{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_42957/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_42957","id":"gutenberg_42957","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/42957","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Church of England","Skepticism","Skepticism -- Controversial literature"],"text":"MODERN SCEPTICISM.\n\n\n\n\n    MODERN SCEPTICISM.\n\n    A\n    COURSE OF LECTURES\n    DELIVERED AT THE REQUEST OF THE\n    CHRISTIAN EVIDENCE SOCIETY,\n\n    _WITH AN EXPLANATORY PAPER_\n\n    BY THE RIGHT REVEREND\n    C. J. ELLICOTT, D.D.,\n    LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER AND BRISTOL.\n\n    NEW YORK:\n    ANSON D. F. RANDOLPH AND CO.,\n    770, BROADWAY.\n\n    MDCCCLXXI.\n\n\n\n\n    _Issued in this Country\n    by special arrangement with the English Publishers_,\n    MESSRS. HODDER AND STOUGHTON.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nThe following Lectures, delivered at the request of the Christian\nEvidence Society, are now, for the convenience of the reader, gathered\ntogether into one volume, and earnestly commended to his serious\nconsideration.\n\nA short account of the general designs of the Society, of the plan of\nthe Lectures, and the reasons for their appearing in a different order\nfrom that in which they were delivered, will be found in an explanatory\npaper which the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol has been kind enough\nto draw up at the request of the Committee. Though placed, as last\nwritten, at the end of the volume, the attention of the reader should\nbe early directed to this paper.\n\nThe Committee take this opportunity of offering their best thanks to\nthe eminent men who have found time, in the midst of their varied and\nlaborious avocations, to lend such able and efficient service to the\ngreat cause in hand,--the maintenance of the truth of the Christian\nRevelation.\n\n    HARROWBY,\n\n    _Chairman of Committee._\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n                         Page\n\n  DESIGN IN NATURE                                                  1\n      BY THE MOST REVEREND THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF YORK.\n\n  PANTHEISM                                                        33\n      BY THE REV. J. H. RIGG, D.D., Principal of Westminster\n      Training College.\n\n  POSITIVISM                                                       79\n      BY THE REV. W. JACKSON, M.A., F.S.A., late Fellow of\n      Worcester College, Oxford.\n\n  SCIENCE AND REVELATION                                          139\n      BY THE VERY REV. R. PAYNE SMITH, D.D., Dean of\n      Canterbury; late Regius Professor of Divinity, Oxford.\n\n  THE NATURE AND VALUE OF THE MIRACULOUS TESTIMONY TO\n          CHRISTIANITY                                            179\n      BY THE REV. JOHN STOUGHTON, D.D.\n\n  THE GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF REVELATION                           229\n      BY THE RIGHT REV. THE LORD BISHOP OF CARLISLE.\n\n  THE ALLEGED HISTORICAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE OLD AND NEW\n          TESTAMENTS, AND THE LIGHT THROWN ON THEM BY MODERN\n          DISCOVERIES                                             265\n      BY THE REV. GEORGE RAWLINSON, M.A., Camden Professor of\n      Ancient History, Oxford.\n\n  MYTHICAL THEORIES OF CHRISTIANITY                               305\n      BY THE REV. CHARLES ROW, M.A., of Pembroke College,\n      Oxford.\n\n  THE EVIDENTIAL VALUE OF ST. PAUL'S EPISTLES                     361\n      BY THE REV. STANLEY LEATHES, M.A., Professor of Hebrew,\n      King's College.\n\n  CHRIST'S TEACHING AND INFLUENCE ON THE WORLD                    409\n      BY THE RIGHT REV. THE LORD BISHOP OF ELY.\n\n  THE COMPLETENESS AND ADEQUACY OF THE EVIDENCES OF\n          CHRISTIANITY                                            457\n      BY THE REV. CANON COOK, M.A., Canon of Exeter; Preacher\n      at Lincoln's Inn.\n\n  EXPLANATORY PAPER                                               503\n      BY THE RIGHT REV. THE LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER AND\n      BRISTOL.\n\n  NOTES                                                           529\n\n\n\n\n    DESIGN IN NATURE.\n\n    BY THE MOST REVEREND\n\n    THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF YORK.\n\n\n\n\nDESIGN IN NATURE.\n\n\n\"All things are full of God,\" said the father of Greek philosophy.\n\"We have no need of the hypothesis of God,\" said a modern French\nastronomer. It is with the latter saying, which is descriptive of the\nattitude of modern science at this time, that the present address will\nhave to do. Atheism no doubt exists; but far more common is the mode\nof thinking which would dispense with all questions about the Divine\nnature in dealing with the world and its phenomena; which considers\nthat the introduction of the name of God into scientific research,\ncomplicates what is simple, obscures the rules of observation,\nintroduces controversies that are useless to science, restrains the\nfree course of inductive reasoning by an apprehension of consequences,\nand entangles physical inquiry which leads to sure and clear results,\nwith mental and with spiritual inquiry which have produced nothing but\ndisputation. Those who hold such views would think it unphilosophical\nto deny, just as they would regard it to affirm, the existence of God.\nBut the popular mind is not equal to nice distinctions; and it seems\nalmost the same thing to most people to deny the existence of God as to\nexclude the thought of Him when exploring His creation.\n\nI am not without hope that a few words delivered here upon \"the\nargument from design,\" as it is called, may tend to diminish the\ngrowing estrangement between science and religion, and at the same\ntime to revindicate for religion her legitimate share in matters of\nscientific interest.\n\nI may undertake that the subject, however unworthily treated in other\nrespects, shall be discussed without bitterness, and with a fitting\nrespect for those who have done so much for physical science during the\npresent generation.\n\nIt is necessary to sketch in a few sentences that field of creation\nwith which the argument from design has to do. The world presents to\nus four kingdoms or classes of facts. One of these, and the first in\npoint of order, is the mineral kingdom. A few so-called elements, as\nmetals, earthy bases, and the like, acted upon by certain forces,\nknown to us as gravitation, motion, heat, electricity, magnetism,\nchemical affinity, have formed the mountain and the valley, the wind\nand the clouds, the sea margin and the cave; in a word, all the grand\nsubstructure on which the higher kingdoms are to take their places.\nModern science has discovered however, that these physico-chemical\nforces are interchangeable or convertible; that retarded motion turns\nto heat, as in the railway break, that heat generates electricity, and\nthe electric current magnetises the iron round which it passes. Not\nonly this, but each force generates a certain equivalent of another--so\nmuch and no more; and no force is lost, though a force may pass from an\nactive to a potential state. For example, two tuns of water are raised\nby evaporation from the sea, and one of them falls in rain in a valley\ndrained by a river, and in its downward motion back to the sea it will\nturn the water-wheel, lift the tilt-hammer, bear the barge swiftly in\nits current, leap over the rocky ledge a foaming cataract, and in all\nthese it is only sending back a portion of the force which was spent\nupon its evaporation; and the real source of all this work is, and\nmust be, the sun's heat. And ere the water rests again in the sea it\nwill have accounted for the whole of the force, neither less nor more,\nthat had operated upon it; part of it in friction on its bed and in\nconsequent heat; part of it in tasks imposed by human skill. The other\ntun of water shall fall into some land-locked tarn, high in the hills,\nwhere it cannot at once render back its force in work or duty, but the\nforce is there, held in suspense or in reserve. Water lifted from the\nsea level to the valley of the Engadine, a mile higher, has used much\nof the sun's heat; it will restore that heat or some equivalent force,\nas soon as you make a way for it to the sea level again; and it will\nhave parted with all the force, neither more nor less, which raised it\nto that height. That forces are convertible, and that whether converted\nor not they are conserved, so that nothing is lost, are propositions\ndemonstrated. It is not, I believe, demonstrated, but it is a probable\nsupposition, that all forces are but one force manifested in different\nmodes.\n\nThen as to the material elements on which these forces work; the\nhydrogen, carbon, iron, lime, and the like, the name of elements must\nbe held to mean no more than that they have not as yet been resolved\ninto simpler substances. Of their ultimate composition we know nothing.\nThey may be so many modifications of an ultimate matter; but whether\nthis ultimate matter exists, whether it be, as modern materialists\ntell us with such confidence, eternal and indestructible, whether\nimpenetrability be one of its properties, whether it be not a kind of\npolar opposite to the physico-chemical forces, and engendered with\nthem, so that in a different universe, with other forces at work,\nthere must have been different elements, these are all questions of\nmere speculation, incapable of proof. The physical enquirer has bound\nhimself to consider only the facts which he can observe; and when\nhe tells us that matter is eternal, and that therefore creation is\nimpossible, he is deserting the ground where alone he is strong.\nBishop Berkeley's and Collier's denial that matter truly exists is\nquite as probable as this affirmation. But both alike are speculative\nguesses and not science.\n\nThere is a second kingdom to add to the first. The world is not a\nmere agglomeration of rocks and mountains, seas and lakes. Before the\nphysical forces had completed their work, a new force had been added\nto them; that of life. The bare rocks became clothed with living\nmoss. In marshy places, warm and moist, a rich vegetation grew and\ndecayed. Along the slopes the interlacing roots of grasses detained the\nparticles of soil which would otherwise have been washed down to some\nlower bed. The vegetable world, with thousands of varieties, clothed\nand adorned the stony earth. England's greatness in the present was\ntaken order for in those ages when her coal measures were formed out\nof the forests which grew rank and died in a climate different in all\nrespects from that which forms the subject of our daily animadversion.\n\nThird in order comes the Animal Kingdom. I do not attempt to define\nlife, whether animal or vegetable, with exactness. Every one has\nfailed in that attempt. As a rough description of animal life, it\nmay, perhaps, suffice to say that the living being is one endowed\nwith sensation and spontaneous motion, of which each of the parts\ncontributes something to the continuance of the whole, and is in\nturn preserved or defended by the whole. If those who find fault with\nthis, look for another definition in Dr. Whewell's comprehensive\nwork,[1] they will find my excuse in the variety and the inadequacy of\nthe definitions there collected. The animal life spread out over the\nglobe from the first is profuse, is beautiful and various. The oolitic\nlimestone and the white chalk are almost wholly made up of shells of\nForaminifera. On the river Columbia is a bed of clay 500 feet thick,\nwhich consists largely of the shells of Diatoms, if, indeed, these are\nto be ranked in the animal kingdom. The shells of the Foraminifera,\nwhich can only be examined by the microscope, exhibit wonderful variety\nand beauty. Still more remarkable in this respect are the Polycystina,\nwhose shells, as figured in Mr. Ponton's book, recall censers and\nvases, jewelled crosses and stars, pendants and tripods, such as a\nLondon goldsmith would do well to reproduce. Until the microscope was\ninvented no eye can have explored this wonderful dust. The shells of\nboth these humble tribes, the Foraminifera and Polycystina resemble the\nshells of other animals much higher in the scale of organization; but\nnearly as they are related in organization to each other, the forms\nare very different, and each in itself presents a wonderful diversity\nof forms. In higher families of animals there are the same characters.\nThe globe teems with life in earth, and air, and water. If you will\npermit me, so early in my argument, to speak of the Maker of them all,\nI will say that the creative power is inexhaustible in invention, both\nof useful and beautiful parts. And in the ceaseless activity of these\ncreatures, great and small, we recognise the physical happiness which\naccompanies so much life. It is a chorus of thanksgiving and praise,\nfrom pool and jungle, from treetop and soft grass, from the creatures\nthat revel in the life that God has given them.\n\nIn demanding the right to regard man as the fourth kingdom of nature, I\nam aware that some may demur to the claim. No doubt he must take rank\nin the kingdom of the animals, by reason of his identity with animals\nin all the vital functions. Disparaging things have been said of his\nbrain; and Moleschott has remarked, I think, that all its finest things\nare but modified phosphorus after all. \"No phosphorus, no thinking!\"\nThe slight projection on the outer margin of the ear has lately assumed\nportentous proportions. The possession of that precious relic, which\nhas turned up suddenly like the locket of the long lost child in a\nstimulating novel, proves our kinship to the Simian race, from some\nbalder specimens of which we are supposed to have descended, and gives\nus a place on an unsuspected family tree. But, after all that has been\nsaid by the naturalists to teach us humility, there do remain some\nfacts, which entitle man to a separate place, to one at least of which\nthe modern school have given greater prominence than before. They are\nthese. Man can control nature. He can read nature and understand it. He\nhas a power of self-regulation, which we call conscience. And he can\nand does think much about God.\n\nAs to the power of man to control nature, I prefer to employ the\nwords of Mr. Wallace, one of the first to put forward what is called\n\"the law of natural selection,\" who will not be suspected of claiming\nany transcendental place or privilege for man. \"With a naked and\nunprotected body,\" he says, man's intelligence \"gave him clothing\nagainst the varying inclemencies of the seasons. Though unable to\ncompete with the deer in swiftness, or with the wild bull in strength,\nit has given him weapons wherewith to capture and overcome both. Though\nless capable than most other animals, of living on the herbs and the\nfruits which unaided nature supplies, this wonderful faculty taught\nhim to govern and direct nature to his own benefit, and to make her\nproduce food for him when and where he pleased. From the moment when\nthe first skin was used as a covering, when the first rude spear was\nformed to assist in the chase, the first seed sown or root planted, a\ngrand revolution was effected in nature, a revolution which in all the\nprevious ages of the world had had no parallel, for a being had arisen\nwho was no longer necessarily subject to change with the changing\nuniverse, a being who was, in some degree, superior to nature, inasmuch\nas he knew how to control and regulate her action, and could keep\nhimself in harmony with her, not by a change in body, but by an advance\nin mind. Here, then, we see the true grandeur and dignity of man. On\nthis view of his special attributes we may admit that even those who\nclaim for him a position and an order a class or a sub-kingdom by\nhimself, have some reason on their side. He is indeed a being apart,\nsince he is not influenced by the great laws which irresistibly modify\nall other organic beings. Nay, more, this victory which he has gained\nfor himself gives him a directing influence over other existences. Man\nhas not only escaped natural selection himself, but he is actually able\nto take away some of that power from nature which before his appearance\nshe universally exercised. We can anticipate the time when the earth\nwill produce only cultivated plants and domestic animals; when man's\nselection shall have supplanted natural selection; and when the ocean\nwill be the only domain in which that power can be exerted, which for\ncountless cycles of ages ruled supreme over the earth.\"[2]\n\nThus eloquently and forcibly speaks Mr. Wallace; and I do not stop\nnow to criticise the exaggeration of language which treats the law of\nnatural selection as supreme ruler of the earth. Let me say a few words\nnext upon man's power to reflect on, and to understand nature. For this\nwas the second mark by which man was distinguished from the animal\ncreation, with which he has so much in common.\n\nMan alone is capable of an unselfish interest in the world around him;\nthat is, an interest that does not bear immediately on his bodily\nwants. How far he has carried this interest, let modern science bear\nwitness. The common feat of foretelling all the eclipses of sun and\nmoon for a given year, is performed for our almanack yearly, without\nexciting surprise or gratitude. Yet it means that man can so follow\nthe heavenly bodies in their path, for years and years to come, for\nall the years that are gone, that he can tell, without fear of error,\non what day the cone of shadow thrown by the sun-lighted earth into\nspace, shall sweep over the face of the moon and blot out her light,\ncompletely or a little. But this is an old triumph, hardly worth\nquoting, but for its aptness to impress all kinds of minds. A clerk\nin one of our public offices, using only such leisure as official\nwork allowed, has told us lately wonders about the composition of\nthe sun; and here in London, armed with a little instrument (the\nspectroscope), this distinguished man has been able to ascertain that\nin yonder photosphere the same elements are found which the chemist\nseeks and finds in the crust of our little earth. What proofs can be\nmore convincing of the fitness of man to play his part in the scene\nin which he is placed? His senses are adapted to the facts he is to\nobserve; his eye to light, his ear to sonorous vibrations, his touch\nto resistance and to weight. But the naked organ soon falls short of\nhis wishes. And soon the microscope unfolds the beautiful forms of the\nPolycystina shells, the minute fibril of the muscle, and the components\nof the blood of life. The telescope brings near the world of stars, and\nresolves the bright mist into clusters of distinct orbs. The balance\nweighs quantities of matter too small for the touch to appreciate.\nAnd lastly, the spectroscope takes the picture, so to speak, of\nchemical phenomena too distant to be realised by these means; and so\nthe composition of the heavenly bodies, about which the most sanguine\nobserver twenty years ago would have admitted that we should never\nknow anything firmer than conjecture, is already the subject of exact\nobservation.\n\nThe names of Homer, Plato, and Shakspeare remind us how marvellously\nthe world is imaged and reproduced in the minds of some great men, and\nof the share which we smaller men can take in their work by an admiring\nsympathy. A production of art, whether literary, pictorial, or\nplastic, is a creation. The things of Troy were not so touching nor so\ngrand in their reality as they became in the form which the poet gave\nthem. Legend enters largely into the stories of Macbeth and Hamlet. The\nhistories are shadowy, but the plays are substantial; they contain some\ntouch of truth. Old and young read them, and lend to the author all\ntheir feelings to work on as he will. Weigh this fact well. It seems\nto me to show so plainly that man's constitution has been fitted by\nforesight and preparation for the place in earth that he was to fill.\n\nSupposing that Moleschott was right in his startling aphorism,\n\"Without phosphorus there is no thought,\" what a wonder are we forced\nto recognise here. The rage of Achilles, the death of Socrates, the\nresolute wickedness of Lady Macbeth, the character of her husband,\nso weak in his crime, so grand in his remorse and ruin; the refined\nand gentle Hamlet, forced by a preternatural command to assume the\ncharacter of an avenger; to all these the presence of phosphorus in\nthe brain is indispensable. How comes so small a cause to work such\ngrand effects. It is sufficiently wonderful to hear Joachim discourse\neloquent music upon the simplest of instruments, a violin; take away\nthe violin and substitute a bit of wood; if the music still continues,\nwhat was before a wonderful exercise of skill is now miraculous. If\ngreat thoughts are but phosphorus burnt in the closed stove of a poet's\nbrain, I am more ready than ever to admire that creative wisdom which\ncould bring this out of that, which could so dispense with ordinary\nmeans in His highest productions. But the aphorism is not true as it\nstands. I believe there is no free phosphorus in the brain. \"Without\nlime, no thought; without oxygen, no thought; without water, no\nthought.\" All these are true, and they import a well-known fact, that\nman who thinks is a creature in a material world, and that certain\nforms of matter are needful to his existence as an organised being.[3]\n\n\"Two things are awful to me,\" said Kant, \"the starry firmament and the\nsense of responsibility in man.\" In his \"Metaphysics of Ethics\" he\nhas treated this sense of responsibility with singular logical power.\nIt is one of the marks that separate man from all other creatures. No\ndoubt this principle has allowed men to come to very wrong and absurd\nconclusions. Because the savage practises cannibalism, and knows no\nrules of chastity but those which flow from the husband's right of\nproperty in the wife, it is inferred that the savage has no moral\nsense. It would be as fair to infer that because England once traded\nin slaves, fought cocks, baited bulls, and oppressed the native races\nin India and her colonies, therefore there was no sense of right\nand wrong in England. It is for the existence of the principle that\nI contend, and not for its perfect education and enlightenment. The\nprinciple is that something is right to will and to do, and something\nis not right. The existence of the principle is proved if the poor\nsavage of whom I spoke would consider his manhood disgraced by fleeing,\neven for his life's sake, before the foe, or by suffering one cry to\nescape him under the tortures, wherewith his captors are doing him\nto death. The education of this principle is a different matter; no\none could say that even now his conscience was completely educated.\n\"So act that your principle of action would bear to be made a law for\nthe whole world,\"[4] is a noble maxim; but it requires knowledge and\nlight, as well as right intention. If you twit us with the fact that\nmen have been cruel, impure, capricious, and absurd in their conduct,\nwe answer that they had still a right and a wrong. One who has the\nsense of sight may find himself compelled to live in some narrow cleft\nor ravine, where there is little to see, but the sense is there still.\nThe bathing-men at Pfeffers, with the earth closed almost over their\nheads, see little of the scenery of Switzerland: but they have eyes not\nthe less. We are claiming for men now, not the fine sweep of moral\nprospect, but the moral sense of sight; and this is never wanting. Upon\nthis sense every artifice has been used to make it look like something\nelse;[5] for until it can be so transformed, it is a powerful witness\nfor another world than this. The commonest explanation is that it is\nonly a principle of enlightened self-interest. Study it for yourself\nin the savage, in the little child; you will find that these two\nprinciples run on different lines.\n\nThe last mark of man, that distinguishes him from all animals is, that\nhe believes in God. One half the human race at this moment profess\nsome creed in which God is the great first cause, the Creator and\nGovernor of the world. Of the other half, hardly any are quite without\nreligion. \"Obliged as I am,\" says M. Quatrefages, in words which I have\nhad occasion to quote elsewhere,[6] \"even by my education, to pass in\nreview the races of men, I have sought for atheism in the lowest and in\nthe highest, but nowhere have I met with it, except in an individual,\nor at most in some school of men, more or less known, as we have seen\nin Europe in the last century, and as we see at the present day.\nEverywhere and always the masses of the people have escaped it.\" But\nfor my present argument it is not necessary to insist that a right\nbelief in God prevails. There is a belief in God, and it cannot have\ncome from experience or observation of visible facts. You may lower the\nposition of man, by comparing him to the apes, and by chemical analysis\nof his brain; all the more wonderful is it that a creature in such\nsorry case should pretend to hold communion with the divine. His feet\nare in the earthy clay, but his head is lifted up towards heaven. Heir\nto a hundred maladies, the sport of a hundred passions, holding on this\nlife, so chequered in its complexion, but for a few days, this creature\ncries out of his trouble: \"God exists; and he can see and hear me.\"\n\nMan, if I have proved my position, stands quite alone at the head of\nthe kingdoms of nature, alone in his power of controlling it, alone\nin his appreciation of its beauty, alone in the self-government of\nconscience, the first of all the creatures of God, to pronounce the\nname of Him who had made all things, in a world which for ages had been\nblind to its Maker, and thankless because blind.\n\nNow it has become, and will probably continue to be, a question of the\ndeepest interest to mankind, how these four kingdoms came into being.\nAnd at present there is a tendency towards a theory purely material\nand mechanical. It is so in Germany, the country of B\u00fcchner, Vogt, and\nMoleschott; it is so in France, where Comte and Littr\u00e9 have written;\nit is so here in England, where it is needless to quote distinguished\nnames. I purpose, in the remainder of this lecture, to attempt an\ninterpretation of the facts before us, quite different from this\nprevalent notion; and also to show how vicious and how inadequate in a\nscientific point of view the system known as materialism appears to be.\nThe time is all too short for such a purpose: but any address like this\ncan only aim to scatter germs of thought, not to present a system.\n\nThat the creation was gradual, appears alike from the account of the\nBible and from scientific observation. Matter and motion must have\nexisted before the ball of earth was formed; and the physico-chemical\nforces must have been in full play when the first lichen clothed the\nrocks, or the first plants were formed in the sea. The first appearance\nof life on the globe was a mighty step in creation, and from this point\nthe question of design becomes a very urgent one. Observe: the plant\nworld is a new world, with a series of wonders all its own. There was\nnothing in the heat of the sun, nor in the earth's motion or magnetic\ncurrents, to give any promise or presage of the marvels of the forest.\nSupposing that we admit that these were evolved by law, that is to\nsay, that as a matter of fact plants only appeared where certain\nconditions of light and heat and moisture combined to favour them,\nand that wherever these conditions were combined they never failed\nto appear. The question next arises whether matter and force evolved\nthem from their own inherent nature, or force and matter were created\nwith the intention to produce them, so that the plant was intended and\nprepared then when the other forces began to stir the formless void.\nIs the plant world the accidental or necessary outcome of the forces\nthat made the mineral world? or must we say that it bears marks of\ndesign? Here we must observe that it is a wider and richer world than\nthat which preceded it: more full by far of forms of beauty and grace,\neach of them sustained by a vascular system of which the mineral world\naffords no parallel. You stand before the gnarled and twisted oak that\nrises out of the feathering ferns; you never think that this giant of\ntwo centuries, endued with a certain power of self-protection against\nthe storms of two hundred years, is an accidental product. It is so\ngrandly strong, so richly clothed with a myriad leaves, alike but\nyet in something different each from each. The cattle count upon its\nfriendly shade; the fowls of the air make it their resting-place. This\na result of certain motions in the universe and certain properties\nof matter, not designed at all, foreseen by no eye? To no one would\nsuch a thought naturally occur. The world, full in its first stage of\nmarks of order and purpose, shows more of the same marks in its second\nand more complicated state. The change that has taken place is not\ntowards confusion and exhaustion from unforeseen defects in mechanism,\nbut a higher development. The mineral kingdom was wonderful; that it\nshould be able to clothe itself with a mantle of verdure, and pass\ninto another kingdom much more complex, heightens the wonder. But then\ncomes the further change, the pouring out of animal life upon the\nglobe. Was this too an inevitable consequence of physical forces? All\nthe animal creation teems with marks of purpose. Consider only some of\nthe contrivances by which the fowls of the air are fitted for their\npeculiar life. Describing a night of extreme coldness, the poet says:\n\n        \"The owl, for all her feathers, is a-cold.\"\n\nThat warm covering of the bird must be portable as well as warm; it\nweighs about an ounce and a half. But the covering of birds would be\nuseless to them if the showers to which they must be exposed were\nabsorbed by the plumage, so that it became a heavy clinging mass. An\noily secretion makes it waterproof; we have all seen the duck free\nitself by one shake from every trace of its recent bath. The heavy\nskeleton that befits pedestrian creatures, would disable the bird from\nflight; so it is provided with tubes of thin bone, surrounding a cavity\nfilled with air. Its pinions must be light as well as strong; observe\nhow the light barbs of the feather have roughened edges so that they\nform one strong continuous surface, almost impervious to the air which\nthey strike. The air in the bones of birds and in other cavities of\nthe body, heated too by an inner warmth much greater than that of man,\ncontributes something to their buoyancy. Their speed and endurance are\nenormous. It is said that the swallow's flight is ninety miles an hour.\nOne long stretch across the North Sea brings the sea-fowl from Norway\nto Flamborough Head; they rest for a short time after this flight, and\npass inland, not the worse for their exploit. You may infer from the\nbeak of a bird its habits and its food. The bill of a woodpecker is a\npointed tool, tipped with hardest horn, to break open the bark of the\ntree for insects. The flat bill of the duck has plates of horn at the\nside; an excellent instrument for straining off the water and retaining\nthe food. The bill of the snipe is long, and narrow, and sensitive, to\npierce the marshy ground, and feel after its food. We might go on for\nhours multiplying such instances, and from every part of the field of\ncreation.\n\nNow, any mind in its natural state knows that in human works such\nadaptations could only proceed from contrivance, and is willing to\nregard these in the same way as proofs of design in creation. The\nphysicist has to tutor himself to a different view. All these things\nare evolutions, under pressure of circumstances, of the original forces\nof creation. For example, out of certain birds tenanting marshy\nplaces, one has a somewhat larger beak, and this gives him an advantage\nin piercing the ground for food; and so his share of food is larger,\nand his strength and courage greater, and he has a freer choice of a\nmate; and so the long beak grows longer in the next generation, and\nthe grandson's beak is longer than the son's, from the same causes;\nand thus the law works, until in course of time there stands confessed\na new species--a perfect snipe. Is the scientific theory better in\nthis case than the popular? It is not. It does not account for the\nfacts so well. But is not our belief that God made the fowl of the\nair with fitting instruments for a peculiar life because He saw that\nit was good, and wished all portions of His varied earth to be the\nscene of the joy and energy of appropriate tenants, a mere hypothesis?\nThe worship of God is universal, and exists without any explicit\nopinion that He is the Creator, the first Cause. Because you are able\nto conceive of Him, and are willing to accept Him as the Ruler of\nyour will and conscience, He must exist. Does this seem too rapid an\nassumption? Consider the alternative. If He exists not, the sound of\nworship has gone up from all lands in vain, and in vain have all good\nmen consecrated their lives to an obedience to the law of duty. Were\nsuch deceit felt to be possible, a darkness that might be felt would\nsettle upon our spirits, and the hands would indeed hang down, and the\nfeeble knees be paralyzed, and a strict silence on all moral subjects\nbecome us best. But we must see with such eyes as God has given us; and\nscepticism about faith and conscience is perhaps as unprofitable as\nscepticism about touch and sight. God exists then, it is assured to us\nby the common faith of mankind, by the highest law within ourselves.\nAnd as He exists, to Him, and to no other, must we assign the place\nof Creator. There cannot be two Gods. I cannot give my conscience to\none as its guide, and adore another for the wisdom of the universe.\nGod exists then, and His existence is not merely assumed in order to\naccount for marks of design in nature. And we maintain that the easier\nsupposition is also the truer. These marks of purpose are what they\nappear to be, tokens of the wisdom of God. \"Thou hast made heaven, the\nheaven of heavens with all their host, the earth and all things that\nare therein, the sea and all that is therein, and thou preservest them\nall.\"[7]\n\nIf I were to venture to express in a few sentences the belief of a man\nof ordinary education upon this subject I should say that God alone is\nand can be the first cause of this universe, the mover of its motion,\nthe giver of its life. The wise purposes which shine forth for us\nin nature, were in the mind of God from the first act of creation.\nIn saying that He has wrought by laws, we do not detract from His\npower; we seem rather to enhance it to our minds in attributing to Him\nconstancy as well as wisdom. A law is not a restraint; it is a fixed\nmanner of working. To say of a painter that he never produces any but\nfine works, does not affirm that he is less free than an inferior\nartist; just because producing bad work is no power or privilege but a\ndefect. And so, when we admit that God works by law, and expect to find\nthe same spectrum from the sun's rays, which we have once made with\nour own prism, at every time and in every place where the sun's light\nshines, and so on, we do not narrow the power of the Great Artificer,\nunless it can be shown that caprice is a privilege and a good. The\nsubject of miracles is not here to be discussed; I will only observe\nthat they are presented to us as parts of a great purpose for the\ngood of man; and that our Lord refused, when He was tempted, to work\nwonders out of wilfulness, or only to astonish. The extreme jealousy\nof scientific men of admitting any allusion to theology, in connection\nwith the course of nature, proceeds from erroneous conceptions of God.\nMr. Wallace, whom I have already quoted with respect, is ready to\nadmit that the Creator works in the beginning as the founder of the\nlaws on which the world is to proceed; but he is afraid of admitting\nthat there has been continual interference and re-arrangement of\ndetails.[8] But this eminent naturalist attributes to us a conception\nof the Most High which we do not hold, nay, which we energetically\nreject. If the laws were wise and good, whence would come the need\nof interference or re-arrangement? Who are we that we should bid God\nspeak once, and forbid Him twice to speak? The laws of nature are God's\nlaws, and God's laws are His utterance of Himself through the speech\nof nature. God is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever; and so His\nlaws remain the same. They are, if I may say so without irreverence,\nthe veil and vesture over the form of God, too bright in itself for\nus to look on; they take their outline from Him who is beneath them.\nYou may continue your researches in full confidence that the laws\nwill stand sure, not because you have the slightest guarantee as a\nman of science that these laws will never be interfered with; such a\nguarantee you have on your own principles no right to ask. You are to\nobserve that the facts are so; that they shall eternally be so is not\nfor you, for that is all beyond experience. But the wisdom that made\nthe laws needs not to revise its work, and erase and insert and amend\nits code. In the days of creation God saw that it was good; the eye\nthat so approved it changes not. Until the purpose that runs through\nthe ages is completed the laws will stand sure. But each new kingdom\nof nature has introduced a change amounting to a revolution, which\nneither the theologian nor the naturalist regards as an interference or\na caprice. When the principle of plant-life was introduced, the mineral\nworld became the material on which the plant-life worked; it gathered\ninto itself the lower elements, carbon, silica, nitrogen, and used\nthem as means of its own organic life. The plant partook of the nature\nof the class below it, whilst it dominated and used that class. This\nsame took place when animal life was introduced. The beautiful plants\nbecome the material whereon the animal life worked, the food whereby it\nsustained itself. It was the same when man was added, in whom instinct\nis replaced by reason, and ethical action supervenes over action by\nimpulse and appetite. Each of these kingdoms has much in common with\nthat which is below it. The animal is in many respects a plant; for the\ndiatomaceous creatures one knows hardly in which kingdom to find their\nplace. The man is an animal in much, and perhaps his animal instincts\nplay a larger part in the world's history and in his own development\nthan we are wont to allow. But each higher step brings in something\nwholly new. \"An animal,\" says Hegel, \"is a miracle for the vegetable\nworld.\" Each step is a revolution in one point of view; but then the\nlower state prepared itself for the higher, prophesied, so to speak,\nof its coming, and the higher seated itself so easily on the throne\nprepared for it, that we do not wonder to find it there. You call it\nevolution; we call it a creative act. We think that God exists, and if\nHe acts anywhere it must be in this, the universe of things. \u1f18\u03be \u1f11\u03bd\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 [Greek: Ex henos ta panta gignesthai] is an old saying\nlong before Christianity. But you and we may work by the same calculus\nand rules of observation. The facts are the same, the interpretation of\nwhat is behind them is different. Nor need we deny that the principle\nof which Mr. Wallace spoke as \"supreme in the world,\" has its truth and\nits use in explaining the facts of creation. It never raised an inert\nmineral mass into a vegetable organism; it never raised a plant into\nan animal. It never raised an ape into a man. No facts have yet been\nproduced that go to prove any such leaps, and if our logic is to be\nimproved in anything by the light of experience, it is in this, that\nfacts should be recorded and generalised, but not assumed. But that\nclimatic conditions, and the struggles for life, have modified species,\nand worked out new varieties, or new species, we may fearlessly admit;\nit is one more proof, perhaps, that the world is a meet school and\ntraining ground for the creatures placed in it for discipline. But a\nlaw is not a god; it never ruled supreme; never was other than one\nprecept out of many in the Divine code of the world.\n\nIt has become the fashion with some naturalists to speak of God as \"the\nUnknowable.\" Mr. Martineau has finely observed, somewhere, that this\nname is self-contradictory; for we affirm by the use of it that we\nknow so much, that He cannot be known. I go much further. It assumes\nthe existence of God, and in the same breath separates us from Him\nfor ever. Theologians have ever been ready to confess that God cannot\nbe known in His own essence to creatures such as we. \"Lo! these are\nparts of His ways: but how little a portion is known of Him? but the\nthunder of His power who can understand?\"[9] An uninspired writer\nspeaks the same language as the inspired. \"For us that are men to talk\nabout divine things is as when the unmusical discourse of music or\ncivilians of strategy.\"[10] But shall we then sit down in despair, and\nno more look up to God? We shall be untrue to our own best instincts;\nwe shall not have used all our means of enlightenment. I grant that\nthe mere contemplation of God in nature is not enough. Like the pillar\nof cloud of old, it is at once light and darkness; a light to us in\ncontemplating the book of nature, a darkness to our hearts, shut in\nwith their own sins and sorrows. Naturalists have never done justice,\nas it seems to me, to the most important facts of man's nature. Not\nonly can he study nature, but he can act in it and upon it. And this\npower of action assures him of his freedom. Possessed of this gift,\nthat places him a little lower than the angels, he knows that he can\nuse it either way. He may follow his own foolish vanity, his own evil\nwishes, and set up for his own law, and be his own God; or he may\nreturn to Him, whence he came out, and offer to God the homage of his\nown will, of his love, and his obedience. To one who has performed this\ngreat act God is no more \"the Unknowable.\" In the mutual commerce of\ntwo wills, two spirits, the finite and the infinite, the finite rises\nmore and more, and sees more and more of Him who has manifested Himself\nto us in His creation of the world out of free love, in His creation of\na free being to rule in the same world, crowned with glory and honor,\nin His giving that free being a law of duty wherewith to rule himself,\nin His having planted in him hopes and longings that will be satisfied\nonly in eternity.\n\nYes; man is humble and low. By every organ, and by every fibre he is\nmated with some analogous creature in the brute world. He surpasses\nthem in the variety of his ailments, and the profundity of his pains.\nHe is part of a system, which naturalists tell us is hastening towards\nnight and death;[11] the motion of the power of nature tending plainly\ntowards universal rest. But\n\n        \"Placed on this isthmus of a middle state,\n        A being darkly wise and rudely great,\"\n\nhe has that in him which unites him to another sphere. To be able\nto conceive of God at all; to have within him a will and a power of\nworship, these make him one with God, and assure him against death and\ndarkness. To deny oneself this privilege of viewing the earth in its\nrelation to God, to shut out God artificially from that sphere where\nthe natural understanding has always found Him without assistance, is\na pedantry for which we shall surely suffer. God will find us out.\nThere is often a certain irritation in those who would exclude Him\nfrom their sphere of view. They lose their philosophic calmness when\nthey speak of religious things. These are the tokens of past conflicts\nand past quarrels, of a soul that might know more of God if it had not\nrefused. God is reflected in the world, in the man's intelligence, in\nhis conscience, in his will. \"Whither shall I go from His presence?\"\nwe seem to be saying. It is better to be able to say, \"Whom have I in\nheaven and earth but Thee?\"\n\n\n\n\nPANTHEISM.\n\nBY THE\n\nREV. J. H. RIGG, D.D.,\n\nPRINCIPAL OF WESTMINSTER TRAINING COLLEGE.\n\n\n\n\nPANTHEISM.\n\n\nA hundred years ago the controversy of Christianity in England was\nwith Deism, and in France with Atheism; while at that time the\ntranscendental infidelity of Germany was as yet undeveloped, and the\nname of Spinoza was nowhere held in honour. Now, however, deistic\ninfidelity appears to be obsolete, and it is universally felt by those\nwho have entered truly into the thought and controversies of the age,\nthat the question for the present is between Christian Theism and that\nstyle of philosophy which recognises an impersonal divinity in all\nthings.\n\nDeism grants too much to the Christian. If a man really believes in a\nliving and personal God, a Divine Maker and Ruler of the universe, with\na moral character and will, he finds it hard to deny the possibility\nand probability of a revelation, and impossible to maintain the\nimpossibility of miracles. Having been obliged to yield thus far to\nthe Christian argument, the deist is unable thereafter to withstand\nthe positive evidence in favour of Christianity. Moreover Deism is\nbeset by the same difficulties in effect which surround the Christian\nrevelation, without its lights, its consolations, its blessings. The\nman, therefore, who rejects Christianity seldom finds his resting-place\nin Deism. He becomes a pantheist or an atheist.\n\nNaked atheism, however, is a repulsive creed. It is a heart-withering\nnegation. It touches no sympathy; it stimulates no play of intellect;\nunder the deadly chill of its unlighted vacancy, imagination cannot\nbreathe. There is nothing about it refined, or subtle, or profound. It\nis the barest and hardest form of infidelity, and has been professed\nby the coarsest minds. It demands no effort to comprehend its one\nuniversal negation and it taxes no skill to expound it. It is an arid\nand barren, a cold and dreary, hypothesis, which no genius, not even\nthat of Lucretius, could make attractive. The old illustration is\nconclusive as to its absurdity. It would be immensely less monstrous\nto maintain that the Iliad, in its full perfection, might have been\nthe product of the \"fortuitous concourse\" of the letters of the Greek\nalphabet, than that this infinitely wonderful and glorious universe\nis the result of the \"fortuitous concourse of atoms.\" Stark atheism,\ntherefore, however it may have flourished in the heartless and\nhopeless France of a hundred years ago, was never likely to take root\nin the soil of European scepticism as the alternative of Christianity.\nIn England it has had very few votaries. Nor has atheism, as such,\never found favour in the land of Luther and Melancthon, the favourite\nsoil of mysticism and pietism. English deism and Scottish scepticism\ndid, indeed, produce potent effects in Germany a hundred years ago;\nbut the result was neither deism, nor such scepticism as that of Hume,\nnor atheism, but a dreamy idealistic pantheism. And now Germany,\nwith a disastrous fidelity, by an infusion into our literature of\nits pantheistic unbelief, has repaid to Britain the debt which it\ncontracted by its importation of English deism and Scottish scepticism.\nAt the present moment a pantheistic philosophy is the philosophy in\nwhich unbelief for the most part invests itself in England.\n\nHence the task which falls to me to-day cannot but be felt by myself\nto be one of very grave importance. I could unfeignedly have wished\nthat it had fallen into other and more competent hands. Perhaps,\nhowever, I may venture to claim two qualifications which may, in some\nmeasure, help to fit me for dealing with the subject on which I have\nto speak. One is, that the subject of Pantheism is one which has much\nand frequently exercised my thoughts for many years past, ever since I\nlearnt from the writings of Coleridge, Hare, and others the meaning\nof what Hare spoke of as the \"fascination of Pantheism;\" ever since I\nwas led to the study of philosophy and its development, and especially\nof the thoughts of the early Greek wrestlers with the mysteries of\nbeing, of the Alexandrian Neo-Platonists, and of the modern thinkers\nof Germany, who have filled with transcendental exhalations of verbal\ndialectics the vacuum in speculation which had been created by the\ndestructive logic of Kant. The other qualification which I venture\nto claim for my task to-day is that I have some knowledge of the\ndifficulties of thought and belief which may lead honest men to become\npantheists; that I understand the manner of thought of one who has\nbecome entangled in the mazy coil of pantheistic reasonings; at all\nevents, that I know that honest searchers after truth may reluctantly\nbecome intellectually pantheists, while yet their heart longs to\nretain faith and worship towards a personal God. If, therefore, one\nnecessary condition of true success in argument is an intellectual\nand, as far as possible, a moral sympathy with one's opponents, that\ncondition, I believe, is fulfilled in my case. And I cannot but think\nthat all Christian controversialists ought to feel a tender sympathy\ntowards honest thinkers who are involved in the bewildering confusions\nof a philosophy which they do not love, even although they may, after\nmany a struggle and in sadness of heart, have succumbed at length to\nPantheism as the only conclusion of controversy in which they are able\nto abide.\n\nMy subject to-day is not the history of Pantheism, but its principles.\nThe history could not be dealt with in one lecture; the principles, I\nhope, may. And whatever may be the intellectual genesis, the descent\nand derivation, or the special character, of any particular form of\nPantheism, all its forms will be found to coincide in certain respects.\nThe semi-Hegelian of Oxford, and the pantheist who falls back on the\nlines of Mr. Herbert Spencer's speculations as his place of defence,\nmay both be regarded as standing on common ground for the purpose of my\npresent argument.\n\nIn attempting a criticism of the principles of Pantheism, the first\nthing to be done is to obtain as clear an idea as possible of what\nis to be understood by Pantheism, as distinguished from Theism on\nthe one hand, and from Atheism on the other. There can be no doubt\nthat the difficulties, both metaphysical and moral, which attach to\nthe conception of a personal God, the Creator and Governor of the\nuniverse, have, more than any other cause, constrained thoughtful\nmen who have pondered the problem of the universe, to endeavour to\nescape from their perplexities and bewilderments by taking refuge\nin the notion of a diffused impersonal divinity. And it must be\nconfessed that these difficulties are so oppressive and so staggering\nto our incompetent human reason, that they might well tempt the\nmere reasoner, the mere logician, the mere metaphysician, to give up\nfaith in a personal God, if so to do were not really to involve one's\nself in more than equivalent difficulties of the very same class,\nbesides many other difficulties, and in truth contradictions, both\nintellectual and also moral, which are involved in the pantheistic\nhypothesis. That the alternative is such as I have now stated, that\nthe pantheistic hypothesis is necessarily beset with such difficulties\nand contradictions, will in part be shown by the inquiry which, as\nI have intimated, must needs come first of all in the criticism I\nam to attempt. An investigation of the meaning of Pantheism, of the\ncharacteristic idea proper to the intermediate hypothesis which rejects\nequally A-Theism and Theism, will open to view the metaphysical\ndifficulties and contradictions involved in the hypothesis. I shall\nafterwards try to show the incompatibility of the principles of\nPantheism with the true principles of natural science. The moral\nconsiderations belonging to the Christian controversy with Pantheism I\nshall reserve till the final stage in my argument.\n\nPantheism agrees with atheism in its denial of a personal Deity. Its\ndivinity of the universe is a divinity without a will and without\nconscious intelligence. In what respect, then, does Pantheism really\ndiffer from atheism? If we eliminate from our idea of the divinity\nof the universe all consciousness, all sympathy, all will, what\nsort of a divinity remains, what sense of a present and real divine\npower is left to the man that shrinks from atheism? Atheism denies\nthat in, or over, or with nature there is anything whatever besides\nnature. Does not Pantheism do the very same? If not, what is there,\nlet the pantheist tell us, in nature besides nature? What sort of a\ndivinity is that which is separate from conscious intelligence and\nfrom voluntary will or power? Is it said that though there be no Deity\nin the universe, yet there is a harmony, a unity, an unfolding plan\nand purpose, which must be recognised as transcending all limitation,\nas unerring, inexhaustible, infinite, and therefore as divine? Let us\nask ourselves what unity that can be which is above mere nature, as\nsuch, and yet stands in no relation to a personal Lord and Ruler of the\nuniverse; what plan and purpose that can be which is the product of no\nintelligence, which no mind ever planned; what infinite and unerring\nharmony can mean, when there is no harmonist to inspire and regulate\nthe life and movement of the whole. Do not the points of distinction\nwhich the pantheist makes between his philosophy and the bald tenets of\nthe atheist amount in effect to so many admissions that the facts of\nthe universe cannot be stated, that the phenomena of nature cannot be\ndescribed, with anything like fidelity or accuracy, without the use of\nlanguage such as has no real meaning unless it implies the existence\nand operation throughout universal nature of a supreme actuative and\nprovidential Mind and Will?\n\nThe least and lowest implication which is involved in Pantheism, the\nmost elementary idea which the word pantheism can be held to connote,\nthe barest _minimum_ of meaning which the creed of the pantheist can\nbe presumed to contain, is that there is in the whole of nature--in\nthis universe of being--a _divine unity_. Let us then look at this word\n_unity_, and consider closely what it must mean.\n\nThose who believe in a divine unity pervading all nature must imply\nthat in the midst of the infinite complexity and variety of the\nuniverse there is everywhere to be recognised a grand law and order\nof nature--a method, plan, and harmony in the great whole, which must\nconsequently be traceable through all the parts. But whose and whence\nis this grand law? Is it indeed a reality? Are all things fitted to\neach other, part to part, law to law, force to force, throughout the\ninfinite depths of microscopic disclosures, throughout the infinite\nexuberance of nature's grandest provinces, throughout all space and\nall duration? Do all things work to meet each other? Is every several\nlife-cell, each organic fibre, moving, tending, developing, making\nescapes or overtures, as if a separate angel of unerring sympathy and\ninsight, of illimitable plastic skill and power, of creative energy\nand perfect providence, inhabited, inspired, and actuated it? Is it so\nthat the man of science, who enters into communion with nature's actual\nlife, and movement, and purpose, seems to see and feel divinities,\nunrestingly, unweariedly, in silent omnipotence, in infinite diffusion,\neverywhere at work, so that the reverent inquirer and gazer to\nwhom this wondrous spectacle is unveiled, could almost, in his own\npantheistic sense, adopt the invocation of Coleridge, and address the\npowers he sees at work in such words as these:\n\n        \"Spirits that hover o'er\n        The immeasurable fount,\n        Ebullient with creative Deity!\n        _And ye of plastic power that interfused\n        Roll through the grosser and material mass,\n        In organising surge! Holies of God!\n        (And what if Monads of the Infinite Mind?)_\"\n\nIs it so? I ask. Then, what does such a real harmony and such universal\ncorrespondence and providence as this imply? Surely we must perforce\nadopt one of two alternatives. If we refuse to believe in One Ruling,\nOrganizing, Creative Mind, One Living, Universal Mind and Will and\nProvidence, which works through all, we must endow each separate being,\nor at least each form of life, with creative energy, illimitable and\nall-answering sensibility and sympathy, unerring wisdom, and veritable\nwill. Nay, ultimately, as it seems to me, the alternative must be\nbetween accepting the faith in an infinite God, and attributing to even\nthe particles of inorganic matter, amenable as these are to the laws\nof gravitation and chemical combination, a wisdom, will, and power of\ntheir own, the power of intelligence and of self-direction. As to what\nare called the laws of gravitation and of chemical combination, we\nknow that a law, like \"an idol,\" is \"nothing in the world\" but a name.\n\"There is no power but of God; the powers that be, are ordained of\nGod.\" A law is not a power; the laws of science do but define observed\nmethods of movement or forms of customary relation between thing and\nthing.\n\nOf one thing, at any rate, I think we may be sure, that a mere order\nof nature, ascertained though it may have been by the truest and\nsurest induction, cannot have made and cannot sustain itself, cannot\nbe self-originated and self-impelled. So also it is certain that a\nmere plastic universal power, apart from any creative or providential\nmind, however its products might seem to imply intelligence, could be\nanimated by no conscious purpose, and could not be conceived as working\nwith blind automatic certainty conformably to a grand cosmical plan\nor towards a providential end. And if the divinity of the pantheist\nis nothing more than a personified law or order of nature, his\npersonification of this order or law can add nothing to its virtue\nor potency, can by no means transform it from a phrase into a living\npower, from a figure of speech into a real and intelligent force,\ncan never constitute it into a divinity. The more I reflect upon the\nsubject, the more assured the conclusion appears to be, that any\nconception of a real unity in and of nature is self-contradictory and\nunmeaning, except upon the assumption of a conscious and intelligent\nCreator. The unity of nature, to a man who denies the existence of\na real God, cannot be a unity inherent in nature, cannot be a unity\naccording to which nature itself has been planned, and is really\nworking; it is an imputed unity, the conception of the pantheistic\nphilosopher's own mind. Unity, indeed, as apprehended by us--and it\ncan only be known through our apprehension of it--is essentially a\nconception, a relative idea. If one could conceive nature as existing\ndestitute of a mind either to work on a plan, or to recognise a plan\nin working, in such nature there could be no unity. Unity in action\nimplies a plan of voluntary working, and therefore a regulating mind.\nUnity of conception and exposition implies an intelligent observer. The\nunity of nature, if it be not the plan and work of the very God, can be\nnothing more than a scheme and conception which has been invented and\nimputed by man.\n\nBut perhaps it may be thought that the word unity, as used by\npantheists, should be understood rather as referring to the ultimate\noneness and identity of all force throughout the universe, than to\nharmony of universal plan and purpose. Various as are the appearances\nof nature, and the modes in which the laws of nature operate, it may\nyet be set forth by the pantheist as his belief,--a belief, he will\nsay, which the modern advance of science tends continually to establish\nas the true theory of the universe,--that all force is ultimately\none, that the different forces of nature are mutually convertible and\nequivalent, that one energy of nature, Protean, universal, of infinite\nplasticity and power of variation or adaptation, pervades and actuates\nall things. It may be called gravitation, or electricity, or light, or\nheat, or nervous energy, or vital force; but ultimately and essentially\nit is one and the same; it is, to quote well-worn lines which will be\nheld here strictly to apply--\n\n        \"Changed thro' all, and yet in all the same.\"\n\nIt\n\n        \"Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,\n        Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees;\n        Lives thro' all life, extends thro' all extent,\n        Spreads undivided, operates unspent:\n        Breathes in our soul, informs our mortal part,\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n        To it no high, no low, no great, no small,\n        It fills, it bounds, connects, and equals all.\"\n\nNow if this be the pantheistic unity which is admitted by men who\ndeny a personal Deity, I will not stay to object that such a view is\nhardly consistent with the essential distinction in nature which even\nProfessor Huxley and men of his school unwaveringly and powerfully\nmaintain, between inorganic matter and living forms. It is more to my\npurpose to remark that it is much simpler and easier to believe in\na personal God, than in such an impersonal divinity as this Protean\nForce. Every difficulty which belongs to the thought of God's existence\nbelongs to this also. This force must be self-originated, must have\nbeen from everlasting, must be creative, omnipresent, providential,\nequal to all plans, purposes, contrivances, inspirations, which have\nbeen, or ever will be, in this d\u00e6dalean and infinite universe; must be\nthe source of all intelligence, though itself unintelligent; of all\nsympathy, although itself incapable of sympathy; must have formed the\neye, though it cannot see, and the ear, though it cannot hear; must\nhave blossomed and developed into personal intelligences, although\npersonal intelligence is a property which cannot be attributed to\nit; must unquestionably be omniscient as well as omnipresent, or it\ncould not, in its infinite convertibility, anticipate all needs,\nmeet all demands, answer in absolute and universal harmony to every\nfaculty, capability, and tendency of all things that are and all\nthings that become. Now is it reasonable to object to the doctrine of\na personal Deity because of its inconceivability and its stupendous\ndifficulties, and yet to believe in such a primal, essential,\nimmaterial, creative, infinite, blind and unintelligent force as\nthis? Surely no contradiction could be greater. The conception of God\nas from everlasting _is_ stupendous. But an infinite Protean Force\nfrom everlasting, destitute of intelligence and will, yet continually\noperative as the life, soul, wisdom, and providence, of all things, is\nnothing less than contradictory and absurd.\n\nI can come to no conclusion, accordingly, but that Pantheism really\nonly differs from atheism, in so far as it confesses that it is\nimpossible to speak with ordinary propriety, or in any such way as to\nmeet the necessities either of science itself or of the common sense\nand feelings of mankind, without employing theistic language. It has\nbeen said that hypocrisy is the homage which vice pays to virtue. So\na profession of Pantheism is the tribute of compliance at least in\nspeech, is the outward language of homage, which theism has power\nto extort from atheism. \"Pantheism,\" as is said by the author of\n_Lothair_, \"is but atheism _in domino_. Nothing,\" as the same writer\nadds, \"can surely be more monstrous than to represent a creator as\nunconscious of creating.\"\n\nYes, Pantheism is but veiled atheism. Strip Pantheism of all\ninvolutions of thought and all investitures of language, and in\nits naked truth it stands forth as mere atheism. Every form which\nPantheism takes, every disguise which it assumes, to hide from itself\nand from the world its real character, is a testimony borne by atheism\nto the necessity which all men feel for assuming the existence of\nDeity; What Robespierre is reported to have said with reference to\npolitical government and national well-being, that if there were not\na God, it would be necessary to invent one, is felt by pantheistic\nphilosophers to be true in regard to nature. So monstrous a conception\nis that of this universe without a governing mind; so clearly and\ndirectly to the common sense of mankind do the infinite harmonies of\nthe universe seem to imply a designing and governing Intelligence; so\nindubitably does the might and life of the universe, ever coming forth\nanew, ever springing up afresh, ever unfolding and advancing, imply a\ncentral living Power, One with the infinite governing Intelligence;\nthat pantheists, in order to speak and write intelligibly, are\ncompelled to invest nature with the qualities which they deny to the\nDeity, to attribute a spirit and intelligence to the whole machine,\nbecause they deny the existence of the great Mechanist; to personify\na harmony and unity which is but an abstraction, which, on their own\nhypothesis, is but a grand accident, a result without a cause, because\nthey refuse to believe in a personal God.\n\nI am very far indeed from wishing to come under the definition of\nwhat Mr. Hutton has spoken of as the \"Hard Church,\" or to carry my\npositions merely by the use of the dilemma, yet I cannot refrain from\nsaying, parenthetically, that the argument of the dilemma, carefully\nand truly applied, is not only always legitimate but often necessary,\nand I must affirm that it applies very closely in the present instance.\nThe pantheist cannot maintain his position midway between atheism\nand theism. If he absolutely refuses to be a theist, it is necessary\nto show him that he will have to yield to the cruel necessity of\nacknowledging himself to be an atheist. Standing midway, his position\nis altogether untenable, from whichever side it is assailed. On the one\nside, the pantheist is condemned by the same arguments which condemn\natheism; on the other side, the atheist may justly allege against\nthe position of the pantheist the self-same difficulties which both\npantheist and atheist urge against theism.\n\nBut if pantheism be in reality only atheism, I may henceforth\ndisregard the verbal distinction between the two, and bring forward\nconsiderations and arguments which apply indifferently to either.\nIn pursuing the discussion I shall take up in detail some points of\nargument already, as to their general scope, more or less distinctly\nintimated in the preliminary considerations which I have advanced.\n\nTo explode any view of the world which excludes from it the presence\nand government of a personal God, nothing more is needed than to\nrealize and truly understand the atheistic view in its various aspects.\nLet us try the atheist's theory on the history of the universe, and see\nwhether it can be made to fit, or must be broken in the attempt to fit\nit.\n\nThe will and interference of God, as the Lord and Ruler of the\nuniverse, is excluded. The universe is held to have been from the\nbeginning without a shaping and ruling intelligence and will. No\nmind has presided over its destinies, has animated its energies; no\nprovidence of Divine power and wisdom has guided its changes and\nprogress, has renewed and replenished and sustained it. It follows\nthat no power or will from beyond itself has ever touched the\nuniverse. Its own unaided and unguided powers have done all. If the\nuniverse did not make itself, it has developed itself: all that has\nbeen, or is to be, was included potentially in that which was at the\nbeginning, and has unfolded in necessary order. The vision presented\nis to certain minds very fascinating: it is a vision of vast unbroken\nprogress, of continual and infinite self-development. But let it\nbe worked out, and let us consider what it really means. Such an\nhypothesis must lead us back, in the infinite dim distance of the\noriginal and indistinguishable past, into a universe-mist of germinal\npowers from which all has since developed.--But stay. Was this mist\nand expanse of universal nature in its _origines_ all homogeneous\nand at one stage of existence? Then I have to ask, whence came it?\nWhat, going ever further and further back, where were the infinitely\nearlier, fainter, evanishing entities or powers, into which infinite\ncreative force and potentiality was diffused? and what the one life\nand grand harmony of influences and impulses, tending towards an\ninfinite goal of progress and perfection, which pervaded the whole?\nWhat does all this mean? Is this easier, simpler, more rational, than\nto believe in God from everlasting? Is anything gained in simplicity,\ncomprehensibility, probability, or in scientific character, by denying\nthat in the \"increasing purpose\" which \"runs through the ages\" there\nis any guidance of a divine intelligence or working of a divine will;\nand calling the whole process from first to last, from everlasting to\neverlasting, \"development\"? What is this word development but a name?\nDoes the use of the word explain anything? Does the use of the word\nreduce the mystery of the universe to the simplicity of an axiom? Does\nthe use of the word provide a simple equivalent for all that divine\nwisdom, power, and providence, have ever been imagined to do for the\nuniverse? Men call the mystery of being and becoming by the name of\ndevelopment, and then say that all things are effected by development,\nand that development explains all! Whereas this development of which\nthey talk so familiarly, as though they understood all its secrets, and\nwere privy to its infinitely various and mighty workings, and could\nunfold its source and meaning, is itself all the time the very mystery\nto be resolved and explained. Development is in truth as amazing and\nincomprehensible a mystery as creation. It seems to be but another\nword for creation. Only they who affect its use instead of the word\n_creation_, insist upon creation without a creator. The unintelligent\nand unconscious universe, on their view, is continually creating itself.\n\nThe hypothesis of development, however, is not only unintelligible and\nutterly devoid of reality, when criticized in its general principle;\nas might be expected, it altogether breaks down when it is tested\nin detail. Professor Huxley's protoplasm breaks it down. All the\nscientific evidence, as that eminent teacher of science showed at\nLiverpool last autumn, is opposed to the idea that protoplasm was\ndeveloped out of inorganic matter. The hypothesis of spontaneous\nlife-generation appears to be exploded. Science, at any rate, on its\nown positive principles, has no right whatever to pretend that life has\never been developed out of what was not living. Here, then, a great\nand, so far as science can help us to form a judgment, an altogether\nimpassable barrier rises to view against any development hypothesis. At\na certain stage in the history of the universe protoplasm, organized\nlife, made its appearance on the scene, starting up as a perfectly new,\nan original, an undeveloped phenomenon. Before, all had been inorganic\nand dead; now Life was abroad in the world, destined to increase and\nmultiply, and replenish the universe. Let those who deny divine and\ncreative will and government, inform us whence came this life. It was\nnot developed. Must it not have been created. If not, then whence, I\nask, whence did it spring?\n\nThe argument which I have just urged should, as I venture to think, be\nconclusive even with those who know, and seek to know, nothing more\nof science than the order and method of its phenomenal processes. I\nwill now bring forward a consideration which will, I hope, be admitted\nto have weight by those men of science--it is to be greatly lamented\nthat there should be so few of these--who have studied the nature and\nworking of the mind as well as the phenomena of sense. We have seen\nthat protoplasm--that Life--was not developed out of inorganic matter,\nbut appears to have been an entirely new and primary fact on the face\nof the universe. Life came in and appropriated, put to its own uses,\nbound up under its own seal, impregnated with its own specific virtue,\nthe raw inorganic materials which it found in nature; but the power of\nLife itself was altogether new. A fact in some sort analogous to this\nconfronts us in a higher sphere, in the sphere of living intelligence\nitself. I refer to the emergence of personal consciousness among\nthe world of living creatures. To me it appears that the sense of\npersonality is an altogether new and original fact, one which cannot\nbe conceived as developed or developable out of any pre-existing\nphenomena or conditions. Whence it comes, or how it arises, I know not.\nBut it appears to be, in and of itself, the assertion of an essential\nseparateness between One's Self and all phenomena, all constituents,\nall conditions whatever. The sense of an I Myself, of Personality,\nasserts an antithesis between the Man, and all that the Man uses, takes\nup into his personality, makes his own. As Life binds up inorganic\nmatter under its seal, but is not developed out of inorganic matter, so\nthe voluntary and responsible Self binds up under the seal of its own\npersonality all that belongs to the manifold life of its complex being.\nAs life brings into the universe a new world of phenomena, higher and\nmore manifold than those of mere inorganic matter, yet embodying and\nadopting these, so personality brings into the universe a new world\nof vastly higher and rarer phenomena than those of mere vitality,\nyet embodies and adopts these:--it introduces all that belongs to\nreflection and morality, giving birth to an intelligence and a world\nof thought, in which all the lower and anterior phenomena of the world\nbecome matters of cognisance, and are mirrored as objects of thought.\n\nAs I venture to think that this sense of personality, with the new\nworld of reflective consciousness and morality which it brings in, is a\nfact, starting up in the midst of a universe of anterior developments,\nsuch as all Mr. Darwin's solvents utterly fail to touch, a phenomenon\nwhich remains as far from explanation as before he wrote his last book,\nso it appears to me that the power of human speech is another fact\nstarting up in the midst of the line of supposed developments which\nno hypothesis of evolution can afford any help towards explaining.\nMiraculously developed reason, something higher, as it seems to me,\nthan any development of human reason our race has, in its highest\nculture, as yet put forth, must have been necessary in order to the\ninvention of language by any race even of the most sagacious mammals.\nAnd yet, again, speech itself is a necessity, a necessary instrument,\nin order to the high development of reason. We have some idea what\ndeaf mutes of our human family are like, when no painstaking and\nkindly culture has been bestowed on their intelligence, and temper,\nand affections, and conscience. Let us conceive the whole race of\nman to be, and to have been from the beginning, not indeed deaf, but\ncongenitally and irreversibly dumb, with no more power of articulate\nexpression than a horse, or let us say, a dog. What would the\ndevelopment of human reason have been under such conditions? How, then,\nis it possible to conceive that the wondrous faculty and instrument\nof speech was ever invented and perfected by mammals of infra-human\nfaculty and development, and that they were afterwards through this\ninvention developed yet more highly, until they attained to the dignity\nand advancement of humanity? Such infra-human mammals must have been\nmore miraculously endowed in order to such an invention than ever man\nhimself has been.\n\nAfter all that Mr. Darwin has written, does or can any reasonable\nman or woman actually believe in the possibility,--_apart from the\nDivine Power and Will and Guidance_,--for that is the point,--of the\nself-development, the spontaneous upgrowth of articulate language?\nLet us study our quadrupedal familiars, for the sake of illustration\nand analogy. We see daily how our noble dogs strain and groan after\nspeech, do all but speak: we mark their eloquent looks, their speaking\ngestures, their wonderfully expressive movements, how they watch us\nspeak, and seem as if they understood what speech is to us, and as if\nthey craved most longingly the power for themselves. We cannot but\nsympathetically admire the intelligent, the benevolent, the noble, the\nsagacious physiognomies which they show. If any creature ever could,\nwould, or did develop speech in any rudimentary form, are not they\njust in the circumstances to do it? And when once rudimentally begun,\nhowever uncouthly and imperfectly, should not their organs continually\nimprove by the continual effort and the increasing intelligence? Is it\nnot immensely less hard of belief, and less difficult to imagine, that\ndogs should develop speech, than that man should have been developed\nfrom the larv\u00e6 of the _ascidi\u00e6_? Yet is there even a beginning made\ntowards the canine development of articulate language, or does any\nliving man believe that such a beginning ever could be made?\n\nTo me it appears that human speech and human personality are in some\nway bound up with each other, that the one, in some sort, implies\nthe other, and that these two characteristics of our race present an\ninsuperable obstacle to the acceptance by really scientific thinkers\nof any hypothesis of evolution which, leaving God out of nature, would\naccount for the whole existence and progress of the universe on the\nprinciple of spontaneous development.\n\nBut again, let me be allowed to test the development hypothesis in\ndetail at another point. This hypothesis--and any pantheistic or\natheistic view of the universe which professes to be scientific--is\nobliged to confess that all living beings, of whatever sort, have been\ndeveloped out of a single primary cell--called often a germ-cell--of\nprotoplasm. Here they find the beginning of every kind of life. The\nplant, the animal, of every sort,--the lichen, the cedar, the sponge,\nthe bird, the mammal, the minutest entozoon, the most microscopic\ninfusorium, and man,--have been developed out of these primary\ncells. What then do the same men who teach us this, find to be the\nconstitution of these same cells, when microscopically examined?\nThey find them to be, for the most part, and indeed always, if\nallowance be made for very trivial exceptions, identically the same.\nThe matter is identically the same, the appearance identically the\nsame; no difference whatever of constitution, form, or properties,\nis to be detected. They cannot tell whether the nettle, or the frog,\nor the eagle, or the man, is to be developed out of any given cell:\nfor anything their science can teach them, any of these might be\ndeveloped, as they call it, out of any cell. But if this be so, is it\nscientific, is it real or true, is it not altogether misleading, to\nspeak of _mere development_ in such a case? The flower may be said to\nbe developed out of the bud because the bud is the flower in miniature,\nthe flower is really folded up in the bud. But surely here is no\ncase of mere development; here is no unfolding out of the germ-cell\nof what is potentially contained in the cell, regarded as a merely\nmaterial organism. Judged by every test of physical experiment, the\nprimary cells are identically the same; and yet they grow into forms\nessentially and infinitely dissimilar. Does it not clearly appear that\nhere is a matter in which some power above and beyond the mere physical\nconstitution and nature of the primary cell must be admitted, on every\nprinciple of science, on every ground of pure candour and truth, to\nbe of necessity present? Is it not evident that with each germ-cell\nthere must be associated some individual life-power which animates\nthe cell, which uses it as a unit to multiply, as a foundation to\nbuild upon, which does build and weave and work into it and upon it\ncontinually new material, which, for its own use in its work of weaving\nand fabricating, and for the completion of its own distinctive form\nand vehicle, takes toll of air and earth and water and heat-power--the\nancient elements--selecting out of them its appropriate pabulum,\nin whatever chemical combinations of the primary elements known to\nour modern scientific analysis may be fit and needful? Surely not\ndevelopment, but life, the mystery of individual life, is here. And\nif the philosopher will deny the omnipresent creative and sustaining\npower of God, it appears to me that he must be prepared to animate\neach germ-cell with an individual intelligence which works with divine\npower, on a definite and most miraculous plan, and towards a distinct\ngoal of perfection. To call such various powers and processes, such\ndiverse and generically different operations, in every sphere of life,\nby the same term, appears to me to be unscientific; to speak of them\nall alike as processes of unfolding or development, when results the\nmost infinitely unlike and separate are obtained from beginnings\nwhich are identically alike, appears to be not only unscientific but\naltogether misleading.\n\nI do not think it arrogant or unwarranted to conclude from such\nconsiderations as I have been trying to set forth, that evolution,\nor development, apart from the power and guidance of the Living God,\nis an unphilosophical, an unscientific idea, an empty, an unmeaning\nword. It is a thing of naught, utterly impotent to solve the mysteries\nof the universe, even when expounded and reinforced by Mr. Darwin's\n\"Natural Selection.\" I have not a word to say here against the views of\nMr. Darwin, as defined and modified by the requirements of scientific\nmodesty and precision. If I had any pretensions to be called a student\nof natural science, I should sit at the feet of Mr. Darwin when he\nspeaks, not as a philosophic theorist, but as a scientific observer\nand a truly inductive naturalist. But I must say here in respect to\nNatural Selection, regarded as, according to Mr. Darwin's hypothesis,\nthe handmaid of development, that, like development, it is but a\nname, and not a power. It describes the order and mode according to\nwhich Providence works; it is not itself a force--a working energy.\nMr. Darwin himself indeed often speaks as if Natural Selection were\nitself a power and a providence. I find to my hand in Mr. Kingsley's\nfine, suggestive paper on _The Natural Theology of the Future_,\nrecently published in _Macmillan's Magazine_, a sentence of Mr.\nDarwin's in regard to Natural Selection which I will quote. \"It may\nbe metaphorically said,\" writes Mr. Darwin, \"that natural selection\nis daily and hourly scrutinizing throughout the world every variation\neven the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving and adding\nup that which is good, silently and necessarily working whenever and\nwherever opportunity offers at the improvement of every organic being.\"\n\"It may be metaphorically said,\" are Mr. Darwin's words. But in fact\nhe is using, not a metaphor, but a personification. The distinction\nMr. Darwin does not see. He repeatedly speaks of his personifications\nas metaphors. But the distinction notwithstanding is most important.\nBy personifying Natural Selection Mr. Darwin makes it appear to be a\ncause, attributes to it a real power, nay, wisdom and providence, as\nwell as power. He speaks in one place of \"Nature's power of selection;\"\ncontrasting this with the \"powers of artificial selection exercised\nby feeble man,\" by which, however, man can do so much; and arguing\nthat \"Nature's power of selection\" must be incomparably greater, and\ncompetent to produce incomparably superior effects in respect of \"the\nbeauty and infinite complexity of the co-adaptations between all\norganic beings, one with another, and with their physical conditions\nof life.\" Language of a similar sort he very frequently uses. He has,\ntherefore, as a scientific man laid himself open to the reproof of M.\nFlourens, whom no one will deny to be a scientific critic. \"Either,\"\nsays M. Flourens, \"Natural Selection is nothing, or it is nature, but\nnature endowed with the attribute of selection--nature personified,\nwhich is the last error of the last century; the nineteenth century has\ndone with personifications.\" The nineteenth century ought to have done\nwith personifications; but with the spirit of Lamarck's speculations\nthe style of the French atheistic philosophy of the last century\nreappears.\n\nMr. Darwin, in the passage quoted by Mr. Kingsley, describes the\nmanner in which his Natural Selection may be conceived as operating.\nWhat, if his meaning were expressed with strict scientific truth, he\nought to intend to say, is that such as he describes is the result\nof providential working according to the mode and order which he\ndesignates by the phrase Natural Selection. \"All we ask,\" says one of\nMr. Darwin's ablest critics, \"is that we may be allowed to believe in a\nGod and a real Divine Providence, as powerful and wise and good as Mr.\nDarwin's Natural Selection.\"\n\nBut, moreover, it must not be forgotten that there is something besides\nthe mere process of change and growth, of what our philosophers call\ndevelopment, to be accounted for. There is a fact on which the growth,\nthe change, the evolution, must be held in a true sense to depend: a\nprior fact to be taken account of. The growth proceeds upon a plan,\nand fulfils an idea: protoplasm itself embodies a scientific principle.\nBut as the seal must be before the impression, the original before the\ncopy, so the principle must be before its embodiment, the plan and the\nidea must be before the growth: the end, towards which as its goal the\ngrowth or development proceeds, must have been conceived and set up\nas an aim before its fulfilment began. We are bound therefore, if we\nwould exhaust the problem, nay, if we would truly conceive, and justly\nstate it, to ask how and whence the principle, the plan, the idea, the\nend, had their existence? These are realities; they are the most inner\nand essential realities in every instance of growth or development;\nto deal only with the development of the physical basis, is to leave\nuntouched the kernel of the matter, is altogether superficial and\nunreal. But principles, plans, types and ideas, ends contemplated in\nmovement and progress, these at any rate are not physical, are not\nmatters of sense and organization. They are, as I have said, prior to\nwhat is physical, they are conditions antecedent to organization and\ngrowth. Moreover, they are mental conceptions, not physical affections.\nThey are only possible, they have no meaning, except as the thoughts of\nsome mind. Here, then, we are brought back by an inevitable necessity\nto an antecedent mind, the seat and origin of all the principles, the\nplans the ideas, the ends, embodied in organized beings, and fulfilled\nin their existence, growth, and perfection. In short, from whatever\nside we contemplate the problems of nature, and whencesoever we take\nour point of departure in their investigation, we find ourselves\nbrought face to face with creative mind. The things which are \"seen and\ntemporal\" lead us always inwards to \"the things which are unseen and\neternal;\" man and creaturely existence conduct us to the living God.\n\nIf any one would escape from the pressure of this argument by hardily\ndenying that living organization involves principle or plan, type or\nidea, purpose or end, it can only follow that the living forms of the\nuniverse are an infinite congeries of accidental combinations, that in\nreality there are no such things as organs, that there can be no such\nthing as development, and that there is no such thing as law. What men\ncall law is mere sequence that happens to follow regularly. The whole\nuniverse has been constituted and regulated by the fortuitous concourse\nof atoms. Against such a conclusion as this I do not need to argue. It\nis the naked and repulsive atheism of which I spoke in the introduction\nto this lecture. The line of argument which I have been pursuing seems\nto force us to the conclusion that there is no logical resting-place\nbetween such theism as Christianity teaches and such Democritean\natheism as that of which we have now had a glimpse.\n\nBut if this be so, it follows that it is impossible to deny design and\nfinal causes in creation, and the sway and oversight of a universal\nDivine Providence, the providence of a living God, except by denying\nall law. To the Christian theist, science is living science indeed; to\nthe pantheist, no less than the atheist, science is hardly better than\na dead register. He may talk of the wisdom, the power, the order, the\nbenevolence, of nature. But such expressions on the lips of a pantheist\nare utterly illusive. All the wisdom, all the marvellous adjustments\nof nature, are but the happy conjunctures, the exquisite chance\nunisons, of he knows not what. When lost in admiration of marvellous\norganizations, complexly apt and beautiful contrivances, of what seem\nlike the most studied and beneficent provisions, the soul that is\nbeginning to glow with wonder at this seeming wisdom, and to swell with\nthankfulness because of this seeming love, must be chilled into blank\nconfusion and amazement by the thought that there is no Being of Wisdom\nand Benevolence Who is to be thanked and adored because of these His\nmarvellous works. Surely this is enough to darken the universe to the\nexplorer of nature's mysteries, and to fill his soul with perpetual\nmelancholy. Nor is it easy to understand how any man of true science,\nany real inductive philosopher, who comes into contact with nature's\nliving processes and hears the perpetual whisper of her living voice,\ncan be ensnared into the acceptance of such a hard mystery of sceptical\nbelief as this.\n\nSurely, then, on purely scientific grounds,--the grounds not only of\nmetaphysical but also of natural science, on every ground which can be\nappealed to by high and pure philosophy, we are at liberty, I should\nsay we are bound, to reject the hypothesis which attempts to expound\nnature and to solve its mysteries, without the admission of a divine\nmind. Sense and matter and the observed order of phenomena do not\nconstitute the whole of our science. There are some words written by a\npoet, too much neglected at the present time, which I cannot forbear\nfrom quoting here.\n\n        \"How should matter occupy a charge\n        Dull as it is, and satisfy a law,\n        So vast in its demands, unless impelled\n        To ceaseless service by a ceaseless force,\n        And under pressure of some conscious cause?\n        The Lord of all, Himself through all diffused,\n        Sustains, and is the life of all that lives.\n        Nature is but a name for an effect,\n        Whose cause is God. He feeds the secret fire\n        By which the mighty process is maintained,\n        Who sleeps not, is not weary; in whose sight\n        Slow circling ages are as transient days;\n        Whose work is without labour; whose designs\n        No flaw deforms, no difficulty thwarts;\n        And whose beneficence no charge exhausts.\"\n\nSurely, if I may here quote some words of Mr. Kingsley's in the\nlecture to which I have already referred, this is what men of science\n\"are finding, more and more, below their facts, below all phenomena\nwhich the scalpel and the microscope can show, a something nameless,\ninvisible, imponderable, yet seemingly omnipresent and omnipotent,\nretreating before them deeper and deeper, the deeper they delve, that\nwhich the old schoolmen called 'forma formativa,' the mystery of that\nunknown and truly miraculous element in nature which is always escaping\nthem, though they cannot escape it, that of which it was written of\nold, 'Whither shall I go from Thy presence, or whither shall I flee\nfrom Thy Spirit?'\"\n\nThe observations which I have thus far offered are directed wholly to\nthe philosophical and scientific aspect of the argument respecting\nPantheism. I cannot bring this lecture to an end without referring to\nthe moral branch of the argument. The existence of evil in the universe\nis alleged as an argument against the existence of God and divine\ngovernment. Doubtless, the existence of evil is a painful mystery.