{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_44200/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_44200","id":"gutenberg_44200","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44200","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Warfare","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Clausewitz, Carl von, 1780-1831. Vom Kriege","Military art and science","War"],"text":"THE REALITY OF WAR\n\n\n\n\n  THE\n  REALITY OF WAR\n\n  A COMPANION\n  TO CLAUSEWITZ\n\n  BY\n  MAJOR STEWART L. MURRAY\n  LATE GORDON HIGHLANDERS\n\n  POPULAR EDITION EDITED BY\n  A. HILLIARD ATTERIDGE\n\n  LONDON\n  HODDER AND STOUGHTON\n  WARWICK SQUARE, E.C.\n\n  HUGH REES, LTD.\n  5 REGENT STREET, S.W.\n\n\n  _Reprinted in 1914_\n\n\n\n\nEDITOR'S PREFACE\n\n\nGreat books, the masterpieces of the special branch of knowledge with\nwhich they deal, are often very big books; and busy men, who have not\nunlimited time for reading, find it helpful to have some one who will\ngive them a general summary of a famous writer's teaching, and point\nout the most important passages in which the author himself embodies\nthe very essence of his argument.\n\nThis is what Major Murray has done for the most important work on war\nthat was ever written. He does not give a mere dry summary of its\ncontents. He sets forth, in language so plain that even the civilian\nreader or the youngest soldier can read it with interest, the essence\nof the teaching of Clausewitz, and he embodies in his book the most\nstriking passages of the original work. He adds to each section of his\nsubject some useful criticisms, and at the end of the book he sums up\nthe effect of recent changes on the practice of war.\n\nThe book is a popular manual of the realities of war, which should be\nread not only by soldiers, but by every one who takes an intelligent\ninterest in the great events of our time.\n\nAs to the practical value of the writings of Clausewitz, it may be\nwell to quote here the words of Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, the Professor\nof Military History at Oxford, from his introduction to the original\nedition of Major Murray's work:\n\n\"Clausewitz was a Prussian officer who first saw fighting as a boy in\n1793, and whose experience of war lasted until 1815, when the great\nwar ended. He was then thirty-five and spent the next fifteen years in\ntrying to clear his mind on the subject of war, which he did by writing\na number of military histories and a systematic treatise 'On War.' At\nthe age of fifty he tied his manuscripts into a parcel, hoping to work\nat them again on the conclusion of the duties for which he was ordered\nfrom home. A little more than a year later he died at Breslau of\ncholera, and the papers, to which he had never put the finishing touch,\nwere afterwards published by his widow.\n\n\"Part of the value of his work is due to the exceptional opportunities\nwhich he enjoyed. When the war of 1806 began he had long been the\npersonal adjutant of one of the Prussian princes, and an intimate\nfriend of Scharnhorst, who was probably the greatest of Napoleon's\ncontemporaries. In the period of reorganization which followed\nthe Peace of Tilsit he made the acquaintance of Gneisenau, and of\nalmost all the officers who made their mark in the subsequent wars\nof liberation. During the years of preparation he was Scharnhorst's\nassistant, first in the Ministry of War and then on the General Staff.\nDuring the campaign of 1812 he served with the Russian army as a\nstaff officer. Thus his experience during the four years of the Wars\nof Liberation was that of one who was continually behind the scenes,\nalways in touch with the Governments and Generals, and therefore better\nable than any one not so favourably placed to see everything in its\nproper perspective, and to follow and appreciate the considerations\nwhich directed the decisions both of statesmen and of the commanders\nof armies. His personal character was of the finest mould, and his\nwritings have the sincerity, the absence of which makes it so difficult\nto rely upon those of Napoleon.\n\n\"The ultimate test of the value of books is time. When Clausewitz\ndied, the two books on war which were thought the best were those of\nthe Archduke Charles of Austria and General Jomini. To-day the book\nof Clausewitz, 'On War,' easily holds the first place. It is the\nleast technical of all the great books on war; from beginning to end\nit is nothing but common sense applied to the subject, but for that\nreason it is the hardest to digest, because common sense or a man's\nnatural instinctive judgment on any subject is exceedingly hard to\nanalyse and put into words. An exceptionally gifted man can go through\nthis process, but few can follow it for any length of time without a\ndistinct effort.\n\n\"Almost every good institution has arisen out of the effort to provide\na remedy for some evil, but in the imperfection of human nature nearly\nevery institution brings with it fresh evils, which in their turn have\nto be counteracted. The modern spirit, with its hatred of nepotism\nand its belief in knowledge, has grafted the examination system upon\nevery form of education from the lowest to the highest. The British\narmy shares in the benefits and in the disadvantages of the system,\nof which, in the case of an officer, the danger to be guarded against\nis that it tends to accustom a man to rely rather on his memory than\nhis intelligence, and to lean more on other people's thinking than on\nhis own. Clausewitz aimed at producing the very opposite result. He\ndoes not offer specific solutions of the various problems of war lest\nofficers, in moments when their business is to decide and to act,\nshould be trying to recall his precepts instead of using their eyes and\ntheir wits. His purpose rather is to enable them to understand what war\nis. He believed that if a man had accustomed himself to think of war as\nit really is, had got to know the different elements which go to make\nit up, and to distinguish those that are important from those that are\ncomparative trifles, he would be more likely to know of himself what\nto do in a given situation, and would be much less likely to confuse\nhimself by trying to remember what some general, long since dead, did\non some occasion in which after all the position was by no means the\nsame as that in which he finds himself.\"\n\nWhat is said here of the soldier actually engaged in war, is true also\neven of the onlooker who takes a patriotic interest in the progress of\na war in which his country is involved. Unless he has a clear idea of\nthe real character of modern war, and the principles on which success\nor failure depend, he will be utterly unable to grasp the significance\nof the events of which he reads each day. And it is of real importance\nthat in time of war every citizen should judge soundly the course of\nevents, for opinion influences action, and public opinion is made up of\nthe ideas of the units who compose the public. In this connection it is\nwell to bear in mind a point that is often overlooked, a point on which\nClausewitz insists in a singularly convincing passage--namely, the fact\nthat one of the main objects of a nation waging war is to force the\nenemy's population into a state of mind favourable to submission. This\nfact is sufficient proof of the importance of public opinion being\nwell informed not only as to the course of events, but also as to the\nprinciples that give to these events their real significance.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n  CHAPTER I\n\n                                           PAGE\n  THE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ                      3\n\n\n  CHAPTER II\n\n  THE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN\n    POLICY AND WAR                           11\n\n\n  CHAPTER III\n\n  THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ                 23\n\n\n  CHAPTER IV\n\n  THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR         33\n\n\n  CHAPTER V\n\n  THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED\n    IN A MODERN NATIONAL WAR                 47\n\n\n  CHAPTER VI\n\n  PUBLIC OPINION IN WAR                      65\n\n\n  CHAPTER VII\n\n  THE NATURE OF WAR                          79\n\n\n  CHAPTER VIII\n\n  WAR AS POLICY                             119\n\n\n  CHAPTER IX\n\n  STRATEGY                                  137\n\n\n  CHAPTER X\n\n  THE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY                 161\n\n\n  CHAPTER XI\n\n  TACTICS                                   177\n\n\n  CHAPTER XII\n\n  CHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ      213\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I\n\nTHE LIFE OF CLAUSEWITZ\n\n\nIn an endeavour, such as the present, to interest the British public in\neven the greatest military writer, the first necessity is to show that\nhe was not a mere theorist or bookworm. The wide and varied experience\nwhich the British officer gradually gains in so many different parts\nof the world shows up the weak points of most theories, and produces\na certain distrust of them. Also a distrust of theory is undoubtedly\none of our national characteristics. Hence, in order to appeal to the\nBritish officer or civilian, a writer must be a practical soldier.\n\nSuch was General Clausewitz: a practical soldier of very great\nexperience in the long series of wars 1793 to 1815, and one present\nthroughout that most awful of all campaigns, Napoleon's Russian\ncampaign in 1812.\n\n\"General Karl von Clausewitz was born near Magdeburg in 1780, and\nentered the Prussian army as Fahnenjunker in 1792. He served in the\ncampaigns of 1793-1794 on the Rhine. In 1801 he entered the military\nschool at Berlin as an officer, and remained there till 1803. He here\nattracted the notice of Scharnhorst. In the campaign of 1806 he served\nas aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus of Prussia, was present at the\nbattle of Jena, and saw that awful retreat which ended a fortnight\nlater in the surrender at Prentzlau. Being wounded and captured, he\nwas sent into France as a prisoner till the end of the war.\" \"On his\nreturn (in November, 1807) he was placed on General Scharnhorst's\nstaff, and employed on the work then going on for the reorganization\nof the Prussian army. In 1812 Clausewitz entered the Russian service,\nwas employed on the general staff, and was thus able to gain much\nexperience in the most gigantic of all the struggles of his time.\" \"In\nthe spring campaign of 1813 (battles of Lutzen, Bautzen, etc.), he, as\na Russian officer, was attached to Blucher's staff; during the winter\ncampaign he found employment as chief-of-the-staff to Count Walmoden,\nwho fought against Davoust on the Lower Elbe, and the splendid action\nof the Goerde was entirely the result of his able dispositions. In 1815\nhe again entered the Prussian service, and was chief-of-the-staff to\nthe III. Army Corps (Thielman), which at Ligny formed the left of the\nline of battle, and at Wavre covered the rear of Blucher's army.\" \"In\naddition to this, we may say, considerable practical training (note,\nenormous and varied indeed compared to any obtainable in the present\nday), he also possessed a comprehensive and thorough knowledge of\nmilitary history, and also an uncommonly clear perception of general\nhistory\" (Von Caemmerer). After the Peace he was employed in a command\non the Rhine. In 1818 he became major-general, and was made Director of\nthe Military School at Berlin. Here he remained for some years. This\nwas the chief period of his writings. As General von Caemmerer, in his\n\"Development of Strategical Science,\" puts it: \"This practical and\nexperienced, and at the same time highly cultured soldier, feels now,\nin peaceful repose, as he himself confesses, the urgent need to develop\nand systematize the whole world of thought which occupies him, yet also\nresolves to keep secret till his death the fruit of his researches, in\norder that his soul, which is thirsting for _Truth_, may be safely and\nfinally spared all temptations from subordinate considerations.\"\n\nIn 1830 he was appointed Director of Artillery at Breslau, and, having\nno more time for writing, sealed up and put away his papers, unfinished\nas they were. In the same year he was appointed chief-of-the-staff to\nField-Marshal Gneisenau's army. In the winter of that year war with\nFrance was considered imminent, and Clausewitz had prospects of acting\nas chief of the general staff of the Commander-in-Chief Gneisenau. He\nthen drew up two plans for war with France, which bear the stamp of\nthat practical knowledge of war and adaptation of means to ends which\ndistinguish his writings.\n\nIn the same year the war scare passed away, the army of Gneisenau was\ndisbanded, and Clausewitz returned to Breslau, where after a few days\nhe was seized with cholera, and died in November, 1831, aged only 51.\n\nHis works were published after his death by his widow.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nTHE INFLUENCE OF CLAUSEWITZ ON MODERN POLICY AND WAR\n\n\nFrom the day of their publication until now the influence of the\nwritings of Clausewitz has been steadily growing, till to-day it is\nimpossible to over-estimate the extent of that influence upon modern\nmilitary and political thought, especially in Germany. As General von\nCaemmerer, in his \"Development of Strategical Science,\" says: \"Karl\nvon Clausewitz, the pupil and friend of Scharnhorst and the confidant\nof Gneisenau, is in Germany generally recognized as the most prominent\ntheorist on war, as the real philosopher on war, to whom our famous\nvictors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training.\"\n\nField-Marshal Moltke was \"his most distinguished pupil,\" and adapted\nthe teaching of Clausewitz to the conditions of to-day.\n\nGeneral von der Goltz, in the introduction to his great work, \"The\nNation in Arms,\" thus describes the veneration which he inspires: \"A\nmilitary writer who, after Clausewitz, writes upon the subject of war,\nruns the risk of being likened to a poet who, after Goethe, attempts a\n_Faust_, or, after Shakespeare, a _Hamlet_. Everything important that\ncan be told about the nature of war can be found stereotyped in the\nworks which that great military genius has left behind him. Although\nClausewitz has himself described his book as being something as yet\nincomplete, this remark of his must be taken to mean that he, too,\nwas subject to the fate of all aspiring spirits, and was forced to\nfeel that all he attained lay far beneath his ideal. For us, who knew\nnot what that ideal was, his labours are a complete work. I have,\naccordingly, not attempted to write anything new, or of universal\napplicability about the science of warfare, but have limited myself to\nturning my attention to the military operations of our own day.\" One\ncan hardly imagine a stronger tribute of admiration.\n\nAnd, as Moltke was Clausewitz's most distinguished pupil, so also\nare all those trained in the school of Moltke pupils of Clausewitz,\nincluding the most eminent of modern German military writers, such as\nGeneral von Blume, in his \"Strategy\"; Von der Goltz, in his \"Nation in\nArms\" and \"The Conduct of War,\" who trained the Turkish General Staff\nfor the campaign of 1897 against Greece and the battle of Pharsalia,\netc.; General von Boguslawski; General von Verdy du Vernois, the\nfather of the study of Applied Tactics; General von Schlichting, in his\n\"Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Present\"; General Meckel,\nwho trained the Japanese Staff, etc., etc.\n\nWe all remember the telegram sent to General Meckel by Marshal Oyama\nafter the battle of Liao-yang: \"We hope you are proud of your pupils.\"\n\nSome time ago, when asked to give a lecture at Aldershot to the\nofficers of the 2nd Division on Clausewitz, it struck me that it would\nbe very interesting, anxious as we all were then to know the causes\nof the wonderful Japanese efficiency and success, if I could obtain a\npronouncement from General Meckel how far he had been influenced in his\nteaching by Clausewitz. My friend Herr von Donat did me the favour to\nwrite to General von Caemmerer and ask him if he could procure me such\na pronouncement which I might publish. General Meckel, whose death both\nJapan and Germany have since had to mourn, most kindly consented, and\nI esteem it a great honour to be allowed to quote part of his letter.\nHe said: \"I, like every other German officer, have, consciously or\nunconsciously, instructed in the spirit of Clausewitz. Clausewitz is\nthe _founder_ of that theory of war which resulted from the Napoleonic.\nI maintain that _every one_ who nowadays either makes or teaches war\nin a modern sense, bases himself upon Clausewitz, even if he is not\nconscious of it.\" This opinion of General Meckel, to whose training of\nthe Japanese General Staff the success of the Japanese armies must be\nlargely attributed, is most interesting. It is not possible to give a\nstronger or more up-to-date example of the magnitude of the influence\nof Clausewitz.\n\nIn this connection I should like to make a short quotation from \"The\nWar in the Far East,\" by the _Times_ military correspondent. In his\nshort but suggestive chapter on \"Clausewitz in Manchuria\" he says: \"But\nas all save one of the great battles in Manchuria have been waged by\nthe Japanese in close accordance with the spirit and almost the letter\nof Clausewitz's doctrine, and as the same battles have been fought by\nthe Russians in absolute disregard of them (though his works had been\ntranslated into Russian by General Dragomiroff long before the war),\nit is certainly worth showing how reading and reflection may profit\none army, and how the neglect of this respectable practice may ruin\nanother.\" \"Clausewitz in Manchuria\"! That brings us up to date. It is a\nfar cry for his influence to have reached, and triumphed.\n\n\nREFLECTIONS\n\nClausewitz wrote his book expressly for statesmen as well as soldiers.\nWe may be sure, therefore, that the influence of Clausewitz on the\nContinent has penetrated the realm of policy little less widely than\nthe realm of war. From this thought arise many reflections. It will be\nsufficient here to suggest one. I would suggest that we should regard\nevery foreign statesman, especially in Germany, as, consciously or\nunconsciously, a disciple of Clausewitz. That is to say, we should\nregard him as a man who, underneath everything else, underneath the\nmost pacific assurances for the present, considers war an unalterable\npart of policy. He will regard war as part of the ordinary intercourse\nof nations, and occasional warlike struggles as inevitable as\ncommercial struggles. He will consider war also as an instrument\nof policy, which he himself may have to use, and to be studied\naccordingly. He will consider it not as a thing merely for speeches,\nbut for practical use in furthering or defending the interests of his\nState. He will regard war as the means by which some day his nation\nshall impose its will upon another nation. He will be prepared to wait\nand wait, to make \"every imaginable preparation,\" and finally to let\nloose war in its most absolute and ruthless character, war carried out\nwith the utmost means, the utmost energy, and the utmost effort of a\nwhole nation-in-arms, determined to achieve its political object and\ncompel submission to its will by force.\n\nTo talk to such a man of \"the evils of war,\" or of \"the burden of\narmaments\"; or to propose to him \"disarmament\" or \"reduction of\narmed forces,\" and so forth can only appear to him as the result of\n\"imperfect knowledge.\" He will not say so, but he will think so, and\nact accordingly. To the partially instructed opponent of such a man\none can only say, \"Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he\nfall.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III\n\nTHE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ\n\n\nThe writings of Clausewitz are contained in nine volumes, published\nafter his death in 1831, but his fame rests chiefly on his three\nvolumes \"On War,\" which have been translated by Colonel J. J. Graham\n(the last edition edited by Colonel F. N. Maude, and published by\nMessrs. Kegan Paul, London). Clausewitz calls them \"a collection of\nmaterials,\" \"a mass of conceptions not brought into form,\" and states\nthat he intended to revise, and throw the whole into more complete\nshape.