros,\n(Wealth and Poverty).[344]\n\n\nSIXTH ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE.\n\nThe One and Identical Being is Everywhere Present In Its Entirety.[345]\n\nTHE INCORPOREAL BEING IS ENTIRE IN EVERYTHING.\n\n40. Better[346] to express the special nature of incorporeal existence\nthe ancient philosophers, particularly Parmenides,[347] do not content\nthemselves with saying \"it is one,\" but they also add \"and all,\" just\nas a sense-object is a whole. But as this unity of the sense-object\ncontains a diversity (for in the sense-object the total unity is not\nall things in so far as it is one, and as all things constitute the\ntotal unity). The ancient philosophers also add, \"in so far as it is\none.\" This was to prevent people from imagining a collective whole\nand to indicate that the real being is all, only by virtue of its\nindivisible unity. After having said, \"it is everywhere,\" they add, \"it\nis nowhere.\" Then, after having said, \"it is in all,\" that is, in all\nindividual things whose disposition enables them to receive it, they\nstill add, as an entire whole. They represent it thus simultaneously\nunder the most opposite attributes, so as to eliminate all the false\nimaginations which are drawn from the natures of the bodies, and which\nwill only obscure the genuine idea of real existence.\n\n\nDIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE INTELLIGIBLE BEING, AND THE BEING OF SENSATION.\n\n41. Such[348] are the genuine characteristics of the sensual and\nmaterial; it is extended, mutable, always different from what it\nwas, and composite; it does not subsist by itself, it is located in\na place, and has volume, and so forth. On the contrary, the real\nbeing that is self-subsisting, is founded on itself, and is always\nidentical; its nature (\"being\") is identity, it is essentially\nimmutable, simple, indissoluble, without extension, and outside of all\nplace; it is neither born, nor does it perish. So let us define these\ncharacteristics of the sensual and veritable existence, and let us put\naside all other attributes.\n\n42. Real[349] existence is said to be manifold, without its really\nbeing different in space, volume, number, figure, or extension of\nparts; its division is a diversity without matter, volume, or real\nmanifoldness. Consequently, the real being is one. Its unity does not\nresemble that of a body, of a place, of a volume, of a multitude. It\npossesses diversity in unity. Its diversity implies both division\nand union; for it is neither exterior nor incidental; real existence\nis not manifold by participation in some other (nature), but by\nitself. It remains one by exercising all its powers, because it holds\nits diversity from its very identity, and not by an assemblage of\nheterogeneous parts, such as bodies. The latter possess unity in\ndiversity; for, in them, it is diversity that dominates, the unity\nbeing exterior and incidental. In real existence, on the contrary,\nit is unity that dominates with identity; diversity is born of the\ndevelopment of the power of unity. Consequently, real existence\npreserves its indivisibility by multiplying itself; while the body\npreserves its volume and multiplicity by unifying itself. Real\nexistence is founded on itself, because it is one by itself. The\nbody is never founded upon itself, because it subsists only by its\nextension. Real existence is, therefore, a fruitful unity, and the body\nis a unified multitude. We must, therefore, exactly determine how real\nexistence is both one and manifold, how the body is both manifold and\none, and we must guard from confusing the attributes of either.\n\n\nTHE DIVINITY IS EVERYWHERE AND NOWHERE.\n\n43. The divinity[350] is everywhere because it is nowhere. So also with\nintelligence and the soul. But it is in relation to all beings that it\nsurpasses, that the divinity is everywhere and nowhere; its presence\nand its absence depend entirely on its nature and its will.[351]\nIntelligence is in the divinity, but it is only in relation to the\nthings that are subordinated to it, that intelligence is everywhere and\nnowhere (?). The body is within the soul and in divinity. All things\nthat possess or do not possess existence proceed from divinity, and are\nwithin divinity; but the divinity is none of them, nor in any of them.\nIf the divinity were only present everywhere, it would be all things,\nand in all things; but, on the other hand, it is nowhere; everything,\ntherefore, is begotten in it and by it, because it is everywhere, but\nnothing becomes confused with it, because it is nowhere. Likewise if\nintelligence be the principle of the souls and of the things that come\nafter the souls, it is because it is everywhere and nowhere; because\nit is neither soul, nor any of the things that come after the soul,\nnor in any of them; it is because it is not only everywhere, but also\nnowhere in respect to the beings that are inferior to it. Similarly\nthe soul is neither a body, nor in the body, but is only the cause of\nthe body, because she is simultaneously everywhere and nowhere in the\nbody. So there is procession in the universe (from what is everywhere\nand nowhere), down to what can neither simultaneously be everywhere\nand nowhere, and which limits itself to participating in this double\nproperty.\n\n\nTHE HUMAN SOUL IS UNITED TO UNIVERSAL BEING BY ITS NATURE.\n\n44. \"When[352] you have conceived of the inexhaustible and infinite\npower of existence in itself, and when you begin to realize its\nincessant and indefatigable nature, which completely suffices itself,\"\nwhich has the privilege of being the purest life, of possessing itself\nfully, of being founded upon itself, of neither desiring nor seeking\nanything outside of itself, \"you should not attribute to it any\nspecial determination,\" or any relation; for when you limit yourself\nby some consideration of space or relation, you doubtlessly do not\nlimit existence in itself, but you turn away from it, extending the\nveil of imagination over your thought. \"You can neither transgress,\nnor fix, nor determine, nor condense within narrow limits, the\nnature of existence in itself, as if it had nothing further to give\nbeyond (certain limits), exhausting itself gradually.\" It is the\nmost inexhaustible spring of which you can form a notion. \"When you\nwill have achieved (?) that nature, and when you will have become\nassimilated to eternal existence, seek nothing beyond.\" Otherwise,\nyou will be going away from it, you will be directing your glances on\nsomething else. \"If you do not seek anything beyond,\" if you shrink\nwithin yourself and into your own nature, \"you will become assimilated\nto universal Existence, and you will not halt at anything inferior\nto it. Do not say, That is what I am. Forgetting what you are (?),\nyou will become universal Existence. You were already universal\nExistence, but you had something besides; by that mere fact you were\ninferior, because that possession of yours that was beyond universal\nExistence was derived from nonentity. Nothing can be added to universal\nExistence.\" When we add to it something derived from nonentity, we\nfall into poverty and into complete deprivation. \"Therefore, abandon\nnonentity, and you will fully possess yourself, (in that you will\nacquire universal existence by putting all else aside; for, so long as\none remains with the remainder, existence does not manifest; and does\nnot grant its presence).\" Existence is discovered by putting aside\neverything that degrades and diminishes it, ceasing to confuse it with\ninferior objects, and ceasing to form a false idea of it. Otherwise\none departs both from existence and from oneself. Indeed, when one\nis present to oneself, he possesses the existence that is present\neverywhere; when one departs from himself, he also departs from it. So\nimportant is it for the soul to acquaint herself with what is in her,\nand to withdraw from what is outside of her; for existence is within\nus, and nonentity is outside of us. Now existence is present within us,\nwhen we are not distracted from it by other things. \"It does not come\nnear us to make us enjoy its presence. It is we who withdraw from it,\nwhen it is not present with us.\" Is there anything surprising in this?\nTo be near existence, you do not need to withdraw from yourselves; for\n\"you are both far from existence and near it, in this sense that it is\nyou who come near to it, and you who withdraw from it, when, instead of\nconsidering yourselves, you consider that which is foreign to you.\" If\nthen you are near existence while being far from it; if, by the mere\nfact of your being ignorant of yourselves, you know all things to which\nyou are present, and which are distant from you, rather than yourself\nwho is naturally near you, is there anything surprising in that, that\nwhich is not near you should remain foreign to you, since you withdraw\nfrom it when you withdraw from yourself? Though you should always be\nnear yourself, and though you cannot withdraw from it, you must be\npresent with yourself to enjoy the presence of the being from which\nyou are so substantially inseparable as from yourself. In that way it\nis given you to know what exists near existence, and what is distant\nfrom it, though itself be present everywhere and nowhere. He who by\nthought can penetrate within his own substance, and can thus acquire\nknowledge of it, finds himself in this actualization of knowledge and\nconsciousness, where the substrate that knows is identical with the\nobject that is known. Now when a man thus possesses himself, he also\npossesses existence. He who goes out of himself to attach himself to\nexternal objects, withdraws also from existence, when withdrawing\nalso from himself. It is natural to us to establish ourselves within\nourselves, where we enjoy the whole wealth of our own resources, and\nnot to turn ourselves away from ourselves towards what is foreign to\nourselves, and where we find nothing but the most complete poverty.\nOtherwise, we are withdrawing from existence, though it be near us; for\nit is neither space, nor \"being\" (substance), nor any obstacle that\nseparates us from existence; it is our reversion towards nonentity. Our\nalienation from ourselves, and our ignorance are thus a just punishment\nof our withdrawal from existence. On the contrary, the love that the\nsoul has for herself leads her to self-knowledge and communion with the\ndivinity. Consequently, it has rightly been said that man here below is\nin a prison, because he has fled from heaven[353] ... and because he\ntries to break his bonds; for, when he turns towards things here below,\nhe has abandoned himself, and has withdrawn from his divine origin.\nIt is, (as Empedocles says), \"a fugitive who has deserted his heavenly\nfatherland.\"[354] That is why the life of a vicious man is a life that\nis servile, impious, and unjust, and his spirit is full of impiety and\ninjustice.[355] On the contrary, justice, as has been rightly said,\nconsists in each one fulfilling his function (?). To distribute to each\nperson his due is genuine justice.\n\n\n\n\nPSYCHOLOGICAL FRAGMENTS.\n\n\nA. On the Faculties of the Soul, by Porphyry.[356]\n\n\nOBJECT OF THE BOOK.\n\nWe propose to describe the faculties of the soul, and to set forth\nthe various opinions on the subject held by both ancient and modern\nthinkers.\n\n\nDIFFERENCE BETWEEN SENSATION AND INTELLIGENCE.\n\nAristo (there were two philosophers by this name, one a Stoic, the\nother an Aristotelian) attributes to the soul a perceptive faculty,\nwhich he divides into two parts. According to him, the first, called\nsensibility, the principle and origin of sensations, is usually kept\nactive by some one of the sense-organs. The other, which subsists\nby itself, and without organs, does not bear any special name in\nbeings devoid of reason, in whom reason does not manifest, or at\nleast manifests only in a feeble or obscure manner; however, it is\ncalled intelligence in beings endowed with reason, among whom alone\nit manifests clearly. Aristo holds that sensibility acts only with\nthe help of the sense-organs, and that intelligence does not need\nthem to enter into activity. Why then does he subordinate both of\nthese to a single genus, called the perceptive faculty? Both doubtless\nperceive, but the one perceives the sense-form of beings, while the\nother perceives their essence. Indeed, sensibility does not perceive\nthe essence, but the sense-form, and the figure; it is intelligence\nthat perceives whether the object be a man or a horse. There are,\ntherefore, two kinds of perception that are very different from each\nother; sense-perception receives an impression, and applies itself to\nan exterior object; on the contrary, intellectual perception does not\nreceive any impression.\n\nThere have been philosophers who separated these two parts; they called\nintelligence or discursive reason the understanding which is exercised\nwithout imagination and sensation; and opinion, the understanding\nwhich is exercised with imagination and sensation. Others, on the\ncontrary, considered rational \"being,\" or nature, a simple essence,\nand attributed to it operations whose nature is entirely different.\nNow it is unreasonable to refer to the same essence faculties which\ndiffer completely in nature; for thought and sensation could not depend\non the same essential principle; and if we were to call the operation\nof intelligence a perception, we would only be juggling with words.\nWe must, therefore, establish a perfectly clear distinction between\nthese two entities, intelligence and sensibility. On the one hand,\nintelligence possesses a quite peculiar nature, as is also the case\nwith discursive reason, which is next below it. The function of the\nformer is intuitive thought, while that of the latter is discursive\nthought. On the other hand, sensibility differs entirely from\nintelligence, acting with or without the help of organs; in the former\ncase, it is called sensation; in the latter, imagination. Nevertheless,\nsensation and imagination belong to the same genus. In understanding,\nintuitive intelligence is superior to opinion, which applies to\nsensation or imagination; this latter kind of thought, whether called\ndiscursive thought, or anything else (such as opinion), is superior to\nsensation and imagination, but inferior to intuitive thought.\n\n\nOF ASSENT.\n\nNumenius, who teaches that the faculty of assent (or, combining\nfaculty) is capable of producing various operations, says that\nrepresentation (fancy) is an accessory of this faculty, that it does\nnot, however, constitute either an operation or function of it, but\na consequence of it. The Stoics, on the contrary, not only make\nsensation consist in representation, but even reduce representation\nto (combining) assent. According to them sense-imagination (or\nsense-fancy) is assent, or the sensation of the determination of\nassent. Longinus, however, does not acknowledge any faculty of assent.\nThe philosophers of the ancient Academy (the Platonists) believe\nthat sensation does not comprise sense-representation, and that,\nconsequently, it does not have any original property, since it does\nnot participate in assent. If sense representation consisted of assent\nadded to sensation, sensation, by itself, will have no virtue, since it\nis not the assent given to the things we possess.\n\n\nOF THE PARTS OF THE SOUL.\n\nIt is not only about the faculties that the ancient philosophers\ndisagree.... They are besides in radical disagreement about the\nfollowing questions: What are the parts of the soul; what is a part;\nwhat is a faculty; what difference is there between a part and a\nfaculty?\n\nThe Stoics divide the soul into eight parts: the five senses, speech,\nsex-power, and the directing (predominating) principle, which is served\nby the other faculties, so that the soul is composed of a faculty that\ncommands, and faculties that obey.\n\nIn their writing about ethics, Plato and Aristotle divide the soul into\nthree parts. This division has been adopted by the greater part of\nlater philosophers; but these have not understood that the object of\nthis definition was to classify and define the virtues (Plato: reason,\nanger and appetite; Aristotle: locomotion, appetite and understanding).\nIndeed, if this classification be carefully scrutinized, it will be\nseen that it fails to account for all the faculties of the soul; it\nneglects imagination, sensibility, intelligence, and the natural\nfaculties (the generative and nutritive powers).\n\nOther philosophers, such as Numenius, do not teach one soul in three\nparts, like the preceding, nor in two, such as the rational and\nirrational parts. They believe that we have two souls, one rational,\nthe other irrational. Some among them attribute immortality to both of\nthe souls; others attribute it only to the rational soul, and think\nthat death not only suspends the exercise of the faculties that belong\nto the irrational soul, but even dissolves its \"being\" or essence.\nLast, there are some that believe, that by virtue of the union of the\ntwo souls, their movements are double, because each of them feels the\npassions of the other.\n\n\nOF THE DIFFERENCE OF THE PARTS, AND OF THE FACULTIES OF THE SOUL.\n\nWe shall now explain the difference obtaining between a part\nand a faculty of the soul. One part differs from another by the\ncharacteristics of its genus (or, kind); while different faculties may\nrelate to a common genus. That is why Aristotle did not allow that the\nsoul contained parts, though granting that it contained faculties.\nIndeed, the introduction of a new part changes the nature of the\nsubject, while the diversity of faculties does not alter its unity.\nLonginus did not allow in the animal (or, living being) for several\nparts, but only for several faculties. In this respect, he followed the\ndoctrine of Plato, according to whom the soul, in herself indivisible,\nis divided within bodies. Besides, that the soul does not have several\nparts does not necessarily imply that she has only a single faculty;\nfor that which has no parts may still possess several faculties.\n\nTo conclude this confused discussion, we shall have to lay down a\nprinciple of definition which will help to determine the essential\ndifferences and resemblances that exist either between the parts of a\nsame subject, or between its faculties, or between its parts and its\nfaculties. This will clearly reveal whether in the organism the soul\nreally has several parts, or merely several faculties, and what opinion\nabout them should be adopted. (For there are two special types of\nthese.) The one attributes to man a single soul, genuinely composed of\nseveral parts, either by itself, or in relation to the body. The other\none sees in man a union of several souls, looking on the man as on a\nchoir, the harmony of whose parts constitutes its unity, so that we\nfind several essentially different parts contributing to the formation\nof a single being.\n\nFirst we shall have to study within the soul the differentials between\nthe part, the faculty and the disposition. A part always differs from\nanother by the substrate, genus, and function. A disposition in a\nspecial aptitude of some one part to carry out the part assigned to it\nby nature. A faculty is the habit of a disposition, the power inherent\nin some part to do the thing for which it has a disposition. There\nwas no great inconvenience in confusing faculty and disposition; but\nthere is an essential difference between part and faculty. Whatever\nthe number of faculties, they can exist within a single \"being,\" or\nnature, without occupying any particular point in the extension of the\nsubstrate, while the parts somewhat participate in its extension,\noccupying therein a particular point. Thus all the properties of an\napple are gathered within a single substrate, but the different parts\nthat compose it are separate from each other. The notion of a part\nimplies the idea of quantity in respect to the totality of the subject.\nOn the contrary, the notion of a faculty implies the idea of totality.\nThat is why the faculties remain indivisible, because they penetrate\nthe whole substrate, while the parts are separate from each other\nbecause they have a quantity.\n\nHow then may we say that a soul is indivisible, while having three\nparts? For when we hear it asserted that she contains three parts\nin respect to quantity, it is reasonable to ask how the soul can\nsimultaneously be indivisible, and yet have three parts. This\ndifficulty may be solved as follows: the soul is indivisible in so far\nas she is considered within her \"being,\" and in herself; and that she\nhas three parts in so far as she is united to a divisible body, and\nthat she exercises her different faculties in the different parts of\nthe body. Indeed, it is not the same faculty that resides in the head,\nin the breast, or in the liver;[357] (the seats of reason, of anger\nand appetite). Therefore, when the soul has been divided into several\nparts, it is in this sense that her different functions are exercised\nwithin different parts of the body.\n\nNicholas (of Damascus[358]), in his book \"On the Soul,\" used to say\nthat the division of the soul was not founded on quantity, but on\nquality, like the division of an art or a science. Indeed, when we\nconsider an extension, we see that the whole is a sum of its parts,\nand that it increases or diminishes according as a part is added or\nsubtracted. Now it is not in this sense that we attribute parts to\nthe soul; she is not the sum of her parts, because she is neither an\nextension nor a multitude. The parts of the soul resemble those of an\nart. There is, however, this difference, that an art is incomplete\nor imperfect if it lack some part, while every soul is perfect, and\nwhile every organism that has not achieved the goal of its nature is an\nimperfect being.\n\nThus by parts of the soul Nicholas means the different faculties of\nthe organism. Indeed, the organism, and, in general, the animated\nbeing, by the mere fact of possessing a soul, possesses several\nfaculties, such as life, feeling, movement, thought, desire, and the\ncause and principle of all of them is the soul. Those, therefore, who\ndistinguish parts in the soul thereby mean the faculties by which the\nanimated being can produce actualizations, or experience affections.\nWhile the soul herself is said to be indivisible, nothing hinders her\nfunctions from being divided. The organism, therefore, is divisible,\nif we introduce within the notion of the soul that of the body; for\nthe vital functions by the soul communicated to the body must thereby\nnecessarily be divided by the diversity of the organs, and it is this\ndivision of vital functions that has caused parts to be ascribed to\nthe soul herself. As the soul can be conceived of in two different\nconditions, according as she lives within herself, or as she declines\ntowards the body,[359] it is only when she declines towards the body\nthat she splits up into parts. When a seed of corn is sowed, and\nproduces an ear, we see in this ear of corn the appearance of parts,\nthough the whole it forms be indivisible,[360] and these indivisible\nparts themselves later return to an indivisible unity; likewise, when\nthe soul, which by herself is indivisible, finds herself united to the\nbody, parts are seen to appear.\n\nWe must still examine which are the faculties that the soul develops\nby herself (intelligence and discursive reason), and which the soul\ndevelops by the animal (sensation). This will be the true means of\nillustrating the difference between these two natures (\"beings\"), and\nthe necessity of reducing to the soul herself those parts of her\n\"being\" which have been enclosed within the parts of the body.[361]\n\n\nB. Jamblichus.[362]\n\nPlato, Archytas, and the other Pythagoreans divide the soul into three\nparts, reason, anger, and appetite, which they consider to be necessary\nto form the ground-work for the virtues. They assign to the soul as\nfaculties the natural (generative) power, sensibility, imagination,\nlocomotion, love of the good and beautiful, and last, intelligence.\n\n\nC. Nemesius.[363]\n\nAristotle says, in his Physics,[364] that the soul has five\nfaculties, the power of growth, sensation, locomotion, appetite,\nand understanding. But, in his Ethics, he divides the soul into two\nprincipal parts, which are rational part, and the irrational part;\nthen Aristotle subdivides the latter into the part that is subject to\nreason, and the part not subject to reason.\n\n\nD. Jamblichus.[365]\n\nThe Platonists hold different opinions. Some, like Plotinos and\nPorphyry, reduce to a single order and idea the different functions and\nfaculties of life; others, like Numenius, imagine them to be opposed,\nas if in a struggle; while others, like Atticus and Plutarch, bring\nharmony out of the struggle.\n\n\nE. Ammonius Saccas.\n\nA. FROM NEMESIUS.[366]\n\nON THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL.\n\nIt will suffice to oppose the arguments of Ammonius, teacher of\nPlotinos, and those of Numenius the Pythagorean, to that of all those\nwho claim that the soul is material. These are the reasons: \"Bodies,\ncontaining nothing unchangeable, are naturally subject to change, to\ndissolution, and to infinite divisions. They inevitably need some\nprinciple that may contain them, that may bind and strengthen their\nparts; this is the unifying principle that we call soul. But if the\nsoul also be material, however subtle be the matter of which she may be\ncomposed, what could contain the soul herself, since we have just seen\nthat all matter needs some principle to contain it? The same process\nwill go on continuously to infinity until we arrive at an immaterial\nsubstance.\"\n\nUNION OF THE SOUL AND THE BODY.\n\nAmmonius, teacher of Plotinos, thus explained the present problem (the\nunion of soul and body): \"The intelligible is of a nature such that it\nunites with whatever is able to receive it, as intimately as the union\nof things, that mutually alter each other in uniting, though, at the\nsame time, it remains pure and incorruptible, as do things that merely\ncoexist.[367] Indeed, in the case of bodies, union alters the parts\nthat meet, since they form new bodies; that is how elements change into\ncomposite bodies, food into blood, blood into flesh, and other parts\nof the body. But, as to the intelligible, the union occurs without any\nalteration; for it is repugnant to the nature of the intelligible to\nundergo an alteration in its essential nature. It disappears, or it\nceases to be, but it is not susceptible of change. Now the intelligible\ncannot be annihilated; otherwise it would not be immortal; and as\nthe soul is life, if it changed in its union with the body, it would\nbecome something different, and would no longer be life. What would\nthe soul afford to the body, if not life? In her union (with the body,\ntherefore), the soul undergoes no alteration.\n\nSince it has been demonstrated that, in its essential nature, the\nintelligible is immutable, the necessary result must be that it does\nnot alter at the same time as the entities to which it is united. The\nsoul, therefore, is united to the body, but she does not form a mixture\nwith it.[368] The sympathy that exists between them shows that they are\nunited; for the entirely animated being is a whole that is sympathetic\nto itself, and that is consequently really one.[369]\n\nWhat proves that the soul does not form a mixture with the body, is the\nsoul's power to separate from the body during sleep; leaving the body\nas it were inanimate, with only a breath of life, to keep it from dying\nentirely; using her own activity only in dreams, to foresee the future,\nand to live in the intelligible world.\n\nThis appears again when the soul gathers herself together to devote\nherself to her thoughts; for then she separates from the body so far as\nshe can, and retires within herself better to be able to apply herself\nto the consideration of intelligible things. Indeed, being incorporeal,\nshe unites with the body as closely as the union of things which by\ncombining together perish because of each other, (thus giving birth to\na mixture); at the same time, she remains without alteration, as two\nthings that are only placed by each others' side; and she preserves\nher unity. Thus, according to her own life, she modifies that to which\nshe is united, but she is not modified thereby. Just as the sun, by\nits presence, makes the air luminous, without itself changing in any\nway, and thus, so to speak, mingles itself therewith, without mingling\nitself (in reality), so the soul, though united with the body, remains\nquite distinct therefrom. But there is this difference, that the sun,\nbeing a body, and consequently being circumscribed within a certain\nspace, is not everywhere where is its light; just as the fire dwells\nin the wood, or in the wick of the lamp, as if enclosed within a\nlocality; but the soul, being incorporeal, and not being subjected to\nany local limitation, exists as a whole everywhere where her light\nis; and there is no part of the body that is illuminated by the soul\nin which the soul is not entirely present. It is not the body that\ncommands the soul; it is the soul, on the contrary, that commands the\nbody. She is not in the body as if in a vase or a gourd; it is rather\nthe body that is in the soul.[370]\n\nThe intelligible, therefore, is not imprisoned within the body; it\nspreads in all the body's parts, it penetrates them, it goes through\nthem, and could not be enclosed in any place; for by virtue of its\nnature, it resides in the intelligible world; it has no locality other\nthan itself, or than an intelligible situated still higher. Thus the\nsoul is within herself when she reasons, and in intelligence when she\nyields herself to contemplation. When it is asserted that the soul is\nin the body, it is not meant that the soul is in it as in a locality;\nit is only meant that the soul is in a habitual relation with the body;\nand that the soul is present there, as we say that God is in us. For\nwe think that the soul is united to the body, not in a corporeal and\nlocal manner, but by the soul's habitual relations, her inclination and\ndisposition, as a lover is attached to his beloved. Besides, as the\naffection of the soul has neither extension, nor weight, nor parts,\nshe could not be circumscribed by local limitations. Within what place\ncould that which has no parts be contained? For place and corporeal\nextension are inseparable; the place is limited space in which the\ncontainer contains the contained. But if we were to say, \"My soul is\nthen in Alexandria, in Rome, and everywhere else;\" we would be still\nspeaking of space carelessly, since being in Alexandria, or in general,\nbeing somewhere, is being in a place; now the soul is absolutely in\nno place; she can only be in some relation with some place, since it\nhas been demonstrated that she could not be contained within a place.\nIf then an intelligible entity \"be in relation with a place, or with\nsomething located in a place, we say, in a figurative manner, that\nthis intelligible entity is in this place, because it tends thither by\nits activity; and we take the location for the inclination or for the\nactivity which leads it thither. If we were to say, That is where the\nsoul acts, we would be saying, \"The soul is there.\"\n\n\nB. NOTICE OF AMMONIUS BY HIEROCLES.[371]\n\nThen shone the wisdom of Ammonius, who is famous under the name of\n\"Inspired by the Divinity.\" It was he, in fact, who, purifying the\nopinions of the ancient philosophers, and dissipating the fancies woven\nhere and there, established harmony between the teaching of Plato, and\nthat of Aristotle, in that which was most essential and fundamental....\nIt was Ammonius of Alexandria, the \"Inspired by the Divinity,\" who,\ndevoting himself enthusiastically to the truth in philosophy, and\nrising above the popular notions that made of philosophy an object\nof scorn, clearly understood the doctrine of Plato and of Aristotle,\ngathered them into a single ideal, and thus peacefully handed\nphilosophy down to his disciples Plotinos, the (pagan) Origen, and\ntheir successors.\n\n\n\n\nPLOTINIC STUDIES IN SOURCES, DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCE.\n\n\n\n\nI. DEVELOPMENT IN THE TEACHINGS OF PLOTINOS.\n\n\nIt was only through long hard work that the writer arrived at\nconclusions which the reader may be disposed to accept as very\nnatural, under the circumstances. It is possible that the reader may,\nnevertheless, be interested in the manner in which the suggestion here\nadvanced was reached.\n\nThe writer had for several years been working at the premier edition\nof the fragments of Numenius, in reasonably complete form, with\ntranslation and outline. After ransacking the accessible sources of\nfragments, there remained yet an alleged treatise of Numenius on\nMatter, in the library of the Escoreal, near Madrid. This had been\nknown to savants in Germany for many years; and Prof. Uzener, of\nBonn, in his criticism of Thedinga's partial collection of fragments,\nhad expressed a strong desire that it be investigated; it had also\nbeen noticed by Zeller, and Bouillet, as well as Chaignet. If then I\nhoped to publish a comparatively reliable collection of the fragments\nof Numenius, it was my duty, though hailing from far America, and\nthough no European had shown enough interest therein to send for a\nphotographic copy, to go there, and get one, which I did in July, 1913.\nI bore the precious fragment to Rostock and Prof. Thedinga in Hagen,\nwhere, however, we discovered that it was no more than a section of\nPlotinos's Enneads, iii. 6.6 to end. The manuscript did, indeed, show\nan erasure of the name of Plotinos, and the substitution of that of\nNumenius. After the first disappointment, it became unavoidable to ask\nthe question why the monk should have done that. Had he any reason\nto suppose that this represented Numenian doctrine, even if it was\nnot written by Numenius? Having no external data to go by, it became\nnecessary to resort to internal criticism, to compare this Plotinian\ntreatment of matter with other Plotinian treatments, in other portions\nof the Enneads.\n\nThis then inevitably led to a close scrutiny of Plotinos's various\ntreatments of the subject, with results that were very much unlooked\nfor. This part that we might well have had reason to ascribe to\nNumenian influence, on the contrary, turned out to be by far\nmore Plotinian than other sections that we would at first have\nunhesitatingly considered Plotinian, and, as will be seen elsewhere,\nthe really doubtful portions occur in the very last works of Plotinos's\nlife, where it would have been more natural to expect the most genuine.\nHowever, the result was a demonstration of a progress in doctrines in\nthe career of Plotinos, and after a careful study thereof, the reader\nwill agree that we have in this case every element of probability in\nfavor of such a development; indeed, it will seem so natural that the\nunbiased reader will ask himself why this idea has not before this been\nthe general view of the matter.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nFirst a few words about the distinction of periods in general.\nAmong unreflecting people, for centuries, it has been customary\nto settle disputes by appeals to the Bible as a whole. This was\nalways satisfactory, until somebody else came along who held totally\ndifferent views, which he supported just as satisfactorily from the\nsame authority. The result was the century-long bloody wars of the\nReformation, everywhere leaving in that particular place, as the\northodox, the stronger. Since thirty years, however, the situation has\nchanged. The contradictions of the Bible, so long the ammunition of\nscoffers of the type of Ingersoll, became the pathfinders of the Higher\nCriticism, which has solved the otherwise insoluble difficulties by\nshowing them to rest on parallel documents, and different authors. It\nis no longer sufficient to appeal to Isaiah; we must now specify which\nIsaiah we mean; and we may no longer refer to the book of Genesis, but\nto the Jehovistic or Elohistic documents.\n\nThis method of criticism is slowly gaining ground with other works. The\nwriter, for instance, applied it with success to the Gathas, or hymns\nof Zoroaster. These appear in the Yasnas in two sections which have\never given the editors much trouble. Either they were printed in the\nmeaningless traditional order, or they were mixed confusedly according\nto the editor's fancy, resulting of course in a fancy picture. The\nwriter, however, discovered they were duplicate lives of Zoroaster, and\nprinting them on opposite pages, he has shown parallel development,\nreducing the age-long difficulties to perfectly reasonable, and\nmutually confirming order.\n\nAnother case is that of Plato. It is still considered allowable to\nquote the authority of Plato, as such; but in scientific matters we\nmust always state which period of Plato's activities, the Plato of the\nRepublic, or the more conservative Plato of the Laws, and the evil\nWorld-soul, is meant.\n\nAnother philosopher in the same case is Schelling, among whose views\nthe text-books distinguish as many as five different periods. This\nis no indication of mental instability, but rather a proof that he\nremained awake as long as he lived. No man can indeed continue to think\nwith genuineness without changing his views; and only men as great as\nBacon or Emerson have had the temerity to discredit consistency when\nit is no more than mental inertia.\n\nThere are many other famous men who changed their views. Prominent\namong them is Goethe, whose Second Faust, finished in old age, strongly\ncontrasted with the First Part. What then would be inherently unlikely\nin Plotinos's changing his views during the course of half a century\nof philosophical activity? On the contrary, it would be a much greater\nmarvel had he not done so; and the burden of proof really lies with the\npartisans of unchanging opinions.\n\nFor example: in ii. 4 we find Plotinos discussing the doctrine of two\nmatters, the physical and the intelligible. In the very next book,\nof the same Ennead, in ii. 5.3, we find him discrediting this same\nintelligible matter. Moreover, in i. 8.7, he approves of the world as\nmixture; in ii. 4.7 he disapproves of it. What do these contradictions\nmean? That Plotinos was unreliable? That he was mentally incoherent?\nNo, something much simpler. By consulting the tables of Porphyry, we\ndiscover of the first two, that the first statement was made during\nthe Amelian period, and the latter during the Porphyrian. Another case\nof such contradiction is his assertion of positive evil (i. 8) and\nhis denial thereof (ii. 9). The latter assertion is of the Porphyrian\nperiod, the former is Eustochian; while of the latter two, the first\nwas Eustochian; and the second Amelian. It is simply a case of\ndevelopment of doctrines at different periods of his life.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nLet us now examine Plotinos's various treatments of the subject of\nmatter.\n\nThe first treatment of matter occurs in the first Ennead, and it may\nbe described as thoroughly Numenian, being treated in conjunction with\nthe subject of evil. First, we have the expression of the Supreme\nhovering over Being.[372] Then we have the soul double,[373] reminding\nus of Numenius's view of the double Second Divinity[374] and the double\nsoul.[375] Then we have positive evil occurring in the absence of\ngood.[376] Plotinos[377] opposes the Stoic denial of evil, for he says,\n\"if this were all,\" there were no evil. We find a threefold division\nof the universe without the Stoic term hypostasis, which occurs in the\ntreatment of the same topic elsewhere.[378] Similar to Numenius is the\nKing of all,[379] the blissful life of the divinities around him,[380]\nand the division of the universe into three.[381] Plotinos[382]\nacknowledges evil things in the world, something denied by the\nStoics,[383] but taught by Numenius, as is also original, primary\nexistence of evil, in itself. Evil is here said to be a hypostasis in\nitself, and imparts evil qualities to other things. It is an image of\nbeing, and a genuine nature of evil. Plotinos describes[384] matter\nas flowing eternally, which reminds us unmistakably of Numenius's\nimage[385] of matter as a swiftly flowing stream, unlimited and\ninfinite in depth, breadth, and length. Evil inheres in the material\npart of the body,[386] and is seen as actual, positive, darkness,\nwhich is Numenian, as far as it means a definite principle.[387]\nPlotinos also[388] insists on the ineradicability of evil, in almost\nthe same terms as Numenius,[389] who calls on Heraclitus and Homer as\nsupporters. Plotinos[390] as reason for this assigns the fact that the\nworld is a mixture, which is the very proof advanced by Numenius in 12.\nPlotinos, moreover,[391] defines matter as that which remains after all\nqualities are abstracted; this is thoroughly Numenian.[392]\n\nIn the fourth book of the Second Ennead the treatment of matter is\noriginal, and is based on comparative studies. Evil has disappeared\nfrom the horizon; and the long treatment of the controversy with the\nGnostics[393] is devoted to explaining away evil as misunderstood\ngood. Although he begins by finding fault with Stoic materialism,[394]\nhe asserts two matters, the intelligible and the physical. Intelligible\nmatter[395] is eternal, and possesses essence. Plotinos goes on[396]\nto argue for the necessity of an intelligible, as well as a physical\nsubstrate (hypokeimenon). In the next paragraph[397] Plotinos seems\nto undertake a historical polemic, against three traditional teachers\n(Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus) under whose names he was\nsurely finding fault with their disciples: the Stoics, Numenius, and\npossibly such thinkers as Lucretius. Empedocles is held responsible\nfor the view that elements are material, evidently a Stoical view.\nAnaxagoras is held responsible for three views, which are distinctly\nNumenian: that the world is a mixture,[398] that it is all in all,[399]\nand that it is infinite.[400] We might, in passing, notice another\nPlotinian contradiction in here condemning the world as mixture,\napproved in the former passage.[401] As to the atomism of Democritus,\nit is not clear with which contemporaries he was finding fault.\nIntelligible matter reappears[402] where we also find again the idea\nof doubleness of everything. As to the terms used by the way, we find\nthe Stoic categories of Otherness or Variety[403] and Motion; the\nconceptual seminal logoi, and the \"Koin\u00ea ousia\" of matter; but in\nhis psychology he uses \"logos\" and \"no\u00easis,\" instead of \"nous\" and\n\"phronesis,\" which are found in the Escorial section, and which are\nmore Stoical. We also find the Aristotelian category of energy, or\npotentiality.\n\nIn the very next book of the same Ennead,[404] we find another\ntreatment of matter, on an entirely different basis, accented by a\nrejection of intelligible matter.[405] Here the whole basis of the\ntreatment of matter is the Aristotelian category of \"energeia\" and\n\"dunamis,\" or potentiality and actuality, Although we find the Stoic\nterm hypostasis, the book seems to be more Numenian, for matter is\nagain a positive lie, and the divinity is described by the Numenian\ndouble name[406] of Being and Essence (\"ousia\" and \"to on\").\n\nWe now come to the Escorial section.[407] This is by far the most\nextensive treatment of matter, and as we are chiefly interested in it\nin connection with its bearing the name of Numenius at the Escorial,\nwe shall analyze it for and against this Numenian authorship, merely\nnoting that the chief purpose is to describe the impassibility of\nmatter, a Stoic idea.\n\nFor Numenius as author we note:\n\na. A great anxiety to preserve agreement with Plato, even to the point\nof stretching definitions.[408]\n\nb. Plato's idea of participation, useless to monistic Stoics, is\nrepeatedly used.[409] Numenius had gone so far as to assert a\nparticipation, even in the intelligibles.[410]\n\nc. Matter appears as the curse of all existent objects.[411] It also\nappears as mother.[412]\n\nd. Try as he may, the author of this section cannot escape the dualism\nso prominent in Numenius;[413] the acrobatic nature of his efforts in\nthis direction are pointed out elsewhere. We find here a thoroughgoing\ndistinction between soul and body, which is quite Numenian, and\ndualistic.[414]\n\ne. Matter is passive, possessing no resiliency.[415]\n\nf. We find an argument directed[416] against those who \"posit being in\nmatter.\" These must be the Stoics, with whom Numenius is ever in feud.\n\ng. Of Numenian terms, we find \"s\u00f4teria,\"[417] God the Father.[418] Also\nthe double Numenian name for the Divinity, Being and Essence.[419]\n\nAgainst Numenius as author, we note:\n\na. The general form of the section, which is that of the Enneads, not\nthe dialogue of Numenius's Treatise on the Good. We find also the usual\nPlotinic interjected questions.\n\nb. Un-Numenian, at least, is matter as a mirror,[420] and evil as\nmerely negative, merely unaffectability to good.[421] While Numenius\nspeaks of matter as nurse and feeder, here we read nurse and receptacle.\n\nc. Stoic, is the chief subject of the section, namely the affectibility\nof matter. Also, the allegoric interpretation of the myths, of the\nithyphallic Hermes, and the Universal Mother, which are like the other\nPlotinic myths, of the double Hercules, Poros, Penia, and Koros. We\nfind[422] the Stoic idea of passibility and impassibility, although not\nexactly that of passion and action. We find[423] connected the terms\n\"nous\" and \"phron\u00easis,\" also \"anastasis.\" The term hypostasis, though\nused undogmatically, as mere explanation of thought, is found.[424]\nFrequent[425] are the conceptual logoi of the divine Mind (the seminal\nlogoi) which enter into matter to clothe themselves with it, to produce\nobjects. We also have the Stoic category \"heterot\u00eas,\"[426] and the\napplication of sex as explanation of the differences of the world.[427]\n\nd. Aristotelian, are the \"energeia\" and \"dunamis.\"[428]\n\ne. Plotinic, are the latter ideas, for they are used in the same\nconnection.[429] Also the myths of Poros, Penia and Koros, which are\nfound elsewhere in similar relations.[430]\n\nOn the whole, therefore, the Plotinic authorship is much more strongly\nindicated than the Numenian.\n\nThe next treatment of matter in the Fourth Ennead, is\nsemi-stoical.[431] The opposite aspects of the Universe appear\nagain as \"phronesis\" and \"phusis.\" We find here the Stoic doing and\nsuffering, and[432] hypostasis. Nevertheless, the chief process\nillustrated is still the Platonic image reproduced less and less\nclearly in successively more degraded spheres of being. Plotinos seems\nto put himself out of the Numenian sphere of thought, referring to\nit in abstract historical manner, as belonging to the successors of\nPythagoras and Pherecydes, who treated of matter as the element that\ndistinguished objects in the intelligible world.\n\nThe last treatment of matter[433] seems to have reached the extreme\ndistance of Numenianism. Instead of a dualism, with matter an original,\npositive principle, Plotinos closes his discussion by stating that\nperhaps form and matter may not come from the same origin, as there is\nsome difference between them. He has just said that Being is common\nto both form and matter, as to quality, though not as to quantity. A\nlittle above this he insists that matter is not something original, as\nit is later than many earthly, and than all intelligible objects. As\nto the Numenian double name of the Divinity, Being and Essence, he had\ntaken from Aristotelianism the conceptions of \"energeia\" and \"dunamis,\"\nand added them as the supreme hypostasis, so as to form in theological\ndialect the triad he, following Numenius and Plato, had always asserted\ncosmologically (good, intellect, and soul): \"The developed energy[434]\nassumes hypostasis, as if from a great, nay, as from the greatest\nhypostasis of all; and so it joins Essence and Being.\"\n\nReviewing these various treatments of matter we might call the\nfirst[435] Numenian; the next[436] Platonic (as most independent, and\nhistorically treated); the next[437] as Aristotelian; the Escorial\nSection as semi-Stoic;[438] as also another short notice.[439] The last\ntreatment of matter, in vi. 3.7, is fully Stoic, in its denial of the\nevil of matter.\n\nHow then shall we explain these differences? Chiefly by studying the\nperiods in which they are written, and which they therefore explain.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhen we try to study the periods in Plotinos's thought, as shown in\nhis books, we are met with great difficulties, which are chiefly\ndue to Porphyry. Exactly following the contemporary methods of the\ncompilers of the Bible, he undiscerningly confused the writings of\nthe various periods, so as to make up an anthology, grouped by six\ngroups of nine books each, according to subjects, consisting first\nof ethical disquisitions; second, of physical questions; third,\nof cosmic considerations; fourth, of psychological discussions;\nfifth, of transcendental lucubrations; and sixth, of metaphysics and\ntheology.[440] As the reader might guess from the oversymmetrical\ngrouping, and this pretty classification, the apparent order is only\nillusory, as he may have concluded from the fact that the discussions\nof matter analyzed above are scattered throughout the whole range of\nthis anthology. The result of this Procrustean arrangement was the same\nas with the Bible: a confusion of mosaic, out of which pretty nearly\nanything could be proved, and into which almost everything has been\nread. Compare the outlines of the doctrines of Plotinos by Ritter,\nZeller, Ueberweg, Chaignet, Mead, Guthrie, and Drews, and it will be\nseen that there is very little agreement between them, while none of\nthem allow for the difference between the various parts of the Enneads.\n\nHow fearful the confusion is, will best be realized from the following\ntwo tables, made up from the indications given in Porphyry's Life of\nPlotinos.\n\nPorphyry gives three lists of the works of the various periods.\nIdentifying these in the present Ennead arrangement, they are to be\nfound as follows:\n\nThe works of the Amelian period are now i. 6; iv. 7; iii. 1; iv. 2; v.\n9; iv. 8; iv. 4; iv. 9; vi. 9; v. 1; v. 2; ii. 4; iii. 9; ii. 2; iii.\n4; i. 9; ii. 6; v. 7; i. 2; i. 3; i. 8.\n\nThe works of the Porphyrian period are now vi. 5, 6; v. 6; ii. 5; iii.\n6; iv. 3-5; iii. 8; v. 8; v. 5; ii. 9; vi. 6; ii. 8; i. 5; ii. 7; vi.\n7; vi. 8; ii. 1; iv. 6; vi. 1-3; iii. 7.\n\nThe works of the latest or Eustochian period are: i. 4; iii. 2, 3; v.\n3; iii. 5; i. 8; ii. 3; i. 1; i. 7. (For Eustochius, see Scholion to\nEnn. iv. 4.29, ii. 7.86, Creuz. 1, 301 Kirchhof.)\n\nA more convenient table will be the converse arrangement. Following\nthe present normal order of the books in Enneads, we will describe\nits period by a letter, referring to the Amelian period by A, to the\nPorphyrian by P, and the Eustochian by E. I: EAAEPAEAA. II: PAEAPAPPP.\nIII: AEEAEAPPA. IV: AAPPPPAAA. V: AAEAPPAPA. VI: PPPPPPPPA.\n\nThis artificial arrangement into Enneads should therefore be abandoned,\nand in a new English translation that the writer has in mind, the books\nwould appear in the order of their periods, while an index would allow\neasy reference by the old numbers. Then only will we be able to study\nthe successive changes of Plotinos's thought, in their normal mutual\nrelation; and it is not difficult to prophesy that important results\nwould follow.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nHaving thus achieved internal proof of development of doctrines in\nPlotinos, by examination of his views about Matter, we may with some\nconfidence state that the externally known facts of the life of no\nphilosopher lend themselves to such a progress of opinions more readily\nthan that of Plotinos. His biographer, Porphyry, as we have seen, had\nalready given us a list of the works of three easily characterized\nperiods in Plotinos's life: the period before Porphyry came to him,\nthe period while Porphyry staid with him, and the later period when\nPlotinos was alone, and Porphyry was in retirement (or banishment?) in\nSicily.\n\nAn external division into periods is therefore openly acknowledged; but\nit remains for us to recall its significance.\n\nIn the first place, the reader will ask himself, how does it come about\nthat Plotinos is so dependent on Porphyry, and before him, on Amelius?\nThe answer is that Plotinos himself was evidently somewhat deficient\nin the details of elementary education, however much proficiency\nin more general philosophical studies, and in independent thought,\nand personal magnetic touch with pupils he may have achieved. His\npronunciation was defective, and in writing he was careless, so much so\nthat he usually failed to affix proper headings or notice of definite\nauthorship.[441] These peculiarities would to some extent put him in\nthe power, and under the influence of his editors, and this explains\nwhy he was dependent on Porphyry later, and Amelius earlier.[442] These\neditors might easily have exerted potent, even if unconscious or merely\nsuggestive influence; but we know that Porphyry did not scruple to add\nglosses of his own,[443] not to speak of hidden Stoic and Aristotelian\npieces,[444] for he relied on Aristotle's \"Metaphysics.\" Besides,\nPlotinos was so generally accused of pluming himself on writings of\nNumenius, falsely passed off as his own, that it became necessary\nfor Amelius to write a book on the differences between Numenius and\nPlotinos, and for Porphyry to defend his master, as well as to quote\na letter of Longinus on the subject;[445] but Porphyry does not deny\nthat among the writings of the Platonists Kronius, Caius, and Attikus,\nand the Peripatetics Aspasius, Alexander and Adrastus, the writings of\nNumenius also were used as texts in the school of Plotinos (14).\n\nHaving thus shown the influence of the editors of Plotinos, we must\nexamine who and what they were. Let us however first study the general\ntrend of the Plotinic career.\n\nHis last period was Stoic practise, for so zealously did he practise\nausterities that his death was, at least, hastened thereby.[446] It\nis unlikely that he would have followed Stoic precepts without some\nsympathy for, or acquaintance with their philosophical doctrines; and\nas we saw above, Porphyry acknowledges Plotinos's writings contain\nhidden Stoic pieces.[447] Then, Plotinos spent the last period of his\nlife in Rome, where ruled, in philosophical circles, the traditions of\nCicero, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.\n\nThat these Stoic practices became fatal to him is significant when\nwe remember that this occurred during the final absence of Porphyry,\nwho may, during his presence, have exerted a friendly restraint on\nthe zealous master. At any rate, it was during Porphyry's regime that\nthe chief works of Plotinos were written, including a bitter diatribe\nagainst the Gnostics, who remained the chief protagonists of dualism\nand belief in positive evil. Prophyry's work, \"De Abstinentia,\" proves\nclearly enough his Stoic sympathies.\n\nSuch aggressive enmity is too positive to be accounted for by the mere\nremoval to Rome from Alexandria, and suggests a break of some sort\nwith former friends. Indications of such a break do exist, namely,\nthe permanent departure to his earlier home, Apamea, of his former\neditor, Amelius. We hear[448] of an incident in which Amelius invited\nPlotinos to come and take part in the New Moon celebrations[449] of\nthe mysteries. Plotinos, however, refused, on the grounds that \"They\nmust come to me, not I go to them.\" Then we hear[450] of bad blood\nbetween this Amelius and Porphyry, a long, bitter controversy, patched\nup, indeed, but which cannot have failed to leave its mark. Then this\nAmelius writes a book on the Differences between Plotinos and Numenius,\nwhich, in a long letter, he inscribes to Porphyry,[451] as if the\nlatter were the chief one interested in these distinctions. Later,\nAmelius, who before this seems to have been the chief disciple and\neditor of Plotinos, departs, never to return, his place being taken by\nPorphyry. It is not necessary to possess a vivid imagination to read\nbetween the lines, especially when Plotinos, in the last work of this\nperiod, against the Gnostics, section 10, seems to refer to friends of\nhis who still held to other doctrines.\n\nNow in order to understand the nature of the period when Amelius was\nthe chief disciple of Plotinos, we must recall who Amelius was. In\nthe first place, he hailed from the home-town of Numenius, Apamea in\nSyria. He had adopted as son Hostilianus-Hesychius, who also hailed\nfrom Apamea. And it was to Apamea that Amelius withdrew, after he\nleft Plotinos. We are therefore not surprised to learn that he had\nwritten out almost all the books of Numenius, that he had gathered them\ntogether, and learned most of them by heart.[452] Then we learn from\nProclus (see Zeller's account) that Amelius taught the trine division\nof the divine creator, exactly as did Numenius. Is it any wonder, then,\nthat he wrote a book on the differences between Plotinos and Numenius\nat a later date, when Porphyry had started a polemic with him? During\nhis period as disciple of Plotinos, twenty-four years in duration,\nPlotinos would naturally have been under Numenian influence of some\nkind, and we cannot be very far wrong in thinking that this change of\neditors must have left some sort of impress on the dreamy thinker,\nPlotinos, ever seeking to experience an ecstasy.