{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_44635/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_44635","id":"gutenberg_44635","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44635","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Warfare","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Military art and science","Soldiers","War"],"text":"Transcriber's Note:\n\n    Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as\n    possible, including inconsistent hyphenation. Some changes have been\n    made. They are listed at the end of the text.\n\n    Italic text has been marked with _underscores_.\n\n\n\n\nMILITARY MANNERS AND CUSTOMS\n\n\n\n\n                          LONDON: PRINTED BY\n                SPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NEW-STREET SQUARE\n                         AND PARLIAMENT STREET\n\n\n\n\n                           MILITARY MANNERS\n                              AND CUSTOMS\n\n                                  BY\n\n                          JAMES ANSON FARRER\n\n                               AUTHOR OF\n     \u2018PRIMITIVE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS\u2019 \u2018CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS\u2019 ETC.\n\n                            [Illustration]\n\n                   _\u2018Homo homini res sacra\u2019_--Seneca\n\n                                London\n                      CHATTO & WINDUS, PICCADILLY\n                                 1885\n\n               [_The right of translation is reserved._]\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nIn the present volume I have attempted within the limits of the\nhistorical period and of our European civilisation, and without\nrecognising any hard and fast line between ancient and modern,\nChristian and Pagan, to allude, in the places that seemed most\nappropriate, to all points in the history of war that appeared to be\neither of special interest or of essential importance. As examples\nof such points I may refer to the treatment of prisoners of war, or\nof surrendered garrisons; the rules about spies and surprises; the\nintroduction of, and feeling about, new weapons; the meaning of parts\nof military dress; the origin of peculiar customs like the old one of\nkissing the earth before a charge; the prevalent rules of honour, as\ndisplayed in notions of justice in regard to reprisals, or of fairness\nin stratagems and deception. The necessity of observing in so vast a\nfield the laws of proportion has enforced resort to such condensation,\nthat on subjects which deserve or possess their tomes upon tomes, I\nhave in many cases been unable to spend more than a page or a chapter.\nIt is easier, however, to err on the side of length than of brevity,\nbut on whichever side I have exceeded, I can only hope that others, who\nmay feel the same interest with myself in the subject without having\nthe same time to give to it, may derive a tithe of the pleasure from\nreading the following nine chapters that I have found in putting them\ntogether.\n\nThe study, of course, is no new one, but there can be no objection\nto calling it by the new name of Bellology--a convenient term, quite\ncapable of holding its own with Sociology or its congeners. The only\nnovelty I have aimed at is one of treatment, and consists in never\nlosing sight of the fact that to all military customs there is a moral\nand human side which has been only too generally ignored in this\nconnection. To read books like Grose\u2019s \u2018Military Antiquities,\u2019 one\nwould think their writers were dealing with the manners, not of men but\nof ninepins, so utterly do they divest themselves of all human interest\nor moral feeling, in reference to the customs they describe with so\nlaudable but toneless an accuracy.\n\nThe starting-point of modern bellological studies will, undoubtedly,\nalways be the Parliamentary Blue Book, containing the reports (less\nfull than one might wish) of the Military International Conference\nthat met at Brussels in 1874, to discuss the existing laws and customs\nof war, and to consider whether any modification of them were either\npossible or desirable. Most of the representatives appointed to attend\nby the several Powers were military men, so that we are carried by\ntheir conversation into the actual realities of modern warfare, with\nan authority and sense of truth that one is conscious of in no other\nmilitary book. It is to be regretted that such a work, instructive as\nit is beyond any other on the subject, has never been printed in a\nform more popular than its official dress. It was from it that I first\nconceived the idea of the following pages, and in the sequel frequent\nreference will be made to it, as the source of the most trustworthy\nmilitary information we possess, and as certain to be for some time\nto come the standard work on all the actual laws and customs of\ncontemporary warfare.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n CHAPTER I.\n\n THE LAWS OF WAR.\n\n                                                                    PAGE\n\n The prohibition of explosive bullets in war                           2\n\n The importance of the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868           3\n\n The ultimate triumph of more destructive methods                      4\n\n Illustrated by history of the crossbow or the musket                  5\n\n Or of cannons, torpedoes, red-hot shot, or the bayonet                5\n\n Numbers slain in modern and earlier warfare                           8\n\n The laws of war at the Brussels Conference of 1874                   10\n\n Do the laws of war tend to improve?                                  13\n\n A negative answer suggested from reference                           13\n\n    1. To the use of poison in war                                    14\n\n    2. To the bombardment of towns                                    15\n\n    3. To the destruction of public buildings                         16\n\n    4. To the destruction of crops and fruit-trees                    16\n\n    5. To the murder of prisoners or the wounded                      17\n\n    6. To the murder of surrendered garrisons                         18\n\n    7. To the destruction of fishing-boats                            19\n\n    8. To the disuse of the declaration of war                        19\n\n    9. To the torture and mutilation of combatants and\n          non-combatants                                              20\n\n   10. To the custom of contributions                                 20\n\n The futile attempts of Grotius and Vattel to humanise warfare        21\n\n The rights of war in the time of Grotius                             24\n\n The futility of international law with regard to laws of war         26\n\n The employment of barbarian troops                                   26\n\n The taking of towns by assault                                       27\n\n The laws of war contrasted with the practice                         28\n\n War easier to abolish than to humanise                               30\n\n\n CHAPTER II.\n\n WARFARE IN CHIVALROUS TIMES.\n\n Delusion about character of war in days of chivalry                  32\n\n The common slaughter of women and children                           33\n\n The Earl of Derby\u2019s sack of Poitiers                                 34\n\n The massacres of Grammont and Gravelines                             35\n\n The old poem of the Vow of the Heron                                 36\n\n The massacre of Limoges by Edward the Black Prince                   37\n\n The imprisonment of ladies for ransom                                38\n\n Prisoners of war starved to death                                    39\n\n Or massacred, if no prospect of ransom                               41\n\n Or blinded or otherwise mutilated                                    42\n\n The meaning of a surrender at discretion                             44\n\n As illustrated by Edward III. at Calais                              44\n\n And by several instances in the same and the next century            45\n\n The practice of burning in aid of war                                47\n\n And of destroying sacred buildings                                   47\n\n The practice of poisoning the air                                    49\n\n The use of barbarous weapons                                         50\n\n The influence of religion on war                                     51\n\n The Church in vain on the side of peace                              52\n\n Curious vows of the knights                                          54\n\n The slight personal danger incurred in war by them                   54\n\n The explanation of their magnificent costume                         55\n\n Field sports in war-time                                             56\n\n The desire of gain the chief motive of war                           57\n\n The identity of soldiers and brigands                                57\n\n The career and character of the Black Prince                         59\n\n The place of money in the history of chivalry                        61\n\n Its influence as a war-motive between England and France             62\n\n General low character of chivalrous warfare                          64\n\n\n CHAPTER III.\n\n NAVAL WARFARE.\n\n Robbery the first object of maritime warfare                         66\n\n The piratical origin of European navies                              67\n\n Merciless character of wars at sea                                   69\n\n Fortunes made by privateering in England                             71\n\n Privateers commissioned by the State                                 72\n\n Privateers defended by the publicists                                73\n\n Distinction between privateering and piracy                          73\n\n Failure of the State to regulate privateering                        74\n\n Privateering condemned by Lord Nelson                                77\n\n Privateering abolished by the declaration of Paris in 1856           78\n\n Modern feeling against seizure of private property at sea            79\n\n Naval warfare in days of wooden ships                                80\n\n Unlawful methods of maritime war                                     81\n\n The Emperor Leo VI.\u2019s \u2018Treatise on Tactics\u2019                          83\n\n The use of fire-ships                                                84\n\n Death the penalty for serving in fire-ships                          85\n\n Torpedoes originally regarded as \u2018bad\u2019 war                           85\n\n English and French doctrine of rights of neutrals                    86\n\n Enemy\u2019s property under neutral flag secured by Treaty of Paris       87\n\n Shortcomings of the Treaty of Paris with regard to--\n\n   1. A definition of what is contraband                              88\n\n   2. The right of search of vessels under convoy                     88\n\n   3. The practice of Embargoes                                       89\n\n   4. The _Jus Angari\u00e6_                                               90\n\n The International Marine Code of the future                          91\n\n\n CHAPTER IV.\n\n MILITARY REPRISALS.\n\n International law on legitimate reprisals                            93\n\n The Brussels Conference on the subject                               95\n\n Illustrations of barbarous reprisals                                 97\n\n Instances of non-retaliation                                         98\n\n Savage reprisals in days of chivalry                                100\n\n Hanging the commonest reprisals for a brave defence                 101\n\n As illustrated by the warfare of the fifteenth century              102\n\n Survival of the custom to our own times                             104\n\n The massacre of a conquered garrison still a law of war             105\n\n The shelling of Strasburg by the Germans                            106\n\n Brutal warfare of Alexander the Great                               107\n\n The connection between bravery and cruelty                          110\n\n The abolition of slavery in its effects on war                      112\n\n The storming of Magdeburg, Brescia, and Rome                        112\n\n Cicero on Roman warfare                                             114\n\n The reprisals of the Germans in France in 1870                      115\n\n Their revival of the custom of taking hostages                      117\n\n Their resort to robbery as a plea of reprisals                      118\n\n General Von Moltke on perpetual peace                               119\n\n The moral responsibility of the military profession                 121\n\n The Press as a potent cause of war                                  122\n\n Plea for the abolition of demands for unconditional surrender       123\n\n Such as led to the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882                123\n\n\n CHAPTER V.\n\n MILITARY STRATAGEMS.\n\n Grotius\u2019 theory of fair stratagems                                  126\n\n The teaching of international law                                   127\n\n Ancient and modern naval stratagems                                 127\n\n Early Roman dislike of such stratagems                              132\n\n As ambuscades, feigned retreats, or night attacks                   132\n\n The degenerate standard of Frontinus and Poly\u00e6nus                   135\n\n The Conference stratagem of modern Europe                           136\n\n The distinction between perfidy and stratagem                       139\n\n The perfidy of Francis I.                                           140\n\n Vattel\u2019s theory about spies                                         141\n\n Frederick the Great\u2019s military instructions about spies             142\n\n Lord Wolseley on spies and truth in war                             144\n\n The custom of hanging or shooting spies                             145\n\n Better to keep them as prisoners of war                             146\n\n Balloonists regarded as spies                                       147\n\n The practice of military surprises                                  148\n\n Death formerly the penalty for capture in a surprise                150\n\n Stratagems of uncertain character                                   151\n\n Such as forged despatches or false intelligence                     151\n\n The use of the telegraph in deceiving the enemy                     151\n\n May prisoners of war be compelled to propagate lies?                152\n\n General character of the military code of fraud                     153\n\n\n CHAPTER VI.\n\n BARBARIAN WARFARE.\n\n Variable notions of honour                                          156\n\n Primitive ideas of a military life                                  156\n\n What is civilised warfare?                                          158\n\n Advanced laws of war among several savage tribes                    159\n\n Symbols of peace among savages                                      161\n\n The Samoan form of surrender                                        162\n\n Treaties of peace among savages                                     162\n\n Abeyance of laws of war in hostilities with savages                 163\n\n Zulus blown up in caves with gun-cotton                             165\n\n Women and men kidnapped for transport service on the Gold Coast     166\n\n Humane intentions of the Spaniards in the New World                 167\n\n Contrasted with the inhumanity of their actions                     167\n\n Wars with natives of English and French in America                  170\n\n High rewards offered for scalps                                     171\n\n The use of bloodhounds in war                                       171\n\n The use of poison and infected clothes                              172\n\n Penn\u2019s treaty with the Indians                                      173\n\n How Missionaries come to be a cause of war                          176\n\n Explanation of the failure of modern missions                       178\n\n The mission stations as centres of hostile intrigues                179\n\n Plea for the State-regulation of missions                           181\n\n Depopulation under Protestant influences                            181\n\n The prevention of false rumours--_Tendenzl\u00fcgen_                     182\n\n Civilised and barbarian warfare                                     183\n\n No real distinction between them                                    184\n\n\n CHAPTER VII.\n\n WAR AND CHRISTIANITY.\n\n The war question at the time of the Reformation                     185\n\n The remonstrances of Erasmus against the custom                     186\n\n Influence of Grotius on the side of war                             187\n\n The war question in the early Church                                188\n\n The Fathers against the lawfulness of war                           190\n\n Causes of the changed views of the Church                           192\n\n The clergy as active combatants for over a thousand years           193\n\n Fighting bishops                                                    193\n\n Bravery in war and ecclesiastical preferment                        196\n\n Pope Julius II. at the siege of Mirandola                           197\n\n The last fighting bishop                                            197\n\n Origin and meaning of the declaration of war                        198\n\n Superstition in the naming of weapons, ships, &c.                   200\n\n The custom of kissing the earth before a charge                     201\n\n Connection between religious and military ideas                     202\n\n The Church as a pacific agency                                      204\n\n Her efforts to set limits to reprisals                              207\n\n The altered attitude of the modern Church                           208\n\n Early Reformers only sanctioned _just_ wars                         208\n\n Voltaire\u2019s reproach against the Church                              210\n\n Canon Mozley\u2019s sermon on war                                        212\n\n The answer to his apology                                           214\n\n\n CHAPTER VIII.\n\n CURIOSITIES OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE.\n\n Increased severity of discipline                                    218\n\n Limitation of the right of matrimony                                219\n\n Compulsory Church parade and its origin                             219\n\n Atrocious military punishments                                      221\n\n Reasons for the military love of red                                223\n\n The origin of bear-skin hats                                        223\n\n Different qualities of bravery                                      225\n\n Historical fears for the extinction of courage                      225\n\n The conquests of the cause of Peace                                 227\n\n Causes of the unpopularity of military service                      228\n\n The dulness of life in the ranks                                    228\n\n The prevalence of desertion                                         230\n\n Articles of war against Malingering                                 231\n\n Military artificial ophthalmia                                      233\n\n The debasing influence of discipline                                234\n\n Illustrated from the old flogging system                            235\n\n The discipline of the Peninsular army                               236\n\n Attempts to make the service more popular                           239\n\n By raising the private\u2019s wages                                      239\n\n By shortening his term of service                                   240\n\n The old recruiting system of France and Germany                     241\n\n The conscription imminent in England                                242\n\n The question of military service for women                          242\n\n The probable results of the conscription                            243\n\n Militarism answerable for Socialism                                 246\n\n\n CHAPTER IX.\n\n THE LIMITS OF MILITARY DUTIES.\n\n The old feeling of the moral stain of bloodshed                     250\n\n Military purificatory customs                                       250\n\n Modern change of feeling about warfare                              252\n\n Descartes on the profession of arms                                 254\n\n The old-world sentiment in favour of piracy                         255\n\n The central question of military ethics                             257\n\n May a soldier be indifferent to the cause of war?                   257\n\n The right to serve made conditional on a good cause                 258\n\n By St. Augustine, Bullinger, Grotius, and Sir James Turner          258\n\n Old Greek feeling about mercenary service                           260\n\n Origin of our mercenary as opposed to gratuitous service            260\n\n Armies raised by military contractors                               261\n\n The value of the distinction between foreign and native\n    mercenaries                                                      262\n\n Original limitation of military duty                                264\n\n To the actual defence of the realm                                  264\n\n Extension of the notion of allegiance                               265\n\n The connection of the military oath with the first Mutiny Act       265\n\n Recognised limits to the claims on a soldier\u2019s obedience            266\n\n The falsity of the common doctrine of duty                          266\n\n Illustrated by the devastation of the Palatinate by the French      267\n\n And by the bombardment of Copenhagen by the English                 268\n\n The example of Admiral Keppel                                       270\n\n Justice between nations                                             271\n\n Its observation in ancient India and Rome                           271\n\n St. Augustine and Bayard on justice in war                          273\n\n Grotius on good grounds of war                                      273\n\n The military claim to exemption from moral responsibility           276\n\n The soldier\u2019s first duty to his conscience                          279\n\n The admission of this principle involves the end of war             280\n\n\n\n\nMILITARY MANNERS AND CUSTOMS.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE LAWS OF WAR.\n\n    _Ce sont des lois de la guerre. Il faut estre bien cruel bien\n    souvent pour venir au bout de son ennemi; Dieu doit estre\n    bien mis\u00e9ricordieux en nostre endroict, qui faisons tant de\n    maux._--MARSHAL MONTLUC.\n\n    The prohibition of explosive bullets in war--The importance of the\n    Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868--The ultimate triumph of\n    more destructive methods--Illustrated by history of the cross-bow\n    or the musket; or of cannons, torpedoes, red-hot shot, or the\n    bayonet--Numbers slain in modern and earlier warfare--The laws of\n    war at the Brussels Conference of 1874--Do the laws of war tend to\n    improve?--A negative answer suggested from reference: (1) to the\n    use of poison in war; (2) to the bombardment of towns; (3) to the\n    destruction of public buildings; (4) to the destruction of crops\n    and fruit trees; (5) to the murder of prisoners or the wounded; (6)\n    to the murder of surrendered garrisons; (7) to the destruction of\n    fishing boats; (8) to the disuse of the declaration of war; (9) to\n    the torture and mutilation of combatants and non-combatants; (10)\n    to the custom of contributions--The futile attempts of Grotius\n    and Vattel to humanise warfare--The rights of war in the time of\n    Grotius--The futility of international law with regard to laws of\n    war--The employment of barbarian troops--The taking of towns by\n    assault--The laws of war contrasted with the practice--War easier\n    to abolish than to humanise.\n\n\nIt is impossible to head a chapter \u2018The Laws of War\u2019 without thinking\nof that famous chapter on Iceland headed \u2018The Snakes of Iceland,\u2019\nwherein the writer simply informed his readers that there were none in\nthe country. \u2018The laws of war\u2019 make one think of the snakes of Iceland.\n\nNevertheless, a summary denial of their existence would deprive the\nhistory of the battle-field of one of its most interesting features;\nfor there is surely nothing more surprising to an impartial observer of\nmilitary manners and customs than to find that even in so just a cause\nas the defence of your own country limitations should be set to the\nright of injuring your aggressor in any manner you can.\n\nWhat, for instance, can be more obvious in such a case than that no\nsuffering you can inflict is needless which is most likely permanently\nto disable your adversary? Yet, by virtue of the International\nDeclaration of St. Petersburg, in 1868, you may not use explosive\nbullets against him, because it is held that they would cause him\nneedless suffering. By the logic of war, what can be clearer than that,\nif the explosive bullet deals worse wounds, and therefore inflicts\ndeath more readily than other destructive agencies, it should be\nused? or else that those too should be excluded from the rules of the\ngame--which might end in putting a stop to the game altogether?\n\nThe history of the explosive bullet is worth recalling, for its\nprohibition is a straw to clutch at in these days of military revival.\nLike the plague, and perhaps gunpowder, it had an Eastern origin. It\nwas used originally in India against elephants and tigers. In 1863 it\nwas introduced into the Russian army, and subsequently into other\nEuropean armies, for use against ammunition-waggons. But it was not\ntill 1867 that a slight modification in its construction rendered it\navailable for the destruction of mankind. The world owes it to the\nhumanity of the Russian Minister of War, General Milutine, that at this\npoint a pause was made; and as the Czar, Alexander II., was no less\nhumane than his minister, the result was the famous Declaration, signed\nin 1868 by all the chief Powers (save the United States), mutually\nforegoing in their future wars by land or sea the use of projectiles\nweighing less than 400 grammes (to save their use for artillery),\neither explosive or filled with inflammable substances. The Court of\nBerlin wished at the time for some other destructive contrivances to be\nequally excluded, but the English Government was afraid to go further;\nas if requiring breathing time after so immense an effort to diminish\nhuman suffering, before proceeding in so perilous a direction.\n\nThe Declaration of St. Petersburg, inasmuch as it is capable of\nindefinite expansion, is a somewhat awkward precedent for those who\nin their hearts love war and shield its continuance with apologetic\nplatitudes. How, they ask, can you enforce agreements between nations?\nBut this argument begins to totter when we remember that there is\nabsolutely no superior power or tribunal in existence which can enforce\nthe observance of the St. Petersburg Declaration beyond the conscience\nof the signatory Powers. It follows, therefore, that if international\nagreements are of value, there is no need to stop short at this or that\nbullet: which makes the arbitration-tribunal loom in the distance\nperceptibly nearer than it did before.\n\nAt first sight, this agreement excluding the use of explosive bullets\nwould seem to favour the theory of those who see in every increase in\nthe peril of war the best hope of its ultimate cessation. A famous\nAmerican statesman is reported to have said, and actually to have\nappealed to the invention of gunpowder in support of his statement,\nthat every discovery in the art of war has, from this point of view,\na life-saving and peace-promoting influence.[1] But it is difficult\nto conceive a greater delusion. The whole history of war is against\nit; for what has that history been but the steady increase of the\npains and perils of war, as more effective weapons of destruction have\nsucceeded one another? The delusion cannot be better dispelled than by\nconsideration of the facts that follow.\n\nIt has often seemed as if humanity were about to get the better of\nthe logical tendency of the military art. The Lateran Council of 1139\n(a sort of European congress in its day) not only condemned Arnold of\nBrescia to be burnt for heresy, but anathematised the cross-bow for its\ninhumanity. It forbade its use in Christian warfare as alike hateful to\nGod and destructive of mankind.[2] Several brave princes disdained to\nemploy cross-bow shooters, and Innocent III. confirmed the prohibition\non the ground that it was not fair to inflict on an enemy more than the\nleast possible injury.[3] The long-bow consequently came into greater\nuse. But Richard I., in spite of Popes or Councils or Chivalry, revived\nthe use of the cross-bow in Europe; nor, though his death by one\nhimself was regarded as a judgment from Heaven, did its use from that\ntime decline till the arquebus and then the musket took its place.\n\nCannons and bombs were at first called diabolical, because they\nsuggested the malice of the enemy of mankind, or serpentines, because\nthey seemed worse than the poison of serpents.[4] But even cannons were\nat first only used against fortified walls, and there is a tradition\nof the first occasion when they were directed against men.[5] And\ntorpedoes, now used without scruple, were called infamous and infernal\nwhen, under the name of American Turtles, they were first tried by the\nAmerican Colonies against the ships of their mother country.\n\nIn the sixteenth century, that knight \u2018without fear or reproach,\u2019 the\nChevalier Bayard, ordered all musketeers who fell into his hands to\nbe slain without mercy, because he held the introduction of fire-arms\nto be an unfair innovation on the rules of lawful war. So red-hot\nshot (or balls made red hot before insertion in the cannon) were at\nfirst objected to, or only considered fair for purposes of defence,\nnot of attack. Yet, what do we find?--that Louis XIV. fired some\n12,000 of them into Brussels in 1694; that the Austrians fired them\ninto Lille in 1792; and that the English batteries fired them at the\nships in Sebastopol harbour, which formed part of the Russian defences.\nChain-shot and bar-shot were also disapproved of at first, or excluded\nfrom use by conventions applying only to particular wars; now there\nexists no agreement precluding their use, for they soon became common\nin battles at sea.\n\nThe invention of the bayonet supplies another illustration. The\naccounts of its origin are little better than legends: that it was\ninvented so long ago as 1323 by a woman of Bayonne in defence of the\nramparts of that city against the English; or by Pus\u00e9ygur, of Bayonne,\nabout 1650; or borrowed by the Dutch from the natives of Madagascar;\nor connected with a place called the Redoute de la Ba\u00efonnette in the\nEastern Pyrenees, where the Basques, having exhausted their ammunition\nagainst the Spaniards, are said to have inserted their knives into\nthe muzzles of their guns. But it is certain that as soon as the idea\nwas perfected by fixing the blade by rings outside the muzzle (in\nthe latter quarter of the seventeenth century), battles became more\nmurderous than ever, though the destruction of infantry by cavalry\nwas diminished. The battle of Neerwinden in 1693, in which the French\ngeneral, Luxembourg, defeated the Prince of Orange, is said to have\nbeen the first battle that was decided by a charge with a bayonet, and\nthe losses were enormous on both sides.[6]\n\nHistory, in fact, is full of such cases, in which the victory has\nuniformly lain ultimately with the legitimacy of the weapon or method\nthat was at first rejected as inhumane. For the moment, the law of\nnations forbids the use of certain methods of destruction, such as\nbullets filled with glass or nails, or chemical compounds like kakodyl,\nwhich could convert in a moment the atmosphere round an army into one\nof deadly poison;[7] yet we have nothing like certainty--we have not\neven historical probability--that these forbidden means, or worse\nmeans, will not be resorted to in the wars of the future, or that\nreluctance to meet such forms of death will in the least degree affect\neither their frequency or their duration.