\n\nWe must lament that he did not live to complete his revision. But,\non the other hand, it is perhaps possible that this unfinished\nstate is really an advantage, for it leaves us free to apply his\ngreat maxims and principles and mode of thought to the ever-varying\nconditions of the present and future, unhampered by too complete a\ncrystallization of his ideas written before more modern conditions of\nrailways, telegraphs, and rapid long-ranging arms of precision, etc.,\narose. It is perhaps this unfinished state which renders Clausewitz\nso essentially in touch with, and a part of, the onward movement and\nevolution of military thought. For his great aim was \"the truth, the\nwhole truth, and nothing but the truth,\" without preconception or\nfavour, as far as he could go--essentially \"a realist\" of war--and what\nbetter aim can we set before ourselves?\n\nAs Sir Arthur Helps has so well put it in his \"Friends in Council,\"\nevery man needs a sort of central stem for his reading and culture. I\nwish here to say why I think that Clausewitz is admirably adapted to\nform such a main stem in the military culture of British officers.\n\nIn the first place there is a lofty sort of tone about his writings\nwhich one gradually realizes as one reads them, and which I will not\nattempt to describe further than by saying that they stamp themselves\nas the writings of a gentleman of fine character.\n\nIn the second place it is a book which \"any fellow\" can read, for\nthere is nothing to \"put one off,\" nothing abstruse or mathematical or\nformal, no formul\u00e6 or lines and angles and technical terms, such as in\nother writers, Jomini, Hamley, etc. Clausewitz is free from all such\npedantries, which for my part, and I dare say for the part of many\nothers, often \"put one off\" a book, and made one instinctively feel\nthat there was something wrong, something unpractical about it, which\nrendered it hardly worth the sacrifice of time involved in its study.\nThere is in Clausewitz nothing of that kind at all. All those lines and\nangles and formul\u00e6 he dismisses in a few pages as of little practical\nimportance.\n\nIn the third place Clausewitz only goes in for experience and the\npractical facts of war. As he somewhat poetically puts it, \"The\nflowers of Speculation require to be cut down low near the ground of\nExperience, their proper soil.\"[1] He is the great apostle of human\nnature and character as being everything in war. \"All war supposes\nhuman weakness, and against that it is directed.\"[2] I believe that the\nBritish officer will find himself in sympathy with the great thinker\non war, who asserts that \"_Of_ _all military virtues Energy in the\nconduct of Operations has always conduced most to glory and success of\narms_.\"[3]\n\nIn the fourth place, to the practical mind will appeal his denunciation\nof all elaborate plans, because _Time_ is required for all elaborate\ncombinations, and Time is just the one thing that an active enemy\nwill not give us,--and his consequent deduction that all plans must\nbe of the simplest possible form. His famous sentence, \"_In war all\nthings are simple, but the simple are difficult_,\"[4] gives the key\nto his writings, for to _overcome those simple yet great difficulties\nhe regards as the art of war_, which can only be done by the military\nvirtues of perseverance, energy, and boldness.\n\nIn the fifth place he does not want men to be bookworms, for he says:\n\n\"_Theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations\nin which we can be placed in war_.\"[5] And we can all reflect, without\nreading too many books. Also he says: \"Much reading of history is\nnot required for the above object. The knowledge of a few separate\nbattles, _in their details_, is more useful than a general knowledge of\nseveral campaigns. On this account it is more useful to read detailed\nnarratives and journals than regular works of history.\"[6] He wants\nhistory in detail, not a general smattering and a loose application\nthereof, which fault he strongly denounces. And he expressly states\nthat the history of the very latest war is the most useful. All of\nwhich is very practical, and in accord with what we feel to be true.\n\nAs he pictures war, \"_the struggle between the spiritual and moral\nforces_ on _both_ sides is the centre of all,\"[7] and to this aspect\nof the subject he gives much more attention than Jomini and most of\nJomini's disciples. He has freed us once for all from all formalism.\nThe formation of character, careful, practical, detailed study, and\nthorough preparation in peace, the simplest plans carried out with the\nutmost perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness in war--these are\nthe practical fruits of his teaching.\n\nTherefore, I say again, that I do not think that the British officer\ncould possibly find a more interesting or a better guide for the main\nstem of his reading than Clausewitz, nor any one that will appeal\nto his practical instincts of what is _True_ half so well. I do not\nbelieve that he could possibly do better than with Clausewitz as\nmain stem, and a detailed study of the latest campaigns and modern\ntechnicalities as the up-to-date addition required to transform\nknowledge into action. I trust that every reader of Clausewitz will\nagree with me in this.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV\n\nTHE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF WAR\n\n\n\"Moltke, the most gifted pupil of Clausewitz,\" \"Moltke, who knew\nClausewitz's book well, and often liked to describe him as the\ntheoretical instructor.\" As Chaucer would say, \"What needeth wordes\nmore?\"\n\nClausewitz has treated practically every chief branch of strategy\nand tactics (except, of course, the present-day developments of\nrailways, telegraphs, quick-firing guns, smokeless powder, universal\nservice armies, etc.). The whole of his bulky work \"On War\" is full\nof interesting and sometimes eloquent and almost poetical passages,\nof concentrated, pregnant, and far-reaching thoughts on every\nsubject. Through all these it is, of course, impossible to follow\nhim in any introduction. One can really do no more than urge all to\nread Clausewitz for themselves, to go to the fountain-head, to the\nmaster-work itself. In the short space to which I have restricted\nmyself, I propose, therefore, to concentrate on a few of his leading\nideas, reluctantly leaving out many others which are really almost just\nas good.\n\n\nTHEORY AND PRACTICE\n\nOne of the things for which we are most deeply indebted to Clausewitz\nis that he has shown us clearly the proper place of theory in relation\nto practice. \"It should educate the mind of the future leader in\nwar, or, rather, guide him in his _self-instruction_, but _not_\naccompany him on to the battlefield; just as a sensible tutor forms\nand enlightens the opening mind of a youth without therefore keeping\nhim in leading-strings all his life.\"[8] Again, \"In real action most\nmen are guided by the tact of judgment, which hits the object more or\nless accurately, according as they possess more or less genius. This\nis the way in which all great generals have acted, and therein partly\nlay their greatness and their genius, in that they always hit upon what\nwas right by this tact. Thus also it will always be in _action_, and\nso far this tact is amply sufficient. But when it is a question not of\nacting one's self, but of convincing others _in consultation_, then\nall depends upon clear conceptions and demonstrations and the inherent\nrelations; and so little progress has been made in this respect that\nmost deliberations are merely a contention of words, resting on no\nfirm basis, and ending either in every one retaining his own opinion,\nor in a compromise from mutual considerations of respect, a middle\ncourse really without any value. Clear ideas on these matters are not,\ntherefore, wholly useless.\"[9]\n\nHow true this is any one will admit who reflects for a moment upon\nthe great diversity of opinions on almost every subject held in our\narmy, just because of this want of a central theory common to all. In\nthe domain of tactics it is evident that this holds good even as in\nstrategy, for a common central theory of war will produce a more or\nless common way of looking at things, from which results more or less\ncommon action towards the attainment of the common object.\n\n\nREJECTION OF SET AND GEOMETRICAL THEORIES\n\n\"It should educate the mind of the future leader in war\" is what\nClausewitz demands from a useful theory; but he most expressly and\nunreservedly rejects every attempt at a method \"by which definite\nplans for wars or campaigns are to be given out all ready made as if\nfrom a machine.\"[10] He mocks at B\u00fclow's including at first in the\none term \"base\" all sorts of things, like the supply of the army, its\nreinforcements and equipments, the security of its communications with\nthe home country, and lastly the security of its line of retreat, and\nthen fixing the extent of the base, and finally fixing an angle for the\nextent of that base: \"And all this was done merely to obtain a pure\ngeometrical result utterly useless\" (Von Caemmerer).\n\nFor the same reason Jomini's principle of the Inner Line does not\nsatisfy him, owing to its mere geometrical nature, although he right\nwillingly acknowledges \"that it rests on a sound foundation, on\nthe truth that the combat is the only effectual means in war\" (Von\nCaemmerer). All such attempts at theory seem to him therefore perfectly\nuseless, \"because they strive to work with fixed quantities, while in\nwar everything is _uncertain_, and all considerations must reckon with\nall kinds of variable quantities; because they only consider _material_\nobjects, while every action in war is saturated with _moral_ forces and\neffects; lastly, because they deal only with the action of _one_ party,\nwhile war is a constant reciprocal effect of _both_ parties\" (Von\nCaemmerer).\n\n\"Pity the warrior,\" says Clausewitz, \"who is contented to crawl about\nin this beggardom of rules.\" \"Pity the theory which sets itself in\nopposition to the mind\"[11] (note, the moral forces).\n\n\nA THEORY TO BE PRACTICALLY USEFUL\n\nClausewitz insists that a useful theory cannot be more than a thorough\nknowledge of military history and \"reflection upon all the situations\nin which we can be placed in war.\" \"What genius does must be just the\nbest of all rules, and theory cannot do better than to show just how\nand why it is so.\" \"It is an analytical investigation of the subject\nwhich leads to exact knowledge: and if brought to bear on the results\nof experience, which in our case would be military history, to a\n_thorough_ familiarity with it. If theory investigates the subjects\nwhich constitute war; if it separates more distinctly that which at\nfirst sight seems amalgamated; if it explains fully the properties of\nthe means; if it shows their probable effects; if it makes evident the\nnature of objects; _if it brings to bear all over the field of war the\nlight of essentially critical investigation_,--then it has fulfilled\nthe chief duties of its province. It becomes then a guide to him who\nwishes to make himself acquainted with war from books; it lights up the\nwhole road for him, facilitates his progress, educates his judgment,\nand shields him from error.\"[12]\n\n\nKNOWLEDGE MUST BE THOROUGH\n\nThis Clausewitz considers most important. He says that \"Knowledge of\nthe conduct of war ... _must pass completely into the mind_, and almost\ncease to be something objective.\" For in war \"The moral reaction, the\never-changing form of things makes it necessary for the chief actor\nto carry _in himself_ the whole mental apparatus of his knowledge, in\norder that anywhere and at every pulse-beat he may be capable of giving\nthe requisite decision _from himself_. Knowledge must, by this complete\nassimilation with his own mind and life, be converted into real power.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSo much for Clausewitz, therefore, as the greatest yet the simplest and\nleast theoretical of theorists on war. Mark well his comforting dictum\nthat \"Theory is nothing but rational reflection upon all the situations\nin which we can be placed in war.\" That is a task which we have all\nmore or less attempted. Therefore we are all more or less theorists.\nThe only question is that of comparative \"thoroughness\" in our\nreflections. And it is essentially this \"thoroughness\" in investigation\nand reflection towards which Clausewitz helps us. Like every other\nhabit, the _habit_ of military reflection gradually grows with use;\ntill, fortified and strengthened by detailed knowledge, it gradually\nbecomes Power.\n\n\nREFLECTIONS\n\nThe theory of war is simple, and there is no reason why any man who\nchooses to take the trouble to read and reflect carefully on one or\ntwo of the acknowledged best books thereon, should not attain to a\nfair knowledge thereof. He may with reasonable trouble attain to such\nknowledge of the theory of war as will enable him to follow with\nintelligent appreciation the discussions of experienced soldier or\nsoldiers. Such knowledge as will prevent his misunderstanding the\nexperienced soldier's argument from pure ignorance, and such knowledge\nas will enable him to understand the military reasons put forward and\nthe military object proposed. To the opinion of such a man all respect\nwill be due. Thus, and thus only.\n\nIt is indeed the plain duty of all who aspire to rule either thus to\nqualify themselves to understand, or else to abstain from interference\nwith, the military interests of the State.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V\n\nTHE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFORT REQUIRED IN A MODERN NATIONAL WAR\n\n\nThis point is here illustrated with more detail from Clausewitz than\nmay seem necessary to some, because it is precisely the point regarding\nmodern war which is least understood in this country.\n\n\"The complete overthrow of the enemy is the natural end of the art of\nwar.\" \"As this idea must apply to both the belligerent parties, it\nmust follow, that there can be no suspension in the military act, and\npeace cannot take place until one or other of the parties concerned is\ncompletely overthrown.\" This is what Clausewitz means by Absolute War,\nthat is war carried to its absolute and logical conclusion with the\nutmost force, the utmost effort and the utmost energy. He then proceeds\nto show that war, owing \"to all the natural inertia and friction of its\nparts, the whole of the inconsistency, the vagueness and hesitation (or\ntimidity) of the human mind,\" usually takes a weaker or less absolute\nform according to circumstances. \"All this, theory must admit, but it\nis its duty to give the foremost place to the absolute form of war, and\nto use that form as a general point of direction.\" He then proceeds to\nshow that war finally took its absolute form under Napoleon. To-day we\nmay say that war takes its absolute form in the modern great national\nwar, which is waged by each belligerent with the whole concentrated\nphysical and mental power of the nation-in-arms.\n\nThis requires to be gone into a little more in detail, for it is a\nmost important point.\n\nClausewitz in Book VIII. approaches this part of his subject by an\nhistorical survey of war from the time of the Roman Empire to that\nof Napoleon. He shows how as the feudal system gradually merged into\nthe later monarchical States of Europe, armies gradually became less\nand less national, more and more mercenary. Omitting this, we arrive\nat the seventeenth century. He says: \"The end of the seventeenth\ncentury, the time of Louis XIV., is to be regarded as the point in\nhistory at which the standing military power, such as it existed in the\neighteenth century, reached its zenith. That military force was based\non enlistment and money. States had organized themselves into complete\nunities; and the governments, by commuting the personal services of\ntheir subjects into money payments, had concentrated their whole power\nin their treasuries. Through the rapid strides in social improvements,\nand a more enlightened system of government, this power had become very\ngreat in comparison with what it had been. France appeared in the field\nwith a standing army of a couple of hundred thousand men, and the other\nPowers in proportion.\"\n\nArmies were supported out of the Treasury, which the sovereign regarded\npartly as his privy purse, at least as a resource belonging to the\nGovernment, and not to the people. Relations with other States, except\nwith respect to a few commercial subjects, mostly concerned only the\ninterests of the Treasury or of the Government, not those of the\npeople; at least ideas tended everywhere in that way. The Cabinets\ntherefore looked upon themselves as the owners and administrators\nof large estates, which they were continually seeking to increase,\nwithout the tenants on those estates being particularly interested in\nthis improvement.\n\nThe people, therefore, who in the Tartar invasions were everything in\nwar, who in the old republics and in the Middle Ages were of great\nconsequence, were in the eighteenth century absolutely nothing directly.\n\nIn this manner, in proportion as the Government separated itself more\nfrom the people, and regarded itself as the State, war became more and\nmore exclusively a business of the Government, which it carried on\nby means of the money in its coffers and the idle vagabonds it could\npick up in its own and neighbouring countries. The army was a State\nproperty, very expensive, and not to be lightly risked in battle.\n\"In its signification war was only diplomacy somewhat intensified, a\nmore vigorous way of negotiating, in which battles and sieges were\nsubstituted for diplomatic notes.\"\n\n\"Plundering and devastating the enemy's country were no longer in\naccordance with the spirit of the age.\" \"They were justly looked upon\nas unnecessary barbarity.\" \"War, therefore, confined itself more and\nmore, both as regards means and ends, to the army itself. The army,\nwith its fortresses and some prepared positions, constituted a State in\na State, within which the element of war slowly consumed itself. All\nEurope rejoiced at its taking this direction, and held it to be the\nnecessary consequence of the spirit of progress.\"\n\nSo think many in this country to-day. They are only a hundred years\nbehind the times.\n\n\"The plan of a war on the part of the State assuming the offensive in\nthose times consisted generally in the conquest of one or other of the\nenemy's provinces; the plan of the defender was to prevent this. The\nplan of campaign was to take one or other of the enemy's fortresses, or\nto prevent one of our own being taken; it was only when a battle became\nunavoidable for this purpose that it was sought for and fought. Whoever\nfought a battle without this unavoidable necessity, from mere innate\ndesire of gaining a victory, was reckoned a general with too much\ndaring.\" For armies were too precious to be lightly risked. \"Winter\nquarters, in which the mutual relations of the two parties almost\nentirely ceased, formed a distinct limit to the activity which was\nconsidered to belong to one campaign.\" \"As long as war was universally\nconducted in this manner, all was considered to be in the most regular\norder.\" \"Thus there was eminence and perfection of every kind, and\neven Field-Marshal Daun, to whom it was chiefly owing that Frederick\nthe Great completely attained his object, and Maria Theresa completely\nfailed in hers, notwithstanding that could still pass for a great\ngeneral.\"\n\nBeyond this stage of military thought, many in this country have not\nyet advanced.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\"Thus matters stood when the French Revolution broke out; Austria\nand Prussia tried their diplomatic art of war; this very soon proved\ninsufficient. Whilst, according to the usual way of seeing things,\nall hopes were placed on a very limited military force in 1793, such\na force as no one had any conception of made its appearance. War had\nsuddenly become again an affair of the people, and that of a people\nnumbering thirty millions, every one of whom regarded himself as a\ncitizen of the State.\" \"_By this participation of the people in the\nwar_, instead of a cabinet and an army, a whole nation with its natural\nweight came into the scale. Henceforth the means available--the efforts\nwhich might be called forth--had no longer any definite limits; the\nenergy with which the war itself might be conducted had no longer any\ncounterpoise, and consequently the danger to the adversary had risen to\nthe extreme.\"\n\nIf only our politicians could learn this old lesson of the French\nRevolution! For many, too many, of them appear to derive their ideas of\nwar to-day from some dim reminiscent recollections of school histories\nof the wars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.