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn this account of the matter we have restrained ourselves from\nmentioning one of the strangest coincidences in literature, which would\nhave emphasized the nature of the break of Amelius with Plotinos, for\nthe reason that it may be no more than a chance pun; but that even as\nsuch it must have been present to the actors in that drama, there is no\ndoubt. We read above that Amelius invited Plotinos to accompany him to\nattend personally the mystery-celebrations at the \"noum\u00eania,\" a time\nsacred to such celebrations.[453] But this was practically the name of\nNumenius, and the text might well have been translated that Amelius\ninvited him to visit the celebrations as Numenius would have done; and\nindeed, from all we know of Numenius, with his initiation at Eleusis\nand in Egypt, that is just of what we might have supposed he would have\napproved. In other words, we would discover Amelius in the painful act\nof choice between the two great influences of his life, Numenius, and\nPlotinos. Moreover, that the incident was important is revealed by\nPorphyry's calling Plotinos's answer a \"great word,\" which was much\ncommented on, and long remembered.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn thus dividing the career of Plotinos in the Amelian, the Porphyrian,\nand Eustochian (98) we meet however one very interesting difficulty.\nThe Plotinic writings by Porphyry assigned to the last or Eustochian\nperiod are those which internal criticism would lead us to assign to\nhis very earliest philosophising; and in our study of the development\nof the Plotinic views about Matter, we have taken the liberty of\nconsidering them as the earliest. We are however consoled in our\nregret at having to be so radical, by noticing that Porphyry, to whom\nwe are indebted for our knowledge of the periods of the works, has\ndone the same thing. He says that he has assigned the earliest place\nin each Ennead to the easier and simpler discussions;[454] yet these\nlatest-issued works of Plotinos are assigned to the very beginning of\neach Ennead, four going to the First Ennead, one to the Second, three\nto the Third, and one only to the Fifth. If these had been the crowning\nworks of the Master's life, especially the treatise on the First God\nand Happiness, it would have been by him placed at the very end of\nall, and not at the beginning. Porphyry must therefore have possessed\nsome external knowledge which would agree with the conclusions of our\ninternal criticism, which follows.\n\nThese Eustochian works make the least use of Stoic, or even\nAristotelian terms, most closely following even the actual words of\nNumenius. For instance, we may glance at the very first book of the\nFirst Ennead, which though of the latest period, is thoroughly Numenian.\n\nThe first important point is the First Divinity \"hovering over\"\nBeing,[455] using the same word as Numenius.[456] This was suggested by\nProf. Thedinga. However, he applied the words \"he says\" to Numenius;\nbut this cannot be the case, as a Platonic quotation immediately.\n\nThe whole subject of the Book is the composite soul, and this is\nthoroughly Numenian.[457]\n\nThen we have the giving without return.[458]\n\nThen we find the pilot-simile as illustration for the relation of soul\nto body,[459] although in Numenius it appears of the Logos and the\nworld.\n\nWe find the animal divided in two souls, the irrational and the\nrational,[460] which reminds us of Numenius's division into two\nsouls.[461]\n\nThe soul consists of a peculiar kind of motion, which however is\nentirely different from that of other bodies, which is its own\nlife.[462] This reminds us of Numenius's still-standing of the Supreme,\nwhich however is simultaneously innate motion.[463]\n\nReferring to the problem, discussed elsewhere, that these Plotinic\nworks of the latest or Eustochian period, are the most Numenian, which\nwe would be most likely to attribute to his early or formative stage,\nrather than to the last or perfected period, it is interesting to\nnotice that these works seem to imply other works of the Amelian or\nPorphyrian periods, by the words,[464] \"It has been said,\" or treated\nof, referring evidently to several passages.[465] Still this need not\nnecessarily refer to this later work, it may even refer to Plato, or\neven to Numenius's allegory of the Cave of the Nymphs,[470] where the\ndescent of the souls is most definitely studied. Or it might even refer\nto Num. 35a, where birth or genesis is referred to as the wetting of\nthe souls in the matter of bodies.\n\nMoreover, they contain an acknowledgment, and a study of positive evil,\nsomething which would be very unlikely after his elaborate explaining\naway of evil in his treatise against the Gnostics, of the Porphyrian\nperiod, and his last treatment of Matter, where he is even willing to\ngrant the possibility of matter possessing Being. The natural process\nfor any thinker must ever be to begin with comparative imitation of his\nmaster, and then to progress to independent treatment of the subject.\nBut for the process to be reversed is hardly likely.\n\nMoreover, when we examine these Eustochian works in detail, they\nhardly seem to be such as would be the expressions of the last years\nof an ecstatic, suffering intense agony at times, his interest already\ndirected heavenwards. The discussion of astrology must date from the\nearliest association with Gnostics, in Alexandria, who also might have\ninspired or demanded a special treatment of the nature of evil, which\nlater he consistently denied. Then there is an amateurish treatment of\nanthropology in general, which the cumulatively-arranging Porphyry puts\nat the very beginning of the First Book. The treatise on the First Good\nand Happiness, is not unlike a beginner's first attempt at writing out\nhis body of divinity, as George Herbert said, and Porphyry also puts it\nat the beginning. The Eros-article is only an amplification of Platonic\nmyths, indeed making subtler distinctions, still not rising to the\nheights of pure, subjective speculation.\n\nThese general considerations may be supplemented by a few more definite\nindications. It is in the Eros-article that we find the Platonic\nmyth of Poros and Penia. Yet these reappear in the earliest Amelian\ntreatment of matter (ii. 4), as a sort of echo, mentioned only by the\nway, as if they had been earlier thoroughly threshed out. Here also we\nfind only a stray, incidental use of the term \"hypostasis,\" whereas the\nStoic language in other Amelian and Porphyrian treatises has already\nbeen pointed out.\n\nWe are therefore driven to the following, very human and natural\nconclusion. Plotinos's first attempts at philosophical writing had\nconsisted of chiefly Numenian disquisitions, which would be natural in\nAlexandria, where Numenius had probably resided, and had left friends\nand successors among the Gnostics. When Plotinos went to Rome, he\ntook these writings with him, but was too absorbed in new original\nAmelian treatises to resurrect his youthful Numenian attempts, which he\nprobably did not value highly, as being the least original, and because\nthey taught doctrines he had left behind in his Aristotelian and Stoic\nprogress. He laid them aside. Only when Porphyry had left him, and he\nfelt the increasing feebleness due to old age and Stoic austerities,\ndid his attendant Eustochius urge him to preserve these early works.\nPlotinos was willing, and sent them to Sicily where Porphyry had\nretired. And so it happened with Plotinos, as it has happened with many\nanother writer, that the last things became first, and the first became\nlast.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe idea of classifying the works of Plotinos chronologically,\ntherefore, has so much external proof, as well as internal indications,\nto support it, that, no doubt, in the future no reference will be\nmade to Plotinos without specifying to which period it refers; and we\nmay expect that future editions of his works will undo the grievous\nconfusion introduced by Porphyry, and thus render Plotinos's works\ncomparatively accessible to rational study.\n\nThere are besides many other minor proofs of the chronological order\nof the writings of Plotinos, most of which are noticed at the heading\nof each succeeding book; but the most startling human references are\nthose to Amelius's departure as a false friend;[466] to Porphyry's\ndesire to suicide at his departure,[467] and to his own impending\ndissolution,[468] each of these occurring at the exact time of the\nevent chronologically, but certainly not according to the traditional\norder.\n\n\n\n\nII. PLATONISM: SIGNIFICANCE, PROGRESS AND RESULTS.\n\n\nOf all fetishes which have misled humanity, perhaps none is responsible\nfor more error than that of originality. As if anything could be new\nthat was true, or true that was new! The only possible lines along\nwhich novelty or progress can lie are our reports, combinations, and\nexpressions. Some people think they have done for a poet if they have\nshown that he made use of suitable materials in the construction of\nhis poem! So Shakespeare has been shown to have used whole scenes from\nearlier writers. So Virgil, by Macrobius, has been shown to have laid\nunder contribution every writer then known to be worth ransacking.\nDante has also been shown to have re-edited contemporary apocalypses.\nSo Homer, even, has been shown to re-tell stories gathered from many\nsources. The result is that people generally consider Shakespeare,\nVirgil, or Homer great in spite of their borrowings, when, on the\ncontrary, the statement should be that they were great because of their\nrootage in the best of their period. In other words, they are great not\nbecause of their own personality (which in many cases has dropped out\nof the ken of history), but because they more faithfully, completely,\nand harmoniously represent their periods than other now forgotten\nwriters. Therein alone lay their cosmic value, and their assurance of\nimmortality. They are the voices of their ages, and we are interested\nin the significance of their age, not in them personally.\n\nIt is from this standpoint that we must approach Plato. Of his\npersonality what details are known are of no soteriologic significance;\nand the reason why the world has not been able to get away from him,\nand probably never will, is that he sums up prior Greek philosophy in\nas coherent a form as is possible without doing too great Procrustean\nviolence to the elements in question. This means that Plato did not\nfuse them all into one absolutely, rigid, coherent, consistent system,\nin which case his utility would have been very much curtailed. The very\nform of his writings, the dialogue, left each element in the natural\nliving condition to survive on its merits, not as an authoritative\noracle, or Platonic pronunciamento, or creed.\n\nFor details, the reader is referred to Zeller's fuller account of\nthese pre-Platonic elements.[471] But we may summarize as follows:\nthe physical elements to which the Hylicists had in turn attributed\nfinality Plato united into Pythagorean matter, which remained as\nan element of Dualism. The world of nature became the becoming of\nHeraclitus. Above that he placed the Being of Parmenides, in which the\nconcepts of Socrates found place as ideas. These he identified with\nthe numbers and harmonies of Pythagoras, and united them in an Eleatic\nunity of many, as an intelligible world, or reason, which he owed to\nAnaxagoras. The chief idea, that of the Good, was Megaro-Socratic. His\ncosmology was that of Timaeus. His psychology was based on Anaxagoras,\nas mind; on Pythagoras, as immortal. His ethics are Socratic, his\npolitics are Pythagorean. Who therefore would flout Plato, has all\nearlier Greek philosophy to combat; and whoever recognizes the\nachievements of the Hellenic mind will find something to praise in\nPlato. When, therefore, we are studying Platonism, we are only studying\na blending of the rays of Greece, and we are chiefly interested in\nGreece as one of the latest, clearest, and most kindred expressions of\nhuman thought.\n\nIf however we should seek some one special Platonic element, it\nwould be that genuineness of reflection, that sincerity of thought,\nthat makes of his dialogues no cut and dried literary figments, but\nsoul-tragedies, with living, breathing, interest and emotion. Plato\nthus practised his doctrine of the double self,[472] the higher and\nthe lower selves, of which the higher might be described as \"superior\nto oneself.\" In his later period, that of the Laws, he applied this\ndouble psychology to cosmology, thereby producing doubleness in\nthe world-Soul: besides the good one, appears the evil one, which\nintroduces even into heaven things that are not good.\n\nIt was only a step from this to the logical deduction of Xenocrates\nthat these things in heaven were \"spirits\" or \"guardians,\" both good\nand evil, assisting in the administration of human affairs.[473] Such\nis the result of doubleness introduced into anthropology; introduced\ninto cosmology, it establishes Pythagorean indefinite duality as the\nprinciple opposing the unity of goodness.\n\nThe next step was taken by Plutarch. The evil demons, had, in Stoic\nphraseology, been called \"physical;\" and so, in regard to matter,\nthey came to stand in the relation of soul to body. Original matter,\ntherefore, became two-fold; matter itself, and its moving principle,\n\"the soul of matter.\" This was identified with the worse World-soul\nby a development, or historical event, which was the ordering of the\ncosmos, or, creation.\n\nThis then was the state of affairs at the advent of Numenius.\nAlthough his chief interest lay in practical comparative religion, he\ntried, philosophically, to return to a mythical \"original\" Platonism\nor Pythagoreanism. What Plato did for earlier Greek speculation,\nNumenius did for post-Platonic development. He harked back to\nthe latter Platonic stage, which taught the evil world-Soul. He\nincluded the achievements of Plutarch, the \"soul of matter,\" and the\ntrine division of a separate principle, such as Providence. To the\nachievement of Xenocrates he was drawn by two powerful interests, the\nEgyptian, Hermetic, Serapistic, in connection with the evil demons;\nand the Pythagorean, in connection with the Indefinite-duality. Thus\nNumenius's History of the Platonic Succession is not a delusion;\nNumenius really did sum up the positive Platonic progress, not\nomitting even Maximus of Tyre's philosophical hierarchic explanation\nof the emanative or participative streaming forth of the Divine. But\nNumenius was not merely a philosopher: of this gathering of Platonic\nachievements he made a religion. In this he was also following the\nfootsteps of Pythagoras, who limited his doctrines to a group of\nstudents. But Numenius did not merely copy Pythagoras. Numenius\nmodernized him, connecting up the Platonic doctrinal aggregate with\nthe mystery-rites current in his own day. Nor did Numenius shirk any\nunpleasant responsibilities of a restorer of Platonism: he continued\nthe traditional Academico-Stoical feud. Strange to say, the last great\nStoic philosopher, Posidonius (A.D. 135-151) hailed from Numenius's\nhome-town, Apamea, so that this Stoic feud may have been forced on\nNumenius from home personalities or conditions. It would seem that in\nNumenius and Posidonius we have a re-enactment of the tragedy of Greek\nphilosophy on a Syrian theatre, where dogmatic Stoicism died, and\nPlatonism admitted Oriental ideas.\n\nApamea, however, had not yet ended its role in the development of\nthought. Numenius's pupil, Amelius, had gathered, copied, and learned\nby heart his master's works. It was in Apamea that he adopted as son\nHostilianius-Hesychius. After a twenty-four years' sojourn in Rome he\nreturned to Apamea, and was dwelling there still at the time of the\ndeath of Plotinos, with whom he had spent that quarter of a century.\nHere then we have a historical basis for a connection between Numenius\nand Plotinos, which we have elsewhere endeavored to demonstrate from\ninner grounds.\n\nIt was however by Amelius that philosophy is drawn into the maelstrom\nof the world-city. Plotinos, in his early periods a Numenian\nPlatonist, will later go over to Stoicism, and conduct a polemic\nwith the Gnostics, the Alexandrian heirs of Platonic dualism,\nunder the influence of the Stoic Porphyry. However, Plotinos will\nnot publicly abandon Platonism; he will fuse the two streams of\nthought, and interpret in Stoic terms the fundamentals of Platonism,\nproducing something which, when translated into Latin, he will leave\nas inheritance to all the ages. Not in vain, therefore, did Amelius\ntransport the torch of philosophy to the Capital.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nLet us in a few words dispose of the general outlines of the fate of\nthe Platonic movement.\n\nPlotinos was no religious leader; he was before everything else a\nphilosopher, even if he centred his efforts on the practical aspects\nof the ecstatic union with God. Indeed, Porphyry relates to us the\nincident in which this matter was objectively exemplified. At the\nNew Moon, Amelius invited him to join in a visit to the mystery\ncelebrations. Plotinos refused, saying that \"they would have to come to\nhim, not he go over to them.\" This then is the chief difference between\nNumenius and Plotinos, and the result would be a recrudescence of pure\nphilosophic contentions, as those of Plotinos against the Gnostics.\n\nAs to the general significance of Plotinos, we must here resume what we\nhave elsewhere detailed: that with the change of editors, from Amelius\nto Porphyry, Plotinos changed from Numenian or Pythagorean dualism\nto Stoic monism, in which the philosophic feud was no longer with the\nStoics, but with the Alexandrian descendants of Numenian dualism, the\nGnostics. Even though Plotinos showed practical religious aspects in\nhis studying and experiencing the ecstasy, there is no record of any of\nhis pupils being encouraged to do so, and therefore Plotinos remains\nchiefly a philosopher.\n\nThe successors of Plotinos could not remain on this purely philosophic\nstandpoint. Instead of practising the ecstasy, they followed the\nGnostics in theorizing about practical religious reality in their\ncosmology and theology, which took on, more or less, the shape of\nmagic, not inconsiderably aided by Stoic allegoric interpretations of\nmyths, as in Porphyry's \"Cave of the Nymphs.\"\n\nWhat Plato did for early Greek philosophy, what Numenius did for\npost-Platonic thought, that Proclus Diadochus, the \"Successor,\" did\nfor Plotinos and his followers. For the first time since Numenius we\nfind again a comparative method. By this time religion and philosophy\nhave fused in magic, and so, instead of a comparative religion, we have\na comparative philosophy. Proclus was the first genuine commentator,\nquoting authorities on all sides. He was sufficient of a philosopher\nto grasp Neoplatonism as a school of thought; and far from paying\nany attention to Ammonius, as recent philosophy has done, as source\nof Neoplatonism, he traces the movement as far as Plutarch, calling\nhim the \"father of us all,\" inasmuch as he introduced the conception\nof \"hypostasis.\" Evidently, Proclus looked upon this as the centre\nof Neoplatonic development, and therefore we shall be justified in a\ncloser study of this conception; and we may even say that its historic\ndestiny was a continuation of the main stream of creative Greek\nphilosophy; or, if you prefer, of Platonism, or Noumenianism, or even\nPlotinian thought.\n\nDid Greek philosophy die with Proclus? The political changes of the\ntime forced alteration of dialect and position; but the accumulations\nof mental achievements could not perish. This again we owe to Proclus.\nBesides being the first great commentator he precipitated his most\nvaluable achievements in logical form, in analytic arrangement, in\nthe form of crystal-clear propositions, theorems, demonstrations, and\ncorollaries. Such a highly abstract form was inevitable, inasmuch as\nNumenius had turned away from Aristotelian observation of nature. Just\nlike the Hebrew thinkers, who finally became commentators and abstract\ntheorizers, nothing else was left for a philosophy without connection\nwith experiment, when whittled down by the keenest intellects of the\ntimes.\n\nThis abstract method, still familiarly used by geometry, reappeared\namong the School-men, notably in Thomas Aquinas. Later it persisted\nwith Spinoza and Descartes. However, rising experimentalism has\ngradually terminated it, its last form appearing in Kant and Hegel.\nKant's \"Ding in sich,\" reached after abstracting all qualities, is only\na re-statement of Numenius and Plotinos's \"subject,\" or, definition of\nmatter; and Hegel's dialectic, beginning with Being and Not-being, more\ndefinitely proclaimed by Plotinos, goes as far back as the Eleatics\nand Heraclitus, not to mention Plato. However, Kant and Hegel are the\ngreat masters of modern thought; and although at one time the rising\ntide of materialism and cruder forms of evolution threatened to obscure\nit, Karl Pearson's \"Grammar of Science,\" generous as it is in invective\nagainst Kant and Hegel, in modern terms clinches Berkeley's and Kant's\ndemonstration of the reality of the super-sensual, thus vindicating\nPlotinos, and, before him, Numenius.\n\nIt must not be supposed that in thus tracing the springs of our modern\nthought we necessarily approve of all the thought of Plotinos, Numenius\nor Plato. On the contrary, they were far more likely to have committed\nlogical errors than we are, because they were hypnotized by the glamor\nof the terms they used, which to us are mere laboratory tools. The\nbest way to prove this will be to appraise at its logical value for us\nPlotinos's discussion of Matter, elsewhere studied in its value for us.\n\n\n\n\nIII. PLOTINOS'S VIEW OF MATTER.\n\n\nWe have elsewhere pointed out the hopelessness of escaping either\naspect of the problem of the One and the Many; and that the attempt\nof the Stoics to avoid the Platonic dualism by a materialistic monism\nwas merely a change of names, the substance of the dualism remaining\nas the opposition of the contraries, such as active and passive,\nmale and female, the predominant elements,[474] etc. Plotinos, in\nhis abandonment of Numenian dualism, and championing of Stoicism,\nundertaking the feud with the Gnostics, the successors of Numenius,\nmust therefore have inherited the same difficulties of thought, and we\nshall see how in spite of his mental agility he is caught in the same\ntraditional meshes, and that these irreducible difficulties occur in\neach one of his three periods of life, the Eustochian, the Amelian, and\nthe Porphyrian.\n\nIn the Amelian, he teaches two matters, the physical and the\nintelligible, by which device he seeks to avoid the difficulties of\ndualism, crediting to intelligible matter any necessary form of Being,\nthus pushing physical matter into the outer darkness of non-being.\nSo intelligible matter is still a form of Being, and we still hold\nto monism; as intelligible matter may participate in the good; while\nmatter physical remains evil, being a deprivation of good, not\npossessing it. This, of course is dualism; and he thus has a convenient\npun on the word matter, by which he can be monist or dualist, as\nthe fancy takes him, or as exigencies demand. This participation,\ntherefore, does not eliminate the dualism, while formally professing\nmonism. Therefore Plotinos tries to choose between monism and dualism\nby surreptitiously accepting both.\n\nIn the Porphyrian period, he rejected the idea of intelligible\nmatter.[475] Forced to fashion entirely new arguments, he seizes as\ntool the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality,\nor energy as dynamic accomplishment.[476] But no logical device can\nhelp a man to pull himself up by his boot-straps. If by Being you\nmean existence, then its opposite must be negative, and to speak of\nreal non-being, as something that shares being, is an evasion. To say\nthat matter remains non-being, while having the possibility of future\nBeing, which however can never be actualized, is mere juggling with\nwords. Even if matter is no more than a weak, confused image, it is\nnot non-being. If it is a positive lie, it is not non-being. To talk\nof a higher degree of Non-being, that is real non-being, is simply to\nconfuse the actuality intended with the thought of non-being, which\nof course is a thought as actually existing as any other. Moreover if\nmatter is imperishable, it cannot be non-being; and if it possesses\nBeing potentially, it certainly is not non-existence. The Aristotelian\npotentiality could help to create this evasion, but did not remove its\nreal nature; it merely supplied Plotinos with an intellectual device\nto characterize something that would not be actually existing as still\nhaving the possibility of existence; but this is not non-existence. In\nanother writing[477] of this period Plotinos continues his evasions\nabout the origin and nature of matter. First, he grants that it is\nsomething that is not original, being later than many earthly, and all\nintelligible objects; although, if he had returned to the conception\nof intelligible matter, he would have been at liberty to assert the\noriginality of the latter. Then he holds that Being is common to both\nform and matter, as to quality, but not as to quantity. Last, he\ncloses the paragraph by saying that perhaps form and matter do not come\nfrom the same origin, as there is a difference between them.\n\nIn Plotinos's third, or Eustochian period, the same evasions occur.\nFor instance[478] he limits Being to goodness. Then he acknowledges\nthe existence of evil things, and derives their evil quality from a\nprimary evil, the \"image of essence,\" the Being of evil. That he is\nconscious of having strained a point is evident from the fact that he\nadds the clause, \"if there can be a Being of evil.\" Likewise,[479]\nwhile discussing evil, which is generally recognized because in our\ndaily lives there is positive pain, and sensations of pain, he defines\nevil as lack of qualities. To say that evil is not such as to form,\nbut as to nature is opposite to form is nonsense, inasmuch as life is\nfull of positive evils, as Numenius brought out in 16, and Plotinos\nacknowledged even in spite of his polemic against the Gnostics.\n\nFinally Plotinos takes refuge in a miracle[480] as explanation of\n\"unparticipating participation.\" This is commentary enough; it shows\nhe realized the futility of any arguments. But Plotinos was not alone\nin despairing of establishing an ironclad system; before him Numenius\nhad, just as pathetically, despaired of a logical dualism, and he\nacknowledged in fragment 16 that Pythagoras's arguments, however true,\nwere \"wonderful and opposed to the belief of a majority of humanity.\"\n\nIn other words, monism is as unsatisfactory to reason as dualism. This\nwas the chief point of agreement between Pythagoras and the Stoics; and\nPragmatism has in modern times attempted to show a way out by a higher\nsanction of another kind.\n\nPerhaps the reader may be interested in a side-light on this subject.\nDrews is interested in Plotinos only because Plotinos's super-rational\ndivinity furnishes a historical foundation for Edouard Hartmann's\nphilosophy of the Unconscious. It would seem, however, to be a mistake\nto use the latter term, for it is true only as a doubtful corollary.\nIf the Supreme is super-conscious, it is possible to describe this\nlogically as unconscious. But generally, however, unconsciousness is a\nterm used to denote the sub-conscious, rather than the super-conscious,\nand the use of that term must inevitably entail misunderstandings. It\nwould be better then to follow Pragmatism into the super-conscious,\nrather than to sink with Hartmann into the sub-conscious. It was\ndirectly from Plotinos[481] that Hartmann took his expression \"beyond\ngood and evil.\"\n\nHaving watched Numenius, for Platonic dualism; and Plotinos for Stoic\nmonism, both appeal to a miracle as court of last resort, we may now\nreturn to that result of Platonism which has left the most vital\nimpress on our civilization, its conception of the divine.\n\n\n\n\nIV. PLOTINOS'S CREATION OF THE TRINITY.\n\n\nElsewhere we have seen how Numenius waged the traditional Academic feud\nwith the Stoics bravely, but uselessly, inasmuch as it was chiefly\na difference of dialects that separated them. In the course of this\nstruggle, Numenius had made certain distinctions within the divinity,\nwhich were followed by Amelius, but are difficult to trace in Plotinos\nbecause, as a matter of principle, Plotinos[482] was averse to thus\n\"dividing the divinity.\" Why so? Because he was waging a struggle\nwith the Gnostics, who had followed in the footsteps of the Hermetic\nwritings (with their Demiurge and Seven Governors); Philo Judaeus (with\nhis five Subordinate Powers); Numenius and Amelius (with their triply\ndivided First and Second gods);--after which we come to Basilides (with\nhis seven Powers); Saturninus (with his Seven Angels); and Valentinus\n(with his 33 Aeons).\n\nThis new feud between Plotinos and the Gnostics is however just as\nillusory as the earlier one between Numenius and the Stoics. It was\nmerely a matter of dialects. Plotinos indeed found fault with the\nGnostics for making divisions within the Divinity; but wherever he\nhimself is considering the divinity minutely, he, just as much as the\nGnostics, is compelled to draw distinctions, even though he avoided\nacknowledged divisions by borrowing from Plutarch a new, non-Platonic,\nnon-Numenian, but Aristotelian, Stoic (Cornutus and Sextus) and still\nAlexandrian (Philo, Septuagint, Lucian) term \"hypostasis.\"\n\nThe difference he pretended to find between the Gnostic distinctions\nwithin the Divinity and his new term hypostasis was that the former\nintroduced manifoldness into the divinity, by splitting Him,[483] thus\nallowing the influence of matter to pervade the pure realm of Being.\nHypostasis, on the contrary, wholly existed within the realm of pure\nBeing, and was no more than a trend, a direction, a characterization,\na function, a face, or orientation of activity of the unaffected unity\nof Being. Thus the divinity retained its unity, and still could be\nactive in several directions, without admixture of what philosophy had\ntill then recognized as constituting manifoldness. But reflection shows\nthat this is a mere quibble, an evasion, a paralogism, a quaternio\nterminorum, a pun. How it came about we shall attempt to show below.\n\nIn thus achieving a manifoldness in the divinity without divisions,\nPlotinos did indeed keep out of the divinity the splitting influence\nof matter, which it was now possible to banish to the realm of\nunreality, as a negation, and a lie. Monism was thus achieved ... but\nat the cost of two errors: denial of the common-sense reality of the\nphenomenal world,[484] and that quibble about three hypostases without\nmanifoldness, genuinely a \"distinction without a difference.\"\n\nThis intellectual dishonesty must not however be foisted on\nAristotle[485] or Plutarch. The latter, for instance,[486] adopted\nthis term only to denote the primary and original characteristics\n(or distinctions within) existing things, from a comparative study\nof Aristotle's \"de Anima,\" and Plato's \"Phaedo.\"[487] These five\nhypostases were the divinity, mind, soul, forms immanent in inorganic\nnature, \"hexis,\" in Stoic dialect, and to matter, as apart from these\nforms.\n\nSo important to Neoplatonism did this term seem to Proclus, that he\ndid not hesitate to say that Plutarch, by the use thereof, became \"our\nfirst forefather.\" He therefore develops it further. Among the hidden\nand intelligible gods are three hypostases. The first is characterized\nby the Good; it thinks the Good itself, and dwells with the paternal\nMonad. The second is characterized by knowledge, and resides in the\nfirst thought; while the third is characterized by beauty, and dwells\nwith the most beautiful of the intelligible. They are the causes from\nwhich proceed three monads which are self-existent but under the form\nof a unity, and as in a germ, in their cause. Where they manifest, they\ntake a distinct form: faith, truth, and love (Cousin's title: \"Du Vrai,\ndu Beau, et du Bien\"). This trinity pervades all the divine worlds.\n\nIn order to understand the attitude of Plotinos on the subject, we must\ntry to put ourselves in his position. In the first place, on Porphyry's\nown admission, he had added to Platonism Peripatetic and Stoic views.\nFrom Aristotle his chief borrowings were the categories of form and\nmatter, and the distinction between potentiality and actuality,[488]\nas well as the Aristotelian psychology of various souls. To the Stoics\nhe was drawn by their monism, which led him to drop the traditional\nAcademico-Stoic feud, or rather to take the side of the Stoics against\nNumenius the Platonist dualist and the dualistic successors, the\nGnostics. But there was a difference between the Stoics and Plotinos.\nThe Stoics assimilated spirit to matter, while Plotinos, reminiscent of\nPlato, preferred to assimilate matter to spirit. Still, he used their\nterminology, and categories, including the conception of a hypostasis,\nor form of existence. With this equipment, he held to the traditional\nPlatonic trinity of the \"Letters,\" the King, the intellect, and the\nsoul. Philosophically, however, he had received from Numenius the\ninheritance of a double name of the Divinity, Being and Essence. As a\nthinker, he was therefore forced to accommodate Numenius to Plato, and\nby adding to Numenius's name of the divinity, to complete Numenius's\ntheology by Numenius's own cosmology. This then he did by adding as\nthird hypostasis the Aristotelian dynamic energy.\n\nBut as Intellect is permanent, how can Energy arise therefrom? Here\nthis eternal puzzle is solved by distinguishing energy into indwelling\nand out-flowing. As indwelling, Energy constitutes Intellect; but its\nenergetic nature could not be demonstrated except by out-flowing, which\nproduces a distinction.\n\nSimilarly, there are two kinds of heat, that of the fire itself,\nand that emitted by the fire, so that the fire may remain itself\nwhile exerting its influence without. It is thus also there: in that\nit remains itself in its inmost being, and from its own inherent\nperfection, and energy, the developed energy assumes hypostasis, as\nif from a Dynamis that is great, nay, greatest; and so it joins the\nEssence and the Being. For that was beyond all Being, and that was the\nDynamis of all things, and already was all things. If then it is all,\nit must be above all; consequently also above Being. \"And if this is\nall, then the One is before all; not of an essence equal to all, and\nthis must be above Being, as this is above intellect; for there is\nsomething above intellect.\"[489]\n\nThis is the most definite statement of Plotinos's solution of the\nproblem; other references thereto are abundant. So we have a trinity of\nenergy, being and essence,[490] and each of us, like the world-Soul has\nan Eros which is essence and hypostasis.[491] Reason is a hypostasis\nafter the nous, and Aphrodite gains an hypostasis in the Ousia.[492]\nThe One is intellect, the intelligible, and ousia; or, energy, being,\nand the intelligible (essence).[493] The soul is activity.[494] The\nsoul is the third God,[495] we are the third rank proceeding from the\nupper undivided Nature,[496] the whole being God, nous, and essence.\nThe Nous is activity, and the First essence. There are three stages of\nthe Good: the King, the nous, and the soul.[497] We find energy,[498]\nthinking and being, then[499] the soul, the nous, and the One. We find\nProvidence threefold (as in Plutarch)[500] and three ranks of Gods,\ndemons and world-life.[501] Elsewhere, untheologically, or, rather,\nmerely philosophically, he speaks of the hypostasis of wisdom.[502]\n\nChaignet's summary of this is[503] that[504] Plotinos holds that every\nforce in the intelligible is both Being and Substance simultaneously;\nand reciprocally that no Being, could be conceived without hypostasis,\nor directed force. Again,[505] the world, the universe of things,\ncontains three natures or divine hypostases, soul, mind and unity;\nwhich indeed are found in our own nature, and of which the divinest is\nunity or divinity.\n\nLet us now try to understand the matter. Why should the word\nhypostasis, which unquestionably in earlier times meant \"substance,\"\nhave later come to mean \"distinctions\" within the divinity? For\n\"substance,\" on the contrary, represents to our mind an unity, the\nunderlying unity, and not individual forms of existence. How did the\nchange occur?\n\nNow Plotinos, as we remember, found fault with the Gnostics in that\nthey taught distinctions within the divinity.[506] He would therefore\nbe disposed to remove from within the divinity those distinctions of\nPlotinic, Plutarchian, Numenian, or Gnostic theology; although he\nhimself in early times did not scruple to speak of a hypostasis of\nwisdom, or of Eros, or other matter he might be considering. Such terms\nof Numenius or Amelius as he seems to ignore are the various Demiurges;\nthe three Plutarchian Providences he himself still uses. Still, all\nthese terms he would be disposed to eradicate from within the divinity.\n\nAs a constructive metaphysician, however, he could not well get along\nwithout some titles for the different phases of the divinity; and even\nif he dispensed with the old names, there would still remain as their\nunderlying support the reality or substance of the distinction. So he\nremoved the offensive, aggressive, historically known and recognized\nterms, while leaving their underlying substances, or supports. Now\n\"substance\" had become \"substances,\" and to differentiate these it was\nnecessary to interpret them as differing forms of existence. The change\nwas most definitely made by Athanasius, who at a synod in Alexandria,\nin A.D. 362,[507] fastened on the church, as synonymous with hypostasis\nthe popular term \"prosopon\" or \"face.\" That this was an innovation\nappears from the fact that the Nicene Council had stated that it\nwas heretical to say that Christ was of a hypostasis different from\nthat of the Father, in which case the word evidently meant still the\noriginal underlying (singular) substance. With this official definition\nin vogue, the original (singular) substance became forgotten, and it\nbecame possible to speak in the plural, of three faces, as indeed\nPlotinos had done.\n\nIn other words, so necessary were distinctions in the divinity,\nthat the popular mind supplied other individual names to designate\nthe distinctions Plotinos had successfully banished, for Demiurges\nand Providences no longer return. Thus more manifold differences\nre-entered into the divinity, than Plotinos had ever emptied out of\nit, although under a name which the poverty of the Latin language\nrendered as \"persons,\" which represents to us individual consciousness\nof a far more distinctive kind than was ever implied in three phases\nof Providence, or of the Demiurge. Thus the translation into Latin\nclinched the illicit linguistic process, and the result of Plotinos's\nattempt to distinguish in the Divinity phases so subtle as not to\ndemand or allow of manifoldness, resulted in the most pronounced\ndifferences of personality. This was finally clinched by Plotinos's\nillustration of the three faces around a single head,[508] which\nestablished the idea of three \"persons\" (masks, from \"per-sonare\") in\none God.\n\nNot only in the abstract realm of Metaphysics, therefore, is the world\nindebted to Greek thought; but even in the realm of religion a Stoic\nreinterpretation of Platonism, itself reinterpreted in a different\nlanguage has given a lasting inheritance to the spiritual aspirations\nof the ages.\n\n\n\n\nV. RESEMBLANCES TO CHRISTIANITY.\n\n\nTRINITARIAN SIGNIFICANCE OF PLOTINOS.\n\nPlotinos's date being about A.D. 262, he stands midway between the\nChristian writings of the New Testament, and the Council of Nicaea,\nA.D. 325. As a philosopher dealing with the kindred topics--the soul\nand its salvation,--and deriving terminology and inspiration from\nthe same sources, Platonism and Stoicism, we would expect extensive\nparallelism and correspondence. Though Plotinos does not mention any\ncontemporaneous writings, we will surely be able to detect indirect\nreferences to Old and New Testaments. But what will be of most\nvital interest will be his anticipations of Nicene formulations, or\nreflection of current expressions of Christian philosophic comment.\nWhile we cannot positively assert this Christian development was\nexclusively Plotinian, we are justified in saying that the development\nof Christian philosophy was not due exclusively to the Alexandrian\ncatechetical school; that what later appears as Christian theology was\nonly earlier current Neoplatonic metaphysics, without any exclusive\ndogmatic connection with the distinctively Christian biography. This\navoids the flat assertion of Drews that the Christian doctrine of\nthe Trinity was dependent on Plotinos, although it admits Bouillet's\nmore cautious statement that Plotinos was the rationalizer of the\ndoctrine of the Trinity.[509] This much is certain, that no other\ncontemporaneous discussion of the trinity has survived, if any ever\nexisted; and we must remember that it was not until the council of\nConstantinople in A.D. 381, that the Nicene Creed, by the addition of\nthe Filioque clause, became trinitarian in a thoroughgoing way; and\nnot until fifty years later that Augustine, again in the West, fully\nexpressed a philosophy and psychology of the trinity.\n\nTo Plotinos therefore is due the historical position of protagonist of\ntrinitarian philosophy.\n\n\nNON-CHRISTIAN ORIGIN OF PARALELLISMS TO CHRISTIANITY.\n\nChristian parallelisms in Plotinos have a historical origin in\nChristian parallelisms in his sources, namely, Stoicism, Numenius and\nPlato.\n\nTo Christian origins in Plato never has justice been done, not even by\nBigg. His suggestion of the crucifixion of the just man, his reference\nto the son of God are only common-places, to which should be added many\nminor references.\n\nThe Christian origins in Numenius are quite explicit; mention of the\nHebrews as among the races whose scriptures are important, of Moses\namong the great religious teachers, of the Spirit hovering over the\nwaters, of the names of the Egyptian magicians which, together with\nPliny, he hands down to posterity. He also was said to have told many\nstories about Jesus, in an allegorical manner.\n\nThe Christian origins in Stoicism have been widely discussed;\nfor instance, by Chaignet. But it is likely that this influence\naffected Christianity indirectly through Plotinos, along with the\nother Christian ideas we shall later find. At any rate Plotinos is\nthe philosopher who uses the term \"spiritual body\" most like the\nChristians.[510] The soul is a slave to the body,[511] and has a\ncelestial body[512] as well as a spiritual body.[513] Within us are two\nmen opposing each other,[514] the better part often being mastered by\nthe worse part, as thought St. Paul,[515] in the struggle between the\ninner and outer man.[516]\n\nWith Plotinos the idea of \"procession\" is not only cosmic but\npsychological. In other words, when Plotinos speaks of the \"procession\"\nof the God-head, he is not, as in Christian doctrine, depicting\nsomething unique, which has no connection with the world. He is only\nreferring to the cosmic aspect of an evolution which, in the soul,\nappears as educational development.[517] As the opposite of the soul's\nprocession upwards, there is the soul's descent into hell,[518] or, in\nother words, the soul's descent and ascension.[519] This double aspect\nof man's fate upward or downward is referred to by Plotinos in the\nregular Christian term \"sin,\" as consisting in missing one's aim.[520]\nThe soul repents,[521] and its duty is conversion.[522] As a result of\nthis conversion comes forgiveness.[523]\n\n\nOLD TESTAMENT REFERENCES.\n\nThe famous \"terrors of Jeremiah\"[524] might have come mediately\nthrough the Gnostics, who indeed may have been the persons referred\nto as Christians.[525] More direct no doubt was God admiring his\nhandiwork[526] and the soul breathing the spirit of life into\nanimals.[527] God is called both the \"I am what I am\"[528] and \"He is\nwhat He ought to be.\"[528] He sits above the world,[529] as the king of\nkings.[530]\n\n\nNEW TESTAMENT REFERENCES.\n\nPlotinos says that it would be a poor artist who would conceive of\nan animal as all covered with eyes. There is hardly such a reference\noutside of Revelations,[531] to which we must also look for a new\nheaven and a new earth.[532] Then we have practically a quotation of\nthe Johannine prologue \"In the beginning was the Logos,\" and by him\nwere all things made.[533] Light was in the beginning.[534] We are told\nnot to leave the world, but not to be of it.[535] The divinity prepares\nmansions in heaven for good souls.[536]\n\nPauline references seem to be that sin exists because of the law.[537]\nGod is above all height or depth.[538] The vulgar who attend\nmystery-banquets only to gorge are condemned.[539] There are several\nheavens.[540] The beggarly principles and elements towards which some\nturn, are mentioned.[541] The genealogies of the Gnostics are held up\nto ridicule.[542] General references are numerous. Diseases are caused\nby evil spirits.[543] We must cut off any offending member.[544] Thus\nwe are saved.[545] In him we breathe and move and have our being.[546]\nThe higher divinity begets a Son, one among many brethren.[547] As the\nfather of intelligence, God is the father of lights.[548]\n\nHowever, the most interesting incident is that scriptural text which,\nto the reflecting, is always so much of a puzzle: \"If the light that\nis in them be darkness,\" etc.[549] This is explained by the Platonic\ntheory[550] that we see because of a special light that is within the\neye.\n\n\nTHEOLOGICAL REFERENCES.\n\nGeneral theological references may be grouped under three heads: the\nsoul's salvation, the procession of the divinity, and the trinity.\n\nAs to the soul's salvation, God is the opposite of the evil of\nbeings,[551] which, when created in honor of the divinity[552] is the\nimage of the Word, the interpreter of the One,[553] and is composed of\nseveral elements;[554] but it is a fall from God,[555] and its fate is\nconnected with the \"parousia.\"[556]\n\nThis going forth of the soul from God, when considered cosmically,\nbecomes the \"procession of the soul.\"[557] This is the \"eternal\ngeneration,\"[558] whereby the Son is begotten from eternity,[559] so\nthat there could be no (Arian) \"\u00ean hote ouk \u00ean,\" or, \"time when he was\nnot.\"[560] This is expressed as \"light of light,\"[561] and explained by\nthe Athanasian light and ray simile.[562] We find even the Johannine\nand Philonic distinction between God and the Good.[563] The world is\nthe first-begotten,[564] and the Intelligence is the logos of the first\nGod,[565] as the hypostasis of wisdom is \"ousia,\" or \"being,\"[566] and\nit is the \"universal reason.\"[567]\n\nAs to the trinity, Plotinos is the first and chief rationalizer\nof the cosmic trinity, which he continuously and at length\ndiscusses.[568] God is father and son,[569] and they are \"homoousian,\"\nor \"consubstantial.\"[570] The human soul (as image of the cosmic\ndivinity), is one nature in three powers.[571] Elsewhere we have\ndiscussed the history of the term \"persons,\" but we may understand the\nresult of that process best by Plotinos's simile of the trinity as\none head with three faces,[572] in which the \"persons\" bear out their\noriginal meaning of masks, \"personare.\" Henceforward the trinity was an\nobjective idea.\n\n\nNOTE\n\nAlthough mentioned above, special attention should be given to the\nparable of the vine and the branches (iii. 3.7.--48, 1088 with Jno.\nxv. 1-8), and the divinity's begetting a Son (v. 8.12--31, 571). The\nsignificant aspect of this is that it is represented as being the\ncontent of the supreme ecstatic vision; what you might call the crown\nof Plotinos' message. \"He tells us that he has seen the divinity\nbeget an offspring of an incomparable beauty, producing everything\nin Himself, and without pain preserving within Himself what He has\nbegotten.... His Son has manifested Himself externally. By Him, as by\nan image (Col. i. 15), you may judge of the greatness of His Father ...\nenjoying the privilege of being the image of His eternity.\"\n\n\nVII. PLOTINOS'S INDEBTEDNESS TO NUMENIUS.\n\n\n1. HISTORICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NUMENIUS AND PLOTINOS.\n\nWe have, elsewhere, pointed out the historic connections between\nNumenius and Plotinos. Here, it may be sufficient to recall that\nAmelius, native of Numenius's home-town of Apamea, and who had\ncopied and learned by heart all the works of Numenius, and who later\nreturned to Apamea to spend his declining days, bequeathing his copy\nof Numenius's works to his adopted son Gentilianus Hesychius, was the\ncompanion and friend of Plotinos during his earliest period, editing\nall Plotinos's books, until displaced by Porphyry. We remember also\nthat Porphyry was Amelius's disciple, before his spectacular quarrel\nwith Amelius, later supplanting him as editor of the works of Plotinos.\nPlotinos also came from Alexandria, where Numenius had been carefully\nstudied and quoted by Origen and Clement of Alexandria. Further,\nPorphyry records twice that accusations were popularly made against\nPlotinos, that he had plagiarized from Numenius. In view of all this\nhistorical background, we have the prima-facie right to consider\nPlotinos chiefly as a later re-stater of the views of Numenius, at\nleast during his earlier or Amelian period. Such a conception of the\nstate of affairs must have been in the mind of that monk who, in the\nEscoreal manuscript, substituted the name of Numenius for that of\nPlotinos on that fragment[573] about matter, which begins directly\nwith Numenius's name of the divinity, \"being and essence.\"[574]\n\n\n2. NUMENIUS AS FATHER OF NEO-PLATONISM.\n\nLet us compare with this historical evidence, that which supports the\nuniversally admitted dependence of Plotinos on his teacher Ammonius.\nWe have only two witnesses: Hierocles and Nemesius; and the latter\nattributes the argument for the immateriality of the soul to Ammonius\nand Numenius jointly. No doubt, Ammonius may have taught Plotinos in\nhis youth; but so no doubt did other teachers; and of Ammonius the only\nsurvivals are a few pages preserved by Nemesius. The testimony for\nPlotinos's dependence on Numenius is therefore much more historical, as\nwell as significant, in view of Numenius having left written records\nthat were widely quoted. The title of \"Father of Neo-platonism,\"\ntherefore, if it must at all be awarded, should go to Numenius, who had\nwritten a \"History of the Platonic Succession,\" wherein he attempts\nto restore \"original\" Platonism. This fits the title \"Neo-platonism,\"\nwhereas the philosophy of Ammonius, would be better described as an\neclectic synthesis of Platonism and Aristotelianism.\n\n\n3. CONTRAST BETWEEN THEM.\n\nOf course we shall admit that there are differences between Plotinos\nand Numenius, at least during his Porphyrian period; this was\ninevitable while dismissing his Numenian secretary Amelius,[575] a\nfriend \"who had become imbued with\" such doctrines before becoming the\nfriend of Plotinos, who persevered in them, and wrote in justification\nthereof. We find that the book chronologically preceding this one is v.\n5, on the very subject at issue between Amelius and Porphyry. Plotinos\ntook his stand with the latter, and therefore against the former,\nand through him, against Numenius; and indeed we find him opposing\nseveral Gnostic opinions which can be substantiated in Numenius: the\ncreation by illumination or emanation,[576] the threefoldness of the\ncreator,[577] and the pilot's forgetting himself in his work.[578]\n\nBut, after all, these points are not as important as they might seem;\nfor in a very little while we find Plotinos himself admitting the\nsubstance of all of these ideas, except the verbiage; he himself\nuses the light and ray simile, the \"light of light;\"[579] he himself\ndistinguishes various phases of the allegedly single intelligence,[580]\nand the soul, as pilot of the body incarnates by the very forgetfulness\nby which the creator created.[581]\n\nFurther, as we shall show, during his last or Eustochian period after\nPorphyry had taken a trip to Sicily to avoid suicide, he himself was\nto return to Numenian standpoints. This may be shown in a general way\nas follows. Of the nine Eustochian essays[582] only two[583] betray no\nsimilarities to Numenian ideas, while seven[584] do. On the contrary,\nin the Amelio-Porphyrian period,[585] written immediately on Amelius's\ndismissal, only six[586] are Numenian, and six[587] are non-Numenian.\nIn the succeeding wholly Porphyrian period,[588] we have the same equal\nnumber of Numenian[589] and non-Numenian[590] books. An explanation of\nthis reversion to Numenian ideas has been attempted in the study of the\ndevelopment in Plotinos's views. On the whole, therefore, Plotinos's\nopposition to Numenius may be considered no more than episodic.\n\n\n4. DIRECT INDEBTEDNESS OF PLOTINOS TO NUMENIUS.\n\nAs Plotinos was in the habit of not even putting his name to his own\nnotes; as even in the times of Porphyry the actual authorship of much\nthat he wrote was already disputed; as even Porphyry acknowledges\nprinciples and quotations were borrowed, we must discover Numenian\npassages by their content, rather than by any external indications.\nAs the great majority of Numenius's works are irretrievably lost,\nwe may never hope to arrive at a final solution of the matter; and\nwe shall have to restrict ourselves to that which, in Plotinos, may\nbe identified by what Numenian fragments remain. What little we can\nthus trace definitely will give us a right to draw the conclusion\nto much more, and to the opinion that, especially in his Amelian\nperiod, Plotinos was chiefly indebted to Numenian inspiration. We\ncan consider[591] the mention of Pythagoreans who had treated of the\nintelligible as applying to Numenius, whose chief work was \"On the\nGood,\" and on the \"Immateriality of the Soul.\"\n\nThe first class of passages will be such as bear explicit reference to\nquotation from an ancient source. Of such we have five: \"That is why\nthe Pythagoreans were, among each other, accustomed to refer to this\nprinciple in a symbolic manner, calling him 'A-pollo,' which name means\na denial of manifoldness.\"[592] \"That is the reason of the saying, 'The\nideas and numbers are born from the indefinite doubleness, and the\nOne;' for this is intelligence.\"[593] \"That is why the ancients said\nthat ideas are essences and beings.\"[594] \"Let us examine the (general)\nview that evils cannot be destroyed, but are necessary.\"[595] \"The\nDivinity is above being.\"[596]\n\nA sixth case is, \"How manifoldness is derived from the First.\"[597]\nA seventh case is the whole passage on the triunity of the divinity,\nincluding the term \"Father.\"[598]\n\nAmong doctrines said to be handed down from the ancient\nphilosophers[599] are the ascents and descents of souls[600] and the\nmigrations of souls into bodies other than human.[601] The soul is a\nnumber.[602]\n\nMoreover, Plotinos wrote a book on the Incorruptibility of the\nsoul,[603] as Numenius had done;[604] and both authors discuss the\nincorporeity of qualities.[605]\n\nBesides these passages where there is a definite expression of\ndependence on earlier sources, there are two in which the verbal\nsimilarity[606] is striking enough to justify their being considered\nreferences: \"Besides, no body could subsist without the power of the\nuniversal Soul.\" \"Because bodies, according to their own nature,\nare changeable, inconstant, and infinitely divisible, and nothing\nunchangeable remains in them, there is evidently need of a principle\nthat would lead them, gather them, and bind them fast together; and\nthis we name soul.\"[607] This similarity is so striking that it had\nalready been observed and noted by Bouillet. Compare \"We consider that\nall things called essences are composite, and that not a single one\nof them is simple,\" with \"Numenius, who believes that everything is\nthoroughly mingled together, and that nothing is simple.\"[608]\n\n\n5. UNCERTAIN INDEBTEDNESS OF PLOTINOS.\n\nAs Plotinos does not give exact quotations and references, it is\ndifficult always to give their undoubted source. As probably Platonic\nwe may mention the passage about the universal Soul taking care of all\nthat is inanimate;[609] and \"When one has arrived at individuals, they\nmust be abandoned to infinity.\"[610] Also other quotations.[611] The\nline \"It might be said that virtues are actualizations,\"[612] might\nbe Aristotelian. We also find:[613] \"Thus, according to the ancient\nmaxim, 'Courage, temperance, all the virtues, even prudence, are but\npurifications.'\" \"That is the reason that it is right to say that\nthe 'soul's welfare and beauty lie in assimilating herself to the\ndivinity.'\" This sounds Platonic, but might be Numenian.