{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_43405/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_43405","id":"gutenberg_43405","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/43405","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics"],"text":"By RUDOLF EUCKEN\n\nSenior Professor of Philosophy in the University of Jena\n\nThe Truth of Religion\nThe Life of the Spirit\nReligion and Life\nEthics and Modern Thought\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nEthics and Modern Thought\n\nA Theory of Their Relations\n\nThe Deem Lectures\n\nDelivered in 1913 at New York University\n\nBy\nRudolf Eucken\nProfessor of Philosophy, University of Jena\n\nTranslated from the German Manuscript by\nMargaret von Seydewitz\n\nG. P. Putnam's Sons\nNew York and London\nThe Knickerbocker Press\n1913\n\n\nCOPYRIGHT, 1913\nBY\nRUDOLF EUCKEN\n\n\nThe Knickerbocker Press, New York\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThese lectures, delivered at New York University from February 20th till\nMarch 1, 1913, appeal less to students and philosophers than to the\ncultured public at large. I take this opportunity of expressing my\nsincere gratitude to the New York University, and especially to\nChancellor Elmer E. Brown, for all the kindness and interest shown to me\nduring my stay in New York.\n\n\nRUDOLF EUCKEN.\n\nJENA, June, 1913.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n                                               PAGE\n  I. THE ETHICAL PROBLEM IN THE PRESENT TIME      1\n\n II. THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE                       23\n\nIII. A DEFENCE OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE          43\n\n IV. EVOLUTION OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE          63\n\n  V. MORALITY AND RELIGION                       87\n\n VI. THE PRESENT STATUS OF MORALITY             107\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nTHE ETHICAL PROBLEM IN THE PRESENT TIME\n\n\nIn former times, nothing seemed more plausible and more certain than\nmorality. It was a tower of strength, where men sought refuge in the\nmidst of all the doubts and conflicts of life. This was especially the\ncase during the Age of Enlightenment. Men were beginning to believe less\nabsolutely in the religion handed down to them, but they clung all the\nmore to morality. Metaphysical speculation and theoretical endeavours to\nreveal the innermost essence of things encountered growing opposition,\nyet morality was welcomed as something superior to all complications,\nand valuable to all. It was held to be the pivot of Archimedes, which\ngives stability to the whole of life.\n\nIn our days morality has ceased to be a matter of such unquestionable\ncertainty, and has been drawn into the wave of disintegration which is\npassing over our minds. Formerly the scientific definition and accurate\nconception of morality were matters of contention; but it is now the\nfundamental idea of morality that is questioned. Many of our\ncontemporaries are of opinion that the revelations of modern science and\nthe claims of modern life have destroyed the foundations of morality and\nmade it untenable in the old sense. Morality in the old sense demands\ndissociation of our aspirations from our own personal interest, and\ndevotion to something that is esteemed higher; whenever an action that\nappears good is seen to proceed from selfish motives, it can no longer\nclaim any moral value. There is a widespread tendency in modern life, to\nquestion the possibility of such detachment from the _Ego_, and to\nacknowledge the coercion exercised over man by his instinct of\nself-preservation. Emancipation from this restraint is not even\nconsidered desirable, for constant strife and competition seem\nnecessary to life and progress, and a softening of this strife would\ninevitably reduce the energy of life.\n\nMorality further demands independence and spontaneity of action. An\naction performed under the pressure of external coercion or mechanical\nhabit, loses immediately its moral character. Now such independence and\nspontaneity are not possible apart from some kind of free choice, yet\nthis would contradict the law of causality, which in the present age is\ngenerally considered to rule the whole of reality. In man's soul, the\nsupremacy of this law of causality is strengthened by our growing\ninsight into the power of heredity and of social environment. Yet\nmorality in the old sense stands and falls with man's power of\nspontaneous and independent decision.\n\nIt is difficult also for morality to retain in modern life the position\nand estimation it formerly enjoyed. It used to be invested with unique\nsignificance, and placed high above all other manifestations of the\ninner life. This conviction found its strongest expression at times of\ngreat historical import. We all remember the words of Jesus: \"What shall\nit profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own\nsoul?\" The same conviction is expressed in philosophical language by the\ngreatest antique philosopher and the greatest modern philosopher: Plato\nand Kant. Plato says: \"All the gold on the earth and under the earth is\nless precious than virtue.\" Kant says: \"If righteousness should perish,\nit would not be worth while for men to inhabit the earth.\"\n\nBut this conviction of the absolute supremacy of the moral task requires\nan inner gradation of life, for which modern conditions offer no scope.\nFor modern life subordinates all aspiration and endeavour to the aim of\nenhancing the process of life. Every action is valued as a means to this\nend; and morality could only hold its own as an instrument of human\nwelfare. But such degradation of morality would mean annihilation of\nmorality. The present time is not entirely dominated by such a movement\nagainst morality, only a few currents of thought are so absolute in\ntheir negation of ethical claims. But these currents could never have\nattained the strength and expansion they undoubtedly exhibit, if in our\nday morality were more securely established and more distinctly\nformulated. It is the want of union in moral ideals (never before so\nstrongly marked) which gives added power to the enemies of morality.\n\n\nThere are to-day no less than four kinds of morality, often crossing and\nopposing each other, which claim men's allegiance. These are:\n\nReligious Morality,\n\nThe Morality of Reason or of immanent idealism,\n\nThe Morality of Work,\n\nSocial Morality.\n\nReligious Morality and the Morality of Reason have come down to us from\npast ages, and grow out of an inner world of thought. The Morality of\nWork and Social Morality are specific results of the present time,\ngrowing out of work in a visible world of realities. The two older forms\nof morality form an antithesis to the two newer forms, as will hereafter\nbe seen.\n\nThe most effectual kind of morality is still the religious one--for us,\nthe morality associated with Christianity, the religion of ethical\nredemption. Christianity, which is founded on a holy will superior to\nthe world, exalts moral action far above arbitrary human choice and\nhuman aim. It completely severs moral action from all natural\ninclination, dissociates it from all external performance, and gives it\na purely spiritual character. It supplies a most powerful impulse to\naction, by connecting man's destiny with his attitude to his moral\nobligations. The awakening and ennobling power inherent in Christianity\nwas not confined to individuals, but was embodied in a large section of\nthe human race, creating a spiritual atmosphere which still acts\npowerfully on individual souls, even if they themselves are not\nconscious of it. Religious morality still continues to influence us in\nthis way. All other kinds of morality could not be as effectual as they\nare, were they not constantly supplemented and deepened by religious\nmorality.\n\nAnd yet we cannot ignore the fact that in our day the supremacy of\nreligious morality is often contested. The world of religion no longer\nencompasses man as a matter of course, and this also weakens its moral\ninfluence. At the same time many objections are raised against the\nnature and demands of religious morality. Owing to the closer connection\nbetween man's endeavour and his environment and to the accentuation of\nthe struggle for existence, this kind of morality appears too mild, too\nsoft, too subjective, and there is often a desire for a sterner and more\nvirile kind. Religious ethics do not seem to have sufficient latitude to\ntransform the whole of life. We can therefore understand the widespread\ndesire for something which can sufficiently supplement religious ethics.\n\nAt all periods of higher civilisation, religious morality has been\nsupplemented and completed by the morality of reason, which was\ndeveloped above all by the philosophers, from the Stoics down to Kant\nand Fichte. Here morality does not proceed from a superior and divine\nwill, but from man's own reasonable nature. This nature seems to demand\nrecognition of a universal law, and voluntary submission to it; only\nthen does man bring his own being to perfection. The morality arising\nherefrom is strong and manly; it incites man to a proud independence of\nspirit, and exalts him far above everyday life. To this morality of\nreason we owe the scientific development of the moral world of thought,\nand the distinct formulation of conceptions like Duty and Conscience. By\nmeans of such conceptions, the morality of reason also influences our\nown time, without however taking the lead, as it did during the Age of\nEnlightenment. The idea of reason as the sure foundation of our\nspiritual life is no longer universally accepted, and has little\ninfluence on the man of to-day. He is too fully conscious of his\nsubordination to the world of sense, of which he is a member, to be able\nto enfranchise himself completely from it, and to assert his own\nsuperior power. The rationalistic conception of life reckons with\nstrong, self-centred personalities, who, as we know, do not abound in\nour time.\n\nMorality could not be in close touch with the movements and problems of\nthe present day, if--either as religious or as rational morality--it\nwere inseparable from belief in an invisible world. But the latest\ndevelopment of life supplies morality with valuable motives derived from\nthe visible world, and even creates new specific forms of morality. On\nthe one hand, the impulse comes from modern work; on the other hand,\nfrom modern society. In both cases, we have forces that were always at\nwork, but that gain considerable significance from the conditions of\nmodern life.\n\nAll really earnest work is directed towards some object which it seeks\nto penetrate; it impels us to value the object for its own sake, and to\ntreat it according to its own requirements. Man is thus exalted above\nhis own personal opinion and inclination. Only in modern times has work\nreached its full development as a factor of education and of moral\nculture. For work has now become more and more independent of separate\nindividuals; it is becoming a concern common to all mankind, and it\nforms its own great complexes. Such a complex is modern science. It is\nno longer dependent on individuals, but has formed a fabric of its own.\nIn accordance with the development it has attained, science dictates to\nindividuals the channels and methods of their work, presents problems to\nbe solved, and indicates the means of their solution. The individual\nworks in vain, if he detaches himself from the movement of the whole.\nHis enrolment in the movement of the whole imparts to life a distinctly\nethical character. For the individual must subordinate himself\ncompletely to the demands of the whole; he must repress everything\nbearing upon his own will and desire; he must feel that his own efforts\nare part of the great sum of human endeavour, the promotion of which\nmust be his highest satisfaction. Single workers come and go, but\nthrough the work of generations the proud edifice of science is ever\ngrowing. As Bacon says: \"_Multi pertransibunt et augebitur scientia_.\"\n(Many will pass by, and science will grow.)\n\nWhat applies to science is equally true of the other provinces of life.\nIn modern times, mighty complexes are everywhere springing up, which\nencompass individuals with their superior power. We see this above all\nin technical and industrial work, but also in state organisation, in\neducation with its schools and so forth. All these finally unite in the\ncomprehensive conception of civilisation and culture,--in the idea of\nman's supremacy over the world by means of his work.\n\nIt is evident that a strong moral force is here engendered. Without\nthis ethical factor, without a constant enrolment and subordination,\nmodern civilisation could never have reached its present development.\nYet we cannot deny that this morality of work has inner limitations. The\ntechnical side of work does indeed repress and even destroy all\nindividual will; but it is an open question in what temper the work is\ndone, whether from love to the work or from petty and selfish motives.\nIt is quite possible for a petty and narrow frame of mind to be\naccompanied by the greatest technical skill. Further work spurs on\ntowards achievement, and the worker is judged by what he achieves. What\nbecomes of his inner life, of his whole personality, is a matter of\nindifference. Here we are only parts of a structure, and are nothing at\nall in ourselves. This must become so more and more in proportion as\nwork is specialised, and vitalises an ever smaller part of the\nindividual's powers. Moreover the union of men which in this direction\ntakes place, is only confined to their common work. However closely\nconnected they may be through their work, their individual principles\nand convictions can be very different, if not absolutely hostile. It is,\nin our day, above all, the social problem, which divides men into\nhostile factions. In one special direction--that of work--there is an\nethical development of life; but we cannot base on it an inner entity of\nright and humanity. The morality thus developed is cold and impersonal;\nit lacks inner warmth, and cannot appeal to the whole personality.