\n\nTo continue: \"After all this was perfected by the hand of Bonaparte,\nthis military power based on the strength of the whole nation, marched\nover Europe, smashing everything in pieces so surely and certainly,\nthat where it only encountered the old-fashioned armies the result was\nnot doubtful for a moment.\n\n\"A reaction, however, awoke in due time. In Spain the war became of\nitself an affair of the people.\" In Austria. In Russia. \"In Germany\nPrussia rose up the first, made the war a national cause, and without\neither money or credit, and with a population reduced one-half, took\nthe field with an army twice as strong as in 1806. The rest of Germany\nfollowed the example of Prussia sooner or later.\" \"Thus it was that\nGermany and Russia, in the years 1813 and 1814, appeared against France\nwith about a million of men.\"\n\n\"Under these circumstances the energy thrown into the conduct of war\nwas quite different.\" \"In eight months the theatre of war was removed\nfrom the Oder to the Seine. Proud Paris had to bow its head for the\nfirst time; and the redoubtable Bonaparte lay fettered on the ground.\"\n\n\"Therefore, since the time of Bonaparte, war, through being, first on\none side, then again on the other, an affair of the whole nation, has\nassumed quite a new nature, or rather it has approached much nearer\nto its real nature, to its absolute perfection. The means then called\nforth had no visible limit, the limit losing itself in the energy\nand enthusiasm of the Government and its subjects. By the extent of\nthe means, and the wide field of possible results, as well as by\nthe powerful excitement of feeling which prevailed, energy in the\nconduct of war was immensely increased; the object of its action was\nthe downfall of the foe; and not until the enemy lay powerless on\nthe ground was it supposed to be possible to stop, or to come to any\nunderstanding with regard to the mutual objects of the contest.\n\n\"Thus, therefore the element of war, freed from all conventional\nrestrictions, broke loose with all its natural force. The cause was the\nparticipation of the people in this great affair of State, and this\nparticipation arose partly from the effects of the French Revolution on\nthe internal affairs of other countries, partly from the threatening\nattitude of the French towards all nations.\n\n\"Now, whether this will be the case always in future, whether all wars\nhereafter in Europe will be carried on with the whole power of the\nStates, and, consequently, _will only take place on account of great\ninterests closely affecting the people_, would be a difficult point to\nsettle. But every one will agree with us that, at least, _Whenever\ngreat interests are in dispute_, mutual hostility will discharge itself\nin the same manner as it has done in our times.\"\n\n\nREFLECTIONS\n\nThis is so true, that every war since the days of Clausewitz has made\nits truth more apparent. Since he wrote, the participation of the\npeople in war has become, not a revolutionary fact, but an organized\nfact, an ordinary fact in the everyday life of nations. To-day every\nState except Great Britain, securely based on the system of the\nuniversal training of its sons to arms, stands ready to defend its\ninterests with the whole concentrated power, physical, intellectual,\nand material, of its whole manhood. Consequently, European war,\nas Clausewitz foresaw, \"will only take place on account of great\ninterests closely affecting the people.\" The character of such war\nwill be absolute, the object of its action will be the downfall of the\nfoe, and not till the foe (be it Great Britain or not) lies powerless\non the ground will it be supposed possible to stop. In the prosecution\nof such a national war the means available, the energy and the effort\ncalled forth, will be without limits. Such must be the conflicts of\nnations-in-arms.\n\nYet, even now, so many years after Clausewitz wrote, in the hope, as he\nhimself stated, \"to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists\nand statesmen,\" the great transformation in the character of modern\nwar, due to the participation of the people therein, has not yet been\nadequately realized by many men in this country _who ought to know_.\nIt is earnestly to be hoped that they will endeavour to adjust their\nminds, as regards war, to the fact that we are living, not in the\neighteenth century, but in the twentieth, and that they will consider\nthat war has once for all become an affair of the people, that our\nopponents will be a people-in-arms, using the uttermost means of their\nwhole manhood to crush us, and that disaster can only be prevented by a\nlike utmost effort on our part, by an effort regardless of everything\nexcept self-preservation.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI\n\nPUBLIC OPINION IN WAR\n\n\n\"War belongs, not to the province of arts and sciences, but to the\nprovince of social life. It is a conflict of great interests which is\nsettled by bloodshed, and only in that respect is it different from\nothers. It would be better, instead of comparing it with any art, to\nliken it to trade, which is also a conflict of human interests and\nactivities; and it is still more like state policy, which again, on\nits part, may be looked upon as a kind of trade on a great scale.\nBesides, state policy is the womb in which war is developed, in which\nits outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state, like the qualities of\nliving creatures in their germs.\"[13]\n\nThese conflicts of interest can bring about gradually such a state of\nfeeling that \"even the most civilized nations may burn with passionate\nhatred of each other.\" It is an unpleasant fact for the philosopher,\nfor the social reformer, to contemplate, but history repeats and\nrepeats the lesson. Still more, \"It is quite possible for such a state\nof feeling to exist between two States that a very trifling political\nmotive for war may produce an effect quite disproportionate--in fact, a\nperfect explosion.\"\n\n\"War is a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its\nelements--hatred and animosity--which may be looked upon as blind\ninstinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free\nactivity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political\ninstrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason.\n\n\"The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second,\nmore the general and his army; the third more the Government. _The\npassions which break forth in war must already have a latent existence\nin the peoples._\n\n\"These three tendencies are deeply rooted in the nature of the subject.\nA theory which would leave any one of them out of account would\nimmediately become involved in such a contradiction with the reality,\nthat it might be regarded as destroyed at once by that alone.\"[14]\n\nClausewitz is the great thinker, the great realist, the great\nphilosopher of war. His aim was, free from all bias, to get at _the\ntruth of things_. His view of war as a social act, as part of the\nintercourse of nations, so that occasional warlike struggles can no\nmore be avoided than occasional commercial struggles, is a view which\nrequires to be most carefully pondered over by every statesman. It\nis based upon the essential fundamental characteristics of human\nnature, which do not alter. It is not to be lightly set aside by\ndeclamation about the blessings of peace, the evils of war, the burden\nof armaments, and such-like sophistries. To submit without a struggle\nto injustice or to the destruction of one's vital interests is not in\npassionate human nature. Nor will it ever be in the nature of a virile\npeople. It is indeed to be most sincerely hoped that _arbitration_\nwill be resorted to more and more as a means of peacefully settling\nall non-vital causes of dispute. But arbitration has its limits. For\n_no great nation will ever submit to arbitration any interest that\nit regards as absolutely vital_. The view of war, therefore, as a\nsocial act, as part of the intercourse of nations, with all that it\nimplies, appears to be the only one which a statesman, however much he\nmay regret the fact, can take. It has, therefore, been brought forward\nhere at once, as it underlies the whole subject and is essential to all\nclear thought thereon.\n\nSo much for the influence of Public Opinion in producing war. Now for\nits influence in and during war.\n\n\"There are three principal objects in carrying on war,\" says Clausewitz.\n\n  \"(_a_) To conquer and destroy the enemy's armed force.\n\n  \"(_b_) To get possession of the material elements of aggression,\n  and of the other sources of existence of the hostile army.\n\n  \"(_c_) _To gain Public Opinion._[15]\n\n\"To attain the first of these objects, the chief operation must be\ndirected against the enemy's principal army, for it must be beaten\nbefore we can follow up the other two objects with success.\n\n\"In order to seize the material forces, operations are directed against\nthose points at which those resources are chiefly concentrated:\nprincipal towns, magazines, great fortresses. On the road to these the\nenemy's principal force, or a considerable part of his army, will be\nencountered.\n\n\"Public Opinion is ultimately gained by great victories, and by the\npossession of the enemy's capital.\"[16]\n\nThis almost prophetic (as it was in his day) recognition by Clausewitz\nof the vast importance of gaining Public Opinion _as one of the\nthree great aims in war_, is fundamental. It is just one of those\ninstances of his rare insight into the principles and development of\nmodern national war which make his book of such great and enduring\nvalue to us. For since his day Europe has become organized into great\nindustrial nations, democracy and popular passion have become more\nand more a force to be reckoned with, and the gaining and preserving\nof Public Opinion in war has become more and more important. It has,\nin fact, become the statesman's chief business during a great modern\nnational war. It has become necessary for him to study intently war in\nits relation to industry, and to the industrial millions over whom he\npresides, or over whom he may preside.\n\n\nREFLECTIONS\n\n(1) In the time of Clausewitz we in Britain were a nation of\n18,000,000, practically self-supporting, and governed by an\naristocracy. To-day we are a crowded nation of 43,000,000 dependent\nupon over-sea sources for three-fourths of our food, for our raw\nmaterials, for our trade, for our staying power, _and_ we are governed\nby a democracy. In a modern democratic State it will only be possible\nto carry on the most just and unavoidable war so long as the hardships\nbrought on the democracy by the war do not become intolerable. To\nprevent these hardships from thus becoming intolerable to the people,\nto Public Opinion, will be the task of the modern statesman during war,\nand this can only be done by wise prevision and timely preparation. _It\nrequires the internal organization of the Industrial State for war._\n\nIt appears to the _writer_ that internal organization can be subdivided\nas follows:--\n\nI. An adequate gold reserve.\n\nII. The protection of our ships carrying raw material, food, and\nexports during their passage on the high seas from the places of\norigin to the consumers: (A) by the few available cruisers which could\nbe spared from the fighting fleets, assisted by a thoroughly well\nthought out and prepared scheme of national indemnity (_vide_ Blue Book\nthereon); (B) by insuring the distribution to the consumers of food\nand raw material, after it has arrived in the country, by preparing a\nthorough organization which would deal with the blocking of any of the\nprincipal ports of arrival, and by guarding the vulnerable points of\nour internal lines of communications to and from the shipping centres.\n\nIII. Organization of Poor Law system to bring immediate relief by\nselling at peace price food to those unable to pay war prices owing to\n(A) normal poverty (7,000,000 to 8,000,000 souls), (B) out-of-works,\ndue to effect of war on trade.\n\nWork and wages the State _must_ guarantee during modern war, and\nbefore the State _can_ guarantee these, it is absolutely necessary\nthat it should satisfy itself that the above preparations are actually\n_in being_. This pre-supposes a more earnest study of the industrial\neffects of a great national war than has yet been given to the subject\nby our political leaders. For in the warfare of the present and future\nthe importance of gaining and preserving Public Opinion, as pointed\nout by Clausewitz, cannot be over-estimated. It is as fundamentally\nimportant _to safeguard our own Public Opinion as it is to attack,\nweaken, and gain over that of the enemy_. This has not yet passed\nthe stage of thought. But good thoughts are no better than good dreams\nunless they be put into action. We are waiting for the statesman to DO\nit. There is no great difficulty.\n\n(2) In arousing the national spirit to the requisite height of\npatriotic self-denial and self-sacrifice, in elevating, preserving, and\nsafe-guarding Public Opinion during a great national struggle, much\nmay be hoped for from the patriotism of our Press. Only in fairness to\nthose whose patriotism is self-originating and spontaneous, it must\nbe made compulsory upon ALL, so that no journal may suffer loss of\ncirculation or pecuniary injury thereby.\n\n(3) There lies a practical task immediately to the hand of our\nstatesmen if they will seriously set themselves to the task of\nimproving the _moral_ of our nation by reforming our education\n_curriculum_, on the leading principle that the moral is to the\nphysical as three to one in life, and that therefore character-building\nmust be its chief aim. Then they will do much towards strengthening\nus for war, towards carrying out Clausewitz's idea of the gaining and\npreserving of our Public Opinion in War.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII\n\nTHE NATURE OF WAR\n\n\n\"It is necessary for us to commence with a glance at the nature of the\nwhole, because it is particularly necessary that, in the consideration\nof any of the parts, the whole should be kept constantly in view. We\nshall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by\nPublicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a\nduel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would\nconceive as a unit the countless numbers of duels which make up a\nwar, we shall do so best by supposing two wrestlers. Each strives\nby physical force to throw his adversary, and thus to render him\nincapable of further resistance.\n\n\"Violence arms itself with the inventions of arts and science in\norder to contend against violence. Self-imposed restrictions, almost\nimperceptible, and _hardly worth mentioning_, termed _usages of\nInternational Law_, accompany it without essentially impairing its\npower.\n\n\"Violence, that is to say physical force, is therefore _the Means_;\nthe compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate\n_object_. In order to attain this object fully the enemy must first be\ndisarmed: and this is, correctly speaking, the real aim of hostilities\nin theory.\"[17]\n\nNow, \"philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful\nmethod of disarming and overcoming an adversary without causing great\nbloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of war.\nHowever plausible this may appear, _still it is an error which must\nbe extirpated_, for in such dangerous things as war _the errors which\nproceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst_. As the\nuse of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the\nco-operation of the intelligence, it follows that _he who uses force\nunsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed_, MUST\n_obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise_.\" \"To\nintroduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation\nwould be an absurdity.\" \"We therefore repeat our proposition, that _War\nis an act of violence which in its application knows no bounds_.\"\n\n\nTHE POLITICAL NATURE OF WAR\n\nIn endeavouring briefly to describe Clausewitz's method of looking at\nwar, one is continually confronted by the difficulty of selecting\na few leading ideas out of so many profound thoughts and pregnant\npassages. However, a selection must be made.\n\nI assign the first place to his conception of war as a part of policy,\nbecause that is fundamentally necessary to understand his practical\nway of looking at things. This point of view is as necessary for\nthe strategist as for the statesman, indeed for every man who would\nunderstand the nature of war. For otherwise it is impossible to\nunderstand the military conduct of many campaigns and battles, in which\nthe political outweighed the military influence, and led to action\nincomprehensible almost from a purely military point of view. History\nis full of such examples.\n\nClausewitz clearly lays down: \"_War is only a continuation of State\npolicy by other means._ This point of view being adhered to will\nintroduce much more unity into the consideration of the subject, and\nthings will be more easily disentangled from each other.\"[18] \"It\nis only thus that we can obtain a clear conception of war, for the\npolitical view is the _object_, war is the _means_, and the means\nmust always include the object in our conception.\" \"Each (nation or\ngovernment) strives by physical force to compel the other to submit to\nits will.\"[19]\n\nOwing to the great importance of this point of view, so little\nunderstood in this country, I have devoted the next chapter to it\nalone, so as to bring out Clausewitz's view more in detail. We can,\ntherefore, pass on for the present.\n\n\nTHE CULMINATING POINT OF VICTORY\n\nSecondly, I select his doctrine of the culminating point of victory,\nbecause that is essential in order to understand his division of all\nwars into two classes, according to how far the attack is likely to be\nable to extend into the hostile country before reaching its culminating\npoint, where reaction may set in.[20]\n\n\"The conqueror in a war is not always in a condition to subdue his\nadversary completely. Often, in fact almost _universally, there is a\nculminating point of victory_. Experience shows this sufficiently.\"[21]\nAs the attack or invasion progresses it becomes weaker even from its\nsuccesses, from sieges or corps left to observe fortified places, from\nthe troops required to guard the territory gained, and the lengthening\nline of communications, from the fact that we are removing further\nfrom our resource while the enemy is falling back upon and drawing\nnearer to his, from the danger of other States joining in to prevent\nthe utter destruction of the defeated nation, from the rousing of\nthe whole nation in extremity to save themselves by a people's war,\nfrom the slackening of effort in the victorious army itself, etc.,\netc. Leoben, Friedland, Austerlitz, Moscow, are instances of such a\nculminating point, and probably in the late Russo-Japanese war Harbin\nwould have proved so, too, if peace had not intervened.\n\nClausewitz continues: \"It is necessary to know how far it (our\npreponderance) will reach, in order not to go beyond that point and,\ninstead of fresh advantage, reap disaster.\" He defines it as \"_The\npoint at which the offensive changes into the defensive_,\" and says,\n\"to overstep this point is more than simply a useless expenditure of\npower yielding no further results, it is a _destructive_ step which\ncauses reaction, and the reaction is, according to all experience,\nproductive of most disproportionate effects.\"[22] The reader will find\nit an interesting exercise to search for this culminating point of\nvictory in historical campaigns, and mark the result where it has been\noverstepped and where it has not been overstepped.\n\n\nTHE TWO CLASSES OF WARS\n\nFrom this consideration of the culminating point of victory follow the\ntwo classes into which Clausewitz divides all wars.\n\n\"The two kinds of war are, first, those in which the object is the\ncomplete _overthrow of the enemy_, whether it be that we aim at his\ndestruction politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to\nconclude peace on our terms; and, _next_, those in which our aim is\nmerely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country, either\nfor the purpose of retaining them permanently, or of turning them to\naccount as matters for exchange in the settlement of Peace.\"[23]\n\nAll wars, therefore, are wars for the complete destruction of the\nenemy, _i.e._ \"unlimited object,\" or wars with a \"limited object.