\n\nIt is easy to explain this law of history. The soldier\u2019s courage, as he\nfaces the mitrailleuse with the same indifference with which he would\nface snow-balls or bread-pellets, is a miracle of which discipline is\nthe simple explanation; for whether the soldier be hired or coerced to\nface death, it is all one to him against what kind of bullet he rushes,\nso long as discipline remains--as Helvetius the French philosopher\nonce defined it, the art of making soldiers more afraid of their own\nofficers than of their enemy.[8] To Clearchus, the Laced\u00e6monian, is\nattributed the saying that a soldier should always fear his own general\nmore than the enemy: a mental state easily produced in every system of\nmilitary mechanism. Whatever form of death be in front of a man, it\nis less certain than that in his rear. The Ashantees as they march\nto battle sing a song which is the soldier\u2019s philosophy all the world\nover: \u2018If I go on, I shall die; if I stay behind I shall be killed; it\nis better to go on.\u2019[9]\n\nHow often is it said, in extenuation of modern warfare, that it is\ninfinitely less destructive than that of ancient or even medi\u00e6val\ntimes; and that the actual loss of life in battle has not kept pace\nwith the development of new and more effective life-taking implements!\nYet it is difficult to imagine a stranger paradox, or a proposition\nthat, if true, would reflect greater descredit on our mechanical\nscience. If our Gatling guns, or Nordenfeldt 5-barrels capable of\nfiring 600 rounds a minute, are less effective to destroy an enemy than\nall the paraphernalia of a medi\u00e6val army, why not in that case return\nto weapons that by the hypothesis better fulfilled the purposes of war?\nThis question is a _reductio ad absurdum_ of this soothing delusion;\nbut as a matter of fact, there is no comparison in destructiveness\nbetween our modern warfare and that of our ancestors. The apparent\ndifference in our favour arises from a practice alluded to by Philip\nde Commines, which throws a flood of light upon the subject: \u2018There\nwere slain in this battle about 6,000 men, which, to people that are\nunwilling to lie, may seem very much; but in my time I have been in\nseveral actions, where for one man that was really slain they have\nreported a hundred, thinking by such an account to please their\nmasters; and they sometimes deceive them with their lies.\u2019 That is to\nsay, as a rule the number of the slain should be divided by a hundred.\n\nThis remark applies even to battles like Crecy or Agincourt, where the\nnumbers slain were unusually high, and where they are said to have been\naccurately ascertained by counting after the victory. When Froissart on\nsuch authority quotes 1,291 as the total number of warriors of knightly\nor higher rank slain at Crecy, it is possible of course that he is not\nthe victim of deception; but what of the 30,000 common soldiers for\nwhose death he also vouches? A monk of St. Albans, also a contemporary,\nspeaks only of an unknown number (_et vulgus cujus numerus ignoratur_);\nwhich in the account of the Abbot Hugo was put definitely at more than\n100,000. It is evident from this that the greatest laxity prevailed\nin reference to chronicling the numbers of the slain; so that if we\ntake 3,000 instead of 30,000 as the sum total of common soldiers slain\nat Crecy, it is probable that we shall be nearer the truth than if we\nimplicitly accept Froissart\u2019s statement.\n\nThe same scepticism will of course hold good of the battles of the\nancient world. Is it likely, for instance, that in a battle in which\nthe Romans are said only to have lost 100 men, the Macedonians should\nhave lost 20,000?[10] Or again, is it possible, considering the\ndifficulty of the commissariat of a large army, even in our own days\nof trains and telegraphs and improved agriculture, that Marius in one\nbattle can have slain 200,000 Teutons, and taken 90,000 prisoners?\nBut whilst no conclusion is possible but that the figures of the older\nhistories are altogether too untrustworthy to afford any basis for\ncomparison, the calculation rests on something more like fair evidence,\nthat in the fortnight between August 4, 1870, the date of the battle\nof Wissembourg, and August 18, that of Gravelotte, including the\nbattles of Woerth and Forbach on August 6, of Courcelles on the 14th,\nand of Vionville on the 16th more than 100,000 French and Germans\nmet their death on the battle-field, to say nothing of those who\nperished afterwards in agonies in the hospitals. Recent wars have been\nundoubtedly shorter than they often were in olden times, but their\nbrevity is founded on no reason that can ensure its recurrence: nor, if\n100,000 are to be miserably cast out of existence, is the gain so very\ngreat, if the task, instead of being spread over a number of years,\nrequires only a fortnight for its accomplishment.\n\nFor the nearest approach to a statement of what the laws of war in our\nown time really are, we must turn to the Brussels Conference, which\nmet in 1874 at the summons of the same great Russian to whom the world\nowes the St. Petersburg Declaration, and which constituted a genuine\nattempt to mitigate the evils of war by an international agreement and\ndefinition of their limits. The idea of such a plan was originally\nsuggested by the Instructions published in 1863 by President Lincoln\nfor the government of the armies of the United States in the civil\nwar.[11] The project for such an international agreement, originally\nsubmitted by the Russian Government for discussion, was very much\nmodified before even a compromise of opinion could be arrived at on\nthe several points it contained. And the project so modified, as a\npreliminary basis for future agreement, owing to the timid refusal\nof the English Government to take further part in the matter, never,\nunfortunately, reached its final stage of a definite code;[12] but it\nremains nevertheless the most authoritative utterance extant of the\nlaws generally thought to be binding in modern warfare on the practices\nand passions of the combatants. The following articles from the project\nas finally modified are undoubtedly the most important:--\n\n_Art. 12._ The laws of war do not allow to belligerents an unlimited\npower as to the choice of means of injuring the enemy.\n\n_Art. 13._ According to this principle are strictly forbidden--\n\n _a._ The use of poison or poisoned weapons.\n\n _b._ Murder by treachery of individuals belonging to the hostile\n    nation or army.\n\n _c._ Murder of an antagonist who, having laid down his arms, or having\n    no longer the means of defending himself, has surrendered at\n    discretion.\n\n _d._ The declaration that no quarter will be given.\n\n\n _e._ The use of arms, projectiles, or substances which may cause\n    unnecessary suffering, as well as of those prohibited by the\n    Declaration of St. Petersburg in 1868.\n\n _f._ Abuse of the flag of truce, the national flag, or the military\n    insignia or uniform of the enemy, as well as the distinctive badges\n    of the Geneva Convention.\n\n _g._ All destruction or seizure of the enemy\u2019s property which is not\n    imperatively required by the necessity of war.\n\n_Art. 15._ Fortified places are alone liable to be besieged. Towns,\nagglomerations of houses or villages which are open or undefended,\ncannot be attacked or bombarded.\n\n_Art. 17._ ... All necessary steps should be taken to spare as far as\npossible buildings devoted to religion, arts, sciences, and charity,\nhospitals and places where sick and wounded are collected, on condition\nthat they are not used at the same time for military purposes.\n\n_Art. 18._ A town taken by storm shall not be given up to the\nvictorious troops for plunder.\n\n_Art. 23._ Prisoners of war ... should be treated with humanity.... All\ntheir personal effects except their arms are to be considered their own\nproperty.\n\n_Arts. 36, 37._ The population of an occupied territory cannot be\ncompelled to take part in military operations against their own\ncountry, nor to swear allegiance to the enemy\u2019s power.\n\n_Art. 38._ The honour and rights of the family, the life and property\nof individuals, as well as their religious convictions and the exercise\nof their religion, should be respected.\n\nPrivate property cannot be confiscated.\n\n_Art. 39._ Pillage is expressly forbidden.\n\nThere is at first sight a pleasing ring of humanity in all this,\nthough, as yet, it only represents the better military spirit, which is\nalways far in advance of actual military practice. In the monotonous\nhistory of war there are always commanders who wage it with less\nferocity than others, and writers who plead for the mitigation of\nits cruelties. As in modern history a Marlborough, a Wellington, or\na Villars forms a pleasant contrast to a Feuqui\u00e8res, a Belleisle, or\na Bl\u00fccher, so in ancient history a Marcellus or a Lucullus helps us\nto forget a Marius or an Alexander; and the sentiments of a Cicero or\nTacitus were as far in advance of their time as those of a Grotius or\nVattel were of theirs. According to the accident of the existence of\nsuch men, the laws of war fluctuate from age to age; but, the question\narises, Do they become perceptibly milder? do they ever permanently\nimprove?\n\nIt will be said that they do, because it will be said that they have;\nand that the annals of modern wars present nothing to resemble the\natrocities that may be collected from ancient or medi\u00e6val history. Yet\nsuch statements carry no conviction. Deterioration seems as likely as\nimprovement; and unless the custom is checked altogether, the wars of\nthe twentieth century may be expected to exceed in barbarity anything\nof which we have any conception. A very brief inquiry will suffice to\ndispel the common assurances of improvement and progress.\n\nPoison is forbidden in war, says the Berlin Conference; but so it\nalways was, even in the Institutes of Menu, and with perhaps less\ndifference of opinion in ancient than in modern times. Grotius and\nVattel and most of their followers disallow it, but two publicists\nof grave authority defend it, Bynkershoeck and Wolff. The latter\npublished his \u2018Jus Gentium\u2019 as late as 1749, and his argument is worth\ntranslating, since it can only be met by arguments which equally apply\nto other modes of military slaughter. \u2018Naturally it is lawful to kill\nan enemy by poison; for as long as he is our enemy, he resists the\nreparation of our right, so that we may exercise against his person\nwhatever suffices to avert his power from ourselves or our possessions.\nTherefore it is not unfair to get rid of him. But, since it comes to\nthe same thing whether you get rid of him by the sword or by poison\n(which is self-evident, because in either case you get rid of him, and\nhe can no longer resist or injure you), it is naturally lawful to kill\nan enemy by poison.\u2019 And so, he argues with equal force, of poisoned\nweapons.[13] That poison is not in use in our day we do not therefore\nowe to our international lawyers, but to the accident of tradition. In\nRoman history the theory appears to have been unanimous against it.\n\u2018Such conduct,\u2019 says the Roman writer Florus of a general who poisoned\nsome springs in order to bring some cities in Asia to a speedier\nsurrender, \u2018although it hastened his victory, rendered it infamous,\nsince it was done not only against divine law, but against ancestral\ncustoms.\u2019[14] Our statesman Fox refused indignantly to avail himself\nof an offer to poison Napoleon, but so did the Roman consuls refuse a\nsimilar proposal with regard to Pyrrhus; and Tiberius and the Roman\nsenate replied to a plan for poisoning Arminius, that the Roman people\npunished their enemies not by fraud or in secret, but openly and in\narms.\n\nThe history of bombarding towns affords an instance of something\nlike actual deterioration in the usages of modern warfare. Regular\nand simple bombardment, that is, of a town indiscriminately and not\nmerely its fortresses, has now become the established practice. Yet,\nwhat did Vattel say in the middle of the last century? \u2018At present we\ngenerally content ourselves with battering the ramparts and defences of\na place. To destroy a town with bombs and red-hot balls is an extremity\nto which we do not proceed without cogent reasons.\u2019 What said Vauban\nstill earlier? \u2018The fire must be directed simply at the defences and\nbatteries of a place ... and not against the houses.\u2019 Then what of the\nEnglish bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807, when the cathedral and some\n300 houses were destroyed; what of the German bombardment of Strasburg\nin 1870, where rifled mortars were used for the first time,[15] and the\nfamous library and picture gallery destroyed; and what lastly of the\nGerman bombardment of Paris, about which, strangely enough, even the\nmilitary conscience of the Germans was struck, so that in the highest\ncircles doubts about the propriety of such a proceeding at one time\nprevailed from a moral no less than from a military point of view?[16]\n\nWith respect again to sacred or public buildings, warfare tends to\nbecome increasingly destructive. It was the rule in Greek warfare to\nspare sacred buildings, and the Romans frequently spared sacred and\nother buildings, as Marcellus, for instance, at Syracuse.[17] Yet when\nthe French ravaged the Palatinate in 1689 they not only set fire to the\ncathedrals, but sacked the tombs of the ancient Emperors at Spiers.\nFrederick II. destroyed some of the finest buildings at Dresden and\nPrague. In 1814 the English forces destroyed the Capitol at Washington,\nthe President\u2019s house, and other public buildings;[18] and in 1815 the\nPrussian general, Bl\u00fccher, was with difficulty restrained from blowing\nup the Bridge of Jena at Paris and the Pillar of Austerlitz. Military\nmen have always the excuse of reprisals or accident for these acts of\nVandalism. Yet Vattel had said (in language which but repeated the\nlanguage of Polybius and Cicero): \u2018We ought to spare those edifices\nwhich do honour to human society, and do not contribute to the enemy\u2019s\nstrength, such as temples, tombs, public buildings, and all works of\nremarkable beauty.\u2019\n\nOf as little avail has been the same writer\u2019s observation that those\nwho tear up vines and cut down fruit trees are to be looked upon\nas savage. The Fijian islanders were barbarians enough, but even\nthey used as a rule to spare their enemies\u2019 fruit trees; so did the\nancient Indians; and the Koran forbids the wanton destruction of fruit\ntrees, palm trees, corn and cattle. Then what shall we think of the\narmies of Louis XIV. in the Palatinate not only burning castles,\ncountry-houses, and villages, but ruthlessly destroying crops, vines,\nand fruit trees?[19] or of the Prussian warrior, Bl\u00fccher, destroying\nthe ornamental trees at Paris in 1815?\n\nIt is said that the Germans refused to let the women and children leave\nStrasburg before they began to bombard it in 1870.[20] Yet Vattel\nhimself tells us how Titus, at the siege of Jerusalem, suffered the\nwomen and children to depart, and how Henri IV., besieging Paris, had\nthe humanity to let them pass through his lines.\n\nIt was in a campaign of this century, 1815, that General Roquet\ncollected the French officers, and bade them tell the grenadiers that\nthe first man who should bring him in a Prussian prisoner should be\nshot; and it was in reprisals for this that a few days later the\nPrussians killed the French wounded at Genappe.[21]\n\nGrotius, after quoting the fact that a decree of the Amphictyons\nforbade the destruction of any Greek city in war, asserts the existence\nof a stronger bond between the nations of Christendom than between\nthe states of ancient Greece. And then we remember how the Prussians\nbombarded the Danish town of S\u00f6nderborg, and almost utterly destroyed\nit, though it lay beyond the possibility of their possession; and we\nthink of Peronne in France reduced to ruins, with the greater part of\nits fine cathedral, in 1870; and of the German shells directed against\nthe French fire-engines that endeavoured to save the Strasburg Library\nfrom the flames that consumed it; and we wonder that so great a jurist\ncould have been capable of so grievous a delusion.\n\nTo murder a garrison that had made an obstinate defence, or in order\nto terrorise others from doing the same, was a right of modern war\ndisputed by Grotius, but admitted by Vattel not to be totally exploded\na century later. Yet they both quote cases which prove that to murder\nenemies who had made a gallant defence was regarded in ancient times as\na violation of the laws of war.\n\nTo murder enemies who had surrendered was as contrary to Greek or\nRoman as it ever was to Christian warfare. The general Greek and\nRoman practice was to allow quarter to an enemy who surrendered, and\nto redeem or exchange their prisoners.[22] There was indeed, by the\nlaws of war, a right to slay or enslave them, and though both rights\nwere sometimes exercised with great barbarity, the extent to which the\nformer right was exercised has been very much exaggerated. Otherwise,\nwhy should Diodorus Siculus, in the century preceding our era, have\nspoken of mercy to prisoners as the common law (\u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03b9\u03bc\u03b1), and\nof the violation of such law as an act of exceptional barbarity?[23]\nIt may be fairly doubted whether the French prisoners in the English\nhulks during the war with Napoleon suffered less than the Athenian\nprisoners in the mines of Syracuse; and as to quarter, what of the\nFrench volunteers or Franc-tireurs who in 1870 fell into the hands of\nthe Germans, or of the French peasants, who, though levied and armed\nby the local authorities under the proclamation of Napoleon, were, if\ntaken, put to death by the Allies in 1814?\n\nSome other illustrations tend further to show that there is no real\nprogress in war, and that many of the fancied mitigations of it are\nmerely accidental and ephemeral features.\n\nThe French and English in olden time used to spare one another\u2019s\nfishing boats and their crews. \u2018Fishermen,\u2019 said Froissart, \u2018though\nthere may be war between France and England, never injure one another;\nthey remain friends, and assist each other in case of need, and buy\nand sell their fish whenever one has a larger quantity than the other,\nfor if they were to fight we should have no fresh fish.\u2019[24] Yet in\nthe Crimean war, the English fleets in the Baltic seized or burnt the\nfishing boats of the Finns, and destroyed the cargoes of fish on which,\nhaving been salted in the summer months, they were dependent for their\nsubsistence during the winter.[25]\n\nPolybius informs us that the \u0152tolians were regarded as the common\noutlaws of Greece, because they did not scruple to make war without\ndeclaring it. Invasions of that sort were regarded as robberies, not\nas lawful wars. Yet declarations of war may now be dispensed with, the\nfirst precedent for doing so having been set by Gustavus Adolphus.\n\nGustavus Adolphus, in 1627, issued some humane Articles of War, which\nforbade, among other things, injuries to old men, women, and children.\nYet within a few years the Swedish soldiery, like other troops of their\ntime, made the gratuitous torture and mutilation of combatants or\nnon-combatants a common episode of their military proceedings.[26]\n\nWhen Henry V. of England invaded France, early in the fifteenth\ncentury, he forbade in his General Orders the wanton injury of\nproperty, insults to women, or gratuitous bloodshed. Yet four centuries\nlater the character of war had so little changed that we find the Duke\nof Wellington, when invading the same country, lamenting in a General\nOrder that, \u2018according to all the information which the Commander\nof the Forces had received, outrages of all descriptions\u2019 had been\ncommitted by his troops, \u2018in presence even of their officers, who took\nno pains whatever to prevent them.\u2019[27]\n\nThe French complain that their last war with Germany was not war,\nbut robbery; as if pillage and war had ever been distinct in fact\nor were distinguishable in thought. There appears to have been very\nlittle limit to the robbery that was committed under the name of\ncontributions; yet Vattel tells us that, though in his time the\npractice had died out, the belligerent sovereigns, in the wars of Louis\nXIV., used to regulate by treaty the extent of hostile territory in\nwhich each might levy contributions, together with the amount which\nmight be levied, and the manner in which the levying parties were to\nconduct themselves.[28]\n\nIs it not proved then by the above facts, that the laws of war\nrather fluctuate from age to age within somewhat narrow limits than\npermanently improve, and that they are apt to lose in one direction\nwhatever they gain in another? Humanity in warfare now, as in\nantiquity, remains the exception, not the rule; and may be found now,\nas at all times, in books or in the finer imaginations of a few, far\nmore often than in the real life of the battle-field. The plea of\nshortening the horrors of war is always the plea for carrying them to\nan extreme; as by Louvois for devastating the Palatinate, or by Suchet,\nthe French general, for driving the helpless women and children into\nthe citadel of Lerida, and for then shelling them all night with the\nhumane object of bringing the governor to a speedier surrender.[29]\n\nWriters on the Law of Nations have in fact led us into a Fool\u2019s\nParadise about war (which has done more than anything else to keep\nthe custom in existence), by representing it as something quite mild\nand almost refined in modern times. Vattel, the Swiss jurist, set the\nexample. He published his work on the rights of nations two years\nafter the Seven Years\u2019 War had begun, and he speaks of the European\nnations in his time as waging their wars \u2018with great moderation and\ngenerosity,\u2019 the very year before Marshal Belleisle gave orders to\nmake Westphalia a desert. Vattel too it was who first appealed to the\namenities that occasionally interrupt hostilities in support of his\ntheory of the generosity of modern warfare.\n\nBut what after all does it come to, if rival generals address each\nother in terms of civility or interchange acceptable gifts? At\nSebastopol, the English Sir Edmond Lyons sent the Russian Admiral\nMachinoff the present of a fat buck, the latter acknowledging the\ncompliment with the return of a hard Dutch cheese. At Gibraltar, when\nthe men of Elliot\u2019s garrison were suffering severely from scurvy,\nCrillon sent them a cartload of carrots. These things have always\noccurred even in the fiercest times of military barbarism. At the\nsiege of Orleans (1429) the Earl of Suffolk sent the French commander\nDunois a present of dessert, consisting of figs, dates, and raisins;\nand Dunois in return sent Suffolk some fur for his cloak; yet there was\nlittle limit in those days to the ferocity shown in war by the French\nand English to one another. A ransom was extorted even for the bodies\nof the slain. The occasional gleams of humanity in the history of war\ncount for nothing in the general picture of its savagery.\n\nThe jurists in this way have helped to give a totally false colour to\nthe real nature of war; and scarcely a day passes in a modern campaign\nthat does not give the lie to the rules laid down in the ponderous\ntomes of the international-law writers. It is said that Gustavus\nAdolphus always had with him in camp a copy of \u2018Grotius,\u2019 as Alexander\nis said to have slept over Homer. The improbability of finding a copy\nof \u2018Grotius\u2019 in a modern camp may be taken as an illustration of the\nneglect that has long since fallen on the restraints with which our\npublicists have sought to fetter our generals, and of the futility of\nall such endeavours.\n\nAll honour to Grotius for having sought to make warfare a few degrees\nless atrocious than he found it; but let us not therefore deceive\nourselves into an extravagant belief in the efficacy of his labours.\nKant, who lived later, and had the same problem to face, cherished no\nsuch delusion as to the possibility of humanising warfare, but went\nstraight to the point of trying to stop it altogether; and Kant was in\nevery point the better reasoner. Either would doubtless have regarded\nthe other\u2019s reasoning on the subject as Utopian; but which with the\nbetter reason?\n\nGrotius took the course of first stating what the extreme rights of\nwar were, as proved by precedent and usage, and of then pleading for\ntheir mitigation on the ground of religion and humanity. In either case\nhe appealed to precedent, and only set the better against the worse;\nleaving thereby the rights of war in utter confusion, and quite devoid\nof any principle of measurement.\n\nLet us take as an illustration of his method the question of the\nslaughter of women and children. This he began with admitting to be\na strict right of war. Profane history supplied him with several\ninstances of such massacres, and so more especially did Biblical\nhistory. He refrained, he expressly tells us, from adducing the slaying\nof the women and children of Heshbon by the Hebrews, or the command\ngiven to them to deal in the same way with the people of Canaan, for\nthese were the works of God, whose rights over mankind were far greater\nthan those of man over beasts. He preferred, as coming nearer to the\npractice of his own time, the testimony of that verse in the Psalms\nwhich says, \u2018Blessed shall he be who shall dash thy children against a\nstone.\u2019 Subsequently he withdrew this right of war, by reference to the\nbetter precedents of ancient times. It does not appear to have occurred\nto him that the precedents of history, if we go to them for our rules\nof war, will prove anything, according to the character of the actions\nwe select. Camillus (in Livy) speaks of childhood as inviolable even\nin stormed cities; the Emperor Severus, on the other hand, ordered his\nsoldiers to put all persons in Britain to the sword indiscriminately,\nand in his turn appealed to precedent, the order, namely, of Agamemnon,\nthat of the Trojans not even children in their mothers\u2019 womb should\nbe spared from destruction. The children of Israel were forbidden in\ntheir wars to cut down fruit trees; yet when they warred against the\nMoabites, \u2018they stopped all the wells of water and felled all the good\ntrees.\u2019 It was only possible in this way to distinguish the better\ncustom from the worse, not the right from the wrong; either being\nequally justifiable on a mere appeal to historical instances.\n\nThe rules of war which prevailed in the time of Grotius--the early\ntime of the Thirty Years\u2019 War--may be briefly summarised from his work\nas follows. The rights of war extended to _all_ persons within the\nhostile boundaries, the declaration of war being essentially directed\nagainst every individual of a belligerent nation. Any person of a\nhostile nation, therefore, might be slain wherever found, provided it\nwere not on neutral territory. Women and children might be lawfully\nslain (as it will be shown that they were also liable to be in the\nbest days of chivalry); and so might prisoners of war, suppliants for\ntheir lives, or those who surrendered unconditionally. It was lawful\nto assassinate an enemy, provided it involved no violation of a tacit\nor express agreement; but it was unlawful to use poison in any form,\nthough fountains, if not poisoned, might be made undrinkable. Anything\nbelonging to an enemy might be destroyed: his crops, his houses, his\nflocks, his trees, even his sacred edifices, or his places of burial.\n\nThat these extreme rights of war were literally enforced in the\nseventeenth century admits of no doubt; nor if any of them have at all\nbeen mitigated, can we attribute it so much to the humane attempt of\nGrotius and his followers to set restrictions on the rightful exercise\nof predominant force, as to the accidental influence of individual\ncommanders. It has been well remarked that the right of non-combatants\nto be unmolested in war was recognised by generals before it was ever\nproclaimed by the publicists.[30] And the same truth applies to many\nother changes in warfare, which have been oftener the result of a\ntemporary military fashion, or of new ideas of military expediency,\nthan of obedience to Grotius or Vattel. They set themselves to as\nfutile a task as the proverbial impossibility of whitening the negro;\nwith this result--that the destructiveness of war, its crimes, and\nits cruelties, are something new even to a world that cannot lose the\nrecollection of the sack of Magdeburg in 1631, or the devastation of\nthe Palatinate in 1689.[31]\n\nThe publicists have but recognised and reflected the floating\nsentiments of their time, without giving us any definite principle by\nwhich to separate the permissible from the non-permissible practice in\nwar. We have seen how much they are at issue on the use of poison. They\nare equally at issue as to the right of employing assassination; as to\nthe extent of the legitimate use of fraud; as to the right of beginning\na war without declaration; as to the limits of the invader\u2019s rights of\nrobbery; as to the right of the invaded to rise against his invader; or\nas to whether individuals so rising are to be treated as prisoners of\nwar or hanged as assassins. Let us consider what they have done for us\nwith regard to the right of using savages for allies, or with regard to\nthe rights of the conqueror over the town he has taken by assault.\n\nThe right to use barbarian troops on the Christian battle-field is\nunanimously denied by all the modern text-writers. Lord Chatham\u2019s\nindignation against England\u2019s employment of them against her revolted\ncolonies in America availed as little. Towards the end of the Crimean\nwar Russia prepared to arm some savage races within her empire, and\nbrought Circassians into Hungary in 1848.[32] France employed African\nTurcos both against Austria in 1859 and against Prussia in 1870; and it\nis within the recollection of the youngest what came of the employment\nby Turkey of Bashi-Bazouks. Are they likely not to be used in future\nbecause Bluntschli, Heffter, or Wheaton prohibits them?\n\nTo take a town by assault is the worst danger a soldier can have to\nface. The theory therefore had a show of reason, that without the\nreward of unlimited licence he could never be brought to the breach.\nTilly is said to have replied, when he was entreated by some of his\nofficers to check the rapine and bloodshed that has immortalised\nthe sack of Magdeburg in 1631: \u2018Three hours\u2019 plundering is the\nshortest rule of war. The soldier must have something for his toil\nand trouble.\u2019[33] It is on such occasions, therefore, that war shows\nitself in its true character, and that M. Girardin\u2019s remark, \u2018_La\nguerre c\u2019est l\u2019assassinat, la guerre c\u2019est le vol,_\u2019 reads like a\nrevelation. The scene never varies from age to age; and the storming of\nBadajoz and San Sebastian by the English forces in the Peninsular War,\nor of Constantine in Algeria by the French in 1837, teaches us what\nwe may expect to see in Europe when next a town is taken by assault,\nas Strasburg might have been in 1870. \u2018No age, no nation,\u2019 says Sir\nW. Napier, \u2018ever sent forth braver troops to battle than those who\nstormed Badajoz\u2019 (April 1812). Yet for two days and nights there\nreigned in its streets, says the same writer, \u2018shameless rapacity,\nbrutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty, and murder.\u2019[34] And what\nsays he of San Sebastian not a year and a half later? A thunderstorm\nthat broke out \u2018seemed to be a signal from hell for the perpetration\nof villany which would have shamed the most ferocious barbarians of\nantiquity.\u2019 ... \u2018The direst, the most revolting cruelty was added to\nthe catalogue of crime: one atrocity ... staggers the mind by its\nenormous, incredible, indescribable barbarity.