\n\nIn this respect, social morality is infinitely superior to the morality\nof work. For social morality proceeds from the immediate relation of man\nto man. Here also, something old and familiar acquires a new form and\nstronger influence. It was an old conviction that man could only develop\nin connection with his fellow-men, towards whom his activity was mainly\ndirected. But what has re-cast the idea of society in a new mould, is\nthe modern doctrine that men are not united by their common relation to\nan invisible world--ruled either by a Divine Being or by an\nall-pervading Reason--but by their actual living together in the realm\nof experience. This modern doctrine points out that individuals not only\nmeet during the course of their life, but that they are interdependent\nfrom the very beginning,--that union and life with others is a\nfundamental necessity for every human being. In developing this idea,\nmodern sociology shows, by means of innumerable statistics, how the\nnature and welfare of the individual depends upon the condition of the\nwhole. It tries to prove that all progress--even for the individual--is\ninseparable from the amelioration of the community at large; such\namelioration therefore becomes the main object of endeavour. Modern\nsociology at the same time advocates the idea of a common\nresponsibility, a solidarity of all human life and action. Strong\nmotives are thus offered to the individual to direct his activity,\nbeyond his own personal interest, towards the welfare of all, and to\nfind in work for the welfare of others--in \"altruistic\" action--the\nhighest value of life.\n\nThe \"social\" ethics thus developed are further enhanced by the growing\nconviction that the traditional form of life in the community is\ncapable--nay needful--of fundamental changes. Formerly the structure of\nsociety was above all aristocratic in character. The conduct of life was\nin the hands of a small minority. They alone acquired full development\nof all their powers and full possession of earthly goods, which the rest\ncould only enjoy in part and through the agency of the favoured few.\nThis division of mankind appeared to be too firmly established by the\ndivine will or by a mysterious destiny for human endeavour to try and\nalter it. The modern man, in the consciousness of his power, by no means\nconsiders these things incapable of change. For him, it is a sublime\ntask to suppress such distinctions, and to let \"all that bears human\nfeatures\" (Fichte) participate in the work and enjoyment of life.\n\nWe can here discuss neither the possibility of solving this problem in\nall its bearings, nor the complications resulting therefrom. But we\ncannot deny the strong ethical stimulus of such a movement. It has\nresulted in an eager desire to strengthen the weak, to raise aspiring\nspirits, to oppose injustice, to eradicate suffering as far as possible,\nand to increase the enjoyment of life. In all this, there is much warmth\nand vigour, a strong feeling of responsibility, and recognition of the\nrights of others. No other ethical force so strongly influences the men\nof to-day, as the social idea; we see this in legislation, in education,\nin every relation of man to man. This idea counteracts egoism, and\nproduces such a wealth of humane action, as was hardly ever witnessed at\nany period of the world's history.\n\nBut even here, in spite of so much that is admirable, inner limitations\nare evident. Life and morality are concentrated on activity for others.\nBut this activity is more for man's external welfare than for that of\nhis soul,--more for the conditions of life than for life itself. Inner\nproblems find too often only a secondary consideration and the\npersonality as a whole is apt to be neglected. This morality of social\nactivity believes in the existence of goodwill and its growth by means\nof external activity, and takes human virtue for granted. But it has\nnothing to offer that could allay the inner conflicts, or could overcome\nthe dark, wild, and passionate element in man's soul. Nor does this kind\nof morality sufficiently realise what complications and passions are\ninseparable from life in the community: the strife for power and\nsupremacy, the vanity and unreality which arise and rapidly spread among\nits members. Social morality shows a very optimistic conception of man,\nwhich is often contradicted by experience. However great therefore the\nmerits of social morality may be in one special direction, it takes up\nthe problem too superficially, and offers no firm foundation for\nmorality, which it presupposes rather than creates.\n\nMorality to-day thus appears to be accompanied by much confusion and\nmany complications. There is no lack of separate developments, but these\ncross and oppose each other. What one kind of morality takes to be its\nchief source of strength, appears to another to be mere weakness. The\ninner and spiritual character of the older forms is condemned by the\nyounger forms as a subjective illusion, while the unremitting activity\nof the latter seem to their opponents to be an exclusive concentration\non external work. Life as a whole has become uncertain to us in its\ndeepest aspects; and we are no longer satisfied with the moral impulses\ncoming from the life around us. We hesitate between absolutely different\nkinds of morality, which can only fully develop their individual\ncharacteristics by injuring one another; this must inevitably weaken the\ninfluence of morality on the whole of life. At the same time, movements\nhostile to morality encounter less opposition, and gain ground in spite\nof their inherent superficiality. Morality, once an undoubted\npossession of mankind, has thus come to be a difficult problem; instead\nof ruling over man from the height of its superiority, it seems now to\ndepend on his opinion and choice.\n\nThe condition of things resulting herefrom is becoming more and more\nunendurable. If morality is weakened, then life is robbed of a strong\nimpulse, an ennobling power, and a dominant aim; it is in danger of\ninner insignificance and disintegration. The salt of life is then\nlacking, which alone can keep it fresh and healthy, and with all its\nouter brilliancy, it is threatened with inner decay. If we are to resist\nthis danger with all our might, then science must help to overcome the\nuncertainty and want of concentration so characteristic of our time, and\nto gain full recognition of morality as a whole. To do this, it is above\nall necessary to find some point of view whence we can successfully\ncombat this disintegration.\n\nWe shall therefore have to consider first of all how such a point of\nview may be attained.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nTHE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE\n\n\nThe intricate situation of to-day necessarily incites us to reflection.\nWe must consider our life as a whole; we must ask ourselves whether\nhuman existence comprises various kinds and gradations of life, and\nwhether a task thus arises which embraces all man's endeavour. There can\nbe no doubt that human life is not confined to one single plane,--that\nall variety of endeavour does not easily unite to form a definite\nentity, but that heterogeneous elements meet and mingle in man.\n\nMan at first appears to be part of nature, of the world of sense,\nsubject to its laws and impulses. Dim and unreasonable instincts pervade\nman's soul with compelling force. Our conceptions grow out of sense\nimpressions, and form at first the purely mechanical concatenation\nwhich we term \"association,\" while all our efforts are directed towards\nindividual self-preservation. In all this, man is entirely within the\nlimitations of nature. Yet though this natural life at first\npredominates, it does not represent the whole of our life. We become\naware of new features, which we characterise as \"spiritual.\" We see how\nman grows independent of his environment, and strives to subdue it from\nwithout and within. By thought he frees himself from the shackles of his\nenvironment, and asserts himself against the whole world; at the same\ntime he is driven back to the world, and feels impelled to fathom it and\nto make it his own by personal experience. His actions do not always\nremain a mere part of nature's concatenations. He can detach himself\nfrom all cohesion. In unbridled egoism he can subordinate every event\nand action to his own well-being; or he can absorb into himself all that\nat first existed beside him and apart from him, and that often appeared\nhostile, and can thus manifest boundless love and sympathy. His natural\ninstinct of self-preservation will then appear too small and\ninsignificant; he can even come to feel its narrow restrictions as\nintolerable.\n\nIf we pass from the individual to the whole of mankind, we see in\ncivilisation and culture a new form of life opposed to mere nature. For\nman is no longer swayed and ruled by what assails him from without, but\nhe confronts it with new aims and ideals. He judges and weighs; he\napproves and rejects; he forms new complexes, like those of state\norganisation and of science. In all this, man is the representative of a\nnew and specific kind of life; he manifests an independence unknown to\nnature.\n\nThis new life differs from nature and from what may be attained on the\nbasis of nature, not only in single characteristics, but in all its\nmanifestations and even in its fundamental essence. Nature forms a\ntissue of separate elements, which come into reciprocal action but lack\nall inner cohesion. Great complexes are thus formed, but no combination\namounts to real cohesion: there is no inner whole, and no life\nproceeding from such an inner entity.\n\nAll life grows out of contact with the environment; therefore\nintellectual participation is indissolubly bound to the world of sense.\nIn this life of nature, the intellect can create no conceptions\nindependent of sense impressions, and action cannot free itself from the\npower of natural impulse. All inner values can here be nothing more than\nan accessory and reminiscence of what reaches us from without.\n\nWe see something essentially different, wherever spiritual life\ndevelops. Here life is not decomposed into a multitude of separate\nparticles, but inner cohesions are formed, which embrace and dominate\nall achievement of individual beings. This is especially the case when\nhuman thought aspires towards Truth. Every individual has his own sum of\nconceptions and his own special associations; but he does not possess a\ntruth of his own. All search for truth is based on the conviction that\nsomething must be acquired which is common to all men, and which\nembraces and governs them all. Aspiration thus extends far beyond\nseparate individuals. We have here not a disconnected mass of assertion\nand dogma; all is gathered into a well ordered cohesion, and all\nseparate efforts result in progression to the whole. Every kind of\nintellectual endeavour presents a similar situation. Thus the Good and\nthe Beautiful are not values confined to single individuals; every man\nstriving after them, only contributes towards the sum of common\nendeavour, and what he wins for himself is at the same time a gain for\nall. Aspiration is not confined to a limited number of separate results,\nbut the manifestation of a great whole is sought for: a comprehensive\nrealm of the good and the beautiful.\n\nOnce the mind is thus concentrated on the whole, greater spiritual\nindependence inevitably ensues. For it is necessary to rise above the\nsense impression and constantly to assert the autonomy of the soul, if\naspiration from the whole and to the whole is to be successfully\ndeveloped. From being a mere accessory, the soul now becomes in all\nrespects a source of independent life. In science ideas gain a\nsignificance of their own, apart from the impressions of sense; they\ndevelop their own laws, and react with transforming power on what they\nhave absorbed, as we see in the case of mathematics. Our own mind\nsupplies the forms in which we shape our world. Feeling also frees\nitself from sense impressions. Sense enjoyment no longer suffices for\nman's happiness. His relation to other human beings does not remain\nconfined to external contact; pity and love can embrace the whole of\nmankind, as is proved by the great religions. We can no longer doubt\nman's capacity of aspiring to values far beyond external possessions;\nand his inner life, the development of his own individual personality\nmay become a matter of paramount importance to him.\n\nBut this inner life, with all its distinct manifestations, can cope\nsuccessfully with the outer world and its forcible inroads, only by\ndeveloping an inner realm which it extends to an independent world of\nits own. This does in reality take place. What was at first beside us\nand apart from us, can be transferred to the soul without merging into\nit. The antithesis between internal and external values, which at first\nseemed to disintegrate life, can be overcome, if spiritual endeavour\nabsorbs the object and brings it into reciprocal action with spiritual\nforces. Where spiritual development is at its highest, life does not\nfluctuate between the subjective and objective, but unites both in\nitself, brings them into reciprocal action, and develops one by means of\nthe other. Such a triumph over antitheses is to be seen most clearly in\nthe province of art. Art is not merely capable of copying external\nobjects as exactly as possible, or of rendering with the greatest\npossible truth the feeling of the individual: really great art must\nembrace both factors and blend them to a perfect unity. This is how a\nreal work of art is created, which then gives to life an inner expansion\nand a new reality.\n\nAs in art, so also in the other provinces human life. In the mutual\nrelation of man to man, the spiritual phase by no means does away with\nall distinctions, but it exalts us above them, and embraces them all\nfrom a higher point of view. Individuals are not to be merged in a hazy\nand colourless whole, but in rising towards a higher life an inner\ncommunion becomes possible, within which even what is alien becomes to a\ncertain extent our own. This enables men to understand each other, to\nput themselves in the place of one another, to find themselves in\nothers. Man acquires in such communion a vaster self, which is not\ndependent on one tiny atom, but has a whole world of its own.\n\nIf scientific research is not to degenerate into barren scepticism, it\nmust also overcome the antithesis of the subjective and the objective.\nTo do this, it assimilates external objects by means of thought, and\nstrives to embrace at the same time both the inner man and the outer\nworld, developing one by means of the other.\n\nWe observe everywhere this tendency to subject everything to the\noperation of spiritual forces--to create and develop an inner world.\nHere all problems are confined to life itself, which is no longer\nconcerned with extraneous matters, but with itself alone. In this inner\nworld, life develops in its own way; it finds its aims and ideals in\nitself, in its own perfection, in its complete triumph over the\nantitheses it embraces.