\nMany good Christians have felt it to be an oppressive and almost an\noverwhelming mystery. It is one of the difficulties attendant on the\nChristian's belief; it is, in fact, the one moral difficulty. But\ndifficulties and mysteries cannot annul the positive necessities of\nthought and argument. If such arguments as I have endeavoured to state\nmake all science to be contradictory and unintelligible which speaks,\nin one breath, of the laws and wisdom of nature, and, in the next,\ndenies the existence of a God, then we are bound to accept theism with\nits inevitable consequences, notwithstanding the mysteries, whether\nmetaphysical or moral, which our faith may involve. Mysteries are not\ncontradictions, and, in whichever direction we move, we shall find it\nimpossible to escape from them. Mysteries surround the position of the\nsceptic or the atheist, no less than that of the Christian theist;\nnot only mysteries, but, as we have seen, contradictions, beset him\nround, in whichever direction he turns. The Christian theist, by his\nfaith in God, accepts the mysteries which are involved in the thought\nof God, but, unlike the unbeliever, he escapes from contradictions and\nabsurdities. It appears that the morality of man--his great glory--that\nhis sense of responsibility and of voluntary moral power, that which\nmost peculiarly constitutes him man, involves the law of moral\ninfluence as between man and man. It appears further that the power\nand faculty of moral influence for good must needs involve the law of\nmoral influence for evil. From the fact of man's own moral nature and\nmoral responsibility, and the consequent fact of his moral influence\nover his fellow-men, is derived, not only the possibility of moral evil\nin the case of a solitary individual, but the possibility, perhaps\nI may say the naturalness, the probability, of a contagion of moral\nevil spreading throughout the race, the effect of which can only be\ncounteracted or limited by moral arrangements and influences specially\nconstituted for that end. So much I may perhaps say in general,\nalthough the subject is one on which I think it wiser, as a rule, to\nsay nothing. I feel it to be a profound and perilous mystery, however\ngloriously it may have been made the occasion for the manifestation in\nChrist Jesus our Lord of the Divine superabounding wisdom, mercy, and\npower. But if we admit the subject to be involved in profound, even\nterrible mystery, is that a reason why, making shipwreck at one plunge\nof all that belongs to humanity, faith and hope and philosophy should\ncommit suicide, and descend together into the gulf of everlasting\ndarkness and despair! Reason may reel and grow dizzy while it looks too\nlong and too absorbedly down the fearful and fathomless depths of the\nmystery of sin, but that is no sufficient cause why reason should cast\nitself headlong into the abyss.\n\nPantheism has only one way in which to escape from the mystery of\nevil, and that is to deny all distinction between right and wrong,\nbetween moral good and moral evil. Of course there can be no such thing\nas sin for the pantheist, because all, according to his creed, is\nnature and development and necessity. Holiness is a matter of taste or\nsentiment. Conscience is an illusive development; what we regard as\ndivine morality is but utilitarianism sentimentalized and exalted into\nsacred law under the influence of unenlightened impulse and antique\nsuperstition, a mere affair of the association of ideas which science\nwill some day explain away. The ontology and ethics of Pantheism may be\nsummed up in one sentence, \"Whatever is, is; and there is neither right\nnor wrong, but all is fate and nature.\" Pantheism--I say Pantheism just\nas truly and completely as atheism, for the difference between the\ntwo, as we have seen, is but one of name and phrase, and both alike\ndeny God and conscience--Pantheism thus does cruel violence to every\nbetter instinct of our nature, outrages all the demands of religion and\ngovernment, whether human or divine, and makes itself the direst foe of\nhuman progress and well-being. Many pantheists, doubtless, have been\nand are virtuous, even noble, men; some, I am prepared to believe, may\neven, in a certain sense, be religious men. But the direct tendency\nof the pantheistic philosophy is confessedly what I have now stated.\nWhen moral and pure, its pure morality can be nothing more, at least in\ntheory, than a refined utilitarianism. Only as such can any pantheist\npretend to impose morality as law.\n\nTo sum up, may I not say that Pantheism, whether in its metaphysical or\nits moral aspect, is the dream of men who will not admit that there is\nin the universe anything beyond what their senses immediately reveal\nto them? Its philosophy was represented in the last century in its\nlower and more popular form by Condorcet; the basis of whose system was\nlaid in the principle, \"penser c'est sentir,\"--thought is nothing more\nthan sense or feeling; in its higher and more intellectual form it was\nrepresented by the sceptical sense-idealism of Hume. At the present day\nBain and Mill have endeavoured to develop the principle of Condorcet\nin harmony with the higher and more subtle philosophy of Hume. The\nresult appears to be a sort of nihilistic sense-idealism. Matter is\nprobably nothing different from our mental ideas--so far Berkeley, no\nless than Hume, is followed; our ideas, however developed, are yet\nessentially only the combination and interfusion of our sensations\nand sense-associations; meantime there is no evidence of the real and\nsubstantial existence either of the world outside us, or of ourselves\nas true and separate selves or persons, or of God. Such at least would\nseem to be the metaphysics of the distinctively _English_ school of\nPantheism, _i.e._, of Pantheism rendered into philosophic system by\nthe English mind. The German Pantheism has _infected_ the _tendencies_\nof English thought and criticism, but, notwithstanding the influence\nof Hegel at Oxford, has not been reproduced in any English system of\negoistic Pantheism. In their aspects and results, in relation to\ntheism and Christian faith, the German egoistic Pantheism and the\nEnglish sense-idealistic Pantheism strictly coincide.\n\nSuch then is the highest philosophy to-day of those who, refusing to\nbe called atheists, nevertheless reject all faith in God; of those\nwho, rejecting Christian theism, claim to be positively neither more\nnor less than the men of science. Men of science though they be,\ntheir philosophy is the philosophy of nescience and the philosophy\nof despair. We need be under no apprehension that such a philosophy\nwill ever be generally accepted. It is too strong, too sorrowful, too\nnauseous a composition to suit the common taste. It not only dissolves\nmorality and its foundations, but it precludes all hope of immortality.\nThe race indeed may be immortal and progressively great and glorious,\nalthough how even so much can be known is more than I can see; but the\nindividual man by man, woman by woman, child by child, perishes each\none for ever. Men and women with yearning, loving hearts, with tender\nand passionate affections, who have buried their dead out of their\nsight, and who could not endure to live if they were doomed to sorrow\nwithout hope, cannot but reject with loathing and horror such doctrines\nas these. Men of various culture, of manifold intellectual resources,\nwho live in the midst of refined and accomplished society, and who are\nnot suffering from the pang of immedicable anguish and irreparable\nbereavement, may possibly live so merely intellectual and speculative\na life, may be so wholly absorbed in mere science, may have so far\nseparated themselves from all that belongs to the heart's affections\nand the trembling religious sensibilities of human nature, as to adopt\nthe philosophy of nihilism with hardy calmness, although I confess\nthat it passes my power to understand or conceive this; such men may\nbe content to follow their speculative conclusions into the \"blackness\nof darkness\" for ever, and may thus, if not less, be more than the\ncommon crowd of humanity. But such a philosophy will not content\nthose who share the ordinary wants and sensibilities of our race. The\nworking, sorrowing, loving, hoping men and women of this human race\nwill no more be able to satisfy themselves with any atheistic or, if\nany should prefer so to call it, pantheistic philosophy, than they can\n\"feast upon the east wind.\" They will cleave to that Christian truth\nand faith which has \"brought life and immortality to light,\" and which,\nin \"showing\" to the craving heart of needy, sorrowing, sinful man \"the\nFather\" reconciled in Christ, has blessedly \"sufficed\" a longing world.\n\nIndeed, it would seem that, when, it comes to the point, even\ndistinguished leaders in the ranks of those against whose views I have\nbeen arguing, find it impossible to give up their faith, at least in\nimmortality. R\u00e9nan is unquestionably one of the most distinguished\nleaders among those men of learning and culture who deny the existence\nof a creative will and Personal God. Yet R\u00e9nan cannot make up his mind\nthat he has lost for ever his beloved sister; that she has passed\ninto the night of nothingness into which he must soon follow her. In\nthe dedication to her memory of his \"Life of Jesus,\" he addresses an\ninvocation to \"the pure soul of his sister Henriette, who died at\nByblos, Sept. 24th, 1861;\" and appeals to her \"to reveal to him, from\nthe bosom of God in which she rests, those truths which are mightier\nthan death, and take away the fear of death.\"\n\nR\u00e9nan, then, after all, cannot give up his sister, nor, if it were\nonly for her sake, his belief in immortality. And yet how utterly\nunscientific is such a belief, if science is to be defined and limited\nin accordance with the principles of the anti-theistic philosophy.\nWhere can our men of mere sense-science find any physical basis of\nimmortality? There is no hope, no instinct or faith, at once so\nindissolubly bound up with our nature, so necessary to the development\nof all that is best in man, and so utterly destitute of evidence and\nbasis in merely natural science, as our assurance of immortality. If\nwe are to retain our belief in immortality, we must maintain our faith\nin realities above and apart from sense, in realities which cannot\nbe tested or investigated by any appliances of natural science. If\nimmortality be true, Pantheism cannot be true.\n\nWhat, then, have we found respecting the seductive and too fashionable\nillusion which has led astray so many minds, especially of speculative,\nrestless, and daring intelligence, in the present age? We have found\nthat Pantheism is essentially only atheism in disguise, and occupies\na position in which it combines against itself the arguments which\ntheists have to allege against atheism, and atheists against theism;\nthat, while it dethrones the true God, it sets up in His place\nDevelopment and Natural Selection as its divinities, clothing them\nwith the attributes which it denies to deity; that its development\nhypothesis will not bear the test of science, of the natural science\nto which it professes to appeal; that the origin of protoplasm, the\nattributes of man, and the growth and transformation of germ-cells,\nalike refuse to accord with the hypothesis; that the very nature of\nscience itself, as recognizing law and organization, is incompatible\nwith any philosophy which denies theism; that the moral difficulties\nwhich rise up as a barrier against a denial of the Christian theism\nare no less insurmountable than the metaphysical and scientific\ndifficulties; that morality, conscience, natural affection, immortal\nhope, every deepest, most tender and sacred, most blessed and\nhumanising, instinct of our nature is violated by the denial of a\npersonal and holy God and Judge; in a word, that our whole humanity\nrevolts against it.\n\nMay I venture to hope that the views which I have now endeavoured to\nset forth may have some weight with young and inquiring spirits? No\nmore terrible suffering can there be, than for an honest, loving, and\nvirtuous nature to become involved in the meshes of pantheistic doubt\nand unbelief. We must make up our minds to bear with many profound and\npainful mysteries which are not to be solved by man; but may the good\nSpirit of God save us each and all from losing our childlike faith in\nHis almighty, omnipresent, and absolutely good and holy government and\nprovidence!\n\n\n\n\n    POSITIVISM.\n\n    BY THE\n\n    REV. W. JACKSON, M.A., F.S.A.,\n\n    LATE FELLOW OF WORCESTER COLLEGE, OXFORD.\n\n\n\n\nPOSITIVISM.\n\n\nEverybody in this room has, I suppose, heard of the \"positive\"\nsciences, or \"Positivism\" in some shape or other.\n\nWhat does \"Positivism\" mean?\n\nA system based on _positive_ facts. But what are facts? They are (says\nthe Positivist) observed phenomena. As for metaphysical conceptions of\nall sorts, these are _negatives_ with nothing real, nothing positively\ntrue in them. Truth must be sought amongst observed phenomena.\n\nIt is worth our while to examine this last proposition. Take a\n\"_phenomenon_.\" You have all observed colour,--what is it?\n\nA physicist, if you ask him, will tell you of a modification in a\nray of light variously produced--by refraction, for example--as when\nsunlight breaks a dark cloud into many-tinted beauty. But how if all\nthe world of men and animals were blind?\n\nThe physiologist will step in and speak to you of the structure of the\neye--the susceptibility of its retina for special impressions; there he\nsays you may find colour.\n\nPut both accounts together, and they appear as part-causes, each\na factor helping to make up a result; which result physicist and\nphysiologist would agree to call colour.\n\nYet again: Suppose the human and animal world were deprived of all\nconsciousness, all which in the widest meaning we call mind--their eyes\nremaining like mirrors, telescopes, microscopes; perfect instruments,\nonly every kind of intelligence, instinctive or rational, gone. Where\nwould colour then be? The sun might play upon cloud or rain, the light\nof a rainbow be reflected in the eye. Were there but perceiving mind,\nthe impression would exist. But we are supposing the impressible to\nbe wanting; there is no sensation, no percipient; colour must remain\nunknown, for there is nothing capable of observing it.\n\nNow this shows you, first, how important it is to emphasize the word\n_observed_ added to phenomenon. It shows you, secondly, _where_\nthe ultimate seat of every observation really lies; each observed\nphenomenon, each positive fact, is at last neither more nor less than\na mental state. The evidence for each fact is the condition of your\nown mind, your consciousness as it is called. You may sift the thing\nwitnessed, verify, examine, and cross-examine; but after all, your own\nconsciousness is the first real evidence you have got.\n\nIt would seem, then, that the most positive of all sciences would be\nthe science of mind; and the next most positive the sciences which\nenable us to draw conclusions from our positively existing mental\nstates; the statements, we may call them, which our minds make to\nus. Yet, strange to say, the very first thing Positivism does is to\ndispense with a science of mind, as mind, altogether. Mr. Mill makes\nit a severe reproach against Comte, that he ignores both psychology\nand logic; recognizes no power in the mind, even of self-observation;\naccepts no theory even of the inductive process. Mr. Mill characterises\nComte's want of mental science as \"a grave aberration.\"[12] It is\nindeed so. This appears plainly enough in the example just adduced\nfrom our commonest sensation, the every-day phenomenon of colour.\nIt was made up, you saw, of three factors, a physical antecedent, a\ncondition of the sensitive apparatus, and a mind which received into\nits consciousness the impression instrumentally conveyed to it. This\nlast, you will remember, was the _first_ fact to us. It is _the_ fact:\nthe revelation of an outward world, its changes and its continuing\npresence, its rest and its constant motion. Without this fact of inward\nconsciousness, nature would have possessed no more significance than\npictures seen in the eyes of the newly dead.\n\nSuch being the case, it needs no argument to show the importance\nof making quite sure that our interpretation of nature is correct.\nIf there be any unobserved illusion in our sensory instruments, or\nwhat must evidently be much worse, in our percipient mind, truth is\nat an end, and falsehood received in its stead. Hence the necessity\nof observing our own observations, subjecting our consciousness to\nscrutiny, and being acquainted with the criteria, not only of our\nperceptions, but of our judgments. It is this process of analysis and\ncriticism which forms a large part of the method of verification,--a\nmethod the value of which did not escape the great Greek philosophers,\nthough some recent writers seem to fancy it a modern discovery.\n\nInexperienced observers are often so little aware of the pre-eminent\nimportance of this critical process, that I will detain you with an\nillustration of it for the benefit of my younger auditors. My example\nshall be taken from perception _par excellence_--our eyesight, _the_\nsense pronounced surest both in poetry and prose. You will remember\nyour Horace\n\n        Segnius irritant animos demissa per aurem,\n        Quam qu\u00e6 sunt oculis subjecta fidelibus, et qu\u00e6\n        Ipse sibi tradit spectator.\n\nAnd almost everybody else has said the same, as witness the old\nproverb, \"Seeing is believing.\" Now I will mention five instances in\nwhich people believe they see something, and do not see it; in other\nwords, the objective antecedent is wanting, and the impression is\nproduced partly by the sensory apparatus, partly by the mind itself. As\nI describe these instances one by one, let my hearers ask themselves,\nHow does this illusion come about? Is it produced by our optic\ninstrument or by our mental activity?\n\nFirst, then, Take a lighted stick, and whirl it rapidly round and\nround. You believe you see a circle of sparks--in reality it is no more\nthan a simple train, and on a like illusion the Catherine-wheel is\nconstructed. Again, put yourself in the hands of an optically inclined\nfriend, and let him operate upon you thus. He shall place a cardboard\ndown the middle axis of your face, quite close against your nose--one\nside of his board, say the right, coloured a brilliant red, the left\na vivid green. After an instant or two let him suddenly substitute\nanother board, white on both sides. Do my young friends guess what will\nfollow? Your right eye will see green, your left red--the reverse of\nwhat they saw before; yet neither will see correctly, for both eyes are\nlooking at uncoloured surfaces.\n\nThirdly, Watch the full moon rising--how large and round she looks,\nresting as it were upon that eastern hill, and seen amidst the tops\nof its forest trees! How much larger and broader than when she hangs\naloft in upper sky! Has every one here learned the true reason why?\nIf not, look at her through a slit in a card, and her diameter will be\nthe same. Fourthly, A schoolboy is crossing his bedroom in the deep\ndark night, anxiously hoping that his head may not come into collision\nwith the bed-post. Though carefully and successfully avoiding it, he\nimagines of a sudden that the blow is imminent. Quick as thought he\nstops to save his head, and, behold, the room is as quickly filled\nwith sparks or flames of fire. Another moment, and all becomes dark\nonce more. I have heard many a schoolboy exclaim over this phenomenon,\nbut never knew one who could explain it. Finally, did you ever, on\nopening your eyes in a morning, close them quickly again, and keep them\nshut, directing them as if to look straight forwards? Most persons of\nactive nervous power, after a few trials--say a dozen, or a score--are\nsurprised to see colours appear and flit before the sight. Some years\nago, Germany's greatest poet tried, at the suggestion of her greatest\nphysiologist, a series of experiments on these coloured images. He\nfound that by an effort of will he could cause them to come and go,\ngovern their movement, march, and succession. And this took place\nunder no conditions of impaired sensation, nor any hallucination of a\ndiseased mind. A thoroughly healthy will succeeded in impressing itself\nupon physical instruments, controlling their law, and creating at its\nown pleasure an unfailingly bright phantasmagoria.\n\nSome here may, others may not, have apprehended the distinctions\nbetween our five cases. The first two are due to the sensory apparatus,\nits optical laws of continued impression and complementary colour.\nIn the latter three, mind intervenes. The enlarged size of the moon\noccurs through rapid comparison, the fiery lights in a dark room\nthrough instinctive apprehension, both influences of mind on the\nsensory system. The fifth and most interesting of all is no bad\nexample of interference between moral and material law. The will truly\ncausative (you may remark) overrules the natural process of physical\nimpression, alters it, and creates a designed effect. I wish I could\ninduce my young friends to devise a number of experiments on similar\nmixed cases, and, having tried them, to dissect out their real laws.\nThese sharpenings of the critical faculty are exceedingly useful--they\ncultivate clearness; and most people know that two-thirds among our\nmistakes in life are caused by confusion of thought.\n\nBesides all other uses, such lessons teach at once the necessity, as\nwe said before, of observing your own observations. And as, first, the\nreal witness of every observation is our mind; every fact[168] which\ncomes through our bodily senses being to us a mental impression, it\nseems but common sense to hear above all things what mind has to say\nfor and about itself. Then, secondly, where would be the benefit\nderived from our observations, if we could not reason upon them,\nor could place no confidence in our own reasonings? Yet the art of\nreasoning is so purely a mental process, that it can be represented by\nsymbols as abstract and free from material meaning as if they were bare\nalgebraic signs. Thirdly, in the most accurate of sciences mind extends\nour knowledge far beyond the circle of observation, and gives us\naxiomatic assurance of its own accuracy. Who ever saw, or ever can see,\nall straight lines in all conceivable positions, yet who doubts that\nthroughout the whole universe no two straight lines ever did inclose or\ncan inclose a space? And, fourthly, can it be a matter of indifference\nto any of us what evidence the mind offers concerning its own moral\nnature, and what is the value of that evidence, and the laws deducible\ntherefrom? How true it thus appears that \"know thyself\" lies at the\nroot of all knowledge, and that the man who receives no witness from\nwithin can know nothing as he ought to know it!\n\nComte swept away all these and the like considerations by a neat little\nfiction of his own. We cannot observe ourselves observing, he said, we\ncannot observe ourselves reasoning. So, then, logic becomes a chimera,\nand psychology a word of contempt. Respecting this fallacy, Mr. Mill\nthinks the only wonder is that it should impose on any one. Clearly\nit imposed on Comte himself. But, \"what organon,\" asks Mill, \"for\nthe study of our moral and intellectual functions does M. Comte offer\nin lieu of the direct mental observation which he repudiates? We are\nalmost ashamed to say it is phrenology!\" Mill regards this statement\nas a _reductio ad absurdum_, but the actual organon substituted is\nmore absurd still. Comte's phrenology was not the phrenology of Gall\nor Spurzheim, but a funny small bantling of his own, a sort of \"infant\nphenomenon,\" called into existence not without a Positive purpose. In\nplain words, mind was no longer to give evidence respecting itself. We\nmust study its laws in brain. How any true correspondence of brain and\nmind could be known unless both were studied, does not appear. Comte\noverlooked the question in his anxiety to substitute for psychology and\nits laws a bodily function and _its_ laws. Yet his motive appears to\nhave been excellent! He regarded this dwarfed superficial phrenology,\nMr. Mill tells us, \"as extricating the mental study of man from the\nmetaphysical stage, and elevating it to the positive.\" The chief gist\nof which sentence, bewildering to the uninitiated, opens up the very\ncore and centre of the Positive system--a subject for dissection of\nsome considerable human interest.\n\nEach science is brought into the positive stage when it is co-ordinated\naccording to positive laws--\"systematized,\" Comte would say. He has\na perfect mania for systematization; system is with him almost an\nequivalent for truth. Of course, the real value of every system turns\nentirely on its co-ordinating method, or principle of formation; and\nComte's, we see, was one of positive laws. The nature of these laws is,\ntherefore, the essence and turning-point of the whole matter. I cannot\nimpress upon you too strongly the paramount importance of keeping this\ntruth steadily in view.\n\nBut if any one inquires exactly what these laws are, he asks, I fear,\na puzzling question. Puzzling, for this reason that, say what one\nwill--employ any words, however carefully selected--one may become\nliable to the charge of raising a false impression. Positivist _savans_\nthemselves do not use any uniform phraseology, and many phrases they\ndo use are necessarily derived from philosophies most disedifying to\nPositive ears.\n\nExamples showing what sort of law is really meant are therefore always\nwelcome; and few could be more instructive than this way of making\nmind Positive. Comte did not falter in his purpose. Later on he\nexplained the necessity (for his system, you understand) of bringing\nour intellectual and moral phenomena under the same law with other\nphenomena of animal life; and reduced them, not to brain action pure\nand simple, but to cerebral functions, controlled by the viscera and\nvegetative movements of our bodily existence.\n\nLet us look at the meaning of all this. Soul used to be conceived of\nas different in _kind_ from body. The brain, the nervous system, the\nbody, were its organs, allies, machines. Sometimes they, especially the\ninstruments through which the soul more immediately works, exercised\nreaction on their sovereign employer; they impeded or suspended her\nfunctions, and troubled her serenity. But though they might cloud the\nmanifestation, they could not destroy the essence of a living soul.\nWhat they did was temporal and transitory; but they shall pass away and\nbe dissolved, while soul will endure for ever.\n\nThe word mind has been much used to signify soul, as acting in and\nthrough body. There is, however, some vagueness in its employment. Yet\nwe constantly speak of the laws of mind, because soul is in this life\nthe partner of body; and therefore known to us as mind, and _as_ mind\nis studied through its laws. One psychological task has always been to\nseparate the pure activity of soul from the mixed workings of mind, by\nexamination and cross-examination of our internal consciousness.\n\nYou will now easily understand how vast the change Comte intended by\nhis physiological organon for the study of our moral and intellectual\nfunctions. You will see what is meant by elevating mental science\nto the Positive stage, and systematizing it under laws which people\nmay variously describe as phenomenal, mechanical, or material;\nadjectives all roughly used to express the same general idea. What we\ntook for a spiritual essence is only a developed animal nature, the\ndifference between men and beasts of the field is not one of _kind_,\nbut of degree. ManKIND is a misnomer. Humanity is (as Comte thought)\na higher degree of animality. We have no right to suppose a personal\nimmortality. Man may be said to live after death in the memory of his\nfellow-men, but the truly Positive philosopher believes in no other\ndeathless existence. What we really can see and investigate is a vast\nmoving mechanism, _our_ universe. Beyond this all knowledge is a blank.\nWe know of nothing which set this mechanism in motion; it may have\nmoved from all eternity; it may go on moving everlastingly; or it may\nwear itself out. Philosophy can teach us no more than distinctions\nand degrees in the phenomenal law which pervades and rules a universe\nwithout a God.\n\nYet Comte said that he was no Atheist. He even denounced Atheism, and\ndeclared it as bad as theology. He did not wish to deny, only to ignore\nGod. Neither did he desire to appear ungrateful; (pardon words which\nsound in your ears profanity;) God was a really useful hypothesis once;\nin the days when men had recently issued from their prim\u00e6val forests.\nThanking the Deity for His provisional services, Comte courteously\ndismissed Him from His throne.\n\nAll this will have seemed to you a most monstrous tissue of negations.\nBut Comte held it to be a code of Positive faith; a faith firmly\ngrounded on the self-sufficingness of human nature, read according to\nhis version of course--void of belief in a personality which survives\nthe grave, without knowledge of, trust in, or prayer to God. The\nblessings of this advanced faith he desired to extend far and wide.\nAt the present moment his desire is realizing itself; for the like\nattitude of thought has become a favourite position among the _savans_\nof our Western world. When it penetrates the more active classes, we\nshall discern it easily by its _fruits_! what those fruits will be, is\na question for statesmen and for us all.\n\nThe chief hindrance opposing its spread amongst unsophisticated minds\nhas been a point much dwelt upon of old by Plato, and by Cicero after\nhim. It is the protest which that irrepressible entity called soul\nperseveres in alleging. We are all apt to shrink from the picture of\nbodily dissolution:\n\n        \"To lie in cold obstruction, and to rot;\n        This sensible warm motion to become\n        A kneaded clod!\"\n\nBut what if the \"delighted spirit\" has been developed by brain, and\nwith brain must be dissolved? Our whole distinctive human life,\nour mind, moral, intellectual, spiritual, rebels against a doom\nof subjection to that crass material law! Yet can we establish a\ndifference? Can we show that the law of our true being differs from the\nlaw of things outside us?\n\nThis question, unspeakably interesting to every one of us, might be\nput in various shapes. We might ask, Can the protest of soul be set\ndown as a mere sentiment only? If it were no more than an instinct of\nour nature, it would deserve consideration; for why should so high and\nnoble an instinct be aimless and misleading? If we cannot trust our own\nsouls, what are we to trust? Phenomena themselves are given us within.\nMathematical truths, which Positivists are obliged to exempt from\nphenomenal law, have a subjective validity--we cannot help thinking\nthem, and we cannot think their contradictories.\n\nBut suppose that a future state of recompence with its\ninferential moralities cannot be denied without denying our own\nconsciousness--pronouncing the clearest of our intuitions a will o'\nthe wisp--or, sadder still, a corpse light on the grave of hope--nay,\nmore, without subverting the law which makes human society to differ\nfrom animal gregariousness, and gives to human action its spring, its\nliberty, its life--suppose all this true, what shall, what can we say?\nAnd such is the issue I propose to try this morning.\n\nThe plan I have devised for trying it fairly is, first, to get as\nclear an idea as short compass will allow of what Positivism says\non our question. Afterwards to state a case for moral law by way of\nantithesis. It is through the law of our moral being that we may most\nreadily look for something to difference our souls from creatures below\nthem. The strain I shall have to put on your attention lies in this;\nafter grasping in brief the Positivist attitude, I must ask that you\nwill not take my facts or arguments on trust, but will verify each\nseverally by an appeal to your own consciousness. It is always upon the\nlaw deduced from or applied to facts that you ought to exercise your\ngreatest vigilance. For law interprets facts to us--we might almost say\nthat under its manipulation they bend like a nose of wax; nothing, you\nwill remember, so flexible as figures, except facts.\n\nLet me represent these maxims to you under a similitude. Everybody has\nlooked (when young at least) through a kaleidoscope, and has observed\nthe beauty of its many-coloured figures, their symmetrical shapes,\nand the enchantment of their succession. What magic creates this\nphantasmagoria? Some pretty bits of coloured glass, shining gewgaws,\nscraps of lace, fripperies, and other odds and ends, are put into a\ntranslucent box, and beheld through a tube fitted with mirrors which\nare set at an angle determined by optical law. The broken knick-knacks\nrepresent the facts of everybody's phenomenal kaleidoscope; the\nreflecting angle under which they are seen is its law; the coloured\nimages are everybody's impressions of things, nature, and mankind.\nAs long as you live, remember that whenever you are contemplating\nthe world's phenomena--whenever you see facts of life, either great\nor small, you are looking at them through some optical instrument or\nanother. If its law accords with their law, your view is truthful;\nbut then it will be all the less pretty, the less symmetrical. There\nare dark spots in our real world, checks of all sorts, moral evil,\nanguish of heart and conscience, foresights, stern accountabilities!\nYou have lost your childhood's magic glass, and have got a clear\nreflecting telescope in its stead! Pity to forego the nice kaleidoscope\nwhere all was so bright, so harmonious, and arrayed in such regular\nshapes. Yet the view it gave was worth what most people's views are\nworth--precisely nothing!\n\nComte had his kaleidoscope. Every systematizer who allows no mystery,\nno darkness anywhere, must keep the article; in point of fact, most\npeople enjoy having one. Alas! for the 19th century! It has such a\nfeverish viewiness, such a fashion of incessantly turning its magic\ntube, that life seems little else than a dreamy phantasmagoria!\nTo construct a steady reflecting instrument for yourself requires\nindustry, time, and thought, three things which few people care to\nbestow upon their beliefs. Therefore the practice is to pick up\nkaleidoscopes ready-made at a cheap rate, and to feel as easy as stern\nrealities will permit on the subject of their truthfulness. Romances\nare the kaleidoscopes of one class, cram-books of a second, newspapers\nof a third, self-love the optical law of the greatest number. We are\nmet this morning to break up a grand kaleidoscope, and to look into its\nconstruction. I shall do my endeavour to prevent you all from replacing\nit by any instrument of a ready-made sort. The easiest plan for all\nlecturers is to display a series of transparent conclusions; but I\nshall prefer furnishing you with facts and arguments, letting you put\nthem together, look at them, and verify their law of true vision for\nyourselves.\n\nLet us see Comte's law first. It was, strictly speaking, a law of\nsuccession and resemblance. You will guess at once that were this\nall we could see in the phenomenal world, our insight would be very\nlimited. And Comte's object was to limit us. We can never know,\nPositively speaking, final causes; those which make up the common\nnotion of design, purpose, intention. Nor yet any efficient causes;\nnothing truly productive of an effect, as men usually say. All we can\nknow is the middle of a chain of successive phenomena. The two ends are\nabsolutely hidden from our eyes. It was in this sense that Comte denied\ncausation--his language was vigorous; he denounced it as metaphysical,\nand when Comte nicknames anything metaphysical or theological, he\nmeans, as everybody knows, Anathema maranatha.\n\nThe difficulty here is palpable. A law of averages--a statistical law,\nas it is often called, does not profess to account for anything; it\nmerely generalizes crude material, and gets it ready for scientific\nthought to work out the true law. But a law of succession has an\nimposing sound, and it does in the worst sense impose. The fallacy may\nbe shown in an instant. Day and night succeed each other regularly.\nDoes either _account_ for the other? The rotation of the earth is\nsimultaneous with both--it accounts for both. Its effect is to expose\nthe earth's two hemispheres alternately to the sun's rays. This\nrotation coincides again with other laws of our planetary system, and\nthey account for it. It is on these laws, and not on such grounds as\nHume, Comte's great Positive antecedent, alleged, that we look for\nsunset and sunrise. When they fail, the system of which our globe forms\npart will have collapsed.\n\nSuch then was the original kaleidoscope of Positivism. It was condemned\nfor reasons which will have plainly appeared to you. Other eyes have\nswept the field of vision this world offers, and other instruments to\naid our insight have been adopted.\n\nYou will not have failed already to remark the extreme vagueness of\nthat word \"law.\" There are very few English words more vague: it\nis applied to almost every sort of formula, force, principle, idea;\nbesides being misused in ways almost innumerable. You must therefore,\nwhen busy with questions like the present, fix your attention upon\nthe adjectives added to it, and the examples selected by way of\nillustration.\n\nThe Positive system is, according to Littr\u00e9, of immeasurable extent,\nembracing the whole universe. Thus, whatever was conceived in dark\npreparatory ages, theological or metaphysical; whatsoever persons, who\nphilosophize in either of those antiquated ways may even now dream;--if\nthe conception cannot be reduced under Positive laws, it must be\nregarded as non-existent. All that really exists is included within\nsuch laws, the definition of which, therefore, becomes a subject of\nthe greatest possible importance. They are, he says, immanent causes.\nThe room we are in contains intelligent and educated people, but how\nmany here could define this word \"immanent\"? It and its correlative,\ntranscendent, are in truth metaphysical terms. If you will turn to\nMellin's Encyclop\u00e6dic Word-Book (favourably known to metaphysicians for\npurposes of pillage), you will find _immanent_ explained, under the\nGerman _einheimisch_, into ten shades of usage. Probably, in common\nEnglish Littr\u00e9 might have said \"inherent.\" \"The universe,\" he writes,\n\"now appears to us as a whole, having its causes within itself,\ncauses which we name its laws. The long conflict between immanence\nand transcendence is touching its close. Transcendence is theology or\nmetaphysic, explaining the universe by causes outside it; immanence is\nscience, explaining the universe by causes within itself.\"[13] Now,\none stock-in-trade example is that a stone falls to the ground by\nvirtue of an immanent cause. In plainer words, the stone belongs to\nuniversal matter of which gravity is an inherent law. Next, we find\nthis same example Positively applied to the human will. Volition is\nfree just as a falling stone is free; it obeys its own inherent law.\nFurther, we read of \"the rigorous fatalities which make the world\nwhat it is.\" Comte, Littr\u00e9, and others object against calling these\nfatalities materialistic, because they distinguish gradations of law.\nYet they limit all human knowledge within the materialistic circle,\nand Janet, who refuses to acquit them of Materialism, dwells on the\npoint that, instead of defining mind as an unknown cause of thought,\nemotion, and will, it is said to be, \"when anatomically considered,\nthe sum of the functions of brain and spinal cord; and when considered\nphysiologically, the sum of the functions of brain in consciously\nreceiving impressions.\"[14] We need not wish to dispute about words.\nBut suppose it had been stated in plain French or English that all\nknown or knowable objects in the universe are placed by Positivism\nunder the rule of laws as rigorous in their fatality as the laws\nof matter, would not the ultimate point in question have been more\ntangible, more intelligible? People might indeed have said, \"Why, after\nall Positivism comes to the same thing as Fatalism, or Materialism;\"\nand with certain writers this risk may very possibly be held a decisive\nobjection.\n\nOnce more,--another explanation given by Littr\u00e9 is, that Positivism\nlies strictly within the \"relative.\" Many here are aware how,\nsince Kant's time, England, France, and Germany have been flooded\nwith metaphysic, good, bad, and indifferent, on the relative and\nthe conditioned. Pity that Littr\u00e9 should have plunged into these\nwhirlpools! Ravaisson refers to Herbert Spencer and Sophie St. Germain\nfor the point that this conception, the relative, must always imply\nthe existence of an absolute, known or unknown.[169] I cannot follow\nhim now, but any one interested in doing so will find the subject\ncommenced at page 66 of his \"Philosophie en France,\" (one of the\nImperial Reports), and continued through sections 9 and 10. It is a\nvery important discussion. Ravaisson stands out amongst Frenchmen as a\nconsummate master of his science; and he inclines to infer that Comte\ntended, and that Positivism generally now tends, towards a final\nreturn to metaphysic. However this may be, I fear I have tired you,\nand am glad to quit this dry part of my lecture, and get away to more\ncommon-sense ground.\n\nBy way of introducing our most interesting topic, let me draw one\ncommon-sense conclusion from the difficult tract just shot over. During\nour passage, a thought may have flashed upon you which I remember\nhearing in a Bampton Lecture, somewhat to this effect--\"Positivism is\nthe most negative system of all.\" It appears hard to avoid this idea;\nfor Positivism denies in express terms that human beings have any\nknowledge outside those generalized laws of experience which make up\nthe Positive sciences. It denies (in a word) the most essential part of\nwhat was formerly held to be a knowledge of mind, both human and Divine.\n\nPositive thinkers rebut the charge of negativism this way. We confine\nourselves, they say, to what we know; we do not venture, like\nPantheists and Atheists, into the unknowable. We do not deny God, we\nonly ignore Him. We do not ask about the first cause of the world,\nor whether it has a constructural final end. Such questions as these\nare \"disedifying.\" \"The Positive philosophy,\" says Littr\u00e9, \"does not\nbusy itself with the beginning of the universe, if the universe had a\nbeginning--nor yet with what happens to living things, plants, animals,\nmen, after their death, or at the consummation of the ages, if the\nages have a consummation.\"[15] Littr\u00e9's sentence, which I have rendered\n_verbatim_, reminds one of the prayer told to Bishop Atterbury, as\noffered by soldier on the eve of battle: \"O God, if there be a God,\nsave my soul, if I have a soul!\" I am sorry to repeat ill-sounding\nwords again; but is not this really the exact religious attitude of an\nhonest Positivist, who feels sometimes touched by visions of possible\nlife after death,\n\n        \"Of all the nurse and all the priest have taught;\"\n\nthat is, if we conceive his attitude according to the _least_ negative\ninterpretation put upon the system?\n\nContinuing this least negative interpretation, let us view under its\nlight the Positive cosmology or theory of the world's existence; of\ncreation,--that is to say, if there ever was a creation. A stone\nfalls to the ground. Trying to account for the phenomenon, we grasp a\nlaw inherent in the material world. Other phenomena lead us to other\nlaws. We contemplate the material world with its laws in operation,\na magnificent spectacle of moving forces; an organic whole, shining\nthrough its own intrinsic glory of never-ceasing development. If we\nturn and pursue the reverse road, and trace evolution back to its\nelementary principles, we may dissolve worlds into primordial force, or\nwe may, as Professor Tyndall suggested at Liverpool, find the All in\na fiery cloud occupying space. Then comes the complex question,[170]\nWhat beyond? What before? Whence, and How produced? a Positivist\nthinker may return one of two answers. He may either say, \"We do not\nknow,\" or he may say, \"Nothing can be known.\" Take the least negative\nfirst, as we proposed; it surely deserves this rejoinder: If you plead\nignorance, but surmise that knowledge is possible, you ought not, for\nreasons valid with every true lover of wisdom, to stop here. You are\nsubstituting for the ideas of creation and first cause, what you call\na primordial universe, a material condition of some kind, producing\nphenomena regulated by inherent laws, successive, perishable, and\nnothing more! All once believed beyond, a blank! Even the very name of\nphilosophy consecrated by consent of ages to the First and to the Last,\nadmonishes you. Renounce your vocation, deny your name, or proceed. We\ndemand a Positive result in the highest sense, not a fog of ignorance,\nnot a slough of despond. But if the second answer be the true one, if\nthe teaching of Positivism is that nothing more can be known, let us be\ntold so in plain words. Let no one be charmed into the Positive circle\nby false allurements; for of all vices treachery and hypocrisy are the\nmost cowardly. Are you really wiser than the pagan Lucretius? If not,\nwhy boast of 19th century discoveries in wisdom, insight, happiness?\nIf you have examined the relics of a prim\u00e6val world, explored the races\nof living and thinking creatures, if you have ascended to the starry\nfirmament, and traversed its shining hosts, to come back with shame and\ndisappointment, and tell us this is _your_ all, _our_ all, then indeed\nthe wages of your science is death. While you speak your final verdict\nat least cover your faces,\n\n        \"And, sad as angels for a good man's sin,\n        Weep to record, and blush to give it in!\"\n\nThese thoughts have brought us to the most essential considerations\nof this lecture. Whether the Positive _savant_ puts in a plea of\nignorance or of blank negation, we care not. We will treat it as a\nchallenge thrown down, and do our best to meet it. Succeed or not,\nwe will take no refuge in ambiguities, but maintain a truly positive\nassertion. We say that the world we live in is not one world, but\ntwo,[171] distinguishable through the laws by which each is governed.\nThere exists such a thing as phenomenal law; we accept the fact. But\ndistinct, broadly distinct, apart in its working, its elements, and its\nfinal result, is moral law. An appeal lies to facts, and we shall try\nto justify our assertion.\n\nThe mode of proof now to be adopted is not metaphysical. I mention\nthe circumstance because investigations into mind are apt to be\nconfounded with metaphysic, and are then supposed too difficult to\ndeserve attention. My argument will demand nothing beyond a hearing\nand a scrutiny. It will consist of just so much mental dissection as\nmay be needful to show, first, a structural law of our inward nature,\nand, secondly, to illustrate its workings and effects. These two sets\nof facts will be placed side by side, in order that each may check\nthe other, and that their coincidence may also (as I hope it will)\nfurnish a fresh and sufficient proof of the contrast between moral and\nmaterial law. Everybody knows how convincing are, and ought to be,\nfacts separately ascertainable, yet converging into one and the same\nconclusion.\n\nOne form of speech almost unavoidable ought to be remarked beforehand.\nI mean the word freedom as applied to the human will and its volitions.\nWhen compelled to use it, I shall do so only in the sense of\nphilosophic as contrasted with theological free will. By philosophic\nfreedom I understand that sort and degree of active choice free from\nconstraint which is required for the idea of responsibility, an\nidea universally agreed on by divines opposed to each other on the\npoint of theological freewill. By this last-named idea I understand\nsupposed powers of spiritual attainment, which go to make up a notion\nof self-sufficing moral strength. With it the present lecture, being\npurely philosophical, can have nothing whatever to do, but I should\nmuch deplore misconception, because any theory of self-sufficingness\nwould be repugnant to my own personal convictions.\n\nLook now at the life of an animal, with senses often more\ninstrumentally accurate than ours. Survey the world around, which\nfurnishes the objects of his perception and his intelligence. The\nmode in which that intelligence acts is held to be more or less under\nthe absolute rule of instinct, and creatures below man are commonly\ndescribed as those \"that nourish a blind life within the brain.\"\nWhether this be or be not perfectly correct makes no difference to\nour present purpose. The point I want you to fix your thoughts upon\nis the _directness_ of relation between the feeling or intelligent\nprinciple of mere animal life, and the object perceived, felt, or\napprehended. Perhaps it may give vividness to your thought, if you\nfigure this relation under the similitude of a right line connecting\ntwo points--object without, apprehension within. The line itself will\nthen represent the impulsive activity of a creature, as, for example,\nwhen a hungry tiger leaps upon his prey.\n\nNow this directness of action is _not_ the thing most marked in our own\nproper human existence. What is really marked is the exact reverse;\nthe more truly _human_ any action appears, the farther is it away from\nresemblance to that animal characteristic. Suppose a man acts like a\ntiger, he is simply brutal; if he be governed by his feelings, however\namiable, we pronounce him weak or unreasoning.\n\nAbsolutely impulsive doings, such as the indulgence of an appetite,\nblows struck in passion, or even in self-defence, we separate from\nour volitions proper, and call them irrational and instinctive. In\neducating children we check displays of impulse, we bid them pause\nand reflect. And it is obvious that education presupposes an educable\npower or principle, which principle self-education (the most important\ntraining of all) will place in a clear light before you. Interrogate\nyourselves, then. You will see that the mental power you most wish\nto train and augment is distinguishable enough even in the commonest\naffairs of life. Take a case of feeling. Some object--no matter\nwhat--kindles an emotion within you--anger, wish affection, pursuit,\ndislike, avoidance--and you feel strongly impelled to take action\nthereupon. This would be the movement which was imaged to our minds\nas a simple line. But to launch along it inconsiderately you would\nfeel neither proper _per se_--nor yet doing what is due to yourself,\nbecause it is your human prerogative to act, not according to impulse,\nbut according to reason. And observe, to do, or to forbear doing, is\na question by no means determined by finding whether another emotion\nbe or be not stronger than the first. What reason demands is that the\nimpulse you feel, or it may chance the strongest of a dozen impulses,\nshall become to you an object of careful scrutiny. You are bound in\nhonesty to scrutinize it; not only because it exists as an incitement\nfelt within yourself, but much, much more because it is felt to be your\nactual self. It is your character which gave the spring, and lives in\nthe movement to action. Perchance this point of character is a hidden\nnook, an unknown depth of feeling or desire, undiscovered, unsuspected\nby your fellow-creatures--a secret of your inner self. Nevertheless it\nis amenable to the tribunal of a more inward self still, to be brought\nbefore it as an object that shall be examined and cross-examined,\nsentenced either to vivid freedom or present suppression--it may\nbe even to extinction evermore! Each human being possesses this\nwonderful self-objectivizing power. He is able to look at himself as\na NOT-self--a something partitioned off, and external; to be thought\nabout, felt about, reasoned about; to be controlled, chastened,\ncorrected. This power is our inalienable heritage; we cannot resign it\nif we would; we cannot finally suspend its exercise. Mountains could\nnot crush, nor oceans drown it; flames of fire never burned it out from\nthe breast of one single martyr. Whether we use our birthright for good\nor for evil, it still remains with us; when we act, our will is not a\nfeeling, an appetition, travelling simply from one point to another. It\nis a movement of our world within, a movement of that microcosm called\nMan.\n\nSuppose a person resolves to employ this power aright. Some wish or\nfeeling, such as might drive a lower creature to instinctive action,\nstirs within him, and becomes the object of his contemplation. To\nthe sessions of silent thought he summons whatever assistants he can\nget; the witnesses of experience, prudence, duty, the golden rules\nof the Gospel; whatever seems most proper to determine the question\nat issue,--fitness or unfitness, to act or to abstain from acting.\nHe says to himself (as all here have done a thousand times), \"This\nlonging, thought, state of mind, is wise or foolish, good or bad, right\nor wrong; nay, 'tis I myself that am so!\" And in thus saying he is\nconscious of that sort of freedom to will or not to will, which makes\nup responsibility. He does not deny--contrariwise, with the might of\nhis whole essential humanity he asserts--that the act of will is thus\ntaken out of the direct line of inevitable antecedency, away from the\nphysico-mechanical series, and enabled to commence a series of its own.\nIn a word, his consciousness evidences to him that functional law which\nmakes the human soul a thing more wonderful than all the inorganic or\nall the animated universe besides. And the law thus evidenced is the\nlaw of moral causation.\n\nI said that our own soul thus becomes to us more wonderful than all\nthe known universe besides. I might have said more mysterious; so truly\n_sui generis_ and different from all things not ensouled, as to be\ninexplicable by human sciences, an enigma to itself, dwelling alone in\nits own awful isolation. Do but think what _cause_ is--nothing less\nthan originating power; what then must it be in stern and sad reality\nfor a soul to originate a sin! Yet we cannot deny the fact. We confess\nit every day, not only in our hearts and deeper utterances, but in the\ncommonest though most tremendous of words, the word responsibility.\nIf a man were in no true sense the cause of his own actions, he could\nnever be held responsible either by God or Man. But as long as Justice\nmaintains her seat, each criminal will be so held, so judged, so\nrecompensed. And the only principle under which Justice can justify her\njudgments is the reality of moral causation.\n\nIf, then, this law be established, we have proved our point. Just as we\nrecognize a material world by mechanical law--and indeed our knowledge\nof matter itself is only a knowledge of its laws--so in like manner,\nand _pari passu_, we recognize a moral world by its distinctive law. We\nlive, therefore, not in one world, but in two:\n\n        \"Man is one world, and hath\n        Another to attend him.\"\n\nThe point is of surpassing importance! Upon it turns the whole issue.\n\"Can mechanism--or, as it is vaguely called, materialism--be or be\nnot accepted, with its attendant theories, as the truth; that is,\n_our_ whole truth, all we have to live by and to die by?\" Infinitely\nimportant issue! having much to do at this very moment with the\nhappiness and real good of millions amongst our fellow-creatures and\nfellow-countrymen. It is for this reason we must not spare pains to\ndemonstrate our moral law, for this reason also we will give some\npassing sentences to show how worthless in argument is the sophism most\ncommonly circulated against it. Men speak of a \"law of motives,\" with\ncomplete assurance, and without seeming to be aware of the twofold\nfallacy underlying it. Writers on the subject furnish statistics of\nsuicide, murder, and the like; and then ask how the freedom of moral\ncause can be compatible with so visible a law? But what sort of a law\nis this? Clearly not a law upon which the results are conditioned,\nas sunrise on the earth's rotation; but a mere generalization, like\nthe laws of average before mentioned. Such a law does not govern the\nacts, but the acts the law, or, in plain words, they _are_ the law.\nIt is an epitomized result, inferring no more consequence to our free\nmoral causation, than a life assurance infers to the contingency of\nour individual life or death. The sophism would be readily detected if\nit were not for that unfortunate word \"motive.\" People forget that a\nmotive is not a power that compels us, but an object which we choose\nto seek. \"Will,\" we are seriously told, \"must be determined by the\nstrongest motive.\" Now if, in thus speaking, the strongest motive\n_objectively_ be meant, that is the motive essentially and in its own\nnature the strongest, then indeed we may exclaim, \"Would that this\nwere true!\" For are not right, justice, goodness, absolutely and in\nthemselves the strongest? Yet men in general fail to pursue them;\nthey are chosen by those of whom the world is not worthy. But if, on\nthe other hand, the phrase \"strongest motive\" is to be understood\n_subjectively_, and means that which on each occasion is _felt_ to be\nthe strongest; what form of sounding words has ever yielded a more\nbarren sense, a simpler truism? \"Will must be determined by the choice\nof will.\" It means this, and nothing more.\n\nWe may sum the whole matter of motive in a single sentence. Motives do\nnot make the man, but the man his motives. To conceive it otherwise\nwould be to imagine each man a mere bundle of instincts, such instincts\nas we calculate with certainty in the brute animals we wish to allure,\nto subdue, or to destroy.\n\n        \"Be not like dumb driven cattle,\"\n\nsays the Psalm of Life, and old Herbert exhorts--\n\n        \"Not rudely, as a beast,\n        To run into an action.\"\n\nThe beast feels an incitement, and rushes direct upon the pitfall. It\nis the prerogative of a true man to subsume (as logicians speak) each\nline of impulse into the circle of his own soul; to deliberate in the\nsecret chambers of a being impenetrable even to his own understanding,\nand to put in force the result which becomes as it were the free\nmanifestation of himself. When therefore you examine the actions of a\nfellow-creature, and discern his motives, you praise or blame what? not\nthe motives, but the man.\n\nPermit me to close this discussion by an example of the manner in which\nwe make and unmake our own motives.\n\nNo one present is so young, or so careless, as never to have felt the\npains of self-reproach. Some light or shade of life projects before us\nthe outline of ourself. By virtue of the law described, we view and\nreview it, as if it were the picture of another being. In contrast\nwith it, we place our own ideal, all that our boyhood fondly fancied\nour manhood would become; the semblances of those we have loved and\nlost; of the father, who taught us to prize truth and virtue above\nearthly wealth and distinction; of the mother, at whose knee we knelt\nin prayer, and whose upraised eye imaged the serenity of that heaven\nto which she implored us to aspire. These beloved forms, robed in the\nunfading freshness of a love stronger than death, stir our heart of\nhearts, with accents unmistakable. They remind us of what we resolved\nand trusted one day to be found, in thought, in feeling, and in life.\nBut, close to the glowing portrait of our purposed self stands the\ndwindled figure of what we actually are; and, oh, the shame, the\nanguish of that stern, disappointing comparison!\n\nAmong the lower creatures (we ask in passing) what is there to resemble\nthis self-reforming principle? In the domesticated animal, both beast\nand bird, we see wounded affection, grief under a master's anger, and\ndesire to win back his love. In the gregarious tribes we find respect\nfor a common bond of what we almost may call utility; but has any sense\nof wrong as wrong, or sin as sin, ever been found educable? Man shows\nthe mighty strength of this principle within him, even when he shows it\nin its most repulsive shapes. The remorseful wretch who throws himself\nbeneath the wheel of Juggernaut, is a different _kind_ of being from\nthe horse or dog. And considering the self-interest, self-flattery, and\nself-indulgence arrayed against it, may we not say that the root of\nsuch passionate remorse has something sound in it, else it would long\nago have been trodden out from the life and heart of mankind?\n\nFor now, as always, our honest anguish and shame sow the appointed seed\nof our noblest attainments. Those steps by which we climb our steep\nascent are hewn in the travail of our souls. David found it so, when\nhe heard the voice of Nathan saying, \"Thou art the man!\" and wrote\nwords which have come down near three thousand years;--\"The sacrifices\nof God are a broken spirit.\" \"Of all acts,\" asks Mr. Carlyle, \"is not,\nfor a man, _repentance_ the most divine? The deadliest sin, I say, were\nthat same supercilious consciousness of no sin; that is death; the\nheart so conscious is divorced from sincerity, humility, and fact; is\ndead; it is 'pure' as dead dry sand is pure. David's life and history,\nas written for us in those Psalms of his, I consider to be the truest\nemblem ever given of a man's moral progress and warfare here below.\"\nTruest emblem indeed! In it, we see, as in a glass, how living in two\nworlds we cannot but have a sympathy with each; insomuch that every man\nfeels himself to be two selves, not one; a spiritual and a psychical\nman. \"There is,\" says Sir Thomas Browne, \"another man within me,\nthat's angry with me, rebukes, commands, and dastards me.\" A _double_\nconsciousness which grows upon many a soul, until its truer choice and\nbetter motives are attained:\n\n        \"The life which is, and that which is to come,\n        Suspended hang in such nice equipoise\n        A breath disturbs the balance; and that scale\n        In which we throw our hearts preponderates.\"\n\nThis lecture started from the question, what is a phenomenon, and\nhow do we know of its existence? Seeing that our knowledge rests\nprimarily on the evidence of our own mind, we drew the inference that\nComte committed a fatal error when he banished the science of mind, as\nmind, from his cycle. Reviewing his various devices, and some devices\nof his successors, for eliminating psychology, and reducing the study\nof mind to a study of bodily functions, we approached the stronghold\nof Positivism,--law. And, after discussing the theories maintained\nrespecting it, we boldly threw down our challenge to this effect: law\nphenomenal or mechanical admitted, we assert, the existence of another\nkind of law. We say that the freedom of human choice between evil and\ngood is utterly unlike the freedom of a stone which falls by mechanical\nlaw, and cannot choose but fall. The inference from phenomenal law\nis the existence of a phenomenal world. The inference from another\nexistent law is that there is another existent world. Man, we affirm,\nlives in both; has sympathies with both; and, by virtue of his double\nnature, is a true citizen of both. The ultimate principle of man's\nhigher nature is to us inscrutable; for, even as the eye sees not\nitself, so neither does the spirit of a man discern that which makes\nit spirit. But, though we cannot know the soul, we can know much and\nmany things about it; things most important--nay, all-important for us\nto know, since they distinguish the spirit that burns within us from\nmatter, from mechanism, and from mere animality. Hence we do not, with\nthe Positivist, ignore the unknowable. Contrariwise, confessing our\nignorance, where we are ignorant, we strive to observe and gather all\nwe can.\n\nOne thing that can be thus known is the principle of moral causation;\nand this we have inductively investigated. We began by observing a\nprocess in our own minds, a process or law of self-objectivity. I am\nsorry to use such an uncouth word; but it saves a long description,\nand you will all remember the fact. That process carries, on the very\nface of it, adaptation to the purposes of moral choice, free from the\nmaterial necessity which governs a falling stone, and disengaged from\nthe control of such impulses as the incitement of ruling instincts. We\nnext verify this law by observing its operation; _first_, in single\nacts of the Will accompanied, as you will recollect, by distinct\nconsciousness of choice and responsibility. It was in respect of\nthis conscious certainty that Dr. Johnson said, \"We _know_ we are\nfree, and there ends the matter.\" We verified, a _second_ time, the\nself-objectivising law, by its working and effects upon our motives,\nwhich it makes and unmakes; eliminating some, adopting others, so as to\nmodify and alter our whole real character. Any one who is happy enough\nto recall the slow advances of successful self-education, or a less\nordinary process by which old things passed away and all things became\nnew, may recollect with pleasure how this law served as an instrument\nof change; how it placed himself before his own inward eye, even\ndaily, in freshly instructive lights, awakening new self-questionings,\nemotions, aversions, desires, hopes, and stimulating to new exertions;\nhow it opposed itself to the mastery of any single dominant passion,\nunder which we say a man acts mechanically, because he has already\nsurrendered himself a slave to its sway; how it became a check upon all\nday-dreaming or drifting with the tide, when again we are said to act\nmechanically because we yield to circumstances as they flow, and live\na blind life, like creatures that cannot escape the chain of Instinct.\nFor, observe: let any instinct, even the noblest, be ever so nobly\ndeveloped, if we act from its impulse only, and not from a reflective\nchoice of the prompting which it gives, we are living below the image\nof our true nature, because we are not striving to become a law unto\nourselves.\n\nYou may verify our moral law in numberless ways among the common\nwalks of life; and it really is a task of no great difficulty, if\nyou take with you the truth that the whole issue is summed in one\nword--Responsibility. A falling stone cannot choose but fall; were\na man subject to material law, he could have no choice whatever.\nNeither would it make any real difference, if the Will were impelled\nby overpowering motive, and did not make its motive to itself. The\nslate which slides from a roof, and kills a child, we do not accuse\nof murder; we do not attach moral accountability to the hungry tiger.\nIt is because man is not impelled like stones or tigers, that we hold\nhim responsible. And we praise or blame in the highest degree his most\ndeliberate acts. The wrong he does with malice aforethought is a crime\nin the strongest sense; the good he works with considerate purpose we\nesteem his highest well-doing. In our time the wills of individual men\nhave changed the destinies of nations; and any one who reads books,\nreviews, or newspapers sees a vigorous use of that word responsibility.\nNo one doubts that these powerful wills are the true causes of effects\nfelt throughout all Europe, effects which will remain when those who\ncaused them are in the grave; nay, even when generations--perchance\ndynasties--shall have passed away.\n\nIn lower life, we honour the truly causative man who conquers a habit\nof intemperance or any evil passion: it is greater to overcome one's\nself than to conquer many cities. We deem every one accountable for\nwhat he allows, or disallows, in relation to his God, his fellows, or\nhimself. In a word, we consider each man so far the true cause of his\nown conduct, as to load him with responsibility.\n\nYes, responsibility! Do not shrink from the thought; it is wholesome\nfor all. Do but practise self-control enough to look yourself with\nhonest purpose in the face when you are about to act, you will never\nsuppose that you act mechanically, and you will seldom act amiss. If\nyou wish to benefit your countrymen, inculcate the grand lesson of\nresponsibility; for what well-informed person doubts that one main root\nof our present social and religious ailments lies in compromise with\nknown immoralities, indolent acquiesence in hollow words, and lifeless\noutside shows, where ought to be heard and seen the rigid truths of\naccountability, duty, consistency?--all impossible without a practical\nlaw of self-scrutiny and self-control. Yet further: Responsibility is\nalso an undeniable witness to a world of life beyond death. Just as\neven Herbert Spencer himself has remarked, that the idea of relativity\ninvolves the correlative idea of an absolute; even so, in thought,\nresponsibility involves its correlative belief, a recompence! But, in\nmorality, the evidence is stringent beyond expression. For, the idea of\nresponsibility is fixed in the nature of things; unchangeable, eternal.\nAnd it contains in itself the loftier idea of personality. Leading us\nto look for a world of righteous recompence, it leads also to belief in\na personal Being, before whom we are responsible, and who will award to\neach of us our recompence. David travelled the same road to the same\nconclusion, when he looked round upon men, who lacked mercy because\nthey lacked justice, and said, \"Unto thee, O Lord, belongeth mercy:\nfor thou renderest to every man according to his work.\"\n\nDid I not feel that my strain upon your attention must now cease, I\nshould have liked to show at length how the law by which we discover\nmoral causation, may be verified everywhere in the whole province\nof mind. It is difficult, for instance, to look at the perplexing\nquestions raised about language, without perceiving that there\nruns through its purely human formation the articulate results of\nan element resembling internal dialogue; in other words, a law of\nself-objectivising representation. In art, again, the perpetual efforts\nof ages is to present our human manifoldness of thought, feeling, and\nidea, before our one individual self. Hence the art formula of multeity\nin unity. And what is the true bond of society as distinguished from\ngregariousness? Is it not the Gospel's golden rule? But how can our\nneighbour be viewed as a second self, unless self has been already\nobjectivised before our moral intuitions? We might follow the same\nthread throughout the conditions of all philosophy.\n\nThe one thing we have to remember in every research concerning man\nis that education, whether of self or others, implies an educable\nprinciple; a germ, of which education and attainment are the bud, the\nblossom, and the fruit. Therefore, if we want to know Humanity, we must\nlook to the educated human being. The philosopher, the artist, the\nthinker of every sort, must have risen into clearness ere he can become\na typical man. Is it not, therefore, a mistake to appeal for theories\nof human nature to the statistics (always statistics!) of ignorance and\nsavagery? When modelling our physical form, Buonarotti did not seek his\ntype in hospitals for maimed or distorted limbs, and exclaim, Behold,\nsuch is man! Curious too, and contradictory, the way in which appeals\nto barbarism have worked. In the 18th century we used always to hear of\nthat golden age,\n\n        \"When free in woods the noble savage ran,\n        And man, the brother, lived the friend of man.\"\n\nIn the 19th, savage life is cannibalism, superstition, cruelty,\nterrible, revolting, loathsome; perchance, time must yet pass before we\nlearn justice to our fellows of any age! Meanwhile, we may feel sure\nthat our human ideal is not to be found in the frost-bitten rickety\ninfant species; nor yet in its dwarfed and stunted adult; the cretin\nand the imbecile will not give its lineaments; and it may be hard to\nsay which is least like a true man, the undeveloped or the perverted\ncreature. For example, what superiority in moral height has the\n_savant_, whose self-satisfied science ignores or denies a God, over\nthe poor pigmy barbarian, unskilled in the use of fire, and living upon\nberries and insects, who props himself against a tree with earthward\nface, and prays, saying, \"_Yere_, if indeed thou art, why dost thou\nsuffer us to be killed? Thou hast raised us up. Why dost thou cast us\ndown?\"[16] Better perhaps the rude stammering of our race's childhood\nthan its half-speechless, half-paralyzed old age!\n\nAnd here the argument of this lecture ends. Of causation in general,\nand the grand subject of design, it has not been my hint to speak.\nThese vast topics have fallen into higher hands than mine. My aim was\nlimited to finding the _differentia_ of man--the moral characteristic\nwhich places him in contrast with physico-mechanical laws.\n\nIt occurs to me, however, that you may employ ten minutes not\nunpleasantly, upon what we can hardly help calling the romance\nof Positivism. The story, taken from first to last--part comic,\npart tragic--is as wild and weird as one of the Frenchman Dor\u00e9's\npictures,--a story too strange to be thought true, if it did not\nhappen to have been true! It has also its stinging lessons, and they\nfollow naturally; evolved, as it were, from the motley and mystifying\ncommencement.\n\nComte's life has been written by friend and foe. For fulness of detail\nthe right book is by his disciple and executor, Dr. Robinet, who has\njust figured among those who rule in the Commune of Paris. Robinet\nis very interesting, for he thoroughly believes in his master, and\naccepts the whole Comtist religion, calendar and all, which Littr\u00e9 and\nothers reject. No reproach this to Comte's biographer, for that same\nworship is celebrated in our cooler atmosphere of England. The _Pall\nMall Gazette_ has, by its notices, made the celebrations widely known.\nThere is an account of the grandest yearly solemnity which will suffice\nmany, and excite the curiosity of more, in its number for January\n7th, 1868. It is not hard to see that the worshippers differ from\nthe recusants by a strong feeling that they cannot live upon axioms\nsounding like negatives. They want sentiment, emotion, excitement to\nsustain them. Let us observe how Comte caught the first glimpse of this\nrequirement.\n\nHis life was sombre--a boy delicate and fractious, disliked by his\nmasters, turned out of the Polytechnique, repudiated by his great\nsocialist teacher St. Simon. His family relations not happy, his\nmarriage least of all. We cannot wonder at vagaries, for he had a\nreal fit of rampant insanity, and after release from an asylum had\nnearly drowned himself in the Seine. His wife found him intolerable,\nand left her home. Mr. Mill speaks of her respect for him;--it was\noddly testified after his death, for she pleads in law that he was a\nmadman, an atheist, and immoral; repudiates his will, and seizes the\nconsecrated relics of his dwelling. Littr\u00e9 supported her against those\nwho, like Robinet, thought her little less than blasphemous. If she had\nappeared in an English law court, we should have known more truth than\nwe do.\n\nLet us now look at such facts as we have from the more favourable\nside. The man lived a lonely life, as became a sort of conceptual\nalchemist, sustained by a belief that he was turning men's leaden\nthoughts into his own pure gold. One brilliant projection of his has\nmade him the idol of Positivists. I confess it puzzles me, among\nmany others, to imagine how a qualified critic can treat such a\nphilosophic solvent either as true or as original. It supposes the\nhistory of all human thinking to pass necessarily through three stages,\ntheology, metaphysics, positive truth; and that the world makes\nprogress accordingly. We will hope that the thing called theology, a\nbenighted belief in the government and intervention of supreme will,\nis not altogether extinct in this age of progress; if it be so, Mr.\nFroude encourages us to look for a revival. Among lesser matters, the\nhypothesis of metaphysical cookery is an idea one fails to realise.\nWas it a banquet with joints cut Laputa-like, after some fashion of\nconcepts, or syllogistic figures? Was it a \"feast of reason and a flow\nof soul,\" or, more probably, an abstraction pure and simple, as if a\nman could\n\n        \"Cloy the hungry edge of appetite\n        By bare imagination of a feast\"?\n\nComte's comicalities strike most people all the more because he writes\non, always utterly insensible to his own comedy. If any one wishes for\na serious critique in small compass, I may mention Stirling's appendix\nto his translation of Schwegler's Handbook; Whewell in his Philosophy\nof Discovery, and elsewhere.\n\nComte was most confiding in his own theory. Littr\u00e9 is not so confident,\nfor he has another theory of his own. But, putting aside the question\nof its verification, we may remark that in the rough idea Comte showed\nhimself before his age. Positive thinkers have busied themselves with\nphysical evolution; for example, the development of a brain from an\noyster or an eozoon; but Comte was intent upon mental evolution.[172]\nMan need not much care about the congeners of a body sprung from\nearth; but soul is another thing. We trust our own spirit, as carrying\nsome image and superscription of God; we feel and conceive it to be\ndifferent in kind from sensitive life; we love to think of it in its\nfinality as a spark flowing out from Divine Light; a breath breathed\ninto body from above. In the reverse of this belief there is doubtless\nan element unfavourable to happiness; it makes some men cynics, some\npessimists, some simply victims. Comte's infinite self-satisfaction\nprobably saved him from self-torture. But we judge that he felt his\ncondition deeply, from the rapture with which he hailed a new and\nbrilliant discovery!\n\nYes, it was the most wonderful of all his discoveries; he one day found\nan unsuspected law of life within himself; he discovered that he had a\nheart.\n\nTo many, this is the black spot on Comte's memory; they cannot receive\nhis love, nay, his frantic adoration, of the lonely wife of a convict,\nabsent in the gallies, as a piece of pure Platonism. Had Madame Comte's\nallegations been sifted fully, we might have known all. As it is, I\nfor my own part like to think him innocent; he was mad from disease,\nand perhaps from conceit; a conceit, says Mr. Mill, too colossal to be\nbelieved without reading him up; but I trust he was not immoral. His\nletters are against it, the lady's face is against it, and above all,\nthere is against it the lasting effect upon himself. After a year's\nhappiness to Comte, she died and left him, as he thoroughly supposed,\nan enlightened and a religious man.\n\nPoor Comte! His sweeter life was buried with the dead, who to him could\nnever rise again. His religion was no more than a funereal cult; a veil\nthrown over it, no hope, no thought of reunion! The episode of Clotilde\nwas, in itself, one of those touches of nature which make the whole\nworld kin; the brief, bright, and long sad experience the solitary\nhad of his heart; the love, the loss, the unforgetting sorrow! But,\ndid it not prove, beyond the force of reclamation to disprove, that\nComte's system ends, at last, in what is commonly called materialism?\nits faith (or negation of faith) being in effect this, that we look\nfor entire human dissolution coincident with bodily death. And the end\nflows naturally from the beginning; all we think is phenomenal, all\nwe know is phenomenal, first and last. Our life is only a phenomenon;\nand death, death joins us to the unreturning past. We are absorbed,\nall that is good of us, into general and generic humanity; an Eidolon,\ncalled the Great Being for our comfort; as if a name (what's in a\nname?) could console us! The race we may have tried to serve is to be\nour Euthanasia, our sepulchre, I had almost said our cenotaph!\n\nStrange thought, not without a kind of serpent-fascination! Epidemic\nin England now, gaining force from its unhallowed audacity! The\nconsistent pessimist, who rates men at the worst, thinks the worst in\nhimself, and does the worst by all others, and by himself, if he is\nbut fixed in this unbelief, need not fear what the world, man, or God\nshall do unto him. It is the old whisper, \"Ye shall be as gods!\" 'Tis\nsuperhuman to sit and watch the storm; to have our strong sensations,\nillusions they are called in France; blood-poisons which circulate in\nour life, working hot passion and mischief; sorrow to many a loving,\nmany a confiding heart; passion, mischief, sorrow, what matters it?\nthere comes an opiate by-and-by! The man of overwrought brain, used\nup, worn-out feelings; the distempered dreamer; the reckless worker of\nwrongs; the disappointed striver for an earthly crown, all shall have\ntheir common slumber at last; unconscious, impervious, unbroken. I will\nread you three stanzas from a longer piece written by one not unknown\nalways where that tree of knowledge grew:--\n\n        \"Cessation is true rest,\n        And sleep for them opprest;\n        And not to be,--were blest.\n\n        Annihilation is\n        A better state than this;\n        Better than woe or bliss.\n\n        The name is dread;--the thing\n        Is death without its sting;\n        An overshadowing.\"\n\nIf such be the thought to them whose natural heritage stands strong,\nfringed with luxurious hope to live beloved, to die regretted; what\nwill the \"overshadowing\" be when it passes, like a plague breath, over\nthe children of toil and anxiety, over them whose life is at best hard,\nand their lot depressed and without \"illusions\"? Will they not want\ntheir strong sensations? Will they respect any law, human or divine,\nwhich stands between them and their enjoyments? Will they not crush\nall who bar their pleasures, aye, choke them in their own blood? Why\nnot? The opiate comes to all at last. 'Tis an act of oblivion! The\novershadowing will cover all.\n\nAnd this is the coming creed of the 19th century. To return to Comte,\nabout whom I might say much, but must not;--of course, he had no\nforesight of anything worse than an immediate realization of his\ncrowning ideas--sociality, fraternity, Positivism. Europe split into\nsmall states; women made incapable of property, but held objects\nof religious worship; men worked on a communistic principle; an\noligarchy of rich; a spirituality of Positive believers, with a supreme\ninfallible pontiff at their head; Paris the seat of infallibility and\nof order. Clotilde had shown Comte a principle antagonistic to, and\npredominating over, all egoism; Altruism was to burn out of men all\nselfish aims, nay, the ordinary feelings of a man! A rigorous rule of\nlife was to aid, and a religion without a God to enforce, this new\nlaw. Two hours a day, divided into three private services, were to be\nspent in the adoration of Humanity under the form of a living or dead\nwoman. The image of the fair idol, dress, posture, everything was to be\nbrought distinctly to mind; and the whole soul to be prostrated in her\nhonour. Comte, it has been said, gave woman everything except justice.\n\nThere is a grave moral in this tale. Theology was extinguished; but the\ndesire to worship burned on--a fire unquenchable. Is that desire, or\nis it not, a broad reality, an inalienable truth of our nature? Comte\naccepted it for himself, and not for himself alone, but for our whole\nhuman race. Along with it he accepted the only principle which could\nbestow universal validity. Our moral intuitions were acknowledged safe\nguides, and something more; the rulers of an intellectual world, the\nrevealers of truth higher than all beside. Often and often he asserted\nthe dominion of heart over mind. Probably, if Comte had lived longer he\nwould have acknowledged other revelations of our moral nature. Moral\ncausation, for example. That strange phrase of his--\"a modifiable\nfatality,\" self-contradiction in words, suicide in sense, what did it\nportend? Was it the first sound of a marriage-bell, freedom and duty\nonce again united? A change of his system wonderful to contemplate, yet\nnot more wonderful than the state in which he left it.\n\nOne cannot help here asking how matters would have stood if Comte had\ndied without knowing his Clotilde. How incomplete according to his own\naccount his philosophy! how wanting in that which perfected the whole!\nA notable fact this, throwing great light on the value of such-like\nsystematization which, after all, much resembles secretion from that\ninteresting viscus, the system-maker's own particular brain. And there\nis another fact quite as notable. How curious that Comte should have\nlived so long without discovering whatever truth his own heart and\na strong human affection disclosed to him! Hence we might illustrate\nand confirm a previous remark, that any one not living a truly human\nlife--call him undeveloped, uneducated, dwarfed, or immature--is no\ntypical man; and if we believe ancient maxims, scarcely a learner in\nphilosophy, certainly not a judge of its highest and widest problems.\n\nThe most notable fact and greatest surprise of all is, that Comte's\nprayer without petition, his passionate self-mesmerizing adoration,\nhis religion without a God, should have taken any hold on men. No\none can transfer to others his private sorrow or his private joy;\nit is hard for a man to get his thought understood, harder still to\nmake common pasture of his heart. But Comte devised extraordinary\npropagandist expedients; those who consider his developments mere\nmadness, should explain why sane people have accepted them. Comte\nset no value on Protestantism in any shape. The religion of his own\ncountry he carried back to medi\u00e6val forms, and then travestied it.\nThere were many festivals, a calendar of saints, nine sacraments, and\na horrible caricature of the Christian Trinity. This idea crowned his\nsociology, which I need hardly say was communistic socialism, enfolding\n(as socialism always must enfold) and scarcely veiling the most iron\nof despotisms, both temporal and spiritual. His mind delighted in\ncontemplating a synthesis of the great Fetish, Earth, with the great\nBeing Humanity; which last somehow assumes on occasion a feminine\ngender.\n\nTo Clotilde, symbolizing that supreme object, Clotilde, his noble and\ntender patroness, he transferred Dante's homage of Beatrice; addresses\nto the mother of our Lord; and stranger than all, the prayer of Thomas\n\u00e0 Kempis to Almighty God, \"Amem te plusquam me, nec me nisi propter\nte\"--\"May I love Thee more than self, nor self at all except for Thee.\"\nNow consider: when Comte died, sixty-four years had not quite elapsed\nsince goddesses of Reason were worshipped in the cathedral and other\nchurches of Paris. Upon each high altar a fair woman, chosen for her\nfaultless beauty, sate enthroned, her feet resting upon the consecrated\nslab. Gaily clothed in tunic and Greek mantle, she was so displayed\nby a torch behind her throne, so elevated above her worshippers, as\nto attract from Phrygian cap to Italic shoe their passionate gaze and\nadoration. Low down beneath her footstool lay the broken symbols of\na faith then declared effete and passed away; just as half a century\nafterwards Comte declared theology passed away. Music sounded, incense\nsmoked, Bishop Gobel, who assisted at a parody of sacred rites, wept\ntears of shame, but in fear and trembling he assisted. The object of\nthis mad mockery of religion, this empire of heart over mind, this\nwoman-worship, was to proclaim afresh Fraternity, Progress, Sociality.\nSociality, for the supposed law of which final development Comte\nworshipped humanity and Clotilde--but disowned immortality and God.\n\nThese two madnesses, how near akin, how far apart were they? The world\nis not really made young by destroying old things; yet the path of 18th\ncentury madness lay through fire and blood. Its deeds are sometimes\nspoken of, even now, as great crimes; but no great crime is criminal\nin the sight of men whose life is godless, dark, and unsubstantial.\nHorrors pass before them like unrealities. \"The world,\" writes Mercier\non the trial of Louis XVI,--\"The world is all an optical shadow.\" In\nour 19th century life, 'tis a skilfully prepared overshadowing, beneath\nwhich men beat their brows till their blood-shot eyes see red. \"I see\nred,\" exclaimed Eugene Sue's ruffian, \"and then I strike with the\nknife.\"[17]\n\nLet me end by telling you a dream, which is not all a dream.\n\nA company of _savans_ were seen in the visions of the night, busy\nwith a new scientific invention. Earth, they argued, earth has her\nvolcanoes, her burning exhalations; men have electric lights, fires,\ngas lamps, furnaces. These make up the world's proper illumination.\nThe effect intended was, therefore, to darken the air we breathe, so\nthat no rays from the upper sky should pass through it. The inventors\nhoped that a district, a country, nay, even a world, might thus be\novershadowed by a gloom impervious to moon and stars by night, to sun\nby day; and the human eye see no changes, save those which the earth's\nactivity, or human power and skill, might produce. Terrestrial and\nartificial alternations excepted, all was to be changeless as winter\nmidnight--deep impenetrable darkness! It was seen slowly, very slowly,\nto descend. In thirty years the men of science hoped and purposed its\nperfection.\n\nDid those who had previously known the beautiful light of heaven, who\nhad bathed and basked in the life-giving sunbeam, feel happy, or even\ncalm, when they saw their children and children's children robbed of\ncelestial glory and gladness?\n\nYet there is one thing worse than a world without a sun--you know what\nI mean--Humanity without a GOD.\n\n\nPOSTSCRIPT.\n\nThe Lecturer purposely abstained from reading Professor Huxley's acute\ncritique on Positivism until this Lecture had gone to press. He now\nstrongly recommends his auditors to read No. viii. of the Lay Sermons.\n\nShould any reader find difficulties in pages 23-25 of the foregoing\nLecture, he will do well to peruse Littr\u00e9's \"Auguste Comte et la\nPhilosophie Positive,\" chapter iii., particularly pp. 42, 43.\n\n\n\n\nSCIENCE AND REVELATION.\n\nBY THE VERY REVEREND\n\nR. PAYNE SMITH, D.D.,\n\nDEAN OF CANTERBURY; LATE REGIUS PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY, OXFORD.\n\n\n\n\nSCIENCE AND REVELATION.\n\n\nThe duty which has been imposed upon me to-day by the Christian\nEvidence Society is, I conceive, to state as clearly as I can, what\nis our ground for believing that a revelation is not only possible,\nbut is a necessary part of the system of this world. As the programme\nfurther joins science and revelation, I conceive that I am debarred\nfrom any but a strictly scientific proof. We may reasonably infer the\nprobability of a revelation from God's necessary attribute of love. We\nmay ourselves feel morally sure that a creature, approaching so nearly\nto the spiritual world, and capable of so much good as is man, would\nnot be left by his Maker in that miserable state of vice and misery in\nwhich we find ourselves. There are many good and weighty reasons for\nbelieving that God would give us a revelation, and that the Christian\nreligion is God's revelation--reasons drawn from the nature of God,\nfrom the actual condition in which man is placed, and from the direct\nteachings of Holy Scripture--all these, like a cord of many threads\nthat cannot easily be broken, serve to confirm the faith of the\nbeliever, but I must forego their use. In confining myself to what I\nconceive to be the strictly scientific basis of a revelation, I would,\nnevertheless, beg you to remember that the evidences of Christianity\nare cumulative. They cover a vast field, and it is in their united\nforce that their strength lies. The very vastness of the field often\ninvites attack. Some outlying work seems capable of overthrow. Some\ndiscovery in the domains of history, of philology, or of physical\nscience, seems to provide new weapons for the assault. Possibly not\nall the arguments used in defence of Christianity will endure the\ntest of close and accurate examination. Possibly, too, in our views\nof the nature of Christianity, and in our exegesis of the Scriptures,\nwe have arrived only at partial truth, and do not distinguish with\nsufficient accuracy between what is certainly revealed, and what is\nnothing more that a possible explanation of the Divine word. There\nare, moreover, I will candidly confess, difficulties in the way of\nfaith. However new may be the form of the attack, and however modern\nthe materials which it uses, yet the strength of the attack lies in\nreal difficulties, which are no new matter, but have ever lain deep in\nthe minds of thoughtful men. I do not believe that belief is a thing\neasy of attainment, any more than virtue is. I believe that both are\nvictories, gained by a struggle--gained over opposing forces.