\n\nIn this connection it might not be uninteresting to note passages\nin Numenius which are attributed to Plato, but which are not to be\nidentified: \"O Men, the Mind which you dimly perceive is not the\nFirst Mind; but before this Mind is another one, which is older and\ndiviner.\" \"That the Good is One.\"[614]\n\nWe turn now to thoughts found identically in Plotinos and Numenius,\nalthough no textual identity is to be noted. We may group these\naccording to the subject, the universe, and the soul.\n\n\n6. PARTICULAR SIMILARITIES.\n\nGod is supreme king.[615] Eternity is now, but neither past nor\nfuture.[616] The King in heaven is surrounded by leisure.[617] The Good\nis above Being;[618] the divinity is the unity above the \"Being and\nEssence;[619] and connected with this is the unitary interpretation\nof the name A-pollo,[620] following in the footsteps of Plutarch.\nNevertheless, the inferior divinity traverses the heavens,[621] in\na circular motion.[622] While Numenius does not specify this motion\nas circular,[623] it is implied, inasmuch as the creator's passing\nthrough the heavens must have followed their circular course. With\nthis perfect motion is connected the peculiar Numenian doctrine of\ninexhaustible giving,[624] which gave a philosophical basis for the old\nsimile of radiation of light,[625] so that irradiation is the method\nof creation,[626] and this is not far removed from emanationism. This\nprocess consists of the descent of the intelligible into the material,\nor, as Numenius puts it, that both the intelligible and the perceptible\nparticipate in the ideas.[627] Thus intelligence is the uniting\nprinciple that holds together the bodies whose tendency is to split\nup, and scatter,[628] making a leakage or waste,[629] which process\ninvades even the divinity.[630] This uniting of scattering elements\nproduces a mixture or mingling,[608] of matter and reason,[631] which,\nhowever, is limited to the energies of the existent, not to the\nexistent itself.[632] All things are in a flow,[633] and the whole all\nis in all.[634] The divinity creates by glancing at the intelligence\nabove,[635] as a pilot.[636] The divinity is split by over-attention to\nits charges.[637]\n\nThis leads us over to consideration of the soul. The chief effort\nof Numenius is a polemic against the materialism of the Stoics,\nand to it Plotinos devotes a whole book.[638] All souls, even the\nlowest, are immortal.[639] Even qualities are incorporeal.[640]\nThe soul, therefore, remains incorporeal.[641] The soul, however,\nis divisible.[642] This explains the report that Numenius taught\nnot various parts of the soul,[643] but two souls, which would be\nopposed by Plotinos in his polemic against the Stoics,[644] but\ntaught in another place.[645] Such divisibility is indeed implied\nin the formation of presentation as a by-product,[646] or a \"common\npart.\"[647] Moreover, the soul has to choose its own demon, or guardian\ndivinity.[648] Salvation as a goal appears in Numenius,[649] but not\nin Plotinos, who opposes the Gnostic idea of the \"saved souls,\"[650]\nthough elsewhere he speaks of the paths of the musician,[651]\nlover[652] and philosopher[653] in reaching ecstasy.[654] Still both\nGnostics and Plotinos insisted on the need of a savior.[655] Memory\nis actualization of the soul.[656] In the highest ecstasy the soul is\nalone with the alone.[657]\n\n\n7. SIMILARITIES APPLIED DIFFERENTLY.\n\nThis comparison of philosophy would have been much stronger had we\nadded thereto the following points in which we find similar terms and\nideas, but which are applied differently. The soul is indissolubly\nunited to intelligence according to Plotinos, but to its source with\nNumenius.[658] Plotinos makes discord the result of their fall, while\nwith Numenius it is its cause.[659] Guilt is the cause of the fall of\nsouls, with Plotinos,[660] but with Numenius it is impulsive passion.\nThe great evolution or world-process is by Plotinos called the \"eternal\nprocession,\" while with Numenius it is progress.[661] The simile of\nthe pilot is by Plotinos applied to the soul within the body; while\nwith Numenius, it refers to the logos, or creator in the universe,[662]\nwhile in both cases the cause,--of creation for the creator,[663] and\nincarnation for the soul[664]--is forgetfulness. There is practically\nno difference here, however. Doubleness is, by Plotinos, predicated\nof the sun and stars, but by Numenius, of the demiurge himself,[665]\nwhich Plotinos opposes as a Gnostic teaching.[666] The Philonic term\n\"legislator\" is, by Plotinos, applied to intelligence, while Numenius\napplies it to the third divinity, and not the second.[667] Plotinos\nextends immortality to animals, but Numenius even to the inorganic\nrealm, including everything.[668] While Numenius seems to believe in\nthe Serapistic and Gnostic demons,[669] Plotinos opposes them,[670]\nalthough in his biography[671] he is represented as taking part in the\nevocation of his guardian spirit in a temple of Isis.\n\nWe thus find a tolerably complete body of philosophy shared by Plotinos\nand Numenius, out of the few fragments of the latter that have come\ndown to us. It would therefore be reasonable to suppose that if\nNumenius's complete works had survived we could make out a still far\nstronger case for Plotinos's dependence on Numenius. At any rate, the\nDominican scribe at the Escoreal who inserted the name of Numenius in\nthe place of that of Plotinos in the heading of[672] the fragment about\nmatter, must have felt a strong confusion between the two authors.\n\n\n8. PHILOSOPHICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NUMENIUS AND PLOTINOS.\n\nTo begin with, we have the controversy with the Stoics, which,\nthough it appears in the works of both, bears in each a different\nsignificance. While with Numenius it absorbed his chief controversial\nefforts,[673] with Plotinos[674] it occupied only one of his many\nspheres of interest; and indeed, he had borrowed from them many\nterms, such as \"pneuma,\" the spiritual body, and others, set forth\nelsewhere. Notable, however, was the term \"hexis,\" habituation,\nor form of inorganic objects,[675] and the \"phantasia,\" or\nsense-presentation.[676] Like, them, the name A-pollo is interpreted as\na denial of manifoldness.[677]\n\nNext in importance, as a landmark, is Numenius's chief secret, the name\nof the divinity, as \"being and essence,\" which reappears in Plotinos in\nnumberless places.[678] Connected with this is the idea that essence is\nintelligence.[679]\n\n\n9. PYTHAGOREAN SIMILARITIES.\n\nIt is a common-place that Numenius was a Pythagorean, or at least\nwas known as such, for though he reverenced Pythagoras, he conceived\nof himself as a restorer of true Platonism. It will, therefore, be\nall the more interesting to observe what part numbers play in their\nsystem, especially in that of Plotinos, who made no special claim to\nbe a Pythagorean disciple. First, we find that numbers and the divine\nideas are closely related.[680] Numbers actually split the unity of the\ndivinity.[681] The soul also is considered as a number,[682] and in\nconnection with this we find the Pythagorean sacred \"tetraktys.\"[683]\nThus numbers split up the divinity,[684] though it is no more than fair\nto add that elsewhere Plotinos contradicts this, and states that the\nmultiplicity of the divinity is not attained by division;[685] still,\nthis is not the only case in which we will be forced to array Plotinos\nagainst himself.\n\nThe first effect of the splitting influence of numbers will be\ndoubleness,[686] which, though present in intelligence,[687]\nnevertheless chiefly appears in matter,[688] as the Pythagorean\n\"indefinite dyad.\"[689] Still, even the Supreme is double.[690] So\nwe must not be surprised if He is constituted by a trinity,[691] in\nconnection with which the Supreme appears as grandfather.[692]\n\nIf then both Numenius and Plotinos are really under the spell of\nPythagoras, it is pretty sure they will not be materialist, they will\nbelieve in the incorporeality of the divinity,[693] of qualities;[694]\nand of the soul[695] which will be invisible[696] and possess no\nextension.[697] A result of this will be that the soul will not be\nlocated in the body, or in space, but rather the body in the soul.[698]\n\nFrom this incorporeal existence,[699] there is only a short step to\nunchangeable existence,[700] or eternity.[701] This, to the soul, means\nimmortality,[702] one theory of which is reincarnation.[703] To the\nuniverse, however, this means harmony.[704]\n\nThere are still other Pythagorean traces in common between Numenius\nand Plotinos. The cause that the indeterminate dyad split off from the\ndivinity is \"tolma,\" rashness, or boldness.[705] Everything outside\nof the divinity is in a continual state of flux.[706] Evil is then\nthat which is opposed to good.[707] It also is therefore unavoidable,\ninasmuch as suppression of its cosmic function would entail cosmic\ncollapse.[708] The world stands thus as an inseparable combination of\nintelligence and necessity, or chance.[709]\n\n\n10. PLATONIC TRACES.\n\nPlatonic traces, there would naturally be; but it will be noticed that\nthey are far less numerous than the Pythagorean. To begin with, we\nfind the reverent spirit towards the divinities, which prays for their\nblessing at the inception of all tasks.[710] To us who live in these\nlatter days, such a prayer seems out of place in philosophy; but that\nis only because we have divorced philosophy from theology; in other\nwords, because our theology has left the realm of living thought,\nand, being fixed once for all, we are allowed to pursue any theory\nof existence we please as if it had nothing whatever to do with any\nreality; in other words, we are deceiving ourselves. On the contrary,\nin those days, every philosophical speculation was a genuine adventure\nin the spiritual world, a magical operation that might unexpectedly\nlead to the threshold of the cosmic sanctuary. Wise, indeed, therefore,\nwas he who began it by prayer.\n\nOf other technical Platonic terms there are quite a few. The lower is\nalways the image of the higher.[711] So the world might be considered\nthe statue of the Divinity.[712] The ideas are in a realm above the\nworld.[713] The soul here below is as in a prison.[714] There is a\ndivinity higher than the one generally known.[715] The divinity is in\na stability resultant of firmness and perfect motion.[716] The perfect\nmovement, therefore, is circular.[717] This inter-communion of the\nuniverse therefore results in matter appearing in the intelligible\nworld as \"intelligible matter.\"[718] By dialectics, also called\n\"bastard reasoning,\"[719] we abstract everything[720] till we reach the\nthing-in-itself,[721] or, in other words, matter as a substrate of the\nworld.[722] Thus we metaphysically reach ineffable solitude.[723]\n\nThe same goal is reached psychologically, however, in the ecstasy.[724]\nThis idea occurred in Plato only as a poetic expression of metaphysical\nattainment; and in the case of Plotinos at least may have been used as\na practical experience chiefly to explain his epileptic attacks; and\nthis would be all the more likely as this disease was generally called\nthe \"sacred disease.\" Whether Numenius also was an epileptic, we are\nnot told; it is more likely he took the idea from Philo, or Philo's\noriental sources; at least Numenius seems to claim no personal ecstatic\nexperiences such as those of Plotinos.\n\nWe have entered the realm of psychology; and this teaches us that that\nin which Numenius and Plotinos differ from Plato and Philo is chiefly\ntheir psychological or experimental application of pure philosophy. No\nbody could subsist without the soul to keep it together.[725] Various\nattempts are made to describe the nature of the soul; it is the extent\nor relation of circumference to circle.[726] Or it is like a line and\nits divergence.[727] In any case, the divinity and the soul move around\nthe heavens,[728] and this may explain the otherwise problematical\nprogress or evolution (\"prosodos\" or \"stolos\") of ours.[729]\n\n\n11. VARIOUS SIMILARITIES.\n\nThere are many other unclassifiable Numenian traces in Plotinos. Two of\nthem, however, are comparatively important. First, is a reaffirmation\nof the ancient Greek connection between generation, fertility of birth\nof souls and wetness,[730] which is later reaffirmed by Porphyry in\nhis \"Cave of the Nymphs.\" Plotinos, however, later denies this.[731]\nThen we come to a genuine innovation of Numenius's; his theory of\ndivine or intelligible giving. Plato had, of course, in his genial,\ncasual way, sketched out a whole organic system of divine creation\nand administration of this world. The conceptions he needed he had\ncheerfully borrowed from earlier Greek philosophy without any rigid\nsystematization, so that he never noticed that the hinge on which all\nwas supposed to turn was merely the makeshift of an assumption. This\ncapital error was noticed by Numenius, who sought to supply it by a\npsychological observation, namely, that knowledge may be imparted\nwithout diminution. Plotinos, with his winning way of dispensing with\nquotation-marks, appropriated this,[732] as also the idea that life\nstreams out upon the world in the glance of the divinity, and as\nquickly leaves it, when the Divinity turns away His glance.[733]\n\nOther less important points of contact are: the Egyptian ship of\nsouls;[734] the Philonic distinction between \"the\" God as supreme, and\n\"god\" as subordinate;[735] the hoary equivocation on \"kosmos;\"[736] and\nthe illustration of the divine Logos as the pilot of the world.[737]\n\n\n\n\nVALUE OF PLOTINOS.\n\n\nIMPORTANCE IN THE PAST.\n\nWe must focus our observations on Plotinos as a philosopher. To\nbegin with, we should review his successors, Porphyry, Jamblichus,\nSallust, Proclus, Hierocles, Simplicius;[738] Macrobius;[739] Priscus;\nOlympicdorus and John Philoponus.[740]\n\nAmong the Arabian philosophers that follow in his steps are Maimonides\nand Ibn Gebirol.[741]\n\nOf the Christian fathers we first have two who paraphrased, rather than\nquoted him.\n\nSt. Augustine by name quotes i. 6; iii. 2; iv. 3, and v. 1; he\nparaphrases parts of i. 2; ii. 1; iii. 6, 7; iv. 2, 7; vi. 5, 6.[742]\nSt. Basil so closely paraphrases parts of Plotinos in his treatise on\nthe Holy Spirit,[743] his letter on the Monastic Life,[744] and his\nHexameron,[745] that Bouillet prints the passage in question in deadly\nparallel.\n\nOther Christian Plotonic students were Gregory of Nyssa, Synesius,\nDionysius the Areopagite, Theodorus, Aeneas of Gaza, Gennadius;[746]\nVictorinus;[747] Nicephorus Chumnus;[748] and Cassiodorus.[749]\n\nThomas Aquinas also was much indebted to Plotinos; and after him came\nBoethius, F\u00e9n\u00e9lon, Bossnet and Leibnitz (all quoted in Bouillet's work).\n\nWe have frequently pointed out that Plotinos' \"bastard reasoning\"\nprocess of reaching the intelligible was practically paraphrased by\nKant's dialectical path to the \"thing-in-itself.\" This dialetic, of\ncourse, was capitalized by Hegel.\n\nDrews has shown that Edouard von Hartmann used Plotinos'\nsemi-devotional ecstasy as a metaphysical basis for his philosophy of\nthe Unconscious.\n\nIt is, of course, among mystics that Plotinos has been accorded the\ngreater honor. His practical influence descended through the visions\nand ecstasies of the saints down to Swedenborg, who attempted to write\nthe theology of the ecstasy; and the relation between these two,\nSwedenborg and Plotinos should prove a fertile field for investigation.\n\n\nCULTURAL IMPORTANCE.\n\nSummarizing, he formed a bridge between the pagan world, with its\nGreco-Roman civilization, and the modern world, in three departments:\nChristianity, philosophy, and mysticism. So long as the traditional\nPlatonico-Stoical feud persisted there was no hope of progress; because\nit kept apart two elements that were to fuse into the Christian\nphilosophy. Numenius was the last Platonist, as Posidonius was the last\nStoic combatant. However, if reports are to be trusted, Ammonius was an\neclecticist, who prided himself on combining Plato with Aristotle. If\nPlotinos was indeed his disciple, it was the theory eclecticism that\nhe took from his reputed teacher. Practically he was to accomplish it\nby his dependence on the Numenian Amelius, the Stoic Porphyry, and\nthe negative Eustochius. It will be seen therefore that his chief\nimportance was not in spite of his weakness, but most because of it.\nBy repeatedly \"boxing the compass\" he thoroughly assimilated the best\nof the conflicting schools, and became of interest to a sufficiency\nof different groups (Christian, philosophical and mystical) to insure\npreservation, study and quotation. His habit of omitting credit to\nany but ancient thinkers left his own work, to the uninformed--who\nconstituted all but a minimal number--as a body of original thought.\nThus he remains to us the last light of Greece, speaking a language\nwith which we are familiar, and leaving us quotations that are\nimperishable.\n\n\nPERSONAL VALUE.\n\nWhile therefore providentially Plotinos has ever been of great\nimportance theologically, philosophically and mystically, we cannot\nleave him without honestly facing the question of his value as an\noriginal thinker. It is evident that his success was in inverse ratio\nto originality; but we can also see that he could not have held\ntogether those three spheres of interest without the momentum of a\nwonderful personality. This will be evident at a glance to any reader\nof his biography. But after all we are here concerned not so much\nwith his personality as with his value as an original thinker. This\nquestion is mooted by, and cannot be laid aside because of its decisive\ninfluence on the problem of his dependence of Numenius. The greater\npart of the latter's works being irretrievably lost, we can judge only\nfrom what we have; and as to the rest, we must ask ourselves, was\nPlotinos the kind of a man who would have depended on some other man's\nthoughts? Is he likely to have sketched out a great scheme and filled\nit in; or rather, was he likely to depend on personal suggestion,\nand embroider on it, so to speak. Elsewhere we have demonstrated a\ndevelopment of his opinions, for instance, about matter. Was this due\nto progressiveness, or to indefiniteness? The reader must judge for\nhimself.\n\n\nPERSONAL LIMITATIONS.\n\nHis epilepsy naturally created an opportunity for, and need of a\ndoctrine of ecstasy; which for normal people should be no more than\na doctrine, or at least be limited to conscious experiences. Even\nhis admirer, Porphyry, acknowledges that he spelled and pronounced\nincorrectly.[750] He acknowledged that without Porphyry's objections he\nwould have nothing to say. He refrained from quoting his authorities,\nand Porphyry acknowledged that his writings contained many Stoic\nand Aristotelian doctrines. It was generally bruited around that his\ndoctrines were borrowed from Numenius,[751] to the extent that his\ndisciples held controversies, and wrote books on the subject. His style\nis enigmatic, and the difficulty of understanding him was discussed\neven in his own day. He was dependent on secretaries or editors; first\non Amelius, later on Porphyry, who does not scruple to acknowledge\nhe added many explanations.[752] Later, Plotinos sent his books to\nPorphyry in Sicily to edit. No doubt the defectiveness of his eyesight\nmade both reading and writing difficult, and explains his failure\nto put titles to his works; though, as in the case of Virgil, such\nhesitation may have been the result of a secret consciousness of his\nindebtedness to others.\n\n\nRELIANCE ON PUNNING.\n\nPunning has of course a hoary antiquity, and even the revered Plato\nwas an adept at it--as we see in his Cratylos. Moreover, not till a\nman's work is translated can we uncover all the unconscious cases\nof \"undistributed middle.\" Nevertheless, in an inquiry as to the\npermanent objective validity of a train of reasoning, we are compelled\nto note extent and scope of his tendency. So he puns on aeons;[753]\non science and knowledge;[754] on \"agalmata\";[755] on Aphrodite,\nas \"delicate\";[756] on Being;[757] on \"koros,\" as creation or\nadornment\";[758] on difference in others;[759] on idea;[760] on heaven,\nworld, universe, animal and all;[761] on Vesta, and standing;[762] on\nHexis;[763] on inclination;[764] on doxa;[765] on love and vision;[766]\non \"einai\" and \"henos;\"[767] on \"mous,\" \"no\u00easis,\" and to \"no\u00eafon\";[768]\non paschein;[769] on Poros;[770] on Prometheus and Providence;[771]\non reason and characteristic;[772] on \"schesis\" and \"schema\";[773]\nand \"soma\" and \"sozesthai\";\"[774] on suffering;[775] on thinking,\nthinkable, and intellection;[776] on \"timely\" and \"sovereign.\"[777]\nIt will be noted that these puns refer to some of the most important\nconceptions, and are found in all periods of his life. We must\ntherefore conclude that his was not a clear thinking ability; that he\ndepended on accidental circumstances, and may not always have been\nfully conscious how far he was following others. This popular judgment\nthat he was revamping Numenius's work may then not have been entirely\nunfounded, as we indeed have shown.\n\nNevertheless, he achieved some permanent work, that will never be\nforgotten; for instance:\n\n1. His description of the ecstatic state.\n\n2. His polemic against the Aristotelian and Stoic categories.\n\n3. His establishment of his own categories.\n\n4. His allegoric treatment of the birth of love, the several Eroses,\nPoros and Penia, and other myths.\n\n5. His building of a Trinitarian philosophy.\n\n6. His threefold spheres of existence, underlying Swedenborgian\ninterpretation.\n\n7. His aesthetic theories.\n\n8. His ethical studies of virtues and happiness.\n\n9. His restatement of Numenius's arguments for the immateriality of the\nsoul.\n\n\nSELECTED MAXIMS\n\nThe reader may be interested in a few maxims selected from Plotinos'\nworks which may be of general interest.\n\n1. We develop toward ecstasy by simplification of Soul.\n\n2. We rise by the flight of the Single to the Single, face to face.\n\n3. We contain something of the Supreme.\n\n4. The Soul becomes what she remembers and sees.\n\n5. Everything has a secret power.\n\n6. The best men are those who have most intimacy with themselves.\n\n7. The touch of the good man is the greatest thing in the world.\n\n8. Every being is its best, not when great or numerous, but when it\nbelongs to itself.\n\n9. There are two men in us, the better and the worse.\n\n10. The secret of life is to live simultaneously with others and\nyourself.\n\n11. God is the author of liberty.\n\n12. Concerning what would it be most worth while to speak, except the\nSoul? Let us therefore know ourselves.\n\n13. Without virtue, God is but a name.\n\n14. The object of virtue is to separate the soul from the body.\n\n15. We can never become perfect, because he who thinks himself so has\nalready forgotten the supreme divinity towards which he must hasten.\n\n16. The world was created by a concurrence of intelligence and\nnecessity.\n\n17. The Soul is the image, word, and interpreter of the One.\n\n18. The divinities though present to many human beings often reveal\nthemselves only to some one person, because he alone is able to\ncontemplate them.\n\n19. To act without suffering is the sign of a great power.\n\n20. Only virtue is independent.\n\n21. We are beautiful when we know ourselves.\n\n22. The Soul is the child of the universal Father.\n\n23. True happiness is being wise, and exercising this within oneself.\n\n24. To become again what one was originally is to live in the Superior\nworld.\n\n25. The desired goal is not to cease failing, but to grow divine.\n\n26. Virtue demands preliminary purification.\n\n27. Our effort at assimilation should be directed not at mere\nrespectability, but at the gods themselves.\n\n28. One should study mathematics in order to accustom oneself to think\nof incorporeal things, and to believe in their existence.\n\n29. Soul is not in body, but body in Soul.\n\n30. The Soul's higher part remains in heaven.\n\n31. We should not leave the earth, but not be of it.\n\n32. The object of life is not to avoid evil, or copy the good, but to\nbecome good.\n\n33. Dying, to Eustochius: \"I am awaiting you, in order to draw the\ndivine in me to the divine in all.\"\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n\n[1] It is significant that the subject of the first treatise of\nPlotinos, after the departure of Porphyry, should treat of happiness\nas the object of life. These may have been the arguments he advanced\nto persuade Porphyry to abstain from suicide (to which he refers in\nsections 8, 16), and, rather, to take a trip to Sicily, the land of\nnatural beauty. He also speaks of losing friends, in section 8. The\nnext book, on Providence, may also have been inspired by reflections\non this untoward and unexpected circumstance. We see also a change\nfrom abstract speculation to his more youthful fancy and comparative\nlearning and culture.\n\n[2] Diog. Laert. x.; Cicero, de Fin. i. 14, 46.\n\n[3] Cicero, de Fin. 11, 26.\n\n[4] See Arist. Nic. Eth. vii. 13; Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyp. Pyrrhon,\niii. 180; Stob. Ecl. ii. 7.\n\n[5] Arist. Nic. Eth. i. 10, 14.\n\n[6] Stob. Floril. i. 76.\n\n[7] See vi. 8.\n\n[8] In Plutarch, of Wickedness, and in Seneca, de Tranquil, Animi, 14.\n\n[9] De Providentia, 3.\n\n[10] De Provid. 5.\n\n[11] Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes, 327.\n\n[12] The vegetative soul, the power that presides over the nutrition\nand growth of the body; see iv. 3.23.\n\n[13] See i. 8; also Numenius, 16.\n\n[14] i. 2.4.\n\n[15] Cicero, Tusculans. ii. 7.\n\n[16] The animal; see i. 1.10.\n\n[17] See i. 1.8, 10.\n\n[18] See the Theataetus, p. 176. Carv. 84; the Phaedo. p. 69, Cary, 37;\nthe Republic, vi. p. 509; Cary, 19; x. p. 613, Cary, 12; the Laws, iv.\np. 716, Cary, 8; also Plotinos i. 2.1.\n\n[19] See i. 9.\n\n[20] A Stoic confutation of Epicurus and the Gnostics. As soon as\nPorphyry has left him, Plotinos harks back to Amelius, on whose\nleaving he had written against the Gnostics. He also returns to\nNumenian thoughts. Bouillet notices that here Plotinos founded himself\non Chrysippus, Marcus Aurelius, and Epictetus, and was followed\nby Nemesius. This new foundation enabled him to assume a rather\nindependent attitude. Against Plato, he taught that matter derived\nexistence from God, and that the union of the soul and body is not\nnecessarily evil. Against Aristotle, he taught that God is not only\nthe final, but also the efficient cause of the universe. Against\nthe Stoics, he taught that the human soul is free, and is a cause,\nindependent of the World Soul from which she proceeded. Against the\nGnostics, he insisted that the creator is good, the world is the best\npossible, and Providence extends to mundane affairs. Against the\nManicheans, he taught that the evil is not positive, but negative, and\nis no efficient cause, so that there is no dualism.\n\n[21] Diog. Laert. x. 133.\n\n[22] See iv. 2.4; vi. 7; see Plato, Philebus, p. 30, Cary, 56; Philo,\nLeg. Alleg, vi. 7.\n\n[23] Lactantius, de Ira Dei, 13.\n\n[24] Ireneus, Ref. Her. ii. 3.\n\n[25] As in vi. 7.1.\n\n[26] Philo, de Creatione Mundi, 6.\n\n[27] As the Gnostics taught; see ii. 9.1.\n\n[28] As was held by the Gnostics, who within the divinity distinguished\npotentiality and actuality, as we see in ii. 9.1.\n\n[29] See ii. 9.3. 8.\n\n[30] Numenius, 32.\n\n[31] Plato, Timaeus, p. 48, Cary, 21. Statesman, p. 273, Cary, 16;\nLaws, x. p. 904, Cary, 12.\n\n[32] See ii. 9.2.\n\n[33] From Aristotle, de Anima, 2.\n\n[34] This is the Aristotelian psychological scheme.\n\n[35] Clem. Al.; Strom. v. p. 712; Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys. i. p. 372, 446.\n\n[36] iv. 8.12; Plato, Tim. p. 41. 69; Cary, 16, 44.\n\n[37] Stob. Ecl. Eth. ii. 7.\n\n[38] iii. 2.13.\n\n[39] p. 253; Cary, 74.\n\n[40] Sen. 526.\n\n[41] According to Plato's Theaetetus, p. 176, Cary, 83; Numenius,16.\n\n[42] Seneca, de Provid. 2.\n\n[43] In his Republic, ix. p. 585, Cary, 10.\n\n[44] See iii. 1.9.\n\n[45] See iv. 3.12.\n\n[46] See iv. 3.5.\n\n[47] Gregory of Nyssa, Catech. Orat. 7.\n\n[48] As thought Sallust, Consp. Cat. 52.\n\n[49] Republic x. p. 620; Cary, 16; Numenius, 57.\n\n[50] As said Sallust, Conspiration of Catiline, 52.\n\n[51] As thought Epictetus, Manual, 31.\n\n[52] In his Republic, vi. p. 488; Cary, 4.\n\n[53] Marcus Aurelius. Thoughts, xi. 18.\n\n[54] As thought Cicero, de Nat. Deor. iii. 63. 64.\n\n[55] As thought Philo, de Prov. in Eus. Prep. Ev. viii. 14.\n\n[56] According to Plato, in the Sophist and Protagoras, and the Stoics,\nas in Marcus Aurelius. Meditations, vii. 63.\n\n[57] As did the writer of Revelation, iv. 6.\n\n[58] In his Timaeus, p. 29e, Cary, 10.\n\n[59] As said Chrysippus in Plutarch, de Comm. Not. adv. Stoicos, 13.\n\n[60] Mentioned by Plato in his Phaedrus, p. 248, Cary, 59; Republ. v.\np. 451, Cary, 2; and in the famous hymn of Cleanthes, Stobaeus Ecl.\nPhys. i. 3.\n\n[61] Like the figure of the angel Mithra; see Franck, LaKabbale, p. 366.\n\n[62] As Hierocles wondered, de Prov. p. 82, London Ed.\n\n[63] In the words of Plato's Timaeus p. 48; Cary, 21; and Theaetetus,\np. 176; Cary, 84; Numenius, 16.\n\n[64] Almost the words of John i. 1.\n\n[65] In the Laws, vii. p. 796, Cary, 6; p. 815, Cary, 18; and Philo, de\nProv. in Eus. Prep. Ev. viii. 14.\n\n[66] As thought Epictetus in his Manual, 2, 6.\n\n[67] In his Philebus, p. 48, Cary, 106.\n\n[68] As thought Epictetus in his Manual. 8.\n\n[69] See iii. 8.\n\n[70] Numenius, 32.\n\n[71] Plato, Banquet, p. 187, Cary, 14.\n\n[72] Marcus Aurelius, Medit. ii. 13.\n\n[73] As thought Marcus Aurelius, in his Thoughts, xii. 42.\n\n[74] See iv. 3.24.\n\n[75] In his Manual, 37.\n\n[76] See iv. 1.9-12.\n\n[77] Marcus Aurelius, Medit. vii. 9; Seneca, Epist. 94.\n\n[78] Numenius, iii. 7.\n\n[79] This image was later adopted by Swedenborg in his \"celestial man.\"\n\n[80] In close proximity to note 45, another distinctly Johannine\nexpression.\n\n[81] Stoic ideas.\n\n[82] As Plato said in his Phaedrus, p. 247, Cary, 56.\n\n[83] See i. 8.2.\n\n[84] See ii. 3.17.\n\n[85] See ii. 3.13. Ficinus's translation.\n\n[86] A Stoic term.\n\n[87] Plato, Timaeus, p. 42, Cary, 17; see also Enn. ii. 3.10. 11, 15,\n16.\n\n[88] Timaeus, p. 42, 91, Cary, 17, 72, 73.\n\n[89] See ii. 3.13.\n\n[90] Alcinous, de Doctrina Platonica, 26.\n\n[91] Gregory of Nyssa, Catech. Oratio, 7; Dionysius Areopagite, Divine\nNames, 4.\n\n[92] See ii. 3.7.\n\n[93] See iii. 2.6.\n\n[94] Plato, Timaeus, p. 31c, Cary, 11.\n\n[95] See Numenius. 14.\n\n[96] Clem. Al. Strom. v. 689.\n\n[97] In this book we no longer find detailed study of Plato, Aristotle\nand the Epicureans, as we did in the works of the Porphyrian period.\nWell indeed did Plotinos say that without Porphyry's objections he\nmight have had little to say.\n\n[98] Porphyry, Principles of the theory of the Intelligibles, 31.\n\n[99] Olympiodorus, in Phaedonem, Cousin, Fragments, p. 404.\n\n[100] Ib., p. 432.\n\n[101] Ib., p. 418.\n\n[102] Ib., p. 431.\n\n[103] John Philoponus, Comm. in Arist., de Anima, i. 1.\n\n[104] See iii. 6.1.\n\n[105] By a triple pun, on \"nous,\" \"no\u00easis,\" and \"to no\u00eaton.\"\n\n[106] Porphyry, Principles, 32.\n\n[107] By a pun.\n\n[108] See John i. 4, 9.\n\n[109] This anticipates Athanasius's explanations of the divine process.\n\n[110] See v. 1.4.\n\n[111] Porphyry, Principles, 26.\n\n[112] The Eleusynian Mysteries, Hymn to Ceres, 279; see vi. 9.11.\n\n[113] See v. 3.14.\n\n[114] In this book Plotinos harks back to the first book he had\nwritten, i. 6, to Plato's Banquet and Cratylos. Porphyry later agreed\nwith some of it. Like St. John, Plotinos returns to God as love, in\nhis old age. His former book had also been a re-statement of earlier\nthoughts.\n\n[115] See iii. 5.6.\n\n[116] See i. 6.2, 3.\n\n[117] See i. 6.3, 7.\n\n[118] Plato, Banquet, p. 206-208, Cary, 31, 32.\n\n[119] Plato, Banquet, p. 210, Cary, 34, sqq.\n\n[120] Porphyry, Biography of Plotinos, 15.\n\n[121] See i. 3.2.\n\n[122] See sect. 5, 6.\n\n[123] Plato, Banquet, p. 185, Cary, 12, 13.\n\n[124] By Plato, in his Cratylus, p. 396, Cary, 29, 30; interpreted to\nmean \"pure Intelligence.\"\n\n[125] This is the principal power of the soul; see ii. 3.17.\n\n[126] See v. 8.12, 13.\n\n[127] Plotinos thus derives \"eros\" from \"orasis,\" which, however\nfar-fetched a derivation, is less so than that of Plato, from \"esros,\"\nmeaning to \"flow into,\" Cratylos, p. 420, Cary, 79, 80.\n\n[128] For this distinction, see ii. 3.17, 18.\n\n[129] For the two Loves, see v. 8.13, and vi. 9.9.\n\n[130] See iii. 4.\n\n[131] See iv. 9.\n\n[132] Plato, Banq. 203: Cary, 29.\n\n[133] In his Isis and Osiris, p. 372, 374.\n\n[134] See i. 1.\n\n[135] Plato, Banquet, p. 202, Cary, 27, 28; Porphyry, de Abst. ii. 37,\nsqq.\n\n[136] In section 4.\n\n[137] Plato, Epinomis, p. 984, Cary, 8; Porphyry, de Abst. ii. 37-42.\n\n[138] See ii. 4.3.\n\n[139] See ii. 4.3.\n\n[140] An expression often used by the Platonists; see the Lexicon\nPlatonicum, by the grammarian Timaeus, sub voce \"oistra.\"\n\n[141] See Plato, Banquet, p. 203, Cary, 29.\n\n[142] See iii. 4.6.\n\n[143] See iii. 4.3.\n\n[144] A Stoic distinction.\n\n[145] P. 246, Cary, 56.\n\n[146] P. 28, Cary, 50.\n\n[147] Didymus, Etym. Magn. p. 179, Heidelb. p. 162, Lips.\n\n[148] Timaeus Locrius, of the Soul of the World, p. 550, ed. Gale,\nCary, 4.\n\n[149] Origen, c. Cels., iv. p. 533.\n\n[150] \"logoi.\"\n\n[151] Proclus, Theology of Plato, vi. 23.\n\n[152] As the generation of the world, in Plato's Timaeus, p. 28, 29,\nCary, 9; and the erecting into separate Gods various powers of the same\ndivinity, as Proclus said, in his commentary thereon, in Parm. i. 30.\n\n[153] ii. 3.17; ii. 9.2.\n\n[154] Pun on \"Poros\" and \"euporia.\"\n\n[155] See ii. 4.16.\n\n[156] See books ii. 3; ii. 9; iii. 1, 2, 3, 4, for the foundations\non which this summary of Plotinos's doctrine of evil is contained.\nTo do this, he was compelled to return to Plato, whose Theaetetus,\nStatesman, Timaeus and Laws he consulted. Aristotle seems to have been\nmore interested in natural phenomena and human virtue than in the\nroot-questions of the destiny of the universe, and the nature of the\ndivinity; so Plotinos studies him little here. But it will be seen that\nhere Plotinos entirely returns to the later Plato, through Numenius.\n\n[157] As thought Empedocles, 318-320.\n\n[158] i. 6.2.\n\n[159] i. 8.7.\n\n[160] i. 8.3.\n\n[161] As thought Plato in his Laws, iv. p. 716; Cary, 7, 8.\n\n[162] As thought Plato in his Philebus, p. 28; Cary 49, 50.\n\n[163] See v. 1; vi. 9.2.\n\n[164] Numenius, fr. 32.\n\n[165] As said Plato, in his second Letter, 2.312.\n\n[166] See iii. 8.9; iv. 7.14; vi. 4.2; vi. 9.2.\n\n[167] As held by Plato in the Parmenides and First Alcibiades.\n\n[168] See ii. 4.8-16.\n\n[169] It is noteworthy that Plotinos in his old age here finally\nrecognizes Evil in itself, just as Plato in his later work, the Laws\n(x. p. 897; Cary, 8) adds to the good World-soul, an evil one. This,\nfor Plotinos, was harking back to Numenius's evil world-soul, fr. 16.\n\n[170] In his First Alcibiades, p. 122; Cary, 37.\n\n[171] See i. 1.12.\n\n[172] This means created things, which are contingent and perishable;\nsee ii. 4.5, 6.\n\n[173] See ii. 4.10-12. This idea of irradiation is practically\nemanationism; and besides Plotinos's interest in orientalism (Porphyry\nBiography, 3), it harks back to Numenius, fr. 26.3; 27a.10.\n\n[174] Held by Plato in his Theaetetus, p. 176; Cary, 84, 85; and\nRepublic, ii. 279; Cary, 18, and of Numenius, fr. 16.\n\n[175] See i. 2.1.\n\n[176] In the Theaetetus, p. 176; Cary, 84, 85.\n\n[177] Numenius, fr. 10; Plato, Rep. vi. p. 509b; Cary, 19.\n\n[178] As Plato suggested in his Philebus, p. 23; Cary, 35-37.\n\n[179] Numenius, fr. 17.\n\n[180] Mentioned by Plato in the Timaeus, pp. 28, 30, 38; Cary, 9, 10,\n14.\n\n[181] From the Timaeus, p. 41; Cary, 16, 17.\n\n[182] See i. 2.1; i. 6.8.\n\n[183] That is, the relative inferiority of beings which, proceeding\nfrom each other, become more and more distant from the good; see ii.\n5.5; ii. 9.8, 13; v. 1; Philo, Leg. Alleg. ii. p. 74.\n\n[184] See i. 8.1.\n\n[185] ii. 4.12.\n\n[186] Numenius, fr. 26.3.\n\n[187] Diog. Laertes vii.\n\n[188] See ii. 6.\n\n[189] ii. 4.13.\n\n[190] i. 8.15.\n\n[191] As thought Plato in his Banquet, p. 211; Cary, 35.\n\n[192] As said Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534; Cary, 14.\n\n[193] As Plato says in his Phaedrus, p. 246; Cary, 54, 56.\n\n[194] As wrote Plato in his Banquet, p. 203; Cary, 28, 29, and see iii.\n7.14 and iii. 5.9 as well as iii. 6.14.\n\n[195] According to the interpretation of Ficinus.\n\n[196] See ii. 4. This is an added confirmation of the chronological\norder; in the Enneadic order this book is later, not earlier.\n\n[197] Again a term discussed by Numenius, fr. ii. 8, 13; and iii; see\ni. 1.9; iv. 3.3, 30, 31; i. 4.10.\n\n[198] We notice how these latter studies of Plotinos do not take\nup any new problems, chiefly reviewing subjects touched on before.\nThis accounts for Porphyry's attempt to group the Plotinic writings,\nsystematically. This reminds us of the suggestion in the Biography,\nthat except for the objections of Porphyry, Plotinos would have nothing\nto write. Notice also the system of the last Porphyrian treatises,\ncontrasted with the more literary treatment of the later. All this\nsupports Porphyry's table of chronological arrangement of the studies\nof Plotinos. This book is closely connected with the preceding studies\nof Fate and Providence, iii. 1-3; for he is here really opposing not\nthe Gnostics he antagonized when dismissing Amelius, but the Stoic\ntheories on Providence and Fate.\n\n[199] See iii. 1.5, 6; iii. 6; iv. 4.30-44.\n\n[200] Macrobins. In Somn. Scipionis.\n\n[201] Cicero, de Divinatione, i. 39.\n\n[202] Julius Firmicus Maternus, Astrol. ii. 23.\n\n[203] With Ptolemy's Tetrabiblion, i. p. 17.\n\n[204] See iv. 4.31.\n\n[205] Discussed in par. 4.\n\n[206] This incomprehensibility was no doubt due to Plotinos's advancing\nblindness and renal affection.\n\n[207] Numenius, fr. 32.\n\n[208] Cicero, de Nat. Deorum, ii. 46.\n\n[209] See iv. 4.32.\n\n[210] According to the Stoics: Alex. Aphrod. de Mixtione, p. 141;\nCicero, de Nat. Deorum, ii. 32.\n\n[211] See iii. 1.4, 7-10.\n\n[212] See iii. 1.6.\n\n[213] See iv. 4.33.\n\n[214] See iv. 4.35; according to the Stoics, see Diogenes Laertes. vii.\n140.\n\n[215] See iv. 4.32.\n\n[216] Seneca, Quest. Nat. i. 1.\n\n[217] See iii. 4.2, 4.\n\n[218] See ii. 3.13.\n\n[219] See iii. 4.3.\n\n[220] See iii. 1.8-10.\n\n[221] The law of Adrastea; see iii. 4.2; iv. 4.4, 5.\n\n[222] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 244-251; Cary, 47-66.\n\n[223] See i. 8; ii. 11; iii. 1; vi. 8.\n\n[224] Plato, Rep. x. p. 617; Cary, 14.\n\n[225] p. 41-42; Cary, 16, 17.\n\n[226] See i. 1.7-10.\n\n[227] See ii. 1.5.\n\n[228] Stoic terms.\n\n[229] See ii. 1.8-10.\n\n[230] See i. 2.1; vi. 8.\n\n[231] See i. 1.7-12; iv. 3.19-23.\n\n[232] This is the exact doctrine of Numenius, fr. 53; it logically\nagrees with the doubleness of matter, Num. 14; of the Creator, Num. 36;\nand the world-Soul, fr. 16. See note 71.\n\n[233] See par. 18.\n\n[234] Plato, Banquet, p. 202; Cary, 28; Timaeus, p. 90; Cary, 71.\n\n[235] See iii. 1.2.\n\n[236] That is, to share the passions of the bodies: see iii. 1.2.\n\n[237] See iv. 4.38-40.\n\n[238] Seneca, Nat. Quest. ii. 32.\n\n[239] According to Aristotle, Met. xii. 3.\n\n[240] See iii. 1.6.\n\n[241] See Cicero, de Nat. Deor. ii. 34.\n\n[242] See iv. 4.39, 40.\n\n[243] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 248; Cary, 59.60.\n\n[244] See iii. 1.8-10.\n\n[245] See iv. 4.39.\n\n[246] See iii. 4.3.\n\n[247] See iii. 1.10.\n\n[248] See iii. 1.5.\n\n[249] Rep. x. p. 616; Cary, 14; Enn. iii. 4.\n\n[250] See iv. 4.30, 40, 43, 44.\n\n[251] See i. 4.\n\n[252] See i. 2.5.\n\n[253] In i. 1; proof of the chronological order.\n\n[254] See ii. 9.12; iv. 3.9, 10; negatively.\n\n[255] See iii. 3.1, 2; see Seneca, de Provid. 5.\n\n[256] See ii. 3.17; iii. 8.\n\n[257] See iv. 4.9-12.\n\n[258] See ii. 4; Seneca, de Provid. 5.\n\n[259] See ii. 9.2; iii. 2, 3. Seneca, de Provid. 5.\n\n[260] Or generative reasons, a Stoic term, Seneca, Quest. Nat. iii. 29;\nsee iii. 3.1, 2, 7.\n\n[261] Plotinos is here harking back to his very earliest writing, 1.6,\nwhere, before his monistic adventure with Porphyry, he had, under\nthe Numenian influence of Amelius, constructed his system out of a\ncombination of the doctrines of Plato (about the ideas), Aristotle (the\ndistinctions of form and matter and of potentiality and actualization),\nand the Stoic (the \"reasons,\" \"seminal reasons,\" action and passions,\nand \"hexis,\" or \"habit,\" the inorganic informing principle). Of these,\nNumenius seems to have lacked the Aristotelian doctrines, although he\nleft Plato's single triple-functioned soul for Aristotle's combination\nof souls of various degrees (fr. 53). Plotinos, therefore, seems to\nhave distinguished in every object two elements, matter and form (ii.\n4.1; ii. 5.2). Matter inheres potentially in all beings (ii. 5.3, 4)\nand therefore is non-being, ugliness, and evil (i. 6.6). Form is the\nactualization (K. Steinhart's Melemata Plotiniana, p. 31; ii. 5.2);\nthat is, the essence and power (vi. 4.9), which are inseparable. Form\nalone possesses real existence, beauty and goodness. Form has four\ndegrees: idea, reason, nature and habit; which degrees are the same\nas those of thought and life (Porphyry, Principles 12, 13, 14). The\nidea is distinguished into \"idea\" or intelligible Form, or \"eidos,\"\nprinciple of human intellectual life. Reason is 1, divine (theios\nlogos, i. 6, 2; the reason that comes from the universal Soul, iv.\n3.10), 2, human (principle of the rational life, see Ficinus on ii.\n6.2); 3, the seminal or generative reason (principle of the life\nof sensation, which imparts to the body the sense-form, \"morph\u00e9,\"\n3.12-end; Bouillet, i. 365). Now reasons reside in the soul (ii. 4.12),\nand are simultaneously essences and powers (vi. 4.9), and as powers\nproduce the nature, and as essences, the habits. Now nature (\"physis\")\nis the principle of the vegetative life, and habit, \"hexis,\" Numenius,\nfr. 55, see ii. 4.16, is the principle of unity of inorganic things.\n\n[262] As thought Aristotle, Met. xii, 3.\n\n[263] See ii. 9.13.\n\n[264] See iv. 4.9-13.\n\n[265] See iii. 4.1.\n\n[266] This is Numenius' doctrine, fr. 16.\n\n[267] See iii. 3.5, 11.\n\n[268] Plotinos here makes in the world-Soul a distinction analogous to\nthat obtaining in the human one (where there is a reasonable soul, and\nits image, the vegetative soul, see i. 1.8-12; iv. 4. 13, 14). Here\nhe asserts that there are two souls; the superior soul (the principal\npower of the soul, which receives the forms from Intelligence (see iv.\n4.9-12, 35), and the inferior soul (nature, or the generative power),\nwhich transmits them to matter, so as to fashion it by seminal reasons\n(see iii. 4.13, 14, 22, 27). Bouillet, no doubt remembering Plotinos's\nown earlier invectives against those who divided the world-soul (ii.\n9.6), evidently directed against Amelius and the Numenian influence,\nwhich till then he had followed--tries to minimize it, claiming that\nthis does not mean two different hypostases, but only two functions\nof one and the same hypostasis. But he acknowledges that this gave\nthe foundation for Plotinos's successors' distinction between the\nsupermundane and the mundane souls (hyperkosmios, and egkosmios).\nPlotinos was therefore returning to Numenius's two world-souls (fr.\n16), which was a necessary logical consequence of his belief in two\nhuman souls (fr. 53), as he himself had taught in iii. 8.5. Plotinos\nobjectifies this doubleness of the soul in the myth of the two\nHercules, in the next book, i. 1.12.\n\n[269] See ii. 9.2.\n\n[270] The subject announced in the preceding book, ii. 3.16; another\nproof of the chronological order. This is a very obscure book,\ndepending on iv. 3 and 4: and vi. 7; on the theory of the three divine\nhypostases, on his psychology, the soul's relation to, and separation\nfrom the body, and metempsychosis. His doctrines of \"self\" and of the\nemotions are strikingly modern.\n\n[271] See sect. 2.\n\n[272] See sect. 3.\n\n[273] See sect. 4.\n\n[274] See sect. 7, 11.\n\n[275] This most direct translation of \"pathos,\" is defective in that\nit means rather an experience, a passive state, or modification of the\nsoul. It is a Stoic term.\n\n[276] \"Dianoia\" is derived from \"dia nou,\" and indicates that the\ndiscursive thought is exercised \"by means of the intelligence,\"\nreceiving its notions, and developing them by ratiocination, see v.\n3.3. It is the actualization of discursive reason \"to diano\u00eatikon,\" or\nof the reasonable soul (\"psych\u00ea logik\u00ea\"), which conceives, judges, and\nreasons (dianoei, kr\u00ednei, logizetai).\n\n[277] \"No\u00easis\" means intuitive thought, the actualization of\nintelligence.\n\n[278] See sect. 7.\n\n[279] See Porphyry, Faculties of the Soul, and Ficinus, commentary on\nthis book.\n\n[280] In Greek, \"to zoon,\" \"to syntheton,\" \"to synamphoteron,\" \"to\nkoinon,\" \"to eid\u00f4lon.\"\n\n[281] See i. 2.5.\n\n[282] According to the Stoics.\n\n[283] According to Alexander of Aphrodisia.\n\n[284] As thought Aristotle, de Anima 2.1; see 4.3.21, and Numenius, 32.\n\n[285] A famous comparison, found in Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1; Plato,\nLaws, x. p. 906; Cary, 14; and especially Numenius, 32.\n\n[286] As Plotinos thinks.\n\n[287] iv. 4.20.\n\n[288] iv. 3.20.\n\n[289] Arist., de Anim. 2.1.\n\n[290] According to Aristotle.\n\n[291] Phaedo, p. 87; Cary, 82.\n\n[292] Similar to the modern James-Lange theory of bodily emotions.\n\n[293] See iv. 4.20, 28.\n\n[294] See sect. 7, 9, 10.\n\n[295] See iv. 3.22, 23.\n\n[296] Porphyry and Ammonius in Bouillet, i. Intr. p. 60, 63, 64, 75,\n79, 93, 96, 98, and note on p. 362 to 377.\n\n[297] Namely, intelligence and the reasonable soul.\n\n[298] See Bouillet, i. p. 325, 332.\n\n[299] Bouillet, Intr. p. lxxviii.\n\n[300] See Bouillet, i., note, p. 327, 341.\n\n[301] One of the three hypostases.\n\n[302] See Bouillet, i. p. lxxiii. 344-352.\n\n[303] Plato, Timaeus, p. 35; Cary, 12.\n\n[304] These images of the universal Soul are the faculties of the soul,\nsense-power, vegetative power, generative power or nature; see iv.\n4.13, 14.\n\n[305] \"Turning\" means here to incline.\n\n[306] See St. Paul, Rom. for phantasy, or imagination; vii. 7-25.\n\n[307] See iv. 3.29-31, also i. 1.9; Numenius, fr. ii. 8, 19; iii. See\nsection 10.\n\n[308] See i. 2.5.\n\n[309] iv. 3.19, 23.\n\n[310] See ii. 9.3, 4, 11, 12.\n\n[311] Fancy or representation, i. 4.10; iv. 3.3, 30, 31.\n\n[312] See 4.3.19, 23; 6.7.6.7.\n\n[313] Plato, Rep. x. p. 611; Cary, 11.\n\n[314] For this see 4.3.12, 18; 4.8.\n\n[315] Odyss. xi. 602, 5; see 4.3.27.\n\n[316] We find here a reassertion of Numenius's doctrine of two souls in\nman, fr. 53.\n\n[317] Bouillet observes that this book is only a feeble outline of\nsome of the ideas developed in vi. 7, 8, and 9. The biographical\nsignificance of this might be as follows. As in the immediately\npreceding books Plotinos was harking back to Numenius's doctrines, he\nmay have wished to reconcile the two divergent periods, the Porphyrian\nmonism of vi. 7 and 8, with the earlier Amelian dualism of vi. 9.\nThis was nothing derogatory to him; for it is well known that there\nwas a difference between the eclectic monism of the young Plato of\nthe Republic, and the more logical dualism of the older Plato of\nthe Laws. This latter was represented by Numenius and Amelius; the\nformer--combined with Aristotelian and Stoic elements--by Porphyry.\nWhere Plato could not decide, why should we expect Plotinos to do\nso? And, as a matter of fact, the world also has never been able to\ndecide, so long as it remained sincere, and did not deceive itself with\nsophistries, as did Hegel. Kant also had his \"thing-in-itself\"--indeed,\nhe did little more than to develop the work of Plotinos.\n\n[318] As the Stoics would say.\n\n[319] Which is one of the three hypostases, ii. 9.1 and v. 1.\n\n[320] We see here Plotinos feeling the approach of this impending\ndissolution.\n\n[321] Arranged by Bouillet in the order of the Enneads they summarize.\n\n[322] Passages in quotation marks are from the text of Plotinos.\n\n[323] See i. 2.3.\n\n[324] See i. 2.4.\n\n[325] See i. 2.4.\n\n[326] See i. 2.6.\n\n[327] See i. 2.7.\n\n[328] See i. 2.7.\n\n[329] See i. 2.5.\n\n[330] See i. 8.1.\n\n[331] See 36.38.\n\n[332] These are the three divine hypostases, i. 8.2; ii. 9.1.\n\n[333] See ii. 2.2.\n\n[334] See v. 3.6.\n\n[335] See iii. 7.2.\n\n[336] See iii. 7.2.\n\n[337] A pun on \"noein\" and \"nous.\"\n\n[338] See v. 3.10-12.\n\n[339] See v. 6.11, 12, 13.\n\n[340] See v. 4.3, 2, 12.\n\n[341] See v. 4.4, 9.\n\n[342] See vi. 4.9.\n\n[343] See vi. 4.16.\n\n[344] See iii. 5.7-9. from Plato.\n\n[345] See vi. 2; vi. 5.\n\n[346] See vi. 5.1.\n\n[347] See vi. 4.4.\n\n[348] See vi. 5.2.\n\n[349] See vi. 5.3, 6.\n\n[350] See vi. 5.4.\n\n[351] See vi. 8.4.\n\n[352] See vi. 5.12.\n\n[353] See iv. 8.1.\n\n[354] See iv. 8.1.\n\n[355] See 23.\n\n[356] Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys., i. 52, ed. Heeren.\n\n[357] See iv. 3.23.\n\n[358] In his book \"On the Soul.\"\n\n[359] See i. 1.12.\n\n[360] See ii. 6.1.\n\n[361] See Ennead, i. 1.\n\n[362] Stobaeus, Ecl. Physicae, i. 52, p. 878.\n\n[363] Of Human Nature, xv.\n\n[364] de Anima, ii. 3.\n\n[365] Stobaeus, Eclogae Physicae, i. 52. p. 894.\n\n[366] On Human Nature, 2.\n\n[367] See Plotinos, ii. 7.1; Porphyry, Principles, 17, 18, 21, 22, 36,\n38.\n\n[368] See iv. 3.20.\n\n[369] See ii. 3.5.\n\n[370] See iv. 3.20.\n\n[371] In his treatise on Providence; Photius, Biblioteca, 127, 461.\n\n[372] i. 1.8; Num. 10.\n\n[373] i. 1.10.\n\n[374] 25.4.a.\n\n[375] 38; 53.\n\n[376] i. 8.1; Num. 16.\n\n[377] i. 8.2.\n\n[378] in v. 5.1.\n\n[379] Num. 27.a.8.\n\n[380] 27.b.10.\n\n[381] Num. 36,a.\n\n[382] In i. 8.3.\n\n[383] Num. 16.\n\n[384] i. 8.4.\n\n[385] 11.\n\n[386] Num. 16.\n\n[387] Num. 15.16.\n\n[388] i. 8.6.\n\n[389] 16.\n\n[390] i. 8.7.\n\n[391] 1.8.10.\n\n[392] 18.\n\n[393] ii. 9.\n\n[394] ii. 4.1.\n\n[395] ii. 4.5.\n\n[396] ii. 4.6.\n\n[397] ii. 4.7.\n\n[398] Num. 32, 18.\n\n[399] Num. 48.\n\n[400] Num. 14.\n\n[401] i. 8.7, with ii. 4.7.\n\n[402] In ii. 4.15, 16.\n\n[403] heterot\u00eas.\n\n[404] ii. 5.\n\n[405] In ii. 5.3.\n\n[406] Num. 20.\n\n[407] iii. 6.6 to end.\n\n[408] iii. 6.12.\n\n[409] iii. 6.11, 12.\n\n[410] 33.\n\n[411] iii. 8.13.\n\n[412] iii. 6.19.\n\n[413] iii. 6.11.\n\n[414] iii. 6.9.\n\n[415] iii. 6.7, 18; with Num. 12, 15, 17.\n\n[416] iii. 6.6.\n\n[417] iii. 6.13; Num. 12; 30.\n\n[418] iii. 6.18; v. 1.1, etc.\n\n[419] iii. 6.6, 13; see ii. 5.3, 5.\n\n[420] iii. 6.14.\n\n[421] iii. 6.11, as against Num. 14, 16.\n\n[422] In iii. 6.6, 8, 10.\n\n[423] In iii. 6.6.\n\n[424] iii. 6.7, 13; see ii. 5.5.\n\n[425] iii. 6.13, 6, 16, 17, 18.\n\n[426] iii. 6.15.\n\n[427] iii. 6.19.\n\n[428] iii. 6.15.\n\n[429] In ii. 5.5.\n\n[430] v. 1.7; iii. 5.6.\n\n[431] iv. 4.13.\n\n[432] In iv. 4.15.\n\n[433] vi. 3.7.\n\n[434] v. 1.7.\n\n[435] i. 8.\n\n[436] ii. 4.\n\n[437] ii. 5.\n\n[438] iii. 6.\n\n[439] In iv. 4.13.\n\n[440] Life of Plotinos, 24, 25.\n\n[441] Vit. Plot. 4, 5, 13, 17.\n\n[442] Ib. 6.\n\n[443] 26.\n\n[444] 14.\n\n[445] 17, 18, 21.\n\n[446] 1, 2, 7.\n\n[447] 14.\n\n[448] 10.\n\n[449] See Daremberg, s. v.\n\n[450] 18.\n\n[451] 17.\n\n[452] 3.\n\n[453] As may be seen in Daremberg's Dictionary of Antiquities, s. v.\n\n[454] Ib. 24.\n\n[455] In c. 8.\n\n[456] c. 10.\n\n[457] 48. Plot. i. 1.2, 12, etc.\n\n[458] Enn. i. 1.2; Num. 29; i. 1.7.\n\n[459] i. 1.3; see Num. 32.\n\n[460] i. 1.7, 12.\n\n[461] 53.\n\n[462] i. 1.13.\n\n[463] 30.21.\n\n[464] i. 1.12.\n\n[465] iv. 8, or even iv. 3.12-18.\n\n[466] 2.9.10.\n\n[467] 1.4.8, 16.\n\n[468] 1.7.3.\n\n[469] Porphyry, Biography 2.\n\n[470] Cave of the Nymphs, 54.\n\n[471] Plato, p. 147.\n\n[472] Rep. iv. 9.\n\n[473] Plut. Def. Or. 17.\n\n[474] To hegemonikon. Enn. ii. 4.2.\n\n[475] ii. 5.3.\n\n[476] ii. 5.5.\n\n[477] vi. 3.7.\n\n[478] In i. 8.3.\n\n[479] In i. 8.10.\n\n[480] 3.6, 14.\n\n[481] 1.8, 13.\n\n[482] 2.9.2.\n\n[483] Num. 26.\n\n[484] Enn. iii. 6.6, 7.\n\n[485] de Mund. iv. 21.\n\n[486] Chaignet, H. Ps. d. G., v. 138.\n\n[487] Proclus, in Parm. vi. 27.\n\n[488] Energeia and dynamis.\n\n[489] 5.1.7, 19.\n\n[490] iii. 5.3.\n\n[491] Ib. 4.7.\n\n[492] Ib. 9.\n\n[493] v. 3.5.\n\n[494] i. 4.14.\n\n[495] iii. 5.6.\n\n[496] 1.1.8.\n\n[497] i. 8.2.\n\n[498] In i. 4.10.\n\n[499] In ii. 9.1.\n\n[500] iii. 3.4.\n\n[501] iii. 2.11.\n\n[502] i. 4.9.\n\n[503] H. Ps. d. Gr. iv. 244.\n\n[504] Enn. vi. 4.9.\n\n[505] Chaignet, ib., iv. 337; Enn. v. 1.7, 10.\n\n[506] ii. 9.1, 2.\n\n[507] See McClintock and Strong, B. T. & E. Encyclopedia, s. v.\n\n[508] Enn. vi, 5.7.\n\n[509] vi. 2.8, 9.\n\n[510] See iv. 4.26; vi. 7.12, 13.\n\n[511] See i. 8.4.\n\n[512] See iv. 2.15.\n\n[513] See iv. 3.9.\n\n[514] See vi. 4.14; vi. 5.6; i. 1.9.\n\n[515] Rom. vii. 7.25.\n\n[516] See v. 1.10.\n\n[517] See iv. 8.5, 6, and iv. 7.13, 14, and iii. 6.14.\n\n[518] See i. 8.13\n\n[519] iv. 3.11.\n\n[520] vi. 1.10.\n\n[521] ii. 1.4.\n\n[522] v. 1.1, v. 4.2, v. 8.11, i. 4.11, v. 1.7, vi. 8.4, iv. 8.4.\n\n[523] i. 1.9 and 12.\n\n[524] x. 2, Enn. ii. 9.13.\n\n[525] Biography, 16.\n\n[526] See v. 8.8.\n\n[527] See viii. 5.12.\n\n[528] See vi. 8.9.\n\n[529] See vi. 7.17.\n\n[530] See v. 5.3.\n\n[531] Rev. iv. 6; see iii. 2.11.\n\n[532] See ii. 9.5; Rev. xxi. 1.\n\n[533] See iii. 2.15.\n\n[534] See v. 3.8.\n\n[535] See i. 8.6.\n\n[536] See iv. 3.6; Jno. xiv. 2.\n\n[537] See iii. 2.4, and Rom. iii. 20.\n\n[538] See vi. 8.15, and Rom. viii. 39.\n\n[539] See v. 5.11, and 1 Cor. xi. 22.\n\n[540] See ii. 1.4, and 2 Cor. xii. 2.\n\n[541] See vi. 2, and Gal. iv. 9.\n\n[542] See ii. 9.6, and i. Tim. 1.4.\n\n[543] See ii. 9.14, and Mark vi. 7.\n\n[544] See v. 3.17, and Mk. ix. 43, 45.\n\n[545] See v. 9.5, and Mt. xxiv. 13.\n\n[546] See vi. 9.9; vi. 5.12, and Acts xvii. 28.\n\n[547] See v. 8.12, and Heb. ii. 11-17\n\n[548] See vi. 7.29, and Jas. i. 17.\n\n[549] Luke xi. 13.\n\n[550] See i. 6.9; ii. 4.5.\n\n[551] v. 5.13.\n\n[552] ii. 9.4.\n\n[553] iv. 3.11.\n\n[554] ii. 9.5.\n\n[555] iv. 8.9.\n\n[556] v. 9.4.\n\n[557] See iii. 8.4; iv. 2.1; vi. 7.8.\n\n[558] See ii. 4.5; v. 7.3; vi. 8.20.\n\n[559] See vi. 6.11.\n\n[560] See vi. 8.20.\n\n[561] See iv. 3.17; vi. 4.9.\n\n[562] See v. 3.15.\n\n[563] See vi. 7.1.\n\n[564] See v. 2.1.\n\n[565] See v. 1.6.\n\n[566] See i. 4.9.\n\n[567] See iii. 8.3.\n\n[568] See vi. 2.8, 9.\n\n[569] See iii. 8.10; ii. 9.2.\n\n[570] See iv. 7.10; v. 1.4; vi. 7.2.\n\n[571] See ii. 9.2.\n\n[572] See vi. 5.7.\n\n[573] iii. 6.6 to end.\n\n[574] N. 20.6.\n\n[575] ii. 9.10.\n\n[576] i. 8.4; ii. 9.2, 10; vi. 7.5, with N. 26.3.\n\n[577] ii. 9.6, with N. 36.\n\n[578] iv. 3.17, with N. 26.3.\n\n[579] v. 3.9; v. 5.7; vi. 5.5.\n\n[580] ii. 9.1; but see ii. 9.8; iv. 8.3, etc.\n\n[581] iv. 3.17.\n\n[582] 46-54.\n\n[583] 49, 50; or, 22%.\n\n[584] 46-48, 51-54; or, 88%.\n\n[585] 22-33, 12 books.\n\n[586] 23, 26, 27, 31, 32, 33; or, 50%.\n\n[587] 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30; or, 50%.\n\n[588] 33-45, 12 books.\n\n[589] 34, 37, 38, 39, 43, 44.\n\n[590] 35, 36, 40, 41, 42, 45.\n\n[591] v. 1.9.\n\n[592] v. 5.6; N. 42, 67.\n\n[593] v. 4.2 and N. 15-17.\n\n[594] v. 8.5; v. 9.3; vi. 6.9; and N. 20.\n\n[595] i. 8.6; i. 4.11; iii. 3.7; and N. 16, 17.\n\n[596] vi. 8.19; and N. 10; 32.\n\n[597] v. 1.6; with N. 14.\n\n[598] v. 1.9; with N. 36, 39.\n\n[599] vi. 4.16; iv. 3.11.\n\n[600] N. 54.\n\n[601] N. 49a.\n\n[602] vi. 5.9; and N. 46.\n\n[603] iii. 6.\n\n[604] N. 44.\n\n[605] ii. 7.2; vi. 1.29; and N. 44.\n\n[606] In meaning at least.\n\n[607] iv. 7.2, 3; and N. 44.\n\n[608] iv. 7.2, 3; v. 9.3; N. 40.\n\n[609] Philebus, in iv. 3.1.\n\n[610] vi. 2.21.\n\n[611] i. 2.6; v. 3.17; iii. 4.\n\n[612] vi. 3.16.\n\n[613] i. 6.6.\n\n[614] N. 31.22; 33.8.\n\n[615] iv. 8.2; i. 8.2; v. 5.3; vi. 7.42; and N. 27a. 8.\n\n[616] v. 1.4, and N. 19.\n\n[617] v. 8.3; ii. 9.3, 8.\n\n[618] i. 8.6 and N. 10.\n\n[619] vi. 2.2 and N. 14.\n\n[620] vi. 5.6 and N. 42, 67.\n\n[621] v. 8.3; iii. 4.2; N. 27a. 8.\n\n[622] iii. 8.8; iv. 3.1, 8; vi. 8.7; and N. 27b. 9.\n\n[623] Still, see 30.\n\n[624] iv. 8.2; vi. 9.9; N. 29.\n\n[625] iii. 2.4; v. 1.6; v. 5.7; and N. 29.18.\n\n[626] i. 8.4; ii. 9.2, 10; vi. 7.5 and N. 26.3; 27a. 10.\n\n[627] vi. 5.6; and N. 37, 63.\n\n[628] iv. 7.1; vi. 5.10; and N. 12.8.\n\n[629] vi. 4.10; vi. 5.3; ii. 9.7; with N. 12, 22.\n\n[630] v. 8.13; and N. 26.3.\n\n[631] iii. 2.2; with N. 16, 17.\n\n[632] iii. 1.22; iv. 2.1, 2; iv. 7.2; and N. 38.\n\n[633] ii. 9.7; v. 6.6; vi. 5.3; and N. 12, 15, 22, 26.3.\n\n[634] iv. 3.8; vi. 7.3; and N. 48.\n\n[635] iv. 3.11; with N. 32.\n\n[636] iv. 3.17, 21; with N. 32.\n\n[637] iv. 3.17; with N. 26.3.\n\n[638] iv. 7; and N. 44.\n\n[639] N. 55.\n\n[640] ii. 7.2; vi. 1.29; and N. 44.\n\n[641] iv. 7.3; vi. 3.16; and N. 44.\n\n[642] ii. 3.9; iii. 4.6; and N. 46, 52, 56.\n\n[643] Still, see i. 1.9; iv. 3.31; vi. 4.15; and N. 53.\n\n[644] i. 1.12; ii. 3.9; ii. 9.2; iv. 3.31; iv. 2.2; and N. 53.\n\n[645] iv. 3.31; with N. 32.\n\n[646] N. 52.\n\n[647] i. 1.10; iv. 7.8; v. 8.3.\n\n[648] iii. 4.4; and N. 15.\n\n[649] N. 15.\n\n[650] ii. 9.5.\n\n[651] i. 3.1.\n\n[652] i. 3.2.\n\n[653] i. 3.3.\n\n[654] v. 9.1.\n\n[655] iv. 4.10; with N. 12.\n\n[656] iv. 3.25; with N. 25.\n\n[657] ii. 9.11; i. 6.7; vi. 7.34; vi. 9.11; with N. 10.\n\n[658] iv. 8.8; and N. 51.\n\n[659] iv. 8.1; and N. 62a.\n\n[660] iv. 8.1; quoting Empedocles; N. 43.\n\n[661] iv. 2.2; and N. 27b.\n\n[662] iv. 3.21; and N. 32, 36, 16.\n\n[663] N. 26.\n\n[664] iv. 3.17.\n\n[665] ii. 3.8; iii. 3.4; N. 36, 53.\n\n[666] ii. 9.6.\n\n[667] v. 9.5; and N. 28.\n\n[668] iv. 7.14; and N. 55, 56.\n\n[669] 61, 62a.\n\n[670] ii. 9.14.\n\n[671] 10.