\"\nIn the plan of a war it is necessary to settle which it is to be in\naccordance with our powers and resources of attack compared with\nthe enemy's resources for defence, and where our culminating point\nof victory is likely to be, on this side of the enemy's capital or\nbeyond it. If the former--then the plan should be one with a \"limited\nobject,\" such as the Crimea, Manchuria, etc.; if the latter--then the\nplan should aim at the enemy's total destruction, such as most of\nNapoleon's campaigns, or the Allies in 1813, 1814, 1815, or as 1866,\nor 1870. As Clausewitz says: \"_Now, the first, the grandest, and most\ndecisive act of judgment which the statesman and general exercises, is\nrightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages_,\nnot to take it for something or to wish to make of it something which,\nby the nature of its relations, it is impossible for it to be. _This,\ntherefore, is the first and most comprehensive of all strategical\nquestions._\"[24]\n\nIn Clausewitz's two plans for war with France in 1831,[25] this\ndifference is plain. In the first plan, he considered Prussia, Austria,\nthe German Confederation, and Great Britain united as allies against\nFrance,--and with this great superiority of numbers he plans an attack\nby two armies, each of 300,000 men, one marching on Paris from Belgium,\none on Orleans from the Upper Rhine. In the second plan the political\nconditions had meanwhile changed; Austria and Great Britain were\ndoubtful, and Clausewitz held it accordingly dubious if Prussia and\nthe German Confederation alone could appear before Paris in sufficient\nstrength to guarantee victory in a decisive battle, and with which it\nwould be permissible to venture even beyond Paris. So he proposed to\nlimit the object to the conquest of Belgium, and to attack the French\nvigorously the moment they entered that country.\n\nWhich strict limitation of the object within the means available to\nattain it is characteristic of Clausewitz's practical way of looking\nat things. In each plan, however, a vigorous offensive aiming at a\ndecisive victory was to be adopted.\n\n\nPREPARATION FOR WAR\n\nThe third place, in respect to its present-day importance, I assign to\nClausewitz's clear statement that--\n\n\"If we have clearly understood the result of our reflections, then\nthe activities belonging to war divide themselves into two principal\nclasses, into such as are only _preparations for war_ and into _the war\nitself_. This distinction must also be made in theory.\"\n\nNothing could be more clearly stated than this, or place in greater\nhonour peace preparations. Like his doctrine of the importance of\ngaining public opinion in war, it is one of those almost prophetic\nutterances which make Clausewitz the germ of modern military evolution.\n\nClausewitz, unlike Jomini who did not, foresaw to a certain extent\n(probably owing to his employment in organizing the new Prussian\nshort-service army after 1806) the nation-in-arms of the present day.\nAnd, since his time, the greater the forces which have to be prepared,\nthe greater has become the value of preparation for war. It has been\ncontinually growing, till to-day it has obtained such overwhelming\nimportance that one may almost say that a modern war is practically (or\nnearly so) decided _before_ war breaks out, according to which nation\nhas made the greatest and most thorough peace preparations.\n\nClausewitz elsewhere speaks of \"every imaginable preparation.\" We may\nnowadays almost go so far as to say that preparation is war, and that\nthat nation which is beaten in preparation is already beaten BEFORE\nthe war breaks out.\n\nA failure to understand this fact is a fundamental error at the root\nof the idea of war as held by civilians, for many of them think that\nspeeches are a substitute for preparations.\n\nIt is plain that these three ideas of Clausewitz regarding the nature\nof war, its political nature, the distinction between wars with an\nunlimited object and a limited object, and preparations in peace-time,\nare as much matters for the statesman as for the soldier, and require\nstudy and reflection on the part of the former as much as on the part\nof the latter.\n\n\nFRICTION IN WAR\n\nI place friction here before the more detailed consideration of actual\nwar, of war in itself, because it is that which distinguishes war\non paper from real war, the statesman's and soldier's part from the\npart of the soldier only, and is therefore to be fitly treated midway\nbetween the two.\n\nFriction in war is one of Clausewitz's most characteristic ideas. He\nalways looks at everything from that point of view, and as friction\nand the fog of war, and their influence on human nature will always be\nthe chief characteristic of real war as distinguished from theoretical\nwar or war on paper, it is chiefly this habit or mode of thought which\nmakes his writings of such great and permanent value. It is also a\nhabit which we ought sedulously to cultivate in ourselves.\n\n\"_In war everything is very simple, but the simplest thing is\ndifficult_,\"[26] runs his famous saying. Why is the simplest thing\ndifficult? Because of the friction of war. And how can that friction\nbe minimized? Only by force of character, and the military virtues of\ndiscipline, perseverance, resolution, energy, and boldness. Hence the\ngreat emphasis which he always and everywhere lays upon character and\nthese military virtues as the deciding factors in war.\n\n\"_Friction is the only conception which in a general way corresponds to\nthat which distinguishes real war from war on paper_,\" he says. Each\nindividual of the army \"keeps up his own friction in all directions.\"\n\"The danger which war brings with it, the bodily exertions which it\nrequires, augment this evil so much that they may be regarded as the\ngreatest causes of it.\"[27] \"_This enormous friction is everywhere\nbrought into contact with chance_, and thus facts take place\nupon which it was impossible to calculate, their chief origin being\nchance. As an instance of one such chance take the weather. Here the\nfog prevents the enemy from being discovered in time,--a battery from\nfiring, or a report from reaching the general. The rain (mud) prevents\na battalion from arriving,--or the cavalry from charging effectively,\nbecause it had stuck fast in the heavy ground.\" And so on. Consider\nfor examples the foggy mornings of Jena or Austerlitz, of Eylau, the\nKatzbach, Grosbeeren, Dennewitz, Pultusk, Dresden, Sadowa; or the mud\nof Poland, the snow of Russia, or, latest, the mud of Manchuria.\n\n\"_Activity in war is movement in a resistant medium._\" \"_The knowledge\nof friction is a chief part of that so often talked of experience in\nwar_, which is required in a good general.\" \"It is therefore this\nfriction which makes that which appears easy in war so difficult in\nreality.\"[28] In considering any situation in war we must therefore\nalways add to the known circumstances--friction.\n\n\nWAR ITSELF\n\nIn Clausewitz's way of looking at war itself I assign at once the first\nplace to his doctrine, \"_The destruction of the enemy's military force\nis the leading principle of war_, and for the whole chapter of positive\naction _the direct way to the aim_.\"[29] This dictum, repeated in\nmany different forms, underlies his whole conception of war. All the\nold theoretical ideas about threatening by manoeuvring, conquering by\nmanoeuvring, forcing the enemy to retreat by manoeuvring, and so forth,\nin which his predecessors entangled strategy, and from which even the\nArchduke Charles and Jomini had not completely freed themselves, he\nbrushes aside by \"our assertion is that ONLY great tactical results can\nlead to great strategical results.\"[30] Thus he leads and concentrates\nour thoughts in strategy on the central idea of victory in battle,\nand frees us once for all from the obscuring veil of lines and angles\nand geometrical forms by which other writers have hidden that truth.\n\"Philanthropists may easily imagine that there is a skilful method of\novercoming and disarming an adversary without causing great bloodshed,\nand that this is the proper tendency of the art of war. However\nplausible this may appear, _it is an error which must be extirpated_,\nfor, in such dangerous things as war, _the errors which spring from a\nspirit of benevolence are just the worst_.\"[31] For \"he who uses force\nunsparingly without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, _must_\nobtain the superiority if his adversary does not act likewise.\" And the\n\"worst of all errors in wars\" is still the idea of war too commonly\nheld by civilians in this country, as witness the outcries which\ngreeted every loss during the South African war, which shows how much\nClausewitz is needed as a tonic to brace their minds to the reality.\n\n\"War is an act of violence which in its application knows NO bounds.\"\n\"Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed; if a bloody\nslaughter be a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more\nrespect to war (for avoiding unnecessary war), but not for making the\nsword we wear blunt and blunter by degrees from feelings of humanity,\ntill some one steps in with a sword that is sharp, and lops off the\narm from our body.\"\n\n\nSIMPLE PLANS\n\nThe second place I assign to his doctrine of _the simplest plans_,\nbecause time is required for the completion of complicated evolutions,\nbut \"a bold, courageous, resolute enemy will not let us have _time_\nfor wide-reaching skilful combination.\"[32] \"By this it appears to us\nthat the advantage of simple and direct results over those that are\ncomplicated is conclusively shown.\"\n\n\"We must not lift the arm too far for the room given to strike,\" or the\nopponent will get his thrust in first.\n\n\"Whenever this is the case, we must ourselves choose the shorter.\"\n\"Therefore, far from making it our aim to gain upon the enemy by\ncomplicated plans, _we must always rather endeavour to be beforehand\nwith him by the simplest and shortest_.\"\n\n\nSTRATEGIC LINES\n\nThe salient and re-entrant frontiers, the subtle distinctions between\nthe numerous kinds of strategic lines, and lines of operation,\nand lines of manoeuvre, etc., etc., etc., which in Jomini and his\npredecessors and followers play so great, so pedantic, and so confusing\na part,--for these Clausewitz has little respect. In his chapter on\n\"The Geometrical Element,\"[33] he says, \"We therefore do not hesitate\nto regard it as an established truth that _in strategy more depends\nupon the number and magnitude of the victorious battles than on the\nform of the great lines by which they are connected_.\"[34] Of course\nhe does not altogether leave out such considerations, but the above\nsentence shows how he regards them as only of minor importance. He\ntherefore frees us from a great deal of pedantry, and takes us back to\nthe heart of things.\n\n\nFRICTION\n\nhas been already dealt with, so no more need be said here, except about\nits components.\n\n\nDANGER\n\n\"An ordinary character never attains to complete coolness\" in danger.\n\"Danger in war belongs to its friction, and a correct idea of it is\nnecessary for truth of perception, and therefore it is brought under\nnotice here.\"[35]\n\n\nBODILY EXERTION\n\nClausewitz says that bodily exertion and fatigue in war \"put fetters on\nthe action of the mind, and wear out in secret the powers of the soul.\"\n\"Like danger, they belong to the fundamental causes of friction.\"[36]\n\nTo one who, like Clausewitz, had seen the retreat from Moscow, the\nawful passage of the Beresina, and the battle of the nations round\nLeipzig, bodily exertion could not be overlooked. Had he not seen\nbodily exertion and hardship break up the Grand Army into a small horde\nof stragglers, and destroy the army of Kutusoff in almost an equal\nmeasure, in 1812, as well as practically ruin the spirit, and largely\nbreak up the great army of Napoleon in 1813?\n\nAs for the effects of bodily exertion on the mind, purpose, and\nresolution of the general, compare Benningsen at Eylau after thirty-six\nhours in the saddle, or Napoleon at Dresden, by which he lost all the\nresults of his victory.\n\n\nINFORMATION IN WAR\n\n\"_The foundation of all our ideas and actions_,\" but \"in a few words,\n_most reports are false_.\" \"When in the thick of war itself one\nreport follows hard upon the heels of another, it is fortunate if\nthese reports in contradicting each other show a certain balance of\nprobability.\" In another passage, in order to illustrate this perpetual\nuncertainty under which all decisions in war have to be made, he\ncompares two opposing commanders to two men fighting in a dark room and\ngroping uncertainly for one another.\n\n\"These things which as elements meet together in the atmosphere of war\nand make it a _resistant medium for every activity_, we have designated\ndanger, bodily exertion, information, and friction.\"[37] He never loses\nsight of this; it pervades everything he writes.\n\n\nTHE MORAL AND PHYSICAL\n\n\"And therefore the most of the subjects which we shall go through in\nthis book are composed _half of physical, half of moral causes and\neffects_, and we might say that the physical are almost no more than\nthe wooden handle, whilst the moral are the noble metal, the real\nbright polished weapon.\"[38] Pages might be filled with extracts\nshowing his opinion that the moral is everything in war, but the reader\nis already convinced of that. Compare Napoleon's in war, \"The moral\nis to the physical as three to one.\" Clausewitz regards all military\nquestions from this point. His psychological attitude is what chiefly\ncharacterizes Clausewitz from all writers who came before him, and\nwhich makes his deductions so realistic, so interesting and so valuable\nfor all who come after him.\n\n\nTENSION AND REST IN WAR\n\nIn order not to weary the reader I will bring this chapter to a\nconclusion with one or two extracts relating to \"tension and rest;\nthe suspension of the act in warfare.\" This is explanatory of those\nfrequent halts which take place in a campaign, which appear at first\nsight contradictory to the absolute theory of war. These halts are\ndue to many causes, such as preparations, exhaustion, uncertainty,\nirresolution, friction, waiting for reinforcements, etc.\n\nIn this connection one must remember that war is \"a chain of battles\nall strung together, one of which always brings on another.\" But they\nseldom follow each other immediately; there is usually a certain\npause between. As soon as one battle is gained, strategy makes new\ncombinations in accordance with the altered circumstances to win the\nnext. Whilst these new combinations are being developed, or perhaps\nconsidered, there may be a greater or less suspension of the act, a\nlonger or shorter halt in the forward movement. Then another spring\nforward. Clausewitz has a great many interesting things to say on this\nsubject.[39]\n\n\"If there is a suspension of the act in war, that is to say, if neither\nparty for the moment wills anything positive, there is _rest_, and for\nthe moment equilibrium.... As soon as ever one of the parties proposes\nto himself a new positive object, and commences active steps towards\nit, even if it is only by preparations, and as soon as the enemy\nopposes this, there is _tension_ of the powers; this lasts until the\ndecision takes place.... This decision, the foundation of which lies\nalways in the battle-combinations which are made on each side, ... is\nfollowed by a movement in one or other direction.\"\n\n\"It may so happen that both parties, at one and the same time, not only\nfeel themselves too weak to attack, but are so in reality.\"\n\n\"Wild as is the nature of war it still wears the claims of human\nweakness, and the contradiction we see here, that man seeks and creates\ndangers which he fears at the same time, will astonish no one.\"\n\n\"If we cast a glance at military history in general, there we find\nso much the opposite of an incessant advance towards the aim, that\n_standing still_ and _doing nothing_ is quite plainly the _normal\ncondition_ of an army in the midst of war, _acting_ the _exception_.\nThis must almost raise a doubt as to the correctness of our conception.\nBut if military history has this effect by the great body of its\nevents, so also the latest series of wars redeem the view. The war of\nthe French Revolution shows only too plainly its reality, and only\nproves too plainly its necessity. In that war, and especially in the\ncampaigns of Bonaparte, the conduct of war attained to that unlimited\ndegree of energy which we have represented as the natural law of the\nelement. This degree is therefore possible, and if it is possible then\nit is necessary.\"\n\n\nREFLECTIONS\n\n(1) \"Hardly worth mentioning\"! So that is how Clausewitz regards\nInternational Law, Clausewitz to whom in Germany \"our most famous\nvictors on the more modern battlefields owe their spiritual training,\"\nand on whom \"everybody who to-day either makes or teaches modern war\nbases himself, even if he is not conscious of it.\" And we must regard\nnearly every foreign statesman as, consciously or unconsciously, a\ndisciple of Clausewitz. It is, therefore, high time that we should\ncease to pin our faith on International Law, or think that it can in\nany way protect us, if we neglect strongly to protect ourselves. Power\nand expediency are the only rules that the practical politicians of\nforeign countries recognize, and the only question they ask themselves\nis, \"Have we got sufficient power to do this,\" and if so, \"Is it\nexpedient to do it?\"\n\n(2) Treaties, too, what reliance can we place upon them for any length\nof time? None whatever. For treaties are only considered binding as\nlong as the interests of _both_ contracting parties remain the same.\nDirectly circumstances change, and they change constantly, the most\nsolemn treaties are torn up, as Russia tore up the Treaty of Paris, or\nas Austria tore up the Treaty of Berlin. All history is full of torn-up\ntreaties. And as it has been so it will be. The European waste-paper\nbasket is the place to which all treaties eventually find their way,\nand a thing which can any day be thrown into a waste-paper basket\nis, indeed, a poor thing on which to hang our national safety. Only\nin ourselves can we trust. Therefore no treaties at present existing\nshould be allowed in any way to alter or lessen our preparations to\nenable us to fight _alone_ when necessary.\n\n(3) It cannot be too often repeated, or too much insisted on, that the\nsuccess or failure of a State policy is dependent upon the amount of\narmed force behind it. For upon the amount of armed force behind a\npolicy depends the greater or less amount of resistance, of friction,\nwhich that policy will meet with on the part of other nations. The\nprestige of a nation depends upon the general belief in its strength.\nThe less its prestige, the more it will be checked and foiled by its\nrivals, till at last perhaps it is goaded into a war which would have\nbeen prevented if its prestige, or armed force, had been greater. On\nthe other hand, the greater its prestige, its armed force, the more\nreasonable and inclined to a fair compromise are its rivals found. So\nthat the greater the prestige, the armed force, of our nation is, the\nmore likely is it that all our negotiations will be settled by peaceful\ncompromise, and the longer we shall enjoy peace.\n\nTherefore, under this consideration, those who would reduce our\nnational forces are deeply mistaken, for such action would imperil our\nprestige, imperil our negotiations, imperil our peace, and perhaps lead\neventually to a war that we might otherwise have avoided. Therefore\nno such deeply mistaken economy for us. A few hundred thousand pounds\nsaved would be dear economy indeed if it led, as well it might, to the\npayment before many years of a War Indemnity of \u00a3800,000,000 or so.\nBetter the evils we know than the far greater evils we know not of.\n\n(4) Surprise in war is what we have to fear. There are two sorts of\nnational surprise that we must consider. These are (A) the _surprise\nby actual hostilities_ taking place before the actual declaration of\nwar, such as the Japanese surprise and practical destruction of the\nfighting force of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur; (B) the _surprise\nby superior preparation_, silently carried out till all is ready for a\ndecisive blow, whilst we are not ready for equally efficient defence,\nand then a declaration of war before we have time to get properly\nready, as the surprise in this sense of France by Germany in 1870.