\n\nHow are we to interpret this new life and its origin? It cannot have\nproceeded from that nature inferior to man, from which it differs even\nin its most elementary fundamental forms. It cannot be a creation of man\nalone, in whom--as experience proves--it is far too weak, too much\nalloyed with lower and sensual elements, for a new gradation of life to\noriginate in him. Nothing therefore remains but to recognise in this\ninward tendency a movement of the universe--a movement in which man is\nprivileged to participate, but which he could never engender from out of\nhis own nature. The recognition of such a movement completely changes\nthe aspect of reality. The universe now seems to embrace two planes, and\nto be rising--at least as far as humanity is concerned--from one plane\nto the other. A new light is cast on reality, which ceases to be a\ncollection of separate and non-cohesive elements, and becomes capable of\ncomprehensive operation and of self-concentration. We realise that what\nat first appeared to be the whole of reality was only its outer aspect,\nwhich is supplemented by the new depth revealed to us. It is only the\ndevelopment of these depths that gives life its real significance;\nvalues come into existence which lie beyond the natural instinct of\nself-preservation--such values as the good, the true, and the beautiful.\n\nLet us now see how this order of things strikes and influences man. The\nnew phase of life at first appears--in man--only in a few individual\noperations, while his life and aspiration are still mainly determined by\nnature and natural self-preservation. A certain spirituality does indeed\nappear wherever there is human life, yet only as something subordinate,\nas an accessory to another kind of life, but without the autonomy\nnecessary to a comprehensive and self-centred whole, which could develop\nits own specific character. If man is to participate in the movement of\nthe universe and bring the spiritual into full operation in himself,\nthis autonomy of the spiritual life is of paramount importance. It can\nonly develop where a movement reaches man from the universe, embraces\nhim, and determines his further course. But, at the same time, man must\nrecognise and seize this impulse, thus taking possession of this new\nlife. We have seen that what used to be considered of secondary\nimportance, is now of paramount value. This requires a reversion of the\noriginal order of things, a readjustment of the values of life. We have\nnot to realise any new achievement within a given sphere of activity, or\nto further develop existing conditions; we have to acquire an\nessentially new life.\n\nThe requirements thus formulated lead to a system of ethics. Its\nfundamental doctrine is man's power to rise by free action to the higher\nplane of cosmic life, and to develop it with all the strength of his\nsoul. We have shown that the new object of our endeavour is not\nsomething unfamiliar that suddenly invades our consciousness. For it is\nthe working within us of some spiritual force, that exalts us above the\nanimal world to the status of human beings. But the spiritual life\nundergoes an essential change, as soon as it acquires autonomy within\nus. As long as it was held to be of secondary importance, it was chiefly\nappreciated as a means towards human ends: spiritual forces were to give\nus more power over external realities, and fuller enjoyment of life,\nbut we did not penetrate into the life of the spirit and there find a\nnew world. If we do this in accordance with the transformation of life\nwe have been considering, great results will soon appear. In science and\nart, as well as in law and morality, our efforts will be accompanied by\nsuch strength, devotion, and gladness as we never before experienced. We\nshall operate with the laws and powers inherent in the things\nthemselves; we shall become indifferent to outer profit and success, and\nshall find full satisfaction in the manifestation of genuine spiritual\nlife, in spite of the trials and difficulties it may offer. If the\nspiritual life can thus grow towards perfection, undisturbed by human\naims, it will manifest all its values in rich and pure abundance; it\nwill reveal a new world, and will open up a new depth of reality. We\nthus take possession of a world which exalts us far above all petty\nhuman considerations, yet which is not alien and unfamiliar to us, but\nis essentially our own life and being.\n\nWith autonomy, the spiritual life also gains more unity. As at first\nmanifested in human life, it is divided into a variety of separate\nbranches--such as art, science, law, technical knowledge--which lack all\ninner cohesion and mutual understanding. If the autonomy of the\nspiritual life reveals a new phase of reality, it must also form a\ncomprehensive whole, of which all the separate provinces are but the\nvarious manifestations. They themselves now appear in a new light, and\nevery province must determine its position and significance in the\nwhole, and must submit to the operation of the forces proceeding from\nthe whole. This will give more depth and more soul to the activity in\neach separate province, while all will seek to come into closer touch\nand to supplement one another.\n\n\nAll this implies a great task for man. He is an imperfect and unfinished\nbeing, full of contradictions. He has to seek and achieve genuine life;\nhe must penetrate from the sphere of effects to that of their causes;\nhe must recognise the great cosmic movement as a personal concern of his\nown, and must thus give meaning and value to his life and aspiration.\n\nWe have here a matter of vast import. Not only must the new world be\nrecognised and taken possession of by the individual, but a new order of\nthings, valid for all humanity, must be created and triumphantly\nasserted against an entirely different order of things. Instead of the\nmere juxtaposition which the world of sense at first presents to us, we\nmust establish inner cohesion in society and history. The efforts of all\nhumanity must supplement the visible world, to which we remain bound, by\nan invisible one, and must make of this invisible world the chief seat\nof human life. While time is forever flowing onward, permanent truths\nand values of life must be found, which can sustain from within all\naspiration and endeavour. We human beings must realise a higher life\nwithin given natural conditions; and to do this, we have first to\ncreate and establish a new order of things within our own sphere of\nexistence. This transforms our life into a never ending task, but also\nimparts to it an incomparable greatness. While thus striving forward,\nthe individual must first of all submerge himself in the new world as a\nwhole, until he finds there his true life, his real and higher self. A\ncomplete negation of the little _Ego_ and emancipation from it are\nrequisite. This does not mean that the individual is to disappear and be\nabsorbed by the infinite. The infinite becomes a living present at this\nspecial point, and the individual must take possession of it and assert\nit. He must also promote the forward movement of life, and must enrich\nreality by the culture of a spiritual individuality, very different from\nthe one nature has given him. This spiritual individuality can only\ndevelop on the basis of the spiritual life, from which it takes its aims\nand standards; and it must always be in harmony with the movement of the\nwhole.\n\nIt is evident that all these factors have laid the foundations for a\nsystem of ethics. As we have seen, life as a whole challenges man to a\ngreat change, to a decision, an action, but also to unremitting work for\nthe establishment of a new order of things. That which gives us human\nbeings our pre-eminence and constitutes our innermost essence is not to\nbe gained without our own efforts, and pervades our life as a continuous\ntask. We may call the morality arising thence the Ethics of the\nSpiritual Life, for the centre of life and its ruling motive lie in\nman's relation to a superior spiritual life, which is at the root of his\nown being and yet has to be acquired by his own action and effort.\nMorality represents the principles underlying this great change.\nMorality grasps the question as a whole. Morality elucidates the fact\nthat all the variety of work is dominated by strife for a spiritual\nself, a strife which can only be successful if the original situation is\nreversed.\n\nWe must now try to determine more closely what form these ethics are to\ntake, and whether they are able to overcome the objections which\nconfront every kind of morality.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nA DEFENCE OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE\n\n\nBefore we proceed further in the direction indicated, we must see\nwhether our own convictions are capable of overcoming the opposition and\nimpediments to morality, presented by widespread currents of\ncontemporary thought. Were we unable to overcome them, then all further\nadvance would be stamped by inner uncertainty.\n\nThe first objection was, that all human action must tend to the\npreservation and advancement of the performer, so that action apart from\nself-interest, as required by morality, is impossible. We are told that\nman cannot be inspired and moved to action by any aim outside his own\npersonality, and that even where this appears to be the case, closer\nexamination reveals some hidden motive of self-interest. This was the\ndoctrine of Spinoza and is now a widespread conviction. There is\nundoubtedly some truth in the fundamental idea, but it is by no means\ncertain that this truth is rightly applied. It is true that all\nendeavour must start from the life and being of a man and reflect back\non him. Something absolutely alien would necessarily leave us cold and\nindifferent; by his action man must in some way grow and gain and assert\nhis own inner self.\n\nBut we must ask ourselves whether the natural Ego, to which the opponent\nof morality binds all human action, represents the whole of man's life,\nand whether all endeavour is obliged to serve the interests of natural\nself-preservation. If a man recognises any kind of spiritual activity in\nits specific working, he will reject such limitation; and the more he\nsees in the spiritual life a new and independent phase of reality, the\nmore decisively will he declare that a real self is not contained in the\nnatural Ego, but must first be acquired by means of the spiritual life.\nIn spite of all the subjective force and passion displayed in the\nself-preservation of the natural Ego, this Ego and its life are without\ninner significance: it plans and acts, without being absorbed and\nilluminated by an inner force; it remains alien and dense.\n\nOn the spiritual plane, on the other hand, man acquires an\nindividuality, and is able to embrace a whole of reality, into the life\nof which he submerges himself; and in developing this life, he is able\nto find full satisfaction and joy. The spiritual life does indeed demand\nrepression, subjection, and even sacrifice of the little Ego; yet the\nexperience of humanity clearly proves that life thereby suffers neither\ndegradation nor disintegration, but rather, that it is thus strengthened\nand regenerated. Life is certainly not weakened or extinguished in the\nefforts to gain truth and beauty, in the activity of the scholar and the\nartist, in social and philanthropic work. By enfranchisement from the\nlittle Ego, life has gained in expansion and strength. Man is conscious\nof finding his real self and of developing his innermost being in such\nwork, not of promoting ends outside himself. All deeper religions and\nsystems of philosophy have in common this requirement that man should\ngive up his little Ego, and they promise that from this renunciation a\nnew life shall be born, which is of infinitely greater meaning and value\nthan the old life. The movement towards spirituality is not a mere\nnegation, but leads to an assertion founded on the basis of negation.\nOnce man has found the right plane of life, and has acquired a new\nindividuality, the gulf between man and the universe is bridged over.\nMan can then come into inner relation with reality, and can take\npossession of the infinite. This is the meaning of Goethe's lines:\n\n\n     Und so lang du dies nicht hast,\n     Dieses \"Stirb und Werde!\"\n     Bist du nur ein tr\u00fcber Gast\n     Auf der dunklen Erde.\n\n     (Till thou hearest the behest\n     Saying: \"Death is Birth!\"\n     Thou art but a dreary guest\n     On the gloomy earth.)\n\n\nIf this is the case, then all spiritual work contributes to the\ndevelopment of a new, real self; then no blame can be attached to\nmorality for advocating the absolute necessity of this change, and for\nrecognising, in all ramifications of work, the one great task of\ndeveloping a new human individuality. Morality will not thereby weaken\nand suppress the impulse of life, but will direct it into the right\nchannel and ennoble it. By treating man's task as a harmonious\nwhole--which at the same time forms part of the one great entity--it\nwill act as a stimulus on all the separate provinces of life. The\ngravity of this ethical task is heightened by the fact, that we must\npass through a negative stage in order to reach one of positive\naffirmation, and that all action which denies or obscures such negation,\nremains one-sided and imperfect.\n\nClosely allied to this first objection to morality is the second: the\nassertion of the Determinists that human action is but part of an\nimmutable concatenation, and that the decision of the moment arises,\nwith inevitable necessity, from what is and what has been. This is an\nold assertion, reaching back to the latter days of antiquity. It has\nfrequently aroused men to passion in the domain of religion. It\npermeates modern philosophy, and has found classical expression in the\ndoctrine of Spinoza. In our day, it is often confirmed by a more careful\nstudy of the universe. Favourable to Determinism is also our modern\ninsight into such forces as heredity and social environment, and our\ngreater knowledge of psychology. Everywhere the single atom appears as\nthe result of some cohesion, of which it at the same time forms part.\nCloser observation only accentuates such dependence; we can no longer\nconsider a separate atom or moment as something absolutely self-centred,\nnor can we interpret any action as really taking place suddenly. There\nexists, without doubt, more cohesion and more subordination than was\nformerly believed, or is often accepted even now.