\n\n[672] iii. 6.6 to end.\n\n[673] 14, 15, 16, 17, 44.\n\n[674] vi. 1, and passim.\n\n[675] ii. 3.16; ii. 4.16; ii. 5.2; and N. 55.\n\n[676] i. 8.15; i. 1.9; i. 4.10; iv. 3.3, 30.31; vi. 8.3; iv. 7.8; and\nN. 2, 3, 4.7 and 24.\n\n[677] vi. 5.6; and N. 42, 67.\n\n[678] All of ii. 6; iii. 6.6; iii. 7.5; iii. 8.9; iv. 3.9; iv. 3.24; v.\n3.6, 15, 17; v. 4.1, 2; v. 5.10, 13, 55; v. 8.5, 6; v. 9.3; vi. 2.2, 5,\n6, 8, 9, 13; vi. 3.6, 16; vi. 6.10, 13, 16; vi. 7.41; vi. 9.2, 3.\n\n[679] v. 9.3; and N. 21, 22.\n\n[680] v. 4.2; and N. 10; vi. 6.9; and N. 34.\n\n[681] vi. 6.9; N. 10, 21.\n\n[682] v. 1.5; vi. 5.9; vi. 6.16; and N. 46.\n\n[683] vi. 6.16; and N. 60.\n\n[684] vi. 2.9; and N. 26.\n\n[685] vi. 4.2.\n\n[686] ii. 4.5; iv. 8.7; v. 5.4; and N. 36b.\n\n[687] iv. 3.1; v. 4.2; and N. 36c?\n\n[688] ii. 5.3; and N. 14, 16, 26.\n\n[689] v. 4.2; v. 5.4; and N. 14.\n\n[690] ii. 9.1; and N. 25.\n\n[691] iii. 8.9; iii. 9.1; v. 1.8; and N. 36, 39.\n\n[692] v. 5.3; and N. 36, 39.\n\n[693] i. 3.4; and N. 10, 13.\n\n[694] ii. 4.9; ii. 7.2; vi. 1.29; vi. 3.16; and N. 44.\n\n[695] iv. 9.4; and N. 44.\n\n[696] iii. 4.1; and N. 44.\n\n[697] iv. 6.7; and N. 44.\n\n[698] iv. 3.20; and N. 12, 44.\n\n[699] N. 20.\n\n[700] N. 21.\n\n[701] iii. 7.3, 5; and N. 19.\n\n[702] N. 55, 56; 57.\n\n[703] iii. 4.2; and N. 57.\n\n[704] i. 8.2; iii. 2.16; iv. 7.14; vi. 6.16; vi. 7.6; and N. 32.\n\n[705] v. 1.1; and N. 17, 26.\n\n[706] vi. 5.3; vi. 7.31; and N. 11, 15, 16, 17, 12.7, 22, 26.\n\n[707] i. 8.3; v. 5.13; and N. 15, 16, 49b.\n\n[708] i. 4.11; i. 8.6, 7; ii. 3.18; iii. 2.5, 15; iii. 8.9; and N. 16,\n17, 18.\n\n[709] i. 8.7; iii. 2.2, N. 15, 17. Alexander of Aphrodisia taught this\nworld was a mixture; ii. 7.1; iv. 7.13.\n\n[710] iv. 9.4; v. 16; and N. 26.\n\n[711] Plotinos passim; N. 25.\n\n[712] vi. 1.23; and N. 18. Also vi. 9.10, 11.\n\n[713] Passim; N. 10, 37, 63.\n\n[714] v. 8.1; and N. 43.\n\n[715] iii. 9.3; and N. 31.\n\n[716] vi. 2.7; vi. 3.27; and N. 19.4, 20; 27a; 30.\n\n[717] iii. 7.3; iv. 4.33; and N. 30.\n\n[718] ii. 4.2-5; ii. 5.3; v. 4.2; and N. 26.\n\n[719] ii. 4.12; etc.\n\n[720] ii. 4.6; and N. 11, 18.\n\n[721] ii. 6.2; and N. 12.8; 18.\n\n[722] ii. 4.10; and N. 12, 16, 17.\n\n[723] v. 1.6; vi. 9.10, 11; and N. 10.\n\n[724] vi. 4.2; vi. 9.3; and N. 10.\n\n[725] iv. 7.3; and N. 13, 27, 44.\n\n[726] iv. 4.16; and N. 46.\n\n[727] Might it mean an angle, and one of its sides?\n\n[728] iii. 4.2; and N. 27.\n\n[729] iv. 8.5, 6; and N. 27b.\n\n[730] v. 9.6; and N. 23.\n\n[731] v. 1.5.\n\n[732] vi. 7.17, 36; vi. 9.9; and N. 29.\n\n[733] iii. 4.2; iv. 3.11; v. 8.3; v. 1.2; and N. 27b.\n\n[734] iii. 4.6; and N. 35a.\n\n[735] vi. 7.1; and N. 27a, b.\n\n[736] Creation or adornment, ii. 4.4, 6; iv. 3.14; and N. 14, 18.\n\n[737] i. 1.3; iv. 3.17, 21; and N 32.\n\n[738] Bouillet ii. 520.\n\n[739] ib. ii. 584.\n\n[740] ib. ii. 607.\n\n[741] ib. ii. 597.\n\n[742] ib. ii. 561.\n\n[743] B. iii. 638-650.\n\n[744] ib. 651-653.\n\n[745] ib. 654-656.\n\n[746] Bouillet ii. 520.\n\n[747] ib. ii. 562.\n\n[748] ib. ii. 585.\n\n[749] ib. ii. 588.\n\n[750] Biog. 8, 13.\n\n[751] Biog. 17, 18.\n\n[752] Biog. 24.\n\n[753] iii. 7.1, 4.\n\n[754] v. 8.4.\n\n[755] v. 8.5, 6.\n\n[756] iii. 5.8.\n\n[757] vi. 3.8.\n\n[758] i. 8.7; ii. 4.4; iii. 8.11; iv. 8.13; v. 9.8. 4.4; iii. 8.11; v.\n8.13; v. 9.8. 1.11.\n\n[762] v. 5.5.\n\n[763] vi. 1.23.\n\n[764] ii. 9.4.\n\n[765] v. 5.1.\n\n[766] iii. 5.3.\n\n[767] v. 5.5.\n\n[768] v. 3.5, 6.\n\n[769] vi. 1.15.\n\n[770] iii. 5.9, 10.\n\n[771] iv. 3.14.\n\n[772] iv. 7.4; ii. 6.2; iii. 2.17.\n\n[773] iv. 4.29.\n\n[774] v. 9.5.\n\n[775] iv. 9.3.\n\n[776] vi. 1.18.\n\n[777] vi. 8.18.\n\n\n\n\nCONCORDANCE TO PLOTINOS.\n\nOf the two numbers in the parenthesis, the first is the chronological\nbook number, the second is the reference's page in this translation.\n\n\n      A\n\n  Abandonment by Providence, even of the mediocre, impossible, iii. 2.9\n    (47-1058).\n\n  Ability or desire is the limit of man's union with the divinity, v.\n    8.11 (31-569).\n\n  Absolute Beauty is a formless shape, vi. 7.33 (38-754).\n\n  Absolute Evil is the goal of the degenerate soul, i. 8.15 (51-1163).\n\n  Absolute Existent is preceded by contingent, vi. 1.26 (42-881).\n\n  Abstraction is method of reaching divinity, vi. 8.21 (39-811).\n\n  Abstraction of qualities ends in thing-in-itself, ii. 4.10 (12-207).\n\n  Abstraction of the form produces thought of infinite, vi. 6.3\n    (34-646).\n\n  Abundance and Need, myth of, iii. 6.14 (26-375).\n\n  Abundance (Poros), myth of, iii. 5.2-10 (50-1125 to 1140).\n\n  Academy, vi. 1.14, 30 (42-863, 888).\n\n  Accidents are received by the soul from matter, v. 9.14 (5-117).\n\n  Accidents, is the fifth physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3\n    (44-937).\n\n  Accomplishments are only temporary crutches for development, i. 4.16\n    (46-1040).\n\n  Accretion, foreign, is the nature of ugliness, i. 6.5 (1-48).\n\n  Accretions to soul, and body, are removed from soul by philosophic\n    \"separation,\" i. 1.12 (53-1204).\n\n  Action and experience does not include prediction with its\n    responsiveness, and is underlayed by transmission, reception, and\n    relation, vi. 1.22 (42-874).\n\n  Action and experiencing, Aristotelian category, vi. 1.15 (42-863).\n\n  Action and passion iii. 3.2 (48-1078).\n\n  Action and reaction form but a single genus, vi. 1.19 (42-870).\n\n  Action and suffering cannot be separate categories, but are subsumed\n    under movement, vi. 1.17 (42-866).\n\n  Action does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-920).\n\n  Action is natural on both wholes and parts, iv. 4.31 (28-487).\n\n  Action, uniform, is exerted by body and varied by the soul, iv. 7.4\n    (2-62).\n\n  Actions, some appear imperfect when not joined to time, vi. 1.19\n    (42-868).\n\n  Actions do not control freedom of will and virtue, vi. 8.5 (39-779).\n\n  Active life predisposes to subjection to enchantments, iv. 4.43\n    (28-507).\n\n  Activity of soul is triple: thought, self-preservation and creation,\n    iv. 8.3 (6-125).\n\n  Actors good and bad, are rewarded by the manager: so are souls, iii.\n    2.17 (47-1072).\n\n  Actual, everything is actual in the intelligible world, ii. 5.3\n    (25-346).\n\n  Actual matter cannot be anything, as it is non-being, ii. 5.2, 4\n    (25-343 to 347).\n\n  Actuality and potentiality, iii. 9.8 (13-225).\n\n  Actuality and potentiality are inapplicable to the divinity, ii. 9.1\n    (33-600).\n\n  Actualization, continuous, constitutes Intelligence, iv. 7.13 (18),\n    (2-84); iv. 8.6, 7 (6-129, 130).\n\n  Actualization is a far better category than doing or acting, vi. 1.15\n    (42-863).\n\n  Actualization is prior to potentiality (devolution), iv. 7.8 (11),\n    (2-74).\n\n  Actualization of soul in life, is the sole use of its existence, iv.\n    8.5 (6-127).\n\n  Actualization, single and simple, iv. 7.12 (17), (2-83).\n\n  Actualization when appearing is harmonized to its seminal reason, vi.\n    3.16 (44-960).\n\n  Actualizations are none of bodies that enter into a mixture, iv. 7.8\n    (10), (2-72).\n\n  Actualizations are the condition of Intelligence, because its thought\n    is identical with its essence, v. 9.3 (5-104).\n\n  Actualizations, permanent, form the hypostasis, v. 3.12 (49-1111).\n\n  Actualizations, relative, are sensations, not experiences, iv. 6.2\n    (41-831).\n\n  Acuteness may destroy excessive ecstatic vision, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Administration by Jupiter does not imply memory, iv. 4.9 (28-453).\n\n  Admiration of his handiwork, by the Creator, refers to the\n    world-model, v. 8.8 (31-564).\n\n  Admiration of the world, by Plato, supplements his hatred of the\n    body, ii. 9.17 (33-633).\n\n  Adrastea, law of, is justice, ii. 3.8 (52-1173); iii. 2.4, 13\n    (47-1049 to 1062).\n\n  Adulteries not produced by planet-positions, ii. 3.6 (52-1171).\n\n  Adumbrations of superior principles, i. 6.8 (1-52).\n\n  Advantages resulting from ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Aeon Jesus, is unaccountable, ii. 9.1 (33-601).\n\n  Aeon, see eternity, throughout, iii. 7.1 sqq (45-985).\n\n  Aesthetic sense appreciates beauty, i. 6.2 (1-42).\n\n  Affection and weaknesses of man subject him to magic, iv. 4.44\n    (28-508).\n\n  \"Affection of matter,\" definition of soul; if such, whence is she?\n    iv. 7.3.d (2-59).\n\n  Affections are common to soul and body; not all are such, i. 1.5\n    (53-1197).\n\n  Affections caused by incorporeal's affective part, iii. 6.4 (26-357).\n\n  Affections, derivation of qualities from them is of no importance,\n    vi. 1.11 (42-857).\n\n  Affections of soul, like a musician playing a lyre, iii. 6.4 (26-358).\n\n  Affections produced by \"tension\" in lyre-strings, iv. 7.8 (2-75).\n\n  Age, pun on \"aeons,\" iii. 7.4 (45-992).\n\n  Aggregate, composite, see \"combination,\" i. 1.1 (53-1191).\n\n  Aggregate individual, formed by uniting of soul and body, i. 1.6\n    (53-1197).\n\n  Aggregate of molecules could not possess life and intelligence, iv.\n    7.2, 3 (2-57).\n\n  Agriculture, v. 9.11 (5-114).\n\n  Aid to magnitude-perception, is color-difference, ii. 8.1 (35-681).\n\n  Air and fire, action of, not needed by Heaven, ii. 1.8 (40-826).\n\n  Air contained in intelligible world, vi. 7.11 (38-720).\n\n  Air not necessary, even for hearing, iv. 5.5 (29-523).\n\n  Air, relation to light, iv. 5.6 (29-524).\n\n  Air, useless as transmitting medium, iv. 5.3 (29-519).\n\n  Alexander of Aphrodisia's theory of mixture, iv. 7.2, 8 (2-58, 72);\n    iii. 1.7 (3-96).\n\n  Alienation, v. 1.10 (10-190).\n\n  All in all, iii. 8.8 (30-543); iv. 3.8 (27-402).\n\n  All is intelligence, vi. 7.17 (38-729).\n\n  All things are united by a common source, vi. 7.12 (38-721).\n\n  All things, how the same principle can exist in them, vi. 4.6\n    (22-295).\n\n  All things, is the soul, iii. 4.3 (15-236).\n\n  All things, transcended by their principle, v. 2.1 (11-193).\n\n  Alone with the alone, i. 6.7 (1-50); vi. 7.34 (38-757); vi. 9.11\n    (9-172).\n\n  Aloneness of Supreme, v. 1.6 (10-182).\n\n  Alteration, definition of, vi. 3.22 (44-973).\n\n  Alteration, not constituted by composition and decomposition, vi.\n    3.25 (44-978).\n\n  Alteration of soul, Stoic conception, opposed, iii. 6.3 (26-355).\n\n  Alternate living in Intelligence and world, by soul, iv. 8.4 (6-126).\n\n  Alternate rising and falling of soul when in body, iii. 1.8 (3-97).\n\n  Amphibians, souls are, iv. 8.48 (6-126).\n\n  Analogy explains prediction, iii. 3.6 (48-1086).\n\n  Analogy only allows us to attribute physical qualities to the\n    Supreme, vi. 8.8 (39-785).\n\n  Analysis, contingency is eliminated in, vi. 8.14 (39-798).\n\n  Analyze, object of myths, iii. 5.10 (50-1138).\n\n  Anger localized in the heart, iv. 3.23 (27-426); iv. 4.28 (28-481).\n\n  Anger-part of earth, iv. 4.28 (28-482).\n\n  Anger-part of soul explained, iii. 6.2 (26-354).\n\n  Anger-power, does not originate in body, iv. 4.28 (28-481).\n\n  Anger-trace of the soul, originates in growth and generative power,\n    iv. 4.28 (28-481).\n\n  Animal, existing is intelligence (Plato) iii. 9.1 (13-220).\n\n  Animal nature formed by light of soul, i. 1-7 (53-1198).\n\n  Animal nature, how it is generated, i. 1.12,(53-1205).\n\n  Animal, relation of, to human nature, i. 1.7 (53-1199).\n\n  Animal, the living, i. 1.5 (53-1196).\n\n  Animal, what is it, i. 1.1 (53-1191).\n\n  Animals, all are born from essence, vi. 2.21 (43-929).\n\n  Animals, are they happy? i. 4.1 (46-1019).\n\n  Animals, distinction to the whole, i. 1.7 (53-1199).\n\n  Animals, do they possess right to living well, i. 4.2 (46-1020).\n\n  Animals, four kinds, seen in intelligence, iii. 9.1 (13-221).\n\n  Animals, individual and universal, exist later than number, vi. 6.15\n    (34-668).\n\n  Animals, irrational, must exist within intelligence, vi. 7.8 (38-713).\n\n  Animals, lower nature of, ridiculous to complain of, iii. 2.9\n    (47-1059).\n\n  Animals, many are not so irrational as different, vi. 7.9 (38-714).\n\n  Animals, their animating principle, i. 1.10 (53-1204).\n\n  Animated, universe was always, iv. 3.9 (27-404).\n\n  Animating principle of animals, i. 1.11 (53-1204).\n\n  Answers, how they come to prayers, iv. 4.41 (28-505).\n\n  Antechamber of good is intelligence, v. 9.2 (5-104).\n\n  Anterior things can be only in lower principles, iv. 4.16 (28-461).\n\n  Anteriority in intelligible, is order not time, iv. 4.1 (28-443).\n\n  Anxiety absent from rule of world by soul, iv. 8.2 (6-122).\n\n  Aphrodite, see Venus, pun on, iii. 5.8 (50-1137).\n\n  Apollo, name of Supreme, v. 5.6 (32-584).\n\n  Apostasy of soul from God, v. 1.1 (10-173).\n\n  Appearance, by it only does matter participate in the intelligible,\n    iii. 6.11 (26-369).\n\n  Appearance, magnitude is only, iii. 6.18 (26-381).\n\n  Appearance, makes up unreal sense objects, iii. 6.12 (26-371).\n\n  Appearance of intelligence in the intelligible, v. 3.8 (49-1102).\n\n  Apperception-unity, iv. 4.1 (28-442).\n\n  Appetite is the actualization of lustful desire, iv. 8.8 (6-132).\n\n  Appetite keeps an affection, not memory, iv. 3.28 (27-435).\n\n  Appetite located in combination of body and soul, iv. 4.20 (28-468).\n\n  Appetite not simultaneous with desire, i. 1.5 (53-1197).\n\n  Appetite noticed only when perceived by reason or interior sense, iv.\n    8.8 (6-132).\n\n  Appetite, when swaying soul, leaves it passive, iii. 1.9 (3-98).\n\n  Apportionment of spirit, iv. 7.8 (2-68).\n\n  Appreciation of self, v. 1.1 (10-174).\n\n  Approach, how the body approaches the soul, vi. 4.15 (22-309).\n\n  Approach impossible in connection with non-spatial intelligible\n    light, v. 5.8 (32-587).\n\n  Approach of soul to good, by simplification, i. 6.6 (1-50).\n\n  Approach to Supreme is sufficient talk of Him, v. 3.14 (49-1114).\n\n  Approach to the First, manner of, v. 5.10 (32-591).\n\n  Approach to the soul, which is lowest divine, v. 1.7 (10-186).\n\n  Approaching of soul's rejection of form, proves formlessness of the\n    Supreme, vi. 7.34 (38-756).\n\n  Archetype of the world, the intelligible is, v. 1.4 (10-178).\n\n  Archetype, universal, contained by intelligence, v. 9.9 (5-112).\n\n  Archetypes, vi. 5.8 (23-322).\n\n  Aristotelian category of When? vi. 1.13 (42-860).\n\n  Aristotelian distinction, actuality and potentiality, ii. 5.1\n    (25-341).\n\n  Aristotle was wrong in considering rough, rare and dense qualities,\n    vi. 1.11 (42-857).\n\n  Art intelligible, creates the artist and later nature, v. 8.1\n    (31-552).\n\n  Art makes a statue out of rough marble, v. 8.1 (31-552).\n\n  Artificial movements, vi. 3.26 (44-980).\n\n  Artist of the universe is the soul, iv. 7.13 (2-84).\n\n  Arts, auxiliary, which help the progress of nature, v. 9.11 (5-115).\n\n  Arts, dependent on the soul, v. 9.14 (5-118).\n\n  Arts, most achieve their own ends, iv. 4.31 (28-488).\n\n  Arts, some, merely earthly, others more intelligible, v. 9.11 (5-114).\n\n  Ascended soul, not even, need be divided, iv. 4.1 (28-442).\n\n  Ascension of sign, absurd, ii. 3.6 (52-1171).\n\n  Ascension of soul in ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170).\n\n  Ascension to Divinity, iv. 7.10 (2-79).\n\n  Ascension towards divinity, process of life, i. 6.7 (1-50).\n\n  Ascent cannot stop with the soul, why? v. 9.4 (5-106).\n\n  Ascent of life witnessed to disappearance of contingency, vi. 8.15\n    (39-801).\n\n  Ascent of the soul psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-310).\n\n  Aspects and houses, absurdity, ii. 3.4 (52-1168).\n\n  Assimilation depends on taking a superior model, i. 2.7 (19-267).\n\n  Assimilation of matter, not complete in earthly defects, v. 9.12\n    (5-115).\n\n  Assimilation to divine, key of vision to ecstasy, i. 6.9 (1-53).\n\n  Assimilation to divinity, is flight from world, i. 2.5 (19-263).\n\n  Assimilation to divinity, is soul's welfare and beauty. i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Assimilation to divinity results only in higher virtues, i. 2.1\n    (19-256).\n\n  Assimilation to Supreme, by homely virtues, indirectly, i. 2.3\n    (19-260).\n\n  Astrologers make cosmic deductions from prognostication, iii. 1.2\n    (3-89).\n\n  Astrological influence is merely an indication, iv. 4.34 (28-494).\n\n  Astrological influence, partly action, partly significance, iv. 4.34\n    (28-495).\n\n  Astrological power not due to physical soul, iv. 4.38 (28-501).\n\n  Astrological system of fate, iii. 1.5 (3-92).\n\n  Astrological theories absurd, ii. 3.6 (52-1171).\n\n  Astrological views of Venus, Jupiter and Mercury, ii. 3.5 (52-1169).\n\n  Astrologically, divine would be blamed for unjust acts, iii. 2.10\n    (47-1059).\n\n  Astrology confuted, leaves influence of world-soul, iv. 4.32 (28-490).\n\n  Astrology replaced by natural production of souls, iv. 4.38 (28-501).\n\n  Astrology replaced by radiation of good and characteristic figures,\n    iv. 4.35 (28-498).\n\n  Astrology reveals teleology, ii 3.7 (52-1172).\n\n  Astrology, signs only concatenations from universal reason, iv. 4.3\n    (28-502).\n\n  Astrology, truth of, judgement of one part by another, ii. 3.7\n    (52-1173).\n\n  Athens, vi. 1.14 (42-863).\n\n  Atomism, does not demand a medium for vision, iv. 5.2 (29-516).\n\n  Atoms, iii. 1.2 (3-88).\n\n  Atoms do not explain matter, ii. 4.7 (12-204).\n\n  Atropos, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).\n\n  Attachment to centre constitutes divinity, vi. 9.8 (9-163).\n\n  Attention, condition of perception, v. 1.12 (10-191).\n\n  Attracting all things, does the power and beauty of essence, vi. 6.18\n    (34-678).\n\n  Attribute, fourth physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937).\n\n  Attributing qualities to good, would degrade it, v. 5.13 (32-595).\n\n  Audacity not in higher soul, see boldness, i. 1.2 (53-1192).\n\n  Audacity the cause of human apostasy, v. 1.1 (10-173); v. 2.2\n    (11-195).\n\n  Author of this perfection must be above it, vi. 7.32 (38-752).\n\n  Autocracy of divinity, vi. 8.21 (39-810).\n\n  Aversion for ugliness, explains love of beauty, i. 6.5 (1-47).\n\n  Avoid magic enchantments, how to, iv. 4.44 (28-510).\n\n  Avoidance of passions, is task of philosophy, iii. 6.5 (26-358).\n\n\n  Bacchus, mirror of, iv. 3.12 (27-409).\n\n  Ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165); vi. 2.11 (43-912).\n\n  Ballet dancer, iii. 2.17 (47-1071).\n\n  Bastard, reason goes beyond corporeity, ii. 4.12 (12-212).\n\n  Bastard reasoning, is abstraction reaching thing in itself, ii. 4.10,\n    12 (12-207, 212); i. 8.9, 10 (51-1156); vi. 8.8 (39-786).\n\n  Bath-tub, simile of, vi 9.8 (9-163).\n\n  Beauties, moral, more delightful than sense-beauties, i. 6.4 (1-46).\n\n  Beautification, by descent upon object of reason from divine, i. 6.2\n    (1-43).\n\n  Beautiful, inferior to good, v. 5.12 (32-593).\n\n  Beautiful, most things, such only by participation, i. 6.2 (1-43).\n\n  Beautiful, nothing more could be imagined than the world, ii. 9.4\n    (33-606).\n\n  Beautiful, the Supreme, of three ranks of existence, vi. 7.42\n    (38-770).\n\n  Beautiful, what is its principle, i. 6.1 (1-41).\n\n  Beauty, v. 1.11 (10-189).\n\n  Beauty absolute, is a formless shape, vi. 7.33 (38-754).\n\n  Beauty and good, identical, i. 6.6 (1-51).\n\n  Beauty and power of essence attracts all things, vi. 6.18 (34-678).\n\n  Beauty appreciated by an aesthetic sense, i. 6.3 (1-43).\n\n  Beauty belongs to men, when they belong to and know themselves, v.\n    8.13 (31-574).\n\n  Beauty classified along with the relatives, vi. 3.11 (44-952).\n\n  Beauty comes from form imparted by originator, v. 8.2 (31-553).\n\n  Beauty consists in kinship to the soul, i. 6.2 (1-42).\n\n  Beauty consists in participation in a form, i. 6.2 (1-43).\n\n  Beauty does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-920).\n\n  Beauty does not possess extension, iv. 7.8 (2-69).\n\n  Beauty, emotions of, caused by invincible soul, i. 6.5 (1-46).\n\n  Beauty essential is Supreme, the shapeless shaper, and the\n    transcendent, vi. 7.33 (38-754).\n\n  Beauty external, appreciation of, depends on cognition of interior\n    beauty, v. 8.2 (31-554).\n\n  Beauty external, partial, does not mar beauty of universe, ii. 9.17\n    (33-634).\n\n  Beauty, highest conceivable, is the model, v. 8.8 (31-564).\n\n  Beauty, if it is a genus, must be one of the posterior ones, vi. 2.18\n    (43-923).\n\n  Beauty inferior to good, i. 6.9 (1-54).\n\n  Beauty in last analysis is intelligible, v. 8.3 (31-555).\n\n  Beauty in nothing if not in God v. 8.8 (31-564).\n\n  Beauty intelligible, v. 8 (31).\n\n  Beauty intelligible, does not shine merely on surface, v. 8.10\n    (31-568).\n\n  Beauty interior, could not be appreciated, without interior model, i.\n    6.4 (1-45).\n\n  Beauty is creating principle of primary reason, v. 8.3 (31-555).\n\n  Beauty is immortal, iii. 5.1 (50-1124).\n\n  Beauty is inherent wisdom, v. 8.2 (31-554).\n\n  Beauty is symmetry, acc. to Stoics, opposed, i. 6.1 (1-41).\n\n  Beauty is unseen, in supreme fusion, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Beauty, love for, explained by aversion for opposite, i. 6.5 (1-47).\n\n  Beauty makes being desirable, v. 8.9 (31-565).\n\n  Beauty model, is intelligence, hence very beautiful, v. 8.13 (31-573).\n\n  Beauty not in physical characters, but in color form, v. 8.2 (31-553).\n\n  Beauty of body need not imply attachment thereto, ii. 9.17 (33-634).\n\n  Beauty of daily life reviewed, in sight, sound, science and morals,\n    i. 6.1 (1-40).\n\n  Beauty of soul is as the matter to the soul, v. 8.3 (31-555); 6.6\n    (1-43).\n\n  Beauty of world, even added to, iv. 3.14 (27-412).\n\n  Beauty primary, chiefly revealed in virtuous soul, v. 8.3 (31-555).\n\n  Beauty, shining, highest appearance of vision of intelligible wisdom,\n    v. 8.10 (31-568).\n\n  Beauty that is perceivable is a form, beneath super beautiful, v. 8.8\n    (31-564).\n\n  Beauty transition from sense to intellectual, i. 6.2 (1-43).\n\n  Beauty visible, is effect and image of the intelligible, iii. 5.1\n    (50-1122).\n\n  Becoming, v. 1.9 (10-187).\n\n  Begetter of intelligence must be simpler than it, iii. 8.8 (30-542).\n\n  Begetter of intelligence reached by intuition, not reason, iii. 8.8\n    (30-543).\n\n  Begetting, eternal, is the world, ii. 9.3 (33-604).\n\n  Begetting, lower forms of, due to seminal reasons, iii. 8.7 (30-541).\n\n  Begetting Son, by Supreme, result of ecstasy, v. 8.12 (31-572).\n\n  Beginning, Heaven has none, proves its immortality, ii. 1.4 (40-818).\n\n  Begotten, nothing is in universal soul, vi. 4.14 (22-307).\n\n  Begotten what is, not seminal reason, contains order, iv. 4.16\n    (28-461).\n\n  Being, v. 1.5, 8 (10-181 and 186).\n\n  Being, above intelligent life, iii. 6.6 (25-360).\n\n  Being, actualized, less perfect than essence, ii. 6.1 (17-245).\n\n  Being and actualization, constitute self-existent principle, vi. 8.7\n    (39-784).\n\n  Being and essence identical with unity, vi. 9.2 (9-149).\n\n  Being and quiddity earlier than suchness, ii. 6.2 (17-248).\n\n  Being cannot be ascribed to matter, vi. 3.7 (44-944).\n\n  Being cannot precede such being, ii. 6.2 (17-248).\n\n  Being contains its cause, vi. 7.3 (38-704).\n\n  Being desirable because beautiful, v. 8.9 (31-566).\n\n  Being distinguished into four senses, vi. 1.2 (42-839).\n\n  Being, every one, is a specialized organ of the universe, iv. 4.45\n    (28-510).\n\n  Being in the intelligible is generation in the sense-world, vi. 3.1\n    (44-933).\n\n  Being is very wisdom, v. 8.4, 5 (31-559).\n\n  Being loves essence as entire, vi. 5.10 (23-325).\n\n  Being lower form of, possessed by evil, i. 8.3 (51-1145).\n\n  Being of a soul, iv. 1. (4-100).\n\n  Being of a thing displayed by its energy, iii. 1.1 (3-87).\n\n  Being physical, is that which is not in a subject, vi. 3.5 (44-941).\n\n  Being physical, principle of all other things, vi. 3.4 (44-940).\n\n  Being present everywhere entire, only solution of a puzzle, vi. 5.3\n    (23-317).\n\n  Being primary and secondary, divided by no substantial differences,\n    vi. 3.9 (44-949).\n\n  Being supra lunar, is deity, in intelligible, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).\n\n  Being supreme, not dependent on it, therefore above it, vi. 8.19\n    (39-807).\n\n  Being the basis of judgment, in things participating in being, vi.\n    5.2 (23-315).\n\n  Being universal, description of, vi. 4.2 (23-286).\n\n  Being, universal, is undividable, vi. 4.3 (22-288).\n\n  Beings, all are contemplation, iii. 8.7 (30-542).\n\n  Beings, all contained by intelligence generatively, v. 9.6 (5-109).\n\n  Benefits are granted to men through the world-soul's mediation, iv.\n    4.30 (28-486).\n\n  Better nature of man, not dominant because of subconscious nature,\n    iii. 3.4 (48-1081).\n\n  Bewitched, gnostics imagine intelligible entities can be, ii. 9.14\n    (33-627).\n\n  Beyond first, impossible to go, vi. 8.11 (39-791).\n\n  Bile, fulfils unique role in universe, ii. 3.5 (52-1171).\n\n  Birds, overweighted like sensual men, v. 9.1 (5-102).\n\n  Birth of subordinate deities, inhering in Supreme, v. 8.9 (31-566).\n\n  Birth of subordinate divinities does not affect power of Supreme, v.\n    8.9 (31-565).\n\n  Birth of time reveals nature, iii. 7.10 (45-1005).\n\n  Blamed for its imperfections, the world should not be, iii. 2.3\n    (47-1046).\n\n  Blank, mental, differs from impression of shapeless, ii. 4.10\n    (12-208).\n\n  Boast of kinship with divinities, while not being able to leave body,\n    ridiculous, ii. 9.18 (33-637).\n\n  Bodies added, introduce conflicting motions, ii. 2.2 (14-231).\n\n  Bodies, classification of, vi. 3.9 (44-948).\n\n  Bodies classified, not only by forms and qualities and specific\n    forms, vi. 3.10 (44-950).\n\n  Bodies could not subsist with power of universal Soul iv. 7.3 (2-60).\n\n  Bodies, different kinds of, why souls take on, iv. 3.12 (27-410).\n\n  Bodies, even simple, analyzed into form and matter, iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Bodies, human, more difficult to manage than world-body iv. 8.2\n    (6-121).\n\n  Bodies of souls, may be related differently, iv. 4.29 (28-485).\n\n  Bodies simple, could not exist, without world-soul iv. 7.3 (2-60).\n\n  Bodies, souls descend into, why and how? iv. 3.8 (27-401).\n\n  Body, activated only by incorporeal powers, iv. 7.8 (2-70).\n\n  Body alone visible, reason why soul is said to be in it, iv. 3.20\n    (27-419).\n\n  Body and soul, consequences of mixture, i. 1.4 (53-1194).\n\n  Body and soul forms fusion, iv. 4.18 (28-465).\n\n  Body and soul mixture impossible, i. 1.4 (53-1195).\n\n  Body and soul primitive relation between, i. 1.3 (53-1194).\n\n  Body and soul relation between iv. 3.19 (27-418).\n\n  Body, anger-power, does not originate in it, iv. 4.28 (28-480).\n\n  Body as rationalized matter, ii. 7.3 (37-696).\n\n  Body can lose parts, not the soul, iv. 7.5 (2-63).\n\n  Body cannot possess virtue, iv. 7.8 (2-69).\n\n  Body cannot think, iv. 7.8 (2-68).\n\n  Body contains one kind of desires, iv. 4.20 (28-468).\n\n  Body cosmic, perfect and self-sufficient, iv. 8.2 (6-122).\n\n  Body could not have sensation, if soul were corporeal, iv. 7.6 (2-65).\n\n  Body differs from real man, i. 1.10 (53-1202).\n\n  Body, does the anger-power originate in it? iv. 4.28 (28-480).\n\n  Body, even simple, composed of form and matter, iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Body exerts a uniform action; soul a varied one, iv. 7.4 (2-62).\n\n  Body, eyes of, to close them, method to achieve, i. 6.8 (1-52).\n\n  Body grows a little after departure of soul, iv. 4.29 (28-485).\n\n  Body has single motion, soul different ones, iv. 7.5 (2-62).\n\n  Body, how it approaches the soul, vi. 4.15 (22-309).\n\n  Body in soul, not soul in body, iii, 9.3 (13-222); iv. 3.22 (27-423).\n\n  Body is composite, therefore perishable, iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Body is instrument of the soul, iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Body is not us but ours, iv. 4.18 (28-465).\n\n  Body part of ourselves, i. 1.10 (53-1203); iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Body is proximate transition of the soul, iv. 3.20 (27-420).\n\n  Body is tool and matter of soul, iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Body is within soul, iv. 3.20 (27-419).\n\n  Body managed by reasoning hence imperfectly, iv. 8.8 (6-132).\n\n  Body management, only one phase of excursion of procession, iv. 8.7\n    (6-131).\n\n  Body needs soul for life, iv. 3.19 (27-418).\n\n  Body never entirely entered by the soul, iv. 8.8 (6-132).\n\n  Body not a vase for the soul, iv. 3.20 (27-420).\n\n  Body not constituted by matter exclusively, iv. 7.3 (2-60).\n\n  Body of demons is air or fire-like, iii. 5.6 (50-1133); ii. 1.6\n    (40-823).\n\n  Body of elements, common ground of, makes them kindred, ii. 1.7\n    (40-824).\n\n  Body penetrated by soul, but not by another body, iv. 7.8 (2-72).\n\n  Body relation to soul, is passage into world of life, vi. 4.12\n    (22-304);\n\n  Body, separation of soul from it, i. 1.3 (53-1193).\n\n  Body sick, soul devoted to it, iv. 3.4 (27-395).\n\n  Body, superior and inferior of soul, related in three ways, iv. 4.29\n    (28-485).\n\n  Body, the soul uses as tool, i. 1.3 (53-1193).\n\n  Body throughout all changes, soul powers remain the same, iv. 3.8\n    (27-402).\n\n  Body used for perception makes feeling, iv. 4.23 (28-475); iv. 7.8\n    (2-68).\n\n  Body, will of stars, do not sway earthly events, iv. 4.34 (28-494).\n\n  Body's composition demands the substrate, ii. 4.11 (12-209).\n\n  Body's elements cannot harmonize themselves, iv. 7.8 (2-75).\n\n  Body's size nothing to do with greatness of soul, vi. 4.5 (22-293).\n\n  Boldness, see Audacity; i. 1.2 (53-1192).\n\n  Bond of the universe is number, vi. 6.15 (34-670).\n\n  Born philosophers alone, reach the higher region, v. 9.2 (5-103).\n\n  Both men, we always should be, but are not, vi. 4.14 (22-308).\n\n  Boundary of intelligible, location of soul, iv. 8.7 (6-131).\n\n  Brains, seat of sensation, iv. 3.23 (27-425).\n\n  Brothers of Jupiter unissued yet, v. 8.12 (31-572).\n\n  Brutalization or divinization is fate of three men in us, vi. 7.6\n    (38-708).\n\n\n  Calypso, i. 6.8 (1-53).\n\n  Capacity, limits participation in the one, vi. 4.11 (22-302).\n\n  Care divine, exemption from certain classes, heartless, ii. 9.16\n    (33-631).\n\n  Care for individual things, draws soul into incarnation, iv. 8.4\n    (6-124).\n\n  Career of the soul, what hell means for it, vi. 4.16 (22-312);\n\n  Castration indicates sterility of unitary nature, iii. 6.19 (26-385).\n    v. 8.13 (31-573).\n\n  Categories, v. 1.4 (10-180); v. 3.15 (49-1116).\n\n  Categories, Aristotelian and Stoic, vi. 1.1 (42-837).\n\n  Categories, Aristotelian neglect intelligible world, vi. 1.1 (42-831).\n\n  Categories cannot contain both power and lack of power, vi. 1.10\n    (42-852).\n\n  Categories cause one to produce manifoldness, v. 3.15 (49-1116).\n\n  Categories, four of Stoics, evaporate, leaving matter as basis, vi.\n    1.29 (42-885).\n\n  Categories, if where and place are different categories, many more\n    may be added, vi. 1.14 (42-862).\n\n  Categories, movement and difference applied to intelligence, ii. 4.5\n    (12-202).\n\n  Categories of Plotinos do not together form quality, vi. 2-14\n    (43-918).\n\n  Categories of Plotinos, five, why none were added, vi. 2.9 (43-907).\n\n  Categories of Plotinos, six, ii. 4.5 (12-202); ii. 6.2 (17-248); v.\n    1.4 (10-180); vi. 2.1, 8, 9 (43-891, 904).\n\n  Categories of quality, various derivatives of, vi. 3.19 (44-967).\n\n  Categories of Stoics enumerated, vi. 1.25 (42-878).\n\n  Categories, physical, fourth and fifth, refer to the first three, vi.\n    3.6 (44-943).\n\n  Categories, physical, of Plotinos, enumerated, vi. 3.3 (44-937).\n\n  Categories, separate, action and suffering cannot be, vi. 1.17\n    (42-866).\n\n  Categories, single, could not include intelligible and sense being,\n    vi. 1.2 (42-839).\n\n  Categories, six, from which all things are derived, v. 1.4 (10-180).\n\n  Categories, sources of characteristics, in intelligible, v. 9.10\n    (5-113).\n\n  Categories, unity is not one, arguments against, vi. 2.10 (43-910).\n\n  Categories far better than doing or acting actualization, vi. 1.15\n    (42-863).\n\n  Categories, having cannot be, because too various, vi. 1.23 (42-876).\n\n  Categories of something common is absurd, vi. 1.25 (42-878).\n\n  Categories, why movement is, vi. 3.21 (44-971).\n\n  Cause absent, in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563).\n\n  Cause coincides with nature in intelligible, vi. 7.19 (38-735).\n\n  Cause, everything has, iii. 1.1 (3-86).\n\n  Cause, is Supreme, of Heraclitus, iii. 1.2 (3-88).\n\n  Cause, of affections, though corporeal, iii. 6.4 (26-356).\n\n  Cause of procession of world from unity, v. 2.1 (11-193).\n\n  Cause, suitability of, puts Supreme beyond chance, vi. 8.18 (39-806).\n\n  Cause ultimate, is nature, iii 1.1 (3-87).\n\n  Cause why souls are divine, v. 1.2 (10-175).\n\n  Causeless origin, really is determinism, iii. 1.1 (3-86).\n\n  Causes, any thing due to several, ii. 3.14 (52-1180).\n\n  Causes for incarnation are twofold, iv. 8.1, 5 (6-119, 128).\n\n  Causes of deterioration, iii. 3.4 (48-1083).\n\n  Causes of things in the world, possible theories, iii. 1.1 (3-86).\n\n  Causes proximate are unsatisfactory, demanding the ultimate, iii. 1.2\n    (3-88).\n\n  Causes ulterior always sought by sages, iii. 1.2 (3-88).\n\n  Cave, Platonic simile of world, iv. 8.1, 4 (6-120, 126).\n\n  Celestial divinities, difference from inferior, v. 8.3 (31-556).\n\n  Celestial light not exposed to any wastage, ii. 1.8 (40-827).\n\n  Celestial things last longer than terrestrial things, ii. 1.5\n    (40-819).\n\n  Centre is father of the circumference and radii, vi. 8.18 (39-804).\n\n  Centre of soul and body, difference between, ii. 2.2 (14-230).\n\n  Ceres, myth of soul of earth, iv. 4.27 (28-480).\n\n  Certain, conception limiting objects, vi. 6.13 (34-663).\n\n  Chains bind soul in incarnation, iv. 8.4 (6-126).\n\n  Chains, golden, on captive, as beauty is on matter, i. 8.15 (51-1163).\n\n  Chains that hold down Saturn, v. 8.13 (31-573).\n\n  Chance, apparent, is really Providence, iii. 3.2 (48-1078).\n\n  Chance banished by form, limit and shape, vi. 8.10 (39-789).\n\n  Chance, cause of suitability and opportunity, puts them beyond it,\n    vi. 8.17 (39-804).\n\n  Chance could not cause the centre of circular of intelligence, vi.\n    8.18 (39-804).\n\n  Chance does not produce supreme being, vi. 8.11 (39-792).\n\n  Chance is not the cause of the good being free, vi. 8.7 (39-783).\n\n  Chance, men escape by interior isolation, vi. 8.15 (39-800).\n\n  Chance, no room for in Supreme, assisted by intelligence, vi. 8.17\n    (39-804).\n\n  Chance, Supreme could not possibly be called by any one who had seen\n    it, vi. 8.19 (39-807).\n\n  Change, how can it be out of time, if movement is in time, vi. 1.16\n    (42-864).\n\n  Change, is it anterior to movement? vi. 3.21 (44-972).\n\n  Change must inevitably exist in Heaven, ii. 1.1 (40-813).\n\n  Changeable, desires are, iv. 4.2 (28-469).\n\n  Changeableness, self-direction of thought is not, iv. 4.2 (28-444).\n\n  Changes of fortune, affect only the outer man, iii. 2.15 (47-1067).\n\n  Changes of the body, do not change soul powers, iv. 3.8 (27-402).\n\n  Changes, ours, world-souls unconscious of, iv. 4.7 (28-450).\n\n  Chaos, usual starting point, causes puzzle of origin of God, vi. 8.11\n    (39-792).\n\n  Character, human, result of former lives, iii. 3.4 (48-1083).\n\n  \"Characteristic, certain,\" a spiritualization of terms, ii. 4.1\n    (12-197); v. 1.4 (10-180).\n\n  Characteristic, if anything at all, is a reason spiritual, v. 1.4\n    (10-180).\n\n  Chariot, God traverses heaven in one, iv. 3.7 (27-399).\n\n  Chastisement of souls psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-310).\n\n  Chemical mixture described, iv. 7.8 (2-72).\n\n  Chief, the great Jupiter, third God, iii. 5.8 (50-1136).\n\n  Choir of virtues (Stoic), vi. 9.11 (9-170).\n\n  Choosing is essence of consciousness, iv. 4.37 (28-500).\n\n  Chorus, see Ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165).\n\n  Circe, i. 6.8 (1-53).\n\n  Circle, iii. 8.7 (30-543); v. 1.7, 11 (10-184, 191).\n\n  Circular movement is that of soul, vi. 9.8 (9-162, 164); ii. 2.1\n    (14-227); iv. 4.16 (28-462).\n\n  Circular movement of heavens, ii. 2.2 (14-230).\n\n  Circulating around heavens, iii. 4.2 (15-234).\n\n  Cities haunted by divinities, vi. 5.12 (23-332).\n\n  Classification of purification, result of virtue, i. 2.4 (19-260).\n\n  Climate, a legitimate governing cause, iii. 1.5 (3-93).\n\n  Close eyes of body, method to achieve ecstasy, i. 6.8 (1-52).\n\n  Closeness to divinity, permanent result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Clotho, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).\n\n  Coelus, (Uranus), v. 8.13 (31-573).\n\n  Co-existence of unity and multiplicity demands organization in\n    system, vi. 7.10 (38-716).\n\n  Cognition, how it operates, v. 5.1 (32-575).\n\n  Cognition of intelligible objects, admits no impression, iv. 6.2\n    (41-832).\n\n  Cold is not method of transforming breath into soul, iv. 7.8 (2-68).\n\n  Collective nouns prove independent existence, vi. 6.16 (34-672).\n\n  Combination begotten by the soul, its nature, vi. 7.5 (38-708).\n\n  Combination contains one kind of desires, iv. 4.20 (28-468).\n\n  Combination is a physical category, vi. 3.3 (44-937).\n\n  Combination of body and soul, appetites located in, iv. 4.20 (28-468).\n\n  Combination of soul and body as mixture, or as resulting product, i.\n    1.1 (53-1191).\n\n  Combination, see Aggregate, 1.11.\n\n  Combination, third physical category (53-1191). of Plotinos, vi. 3.3\n    (44-937).\n\n  Commands himself, Supreme does, vi. 8.20 (39-809).\n\n  Common element, growth in increase and generation, vi. 3.22 (44-975).\n\n  Common ground of the elements make them kindred, ii. 1.7 (40-824).\n\n  Common part, function of, i. 1.10 (53-1203).\n\n  Common to soul and body, not all affections are, i. 1.5 (53-1197).\n\n  Communion of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170).\n\n  Communion with the divine, as of Minos with Jupiter, vi. 9.7 (9-162).\n\n  Comparative method of studying time, iii. 7.6 (45-996).\n\n  Complaining of the world, instead of fit yourself to it, ii. 9.13\n    (33-625).\n\n  Complaint, grotesque to wisdom of creator, iii. 2.14 (47-1063).\n\n  Complaint of lower nature of animals ridiculous, iii. 2.9 (47-1059).\n\n  Complement of being called quality only by courtesy, vi. 2.14\n    (43-918).\n\n  Composite aggregate, see combination, i. 1.2 (53-1191).\n\n  Composite is body, therefore perishable, iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Composite of form and matter is everything, v. 9.3 (5-104).\n\n  Compositeness not denied by simplicity of the intelligent, vi. 7.13\n    (38-722).\n\n  Compositeness of knower not necessarily implied by knowledge, v. 3.1\n    (49-1090).\n\n  Composition and decomposition are not alterations, vi. 3.25 (44-979).\n\n  Composition and decomposition, explanation of, vi. 3.25 (44-978).\n\n  Comprising many souls makes soul infinite, vi. 4.4 (22-291).\n\n  Compulsory, memory is not, iv. 4.8 (28-451).\n\n  Concatenation from universal reason are astrological signs, iv. 4.38\n    (28-501).\n\n  Concatenation in all things is the universe, v. 2.2 (11-196).\n\n  Concatenation of causes is Chrysippus's fate, iii. 1.2, 7 (3-89, 96).\n\n  Conceiving principle is the world-soul, iii. 9.1 (13-221).\n\n  Concentricity of all existing things, v. 3.7 (49-1101); v. 5.9\n    (32-587).\n\n  Conception, true, is act of intuition, i. 1.9 (53-1202).\n\n  Conformity to the universal soul, implied they do not form part of\n    her, iv. 3.2 (27-389).\n\n  Connection between sense and intelligible worlds is triple nature of\n    man, vi. 7.7 (38-711).\n\n  Connection with infinite is Chrysippus's fate, iii. 1.2 (3-89).\n\n  Consciousness, iii. 9.9 (13-226).\n\n  Consciousness, constituted by timeless memory, iv. 3.25 (27-429).\n\n  Consciousness depends on choosing, iv. 4.37 (28-500).\n\n  Consciousness, etymologically, is sensation of manifoldness, v. 3.13\n    (49-1113).\n\n  Consciousness is not a pre-requisite of happiness or virtue and\n    intelligence, i. 4.9, 10 (46-1033).\n\n  Consciousness is unitary, though containing the thinker, ii. 9.1\n    (33-601).\n\n  Consciousness, local and whole, relation between not applicable to\n    soul, iv. 3.3 (27-392).\n\n  Consciousness of higher soul-part dimmed by predominance or\n    disturbance of lower, iv. 8.8 (6-132).\n\n  Consciousness of self, lost in ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569).\n\n  Consciousness, unity limits principles to three, ii. 9.2 (33-602).\n\n  Consciousness would be withdrawn by differentiating reason, ii. 9.1\n    (33-602).\n\n  Contemplating intelligence, is horizon of divine approach, v. 5.7\n    (32-587).\n\n  Contemplating the divinity, a Gnostic precept, ii. 9.15 (33-630).\n\n  Contemplation, v. 1.2, 3 (10-175, 177); v. 3.10 (49-1106).\n\n  Contemplation, aspired to, by even plants, iii. 8.1 (30-531).\n\n  Contemplation, everything is, iii. 8 (30).\n\n  Contemplation, goal of all beings, iii. 8.7 (30-540).\n\n  Contemplation, immovable results in nature and reason, iii. 8.2\n    (30-533).\n\n  Contemplation includes nature and reason, iii. 8.2 (30-533).\n\n  Consequence of derivative goods of third rank, i. 8.2 (51-1144).\n\n  Consequences of mixture of soul and body, i. 1.4 (53-1194).\n\n  Constitution, of universe, hierarchical, vi. 2.1 (13-892).\n\n  Consubstantial, v. 1.4 (10-180).\n\n  Contemplation, constitution of even lower forms, iii. 8.1 (30-531).\n\n  Contemplation of intelligence, demands a higher transcending unity,\n    v. 3.10 (49-1106).\n\n  Contemplation of itself made essence intelligence, v. 2.1 (11-193).\n\n  Contemplation only one phase of excursion of procession, iv. 8.7\n    (6-131).\n\n  Contemplation the goal of all kinds and grades of existence, iii. 8.6\n    (30-540).\n\n  Contemplation's preparation is practice, iii. 8.5 (30-538).\n\n  Contemporaneous is life of intelligence, iii. 7.2 (45-989).\n\n  Contemporary are matter and the informing principles, ii. 4.8\n    (12-206).\n\n  Contingence applicable to Supreme, under new definition only, vi. 8.8\n    (39-785).\n\n  Contingence not even applies to essence, let alone super-essence, vi.\n    8.9 (39-787).\n\n  Contingency, disappearance of, witnessed to by ascent of life, vi.\n    8.15 (39-801).\n\n  Contingency illuminated in analysis, vi. 8.14 (39-798).\n\n  Contingent existence, precedes absolute, vi. 1.26 (42-881).\n\n  Continuance need not interfere with fluctuation, ii. 1.3 (40-816).\n\n  Continuity between nature and elements, there is none, iv. 4.14\n    (28-459).\n\n  Continuous procession, necessary to Supreme, iv. 8.6 (6-129).\n\n  Contraries, are those things that lack resentments, vi. 3.20 (44-968).\n\n  Contraries passing into each other, Heraclitus, iv. 8.1 (6-119).\n\n  Contraries teach appreciation, iv. 8.7 (6-131).\n\n  Contrariness is not the greatest possible difference, vi. 3.20\n    (44-968).\n\n  Contrary contained in reason, constitute its unity, iii. 2.16\n    (47-1069).\n\n  Conversion effected by depreciation of the external and appreciation\n    of herself, v. 1.1 (10-174); see v. 1.7.\n\n  Conversion of soul towards herself, only object of virtue, i. 4.11\n    (46-1035).\n\n  Conversion of souls, iv. 3.6, 7 (27-397, 399); iv. 8.4 (6-126).\n\n  Conversion of super-abundance, back towards one, v. 2.1 (11-194).\n\n  Conversion produced by purification, i. 2.4 (10-261).\n\n  Conversion to good and being in itself depends on intelligence, vi.\n    8.4 (39-778).\n\n  Conversion towards divinity, result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Co-ordination of universe, truth of astrology, ii. 3.7 (52-1173).\n\n  Corporeal, if soul is, body could not possess sensation, iv. 7.6\n    (2-65).\n\n  Corporeity is nonentity because of lack of unity, iii. 6.6 (26-362).\n\n  Corporeity not in matter of thing itself, ii. 4.12 (12-212).\n\n  Correspondence of sense-beauty, with its idea, i. 6.2 (1-43).\n\n  Cosmic intellect, relation with individual, i. 1.7 (53-1199).\n\n  Counterfeit implied by true good, vi. 7.26 (38-743).\n\n  Courage is no longer to fear death, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Courage of soul's anger part explained, iii. 6.2 (26-354).\n\n  Creation by divinity glancing at intelligence above, iv. 3.11\n    (27-408).\n\n  Creation by foresight, not result of reasoning, vi. 7.1 (38-699).\n\n  Creation by mere illumination, gnostic, opposed, ii. 9.11 (33-621).\n\n  Creation drama, the world-soul could not have gone through, ii. 9.4\n    (33-605).\n\n  Creation is effusion of super-abundance, v. 2.1 (11-194).\n\n  Creation limited to world-soul because nearest to intelligible world,\n    iv. 3.6 (27-397).\n\n  Creation of sense-world, not by reflection, but self-necessity, iii.\n    2.2 (47-1044).\n\n  Creation of world, how it took place, v. 8.7 (31-562).\n\n  Creation, why denied human souls, iv. 3.6 (27-397).\n\n  Creative is the universal soul, not preservative, ii. 3.16 (52-1183).\n\n  Creative motives, ii. 9.4 (33-605).\n\n  Creator admires his handiwork, v. 8.8 (31-564).\n\n  Creator and preserver, is the good, vi. 7.23 (38-740).\n\n  Creator and world, are not evil, ii. 9 (33).\n\n  Creator is outside of time, iii. 7.5 (45-994).\n\n  Creator so wise that all complaints are grotesque, iii. 2.14\n    (47-1063).\n\n  Creator testified to, by the world, iii. 2.3 (47-1047).\n\n  Creator's universality, overcame all obstacles, v. 8.7 (31-562).\n\n  Creator's wisdom makes complaints grotesque, iii. 2.14 (47-1063).\n\n  Credence of intelligence in itself, v. 5.2 (32-578).\n\n  Crimes should not be attributed to the influence of sublunary\n    divinities, iv. 4.31 (28-489).\n\n  Criticism of world is wrong, v. 8.8 (31-565).\n\n  Culmination, ii. 3.3 (52-1165).\n\n  Cup, cosmic, in Plato, iv. 8.4 (6-127).\n\n  Cupid and Psyche, vi. 9.9 (9-166).\n\n  Curative, the, is a prominent element of life, iii. 3.5 (48-1084).\n\n  Cutting off every thing else, is means of ecstasy, v. 3.7 (49-1121).\n\n  Cybele, iii. 6.19 (26-385).\n\n\n  Daemon helps to carry out chosen destiny, iii. 4.5 (15-239).\n\n  Daemon is next higher faculty of soul, iii. 4.3 (15-235).\n\n  Daemon is the love that unites a soul to matter, iii. 5.4 (50-1130).\n\n  Daemon may remain after death or be changed to Daemon superior to\n    predominating power, iii. 4.6 (15-239).\n\n  Daemon of souls is their love, iii. 5.4 (50-1130).\n\n  Daemon's all, born of Need and Abundance, iii. 5.6 (50-1131).\n\n  Daemons and deities, difference between, iii. 5.6 (50-1131).\n\n  Daemons are individual, iii. 4 (15).\n\n  Daemons both related and independent of us, iii. 4.5 (15-239).\n\n  Daemons even in souls entering animal bodies, iii. 4.6 (15-240).\n\n  Daemons follow Supreme, v. 8.10 (31-567).\n\n  Daemon's guidance does not hinder responsibility, iii. 4.5 (15-238).\n\n  Daemons in charge of punishment of soul, iv. 8.5 (6-128).\n\n  Dance, prearranged, simile of star's motion, iv. 4.33 (28-492).\n\n  Darkness, existence of, must be related to the soul, ii. 9.12\n    (33-624).\n\n  Darkness, looking at, cause of evil of soul, i. 8.4 (51-1147).\n\n  Death, after, colleagues in government of world, iv. 8.4 (6-125).\n\n  Death, after, discursive reason not used, iv. 3.18 (27-416).\n\n  Death, after, judgment and expiation, iii. 4.6 (15-240).\n\n  Death, after, man becomes what he has lived, iii. 4.2 (15-234).\n\n  Death, after, memory may last, if trained, iii. 4.2 (15-234); iv. 4.5\n    (28-448).\n\n  Death, after, rank depends on state of death, i. 9 (16).\n\n  Death, after, recognition and memory, iv. 4.5 (28-447).\n\n  Death, after, soul goes to retribution, iii. 2.8 (47-1056).\n\n  Death, after, where does the soul go, iii. 4.6 (15-240); iii. 2.8\n    (47-1056).\n\n  Death, at, memories of former existences are reproduced, iv. 3.27\n    (27-433).\n\n  Death better than disharmony, iii. 2.8 (47-1057).\n\n  Death, how the soul splits up, iii. 4.6 (15-241).\n\n  Death is only separation of soul from body, i. 6.6 (1-50).\n\n  Declination, ii. 3.3 (52-1165).\n\n  Decomposible, soul is not, merely because it has three parts, iv.\n    7.14 (2-84).\n\n  Decomposition and composition are not alteration, vi. 3.25 (44-979).\n\n  Decomposition and composition, explanation of, vi. 3.25 (44-978).\n\n  Defects, not in intelligible world, v. 9.14 (5-117).\n\n  Defects such as limping, do not proceed from intelligence, v. 9.10\n    (5-113).\n\n  Degeneration of races, implied by determinism, ii. 3.16 (52-1184).\n\n  Degeneration of soul is promoted by looking at darkness, i. 8.4\n    (51-1147).\n\n  Degrees, admitted of, by quality, vi. 3.20 (44-970).\n\n  Degrees, different, of the same reality, are intelligence and life,\n    vi. 7.18 (38-732).\n\n  Degrees of ecstasy, vi. 7.36 (38-760).\n\n  Deities and demons, difference between, iii. 5.6 (50-1131).\n\n  Deities, second rank, are all visible super-lunar deities, iii. 5.6\n    (50-1132).\n\n  Deliberating before making sense-man intelligence did not, vi. 7.1\n    (38-698).\n\n  Deliberation in creating of world, gnostic opposed, v. 8.7, 12\n    (31-561, 571).\n\n  Delphi, at middle of earth, vi. 1.14 (42-862).\n\n  Demiurge, how the gnostic created it, ii. 9.12 (33-623).\n\n  Demon, chief, in intelligible world is deity, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).\n\n  Demon is any being in intelligible world, iii. 5.6 (50-1133).\n\n  Demon is vestige of a soul descended into the world, iii. 5.6\n    (50-1132).\n\n  Demon, the great, Platonic, ii. 3.9 (52-1176).\n\n  Demoniacal possession, as explanation of disease wrong, ii. 9.14\n    (33-627).\n\n  Demons, among them, those are loves that exist by a soul's desire for\n    good, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).\n\n  Demons have bodies of fire, ii. 1.6 (40-823); iii. 5.6 (50-1133).\n\n  Demons have no memories, and grant no prayers; in war life is saved\n    by valor, not by prayers, iv. 4.30 (28-486).\n\n  Demons, no crimes should be attributed to, iv. 4.31 (28-489).\n\n  Demons not born of souls, generated by world-soul powers, iii. 5.6\n    (50-1133).\n\n  Demons, psychology of, iv. 4.43 (28-507).\n\n  Demons, why not all of them are loves, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).\n\n  Demons, why they are not free from matter, iii. 5.6 (50-1133).\n\n  Demonstration absent in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563).\n\n  Demonstration of divinity defies, i. 3.1 (20-269).\n\n  Depart from life by seeking beyond it, vi. 5.12 (23-331).\n\n  Deprivation, in soul, is evil, i. 8.11 (51-1158).\n\n  Deprivation is matter, and is without qualities, i. 8.11 (51-1158).\n\n  Derivatives of category of quality, vi. 3.19 (44-967).\n\n  Descartes, \"Cogito, ergo sum,\" from Parmenides, v. 9.5 (5-108).\n\n  Descend, how souls come to, iv. 3.13 (27-410).\n\n  Descend, intelligible does not, sense-world rises, iii. 4.4 (15-237).\n\n  Descent from intelligible into heaven by souls leads to recognition,\n    iv. 4.5 (28-447).\n\n  Descent from the intelligible world enables us to study time, iii.\n    7.6 (45-995).\n\n  Descent into body, does not injure eternity of soul, iv. 7.13 (2-83).\n\n  Descent of soul, causes, as given by Plato, iv. 8.1 (6-121).\n\n  Descent of soul into body, iii. 9.3 (13-222); iv. 8.1 (6-120).\n\n  Descent of the soul, is fall into matter, i. 8.14 (51-1161).\n\n  Descent of the soul, procedure, vi. 4.16 (22-311).\n\n  Descent of the soul, psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-311).\n\n  Descent, souls not isolated from intelligence, during, iv. 3.12\n    (27-409).\n\n  Description of intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-557).\n\n  Description of universal being, vi. 4.2 (22-286).\n\n  Desirability of being in its beauty v. 8.10 (31-568).\n\n  Desirable in itself, is the good. vi. 8.7 (39-783).\n\n  Desire not simultaneous with appetite, i. 1.5 (53-1197).\n\n  Desire of soul, liver seat of, iv. 4.28 (28-480).\n\n  Desire or ability, only limit of union with divinity, v. 8.11\n    (31-570).\n\n  Desire to live, satisfaction of, is not happiness, i. 5.2 (36-684).\n\n  Desires are physical, because changeable with harmony of body, iv.\n    4.21 (28-469).\n\n  Desires, double, of body and of combination, iv. 4.20 (28-468).\n\n  Desires, function, relation of, to the vegetative power, iv. 4.22\n    (28-470).\n\n  Destiny chosen, helped by Daemon, iii. 4.5 (15-239).\n\n  Destiny conformed to character of soul, iii. 4.5 (15-238).\n\n  Destiny of man, gnostic, is demoralizing, ii. 9.15 (33-629).\n\n  Destiny of souls, depend on condition of birth of universe, ii. 3.15\n    (52-1182).\n\n  Destroyed would be the universe, if unity passed into the manifold,\n    iii. 8.10 (30-547).\n\n  Destruction of soul elements, does it imply disappearance? iv. 4.29\n    (28-484).\n\n  Detachment as simplification of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170).\n\n  Detachment of soul at death, how arranged naturally, i. 9 (16).\n\n  Detachment of soul by death voluntary, forbidden, i. 9 (16).\n\n  Detailed fate not swayed by stars, iv. 4.31 (28-488).\n\n  Details, fault in, cannot change harmony in universe, ii. 3.16\n    (52-1185).\n\n  Determinate form, v. 1.7 (10-184); v. 5.6 (32-584).\n\n  Determinateness, impossible of one, v. 5.6 (32-584).\n\n  Determination demands a motive, iii. 1.1 (3-86).\n\n  Determination of future implied by prediction, iii. 1.3 (3-90).\n\n  Determinism implies degeneration of races, ii. 3.16 (52-1184).\n\n  Determinism, really, under causeless origin, iii. 1.1 (3-86).\n\n  Determinism supported by materialists, iii. 1.2 (3-88).\n\n  Deterioration, causes of, iii. 3.4 (48-1083).\n\n  Development natural of essence to create a soul, iv. 8.6 (6-129).\n\n  Deviltry confuted, leaves influence of world-soul, iv. 4.32 (28-490).\n\n  Devolution (Platonic world scheme, intelligence, soul, nature), iv.\n    7.8 (2-69).\n\n  Diagram of universe, iv. 4.16 (28-462).\n\n  Dialectics, i. 3 (20-269); ii, 4.10 (12-206); vi. 3.1 (44-934); i.\n    3.4 (20-272); i. 8.9 (51-1156).\n\n  Dialectics, crown of various branches of philosophy, i. 3.5 (20-273).\n\n  Dialectics, how to conceive infinite, vi. 6.2 (34-644).\n\n  Dialectics is concatenation of the world, i. 3.4 (20-272).\n\n  Dialectics neglects opinion and sense opinions, i. 3.4 (20-272).\n\n  Dialectics not merely instrument for philosophy (Aristotle), i. 3.5\n    (20-273).\n\n  Dialectics not speculation and abstract rules (Epicurean), i. 3.5\n    (20-273).\n\n  Dialectics science of (judging values, or) discovery, amount of real\n    being in things, i. 3.4 (20-273).\n\n  Dialectics staying in intelligible, v. 1.1 (10-173).\n\n  Dialectics three paths, philosopher, musician and lover, i. 3.1\n    (20-269).\n\n  Dialectics two fold, first ascent to intelligible and then how to\n    remain, i. 3.1 (20-269).\n\n  Dialectics without it, lower knowledge would be imperfect, i. 3.6\n    (20-274).\n\n  Differ, souls do, as the sensations, vi. 4.6 (22-294).\n\n  Difference and identity, implied by triune process of categories, vi.\n    2.8 (43-905).\n\n  Difference between celestial and inferior divinities, v. 8.3 (31-556).\n\n  Difference between human and cosmic incarnation, iv. 8.3 (6-123).\n\n  Difference, greatest possible, is not contrariness, vi. 3.20 (44-968).\n\n  Difference of Supreme from second, is profound, v. 5.3 (32-580).\n\n  Difference, or category, v. 1.4 (10-180).\n\n  Differences, minor, derived from matter, v. 9.12 (5-115).\n\n  Differences of color, aid to discriminate magnitudes, ii. 8.1\n    (35-681).\n\n  Differences of soul, retained on different levels, iv. 3.5 (27-396).\n\n  Differences of things, depend on their seminal reasons, v. 7.1\n    (18-252).\n\n  Differences, some are not qualities, vi. 3.18 (44-965).\n\n  Differentials of beings, are not genuine qualities, vi. 1.16 (42-853).\n\n  Difficulties of understanding, clear to intelligence, iv. 9.5 (8-146).\n\n  Dimension and number are so different as to suggest different\n    classifications, vi. 2.13 (43-916).\n\n  Diminished, essence is not, though divisible, vi. 4.4 (22-290).\n\n  Dione, iii. 5.2 (50-1126).\n\n  Disappearance of form, implies that of size, ii. 8.1 (35-682).\n\n  Disappearance of soul parts, does it imply destruction, iv. 4.29\n    (28-484).\n\n  Discontent, divine, and transforms virtues, homely into higher, i.\n    2.7 (19-267).\n\n  Discontent, divine, supplement of homely virtues, i. 2.7 (19-267).\n\n  Discord, cause of incarnation, iv. 8.1 (6-119).\n\n  Discursive reason, v. 1.10, 11 (10-189); v. 3.14 (49-1115); v. 5.1\n    (32-575); v. 9.4 (5-106).\n\n  Discursive reason cannot turn upon itself, v. 3.2 (49-1091).\n\n  Discursive reason, its function, v. 3.1 (49-1090).\n\n  Discursive reason, why it belongs to soul, not to intelligence, v.\n    3.3 (49-1093).\n\n  Discursive reason's highest part, receives impressions from its\n    intelligence, v. 3.3 (49-1092).\n\n  Disease, as demoniacal possession wrong, ii. 9.14 (33-627).\n\n  Disharmony, vice is, iii. 6.2 (26-352).\n\n  Disharmony with laws of universe, worse than death, iii. 2.8\n    (47-1057).\n\n  Displacement, movement is single, vi. 3.24 (44-977).\n\n  Disposition, difficulty of mastering these corporeal dispositions, i.\n    8.8 (51-1154).\n\n  Distance from a unity is multitude and an evil, vi. 6.1 (34-643).\n\n  Distance from the Supreme, imperfection, iii. 3.3 (48-1080).\n\n  Distinction between spiritual, psychic and material, due to ignorance\n    of other people's attainments, ii. 9.18 (33-637).\n\n  Distinction in intelligibles, (good above beauty), i. 6.9 (1-53).\n\n  Distinguish, object of myths, iii. 5.10 (50-1138).