\u2019[35] If officers lost\ntheir lives in trying to prevent such deeds--whose very atrocity, as\nsome one has said, preserves them from our full execration, because it\nmakes it impossible to describe them--is it likely that the gallant\nsoldiers who crowned their bravery with such devilry would have been\none whit restrained by the consideration that in refusing quarter, or\nin murdering, torturing, or mutilating non-combatants, they were acting\ncontrary to the rules of modern warfare?\n\nIf, then, we temper theory with practice, and desert our books for the\nfacts of the battle-field (so far as they are ever told in full), we\nmay perhaps lay down the following as the most important laws of modern\nwarfare:\n\n1. You may not use explosive bullets; but you may use conical-shaped\nones, which inflict far more mutilation than round ones, and even\nexplosive bullets if they do not fall below a certain magnitude.\n\n2. You may not poison your enemy, because you thus take from him the\nchance of self-defence: but you may blow him up with a fougass or\ndynamite, from which he is equally incapable of defending himself.\n\n3. You may not poison your enemy\u2019s drinking-water; but you may infect\nit with dead bodies or otherwise, because that is only equivalent to\nturning the stream.\n\n4. You may not kill helpless old men, women, or children with the sword\nor bayonet; but as much as you please with your Congreve rockets,\nhowitzers, or mortars.\n\n5. You may not make war on the peaceable occupants of a country; but\nyou may burn their houses if they resist your claims to rob them of\ntheir uttermost farthing.\n\n6. You may not refuse quarter to an enemy; but you may if he be not\nequipped in a particular outfit.\n\n7. You may not kill your prisoners of war; but you may order your\nsoldiers not to take any.\n\n8. You may not ask a ransom for your prisoners; but you may more than\ncover their cost in the lump sum you exact for the expenses of the war.\n\n9. You may not purposely destroy churches, hospitals, museums, or\nlibraries; but \u2018military exigencies\u2019 will cover your doing so, as they\nwill almost anything else you choose to do in breach of any other\nrestrictions on your conduct.\n\nAnd it is into these absurdities that the reasonings of Grotius and his\nfollowers have led us. The real dreamers, it appears, have been, not\nthose who, like Henri IV., Sully, St. Pierre, or Kant, have dreamed of\na world without wars, but those who have dreamed of wars waged without\nlawlessness, passion, or crime. On them be thrown back the taunts of\nUtopianism which they have showered so long on the only view of the\nmatter which is really logical and consistent. On them, at least, rests\nthe shadow, and must rest the reproach, of an egregious failure, unless\nrecent wars are of no account and teach no lesson. And if their failure\nbe real and signal, what remains for those who wish for better things,\nand for some check on deeds that threaten our civilisation, but to turn\ntheir backs on the instructors they once trusted; to light their fires\nrather than to load their shelves with Grotius, Vattel, and the rest;\nand to throw in their lot for the future with the opinion, hitherto\ndespised, though it was Kant\u2019s, and the endeavour hitherto discredited,\nthough it was Henry the Great\u2019s, Sully\u2019s, and Elizabeth\u2019s--the opinion,\nthat is, that it were easier to abolish war than to humanise it, and\nthat only in the growth of a spirit of international confidence lies\nany possible hope of its ultimate extinction?\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nWARFARE IN CHIVALROUS TIMES.\n\n    _Voi m\u2019avete fatto tornare quest\u2019arte del soldo quasi che nulla, ed\n    io ne l\u2019aveva presupposta la pi\u00f9 eccellente e la pi\u00f9 onorevole che\n    si facesse._--MACHIAVELLI, _Dell\u2019Arte della Guerra_.\n\n    Delusion about character of war in days of chivalry--The common\n    slaughter of women and children--The Earl of Derby\u2019s sack of\n    Poitiers--The massacres of Grammont and Gravelines--The old poem\n    of the Vow of the Heron--The massacre of Limoges by Edward the\n    Black Prince--The imprisonment of ladies for ransom--Prisoners\n    of war starved to death; or massacred, if no prospect of ransom;\n    or blinded or otherwise mutilated--The meaning of a surrender at\n    discretion, as illustrated by Edward III. at Calais; and by several\n    instances in the same and the next century--The practice of burning\n    in aid of war; and of destroying sacred buildings--The practice of\n    poisoning the air--The use of barbarous weapons--The influence of\n    religion on war--The Church in vain on the side of peace--Curious\n    vows of the knights--The slight personal danger incurred in war by\n    them--The explanation of their magnificent costume--Field-sports\n    in war-time--The desire of gain the chief motive to war--The\n    identity of soldiers and brigands--The career and character of the\n    Black Prince--The place of money in the history of chivalry--Its\n    influence as a war-motive between England and France--General low\n    character of chivalrous warfare.\n\n\nFor an impartial estimate of the custom of war, the best preparation\nis a study of its leading features in the days of chivalry. Not only\nare most of our modern military usages directly descended from that\nperiod, though many claim a far remoter ancestry, and go back to the\ndays of primitive savagery, but it is the tradition of chivalry that\nchiefly keeps alive the delusion that it is possible for warfare to be\nconducted with humanity, generosity, and courtesy.\n\nHallam, for instance, observes that in the wars of our Edward III.,\n\u2018the spirit of honourable as well as courteous behaviour towards\nthe foe seems to have arrived at its highest point;\u2019 and he refers\nespecially to the custom of ransoming a prisoner on his parole, and to\nthe generous treatment by the Black Prince of the French king taken\ncaptive at Poitiers.\n\nIn order to demonstrate the extreme exaggeration of this view, and to\nshow that with war, as with the greater crimes, moral greatness is only\nconnected accidentally, occasionally, or in romance, it is necessary\nto examine somewhat closely the warfare of the fourteenth century.\nChivalry, according to certain historians, was during that century in\nprocess of decline; but the decline, if any, was rather in the nature\nof its forms and ceremonies than of its spirit or essence. It was\nthe century of the most illustrious names in chivalry, in France of\nBertrand du Guesclin, in England of the Black Prince, Sir Walter Manny,\nSir John Chandos. It was the century of the battles of Crecy, Poitiers,\nAvray, and Navarette. It was the century of the Order of the Star in\nFrance, of the Garter and the Bath in England. Above all, it was the\ncentury of Froissart, who painted its manners and thoughts with a\nvividness so surpassing that to read his pages is almost to live in his\ntime. So that the fourteenth century may fairly be taken as the period\nin which chivalry reached its highest perfection, and in which the\nmilitary type of life and character attained its noblest development.\nIt is the century of which we instinctively think when we would imagine\na time when the rivalry of brave deeds gave birth to heroism, and the\nrivalry of military generosity invested even the cruelties of the\nbattle-field with the halo of romance.\n\nImagination, however, plays us false here as elsewhere. Froissart\nhimself, who described wars and battles and noble feats of arms\nwith a candour equal to his honest delight in them, is alone proof\nenough that there seldom was a period when war was more ferociously\nconducted; when the laws in restraint of it, imposed by the voice\nof morality or religion, were less felt; when the motives for it as\nwell as the incentives of personal courage, were more mercenary; or\nwhen the demoralisation consequent upon it were more widely or more\nfatally spread. The facts that follow in support of this conclusion\ncome, in default of any other special reference, solely from that\ncharming chronicler; allusions to other sources being only necessary\nto prove the existence of a common usage, and to leave no room for the\ntheory that the cases gathered from Froissart were but occasional or\naccidental occurrences.\n\nEven savage tribes, like the Zulus, spare the lives of women and\nchildren in war, and such a restraint is the first test of any warfare\nclaiming to rank above the most barbarous. But in the fourteenth\ncentury such indiscriminate slaughter was the commonest episode of\nwar: a fact not among the least surprising when we remember that the\nprotection of women and the defenceless was one of the special clauses\nof the oath taken by knights at the ceremony of investiture. Five\ndays after the death of Edward III., and actually during negotiations\nbetween France and England, the admirals of France and Spain, at the\ncommand of the King of France, sailed for Rye, which they burnt,\nslaying the inhabitants, whether men or women (1377); and it is a\nreasonable supposition that the same conduct marked their further\nprogress of pillage and incendiarism in the Isle of Wight.\n\nNor were such acts only the incidents of maritime warfare, and\nperpetrated merely by the pirates of either country; for they occurred\nas frequently in hostilities by land, and in connection with the\nnoblest names of Christendom. At Taillebourg, in Saintonge, the Earl\nof Derby had all the inhabitants put to the sword, in reprisals for\nthe death of one knight, who during the assault on the town had met\nwith his death. So it fared during the same campaign with three other\nplaces in Poitou, the chronicler giving us more details with reference\nto the fate of Poitiers. There were no knights in the town accustomed\nto war and capable of organising a defence; and it was only people of\nthe poorer sort who offered a brave but futile resistance to the army.\nWhen the town was won, 700 people were massacred; \u2018for the Earl\u2019s\npeople put every one to the sword, men, women, and little children.\u2019\nThe Earl of Derby took no steps to stop the slaughter, but after many\nchurches and houses had been destroyed, he forbade under pain of death\nany further incendiarism, apparently for no other reason than that he\nwished to stay there for ten or twelve days. A few years later, when\nthe French had recovered Poitiers, the English knights, who had been\nthere, marched away to Niort, which, on the refusal of the inhabitants\nto admit them, they forthwith attacked and speedily won, owing to the\nabsence, as at Poitiers, of any knights to direct the defence. The male\nand female inhabitants alike were put to the sword. All these instances\noccur in one short chapter of Froissart.\n\nSometimes this promiscuous slaughter even raised its perpetrators to\nhigher esteem. An episode of this sort occurred in the famous war\nbetween the citizens of Ghent and the Earl of Flanders. The Lord\nd\u2019Enghien, with 4,000 cavaliers and a large force of foot, besieged the\ntown of Grammont, which was attached to Ghent. About four o\u2019clock one\nfine Sunday in June, the besiegers gained the town, and the slaughter,\nsays Froissart, was very great of men, women, and children, for to\nnone was mercy shown. Upwards of 500 of the inhabitants were killed;\nnumbers of old people and women were burnt in their beds; and the town\nbeing then set on fire in more than two hundred places, was speedily\nreduced to ashes. \u2018Fair son,\u2019 said the Earl of Flanders, greeting his\nreturning relative, \u2018you are a valiant man, and if it please God will\nbe a gallant knight, for you have made a handsome beginning.\u2019 History,\nhowever, may rejoice that so promising a career was checked in the bud;\nfor the young nobleman\u2019s death in a skirmish within a few days made his\nfirst feat of arms also his last.\n\nA similar story is connected with the memory of the fighting Bishop of\nNorwich, famous in those days. Having been authorised by Pope Urban\nVI. to make war on Pope Clement VII., he went and besieged the town of\nGravelines with shot and wild-fire, \u2018till in the end our men entered\nthe town with their Bishop, when they at his commandment destroying\nboth man, woman, and child, left not one alive of all those who\nremained in the town.\u2019[36] This was in 1383; and it will be observed\nhow then, just as in later days, the excuse of superior orders served\nas an excuse for the perpetration of any crime, provided only it were\ncommitted in war.\n\nIt would be an error to suppose that these things were the mere\naccident of war, due to the passion of the moment, or to the feeble\ncontrol of leaders over their men. In a very curious old French poem,\ncalled \u2018The Vow of the Heron,\u2019 indisputable evidence exists that the\nslaughter of women and children was not only often premeditated before\nthe opening of hostilities, but that an oath binding a man to it was\nsometimes given and accepted as a token of commendable bravery. The\npoem in question deals with historical events and persons; and if not\nto be taken as literal history, undoubtedly keeps within the limits\nof probability, as proved by other testimony of the manners of those\ntimes. Robert, Count of Artois, exiled from France, comes to England,\nand bringing a roasted heron before Edward III. and his court, prays\nthem to make vows by it before eating of it (in accordance with the\ncustom which attached to such oaths peculiar sanctity) concerning the\ndeeds of war they would undertake against the kingdom of France. Edward\nIII., the Earl of Salisbury, Sir Walter Manny, the Earl of Derby,\nLord Suffolk, having all sworn according to the Count\u2019s wishes, Sir\nFauquemont, striving to outdo them in the profession of military zeal,\nswore that if the king would cross the sea to invade France, he would\nalways appear in the van of his troops, carrying devastation and fire\nand slaughter, and sparing not altars, nor relations, nor friends,\nneither helpless women nor children.[37]\n\nLet the reader reflect that these things occurred in war, not of\nChristians against infidels, but of Christians with one another, and\nin a period commonly belauded for its advance in chivalrous humanity.\nThe incidents related were of too common occurrence to call for special\nremark by their chronicler; but the peculiar atrocities of the famous\nsack of Limoges, by the express orders of Edward the Black Prince,\nwere too much even for Froissart. It is best to let him tell his own\nstory from the moment of the entry of the besieging force: \u2018The Prince,\nthe Duke of Lancaster, the Earls of Cambridge and of Pembroke, Sir\nGuiscard d\u2019Angle, and the others, with their men, rushed into the town.\nYou would then have seen pillagers active to do mischief, running\nthrough the town, slaying men, women, and children, according to their\ncommands. It was a most melancholy business, for all ranks, ages, and\nsexes cast themselves on their knees before the Prince, begging for\nmercy; but he was so inflamed with passion and revenge that he listened\nto none, but all were put to the sword, wherever they could be found,\neven those who were not guilty; for, I know not why, the poor were\nnot spared, who could not have had any part in this treason; but they\nsuffered for it, and indeed more than those who had been the leaders\nof the treachery. There was not that day in the city of Limoges any\nheart so hardened or that had any sense of religion, who did not deeply\nbewail the unfortunate events passing before their eyes; for upwards\nof 3,000 men, women, and children were put to death that day. God have\nmercy on their souls, for they were veritable martyrs.\u2019 Yet the man\nwhose memory is stained with this crime, among the blackest in history,\nwas he whom not his own country alone, but the Europe of his day,\ndubbed the Mirror of Knighthood; and those who blindly but (according\nto the still prevalent sophistry of militarism) rightly carried out\nhis orders counted among them at least three of the noblest names in\nEngland.\n\nThe absence in chivalry of any feeling strong enough to save the lives\nof women from the sword of the warrior renders improbable _\u00e0 priori_\nany keen scruples against making them prisoners of war. In France such\nscruples were stronger than in England. The soldiers of the Black\nPrince took captive the Duchess of Bourbon, mother to the King of\nFrance, and imprisoned her in the castle of Belleperche; whence she was\nafterwards conducted into Guyenne, and ransom exacted for her liberty.\nSimilar facts mark the whole period from the twelfth to the fifteenth\ncentury. When the Crusaders under Richard I. took Messina by assault,\nthey carried off with their other lawful spoils all the noblest women\nbelonging to the Sicilians.[38] Edward I. made prisoners of the queen\nof Robert Bruce and her ladies, and of the Countess of Buchan, who had\ncrowned Bruce. The latter, he said, as she had not used the sword,\nshould not perish by it; but for her lawless conspiracy she should be\nshut up in a chamber of stone and iron, circular as the crown she gave;\nand at Berwick she should be suspended in the open air, a spectacle to\ntravellers, and for her everlasting infamy. Accordingly, a turret was\nfitted up for her with a strong cage of lattice-work, made of strong\nposts and bars of iron.[39] In the fifteenth century, the English, in\ntheir war upon the French frontier, according to Monstrelet, \u2018made many\nprisoners, and even carried off women, as well noble as not, whom they\nkept in close confinement until they ransomed themselves.\u2019[40] The\nnotion, therefore, that in those times any special courtesy was shown\nin war to the weaker sex must be received with extreme latitude. In\n1194, Henry, Emperor of the Romans, having taken Salerno in Apulia by\nstorm, actually put up for auction to his troops the wives and children\nof the chief citizens whom he had slain and exiled.\n\nTo pass to the treatment of prisoners of war, who, be it remembered,\nwere only those who could promise ransom. The old historian Hoveden,\nspeaking of a battle that was fought in 1173, says that there fell in\nit more than 10,000 Flemings; the remainder, who were taken captive,\nbeing thrown into prison in irons, and there starved to death. There\nis no evidence whether, or for how long, starving remained in vogue;\nbut the iron chains were habitual, down even to the fourteenth century\nor later, among the Germans and Spaniards, the extortion of a heavier\nransom being the motive for increasing the weight of chain and the\ngeneral discomfort of prison. To let a prisoner go at large on parole\nfor his ransom was an advance initiated by the French, that sprang\nnaturally out of a state of hostilities in which most of the combatants\nbecame personally acquainted, but it was still conduct so exceptional\nthat Froissart always speaks of it in terms of high eulogy. It was also\nan advance that often sprang out of the plainest necessities of the\ncase, as when, after the battle of Poitiers, the English found their\nprisoners to be double their own numbers, wherefore in consideration of\nthe risk they ran, they either received ransom from them on the spot\nor gave them their liberty in exchange for a promise to bring their\nransom-money at Christmas to Bordeaux. Bertrand du Guesclin did the\nsame by the English knights after their defeat at Pontvalin; and it was\nin reference to this last occasion that Froissart calls attention to\nthe superiority of the French over the Germans in not shackling their\nprisoners with a view to a heavier ransom. \u2018Curses on them for it,\u2019 he\nexclaims of the Germans; \u2018they are a people without pity or honour,\nand they ought never to receive quarter. The French entertained their\nprisoners well and ransomed them courteously, without being too hard\nupon them.\u2019\n\nNevertheless we must suspect that this sort of courtesy was rather\noccasional than habitual. Of this same Du Guesclin, whom St.-Palaye\ncalls the flower of chivalry,[41] two stories are told that throw a\ndifferent but curious light on the manners of those times. Having on\none occasion defeated the English and taken many of them prisoners,\nDu Guesclin tried to observe the rules of distributive justice in\nthe partition of the captives, but failing of success and unable to\ndiscover to whom the prisoners really belonged, he and Clisson (who\nwere brothers in arms) in order to terminate the differences which the\nvictorious French had with one another on the subject, conceived that\nthe only fair solution was to have them all massacred, and accordingly\nmore than 500 Englishmen were put to death in cold blood outside the\ngates of Bressi\u00e8re.[42] So, on a second occasion, such a quantity\nof English were taken that \u2018there was not, down to the commonest\nsoldier, anyone who had not some prisoner of whom he counted to win a\ngood ransom; but as there was a dispute between the French to know to\nwhom each prisoner belonged, Du Guesclin, to put them all on a level,\nordered them to put all to the sword, and only the English chiefs were\nspared.\u2019[43] This ferocious warrior, the product and pride of his\ntime, and the favourite hero of French chivalry, was hideous in face\nand figure; and if we think of him, with his round brown face, his\nflat nose, his green eyes, his crisp hair, his short neck, his broad\nshoulders, his long arms, short body, and badly made legs, we have\nevidently one of the worst specimens of that type which was for so long\nthe curse of humanity, the warrior of medi\u00e6val Europe.\n\nIn respect, therefore, of Hallam\u2019s statement that the courtesy of\nchivalry gradually introduced an indulgent treatment of prisoners which\nwas almost unknown to antiquity, it is clear that it would be unwise to\npress too closely the comparison on this head between pre-Christian and\npost-Christian warfare. At the siege of Toledo, the Besque de Vilaines,\na fellow-soldier of Du Guesclin in the Spanish war, in order to\nintimidate the besieged into a surrender, had as many gallows erected\nin front of the city as he had taken prisoners, and actually had more\nthan two dozen hung by the executioner with that object. In the pages\nof Livy or Thucydides there may be many a bad deed recorded, but at\nleast there is nothing worse than the deeds of the Besque de Vilaines,\nor of Du Guesclin, Constable of France, or of Edward the Black Prince\nof England.\n\nThere is another point besides the fettering of prisoners in which\nattention is drawn in Froissart to the exceptional barbarity of\nthe Spaniards; and in no estimate of the military type of life in\nthe palmiest days of chivalry would it be reasonable to omit all\nconsideration of Spain. In the war between Castile and Portugal,\nthe forces under Don John of Castile laid siege to Lisbon, closely\ninvesting it; and if any Portuguese were taken prisoners in a skirmish\nor otherwise, their eyes were put out, their legs, arms, or other\nmembers torn off, and in such plight they were sent back to Lisbon with\nthe message that when the town was taken mercy would be shown to none.\nSuch was the story told by the Portuguese ambassador to the Duke of\nLancaster, and repeated on his authority by Froissart. For the credit\nof humanity, to say nothing of chivalry, one would fain disbelieve\nthe tale altogether, or regard it as an episode that stood by itself\nand apart from the general practice of the age, since it is the only\none of the kind related by Froissart. But the frequency as much as\nthe rarity of a practice may account for the silence of an annalist,\nand there is little doubt that mutilation of the kind described was\ncommon in the chivalrous period, even if obsolete or nearly so in the\nfourteenth century. Blinding and castration were not only punishments\ninflicted for offences against the forest laws of the Norman kings of\nEngland, but were the common fate of captive enemies in arms throughout\nEurope in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. This, for instance, was\nthe treatment of their Welsh prisoners by the Earls of Shrewsbury\nand Chester in 1098; as also of William III., King of Sicily, at the\nhands of Henry, Emperor of the Romans, in 1194. At the close of the\ntwelfth century, in the war between Richard I. of England and Philip\nAugustus of France, blinding was resorted to on both sides; for Hoveden\nexpressly says: \u2018The King of France had the eyes put out of many of the\nEnglish king\u2019s subjects whom he had made prisoners, and this provoked\nthe King of England, unwilling as he was, to similar acts of impiety.\u2019\nAnd to take a last instance, in 1225, the Milanese having taken\nprisoners 500 Genoese crossbowmen, deprived each of them of an eye and\nan arm, in revenge for the injury done by their bows.[44] So that it\nwould be interesting, if possible, to learn from some historian the\ndate and cause of the cessation of customs so profoundly barbarous and\nbrutal.\n\nBy the rules, again, of chivalrous warfare all persons found within\na town taken by assault were liable, and all the male adults likely,\nto be killed. Bertrand du Guesclin made it a maxim before attacking a\nplace to threaten its commander with the alternative of surrender or\ndeath; a military custom perhaps as old as war itself, and one that\nhas descended unchanged to our own times. Only by a timely surrender\ncould the besieged cherish any hope for their lives or fortunes; and\neven the offer of a surrender might be refused, and an unconditional\nsurrender be insisted upon instead. This is proved by the well-known\nstory of Edward III. at the siege of Calais, a story sometimes called\nin doubt merely for resting solely on the authority of Froissart. The\ngovernor of Calais offered to surrender the town and all things in it,\nin return for a simple permission to leave it in safety. Sir Walter\nManny replied that the king was resolved that they should surrender\nthemselves solely to his will, to ransom or kill them as he pleased.\nThe Frenchman retorted that they would suffer the direst extremities\nrather than submit to the smallest boy in Calais faring worse than the\nrest. The king obstinately refused to change his mind, till Sir Walter\nManny, pressing upon him the reluctance of his officers to garrison his\ncastles with the prospect of reprisals which such an exercise of his\nwar-right would render probable, Edward so far relented as to insist\non having six citizens of Calais left to the absolute disposal of his\nrevenge. When the six who offered themselves as a sacrifice for the\nrest of their fellow-citizens reached the presence of the king, the\nlatter, though all the knights around him were moved even to tears,\ngave instant orders to behead them. All who were present pleaded for\nthem, and above all, Sir Walter Manny, in accordance with his promise\nto the French governor; but it was all in vain, and but for the\nentreaties of the queen, those six citizens would have fallen victims\nto the savage wrath of the pitiless Edward.\n\nTwo facts support the probable truth of the above narrative from\nFroissart. In the first place, it is in perfect keeping with the\nconduct of the same warrior at the taking of Caen. When the king heard\nwhat mischief the inhabitants had inflicted on his army by their\nvigorous defence, he gave orders that all the rest of the inhabitants\nshould be slain and the town burnt;[45] and had it not been for the\nremonstrances of Sir Godfrey de Harcourt, there is little reason to\ndoubt but that he would thus have glutted, as he craved to do, the\nintense native savagery of his soul. In the second place, the story is\nin perfect keeping with the common war-rule of that and later times, by\nvirtue of which a conqueror might always avail himself of the distress\nof his enemy to insist upon a surrender at discretion, which of course\nwas equivalent to a surrender to death or anything else.\n\nHow commonly death was inflicted in such cases may be shown from\nsome narratives of capitulations given by Monstrelet. When Meaux\nsurrendered to Henry V., six of the defenders were reserved by name to\nbe delivered up to justice (such was the common expression), and four\nwere shortly after beheaded at Paris.[46] When Meulan surrendered to\nthe regent, the Duke of Bedford, numbers were specially excepted from\nthose to whom the Duke granted their lives, \u2018to remain at the disposal\nof the lord regent.\u2019[47] When some French soldiers having taken refuge\nin a fort were so closely besieged by the Earl Marshal of England as to\nbe obliged to surrender at discretion, many of them were hanged.[48]\nWhen the garrison of Guise capitulated to Sir John de Luxembourg, a\ngeneral pardon was granted to all, except to certain who were to be\ndelivered up to justice.[49] When the same captain, with about one\nthousand men, besieged the castle of Guetron, wherein were some sixty\nor eighty Frenchmen, the latter proposed to surrender on condition\nof the safety of their lives and fortunes; \u2018they were told they must\nsurrender at discretion. In the end, however, it was agreed to by the\ngovernor that from four to six of his men should be spared by Sir\nJohn. When this agreement had been settled and pledges given for its\nperformance, the governor re-entered the castle, and was careful not to\ntell his companions the whole that had passed at the conference, giving\nthem to understand in general that they were to march away in safety;\nbut when the castle was surrendered all within it were made prisoners.\nOn the morrow, by the orders of Sir John de Luxembourg, they were all\nstrangled and hung on trees hard by, except the four or six before\nmentioned--one of their companions serving for the executioner.\u2019[50]\nOne more of these black acts, so common among the warriors of chivalry,\nand this point perhaps will be accepted as proved. The French had\ngained possession of the castle of Rouen, but after twelve days were\nobliged to surrender at discretion to the English; \u2018they were all made\nprisoners, and put under a good guard; and shortly after, one hundred\nand fifty were beheaded at Rouen.\u2019[51]\n\nLet us pass next from the animate to the inanimate world as affected\nby warfare. The setting on fire of Grammont in more than two hundred\nplaces is a fair sample of the normal use of arson as a military weapon\nin the chivalrous period. To burn an undefended town or village was\naccounted no meanness; and was as frequent as the destruction of crops,\nfruit trees, or other sources of human subsistence. The custom of\ntearing up vines or fruit trees contrasts strongly with the command of\nXerxes to his forces to spare the groves of trees upon their march; and\nany reader of ancient history will acknowledge the vast deterioration\nfrom the pagan laws of war which every page of the history of Christian\nchivalry reveals and exposes.\n\nBut little as was the forbearance displayed in war towards defenceless\nwomen and children, or to the crops and houses that gave them food and\nshelter, it might perhaps have been expected that, at a time when no\nserious dissent had come to divide Christianity, and when the defence\nof religion and religious ceremonies were among the professed duties of\nknighthood, churches and sacred buildings should have enjoyed especial\nimmunity from the ravages of war. Even in pagan warfare the temples\nof the enemy as a rule were spared; such an act as the destruction of\nthe sacred edifices of the Marsi by the Romans under Germanicus being\ncontrary to the better traditions of Roman military precedent.\n\nPermissible as it was by the rules of war, says Polybius, to destroy\nan enemy\u2019s garrisons, cities, or crops, or anything else by which his\npower might be weakened, it was the part of mere rage and madness to\ndestroy such things as their statues or temples, by which no benefit\nor injury accrued to one side or the other; nor are allusions to\nviolations of this rule numerous in pre-Christian warfare.[52] The\npractice of the Romans and Macedonians to meet peaceably together in\ntime of war on the island of Delos, on account of its sanctity as\nthe reputed birthplace of Apollo,[53] has no parallel in the history\nof war among the nations of Christendom. The most that can be said\nfor the fourteenth century in this respect is that slightly stronger\nscruples protected churches and monasteries than the lives of women and\nchildren. This is implied in Froissart\u2019s account of the storming of\nGuerrande: \u2018Men, women, and children were put to the sword, and fine\nchurches sacrilegiously burnt; at which the Lord Lewis was so much\nenraged, that he immediately ordered twenty-four of the most active to\nbe hanged on the spot.