[173] But\nas certain as I am that this present state of things was intended to\ntrain man to virtue, though I cannot answer all the objections brought\nagainst the system of the world being exactly what it is, nor solve all\nthe doubts and difficulties, moral and metaphysical, which surround\nus: so I am convinced, in spite of similar difficulties in the way of\nreligion, that belief, and not unbelief, is the end at which man ought\nto aim. I believe that man was intended to attain to a higher and more\nperfect state than that in which he now finds himself, and that he can\nonly attain to it by virtue and faith; but as the very value of these\nlies apparently in their being won by an effort, long and earnestly\nmaintained, I am not surprised at the existence of difficulties, least\nof all of such difficulties as arise from our ignorance. Still belief\nwould be unnecessarily[18] difficult,[174] and we may even say, morally\nimpossible, if the sum of the arguments in defence of a revelation did\nnot largely exceed the sum of the arguments against one. With these\narguments I have to-day nothing to do. The evidences of Christianity,\nexternal and internal, will be treated of by others. My business is to\nshow that a revelation was to be expected; that it was probable, or at\nall events possible, and, therefore, that the evidences of Christianity\nhave a claim upon the consideration of every right thinking man. In\nshowing that a revelation was to be expected, I shall at the same\ntime show what is the exact position which it holds, and in what way\nrevealed knowledge differs from all other knowledge, scientific and\nunscientific.\n\nNow the argument which I shall use as my proof of the possibility of a\nrevelation is simply this, that in the present system of things we find\nno being endowed with any faculties without there being also provided\na proper field for their exercise, and a necessity imposed upon that\nbeing of using those faculties. In this statement I assume nothing.\nI do not assume that there is a God who made these beings. I do not\nassume that they were made or created; still less do I assume that\nthey were intended to use their faculties. I put aside all theories of\ndesign and causation, not because I do not believe that they possess\nforce, but because the actual facts which I see around me, or which I\nam taught by scientific men, are enough for my proof. The only thing\nwhich I assume is, that the laws of nature are universal; and I assume\nthis simply because it will be readily granted me. The universality of\nnature's laws compels us to admit that a law which holds good in all\nknown cases, will necessarily hold good in all cases whatsoever.\n\nOur whole language is so essentially based upon religious ideas that it\nwould be very difficult for me to use only neutral words. But in using\nreligious words, I wish them to be understood in a neutral sense. If\nI speak of creatures, I mean only beings, things which exist now, or\nhave existed. If I speak of them as endowed with faculties, I merely\nmean that they possess them. By nature, I mean simply the present\nstate of things, whether designed by an intelligent mind, or a mere\ncome-by-chance. I look simply around me at what is--or at all events\nappears to be--and I find myself in a world in which there is a very\nexact correspondence between the endowments and faculties of every\nexistent being, and the state of things in which it happens to be.\n\nSo exact is this correspondence, that if you give Professor Owen a\nbone, he will tell you to what order of animals its owner belonged,\nwhat were its habits, the nature of its food, of its habitat, and mode\nof life. Nature works out this correspondence even to the most minute\ndetail. By looking at the bone of a quadruped we can tell, not merely\ngreat things about it, but such trifles as which leg it used first\nin getting up from the ground. For nature is so undeviating that the\noutward habits, even in things of no apparent moment, correspond to\nthe internal conformation.\n\nNow, possibly, it will readily be granted that such is the present\nstate of things. Whatever may have been the stages through which we\nhave, or have not, passed, we now find ourselves in a world of apparent\ncause and effect--full of infinitely varied forms of life, but of\nwhich none are purposeless. I cannot upon this point bring forward a\nbetter witness than Professor Huxley, who, in his most interesting\nessay on Geological Contemporaneity (Lay Sermons, p. 236) speaks\nas follows:--\"All who are competent to express an opinion upon the\nsubject are, at present, agreed that the manifold varieties of animal\nand vegetable form have not either come into existence by chance,\nnor result from _capricious exertions of creative power_; but that\nthey have taken place in a definite order, the statement of which\norder is what men of science term a natural law.\" The whole chain of\nanimal and vegetable life seems to this great authority so perfect\nand complete, that even the variations which have taken place in it,\nhave been governed, he considers, by a law, that is, a regular and\norderly succession. These variations have been the result, apparently,\nof certain changes in the external state of things, to which the\nexternal conformation of the animal has somehow or other been made\nto correspond. But as Professor Huxley points out, these variations\nhave been confined to very narrow limits. When people speak of the\nenormous changes which have taken place in the living population of\nthe globe during geological eras, they refer, he says, to the presence\nin the later rocks of fossil remains of a vast number of animals not\ndiscoverable in the earlier rocks; but the fossils which you do find in\nthe early rocks differ but little from existing species. (See p. 238.)\nHe thus negatives on sure grounds the idea that a state of things ever\nexisted on this globe essentially unlike what exists now.\n\nWhat then exists now? I answer, first of all a vast chain of vegetable\nlife, fitted in every portion of it to find its own subsistence, and\nto propagate its species. Its main function is to \"manufacture out\nof mineral substances that protoplasm, upon which, in the long run,\nall animal life depends.\" (Lay Sermons, p. 138.) I need not detain\nyou by enumerating the many various contrivances by which plants are\nenabled to manufacture food for us out of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen,\nand nitrogen--substances upon which, in their original state, animals\ncannot feed--nor the still more curious and elaborate processes by\nwhich their fecundation, and the propagation of each species is\nprovided for--processes which seem often to require the intervention of\nanimal life. I need not detain you upon this point: you will readily\ngrant that this correspondence does exist. If a plant is not suited to\nits habitat, and cannot use its natural powers, nature imposes upon it\nthe severe penalties--first, of degradation, and then of death.\n\nUpon the animal world she imposes just the same penalties. There is\nneither excess nor defect in her operations.[19] Whatever she gives\nmust be used, but animals, being governed in the main by instincts,\nhave no choice. They necessarily employ all their living powers,\nand apparently have no powers beyond those indispensable for their\nexistence. This point, however, I will not press, though it seems to\nfollow from the fact asserted by Professor Huxley, that no important\ndifference can be observed between the fossil remains found in the\nearliest strata, and animals of the same species and order existent\nnow. (See pp. 241, 242, and for vegetables, p. 240.) For, as he tells\nyou, facts establish a scientific law--law in the mouths of scientific\nmen, meaning an established order of facts. Well then! I will put this\nfact of absence of progress aside, and with it the corollary of the\nabsence of latent powers.[20] But of actual powers it is evident that\nanimals do use them all, and have to use them all. So close, too, is\nthe agreement between the powers and the external position of every\nanimal, that a change in its external relations will modify its powers\nto a certain extent. But only to a certain extent; there are fixed\nlimits to the adaptability of those living powers. If the changes are\nsuch as to occasion a more active exercise of its living powers, the\nanimal increases in strength, size, and beauty; if unfavourable, but\nstill permitting some use of its powers, it dwindles and decays. But\npass the appointed bounds and the animal dies. Nature is exacting the\npenalty of the non-use of what it has given. Nature exacts a severe\npenalty for the mis-use, and the last and final penalty for the\nviolation of her laws. I do not know that an ascidian jelly-bag has any\nother faculties than those of sucking in water, and of sticking to a\nstone.[21] But this I know, that if it does not use all the powers it\npossesses and suck in its water, and stick to its stone, no process of\nnatural selection will ever develop it into a monkey: it will go to the\nlimbo of nonentity.[22] But what an alarming thought, that at a period\nseparated from us by such vast geologic ages, that, according to the\nnebular hypothesis, held by so many of our leading astronomers as a\nprobable theory, this whole universe was a mass of heated vapour; what\nan alarming thought that the very existence of man should have depended\nupon a jelly bag sticking to a stone and sucking up water! Alas! there\nwas then no water, no stones, no jelly bags, and therefore there are\nnow no men! Man escapes, poor thing, from his humble parentage: he\nneed not feel his ears to find the proof there of his monkeyhood:[23]\nbut his escape costs him dear. What with astronomy and biology, men of\nscience between them have cleared us out of existence. Scientifically,\nman is no more.\n\nMy argument, fortunately, depends upon matters of fact: facts for which\nthe believer accounts by holding that this world is the work of a\nBeing possessed of infinite wisdom and power, and who therefore has\nendowed all His creatures with those faculties which they needed, and\nwith no others; because to give useless faculties would be a violation\nof God's attribute of wisdom. The student of natural science may take\nanother view. It is no part of his business to do so. His office is\nto discover and tabulate the order of facts, of phenomena, and this\norder he calls a natural law. Well and good. But teleology, the science\nof ends, which gives the reason why a thing is what it is--teleology\nbelongs to the metaphysician. It is his business to inquire into causes\nand effects. Still, as a matter of fact, scientific men do try their\nhand at accounting for the present state of things, and they say,\nperhaps, that there is a struggle, a competition in nature,[177] so\nsharp and close that no creature can continue to exist save by the\nvigorous exercise of all its necessary faculties, while all useless\nqualities will be cast away as mere overweight and incumbrance. I\nneed no decision upon this point; the fact is all I want. I do not\nwant you to decide whether mind preceded matter, and consequently\nthat there is a God: or whether matter and mind came into existence\ncontemporaneously, in which case there is no room for the theory of\ndevelopment, but abundant room for impossibilities, metaphysical and\nactual; or, lastly, whether matter preceded mind, the latter being\nsimply the result of a high corporeal organisation, slowly attained to\nby the processes of selection, natural and sexual. Whether this present\nstate of things was worked out intelligently, by a Being possessed of\nwill and understanding, or is the result of blind and unintelligent\npowers, working fortuitously, this, to my argument, matters not. All\nI want is the admitted fact--that every living organisation fully\npossesses all those faculties which it needs, and must use all its\nfaculties under penalty, first of degradation, and, finally, in the\nlong run, of extinction.\n\nBut man is a living organization, and must, therefore, come under this\nlaw. Let us see whether the fact confirms this deduction. Now, in all\nthe long line, from the ascidian upwards to man, nature had supplied\nnone but physical wants. Her children need food; she gives them each\nthose senses and that conformation which enables them to get each their\nown food. They need safety: she uses much ingenuity in providing for\ntheir safety. She is, moreover, liberal. Their food is, in general,\ngained so easily, and their safety so well provided for, that their\nlives are full of enjoyment. Her care, however, is taken in the main\nfor the species, and not for the individual. He enjoys his food because\nnature has taken loving care for the whole family to which he belongs;\nand she further takes care that that family shall continue to exist.\nIf it perish, it is because by some change in temperature, or the like,\nthe correspondence is destroyed between its faculties and its external\nposition. Short of this, the ingenuity employed by nature in providing\nfor the continued existence of every species of insect and animal is as\nwonderful as that employed by her in continuing vegetable life; and,\nas a rule, the lower the creature is in the scale of being, the more\ncurious the contrivances used for its preservation.\n\nWell, when we come to man we find these three leading necessities\nequally well provided for. Man is provided with the means for obtaining\nfood, for providing for his safety, and for propagating his species.\nBut, though nature's ends are the same, and reached with equal\ncertainty, her means are, in the main, different. The animals are moved\nto gain their existence by their senses working upon their instincts.\nThis is a great advance upon vegetable life. You had there neither\nsenses nor instincts, but simply powers. But man rises above the\nanimals as much as they transcend vegetables. He attains to these same\nends of food, safety, and continued existence by the use of his reason.\n\nNow, I wish you to notice this. Nature is not limited in her resources,\nnor confined to one method. She is not obliged to plant animals in\nthe ground that they may suck up food through their legs; she can and\ndoes give them instincts by which they can get their food in a very\ndifferent way. But perfect as these instincts are, nature can do still\nbetter. She can produce an animal capable of reasoning upon causes and\neffects, and who, therefore, provides for everything which he imagines\nto be good for him by setting those causes in motion which produce the\ndesired effect.[24]\n\nBut with the possession of reason there also goes the possession of\nwhat we call mental faculties. Not only can man by the use of his\nreason obtain food, provide for his safety, and continue his race,\nbut higher ends are made possible for him, to be attained to by the\nuse of this higher endowment. Man has the power of articulate speech,\nand upon this follows the power of learning to read, to write, and\nto cypher; and upon the power of doing these three things follows\na plenitude of other powers. Now, I shall not stop to enquire how\nman gained these powers, whether by natural and sexual selection or\nnot; but I venture to point out that there is a vast chasm between\nphysical and intellectual powers. The most sensible monkey is a parody\nrather than an imitation of man, and the difference between the two\nis enormous.[25] The points of agreement serve rather to enable us to\nmeasure this interval, and see how wide it is, than to bridge it over.\nNow, let us suppose ourselves philosophers come, we will say, from the\nplanet Jupiter, on a mission intrusted to us by the Jovians, to examine\nand report upon the nature of the creatures which people the four\ninferior planets, Terra, Venus, Mercury, and Mars. Of course, we should\nlook upon the inhabitants of such small communities with contempt,\nbut, being philosophers, we should not neglect anything because it was\ntrifling. Well, when we came to Terra we should report that it was a\nvery curious region, inhabited by a long scale of beings, each one\nfitted to its place, and that at their head there was a rather noxious,\ntroublesome, and uppish creature called man, whose examination had\ncaused us an infinity of trouble.\n\nIn examining this creature we should find that it shared in all the\nwants of those beneath him, but that it supplied its wants, not by\nthe use of instincts, but of reason. Over and above, however, man's\nphysical wants, we should find that he had mental wants; and with\nthese wants faculties also, by which he could supply them. Supply all\nthe physical wants of an animal, and having none besides, it will lie\nstill for hours or days until hunger stirs it to renewed exertion.\nSupply all man's physical wants, and his mental wants then develop\ninto full activity. Give him the lowest and basest drudgery; make him\nwork morning, noon, and night in the meanest occupations, for the\nsupply of merely physical necessities, and, though you can infinitely\ndegrade, you cannot destroy his mental powers. He still thinks, still\nconnects causes and effects. But our purpose will be best answered by\ntaking the case of those whose faculties are most highly cultivated.\nHas nature supplied a proper field for the exercise of the mental\npowers, not merely of Fuegians, but of the most highly developed man?\nYou know that she has. Take the senses which he has in common with the\nanimals, but see what vast means have been provided by which he can\nmake an intellectual use of them. What arts and sciences, painting,\nmusic, harmony, numbers, eloquence, have grown out of their use. As for\nour mental powers, think only of the vast number of ologies which are\nclaiming admission into our very normal schools. Think only of all our\nlearned Associations, our Royal Societies, our Social Congresses, our\nBritish Museums full of books, which have been written, and are waiting\nonly to be read, and you must own that men do use their mental powers,\nand have means enough for a more ample use of them. Nature makes us\nuse our mental powers to some extent. She encourages us to use them\nthoroughly and earnestly.\n\nUse them we must. Man is placed in such a position that he must\nstudy what passes round him. Man learns by experience. Instincts are\nbut slightly progressive. Unless brought into contact with man, the\nanimals learn little--perhaps nothing. I do not doubt but that those\nhuge monsters, whose remains we behold in geological museums, were the\nmost dull and stupid creatures possible. I think this simply because\nI suppose that man did not then exist, and, therefore, that these\nmonsters had nothing to waken them up out of their sluggish torpor. But\nscientific men[26] tell me that existing mammals actually have larger\nbrains than their ancient tertiary prototypes of the same order.\nLet man enter the stage, and the instincts of animals are quickened.\nNature did not create man without taking care to guard the inferior\nanimals from his destructive powers. But man in himself, essentially,\nis at once progressive and retrogressive. Bound up with him is an\ninfinite possibility of advance and decay. He is never stationary.\nBoth individuals and communities are perpetually either ascending or\ndescending in the scale, morally and intellectually. But this law of\nnature obliges man to perpetual mental effort under the usual penalty\nof degradation. We have not merely to advance, to win new ground. If\nthis were all, at length we should have nothing to do. We have to win\nback lost ground. Our gains are, I hope, greater than our losses;\nbut the progress of no community will ever be fast enough, continued\nenough, and assured enough, to justify the members of it in living in\na fool's paradise. This, then, was our second point. The first was,\nthat nature has provided us with a proper field for the exercise of our\nmental faculties; the second, that she imposes upon us the necessity of\nusing them.\n\nWe may add, that the law of scientific progress also makes it certain\nthat no advance of science will ever deliver us from the necessity\nof using our faculties. The valuable part of every science is its\ntheory--the mental part. Facts and fossils are of no value, except as\nbeing the materials for thought. No geologist would care much for a\ndiscovery of fossils in agreement with an established theory, but if\nthe theory were still debated, then every discovery that tended to\nprove or disprove it, would be canvassed with intelligent interest.\nThe pure sciences can grow, I am well aware, only by additions. But\nthen they are simply instrumental. They are to the mixed sciences what\narithmetic is to the ordinary business of life. Logarithms, algebra,\nthe integral and differential calculuses, are simply easy ways of\ndoing difficult sums. It is a great thing, no doubt, for science to\nperfect its instruments and processes, but scientific progress lies\nin the mixed sciences themselves, and these are constantly undergoing\nmodification. The spectrum analysis is largely modifying the science\nof astronomy. Deep sea dredging, and other fresh means of information,\nhave so modified geology, that no one holds now that similar strata are\nnecessarily of the same date. A vast cretaceous formation is probably\ngoing on at this very day in the bed of the Atlantic. (Huxley, \"Lay\nSermons,\" p. 206.) The law, then, of scientific progress is constant\nmodification; fresh facts are discovered, new theories started, old\ntheories revived, existing theories altered, recast, newly shaped.\nShould a science become, practically, complete and perfect, scientific\nmen would care for it no longer. The manufacturer and merchant would\nthen seize upon it. In this way what was once a problem in the mind\nof the student, becomes an article of use, comfort, and enjoyment in\nour daily lives. Meanwhile, new sciences spring up, and old sciences\ntake new shape, and, as a matter of fact, so large has become the\nscientific domain, that no one man can master it. Division of labour\nhas become as necessary here as in the manual crafts. We are no longer\nencyclop\u00e6dists, but each one must stick to his own page in the great\nbook of learning.\n\nMany of these sciences relate to our social condition. And of these\nthe importance and value every day rapidly increases. Good government\nlargely depends upon knowledge of all those natural laws upon which\nmoral and physical well-being depends. Upon good government follow\nincreased wealth, active trade, higher wages, and larger consumption\nof commodities. Upon these follows increased population, and that\npopulation concentrated upon spots favourable for all this activity.\nAnd upon this follow new social difficulties; fresh problems arise to\nbe solved, and new questions to occupy the mind both of the student\nand of the statesman. Unless solved, society will retrograde; it\nwill suffer in health, in wealth, and morality; turbulence will take\nthe place of quiet industry; and that community will decay. Here\nagain nature provides a field for the employment of our faculties,\nand compels us to use them. If not there is the same penalty,\ndegradation. I do not know how many geological periods it would take\nbefore, by the neglect of our powers, we could retrograde back to our\nascidian progenitor; but I see everywhere around me the proofs that\nretrogression is as much a law of man's nature as progress. We can only\ncontinue what we are by using all our powers.[27]\n\nBut I may have lingered over this part of my subject too long. No one\nperhaps will deny that man both can and must use his mental powers\nas thoroughly as an animal must use its instincts, and a plant its\nvegetative powers, or it will suffer for its neglect. Only remember\nthat my argument has nothing to do with individuals; I am treating of\nman as a species, and investigating the general laws which regulate his\nwell being. Well, now, has man any other powers than those already\ndescribed? Has he merely physical powers to enable him to get food,\nand other bodily necessaries; and mental powers to enable him to read,\nwrite, and cypher? Is this all? You know that it is not all. There is\nanother broad distinction between man and all the other inhabitants of\nthis earth. He alone distinguishes between right and wrong.[28]\n\nNow if man possesses this faculty, however acquired, and by whatever\nname called, then if nature's laws are universal, he is both bound to\nuse it, will suffer from not using it, and will have a proper field\nprovided for its use. Nature gives no faculty without imposing an\nobligation of exercising it: an obligation, however, which rests in its\nfull force upon the species, and upon the individual only as belonging\nto the species. Some powers every individual must use or he would\ndie; there are other powers which, if he does not use, nature will be\ncontent with a lighter penalty. Far be it from me to affirm that every\none here uses his reasoning powers. I hope he does; but if he does not\nuse them, I am quite sure that nature will exact of him the penalty of\nstupidity. But the species must use them; if not, upon degradation\nwould soon follow extinction. Nature, for instance, would not let man\nexist as a mere animal. If he did not use his reason, the instincts of\nother animals are so superior to his, that while they found food he\nwould be unable to do so. Even if necessity quickened his instincts, he\nwould yet have ceased to be a man, and would be retrograding back to\nthe ascidian. To continue to be a man he must make some low use at all\nevents of his mental powers. Now, can you establish any such difference\nbetween man's intellectual and moral powers, as will justify you, while\nacknowledging that you must use the one, in neglecting the other? Can\nyou give any reason why you need not use the faculty which undoubtedly\nyou possess of distinguishing between right and wrong, and the faculty,\nlet us say, of \"using the imagination in matters of science.\" I am sure\nyou cannot. By not using your mental powers you will be in an inferior\nmental position; by not using your moral powers you will hold an\ninferior moral position.\n\nBut you may say the penalty is slight, and we will pay it. We will\nuse our physical powers, and become grand animals and we will use our\nmental powers, and become grand intellectual men. Not men I answer.\nAdd intellectuality to animality, and you merely get an intellectual\nanimal. Your moral powers are an essential part of yourselves.\nConfessedly too, there is ample field for using them. The whole\nworld is so constituted that morning, noon, and night, the question\nperpetually arises of right and wrong. You cannot take a step in\nlife without conscience intervening. It is so inseparably a part of\nyourselves that constantly it acts as a mere instinct, and approves or\ncondemns your conduct as spontaneously as your palate distinguishes\nbetween sweet and bitter. You may render your palate dull, so that you\ncannot taste what you eat and drink; you may render your conscience\ndull, but it has a strong recuperative force, and, after years of\ndullness, will awaken, and exercise again its judicial functions with\nstern and decisive energy. Struggle as much as you like, but the\nconclusion cannot be evaded, that you can distinguish between right and\nwrong, that you ought to do so, and that you must do so.\n\nIf so, what follows? I answer, the necessity of religion, and therefore\nof revelation. Resist as men will and do, they have but a choice\nbetween two alternatives. Either all this present state of things, in\nwhich every faculty has its appropriate field of exercise, and every\nexternal possibility has opposite to it an internal faculty; either\nall this is an illusion and deceit, a purposeless and objectless piece\nof jugglery;[29] or if it be a reality, then the existence in man\nof faculties, obliging him to distinguish between right and wrong,\nconstitute him a _responsible_ agent. If he is responsible, he is\nresponsible to some one: and certain penalties are necessarily attached\nto the neglect, the misuse, and the violation of his moral powers.\nThe person to whom man is responsible must be capable of forming an\nequitable judgment, and therefore must know the motives as well as the\noutward acts, and for this nothing less than omniscience will suffice.\nHe must have the power of apportioning adequate rewards and punishments\nto human actions, which will need little less than omnipotence. And\nas no adequate reward or punishment follows in this life, there must\nbe some other state in which men will be dealt with according to\ntheir true deserts. If not, then there exists in man a whole class of\nfaculties, moral faculties, which seem to find in this present state of\nthings an appropriate field for their exercise, but which man is under\nno necessity of using. A man who lives in the habitual violation of\nevery moral obligation, but does so with discretion, may have a very\nlarge enjoyment of the things of this world: while generally a man\nwhose conscience is tender, and whose life is regulated by the highest\nmotives, necessarily and voluntarily abandons much, both of pleasure\nand prosperity. Nature cannot have so bungled her work. The highest\npossible exercise of the powers which she has given us must necessarily\nlead to the highest possible good. It does not matter to the argument\nwhether conscience and your other moral faculties be natural or\nacquired. If nature endowed an ascidian with the power of acquiring\nmoral faculties, it was bound to use them as soon as it had got them.\nThe question whether you are bound to use your mental faculties does\nnot depend in the least upon the question whether man is an improved\nmonkey. You are bound to use them simply because you have them. So you\nare bound to live as a responsible being simply because you have the\nfaculty of distinguishing between right and wrong. You know, too, that\nyou act yourselves upon this principle. If any one were to push one of\nyou out of your seat and take it himself, not only would you be angry,\nbut our chairman would call in a policeman to expel the disturber, and\ngive you your seat back again. Why? Because the man would have been\ndoing wrong, and need not have done it; and because it was wrong you\nare angry and punish him. But can you stop there? There are things\nwhich we know to be wrong, but which hurt none but ourselves; things\nwe know to be wrong, but which benefit society. A man may liberally\nsupport useful institutions from motives of ostentation, or as a bribe,\nif he is a candidate, let us say, for a seat in parliament. An act may\nbe apparently right, but the inner motive wrong. Now, conscience judges\nof things absolutely; it condemns or approves of things, not as they\nseem, but as they really are: not by results, but by their intrinsic\ncharacter. What is there which answers to this outside of man? Must\nthere not be a judge who also judges men absolutely? You can find no\nsuch judge but God. Either, then, nature is a sham, and her laws not\nuniversal, and this present state of things a delusion, or there is a\nuniversal judge, and a future state in which reward and punishment will\nbe meted out in strict accordance with the rightness and wrongness of\nhuman action. A being omniscient and almighty can alone judge actions\nabsolutely in the same way as conscience judges us, both for our\nthoughts, words, and deeds.\n\nI have chiefly spoken of conscience, but the argument takes in all\nman's moral and spiritual powers.[30] No man can doubt but that man\nhas within him powers which exactly answer to religion outside of\nhim. The power of faith is as much a faculty as that of sight; and so\nalso is that instinct, I had almost called it, which makes a man ever\nturn away in discontent from the present to struggle for the future.\nAnd what is more, man's moral and religious faculties develop with\nadvancing civilization just as his mental faculties do. The mental\nquestions which agitate our minds would be entirely void of interest\nto a savage; the social difficulties which occupy the attention of our\npolitical economists and statesmen would be mere trash to a peasant:\nso, too, with religion. I do not see any reason why a race may not\nsink so low as to lose the very idea of a God; but I am sure that such\na race would hold the very lowest place in the scale of humanity.\nWhatever round in the ladder of human progress you like to examine, I\nwill make bold to say that you will find the religious and moral state\nof mankind there holding a very close relation to the degree of mental\nculture and civilization to which it has attained.\n\nNow, the only thing that acts powerfully upon man's moral faculties\nis religion. I do not say that this ought or ought not to be so; all\nI assert is that it is so. Call, if you like, the great mass of your\nfellow men Philistines, and despise their low culture, but you will\nfind nothing that acts powerfully upon these Philistines to give\nthem culture, to raise, refine, and purify them, except religion.\nConscience, too, holds a most direct and evident relation to religion.\nYou will not find conscience amenable to reasoning. When virtue\nbegins to reason, the proverb tells you it is lost. When conscience\ncondemns, it is because the thing condemned is a sin against God;\nwhen it approves, it is because the thing done is absolutely right,\nand as God commanded. Conscience never asks whether a thing is a sin\nagainst society; it never troubles about consequences, knows nothing\nabout political economy, or political morality either. It judges by a\nhigher and absolute rule. By so doing it makes man a responsible agent\nabsolutely, brings him into direct relation with God as the absolute\njudge, and renders necessary a more exact apportionment of rewards and\npunishments than exists at present. There must be some other state of\nexistence in which man will be judged in the same way as now he judges\nhimself, and in which the natural effects of this judgment will be\nfully carried out.\n\nBut, if there is thus a future judgment, and a state in which happiness\nand misery will follow as the natural[31] results of our actions\nhere, man will require a certain amount of knowledge concerning\nthis judgment. By the possession of conscience and other religious\nfaculties, man holds a definite relation towards God. Plainly the most\ntremendous results may follow from this relation, and man ought to have\nsome sure knowledge of these results. Now it is conceivably possible\nthat God might have given us this knowledge by means of the light of\nnature, as we call it. But He has not. Confessedly natural religion\nis neither clear enough nor certain enough to affect powerfully the\nmasses. Man is not a quiet, orderly, neutral sort of being; he bears\nabout with him a nature fraught and fully charged with the most\ndangerous passions. Reason, with its prudential maxims, has never done\nmuch to restrain these passions. To take, then, the lowest possible\nground. As nature has given us moral qualities, I suppose that moral\nexcellence is a thing as necessarily to be attained to as physical\nand mental excellence. But while nature has provided ample means for\nattaining to the two last, she will not, without a revelation, have\nprovided sufficient means for the attainment of the first. By the aid\nof religion, about as many men probably attain to moral excellence, as\nby other natural means attain to physical and mental excellence.[32]\nWithout religion nature will have broken down. You would have\nuniversally a state of things like that in ancient Greece--one Plato,\nsurrounded by the mass leading the most grossly sensual life.\n\nNature cannot develop any being higher than herself, nor endow it with\nwants which she cannot supply. If nature develops intellect, morality,\nreligion, then that power which developed these faculties must also be\nintellectual, moral, religious. What, then, can this power in nature be\nbut the working of God? Out of nothing comes nothing. The effect cannot\nbe greater than the cause. The existence of man, with his mental,\nmoral, and religious powers, forbids us to believe that that which\ncaused man to exist can be less possessed of these powers than he is.\nInfinitely higher he may be, lower he cannot be. And as surely as man's\nphysical and mental wants are provided for by that power which called\nthese wants into being, so surely will man's moral and religious wants\nbe supplied.\n\nThey are not supplied by the light of nature; nothing then remains but\nrevelation. Into the formal proof of revelation I must not enter; all\nthat devolved upon me was to show the _\u00e0 priori_ probability, or at\nleast possibility, of a revelation. I have endeavoured to show this\nby a consideration of what man is, viewed simply as a natural being,\nand by the consideration of his natural wants. I have not taken into\nconsideration any of the additional knowledge given us in the Bible\nconcerning man. I have treated him in much the same way as I might\none of the creatures in the Zoological Gardens, if I had been asked\nto study it in order that I might see what its wants were, and tell\nthe keeper what to give it to maintain it in the full possession\nof its powers. No doubt it would have helped me if I had been told\nwhat and where the creature had been before. I should then have had\nno difficulty in explaining and accounting for everything. Such\nknowledge, however, even revelation does not give us, because it is not\nindispensable. It gives us that only which is necessary for the supply\nof our wants.\n\nEven with this knowledge my argument is not concerned; but certain\ngeneral principles about revelation follow from what I have laid\ndown. And first, revelation has nothing to do with our physical state.\nReason is quite sufficient to teach us all those sanitary laws by\nwhich our bodies will be maintained in healthful vigour. If the Bible\ncondemns drunkenness, gluttony, and the like, it does so not for\nsanitary reasons, but for moral reasons, because they are sins. So\nrevelation has nothing to do with our mental powers; whatever we can\nattain to by our mental powers we are to attain to by them. Physical\nand metaphysical science alike lie remote from the object-matter of\nrevelation. Because God has, in the Bible, given us revelation in an\ninformal way, in order, perhaps, to commend it to our entire nature,\npeople often forget that its proper object-matter is simply the moral\nrelation in which man stands to God, especially with reference to a\nfuture state of being. Religious men forget this. They often take up\nan antagonistic position to science, and try to make out systems of\ngeology and astronomy and anthropology from the Bible and by these\njudge all that scientific men say. Really the Bible never gives us\nany scientific knowledge in a scientific way. If it did, it would\nbe leaving its own proper domain. When it does seem to give us any\nsuch knowledge, as in the first chapter of Genesis, there is a very\nimportant differentia about it. What it says has always reference to\nman. The first chapter of Genesis does not tell us how the earth was\nformed absolutely; geology ought to tell us that. It tells us how it\nwas prepared and fitted for man. Look at the work of the fourth day.\nDoes any man suppose that the stars were set in the expanse of heaven\nabsolutely that men might know what time of year it was? But that\nis their special service, and in old time a most important service\nfor man. To the geologist man is just as much and just as little as\na trilobite or a megatherium. To the student of the Bible man is\neverything, and the first chapter of Genesis teaches him that man was\nthe cause of all other terrestrial creation, the sum and crown of the\nCreator's work.[180]\n\nBut if believers mix up science and revelation, so do the students of\nphysical science. No sooner is a theory started, than it is immediately\ncompared with what the Bible says, or is supposed to say. Now, no\ndoubt, the comparison between the teachings of revelation and science\nis inevitable. Whatever is mixed up with revelation, owing to the\nmanner in which God has been pleased to bestow it, must, at least, be\ntrue. It would be impossible for us to accept the authority of the\nBible upon those points in which we cannot judge of its truth, if in\nthose points in which we are competent judges we found it erroneous.\nThe teachings, therefore, of science and of revelation must be\ncompared; but in this comparison not only must we remember that it is\nnot the object of the Bible to teach science, and that, as it speaks\nto all people at all times, it must use popular language, but also\nthat the comparison must be made, not with the floating theories of\nthe hour, but only with established truths. If the wisest geologist\nof our days could show that there was an exact agreement between\ngeology and the Bible, it would rather disprove than prove its truth.\nFor, as geology is a growing science, it would prove the agreement\nof the Bible with that which is receiving daily additions, and is\nconstantly undergoing modification, and ten years hence the two would\nbe at hopeless variance. At the same time there is a good side to the\ndiscussion, and the theologian especially is the gainer. In the present\nday the attack upon revelation draws its weapons from our increased\nknowledge of physical science, of philology, and of history, and the\ntheologian can no longer neglect these studies. I have no scruple\nin saying that I look with pride upon what my countrymen have done,\nand are doing, in enlarging the bounds of our scientific knowledge,\neven if I do not always approve of their spirit, or accept their\nconclusions; and I am quite sure theologians must study, intelligently\nand dispassionately, all those branches of knowledge which are brought\ninto contact with revelation, or they will lose their influence over\nthe intellect of the country. It is no use treating physical science\nas a bugbear. Let our theologians master it, and they will find it a\nmanly study, which will give their minds breadth, will teach them what\nare the difficulties which press heavily on many thoughtful minds, and\nwhich must be fairly met. An opposition between an old science like\ntheology and new sciences there must be: but let both sides remember\nthat revelation was never intended to teach us anything that we could\nlearn by the use of our natural faculties, and that what the Bible\nteaches must be compared not with floating and probable theories, but\nwith proved theories. These proved theories will, I believe, fall into\ntheir place in due course of time, as easily as Galileo's theory about\nthe revolution of the earth round the sun. If not, I do not see how\nthe claims of the Bible to be the Word of God can be maintained: for I\ncannot believe that there is any chasm between the teachings of God in\nnature and in revelation. But I think it perfectly possible that men\nmay misinterpret and misunderstand both one and the other.\n\nI have detained you too long. But I must make one more remark. If the\nproper object matter of revelation is that knowledge, which being\nnecessary for us as moral agents, was yet unattainable by our natural\npowers, then reason is no judge of what revelation teaches. There\nmay be in our relations to God, things which we never should have\nexpected: deep truths opening onwards into mysteries past our present\nfinite comprehension. If everything had been plain, easy, commonplace,\nrevelation would not have been needed. Nevertheless, reason holds a\nvery high office with respect to revelation. In a matter of so high\nconsequence, as whether God has spoken to us or not, we are bound to\nexamine most scrupulously the evidence upon which the fact of the\nrevelation rests. And this examination involves an enquiry into the\nteachings of revelation. The existence of mysteries in a revelation is\nreasonable: the existence of immorality in it would be fatal to its\nclaims. For if the scientific basis for my belief in the gift of a\nrevelation is the existence in me of conscience, and of moral faculties\nwhich make me a responsible being, I am left absolutely without a basis\nfor a revelation which makes me violate my conscience. A revelation\nwhich degrades my moral and spiritual powers is as much against nature\nas anything that degraded my physical or mental powers. If religion be\ntrue, it must ennoble, elevate, purify, and perfect me, here as far as\nthe present condition of my existence permits, entirely in that other\nstate to which our present responsibility points, provided, of course,\nthat I submit myself to its teachings. I know of no way by which I\ncan make this examination except by reason and experience. And I hold\nthis further, because I hold that a true religion must be commensurate\nwith the whole of man. It must make him better physically, mentally,\nmorally, and spiritually, and consecrate all his powers to God.\n\nI am only too well aware that much which I have said has been put in\na feeble and confused manner. Much also necessary for the support and\nelucidation of the argument had to be omitted because of the necessity\nof compressing it into so short an essay; but I trust that the main\nline of thought is clear, namely, that religion outside of us stands in\nso plain a relation to what we are internally, that either it is real,\nor this whole state of things is a delusion. Man, without a revelation,\nand therefore without religion, is the only one thing of all that exist\nupon the face of the earth that is a bungle,[33] a failure, and a\nmistake.\n\n\n\n\nTHE\n\nNATURE AND VALUE\n\nOF THE\n\nMIRACULOUS TESTIMONY TO CHRISTIANITY.\n\n\nBY\n\nJOHN STOUGHTON, D.D.,\n\nKENSINGTON.\n\n\n\n\nMIRACLES.\n\n\nOne of the most touching narratives in the New Testament relates to a\nwant of faith in miracles. It is said that when Thomas was told of his\nMaster's resurrection, he replied, \"Except I shall see in His hands\nthe print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails,\nand thrust my hand into His side, I will not believe.\" He was not\ndenounced for this. No word of withering scorn, or cutting ridicule,\nor threatening anger, fell on the ear of the doubting disciple. But\nevidence was offered. \"Reach hither thy finger, and behold my hands;\nand reach hither thy hand, and thrust it into my side; and be not\nfaithless, but believing.\" As far as rebuke appeared, it was only by\nimplication, in words respecting those whose faith is of keener eye,\nand swifter foot: \"Blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have\nbelieved.\"\n\nI think that every one who speaks of miracles to doubting minds should\nfrom this narrative take a lesson. Surely the gist and purpose of\nit is, that we should distinguish between intellectual difficulty\nand moral prejudice, and deal patiently and convincingly with honest\nseekers after truth. Sometimes the subject before us has been so\nhandled as to drive the unbeliever into deeper unbelieving--I would\nrather strive to work upon a little faith, and make it more.\n\n\nI.\n\nI am to speak to you respecting the _nature_ of the miraculous\ntestimony to Christianity. My business is with mighty works, recorded\nin the New Testament as having been wrought for the purpose of\ntestifying to a Divine mission. No definition of their character in\nrelation to physical law can anywhere be found in this ancient record.\nThey are not spoken of as _violations_ of law, or as _suspensions_\nof law, or as _interferences_ with law, or as _contradictions_ to\nlaw. They are described, not on the side of their physical nature,\nbut on the side of their moral signification. They are depicted, not\nin their connection with the obvious order of the material universe,\nor with any hidden powers and principles of a higher and harmonious\ndescription; but in their connection with Him who claimed to be the\nRedeemer of mankind, who came, according to His own words, to seek and\nsave that which was lost. They are denominated \"_wonders_,\" startling\noccurrences, things contrary to common experience; and \"_signs_,\"--not\nmere marvels bursting idly on the public gaze, and exciting in a\nmultitude of spectators a barren curiosity, but _signs_,--replete with\nan ulterior meaning, and testifying to the character and work of Him\nthrough whom they were accomplished.\n\nThere is no necessity, then, for us at the outset to define a miracle\non the physical side of it--to call it a violation of law, or a\nsuspension of law--an interference with it, or a contradiction to it.\nIn other words, there is no need imposed by the conditions of our\nargument, to inquire into the mode in which such a phenomenon can be\nproduced. It is enough to show that it did occur, and to dwell upon the\nreligious significancy of its occurrence first to the witnesses, and\nnext to ourselves. What is the exact position which miracles may be\nthought to occupy as wonders in the universe, whether, through breaking\nin upon common experience, they are referable to the operation of\noccult laws, known and controlled at a fitting moment by the mysterious\ntouch of the wonder-worker; or whether they are to be considered as\nresulting simply from the immediate fiat of the Supreme will, are\nquestions which may with advantage be relegated for consideration\nelsewhere.\n\n1. But, at the very threshold of our inquiry we are met by the\nassertion, that a miracle, however defined, is in itself simply\nimpossible. Impossible! In what sense impossible? Does it mean\nimpossible to man, or impossible to God? Impossible to man, of course,\nit is. That impossibility enters into the popular idea of a miracle.\nMan has no such control over nature as to be able to produce one. But\nif it be said a miracle is impossible to God, such an impossibility\ninvolves the extension of human inability to God Himself. It involves\neither the idea, that nature has ever been independent of God, or\nthe idea, that if produced by Him, He is no longer Lord of His\nown works--this Lordship having been surrendered by His will, or\nhaving escaped from His hands. Summarily disposing of this gross\nanthropomorphism, we find behind it the dogma of Spinoza, that there\nis nothing transcendental anywhere, no transcendental beginnings, no\ntranscendental interpositions; for God and nature are one through the\neternities. In the wake of Spinoza's philosophy follows the modern\naxiom--\"to recognise the impossibility even of any two material atoms\nsubsisting together without a determinate relation--of any action of\nthe one on the other, whether of equilibrium or of motion, without\nreference to a physical cause--of any modification whatsoever in the\nexisting conditions of material agents, _unless through the invariable\noperation of a series of eternally impressed consequences, following in\nsome necessary chain of orderly connexion_.\"[34]\n\nHere, _in limine_, before examining this principle, let me observe,\nonce for all, that miracles do by no means cast any slur upon the\nsettled order of nature, as if it were faulty and imperfect, and\nrequired correction or supplement for effectuating its proper ends--as\nfrail constructions in engineering departments of human contrivance\nneed subsequent repairs. Nature is perfect enough for her own ends;\nmiracles are introduced for other and higher purposes. This requires to\nbe borne in mind throughout our entire discussion.\n\nBut to come to the antagonist principle, that there is a development\nin nature through the agency of physical laws, apart from an original\nCreator and an everlasting Lord. I do not say--far from it--that the\nprinciple denies the existence of such a Creator and Lord, but it\nsupposes at least that the physical order of the universe is fixed in\nsuch a sense, as to have ever excluded from it the action, directly\nor indirectly, of a Divine will, beyond the inflexible maintenance of\nordinary operations. It is said, \"The enlarged critical and inductive\nstudy of the natural world cannot but tend powerfully to evince the\ninconceivableness of imagined interruptions of natural order, or\nsupposed suspensions of the laws of matter, and of that vast series\nof dependent causation which constitutes the legitimate field for the\ninvestigation of science, whose constancy is the sole warrant for its\ngeneralization.\" In reply to this it may be fairly urged that science,\nwhilst she maintains the invariable sequence of causes and effects,\nand the uninterrupted order of physical events, is a prophetess of\ntruth and wisdom. She enunciates lessons bound up with the welfare of\nthe race. Thus far there is no antagonism between her and religion.\nShe can, without abandonment of her principles, nay, in the act of\ncarrying them out, officiate as a priestess at the altar of God; nor\nis there anything in the position for which she stipulates contrary to\nthe claims of Revelation. For Revelation, in appealing to miracles,\nsupposes the ordinary course of physical phenomena to be inviolable,\nand no book more than the Bible exhibits the normal constancy of\nnatural agencies. But when science pronounces as impossible all such\nsigns and wonders as are recorded in Scripture, she steps out of her\nprovince. In her own province she may justly affirm there are no signs\nof miracles; she may sweep her telescope over the fields of the sky,\nand ply her microscope amidst the growths of the earth, and say, I can\nsee no traces anywhere but of inflexible law. These realms of existence\nare full of order. It is the perfection of their beauty, that they are\nfree from violations, suspensions, disturbances, and interferences.\nBut to say this--and I fully concur in it--is not to demonstrate that\nthe Scriptures relate impossibilities. To do so, philosophy must pass\nbeyond the range of physical observation, since _there_ no place can\nbe found for working out the desired demonstration. Philosophers do\nnot always remember how difficult it is to prove a negative. Showing\nthat certain things are, they are apt to slide into a belief that\n_therefore_ certain other things cannot be, the conclusion proving on\nlogical examination a simple _non sequitur_. Doubtless it is a fact,\nthat we can detect nowhere in nature a provision made for producing\nmiracles such as come under our review in this lecture, that no\nprophecy nor hint of them can be discerned throughout her measured\nrealms; but this is a very different thing from saying, that nature\nteaches the belief of them to be absurd. So far from its being absurd,\nthere may, after all, be found in nature something analogous to a\nmiracle. In nature there are distinct worlds, worlds between which\nthere are gaps and gulfs. I do not dispute that there are striking\napproximations in the phenomena of some realms to the phenomena of\nothers; but there are also broad deep spaces, here and there, never\nbridged over by the discoveries of science. Hence, \"an animal,\" as you\nhave been told already, in the words of Hegel, \"is a miracle for the\nvegetable world.\" It is a new creation in some way, and a new creation\nin any way is a miracle. After wandering amongst rocks, we find in\nplants a new world. Organized life is so; so also, compared with\nanimal instinct, is the mind of man, with its spiritual reason, and its\nmoral consciousness.\n\nNot only do Coleridge, Kant, and Plato regard man's highest faculty as\nessentially different from the mere adaptive understanding of an animal\nnature; but what is still more remarkable, Aristotle himself, whose\nturn of mind was so different from theirs, differentiates man from\nother creatures on the ground of his being endowed with the faculty of\nreason. In his work on the Generation of Animals, he says that there\nis no resource except to believe, that the reason has no affinity with\nthe material elements out of which the human embryo is formed, but that\nit comes from without, and that it alone, of all the component parts\nof man, is divine.[35] Thus, in the opinion of one of the greatest\nphilosophers the world has ever known, the line of demarcation between\nman and all lower creatures is broad and clear, a line which in the\nsimple order and development of nature they could never cross. The\nsuperior attributes of humanity, according to him, come _from without_;\nhere, then, amongst the component parts of humanity is something\ndivine. In other words, we have a new world; a new creation. I do not\nsay there is a strict parallel between any new race or species in\nnature and the occurrence of individual miracles on rare occasions,\nbut I do say that there is enough of resemblance between these two\ndescriptions of change to exempt a believer in both of them from the\ncharge of being absurd.\n\nFurthermore, there are in human minds varieties of power of an\nastonishing description: although there be faculties common to all\nmen, the vigour of those faculties in some cases is such as perfectly\nto eclipse the vigour of them in others. The superiority of individual\nminds, whose works have filled the world with wonder, is such as to\nleave behind, at an unapproachable distance, the ordinary measure\nof human endowment. Certain intellects (I need not name them) have\nlong exercised a formative power upon the civilized portions of our\nrace. They have been as crystals inserted in a solution, and other\ncrystals have received shape from them. Whence have come these typical\nenergies in the intellectual world? No law of development will account\nfor a resplendent genius now and then flashing on the world; for the\nappearance of a master mind, after humanity has kept on a low level\nthrough generation after generation; for the ascent again of gifted\nspirits into the highest heaven of invention, after another lapse into\nmere mediocrity. No known laws of causality account for such facts\nin the realms of intellectual existence. If, in the case of man, as\ncompared with other animals, the difference, as Aristotle says, is\nsomething which comes _from without_, the same may be said with respect\nto the difference between ordinary mortals and William Shakespere or\nJohn Milton. There is forced upon us the conviction, that these stars\nwhich dwell apart are kindled by fires burning in superhuman spheres.\nI do not say, in this case, any more than in the others I have cited,\nthat we find an exact parallel to a miracle; but I do maintain, that\nwe discover here a kind of inspiration which, like the miraculous,\ntranscends all known laws, and brings to mind what was said by the\nfirst of those just named:\n\n        \"There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,\n        Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.\"\n\nWhat is called physical science must change her name, and renounce\nher office, and assume functions of another order, before she can\npronounce a peremptory negative upon the point in controversy.[36]\nPhysical science needs to become metaphysical, and to pass into fields\nof abstract reasoning in order to the utterance of a universal dictum.\nTo this kind of mental employment in itself I make no objection; for\nthe science of merely physical nature, without any outlook into higher\nregions, keeps the soul in humiliating imprisonment. The excursions of\nthought, however, now before us are regarded in some quarters under\nthe singular delusion of being strictly scientific, whilst employed\nin devising a theory of the universe which excludes the constant\ncontrol of a personal God, an Almighty will. The assaults on what\nis miraculous can be carried on only with metaphysical weapons. The\nfacts of physical nature do not supply them; only from theories of\nphysical nature, taking a metaphysical form, can they be gathered. Even\nPositivism, with all its doubtfulness and denial--strange contradiction\nthat--must, in order to deny the possibility of miracles, build up a\nwall to shut them out, by trenching first on ground beyond its own\ndomain. Pure Positivism, consistently with itself, is not competent to\ncontradict the existence of the supernatural; it can but leave it an\nopen question. The common method of distinctly denying miracles is one\ninvolving either some atheistic or pantheistic principle. Assume--and\nit is but an assumption--that matter is eternal and self-sufficient;\nthat natural laws have not originated in, or are not administered\nby, a personal will; and thus assuming what prepares for, if it does\nnot necessitate, some atheistic or pantheistic hypothesis, you can\nplausibly maintain that the wonders of which we speak are utterly\ninconceivable. But, as you see, it is not physical science simply\nconsidered which brings out this result; the result comes through\nadding to physical science what is really a metaphysical element.\n\nAt what a tremendous cost, it may be observed by the way, is such a\nresult achieved. The philosophy of universal necessity places man in\nthe same predicament as it does simple matter. If all nature excludes\nvoluntary control, and is subject only to an iron rule of invariable\nsuccession, then man also must himself be incapable of voluntary\ncontrol, whether it comes from a supreme will or from his own. Thus\nthe warfare which assails miracles, threatens to destroy all ideas of\nfreedom and moral responsibility. And this dark foreshadowing is not\nconcealed. \"Step by step,\" we are confidently and calmly told, \"the\nnotion of evolution by law is transforming the whole field of our\nknowledge and opinion. Not the physical world alone is now the domain\nof inductive (?) science, but the moral, the intellectual, and the\nspiritual are being added to the empire. It is the crown of philosophy\nto see the immutable even in the complex action of human life.\"[37]\n\nBut when all assumptions are denied, the whole question presents\nanother aspect. Given the fundamental distinction between things\nphysical and things moral; given the higher nature of man, the personal\nexistence of God, a moral element in the Divine rule, the immortality\nof the human soul, and the present vicinity of invisible spiritual\nrealms; and, immediately, miracles wrought by the Divine will for\nmen's moral welfare are completely removed out of the sphere of the\nimpossible.\n\nPositivism, Atheism, and Pantheism are considered in other lectures of\nthis course, and therefore it is not my office to examine them. To what\nhas been said by the Archbishop of York and the Rev. Mr. Jackson, and\nto what may be said by the Rev. Dr. Rigg, I must refer my hearers.\n\nI would only observe in passing, what, indeed, I have hinted at\nalready, that it puzzles me beyond description to conceive how, by any\ncourse of natural evolution, independent of the introduction of a new\nforce by an overruling power, the phenomena of the human will with its\nmorally creative energy for good and evil could have been produced. To\nsolve, on the principle of pure development, the problem of the genesis\nof that mysterious faculty, is an insuperable task. If we may speak of\nwhat is inconceivable--and scientific men set us the example--we should\nsay the existence of volition in man, with its moral accompaniments,\nis utterly inconceivable, apart from belief in a Divine will, of which\nours is the offspring.\n\nIt appears, then, that science really presents no antecedent grounds\nfor rejecting miracles, and that if we believe in a personal God, the\npresumed impossibility melts away. This point has been conceded by one\nof the masters of modern reasoning. \"A miracle,\" as was justly remarked\nby Brown, \"is no contradiction to the law of cause and effect; it is a\nnew effect, supposed to be produced by the introduction of a new cause.\nOf the adequacy of that cause, if present, there can be no doubt, and\nthe only antecedent improbability which can be ascribed to the miracle,\nis the improbability that any such cause existed.\"[38]\n\n2. When we have disposed of the preliminary objection which, in\nsome way or other, says miracles are impossible, we are met by\nanother objection, namely, that they are immensely _improbable_.\nHume's ingenious position,[39]--that miracles are contrary to human\nexperience, that no amount of human testimony is sufficient to\nestablish them, and that it is far more likely men should be deceived\nor mistaken, than that such events as miracles must be, could ever take\nplace,--has been made to do abundant service in this controversy; very\nlittle, if anything, has been added by those who have persistently used\nthe argument, to improve its form or to increase its plausibility.\nOne of its latest modifications is, that incidents out of the common\ncourse of things, said to happen in the present day, are by all of us\nsceptically regarded, that supernatural pretensions are felt by us to\nbe inadmissible, and that where we are compelled to allow the honesty\nof witnesses, if they affirm anything involving a miraculous nature,\nwe at once dispose of the whole matter by saying 'there must be a\nmistake somewhere.' Undoubtedly it is true that miracles are contrary\nto common experience. They must be so, or they would not be what they\nare. If they were of frequent occurrence, if they had happened in the\nhistory of the world so often as to become familiar to mankind, they\nwould change their character completely. Their nature and purpose, in\nthe view of those who receive them, is such as to render it necessary\nthat we should bear this in mind. But to allege that they are contrary\nto human experience, taken in the widest point of view, is to beg the\nquestion at issue, a fact remarked a thousand times. That they are\nnot contrary to the experience of certain persons who lived eighteen\nhundred years ago, is what Christians affirm; to say that they are,\nis illogically to cut the controversy short, and, by a general denial\nof everything of the kind, to put out of court the very case about to\nbe tried, in support of which there are credible witnesses waiting\nto give evidence. The question of probability must be looked at all\nround. The circumstances under which any alleged wonders may have\nhappened must be taken into account, before we pronounce upon their\nprobability or improbability. When extraordinary things, coloured with\na supernatural tinge, are related to us as having occurred without\nany assignable purpose, or only for some sectarian or party end, in\nconnection with beliefs long cherished and avowed, of course we look on\nthem suspiciously; giving to the authorities relating the narratives,\ncredit for integrity and truthfulness, we naturally say 'there must\nbe a mistake somewhere.' And, no doubt, the general culture of the\npresent age, however superficial that culture may be, makes us far\nless ready than our fathers were, to endorse popular tales of wonder.\nThere is a salutary scepticism which grows out of extensive knowledge.\nTruth is of such immense value, that we should not be indifferent\nto it in the smallest communications and concernments of life. Most\nassuredly any wayward, eccentric, unmeaning, and useless departure\nfrom the common course of things, tending only to shake our faith in\nnature,--as if men might gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles,\nas if barley being sown, wheat should spring up, or an apple tree by\na sudden freak should bear oranges,--would deserve to be stigmatized\nas unworthy of belief. But the wonders in question come under another\ncategory. They are represented in the history which has recorded\nthem, not only as being exceptional incidents in themselves, but as\nhaving been accomplished under exceptional circumstances. They are\nnot waifs and strays on the stream of time, floating no one knows why\nand whither; but growths rooted in what appears as a unique system of\nmoral instruction and improvement, designed by the loving Father of\nspirits for His lost children. They do not produce what may be called a\ndisturbance of nature--that is, a throwing things in the physical world\nout of gear, so that men are thereby puzzled to make out what nature\nis, and how far it may be trusted. The documents which contain our\nmiraculous chronicles attest the immutability of Him who is the King of\nnature, and the unchangeable foundation of His government and law, with\na pre-eminent luminousness and with an unparalleled force.\n\nThe wonders chronicled were avowedly wrought for purposes of the\nhighest order; and here, again, we fall back upon the distinction\nbetween what is physical and what is moral. Those purposes of the\nhighest order to which we refer are moral. They bear on the noblest\ndestinies of humanity, and they link themselves with the principles\nof natural religion, with the being and sway of a mighty, wise, and\ngracious God, with our conscience and responsibility, and with the\nfuture existence of the soul. Natural religion, though it speaks not\na word of miracles, though it gives no prophecies of their advent,\nyet prepares for their appearance so far, that its teachings, fairly\nconsidered, cut off all antecedent unlikelihood of their occurrence.\nFor natural religion suggests the desirableness of revealed religion,\nand revealed religion is only another name for supernatural\ninterposition.\n\nIn a lecture upon Science and Revelation, by the Dean of Canterbury,\nit has been shown that man's moral nature, man's religious\nsusceptibilities, render religion a necessity for the supply of his\ndeepest wants; but that what is called natural religion is not clear\nenough, nor certain enough, to affect the generality of our race.\nRevelation, then, it may be fairly argued, looking at man, is a\ndesideratum, looking at God, is a probability; and Revelation, being\nobviously a supernatural bestowment, seems to imply some authentication\nof itself, in part at least, by means of evidence corresponding with\nits own supernatural origin and character.\n\nThe conditions under which Scripture miracles are said to have been\nperformed must be kept in view when we are told they are improbable.\nThey were not performed in one continued series by a succession\nof Thaumaturgists; but they are found grouped together in certain\nclusters. As science indicates particular epochs of the energizing\npower of nature, so the Bible records particular epochs of an\nenergizing power above nature.\n\nThe first great cluster of Bible wonders we find gathered round the\nLawgiver of Israel; the second round the great Reformer of God's\nancient Church; the third round Him who is spoken of as The Word made\nflesh, who dwelt among us, and who imparted to His apostles miraculous\npowers akin to His own. Miracles, for the most part, are halos of\ndivine light encircling three grand names--Moses, Elijah, Jesus,--the\nlast the greatest of the three.\n\nPhysical wonders we meet with in company with spiritual ones--wonders\nin outward nature in company with wonders in the great soul-world,\nof which sensible things are the types and shadows. In other words,\nmiracles occur in connection with inspiration, and, whilst marvels\nstartle the eye, new truths or new applications of truth are addressed\nto the mind. In harmony with facts in the intellectual universe already\nnoticed, resembling the exceptional illuminations of genius which at\nintervals have flashed on the rest of mankind,--like the lightning that\nlighteneth out of the one part under heaven, and shineth unto the other\npart under heaven,--souls inspired with a grand moral message have come\nforth from the secret place of the Most High; and it has been in the\npathway of these inspired souls that physical miracles have started up;\nrather, it has been by their hands that physical miracles have been\nwrought.\n\nThere have been surprising coincidences in modern times between the\nwonderful in nature and the wonderful in history; for example, between\nthe sailing of the invincible Spanish Armada, and the storm which\nstrewed the shores of Great Britain with its ponderous wrecks--between\nthe march of Napoleon's army and the winter's snow which blinded,\nbenumbed, and destroyed so many thousands. The connection is\nunexplained except on the principle of a Divine providence.[40] And\nso in ancient times there were coincidences between the lightning\nand thunder of Sinai, and the legislative wisdom of Moses--between\nthe fire that fell on Carmel, and the reforming zeal of Elijah. The\nconnection is explicable only on the principle of these men having\nbeen the internunciators of the Divine will. This explication is\nstrengthened by what they did with their own fingers or their own lips.\n\nIt may be considered as entrenching too much on the domain of doctrine\nto speak in this lecture of the Incarnation; but I would venture to\nsay thus much, that Jesus appears on the face of the evangelical\nnarratives, as the Son of God, in a sense in which no other being\ncan be rightly called so; that in the opinions of early Christendom,\nthe lowest as well as the highest, He was esteemed as a supernatural\nPerson;[41] and that, by common consent, amidst diversities of\ntheological sentiment, it is acknowledged, never man spake like this\nman, or lived like this man, or died like this man, or was like this\nman. And being, by the perfection of His moral character, and by the\npurpose of His benevolent mission, a truly exceptional person, it\nis only in keeping with the first blush, and with the deeper study\nof His wondrous life, to believe in signs and wonders attending His\nearthly career, showing whence He came, and illustrating what He came\nto do. Christ Himself is the greatest of wonders in the history of\nthe world. No other approaches Him in wisdom, love, beautifulness, and\nglory. In more senses than one His name is \"above every name.\" Taking\nthe four Gospels together, the Incarnation of the Word is associated\nwith a supernatural birth. The miracle in the spiritual world of the\nmanifestation of God in Jesus Christ, is coupled with the miracle in\nthe physical world of the Virgin's conception. If Christianity be more\nthan the republication of natural religion, if it be the revelation of\nGod's redeeming love, it involves a miracle as the very starting-point\nof the process; and the unfolding of the idea in the New Testament\nincludes a divine manifestation, which is a miracle in history, and a\ndivine birth, which is a miracle in nature.[42]\n\nHis advent in the world comes out in the four Gospels as a central\nsunlike marvel, and therefore it seems no improbability, but rather the\nclearest of all probabilities, that around Him there should revolve a\nplanetary circle of miracles.\n\nDifficulties are needlessly created by forgetfulness of the character\nascribed to this extraordinary Person. To argue as to what He did, or\nas to what He did not do, without a recognition of the actual _One_\npainted in the Gospels, is really to argue about another Christ, not\nthe one whom Christians follow.\n\nIn accordance with the view I have taken, is the manner in which\nthe New Testament miracles are narrated. It seems assumed that such\nthings might be expected in the wake of such a personage as the Son\nof God. They are not introduced as a procession of facts challenging\nsupreme admiration. No flourish of trumpets heralds their march; but\nthey follow as the fitting and humble retinue of Him who walked the\nearth its undisputed Master. The Evangelists write as men who were not\nastounded at what their Master did, because they were so filled with\nreverence and admiration, at the thought of what their Master was.\n\nHaving considered the antecedent objections made to miracles, we\nare now prepared to look at what is really the _nature_ of the\nmiraculous testimony afforded to Christianity. And here, for the sake\nof simplifying the argument, I shall confine myself to the miracles\nascribed to Christ. Faith in His miracles will lead to faith in\nthe miracles of His apostles. If it be granted, as we contend from\nwhat has been said it ought to be, that this is a case in which\nhistorical proof is admissible, then it is impossible to find stronger\nhistorical proof than comes to hand in support of the truth of the\nevangelical narratives. The historical proof, as such, has of late\nbeen comparatively little impugned; the assaults made on the prior\ncredibility of supernatural facts being the main opposition with which\nbelievers in Christianity have to contend. That opposition overcome,\nand the validity of competent witnesses, as to the question at issue,\nestablished, the course is free for an accumulation of evidence, such\nas Dr. Lardner, with rare erudition, has piled up in his volumes on\nthe Credibility of the Gospel History: such as Archdeacon Paley,\nwith unique ingenuity, and with singular felicity of arrangement\nand illustration, has condensed in his view of the Evidences of\nChristianity.[43] The works now mentioned do not, it must be confessed,\nsupply all that is wanted for the settlement of the question,\naccording to the phase it assumes at present. But when scientific and\nmetaphysical difficulties of modern creation have been grappled with\nand removed, the array of pagan and Christian testimonies in support\nof the original credibility of the Evangelists, as collected by these\nand other writers, comes to render service of immense value. It is\nmore than any one has yet attempted, to overturn, by citation against\ncitation, criticism against criticism, argument against argument, the\nbulwarks of historical defence built up by the researches of learned\nadvocates. Indeed, the early historical evidence all goes one way. It\nis evidence without counter-evidence.\n\nAnd to pass for a moment to foreign literature. After the endeavours\nof Strauss and others to resolve much of the Gospel story into myths of\na later age, and of R\u00e9nan, to construct out of the original documents a\nFrench philosophical romance, we are provided with the works of Ebrard\nand Pressens\u00e9, who have vindicated the truth of the New Testament story.\n\nIt would be idle to attempt, within the compass of this lecture, any\noutline of the mass of matter brought together in this service. But I\nmay be allowed to indicate that it may be arranged in three divisions.\n_First_, the concessions of the Jews. Talmudical writings imply that\nJesus of Nazareth did many mighty works. The _Toldoth Jeschu_ relates\na number of things, such as raising the dead, healing lepers, and\nrestoring the lame. It represents people as falling down before Him,\nexclaiming, \"Truly Thou art the Son of God.\"[44] The Christian miracles\nare allowed, but they are attributed to magic. \"There can be no doubt,\"\nsays Whately, \"that this must have been (as our sacred writers tell\nus it was) what the adversaries of Jesus maintained from the first.\nFor if those who lived on the spot in His time had denied or doubted\nthe facts of the miracles, and had declared that the accounts of them\nwere false tales, and that no miracles had ever really been wrought,\nwe may be sure that the same would have been said ever after by their\ndescendants.\"[45] _Secondly_, the admissions of heathens. The extracts\nfrom Celsus in Origen afford an abridged history of Jesus Christ,\nand acknowledge that He did many marvellous things. Celsus explains\nthe fact by saying, Jesus went into Egypt, and having made trial of\npowers practised there, returned highly elated, and pronounced Himself\na God.[46] Porphry speaks of Christian miracles as wrought by poor\nrustics through magical arts.[47] Julian does not contradict them when\nhe contemptuously affirms, that Jesus did nothing in His lifetime\nworthy of remembrance, unless any one thinks it a mighty matter to heal\nlame and blind people, and exorcise demons in the villages of Bethsaida\nand Bethany.[48] To these heathen admissions, which are of considerable\nvalue, are to be added, _thirdly_, the affirmations of Christians.\nMiracles are asserted by them in manifold forms and in manifold\nwritings. The Fathers follow in the wake of Apostles and Evangelists;\nand, be it remembered, each New Testament author who testifies to\nthese superhuman achievements is an independent witness, so that their\nstatements bear the value of as many concurrent proofs: and if it\nshould be said that, because they were Christians, they are partial\nwitnesses, on the other hand it can be said that some of the Fathers,\nand all the New Testament writers, had become so, contrary to former\nhabits and prejudices, in part, at least, through the very force of\nmiracles, and that too at the cost of extraordinary self-sacrifice and\nsuffering.\n\nI have not sufficient space to exhibit adequately the argument for\nthe credibility of the New Testament witnesses. I must, however,\nobserve that the force has not departed from the old-fashioned method\nof stating the case, namely, that you must accept them as competent\nand satisfactory; or you must believe either that they were dishonest\nmen, intending to deceive, or that they were dupes of their own or of\nother people's fancies. I am disposed to extend the dilemma, and to\nsay, that there is a third supposition, growing out of the junction\nof these two, the supposition (according to a not uncommon occurrence\nin the mysteries of human nature) that the witnesses might be partly\nthe victims of delusion, and partly the inventors of fiction, that\ncredulity and imagination might be both at work, the result being a\nfabrication of miracles, having no basis, or but an exceedingly slender\none, in facts occurring before men's eyes. With these alternatives\nunder our view, the inquiry is, Which shall we apply to the witnesses\nof the miracles of Christ? R\u00e9nan has applied the composite supposition\nto the witnesses of the resurrection. \"On the Sunday morning, Mary\nMagdalene first came very early to the tomb. The stone was displaced\nfrom the opening, and the body was no longer in the place where they\nhad laid it. At the same time the strangest rumours were spread in the\nChristian community. The cry, 'He is risen,' quickly spread amongst the\ndisciples. Love caused it to find ready credence everywhere.\" \"Such was\nthe impression He had left in the hearts of His disciples, and of a few\ndevoted women, that during some weeks more, it was as if He were living\nand consoling them. Had His body been taken away, or did enthusiasm,\nalways credulous, create afterwards the group of narratives by which it\nwas sought to establish faith in the resurrection? In the absence of\nopposing documents this can never be ascertained. Let us say, however,\nthat the strong imagination of Mary Magdalene played an important part\nin this circumstance. Divine power of love! Sacred moments in which the\npassion of one possessed gave to the world a resuscitated God!\" No one\nis more ready than I am to do justice to the extraordinary literary\nmerits of the \"_Vie de J\u00e9sus_,\" its lucid style, its descriptive\npower, its manifold charms; but I cannot conceal my amazement that\nthe author, with his exquisite genius, should adopt such a travestied\nrendering of the noblest of Bible stories. There are no documents,\nas he confesses, to work upon but the four Gospels; and from these\nGospels it distinctly appears that, so far from the witnesses produced\nbeing of the character he indicates, so far from their love snatching\nat anything within reach, however airy, out of which to weave a web of\nwonders, there were men amongst them slow of heart to believe what the\nprophets had written, and what Jesus had said about the resurrection;\nmen who counted the report of that resurrection, when they first heard\nof it, as an idle tale,--one of whom even would not yield to sight\nitself, but demanded to touch the nail-prints in the holy palms, and\nto thrust his hand into the sacred side. And as to the women, when\nthey came to the sepulchre on the third day, it was not to hail a\nrisen Jesus, but to anoint a buried one. That persons represented by\nthe historians as burdened with doubts, and fears, and unbelief, and\ndemanding demonstrative evidence, should have been finally convinced,\nand should have staked their all upon that conviction, removes them\nfor ever utterly beyond all reasonable suspicion of dreaming strangely\ncoloured dreams of their Lord's risen life,--to say nothing of\ncollusion and fraud,--and places them at once amongst witnesses, who\nwell knew what they said, and whereof they affirmed.\n\nThe credibility of the witness borne to another resurrection is also\nwell established. For evidence of the authenticity of the Gospel of\nSt. John, I refer to Professor Lightfoot's lecture, and would only\nremark upon the narrative in this Gospel--a narrative so full of\npathetic beauty--that it is impossible to explain away its details\nby possibilities of misapprehension, and pardonable exaggerations\nof extraordinary incidents. Thus much is indisputable, Lazarus was\nsick unto death. To all human appearance he died. He died, and was\nburied, and remained so long in the grave that it was believed the\ncorruption of his corpse had commenced. Coincident with the utterance\nby Jesus, at the door of the tomb, of the words, \"Lazarus, come\nforth!\" the body moved, arose, came forth, bound hand and foot with\ngrave-clothes; in consequence of which, \"many of the Jews which came\nto Mary, and had seen the things which Jesus did, believed on Him.\"\nHere were presented to the senses of witnesses phenomena involving\nthe performance of a miracle. A distinction has been justly drawn\nbetween testimony to phenomena cognizable by the senses, and miracles\ncompletely considered on their invisible and divine side, as well as\ntheir visible and human one. \"Testimony,\" it is said, \"can apply only\nto apparent sensible facts; testimony can only prove an extraordinary\nand perhaps inexplicable occurrence or phenomenon; that it is due\nto supernatural causes is entirely dependent on the previous belief\nand assumption of the parties.\"[49] With the omission of the words\n\"previous belief and assumption,\" and the substitution of the words\n\"reflection and conviction,\"--whether exercised and experienced at the\ntime or afterwards,--I accept the statement. Phenomena are immediately\napprehensible; the cause is not so. A persuasion that the cause is\nmiraculous arises in the mind as an inference from what is directly\nwitnessed. But what is directly witnessed may be of such a nature\nas to compel the witness, as a reasonable person, to believe that\nwhat has taken place results from a supernatural interposition. This\nconviction implies, indeed, that the person believes in the existence\nof supernatural power--in other words, believes in the existence and\nagency of God--which belief may be described as a \"previous belief:\"\nbut a conviction that particular phenomena are the result of a\nsupernatural cause, depends on the exercise of reason in regard to\nthe phenomena themselves. \"No testimony,\" I admit, \"can reach to the\nsupernatural,\" directly, but it may reach it by implication.\n\nKeeping in view the distinction laid down, we say of the narrative\nof the resurrection of Lazarus, that no natural solution of the\nevent recorded is within reach. Fraud, collusion, trickery,[50] are\nexcluded by the character of Christ and of Lazarus: no reference to\naccidental coincidences, or to mesmerism, or to electric influences,\nor to any known physical agencies, meets the case. Nor is there room\nfor the anticipation that the advancement of science will ever solve\nthis problem. If a solution be attainable, we are shut up to the\none solution accepted by Christians. To leave it unsolved, to refer\nit to the class of unaccountable phenomena, through a persistent\ndetermination not to believe in anything supernatural, in the face\nof all which can be said in reply to antecedent objections, is most\nunphilosophical.\n\nLet me here add, in reference to narratives of the miraculous, that\nit is easy to marshal a number of general reflections together,\ncasting a slur upon evidence, and to invest with some plausibility its\ndenial or non-acceptance. But, when we think how fallaciously, yet\nplausibly, general reflections may be employed for the contradiction\nof evidence,--how, by reference to the proverbial exaggerations of\ntravellers' stories, accounts of other countries, of their customs and\nproductions, may be discredited; how, by insisting upon men's liability\nto illusion, the observations of scientific inquirers may be set aside;\nhow, by dwelling on credulity and passion, party spirit, and the\nlike, historic doubts may be conjectured respecting the existence of\nNapoleon I., and how, in the same way, historic doubts may be hereafter\nraised respecting a large part of the career of Napoleon III.; we see\nhow little such general reflections are to be trusted, how much more\nthey may do to hinder the interests of truth than to help them.[51] The\nabsurdity of the conclusions in such cases discredits the process by\nwhich they are reached.\n\nLet us not pass from this part of the subject without saying one word\nas to the presumption in favour of the New Testament narratives of\nmiracles, when compared with narratives of miracles found elsewhere.\nPlace side by side with the Scripture narratives the miraculous stories\nin the Apocryphal Gospels, in the writings of the Fathers, in medi\u00e6val\nchronicles, in modern legends of Saints, and one sees the force of\na remark by an eminent German theologian: \"The critical acumen of\nNiebuhr was, as is admitted, inferior to that of no man, and he has\ndone away with only too much of the ancient history of Rome. Yet he\nacknowledged, 'with respect to a miracle, in the strictest sense of\nthe word, it needs but an unprejudiced and searching investigation\nof nature to perceive, that the miracles related are anything but\nabsurd, and a comparison of them with the legends or so-called miracles\nof other religions, to recognize what a different spirit dwells in\nthem.'\"[52] To take only one step farther in this direction, when it is\nasked, \"What, if so many apparently competent witnesses were to assure\nyou, that they had seen such and such a miracle--mentioning the most\nmonstrous absurd, fantastic, and ludicrous confusion of nature--would\nyou believe them?\" We answer in the words of a modern Writer: \"We are\nonly concerned with the miraculous under that form and those conditions\nunder which it has actually by trustworthy report taken place, as\nsubordinated to what has been called 'a general law of wisdom,'\n_i.e._ to a wise plan and design in the Divine mind under which check\nthe course of miracles has, so to speak, kept near to nature, just\ndiverging enough for the purpose, and no more.\"[53]\n\n\nII.\n\nIt is time to attend to the second part of our subject, the _value_ of\nthe miraculous testimony to Christianity.\n\n1. The miracles must not be taken alone; they form a part of\nChristianity; and therefore, to be rightly understood, they should\nhold in the mind an inseparable relation to the rest of Christianity.\nChristianity is its own evidence. Each portion harmonizes with the\nother portions. They yield mutual support. Miracles, therefore, are\nconcurrent with other proofs. \"External\" and \"internal\" are convenient\nwords, but they are liable to mischievous application. One objection to\nthe word \"external,\" as designating the evidence of miracles, is that\nit assumes them to be outside the Gospel--only bulwarks for defence,\nnot pillars identical with the inner structure. It is curious that\nopposite classes of persons have attributed to miracles an externality\nwhich their place in Scripture will not allow. By one class, consisting\nof advocates for the evidence, miracles are presented as the chief\npart of the evidence, as marks indispensable for the authentication\nof Divine truth, yet quite _ab extra_ things, placed round about the\ntemple to ward off evil-disposed persons who would dare to violate the\nshrine. By another class, consisting of those who take exception to the\nmiracles, they are also treated as things _ab extra_, things which may\nwell be cut off from Christianity--burdens which there is no necessity\nit should be made to bear--a dress which disfigures it rather than\notherwise, and which, for the sake of its progress in the world, had\nbetter be stripped off and cast away. These two modes of assuming one\nand the same thing, are as objectionable in themselves, as they are\ncurious in their coincidence.