\n\n  Distinction, Philonic, between the God, and God, vi. 7.1 (38-697).\n\n  Distinguishing of being, quality and differences absurd, vi. 3.18\n    (44-965).\n\n  Distraction by sensation, makes us unconscious of higher part, iv.\n    8.8 (6-132).\n\n  Divergence from Plato, forces Plotinos to demonstrate categories, vi.\n    2.1 (43-891).\n\n  Diversity from same parents depends on manner of generation, v. 7.2\n    (18-253).\n\n  Diversity of relations of all things connected with the first, v. 5.9\n    (32-589).\n\n  Divided, not even the ascended soul need be, iv. 4.1 (28-442).\n\n  Divided, time cannot be without soul's action, iv. 4.15 (28-460).\n\n  Divine sphere, limited by soul, downwards, v. 1.7 (10-186).\n\n  Diviner, duty of, is to read letter traced by nature, iii. 3.6\n    (48-1087).\n\n  Divinities begotten by actualization of intelligence, vi. 9.9 (9-168).\n\n  Divinities begotten by silent intercourse with the one, vi. 9.9\n    (9-166).\n\n  Divinities celestial and inferior, difference between, v. 8.3\n    (31-556).\n\n  Divinities contained in Supreme, dynamically, by birth, v. 8.9\n    (31-566).\n\n  Divinities haunt the cities, vi. 5.12 (23-332).\n\n  Divinities hidden and visible, v. 1.4 (10-178).\n\n  Divinity absent only, for non-successful in avoiding distraction, vi.\n    9.7 (9-161).\n\n  Divinity and also the soul is always one, iv. 3.8 (27-400).\n\n  Divinity constituted by attachment to centre, vi. 9.8 (9-163).\n\n  Divinity distinguished Philonically, the God, and God, vi. 7.1\n    (18-251).\n\n  Divinity, resemblance to, in soul's welfare, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Divinity within us, single and identical in all, vi. 5.1 (23-314).\n\n  Divinization, as Cupid and Psyche, vi. 9.9 (9-166).\n\n  Divinization of brutalization, is fate of three men in us, vi. 7.6\n    (38-708).\n\n  Divisible, all bodies are fully, iv. 7.8 (2-68).\n\n  Divisible and indivisible can soul be simultaneously, iv. 3.19\n    (27-417).\n\n  Divisible and indivisible is soul, iv. 2.2 (21-279).\n\n  Divisible beings, existence of, iv. 2.1 (21-276).\n\n  Divisible intelligence is not, v. 3.5 (49-1096).\n\n  Divisible is essence though not diminished, vi. 4.4 (22-290).\n\n  Divisible of soul, mixture and double, ii. 3.9 (52-1176).\n\n  Divisible soul is not unifying manifold, sensation, iv. 7.6 (2-65).\n\n  Divisibility, v. 1.7 (10-184).\n\n  Divisibility, goal of sense, growth and emotion, iv. 3.19 (27-418).\n\n  Divisibility of soul in vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10\n    (31-567).\n\n  Division, between universal soul and souls impossible, iv. 3.2\n    (27-390).\n\n  Division, characteristic of bodies not of soul, iv. 2.8 (21-276).\n\n  Dominant, better nature is not, because of sub-consciousness, iii.\n    3.4 (48-1081).\n\n  Double cause of incarnation, motive and deeds, iv. 8.4 (6-125).\n\n  Double, Hercules symbolizes the soul, i. 1.12 (53-1206).\n\n  Doubleness of everything, including man, vi. 3.4 (44-938).\n\n  Doubleness of soul, reasons and Providence, iv. 6.2 (41-832); iii.\n    3.4 (48-1081).\n\n  Doubleness of souls, suns, stars, ii. 3.9 (52-1175).\n\n  Doubleness of wisdom, i. 2.6 (19-265).\n\n  Doubleness of world soul, ii. 2.3 (14-233).\n\n  Doubleness, see \"pair\", or \"dyad\", of every man, ii. 3.9 (52-1176).\n\n  Doubt of existence of divinity, like dreamers who awake, to slumber\n    again, v. 5.11 (32-592).\n\n  Drama as a whole, iii. 2.17 (47-1071).\n\n  Drama of life, parts played badly by the evil, iii. 2.17 (47-1072).\n\n  Drama, simile of, allows for good and evil within reason, iii. 2.17\n    (47-1070).\n\n  Dream of the good is form, vi. 7.28 (38-745).\n\n  Dream of the soul is sensation, from which we must wake, iii. 6.6\n    (26-363).\n\n  Dreamers who wake, only to return to dreams like doubters of\n    divinity, v. 5.11 (32-593).\n\n  Driver and horses, simile of, Platonic, ii. 3.13 (52-1179).\n\n  Dualism breaks down just like monism, vi. 1.27 (42-883).\n\n  Duality (form and matter) in all things, iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Duality of every body, ii. 4.5 (12-200).\n\n  Duration has nothing to do with happiness, i. 5.1 (36-684).\n\n  Duration increases unhappiness, why not happiness? i. 5.6 (36-686).\n\n  Duration of happiness does not affect its quality, i. 5.5 (36-685).\n\n  Duration of time, as opportunity, is of importance to virtue, i. 5.10\n    (36-689).\n\n  Dyad, or doubleness, v. 5.4 (32-581).\n\n  Dyad, see \"pair,\" vi. 2.11 (43-914).\n\n\n  Earth and fire contained in the stars, ii. 1.6 (40-822).\n\n  Earth can feel as well as the stars, iv. 4.22 (28-471).\n\n  Earth contains all the other elements, ii. 1.6 (40-823).\n\n  Earth exists in the intelligible, vi. 7.11 (38-718).\n\n  Earth feels and directs by sympathetic harmony, iv. 4.26 (28-477).\n\n  Earth, model of the new, gnostic, unreasonable, ii. 9.5 (33-608).\n\n  Earth, postulated by Plato, as being basis of life, ii. 1.7 (40-823).\n\n  Earth senses may be different from ours, iv. 4.26 (28-478).\n\n  Earth, what passions suitable to it, iv. 4.22 (28-471).\n\n  Earthly events, not to be attributed to stars, body or will, iv. 4.35\n    (28-495).\n\n  Earth's psychology, iv. 4.27 (28-479).\n\n  Ecliptic's inclination to equator, v. 8.7 (31-563).\n\n  Ecstasy as divine spectacle, vi. 9.11 (9-169).\n\n  Ecstasy as intellectual contact with sudden light, v. 3.17 (49-1120).\n\n  Ecstasy described, iv. 8.1 (6-119).\n\n  Ecstasy ends in a report of seeing God beget a Son, v. 8.12 (31-571).\n\n  Ecstasy ends in fusion with divinity, and becoming own object of\n    contemplation, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Ecstasy ends in \"rest\" and \"Saturnian realm,\" v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Ecstasy ends in vision which is not chance, vi. 8.21 (39-807).\n\n  Ecstasy, experience of, i. 6.7 (1-50).\n\n  Ecstasy has two advantages following, self-consciousness and\n    possession of all things, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Ecstasy illustrated by secrecy of mystery-rites, vi. 9.11 (9-169).\n\n  Ecstasy in soul does not think God, because she doesn't think, vi.\n    7.35 (38-759).\n\n  Ecstasy is possession by divinity, v. 8.10 (31-567).\n\n  Ecstasy, land-marks on path to, i. 6.9 (1-54).\n\n  Ecstasy, mechanism of, v. 8.11 (31-569).\n\n  Ecstasy, permanent results, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Ecstasy results in begotten son forming a new world, v. 8.12 (31-571).\n\n  Ecstasy, simplification, super beauty and virtue, vi. 9.11 (9-170).\n\n  Ecstasy, the degrees leading to God, vi. 736 (38-760).\n\n  Ecstasy trance (enthusiasm), vi. 9.11 (9-169).\n\n  Ecstasy, trap on way to, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Ecstasy, way to approach, first principle, v. 5.10, 11 (32-591).\n\n  Ecstasy, when experienced, leads to questions, iv. 8.1 (6-119).\n\n  Ecstasy's last stage, vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 (31-568).\n\n  Ecstasy's method, is to close eyes of body, i. 6.8 (1-52).\n\n  Ecstatic vision of God, chief purpose of life, i. 6.7 (1-51).\n\n  Ecstatic, subsequent experiences, vi. 9.11 (9-190).\n\n  Education and training, memory needs, iv. 6.3 (41-835).\n\n  Effusion of super-abundance is reation, v. 2.1 (11-194).\n\n  Effects, differences in, limited to intelligibles, vi. 3.17 (44-964).\n\n  Egyptian hieroglyphics, v. 8.6 (31-560).\n\n  Elemental intermediary soul, also inadmissible, ii. 9.5 (33-607).\n\n  Elemental process demands substrate, ii, 4.6 (12-203).\n\n  Elements and nature, there is continuity between, iv. 4.14 (28-459).\n\n  Elements are also individual, ii. 1.6 (40-823).\n\n  Elements are kindred, through their common ground, the universe body,\n    ii. 1.7 (40-824).\n\n  Elements, earth contains all, ii. 1.6 (40-821).\n\n  Elements, principles of physicists, iii. 1.3 (3-89).\n\n  Elements of body cannot harmonize themselves, iv. 7.8 (2-74).\n\n  Elements of essence can be said to be one only figuratively, vi. 2.10\n    (43-909).\n\n  Elements of universe, simultaneously principles and general, vi. 2.2\n    (43-893).\n\n  Elements terrestrial, do not degrade the heaven, ii. 1.6 (40-823).\n\n  Elevation of soul gradual, v. 3.9 (49-1106).\n\n  Eliminated, is contingency in analysis, vi. 8.14 (39-798).\n\n  Emanations of a single soul, are all souls, iv. 3 (27).\n\n  Emanations of light from sun, v. 3.12 (49-1112).\n\n  Emanations of universal soul, are individual souls, iv. 3.1 (27-388).\n\n  Emanations, sense and growth tend towards divisibility, iv. 3.19\n    (27-418).\n\n  Emigration of soul should not be forced, i. 9 (10).\n\n  Emotion at seeing God, sign of unification, vi. 9.4 (9-155).\n\n  Emotions, James Lange, theory of refuted, i. 1.5 (53-1196).\n\n  Emotions of beauty caused by invisible soul, i. 6.5 (1-46).\n\n  Enchantments, an active life, predisposes to subjection to, iv. 4.43\n    (28-507).\n\n  Enchantments, magic, how to avoid them, iv. 4.44 (28-509).\n\n  Enchantments, wise men escape all, iv. 4.43 (28-507).\n\n  End and principle, simultaneous in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563).\n\n  End of all other goods is the Supreme, i. 7.1 (54-1209).\n\n  Entelechy, soul is not, iv. 2.1; iv. 7.8 (21-276, 2-74-77).\n\n  Energy, displayed, constitutes a thing's being, iii. 1.1 (3-86).\n\n  Ennobled and intellectualized is soul, scorning even thought, vi.\n    7.35 (38-757).\n\n  Enthusiasm of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-169).\n\n  Entire essence loved by being, vi. 5.10 (23-325).\n\n  Entire everywhere is universal soul, vi. 4.9 (22-300).\n\n  Entire soul, fashioned whole and individuals, vi. 5.8 (23-322).\n\n  Entire soul is everywhere, iv. 7.5 (2-63).\n\n  Entities earthly, not all have ideas corresponding, v. 9.14 (5-117).\n\n  Entities incorporeal, impassibility, iii. 6.1 (26-351).\n\n  Enumeration of divine principles, vi. 7.25 (38-742).\n\n  Enumeration, successive, inevitable in describing the eternal, iv.\n    8.4 (6-127).\n\n  Epicurus, iv. 5.2 (29-516).\n\n  Epimetheus, iv. 3.14 (27-412).\n\n  Equator to Ecliptic, inclination, v. 8.7 (31-563).\n\n  Erechtheus, iv. 4.43 (28-508).\n\n  Eros, Platonic myth interpretation of, iii. 5.2 (50-1125).\n\n  Eros, son of Venus, iii. 5.2 (50-1125).\n\n  Escape all enchantments, how the wise men do, iv. 4.43 (28-507).\n\n  Escape, how to, from this world, i. 6.8 (1-52).\n\n  Escoreal fragment, introduction to, iii. 6.6 (26-360).\n\n  Essence alone, possesses self existence, vi. 6.18 (34-678).\n\n  Essence and being, distinction between, ii. 6.1 (17-245).\n\n  Essence and stability, distinction between. vi. 2.7 (43-903).\n\n  Essence and unity, genuine relations between, vi. 2.11 (43-911).\n\n  Essence, by it all things depend on the good, i. 7.2 (54-1209).\n\n  Essence cannot become a genus so long as it remains one, vi. 2.9\n    (43-909).\n\n  Essence derives its difference from other co-ordinate categories, vi.\n    2.19 (43-923).\n\n  Essence divisible if not thereby diminished, vi. 4.4 (22-290).\n\n  Essence elements can be said to be one only figuratively, vi. 2.10\n    (43-909).\n\n  Essence entire loved by being, vi. 5.10 (23-325).\n\n  Essence, ideas and intelligence, v. 9 (5-102).\n\n  Essence, indivisible and divisible mediated between by soul, iv. 2\n    (21-276).\n\n  Essence indivisible becomes divisible within bodies, iv. 2.1 (21-277).\n\n  Essence indivisible, description of, iv. 2.1 (21-277).\n\n  Essence intelligible, is both in and out of itself, vi. 5.3 (23-316).\n\n  Essence is not contingent let alone super-essence, vi. 8.9 (39-788).\n\n  Essence is the origin of all animals, vi. 2.21 (43-928).\n\n  Essence, location for the things yet to be produced, vi. 6.10\n    (34-657).\n\n  Essence made intelligible by addition of eternity, vi. 2.1 (43-892).\n\n  Essence more perfect than actualized being, ii. 6.1 (17-247).\n\n  Essence must be second in order to exist in ground of first, v. 2.1\n    (11-193).\n\n  Essence not stable though immovable, vi. 9.3 (9-153).\n\n  Essence not synonymous with unity, vi. 2.9 (43-908).\n\n  Essence, number follows and proceeds from, vi. 6.9 (34-655).\n\n  Essence of soul derives from its being, adding life to essence, vi.\n    2.6 (43-900).\n\n  Essence one and identical is everywhere, entirely present, vi. 4\n    (22-285).\n\n  Essence relation to being, v. 5.5 (32-583).\n\n  Essence unity must be sought for in it, vi. 5.1 (23-314).\n\n  Essence's power and beauty, is to attract all things, vi. 6.18\n    (34-678).\n\n  Essential number, vi. 6.9 (34-657).\n\n  Eternal being, cares not for inequality of riches. ii, 9.9 (33-616).\n\n  Eternal generation, iv. 8.4 (6-127); vi. 7.3 (38-703); vi. 8.20\n    (39-809).\n\n  Eternal must have been the necessity to illuminate darkness, ii. 9.12\n    (33-624).\n\n  Eternal revealed by sense objects, iv. 8.6 (6-130).\n\n  Eternally begotten, is the world, ii. 9.3 (33-603).\n\n  Eternity added to essence makes intelligible essence, vi. 2.1\n    (43-892).\n\n  Eternity and perpetuity, difference between, iii. 7.4 (45-991).\n\n  Eternity and time, iii. 7 (45-985).\n\n  Eternity as union of the five categories, iii, 7.2 (45-988).\n\n  Eternity at rest, error in this, iii. 7.1 (45-987).\n\n  Eternity exists perpetually, iii. 7. introd. (45-985).\n\n  Eternity, from, is providence the plan of the universe, vi. 8.17\n    (39-803).\n\n  Eternity has no future or past, v. 1.4 (10-179); iii. 7.4 (45-992).\n\n  Eternity is immutable in unity, iii. 7.5 (45-993).\n\n  Eternity is infinite, universal life, that cannot lose anything, iii,\n    7.4 (45-992).\n\n  Eternity is sempiternal existence, iii. 7.5 (45-993).\n\n  Eternity is the model of its image, time, iii. 7. introd. (45-985).\n\n  Eternity is to existence, as time is interior to the soul, iii. 7.10\n    (45-1008).\n\n  Eternity is to intelligence, what time is to the world-soul. iii.\n    7.10 (45-1007).\n\n  Eternity kin to beauty, iii. 5.1 (50-1124).\n\n  Eternity not an accident of the intelligible, but an intimate part of\n    its nature, iii. 7.3 (45-989).\n\n  Eternity of soul, not affected by descent into body, iv. 7.13 (2-83).\n\n  Eternity of soul proved by thinking the eternal, iv. 7.10 (2-81).\n\n  Eternity, relation of, to intelligible being, iii. 7.1 (45-986).\n\n  Eternity replaces time, in intelligible world, v. 9.10 (5-113).\n\n  Eternity, see Aeon and pun on Aeon, iii. 7.1 (45-986).\n\n  Evaporation, explains a theory of mixture, ii. 7.2 (37-694).\n\n  Evaporation, both Stoic and Aristotelian refuted, ii, 7.2 (37-695).\n\n  Everything is composite of form and matter, v. 9.3 (5-105).\n\n  Everywhere and nowhere is Supreme, inclination and imminence, vi.\n    8.16 (39-801).\n\n  Evil, absolute, goal of degeneration of the soul, i. 8.15 (51-1163).\n\n  Evil, an evil is life without virtue, i. 7.3 (54-1210).\n\n  Evil are doers, who play their parts badly in drama of life, iii.\n    2.17 (47-1071).\n\n  Evil as an obstacle to the soul, i. 8.12 (51-1159).\n\n  Evil as infinite and formlessness as itself, i. 8.3 (51-1145).\n\n  Evil cannot be possessed within the soul, i. 8.11 (51-1158).\n\n  Evil constituted by indetermination, success and lack, i. 8.4\n    (51-1147).\n\n  Evil creator and world are not, ii. 9 (33-599).\n\n  Evil effects of suicide on soul itself, i. 9 (16-243).\n\n  Evil even is a multitude, vi. 6.1 (34-643).\n\n  Evil external and internal, relation between, i. 8.5 (51-1149).\n\n  Evil, how sense-objects are not, iii. 2.8 (47-1055).\n\n  Evil implied by good, because matter is necessary to the world, i.\n    8.7 (51-1152).\n\n  Evil in itself, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Evil in itself is the primary evil, i. 8.3 (51-1146).\n\n  Evil in the soul, explained by virtue as a harmony, iii. 6.2 (26-352).\n\n  Evil inseparable from good, iii. 3.7 (48-1088).\n\n  Evil is consequence of derivative goods of third rank, i. 8.2\n    (51-1144).\n\n  Evil is no one vice in particular, i. 8.5 (51-1148).\n\n  Evil is soul's rushing into region of diversity, i. 8.13 (51-1161).\n\n  Evil is the absence of good in the soul, i. 8.11 (51-1157).\n\n  Evil is weakness of the soul, i. 8.14 (51-1160).\n\n  Evil, its nature depends on that of good, i. 8.2 (51-1143).\n\n  Evil, lower form of good, iii. 2.7 (47-1053); vi. 7.10 (38-716).\n\n  Evil, nature of, i. 8.3 (51-1144).\n\n  Evil, necessary, is lowest degree of being, i. 8.7 (51-1152).\n\n  Evil, neutral, is matter, vi, 7.28 (38-746).\n\n  Evil, none unalloyed for the living people, i. 7.3 (54-1210).\n\n  Evil of the soul, explanation, i. 8.15 (51-1163).\n\n  Evil only figurative and antagonist of good, i. 8.6 (51-1150).\n\n  Evil possesses a lower form of being, i. 8.3 (51-1145).\n\n  Evil primary and secondary defined, i. 8.8 (51-1155).\n\n  Evil, primary and secondary, of soul, i. 8.5 (51-1148).\n\n  Evil primary, is evil in itself, i. 8.3 (51-1146).\n\n  Evil primary is lack of measure, (darkness), i. 8.8 (51-1154).\n\n  Evil secondary, is accidental formlessness (something obscured), i.\n    8.8 (51-1155).\n\n  Evil secondary, is matter, i. 8.4 (51-1146).\n\n  Evil triumphed over, in faculties not engaged in matter, i. 8.5\n    (51-1149).\n\n  Evil universal and unavoidable, i. 8.6 (51-1150).\n\n  Evil, victory of, accuses Providence, iii. 2.6 (47-1052).\n\n  Evils are necessary to the perfection of the universe, ii. 3.18\n    (52-1187).\n\n  Evils even if corporeal, caused by matter, i. 8.8 (51-1153).\n\n  Evil, nature and origin of, i. 8 (51-1142).\n\n  Evils, origin of, i. 1.9 (53-1201).\n\n  Evils, that the sage can support without disturbing happiness, i. 4.7\n    (46-1029).\n\n  Evolution impossible (from imperfect to perfect), iv. 7.8 (2-73).\n\n  Examination, for it only are parts of a manifold unity apart, vi. 2.3\n    (43-897).\n\n  Examination of self, i, 6.9 (1-54).\n\n  Examination of soul, body must first be dissociated, vi. 3.1 (44-934).\n\n  Excursion down and up, is procession of intelligence, iv. 8.7 (6-131).\n\n  Excursion yields the soul's two duties, body management and\n    contemplation, iv. 8.7 (6-131).\n\n  Exemption of certain classes from divine care, heartless, ii. 9.16\n    (33-631).\n\n  Exile, gnostic idea of, opposed, ii. 9.6 (33-609).\n\n  Existence absolute precedes contingent, vi. 1.26 (42-881).\n\n  Existence, all kinds and grades of, aim at contemplation, iii. 8.6\n    (30-538).\n\n  Existence, category, v. 1.4 (10-180).\n\n  Existence, descending, graduations of, iv. 3.17 (27-415).\n\n  Existence, how infinite arrived to it, vi. 6.3 (34-645).\n\n  Existence in intelligible, before application to multiple beings, is\n    reason, vi. 6.11 (34-659).\n\n  Existence of darkness may be related to the soul ii. 9.12 (33-625).\n\n  Existence of divisible things, iv. 2.1 (21-276).\n\n  Existence of first, necessary. v. 4.1 (7-134).\n\n  Existence of intelligence, proved, v. 9.3 (5-104).\n\n  Existence of manifoldness impossible, without something simple, ii.\n    4.3 (12-198).\n\n  Existence of memory alter death, and of heaven, iv. 4.5 (28-447).\n\n  Existence of matter is sure as that of good, i. 8.15 (51-1162).\n\n  Existence of object implies a previous model, vi. 6.10 (34-658).\n\n  Existence of other things not precluded by unity, vi. 4.4 (22-290).\n\n  Existence, primary, will contain thought, existence and life, ii. 4.6\n    (12-203); v. 6.6 (24-339).\n\n  Existence real possessed by right thoughts, iii. 5.7 (50-1136).\n\n  Existence sempiternal is eternity, iii. 7.5 (45-993).\n\n  Existence the first being supra-cogitative, does not know itself, v.\n    6.6 (24-340).\n\n  Existence thought and life contained in primary existence, v. 6.6\n    (24-338).\n\n  Existing animal of Plato differs from intelligence, iii. 9.1 (13-220).\n\n  Experience and action, underlying transmission, reception, and\n    relation, vi. 1.22 (42-875).\n\n  Experience does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-920).\n\n  Experience necessary to souls not strong enough to do without it, iv.\n    8.7 (6-131).\n\n  Experience of ecstasy leads to questions, iv. 8.1 (6-119).\n\n  Experience of evil yields knowledge of good, iv. 8.7 (6-131).\n\n  Experiences, sensations are not, but relative actualizations, iv. 6.2\n    (41-831).\n\n  Experiment proposed, ii. 9.17 (33-633).\n\n  Expiation is condition of soul in world, iv. 8.5 (6-128).\n\n  Expiations, time of, between incarnations, iii. 4.6 (15-240).\n\n  Extension is merely a sign of participation into the word of life,\n    vi. 4.13 (22-306).\n\n  Extension, none in beauty or justice, iv. 7.8 (2-69).\n\n  Extension, none in soul or reason, iv. 7.5 (2-63).\n\n  Extensions, soul was capable of, before the existence of the body,\n    vi. 4.1 (22-285).\n\n  External and internal relation of evil, i. 8.5 (51-1149).\n\n  External circumstances cause wealth, poverty and vice, ii. 3.8\n    (52-1174).\n\n  Exuberant fruitfulness of one, (see super-abundance), v. 3.15\n    (49-1116).\n\n  Eyes implanted in man by divine foresight, vi. 7.1 (38-697).\n\n  Eyes impure can see nothing, i. 6.9 (1-53).\n\n  Eyes of body, close them, is method to achieve ecstasy, i. 6.8 (1-52).\n\n\n  Face to face, vision of God, i. 6.7 (1-50).\n\n  Faces all around the head, simile of, vi. 5.7 (23-320).\n\n  Faculty, reawakening of, is the memory, not an image, iv. 6.3\n    (41-833).\n\n  Faith absent in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563).\n\n  Faith in intelligible, how achieved, vi. 9.5 (9-156).\n\n  Faith teaches Providence rules the world, iii. 2.7 (47-1054).\n\n  Fall into generation, due to division into number, iv. 8.4 (6-126).\n\n  Fall into generation may be partial and recovery from, possible, iv.\n    4.5 (28-448).\n\n  Fall not voluntary, but punishment of conduct, iv. 8.5 (6-127).\n\n  Fall of the soul as descent into matter, i. 8.14 (51-1161).\n\n  Fall of the soul due to both will and necessity, iv. 8.5 (6-128).\n\n  Fall of the soul due to guilt, (Pythagorean), iv. 8.1 (6-120).\n\n  Fate, according to Stoic Chrysippus, iii. 1.2 (3-89).\n\n  Fate detailed, does not sway stars, iv. 4.31 (28-489).\n\n  Fate, Heraclitian, constituted by action and passion, iii. 1.4 (3-91).\n\n  Fate is unpredictable circumstances, altering life currents, iii. 4.6\n    (15-242).\n\n  Fate, mastery of, victory over self, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).\n\n  Fate, may be mastered, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).\n\n  Fate, obeyed by the soul only when evil, iii, 1.10 (3-98).\n\n  Fate of the divisible human soul, iii. 4.6 (15-241).\n\n  Fate of three men in us, is brutalization or divinization. vi. 7.6\n    (38-708).\n\n  Fate, possible theories about it, iii. 1.1 (3-86).\n\n  Fate spindle, significance of, ii. 3.9 (52-1171).\n\n  Fate, the Heraclitian principle, iii. 1.2 (3-88).\n\n  Father, v. 1.8 (10-186); v. 5.3 (32-580).\n\n  Father, dwells in heaven, i. 6.8 (1-53).\n\n  Father of intelligence, name of first, v. 8.1 (31-551).\n\n  Fatherland, heaven, i. 6.8 (1-53).\n\n  Faults are reason's failure to dominate matter, v. 9.10 (5-113).\n\n  Faults come not from intelligence, but from the generation process,\n    v. 9.10 (5-113).\n\n  Faults in the details cannot change harmony in universe, ii. 3.16\n    (52-1185).\n\n  Faults of the definition, that eternity is at rest while time is in\n    motion, iii. 7.1 (45-987).\n\n  Faults of the soul, two possible, motive and deeds, iv. 8.5 (6-128).\n\n  Fear of death, overcoming of, is courage, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Feast, divinities seated at, meaning, iii. 5.10 (50-1139).\n\n  Feeler, the soul implied by sensation i. 1.6 (53-1198).\n\n  Feeler, who is the, v. 1.1 (53-1191).\n\n  Feeling is perception by use of body, iv. 4.23 (28-475).\n\n  Feelings, modes of passions, i. 1.1 (53-1191).\n\n  Fidelity, kinship to one's own nature, iii. 3.1 (48-1077).\n\n  Field of truth, intelligence evolves over, vi. 7.13 (38-723).\n\n  Figurative expressions, reasoning and foresight are only, vi. 7.1\n    (37-699).\n\n  Figure, spherical and intelligible is the primitive one, vi. 6.17\n    (34-675).\n\n  Figures have characteristic effects, iv. 4.35 (28-498).\n\n  Figures pre-exist in the intelligible, vi. 6.17 (34-675).\n\n  Fire and air, action of, not needed by heaven, ii. 1.8 (40-826).\n\n  Fire and earth contained in the stars, ii. 1.6 (40-821).\n\n  Fire, and light celestial, nature, ii. 1.7 (40-825).\n\n  Fire contained in intelligible world, vi. 7.11 (38-719).\n\n  Fire image of, latent and radiant, v. 1.3 (10-177).\n\n  Fire, though an apparent exception, conforms to this, ii. 1.3\n    (40-817).\n\n  First and other goods, 1.7 (54-1208).\n\n  First does not contain any thing to be known, v. 6.6 (24-339).\n\n  First does not know itself, being supra-cogitative, v. 6.6 (24-339).\n\n  First, existence of, necessary, v. 4.1 (7-134).\n\n  First impossible to go beyond it, vi. 8.11 (39-791).\n\n  First must be one exclusively, making the one supra-thinking, v. 6.3\n    (24-340).\n\n  First principle has no need of seeing itself, v. 3.10 (49-1106).\n\n  First principle has no principle, vi. 7.37 (38-762).\n\n  First principle has no thought, the first actualization of a\n    hypostasis, vi. 7.40 (38-766).\n\n  First principle is above thought, v. 6.26 (24-338).\n\n  First principle may not even be said to exist, is super-existence,\n    vi. 7.38 (38-763).\n\n  Fit itself, the soul must to its part in the skein, iii. 2.17\n    (47-1072).\n\n  Fit yourself and understand the world, instead of complaining of it,\n    ii. 9.13 (33-625).\n\n  Five physical categories of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937).\n\n  Five Plotinic categories, why none more can be added, vi. 2.9\n    (43-907).\n\n  Fleeing from intelligence, rather than intelligence from soul, v.\n    5.10 (32-591).\n\n  Flight from evil, not by locality but virtue, i. 8.7 (51-1152).\n\n  Flight from here below, i. 2.6 (51-1150); ii. 3.9 (52-1175); i. 6.8\n    (1-52); iv. 8.5 (6-128).\n\n  Flight from here below, if prompt, leaves soul unharmed, iv. 8.5\n    (6-128).\n\n  Flight from world is assimilation to divinity, i. 2.5 (19-263).\n\n  Flight is simplification or detachment of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170).\n\n  Fluctuation need not interfere with continuance, ii. 1.3 (40-816).\n\n  Flux, heaven though in, perpetuates itself by form, ii. 1.1 (40-813).\n\n  Flux of all beauties here below, vi. 7.31 (38-751).\n\n  Followers of the king are universal stars, ii. 3.13 (52-1179).\n\n  Foreign accretion is ugliness, i. 6.5 (1-48).\n\n  Foreign sources, derived from modification, i. 1.9 (53-1202).\n\n  Foreknowledge of physician like plans of Providence, iii. 3.5\n    (48-1085).\n\n  Foresight and reasoning are only figurative expressions, vi. 7.1\n    (38-699).\n\n  Foresight by God of misfortunes, not cause of senses in man, vi. 7.1\n    (38-697).\n\n  Foresight, eyes implanted in man by it, vi. 7.1 (38-697).\n\n  Foresight of creation, not result of reason, vi. 7.1 (38-698).\n\n  Form and light, two methods of sight, v. 5.7 (32-586).\n\n  Form and matter in all things, iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Form and matter intermediary between, is sense-object, iii. 6.17\n    (26-381).\n\n  Form as model, for producing principle, v. 8.7 (31-562).\n\n  Form being unchangeable, so is matter, iii. 6.10 (26-368).\n\n  Form difference of matter, due to that of their intelligible sources,\n    vi. 3.8 (44-946).\n\n  Form, disappearance of, implies that of size, ii. 8.2 (35-682).\n\n  Form exterior is the overshadowed, inactive parts of the soul, iii.\n    4.2 (15-235).\n\n  Form improves matter, vi. 7.28 (38-745).\n\n  Form in itself, none in the good, vi. 7.28 (38-746).\n\n  Form is not quality but a reason, ii. 6.2 (17-248).\n\n  Form is second physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937).\n\n  Form is the dream of the good, vi. 7.28 (38-745).\n\n  Form of a thing is its good, vi. 7.27 (38-744).\n\n  Form of a thing is its whyness, vi. 7.2 (38-702).\n\n  Form of forms, vi. 7.17 (38-731).\n\n  Form of good borne by life, intelligence and idea, vi. 7.2 (38-732).\n\n  Form of good may exist at varying degrees, vi. 7.2 (38-732).\n\n  Form of the body is the soul, iv. 7.1, 2 (2-57).\n\n  Form of unity, is principle of numbers, v. 5.5 (32-583).\n\n  Form of universe, as soul is, would be matter, if a primary\n    principle, iii. 6.18 (26-382).\n\n  Form only in the sense-world, proceeds from intelligence, v. 9.10\n    (5-113).\n\n  Form substantial, the soul must be as she is not simple matter, iv.\n    7.4 (2-61).\n\n  Former lives cause present character, iii. 3.4 (48-1083).\n\n  Formless shape is absolute beauty, vi. 7.33 (38-754).\n\n  Formlessness in itself and infinite is evil, i. 8.3 (51-1145).\n\n  Formlessness of one, v. 5.6 (32-584).\n\n  Formlessness of the Supreme shown by approaching soul's rejection of\n    form, vi. 7.34 (38-756).\n\n  Forms of governments, various, soul resembles, iv. 4.17 (28-464).\n\n  Forms rational sense and vegetative, iii. 4.2 (15-234).\n\n  Forms, though last degree of existence, are faint images, v. 3.7\n    (49-1102).\n\n  Fortune, changes of, affect only the outer man, iii. 2.15 (47-1067).\n\n  Freedom, for the soul, lies in following reason, iii. 1.9 (3-97).\n\n  Freedom of will, and virtue, are independent of actions, vi. 8.5\n    (39-775).\n\n  Freedom of will, on which psychological faculty is it based? vi. 8.2\n    (39-775).\n\n  Friends of Plotinos, formerly gnostic, ii. 9.10 (33-620).\n\n  Functions, if not localized, soul will not seem within us, iv. 3.20\n    (27-419).\n\n  Functions, none in the first principle, vi. 7.37 (38-762).\n\n  Fund of memory, partitioned between both souls, iv. 3.31 (27-439).\n\n  Fusion forms body and soul, iv. 4.18 (28-465).\n\n  Fusion with the divinity, result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569).\n\n  Future determined, according to prediction, iii. 1.3 (3-90).\n\n  Future necessary to begotten things not to the intelligible, iii. 7.3\n    (45-990).\n\n\n  Gad-fly, love is, iii. 5.7 (50-1134).\n\n  Galli, iii. 6.19 (26-385).\n\n  Garden of Jupiter is the reason that begets everything, iii. 5.9\n    (50-1137).\n\n  Garden of Jupiter, meaning of, iii. 5.10 (50-1138).\n\n  Genera and individuals are distinct, as being actualizations, vi. 2.2\n    (43-894).\n\n  Genera exist both in subordinate objects, and in themselves, vi. 2.12\n    (43-915).\n\n  Genera, first two, are being and movement, vi. 2.7 (43-902).\n\n  Genera of essence decided about by \"one and many\" puzzle, vi. 2.4\n    (43-898).\n\n  Genera of the physical are different from those of the intelligible,\n    vi. 3.1 (44-933).\n\n  Genera, Plotinic five, are primary because nothing can be affirmed of\n    them, vi. 2.9 (43-906).\n\n  General, simile of Providence, iii. 3.2 (48-1078).\n\n  Generation, common element with growth and increase, vi. 3.22\n    (44-975).\n\n  Generation eternal, iv. 8.4 (6-127); vi. 7.3 (38-703); vi. 8.20\n    (39-809).\n\n  Generation falling into, causes trouble, iii. 4.6 (15-241).\n\n  Generation in the sense-world, is what being is in the intelligible,\n    vi. 3.2 (44-935).\n\n  Generation is like lighting fire from refraction, iii. 6.14 (26-376).\n\n  Generation is radiation of an image, v. 1.6 (10-182).\n\n  Generation of everything is regulated by a number, vi. 6.15 (34-670).\n\n  Generation of matter, consequences of anterior principles, iv. 4.16\n    (28-461).\n\n  Generation of the ungenerated, iii. 5.10 (50-1138).\n\n  Generation, from the good, is intelligence, v. 1.8 (10-186).\n\n  Generation's eternal residence is matter, iii. 6.13 (26-373).\n\n  Generatively, all things contained by intelligence, v. 9.6 (5-109).\n\n  Gentleness, sign of naturalness as of health and unconsciousness of\n    ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Genus, another, is stability, vi. 2.7 (43-903).\n\n  Genus divides in certain animals, iv. 7.5 (2-63).\n\n  Genus, there is more than one, vi. 2.2 (43-895)\n\n  Geometry, an intelligible art, v. 9.11 (5-115).\n\n  Geometry studies quantities, not qualities, vi. 3.15 (44-958).\n\n  Giving without loss (a Numenian idea), vi. 9.9 (9-165).\n\n  Gluttonous people who gorge themselves at the ceremonies and leave\n    without mysteries, v. 5.1 (32-592).\n\n  Gnostic planning of the world by God, refuted, v. 8.7, 12 (31-561,\n    572).\n\n  God cannot be responsible for our ills, iv. 4.39 (28-503).\n\n  God not remembered by world-soul continuing to be seen, iv. 4.7\n    (28-449).\n\n  God's planning of the world (gnosticism) refuted, v. 8.7 (31-561).\n\n  God relation with individual and soul, i. 1.8 (53-1200).\n\n  Golden face of Justice, i. 6.4 (1-45).\n\n  Good absolute, permanence chief characteristic, i. 7.1 (54-1209).\n\n  Good, all things depend on by unity, essence and quality, i. 7.1\n    (54-1209).\n\n  Good and beauty identical, i. 6.6 (1-50).\n\n  Good and one, vi. 9 (9-147).\n\n  Good as consisting in intelligence, i. 4.3 (46-1024).\n\n  Good, as everything tends toward it, it tends toward the one, vi.\n    2.12 (43-914).\n\n  Good, as supra-cogitative, is also supra-active, v. 6.6 (24-340).\n\n  Good as supreme, neither needs nor possesses intellection, iii. 8.10\n    (30-548).\n\n  Good cannot be a desire of the soul, vi. 7.19 (38-734).\n\n  Good cannot be pleasure, which is changeable and restless, vi. 7.27\n    (38-754).\n\n  Good consists in illumination by the Supreme, vi. 7.22 (38-737).\n\n  Good contains no thought, vi. 7.40 (38-766).\n\n  Good does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-922).\n\n  Good, even if it thought, there would be need of something superior,\n    vi. 7.40 (38-767).\n\n  Good, form of, borne by life, intelligence and idea, vi. 7.18\n    (38-731).\n\n  Good for the individual is illumination, vi. 7.24 (38-740).\n\n  Good has no need of beauty, while beauty has of the good, v. 5.12\n    (32-594).\n\n  Good, if it is a genus, must be one of the posterior ones, vi. 2.17\n    (43-921).\n\n  Good, implied by scorn of life, vi. 7.29 (38-748).\n\n  Good implies evil because matter is necessary to the world, i. 8.7\n    (51-1152).\n\n  Good, in what does it consist, iv. 1.\n\n  Good, inseparable from evil, iii. 3.7 (48-1088).\n\n  Good, intelligence and soul, are like light, sun and moon, v. 6.4\n    (24-337).\n\n  Good is a nature that possesses no kind of form in itself, vi. 7.28\n    (38-746).\n\n  Good is a simple perception of itself; a touch, vi. 7.39 (38-764).\n\n  Good is creator and preserver, vi. 7.23 (38-740).\n\n  Good is free, but not merely by chance, vi. 8.7 (39-783).\n\n  Good is not for itself, but for the natures below it, vi. 7.41\n    (38-769).\n\n  Good is intelligence and primary life, vi. 7.21 (38-737).\n\n  Good, is it a common label or a common quality? vi. 7.18 (38-733).\n\n  Good is not only cause, but intuition of being, vi. 7.16 (38-728).\n\n  Good is such, just because it has no attributes worthy of it, v. 5.13\n    (32-595).\n\n  Good is superior to all its possessions, as result of its being\n    supreme, v. 5.12 (32-595).\n\n  Good is superior to beautiful and is cognized by mind, v. 5.12\n    (32-594).\n\n  Good is super-thinking, v. 6.5 (24-338).\n\n  Good is super-thought, iii. 9.9 (13-225).\n\n  Good is supreme, because of its supremacy, vi. 7.23 (38-739).\n\n  Good is desirable in itself, vi. 8.8 (39-783).\n\n  Good is the whole, though containing evil parts, iii. 2.17 (47-1070).\n\n  Good is lower form of evil, iii. 2.7 (47-1053).\n\n  Good leaves the soul serene, beauty troubles it, v. 5.12 (32-594).\n\n  Good may accompany the pleasure, but it is independent of it, vi.\n    7.27 (38-745).\n\n  Good may neglect natural laws that carry revolts, iii, 2.9 (47-1057).\n\n  Good, multitude of ideas of, vi. 7 (38-697).\n\n  Good must be superior to intelligence and life, v. 3.16 (49-1117).\n\n  Good not to be explained by Aristotelian intelligence, vi. 7.20\n    (38-736).\n\n  Good not to be explained by Pythagorean oppositions, vi. 7.20\n    (38-735).\n\n  Good not to be explained by Stoic characteristic virtue, vi. 7.20\n    (38-736).\n\n  Good of a thing is its intimacy with itself, vi. 7.27 (38-744).\n\n  Good only antagonistic and figurative of evil, i. 8.6 (51-1150).\n\n  Good, Platonic discussed, vi. 7.25 (38-741).\n\n  Good related to intelligence and soul as light, sun and moon, v. 6.4\n    (24-337).\n\n  Good, self-sufficient, does not need self consciousness, vi. 7.38\n    (38-763).\n\n  Good, slavery of, accuses Providence, iii. 2.6 (47-1052).\n\n  Good, study, vi. 7.15 sqq., (38-726).\n\n  Good superior to beauty, i. 6.9 (1-55).\n\n  Good supreme, Aristotelian, vi. 7.25 (38-742).\n\n  Good the first and other goods, i. 7 (54-1208).\n\n  Good, therefore also supra-active, v. 6.5 (24-338).\n\n  Good, true, implies counterfeit, vi. 7.26 (38-743).\n\n  Goods, all, can be described as a form, i. 8.1 (51-1142); i. 6.2\n    (1-43).\n\n  Goods, independence from pleasure is temperate man, vi. 7.29 (38-747).\n\n  Goods of three ranks, i. 8.2 (51-1144).\n\n  Goods, Plato's opinion interpreted in two ways, vi. 7.30 (38-749).\n\n  Goods, supreme as end of all other ones, i. 7.1 (54-1208).\n\n  Gorge with food, v. 5.11 (32-592).\n\n  Governing principle, Stoic, iii. 1.2, 4 (3-89, 91).\n\n  Governments, soul resembles all forms of, iv. 4.17 (28-464).\n\n  Gradations, descending of existence, iv. 3.7 (27-415).\n\n  Grades of thought and life, iii. 8.7 (30-540).\n\n  Grand Father supreme, v. 5.3 (32-581).\n\n  Grasp more perfect, increases happiness, i. 5.3 (36-685).\n\n  Gravitation, iv. 5.2 (29-517).\n\n  Greatness of soul, nothing to do with size of body, vi. 4.5 (22-293).\n\n  Grotto, Empedoclean simile of world, iv. 8.1 (6-120).\n\n  Group, v. 5.4 (32-581).\n\n  Group unites, all lower, adjusted to supreme unity, vi. 6.11 (34-660).\n\n  Groups-of-four, or tens, Pythagorean, vi. 6.5 (34-649).\n\n  Growth, common elements with increase and generation, vi. 3.22\n    (44-975).\n\n  Growth, localized in liver, iv. 3.23 (27-426).\n\n  Growth power, relation of to the desire function, iv. 4.22 (28-470).\n\n  Growth, sense and emotions, tend towards divisibility, iv. 3.19\n    (27-418).\n\n  Growth-soul derived from world-soul, not ours, iv. 9.3 (8-143).\n\n  Guidance of Daemon does not interfere with responsibility, iii. 4.5\n    (15-238).\n\n  Guilt cause of fall of souls, (Pythagorean), iv. 8.1 (6-120).\n\n  Guilt not incurred by soul in toleration, iii. 1.8 (3-97).\n\n  Gymnastics, v. 9.11 (5-114).\n\n\n  Habit intellectualizing, that liberates the soul, is virtue, vi. 8.5\n    (39-780).\n\n  Habit, Stoic, ii. 4.16 (12-218); iv. 7.8 (2-73).\n\n  Habit, Stoic, as start of evolution to soul, impossible, iv. 7.8\n    (2-73).\n\n  Habituation, ii. 5.2 (25-345).\n\n  Habituation, active, immediate, and remote, distinction between, vi.\n    1.8 (42-849),\n\n  Habituation or substantial act is hypostasis, vi. 1.6 (42-845).\n\n  Habituation, Stoic, must be posterior to reasons as archetypes, v.\n    9.5 (5-108).\n\n  Habituations are reasons which participate in form, vi. 1.9 (42-850).\n\n  Hades, chastisements, i. 7.3 (54-1210).\n\n  Hades, what it means for the career of the soul, vi. 4.16 (22-312).\n\n  Happiness according to Aristotle, i. 4.1 (46-1019).\n\n  Happiness as sensation, does not hinder search for higher, i. 4.2\n    (1021).\n\n  Happiness defined, i. 4.1, 3 (46-1019, 1023).\n\n  Happiness dependent upon interior characteristics, i. 4.3 (46-1023).\n\n  Happiness, does it increase with duration of time? 1.5 (36-684).\n\n  Happiness has nothing to do with duration, i. 5.1, 5 (36-684, 685).\n\n  Happiness has nothing to do with pleasure, i. 5.4 (36-685).\n\n  Happiness in goal of each part of their natures, i. 4.5 (46-1026).\n\n  Happiness increased would result only from more grasp, i. 5.3\n    (36-685).\n\n  Happiness is actualized wisdom, i. 4.9 (46-1033).\n\n  Happiness is desiring nothing further, i. 4.4 (46-1026).\n\n  Happiness is human (must be something), i. 4.4 (46-1025).\n\n  Happiness is not the satisfaction of desire to live, i. 5.2 (36-684).\n\n  Happiness, lack of blame on a soul that does not deserve it, iii. 2.5\n    (47-1050).\n\n  Happiness not increased by memories of the past, i. 5.9 (36-689).\n\n  Happiness of animals, i. 4.2 (46-1020).\n\n  Happiness of plants, i. 4.1 (46-1019).\n\n  Happiness of sage not diminished in adversity, i. 4.4 (46-1026).\n\n  Happiness, one should not consider oneself alone capable of achieving\n    it, ii. 9.10 (33-619).\n\n  Harm, none can happen to the good, iii. 2.6 (47-1051).\n\n  Harmony as a single universe, ii. 3.5 (52-1170).\n\n  Harmony cannot be reproduced from badly tuned lyre, ii. 3.13\n    (52-1180).\n\n  Harmony is universe in spite of the faults in the details, ii. 3.16\n    (52-1185).\n\n  Harmony posterior to body, iv. 7.8 (2-74).\n\n  Harmony presupposes producing soul, iv. 7.8 (2-75).\n\n  Harmony (Pythagorean), soul is not, iv. 7.8 (2-74).\n\n  Harmony sympathetic, earth feels and directs by it, iv. 4.26 (28-477).\n\n  Hate of the body by Plato, supplemented by admiration of the world,\n    ii. 9.17 (33-633).\n\n  Hate, virtue is a, iii. 6.2 (26-352).\n\n  Having as Aristotelian category, vi. 1.23 (42-876).\n\n  Having is too indefinite and various to be a category, vi. 1.23\n    (42-876).\n\n  Head, seat of reason, iv. 3.23 (27-425).\n\n  Head, with faces all round, simile of, vi. 5.7 (23-320).\n\n  Health is tempermanent of corporeal principles, iv. 7.8 (2-71).\n\n  Hearing and vision, process of, iv. 5 (29-514).\n\n  Heart, seat of anger, iv. 3.23 (27-426).\n\n  Heaven, ii. 1 (40-813).\n\n  Heaven, according to Heraclitus, opposed, ii. 1.2 (40-815).\n\n  Heaven, existence of, iv. 4.45 (28-512).\n\n  Heaven needs not the action of air or fire, ii. 1.8 (40-826).\n\n  Heaven possesses soul and body and supports Plotinos's view, ii. 1.2\n    (40-815).\n\n  Heaven, souls first go into it in intelligible, iv. 3.17 (27-415).\n\n  Heaven, there must inevitably be change, ii. 1.1 (40-813).\n\n  Heaven, though influx perpetuates itself by form, ii. 1.1 (40-813).\n\n  Heavens after death, is star harmonizing with their predominant moral\n    power, iii. 4.6 (15-239).\n\n  Heavens do not remain still, ii. 1.1 (40-814).\n\n  Heaven's immortality also due to universal soul's spontaneous motion,\n    ii. 1.4 (40-818).\n\n  Heaven's immortality due to its residence, ii. 1.4 (40-817).\n\n  Heaven's immortality proved by having no beginning, ii. 1.4 (40-819).\n\n  Helen, iii. 3.5 (48-1085).\n\n  Helena's beauty, whence it came, v. 8.2 (31-553).\n\n  Hell, descent into, by souls, i. 8.13 (51-1160).\n\n  Hell in mystery teachings, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Hell, what it means for the career of the soul, vi. 4.16 (22-312).\n\n  Hells, Platonic interincarnational judgment and expiation, iii. 4.6\n    (15-240).\n\n  Hell's torments are reformatory, iv. 4.45 (28-512).\n\n  Help for sub-divine natures is thought, vi. 7.41 (38-768).\n\n  Help from divinity, sought to solve difficulties, v. 1.6 (10-182).\n\n  Heraclidae, vi. 1.3 (42-840).\n\n  Hercules as double, symbolizes soul, i. 1.13 (53-1206).\n\n  Hercules, symbol of man, in the hells, i. 1.12 (53-1206); iv. 3.27,\n    31 (27-433, 440).\n\n  Heredity a legitimate cause, iii. 1.6 (3-94).\n\n  Heredity more important than star influence, iii. 1.6 (3-94).\n\n  Hermaphrodite, or castrated, iii. 6.19 (26-385); v. 8.13 (31-573).\n\n  Hermes, ithyphallic, iii. 6.19 (26-385).\n\n  Hierarchy in universe (see concatenation), v. 4.1 (7-135).\n\n  \"Higher,\" or \"somewhat,\" a particle that is prefixed to any Statement\n    about the Supreme, vi. 8.13 (39-797).\n\n  Higher part of soul sees vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10\n    (31-569).\n\n  Higher region, reached only by born philosophers, v. 9.2 (5-103).\n\n  Higher stages of love, v. 9.2 (5-103).\n\n  Higher things from them the lower proceed, i. 8.1 (51-1142).\n\n  Highest, by it souls are united, vi 7.15 (38-726).\n\n  Highest self of soul is memory's basis, iv. 6.3 (41-832).\n\n  Homely virtues are the civil, Platonic four, i. 2.1 (19-257).\n\n  \"Homonyms,\" or \"labels,\" see references to puns; also, vi. 1.2, 10,\n    11, 23, 26; vi. 2.10; vi. 3.1, 5.\n\n  Honesty escapes magic, iv. 4.44 (28-509).\n\n  Honesty results from contemplation of the intelligible, iv. 4.44\n    (28-509).\n\n  Horizon of divine approach is contemplating intelligence, v. 5.8\n    (32-586); v. 8.10 (31-567).\n\n  Horoscopes do not account for simultaneous differences, iii. 1.5\n    (3-93).\n\n  Houses and aspects, absurdity of, ii. 3.4 (52-1168).\n\n  How to detach the soul from the body naturally, 1.9 (16-243).\n\n  Human beings add to the beauty of the world, iv. 3.14 (27-412).\n\n  Human life contains happiness, i. 4.4 (46-1025).\n\n  Human nature intermediate, iv. 4.45 (28-511).\n\n  Human nature relation to animal, i. 1.7 (53-1199).\n\n  Human organism studied to explain soul relation, iv. 3.3 (27-393).\n\n  Human soul and world-soul differences between, ii. 9.7 (33-611).\n\n  Hypostases that transmit knowledge (see the new title), v. 3\n    (49-1090).\n\n  Hypostasis, v. 1.4, 6 (10-180 to 184).\n\n  Hypostasis are permanent actualizations, v. 3.12 (49-1111).\n\n  Hypostasis as substantial act, iii. 4.1 (15-233).\n\n  Hypostasis is a substantial act or habituation, vi. 1.6 (42-845).\n\n  Hypostasis not in loves contrary to nature, iii. 5.7 (50-1134).\n\n  Hypostasis of love, iii. 5.2, 3, 7 (50-1125, 1127, 1133).\n\n  Hypostasis of ousia, v. 5.3 (32-581).\n\n  Hypostasis the first actualization of first principle has no thought,\n    vi. 7.40 (38-766).\n\n  Hypostatic existence, vi. 6.9, 12 (34-655, 661); vi. 8.10, 12\n    (39-790, 793).\n\n  Hypostatic existence of matter proved, i. 8.15 (51-1162); ii. 4\n    (12-197).\n\n\n  Idea named existence and intelligence, v. 1.8 (10-186).\n\n  Ideas and numbers, identification of, vi. 6.9 (34-656).\n\n  Ideas, descent of, into individuals, vi. 5.6 (23-320).\n\n  Ideas, different, for twins, brothers or work of art, v. 7.1 (18-252).\n\n  Ideas imply form and substrate, ii. 4.4 (12-199).\n\n  Ideas, intelligence and essence, v. 9 (5-102).\n\n  Ideas, multitude of, of the good, vi. 7 (38-697).\n\n  Ideas not for all earthly entities, v. 9.14 (5-117).\n\n  Ideas of individuals, do they exist v. 7.1 (18-251).\n\n  Ideas of individuals, two possible hypotheses, v. 7.1 (18-251).\n\n  Ideas or reasons possessed by intellectual life, vi. 2.21 (43-927).\n\n  Ideas participated in by matter, vi. 5.8 (23-321).\n\n  Identification, unreflective, memory not as high, iv. 4.4 (28-445).\n\n  Identity and difference implied by triune process of categories, vi.\n    2.8 (43-905).\n\n  Identity, category, v. 1.4 (10-180).\n\n  Identity of thought and existence makes actualizations of\n    intelligence, v. 9.5 (5-107).\n\n  Identity, substantial, inconsistent with logical distinctness, ii.\n    4.14 (12-214).\n\n  Ignorance of divinity, v. 1.1 (10-173).\n\n  Ignorance illusory because overnatural gentleness, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Ignores everything, does God, being above thought, vi. 7.38 (38-763).\n\n  Illumination, creation by mere gnostic, opposed, ii. 9.11 (33-622).\n\n  Illumination of darkness must have been eternal, ii. 9.12 (33-624).\n\n  Illumination, the good is, for the individual, vi. 7.24 (38-740).\n\n  Illustrations, see \"Simile.\"\n\n  Image, v. 5.1 (10-174); v. 8.8 (31-564).\n\n  Image bound to model by radiation, vi. 4.10 (22-300).\n\n  Image formed by the universal beings, is magnitude, iii. 6.17\n    (26-380).\n\n  Image in mirror, iv. 5.7 (29-528).\n\n  Image of archetype is Jupiter, begotten by ecstasy, v. 8.12 (31-572).\n\n  Image of intelligence is only a sample that must be purified, v. 3.3\n    (31-555).\n\n  Image of its model eternity is time, iii. 1, introd. (45-985).\n\n  Image of one intelligence, v. 1.7 (10-184).\n\n  Images do not reach eye by influx, iv. 5.2 (29-516).\n\n  Images external produce passions, iii. 6.5 (26-358).\n\n  Imagination, iv. 3.25 (27-428).\n\n  Imagination, both kinds, implied by both kinds of memory, iv. 3.31\n    (27-483).\n\n  Imagination does not entirely preserve intellectual conceptions, iv.\n    3.30 (27-437).\n\n  Imagination is related to opinion, as matter to reason, iii. 6.15\n    (26-377).\n\n  Imagination, memory belongs to it, iv. 3.29 (27-436).\n\n  Imagination, of the two, one always overshadows the other, iv. 3.3\n    (27-438).\n\n  Imitation of the first, v. 4.1 (7-135).\n\n  Immaterial natures could not be affected, iii. 6.2 (26-354).\n\n  Immanence and inclination is the Supreme, vi. 8.16 (39-801).\n\n  Immortal, are we, all of us, or only parts? iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Immortal as the One from whom they proceed, are souls, vi. 4.10\n    (22-301).\n\n  Immortal soul, even on Stoic hypothesis, iv. 7.10 (2-80).\n\n  Immortality does not extend to sublunar sphere, ii. 1.5.\n\n  Immortality in souls of animals and plants, iv. 7.14 (2-84).\n\n  Immortality of heaven also due to universal soul's spontaneous\n    motion, ii. 1.4 (40-818).\n\n  Immortality of heaven due to its residence there, ii. 1.4 (40-817).\n\n  Immortality of heaven proved by having no beginning, ii. 1.4 (40-819).\n\n  Immortality of soul, iv. 7 (2-56).\n\n  Immortality of soul proved historically, iv. 7.15 (2-85).\n\n  Immovability of Intelligence necessary to make it act as horizon, v.\n    5.7 (32-586).\n\n  Impassible, and punishable, soul is both, i. 1.12 (53-1204).\n\n  Impassible are world soul and stars, iv. 4.42 (28-506).\n\n  Impassible as the soul is, everything contrary is figurative, iii.\n    6.1 (26-351).\n\n  Impassible, how can the soul remain, though given up to emotion, iii.\n    6.1 (26-351).\n\n  Impassibility of incorporeal entities, iii. 6.1 (26-351).\n\n  Impassibility of matter depends on different senses of participation,\n    iii. 6.9 (26-366).\n\n  Impassibility of the soul, iii. 6.1 (26-350).\n\n  Imperfection, cause of distance from the Supreme, iii. 3.3 (48-1080).\n\n  Imperfections are only lower forms of perfections, vi. 7.10 (38-716).\n\n  Imperfections of world should not be blamed on it, iii. 2.3 (47-1046).\n\n  Imperishable is world, so long as archetype subsists, v. 8.12\n    (31-572).\n\n  Imperishable, no way the soul could perish, iv. 7.12 (2-82).\n\n  Imperishable soul, even by infinite division, iv. 7.12 (2-83).\n\n  Importance to virtue, not, duration of time, i. 5.10 (36-689).\n\n  Impossible to go beyond First, vi. 8.11 (39-791).\n\n  Impression admits no cognition of intelligible objects, iv. 6.3\n    (41-832).\n\n  Impressions on seal of wax, sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-66).\n\n  Improvement of the low, destiny to become souls, iv. 8.7 (6-131).\n\n  Improvement of what is below her, one object of incarnation, iv. 8.5\n    (6-128).\n\n  Impure eye can see nothing, i. 6.9 (1-53).\n\n  Inadequacy of philosophical language, vi. 8.13 (39-797).\n\n  Inanimate entirely, nothing in universe is, iv. 4.36 (28-499).\n\n  Incarnation, difference between human and cosmic, iv. 8.3 (6-123).\n\n  Incarnation of soul; its object is perfection of universe, iv. 8.5\n    (6-129).\n\n  Incarnation of soul manner, iii. 9.3 (13-222).\n\n  Incarnation of soul not cause of possessing memory, iv. 3.26 (27-431).\n\n  Incarnation, study of, iv. 3.9 (27-403).\n\n  Incarnation unlikely, unless souls have disposition to suffer, ii.\n    3.10 (52-1177).\n\n  Incarnations, between, hell's judgment and expiation, iii. 4.6\n    (15-240).\n\n  Incarnation's purpose is, self-development and improvement, iv. 8.5\n    (6-127).\n\n  Inclination and immanence is the Supreme, vi. 8.16 (39-801).\n\n  Inclination of equator to ecliptic, v. 8.7 (31-563).\n\n  Incomprehensible unity approached only by a presence, vi. 9.4 (9-154).\n\n  Incorporeal entities alone activate body, iv. 7.8 (2-70).\n\n  Incorporeal entities, impossibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350).\n\n  Incorporeal matter, ii. 4.2 (12-198).\n\n  Incorporeal objects limited to highest thoughts, iv. 7.8 (2-78).\n\n  Incorporeal, the soul remains, vi. 3.16 (44-962).\n\n  Incorporeal qualities, ii. 7.2 (37-695); vi. 1.29 (42-885).\n\n  Incorporeality of divinity, vi. 1.26 (42-880).\n\n  Incorporeality of intelligible entities, iv. 7.8 (2-78).\n\n  Incorporeality of matter and quantity, ii. 4.9 (12-206).\n\n  Incorporeality of soul must be studied, iv. 7.2, 8 (2-57, 68).\n\n  Incorporeality of soul proved by its penetrating body, iv. 7.8 (2-72).\n\n  Incorporeality of soul proved by kinship with Divine, iv. 7.10 (2-79).\n\n  Incorporeality of soul proved by priority of actualization, iv. 7.8\n    (2-71).\n\n  Incorporeality of virtue, not perishable, iv. 7.8 (2-69).\n\n  Incorruptible matter exists only potentially, ii. 5.5 (25-348).\n\n  Increase, common element, with growth and generation, vi. 3.22\n    (44-975).\n\n  Increased happiness would result only from more grasp, i. 5.3\n    (36-685).\n\n  Independent existence proved, by the use of collective nouns, vi.\n    6.16 (34-672).\n\n  Independent good from pleasure is temperate man, vi. 7.29 (38-747).\n\n  Independent principle, the human soul, iii. 1.8 (3-97).\n\n  Indeterminateness of soul not yet reached the good, iii. 5.7\n    (50-1133).\n\n  Indetermination of space leads to its measuring movement, iii. 7.12\n    (45-1011).\n\n  Indigence is necessarily evil, ii. 4.16 (12-218).\n\n  Indigence of soul from connection with matter, i. 8.14 (51-1160).\n\n  Indiscernibles, Leitnitz's doctrine of, v. 7.1 (18-254).\n\n  Individual aggregate formed by uniting soul and body, i. 1.6\n    (53-1197).\n\n  Individual relation with cosmic intellect, i. 1.8 (53-1200).\n\n  Individual relation with God and soul, i. 1.8 (53-1200).\n\n  Individuality in contemplation weakens soul, iv. 8.4 (6-125).\n\n  Individuality possessed by rational soul, iv. 8.3 (6-124).\n\n  Individuality, to which soul does it belong? ii. 3.9 (52-1175).\n\n  Individuals, descent of ideas into, vi. 5.6 (23-320).\n\n  Individuals distinct as being actualizations, vi. 2.2, (43-894).\n\n  Indivisible, v. 3.10 (49-1107).\n\n  Indivisible and divisible is the soul, iv. 2.2 (21-279).\n\n  Indivisible essence becomes divisible within bodies, iv. 2.1 (21-277).\n\n  Indivisible essence, description of, iv. 2.1 (21-277).\n\n  Indivisible is the universal being, vi. 4.3 (22-288).\n\n  Indivisibility, v. 1.7 (10-184).\n\n  Indumeneus, iii. 3.5 (48-1085).\n\n  Ineffable is the Supreme, v. 3.13 (49-1112).\n\n  Inequality of riches, no moment to an eternal being, ii. 9.9 (33-616).\n\n  Inertia of matter aired by influx of world soul, v. 1.2 (10-175).\n\n  Inexhaustible are stars, and need no refreshment, ii. 1.8 (40-827).\n\n  Inferior divinities, difference from celestial, v. 8.3 (31-556).\n\n  Inferior nature, how it can participate in the intelligible, vi. 5.11\n    (23-329).\n\n  Inferior natures are helped by souls descending to them, iv. 8.5\n    (6-127).\n\n  Inferiority of world to its model, highest criticism we may pass, v.\n    8.8 (31-565).\n\n  Influence of stars is their natural radiation of good, iv. 4.3\n    (28-497).\n\n  Influence of universe should be partial only, iv. 4.34 (28-494).\n\n  Influx movement as, vi. 3.26 (44-980).\n\n  Influx of world-soul, v. 1.2 (10-175).\n\n  Infinite and formlessness in itself is evil, i. 8.3, (51-1145).\n\n  Infinite contained by intelligence as simultaneous of one and many,\n    vi. 7.14 (38-725).\n\n  Infinite explained as God entirely present everywhere, vi. 5.4\n    (23-318).\n\n  Infinite, how a number can be said to be, vi. 6.16 (34-673).\n\n  Infinite, how it arrived to existence, vi. 6.2, 3 (34-644, 645).\n\n  Infinite is conceived by the thoughts making abstraction of the firm,\n    vi. 6.3 (34-646).\n\n  Infinite is soul, as comprising many souls, vi. 4.4 (22-291).\n\n  Infinite may be ideal or real, ii. 4.15 (12-217).\n\n  Infinite, what is its number, vi. 6.2 (34-644).\n\n  Infinity, how it can subsist in the intelligible world, vi. 6.2\n    (34-645).\n\n  Infinity of number, due to impossibility of increasing the greatest,\n    vs. 6.18 (34-676).\n\n  Infinity of parts of the Supreme, v. 8.9 (31-566).\n\n  Infra-celestial vault of Theodore of Asine (\"invisible place\") v.\n    8.10 (31-567); ii. 4.1 (12-198).\n\n  Inhering in Supreme, is root of power of divinities, v. 8.9 (31-566).\n\n  Initiative should not be overshadowed by Providence, iii. 2.9\n    (47-1057).\n\n  Insanity even, does not justify suicide, i. 9 (16).\n\n  Inseparable from their beings are potentialities, vi. 4.9 (22-298).\n\n  Instances of correspondence of sense beauty with its idea, i. 6.3\n    (1-44).\n\n  Instrument of soul is body, iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Intellect, cosmic relation with individual, i. 1.8 (53-1200).\n\n  Intellect did not grasp object itself, i. 1.9 (53-1201).\n\n  Intellection neither needed nor possessed by good, iii. 8.11 (30-549).\n\n  Intellection would be movement or actualization on Aristotelian\n    principles, vi. 1.18 (42-867).\n\n  Intellectual differences between world-soul and star-soul, iv. 4.17\n    (28-463).\n\n  Intellectualized, and ennobled is soul, scorning even thought, vi.\n    7.35 (38-757).\n\n  Intellectualizing habit that liberates the soul is virtue, vi. 8.5\n    (39-780).\n\n  Intellectual life possesses the reasons or ideas, vi. 2.21 (43-927).\n\n  Intelligence, always double as thinking subject and object thought,\n    v. 3.5, 6 (49-1096); v. 4.2 (7-136); v. 6.1 (24-334).\n\n  Intelligence and life mus be transcended by good, v. 3.16 (49-1117).\n\n  Intelligence and life only different degrees of the same reality, vi.\n    7.18 (38-732).\n\n  Intelligence and soul contained in intelligible world, besides ideas,\n    v. 9.13 (5-116).\n\n  Intelligence as a composite, is posterior to the categories, vi. 2.19\n    (43-924).\n\n  Intelligence as demiurgic creator, v. 1.8 (10-186).\n\n  Intelligence as matter of intelligible entities, v. 4.2 (7-136).\n\n  Intelligence as vision of one, v. 1.7 (10-185).\n\n  Intelligence assisting Supreme, has no room for chance, vi. 8.17\n    (39-804).