{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_44024/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_44024","id":"gutenberg_44024","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44024","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Ancient","Category: History - Warfare","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Military art and science -- Early works to 1800","Strategy -- Early works to 1800","War -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"Nore: Images of the original pages are available through\n      Internet Archive. See\n      https://archive.org/details/bookofwarmilitar00caltiala\n\n\nTranscriber's note:\n\n      Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).\n\n      Changes made are listed at the end of the text.\n\n\n\n\nTHE BOOK OF WAR\n\nThe Military Classic of the Far East\n\nTranslated from the Chinese by\n\nCAPTAIN E. F. CALTHROP, R.F.A.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nLondon\nJohn Murray, Albemarle St., W.\n1908\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n                                           PAGE\n\n          INTRODUCTION                        7\n\n\n          THE ARTICLES OF SUNTZU\n\n       I. PRELIMINARY RECKONING              17\n\n      II. OPERATIONS OF WAR                  20\n\n     III. THE ATTACK BY STRATAGEM            24\n\n      IV. THE ORDER OF BATTLE                28\n\n       V. THE SPIRIT OF THE TROOPS           31\n\n      VI. EMPTINESS AND STRENGTH             34\n\n     VII. BATTLE TACTICS                     40\n\n    VIII. THE NINE CHANGES                   44\n\n      IX. MOVEMENT OF TROOPS                 47\n\n       X. GROUND                             53\n\n      XI. NINE GROUNDS                       58\n\n     XII. ASSAULT BY FIRE                    67\n\n    XIII. THE EMPLOYMENT OF SPIES            70\n\n\n          THE SAYINGS OF WUTZU\n\n          INTRODUCTION                       75\n\n       I. THE GOVERNMENT OF A COUNTRY        77\n\n      II. ESTIMATION OF THE ENEMY            85\n\n     III. CONTROL OF THE ARMY                93\n\n      IV. QUALITIES OF THE GENERAL          101\n\n       V. SUITING THE OCCASION              108\n\n      VI. ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE TROOPS       116\n\n\n\n\nTHE BOOK OF WAR\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nI\n\nWritten in the fifth century B.C., Suntzu and Wutzu still remain the\nmost celebrated works on war in the literature of China. While the\nchariot has gone, and weapons have changed, these ancient masters have\nheld their own, since they deal chiefly with the fundamental principles\nof war, with the influence of politics and human nature on military\noperations; and they show in a most striking way how unchanging these\nprinciples are.\n\nWhen these books were written, China was a conglomerate of\nprincipalities in continual ferment. Personal ambition and intrigue,\nand not the wishes of the people, were the main factors in these wars.\nPatriotism, or a popular cause, could not, therefore, be relied on\nto maintain the _moral_ of the levies. Instead of these, what may be\ncalled the force of despair is pointed out as the most powerful agent\nin giving cohesion and energy to an army. The general is urged to\ntake a vigorous offensive; and to act at a distance from his base,\nwhere defeat means disaster, and where desertion is minimised owing to\nthe distance from home. He should, in fact, burn his boats before an\naction, or, in Chinese phrase, act as one who removes the ladder from\nunder those mounted upon the roof.\n\nOn the other hand, every care must be taken not to render the enemy\ndesperate; and, as an instance of this, Sun observes that an opponent\nshould on no account be completely surrounded. A loop-hole of escape\nweakens the resolution of the general and the energy of his troops.\n\nIt is interesting to notice that _moral_, or the spirit of the troops,\nis thus considered a determining factor in war. The Chinese are\nperhaps unusually affected by climatic conditions. As is well known,\nthe umbrella was part of a soldier's equipment; and for the same\nreasons, the sunny side of high ground is recommended as most suitable\nfor defence, tactical considerations permitting.\n\nThe large number of bannermen in the Chinese army was out of all\nproportion to the service of standards in providing rallying points.\nThe chief use of banners was to maintain the spirit of the troops.\nA forest of banners, held erect, gave a feeling of liveliness and\nsecurity to the ranks, in the same way as a military band, and when Sun\nremarks that the march of an army should be calm like the forest, he is\nusing a simile that is not inappropriate.\n\nProbably owing to the fact that the profession of arms has never been\nhighly regarded in China, we find that the ruler of the state did not\nusually take the field, but employed a professional to command the\narmy--one of the masters of war who wandered from state to state at\nthat time with the secrets of victory to impart to the highest bidder.\nThe question of political interference with the general in the field\nnaturally arises under these conditions. The two sages point out, that\nto unite the nation under firm and just government is the business of\nthe ruler and necessary to victory; but that the general is the best\njudge of the questions that arise on a distant field, and that all\ninterference with him causes delay and disaster.\n\nWar meaning ravage, it was essential that the operations should be\nconducted in the enemy's territory. Once there, however, a vigorous\noffensive is no longer advised. \"At first behave with the discretion of\na maiden\" is the counsel of Sun. The enemy must be induced to take the\ninitiative, and when he is worn out by marching, or makes a false move,\n\"then,\" says the master, \"dart in like a rabbit.\"\n\nUnlike the tactics of the Japanese, in whom the spirit of attack\nburns so strongly, those of Suntzu and Wutzu are essentially of\nthe offensive-defensive order--manoeuvre before fighting, and\nnon-committal until the enemy has shown his hand. The business of the\ngeneral is to avoid encounter in battle until the enemy is no longer\ncapable of offering a successful resistance.\n\nThe masters do not make, however, the mistake of advocating a passive\ndefensive. Suntzu lays down that the division of the forces which this\nstrategy involves, is to be everywhere weak, rendering the army liable\nto be taken in detail by the concentrated forces of the enemy. It is\nrather the defence which avoids battle by mobility and manoeuvre,\ninduces the enemy by stratagem to divide his forces, or act in\nconformity with our wishes, and then falls upon him.\n\nWith regard to the tactics of the battlefield, the pitched battle,\nor, in other words, the frontal attack, is considered unworthy of the\nskilful general. The plan of attack should consist, broadly speaking,\nin the division of the army into two forces. The enemy is \"attracted\nand engaged by one force, and defeated with the other;\" and here we\nhave the containing or secondary attack, and the main or reserve force\nwhich decides the battle of to-day--a most striking instance of the\ncontinuity of military principles.\n\nConsiderable space is devoted to the influence of ground on war. The\npassage of defiles and rivers is still conducted in the same way. The\nmany large rivers of China naturally affected military operations; and,\namong other axioms, it is laid down that the passage of a river should\nnot be disputed, as the enemy will probably give up the attempt, and\nmake the passage untouched at some other point, but that he should\nbe attacked when half his force is across the stream. Again, an army\nshould not encamp on a river below the enemy, as it is thereby liable\nto be inundated, or to have its water poisoned; or the enemy may come\ndown stream and make a sudden attack.\n\nWhile both writers were professional soldiers, they show a fine\ndisinterestedness by repeatedly pointing out that even successful\nwar brings evil in its train. Wu remarks that \"few are those who have\ngained power on earth by many victories,\" and he is insistent that war\nshould not be undertaken until a careful comparison of the two sides\nshows that victory is certain; and he adds, \"The army which conquers\nmakes certain of victory and then attacks, while the army that is\ndefeated fights in the hope of success.\"\n\nHence the importance they assign to intelligence of the enemy, and to\nthe spy; and as the sages dealt with war between members of the same\nrace, the work of spies was greatly facilitated. The spy was treated\nwith great honour by his countrymen, and the fact that many of the\nnational heroes of China were spies, shows that the part that they\nplayed was not forgotten. They frequently toiled for years, and rose\nto high rank in the enemy's service; and thus, by wrong counsel and by\nspreading mistrust in his ranks, they became a two-edged sword in the\nhands of the general. \"Wonderful, indeed, is their power,\" exclaims\nSun; but he also reminds us that their management is the most difficult\nand delicate duty of the general.\n\n\nII\n\nSun and Wu are perhaps held in even greater reverence in Japan than\nin China, where war is looked upon as a troublesome phase in national\nlife, and victory in battle is not considered the greatest achievement\nof a state. Far otherwise is it in Japan; and successive generations\nof her soldiers have been brought up on Sun and Wu. Like other arts,\nmystery was formerly supposed to surround the art of war, a belief that\nwas encouraged by the strategist; and for a considerable time, the few\ncopies of this book, that were brought over from China to Japan, were\njealously guarded by their possessors. Later, as they became known, an\narmy of Japanese commentators arose--for Chinese literature is thought\ncompressed, to be unfolded in the mind of the reader.\n\nTo-day Sun and Wu have given way to the scientific works of European\nwriters, but their sayings have become proverbs, and their influence\nundoubtedly helped the Japanese to victory in the late war. Belief\nin the importance of a knowledge of the enemy and his resources, of\npreparation and training, had grown out of a long study of these\nancient masters; and since it was the vital importance of a successful\nissue to the Japanese which, after all, fired their resolution and\ncarried them through, they proved the sage's words that it is the\nenergy, born of despair, that wins the victory.\n\n\nIII\n\nLittle is known of the life of either master. They were in no sense\npatriots but professional strategists, continually changing their\nemployer. Chinese history tells a famous story about Sun. A certain\nruler asked Sun to give a practical demonstration of his principles in\nthe neighbourhood of the palace, and entrusted him with the women of\nthe court for this purpose. During the operations, the leader of one of\nthe sides did not obey the master's instructions, and her execution was\nordered. She happened to be the king's favourite wife, but Sun pointed\nout that the king's wish that her life should be spared was a case of\npolitical interference with the general in the field; and the sentence\nwas carried out.\n\nWu is represented as a person of low moral character. On two separate\noccasions, for fear of giving rise to suspicion, he killed one of his\nwives who belonged to a state with which his employer at the time was\nat war; and, graver still in the eyes of the Chinese historian, he was\nnot present at the death-bed of his mother.\n\n                                                               E. F. C.\n\n\nNOTE.\n\nThe translator is indebted to Major J. C. Somerville for his kind help\nand criticism.\n\n\n\n\nTHE ARTICLES OF SUNTZU\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nPRELIMINARY RECKONING\n\n\nThe words of Sun the Master:--\n\nTo all nations War is a great matter. Upon the army death or life\ndepend: it is the means of the existence or destruction _of the State_.\n\nTherefore it must be diligently studied.\n\nNow, in war, besides stratagem and the situation, there are five\nindispensable matters. The first is called The Way;[1] the second,\nHeaven; the third, Earth; the fourth, the Leader; the fifth, Law.\n\nThe _Way_ or the proper conduct of man. If the ruling authority be\nupright, the people are united: fearless of danger, their lives are at\nthe service of their Lord.\n\n_Heaven._ Yin and Yang;[2] heat and cold; time and season.\n\n_Earth._ Distance; nature; extent; strategic position.\n\nThe _Leader_. Intelligence; truth; benevolence; courage and strictness.\n\n_Law._ Partition and ordering of troops.\n\nThese things must be known by the leader: to know them is to conquer;\nto know them not is to be defeated.\n\nFurther, with regard to these and the following seven matters, the\ncondition of the enemy must be compared with our own.\n\nThe seven matters are:--\n\nThe virtue of the prince; the ability of the general; natural\nadvantages; the discipline of the armies; the strength of the soldiers;\ntraining of the soldiers; justice both in reward and punishment.\n\nKnowing these things, I can foretell the victor.\n\nIf a general under me fight according to my plans, he always conquers,\nand I continue to employ him; if he differ from my plans, he will be\ndefeated and dismissed from my service.\n\nWherefore, with regard to the foregoing, considering that with us\nlies the advantage, and the generals agreeing, we create a situation\nwhich promises victory; but as the moment and method cannot be fixed\nbeforehand, the plan must be modified according to circumstances.\n\nWar is a thing of pretence: therefore, when capable of action, we\npretend disability; when near to the enemy, we pretend to be far; when\nfar away, we pretend to be near.\n\nAllure the enemy by giving him a small advantage. Confuse and capture\nhim. If there be defects, give an appearance of perfection, and awe the\nenemy. Pretend to be strong, and so cause the enemy to avoid you. Make\nhim angry, and confuse his plans. Pretend to be inferior, and cause him\nto despise you. If he have superabundance of strength, tire him out;\nif united, make divisions in his camp. Attack weak points, and appear\nin unexpected places.\n\nThese are the secrets of the successful strategist, therefore they must\nnot be made known beforehand.\n\nAt the reckoning in the Sanctuary before fighting, victory is to the\nside that excels _in the foregoing matters_. They that have many of\nthese will conquer; they that have few will not conquer; hopeless,\nindeed, are they that have none.\n\nIf the condition of both sides with regard to these matters be known, I\ncan foretell the victor.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nOPERATIONS OF WAR\n\n\nSun the Master said:--\n\nNow the requirements of war are such that we need a thousand light\nchariots with four horses each; a thousand leather-covered chariots,\nand one hundred thousand armoured men; and we must send supplies to\ndistant fields. Wherefore the cost at home and in the field, the\nentertainment of guests, glue and lacquer for repairs, and necessities\nfor the upkeep of waggons and armour are such that in one day a\nthousand pieces of gold are spent. With that amount a force of one\nhundred thousand men can be raised:--you have the instruments of\nvictory.\n\nBut, even if victorious, let the operations long continue, and the\nsoldiers' ardour decreases, the weapons become worn, and, if a siege be\nundertaken, strength disappears.\n\nAgain, if the war last long, the country's means do not suffice.\nThen, when the soldiers are worn out, weapons blunted, strength gone\nand funds spent, neighbouring princes arise and attack that weakened\ncountry. At such a time the wisest man cannot mend the matter.\n\nFor, while quick accomplishment has been known to give the victory to\nthe unskilful, the skilful general has never gained advantage from\nlengthy operations.\n\nIn fact, there never has been a country which has benefited from a\nprolonged war.\n\nHe who does not know the evils of war will not reap advantage thereby.\nHe who is skilful in war does not make a second levy, does not load his\nsupply waggons thrice.