\u2019\n\nBut the slightest embitterment of feeling removed all scruples\nin favour of sacred buildings. Richard II., having with his army\ncrossed the Tweed, took up his quarters in the beautiful abbey of\nMelrose; after which the monastery, though spared in all previous\nwars with Scotland, was burnt, because the English had determined,\nsays Froissart, to ruin everything in Scotland before returning home,\nin revenge for the recent alliance entered into by that country with\nFrance. The abbey of Dunfermline, where the Scotch kings used to be\nburied, was also burnt in the same campaign; and so it fared with all\nother parts of Scotland that the English overran; for they \u2018spared\nneither monasteries nor churches, but put all to fire and flame.\u2019\n\nNeither did any greater degree of chivalry display itself in the\nmatter of the modes and weapons of warfare. Although reason can urge\nno valid objection against the means of destruction resorted to\nby hostile forces, whether poisoned arrows, explosive bullets, or\ndynamite, yet certain things have been generally excluded from the\ncategory of fair military practices, as for example the poisoning of\nan enemy\u2019s water. But the warriors of the fourteenth century, even if\nthey stand acquitted of poisoning rivers and wells, had no scruples\nabout poisoning the air: which perhaps is nearly equivalent. The great\nengines they called Sows or Muttons, like that one, 120 feet wide and\n40 feet long, from which Philip von Artefeld and the men of Ghent cast\nheavy stones, beams of wood, or bars of hot copper into Oudenarde, must\nhave made life inside such a place unpleasant enough; but worse things\ncould be injected than copper bars or missiles of wood. The Duke of\nNormandy, besieging the English garrison at Thin-l\u2019Ev\u00eaque, had dead\nhorses and other carrion flung into the castle, to poison the garrison\nby the smell; and since the air was hot as in midsummer, it is small\nwonder that the dictates of reason soon triumphed over the spirit of\nresistance. And at the siege of Grave the chivalry of Brabant made a\nsimilar use of carrion to empoison the garrison into a surrender.\n\nEven in weapons different degrees of barbarity are clearly discernible,\naccording as they are intended to effect a disabling wound, or a wound\nthat will cause needless laceration and pain by the difficulty of their\nremoval. A barbed arrow or spear betokens of course the latter object,\nand it is worth visiting the multi-barbed weapons in Kensington Museum\nfrom different parts of the world, to learn to what lengths military\ningenuity may go in this direction. The spear heads of the Crusaders\nwere barbed;[54] and so were the arrows used at Crecy and elsewhere,\nas may be seen on reference to the manuscript pictures, the object\nbeing to make it impossible to extract them without laceration of\nthe flesh. The sarbacane or long hollow tube was in use for shooting\npoisoned arrows at the enemy;[55] and pictures remain of the vials\nof combustibles that were often attached to the end of arrows and\nlances.[56]\n\nThe above facts clearly show the manner and spirit with which our\nancestors waged war in the days of what Hallam calls chivalrous virtue:\none of the most stupendous historical impostures that has ever become\nan accepted article of popular belief. The military usages of the\nGreeks and Romans were mild and polished, compared to the immeasurable\nsavagery which marked those of the Christians of Froissart\u2019s day. As\nfor the redeeming features, the rare generosity or courtesy to a foe,\nthey might be cited in almost equal abundance from the warfare of the\nRed Indians; but what sheds a peculiar stain on that of the Chevaliers\nis the ostentatious connection of religion with the atrocities of\nthose blood-seeking marauders. The Church by a peculiar religious\nservice blessed and sanctified both the knight and his sword; and the\nmost solemn rite of the Christian faith was profaned to the level of\na preliminary of battle. At Easter and Christmas, the great religious\nfestivals of a professedly peace-loving worship, the Psalm that was\ndeemed most appropriate to be sung in the chapels of the Pope and the\nKing of France was that beginning, \u2018Benedictus Dominus Deus meus, qui\ndocet manus meas ad bellum et digitos meos ad pr\u0153lia.\u2019\n\nIt was a curious feature of this religion of war that, when Edward\nIII.\u2019s forces invaded France, so strict was the superstition that led\nthem to observe the fast of Lent, that among other things conveyed\ninto the country were vessels and boats of leather wherewith to obtain\nsupplies of fish from the lakes and ponds of the enemy.\n\nIt is indeed passing strange that Christianity, which could command so\nstrict an observance of its ordinances as is implied in the transport\nof boats to catch fish for Lent, should have been powerless to place\nany check whatever on the ferocious militarism of the time; and the\nvery little that was ever done by the Church to check or humanise\nwarfare is an eternal reflection on the so-called conversion of Europe\nto Christianity. Nevertheless the Church, to do her justice, used what\ninfluence she possessed on the side of peace in a manner she has long\nsince lost sight of; nor was the Papacy in its most distracted days\never so indifferent to the evils of war as the Protestant Church has\nbeen since, and is still. Clement VI. succeeded in making peace between\nFrance and England, just as Alexander III. averted a war between the\ntwo countries in 1161. Innocent VI. tried to do the same; and Urban V.\nreturned from Rome to Avignon, hoping to effect the same good object.\nGregory XI. was keenly distressed at the failure of efforts similar to\nthose of his predecessors. The Popes indeed endeavoured to stop wars,\nas they endeavoured to stop tournaments, or the use of the crossbow;\nbut they were defeated by the intense barbarism of chivalry; nor can it\nbe laid to the charge of the Church of Rome, as it can to that of the\nChurch of the Reformation, that she ever folded her hands in despairful\napathy before a custom she admitted to be evil. The cardinals and\narchbishops of those days were constantly engaged in pacific, nor\nalways futile, embassies. And the prelates would frequently preach to\neither side arguments of peace: a fact that contrasts badly with the\nalmost universal silence and impotence of the modern pulpit, either to\nstay a war or to mitigate its barbarities.\n\nBut it is true that they knew equally well how to play on the martial\nas on the pacific chord in their audiences; for the eloquence of an\nArchbishop of Toulouse turned sixty towns and castles to the interest\nand rights of the French king in his quarrel with England; and the\npreaching of prelates and lawyers in Picardy had a similar effect in\nother large towns. Nor were the English clergy slower than the French\nto assert the rights of their king and country, for Simon Tibald,\nBishop of London, made several long and fine sermons to demonstrate (as\nalways is demonstrated in such cases) that the King of France had acted\nmost unjustly in renewing the war, and that his conduct was at total\nvariance both with equity and reason.\n\nBut these appeals to the judgment of their congregations by the clergy\nare also a proof that in the fourteenth century the opinion of the\npeople did not count for so little as is often supposed in the making\nof peace and war. Yet the power of the people in this respect was\ndoubtless as insignificant as it still is in our own days: nothing\nbeing more remarkable, even in the free government of modern England,\nthan the influence of the people in theory and their influence in fact\non the most important question that regards their destinies.\n\nNor are the moral causes difficult to trace which in those times made\nwars break out so frequently and last so long, that those who now read\nof them can only marvel how civilisation ever emerged at all, even to\nthe imperfect degree to which it is given to us to enjoy it. The love\nof adventure and the hope of fame were of course among the principal\nmotives. The saying of Adam Smith, that the great secret of education\nis the direction of personal vanity to proper objects, contains the\nkey to all advance that has ever been made in civilisation, and to\nevery shortcoming. The savagery of the middle ages was due to the\ndirection of personal vanity exclusively into military channels, so\nthat the desire for distinction often displayed itself in forms of\nperfect absurdity, as in the case of the young English knights who went\nabroad with one eye veiled, binding themselves by a vow to their ladies\nneither to see with their eyes nor to reply to anything asked of them\ntill they had signalised themselves by the performance of some wondrous\ndeed in France. The gradual opening up in later days of other paths to\ndistinction than that of arms has very much diminished the danger to\nthe public peace involved in the worthless education of our ancestors.\n\nNor was the personal distinction of the warrior gained at any great\nrisk of personal danger. The personal danger in war decreased in\nexact ratio with the rank of the combatant, and it was only the lower\norders of the social hierarchy who unreservedly risked their lives.\nIn case of defeat they had no ransom to offer for mercy, and appear\nalmost habitually to have been slain without any. If it was a common\nthing for either side to settle before a battle the names of those on\nthe other who should be admitted to ransom, it was no uncommon thing\nto determine, as the English did before Crecy, to give no quarter to\nthe enemy at all. But as a rule the battle-field was of little more\nperil to the knight than the tournament; and though many perished when\npowerless to avert the long thin dagger, called the _mis\u00e9ricorde_, from\nthe interstices of their armour or the vizor of their helmets, yet the\nstriking fact in Froissart is the great number of battles, skirmishes,\nand sieges in which the same names occur, proving how seldom their\nbearers were wounded, disabled, or killed. This of course was due\nmainly to the marvellous defensive armour they wore, which justifies\nthe wonder not merely how they fought but even how they moved. Whether\nencased in coats of mail, sewn upon or worn over the gambeson or thick\nundergarment of cloth or leather, or in plates of solid steel, at first\nworn over the mail and then instead of it, and often with the plastron\nor breastplate of forged iron beneath both hauberk and gambeson, they\nevidently had little to fear from arrow, sword, or lance, unless\nwhen they neglected to let down the vizor of the helmet, as Sir John\nChandos did, when he met with his death from a lance wound in the eye\n(1370). Their chief danger lay in the hammering of battle-axes on their\nhelmets, which stunned or wounded, but seldom killed them. But the foot\nsoldiers and light cavalry, though generally well equipped, were less\nwell protected by armour than the knights, the hauberk or coat of mail\nbeing allowed in France only to persons possessed of a certain estate;\nso that the knights were formidable less to one another than to those\nwho by the conditions of the combat could not be so formidable to\nthemselves.\n\nThe surcoat was also a defence to the knight, as indicating the ransom\nhe could pay for his life. Otherwise it is impossible to account for\nhis readiness to go into action with this long robe flowing over his\nplate of steel and all his other accoutrements. Had Sir John Chandos\nnot been entangled in his long surcoat when he slipped, he might have\nlived to fight many another battle to the honour of English chivalry.\nRichness of armour served also the same purpose as the surcoat. At\nthe battle of Nicopoli, when the flower of the French nobility met\nwith so disastrous a defeat at the hands of the Turks, the lords of\nFrance were, says Froissart, so richly dressed out in their emblazoned\nsurcoats as to look like little kings, and many for a time owed their\nlives to the extreme richness of their armour, which led the Saracens\nto suppose them greater lords than they could really boast to be. So\nagain the elaborate gold necklaces worn by distinguished officers in\nthe seventeenth century were probably rather symbols of the ransom\ntheir wearers could pay, than worn merely for ostentation and vanity.\nIt was to carelessness on this score that the Scotch owed their great\nlosses at the battle of Musselborough in 1548: for (to put the words of\nPatin in modern dress) their \u2018vileness of port was the cause that so\nmany of the great men and gentlemen were killed and so few saved. The\noutward show, the semblance and sign whereby a stranger might discern a\nvillain from a gentleman, was not among them to be seen.\u2019\n\nWar under these conditions chiefly affected the lives of the great by\npleasantly relieving the monotony of peaceful days. In time of peace\nthey had few occupations but hawking, hunting, and tilting, and during\nhostilities those amusements continued. Field sports, sometimes spoken\nof by their eulogists as the image of war, were not absent during its\nreality. Edward III. hunted and fished daily during his campaign in\nFrance, having with him thirty falconers on horseback, sixty couples\nof staghounds, and as many greyhounds. And many of his nobles followed\nhis example in taking their hawks and hounds across the Channel.\n\nBut the preceding causes of the frequency of war in the days of\nchivalry are quite insignificant when compared with that motive\nwhich nowadays mainly finds vent in the peaceful channels of\ncommerce--namely, the common desire of gain. The desire for glory had\nfar less to do with it than the desire of lucre; nor is anything from\nthe beginning to the end of Froissart more conspicuously displayed\nthan the merely mercenary motive for war. The ransom of prisoners\nor of towns, or even ransom for the slain,[57] afforded a short and\nroyal road to wealth, and was the chief incentive, as it was also the\nchief reward of bravery. The Chevalier Bayard made by ransoms in the\ncourse of his life a sum equal to 4,000_l._, which in those days must\nhave been a fortune;[58] and Sir Walter Manny in a single campaign\nenriched himself by 8,000_l._ in the same way.[59] So that the story is\nperfectly credible of the old Scotch knight, who in a year of universal\npeace prayed, \u2018Lord, turn the world upside down that gentlemen may make\nbread of it.\u2019 Loot and rapine, the modern attractions of the brigand,\nwere then in fact the main temptations of the knight or soldier; and\nthe distinction between the latter and the brigand was far less than\nit had been in the pre-Christian period, or than it is in more modern\ntimes. Indeed the very word _brigand_ meant, originally, merely a\nfoot-soldier who fought in a brigade, in which sense it was used by\nFroissart; and it was only the constant addiction of the former to\nthe occupations of the highwayman that lent to the word brigand its\nsubsequent evil connotation.\n\nBut it was not merely the common soldier to whom the first question in\na case of war was the profit to be gained by it; for men of the best\nfamilies of the aristocracy were no less addicted to the land piracy\nwhich then constituted war, as is proved by such names as Calverly,\nGournay, Albret, Hawkwood, and Guesclin. The noble who was a soldier\nin war often continued to fight as a robber after peace was made, nor\nthought it beneath him to make wretched villagers compound for their\nlives; and in spite of truces and treaties, pillage and ransom afforded\nhis chief and often his sole source of livelihood. The story of Charles\nde Beaumont dying of regret for the ransom he had lost, because by\nmistake he had slain instead of capturing the Duke of Burgundy at the\nbattle of Nancy, is a fair illustration of the dominion then exercised\nby the lowest mercenary feelings over the nobility of Europe.\n\nThis mercenary side of chivalrous warfare has been so lost sight of in\nthe conventional descriptions of it, that it is worth while to bring\ninto prominence how very little the cause of war really concerned those\nwho took part in it, and how unfounded is the idea that men troubled to\nfight for the weak or the oppressed under fine impulses of chivalry,\nand not simply in any place or for any object that held out to them\nthe prospect of gain. How otherwise is it possible to account for the\nconduct of the Black Prince, in fighting to restore Pedro the Cruel\nto the throne of Castile, from which he had been displaced in favour\nof Henry of Trastamare not merely by the arms of Du Guesclin and the\nFrench freebooters, but by the wishes and consent of the people? Any\nthought for the people concerned, or of sympathy for their liberation,\nas little entered into the mind of the Black Prince as if the question\nhad concerned toads or rabbits. Provided it afforded an occasion for\nfighting, it mattered nothing that Pedro had ruled oppressively; that\nhe had murdered, or at least was believed to have murdered, his wife,\nthe sister of the reigning King of France: nor that he had even been\ncondemned by the Pope as an enemy to the Christian Church. Yet before\nthe battle of Navarette (1367), in which Henry was completely defeated,\nthe Prince did not hesitate in his prayers for victory to assert that\nhe was waging war solely in the interests of justice and reason; and it\nwas for his success in this iniquitous exploit (a success which only\nawaited his departure from the country to be followed by a rising in\nfavour of the monarch he had deposed) that the Prince won his chief\ntitle to fame; that London exhausted itself in shows, triumphs, and\nfestivals in his honour; and that Germans, English, and Flemish with\none accord entitled him \u2018the mirror of knighthood.\u2019 The Prince was only\nthirteen when he fought at Crecy, and he fought with courage: he was\nonly ten years older when he won the battle of Poitiers, and he behaved\nwith courtesy to the captive French king, from whom he looked for an\nextortionate ransom: but the extravagant eulogies commonly heaped upon\nhim prove how little exalted in reality was the military ideal of his\nage. His sack of Limoges, famous among military atrocities, has already\nbeen spoken of; nor should it be forgotten, as another indication of\nhis character, that when two messengers brought him a summons from the\nKing of France to answer the appeal of the Gascons of Aquitaine, he\nactually imprisoned them, showing himself however in this superior to\nhis nobles and barons, who actually advised capital punishment as the\nfittest salary to the envoys for their pains.\n\nThe Free Companies, or hordes of robbers, who ravaged Europe through\nall the period of chivalry and constituted the greatest social\ndifficulty of the time, were simply formed of knights and men-at-arms,\nwho, when a public war no longer justified them in robbing and\nmurdering on behalf of the State, turned robbers and murderers on their\nown account. After the treaty of Bretigny had put a stop to hostilities\nbetween France and England (1360), 12,000 of these men, men of rank\nand family as well as needy adventurers, and under leaders of every\nnationality, resolved sooner than lay down their arms to march into\nBurgundy, there to relieve by the ransoms they might levy the poverty\nthey could not otherwise avert. Many a war had no other justification\nthan the liberation of one people from their outrages by turning them\nupon another. Thus Du Guesclin led his White Company into Spain on\nbehalf of Henry the Bastard, less to avenge the cruelties of Pedro than\nto free France from the curse of her unemployed chivalry; and Henry the\nBastard, when by such help he had wrested the kingdom of Castile from\nhis brother Pedro, designed an invasion of Granada simply to divert\nfrom his own territories the allies who had placed him in possession of\nthem. This was a constant source of war in those days, just as in our\nown the existence of large armies leads of necessity to wars for their\nemployment; and even the Crusades derive some explanation from the\noperation of the motive indicated.\n\nNo historical microscope, indeed, will detect any difference between\nthe Free Companies and the regular troops, since not only the latter\nmerged into the former, but both were actuated by the sole pursuit\nof gain, and equally indifferent to ideas of honour or patriotism.\nThe creed of both was summed up in the following regretful speech,\nattributed to Aymerigot Marcel, a great captain of the pillaging\nbands: \u2018There is no pleasure in the world like that which men such as\nourselves enjoyed. How happy were we when, riding out in search of\nadventures, we met a rich abbot, a merchant, or a string of mules, well\nladen with draperies, furs, or spices, from Montpellier, Beziers, and\nother places! All was our own, or ransomed according to our will. Every\nday we gained money, ... we lived like kings, and when we went abroad\nthe country trembled; everything was ours both in going and returning.\u2019\n\nIn the days of chivalry, this desire of gain, however gotten, pervaded\nand vitiated all classes of men from the lowest to the highest. Charles\nIV. of France, when his sister Isabella, queen of Edward II., fled to\nhim, promised to help her with gold and silver, but secretly, lest\nit should bring him into war; and then when messengers from England\ncame with gold and silver and jewels for himself and his ministers,\nboth he and his council became in a short time as cold to the cause\nof Isabella as they had been warm, the king even going so far as to\nforbid any of his subjects under pain of banishment to help his sister\nin her projected return. And again, when Edward III. was about to make\nwar with France, was he not told that his allies were men who loved to\ngain wealth, and whom it was necessary to pay beforehand? And did he\nnot find that a judicious distribution of florins was as effective in\nwinning over to his interests a duke, a marquis, an archbishop, and the\nlords of Germany, as the poorer citizens of the towns of Flanders?\n\nMoney, therefore, or its equivalent, and not the title to the crown of\nFrance, was at the root of the wars waged abroad by the English under\nEdward III. The question of title simply served as pretext, covering\nthe baser objects of the invasion. No historical fact is clearer,\nignored though it has been in the popular histories of England, than\nthat the unpopularity of his successor, Richard II., arose from his\nmarriage with the daughter of the King of France, and from his desire\nfor peace between the two kingdoms, of which the marriage was the\nproof and the security. When his wish for peace led to the formation\nof a war and a peace party among the English nobility, Froissart says:\n\u2018The poorer knights and archers were of course for war, as their sole\nlivelihood depended upon it.[60] They had learnt idleness and looked to\nwar as a means of support.\u2019 In reference to the great peace conference\nheld at Amiens in 1391, he observes: \u2018Many persons will not readily\nbelieve what I am about to say, though it is strictly true, that the\nEnglish are fonder of war than of peace. During the reign of Edward, of\nhappy memory, and in the lifetime of his son the Prince of Wales, they\nmade such grand conquests in France, and by their victories and ransoms\nof towns, castles, and men gained such wealth, that the poorest knights\nbecame rich; and those who were not gentlemen by birth, by gallantly\nhazarding themselves in these wars, were ennobled by their valour and\nworth. Those who came after them were desirous of following the same\nroad.... Even the Duke of Gloucester, son of King Edward, inclined to\nthe opinion of the commons, as did many other knights and squires who\nwere desirous of war to enable them to support their state.\u2019[61]\n\nNo other country, indeed, pleased these English brigand knights so well\nas France for the purpose of military plunder. Hence the English who\nreturned from the expedition to Castile complained bitterly that in the\nlarge towns where they expected to find everything, there was nothing\nbut wines, lard, and empty coffers; but that it was quite otherwise\nin France, where they had often found in the cities taken in war such\nwealth and riches as astonished them; it was in a war with France\ntherefore that it behoved them to hazard their lives, for it was very\nprofitable, not in a war with Castile or Portugal, where there was\nnothing but poverty and loss to be suffered.[62]\n\nWith this evidence from Froissart may be compared a passage from Philip\nde Commines, where he says, in speaking of Louis XI. towards the end of\nthe following century: \u2018Our master was well aware that the nobility,\nclergy, and commons of England are always ready to enter upon a war\nwith France, not only on account of their old title to its crown, but\nby the desire of gain, for it pleased God to permit their predecessors\nto win several memorable battles in this kingdom, and to remain in\npossession of Normandy and Guienne for the space of 350 years, ...\nduring which time they carried over enormous booty into England. Not\nonly in plunder which they had taken in the several towns, but in the\nrichness and quality of their prisoners, who were most of them great\nprinces and lords, and paid them vast ransoms for their liberty; so\nthat every Englishman afterwards hoped to do the same thereby and\nreturn home laden with spoils.\u2019[63]\n\nSuch, then, were the antecedents of the evil custom of war which has\ndescended to our own time; and we shall have taken the first step to\nits abolition when we have thus learnt to read its real descent and\nplace in history, and to reject as pure hallucination the idea that\nin the warfare of the past any more than of the present there was\nanything noble or great or glorious. That brave deeds were often done\nand noble conduct sometimes displayed in it must not blind us to its\nother and darker features. It was a warfare in which not even women and\nchildren were safe from the sword or lance of the knight or soldier;\nnor sacred buildings exempt from their rage. It was a warfare in\nwhich the occasional mercy shown had a mercenary taint; in which the\ndefeated were only spared for their ransom; and in which prisoners were\nconstantly liable to torture, mutilation, and fetters. Above all, it\nwas a warfare in which men fought more from a sordid greed of gain than\nfrom any love or attachment to their king or country, so that all sense\nof loyalty would speedily evaporate if a king like Richard II. chanced\nto wish to live peaceably with his neighbours.\n\nIt is not unimportant to have thus shown the warfare of chivalry in its\ntrue light. For it is the delusion with regard to it, which more than\nanything else keeps alive those romantic notions about war and warriors\nthat are the most fatal hindrance to removing both from the face of the\nearth. We clearly drive militarism to its last defences, if we deprive\nit of every period and of almost every name on which it is wont to rely\nas entitling it to our admiration or esteem.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nNAVAL WARFARE.\n\n    _Una et ea vetus causa bellandi est profunda cupido imperii et\n    divitiarum._--SALLUST.\n\n    Robbery the first object of maritime warfare--The piratical origin\n    of European navies--Merciless character of wars at sea--Fortunes\n    made by privateering in England--Privateers commissioned by\n    the State--Privateers defended by the publicists--Distinction\n    between privateering and piracy--Failure of the State to regulate\n    privateering--Privateering condemned by Lord Nelson--Privateering\n    abolished by the Declaration of Paris in 1856--Modern feeling\n    against seizure of private property at sea--Naval warfare in days\n    of wooden ships--Unlawful methods of maritime war--The Emperor\n    Leo VI.\u2019s \u2018Treatise on Tactics\u2019--The use of fire-ships--Death\n    the penalty for serving in fire-ships--Torpedoes originally\n    regarded as \u2018bad\u2019 war--English and French doctrine of rights of\n    neutrals--Enemy\u2019s property under neutral flag secured by Treaty of\n    Paris--Shortcomings of the Treaty of Paris with regard to:--(1)\n    A definition of what is contraband; (2) The right of search of\n    vessels under convoy; (3) The practice of embargoes; (4) The _jus\n    angari\u00e6_--The International Marine Code of the future.\n\n\nThe first striking difference between military and naval warfare is\nthat, while--in theory, at least--the military forces of a country\nconfine their attacks to the persons and power of their enemy, the\nnaval forces devote themselves primarily to the plunder of his\nproperty and commerce. If on land the theory of modern war exempts\nfrom spoliation all of an enemy\u2019s goods that do not contribute to his\nmilitary strength, on sea such spoliation is the professed object of\nmaritime warfare. And the difference, we are told, is \u2018the necessary\nconsequence of the state of war, which places the citizens or subject\nof the belligerent states in hostility to each other, and prohibits\nall intercourse between them,\u2019[64] although the very reason for the\nimmunity of private property on land is that war is a condition of\nhostility between the military forces of two countries, and not between\ntheir respective inhabitants.[64]\n\nWriters on public law have invented many ingenious theories to explain\nand justify, on rational grounds, so fundamental a difference between\nthe two kinds of warfare. \u2018To make prize of a merchant ship,\u2019 says\nDr. Whewell, \u2018is an obvious way of showing (such a ship) that its own\nState is unable to protect it at sea, and thus is a mode of attacking\nthe State;\u2019[65] a reason that would equally justify the slaughter\nof nonagenarians. According to Hautefeuille, the differences flows\nnaturally from the conditions of hostilities waged on different\nelements, and especially from the absence at sea of any fear of a\nrising _en masse_ which, as it may be the result of wholesale robbery\non land, serves to some extent as a safeguard against it.[66]\n\nA simpler explanation may trace the difference to the maritime Piracy\nwhich for many centuries was the normal relation between the English\nand Continental coasts, and out of which the navies of Europe were\ngradually evolved. Sir H. Nicolas, describing the naval state of the\nthirteenth and early part of the fourteenth century, proves by abundant\nfacts the following picture of it: \u2018During a truce or peace ships were\nboarded, plundered, and captured by vessels of a friendly Power as if\nthere had been actual war. Even English merchant ships were attacked\nand robbed as well in port as at sea by English vessels, and especially\nby those of the Cinque Ports, which seem to have been nests of robbers;\nand, judging from the numerous complaints, it would appear that a\ngeneral system of piracy existed which no government was strong enough\nto restrain.\u2019[67]\n\nThe governments of those days were, however, not only not strong\nenough to restrain, but, as a rule, only too glad to make use of these\npirates as auxiliaries in their wars with foreign Powers. Some English\nships carrying troops to France having been dispersed by a storm, the\nsailors of the Cinque Ports were ordered by Henry III., in revenge, to\ncommit every possible injury on the French; a commission undertaken\nwith such zeal on their part that they slew and plundered not only all\nthe foreigners they could catch, but their own countrymen returning\nfrom their pilgrimages (1242). During the whole reign of Henry IV.\n(1399-1413), though there existed a truce between France and England,\nthe ordinary incidents of hostilities continued at sea just as if the\ncountries had been at open war.[68] The object on either side was\nplunder and wanton devastation; nor from their landing on each other\u2019s\ncoasts, burning each other\u2019s towns and crops, and carrying off each\nother\u2019s property, did the country of either derive the least benefit\nwhatever. The monk of St. Denys shows that these pirates were really\nthe mariners on whom the naval service of England chiefly depended in\ntime of war, for he says, in speaking of this period: \u2018The English\npirates, discontented with the truce and unwilling to abandon their\nprofitable pursuits, determined to infest the sea and attack merchant\nships. Three thousand of the most skilful sailors of England and\nBayonne had confederated for that purpose, and, as was supposed, with\nthe approbation of their king.