\n\n  Intelligence begets world-souls and individual souls, vi. 2.22\n    (43-929).\n\n  Intelligence cannot be first, v. 4.1 (7-135).\n\n  Intelligence category, v. 1.4 (10-180).\n\n  Intelligence conceived of by stripping the soul of every\n    non-intellectual part, v. 3.9 (49-1104).\n\n  Intelligence consists of intelligence and love, vi. 7.35 (38-758).\n\n  Intelligence contains all beings, generatively, v. 9.6 (5-109).\n\n  Intelligence contains all intelligible entities, by its very notion,\n    v. 5.2 (32-578).\n\n  Intelligence contains all things conformed to the good, vi. 7.16\n    (38-727).\n\n  Intelligence contains the infinite as friendship, vi. 7.14 (38-725).\n\n  Intelligence contains the infinite as simultaneous of one and many,\n    vi. 7.14 (38-725).\n\n  Intelligence contains the universal archetype, v. 9.9 (5-112).\n\n  Intelligence contains the whyness of its forms, vi. 7.2 (38-732).\n\n  Intelligence contemplating, is horizon of divine approach, v. 5.7\n    (32-586).\n\n  Intelligence could not have been the last degree of existence, ii.\n    9.8 (33-614).\n\n  Intelligence destroyed by theory that truth is external to it, v. 5.1\n    (32-576).\n\n  Intelligence develops manifoldness just like soul, iv. 3.5 (27-396).\n\n  Intelligence did not deliberate before making sense-man, vi. 7.1\n    (38-698).\n\n  Intelligence differentiated into universal and individual, vi. 7.17\n    (38-729).\n\n  Intelligence, divine nature of, i. 8.2 (51-1143).\n\n  Intelligence does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-921).\n\n  Intelligence dwelt in by pure incorporeal souls, iv. 3.24 (27-427).\n\n  Intelligence evolves over the field of truth, vi. 7.13 (38-723).\n\n  Intelligence, good and soul related by light, sun and moon, v. 6.4\n    (24-337).\n\n  Intelligence has conversion to good and being in itself, vi. 8.4\n    (39-778).\n\n  Intelligence, how it makes the world subsist, iii. 2.1 (47-1043).\n\n  Intelligence, how though one, produces particular things, vi. 2.21\n    (43-926).\n\n  Intelligence, ideas and essence, v. 9 (5-102).\n\n  Intelligence identical with thought, as far as existence, v. 3.5\n    (49-1096).\n\n  Intelligence, image of one, v. 1.7 (10-185).\n\n  Intelligence implies aspiration, as thought is aspiration to the\n    good, iii. 8.11 (30-548).\n\n  Intelligence implies good, as thought is aspiration thereto, v. 6.5\n    (24-338).\n\n  Intelligence in actualization, because its thought is identical with\n    its essence, v. 9.5 (5-107).\n\n  Intelligence in relation to good. i. 4.3 (46-1024).\n\n  Intelligence is all, vi. 7.17 (38-729).\n\n  Intelligence is goal of purification, i. 2.5 (19-263).\n\n  Intelligence is matter of intelligible entities, v. 4.2 (7-136).\n\n  Intelligence is the potentiality of the intelligences which are its\n    actualizations, vi. 2.20 (43-925).\n\n  Intelligence itself is the substrate of the intelligible world, ii.\n    4.4 (12-199).\n\n  Intelligence, life of, is ever contemporaneous, iii. 7.2 (45-989).\n\n  Intelligence, like circle, is inseparably one and many, iii. 8.8\n    (30-543).\n\n  Intelligence may be denied liberty, if granted super-liberty, vi. 8.6\n    (39-782).\n\n  Intelligence, multiplicity of, implies their mutual differences, vi.\n    7.17 (38-730).\n\n  Intelligence must remain immovable to act as horizon, v. 5.7 (32-586).\n\n  Intelligence not a unity, but its manifold produced by a unity, iv.\n    4.1 (28-443).\n\n  Intelligence not constituted by things in it, v. 2.2 (11-196).\n\n  Intelligence not ours, but we, i. 1.13 (53-1206).\n\n  Intelligence passes from unity to duality by thinking, v. 6.1\n    (24-333).\n\n  Intelligence potential and actualized in the soul, vi. 6.15 (34-669).\n\n  Intelligence primary knows itself, v. 3.6 (49-1099).\n\n  Intelligence proof of its existence and nature, v. 9.3 (5-104).\n\n  Intelligence ranks all else, v. 4.2 (7-136).\n\n  Intelligence relation to intelligible, iii. 9.1 (13-220).\n\n  Intelligence's existence proved by identity of its thought and\n    essence, v. 9.3 (5-104).\n\n  Intelligence shines down from the peak formed by united souls, vi.\n    7.15 (38-726).\n\n  Intelligence supreme, is king of kings, v. 5.3 (32-579).\n\n  Intelligence's working demands a supra-thinking principle, v. 6.2\n    (24-334).\n\n  Intelligence that aspires to form of good is not the supreme, iii.\n    8.11 (30-548).\n\n  Intelligence thinks things, because it possesses them, vi. 6.7\n    (34-653).\n\n  Intelligence unites, as it rises to the intelligible, iv. 4.1\n    (28-442).\n\n  Intelligence, which is free by itself, endows soul with liberty, vi.\n    8.7 (39-983).\n\n  Intelligence world, in it each being is accompanied by its whyness,\n    vi. 7.2 (38-702).\n\n  Intelligent life beneath being, iii. 6.6 (26-361).\n\n  Intelligent animals are distinct from the creating image of them, vi.\n    7.8 (38-712).\n\n  Intelligible animals are pre-existing, vi. 7.8 (38-712).\n\n  Intelligible animals do not incline towards the sense-world, vi. 7.8\n    (38-712).\n\n  Intelligible beauty, v. 8 (31-551).\n\n  Intelligible believed in by those rising to the soul, vi. 9.5 (9-156).\n\n  Intelligible contains the earth, vi. 7.11 (38-718).\n\n  Intelligible does not descend; sense-world rises, iii. 4.4 (15-237).\n\n  Intelligible entities are not outside of the good, v. 5 (32-575).\n\n  Intelligible entities are veritable numbers, vi. 6.14 (34-668).\n\n  Intelligible entities contained by very motion of intelligence, v.\n    5.2 (32-578).\n\n  Intelligible entities do not exist apart from their matter,\n    intelligence, v. 4.2 (7-138).\n\n  Intelligible entities eternal and immutable, not corporeal, iv. 7.8\n    (2-69).\n\n  Intelligible entities, gnostics think they can be bewitched, ii. 9.14\n    (33-627).\n\n  Intelligible entities higher and lower, first and second, v. 4.2\n    (7-135).\n\n  Intelligible entities must be both, identical with and different from\n    intelligence, v. 3.10 (49-1108).\n\n  Intelligible entities not merely images, but potentialities for\n    memory, iv. 4.4 (28-446).\n\n  Intelligible entities presence implied by knowledge of them, v. 5.1\n    (32-575).\n\n  Intelligible entities return not by memory, but by further vision,\n    iv. 4.5 (28-447).\n\n  Intelligible entity what, and how it is it, vi. 6.8 (34-654).\n\n  Intelligible essence, both in and out of itself, vi. 5.3 (23-316).\n\n  Intelligible essence formed by adding eternity to essence, vi. 2.1\n    (43-892).\n\n  Intelligible eternity in not an accident of, but an intimate part of\n    its nature, iii. 7.3 (45-989).\n\n  Intelligible has eternity as world-soul is to time, iii. 7.10\n    (45-1007).\n\n  Intelligible, how participated in by inferior nature, vi. 5.11\n    (23-329).\n\n  Intelligible in it, cause coincides with nature, vi. 7.19 (38-735).\n\n  Intelligible in it, stability does not imply stillness, vi. 3.27\n    (44-982).\n\n  Intelligible line exists in the intelligible, vi. 6.17 (34-674).\n\n  Intelligible line posterior to number, vi. 6.17 (34-674).\n\n  Intelligible man, scrutiny of, demanded by philosophy, vi. 7.4\n    (38-705).\n\n  Intelligible matter, ii. 4.1 2 (12-197, 198); iii., 8.11 (30-548).\n\n  Intelligible matter composite of form and matter, ii. 4.4 (12-200).\n\n  Intelligible matter is not potential, ii, 5.3 (25-345).\n\n  Intelligible matter is not shapeless, ii. 4.3 (12-198).\n\n  Intelligible matter is shaped real being, ii. 4.5 (12-201).\n\n  Intelligible matter, why it must be accepted, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).\n\n  Intelligible number infinite because unmeasured, vi. 6.18 (34-676).\n\n  Intelligible numbers, vi. 6.6 (34-651).\n\n  Intelligible parts of men unite in the intelligible, vi. 5.10\n    (23-327).\n\n  Intelligible Pythagorean numbers discussed, vi. 6.5 (34-649).\n\n  Intelligible relation to intelligence, iii. 9.1 (13-220).\n\n  Intelligible remains unmoved, yet penetrates the world, vi. 5.11\n    (23-328).\n\n  Intelligible, shared by highest parts of all men, vi. 7.15 (38-726).\n\n  Intelligible, spherical figure the primitive one, vi. 6.17 (34-675).\n\n  Intelligible terms, only verbal similarity to physical, vi. 3.5\n    (44-941).\n\n  Intelligible, to them is limited difference in effects, vi. 3.17\n    (44-964).\n\n  Intelligible unity and decad exist before all numbers, vi. 6.5\n    (34-650).\n\n  Intelligible, what is being in it is generation in the sense-world,\n    vi. 3.2 (44-935).\n\n  Intelligible world and sense-world, connection between man's triple\n    nature, vi. 7.7 (38-711).\n\n  Intelligible world archetype of ours, v. 1.4 (10-178).\n\n  Intelligible world contains air, vi. 7.11 (38-720).\n\n  Intelligible world contains beside ideas, soul and intelligence, v.\n    9.13 (5-116).\n\n  Intelligible world contains earth, vi. 7.11 (38-718).\n\n  Intelligible world contains fire, vi. 7.11 (38-719).\n\n  Intelligible world contains water, vi. 7.11 (38-720).\n\n  Intelligible world, could it contain vegetables or metals, vi. 7.11\n    (38-717).\n\n  Intelligible world is model of this universe, vi. 7.12 (38-720).\n\n  Intelligible world, description of, v. 8.4 (31-557).\n\n  Intelligible world has more unity than sense-world, vi. 5.10 (23-327).\n\n  Intelligible world, how infinity can subsist in, vi. 6.3 (34-645).\n\n  Intelligible world, in it everything is actual, ii. 5.3 (25-346).\n\n  Intelligible world is complete model of this universe, vi. 7.12\n    (38-720).\n\n  Intelligible world, man relation to, vi. 4.14 (22-308).\n\n  Intelligible world, stars influence is from contemplation of, iv.\n    4.35 (28-496).\n\n  Intelligible world, we must descend from it to study time, iii. 7.6\n    (45-995).\n\n  Interior characteristics necessary to happiness, i. 4.3 (46-1023).\n\n  Interior life, rather than exterior, is field of liberty, vi. 8.6\n    (39-781).\n\n  Interior man, v. 1.10 (10-189).\n\n  Interior model, cause of appreciation of interior beauty, i. 6.2\n    (1-45).\n\n  Interior vision, how trained, i. 6.9 (1-53).\n\n  Intermediary between form and matter, are sense-objects, iii. 6.17\n    (26-381).\n\n  Intermediary body not necessary for vision, iv. 5.1 (29-514, 515).\n\n  Intermediary elemental soul, also inadmissible, ii. 9.5 (33-607).\n\n  Intermediary of reason is the world-soul, iv. 3.11 (27-407).\n\n  Intermediary position of Saturn, between Uranus and Jupiter, v. 8.13\n    (31-573).\n\n  Intermediary sensation, demanded by conceptive thoughts, iv. 4.23\n    (28-472).\n\n  Intermediate is human nature, suffering with whole, but acting on it,\n    iv. 4.45 (28-511).\n\n  Intermediate is the soul's nature, iv. 8.7 (6-130).\n\n  Intermediate sense shape on which depends sensation, iv. 4.23\n    (28-473).\n\n  Internal and external evil, relation between, i. 8.5 (51-1149).\n\n  Internecine war is objection to Providence, iii. 2.15 (47-1065).\n\n  Internecine warfare necessary, iii. 2.15 (47-1065).\n\n  Interpenetration of everything in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-557).\n\n  Interpreter of reason is the world-soul, iv. 3.11 (27-407).\n\n  Interrelation of supreme and subordinate divinities dynamic (birth)\n    or mere relation of parts and whole dynamic? v. 8.9 (31-566).\n\n  Intimacy of itself is the good of a thing, vi. 7.27 (38-744).\n\n  Intuition, omniscient, supersedes memory and reasonings, iv. 4.12\n    (28-457).\n\n  Intuitionally, the soul can reason, iv. 3.18 (27-417).\n\n  Intuition's act is true conception, i. 1.9 (53-1202).\n\n  Involuntariness to blame spontaneity, iii. 2.10 (47-1060).\n\n  Irascible part of earth, iv. 4.28 (28-481).\n\n  Irrational claims of astrologers, iii. 1.6 (3-95).\n\n  Isolated, pure soul would remain, iv. 4.23 (28-473).\n\n\n  James-Lange theory of emotions refuted, i. 1.5 (53-1196).\n\n  James-Lange theory taught, iv. 4.28 (28-480, 481).\n\n  Jar, residence or location of generation is matter, ii. 4.1 (12-197);\n    iii. 6.14 (26-376); iv. 3.20 (27-420).\n\n  Jealousy does not exist in divine nature, iv. 8.6 (6-129).\n\n  Judgment and soul, passibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350).\n\n  Judgment, mental, reduces multitude to unity, vi. 6.13 (34-664).\n\n  Judgment of one part by another, truth of astrology, ii. 3.7 (52-1172).\n\n  Judgment of soul and other things in purest condition only, iv. 7.10\n    (2-80).\n\n  Judgment of soul condemns her to reincarnation, iv. 8.5 (6-128).\n\n  Judgment, time of, between incarnations, iii. 4.6 (15-240).\n\n  Jupiter, v. 1.7 (10-185); v. 8.1 (31-552); v. 8.10 (31-568); iii. 5.2\n    (50-1126); v. 5.3 (32-580); v. 8.4 (31-558); iv. 3.12 (27-409); vi.\n    9.7 (9-162).\n\n  Jupiter, as demiurge, as world-soul, and as governor, iv. 4.10\n    (28-454).\n\n  Jupiter life's infinity destroys memory, iv. 4.9 (28-453).\n\n  Jupiter the greatest chief, or third God, is the soul, iii. 5.8\n    (50-1136).\n\n  Jupiter, two-fold, celestial and earthly, iii. 5.2 (50-1126).\n\n  Jupiter, Venus and Mercury, also considered astrologically, ii. 3.5\n    (52-1170).\n\n  Jupiter's administration above memory, iv. 4.9 (28-453).\n\n  Jupiter's garden is the reason begets everything, iii. 5.9 (50-1137).\n\n  Jupiter, two-fold, celestial and earthly, iii. 5.2 (50-1126).\n\n  Justice, v. 1.11 (10-190); v. 8.4, 10 (31-557, 567); i. 6.4 (1-61).\n\n  Justice, absolute, is indivisible, i. 2.6 (19-265).\n\n  Justice does not possess extension, iv. 7.8 (2-69).\n\n  Justice extends into past and future, iii. 2.13 (47-1062).\n\n  Justice, golden face of, vi. 6.6 (34-652); i, 6.4 (1-61).\n\n  Justice incarnate, is individual, i. 2.6 (19-265).\n\n  Justice is no true category, vi. 2.18 (41-923).\n\n  Justice, like intellectual statue, was born of itself, vi. 6.6\n    (34-652).\n\n  Justice not destroyed by superficiality of punishments, iii. 2.15\n    (47-1066).\n\n  Justice of God vindicated by philosophy, iv. 4.30, 37 (28-486, 500).\n\n  Justice seated beside Jupiter, v. 8.4 (31-558).\n\n  Juxtaposition, ii. 7.1 (37-691); iv. 7.3 (2-59).\n\n\n  Kinds of men, three, v. 9.1 (5-102).\n\n  King of kings, v. 5.3 (32-579).\n\n  Kings, men are, v. 3.4 (49-1094).\n\n  King, universal, stars followers of, ii. 3.13 (52-1179).\n\n  Kinship divine, recognition of, depends on self-knowledge, vi. 9.7\n    (9-161).\n\n  Kinship of human soul with divine, v. 1.1 (10-173).\n\n  Kinship to world-soul shown by fidelity to one's own nature, iii. 3.1\n    (48-1077).\n\n  Kinship with beautiful world scorned by gnostics, ii. 9.18 (33-635).\n\n  Kinship with depraved men accepted, ii. 9.18 (33-636).\n\n  Know thyself, iv. 3.1 (27-387); vi. 7.41 (38-769).\n\n  Knowledge of better things, cleared up by purification, iv. 7.10\n    (2-80).\n\n  Knowledge of good attained experience of evil, iv. 8.7 (6-131).\n\n  Knowledge of intelligible entities implies their presence, v. 5.1\n    (32-575).\n\n  Knowledge, true, shown not by unification, not revelation of divine\n    power, ii. 9.9 (33-617).\n\n  Kronos, of Uranus, iii. 5.2 (50-1126).\n\n\n  Label, is good, a common quality or a common label, vi. 7.18 (38-733).\n\n  Lachesis, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).\n\n  Land marks on path to ecstasy, i. 6.9 (1-54).\n\n  Last degree of existence could not have been existence, ii. 9.8\n    (33-614).\n\n  Last stage of soul-elevation, is vision of intelligible wisdom, v.\n    8.10 (31-567).\n\n  Law, natural directs soul. ii. 3.8 (52-1173).\n\n  Law of the order of the universe, why souls succumb to it, iv. 3.15\n    (27-413).\n\n  Laws, natural, which carry rewards, may be neglected by good, iii.\n    2.8 (47-1055).\n\n  Leakage (flow of or escape), ii. 1.6, 8 (40-822); v. 1.6 (10-182);\n    vi. 5.10 (23-327); v. 1.6 (10-182).\n\n  Leakage, none in radiation of soul (see wastage), vi. 4.5, 10\n    (22-293, 301); vi. 5.3 (23-317).\n\n  Leakage, none with celestial light, ii. 1.8 (40-784).\n\n  Leave not world, but be not of it, i. 8.6 (51-1150).\n\n  Leibnitz, theory of indiscernibles, v. 7.2 (18-254).\n\n  Legislator, intelligence, v. 9.5 (5-108).\n\n  Leisure in life of celestial Gods, v. 8.3 (31-556).\n\n  Lethe, iv. 3.26 (27-432).\n\n  Letters in which to read nature, iii. 3.6 (48-1087).\n\n  Letters in which to read nature, are stars, ii. 3.7 (52-1172); iii.\n    1.6 (3-95).\n\n  Liberation of soul effected by virtue as intellectualizing habit, vi.\n    8.5 (39-779).\n\n  Liberty, vi. 8 (39-773).\n\n  Liberty depends on intelligence, vi. 8.3 (39-777).\n\n  Liberty, does it belong to God only, or to all others also? vi. 8.1\n    (39-773).\n\n  Liberty lies in following reason, iii. 1.9, 10 (3-97, 98).\n\n  Liberty may be denied to intelligence, if granted super-liberty, vi.\n    8.6 (39-781).\n\n  Liberty must be for men, if it is for the divinities, vi. 8.1\n    (39-782).\n\n  Liberty not for the depraved who follow images, vi. 8.3 (39-777).\n\n  Liberty refers to the interior life, rather than to the exterior, vi.\n    8.6 (39-781).\n\n  Liberty would be destroyed by astrology. iii. 1.7 (3-96).\n\n  Life and intelligence could not inhere in molecules, iv. 7.2 (2-58).\n\n  Life and thought, different grades of, iii 8.7 (30-540).\n\n  Life changed from an evil to a by virtue, i. 7.1 (54-1208).\n\n  Life, drama of, roles played badly by evil, iii. 2.17 (47-1071).\n\n  Life interpenetrates all, and knows no limits, vi. 5.12 (23-330).\n\n  Life is actualization of intelligence, vi. 9.9 (9-165).\n\n  Life is below good, iii. 9.9 (13-225).\n\n  Life is perfect when intelligible, i. 4.3 (46-1024).\n\n  Life is presence with divinity, vi. 9.9 (9-165).\n\n  Life of intelligence is ever contemporaneous, iii. 7.2 (45-989).\n\n  Life, thought and existence, contained in primary existence, ii. 4.6\n    (12-203); v. 6.6 (24-339).\n\n  Life's ascent, witness to, is disappearance of contingency, vi. 8.15\n    (39-801).\n\n  Light abandoned by source does not perish, but is no more there, iv.\n    4.29 (28-484); iv. 5.7 (29-526).\n\n  Light and fire celestial, nature of, ii. 1.7 (40-825).\n\n  Light and form, two methods of sight, v. 5.7 (32-586).\n\n  Light as actualization is incorporeal, iv. 5.7 (29-527).\n\n  Light celestial, not exposed to any wastage, ii. 1.8 (40-826).\n\n  Light emanates from sun, v. 3.12 (49-1112).\n\n  Light emitted by the soul forms animal nature, i. 1.7 (53-1198).\n\n  Light exists simultaneously within and without, vi. 4.7 (22-295).\n\n  Light from sun exists everywhere, vi. 4.6 (22-296).\n\n  Light in eye, v.7 (32-586); v. 6.1 (24-334); iv. 5.4 (29-500).\n\n  Light intelligible, v. 5.8 (32-587).\n\n  Light intelligible is not spatial, has no relation to place, v. 5.8\n    (32-587).\n\n  Light intermediary is unnecessary, being a hindrance, iv. 5.4\n    (29-521).\n\n  Light is composite of light in eye and light outside, v. 6.1 (24-334).\n\n  Light, is it destroyed when its source is withdrawn or does it follow\n    it? iv. 5.7 (29-526).\n\n  Light, objective and visual, mutual relation of, iv. 5.4 (29-520).\n\n  Light, objective, does not transmit by relays, iv. 5.4 (29-522).\n\n  Light, relation to air, iv. 4.5, 6 (29-524).\n\n  Light, visual, not a medium, iv. 5.4 (29-522).\n\n  Lighting fire, from refraction, generation illustrates, iii. 6.14\n    (26-376).\n\n  Limit lower, of divine things, the soul, v. 1.7 (10-186).\n\n  Limit of union with divinity, desire or ability, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Limitless is supreme, vi. 7.32 (38-753).\n\n  Limits, none known by life, vi. 5.12 (23-330).\n\n  Line intelligible, posterior to number, vi. 6.17 (34-674).\n\n  Liver, location of growth, iv. 3.23 (27-426).\n\n  Liver, seat of soul's desire, iv. 4.28 (28-480).\n\n  Lives, former, cause human character, iii. 3.4 (48-1083).\n\n  Living being, no evil is unalloyed for it, i. 7.3 (54-1210).\n\n  Living well not explainable by reason, i. 4.2 (46-1022).\n\n  Living well not extended to all animals, i. 4.2 (46-1020).\n\n  Localization of soul open to metaphysical objections, iv. 3.20\n    (27-419).\n\n  Location does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-919).\n\n  Location for the things yet to be produced is essence, vi. 6.10\n    (34-657).\n\n  Location of form (see residence), iii, 6.14 (26-376).\n\n  Location of soul is principle that is everywhere and nowhere, v. 2.2\n    (11-195).\n\n  Location of world is in soul and not soul in body, iv, 3.9 (27-405).\n\n  Logos, intermediary, also unaccountable, ii. 9.1 (33-601).\n\n  Logos, form of, character, role and reason, iii. 2.17 (47-1071).\n\n  Lost wings, has soul, in incarnation, i. 8.14 (51-1161).\n\n  Love as God, demon and passion, iii. 5.1 (50-1122).\n\n  Love as recognition of hidden affinity, iii. 5.1 (50-1122).\n\n  Love based on unity and sympathy of all things, iv. 9.3 (8-142).\n\n  Love causes, four, divine, innate notion, affinity and sentiment of\n    beauty, iii. 5.1 (50-1123).\n\n  Love, celestial, must abide in intelligible with celestial soul, iii.\n    5.3 (50-1128).\n\n  Love, higher, is celestial, iii. 5.3 (50-1128).\n\n  Love, how transformed into progressively higher stages, v. 9.2\n    (5-103).\n\n  Love is a gad-fly, iii. 5.7 (50-1134).\n\n  Love is both material and a demon, iii. 5.10 (50-1140).\n\n  Love is both needy and acquisitive, iii. 5.7 (50-1134).\n\n  Love is not identical with the world, iii. 5.5 (50-1130).\n\n  Love, like higher soul, inseparable from its source, iii. 5.2\n    (50-1126).\n\n  Love, lower, beauty, celestial, v. 8.13 (31-573).\n\n  Love, lower, corresponding to world-soul, iii. 5.3 (50-1128).\n\n  Love must exist because the soul does, iii. 5.10 (50-1139).\n\n  Love, myth of birth, significance, iii. 5.10 (50-1139).\n\n  Love of beauty explained by aversion for ugliness, i. 6.5 (1-47).\n\n  Love possesses divine being, iii. 5.3 (50-1127).\n\n  Love, working as sympathy, affects magic, iv. 4.40 (28-503).\n\n  Love or Eros, iii. 5 (50-1122).\n\n  Love that unites soul to good is deity, iii. 5.4 (50-1130).\n\n  Love that unites soul to matter is demon only, iii. 5.4 (50-1130).\n\n  Lover, divine, waits at the door, vi. 5.10 (23-325).\n\n  Lover, how he develops, v. 9.2 (5-103).\n\n  Lover, how he is attracted by beauty of single body, i. 3.2 (20-271).\n\n  Lover, how he uses to intelligible world, i. 3.2 (20-271).\n\n  Lover, simile of, in seeing God, vi. 9.4 (9-155).\n\n  Lovers are those who feel sentiments most keenly, i, 6.4 (1-46).\n\n  Lover's beauty in virtues transformed to intellectual, i. 3.2\n    (20-271).\n\n  Lover's beauty transformed into artistic and spiritual virtues, i.\n    3.2 (20-271).\n\n  Loves contrary to nature are passions of strayed souls, iii. 5.7\n    (50-1135).\n\n  Loves implanted by nature are all good, iii. 5.7 (50-1136).\n\n  Loves in the evil charged down by false opinions, iii. 5.7 (50-1136).\n\n  Lower form of being possessed by evil, i. 8.3 (51-1145).\n\n  Lower forms of contemplation, iii. 8.1 (30-531).\n\n  Lower natures, good is for them, not for itself, vi. 7.4 (38-706).\n\n  Lower things follow higher, i. 8.1 (51-1142).\n\n  Lowest degree of being is evil, hence necessary, i. 8.7 (51-1146).\n\n  Lyceum, vi. 1.14, 30 (42-862, 888).\n\n  Lynceus, whose keen eyes pierce all, symbol of intelligible world, v.\n    8.4 (31-558).\n\n  Lyre, badly tuned, cannot produce harmony, vi. 3.13 (44-961); ii.\n    3.13 (52-1180).\n\n  Lyre played by musician, like affections of the soul, iii. 6.4\n    (26-358).\n\n  Lyre, simile of striking single cord, vi, 5.10 (23-326).\n\n\n  Made himself, divinity has, does not cause priority, vi. 8.20\n    (39-808).\n\n  Magic, based on sympathy, iv. 9.3 (8-142).\n\n  Magic enchantments described, iv. 9.3 (8-142).\n\n  Magic, escaped by honesty, iv. 4.44 (28-509).\n\n  Magic occurs by love, working as sympathy, iv. 4.40 (28-503).\n\n  Magic power over honesty, iv. 4.44 (28-509).\n\n  Magic power over man by its affections and weakness, iv. 4.44\n    (28-508).\n\n  Magnanimity interpreted as purifications, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Magnitude an aid to differences of color, ii. 8.1 (35-681).\n\n  Magnitude is an image formed by reflection of universal beings, iii.\n    6.17 (26-380).\n\n  Magnitude is only appearance, iii. 6.18 (26-381).\n\n  Magnitude of matter derived from seminal reasons, iii. 6.15 (26-377).\n\n  Magnitude, why could the soul have none, if it filled all space, vi.\n    4.1 (22-285).\n\n  Magnitudes and numbers are of different kind of quality, vi. 1.4\n    (42-843).\n\n  Man as soul subsisting in a special reason, vi. 7.5 (38-707).\n\n  Man in himself, vi. 7.4 (38-706).\n\n  Man is defined as reasonable soul, vi. 7.4 (38-706).\n\n  Man is perfected through his evils, ii. 3.18 (52-1187).\n\n  Man produces seminal reason, ii. 3.12 (52-1178).\n\n  Man, relation of, to the intelligible world, vi. 4.14 (22-308).\n\n  Man's triple nature is connection between sense and intelligible\n    world, vi. 7.7 (38-711).\n\n  Management of body by reasoning, of world by intelligence, iv. 8.8\n    (6-132).\n\n  Manager, rewards and punishes, good and bad actors, iii. 2.17\n    (47-1071).\n\n  Managing part of soul, discredited, iv. 2.2 (21-280).\n\n  Manicheans, wine divided in jars theory of reflected, iv. 3.2, 20\n    (27-390).\n\n  Manifold contains unity of manner of existence, vi. 4.8 (22-296).\n\n  Manifold could not exist without something simple, v. 6.3 (24-336).\n\n  Manifold, how intelligence became, v. 3.11 (49-1108).\n\n  Manifold, how it arises from the one Intelligence, vi. 2.21 (43-926).\n\n  Manifold, if it passed into unity, would destroy universe, iii. 8.10\n    (30-547).\n\n  Manifold is unity of apperception, iv. 4.1 (28-442).\n\n  Manifold not explained by supreme unity, v. 9.14 (5-1116).\n\n  Manifold, nothing, could exist without something simple, v. 6.3\n    (12-336).\n\n  Manifold of intelligence produced by unity, iv. 4.1 (28-443).\n\n  Manifold unity, only for examination are its parts apart, vi. 2.3\n    (43-897).\n\n  Manifoldness, v. 3.16 (49-1118).\n\n  Manifoldness contained by universal essence, vi. 9.2 (9-149).\n\n  Manifoldness developed by soul, as by intelligence, iv. 3.6 (27-398).\n\n  Manifoldness must pre-exist, vi. 2.2 (43-894).\n\n  Manifoldness of any kind cannot exist within the first, v. 3.12\n    (49-1110).\n\n  Manifoldness of unity, vi. 5.6 (23-321).\n\n  Manifoldness produced by one because of categories, v. 3.15 (49-1116).\n\n  Manifoldness, why it proceeded from unity, v. 2.1 (11-193).\n\n  Manner of existence determines how unity is manifold, vi. 4.8\n    (22-296).\n\n  Many and one inseparably, is intelligence, iii. 8.8 (30-543).\n\n  Many and one, puzzle of decides genera of essence, vi. 2.4 (43-898).\n\n  Marriages, presided over by lower love, iii. 5.3 (50-1129).\n\n  Mars, relations to Saturn illogical, ii. 3.5 (52-1169).\n\n  Mass is source of ugliness, v. 8.2 (31-554).\n\n  Master, even beyond it, is the Supreme, vi. 8.12 (39-793).\n\n  Master of himself power is the Supreme, vi. 8.10 (39-790).\n\n  Masters of ourselves are even we, how much more Supreme, vi. 8.12\n    (39-793).\n\n  Mastery of these corporeal dispositions is not easy, i. 8.8 (51-1154).\n\n  Material, gnostic distinction of men, ii. 9.18 (33-637).\n\n  Materialism, polemic against, iv. 7 (2-56).\n\n  Materialists cannot understand solid things near nonentity, iii. 6.6\n    (26-361).\n\n  Materialists support determination, iii. 1.2 (3-88).\n\n  Mathematical parts not applicable to soul. iv. 3.2 (27-389).\n\n  Matter acc. to Empedocles and Anaximander, ii. 4.7 (12-204).\n\n  Matter alone could not endow itself with life, iv. 7.3 (2-60).\n\n  Matter an empty mirror that reflects everything, iii. 6.7 (26-363).\n\n  Matter and form in all things, iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Matter and form intermediary between is sense object, iii. 6.17\n    (26-381).\n\n  Matter as deprivation still without qualities, i. 8.11 (51-1157).\n\n  Matter as mirror, not affected by the object reflected, iii. 6.7\n    (26-363).\n\n  Matter as mother, nurse, residence and other nature, iii. 6.19\n    (26-384).\n\n  Matter as residence of generation. iii. 6.13 (26-373).\n\n  Matter as substrate and residence of forms, ii. 4.1 (12-197).\n\n  Matter as the infinite in itself, ii. 4.15 (12-216).\n\n  Matter, born of world-soul, shapeless, begetting principle, iii. 4.1\n    (15-233).\n\n  Matter, both kinds, relation of, to essence, ii. 4.16 (12-219).\n\n  Matter cannot be affected, as cannot be destroyed, iii. 6.8 (26-365).\n\n  Matter cannot be credited with being, vi. 3.7 (44-944).\n\n  Matter cannot be the primary principle, vi. 1.26 (42-881).\n\n  Matter contained in the soul from her looking at darkness, i. 8.4\n    (51-1147).\n\n  Matter contemporarily with the informing principle, ii. 4.8 (12-206).\n\n  Matter, corporeal and incorporeal, ii. 4.1 (12-198).\n\n  Matter, cult of implies ignoring soul and intelligence, vi. 1.29\n    (42-887).\n\n  Matter derives its being from intelligibles, vi. 3.7 (44-944).\n\n  Matter, descent into, is fall of the soul, i. 8.14 (51-1161).\n\n  Matter, difference from form, due to that of intelligible sources,\n    vi. 3.8 (44-946).\n\n  Matter existed from all eternity, iv. 8.6 (6-130).\n\n  Matter, first physical category of Plotinos, vi. 3.3 (44-937).\n\n  Matter, how to see the formless, a thing of itself, i. 8.9 (51-1156).\n\n  Matter (hypostatic), existence as undeniable as that of good, i. 8.15\n    (51-1162).\n\n  Matter, if primary, would be form of the universe, iii. 6.18 (26-382).\n\n  Matter, impassible, because of different senses of participation,\n    iii. 6.9 (26-366).\n\n  Matter, incorporeal (Pyth. Plato, Arist.), ii. 4.1 (12-198).\n\n  Matter, incorruptible, exists only potentially, ii. 5.5 (25-348).\n\n  Matter, intelligible, ii. 4.3 (12-198); ii. 5.3 (25-345); iii. 5.7\n    (50-1134).\n\n  Matter, intelligible, entities to reach sense-matter, iii. 5.7\n    (50-1154).\n\n  Matter, intelligible, is not potential, ii. 5.3 (25-345).\n\n  Matter, intelligible, why it must be accepted, iii. 5.6, 7 (50-1133).\n\n  Matter is born shapeless, receives form while turning to, ii. 4.3\n    (12-198).\n\n  Matter is both without qualities and evil, i. 8.10 (51-1156).\n\n  Matter is bottom of everything, ii. 4.5 (12-201).\n\n  Matter is cause of evils, even if corporeal, i. 8.8 (51-1153).\n\n  Matter is disposition to become something else, ii. 4.13 (12-214).\n\n  Matter is improved by form, vi. 7.28 (38-745).\n\n  Matter is incorporeal, ii. 4.9 (12-206).\n\n  Matter is nonentity, i. 8.5 (51-1148).\n\n  Matter is non-essential otherness, ii. 4.16 (12-218).\n\n  Matter is not a body without quality, but with magnitude, vi. 1.26\n    (42-880).\n\n  Matter is not being and cannot be anything actual, ii. 5.4 (25-347).\n\n  Matter is not composite, but simple in one, ii. 4.8 (12-205).\n\n  Matter is not wickedness, but neutral evil, vi. 7.28 (38-746).\n\n  Matter is nothing actually, ii. 5.2 (25-343).\n\n  Matter is physical category, vi. 3.3 (44-937).\n\n  Matter is real potentially, ii. 5.5 (25-348).\n\n  Matter is relative darkness, ii. 4.5 (12-201).\n\n  Matter is secondary evil, i. 8.4 (51-1155).\n\n  Matter is unchangeable because form is such, iii. 6.10 (26-368).\n\n  Matter left alone as basis after Stoic categories evaporate, vi. 1.29\n    (42-886).\n\n  Matter magnitude derived from seminal reason, iii. 6.15 (26-377).\n\n  Matter may exist yet be evil, i. 8.11 (51-1158).\n\n  Matter, modified, is Stoic God, vi. 12.7 (42-881).\n\n  Matter must be possible because its qualities change, iii. 6.8\n    (26-366).\n\n  Matter necessary to the world; hence good implies evil, i. 8.7\n    (51-1152).\n\n  Matter not in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-557).\n\n  Matter nothing real actually, ii. 5.4 (25-347).\n\n  Matter of demons is not corporeal, iii. 5.7 (50-1135).\n\n  Matter participates in existence, without participating it, iii. 6.14\n    (26-376)\n\n  Matter participates in the intelligible, by appearance, iii. 6.11\n    (26-369).\n\n  Matter, participation of, in ideas, vi. 5.8 (23-321)\n\n  Matter possesses no quality, ii. 4.8 (12-205); iv. 7.3 (2-59).\n\n  Matter qualified as seminal reasons, vi. 1.29\n\n  Matter rationalized is body, ii. 7.3 (37-696).\n\n  Matter received forms until hidden by them, v. 8.7 (31-562).\n\n  Matter, relation of, to reason, illustrates that of opinion to\n    imagination, iii. 6.15 (26-377).\n\n  Matter, since cannot be destroyed, cannot be affected, iii. 6.8\n    (26-365).\n\n  Matter things mingled, contain no perfection, iii. 2.7 (47-1053).\n\n  Matter's generation, consequence of anterior principles, iv. 8.6\n    (6-130).\n\n  Matter's primitive impotence before generation, iv. 8.6 (6-130).\n\n  Mechanism of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569).\n\n  Medicine, v. 9.11 (5-114).\n\n  Mediocre, evil men even, never abandoned by Providence, iii. 2.9\n    (47-1058).\n\n  Mediation of soul between indivisible and divisible essence, iv. 2\n    (21-276).\n\n  Mediation of world-souls, through it, benefits are granted to men,\n    vi. 4.12, 30 (28-457, 486).\n\n  Medium cosmologically necessary, but affects sight only slightly, iv.\n    5.2 (29-517).\n\n  Medium needed in Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, iv. 5.2\n    (29-516).\n\n  Medium not needed in Atomism and Epicurianism, iv. 5.2 (29-516).\n\n  Medium of sight, Aristotle's unnecessary iv. 5.1 (29-515).\n\n  Medium, though possible, hinders organs of sight, iv. 5.1 (29-514).\n\n  Medium, untroubled, is the world-soul, iv. 8.7 (6-130).\n\n  Medium's absence would only destroy sympathy, iv. 5.3 (29-519).\n\n  Medium's affection does not interfere with vision, iv. 5.3 (29-520).\n\n  Memories not needed, unconscious prayer answered by Stars, iv. 4.42\n    (28-505).\n\n  Memories of the past do not increase happiness, i. 5.9 (36-689).\n\n  Memory, iv. (27-428).\n\n  Memory and reasoning, not implied by world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.12\n    (28-457).\n\n  Memory and reasoning suspended by omniscient intuition, iv. 4.12\n    (28-457).\n\n  Memory and sensation iv. 6 (41-829).\n\n  Memory and sensation, Stoic doctrines of, hang together, iv. 6.1\n    (41-829).\n\n  Memory acts through the sympathy of the soul's highest self, iv. 6.3\n    (41-832).\n\n  Memory, actualization of the soul, iv. 3.25 (27-429).\n\n  Memory belongs to divine soul, and to that derived from world-soul,\n    iv. 3.27 (27-433).\n\n  Memory belongs to imagination, iv. 3.29 (27-433).\n\n  Memory belongs to the soul alone, iv. 3.26 (27-432).\n\n  Memory, both kinds, implies both kinds of imagination, iv. 3.31\n    (27-438).\n\n  Memory definition depends on whether it is animal or human, iv. 3.25\n    (27-429).\n\n  Memory does not belong to appetite, iv. 3.28 (27-434).\n\n  Memory does not belong to the power of perception, iv. 3.29 (27-435).\n\n  Memory does not belongs to the stars, iv. 4.30 (28-441).\n\n  Memory impossible to world-souls to whom there is no time but a\n    single day, iv. 4.7 (28-450).\n\n  Memory inapplicable to any but time limited beings, iv. 3.25 (27-428).\n\n  Memory is not identical with feeling or reasoning, iv. 3.29 (27-436).\n\n  Memory limited to souls that change their condition, iv. 4.6 (28-448).\n\n  Memory may be reduced to sensation, iv. 3.28 (27-434).\n\n  Memory needs training and education, iv. 6.3 (41-835).\n\n  Memory, none in stars, because uniformly blissful, iv. 4.8 (28-452).\n\n  Memory not an image but a reawakening of a faculty, iv. 6.3 (41-833).\n\n  Memory not as high as unreflective identification, iv. 4.4 (28-445).\n\n  Memory not, but an affection, is kept by appetite, iv. 3.28 (27-434).\n\n  Memory not compulsory, iv. 4.8 (28-451).\n\n  Memory not exercised by world-souls and stars' souls, iv. 4.6\n    (28-449).\n\n  Memory not intelligible because of simultaneity, iv. 4.1 (28-441).\n\n  Memory of soul in intelligible world, iv. 4.1 (28-441).\n\n  Memory peculiar to soul and body, iv. 3.2 (27-430).\n\n  Memory, possession of, not caused by incarnation of soul, iv. 3.26\n    (27-431).\n\n  Memory problems depend on definition, iv. 3.25 (27-429).\n\n  Memory, timeless, constitutes self-consciousness, iv. 3.25 (27-429).\n\n  Memory when beyond, helped by training here below, iv. 4.5 (28-447).\n\n  Memory would be hindered if soul's impressions were corporeal, iv.\n    7.6 (2-66).\n\n  Men are kings, v. 3.4 (49-1094).\n\n  Men both, we are not always as we should be, vi. 4.14 (22-308).\n\n  Men escape chance by interior isolation, vi. 8.15 (39-800).\n\n  Men non-virtuous, do good when not hindered by passions, iii. 1.10\n    (3-98).\n\n  Men of three kinds, sensual, moral and spiritual, v. 9.1 (5-102).\n\n  Men seek action when too weak for contemplation, iii. 8.4 (30-536).\n\n  Men sense and intelligible, difference between, vi. 7.4 (38-705).\n\n  Men, three in each of us, vi. 7.6 (38-708).\n\n  Men, three in us, fate of them is, brutalization or divinization, vi.\n    7.6 (38-709).\n\n  Men, three kinds of, v. 9.1 (5-102).\n\n  Mercury, Jupiter and Venus, also considered astrologically, ii. 3.5\n    (52-1169).\n\n  Metal is to statue as body to soul, iv. 7.8 (2-76).\n\n  Messengers of divinities are souls incarnated, iv. 3.12, 13 (27-409);\n    iv. 8.5 (6-127).\n\n  Metaphorical is all language about the Supreme, vi. 8.13 (39-795).\n\n  Method of creation, ii. 3.17 (52-1186).\n\n  Method of ecstasy is to close eyes of body, i. 6.8 (1-52).\n\n  Methods of dialectic differ with individuals, i. 3.1 (20-269).\n\n  Methods of participation in good, i. 7.1 (54-1208).\n\n  Metis or prudence (myth of), iii. 5.5 (50-1130).\n\n  Microcosm, iv. 3.10 (27-406).\n\n  Migrating of soul psychologically explained, vi. 4.16 (22-310).\n\n  Minerva, vi. 5.7 (23-321).\n\n  Minos, vi. 9.7 (9-162).\n\n  Miracle, matter participates in existence, while not participating in\n    it, iii. 6.14 (26-376).\n\n  Mire, unruly, soul falls into, when plunging down, i. 8.13 (51-1160).\n\n  Mirror, iv. 3.30 (27-437); iv. 5.7 (29-528).\n\n  Mirror empty, reflects everything like matter, iii. 6.7 (26-363).\n\n  Mirror, simile of, i. 4.10 (46-1034).\n\n  Misfortune and punishment, significance of, iv. 3.16 (27-414).\n\n  Misfortune, experience of, does not give senses to man, vi. 7.1\n    (38-697).\n\n  Misfortune foreseen by God, not cause of human senses, vi. 7.1\n    (38-697).\n\n  Misfortune none too great to be conquered by virtues, i. 4.8\n    (46-1031).\n\n  Misfortune to the good only apparent, iii. 2.6 (47-1051).\n\n  Mithra, simile of, used, iii. 2.14 (47-1064).\n\n  Mixture, consequences of soul and body, i. 1.4 (53-1195).\n\n  Mixture, elements are not, but arise from a common system, ii. 1.7\n    (40-824).\n\n  Mixture explained by evaporation (Stoic), ii. 7.2 (37-694).\n\n  Mixture limited to energies of the existent, iv. 7.2, 8 (2-58, 68).\n\n  Mixture of intelligence and necessity, i. 8.7 (51-1152).\n\n  Mixture of soul and body impossible, i. 1.4 (53-1194).\n\n  Mixture of soul divisible, ii. 3.9 (52-1176).\n\n  Mixture of unequal qualities, ii. 7.1 (37-693).\n\n  Mixture that occupies more space than elements, ii. 7.1 (37-693).\n\n  Mixture, theory of, of Alexander of Aphrodisia, ii. 7.1 (37-691); iv.\n    7.2 (2-58).\n\n  Mixture to the point of total penetration, ii. 7 (37-691).\n\n  Modality, should not occupy even third rank of existence, vi. 1.30\n    (42-887).\n\n  Model, v. 8.8 (31-564).\n\n  Model for producing principle, is form, v. 8.7 (31-561).\n\n  Model, image bound to it by radiation, vi. 4.10 (22-300).\n\n  Model, interior, cause of appreciation of interior beauties, i. 6.4\n    (1-45).\n\n  Model of reason, is the universal soul, iv. 3.11 (27-407).\n\n  Model of the old earth, gnostic, ii. 9.5 (33-607).\n\n  Model of the universe is intelligible world, vi. 7.12 (38-720).\n\n  Model, previous, object's existence implies, vi. 6.10 (34-658).\n\n  Model, superior, method of producing assimilation, i. 2.7 (19-267,\n    268).\n\n  Modesty is part of goodness, ii. 9.9. (33-616).\n\n  Modification derived from foreign sources, i. 1.9 (53-1202).\n\n  Modified matter, is Stoic God, vi. 1.27 (42-881).\n\n  Molecules could not possess life and intelligence, iv. 7.2 (2-57).\n\n  Monism of the Stoics breaks down just like dualism, v. 1.27 (42-883).\n\n  Moon, limit of world-sphere, ii. 1.5 (40-820).\n\n  Moon, sun and light universe like, v. 6.4 (24-337).\n\n  Moral beauties, more delightful than sense-beauties, i. 6.4 (1-45).\n\n  Moral men, v. 9.1 (5-102).\n\n  Moral men become superficial, v. 9.1 (2-102).\n\n  Moralization, iv. 4.17 (28-464).\n\n  Moralization decides government of soul, iv. 4.17 (28-464).\n\n  Mortal, either whole or part of us, iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Mother, nurse, residence and other nature is matter, iii. 6.18\n    (26-384).\n\n  Motion, how imparted to lower existences, ii. 2.2 (14-231).\n\n  Motion is below the One, iii. 9.7 (13-225).\n\n  Motion of fire, is straight, ii. 2.1 (14-228).\n\n  Motion of soul is circular, ii. 2.1 (14-229).\n\n  Motion, single, effected by body, and different ones by soul, iv. 7.4\n    (2-62).\n\n  Motion spontaneous, of universal soul, immortalizes heaven, ii. 1.4\n    (40-818).\n\n  Motions, conflicting, due to presence of bodies, ii. 2.2 (14-231).\n\n  Motions, different, caused by soul, iv. 7.5 (2-62).\n\n  Motive, essential to determination, iii. 1.1 (3-87).\n\n  Motives of creation ii. 9.4 (33-605).\n\n  Movement, v. 1.4 (10-180).\n\n  Movement and rest, destruction also inapplicable, ii. 9.1 (33-600).\n\n  Movement and stability exist because thought by intelligence, vi. 2.8\n    (43-904).\n\n  Movement another kind of stability, vi. 2.7 (43-903).\n\n  Movement cannot be reduced to any higher genus, vi. 3.21 (44-971).\n\n  Movement, circular of the soul, iv. 4.16 (28-462).\n\n  Movement divided in natural, artificial and voluntary, vi. 3.26\n    (44-980).\n\n  Movement does not beget time, but indicates it, iii. 7.11 (45-1009).\n\n  Movement for sense objects, vi. 3.23 (44-976).\n\n  Movement, how can it be in time if changes are out of time, vi. 1.16\n    (42-864).\n\n  Movement is a form of power, vi. 3.22 (44-973).\n\n  Movement is active for, and is the cause of other forms, vi. 3.22\n    (44-974).\n\n  Movement, is change anterior to it? vi. 3.21 (44-972).\n\n  Movement measured by space because of its indetermination, iii. 7.11\n    (45-1011).\n\n  Movement measures time, and is measured by it, iii. 7.12 (45-1011).\n\n  Movement of combination, vi. 3.25 (44-978).\n\n  Movement of displacement is single, vi. 3.24 (44-927).\n\n  Movement, of its image time, is eternity, iii. 7, int. (45-985).\n\n  Movement of the heavens, ii. 2 (14-227).\n\n  Movement of the soul is attributed to the primary movement, iii. 7.12\n    (45-985).\n\n  Movement, persistent, and its interval, are not time, but are within\n    it, iii. 7.7 (45-999).\n\n  Movement, three kinds, ii. 2.1 (14-227).\n\n  Movement, under it, action and suffering may be subsumed, vi. 1.17\n    (42-866).\n\n  Movement, why it is a category, vi. 3.20 (44-971).\n\n  Multiple unity, iv. 9.1 (8-139).\n\n  Multiple unity, radiation of, v. 3.15 (49-1115).\n\n  Multiplicity could not be contained in the first, vi. 7.17 (38-729).\n\n  Multiplicity demands organization in system, vi. 7.10 (38-716).\n\n  Multiplicity of intelligences implies their natural differences, vi.\n    7.17 (38-730).\n\n  Multitude, how it precedes from the One, v. 9.14 (5-116); vi. 7\n    (38-697).\n\n  Multitude is distance from an unity, and is an evil, vi. 6.1 (34-643).\n\n  Multitude of ideas of the good, vi. 7 (38-697).\n\n  Muses, v. 8.10 (31-569); iii. 7.10 (45-1005).\n\n  Music makes the musician, v. 8.1 (31-552).\n\n  Musician educated by recognizing truths he already possesses, i. 3.1\n    (20-270).\n\n  Musician, how he rises to intelligible world, i. 3.1 (20-270).\n\n  Musician led up by beauty, i. 3.1 (20-270).\n\n  Mutilation of Saturn typifies splitting of unity, v. 8.13 (31-573).\n\n  Mysteries, v. 3.17 (49-1120).\n\n  Mysteries, ancient, their spiritual truth, vi. 9.11 (9-169).\n\n  Mysteries purify and lead to nakedness in sanctuary, i. 6.6 (1-50).\n\n  Mystery of derivation of Second from First, v. 1.6 (10-181).\n\n  Mystery rites explain secrecy of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-169).\n\n  Mystery teachings of hell, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Myths explained by body's approach to the soul, iii. 5.10 (50-1138).\n\n  Myths, object of, is to analyze and distinguish, iii. 5.10 (50-1139).\n\n  Myths of ithyphallic Hermes, iii. 6.19 (26-385).\n\n  Myths of Need and Abundance, iii. 6.14 (26-375).\n\n  Myths, see Abundance, Need of, iii. 6.14 (26-375).\n\n\n  Nakedness follows purification in mysteries, i. 6.6 (1-50).\n\n  Names of Supreme approximations, v. 5.6 (32-584).\n\n  Narcissus, i. 6.8 (1-52); v. 8.2 (31-554).\n\n  Narcissus followed vain shapes, i. 6.8 (1-52).\n\n  Natural characteristics, derived from categories in intelligible, v.\n    9.10 (5-113).\n\n  Natural law, by it all prayers are answered, even of evil, iv. 4.42\n    (28-505).\n\n  Natural movements, vi. 3.26 (44-980).\n\n  Nature and elements, there is continuity between, iv. 4.14 (28-459).\n\n  Nature, and origin of evils, i. 8 (51-1142).\n\n  Nature as weaker contemplation, iii. 8.4 (30-535).\n\n  Nature betrayed, but not affected by stars, iii. 1.6 (3-95).\n\n  Nature, capable of perfection as much as we, ii. 9.5 (33-607).\n\n  Nature, cause coincides with it in intelligible, vi. 7.19 (38-735).\n\n  Nature contemplation in unity, iii. 8 (30-542).\n\n  Nature, contrary to loves, are passions of strayed souls, iii. 5.7\n    (50-1135).\n\n  Nature dominates in plants, but not in man, iii. 4.1 (15-233).\n\n  Nature first actualization of universal soul, v. 2.1 (11-194).\n\n  Nature is immovable as a fall, but not as compound of matter and\n    form, iii. 8.2 (30-533).\n\n  Nature is ultimate cause, iii. 1.1 (3-87).\n\n  Nature law directs soul, ii. 3.8 (52-1173).\n\n  Nature, lowest in the world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.13 (28-458).\n\n  Nature of divine intelligence, i. 8.2 (51-1143).\n\n  Nature of evil, i. 8.3 (51-1144).\n\n  Nature of intelligence proved, v. 9.3 (5-104).\n\n  Nature of soul is intermediate, iv. 8.7 (6-130).\n\n  Nature of Supreme, i. 8.2 (51-1144).\n\n  Nature of universal soul, i. 8.2 (51-1144).\n\n  Nature posterior to intelligence, iv. 7.8 (2-78).\n\n  Nature reason is result of immovable contemplation, iii. 8.2 (30-533).\n\n  Nature, relation of animal to human, i. 1.7 (53-1199).\n\n  Nature sterility indicated by castration, iii. 6.19 (26-384).\n\n  Nature, Stoic name for generative power in seeds, v. 9.6 (5-110).\n\n  Nature, to what part belongs emotions? i. 1.1 (53-1191).\n\n  Nature's mother is universal reason and father the formal reasons,\n    iii. 8.4 (30-535).\n\n  Nature's progress aided by auxiliary arts, v. 9.11 (5-114).\n\n  Necessary, begetting of Second by First, v. 4.1 (7-135).\n\n  Necessary things are those whose possession is unconscious, i. 4.6\n    (46-1027).\n\n  Necessity, characteristic of intelligence, v. 3.6 (49-1100).\n\n  Necessity does not include voluntariness, iv. 8.5 (6-127).\n\n  Necessity, Heraclitian, iii. 1.4 (3-91).\n\n  Necessity mingled with reason, iii. 3.6 (48-1080).\n\n  Necessity of continuous procession to Supreme, iv. 8.5 (6-129).\n\n  Necessity of existence of the First, v. 4.1 (7-134).\n\n  Necessity of illumination of darkness must have been eternal, ii.\n    9.12 (33-623).\n\n  Necessity, spindle of, Platonic, iii. 4.6 (15-242); ii. 3.9 (52-1171).\n\n  Nectar, iii. 5.7 (50-1133).\n\n  Nectar is memory of vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10 (31-569).\n\n  Need and Abundance, myth of, iii. 6.14 (26-375).\n\n  Need, or Poros, iii. 5.2, 5, 6, 7, 10 (50-1125 to 1135).\n\n  Negative necessary to a definition, v. 5.6 (32-584).\n\n  Neutral evil is matter, vi. 7.28 (38-746).\n\n  New things, unnoticed, their perception not forced, iv. 4.8 (28-450).\n\n  New world arises out of Jupiter begotten by result of ecstasy, v.\n    8.12 (31-572).\n\n  Night objects prove uselessness of sight medium, iv. 5.3 (29-519).\n\n  Non-being is matter, cannot be anything actual, ii. 5.4 (25-347).\n\n  Nonentity has intelligent life beneath being, iii. 6.6 (26-360).\n\n  Nonentity is matter, i. 8.5 (51-1150).\n\n  Normative element of life, is Providence, iii. 3.5 (48-1084).\n\n  Noses, pug, and Roman, due to matter, v. 9.12 (5-115).\n\n  Nothing is contained in One; reason why everything can issue from it,\n    v. 2.1 (11-193).\n\n  Notions, scientific, are both prior and posterior, v. 9.7 (5-110).\n\n  Nowhere and everywhere is Supreme, inclination and imminence, vi.\n    8.16 (39-801).\n\n  Number and unity proceed from the One and many beings, vi. 6.10\n    (34-659).\n\n  Number as universal bond of universe, vi. 6.15 (34-670).\n\n  Number can be said to be infinite, vi. 6.19 (34-674).\n\n  Number, category, v. 1.4 (10-180).\n\n  Number exists for every animal and the universal animal, vi. 6.15\n    (34-668).\n\n  Number follows and proceeds from essence, vi. 6.9 (34-655).\n\n  Number is not in quantity, vi. 1.4 (42-842).\n\n  Number, posterior to, is intelligible line, vi. 6.17 (34-674).\n\n  Number, what is it to infinite? vi. 6.2 (34-644).\n\n  Number within is the number, constituted with our being, vi. 6.16\n    (34-673).\n\n  Numbers, vi. 6 (34-651).\n\n  Numbers and dimensions are so different as to demand different\n    classification, vi. 2.13 (43-916).\n\n  Numbers and ideas, identification of, vi. 6.9 (34-656).\n\n  Numbers and magnitudes, are of different kinds of quantity, vi. 1.4\n    (42-843).\n\n  Numbers are not quantity in themselves, vi. 1.4 (42-842).\n\n  Numbers form part of the intelligible world, vi. 6.4 (34-647).\n\n  Numbers, intelligible, are identical with thought, v. 5.4 (32-582).\n\n  Numbers intelligible, difficulties connected with, vi. 6.16 (34-671).\n\n  Numbers must exist in the primary essence, vi. 6.8 (34-654).\n\n  Numbers participated in by objects, vi. 6.14 (34-667).\n\n  Numbers, principle is unity's form, v. 5.5 (32-583).\n\n  Numbers, Pythagorean, intelligible discussed, vi. 6.5 (34-649).\n\n  Numbers, quantitative, v. 5.4 (32-583).\n\n  Numbers, regulated generation of everything, vi. 6.15 (34-670).\n\n  Numbers, soul as v. 1.5 (10-187); vi. 5.9 (23-324).\n\n  Numbers split the unity into plurality, vi. 6.9 (34-656).\n\n  Numbers, two kinds, essential and unitary, vi. 6.9 (34-657).\n\n  Numbers, veritable, are intelligible entities, vi. 6.14 (34-668).\n\n  Numenian name of Divinity, Essence and Being, v. 9.3 (5-104); v. 8.5\n    (31-560); vi. 6.9 (34-656).\n\n  Numerals, veritable, of the man in himself, are essential, vi. 6.16\n    (34-672).\n\n  Nurse, mother, residence and other nature is matter, iii. 6.19\n    (26-384).\n\n\n  Object itself did not grasp intellect, i. 1.9 (53-1201).\n\n  Objective justice and beauty to which we are united, v. 1.11 (10-190).\n\n  Objective world subsists even when we are distracted, v. 1.12\n    (10-191).\n\n  Objects existence implies a previous model, vi. 6.10 (34-658).\n\n  Objects outside have unitary existence, vi. 6.12 (34-662).\n\n  Objects participate in numbers, vi. 6.14 (34-667).\n\n  Obstacle to divinity is failure to abstract from Him, vi. 8.21\n    (39-811).\n\n  Obstacle to the soul is evil, i. 8.12 (51-1159).\n\n  Obstacles lacking to creator, because of his universality, v. 8.7\n    (31-562).\n\n  Omnipresence explained by possession of all things, without being\n    possessed by them, v. 5.9 (32-589).\n\n  One, v. 4; v. 4.2 (7-134, 136).\n\n  One and Good, vi. 9 (1-47).\n\n  One and many, like circle, is intelligence, iii. 8.8 (30-543).\n\n  One and many, puzzle of, decides genera of essence, vi. 2.4 (43-898).\n\n  One for Supreme, is mere negation of manifold, v. 5.6 (32-585).\n\n  One, independent of the one outside, vi. 6.12 (34-661).\n\n  One is all things, but none of them, v. 2.1 (11-193).\n\n  One is everywhere by its power, iii. 9.4 (13-224).\n\n  One is formless, v. 5.6 (32-585).\n\n  One is nowhere, iii. 9.4 (13-224).\n\n  One is super-rest and super-motion, iii. 9.7 (13-225).\n\n  One not absolute, but essentially related to one examined, vi. 2.3\n    (43-896).\n\n  One not thinker, but thought, itself, vi. 9.6 (9-160).\n\n  One present without approach, everywhere though nowhere, v. 5.8\n    (32-587).\n\n  One related in some genera, but not in others, vi. 2.3 (43-896).\n\n  One so far above genera is not to be counted, vi. 2.3 (43-895).\n\n  One, the soul, like divinity, always is, iv. 3.8 (27-402).\n\n  One within us, independent of the one outside, vi, 6.12 (34-661).\n\n  Opinion as sensation, v. 5.1 (32-576).\n\n  Opinion, in relation to imagination, illustrates that of matter to\n    reason, iii. 6.15 (26-377).\n\n  Opinions, false, are daughters of involuntary passions, i. 8.4\n    (51-1147).\n\n  Opportunity and suitability, cause of, put them beyond change, vi.\n    8.18 (39-806).\n\n  Opposition, ii. 3.4 (52-1168).\n\n  Opposition among inanimate beings (animals and matter), iii. 2.4\n    (47-1048),\n\n  Optimism right, v. 5.2 (32-579).\n\n  Order, cosmic, is natural, iv. 3.9 (27-404).\n\n  Order exists only in begotten, not in seminal reason, iv. 4.16\n    (28-461).\n\n  Order in the hierarchy of nature, ours cannot be questioned, iii. 3.3\n    (48-1079).\n\n  Order is anteriority in the intelligible, iv. 4.1 (28-443).\n\n  Order, priority of, implies conception of time, iv. 4.16 (28-461).\n\n  Organ, the universe, every being is, iv. 4.45 (28-510).\n\n  Organs alone, could be affected, iii. 6.2 (26-354).\n\n  Origin and nature of evils, i. 8 (51-1142).\n\n  Origin, causeless, really is determinism, iii. 1.1 (3-86).\n\n  Origin of God, puzzling, by our starting from chaos, vi. 8.11\n    (39-792).\n\n  Origins of evil, sins and errors, i. 1.9 (53-1201).\n\n  Otherness is characteristic of matter, ii. 4.13 (12-214).\n\n  Ours is not intelligence, but we, i. 1.13 (53-1206).\n\n  Ours, why discursive reason is, v. 3.3 (49-1093).\n\n  Outer man, only, affected by changes of fortune, iii 2.15 (47-1067).\n\n\n  Pair, vi. 7.8; vi. 2.11; v. 1.5; vi. 7.39.\n\n  Pair or dyad, v. 5.4 (32-582).\n\n  Pandora, iii. 6.14 (26-375); iv. 3.14 (27-412).\n\n  Panegyrists, who degrade what they wrongly praise, v. 5.13 (32-596).\n\n  Pangs of childbirth, v. 5.6 (32-585).\n\n  Paris, iii. 3.5 (48-1085).\n\n  Part in scheme, soul must fit itself to, iii, 2.17 (47-1071).\n\n  Partake of the one according to their capacities, vi. 4.11 (22-302).\n\n  Partial only should be the influence of universe, iv. 4.34 (28-494).\n\n  Participation by matter in the intelligible, only by appearance, iii.\n    6.11 (26-369).\n\n  Participation can be only in the intelligible, vi. 4.13 (22-306).\n\n  Participation in good, two methods of, i. 7.1 (54-1208).\n\n  Participation in sense-objects by unity is intelligible, vi. 6.13\n    (34-664).\n\n  Participation in the world of life is merely a sign of extension, vi.\n    4.13 (22-306).\n\n  Participation, method of, inferior in intelligible, vi. 5.12 (23-329).\n\n  Participation of matter in existence and opposite, iii. 6.4 (26-357).\n\n  Participation of matter in ideas, proves simile of head with faces,\n    vi. 5.8 (23-321).\n\n  Participations, difference of senses of, allows matter to remain\n    impassible, iii. 6.9 (26-366).\n\n  Partition of fund of memory between the two souls, iv. 3.31 (27-439).\n\n  Parts, actual division in, would be denial of the whole, iv. 3.12\n    (27-390).\n\n  Parts can be lost by body, not by soul, iv. 7.5 (2-63).\n\n  Parts divisible and indivisible, in the whole of a soul, iv. 3.19\n    (27-419).\n\n  Parts, in incorporeal things, have several senses, iv. 3.2 (27-390).\n\n  Parts, as wine in jars, Manichean theory, rejected, iv. 3.20 (27-421).\n\n  Parts, mathematical, not applicable as a soul, iv. 3.2 (27-390).\n\n  Parts of a manifold unity are a part only, for examination, vi. 2.3\n    (43-897).\n\n  Parts of Supreme, mere, subordinate divinities, denied, v. 8.9\n    (31-566).\n\n  Parts, physical, term limited, iv. 3.2 (27-389).\n\n  Passage into world of life is body's relation to the soul, vi. 4.12\n    (22-304).\n\n  Passibility of judgment and of soul, iii. 6.1 (26-350).\n\n  Passing of intelligence from unity to duality, by thinking, v. 6.1\n    (24-333).\n\n  Passion as category (see action), vi. 1.17 (42-866).\n\n  Passional changes in body, not in passional part of soul, iii. 6.3\n    (26-356).\n\n  Passional love elevating, though open to misleading temptations, iii.\n    5.1 (50-1124).\n\n  Passionate love twofold, sensual and beautiful, iii. 5.1 (50-1122).\n\n  Passions affect soul differently from virtue and vice, iii. 6.3\n    (26-356).\n\n  Passions arise from seminal reasons, ii. 3.16 (52-1184).\n\n  Passions felt by soul, without experiencing them, iv. 4.19 (28-466).\n\n  Passions, how they penetrate from the body into the soul, i. 1.3\n    (53-1194).\n\n  Passions involuntary are mothers of false opinions, i. 8.4 (51-1147).\n\n  Passions, modes of feeling, i. 1.1 (53-1191).\n\n  Passions not caused by soul, ii. 3.16 (52-1184).\n\n  Passions of strayed souls are loves contrary to nature, iii. 5.7\n    (50-1135).\n\n  Passions of universe produced by body of stars, ii. 3.10 (52-1177).\n\n  Passions reduced external images, iii. 6.5 (26-358).\n\n  Passions, Stoic theory of, opposed, iii. 6.3 (26-355)\n\n  Passions, their avoidance, task of philosophy, iii. 6.5 (26-358).\n\n  Passions, what suitable to earth, iv. 4.22 (28-471).\n\n  Passive, really, is soul, when swayed by appetites, iii. 1.9 (3-98).\n\n  Path of simplification to unity, vi. 9.3 (9-152).\n\n  Path to ecstasy, land marks, i. 6.9 (1-54)\n\n  Penetration into inner sanctuary, yields possession of all things, v.\n    8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Penetration of body by soul, but not by another body, iv. 7.8 (2-72).\n\n  Penetration of body by soul proves the latter's incorporeality, iv.\n    7.8 (2-72).\n\n  Penetration, total, impossible in mixture of bodies, iv. 7.8 (2-72).