\n\nWar material and arms we obtain from home, but food sufficient for the\narmy's needs can be taken from the enemy.\n\nThe cost of supplying the army in distant fields is the chief drain\non the resources of a state: if the war be distant, the citizens are\nimpoverished.\n\nIn the neighbourhood of an army prices are high, and so the money\nof the soldiers and followers is used up. Likewise the state funds\nare exhausted, and frequent levies must be made; the strength of the\narmy is dissipated, money is spent, the citizen's home swept bare: in\nall, seven-tenths of his income is forfeited. Again, as regards State\nproperty, chariots are broken, horses worn out, armour and helmet,\narrow and bow, spear, shield, pike and fighting tower, waggon and oxen\nused and gone, so that six-tenths of the Government's income is spent.\n\nTherefore the intelligent general strives to feed on the enemy; one\nbale of the enemy's rice counts as twenty from our own waggons; one\nbundle of the enemy's forage is better than twenty of our own.\n\nIncitement must be given to vanquish the enemy.\n\nThey who take advantage of the enemy should be rewarded.\n\nThey who are the first to lay their hands on more than ten of the\nenemy's chariots should be rewarded; the enemy's standard on the\nchariots exchanged for our own; the captured chariots mixed with our\nown chariots and taken into use.\n\nThe accompanying warriors must be treated well, so that, while the\nenemy is beaten, our side increases in strength.\n\nNow the object of war is victory; not lengthy operations, even\nskilfully conducted.\n\nThe good general is the lord of the people's lives, the guardian of the\ncountry's welfare.\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nTHE ATTACK BY STRATAGEM\n\n\nSun the Master said:--\n\nNow by the laws of war, better than defeating a country by fire and the\nsword, is to take it without strife.\n\nBetter to capture the enemy's army intact than to overcome it after\nfierce resistance.\n\nBetter to capture the \"Lu,\"[3] the \"Tsu\" or the \"Wu\" whole, than to\ndestroy them in battle.\n\nTo fight and conquer one hundred times is not the perfection of\nattainment, for the supreme art is to subdue the enemy without fighting.\n\nWherefore the most skilful warrior outwits the enemy by superior\nstratagem; the next in merit prevents the enemy from uniting his\nforces; next to him is he who engages the enemy's army; while to\nbesiege his citadel is the worst expedient.\n\nA siege should not be undertaken if it can possibly be avoided. For,\nbefore a siege can be commenced, three months are required for the\nconstruction of stages, battering-rams and siege engines; then a\nfurther three months are required in front of the citadel, in order to\nmake the \"Chuyin.\"[4] Wherefore the general is angered, his patience\nexhausted, his men surge like ants against the ramparts _before the\ntime is ripe_, and one-third of them are killed to no purpose. Such are\nthe misfortunes that sieges entail.\n\nTherefore the master of war causes the enemy's forces to yield, but\nwithout fighting; he captures his fortress, but without besieging\nit; and without lengthy fighting takes the enemy's kingdom. Without\ntarnishing his weapons he gains the complete advantage.\n\nThis is the assault by stratagem.\n\nBy the rules of war, if ten times as strong as the enemy, surround him;\nwith five times his strength, attack; with double his numbers, divide.\nIf equal in strength, exert to the utmost, and fight; if inferior in\nnumbers, manoeuvre _and await the opportunity_; if altogether inferior,\noffer no chance of battle. A determined stand by inferior numbers does\nbut lead to their capture.\n\nThe warrior is the country's support. If his aid be entire, the country\nis of necessity strong; if it be at all deficient, then is the country\nweak.\n\nNow a prince may embarrass his army in three ways, namely:--\n\nIgnorant that the army in the field should not advance, to order it to\ngo forward; or, ignorant that the army should not retreat, order it to\nretire.\n\nThis is to tie the army as with a string.\n\nIgnorant of military affairs, to rule the armies in the same way as the\nstate.\n\nThis is to perplex the soldiers.\n\nIgnorant of the situation of the army, to settle its dispositions.\n\nThis is to fill the soldiers with distrust.\n\nIf the army be perplexed and distrustful, then dangers from neighbouring\nprinces arise. The army is confounded, and offered up to the enemy.\n\nThere are five occasions when victory can be foretold:--\n\nWhen the general knows the time to fight and when not to fight; or\nunderstands when to employ large or small numbers; when government\nand people are of one mind; when the state is prepared, and chooses\nthe enemy's unguarded moment for attack; when the general possesses\nability, and is not interfered with by his prince.\n\nThese five things are the heralds of victory.\n\nIt has been said aforetime that he who knows both sides has nothing\nto fear in a hundred fights; he who is ignorant of the enemy, and\nfixes his eyes only on his own side, conquers, and the next time is\ndefeated; he who not only is ignorant of the enemy, but also of his own\nresources, is invariably defeated.\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\nTHE ORDER OF BATTLE\n\n\nSun the Master said:--\n\nThe ancient masters of war first made their armies invincible, then\nwaited until the adversary could with certainty be defeated.\n\nThe causes of defeat come from within; victory is born in the enemy's\ncamp.\n\nSkilful soldiers make defeat impossible, and further render the enemy\nincapable of victory.\n\nBut, as it is written, the conditions necessary for victory may be\npresent, but they cannot always be obtained.\n\nIf victory be unattainable, we stand on the defensive; if victory be\nsure, we attack.\n\nDeficiency compels defence; super-abundance permits attack.\n\nThe skilful in defence crouch, hidden in the deepest shades; the\nskilful in attack push to the topmost heaven.[5]\n\nIf these precepts be observed, victory is certain.\n\nA victory, even if popularly proclaimed as such by the common folk, may\nnot be a true success. To win in fight, and for the kingdom to say,\n\"Well done,\" does not mark the summit of attainment. To lift an autumn\nfleece[6] is no proof of strength; the eyes that only see the sun and\nmoon are not the eagle's; to hear the thunder is no great thing.\n\nAs has been said aforetime, the able warrior gains the victory without\ndesperate and bloody engagements, and wins thereby no reputation for\nwisdom or brave deeds. To fight is to win, for he attacks only when the\nenemy has sown the seeds of defeat.\n\nMoreover, the skilful soldier in a secure position does not let pass\nthe moment when the enemy should be attacked.\n\nThe army that conquers makes certain of victory, and then seeks battle.\n\nThe army destined to defeat, fights, trusting that chance may bring\nsuccess to its arms.\n\nThe skilful leader is steadfast in the \"Way\"; upholds the Law, and\nthereby controls the issue.\n\nTouching the laws of war, it is said: first, the rule; second, the\nmeasure; third, the tables; fourth, the scales; fifth, the foretelling\nof victory.\n\nFor the rule is the survey of land; the measure tells the amount of\nthat land's produce; the tables its population; from the scales their\nweight or quality is made known; and then can we calculate victory or\ndefeat.\n\nThe army that conquers as against the army destined to defeat, is as a\nbeam against a feather in the scales. The attack of conquering forces\nis as the outburst of long-pent-up waters into sunken valleys.\n\nSuch are the orders of battle.\n\n\n\n\nV\n\nTHE SPIRIT OF THE TROOPS\n\n\nSun the Master said:--\n\nThe control of large numbers is possible, and like unto that of small\nnumbers, if we subdivide them.\n\nBy means of drum, bell and flag,[7] the direction of large forces in\nbattle is possible, and like unto the direction of small forces.\n\nBy the skilful interchange of normal and abnormal manoeuvres are the\narmies certainly preserved from defeat.\n\nThe enemy is crushed, like the fall of a grindstone upon an egg, by\nknowledge of his strength and weakness, and by the employment of truth\nand artifice.\n\nMoreover, in battle the enemy is engaged with the normal and defeated\nby the abnormal force.[8]\n\nThe abnormal force, skilfully handled, is like the heaven and earth,\neternal; as the tides and the flow of rivers, unceasing; like the sun\nand moon, for ever interchanging; coming and passing, as the seasons.\n\nThere are five notes; but by combinations, innumerable harmonies are\nproduced. There are but five colours; but if we mix them, the shades\nare infinite. There are five tastes, but if we mix them there are more\nflavours than the palate can distinguish.[9]\n\nIn war there are but two forces, the normal and the abnormal; but they\nare capable of infinite variation. Their mutual interchange is like a\nwheel, having neither beginning or end. They are a mystery that none\ncan penetrate.\n\nAs the rush of rock-shouldering torrents, so is the spirit of the\ntroops.\n\nLike the well-judged flight of the falcon, in a flash crushing its\nquarry, so should the stroke be timed.\n\nWherefore the spirit of the good fighter is terrifying, his occasions\nsudden; like the stretched cross-bow, whose string is released at the\ntouch of the trigger.\n\nIn the maze and tumult of the battle, there is no confusion; in the\nthick of action the battle array is impenetrable.\n\nIf discipline be perfect, disorder can be simulated; if truly bold, we\ncan feign fear; if really strong, we can feign weakness.\n\nWe simulate disorder by subdivision; fear, by spirit; weakness, by\nbattle formation.\n\nWe set the enemy in motion by adopting different formations to which he\nmust conform.\n\nIf we offer the enemy a point of advantage, he will certainly take it:\nwe give him an advantage, set him in motion and then fall upon him.\n\nWherefore the good fighter seeks victory from spirit, and does not\ndepend entirely upon the skill of his men. He is careful in his choice,\nand leaves the rest to battle force; yet, when an opening or advantage\nshows, he pushes it to its limits.\n\nAs a log or rock which, motionless on flat ground, yet moves with\never-increasing force when set on an incline, so await the opportunity,\nand so act when the opportunity arrives.\n\nIf the general be skilful, the spirit of his troops is as the impetus\nof a round stone rolled from the top of a high mountain.\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\nEMPTINESS AND STRENGTH\n\n\nSun the Master said:--\n\nTo be the first in the field, and there to await the enemy, is to\nhusband strength.\n\nTo be late, and hurrying to advance to meet the foe, is exhausting.\n\nThe good fighter contrives to make the enemy approach; he does not\nallow himself to be beguiled by the enemy.\n\nBy offering an apparent advantage, he induces the enemy to take up a\nposition that will cause his defeat; he plants obstructions to dissuade\nhim from acting in such a way as to threaten his own dispositions.\n\nIf the enemy be at rest in comfortable quarters, harass him; if he be\nliving in plenty, cut off his supplies; if sitting composedly awaiting\nattack, cause him to move.\n\nThis may be done by appearing where the enemy is not, and assaulting\nunexpected points.\n\nIf we go where the enemy is not, we may go a thousand leagues without\nexhaustion.\n\nIf we attack those positions which the enemy has not defended, we\ninvariably take them: but on the defence we must be strong, even where\nwe are not likely to be attacked.\n\nAgainst those skilful in attack, the enemy does not know where to\ndefend: against those skilful in defence, the enemy does not know where\nto attack.\n\nNow the secrets of the art of offence are not to be easily apprehended,\nas a certain shape or noise can be understood, of the senses; but when\nthese secrets are once learnt, the enemy is mastered.\n\nWe attack, and the enemy cannot resist, because we attack his\ninsufficiency; we retire, and the enemy cannot pursue, because we\nretire too quickly.\n\nAgain, when we are anxious to fight, but the enemy is serenely secure\nbehind high walls and deep moats; we attack some such other place that\nhe must certainly come out to relieve.\n\nWhen we do not want to fight, we occupy an unfortified line; and\nprevent the enemy from attacking by keeping him in suspense.\n\nBy making feints, and causing the enemy to be uncertain as to our\nmovements, we unite, whilst he must divide.\n\nWe become one body; the enemy being separated into ten parts. We\nattack the divided ten with the united one. We are many, the enemy is\nfew, and in superiority of numbers there is economy of strength.\n\nThe place selected for attack must be kept secret. If the enemy know\nnot where he will be attacked, he must prepare in every quarter, and so\nbe everywhere weak.\n\nIf the enemy strengthen his front, he must weaken his rear; if he\nstrengthen his right, his left is weakened; and if he strengthen his\nleft, his right is weakened.\n\nEverywhere to make preparations, is to be everywhere weak. The enemy is\nweakened by his extended preparations, and we gain in strength.\n\nHaving decided on the place and day of attack, though the enemy be a\nhundred leagues away, we can defeat him.\n\nIf the ground and occasion be not known, the front cannot help the\nrear; the left cannot support the right, nor the right the left, nor\nthe rear the front. For on occasion, the parts of the army are two\nscore leagues apart, while a distance of four or five leagues is\ncomparatively close.\n\nThe soldiers of Wu[10] are less than the soldiers of Yueh; but as\nsuperiority in numbers does not of necessity bring victory, I say,\nthen, that we may obtain the victory.\n\nIf the enemy be many in number, prevent him from taking advantage of\nhis superiority, and ascertain his plan of operations. Provoke the\nenemy and discover the state of his troops; feint and discover the\nstrength of his position. Flap the wings, and unmask his sufficiency or\ninsufficiency. By constant feints and excursions, we may produce on the\nenemy an impression of intangibility, which neither spies nor art can\ndispel.\n\nThe general makes his plans in accordance with the dispositions of\nthe enemy, and puts his hosts in motion; but the multitude cannot\nappreciate the general's intention; they see the signs of victory, but\nthey cannot discover the means.\n\nIf a victory be gained by a certain stratagem, do not repeat it. Vary\nthe stratagem according to circumstances.\n\nAn army may be likened to water.\n\nWater leaves dry the high places, and seeks the hollows. An army turns\nfrom strength and attacks emptiness.\n\nThe flow of water is regulated by the shape of the ground; victory is\ngained by acting in accordance with the state of the enemy.\n\nThe shape of water is indeterminate; likewise the spirit of war is not\nfixed.\n\nThe leader who changes his tactics in accordance with his adversary,\nand thereby controls the issue, may be called the God of war.\n\nAmong the five elements[11] there is no settled precedence; the four\nseasons come and go; the days are long and short; and the moon waxes\nand wanes. _So in war there is no fixity._\n\n\n\n\nVII\n\nBATTLE TACTICS\n\n\nSun the Master said:--\n\nFor the most part, military procedure is as follows:--\n\nThe general receives orders from his lord; assembles and settles\nharmony among the forces, and takes the field.\n\nThere is nothing more difficult than Battle Tactics. Their difficulty\nlies in the calculation of time and distance, and the reversal of\nmisfortune.\n\nTo make the enemy take a circuitous route by a show of gain, and then,\nwhilst starting after him, to arrive before him, is to be a master of\nthe art of manoeuvre.\n\nThe operations of an army may reap advantage; the wrangles of a\nmultitude are fraught with peril.\n\nEmploying our whole force at one time in order to gain advantage over\nthe enemy, we may not have time enough to gain our object. If we push\non with a portion of the force only, the transport is lost. Discarding\nhelmet and armour; stopping neither day nor night; marching double\ndistance; doing double work; and finally contending with the enemy at\na distance of a hundred leagues: results in the loss of the general.