\n\nHowever legitimate these considerations may be, it does not follow that\nthey exhaust all the possibilities offered by reality. If we declare\nthat man is completely absorbed in such concatenation, we must assume\nwhat is by no means unassailable: that man is simply part of a given\norder of things, of a natural mechanism, of a network of causality. Were\nhe in reality no more than this, there would be no possibility of his\nown decision, no freedom of action, and consequently no morality. This\nwould destroy, not morality alone, but much that its opponents could not\nwell give up. If our life were merely part of a natural mechanism, it\nwould necessarily cease to be our own life; it would be only a process\nrealised in us without our co-operation, and our attitude to it would\nresemble our attitude to our bodily functions. It is difficult to see\nhow we could then be made responsible by society, or how we could\nourselves feel any responsibility,--how such conceptions as those of\ngood and evil could come into existence and engross our attention.\nNeither would there be any real present, for if there is no demand for\ndecision, and no room for original action, all action would, with\ninevitable necessity, grow out of the past, like a flower out of its\nbud, without our co-operation.\n\nWe might be able to endure such determination of our life for all time,\nif the various movements could easily meet and mingle in our soul,\nwithout any complications. But if our life contains great problems,\ngrave conflicts, various and often opposed planes, then we human beings,\ndid we submit passively and unresistingly, would be chained like\nPrometheus to a pitiless rock. Determinism, if followed to its logical\nconclusion, is nothing less than inner annihilation of life.\n\nSuch recognition necessarily brings us to the question whether the\nhypothesis held by the Determinists is unassailable. Do we really\nappertain absolutely to a given and distinctly limited existence? From\nthe point of view of a new plane of reality manifested by the spiritual\nlife, our reply must be a decided negative. As we have seen, this new\nphase does not embrace us from the beginning, but must be grasped,\nappropriated, and developed by us; our own decision and action are here\nindispensable. Our life must indeed reckon with certain given factors;\nwe must recognise the powerful influence of heredity and environment.\nOur individuality is determined for us by nature; we cannot in all\nthings remould ourselves as we would wish to do; we are on all sides\nencompassed by fate. But man is not entirely at the mercy of this fate.\nThe spiritual life which can grow up in him gives him a new, spontaneous\nsource of life; he can originate something new, something entirely his\nown, and can oppose his own action to fate.\n\nOur life thus becomes a struggle between freedom and fate; and to this\nstruggle it chiefly owes its expansion and greatness. The idea of\ndevelopment is therefore not applicable to the progression of human\nlife. There is no inevitable sequence on a well established basis and in\none definite direction; later results are not simply determined by what\nhas gone before; one thing does not follow another naturally and easily,\nbut various elements meet and clash. Time after time, we are in danger\nof losing what we seemed to have won; over and over again, we must climb\nto the summit of life. But this struggle constantly calls forth new\npowers. We see that there is much more in us than appeared at first\nsight, or than we ourselves were wont to believe. Great shocks and\nstrong emotions often produce new convictions or set free new forces\nwithin us. It is, above all, suffering which rouses and regenerates,\nwhich teaches us to see and cultivate the deepest that is in us. What\nhitherto seemed to constitute our whole being, now proves to be but a\nsingle stratum, which it is quite possible to transcend.\n\nThe real man is only a part, a section of the possible man. The\npossibilities dormant in us are an integral part of our being; and these\npossibilities enable us to attain something higher and greater. On this\npower of inner growth rests the confidence of those who, while\nrecognising the evils of this life, fight bravely and hopefully on the\nside of progress. The statesman wishing to raise his people from within,\nbuilds on such a capacity for inner growth, and believes in the\nrealisation of new possibilities; so does the educator in his efforts to\ncultivate and ennoble men's souls. Art and religion are ever at work, in\norder to discover new possibilities and bring them home to man. Were it\nnot for such new possibilities and the regenerative power of man, his\nlife could retain nothing of its youthful vigour, and would lapse into\nstagnation and senility. The same would apply to human civilisation: it\nwould drift away from simplicity and truth, and would become more and\nmore artificial.\n\nIt is in our own power to maintain our vitality, and to oppose\nincreasing inner strength to all alien and hostile forces. It is by no\nmeans certain that we shall always be victorious; it is one of the\ntragedies of life that a man's soul is filled with longing for something\nbetter, yet is held captive by circumstance, and is finally driven back\nto that from which he would fain escape. And yet it is this struggle\nwhich gives to life its vitality and its greatness; and wherever there\nis religious conviction, there also dwells the hope that what could not\ngain full victory in our life, will not be lost before God. To quote\nBrowning:\n\n\n     What I aspired to be,\n     And was not, comforts me....\n\n     All instincts immature,\n     All purposes unsure....\n\n     All I could never be,\n     All, men ignored in me:\n\n       This, I was worth to God.[1]\n\n\nIf all this helps to prove the autonomy of man and his independent\npower of decision, it does not mean the dissociation of man from all\ninner cohesion. This freedom only becomes possible by the revelation\nwithin him of a new world. There could be no spontaneity of action in\nsingle cases, if a world of independent and spontaneous life did not\nexist and embrace us from within. Thus the individual appertains to the\nwhole, even in the exercise of freedom. That of which he is capable by\nhimself alone, is only his ability to bring his own will into accordance\nwith higher laws. All deep thinkers have seen, in the grasp of the\nessence of life and the development of its possibilities by means of\nthis individual capacity, not an achievement of man alone, but the\nmanifestation of a higher power, a gift of grace. Life did not seem to\nthem to be so divided between grace and freedom, that one of these\nfactors could only be enriched by what was taken from the other; they\nconsidered both to be so indissolubly united, that freedom and the power\nof inner growth appeared to them to be the highest sign of grace. The\nmost energetic natures, if possessed of any spirituality, have generally\nfelt themselves to be instruments of a higher power and compelled by an\ninner necessity. This feeling gave them the strength and self-confidence\nindispensable for their work. In the case of achievement for the visible\nworld, this higher power was mostly looked upon as a dark fate, which\nprotects man as long as it needs him, and abandons him as soon as he\nceases to be useful. But in the case of inner change and regeneration,\nthis fate was superseded by a power of love and mercy, which sustains\nman even in the midst of the greatest dangers. In religion especially,\nthe consciousness of complete dependence on a superior power has not led\nto a suspension or restriction of activity. This is clearly proved by\nsuch men as St. Paul, St. Augustine, and Calvin. They were not the\nsoulless vessels of a truth committed to them; they grasped, by their\nown recognition and decision, what seemed to them to be the truth. Yet\nin their own consciousness, achievement was of small value compared to\nwhat they revered as a gift of grace. \"Quid habemus quod non accepimus?\"\n(St. Augustine). \"What have we that we have not received?\"\n\n\nHitherto we have been concerned with refuting widespread objections to\nthe possibility of morality. We must now consider the violent opposition\nagainst the appreciation which morality demands--and must demand. It\nseems impossible for morality to be unquestionably superior to\neverything else in life, and to demand absolute obedience to its\nrequirements, since it does not fill the whole of life, but must share\nmen's allegiance with other obligations, and must seek some compromise\nwith them. This objection could only be valid, if our whole life were a\nhomogeneous structure,--if one single aim dominated all activity, and\nachievement in this direction could alone determine the value of our\naction. But the case is very different. Even the one fact that two\nplanes unite in our life makes it impossible to apply the same standard\nto all the variety we encounter. The various values determined by these\ntwo planes are too different to be compared with one another. How could\nwe judge sensuous enjoyment and outer success in the same way as we\njudge values like truth and honour?\n\nFurther, morality is not concerned merely with single values\nappertaining to the higher plane, but with the recognition and\nappropriation of this higher plane itself: it is a movement from a whole\nand to a whole. Once the conviction obtains that the spiritual phase of\nlife is something entirely different to nature, the acquisition of it\nbecomes the chief problem of life, and the claim of morality--which\nupholds the principle of such acquisition--can assert its supremacy over\nall other claims. Wherever this was contested, the new world revealed by\nthe spiritual life was not fully recognised. The experience of history\nshows that no artistic or intellectual achievement could prevent a\nrapid abatement and deterioration of the spiritual life, if the ethical\ntask was not fully recognised. Morality is like religion: neither can\ntake a secondary or even a co-ordinate place; they must be valued _more_\nthan everything else in life, or else they will inevitably come to mean\n_less_.\n\nWe have now seen that the doubts assailing morality generally proceed\nfrom a particular conception of the universe and of man's position in\nit. This more or less naturalistic conception, in spite of all it claims\nto be, by no means exhausts the resources of human life. As soon as we\nrecognise the limitations of this conception of life and free ourselves\nfrom its tyranny, we are able to acknowledge fully the claims of\nmorality. Nay, more: these claims must then appeal to us as being both\nlegitimate and imperative; and what might at first appear to be\nunintelligible, will become absolutely clear and certain.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[1] From \"Rabbi Ben Ezra.\"\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\nEVOLUTION OF THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE\n\n\nHaving removed the obstructions which oppose the development of\nmorality, we can now inquire into the special characteristics of the\nmorality based on the spiritual life. Since morality recognises the\nprinciple of the spiritual life, which it absorbs into its own volition\nand being, therefore the nature of the spiritual life will also\ndetermine the nature of morality itself. We have already seen that the\nlife of the spirit constitutes a new world as compared to the life which\noriginally encompasses us in nature and society, and which, though it\ncontains certain processes of a spiritual character, is yet mainly and\nfundamentally bound to the senses. The spiritual element is here\ndisintegrated into separate manifestations, and is never free from the\nalloy of sense. In the new life, the spiritual gains autonomy, becomes a\ncomprehensive whole, and is able to cultivate its own individuality. It\nreveals a plane of life essentially superior to that of nature. On man\ndevolves the great task of attaining and developing this plane, on which\nlife first acquires self-concentration and inner significance, and\nbecomes real, genuine life.\n\nLet us see how this affects morality. It is not confined to individual\nprovinces of life, but extends over its whole expansion and into every\nramification, demanding a change and an uplifting. This refutes a\nconception of morality which limits it to the relation of man to man,\nand makes it synonymous with altruism. Morality undoubtedly has much to\ndo in relation to our fellow-men; but does it not also find great tasks\nin the culture of the soul,--in spiritual work for the world, as\nexpressed in science and art? The quintessence of the Stoical teaching\nwas the development of personality, the proclamation of man's inner\nautonomy and superiority to the world around him. We can hardly refuse\nto acknowledge the moral character of this teaching, as also of the\nChristian teaching, which found expression in men like Augustine, who\nbrought all moral action into immediate connection with God, and derived\nit from love to Him.\n\nLet us now turn to science and art. We see how, in spite of all inner\nand outer difficulties, a man like Kant devotes himself in unremitting\nactivity to the lifelong task of finding pure and adequate expression\nfor the perception of truth struggling into consciousness within him. We\nsee how, in the same spirit, an artist scorns all external advantage,\nand strives only after a pure cultivation and assertion of the creative\npower within his soul. Must not such fidelity to oneself and to one's\nown work strike us as being in the highest degree moral? The ethical\nobligation consequently extends to all ramifications of life. Everywhere\nwe must take possession of the spiritual life for its own sake,\ntranspose ourselves into its inner movement, and exalt it above all\nconcerns of the individual or even of mankind. Therefore we must not\nseek the highest aim of our actions in the welfare of society, of the\ncommunity to which we belong.\n\nThe welfare of society is a conception capable of very different\ninterpretations. It may mean the mere subjective well-being of people\nliving together. In that case, a new plane of life is not attained; a\nsocial utilitarianism develops, which destroys all inner values, and the\nsole _aim_ of life is to provide the _means_ of life. But the condition\nof society can also be our chief aim because the new plane, with its\nessentially new values, is best attained through life in the community.\nThen we do not place ourselves merely in the service of humanity, but we\nlabour for the development of a spiritual world within the life of man.\nThen humanity as a whole is uplifted, and acknowledges a great task,\nwhile social utilitarianism limits life to the human sphere, and takes\nfrom it all possibility of inner uplifting. Utilitarianism is the most\ndangerous opponent of spiritual productive power, for it degrades to a\nmeans what should be valued for its own sake and as the highest aim.\nUtilitarianism does not change its character by becoming _social_\nutilitarianism. Inner progress of life is only possible if the spiritual\nvalues, as the true, the good, and the beautiful, are striven after and\nappreciated for their own sake, and not as a means for promoting human\nwelfare,--if creative production is not actuated by any consideration of\nresults, but is an inner necessity of a man's own soul.