\n\n  Penetration, total, mixture, to the point of, ii. 7 (37-691).\n\n  Penia, or need, myth of, iii. 5.25 (50-1130)\n\n  Perception of new things, not forced, iv. 4.8 (28-450).\n\n  Perception of the Supreme, its manner, v. 5.10 (32-591).\n\n  Perfect happiness attained when nothing more is desired, i. 4.4\n    (46-1026).\n\n  Perfect is primary nature (Plotinic); not goal of evolution (Stoic),\n    iv. 7.8 (2-73).\n\n  Perfect life consists in intelligence, i. 4.3 (46-1024).\n\n  Perfect life, its possession, i. 4.6 (46-1027).\n\n  Perfection not to be sought in, material things, iii. 2.7 (47-1053).\n\n  Perfection of a picture make shadows necessary, iii. 2.11 (47-1060).\n\n  Perfection of the universe, evils are necessary, ii. 3.18 (52-1187).\n\n  Perfection of universe, object of incarnation, iv. 8.5 (6-128).\n\n  Perfection's author must be above it, vi. 7.32 (38-752).\n\n  Perishable is body, because composite, iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Permanence, the characteristic of absolute good, i. 7.1 (54-1209).\n\n  Perpetuates itself by form, does heaven, through influx, ii. 1.1\n    (40-813).\n\n  Perpetuity and eternity, difference between, iii. 7.4 (45-991).\n\n  Persistence of changeable, iv. 7.9 (2-78).\n\n  Perspective, ii. 8 (35-680).\n\n  Perspective, various theories of, ii. 8.1 (35-680).\n\n  Persuasion, characteristic of soul, v. 3.6 (49-1099).\n\n  Perversity of soul induces judgment and punishment, iv. 8.5 (6-128)\n\n  Pessimism wrong, v. 5.2 (32-579).\n\n  Phidias sculpts Jupiter not from sense imitation, v. 8.1 (31-552).\n\n  Philonic distinction between God, and the God, vi. 7.1 (38-697).\n\n  Philosopher, being already virtuous, needs only promotion, i. 3.3\n    (20-272).\n\n  Philosopher, how he rises to intelligible world, i. 3.3 (20-271).\n\n  Philosopher is already disengaged and needs only a guide, i. 3.3\n    (20-271).\n\n  Philosophers born, alone reach the higher region, v. 9.2 (5-103).\n\n  Philosophers, how they develop, v. 9.2 (5-103).\n\n  Philosophers justify justice of God, iv. 4.30 (28-486).\n\n  Philosopher's mathematics followed by pure dialectics as method of\n    progress, i. 3.3 (20-272).\n\n  Philosopher's method of disengagement is mathematics as incorporeal\n    science, i. 3.3 (20-271).\n\n  Philosopher's opinions about time to be studied, iii. 7.6 (45-995).\n\n  Philosophy contains physics, ethics, i. 3.5 (20-273).\n\n  Philosophy exact root of psychology, ii. 3.16 (52-1183).\n\n  Philosophy lower part of dialectic, i. 3.5 (20-273).\n\n  Philosophy separates soul from her image, vi. 4.16 (22-310).\n\n  Philosophy's task is avoidance of passions, iii. 6.5 (26-358).\n\n  Phoebus inspires men to interior vision, v. 8.10 (31-569).\n\n  Physical categories are matter, form, combination, attributes and\n    accidents, vi. 3.3 (44-938).\n\n  Physical categories of Plotinos, vi. 3 (44-933).\n\n  Physical genera of, are different from those of the intelligible, iv.\n    3.1 (27-387).\n\n  Physical life, can it exist without the soul? iv. 4.29 (28-485).\n\n  Physical, not mental being, affected by stars, iii. 1.6 (3-95).\n\n  Physical powers do not form a secondary quality, vi. 1.11 (42-856).\n\n  Physical qualities applied to Supreme only by analogy, vi. 8.8\n    (39-785).\n\n  Physical soul, production due to, not astrological power, iv. 4.38\n    (28-501).\n\n  Physical souls, various, how they affect production, iv. 4.37\n    (28-500).\n\n  Physical terms, only verbal similarity to intelligible, vi. 3.5\n    (44-941).\n\n  Physical theories, absurd, iii. 1.3 (3-89).\n\n  Physically begun, spiritual becomes love, vi. 7.33 (38-755).\n\n  Physician's fore-knowledge, simile of Providence, iii. 3.5 (48-1085).\n\n  Picture of the structure of the universe, ii. 3.18 (52-1187).\n\n  Picture, perfection of, demands shadow, iii. 2.11 (47-1060).\n\n  Picture that pictures itself is universe, ii. 3.18 (52-1188).\n\n  Pilgrim soul is in the world, ii. 9.18 (33-635).\n\n  Pilot governs the ship, relation of soul to body, i. 1.3 (53-1194);\n    iv. 3.21 (27-422).\n\n  Place has no contrary, vi. 3.12 (44-954).\n\n  Place or time do not figure among true categories, vi. 2.16 (43-919).\n\n  Place or where is Aristotelian category, vi. 1.14 (42-862).\n\n  Planet calculations, ii. 3.6 (52-1171).\n\n  Plant positions producing adulteries, absurd, ii. 3.6 (52-1171).\n\n  Planning of the world by God, refuted, v. 8.7 (31-561, 563).\n\n  Plants, do they admit of happiness, i. 4.1, 2 (46-1019 to 1021).\n\n  Plants even aspire to contemplation, iii. 8.1 (30-531).\n\n  Plato departed from, in categories, vi. 2.1 (43-891).\n\n  Plato not only hates body, but admires world, ii. 9.17 (33-633).\n\n  Plato uncertain about time, iii. 7.12 (45-1012).\n\n  Platonic basis of anti-gnostic controversy, v. 8.7 (31-561).\n\n  Plato's authority, restored, v. 1.8 (10-186).\n\n  Plato's language doubtful, iii. 6.12 (26-372); vi. 7.30 (38-749).\n\n  Pleasure an accessory to all goods of the soul, vi. 7.30 (38-749).\n\n  Pleasure, because changeable and restless, cannot be the good, vi.\n    7.27 (38-745)\n\n  Pleasure, good's independence from, is temperate man, vi. 7.29\n    (38-747).\n\n  Pleasure may accompany the good, but is independent thereof, vi. 7.27\n    (38-745).\n\n  Pleasure strictly, has nothing to do with happiness, i. 5.4 (36-685).\n\n  Pleasures of virtuous men are of higher kinds, i. 4.12 (46-1036).\n\n  Plotinos forced to demonstration of categories by divergence from\n    Plato, vi. 2.1 (43-891).\n\n  Plotinos's genera of sensual existence, iv. 3 (27-387).\n\n  Poros or Abundance, myth of, iii. 5.2, 5 (50-1125 to 1131).\n\n  Possession by divinity is last stage of ecstasy, v. 8.10 (31-569).\n\n  Possession of perfect life, i. 4.4 (46-1026).\n\n  Possession of things causes intelligence to think them, vi. 6.7\n    (34-653).\n\n  Potential, intelligible matter is not, ii. 5.3 (25-345).\n\n  Potentialities are inseparable from their beings, vi. 4.9 (22-298).\n\n  Potentiality and actuality not applicable to divinity, ii. 9.1\n    (33-599).\n\n  Potentiality, definition of, ii. 5.1 (25-341).\n\n  Potentiality exists only in corruptable matter, ii. 5.5 (25-348).\n\n  Potentiality explains miracle of seeds containing manifolds, iv. 9.5\n    (8-146).\n\n  Potentiality producing, not becoming, is the soul, ii. 5.3 (25-345).\n\n  Poverty caused by external circumstances, ii. 3.8 (52-1174).\n\n  Power and beauty of essence attracts all things, vi. 6.18 (34-678).\n\n  Power, lack of, cannot fall under same categories as power, vi. 1.10\n    (42-852).\n\n  Power, master of himself, really is the Supreme, vi. 8.10 (39-788).\n\n  Power of divinities lies in their inhering in the Supreme, v. 8.9\n    (31-565).\n\n  Powers though secret, in everything, iv. 4.37 (28-500).\n\n  Practice is only a preparation for contemplation, iii. 8.6 (30-538).\n\n  Prayed to, sun as well as stars may be, iv. 4.30 (28-486).\n\n  Prayers, all made in accordance with natural law, answered, iv. 4.42\n    (28-506).\n\n  Prayers answered by stars unconsciously, iv. 4.42 (28-505).\n\n  Prayers, how they are answered, iv. 4.41 (28-505).\n\n  Prayers of even the evil are answered, iv. 4.42 (28-506).\n\n  Predict, stars do, because of souls imperfection, ii. 3.10 (52-1177).\n\n  Prediction implies that future is determined, iii. 1.3 (3-90).\n\n  Prediction, not by works, but by analogy, iii. 3.6 (48-1080).\n\n  Prediction, with its responsiveness, do not fall under action and\n    experience, vi. 1.22 (42-875).\n\n  Predisposition of active life subjection to enchantments, iv. 4.43\n    (28-508).\n\n  Predisposition to magic by affections and weaknesses, iv. 4.44\n    (28-508).\n\n  Predominant soul part active while others sleep and (see managing\n    soul) appear exterior, iv. 2.2 (21-279); iii. 4.2 (15-234).\n\n  Predominating part, Stoic, iii. 3.2 (48-1078).\n\n  Predominating principle directs universe, ii. 3.8 (52-1173).\n\n  Preparation for contemplation is practice, iii. 8.6 (30-538).\n\n  Preponderance spiritual method of becoming wise, i. 4.14 (46-1037).\n\n  Presence of God, everywhere entire, explained as infinite, vi. 5.4\n    (23-318).\n\n  Presence of intelligible entities implied by knowledge of them, v.\n    5.1 (32-575).\n\n  Presence the one identical essence everywhere, entirely, vi. 4\n    (22-285).\n\n  Presences, different kinds of, vi. 4.11 (22-302).\n\n  Present, eternal, v. 1.4 (10-179).\n\n  Preservative not, is universal soul, but creative. ii. 3.16 (52-1183).\n\n  Preserver and creator is the good, vi. 7.23 (38-740).\n\n  Preserving, begotten Son, as result of ecstasy, v. 8.12 (31-571).\n\n  Priam, misfortunes of, i. 4.5 (46-1027).\n\n  Pride is folly, ii. 9.9 (33-618).\n\n  Primary essence, numbers must exist in it, vi. 6.8 (34-654).\n\n  Primary evil is evil in itself, i. 8.3 (51-1146).\n\n  Primary evil is lack of measure, i. 8.8 (51-1155).\n\n  Primary evil of soul, i. 8.5 (51-1148).\n\n  Primary existence will contain thought, existence and life, ii. 4.6\n    (12-203); v. 6.6 (24-339).\n\n  Primary movement said to underlie movement of soul, iii. 7.12\n    (45-1013).\n\n  Primitive one is a spherical figure and intelligible, vi. 6.17\n    (34-675).\n\n  Primitive relation between soul and body, i. 1.3 (53-1194).\n\n  Principle, a supra-thinking, necessary to the working of\n    intelligence, v. 6.2 (24-334).\n\n  Principle and end simultaneous in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563).\n\n  Principle, independent, is human soul, iii. 1.8 (3-97).\n\n  Principle of all, though not limited thereby, is the one, v. 3.11\n    (49-1109).\n\n  Principle of beauty, what is it? i. 6.1 (1-40).\n\n  Principle one self-existent constituted by being an actualization,\n    vi. 8.7 (39-784).\n\n  Principle, primary, matter cannot be, vi. 1.26 (42-879.)\n\n  Principle, simultaneous, above intelligence and existence, iii. 7.2\n    (45-989).\n\n  Principle, super-essential, does not think, v. 6.1 (24-333).\n\n  Principle, the first, must be one exclusively, which would make\n    thought impossible, v. 6.1 (24-335).\n\n  Principle, the first, thinking, is the second principle, v. 6.1\n    (24-335).\n\n  Principle, the second, the first thinking principle, is, v. 6.1\n    (24-335).\n\n  Principles, divine, enumerated, vi. 7.25 (38-741).\n\n  Principles limited to three, ii. 9.2 (33-602).\n\n  Principles, lower, contain only anterior things, iv. 4.16 (28-461).\n\n  Principles, single, of universe, ii. 3.6 (52-1171).\n\n  Priority not applied in the divinity because he made himself, vi.\n    8.20 (39-808).\n\n  Prison of soul, is body, iv. 8.11 (6-120).\n\n  Priority of soul to body, iv. 7.2 (2-58).\n\n  Privation is nonentity, adds no conceit, ii. 4.14 (12-215).\n\n  Privation of form of matter, ii. 4.13 (12-213).\n\n  Privation of qualities; not a quality, ii. 4.13 (12-213).\n\n  Privation relative is impossible, i. 8.12 (51-1158).\n\n  Process, vi. 3.1 (44-933); iv. 8.6 (6-129).\n\n  Process from unity to duality, v. 6.1 (24-338).\n\n  Process, natural, only affected by starvation, ii. 3.12 (52-1178).\n\n  Process of purification of soul and its separation from body, iii.\n    6.5 (26-359).\n\n  Process of soul elevation, v. 3.9 (49-1106).\n\n  Process of unification, v. 5.4 (32-581).\n\n  Process of vision and hearing, iv. 5 (29-514).\n\n  Process of wakening to reality, v. 5.11 (32-592).\n\n  Process, triune, also implies identity and difference, vi. 9.8\n    (43-905).\n\n  Processes of ecstasy by purification, i. 6.6, 8, 9 (1-49).\n\n  Procession by it, soul connects indivisible and divisible essence,\n    iv. 2.1 (21-276).\n\n  Procession, continuous, necessary to the Supreme, iv. 8.6 (6-129).\n\n  Procession from one of what is after it, v. 4 (7-134).\n\n  Procession is effusion of super-abundance, v. 2.1 (11-194).\n\n  Procession is universal, from first to last, v. 2.2 (11-195).\n\n  Procession of intelligence is an excursion down and up, iv. 8.7\n    (6-131).\n\n  Procession of soul, iv. 8.5 (6-128).\n\n  Procession of the world-soul, iii. 8.5 (30-537).\n\n  Procession of world from unity, cause. v. 2.1 (11-193).\n\n  Procreation, he not desiring it, aspires to higher beauty, iii. 5.1\n    (50-1123).\n\n  Procreativeness inherent (see radiation, exuberant, super-abundant),\n    v. 4.1 (7-135).\n\n  Prodigal, return, i. 6.8 (1-53).\n\n  Prodigal son, v. 1.1 (10-173).\n\n  Produced by stars, which is and what is not, ii. 3.13 (52-1178).\n\n  Producing potentiality, not becoming, is the soul, ii. 5.3 (25-346).\n\n  Production due to some physical soul not astrological power, iv. 4.38\n    (28-501).\n\n  Production of the things located is essence, vi. 6.10 (34-657).\n\n  Progress possible, argument against suicide, i. 9 (16-243).\n\n  Progressively higher stages of love, v. 9.2 (5-103).\n\n  Progressively, world-soul informs all things, iv. 3.10 (27-406).\n\n  Prometheus, iv. 3.14 (27-412).\n\n  Prometheus of flight leaves soul unharmed from incarnation, iv. 8.5\n    (6-128).\n\n  Proofs for existence and nature of intelligence, v. 9.3 (5-104).\n\n  Proportion, Stoic principle of beauty, not ultimate, but derivative,\n    i. 6.1 (1-41).\n\n  Providence accused by slavery of good and victory of evil, iii. 2.6\n    (47-1052).\n\n  Providence, chief of all, iii. 3.2 (48-1079).\n\n  Providence consists of appointed times in life, should be observed,\n    i. 9 (16-243).\n\n  Providence does not abandon even the mediocre, iii. 2.9 (47-1058).\n\n  Providence does not explain prediction but analogy, iii. 3.6\n    (48-1086).\n\n  Providence, double, particular and universal, iii. 3.4 (48-1081).\n\n  Providence embraces everything below, iii. 2.7 (47-1054).\n\n  Providence, fore knowledge of, like unto a physician, iii. 3.5\n    (48-1085).\n\n  Providence is normative element of life, iii. 3.5 (48-1084).\n\n  Providence is not particular, because world had no beginning, iii.\n    2.1 (47-1043).\n\n  Providence is prevision and reasoning, iii, 2.1 (47-1042).\n\n  Providence is unpredictable circumstance changing life, iii. 4.6\n    (15-242).\n\n  Providence may appear as chance, iii. 3.2 (48-1078).\n\n  Providence, objection to by internecine war, iii. 2.15 (47-1064).\n\n  Providence problems solved by derivation of reason from intelligence,\n    iii. 2.16 (47-1068).\n\n  Providence should not overshadow initiative, iii. 2.9 (47-1057).\n\n  Providence, the plan of the universe is from eternity, vi. 8.17\n    (39-803).\n\n  Providence, twofold, exerted by twofold soul, iv. 8.2 (6-122).\n\n  Prudence interpreted as purification, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Prudence or Metis, myth of, iii. 5.5 (50-1130).\n\n  Psychic, gnostic distinction of men, ii. 9.18 (33-635).\n\n  Psychologic elements, sensation, faculties of generation and\n    increase, and creative power, i. 1.8 (53-1200).\n\n  Psychologic elements, soul gives life to, i. 1.8 (53-1200).\n\n  Psychological effect of vision of intelligible wisdom, v. 8.10\n    (31-568).\n\n  Psychological faculty, on which is the freedom of will based, vi. 8.2\n    (39-775).\n\n  Psychological questions, iv. 3 (27-387).\n\n  Psychological study of, outline, iv. 2.1 (21-276).\n\n  Psychological theory of quality, vi. 1.12 (42-858).\n\n  Psychology, common part, its function, i. 1.10 (53-1203).\n\n  Psychology, does ratiocination belong to same principles as passions,\n    i. 1.1 (53-1191).\n\n  Psychology (every man double), composite animal, real man or\n    reasonable soul, ii. 3.9 (52-1176).\n\n  Psychology, exact root of philosophy, ii. 3.16 (52-1183).\n\n  Psychology, explanation of anger parts, courage, iii. 6.2 (26-354).\n\n  Psychology, inquiring principle, i. 1.1 (53-1191).\n\n  Psychology obeys the precept \"Know thyself,\" iv, 3.1 (27-387).\n\n  Psychology of demons, iv. 4.43 (28-507).\n\n  Psychology of earth, iv. 4.27 (28-479).\n\n  Psychology of sensation, iv. 3.26 (27-430).\n\n  Psychology of vegetative part of soul, iv. 4.28 (28-481).\n\n  Psychology thought, its nature and classification, i. 1.1 (53-1191).\n\n  Pun between science and knowledge, v. 8.4 (31-559).\n\n  Pun on aeon, as age or eternity, iii. 7.1 (45-986).\n\n  Pun on \"agalmata,\" v. 8.5, 6 (31-560).\n\n  Pun on Aphrodite, as delicate, iii. 5.8 (50-1137).\n\n  Pun on being, intelligible, vi. 3.8 (44-947).\n\n  Pun on creation and adornment, ii. 4.4 (12-214); i. 8.7 (51-1152).\n\n  Pun on difference in others, ii. 4.13 (12-214).\n\n  Pun on \"dii\" and \"diken,\" v. 8.4 (31-558).\n\n  Pun on \"doxa,\" v. 5.1 (32-578).\n\n  Pun on Egyptian hieroglyphics and statues (see \"agalmata\").\n\n  Pun on \"eidos\" and \"idea,\" v. 9.8 (5-111); vi 9.2 (9-149).\n\n  Pun on \"einai\" and \"henos,\" v. 5.5 (32-584).\n\n  Pun on forms and statues, v. 8.5 (31-560).\n\n  Pun on heaven, world, universe, animal and all, ii. 1.1 (40-814).\n\n  Pun on Hestia, and standing, v. 5.5 (32-584).\n\n  Pun on Hesis, vi. 1.23 (42-877).\n\n  Pun on \"idea\" and \"eidos,\" see \"eidos.\"\n\n  Pun on inclination, ii. 9.4 (33-605).\n\n  Pun on \"koros,\" iii. 8.11 (30-550); v. 8.13 (31-573); v. 9.8 (5-111);\n    iv. 3.14 (27-412); i. 8.7 (51-1152).\n\n  Pun on love and vision, iii. 5.3 (50-1128).\n\n  Pun on \"nous,\" \"noesis,\" and \"to noeton,\" v. 3.5 (49-1096 to 1099).\n\n  Pun on \"paschein,\" experiencing, suffering, reacting, and passion,\n    vi. 1.15 (42-864).\n\n  Pun on Poros, iii. 5.9, 10 (50-1140).\n\n  Pun on Prometheus and Providence, iv. 3.14 (27-412).\n\n  Pun on reason and characteristic, iii. 6.2 (17-248); iv. 7.4 (2-61).\n\n  Pun on \"schesis\" and \"schema,\" iv. 4.29 (28-484).\n\n  Pun on \"Soma\" and \"sozesthai,\" v. 9.5 (5-109).\n\n  Pun on suffering, iv. 9.3 (8-143).\n\n  Pun on thinking, thinkable and intellection, vi. 1.18 (42-868).\n\n  Pun on timely and sovereign, vi. 8.18 (39-806).\n\n  Pun on unadorned and created, see \"koros,\" i. 8.7 (51-1152).\n\n  Pun on Vesta and Hestia, v. 5.5 (32-584).\n\n  Punishable and impassible, soul is both. i. 1.12 (53-1204).\n\n  Punishment follows perversity of soul, iv. 8.5 (6-128).\n\n  Punishments and misfortunes, significance of, iv. 3.15 (27-414).\n\n  Pure thoughts is that part of the soul which most resembles\n    intelligence, v. 3.8 (49-1102).\n\n  Purification clears up mental knowledge, iv. 7.10 (2-80).\n\n  Purification, content of virtues, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Purification in mysteries, leads to nakedness, i. 6.6 (1-50).\n\n  Purification of soul like man washing off mud, i. 6.5 (1-48).\n\n  Purification produces conversion, and is used by virtue, i. 2.4\n    (19-261).\n\n  Purification of soul process involved, iii. 6.5 (26-359).\n\n  Purification's goal is second divinity intelligence, i. 2.6 (19-264).\n\n  Purification limit is that of the soul self-control, i. 2.5 (19-263).\n\n  Purity, condition of remaining in unity with the divinity, v. 8.11\n    (31-570).\n\n  Purpose of life, supreme, vision of God, i. 6.7 (1-50).\n\n  Puzzle of one and many decides of the genera of essence, vi. 2.4\n    (43-898).\n\n  Puzzle of origin of God due to chaos being starting point, vi. 8.11\n    (39-792).\n\n  Puzzle of soul being one, yet in all, iv. 3.4 (27-394).\n\n\n  Quadrature, ii. 3.4 (52-1168).\n\n  Qualities, sqq. vi. 1.10 (42-852).\n\n  Qualities admit of degrees, vi. 3.20 (44-970).\n\n  Qualities are accidental shapes of being, ii. 6.3 (17-250).\n\n  Qualities are acts of being, ii. 6.2 (17-249).\n\n  Qualities are incorporeal, vi. 1.29 (42-885).\n\n  Qualities, because they change, matter must be passible, iii. 6.8\n    (26-366).\n\n  Qualities classified as body and of soul, vi. 3.17 (44-963).\n\n  Qualities, distinction between qualities and complements of being,\n    ii. 6.1 (17-245).\n\n  Qualities, genuine, are not differential beings, vi. 1.10 (42-853).\n\n  Qualities, modal and essential, distinctions between, ii. 6.1\n    (17-246).\n\n  Qualities more essential than quantity, ii. 8.1 (35-680).\n\n  Qualities not all are reasons, vi. 1.10 (42-854).\n\n  Qualities not formed by union of four Plotinic categories, vi. 2.15\n    (43-918).\n\n  Qualities of sense, among them belong many other conceptions, vi.\n    3.16 (44-961).\n\n  Qualities, some are differences, vi. 3.18 (44-965).\n\n  Qualities, some differences are not, vi. 3.18 (44-966).\n\n  Qualities, their derivation from affection is of no importance, vi.\n    1.11 (42-857).\n\n  Qualities, ugly, are imperfect reasons, vi. 1.10 (42-855).\n\n  Quality, ii. 6 (17-245); iv. 7.5, 9, 10 (2-62 to 80).\n\n  Quality and matter form body, according to Stoics, iv. 7.3 (2-59).\n\n  Quality and thing qualified, relation between, vi. 1.12 (42-858).\n\n  Quality, by it all things depend on the good, i. 7.2 (54-1209).\n\n  Quality, by it, being differences are distinguished, vi. 3.17\n    (44-963).\n\n  Quality, category, various derivatives of, vi. 3.19 (44-967).\n\n  Quality consists of a non-essential character, vi. 1.10 (42-855).\n\n  Quality differences cannot be distinguished by sensation, vi. 3.17\n    (44-963).\n\n  Quality, intelligible and sense, difference between, ii. 6.3 (17-249).\n\n  Quality is good, a common label or common quality, vi. 7.18 (38-733).\n\n  Quality is not a power but disposition, form and character, vi. 1.10\n    (42-854).\n\n  Quality is only figurative name for complement of being, vi. 2.14\n    (43-918).\n\n  Quality none in matter, ii. 4.7 (12-204); iv. 7.3 (2-59).\n\n  Quality none in matter which is deprivation, i. 8.11 (51-1157).\n\n  Quality not a primary genus, because posterior to being, vi. 2.14\n    (43-917).\n\n  Quality not in matter is an accident, i. 8.10 (51-1157).\n\n  Quality, one, partaken of by capacity and disposition, vi. 1.11\n    (42-856).\n\n  Quality, physical need of supreme only by analogy, vi. 9.8 (9-164).\n\n  Quality, psychological theory of, vi. 1.12 (42-858).\n\n  Quality, secondary, not formed by physical powers, vi. 1.11 (42-856).\n\n  Quality, shape is not, vi. 1.11 (42-857).\n\n  Quality, according to the Stoics, vi. 1.29 (42-885).\n\n  Quality, there is only one kind, vi. 1.11 (42-856).\n\n  Quality, various terms expressing it, vi. 3.16 (44-960).\n\n  Quality, whether it alone can be called similar or dissimilar, vi.\n    3.15 (44-959).\n\n  Quality-less thing in itself, reached by abstraction, ii. 4.10\n    (12-207).\n\n  Quantity, vi. 1.4 (42-841).\n\n  Quantity a secondary genus, therefore not a first, vi. 2.13 (43-915).\n\n  Quantity admits of contraries, vi. 3.11 (44-953).\n\n  Quantity, Aristotelian criticized, vi. 1.4 (42-841).\n\n  Quantity, as equal and unequal, does not refer to the objects, vi.\n    1.5 (42-845).\n\n  Quantity category, v. 1.4 (10-180).\n\n  Quantity, continuous and definite, have nothing in common. vi. 1.4\n    (42-841).\n\n  Quantity, definition of, includes large and small, vi. 3.11 (44-952).\n\n  Quantity, different kinds of, in magnitudes and numbers, vi. 1.4\n    (42-843).\n\n  Quantity, discrete, different from continuous, vi. 3.13 (44-955).\n\n  Quantity, elements of continuous, vi. 3.14 (44-955).\n\n  Quantity, if time is, why a separate category, vi. 1.13 (42-861).\n\n  Quantity in number, but not number in quantity, vi. 1.4 (42-842).\n\n  Quantity in quantative number, v. 5.4 (32-582).\n\n  Quantity is incorporeal, ii. 4.9 (12-207).\n\n  Quantity is speech, 1.5 (42-844).\n\n  Quantity less essential than quality, ii. 8.1 (35-680).\n\n  Quantity not qualities studied by geometry, vi. 3.15 (44-958).\n\n  Quantity, time is not, vi. 1-5 (42-844).\n\n  Question, not to be asked by our order in nature, iii. 3.3 (48-1079).\n\n  Quiddity and being earlier than suchness, ii. 6.2 (17-248).\n\n  Quintessence, ii. 1.2 (40-815); ii. 5.3 (25-346).\n\n\n  Radiation joins image to its model, vi. 4.10 (22-300).\n\n  Radiation of an image is generation, v. 1.6 (10-182).\n\n  Radiation of good is creative power, vi. 7.37 (38-761).\n\n  Radiation of light, v. 5.7 (32-586).\n\n  Radiation of multiple unity, v. 3.15 (49-1115).\n\n  Radiation of stars for good, explains their influence, iv. 4.35\n    (28-497).\n\n  Radii centering, to explain, soul unifying sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-65).\n\n  Rank, v. 4.2 (7-136); v. 5.4 (32-581).\n\n  Rank after death, depends on state at death, hence progress must be\n    achieved, i. 9 (16-243).\n\n  Rank of souls, iv. 3.6 (27-397).\n\n  Rank, souls of the second, universal rank, are men, ii. 3.13\n    (52-1180).\n\n  Rank third, of existence, should not be occupied by modality, vi.\n    1.30 (42-887).\n\n  Rank third of souls, ii. 1.8 (55-1200).\n\n  Ranks in the Universe reasonable for souls to be assigned thereto,\n    iii. 2.12 (47-1061).\n\n  Ranks of existence, three, ii. 9.13 (33-626); iii. 3.3 (48-1079);\n    iii. 5.9 (50-1138); vi. 4.11 (22-302); vi. 5.4 (23-318).\n\n  Ranks of existence beneath the beautiful, vi. 7.42 (38-770).\n\n  Ratiocination, has no place even in the world-soul, iv. 4.11 (28-455).\n\n  Ratiocination, souls can reason intuitionally without, iv. 3.18\n    (27-416).\n\n  Rationalized matter, body as, ii. 7.3 (37-696).\n\n  Reaction or suffering, definition of, vi. 1.21 (43-872).\n\n  Reactions, need not be passive, but may be active, vi. 1.21 (42-870).\n\n  Real man and we, distinctions between, i. 1.10 (53-1202).\n\n  Real man differs from body, i. 1.10 (53-1203).\n\n  Reality, same different degrees of, are intelligence and life, vi.\n    7.18 (38-732).\n\n  Reason and form possessed by everything, ii. 7.3 (37-696).\n\n  Reason as a whole, vi. 5.10 (23-326).\n\n  Reason as derived from intelligence, iii. 2.16 (47-1068).\n\n  Reason cannot be deduced from atoms, iii. 1.2 (3-88).\n\n  Reason, differentiated, would deprive the soul of consciousness, ii.\n    9.1 (33-602).\n\n  Reason discursive is not used during discarnation, iv. 3.18 (27-416).\n\n  Reason divine is to blame, iv. 2.10 (47-1059).\n\n  Reason followed, is secret of freedom, iii. 1.9 (3-97).\n\n  Reason has no extension, iv. 7.5 (2-64).\n\n  Reason in head, not in brain, iv. 3.23 (27-425).\n\n  Reason, its influence is only suggestive, i. 2.5 (19-264).\n\n  Reason no explanation of living well, i. 4.2 (46-1022).\n\n  Reason not resulted in foresight of creation, vi. 7.1 (38-697).\n\n  Reason not sufficient explanation of living well, i. 4.2 (46-1022).\n\n  Reason or ideas possessed by intellectual life, vi. 2.21 (43-927).\n\n  Reason, seminal iv. 7.2 (2-58).\n\n  Reason, seminal, produces man, ii. 3.12 (52-1178).\n\n  Reason that begets everything is Jupiter's garden, iii. 5.9 (50-1137).\n\n  Reason, total of the universe, ii. 3.13 (52-1178).\n\n  Reason unites the soul divided by bodies, iv. 9.3 (8-142).\n\n  Reason, universal, is both soul and nature, iii. 8.3 (30-533).\n\n  Reason used only while hindered by obstacles of body, iv. 3.18\n    (27-416).\n\n  Reasonable for souls to be assigned to different ranks, iii. 2.12\n    (47-1061).\n\n  Reasoning absent in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563).\n\n  Reasoning and foresight are only figurative expressions, vi. 7.1\n    (38-699).\n\n  Reasoning and memory not implied by world-soul, wisdom, iv. 4-12\n    (28-457).\n\n  Reasoning and memory superseded by world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.12\n    (28-456).\n\n  Reasons are the actualization of the soul that begets the animal, vi.\n    7.5 (38-707).\n\n  Reasons, double, iii. 3.4 (48-1081).\n\n  Reasons, not all are qualities, vi. 1.10 (42-854).\n\n  Reasons, unity constituted by contained contraries, iii. 2.16\n    (47-1069).\n\n  Reception, transmission, relation, underlies action and experience,\n    vi. 1.22 (42-874).\n\n  Receptivity accounts for divinity's seeing by individuals, vi. 5.12\n    (23-330).\n\n  Receptivity determines participation in the one, vi. 4.11 (22-331).\n\n  Receptivity is limit of participation in divine, iv. 8.6 (6-129).\n\n  Reciprocal nature of all things, iii. 3.6 (48-1080).\n\n  Recognition of divine kinship depends of self knowledge, vi. 9.7\n    (9-163).\n\n  Recognition of each other by souls, descending from intelligibles\n    into heaven, iv. 4.5 (28-447).\n\n  Redemption of world by world-soul, v. 1.2 (10-175).\n\n  Reduction to unity, v. 3.6 (49-1099).\n\n  Reflection, not, but self-necessity, cause of creation of\n    sense-world, iii. 2.2 (47-1044).\n\n  Reflects everything, does the empty mirror of matter, iii. 6.7\n    (26-363).\n\n  Reformatory, are hell's torments, iv. 4.45 (28-511).\n\n  Refraction, lighting fire from, illustrates generation, iii. 6.14\n    (26-376).\n\n  Refreshment not needed by stars, which are inexhaustible, ii. 1.8\n    (40-827).\n\n  Refutation of James Lange theory, i. 1.5 (53-1196).\n\n  Reincarnation is result of soul-judgments, iv. 8.5 (6-128).\n\n  Rejection of form of approaching souls proves formlessness of the\n    Supreme, vi. 7.34 (38-756).\n\n  Relation, vi. 1.6 (42-845).\n\n  Relation between external and internal, i. 8.5 (51-1149).\n\n  Relation is a habit or manner of being, vi. 3.27 (44-981).\n\n  Relation is an appendage existing only among definite objects, vi.\n    2.16 (43-919).\n\n  Relation of good, intelligence and soul like light, sun and moon, v.\n    6.4 (24-337).\n\n  Relation primitive between soul and body, i. 1.3 (53-1194).\n\n  Relation, Stoic, category confuses the new with the anterior, vi.\n    1.31 (42-888).\n\n  Relations are simultaneous existences, vi. 1.7 (42-848).\n\n  Relations, are they subjective of objective? vi. 1.7 (42-847).\n\n  Relay of sensation from organ to directing principle, impossible, iv.\n    7.7 (2-67).\n\n  Relay transmission, iv. 2.2 (21-280); iv. 5.4 (29-522).\n\n  Relays in spreading light, v. 3.9 (49-1105).\n\n  Remember itself, the soul does not even, iv. 4.2 (28-443).\n\n  Remembers, soul becomes that which she does, iv. 4.3 (28-445).\n\n  Reminiscences of intelligible entities, v. 9.5 (5-107).\n\n  Repentances of gnostics, opposed, ii. 9.6 (33-608).\n\n  Repugnance natural to study of unity, vi. 9.3 (9-15).\n\n  Resemblance lacking, makes contraries, vi. 3.20 (44-970).\n\n  Resemblance of intelligible to earthly based on the converse\n    (Platonic), v. 8.6 (31-561).\n\n  Resemblance to divinity is soul's welfare, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Resemblance to divinity, result of homely virtues, i. 2.1 (19-257).\n\n  Resemblance, two kinds, effect and cause or simultaneous effects, i.\n    2.2 (19-258).\n\n  Residence and substrate of forms to matter, ii. 4.1 (12-197).\n\n  Residence demanded by forms, against Moderatus of Gades, ii. 4.12\n    (12-211).\n\n  Residence, mother, nurse or other nature is matter, iii. 6.18\n    (26-382).\n\n  Residence of eternal generation is matter, iii. 6.13 (26-373).\n\n  Residence of form is matter as image of extension, ii. 4.11 (12-210).\n\n  Residence of universal soul is heaven, immortalizing it, ii. 1.4\n    (40-817).\n\n  Responsible for our ills, Gods are not, iv. 4.37 (28-500).\n\n  Responsible, spontaneity not affected by involuntariness, iii. 2.10\n    (47-1060).\n\n  Responsibility depends solely on involuntariness, vi. 8.1 (39-774).\n\n  Responsibility not injured by guidance of Daemon, iii. 4.5 (15-238).\n\n  Responsibility not to be shifted from responsible reason, iii. 2.15\n    (47-1065).\n\n  Rest, v. 1.4 (10-178); v. 3.7 (49-1101).\n\n  Rest and motion below one, iii. 9.7 (13-225).\n\n  Rest and movement distinction also inapplicable, ii. 9.1 (33-600).\n\n  Rest, as category, iii. 7.1 (45-987); vi. 2.7 (43-903).\n\n  Rest consists of change, iv. 8.1 (6-119).\n\n  Rest, intelligible, the form by which all consists, v. 1.7 (10-184).\n\n  Rest of Heraclitus, description of ecstatic goal, vi. 9.8 (9-165);\n    vi. 9.11 (9-170).\n\n  Resultance of causes is anything, ii. 3.14 (52-1181).\n\n  Results of ecstasy, remaining close to divinity, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Retirement of soul is to superior power, v. 2.2 (11-195).\n\n  Retribution divine, all are led to it by secret road, iv. 4.45\n    (28-511).\n\n  Return of prodigal, i. 6.8 (1-52).\n\n  Return of soul to intelligible by three paths, i. 3.1 (20-270).\n\n  Return of soul to its principle on destruction of body, v. 2.2\n    (11-195).\n\n  Revealers of the eternal, are sense-objects, iv. 8.6 (6-130).\n\n  Revelation of divine power expresses true knowledge, ii. 9.9 (33-617).\n\n  Rewards may be neglected by good, iii. 2.8 (47-1055).\n\n  Rhea, iii. 6.19 (26-385); v. 1.7 (10-185).\n\n  Riches, inequality of no moment to an eternal being, ii. 9.9 (33-616).\n\n  Ridiculous to complain of lower nature of animals, iii. 2.9 (47-1059).\n\n  Ridiculous to expect perfections, but deny it to nature, ii. 9.5\n    (33-607).\n\n  Right of leaving world reserved by wise men, i. 4.16 (46-1039).\n\n  Rises to the good, does the soul, by scorning all things below, vi.\n    7.31 (38-750).\n\n  Roads, secret, leads all to retribution, iv. 4.45 (27-511).\n\n  Rocks have greatest nonentity, iii. 6.6 (26-361).\n\n  Rush of soul towards the one, v. 3.17 (49-1120).\n\n\n  Same principle, how can it exist in all things? vi. 4.6 (22-295).\n\n  Same principle, how various things can participate, vi. 4.12 (22-303).\n\n  Same thing not seen in the Supreme by different persons, v. 8.12\n    (31-571).\n\n  Sample is only thing we can examine, v. 8.3 (33-555).\n\n  Sample that must be purified, is image of intelligence, v. 8.3\n    (31-555).\n\n  Sanative element of life, is Providence, iii. 3.5 (48-1084).\n\n  Sanctuary, inner, penetrations into, resulting advantage of ecstasy,\n    v. 8.11 (31-569).\n\n  Sanctuary of ecstasy, i. 6.8 (1-52); i. 8.7 (51-1152); v. 8.4\n    (31-557); vi. 9.11 (9-169).\n\n  Sanctuary of mysteries, i. 6.6 (1-50).\n\n  Satiety does not produce scorn, in the intelligible, v. 8.4 (31-558).\n\n  Satisfaction of desire to live is not happiness, i. 5.2 (36-684).\n\n  Saturn, v. 1.7 (10-185); v. 8.13 (31-573); iv. 4.31 (28-489).\n\n  Saturn and Mars, relations are quite illogical, ii 3.5 (52-1169).\n\n  Saturn held down by chains, v. 8.13 (31-573).\n\n  Saturnian realm, vi. 1.4 (10-178).\n\n  Scheme, part in it soul must fit itself to, iii. 2.17 (47-1071).\n\n  Science does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-920).\n\n  Science is either a movement or something composite, vi. 2.18\n    (43-923).\n\n  Science is present in the whole, potentially at least, v. 9.8 (5-111).\n\n  Science is the actualization of the notions that are potential\n    science, vi. 2.20 (43-925).\n\n  Science, part and whole in it not applicable to soul, iv. 3.2\n    (27-390).\n\n  Science's, greatest is touched with the good, vi. 7.3 (38-760).\n\n  Scorn not produced by satiety in the intelligible world, v. 8.4\n    (31-558).\n\n  Scorn of life implies good, vi. 7.29 (38-748).\n\n  Scorn of this world no guarantee of goodness, ii. 9.16 (33-630).\n\n  Scorning all things below, soul rises to the good, vi. 7.31 (38-750).\n\n  Sculptor, v. 9.3 (5-104).\n\n  Seal of wax, impressions on, are sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-66).\n\n  Second must be perfect, v. 4.1 (7-136).\n\n  Second necessarily begotten by first, v. 4.1 (7-135).\n\n  Second rank of universe, souls of men, ii. 3.13 (52-1180).\n\n  Secondary evil is accidental formlessness, i. 8.8 (51-1154).\n\n  Secondary evil is matter, i. 8.4 (51-1146).\n\n  Secondary evil of soul, i. 8.5 (51-1148).\n\n  Secrecy of mystery-rites explains ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-171).\n\n  Secret powers in everything, iv. 4.37 (28-500).\n\n  Secret road, leads all to divine retribution, iv. 4.45 (28-511).\n\n  Seeing God without emotion, sign of lack of unification, vi. 9.4\n    (9-155).\n\n  Seeking anything beyond life, departs from it, vi. 5.12 (23-331).\n\n  Seeming to be beautiful satisfies, but only being good satisfies, v.\n    5.12 (32-594).\n\n  Seems as if the begotten was a universal soul, vi. 4.14 (22-307).\n\n  Seen the Supreme, no one who has calls him chance, vi. 8.19 (39-807).\n\n  Self autocracy, vi. 8.21 (39-807).\n\n  Self-consciousness can exist in a simple principle, v. 3.1 (49-1090).\n\n  Self-consciousness consists of becoming intelligence, v. 3.4\n    (49-1096).\n\n  Self-consciousness is not needed by self-sufficient good, vi. 7.38\n    (38-763).\n\n  Self-consciousness is more perfect in intelligence than in the soul,\n    v. 3.6 (49-1098).\n\n  Self-consciousness result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Self-control is assimilation to divinity, i. 2.5 (19-263).\n\n  Self-control limited by soul's purification, v. 2.5 (19-263).\n\n  Self-development, one object of incarnation, v. 8.5 (31-559).\n\n  Self-esteem, proper, v. 1.1 (10-173).\n\n  Self-existence possessed by essence, vi. 6.18 (34-678).\n\n  Self-glorified, image of a trap on way to ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569).\n\n  Self is the soul, iv. 7.1 (2-57).\n\n  Self-luminous statues in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-558).\n\n  Self-sufficiency of supreme, v. 3.17 (49-1120).\n\n  Self-victory over, mastery of fate, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).\n\n  Seminal reason, ii. 6.1 (17-246); iii. 1.8 (3-97).\n\n  Seminal reason does not contain order, iv. 4.16 (28-461).\n\n  Seminal reason harmonizes with its appearing actualization, vi. 3.16\n    (44-960).\n\n  Seminal reason produces man, ii. 3.12 (52-1178).\n\n  Seminal reasons, v. 8.2 (31-553); v. 7.1 (18-252).\n\n  Seminal reasons, as qualified matter would be composite and\n    secondary, vi. 1.29 (42-886).\n\n  Seminal reasons, cause of difference of things, v. 7.1 (18-251).\n\n  Seminal reasons cause the soul, ii. 3.16 (52-1184).\n\n  Seminal reasons may be contrary to soul's nature, but not to soul,\n    vi. 7.7 (38-710).\n\n  Sensation, v. 1.7 (10-184).\n\n  Sensation and memory, iv. 6 (41-829).\n\n  Sensation and memory, Stoic doctrines of, hang together, iv. 6.1\n    (41-829).\n\n  Sensation as dream of the soul, from which we must wake, iii. 6.6\n    (26-363).\n\n  Sensation cannot distinguish quality differences, vi. 3.17 (44-963).\n\n  Sensation cannot reach truth, v. 5.1 (32-576).\n\n  Sensations cause of emotion, iv. 4.28 (28-482).\n\n  Sensation equivalent to good, i. 4.2 (46-1021).\n\n  Sensation depends on sense-shape, iv. 4.23 (28-473).\n\n  Sensation, external and internal, i. 1-7 (53-1199).\n\n  Sensation implies the feeling soul, i. 1.6 (53-1198).\n\n  Sensation, intermediary, demands conceptive thought, iv. 4.23\n    (28-472).\n\n  Sensation is limited to the common integral parts of the universe,\n    iv. 5.8 (29-529).\n\n  Sensation must first be examined, iv. 4.22 (28-472).\n\n  Sensation not a soul distraction, iv. 4.25 (28-477).\n\n  Sensation not in head, but in brain, iv. 3.23 (27-425).\n\n  Sensation, psychology of, iv. 3.26 (27-430).\n\n  Sensation relayed from organ to directing principle impossible, iv.\n    7.7 (2-67).\n\n  Sensation taken as their guide, Stoic's fault, vi. 1.28 (42-884).\n\n  Sensations are actualizations, not only in sight, but in all senses,\n    iv. 6.3 (41-835).\n\n  Sensations are not experiences but relative actualizations, iv. 6.2\n    (41-831).\n\n  Sensations as impressions on seal of wax, iv. 7.5 (2-66).\n\n  Sensations distract from thought, iv. 8.8 (6-132).\n\n  Sense beauties, less delightful than moral, i. 6.4 (1-44).\n\n  Sense beauty, transition to intellectual, i. 6.3 (1-45).\n\n  Sense being, common element, in matter form and combination, vi. 3.4\n    (44-940).\n\n  Sense growth and emotions lead to divisibility, iv. 3.19 (27-418).\n\n  Sense objects are intermediate between form and matter, iii. 6.17\n    (26-381).\n\n  Sense objects, how are not evil, iii. 2.8 (47-1055).\n\n  Sense objects, men, v. 9.1 (9-148).\n\n  Sense objects, motion for, vi. 3.23 (44-976).\n\n  Sense objects reveal eternal, iv. 8.6 (6-130).\n\n  Sense objects unreal, made up of appearance, iii. 6.12 (26-371).\n\n  Sense organs, sense better without medium however passible, iv. 5.1\n    (29-515).\n\n  Sense power of soul deals only with external things, v. 3.2 (49-1091).\n\n  Sense qualities, many other conceptions belong among them, vi. 3.16\n    (44-961).\n\n  Sense shape, like tools, is intermediate, iv. 4.23 (28-473).\n\n  Sense world created not by reflection but self-necessity, iii. 2.2\n    (47-1044).\n\n  Sense world has less unity than intelligible world, vi. 5.10 (23-322).\n\n  Sense world, the generation in it, is what being is in the\n    intelligible, iv. 3.3 (27-392).\n\n  Senses, not given only for utility, iv. 4.24 (28-475).\n\n  Senses not given to man, from experience of misfortune, vi. 7.1\n    (38-697).\n\n  Senses of earth may be different from ours, iv. 4.26 (28-478).\n\n  Sentiments, most keenly felt, constitute people lovers, i. 6.4 (1-46).\n\n  Separation of soul from body, enables soul to use it, i. 1.3\n    (53-1193).\n\n  Separation of soul from body is death, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Separation of soul from body, process involved, iii. 6.5 (26-359).\n\n  Separation refers not only to body but accretions, i. 1.12 (53-1204).\n\n  Sex alone would not account for differences of things, v. 7.2\n    (18-252).\n\n  Shadows necessary to the perfection of a picture, iii. 2.11 (47-1060).\n\n  Shape is not a quality, but a specific appearance of reason, vi. 1.11\n    (42-857).\n\n  Shape is the actualization, thought the form of being, v. 9.8 (5-111).\n\n  Shape received from elsewhere, v. 9.5 (5-107).\n\n  Shapeless impressions of, differ from mental blank, ii. 4.10 (12-207).\n\n  Shapeless shaper, essential beauty and the transcendent to Supreme,\n    vi. 7.33 (38-754).\n\n  Sight, ii. 8 (35-680).\n\n  Sight, actualize as thought, v. 1.5 (10-181).\n\n  Sight and thought form but one, v. 1.5 (10-181).\n\n  Sight, sense of, does not possess the image seen within it, iv. 6.1\n    (41-829).\n\n  Sight, two methods of, form and light, v. 5.7 (32-586).\n\n  Significance of punishments and misfortunes, iv. 3.16 (27-414).\n\n  Silence, v. 1.2 (10-175).\n\n  Simile from lighting fire from refraction, iii. 6.14 (26-376).\n\n  Simile of abstraction, triangles, circles, iv. 7.8 (2-69).\n\n  Simile of badly tuned lyre cannot produce harmony, ii. 3.13 (52-1180).\n\n  Simile of captive in golden chains--matter, i. 8.15 (51-1163).\n\n  Simile of cave and grotto, iv. 8.1 (6-120).\n\n  Simile of center and circular intelligence, vi. 8.18 (39-804).\n\n  Simile of choral ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165).\n\n  Simile of circles, v. 8.7 (31-563); iv. 4.16 (28-462).\n\n  Simile of clear gold, admitting its real nature, iv. 7.10 (2-81).\n\n  Simile of cosmic choric ballet, vi. 9.8 (9-165).\n\n  Simile of Cupid and Psyche, vi. 9.9 (9-167).\n\n  Simile of drama of life, allows for good and bad, iii. 2.18 (47-1072).\n\n  Simile of face in several mirrors, i. 1.8 (53-1200).\n\n  Simile of foreknowledge of physician to explain Providence, iii. 3.5\n    (48-1085).\n\n  Simile of guest and architect of house, ii. 9.18 (33-635).\n\n  Simile of head with three faces all round, vi. 5.7 (23-320).\n\n  Simile of light in air, as soul is present in body, iv. 3.22 (27-423).\n\n  Simile of light remaining on high, while shining down, iv. 8.3\n    (6-124).\n\n  Simile of light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337).\n\n  Simile of love that watches at door of the beloved, vi. 5.10 (23-325).\n\n  Simile of man fallen in mud, needing washing, i. 6.5 (1-48).\n\n  Simile of man with feet in bath tub, vi. 9.8 (9-163).\n\n  Simile of mirror, i. 4.10 (46-1034).\n\n  Simile of mob in assembly, vi. 4.15 (22-310).\n\n  Simile of net in the sea for universe in soul, iv. 3.9 (27-405).\n\n  Simile of opinion and imagination illustrates relation between matter\n    and reason, iii. 6.15 (26-377).\n\n  Simile of overweighted birds, sensual man, v. 9.1 (5-102).\n\n  Simile of peak, formed by uniting of souls, vi. 7.15 (38-726).\n\n  Simile of pilot governing the ship, i. 1.3 (53-1194).\n\n  Simile of platonic vision theory to explain simultaneity of unity and\n    duality, v. 6.1 (24-333).\n\n  Simile of prearranged dance as star's motion, iv. 4.33 (28-492).\n\n  Simile of radii around centre, iv. 2.1 (21-277).\n\n  Simile of radii centering, to explain unifying sensations, iv. 7.4\n    (2-277).\n\n  Simile of radii meeting in centre, i. 7.1 (54-1209).\n\n  Simile of ray from centre to circumference, iv. 1 (4-100).\n\n  Simile of science explains whole and part, iii. 9.3 (13-222); iv. 9.5\n    (8-145).\n\n  Simile of seal on wax, iv. 9.4 (8-144).\n\n  Simile of seed to explain unity of essence in many souls, iv. 9.5\n    (8-145).\n\n  Simile of spring of water, iii. 8.1 (30-547).\n\n  Simile of striking cord of a lyre, vi. 5.10 (23-326).\n\n  Simile of sun and light, vi. 5.5 (23-319).\n\n  Simile of the sun's rays, vi. 5.5 (23-319).\n\n  Simile of the tree of the universe, iii. 8.10 (30-547).\n\n  Simile of vine and branches, v. 3.7 (48-1088).\n\n  Simile, Platonic, of drivers of horses, ii. 3.13 (52-1179).\n\n  Simple and not compound is the Supreme, ii. 9.1 (33-599).\n\n  Simple bodies, their existence demands that of world-soul, iv. 7.2\n    (2-57).\n\n  Simple is the soul; composite the body, iv. 7.3 (2-59).\n\n  Simple nothing is, v. 9.3 (5-104).\n\n  Simple, without something simple nothing manifold could exist, ii.\n    4.3 (12-199).\n\n  Simple's existence necessary to that of one, v. 6.3 (24-336).\n\n  Simplification, approach of soul to good, i. 6.6 (1-50).\n\n  Simplification as path to unity, vi. 9.3 (9-152).\n\n  Simplification of ecstasy, super beauty and super virtue, vi. 9.11\n    (9-170).\n\n  Simplicity of principle, insures its freedom of action, vi. 8.4\n    (39-779).\n\n  Simplicity the intelligent, does not deny compositeness, vi. 7.13\n    (38-722).\n\n  Simplicity the intelligible, implies height of source, vi. 7.13\n    (38-722).\n\n  Simultaneity of end and principle in Supreme, v. 8.7 (31-563).\n\n  Simultaneity of everything in the intelligible world, iv. 4.1\n    (28-441).\n\n  Simultaneity of the intelligible permits no memory, iv. 4.1 (28-441).\n\n  Simultaneous giving and receiving by world-soul, iv. 8.7 (6-132).\n\n  Simultaneous of one and many, intelligence contains the infinite as\n    vi. 7.14 (38-725).\n\n  Simultaneous unity and duality of thought, v. 6.1 (24-333).\n\n  Simultaneous within and without is vi. 4.7 (22-295).\n\n  Sin and justice, not destroyed by superficiality of misfortunes, iii.\n    2.16 (47-1067).\n\n  Sister beneficent, is world-soul to our soul, ii. 9.17 (33-633).\n\n  Situation, as Aristotelian category, vi. 1.24 (42-877).\n\n  Slavery of good, accuses Providence, iii. 2.6 (47-1062).\n\n  Socrates, i. 8.7; iii. 2.15; iv. 3.5; ii. 5.2; vi. 2.1; vi. 3.6, 15.\n\n  Socrates (as representative man), v. 1.4 (10-179); v. 7.1 (18-251).\n\n  Solid things, nearest nonentity, iii. 6.6 (26-361).\n\n  Solution of puzzle is that being is everywhere present, vi. 5.3\n    (23-317).\n\n  \"Somewhat,\" a particle to modify, any statement about the supreme,\n    vi. 8.13 (39-797).\n\n  Son, begotten by supreme, report of ecstasy, see pun on \"koros,\" iii.\n    8.11 (30-550); v. 8.12 (31-571).\n\n  Soul, after reaching yonder does not stay; reasons why, vi. 9.10\n    (9-168).\n\n  Soul alone possesses memory, iv. 3.26 (7-432).\n\n  Soul and body consequences of mixture, i. 1.4 (53-1194).\n\n  Soul and body form fusion, iv. 4.18 (28-465).\n\n  Soul and body mixture impossible, i. 1.4 (53-1195).\n\n  Soul and body, primitive relation between, i. 1.3 (53-1194).\n\n  Soul and body, relation between, vi. 3.19 (27-418).\n\n  Soul and intelligence, besides ideas, contained in intelligible\n    world, v. 9.13 (5-116).\n\n  Soul and judgment, passibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350).\n\n  Soul and relation with God and individual, i. 1.8 (53-1200).\n\n  Soul and soul essence, distinction between, i. 1.2 (53-1192).\n\n  Soul and we, the relation between, i. 1.13 (53-1206).\n\n  Soul as divisible and indivisible, iv. 2.2 (21-279).\n\n  Soul as hypostatic actualization of intelligence, v. 1.3 (10-177).\n\n  Soul as number, v. 1.5 (10-180).\n\n  Soul becomes what she remembers, iv. 4.3 (28-445).\n\n  Soul begets her combination, its nature, vi. 7.5 (38-708).\n\n  Soul begets many because incorporeal, iv. 7.4 (8-144).\n\n  Soul being impassable, everything contrary is figurative, iii. 6.2\n    (26-354).\n\n  Soul both divisible and indivisible, iv. 1 (4-100).\n\n  Soul can penetrate body, iv. 7.8 (2-72).\n\n  Soul cannot be corporeal, iv. 7.8 (2-70).\n\n  Soul cannot be entirely dragged down, ii. 9.2 (33-603).\n\n  Soul cannot lose parts, ii. 7.5 (2-63).\n\n  Soul cannot possess evil within herself, i. 8.11 (51-1158).\n\n  Soul capable of extension, vi. 4.1 (22-286).\n\n  Soul celestial of world, iii. 5.3 (50-1128).\n\n  Soul, circular movement of, iv. 4.16 (28-462).\n\n  Soul, combination as mixture or resultant product, i, 1.1 (53-1191).\n\n  Soul conforms destiny to her character, iii. 4.5 (15-238).\n\n  Soul contains body, iv. 8.20 (27-421).\n\n  Soul-difference between individual universal, iv. 3.7 (27-399).\n\n  Soul directed by natural law, ii. 3.8 (52-1173).\n\n  Soul divisible, mixed and double, ii. 3.9 (52-1176).\n\n  Soul does not entirely enter into body, iv. 8.8 (6-132).\n\n  Soul does not even remember herself, iv. 4.2 (28-443).\n\n  Soul double, iii. 3.4 (48-1081); iv. 3.31 (27-438).\n\n  Soul descended into world vestige of, is Daemon, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).\n\n  Soul distraction, sensation is not, iv. 4.25 (28-477); iii. 4.6\n    (15-241).\n\n  Soul divisible, how she divides at death, iv. 1 (4-100).\n\n  Soul entire, fashioned whole and individuals, vi. 5.8 (23-322).\n\n  Soul essence derives from her being, vi. 2.6 (43-900).\n\n  Soul exerts a varied action, iv. 7.4 (2-62).\n\n  Soul feeling implied by sensation, i. 1.6 (53-1198).\n\n  Soul feels passions without experiencing them, iv. 4.19 (28-466).\n\n  Soul gives life to psychologic elements, i. 1.8 (53-1200).\n\n  Soul, good and intelligence related to light, sun and moon, v. 6.4\n    (24-337).\n\n  Soul governs body as pilot the ship, i. 1.3 (53-1194).\n\n  Soul, greatness of, nothing to do with size of body, vi. 4.5 (22-293).\n\n  Soul has double aspect, to body and to intelligence, iv. 8.7 (6-131).\n\n  Soul has no corporeal possibility, hence incorporeal, iv. 7.2 (2-57).\n\n  Soul has to exist in twofold sphere, iv. 8.7 (6-130).\n\n  Soul has various motions, iv. 7.5 (2-62).\n\n  Soul, healthy, can work, iv. 3.4 (27-395).\n\n  Soul, herself, body-user and combination of both, i. 1.1 (53-1191).\n\n  Soul, how can she remain impassible, though given up to emotion, iii.\n    6.1 (26-350).\n\n  Soul, how she comes to know vice, i. 8.9 (51-1155).\n\n  Soul human, as independent principle, iii. 1.8 (3-97).\n\n  Soul human, when in body, has possibilities up or down, iv. 8.7\n    (6-131).\n\n  Soul, if she were corporeal body, would have no sensation, iv. 7.6\n    (2-64).\n\n  Soul, immortal, i. 1.2 (53-1192).\n\n  Soul, impassibility of, iii. 6.1 (26-350).\n\n  Soul imperishable, iv. 7.12 (2-82).\n\n  Soul in body as form is in matter, iv. 3.20 (27-421).\n\n  Soul in body as whole in a part, iv. 3.20 (27-421).\n\n  Soul in the body as light in the air, iv. 3.22 (27-423).\n\n  Soul, individual, born of intelligence, vi. 2.22 (43-929).\n\n  Soul intelligence, good are like light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337).\n\n  Soul, intermediary elemental, also inadmissible, ii. 9.5 (33-607).\n\n  Soul invisible, cause of these emotions, i. 6.5 (1-46).\n\n  Soul is a definite essence, as particular being, vi. 2.5 (43-900).\n\n  Soul is a number, vi. 5.9 (23-324); v. 1.5 (10-180).\n\n  Soul is a simple actualization, whose essence is life, iv. 7.12\n    (2-83).\n\n  Soul is a simple (substance) the man himself, iv. 7.3 (2-59).\n\n  Soul is a whole of distinct divisible and indivisible parts, iv. 3.19\n    (27-419).\n\n  Soul is all things, iii. 4.3 (15-236).\n\n  Soul is artist of the universe, iv. 7.13 (2-84).\n\n  Soul is both being and life, vi. 2.6 (43-901).\n\n  Soul is both punishable and impassible, i. 1.12 (53-1204).\n\n  Soul is double (see Hercules), iv. 3.31 (27-438).\n\n  Soul is everywhere entire, iv. 7.5 (2-63).\n\n  Soul is free by intelligence, which is free by itself, vi. 8.7\n    (39-783).\n\n  Soul is formed governing the body (Aristotle), i. 1.4 (53-1195).\n\n  Soul is formed inseparable from body (Alexander of Aphrodisia), i.\n    1.4 (53-1195).\n\n  Soul is in body as pilot is in ship, iv. 3.21 (27-422); i. 1.3\n    (53-1194).\n\n  Soul is individuality, and is form and workman of body, iv. 7.1\n    (2-57).\n\n  Soul is infinite as comprising many souls, vi. 4.4 (22-296).\n\n  Soul is located, not in body, but body in soul, iv. 3.20 (27-423).\n\n  Soul is matter of intelligence (form), v. 1.3 (10-178).\n\n  Soul is neither harmony nor entelechy, iv. 7.8 (2-74).\n\n  Soul is partly mingled and separated from body, i. 1.3 (53-1193).\n\n  Soul is prior to body, iv. 7.8 (2-74).\n\n  Soul is substantial from one being, simple matter, iv. 7.4 (2-61).\n\n  Soul is the potentiality of producing, not of becoming, ii. 5.3\n    (25-346).\n\n  Soul, its being, iv. 1 (4-100).\n\n  Soul leaving body, leaves trace of life, iv. 4.29 (28-483).\n\n  Soul light forms animal nature, i. 1.7 (53-1198).\n\n  Soul, like divinity, is always one, iv. 3.8 (27-402).\n\n  Soul like face in several mirrors, i. 1.8 (53-1200).\n\n  Soul may be said to come and go, iii. 9.3 (13-223).\n\n  Soul may have two faults, iv. 8.5 (6-128).\n\n  Soul must be one and manifold, even on Stoic hypotheses, iv. 2.2\n    (21-281).\n\n  Soul must be stripped of form to shine in primary nature, vi. 9.7\n    (9-161).\n\n  Soul must first be dissected from body to examine her, vi. 3.1\n    (44-934).\n\n  Soul must fit herself to her part in the scheme, iii. 2.1, 7\n    (47-1071).\n\n  Soul necessary to unify manifold sensations, iv. 7.6 (2-65).\n\n  Soul needed by body for life, iv. 3.19 (27-418).\n\n  Soul not decomposable, iv. 7.1, 4 (2-84).\n\n  Soul not evil by herself but by degeneration, i. 8.4 (51).\n\n  Soul not in body as part in a whole, iv. 3.20 (27-421).\n\n  Soul not in body as quality in a substrate, iii. 9.3 (13-222).\n\n  Soul not in body, but body in soul, iv. 4.15 (28-460).\n\n  Soul not in time, though her actions and reactions are, v. 9.4\n    (5-106).\n\n  Soul not the limit of one ascent, why? v. 9.4 (5-106).\n\n  Soul obeys fate only when evil, iii. 1.10 (47-1060).\n\n  Soul of the unity, proves that of the Supreme, vi. 5.9 (23-323).\n\n  Soul originates movements, but is not altered, iii. 6.3 (26-355).\n\n  Soul power everywhere, localized in special organ, iv. 3.23 (27-424).\n\n  Soul power revealed in simultaneity of control over world, v. 1.2\n    (10-176).\n\n  Soul powers remain the same throughout all changes of body, iv. 3.8\n    (27-402).\n\n  Soul pristine, precious, v. 1.2 (10-176).\n\n  Soul, psychological distinctions in, i. 1.1 (53-1191).\n\n  Soul pure, would remain isolated, iv. 4.23 (28-473).\n\n  Soul puzzle of her being one, yet in all, iv. 3.4 (27-394).\n\n  Soul, rational, if separated what would she remember? iv. 3.27\n    (27-433).\n\n  Soul receives her form from intelligence, iii. 9.5 (15-224).\n\n  Soul related to it might have been darkness, ii. 9.12 (33-625).\n\n  Soul remains incorporeal, vi. 7.31 (38-750).\n\n  Soul rises to the good by scorning all things below, iv. 3.20\n    (27-422).\n\n  Soul said to be in body because body alone is visible, vi. 7.35\n    (38-757).\n\n  Soul scorns even thought, she is intellectualized and ennobled, iv.\n    3.4 (27-395).\n\n  Soul, sick, devoted to her body, iv. 4.1 (28-441).\n\n  Soul, speech in the intelligible world, ii. 9.2 (33-603).\n\n  Soul split into three, intelligible, intermediary and sense-world.\n\n  Soul symbolizes double Hercules, i. 1.13 (53-1206).\n\n  Soul, the two between them, partition the fund of memory, iv. 3.31\n    (27-439).\n\n  Soul, three principles, reason, imagination and sensation, ii. 3.9\n    (52-1175).\n\n  Soul, to which of ours does individuality belong, ii. 9.2 (33-603).\n\n  Soul, triune, one nature for three powers, iv. 9.5 (51-1163).\n\n  Soul unharmed, if her flight from here below is prompt enough, i.\n    7.26 (1-50).\n\n  Soul unity does not resemble reason unity, as it includes plurality,\n    vi. 2.6 (43-901).\n\n  Soul, universal, is everywhere entire, vi. 4.9 (22-300).\n\n  Soul uses the body as tool, i. 1.3 (53-1193).\n\n  Soul unconscious of her higher part, if distracted by sense, iv. 8.8\n    (6-132).\n\n  Soul will not seem entirely within us, if functions are not\n    localized, iv. 3.20 (27-419).\n\n  Soul's action divided by division of time, iv. 4.15 (28-460).\n\n  Soul's activity is triple: thinking, self-preservation and creation,\n    iv. 8.3 (6-125).\n\n  Soul's affection compared to lyre, iii. 6.4 (26-357).\n\n  Souls all are one in the world soul, but are different, iv. 9.1\n    (8-139).\n\n  Souls all have their demon which is their love. iii. 5.4 (50-1129).\n\n  Souls are as immortal as the one from whom they proceed, vi. 4.10\n    (22-301).\n\n  Souls are plural unity of seminal reasons, vi. 2.5 (43-899).\n\n  Souls are united by their highest, vi. 9.15 (38-726).\n\n  Souls as amphibious, iv. 8.4 (6-126).\n\n  Soul's ascension to eligible world, ii. 9.2 (13-222).\n\n  Soul's bodies may be related differently, iv. 4.29 (28-485).\n\n  Souls can reason intuitionally without ratiocination, iv. 3.18\n    (27-417).\n\n  Souls cannot lose parts, iv. 7.5 (2-63).\n\n  Soul's condition in higher regions, iii. 4.6 (15-240).\n\n  Soul conforms destiny to her character, iii. 4.5 (15-238).\n\n  Soul's conformity to universal, proves they are not parts of her, iv.\n    3.2 (27-389).\n\n  Soul's descent into body, iii. 9.3 (13-222).\n\n  Soul's desire, liver seat of, iv. 4.28 (28-480).\n\n  Soul's destiny depends on condition of birth of universe, ii. 3.14\n    (52-1181).\n\n  Souls develop manifoldness as intelligence does, iv. 3.5 (27-396).\n\n  Souls differ as do the sensations, vi. 4.6 (22-294).\n\n  Souls, difference between, iv. 3.8 (27-400).\n\n  Souls, do all form a single one, iv. 9 (8-139).