\n\nThe miracles really run into and intersect the lines of New Testament\nteaching from end to end. They are not seals externally attached,\nbut contents deposited inside--not post-marks showing simply whence\nthe letter comes, but paragraphs written in the folded sheet. The\n\"_internal_\" and the \"_external_\"--if we may use the words in their\npopular currency--must occupy our attention together. Miracles cannot\nbe torn from the life of Christ. His nature, character, teaching,\nwonders, constitute an unparalleled spiritual unity. Criticism here,\nof course, has its own department of duty to fulfil. What really\nconstitute the synoptical Gospels and the Gospel of St. John, is\nits province to determine. Readings of MSS. require to be examined\nwith an honest desire to render the _textus receptus_ as perfect as\npossible--a desire which a reverential regard for the genuine contents\nof the record must serve to stimulate. When all that labour has been\naccomplished, the miracles of the genuine rolls of Scripture are to be\nregarded as integral elements of faith. \"The facts of Christianity,\"\nsays Archdeacon Lee, \"are represented by some as forming no part of\nits essential doctrines; they rank, it is argued, no higher than its\nexternal accessories. It is impossible to maintain this distinction. In\nthe Christian Revelation the fact of the Resurrection is the cardinal\ndoctrine, the doctrine of the Incarnation is the fundamental fact.\nChristianity exhibits its most momentous truths as actual realities, by\nfounding them upon an historical basis, and by interweaving them with\ntransactions and events which rest upon the evidence of sense.\"[54]\n\n2. Miracles are reasonable attestations of a Divine mission. As such\nour Lord appeals to them, they \"bear witness of me, that the Father\nhath sent me.\" As such Nicodemus received them: \"We know that Thou art\na teacher come from God: for no man can do these miracles that Thou\ndoest, except God be with him.\" As such the poor blind man regarded\nthem in that exquisite piece of _na\u00efvet\u00e9_, in which he says, \"Why\nherein is a marvellous thing, that ye know not from whence He is, and\nyet He hath opened mine eyes.\" As it is reasonable, in the case of an\nambassador, to refer to his credentials in proof of his legitimate\nauthority; so it is reasonable, in the case of a professedly Divine\nteacher, to refer to signs and wonders he is capable of working, in\nproof of his Divine commission.\n\nOf vast importance is it that we should note precisely the point\ntouched by the finger of miraculous evidence. It may be said, not only\nare miracles incapable of enforcing a train of argument, but they\nare incapable of establishing any moral or religious proposition. No\nphysical demonstration, it may be alleged, can ever link itself on to\na spiritual truth, because the two things belong to totally different\nspheres. We should get involved in metaphysical subtleties, were I\nto inquire thoroughly into this position. It is enough to say, that,\nadmitting it, the exact point touched by miraculous evidence, is,\naccording to the teaching of Scripture itself, the _office_ sustained\nand the _commission_ borne by a person. \"The works which the Father\nhath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness\nof _me_.\" \"Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you, by\nmiracles, and wonders, and signs, which God did by _Him_.\" In these\npassages, the witness of miracles is attached to a person. \"My works\nbear witness of _me_,\" says Jesus. They are the approval of \"_a man_,\"\nsays Peter. The evidential force of them bears on Christ Himself, the\nsent of God. Thus considered, miracles free themselves from objections\nmade to their competency to serve as direct proofs of spiritual truths.\n\nThe miracles of Moses afford evidence of his Divine legation: in like\nmanner the miracles of Jesus afford evidence of His Divine Messiahship.\nIt is said of Him that \"He taught them as one having authority, and\nnot as the scribes.\" Authoritativeness is characteristic of His mode\nof teaching. \"Verily, verily, I say unto you.\" He claimed a right to\nspeak, as one who had power to command men that they should obey. There\nis in His utterance little of argument, but much of law. Miracles can\nadd no force to a chain of reasoning, and you may say they cannot\nimmediately demonstrate spiritual truth, but they afford a basis for\nthe enunciation of a Divine message, a mandate of the Divine will.\n\nMiracles, no doubt, come within relations to spiritual truth, through\nthe medium of the miraculously demonstrated authority of its utterer;\nbut spiritual truth has other distinct and appropriate marks of its\nDivine origin and character. It contains an inward witness--it shines\nby its own light. It commends itself to men's consciences in the sight\nof God, and when believed, vindicates the justness and wisdom of such\nbelief.\n\nIt cannot be too much insisted on, that miraculous evidence comes not\nout in Scripture _by itself_. The works of Jesus include more than His\nmiracles. The whole beneficent influence of His life is covered by the\nwords, \"who went about doing good.\" With the thought of what He did,\nstands associated the thought of what He was; and with the character\nof His matchless life is interwoven the character of His matchless\nteaching. Miracles form but one strand in the cable which binds the\nChurch's faith to Him who is the Anchor of her hope; and _they_ expose\nthe ship to peril who untwist the rope, and lay upon that single strand\nthe whole amount of strain--the entire stress of tension. Holy Writ\nwarrants no such course; but warns against it. \"If there arise among\nyou a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a\nwonder, and the sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he spake\nunto thee, saying, 'Let us go after other gods which thou hast not\nknown, and let us serve them;' thou shalt not hearken unto the words\nof that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams.\" Moses, himself a worker\nof miracles, appeals to something beyond miracles as essential to the\nfinal establishment of religious authority. The moral proof is put\nin the foremost place, and no mere physical achievement can exercise\nexclusive force apart from that. And, as if to remind us of these words\nin Deuteronomy, we read in the last chapters of Revelation of men being\ndeceived by the miracles of the beast, of the spirits of devils working\nmiracles, and of the false prophet that wrought miracles. Thus the\nNew Testament teaches us to bind the evidence of Christian miracles\nto that which shows how utterly different they are from all the\npretensions of deceivers, from all the delusions of fanatics. To dwell\non extraordinary incidents, apart from other considerations, is to open\na door to superstition, and even revolting credulity. In this way, a\nbelief in witchcraft, sanctioning most unrighteous and cruel laws,\nmaintained its ground in England to the end of the seventeenth century.\nFrom anything like the unreasonableness of staking religious faith upon\nphysical events or historical circumstances, _simply because_ they are\nunaccountable upon any ordinary hypothesis of human affairs, the Gospel\nis perfectly free. He who appeals to His own mighty works, appeals also\nto His own self-evidencing words, and to the moral disposition of His\ndisciples. \"To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the\nworld, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Every one that is of\nthe truth heareth my voice.\" \"My doctrine is not mine, but His that\nsent me. If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine\nwhether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself. He that speaketh of\nhimself, seeketh his own glory; but he that seeketh his glory that sent\nhim, the same is true, and no unrighteousness is in him.\"\n\nThe solitary position assigned to the evidence of miracles in the\ncontroversies of the last century was mischievous to the interests of\nreligion. I believe with Coleridge, \"how little of divine, how little\nfitting to our nature a miracle is, when insulated from spiritual\ntruths, and disconnected from religion as its end:\"--and I would ask\nwith him, \"What then can we think of a theological theory, which,\nadopting a scheme of prudential legality, common to it with 'the sty\nof Epicurus,' as far at least as the springs of moral action are\nconcerned, makes its whole religion consist in the belief of miracles!\"\nThere is some room for this severe censure of theologians in the\nlast century, who failed to insist \"on the creating of a new heart,\nwhich collects the energies of a man's whole being in the focus of\nthe conscience--the one essential miracle, the same, and of the same\nevidence to the ignorant and the learned, which no superior skill can\ncounterfeit, human or demoniacal.\" I should assign a higher place to\nthe physical miracle than Coleridge did,--but there is to my mind a\ntrue and deep sense in what he asks respecting the moral one:--\"Is it\nnot that implication of doctrine in the miracle, and of miracle in\nthe doctrine, which is the bridge of communication between the senses\nand the soul?\"[55] Christianity as a whole, at the present time,\nestablishes its claims by the new spiritual creation which it effects\nin its sincere disciples. And here, let me add: looking at the position\nof our inquiry at the present day, it appears of great importance, not\nto lay down as a principle, that miracles are indispensable in the\nauthorization of a Divine message. To do so hampers our argument. To\ndo so contradicts Scripture,--\"John did no miracle.\" If one eminent\nservant of the Most High could make good his authority without\neffecting any physical marvel, so might another. Regarding Jesus simply\nas a Divine Teacher, there would, then, be no absolute necessity for\nHis working wonders in the fields of material nature. His moral acts,\nHis freedom from moral defects, and the whole moral tenor of His life,\nwould evince the holiness of His character, and the oneness of His own\nspirit with that of the Father of spirits, the fountain of love and\ntruth; for what He said of men applied to Himself, \"By their fruits\nye shall know them.\" Yet, though I cannot see that miracles, as some\nthink, were essential to the proof of what He said respecting Himself,\nthey are, as indicated already, what might be expected in one who was\nall that Jesus of Nazareth claimed to be; they also corroborate claims\nto spiritual authority, resting on other grounds; and, still further,\nthe manner in which some of them were performed, points to the higher\nnature which tabernacled in His humanity.\n\nThe place in the sphere of evidence occupied by the miracles of\nJesus, is not exactly the same to us that it was to the multitudes\nwho witnessed them. I fully agree in the remark, \"We do not ask any\none to begin with the miracles,--to regard power, and still more the\nrecord of power, centuries afterwards, as the one irresistible proof of\nthe truth and Divine origin of a Revelation. This has been done--done\nperhaps too long--done certainly in this age without conviction.\"[56]\nA miracle never was _the one_ irresistible proof. It never was more\nthan one amongst others. But at first it had a power of awakening\nattention, which it does not possess now. _Seen_, it irresistibly\nproduced excitement, which led to inquiry. _Recorded_, it fails of that\neffect. It is wise, at this time of day, to begin the exposition of\nChristian evidence by insisting on Christianity as a fact--as a moral\nspiritual power in the world; and then, examining its principles, and\ntracing its achievements to the beginning, to bring out the evidential\nworth of Christ's miracles as a crown on the head of other proofs. At\nthe same, time it should be observed, that their pertinency as proofs\nremains unaltered. They are not less true for being old. They are as\ngood witnesses now as they were eighteen centuries ago. What was done\nby Julius C\u00e6sar, what was done by Alexander the Great, as it appears\non record, is still as valid an indication as ever, of the genius and\nprowess which the men possessed. So, what Jesus did, as we find it\nrecorded in His fourfold memoirs, produces undiminished assurance of\nHis superhuman character. If any one asks for miracles now, I reply,\nthey are not wanted, they could not be used as credentials of one who\nleft the world ages since. His own miracles, ascertained by history,\nwill, to the end of time, in connection with His whole life, avail as\nguarantees for faith in His Divine might and goodness.\n\n3. And, finally, the miracles promote the acceptance of Christian\ntruths by the illustrations of them which they afford. Christ's\nmiracles are of the same description as the principles and precepts\nin Christ's teaching. They are animated with benevolence, instinct\nwith love. The Gospel perpetually offers to men a spiritual salvation;\nMiracles at the beginning brought them salvation of a lower kind, which\nnevertheless pointed to a higher. Of the author of Christianity it\nmight be said literally, \"He is the Saviour of the body.\" His wondrous\nworks of healing sparkled with a tenderness, compassion, and help, like\nthose with which His main mission to mankind was filled. And, as they\nwere eminently beneficial to human beings, and so were of the same\nclass as the other bestowments the Christ of God came to confer, they\nexhibited types of the nobler blessings themselves. They are mirrors\nreflecting larger and better gifts. Signs they are as well as wonders;\nparables as well as proofs. In cures of the blind, there are parables\nof spiritual illumination; in the cleansing of lepers, parables of\nspiritual purification; and in exorcisms, parables of spiritual\ndisenthralment.\n\nThe benevolent animus, and the didactic form of the miracles of Jesus\nseized the attention of early Christian writers, and were employed by\nthem for the purpose of establishing and recommending the Christian\nreligion. They used them much more under their illustrative than under\ntheir strictly evidential aspect. Arnobius (A.D. 306), in ten chapters\nof his seven books, \"_Adversus Gentes_,\" lays special stress upon\ntheir kind and beneficent tendency.[57] Lactantius, his contemporary\nin his \"Institutions,\" whilst regarding Christ's miracles as proofs\nof His higher nature, manifests particular delight in searching\nout their ethical significance. He goes through the mighty works\nof our Lord in order, and points out, how they demonstrated the\nrenewal of the human soul, the opening of its eyes, the unstopping\nof its ears, the loosening of its tongue.[58] And Athanasius (A.D.\n326) takes special pains to show that the miracles of Jesus were\nrevelations--self-representations of His Person as Divine Creator,\nnot mere credentials of His doctrine, but veritable victories over\nnature, so that no one can doubt who Christ is, when once he beholds\nHis works:--and moreover, that by the manner of His working miracles,\nHe at once proved his Divinity, and His humanity, His Godhead and\nHis incarnation.[59] And Augustine insists much on their design as\nsymbolical of redemption, as instructive acts, charged with prophetical\nimport, and calculated to inspire delight more than wonder.[60]\n\nThese remarks and quotations bear chiefly on the relation of miracles\nto the spiritual blessings of the Gospel at the beginning. But miracles\nalso sustain a very interesting relation to the like blessings as\nbestowed in after, and in present times. When the spring is over, and\nits produce of blossoms has passed away, it is found, that though the\nground is covered with leaves of white and pink, the blossoms have\nset into precious fruit. They have bequeathed more than blossoms. Each\nfolded up a promise of what is richer than itself. The peach flower,\nthe peach--the pear flower, the pear. We read in the Apocalypse, of\nthe Tree of Life. Is not the Gospel the Tree of Life? Is not Christ\nthe Tree of Life? It is not fanciful to speak of the miracles as early\nblossoms. Long since they burst out profusely. Long since they fell. To\nsome eyes, they may seem to lie in the paths of history, as withered\nleaves. But if the spring-time is past, the autumn-time has long\nsince come. Christianity can tell of spiritual blessings which it has\nconferred on the children of men down to this day, and is conferring\nstill. A tranquil conscience, a pure heart, a holy life, a hope that\nmaketh not ashamed,--these are the clustering felicities, the manifold\nbeatitudes, of the Gospel of Love. Thank God! abundant has been the\ningathering. Thank God! abundant is the harvest, still waiting to be\ngathered. In nature the bloom is more plentiful than the fruit, but\nhere the fruit is more plentiful than the bloom.\n\n\n\n\nTHE GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF REVELATION.\n\nBY THE RIGHT REVEREND\n\nTHE LORD BISHOP OF CARLISLE.\n\n\n\n\nTHE GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF REVELATION.\n\n\nWhen I undertook, at the request of the Christian Evidence Society,\nto deliver a lecture having for its title _The Gradual Development\nof Revelation_, I confess that I did not perceive that the title was\nopen to criticism. I thought that I understood the terms employed, and\nI still trust that this is so; but a little consideration showed me\nthat the language was not used very strictly, and that there was in\nit a confusion of metaphors, which might possibly be connected with a\nconfusion of thought.\n\nThis being so, I propose to introduce what I have to say by a short\nexamination of the words which express the subject of my lecture: and I\ndo so, as I need hardly say, not for the purpose of finding fault, but\nbecause it seems to me that I shall in this manner most easily explain\nthe nature of the subject which I conceive to be committed to me, and\nindicate the manner in which I purpose to treat it.\n\nNow the word _development_, which like many other long words has\nbecome very common, is also, like many other words, not unfrequently\nused somewhat loosely. The root of it, the word _velop_, is unknown in\nany other form than the two words _envelope_ and _develope_.[61] In\nmathematics, the word _develope_ is used, as all words are, with the\nutmost precision. We speak of _developing a function_, that is, putting\nit into a new and unfolded form, which, however, shall be essentially\nequivalent to the original. So also we speak of _developable surfaces_,\nthat is, surfaces such as cones and cylinders, which can be unfolded\nand laid flat upon a plane without tearing. It will be seen that in\nthese applications of the word the essential thought is that of a\nchange, by a process of unfolding, in the condition of something which\nyou already possess; and this I take to be the true definition of\ndevelopment.\n\nFrom this, however, we easily pass to a cognate meaning of the term.\nThus we speak of the development of an idea, that is, the unfolding\nand applying of the results of an original thought, a discovery or\nprinciple, which were truly contained in it from the first, but were\nnot from the first perceived to be so contained. For example, we\nsay that railways are only a development of the original idea of\nturning to account the expansive force of steam; or that Newton's\n\"Principia\" and Laplace's \"Mecanique Celeste,\" and, in fact, the whole\nof modern physical astronomy, are developments of the idea, or fact,\ncall it which you will, of the universal gravitation of matter; or\nthat the British constitution of this century is a development of\n_Magna Charta_; and so forth. What we mean by this language is that\nthe essential principles of the development were implicitly contained\nin the original idea, and that one has been derived from the other\nsomewhat in the same way as that in which the bird comes from the egg\nand the plant from the seed.\n\nDr. Newman, in his Essay \"On the Development of Christian Doctrine,\"\ntakes a somewhat different view. He speaks of the development of\nan idea as follows: \"When some great enunciation, whether true or\nfalse, about human nature, or present good, or government, or duty,\nor religion, is carried forward into the public throng and draws\nattention, then it is not only passively admitted in this or that form\ninto the minds of men, but it becomes a living principle within them,\nleading them to an ever-new contemplation of itself, an acting upon it,\nand a propagation of it. Such is the doctrine of the natural bondage\nof the will, or of individual responsibility, or of the immortality of\nthe soul, or of the rights of man, or of the divine right of kings, or\nof the hypocrisy and tyranny of priestcraft, or of the lawfulness of\nself-indulgence.... Let one such idea get possession of the popular\nmind, or the mind of any set of persons, and it is not difficult to\nunderstand the effects which will ensue.\"[62] Taking this view, there\nis manifestly a difficulty in determining whether an idea has been\nrightly or wrongly developed, whether the growth be wholly from the\nroot or partly parasitical; and the prime intention of Dr. Newman's\nbook is to supply tests of genuine development, and to apply them in\none particular case; but I wish it to be perceived that whether we take\nthis wider view, or the stricter one which I endeavoured to present\nto you just now, it is essentially necessary to regard development as\nthe exhibition in a new unfolded form of that which already existed in\nanother.\n\nWhen therefore we speak of development with reference to God, we must\nregard Him as the developer, and His eternal purposes as the thing\ndeveloped: the point which I have to bring before you with reference to\nits bearing upon the faith of Christians, and the unbelief of those who\nscruple to be regarded as disciples of Christ, is the gradual character\nof the process by which God has developed His purposes.\n\nAnd this being the meaning of development, I think it is manifest\nthat it is a confusion of figures to speak of the _development_ of a\n_revelation_. To _reveal_ is to _draw back a veil_, and so to uncover\nsomething which was concealed before. Hence we can properly speak\nof God as _revealing_ to us His person, His character, His will.\nHis person is eternal and unchangeable; so is His character; so is\nHis will; but He uncovers and shows these to us; it may be by Holy\nScripture, it may be by the living voice, or the life, or the person of\nthe Lord Jesus Christ; but however it be, the conception appropriate\nto the word revelation is that of something which exists independently\nof our minds, and which is uncovered, so that our minds can perceive\nit. Revelation, therefore, cannot be developed; if we use the word as\nmeaning the process of revealing, then this is a different process from\nthat of developing; and if we use the word as meaning objectively the\nknowledge which has been revealed, the knowledge which we obtain of God\nby revelation, then this knowledge comes to us in an already developed\nform: it is not an idea to be developed, but a truth to be received.\n\nOn the whole, I regard as the most important word in the title of my\nlecture, the word _gradual_: whether we speak of the development of\nHis eternal purposes and intentions, or the revelation of His person\nand character, the process appears to have been a gradual one, and\nin a certain sense a slow one: and this gradualness of operation may\nbe variously estimated according to the turn of mind and habits of\nthought of him who considers it: some will be content simply to bow\ntheir heads and worship as being in the presence of Him whose ways are\npast finding out: some will say that that which Christians believe to\nbe the development of His purposes and the revelation of His person\nis inconsistent with their conceptions of God, and so will reject it:\nothers will hesitate to reject on _\u00e0 priori_ grounds that which, to\nsay the least, admits of a strong argument in its favour, but will\nconfess that they feel the difficulties which have been urged against\nthe creed of Christendom; and with regard to that particular phase of\ndifficulty with which I am professing to deal in this lecture, they\nwill say, and perhaps say with sadness, that the revelation which the\nvolume of Holy Scripture purports to contain, does not commend itself\nto their minds, as corresponding to their highest thoughts of that\nwhich God might be expected to do in making Himself known to man. Now\nit is to minds in this condition that considerations concerning the\ndoings of God may be hopefully offered. I do not see how it is possible\nto treat such a subject as mine, if I consider myself as speaking to\npersons who deny the impossibility of revelation as distinct from human\nknowledge: if a revelation be impossible, _per se_, it is useless to\ndiscuss the qualities of that particular form of revelation which\nChristians profess to have received; but if a man is willing to\nreceive a revelation, and has something of the spirit indicated by the\nwords, \"Oh, that I knew where I might find Him,\" then it does seem to\nbe possible to offer some suggestions which shall tend to show that\nthe manner of revelation which Holy Scripture exhibits is in harmony\nwith all that we know of our Creator from other sources, and that\nthe gradual character of the Divine operations, as exhibited in that\nhistory which culminates in the Lord Jesus Christ, is wonderfully\nanalogous to the character of every other operation which we can\nrightly call divine.\n\nLet us then observe what the revelation of God purports to be; and for\nthe special end which I have in view, I think we may suitably divide it\ninto the following principal steps:--\n\n    1. That made to Adam and Eve;\n    2. That made to Abraham;\n    3. That made to Moses;\n    4. That made in and by Jesus Christ our Lord.\n\nLet us look at each of these for a moment.\n\nThe revelation to Adam and Eve is represented as being of the simplest\nkind possible. In fact it is difficult to conceive how anything beyond\na very simple and partial revelation could be possible in the very\ninfancy of humanity. It amounts to little more than the revelation\nof God as a personal governor, whose will must be obeyed: a command\nis given; that command is broken, and a punishment is inflicted;\nand then mankind is represented as cast out of Eden into the wild,\nuncultivated world. It is necessary to realize the extreme simplicity\nof this history, and the imperfect character of the revelation: the\nmore so, because there is some temptation to imagine Adam and Eve as\nbeing in the possession of more knowledge than Scripture attributes\nto them; Scripture in reality attributes no knowledge to them, but\nrather represents the tree of knowledge as having been the cause of\ntheir fall. Philosophically speaking, we may describe the condition\nof things which existed in Eden as being the dawn of man's religious\nconsciousness; he has no responsibility, and no sin; but a law is\nimposed upon him, and thus comes responsibility, and thus by the breach\nof law comes sin: man \"was alive without the law once, but when the\ncommandment came sin revived,\" and man \"died.\"\n\nThe sacred history represents the world as engaged, so to speak, in\nworking out the results of this primitive revelation till the time of\nAbraham. God is represented as punishing the evil and rewarding the\ngood, the punishment of the evil being the more conspicuous conduct\nof the two; thus Cain is punished, the people in the days of Noah are\npunished, the builders of the tower of Babel are punished: but I do\nnot think it can be said that the being and character of God are any\nfurther revealed till the time of Abraham. Then we have the new fact of\nGod calling out a family; granting to that family special promises and\nspecial privileges, and making it (as it were) the depository of the\nfortunes of the world. Probably this is a step which we should not have\nexpected; possibly it may even be argued that it is no real step in\nadvance; but, be this as it may, it is represented in Scripture as the\nnext step in the process of revelation; whether it strike us as strange\nor not, we are compelled, on the hypothesis that Scripture contains the\nhistory of revelation, to regard Abraham and his family as a point, a\nstation, in the process.\n\nAnd so we come to Moses. I am disposed, however, to regard the Mosaic\nrevelation as differing in degree rather than in kind from that made to\nAbraham. A family was called in Abraham, a nation in Moses; but in the\none case as in the other, the fortunes of the whole world were bound\nup with the history and conduct of a chosen few; the family of Abraham\nwas a peculiar and chosen family, the Israelites whom Moses made into a\nnation were a peculiar and chosen people: the principle was the same,\nnamely that of selection, and whatever difficulty belongs to one case,\nbelongs equally to the other.\n\nIt would be a long task, and for my purpose an unnecessary one, to\ntrace the gradual progress of the revelation made \"in sundry times\nand in divers manners\" to the Israelitish church and people; beginning\nwith the grand announcement of the Name of God from the Burning Bush,\nand continued by the declaration of the law in the wilderness, rendered\nvisible, so to speak, by the sacrificial ritual, and expounded by\npriests and prophets, it gradually became clearer and clearer, until\n\"the fulness of time\" came, and \"God sent forth His Son made of a\nwoman.\" I need not say that to Christians this is emphatically _the_\nrevelation of God--\"he who has seen the Son has seen the Father.\"\nAll previous revelations are only preparatory for this; and when we\nhave received this, all others seem to be lost, just as the moon and\nstars which shine so brightly at night are absolutely extinguished as\nsoon as the sun is risen. Assuming all this, however, it may be worth\nwhile to remark, first, that Jesus Christ expressly connected Himself\nwith all that had gone before, saying that He \"came not to destroy,\nbut to fulfil;\" and secondly, that He, like Moses and Abraham before\nHim, founded an \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03af\u03b1 [Greek: ekkl\u00easia], or church, as a depository\nof the fortunes of mankind, only with this difference or extension\nof principle, that whereas the church of Abraham was a family, and\nthe church of Moses was a nation, the church of Christ was catholic,\nknowing no distinction of family or nation, but embracing all who were\nwilling to take Him as their Captain, and His Cross as their banner.\n\nThis sketch, slight as it is, of the progress of revelation, as\npresented to us in Holy Scripture, will be abundantly sufficient for my\npresent purpose. In considering its claims to be received by mankind,\nI think it should be at once candidly owned, as seems indeed to be\nconceded in Holy Scripture, that the method of revelation is probably\ndifferent from anything which we should have expected on general\ngrounds of reason. Perhaps it is difficult, it may be impossible, to\nsay very precisely what we should have expected; but certainly I think\nwe should _not_ have expected to have found the principal revelations\nof God made, as they are alleged to have been made, to a selected\nfamily, a selected nation, a selected corporate body. It is only candid\nto acknowledge that, from a philosophical point of view, we may here\nsee a great difficulty; and the difficulty becomes more salient when we\nlook out of the narrow groove of sacred history into the wide history\nof the world at large. There we find a remarkable growth of knowledge,\nand an exhibition of the highest powers and gifts of humanity, quite\nseparated from that region which is asserted to have been specially\nilluminated with light from heaven. The progress of our knowledge of\nthe literature of ancient nations, and a greater familiarity with\nthe thoughts and feelings of people outside the Christian pale,\nhave tended to throw this difficulty into stronger relief: our old\nacquaintance with Greece and Rome, our more recent acquaintance with\nsuch countries as India and China, have made us aware that, somehow\nor other, great light did shine upon these countries in olden days,\nand it is harsh to say that the light did not come from heaven. Let,\ntherefore, the difficulty be frankly acknowledged; while at the same\ntime it is also acknowledged that in a matter so much beyond the scope\nof our faculties as that of saying in what manner God can best reveal\nHimself to mankind, all difficulties depending upon the strangeness or\nunexpectedness of a method alleged to have been adopted, must in the\nnature of things be of less than first-rate magnitude, and must give\nway to sufficient evidence.\n\nAcknowledging, however, as frankly as can be desired, the difficulty\nhere stated, I observe that there is anyhow a remarkable consistency\nin the scheme of revelation which Scripture contains. One step leads\nnaturally to another; and looking at the whole course of Scripture\nhistory, from the first verse of the Book of Genesis to the last verse\nof the Book of Revelation, it is wonderful (perhaps upon any infidel\nhypothesis, more than wonderful) how the various parts hang together,\nand how the beginning, the middle, and the end seem to dovetail\nthemselves together into one connected and consistent whole. I do not\nknow that I have ever been more struck with this, than when reading\nthe recent work on \"The History and Literature of the Israelites,\" by\nC. and A. de Rothschild. In this work we have the advantage of seeing\nthe Old Testament exhibited in a reverent and loving spirit without the\nNew, and as it might have appeared if Jesus Christ had not been born.\nAny one reading the book would be impelled to say that the influence\nof the literature of the Israelites must be for the improvement and\nenlightenment of mankind; but the questions press upon the mind of the\nreader--at least they did upon mine--\"What does all this lead to? What\nhas become of these Israelites? and what is the meaning of the language\nof their prophets?\" In fact, the book seems to put the reader very much\nin the position of the Ethiopian nobleman in the Book of the Acts of\nthe Apostles, who was prepared by reading some of the \"literature of\nthe Israelites\" to receive from Philip the evangelist the preaching of\nthe name of Jesus. The New Testament seems exactly to _fit_ upon the\nOld; and that gradual progress of revelation which we notice in the Old\nTestament, seems to lead up to, and find its completion and explanation\nin, the history which is contained in the New.\n\nOn the whole, looking at the scheme of revelation as it appears in\nScripture, and as it has been illustrated by history, both profane and\nsacred, I believe that I discern these features. I see the knowledge\nof God emerging from very obscure beginnings, and imparted in very\nunexpected ways; I see, however, that this knowledge does somehow or\nanother not merely remain with mankind, but increase and become clearer\nand more influential; I see a particular family and nation selected for\nthe reception and spread of this knowledge, and the family and nation\nso selected, after going through much education and many vicissitudes,\nproducing at length One in whom the whole history appears to culminate,\nand then disappearing from all position of influence upon the fortunes\nof the world except through this one pre-eminent member. Still further,\nI perceive, and it is absolutely impossible for the most sceptical to\ndeny, that the name of this remarkable member of the selected family\nand nation has been the most potent that has ever been named, and that\nHis influence in the world has been and is far greater, more extended,\nand more intense in its action, than any other influence which has ever\nbeen brought to bear upon the human heart and mind. Even in the work\nto which I referred just now, in which the Old Testament alone comes\nunder consideration, the dates of the history are given by reference\nto the birth of Jesus Christ; and whatever view men may be disposed to\ntake of the more mysterious and transcendental allegations concerning\nthe life of Jesus of Nazareth, it is impossible to deny that the\ncivilization and improvement of the world, and the purification of\nhuman society and the like, are more connected with His Name than with\nthat of any other philosopher or teacher or leader of mankind. When\nI say that it is impossible to deny this, I am of course aware that\nit has been denied, and that there are and have been persons who have\nasserted that Christianity has not only not been that which Christians\nbelieve it to have been, but has been positively detrimental to human\nprogress; but what I mean is, that to make the denial to which I refer,\nis so contrary to the general verdict of mankind that it is hard for\nany one to make it, and impossible for any one who is at all likely\nto be influenced by anything that I can say. For those who are at all\nlikely to be influenced are persons who are _sceptical_, not those\nwho are _antagonistic_; a man may doubt--who has not doubted?--and a\nman may be tortured by his doubts, and it may be possible to relieve\nhim; but I see no probability of helping that man who has come to the\nconclusion that the influence of Jesus Christ has been a mischievous\nand obstructive influence in the history of human progress; with such a\nman, I, at least, as a Christian apologist, do not feel that I have any\ncommon ground.\n\nTaking then the view of revelation to which I have referred as being\nthat contained in Holy Scripture, and acknowledging that such a view\npresents difficulties to thoughtful and inquiring minds, I wish to\nexamine and see whether we cannot find some help towards a right\nappreciation of God's method of revelation by examining the course of\nnature, or that which is supposed to be its course.\n\nAnd when we look to nature with this purpose, it is impossible not to\nbe struck by this general fact, namely, that gradualness of development\nappears to be a universal law. The manner in which the original design\nof the Creator (for I assume that there was an original design) has\nbeen carried out, so far from being sudden, has been very slow;[63]\nand more than this, the method of operation has been frequently such\nas we should scarcely have expected, and greatly opposed to those\nnotions of creative majesty which most of us are very much disposed\nto preconceive. In order to put this clearly before you, let me\ncall your attention to the very picturesque and poetical view of\ncreation, contained in Chateaubriand's \"Genie du Christianisme.\" That\nwork appeared after the explosion of the volcano of the first great\nFrench revolution, and was intended to reconcile the minds of men,\nweary with the infidelity and atheism which had so long been rampant,\nto the views of God contained in Holy Scripture, and maintained by\nChristians. Writing with this purpose, M. Chateaubriand tells us\nthat we may conceive of the Creator as having called the world into\nexistence in a condition as complete, and having as many marks of\nantiquity, as we now see about us: when this earth was created there\nwould be already ancient forests, and abundance of animals, some in\ntheir maturity, others dancing about in the friskiness of youth; the\ntrees would be furnished with birds' nests, and the crows and pigeons\nwould be hatching their eggs, or tending their young; the butterflies\nand moths would be sporting on the plants; the bees would be making\nhoney from the new-formed flowers; the sheep would be followed by their\nlambs; and the nightingales would be astonishing themselves with their\nfirst, yet perfect songs, in all the groves. Finally, Adam would be\na man of thirty, and Eve a girl of sixteen. \"Without this original\nantiquity,\" says our author, \"there would have been neither pomp nor\nmajesty in the work of the Eternal; and, which could not well be,\nnature in her innocence would have been less fair than she is now in\nher corruption. An insipid infancy of plants, animals, elements, would\nhave crowned a world devoid of poetry.\"[64] No doubt this description\nis anything but devoid of poetry; it is perhaps the only way in which\na poet would be disposed to conceive of creation; it is difficult to\nimagine the music of Haydn set to any other description of the creative\nwork; but undoubtedly it is not scientific, and, what is more, it is\nnot Scriptural. Chateaubriand no more got his picture of creation\nfrom the Book of Genesis than Ernest R\u00e9nan got his picture of Jesus\nChrist from the four Gospels; and that there may be no mistake about\nthis latter point, let me ask you to observe that the most marked and\nsalient feature of the Bible picture of creation is the gradualness of\nthe creative work. I do not say that the picture is not poetical; I\nbelieve it to be quite as poetical as that which Chateaubriand would\nsubstitute for it, and I quite admit that it ought to be regarded from\na poetical rather than a scientific point of view; still gradualness\nof development is the most marked and salient of its features: first,\na chaos of matter without life; then vegetable life; then the lower\nforms of animal life; then mammals; and lastly, man. No one can deny\nthat these and other steps, spread over the time which is indicated\nby the mysterious creative days, do together make up the Bible history\nof physical creation; and no one can fail to perceive that the order\nof proceeding is as different as possible from that described by the\nFrench apologist. According to this latter view, creation starts\nforth, Minerva-like, from the mind of God; according to Scripture, the\nwork is expressly gradual and presumably slow. We are so accustomed\nto the first chapter of Genesis, that I think we sometimes scarcely\nperceive its peculiarities; but suppose that the reverse order of\narrangement had been adopted, and that man in deference to his dignity\nhad been represented as coming in first, and that other creatures had\nbeen represented as being made afterwards for his use and pleasure,\nwould not this have made a radical change, and introduced an enormous\nscientific difficulty? I remember once being told by a person, who held\nstrong views with regard to the dangerous character of the conclusions\nof geology, that it seemed to him absolutely incredible that a period\nshould have existed when the earth was inhabited by nothing but fishes,\nreptiles, and the like; yet this is precisely what Scripture affirms to\nhave been the fact; and if the creative work had been concluded with\nthe fifth day, there would have been no mammals upon the earth, and no\nman.\n\nGradualness in creative work, therefore, is so far from being contrary\nto the indications of God's method given in Scripture, that it is one\nof the few things which stand out from the scriptural account with\nundeniable prominence. That this same feature is not less prominent\nin the results of all the physical sciences, it would take more time\nand more ability to demonstrate than are at my command; nevertheless\nit is necessary that I should ask you kindly to accompany me, while\nI endeavour to show you that the conclusions of science, and even\nthe guesses of scientific men, point to this conclusion, and tend to\nmake untenable any objections to the revelation of God contained in\nScripture, on the ground of the gradual manner in which that revelation\nis alleged to have been made.\n\nThe general evidence of geology is familiar probably to most of us,\nand it is only the general evidence with which I can desire to deal on\nsuch an occasion as this; but pray observe that while the particular\nconclusions of geology, like those of other physical sciences, are\nliable to continued modification and amendment, the general drift of\nthe conclusions is sufficiently clear and certain. No one can doubt,\nfor instance, the great antiquity of our globe, and the fact that it\nhas gone through successive changes with regard to the character of\nits surface, the nature of its inhabitants, and the like. Undoubtedly\nthere was a time when civilized men did not dwell upon it; undoubtedly\nthere was a still more distant period when men did not dwell upon it\nin any form, civilized or uncivilized; perhaps there was a period even\nmore distant, when life was not to be found upon the earth's surface at\nall. And physical astronomy will take us even beyond geology, and will\nmake it probable that the earth was originally in a fluid condition,\nin which from the excessive temperature no form of life could have\nexisted. Few problems are more curious than that which deduces the\npresent figure of our globe from the hypothesis of original fluidity.\nTake a mass of fluid, and set it revolving slowly about an axis, as our\nearth revolves, and it can be shown that it will assume such a form\nas that which our earth has. I do not lay stress upon the remarkable\nnumerical coincidence of the ellipticity of the earth, as derived by\nLaplace from theory, with that which is discovered by observation,\nbecause this involves certain arbitrary hypotheses; but taking those\nresults which involve nothing arbitrary at all, it is almost impossible\nnot to believe that the earth was at one time a hot fluid mass, and\nthat it has gradually cooled down and hardened into its present\npermanent condition.\n\nLook upon the earth then as being once in this hot fluid condition.\nIt turns slowly round upon its axis and cools. I cannot trace the\nwhole of the process, but before it arrived at its present condition\nthere must have been crackings and burstings and eruptions; and so\ncontinents and islands and mountains would be formed; but upon the\nwhole, even in the wildest times, the process would be very gentle, for\nthe highest mountains on the earth's surface are but as the down upon\nthe surface of a peach. Then upon this globe appear creatures suited to\nits condition; and the eye which could have watched the world in its\nprogress would have seen animals of successively higher types occupying\nthe earth's surface, till at length that surface was spotted with\ncities built by the hand of man, and the ocean studded with his ships.\nIt is impossible to guess the time which must have elapsed between the\nepoch when the earth was a hot revolving mass of fluid, and the epoch\nin which we live; neither is it very possible to say, though it is\npossible to guess, what would have been the successive scenes presented\nby the earth to the eye which should have witnessed the whole of the\nchanges; but whatever may have been the nature of the changes, this\nconclusion is inevitable, namely, that there has been a progression\nof some kind from the fluidity of the prim\u00e6val dead revolving mass to\nthe inhabited world of this nineteenth century; it matters not for my\nargument whether the progression, so far as animal life is concerned,\nhas been due to natural selection, or to such a process as that\nadvocated by the author of \"Vestiges of Creation,\" or to successive\nand distinct creative acts; the fact holds good, upon any hypothesis,\nthat the Almighty Creator has produced that universe which we see, not\nby one act, but by a gradual and apparently very slow creative process,\nwhether continuous or discontinuous it matters not for my purpose to\ninquire.\n\nNow this course of nature is strikingly analogous to that gradual\nmode of proceeding which is alleged to belong to revelation; and any\ndifficulty which belongs to one appears to attach equally to the\nother. Nay, if we are to give any weight to the most recent physical\nspeculations, it may be fairly argued that the difficulties connected\nwith revelation are but as trifles compared with those which nature\npresents. I refer to those views of which the latest exposition is to\nbe found in Mr. Darwin's \"Descent of Man.\" Let me touch upon those\nviews for a moment.\n\nIt seems that \"the early progenitors of man were once covered with\nhair, both sexes having beards; their ears were pointed and capable of\nmovement; and their bodies were provided with a tail, having the proper\nmuscles.... The males were provided with great canine teeth, which\nserved them as formidable weapons.... At a still earlier period, the\nprogenitors of man must have been aquatic in their habits.\" And lastly,\n\"the most ancient progenitors in the kingdom of the Vertebrata, at\nwhich we are able to obtain an obscure glance, apparently consisted of\na group of marine animals resembling the larv\u00e6 of existing ascidians.\"\nThis is certainly a somewhat alarming conclusion; looking however\nto the _ascent_ (for so I think it ought to be called) rather than\nthe _descent_, it would seem to be the view of some of our advanced\nnatural investigators, that the marine animals in question produced\ncertain lowly organized fishes; these produced ganoids and the like;\nthese produced amphibians;--here there seems to be a difficulty--\"No\none,\" writes Mr. Darwin, \"can at present say by what line of descent\nthe three higher and related classes, namely, mammals, birds, and\nreptiles, were derived from either of the two lower vertebrate classes,\nnamely, amphibians and fishes.\" However, once get to the mammals, and\nall difficulty ceases: the Monotremata produced the Marsupials; these\nthe placental Mammals: thus we come to the Lemurid\u00e6, and from them the\ninterval is not great to the Simiad\u00e6; the Simiad\u00e6 branched off into\ntwo great stems,--the New World and Old World Monkeys; and \"from the\nlatter at a remote period, _Man_, the wonder and glory of the universe,\nproceeded.\"[65]\n\nOf this pedigree, which, \"if not of noble quality,\" is \"of prodigious\nlength,\" Mr. Darwin tells us \"we need not feel ashamed.\" Perhaps not;\nthough certainly the nerves of any one unaccustomed to anthropological\ninvestigations may be excused for trembling slightly as he hears it\nrecited; but the point which I wish to press is this, that supposing\n(for argument's sake) this view of man's origin, or anything like\nit, to be true, it is impossible to imagine a more thorough case of\ngradual development; there is nothing in the religious history of\nmankind as expounded in Holy Scripture so amazingly marvellous as\nthat which is contained in this physical history; and certainly those\nwho are prepared to receive the Darwinian view of the development of\nman's body, ought not to find anything to offend them on the ground of\nimprobability in the Scriptural account of the revelation made by God\nto the human soul.\n\nI do not know to what extent Mr. Darwin's views are likely to be\npermanent; but supposing that they, or any view of the same class,\nshould eventually overcome all existing difficulties, and be generally\nregarded as representing the process by which it has pleased God to\nbring about man's physical and mental supremacy, then it can hardly\nseem strange that the same God should have adopted a course of\nprogress and development in the spiritual and religious world. I say,\nemphatically, \"if it has pleased God\" to act thus; because if I accept\nthe hypothesis of the nebular origin of planetary systems, or the\nsupposition of the earth being a fluid globe gradually cooled, or even\nthe assertion that our most ancient progenitors were marine animals, I\nmust do so with the underlying assumption that it has pleased God so\nto work. I do not find fault with scientific men for not putting their\ntheories in this form; but looking at the question from a religious,\nor even from a philosophical, point of view, I cannot consent to lose\nsight of God, as the intelligent maker of the whole. If this earth was\noriginally a fluid mass, then I believe that that was the best, or, for\nanything I know to the contrary, the only way of making a world; if the\nmarine animals, which Mr. Darwin sees through his scientific telescope,\ndid become fish, and those fish eventually became men, then I believe\nthat that was the best, or, for anything I know to the contrary, the\nonly way of making men; and this being so, why may I not deal in the\nsame manner with the alleged course of man's spiritual history? I\nhave in my hands something which purports to be a revelation to my\nintellect, and to my soul, of the God who made me: that revelation is\ncontained in a history which tells me that God spake at sundry times\nand in divers manners to the people of olden time, and that finally\nHe spake by One who is called His Son. Now I do not say that this\nrevelation is or is not a real one; but I do say that there is nothing\nto render us suspicious of its reality in the fact that it has been\ncommunicated gradually, that it has grown as the human race has grown,\nand that some of the steps in the process of revelation appear strange,\nor even, at first sight, unworthy of the grand scheme of which they\nform a part. No one has a right to find fault on this ground who has\nread the lessons of natural science, and observed how it points to\ngradual progression as a characteristic of the doings of God. Least of\nall can they find fault on this ground, who receive in whole, or even\nin part, the recent theories concerning the origin of man. I will not\nundertake to answer for those students who have gone deeply into these\nphysical questions; but I do assert, without fear of contradiction,\nthat to men of ordinary education, and ordinary habits of thought, the\ndifficulties of accepting Scripture as the revelation of God to the\nhuman soul, however much those difficulties may be expounded or even\nexaggerated, are absolutely nothing as compared with the difficulty of\naccepting recent views of man's prodigious pedigree.\n\nThe fact is, that it is not so much the process by which a result has\nbeen brought about, as the result itself, which is the all-important\nthing. Whatever may have been the history of our earth in the dark\ndim distance of incalculable ages, we know that its present condition\nis very beautiful, and that it answers admirably well the purpose\nfor which it seems to have been originally designed, namely, that of\nserving for the residence of intelligent man; and whatever may have\nbeen the process by which that creative work was consummated, which\nis described in Scripture as the making of man out of the dust, and\nbreathing into his nostrils the breath of life, we know that man is\nhigh above all the rest of creation, and worthy of being spoken of as\nbeing made in the image of God. And so in the case of man's spiritual\nhistory, we need not be over-careful to criticize the several steps\nwhen we are able to see the result; the question is, not so much\nwhether the steps of God which we trace in Old Testament history be\nsuch steps as we should imagine that the Most High would have left,\nas whether the mystery of the Incarnation, and the truth that God has\nspoken to us by His own Son, be not worthy of all acceptation. If\nChrist be worthy of our adoration and love, then, though the way may\nhave been long, and strange, and dark, and sometimes even weary, yet we\nmay be sure that it is the right way, because it has led us to Him.\n\nFor there is this further analogy between nature and revelation,\nnamely, that in each the progress is not indefinite, but tends to\na limit. Whatever theory be adopted with regard to the history of\nthe earth, we seem to see in its present settled condition the\nlimit towards which everything has been moving in past geological\nages; and even if man has been a progressive animal, and has only\ngradually attained his present physical perfection, I presume it is\nnot anticipated that the process of natural selection, or any other\nprocess, will carry him beyond the point which he has now reached.\nOr, if we take the divine picture of creation, we see the creative\nwork tending from the limit of chaos to the limit of man; then physics\ncease and religion begins, and we hear utterances of the voice of God\nbeginning with whispers, and becoming more and more distinct, until we\nare permitted to listen to divine oracles uttered by human lips. Beyond\nthis the dreams of philosophy, and the aspirations of the human heart,\nand the longings of the weary and heavy-laden cannot carry our thoughts\nor raise our desires.\n\nThose who are acquainted with Bishop Butler's great work will perceive\nthat I have now been endeavouring--how imperfectly no one knows better\nthan myself--to apply to the question of \"the gradual development of\nrevelation,\" those principles of reasoning which Bishop Butler has\ntaught us to use. I was very sorry to see it stated in the evidence\ntaken before the select committee of the House of Lords on University\nTests, that Bishop Butler's _Analogy_ was \"out of fashion\" in\nOxford.[66] I trust that the witness only intended to assert that the\n_Analogy_ was not now so commonly chosen for examinations as formerly,\nfor it will be an evil day for us all when the method of reasoning\nwhich Bishop Butler taught us shall be \"out of fashion\" with thinking\npeople. In truth, the advantage of the method is that, properly\nspeaking, it never can be out of fashion; it is like the method of\nEuclid, or that of the Differential Calculus; it is an _organum_,\nan instrument, a machine, which may be applied in all the varying\ncircumstances of theological controversy, and to almost all religious\ndifficulties. For the principle of the method is this. You find certain\ndifficulties in that which professes to be a revelation of God; you\nthink to get rid of these difficulties by denying the revelation;\nwill you succeed in doing so? Not if you find precisely analogous\ndifficulties in the course of nature; unless you go further, and deny\nnot only that there is a God of revelation, but a God of nature too.\nNay, the argument carries you beyond this point, and suggests to you\nthat if there be difficulties in God's natural world, and if He be\npleased to reveal the spiritual world to us, then we ought to expect to\nfind the same general method of proceeding in matters spiritual which\nwe have been able to observe in the natural world. I quite admit that\nthis reasoning has no force for the man who says \"There is no God;\" he\nmust be dealt with in another way; but it has force and it has comfort\nfor the doubting inquiring soul, by assuring it that it can find a\nlogical resting-place, and that the refuge from the misery of blank\nand hopeless atheism is to be found in simple faith in the Lord Jesus\nChrist.[67]\n\nWith the atheist, I honestly confess, that I have little or no\nsympathy; certainly I should not think it worth while to compose\na lecture intended for his special behoof. I should feel disposed\nrather to send him for his answer to the fourteenth and fifty-third\nPsalms. The difficulty of supposing the framework of the universe to\nhave had no architect, appears to me to be so great, so absolutely\nimmeasurable, that the man who can fancy that he has got over it must,\nas I believe, either not have understood the difficulty, or else have\ndeceived himself as to his power of solving it; anyhow, I feel that\nhe has cut away all ground of argument, as between him and me. Not so\nthe man whose mind is sceptically inclined. Be it ever remembered that\nthe word _sceptic_ is derived from a word which means to _look_ or to\n_see_--it is the same word which forms the root of the word _bishop_\nor _overseer_; and accordingly there is nothing radically reproachful\nin the name of _sceptic_. It implies that a man is determined to look\ninto matters for himself, not to trust every assertion, not to repeat\na parrot creed; and so far as this determination is concerned, it is\nhigh and noble, and is in fact the very root and spring of all human\nknowledge; but who can wonder if looking should lead to doubting, and\nthat so the name of sceptic should popularly imply, not the man who\nlooks and believes, but the man who looks and doubts? And I am not\nashamed to confess that I have much sympathy with this sceptical frame\nof mind. Not only is it closely connected with a noble instinct of\ninquiry and search for truth which God has implanted in the human mind,\nbut also, as I believe, it is well-nigh impossible that an inquiring\nmind should deal seriously with religious subjects and remain entirely\nfree from doubt. In my opinion, the amount of scepticism which has,\nduring some period of his life, occupied the mind of each thoughtful\nearnest man, will be merely a question of degree; while, at the same\ntime, I most sincerely believe that scepticism ought not to be, and\nneed not be the lasting condition of the human soul, and that all\ndoubts may be made to vanish in the light which God has given to\n\"lighten every man who is born into the world.\"\n\nI know not what may be the condition of mind of those to whom I have\nbeen speaking to-day. I presume the hope of the Christian Evidence\nSociety is that some persons who feel practically the pressure of doubt\nand unbelief, will come and see whether any of their difficulties\ncan be resolved by this course of Lectures. If there be such in this\ncompany, I beg them, in concluding this Lecture, to believe that they\nhave been listening to one who does not wish to treat their speculative\ndifficulties as trifles, but who would consider it as an unspeakable\nprivilege to be able to help a doubting brother to get rid of his\ndoubts, and to exchange them for the steady assurance of faith in the\nLord Jesus Christ.\n\n\n\n\nTHE ALLEGED HISTORICAL DIFFICULTIES\n\nOF THE\n\nOLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS,\n\nAND THE\n\nLIGHT THROWN ON THEM BY MODERN DISCOVERIES.\n\nBY THE\n\nREV. GEORGE RAWLINSON, M.A.,\n\nCAMDEN PROFESSOR OF ANCIENT HISTORY, OXFORD.\n\n\n\n\nTHE ALLEGED HISTORICAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS.\n\n\nIn addressing you on the historical difficulties of the Old and New\nTestaments--a large subject, which it will be hard to treat adequately\nwithin the time allowed to me--I must in the first place premise,\nthat with difficulties which lie on the verge or outskirts of the\nhistoric field, on the debatable ground between Science and History,\nI do not on the present occasion profess to deal. Questions as to the\norigin of man, whether by development or by direct creation, whether\nfrom one pair or from more; questions as to his prim\u00e6val condition,\nhis possession from the first of the faculty of speech, his original\nsavagery or civilisation, and the like, lie (I think) beyond the\ndomain of history proper, belonging to what has been properly termed\nthe \"_pre-historic_ period\" of our race, and so not coming within the\nterms of the subject on which I have undertaken to speak to-day.\nHistory deals with man from the time to which written records reach\nback. Historical difficulties arise from divergence, real or apparent,\nbetween the different accounts contained in those records. Now the\nprofane records, to which any modern critical school would attribute\nan historical value, do not reach back within many ages of the origin\nof man, and thus no \"historical difficulty\" can arise with respect\nto these primitive times. It is only when we descend to an age of\nrecords, when the apparently authentic accounts of ancient countries\npreserved to our day can be compared with the Scriptural narrative that\ndifficulty arises and that either agreement or disagreement can be\nshown.\n\nThe first difficulty, really historical, which meets us when we open\nthe volume of Scripture, is the shortness of the time into which\nall history is (or at any rate appears to be) compressed, by the\nchronological statements, especially those of Genesis. The exodus of\nthe Jews is fixed by many considerations to about the fifteenth or\nsixteenth century before our era. The period between the Flood and the\nExodus, according to the numbers of our English version, but a very\nlittle exceeds a thousand years. Consequently, it has been usual to\nregard Scripture as authoritatively laying it down that all mankind\nsprang from a single pair within twenty-five or twenty-six centuries\nof the Christian era, and therefore that all history, and not only\nso, but all the changes by which the various races of men were formed,\nby which languages developed into their numerous and diverse types, by\nwhich civilization and art emerged and gradually perfected themselves,\nare shut up within the narrow space of 2,500 or 2,600 years before\nthe birth of our Lord. Now this time is said with reason to be quite\ninsufficient. Egypt and Babylonia have histories, as settled kingdoms,\nwhich reach back (according to the most moderate of modern critical\nhistorians) to about the time at which the numbers of our English Bible\nplace the Deluge. Considerable diversities of language can be proved to\nhave existed at that date; markedly different physical types appear not\nmuch subsequently; civilization in Egypt has, about the Pyramid period,\nwhich few now place later than B.C. 2,450, an advanced character; the\narts exist nearly in the shape in which they were known in the country\nat its most flourishing period. Clearly, a considerable space is wanted\nanterior to the pyramid age for the gradual development of Egyptian\nlife into the condition which the monuments show to have been then\nreached. This space the numbers of our English Bible do not allow.\n\nSuch is the difficulty. Now how is it to be met? In the first place,\ncandour should (I think) induce all those who urge it to let their\nreaders, or hearers, know that a special uncertainty attaches to the\nnumbers in question, from the fact that they are given differently in\nthe different ancient versions. We possess the Pentateuch in three very\nancient forms, in Hebrew, in the Greek version known as the Septuagint,\nand in Samaritan. Our English numbers represent those of the Hebrew\ntext. The numbers of the Septuagint and the Samaritan version are\ndifferent. Those of the Samaritan version extend the period between\nthe Deluge and the birth of Abraham from the 292 years of the Hebrew\ntext to 942 years,--an addition of six centuries and a half--while\nthose of the Septuagint, according to some copies, give 1,072 years\nas the interval, according to others 1,172 years, thus increasing the\nperiod between the Deluge and Abraham by a space of nearly eight, or\nnearly nine centuries. Now if the Greek, or even if the Samaritan,\nnumbers are the right ones, if they represent, that is, the original\ntext, it may be questioned whether anything more is wanted. It may be\nquestioned whether a term of from six to eight centuries is not enough\nfor the production of that state of things which we find existing in\nBabylonia and in Egypt when the light of history first dawns upon them,\nwhether within that space might not have been produced such a state of\ncivilization, so much progress in art, such differences of physical\ntype, and such diversities of language as appear to have existed at\nthat period.\n\nIf, however, the ultimate verdict of calm reason, and rigid scientific\ninquiry should be against this view, if more time seem to be absolutely\nwanted for the development of settled government, of art, science,\nlanguage, ethnical diversities, varieties of physical type, and the\nlike, than even the enlarged chronology of the Septuagint allows, then\nI should not be afraid to grant that the original record of Scripture\non this point may have been lost, and that, as it is certain that we\ncannot possess the actual chronological scheme of Moses in more than\none of the three extant versions of his words which have come to us\nwith almost equal authority, so it is quite possible that we may not\nposses his real scheme in any. Nothing in ancient MSS. is so liable to\ncorruption from the mistakes of copyists as the numbers; the original\nmode of writing them appears in all countries of which we have any\nknowledge to have been by signs, not very different from one another;\nthe absence of any context determining in favour of one number rather\nthan another, where the copy is blotted or faded, increases the chance\nof error, and thus it happens that in almost all ancient works the\nnumbers are found to be deserving of very little reliance. Where they\nto any extent check one another, they are generally self-contradictory;\nwhere they do not, they are frequently in the highest degree improbable.\n\nA second historical difficulty connected with Genesis was much\ninsisted upon by the late Baron Bunsen. The primitive Babylonian\nkingdom is declared in the tenth chapter of Genesis to have been\nCushite. Baron Bunsen held that there were no Cushites out of\nAfrica, and that \"an Asiatic Cush existed only in the imagination\nof Biblical interpreters, and was the child of their despair.\"[68]\nBut an analysis of the earliest documents recovered from Babylonia\nhas shown that the primitive Babylonian people, that which raised\nthe first structures whereof any trace remains, in the country, and\nwhose buildings had gone to ruin in the days of Nebuchadnezzar,\nwas (at any rate to a large extent) Cushite, its vocabulary being\n\"undoubtedly Cushite or Ethiopian,\" and presenting numerous analogies\nwith those of the non-Semitic races of modern Abyssinia. Hence, modern\nhistorical science, in the person of one of its best representatives,\nM. Lenormant, commences now the history of the East with a \"First\nCushite Empire,\" which it regards as dominant in Babylonia for several\ncenturies before the earliest Semitic Empire arose.[69]\n\nA difficulty less noticed, yet one which was, in the state of our\nhistorical knowledge a few years since, more real, may be found in the\nnarrative contained in the 14th chapter of Genesis with respect to the\ninvasion of Palestine in the time of Abraham by a number of kings from\nthe vicinity of the Persian Gulf. These kings act under the presidency\nof a monarch, called Chedorlaomer (or Chedor-lagomer), who is stated to\nbe \"king of Elam.\" Now till very recently there was no profane evidence\nthat Elam--which is not Persia, as many have supposed, but Elyma\u00efs or\nSusiana, the country between Babylonia and Persia--had ever been an\nindependent state, much less a powerful kingdom, and still less one\nthat at so remote a date could have exercised suzerainty over so many\nand such important nations. But the Assyrian cuneiform inscriptions\nhave shown that throughout almost the whole of the Assyrian period Elam\nmaintained herself as an independent state and one of considerable\nmilitary strength on the south-eastern borders of the empire; and\nvery recently[70] it has further been discovered that, according to\nthe Assyrian belief, an Elamitic king was strong enough to invade and\nplunder Babylonia at a date, which expressed in our ordinary manner\nwould be B.C. 2,286, or somewhat earlier than the time commonly\nassigned to Abraham. Further, the primitive Babylonian remains bear\ntraces of the extension of Elamitic influence into Babylonia at a\nremote era; and the possibility of such distant military expeditions\nat this far-off period of the world's history, receives illustration\nat once from the epithet \"Ravager of Syria,\" which is borne by a\nBabylonian monarch of about this date, and also from the numerous\nexpeditions conducted not very much later by the Egyptian princes from\nthe valley of the Nile into Mesopotamia.\n\nNo other historical difficulties, so far as I know, present themselves\nin the narrative of Genesis. Some attempts were made in Germany,\nabout thirty or forty years ago, to prove that the description of\nEgypt contained in the latter portion of the book exhibited numerous\n\"mistakes and inaccuracies;\" but the \"mistakes and inaccuracies\"\nalleged were scarcely of an historical character, and the writers who\nalleged them have been so triumphantly refuted by Hengstenberg, and\nothers, that the sceptical school has ceased to urge the point, and now\nallows the entire truthfulness and accuracy of the whole account. Few\nthings are in truth more remarkable than the _complete_ harmony and\naccordance which exist between the picture of ancient Egypt and the\nancient Egyptians, as drawn for us by Moses, and that portraiture of\nthem which is now obtainable from their own contemporary writings and\nmonuments.\n\nWith regard to the narrative contained in the last four books of the\nPentateuch, modern criticism has chiefly employed itself in objections\nturning upon the numbers. The multiplication of the Israelites, as\nrelated in Genesis and Exodus, has been declared to be utterly and\nabsolutely incredible. The sudden exodus from Egypt of a body of\ntwo millions of persons in the way narrated has been pronounced an\nimpossibility. The subsistence of such a multitude, with their flocks\nand herds, in the Desert of Tih for forty years, or even a single year,\nhas been said to be inconceivable. Many minor objections, turning\non the same point of numerical difficulty, have been urged, and the\nconclusion has been drawn that the entire narrative of Exodus, Numbers,\nLeviticus, and Deuteronomy is unhistorical--a romance drawn up at a\ncomparatively late period of the nation's history, having perhaps a\ncertain historic foundation, but in its details wholly and entirely\nimaginary.[71]\n\nNow, with respect to these objections, let it be observed, in the\nfirst place, that they all turn upon the one point of number; and that\nthe numbers of the sacred texts are (as has been already observed)\nexactly the part of it which is most liable to corruption and least to\nbe depended upon. So that if the difficulties of the multiplication,\nas stated, of the exit from Egypt, the march, the passage of the Red\nSea, and the sojourn in the wilderness, were all allowed to be as\ngreat as represented, it would be enough to reply that there may have\nbeen a corruption of the numbers--the addition (say) of a cipher in\neach case--and that the whole narrative would stand good, and the\ndifficulties disappear, if for \"six hundred thousand that were men\" in\nExodus xii. 37, we were to read 60,000, and so on--the entire exodus\nbeing thus made one of 200,000 instead of two million souls. But this\nmode of meeting the difficulty is not, perhaps, here the right one. The\nnumbers may be defended as they stand. In Germany the best critics,\nincluding so subtle and little credulous a writer as Ewald, accept\nthem. They seem required by the general tenor of the whole narrative,\nespecially by the great unwillingness of the Egyptians to let the\npeople go, and by their power, within little more than a generation to\nconquer and occupy Canaan. Assuming therefore the numbers to be sound,\nto have come to us as they were delivered by Moses, let us inquire what\nthe great difficulties are of which so much has been made, and see if\nthey are really so insuperable.\n\nIn the first place, as to the multiplication in Egypt. Now here, before\nwe can form any judgment, two things have to be determined--\"What was\nthe number of the Israelites when they entered Egypt,\" and \"What was\nthe duration of their stay there?\" What was their number when they\nentered Egypt? We are commonly told, \"seventy souls.\" Now, no doubt,\nthese words occur in Scripture, \"All the souls of the house of Jacob,\nwhich came into Egypt, were threescore and ten.\"[72] But, when we\ncome to look into details, we find first, that the seventy souls of\nJacob's descendants comprise only two women, the married daughters and\ngrand-daughters of Jacob not being mentioned, who yet, we are told,\nfollowed the migrations of the tribe,[73] and no account being taken of\nthe wives of his sons and grandsons. Supplying these omissions, we have\nfor the family of Jacob as it entered Egypt, the number 267, instead\nof the number seventy, or nearly four times the ordinary estimate. But\nthis is far from being all. The children of Israel entered Egypt with\ntheir households, or retainers.[74] What the size of a patriarchal\nhousehold was we may gather from the history of Abraham, who had 318\ntrained servants born in his house, capable of active military service.\nIt has been well observed that \"we shall scarcely find so many in a\nclan of three thousand souls.\"[75] Jacob's retainers are likely to have\nbeen more numerous rather than less numerous than those of Abraham; and\nthe conclusion of Kurtz, that they amounted to \"several thousands\"[76]\nis therefore perfectly reasonable. It appears to me quite probable that\nthe tribe which took possession of the Land of Goshen on the invitation\nof Joseph and Pharaoh was a body of five or six thousand persons.\n\nNext, as to the duration of the sojourn in Egypt, the Hebrew text\nlays it down very positively that it was 430 years.[77] The best MSS.\nof the Septuagint agree. There was a tradition among the later Jews\nwhich brought down the term to 215 years; but this tradition cannot\nreasonably be set against the plain words of Exodus; and consequently\nwe must take 430 years as the duration of the sojourn.\n\nIs it then, or is it not, conceivable, that under the circumstances\nof the time and country, a tribe or clan of 5,000 persons may have\nincreased in 430 years to one of two millions? Here it has to be\nremembered that there were two modes whereby they might increase, one\nthat of ordinary natural increase, the other by augmentation of the\nnumber of their retainers. The natural tendency of population has been\nshown by Mr. Malthus, to be to double itself, if unchecked, every 25\nyears.[78] The Israelites, having the land of Goshen, a large fertile\nterritory, capable of supporting a population of several millions,\nassigned them, would be in a position where the checks on the natural\ntendency, especially at first, would be very slight. Now, according\nto the estimate of Mr. Malthus, a body of 5,000 persons increasing\nwithout check, would have become more than two millions at the end of\n225 years; a body of 267 persons would have exceeded the same amount\nat the close of 325 years; and a body even of seventy persons would\nhave done the same at the expiration of 375 years; so that, except for\nthe operation of artificial checks, the family of Jacob, had it really\nconsisted of seventy persons only, would have become one of above two\nmillions fifty-five years before the time of the exodus. But, no doubt,\nas the increase took place, the artificial checks, which keep down\nthe natural tendency of population, began to operate, and the result\nwas, that if the original immigrants were, as I have supposed, about\n5,000, the actual rate of increase had been a doubling, not once each\ntwenty-five years, but once each forty-eight years, or not very much\nbeyond the rate which prevails in our own country at the present time.\n\nIf we add to this the consideration that the Israelites, being in a\nvery flourishing condition during the earlier portion of their sojourn\nin Egypt, would naturally augment, by purchase, the number of their\nhouseholds, and might even receive, by agreement, whole tribes into\ntheir body, we shall not be surprised that at the end of the 430 years,\nthe clan had grown to be a nation of two million souls.\n\nWith respect to the difficulties of the exit of this large body of\npersons from Egypt in the sudden way which the narrative in Exodus\nseems to describe, they depend (I think) mainly on the broad and\ngeneral manner of description habitual to Oriental writers, who do not\ntrouble themselves with details, or with exceptions, but describe _in\nthe mass_, stating that to be done by all which was done by most, or\nby those of most account; regarding a nation as concentrated in its\nheads; and directing attention to the main events, to the neglect of\nthe various details into which they were broken up. A candid reader,\nmaking fair allowance for these characteristics of Oriental style,\nand for the brevity of the sacred narrative, will scarcely be much\ntroubled by the difficulties of the start and the march, as they\nhave been urged by some critics. It is certain migrations of tribes,\nquite as large as that of Israel is said to have been, have from time\nto time taken place in the east, and indeed in the west also. Such\nmigrations have frequently been sudden--the emigrants have started off\nwith their women, children, and all their possessions on a certain\nday[79]--they have traversed enormous distances, much greater ones than\nthe Israelites traversed, and have finally settled themselves in new\nabodes. That the Israelites made such a migration there cannot be a\ndoubt. The Egyptians, Greeks, Romans, all accepted the fact as certain.\nCavils as to their exact numbers, or as to the particular expressions\nused in Exodus, do not touch the main fact, but show (if they show\nanything) either that our ancient manuscripts are here and there\ndefective, or that an early Oriental historian does not write in the\nexact and accurate style of a nineteenth-century occidental critic.\n\nThe difficulty which attaches to the subsistence of the Israelites\nfor forty years in the wilderness of Tih, concerns almost wholly the\nsustenance of their flocks and herds, which are said to have been\nnumerous, and have been calculated at two million head of cattle. The\nanswer to this difficulty may be very brief. In the first place, we\nare not told that the cattle did not very rapidly decrease; for no\nmention is made of the people possessing any considerable number in\nthe later portion of the sojourn, until an enormous booty is captured\nfrom the Midianites;[80] and in the second place, there is ample reason\nto believe that the wilderness was anciently very much more fertile\nthan it is at present, and quite capable of furnishing pasturage to\nflocks and herds of a large size. The recent explorations of Mr.\nTristram and Mr. Holland have placed this fact beyond a doubt, and have\nshown that the Sinaitic peninsula, at any rate, was a \"desert\" merely\nin comparison with the richly agricultural countries of Egypt and\nPalestine.\n\nHistorical difficulties are scarcely alleged with respect to the\nportion of the Biblical narrative which follows upon the sojourn in\nthe wilderness. The conquest of Canaan by the immigrant Israelites is\na fact too well attested to be denied; and the subsequent chequered\nhistory of the race, as delivered to us in Judges and in the First\nBook of Samuel, is for the most part too modest and unpretending an\naccount to tempt the assaults of sceptics. The exploits of Gideon and\nSamson are viewed indeed with incredulity; but merely on the ground\nthat they are intrinsically improbable. It is not until we come to the\ntime of David and Solomon that any further difficulties, really of an\nhistorical character, present themselves, and that an examination of\nthe difficulties by the light of historical documents becomes possible.\n\nThe sudden rise of the Israelites to power and greatness in the reign\nof David, the grandeur, magnificence, and extent of the kingdom of\nSolomon, and the entire collapse of the empire at his death appear to\nsome, not merely in themselves strange and improbable, but incompatible\nwith what is known from history of the condition of the neighbouring\ncountries. The little country of Palestine was placed midway between\nthe territories of two great and powerful monarchies, of which it may\nbe said, in a general way, that for a thousand years before the rise\nof the Persians to power, they contested the sovereignty of the East.\nOver-shadowed by the grand forms of Egypt and Assyria, how could Israel\n(it may be asked) emerge from obscurity, how especially advance at\na bound from a dependent to a dominant position, asserting, and for\nabove fifty years maintaining, her place among the great ones of the\nearth? We may answer, that, in the first place such a revolution has\nnumerous analogies in the history of the East, where the rapid rise of\npetty states to greatness, the sudden conversion of an oppressed into a\ndominant power, is the rule rather than the exception; where Babylon,\nMedia, Persia, Parthia, where the histories of Timur, Yenghis Khan,\nNadir Shah, all illustrate it. But further, in this particular case,\nwe can see not only a general analogy, but a fitness in the peculiar\ncircumstances of the time for the production of such a phenomenon as\nthat which Scripture places before us. The monumental evidence of the\ntwo countries shows, that exactly at the time when the conquests of\nDavid and the Empire of Solomon are placed, both Egypt and Assyria were\nexceptionally weak. Egypt, after the time of Ramesses III. (ab. B.C.\n1,200) ceased to be aggressive on the side of Syria, and continued\nuntil the accession of Sheshonk or Shishak, (ab. B.C. 990) to be a\nquiet and unwarlike power. Assyria, which, about B.C. 1,100, extended\nher sway into the valley of the Orontes, and threatened Palestine with\nsubjection, passed under a cloud soon afterwards, and did not again\nbecome a terror to Syria, till about B.C. 880. For a Jewish Empire to\narise it was necessary that Egypt and Assyria should be simultaneously\nweak. Such simultaneous weakness is found for the hundred or hundred\nand twenty years between B.C. 1,100 and B.C. 990. And exactly into this\ninterval fall the rise of the Jews to power under Saul and David, and\nthe establishment of their empire under Solomon.\n\nDoubts were thrown a few years since, by an able writer, on the\nexpeditions of Shishak against Rehoboam, Solomon's son, and of Zerah,\nthe Ethiopian, against Asa, Rehoboam's grandson;[81] which, it was\nsuggested, might be mere embellishments of a history, otherwise tame\nand uninteresting. The careful analysis which the inscription of\nShishak at Karnac has undergone at the hands of Mr. Stuart Poole,[82]\nand Dr. Brugsch,[83] not to mention other scholars, and the evidence\nthus furnished of the reality and the importance of his expedition into\nPalestine, render the continuance of incredulity, as to the former of\nthese attacks, impossible. The analysis has thrown a flood of light\non what was previously obscure in the scriptural narrative. It has\nshown that Shishak went up, not so much with any extensive scheme of\nconquest, as to settle his _proteg\u00e9_, Jeroboam, in his kingdom, where\nhe was in great danger from the Levitical and Canaanite towns not\nbeing in his hands. These Shishak reduced and made over to Jeroboam,\nthus giving him a firm hold on the northern kingdom. Having done\nthis, he was content to receive the mere submission of Rehoboam, and\nallowed him to retain the southern kingdom, perhaps not wishing to make\nJeroboam too strong. It was the constant practice of the great monarchs\nof Egypt, Assyria, and Babylon, to maintain, on dependent thrones, a\nlarge number of petty princes, who were checks upon each other, and\ncould easily be dealt with, if they shewed any inclination to rebellion.\n\nThe expedition of Zerah has not yet received any distinct confirmation\nfrom monuments. But the recent discovery that there reigned about\nthis time a king called _Azerch_-Amen in Ethiopia, has removed the\ndifficulties which attached to the name and the description of the\ninvader, and has indicated to the dispassionate and candid student,\nthat here, too, the Jewish historian had probably contemporary records\nto guide him, and related real facts of history, not figments drawn\nfrom his imagination.\n\nA real historical difficulty meets us soon after this, in the sacred\nnarrative, in the invasion of the kingdom of Samaria, by Pul, who\nis called a \"king of Assyria,\" and is said to have put Menahem to a\ntribute of a thousand talents of silver.[84] We possess the history\nof Assyria for this period, apparently in a state of completeness;\nand this history shows us no monarch at this time (or indeed at any\nother time), bearing a name in the least resembling that of Pul. The\npredecessor of Tiglath-pileser on the throne of Assyria, was a certain\nAsshur-lush (or Asshur-likkis), whose predecessor was Asshur-dayan, who\nfollowed on Shalmaneser III. It seems impossible that any one of these\nkings can be Pul. Moreover, Assyria, in the time immediately preceding\nthe accession of Tiglath-pileser, instead of being a great, aggressive\npower, capable of marching armies into Palestine, was in a depressed\nstate, troubled by frequent insurrections among her own subjects, and\nquite incapable of sending out distant military expeditions. Thus \"Pul,\nking of Assyria,\" constitutes to the modern historical inquirer a real\ndifficulty--a difficulty which it has been proposed to meet in various\nways.\n\nThe best explanation hitherto suggested is, I think, the following.\nPul, who was called by Berosus, the great Babylon historian, \"king\nof the Chaldeans,\" was probably a monarch who reigned at Babylon,\nwhile Asshur-lush was reigning at Nineveh. In the troublous decade\nof years which preceded Tiglath-pileser's accession, he became a\npowerful prince, perhaps deprived Assyria of her western provinces,\nand invaded Syria and Palestine from the quarter from which Assyrian\ninvasions had been wont to come. Presenting himself to the Israelites\nas the representative of the great Mesopotamian power, with which they\nhad been contending for centuries, they termed him loosely \"king of\nAssyria\" when he was in reality a king of Babylon, who had possessed\nhimself of a portion of the Assyrian dominions. In the same way, they\nsubsequently termed Nabopolassar, the father of Nebuchadnezzar, and\neven Darius Hystaspis, \"kings of Assyria.\"[85]\n\nA difficulty used to be felt with respect to \"Sargon, king of\nAssyria,\" who is said to have taken Ashdod by the hand of one of his\ncaptains.[86] Sargon's name is not contained in the historical books\nof Scripture, nor is he mentioned by any of the classical writers, who\nspeak of Shalmaneser, Sennacherib, and Esarhaddon. The occurrence of\nhis name in Isaiah was thought to indicate an irreconcilable difference\nbetween the historical data possessed by that prophet and those of\nthe writer of Kings. Even his existence was doubted, and different\nwriters proposed to regard his name as a mere variant for those of\neach of the three princes just mentioned. The Assyrian inscriptions\nhave completely cleared up all this obscurity. Sargon is found to\nhave been the successor of Shalmaneser; the predecessor and father of\nSennacherib. He speaks of having captured Ashdod. All that Isaiah says\nof him is confirmed; and it appears to have been quite accidental that\nthe writer of Kings, who more than once alludes to him,[87] does not\nmention his name.\n\nThe strictly historical character of the later portion of the Old\nTestament narrative, especially of that delivered to us in Kings,\nChronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah, and in the contemporary prophets,\nJeremiah, Zechariah, and Haggai, is generally admitted, even by\nsceptics. The only writings belonging to this period, whereto exception\nis taken are the Books of Daniel and Esther, which many still regard\nas full of historical inaccuracies, and as quite unworthy of credence.\nI shall therefore conclude my observation on the alleged historical\ndifficulties of the _Old_ Testament, and the light thrown on them by\nmodern discoveries, by a brief consideration of these two books and of\nthe objections taken to them.\n\nThe chief historical inaccuracies alleged against Daniel are the\nfollowing: He is said to have invented two kings, Belshazzar, and\nDarius the Mede, whose existence is not merely unknown to history,\nbut precluded by it; to have falsely ascribed a government by satraps\nto the Babylonians; to have incorrectly represented the condition of\ntheir \"wise men\"; to have made Susa a residence of the Persian monarchs\nwhen it was not even built; to have wrongly made the last king of\nBabylon a son of Nebuchadnezzar, and to have misrepresented his fate;\nto have misconceived the relative position of the Medes and Persians\nat the time of the capture of Babylon; and to have related an utterly\nincredible circumstance, viz. that Daniel was admitted among the\nBabylonian \"wise men,\" and even constituted their head.