\n\nWe have seen that the attainment of autonomy in the spiritual life\nimplies a reversion of the original order of things, and that the whole\nof life is thus seen in a new light. It follows that no real morality\ncan be engendered merely by developing existing conditions, or\nheightening natural forces. Wherever this was attempted, closer\ninvestigation will always show the presence of both the lower and the\nhigher phase, and the consequent weakening of morality. Here\nChristianity has achieved something of world-wide historical importance:\nit clearly demonstrated the gulf between all merely natural development\nand real moral action; it has also shown us that something essentially\nnew appears in morality, something unattainable by merely ennobling\nnature.\n\nThis was not only the case with religion, for the deepest thinkers of\nall times have seen in morality not a mere intensification, but a\ncomplete transformation. Plato made real virtue dependent on aspiration\nto the world of ideas. He distinguished this virtue from all that men\ncall virtue, though to him it was little more than physical ability.\nKant advocated something similar, by forbidding man to base action on\ninclination alone. He even went so far as to make action against natural\ninclination a sign of good principle. The requirement thus formulated\ndoes not preclude fruitful moral germs and impulses in the existing\norder of things; but their full development is only possible when a\ndistinct reversion has taken place, and when an independent spiritual\nlife purifies, unites, and exalts all beginnings. These alone can never,\nby a slow process of evolution, raise life to the plane of genuine\nspirituality. As we have seen, the morality of the spiritual life\nrejects a merely natural origin. But because it represents something\nessentially new, its main object cannot consist in the denial and\nsuppression of mere nature. This was the aim of asceticism, especially\nin its development as a reaction against the antique over-estimation of\nnature. In the latter days of antiquity, life was swamped and enfeebled\nby a refined form of sensuality. Life could only develop if this\nsensuality was resisted and full supremacy was advocated for the\nspiritual. We can understand that those engaged in this struggle went so\nfar as to see the highest morality in the complete suppression of\nsensual life. This bears witness to admirable personal feeling; and yet\nit was a dangerous error, for it diverted men from the great task of\ngiving inner significance to life, and of filling it with strong and\nhealthy love. The strictest asceticism can be united to inner\nhollowness, to spiritual pride, and to want of love. An ascetic element\nis inseparable from all morality, but only an element subject to higher\naims. We feel it to have been one of the great merits of the\nReformation, that it set aside the medi\u00e6val appreciation of asceticism.\n\nIf it is true that autonomy of the spiritual life results in progression\ntowards a new plane, then only such forms of morality can satisfy us as\nfully acknowledge such progression and the consequent affirmation of\nlife,--as establish the value of man, and stimulate him to strenuous\neffort. All systems which base morality on pity alone must therefore\nappear inadequate. Pity does much to free man from narrow egoism, and to\ninspire him with sympathy for others, even for all mankind; but pity\nalone shows only one side of life--only limitations and difficulties,\nsuffering and gloom. It restricts man's outlook to this one side of\nlife, so that he can acquire neither glad courage nor any impulse\ntending to the uplifting of his existence. Pity reveals no new\npossibilities as love does it; complete resignation here forms the\nhighest pinnacle of the philosophy of life and not the creating of a new\nworld.\n\nNeither can a system of morality satisfy us which only draws up laws and\nregulations,--which indicates definite channels of action, without\nvitalising action or giving it any progressive impulse. This might\nsuffice if man only had to take his place in a given order of things.\nBut it is quite inadequate if the whole soul is to be gained for a new\nplane, and if a new order of things is to be built up within the human\nsphere. There is, besides, the danger of interpreting morality above all\nas a narrowing, a police system of life, and of thus forfeiting man's\nsympathy. We do not deny that the uplifting, inseparable from spiritual\nlife, demands many struggles and renunciations. We can only rise to an\naffirmative by means of a decided negation--a negation rendered\nnecessary by the brutality of mere nature and the pettiness of mere man.\nIn the history of mankind, morality at first operated chiefly through\nprohibition: it was necessary to restrain the wild natural impulses and\ndestructive passions of man, in order to prepare the way for spiritual\nactivity. We have but to think of the frequent recurrence of prohibitive\nlaws in the older legislation of all nations. But there is a great\ndistinction, even in this primitive form of morality. The lower kind may\nremain permanently on the grade of negation, while higher forms will\nwork their way through the negation to affirmation, and will retain\nconsciousness of this affirmation even in presence of negation. Morality\nmust consequently be productive in character, not merely regulative.\nProductive morality will press forward, not waiting till man is brought\nface to face with a new requirement or an opportunity of action, but\ntaking the initiative, seeking new points of attack, bringing\neverything into movement, and promoting the growth of the spiritual\nlife.\n\nEven then, morality cannot limit its task to the ordering of private\nlife, but must extend its activity to general conditions and human\nsociety. Life in the community must be exalted, and fitted to become the\nrepresentative of spiritual life. It is one of the chief demands of\nmodern times, that not only private life, but the whole of human\nsociety, should be subject to moral judgment and moral operation. Hegel\ncondemned as \"paltriness of faith,\" (Kleinkr\u00e4merei des Glaubens) men's\nbelief in the guidance of their personal destiny by divine might and\nwisdom, while at the same time they believed the fate of mankind, as\nmanifested in the history of the world, to be governed by blind\nunreasonable chance. We must also combat a paltriness of morality which\nconcerns itself with the private affairs of individuals, but shows no\ninterest and recognises no obligation with regard to what concerns\nhumanity at large. In former times, when man was conscious of his\nweakness with regard to his environment, the most hopeless situation\ncould be accepted as the will of God or as a decree of fate. But the\nmodern man, with his consciousness of power and of his obligations\ntowards the community, cannot reject the idea of the moral solidarity of\nall. He must therefore concern himself with the general conditions of\nmankind, and must display active interest in this direction.\n\n\nLet us further consider what has been achieved by the autonomy of the\nspiritual life. We must first of all return to the new depth of life\nwhich we have already recognised as one of its most important results.\nThis means that we must cultivate in ourselves a firm basis, a\ncontinuous activity which determines, vitalises, and permeates each\nindividual action. We must develop a distinct nucleus, an essential\ncharacter which is not a mere background to our activity, but an\nintegral part of it. This being the case, morality cannot be satisfied\nwith stimulating man to certain achievements, and setting free the\nforces within him; it demands of him a new life, in which he must strive\nto make the deepening of activity we have been considering, an essential\npart of all his action. This is the ideal we try to realise in the\ndevelopment of personality and moral character. We want not merely to\n_act_ but to _be_ something, to make something out of ourselves, to put\nour own personal self into our action, and to so act that we ourselves\nthereby grow and advance. Only then life is so concentrated on itself\nand becomes self-conscious and self-centred--only then can it gain\nsignificance; it will otherwise be empty and hollow inwardly, in spite\nof unremitting activity. This is what justifies the estimation in which\nthe ideas of personality and character are held. Why indeed should we\nvalue it so highly, were it but an accumulation of natural forces and\nimpulses, and not the representative and starting-point of a new life?\n\nNot only in individuals must such a depth of being, such a spiritual\nindividuality be developed; but in every community, in every nation, in\nall mankind. Everywhere must a spiritual character be formed, and this\nspiritual character must inspire and permeate all action. Only thus can\na spiritual atmosphere be created,--can a really civilised nation be\ndifferentiated from other nations; only thus, and not by means of outer\nvictories and conquests, can any nation gain lasting significance for\nall humanity. So, for instance, Greek culture is a possession forever.\n\nIn all this, it is evident that in striving for morality, we are not\nseeking something alien, but rather our own essential being. Yet this\nbeing does not already exist in us, but has first to be acquired; it\nlies not behind us, but in front of us; we cannot take for granted a\nfirm basis and positive continuity, which we see before us as high tasks\nand ideals. From the imperfect and incomplete life we generally lead, we\nmust resolutely advance towards real and genuine life. While striving\nafter morality, we are at the same time battling for our own spiritual\nself; we cannot but feel morality as a living inner presence, a source\nof strength and of joyous impulse to action. Thus understood, morality\nneeds no reward from without; indeed, it sustains grave injury, if\naction is dominated by the thought of reward. For then the autonomy and\nindependence which are above all aimed at, must be given up; and we\nforce under an alien yoke that life which should be based on itself\nalone.\n\nSuch accentuation of autonomy in life and morality, might seem to exalt\nman unduly, and to inspire him with self-conscious pride. But we have\nalready guarded ourselves against such misapprehension. We have seen\nthat every undertaking possible to the individual lies within a\nsustaining and impelling movement of the whole. The recognition of\nmorality is therefore not a matter of personal option or caprice. The\nlife of the whole operates in the individual; but, on the other hand,\nhis decision influences the whole of reality in the direction of\nprogress or retrogression. In this way the conception of duty arises, in\nwhich the whole of life, the whole of the cosmic movement formulates a\nclaim on us. Kant rightly pointed out that duty cannot come to us from\nwithout, but must proceed from our own being. This can only be the case\nif our being experiences an inner gradation. A spiritual world speaks\nwithin us, not as something alien, but in union with our own innermost\nbeing, as the depth of our own soul. The idea of duty is necessary in\nproportion to the consciousness and recognition of the difference\nbetween man as he is, and the inner world which corresponds to his\ninnermost being. Wherever this consciousness grows dim, there morality\nspeedily experiences an inner weakening. Duty is the salt of life. Where\nit is lacking, life, however brilliant externally, becomes inwardly tame\nand insipid, while on the other hand, duty can impart inner greatness\nand dignity to what appears small and insignificant. But as we do not\nwish the presence of salt to be everywhere perceptible, so also the idea\nof duty must not always force itself on our consciousness, but must be a\nlatent power in our soul and life, lifting us above all that is\narbitrary and capricious. We must take duty up into our inner being, and\nnot place it there as something alien or hostile. Moral life can quite\nwell unite earnestness and joy, reverence and love--earnestness and\nreverence towards the superior majesty of a higher power operative to\nus, joy and love arising from the mighty presence of this higher power\nwithin us.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThus constituted, morality can fully acknowledge the various moral\nimpulses at work in the present day; it can, at the same time, oppose\ntheir disintegration, and help them as far as possible to promote each\nothers best interests. We have seen how, in our day, invisible and\nvisible impulses are in operation, which easily come into mutual\nopposition. The morality of the spiritual life can in such cases\nacknowledge both aspects, even if it cannot value them equally. For this\nmorality must take up a position in an invisible world, since the\nprogression from a visible to an invisible world goes through the whole\nof the spiritual life. At the same time work in the visible world is\nmost important for man, if not indispensable. He is driven to it not\nonly by the necessity of natural self-preservation, but also by the real\ninterests of the invisible world. He does not find this invisible world\nready for him, or waiting to develop steadily from within, but he must\nacquire and strengthen it by battling against the visible world and its\nresistance. The spiritual movement is sure to become subjective and\nuncertain, as soon as it severs all connection with the visible world,\nin relation to which our work gains strength and confidence. Love,\nstrength, and continuity are thus acquired, which must then be\ntransformed into activity for our fellow-men. This applies both to\nindividuals and to all mankind. Such valuation of activity for the\nvisible world does not mean that we constitute life out of the visible\nand the invisible as out of two factors of equal value, for wherever\nspiritual life develops, the invisible is of paramount importance, and\neverything else must be brought into relation with it. The visible is\nvaluable only as a means for the development or manifestation of the\ninvisible. But as such, it is of considerable value. Thus the morality\nof the spiritual life is quite able to recognise--and to benefit by--the\ngreat civilising work of the modern age and its untiring social\nactivity, even while insisting on their assimilation by a vaster\ncohesion which is to vitalise them.