\u2019 It was not till the year 1413 that\nHenry V. sought to put a stop to the piratical practices of the English\nmarine, and he then did so without requiring a reciprocal endeavour on\nthe part of the other countries of Europe.[69]\n\nMaritime warfare being thus simply an extension of maritime piracy, the\nusages of the one naturally became the usages of the other; the only\ndifference being that in time of war it was with the licence and pay of\nthe State, and with the help of knights and squires, that the pirates\ncarried on their accustomed programme of incendiarism, massacres, and\nrobberies.\n\nFrom this connection, therefore, a lower character of warfare prevailed\nfrom the first on sea than on land, and the spirit of piracy breathed\nover the waters. No more mercy was shown by the regular naval service\nthan was shown by pirates to the crew of a captured or surrendered\nvessel, for wounded and unwounded alike were thrown into the sea. When\nthe fleet of Breton pirates defeated the English pirates in July 1403,\nand took 2,000 of them prisoners, they threw overboard the greater\npart of them;[70] and in the great sea-fight between the English and\nSpanish fleets of 1350, the whole of the crew of a Spanish ship that\nsurrendered to the Earl of Lancaster were thrown overboard, \u2018according\nto the barbarous custom of the age.\u2019[71]\n\nTwo other stories of that time still further display the utter want\nof anything like chivalrous feeling in maritime usages. A Flemish\nship, on its way to Scotland, having been driven by a storm on the\nEnglish coast, near the Thames, and its crew having been slain by the\ninhabitants, the king rewarded the assassins with the whole of the\ncargo, and kept the ship and the rigging for himself (1318).[72] In\n1379, when a fleet of English knights, under Sir John Arundel, on its\nway to Brittany, was overtaken by a storm, and the jettison of other\nthings failed to relieve the vessels, sixty women, many of whom had\nbeen forced to embark, were thrown into the sea.[73]\n\nThe piratical origin, therefore, of the navies of Europe sufficiently\nexplains the fact that plunder, which is less the rule than an incident\nof war on land, remains its chief object and feature at sea. The fact\nmay further be explained by the survival of piracy long sanctioned by\nthe States under the guise of Privateering. If we would understand the\npopularity of wars in England in the old privateering days, we must\nrecall the magnificent fortunes which were often won as prize-money in\nthe career of legalised piracy. During the war which was concluded in\n1748 by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, England captured of French and\nSpanish ships collectively 3,434, whilst she herself lost 3,238; but,\nsmall compensation as this balance of 196 ships in her favour may seem\nafter a contest of some nine years, the pecuniary balance in her favour\nis said to have amounted to 2,000,000_l._[74]\n\nWe now begin to see why our forefathers rang their church bells at the\nannouncement of war, as they did at the declaration of this one against\nSpain. War represented to large classes what the gold mines of Peru\nrepresented to Spain--the best of all possible pecuniary speculations.\nIn the year 1747 alone the English ships took 644 prizes; and of what\nenormous value they often were! Here is a list of the values which the\ncargoes of these prizes not unfrequently reached:\n\n    That of the \u2018H\u00e9ron,\u2019 a French ship, 140,000_l._\n    That of the \u2018Conception,\u2019 a French ship, 200,000_l._\n    That of \u2018La Charmante,\u2019 a French East Indiaman, 200,000_l._\n    That of the \u2018Vestal,\u2019 a Spanish ship, 140,000_l._\n    That of the \u2018Hector,\u2019 a Spanish ship, 300,000_l._\n    That of the \u2018Concordia,\u2019 a Spanish ship, 600,000_l._[75]\n\nTwo Spanish register ships are recorded to have brought in 350_l._\nto every foremast man who took part in their capture. In 1745 three\nSpanish vessels returning from Peru having been captured by three\nprivateersmen, the owners of the latter received to their separate\nshares the sum of 700,000_l._, and every common seaman 850_l._ Another\nSpanish galleon was taken by a British man-of-war with a million\nsterling in bullion on board.\n\nThese facts suffice to dispel the wonder we might otherwise feel at\nthe love our ancestors had for mixing themselves up, for any pretext\nor for none, in hostilities with Continental Powers. Our policy was\nnaturally spirited, when it meant chances like these for all who lacked\neither the wit or the will to live honestly, and returns like these on\nthe capital invested in the patriotic equipment of a few privateers.\nBut what advantage ultimately accrued to either side, after deduction\nmade for all losses and expenses, or how far these national piracies\ncontributed to the speedier restoration of peace, were questions that\napparently did not enter within the range of military reasoning to\nconsider.\n\nEverything was done to make attractive a life of piracy spent in the\nservice of the State. Originally every European State claimed some\ninterest in the prizes it commissioned its privateers to take; but the\nfact that each in turn surrendered its claim proves the difficulty\nthere was in getting these piratical servants to submit their plunder\nto the adjudication of the prize-courts. Originally all privateers\nwere bound to deliver captured arms and ammunition to their sovereign,\nand to surrender a percentage of their gains to the State or the\nadmiral; but it soon came to pass that sovereigns had to pay for the\narms they might wish to keep, and that the percentage deducted was\nfirst diminished and then abolished altogether. At first 30 per cent.\nwas deducted in Holland, which fell successively to 18 per cent., to\n10 per cent., to nothing; and in England the 10 per cent. originally\ndue to the admiral was finally surrendered.[76] The crew also enjoyed\nan additional prize of money for every person slain or captured on an\nenemy\u2019s man-of-war or privateer, and for every cannon in proportion to\nits bore.[77]\n\nOf all the changes of opinion that have occurred in the world\u2019s\nhistory, none is more instructive than that which gradually took place\nconcerning privateering, and which ended in its final renunciation by\nmost of the maritime Powers in the Declaration of Paris in 1856.\n\nThe weight of the publicists\u2019 authority was for long in its favour.\nVattel only made the proviso of a just cause of war the condition for\nreconciling privateering with the comfort of a good conscience.[78]\nValin defended it as a patriotic service, in that it relieved the State\nfrom the expense of fitting out war-vessels. Emerigon denounced the\nvocation of pirates as infamous, while commending that of privateers\nas honest and even glorious. And for many generations the distinction\nbetween the two was held to be satisfactory, that the privateer acted\nunder the commission of his sovereign, the pirate under no one\u2019s but\nhis own.\n\nMorally, this distinction of itself proved little. Take the story of\nthe French general Crillon, who, when Henri III. proposed to him to\nassassinate the Duc de Guise, is said to have replied, \u2018My life and my\nproperty are yours, Sire; but I should be unworthy of the French name\nwere I false to the laws of honour.\u2019 Had he accepted the commission,\nwould the deed have been praiseworthy or infamous? Can a commission\naffect the moral quality of actions? The hangman has a commission,\nbut neither honour nor distinction. Why, then, should a successful\nprivateer have been often decorated with the title of nobility or\npresented with a sword by his king?[79]\n\nHistorically, the distinction had even less foundation. In olden times\nindividuals carried on their own robberies or reprisals at their own\nrisk; but their actions did not become the least less piratical when,\nabout the thirteenth century, reprisals were taken under State control,\nand became only lawful under letters of marque duly issued by a\nsovereign or his admirals. In their acts, conduct, and whole procedure,\nthe commissioned privateers of later times differed in no discernible\nrespects from the pirates of the middle ages, save in the fact of being\nutilised by the State for its supposed benefit: and this difference,\nonly dating as it did from the time when the prohibition to fit out\ncruisers in time of war without public authority first became common,\nwas evidently one of date rather than of nature.\n\nMoreover, the attempt of the State to regulate its piratical service\nfailed utterly. In the fourteenth century it was customary to make\nthe officers of a privateer swear not to plunder the subjects of the\ncommissioning belligerent, or of friendly Powers, or of vessels\nsailing under safe-conducts; in the next century it became necessary,\nin addition to this oath, to insist on heavy pecuniary sureties;[80]\nand such sureties became common stipulations in treaties of peace.\nNearly every treaty between the maritime Powers after about 1600\ncontained stipulations in restraint of the abuses of privateering;\non the value of which, the complaints that arose in every war that\noccurred of privateers exceeding their powers are a sufficient comment.\nThe numerous ordinances of different countries threatening to punish\nas pirates all privateers who were found with commissions from _both_\nbelligerents, give us a still further insight into the character of\nthose servants of the State.\n\nIn fact, so slight was the distinction founded on the possession of\na commission, that even privateers with commissions were sometimes\ntreated as actual pirates and not as legitimate belligerents. In the\nseventeenth century, the freebooters and buccaneers who ravaged the\nWest Indies, and who consisted of the outcasts of England and the\nContinent, though they were duly commissioned by France to do their\nutmost damage to the Spanish colonies and commerce in the West Indies,\nwere treated as no better than pirates if they happened to fall into\nthe hands of the Spaniards. And especially was this distinction\ndisallowed if there were any doubt concerning the legitimacy of the\nletters of marque. England, for instance, refused at first to treat\nas better than pirates the privateers of her revolted colonists in\nAmerica; and in the French Revolution she tried to persuade the Powers\nof Europe so to deal with privateers commissioned by the republican\ngovernment. Russia having consented to this plan, its execution was\nonly hindered by the honourable refusal of Sweden and Denmark to accede\nto so retrograde an innovation.[81]\n\nAn illusory distinction between the prize of a pirate and that of\na privateer was further sustained by the judicial apparatus of the\nprize-court. The rights of a captor were not complete till a naval\ntribunal of his own country had settled his claims to the ships or\ncargo of an enemy or neutral. By this device confiscation was divested\nof its likeness to plunder, and a thin veneer of legality was laid on\nthe fundamental lawlessness of the whole system. Were it left to the\nwolves to decide on their rights to the captured sheep, the latter\nwould have much the same chance of release as vessels in a prize-court\nof the captor. A prize-court has never yet been equally representative\nof either belligerent, or been so constituted as to be absolutely\nimpartial between either.\n\nBut, even granted that a prize-court gave its verdicts with the\nstrictest regard to the evidence, of what nature was that evidence\nlikely to be when it came chiefly from the purser on board the\nprivateer, whose duty it was to draw up a verbal process of the\ncircumstances of every visit or capture, and who, as he was paid and\nnominated by the captain of the privateer, was dependent for his\nprofits in the concern on the lawfulness of the prizes? How easy to\nrepresent that a defenceless merchant vessel had offered resistance to\nsearch, and that therefore by the law of nations she and her cargo\nwere lawful prize! How tempting to falsify every circumstance that\nreally attended the capture, or that legally affected the captors\u2019\nrights to their plunder!\n\nThese aspects of privateering soon led unbiassed minds to a sounder\njudgment about it than was discernible in received opinion. Molloy, an\nEnglish writer, spoke of it, as long ago as 1769, as follows: \u2018It were\nwell they (the privateers) were restrained by consent of all princes,\nsince all good men account them but one remove from pirates, who\nwithout any respect to the cause, or having any injury done them, or so\nmuch as hired for the service, spoil men and goods, making even a trade\nand calling of it.\u2019[82] Martens, the German publicist, at the end of\nthe same century, called privateering a privileged piracy; but Nelson\u2019s\nopinion may fairly count for more than all; and of his opinion there\nremains no doubt whatever. In a letter dated August 7, 1804, he wrote:\n\u2018If I had the least authority in controlling the privateers, whose\nconduct is so disgraceful to the British nation, I would instantly take\ntheir commissions from them.\u2019 In the same letter he spoke of them as\na horde of sanctioned robbers;[83] and on another occasion he wrote:\n\u2018The conduct of all privateering is, as far as I have seen, so near\npiracy, that I only wonder any civilised nation can allow them. The\nlawful as well as the unlawful commerce of the neutral flag is subject\nto every violation and spoliation.\u2019[84] Yet it was for the sake of\nsuch spoliation, which England chose to regard as her maritime right\nand to identify with her maritime supremacy, that, under the pretext\nof solicitude for the liberties of Europe, she fought her long war\nwith France, and made herself the enemy in turn of nearly every other\ncivilised Power in the world.\n\nThe Declaration of Paris, the first article of which abolished\nprivateering between the signatory Powers, was signed by Lord Clarendon\non behalf of England; but on the ground that it was not formally a\ntreaty, never having been ratified by Parliament or the Crown, it has\nactually been several times proposed in the English Parliament to\nviolate the honour of England by declaring that agreement null and\nvoid.[85] Lord Derby, in reference to such proposals, said in 1867:\n\u2018We have given a pledge, not merely to the Powers who signed with\nus, but to the whole civilised world.\u2019 This was the language of real\npatriotism, which esteems a country\u2019s honour its highest interest; the\nother was the language of the plainest perfidy. In November 1876, the\nRussian Government was also strongly urged, in the case of war with\nEngland, to issue letters of marque against British commerce, in spite\nof the international agreement to the contrary.[86] It is not likely\nthat it would have done so; but these motions in different countries\ngive vital interest to the history of privateering as one of the\nlegitimate modes of waging war.\n\nMoreover, since neither Spain, the United States, nor Mexico signed\nthe Declaration of Paris, war with any of them would revive all the\natrocities and disputes that have embittered previous wars in which\nEngland has been engaged. The precedent of former treaties, such as\nthat between Sweden and the United Provinces in 1675, the United States\nand Prussia in 1785, and the United States and Italy in 1871, by which\neither party agreed in the event of war not to employ privateers\nagainst the other, affords an obvious sample of what diplomacy might\nyet do to diminish the chances of war between the signatory and the\nnon-signatory Powers.\n\nThe United States would have signed the Declaration of Paris if it had\nexempted the merchant vessels of belligerents as well from public armed\nvessels as from privateers: and this must be looked to as the next\nconquest of law over lawlessness. Russia and several other Powers were\nready to accept the American amendment, which, having at first only\nfallen through owing to the opposition of England, was subsequently\nwithdrawn by America herself. Nevertheless, that amendment remains the\nwish not only of the civilised world, but of our own merchants, whose\ncarrying trade, the largest in the world, is, in the event of England\nbecoming a belligerent, in danger of falling into the hands of neutral\ncountries. In 1858 the merchants of Bremen drew up a formal protest\nagainst the right of ships of war to seize the property and ships of\nmerchants.[87] In the war of 1866 Prussia, Italy, and Austria agreed\nto forego this time-honoured right of mutual plunder; and the Emperor\nof Germany endeavoured to establish the same limitation in the war of\n1870. The old maxim of war, of which the custom is a survival, has\nlong since been disproved by political economy--the doctrine, namely,\nthat a loss to one country is a gain to another, or that one country\nprofits by the exact extent of the injury that it effects against the\nproperty of its adversary. Having lost its basis in reason, it only\nremains to remove it from practice.\n\nIf we turn for a moment from this aspect of naval warfare to the actual\nconduct of hostilities at sea, the desire to obtain forcible possession\nof an enemy\u2019s vessels must clearly have had a beneficial effect in\nrendering the loss of life less extensive than it was in battles on\nland. To capture a ship, it was desirable, if possible, to disable\nwithout destroying it; so that the fire of each side was more generally\ndirected against the masts and rigging than against the hull or lower\nparts of the vessel. In the case of the \u2018Berwick,\u2019 an English 74-gun\nship, which struck her colours to the French frigate, the \u2018Alceste,\u2019\nonly four sailors were wounded, and the captain, whose head was taken\noff by a bar-shot, was the only person slain; and \u2018so small a loss was\nattributed to the high firing of the French, who, making sure of the\n\u2018Berwick\u2019s\u2019 capture, and wanting such a ship entire in their fleet,\nwere wise enough to do as little injury as possible to her hull.\u2019[88]\nThe great battle between the English and Dutch fleets off Camperdown\n(1795) was exceptional both for the damage inflicted by both on the\nhulls of their adversaries, and consequently for the heavy loss of\nlife on either side. \u2018The appearance of the British ships at the close\nof the action was very unlike what it generally is when the French\nor Spaniards have been the opponents of the former. Not a single mast\nnor even a top-mast was shot away; nor were the rigging and sails of\nthe ships in their usual tattered state. It was at the hulls of their\nadversaries that the Dutchmen had directed their shot.\u2019[89] As the\nEnglish naturally retaliated, though \u2018as trophies the appearance of\nthe Dutch prizes was gratifying,\u2019 as ships of war \u2018they were not the\nslightest acquisition to the navy of England.\u2019[90]\n\nWhen this happened, as it could not but often do in pitched naval\nbattles, the Government sometimes made good to the captors the value of\nthe prizes that the serious nature of the conflict had caused them to\nlose. Thus in the case of the six French prizes made at the Battle of\nthe Nile, only three of which ever reached Plymouth, the Government,\n\u2018in order that the captors might not suffer for the prowess they had\ndisplayed in riddling the hulls of the captured ships, paid for each of\nthe destroyed 74s, the \u201cGuerrier,\u201d \u201cHeureux,\u201d and \u201cMercure,\u201d the sum of\n20,000_l._, which was as much as the least valuable of the remaining\n74s had been valued at.\u2019\n\nIt is curious to notice distinctions in naval warfare between lawful\nand unlawful methods similar to those conspicuous on land. Such\nprojectiles as bits of iron ore, pointed stones, nails, or glass, are\nexcluded from the list of things that may be used in _good war_; and\nthe Declaration of St. Petersburg condemns explosive bullets as much\non one element as on the other. Unfounded charges by one belligerent\nagainst another are, however, always liable to bring the illicit\nmethod into actual use on both sides under the pretext of reprisals;\nas we see in the following order of the day, issued at Brest by the\nFrench Vice-Admiral Marshal Conflans (Nov. 8, 1759): \u2018It is absolutely\ncontrary to the law of nations to make bad war, and to shoot shells at\nthe enemy, who must always be fought according to the rules of honour,\nwith the arms generally employed by polite nations. Yet some captains\nhave complained that the English have used such weapons against them.\nIt is, therefore, only on these complaints, and with an extreme\nreluctance, that it has been resolved to embark hollow shells on\nvessels of the line, but it is expressly forbidden to use them unless\nthe enemy begin.\u2019[91]\n\nSo the English in their turn charged the French with making bad\nwar. The wound received by Nelson at Aboukir, on the forehead, was\nattributed to a piece of iron or a langridge shot.[92] And the wounds\nthat the crew of the \u2018Brunswick\u2019 received from the \u2018Vengeur\u2019 in the\nfamous battle between the French and English fleets in June 1794, are\nsaid to have been peculiarly distressing, owing to the French employing\nlangridge shot of raw ore and old nails, and to their throwing\nstinkpots into the portholes, which caused most painful burnings and\nscaldings.[93] It is safest to discredit such accusations altogether,\nfor there is no limit to the barbarities that may come into play, in\nconsequence of too ready a credulity.\n\nRed-hot shot, legitimate for the defence of land forts against ships,\nused not to be considered good war in the contests of ships with one\nanother. In the three hours\u2019 action between the \u2018Lively\u2019 and the\n\u2018Tourterelle,\u2019 a French privateer, the use by the latter of hot-shot,\n\u2018not usually deemed honourable warfare,\u2019 was considered to be wrong,\nbut a wrong on the part of those who equipped her for sea more than\non the part of the captain who fired them.[94] The English assailing\nbatteries that fired red-hot shot against Gl\u00fcckstadt in 1813 are said\nto have resorted to \u2018a mode of warfare very unusual with us since the\nsiege of Gibraltar.\u2019[95]\n\nThe \u2018Treatise on Tactics,\u2019 by the Emperor Leo VI., carries back the\nrecord of the means employed against an enemy in naval warfare to\nthe ninth century. The things he recommends as most effective are:\ncranes, to let fall heavy weights on the enemy\u2019s decks; caltrops,\nwith iron spikes, to wound his feet;[96] jars full of quicklime,\nto suffocate him; jars containing combustibles, to burn him; jars\ncontaining poisonous reptiles, to bite him; and Greek fire with its\nnoise like thunder, to frighten as well as burn him.[97] Many of these\nmethods were of immemorial usage; for Scipio knew the merits of jars\nfull of pitch, and Hannibal of jars full of vipers.[98] Nothing was\ntoo bad for use in those days; nor can it be ascertained when or why\nthey ceased to be used. Greek fire was used with great effect in the\nsea-battles between the Saracens and Christians; and it is a fair cause\nfor wonder that the invention of gunpowder should have so entirely\nsuperseded it as to cause its very manufacture to have been forgotten.\nNeither does history record the date of, nor the reason for, the disuse\nof quicklime, which in the famous fight off Dover in 1217 between\nthe French and English contributed so greatly to the victory of the\nlatter.[99]\n\nIt is difficult to believe that sentiments of humanity should have\ncaused these methods to be discarded from maritime hostilities; but\nthat such motives led to a certain mitigation in the use of fire-ships\nappears from a passage in Captain Brenton\u2019s \u2018Naval History,\u2019 where he\nsays: \u2018The use of fire-ships has long been laid aside, to the honour of\nthe nation which first dispensed with this barbarous aggravation of the\nhorrors of war.\u2019 That is to say, as he explains it, though fire-ships\ncontinued to accompany the fleets, they were only used in an anchorage\nwhere there was a fair chance of the escape of the crew against which\nthey were sent; they ceased to be used, as at one time, to burn or\nblow up disabled ships, which the conqueror dared not board and carry\ninto port, and which were covered with the wounded and dying. The last\ninstance in which they were so used by the English was in the fight\noff Toulon, in 1744; and their use on that occasion is said to have\nreceived merited reproach from an historian of the day.[100]\n\nAs the service of a fire-ship was one that required the greatest\nbravery and coolness--since it was, of course, attacked in every\npossible way, and it was often difficult to escape by the boat chained\nbehind it--it displays the extraordinary inconsistency of opinion about\nsuch matters that it should have been accounted rather a service of\ninfamy than of honour. Molloy, in 1769, wrote of it as the practice of\nhis day to put to death prisoners made from a fire-ship: \u2018Generally\nthe persons found in them are put to death if taken.\u2019[101] And another\nwriter says: \u2018Whether it be from a refined idea, or from the most\ndetermined resentment towards those who act in fire-ships, may be\ndifficult to judge; but there is rarely any quarter given to such as\nfall into the enemy\u2019s power.\u2019[102]\n\nClock-machines, or torpedoes, were introduced into European warfare by\nthe English, being intended to destroy Napoleon\u2019s ships at Boulogne in\n1804. It is remarkable that the use of them was at first reprobated by\nCaptain Brenton, and by Lord St. Vincent, who foresaw that other Powers\nwould in turn adopt the innovation.[103] The French, who picked up some\nof them near Boulogne, called them infernal machines. But at present\nthey seem fairly established as part of good warfare, in default of any\ninternational agreement against them, such as that which exists against\nexplosive bullets.\n\nThe same International Act which abolished privateering between the\nsignatory Powers settled also between them two other disputed points\nwhich for centuries were a frequent cause of war and jealousy--namely,\nthe liability of the property of neutrals to be seized when found in\nthe ships of an enemy, and of the property of an enemy to be seized\nwhen found in the ships of a neutral.\n\nOver the abstract right of belligerents so to deal with the ships\nor property of neutral Powers the publicists for long fought a\nbattle-royal, contending either that a neutral ship should be regarded\nas neutral territory, or that an enemy\u2019s property was lawful prize\nanywhere. Whilst the French or Continental theory regarded the\nnationality of the vessel rather than of its cargo, so that the goods\nof a neutral might be fairly seized on an enemy\u2019s vessel, but those\nof an enemy were safe even in a neutral ship; the English theory was\ndiametrically the opposite, for the Admiralty restored a neutral\u2019s\nproperty taken on an enemy\u2019s vessel, but confiscated an enemy\u2019s goods\nif found on a neutral vessel. This difference between the English\nrule and that of other countries was a source of endless contention.\nFrederick II. of Prussia, in 1753, first resisted the English claim to\nseize hostile property sailing under a neutral flag. Then came against\nthe same claim the first Armed Neutrality of 1780, headed by Russia,\nand again in 1801 the second armed coalition of the Northern Powers.\nThe difference of rule was, therefore, as such differences always must\nbe, a source of real weakness to England, on account of the enemies it\nraised against her all over the world. Yet the Continental theory of\nfree ships making free goods was considered for generations to be so\nadverse to the real interests of England, that Lord Nelson, in 1801,\ncharacterised it in the House of Lords as \u2018a proposition so monstrous\nin itself, so contrary to the law of nations, and so injurious to the\nmaritime interests of England, as to justify war with the advocates\nof such a doctrine, so long as a single man, a single shilling, or a\nsingle drop of blood remained in the country.\u2019[104] The Treaty of Paris\nhas made binding the Continental rule, and in spite of Lord Nelson free\nships now make free goods.\n\nThe fact, therefore, that if England were now at war with France she\ncould not take French property (unless it were contraband) from a\nRussian or American ship, we owe not to the publicists who were divided\nabout it, nor to naval opinion which was decided against it, but to the\naccidental alliance between France and England in the Crimean war. In\norder to co-operate together, each waived its old claim, according to\nwhich France would have been free to seize the property of a neutral\nfound on Russian vessels, and England to seize Russian property on the\nvessels of a neutral. As the United States and other neutral Powers\nas well would probably have resisted by arms the claim of either so\nto interfere with their neutrality, the mutual concession was one of\ncommon prudence; and as the same opposition would have been perennial,\nit was no great sacrifice on the part of either to perpetuate and\nextend by a treaty at the close of the war the agreement that at first\nwas only to last for its continuance.\n\nMuch, however, as that treaty has done for the peace of the world, by\nassimilating in these respects the maritime law of nations, it has left\nmany customs unchanged to challenge still the attention of reformers.\nIt is therefore of some practical interest to consider of what nature\nfuture changes should be, inasmuch as, if we cannot agree to cease from\nfighting altogether, the next best thing we can do is to reduce the\npretexts for it to as few as possible.\n\nThe reservation, then, in favour of confiscating property that is\ncontraband of war has left the right of visiting and searching neutral\nor hostile merchantmen for contraband untouched; though nothing has\nbeen a more fruitful source of quarrel than the want of a common\ndefinition of what constitutes contraband. Anything which, without\nfurther manipulation, adds directly to an enemy\u2019s power, as weapons\nof war, are contraband by universal admission; but whether corn and\nprovisions are, as some text-writers assert and others deny; whether\ncoined money, horses, or saddles are, as was decided in 1863 between\nthe Northern Powers of Europe; whether tar and pitch for ships are, as\nwas disputed between England and Sweden for 200 years; whether coal\nshould be, as Prince Bismarck claimed against England in 1870; or\nwhether rice is a war-threatening point of difference between England\nand France in this very year of grace; these are questions that remain\nabsolutely undecided, or are left to the treaties between the several\nPowers or the arbitrary caprice of belligerents.\n\nThe Declaration of Paris was equally silent as to the right (demanded\nby all the Powers save England) for ships of war, which have always\nbeen exempt from search, to exempt from search also the merchant\nvessels sailing under their convoy. So fundamental a divergence between\nthe maritime usages of different countries can only be sustained under\nthe peril of incurring hostility and war, without any corresponding\nadvantage in compensation.\n\nThe Declaration of Paris has also left untouched the old usage of\nembargoes. A nation wronged by another may still seize the vessels of\nthat other which may be in its ports, in order to secure attention to\nits claims; restoring them in the event of a peaceable settlement,\nbut confiscating them if war ensues. The resemblance of this practice\nof hostile embargo to robbery, \u2018occurring as it does in the midst of\npeace ... ought,\u2019 says an American jurist, \u2018to make it disgraceful and\ndrive it into disuse.\u2019[105] It would be as reasonable to seize the\npersons and property of all the merchants resident in the country, as\nused to be done by France and England. In 1795, Holland, having been\nconquered by France, became thereby an enemy of England. Accordingly,\n\u2018orders were issued to seize all Dutch vessels in British ports;\u2019 in\nvirtue of which, several gun-ships and between fifty and sixty merchant\nvessels in Plymouth Sound were detained by the port admiral.