\n\n  Soul's dream is sensation, iii. 6.6 (26-363).\n\n  Souls first go in Heaven in the intelligible world, iv. 3.17 (27-415).\n\n  Souls form a genetic but not numeric unity, iv. 9.1 (8-146).\n\n  Souls that enter into this world generate a love demon, iii. 5.6\n    (50-1132).\n\n  Soul's highest part always remains above body. v. 2.1 (11-194).\n\n  Soul's highest part, even whole, sees vision of intelligible wisdom,\n    v. 8.10 (31-568).\n\n  Souls, how they come to descend, iv. 3.13 (27-410).\n\n  Soul's immortality, iv. 7 (2-56).\n\n  Soul's incarnation is for perfection of universe, iv. 8.5 (6-127).\n\n  Souls incorporeal dwell within intelligence, iv. 3.24 (27-427).\n\n  Souls, individual, are the emanations of the universal, iv. 3.1\n    (27-388).\n\n  Soul's instrument is the body, iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Soul's lower part, in sense world, fashions body, v. 1.10 (10-190).\n\n  Souls may be unified without being identical, iv. 9.2 (8-140).\n\n  Soul's mediation between indivisible and divisible essence, iv. 2\n    (21-279).\n\n  Soul's memory in intelligible world, iv. 4.1 (28-441).\n\n  Soul's mixture of reason and indetermination, iii. 5.7 (50-1133).\n\n  Soul's multiplicity, based on their unity, iv. 9.4 (7-843).\n\n  Soul's nature is intermediate, iv. 8.7 (6-130).\n\n  Souls not isolated from intelligence during descent, iv. 3.12\n    (27-409).\n\n  Souls of stars and incarnate humans govern worlds untroubledly, iv.\n    8.2 (6-123).\n\n  Souls of the second universal rank are men, ii. 3.13 (52-1180).\n\n  Soul's powers differ and thence do not act everywhere, iv. 9.3\n    (8-143).\n\n  Soul's primary and secondary evil, iii. 8.5 (30-538).\n\n  Souls prognosticate but do not cause event, ii. 3.6 (52-1171).\n\n  Soul's purification and separation, iii. 6.5 (26-359).\n\n  Soul's relation to body is that of statue and metal, iv. 7.8 (2-176).\n\n  Soul's relation to intelligence is that of matter to form, v. 1.3\n    (10-178).\n\n  Souls resemble various forms of governments, iv. 4.17 (28-464).\n\n  Souls retain unity and differences, on different levels, iv. 3.5\n    (27-396).\n\n  Soul's separation from body enables her to use the body as tool, i.\n    1.3 (53-1193).\n\n  Souls show kinship to world by fidelity to their own nature, iii. 3.1\n    (48-1077).\n\n  Soul's superior and inferior bodies related in three ways, iv. 4.29\n    (28-485).\n\n  Souls that change their condition alone have memory, iv. 4.6 (28-448).\n\n  Souls united, intelligence shined down from the peak formed by them,\n    vi. 7.15 (38-726).\n\n  Souls united to world-souls by functions, iv. 3.2 (27-392).\n\n  Souls weakened by individual contemplation, iv. 8.4 (6-125).\n\n  Soul's welfare is resemblance to divinity, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Souls, why they take different kinds of bodies, iv. 3.12 (27-410).\n\n  Source, common, by it all things are united, vi. 7.12 (38-721).\n\n  Source, height of, implied by simplicity of the intelligible, vi.\n    7.13 (38-722).\n\n  Sowing of soul in stars and matter, iv. 8.45 (6-127).\n\n  Space, 5.1, 10.\n\n  Space, corporeal, iv. 3.20 (27-420).\n\n  Space has nothing to do with intelligible light, which is\n    non-spatial, v. 5.7 (29-526).\n\n  Space, result of procession of the universal soul, iii. 7.10\n    (45-1006).\n\n  Space said to measure movement because of its determination, iii.\n    7.11 (45-1011).\n\n  Species destroyed by fundamental unity, vi. 2.2 (43-894).\n\n  Spectacle Divine in ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170).\n\n  Spectator of vision becomes participator, v. 8.10 (31-569).\n\n  Speech is a quantity, vi. 3.12 (44-954).\n\n  Speech is a quantity, classification of, vi. 3.12 (44-954).\n\n  Speech of soul in the intelligible world, iv. 4.1 (28-441).\n\n  Spherical figure, intelligible is the primitive one, vi. 6.17\n    (34-675).\n\n  Spindle of fate (significance), ii. 3.9 (52-1174); iii. 4.6 (15-242).\n\n  Spirit and its apportionment, iv. 7.8 (2-69).\n\n  Spirits inanimate, i. 4.7 (2-56).\n\n  Spiritual becomes love, begun physically, vi. 7.33 (38-755).\n\n  Spiritual body, ii. 2.2 (14-231).\n\n  Spiritual gnostic distinction of men, ii. 9.18 (33-637).\n\n  Spiritual men, v. 9.1 (5-102).\n\n  Splendor, last view of revelation, v. 8.10 (31-567).\n\n  Splitting of intelligible principle, ii. 4.5 (12-202).\n\n  Splitting of unity typified by mutilation of Saturn, v. 8.13 (31-573).\n\n  Splitting up of soul at death, iii. 4.6 (15-241).\n\n  Spontaneity not affected by irresponsible, iii. 2.10 (47-1060).\n\n  Stability and essence, distinction between, vi. 2.7 (43-903).\n\n  Stability and movement exist because thought by intelligence, vi. 2.8\n    (43-904).\n\n  Stability another kind of movement, vi. 2.7 (43-903).\n\n  Stability, distinction from, vi. 3.27 (44-980).\n\n  Stability does not imply stillness in the intelligible, vi. 3.27\n    (44-982).\n\n  Stability of essence only accidental, vi. 9.3 (9-153).\n\n  Standard human cannot measure world soul, ii. 9.7 (33-612).\n\n  Star action mingled only affects already natural process, ii. 3.12\n    (52-1166).\n\n  Star-soul and world-soul intellectual differences, iv. 4.17 (28-463).\n\n  Stars affect physical, not essential being, iii. 1.6 (3-95).\n\n  Stars and world-soul are impassable, iv. 4.42 (28-506).\n\n  Stars answer prayers unconsciously, iv. 4.42 (28-505).\n\n  Stars are inexhaustible and need no refreshment, ii. 1.8 (40-827).\n\n  Stars are they animate?\n\n  Stars are they inanimate?\n\n  Stars, as well as sun, may be prayed to, iv. 4.30 (28-486).\n\n  Stars, body or will do not sway earthly events, iv. 4.35 (28-495).\n\n  Stars by their body produce only passions of universe, ii. 3.10\n    (52-1177).\n\n  Stars contain not only fire but earth, ii. 1.6 (40-821).\n\n  Stars do not need memories to answer prayers, iv. 4.42 (28-505).\n\n  Stars follow the universal kind, ii. 3.13 (52-1179).\n\n  Stars have no memory, because uniformly blissful, iv. 4.42 (28-505).\n\n  Stars influence is from contemplation of intelligible world, iv. 4.35\n    (28-496).\n\n  Stars motion compared to a prearranged dance, iv. 4.33 (28-492).\n\n  Stars natural radiation of good, explains their influence, iv. 4.35\n    (28-497).\n\n  Stars predict because of soul's accidents, ii. 3.10 (52-1177).\n\n  Stars serve as letters in which to read nature, iii. 1.6 (3-95).\n\n  Stars, souls govern worlds untroubled by, iv. 8.2 (6-123).\n\n  Stars sway general but not detailed fate, iv. 4.31 (28-487).\n\n  Stars, what is and what is not produced by them, ii. 3.13 (52-1178).\n\n  Statue, art makes out of rough marble, v. 8.1 (31-551).\n\n  Statue, composite of form and matter, v. 9.3 (5-504).\n\n  Statue, essential beings as statues, v. 8.4 (31-558).\n\n  Statue, heating of statue by metal only indirect, vi. 1.21 (42-874).\n\n  Statue, justice as self born intellectual statue, vi. 6 (34-653).\n\n  Statue, metal is not potentiality of statue, ii. 5.1 (25-342).\n\n  Statue, purified cleans within herself divine statues, v. 7.10 (2-81).\n\n  Statue, shining in front rank is unity, v. 1.6 (10-182).\n\n  Statue, soul is to body as metal is to statue, iv. 7.8 (2-76).\n\n  Statues at entrance of temples left behind, vi. 9.9 (9-170).\n\n  Statues of palace of divinity, vi. 7.35 (38-758).\n\n  Sterility of nature indicated by castration, iii. 6.19 (26-385).\n\n  Still, why the heavens do not remain, ii. 9.1 (40-814).\n\n  Stillness, not implied by stability in the intelligible, vi. 3.27\n    (44-980).\n\n  Stoic explanation of beauty, symmetry, opposed, i. 6.1 (1-41).\n\n  Stoic four categories evaporate, leaving matter as basis, vi. 1.29\n    (42-886).\n\n  Stoic God is only modified matter, vi. 1.27 (45-881).\n\n  Stoic relation category confuses new with anterior, vi. 1.31 (42-888).\n\n  Stoics, v. 9.4 (5-106).\n\n  Stoics' fault is to have taken sensation as their guide, vi. 1.28\n    (42-884).\n\n  Stones growing while in earth, iv. 4.27 (28-479); vi. 7.11 (38-718).\n\n  Straight line represents sensation, while the soul is like a circle,\n    v. 1.7 (10-184).\n\n  Straight movement, vi. 4.2 (22-288); ii. 2.12 (14-231).\n\n  Studied world must be just as one would analyze the voice, vi. 3.1\n    (44-933).\n\n  Study of time makes us descend from the intelligible, iii. 7.6\n    (45-995).\n\n  Sub-conscious nature hinders dominance of better-self, iii. 3.4\n    (48-1081).\n\n  Subdivision infinite of bodies, leads to destruction, iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  Subject, one's notion does not come from subject itself, vi. 6.13\n    (34-663).\n\n  Sublunar sphere, immortality does not extend to it, ii. 1.5 (40-820).\n\n  Sublunary divinities, crimes should not be attributed to, iv. 4.31\n    (28-489).\n\n  Substance as Stoic category would be split up, vi. 1.25 (42-878).\n\n  Substantial act or habitation is hypostasis, vi. 1.6 (42-845).\n\n  Substrate, iii. 3.6 (48-1087).\n\n  Substrate and residence of forms, is matter, ii. 4.1 (12-197).\n\n  Substrate demanded by process of elements, ii. 4.6 (12-203).\n\n  Substrate needed by composition of the body, ii. 4.11 (12-209).\n\n  Substrate not common to all elements, being indeterminate, ii. 4.13\n    (12-213).\n\n  Subsumed under being in essence not everything can, vi. 2.2 (43-893).\n\n  Successive enumeration inevitable in describing the eternal, iv. 8.6\n    (6-129).\n\n  Succumb to the law of the universe, why many souls do, iv. 3.15\n    (27-413).\n\n  Suchness, ii. 7.2 (37-701). (Whatness.)\n\n  Suchness later than being and quiddity, ii. 6.2 (17-248).\n\n  Suffering and action cannot be separate categories, vi. 1.17 (42-866).\n\n  Suffering of most men physical, virtuous man suffers least because\n    most suffering is physical, i. 4.13 (46-1036).\n\n  Suffering part of virtuous man is the higher, i. 4.13 (46-1036).\n\n  Suggestive is influence of reason, i. 2.5 (19-264).\n\n  Suicide, i. 9 (16-243).\n\n  Suicide breaks up the appointed time of life, i. 9 (16-244).\n\n  Suicide unavailable even to avoid insanity, i. 9 (16-244).\n\n  Suitability and opportunity, cause of, puts them beyond chance, vi.\n    8.18 (39-806).\n\n  Sun and ray, simile of, v. 5.7 (32-587); v. 3.9 (49-1105).\n\n  Sun as well as stars, may be prayed to, iv. 4.30 (28-486).\n\n  Sunlight exists everywhere, vi. 4.7 (22-296).\n\n  Sunrise only image for divine approach, v. 5.8 (32-588).\n\n  Superabundance, manner in which all things issue from one, v. 2.1\n    (11-194).\n\n  Super-beauty and super-virtue, vi. 9.11 (9-170).\n\n  Super-beauty of the Supreme, v. 8.8 (31-564).\n\n  Super-being achieved in ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-170).\n\n  Super-essential principle does not think, v. 6.1 (24-333).\n\n  Super-essentiality and super-existence of Supreme, v. 3.17 (49-1119).\n\n  Super-existence and super-essentiality of Supreme, v. 3.17 (49-1119);\n    v. 4.2 (7-137).\n\n  Super-existence of first principle, vi. 7.38 (38-763).\n\n  Super-form is uniform unity, vi. 9.3 (9-152).\n\n  Super-goodness is Supreme, vi. 9.6 (9-160).\n\n  Superior principle not always utilized, i. 1.10 (53-1203).\n\n  Superior would be needed if the good thought, vi. 7.40 (38-767).\n\n  Super-liberty may be attributed to intelligence, vi. 8.6 (39-782).\n\n  Super-master of himself is the Supreme, vi. 8.10 (39-790).\n\n  Super-rest, super-motion, super-thought is the one\n    super-consciousness and super-life, iii. 9.7, 9 (13-226).\n\n  Super-virtue, soul meets absolute beauty, vi. 9.11 (9-170).\n\n  Supra active, the good is, as supra-cogitative, v. 6.6 (24-338).\n\n  Supra cogitative, the good as, is also supra-active, v. 6.6 (24-338).\n\n  Supra-thinking principle does not think, necessary to working of\n    intelligence, v. 6.2 (24-334).\n\n  Supremacy is the cause of the good, vi. 7.23 (38-739).\n\n  Supremacy of good implies its supremacy over all its possessions, v.\n    5.13 (32-595).\n\n  Supreme admits of no reasoning, demonstration, faith or cause, v. 8.7\n    (31-563).\n\n  Supreme, all language about it is metaphorical, vi. 8.13 (39-795).\n\n  Supreme as a spring of water, iii. 8.10 (30-547).\n\n  Supreme as being as being and essence, v. 3.17 (49-1119); v. 9.2\n    (7-149); v. 4.2 (7-138); v. 5.5 (32-584); v. 5.5 (32-585).\n\n  Supreme, assisted by intelligence would have no room for chance, vi.\n    8.17 (39-804).\n\n  Supreme banishes all chance, vi. 8.10 (39-789).\n\n  Supreme being not produced by chance, vi. 8.11 (39-793).\n\n  Supreme beyond chance because of suitability, vi. 8.17 (39-806).\n\n  Supreme can be approached sufficiently to be spoken of, v. 3.14\n    (49-1114).\n\n  Supreme can be attributed contingence only under new definition, vi.\n    8.9 (39-787).\n\n  Supreme can be attributed physical qualities only by analogy, vi. 8.8\n    (39-785).\n\n  Supreme cannot aspire higher, being super-goodness, vi. 9.6 (9-159).\n\n  Supreme commands himself, vi. 8.20 (39-809).\n\n  Supreme consists with himself, vi. 8.15 (39-800).\n\n  Supreme could not be called chance by any one who had seen him, vi.\n    8.19 (39-807).\n\n  Supreme, every term should be limited by some what or higher, vi.\n    8.13 (39-797).\n\n  Supreme formlessness shown by approaching soul's rejection of form,\n    vi. 7.34 (38-756).\n\n  Supreme inevitable for intelligence that is intelligible, iii. 8.9\n    (30-544).\n\n  Supreme intelligence is king of kings, v. 15.3 (32-580).\n\n  Supreme intelligence, nature of, i. 8.2. (51-1144).\n\n  Supreme is both being and whyness, ii. 7.2 (37-707).\n\n  Supreme is entirely one, does not explain origin of manifold, v. 9.14\n    (5-116).\n\n  Supreme is essential beauty, the shapeless shaper and the\n    transcendent, vi. 7.33 (38-754).\n\n  Supreme is everywhere and nowhere, is inclination and imminence, vi.\n    8.16 (39-801).\n\n  Supreme is ineffable, v. 3.13 (49-1113).\n\n  Supreme is limitless, v. 7.32 (38-753).\n\n  Supreme is potentiality of all things, above all actualization, iii.\n    8.10 (30-546).\n\n  Supreme is super-being, because not dependent on it, vi. 8.19\n    (39-807).\n\n  Supreme is the good, because of its supremacy, vi. 7.23 (38-739).\n\n  Supreme is the power, really master of himself, vi. 8.9 (39-788); vi.\n    8.10 (39-790).\n\n  Supreme is will being and actualization, vi. 8.13 (39-795).\n\n  Supreme must be free, as chance is escaped by interior isolation, vi.\n    8.13 (39-795); vi. 8.15 (39-800).\n\n  Supreme must be simple and not compound, ii. 9.1 (33-599).\n\n  Supreme named Apollo, v. 5.6 (32-584).\n\n  Supreme not intelligence that aspires to form of good, iii. 8.10\n    (30-548).\n\n  Supreme of three ranks of existence is the beautiful, vi. 7.42\n    (38-770).\n\n  Supreme one only figuratively, vi. 9.5 (9-157).\n\n  Supreme principles must then be unity, intelligence and soul, ii. 9.1\n    (33-600).\n\n  Supreme, proven by the unity of the soul, vi. 5.9 (23-323).\n\n  Supreme super-master of himself, vi. 8.12 (39-793).\n\n  Supreme unity adjusts all lower group unities, vi. 6.11 (34-660).\n\n  Supreme would wish to be what he is, is such as he would wish to be,\n    vi. 8.13 (39-796); vi. 8.15 (39-800).\n\n  Swine, simile of the impure, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Sympathy between individual and universal soul due to common origin,\n    iv. 3.8 (48-1088); v. 8.12 (31-571).\n\n  Syllables a quantity, vi. 3.12 (44-954).\n\n  Symmetry, earthly, contemplates universal symmetry, v. 9.11 (5-114).\n\n  Symmetry, Stoic definition of beauty, opposed, i. 6.1 (1-41).\n\n  Sympathetic harmony, earth feels and directs by it, iv. 4.26 (28-477).\n\n  Sympathy, cosmic, ii. 1.7 (40-824).\n\n  Sympathy, does not force identity of sensation, iv. 9.3 (8-142).\n\n  Sympathy implies unity of all beings in lower magic enchantment, iv.\n    9.3 (8-152).\n\n  Sympathy, love working as, effects magic, iv. 4.40 (28-503).\n\n  Sympathy of soul and body, iv. 4.23 (28-473).\n\n  Sympathy of soul's highest self, basis of memory, iv. 6.3 (41-832).\n\n  Sympathy or community of affection, Stoic, iv. 7.3 (2-59).\n\n  System, co-existence of unity and multiplicity, demands organization\n    in, vi. 7.10 (38-716).\n\n\n  Taming of body, i. 4.14 (46-1037).\n\n  Theology revealed by astrology, ii. 3.7 (52-1172).\n\n  Telescoping, of intelligible entities, v. 9.10 (5-113).\n\n  Temperament of corporeal principles, is health, iv. 7.8 (2-71).\n\n  Temperament, soul as mixture, iv. 7.2 (2-58).\n\n  Temperance, gate of ecstasy, i. 6.9 (1-53).\n\n  Temperance interpreted as purification, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Temperance is not real category, vi. 2.18 (43-923).\n\n  Temperate man is good's independence from pleasure, vi. 7.29 (38-747).\n\n  Temples of divinity, explained by psychology, iv. 3.1 (27-387).\n\n  Temporal conceptions implied by priority of order, iv. 4.16 (28-461).\n\n  Tending towards the good, all things tend towards the one, vi. 2.12\n    (43-914).\n\n  Tension, Stoic, iv. 7.13 (2-83); iv. 5.4 (29-522).\n\n  Terrestrial things do not last so long as celestial ones, ii. 1.5\n    (40-819).\n\n  Testimony, to its creator by world, iii. 2.3 (47-1047).\n\n  The living animal, i. 1.5 (53-1126).\n\n  Theodore, from P1ato's Theatetus, i. 8.6 (51-1150).\n\n  Theodore of Asine, his infra celestial vault (invisible place), v.\n    8.10 (31-567); ii. 4.1 (12-198).\n\n  Theory of happiness consisting in reasonable life, i. 4.2 (46-1022).\n\n  Thing in itself, differs from nonentity, ii. 4.10 (12-207).\n\n  Thing in itself, qualityless, found by abstraction, ii. 4.10 (12-207).\n\n  Things good is their form, vi. 7.27 (38-744).\n\n  Think, body cannot, iv. 7.8 (2-68).\n\n  Thinking in conformity with intelligence, two ways, v. 3.4 (49-1094).\n\n  Thinking is perception without help of the body, iv. 7.8 (2-68).\n\n  Thinking ourselves, is thinking an intellectual nature, iii. 9.6\n    (13-224).\n\n  Thinking principle, the first, is the general second, v. 6.2 (24-335).\n\n  Thinking principles--which is the first, and which is the second? v.\n    6.1 (24-335).\n\n  Third principle is soul, iii. 9.1 (13-221).\n\n  Third rank of existence should not be occupied by modality, vi. 1.30\n    (42-887).\n\n  Thought and life, different grades of, iii. 8.7 (30-540).\n\n  Thought actualization of light, v. 1.5 (10-181).\n\n  Thought as first actualization of a hypostasis is not in first\n    principle, vi 7.40 (38-766).\n\n  Thought as touch of the good leads to ecstasy, vi. 7.36 (38-760).\n\n  Thought below one and Supreme, iii. 9.7, 9 (13-226).\n\n  Thought beneath the super essential principle, v. 6 (24-339).\n\n  Thought distracted from by sensation, iv. 8.8 (6-132).\n\n  Thought implies simultaneous unity and duality, v. 6.1 (24-333).\n\n  Thought in first principle would imply attributes, and that\n    manifoldness, v. 6.2 (24-336).\n\n  Thought is actualized intelligence, v. 3.5 (49-1097).\n\n  Thought is beneath the first so intelligence implies the latter, v.\n    6.5 (24-338); v. 6.2, 6 (24-339).\n\n  Thought is inspiration for good, v. 6.5 (24-338).\n\n  Thought is integral part of intelligence, v. 5.2 (32-579).\n\n  Thought is seeing the intelligible, v. 4.2 (7-138).\n\n  Thought is the form; shape the actualization of being, v. 9.8 (5-111).\n\n  Thought, life and existence, contained in primary existence, v. 6.6\n    (24-339).\n\n  Thought made impossible only by the first principle being one\n    exclusively, v. 6.3 (24-335).\n\n  Thought, one with sight, v. 1.5 (10-181).\n\n  Thought, self direction of, is not changeableness, iv. 4.2 (28-444).\n\n  Thought, the means by which intelligence passes from unity to\n    duality, v. 6.1 (24-333).\n\n  Thoughts, conceptive, demand intermediary sensation, iv. 4.23\n    (28-472).\n\n  Thoughts, contrary to rights, possess real existence, iii. 5.7\n    (50-1136).\n\n  Thoughts, highest, have incorporeal objects, iv. 7.8 (2-68).\n\n  Three kinds of men, v. 9.1 (5-102).\n\n  Three men in each of us, vi. 7.6 (38-708).\n\n  Three principles, v. 6.2 (24-334 to 337); v. 1.10 (10-189).\n\n  Three ranks of existence, vi. 4.11 (22-302); v. 1.10 (10-189); v.\n    6.2 (24-335); iii. 3.3 (48-1077); iii. 5.9 (50-1138); vi. 1.30\n    (43-887); vi. 7.6 (38-708).\n\n  Three spheres, v. 1.8 (10-186).\n\n  Threefold activity of soul, thought, self-preservation and creation,\n    iv. 8.3 (6-125).\n\n  Time and eternity, iii. 7 (45-985).\n\n  Time arose as measurement of the activity of the universal soul, iii.\n    7.10 (45-1005).\n\n  Time as motion, errors in, iii. 7.1 (45-987).\n\n  Time becomes, iii. 7, int. (45-985).\n\n  Time can be increased, why not happiness, i. 5.7 (36-687).\n\n  Time cannot be divided without implying soul's action, iv. 4.15\n    (28-460).\n\n  Time, considered as motion, as moveable or as something of motion,\n    iii. 7.6 (45-996).\n\n  Time, if it is a quantity, why a separate category? vi. 1.13 (42-861).\n\n  Time included action and reaction of soul, not soul itself, iv. 4.15\n    (28-460).\n\n  Time is also within us, iii. 7.12 (45-1014).\n\n  Time is as interior to the soul as eternity is to existence, iii.\n    7.10 (45-1008).\n\n  Time is measured by movement and is measure of movement, iii. 7.12\n    (45-1011).\n\n  Time is no interval of movement (Stoic Zeno), iii. 7.7 (45-999).\n\n  Time is not a numbered number (Aristotle), iii. 7.8 (45-1000).\n\n  Time is not a quantity, vi. 1.5 (42-844).\n\n  Time is not an accident or consequence of movement, iii. 7.9\n    (45-1004).\n\n  Time is not begotten by movement but only indicated thereby, iii.\n    7.11 (45-1009).\n\n  Time is not motion and rest (Strato), iii. 7.7 (45-1000).\n\n  Time is not movement, iii. 7.7 (45-997).\n\n  Time is not the number and measure of movement (Aristotle), iii. 7.8\n    (45-1000).\n\n  Time is present everywhere, as against Antiphanes and Critolaus, iii.\n    7.12 (45-1013).\n\n  Time is the length of the life of the universal soul, iii. 7.11\n    (45-1008).\n\n  Time is the life of the soul, considered in the movement by which she\n    passes from one actualization to another, iii. 7.10 (45-1005).\n\n  Time is the model of its image eternity, iii. 7 int. (45-985).\n\n  Time is the universe, iii. 7.1 (45-986).\n\n  Time is to the world-soul, what eternity is to intelligence, iii.\n    7.10 (45-1007).\n\n  Time joined to actions to make them perfect, vi. 1.19 (42-868).\n\n  Time must be studied comparatively among the philosophers, iii. 7.6\n    (45-996).\n\n  Time none, only a single day for world-souls, iv. 4.7 (28-450).\n\n  Time or place do not figure among the categories, vi. 2.16 (43-919).\n\n  Time, Plato uncertain about it, iii. 7.12 (45-1012).\n\n  Time replaced by eternity in intelligible world, v. 9.10 (5-113).\n\n  Time's nature will be revealed by its birth, iii. 7.10 (45-1005).\n\n  Toleration by soul, without guilt, iii. 1.8 (3-97).\n\n  Tomb of soul is body, iv. 8.1, 4 (6-126).\n\n  Tool, body uses the soul as, i. 1.2 (55-1194); iv. 7.1 (2-57).\n\n  Tools are intermediate, like sense shape, iv. 4.23 (28-473).\n\n  Torments of hell are reformatory, iv. 4.45 (28-448).\n\n  Total reason of universe, ii. 3.13 (52-1179).\n\n  Touch, the good is a simple perception of itself, vi. 7.39 (38-764).\n\n  Touched with the good is the greatest of sciences, vi. 7.36 (38-760).\n\n  Trace of life, left by soul when leaving body, iv. 4.29 (28-483).\n\n  Trace of the One, is the being of souls, v. v. 5 (32-583).\n\n  Traditions of divinity contained by the world, ii. 9.9 (33-616).\n\n  Training and education, memory needs, iv. 6.3 (41-835).\n\n  Training here below help souls to remember when beyond, iv. 4.5\n    (28-448).\n\n  Training of interior vision, i. 6.9 (1-53).\n\n  Trance of ecstasy, vi. 9.11 (9-169).\n\n  Transcendence of good over intelligence and life, v. 3.16 (49-1117).\n\n  Transcendent, v. 3 (49-1090).\n\n  Transcendent shapeless shaper and essential beauty is supreme, vi.\n    7.33 (38-754).\n\n  Transcending unity demanded by contemplation of intelligence, v. 3.10\n    (49-1106).\n\n  Transition of sense-beauty to intellectual, i. 6.3 (1-45).\n\n  Transmigration, animals into animals, plants, birds, eagles and\n    soaring birds and bee, iii. 4.2 (15-235).\n\n  Transmigration, two kinds, into human or animal bodies, iv. 3.9\n    (27-403).\n\n  Transmission, reception, relation underlies action and experience,\n    vi. 1.22 (42-874).\n\n  Transparency of everything in intelligible world, v. 8.4 (31-558).\n\n  Trap on way to ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-569).\n\n  Traverse heaven, without leaving rest (celestial divinities), v. 8.3\n    (31-556).\n\n  Tree of the universe, simile of, iii. 8.10 (30-547).\n\n  Triad is limit of differentiation, ii. 9.2 (33-602).\n\n  Triangles equal to two, iii. 5.7 (50-1136).\n\n  Triangles, material and immaterial, explain trine relations, vi. 5.11\n    (23-330).\n\n  Trinity, compared to light, sun and moon, i. 8.2 (51-1144); vi. 7.6\n    (38-708); vi. 7.7 (38-711); iv. 8.4 (6-125); vi. 7.42 (38-770); vi.\n    2.8 (43-905); iv. 7.13 (2-84); iii. 4.2 (15-234).\n\n  Triune, v. 6.4 (24-337).\n\n  Triune, soul, one nature in three powers, ii. 3.4 (52); v. 1\n    (10-173); ii. 9.2 (33-602).\n\n  Triune play implies also identity and difference, vi. 2.8 (43-905).\n\n  True good, implies counterfeit, vi. 7.26 (38-743).\n\n  Truth external to intelligence, a theory that destroys intelligence,\n    v. 5.1 (32-576).\n\n  Truth, field of, intelligence evolves, vi. 7.13 (38-723).\n\n  Truth self-probative; nothing truer, v. 5.2 (32-579).\n\n  Two-fold soul exerts two-fold providence, iv. 8.2 (6-122).\n\n  Two-fold sphere in which soul has to exist, iv. 8.7 (6-130).\n\n  Two, not addition to one, but a change, vi. 6.14 (34-666).\n\n  Ugliness, aversion for, explains love for beauty, i. 6.5 (1-47).\n\n  Ugliness consists of formlessness, i. 6.2 (1-43).\n\n  Ugliness is a foreign accretion, i. 6.5 (1-48).\n\n  Ugliness is form's failure to dominate matter, i. 8.9 (51-1156).\n\n  Ugliness is predominance of matter, v. 7.2 (18-253).\n\n  Ugliness of men due to lowering themselves to lower natures, and\n    ignoring themselves, v. 8.13 (31-574).\n\n  Ulysses, i. 6.8 (1-52).\n\n  Unalloyed is no evil for the living people, i. 7.3 (54-1210).\n\n  Unattached, condition o wise man, i. 4.1, 7 (46-1029).\n\n  Unavoidable and universal evils are, i. 8.6 (51-1149).\n\n  Uncertainty in location of good and beauty, i. 6.9 (1-53).\n\n  Unchangeableness of form and matter, iii. 6.10 (26-368).\n\n  Unconsciously do stars answer prayers, iv. 4.4 (28-505); iv. 4.2\n    (28-505).\n\n  Unconsciousness does not hinder virtue, handsomeness or health, i.\n    4.9 (46-1033).\n\n  Unconsciousness of oneself in ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Unconsciousness of soul intelligence and one does not detract from\n    their existence, v. 1.12 (10-191).\n\n  Undefinability of unity (referred to by feelings), vi. 9.3 (9-151).\n\n  Understand and fit yourself to the world instead of complaining of\n    it, ii. 9.13 (33-625).\n\n  Undisturbed is the world-soul by the things of sense, iv. 8.7 (6-131).\n\n  Unhappiness increased by duration, why not happiness? i. 5.6 (36-686).\n\n  Unharmed is the soul by incarnation, if prompt in flight, iv. 8.5\n    (6-128).\n\n  Unification does not reveal true knowledge, ii. 9.9 (33-617).\n\n  Unification process, v. 1.5 (10-180); v. 5.4 (32-581).\n\n  Unification with divinity result of ecstasy, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Uniform action, exerted by body, iv. 7.4 (2-62).\n\n  Uniform in itself is unity and super-form, vi. 9.3 (9-152).\n\n  Unincarnate souls govern world untroubledly, iv. 8.2 (6-123).\n\n  Unique (Monad), v. 5.4 (32-581); v. 5.13 (32-595).\n\n  Unissued brothers of Jupiter, vi. 8.12 (31-572).\n\n  Unitary are intelligibles, but not absolute unity, vi. 5.4 (32-581).\n\n  Unitary is consciousness, though containing thinker, ii. 9.1 (33-601).\n\n  Unitary number, vi. 6.9 (34-656).\n\n  United are all things by a common source, vi. 7.12 (38-721).\n\n  United are souls, by their highest, vi. 7.15 (38-726).\n\n  United souls, intelligence shines down from the peak formed by them,\n    vi. 7.15 (38-726).\n\n  Unities, different kinds of, v. 5.4 (32-582).\n\n  Uniting of highest parts of men in intelligible, vi. 5.10 (23-327).\n\n  Uniting of intelligence, as it rises to the intelligible, iv. 4.1\n    (28-442).\n\n  Uniting soul and body forms individual aggregate, i. 1.6 (53-1197).\n\n  Unity, v. 1.6 (10-182); v. 5.4 (32-581).\n\n  Unity above all; intelligence and essence. vi. 9.2 (9-149).\n\n  Unity absolute, is first, while intelligence is not, vi. 9.2 (9-150).\n\n  Unity, abstruse, because soul has repugnances to such researches, vi.\n    9.3 (9-151).\n\n  Unity an accident amongst sense things, something more in the\n    intelligible, vi. 6.14 (34-666).\n\n  Unity and essence, genuine relations between, vi. 2.11 (43-911).\n\n  Unity and number precede the one and many beings, vi. 6.10 (34-659).\n\n  Unity as indivisible and infinite, vi. 9.6 (9-158).\n\n  Unity is the self-uniform and formless super form, vi. 9.3 (9-152).\n\n  Unity, by it all things depend on the good, i. 7.2 (54-1209).\n\n  Unity, by thinking intelligence passes to duality, v. 6.1 (24-333).\n\n  Unity, co-existence of, demands organization in system, vi. 7.10\n    (38-716).\n\n  Unity, contained in sense objects, is not unity itself, vi. 6.16\n    (34-671).\n\n  Unity, contemplation in nature, iii. 8 (30-531).\n\n  Unity does not even need itself, vi. 9.6 (9-159).\n\n  Unity, everything tends toward it as it tends toward the good, vi.\n    2.12 (43-914).\n\n  Unity, fundamental of genera, would destroy species, vi. 2.2 (43-894).\n\n  Unity, greater in intelligible than in physical world, vi. 5.10\n    (23-327).\n\n  Unity, if passed into the manifold, would destroy universe, iii. 8.10\n    (30-547).\n\n  Unity, imparted by soul is not pure, vi. 9.1 (9-147).\n\n  Unity, incomprehensible, vi. 9.4 (9-154).\n\n  Unity in manifoldness, vi. 5.6 (23-320).\n\n  Unity into plurality split by numbers, vi. 6.9 (34-656).\n\n  Unity is in the manifold by a manner of existence, vi. 4.8 (22-296).\n\n  Unity is intelligible, though participated in by sense-objects, vi.\n    6.13 (34-664).\n\n  Unity is not intelligence, its manifold produced by a unity, iv. 4.1\n    (28-443).\n\n  Unity, lack of, causes corporeity to be nonentity, iii. 6.6 (26-362).\n\n  Unity, multiple, radiation of, v. 3.15 (49-1115).\n\n  Unity must be sought for in essence, vi. 5.1 (23-342).\n\n  Unity must exist in the intelligible before being applied to mutable\n    beings, vi. 6.11 (34-659).\n\n  Unity necessary to existence of all beings, especially collective\n    nouns, vi. 9.1 (9-147).\n\n  Unity not category, are arguments against, vi. 2.10 (43-910).\n\n  Unity not mere numbering, but existence, vi. 9.2 (9-149).\n\n  Unity not synonymous with essence, vi. 2.9 (43-908).\n\n  Unity of apperception, iv. 4.1 (28-442).\n\n  Unity of being does not exclude unity of other beings, vi. 4.4\n    (22-290).\n\n  Unity of reason constituted by contained contraries, iii. 2.16\n    (47-1069).\n\n  Unity of soul, does not resemble reason unity because it includes\n    plurality, vi. 2.6 (43-901).\n\n  Unity of soul not effected by plurality of powers, iv. 9.4 (8-143).\n\n  Unity of soul retained on different levels, iv. 3.5 (27-396).\n\n  Unity of souls based on their multiplicity, iv. 9.4 (8-143).\n\n  Unity of Supreme entailed by its being a principle, v. 4.1 (7-134).\n\n  Unity of Supreme only figurative, vi. 9.5 (9-157).\n\n  Unity of the soul proves that of the Supreme, vi. 5.9 (23-323).\n\n  Unity of will, being an actualization, is the Supreme, vi. 8.13\n    (39-795).\n\n  Unity only for its examination are its parts apart, vi. 2.3 (43-897).\n\n  Unity passing into manifold would destroy universe, iii. 8.10\n    (30-547).\n\n  Unity reigns still more in the good, vi. 2.11 (43-912).\n\n  Unity self-sufficient, needing no establishment, vi, 9.6 (9-159).\n\n  Unity indefinable, referred to by feeling, vi. 9.3 (9-154).\n\n  Unity, why world proceeded from it, v. 2.1 (11-193).\n\n  Unity's form is principle of numbers, v. 5.5 (32-583).\n\n  Universal and unavoidable evils are, i. 8.6 (51-1149).\n\n  Universal being, description of, vi. 4.2 (22-286).\n\n  Universal being is indivisible, vi. 4.3 (22-288).\n\n  Universal being, stars followers of, ii. 3.13 (52-1179).\n\n  Universal, second rank, souls of men, ii. 3.13 (52-1180).\n\n  Universal soul, first actualization of essence and intelligence, v.\n    2.2 (11-194).\n\n  Universal soul is everywhere entire, vi. 4.9 (22-300).\n\n  Universal soul may not be judged by human standards, ii. 9.7 (33-611).\n\n  Universal soul's motion, immortalized heaven, ii. 1.4 (40-817).\n\n  Universality of creator overcame all obstacles, v. 8.7 (31-562).\n\n  Universe, ii. 1 (40-813).\n\n  Universe and deity if include separable soul, ii. 3.9 (52-1176).\n\n  Universe animated by world-soul, iv. 3.9 (27-404).\n\n  Universe as a single harmony, ii. 3.5 (52-1170).\n\n  Universe, birth of, destiny of souls depend on, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).\n\n  Universe depends on single principle, ii. 3.7 (52-1117).\n\n  Universe, diagram of, iv. 4.16 (28-462).\n\n  Universe, hierarchical constitution, vi. 2.2 (43-892).\n\n  Universe is harmony in spite of the faults in the details, ii. 3.16\n    (52-1185).\n\n  Universe like light, sun and moon, v. 6.4 (24-337).\n\n  Universe moves in circle, and stands still simultaneously, ii. 2.3\n    (14-230).\n\n  Universe, nothing in it inanimate, iv. 4.36 (28-499).\n\n  Universe passions produced by body of stars, ii. 3.13 (52-1178).\n\n  Universe, perfection of, evils are necessary, ii. 3.18 (52-1187).\n\n  Universe picture, that pictures itself, ii. 3.18 (52-1188).\n\n  Universe, plan of, is from eternity, Providence, vi. 8.17 (39-803).\n\n  Universe specialized, organ of, every being is, iv. 4.45 (28-510).\n\n  Universe would be destroyed if unity passed into the manifold, iii.\n    8.10 (30-547).\n\n  Universe's influence should be partial only, iv. 4.34 (28-494).\n\n  Universe's total reason, ii. 3.13 (52-1178).\n\n  Unjust acts unastrological theory blame divine reason, iii. 2.10\n    (47-1059).\n\n  Unmeasured, is intelligible number infinite, vi. 6.18 (34-676).\n\n  Unnoticed are many new things, iv. 4.8 (28-450).\n\n  Unreflective identification not as high as memory, iv. 4.4 (28-445).\n\n  Unseen is beauty in supreme fusion, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Uranus, see Kronos, iii. 5.2 (50-1127).\n\n  Uranus (Coleus), v. 8.13 (31-573).\n\n  Utility not the only deciding factor with the senses, iv. 4.24\n    (28-475).\n\n  Utilized, superior principle not always, i. 1.10 (53-1203).\n\n\n  Varied action, exerted by soul, iv. 7.4 (2-62).\n\n  Variety may depend on latency of part of seminal reason, v. 7.1\n    (18-253).\n\n  Variety of world-soul's life makes variety of time, iii. 7.10\n    (45-1005).\n\n  Vase for form, see residence, see jar, iv. 3.20 (27-420).\n\n  Vase is the body, iv. 3.7 (27-399).\n\n  Vase of creation of Timaeus, iv. 3.7 (27-399).\n\n  Vault, Theodore of Asine's infra celestial, ii. 4.1 (12-198); v. 8.10\n    (31-567).\n\n  Vegetables not irrational and rooted in the intelligible, vi. 7.11\n    (38-717).\n\n  Venus, iv. 3.14 (27-412); iii. 5.18 (50-1136); ii. 3.5, 6 (52-1170).\n\n  Venus as subordinate nature of world-soul, v. 8.13 (31-573).\n\n  Venus beauty, whence it came, v. 8.2 (31-553).\n\n  Venus is world-soul, iii. 5.5 (50-1131).\n\n  Venus, Jupiter and Mercury also considered astrologically, ii. 3.5\n    (52-1170).\n\n  Venus, mother of Eros, iii. 5.2 (50-1125).\n\n  Venus, or the soul is the individual of Jupiter, iii. 5.8 (50-1137).\n\n  Venus Urania, vi. 9.9 (9-167).\n\n  Vesta, pun on, represents intelligence, v. 5.5 (32-583).\n\n  Vesta represents earth, iv. 4.27 (28-480).\n\n  Vestige of soul descended into world is demon, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).\n\n  Vice as disharmony, iii. 6.2 (26-352).\n\n  Vice caused by external circumstances, i. 8.8 (51-1154); ii. 3.8\n    (52-1174); iii. 1 (3-86); vi. 8 (39-773).\n\n  Vice, how soul comes to know it, i. 8.9 (51-1155).\n\n  Vice is deprivation in soul, i. 8.11 (51-1157).\n\n  Vice not absolute but derived evil, i. 8.8 (51-1155).\n\n  Vices, intemperance and cowardliness comes from matter, i. 8.4\n    (51-1147).\n\n  Victory over self is mastery of fate, ii. 3.15 (52-1182).\n\n  Vindication, God's justice by philosophy, iv. 4.30 (28-487).\n\n  Vine and branches, simile of, iii. 3.7 (48-1088).\n\n  Violence, proof of, unnaturalness, as of sickness, v. 8.11 (31-570).\n\n  Virtue affects the soul differently from other passions, iii. 6.3\n    (26-356).\n\n  Virtue an intellectualizing habit that liberates the soul, vi. 8.5\n    (39-780).\n\n  Virtue as a harmony, iii. 6.2 (26-352).\n\n  Virtue as harmony explains evil in soul, iii. 6.2 (26-352).\n\n  Virtue belongs to soul, not to intelligence of super-intelligence, i.\n    2.2 (19-259).\n\n  Virtue can conquer any misfortune, i. 4.8 (46-1031).\n\n  Virtue changes life from evil to good, i. 7.3 (54-1210).\n\n  Virtue considered a good, because participation in good, i. 8.12\n    (51-1158).\n\n  Virtue consists not in conversion but in its result, i. 2.4 (19-261).\n\n  Virtue consists of doing good when not under trials, iii. 1.10 (3-98).\n\n  Virtue derived from primitive nature of soul, ii. 3.8 (52-1174).\n\n  Virtue does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-920).\n\n  Virtue independent of action, vi. 8.5 (39-779).\n\n  Virtue is good, not absolute, but participating, i. 8.8 (51-1155).\n\n  Virtue is soul's tendency to unity of faculties, vi. 9.1 (9-1147).\n\n  Virtue not corporeal, iv. 7.8 (2-69).\n\n  Virtue not possessed by body, iv. 7.8 (2-69).\n\n  Virtue of appetite explained, iii. 6.2 (26-354).\n\n  Virtue the road to escape evils, i. 2.1 (19-256).\n\n  Virtue, without which, God is a mere word ignored by gnostics, ii.\n    9.15 (33-629).\n\n  Virtues, i. 2.\n\n  Virtue's achievement makes this the best of all possible worlds, ii.\n    9.8 (33-615).\n\n  Virtues are only purifications, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Virtues are symmetrical in development, i. 2.7 (19-267).\n\n  Virtues, Aristotelian, rational, i. 3.6 (20-274).\n\n  Virtues, by shaping man, increase divine element in him, i. 2.2\n    (19-259).\n\n  Virtues cannot be ascribed to divinity, i. 2.1 (19-256).\n\n  Virtue, choir of, Stoic, vi. 9.11 (9-170).\n\n  Virtues, discussion of, is characteristic of genuine philosophy, ii.\n    9.15 (33-621).\n\n  Virtues exist through incorporeality of soul, iv. 7.8 (2-70).\n\n  Virtues, higher, are continuations upward of the homely, i. 2.6\n    (19-265).\n\n  Virtues, higher, imply lower but not conversely, i. 3.7 (19-266).\n\n  Virtues, higher, merge into wisdom, i. 2.6 (19-265).\n\n  Virtues, homely, assimilate us to divinity only partially, i. 2.3\n    (19-260).\n\n  Virtues, homely (civil, prudence, courage, temperance, justice), i.\n    2.1 (19-257).\n\n  Virtues, homely, produce in man a measure and proportion, i. 2.2\n    (19-259).\n\n  Virtues, homely, to be supplemented by divine discontent, i. 2.7\n    (19-267).\n\n  Virtues, homely, yield resemblance to divinity, i. 2.1 (19-256).\n\n  Virtues, how they purify, i. 2.4 (19-261).\n\n  Virtues, lower, are mutually related, i. 2.7 (19-266).\n\n  Virtues must be supplemented by divine discontent, i. 2.7 (19-267).\n\n  Virtues, natural, yield only to perfect views, need correction of\n    philosophy, i. 3.6 (20-275).\n\n  Virtues, Platonic, homely and higher, distinguished, i. 2.3 (19-260).\n\n  Virtuous actions derived from self, are free, iii. 1.10 (3-99).\n\n  Virtuous man can suffer only in the lower part, i. 4.13 (46-1023).\n\n  Virtuous man is fully happy, i. 4.4 (46-1026).\n\n  Virtuous man is he whose highest principle is active, iii. 4.6\n    (15-239).\n\n  Virtuous men do right at all times, even under trials, iii. 1.10\n    (3-99).\n\n  Virtuous will only object conversion of soul towards herself, i. 4.11\n    (46-1035).\n\n  Vision and hearing, process of, iv. 5 (29-523).\n\n  Vision does not need intermediary body, iv. 5.1 (29-514).\n\n  Vision further, recall intelligible entities not memory, iv. 4.5\n    (28-447).\n\n  Vision interior, how trained, i. 6.9 (1-53).\n\n  Vision not dependent on medium's vision, iv. 5.3 (29-520).\n\n  Vision of God, ecstatic supreme purpose of life, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Vision of intelligible wisdom, last stage of soul progress, v. 8.10\n    (31-568).\n\n  Vision, theory of, ii. 8 (35-680); iv. 7.6 (2-65); v. 5.7 (32-586);\n    v. 6.1 (24-334); vi. 1.20 (42-872).\n\n  Visual angle theory of Aristotle refuted, ii. 8.2 (35-682).\n\n  Voice as one would analyze it, so must the world be studied, vi. 3.1\n    (44-933).\n\n  Voice used by demons and other inhabitants of air, iv. 3.18 (27-417).\n\n  Voluntariness not excluded by necessity, iv. 8.5 (6-127).\n\n  Voluntariness, the basis of responsibility, vi. 8.1 (39-774).\n\n  Voluntary movements, vi. 3.26 (44-980).\n\n  Voluntary soul detachment forbidden, i. 9 (16-245).\n\n  Vulcan, iii. 2.14 (47-1064).\n\n\n  Wakening to true reality content of approach to Him, v. 5.11 (32-592).\n\n  Warfare, internecine, necessary, iii. 2.1, 5 (47-1064).\n\n  Washing of man fallen in mud, simile of purification, i. 6.5 (1-48).\n\n  Wastage, none in heaven, ii. 1.4 (40-818).\n\n  Wastage of physical body, and matter, ii. 1.4 (40-819).\n\n  Wastage, see leakage, vi. 5.10 (23-327).\n\n  Wastage, see leakage, none in celestial light, ii. 1.8 (40-826).\n\n  Water, contained in the intelligible world, vi. 7.11 (38-720).\n\n  Way to conceive of first principle, v. 5.10, 11 (32-592).\n\n  Wax seal, impressions are sensations, Stoic, iv. 7.6 (2-66); iii. 6.9\n    (26-366); iv. 6.1 (41-829).\n\n  We and ours, psychological names of soul, v. 3.3 (49-1094).\n\n  We and ours, psychological terms, i. 1.7 (53-1199).\n\n  We and the real man, distinctions between, i. 1.10 (53-1202).\n\n  We and the soul, relation between, ii. 1.3 (53-1194).\n\n  We, not ours, is intelligible, i. 1.7 (53-1199).\n\n  Weakening of incarnate souls due to individual contemplation, iv. 8.4\n    (6-125).\n\n  Weakness and affection of man, subject him to magic, iv. 4.44\n    (28-509).\n\n  Weakness of soul consists of falling into matter, i. 8.14 (51-1160).\n\n  Weakness of soul is evil, i. 8.4 (51-1147).\n\n  Wealth caused by external circumstances, ii. 3.8 (52-1174).\n\n  Weaning of the soul from the body, iii. 6.5 (26-359).\n\n  Welfare of soul is resemblance to divinity, i. 6.6 (1-49).\n\n  Whatness, vi. 7.19 (38-735).\n\n  Whatness and affections (quiddity) of being distinguishes between,\n    ii. 6.2 (17-248).\n\n  Where or place is Aristotelian category, vi. 1.1, 4 (42-862).\n\n  Whole and individuals fashioned by entire soul, vi. 5.8 (23-322).\n\n  Whole is good, though continued mingled parts, iii. 2.17 (47-1070).\n\n  Whole of divisible and indivisible parts, human soul is, iv. 3.19\n    (27-419).\n\n  Whole, reason is a, vi. 5.10 (23-326).\n\n  Whyness is form, vi. 7.19 (38-735); vi. 7.2 (38-732).\n\n  Whyness of its forms contained by its intelligence, ii. 7.2 (38-732).\n\n  Will be, not are in one, all things, v. 2.1 (11-193).\n\n  Will, freedom of, on what is it based, vi. 8.2 (39-775).\n\n  Will of the one, vi. 8 (39-773).\n\n  Wings of souls lost, iv. 3.7 (27-399).\n\n  Wings, souls lose them when falling, iv. 8.1 (6-120); i. 8.14\n    (51-1161).\n\n  Wisdom and prudence, first are types; become virtues by contemplation\n    of soul, i. 2.7 (19-267).\n\n  Wisdom derived from intelligence, and ultimately from good, v. 9.2\n    (5-104).\n\n  Wisdom does not imply reasoning and memory, iv. 4.12 (28-456).\n\n  Wisdom, established by spiritual preponderance, i. 4.14 (46-1037).\n\n  Wisdom, highest, nature lowest in world-soul's wisdom, iv. 4.12\n    (28-458).\n\n  Wisdom, intelligible, last stage of soul-progress, v. 8.10 (31-567).\n\n  Wisdom is very being, v. 8.5 (31-559).\n\n  Wisdom none the less happy for being unconscious, i. 4.9 (46-1032).\n\n  Wisdom of creator makes complaints grotesque, iii. 2.14 (47-1063).\n\n  Wisdom of soul alone has virtue, i. 2.6 (19-265).\n\n  Wisdom seen in divine, v. 8.10 (31-568).\n\n  Wisdom, two kinds, of soul and of intelligence, i. 2.6 (19-265).\n\n  Wisdom universal, permanent because timeless, iv. 4.11 (28-456).\n\n  Wise man, description of his methods, i. 4.14 (46-1137).\n\n  Wise man, how he escapes all enchantments, iv. 4.43 (28-507).\n\n  Wise man remains unattached, i. 4.16 (46-1039).\n\n  Wise man uses instruments only as temporary means of development, i.\n    4.16 (46-1040).\n\n  Wise men, two will be equally happy though in different fortunes, i.\n    4.15 (46-1038).\n\n  Withdrawal within yourself, i. 6.9 (1-54).\n\n  Wonderful is relation of one (qv.) to us, v. 5.8 (32-588).\n\n  Word prophoric and innate, v. 1.3 (10-177).\n\n  Word, soul as and actualization of intelligence, v. 1.3 (10-177).\n\n  Workman of the body, instrument is the soul, iv. 7.1 (2-56).\n\n  World and creator are not evil, ii. 9 (33-599).\n\n  World as eternally begotten, ii. 9.2 (33-603).\n\n  World body, why the world-soul is everywhere present in it, vi. 4.1\n    (22-285).\n\n  World contains traditions of divinity, ii. 9.9 (33-616).\n\n  World imperishable, so long as archetype subsists, v. 8.12 (31-572).\n\n  World intelligible, everything is actual, ii. 5.3 (25-346).\n\n  World is deity of third rank, iii. 5.6 (50-1132).\n\n  World must be studied, just as one would analyze the voice, vi. 3.1\n    (44-933).\n\n  World not evil because of our sufferings, ii. 9.4 (33-606).\n\n  World not to be blamed for imperfections, iii. 2.3 (47-1046).\n\n  World, nothing more beautiful could be imagined, ii. 9.4 (33-606).\n\n  World, objective, subsists, even when we are distracted, v. 1.12\n    (10-191).\n\n  World, outside our world would not be visible, iv. 5.8 (29-529).\n\n  World penetrating by intelligence that remains unmoved, vi. 5.11\n    (23-328).\n\n  World planned by God, refuted, v. 8.7 (31-561).\n\n  World sense and intelligible, are they separate or classifiable\n    together, vi. 1.12 (42-860).\n\n  World-soul activity, when measured is time, iii. 7.10 (45-1005).\n\n  World-soul and human soul, differences between, ii. 9.7 (33-612).\n\n  World-soul and individual souls born from intelligence, vi. 2.22\n    (43-929).\n\n  World-soul and star soul, intellectual differences, iv. 4.17 (28-463).\n\n  World-soul and stars are impassible, iv. 4.42 (28-506).\n\n  World-soul animated by universe, iv. 3.9 (27-404).\n\n  World-soul basis of existence of bodies, iv. 7.3 (2-60).\n\n  World-soul begotten from intelligence by unity and universality, v.\n    1.2 (10-175).\n\n  World-soul creates, because nearest the intelligible, iv. 3.6\n    (27-397).\n\n  World-soul creative, not preservative, ii. 3.16 (52-1183).\n\n  World-soul contains universe as sea the net, iv. 3.9 (27-405).\n\n  World-soul could not have gone through creation drama, ii. 9.4\n    (33-605).\n\n  World-soul does not remember God, continuing to see him, iv. 4.7\n    (28-449).\n\n  World-soul, earth can feel as well as stars, iv. 4.22 (28-471).\n\n  World-soul exerts influence apart from astrology and deviltry, iv.\n    4.32 (28-490).\n\n  World-soul glorifies man as life transfigures matter, v. 1.2 (10-176).\n\n  World-soul has no ratiocination, iv. 4.11 (28-455).\n\n  World-soul, how idea of it is reached, ii. 9.17 (33-633).\n\n  World-soul, in it, wisdom is the lowest and nature the highest, iv.\n    4.12 (28-458).\n\n  World-soul inferior, ii. 2.3 (14-233).\n\n  World-soul informs all things progressively, iv. 3.10 (27-406).\n\n  World-soul is to time what intelligence is to eternity, iii. 7.10\n    (45-1007).\n\n  World-soul, length of its life is time, iii. 7.11 (45-1008).\n\n  World-soul mediation, through it are benefits granted to men, iv.\n    4.30 (28-486).\n\n  World-soul, nature of, i. 8.2 (51-1144).\n\n  World-soul participates to create world only by contemplation, and is\n    undisturbed thereby, iv. 8.7 (6-131).\n\n  World-soul, Plato is in doubt about its being like the stars, iv.\n    4.22 (28-470).\n\n  World-soul procession, iii. 8.5 (30-537).\n\n  World-soul procession results in space, iii. 7.10 (45-1006).\n\n  World-soul remains in the intelligible, iii. 9.3 (13-223).\n\n  World-soul simultaneously gives and receives as untroubled medium,\n    iv. 8.7 (6-131).\n\n  World-soul unconscious of our changes, iv. 4.7 (28-450).\n\n  World-soul unconscious of what goes on in it, iii. 4.4 (15-237).\n\n  World-soul, why it is everywhere entirely in the world body, vi. 4\n    (22-285).\n\n  World-souls and individual souls inseparable, because of functions,\n    iv. 3.2 (27-392).\n\n  World-soul's creation of world is cause of divinity of souls, v. 1.2\n    (10-175).\n\n  World-soul's existence, basis of that of simple bodies, iv. 7.2\n    (2-57).\n\n  World, this is the best of all possible, because we can achieve\n    virtue, ii. 9.8 (33-615).\n\n  World, to be in it but not of it, i. 8.6 (51-1150).\n\n  World's testimony to its creator, iii. 2.3 (47-1047).\n\n\n  Zodiac, ii. 3.3 (52-1165).\n\n\n\n\nPlotinos, his Life, Times and Philosophy\n\nBy _Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie_, _A. M._, Harvard, _Ph. D._, Tulane.\n\n\nThis is a lucid, scholarly systematization of the views of Plotinos,\ngiving translation of important and useful passages. It is preceded by\na careful indication and exposition of his formative influences, and a\nfull biography dealing with his supposed obligations to Christianity.\nAccurate references are given for every statement and quotation. The\nexposition of, and references on Hermetic philosophy are by themselves\nworth the price of the book.\n\nDr _Harris_, U.S. Commissioner of Education has written about it in the\nhighest terms. Dr. _Paul Carus_, Editor of the _Open Court_, devoted\nhalf a page of the July 1897 issue to an appreciative and commendatory\nReview of it. Among the many other strong commendations of the work are\nthe following:\n\n    From _G. R. S. Mead_, Editor _The Theosophical Review_, London:\n\n    It may be stated, on the basis of a fairly wide knowledge of\n    the subject, that the summary of our anonymous author is the\n    CLEAREST and MOST INTELLIGENT which has as yet appeared. The\n    writer bases himself upon the original text, and his happy\n    phrasing of Platonic terms and his deep sympathy with Platonic\n    thought proclaim the presence of a capable translator of\n    Plotinos amongst us....\n\n    To make so lucid and capable a compendium of the works of\n    so great a giant of philosophy as Plotinos, the author must\n    have spent much time in analysing the text and satisfying\n    himself as to the meaning of many obscure passages; to test\n    his absolute accuracy would require the verification of every\n    reference among the hundreds given in the tables at the end\n    of the pamphlet, and we have only had time to verify one or\n    two of the more striking. These are as accurate as anything\n    in a digest can rightly be expected to be. In addition to\n    the detailed chapters on the seven realms of the Plotinic\n    philosophy, on reincarnation, ethics, and \u00e6sthetics, we have\n    introductory chapters on Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism,\n    and Emanationism, and on the relationship of Plotinos to\n    Christianity and Paganism.\n\n    Those who desire to enter into the Plotinian precincts of the\n    temple of Greek philosophy by the most expeditious path CANNOT\n    do BETTER than take this little pamphlet for their guide; it\n    is of course not perfect, but it is undeniably THE BEST which\n    has yet appeared. We have recommended the T.P.S. to procure\n    a supply of this pamphlet, for to our Platonic friends and\n    colleagues we say not only YOU SHOULD, but YOU MUST read it.\n\n    HUMAN BROTHERHOOD, NOV. 1897, in a very extended and most\n    commendatory review, says: TOO GREAT PRAISE COULD HARDLY\n    BE BESTOWED upon this scholarly contribution to Platonic\n    literature.\n\n_Net price, cloth bound, post-paid, $1.31._\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\n\nPunctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant\npreference was found in this four-volume set; otherwise they were not\nchanged.\n\nSimple typographical errors were corrected. Inconsistent capitalization\nhas not been changed.\n\nAmbiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.\n\nInfrequent spelling of \"Plotinus\" changed to the predominant \"Plotinos.\"\n\nSeveral opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are\nunmatched; Transcriber has not attempted to determine where they belong.\n\nPage 1030: The opening parenthesis in \"(Nor would he be troubled if the\nmembers\" either has no match or shares one with a subordinate phrase.\nSuch \"sharing\" occurs elsewhere in this four-volume set.\n\nPage 1059: \"(the former for their ferocity,\" has no matching closing\nparenthesis.\n\nPage 1188, footnote 268 (originally 71): The opening parenthesis in\n\"(the principal power of the soul,\" has no match, or shares one with a\nsubordinate phrase.\n\nPage 1218: The opening quotation mark just before 'He who possesses the\nvirtues' has no matching closing quotation mark.\n\nPage 1262: The opening quotation mark just before 'The intelligible is\nof a nature' has no matching closing quotation mark.\n\nPage 1265: The opening quotation mark just before 'be in relation with\na place,' has no matching closing quotation mark.\n\nPage 1318: The opening quotation mark just before 'Being and Essence;'\nhas no matching closing quotation mark.\n\nPage 1327: The first few lines were misprinted, with the sub-heading\n\"IMPORTANCE IN THE PAST.\" in the middle of the first paragraph and part\nof a word missing from that paragraph. This eBook attempts to correct\nthat.\n\n\nConcordance Issues:\n\nEntries in the Concordance have not been systematically checked for\naccuracy; some errors have been corrected, but others probably remain.\nDetected errors are noted below.\n\nPage ii: \"Alone with the alone... 1-550\" corrected to 1-50.\n\nPage v: \"Beauty consists in kinship to the soul... 1.42.\" corrected to\n1-42.\n\nPage vi: \"Being and actualization... 30-784\" corrected to 39-784.\n\nPage viii: \"Castration\", second reference, \"v. 8.13 (31-573).\" does not\nbelong here.\n\nPage xvii: \"Effusion\", last word \"reation\" could be \"reaction\" or\n\"reason\".\n\nPage xxix: \"Incorporeality of soul proved by its... 2.72.\" corrected to\n2-72.\n\nPage xxxii: \"Intelligence's existence proved... 50-104.\" corrected to\n5-104.\n\nPage xxxiv: \"Judgment of one part by another... 52-472.\" corrected to\n52-1172.\n\nPage lviii: \"\"Somewhat,\" a particle to modify... 31-797\" corrected to\n39-797.\n\nPage lviii: \"Soul and relation with God\", reference to \"i.\" was\nmisprinted as \"ii.\"\n\nPage lviii: \"Soul conforms destiny to her character... 53-238.\"\ncorrected to 15-238.\n\nPage lx: \"Soul split into three\" has no reference.\n\nPage lxii: \"Spectator of vision becomes participator... 34-569\"\ncorrected to 31-569.\n\nPage lxii: \"Stars are they animate?\" has no reference.\n\nPage lxii: \"Stars are they inanimate?\" has no reference.\n\nPage lxiv: \"Supreme intelligence, nature of... 51-144.\" corrected to\n51-1144.\n\nPage lxviii: \"Unity, contained in sense objects... 24-671\" corrected to\n34-671.\n\nPage lxxii: \"We and ours, psychological names of soul\" was missing part\nof reference; reconstructed by Transcriber based on page reference.\n\n\nFootnote Issues:\n\nIn these notes, \"anchor\" means the reference to a footnote, and\n\"footnote\" means the information to which the anchor refers. Anchors\noccur within the main text, while footnotes are grouped in sequence at\nthe end of this eBook. The structure of the original book required some\nexceptions to this, as explained below.\n\nThe original text used chapter endnotes. In this eBook, they have been\ncombined into a single, ascending sequence based on the sequence in\nwhich the footnotes (not the anchors) occurred in the original book,\nand placed at the end of the main text, just before the Concordance.\n\nFour kinds of irregularities occurred in the footnotes:\n\n1. Some footnotes are referenced by more than one anchor, so two or\nmore anchors may refer to the same footnote.\n\n2. Some anchors were out of sequence, apparently because they were\nadded afterwards or because they are share a footnote with another\nanchor. They have been renumbered to match the numbers of the footnotes\nto which they refer.\n\n3. Some footnotes have no anchors. These are noted below.\n\n4. One footnote was misprinted beyond repair, and the next three\nfootnotes were missing. These are noted below.\n\nPage 1076: Footnote 61 (originally 42) has no anchor; the missing\nanchor would be in page range 1062-1064.\n\nPage 1121: Footnote 100 (originally 4) has no anchor; the missing\nanchor would be in page range 1091-1093.\n\nPage 1121: Footnote 103 (originally 7) has no anchor; the missing\nanchor would be in page range 1094-1097. Anchor 99 (originally 3) on\npage 1094 could be the missing anchor, as that number also is used on\npage 1091.\n\nPage 1188: Footnote 210 (originally 13) has no anchor; the missing\nanchor would be on page 1171 or 1172.\n\nPage 1189: Footnote 226 (originally 29) has no anchor; the missing\nanchor would be on page 1174 or 1175.\n\nPage 1253: Footnote 329 (originally 9) has no anchor; the missing\nanchor would be in page range 1219-1226.\n\nPage 1287: Footnote 469 (originally 98) has no anchor; the missing\nanchor would be on page 1287.\n\nPage 1313: Chapter number is \"VII.\" but there is no earlier \"VI.\"\n\nPage 1333: Footnote 758 (originally 21) appears to be misprinted, and\nthe next three footnotes 759-761 (originally 22-24) are missing.","title":"Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":132377}