\n\nWe shall see, later on, that the invisible world cannot hold its own\nagainst doubts and obstacles, unless it is aided by religion. But\nalthough the morality of the spiritual life must seek to be in close\ntouch with religion, it must do its best to counteract the dangers\narising from an exclusively religious system of ethics. Religious\nmorality in former times often directed man's endeavour too much towards\na world of faith and hope beyond our world, and was inclined to neglect\nearthly matters as being of secondary importance. It often transferred\nto human affairs the humility and pliability born of its relation to\nGod; and it consequently lacked strength and vigour when dealing with\nthe evils of human life. These perils can be counteracted by a morality\nof the spiritual life, which sees the operation of the Divine Being\nabove all in man, even while acknowledging its superiority to man. Such\nmorality will urge man to seek and appropriate eternal values, not only\nin a future state, but in this our earthly life. Such morality will\nteach man not to accept the unreasonable conditions as he finds them,\nbut to struggle against them with all his might, striving to impart\nreality to the reasonable and reason to reality.\n\nThe morality of reason and immanent idealism contains a virile strength\nand educational power that the morality of the spiritual life is bound\nto acknowledge. Yet spiritual morality must counteract certain\nundesirable results frequently brought about by mere rational morality,\nwhich is prone to overrate intellect and abstract ideas, to overvalue\nthe strength of the individual, and thus to encourage undue pride and\nself-consciousness.\n\n\nThus great tasks are evident in all directions. From the standpoint of\nthe spiritual life it is possible to take them up hopefully, and to\ncounteract antitheses which would otherwise disintegrate human life. In\nall these tasks, taken together, we see how life may be quickened and\nstrengthened by the ethics of the spiritual life. Everywhere it is\nnecessary to proceed beyond a given order of things,--to rise above\nmerely human aims and conditions,--to develop the consciousness of a\nmarvellous depth of reality, in which man is privileged to participate.\nWe discover a great cosmic movement, and we see our own greatness in our\nco-operation in this movement, by which we contribute something to the\ngrowth of the spiritual world. To speak with Leibnitz: \"Man is not a\npart, but an image of the divine, a presentation of the universe, a\ndenizen of the City of God.\"\n\n\n\n\nV\n\nMORALITY AND RELIGION\n\n\nWe have hitherto confined ourselves to the inner development of\nmorality, without considering the attitude of the world around us and\nwithin us to those claims which morality, from its very nature, is bound\nto assert. At all times, this question has presented grave\ncomplications, which are magnified rather than diminished by the\nphilosophy of the spiritual life.\n\nIf morality is the first condition and an essential factor of all\nindependent spiritual life,--if this spiritual life is the central point\nof reality, and dominates all its manifestations: then we might expect\nto see, throughout the visible world, the triumph of good, the\nrepression of evil, and the rule of a moral order of things, moulding\nreality to its requirements. Man's desire for such an order of things\ndoes not rise from petty motives, but from an imperative desire for the\nunquestioned supremacy of the good: what is in itself of such absolute\nvalue, must be strong enough to enforce its dominion over reality,\notherwise it might come to be considered merely as a subjective\nillusion.\n\nThe world, as we see it, does not come up to this requirement. It\nevinces--as every impartial observer must acknowledge--absolute\nindifference, not only to the weal and woe of man, but also to his moral\nconduct. How often, in the destiny of nations as of individuals, does\ngood succumb and evil triumph! It may be that we often judge too\nexclusively from external impressions, and that there is more justice in\nthe world than appears at first sight. But this is no more than a\npossibility, and we cannot assert that it is in any way realised. Much\nremains dark, and has not been explained away, in spite of the efforts\nmade by religion and philosophy during thousands of years. These\nefforts have made the darkness less evident, but have not brought light\ninto it. We can deny neither the indifference of nature to our moral\naction, nor the incapacity of man to enforce, in his own sphere, the\ntriumph and supremacy of the moral idea. And this gulf between what we\nmust demand and what we find in the world, receives further accentuation\nby the recognition of an independent spiritual life closely allied to\nmorality. For the impotence of morality now appears as the impotence of\nthe whole spiritual life. At the same time, the human sphere seems to\nlose all its own special significance, since it cannot enforce universal\nrecognition of the power to which it owes its privileged position.\n\nDistressing as is this contradiction between the inner requirement and\nexternal experience, it does not necessarily lead to a weakening of the\nmoral obligation. This is plainly shown by religion, more especially by\nearly Christianity. The early Christians were fully conscious of the\nsorrow and gloom of human life; they realised the unreasonableness of\nthe world we live in, quite as fully as the pessimists of our day. Yet\ntheir faith and courage remained unshaken. The contradiction of\nexperience only intensified their inner conviction, and gave it an\nalmost defiant superiority. This was only possible, because the\npossession of a new life and the certainty of a new world made it easy\nto bear all the contradictions in the existing order of things. From\ntheir certainty of a new world, arose the conviction that the good could\nonly be impotent in a certain phase and for a certain time. The early\nChristians were so sure of the ultimate triumph of good, that they found\nstrength to persevere in the battle of life.\n\nThe present time lacks this joyous certainty of a higher world and a new\nlife. Therefore the contradiction between the course of the world and\nthe requirements of morality, is felt in all its rigour, and doubt is\nintensified by the unsatisfactory moral condition of human life, by the\ninner weakness of morality in our day. Single individuals are not\nwithout good intentions, but they lack the power of achievement.\nSpiritual activity is generally treated as of secondary importance;\ninfinitely greater value is attached to the natural self-preservation of\nindividuals and of society. Life in the community ought to give greater\nprominence to moral claims, and be governed as far as possible by moral\nlaw. But on the one hand there is not enough power of volition, and on\nthe other hand there is, here also, a wide gulf between volition and\nachievement. Social life also displays so much self-interest,\nselfishness, and passion, so much unreality and hypocrisy, that morality\ncannot reach any adequate development. The spiritual powers which should\nraise man to a higher plane are mostly withdrawn into the service of the\nlower plane, and life is thus diverted into wrong channels. This\ncontradiction between human conditions and the requirements of morality\nhas been expressed in various ways by the great thinkers. Plato\nlamented, above all, the evanescence and unreality of everyday life;\nAugustine the overweening conceit of man; Kant the insincerity and\ninjustice everywhere apparent. But to one and all, the moral condition\nof mankind appeared most unsatisfactory.\n\nAll these contradictions, obstructions, and distortions are so\ndeep-rooted, that we can hardly expect any essential progress to result\nfrom a gradual amelioration. In other directions--such as science and\ntechnical knowledge--humanity may make steady progress; but it is not so\neasy to prove that humanity will also experience moral improvement. The\nprogress of civilisation brings with it the development of much that is\ngood, but also of much that is evil, for civilisation develops great\npower, without providing for its moral guidance. History shows us how\nmankind has always seemed to alternate between periods of moral growth\nand periods of moral decay; but it is doubtful whether, on the whole,\nmuch has been gained. How often have the nations longed to return to\nsimpler and more innocent beginnings!\n\n\nAll these impressions might seem to prove that morality has no power in\nthe life of man. A doubt easily arises as to whether, if morality is so\npowerless, we ought to acknowledge it as the guide of our life, or\nwhether we should not rather expel it as a mere illusion. But the\nexperience of history shows us unmistakably that the roots of morality\nlie deeper, and are not so easily removed. Even if morality is not the\nruling power, it is unquestionably efficacious as man's lawgiver and\njudge. Again and again, the nations may resist the claims of morality,\nand the conceptions of morality itself may be widely divergent; yet\nwherever human life develops, moral judgment develops with it. Certain\nactions are highly esteemed, others are decidedly condemned. Something\noperates in man which is not confined to his own interest, and which\nforces him to judge his actions. Such judgment must inevitably\ninfluence both the action and the spiritual condition of man; in one\ndirection it promotes, in another it represses.\n\nHistory gives us an indirect proof of the power of morality over man.\nThere are times in the history of mankind when the moral idea, with its\ndecree of duty, recedes into the background, and is even scoffed at as\nan irksome instrument of control. But such times, however brilliant on\nthe surface, cannot resist inner decay and hollowness, till at last they\nbecome unendurable. Then, if there is a return to morality, it is\nsuperior to, and triumphant over all other interests. It was moral\nearnestness and moral strength that were above all instrumental in\ncausing early Christianity to overcome the pagan world that was, in all\nouter respects, superior and more powerful. It was moral energy that\ngave the Reformation its power to advance and conquer, while the soft\nand beautiful Renaissance perished because it lacked morality. Look\nwhere we will, we see that the moral task, if fully and clearly\ngrasped, is stronger than anything else.\n\nIt is therefore impossible for mankind to renounce morality. But we have\nseen that morality, as a rule, has little power over external life or\nman's soul, and is forced into a subordinate position. This produces\ninner discord in human life. Man acquires inner insincerity by not\nrecognising and developing the depths of his own being. This inner\ncontradiction can be fully appreciated by a system of philosophy which\nattaches special importance to the idea of the spiritual life. For in\nthe light of such philosophy, we see one great contradiction pervading\nthe whole of life: the spiritual activity--which ought to lead man to an\nindependent inner life, thus making his existence one of joyous creative\nwork--is used by average life as a mere means and instrument for human\nends. Spiritual activity is thus degraded, for the good has mostly to\ngive way to utilitarian considerations. This is the case, when the\nmotive of scientific research is its utility, and not a desire for\ntruth. This is the case, when art does not reveal a new world to man by\nmeans of genuine beauty, but appeals only to his senses. This is the\ncase, whenever the subjective welfare of man--either of the individual\nor of society--is the highest aim,--whenever man is not led to a higher\nlife by spiritual activity, but is only confirmed by it in the lower\nlife.\n\nSuch conflicts, such inner discord, such stagnation of life impel\nmorality to seek close contact with religion. We see that man has in\nhimself an ideal, on which depends all the greatness and dignity of his\nlife; but he cannot reach it unaided. Something strives to assert itself\nwithin him, without his being able to accomplish it. He remains chained\nto a lower level, above which his innermost soul longs to rise. Doubt\nand uncertainty proceed from the fact that what is of the very highest\ninner value should have so little power in the world and in the sphere\nof human life. For deep and earnest natures as St. Augustine and as\nLuther, such uncertainty has often become unbearable; from inner\nconflicts was born the sure and triumphant conviction of a higher power\nin the movement towards morality,--a power which not only imposes moral\nobligations on man, but which, by the revelation of a new life, gives\nhim strength to fulfil them. Morality here appears as something\ninfinitely superior to the uncertainty of human conditions, and\ncompletely independent of man's attitude towards it. If morality does\nnot attain the power due to it in man's life, this is now attributed to\nthe weakness, not of morality, but of man. The majesty of morality is by\nno means prejudiced by man's line of conduct. Kant could therefore\ndeclare that \"it is most reprehensible to derive either the origin or\nany restriction of the laws telling me what I should do, from that which\nis done by others.\"\n\nIt is the essence of all deep religions, especially of Christianity,\nthat a new life is created in man by a revelation of the Divine by means\nof a direct union of the soul with God. This new life is held to be\nsuperior to the complexity of existing conditions, and is sure to\ntriumph, because it is founded in God. A source of life is thus opened\nup, which imparts new activity to the life hitherto stagnant. Man\nregains courage and confidence, because he feels himself sustained by\ndivine strength and love. No contradiction in the world of external\nrealities is now able to weaken man's inner certainty. A powerful\nimpulse towards work and creative activity will be born of the gladness\nwithin him. This explains the unquestioning confidence and joyous energy\nmanifested by all the leaders of religious life; the consciousness of\ntheir deliverance from dire distress filled them with unbounded\ngratitude, which sought expression in unremitting work for their\nfellow-men. Luther says: \"From faith flow love and joy in the Lord, and\nfrom love a free and joyous spirit of voluntary service of our\nneighbour, quite irrespective of gratitude or ingratitude, praise or\nblame, gain or loss.\"\n\nFurther development of life by means of religion is sure to stamp\nmorality with characteristic features. The consciousness of deliverance\nby a higher power will arouse not only gratitude, but humility and\nchildlike confidence. If everything man has is but a gift, then he will\nsee, in his highest achievement, less his own work than that of God.\nGentleness and toleration will gain ground; arrogance and harshness will\ndisappear; all decisive action will have an inner rather than an outer\nsignificance. The value of an action depends on loyalty to principle,\nand not on the greatness of what is achieved. This is shown by Jesus in\nthe parable of the talents.