\n\n(A) Every successful example is always copied, and usually on a larger\nscale. We may be quite certain that our rivals have taken to heart\nthe lesson of Port Arthur. It is possible that our next war will open\nwith a similar night attack on our fleet, either just before, or\nsimultaneously with the declaration of war. If it is successful, or\neven partially successful, it may produce the most grave results, as in\nthe Russo-Japanese War. It _may_ render possible a naval action with\nalmost equal forces, in which our opponents _might_ be victorious. The\ninvasion of this country on a gigantic scale by 300,000 men or more\nwould then follow as a certainty. This is not a probability, but a\npossibility which requires to be kept in our view.\n\n(B) _The surprise by superior preparation_, as I term it, for want\nof a better name, is a danger to which we are peculiarly liable. As\nLord Salisbury said, \"The British constitution is a bad fighting\nmachine,\" and it is made an infinitely worse fighting machine by\nthe lack of interest which our politicians appear to take in all\nthat appertains to war. Hence they are always liable to oppose, as\nexcessive, preparations which are in reality the minimum consistent\nwith national safety. Consequently our preparations for war, controlled\nas they are by those who have no special knowledge of war, are always\napt to be insufficient, as were those of France in 1870. In former\ndays this did not perhaps so very much matter, although it resulted\nin the unnecessary loss of hundreds of thousands of British lives and\nhundreds of millions of British treasure. But still we were able, at\nthis somewhat excessive price, to \"muddle through,\" owing to the heroic\nefforts of our soldiers and sailors to make bricks without straw and\nretrieve the mistakes of our policy. For our opponents then conducted\nwar in such a slow way as to give us time to repair _after_ the\noutbreak of war our lack of preparation _before_ it. But opposed to a\nmodern nation-in-arms, guided by statesmen and led by generals brought\nup in the school of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Moltke--all will be\ndifferent. In such a war the national forces brought into play are so\nimmense that it is only possible to do so efficaciously if everything\nhas been most carefully prepared and organized beforehand. It is not\n_possible_ to improvise such organization of national force _after_\nthe war has begun, for there cannot be sufficient time. If our rival\nmakes adequate preparation before the war to bring to bear in that\nwar the _whole_ of its national force, material, moral, and physical,\nwhile we only prepare to bring to bear a _small portion_ thereof, then\nthere will be no time afterwards for us to repair our negligence. The\nwar will be conducted with the utmost energy, and the aim will be to\nutilize to the utmost the superiority obtained by superior preparation,\nso as to make the decision as rapid as possible before we have time to\nrecover from the effects of our surprise. That is the danger we have to\nfear, and to keep ever in mind.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII\n\nWAR AS POLICY\n\n\n\"War,\" says Clausewitz, \"is only a continuation of State policy by\nother means.\" The first question that at once arises in the mind is\nwhat is meant by Policy. We may safely lay down that State policy is\nthe defence and furtherance of the interests of the nation as a whole\namidst the play of the conflicting tendencies towards rest and towards\nacquisition, and that its instruments are the pen and the sword. There\ncan, of course, be any degree of consistency or fickleness, of strength\nor weakness, of success or failure, in the policy of a State.\n\nClausewitz expressly stated that he hoped \"to iron out many creases\nin the heads of strategists and statesmen,\" such, for instance, as\nthe idea that it is possible to consider either policy or war as\nindependent of the other.\n\nIt is only possible to obtain a proper conception of policy if we\nregard it as continuous both in peace and war, using sometimes peace\nnegotiations, sometimes war negotiations, as circumstances require, to\nattain the political object.\n\nWar is only a part of policy, a continuance of the previous\nnegotiations; but the instrument is now the sword and not the pen. As\nClausewitz says, \"_In one word, the art of war, in its highest point\nof view, is policy; but no doubt a policy which fights battles instead\nof writing notes._\" War is merely a means whereby a nation attempts\nto impose its will upon another nation in order to attain a political\nobject. This object is settled by policy, which also orders the war,\ndetermines what sort of war it is to be, with what means and resources\nand expenditure it is to be waged, when its object has been attained,\nand when it is to cease. In fact, policy prepares, leads up to, orders,\nsupports, guides, and stops the war. As Clausewitz said, \"_All the\nleading outlines of a war are always determined by the Cabinet--that\nis, by a political, not a military functionary._\"\n\nUnity of thought is only to be obtained by \"the conception that\nwar is only a part of political intercourse, therefore by no means\nan independent thing in itself.\" \"And how can we conceive it to be\notherwise? Does the cessation of diplomatic notes stop the political\nrelations between different nations and governments? Is not war\nmerely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts?\"\n\"Accordingly war can never be separated from political intercourse;\nand if, in the consideration of the matter, this is done in any way,\nall the threads of the different relations are, to a certain extent,\nbroken, and we have before us a senseless thing without an object.\"\n\n\"If war belongs to policy, it will naturally take its character from\npolicy. If the policy is grand and powerful, so will also be the war,\nand this may be carried to the point at which war attains to its\nabsolute form.\" \"Only through this kind of view war recovers unity;\nonly by it can we see _all_ wars of _one_ kind, and it is only through\nit that the judgment can obtain the true and perfect basis and point of\nview from which _great plans_ may be traced out and determined upon.\"\n\n\"There is upon the whole nothing more important in life than to find\nout the _right_ point of view from which things should be looked at and\njudged of, and then to keep to that point; for we can only apprehend\nthe mass of events in their unity from _one_ standpoint; and it is only\nthe keeping to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency.\"\n\"We can only look at policy here as the representative of the interests\ngenerally of the whole community,\" and \"_wars are in reality only the\nexpressions or manifestations of policy itself_.\"\n\nTo the student of history this unity of conception is equally\nnecessary, for it supplies the key to many a military puzzle. Without\nit we can never understand, for instance, Napoleon's conduct in\n1812, 1813, 1814; nor without it can we see the compelling reason of\nmany battles, apparently fought against military judgment, such, for\ninstance, as Borodino, Leipzig, Sedan, etc. We have to remember that\nthese and many other battles, as, for instance, Ladysmith, were fought\nfrom a political, not a military, motive. It is a well-known fact that\nthe strategist frequently has to alter and adapt his plans so as to\nsuit overmastering political necessity. Yet many people have failed to\ndraw therefrom the generalization of Clausewitz that \"war is only a\ncontinuation of State policy by other means.\" But having got it now,\nlet us hold fast to it, with all its consequences.\n\n\nSOME KNOWLEDGE OF WAR NECESSARY FOR STATESMEN\n\n\"From this point of view there is no longer in the nature of things\na necessary conflict between the political and military interests,\nand where it appears it is therefore to be regarded as _imperfect\nknowledge_ only. That policy makes demands upon the war which it\ncannot respond to, would be contrary to the supposition that _it knows\nthe instrument it is going to use_, therefore contrary to a natural and\n_indispensable supposition_.\"\n\n\"_None of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made\nwithout an insight into the political relations_; and in reality when\npeople speak, as they often do, of the prejudicial influence of policy\non the conduct of a war, they say in reality something very different\nto what they intend. It is not this influence, but the policy itself\nwhich should be found fault with. If policy is right, if it succeeds\nin hitting the object, then it can only act on the war also with\nadvantage; and if this influence of policy causes a divergence from the\nobject, the cause is to be looked for in a mistaken policy.\n\n\"It is only when policy promises itself a wrong effect from certain\nmilitary means and measures, an effect opposed to their nature, that it\ncan exercise a prejudicial effect on war by the course it prescribes.\nJust as a person in a language with which he is not conversant\nsometimes says what he does not intend, _so policy, when intending\nright, may often order things which do not tally with its own views_.\n\n\"_This has happened times without end, and it shows that a certain\nknowledge of the nature of war is essential to the management of\npolitical intercourse._\"\n\n\nTHE WAR MINISTER\n\n\"Before going further we must guard ourselves against a false\ninterpretation of which this is very susceptible. We do not mean to\nsay that this acquaintance with the nature of war is the _principal_\nqualification for a war minister. Elevation, superiority of mind,\nstrength of character, these are the principal qualifications which he\nmust possess; a knowledge of war may be supplied in one way or another.\"\n\n\nPOLICY AND THE MEANS TO CARRY OUT THAT POLICY MUST HARMONIZE\n\n\"_If war is to harmonize entirely with the political views, and policy\nto accommodate itself to the means available for war_, there is only\none alternative to be recommended when the statesman and soldier are\nnot combined in one person (note, as William of Orange, Frederick\nthe Great, or Napoleon), which is to make the chief commander an\n_ex-officio_ member of the Cabinet, that he may take part in its\ncouncils and decisions on important occasions.\"\n\n\"The influence of any military man except the general-in-chief in the\nCabinet is extremely dangerous; it very seldom leads to able, vigorous\naction.\"\n\n\nREFLECTIONS\n\nWe shall conclude this chapter with a few reflections on the preceding\ndicta of Clausewitz, with which it is hoped that the reader will agree.\n\nFirstly, then, it is clearly apparent that war is subordinate to\npolicy, is an instrument of policy, is a part of policy, just as much\nas diplomatic negotiations are a part of policy.\n\nSecondly, a statesman, however good at peaceful administration he may\nbe, who is ignorant of war is, therefore, ignorant of one part of\nhis profession; that part which deals with the preparing, ordering,\nguiding, and controlling of war. As Clausewitz says, \"it is an\n_indispensable supposition_ that policy knows the instrument it is\ngoing to use.\" It is a mistake to suppose, when diplomatic relations\nbetween two States cease, and war breaks out, that therefore the\npolitical negotiations cease, for they do not, but are merely continued\nin another form--in the form of war. The statesman still retains\ncontrol, and uses the military events as they occur to attain his\nobject. He is still responsible for the success of the warlike, as well\nas of the peaceful, policy of the nation.\n\nThirdly, it is a disputed point how far the influence of policy is\ntheoretically allowable during the course of actual operations, _i.e._\nafter the war has actually begun. Moltke's opinion was that policy\nshould only act at the beginning and at the end of a war, and should\nkeep clear during the actual operations. Clausewitz, however, holds\nthat the two are so intimately related that the political influence\ncannot be lost sight of even during actual operations. Between two\nsuch authorities we may well hesitate to give a definite opinion, and\nmust seek for the middle way. Undoubtedly, in history policy often\nhas really affected the actual operations, as in 1812, 1813, 1814,\n1864, Macmahon's march to Sedan, or Bismarck's interference to hurry\non the siege of Paris in 1870, or Ladysmith in the Boer War, and in\nmany other cases. That, we must admit. We must also admit that its\ninterference frequently produces a weakening effect on the operations.\nClausewitz says that that only occurs when the policy itself is\nwrong. Perhaps. But the safest middle way rule appears to be this,\nthat policy should be dominant at the beginning and end of a war, but\nduring actual operations the statesman should exercise the greatest\npossible restraint, and avoid all interference, except when demanded by\n_overwhelming political necessity_.\n\nFourthly, a politician is bound to study war. He is bound to study war\nas well as diplomacy, his two instruments. If he only studies how to\nuse one of his two instruments, he will be a poor statesman indeed.\nIt is plain that he MUST study war, so that he may not try to use an\ninstrument of which he knows nothing. It is not meant, of course,\nthat a politician should study all the details of naval and military\nmatters, but only that he should study the general principles of war,\nand the means, resources, and forces required to attain the political\nobject of war, through the submission of the enemy.\n\nFifthly, in order that the object and the means of policy may\nharmonize, it is necessary that the one to whom the national interests\nare entrusted should study the principles of war, so that _he may keep\nhis policy proportionate to the means of enforcing it_. That is to say,\nhe must not propose or commit the nation to a policy which is likely\nto be strongly opposed by another Power, unless he has from careful\nstudy and enquiry made certain that he has sufficient armed force at\nhis disposal, in case the opposing nation suddenly challenges his\npolicy and declares war. He should not even consider a policy without\n_at the same time_ considering with his military and naval advisers the\nnation's means of enforcing that policy if challenged to do so. He must\nnot think of embarking upon a war, or of provoking another nation to do\nso, till he has carefully provided sufficient armed force to give a\nreasonable prospect, if not a certainty, of success. Otherwise,\n\nSixthly, as our next contest will be with a nation-in-arms, as the war\nwill be in its character absolute, as its object will be the downfall\nof the foe, as not until the foe (whether it be Great Britain or not)\nlies powerless upon the ground will it be supposed possible to stop, as\nwe shall have to contend against the utmost means, the utmost energy,\nthe utmost efforts of a whole people-in-arms,--these points deserve the\nmost serious consideration of every politician who aspires to guide the\ndestinies of the Anglo-Saxon Race.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX\n\nSTRATEGY\n\n\nClausewitz defines strategy as \"_the use of the battle to gain the\nobject of the war_.\" War is \"a chain of battles all strung together,\none of which always brings on another.\"[40] The great thing in strategy\nis to win these battles one after the other till the enemy submits.\n\"_The best strategy is always to be very strong, first, generally;\nsecondly, at the decisive point._\"[41]\n\n\"In such an aspect we grant that the superiority of numbers is the\nmost important factor in the result of a battle, only it must be\nsufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operating\ncircumstances. The direct result of all this is that the _greatest\npossible number of troops should be brought into action at the decisive\npoint_.[42] Whether the troops thus brought up are sufficient or not,\nwe have then done in this respect all that our means allowed. This is\n_the first great principle of strategy_, as well suited for Greeks or\nPersians, or for Englishmen, or Mahrattas, as for French or Germans.\"\n\nIt sounds so simple, and yet how many times has it not been done. How\nmany generals have been ruined in consequence!\n\n\nSUPERIORITY IN NUMBERS WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR STRATEGIC CERTAINTY\n\nClausewitz says, \"It is a fact that we may search modern military\nhistory in vain for a battle (except Leuthen or Rosbach) in which an\narmy has beaten another double its own strength, an occurrence by no\nmeans uncommon in former times. Bonaparte, the greatest general of\nmodern days, in all his great victorious battles, with one exception,\nthat of Dresden 1813, had managed to assemble an army superior in\nnumbers, or at least very little inferior, to that of his opponent, and\nwhen it was impossible for him to do so, as at Leipzig, Brienne, Laon,\nWaterloo, he was beaten.\"[43] \"From this we may infer, in the present\nstate of Europe, that it is very difficult for the most talented\ngeneral to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. Now, if\nwe see that double numbers are such a weight in the scale against even\nthe greatest generals, we may be sure that in ordinary cases, in small\nas well as in great combats, an important superiority of numbers, but\nwhich need not be over _two to one_, will be sufficient to _ensure the\nvictory_, however disadvantageous other circumstances may be.\"[44]\n\nThe double superiority of numbers at the decisive point is, therefore,\nthe ideal of strategy. \"_The superiority of numbers is, therefore, to\nbe regarded as the fundamental idea, always to be aimed at, before\nall_, and as far as possible.\" If strategy has done this, then it has\ndone its utmost duty. It is then for the tactician to make the most\nof this superiority thus provided by strategy, and win the victory.\nStrategy then repeats the operation with new combinations suited to\nthe altered circumstances to win the next battle, and so on, till the\nhostile armed force is destroyed.\n\nThis _superiority of numbers_ in battle as the _first principle of\nstrategy_ we require, on all occasions in season and out of season, to\nrepeat and repeat. At present we have not the numbers we shall want. We\nmust get them. Otherwise we are bound to be inferior in numbers, and\n\"the best strategy\" will be possible for our enemies and impossible for\nus. This rests with our statesmen.\n\n\nTHE DECISIVE POINT\n\nIf the double superiority, or as near the double as possible, at the\ndecisive point is the ideal of strategy ... what is the decisive point?\n\nHere we owe another debt to Clausewitz. Jomini, even after Napoleon,\nconfuses us with three different sorts of decisive points in a theatre\nof war, but Clausewitz clears the air by asserting only _one_.\n\n\"But whatever may be the central point of the enemy's power against\nwhich we are to direct our ultimate operations, _still the conquest and\ndestruction of his army is the surest commencement_ and, _in all cases,\nthe most essential_.\"[45]\n\nHere we have it in a nutshell; wherever the enemy's main force is THERE\nis the decisive point, against which we must concentrate ALL our forces.\n\n\"There are,\" said Napoleon, \"many good generals in Europe, but they\nsee too many things at one time. _As for me, I see only one thing, the\nenemy's chief army, and I concentrate all my efforts to destroy it._\"\n\n\nTHE SIMULTANEOUS USE OF ALL THE FORCES\n\n\"The rule,\" says Clausewitz, \"which we have been endeavouring to set\nforth is, therefore, that all the forces which are available and\ndestined for a strategic object should be _simultaneously_ applied\nto it. And this application will be all the more complete the more\neverything is compressed into one act and one moment.\"[46] This he\ncalls \"_the law of the simultaneous employment of the forces in\nstrategy_.\"[47] \"In strategy we can never employ too many forces.\"[48]\n\"What can be looked upon in tactics as an excess of force must be\nregarded in strategy as a means of giving expansion to success.\"\n\"_No troops should be kept back as a strategic reserve_,\" but every\navailable man hurried up to the first battlefield, fresh levies being\nmeanwhile formed in rear. As an instance of what not to do, Prussia, in\n1806, kept back 45,000 men in Brandenburg and East Prussia; they might,\nif present at Jena, have turned defeat into victory, but they were\nuseless afterwards.[49] A fault so often made may be made again.\n\n\nCONCENTRATION\n\n\"It is impossible to be too strong at the decisive point,\" said\nNapoleon. To concentrate every available man and gun at the decisive\npoint so as to attain superiority there, is not an easy thing, for the\nenemy will be making a similar attempt. \"The calculation of time and\nspace appears the most essential thing to this end. But the calculation\nof time and space, though it lies universally at the foundation of\nstrategy, and is to a certain extent its daily bread, is still neither\nthe most difficult nor the most decisive one.