\nSince the strong men arrive first, and the tired drop in rear, only\none-tenth of the forces is available.\n\nA forced march of fifty leagues to secure an advantage may result in\nfailure to the leader of the vanguard, for only half his men will\narrive.\n\nAfter a forced march of thirty leagues to secure an advantage, only\ntwo-thirds of the army will be available.\n\nFurther, a lack of ammunition, of supplies, or of stores, may lead to\ndisaster.\n\nThe ruler who is ignorant of the designs of neighbouring princes,\ncannot treat with them.\n\nHe who is ignorant of mountain and forest, defile and marsh, cannot\nlead an army.\n\nHe who does not employ a guide, cannot gain advantage from the ground.\n\nDisguise your movements; await a favourable opportunity; divide or\nunite according to circumstance.\n\nLet your attack be swift as the wind; your march calm like the\nforest;[12] your occupation devastating as fire. In defence, as a\nmountain rest firm; like darkness impenetrable to the enemy. Let your\nmovements be swift as the lightning.\n\nLet as many as possible take part in the plunder: distribute the profit\nfrom the captured territory.\n\nSo he who understands the crooked and the straight way conquers.\n\nThese are the methods of Battle Tactics.\n\nAccording to the ancient books on war, the drum and bell are used,\nbecause the voice does not carry; the flag is used to assist the\nsight. The use of bell, drum, banner and flag is to attract the united\nattention of eye and ear.\n\nWhen all are united, the strong are not left to go forward alone,\nthe cowardly are not free to retreat unrestricted. In this way can a\nmultitude be used.\n\nTherefore in night fighting, beacons and drums are largely used; in day\nfighting, a great number of banners and flags and the enemy's eyes and\nears are confounded.\n\nWe thus awe his army, and defeat his general's ambition.\n\nIn the morning the spirits are keen; at midday there is a laziness; in\nthe evening a desire to return. Wherefore, he who uses his soldiers\nwell, avoids the time when the spirits are keen; but attacks the enemy\nwhen he is languid or seeking his camp.\n\nThus should the nature of energy be turned to account.\n\nTo oppose confusion with order, clamour with quiet, is to have the\nheart under control.\n\nTo await an enemy from a distance, to oppose hunger with satiety, rest\nwith fatigue, is the way to husband strength.\n\nDo not attack where lines of banners wave, nor the serried ranks of\nbattle spread, but patiently await your time.\n\nDo not attack an enemy on high ground, nor one who has high ground at\nhis back. Do not pursue an enemy who is imitating flight; do not attack\na spirited enemy.\n\nIf the enemy offer an allurement, do not take it.\n\nDo not interfere with an enemy who has struck camp, and is about to\nretire. When surrounding an enemy, allow him an outlet. Do not press a\ndesperate enemy.\n\nThese are the methods of employing troops.\n\n\n\n\nVIII\n\nTHE NINE CHANGES\n\n\nSun the Master said:--\n\nIn general, the procedure of war is:--the Leader, having received\norders from his lord, assembles the armies.\n\nDo not camp on marshy or low-lying ground; enter into friendly\nrelations with neighbouring states; do not linger in a far country;\nuse stratagem in mountainous and wooded country; on death ground, fight.\n\nThere are always roads that must be avoided; forces that must not be\nattacked; castles that must not be besieged; ground that must not be\nchosen for encounter; orders from the lord that must not be obeyed.\n\nThe general who knows the Nine Changes understands the use of troops;\non the contrary, he who does not understand them, can make no use of\nhis topographical knowledge.\n\nIn the management of armies, if the art of the Nine Changes be\nunderstood, a knowledge of the Five Advantages is of no avail.\n\nThe wise man considers well both advantage and disadvantage. He sees a\nway out of adversity, and on the day of victory to danger is not blind.\n\nIn reducing an enemy to submission, inflict all possible damage upon\nhim; make him undertake useless adventures; also make neighbouring\nrulers move as you would desire them by tempting them with gain.\n\nWherefore in the conduct of war do not depend on the enemy's not\ncoming, but rely on your own preparations; do not count on the enemy\nnot attacking your fortress, but leave nothing undefended.\n\nGenerals must be on their guard against these five dangerous faults:--\n\nBlind impetuosity, which leads to death.\n\nOver-cautiousness, which leads to capture.\n\nQuick temper, which brings insult.\n\nA too rigid propriety, which invites disgrace.\n\nOver-regard for the troops, which causes inconvenience.\n\nThese five faults in the leader are disastrous in war. The overthrow of\nthe army and the slaughter of the general arise from them. Therefore\nthey must be carefully considered.\n\n\n\n\nIX\n\nMOVEMENT OF TROOPS\n\n\nSun the Master said:--\n\nTouching the disposal of troops and observation of the enemy in\nrelation to mountain warfare:--\n\nCross mountains and camp in valleys, selecting positions of safety.\n\nPlace the army on high ground, and avoid an enemy in high places.\n\nIn relation to water:--\n\nAfter crossing waters, pass on immediately to a distance. When the\nenemy is crossing a stream, do not meet and engage him in the waters,\nbut strike when half his force has passed over. Do not advance on an\nenemy near water, but place the army on high ground, and in safety.\n\nDo not fight when the enemy is between the army and the source of the\nriver.\n\nWith regard to marshes:--\n\nCross salty marshes quickly; do not linger near them.\n\nIf by chance compelled to fight in the neighbourhood of a marsh, seek a\nplace where there is water and grass, and trees in plenty in the rear.\n\nIn open country place the army in a convenient place with rising ground\nin the right rear; so that while in front lies death, behind there is\nsafety.\n\nSuch is war in flat country.\n\nHuangti, by observing these things, gained the victory over four\nPrinces.\n\nAs a rule, the soldiers prefer high ground to low. They prefer sunny\nplaces to those the sun does not reach.\n\nIf the health of the troops be considered, and they are encamped on\nhigh and sunny ground, diseases will be avoided, and victory made\ncertain.\n\nIf there be rising ground, encamp on its sunny side and in front of\nit; for thereby the soldiers are benefited, and the ground used to our\nadvantage.\n\nIf, owing to rains in the upper reaches, the river become turbulent, do\nnot cross until the waters have quieted.\n\nSteep and impassable valleys; well-like places; confined places;\ntangled impenetrable ground; swamps and bogs; narrow passages with\npitfalls:--quickly pass from these, and approach them not. Cause the\nenemy to approach near to them, but keep yourself from these places;\nface them, so that the enemy has them in his rear.\n\nIf there be near to the army, precipices, ponds, meres, reeds and\nrushes, or thick forests and trees, search them thoroughly. These are\nplaces where the enemy is likely to be in ambush.\n\nWhen the enemy is close, but quiet, he is strong in reliance on natural\ndefences.\n\nIf the enemy challenge to fight from afar, he wishes you to advance.\n\nIf the enemy be encamped in open country, it is with some special\nobject in view.\n\nMovement among the trees shows that the enemy is advancing. Broken\nbranches and trodden grass, as of the passing of a large host, must be\nregarded with suspicion.\n\nThe rising of birds shows an ambush.\n\nStartled beasts show that the enemy is stealthily approaching from\nseveral sides.\n\nHigh, straight spurts of dust betoken that chariots are coming.\n\nLong, low masses of dust show the coming of infantry.\n\nHere and there, thin and high columns of dust are signs that firewood\nand fodder are being collected.\n\nSmall clouds of dust moving to and fro are signs that the enemy is\npreparing to encamp for a short time.\n\nBusy preparations and smooth words show that the enemy is about to\nadvance to attack.\n\nBig words, and the spurring forward of horsemen, are signs that the\nenemy is about to retire.\n\nAn advance of the light chariots to the flanks of the camp is a sign\nthat the enemy is coming forth to fight.\n\nWithout consultation, suddenly to desire an armistice, is a mark of\nulterior design.\n\nThe passing to and fro of messengers, and the forming up of troops,\nshow that the enemy has some movement on foot.\n\nAn advance, followed by sudden retirement, is a lure to attack.\n\nWhen the enemy use their weapons to rest upon, they are hungry.\n\nIf the drawers of water drink at the river, the enemy is suffering from\nthirst.\n\nDisregard of booty that lies ready at hand is a sign of exhaustion.\n\nThe clustering of birds round a position shows that it is unoccupied.\n\nVoices calling in the night betoken alarm.\n\nDisorder in the army is a sign that the general is disregarded.\n\nA changing about of flags and banners is a sign that the army is\nunsettled.\n\nIf the officers be angry, it is because the soldiers are tired, _and\nslow to obey_.\n\nThe killing of horses for food shows that the enemy is short of\nprovisions.\n\nWhen the cooking-pots are hung up on the wall and the soldiers turn\nnot in again, the enemy is at an end of his resources.\n\nExceeding graciousness and familiarity on the part of the general show\nthat he has lost the confidence of the soldiers.\n\nFrequent rewards show that discipline is at an end.\n\nFrequent punishments are a sign that the general is in difficulties.\n\nThe general who first blusters, and then is obsequious, is without\nperception.\n\nHe who offers apologies and hostages is anxious for a truce.\n\nWhen both sides, eager for a fight, face each other for a considerable\ntime, neither advancing nor retiring, the occasion requires the utmost\nvigilance and circumspection.\n\nNumbers are no certain mark of strength.\n\nEven if incapable of a headlong assault, if the forces be united, and\nthe enemy's condition ascertained, victory is possible.\n\nHe who without taking thought makes light of the enemy is certain to be\ncaptured.\n\nIf a general who is strange to the troops punish them, they cease to\nobey him. If they are not obedient, they cannot be usefully employed.\n\nIf the troops know the general, but are not affected by his punishments,\nthey are useless.\n\nBy humane treatment we obtain obedience; authority brings uniformity.\nThus we obtain victory.\n\nIf the people have been trained in obedience from the beginning, they\nrespect their leader's commands.\n\nIf the people be not early trained to obedience, they do not respect\ntheir leader's commands.\n\nOrders are always obeyed, if general and soldiers are in sympathy.\n\n\n\n\nX\n\nGROUND\n\n\nSun the Master said:--\n\nWith regard to the different natures of ground there are:--\n\nOpen ground; broken ground; suspended ground; defiles; precipices; far\ncountries.\n\nOpen ground is that where either side has liberty of movement: be\nquick to occupy any high ground in the neighbourhood and consider well\nthe line of supplies.\n\nBroken ground. Advance is easy, but retreat from it is difficult. Here,\nif the enemy be not prepared, we may win: but should he be prepared,\nand defeat us, and retreat be impossible, then there is disaster.\n\nSuspended ground. The side that takes the initiative is under a\ndisadvantage. Here, if the enemy offer some allurement, we should not\nadvance: but rather, by feigning retreat, wait until he has put forth\nhalf his force. Then we may attack him with advantage.\n\nDefiles, make haste to occupy; garrison strongly and await the enemy.\nShould the enemy be before you, and in strength, do not engage him; but\nif there be unoccupied points, attack him.\n\nIn precipitous ground quickly occupy a position on a sunny height, and\nawait the enemy. If the enemy be before you, withdraw and do not attack\nhim.\n\nIf distant from the enemy, and the forces be equal, to take the\ninitiative is disadvantageous.\n\nNow, these are the six kinds of ground. It is the duty of generals to\nstudy them.\n\nAgain, there are six calamities among the troops, arising, not from\ndefect of ground, or lack of opportunity, but from the general's\nincapacity.\n\nThese are: repulse, relaxation, distress, disorganisation, confusion\nand rout.\n\nIf troops be sent to attack an enemy of equal quality, but ten times\ntheir number, they retire discomfited.\n\nStrong soldiers with weak officers cause relaxation.\n\nAble officers with feeble soldiers cause distress.\n\nEnraged senior officers, who fall upon the enemy without orders, and\nobey not the general because he does not recognise their abilities,\nproduce disorganisation.\n\nWeak and amiable generals, whose directions and leadership are vague,\nwhose officers' and men's duties are not fixed, and whose dispositions\nare contradictory, produce confusion.\n\nGenerals, who are unable to estimate the enemy, who oppose small\nnumbers to large, weakness to strength, and who do not put picked men\nin the van of the army, cause it to be routed.\n\nThese six things lead to defeat. It is the duty of the general to study\nthem carefully.\n\nGround is the handmaid of victory.\n\nAbility to estimate the enemy, and plan the victory; an eye for\nsteepness, command and distances: these are the qualities of the good\ngeneral.\n\nWhosoever knows these things, conquers; he who understands them not, is\ndefeated.\n\nIf victory be certain from the military standpoint, fight, even if the\nlord forbid.\n\nIf defeat be certain from the military standpoint, do not fight, even\nthough the lord commands it.\n\nThe general who advances, from no thought of his own glory, or retires,\nregardless of punishment; but only strives for the people's welfare,\nand his lord's advantage, is a treasure to the state.\n\nThe good general cares for his soldiers, and lovingly treats them as\nhis children; as a consequence they follow him through deep valleys,\nand are beside him in death.\n\nNevertheless, over-care for the soldiers may cause disobedience;\nover-attention may make them unserviceable; over-indulgence may produce\ndisorder: they become like spoilt children, and cannot be used.\n\nHe who is confident of his own men, but is ignorant that the enemy\nshould not be attacked, has no certainty of victory.\n\nHe who knows that the enemy may be attacked with advantage, but knows\nnot his own men, has no certainty of victory.\n\nConfidence in the troops, right judgment when to attack the enemy, but\nignorance of the ground, bring uncertain victory.\n\nThe wise soldier, once in motion, does not waver, and is never at a\nloss.\n\nAs has been said: \"Know thyself; know the enemy; fear not for victory.\"\n\nAlso, if the season and the opportunity be realised, and the ground\nknown, complete victory is certain.\n\n\n\n\nXI\n\nTHE NINE GROUNDS\n\n\nSun the Master said:--\n\nIn respect to the conduct of war there are:--\n\nDistracting ground; disturbing ground; ground of contention;\nintersecting ground; path-ridden ground; deeply-involved ground;\ndifficult ground; enclosed ground; death ground.\n\nAt all times, when the prince fights in his own territory, it is called\ndistracting[13] ground.\n\nThat ground a short way inside the enemy's border is called disturbing\nground.\n\nGround giving advantage to whichever side is in possession, is called\nground of contention.\n\nGround to which either side has access, is called intersecting ground.\n\nGround between three provinces first possession of which enables the\npeoples of the earth to be controlled, is called path-ridden ground.\n\nThe interior of the enemy's country with many of his fortified towns in\nrear, is called deeply-involved ground.\n\nMountain and forest, precipices, ravines, marsh and swamp, all places\nwhere passage is hard, are called difficult ground.\n\nA narrow entrance and winding outlet, where a small number can oppose a\nlarge force, is called enclosed ground.\n\nThat ground where delay means disaster, is called death ground.\n\nWherefore, do not fight on distracting ground; do not linger on\ndisturbing ground.