[88]\n\nNow of these charges some are quite incapable of being either\nsubstantiated or distinctly refuted from our insufficient knowledge of\nthe times to which they refer. Nothing is really known of the classes\ninto which the \"wise men\" of Babylon were divided in Nebuchadnezzar's\ntime, excepting what we learn from Daniel himself. The authors supposed\nto contradict Daniel on this point, write of the state of things in\ntheir own day, which happens to be eight centuries later! And they\ndo not write about the Babylonian \"wise men\" at all, but about the\ndivisions of the Persian magi, an entirely different class. We do not\neven know enough about the \"wise men\" to say whether there was anything\nstrange and unusual in a foreigner being placed at their head. We may\nsuspect that it was so, but we have really no sufficient evidence on\nthe subject. The little evidence that we have is to the effect that\nthe \"wise men\" were a learned, not a priestly, body; and that they\nadmitted foreigners among them--more we do not know; but there is\ncertainly not the slightest difficulty in supposing that the despotic\npower of a Babylonian monarch would have been amply sufficient to\novercome any repugnance which any class of his subjects might have felt\ntowards one of his appointments.\n\nSimilarly, we have no sufficient knowledge of the Babylonian\ngovernmental system to say that it was not, at any rate, to some\nextent, satrapial. A satrapial system is simply one in which governors\nare appointed over the provinces, instead of their being suffered\nto remain under the rule of native kings. Our present Indian system\nis in part satrapial, in part a government by means of kings. The\nAssyrian government was one of the same kind; and, on the whole, it\nis most probable that so was the Babylonian. Gedaliah, who succeeded\nto King Zedekiah in Judea, was a \"governor,\"[89] that is, a satrap,\nappointed by Nebuchadnezzar; and Berosus speaks of a \"satrap of Egypt,\nC\u0153le-Syria, and Ph\u0153nicia,\" as holding office under Nabopolassar,\nNebuchadnezzar's father. Thus there is no \"inaccuracy\" in Daniel's\nspeaking of Nebuchadnezzar as summoning, among his other great\nofficers, his \"satraps.\"[90] That the _word_, which is Persian, was\nnot used in Babylonia is probable; but Daniel, writing for Jews under\nPersian government, who were perfectly familiar with the term, employed\nit for a corresponding Babylonian expression.\n\nThe charge that Daniel misapprehended the relative position of the\nMedes and Persians at the capture of Babylon, regarding the supremacy\nof the Medes as still continuing, is unjust, and rests on an omission\nto look carefully to the original text. It is true that the Medes are\nplaced before the Persians in the words of the handwriting upon the\nwall, and also in the formula, \"according to the law of the Medes and\nPersians, which altereth not.\" But this honorary precedence assigned\nto the Medes is a mere trace of their ancient supremacy--a trace much\nmore strongly marked in Greek writers, who actually call Cyrus and\nhis successors \"Medes\"--and is not an indication of its continuance.\nDaniel twice marks very strongly the subordinate position of the\nMedes, stating in one place[91] that Darius the Mede \"_received_ the\nkingdom\"--_i.e._, was given it by another; and further declaring that\nhe \"_was made king_ over the nation of the Chald\u00e6ans,\"[92] using in\nthis case an expression which distinctly implies that he derived his\nposition from some superior authority, which made him king.[93]\n\nThe notion that Susa, or at any rate, its palace, was not built at\nthe time when Daniel says that he saw himself in vision there, rests\nwholly upon a statement made by Pliny, six hundred years later, that\n\"Susa, the ancient regal city of the Persians, was built by Darius\nHystaspis.\"[94] Now this statement, one of very weak authority, had we\nnothing to set against it, is contrary to the declarations of various\nother classical authorities, among them notably of Herodotus; and is\ncompletely disproved by the Assyrian inscriptions, which show that Susa\nwas one of the most ancient of all the Mesopotamian cities, and that\nits \"palace\" was famous for many centuries before the time of Daniel.\nThe truth which underlies Pliny's statement, is the fact that Darius\nHystaspis was the first Persian monarch to build a palace at Susa after\nthe Persian fashion; but the ancient residence of the Susian kings, the\nMemnonium, as the Greeks called it, had existed for considerably more\nthan a thousand years when the son of Hystaspes began his edifice.\n\nOf the two remaining charges, which concern Darius the Mede, and\nBelshazzar, one--and that the more important of the two--has been\ncompletely rebutted by the evidence of the Babylonian monuments. These\nmonuments show that Nabonnedus (or Labynetus), the king of Babylon\nattacked by Cyrus, had a son named Bel-shar-ezer, or Belshazzar, whom\nduring some years he associated with him in the government. This son\nmay well have been on the mother's side descended from Nebuchadnezzar,\nas Daniel says that Belshazzar was;[95] he may have played the part in\nthe siege which Daniel states that he did, while his father (as Berosus\nmentioned) defended the fortress of Borsippa; and he may have fallen\nin the general massacre during the night in which Babylon was taken,\nwhile his father was subsequently made prisoner, and kindly treated by\nCyrus. All the supposed contradictions of profane history by Daniel\nin connection with this matter, are entirely removed by one little\ndocument, exhumed in our own day from the soil of Mesopotamia, by the\nexertions of an English gentleman.\n\nWith respect to Darius the Mede, nothing has been as yet discovered.\nIt is clear from Daniel that he was not a king in his own right, but\na viceroy set up by Cyrus. He held his government probably for not\nmore than two years. Perhaps he is to be identified with Astyages, the\nMedian king, whom Cyrus deposed but treated kindly; perhaps he was\nmerely a Median noble, whom Cyrus advanced, as he did other Medes, to\na position of trust and importance. The monuments have not at present\nthrown any light on this matter; but he would be a bold person, who,\nafter the discovery with respect to Belshazzar, would undertake to say\nthat there may not, ere many years are past, be as much light thrown\nupon the obscure history of this monarch, as has been recently thrown\non the history, formerly at least as obscure, of his predecessor.\n\nI cannot leave this matter and turn to another without strongly\nadvising those who have any doubts as to the genuineness and\nauthenticity of the Book of Daniel, which have been of late so fiercely\nattacked, to study carefully the recent work of Professor Pusey\nupon the subject. They will find in it a complete answer to all the\nobjections, historical, and critical, which have been urged against\nthis portion of Scripture.\n\nThe historical difficulties alleged against the Book of Esther, are\nchiefly the following. Assuming Ahasuerus to be Xerxes, which is no\ndoubt a highly probable identification, it is said that Esther's\nposition is impossible, since Xerxes had but one wife, Amestris, who\ncannot be Esther. Nor could any Persian king have married a Jewess,\nsince there was a law that the kings should take all their wives out\nof seven noble Persian families. Such a feast as that described in the\nfirst chapter, where all the princes of the provinces were entertained\nfor 180 days, could not have taken place, since the governors could\nnot without ruin to the empire have been so long absent from their\ngovernments. It is incredible that a Persian king should have given\nthe command, said to have been given by Ahasuerus to Vashti. The\nedicts ascribed to Ahasuerus are all incredible--especially the second\nand third. No king would have consented to the murder of 2,000,000 of\nhis subjects; nor would any king ever have allowed at a later time\nthose two millions to stand up and slay as many as they pleased of\ntheir enemies. Finally, the honours granted to Mordecai are said to be\nexcessive, and such as no monarch would have allowed to a subject.\n\nWith respect to the first of these objections, we may reply that though\nAmestris cannot be Esther, she may well be Vashti; and that though the\nclassical writers tell us of no other wife of Xerxes, yet it is quite\npossible that he may have had several. Polygamy was the rule with\nthe Persian kings. Amestris was no doubt on the whole the chief wife\nof Xerxes, and if she at one time fell into disgrace, must have been\nafterwards restored to favour; but the accounts which we have from\nthe Greeks do not at all preclude the possibility of such a temporary\ndisgrace, and of the elevation of another wife to the first place for\na time. As to its being impossible that any Persian king could have\nmarried a Jewess, it is sufficient to remark, that though the Persians\nhad laws, the Persian kings were above the law, and could always\ndisregard its restraints. When Cambyses having conceived an affection\nfor his full sister, Atossa, asked the royal judges if they could find\na law allowing a Persian to marry such a near relative, their reply\nwas, that they could find no law permitting the marriage of brothers\nand sisters, but that they found a law, that the king of the Persians\nmight do what he liked.[96]\n\nThe objection to Xerxes feasting _all_ his princes for 180 days is an\nobjection, not to anything contained in the Book of Esther, but to\nsomething which the critic who makes it has intruded into the book.\nThe writer of the book tells us that Xerxes \"made a feast to all his\nprinces and his servants\" (ch. i. 3), and subsequently relates that the\nfeast lasted \"an hundred and fourscore days\" (verse 4); but he nowhere\nstates that the princes were all present during the whole of the time.\nIndeed, the reader possessed of common sense sees clearly enough that\nthe very duration of the festivity was probably contrived, in order\nthat all the princes might in their turn partake of it. The critic\nsays, \"it is not so stated in the text,\" which is true: but neither is\nthat stated which he has thought that he saw in it.\n\nThe command given to Vashti is undoubtedly strange and abnormal. It\nwas an outrage on Oriental custom; and as such the narrative sets it\nbefore us. The king does not issue the order until he is \"merry with\nwine\"; and the Queen refuses to obey, because she feels the order to\nbe an insult. But can we say that no Oriental king could possibly\nhave issued such a command? Is it not more reasonable to allow, with\na German critic of the sceptical school, that the narrative is here\n\"possible on account of the advancing corruption in Xerxes' time, and\nthrough the folly of Xerxes himself\"?[97] Indeed is it not clear that\nwe can set no limit to the caprices of absolute power, or to the orders\nthat may not be issued by a proud and silly despot?\n\nConsiderations of this kind go far also to remove the difficulty which\nhas been felt as to the main facts of the narrative of Esther, the\nintended massacre of the Jews, and the counter-edict allowing them to\ndefend themselves and slay their enemies. Such facts are altogether out\nof the ordinary experience of Western nations; and it is not surprising\nthat they have been met with incredulity on the part of those whose\nknowledge of the past is limited to an acquaintance with the course\nof European, and especially of modern European, history. But can it\nbe said that they are altogether out of nature? that they have no\ncounterpart in the history of the East? that they transcend altogether\nwhat authentic history relates of the doings of Oriental tyrants? Here\nagain the German sceptic is more cautious than some of those who have\nsought to popularise him, and allows that from what we know of the\nbase character and despotism of Xerxes it may perhaps be believed that\nHaman obtained from him a decree for the extirpation of the Jews,\nand Mordecai in return a corresponding counter-decree[98]. All that\nhe objects to is, the fierceness with which the Jews set to work, and\nthe consequent massacre by them of above 75,000 persons. This fact\nhe thinks \"incredible.\" It may be allowed that had the persons slain\nbeen, as the objectors suppose, \"Persians,\" the circumstances related\nwould have been extremely hard of belief; but it is on the whole most\nprobable that there were few or no \"Persians\" among them. A religious\nsympathy united the Persians with the Jews; and it is scarcely likely\nthat any of them would have taken part in the proposed destruction of\nthe Jewish nation. The adversaries of the Jews were to be found in the\nranks of the conquered nations, not of the conquering one. They were\nPersian subjects, not Persians. There is no reason to think that the\nloss even of 75,000 of such persons would have been felt by Xerxes as a\nmatter of much importance. We must remember, however, that the number\n75,000 is doubtful. The Septuagint version has 15,000; and this number\nis more in harmony than the other with the 800 slain in the capital.\n\nFinally, to the objection that the honours granted to Mordecai are\nexcessive, it may be replied, in the first place, that they are\nanalogous to those granted to Joseph,[99] and Daniel,[100] and\ntherefore such as were occasionally allowed to subjects by Oriental\nsovereigns; and secondly, that if there were anything abnormal in them,\nit would be sufficiently accounted for by the wild and extravagant\ntemper of Xerxes, which delighted in strange acts and exhibitions of an\nunusual character. Haman, who knew his master's weakness, might well\nspeculate upon it, and suggest extraordinary honours, since he imagined\nthat it was himself for whom they were intended.\n\nI have now noticed _all_ the historical difficulties of any force\nor weight, which have come before me in the course of my studies\non the history of the Old Testament. I have dwelt particularly on\nthose connected with the Pentateuch and with the two Books of Daniel\nand Esther, because of late years the attacks of sceptics have been\nespecially directed against those portions of the Sacred volume. I\nhave left myself but scant time for noticing historical difficulties\nconnected with the narrative of the New Testament; but this is of\nthe less consequence, since there are no more than one or two such\ndifficulties on which any stress has recently been laid by our\nopponents.\n\nIt has been said that St. Luke, in connecting the name of Cyrenius\nwith the \"taxing\" which caused Joseph and Mary to go from Nazareth\nto Bethlehem, \"undeniably contradicts history.\"[101] Cyrenius (or\nQuirinus) was appointed governor of Syria about ten years after the\ndeath of Herod the Great, and made a census of his province shortly\nafterwards. This census St. Luke is accused of placing ten years too\nearly. The answer to this charge is, that the words of St. Luke (chap.\nii. 2) cannot possibly mean that Cyrenius was governor at the time of\nthe taxing; had it been St. Luke's intention to express this, the verse\nwould have ran thus: \"This taxing was made when Cyrenius was governor\nof Syria,\" and not \"this taxing was first made,\" etc. \"First,\" that\nis, which is manifestly the emphatic word of the sentence, would then\nhave been absent from it. Evidently, therefore, St. Luke's words must\nbear some other meaning. They may signify, \"_this_ taxing was made\n_before_ Cyrenius was governor,\" and so before that better known taxing\nwhich he ordered. This is an allowable translation of the passage.\nOr they may mean, and I think they do mean, \"this taxing was first\ncompleted--first took full effect--when Cyrenius was governor;\" that is\nto say, the taxing ordered by Augustus, and commenced under Herod the\nGreat, was interrupted (as it may easily have been, since the Jews were\nvery bitter against it), and the business was first accomplished under\nCyrenius. This is a sense which the Greek verb translated incur version\n\"was made\" sometimes has.\n\nAgain, it has been said that St. Luke erred in stating that Lysanias\nwas tetrarch of Abilene (iii. 1) in the fifteenth year of the reign of\nTiberius C\u00e6sar.[102] Lysanias, it is said, died sixty years previously;\nand St. Luke has ignorantly made him alive, being deceived by the fact\nthat Abilene continued to be called \"the Abilene of Lysanias,\" after\nits former ruler, for sixty or seventy years subsequently. Now here\nit is in the first place assumed, without any word of proof, that the\nLysanias who died B.C. 34 once ruled over Abilene. Secondly, it is\nassumed, also without any word of proof, that Abilene came to be known\nas \"the Abilene of Lysanias,\" from him. I venture to assert that there\nis absolutely no ground for believing that the old Lysanias was ever\nruler of Abilene; and I venture to maintain that Abilene came to be\ncalled \"the Abilene of Lysanias\" from a second or later Lysanias, a\nson of the former one, who is the person intended by St. Luke. Till\nrecently, Christian apologists were defied to show historically that\nthere was ever more than one Lysanias, and were accused of inventing a\nsecond to escape a difficulty. But a few years since, a discovery was\nmade which must be regarded by all reasonable persons as having set the\nwhole matter at rest. This was an inscription found near Baalbek,[103]\ncontaining a dedication of a memorial tablet or statue to \"Zenodorus,\nson of the tetrarch Lysanias, and to Lysanias, her children,\" by\n(apparently) the widow of the first, and the mother of the second\nLysanias. Zenodorus was already known as having succeeded the first\nLysanias in his government. It is thus clear, that there were, as\npreviously suspected, two persons of the name, a father, and a son, and\nthere is not the slightest reason for doubting St. Luke's statement\nthat the latter was tetrarch of Abilene in the fifteenth of Tiberius.\n\nI know of no other cavil against the historical accuracy of the New\nTestament, that I can regard as worthy of being dignified with the\nname of difficulty. It has been denied that any decree ever went out\nfrom C\u00e6sar Augustus, that all the world should be taxed,[104] but as\nSavigny, the best authority on Roman antiquities, holds the contrary\nto be certain, this denial need not detain us. It has been asserted\nthat if the massacre of the Innocents had taken place, it _must_ have\nbeen noticed by Josephus;[105] but this argument from omission is too\nweak to deserve more than a passing notice. Nothing is more familiar\nto historical students than the unaccountable omissions which occur\nin the works of almost all historians. Scepticism has searched in the\nmost minute and unsparing way every detail of the Gospel and the Acts,\nand has endeavoured earnestly to find \"differences\" and \"divergences\"\nbetween these facts and those of profane history; but again and again\nhas it been compelled to own that the divergences are slight, and\nthe differences such as may be reconciled by natural and probable\nsuppositions. The entire result of the searching criticism, whereto the\nhistorical character of the New Testament has been exposed, has been\nto show that not only the general narrative, but all its minuti\u00e6, are\ntrustworthy. No evangelist has been convicted of error in respect of\nany historical statements. Where a shallow learning and a defective\nknowledge of the records of the past have led men to think that they\nhad found a slip or a mistake, and a shout of triumph has been raised,\nprofounder research has always demonstrated the veracity and accuracy\nof the sacred writer, and has exposed the ignorance of his assailant.\nThe historical character of the New Testament is, I think I may say, in\nthe eyes of all sober historical critics established.\n\n\n\n\n    MYTHICAL THEORIES OF CHRISTIANITY.\n\n    BY THE\n\n    REV. CHARLES ROW, M.A.,\n\n    OF PEMBROKE COLLEGE, OXFORD.\n\n\n\n\nMYTHICAL THEORIES OF CHRISTIANITY.\n\n\nIt is hardly possible to over-estimate the importance of the issues\nto which it will be my duty to address myself in this lecture. They\ninvolve the central position of Christianity; viz., the all-important\nquestion whether Jesus Christ was an historical person, or a creation\nof the imagination. Is the Church which is erected on Him founded on an\nhistoric fact, which had an objective existence; or is the Jesus of the\nEvangelists a subjective creation which existed only in the minds of\nits originators?\n\nMany of the attacks which have been made on Revelation are directed\nagainst its outworks merely; this is one directed against the very\nkey of the Christian position. If it can be carried by our opponents,\nthe whole line of our defences becomes untenable. Let us not deceive\nourselves. If the Gospels are not _in their main outlines_ historically\ntrue, Christianity is no more divine than Shakespeare. It may be the\nhighest development of man; but it can have no pretence to be esteemed\na revelation from God.\n\nThe objections of this school have done more to undermine the belief of\nthe educated classes in Christianity as a divine revelation than any\none single cause. They have largely created the so-called rationalism\nof the Continent. They are widely diffused in America. In our own\ncountry, a numerous class of writers who obtain ready access to our\nperiodical literature are not only imbued with similar views, but\nwrite with the quiet assumption that the historical foundation of\nChristianity cannot be defended.\n\nAs my subject is a wide one, I must address myself to it without any\npreliminary observations. The question before us is simply this, Are\nthe Gospels credible histories, in the sense that other writings of\nthe same description are? or are the larger portion of their contents\nfictitious?\n\nIt should be observed that although these schools support their views\nby an immense critical apparatus, the real \u03c3\u03ba\u03ac\u03bd\u03b4\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd [Greek: skandalon]\nof the Gospels is the supernatural element which they contain. Apart\nfrom this, their historical character would never have been questioned.\nThe theory that miracles are impossible underlies the entire mass of\nthese objections. But the question of the miraculous has been already\nhandled by another lecturer. I shall therefore only observe on it that\nit forms no portion of a strictly historical inquiry. It appertains to\nthe abstract regions of thought. History has to deal with evidence, not\nwith abstract dogmas or philosophical questions. To begin an historical\ninquiry with the assumption that miracles are impossible, and that any\nevent which involves the supernatural must be a fiction, is quietly to\nassume the point at issue.\n\nBut as the Christian Church is an institution which actually exists,\nand as its origin can be traced up to the times of Jesus Christ, and as\nit is erected on the Gospels as its foundation, these schools are fully\naware that the question cannot be settled by the quiet assumption that\nmiracles are impossible. The case stands thus. The Christian Church\nexists. It has had its origin in the events of past history. The Church\nitself asserts now, and has asserted in all ages, that it is founded\non the historical truth of the divine person of Christ our Lord, as\nHe is depicted in the Gospels. If the Gospels are true, they give a\nrational account of its origin, But those with whom I am reasoning deny\nthat they are a statement of historic facts, and consequently that they\nare not the true account of it. But as the Church is an historic fact,\nthey are quite aware that any mere general assumption that miracles\nare impossible is not sufficient. They find themselves, therefore,\ncompelled to do two things,--first, to invent a critical apparatus to\ndestroy the credibility of the Gospels; and, secondly, to propound a\ntheory which shall account for the origin of the Church on principles\npurely human. The solution propounded is the mythical and T\u00fcbingen\ntheories.\n\nThis critical apparatus keeps two aims in view,--first, to prove the\nexistence of statements in the Gospels at variance with those of\ncontemporaneous history; secondly, to show that these narratives abound\nwith a multitude of contradictions. To effect this latter purpose,\nevery variation of statement is made to assume the character of a\ncontradiction. The extent to which this has been carried is scarcely\ncredible.\n\nThis process having as they hope destroyed the substance of the\nGospels, the next procedure is to invent a theory out of the\nimagination as the account of the origin of Christianity, and to\npropound it as true history.\n\nAt first sight it would appear to have been the easiest course to\nassert that they are simple forgeries, in the same sense in which the\nDonation of Constantine or the False Decretals are forgeries. But this\nis what no unbeliever of the present day who regards his literary\nreputation ventures to propound as the alternative to their historical\ncredibility. Why is the simple course abandoned, and an infinitely\ncomplicated theory substituted in its place? The answer is that\ntheir entire phenomena negative the supposition that they could have\noriginated in directly conscious fraud.\n\nA more elaborate theory, therefore, has to be substituted for the\nsimple one. It must be observed that I can only speak of it in its\ngeneral aspect, for its modifications are extremely numerous, and\nhardly any two writers can be found who take precisely the same view.\nBut the following may be stated as the principles which underlie these\nsystems of modern unbelief, throwing aside their minor details.\n\nFirst. That miracles being impossible, no supernatural element whatever\nenters into the character of the historical Jesus.\n\nSecond. That He was probably a very great man, though, whenever the\nexigencies of the system require it, it is necessary to assume that He\nwas deeply implicated in the prejudices and superstitions of the age in\nwhich He lived.\n\nThird. That He probably believed Himself to be the Messiah expected by\nHis countrymen, though as to the precise nature of His Messianic claims\nmy opponents are not agreed.\n\nFourth. That He succeeded in inspiring a crowd of followers with an\nenthusiastic attachment to Him.\n\nFifth. That they were honest people after their fashion; but were\nimpelled by an enthusiasm only equalled by their credulity.\n\nSixth. That they invented a multitude of fabulous stories, ascribed\nthem to Jesus, and in time mistook them for facts.\n\nSeventh. That out of these and kindred elements, aided by a succession\nof developments, the human Jesus was gradually metamorphosed, in the\ncourse of the seventy years which followed the crucifixion, into the\nChrist of the Synoptic Gospels, and in a hundred and thirty into that\nof the Gospel of St. John.\n\nNow, as these schools deny the existence of the supernatural, this\nwhole development must have been due to causes which are purely human;\nin one word, to the laws which regulate the developments of the moral\nand spiritual worlds. As those of the natural world have been effected\nthrough the agency of natural laws, so the creation of the Jesus of the\nEvangelists is due to laws which regulate with equal potency the action\nof the mind. Both sets of laws are equally constant and invariable.\n\nTo examine the critical apparatus which has been applied to the Gospels\nfor the purpose of proving their unhistorical character, could only be\naccomplished in a work of considerable length. I shall therefore only\nmake two observations on the principles adopted.\n\nFirst. These schools assault the Gospels by charging them with\ncontaining a multitude of inaccuracies, discrepancies, and\ncontradictions. While they do this they carefully keep in the\nbackground the minute accuracies, agreements with contemporaneous\nhistory, and plain indications of autoptic testimony with which they\nabound. Such a line of conduct is the same thing as to place before\nthe Court which is to try the cause everything which an acute counsel\ncan adduce in opposition, and to suppress the whole evidence for the\ndefence.\n\nSecondly. A great majority of these objections are founded on a view\nof the Gospels which their writers expressly repudiate. It is taken\nfor granted that the Gospels are histories in the strictest sense of\nthat word. By a strict history I mean a narrative in which the events\nare connected together in accordance with the sequences of time and\nplace. This is the arrangement which is generally adopted in modern\nhistories and biographies. But the Gospels expressly assert that they\nbelong to a different class of writings. They are not _histories_,\nbut _memoirs_. In a memoir, the arrangement of events in the strict\nsequence of time and place is not the predominant idea. The Gospels are\nnot only memoirs, but memoirs of a peculiar character. They are details\nof the actions and teachings of Jesus Christ written for the express\npurpose of teaching the Christian religion. In works of this kind\nthe arrangement and grouping of events are formed on very different\nprinciples from those adopted in the composition of pure histories.\n\nAs this is a most important point, I must adduce proof of it which is\nbeyond all contradiction. St. John's Gospel asserts, in as many words,\nthat it was the purpose of its author to write such a memoir, and not\na strict history. At chap. xx., ver. 30, 31, he says, \"And many other\nsigns truly did Jesus in the presence of His disciples, which are not\nwritten in this book: but these are written, that ye may believe that\nJesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye may have\nlife through His name.\" Again, in the last verse of the Gospel it is\nexpressly stated that Jesus did many things which the writer has not\nrecorded.\n\nThe author therefore clearly asserts that he has made a selection of\ncertain events in the life of Jesus Christ, from a very much larger\nnumber, with which he was acquainted, and that the principle which\nguided him, both in the selection and arrangement, was a religious\none. \"These are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ,\"\netc. It is impossible more distinctly to assert that the Gospel is a\nreligious memoir.\n\nNo less clear is the statement of St. Luke. He says \"that he wrote\nin order to the most excellent Theophilus, that he might know the\ncertainty of the things in which he had been instructed.\" The original\nshows that the instruction was given with a definite religious purpose.\nThe Gospel is \"a declaration of those things most surely believed\namong Christians.\" In one word, the work is a memoir, and not a history.\n\nIf it be replied that Luke says that he wrote \"in order,\" \u03b5\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u03be\u03b5\u03b9\n[Greek: en taxei], I answer that there are other orderly arrangements\nbesides those of time and place; and that if a work is a religious\nmemoir, the arrangement would be regulated, though not exclusively, by\nthe reference of the facts to the religious end in view.\n\nThe assertions of the other two Gospels are not so express, but viewed\nin connection with their contents they prove that they belong to the\nsame class of writings. Mark writes, \"The beginning of the good news\nof Jesus Christ, the Son of God.\" Here a religious purpose is asserted\nto be the guiding principle of the work. Matthew, in accordance with\nHebrew phraseology, entitles his work \"The book of the generation of\nJesus Christ, the Son of David, the son of Abraham.\" The whole contents\nof the Gospel answer to this description. It was written to prove that\nJesus was the Messiah of prophecy according to the conceptions of\nJewish Christianity.\n\nSuch being the distinct assertions of the writers of the Gospels as\nto the character of their works, it is absurd to criticize them as\none might be justly entitled to do if four Boswells had set forth\nfour lives of Dr. Johnson, the arrangement of which was professedly\nregulated by the historical sequence. The writer of a religious memoir\nis entitled to adopt a very different order of events in his narrative\nfrom that which ought to be adopted by the writer of a history.\n\nAn illustration will make this matter plain. If I were to compose a\nbiography of Wesley, I should be bound to narrate the events in the\norder of time, with a distinct specification of the order of place; but\nif I were to compose a memoir for the purpose of teaching the doctrines\nof Wesleyanism, I should follow a very different arrangement. Still\nmore remarkable would be the variation in the arrangement if I wrote\nhis memoir for the purpose of proving that Wesley never designed that\nthe Church which he founded should dissent from the Church of England.\n\nSuch being the character of the Gospels, objections which would be\nserious as against regular histories are harmless against compositions\nof this description. A large portion of their alleged discrepancies\narise from the different arrangement of the events narrated in them,\nowing to the predominance in them of the religious idea.\n\nNow observe that in compositions of this description it frequently\nhappens that the connecting links which would make events perfectly\nharmonize together, are wanting, simply because the purpose of the\nwriter has not led him to record them. I adduce a single instance where\nthe connecting link has been accidentally preserved, and which at\nonce converts a narrative against which most serious objections might\nhave been alleged, into one of the strongest proofs of the historical\ntruthfulness of the Evangelists.\n\nWe all remember the account of the murder of John the Baptist. It is\ntold with all those minute and delicate touches which are the peculiar\nindication of autoptic testimony. It places before our eyes the great\nfeast--the young lady dancing her lascivious dance--the words of\nHerod's vow--the girl's going out with excitement to her mother--the\ndemand of the Baptist's head in a large dish--the sorrow and reluctant\nconsent of Herod--the mission of the executioner--the presentation of\nthe head to the girl, and by her to her mother. Everything betokens the\npresence of an eye-witness.\n\nThe narrative is open to this obvious objection: How could the\ndisciples of Christ, mean and low as they were, procure so accurate\na description of an event which happened in the palace at the great\nfeast? There were neither newspapers nor reporters in those days.\nBut this is only the beginning of the difficulty. The authors of the\nGospels profess to give us the _ipsissima verba_ which were uttered\nby Herod, in the retirement of his palace, when the reports brought\nhim of the fame of Jesus rendered him conscience-stricken. The words\nare most remarkable, and leave no alternative between their being\nthe words of Herod or a forgery. \"It is John,\" says he, \"whom I\nbeheaded: he is risen from the dead, and therefore mighty works do show\nforth themselves in him.\" Our version spoils the force of the last\nwords--\u03b1\u1f31 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 [Greek: hai dunameis energousin\nen aut\u00f4]--which, rendered literally, are, \"The powers energize in\nhim.\" This is certainly a most singular expression, and one open to\na strong suspicion of forgery; for how could the followers of Jesus\nhave got hold of the very words of an utterance of Herod spoken in the\nretirement of the palace?\n\nBut besides all this, the words \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bd\u03b5\u03c1\u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff7 [Greek:\nhai dunameis energousin en aut\u00f4] plainly imply that it was the general\nidea that a large number of miracles had been wrought by our Lord.\nMy opponents suppose that the historic Jesus only attempted to work\nmiracles in a very few questionable cases, and that the multitude\nof miracles which have been subsequently ascribed to Him are the\ninventions of His deluded followers. Such are the difficulties. Now for\ntheir solution.\n\nIt has been observed that the author of the Acts of the Apostles tells\nus that among the teachers of the Church at Antioch during Paul's\nsojourn there, was Manaen, who was a foster-brother of Herod the\nTetrarch. This is told us in a manner which is purely incidental, and\nsupplies us with a possible source from whence the information might\nhave been derived. Still it by no means follows that a man who had the\nsame wet-nurse as Herod was an inmate of his palace, or witnessed the\ngreat feast.\n\nBut a passage of the most incidental character in St. Luke's Gospel\nsupplies us with the source of information which we want. In narrating\nour Lord's last journey to Jerusalem, Luke tells us that He was\naccompanied by the twelve apostles, and several women who ministered to\nHim. Of these he designates three by name. One of these is described as\nJoanna, the wife of Chuza, Herod's steward.\n\nHere then we have the very person we are in want of. Chuza's office\nof \u1f10\u03c0\u03af\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 [Greek: epitropos], or steward, imposed on him the\nduty of superintending the great feast. He therefore witnessed the\nwhole procedure, and his wife was in constant communication with the\ndisciples. His office must have brought him into daily communication\nwith his master. What more likely than when he waited on Herod for\nhis orders, he would ask him the news; and that he should report\nto him the fame of the great teacher with whom his wife was in\nattendance? He was therefore in the exact situation to have heard\nHerod's conscience-stricken exclamation. The source of information is\nbefore us. The incidental mention of Joanna and her husband affords\nto this narrative an attestation such as few events in past history\npossess. If this incident had been lost, the difficulty would have been\ninsuperable. The manner in which little circumstances dovetail into\none another in the Gospels is only consistent with their historical\ncharacter. It would be impossible if they were bundles of myths or\nlegends.\n\nI adduce one instance of the manner in which the Gospels fulfil the\nconditions of history, even where the absence of the connecting link\nhas occasioned serious difficulty. You all know that the want of any\nreference in the Synoptics to the miracle of the resurrection of\nLazarus is the stronghold of those who deny its historical credibility.\nIn the absence of any direct information, we are driven for the\nsolution of the difficulty to the regions of conjecture.\n\nLet us suppose, then, that the story is a myth. If so, it is obvious\nthat it is a very grand and perfect one. The inventor must have been a\nman of the highest genius in his way. If a person wished to invent a\ndescription of a resurrection, he would find it impossible, in the same\nnumber of words, to surpass its perfection. If the author of St. John's\nGospel has failed to depict another resurrection in an equally graphic\nmanner, it was not for want of sufficient genius. Yet the Gospel\nasserts the fact of another resurrection--that of Jesus Christ; but it\nutters not one word descriptive of it. All that it says is that Mary\nMagdalene came in the morning, and found the tomb empty.\n\nI put it to your common sense to determine, on the sup position that\nthis Gospel was written by a partisan for the purpose of throwing a\nhalo of glory around the person of his Master, whether the author\nof the resurrection of Lazarus would not have forged a still more\nmagnificent description of the resurrection of Jesus Christ. His\nfailure to do so is clearly not owing to lack of ability.\n\nBut how stands the case on the supposition that the Gospel is\nhistorical? Everything is exactly as it should be. The Evangelist has\ngiven his pictorial description of the resurrection of Lazarus, because\nhe witnessed it. He has not done so with respect to the resurrection of\nJesus Christ, because no human eye beheld it. The narrative therefore\nfulfils the conditions of history, and breaks down under the tests\nwhich belong to fiction.\n\nThe limits of a single lecture necessarily preclude me from entering on\nany minor consideration.[106] I therefore proceed at once to address\nmyself to the demolition of the central position of my opponents,\nthat while the Gospels contain a few grains of historic truth, buried\nbeneath a multitude of fables, the greater portion of their contents\nis a spontaneous growth which sprung up in the bosom of the Christian\nsociety in the last seventy years of the first century; and that\nby means of a number of mythical and legendary inventions, and a\nsuccession of developments, a good and holy Jew, named Jesus, was\nmetamorphosed into the divine Christ of the Evangelists. In reasoning\non this point, I shall assume nothing but what is conceded by the\nSchools in question.\n\nWhat are the concessions which I ask as the foundations of my\nreasoning? Very simple ones indeed, and such that no man can deny me.\nFirst, that the Gospels exist; secondly, that the three first Gospels\nwere in existence about A.D. 100, and the fourth about 160; thirdly,\nthat in addition to the facts or fictions which make up our Gospels,\nthey contain the delineation of a great character--Jesus Christ.\n\nOn the existence of this character my argument is founded. I now\nconcentrate your attention on it, which I shall call for the future\nthe portraiture of Jesus Christ our Lord. I need not prove that it\nexists in the Gospels, for the most ordinary reader perceives that it\nis there. The question is, How did it get there? It is very easy to say\nthat the Gospels consist of a mass of fictions. But this is no account\nof the origin of the portraiture. St. Paul's Cathedral undoubtedly\nconsists of an immense multitude of stones. But to say that a multitude\nof quarrymen dug them, and that a multitude of masons arranged them\naccording to their spontaneous impulses, is no account of the origin of\nthat magnificent structure.\n\nLet us carefully observe what this great portraiture of Jesus Christ,\nas it is exhibited in the Gospels, consists of. It is the delineation\nof a great moral and spiritual character dramatized over a wide sphere\nof action. This portraiture is not the result of the artificial\ndelineation of a character such as we see very commonly presented to\nus by historians, and of which we see very numerous examples in Lord\nMacaulay's History of England. Such characters are the artificial\ncreations of the historian, and exhibit his view of what his heroes\nactually were. But neither of the authors of the Gospels have once\nattempted thus to delineate the character of his Master. But the\nportraiture of Jesus Christ is delineated in the Gospels most clearly\nand most distinctly. Of what materials then does it consist? Only one\nanswer can be returned. It is the combined result of all the facts, or,\nas my opponents say, fictions, which compose the Gospels.\n\nNow as the existence of this portraiture is not a theory, but a fact,\nit is plain that it must be accounted for. The assumption that the\nGospels are historically true, and that their authors have truly\ndelineated the actions and sayings of one who had an historical\nexistence, is a rational account of its origin. But as these Schools\ndeny their historical character, they are bound to tell us how the\nportraiture got there. The only answers which they propound are the\nmythic and T\u00fcbingen theories.\n\nAccording to these theories, a good and holy Jew, who had attracted\na crowd of enthusiastic and credulous followers, was gradually\nmetamorphosed by them into the divine Christ of the Evangelists.\nThe inventors of the character were impelled by purely spontaneous\ninstincts. They had no intention of conscious deception. They mistook\ntheir Master for the Messiah. In the depths of their enthusiastic\ncredulity, they invented multitudes of fictions, and in time mistook\nthem for realities, and innocently ascribed them to Jesus. Development\nsucceeded development. The fruitful mind of the infant Church created\nmyth after myth. Party spirit raged. Compromise followed compromise.\nSpontaneous impulse by the end of the century had created the materials\nof our present Gospels. At last three unknown men appeared who arranged\nthese materials into their present form, and produced the Synoptics.\nSixty years later, another great unknown arose, whose character must\nhave been a compound of mysticism, enthusiasm, and imposture, and\nproduced the fourth Gospel, which he successfully palmed off on the\nChurch as the work of the Apostle John, some seventy or eighty years\nafter he was silent in the grave. Such is the alternative which modern\nunbelief presents as a substitute for the historical reality of the\nportraiture of Jesus Christ as we behold it in the Gospels.\n\nOne cannot help pausing to observe the kind of analogy which exists\nbetween these theories and those of a certain class of philosophers who\nattempt to prove that the moral and religious being whom we designate\nman has been slowly developed out of the lower forms of life by causes\npurely physical. Like as in the one case each development became an\nimprovement on its predecessor, so in the other the lower fabulous\ncreations must have died out, and the nobler ones prevailed, until at\nlast there emerged from them Christianity and the glorious Christ of\nthe Gospels. Physical philosophers, however, work at a great advantage\nin developing an ape into a moral being, compared with the mythologists\nwho developed a Jew of the year 30 into a Christ. The one can draw\ncheques to any extent on the bank of eternity. If a million of years\nis not sufficient, a million of millions may be easily had. But in the\nother case my opponents are limited by the stern conditions of history;\nand the respective periods of seventy and one hundred and thirty years\nare all that they venture even to demand.\n\nNow, observe; the portraiture of the Jesus of the Evangelists consists\nof a multitude of parts which harmoniously blend into a complicated\nwhole. It is composed, in fact, of as many distinct portions as there\nare incidents recorded in the Gospels, which all concur in imparting\nto it a common effect. Those with whom I am contending admit that\nthe character is a very great one. Many of them allow that it is\ngreater and more perfect than any which has ever existed as a fact\nor been conceived as a fiction. Yet the character, taken as a whole,\npresents us with an essential unity. This is obviously the case in the\nthree first Gospels, and will hardly be disputed except on a very few\nsubordinate points. But it is equally remarkable that of the various\ntraits which compose the character, and which are very numerous, each\npresents us with a similar unity, although they are dramatized over\na very wide sphere of action. To this fact I earnestly invite your\nattention. In the portraiture of Jesus at least twenty distinct aspects\nof moral character are blended together, and a number of subordinate\nones not easy to be counted; and each of these constitutes a separate\nunity, which harmoniously blends with the others, and together\ncompose the great unity of the portraiture. Numerous as they are, and\ndramatized over a wide sphere of action, they are yet depicted with a\nfaultless propriety, even in the most minute details. Nor does it to\nany serious extent differ with the fourth Gospel. This is certainly the\ncase as far as the actions attributed to Jesus are concerned, though it\nis not so obvious in the case of the discourses. Still even in these\nan underlying unity of conception can be found.[107] The four Gospels\ncontain, in fact, four portraitures of one and the same Christ, only\ndiffering from each other in the point of view from which they are\ntaken.\n\nNow the obvious course would have been to have assumed that the\nconception of the original character was the creation of some great\npoet, and that the fourfold modification of it which our present\nGospels exhibit has been the work of four subsequent poets. But this\nsupposition the facts and phenomena of the case consign to the region\nof hopeless impossibilities. It is therefore necessary to assume that\nthe character itself, and the Christianity of the New Testament, have\nbeen gradually elaborated bit by bit, not by a succession of great\npoets, but of credulous, enthusiastic mythologists; and that the\nSynoptic Gospels originated in piecing together a multitude of tales\nwhich in the latter end of the first century were floating on the\nsurface of the Christian Church.\n\nIt is impossible to deny that the Jesus of the Evangelists is an\nimmeasurably finer conception than either the Prometheus of \u00c6schylus,\nwhich exhibits the divine in suffering, or the Macbeth or Hamlet of\nShakspeare. Each of these characters is distinguished by a unity of\nconception which proves that as characters they are the creation of\na single mind. But supposing we were to be told that these, and the\ndramas which contain them, were not the creations of single poets,\nnor even of a succession of poets, but had been slowly elaborated,\nstep by step, during a considerable interval of time by a number of\ncredulous enthusiasts. My opponents would be the first to receive such\na suggestion with shouts of derision.\n\nIt is plain that if the portraiture of our Lord be an ideal creation,\nthose who framed it must have been gifted with a high order of genius.\n\nLet me illustrate the position by the art of painting. High genius in\npainting is analogous to high genius in poetry. Let us suppose that we\nare contemplating a great ideal picture,--_e.g._, the Marriage Feast in\nCana of Galilee, at the Louvre,--and that we are told that it is not\nthe work of a single artist, nor even of four, but of a succession who\ngradually developed it.\n\nNor, to make the case a parallel one, is this all which we should be\nasked to believe. As I have already observed, the portraiture of the\nJesus of the Evangelists is made up of a multitude of parts, each\nof which has a separate unity, from the union of which the unity of\nthe whole results. These are said to have been elaborated out of a\nnumber of myths and developments which have been the creations of many\nminds. In a similar manner the picture of the Marriage Feast at Cana\nconsists of a number of separate figures which harmoniously blend\ninto a whole, and to which the magnificent colouring has been adapted.\nNow suppose that we were told that each of these figures had been\ngradually developed into its present form by a set of improvements\neffected unconsciously by a succession of painters; and that all that\nthe artist who formed the picture did was skilfully to combine these\nseparate figures, and place them in juxtaposition. Surely one would not\nbe uncharitable in assuming that the author of such a suggestion had\nescaped from a lunatic asylum.\n\nSimilar is the theory of these Schools as to the origin of the Gospels,\nand of the great character contained in them. Such a theory of their\norigin demands our acquiescence in a greater miracle than all the\nmiracles of the New Testament united together.\n\nViewed in its great outlines, this theory is self-condemned by its\ninherent absurdity. But when we apply a sound logic to its details, it\nvanishes like one of the palaces of the Arabian Nights. Professing to\nbe based on rational principles, it violates all the laws of reason.\nFor historic truth it substitutes wild dreams of the imagination.\n\nYou will please to keep steadily in mind that the means by which my\nopponents undertake to metamorphose a Jew of the year 30 into a divine\nChrist, stated generally, are a succession of mythical and legendary\ncreations and developments, contests and compromises, between hostile\nsects evolved in conformity with the laws of the intellectual and moral\nworld. Let us now assume the truth of their position, and see how it\nwill work.\n\nIf the Jesus of the Evangelists be a development, it is evident that it\nmust have had a starting-point. This could have been none other than\nthe atmosphere of thought and feeling which existed in Jud\u00e6a during the\nfirst thirty years of the first century.[108]\n\nBut none more firmly profess their belief in the reign of law in the\nworld of mind and matter than those whose theories I am controverting.\nIn consequence of this belief they pronounce all supernatural\ninterventions in human affairs impossible. I thankfully concede to them\nthe fact that all developments affecting the mind of man which are of\npurely human origin must be brought about in conformity with law. Let\nit be clearly understood, therefore, that my reasoning is based on this\nassumption.\n\nThis point being clear, the question immediately presents itself,\nwhat is the nature of the laws which regulate the mental developments\nof man, especially in his character of a moral and religious being?\nAre they rapid, or do they require long intervals of time for their\nelaboration? Are great changes in our moral or religious ideas of a\nquick or a slow growth? The answer to these questions is of vital\nimportance to the argument, because on the showing of my opponents they\nhave only seventy years at their command during which they can develop\nthe Christ of the Synoptics, and the Christianity of nearly all the\nEpistles, from the religious and moral ideas of the Judaism of the year\n30.\n\nFortunately for us, the universal testimony of history answers\nthese questions with no ambiguous voice. The developments of man,\nwhether moral, social, or religious, are slow. The whole course of\ncivilization, including within that term everything which relates\nto the growth of the mind of man, and which tends to his refinement\nand higher culture, is a very gradual one; and its successive stages\nrequire long intervals of time for their development. Whenever\nunbelievers attempt to account for the growth of human civilization\nfrom a savage state, or to develop a man out of an ape, in the one\ncase they demand tens of thousands and in the other millions of years\nfor its accomplishment. As this point is of great importance to the\nargument, I must adduce distinctive proof of it.\n\nNo truth is more certain than that it is impossible for men, either\nindividually or collectively, to raise themselves except by very\ngradual stages above that moral and spiritual atmosphere in which they\nwere born. We are united by the closest ties of habit and education\nwith the past. We breathe from the dawn of our consciousness the\nvery atmosphere of its thought and feeling. Every succeeding state\nof society is most closely bound to that which preceded it. Every\ngreat change in thought or feeling has been produced by a succession\nof changes leaving no deep gulf between. Individual progress, unless\nexternal influences are brought to bear on the mind, follows the same\nlaw of gradual growth.\n\nEven genius, and what are called the creative powers of the mind,\nare fettered by these conditions. All greatness is relative to and\nbears the impress of the age which produced it. Great men differ from\nothers only in being able to advance a few stages beyond ordinary\nhumanity. But the greatest genius is unable to elevate itself into a\nvery high region of thought or feeling at a single bound, or to sever\nthe links which unite it with the past. The utmost effect which the\ngreatest of men have been able to produce on those by whom they have\nbeen surrounded is to cause their actual developments to advance at a\nsomewhat accelerated ratio.\n\nTo the truth of these general principles all history testifies. When\nwe measure each stage of human growth, we find that it has occupied\nlong intervals of time. So gradual is the process, that considerable\nchanges can only be discovered after the lapse of lengthened periods.\nThe whole history of philosophy, art, morality, and religion testifies\nto this. All philosophic schools of thought have been of gradual\ngrowth. The daub of a savage has never suddenly developed itself into\nthe creations of a Michael Angelo or a Rubens, nor have his rough\nimitations of the human form passed but by a succession of gradual\nstages into the perfection of a Phidias. Poetry, the most creative of\narts, is subject to similar conditions. The ideas with which the poet\nworks are those of the age in which he lives. He paints the phenomena\nand reflects the line of thought, the morality, the religion, the\nintellectual and social conditions of the times which gave him birth.\nWhat he accomplishes is to exhibit them under new combinations. A\nbushman never at a single bound became a Homer or a Shakspeare.\n\nThe history of philosophy bears witness that the universal law of our\nnature is a gradual growth. Each of its developments was closely allied\nto that which preceded it, and directly grew out of it. Each School has\noccupied a considerable time in its development, has grown out of that\nwhich preceded it, and prepared the way for its successor. The interval\nwhich separates the respective stages is small. Each great race of\nmankind has also created a philosophy stamped with its own impress, and\ndirectly related to its peculiar character. A native of Australia has\nnever suddenly elevated himself into a Socrates.\n\nThe same law is no less applicable to religions. We know no instance\nof the direct creation of one. It is true that the origin of many is\nburied in the obscurity of the past. Yet as soon as they emerge into\nthe light of history, it is clear that they are subject to a law of\ngradual growth; and after they have attained their full development, to\na no less remarkable law of gradual decay. All the religions on earth,\nwith the exception of Christianity, bear witness to this rule. What\nhave been called new religions, have been evolved out of previously\nexisting materials, modified and adapted to the growth and decay of\ncivilization. No Fetish worshipper, however lofty his genius, could\nhave evolved the systems of Brahmanism or Buddhism by a single bound of\nhis imagination.\n\nIf the law of the growth of religions is a very gradual one, that\nof our moral ideas is far more so. Improvements in the great moral\nprinciples which regulate the life of man are most painfully slow. All\nthe great races of mankind have presented the same general outlines of\ncharacter, with only slight improvements, from age to age. I quote only\ntwo examples, the modern French and Germans. How strikingly like are\ncertain portions of the character of the former, to the picture of the\nGauls given in the pages of C\u00e6sar; or to the descriptions of the same\nrace inhabiting a distant region which the great apostle has drawn in\nthe Epistle to the Galatians. We may still read the general outline of\nthe character of the German race in the pages of Tacitus. Developments\nthere have been, and the slowness is sadly disappointing to the\nphilanthropist. To be able even to recognize progress, we must survey\nlong intervals of time. The optimist has indeed need of patience;\nand the most enthusiastic may be certain that long ages before any\nconsiderable advance is made, according to the mere laws of natural\ndevelopment, he will be slumbering in the grave.\n\nBut it must not be forgotten that the developments which our opponents\npostulate are always in the way of progressive improvements. Stern\nhistorical fact compels us to assert that developments are frequently\nretrogressive.\n\nNo less gradual is the moral progress of the individual. It is also a\npainful but undeniable fact that retrogressive ones are much more rapid\nthan progressive ones. The moral ideas in the midst of which we are\neducated cling to us with the firmest grasp. The best men exhibit only\na slight advance above the general morality of their age.\n\nI now draw your attention to the fact that the inventive powers of\nthe composer of fiction are limited by the same laws. He too, in the\nstrict sense of that term, is unable to create the new. The materials\nwith which he can work are the idealization of the times in which he\nlives. Whether he be poet or novel writer, he can neither invent a new\nreligion or a new morality. Mythical inventions of every kind embody\nthe state of thought, feeling, and general idealization of the times\nwhich produced them. The entire mass of existing mythology testifies to\nthis fact.\n\nSuch, then, are the instruments and materials with which my opponents\nhave to work in the elaboration of Christianity out of Judaism, and in\nmetamorphosing a human Jesus into a divine Christ. Let us examine the\npossibility of the attempt.\n\nWe must place ourselves in the position of the followers of Jesus on\nthe evening of the crucifixion. His individual influence had gathered\naround Him a number of enthusiastic and credulous followers who mistook\nHim for the Messiah of popular expectation. The crucifixion certainly\ndashed their hopes. But according to the theory of my opponents, in\nthe height of their enthusiasm they determined to believe in Him as\nthe Messiah still. To carry out this resolution, it is obvious that\nnew ground had to be taken. A development of some kind was absolutely\nnecessary. No amount of credulity could mistake a dead body mouldering\nin the grave for the Messiah of Jewish expectation.\n\nIt was absolutely necessary, therefore, if His Messiahship could\nbecome a possibility, that the crucified Jesus should be rescued from\nthe tomb. If a resurrection could not be effected in reality, it was\nindispensable that one should be in imagination. Until His followers\ncould be brought in considerable numbers to believe that this had\nhappened, no developments in the direction of the Gospels were possible.\n\nThe most obvious expedient to have accomplished this would have been\nfor some of the disciples to have done that which, according to one\nof the Evangelists, the Jews accused them of, viz., to have stolen\nthe body, and report that Jesus was risen from the dead. But those\nagainst whom I am reasoning do not venture to accuse them of conscious\nfraud. This assumption all educated unbelievers have long abandoned as\nhopelessly untenable. Such a basis will certainly not bear the weight\nof the Christianity of the New Testament. In place of this, they assume\nthat the credulity, idealism, and enthusiasm of the followers of Jesus\nwas bottomless. With this machinery they think that He can be rescued\nfrom the grave.\n\nTwo theories have been propounded for this purpose. One is that some\nenthusiastic woman--Mary Magdalene, for example--thought that she\nsaw Jesus with the mind's eye, or mistook the gardener for Him, and\nconverted this appearance into a bodily reality. She communicated\nher enthusiasm to the rest. Others may have imagined that they saw\nHim in a similar manner, and committed a similar mistake. The other\ntheory is that He was buried in a swoon, that He managed to creep out\nof His grave, that He partially recovered, and died shortly after in\nretirement. On such a foundation my opponents propose to erect the\nwhole weight of the historic Church, and from such a chimera to develop\nthe portraiture of the divine Christ.\n\nThe second theory I should not have mentioned if it had not been\ndignified by the name of Bunsen. It is obvious that it will not support\nthe weight of the Christian Church. What! a man who died from weakness\nshortly after creeping out of his grave, metamorphised by his followers\ninto a divine Messiah, and seated on the right hand of God! If He lived\nin retirement, and died in Ph\u0153nicia shortly afterwards,--according\nto an assumption for which there is not even the ghost of historical\ntestimony,--His followers had access to Him or they had not. If we\nadopt the former part of the alternative, no amount of credulity could\nhave mistaken Him for a glorious Messiah rescued from the tomb. The\nvery sight of Him must have acted as a complete extinguisher on the\npowers of the imagination. If we adopt the latter, it falls under the\ngeneral head that the belief in the resurrection was merely due to an\nexcited imagination. All the assistance which it renders is to dispose\nof the dead body.\n\nNow, in theory, nothing is easier than to say that an excited woman\nsaw Jesus with her mental eye, mistook it for a bodily reality, and\ncommunicated her enthusiasm to the rest of His followers. But in\npractice, such things are not quite so easy. Although it is no hard\nmatter to persuade the credulous to believe in the appearance of ghosts\nand phantoms, yet I do not know that the whole history of man presents\nus with a single example of a great institution which owes its origin\nto such a belief. But even the credulous believers in such apparitions\nare very difficult to persuade that they have actually seen a man who\nonce had died again restored to life. I doubt whether the entire mass\nof fictitious literature presents us with anything at all analogous\nto the supposed belief of the credulous followers of Jesus in the\nresurrection of their Master. Even persons who have a most imperfect\nknowledge that nature is governed by law, are quite aware that dead\nmen do not revive. The followers of Jesus could have been hardly more\ncredulous than modern spiritualists, yet these latter have not yet\nsucceeded in erecting a great institution on the basis of an actual\nresurrection from the dead, or even on the presence of a spirit in a\ntable. Supposing, therefore, that some fanatic follower of our Lord\nmade the mistake in question, it could really have been no easy matter\nto have communicated this enthusiasm to the rest, damped as their\nspirits were by the crucifixion. Still more difficult would it have\nbeen for any considerable number to have made the mistake of converting\na flight of the imagination into an objective fact. At any rate my\nopponents must concede that to have persuaded any number of men under\nsuch circumstances that the crucified Jesus was actually risen from the\ndead must have required a considerable interval of time.\n\nIt would be much more easy to create a belief in a resurrection after\nthe lapse of a century, than within a few years of the event. When we\nsurvey a past event through the haze of time, it helps to confuse our\nideas as to what is possible. But long intervals of time so convenient\nfor the physical speculator are precisely the things which my opponents\nhave not at their disposal. Seventy years is all which they themselves\nthink it possible to ask for; and as all developments are slow, one or\ntwo entirely exhaust it, and they require a multitude to effect their\npurpose. But not only was it necessary to get some of the enthusiastic\nfollowers of our Lord to believe in His resurrection, but also to\nconstitute a society founded on its basis. Until this was done, all\ndevelopment was impossible. But each step requires a considerable\ninterval of time. But how could the Church be held together while the\nbelief in the resurrection was forming?\n\nBut even supposing that Jesus by the power of the imagination had been\nrescued from the grave, it became a very serious question what to do\nwith Him. No amount of credulity could have brought Him into daily\ncommunication with His followers. If He continued on earth, His not\ndoing so was a very serious affair. The obvious expedient was that He\nshould be taken up into heaven, from which at some future day he should\ncome back again and take possession of his Messianic throne. Such\nis the idea adopted by these schools of thought, and they are never\nwearied with telling us that the chief if not the only article in the\nprimitive belief of the followers of Jesus was His speedy return to\nrealize their expectations of His Messianic glory.\n\nBe it so; for the consequences are very serious to the position of\nthose whose views I am combating. His followers then expected Him to\nreturn as the Jewish Messiah. Now nothing is more certain than as long\nas this expectation lasted there could have been no development in the\ndirection of the Christ of the Gospels. How long, then, did this state\nof stagnation last in the bosom of the Church? When did it occur to\nthe followers of Jesus that the expectation of the speedy return of\ntheir Master was a baseless one, and that they must set themselves to\nwork to develop a different conception of a Christ? It is a fact that\nsuch beliefs do not speedily die out, and that they can survive many\na disappointment. The modern prophetic School affords a striking proof\nof the tenacity of such hopes. They have repeatedly prophesied that the\nAdvent will happen in our times; and notwithstanding the falsification\nof their predictions, I believe that they still cling to this belief.\nAt any rate it has required a long interval of time to undeceive them;\nand as credulity was, according to the views which I am combating,\nthe leading trait of the followers of Jesus, it must have been a\nconsiderable interval of time before they could have been persuaded to\npart company with their darling expectation. But as long as a Jewish\nMessiah satisfied their aspirations, the Church could have developed no\nnew Messianic conceptions.\n\nBut to afford something like a basis for reasoning, I will suppose\nthese obstacles to have been surmounted; that the work of development\nhas commenced, and that the womb of the Church is at last become\npregnant with its future Christ. Fresh and ever-increasing difficulties\npresent themselves for solution.\n\nLet it be observed that, after they have effected the resurrection, all\nwhich has been accomplished was to repair the damage inflicted on the\nChurch by the crucifixion, and to restore to it, as a necessity of its\nexistence, a living instead of a dead Messiah. That Messiah was still\nthe Messiah of Judaism. They have scarcely advanced a stage in the\ncreation of the Gospels, and of the Christ therein delineated,--not to\nsay of the entire moral and spiritual teaching of the New Testament.\n\nLet us observe the steps of the process by which the metamorphose\nmust have been effected. It is, say my opponents, very uncertain\nwhether the historic Jesus ever attempted to perform a miracle. But\naccording to the conceptions of the times, His followers thought that\nthe Messiah ought to have performed them. To supply the defect, they\ninvented a mass of miraculous stories, and in their fond credulity\nthought that Jesus had actually performed them, and thus the delusion\nof His miraculous wonder-working was propagated in the Church. But all\nexperience proves that mythic and legendary miracles are grotesque. Yet\nthose in the Gospels are all sober ones, and stamped with a high moral\ntone. They must therefore have undergone a succession of developments\nbefore they could have assumed their present form. Still a Jewish\nMessiah has yet to be transformed into the Jesus of the Evangelists.\nAfter a while a happy thought occurs to these uninstructed Jews. They\ndetermine to invest the Teacher with whom they had habitually conversed\nwith a character at once divine and human. The mythic faculty is\nagain invoked, and the human Jesus, by the aid of development after\ndevelopment, gradually assumes the aspect of the divine Christ. In\na similar manner they feel that the moral aspect of the Messiah of\ntheir fondest expectations must undergo a change, and in due time the\ntriumphant King becomes the meek and the lowly Jesus, and the morality\nof Pharisaism becomes that of the New Testament.\n\nFew persons are at all aware of the enormous difficulties which would\nhave beset any persons who, whether consciously or unconsciously, set\nthemselves to metamorphise a Jew of the year 30 into the Christ of\nthe Gospels. Familiarity with the character induces numbers to think\nthat poets or fabulists, inventors of myths and legends, might easily\nhave created it. To form a correct estimate of the difficulty, it is\nnecessary to transport ourselves out of the nineteenth century into the\nJewish atmosphere of thought and feeling of the century which preceded\nthe Advent. A starting-point it must have had. There could have been no\nother than it.\n\nLet it be observed that before the elaboration of the Jesus of the\nGospels, those who fabricated the conception were wholly without\na model to guide them. All ancient fact or fable fails to furnish\nanything at all analogous to this great character. Such models as they\nhad would have guided its inventors wrong. The only ones which they\npossessed were the popular Messianic conceptions of the period, and\nthe prevailing Jewish ideas of religion and morality. Besides these,\nthey might have fallen back on the general ideas contained in the Old\nTestament Scriptures and the apocryphal books. The ideal of a Jewish\nhero would certainly not have helped them in forming the conception\nof the Evangelical Jesus. One apocryphal book has been frequently\nreferred to as affording considerable aid--the Book of Enoch. I have\nfully discussed this subject elsewhere,[109] and the conclusion to\nwhich I have arrived is, I think, incontrovertible, that even if we\ngrant that its Messianic portions were composed prior to the Christian\nera (a concession which I am by no means prepared to make), the aid\nwhich it would have afforded the mythologists who invented the Christ\nof the Gospels would have been inconsiderable. To avoid a lengthened\ncontroversy as to its date, I am quite willing that these schools of\nthought should make all the use they can of them.\n\nLet me point out a few of the difficulties which must have beset the\npath of the inventors of the great portraiture of the Gospels.\n\nEvery reader at once recognizes that the character who is there\ndepicted is a superhuman one; or rather, to speak more accurately,\nit is exhibited as uniting the human and the divine. This is a plain\nmatter of fact, and is quite independent of the question whether\nthe Evangelists were right in so representing it. Nor is my argument\nat all affected by any supposed difficulty in defining, in the terms\nof an abstract creed, the precise measure of the divine which they\nhave ascribed to it. All that I contend for is that the Jesus of the\nEvangelists is dramatized as uniting a divine and human consciousness,\nand that it is exhibited with a faultless propriety.\n\nNow the moment the mythologists made a movement in this direction, a\nhundred problems of a most difficult character must have demanded their\nsolution before they could advance a single step. I can only adduce one\nor two examples. How was the human to be represented as acting in union\nwith the divine, and the divine with the human? In what proportions\nwere they to be combined? How was the one to be prevented from\nswallowing up the other? Let it be observed that there was no model to\nguide them. The attempt to exhibit the divine and human in a single\npersonality had never been attempted before.\n\nThe difficulty will be at once seen from a reference to the Old\nTestament. The nearest approach which it exhibits to uniting the human\nand the divine is in the act of prophetic inspiration. But in this the\ntwo factors are invariably distinct. The Old Testament prophet, when\nunder the influence of the prophetical illapse, invariably prefaces\nhis utterances with \"Thus saith the Lord.\" These words are never once\nplaced in the mouth of Jesus throughout the entire Gospels. Instead of\nthem, His most solemn utterances are introduced with the words, \"I say\nunto you.\" The prophet is generally vehemently excited. The Jesus of\nthe Evangelists is invariably calm.\n\nYou must never forget that the position of those against whose theories\nI am reasoning compels them to assume that the contents of the Gospels\nhave been elaborated by the action of a multitude of minds. Be it so.\nIt follows that these problems must have received as many different\nsolutions as there were minds engaged in the attempt. Instead of the\ncharacter which resulted therefrom presenting a unity of aspect, it\nwould have been a mass of hopeless confusion.\n\nMy limits will only allow me to draw your attention to one or two of\nthese difficulties out of the vast multitude. The historical Jesus was\nunquestionably crucified. How was a crucified man to be represented as\ndivine? He died in agony. How was an artist to dramatize the divine\nin suffering? If my hearers are not aware of the difficulties which\nwould have attended the solution of these and kindred questions, I\nadvise them to study the creation of the great Grecian dramatist, the\nPrometheus Vinctus of \u00c6schylus, and compare it with the Jesus of the\nGospels. I am sure that correct taste will pronounce that the creation\nof the fishermen of Galilee utterly transcends that of the genius of\nthe great tragedian.\n\nNothing is more difficult, even in works of fiction, than to combine\nthe attributes of holiness and benevolence as harmoniously acting\nin the same person. In living men they almost invariably jar. They\npossess them imperfectly, and one generally counteracts the action of\nthe other. The difficulty of combining them is greatly increased if\nthe being uniting them is to be represented as both human and divine.\nHoliness and benevolence are in fact opposite sides of character, and\nno more difficult problem can be presented to the imagination than to\nexhibit them as acting harmoniously in the same character. No question\nin theology is more embarrassing than the mode in which they coexist in\nGod.\n\nIt follows that if the contents of the Gospels were due to a multitude\nof minds, they must have exhibited as many aspects of the character\nof a Christ as there were fabulists engaged in its creation. But the\ncharacter of the Jesus of the Gospels, in its combination of holiness\nwith benevolence, presents us with a complete unity. Not only is the\nunity complete, but the perfection of the picture is inimitable. Where\ncan we find, either in fact or fiction, anything like the perfection\nof the holiness and benevolence of the Jesus of the Evangelists? Yet\nwe are asked to believe that it has been a gradual growth created by\nsuccessions of credulous mythologists.\n\nThe moral and religious teaching of the Gospels forms a subject by\nitself of large dimensions, and it is impossible for me within the\nlimits of a lecture to do more than glance at it.[110] It consists of\ntwo perfectly distinct portions: first, the subject of morality and\nreligion as it is exhibited in the person of Jesus Christ; secondly,\nas He taught them for the use of ordinary men. Most unbelievers will\nadmit that the portraiture of Jesus Christ, as it is exhibited in the\nGospels, is one of the most spotless moral beauty, and the greatest\nelevation. I am quite aware that a few exceptions have been made to\nit; but some of them are obviously founded on misapprehension, and\nothers are evidently incorrect. At any rate it cannot be denied that\nthe entire moral aspect of the person of Christ is unique in human\nliterature.\n\nNo less remarkable is His moral teaching for the use of ordinary men.\nIt is pure, elevated, beneficent, grand. It bears the unquestionable\nmarks of having been the elaboration of a single mind. The parts are\nadapted to each other and to the whole.\n\nBut our Lord's moral character, and His moral teaching as they are\nexhibited in the Gospels, consist of a number of detached portions,\nwhich together make up a complicated whole. Their solution involves\nsuch a multiplicity of questions, as to render it difficult to count\nthem. They are questions which the profoundest thinkers have solved in\nthe most varied manner. Yet in the Gospels the mode of their solution\nis a complete unity. They coalesce with an inimitable beauty. Let\nunbelievers cavil as they may, an overwhelming majority of the holiest\nand the best of men have bowed before the character of the Jesus of\nthe Evangelists in humble adoration, and felt that it was immeasurably\nabove them. Numbers of these subjects were inquired into by ancient\nphilosophers with the keenest interest, but they found no adequate\nsolution. My opponents assert that this great character, around which\nthe entire morality of Christianity centres, is not an historical one.\nHow did it then originate? The answer is, that it is founded on the\ntraditional reminiscences of the teaching of a Jewish peasant who died\nin early manhood; and that the numerous parts of which the character\nand His teaching consist were unconsciously elaborated in the course of\nmany years by a multitude of credulous, enthusiastic mythologists.\n\nI must now advance to another stage of my argument. As my opponents\nassert that the development of the Gospels, and of the portraiture of\nthe Christ which they contain, were entirely due to natural causes, it\nis evident that they must have been effected in conformity with the\nlaws which regulate the developments of the human mind. Let us test\nthis principle.\n\nTaking the atmosphere of Jewish thought and feeling as it existed in\nthe year 30 as the starting-point, it is evident to every one at all\nacquainted with the subject, that the interval which separates its\nconceptions from those of the Gospels is far greater than that which\nseparates any two types of human thought. To take a single example.\nThe interval between the free spirit of morality as it is exhibited\nin the New Testament, and the casuistic and ritualistic tendencies of\nmoral thought which ultimately developed themselves into Rabbinism,\nis profound. If, therefore, Christianity grew out of Judaism by a\nsuccession of natural causes, the interval between them must have been\nbridged over by a succession of developments. So, again, with respect\nto Messianic conceptions. A profound interval separates that of Christ\nfrom that of Barchocebas, to which Jewish Messianism was then tending.\nThat of Barchocebas was a natural growth out of the popular Messianic\nconceptions of the year 30, and separated from them by no great\ninterval. But their development occupied no less than a century. But if\nthe Jesus of the Evangelists grew out of the popular idea of the year\n30, it is evident that the succession of developments must have been\nvery numerous, and have required long intervals of time, before it was\npossible to create the portraiture of Christ.\n\nLet me take another example, which those against whom I am reasoning\ncannot refuse to accept. The interval which separates the state\nof religious and moral thought involved in the primitive Mosaic\ninstitutions from that of the year 30 is considerable, though far\nless than that which separates the latter from that contained in the\nGospels. In adducing this example, I use one most favourable to my\nopponents. Christians maintain that this development was accelerated\nby supernatural causes. The proper subject of comparison would have\nbeen one which both sides are agreed to have been effected by causes\npurely natural. I need not however fear making the concession, for it\nwill more than bear the weight of my argument. We will suppose that\nthe entire history of Judaism, as those with whom I am reasoning say,\ncontained in it nothing supernatural. I ask you therefore to observe\nthat the development in question was completed only after an interval\nof more than a thousand years from its commencement. Yet we are invited\nto believe that the Christianity of the Synoptics, and of the larger\nportion of the Epistles, was evolved in a period of seventy years, and\nthe Christian Church erected on them, as its foundation, and that of\nthe fourth Gospel in 130 years.\n\nLet us take another mode of measurement of my opponents' own choosing.\nThe Synoptic Gospels, as they say, are separated from that of St.\nJohn by an interval of sixty years. Is it possible to bridge over the\ninterval which separates the Synoptics from the Jewish atmosphere of\nthought and feeling of the year 30, in seventy years, if it required\nsixty years to effect the development in question?\n\nAgainst one convenient assumption I must present a most respectful\nprotest. Whenever it suits their purpose, the human Jesus is\nrepresented as a very great man, who towered high above the ordinary\nconditions of humanity. Again, when it is convenient He is represented\nto have been a very little man, the prey of all the superstitions of\nHis age. I am prepared to reason on either side of this alternative,\nbut not on both. These Schools postulate greatness whenever they want\nto make a prodigious leap in religion and morality; littleness when\nthey want to account for the miraculous element in Christianity. But\nwhile I am ready to assume as the basis of the argument that the\nhuman Jesus was a great man, let it be understood that He could have\nbeen great only in the sense in which all other great men have been\ngreat. Those who deny the possibility of physical miracles must not,\nwhen it suits their purpose, assume the existence of moral ones. His\ngreatness must have been limited by the conditions imposed on it by\nthe environment of a Jew of the year 30 who was born a peasant, and\nperished at thirty-five years of age.\n\nObserve again, the miracles of the Gospels have to be invented somehow.\nI am ready to concede that miraculous stories of a certain type have\nbeen invented in rich abundance. But the whole class of fictitious\nmiracles invented in credulous ages are stamped with a peculiar trait\nfrom which those of the Gospels are free. The one are monstrous,\nundignified, and grotesque. The others are sober, dignified, and I\nthink that my opponents will allow, if miracles are possible, worthy of\nGod. The preservation of the apocryphal Gospels enables us to know what\nsort of miracles the mythic spirit commencing with the next century\nattributed to Jesus Christ. I have examined the subject elsewhere. The\nfollowing passage sums up the result:--\n\n\"The case stands thus: our Gospels present us with the picture of a\nglorious Christ; the mythic Gospels with that of a contemptible one.\nOur Gospels have invested Him with the highest conceivable form of\nmoral greatness; the mythic ones have not ascribed to Him one action\nwhich is elevated. In our Gospels He exhibits a superhuman wisdom; in\nthe mythic ones a nearly equal superhuman absurdity. In our Gospels\nHe is arrayed in all the beauty of holiness; in the mythic ones,\nthis aspect is entirely wanting. In our Gospels, not one stain of\nselfishness defiles His character; in the mythic ones, the Lord Jesus\nis both pettish and malicious. Our Gospels exhibit to us a sublime\nmorality; not a ray of it shines in those of the mythologists. The\nmiracles of the one and the other are contrasted in every point. A\nsimilar opposition of character runs through the whole current of\nthought, feeling, morality, and religion.\"[111]\n\nI ask my opponents to account for this difference, and specially to\nsay why in the second century the mythic spirit began to create a\nridiculous Christ, and in the first it produced a glorious one; and\nthrough how many stages of development the creation passed until it\nculminated in what we read in the Gospels, and the interval of time to\nbe assigned to each.\n\nBut according to the theories I am combating, the Messianic aspects\nof the character of the Jesus of the Evangelists must have passed\nthrough a succession of developments before they could have attained\ntheir present form. Different parties had to invent different aspects\nof it. Next, these had to procure acceptance in the various Churches.\nEach party would cling to its own views. The formation of hostile\nsects in the Church was a certain consequence. If they gradually wore\nthemselves out, all experience of sectarian warfare proves that the\ninterval must have been long. We know as fact that nothing is more\ndifficult than to effect compromises between contending religious\nfactions; and that they are only, if at all, possible after long\nand bitter experience. I ask you to compute for yourselves how many\ndevelopments and compromises must have been required, and the interval\nof time each must have occupied?\n\nFar more difficult and more numerous must have been the developments by\nwhich the moral aspects of the Gospels and of their divine Christ must\nhave been elaborated out of the Judaism of the year 30, and the popular\nconceptions of its Messiah. I shall select for illustration only two\nexamples out of a vast multitude. One of the most marked distinctions\nbetween Gospel and ancient moral teaching is this: the whole aspect of\nancient moral teaching assigned the highest place to the heroic and\npolitical virtues, and a subordinate one to the mild, meek, benevolent,\nand humbler ones. This is precisely reversed in the morality of the\nNew Testament. Again: the aspect of a Jewish saint and hero, as it is\ndepicted in the Old Testament, forms a singular contrast to that which\nthe New Testament has assigned to Jesus Christ. I have proved that\nmoral developments in the direction of improvement are very slow. I\npropose, therefore, the following problem for my opponents to solve.\nThrough how many stages must these have passed before the creation of\nthe Gospels became a possibility, and how many years must they have\noccupied?\n\nBut all the while that the Christian Church was creating a mythology,\nand struggling with developments and contentions and external\nopposition, it is an historical fact that it succeeded in extending\nitself over a wide geographical area. This greatly aggravates the\ndifficulty of developing an improved Christ out of her pregnant womb.\nThe wider the geographical area over which she gradually extended\nherself, the more difficult would have become the interchange of ideas\nnecessary for developments and compromises. It by no means follows that\none little society would immediately swallow the mythic creation of\nanother.\n\nI must observe that this portion of the argument is cumulative, and\nadmits of being pressed to an indefinite extent.\n\nIt now remains for those against whose theories I have been reasoning\nto count the number of these developments, and to assign a reasonable\ninterval for each. If they will do so, they will then find that these\ntheories are hopelessly untenable.\n\nI have hitherto argued, on the chosen position of my opponents, that\nthe Synoptic Gospels were written about the year 100, and the fourth\nabout 160. Such dates are entirely fallacious, and against all\nevidence. But as far as my reasoning is concerned, it matters little\nwhen the Gospels were composed. If I can prove that the portraiture of\nChrist and the general aspect of the Gospels were familiarly known in\nthe Church at a much earlier period, it is not the smallest difference\nfor my argument whether they existed in an oral or a written form. The\nconcession of seventy years for the creation of the Synoptic Gospels,\nand one hundred and thirty for that of St. John, has now to be entirely\nrevoked.\n\nThe most extreme of the School that I am opposing concede that the four\nmost important epistles of St. Paul are unquestionably genuine, and\nwritten by him within less than thirty years after the resurrection.\nThe genuineness of at least four others is conceded by the most eminent\nunbelievers. We have, then, before us genuine historical documents of\nChristianity, composed by its most active missionary at about the same\ndistance of time from the resurrection as that which separates us from\nthe repeal of the Corn Law Act.\n\nNow by the aid of these epistles it is possible to prove by a multitude\nof incidental allusions that all the great features of the portraiture\nof Jesus Christ were fully developed when St. Paul wrote them. Nay,\nwhat is more, the manner in which the allusions are made prove that\nthis portraiture was not a new one, but that it had been long known in\nthe Christian Society. To exhibit this proof would require a lecture of\nequal length to the present. As I have given it already elsewhere,[112]\nand it has not been assailed, I shall assume that my position is\nincontestable.\n\nThe period of time during which the human Jesus must have been\ndeveloped into the divine Christ of the Gospels, if the portraiture\nbe a fictitious creation, must be reduced to one of less than ten\nyears. But whether it be ten, seventy, or one hundred and thirty, it\ncontradicts the laws by which all human developments are regulated. Its\ncreation involves a moral miracle of the most stupendous character.\n\nMy opponents postulate a number of conditions which history and\nphilosophy refuse to concede. They require a long interval of\ntime; history will only grant them a short one. They require that\ndevelopments should be rapid; they are always slow, especially moral\nones. They require the creation of elevated moral sentiment; their\nonly instruments with which to work are credulous mythologists. They\nrequire that developments should be always progressive towards higher\nperfection; history declares that they are frequently retrograde ones.