\" \"Much more frequently\nthe relative superiority, that is the skilful assemblage of superior\nforces at the decisive point, has its foundation in the right\nappreciation of those points, in the judicious distribution which by\nthat means has been given to the forces from the very first, and in\n_the resolution to sacrifice the unimportant to the advantage of the\nimportant_. In this respect Frederick the Great and Bonaparte are\nespecially characteristic.\"[50]\n\n\"There is no simpler and more imperative rule for strategy than _to\nkeep all the forces concentrated. No portion to be separated from the\nmain body unless called away by some urgent necessity._ On this maxim\nwe stand firm, and look upon it as a fact to be depended upon.\"[51]\n\n\"_The concentration of the whole force_ (_i.e._ within supporting\ndistance) _should be the rule_, and _every separation or division is an\nexception which must be justified_.\"[52] Of course, this does not\nmean that all the troops are to be kept concentrated in one mass upon\none road, but within supporting distance, for he expressly states, \"_It\nis sufficient now if the concentration takes place during the course of\nthe action._\"[53] This doctrine, qualified by the last sentence, makes\nClausewitz the germ of modern military thought, for the last sentence\nleaves room for all the modern developments of new roads, railways,\ntelegraphs, wire and wireless, and so forth.\n\nTherefore in war, according to Clausewitz, concentration,\nconcentration, concentration, and _every division or detachment is an\nevil which can only be justified by urgent necessity_. Here again we\nfind a simple truth, which, however, the history of all wars shows us\nto be very difficult to carry out. Hence the value of keeping such an\nimperative maxim always in our minds.\n\n\nTHE FIRST PITCHED BATTLE\n\n\"The more a general takes the field in the true spirit of war, as\nwell as of every other contest, that he must and _will_ conquer, the\nmore will he strive to throw every weight into the scale in the first\nbattle, and hope and strive to win everything by it. Napoleon hardly\never entered upon a war without thinking of conquering his enemy at\nonce in the first battle.\"[54]\n\n\"_At the very outset of war we must direct all our efforts to gain the\nfirst battle_, because an unfavourable issue is always a disadvantage\nto which no one would willingly expose himself, and also because the\nfirst decision, though not the only one, still will have the more\ninfluence on subsequent events the greater it is in itself.\"[1]\n\n\"The law of the simultaneous use of the forces in strategy lets the\nprincipal result (which need not be the final one) take place almost\nalways at the commencement of the great act.\"[55] A great victory thus\nwon at the outset will upset all the enemy's plan of campaign and allow\nus to carry out our own. The first pitched battle is, therefore, the\ncrisis of the rival strategies, and towards its favourable decision\nall our preparations, all our forces, and all our energies should be\ndirected. This is a point that civilians seem to find hard to grasp.\nWitness all our history, with inadequate forces at the beginning of\nevery war, as even in the latest of our wars--that in South Africa. It\nis a point which our statesmen should very seriously consider.\n\nThe difficulty of concentrating superior numbers for the first battle\nis that the enemy will be, or should be, of the same opinion, and will\nbe making equal efforts to win the first battle. So, then, the crisis\nwill be all the more acute, the battle greater, and the result greater.\n\n\"_We would not avoid showing at once that the bloody solution of the\ncrisis, the effort for the destruction of the enemy's main force, is\nthe first-born son of war._\"[56]\n\nTill this is done, the first great victory gained, strategy should\nthink of nothing else.\n\nThen, and only then, a further combination in accordance with the\naltered circumstances to win the next.\n\n\"For we maintain that, with few exceptions, _the victory at the\ndecisive point will carry with it the decision on all minor\npoints_\"[57] over the whole theatre of war. Therefore nothing else\nmatters for long, and to victory in the first great battle \"everything\nelse must be sacrificed.\" For concentration can only be obtained by\nsacrifice.\n\n\nPURSUIT\n\n\"Once the great victory is gained, the next question is not about\nrest, not about taking breath, not about re-organizing, etc., but only\nof pursuit, of fresh blows wherever necessary, of the capture of the\nenemy's capital, of the attack of the armies of his allies, or whatever\nelse appears as a rallying point for the enemy.\"[58]\n\nClausewitz points out that this is very difficult, and that to compel\nhis exhausted troops vigorously to pursue till nightfall requires GREAT\nforce of WILL on the part of the equally exhausted commander. We need\nonly remember that Napoleon himself at the supreme crisis of his fate,\nbeing physically tired, failed to pursue the allies after his victory\nat Dresden, 1813, whereby he lost all the fruits of his victory, and\nindeed his last chance of ultimate success.\n\n\nSUMMARY OF STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES\n\nLeaving out, for the sake of shortness, the rest of his strategical\nthoughts, I hasten to conclude this sketch with a glance at\nClausewitz's admirable summary[59] of strategic principles:--\n\n\"_The first and most important maxim which we can set before ourselves\nis to employ_ ALL _the forces which we can make available with the_\nUTMOST ENERGY. Even if the result is tolerably certain in itself, it\nis extremely unwise not to make it _perfectly certain_.\n\n\"_The second principle is to concentrate our forces as much as possible\nat the point where the_ DECISIVE _blow is to be struck. The success at\nthat point will compensate for all defeats at secondary points._\n\n\"_The third principle is not to lose time. Rapidity and surprise are\nthe most powerful elements of victory._\n\n\"_Lastly, the fourth principle is to_ FOLLOW UP THE SUCCESS _we gain\nwith the_ UTMOST ENERGY. _The pursuit of the enemy when defeated is the\nonly means of gathering up the fruits of victory._\n\n\"The first of these principles is the foundation of all the others. _If\nwe have followed the first principle, we can venture any length with\nregard to the three others without risking our all._ It gives the means\nof _continually creating new forces behind us_, and with new forces\nevery disaster may be repaired. _In this, and not in going forward\nwith timid steps, lies that prudence which may be called wise._\"\n\nThese great principles are everything in war, and \"due regard being\npaid to these principles, the form (_i.e._ the geometrical element)\nin which the operations are carried on is in the end of little\nconsequence.\"\n\n\"Therefore I am perfectly convinced that whoever calls forth all his\npowers to appear _incessantly with new masses_, whoever adopts _every\nimaginable means of preparation_, whoever _concentrates his force at\nthe decisive point, whoever thus armed pursues a great object with\nresolution and energy_, has done all that can be done in a general\nway for the strategical conduct of the war, and that, unless he is\naltogether unfortunate in battle, will undoubtedly be victorious in the\nsame measure that his adversary has fallen short of this exertion and\nenergy.\"\n\n\nREFLECTIONS\n\nWhen we have got these great simple leading principles of strategy\nfirmly into our heads, the next question is how to make use of\nour knowledge. For principles are no use unless we apply them. On\nconsideration it appears that there are three ways in which we can all\napply these principles with advantage.\n\nI. It will prove a very interesting and strengthening mental exercise\nto apply these few leading principles to every campaign we read about,\nto search for indications of their application in the strategy of each\nbelligerent, how far each commander succeeded, and how far failed to\ncarry them out in their entirety, and where, when, and why he succeeded\nor failed, and the results of doing or not doing so. Also to search\nfor the interaction of the political motive of the war on the military\noperations, and to see how far the belligerent statesmen gained or\nfailed to gain their political object, according to the comparative\ndegree of preparation they had made for it, and the magnitude of\neffort which they made or did not make to support it with the whole\nmeans of the nation, material, moral and physical. Also to see how\nfar the national spirit was aroused or not, and the causes thereof,\nand to note the greater or less energy, resolution and boldness which\nwas consequently infused into the war. Also to note how the thorough\napplication of these great simple principles of strategy shortens the\nwar and thereby reduces its cost (1866 to 1870), and how the neglect of\nthem by statesmen, despite their fortitude afterwards, lengthens a war\nand adds to its cost enormously (South Africa, etc.). Used thus, these\nprinciples give us a theoretically correct ground for criticism.\n\nII. These principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for\nanticipating what the action of our opponents in any future war will\nbe, the measure of the forces they will bring to bear, how they will\ndirect those forces, and the amount of energy, resolution, and boldness\nwith which they will use them against us. It is an axiom always to\nassume that the enemy will do the best and wisest thing, and to prepare\naccordingly.\n\nIII. These principles also give us a theoretically correct ground for\nour own counter-preparations. We require to take the most dangerous war\nwhich is probable or possible, and make every imaginable preparation to\ncarry out these principles therein.\n\nIn such a case how are we going to render it possible for our generals\nto win, and thus save the nation from the irreparable consequences\nand the huge war indemnity of \u00a3800,000,000 or so, which would follow\ndefeat? How are we going to do it? How are we going to render it\npossible for our generals to employ the best strategy? The ideal of\nstrategy, always to be aimed at, is the double superiority of numbers.\nHow are we going to give our generals that? If we cannot do that,\nhow are we going to give them even any superiority _at all_, so that\nthey may be able to carry out the first principle of strategy? How?\nOr are we going to make NO _adequate preparations_ for these three\neventualities, and when one of them suddenly comes ask our generals to\nsave us from the fate we have brought upon ourselves, by performing the\nimpossible? It is in this way that a statesman should use these few\ngreat simple principles of strategy in order to attain his political\nobject and safeguard the interests of the nation.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X\n\nTHE EXECUTION OF STRATEGY\n\n\nNow, as Clausewitz teaches it, the theory of war is easy enough to\nunderstand. There is no reason--one might almost say no excuse--why\nevery one, soldier or statesman, should not know it fairly well. The\ngreat leading principles of strategy are few and simple. There is no\nreason why every one, soldier and statesman, should not understand\nand know these few simple principles thoroughly, and have them at his\nfinger ends ready to apply them to the consideration of any military\nquestion, past, present, or future. So far all is easy. But when it\nis a question of carrying out in actual war this easy theory, these\nsimple strategical principles, then it is QUITE a different matter,\nthen it is a matter of the very greatest difficulty. This is a\ndifference which the mind always finds very hard to grasp, as witness\nthe denunciations with which any failure in execution by a general, no\nmatter how great the real difficulties with which he had to contend,\nis nearly always greeted. Observers rarely make allowances for these\ndifficulties, very largely probably because they do not understand\nthem. The present chapter is devoted to these difficulties of execution\nin war.\n\n\nTHE GENIUS FOR WAR\n\nIn Clausewitz's great chapter on \"the genius for war\"[60] he sets forth\nthe difficulties which confront a general, the character and genius,\nthe driving and animating force, required to overcome the friction of\nwar. It is impossible to abstract it adequately; I can only advise all\nto read it for themselves. But I will endeavour to give an idea of it.\n\nAfter discussing the various sorts of courage required by a general,\nphysical before danger and moral before responsibility, the strength\nof body and mind, the personal pride, the patriotism, the enthusiasm,\netc., he comes to the unexpected.\n\n\"_War_,\" he says, \"_is the province of uncertainty. Three-fourths of\nthose things upon which action in war must be calculated are hidden\nmore or less in the clouds of great uncertainty._ Here, then, above\nall other, a fine and penetrating mind is called for, to grope out the\ntruth by the tact of its judgment.\" Mark this point, that three-fourths\nof the things that we as critics AFTER the event know, when all\ninformation of the situation has been collected and published, were\nunknown to the general who had to decide, or only dimly guessed at from\na number of contradictory reports.\n\n\"From this uncertainty of all intelligence and suppositions, _this\ncontinual interposition of chance_.\" \"Now, if he is to get safely\nthrough _this perpetual conflict with the unexpected_, two qualities\nare indispensable; in the first place _an understanding which, even\nin the midst of this intense obscurity, is not without some traces\nof inner light_, which _lead to the truth_, and then _the courage to\nfollow this faint light_. The first is expressed by the French phrase\n_coup d'oeil_; the second is resolution.\"\n\n\"Resolution is an _act of courage in face of responsibility_.\" \"The\nforerunner of resolution is an act of the mind making plain the\nnecessity of venturing and thus influencing the will. This quite\npeculiar direction of the mind, which conquers every other fear in man\nby the fear of wavering or doubting, is what makes up resolution in\nstrong minds.\"\n\nThe vital importance of firmness and resolution, so strongly urged\nby Clausewitz, will be apparent to all if we reflect how even the\nstrongest characters have been ruined by a temporary fit of vacillation\nin war. Compare, for instance, York _v._ Wartenburg's masterly\nexposition of Napoleon's ruinous, suicidal vacillation in 1813 at\nDresden.\n\nAlso there is required \"_the power of listening to reason in the midst\nof the most intense excitement_, in the storm of the most violent\npassions.\"\n\n\"But to keep to the result of by-gone reflections in opposition to the\nstream of opinions and phenomena which the present brings with it, is\njust THE difficulty.\" \"Here nothing else can help us but an imperative\nmaxim which, independent of reflection, at once controls it: that maxim\nis, _in all doubtful cases to adhere to the first opinion and not to\ngive it up till a clear conviction forces us to do so_.\"\n\n\"But as soon as difficulties arise, and that must always happen\nwhen great results are at stake, then the machine, the army itself,\nbegins to offer a sort of passive resistance, and to overcome this\nthe commander must have great force of will.\" Driving power, such as\nNapoleon's. And also \"the heart-rending sight of the bloody sacrifice,\nwhich the commander has to contend with in himself.\"\n\n\"These are the weights which the courage and intelligent faculties of\nthe commander have to contend with and OVERCOME, if he is to make his\nname illustrious.\" If he is to prevent the downfall of his country.\n\n\nREFLECTIONS\n\n(1) In connection with these difficulties I would like to put forward a\nsuggestion as to criticism of a general's action in war, which though\nnot exactly Clausewitz's, is a corollary from Clausewitz. It is this.\nIn reading a war with the clearness and after-knowledge of history\nnearly all defeats are easily seen to be due to the non-observance of\none or other of the few leading principles of strategy referred to in\nthe previous chapter. But we must assume that the defeated general was\n_familiar_ with that principle, and that his _will_ was to carry it\nout. What, then, were the difficulties, the friction, which, on any\nparticular day or days, overcame his will and made him sacrifice the\nprinciple? This is where most critics fail us. Here seems the matter\nto search for. And could a stronger resolution have enabled him to\novercome those difficulties, that friction? And if so, how and by what\nmeans? But we must first discover the difficulties and uncertainties\nof the particular day when his will gave way. Take the Manchurian\ncampaign as an instance. If we could only have a military history of\nthe campaign of 1870 or that of Manchuria, written in the form of a\nseries of \"appreciations of the situation,\" so that we know nothing but\nwhat the general knew at the time as we read, and if the true state of\naffairs could be withheld from us till the end, this, I think, would\nbe very instructive and helpful. It would be a more difficult way of\nwriting a military history, but I think that the extra trouble would be\nrepaid by the extra value. So at least it appears.\n\n(2) If we reflect upon the enormous difficulties, so strikingly\nbrought out by Clausewitz, which _our_ generals have to contend with\nand _overcome_ in actual war, it should surely teach us to curb our\ncriticism. It should surely also make us resolve in future to try to\naid them as far as is in our power at home, and not thoughtlessly to\nincrease their already stupendous burdens. In the past we at home have\nmuch to accuse ourselves of, much to regret. In the past often have\nwe added to the difficulties of our generals, often have we greatly\nweakened their chances, and increased those of their opponents, often\nhave we, unintentionally, through ignorance cast a weight into the\nscale against our country.\n\n(3) The ignorance of the public regarding the conduct of war\nconstitutes for us a very serious national danger. If this ignorance\nwere less pronounced, if our statesmen understood the vast importance\nof information to the enemy, and the equal importance to our generals\nthat this information the enemy should NOT obtain, then the public\ncraving for information regarding every detail of what occurs in\nthe field, and the demand for the wide publication thereof, would\ncertainly be repressed. Nothing occurs in any of our campaigns which\nis not immediately made known; reports of actions with the fullest\ndetails as to the troops engaged, and the casualties that have befallen\nthem, appear in the columns of the Press within a few hours of their\noccurrence. _Any efforts, therefore, of our generals_ in the field\nto maintain _secrecy as to strength, intentions, and movements are\ndeliberately_, though probably unintentionally, _counteracted by\ntheir own countrymen_. This is due to pure ignorance of war, no doubt,\nbut the effect of this ignorance is as bad as if it were due to evil\nintention. In fairness, however, we must admit that, in the past, the\nimmense value of reticence has not been fully appreciated by some of\nour soldiers themselves, and it were well if, in the future, more\nattention were directed to the importance of secrecy.\n\nThe results of such almost criminal stupidity may not be apparent\nwhen we are fighting with a savage foe, but if we ever have, as we\nundoubtedly some day shall have, the misfortune to find ourselves\nengaged with a civilized Power, we may be certain that not only will\nthe operations be indefinitely prolonged, _and their cost enormously\nincreased_, but their successful issue will be for us highly\nproblematical.\n\nIn this connection it must be remembered that every Great Power has\nsecret agents in every country, including Great Britain, and that it\nwill be easy for such a secret agent to telegraph in cypher or in\nsome agreed code to an agent in a neutral State all war information\npublished here, who will telegraph it on at once to the hostile\ngeneral, who will thus get, within a very short time of its publication\nin London, perhaps just exactly the information he requires to clear up\nthe strategical or tactical situation for him, and enable him to defeat\nthe combinations of our generals. As a case in point, take Macmahon's\nmarch on Sedan to relieve Metz in 1870, where secrecy was absolutely\nnecessary for success, but which became known to the Germans by the\nEnglish newspapers.--Result, Sedan.\n\nThat this cannot be allowed is plain. It is believed that the\npatriotism of our Press will welcome any necessary measure to this end\nif it is made compulsory upon ALL.