\n\nIf the enemy be in possession of disputed ground, do not attack.\n\nIn intersecting ground, do not interrupt the highways.\n\nAt the crossing of highways, cultivate intercourse.\n\nWhen deeply involved, levy and store up the enemy's property.\n\nQuickly depart from difficult ground.\n\nOn enclosed ground, use stratagem.\n\nOn death ground, fight.\n\nThe skilful fighters of old were at pains to disconnect the enemy's\nfront and rear; they cut asunder small and large forces of the enemy;\nprevented mutual help between his officers and men; spread mistrust\nbetween high and low. They scattered the enemy, and prevented him from\nconcentrating; if his soldiers were assembled, they were without unity.\n\nIf there be a chance of victory, move; if there be no chance of\nsuccess, stand fast.\n\nIf I were asked how a powerful and united force of the enemy should be\nmet, I would say: lay hands on what the enemy cherishes and he will\nconform to our desires.\n\nIn war, above all, speed sustains the spirit of the troops. Strike\nbefore the enemy is ready; and attack his unpreparedness from an\nunexpected quarter.\n\nWith regard to war in foreign lands. When strangers in a far country\nthe soldiers are united and are proof against defeat. Plunder fertile\nplains so that the army is fed; be careful of the health of the\nsoldiers; do not tire them uselessly; unite their minds; store up\nstrength; plan well and secretly. If there be no refuge the soldiers\nwill not fly from death.\n\nIf there be no alternative but death, the soldiers exert themselves to\nthe utmost.\n\nIn desperate places, soldiers lose the sense of fear.\n\nIf there be no place of refuge, there will be no wavering.\n\nIf deeply involved in the enemy's country, there is unity.\n\nIf it be unavoidable, the soldiers will fight their hardest. Even\nwithout warnings they are vigilant; they comply without insistence;\nwithout stipulations they are tractable; without explicit instructions\nthey will trust the general and obey him.\n\nProhibit the discussion of signs and omens, and remove the soldiers'\ndoubts; then to the moment of death they will be undistracted.\n\nRiches are denied the soldiers, not because money is a bad thing; old\nage is forbidden them, but not because long life is evil. Hardships\nand danger are the proper lot of the soldier.\n\nWhen the order for attack is given, the collars of those who are\nsitting may be wet with tears; tears may roll down the cheeks of those\nreclining; yet these men, in a desperate place, will fight with the\ncourage of Chu and Kuei.\n\nSoldiers should be used like the snakes on Mt. Chang; which, if you hit\non the head, the tail will strike you; if you hit the tail, the head\nwill strike you; if you strike its middle, head and tail will strike\nyou together.\n\nShould any one ask me whether men can be made to move like these\nsnakes, I say, yes. The men of Wu and Yueh hate each other; yet, if\nthey cross a river in the same boat and a storm overtake them, they\nhelp each other like the two hands.\n\nThe horses may be tied, and the chariot wheels sunk in the mud; but\nthat does not prevent flight.\n\nUniversal courage and unity depend on good management.\n\nThe best results from both the weak and strong are obtained by a proper\nuse of the ground.\n\nThe skilful warrior can lead his army, as a man leads another by the\nhand, because he places it in a desperate position.\n\nThe general should be calm, inscrutable, just and prudent. He should\nkeep his officers and men in ignorance of his plans, and inform no one\nof any changes or fresh departures. By changing his camps, and taking\ndevious and unexpected routes, his plans cannot be guessed.\n\nAs one taking away the ladder from under those mounted upon the roof,\nso acts the general when his men are assembled to fight. He penetrates\ninto the heart of the enemy's country and then divulges his plans. He\ndrives the army hither and thither like a flock of sheep, knowing not\nwhither they go.\n\nTherefore the general should assemble the armies, and place them in a\ndesperate position.\n\nThe different natures of the Nine Grounds; the suiting of the means to\nthe occasion; the hearts of men: these are things that must be studied.\n\nWhen deep in the interior of a hostile country, there is cohesion; if\nonly on the borders, there is distraction. To leave home and cross the\nborders is to be free from interference.\n\nOn distracting ground, unite the soldiers' minds.\n\nOn disturbing ground, keep together.\n\nOn disputed ground, try to take the enemy in rear.\n\nOn intersecting ground, look well to the defences.\n\nOn path-ridden ground, cultivate intercourse.\n\nOn deeply-involved ground be careful of supplies.\n\nOn difficult ground, do not linger.\n\nOn enclosed ground, close the path of escape.\n\nOn death ground, show the soldiers that there is no chance of survival.\n\nIt is the nature of soldiers to defend when surrounded, to fight with\nenergy when compelled thereto, to pursue the enemy if he retreat.\n\nHe cannot treat with other rulers who knows not their ambitions.\n\nHe who knows not mountain and forest; cliffs; ravines; lakes and\nmarshes; cannot conduct an army.\n\nHe who does not use guides, cannot take advantage of the ground.\n\nHe who has not a complete knowledge of the Nine Grounds, cannot gain\nmilitary dominion.\n\nThe great general, when attacking a powerful nation, prevents the enemy\nfrom concentrating his hosts.\n\nHe overawes the enemy so that other states cannot join against him.\n\nHe does not struggle for the favour of other states; nor is he careful\nof their rights. He has confidence in himself, and awes the enemy.\n\nTherefore he easily takes the fortress, or reduces the country to\nsubjection.\n\nIn the bestowal of rewards, or in his orders, he is not bound by\nancient rule.\n\nHe manages his forces as though they were one man.\n\nOrders should direct the soldiers; but while what is advantageous\nshould be made known, what is disadvantageous should be concealed.\n\nIf the forces be plunged into danger, there is survival; from death\nground there is retrieval; for the force in danger gains the victory.\n\nDiscover the enemy's intentions by conforming to his movements. When\nthese are discovered, then, with one stroke, the general may be killed,\neven though he be one hundred leagues distant.\n\nWhen war is declared, close the barriers; destroy passports; prevent\nthe passage of the enemy's spies; conduct the business of the\ngovernment with vigilance.\n\nTake immediate advantage of the enemy's weakness; discover what he most\nvalues, and plan to seize it.\n\nShape your plans according to rule, and the circumstances of the enemy.\n\nAt first behave with the discretion of a maiden; then, when the enemy\ngives an opening, dart in like a rabbit.\n\nThe enemy cannot defend himself.\n\n\n\n\nXII\n\nASSAULT BY FIRE\n\n\nSun the Master said:--\n\nThere are five ways of attack by fire:\n\nThe first is called barrack burning; the second, commissariat burning;\nthe third, equipment burning; the fourth, store burning; the fifth, the\ncompany burning.\n\nThe moment for the fire assault must be suitable. Further, appliances\nmust always be kept at hand.\n\nThere is a time and day proper for the setting and carrying out of the\nfire assault; namely: such time as the weather is dry; and a day when\nthe moon is in the quarters of the stars Chi, Pi, I, Chen: for these\nare days of wind.\n\nRegard well the developments that will certainly arise from the fire,\nand act upon them. When fire breaks out inside the enemy's camp, thrust\nupon him with all speed from without; but if his soldiers be quiet,\nwait, and do not attack.\n\nWhen the fire is at its height, attack or not, as opportunity may arise.\n\nIf the opportunity be favourable, set fire to the enemy's camp, and do\nnot wait for it to break out from within.\n\nWhen fire breaks out on the windward side, do not attack from the\nleeward.\n\nWind that rises in the day lasts long. Wind that rises in the night\ntime quickly passes away.\n\nThe peculiarities of the five burnings must be known, and the calendar\nstudied, and, if the attack is to be assisted, the fire must be\nunquenchable.\n\nIf water is to assist the attack, the flood must be overwhelming.\n\nWater may isolate or divide the enemy; fire may consume his camp; but\nunless victory or possession be obtained, the enemy quickly recovers,\nand misfortunes arise. The war drags on, and money is spent.\n\nLet the enlightened lord consider well; and the good general keep the\nmain object in view. If no advantage is to be gained thereby, do not\nmove; without prospect of victory, do not use the soldiers; do not\nfight unless the state be in danger.\n\nWar should not be undertaken because the lord is in a moment of\npassion. The general must not fight because there is anger in his heart.\n\nDo not make war unless victory may be gained thereby; if there be\nprospect of victory, move; if there be no prospect, do not move.\n\nFor passion may change to gladness, anger passes away; but a country,\nonce overturned, cannot be restored; the dead cannot be brought to life.\n\nWherefore it is written, the enlightened lord is circumspect, and\nthe good general takes heed; then is the state secure, and the army\nvictorious in battle.\n\n\n\n\nXIII\n\nTHE EMPLOYMENT OF SPIES\n\n\nSun the Master said:--\n\nCalling 100,000 men to arms, and transporting them a hundred leagues,\nis such an undertaking that in one day 1,000 taels of the citizens' and\nnobles' money are spent; commotions arise within and without the state;\ncarriers fall down exhausted on the line of march of the army; and the\noccupations of 700,000[14] homes are upset.\n\nAgain, for years the armies may face each other; yet the issue may\ndepend on a single day's victory.\n\nWherefore, by grudging slight expense in titles and salaries to spies,\nto remain in ignorance of the enemy's circumstances, is to be without\nhumanity. Such a person is no general; he is no assistance to his lord;\nhe is no master of victory.\n\nThe enlightened ruler and the wise general who act, win, and are\ndistinguished beyond the common, are informed beforehand.\n\nThis knowledge is not to be got by calling on gods and demons; nor does\nit come of past experience nor calculation. It is through men that\nknowledge of the enemy is gained.\n\nNow the five kinds of spies are these: village spies, inner spies,\nconverted spies, death spies, living spies.\n\nIf these five means be employed simultaneously, none can discover\ntheir working. This is called the Mysterious Thread: it is the Lord's\nTreasure.\n\nVillage spies are such people of the country as give information.\n\nInner spies are those of the enemy's officials employed by us.\n\nConverted spies are those of the enemy's spies in our pay.\n\nDeath[15] spies are sent to misinform the enemy, and to spread false\nreports through our spies already in the enemy's lines.\n\nLiving spies[16] return to report.\n\nIn connection with the armies, spies should be treated with the\ngreatest kindness; and in dealing out reward, they should receive the\nmost generous treatment. All matters relating to spies are secret.\n\nWithout infinite capacity in the general, the employment of spies is\nimpossible. Their treatment requires benevolence and uprightness.\nExcept they be observed with the closest attention, the truth will not\nbe obtained from them.\n\nWonderful indeed is the power of spies.\n\nThere is no occasion when they cannot be used.\n\nIf a secret matter be spoken of before the time is ripe, the spy who\ntold the matter, and the man who repeated the same, should be put to\ndeath.\n\nIf desirous of attacking an army; of besieging a fortress; or of\nkilling a certain person; first of all, learn the names of the general\nin charge; of his right-hand[17] men; of those who introduce visitors\nto the Presence; of the gate keeper and the sentries. Then set the\nspies to watch them.\n\nSeek out the enemy's spies who come to spy on us; give them money;\ncause them to be lodged and cared for; and convert them to the service.\nThrough them we are enabled to obtain spies among the enemy's villagers\nand officials.\n\nBy means of the converted spy, we can construct a false story for the\ndeath spy to carry to the enemy.\n\nIt is through the converted spy that we are able to use the five\nvarieties, to their utmost advantage; therefore he must be liberally\ntreated.\n\nIn ancient times the rise to power of the province of Yin was due\nto Ichih, who was sent to the country of Hsia. Likewise during the\nfoundation of the state of Chu, Luya lived among the people of Shang.\n\nWherefore, intelligent rulers and wise generals use the cleverest men\nas spies, and invariably acquire great merit. The spy is a necessity to\nthe army. Upon him the movement of the army depends.\n\n\n\n\nTHE SAYINGS OF WUTZU\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nNow Wu, albeit clothed in the raiment of a scholar, was a man skilled\nin the art of war.\n\nAnd Wen, Lord of Wei, came unto him and said:--\n\n\"I am a man of peace, caring not for military affairs.\"\n\nAnd Wu said:--\n\n\"Your actions are witnesses of your mind; why do your words say not\nwhat is in your heart?\n\n\"You do prepare and dress hides and leather through the four seasons,\nornamenting them with red lacquer and the figures of panthers and\nelephants; which give not warmth in winter, neither in summer,\ncoolness. Moreover, you make halberds, 24[18] feet long, and pikes 12\nfeet long, and leather (covered) chariots so large as to fill up the\ngateways, wheels with ornament, and naves capped with leather. Now,\nthese are neither beautiful to the eye nor light in the chase; I know\nnot for what use my lord makes these things.\n\n\"But, although provided with these instruments of war, if the leader be\nnot competent, a brooding hen might as well strike a badger, or a dog\nwith young challenge the tiger: the spirit of encounter may be present,\nbut there is no end but death.\n\n\"In ancient times, the Prince Chengsang cultivated virtue, and put away\nmilitary things, and his kingdom fell.\n\n\"The Prince Yuhu put his trust in numbers, and delighted in war and was\ndriven from the throne.\n\n\"Therefore the enlightened ruler should ponder over these things;\nencourage learning and virtue in the kingdom, and be prepared against\nwar from without.\n\n\"To hesitate before the enemy is not a cause for righteousness; remorse\nfor the fallen is not true humanity.\"\n\nAnd when Lord Wen heard these words, he himself spread a seat, and his\nwife offered up a cup, and Wu was appointed general before the altar.\n\nNow, in the defence of Hsihe against different states there were fought\nseventy-six great fights, of which sixty-four were complete victories,\nand the remainder undecided. And the kingdom grew and stretched 1,000\nleagues on every side, which was all due to the virtue of Wu.\n\n\n\n\nI\n\nTHE GOVERNMENT OF A COUNTRY\n\n\nAnd Wu the Master said:--\n\nThe mighty rulers of old first trained their retainers, and then\nextended their regard to their outlying feudatories.\n\nThere are four discords:--\n\nDiscord in the state: then never make war.\n\nDiscord in the army: then do not strike camp.\n\nDiscord in the camp: then do not advance to attack.\n\nDiscord in the battle array: then seek not to decide the issue.\n\nTherefore, wise rulers who would employ their subjects in great\nendeavours, should first establish harmony among them.\n\nLend not a ready ear to human counsellors, but lay the matter before\nthe altar; seek inside the turtle,[19] and consider well the time and\nseason. Then, if all be well, commit ourselves to the undertaking.\n\nIf the people know that their lord is careful of their lives, and\nlaments their death beyond all else; then, in the time of danger, the\nsoldiers advance, and, advancing, find glory in death; and in survival\nafter retreat, dishonour.\n\nThe Master said:--\n\nThe Way must follow the only true path: righteousness lies at the root\nof achievement and merit.\n\nThe object of stratagem is to avoid loss and gain advantage.\n\nThe object of government is to guard enterprise and to preserve the\nstate.