[106] It is\ndifficult to conceive anything less defensible as a practice between\ncivilised States.\n\nIt equally descends from the barbarous origin of maritime law that all\nships of an enemy wrecked on our coast, or forced to take refuge in our\nharbours by stress of weather or want of provisions, or in ignorance\nof the existence of hostilities, should become ours by right of war.\nThere are generous instances to the contrary. The Spanish Governor of\nHavana in 1746, when an English vessel was driven into that hostile\nport by stress of weather, refused to seize the vessel and take the\ncaptain prisoner; and so did another Spanish governor in the case of\nan English vessel whose captain was ignorant that Honduras was hostile\nterritory. But these cases are the exception; the rule being, that a\nhostile Power avails itself of a captain\u2019s ignorance or distress to\nmake him a prisoner and his ship a prize of war; another proof, if\nfurther needed, how very little magnanimity really enters into the\nconduct of hostilities.\n\nIt is a still further abuse of the rights of war that a belligerent\nState may do what it pleases, not only with all the vessels of its\nown subjects, but with all those of neutrals as well which happen to\nbe within its jurisdiction at the beginning of a war; that it may, on\npaying the owners the value of their freight beforehand, confiscate\nsuch vessels and compel them to serve in the transport of its troops\nor its munitions of war. Yet this is the so-called _jus angari\u00e6_, to\nwhich Prince Bismarck appealed when in the war with France the Germans\nsank some British vessels at the mouth of the Seine.[107] It is true we\nreceived liberal compensation, but the right is none the less one which\nall the Powers are interested in abolishing.\n\nIf, then, from the preceding retrospect it appears that whatever\nadvance we have made on the maritime usages of our ancestors has been\ndue solely to international agreement, and to a friendly concert\nbetween the chief Powers of the world, acting with a view to their\npermanent and collective interests, the inference is evidently in\nfavour of any further advance being only possible in the same way. The\nrenunciations of each Power redound to the benefit of each and all;\nnor can the gain of the world involve any real loss for the several\nnations that compose it. We shall therefore, perhaps, not err far from\nthe truth, if we imagine the following articles, in complement of those\nformulated in Paris in 1856, to constitute the International Marine\nCode which will be found in the future to be most calculated to remove\nsources of contention between nations, and best adapted, therefore, to\nthe permanent interests of the contracting parties:\n\n 1. Privateering is and remains abolished.\n\n 2. The merchant vessels and cargoes of belligerents shall be exempted\n    from seizure and confiscation.\n\n 3. The colonies of either belligerent shall be excluded from the field\n    of legitimate hostilities, and the neutrality of their territory\n    shall extend to their ships and commerce.\n\n 4. The right of visiting and searching neutral or hostile merchantmen\n    for contraband of war shall be abolished.\n\n 5. Contraband of war shall be defined by international agreement; and\n    to deal in such contraband shall be made a breach of the civil\n    law, prohibited and punished by each State as a violation of its\n    proclamation of neutrality.\n\n 6. Except in the case of contraband as aforesaid, all trade shall\n    be lawful between the subjects of either belligerent, since\n    individuals are no more involved in the quarrel between their\n    respective governments at sea than they are on land.\n\n 7. The only limitation to commerce shall be so effective a blockade of\n    an enemy\u2019s ports as shall render it impossible for ships to enter\n    or leave them; and the mere notification that a port is blockaded\n    shall not justify the seizure of ships that have sailed from, or\n    are sailing to, them in any part of the world.\n\n 8. The right to lay hostile embargoes on the ships of a friendly\n    Power, by reason of a dispute arising between them, shall be\n    abolished.\n\n 9. The right to confiscate or destroy the ships of a friendly Power\n    for the service of a belligerent State, the _jus angari\u00e6_, shall be\n    abolished.\n\nWhat, then, would remain for the naval forces of maritime Powers to do?\nEverything, it may be replied, which constitutes legitimate warfare,\nand conforms to the elementary conception of a state of hostility; the\nblockading of hostile ports, and all the play of attack and defence\nthat may be imagined between belligerent navies. Whatsoever is more\nthan this--the plunder of an enemy\u2019s commerce, embargoes on his ships,\nthe search of neutral vessels--not only cometh of piracy, as has been\nshown, but is in fact piracy itself, without any necessary connection\nwith the conduct of legitimate hostilities.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nMILITARY REPRISALS.\n\n    _Si quis clamet iniquum non dare p\u0153nas qui peccavit, respondeo\n    multo esse iniquius tot innocentium millia citra meritum in\n    extremam vocari calamitatem._--ERASMUS.\n\n    International law on legitimate reprisals--The Brussels Conference\n    on the subject--Illustrations of barbarous reprisals--Instances\n    of non-retaliation--Savage reprisals in days of chivalry--Hanging\n    the commonest reprisals for a brave defence, as illustrated by the\n    warfare of the fifteenth century--Survival of the custom to our own\n    times--The massacre of a conquered garrison still a law of war--The\n    shelling of Strasburg by the Germans--Brutal warfare of Alexander\n    the Great--The connection between bravery and cruelty--The\n    abolition of slavery in its effects on war--The storming of\n    Magdeburg, Brescia, and Rome--Cicero on Roman warfare--The\n    reprisals of the Germans in France in 1870--Their revival of the\n    custom of taking hostages--Their resort to robbery as a plea\n    of reprisals--General Von Moltke on perpetual peace--The moral\n    responsibility of the military profession--The Press as a potent\n    cause of war--Plea for the abolition of demands for unconditional\n    surrender, such as led to the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882.\n\n\nOn no subject connected with the operations of war has International\nLaw come as yet to lamer conclusions than concerning Military\nReprisals, or the revenge that may be fairly exacted by one belligerent\nfrom the other for violation of the canons of honourable warfare.\n\nGeneral Halleck, for instance, whilst as against an enemy who puts in\nforce the extreme rights of war he justifies a belligerent in following\nsuit, denies the right of the latter to do so against an enemy who\npasses all bounds and conducts war in a downright savage fashion.\nWhilst therefore, according to him, the law of retaliation would never\njustify such acts as the massacre of prisoners, the use of poison, or\npromiscuous slaughter, he would consider as legitimate reprisals acts\nlike the sequestration by Denmark of debts due from Danish to British\nsubjects in retaliation for the confiscation by England of the Danish\nfleet in 1807, or Napoleon\u2019s seizure of all English travellers in\nFrance in retaliation for England\u2019s seizure and condemnation of French\nvessels in 1803.[108] And a French writer, in the same spirit, denies\nthat the French Government would have been justified in retaliating on\nRussia, when the Czar had his French prisoners of war consigned to the\nmines of Siberia.[109]\n\nThe distinction is clearly untenable on any rational theory of the laws\nof retributive justice. You may retaliate for the lesser, but not for\nthe greater injury! You may check resort to infamous hostilities by the\nthreat of reprisals, but must fold your hands and submit, if your enemy\nbecomes utterly barbarous! You may restrain him from burning your crops\nby burning his, but must be content to go without redress if he slays\nyour wives and children!\n\nHow difficult the question really is appears from the attempt made\nto settle it at the Brussels Conference of 1874, when the following\nclauses formed part of the original Russian project submitted to the\nconsideration of that meeting:\n\n_Section IV._ 69. \u2018Reprisals are admissible in extreme cases only, due\nregard being paid as far as possible to the laws of humanity when it\nshall have been unquestionably proved that the laws and customs of war\nhave been violated by the enemy, and that they have had recourse to\nmeasures condemned by the law of nations.\u2019\n\n70. \u2018The selection of the means and extent of the reprisals should be\nproportionate to the degree of the infraction of the law committed by\nthe enemy. Reprisals that are disproportionately severe are contrary to\nthe rules of international law.\u2019\n\n71. \u2018Reprisals should be allowed only on the authority of the\ncommander-in-chief, who shall likewise determine the degree of their\nseverity and their duration.\u2019\n\nThe delicacy of dealing with such a subject, when the memories of\nthe Franco-German war were still fresh and green, led ultimately to\na unanimous agreement to suppress these clauses altogether, and to\nleave the matter, as the Belgian deputy expressed it, in the domain\nof unwritten law till the progress of science and civilisation should\nbring about a completely satisfactory solution. Nevertheless, the\nmajority of men will be inclined, in reference to this resolution,\nto say with the Russian Baron Jomini, the skilful President of that\nMilitary Council: \u2018I regret that the uncertainty of silence is to\nprevail with respect to one of the most bitter necessities of war.\nIf the practice could be suppressed by this reticence, I could not\nbut approve of this course; but if it is still to exist among the\nnecessities of war, this reticence and this obscurity may, it is to be\nfeared, remove any limits to its existence.\u2019\n\nThe necessity of some regulation of reprisals, such as that contained\nin the clauses suggested at Brussels, is no less attested by the events\nof the war of 1870 than by the customs in this respect which have at\nall times prevailed, and which, as earlier in time, form a fitting\nintroduction to those later occurrences.\n\nThat the fear of reprisals should act as a certain check upon the\ncharacter of hostilities is too obvious a consideration not to have\nalways served as a wholesome restraint upon military licence. When, for\ninstance, Philip II. of Spain in his war with the Netherlands ordered\nthat no prisoners of war should be released or exchanged, nor any\ncontributions be accepted as an immunity from confiscation, the threat\nof retaliation led to the withdrawal of his iniquitous proclamation.\nNor would other similar instances be far to seek.\n\nNevertheless, it is evident that, as seldom as war itself is prevented\nby consideration of the forces in opposition, will its peculiar\nexcesses, which constitute its details, be restrained by the fear of\nretaliatory measures; and inasmuch as the primary offence is more\noften the creation of rumour than a proved fact, the usual result\nof reprisals is, not that one belligerent amends its ways, but that\nboth belligerents become more savage and enter on a fatal career of\ncompetitive atrocities. In the wars of the fifteenth century between\nthe Turks and Venetians, \u2018Sultan Mahomet would not suffer his\nsoldiers to give quarter, but allowed them a ducat for every head, and\nthe Venetians did the same.\u2019[110] When the Duke of Alva was in the\nNetherlands, the Spaniards, at the siege of Haarlem, threw the heads of\ntwo Dutch officers over the walls. The Dutch in return beheaded twelve\nSpanish prisoners, and sent their heads into the Spanish trenches.\nThe Spaniards in revenge hung a number of prisoners in sight of the\nbesieged; and the latter in return killed more prisoners; and so it\nwent on during all the time that Alva was in the country, without the\nleast improvement resulting from such sanguinary reprisals.[111] At\nthe siege of Malta, the Grand Master, in revenge for some horrible\nTurkish barbarities, massacred all his prisoners and shot their heads\nfrom his cannon into the Turkish camp.[112] In one of the wars of Louis\nXIV., the Imperialist forces having put to death a French lieutenant\nand thirty troopers a few hours after having promised them quarter,\nFeuqui\u00e8res, for reprisals, slew the whole garrison of two towns that he\nwon by surprise, though the number so slain in each instance amounted\nto 650 men (1689).[113]\n\nTo all these cases the question asked by Vattel very pertinently\napplies: \u2018What right have you to cut off the nose and ears of the\nambassador of a barbarian who has treated your ambassador in that\nmanner?\u2019 The question is not an easy one to answer, for we have no more\nright in war than in civil life to punish the innocent for the guilty\napart from the ordinary accidents of hostilities, even if otherwise\nwe must dispense with redress altogether. To do so by intention and\nin cold blood is ferocious, whatever the pretext of justification,\nand is never worth the passing gratification it affords. The citizens\nof Ghent, in their famous war with the Earl of Flanders, not only\ndestroyed his house, but the silver cradle and bathing tub he had used\nas a child and the very font in which he had been baptized; but such\nreprisals are soon regretted, and read very pitiably in the eyes of the\nafter-world.\n\nIt is pleasanter to record some instances where abstinence from\nreprisals has not been without its reward. It is said that C\u00e6sar in\nIberia, when, in spite of a truce, the enemy killed many of his men,\ninstead of retaliating, released some of his prisoners and thereby\nbrought the foe to regard him with favour. We read in Froissart that\nthe Lisboners refrained from retaliating on the Castilians, when the\nlatter mutilated their Portuguese prisoners; and the English Government\nacted nobly when it refused to reciprocate the decree of the French\nConvention (though that also was meant as a measure of reprisals) that\nno English or Hanoverian prisoner should be allowed any quarter.[114]\nBut the best story of this kind is that told by Herodotus of Xerxes\nthe Persian. The Spartans had thrown into a well the Persian envoys who\nhad come to demand of them earth and water. In remorse they sent two of\ntheir nobles to Xerxes to be killed in atonement; but Xerxes, when he\nheard the purport of their visit, answered them that he would not act\nlike the Spartans, who by killing his heralds had broken the laws that\nwere regarded as sacred by all mankind, and that, of such conduct as he\nblamed in them, he would never be guilty himself.[115]\n\nBut the most curious feature in the history of reprisals is the fact\nthat they were once regarded as justly exacted for the mere offence\nof hostile opposition or self-defence. Grotius states that it was the\nalmost constant practice of the Romans to kill the leaders of an enemy,\nwhether they had surrendered or been captured, on the day of triumph.\nJugurtha indeed was put to death in prison; but the more usual practice\nappears to have been to keep conquered potentates in custody, after\nthey had been led in triumph before the consul\u2019s chariot. This was the\nfate of Perseus, king of Macedonia, who was also allowed to retain\nhis attendants, money, plate, and furniture;[116] of Gentius, king of\nIllyria;[117] of Bituitus, king of the Arvernians. Prisoners of less\ndistinction were sold as slaves, or kept in custody till their friends\npaid their ransom.\n\nBut in the medi\u00e6val history of Europe, in the so-called times of\nchivalry, a far worse spirit prevailed with regard to the treatment\nof captives. Godfrey of Bouillon, one of the brightest memories of\nchivalry, was responsible for the promiscuous slaughter of three days\nwhich the Crusaders exacted for the six weeks\u2019 siege which it had cost\nthem to take Jerusalem (1099). The Emperor Barbarossa had 1,190 Swabian\nprisoners delivered to the executioner at Milan, or shot from military\nengines.[118] Charles of Anjou reserved many prisoners, taken at the\nbattle of Beneventum, to be killed as criminals on his entrance into\nNaples. When the French took the castle of Pesqui\u00e8re from the Venetians\nby storm, they slew all but three who surrendered to the pleasure of\nthe king; and Louis XII., who counted for a humane monarch, though his\nvictims offered 100,000 ducats for their lives, swore that he would\nneither eat nor drink till they were hanged (1509).[119]\n\nThe indignation of the Roman Senate on one occasion with a consul\nwho had sold as slaves 10,000 Ligurian prisoners, though they had\nsurrendered at discretion,[120] was a sentiment that never affected the\nwarriors of medi\u00e6val Christendom. A surrender at discretion ceased to\nconstitute a claim for mercy. Where the pagan held it wrong to enslave,\nthe Christian never hesitated to kill. Froissart\u2019s story of the six\ncitizens of Calais, whom Edward III. was with difficulty restrained\nfrom hanging for the obstinate siege which their town had resisted,\nthrows a light over the war customs of that time, which other incidents\nof history abundantly confirm. The record of the capitulations of\ncities or garrisons is no pleasant one, but it is a record which must\nbe touched upon, in order that war and its still prevalent maxims may\nbe judged at their proper value. We need scarcely travel further than\nthe fifteenth century alone in search of facts to place in its proper\nlight this aspect of martial atrocities.\n\nWhen the town of Rouen surrendered to Henry V. of England, the latter\nstipulated for three of the citizens to be left to his disposal, of\nwhom two purchased their lives, and the third was beheaded (1419).[121]\nWhen the same king the year following was besieging the castle of\nMontereau, he sent some twenty prisoners to treat with the governor\nfor a surrender; but when the governor refused to treat, even to save\ntheir lives, and when, after a fearful leave-taking with their wives\nand relatives, they had been escorted back to the English army, \u2018the\nKing of England ordered a gallows to be erected and had them all hanged\nin sight of those within the castle.\u2019[122] When the English took the\ncastle of Rougemont by storm, and some sixty of its defenders alive,\nwith the loss of only one Englishman, Henry V., in revenge for his\ndeath, caused all the prisoners to be drowned in the Loire.[123] When\nMeaux surrendered to the same king, it was stipulated that six of\nits bravest defenders should be delivered up to _justice_, four of\nwhom were beheaded at Paris, and its commander at once hung to a tree\noutside the walls of the city (1422).[124]\n\nNot that there was any special cruelty in the English mode of warfare.\nThey simply conformed to the customs of the time, as we may see by\nreference to the French and Burgundian wars into which they allowed\nthemselves to be drawn. In 1434, the garrison of Chaumont \u2018was soon\nso hardly pressed that it surrendered at discretion to the Duke of\nBurgundy (Philip the Good), who had upwards of 100 of them hanged;\u2019 and\nas with the townsmen, so with those in the castle.[125] Bournonville,\nwho commanded Soissons for the Duke of Burgundy, and whom Monstrelet\ncalls \u2018the flower of the warriors of all France,\u2019 was beheaded at\nParis, after the capture of the town, by order of the king and council,\nand his body hung to a gibbet, like a common malefactor\u2019s (1414).[126]\nWhen Dinant was taken by storm by the Burgundians, the prisoners,\nabout 800, were drowned before Bovines (1466).[127] When the town of\nSaint-frou surrendered to the Duke of Burgundy, ten men, left to the\ndisposal of that warrior, were beheaded; and so it fared also with\nthe town of Tongres (1467).[128] After the storming and slaughter at\nLi\u00e8ge, before the Duke of Burgundy (Charles the Bold) left the city,\n\u2018a great number of those poor creatures who had hid themselves in the\nhouses when the town was taken and were afterwards made prisoners, were\nhanged\u2019 (1468).[129] At Nesle, most of those who were taken alive were\nhung, and some had their hands cut off (1472).[130] After the battle\nof Granson, the Swiss retook two castles from the French, and hung\nall the Burgundians they found in them. They then retook the town and\ncastle of Granson, and ordered 512 Germans whom the Burgundians had\nhung to be cut down, and as many of the Burgundians as were still in\nGranson to be suspended on the same halters (1476). In the skirmishes\nthat occurred in a time of truce on the frontiers of Picardy, between\nthe French king\u2019s forces and those of the Duke of Austria, \u2018all the\nprisoners that were taken on both sides were immediately hanged,\nwithout permitting any, of what degree or rank soever, to be ransomed\u2019\n(1481). And as a climax to these facts, let us recall the decree of the\nDuke of Anjou, who, when Montpellier was taken by siege, condemned 600\nprisoners to be put to death, 200 by the sword, 200 by the halter, and\n200 by fire, and who, but for the remonstrances of a cardinal and a\nfriar, would undoubtedly have executed his sentence.\n\nGhastly facts enough these! and a strange insight they afford us into\nthe real character of a profession which, in the days when these things\nwere its commonest occurrences, was held to be the noblest of all, but\nof which it is only too patent that its mainsprings were simply the\nbrigand\u2019s love of plunder and of bloodshed. One story may be quoted\nto show that in this respect the sixteenth century was no improvement\non the fifteenth. In the war between the Dutch and the Spaniards, the\ncaptain of Weerd Castle, having previously refused to surrender to Sir\nFrancis de Vere, begged at last for a capitulation with the honours\nof war; Vere\u2019s answer was, that the honours of war were halters for a\ngarrison that had dared to defend such a hovel against artillery. The\ncommandant was killed first, and the remaining 26 men, having been\nmade to draw black and white straws, the 12 who drew the white straws\nwere hanged, the thirteenth only escaping by consenting to act as\nexecutioner of the rest![131]\n\nIt is clear, therefore, that in the wars of the past the axe and the\nhalter have played as conspicuous a part as the sword or the lance;\na fact to which its due prominence has not always been given in the\nstandard histories of military antiquities. It is surprising to find\nhow close to the glories of war lie the sickening vulgarities of murder.\n\nTo the Duke of Somerset, the regent of England for Edward VI., appears\nto be due the credit of instituting a milder treatment of a besieged\nbut surrendered garrison than had been previously customary. For De\nThou, the historian, speaks of the admiration the Duke received for\nsparing the lives of a Scotch garrison, contrary to that \u2018ancient maxim\nin war which declares that a weak garrison forfeits all claim to mercy\non the part of the conquerors, when, with more courage than prudence,\nthey obstinately persevere in defending an ill-fortified place against\nthe royal army,\u2019 or refuse reasonable conditions.\n\nBut the ancient maxim lasted, in spite of this better example,\nthroughout the seventeenth and till late into the eighteenth century,\nfor we find Vattel even then thus protesting against it: \u2018How could it\nbe conceived in an enlightened age that it was lawful to punish with\ndeath a governor who has defended his town to the last extremity, or\nwho in a weak place had the courage to hold out against a royal army?\nIn the last century this notion still prevailed; it was looked upon as\none of the laws of war, and is not even at present totally exploded.\nWhat an idea! to punish a brave man for having performed his duty.\u2019[132]\n\nBut not even yet is the notion definitely expunged from the unwritten\ncode of martial etiquette. The original Russian project, submitted\nto the Brussels Conference, proposed to exclude, among other illicit\nmeans of war, \u2018the threat of extermination towards a garrison that\nobstinately holds a fortress.\u2019 The proposal was unanimously rejected,\nand that clause was carefully excluded from the published modified\ntext! But as the execution of a threat is morally of the same value\nas the threat itself, it is evident that the massacre of a brave but\nconquered garrison still holds its place among the laws of Christian\nwarfare!\n\nThis peculiar and most sanguinary law of reprisals has always been\ndefended by the common military sophism, that it shortens the horrors\nof war. The threat of capital punishment against the governor or\ndefenders of a town should naturally dispose them to make a conditional\nsurrender, and so spare both sides the miseries of a siege. But\narguments in defence of atrocities, on the ground of their shortening\na war, and coming from military quarters, must be viewed with the\ngreatest suspicion, and, inasmuch as they provoke reprisals and so\nintensify passion, with the greatest distrust. It was to such an\nargument that the Germans resorted in defence of their shelling the\ntown of Strasburg, in order to intimidate the inhabitants and drive\nthem to force General Uhrich to a surrender. \u2018The abbreviation,\u2019 said\na German writer, \u2018of the period of actual fighting and of the war\nitself is an act of humanity towards both parties;\u2019[133] although the\nsavage act failed in its purpose and General Werder had to fall back,\nafter his gratuitous destruction of life and property, on the slower\nprocess of a regular siege. If their tendency to shorten a war be the\nfinal justification of military proceedings, the ground begins to slip\nfrom under us against the use of aconitine or of clothes infected\nwith the small-pox. Therefore such a pretext should meet with prompt\ncondemnation, notwithstanding the efforts of the modern military school\nto render it popular upon the earth.\n\nIn respect, therefore, to this law of reprisals, the comparison is\nnot to the credit of modern times as compared with the pagan era. A\nsurrender, which in Greek and Roman warfare involved as a rule personal\nsecurity, came in Christianised Europe to involve capital punishment\nout of motives of pure vindictiveness. The chivalry so often associated\nwith the battle-field as at least a redeeming feature fades on closer\ninspection into the veriest fiction of romance. Bravery under any form\nhas been the constant pretext for capital reprisals. Edward I. had\nWilliam Wallace, the brave Scotch leader, executed on Tower Hill;\nand it has been observed by one writer, as the facts already quoted\nprove, that the custom of thus killing defeated generals \u2018may be traced\nthrough a series of years so connected and extensive that we are not\nable to point out the exact time when it ceased.\u2019[134]\n\nA characteristic incident of this sort is connected with the famous\npacification of Guienne by Montluc in 1562. Montluc had won Montsegur\nby storm, and its commander had been taken alive. The latter was a man\nof notorious valour, and in a previous campaign had been Montluc\u2019s\nfellow-soldier and friend. For that reason many interceded for his\nlife, but Montluc decided to hang him, and simply on account of his\nvalour. \u2018I well knew his courage,\u2019 he says, \u2018which made me hang him....\nI knew him to be valiant, but that made me the rather put him to\ndeath.\u2019 What of your chivalry after that?\n\nBut Alexander the Great, whose career has been the ideal of all\nsucceeding aspirants to military fame, dealt even more severely than\nMontluc with Betis, the gallant defender of Gaza. When Gaza was at last\ntaken by storm, Betis, after fighting heroically, had the misfortune to\nbe taken alive and to be brought into the presence of the conqueror.\nAlexander addressed him thus: \u2018You shall not die, Betis, in the manner\nyou wished; but make up your mind to suffer whatever torture can be\nthought of against a prisoner;\u2019 and when Betis for all answer returned\nhim but the silence of disdain, Alexander had thongs fixed to his\nankles, and, himself acting as charioteer, drove his yet living victim\nround the city, attached to his chariot wheels; priding himself that by\nsuch conduct he rivalled Achilles\u2019 treatment of Hector.[135]\n\nA valiant resistance was with Alexander always a sufficient motive\nfor the most sanguinary reprisals. Arimages, who defended a fortified\nrock in Sogdia, thought his position so strong that when summoned to\nsurrender, he asked tauntingly whether Alexander could fly; and for\nthis offence, when, unable to hold out any longer, Arimages and his\nrelations descended to Alexander\u2019s camp to beg for quarter, Alexander\nhad them first of all flogged and then crucified at the foot of the\nrock they had so bravely defended.[136] After the long siege of Tyre,\nAlexander had 2,000 Tyrians, over and above the 6,000 who fell during\nthe storming of that city, nailed to crosses along the shore,[137]\nperhaps in reprisal for a violation of the laws of war--for Quintus\nCurtius declares that the Tyrians had murdered some Macedonian\nambassadors, and Arrian, who makes no mention of the crucifixion,\ndeclares that they slew some Macedonian prisoners and threw them from\ntheir walls--but more probably (since there were evidently different\nstories of the Tyrians\u2019 offence) on account simply of the obstinate\nresistance they had offered to Alexander\u2019s attack.\n\nThe Macedonian conqueror regarded his whole expedition against Persia\nas an act of reprisals for the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, 150\nyears before his own time. When he set fire to the Persian capital\nand palace, Persepolis, he justified himself against Parmenio\u2019s\nremonstrances on the ground that it was in revenge for the destruction\nof the temples in Greece during the Persian invasion;[138] and this\nmotive was constantly present with him, in justification both of the\nwar itself and of particular atrocities connected with it. In the\ncourse of his expedition, he came to a city of the Branchid\u00e6, whose\nancestors at Miletus had betrayed the treasures of a temple in their\ncharge to Xerxes, and had by him been removed from Miletus to Asia.\nAs Greeks they met Alexander\u2019s army with joy, and at once surrendered\ntheir city to him. The next day, after reflection given to the matter,\nAlexander had every single inhabitant of the city slain, in spite of\ntheir powerlessness, in spite of their supplications, in spite of their\ncommunity of language and origin. He even had the walls of the city\ndug up from their foundation, and the trees of their sacred groves\nuprooted, that not a trace of their city might remain.[139]\n\nNor can doubt be thrown on these deeds by the fact that they are\nonly mentioned by Quintus Curtius and not by Arrian. The silence of\nthe one is no proof of the falsity or credulity of the other. Both\nwriters lived many centuries after Alexander, and were dependent for\ntheir knowledge on the writings, then extant but long since lost, of\ncontemporaries and eye-witnesses of the expedition to Asia. That those\nwitnesses often gave conflicting accounts of the same event we have the\nassurance of either writer; but since it is impossible to determine\nthe degree of discretion with which each made their selections from\nthe original authorities, it is only reasonable to regard them both as\nof the same and equal validity. Seneca, who lived before Arrian and\nwho therefore was equally conversant with the original authorities,\nhardly ever mentions Alexander without expressions of the strongest\nreprobation.\n\nCruelty, in fact, is revealed to us by history as the most conspicuous\ntrait in the character of Alexander, though not in his case nor in\nothers inconsistent with occasional acts of magnanimity and the gleams\nof a higher nature. This cruelty, however, taken in connection with\nhis undoubted bravery, calls in question the truth of a remark made by\nPhilip de Commines, and supported, he affirmed, by all historians, that\nno cruel man is ever courageous. The popular theory, that inhumanity is\nmore likely to be the concomitant of a timid than of a daring nature,\nignores altogether the teaching of history and the conclusions of _\u00e0\npriori_ reasoning. For if our regard for the sufferings of others is\nproportioned to our regard for our own sufferings, inasmuch as our\nself-love is the foundation and measure of our powers of sympathy,\na man\u2019s disregard for the sufferings of others--in other words his\ncruelty--is likely to be the exact reflection of his disregard for\nsuffering in his own person, or, in other words, of his physical\ncourage. Men, moreover, like Cicero, of whom it was said by Livy that\nhe was better calculated for anything than for war, by their very\nincapacity for positions where their humanity is likely to be tested,\nare rarely exposed to those temptations of cruelty in which men of a\nmore daring temperament naturally find themselves placed.