\n\nBut this accentuation of softer elements and inner values by no means\nparalyses activity. For the new life must be energetically developed and\nbravely asserted against an alien, not to say a hostile, world. Man\nfinds a great task, first of all in his own soul, but then in the whole\nof his life with other men. We may here apply a principle of the\nReformation, which has thus been expressed: \"The word of God comes to\nchange and renew the world, whenever it comes.\" There is one thing on\nwhich a philosophy of the spiritual life must emphatically insist: this\nreturn to religion must not be confined to the individual, but must\nembrace all the conditions of human life. Only thus can the whole of man\nbe won. This can only be done by creating a specific religious sphere of\nlife, a specific religious community. Many of us may wish the Church to\nbe, in certain respects, different to what it is; but that should not\nmake us ignore the necessity of a religious community. It is\nindispensable, if we are to establish the new life in the human sphere,\nand bring it within the reach of the individual; it is indispensable, if\nthe struggle is to be maintained by great entities, and is not to\ndegenerate into small skirmishes. At the present time, when the state is\nengrossed by economic and other constantly changing problems of the day,\nwe need a community which attaches paramount importance to the inner\nproblems of humanity and which directs our life towards eternal aims and\nvalues.\n\nIn this union with religion, morality will be inclined to see more gloom\nthan light in the life around us. For morality will then judge by higher\nstandards, and will emphasise the insufficiency of human achievement,\nthe unsatisfactory character of the present situation. But morality\ncannot lead to despondency, once it is emancipated from the world of\nimmediate environment, and has gained a new world. Morality will then\nsee, in the world of strife and antithesis, only a special kind of\nreality, and not the whole of reality; it will recognise in this world\nonly one act of a great drama, and not the whole drama.\n\nMuch that is dark thus remains unexplained. To speak with Goethe, we\n\"walk among mysteries.\" Even if we cannot enlighten what is dark, the\nnew beginnings established in us will save us from becoming cowed and\ndespondent. We are certain that great things are being accomplished in\nus and through us,--that a higher power is present within us throughout\nthe struggles of our life. At the same time, we feel sure that our inner\nrenewal is not mechanical, but requires our own decision and action,\nthus making us co-operate in the movement of the universe, and giving to\nour activity a significance for the whole. That must and that can be\nsufficient for us. We can agree with Luther, when he thus characterises\nhuman life: \"It is not yet done and accomplished, but it is in working\norder and in full swing; it is not the end, but the way. All does not\nyet glow and shine, but all is being burnished.\"\n\nWe know that so close a connection between morality and religion is\noften contested nowadays. But we believe that religious morality can\nonly be attacked by those who have too low an estimate of morality or\ntoo high an estimate of the actual condition of humanity. If morality is\nbut a means of tolerable order in the social community of life, and is\nonly looked upon as a controlling force, then it can dispense with\nreligion. But this means a lowering of the moral requirement, the\nfulfilment of which brings but little gain or profit. It is possible, on\nthe other hand, to value morality more highly, but to over-estimate man,\nas experience shows him to be. He is looked on as a good and noble\nbeing, easily won for the highest aims. Were this a true conception of\nman, then morality could attain its ends by its own strength alone. But\nwe are clearly shown that this is not the case, both by the conviction\nof all great religious and philosophical teachers, and by the general\nimpression of human life. At all times, the pessimists--and not the\noptimists--were held to have the best knowledge of human nature. We need\nonly consider more closely the delineation of human life left us by the\nso-called optimistic philosophers (like Aristotle and Leibnitz), in\norder to see that even they found in it much that was dark and gloomy.\n\nIf we maintain a high conception of the moral task and an impartial\nconception of the actual condition of human life, there remains but one\ndilemma: either complete hopelessness and inner collapse of life, or the\nacquisition of further cohesions, such as that offered by an alliance\nwith religion. But religion must then mean more than a sum of doctrines\nand institutions. It must influence the whole soul. It must not only\ncling to the past, but must, above all, be a power in the living\npresent. It must not only be a source of comfort to individuals, but\nmust raise the whole of mankind to a higher and purer level. In all\nthese aspects, religion is both action and life, not mere thinking about\nthe world, or subjective emotion. A connection of morality with religion\nthus understood, can be only a source of profit--not of loss--to\nmorality, which will thus be strengthened in its bearing on external\nreality, and will experience a great deepening of its inner life.\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\nTHE PRESENT STATUS OF MORALITY\n\n\nWe must now consider, in conclusion, the position of Morality in our\nday. Let us see what profit and loss accrues to morality from the\npresent, and what its prospects are for the future. There can be no\ndoubt about the fact that great changes are being effected--changes not\nonly in the world of thought, but in the whole range of life and work.\nThese changes at first result in manifold losses to morality. The\npillars which used to support it began to totter, or gave way\naltogether; new ones arose, but are as yet too weak to offer an adequate\nsubstitute for what is lost. We cannot therefore look upon the present\nstatus of morality as a satisfactory one.\n\nThe weakening of religious conviction and practice is unfavourable to\nmorality. Imperfect as the influence of religion often was on mankind at\nlarge, and excessive as was the importance attached to the idea of\nreward and punishment, men yet recognised a power superior to all human\naction and all arbitrary human decision. This power was to be an object\nof reverence; and life was raised above the care for purely material\npossessions. It was also a gain for moral culture, that religion\nestablished the inner solidarity of man, and facilitated mutual\nunderstanding. Thus it is a loss for morality, that religion no longer\nmaintains its former ruling position.\n\nThe general condition of our intellectual life is unfavourable to\nmorality, inasmuch as this intellectual life lacks a uniform aim which\ncould unite scattered aspirations, strengthen every single undertaking,\nand counteract, as a whole, the interests of mere individuals. These\ninterests at all times made themselves felt, and life was always in\ndanger of being dominated by petty human considerations. But the\ndifference between period and period depends on whether or not this\ndanger is counteracted and man is raised above himself by some high aim.\nIn our day, such counteraction is lacking. Where have we an aim\nembracing the whole man, which is common to us all and binds us together\nto inner communion? Every party and faction preaches some ideal of its\nown, the attainment of which will, it believes, unite men, making them\ngood and happy. But these individual aims are very different in\ncharacter; they are a cause of mutual hindrance, and they divide mankind\nin that which should be a means of union.\n\nAnother disadvantage for inner culture is the rapid pace of life, as\ncompared to former times. While we are hastening from moment to moment,\nwe have neither repose nor leisure for the culture of our inner man, for\nthe development of a character, a personality. We are more and more in\ndanger of being absorbed by the whirlpool of life, and robbed of all\npossibility of self-conscious action. Other perils also beset us. In\nour thirst for achievement and success, our moral judgment is often\nrepressed; the accentuation of the battle of life can even make us\nindifferent to the moral quality of the ways and means employed by us.\nAll this necessarily weakens morality, and makes it appear unimportant\nand shadowy.\n\nTo these dangers arising from the general conduct of life, we must add\nothers, which originate in the modern development of work in the\ncommunity. In former times, the conditions of life were at once narrower\nand less subject to change. Social environment exercised a stricter and\nmore exclusive control over the individual, holding him within the\nbounds of law and custom. This influence was often only an external one;\ncorrect behaviour was frequently mistaken for moral integrity. This gave\nrise to much unreality and pharisaical hypocrisy. Still, a certain\nresult was attained in the direction of moral culture; certain\nrestraints were acknowledged, which cannot, without impunity, be\ndispensed with. Restraints play an important part in the life of the\nsoul, as well as in that of the body. Modern freedom of action makes the\nindividual depend on himself alone, and we must be very optimistic to\nbelieve him able to completely withstand, unaided, all the temptations\nof life.\n\nWe cannot omit one characteristic modern development: the change of\nmen's mutual relation from a personal to an impersonal one. We have but\nto think of the difference between the cordial community of life\nestablished by the old arts and crafts, and the cool, almost hostile\nmanner in which, in our great labour complexes, \"employers\" and\n\"employees\" nowadays associate. There is no longer the slightest\npersonal relation or personal sympathy between them.\n\n\nIf we survey all these losses, the balance of the day will hardly appear\nto be in favour of morality. But we must not forget that the present age\nhas also supplied morality with new and valuable impulses. This is\nabove all the case with labour--the modern form of work to which we have\njust alluded. There is a strong moral element in the ever increasing\nformation and organisation of great labour complexes, not only in the\nfactory, but also in science, state organisation, education, and so\nforth. The individual is thereby obliged to work in close union with\nothers, and in accordance with objective requirements. He must adapt his\nown activity to the general character of the work; and yet he must do\nhis own part conscientiously, so that the mass of separate achievements\nmay blend harmoniously and ensure the steady progress of the whole. This\nrequires such loyalty, self-control, and sacrifice of personal taste and\nopinion, that a strong moral effect is undeniable. In this respect, man\nnow learns more implicit obedience than at any former period. Another\nmoral element in modern labour is the concentration of man's whole\nstrength on his work, to the exclusion of all inert repose.\n\nIf the impersonal element predominates in work, the social side of\nmodern life offers, on the other hand, more direct union and more\nreciprocal action between man and man. This was, at first, mainly\ntheoretical. It was pointed out how much one man depends on his\nfellow-men. People realised that the individual develops with other\nindividuals and as part of the community, with which his aspirations are\nindissolubly connected, even when he imagines he is striking out a path\nfor himself. But such theories could only have so much influence,\nbecause they were in harmony with the realities of life. Modern life,\nwith its technical developments, brought individuals into close touch\nand created new opportunities of mutual intercourse, uniting men both in\nsuccess and in failure. Thus grew up the consciousness of human\nsolidarity, the recognition of men's interdependence, the idea of mutual\nobligation. The result is a wealth of humane activity, which penetrates\ninto all the ramifications of life, attacking and seeking to eradicate\nall forms of want and misery, instead of merely helping to relieve\nindividual cases. We encounter the earnest endeavour to impart material\nand spiritual possessions, as far as possible, to all men; to help and\nstrengthen the less favoured section of humanity; to further the\ninterests of aspiring spirits. These efforts are but various aspects of\none great duty, which we feel we cannot ignore; we can no longer look\nupon them as works of mercy, which it is a virtue to perform. This is at\nthe root of the social idea. And this social idea is, in our day, the\ngreatest bond of union between human beings; not only does it stir\nindividuals, but it also exercises a strong influence on law, education,\nand so forth. In this respect our time has a right to claim undoubted\nsuperiority over all former times.\n\nThese moral achievements of the present, valuable as they are, yet have\ntheir inner limitations. Nearly all movement here proceeds outward, and\nis directed towards distinct single achievements, while the culture and\nwelfare of the inner man are mostly treated as of secondary importance.\nZeal for surface ends leads to the neglect of the central values of\nlife. Yet all outer achievement only means real gain for us, if it\npromotes the growth of the whole man, of his soul, of his personality,\nmaking him nobler, greater, and happier. If there is no development and\nstrengthening of the centre of life, achievement on the surface is apt\nto result in grave complications, and all that is great in the present\nmay thereby be driven into the wrong channels. Another danger grows out\nof the ever increasing tendency to organise work. Owing to the necessity\nof specialising and differentiating, the amount of work is restricted\nwhich the individual can comprehend and master. He is tempted to\nconcentrate his interest on his own little province, to be indifferent\nto everything outside it, and to lose all consciousness of a leading\nidea and of a great whole. He thus falls a prey to the narrow conceit of\nthe specialist, and finally pushes aside as worthless accessories all\nmatters of general interest, all the questions and sorrows of humanity\nat large.\n\nBy furthering a spirit of pity for human want and misery, without giving\nto life an inner value and a higher aim, we are in danger of becoming\nsentimental and of producing inner languor in spite of all outer\nactivity. We are often more anxious to procure for man a comfortable and\npleasant life, than to promote inner growth; and our care for the weak,\nwhich is quite justified, leads us to take such weak individuals as a\ncriterion and to lower life to their level.