\n\nIf conduct depart from the Way, and the undertaking accord not with\nrighteousness, then disaster befalls the mighty.\n\nTherefore, wise men maintain order by keeping in the Way, and governing\nwith righteousness; they move with discretion, and with benevolence\nthey make the people amenable.\n\nIf these four virtues be practised, there is prosperity; if they be\nneglected, there is decay.\n\nFor, when Lord Tang of Cheng defeated Lord Chieh, the people of Hsia\nrejoiced, and when Wu of Chou defeated Lord Chou, the people of\nYin were not discomfited. And this was because it was ordained by\nProvidence and human desire.\n\nThe Master said:--\n\nIn the government of a country and command of an army, the inculcation\nof propriety, stimulation of righteousness, and the promotion of a\nsense of shame are required.\n\nWhen men possess a sense of shame, they will attack with resolution\nwhen in strength, and when few in number defend to the last.\n\nBut while victory is easy in attack, it is difficult in defence.\n\nNow, of the fighting races below heaven; those who gained five\nvictories have been worn out; those who have won four victories have\nbeen impoverished; three victories have given dominion; two victories\nhave founded a kingdom; and upon one victory an empire has been\nestablished.\n\nFor those who have gained power on earth by many victories are few; and\nthose who have lost it, many.\n\nThe Master said:--\n\nThe causes of war are five:--\n\nFirst, ambition; second, profit; third, overburdened hate; fourth,\ninternal disorder; fifth, famine.\n\nAgain, the natures of war are five:--\n\nFirst, a righteous war; second, a war of might; third, a war of\nrevenge; fourth, a war of tyranny; fifth, an unrighteous war.\n\nThe prevention of tyranny and the restoration of order is just; to\nstrike in reliance on numbers is oppression; to raise the standard for\nreasons of anger is a war of revenge; to quit propriety, and seize\nadvantage is tyranny; when the state is disordered and the people worn\nout, to harbour designs, and set a multitude in motion, is a war of\nunrighteousness.\n\nThere is a way of overcoming each of these five.\n\nRighteousness is overcome by propriety; might by humanity; revenge by\nwords; tyranny by deception; unrighteousness by strategy.\n\nLord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"I would know the way to control an army, to measure men, and make the\ncountry strong.\"\n\nWu answered and said:--\n\n\"The enlightened rulers of antiquity respected propriety between\nsovereign and people; established etiquette between high and low;\nsettled officials and citizens in close accord; gave instruction in\naccordance with custom; selected men of ability, and thereby provided\nagainst what should come to pass.\n\n\"In ancient times, Prince Huan of Chi assembled 50,000 men at arms, and\nbecame chief among the princes; Prince Wen of Chin put 40,000 mighty\nmen in the van, and gained his ambition; Prince Mu of Chin gathered\ntogether 30,000 invincibles, and subdued his neighbouring foes.\nWherefore, the princes of powerful states must consider their people,\nand assemble the valiant and spirited men by companies.\n\n\"Those who delight to attack, and to display their valour and fealty\nshould be formed in companies.\n\n\"Those skilful in scaling heights, or covering long distances, and who\nare quick and light of foot must be collected in companies.\n\n\"Retainers who have lost their rank, and who are desirous of displaying\ntheir prowess before their superiors should be gathered into companies.\n\n\"Those who have abandoned a castle, or deserted their trust, and are\ndesirous of atoning for their misconduct, should be collected and\nformed into companies.\n\n\"These five bodies form the flower of the army. With 3,000 of such\ntroops, if they issue from within, an encompassing enemy can be burst\nasunder; if they enter from without, a castle can be overthrown.\"\n\nLord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"I desire to know how to fix the battle array, render defence secure,\nand attack with certainty of victory.\"\n\nWu answered and said:--\n\n\"To see with the eye is better than ready words. Yet, I say, if the\nwise men be put in authority and the ignorant in low places, then the\narmy is already arranged.\n\n\"If the people be free from anxiety about their estates, and love their\nofficials, then defence is already secure.\n\n\"If all the lieges be proud of their lord, and think ill of neighbouring\nstates, then is the battle already won.\"\n\nThe Lord Wen once assembled a number of his subjects to discuss affairs\nof state: and none could equal him in wisdom, and when he left the\ncouncil chamber his face was pleased.\n\nThen Wu advanced and said:--\n\nIn ancient times, Lord Chuang of Chu once consulted with his lieges,\nand none were like unto him in wisdom; and when the Lord left the\ncouncil chamber his countenance was troubled. Then the Duke Shen asked\nand said: \"Why is my Lord troubled?\" And he answered: \"I have heard\nthat the world is never without sages, and that in every country there\nare wise men; that good advisers are the foundation of an empire; and\nfriends of dominion. Now, if I, lacking wisdom, have no equal among\nthe multitude of my officers, dangerous indeed is the state of Chu. It\ngrieves me that whereas Prince Chuang of Chu was troubled in a like\ncase my Lord should be pleased.\"\n\nAnd hearing this Lord Wen was inwardly troubled.\n\n\n\n\nII\n\nESTIMATION OF THE ENEMY\n\n\nAnd Lord Wen said to Wu:--\n\n\"Chin threatens us on the west; Chu surrounds us on the south; Chao\npresses us in the north; Chi watches us in the east; Yen stops our\nrear, and Han is posted in our front. Thus, the armies of six nations\nencompass us on every side, and our condition is very unpropitious.\nCanst thou relieve my anxiety?\"\n\nWu answered and said:--\n\n\"The path of safety of a state lies first of all in vigilance. Now my\nLord has already taken warning, wherefore misfortunes are yet distant.\n\n\"Let me state the habits of these six countries. The forces of Chi are\nweighty but without solidity; the soldiers of Chin are scattered, and\nfight each of his own accord: the army of Chu is well ordered, but\ncannot endure: the soldiers of Yen defend well, but are without dash:\nthe armies of the three Chins are well governed, but cannot be used.\n\n\"The nature of Chi is stubborn and the country rich, but prince and\nofficials are proud and luxurious, and neglectful of the common people;\ngovernment is loose and rewards not impartial; in one camp there are\ntwo minds; the front is heavy, but the rear is light. Therefore it is\nponderous without stability. To attack it, the force must be divided\ninto three parts, and, by threatening it on three sides, its front can\nbe broken.\n\n\"The nature of Chin is strong, the country rugged, and the government\nfirm; rewards and punishments just, the people indomitable, and all\nhave the fighting spirit; wherefore, when separated, each fights of his\nown accord.\n\n\"To defeat this people, they must first be tempted by gain to leave\ntheir cause, so that the soldiers, greedy of profit, desert their\ngeneral: then, taking advantage of their disobedience, their scattered\nforces can be chased, ambushes laid, favourable opportunities taken,\nand their general captured.\n\n\"The nature of Chu is weak, its territory wide, the government weak,\nand the people exhausted; the troops are well ordered but of short\nendurance.\n\n\"The way to defeat them is to assault their camp, throw it into\nconfusion and crush their spirit, advance softly, and retire quickly;\ntire them out, avoid a serious encounter, and they may be defeated.\n\n\"The nature of Yen is straightforward; its people are cautious, loving\ncourage and righteousness, and without guile; wherefore they defend but\nare not daring.\n\n\"The way to defeat them is to draw close and press them; tease them and\npass to a distance; move quickly, and appear in the rear, thus causing\nbewilderment to their officers and fear in their ranks. Our chariots\nand horsemen will act with circumspection and avoid encounter. Thus\ntheir general can be captured.\n\n\"The three Chins are the middle kingdom: their nature is peaceful\nand their rule just. Their people are tired of war; their troops are\ntrained, but their leaders are despised; pay is small, and the soldiers\nlack the spirit of sacrifice, thus they are well governed but cannot be\nused.\n\n\"The way to defeat them is to threaten them from afar. If a multitude\nattack--defend; if they retreat--pursue, and tire them out.\n\n\"In every army there are mighty warriors with strength to lift the\nCenser, swifter of foot than the war horse; who can take the enemy's\nstandard, or slay his general. If such men be selected, and set apart,\ncared for and honoured, they are the life of the army.\n\n\"Those who use the five arms[20] with skill, who are clever, strong and\nquick, and careless of the enemy, should be given rank and decoration,\nand used to decide the victory. Their parents and families should be\ncared for, encouraged by rewards, and kept in fear of punishment. These\nmen consolidate the battle array; their presence causes endurance.\n\n\"If these men be well selected, double their number can be defeated.\"\n\nAnd Lord Wen said:--\n\n\"It is good!\"\n\nWu the Master said:--\n\n\"In the estimation of the enemy there are eight cases when, without\nconsulting the oracles, he may be attacked.\n\n\"First, an enemy who, in great wind and cold, has risen early, started\nforth across ice and rivers, and braved stress and hardships.\n\n\"Second, an enemy who, in the height of summer, and in great heat, has\nrisen early, has travelled incessantly, is hungry and without water,\nand is striving to reach a distance.\n\n\"Third, an enemy who has been encamped long in one place, who is\nwithout provisions, when the farmers are vexed and indignant, who\nhas suffered frequent calamities, and whose officers are unable to\nestablish confidence.\n\n\"Fourth, when the enemy's funds are exhausted, fuel and fodder scarce;\nwhen the heavens have been overcast by long continued rain; when there\nis the desire to loot, but no place to loot withal.\n\n\"Fifth, when their numbers are few; when water is scarce; when men and\nhorses are scourged by pestilence, and from no quarter is succour at\nhand.\n\n\"Sixth, when night falls, and the way is yet far; when officers and men\nare worn out and fearful, weary and without food, and have laid aside\ntheir armour and are resting.\n\n\"Seventh, when the general's authority is weak, the officials false,\nand the soldiers unsettled; when their army has been alarmed, and no\nhelp is forthcoming.\n\n\"Eighth, when the battle formation is not yet fixed, or camp pitched;\nwhen climbing a hill, or passing through a difficult place; when half\nis hidden and half exposed.\n\n\"An enemy in these situations may be smitten without hesitation.\n\n\"There are six enemies, that, without consulting oracles, should be\navoided.\n\n\"First, wide and vast territories, and a large and rich population.\n\n\"Second, where the officials care for the people, and bestow bountiful\nfavours and rewards.\n\n\"Third, where rewards are well deserved, punishment accurately\napportioned, and operations undertaken only when the time is fitting.\n\n\"Fourth, where merit is recognised and given rank, wise men appointed,\nand ability employed.\n\n\"Fifth, where the troops are many and their weapons excellent.\n\n\"Sixth, when help is at hand on every side, or from a powerful ally.\n\n\"For, if the enemy excel in the foregoing, he must be avoided without\nhesitation. As it is written, if it be judged good, advance; if it be\nknown to be difficult, retreat.\"\n\nAnd Lord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"I desire to know how the interior of the enemy can be known from his\nouter appearance; the form of his camp by observing his advance, and\nhow victory may be determined?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered and said:--\n\n\"If the coming of the enemy be reckless like roaring waters, his\nbanners and pennons disordered, and horses and men frequently looking\nbehind, then ten can be struck with one. Panic will certainly seize\nthem.\n\n\"Before the various princes have assembled, before harmony has been\nestablished between lord and lieges, before ditches have been dug, or\nregulations established, and the army is alarmed; wishing to advance,\nbut unable; wishing to retreat, but unable: then the force can strike\ntwice their numbers, and in a hundred fights there is no fear of\nretreat.\"\n\nLord Wen asked:--\n\n\"How can the enemy be certainly defeated?\"\n\nWu answered and said:--\n\n\"Make certain of the enemy's real condition and quickly strike his\nweak point; strike an enemy who has just arrived from afar, before his\nranks are arranged; or one who has eaten and has not completed his\ndispositions; or an enemy who is hurrying about, or is busily occupied;\nor has not made favourable use of the ground, or has let pass the\nopportunity; or one who has come a long distance, and those in rear are\nlate and have not rested.\n\n\"Strike an enemy who is half across waters; or who is on a difficult\nor narrow road; or whose flags and banners are in confusion; or who is\nfrequently changing position; or whose general is not in accord with\nthe soldiers; or who is fearful.\n\n\"All such should be assaulted by the picked men; and the remainder of\nthe army should be divided, and follow after them. They may be attacked\nat once without hesitation.\"\n\n\n\n\nIII\n\nCONTROL OF THE ARMY\n\n\nLord Wen said:--\n\n\"What is of first importance in operations of war?\"\n\nWu answered and said:--\n\n\"Lightness, of which there are four natures, Weight, of which there\nare two natures, and Confidence must be clearly comprehended.\"\n\nAnd Wen said:--\n\n\"What are these?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered:--\n\n\"If the way be easy, the horses are light of foot; if the horses be\nlight of foot, the chariots travel freely; if the chariots travel\neasily, men can ride in them without difficulty; if the men be free\nto move, the fight prospers. If the difficult and easy ways be known,\nthe horses are lightened; if the horses be fed at proper intervals,\nthe chariots are swift; if there be plenty of oil on the axles of the\nchariots, the riders are quickly conveyed; if the spears be sharp and\nthe armour strong, the men make the fight easy.\n\n\"Large rewards in advance, heavy punishment in retreat, and impartiality\nin their bestowal are required.\n\n\"He who well understands these things is the master of victory.\"\n\nAnd Lord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"By what means can the army gain the victory?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered:--\n\n\"The foundation of victory is good government.\"\n\nAgain, Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"Is it not determined by numbers?\"\n\nAnd Wu replied:--\n\n\"If laws and orders be not clear; if rewards and punishments be not\njust; if the bell be sounded and they halt not, or drum be beaten and\nmen do not advance; even if there be a hundred thousand men at arms,\nthey are of no avail.\n\n\"Where there is order, then there is propriety at rest, and dignity in\nmotion; none can withstand the attack, and retreat forbids pursuit;\nmotion is regulated, and movements to right and left are made in answer\nto the signal; if the ranks be cut asunder, formation is preserved;\nif scattered, they are maintained; in fortune or in danger, there is\nunity; if a number be collected, they cannot be separated; they may be\nused but not wearied; in whatever situation they are placed, nothing\nunder heaven can withstand them. The army may be called a father and\nhis children.\"\n\nAnd Wu said:--\n\n\"In marching, movements and halts must be properly adjusted, suitable\noccasions for rationing not missed; the strength of men and horses\nnot exhausted. If these three things be observed, the commands of\nthe superior can be carried out; if the commands of the superior be\ncarried out, order is maintained. If advances and halts be without\nmethod, victualling unsuitable, horses and men tired and weary--neither\nunsaddled or housed--it is because the orders cannot be obeyed;\nif the orders be set aside, there is disorder in the camp, and in\nbattle--defeat.