\nThey postulate party spirit, but it produces endless division. They\nrequire compromises, but they must be made by credulous enthusiasts.\nThey require unity of result; they postulate a multitude of agents.\nThey ask for credulity, and are confronted by sobriety. They ask for\nseventy years; historical fact will concede them less than ten. They\ndeny physical miracles, and ask us to believe in moral ones.\n\nSuch is the position of the school of thought against whom I have been\nreasoning. They are called by a sad misnomer rationalistic. I ask, are\nthese theories rational, probable, or possible? Defenders of revelation\nhave no grounds for dreading an appeal to reason. If the Gospels, and\nthe glorious Christ therein delineated, have been evolved in accordance\nwith the various theories against which I have been contending, it\ninvolves a greater miracle than all the miracles of the New Testament\nunited together.[181]\n\n\n\n\n    THE EVIDENTIAL VALUE OF ST. PAUL'S\n    EPISTLES.\n\n    BY THE\n\n    REV. STANLEY LEATHES, M.A.,\n\n    PROFESSOR OF HEBREW, KING'S COLLEGE.\n\n\n\n\nTHE EVIDENTIAL VALUE OF ST. PAUL'S EPISTLES.\n\n\nThe attacks upon that body of traditional belief and received thought\nwhich is conveniently expressed and commonly understood by the term\nChristianity have turned very much of late years upon the authenticity\nof the several books composing the New Testament. Inquiries of this\nnature have commended themselves to an age which we need not shrink\nfrom characterising as critical and discriminating. There is a\nmanifest and a very intelligible pleasure to be derived from reopening\nquestions which many have been accustomed to regard as settled, from\nproving former conclusions erroneous, or showing that considerable\ndoubt still remains where certainty was believed to exist; and in\nthe natural enthusiasm attending investigations of this kind, it is\nby no means a matter of surprise if the actual importance of the\nresults has been somewhat overrated. The inferences following from\nthe conclusions arrived at, have been estimated in proportion to the\nsupposed certainty of the conclusions. If a particular Gospel can be\nshown to be falsely, or at any rate with doubtful truth, ascribed to\nits traditional author, the inference drawn, or at least suggested, is\nthe comparative depreciation, if not worthlessness, of that Gospel. We\nknow not why, but it is frequently assumed that if everything is not in\nexact accordance with the popular belief in any matter, nothing which\nis popularly associated with that belief can reasonably be maintained.\nThe whole edifice will fall, or must even be destroyed, because a stone\nhere or there is faulty, or out of place. Because investigation shows\nthat the foundation does not lie as it was thought to lie, therefore\nthere is no foundation at all. The rashness and precipitancy of any\nsuch inference will be at once apparent to every thoughtful mind.\nBecause the reasons usually assigned are inconclusive, it by no means\nfollows that no reasons can be given. The central questions really\ninvolved, may be altogether unaffected by the technical and subordinate\nquestion, who was actually the writer of some particular book. The\ncritical investigation of authorship may have positively no bearing\nat all on the opinions expressed, or the facts recorded in the book.\nWhether or not this be so in any given instance, it is at any rate\nconceivably possible in the abstract.\n\nIn the case now before us, however, we have to deal with a converse\nposition. There are four Epistles in the New Testament which have been\nadmitted on all hands to be the veritable productions of the Apostle\nPaul. These are the two Epistles to Corinth, the Epistle to the Church\nat Rome, and the Epistle to the Galatians. The writers, if any, who\nhave ventured to call in question the authenticity of these Epistles\nare so few, and so insignificant, as to be unworthy of mention. We may\nsafely pass them by without fear of challenge or dispute. There is\nabsolutely no room for any reasonable doubt that we have in our hands\nin these four letters the true and genuine compositions of Saul of\nTarsus, after he had become a Christian.\n\nIt will be my business, then, on the present occasion, to examine and\nweigh the precise value of this admission of authenticity, which can\nonly be spoken of as universally made. What is the evidence in support\nof Christianity which can be fairly adduced from it? In endeavouring\nto estimate the nature and amount of this evidence, I shall not assume\nthese Epistles to be what we commonly understand by inspired. I shall\nregard them only as the natural human productions of a certain man\nwhose personal history, to a considerable extent, can be discovered\nfrom them. If, on internal or other grounds, there is cause to believe\nthey have any higher authority, that will be another matter. But we\nshall not assume it in dealing with them. Our aim in the first place\nmust simply be to inquire what the acceptance of these four Epistles\nas the work of St. Paul legitimately demands of us; what are the\ninferences fairly deducible from their statements; what insight\nthey give us into the character and motives of the writer, and what\ninformation they convey as to the nature and constitution of the early\nChristian society to which they were addressed.\n\nAnd first, as to their date. We cannot place the death of the Apostle\nPaul later than the year of our Lord 68. It may have been the year\nbefore; but as he is said by Jerome and Eusebius to have suffered\nunder Nero, and Galba succeeded Nero in A.D. 68, it cannot have been\nafterwards. Again, we are safe in saying that, on the supposition of\nthe latter date, these four Epistles had been written ten years before\nthe Apostle Paul died; that is to say, they were all written before\nthe end of A.D. 58. Festus probably succeeded Felix in the year of our\nLord 60. But Paul had been two years a prisoner at C\u00e6sarea, when Festus\ncame into the province;[113] and these letters were written while he\nwas still at liberty. We have, then, in St. Paul's Epistles, by which\nwe mean always and exclusively these particular Epistles, undoubted\ngenuine productions of about five-and-twenty years, or not much more,\nafter the death of Jesus Christ. Making all due allowance for possible\nvariation in the requisite dates, we are warranted in saying that the\ninterval between the Crucifixion and the sending of these letters to\ntheir several destinations, did not exceed by more than two or three\nyears the quarter of a century. It was certainly less than thirty years.\n\nThe best way of appreciating such an interval as this is to take a\ncorresponding period in our own lives. We have most of us a very clear\nrecollection, probably, of events which happened in the year 1844 or\n1845. The war in the Punjaub, and the Irish famine, which happened\nshortly afterwards, in 1846, and the great European events of 1848,\nsome two years later, are fresh and vivid in the memory of every\nperson who has arrived at middle age. To others yet more advanced, an\ninterval of five-and-twenty or thirty years can effect but little in\neffacing events or circumstances which at the time produced a deep and\npowerful impression. They remember them as yesterday. So it must have\nbeen with many who were living at Corinth when the first Epistle to the\nChurch there was written, and who read it on its arrival. But from this\nEpistle we know[114] that more than 250 persons who had seen the risen\nJesus at one time were still alive and able to give their testimony\nto that effect. These persons, therefore, must have had as vivid a\nrecollection of the circumstance referred to, as we ourselves have of\nthe battles on the Sutlej. The Queen's coronation is to us an event\nfarther in the background of the past than the vision of the crucified\nJesus was to the 250 brethren who still survived.\n\nAnd the way in which their experience is mentioned is one which\nis the more striking because it is so casual. St. Paul alludes to\nit incidentally as a thing of which he had often spoken to the\nCorinthians. He could not have done so had this not been the case.\nThey knew perfectly well that he had mentioned it to them. They had\nnot forgotten that it formed a part of his oral communications. He\ncould not have referred to it in this way had it not been so. But so\nneither is it possible that he could have spoken of the fact had the\n250 witnesses been the mere invention of his own brain. Were there no\nshrewd men of common sense in the Church of Corinth who could have\ndetected an imposition so gross as this, if it had been one? Had there\nbeen even a small minority of such men, we should have had no second\nEpistle to the Corinthians, or the second Epistle would surely have\nbeen very different from what it is. We are obliged, in accepting the\nfirst Epistle to Corinth as the veritable work of St. Paul, to conclude\nthat during his stay in that city he had habitually spoken of the fact,\nwhich none could call in question or deny, that there were living at\nthat time more than 250 persons who had a distinct recollection of\nhaving seen Jesus Christ at some period less than six weeks after He\nhad been crucified, _but who never saw Him again_. St. Paul not only\nsaid this, but the whole Corinthian Church knew that what he said was\ntrue, for otherwise he would not in this way have dared to say it.\n\nThere is no occasion now to discuss the question what it was these\npeople saw, because that would carry us far astray. All we need for the\npresent insist upon is the fact that we have contemporary evidence of\nthe very best kind, in the form, namely, of a genuine letter, that a\nlarge number of persons were still alive, say in the year of our Lord\n58, who believed that they had seen a person, not merely as a spectre\nor vision, but as a living and substantial man, whom they knew to have\nbeen crucified and buried but a short time before, and who likewise\nknew that there were many more who could have corroborated their\nevidence on this point if they had not been dead.\n\nWe fully admit, then, that this is a circumstance which is open to\nexplanation in various ways, the true explanation being determinable\nupon other and additional considerations; but what we do maintain is\nthat upon the premises conceded to us by the most rigid criticism, it\nis not possible to set aside the evidence on which it rests, be its\nexplanation what it may.\n\nAnd here it is worth while asking, before we pass on, how we should\nfeel ourselves justified in regarding the testimony of 500 persons now,\nnot more credulous or weak-minded than ourselves, to an event which\nhad passed under the cognisance of their own senses, even though that\nevent were the posthumous appearance of a man who had been put to death\nas a malefactor? Is it not certain that any such supposed appearance\nwould be calculated to make an impression on the beholders which might\nwell last for five-and-twenty or thirty years, and should we not regard\ntheir uniform agreement in the matter as a very remarkable circumstance\nimperatively demanding some solution?\n\nThe first point, then, which the existence of this Epistle establishes,\nis the fact that at the time it was written there were living many\ncompetent eye-witnesses of what was believed by them to have been the\nreanimation of a body which had been dead and buried, and that their\ntestimony was accepted by a very large number of persons who implicitly\nbelieved it. Here, then, we have written evidence to the effect that a\nparticular event was amply testified and very generally believed upon\nthe testimony.\n\nBut, again, the same Epistle shows that this belief was by no means\nunquestioning. The very same chapter proves that there were those at\nCorinth who said there was no resurrection of the dead.[115] They did\nnot believe, that is, in the doctrine that the dead will ultimately\nrise. They held no doubt in common with others that the resurrection\nwas \"past already;\" that the change which had passed upon the Christian\nupon belief in Christ was so radical and so complete, that he might\nliterally, without any violent figure of speech, be said to have risen\nagain from the dead. They acquiesced so fully in the truth expressed\nby St. Paul in the second Epistle, \"If any man be in Christ, he is a\nnew creature,\"[116] that the felt newness of that spiritual creation\nseemed to satisfy all their longings after life, and they relegated\nto the insignificance of a non-essential and a dreamy unreality the\nthought of a resurrection of the body yet to come. The way, then,\nin which the Apostle meets this form of unbelief is in the highest\ndegree noteworthy. He argues from the known to the unknown, from what\nwas believed to what was not believed, from what these early doubters\nimplicitly accepted to that which they sceptically rejected. \"Now, if\nChrist be preached that He rose from the dead, _and ye believe it_, how\nsay some among you that there is no _future_ resurrection of the dead?\nFor if there be no _future_ resurrection of the dead, then is Christ\nnot risen? _but ye know and believe Him to be risen, otherwise ye would\nnot be what ye are_.\"\n\nThis, and nothing else than this, is the drift of the Apostle's\nargument. It shows us plainly, therefore, that there was a\ndiscriminating exercise of reason at work in men's minds at Corinth.\nThe struggle between reason and faith had landed them in a logical\ninconsistency. They rejected the future resurrection on what seemed to\nbe rational grounds, because it appeared to them contrary to reason\nand experience, but they forgot that they had already submitted their\nreason to a belief no less absolute and imperious, which, if logically\nheld, would stultify their scepticism.\n\nAnd there is no setting aside the inference from this argument, that\nthe tendency of the mind which rejected the future resurrection was to\nreject likewise the personal resurrection of the Lord Jesus, and the\ntestimony of the greater part of the 500 brethren yet surviving who\nhad seen Him after He was risen. That is to say, the character of the\nfaith in the one case is enhanced by the scepticism in the other. Just\nas the belief of Thomas after his doubt, accepting for the sake of\nillustration the narrative in St. John,[117] was the stronger and more\nconvincing because he had only adopted it upon conclusive evidence, so\nis the belief of the Corinthians in the resurrection of Jesus of the\ngreater value evidentially, because we know it to have been their habit\nof mind not unquestioningly to believe.\n\nWe arrive, then, at this further position that we may not lightly\nregard the belief of the Corinthian Church in the validity of the\nevidence for Christ's resurrection as the belief of persons who were\ncredulous enough to believe anything. Upon fairly estimating all the\ncircumstances, there is abundant and conclusive proof, which we may\ncall contemporary, that the resurrection of the Lord Jesus was believed\nin as a fact by a vast number of persons who were convinced they had\nreceived that fact upon ample or sufficient testimony.\n\nWe must not forget, also, the nature of the fact that was believed.\nThe resurrection of a dead body is so contrary to all reason and\nexperience, that the difficulties in the way of believing it may be\nestimated as practically equal in all cases. No one can profess to\nbelieve it without being fully conscious of the absurdity of that which\nhe professes to believe. It is a point in which the imagination can\nscarcely hope to take the reason at a disadvantage, or at unawares.\nIn only two ways is deception possible. First, on the supposition\nof the unreality of the previous death; and secondly, that the\nsubsequent appearance was unreal. Now in the first case the notion\nof unreality is precluded, because it was firmly and universally\nbelieved, and not by Christians only, that Christ had died; and there\nis no vestige of any evidence to show that He died in any other way\nthan on the cross. This death was as needful an element in the creed\nof the Corinthian Church as His resurrection, not to say that any\ntrue belief in His resurrection involved the belief in His death.\nIt will not do to explain His supposed resurrection on the ground\nthat His death was unreal. Where would have been the foolishness of\nthe cross, if Christ had not died? To secure the resurrection of\nChrist at the expense of His death would have been simply absurd, for\ntwo reasons: first, because that would have made the resurrection\nafter all no resurrection--an unreality; and secondly, because the\ndeath of Christ alone and by itself was a fact that was implicitly\nbelieved, and without which the faith of the Church cannot be conceived\nor comprehended. We are reduced, therefore, to the necessity of\nexplaining the resurrection of Christ on the alternative supposition\nthat the subsequent appearance was unreal. And here we are met by\nthe transcendent difficulty, that it is antecedently in the highest\ndegree improbable that any sane man should be found to believe that the\nappearance of a person after death, who had been crucified and buried,\ncould be other than imaginary and delusive. And we become, in fact,\nbound to determine whether in the abstract it is more improbable that\nmultitudes of competent persons should believe in what was contradicted\nby universal experience, and especially by their own, or that something\nmay have occurred which, in spite of themselves and their experience,\nhad compelled them to this belief.\n\nFor we must not fail to remember that the two suppositions are\nmutually destructive. If Christ died, then the belief in His\nresurrection can only be explained on the theory that His subsequent\nappearance was unreal. If His subsequent appearance was unreal, then,\nto say the least, it is entirely gratuitous to deny the fact of His\nhaving died, because if He did not truly die, there is no discoverable\nreason why His supposed appearance after death should not have been\nreal. We may choose which explanation we deem preferable. We cannot\nalternately or simultaneously adopt both.\n\nI am not now called upon to prove more than what is clearly proved,\nthat the existence of this one Epistle as the genuine work of St. Paul\naffords abundant evidence that the resurrection of Jesus Christ from\nthe dead was accepted as a fact by large numbers of men, some of whom,\nat least, can only have accepted it on evidence which seemed to them\nsufficient to counteract the adverse testimony of their experience,\ntheir reason, and their senses. And it is almost needless to observe\nthat the belief in the resurrection as here depicted, involved also a\nbelief in the burial[118] of Jesus Christ, in the main and essential\nfeatures of His death,[119] that it was on the third day that He\narose,[120] that His appearances after His resurrection were distinct\nand manifold,[121] and that the Apostle who depicted it had himself\nbeen among the most vehement opponents of this very belief in the\nperson of the Lord, whose resurrection he proclaimed.[122] All this\nis established by the admission of this letter as genuine, and by\nthe admission which cannot be denied, that the writer was giving a\nnatural and plain statement of the truth, and not a fabricated or ideal\nnarrative of fictitious occurrences.\n\nThat is to say, so far the testimony of this Epistle is in conformity\nwith the framework of the Gospel history. If the four Gospels were lost\nto us, the life, and death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ would\nstill remain firmly and distinctly imbedded in the original faith\nof the Corinthian Church. We know from this letter that less than\nthirty years after the death of Christ, there was a very large body\nof men at Corinth who believed implicitly that He had risen from the\ndead, and that they knew that many persons were still alive who were\neye-witnesses of the fact.\n\nI ask you, then, very carefully to observe that this does not prove the\nfact. It only shows us conclusively that less than thirty years after\nthe fact there were many persons who believed in it as such.\n\nAnd let us put a parallel case. Suppose a person coming to London\nin the present day, and declaring that less than thirty years ago\na certain man in a distant country who had been put to death as a\nmalefactor, had risen from the dead the third day, and was still\nalive. What success think you would he meet with? Most assuredly there\nwould not be half-a-dozen people who would believe him. But if, on the\ncontrary, a new society should be formed, consisting exclusively of\npersons professing to believe all this, would not the circumstance be\nso remarkable as to lead us to infer that there must be some adequate\ncause for it? If the persons professing this belief were of all\nstations and classes, and many of them, as is proved by this Epistle,\nmen of intelligence and discernment, should we not be constrained\nto confess that the only reasonable supposition was that there was\nsomething in the evidence which could not be lightly set aside? However\nstrange and mysterious the tale might be, it could not be altogether a\ncunningly devised fable. There must be something at the bottom of it.\nNo effect can exist without an adequate cause. Here is clear evidence\nof a very considerable effect existing. What was the cause of it? The\ncause alleged would doubtless be a sufficient cause, for truth is\nnot only stranger, but mightier than fiction. And it may be fairly\nquestioned whether, under all the circumstances, any other cause can be\ndiscovered which would be sufficient. There is so far, therefore, an\nantecedent probability that the cause alleged was the true cause.\n\nAgain, it is to be observed throughout all these Epistles of St. Paul\nthat the resurrection of Christ was to him not a past influence, but\na present power. If the evidence of the first Epistle to Corinth is\nless than thirty years after the death of Christ, the evidence of the\nsecond carries us back to nearly half that time. The writer speaks of\nhimself as being in Christ more than fourteen years before.[123] This\nbrings us virtually to not more than a dozen or fifteen years from\nthe actual occurrence of the resurrection; and in all probability the\nEpistle to the Galatians carries us back even further still. Critics\nare divided as to the computation of the time mentioned in it. But if\nthe \"fourteen years after\" of chap. ii. are to be added to the \"three\nyears\" after which Paul \"went up to Jerusalem to see Peter,\" then the\nwhole period can be little less than twenty, and the extreme limit\nreferred to scarcely more than ten years after the resurrection.[124]\nAt that time, then, St. Paul himself fully and implicitly believed\nin it. At that time he had made great sacrifices for his belief in\nit. At that time, or shortly after, he had not improbably suffered\nprivation and persecution because of it. But the faith which he held\nthen he is found holding as tenaciously as ever fourteen or twenty\nyears afterwards, holding it, in fact, so tenaciously that he is able\nto bring many others to share it with him. A man must be something more\nthan an enthusiast who for fourteen years could retain a conviction so\nmonstrous as this, if false, and at the end of that time could make\nmore converts than before. Surely this is not the ordinary experience\nof mankind, that it is so easy to get men to believe as a fact,\ncontradicting their own experience, what after all is no fact at all.\nIt is one thing to win converts to our _opinions_ or our _principles_,\nand quite another to gain credence for a _fact_ that it is every one's\ninterest to disprove.\n\nFor at that time what secondary advantage could there be in the\nprofession of a faith which was universally despised, and which exposed\nits more prominent votaries to imminent peril, as the eleventh chapter\nof the second letter to Corinth abundantly shows. It is obvious that at\nfifteen years after the death of Christ many of the 500 brethren who\nwere afterwards dead were still alive, and it is not too much to infer\nthat St. Paul, from the position he held in the Church, was personally\nacquainted with many or most of them. He therefore personally must\nhave had numerous opportunities of amply satisfying himself as to the\ntruth of the fact which he proclaimed so persistently. But still it\nis evident that it possessed for him a power and an influence totally\ndifferent from that of any ordinary occurrence or event. It was not the\nChrist who once rose, but the Christ who was risen that he proclaimed.\nHis first rising from the grave was the work of a distinct moment of\ntime. The influence of which He thereby revealed Himself as the centre\nand source was continuous and inexhaustible. It was this influence\nwhich the Apostle felt in his life. He could tell the Galatians in\nlanguage it would be impossible to counterfeit, \"I am crucified with\nChrist, nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me, and\nthe life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son\nof God, who loved me, and gave Himself for me.\"[125] A declaration\nsuch as this is worth volumes of evidence; it is its own evidence; it\nbubbles up clear and sparkling from the very fountain and well-head of\ntruth. No man could have said it who did not feel it, and no man could\nhave felt it, and not known that what he felt was an intense reality,\ndefying all explanation except on the hypothesis that the central core\nof it was truth, and not falsehood. If an influence thus operating\non the life was derived from the death and resurrection of Jesus\nChrist, there must have been something very unusual in that death, and\nsomething more than a mistake or an illusion in that rising again to\nset such a force in operation. No other man's death would produce the\nsame effect, (who cares for the death of Socrates?) and no other man's\nresurrection, whether alleged or proved, could do so; but if this man's\ndeath and resurrection did produce it, as it plainly did, then the\nresult speaks for itself. The Epistle to the Galatians, though written\nmore than eighteen centuries ago, is a standing witness to it. There\nis no wonder that such an influence was felt then in every part of the\nknown world, and especially in the centres of its life, such as Rome\nand Corinth, because we cannot but feel it now; and a principle so\ninstinct with life cannot but be superior to and independent of the\npower of death. Here is the present power of the resurrection acting\nconcurrently with the mass of cumulative evidence converging in the\npoint when it was an event of actual history, and combining therewith\nto show the truth of it. Nothing can prove more conspicuously the\nstrength of this influence in the personal life of St. Paul than his\ngreat Epistle to the Romans. Everywhere Christ is present with him\nas an energising power, which is vastly more than a mere memory of\nthe past, and is a vital and potent agency still in operation. He did\nindeed die unto sin once, but evermore He liveth unto God.[126] The\ngift of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord, who was\ndeclared to be the Son of God with power according to the spirit of\nholiness by the resurrection from the dead.[127]\n\nBut what is not the least remarkable feature about the Epistle to the\nRomans is the fact that it was written to a Church of which St. Paul\nwas personally ignorant. He had never been at Rome. It is evident,\nhowever, that there were many Christians there. These Christians were\nnot his converts. He says he had had a great desire for many years\nto come unto them.[128] Then there had been Christians at Rome for\nmany years. The many can be scarcely less than ten or a dozen; but\nif so, this brings us again to little more than fifteen years after\nthe death of Christ. We find, however, these Christians professing\nidentically the same belief in the same person and the same facts as\nSt. Paul himself. They also believed in a Jesus Christ who had been\ncrucified, and who had been raised from the dead. How they came to\nbelieve in Him we cannot tell. It is plain they did believe in Him.\nIt is also probable in the highest degree, nay, it is impossible but\nthat many of them from whom they received their faith, had either been\neye-witnesses, or companions of eye-witnesses of the life of Jesus\nChrist. At any rate, it is obvious that the substantial framework of\nbelief was identical with that which was current among the Churches of\nGalatia, and in the Church at Corinth. A man who had been crucified\nand risen again, was the centre of their hope, their affection, their\njoy, their confidence. In Him they all felt they were supernaturally\nunited in a supernatural life; and as their knowledge of Christ was\naltogether independent of St. Paul's preaching, it possesses the\nvalue of independent testimony, and presents an additional amount of\ndifficulty in the face of any attempt to account for the belief in\nChrist's resurrection on the hypothesis of some error or deception.\nHowever unreasonable it was to attempt to account for it in that\nway at Corinth, the difficulty becomes greater when the case of\nRome is added to that of Corinth. Here the personal influence of\nthe enthusiastic Paul is removed, and yet the results produced are\nmanifestly undistinguishable. Their faith had been spoken of throughout\nthe whole world,[129] and it was faith in a crucified and risen\nJesus; a faith which they as Gentiles were not ashamed to profess\nin the Jew Christ Jesus, and to be confirmed in by the Jew Saul of\nTarsus. There is something very remarkable in these results. How many\nnational and personal prejudices must have been overcome; how many\nrooted and inherent animosities must have been eradicated; how much\nstubborn pride must have been bent and mortified; and how many acute\nsensibilities deadened, before results such as these could have been\nobtained. And what was it all for? No earthly advantage had been or was\nlikely to be secured. No hope of visible reward was offered. Simply\nthe loss of self-respect, in having believed what was only a gross\nabsurdity if it was not the truth, was incurred. The knowledge that\nunder any circumstances their temporal condition would have been far\nbetter if they had never heard of Christ Jesus; that the belief in\nHis name could give them neither lands nor houses, but only lay upon\nthem additional hindrances in the way of gratifying their natural\ninclinations, only expose them more and more to the hatred and contempt\nof men. If in this life only they had hope in Christ, they were of\nall men most miserable; there was no one redeeming point, no one\ncompensating advantage. They had believed a lie, and they were all the\nworse for it. These two points at least are clear: that they thought it\nno lie, and that under the circumstances they must have been strangely\nconstituted, if, being a lie, it had the power to sustain them as it\ndid.\n\nFor observe, connected with the faith of Christ there was not even the\ngratification of flattered vanity in the case of these first believers.\nThere is an intelligible pleasure that a man can find nowadays in\nconstituting himself the apostle of unbelief. There is the promise of a\ncertain intellectual glory in the effort to overthrow an ancient faith\nlike that of Christianity. The hope of possible triumph is dazzling.\nThere is a pleasure in seeming to be so much wiser than so many others,\nin having outstripped the accumulated wisdom of ages, in being the\npioneer of intellectual emancipation, the harbinger of light that has\nemerged from every trace of religious darkness, the forerunner of the\ndownfall of superstitious prejudices, the demolition of the last and\noldest of the creeds. There is something to attract the imagination\nin all this, something to foster a self-complacent estimate of self,\ntogether with a kind of malevolent joy in indulging the passion of\ndestructiveness. But what was there to flatter the vanity in the belief\nof a proclamation which was foolishness to the Greeks? What was there\nto exalt the intellect, or to magnify the self, in the doctrine of\nChrist crucified? We do not deny that it was possible for the self to\nenter in and mix even with the doctrine of the cross; but it could only\ndo so as a principle that was fatally antagonistic to it. The two could\nnot co-exist; one must destroy the other. The belief that a crucified\nmalefactor had risen in triumph from the grave, was subversive of\neverything calculated to honour the intellect, or to please the natural\ndesire of man to worship and admire himself. There was no harvest to be\nreaped from belief in the Crucified on this score. We are at a loss to\ndiscover in any one point what secondary motive can, with any show of\nprobability, be attributed to the first believers, as predisposing them\nto their belief, if the motive was not a simple and sincere conviction\nof its truth. And yet if so, the difficulty becomes still greater in\n_assuming_ that what they believed was not the truth, but a flagrant\nlie. For it must ever be remembered that it _is_ an assumption after\nall. It is certainly not less difficult to _prove_ in the face of all\nthe evidence that Christ did not rise, than it is to _prove_ upon that\nevidence that He did. If the result of the whole argument in the one\ncase is a _presumption_, it most assuredly is not less so in the other.\n\nOnce more, it cannot for one moment be asserted that the Epistle to the\nRomans originated in any way the faith which it assumes. It is absurd\nto suppose that an unknown man merely on the credit of his reputation\ncould have substantially modified the belief of a particular Church\nby simply inditing a letter to it. The state of things assumed at\nRome, and the faith depicted in the Epistle to the Romans, are only\nintelligible on the supposition that they are true. It is obvious that\nthe body of the writer's faith was substantially identical with that\nof those to whom he was writing. Both were attached to a particular\nperson whom they believed to be the Son of God, who had been crucified,\ndead, and buried, had risen again, and was then sitting at the right\nhand of God as an intercessor.[130] And more than that, both believed\nthat this person was the giver of a new Spirit which influenced both,\nand animated all believers, and made them all one, and was not only\nthe evidence to them of the actual truth and resurrection of Christ,\nbut was also the pledge that they themselves were accepted in a new\nrelation to God by Christ.[131] This gift of the new Spirit was the\ninvisible bond between them and Christ, between them and one another,\nbetween them and the Macedonian Christians, between them and the\nbrethren of Corinth, between them and St. Paul himself.\n\nNothing the least like this Spirit had been known before in their own\nexperience or in that of the ages past. It was a new phenomenon which\nthey felt, and saw, and acknowledged, and could not deny. Now the\neighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans contains incontrovertible\nproof of the operation of this Spirit. No letters from Paul could have\nmade the Christians at Rome imagine they were influenced by it. We can\nsee for ourselves that it was not less familiar to them than it was to\nhim. No message of his had made it familiar to them. Years before they\nhad known it, although from whom they had received it none can tell,\nbut it is perfectly certain that a condition of belief like that at\nRome could not have been the work of a day. It must have taken time\nto grow. And yet at the same time it is no less clear that it was a\nproduct of the existing generation. There was not one of those to whom\nthe Apostle wrote who had not in his own being the consciousness of a\nprior condition of unbelief. Many of them had probably been defiled\nwith some of the dark catalogue of crimes enumerated in the first\nchapter, but they had been justified by faith, and had found peace with\nGod through our Lord Jesus Christ.[132] They knew this; they were\nconscious of the double experience; they could compare the one with the\nother. The Apostle's letter had not originated these experiences of\ntheir consciousness: it had reflected and expressed them. The notion\nof the Epistle to the Romans being an imaginary letter written under\nimaginary circumstances to imaginary persons, describing imaginary\nincidents and imaginary feelings, is too monstrously preposterous to be\nfor one moment entertained. It has preserved the real and irresistible\nevidence of a vast spiritual influence at work among a large body\nof men which was precisely contemporaneous with one event--their\nbelief, namely, in the resurrection of a man who had been crucified in\nPalestine.\n\nNow it must be admitted that in this alone and by itself, if it was not\ntrue, there is nothing that can be discovered which is adequate to the\nproduction of results so remarkable. When it is asserted that the death\nof Jesus Christ is surpassed in excellence and sublimity by any other\ndeath, the one question that suggests itself is, If this be so, how is\nit that the results which followed that death were not more remarkable\nthan or so remarkable as those which followed the death of Jesus? This\nis a simple fact that no criticism or scepticism can destroy, that the\npreaching of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ in the first\nthirty years afterwards did produce results, as testified by these\nEpistles, which are simply unparalleled in the history of the world.\nIf the death was not a real death, or the resurrection not a true\nresurrection, then the responsibility must rest upon us of discovering\nsome other explanation sufficient to account for effects which are too\npalpable to be ignored, and can assuredly be accounted for on this\nsupposition, but have not yet been adequately accounted for on any\nother.\n\nIt is no part of my present design, and time would fail me, to enlarge\nupon all the points in which the history of the Gospels is confirmed by\nthese Epistles. I am not now concerned to establish the credibility of\nthe Gospels, but only the general credibility of the Gospel history;\nand therefore it may suffice to say that we find St. Paul and the\nRomans believing that Jesus Christ \"was made of the seed of David\naccording to the flesh,\"[133] an admission which, coming from the pupil\nof Gamaliel, who must have had the requisite technical information, is\nvery remarkable; but \"separated as the Son of God with power,\" which\nis at least consistent with our Gospel narrative, that makes Him the\nSon of God, but born of a virgin, and especially characterised during\nHis ministry by miraculous powers; that in each of these Epistles the\ncustom of baptism is expressly mentioned or implied;[134] that if the\norigin of this rite is not directly to be referred to the institution\nof Christ, as recorded in the Gospels, we are altogether ignorant of\nits origin; that the practice of it was clearly universal, which is so\nfar consistent with the belief that it was derived from the express\ncommand of Christ; that in the first Epistle to the Corinthians[135]\nthe writer speaks of Jesus Christ taking bread the same night that\nHe was _betrayed_, and blessing it, and speaks of it in terms almost\nidentical with those of the Gospels, thus showing not only that the\ndeath of Christ, but that the main circumstances of His death were\ncommonly known, and the record of them so far unvarying, and that\nconsequently the supposition of any great or substantial divergence\nis precluded; that the portrait of Jesus which all recognised was, in\nall its principal and important features, identical with that which we\nrecognise now; and that, therefore, as the existence of some Gospels\nis, under the circumstances, a matter of necessity, the question is not\nso much whether _our_ Gospels are true, as whether there are any others\nwhich can be regarded as truer and more trustworthy.\n\nAnd when we bear in mind that at this time the interval of thirty years\nhad not yet elapsed since the death of Christ, we can partly estimate\nthe possibility of dim or uncertain recollection in the case of events\nso clearly defined, and so simple, and so important, by the freshness\nwith which we ourselves remember other events more complicated that\nhave happened within a similar period of time. There is, moreover,\nclear evidence that at the date of these Epistles two practices were\nuniversal in the Church--those, namely, of baptising converts, and\nof commemorating what was called the Lord's Supper. These practices\nmust have had a commencement, and have had an origin. The period of\nthirty years, before which there is no trace of the second, even if\nthe first existed in other forms, is too short a time for their origin\nto have been forgotten, or for the practice of them to have become\nmaterially modified. But the commemoration of the Lord's Supper is\nunmeaning, except in connection with the death of Christ, and St.\nPaul declared, \"As often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup, ye\ndo show the Lord's death till He come;\"[136] and whatever relation\nthere may have been between baptism as practised by the Jews or by\nJohn the Baptist, and Christian baptism, it is certain that baptism\nin the name of Jesus is unintelligible, except on the supposition of\nHis having risen from the dead, or having in some way established His\nclaim to be the Son of God, or the founder of a new society. St. Paul,\nhowever, distinctly says that Christ sent him \"not to baptise, but to\npreach the Gospel,\"[137] as though He had sent others to do both; or\nat any rate, had sent others to baptise. The prevalence, therefore,\nof these significant practices, which is clearly traceable less than\nthirty years after the death of Christ, is well-nigh equivalent to\ncontemporary evidence, both as to their origin and to the reality of\nthe events they signified. If Christ had been a shadow, or a myth, or a\nmere crystallised idea, it is absolutely impossible that we should have\nthe kind of evidence we have as to the universality of these practices.\nWe can account for them on no theory but the express command of Christ,\nwhich must have been substantially identical with that recorded in the\nGospels.\n\nIt is perfectly clear, therefore, that the known writings of St. Paul\ncontain incontrovertible evidence of the whole framework of the life\nof Christ, which was the basis of the Christian faith less than thirty\nyears after His death. They show us the existence of a large and\norganised society, which was held together solely by the attachment of\nits members to His person; and which, but for faith in Him, would have\nhad no existence at all. This society was notorious for the profession\nand the practice of a very high morality, such as had never before been\nseen, and can never be surpassed,--at least, it is such a morality\nthese Epistles inculcate. The occurrence of one or two flagrant\nbreaches of this morality in the Church at Corinth, only serves as a\nfoil to what was, beyond all question, its general standard; but,\nin addition to this, there were other features in it of a wholly\nexceptional and unprecedented character. One of these was what we may\ncall, for want of a better name, its unworldliness. Every one must feel\nthat there is that in the writings of St. Paul which is distasteful\nto the common humanity of the world. It is as if a new sense had been\nsuddenly created, and the writer was bent upon satisfying it. The\nwhole range of sympathies and requirements and tastes is new. It is\nnot a natural thing for men to care about communion with Jesus, or\nprayer to God, or participation in the Holy Spirit, to have hearts\noverflowing with gratitude to the Divine Being for having redeemed\nthem, for adopting them into His family, and making them partakers of\nthe holiness of His own nature. However this is to be accounted for--if\nit can be accounted for--it was not then, and is not now, a condition\nof mind natural to man. Now, take away the expression of these\nfeelings, and the letters of St. Paul come to an end, and the occasion\nfor writing them comes to an end, and the existence of the society for\nwhich they were written comes to an end. But as the letters exist, the\noccasion for writing them must have existed, and the society for which\nthey were written must have existed; and none of these things can have\nexisted without a sufficient and analogous cause. They are inseparably\nconnected with the preaching of Jesus and the belief in His name. Take\naway these two things, and they would not have existed at all. But\ntheir very existence is a proof at the same time that they can only\nhave made their way in opposition to the prevailing tendencies of human\nnature, because they cherished and exhibited a condition of mind which\nis foreign to the natural tastes and inclinations of mankind. There\nis internal evidence, therefore, in the writings of St. Paul that the\nfaith which he preached had only succeeded, wherever it was successful,\nby triumphing over much that was naturally and fatally opposed to it;\nthus showing that we cannot refer to any natural causes the success of\na scheme of religious belief which was itself contrary to nature, and\nis still felt to be contrary to nature.\n\nBut there is another feature, wholly exceptional and unprecedented,\nwhich characterised the new society; the evidence for which is too\ndistinct to be set aside or explained away--the first Epistle to\nCorinth affords conclusive proof of the existence of miraculous gifts\nin the Church there. These gifts were of various kinds; the most\nmysterious of them being the gift of tongues. Whatever this was, it\nis sufficiently clear that it was over-estimated, and that it was\nabused. The possessors of it were puffed up on account of it. They\nwere disposed to prefer it before charity, and the less obtrusive\ngifts of the Spirit. We can only conclude, therefore, that this gift\nwas a reality which was acknowledged and envied by others, but a\nreality likewise which was peculiar to the Church, and which was\nlimited to the area of belief in Christ. Now we must not assume that\nthe possession of this gift was miraculous; all we may insist upon\nis the validity of the evidence that it was real, and of this the\nfourteenth chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians presents\nincontestable proof, and consequently the existence of this gift is\na distinguishing characteristic of the effects which followed the\noriginal profession of the faith of Jesus. Not only was the standard\nof morality raised by it, not only were new dispositions awakened by\nit, and new capacities and tastes created, and new desires and hopes\nimplanted, not only were the original propensities, inclinations, and\nantipathies of nature resisted, thwarted, and overcome; but in addition\nto this, there is a plain evidence of new powers and endowments being\nconferred upon the first believers concurrently with their belief in\nChrist. Now it is obviously impossible that delusion can have operated\nin all these cases; but unless it did, the multiplicity and combination\nof them supply no inconsiderable confirmation of the reality of that\nevent, the belief in which was the very basis of their existence.\nMultitudes believed in the fact that Christ had risen from the dead,\nand the profession of that belief was followed by one or other of these\nresults. A great change was wrought in numerous instances which was\nunprecedented in the experience of the individual, and which could\nfind no counterpart in the experience of the heathen world; and if the\nresults which followed the proclamation of a fact were conspicuously\nso real, is it possible that the fact itself was less so? For there\nis only one alternative--if the cause producing these results was not\na fact--namely, that _belief_ in a particular event which was not a\nfact, produced them. In other words, not only was the faith of the\nearly Church self-originated, but moreover, all the phenomena of its\nexistence were the product of that which itself had no existence.\n\nWe need not fear to admit that a very strong conviction may suffice to\nproduce considerable results, even though the conviction may be based\nupon a falsehood; but we may well question whether all the results here\nmanifested, combined, could have been produced by mere belief in the\nresurrection of a man whose resurrection was not a fact. What was there\nin this belief, supposing it to have been based upon a lie, which could\nhave wrought so powerfully and so generally on the minds of men as it\ndid? Could such a belief have made them morally new, have made them\nwilling to encounter shame and contempt, and endowed them with powers\nwhich rendered them the objects of envy to their fellow-believers?\nIf we think it could, we must still confess that a combination of\ncircumstances like these, taken all together, is so exceptional as to\nbe virtually without a parallel in the history of the world.\n\nThere is, however, another point in the Epistles of St. Paul which\ndeserves our notice when estimating their value as evidence, and that\nis the witness they afford us of his own altered feelings with regard\nto Christ. He speaks, in his letter to the Galatians, of having been\nformerly a devoted Jew, and having persecuted the Church of God and\nlaid it waste.[138] If we had no other evidence than this, it would be\nsufficient. There is no reason to doubt what the Apostle says. He had\nbeen a bitter enemy of Christ. But there is no evidence whatever that\nwhile he was thus hostile to Christ he had ever believed His death\nand His resurrection to have been an unreality. Had he disbelieved in\nthese events as facts, it is more than probable that some trace of such\ndisbelief would have escaped him in his writings. But it is not so.\nThe death of Christ was manifestly a notorious fact which neither he\nnor any one cared to deny. The resurrection of Christ, though perhaps\nreceived more questioningly, was nevertheless put by or explained away\nrather than actually denied. The tradition mentioned at the end of St.\nMatthew's Gospel, as commonly reported among the Jews,[139] is probably\na fair sample of the indolent spirit in which the story of Christ's\nresurrection was met by them, and, perhaps, regarded by Saul of Tarsus.\nIn his own case it was not so much that he disbelieved these things\nas facts, as that he was ignorant of their power. The death of Christ\nwas no more to him than the death of any one else. The resurrection\nof Christ was to him nothing more than an idle Christian tale. He\ndisregarded both rather because of the principles associated with them\nthan because of their intrinsic falsehood. But the time came when it\nwas otherwise. \"It pleased God, who separated him from his mother's\nwomb, and called him by His grace to reveal His Son in him.\"[140] He\nthen found that the man whose death he had known as a fact, though not\nas a power, was intimately connected with himself, that he had a share\nin His death, and had been crucified with Him, and the resurrection,\nwhich had been to him before but as an idle tale, he now found to be\nthe unfailing source of a new spiritual life to him. This was probably\nmore than twenty years before he wrote any one of these Epistles. If we\nplace his escape from Damascus under Aretas in the year of our Lord 39,\nthis will bring his conversion to the year of our Lord 36. Now, I ask\nyou notice this date very carefully. It is as late as we can well fix\nthe conversion of Saul; some have fixed it much earlier. But supposing\nit to have happened as late as A.D. 36, this was but five or at the\nmost six years after the death of Jesus Christ, which happened in A.D.\n30, or, as I believe, in A.D. 31. Now, if the death of Christ was an\nunreality, He would in all probability at that time have been still\nalive, as He would not yet have been forty years old, and His death\nby natural means was not likely to have occurred. But conceive for\none moment the impossible absurdity of the conversion of Saul taking\nplace and the active life of the Christian Church going on for many\nyears while Christ, who was supposed to have died upon the cross, was\nactually living in obscurity in some unknown corner of the world. The\nidea is simply preposterous. The supposition of Christ not having died\nas He was believed to have died is too impossible to be maintained.\n\nIf we have got Christ's death then as a positive historical fact which\nis unquestionable, we have a platform of reality on which to rear\nour superstructure of evidence for the reality of His resurrection.\nIf Christ did not truly rise, there is one very important question\nto be answered which has not been, and which never will be answered,\nnamely--What became of His dead body? The production of that dead body\nby the enemies of Christ would have been absolutely fatal to all the\npreaching and the faith of the Christians; the Christian Church would\nhave been effectually stifled in its very birth. I should not now,\nafter an interval of almost nineteen centuries, be lecturing in St.\nGeorge's Hall on the evidences of Christianity if the dead body of\nChrist had been produced, and yet nothing, surely, would have been\neasier for His enemies to do. If, then, the disciples stole Him away\nfrom the sepulchre while the soldiers slept, and so made away with the\nbody, we must admit that these Epistles of St. Paul, which at least\nare unrivalled in the literature of the world, and which cannot again\nbe produced at will, owe their origin to a deliberate lie; and that\nafter an interval of five-and-twenty years, which might have sufficed\nfor it to have been successfully exposed. And we must confess that\none of the most distinguished and highly educated of the Jews of that\ntime, who himself had been a violent persecutor of the Christians, was\ninduced against his will, and apparently not by Christian influence, to\nconnive at this collusion or become the victim of it, and that in such\na way as to ruin all his worldly prospects, to entail upon him years of\nhardship, and to inspire him, or at least to leave him, after almost a\nquarter of a century, with all the tact, wisdom, and discretion which\nare so conspicuous in his letters to the Churches at Rome and Corinth.\nVerily this supposition is absolutely precluded by the very nature of\nthe case.\n\nThere remains then but one other to be advanced, and that is this.\nThe primitive Christians and St. Paul himself were alike the victims\nof delusion. The testimony of the first disciples was based upon an\nerror. The vision which had arrested Saul on his journey to Damascus,\nand changed the whole current of his life, was nothing more than the\nhallucination of a sunstroke. The preaching in which he passed so\nmany years of his life, and breasted so much resistance, was only an\ninfatuation; the hope, and peace, and joy of which his letters are\nso full, and which had taken permanent possession of him upon belief\nin Christ, were all a lie. He had sacrificed himself for nothing,\nhe had toiled and suffered for nought. He had thrown away his life\nfor a dream. We do not deny that such a position is conceivable; but\nwe do deny that the letters of St. Paul give evidence of it. Had\nthe resurrection of Christ been merely a delusion, the Epistles to\nRome, Corinth, and Galatia are not the kind of fruits we should have\nexpected it to produce after so long an interval; nay, there is room\nfor the gravest possible doubt whether, being a delusion, it could have\nproduced them.\n\nThis, then, is our standing ground. We do not assume that St. Paul\nwas inspired. We do not say that his writings are authoritative or\nbinding upon our faith. We take up no such position. We take only what\nwe find--the genuine letters of an early convert to Christ, which were\ncertainly written less than thirty years after the death of Christ,\nwhich contain internal evidence on the part of their writer to his\nbelief in the central facts they proclaim, at an interval of little\nmore than five years after those facts occurred. We treat these letters\nas the natural productions of any ordinary man. We deduce from them\nonly such evidence as we should deduce from the letters of Cicero, or\nanyone else. We do not affirm that they are in any way supernatural,\nbut we say that they supply conclusive evidence to the very wide-spread\nbelief in centres of life so far removed as Rome, Corinth, and Galatia,\nin a supernatural fact less than thirty years after it occurred. We do\nnot say that this wide-spread belief proves the fact to have occurred;\nbut we do say that if the fact really did occur, it would account\nfor the belief, and we do say that taking all the circumstances into\nconsideration there is at least room for the very gravest possible\ndoubt whether had it not occurred, the phenomena we witness would have\nbeen presented. Given the resurrection, and St. Paul's Epistles are\nexplained; deny the resurrection, and you cannot account for them.\nGiven the resurrection, and St. Paul's own character is the natural\nconsequence of it, St. Paul's conversion its natural product; deny the\nresurrection, and he is the greatest of all inconsistencies, and his\nconversion, _with its effects_, the most inexplicable of all enigmas.\n\nAnd here we might be content to leave the case, confident that we have\nnot overstrained it, and confident in its own intrinsic soundness and\ninherent strength, for the more the character, the history, and the\nwritings of St. Paul are fairly studied, the more disciples they will\nwin to Christ; but it may, perhaps, be expedient to notice briefly one\nor two points in their bearing on this position. It will, of course,\nbe said that no amount of belief in a fact will prove it to have been\na fact, which is obviously true. The resurrection, if a fact, is a\nmiraculous fact, so far removed from the limits of ordinary experience\nand natural law as to be well-nigh sufficient to cover almost any\ncontradiction of the one, or any violation of the other. It is no part\nof my present business to discuss the question to what extent a belief\nin miracles is defensible; that has already been done in a previous\nlecture of this course; but I may make this observation, that, granting\nthe actual occurrence of a miracle like the resurrection, there are\nthose to whom it would be impossible to prove it by any testimony\nwhatever. Nay, there are those who would not believe it on the evidence\nof their own senses, or, at least, who say so. Any demonstration,\ntherefore, of a miracle, even if it could be demonstrated, would be\nclearly useless for them. It would, of course, on this hypothesis,\nfail to reach them. Now, we may concede at once that Christianity is\nwholly unable to offer any such demonstration; nay, we may go further,\nand say that if it could, it would be no nearer to the overcoming of\nsuch opposition. But let it be observed that the existence of such\nopposition by no means proves the evidences of Christianity to be\nunsatisfactory or unsound. The person who declares that he would not\nbelieve a miracle like the resurrection even though he were himself the\nwitness of it, is not likely to believe it on the testimony of a second\nperson, be he never so trustworthy, even if it had actually occurred.\nAnd this is a fact that deserves to be borne in mind, because so far\nfrom showing that the evidences of the great Christian miracle are\ninadequate, it rather shows the absolute impossibility of their being\nadequate to meet successfully the case in point. It rather concedes the\nstrength of those evidences, from mere eagerness to affirm that nothing\ncould make them strong enough.\n\nBut, besides this, it must be remembered that, granting the reality\nof a miracle like the resurrection, it is obvious that, having been\nwitnessed by a limited number of witnesses, it must necessarily\nbe dependent afterwards for its acceptance upon testimony. On the\nsupposition of its actual occurrence, a few only could receive it\nupon ocular demonstration, and the vast majority of mankind, if they\nreceived it, could only do so upon the testimony of others. It is\ntherefore clearly conceivable on the hypothesis that many who rejected\nit might do so in direct contravention of the truth. Indeed, all who\nrejected it must do so.\n\nBecause, then, there are found those who reject the evidence of the\nresurrection of Christ, it by no means follows they have not done so in\ncontravention of the fact. The question really is not whether there\nis still left any possible room for doubt--for that we have seen there\nalways must be--but whether the existing testimony is sufficiently\nunbroken, and sufficiently uniform, and sufficiently valid, to be\nreasonably conclusive. And on this point the known Epistles of St. Paul\nare singularly clear. They witness to the fact of five hundred persons\nhaving seen the risen Jesus at one time, of the universal acceptance of\nbelief in the resurrection, so that neither in the Churches of Rome,\nCorinth, or Galatia, does there seem to have been a single Christian\nwho doubted it. They witness to the fact that St. Paul himself had\nlived in familiar intercourse with Peter, James, and others, who had\nknown the Lord, and that he had originally joined the Christian body at\nthe most six or seven years after the resurrection, when he must have\nhad abundant opportunities of testing the validity of its evidence,\nand when it would have been impossible for him to have given in his\nallegiance to an event so contrary to his experience, except upon\nconclusive proof.\n\nBearing in mind that under any circumstances some must content\nthemselves with belief on testimony, it is difficult to conceive of\nany testimony which could be more convincing or more satisfactory\nthan that of this Apostle; especially seeing that he was at the first\na violent persecutor of the faith he preached; that he must have had\nample means of sifting the evidence on which it rested; and, because,\nliving at the time he did, so near to the death of Christ, that which\nhis testimony loses in the matter of personal eye-witness it more than\ngains, all things considered, in the matter of deliberate conviction\nand devoted lifelong service.\n\nThat is to say, the conversion of the persecutor Saul of Tarsus is\nitself a wondrous evidence of the resurrection of Jesus Christ. The\nletters of the Apostle are the expression of his mature belief; but at\nthe time when that belief was formed he must have had ample means of\nknowing how far he had followed a cunningly devised fable, and how far\nthat which he believed was truth and was no lie.\n\nLastly, it may be said, If the evidence for Christ's resurrection\nwas so satisfactory when it was first proclaimed, why was it not\nuniversally believed? To this we may answer, Why was Paul the Apostle\nat any period of his history Saul the persecutor? or Why were there\nany that believed if there were some who doubted? It is gratuitous to\naffirm that the want of universality on the one side is more remarkable\nthan on the other. We can only say that faith is the great touchstone\nof man's moral nature. To the end of time it will be true that some\nwill believe the things that are spoken, and some believe them\nnot.[141] Why are there now any intelligent and able men who believe\nin Christ's resurrection if it is absolute folly to believe in it?\nThat it is not folly to believe in it we can show to demonstration,\nwhile if, as a matter of fact, it did occur, as for the moment we may\nassume it did, it is obvious that the actual effects are what we see\nthem now to be. There are those who believe, but there are those also\nwho disbelieve. It is from the nature of the case impossible that a\nfact like the resurrection should appeal to man's acceptance like\nany ordinary fact of history, a battle or an earthquake. It cannot\ndo so. If it did, there were no place for the question, \"Why should\nit be thought a thing incredible with you that God should raise the\ndead?\"[142] In accepting the resurrection of Christ, we accept also the\ninference that it was God who raised Him from the dead, and that He did\nso for a special purpose--the purpose, namely, of testifying to His\nlife, His character, His mission, His teaching, and His claims, which\nare inseparable from His teaching. In accepting the resurrection, we\naccept not only a bare fact, but a fact that influences our relation\nto God and our thoughts of God--a fact involving antecedently many\nimportant principles, and resulting in momentous consequences.\n\nBut be it remembered that if the resurrection is established as a fact\nat all, it is established as a fact for all time; no progress of mind,\nno advancement of science, no change of circumstances, no distance of\ntime, no lapse of ages can affect its truth. That which has happened\nonce has happened for ever. The undisputed Epistles of St. Paul furnish\nwhat may be regarded virtually as evidence of a contemporary character\nto the truth of Christ's resurrection. Had it not truly happened, they\ncould not have been written; for the pulse of resurrection life beats\nstrong in every page. Had it not truly happened, those exigencies of\nthe early Church would never have occurred which were the occasion of\ntheir being written, for without the death and resurrection of the\nRedeemer the Church of the redeemed is an impossibility. Had it not\ntruly happened, the Christian Church would have had no existence now,\nand the commentary of eighteen centuries on the advice and judgment of\nGamaliel, when confronted with the first preaching of the resurrection,\nwould have been quite other than it is: \"And now I say unto you,\nRefrain from these men and let them alone; for if this counsel or this\nwork be of men, it will come to nought; but if it be of God, ye cannot\noverthrow it, lest haply ye be found even to fight against God.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n_For further treatment of this subject the reader is referred to the\nBoyle Lectures for 1869--\"The Witness of St. Paul to Christ.\"_\n\n\n\n\n    CHRIST'S TEACHING AND INFLUENCE\n    ON THE WORLD.\n\n    BY THE RIGHT REVEREND\n\n    THE LORD BISHOP OF ELY.\n\n\n\n\nCHRIST'S TEACHING AND INFLUENCE ON THE WORLD.\n\n\nMy subject is a large one, and my time is short; therefore, I will say\nbut very few words of preface. I propose to assume nothing but the\npatent facts of history, admitted even by the most advanced sceptics of\nthe day. Heartily as I myself believe in all the canonical scriptures,\nand in all that they teach us, I do not ask you to admit the truth of\nmiracles, or the inspiration of the Apostles, or the genuineness of\nthe fourth Gospel, or anything which any moderately reasonable man\ncan doubt of. All I would assume is this, that we have in history a\ngeneral outline of the life and teaching of Jesus Christ, that that\noutline corresponds with what we read in the three Synoptical Gospels.\nThere is really no discordant account or contradictory tradition either\namong the early Christians or the early heretics, or the contemporary\nheathens. It is everywhere one and the same. It may be more filled\nup, more coloured, more draped in one picture than another; but the\nfeatures and the lineaments belong unmistakably to one Man. In all the\nbiographies, all the letters, all the traditions, and they are many and\nmost unusually numerous and diversified though not diverse, there is in\nreality nothing like the discrepancy which we observe in the character\nof Socrates as portrayed by his disciple Xenophon, and the character of\nthe same Socrates as drawn by his other and more famous disciple Plato.\nThe account in the first three Gospels is uncontradicted by that in\nthe fourth, by what we read in the Acts, by the letters of the early\ndisciples, by the traditions carefully gathered up by men like Papias,\nsome seventy years after the events, by the general belief of after\nages, or by the few notices to be found in the writings of enemies and\nunbelievers.\n\nI shall ask, then, that you admit the general truth of the history of\nJesus as handed down to us by St. Matthew, St. Mark, and St. Luke, just\nas you would generally admit the evidence of common men, even if some\nchoose to think that they were credulous men.\n\nI. Let us first look at the character of Christ as so depicted. I\nventure to say, in the first place, that it exhibits the most perfect\npicture of sublime simplicity ever drawn. The Gospels seem very much\nlike notes taken from memory by men who were anxious not to lose\nsome record of One whom they had known and loved. It is impossible\nto imagine anything more simple or more simply graphic than their\nstyle--it is still more impossible to imagine anything more removed\nfrom the vulgarity of rhetoric or display or effort at effect, than\nthe character of Jesus Christ. People have spoken as though He had\nbeen merely a first-rate political reformer, a demagogue belonging to\na type of unusual disinterestedness. Surely His retired, unseen youth,\nHis gentle, quiet manhood, His calm, dignified, unimpassioned words\nare the very opposite in tone and character to those of the noblest\ndemagogue or the purest political leader that was ever heard of. \"He\nwent about doing good,\" seems almost to record His history. \"He was\nmeek and lowly of heart,\" seems almost to sum up His character. The\nmost untiring energy, the most patient endurance, the most tender and\naffectionate benevolence strike us in every act and every word of\nChrist. And yet there was nothing feeble, nothing effeminate, nothing\nsentimental about Him. Simple as the gentlest child, He was brave as\nthe hardest warrior. Weeping with the tenderness of a woman for the sad\nand the suffering, He rebuked with inflexible sternness the base, the\ncruel, and the hypocritical. With the most unsullied purity of thought\nand life, He had yet a heart of such large and gentle sympathy that the\nvery outcasts of mankind could come to Him for help and counsel, and\nHe never rejected them. He did not shrink from touching the leper, and\nthe leprous sinner went away from Him a new man, with a new heart and\na new life. But the covetous, the proud, the treacherous, the actor in\nreligion, were rebuked by Him in words which have made a new language\nin Christendom; Scribes, Pharisees, hypocrites, sounding to us no\nlonger as writers of the law, members of a religious body in Palestine,\nand actors in dramatic performances, but as synonyms for all that is\nuntrue in religion and in life. And there is one thing which signally\nseparates Him as a teacher from all other teachers of religion and\nmorality, viz., that the great lesson was Himself. I must speak further\nof this presently. What I mean here is, that the biographies, though\nthey give many of His discourses, set before us most of all, not what\nHe said, but what He did; and His actions are to us, and have been in\nall time, the most impressive lessons ever given to man. Probably all\nmen--even those who do not believe in Him--would confess, that if they\ncould see anyone living just the life which is related to have been the\nlife of Jesus, the man so living would be perfect in all parts, the\nvery ideal of humble-hearted, active-spirited, pure-minded, high-souled\nhumanity. He taught Himself, by simply living Himself; and His life is\nthe great lesson to every age of man.\n\nAnd the originality of His character is almost as observable as its\nexcellence. He was not simply the Great Teacher, like the philosophers\nof old, to whom crowds of disciples were gathered to listen. He was\nnot the contemplative thinker, living retired from human society. He\nwas no ascetic, frowning coldly on the innocent happiness of man. On\nthe other hand, with all His marvellous activity, there is not the\nsmallest appearance of restlessness, excitement, impetuosity. He was,\nif He be rightly described by His biographers, what no other man ever\nwas--perfectly unselfish, living, acting, thinking, speaking, always\nwith reference either to the service of God or the good of man.\n\nOf course, as I do not assume the truth of miracles, I am unable to\nask you to give unlimited credence to all that His followers have\nrecorded concerning Him. But this is evidently the impression that He\nleft upon their minds, viz., that He possessed amazing power, but that\nit was united with infinite condescension, and that it was constantly\nengaged in doing good, and never exerting itself to do mischief. They\nbelieved that He had power to do all things, but that he restrained\nit from doing evil even to His greatest enemies; that He never used\nit to gratify Himself, nor to save Himself from trouble, or even from\nsuffering; that it was always exercised for the benefit of others;\nthat in fact the _Self_ which was unspeakably grand was incessantly\nrestrained and denied.\n\nII. Now let us turn for a few moments to His teaching. It was as\nremarkable as Himself. Other moral philosophers, or teachers of the art\nof living, argued with their followers, setting forth moral systems\nor propounding theological theories. He used no arguments, propounded\nno theories, weaved no elaborate systems. All He said was with an\nauthority which astonished His hearers, and all the more, because of\nthe humility of His life and the self-denial of His character. His\nwhole system of casuistry would be contained in four or five pages of\ncommon printing; and though much of it was new, and all of it of the\nseverest stringency, it yet commended itself at once to the consciences\nof them that heard Him; it has commended itself in the main to the\nconsciences of all subsequent ages, and in principle at least it yet\nrules the morality of all Christendom, and in great measure even the\nmorality of the followers of Mohammed.[143]\n\nIt is easy to sketch out a few of the great principles which He thus\nset forth. At the root of all lay truth. The Easterns, among whom He\ntaught, have always been accounted as too ready to practise deceit.\nThere was nothing Jesus Christ condemned so much as dishonesty or\nhypocrisy--the very word hypocrisy, as I have said already, and all our\ninstinctive hatred and contempt of it, being due to His denunciations\nof it to His disciples. Closely connected with this was the stress\nwhich He laid on purity of thought. To impose a weight and put a strain\non outward conduct was all too little: it would very likely lead to\nsuperficial character, to the dreaded and denounced hypocrisy. From the\nheart come evil thoughts, and evil words, and evil actions. And the axe\nmust be laid to the root of the tree. Make the tree good, and its fruit\nwill be good. To give way to the desire of evil is to do evil.\n\nAgain: there was plenty of partial goodness. The heathens and even the\nJews had learned an ardent patriotism, but it was linked, as to its\n_alter ego_, with a burning hatred of their country's enemies, never\nstronger in Palestine than when Jesus taught there. And this principle\nof love to country and hostility to aliens came home, too, into private\nlife. It was an axiom that men should \"love their neighbours and hate\ntheir enemies.\" Never before were those words clearly uttered upon\nearth, \"I say unto you, love your enemies.\" Imperfectly, miserably ill\nindeed, as they have been acted on, they have revolutionized human\nthought. It was not only \"Spare your enemies,\" not only \"Forgive your\nenemies,\" but \"Love your enemies.\" Like everything that He taught,\nit was to have its seat deep down in the heart. It was essential to\nevery Christian that he should from his _heart_ forgive everyone his\nbrother their trespasses. It has been objected to His teaching that it\nundermined the principle of heroic virtue, absorbing active patriotism\nin a dreamy philanthropy. But the objection is false. His teaching was\nat the farthest possible distance from dreaminess or sickliness. The\nbenevolence He taught was, like His own, active and energetic, busying\nitself, as everything practical must, first on those most easily and\nmost naturally within its reach, but then extending to every created\nbeing, made by the same God, and loved by the common Father. There did,\nindeed, arise a new kind of patriotism, to which I may, perhaps, allude\nhereafter; but can anyone read our Lord's lamentations over Jerusalem,\nor St. Paul's utterances of his heart's desire for Israel, his almost\nwish that he himself might be lost if he could save them, and yet\nmaintain that patriotism in its truest essence was quenched either in\nthe heart of Jesus or in the feelings of His most devoted followers?\n\nBut whatever else may have been peculiar and exceptional in the\nteaching of Christ, that which chiefly distinguishes Him from all\nother teachers is this. Moral philosophers like Socrates, ever kept\nthemselves in the background. It was philosophy that was everything,\nSocrates was but the humble tyro, feebly feeling after truth. Prophets\nof every religion,--Moses, Zoroaster, Mohammed, all spoke the word\nwhich God put into their mouths. He was all; and they were at the best\nHis honoured subjects and servants. But Jesus Christ, the meek, the\ngentle, the humble, the unselfish, the self-denied, the self-devoted,\nnot only showed Himself as the Pattern of life, but even propounded\nHimself as the Object of faith, hope, love, obedience, loyalty,\ndevotion, adoration, worship. It is impossible to deny this without\nrending to pieces every Christian record. It is argued, I know, that\nthis was no part of Christ's original teaching, that it grew up after\nHis death among His devoted followers, who looked back upon Him as a\nloved and lost friend and teacher, and who by degrees invested Him\nwith Divine attributes and paid Him Divine honours; and especially it\nis thought that the writings of St. John, or rather writings in the\nsecond century falsely ascribed to St. John, and the later epistles\nattributed to St. Paul, fostered this exaggerated belief. I may well\nleave the genuineness of these later writings to those who have so ably\nand so amply dealt with them before me. All I wish to say now is, that\nif St. John's Gospel and St. Paul's Epistles had never come down to us,\nwe should still be just where we are. This special teaching of Christ\nby Himself is fully developed in every portion of the three synoptical\nGospels. They are interpenetrated by it from end to end. If it never\ncame from Christ, the writers of those Gospels have misconceived Him\naltogether, and their record is mere fiction and falsehood. And so it\nis of every document which we possess--history, letters, traditions,\nanecdotes, apocalypses--they all turn the same way, they all speak the\nsame tongue. Nay; I have often thought that if we had only the three\nsynoptical Gospels left, though we should suffer terribly indeed by\nlosing the deep theology of St. John the Divine, we should still have\nthe clearest possible statements--though of the character sometimes\ncalled undesigned, or more properly indirect and incidental--as to the\nGodhead, Kingship, Priesthood of Christ; and that we should have none,\nor at most but one or two of those passages which have been thought by\nmany to be inconsistent with the highest belief in our Lord's supreme,\nco-equal, co-eternal Deity. It is in fact in St. John and in St. Paul\nthat we find the most developed form of the New Testament theology,\nbut on that very account the appearance, for appearance it is only, of\ninconsistency and difficulty.[144]\n\nLet us briefly recall our Lord's words in the first three Gospels.\nConstantly He calls Himself _the Son of Man_, meaning--(can we\ndoubt?)--one who had no ordinary interest in mankind, in manhood, in\nall humanity; constantly He confesses Himself, and is confessed to be,\nthe Son of God; constantly He claims to be King: He demands absolute\nobedience, boundless love (\"he that loveth father or mother more than\nHim is not worthy of Him\"); He forgives sins; He has authority over\nthe Sabbath; He baptizes with the Holy Ghost; He promulgates His own\nlaw even where it seems to contradict Moses' law; He is at least\n_represented_ (as I do not assume miracles I must say no more) as\nwith creative power, multiplying bread, restoring sight, calling the\ndead to life, saying to the tempest, \"Peace, be still;\" He proclaims\nHimself the Judge of all the earth, about to sit upon His throne,\nwith all nations, the dead, small and great, gathered before Him,\nand the angels of God waiting to do His pleasure; He pronounces the\nsentence, and it runs in words which indicate that the great act of\nobedience was waiting on Himself in prison, in sickness, in need, and\nin suffering, that the great sin was neglecting Him, Him as represented\nby His servants. There is one other scene which seems to me even more\ntelling than all these. Each of the three Evangelists relate, St.\nJohn alone omits to relate, the institution of the Last Supper. There\ndistinctly--whatever may be held by differing sects as to its meaning\nand its blessing--there distinctly Jesus Christ presents Himself to\nour faith as the Power which sustains all spiritual life; pointing to\nHimself as the great Sacrifice, the anti-typical Paschal Lamb, and then\nprofessing that His Body and Blood can feed and sustain the souls of\nall disciples in all coming time. What is this but, first to proclaim\nHimself the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world; and\nthen to attribute that sustaining, strengthening, life-giving power to\nHimself which can be predicated of nothing short of God?\n\nI therefore fearlessly assert that, if our Christian records be in\nany way better than waste paper, if they be any records of Christ at\nall, we cannot but learn from them that He presented Himself to His\nfollowers, not as Prophet merely, not as Teacher only, but as their\nPriest, their King, their God.\n\nNow, observe, first, the perfect originality of this. No one ever\nprofessed anything like it before. All the heathen fables about gods\ncoming down among men, all their belief or half belief that some men\nwere the offspring of deity, meant nothing like this. Their gods were\nthemselves but deified men or personified powers of nature. It was easy\nto make mythic stories about their bodily appearance, or about their\nearthly loves and their earthly progeny.\n\nOr, to speak of something grander, though perhaps less poetical, the\ngreat pantheistic religions gave ready room for the fancy that there\nwas a spark of deity in every sentient being, and that it might be\nmore and more developed into God. In them, indeed, God is but the\ngeneral principle of life and intelligence which runs throughout all\nthe universe; it is duller in one spot and brighter in another; here it\nmay almost go out in darkness, and there it may burst forth into the\nlight of heaven and of glory. But it is not a person; at the highest\nit is an impersonal power. It may dwell therefore in the Bull Apis,\nit may reside in the Lama of Thibet, it may grow to be the highest\nintelligence in Buddha. In none of them is it really God. It is but\nthe embodiment and the kindling up of a spark of Divine Being, but\nnot a living, thinking, willing maker of the universe and ruler of\nall things. But Jesus Christ, when He was upon earth, lived among the\nonly people on the earth who had a clear conception of one great and\npersonal God, so one and so personal as each separate man is one and\npersonal, man having been made in the express likeness of God. Jesus\nChrist lived among a people who esteemed that one personal God so great\nand so awful that they dared not even speak His name, the name by which\nHe had specially revealed Himself, for they thought that that name,\nif human lips should utter it, would shake heaven and earth. Yet it\nwas this great, only, incommunicable, unutterable Being, whose Son He\ncalled Himself, whose very essence He claimed for His own.\n\nLet it not be said, that He came at a moment when Jewish hopes were all\ncentred on some heavenly Messenger to redeem and restore them, that He\nonly fell into their notions, took advantage of their expectations and\nflattered their prejudices. They expected a Messiah, no doubt, with\nmuch in him that was heavenly (if you will, Divine); they expected Him\nto redeem their nation, to overthrow their enemies, to advance their\nkingdom. But they never thought that their Messiah would claim to be\nthe Supreme JEHOVAH, they never thought that He was to redeem, not\ntheir bodies, but their souls, by dying as a lamb sacrificed upon the\naltar; they never thought that, instead of satisfying their patriotism\nand elevating their nation, He would teach them to subordinate\npatriotism to universal love of man, and that instead of extending the\nearthly kingdom of Israel through the world, He would found a kingdom\nwhich should be wholly moral and spiritual, and which would place\nthe Greek, the Roman and the Samaritan on the same footing with the\nlong-favoured children of Abraham. So far were they from any thoughts\nlike these, that it was because of all this that they crucified their\nChrist.\n\nAnd if all this were original in Jesus, it was as bold as it was\noriginal. The humble, unostentatious, unselfish, Jewish peasant\ndeclares Himself the One Eternal God. If it was assumption only, it\ndeserved the death which was its consequence.\n\nBut just let us consider it for a moment. Was it fanaticism? I have\nalready pointed to the calmness, self-possession, soberness of Christ.\nNo character in history exhibits these qualities so markedly. There\nis not a symptom of restlessness, excitement, intemperance, of any\nkind in one of His discourses. His eloquence--and no one can doubt His\neloquence who has read, \"Consider the lilies of the field,\" who has\nheard \"Come unto Me, all ye that travail and are heavy laden\"--but His\neloquence, though more heart-thrilling than any human eloquence, was\nnever rhetorical, never emotional. It carried conviction because it\nsounded like _truth uttered by love_. In fact, fanaticism or insanity\nare charges that cannot be made against Him on any ground whatever,\nexcept on the ground that He believed what He taught, and that no\nreasonable man could believe it. And if so, I think the charge must be\nabandoned, for Bacon, Locke, Leibnitz, Newton have believed it, and it\nis still believed by the most reasoning minds in Christendom.\n\nImposture is another charge. I have reminded you that the great\nprinciple of Christ's teaching was truth. If there was one point on\nwhich it could with some colour of probability be said that He was an\nenthusiast, it would be in His love of truth, and His scorn for all\nthat was false and hypocritical. It would be strange indeed that such\na teacher should lay the foundation of His teaching in falsehood. And\nbe it remembered, that the supposed falsehood was not to please popular\ntastes, or to take advantage of popular prejudices, but to run counter\nto and offend them all, having apparently no purpose, but the purely\ndisinterested purpose of mending men's manners against their wills,\nand having evidently no earthly end but persecution, suffering, and\ndeath. The fanaticism is the most inexplicable, the imposture the most\nimprobable ever heard or thought of.\n\nIII. And now let us see what the teaching of this so-called fanatic or\nimpostor has done.\n\nI suppose it will be acknowledged that He lived at a time when the\nworld was singularly _in want_. Heathenism had failed to satisfy it.\nThe world had outgrown its infancy, and had tossed away its dolls.\nThe philosophers derided, even the poets could hardly play with,\ntheir old heathen deities. Society was corrupt to its core. The old\nmonarchies had sunk one by one,--Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia,\nMacedonia--oppressed with their own vices. Rome had indeed reached the\nheight of power, but it was power to be vile and so to be miserable.\nAnd there was a groan uttered from universal humanity for something to\nsave it from the utter exhaustion of sensuality hard by suffering, of\nmoral, social, and political degradation. Judea itself, where still God\nwas worshipped, was no exception to the general rule, though it had yet\nhardly fallen to the depth of imperial Rome. And what of philosophy?\nCertainly it could never have had a better trial. The greatest moral\nphilosophers the world ever knew, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, had\ntaught at Athens. The sound of their voices reached Rome, and echoed\nthrough all the civilized world. Without doubt, their teaching was\nvalued, without doubt it was valuable to the thinking few; but the\neffect produced upon the many is too truly described by Ovid, \"Video\nmeliora proboque, Deteriora sequor.\" The salt of society had not been\ndiscovered; for society stank, and was corrupt throughout.\n\nAnd then Jesus Christ set forth a remedy, and it was HIMSELF. It\ncannot be too emphatically said, or too steadily borne in memory, that\nCHRISTIANITY IS CHRIST. So He taught; so His disciples after Him--not a\nlaw--not a theory--not a code of morals--not a system of casuistry--not\neven an elaborate theology--but \"they ceased not to teach and to preach\nJesus Christ.\"\n\n_And this did satisfy human wants._\n\n(1) Moral philosophy never moved more than a few thoughtful minds.\nA strong law, like the law of Moses or the laws of Rome, may put a\ncurb on men's passions and keep them in by bit and bridle, lest they\nfall upon you. But there was something vastly more powerful in the\nteaching of Christ. He propounded Himself to His followers, as the\none great object of their loyalty and love. Now love and loyalty are\nthe very groundsprings of noble and disinterested life. The servant\nof law lives in obedience to law, because to break law is to incur\nits penalties. The moralist trains himself with special reference to\nhimself. The very necessity of his training turns the moral eye inward,\ncreates self-consciousness, and produces, perhaps despondency from\nfailure, perhaps self-confidence from success. The effect of loyalty\nis altogether otherwise. The eye, the heart, the hope, are all turned\noutwards--and in the case of the Christian--not outwards only but\nupwards. The result is, not the calculating morality, which may easily\nmake a man selfish, but the absorbing love of a master, which makes him\nself-devoted. And coincident with the love and loyalty to the Master,\ncame the brotherhood of all who loved and obeyed that Master; a close\ntie of brotherhood towards them, and earnest desire to bring others\ninto that brotherhood, and so an universal charity to mankind. Thus did\nthe Great Teacher provide for the wants of man, considered as a _moral\nbeing_.\n\n(2) Let us see how He provided for His wants as _a spiritual being_. It\nis the witness of all religious antiquity, that, whilst the soul longed\nto look up to, and rest in something above it, it was ever striving to\nbring that which was above it down to a level with itself. It could not\ngrasp infinity, and it was ever trying to make it finite. So it devised\nman-gods and idol-gods. So it degraded God to be no higher than man,\nnay, \"likened its Maker to the grazed ox.\" What Jesus Christ did was to\nbring God down to man, but not to degrade and lower Him by doing so. He\nprofessed not to be a Man-God,--like the Saturn and Jupiter of Latium,\nlike the Lama of Thibet, or like the Buddha of Ceylon and China; but\nthe God-Man, God dwelling in human flesh, and manifesting all the\ncharacter of infinity in the person of the finite. So He satisfied\nthe yearnings of the human soul, without lowering the dignity of the\nDivine Spirit. It is impossible to remember the fables of heathenism\nwithout feeling that Deity is not only lowered, but utterly lost in\nthem. But I appeal to your experience and to your hearts, whether the\nconception of God conveyed to us through Christ is not raised, rather\nthan depressed--raised even above the conception of the High and Lofty\nOne which inhabiteth eternity, as discovered by our reasonings, or as\nrevealed to our faith, in the theism of the philosopher or the writings\nof the Jewish prophets.\n\n(3) Once more, He provided for man's wants _as a social and political\nbeing_. Social polity has ever oscillated between an absolute despotism\nand a pure democracy. There are many who say that the only ideal of\ngood government is either a paternal despotism, or \"liberty, equality,\nand fraternity.