[61]\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI\n\nTACTICS\n\n\nSome will probably feel inclined to ask what Clausewitz, who wrote more\nthan eighty years ago, can possibly have to say about tactics which can\nbe valuable in the twentieth century.\n\nIt was said by Napoleon that tactics change every ten years, according,\nof course, to the progress of technicalities, etc. Weapons indeed\nchange, but there is one thing that never changes, and that is human\nnature. The most important thing in tactics, the man behind the gun,\nnever alters; in his heart and feelings, his strength and weakness, he\nis always much the same.\n\nTherefore, Clausewitz's tactical deductions, founded on the immense\nand varied data supplied by the desperate and long-continued fighting\nof the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, permeated as they are by his\nall-pervading psychological or moral view, can never lose their value\nto us.\n\nIt is true, no doubt, that our rifles of to-day can be used with\neffect at a distance ten times as great as the old smooth bores of\nClausewitz's day, our shrapnel five times as far as his cannon, and\nthat cover and ground play a far more important part now than then, and\nso on. All these things, of course, considerably modify the tactics of\nClausewitz. Not so much, however, as some text-books would lead us to\nsuppose, which always seem to assume clear ground and clear weather.\nFor, after all, how many combats are fought on ground where there is\na very restricted field of fire (_vide_ Herbert's \"Defence of Plevna,\"\netc.), or at night? How many battles are fought during rain, or snow,\nor mist, or fog, which destroys all long range? Compare the tremendous\nfighting with \"bullets, bayonets, swords, hand-grenades, and even\nfists,\" of Nogi's attempt to cut the Russian line of retreat at Mukden,\nwith the hand-to-hand fighting of Eylau, Friedland, Borodino, or with\nthe desperate efforts of the French in 1812 to open their line of\nretreat through Maro-Jaroslawitz, where all day the masses of troops\nfought hand-to-hand in the streets, \"the town was taken and retaken\nseven times, and the rival nations fought with the bayonet in the midst\nof the burning houses\" (Alison).\n\nWhen it comes to push of pike, as in all great decisions between\nequally resolute adversaries it is bound to do, the difference between\nthe fighting of Clausewitz's day and ours is but small. The most recent\ninstances of all, the hand-to-hand fighting in Manchuria, take us back\nto the Napoleonic struggles.\n\nTherefore, despite the eighty years that have intervened, the writings\nof Clausewitz are still valuable from a tactical point of view, always\nconsidering of course the difference in weapons, because of the human\nheart in battle.\n\nHis ideas on tactics have largely filtered through his German pupils\ninto our textbooks, minus the psychological or moral note, so that it\nis not necessary to go at length into the subject, or give a number of\nextracts. It would be wearisome. I will, however, give a few passages\nat haphazard as illustrations.\n\n\nFLANK ATTACKS\n\nThe endeavour to gain the enemy's line of retreat, and protect our own,\non which so much learned erudition has been spent by various writers,\nhe regards as a NATURAL instinct, which will ALWAYS produce itself both\nin generals and subalterns.\n\n\"From this arises, in the whole conduct of war, and especially in great\nand small combats, a PERFECT INSTINCT, which is the security of our\nown line of retreat and the seizure of the enemy's; this follows from\nthe conception of victory, which, as we have seen, is something beyond\nmere slaughter. In this effort we see, therefore, the FIRST immediate\npurpose in the combat, and one which is quite universal. No combat\nis _imaginable_ in which this effort, either in its double or single\nform, is not to go hand in hand with the plain and simple stroke of\nforce. Even the smallest troop will not throw itself upon the enemy\nwithout thinking of its line of retreat, and in most cases it will have\nan eye upon that of the enemy.\"[62] \"This is a great _natural law_ of\nthe combat,\" \"and so becomes the pivot upon which ALL strategical and\ntactical manoeuvres turn.\"\n\n\nRESERVES--DESTRUCTIVE AND DECISIVE ACT\n\nThe combat he regards as settled by whoever has the preponderance of\nmoral force at the end; that is, in fresh or only partly used up troops.\n\nThe combat itself he divides into a destructive and a decisive act.\nDuring the long destructive act, or period of fire preparation, the\ntroops engaged gradually wear each other out, and gradually almost\ncease to count as factors in the decision. \"After a fire combat of\nsome hours' duration, in which a body of troops has suffered severe\nlosses--for instance, a quarter or one-third of its numbers--the\n_d\u00e9bris_ may for the time be looked upon as a heap of cinders. For the\nmen are physically exhausted; they have spent their ammunition; many\nhave left the field with the wounded, though not themselves wounded\n(compare, for instance, Eylau and the 1870 battles); the rest think\nthey have done their part for the day, and if they get beyond the\nsphere of danger, do not willingly return to it. The feeling of courage\nwith which they originally started has had the edge taken off, the\nlonging for the fight is satisfied, the original organization is partly\ndestroyed, and the formations broken up.\"\n\n\"So that the amount of moral force lost may be estimated by the amount\nof the Reserves used up, almost as with a foot rule.\"[63]\n\nThis goes on till, \"In all probability, only the untouched reserve and\nsome troops which, though they have been in action, have suffered very\nlittle, are in reality to be regarded as serviceable, and the remainder\n(perhaps four-sixths) may be looked upon for the present as a \"caput\nmortuum.\"\n\nTherefore the art of the commander he regards as \"economy of force\"\nduring the destructive period; that is, to employ as few troops as\npossible, by taking advantage of ground, cover, etc., \"to use a smaller\nnumber of men in the combat with firearms than the enemy employs,\" so\nthat a smaller proportionate number of his own are reduced to a \"heap\nof cinders\" and more are left, more moral force, for the decision.\n\n\"Hundreds of times,\" he says, \"a line of fire has maintained its own\nagainst one twice its strength\" (_e.g._ the Boers).\n\nTo do this and yet obtain a good fire-effect demands very skilful\nhandling of the troops, both on the part of the chief and subordinate\nleaders.\n\nWith the preponderance thus obtained the commander at last starts the\ndecision. \"Towards the close of a battle the line of retreat is always\nregarded with increased jealousy, therefore a threat against that\nline is always a potent means of bringing on the decision (Liao-yang,\nMukden). On that account, when circumstances permit, the plan of battle\nwill be aimed at that point from the very first.\" Or, \"If this wear and\ntear and exhaustion of the forces has reached a certain pitch, then a\nrapid advance in concentrated masses on one side against the line of\nbattle of the other\" (_i.e._ the Napoleonic breaking the centre, of\nrecent years thought almost hopeless, but revived in Manchuria with\nsuccess, in the case of Nodzu breaking the centre at Mukden).\n\nFrom what precedes it is evident that, as in the preparatory acts, the\nutmost economy of forces must prevail, so in the decisive act to win\nthe mastery through _numbers_ must be the ruling idea.\n\nJust as in the preparatory acts endurance, firmness and coolness are\nthe first qualities, so in the decisive act boldness and fiery spirit\nmust predominate.\n\n\"The difference between these two acts will never be completely lost as\nrespects the whole.\"\n\n\"This is the way in which our view is to be understood; then, on the\none hand, it will not come short of the reality, and on the other\nit will direct the attention of the leader of a combat (be it great\nor small, partial or general) to giving each of the two acts of\nactivity its due share, so that there may be neither precipitation nor\nnegligence.\n\n\"_Precipitation_ there will be if space and time are not allowed\nfor the destructive act. _Negligence_ in general there will be if\na complete decision does not take place, either from want of moral\ncourage or from a wrong view of the situation.\"[64]\n\n\nDURATION OF THE COMBAT\n\n\"Even the resistance of an ordinary division of 8,000 or 10,000 men\nof all arms, even if opposed to an enemy considerably superior in\nnumbers, will last several hours, if the advantages of country are not\ntoo preponderating. And if the enemy is only a little or not at all\nsuperior in numbers, the combat will last half a day. A corps of three\nor four divisions will prolong it to double that time; an army of\n80,000 or 100,000 men to three or four times.\" \"These calculations are\nthe result of experience.\"[65]\n\nAs General von Caemmerer points out, if these calculations were adhered\nto in present-day German manoeuvres, as they are now in all war games,\ntactical exercises, and staff rides, the dangerous dualism of their\ntraining, the difference between theory and manoeuvre practice, would\ncease.\n\n\nATTACK AND DEFENCE\n\nI have left to the last the consideration of three or four disputed\npoints in Clausewitz. In considering these I shall quote a good deal\nfrom General von Caemmerer's \"Development of Strategical Science,\"\nas in such matters it is best to quote the most recent authors of\nestablished reputation.\n\nThe most important of these, and the most disputed, is Clausewitz's\nfamous dictum that \"the defensive is the stronger form of making war.\"\n\"The defence is the stronger form of war with a negative object; the\nattack is the weaker form with a positive object.\"[66]\n\nGeneral von Caemmerer says, \"It is strange, we Germans look upon\nClausewitz as indisputably the deepest and acutest thinker upon the\nsubject of war; the beneficial effect of his intellectual labours is\nuniversally recognized and highly appreciated; but the more or less\nkeen opposition against this sentence never ceases. And yet that\nsentence can as little be cut out of his work 'On War' as the heart out\nof a man. Our most distinguished and prominent military writers are\nhere at variance with Clausewitz.\n\n\"Now, of course, I do not here propose to go into such a controversy.\nI only wish to point out that Clausewitz, in saying this, only meant\nthe defensive-offensive, the form in which he always regards it, both\nstrategically and technically, in oft-repeated explanations all through\nhis works. For instance--\n\n\"It is a FIRST maxim NEVER to remain perfectly passive, but to fall\nupon the enemy in front and flank, even when he is in the act of making\nan attack upon us.\"[67]\n\nAnd again--\n\n\"_A swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive--the flashing sword\nof vengeance--is the most brilliant point in the defensive._ He who\ndoes not at once think of it at the right moment, or rather he who\ndoes not from the first include this transition in his idea of the\ndefensive, will never understand its superiority as a form of war.\"[68]\nVon Caemmerer comments thus: \"And this conception of the defence\nby Clausewitz has become part and parcel of our army--everywhere,\nstrategically and tactically, he who has been forced into a defensive\nattitude at once thinks how he can arrange a counter-attack. I am thus\nunable to see how the way in which Clausewitz has contrasted Attack\nand Defence could in any way paralyse the spirit of enterprise.\" Von\nCaemmerer also justly remarks that, as Clausewitz always insisted\nboth in strategy and tactics, neither Attack nor Defence is pure, but\noscillates between the two forms; and as the Attack is frequently\ntemporarily reduced to defend itself, and also as no nation can be sure\nof never being invaded by a superior coalition, it is most desirable\nto encourage a belief in the strength of the Defence, if properly used.\nIn this I think that Wellington would probably have agreed. Certainly\nAusterlitz and Waterloo were examples of battles such as Clausewitz\npreferred.\n\nStill, one must admit that Clausewitz's chapter on \"The Relations\nof the Offensive and Defensive to each other in Tactics,\" Book VII.\nChapter 2, is the least convincing chapter of his work.\n\nStrategically, the argument is stronger. It always seems to me that we\nmust remember that Clausewitz had taken part in the defensive-offensive\nin its strongest, most absolute and unlimited form, on the greatest\npossible scale--the Moscow campaign and the ruin (consummated before\na single flake of snow fell) of the Grand Army. If he had lived to\ncomplete the revision of his works, it always seems to me that he\nwould have made his theory undeniable by stating that the defensive is\nthe strongest form of war, _if unlimited by space_. What, for instance,\nwould have happened if the Japanese had tried to march through Siberia\non to St. Petersburg?\n\nBut, after all, which of the two is absolutely the stronger form of\nwar, attack or defence, is merely a theoretical abstraction, for,\npractically, the choice is always settled for us by the pressing\nnecessity of circumstances. And, in this connection, let us always bear\nin mind Clausewitz's dictum: \"A swift and vigorous assumption of the\noffensive--the flashing sword of vengeance--is the most brilliant point\nin the defensive.\"\n\n\nTHE INNER LINE\n\nA second disputed point is Clausewitz's alleged preference, as a rule,\nfor the Inner Line in strategy. But it is necessary to remember that\nthat was only due to the conditions of his time, before railways and\ntelegraphs, when it was difficult to communicate between columns acting\non concentric lines. And he is not in any way wedded to the Inner Line,\nlike Jomini, but _only_ when circumstances are favourable. He has many\nsentences from which we may infer that, had he lived in railway and\ntelegraph days, his strategy, like Moltke's, his most distinguished\npupil, would have aimed at envelopment as a rule. For to bring up\ntroops rapidly by several railways necessitates a broad strategic\nfront, and Clausewitz especially lays down rapidity as his second great\nprinciple, and says--\n\n\"If the concentration of the forces would occasion detours and loss\nof time, and the danger of advancing by separate lines is not too\ngreat, then the same may be justifiable on these grounds; for _to\neffect an unnecessary concentration of the forces_ would be contrary\nto the second principle we have laid down (_i.e._ 'to act as swiftly\nas possible').\"[69] Also: \"Such separation into several columns as is\nabsolutely necessary must be made use of for the disposition of the\ntactical attack in the enveloping form, _for that form is natural to\nthe attack, and must not be disregarded without good reason_.\"[70]\nAlso: \"_It is sufficient now if the concentration takes place during\nthe action._\" So that while the conditions of his time led Clausewitz\nto prefer close concentration and the Inner Line, like Napoleon,\nyet his reflections led him to propound the germ of the strategy of\nMoltke. Substitute for Clausewitz's close concentration this: \"As\nclose concentration, the combined movements regulated by telegraph,\nas is compatible with the utmost use of the railways and the greatest\nrapidity\" (as he would certainly have said), and we arrive at Moltke's\nstrategy.\n\n\nFRONTAL ATTACKS\n\nA third disputed point is his belief in the superior tactical\nefficiency, under favourable circumstances, of the Napoleonic method\nof breaking the enemy's line in the centre. Breaking the line by a\nfrontal attack was, of course, much easier in Clausewitz's Napoleonic\nday than it is with the long-ranging arms of our day, and it is only\nnatural that Clausewitz in his writings should give it the full\ntactical importance which it then deserved. His book would not be true\nto the tactical conditions of his day had he not done so, with Rivoli,\nAusterlitz, Salamanca, Eckmuhl, etc., before his mind. But it seems\nhardly correct to accuse him of over-partiality to frontal attacks, for\nhe has examined both frontal and enveloping attacks most fairly, giving\nto each their relative advantages and disadvantages, and concluding:\n\"The envelopment may lead directly to the _destruction_ of the enemy's\narmy, if it is made with very superior numbers and succeeds. If it\nleads to victory the early results are _in every case_ greater than\nby breaking the enemy's line. Breaking the enemy's line can only lead\nindirectly to the destruction of the enemy's army, and its effects\nare hardly shown so much on the first day, but rather strategically\nafterwards,\"[71] by forcing apart on different lines of retreat the\nseparated fragments of the beaten army.\n\n\"The breaking through the hostile army by massing our principal force\nagainst one point, _supposes an excessive length of front on the part\nof the enemy_; for in this form of attack the difficulty of occupying\nthe remainder of the enemy's force with few troops is greater, because\nthe enemy's forces nearer to the principal point of attack can easily\njoin in opposing it. Now in an attack upon the centre there are such\nforces on both sides of the attack; in an attack upon a flank, only\non one side. The consequence of this is that such a central attack\nmay easily end in a very disadvantageous form of combat, _through a\nconvergent counter-attack_.\" Which is exactly our modern difficulty.\n\"The choice between these two forms of attack must therefore be made\naccording to the existing conditions of the moment. Length of front,\nthe nature and direction of the line of retreat, the military qualities\nof the enemy's troops, and the characteristics of their general,\nlastly the ground must determine the choice.\"\n\nSpeaking generally he regards the _concentric_ enveloping form of\ntactical attack aiming at the enemy's line of retreat as the most\nefficacious and natural. \"On the field of battle itself ... the\nenveloping form must always be considered the most effectual.\"[72] And\nthe _eccentric_ or frontal counter-attack at the extended enveloping\nattack as the most efficacious and natural form of the defence, such as\nNapoleon's counter-attacks at Austerlitz or Dresden, or Wellington's\nat Salamanca. \"And we think that one means is at least as good as the\nother.\"[73]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNow I think that these extracts sufficiently defend Clausewitz from the\nimputation of too great a belief in frontal attacks, and considering\nthe frequent success of such Napoleonic attacks in his day, he gives\na very fair summing up of the relative advantages and disadvantages\nthereof, and indeed such as might be written in the present day.\nIndeed the quite abnormal conditions of the Boer war produced such a\nfeeling against frontal attacks, and so much loose talk of their being\nextinct, that it is very useful to turn to Clausewitz for a reminder\nthat breaking the centre, whenever the condition he postulates, namely\n_over-extension of front_ on the enemy's part, is present, will\nalways remain one of the two great forms of decisive attack open to a\ncommander.\n\nAnd as in our day the forces are so enormous that to reach the hostile\nflank becomes more difficult, and the extension of front becomes so\ngigantic (a front of several armies on a line of forty to seventy miles\nperhaps), it is well to consider whether breaking the enemy's centre\nwill not again offer the most advantageous form for the final decisive\nact, coupled of course, as Clausewitz says it ALWAYS MUST be, with a\nstrong flank attack. And in these gigantic battles of the future, such\nas Liao-yang and Mukden, which we must consider typical of the future,\nbattles which must take several days, during which the troops in the\nfirst line become utterly exhausted and used up,--a decisive attack\non the centre can well be imagined after the hostile reserves have\nbeen decoyed away over a day's march by a strong flank attack. As, for\nexample, Nogi's flank attack round Mukden followed by Nodzu's decisive\nbreaking the centre and capture of Mukden itself.\n\nSo that far from thinking Clausewitz's remarks about frontal attacks\nand breaking the line to be obsolete, it rather appears from the great\nRusso-Japanese battles that they are worthy of close study in view of\nthe future.