\"\n\nWu the Master said:--\n\n\"On that depository of corpses, the battlefield, if there be certain\nexpectation of death, there is life; if there be happy expectation of\nlife, there is death. The good general is like unto one sitting in\na leaking ship, or lying under a burning roof; the wisest man cannot\ncontrive against him; the strongest man cannot destroy his composure;\nand the enemy's onslaught can be withstood. For procrastination is\nthe greatest enemy of the general; disasters to the army are born of\nindecision.\"\n\nWu the Master said:--\n\n\"Men meet their death from lack of ability or unskilfulness. Wherefore\ntraining is the first requirement of war. One man with a knowledge of\nwar can teach ten; ten men skilled in war can teach one hundred; one\nhundred can teach one thousand; one thousand can teach ten thousand;\nand ten thousand men can train an army.\n\n\"An enemy from a distance should be awaited, and struck at short range;\nan enemy that is tired should be met in good order; hunger should\nbe opposed by full bellies; the battle formation should be round or\nsquare, the men should kneel or stand; go or remain; move to the right\nor left; advance or retire; concentrate or disperse; close or extend\nwhen the signal is given.\n\n\"All these changes must be learnt, and the weapons distributed. This is\nthe business of the general.\"\n\nWu the Master said:--\n\n\"In the teaching of war, spears are given to the short; bows and\ncatapults to the tall; banners and standards to the strong; the\nbell and drum to the bold; fodder and provisions to the feeble; the\narrangement of the plan to the wise. Men of the same district should\nbe united; and groups and squads should help each other. At one beat\nof the drum the ranks are put in order; at two beats of the drum,\nformation will be made; at three beats of the drum, food will be\nissued; at four beats of the drum, the men will prepare to march; at\nfive beats of the drum, ranks will be formed; when the drums beat\ntogether, then the standards will be raised.\"\n\nAnd Lord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"What is the way of marching and halting an army?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered:--\n\n\"Natural ovens and dragons' heads should be avoided. Natural ovens are\nthe mouths of large valleys. Dragons' heads are the extremities of\nlarge mountains. The green dragons (banners) should be placed on the\nleft, and the white tigers on the right; the red sparrows in front; the\nsnakes and tortoises behind; the pole star (standard) above; and the\nsoldiers will look to the standard.\n\n\"When going forth to battle, the direction of the wind must be\nstudied; if blowing in the direction of the enemy, the soldiers will\nbe assembled and follow the wind; if a head wind, the position will be\nstrengthened, and a wait made for the wind to change.\"\n\nAnd Lord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"In what way should horses be treated?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered and said:--\n\n\"The places where they are kept should be made comfortable; fodder\nshould be suitable and timely. In winter their stables should be\nwarmed, and in summer sheltered from the heat; their coats clipped,\ntheir feet carefully pared, their attention directed so that they\nbe not alarmed, their paces regulated, and their going and halting\ntrained; horses and men should be in accord, and then the horses can be\nused. The harness, the saddle, bit, bridle, and reins must be strong;\nif the horse be without vice at the beginning, he can be used to the\nend; if the horse be hungry it is good; if his belly be full, his value\ndecreases; if the sun be falling and the way still long, dismount\nfrequently. For it is proper that the men be worked, but the horses\nmust be used with discretion, so that they may be prepared should the\nenemy suddenly attack us.\n\n\"If these things be well known, then there is free passage under\nheaven.\"\n\n\n\n\nIV\n\nQUALITIES OF THE GENERAL\n\n\nWu the Master said:--\n\n\"The leader of the army is one who is master of both arms and letters.\nHe who is both brave and tender can be entrusted with troops.\n\n\"In the popular estimation of generals, courage alone is regarded;\nnevertheless, courage is but one of the qualifications of the leader.\nCourage is heedless in encounter; and rash encounter, which is ignorant\nof the consequences, cannot be called good.\n\n\"There are five matters which leaders must carefully consider.\n\n\"First, reason; second, preparation; third, determination; fourth,\nvigilance; fifth, simplicity.\n\n\"With reason, a multitude can be controlled like a small number.\n\n\"Preparedness sees an enemy outside the gate.\n\n\"Determination before the enemy has no thought of life.\n\n\"Even after a victory, vigilance behaves as before the first encounter.\n\n\"Simplicity ensures few regulations, and preserves order.\n\n\"When the leader receives his orders, he forthwith departs. Not until\nthe enemy has been vanquished does he speak of return. This is the duty\nof the general.\n\n\"Wherefore, from the day of departure of the army, the general seeks\nglory in death, and dreams not of return in dishonour.\"\n\nWu the Master said:--\n\n\"In war there are four important influences.\n\n\"First, spirit; second, ground; third, opportunity; fourth, force.\n\n\"The military value of the nation's forces--of one hundred times ten\nthousand fighting men--depends upon the personality of one man alone;\nthis is called the influence of spirit.\n\n\"When the road is steep and narrow, when there are famous mountains and\nfastnesses where ten men can defend and one thousand cannot pass them\nby; such is the influence of ground.\n\n\"When spies have been skilfully sown, and mounted men pass to and from\nthe enemy's camp, so that his masses are divided, his sovereign and\nministers vexed with each other, and superiors and inferiors mutually\ncensorious; this is the moment of opportunity.\n\n\"When the linch-pins are secure, the oars and sweeps ready for use in\nthe boats, the armed men trained for war, and the horses exercised, we\nhave what is called the influence of force.\n\n\"He who understands these four matters has the qualifications of a\ngeneral. Furthermore, dignity, virtue, benevolence, courage, are needed\nto lead the troops, to calm the multitude, to put fear in the enemy,\nto remove doubts. When orders are issued, the subordinates do not defy\nthem. Wheresoever the army is, that place the enemy avoids. If these\nfour virtues be present, the country is strong; if they be not present,\nthe country is overthrown.\n\n\"Of such is the good general.\"\n\nWu the Master said:--\n\n\"The use of drums and bells is to attract the ear; of flags, standards,\nand banners to strike the eye; of laws and penalties to put fear in the\nheart.\n\n\"To attract the ear the sound must be clear; to strike the eye the\ncolours must be bright. The heart is awed by punishment, therefore\npunishment must be strict.\n\n\"If these three matters be not ordered, the state may, peradventure,\nbe preserved, but defeat by the enemy is certain. Therefore, as it has\nbeen said (if these three things be present), there is no departing\nfrom the commands of the general; when he orders, there is no going\nback from death.\"\n\nWu the Master said:--\n\n\"The secret of war is, first, to know who is the enemy's general, and\nto judge his ability. If our plans depend on his dispositions, then\nsuccess will be achieved without toil.\n\n\"If their general be stupid, and heedlessly trustful, he may be enticed\nby fraud; if he be avaricious and careless of his fame, he may be\nbribed with gifts. If he make unconsidered movements without plan, he\nshould be tired out and placed in difficulties. If the superiors be\nwealthy and proud, and the inferiors avaricious and resentful, they\nshould be set against each other. An enemy that is undetermined, now\nadvancing and then retreating, whose soldiers have nought wherein to\nput their trust, should be alarmed, and put to flight.\n\n\"When an enemy thinks lightly of the general, and desires to return\nhome, the easy roads should be blocked, and the difficult and narrow\nroads opened; await their coming and capture them.\n\n\"If their advance be easy and retreat difficult, await their coming and\nthen advance against them.\n\n\"If their advance be difficult and retreat easy, then press and strike\nthem.\n\n\"An army that is camped in marshy ground, where there are no\nwater-courses, and long and frequent rains, should be inundated.\n\n\"An army that is camped in wild marshes, covered with dark and\noverhanging grass and brambles, and swept by frequent high winds,\nshould be overthrown by fire.\n\n\"An army that has halted long without moving; whose general and\nsoldiers have grown careless, and neglect precautions, should be\napproached by stealth, and taken by surprise.\"\n\nLord Wen asked, saying:--\n\n\"If the two armies be facing each other, and the name of the enemy's\ngeneral unknown, in what manner can we discover it?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered and said:--\n\n\"A brave man of low degree, lightly but well equipped, should be\nemployed. He should think only of flight and naught of advantage. Then,\nif he observe the enemy's pursuit, if there be first a halt and then\nan advance, order is established. If we retreat and the enemy pursue,\nbut pretend not to be able to overtake us, see an advantage but pretend\nnot to be aware of it, then their general may be called a wise general,\nand conflict with him must be avoided. If their army be full of uproar;\ntheir banners and standards disordered, their soldiers going about\nor remaining of their own accord, some in line, others in column; if\nsuch an enemy be eager to pursue, and see an advantage which they are\ndesperate to seize, then their general is a fool: even if there be a\nhost, they may be taken.\"\n\n\n\n\nV\n\nSUITING THE OCCASION\n\n\nLord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"If strong chariots, good horses, strong and valiant soldiers suddenly\nmeet the enemy, and are thrown into confusion, and ranks broken, what\nshould be done?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered and said:--\n\n\"In general, the method of fighting is to effect order in daylight by\nmeans of flags and banners, pennons and batons; at night by gongs and\ndrums, whistles and flutes. If a signal be made to the left, the troops\nmove to the left; if to the right, they move to the right. Advance is\nmade at the sound of the drum; halt at the sound of the gong; one blast\nof the whistle is for advance, two for the rally. If those who disobey\nbe cut down, the forces are subject to authority. If officers and\nsoldiers carry out orders, a superior enemy cannot exist; no position\nis impregnable in the attack.\"\n\nLord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"What is to be done if the enemy be many and we be few?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered and said:--\n\n\"Avoid such an enemy on open ground, and meet him in the narrow way;\nfor, as it is written, if 1 is to stand against 1,000, there is naught\nbetter than a pass; if 10 are to hold against 100, there is nothing\nbetter than a steep place; if 1,000 are to strike 10,000, there is\nnothing better than a difficult place. If a small force, with beat\nof gong and drum, suddenly arise in a narrow way, even a host will\nbe upset. Wherefore it is written: 'He who has a multitude seeks the\nplain, and he who has few seeks the narrow way.'\"\n\nAnd Lord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"A mighty host, strong and courageous, which is on the defence with a\nmountain behind, a precipice between, high ground on the right, and\na river on the left, with deep moats, and high walls, and which has\nartillery; whose retreat is like the removal of a mountain, advance\nlike the hurricane, and whose supplies are in abundance, is an enemy\nagainst whom long defence is difficult. In effect, what should be done\nin such a case?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered and said:--\n\n\"This indeed is a great question, whose issue depends, not upon the\nmight of chariot and horse, but upon the schemes of a wise man.\n\n\"Let 1,000 chariots and 10,000 horse, well equipped and with foot-men\nadded to them, be divided into five armies, and a road allotted to each\narmy.\n\n\"Then if there be five armies, and each army take a different road, the\nenemy will be puzzled, and know not in what quarter to be prepared. If\nthe enemy's defence be strong and united, send envoys quickly to him\nto discover his intention. If he listen to our advices, he will strike\ncamp and withdraw. But, if he listen not to our advice, but strikes\ndown the messenger, and burns his papers, then divide and attack\nfrom five quarters. If victorious, do not pursue; if defeated, flee\nto a distance. If feigning retreat, proceed slowly, and, if the enemy\napproach, strike swiftly.\n\n\"One army will hold the enemy in front, with another cut his rear,\ntwo more with gags in their mouths[21] will attack his weak point,\nwhether on the right or on the left. If five armies thus make alternate\nonslaughts, success is certain.\n\n\"This is the way to strike strength.\"\n\nAnd Lord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"If the enemy draw near and encompass us, and we would retreat, but\nthere is no way, and in our multitude there is fear, what should be\ndone?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered and said:--\n\n\"In such a case, if we be many and they be few, divide and fall upon\nthem; if the enemy be many and we be few, use stratagem and act\naccording to opportunity; and if opportunities be untiringly seized,\neven if the enemy be many, he will be reduced to subjection.\"\n\nLord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"If, in a narrow valley with steep places on either side, the enemy be\nmet, and they are many and we are few, what should be done?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered and said:--\n\n\"If they be met among hills, woods, in deep mountains, or wide fens,\nadvance quickly, retire swiftly, and hesitate not. If the enemy be\nsuddenly met among high mountains or deep valleys, be the first to\nstrike the drum and fall upon them. Let bow and cross bow advance;\nshoot and capture; observe the state of their ranks; and, if there be\nconfusion, do not hesitate to strike.\"\n\nLord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"If the enemy be suddenly met in a narrow place with high mountains on\neither side, and advance and retreat are alike impossible, what should\nbe done in such a case?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered and said:--\n\n\"This is called War in valleys where numbers are of no avail. The\nablest officers should be collected, and set against the enemy. Men\nlight of foot and well armed should be placed in front; the chariots\ndivided; the horsemen drawn up, and placed in ambush on four sides,\nwith many leagues between, and without showing their weapons. Then,\nthe enemy will certainly make his defence firm, and neither advance\nor retreat. Whereupon, the standards will be raised, and the ranks of\nbanners shown, the mountains left, and camp pitched in the plain.\n\n\"The enemy will then be fearful, and should be challenged by chariot\nand horse, and allowed no rest.\n\n\"This is the method of fighting in valleys.\"\n\nAnd Lord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"If the enemy be met in a marsh where the water is out, so that the\nwheels of the chariots sink in, and the shafts be covered, and the\nchariots and horsemen overcome by the waters, when there are no boats\nor oars, and it is impossible either to advance or retreat, what should\nbe done in such a case?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered and said:--\n\n\"This is called water fighting. Chariots and horsemen cannot be used,\nand they must be put for a time on one side. Go up to the top of a high\nplace, and look out to the four quarters. Then the state of the waters\nwill certainly be seen; their extent, and the deep places and shallows\nfully ascertained. Then, by stratagem, the enemy may be defeated.