\" It is most true that our Lord declined persistently\nto mingle Himself with earthly politics, or to meddle in the affairs\nof earthly kingdoms. But He declared that His mission was to set up in\nthis world a kingdom not of this world. And the principles, the polity\nof that kingdom combined in a marvellous manner the unopposed will\nof the Father-King with the fraternal equality of all the people. As\nKing of the kingdom of God He exacted the most devoted loyalty and the\nmost unswerving obedience; but to the members of the kingdom He said,\n\"All ye are brethren.\" He forbade any to aspire to pre-eminence, or\nauthority, like the kings of the Gentiles; to those who desired to sit\non His right hand and on His left He only promised that they should\ndrink of His cup of suffering, and be baptized with His baptism of\nblood.\n\n(4) Lastly, He provided for man's natural wants _as a sinful being_.\nEvery religion witnesses to the anxiety of the religious mind to throw\noff a weight from the conscience by austerities, or by sacrifices,\nor by gifts. I am aware that I am treading on ground which may lead\nme into controversy, and from this I must guard myself. Still I\nthink every one who reads the Gospels must confess that the Christian\nhistory and the Christian faith culminate in sacrifice. I do not wish\nto reason on it; I readily admit its deep mystery, and the great\ndifficulty of explaining it; I only assert, and I assert without\nfear of contradiction, that Christ set forth Himself, and that His\ndisciples set Him forth to the world as One who suffered for the sins\nof that race which He had made His own; that He first bound them\nclosely to Himself, and then drained off to the dregs that cup which\ntheir sins had prepared for _them_. He came into mankind that He might\ncarry off the curse which sin had cast into the midst of it. And I\nknow, indeed, that there are some, and some for whose scruples and\ndifficulties I feel deep respect, who, acknowledging all the debts due\nto Christianity, for raising, ennobling, and purifying human life and\nhuman thought, yet say that they could accept every portion of it save\nonly its doctrine of atonement and sacrifice. They think it derogatory\nto the mercy and to the love of God, and they doubt if the sins of\nfeeble beings like ourselves can ever be so offensive to His majesty as\nto need such an intervention, or to cost so tremendous a price. I say I\nrespect their scruples, for in some cases I believe they have been the\nscruples of men very pure in life and very loving in heart. But of this\nI am most certain, that there is nothing in Christianity which has so\ncommended it to the acceptance of mankind at large. And certainly its\neffect, if fully exhibited, is very remarkable. Its effect is first to\nenhance our sense of sin, and secondly to enhance our sense of the love\nof God. Wellnigh every other system of forgiveness tends to make light\nof sin. If repentance be easy, sin cannot be so very hard. Wellnigh\nevery other system of religion has created a dread of the Sovereign\nRuler of the Universe, and has seldom, if ever, led to devoted love\nof Him. Strangely enough, too, all past religions had treated sin,\nwhen great, as inexpiable, and gave no room for repentance, even\nthough sought carefully and with tears. But the Christian faith in\nthe atoning love of Christ has deepened, beyond all comparison with\naught besides, our conviction of the darkness and the danger of sin;\nhas yet assured us that repentance for sin is not impossible, but to\nbe attained and then certain to be accepted; and, lastly, has been the\none only convincing evidence that, for all the clouds and darkness in\nwhich nature and natural religion have enveloped the Deity, there is\nyet a loving Heart in heaven, and that we may, with undoubting, filial\nconfidence cast our orphan souls upon the Fatherhood of God. And so it\nis a fact, which nothing can take away, that, with all its admitted\nmystery and deep obscurity, the cross of Christ has been, even more\nthan all else in His marvellous history, that which has won human\nhearts, and which has satisfied human yearnings.\n\nIV. Let us pass to the reception of Christ's teaching in the world.\nThere is not much that is new to be said about this. First, as to the\nmode of its propagation: it was not propagated by force, like the\nreligion of Mohammed; nor was it a political revolution, as Buddhism\nwas a great rising against the caste system of the Brahmins, joined\nwith a modification or so-called reformation of their theological and\nphilosophical theories. Christ forbade His followers to mix themselves\nup in the politics either of the Jews or of the heathens; and, as to\nforce, He told them, in words which all Christian history since has\nverified, that \"they who take the sword shall perish with the sword.\"\nIn fact, the mode of the propagation of the faith of Christ was the\nsimplest conceivable: it was merely a proclaiming of Christ as the\nPrince and the Saviour of the world. Apostles preached the kingdom of\nGod, invited men to come into it, declared that Christ was its King,\nclaimed from His subjects obedience to His sovereignty, and promised\nthem peace in their hearts here and happiness in His home hereafter. It\nis a matter of perfect indifference to my present argument whether you\nacknowledge that this preaching was accompanied with miracles or not.\nIf it was, then _cadit qu\u00e6stio_. Probably no one in this company will\nsay, as the Jews said and as some of the heathens said, that those\nmiracles were due to Satanic agency. If there were miracles therefore,\nthey were of God. But, if you refuse your assent to miracles, then I\nonly say the result was all the more miraculous. If there was nothing\nbut a simple teaching of Christ--if only men narrated the life of the\nJewish carpenter, told of His death, declared him to be their King,\nset up His cross as their hope, and claimed submission to Him as\ntheir God; and if thereupon, in the midst of Jerusalem and Rome, and\nAthens and Corinth, and Ephesus and Philippi, and Smyrna, and Antioch,\nand Alexandria, at a time when art and science, and civilization\nand philosophy were at the greatest height ever known; if then and\nthere, in the space of a single generation, thousands and hundreds of\nthousands, of all ages and all classes, bowed their heads and gave up\ntheir hearts to Christ, I ask what was it that gave such magic power to\nthe so-called \"foolishness of preaching?\" I answer, It was the force of\ntruth; and I ask again, Has any other answer ever been given?\n\nThe progress of Christianity in every stronghold of heathenism soon\nroused the jealousy of the governors of the world. We need not dwell\nupon the cruelties with which its votaries were persecuted. Men\nclothed in garments smeared with pitch, and then lighted up as living\ntorches, to add a horrid lustre to the festivities of the Emperor.\nMen crucified with their heads downwards. Men thrown to wild beasts.\nThe heart sickens at the recital of their sufferings, and still more\nat the ferocity of their torturers. But nothing stopped them. Every\nhuman power was exerted. Every device was tried. But neither skill\nnor force availed. The stream flowed onwards till it became a river;\nthe river spread out till it became a flood. In the short space of\nthree centuries from the death of Jesus, Europe, Asia, and Africa, as\nfar as civilization had reached, owned Him as their sovereign, and\nmarched under His banner. Not a blow had been struck in His favour,\nthough thousands and hundreds of thousands had died rather than disown\nHim. And then the heathen oracles were silent, the heathen altars\nwere deserted, the heathen philosophers were changed to Christians;\nChristian presbyters ministered where heathen priests had sacrificed;\nChristian orators spoke where heathen advocates had pleaded; Christian\njudges decreed justice in the seats of the pr\u00e6tors and the proconsuls;\na Christian Emperor sat upon the throne of the C\u00e6sars. It is so still;\nthe great bulk of the civilized world still retains, and professes to\nbe guided by, laws, customs, and morals, which are really drawn from\nthe teaching of Jesus Christ.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n(1) It is said that the spread of Christianity is at least partly due\nto mere human and common-place causes.[145] It is said for instance,\nthat the civilization of the heathen empire was effete, that society\nwas corrupt, that the very world was wearied with its own wickedness.\nVery true: yet it was in the Augustan age that Christ lived and taught,\nthe very climax of ancient art and letters, and refinement, and\nphilosophy. Very true; but still, that which will be our only refuge\nif we are driven out of our faith, had offered everything that it can\never have to offer. Moral philosophy had done its best. Socrates,\nPlato, Aristotle, Epictetus, Seneca, had done all that could be done\nby reasoning and moral teaching, to win men from vice, and to train\nthem to virtue. And earth, for all that, was wearing the very semblance\nof hell. Men, no doubt, were weary of it, and they listened the more\nreadily to Him who promised to the weary rest. Is it no mark of design\nand wisdom, that the remedy was offered at that very time when it was\nthe most needed, and when the need was the most keenly felt?\n\n(2) It is said, that the world then, in its deep dissatisfied\nrestlessness and inquietude, was turning right and left for\nsatisfaction, and that thus it readily lent an ear to the superstitious\nand the supernatural. It may have been so. It had apparently given up\nall faith; and the unbeliever passes readily into the credulous. But\nI cannot think it reasonable to conclude, that an age of philosophical\nscepticism, of unbridled licentiousness, even though it might combine\nwith these some disposition in favour of the marvellous, would be\nlikely to admit the pretensions of Christianity without careful\ninvestigation; when Christianity bore with it requirements of the most\nrigid morality, offered in exchange for its philosophy simple faith, in\nexchange for its licentiousness the sternest self-denial, and gave it\nno promise in this life, but of contempt and suffering, and very likely\nmartyrdom.\n\n(3) It is said once more, that the unequalled organization of the\nPrimitive Church made it a firm phalanx sure to win its way through the\nranks of the fiercest foes. Very true. The economy of the Primitive\nChurch, with its bishops, priests, deacons, and deaconesses in every\ncity and suburb, with its strict and unbroken unity throughout the\nworld which it had won and was winning, was, no doubt, an organization,\na freemasonry, a secret society if you will, which constituted the best\npossible machinery for preserving and propagating its faith. Is it no\nsign of the superhuman wisdom of its Founder, that He not only taught\nthe great secret of life; but that He devised means whereby that secret\nshould be guarded and handed on to men?\n\nI must here consider for a moment one of the gravest questions which\narises in many minds about the progress of Christianity. Granted that\nits speed was rapid at the first, why has it ever stagnated since? If\nit be the great remedy for human woes, and the great prompter of human\nvirtue and morality, why did not its Divine Author, if Divine He be,\nordain that it should at once find its way everywhere, and should never\nfail anywhere? I am ready to admit the gravity of the question. I doubt\nif there be any greater mystery connected with the faith of Christ. It\nwas objected to that faith by Lord Herbert of Cherbury, perhaps the\nmost eminent of the deists of the last century, and it has tried many a\nbelieving, as well as many a doubting spirit, since. We naturally feel,\nthat a religion meant to save all men ought to be made known to all\nmen. In the few words I can say on it now, I do not pretend to clear\nup all the mystery. I cannot clear up all the mystery of God's actions\nor of God's will. I would only remind you first, that this is at all\nevents but one specimen of the working of that general law, which seems\nto rule in creation, in Providence, and in grace. The analogy between\nthe development of nature and the development of revelation was ably\ntraced in the lecture of one who preceded me some fortnight or three\nweeks back. It certainly seems the principle of the Divine action, that\nall things should rise up into maturity by steady gradual progress and\ngrowth. So the infancy of mankind was left in the glimmer of twilight;\nthen there was a dawning light in the ages of the patriarchs and the\nprophets, till the day broke full upon the world in the coming into it\nof Jesus Christ. By the same kind of gradual working, that day-spring\nfrom on high has extended its brightness first to one land and then\nto another. It is no more marvellous that China and India and Central\nAfrica should not yet have seen it all, than that for thousands of\nyears of man's past history, the whole human race, except at most a\nvery small portion of it, should have known nothing of Christ or even\nof God. There has been an infancy of man, as there has been an infancy\nof the Universe; and we may well believe, that there may have been a\npreparation for Christ's coming, and elsewhere a preparation for the\nknowledge of His coming, corresponding with the preparation through\ncountless ages past for the habitation of man upon the earth.\n\nAnd as to the imperfect reception of Christianity in some places and\ntimes, and its actual retrogression, as from the Mohammedan conquest,\nin others; is it not plain that we have to expect Christianity to\nadvance by moral means and not by mechanical? Christ left a leaven in\nthe world, that it might work and leaven mankind. We are apt to expect\nthat it should work by magic, and not by its own moral influence. Now,\nour Lord never so worked on earth. If He worked in His miracles by a\nmechanical force on nature, He never applied such a force to human\nwills, nor does His Gospel work so now in the world. He called His\nchurch the salt of the earth; but He warned it that the salt might lose\nits savour. He said it was a grain of mustard seed, which should grow\ninto a tree and fill the earth; but He never said that there should\nbe no blights, no frosts, no tempests which might check its growth,\nor nip its leaves or rend off its branches. The apostles themselves\nknew that they had the Gospel treasure in earthen vessels, and when\nthe vessel was injured the treasure could not be safely conveyed by\nit. It is very natural to expect that a potent remedy should produce\nan instantaneous cure. But we are constantly taught by experience that\nmaladies are too deep-seated, or constitutions too sickly, for rapid\nor perfect restoration. We naturally expect every man under the true\ninfluence of Christianity to become perfect: we expect Christianized\nsociety to exhibit no defects. But, in reality, we only find that both\nthe man and the people have a new principle, which gradually raises\nthem, that they become instinct with a new life, which shows itself\nsometimes indeed by vigorous action, but which sometimes, too, becomes\nlanguid and feeble. If we make these allowances, there will be nothing\nto stagger our faith in the slow progress of the Gospel through the\nworld. In the beginning, Christianity was thrown into mortal conflict\nwith heathenism. That heathenism it steadily extirpated, whilst the\nsounder philosophy which had lived in the midst of heathenism it\nadopted for its own. In the midst of this there came too often an\nattempt at compromise. There sprang up a fusion between Christian\nverity and philosophy, and philosophy, too, of the corrupter heathen\ntype, not of the purest or most divine type. Hence the strange forms\nof heresy which meet us in the earlier centuries. After the barbarian\nconquests, Christendom indeed took its fierce captors captive. They\nwho had trod down imperial Rome, bowed lowly before Him whom Roman\ngovernors had crucified and Roman emperors had persecuted. Then came a\nstruggle between barbarism and faith, the faith gradually subduing the\nbarbarism, but the barbarism still clouding the faith. And I think we\ndo not enough remember how through the Middle Ages, on which we often\nlook so contemptuously back, there was ever going on a great mission\nwork of the church and of the Gospel, the fierce barons and the rude\nchurls being as hard to win to the obedience of faith as the heathens\nwith whom the apostles pleaded in the early ages of the faith.\n\nOn the whole there has been a constant progress, greatest certainly at\nfirst, but never seriously slackened, till Mohammed devised a great\nChristian heresy (for a Christian heresy it was, as much as that of\nthe Gnostics, or that of the Manichees before him,) thereby blighting\nthe growth of the Eastern Church for centuries; still, however,\nthere was progress again in the west, among Germans, and Slaves and\nScandinavians; stagnation for a time from the twelfth to the eighteenth\ncentury, as far at least as visible increase was concerned; and now,\nagain, progress, through the over-spreading of new continents by\nChristian colonists, and the bringing in of newly-known heathen tribes\nto the faith of the Church. Unless we insist that the world should\nbe won by miracle, I do not see that we can ask more evidence to the\nwinning power of the teaching of Christ.\n\nV. And now for its effect on those taught by it, and on the world\nat large through them. I have argued that philosophy failed; has\nChristianity succeeded? With the allowances which must be made for\nthe matter on which it has to work, and with the premised condition\nthat it was not intended so to act as a spell that man's will would\nsimply be enslaved by it, his moral responsibility lost, and his state\nof probation done away with; then I assert that it has succeeded\nincomparably beyond anything else that has ever been devised, or ever\nattempted by man.\n\nLet us take great and acknowledged facts. It is confessed that under\nthe influence of Christianity gladiatorial shows, and the throwing\nof prisoners to wild beasts, were given up and done away with. It is\nimpossible to deny that the worst forms of licentiousness, which were\nnot only tolerated in Greece and Rome, but indulged in openly by\ntheir heroes, attributed to their deities, and celebrated in verse by\ntheir poets, have been universally reprobated in Christendom, and dare\nnot now show their heads abroad even in the most corrupted centres of\nmodern society. The respect paid to woman is due before any other cause\nto the honour with which the Great Founder of our faith treated those\nwomen who waited on Him, and to His filial reverence for the mother\nthat bare Him. The laws of marriage which now rule in Europe are not\nheathen, not even Jewish, but pre-eminently Christian. What Christ\nspoke concerning marriage and divorce regulated the principles of the\nChurch, and the first Christian rulers incorporated those principles\ninto the laws of the empire. Our domestic morals have thus been\ngoverned by a few sentences from the lips of one Man. The existence of\nhospitals for the sick and wounded is entirely due to the charity of\nthe early Christian Church. The softening of the horrors of war, and\nthe better treatment of prisoners, are equally the result of Christian\ninfluence. Contrast, for instance, the conduct of the most humane of\nheathen conquerors with the conduct of any great Christian general. No\none among the ancients is more celebrated for his humanity than Titus;\nyet when Titus had taken Jerusalem, he crucified by thousands its\nundoubtedly brave defenders, and the historian tells us that \"there\nlacked crosses for the bodies and room for erecting the crosses.\"\nWhen Gustavus Adolphus took a city, he so guarded the lives of its\ninhabitants, that it is said that no injury passed upon the head of one\nof them. In the war we have just witnessed, the German army marched\ninto Paris, after fierce fights and long sieges, yet the first care\nof the invaders was not to slay or torture, but to feed the famished\ninhabitants of the city they had taken, the conquering army even giving\nup its rations to supply food to their enemies, who might else have\nperished for hunger. And as for the prisoners in modern warfare, the\nwounded and the sick are tended by the surgeons, and nursed in the\nhospitals of those against whom they have been fighting, and against\nwhom it is possible they may yet live to fight.[146] This regard for\nhuman life is justly regarded by philanthropists as the truest test\nof a high civilization; and I confidently ask whether it has ever\ncome but from the influence of Christian teaching and the effect of\nChristian sympathy.\n\nLet us turn to the question of slavery. It is objected by some that\nthere is no direct denunciation of slavery in the Scriptures. I am\nnot now concerned with the Old Testament; but I may yet, in passing,\nsay, that whilst Moses could hardly refuse to recognise slavery as\na prevailing institution, he still gave laws concerning it which\nmitigated its horrors to the utmost, and placed the Jewish slave\nin a condition, moral, social, and spiritual, utterly unlike to\nhis condition in any heathen state. As regards the Gospel, we must\nremember, once more, that Christ was not a political reformer, not\nprofessedly a social reformer, not even primarily a moral reformer. His\nmission was to elevate men's whole spiritual nature; and this He did by\nthe infusion into society of a new religious or spiritual principle.\nIt did not fall in with the purposes of that mission to descend\nto every detail of social life, still less to regulate political\ninstitutions. So, He never denounces war, nor imperial tyranny, nor\neven the political factions of the Jews. It is scarcely a question that\nsudden emancipation of a great slave population is never desirable.\nAnd if the first Christians had preached against a deeply-rooted\nsocial institution, they might easily have produced great political\nconvulsions, and have ultimately rendered less tolerable than ever the\nconditions of those whom they desired to befriend. But the principles\nof Christ's teaching are directly adverse to slavery, and their\nprogress has invariably tended to mitigate, and at length to eradicate\nit. The principle of the brotherhood of all men, of their common\ninterest in God, of their common humanity with Christ; the principle\nthat there was neither Jew nor Greek, neither male nor female, neither\nbond nor free, in the great Christian commonwealth, but that all were\none in Christ--this principle cannot be worked out without destroying\nthe abject servitude of one man to another. And, as a matter of fact,\nthis is what it has done. \"The change brought about was gradual, but\nit was sure. At first monks, especially eastern monks, refused to be\nwaited on by slaves. Then missionaries never lost an opportunity of\nredeeming slaves.... Ecclesiastical legislation declared the slave to\nbe a _man_, and not a _thing_, or _chattel_; laid it down as a rule\nthat his life was his own, and could not be taken without public trial;\nenforced on a master guilty of involuntary murder of his slave penance\nand exclusion from the communion; opened asylums to those who fled\nfrom their master's cruelty; declared the enfranchisement of the serf\na work acceptable to God. The abolition of domestic slavery was one\nof the most important duties incumbent on the missionary energies of\nthe medi\u00e6val Church.\"[149] It is sad, indeed, to think how the plague\nof slavery again broke out on the discovery of the West Indies and of\nAmerica--slavery, too, in one of its most revolting and debasing forms;\nbut it still is true that Christianity and Christian missions have\nstruggled with it from the first, and that now, at length, it seems to\nbe yielding, and there is good hope that it may ere long be utterly\nsubdued.\n\nIn every way Christianity has been the pioneer of civilization, and\nthe giver of social comfort and peace. Very truly, many colonists from\nChristian lands have given to the colonies which they founded not\ncomfort, nor peace, nor civilization; but it has been because they\nhave left Christian lands and not carried their Christianity out along\nwith them. Often, indeed, they have only laid waste heathen lands and\noppressed heathen races; and Christianity following after them, has had\nto undo the evil, which apostate Christians had inflicted. Still we\nmay challenge any one to show a single instance, in which civilization\nin modern times has spread to any place to which Christianity has not\nfirst found its way. We may challenge any one to deny, that, where\nChristianity has been forsaken or neglected, there have sprung up,\ninstead of it, as in revolutionary France, cruelty, licentiousness, and\nsocial degradation.\n\nChristianity, once more, has been favourable at least to the\ndevelopment of mind, the cultivation of letters, the advancement of\nscience. It is easy, of course, to say that there have often been\nefforts among Christians to check the progress of science, still more\nfrequently panic terrors as to its unexpected discoveries. It is easy\nto point to Galileo, easy to speak of the fate of geology in the\nearlier days of the present century, of the reception of Mr. Darwin's\ntheory now. As to Galileo, we may at once disown the Inquisition as\nrepresenting the Christian faith. But it is unnecessary to deny that\nan appearance of antagonism between faith and science, or faith and\nliterary criticism, will alarm timid believers, and so may lead to\ntemporary misunderstandings between Christians and men of science\nor of literature. Yet look at past history and say, first, whether\nscience and philosophy and literature did not for centuries find their\nonly shelter in the Church, even under the deepest shadows of its\ncathedrals and monasteries. When all the world besides was unlettered\nand ignorant, learning flourished among the schoolmen, philosophy\nand even physical science were pursued, as far as they then could be\npursued, by ecclesiastics and divines. The name of Roger Bacon stands\nout conspicuously as one who, in the cell of a convent and under the\ngarb of a friar, carried inquiries into physical truth to a height\nwhich, considering his date and his difficulties, may compare even with\nthe great and rapid discoveries of the present day. In short, it may be\nsaid truly and fearlessly, that whilst the only other religious systems\nin the world, which deserve consideration, Mohammedanism, Brahminism,\nand Buddhism, have either stifled, or at the best stunted science and\nmade stagnant civilization; Christianity has fostered learning of all\nkinds, and has been in itself the highest civilization ever known.\n\nI have naturally dwelt upon the external development of the religious\nlife of Christians, not upon its inner being. A lecture on evidence,\nmust of necessity appeal to that which can be known and read of all\nmen. Yet I might, if there were time, point to the characters of\nindividual Christians as proof of the elevating, ennobling, purifying,\nsanctifying power of the teaching of Christ, of the contemplation of\nChrist, and of the love of Christ. I will content myself with quoting\nwords which many here have read, and read with interest, long ago. The\nauthor of \"Ecce Homo\" writes: \"That Christ's method, when rightly\napplied, is really of mighty force, may be shown by an argument\nwhich the severest censor of Christians will hardly refuse to admit.\nCompare the ancient with the modern world. 'Look on this picture and\non that.' One broad distinction in the characters of men forces itself\ninto prominence. Among all men of the ancient heathen world, there\nwere scarcely one or two to whom we may venture to apply the epithet\n'holy.' In other words, there were not more than one or two, if any,\nwho, besides being virtuous in their actions, were possessed with an\nunaffected enthusiasm of goodness, and besides abstaining from vice,\nregarded even a vicious thought with horror. Probably no one will\ndeny that in Christian countries this higher-toned goodness, which we\ncall holiness, has existed. Few will maintain that it is exceedingly\nrare. Perhaps the truth is, that there has been scarcely a town in any\nChristian country since the time of Christ, where a century has passed\nwithout exhibiting a character of such elevation that his mere presence\nhas shamed the bad and made the good better, and has been felt at times\nlike the presence of God Himself. And if this be so, has Christ failed?\nor can Christianity die?\"[150]\n\nLet us apply this test to one or two of the greatest and best of the\nheathen philosophers. Take Socrates first. Is it possible to imagine\nan apostle of Christ joining, as we know that Socrates joined, in\ndrinking bouts where many were intoxicated, not himself drinking\nwillingly, but when pressed making deeper potations than any one\nbesides, yet never exhibiting symptoms of drunkenness?[151] It cannot\nbe conceived that the unutterable licentiousness of Alcibiades,\nmanifested during one of those drinking bouts, could have been so\nmanifested, I will not say in the presence of St. Paul or St. John, or\nin the presence of any Christian clergyman since them, but even in the\nlowest assembly of English drunkards.\n\nTake Marcus Aurelius: Mr. Lecky, the eloquent and able writer on\n\"European Morals,\" has held him up as an example of what pure\nphilosophy can do, and has challenged comparison between him and the\nmost exalted and sanctified of the followers of Christ. We may well\nacknowledge the nobleness, the disinterestedness, the simplicity,\nand the elevation of his character. No absolute and irresponsible\ngovernor of men has ever been more \"clear in his high office.\" Yet the\nconcessions, which his panegyrist has made concerning him, separate\nhim off by a broad line of demarcation from the highest types of\nChristian holiness. When his wife died, for his children's sake he\nwould not contract a second marriage; but he preferred the society of\na mistress. When he persecuted the Christians, an act which we may\nperhaps attribute to mistaken conscientiousness, he not only persecuted\nthem, but he derided their sufferings. Could we in these days even call\na man Christian who could so err? Professed Christians, no doubt, fall\ninto licentiousness, but then they know they are in act repudiating\ntheir Christianity. Christians, alas! have persecuted those whom they\nregarded as heretics. But we must look fairly at the sad history of\npersecution before we simply say that Roman emperors did no more. In\nthe first place, persecution was not inconsistent with the principles\nof heathenism, nor is it inconsistent with the principles, if such\nthere be, of atheism or of atheistic philosophy; but it is wholly\ninconsistent with the principles taught by Christ, and can only have\nbeen tolerated when those principles had been perverted or obscured.\nIn the next place, Christian persecutors, believing that their own\nform of Christianity was the only faith that could save mankind,\nesteeming therefore those who defiled that faith as more dangerous to\nmankind than any robbers or murderers, thought consistently, though\nerroneously, that they were bound to stamp out heresy as they would\nstamp out pestilence in their cattle sheds, or moral pestilence in\ntheir homes and villages. In the third place, though deeds of violence\nalways harden the hearts of those that do them, it is well known\nthat even inquisitors, so far from ridiculing the sufferings of their\nvictims, often decreed those sufferings with trembling hands and\nbroken accents, and eyes filled with tears. Persecutors are no types\nof Christian excellence; the truest Christianity utterly repudiates\nthem; but even persecutors have generally been so, not from love of\npersecution, but from a deep and painful conviction that persecution\nwas a duty and a necessity.\n\nIt will be replied, and very truly, that for all this, Socrates and\nMarcus Aurelius were grand specimens of humanity, rising to a noble\nheight of moral greatness in an age of cruelty and licentiousness, and\nthat we cannot expect them to have been all that we should expect from\na Christian apostle or from a Christian king. Granted most heartily\nthis. It only proves that Christianity has raised our standard of\nexcellence and has raised the characters of those who embrace and\nfollow it immeasurably above the highest standard and the noblest\ncharacters of the world, which had never heard of Christ.\n\nI must bring my words, my most feeble and imperfect words in this\nhigh argument, to a close. I have tried to show that the life of\nChrist, and the teaching of Christ, as we have them recorded in the\nmost unsuspicious records,--records which could not possibly have\nbeen the gradual concoctions and concretions of subsequent times,\nthe careful afterthoughts of enthusiasts or impostors; that the\nlife and teaching of Christ were original in the highest degree, not\ncalculated to attract from any pandering to prejudice or to passion,\nthat they exhibit the most marvellous ideal of simple grandeur or grand\nsimplicity; that the power which they exercise is from no apparent\neffort--not even from reasoning and argumentation,--but from the\nstrength of truth, and from their satisfaction to human want; that the\npower which they exercised, and yet exercise, is the greatest moral\npower ever tried upon man; that they have raised, and yet do raise,\nmen and nations to a greater height of civilization, humanity, and\npurity, than anything has ever raised them before. And I ask, How can\nwe account for the fact that all this has been done by the teaching of\none unlettered Peasant in the most despised corner of a despised land?\nIs there any phenomenon in moral science, or in physical science, which\ndemands a patient and honest investigation more seriously than this?\n\nThere are those who think the influence of Christianity is on the wane.\nI confess I can see no sign of this; though, without doubt, its enemies\nare many, and the wish is father to the thought. But I will just put\nmy case in one other shape, which will more or less deal with this\nquestion of decay, and then I will end.\n\nIf an assembly of 500 or 1,000 persons could be gathered together,\nin any city of Europe, or European America, it being provided that\nall of them should be intelligent, well-educated, high-principled,\nand well-living men and women; and if the question were put to each\nof them, \"To what influences do you attribute your high character,\nyour moral and social excellence?\" I feel no doubt that nineteen out\nof twenty of them would, on reflection, reply, \"To the influence of\nChristianity on my education, my conscience, and my heart.\" I will\nsuppose a yet further question to be put to them, and it shall be this:\n\"If you were to be assured that the object you hold dearest on earth\nwould be taken from you to-morrow, and if at the same time you could be\nassured with undoubting certainty that Jesus Christ was a myth or an\nimpostor, and His Gospel a fable and a falsehood, whether of the two\nassurances would strike upon your heart with the more chilling and more\nhope-destroying misery?\" And I believe that nine-tenths of the company,\nbeing such as I have stipulated they should be, would answer, \"Take\nfrom me my best earthly treasure, but leave me my hope in the Saviour\nof the world.\" This is the effect produced upon the most civilized\nnations of the world by the teaching of four years, and the agony of a\nfew hours, of One who lived as a peasant, and died as a malefactor and\na slave. \"Whence had this man this wisdom and these mighty works?\"\n\n\n\n\n    THE COMPLETENESS AND ADEQUACY\n\n    OF THE\n\n    EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.\n\n    BY THE\n\n    REV. F. C. COOK, M.A.,\n\n    CANON OF EXETER; PREACHER AT LINCOLN'S INN.\n\n\n\n\nCOMPLETENESS AND ADEQUACY OF THE EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.\n\n\nThe evidences of Christianity form a department of sacred literature of\nvast extent, to which the most valuable contributions have been made in\nages when the faith of the Church was most vehemently assailed, and her\npowers were developed by severe and protracted struggles.\n\nIt was the subject to which the ablest Christian writers of the first\nthree centuries devoted their energies, carrying on in no alien\nspirit the work of the Apostles, meeting assailants at every point,\ndemolishing with comparative ease the fabric of heathen superstition;\nwinning a nobler and more fertile triumph over the intellect of\nGreece. Nor was the work thus well begun wholly intermitted during\nthe ages which intervened between the overthrow of ancient, and the\nfull development of modern, civilization; a civilization which owes\nwhatever it has of life and power to its reception and assimilation\nof Christian principles.[152] But, as might be expected, the work had\nto be begun anew, new difficulties were to be met, new victories were\nto be achieved, when the spiritual and intellectual energies of Europe\nwere set free by the vast upheaval of mind at the Reformation. The\nway was opened by representative men. Grotius, who combined in a most\nremarkable degree the accurate and profound learning and the clear\ndispassionate judgment characteristic of his countrymen, produced the\nfirst complete treatise, \"_De Veritate Christian\u00e6 Religionis_,\" soon\nadopted as the standard work by Protestants, translated into every\nlanguage of Europe, and by our own Pocock into Arabic, for the use of\nthe East. England followed early in the field, and in the last century\nfairly won the place, which she still retains, among the foremost\nchampions of the Cross. Nor did the persecution which arrested the\nprogress of the Reformation in France, then, as ever, unhappy in\nher struggles for light and air, suppress the workings of spiritual\nthought. Of all advocates of the faith, none penetrated more deeply\ninto its foundation, none ascended with a stronger flight or keener\nvision into its highest sphere, none combined more varied gifts of\nintellect and spirit than Pascal, a name bright with the gracious\ngleam of letters, dear to \"science,\" dearest above all to Christian\ntruth.[153] Germany, too, great in every field of intellectual power,\nhas not been unmindful of the duty of maintaining and defending the\ndeposit of truth--a duty specially incumbent upon her as first leader\nin the revolt against usurped authority--not wholly unmindful, though\nas yet she is far from having discharged her debt to Christendom, of\nlate years perplexed and harassed by her reckless abuse of power.\nStill in the past, among other great names, Leibnitz, who represents,\nperhaps more fully than any one man, the peculiar characteristics\nof German intellect, laid the foundations of a system, in which the\ntrue relation between the Christian revelation and God's universe is\nexamined. And at this present hour men sound in the faith, full of\nthe love and light of Christ, are bringing the resources of profound\nlearning and vigorous intellect to bear upon the chaotic turmoil of\nanti-Christian influences. Within this present year several works have\nappeared in which infidelity is confronted, both in the sphere of\ngeneral cultivation, and in the abstrusest fastnesses of philosophy, by\nLuthardt, Steinmeyer, and Delitzsch.[154] One of the greatest works at\npresent incumbent upon the Church of Christ is to bring together into\na compact and systematic body the results of previous investigations,\nwhich from their very extent are inaccessible to the generality of\ninquirers. It is a work for which this society has been formed; it will\nonly be accomplished by the combined efforts of men varying in gifts\nand powers, but animated alike by one spirit of fealty and love to our\nLord.\n\nOn this occasion I propose, with all possible brevity, to show that\nthose evidences of Christianity which are accessible to every careful\ninquirer are complete and adequate; complete inasmuch as they meet\nthe fair requirements of our moral and rational nature, and adequate\nwith reference to their purpose, which is to bring us into contact\nwith the central and fundamental truths of our religion, and with the\nPerson of its Founder. It may be assumed that persons who meet to\nconsider the evidences of revealed religion have previously satisfied\nthemselves of the existence and the personality of God; or at least\nthat they have not accepted the theory, once deemed too irrational to\nneed refutation, that the universe is but an assemblage of forces,\nself-existent, and uncontrolled by a conscious will. That is a question\nantecedent to our present inquiry. It would be useless to discuss the\nproofs of a supernatural intervention with one who held that there\nis no supernatural power to intervene. Materialism under any form,\nand Christianity in any stage, are mutually exclusive. They are not\neven, properly speaking, antagonistic; since antagonism implies a\ncommon field of action, and the recognition of some principle to which\ndisputants can appeal. We can only argue now with those who admit the\npossibility of a revelation, and are therefore willing to examine the\nevidences, and to accept the conclusions to which those evidences may\nlead.\n\nOur first object will be to see what conclusions are fairly drawn from\nthose broad facts which first present themselves in the history of\nChristianity, and which no one thinks of disputing. Put yourselves, if\npossible, in the position of an inquirer to whom the facts might be\nnew, and who had simply to satisfy himself as to their bearings upon\nhis own convictions and upon the state of man.\n\nHere is one fact. At the central point of the world's history, central\nboth in time and in historical import, equidistant from the end of\nwhat men are agreed to call the prehistoric period and our own time,\nthe man Jesus arose, and claimed to be, in a sense altogether apart\nfrom other men, the teacher and the Saviour of the world. He claimed\na direct mission from God,--nay, more, to be, in a sense hereafter to\nbe ascertained, the Son of God. He assumed that the truth which He had\nto teach was new, inasmuch as it was one which man could not discover\nfor himself, but at the same time one to which man's conscience\nwould bear testimony, which could not therefore be rejected without\nsin. As credentials of His mission, He appealed to works which those\nwho accepted Him and those who opposed Him admitted could not be\nwrought without supernatural aid.[155] To one work, as the crowning\nwork of all, He directed His followers to appeal, as one capable of\nbeing attested, and incapable of being explained away, even His own\nresurrection from the dead.\n\nAnd now observe, the fact of this assumption, quite independent of\nthe evidence by which it was supported, stands absolutely alone in\nthe world's history. Consider the existing religions of the world.\nThree are associated with the names of individuals as their founders.\nOf Mahomet we need not speak. His doctrine was avowedly derived from\nJudaism, he claimed no special relationship to God, nor did he profess\nto work miracles; as coming after our Lord, we might have expected\na far nearer resemblance in pretensions advanced by himself, and to\nsome extent at a later period advanced by his followers. Two other\nmen, however, stand before us with characteristics which attract our\nwarmest interest, and enable us to understand the permanent influence\nthey have exerted over the countless myriads of Asia. I know nothing\nin history more touching than the account of Siddartha[156] (called\nSakya Monni, that is, monk of the royal race of the Sakyas), the\nfounder of Bhuddism, whose tender and noble spirit was driven by the\ncontemplation of human misery into desperate struggles to escape from\nthis prison of the universe even at the cost of personal annihilation;\nbut observe this, he did not even profess to support his strange gospel\nof despair by assertions or attestations which would necessarily imply\nthe personality of God, and His sovereignty over the universe. If,\nagain, you consult the four books in which Confucius[157] sets forth\nwith singular simplicity and force the great principles of moral\ntruth, you will find that he never presents them as revelations, as\na message supernaturally imparted or attested, but as evolutions of\nman's inner conscience, as the product of a faculty inherent equally\nin all. Seekers after truth, honest, earnest, and noble seekers, to\nwhom no Christian should refuse a tribute of admiration, the world\nhas produced, but you will find no one man, save Jesus only, among\nthe founders of existing religions, no one indeed within the historic\nperiod, who ever professed to be the _giver_ of a truth at once\nabsolutely new and attested by works such as God only could enable him\nto perform.\n\nAnd now consider this fact. The appearance of this man Jesus,\nunparalleled as it is shown to have been, was nevertheless _expected_.\nAt present I have not to show that His person, His offices, His work,\ntogether with their permanent effect, had actually been foretold,\nor that the predictions referred to Him as accomplisher of a divine\npurpose; but this we know, as a fact beyond controversy, that when\nHe began to teach and work, his countrymen were familiar with a long\nseries of texts, beginning with the first, and continued to the end,\nof their sacred books, in which they recognized descriptions of such\na teacher. You will remember that those descriptions included all\nparticulars by which an individual could be identified. As for their\naccurate coincidence with what is recorded of our Lord, it is scarcely\nnecessary to argue, since our ablest opponents hold that it is too\nclose to be accounted for, save on the supposition that the records,\nwhether consciously or unconsciously, were moulded so to produce the\nconformity. With that theory Mr. Row and others have dealt. I do\nnot believe that it is likely to retain a hold on the minds of our\ncountrymen, but it is a most striking attestation to an all-important\nfact which I request you most seriously to weigh, remembering that of\nthis man Jesus alone in the world's history can it be asserted that\nsuch an expectation existed.\n\nThe next fact, again, is so obvious that men are in real danger of\noverlooking its significance. The faith in this Man took root. It took\nroot at once, and so deeply that storms which might have sufficed to\ntear up any human institution, served only to fix it more firmly. This\nMan died, His followers were hounded to the death, man's passions,\nman's superstitions, man's intellect, during centuries of struggle,\nwere opposed to this religion, and yet it prevailed. Will you say\nit did not prevail universally? Well, what is its actual extent? I\nanswer, it is co-extensive with the civilization of the world. Is\nthis assertion too strong? Look at the facts. Beyond the pale of\nChristendom, the great races of humanity, which in past ages have\nshown equal capacities for the highest culture, have at this present\ntime no single representative nation, Turanian, Semitic, or Aryan,\nin which liberty, philosophy, nay, even physical science, with its\nserene indifference to moral or spiritual truth, have a settled home or\npractical development. The elements of civilization are there, capable\nundoubtedly of being evoked and energized, but as a plain matter of\nfact at this present time, after thousands of years for development,\nthroughout the vast regions of Islamism, Buddhism, and Confucianism,\nnot to speak of lower forms of paganism, they are stunted, distorted,\nand, to all human ken, in hopeless and chaotic ruin. It would not be\ndifficult to prove that the special evils which have choked the human\nmind, and blighted its energies, are in each case distinctly traceable\nto evils inherent in those religious systems; but we are dealing now\nwith facts not depending upon argument, nor demanding lengthened\ninquiries. It suffices to state the bare fact that the religion of the\ncrucified Jesus, with its doctrines that were a stumbling-block to the\nJews, and foolishness to the Gentiles, is at this day conterminous\nwith human progress, with all advance in liberty, science, and social\nculture, with all that is substantially precious in the civilization of\nthe world.\n\nTo these facts others might be added of a similar character, such\nas the recognition of our Lord Jesus as the true Master and Teacher\nof the world, by men acknowledged in every age of Christendom to be\nconspicuous for moral worth and intellectual power; such, again, as the\npre-eminence in Christendom, in every age, of nations which profess at\nleast to acknowledge Him as their Lord, and as the rapid disintegration\nor ruin of communities which have corrupted or abjured His religion.\nBut the broadest and simplest facts thus stated are sufficient for\nthe one purpose we have now in view; sufficient to induce every one\nwho cares to know the truth to go at once to that Man, to ask what He\nhas to teach. The inquirer will do this, as I should think, before he\nenters into the lengthened and very difficult inquiry into the origin\nor interpretation of the predictions or the words of which we have\nspoken. He will do it because, after all, no evidence has anything\napproaching the weight which attaches to the personal influence of\na teacher, in this case, of one who declares Himself to be ready to\nreceive inquirers, and to satisfy their wants, who claims to be the\nliving and ever-present Teacher of man. The inquirer will certainly do\nthis if he feels the same moral wants, and experiences the same moral\ndifficulties and perplexities which beset the most thoughtful heathen\nbefore the coming of this Man; feelings well expressed in the Ph\u00e6do of\nPlato by Simmias, a good representative of sturdy, even sceptical, but\nthoroughly honest seekers after truth. These are his words: \"It seems\nto me, Socrates, as probably to you also, that to know the certainty\nabout such questions in this present life is a thing either impossible\nor exceedingly difficult; yet that, nevertheless, not to test\nthoroughly whatever is said about them, or to desist until we have done\nour utmost by inquiring in every direction, would be sheer cowardice.\nFor some one at least of the following results we ought to attain about\nthem, either to learn from others how the truth stands, or discover it\nfor ourselves; or, if neither should be possible, then, at any rate, to\ntake the best and most irrefragable of human theories, and use it as a\nraft, so to speak, to convey us, though in much danger, through the sea\nof life, unless, indeed, one were enabled to accomplish the passage,\nwith no risk of error or mishap, upon the firmer conveyance of a word\nfrom God.\"[158]\n\nThe question now meets us, How can we be sure that we have His\nteaching? Where can we find His own words? Where can we learn what He\nreally did? Have we a thoroughly trustworthy, not to say unquestioned,\nrecord of the words He uttered? of the works He is asserted to have\nwrought?\n\nNow there can be no doubt, that of all assaults upon the faith, the\nmost effective in this age are those which have been made upon the\ndocuments which compose the New Testament. The reason for this is\nobvious. An investigation into the authenticity of any ancient book\ndemands an amount of knowledge and critical ability, a soundness and\nkeenness of judgment, which are the very rarest of qualifications. Turn\nto secular literature, and you will find critics arguing for ages,\nwithout any approximation to a settlement, touching the genuineness\nof works attributed to men whose peculiarities of genius and of style\nwould seem to defy imitation. Who would venture on his own judgment to\ndetermine how much of the Homeric poems belong to\n\n                \"That Lord of loftiest song,\n        Who above others like an eagle soars?\"\n\n        \"Quel Signor dell' altissimo canto,\n        Che sovra gli altri com' aquila vola.\"[159]\n\nLook at the controversy between Grote, Jowett, and the latest German\ncritics touching the authenticity of no small portion of the Platonic\ndialogues. Taken simply as a question of critical inquiry, no man of\nsense would venture to determine, on internal data, the authorship of\nany book in the New Testament, without years of laborious preparation.\nI will add, no prudent man at all conversant with the history of\ncriticism would accept assertions, however confident, of critics whose\nknown and avowed prepossessions would make it _\u00e0 priori_ certain that\nthey would be averse to the acceptance of documents which, if genuine,\nsupply substantial grounds for belief in supernatural works and a\nsupernatural Person.\n\nWhat then are we to do? Well, in the first place we may inquire\nwhether any portion of the documents in that book is admitted to be\nwholly unaffected by the corrosive solvent of negative criticism.\nThis will give us at once a most important set of documents, no\nless than those epistles of St. Paul[160] which contain the fullest\nexposition of Christ's doctrine, and the most explicit statements of\nthe supernatural facts on which that doctrine is based; above all,\nthe fact of the Resurrection. There you will find Christ speaking,\naccording to His own promise, by His Spirit. But we are not to be\ncheated of our heritage by a criticism of which the main negative\nresults are repudiated, not only by all who believe in any form or\ndegree of objective revelation, but by a great majority of avowed\nrationalists. One by one we recover, with their concurrence, the\nother general epistles of St. Paul, the first of St. Peter and of\nSt. John, the Gospel of St. Mark, the discourses in St. Matthew, the\ntwo treatises of St. Luke, and, though hotly contested, as might be\nexpected, considering its vital importance, still triumphantly, and I\ndo not fear to say irrevocably, secured, attested by external evidence\never more perfect, and by internal evidence[161] daily more convincing,\nas you can witness, the Gospel of St. John. I might go farther still,\nand point to the reception of nearly all contested portions by some\nor other of our opponents, and show the cogency of the reasons which\novercame deep-seated prejudices; but it is sufficient for our\nimmediate purpose to argue _ex concessis_. If we take at first those\nbooks only which the severest critics, with the exception of certain\nscholars of the T\u00fcbingen school hold to be indisputable, we have Christ\nbefore us, the characteristics of His Personality, the cardinal events\nof His life, the subject matter of His teaching. Even Keim and R\u00e9nan\nadmit that His mark is unmistakably stamped upon those discourses to\nwhich every inquirer will naturally turn at once, when he seeks to know\nwhat Jesus taught.\n\nAnd here let me speak out frankly my own opinion. The whole result of\ninquiry into the truth of Christianity will depend upon the effect\nproduced upon you by the Personality of Jesus Christ. If a careful\nstudy of His words, of His works, does not constrain you to recognize\nin Him a divine Teacher, if it does not lead you to discern the Being\nin whom alone humanity attained to that ideal perfection of which\nphilosophers had ever dreamed, but of which they deemed that the\nrealization was impossible, nay, more, a Being in whom the moral and\nspiritual attributes of Deity, perfect holiness, and perfect love,\nwere manifested, then indeed I admit, nay, I am in truth convinced,\nthat no other evidences will have any real or permanent effect upon\nyour spirit. The completeness of those evidences may fill your minds\nwith anxious questionings, their adequacy may leave you without excuse\nfor their rejection; but without a personal influence they will also\nleave you cold, and in a position, if not of outward antagonism, yet\nof inward alienation. If, on the other hand, you accept Jesus as your\nTeacher and Master, simply and wholly because He has won your heart and\nconquered your spirit, then all other evidences will fall into their\nproper place; they will not be set aside, contemned, or neglected--had\nthey been needless, they would not have been given--but they will be\nused as subsidiary and supplementary; enabling you to give a reason for\nthe faith which is in you, both for your own satisfaction, and for the\ndefence and advancement of Christian truth. The one great evidence, the\nmaster evidence, the evidence with which all other evidences will stand\nor fall, is Christ Himself speaking by His own word.\n\nOur first endeavour must therefore be to acquire a distinct and, so far\nas may be possible, a complete conception of the personal character\nof Jesus Christ. Here, however, we are met by the question, Are we\nto consider Him at first in His human nature separately, or must we,\nin order to appreciate Him truly, contemplate Him at once in the\ncompleteness of His Personality, combining the human with the divine?\nI answer, not without some hesitation, that the line seems pointed\nout by Holy Scripture. We are told there that His nature is twofold,\nthat in Him we see God in man, that the whole work which He came to\naccomplish depended upon that nature; but, on the other hand, we find\nthat the form in which He presented Himself to His contemporaries,\nand through the medium of historical records to the Church, in which\nand by which He drew mankind to Himself, was thoroughly human; and so\nit seems to me clear that our first duty must be to collect from the\nGospel narrative all the characteristic traits of His humanity, and so\nlearn to know Him as perfect man. We may or may not avail ourselves of\nexternal help in this part of the inquiry; but if we do, the utmost\ncaution and discrimination will be needed. It is certain that all\nso-called lives of Jesus are written under some kind of prepossession,\nand convey impressions which, however fair and honest they may be,\nhave a strong colouring of personal feelings. Doubtless by such lives\nas those by Neander, Baumgarten, Pressens\u00e9, not to speak of the \"Ecce\nHomo,\" a student may have his attention drawn to traits which he might\notherwise fail to appreciate: but I believe that, until the mind is\nsaturated with the truth set forth with all plainness and in all\ncompleteness in Scripture, the loss will outweigh the gain. I do not\nsay that, in an advanced stage of inquiry, those among us especially\nwho have to consult the wants of other minds, may not profitably\nresort to these and similar writings for supplementary information or\nsuggestions: but this observation is to some extent true of other\nworks in which the false infinitely preponderates over the true; and\nif you once go outside of the Gospels for aid in the natural attempt\nto gain an independent position as an impartial inquirer, you may\nentangle yourself in the subtle webs of sophistry, such as are woven\nby R\u00e9nan, Keim, or Strauss. Speaking indeed of Pressens\u00e9's work on\nour Saviour's life, which, on the whole, approaches most nearly to a\nfaithful and complete portraiture, a friend remarkable for sound strong\nsense remarked to me that a careful perusal served but to convince him\nof the needlessness of such remouldings of the sacred history. And for\nmy own part, I do not hesitate to say that you will act most wisely if\nyou keep to the gospel narrative exclusively until you have ascertained\nto your own satisfaction what are the true characteristics of our Lord.\nI do not entertain any doubt as to the result. No healthy moral nature\never came into contact with that Personality without recognizing its\nunapproached and unapproachable excellence. Nay, I will add, no human\nheart susceptible of tender or noble emotions ever fixed its gaze upon\nJesus without acknowledging in Him the embodiment of love. Attestations\nto this effect might be adduced in abundance from writings of men who\nhave passed their lives in ineffectual efforts to extricate themselves\nfrom the perplexity arising from their inability to reconcile that\nimpression with their intellectual system: but we need no testimony\nfrom without. Go to Christ, hear Him speak, watch His actions, and you\nwill have an evidence, at once complete and adequate, that in Him was a\nhuman nature which, in its entire freedom from all moral evil, and in\nits perfect development of all moral goodness, stands absolutely alone.\n\nYou may say this is mere assumption. I can only answer, You have to\njudge for yourselves. I do not profess to draw out the evidence, but\nsimply to show what is its nature, and where it is to be found. I do\nnot attempt to delineate that character; at the utmost, I could but\ngive you but a very imperfect account of the impression which it has\nmade on my own very imperfect nature. I simply assert that the evidence\nis there, and that upon you rests the responsibility of examining it.\nIts effect, as I doubt not, will depend upon your moral nature; not\nindeed upon your moral goodness--Christ speaks to sinners--but upon\nyour moral susceptibility, your capacity to discern and appreciate\nmoral goodness. If that character does not attract, subdue, and win\nyou, I freely admit all other evidence will be useless so far as your\ninnermost convictions are concerned. But numerous as are the cases\nof individuals who have remained in, or relapsed into, a state of\nscepticism from various causes, intellectual or moral, few indeed are\nthe cases of men who have not borne with them into that dreary region\nan abiding sense of the personal and supreme goodness of Jesus.\n\nBut the more carefully you examine that character, the more forcibly\nyou will be struck by the fact that this Man, of whom the most special\nand most distinctive characteristics are absolute truthfulness and\nabsolute humility, speaks throughout with an authority which involves\nthe assumption of a divine nature. This statement does not rest on\nparticular texts open to misconstruction or evasion, but on the tenor\nof each and every discourse, on His acts not less than His words.\nHe addresses man as man's Master; He speaks as the Son of God, as\none with God. This fact is stated in strong, not to say irreverent,\nterms by the author of \"Ecce Homo\": \"During His whole public life\nJesus is distinguished from the other prominent characters of Jewish\nhistory by His unbounded personal pretensions.\" Two writers, differing\nwidely in tone of mind, but alike in depth of thought and earnestness\nof purpose, prove, were proof needed, that those pretensions are\njustified by the truth of the Incarnation, and by that alone. (See the\nRev. M. F. Sadler, \"Immanuel,\" pp. 264-309; and Mr. Hutton's \"Essay\non the Incarnation.\") You will, in fact, soon find that you have no\nalternative but either to give up all that has wrought itself into your\nmoral nature, and intwined itself around the fibres of your affections,\nall your convictions of the moral excellence of Jesus, or to accept\nHim, even as He presents Himself, the God-man. His enemies felt this.\nThey persecuted Him because He made Himself, as they said truly,\nequal with God. They crucified Him because He claimed the powers and\nattributes of the Son of God. Modern sceptics of loftier strain feel\nthis keenly. They might be content to accept Him as a moral teacher;\nfor, in that case, they could deal with Him as their equal by nature,\nreceiving or rejecting His teaching as it might accord or not with\ntheir own judgment; if they reject Him it is simply or mainly, as they\nwill tell you, because He claims to be more than man, and, as they well\nknow, to be no less than God. They ask (perhaps you will ask), how\ndid He justify the claim? The answer, of course, involves the whole\ncontroversy; but I will once more state my own conviction. If you put\nyourselves under His teaching, He will not leave you in doubt. You will\nattain by degrees only to any real appreciation of His human goodness;\nbut together with the growth of that appreciation will dawn upon you\nthe consciousness, ever increasing in clearness and intensity, that\nin Him you are gazing upon the Incarnate God. You will have a twofold\nevidence: the evidence of a perfectly logical conviction, founded on\nsure inferences from sure premises, upon the inseparability of truth\nand goodness, self-knowledge and perfect wisdom, and the evidence of\ndirect intuition; you will feel yourselves in the presence of God.\n\nAnd now let me read a passage which is a very remarkable attestation\nto the effect produced upon a man of strong sense and thorough\nindependence of character, by an honest and reverent study of our\nLord's Person and teaching. You will find it in the treatise on the\nIncarnation, published within the last few months, in Mr. Hutton's\nEssays: \"And now let me honestly ask myself, and answer the question\nas truly as I can, whether this great, this stupendous fact of the\nIncarnation is honestly _believable_ by an ordinary man of modern\ntimes, who has not been educated into it, but educated to distrust\nit; who has no leaning to the orthodox creed, as such, but has\ngenerally preferred to associate with heretics; who is quite alive to\nthe force of the scientific and literary criticisms of his day; who\nhas no antiquarian tastes, no predilection for the venerable past;\nwho does not regard this truth as part of a great system, dogmatic\nor ecclesiastical, but merely for itself; who is, in a word, simply\nanxious to take hold, if he so may, of any divine hand stretched out to\nhelp him through the excitement and the languor, the joy, the sorrow,\nthe storm and sunshine, of this unintelligible life. From my heart I\nanswer, Yes--believable, and more than believable, in any mood in which\nwe can rise above ourselves to that supernatural spirit which orders\nthe unruly wills and affections of sinful men; _more_ than believable,\nI say, because it so vivifies and supplements that fundamental faith in\nGod as to realize what were else abstract, and, without dissolving the\nmystery, to clothe eternal love with breathing life.\"[162]\n\nLet me call your attention to the remarkable resemblance, of which\nI believe the writer to have been unconscious, between these most\nstriking words and those which I quoted from Plato. What the ancient\ninquirer longed for, but sought in vain, the modern has sought and\nfound, and with it the one and the only imaginable solution of the\nmystery of life.\n\nI speak to persons able to bring the stores of varied reading to bear\nupon these questions, and we live in a time when learning has fairly\nrivalled science in bringing regions of thought hitherto unknown,\nor known only to solitary students, within the cognizance of men of\ngeneral cultivation. As a matter of a deep interest and importance,\nI would ask you, when you have attained to a complete conception of\nour Lord's Person, to compare His teaching with that of men whose\ninfluence has been most widely and abidingly felt in the world. I will\nnot insult our Master by placing His name in juxtaposition with the\nfounder of Islamism, nor indeed would it fairly enter into the inquiry;\nfor if you separate the elements of truth derived from Judaism\nand from Christianity, through the medium of a corrupt tradition,\nthe Koran will yield you but a mass of idle legends. It is indeed\nthe fashion at present to speak of Mahomet as \"a great and genuine\nprophet, with a Divine mission\" (see Hutton's Essays, i. p. 277).\nNow I do not doubt his sincerity at the beginning of his career, or\nhis steadfast adherence to the one great truth which he proclaimed;\nbut it must never be forgotten that he invented a special revelation\nto justify indulgence in his master-sin (see the Koran, c. 66), and\nthat he commanded the propagation of his religion by the sword.\nThere are, however, three great names connected with those mighty\nrevolutions of thought which have permanently affected the moral or\nreligious convictions of mankind; I speak of them specially, because\ntheir character and teaching were wholly uninfluenced by revelation,\nand because they severally represent the highest development of\npre-Christian character: Buddha, Confucius, and Socrates. Of two\nI have already spoken, and will now simply refer you to the clear\nand impartial accounts given by Amp\u00e8re, Francke, and Barth\u00e9lemi\nSt. Hilaire, to justify my statement, that although, as might be\nexpected, in some points of their moral teaching and in their spiritual\naspirations they bear a true resemblance to Him in whom human nature\nwas perfectly represented, yet each of them differed, as indeed all\nother men differ, from Him, in one special characteristic; each of\nthem is the creature of his race and of his age; the influence of each\nis felt in the full development of the peculiar tendencies of his own\nsection of the human family; in the one case, of physical languor\nand mental dreaminess; in the other, of a formal and conventional\nmorality, and of political unity secured by the sacrifice of all\nindependent action and thought. I turn to Socrates. There is a special\nreason why we should direct our attention to his character. It has\nat various times been brought into comparison with that of our Lord;\neven when that comparison is not distinctly brought out, it is often\nintentionally, or it may be unintentionally, suggested. That character\nhas been delineated by Mr. Jowett, in the prefaces of his translation\nof the Platonic dialogues, with a sagacity beyond all praise, with an\nimpartiality which trenches upon indifference, not merely in questions\nof merely speculative interest, but of moral concernment.[163] It is\na noble work, representing the labour of long years devoted almost\nexclusively to the study of the master-mind of Greece. Socrates\nthere stands before us. We enter into his thoughts, we know him as\na living man. His character may indeed have undergone some change of\nrepresentation in passing through the mind of the most imaginative of\nhuman teachers, his greatest disciple, Plato; but it is a change which\ndoes but magnify and idealize his loftiest characteristics. Let us\nsee, then, in what respects this wisest and best of men, this teacher\nwhom the great Fathers of Christendom justly reverenced as a true\nthough unconscious preparer of men's spirits for the coming Teacher,\nresembles, in what respects, not less than the other two, he especially\ndiffers, from our Lord.\n\nThis strikes us at a glance. Socrates is altogether and throughout\na Greek. His intellect, his character, is Greek. The stamp of an\nexclusive nationality is upon him. He has the feelings, the prejudices,\nof a singularly exclusive section of an exclusive race. His code\nof morals tolerates, I will not say sanctions, habits and feelings\n\"quite at variance,\" as Mr. Jowett says, \"with modern and Christian\n_notions_.\" Characters moulded to a great extent under his influence\nbecame living embodiments of some of the worst characteristics\nof heathenism, of force, pride (\u1f51\u03b2\u03c1\u03b9\u03c2 [Greek: hubris]), and\nlicentiousness, as, for instance, Critias, Charmides, and Alcibiades.\nExquisite and perfect as was his sympathy with all that was noble,\nall that was graceful and beautiful in Hellenic culture, it went no\nfurther. Graces which to the Christian are the very foundation of\nspiritualist life, had no place, no name even, in his philosophy. I\ncannot recall, among all his sayings, one that expresses sympathy\nwith man in his extremest degradation and misery, or indignation with\nhis countrymen for their treatment of their slaves. I would not be\nunjust. I never turn to the pages in which his spirit breathes without\nrecognizing its attractions for the lover of man and the seeker after\nGod; but still the fact remains, and stands out more clearly the more\nfully that spirit is made known, that Socrates, in his best and in his\nworst characteristics, was out and out an Athenian by character, by\ntemperament, by moral sympathy, and by religion also, not less than\nConfucius was a Chinese, and Siddartha a Hindoo.\n\nI touch briefly on another important point Socrates was a true, honest,\nearnest seeker after truth. I give this high praise unreservedly. As\nsuch, he represents the best tendencies of Gentile thought. As an\nhonest seeker he had the fitting reward. So far as his search was not\nimpeded by moral causes to which I have alluded, it was successful.\nHe apprehended and taught truths of infinite value. But note this; he\nhad not, did not profess to have, definite convictions upon the most\nimportant of all truths. Mr. Jowett says deliberately,[164] and as\nI think truly, \"Socrates cannot be proved to have believed in the\nimmortality of the soul.\" His speculations concerning a future state\nof retribution, recorded doubtless with a considerable admixture\nof Platonism in the Ph\u00e6do, are deeply interesting; but they are\nspeculations only, resting partly on grounds of which he recognises the\ninsufficiency, or of which we cannot doubt the unsoundness. Socrates\ngave what he found. He sought for life and immortality; he drew very\nnear to the region where they are to be found; he prepared the spirit\nof man for their announcement; but he did not bring them to light That\nwas the work of Him who at once declares the truth, and justifies its\nreception.\n\nAnd now, keeping these characteristics in mind, let me ask you to\nconsider them in reference to our Lord's teaching. One of our most\npopular and graceful writers--the Dean of Westminster--has done good\nservice to the truth by pointing out repeatedly the very conspicuous\nand utterly peculiar characteristic of the Saviour, that He is wholly\ndevoid of national exclusiveness. This is the more striking since His\nbirth and all the circumstances of His early life would naturally have\nimbued Him with the prejudices of the most exclusive of all nations: a\nnation which was intended to be exclusive, which could only fulfil its\nspecial mission by exclusiveness. Mr. Hutton puts this with his usual\nforce, but somewhat harshly: \"To trust in Him really, to believe that\nHe can help us to reduce the vulgar chaos of our English life to any\norder resting on an eternal basis, is far easier if we believe that\nthe very same mind is shining on our consciences which entered into\nthe poorest of lots among nearly the most degraded generation of the\nmost narrow-minded race that the world has ever known, and made it the\nbirthplace of a new earth\" (Essays, vol. i., p. 283). Christ speaks\never to man as man; His words find an echo in universal consciousness;\nin Him there is neither Jew nor Gentile, and, _note specially this\npoint_, neither bond nor free.\n\nAt this point, however, we may be met with an objection which has\nbeen presented with considerable skill, and appears to have seriously\naffected the judgment of inquirers. It is asserted that, after all,\nour Lord was but a Jewish Rabbi, differing indeed in some remarkable\ncharacteristics from other teachers of the synagogue, but only to\nan extent which may be accounted for, partly by His position and\neducation, and the influence of Essenian principles, partly by\npeculiarity of nature and gifts which our opponents admit to have\nbeen of the highest order, marking Him, as they would say, as a man\nof transcendent genius, one of the few in the world's history in whom\nmen are compelled to recognise a master of the soul. Hebrew writers\nof great learning, by whom this notion is gladly accepted, in their\nefforts to establish it have done signal if unwitting service to our\ncause. They have enabled readers of general culture and unbiassed\njudgment to ascertain for themselves some important facts which were\nformerly known thoroughly to those only who had sufficient learning\nand leisure to enable them to penetrate into the depths of Rabbinical\nliterature, the most intricate and repulsive which human labour ever\nproduced. It is now comparatively easy to ascertain what was the true\ncharacter of the Jewish Rabbi, and of Rabbinical teaching; what, too,\nwas the special character of the Essenian teaching,[165] at and about\nthe period when our Lord impressed His stamp upon the mind of man. Now\nI would challenge any controversialist to deny that our Lord's teaching\ndiffered from that of all the Rabbis, not merely in degree, but in\nkind. It differed in principle, in its processes, in its results, in\nits tone, its spirit, in every essential characteristic. This was\nfelt at once by His hearers: the first and most abiding impression\nmade upon the mass of His countrymen was that He taught _not_ as the\nscribes. This was the secret of the attraction which drew and retained\ndisciples. \"_Where_ shall we go? _Thou_ hast the words of eternal\nlife.\" This was the cause of the fierce antagonism on the part of the\nRabbis. They felt that His system was incompatible with their own. The\nscribe, as such, was a mechanical instrument; his authority was that\nof the system under which he worked, he held the minds of his hearers\nbound down and crippled by fetters by which he was himself bound even\nmore tightly. Properly speaking, he was not even an interpreter of the\nlaw, with the principles of which he was little concerned, but simply\na referee on points of casuistry or of formal observance which had\nbeen settled in past ages. The one merit which he claimed was that\nof unswerving adherence to the old customs, the old interpretations,\nthe old applications of the law. Of all disqualifications for the\noffice of a scribe, the most fatal would be independence of spirit,\noriginality of thought or feeling. Many sayings of the Rabbis express\nthis principle with the utmost _na\u00efvet\u00e9_: _e.g._, \"A scribe will have\nno portion in the world to come, even should he be faithful to the\nlaw of God, and full of good works, if his teaching be not wholly in\naccordance with tradition.\" Our Lord's charge against them, that they\nmade the word of God of none effect by their tradition, scarcely puts\nthis point in a stronger light than their declaration \"that it is\nhighly perilous for any learned man to read the Bible, since he may\nbe induced to trust to its guidance rather than to his teacher.\" For\nthe more advanced disciple the rule was, \"that for one hour given to\nthe study of the Bible, two should be devoted to the Talmud.\" When we\nread of different schools of Rabbis, and learn that they represented\ndifferent tendencies, we naturally suppose that there must have been\nsome movements of spirit, some struggles of moral and intellectual\nspontaneity. And it is true that between the school of Shammai and\nthat of Hillel and the Gamaliels there was a wide divergence, the\none relaxing and the other enforcing rigorous observances, the one\nencouraging, the other condemning all genial culture; but when we\ncompare the teaching of the two parties which is fully represented in\nthe Talmud, we see that the liberality of the most advanced is bounded\nwithin very narrow limits. Hillel, the best of all, had the spirit of\nhis caste. Eternal life, according to him, was the portion of those who\nhad attained to a perfect knowledge of the unwritten and traditional\nsystem to which he devoted his own life.\n\nIt is quite possible to cull from the Talmud, especially from one\nsection (the Pirke Aboth, _i.e._, decisions of the Fathers) a set\nof maxims which breathe a high and grave morality, which enjoin\ntemperance, chastity, gentleness, love of country, earnestness in the\nstudy of God's law, contempt for wealth, celebrity, and power; but the\ngeneral spirit is cold, formal, casuistical, and the decisions are, on\nthe whole, determined by considerations of interest and expediency.\nIn short, errors of every kind,--errors of interpretation, errors in\nthe foundations of moral truth, errors in the representation of God's\nattributes, errors originating in the grossest superstitions, and above\nall in narrow, bitter, exclusive prejudices,--bear an overwhelming\nproportion to the whole compilation, and belong unquestionably to\nthat Talmudic atmosphere in which we are told that the pure and lofty\nspirit of our Master attained its natural development. It is true\nthat the second portion of the Talmud, the Gemara, presents those\ncharacteristics in an exaggerated form; but the first part, the Mishna,\nis replete with a casuistry so trifling and repulsive as to make a\ncontinuous perusal almost impossible, save to one who has some special\nmotive for the study. It contains not less than 4,008 mishnaioth,\nthat is, decisions or precepts, of which the largest proportion is\nattributed to Hillel or his followers. Out of this vast collection it\nwould be difficult to fix upon any consecutive series of maxims, say\nfifty, which would approve themselves to the moral sense.\n\nWidely as our Lord's teaching differs from that of the Greek or\nthe Asiatic, far more does it differ from that of His Hebrew\ncontemporaries: it belongs altogether to a different sphere, the sphere\nin which the human spirit was emancipated from all narrow, dark,\nexclusive prejudices, and all its powers developed by that Spirit which\nrested on Him without measure, which He received as man, and which He\nbestowed as God.\n\nIt may be said that if the evidence supplied by knowledge of the\nPerson of our Lord be of itself complete and adequate for the highest\npurpose, further inquiries may be dismissed as superfluous. Nor is\nthe remark unfair. It is, I believe, quite true that of the myriads\nwho accept the Christian revelation an immense proportion, including\nspirits of every class, are moved chiefly, if not exclusively, by the\npersonal influence of Jesus, by the intuition, so to speak, which\nthey thus attain into the manifested truth. The sun shines with its\nown lustre, and needs no evidence to prove its existence. But our\nnature is full of inconsistencies. Our strongest convictions, after\nall, are held with a feeble grasp, and are liable to be wrenched from\nus by sudden assaults, most especially when they depend upon what\nin modern parlance are called subjective impressions. It is well,\ntherefore, that even this strongest and deepest of all convictions\nshould have outward and independent support, that it should appeal to\npalpable and ascertainable facts, never indeed surrendering its true\nposition in the central stronghold of our spirits, but going forth\nwhen challenged, and examining at frequent intervals the state of\nits defences and outposts. Let us, then, very briefly consider some\nof those evidences which the Christian apologist recognizes as most\nimportant for the confirmation of faith.\n\nHere, undoubtedly, we have first to look at the evidence of miracles,\nwhich has been discussed by Dr. Stoughton, and, among all miracles,\nfirst and foremost--with which all other proofs of miraculous\nintervention stand or fall--the miracle of the resurrection.[166] I\ntake it in this place, not as it is often taken, as an antecedent\nevidence to be examined or rejected previous to examination of the\ncharacter of our Saviour; but as an evidence of which the true force is\ninseparably bound up with the result of that preliminary inquiry. The\nmind may indeed submit to logical inferences drawn from undisputed or\ndemonstrated facts, but it will submit reluctantly, and will, sooner or\nlater, shake off its shackles, unless those inferences accord with its\nsense of moral fitness, of harmony between the outward manifestation\nof power and the inward demands of conscience. All moral antecedent\nobjection to the resurrection of Christ disappears when it is\nacknowledged that His character satisfies those conditions. The first\napologist of Christianity--St. Peter at Pentecost--puts this in the\nvery foreground of his argument: \"God raised Him up, having loosed the\npains of death, because it was not possible that He should be holden\nof it.\" It was impossible, considering the relation of the Son to the\nFather, and of the Father to the universe. The expectation, in fact, of\nthe resurrection of one \"approved by God\" as perfect in holiness, such\nas Christians believe their Master to be, is actually admitted to be\nso natural that the most subtle opponents of revelation assume that it\nmust have existed in the minds of the first disciples, bringing them\ninto a state which prepared them to receive without questioning the\nrumours which were gradually moulded into a semblance of historical\nconsistency. This theory at least proves this,--given the two facts of\nGod's power and justice, and of Christ's nature, as acknowledged by the\nChristian, the resurrection, if proved on other grounds, will find no\nobstacle to its reception in our moral consciousness.\n\nBut the very fact that such a hope exists, one which, if fulfilled,\ntranscends all human longings, carrying with it, as St. Paul shows,\nthe pledge and the only pledge of our personal redintegration, will\nbut make the inquirer careful to prove every link in the chain of\nevidence. And here we have to remark that, so far from having that\nassumed expectation, His disciples were utterly in despair after the\ncrucifixion. With their Master's last breath their last hope departed.\nThey treated the first accounts which reached them as idle, they did\nnot believe till they had the evidence of their senses; \"then were\nthey glad, when they saw the Lord.\" It is a remarkable, not to say\nunique, combination of two conditions for the perfect establishment of\nan ascertainable fact, that on the one side it should be in perfect\ncongruity with an eternal principle, and on the other that it should\nbe witnessed by persons wholly unprepared for its occurrence, and\nattested under circumstances which make it impossible to doubt their\nsincerity. That the attestation was given, that it was confirmed by\noutward effects otherwise psychologically inexplicable, by an immediate\nand complete change in the character of the disciples, and by the rapid\ntriumph of the religion so attested, these and kindred points you\nwill find discussed in every treatise on Christian evidences: they\nare, in fact, not open to reasonable doubt. Weigh more especially the\nattestation of St. Paul, both as one who knew previously all that could\nbe alleged against the belief, as one whose strong intellect and strong\nprejudices rendered him inaccessible to mere subjective impressions,\nand as a man of whose conversion no rational, no intelligible account\nhas ever been given which does not involve the fact of a personal\nmanifestation of Christ, and then you will have all that can be needed\nfor steadfast conviction, evidence complete and adequate for its\npurpose, proving that Jesus was shown \"to be the Son of God with power\nby the resurrection from the dead.\" (Rom. i.)\n\nWith an equal interest the student of evidence will now turn back to\nthe inquiry into the teaching of prophecy. At the outset it sufficed to\nknow the broad fact that the characteristics of the coming Christ were\nbelieved by His contemporaries to have been announced in predictions\nwhich, whether of divine origin or not, unquestionably moulded their\nanticipations. He is now able to test their accuracy, to satisfy\nhimself as to their origin, and to study them with a far deeper and\nmore intelligent interest than would be possible without the previous\nappreciation of our Lord's nature. At first his attention will\nnaturally be caught by separate predictions, by their correspondence\nwith outward occurrences in the Gospel narration; but as he\nadvances in the study his whole spirit will be gradually absorbed in\ncontemplation of their internal coherence, their unbroken continuity,\ntheir ever progressing development. Distinct, accurate, and in the\nstrictest sense of the word evidential, those predictions are, taken\nseparately and independently; as such they are recognised by one and\nall the sacred writers--by none more fully than by the two who stand\npre-eminent among the disciples of Jesus--by St Paul, who represents\nthe highest development of the intellectual forces in Christianity, the\nacute disputant, the subtle reasoner, the spiritualist philosopher, or,\nas he has been lately called, the metaphysician of Christianity--and\nby St. John, whose spirit, insphered in the region of love, came into\nnearest contact with the divine, who represents the very highest of\nall faculties, that of spiritual intuition. Nay, those predictions\nare repeatedly and distinctly recognised as conclusive evidences by\nour Lord Himself. But their full significance is only discerned when\nwe contemplate them as parts of a mighty whole, as a continuous and\ncomplete testimony of the Spirit of God. Two lines of light traverse\nthe realm of spiritual manifestation, the one revealing the divine, the\nother the human characteristics of the future Saviour: the one ever\nexpanding, but from the beginning broad, luminous, equable; the other\nadvancing, so to speak, with varying progress, ever and anon bursting\nout in sudden flashes, each bringing into vivid light some event in\nthe life, above all each event in the crowning work, of the Saviour.\nThese two lines gradually converge until they meet in the Incarnation.\nFrom that point of meeting the Christian goes back; then he learns to\ncombine and to comprehend their intimations. Under Christ's teaching,\nprophecy becomes to him a guiding light--an evidence so complete that\nif it stood alone he might dispense with other proofs, and feel it\nadequate for the support of his faith.\n\nYou will, however, remember that besides those predictions which apply\ndirectly to our Lord's person, an inexhaustible treasury of predictions\nrefer to events in the providential history of the world, and they,\ntoo, are strictly evidential. Even writers to whom the very word\nrevelation is distasteful, acknowledge in the Hebrew prophets true\nseers; that is, men whose spirit was in unison with the everlasting\nharmonies of the universe. But it is only when we know Christ as He\nreveals Himself, as the Lord of history, that the long series of\nprophetic intimations present themselves in their true light to our\nminds. The exact explanation of each specific prediction, such as are\nfound in Isaiah and Daniel, taxes and rewards the industry of students,\nbut the real interest consists not in the satisfaction of a rational\ncuriosity, or the bearing upon controversy, but in the help which is\nthus supplied, enabling us to realize vividly the presence of Christ\nforeordering all events so as to make them work together for the\naccomplishment of His will.\n\nIf time allowed, I might here dwell on other topics. I might point\nout how deep thinkers, Pascal perhaps most powerfully, have shown\nthat Christianity, and Christianity alone, fully recognises the two\nopposite and apparently irreconcilable aspects of our common humanity,\nits unspeakable misery and degradation out of God, and its capacity\nfor restoration and reunion with the Divine, and, again, that it\ncorresponds to an extent wholly incomprehensible, save on the admission\nof its divine origin, with those requirements of man's conscience and\nspirit which every system of philosophy recognises, but which one and\nall admit that they fail to satisfy. I might dwell upon the fact that\nbetween the acceptance of the entire truth thus made known to us,\nand utter negation of the supernatural and divine, the intermediate\npositions long defended as tenable have been, both here and on the\ncontinent, all but universally abandoned by the representatives of\nmodern thought. I might point out that together with that abandonment,\nand as a direct result of that abandonment, a dark, drear hopelessness,\nnot merely as to the immediate issue of the storms which convulse the\natmosphere we breathe as spiritual, social, and intellectual beings,\nbut as to the future and abiding consequences of those convulsions,\nappears to be settling down upon men's minds: a hopelessness for\nwhich there is no remedy save that which depends upon the triumph\nof righteousness and truth, a triumph to be achieved only under the\nbanner of Christ. What I have attempted to do, none can feel as I\ndo how imperfectly, has been to set before you in orderly sequence\nfacts within the reach of all; facts of which the truth and power\nand far-reaching influences will be felt more and more in proportion\nto the earnestness and sincerity of your own inquiry; facts which\nonce admitted are evidences complete in themselves, and adequate for\ntheir purpose in each stage of our spiritual development: evidences\nsufficient to constrain all who believe in God to believe also in the\nSon whom He has sent; to know Him as the way, the truth, and the life.