\n\nAnd accordingly we find, by reference to instances which lie on the\nsurface of history, that great bravery and great cruelty have more\noften been united than separate. In French history there is the cruelty\nof Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy; of Montluc and Des Adretz,\nthe latter of whom made 30 soldiers and their captain leap from the\nprecipice of a strong place they had defended, and of both of whom\nBrant\u00f4me remarks that they were very brave but very cruel.[140] In\nScotch history, it was David I. who, though famed for his courage and\nhumanity, suffered the sick and aged to be slain in their beds, even\ninfants to be killed and priests murdered at the very altars.[141] In\nEnglish history, it was Richard C\u0153ur-de-Lion who had 5,000 Saracen\nprisoners led out to a large plain to be massacred (1191).[142] In\nJewish history, it was King David who, when he took Rabbah of the\nAmmonites, \u2018brought forth the people that were therein and put them\nunder saws and harrows of iron and under axes of iron, and made them\npass through the brick kiln; and thus did he unto all the cities of the\nchildren of Ammon.\u2019[143] It is not therefore more probable that a man\nfamed for his intrepidity will not lend himself to counsels or actions\nof cruelty than that another deficient in personal courage will not be\nhumane.\n\nAnd here one cause is deserving of attention as helping to explain the\ngreater barbarity practised by the modern nations in the matter of\nreprisals, than that which was permitted by the code of honour which\nacted in restraint of them in the better periods of pagan antiquity;\nand that is the change that has occurred with regard to slavery.\n\nThe abolition of slavery, which in Western Europe has been the greatest\nachievement of modern civilisation, did not unfortunately tend to\ngreater mildness in the customs of war. For in ancient times the sale\nof prisoners as slaves operated to restrain that indiscriminate and\nobjectless slaughter which has been, even to cases within this century,\nthe marked feature of the battle-field, and more especially where\ncities or places have been taken by storm. Avarice ceased to operate,\nas it once did, in favour of humanity. In one day the population of\nMagdeburg, taken by storm, was reduced from 25,000 to 2,700; and an\nEnglish eye-witness of that event thus described it: \u2018Of 25,000, some\nsaid 30,000 people, there was not a soul to be seen alive, till the\nflames drove those that were hid in vaults and secret places to seek\ndeath in the streets rather than perish in the fire; of these miserable\ncreatures some were killed too by the furious soldiers, but at last\nthey saved the lives of such as came out of their cellars and holes,\nand so about 2,000 poor desperate creatures were left.\u2019[144] \u2018There\nwas little shooting, the execution was all cutting of throats and\nmere house murders.... We could see the poor people in crowds driven\ndown the streets, flying from the fury of the soldiers, who followed\nbutchering them as fast as they could, and refused mercy to anybody;\ntill, driving them down to the river\u2019s edge, the desperate wretches\nwould throw themselves into the river, where thousands of them\nperished, especially women and children.\u2019[145]\n\nIt is difficult to read this graphic description of a stormed city\nwithout the suspicion arising in the mind that a sheer thirst for blood\nand love of murder is a much more potent sustainer of war than it is\nusual or agreeable to believe. The narratives of most victories and\nof taken cities support this theory. At Brescia, for instance, taken\nby the French from the Venetians in 1512, it is said that 20,000 of\nthe latter fell to only 50 of the former.[146] When Rome was sacked in\n1527 by the Imperialist forces, we are told that \u2018the soldiery threw\nthemselves upon the unhappy multitude, and, without distinction of age\nor sex, massacred all who came in their way. Strangers were spared as\nlittle as Romans, for the murderers fired indiscriminately at everyone,\nfrom a mere thirst of blood.\u2019[147]\n\nBut this thirst of blood was checked in the days of slavery by the\ncounteracting thirst of money; there having been an obvious motive\nfor giving quarter when a prisoner of war represented something of\ntangible value, like any other article of booty. The sack of Thebes\nby Alexander, and its demolition to the sound of the lute, was bad\nenough; but after the first rage for slaughter was over, there remained\n30,000 persons of free birth to be sold as slaves. And in Roman\nwarfare the rule was to sell as slaves those who were taken prisoners\nin a stormed city; and it must be remembered that many so sold were\nslaves already.[148] All who were unarmed or who laid down their arms\nwere spared from destruction, as well as from plunder;[149] and for\nexceptions to this rule, as for instance for the indiscriminate and\ncruel massacre committed at Illiturji in Spain, there was always at\nleast the pretext of reprisals, or some special military motive.[150]\n\nCicero, who lived to see the Roman arms triumphant over the world and\nthe conversion of the Roman republic into a military despotism, found\noccasion to deplore at the same time the debased standard of military\nhonour. He believed that in cruel vindictiveness and rapacity his\ncontemporaries had degenerated from the customs of their ancestors, and\nhe contrasted regretfully the utter destruction of Carthage, Numantia,\nand Corinth, with the milder treatment of their earlier enemies, the\nSabines, Tusculans, and others. He adduced as a proof of the greater\nferocity of the war spirit of his day the fact that the only term\nfor an enemy was originally the milder term of stranger, and that it\nwas only by degrees that the word meaning stranger came to have the\nconnotation of hostility. \u2018What,\u2019 he asks, \u2018could have been added\nto this mildness, to call him with whom you are at war by so gentle\na name as stranger? But now the progress of time has given a harder\nsignification to the word; for it has ceased to apply to a stranger,\nand has remained the proper term for an actual enemy in arms.\u2019[151]\n\nIs a similar process taking place in modern warfare with regard to\nthe law of reprisals? It is a long leap from ancient Rome to modern\nGermany; but to Germany, as the chief military Power now in existence,\nwe must turn, in order to understand the law of reprisals as it is\ninterpreted by the practice of a country whose power and example will\nmake her actions precedents in all wars that may occur in future.\n\nThe worst feature in reprisals is that they are indiscriminate and\nmore often directed against the innocent than the guilty. To murder\nwomen and children, old men, or any one else, on the ground of their\nconnection with an enemy who has committed an action calling for\nretribution, can be justified by no theory that would not equally apply\nto a similar parody of justice in civil life. It is a return to the\ntheory and practices of savages, who, if they cannot revenge themselves\non a culprit, revenge themselves complacently on some one else. For\nbodies of peasants to resist a foreign invader by forming ambuscades or\nmaking surprises against him, though his advance is marked by fire and\npillage and outrage, may be contrary to the laws of war (though that\npoint has never been agreed upon); but to make such attacks the pretext\nfor indiscriminate murder and robbery is an extension of the law of\nreprisals that was only definitely imported into the military code of\nEurope by the German invaders of France in 1870.\n\nThe following facts, offered in proof of this statement, are taken\nfrom a small pamphlet, published during the war by the International\nSociety for Help to the Wounded, and containing only such facts as were\nattested by the evidence of official documents or of persons whose\npositions gave them an exceptional title to credit.[152] At one place,\nwhere twenty-five francs-tireurs had hidden in a wood and received the\nGermans with a fusillade, reprisals were carried so far that the cur\u00e9,\nrushing into the streets, seized the Prussian captain by the shoulders\nand entreated mercy for the women and children. \u2018No mercy\u2019 was the\nonly reply.[153] At another place twenty-six young men had joined the\nfrancs-tireurs; the Baden troops took and shot their fathers.[154] At\nNemours, where a body of Uhlans had been surprised and captured by\nsome mobiles, the floors and furniture of several houses were first\nsaturated with petroleum and then fired with shells.[155]\n\nThe new theory also was imported into the military code, that a\nvillage, by the mere fact of trying to defend itself, constituted\nitself a place of war which might be legitimately bombarded and, when\ntaken, subjected to the rights of war which still govern the fate of\nplaces taken by assault.[156] Nor let it be supposed that those rights\nwere not exercised as rigorously as they ever have been by victorious\ntroops. At Nogent-sur-Seine, the Wurtemburg troops carried their fury\nto the slaughter of women and children and even of the wounded. And if\nthe belief still lingers that the German troops of the Emperor William\nbehaved otherwise towards the weaker sex than their ancestors in Rome\nand Italy under the Constable of Bourbon, let the reader refer to the\nexperiences of Clermont, Andernay, or Neuville.[157]\n\nReprisals beget, of course, reprisals; and had the French and German\nwar been by any accident prolonged, it is appalling to think of the\nbarbarities that would have occurred. \u2018Threat for threat,\u2019 wrote\nColonel R. Garibaldi to the Prussian commander at Ch\u00e2tillon, in\nreference to the latter\u2019s resolve to punish the inhabitants of that\nplace for the acts of some francs-tireurs; \u2018I give you my assurance\nthat I will not spare one of the 200 Prussians whom you know to be in\nmy hands.\u2019[158] \u2018We will fight,\u2019 wrote General Chanzy to the Prussian\ncommander at Vend\u00f4me, \u2018without truce or mercy, because it is a question\nnow not of fighting loyal enemies, but hordes of devastators.\u2019[159]\n\nUnder the theory of legitimate reprisals, the Germans resuscitated\nthe custom of taking hostages. The French having (in accordance with\nthe still recognised but barbarous rule of war) taken prisoners the\ncaptains of some German merchant vessels, the Germans retaliated\nby taking twenty persons of respectable position at Dijon, and nine\nat Vesoul, and detaining them as hostages. Nor was this an uncommon\nepisode in the campaign: though the sending to Germany as prisoners\nof war of French merchants, magistrates, lawyers, and doctors, and\nthe making them answerable with their lives and fortunes for actions\nof their countrymen which they could neither prevent nor repress, was\na revival in its worst form of the theory of vicarious punishment,\nand a direction of hostilities against non-combatants, which was a\ngross violation of the proclamation of the Prussian king, made at\nthe beginning of the campaign (after the common cant of the leaders\nof armies), that his forces had no war to wage with the peaceable\ninhabitants of France.\n\nEven plunder enters into the German law of reprisals. Remiremont in\nthe Vosges had to pay 8,000_l._ because two German engineers and one\nsoldier had been taken prisoners by the French troops. The usual forced\nmilitary contributions which the victors exacted did not exclude a\nsystem of pillage and devastation that the present age fondly believed\nto belong only to a past state of warfare. On December 5, 1870, a\nGerman soldier wrote to the _Cologne Gazette_: \u2018Since the war has\nentered upon its present stage it is a real life of brigands we lead.\nFor four weeks we have passed through districts entirely ravaged; the\nlast eight days we have passed through towns and villages where there\nwas absolutely nothing left to take.\u2019 Nor was this plunder only the\nwork of the common military serfs or conscripts, whose miserable\npoverty might have served as an excuse, but it was conducted by\nofficers of the highest rank, who, for their own benefit, robbed farms\nand stables of their sheep and horses, and sacked country houses of\ntheir works of art, their plate, and even of their ladies\u2019 jewels.[160]\n\nThe world, therefore, at least owes this to the Germans, that they have\ntaught us to see war in its true light, by removing it from the realm\nof romance, where it was decked with bright colours and noble actions,\nto the region of sober judgment, where the soldier, the thief, and\nthe murderer are seen in scarcely distinguishable colours. They have\nwithdrawn the veil which blinded our ancestors to the evils of war,\nand which led dreamy humanitarians to believe in the possibility of\n_civilised warfare_; so that now the deeds of shame threaten to obscure\nthe deeds of glory. In the middle ages it was the custom to declare a\nwar that was intended to be waged with special fury by sending a man\nwith a naked sword in one hand and a burning torch in the other, to\nsignify that the war so begun was to be one of blood and fire. We have\nsince learnt that there is no need to typify by any peculiar ceremony\nthe character of any particular war; for that the characteristics of\nall are the same.\n\nThe German general Von Moltke, in a published letter wherein he\nmaintained that Perpetual Peace was a dream and not even a beautiful\none, went on to say, in defence of war, that in it the noblest virtues\nof mankind were developed--courage, self-abnegation, faithfulness to\nduty, the spirit of sacrifice; and that without wars the world would\nsoon stagnate and lose itself in materialism.[161] We have no data from\nwhich to judge of the probable state of a warless world, but we do\nknow that the brightest samples of these virtues have been ever given\nby those who in peace and obscurity, and without looking for lands, or\ntitles, or medals for their reward, have laboured not to destroy life\nbut to save it, not to lower the standard of morality but to raise it,\nnot to preach revenge but mercy, not to spread misery and poverty and\ncrime but to increase happiness, wealth, and virtue. Is there or will\nthere be no scope for courage, for self-sacrifice, for duty, where\nfever and disease are the foes to be combated, where wounds and pain\nneed to be cured or soothed, or where sin and ignorance and poverty are\nthe forces to be assailed? But apart from this there is another side to\nthe picture of war, of which Von Moltke says not a word, but of which,\nin the preceding pages, some indication has been given. Now that we are\nno longer satisfied with the dry narratives of strategical operations,\nbut are beginning to search into the details of military proceedings;\ninto the fate of the captured, of the wounded, of the pursued; into\nthe treatment of hostages, of women, of children; into the statistics\nof massacre and spoliation that are the penalties of defeat; into the\ncharacter of stratagems; and into the justice of reprisals, we see war\nin another mirror, and recognise that the old one gave but a distorted\nreflection of its realities. No one ever denied but that great\nqualities are displayed in war; but the doubt is spreading fast, not\nonly whether it is the worthiest field for their display, but whether\nit is not also the principal nursing-bed of the crimes that are the\ngreatest disgrace to our nature.\n\nIt is idle to think that our humanity will fail to take its colouring\nfrom our calling. Marshal Montluc, the bravest yet most cruel of\nFrench soldiers, was fond of protesting that the inhumanity he was\nguilty of was in corruption of his original and better nature; and at\nthe close of his book and of his life, he consoled himself for the\nblood he had caused to flow like water by the consideration, that the\nsovereigns whose servant he had been were (as he told one of them)\nreally responsible for the misery he had caused. But does the excuse\navail him, or the millions who have succeeded to his trade? A king or a\ngovernment can commission men to execute its policy or its vengeance;\nbut is a free agent, who accepts a commission that he believes to be\niniquitous, morally acquitted of his share of culpability? Is his\nresponsibility no greater than that of the sword, the axe, or the\nhalter with which he carries out his orders; or does the plea of\nmilitary discipline justify him in acting with no more moral restraint\nthan a slave, or than a horse that has no understanding? The Prussian\nofficer who at Dijon blew out his brains rather than execute some\niniquitous order[162] showed that he understood the dignity of human\nnature as it was understood in the days of the bygone moral grandeur\nof Rome. Such a man deserved a monument far more than most to whom\nmemorial monuments are raised.\n\nRecent events lend an additional interest to the question of\nreprisals, and add emphasis to the necessity of placing them, as it\nwas sought to do at Brussels, on the footing of an International\nAgreement. It is sometimes said that dynastic wars belong to the past,\nand that kings have no longer the power to make war, as they once did,\nfor their own pleasure or pastime. There may be truth in this, though\nthe last great war in Europe but one had its immediate cause in an\ninter-dynastic jealousy; but a far more potent agency for war than\never existed in monarchical power is now wielded by the Press. War in\nevery country is the direct pecuniary interest of the Daily Press. \u2018I\nknow proprietors of newspapers,\u2019 said Cobden during the Crimean war,\n\u2018who have pocketed 3,000_l._ or 4,000_l._ a year through the war as\ndirectly as if the money had been voted to them in the Parliamentary\nestimates.\u2019[163] The temptation, therefore, is great, first to justify\nany given war by irrelevant issues or by stories of the enormities\ncommitted by the enemy, or even by positive false statements (as when\nthe English Press, with the _Times_ at its head, with almost one voice\ntaught us that the Afghan ruler had insulted our ambassador, and left\nus to find out our mistake when a too ready credulity had cost us a\nwar of some 20,000,000_l._); and then, when war has once begun, to fan\nthe flame by demanding reprisals for atrocities that have generally\nnever been committed nor established by anything like proof. In this\nway the French were charged at the beginning of the last German war\nwith bombarding the open town of Saarbr\u00fcck, and with firing explosive\nbullets from the mitrailleuse; and the belief, thus falsely and\npurposely propagated, covered of course with the cloak of reprisals a\ngood deal of all that came afterwards.\n\nIn this way has arisen the modern practice of justifying every resort\nto war, not as a trial of strength or test of justice between enemies,\nbut as an act of virtuous and necessary chastisement against criminals.\nCharges of violated faith, of the abuse of flags of truce, of\ndishonourable stratagems, of the ill-treatment or torture of prisoners,\nare seized upon, regardless of any inquiry into their truth, and made\nthe pretext for the indefinite prolongation of hostilities. The lawful\nenemy is denounced as a rebel or a criminal, whom it would be wicked to\ntreat with or trust; and only an unconditional surrender, which drives\nhim to desperation, and so embitters the war, is regarded as a possible\npreliminary to peace. The time has surely come when such a demand, on\nthe ground of reprisals, should cease to operate as a bar to peace.\nOne of the proposals at the Brussels Conference was that no commander\nshould be forced to capitulate under dishonourable conditions, that\nis to say, without the customary honours of war. It should be one of\nthe demands of civilisation that an unconditional surrender, such\nas was insisted upon from Arabi in 1882 and led to the bombardment\nof Alexandria with all the subsequent troubles, should under no\ncircumstances be insisted on in treating with an enemy; and that no\nvictorious belligerent should demand of a defeated one what under\nreversed conditions it would consider dishonourable to grant itself.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nMILITARY STRATAGEMS.\n\n    _H\u00e9! qu\u2019il y a de tromperie au monde! et en nostre mestier plus\n    qu\u2019en autre qui soit._--MARSHAL MONTLUC.\n\n    Grotius\u2019 theory of fair stratagems--The teaching of international\n    law--Ancient and modern naval stratagems--Early Roman dislike\n    of such stratagems as ambuscades, feigned retreats, or night\n    attacks--The degenerate standard of Frontinus and Poly\u00e6nus--The\n    conference-stratagem of modern Europe--The distinction between\n    perfidy and stratagem--The perfidy of Francis I.--Vattel\u2019s\n    theory about spies--Frederick the Great\u2019s military instructions\n    about spies--Lord Wolseley on spies and truth in war--The\n    custom of hanging or shooting spies--Better to keep them as\n    prisoners of war--Balloonists regarded as spies--The practice of\n    military surprises--Death formerly the penalty for capture in\n    a surprise--Stratagems of uncertain character, such as forged\n    despatches or false intelligence--The use of the telegraph in\n    deceiving the enemy--May prisoners of war be compelled to propagate\n    lies?--General character of the military code of fraud.\n\n\nOne of the most interesting aspects of the state of war is that of its\nconnection with fraud, deceit, and guile. If we may seek to obtain our\nends by force, we may surely, it is argued, do so by fraud; for what is\nthe moral difference between overcoming by superiority of muscle and\nthe same result obtained by dint of brain? Lysander the Spartan went so\nfar as to say that boys were to be cheated with dice, but an enemy with\noaths; and if the world has professed horror at his sentiment, it has\nnot altogether despised his authority.\n\nAmong military stratagems the older writers used to include every kind\nof deception practised by generals in war, not only against the enemy,\nbut against their own troops; as, for instance, devices for preventing\nor suppressing a mutiny, for stopping the spread of a panic, or for\nencouraging them with false news before or during an engagement.\n\nBut in modern use the term stratagem has almost exclusive reference\nto artifices of deception practised against an enemy; and the greater\ninterest that attaches to the latter kind of guile justifies the\nnarrowed denotation of the word. No one, for instance, would now\nregard as a stratagem the clever behaviour of that Thracian general\nCosingas, who, acting also as priest to his forces, brought them back\nto obedience by the report he artfully propagated that certain long\nladders which he had caused to be made and fastened together were\nintended to enable him to climb to heaven, there to complain to Juno of\ntheir misconduct. The false pretence that is involved in a stratagem is\naddressed to the leaders of a hostile force, in order that their fear\nor confidence, unduly raised by it, may be played upon to the advantage\nof their more artful opponents. In the consideration, therefore, of\nmilitary stratagems, or _ruses de guerre_, it is best to conform\nentirely to the more restricted sense in which they are understood in\nmodern parlance.\n\nThe following stratagem is a good one to start with. During the\nFranco-German War of 1870, twenty-five franc-tireurs clothed themselves\nin Prussian uniform, and by the help of that disguise killed several\nPrussians at Sennegy near Troyes; and the deed was made a subject of\nopen boast in a French journal.[164] Was the boast a justifiable or a\nshameful one?\n\nDistinctly justifiable, if at least Grotius, the father of our\ninternational law, is of any authority. The reasoning of Grotius runs\nin this wise. There is a distinction between conventional signs that\nare established by the general consent of all the world and those\nwhich are only established by particular societies or by individuals;\ndeception directed against the former involves the violation of a\nmutual obligation, and is therefore unlawful, whereas that against the\nlatter is lawful, because it involves no such violation. Therefore,\nwhilst it is wrong to deceive an enemy by words or signs which by\ngeneral consent are universally understood in a given sense, it is not\nwrong to overcome an enemy by conduct which involves no violation of\na generally recognised and universally binding custom. Under conduct\nof the latter type fall such acts as a simulated flight, or the use of\nan enemy\u2019s arms, his standards, uniform, or sails. A flight is not an\ninstituted sign of fear, nor have the arms or colours of a particular\ncountry any universally established meaning.[165]\n\nAnd in spite of the sound of sophistry that accompanies this reasoning,\nthe teaching of international law has not substantially swerved on this\npoint from the direction given to it by Grotius. In Cicero\u2019s opinion,\nalthough both force and fraud were resources most unworthy of rational\nhumanity, the one pertaining rather to the nature of the lion and the\nother to that of the fox, fraud was an expedient deserving of more\nhatred than the other.[166] But the teaching of later times has tended\nto overlook this distinction. Bynkershoek, that celebrated Dutch jurist\nwho advocated the use of poison as one of the fair modes of employing\nforce, declares it to be a matter of perfect indifference whether\nstratagem or open force be employed against an enemy, provided perfidy\nbe absent from the former. And Bluntschli, who is the German publicist\nof greatest authority in our own day, expressly includes among the\nlawful stratagems of war the use of an enemy\u2019s uniform or flag.[167]\n\nIf, then, we test the received military theory by some actual\nexperience, the following episodes of history must challenge rather our\nadmiration than our blame, and stand justified by the most advanced\ntheories of modern international law.\n\nCimon, the Athenian admiral, having captured some Persian ships, made\nhis own men step into them and dress themselves in the clothes of the\nPersians; and then, when the ships reached Cyprus, and the inhabitants\nof that island came out joyfully to welcome their friends, they were of\ncourse more easily defeated by their enemies.[168]\n\nAristomachus, having taken some Cardian ships, placed his own rowers\nin them and towed his own ships behind them, as if they were being\nconducted in triumph. When the Cardians came out to greet their\nsupposed victorious crews, Aristomachus and his men fell upon them and\nsucceeded in committing great carnage.[169]\n\nModern history supplies analogous cases. In September 1800 an English\ncrew attacked two ships that lay at anchor at Barcelona, by forcing\na Swedish vessel to take on board some English officers, soldiers,\nand sailors, and so obtaining a means of approach that was otherwise\nimpossible.[170] And English naval historians tell with pride, rather\nthan with shame, how in 1798 two English ships, the \u2018Sibylle\u2019 and the\n\u2018Fox,\u2019 by sailing under false colours captured three Spanish gunboats\nin Manilla Roads. When the Spanish guard-boat was sent to inquire what\nthe ships were, the pilot of the \u2018Fox\u2019 replied that they belonged to\nthe French squadron, and that they wished to put into Manilla, for the\nrecovery of the crews from sickness. The English Captain Cooke was\nintroduced under the French name of Latour; and a conversation ensued\nin which the ceremony of wishing success to the united exertions of the\nSpaniards and French against the English was not forgotten. Two Spanish\nboats having then come to visit the vessels, their crews were quickly\nhanded below; and a party of British sailors having changed clothes\nwith them and got into their boat, advanced to the gunboats, which they\ncaptured without pulling a trigger.[171]\n\nOn another occasion the same \u2018Sibylle,\u2019 which had been taken from the\nFrench by Romney in 1794, captured a large French vessel that lay at\nanchor, by standing in under French colours, and only hoisting her\nreal ones when within a cable\u2019s length of her prize;[172] the only\nlimit to such a stratagem on the sea being the necessity for a ship to\nhoist her real flag before proceeding to actual hostilities. A state of\nwar must surely play strange tricks with our minds to make it possible\nfor us to approve such infamous actions as those quoted. There can be\nno greater proof of the utter demoralisation it causes than that such\ndevices should have ever come to be thought honourable; and that no\nscruples should have ever intervened against the prostitution of a\ncountry\u2019s flag, the symbol of her independence, her nationality, and\nher pride, to the shame of open falsehood. Antiquaries dispute the\ncorrectness of the statement of Poly\u00e6nus that Artemisia, the Queen of\nCaria and ally of Xerxes against Greece, hoisted Persian colours when\nin pursuit of Greek ships, but a Greek flag to prevent Greek ships from\npursuing herself, because they say that flags were not then in use; but\nundoubtedly the custom is a very old one on the seas of having a number\nof different flags on board a ship, for the purpose either of more\neasily capturing a weaker or of more easily escaping from a stronger\nvessel than herself. The French, for instance, in 1337 plundered and\nburnt Portsmouth, after having been suffered to land under the cover of\nEnglish banners.[173] Not only the vessels of pirates and privateers,\nbut the war vessels of the State, learned to sail under colours that\nbelied their nationality.[174] The only limit to the stratagem of\nthe false flag (to which international custom gradually came to give\nthe force of law) came to be the necessity of hoisting the real flag\nbefore proceeding to fire, a limitation that was not of much moment\nafter the successful deception had brought a defenceless merchant\nvessel within the reach of easy capture. And with regard to ships of\nwar, the cannon-shot by which one vessel replied to the challenge of\nits suspected nationality by the other came to be equivalent to the\ncaptain\u2019s word of honour that the flag which floated above the cannon\nhe fired represented the nationality of which it professed to be the\nsymbol. The flag itself might tell a lie, therefore the cannon-shot\noath must redeem it from suspicion. Such are the extraordinary ideas of\nhonour and morality that the system of universal fear, distrust, and\nhostility, by many thought to be so surpassingly glorious, has caused\nto become prevalent upon the ocean.\n\nIn spite, therefore, of Grotius, the above stratagems must be\nconsidered as dishonourable; and that so they are beginning to be\nconsidered is indicated by the fact that at the Brussels Conference of\n1874 the use of an enemy\u2019s flag or uniform was expressly rejected from\nthe category of fair military stratagems. But the improvement is in\nspite of international law, not in consequence of it.\n\nThere is an obvious distinction indeed between the above method of\novercoming an enemy and such favourite devices as ambuscades, feigned\nretreats, night attacks, or the diversion of a defence to the wrong\npoint. But perhaps nothing in the history of moral opinion is more\ncurious than that even these modes of deceit should have been, not by\none people or an unwarlike people, but by several people, and one among\nthem the most warlike nation known to history, deliberately rejected as\nunfair and dishonourable modes of warfare. The historical evidence on\nthis point appears to be quite conclusive, and is worth recalling for\nthe interest that cannot but attach to one of the strangest but most\nneglected chapters in the history of human ethics.\n\nThe Ach\u00e6ans, says Polybius, disdained even to subdue their enemies with\nthe help of deceit. In their opinion a victory was neither honourable\nnor secure that was not obtained in open combat by superior courage.