\n\n\"If the enemy should cross the waters he should be engaged when half\nover.\"\n\nAnd Lord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"If there has been long continued rain so that the horses sink, and the\nchariots cannot move; if the enemy appear from four quarters, and the\nforces are frightened, what is the course in such a case?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered and said:--\n\n\"When wet and overcast, the chariots should halt; when fine and dry,\nthey should arise. Seek height, and avoid low places; drive the strong\nchariots, and choose well the road on which to advance or halt. If the\nenemy suddenly arise, immediately pursue them.\"\n\nLord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"If our fields and pastures be suddenly pillaged, and our oxen and\nsheep taken, what should be done?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered and said:--\n\n\"Lawless enemies that arise are to be feared; defend well and do not\nreply. When, at sunset, they seek to withdraw, they will certainly\nbe overladen and fearful. Striving to return quickly to their homes,\nconnection will be lost. Then if they be pursued and attacked, they can\nbe overthrown.\"\n\nWu the Master said:--\n\n\"The way of attacking the enemy and investing his castle is as\nfollows:--\n\n\"When the outlying buildings have been taken, and the assaulting\nparties enter the innermost sanctuary, make use of the enemy's\nofficials, and take charge of their weapons. Let the army on no account\nfell trees or enter dwellings, cut the crops, slay the six domestic\nanimals, or burn the barns; and show the people that there is no cruel\ndesire. Those who wish to surrender, should be received and freed from\nanxiety.\"\n\n\n\n\nVI\n\nENCOURAGEMENT OF THE TROOPS\n\n\nAnd Lord Wen asked and said:--\n\n\"If punishment be just and reward impartial, is victory thereby gained?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered and said:--\n\n\"I cannot speak of all the things that concern justice and impartiality,\nbut on these alone dependence cannot be placed.\n\n\"If the people hear the word of command, or listen to the order with\nrejoicing; if, when the army be raised, and a multitude assembled, they\ngo forth gladly to the fight; if, in the tumult of the fight, when\nblade crosses blade, the soldiers gladly die; upon these three things\ncan the lord of the people place his trust.\"\n\nAnd Lord Wen said:--\n\n\"How can this be brought about?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered and said:--\n\n\"Seek out merit, advance and reward it, and encourage those without\nfame.\"\n\nAccordingly Lord Wen set seats in the garden of the palace in three\nrows, and made a feast unto his chief retainers. In the first row were\nset those of chief merit, and on the table were placed the best meats\nand precious utensils. Those of medium merit were set in the middle\nrow, and the utensils on the table were fewer in number. Those without\nmerit were set in the last row, and utensils of no value were put\nbefore them. And when the feast was over, and they had all departed,\nthe parents, wives, and children of those with merit were given\npresents outside the gates of the palace according to their degree.\n\nFurther, messengers were sent yearly with gifts to condole with the\nparents of those who had lost a son in the service of the state, and to\nshow that they were had in remembrance.\n\nAnd after this was carried out for three years, the people of Chin\ngathered an army, and came as far as the Western River. And when the\nsoldiers of Wei heard this, without waiting for orders, they armed\nthemselves and fell upon them; and they that went forth were 10,000 in\nnumber.\n\nAnd Lord Wen called Wu and said:--\n\n\"The words that you spoke unto me, have they not indeed been carried\nout?\"\n\nAnd Wu answered and said:--\n\n\"I have heard that there are men, great and small; souls, grand and\nfeeble.\n\n\"As a trial, let 50,000 men, without merit, be collected, and placed\nunder my command against the country of Chin. If we fail, the state\nwill be the laughing-stock among the princes, and its power under\nheaven will be lost. If a desperate robber be hidden in a wide plain,\nand 1,000 men be pursuing him, their glances will be furtive like the\nowl, looking backward like the wolf, for they are in fear of harm from\na sudden onslaught.\n\n\"One desperate man can put fear in the hearts of a thousand. Now,\nif this host of 50,000 men become as a desperate thief, and are led\nagainst Chin, there is nought to fear.\"\n\nOn hearing these words Lord Wen agreed, and adding further 500 chariots\nand 3,000 horse, the hosts of Chin were overthrown, all being due to\nthe encouragement of the troops.\n\nOn the day before the battle Wu gave orders to the forces, saying:--\n\n\"The army will attack the enemy's chariots, horse and foot, in\naccordance with our commands. If the chariots do not capture the\nenemy's chariots, or the horse those of the enemy's, or the foot the\nenemy's footmen, even if their army be overthrown, no merit will be\ngained.\"\n\nTherefore on the day of the battle, the orders were simple, and fear of\nWei shook the heavens.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n A\n\n Abnormal manoeuvres, 31, 32\n\n Advance, followed by retirement, a lure, 51\n\n Advantages, the five, 45\n\n Ally, war to be avoided, if enemy has powerful, 91\n\n Altar, Wu made general before, 77;\n   difficult matters to be laid before, 78\n\n Ambition, one of five causes of war, 80\n\n Ambush, likely places for enemy to be in, 49\n\n Ammunition, lack of, may cause disaster, 41\n\n Anger of officers, cause of, 51;\n   not a fit reason for battle, 69\n\n Animals, the six domestic, to be preserved by besiegers, 115\n\n Apologies, what implied, by general who offers, 52\n\n Archers, employment of, in sieges, 25, _note_\n\n Armies, five, alternate onslaughts by, 111\n\n Armistice, what betokened by sudden desire for, 51\n\n Armour, cost of upkeep of, 21;\n   and of renewing, 22;\n   condition of, an influence in battle, 94\n\n Arms, profession of, not highly regarded in China, 9;\n   the five, 88, _note_\n\n Army, control of the, 93-100;\n   orderly, likened to father and children, 96\n\n Articles of Suntzu, 17-74\n\n Assault, by stratagem, 25\n\n Attack, proportionate number required for, 26;\n   on undefended positions, 35;\n   place of, to be kept secret, 37;\n   five ways of, by fire, 67-68;\n   eight cases of, 89;\n   reckless, 92\n\n\n B\n\n Banners, use of, to inspirit troops, 9;\n   used, in day fighting, 43;\n   enemy's lines not to be attacked where waving, 43-44;\n   changing of, 51;\n   to be entrusted to strong men, 98;\n   Wutzu on attraction of, 104, 108\n\n Barrack burning, 67\n\n Batons, in day fighting, 108\n\n Battle, the Order of, 28-30\n\n Beacons, in night fighting, 43\n\n Beasts, startled, indicate stealthy approach, 50\n\n Bell, use of, in war, 31;\n   a signal to halt, 31, _note_;\n   Wutzu on, 95;\n   to be entrusted to the bold, 98;\n   use of, attracts ear, 104\n\n Benevolence, quality needed by general, 103\n\n Birds, rising of, indicates ambush, 50;\n   clustering of, round position, shows it unoccupied, 51\n\n Bluster in General, 52\n\n Bogs, movement of troops regarding, 49\n\n Booty, exhaustion betrayed by disregard of, 51\n\n Bows, weapons for tall men, 98\n\n Broken ground, 54\n\n Burning barrack, commissariat, equipment, store, and company, 67-68\n\n\n C\n\n Calamities, six, among troops, 55\n\n Camp, safe position for, 47;\n   skilful changes of, 63\n\n Castle, Wutzu's counsel for investing, 115\n\n Catapults, weapons for tall men, 98\n\n Causes of war, 80\n\n Cautiousness-over, one of five dangerous faults for general, 46\n\n Chang Mt., illustration of snakes of, 62\n\n Changes, the Nine, 44-46\n\n Chariots, number of, required, 20-21;\n   cost of renewing, 22;\n   rewards for taking from enemy, 23;\n   advance of light, 50;\n   great size of, 76;\n   axles of, to be well oiled, 94\n\n Cheng, Lord Tang, of, 79\n\n Chengsang, Prince, 76\n\n Chi, estimation of forces of, 85;\n   nature of, 86\n\n Chieh, Lord, 79\n\n Chin, nature of, 86;\n   unsuccessfully opposes Wei, 117-118\n\n Chins, the three, 87-88\n\n China, profession of arms not highly regarded in, 9;\n   large rivers of, affect military operations, 12\n\n Chinese, greatly affected by climate, 9\n\n Chinese literature, place of Suntzu and Wutzu in, 7\n\n Chinese wars, patriotism not a factor in, 8\n\n Chou, Wu, of, 79\n\n Chu, courage of, 62;\n   foundation of state of, 74;\n   want of endurance of army of, 85\n\n Chuang, of Chu, holds consultation, 84\n\n Chuyin, use of, in sieges, 25, and _note_\n\n Circumspection, circumstances requiring, 52\n\n Cohesion of troops, in interior of hostile country, 64\n\n Colours must be bright, in war, 104\n\n Commander, professional, in China, 9\n\n Commissariat burning, 67\n\n Confidence, importance of, in operations, 94\n\n Contention, ground of, 58\n\n Continuity of military principles illustrated, 12\n\n Control of army, 93-100\n\n Converted spies, 71\n\n Cooking pots may betray end of resources, 51-52\n\n Cost of war, 21;\n   of supplying army at distance, 22\n\n Courage, universal, dependent on good management, 63;\n   not the only attribute necessary to general, 101;\n   but nevertheless essential, 103\n\n Cowardly, place of the, in action, 43\n\n\n D\n\n Daylight fighting, use of flags, banners, pennons, and batons in, 108\n\n Death, when only alternative, ensures exertion, 61\n\n Death ground, 58;\n   fighting on, 60;\n   soldiers must recognise conditions of, 64\n\n Death spies, 71, 72\n\n Declaration of war, action following, 66\n\n Decoration for skill in five arms, 88\n\n Defeat, internal causes of, 28;\n   skilful soldiers make impossible, 28;\n   army destined to, trusts in chance, 30;\n   causes of, 55-56\n\n Defence, long, difficulties in, 110\n\n Defensive warfare, when victory unattainable, 28;\n   skill in, 28-29\n\n Deficiency, defence compelled by, 28\n\n Despair, energy born of, wins victory, 15\n\n Desperate enemy not to be pressed, 44\n\n Determination, one of five important matters for general, 101, 102\n\n Dignity, essential for general, 103\n\n Discipline, one of seven important matters in war, 18;\n   perfection of, leads to simulation, 33\n\n Discussion of omens, forbidden, 61\n\n Disorder, a cause of defeat, 96\n\n Disputed ground, action regarding, 64\n\n Distracting ground, action regarding, 64\n\n Disturbing ground, action regarding, 64\n\n Dragons, green (banners), 99\n\n Dragons' heads (mountain extremities), 99\n\n Drum, use of, 31;\n   in night fighting, 43;\n   sounds for advance, 95;\n   meaning of different beats of, 98;\n   to be entrusted to the bold, 98;\n   Wutzu on the, 104, 108\n\n Dust, spurts, masses, columns and clouds of, meaning of, 50\n\n\n E\n\n Ear, to be attracted in war, 104\n\n Earth, one of five indispensable matters in war, 17, 18;\n   the ninth, 29, and _note_\n\n Elements, five, 39, and _note_\n\n Emptiness and strength, 34-39\n\n Enclosed ground, 58;\n   stratagem to be used on, 60;\n   action regarding, 64\n\n Enemies, six to be avoided, 90-91\n\n Equipment, umbrella part of Chinese soldier's, 9\n\n Estimation of enemy, 56;\n   Wutzu on, 85-93\n\n Exhaustion, result of lateness in field, 34;\n   avoided by good tactics, 35;\n   shown by disregard of booty, 51\n\n Expectation of life or death, 96\n\n Eye, to be struck in war, 104\n\n\n F\n\n Famine, a cause of war, 80\n\n Faults, five, dangerous for generals, 46\n\n Feast, given by Wen to guests with high, medium, and deficient merit,\n     117\n\n Feints, use of, 36, 38\n\n Fens, advance in wide, 112\n\n Fighting races, consequences of victories by, 80\n\n Fire, five modes of assault by, 67-68;\n   attack on enemy in overgrown marsh land by, 106\n\n Flag, use of, in war, 31;\n   in day fighting, 43;\n   change of, 51;\n   Wutzu on use of, 104\n\n Flanking (or reserve) force, 12\n\n Flat country, disposal of troops in, 48\n\n Flutes, Wutzu on use of, 108\n\n Fodder, charge of, given to the feeble, 98\n\n Food, taken from enemy, 22;\n   obtained by skilful general, 23;\n   killing of horses for, 51;\n   attack on enemy without, 90;\n   charge of, given to the feeble, 98\n\n Force, one of four important influences in war, 102, 103\n\n Foreign lands, war in, 60\n\n Formation-battle, 97\n\n Frontal attack, 11\n\n\n G\n\n General, interference with, ill-advised, 10;\n   ability of, one of seven important matters, 18;\n   skilful, is steadfast in \"Way\" and \"Law,\" 30;\n   as \"God of War\" changes tactics, 39;\n   must know the Nine Changes, 45;\n   five faults dangerous for, 46;\n   what implied by exceeding graciousness of, 52;\n   blustering and obsequious, 52;\n   strange to troops, 52;\n   weak and amiable, 55;\n   calamities due to defects in, 55;\n   unable to estimate enemy, 56;\n   anxious for people's welfare, 56;\n   must be calm, inscrutable, just, and prudent, 63;\n   conceals plans, 63;\n   must have topographical knowledge and use guides, 65;\n   bestows rewards discreetly, 66;\n   is not actuated by anger, 69;\n   should be in accord with soldiers, 93;\n   must not procrastinate, 97;\n   Wutzu on qualities of, 101-107;\n   five matters important for, 101;\n   of the enemy to be appraised, 104;\n   action in accordance with judgment of enemy's, 105;\n   how to judge enemy's, 106-107\n\n Gongs, use of, in war, 108\n\n Government of a country, 77-84;\n   object of, 79;\n   good, foundation of victory, 95\n\n Ground, influence of, in war, 12;\n   marshy, to be avoided for camp, 44;\n   action in mountainous and wooded, 45;\n   disposal of troops on high, marshy, flat, sunny, steep, boggy,\n     and tangled, 47-49;\n   object of enemy encamped on open, 49;\n   Suntzu on, 53-67;\n   open, 53-54;\n   broken, 54;\n   suspended, 54;\n   defiles in, 54;\n   precipitous, 54;\n   the handmaid of victory, 56;\n   results from good use of, 63;\n   one of four important influences in war, 102, 103;\n   inundation of enemy on marshy, 106\n\n Grounds, the Nine, 58-67;\n   action with regard to, 64;\n   knowledge of, necessary to general, 65\n\n Guests, entertainment of, costly in war, 21\n\n Guides, employment of, necessary, 42, 65\n\n\n H\n\n Halberd, one of the five arms, 88, _note_\n\n Halberds, great length of, 75-76\n\n Harness, must be strong in all details, 100\n\n Health of troops, consideration for, 48\n\n Heat, attack on enemy who has endured, 89\n\n Heaven, one of five indispensable matters in war, 17, 18\n\n Heaven, the Ninth, 29, _note_\n\n Highways, when not to interrupt, 59\n\n Horses, killed for food, 51;\n   care for, 94;\n   treatment of, 99-100\n\n Hsia, 73\n\n Hsihe, defence of, 77\n\n Huangti, cause of victory by, 48\n\n Humane treatment ensures obedience, 53\n\n Hunger, how shown, by use of weapons, 51;\n   how to meet, in case of enemy, 97\n\n\n I\n\n Ichih, 73\n\n Ignorance, three ways of, embarrassing to armies, 26;\n   of enemy causes defeat, 27\n\n Impartiality, Wutzu on, 116\n\n Impetuosity, blind, dangerous fault in general, 46\n\n Indispensable matters, five, Suntzu on, 17\n\n Indulgence, ill effects of, 57\n\n Influences, four important, in war, 102\n\n Initiative, disadvantage of, on suspended ground, 54\n\n Inner spies, 71\n\n Internal disorder, a cause of war, 80\n\n Intersecting ground, 58;\n   action on, 64\n\n Inundation of enemy, on marshy ground, 106\n\n Invincible, how ancient masters made armies, 28\n\n Involved ground, 58, 59;\n   action regarding, 59, 64\n\n\n J\n\n Japan, Sun and Wu revered in, 14\n\n Japanese tactics, unlike Chinese, 10;\n   commentators on Chinese literature, 14\n\n Javelin, one of the five arms, 88, _note_\n\n Justice, importance of, in rewards and punishment, 18;\n   Wutzu on, 116\n\n\n K\n\n Kingdom, the Middle, 87-88\n\n Kuei, courage of, 62\n\n\n L\n\n Lateness in field, cause of exhaustion, 34\n\n Law, the, one of five indispensable matters in war, 17;\n   includes partition and ordering of troops, 18;\n   for defeating a country, or taking it, without strife, 24;\n   touching the rule, measure, tables, and scales, and the foretelling\n     of victory, 30\n\n Leader, one of five indispensable matters in war, 17.