\nIn His school that rational conviction, retaining all its clearness,\nwill undergo a process at once of development and transfigurement; and\nbecome a living faith.\n\n\n\n\n    EXPLANATORY PAPER\n\n    BY THE RIGHT REV. THE\n\n    LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER AND BRISTOL.\n\n\n\n\nEXPLANATORY PAPER\n\n\nHaving been requested by the Committee of the Christian Evidence\nSociety to draw up a short paper which might serve as a partial\nintroduction to the Lectures, and especially might set forth their\ngeneral plan and connexion, as originally designed by the Committee, I\nhave much pleasure in submitting the following brief comments to the\nmany readers of this valuable series. The Lectures were delivered in\nthe course of the spring in the present year, to large audiences, in\nSt. George's Hall, Langham Place, and were specially designed to meet\nsome of the current forms of unbelief among the educated classes.\n\nThey were delivered at the request of the Christian Evidence Society,\nand represent a portion of the work undertaken by the Committee of that\nSociety in the present year.\n\nAs they thus stand in such close connection with our Society, it may\nnot be unsuitable for me to make a few explanatory remarks on the\nSociety itself, and its general objects, as well as on the plan of the\nlectures which have been delivered at its request, and which are now\npresented to the reader in a collected and continuous form.\n\nFirst, then, as to the Society, and its present working and design.\n\nI. The Society was established in the spring of the past year. It had\nlong been felt by earnest and thoughtful persons, both Churchmen and\nNonconformists, that some combined attempt ought to be made to meet in\nfair argument the scepticism and unbelief which for the last few years\nhave been distinctly traceable in all classes of society.\n\nInto all the causes of this state of things it is not now our object\nto inquire. These are, probably, many and various, and may defy any\nformal classification. It is, indeed, seldom that those who live in\nthe stream and current of a quickly moving generation can properly\nestimate the variously combined movements around them, or can always\nvery successfully refer them even to their more proximate causes. We\nmay, however, very profitably, as thus illustrating the general design\nof the lectures, pause to advert to two or three of what would seem to\nbe leading causes of this present prevalence of doubt and scepticism.\n\nWe may, in the first place then, venture to express the opinion that\nit does seem to stand in some degree of connection with the historical\ncriticism, or, to speak more exactly, with the philosophical mode\nof treating ancient history, which, especially since the time of\nNiebuhr, has so honourably marked the present and the latter half of\nthe preceding generation. It was obviously impossible that a system\nwhich appeared to yield results judged to be eminently satisfactory and\ntrustworthy in regard of the general history of the past, should not be\napplied to sacred history, and to the various documents which together\nmake up the Holy Bible. And it _has_ been applied, sometimes cautiously\nand reverently, and with a due regard for the religious convictions of\nChristian readers, but sometimes also with an eagerness and persistence\nwhich may not unfairly be characterized as both inconsiderate and\nunjustifiable. This method of criticism, especially in its more\nunfavourable manifestations, may certainly be specified as one of the\nearlier causes of that suspended belief in the historical truth of\nseveral portions of the Old and New Testament, which many entertain at\nthe present time, and make no scruple of avowing and justifying.\n\nWe may also as certainly specify as a second cause the tendency to\nover-hasty generalization that has of late marked the rapid development\nof some of the natural sciences. From true science true religion has\nnothing to fear. But it is otherwise when results newly obtained, and\nat present, from the very circumstances of the case, imperfectly tested\nand verified, are confidently put forward; and when inferences of\nperhaps doubtful validity are set, if not in actual opposition to the\nstatements of Revelation, yet in such a studious juxtaposition, that\ncomparison is challenged, and by consequence many an early conviction\nweakened and impaired. We say by consequence,--for no acute observer of\nthe heart and its mysteries can have failed to mark how, even in minds\nof higher strain there is often a secret sympathy with the attacking\nparty, not so much on the merits of the case, as from the simple fact\nthat it _is_ the attacking party; and that while on this side there\nis only the passivity of prescription, on the other there is all the\nvigour of assault and progress. This obvious fact, which,--like some\nother mental facts of a similar nature,--is, we fear, proved by almost\ndaily experience, has not been sufficiently taken into consideration;\nbut if estimated properly, it will account for much that is otherwise\nperplexing. It will even tend to reassure us, as it will enable us to\nassign to its true though hidden reason much of the present startling\nreadiness with which scientific inferences, supposed generally to be\nunfavourable to received views, have received at least some measure\nof sympathy and approval It may be, too, that this latent feeling of\nsympathy with the attack will be neutralized when it is found that the\ndefence is not deficient in energy or vigour, and when English fair\nplay seems to suggest that each side should be allowed to fight it out\nwithout having any advantages arising from prepensions or prejudice.\nHowever this may be, there is no doubt that the cause we have specified\nis a real and a prevailing one. Over-hasty scientific generalization is\ncertainly one of the causes of the present state of modern religious\nbelief.\n\nOne more cause we may also pause to specify, as it involves in it much\nthat will minister comfort and reassurance. This cause is the eager and\noften impatient search for solid ground whereon religion and morality\nmay be based. With all their faults, men are now certainly seeking for\ntruth. There may be misapplications of historical criticism, there may\nbe misuses and misapprehensions of the real testimony of science, but\namid all there is clearly a searching for truth and firm ground. The\nprocesses of destructive criticism are in fact nearly over, and the\ndifficult process of reconstruction is commencing. The due remembrance\nof this will help us in estimating a little more calmly, and perhaps\nalso a little more fairly, some of the startling phenomena presented by\nthe present state of religious belief. Let us, for example, take for a\nmoment into consideration two remarkable characteristics of the present\ntime,--first, the attempts to form a system of morality independent of\nrevealed religion; and, secondly, the acceptance on the part of several\nearnest and truthful minds of such a system as Positivism. These really\nwould seem to be at first sight two inexplicable phenomena. Both,\nhowever, are to be accounted for by that searching for something to\nrest on, which has just been mentioned. It has been assumed in the\none case, far too hastily, that the uncertainties connected with the\nbelief in the facts of revealed religion are so great, that no system\nof morality could be considered securely founded if it rested only on\nthe Scriptures. It has been felt by many earnest thinkers that any\nsuch system, to be a true one, ought to rest solely on principles\nacknowledged to be of universal application, and on maxims that have\nreceived the assent of all the better part of civilized mankind. If\nthe teaching of Scripture be in general harmony with such maxims and\nprinciples, its concurrence is not to be slighted; but it is not\ndeemed as of more real moment than the concurrence of any other form\nof religious teaching that has exercised a real influence over any\nlarge portion of the human family. Religion generally is accepted as\na buttress to the rising edifice of morality, but as nothing further.\nThe tower is being builded really with the desire to reach heaven:\nif the sequel be what it was of old, it may still be conceded, with\nall fairness, that the attempt is not made in a bad spirit To change\nslightly the allusion, the effort is not made in the spirit of the\nTitans who piled Pelion on Ossa, but with all the earnestness and\nanxiety of hoping, enquiring, and searching, though we are bound to\nadd, mistaken men.\n\nIn the other case, though it may seem to many rash to say one word\nto mitigate the severity of the judgment that both is and ever will\nbe passed on such a system as Positivism, yet, even here, let us be\njust and sympathising. There is, no doubt, in Positivism much that is\nplainly repulsive, and really calls for severity; still, even in this\nsystem, we may trace the prevailing desire to find something solid,\nsomething which appears to be proof to the changes of opinion or the\nfluctuation of creeds. So the attempt is made to secure a scientific\nbasis, and to place thereon fact after fact, when each has become\nverified and established, and so to build onward--we cannot honestly\nsay upward--until something like a system is so far constructed that\nsucceeding generations may feel induced to continue it. So even in\nthis sombre and cheerless system there is, we believe, really at\nwork a desire to touch ground. To that desire, however, it must be\nsorrowfully added, every loftier aspiration, every nobler incentive, is\nnecessarily sacrificed. Science and scientific truth is used in a way\nthat warrants the apprehension that--if such is to be the use made of\nit--the progress of science may tend, first, to impair, and, next, to\nobliterate, the sense of _responsibility_ on which the present and the\nfuture alike so solemnly rest. It is not without reason, then, that\nthis is dwelt gravely upon by all sober thinkers; nor is it too much to\nsay that this is now one of the gravest considerations connected with\nthe advance of modern scientific investigations. The tendencies of such\ninvestigations certainly do _appear_ to hinder the due recognition of\nthese two momentous principles--first, the sense of responsibility;\nand, secondly, the sense of dependence on something higher than law,\norder, and evolution. This hindrance, we trust, is only in appearance;\nstill that appearance is accepted by many as reality, and it is not\nwithout reason that we are again and again reminded that the acceptance\nof the truth of the Christian creed will with many depend on its power\nof assimilating the doctrine of universal causation, or, to speak more\nprecisely, of demonstrating that that doctrine is itself only a form of\na yet higher and holier truth.\n\nWe turn, however, back again to the design and working of the Society.\nIt was established to meet this growing scepticism, and with a due\nrecognition of the causes which have just been specified. It was not\nstarted, as has been sometimes said, with a little irony, for the\npurpose of restoring a belief in Christianity, but for the purpose of\nmeeting argument with argument, and of supplying the many that are\nnow fluctuating between belief and no belief with sober answers and\nvalid arguments drawn forth anew from the great treasury of Christian\nevidences. This is the true design and object of the Society. Its mode\nof carrying out this design has hitherto been threefold--first, by\nmeans of lectures addressed to the educated; secondly, by the formation\nof classes under competent class-leaders, for the instruction of those\nin lower grades of society who are exposed to the thickening dangers\narising from that organized diffusion of infidel principles which\nis one of the saddest and most monitory signs of the present time.\nThirdly, the Society is endeavouring to stimulate private study by the\ncirculation of useful tracts, and by the offer of prizes to such as may\nbe willing that their private study should be tested by competitive\nexamination. All these three modes of carrying out its work have been\nadopted during the present year; and, so far as can be inferred from\nthe work that has been done, and from the various expressions of public\nopinion, with considerable success. Popular attention has naturally\nbeen directed more especially to the first of the modes specified--the\nlectures to the educated; but it is satisfactory to state, ere we pass\nat once to our explanatory comments on the plan of these lectures, that\nthe formation of classes has answered even beyond expectation, and\nthat, from the amount of the competition for the prizes that have been\noffered, examination in Christian evidences will form a large and most\ninteresting portion of the future work of the Society.\n\nII. We may now turn our attention to the lectures that are included in\nthe present volume--our first year's work.\n\nThe number of the lectures was twelve. One of these, the lecture on\nthe Internal Evidence of the Authenticity of St. John's Gospel, is\nunfortunately not included in the present volume, owing to the desire\nexpressed by the learned writer that it should not be published. The\nabsence is much to be regretted; first, on account of the value and\nimportance of the lecture; and, secondly, on account of the partial\nbreak which has thus been caused in the sequence of the lectures.\n\nThe lectures were not delivered in the order in which they are here\npresented to the reader. The convenience of the active as well as\ndistinguished men who consented to act as lecturers, had naturally to\nbe consulted; adjustments had to be made, and interchanges of days of\nlecturing acceded to, so as to secure the continuous delivery of the\nlectures on the days specified. In this collective edition, however,\nthe proper order is restored, and may now be briefly explained, as\nsome criticisms have been passed on the subjects of the lectures,\nwhich would certainly have been modified if the whole series had been\ndelivered in the order originally designed.\n\nThe first three lectures were designed to be preparatory and\nprelusive. They were directed against the three systems which are\nnow more especially, in different ways, coming into collision with\nChristianity--Materialism and its theories, Pantheism, and Positivism.\nIt was judged by those who sketched out the plan of the lectures,\nthat until these subjects were shortly dealt with, and until the\nobjections against Christianity, founded upon them or derived from\nthem, were briefly noticed, the evidences for Christianity could hardly\nbe expected to have a fair hearing. The internal arguments in favour\nof the leading truths of the Christian religion could scarcely be\nfairly estimated if there were to be antecedent objections of a grave\nand general character left wholly unnoticed and unanswered. Hence\nthe three opening lectures: The first of these breaks ground by the\nconsideration of some leading materialistic opinions, and especially by\nan exposition of the argument from design. It thus prepares the reader\nmore fully to accept the deep truth so well and succinctly stated by\nBishop Martensen,[167] that the \"world has not merely a cosmogonic but\nalso a creational origin,\" and that the mysterious problem of creation\nand life can \"never be solved in a merely natural way, but demands\na supernatural solution, that is, a solution through a _creative\nteleology_.\"\n\nThe second lecture very suitably follows by a clear exposition of\nthat great system which has of late been found to exercise such a\nfascination over thoughtful and cultivated minds that it becomes,\nto far more than we may suppose, the conclusion of all controversy.\nWe allude to the system of Pantheism, into which of late many noble\nspirits have seemed willing to merge all their hopes and all their\nfears. Swayed to and fro, unable to accept Law for their God, and yet\nequally held back from the blessed truth that the God of the universe\nis a PERSON, thousands fall back upon the subtle and fascinating system\nwhich supplies a moving Principle, but withholds the blessed idea of\na holy Will; which discloses to them a _natura naturans_, but denies\nthe existence of a loving Creator and a personal God. It was thus very\nproperly provided that the lecture on this subject should follow the\nlecture on Design in Nature, as exhibiting the true characteristics of\nthat modified Atheism which only too often becomes the refuge of men\nwhose minds have been shaken by the inferences of pure materialism,\nor who may have been drawn towards the disguised forms of it which\nlurk in many of our popular treatises on the origin and evolution\nof Man. After a careful study of these two lectures, the thoughtful\nreader will be enabled to recognize the true nature and force of the\nargument from design, and so will be led the better to appreciate the\nenduring validity of that great _natural_ foundation for our belief in\na personal God. Of the four great arguments by which man is permitted\nto rise to the knowledge of God, the argument from design, or, as it is\ntechnically called, the teleological argument, is the most important,\nas it, in fact, includes the moral argument, which, properly estimated,\nis only its subjective aspect. Apart from revelation we rise to the\nknowledge of God in two ways, by the consideration of ourselves, and by\nthe contemplation of the world around us; what the moral argument is\nin the former method, that the teleological argument is in the latter.\nHence the importance to the general reader of having an argument of\nsuch validity clearly set before him on different sides, and from\ndifferent points of view.\n\nThe third lecture, on Positivism, completes the first group, and forms,\nas it were, a kind of useful appendix to the other two. Here we have\nthe investigation of a special system,--a system that professes to be\nbased on positive and observed phenomena, and claims to extricate the\nmental study of man from metaphysics and abstractions, and to place\nit in the realm of the realizable and the positive. Such a system,\nthough neither now prevailing to any extent, nor ever likely to become\nprevalent or popular, is still worthy of attention, as it stands in\nclose connection with current materialistic conceptions, and suggests\nsome instructive contrasts to Pantheism. In the latter system we have,\nat any rate, some idea of pervading Deity; but in Positivism, if we\nunderstand the system aright, God, and all conceptions of God, are not\nso much denied as simply and entirely ignored. If Pantheism be deemed\nfascinating, Positivism will appear to most minds utterly repellent:\nstill it is a system that claims some distinguished men among its\nprofessed exponents, and perhaps a larger number than we may suppose of\nconscious or unconscious adherents. It may therefore well claim from us\ninvestigation, and, in the position it occupies in the order of these\nlectures, may fairly be considered to be in its right place.\n\nWe have dwelt upon the first group of the lectures, as both the\nposition and the importance of the subjects considered in it have\nseemed to require a fuller notice. On the remaining groups we may speak\nmore briefly, as their connection and the special subjects on which\nthey treat are much more self-explanatory.\n\nThe first three lectures having, as it were, cleared the ground, and\nhaving demonstrated, as we believe, successfully the untenable nature\nof the systems that have been placed in competition with Christianity,\nthe two next lectures, which form the second group, deal with the chief\ndifficulties arising from the supposed conflict between science and\nthe Holy Scriptures. The first of these two lectures, that on Science\nand Revelation, enters into the subject generally, by showing how,\non scientific considerations, a revelation was to be expected, and\nhow, consequently, the evidences of Christianity have a strong claim\nupon the attention of every right-thinking man. The second of these\ntwo lectures is confined to a special but prerogative case, in which\nscience and religion are supposed to be more particularly in opposition\nto each other,--viz., the case of miracles. Here it is necessary, not\nonly to investigate generally the nature of the miraculous evidence\nto Christianity, but fairly to face the antecedent question, whether\nmiracles, however defined, are not in themselves impossible. In facing\nthat question, however, attention is rightly called to the nature\nof the weapons that are used in the conflict, and especially to the\nfact, so often overlooked, that all the assaults on the miraculous\nthat can in any degree be deemed worthy of consideration, are carried\non only with metaphysical weapons. The whole question really turns\nupon the belief in a personal God: if it be conceded that this belief\nis just and reasonable, then, as the writer of the lecture rightly\nobserves, the presumed impossibility in reference to miracles at once\nmelts away. The very idea of a free-creating God carries with it the\npossibility of new manifestations of the Divine will, whether in\nhistory or nature. The sustaining power of God, which we recognise in\nthe form of law and orderly progress, changes whensoever it shall have\nseemed good to His holy will for it to pass into the creative; His\nimmanent workings are then seen in the realm of the transcendental,\nand the result is that which Pantheism, Naturalism, and all similar\nsystems must, if consistent, regard as impossible, a new movement from\nthe Divine centre, an epiphany of a creative and overruling will, a\nwonder, a miracle. When Spinosa said that God and nature are one from\neternity to eternity, he was quite consistent in adding that there is\nno transcendental beginning, and that miracles are impossible; but for\nany one who believes in a personal God, or who believes nature to be\nwhat it is,--not a system eternally fixed, but a system passing through\na development characterised by design,--to deny the possibility of\nmiraculous interpositions, reason and consistency must certainly, in\nthis particular, be suspended or sacrificed.\n\nThe third group of lectures, which may be regarded as subdivided into\ntwo portions, naturally connects itself with, and follows, the subjects\njust specified. After the general consideration of difficulties\nconnected with religion and Christianity, the attention of the reader\nis now directed to the more special difficulties connected with the\nHoly Scriptures. In the first portion of the group the subject of the\nGradual Development of Revelation, or, as the title was re-defined\nby the lecturer, the Gradual Nature of Divine Revelation, properly\noccupies the first place. It is followed by a lecture in which there\nwill be found a careful consideration of some special instances of\ndifficulty connected with the historical portions especially of the\nOld Testament. These two lectures were to have been followed by\na consideration of the moral difficulties that have been felt in\nreference to some parts of the Old Testament; but for this subject,\nwhich, if properly treated, would have probably claimed a large share\nof attention, the Committee were not able to secure the services of a\nlecturer for the present year. This is to be regretted, as there is\nno subject connected with the Holy Scriptures which at the present\ntime more requires a candid and sober consideration; no discussion\nwhich, if fairly conducted, would do more to remove many honestly felt\ndifficulties, and to many minds to bring probably lasting reassurance.\nWithout presuming to enter, however slightly, into such a subject in\na discursive paper like the present, we will venture to make this\ngeneral remark, which perhaps may be found helpful, viz., that in\ndealing with all such difficulties we must carefully distinguish\nbetween those connected with Divine workings, and those connected with\nhuman actions. The former are, in their real nature, utterly beyond\nthe finite judgment of man. All that we may presume to consider is the\nway or manner in which they are brought before us by the writer, and\nall that we can either safely or wisely subject to criticism are the\naspects or colouring under which they are presented. We really are\nnot competent to sketch out theories of Divine government, even in\nthe simplest matters, and with all the advantages of contemporaneous\nknowledge; nay, in the lives of ourselves and those around us, there\nare, as has been wisely observed, innumerable events of sorrow, and\ncountless circumstances of suffering, of which the economic purpose\ncannot even be guessed at in our present state of knowledge, and of\nthe exact purposes of which no sober or reverent thinker ever dreams\nof attempting to form any estimate whatever. It is thus utterly out of\nthe question to attempt to consider the difficulties connected with the\nDivine workings, except as to the manner of their representation by\nthe human narrator, whose human powers were the instruments by which\nGod was pleased to communicate the outward facts of those workings\nto the children of men. In regard of the Divine workings themselves,\nespecially when they come before us in the general forms of judgments\non individuals or nations, all we may presume safely to do is to\nregard them as manifestations of Divine righteousness in judicial\nrelations or contradistinctions to the sins or transgressions of men.\n\nIn reference, however, to the moral difficulties connected with\nrecorded human actions, we may venture to go farther, and to take into\nconsideration the fact already referred to of the gradual nature of\nGod's revelation, and all the modifying thoughts which such a fact\nbrings with it.\n\nIt is thus not only right, but necessary, to accept as our guide\nin all such investigations or discussions this sober spiritual\nprinciple,--that the Old Testament must be interpreted from the\nstand-point of the New Testament, and under the fuller light which is\nafforded by the later dispensation. If we cling to these two great\ntruths--first, that the history of the past, as we find it in the Old\nTestament, ever involves a reference to final purposes; and, secondly,\nthat every attempt to realize the deeper significance of that history\nmust use Christianity as its basis--we shall probably find our way\nin this difficult domain of speculation as far and as safely as the\nfinite powers of man can be deemed capable of advancing; we shall\nsee as clearly as we can be permitted to see, when poor human reason\nis endeavouring to survey the adorable mysteries that surround the\nrecorded workings of the manifold wisdom of God.\n\nThe second portion of this third group is more especially devoted to\ndifficulties connected with the New Testament, the first place being\nnaturally reserved for the questions relating to the life of our Lord\nand the Gospel narrative. The first lecture is thus directed to a\nconsideration of the Mythical Theories of Christianity; the second\nto the Evidential Value of St. Paul's Epistles. As has already been\nmentioned, the lecture on St. John's Gospel, which would have occupied\na position between the two just specified, owing to the request of the\nwriter, has not been published, and the series in this part of it has\nin consequence suffered.\n\nThe two remaining lectures, viz., that on Christ's Teaching and\nInfluence on the World, and that which follows it, on the Completeness\nand Adequacy of the Evidences of Christianity, form the last group,\nand worthily conclude the interesting series. A third lecture on the\nadditional strength which is brought to the evidences of Christianity\nby the convergence of various lines of independent testimony, was\nintended to have been added to this group, but for this important and\ncomprehensive subject, as in the case of another subject recently\nmentioned, the Committee were not able to procure a lecturer.\n\nThe series, as above described, is now commended to the thoughtful\nreader. It will be found to be marked throughout with learning,\ncandour, and we believe also with gentleness and sympathy. On this\nlast characteristic we ourselves lay great stress. If we would reclaim\nthe wandering, or confirm the wavering, it is not by hard words and\nunkindly imputations, but by the expression of that love and gentleness\nwhich an apostle reminds us are numbered among the fruits of the\nSpirit. We must regard ourselves as far as possible in their places,\nendeavour to see as they see, and feel as they feel, and then it may be\npermitted to us to return from our charitable quest, bringing back the\nfriendly wanderers with us, and ourselves sharing some portion of that\nholy joy which is felt in heaven and in earth when the doubter is led\nback to belief, and the lost is found. This rightful characteristic of\nall true Christian controversy is not, we believe, anywhere wanting in\nthis volume, and we thus, with fullest confidence, commend it to the\nconsideration of all who love the truth, and humbly seek it in history,\nscience, and theology.\n\nLastly, we may call attention to the encouraging fact, that in this\ngreat work good men have agreed to forget minor differences. Among the\ndistinguished men whose independent lectures are now, for convenience,\ngathered together in a common volume, are members of the Church\nof England and members of other religious communities. It is long\nthat this co-operation has existed in the circulation of the Holy\nScriptures; it is recently that it has again appeared in the effort to\npresent those Scriptures in their most accurate form to the English\nreader; it is now again happily exemplified in the present attempt to\ndefend and maintain the truth as it is in Jesus Christ our Lord.\n\nThese things are of good augury. Though there may be dissensions, sad\nand pitiful, within the Church, and assaults made upon it from without,\noften sadly characterized with the marks of political strife, yet we\nmay thank God that in efforts such as the present, and in the calm and\nserenity of studies such as those which this volume commends, a true\nunion has been felt and acted on. Yes, it is a cause for thankfulness\nand rejoicing that the love of Christ is more and more binding us\ntogether in companionships of high duty and gentle sympathy, and that\nreverence for His Holy Word, His Word of Life and Truth, is making\nus feel that our work is a common one, and that as we have in common\nfreely received, so it is a blessed thing in common freely to give.\n\nWe may humbly pray then that God's gracious favour may rest on this\nCourse of Lectures, and may be permitted to bear a blessing to those\nthat read it. May they feel anew convinced in heart and spirit that\nwe have not \"followed cunningly devised fables,\" but that in the Holy\nScriptures of the Old and New Testament there is light and truth, even\nbecause they bring us nearer to Him who is the Truth, as He is the Way\nand the Life, for evermore.\n\n        C. J. GLOUCESTER AND BRISTOL.\n\n    _July 19, 1871._\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n\n[1] \"Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.\"\n\n[2] Mr. Wallace, in the \"Anthropological Journal,\" 1864; see also\nLubbock's \"Prehistoric Times,\" last chapter.\n\n[3] Moleschott, \"Circulation of Life:\" Letter XVIII., with Liebig's\nopinion there quoted.\n\n[4] Kant, \"Metaphysics of Ethics.\"\n\n[5] See, for example, Renouvier, \"Science de la Morale,\" 1869.\n\n[6] \"Limits of Philosophical Enquiry.\" 1868.\n\n[7] Nehem. ix. 6.\n\n[8] See Duke of Argyll's \"Reign of Law.\"\n\n[9] Job xxvi. 14.\n\n[10] Plutarch, \"De Justitia.\"\n\n[11] Buchner.\n\n[12] See Mill on Comte, p. 62, _seq._\n\n[13] Paroles de Philosophic Positive, p. 54.\n\n[14] Janet refers to Nysten's Dictionnaire de M\u00e9decine, etc., by Littr\u00e9\nand Robin.\n\n[15] Paroles de Philosophie Positive, p. 53.\n\n[16] Harris's Highlands of \u0152thiopia, vol. iii. p. 63.\n\n[17] While these sheets were passing through the press, I read in the\n_Pall Mall Gazette_ for April 24th, as follows: One of the Communist\npapers, the _Montagne_, writes: \"Education has made sceptics of us;\nthe Revolution of 1871 is atheistic; our Republic wears a bouquet of\nimmortelles in her bosom. We take our dead to their homes, and our\nwives to our hearts without a prayer. Priests! throw aside your frocks,\nturn up your sleeves, lay your hands upon the plough, for a song to the\nlark in the morning air is better than a mumbling of psalms, and an ode\nto sparkling wine is preferable to a chanting of hymns. Our dogs that\nused only to growl when a bishop passed will bite him now, and not a\nvoice will be raised to curse the day which dawns for the sacrifice\nof the Archbishop of Paris. We owe it to ourselves, we owe it to the\nworld. The Commune has promised us an eye for an eye, and has given us\nMonseigneur Darboy as a hostage. The justice of the tribunals shall\ncommence, said Danton, when the wrath of the people is appeased; and he\nwas right. Darboy! tremble in your cell, for your day is past, your end\nis close at hand.\"\n\n[18] I use this word because if the value of faith and virtue consists\nin their being a discipline, while this implies the existence of\ndifficulty, it also limits the degree of the difficulty.\n\n[19] \"Rudiments,\" so far from disproving, prove this. A rudiment shows\nthat nature might have given more, but has not done so. Why? Because\nthe further gift would have been useless, for instance, man would not\nhave been benefited by being able to feel with his eye-brows. (See\nDarwin, \"Descent of Man,\" i. 25.)\n\n[20] Professor Huxley's words are, \"In these groups there is abundant\nevidence of variation--none of what is ordinarily understood as\nprogression; and if the known geological record is to be regarded as\neven any considerable fragment of the whole, it is inconceivable that\nany theory of a necessarily progressive development can stand, for the\nnumerous orders and families cited afford no trace of such a process.\"\n(p. 245.)\n\n[21] Darwin, \"Descent of Man,\" i. 205.[175]\n\n[22] It is a curious fact that these Ascidians possess a heart and a\ncirculation, but that after the heart has beaten a certain number of\ntimes it stops, and then beats the opposite way, so as to reverse the\ncirculation. (Lay Sermons, p. 95.) In what stage of its progress did it\nso degenerate as to lose this remarkable power?\n\n[23] Darwin, \"Descent of Man,\" i. 22.[176]\n\n[24] There is something of this in animals just as, on the other hand,\nman is not altogether devoid of instincts. I should have expected this\nfrom the teaching of the first chapter of Genesis, which represents men\nnot as a distinct creation but as the last act of creation.\n\n[25] Physically the monkey is man's superior. Anatomists assure us that\nthey can find no very great difference between his brain and ours. His\nlarynx also is as well fitted as ours to produce articulate sounds.\nSo far we are equal. But he has four hands, and we have but two. Read\nSir C. Bell's \"Bridgewater Treatise upon the Hand,\" and you will\nsee at once that a vast superiority is implied in this. I can never\nbelieve that when, by natural and sexual selection, a creature had been\nattained possessed of four hands, nature could so degradate in her work\nas to fall back upon two. No well-bred monkey would have mated with one\nso deformed.[178]\n\n[26] Lartet, quoted by Darwin, \"Descent,\" i. 51.\n\n[27] The body politic is in fact very much like the natural body. There\nis a constant waste and a constant repair. The waste may be greater\nthan the repair--and in that case the body dwindles--but the repair may\nbe greater than the waste, in which case there is growth, progress. In\nboth alike real growth can only be by assimilation. The new must be\ntaken up into the old, and become part with it. That which is losing\nvitality must be put away; but that which is to take its place must\nbecome one with the old. After a certain time, however, natural bodies\nlose their powers of assimilation, and old age and death are the\nresult: I cannot enter into the question how far this is also the case\nwith political bodies.[179]\n\n[28] Animals brought into contact with man attain some small share in\nthis power. The influence of man over domesticated animals is most\nremarkable. I should doubt whether a wild animal was at all capable of\nmaking such a distinction.\n\n[29] I have taken these words from the \"Vedanta Philosophy.\" It teaches\nthat the apparent reality of this world is _m\u0101y\u0101_, i.e., deceit,\nillusion, jugglery: \"naught besides _the One_ exists:\" the world was\nmade out of nothing and is nothing. \"All that is real in this visible,\nis the God who is invisible.\" See Ballantyne's \"Christianity compared\nwith Hindu Philosophy,\" pp. xxxi-xxxvii, 43-50.\n\n[30] It is the examination of these moral and spiritual faculties which\nmakes it so probable that man possesses something more than a highly\norganised body and mental powers, which, though superior in degree, are\nstill of the same kind as those possessed by the animals. And it should\nbe remembered that the proof that man possesses a soul, and that the\nsoul is immortal, is entirely independent of revelation. It is based\nupon the intelligent study of the facts of psychology. If, however, it\nis said that man does not really possess, but only seems to possess\nthese faculties, I answer that then nature is a mere deceiver, and its\nworks a sham: and that, consequently, all physical science would be the\nstudy of the illusive.\n\n[31] Though we draw a distinction between the natural and the\nsupernatural, this distinction is tenable only when we look at things\nfrom below, and not when we look at them from above. We call those\nprocesses natural of which we know or might know the secondary causes.\n\n[32] It is no argument against revelation that it does not make us all\nholy and devout. It is not the law of this present state of things that\nall men attain to the highest possible physical and mental excellence.\nAll that we can say is, that they ought to aim at nothing less. So\nneither do all men attain to moral and religious excellence. Equally it\nought to be their aim; but why they so often fail in attaining to it is\nmore than any one can answer. The failure of individuals to attain to\nthe highest good possible for the species is one of nature's universal\nlaws. Why this present state of things is so constituted is a mystery,\nwhich cannot be solved here; but which will certainly be solved when we\nhave the perfect knowledge promised us in 1 Cor. xiii. 12.\n\n[33] Professor Huxley considers that man is a bungle. At all events he\nwould be glad to be \"turned into a sort of clock, and wound up every\nmorning before he got out of bed,\" on condition that he should always\n\"think what is true, and do what is right.\" (Lay Sermons, p. 373.) I\nsuppose this means that we should like to be governed by very perfect\ninstincts, but I question whether he would not find his new kind of\nlife dull. At present both right thinking and right doing require of\nhim an effort, which, from the spirit of his writings, I should think\nhe enjoys. But, after all, what he says has a true foundation. Sin\nis not a necessary part of man's lot. It cleaves to him because he\nis fallen; and this world apparently offers us a state of moral and\nreligious discipline, by the aid of which, in a future state, we shall\nbe free from sin. But those who do not wish to retrograde would prefer\nto have this freedom by the force of perfected habits than by the force\nof instinct.\n\n[34] \"Essays and Reviews\" (Baden Powell), p. 133. The italics are mine,\nsimply to call attention to the point of the quotation.\n\n[35] De Gen. An. II. iii. 10. See article by Sir Alexander Grant in the\n_Contemporary_, May, 1871, p. 277.\n\n[36] Since writing the above, I have lighted on the following passage\nin an able university sermon by one of the lecturers in the present\ncourse. I am glad to confirm what had struck my own mind, by quoting\nthe words of so careful a reasoner. In reference to philosophic doubts\ndirected against the idea of design, and the analogy between human\nand natural productions, he remarks: \"This is evidently a very hard\nquestion, and if it properly belonged to the province of physical\ninquiry I should shrink from hazarding any investigation of its merits.\nBut the question has overstepped the boundary of such sciences, and\nbecome a branch of philosophy. I may seem obscure in making this\nassertion, but you will see its truth if you consider for a moment the\nlimit which divides science from philosophy. Sciences are often content\nto accept their principles, the lower from the higher (as Aristotle\nputs the case) in an ascending scale up to metaphysic, which, if it is\nanything at all, is the philosophy of first grounds so far as they are\ndiscoverable. While the various kinds of inquiry assume their several\ngrounds as postulates, each keeps its separate and subordinate place.\nBut one prime impulse of the human mind is unification, and thus, in\nevery science, there springs up a tendency to ground itself. The moment\nthis attempt is made, a science becomes a philosophy, and must be\ntested by the ordinary criteria of philosophic procedure.\"--_Right and\nWrong_, by the Rev. W. Jackson, M.A.\n\n[37] _Westminster Review_, Oct., 1860. Art. on New Christianity.\n\n[38] Mill's \"System of Logic,\" ii., 160.\n\n[39] \"The argument in Hume's celebrated Essay on Miracles was very far\nfrom being a new one. It had, as Mr. Coleridge has pointed out, been\ndistinctly indicated by South in his sermon on the incredulity of St.\nThomas; and there is a remarkable statement of much the same argument\nput into the mouth of Woolston's Advocate, in Sherlock's Trial of the\nWitnesses.\"--Art. on Miracles in Smith's \"Dictionary of the Bible.\"\n\n[40] See Martensen's \"Christian Dogmatics,\" 222.\n\n[41] I must here refer to Dorner's \"Doctrine of the Person of Christ,\"\nwhere evidence is afforded of what I say.\n\n[42] See again Martensen's \"Christian Dogmatics,\" 220.\n\n[43] I would also mention \"The Divine Origin of Christianity,\" by John\nSheppard. A work less known than it deserves to be.\n\n[44] Wagenseil's Confutation of the Toldoth Jeschu: Sheppard's \"Divine\nOrigin of Christianity,\" ii. 205, _et seq._\n\n[45] Lessons on Christian Evidence, 33.\n\n[46] Celsus in Orig., L. i., \u00a7 28.\n\n[47] Hieron, T. ii. 334.\n\n[48] Cyril contra Jul., L. vi., p. 191. See, respecting these and\nsimilar passages, Lardner's Credibility, vii. 225, 442, 627.\n\n[49] \"Essays and Reviews\" (Baden Powell), 107.\n\n[50] That R\u00e9nan should treat the Resurrection of Lazarus as a pious\nfraud, and the one moral blot in the story of Christ, is the greatest\nliterary, as well as moral, blot in his \"Vie de J\u00e9sus.\" See Hutton's\nEssays, i., 297.\n\n[51] See Art. on Miracles in Smith's Dic.\n\n[52] Niebuhr's \"Lebensnachrichten,\" quoted in Luthardt's \"Apologetic\nLectures,\" 200.\n\n[53] Mozley's \"Lectures on Miracles,\" 120.\n\n[54] \"Lectures on Miracles,\" 5.\n\n[55] Coleridge's \"Friend,\" iii., 104-6.\n\n[56] Dr. Vaughan's \"Christ the Light of the World,\" 172.\n\n[57] Ad. Gen. 1. i. c. 42, _et seq._\n\n[58] Inst. L. iv. c. 25.\n\n[59] Dorner, in his _Person of Christ_ (Clark's Trans.), ii. 254,\ndwells upon this subject as unfolded by Athanasius. See also\nAthanasius' third discourse against the Arians, \u00a7 32.\n\n[60] In Johan. Evan. Tract, 16, 24, 49.\n\n[61] See Brachet's \"Dictionnaire Etymologique,\" sub voc: _Developper_.\n\n[62] \"Essay on Development,\" page 35.\n\n[63] I will here quote the words of a great man, who has for many years\nbeen one of the chief scientific ornaments of this country, and whose\ndeparture from this life, at the ripe age of seventy-nine years, I see,\nwith much sorrow, recorded in the _Times_ of this day.\n\nSpeaking of the manner in which the universe has come into its present\ncondition, and is preserved in that condition, and of the possibility\nof collision amongst the constituent bodies, Sir John Herschel says:\n\"Ages, which to us may well appear indefinite, may easily be conceived\nto pass without a single instance of collision, in the nature of a\ncatastrophe. Such may have gradually become rarer as the system has\nemerged from what must be considered as its chaotic state, till at\nlength, in the fulness of time, and under the pre-arranging guidance\nof that DESIGN which pervades universal nature, each individual may\nhave taken up such a course as to annul the possibility of further\ndestructive interference.\"--_Outlines of Astronomy_, p. 600.\n\nI quote these words for the sake of the phrase which they contain,\nand the importance of which it is impossible to exaggerate, \"The\npre-arranging guidance of that DESIGN which pervades universal nature.\"\n\n[64] \"Le Genie du Christianisme,\" Bk. iv., chap. v.\n\n[65] \"Descent of Man,\" p. 208.\n\n[66] Report of Evidence, 1870:--\n\nQ. 376. I thought you said Bishop Butler had been excluded?--It is\nnot excluded, but being an optional subject it is one that has been\ndiscouraged.\n\nQ. 377. Why?--He is gone out of fashion; I do not know why.\n\nQ. 378. Who makes the fashion?--I suppose the particular set of\nexaminers at one time.\n\nQ. 379. What are the works of Bishop Butler which have so gone out of\nfashion?--The Analogy and the Sermons were the books which we used to\ntake up.\n\n[67] The subject of this Lecture is touched upon, but not expanded,\nin the following pregnant passage of Butler's _Analogy_: \"The thing\nobjected against this scheme of the Gospel is, that it seems to suppose\nGod was reduced to the necessity of a long series of intricate means\nin order to accomplish His ends, the recovery and salvation of the\nworld: in like sort as men, for want of understanding or power, not\nbeing able to come to their ends readily, are forced to go roundabout\nways, and make use of many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them.\nNow, everything which we see shows the folly of this, considered as\nan objection against the truth of Christianity. For, according to our\nmanner of conception, God makes use of a variety of means, what we\noften think tedious ones, in the natural course of providence, for the\naccomplishment of all His ends. Indeed, it is certain there is somewhat\nin this matter quite beyond our comprehension: but the mystery is as\ngreat in nature as in Christianity.\"--_Analogy_, Part II., chap. iv.\n\n[68] Philos. of Univ. Hist. i. p. 191.\n\n[69] Manuel d'Histoire, tom. ii. p. 16.\n\n[70] Zeitschrift f. \u0152gypt. Sp. Nov. 1868.\n\n[71] Colenso. \"The Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua.\"\n\n[72] Gen. xlvi. 27; compare Ex. i. 5.\n\n[73] Gen. xlvi. 7.\n\n[74] Gen. xlvi. 5. The word _taph_ (\u05d8\u05e3) here, translated \"little ones\"\nmeans \"households.\" The Septuagint translate it by \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03af\u03b1 [Greek: oikia]\nor \u03c3\u03c5\u03b3\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 [Greek: sungeneia].\n\n[75] Payne Smith, \"Bampton Lectures.\" p. 89.\n\n[76] History of Old Covenant, vol. ii. p. 149. E. T.\n\n[77] Ex. xii. 40, 41.\n\n[78] Essay on Population, vol. i. p. 8; Encycl. Brit. vol. xviii. p.\n340.\n\n[79] It was on the 5th of January, 1771, the _day_ appointed by the\nhigh priests, that Oubacha began his march, _with seventy thousand\nfamilies_. Most of the hordes were then assembled in the steppes,\non the left bank of the Volga, and _the whole multitude followed\nhim_.\"--Hommaire de Hell, Travels, p. 227, E. T.\n\n[80] Num. xxxi. 32, 33.\n\n[81] F. Newman's \"Hebrew Monarchy,\" pp. 160, 161.\n\n[82] \"Dictionary of the Bible,\" ad voc. SHISHAK.\n\n[83] \"Geographische Inschriften,\" vol. ii., p. 32, _et seq._\n\n[84] 2 Kings xv. 19.\n\n[85] 2 Kings xxiii. 29; Ezra vi. 22.\n\n[86] Isaiah xx. 1.\n\n[87] 2 Kings xvii. 6; xviii. 7, 11.\n\n[88] Von Lengerke, \"Das Buch Daniel; Einleitung,\" \u00a7 13; p. lxiii.\n\"De Wette, Einleitung in d. Abte Testament,\" p. 225, a; Davison,\n\"Introduction to the Old Testament,\" vol. iii. pp. 174-192.\n\n[89] 2 Kings xxv. 23.\n\n[90] Dan. iii. 2. \u05d0\u05ea\u05e9\u05d3\u05e8\u05e4\u05e0\u05d9\u05d0 translated in our version, \"princes,\" but\nreally the Hebrew equivalent of the Persian _khshatrapa_, \"satraps.\"\n\n[91] Dan. v. 31.\n\n[92] Dan. ix. 1.\n\n[93] See Pusey's \"Lectures on Daniel,\" pp. 124, 125. 3rd edition.\n\n[94] H. N. vi. 27.\n\n[95] Dan. v. 11.\n\n[96] Herod. iii. 31.\n\n[97] De Wette, \"Einleitung,\" p. 267.\n\n[98] Ibid. loc. cit.\n\n[99] Gen. xli. 42, 43.\n\n[100] Dan. v. 29.\n\n[101] Strauss, \"Leben Jesu,\" \u00a7 32.\n\n[102] Strauss, \"Leben Jesu,\" \u00a7 44.\n\n[103] See Krafft, \"Topografie Jerusalems,\" Inscr. 29.\n\n[104] Strauss, L. J. \u00a7 32.\n\n[105] Ibid. \u00a7 34.\n\n[106] Those who wish to see the cumulative force of the entire argument\nwill find it in \"the Jesus of the Evangelists.\" It is impossible to\ncompress its reasonings.\n\n[107] See Appendix to \"St. John's Testimony to Christ,\" in Professor\nLeathes' Boyle Lectures. No one who has not read this can form an idea\nof the extent of similarity of thought and expression to the fourth\nGospel which underlies the Synoptics.\n\n[108] To give precision to the argument, it is necessary to determine\nits definite character. But it is impossible to do so within the limits\nof a single lecture.\n\n[109] \"Jesus of the Evangelists,\" chap. x.\n\n[110] See \"Jesus of the Evangelists,\" chap. v.\n\n[111] \"Jesus of the Evangelists,\" p. 381. The entire collection of\napocryphal Gospels has been translated by Mr. Cowper. I am sure\nthat their perusal will greatly confirm our faith in the historical\ncharacter of the true. The order of mind which invented the one could\nnot have invented the other.\n\n[112] \"Jesus of the Evangelists,\" chap. xvii.\n\n[113] Acts xxiv. 27.\n\n[114] 1 Cor. xv. 6.\n\n[115] 1 Cor. xv. 12.\n\n[116] 2 Cor. v. 17.\n\n[117] For evidence as to the authenticity of this Gospel see the Boyle\nLectures for 1870, \"The witness of St. John to Christ.\"\n\n[118] 1 Cor. xv. 4.\n\n[119] 1 Cor. xi. 27.\n\n[120] 1 Cor. xv. 4.\n\n[121] 1 Cor. xv. 5-8.\n\n[122] 1 Cor. xv. 9.\n\n[123] 2 Cor. xii. 2.\n\n[124] 1 Gal. ii. 1, and i. 18.\n\n[125] Gal. ii. 20.\n\n[126] Rom. vi. 10.\n\n[127] Rom. vi. 23; i. 3, 4.\n\n[128] Rom. xv. 23.\n\n[129] Rom. i. 8.\n\n[130] Rom. i. 4; vi. 6-9; viii. 34.\n\n[131] Rom. viii. 14, 16, 17.\n\n[132] Rom. v. 1.\n\n[133] Rom. i. 3, 4.\n\n[134] Rom. vi. 3; 1 Cor. i. 13; Gal. iii. 27; cf. 2 Cor. i. 22.\n\n[135] 1 Cor. xi. 23.\n\n[136] 1 Cor. xi. 26.\n\n[137] 1 Cor. i. 17.\n\n[138] Gal. i. 13.\n\n[139] St. Matt. xxviii. 15.\n\n[140] Gal. i. 15, 16.\n\n[141] Acts xxviii. 24.\n\n[142] Acts xxvi. 8.\n\n[143] It must always be remembered that Mohammed learned the best of\nhis morals and his theology from Jews or Christians.\n\n[144] In answer to this theory of development or afterthought it may\nbe said that all the early records, the writings of the Apostles and\nEvangelists, the writings of the Apostolic fathers, are clear about\nthe Godhead of Christ. It was comparatively late that doubters arose,\nheretics like Cerinthus and Theodotus, and philosophic Christians like\nJustin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, accepting the gospel\nindeed, but diluting it by their reasonings upon it.\n\n[145] The arguments here considered are those propounded in Lecky's\n\"History of European Morals.\"\n\n[146] The terrible scenes just enacted, and even now enacting, in\nParis, almost seem to contradict my words concerning mercy in war,\nwords written and even printed before Paris was burned and wasted.\nBut let us remember that eighty years ago France threw away its\nChristianity, and took Atheism for its creed; that in the last fifty\nyears it has been slowly and painfully recovering its faith; that\nParis has been the centre of the unbelief of Europe; that so, a large\nportion of its inhabitants have grown up utterly without religion;\nthat, according to a friendly witness, \"the people of Paris believe not\nin any God, nor in any man;\"[147] or, according to another statement,\n\"the Communists acknowledge no God, no man, no faith, no hope, nothing\nbut better wages and more pleasure;\"[148] that the chief perpetrators\nof the horrors of the past week not only abhorred Christianity, but\nmurdered priests, only because they were ministers of Christ, and\nproclaimed Atheism and Materialism to be the very basis of their\ntheory, both in politics and in life. There is nothing to surprise\nus when we find that those who deliberately cast off religion and\nhumanity, faith in God, and faith in man, fall lower than those who are\nsimply ignorant of the true principles of either. Atheists in the midst\nof faith are very likely to be much worse than heathens.\n\n[147] _Fortnightly Review_, quoted in _Times_, May 31, 1871.\n\n[148] _Times_, May 31, 1871.\n\n[149] Maclear's \"History of the Christian Missions in the Middle Ages,\"\np. 417. Macmillan, 1863.\n\n[150] \"Ecce Homo,\" p. 71. Second edition, 1866.\n\n[151] Platon. Symposium. Steph. iii., 220.\n\n[152] Midway stands Anselm, the father of modern metaphysics, with the\nscientific demonstration of the two fundamental truths of all religion,\nthe existence of God and the Incarnation.\n\n[153] Pascal, \"Fragmens d'une Apologie du Christianisme,\" in the 2nd\nvol. of \"Pens\u00e9es du Blaise Pascal.\" Paris, 1814.\n\n[154] Luthardt (Apologetische Vortr\u00e4ge, in two parts), presents in a\nform peculiarly adapted for general readers, a very complete survey\nboth of the internal and external evidences. Steinmeyer, Apologetische\nVortr\u00e4ge, in three parts, discusses the historical evidence for the\nmiracles, the death and the resurrection of our Lord, with special\nreference to the latest criticisms. Delitzsch's System der Christlichen\nApologetik is of a more exclusively philosophical and dogmatic\ncharacter. It has been reviewed in the Studien u. Kritiken, by Dr.\nSack, of Bonn, whose own work, Christliche Apologetik, 1841, is one of\nthe best on the whole subject of evidences.\n\n[155] It is well known that both Jews and Gentiles admitted that the\nworks were wrought, though they denied that the power came from God.\nSuperstition, then as ever, opposed the faith of which it is the\ncounterfeit.\n\n[156] The most interesting and accessible accounts of this man are\ngiven by M. Barth\u00e9lemi S. Hilaire, \"Le Bonddha et sa Religion;\" and by\nM. Amp\u00e8re, in \"La Science et les Lettres en Orient.\" Siddartha lived\nabout the end of the seventh century, B.C. The name \"Sakya\nMonni\" is an appellative, meaning the monk or hermit of the Sakyas, the\nroyal race to which he belonged. The true end of all philosophy and\nreligion in his system is to enter into Nirvana, _i.e._ (according to\nM. Eug\u00e8ne Burnouf, the highest authority on this subject), the complete\nannihilation, not only of the material elements of existence, but\nalso, and more specially, of the thinking principle. In this view the\nmajority of Oriental scholars agree; the few who differ, as Colebrook\ndoes, identify Nirvana with an endless and dreamless sleep. See M.\nS. Hilaire, l.c., p. 133. M. Amp\u00e8re (p. 215) thus characterizes the\nsystem, \"La fin supr\u00e8me de l'homme \u00e2 \u00e9t\u00e9 de perdre le sentiment de son\nmoi, de renoncer \u00e0 sa libert\u00e9, de s'\u00e9lever au dessus des affections les\nplus pures, d'arriver \u00e0 un \u00e9tat, o\u00f9 il ne rest\u00e2t plus que le _vide_.\"\n\n[157] The four books of Khung-fu-tseu were written in the second half\nof the sixth century, B.C. They contain the religions and philosophy\nof China in a dogmatic form. The second book, called \"Tchung yung,\"\nrepresents most fully his moral code, of which the principle is\nobedience to natural reason, and the rule is observance of the _via\nmedia_, with due regard to times and circumstances. In one passage,\nccxi., iv., Confucius says a man of strong virtue goes beyond this _via\nmedia_ which prescribes indifference and exact conformity to natural\nlaw. For a just appreciation of the Confucian system, the reader may\nconsult M. Amp\u00e8re, \"La Science et les Lettres en Orient,\" p. 98 ff.\n\n[158] For a very remarkable echo of this passage, showing the depth\nand permanence of such feelings, see the words of Mr. Hutton, quoted\nfurther on.\n\n[159] Dante, Inferno, c. iv.\n\n[160] Romans, Corinthians, and Galatians, accepted by all the T\u00fcbingen\nSchool. (See Mr. Leathes' lecture.)\n\n[161] In addition to the well-known work of Tischendorf, and German,\nFrench, and English commentaries, attention may be called to a valuable\ntreatise by P. H. de Groot, of Groningen, \"Basilides als erster Zeuge\ndes Johannesevangeliums.\" Leipzig, 1868. The internal evidence has\nalready been discussed by Dr. Lightfoot, who promises a complete\ntreatise on the subject, with which no one can deal more effectively.\nSome good points are made by Mr. Hutton in Essays, vol. i.\n\n[162] Essays Theological and Literary, by R. H. Hutton; vol. i., p. 282.\n\n[163] Notice the faint condemnation, if it be a condemnation at all, of\nthe peculiar shame of Athens, as \"greatly at variance with modern and\nChristian _notions_, but in accordance with Hellenic sentiment\" (vol.\ni., p. 482, and compare p. 555).\n\n[164] See the preface to the Republic, in vol. ii. Compare also the\nwords of Socrates on his trial (p. 40 in the Greek, vol. i., p.\n354, Jowett); they probably represent his views more truly than the\nbrilliant speculations in the Ph\u00e6do. One alternative which he seems\ndisposed to accept, viz., that death may be \"a sleep like the sleep of\nhim who is undisturbed by dreams,\" resembles very nearly the Nirvana of\nBuddhism.\n\n[165] Ritschl shows very conclusively that the Essenian principle was\neven more exclusive than the Rabbinical, and more antagonistic in\nprinciple to Christianity. See Altkatholische Kirche, pp. 179-203.\n\n[166] Within the few last months, Steinmeyer has published a treatise\non the history of the resurrection, with reference to the latest\ncriticisms, which I would commend to readers of German. Serious\nattempts have been made in England to disjoin this cardinal truth\nfrom the doctrinal system of St. Paul, attempts which seem passing\nstrange on the part of critics who accept him as a thoroughly truthful\nman, nay, as an inspired apostle, and who must know that he makes\nthe resurrection the very centre or foundation of his teaching. Even\nHegel, the very Corypheus of idealism, declares \"Die Auferstehung\ngeh\u00f6rt wesentlich dem Glauben an;\" _i.e._, the resurrection belongs\nessentially to the faith. See \"Die Philosophie der Religion,\" p. 300.\nIn a note on the same page, Hegel shows that he takes it as a real\nobjective event: \"wie alles Bisherige in der Weise der Wirklichkeit f\u00fcr\ndas unmittelbare Bewusstsein zur Erscheinung gekommen, so auch diese\nErhebung.\"\n\n[167] Christian Dogmatics, \u00a7 63. (Clark.)\n\n\n\n\nNOTES TO\n\nMODERN SCEPTICISM.\n\n\n\n\nNOTES.\n\n\nON POSITIVISM.\n\n[168] \"Does any one fancy that he sees a solid cube? It is easy to\nshow that the solidity of the figure, the relative position of its\nfaces and edges to each other, are inferences of the spectator--no\nmore conveyed to his conviction by the eye alone than they would be if\nhe were looking at a painted representation of a cube. The scene of\nnature is a picture without depth of substance, no less than the scene\nof art; and in the one case, as in the other, it is the mind which, by\nan act of its own, discovers that colour and shape denote distance and\nsolidity. Most men are unconscious of this perpetual habit of reading\nthe language of the external world, and translating as they read.\nThe draughtsman, indeed, is compelled, for his purposes, to return\nback in thought from the solid bodies which he has inferred, to the\nshapes of surface which he really sees. He knows that there is a mask\nof theory over the whole face of nature, if it be _theory_ to infer\nmore than we _see_. But other men, unaware of this masquerade, hold\nit to be a fact that they see cubes and spheres, spacious apartments,\nand winding avenues. And these things are facts to them, because they\nare unconscious of the mental operation by which they have penetrated\nnature's disguise....\n\n\"Our sensations require ideas to bind them together; namely, ideas of\nspace, time, number, and the like. If not so bound together, sensations\ndo not give us any apprehension of things or objects. All things, all\nobjects, must exist in space and in time--must be one or many. Now\nspace, time, number, are not sensations or things. They are something\ndifferent from, and opposed to, sensations and things. We have\ntermed them ideas. It may be said they are relations of things, or of\nsensations. But granting this form of expression, still a _relation_ is\nnot a thing or a sensation; and therefore we must still have another\nand opposite element, along with our sensations....\n\n\"We are often told that such a thing is _a fact_--a fact, and not a\ntheory,--with all the emphasis which, in speaking or writing, tone or\nitalics or capitals can give. We see from what has been said, that when\nthis is urged, before we can estimate the truth, or the value of the\nassertion, we must ask to whom is it a fact? what habits of thought,\nwhat previous information, what ideas does it imply, to conceive the\nfact as a fact? Does not the apprehension of the fact imply assumptions\nwhich may with equal justice be called theory, and which are perhaps\nfalse theory? in which case the fact is no fact. Did not the ancients\nassert it as a fact, that the earth stood still, and the stars moved?\nand can any fact have stronger apparent evidence to justify persons in\nasserting it emphatically than this had?\"--_Whewell's Philosophy of the\nInductive Sciences_, 2nd ed., vol. i., p. 42, _seq._\n\nThat the solidity of figures is in truth given by mental judgment, has\nbeen often proved experimentally; see for examples, Huxley's Elementary\nPhysiology, Lesson x., 13-16. The experiment with a coin, lens and pin,\np. 259, is easy as well as conclusive, but Wheatstone's Pseudoscope\nmore surprising to most observers. Compare on this curious subject\nBrewster's Natural Magic, Letter v.\n\n[169] It is important to bear in mind that, from an admitted\nincompetency of our faculties to _know_ the absolute, we cannot infer\nan impossibility of knowing its _existence_. To know that a thing _is_,\nand to know _what_ it is, are two totally distinct degrees and sorts of\nknowledge. The moment this distinction is stated, every one sees its\ntruth; but many persons omit stating it to themselves when they reason\nupon these difficult subjects.\n\nRavaisson, after giving a brief account of Herbert Spencer's opinion,\ngoes on to say: \"Comment il y a, au fond de toute connaissance, un\nabsolu, auquel correspond, comme son oppos\u00e9, le relatif, c'est ce\nqu'\u00e9tablissait, il y a plus de vingt si\u00e8cles, contre une doctrine\nd\u00e9j\u00e0 r\u00e9gnante alors de relativit\u00e9 et de mobilit\u00e9 universelles, la\ndialectique platonicienne, qui fraya le chemin \u00e0 la metaphysique.\nElle faisait plus: elle montrait que par cet absolu seul les relations\nsont intelligibles, parce qu'il est la mesure par laquelle seule\nnous les estimons. La m\u00e9taphysique, entre les mains de son immortel\nfondateur, fit davantage encore: elle montra que cet absolu, par lequel\nl'intelligence mesure le relatif, est l'intelligence m\u00eame. C'est ce\nque redisait Leibniz, lorsque, \u00e0 cette assertion, renouvel\u00e9e de la\nscolastique par Locke, qu'il n'\u00e9tait rien dans l'intelligence qui\nd'abord n'e\u00fbt \u00e9t\u00e9 dans le sens, il r\u00e9pondait: \"sauf l'intelligence,\"\net que, avec Aristote, il montrait dans l'intelligence la mesure\nsup\u00e9rieure du sens.\"--_Rapport_, p. 66.\n\nRavaisson then gives interesting extracts from Sophie St. Germain, and\nproceeds to show how Comte, without admitting any self-contemplating\nintelligence, and thus inferring the possibility of an Absolute,\ndid in fact pursue the idea of Unity, and extended this idea to the\nuniverse,--a principle which, if fully grasped, must be fatal to\nPositive views. \"D'accord maintenant avec Platon, Aristote, Leibniz,\nil d\u00e9clarait que l'ensemble \u00e9tant le resultat et l'expression\nd'une certaine unit\u00e9, \u00e0 laquelle tout concourt et se co-ordonne\net qui est le but o\u00f9 tout marche, c'est dans cette unit\u00e9, c'est\ndans le but, c'est dans la fin ou cause finale qu'est le secret de\nl'organisme.\"--_Rapport_, p. 76.\n\nA special interest attaches to the work of Ravaisson as an\nauthoritative French rating of the philosophic exchange between England\nand France. It is almost unnecessary to refer for a less abstract\naccount of these relations to the widely known writings of M. Taine.\n\n[170] It should have been stated in the text, as it was in the\ndelivered lecture, that these questions were not forgotten by the\neminent Professor. The passages referred to will be found in his\neloquent address on the \"Scientific use of the Imagination,\" p. 47,\n_seq._, or in his volume of collected Essays, p. 163, _seq._ The reader\nmay observe that, both in Professor Tyndall's pages and two sentences\nback in this lecture, Development is spoken of as a process or law in\noperation. The various kinds of philosophy which may be engrafted on\nsuch a law are severally determined by whatever reply is given to the\nquestions above suggested. It would seem inappropriate here to state\nthe possible relations between a law of development and such consequent\n(or inconsequent) philosophies. Those who wish to consider them the\nwriter may refer to his little volume entitled \"Right and Wrong,\" for a\nbrief discussion of this subject, and more particularly for the results\nto natural theology.\n\nThe following German sketch of an evolution-philosophy may not be\nwithout interest:--\"Verm\u00f6ge einer ewigen Kreisbewegung entstehen als\nVerdichtungen der Luft unz\u00e4hlige Welten, himmlische Gottheiten, in\nderen Mittelpunkt die cylinderf\u00f6rmige Erde ruht, unbewegt wegen des\ngleichen Abstandes von allen Punkten der Himmelskugel. Die Erde hat\nsich aus einem unspr\u00fcnglich fl\u00fcssigen Zustande gebildet. Aus dem\nFeuchten sind unter dem Einfluss der W\u00e4rme in stufenweise Entwickelung\ndie lebenden Wesen hervorgegangen. Auch die Landthiere waren anfangs\nfischartig und haben erst mit der Abtrocknung der Erdoberfl\u00e4che ihre\njetzige Gestalt gewonnen. Die Seele soll Anaximander als luftartig\nbezeichnet haben.\"\n\nAnaximander of Miletus was born about B.C. 610. Consequently he ranks\nearly among European theorizers on development. The extract is from\nUeberweg's Grundriss, t. 1, p. 40. Cf. Plutarch de Placit. v. 19, and\nSympos viii. qu. 8, with Euseb. Pr\u00e6p. Evang. i. 8.\n\n[171] The sight of a dualism apparently insoluble never fails to\nsuggest some such questions as these: Was it always so? will it be so\nalways? and were I at the centre of the universe, should I see it so\nnow?\n\nThere are three possible ways of conceiving otherwise: 1, by reducing\nmind to matter; 2, by reducing matter to mind; 3, by comprehending both\nunder a higher unity.\n\nWe need only write down these issues for common sense to perceive that\nNos. 1 and 2 arise from, and end in one-sided speculation. A man who\nlives shut up amongst machinery is apt to think of his own mind as a\nmachine. Great chemists have ere now taken the human stomach for a\nlaboratory, and were slow in awakening to those physiological facts\nwhich put the vital processes of assimilation in a nobler and truer\nlight. Comte began by reducing all sciences to mathematical elements.\nAfterwards he discovered that to explain a higher order of things by a\nlower is the essence of materialism.\n\nTo a meditative spirit, the inner world is nearer than the outer;\nand therefore the evidence of its reality is stronger by wanting the\nweakness of a second link. But active life brings home to us the\nexistence of both; we suffer by defying or neglecting the laws of\neither; and pain and sorrow are often the advanced guard of much stern\nunyielding truth. In a world where we all endure the friction of things\nexternal, it is hard not to believe in objective as well subjective\nrealities.\n\nThe truth is, that the primary question belongs to the practical\nreason, and can be settled by no other criterion. There is a\nphilosophical maxim that we can never speak of the Divine univocally,\nbut only by analogy, figure, or similitude; the cause being that all\nattributes belonging to the Infinite require words which, if taken\nliterally, must land us in self-contradiction. How vivid an idea do\nwe gain of Omniscience or Omnipotence by saying that it is \"a circle\nof which the centre is everywhere, the circumference nowhere.\" And\nwhat signifies the obvious inconsistency? Deny the Infinite, try to\nfind a place for its centre or circumference, and the inconsistency\nremains, together with a host of absurd consequences. When of two\nhypotheses both cannot, but one must be true, and either position lands\nus in logical inconsistency, it is easy to see that our theoretical\nunderstanding will never clear up the inexplicable issue. A rule\nby which we live and act becomes the surest touchstone of truth or\nfalsehood.\n\nLet us see whether the two worlds in which we live can be practically\ntreated as one. Suppose a bivouac into which a shell descends, certain\nin another moment, by physical law, to explode. Is the moral law--the\neffort of this man or that man to escape--equally certain? Arguing\nabstractedly, most people would hold it so, yet we know that the fact\nlies otherwise. There is a fatalism among soldiers--\"every bullet has\nits billet\"--as there is among nurses who believe that every epidemic\nmust kill its destined prey. One may have trained himself to wish for\ndeath, another is indifferent, a third so undecided that he leaves the\nevent to a doctrine of chances, a fourth is simply capricious. Each by\na course of life and action has made or modified his present moment for\nchoice, and any one may or may not draw back from the coming peril. Had\nthe falling shell been a splash from a carriage wheel, every man would\nhave shrunk from it. The latter risk is too simple for human ponderings\nor human self-direction, and in such cases people act by a proximate\nstraightforward instinct.\n\nBut on what principles must he who shrinks from either risk really\nproceed? He is sure that his own movements are in his own power and\ncontingent. He is equally sure that the movements of shell or mud are\nabsolutely determined in calculable curves, and not at all contingent.\nActing on these two conjoint data, he succeeds in avoiding death or\ndirt; and, whatever theorists may write, he would have perilled his\nsuccess by acting otherwise. Nay, what is much to our purpose, all\ntheoretical men would themselves act upon the like assumption in all\ncases of practical consequence and emergency.\n\nSuppose dualism banished from the world in fact as well as in theory,\nthe problems of education ought to be as demonstrable as those of\ngeometry or chemical experiment. The paths of men and of comets being\nequally calculable, because equally subject to uniform law, how\ncomes it that biography and history abound in the records of grossly\nfalsified predictions? Let the courses of nations be tabulated, and\nstatesmanship is made easy. We must owe it to some egregious oversight\nthat criminal punishments are not invariably deterrent. Perhaps the law\nof the strongest motive has been neglected; if so, re-enact the code of\nDraco, and virtue will become universal. Till then the supposition must\ncontinue only an unverified hypothesis.\n\nIf we go back to our starting-point, and ask, can the practical dualism\nbe reduced to a higher unity? our answer must confess a present\ncondition of ignorance. We are so far from knowing what constitutes\nthe thing we call matter, or what the entity we feel within us--our\nsoul or mind--really is, that we cannot tell how they act and react on\neach other. We fail in tracing our own sensations from their outward\nantecedents to their impression on our consciousness; and, _vice\nvers\u00e2_, we cannot follow our energies from the springs of our volitions\noutward. While thus baffled, the longed-for unity floats before our\ninward eye like a dim vision of that intuitive faculty which pronounces\nsubject and object to be ultimately identical, or as a revelation of\nthat religious faith which accepts the incomprehensible, and reposes in\nthe bosom of God.\n\n[172] Since Comte's time it has been shown that mental development is\nno very difficult process, _provided_ we assume that several principles\nwhich consciousness distinguishes and sometimes places in antagonism,\nmay be treated as equivalents, and be resolved into each other\ninterchangeably. For example, we have been apt to reverence those who\nsuffered the loss of all things rather than accept the Expedient as the\nRight, and who died resolute in disallowing the rule of policy to be\npleaded _in foro conscienti\u00e6_. We have also in common parlance asserted\na distinction between these two principles, while holding that the one\nclaims the other for its assured attendant. Honesty, we said, is the\nbest policy; and we never meant thereby that thorough policy is the\nbest policy. What we did mean was that a regard to expediency fails of\nthe success which a straightforward observance of right deserves, and\nwill at last obtain. But to make mental development easy, antitheses\nmust appear fluent, the noble be convertible with the useful, the\nhuman with the merely animal. Thus, when Comte adored Clotilde, and\nDante immortalized Beatrice, they rehearsed for a millionth time the\nloves of preadamite plants. Coleridge used to maintain that the test\nof a philosophy was its ultimate coincidence with common sense. In\nthe theories under consideration, right is philosophically resolved\ninto the greater happiness of the greater number, and this equivalent\nexactly coincides with the common sense of starving thinkers who are\npossessed by a fixed idea that the happiness of the impoverished many\nis promoted by an opportune pillage of the wealthy few.\n\nIt is less easy to verify mental development than to theorize upon\nit, yet verification may not be impossible! If disbelief in a future\nlife, denial of responsibility, duty, and morality, as opposed to\nexpediency, make sufficient way in the world, and if practice harmonize\nwith speculation, progress may become more evidently regress, and Man\nbe proved a brute animal at last. The promising events in France are\npatent to every one; a less known, but still more encouraging fact,\nwhich we learn on scientific authority, is that certain Basuto tribes\nhave lately adopted the (to them) novel custom of cannibalism.\n\nPending the hoped-for verification, if an identity of human with\nanimal nature be accepted as provisionally true, it may be as well\nto anticipate a few of its logical consequences. Eating the flesh of\nour instinctive congeners ought positively to be discountenanced;\nor, as men and women are simply animal, all carnivorous human beings\nshould on compulsion become cannibals. Despotism being the form of\ngovernment adopted by us with general applause, as regards the animal\nkingdom, it cannot be too soon transferred to our own mismanaged\nnationalities. In a word, our practices in reference to men, women,\nbeasts, fishes, birds, and reptiles, ought to be made uniform. Above\nall, the new school-boards should be charged with the education of our\npoor relations, and the linguistic professors of Oxford and Cambridge\nbe instructed to use every effort for the promotion of a universal\nlanguage. Charity may be thought by some to begin at home, therefore\na commencement may be made with the domesticated irrationals, finches\nspaniels, cats, hackneys, sheep, mules, all asses, all pigs, and\nall monkey favourites. It is just possible that volatile creatures\nunaccustomed to habits of reflection (some tribes of light-minded\nbirds, for example) may find abstract ideas and declarative sentences\na little difficult. Yet, after all, it need not be such a long step in\nthe case of contemplative owls; and we may then apply the old proverb,\n\"Il n'y a que le premier pas qui co\u00fbte.\" At all events, the \"Simious\nprocess,\" so successful in our world of fashion, will be likely to\nsuffice with every well-disposed chimpanzee; the circle of knowledge\nwill continually widen until the world of animals becomes identified\nwith the world of man. Then, but not till then, the astonished\npsychologist may cease his useless labours, and record the inauguration\nof a new era by acknowledging\n\n        \"Omnia jam fient fieri qu\u00e6 posse negabam;\"\n\nor, still more conclusively,\n\n        \"Thinking is but an idle waste of thought,\n        And nought is everything, and everything is nought.\"\n\n\nON SCIENCE AND REVELATION.\n\n[173] In an answer to this lecture by \"Julian,\" it is replied that\n\"Belief is the easiest thing possible for weak and ignorant minds.\"\nBut Julian by belief means _acquiescence_; and every church-goer is\naware that the worthlessness of mere acquiescence is constantly being\nurged upon them from the pulpit. It holds the same relation to faith\nthat respectability--_i.e._, acquiescence in the ordinary standard\nof morality--holds to holiness. The subject is too difficult to be\ndiscussed adequately in a note; but in my first Bampton Lecture I have\nshown how belief, though gained by a struggle, is equally possible for\nthe unlearned and the learned, but in every case it has to be won by an\neffort (Mal. xi. 12).\n\n[174] \"Julian\" asserts that there ought not to be any difficulty.\n\"There ought not to be the least shadow of doubt whether a given book\nis from God or not\" (p. 5): \"If the handwriting of Jehovah in the\nScriptures be doubtful, it cannot be divine.\" But, as Bishop Butler\nhas shown in his \"Analogy,\" there are no difficulties, as regards\nRevelation, different in kind from those which we daily encounter\nin common life. \"Julian's\" easy assertions involve a tremendous\ndifficulty; for what he virtually affirms is that God ought to have\nacted, in matters of religion, in an entirely different way from that\nin which He has acted in the ordinary constitution of this world. The\nwhole question turns upon something quite as much out of \"Julian's\"\ndepth as it is out of mine; namely, what was God's purpose in creating\nman. By the study of \"the constitution and course of nature,\" and of\nwhat is said in Holy Scripture, I arrive at the conclusion that God\nhas, for some wise purpose, been pleased to place man here in a state\nof discipline. Such a state implies the existence of difficulties;\nthe greatness and degree of these difficulties we can know solely by\nexperience, being able only to guess at the reasons which have made\na state of probation necessary for us. But the difficulties must not\nbe insuperable; for if they were, then this present state would be a\ndiscipline no longer.\n\n[175] Mr. Darwin, in his \"Descent of Man\" (i. 201-206), enumerates the\nseveral stages through which man is supposed to have passed, of which\nthe first stage is an imaginary \"group of animals, resembling in many\nrespects the larv\u00e6 of our present Ascidians, which diverged into two\ngreat branches--the one retrograding in development, and producing the\npresent class of Ascidians, the other rising to the Vertebrata.\" He\nfurther describes these Ascidians as \"hardly appearing like animals,\nand consisting of a simple, tough, leathery sack, with two small\nprojecting orifices.\" I must own that in Mr. Darwin's book I can find\nno proof either of the degradation of the present race of Ascidians\nor of the development of their cousins, whom Mr. Darwin has summoned\ninto existence to serve his purpose, into apes. The work is full of\ninteresting facts and ingenious speculations, but the speculations can\nscarcely be said to have consistency enough to merit the name even of a\ntheory.\n\n[176] If this struggle existed, it seems unaccountable that we do\nnot find creatures in every stage of evolution. We must suppose that\nthese Ascidian larv\u00e6 existed by millions--at all events, many thousand\nspecies of animals exist, all according to this theory, evolved from\nthem; and, as many have failed and become our present Ascidians, and\nothers were content to remain as they were, the number of possible\nstarters in this race must have been vast. Reasonably, then, we should\nexpect to find creatures in every stage of progress, and at the head\nnumbers pressing closely on man. Instead of this, we find an empty\nspace between each several order, and that between man and the animal\nsecond in the race is enormous. \"The difference between the mind of the\nlowest man and that of the highest animal is immense\" (Darwin, i. 104).\n\n[177] A monkey must walk, and does so quite as frequently as man,\nbut he walks very ill. \"The gorilla runs with a sidelong shambling\ngait, but more commonly progresses by resting on its bent hands. The\nlong-armed apes occasionally use their arms like crutches: ... yet they\nmove awkwardly, and much less securely than man\" (Darwin, i. 143). Now\nthe theory of revolution would require that, before men and monkeys\nseparated from some common ancestor, their configuration was the same.\nHow and when did the hands become feet, or, _vice vers\u00e2_, the feet\nhands?\n\n[178] I do not think that \"Julian\" can have observed this note. For he\nretorts upon me that dogs, monkeys, and jackdaws have a conscience,\nand that what I deduce from it as regards men, would justify a similar\nconclusion as regards cats and dogs. But I had already pointed out that\nwhatever appearance of the higher moral qualities is to be observed\nin animals is apparently the result of contact with man. It is part\nof the present constitution of things that certain animals have been\ndomesticated, and over these the \"dominion\" given to man (Gen. i. 28)\nis very large. I cannot see how any animal could be domesticated\nif it were quite incapable of quasi-moral qualities. I see then no\ndifficulty in a domestic animal having a sort of conscience: without it\na dog could scarcely be faithful. And note, too, that this rudimentary\nconscience in a dog implies responsibility in it quite as much as man's\nmore perfect conscience does in man. The dog's responsibility is to\nhis master; to whom is his master responsible? Still, as regards these\nrudiments of conscience, I cannot see any real proof for more than a\nvery curious influence of man's qualities upon those of animals brought\ninto contact with him. With Mr. Darwin (i. 89) I hold that \"man only\ncan with certainty be ranked as a moral being;\" and that as regards\nconscience \"man differs profoundly from the lower animals\" (_ib._) I do\nnot hold, however, as \"Julian\" imagines, that conscience is an unerring\nguide. The exact contrary is implied in Matt. vi. 23. Conscience needs\nmore than itself to guide men aright.\n\n[179] \"Julian\" considers that I must be \"one of those who believe a\nstop occurs in the middle of the second verse of Gen. i., which severs\nthe preadamite world from the world as it now is.\" I answer that I am\none of those who know a little Hebrew, and I am therefore aware that\nthe verb rendered _was_ in verse 2 is not a copula, but means continued\nexistence. As regards the geologic notions ascribed to me by \"Julian,\"\nI can only express my regret that scientific men should persist in\nascribing to theologians mere nonsense. Nothing is easier than to slay\nmen of straw, but is it worth the trouble? I would recommend him to\nread a discussion upon the Mosaic record in the last chapter of [Mr.\nCapes'] \"Reasons of Returning to the Church of England.\" He would then\nsee that the opinions of theologians are not so puerile as he supposes.\n\n\nON MIRACLES.\n\n[180] The publishers have asked me whether I have any remarks to make\non \"Julian's\" Reply. A few lines will be sufficient for all I have to\nsay.\n\n\"Julian\" quotes (page 16) a sentence within inverted commas, as mine,\nwhich the reader will in vain search for in my Lecture.\n\nHe, on page 17, attributes to me, for the purpose of exciting ridicule,\na statement which I never dreamed of making. Yet he adds: \"The words\nare Dr. Stoughton's, and you may read them for sixpence.\"\n\nHe concedes the point maintained in the first twenty-six pages of my\nLecture, by remarking: \"We do not say that miracles are improbable or\nimpossible.\"\n\nAlthough I distinctly explain that my argument in the remainder of\nthe Lecture is confined to the miracles ascribed to Christ, \"Julian\"\nsimply indulges in an attack on the authenticity and genuineness of the\nPentateuch. He concludes by saying: \"The New Testament stands on no\nbetter foundation, although we need not enter on that question now.\"\nMost people will think this was the very question on which \"Julian\"\nought to have entered, in answer to a Lecture on \"The Miraculous\nEvidences of Christianity.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nException has been taken to what I have said respecting remarkable\ncoincidences between natural events and historical facts (p. 200). Some\nof my remarks, as the foot-note indicates, were suggested by one of the\nmost thoughtful of modern Continental divines. I therefore subjoin the\nfollowing passage:--\n\n\"There is a mysterious harmony between the natural and the moral,\nbetween facts of nature and facts of history, manifest in what we\ncall the 'wonderful' (_mirabile_), as distinct from what is properly\ncalled the 'miraculous' (_miraculum_). While the miracle, properly\nspeaking, implies a violation of the laws of nature, the wonderful,\nwhich is closely connected with it, is such a coincidence and working\ntogether of nature and history as reveals a supernatural result to the\nreligious perceptions, while the natural explanation still holds good\nfor the understanding. The march of Napoleon into Russia, pregnant\nwith results, and the severe winter; the invincible Armada of Philip\nthe Second, and the sudden storm (_afffavit deus et dissiparit eos_),\nserve as examples of the 'wonderful' in the sense referred to. There\nis in these things a surprising and unaccountable harmony of nature\nand history, and yet all is natural; no law is broken, but the\ncoincidence is inexplicable. Wonders such as these continually present\nthemselves to us, both in the world at large and in the lives of\nindividuals. There is, generally speaking, an unaccountable power of\nnature which plays its part in the historical and moral complications\nof human life; and it cannot escape the notice of the careful observer\nthat wonderful coincidences often occur, which to reason may appear\nonly as an extraordinary, inexplicable _chance_; to the poet as a\nprofound _play_ of the spirit of the world, and an active presence\nof a divine phantasy in the world's progress;--combinations which\nlie beyond the range of rational computation, and which, like genii,\nscorn the narrow laws of human knowledge;--but in which the Christian\ndiscerns the _finger of God_. But he who truly recognizes the finger\nof God in these strange coincidences must be led on to a recognition\nof the actually miraculous. The wonderful is only the half-developed,\nunperfected miracle. The wonderful possesses that ambiguous character,\nhalf chance, half providence, half natural, half divine, just because\nthe coincidence of the holy and the natural is external only; and faith\nmust still demand a relation wherein nature and freedom--separate\nin the usual course of events--shall not only seek one another in\nwonderful configurations, shall not only approach one another, but\nbe immediately and essentially united; faith must still long for an\nunequivocal sign, of which it can say, Here is God, and not nature.\nThis sign is given in the sacred history of Christ; a sign which is\nspoken against, and which is set for the fall of many, and for the\nrising again of many.\"--_Martensen's \"Christian Dogmatics_,\" p. 222.\n\n\nON MYTHICAL THEORIES OF CHRISTIANITY.\n\n[181] The following quotation from Mr. Lecky, who is a witness of the\nmost unexceptionable character, sets forth in a striking light the\nsolitary grandeur of the character of Christ as it has been depicted\nin the Gospels. \"It was reserved for Christianity to present to the\nworld an ideal character which throughout all the changes of eighteen\ncenturies has inspired the hearts of men with an impassioned love; has\nshown itself capable of acting on all ages, nations, temperaments,\nand conditions; has not only been the highest pattern of virtue,\nbut the strongest incentive to its practice; and has exercised so\ndeep an influence that it may be truly said that the simple record\nof three short years of active life has done more to regenerate\nand to soften mankind than all the disquisitions of philosophers,\nand all the exhortations of moralists. This has, indeed, been the\nwell-spring of whatever is best and purest in the Christian life. Amid\nall the sins and failings, amid all the priestcraft and persecution\nand fanaticism that has defaced the Church, it has preserved in\nthe example and character of its Founder an enduring principle of\nregeneration.\"--Lecky's \"History of Morals,\" vol. ii., p. 9.\n\nMr. Lecky distinctly admits that it is an historical fact that the\nChrist of the Gospels has exerted a power compared with which that of\nall characters, whether real or mythical, has been inconsiderable.\nA true philosophy must account for this unique power possessed by\nJesus Christ. If the character is a fiction, why is it that it has\nexerted an influence compared with which all other fictions have been\nfeebleness? If Jesus Christ was a great man only, why \"has He done more\nto regenerate mankind than all the disquisitions of philosophers, and\nall the exhortations of moralists\"? Why has He left immeasurably behind\nHim all other great men who have ever lived? The historical truth of\nthe Divine character portrayed in the Gospels adequately accounts for\nthis mighty influence. Nothing else does. A character which leaves\nevery other human character indefinitely behind it, must belong to the\nsupernatural, not to the natural, order of things. It is a moral and\nspiritual miracle. To suppose that such a character has been generated\nby the slow and gradual action of natural laws, contradicts alike the\nacts of history and the principles of philosophy. Nature recognizes no\nmighty leaps in her order of production.\n\n\nWatson & Hazell, Printers, London and Aylesbury.\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\n\nPunctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant\npreference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.\n\nSimple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced\nquotation marks retained.\n\nAmbiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.\n\nGreek words are shown in Greek and then in English transliterations\nthat are indicated by [Greek: ] and were added by the Transcribers.\nAccent mark errors in Greek text have been remedied.\n\nThe original book used both footnotes (at the bottom of each page) and\nendnotes (at the end of the book). The footnotes have been numbered in\na single sequence and moved nearly to the end of the book, just before\nthe endnotes. There are 14 endnotes, the first of which is identified\nhere as 168.\n\nTypographical inconsistencies in the identifications of the footnotes\nhave been corrected, but the original endnote anchors (in the main\ntext) 176-180 (originally 9-13) appear to have been numbered \"1\" too\nhigh. Also, anchor 180 originally was numbered 1 instead of 13, and\nendnote 180 (originally 13) is associated with a chapter that contains\nno endnote anchors. Anchor 181 (originally 14) is correct.\n\nOne footnote (146 in this eBook) contains anchors to footnotes of its\nown (147 and 148 in this eBook). They appear as separate footnotes,\nimmediately after their parent.\n\nPage 145: \"in a neutral sense. If I speak of\" The period was printed as\na comma.","title":"Modern Skepticism: A Course of Lectures Delivered at the Request of the Christian Evidence Society","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":125505}