\n\n\nTACTICAL VERSUS STRATEGICAL ENVELOPMENT\n\nA fourth disputed point is the preference of Clausewitz, owing to his\ninsistence on the greatest concentration possible with proper regard\nfor the circumstances, for the tactical envelopment arranged on or\nnear the field to strategical envelopment with divided forces arranged\nbeforehand. In this matter I will again quote General v. Caemmerer,\nwho disagrees with him, and says: \"Clausewitz proclaims the oblique\nfront as the most effective strategic form of attack, ... that is to\nsay, when the whole army with one united front falls upon the strategic\n_flank_ of the enemy, and, if victorious, cuts him from his line of\nretreat. But where such a situation cannot be brought about, where our\nadvance has brought us before the strategic _front_ of the enemy, then\nhe sees in the tactical envelopment, in the formation of an offensive\nflank, the proper means of effectively preparing to push the enemy\nfrom his line of retreat, and he distinctly explains that tactical\nenvelopment need not at all be the _consequence_ of strategical\nenvelopment, and need not at all be prepared long beforehand by a\ncorresponding advance of divided forces.\"\n\nClausewitz says, \"The consequence of this is that battles fought with\nenveloping lines, or even with an oblique front, which should properly\nresult from an advantageous relation of the lines of communication,\nare commonly the result of a moral and physical preponderance.\"[74]\nAlso \"he should therefore only advance with his columns on such a width\nof front as will admit of their all coming into action together.\"\n\"Such separation into several columns should be made use of for the\ndisposition of the tactical attack in the enveloping form\" (_i.e._ by\ntroops within a day's march of each other). \"But it must be only of a\ntactical nature, for a strategic envelopment, when a great blow is to\nbe struck, is a complete waste of power.\"\n\nGeneral v. Caemmerer comments: \"He is thus of opinion that the lateral\nmovement of part of the army against the flank of the enemy could\nwithout any difficulty still be carried out as initiated by the plan of\nbattle; and in order to understand this idea we must again bear in mind\nthe difference between the fire-effect of then and now. In those days a\ncomparatively short movement made it still possible for a considerable\nportion of the army to gain the defenders' flank; to-day a lengthy\nand troublesome operation would be necessary for the same object, and\nits successful execution would only be counted upon if the defender\nremained entirely passive, and would neither think of a counter-stroke\nnor of a corresponding movement of his forces to the threatened flank.\"\n\nWithout going into this controversy I will, however, quote the\nexcellent reason given by Clausewitz for his preference for tactical as\nopposed to strategical envelopment: \"One peculiarity of the offensive\nbattle is the uncertainty, in most cases, as to the position (note, and\nstrength) of the enemy; it is a complete groping about amongst things\nthat are unknown (Austerlitz, Wagram, Hohenlinden, Jena, Katzbach).\nThe more this is the case the more concentration of forces becomes\nparamount, and turning a flank to be preferred to surrounding.\"[75]\n\nIt is also well to recollect how many famous generals had been ruined\nin Clausewitz's experience through over-extension or dispersion of\ntheir forces. The crushing defeats of Napoleon's marshals in the winter\nof 1813, Macdonald at the Katzbach, Oudinot at Gros Beeren, Ney at\nDennewitz, which neutralized Napoleon's great victory at Dresden and\nbegan his ruin, were all chiefly owing to this cause.\n\nAnd the weather may, again, have as great influence in shortening\nresistance and allowing troops to be overwhelmed before the too-distant\nreinforcements arrive, as it had in those battles. If the weather then\nprevented the old muskets going off, and enabled the attack to rush\nthe defence, so now a fog, rain, mist, or snow, by restricting the\nfield of view and fire, may produce the same results. When one thinks\nof the number of great battles fought in such weather, as they may\nwell be again, one sees an additional reason for carefully considering\nClausewitz's warning. Far from relegating his preference for the\ntactical as opposed to the strategical envelopment to the region of\nthe obsolete, because of our improved armament, it seems right to give\nit full weight as a corrective to a perceivable tendency to elevate\nstrategical envelopment (after K\u00f6niggr\u00e4tz) into a formula for victory.\nIf in the past many great generals have been ruined by over-extension,\nso may they be again. Against this tendency Clausewitz will for ever\nlift his voice.\n\nAlso it remains to be considered, with the huge armies of to-day and\nthe future, such armies as at Liao-yang and Mukden, such armies as\nmay possibly one day join issue in Afghanistan, whether strategical\nenvelopment will be practicable, or whether tactical envelopment,\nsuch as General Kuroki's tactical enveloping movement on Yentai, and\nthe Russian line of retreat at Liao-yang, or General Nogi's tactical\nenveloping dash northward on Hsinminting and the railway at Mukden,\nwill not be preferable.\n\nPerhaps, as a compromise, one might call such a movement\nstrategical-tactical, and so avoid the dispute by jugglery of words.\n\nI have not attempted to do more than roughly indicate that the solution\nof these four disputed tactical questions in Clausewitz is to be sought\nin a study of the latest campaign, as he would have said himself; that\nis, the campaign in Manchuria. For, as the _Times_ correspondent in the\nXLVth Chapter, \"Clausewitz in Manchuria,\" of his book \"The War in the\nFar East,\" observes, \"It will be abundantly clear to any one who has\nfollowed the great battles in Manchuria that the spirit of Clausewitz\nhas presided over Japanese victories and wept over Russian defeats.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII\n\nCHANGES SINCE THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ\n\n\nIn reading Clausewitz it is, first, the great principles of the nature\nof war founded on human nature, which alter not; and, secondly, it\nis his spirit and practical way of looking at things that we want to\nassimilate and apply to THE PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY, to which end it is\nnecessary to read him always with the changed conditions of to-day in\nour minds, and think what he would have said under the circumstances.\nThese changes are chiefly:--\n\n    (1) The improved net-work of roads.\n    (2) Railways.\n    (3) Telegraphs, wire and wireless.\n    (4) Improved arms.\n    (5) Aviation\n    (6) Universal service armies.\n\n\nTHE IMPROVED NET-WORK OF ROADS\n\nThe improved net-work of roads in Europe (not, of course, in Manchuria,\nor in Afghanistan where we have to consider our future strategy, but in\nEurope), as General v. Caemmerer puts it, \"now offers to the movements\nof armies everywhere a whole series of useful roads where formerly one\nor two only were available,\" easier gradients, good bridges instead of\nunreliable ones, etc. So that the march-discipline of that day when\nconcentrated for battle, artillery and train _on_ the roads, infantry\nand cavalry _by the side_ of the roads, has disappeared. Such close\nconcentration is therefore now not possible, as we move all arms _on_\nthe road, and an army corps with train, or two without, is the most\nthat we can now calculate on bringing into action in one day on one\nroad.\n\n\nRAILWAYS\n\n\"Railways have, above all, completely altered the term 'base,'\" remarks\nV. Caemmerer. \"Railways carry in a few days men, horses, vehicles,\nand materials of all kinds from the remotest district to any desired\npoint of our country, and nobody would any longer think of accumulating\nenormous supplies of all kinds at certain fortified points on his\nown frontier with the object of basing himself on those points. One\ndoes not base one's self any longer on a distinct district which is\nspecially prepared for that object, but upon the whole country, which\nhas become one single magazine, with separate store-rooms. So the term\n'base' has now to be considered in this light.\"\n\nIt is only when operating in savage or semi-savage countries, where\nthere are no railways, that the old idea of a base applies.\n\nAs we penetrate deeper and further from our own country into the\nenemy's, and as a small raiding party can demolish the railway line so\nas to stop all traffic for days or weeks, it becomes far more necessary\nthan it ever was in Clausewitz's day to guard our communications.\nAnd armies become more and more sensitive to any attack upon their\ncommunications.\n\nAlso \"such a line cannot easily be changed, and consequently those\ncelebrated changes of the line of communication in an enemy's country\nwhich Napoleon himself, on some occasion, declared to be the ablest\nmanoeuvre in the art of war, could scarcely be carried out any more\"\n(V. Caemmerer).\n\nAlso concentration by means of several railways demands a broad\nstrategic front, which produces that separation of corps or armies\nwhich prepares the way for strategical envelopment, and so on.\n\nGeneral von der Goltz, in his \"Conduct of War,\" says: \"The more recent\ntreatises on the conduct of war on a large scale are principally taken\nup with the mobilization and strategical concentration of armies, a\ndepartment of strategy which only began to play an important part in\nmodern times. It is the result of a dense net-work of railways in\nWestern Europe which has rendered it possible to mass large bodies\nof troops in a surprisingly brief time. Each Power tries to outdo\nits neighbours in this respect, ... which gives an opportunity to\nthe strategical specialist to show off his brilliant qualities....\nConsequently it is now frequently assumed that the whole conduct of\nwar is comprised in this one section of it.\" This over-estimate is of\ncourse an error, which, however, requires to be pointed out.\n\n\nTELEGRAPHS\n\nThe telegraph has very greatly reduced the danger of separation.\nThe great advantage of the inner line in the day of Napoleon and of\nClausewitz was that separated forces could only communicate by mounted\nmessengers, so if the enemy got between them they could not communicate\nat all, nor act in concert. This the telegraph has completely altered,\nfor as the field telegraph can now be laid as quickly as an army can\nadvance, the most widely separated bodies of troops can every day\narrange combined operations by telegraph through, if necessary,\na point one hundred or four hundred miles in rear. So that to-day\nthe chief advantage of the inner line has gone, while its chief\ndisadvantage, the possibility of being surrounded, remains.\n\n\nMAPS\n\nWe now possess complete detailed Ordnance maps of every country in\nEurope, kept up to date by the latest alterations, whereas in the days\nof Clausewitz maps were of the very roughest character, and quite\nunreliable in comparison.\n\n\nIMPROVED ARMS\n\nSmokeless powder, quick-firing and long-ranging artillery and rifles,\nthe infantry field of effective fire being ten times, the artillery\nfive times what it was in Clausewitz's time, have all to be borne in\nmind when reading the tactical part of his writings. In consequence,\nalso, cover and the tactical use of ground are of far greater\nimportance now than then, etc., etc., etc.\n\n\nAVIATION\n\nThe recent wonderful developments in aviation will obviously almost\nrevolutionize \"Information in War.\" To what extent, it is as yet\nimpossible to say. Each year will teach us more.\n\n\nTHE NATION-IN-ARMS\n\nThe nation-in-arms as the common foundation of all armies (except our\nown), brought up by railways, vastly increases the numbers in a modern\nbattle from what they were in Clausewitz's day. Compare Austerlitz,\nDresden, Leipzig and Waterloo, with Liao-yang and Mukden. It should be\nso with us also, for as General von der Goltz says in \"The Conduct of\nWar\": \"The BEST military organization is that which renders available\nALL the intellectual and material resources of the country in event of\nwar. _A State is not justified in trying to defend itself with only a\nportion of its strength, when the existence of the whole is at stake._\"\n\nIn Great Britain the difference which the introduction of this\nnation-in-arms principle has made in our military strength compared\nwith that of our future opponents, a difference relatively FAR GREATER\nAGAINST US than it was in Napoleon's and Clausewitz's day, is as yet\nhardly realized by the people, or by our statesmen. People forget the\nwastage of war, and the necessity for a constant flow of troops to\nrepair that wastage. As Von der Goltz puts it: \"It is characteristic\nof the strategical offensive that the foremost body of troops of\nan army, the portion which fights the battles, amounts to only a\ncomparatively small fraction, frequently only _a quarter or even\none-eighth_, of the total fighting strength employed, whilst the fate\nof the whole army throughout depends upon the success or failure of\nthis fraction. _Attacking armies melt away like snow in the spring._\"\nTo condense his remarks: \"In spite of the most admirable discipline,\nthe Prussian Guard Corps lost 5000 to 6000 men in the marches between\nthe attack on St. Privat and the battle of Sedan.\" \"Napoleon crossed\nthe Niemen in 1812 with 442,000 men, but reached Moscow only three\nmonths later with only 95,000.\" In the spring of 1810, the French\ncrossed the Pyrenees with 400,000 men, but still Marshal Massena in\nthe end only brought 45,000 men up to the lines of Torres Vedras,\nnear Lisbon, where the decision lay. Again, in 1829, the Russians\nput 160,000 men in the field, but had barely 20,000 left when, at\nAdrianople, a skilfully concluded peace saved them before their\nweakness became apparent and a reaction set in. In 1878 the Russians\nled 460,000 across the Danube, but they only brought 100,000 men--of\nwhom only 43,000 were effective, the rest being sick--to the gates of\nConstantinople. In 1870 the Germans crossed the French frontier with\n372,000 men, but after only a six weeks' campaign brought but 171,000\nmen to Paris. And so on. The result of it all is simple--that a people\nwhich is not based on the modern principle of the nation-in-arms cannot\nfor long rival or contend with one that is, for it can neither put\nan equal (still less a superior) army into the field at the outset\n(_vide_ Clausewitz's first principle), nor even maintain in the field\nthe _inferior_ army it does place there, because it cannot send the\never-required fresh supplies of trained troops. Sooner or later this\nmust tell. Sooner or later a situation must arise in which the nation\nbased on the obsolete voluntary system _must_ go down before a nation\nbased on the nation-in-arms principle. Circumstances change with time,\nand, as wise Lord Bacon said long ago, \"He that will not adopt new\nremedies must expect new evils.\" May we adopt the remedy before we\nexperience the evil!\n\n\nTHE MORAL AND SPIRITUAL FORCES IN WAR\n\nBut though these changed conditions must, of course, _modify_\nClausewitz's details in many important particulars, still (to complete\nour circle and leave off where we started) I repeat that, as human\nnature never changes, and as the moral is to the physical as three\nto one in war, Clausewitz, as the great realistic and practical\nphilosopher on the actual nature of war, as _the chief exponent of the\nmoral and spiritual forces in war_, will ever remain invaluable in the\nstudy of war.\n\nConsider what unsurpassed opportunities he had for observing and\nreflecting on the influence of enthusiasm and passion, of resolution\nand boldness, of vacillation and weakness, of coolness and caution, of\nendurance and hardship, of patriotism and freedom, of ambition and of\nglory--on war, either by his own experience or by conversation with\nother equally experienced soldiers, during that long period of almost\nendless wars between 1793 and 1815.\n\nThe fervour and enthusiasm and boundless energy of the Revolution,\nwhich drove the French forward, smashing everything before them, at\nthe beginning; the ambition, military glory, plunder and greed, which\nanimated them later on; the patriotism, religious and loyal devotion,\nand stern endurance, which nerved the Russian hosts then as now; that\nawful Moscow winter campaign, when human nature rose to its highest and\nsank to its lowest, when the extremes of heroic endurance and selfish\ncallousness were visible side by side; the magnificent uprising of the\nspirit of liberty and freedom from intolerable oppression in Germany,\nwhich gave to the Prussian recruits and Landwehr the same driving\nforce that revolutionary enthusiasm had formerly given to the French;\nthe passing, therefore, in 1813 of the moral superiority, the greater\ndriving force, from the French to the allies. Clausewitz saw all this;\nhe conversed intimately with such men as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau,\nwho saw and guided it, too. All his friends had seen it also. No\nwonder, then, that such an unexampled series of warlike phenomena\ndeeply impressed his reflective mind with the supreme importance of the\nmoral and spiritual factors in war.\n\nHis opportunities for long-continued observation of warlike phenomena\nwere far greater than those of any writer since his day, and it is to\nbe hoped they will remain so. For we have no desire to see another\nseries of wars such as the Napoleonic. It is fortunate for us that\nthere was then such a man as Clausewitz to sum up for us so simply and\nso clearly the accumulated experiences of those long, long years of\ncarnage and devastation.\n\n\n_Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury._\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] Book IV. Chap. 10.\n\n[2] Book IV. Chap. 3.\n\n[3] Book IV. Chap. 3.\n\n[4] Book I. Chap. 8.\n\n[5] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.\n\n[6] Summary of Instruction, p. 120.\n\n[7] Book II. Chap. 6.\n\n[8] Book II. Chap. 2.\n\n[9] Prefatory \"Notice\" by Clausewitz.\n\n[10] Book II. Chap. 4.\n\n[11] Book II. Chap. 2.\n\n[12] Book II. Chap. 2.\n\n[13] Book II. Chap. 3.\n\n[14] Book I. Chap. 1.\n\n[15] By gaining Public Opinion, Clausewitz means, to force the enemy's\npopulation into a state of mind favourable to submission.\n\n[16] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.\n\n[17] Book I. Chap. 1.\n\n[18] Author's \"Introduction.\"\n\n[19] Book I. Chap. 1.\n\n[20] Book VII. Chap. 5.\n\n[21] Book VII. Chap. 21.\n\n[22] Book VII. Chap. 21.\n\n[23] Book VIII. Chaps. 7, 8 and 9.\n\n[24] Book I. Chap. 1.\n\n[25] Book VIII. Chap. 9.\n\n[26] Book I. Chap. 7.\n\n[27] Book I. Chap. 8.\n\n[28] Book I. Chap. 8.\n\n[29] Book IV. Chap. 1.\n\n[30] Book IV. Chap. 3.\n\n[31] Book I. Chap. 1.\n\n[32] Book IV. Chap. 3.\n\n[33] Book III. Chap. 15.\n\n[34] Book VII. Chap. 13.\n\n[35] Book I. Chap. 4.\n\n[36] Book I. Chap. 5.\n\n[37] Book I. Chap. 7.\n\n[38] Book III. Chap. 3.\n\n[39] Book III. Chaps. 16-18.\n\n[40] Book II. Chap. 1.\n\n[41] Book III. Chap. 11.\n\n[42] Book III. Chap. 8.\n\n[43] Book V. Chap. 3.\n\n[44] Book III. Chap. 8.\n\n[45] Book VIII. Chap. 4.\n\n[46] Book III. Chap. 12.\n\n[47] Book III. Chap. 13.\n\n[48] Book III. Chap. 12.\n\n[49] Book III. Chap. 13.\n\n[50] Book III. Chap. 8.\n\n[51] Book III. Chap. 11.\n\n[52] Book VI. Chap. 28.\n\n[53] Book V. Chap. 10.\n\n[54] Book I. Chap. 1.\n\n[55] Book III. Chap. 13.\n\n[56] Book I. Chap. 3.\n\n[57] Book VIII. Chap. 9.\n\n[58] Book VIII. Chap. 9.\n\n[59] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.\n\n[60] Book I. Chap. 3.\n\n[61] This warning as to the consequences of allowing information to be\npublished freely which would be helpful to an enemy was written five\nyears ago. In the present war the prudent reticence of our Press, and\nits loyal co-operation with the Government in depriving the enemy of\nany helpful information, show that the lesson here insisted on has been\nlearned.--Editor's Note.\n\n[62] Book IV. Chap. 4.\n\n[63] Book IV. Chap. 4.\n\n[64] \"Guide to Tactics,\" Vol. III. pp. 136-146.\n\n[65] Book IV. Chap. 4.\n\n[66] Book VI. Chap. 1.\n\n[67] Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.\n\n[68] Book VI. Chap. 5.\n\n[69] Book VIII. Chap. 9.\n\n[70] Book VII. Chap. 15.\n\n[71] Summary of Instruction, \"Guide to Tactics,\" par. 500.\n\n[72] Book VI. Chap. 9.\n\n[73] Book VII. Chap. 9.\n\n[74] Book VII. Chap. 7.\n\n[75] Book VII. Chap. 7.\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Notes:\n\n\nPunctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant\npreference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.\n\nSimple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced\nquotation marks retained.\n\nAmbiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.\n\nPage 133: Paragraph ends with: \"Otherwise,\" rather than with a period.","title":"The Reality of War: A Companion to Clausewitz","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":27612}