\n   (_See_ General)\n\n Letters, general should be master of, 101\n\n Light esteem of enemy, result of, 52\n\n Lightness, importance of, in operations, 93;\n   four natures of, 93-94\n\n Literature, Chinese, place of Suntzu and Wutzu in, 7;\n   Japanese commentators on, 14;\n   thought compressed in, 14\n\n Living spies, 71, 72\n\n Lu, number of men in, 24, _note_\n\n Luya, 74\n\n\n M\n\n Manoeuvre, battle avoided by, 11;\n   normal and abnormal, 31, 32;\n   master in art of, 40\n\n March, forced, 41;\n   should be calm, like forest, 42\n\n Marshes, unsuitable for camp, 44;\n   disposal of troops regarding, 48;\n   attack by fire of enemy encamped in, 106;\n   inundation of enemy in, 106\n\n Measure, the second law of war, 30\n\n Meres, ambush to be expected in, 49\n\n Merit, recognition of, by enemy, 91;\n   to be sought, advanced, and rewarded, 116;\n   Lord Wen discriminates between guests with and without, 117\n\n Messengers, enemy's movements revealed by, 51\n\n Midday, time for spirits of troops to flag, 43\n\n Middle Kingdom, the, 87-88\n\n Might, war of, 81\n\n Modification of military plans, 19\n\n Moon, in quarters suitable for attack by fire, 67-68\n\n Moral of troops, 8;\n   use of banners to maintain, 9\n\n Motion of troops, dignified, 95\n\n Mountain warfare, disposal of troops in, 47\n\n Mountains, advance among, 112\n\n Movement of troops, 47-53\n\n Mu, Prince of Chin, example of, 82\n\n Mysterious Thread, the, 71\n\n Mystery, supposed to surround art of war, 14\n\n\n N\n\n Night, fighting in, 43;\n   voices calling in, 51\n\n Nine Changes, the, 44-46\n\n Nine Grounds, the, 58-67;\n   action with regard to, 64;\n   knowledge of, necessary to general, 65\n\n Normal manoeuvres, 31, 32\n\n Numbers, proportionate, needed to attack and to divide, 26;\n   subdivision of, 31;\n   superiority of, an economy of strength, 37;\n   no certain mark of strength, 52;\n   Prince Yuhu's trust in, 76;\n   tactics regarding differences in, 109;\n   of no avail in war in valleys, 112\n\n\n O\n\n Obedience ensured by humane conduct, 53;\n   early training in, 53\n\n Obsequiousness in general, 52\n\n Officers, when angered by soldiers, 51;\n   weak with strong soldiers, and _vice versa_, 55\n\n Officials, who have care for people, 91\n\n Omens, discussion of, to be forbidden, 61\n\n Open ground, movement on, 53-54\n\n Opportunity, one of four important influences in war, 102, 103\n\n Oracles, cases for attack, when needless to consult, 89\n\n Order of Battle, the, 28-30\n\n Order, importance of, 95\n\n Outlet, for retiring enemy, 44;\n   from enclosed ground, 59\n\n Ovens, natural (mouths of valleys), 99\n\n\n P\n\n Pass, when to meet enemy in, 109\n\n Passages, narrow, avoidance of, 49\n\n Path-ridden ground, 58-59\n\n Patriotism, not a factor in Chinese wars, 8\n\n Penalties, Wutzu on, 104\n\n Pennons, Wutzu on use of, 108\n\n Pestilence, attack on enemy who endures, 90\n\n Pike, one of five arms, 88, _note_\n\n Pillage by enemy, Wutzu on, 115\n\n Plan of campaign, modifications in, 19\n\n Pole star (standard), 99\n\n Population, told by tables of laws of war, 30;\n   division of, into military groups, 70, _note_;\n   cases of enemy's large, 90\n\n Precipitous ground, occupation of, 54\n\n Preparation, one of five important matters for general, 101-102\n\n Pretence, war a thing of, 19\n\n Procedure, military, 40\n\n Procrastination, evil of, in war, 97\n\n Profit, a cause of war, 80\n\n Punishment, frequent, what betokened by, 52;\n   when ordered by strange general, 52\n\n\n Q\n\n Qualities, of the general, 101-107\n\n\n R\n\n Rank, for those skilful in five arms, 88\n\n Reason, one of five important matters for general, 101\n\n Regard-over, for troops, dangerous fault, 46\n\n Relaxation of troops, 55\n\n Repulse, resulting from general's incapacity, 55\n\n Requirements of war, 20-21\n\n Reserve (or flanking) force, 12\n\n Rest, propriety in, 95\n\n Rewards, justice in according, 18;\n   for those who take advantage of enemy, 23;\n   frequent, show lack of discipline, 52;\n   general's freedom in bestowing, 66;\n   for families of skilful in five arms, 88;\n   consequence of enemy's wise bestowal of, 91;\n   in advance, 94;\n   to be given to merit, 116\n\n Revenge, war of, 81\n\n Riches, why denied to soldiers, 61\n\n Right-hand men, 73, and _note_\n\n Righteous war, 81\n\n Righteousness, overcome by propriety, 81;\n   at root of achievement and merit, 79\n\n Rivers of China affect operations, 12;\n   encampment on, inundation, and poisoning of, 12;\n   not to be crossed when turbulent, 49;\n   observation of drawers from, 51\n\n Roads to avoid, 45\n\n Rule, as to survey of land, 30;\n   general above, in bestowing rewards, 66;\n   modified by circumstances, 67\n\n\n S\n\n Sanctuary, reckoning in, before fighting, 20\n\n Scales, in laws of war, 30\n\n Secret of war, Wutzu on, 104\n\n Secret, ground of approaching attack to be kept, 37\n\n Shen, Duke, 84\n\n Shield, one of five arms, 88, _note_\n\n Siege, not to be undertaken, if avoidable, 25;\n   misfortunes entailed by, 25\n\n Simplicity, one of five important matters for leader, 101, 102\n\n Simulation, use of, 33\n\n Situation, important matter in war, 17\n\n Snakes (banners), 99\n\n Soldiers, training of, 18;\n   strength of, 18\n\n Sparrows, red (banners), 99\n\n Spears, weapons for short men, 98\n\n Spies, estimation of, in China, 13;\n   Suntzu on power of, 13-14;\n   on titles and salaries to, 70;\n   five kinds of, 71;\n   of enemy, 73;\n   skillfully sown, 103\n\n Spirit of troops, 31-34;\n   compared to torrent, 33;\n   good fighter seeks victory from, 34;\n   keen in morning, 43;\n   sustained by speed, 60;\n   influence of, 102\n\n Stables, care of, 99\n\n Standard of Takeda Shingen, 42, _note_\n\n Standards to be entrusted to strong men, 98;\n   Wutzu on use of, 104\n\n Strata, Chinese division of earth and sky into nine, 29, _note_\n\n Stratagem, the attack by, 24-27;\n   use of, on enclosed ground, 60;\n   importance of, in war, 17\n\n Strategy, secrets of, 20;\n   how to outwit enemy by, 24;\n   assault by, 25;\n   in offering apparent advantage, 35;\n   not to be repeated, if victorious, 39\n\n Steep place, advantage of, 109\n\n Store burning, 67\n\n Strength, first in field husbands, 34;\n   economy of, 37;\n   ways of husbanding, 43\n\n Strong, place of, with cowardly, 43\n\n Sun. (_See_ Suntzu.)\n\n Sunny ground, 9\n\n Suntzu, place of, in Chinese literature, 7;\n   on march of army, 9;\n   on offensive action, 10;\n   tactics of, unlike Japanese, 10;\n   disinterested comments on war by, 12-13;\n   revered in Japan, 14;\n   influence of, in late Japanese war, 15;\n   not patriot, but strategist, 15;\n   story told of, 15-16;\n   Articles of, 17-74;\n   on five indispensable matters, 17;\n   on operations of war, 20-23;\n   on attack by stratagem, 24-27;\n   on Order of Battle, 28-30;\n   on spirit of troops, 31-34;\n   on emptiness and strength, 34-39;\n   on battle tactics, 40-44;\n   on the Nine Changes, 44-46;\n   on movement of troops, 47-53;\n   on ground, 53-57;\n   on the Nine Grounds, 58-67;\n   on assault by fire, 67-69;\n   on the employment of spies, 70-74\n\n Surprise, case of enemy taken by, 106\n\n Survey of land, 30\n\n Suspended ground, 54\n\n Swamps, movements regarding, 49\n\n Sympathy, between general and soldiers, 53;\n   consequences of, 56-57\n\n\n T\n\n Tables of population, 30\n\n Tactics, skill in change of, 39;\n   difficulty of military, 40;\n   battle, 40-44\n\n Takeda Shingen, words on standard of, 42, _note_\n\n Tang, Lord, of Cheng, 79\n\n Temper, quick, dangerous fault in general, 46\n\n Tigers, white (banners), 99\n\n Tortoises (banners), 99\n\n Training, one of seven important military matters, 18;\n   Wutzu esteems first requirement in war, 97\n\n Transport, loss of, through bad tactics, 41\n\n Trees, movement among, 49-50\n\n Truce, apologies betray anxiety for, 52\n\n Tsu, number of men in, 24, _note_\n\n Turtle, enquiry by, 78, and _note_\n\n Tyranny, war of, 81\n\n\n U\n\n Umbrella, part of Chinese soldier's equipment, 9\n\n Uniformity, brought about by authority, 53\n\n Unity results from position of troops in enemy's land, 61\n\n Unrighteous war, 81\n\n\n V\n\n Valleys, movement of troops regarding steep, 49;\n   advance in, 112;\n   war in, 112\n\n Victory, how to foretell, 18;\n   instruments of, 21;\n   the object of war, 23, 69;\n   five heralds of, 27;\n   skillful soldiers ensure, 28;\n   not always real success, 29;\n   how to calculate, 30;\n   spirit, great factor in, 34;\n   ground handmaid of, 56;\n   good government foundation of, 95\n\n Vigilance, when especially necessary, 52;\n   one of five important matters for general, 101, 102\n\n Village spies, 71\n\n Virtue of the prince, one of seven important matters, 18;\n   essential for general, 103\n\n Virtues, the five, comprised in \"The Way,\" 17, _note_\n\n Voices in night, signification of, in war, 51\n\n\n W\n\n Waggons, cost of upkeep of, 21\n\n War, evils in train of, 12-13;\n   a thing of pretence, 19;\n   requirements of, 20-21;\n   quick accomplishment of, desirable, 21, 22;\n   evils of, should be realised, 22;\n   victory--not long operations--object of, 23;\n   supreme art of, 24;\n   no fixity in spirit of, 39;\n   action on declaration of, 66;\n   five causes of, 80;\n   five natures of, 81;\n   ways of overcoming five natures of, 81\n\n Water, army likened to, 39;\n   troops in relation to, 47;\n   observation of drawers of, 51;\n   isolation or division of enemy by, 68-69;\n   attack on enemy who lacks, 89;\n   striking of enemy when half across, 93, 114\n\n Way, the, an indispensable matter in war, 17;\n   skillful leader steadfast in, 30;\n   Wutzu on, 78-79\n\n Weapons, the five, 88, _note_;\n   condition of enemy's important, 91;\n   distribution of, to tall, short, strong, bold, feeble, and wise, 98\n\n Wei, Wen, Lord of, 75;\n   army of, opposes that of Chin, 117-118;\n   victory by, 119\n\n Wen, Prince of Chin, example of, 82\n\n Wen, Lord of Wei, questions Wutzu, 75;\n   result of questioning by, 77;\n   addresses further questions, 81, 83, 85, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 99,\n     106, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116;\n   treatment by, of guests with great, medium, and deficient merit, 117;\n   proposal by Wutzu to, 118\n\n Whistles, Wutzu on use of, 108\n\n Wind, question of, in assault by fire, 68;\n   attack on enemy who has encountered, 89;\n   direction of, to be studied, 99\n\n Woods, advance among, 112\n\n Words, big or smooth, meaning of, 50\n\n Wu, number of men in, 24, _note_\n\n Wu, soldiers of, 38;\n   hatred between men of, and those of Yueh, 62\n\n Wutzu, place of, in Chinese literature, 7;\n   offensive-defensive tactics of, 10;\n   comments disinterestedly on war, 12-13;\n   revered in Japan, 14;\n   influence of, in late Japanese war, 15;\n   not patriot, but strategist, 15;\n   instance of low moral character of, 16;\n   sayings of, 75-119;\n   a scholar, but skilled in war, 75;\n   made general before altar, 77;\n   on controlling army, selecting men, and strengthening country, 81-82;\n   on distribution of men, 82;\n   on battle array, 83;\n   gives instance of Lord Chuang of Chu, 84;\n   sayings on estimation of the enemy, 85-93;\n   on eight cases of attack, 89;\n   on six enemies to avoid, 90-91;\n   on judgment of enemy's condition, 92;\n   on best time for attack, 92-93;\n   on control of army, 93-100;\n   on maintenance of order, 96;\n   on expectation of life or death, 96;\n   on training, 97;\n   on treatment of horses, 99;\n   on qualities of general, 101-107;\n   on four important influences of war, 102;\n   on use of bells, drums, flags, standards, banners, laws, and\n     penalties, 104;\n   on secret of war, 104;\n   advice for case of troops in confusion, 108;\n   on numerical differences, 109;\n   on division of troops into five armies, 110-111;\n   on differences of position, 112;\n   on war in valleys, 112;\n   on water fighting, 114;\n   on fighting after long rain, 114;\n   on pillage by enemy, 115;\n   on investing a castle, 115;\n   on impartiality, 116;\n   success of counsels of, 119\n\n\n Y\n\n Yang, principle in Chinese philosophy, 18, _note_\n\n Yen, estimation of soldiers of, 85-86;\n   nature of, 87\n\n Yin, principle in Chinese philosophy, 18, _note_\n\n Yin, province of, 73\n\n Yin, even number, 76, _note_\n\n Yueh, continually at war with Wu, 38, _note_\n\n Yuhu, Prince, 76\n\n\n         PRINTED AT THE EDINBURGH PRESS, 9 AND 11 YOUNG STREET\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] The five virtues of humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and\nfaith are known as The Way.\n\n[2] The Yin and Yang are the two principles into which natural\nphenomena are divided in Chinese philosophy. Yin is the masculine,\nactive, or light principle, and Yang is the feminine, passive, or dark\nprinciple. In this connection, day and night, rain, mist and wind are\ndesignated.\n\n[3] The Chinese army consisted of 12,500, the \"lu\" of 500, \"tsu\" of 50,\nand the \"wu\" of 5 men.\n\n[4] The \"Chuyin\" was a large tower or work constructed to give command\nover the interior of the enemy's fortress.\n\nHigh poles were also erected, from the top of which archers, each\nencased in an arrow-proof box and raised by a rope and pulley, shot at\nthe besieged.\n\n[5] Literally 9th heaven, and 9th earth. The Chinese divided the earth\nand sky each into 9 strata.\n\n[6] An animal's coat is thinnest in autumn.\n\n[7] The drum was used to beat the assembly and in the advance, the bell\nas a signal to halt. Flags were of two kinds, signalling flags and\ndistinguishing banners.\n\n[8] The normal and the abnormal refer to what in modern phrase are\ntermed the frontal or holding force and the flanking or surprise force.\n\n[9] The five cardinal tastes are, acridity, bitterness, sourness,\nsweetness and saline taste.\n\n[10] Sun, as has been said, was a man of Wu. Wu and Yueh were\ncontinually at war.\n\n[11] Wood, fire, earth, metal and water.\n\n[12] This passage was written on the standard of Takeda Shingen, one of\nJapan's most famous generals.\n\n[13] This and the following are so called because the men are\ncontinually thinking of, and slipping back to their homes.\n\n[14] The population was divided, for military purposes, into groups of\neight families. In time of war, each group sent one man into the field,\nfurnished his wants, and provided for his family. Therefore if 100,000\nmen are taken, 700,000 homes are affected.\n\n[15] So called because they are put to death when the enemy finds out\nthat he has been tricked.\n\n[16] Messengers and others, who do not disguise their identity, are\nincluded under this heading.\n\n[17] Literally, right and left men, _i.e._ they who sat on either side.\n\n[18] All numbers connected with weapons were Yin, that is to say--even,\nor belonging to the negative principle of Chinese philosophy from their\nconnection with death.\n\n[19] The back of a turtle was burnt, and the answer was ascertained by\nthe manner in which the shell split.\n\n[20] Halberd, shield, javelin, pike, and short pike.\n\n[21] Silently.\n\n\n\n\n      *      *      *      *      *      *\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's note:\n\n    Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as\n    possible.\n\n    OE ligatures have been expanded.\n\n    The following is a list of changes made to the original.\n    The first line is the original line, the second the corrected one.\n\n    Page 40:\n\n    reap advantage; the wrangles of a multitude are frought with peril.\n    reap advantage; the wrangles of a multitude are fraught with peril.\n\n    Page 92:\n\n    Chi answered and said:--\n    Wu answered and said:--\n\n    Page 95:\n\n    \"By what means can the army gain the victory?\n    \"By what means can the army gain the victory?\"\n\n    Page 109:\n\n    And Lord Wu asked and said:--\n    And Lord Wen asked and said:--","title":"The Book of War: The Military Classic of the Far East: The Articles of Suntzu; The Sayings of Wutzu","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":21094}