\n\nModern life often lacks the necessary hardness and vigour; in our care\nfor the rights of individuals, we are inclined to neglect the rights and\nrequirements of the whole and also of the spiritual life. So we are in\ndanger of losing that which according to Goethe, \"No one brings with him\ninto the world, yet which is all important if a man is to become a man\nin every respect: reverence.\"\n\nIf we review the whole and consider the balance of moral profit and\nloss in our day, the result cannot be a favourable one. No full\nsubstitute is offered for what is lost. We have gained in breadth, but\nwe have lost in depth and strength. Above all, morality is in danger of\nlosing its former ruling position, and of having a subordinate one\nassigned to it. It can therefore no longer call forth reverence, or be\ntreated as an independent aim and ideal. We realise at once the gravity\nof this loss.\n\nBut this unfavourable aspect only holds good, if we consider the present\ntime as something complete and incapable of further development. If, on\nthe contrary, we seek to grasp all that is struggling into life, all the\nrequirements of our time that yet await fulfilment: then the situation\nis quite different and far more favourable. What mainly told against\nmorality was the prevalent over-estimation of everything pertaining to\nthe visible life which surrounds us in nature and in human society. The\ninvisible realms of religion and the ideal have, as we have seen, often\ngrown dim and shadowy. Many of our contemporaries deny them altogether,\nand look to the visible world for full satisfaction of all man's wants,\neven of his spiritual and intellectual requirements. This could only\nappear possible because, in reality, the invisible world of spiritual\nvalues continued to influence even those who denied it, and because it\nsupplemented and completed the achievements of the visible world. It is,\nhowever, characteristic of our time, that the old fusion is no longer\npossible, and the irreconcilable antithesis between these two\nconceptions of life stands out in bold relief. With increasing zeal, the\nmovement in favour of the visible world--that is to say,\nNaturalism--tries to eradicate everything appertaining to the invisible\nworld, and to fashion the whole of life in accordance with its own\nprinciples. Naturalism tolerates no rival, and declares war to the death\nto Idealism.\n\nWe now see the truth of Bacon's words: \"_Veritas potius emergit ex\nerrore quam ex confusione_\" (Truth can more easily emerge from error\nthan from confusion). For if we accept naturalism as the only valid\nconception of life, and develop it consistently in all its bearings, we\ncannot but see its incapacity to embrace the whole of life. The apparent\nvictory of naturalism thus contains the germ of a defeat, the beginning\nof a great reaction. What becomes of man and of human life, if the\nvisible world means to him the only form of reality? He is then but part\nof nature--dark and soulless nature. The vast expansion and range of\nnature overwhelms him with the consciousness of his own insignificance,\nwhile, at the same time, nature is absolutely indifferent to his wishes\nand aspirations. What he makes of himself and his life has not the very\nslightest significance for this world of nature. All aspiration which\ntranscends his natural instinct of self-preservation must appear to be\nmere folly. Such ideals as personality and character are but held to be\nillusions.\n\nIf man turns away from the outer world and takes refuge in his own\nsphere, in the social life among his fellows, naturalism there shows him\na mere juxtaposition, but no inner community which could offer new aims\nor develop new values. What remains is only a number of individuals\ninhabiting the same little corner of the universe. Each of these\nindividuals strives to gain recognition of his own merits, and to assert\nhimself, to the detriment of others. Much sordidness and hypocrisy\nbecome rampant, and it is impossible to counteract them within so narrow\na range, or to hope for the growing up of a nobler and purer race of\nmen. The individual remains bound to the condition of society, which\nalso determines his own nature; he appears to be but a product of the\nsocial environment. Having no deeper source of life within himself, how\nshould he be able to escape from the trammels of society, to rise above\nit or oppose it? Society and environment thus become the destiny of man;\nand there is no scope for freedom, for initiative, for independent\naction.\n\nIf we survey and appreciate all this with unbiassed minds, this life\nmust appear empty and meaningless and scarcely worth living. At the same\ntime, we shall discern a development of mankind far transcending these\nnarrow limits, as indeed has already been pointed out in this our study\nof morality. The degradation of life effected by naturalism might be\nendured in feeble and senile periods conscious of no great tasks, but\nnot in our time, which teems with stupendous tasks it is earnestly\nstriving to carry out. These great tasks and problems can only be\ngrappled with, if we are fully conscious of concentrated energy and\nincreased spiritual power. Modern life has developed in various and\nopposite directions. Its expansion is greater than its concentration,\nand this threatens it with disintegration. There is an increasing and\nimperative need of more unity and cohesion, of some universal and\nharmonious character of the whole. How should this be attained without a\nvigorous deepening of life, without the development of invisible\nvalues? We observe, in our day, the encounter of an older and a newer\nage, of a conception of life hallowed by the traditions of history, and\na new one that is struggling into existence; there is a sharp conflict\nbetween the past and the present. We cannot but admit in the old an\nimperishable germ of truth, and in the new, an inalienable right to\nimpress and influence us. We must prove and sift, separate and unite.\nBut how were any progress in this direction possible, could we not find\na superior point of view, such as can be offered only by a world of\nthought, not by the visible life? This problem gains vastly in\nsignificance by extending to the social life of all humanity. We see\nhere a struggle between an older, more aristocratic form of society, and\na newer, more democratic one. This struggle engenders violent passions,\nespecially in the province of economics. We are here placed before a\ngrave question: shall we be able to impart the benefits of civilisation\nto all men alike, and thus broaden every individual soul, without\ninjury to its inner depths?\n\nThese are problems which do not originate in ourselves, but which are\nforced upon us by the movement of history. Their very necessity bids us\nhope for progression, in spite of all impediments. The power which has\nimposed these problems on us will enable us to solve them. But we shall\nalso need to put forth our uttermost strength, and to quicken all our\nlatent spiritual forces; we must grasp our life as a whole, must\nacknowledge its high aims with all our heart and soul, and must find our\nreal self in these ideals. Only thus can we gain the sense of inner\nnecessity which alone can lead us onward.\n\nIn this manner, our aspiration becomes closely linked to morality. Let\nus see wherein we have already recognised the quintessence of morality.\nLife and aspiration are detached from the little Ego, and take root in a\nspiritual world in which we find our own essential being, so that while\nworking for this spiritual world, we are at the same time working for\nour own depth and spiritual self-preservation. Such a change and\nreaction, such identification with the movement of the spiritual life,\nmeans only that our aspiration has gained a moral character. This moral\ncharacter brings us, at all points, into touch with our time. By means\nof our own aspiration, we can now grasp, unite, and deepen all the\ngoodwill, genuine feeling, and untiring activity of our day, which was\nhitherto inadequate only because it lacked inner unity and quickening\nspiritual power.\n\nWe can thus face the future with courage and confidence. Humanity has by\nno means exhausted its vital power; it is full of new possibilities\nwhich demand realisation; and therefore we may expect an inner\nprogression of life and a rejuvenation of morality.\n\nWhat is true of mankind in general, is especially true of America. The\nmultitude of grave problems cannot discourage a nation which feels in\nitself so much youthful vigour, that it will not submit to a dark fate,\nbut is able and ready to mould its own fate, and to aspire to yet\ngreater heights than it has hitherto attained. But to achieve this,\nmoral force is as necessary as unshaken confidence in the power of the\nspirit. We believe in a bright future for this great country. We believe\nalso in the development in America of such moral strength as will\nsuccessfully overcome all conflicts and lead to splendid results, for\nthe benefit not only of the American nation, but of all mankind.\n\n\nTHE END\n\n\n\n\nADVERTISEMENTS\n\n\nWorks by Dr. Rudolf Eucken\n\nProfessor of Philosophy, University of Jena\n\nIn 1908, Dr. Eucken was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. His\nbooks have been translated into many languages and their influence is\nwidespread.\n\nThrough his sustained and heroic appeal to what is most spiritual in\nman, Eucken has ennobled the significance and the mission of philosophy.\nHe aims at developing, not a new category, but a new culture, and holds\nthat it is the privilege of philosophy, by penetrating to what is most\ninward in human nature, to bring a religious inspiration to bear upon\nthe problems of the world of human labor. Eucken's philosophy is a\nphilosophy of life. It is a philosophy of reality as well. It treats of\nthe sources of man's strength, and the meaning and purpose of his\nspiritual endeavor. And can there be anything more real than the\nactivity of a life that has consciously realized the true sources of its\npower and the goal of its ultimate aspirations?\n\nNew York  G. P. Putnam's Sons  London\n\n\nWorks by Dr. Rudolf Eucken\n\n_In the Crown Theological Library Series_\n\nThe Life of the Spirit\n\nAn Introduction to Philosophy\n\nTranslated by F. L. Pogson, M.A.\n\n_12\u00ba, $1.50 net. By mail, $1.65_\n\n_Second Edition. With Introductory Note by Author_\n\n\"Germany has again given us a great constructive philosopher, whose\ninfluence has gone out through all the thinking world.... No one can\nread these powerful pages without understanding that a strong thinker\nhas arisen among us, and without enlargement and deepening of his own\nthought.\"--_Congregationalist._\n\n\"With Bergson of France, he is the most influential personal factor in\narming contemporary thinkers for the fray against materialism and\nirreligion.\"--_Christian Science Monitor._\n\n\nKnowledge and Life\n\n_12\u00ba._\n\n\"No one is having more influence upon the spiritual life and religious\nthought of Europe, at the present time, than Prof. Rudolf Eucken. His\nbooks ... are making a deep impress upon thinking people.\"--_Christian\nWork._\n\n\nReligion and Life\n\n_16\u00ba. Frontispiece. 50 cts. net. By mail, 60 cts._\n\n\"The work is able, as may naturally be expected of Prof. Eucken. But it\nis more. The author is very much in earnest and he is anxious for men to\nsee the great need of religion in their lives. In this book we have the\nbest of his mind and heart.\"\n\n_Boston Transcript._\n\n\"The philosophy of Eucken shares with that of Bergson the keenest living\ninterest of thoughtful men of all classes at the present day.... Eucken\nhas endeavored in this book to put his constructive system into the\nclearest and most elaborate form.\"--_Continent._\n\nNew York  G. P. Putnam's Sons  London\n\n\nWorks by Dr. Rudolf Eucken\n\n_In the Theological Translations Series_\n\n\nThe Truth of Religion\n\nTranslated by W. Tudor Jones, Ph.D.\n\n_Second English Edition. Translated from the Third and Revised German\nEdition with a special Preface by the Author_\n\n_8\u00ba. $3.50 net. By mail, $3.75_\n\n\"When a book of really original thought appears it constitutes an epoch\nin literature. Such a new era is introduced by this work. The ideas of\nProf. Eucken are startling, and revolutionary in some respects, but are\nat the same time inspiring and reassuring to all the essential features\nof Christianity as the true, the supreme and the final\nreligion.\"--_Watchman._\n\n\nContest for the Spiritual Life\n\n_8\u00ba._\n\n\"In Professor Eucken, we have the philosopher as preacher. He not only\nhandles life, he would spread, enrich, and fortify it, and he is a great\nforce for the restoration of idealism in his own land. He is a preacher\nequipped with philosophy and an inspired lecturer on the spiritual life\nand its integration in the Whole.\"--_The Nation._\n\n\nAn Interpretation of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy\n\nBy W. Tudor Jones, Ph.D. (Jena)\n\n_12\u00ba. With Portrait. $1.50 net. By mail, $1.65_\n\nThe main aim of the volume is to present the essentials of Eucken's\nteaching, to show its genesis and growth, its connection with Science,\nPhilosophy, Sociology, History and Religion. The whole volume is an\nattempt to present the nucleus of Eucken's teaching, and to show its\nfundamental importance in the individual life, the society and the\nreligion of the future.\n\nNew York  G. P. Putnam's Sons  London\n\n\n_Only Authorized Edition_\n\nAn Introduction to Metaphysics\n\nBy Henri Bergson\n\nMember of the Institute and Professor of the Coll\u00e8ge de France\n\nTranslated by T. E. Hulme\n\nAuthorized Edition, Revised by the Author, with Additional Material\n\n_12\u00ba. 75 cts. net. By mail, 85 cts._\n\n\n\"I certify that the translation of my volume _Introduction to\nMetaphysics_, which has been prepared by Mr. T. E. Hulme, is the only\nEnglish version to which I have given my authorization. I may add that\nMr. Hulme was excellently well qualified for his task by the careful\nstudy that he has made of the whole series of my writings. I have\nexamined his translation with care and am able to say that it renders\nwith remarkable accuracy the thought and the conclusions presented in my\nvolume.\"\n\nHENRI BERGSON.\n\nThis volume forms the best introduction to M. Bergson's philosophy. In\nit the author explains with a thoroughness not attempted in his other\nbooks the precise meaning he wishes to convey by the word intuition. A\nreading of this book is, therefore, indispensable to a proper\nunderstanding of Bergson's position. German, Italian, Hungarian,\nSwedish, and Russian translations of it have already appeared,\ntestifying to its intrinsic importance and indicating the scope of its\nappeal.\n\nG. P. Putnam's Sons\nNew York  London","title":"Ethics and Modern Thought: A Theory of Their Relations","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":19718}