\nTherefore they esteemed it a kind of law among them never to use any\nconcealed weapons, nor to throw darts from a distance, being persuaded\nthat an open and close conflict was the only fair method of combat.\nFor the same reason they not only made a declaration of war, but sent\nnotice each to the other of their resolution to try the fortune of a\nbattle, and of the place where they were determined to engage.[175]\n\nAnd in Ternate, one of the Molucca Islands, which suffered such\nuntold miseries after the Europeans had discovered its spices and its\nheathenism, not only was war never begun without being first declared,\nbut it was also customary to inform the enemy of the number of men and\nthe amount and kind of weapons with which it was intended to conduct\nhostilities.[176]\n\nBut the case of the Romans is by far the most remarkable. Polybius,\nLivy, and \u00c6lian all agree in their testimony that for a long period\nof their history the Romans refrained from all kinds of stratagem as\nfrom a sort of military meanness; and their evidence is corroborated\nby Valerius Maximus, who says that the Romans, having no word in their\nlanguage to express a military ruse, were forced to borrow the Greek\nword, from which our own word stratagem is derived.[177] Polybius, who\nlived and wrote as late as the second century before Christ, after\ncomplaining that artifice was then so prevalent among the Romans that\ntheir chief study was to deceive one another in war and in politics,\nadds that, in spite of this degeneracy, they still declared war\nsolemnly beforehand, seldom formed ambuscades, and preferred to fight\nman to man in close engagement. So late as the year 172 B.C. the elder\nsenators regretted the lost virtue of their ancestors, who refrained\nfrom such stratagems as night attacks, counterfeit flights, and sudden\nreturns, and who sometimes even appointed the day of battle and fixed\nthe field of combat, looking for victory not from fraud, but only from\nsuperiority in personal bravery.[178] \u00c6lian, too, declares that the\nRomans never resorted to stratagems till about the end of the Second\nPunic War; and truly the great Roman general, Scipio, who took the\nname of Africanus, displayed a thorough African skill in the use he\nmade of spies and surprises to bring that war to a successful issue.\n\nWith regard to night attacks the Macedonians appear to have cherished\nsimilar feelings, since we find Alexander refusing to attack Darius\nby night on the ground that he did not wish to gain a stolen victory.\nAnd with regard to close combat, something of the old Roman and Ach\u00e6an\nfeeling was displayed in Europe when first the crossbow, and in later\ntimes the musket, rendered personal prowess of lesser importance.\nBefore the time of Richard I., when the crossbow became the chief\nweapon in war, warriors, says the Abb\u00e9 Velley, were so free and brave\nthat they would only owe victory to their lance and their sword, and\neverybody detested those perfidious arms with which a coward under\nshelter was enabled to slay the bravest.[179] So said Montluc of the\nmusket, which in 1523 had not yet, he says, superseded in France the\nuse of the crossbow: \u2018Would to God this accursed instrument had never\nbeen invented.... So many brave and valiant men would not have met\ntheir deaths at the hands very often of the greatest cowards, who\nwould not so much as dare look at the man whom they knock down from\na distance with their accursed balls.\u2019[180] And in the same spirit\nCharles XII. of Sweden once bade his soldiers to come to close quarters\nwith the enemy without shooting, on the ground that it was only for\ncowards to shoot.\n\nSuch ideas are, of course, dead beyond the hope of recovery; but\nthey are an odd commentary on our conceit in the improved tone of\nour military code of honour. We have long since learned to despise\nthese old-world notions of honour and courage, and to make very few\nexceptions indeed to the newer doctrine of Christendom, that in war\nanything and everything is fair. But it is worth the pause of a moment\nto reflect that such moral sentiments in restraint of the use of fraud\nin war should have once had a real existence in the world; that they\nshould once have swayed the minds of the most successful military\nnation that ever existed, and stood by them till they had attained that\nhigh degree of power which was theirs at the time of the Second Punic\nWar (217-199 B.C.) In comparing the code of military honour prevalent\nin pagan antiquity with that of more recent times, it is but fair to\nremember that the pagan nations of old recognised some principles\nof action which were never dreamt of in the best days of Christian\nchivalry; and that the generals of the people who we are sometimes told\nwere a mere robber community would have had as strong a feeling against\nthe righteousness of a night attack, a feigned retreat, or a surprise,\nas our modern generals would have of an open violation of a truce or\nconvention.\n\nThe downward path in this matter is easy, and the history of Rome after\nScipio Africanus is associated with a change of opinion concerning\nstratagems that in no degree fell short of that subtlety of the\nGreeks, Gauls, or Africans, which the Romans once regarded as perfidy.\nFrontinus, who wrote a book on stratagems in the reign of Trajan,\nand still more Poly\u00e6nus, who wrote a large book on the same subject\nfor the Emperors Verus and Antoninus, appear to have thought that no\ndeceit was too bad to serve as a good precedent for the conduct of war.\nPoly\u00e6nus not merely made a collection of some nine hundred stratagems,\nbut collected them for the express purpose of their being of service to\nthe Roman Emperors in the war then undertaken against Parthia. To the\nrulers of a people who had once regarded even an ambuscade as beneath\ntheir chivalry he brought as worthy of their recollection and study\nactions which are an eternal stain on the memory of those who committed\nthem. Let us take for example the devices he records for obtaining\npossession of besieged places, remembering that from the moment the\nchamade has been beaten, or any other sign been given for a conference\nor parley between the contending forces, a truce by tacit agreement is\nheld to suspend their mutual hostilities.\n\n1. Thibron persuaded the governor of a fort in Asia to come out to\narrange terms, under an oath that he should return if they failed to\nagree. During the relaxation of guard that naturally ensued, Thibron\u2019s\nmen took the fort by assault: and Thibron, reconducting the governor\naccording to his word, forthwith put him to death.[181]\n\n2. In the same way behaved Paches, the Athenian general at Notium.\nHaving got Hippias, the governor, into his power under the same promise\nthat Thibron made, he took the place by storm, massacred all he found\nin it, reconducted Hippias according to his oath, and had him killed\nupon the spot.[182]\n\n3. Autophrodates proposed a parley with the chiefs of the Ephesian\narmy, having previously ordered his cavalry officers and other troops\nto attack the Ephesians during the conference. The result was a\nsignal victory, and the capture or slaughter of a great number of\nEphesians.[183]\n\n4. Philip of Macedon sent some envoys into a Thracian city, and whilst\nthe people all met in assembly to hear the proposals of the enemy the\nKing of Macedon attacked and took the city.[184]\n\n5. The Thracians, having been defeated by the B\u0153otians, made a truce\nwith them, for a certain number of _days_, and attacked them one\n_night_, whilst the enemy were engaged in making sacrifices. And so\ndealt Cleomenes with the Argives; he made a truce with them for seven\ndays, and attacked them the second night.\n\nAll these things are told by Poly\u00e6nus, not only without a word of\ndisapproval, but apparently as good examples for the conduct of a war\nactually in progress. Such was the state of moral debasement in which\ntheir long career of military success ultimately landed the great Roman\npeople.\n\nNevertheless, it is not for modern history to cast stones at Paches or\nat Thibron. The Conference-stratagem attained its highest development\nin the practice of warfare in Christendom; so that Montaigne declares\nit to have become a fixed maxim among the military men of his time\n(the sixteenth century) never in time of siege to go out to a parley.\nThat great French soldier Montluc, whose autobiography contained in\nhis Commentaries displays so curious a mixture of bravery and cruelty,\nof loyalty and cunning, and is perhaps the best military book by a\nmilitary man that has been written since C\u00e6sar, tells us how once,\nwhilst he was bargaining with the governor of Sarvenal about the terms\nof a capitulation, his men entered the place by a window on the other\nside and compelled the governor to surrender at discretion, and how on\nanother occasion he sent his soldiers to enter Mont de Marsan and put\nall they met to the sword, whilst he himself was deluding the governor\nwith a parley. \u2018The moments of a parley are dangerous,\u2019 he justly\nobserves, \u2018and then more than ever should the besieged be careful in\nguarding their walls, for it is the time when the besiegers, fearful\nof losing by a capitulation the booty that would be theirs if they\ntook the place by storm, study to avail themselves of the relaxation\nof vigilance promoted by the truce to approach the walls with greater\nfacility and success.\u2019 And the man who wrote this as the experience of\nhis time, and illustrated it by the above accounts of his own practice,\nrose to be a Marshal of France!\n\nSome other examples of the same stratagem prove how widely the custom\nentered into the warfare of the European nations. The governor of\nTerouanne, besieged by the forces of the Emperor Charles V., having\nforgotten in a negotiation for a capitulation to stipulate for a\nsuspension of arms, the town was surprised during the conference,\npillaged, and utterly destroyed.[185] And Feuqui\u00e8res, a French general\nof Louis XIV., and the writer of a book of military memoirs which ran\nthrough several editions, tells us how he surprised a place called\nKreilsheim in 1688: \u2018I could not have taken this place by force,\nsurrounded as it was with a wall and a strong enough castle; but the\ncolonel in command having been imbecile enough to come outside the\nplace to parley with me, without exacting a promise from me to let\nhim return, I retained him and compelled him to order his garrison to\nsurrender itself prisoner of war.\u2019[186] And he actually quotes this\nto show that when it is necessary to take a post, all sorts of means\nshould be employed, provided they do not dishonour the general who\nresorts to them, as would the failure of his word to the colonel have\ndishonoured himself had the colonel demanded it of him.\n\nA sounder sense of military honour was displayed by the English\ngeneral, Lord Peterborough, at the siege of Barcelona in 1705. Don\nVelasco had promised to capitulate within a certain number of days,\nin the event of no succour arriving, and he surrendered one gate as a\nproof of his sincerity. During the truce involved in this proceeding,\nthe German and Catalonian allies of the English entered the town and\nbegan that career of plunder and outrage which is the constant reward\nand crown of such military successes. Lord Peterborough undertook to\nprevent disorder in the town, expel the allied soldiery, and return\nto his position. He was taken at his word, acted up to his word, and\nsaved the honour of England. But what of that of his allies?\n\nIt is a fine line that divides a stratagem from an act of perfidy.\nValerius Maximus denounces as an act of perfidy the conduct of Cn\u00e6us\nDomitius, who, having received the King of the Arverni as a guest under\nthe pretence of a colloquy, sent him by sea a prisoner to Rome;[187]\nbut it is not easy to distinguish it from the actions of Montluc or\nFeuqui\u00e8res. Vattel lays down the following doctrine on the subject: As\nhumanity compels us to prefer the gentlest means in the prosecution of\nour rights, if we can master a strong place, surprise or overcome an\nenemy by a stratagem or a feint void of perfidy, it is better to do so\nthan to have resort to a bloody siege or the carnage of a battle. He\nexpressly excludes perfidy; but might not Poly\u00e6nus have defended it\non precisely the same humanitarian grounds as those by which Vattel\njustifies the more ordinary stratagems? Might not an act of perfidy\nequally prevent a siege or a battle? If we are justified in contending\nfor our rights by force, it is hard to say that we may not do so by\nfraud; but it is still harder to distinguish the kinds and the limits\nof such fraud, or to say where it ceases to be lawful.\n\nAnd to this length did Poly\u00e6nus apparently go, as we see in the cases\nof downright perfidy which he includes in his collection of stratagems.\nThe Locrians swore to observe a treaty with the Sicilians so long as\nthey trod the earth they then walked on, or carried their heads on\ntheir shoulders: the next day they threw away the heads of garlic which\nthey had carried under their cloaks on their shoulders, and the earth\nthey had strewn in their shoes, and began a general massacre of the\nSicilians.[188] The Campanians, having agreed to surrender half their\narms, cut them in half, and so virtually surrendered nothing.[189]\nPaches, the Athenian, says Frontinus, having promised personal safety\nto his enemies on condition of their laying down their arms, or as he\ntermed it, their _iron_, slew all those who, having laid down their\narms, still retained the _iron_ clasps in their cloaks.[190]\n\nBy these means it is undoubtedly possible to gain that advantage over\nyour enemy which, according to every theory of war, it is the paramount\nobject of hostilities to obtain; for it has been too often forgotten\nthat a nation\u2019s honour and character, which an enlightened patriotism\nshould value higher than the mere earth on which it feeds and treads,\nare sacrificed and impaired whenever a treaty is taken by one of the\nparties to it to have been made in another sense from that which was\nclearly understood by both parties to have constituted its spirit at\nthe time of making it. What a lasting stain rests, for instance, on the\nmemory of Francis I., who before signing the Treaty of Madrid, by which\nhe swore, in return for his liberty, to restore the Duchy of Burgundy,\nand to return a prisoner to Spain if he failed to do so, made a formal\nprotest beforehand, in the presence of some friends, that the oath he\nwas about to take was involuntary and therefore void, and broke it the\nmoment he was free! And this was the man whose memory is associated\nwith the famous saying after the battle of Pavia: \u2018All is lost save\nhonour.\u2019 What he really said after that event, in a letter to his\nmother, was this: \u2018All is lost save my honour and my life, which is\nsafe,\u2019 and the letter went on at length, much more in keeping with the\ncharacter of that monarch.[191] His life indeed he saved; his honour he\nnever recovered.\n\nIt was agreed at the Brussels Conference that resort to every possible\nmethod of obtaining information about the forces or country of an\nenemy should count as a fair military stratagem; and, indeed, with the\nsubject of the deceitful side of war the military theory and treatment\nof Spies occupies no inconsiderable place.\n\nVattel is again as good an exponent as we can have of what international\nlaw teaches on this subject. His argument is as follows: It is not\ncontrary to the law of nations to seduce one of the hostile side to\nturn spy, nor to bribe a governor to deliver a town, because such\nactions do not, like the use of poison or assassination, strike at\nthe common welfare and safety of mankind. Such actions are the common\nepisodes of every war. But that they are not in themselves honourable\nor compatible with a good conscience is proved by the fact that\ngenerals who resort to such means never boast of them; and, if they are\nat all excusable, it is only in the case of a very just war, when there\nis no other way of saving a country from ruin at the hands of lawless\nconquerors. A sovereign has no right to require the services of a spy\nfrom any of his subjects, but he may hold out the temptation of reward\nto mercenary souls; and if a governor is willing to sell himself and\noffer us a town for money, should we scruple to take advantage of his\ncrime, and to get without danger what we have a right to get by force?\nAt the same time a spy may rightly be put to death, because it is the\nonly way we have of guarding against the mischief he may do us.[192]\n\nFrederick the Great of Prussia was a contemporary of Vattel, and in\nNovember 1760 he published some military instructions for the use\nof his generals which, in the matter of spies, was based on a wider\npractical knowledge of the matter than of course belonged to the more\npacific publicist. He classified spies into ordinary spies, double\nspies, spies of distinction, and spies by compulsion. By double spies\nhe meant spies who also pretended to be in the service of the side\nthey betrayed. By spies of distinction he meant officers of hussars,\nwhose services he had found useful under the peculiar circumstances of\nthe Austrian campaign. When he could not procure himself spies among\nthe Austrians, owing to the careful guard which their light troops\nkept round their camp, the idea occurred to him, and he acted on it\nwith success, of utilising the suspension of arms that was customary\nafter a skirmish between hussars to make those officers the means\nof conducting an epistolary correspondence with the officers on the\nother side. Spies by compulsion he explained in this way: \u2018When you\nwish to convey false information to an enemy, you take a trustworthy\nsoldier and compel him to pass to the enemy\u2019s camp to report there\nall that you wish the enemy to believe; you also send by him letters\nto excite the troops to desertion.\u2019 And in the event of its being\nimpossible to obtain information about the enemy, this distinguished\nchild of Mars prescribes the following: Choose some rich citizen,\nwho has land and wife and children, and another man disguised as his\nservant or coachman, who understands the enemy\u2019s language. Force the\nformer to take the latter with him to the enemy\u2019s camp to complain of\ninjuries sustained, threatening him that if he fail to bring the man\nback with him after having stayed long enough for the desired object,\nhis wife and children shall be hanged and his house burnt. \u2018I was\nmyself constrained,\u2019 adds this great warrior, \u2018to have recourse to this\nmethod, when we were encamped at ----, and it succeeded.\u2019[193]\n\nSuch were the military ethics of the great philosopher and king, whose\ncharacter in the closer intimacy of biography proved so disagreeable a\nrevelation to Carlyle. Pagan antiquity might be searched in vain for\npractice or sentiments more ignoble. Sertorius, the Roman captain,\nwas one of the greatest masters of stratagem in the world, yet how\ndifferent his language from that of the Great Frederick! \u2018A man,\u2019 he\nsaid, \u2018who has any dignity of feeling should conquer with honour, and\nnot use any base means even to save his life.\u2019\n\nFrom the sentiments of Frederick the Great regarding spies, let us pass\nto those of our own time. From Lord Wolseley\u2019s \u2018Soldier\u2019s Pocket-Book\u2019\nmay be gained some insight as to the manner in which a spy in an\nenemy\u2019s camp may correspond with the hostile general. The best way,\nhe suggests, is to send a peasant with a letter written on very thin\npaper, which may be rolled up so tightly as to be portable in a quill\nan inch and a half long, and this precious quill may be hidden in the\nhair or beard, or in a hollow made at the end of a walking-stick. It is\nalso a good plan to write secret correspondence in lemon-juice across\na newspaper or the leaves of a New Testament; it is then safe against\ndiscovery, and will become legible when held before a fire or near a\nred iron.\n\n\u2018As a nation,\u2019 says Lord Wolseley, \u2018we are bred up to feel it a\ndisgrace even to succeed by falsehood; the word spy conveys something\nas repulsive as slave; we will keep hammering along with the conviction\nthat honesty is the best policy, and that truth always wins in the long\nrun. These pretty little sentiments do well for a child\u2019s copy-book,\nbut a man who acts upon them had better sheathe his sword for\never.\u2019[194] Was there ever such a confession of the incompatibility of\nthe soldier\u2019s calling with the precepts of ordinary honour? For how not\nso, if he must so far stoop from the ordinary level of moral rectitude\nas to be ready to scorn honesty and to trifle with truth? And then the\nquestion is, Had not a man better sheathe his sword for ever, or rather\nnot enter at all upon a trade where he will have to regard the eternal\nprinciples of right and wrong as so much pretty sentiment only fit for\nthe copy-book?\n\nSince, therefore, we have the authority of Vattel, of Frederick the\nGreat, and of Lord Wolseley that spies may or even must be employed in\nwar, and that, be the trickery or bribery never so mean that procures\ntheir services, no discredit reflects itself upon those generals\nwho use them--it is impossible not to notice it as one of the chief\nanomalies in existing military usages that, although a general has an\nunlimited right to avail himself of the services of a spy or a traitor,\nthe penalty for acting in either of the latter capacities is death.\nThe capital penalty is not of itself any test of the moral character\nof the action to which it is affixed, for the service of a fire-ship,\nwhich demanded the most desperate bravery, used to be undertaken in the\nface of capital punishment. Moreover, some of the most famous names\nin military history have not hesitated to act as spies. Sertorius\nwas honoured by Marius with the usual rewards of signal valour for\nhaving learnt the language of the Gauls and gone as a spy amongst them\ndisguised in their dress. The French general Custine entered Mayence in\nthe disguise of a butcher. Catinat spied out the strength of Luxembourg\nin the costume of a coal-heaver. Montluc entered Perpignan as a cook,\nand only resolved never again to act as a spy because the narrowness\nof his escape convinced him, not that it was a service of too much\ndishonour, but a service of too much danger.\n\nThe custom of killing spies is an old Roman one,[195] and, indeed,\nseems to have prevailed all the world over. Nevertheless there have\nbeen exceptions even to that. Scipio Africanus had some Carthaginian\nspies who were brought before him led through the camp, and then\ndismissed under escort, and with the polite inquiry whether they had\nexamined everything to their satisfaction.[196]\n\nThe consul L\u00e6vinus is said to have dealt in the same way with some\nspies that were taken, and so did Xerxes by some Greek detectives. At\nthe famous siege of Antwerp in 1584-5, when a Brabant spy was brought\nbefore the Prince of Parma, the latter gave orders that he should be\nshown all the works connected with the wonderful bridge that he was\nthen constructing across the Scheldt, and then sent him back to the\nbesieged city with these words: \u2018Go and tell those who sent you what\nyou have seen. Tell them that I firmly intend either to bury myself\nbeneath the ruin of this bridge or by means of it to pass into your\ncity.\u2019\n\nThere is a clear middle course between both extremes. Instead of being\nhung or shot or sent away scot free, a spy might fairly be made a\nprisoner of war. Suggestions in this sense were made at the Brussels\nConference on the Laws of War. The Spanish delegate proposed that the\ncustom of hanging or shooting detected spies should be abolished, and\nthe custom be substituted of interning them as prisoners of war during\nthe continuance of hostilities. The Belgian delegate proposed that in\nno case should they be put to death without trial; and it was even\nsought to establish a distinction between the deserts of the really\npatriotic and the merely mercenary spy. The feeling in fact made itself\nclearly visible, that an act of which a general might fairly avail\nhimself could not in common justice be regarded as criminal in the\nagent. Between a general and a spy the common-law rule of principal and\nagent plainly holds good: \u2018He who acts through another acts through\nhimself.\u2019 In a case of espionage either both principal and agent are\nguilty of a criminal act, or neither is. If the spy as such violates\nthe laws of war, so does the general who employs him; and either\ndeserves the same punishment. Were it not so, a general who should\nhire a bravo to assassinate an enemy would incur no moral blame, nor\ncould be held to act outside the boundary of lawful and honourable\nhostilities.\n\nIn some other respects the Brussels Conference displayed the vagueness\nof sentiment that prevails about the use of spies in war. It was\nagreed between all the Powers that no one should be considered as a\nspy but one who secretly or under false pretences sought to obtain\ninformation for the enemy in occupied districts; that military men\ncollecting such information within the zone of hostile operations\nshould not be regarded as spies if it were possible to recognise their\nmilitary character; and that military men, and even civilians, if\ntheir proceedings were open, charged with despatches, should not, if\ncaptured, be treated as spies; nor individuals who carried despatches\nor kept up communications between different parts of an army through\nthe air in balloons. The German delegate proposed, with regard to\nballoons, that those who sailed in them might be first of all summoned\nto descend, then fired at if they refused, and if captured be treated\nas prisoners, not as spies. The rejection of his proposal implies\nthat by the laws of modern war a balloonist is liable to be shot as a\nspy; so that, from the point of view of personal danger, the service\nof a balloon becomes doubly heroic. The Brussels Conference settled\nnothing, owing to the withdrawal of England from that attempt to settle\nby agreement between the nations the laws that should govern their\nrelations in war-time; but from what was on that occasion agreed to or\nrejected may be gathered the prevalent practice of European warfare.\nIs it not then a little remarkable that for the dangerous service of\nespionage a different justice should be meted out to civilians and to\nmilitary men; and that a patriot who risks his life in a balloon should\nalso risk it in the same way as a spy, a deserter, or a traitor?\n\nBut whatever be the fate of a spy, and in spite of distinguished\nprecedents to the contrary, men of honour will always instinctively\nshrink from a service which involves falsehood from beginning to\nend. The sentiment is doubtless praiseworthy: but what is the moral\ndifference between entering a town as a spy and the military service\nof winning it by surprise? What, for instance, shall we think of\nthe Spanish officers and soldiers who, dressed as peasants and with\nbaskets of nuts and apples on their arms, gained possession of Amiens\nin 1597 by spilling the contents of their baskets and then slaying the\nsentinels as they scrambled to pick them up?[197] What of the officers\nwho, in the disguise of peasants and women, and concealing daggers and\npistols, got possession of Ulm for the Elector of Bavaria? What of\nthe French who, in Dutch costume, and by supplications in Dutch to be\ngranted a refuge from a pursuing enemy, surprised a fort in Holland in\n1672?[198] What of Prince Eugene, who took the fortress of Breysach by\nsending in a large force concealed in hay-carts under the conduct of\ntwo hundred officers disguised as peasants?[199] What of the Chevalier\nBayard, that favourite of legendary chivalry, who, having learnt from a\nspy the whereabouts of a detachment of Venetian infantry, went by night\nto the village where they slept, and with his men slew all but three\nout of some three hundred men as they ran out of their houses?[200]\nWhat of Callicratidas the Cyren\u00e6an, who begged the commander of a fort\nto receive four sick soldiers, and sent them in on their beds with\nan escort of sixteen soldiers, so that they easily overpowered the\nguards and won the place for their general?[201] What of Phalaris, who,\nhaving petitioned for the hand of a commandant\u2019s daughter, overcame\nthe garrison by sending in soldiers dressed as women servants, and\npurporting to bear presents to his betrothed?[202] What of Feuqui\u00e8res,\nwho, whilst pretending to lead a German force and praying for shelter\nfrom a snowstorm, affixed his p\u00e9tards to the gates of Neuborg, and,\nhaving taken the town, put the whole of the garrison of 650 men to the\nsword?[203]\n\nIn what respect do such actions which are the everyday stratagems of a\ncampaign, and count as perfectly fair, differ from the false pretences\nwhich constitute the iniquity of the spy? In this respect only--that\nwhilst he bears his danger alone, in the case of a surprise the danger\nis distributed among numbers.\n\nAnd, in point of fact, there was a time when the service of a surprise\nand that of espionage were so far regarded as the same that by the laws\nof war death was not only the allotted portion of the captured spy but\nof all who were caught in an endeavour to take a place by surprise.\nThe rule, according to Vattel, was not changed, nor the soldiers who\nwere captured in a surprise regarded or treated as prisoners of war,\ntill the year 1597, when, Prince Maurice having failed in an attempt to\ntake Venloo by surprise, and having lost some of his men, who were put\nto death for that offence, the new rule that has since prevailed was\nagreed upon by both sides for the sake of their future mutual immunity\nfrom that peril.\n\nThe usual rule laid down to distinguish a bad from a good stratagem is\nthat in the latter there is no violation of an expressly or tacitly\npledged faith. The violation of a conference, a truce, or a treaty\nhas always therefore been reprobated, however commonly practised. But\ncertain occurrences of history suggest the feasibility of corresponding\nstratagems which cannot be judged by so simple a formula and which\ntherefore are of still uncertain right.\n\nThe first stratagem of this kind that suggests itself is that of\nforgery. Hannibal, having defeated and slain the Roman general\nMarcellus, and thereby become possessed of his seal, the Romans found\nit necessary to despatch messages to all their garrison towns that\nno more attention should be paid to orders purporting to come from\nMarcellus. The precedent suggests the use of forged despatches as a\nweapon of war. To obtain in time of peace, for use in time of war, the\nsignatures of men likely to be hostile commanders, would obviously\nbe of immense military service for purposes either of defence or\naggression. The stratagem would be dishonourable in the highest degree;\nbut, unfortunately, the standard of measurement in such cases is rather\ntheir effectiveness than their abstract morality.\n\nThe second stratagem of the sort is the stratagem of false intelligence.\nTo what extent is it lawful to deceive an enemy by downright falsehood?\nThe Chevalier Bayard, \u2018without fear or reproach,\u2019 when besieged by\nthe Imperialists in M\u00e9zi\u00e8res, contrived to make the enemy raise the\nsiege by sending a messenger with letters containing false information\ndestined to fall into the hands of the enemy. The invention of the\ntelegraph has increased the means of deceiving the enemy by false\nintelligence, and was freely so used in the Civil War of the United\nStates. It is said to be better to secure the services of a few\ntelegraph operators in a hostile country than to have dozens of\nordinary spies; and for this reason, according to the eminent author of\nthe \u2018Soldier\u2019s Pocket-Book\u2019: \u2018Before or during an action an enemy may\nbe deceived to any extent by means of such men; messages can be sent\nordering him to concentrate upon wrong points, or, by giving him false\ninformation, you may induce him to move as you wish.\u2019\n\nAnother stratagem is suggested by the conduct of the Prince of Orange,\nwho, having detected in one of his own secretaries a spy in the\nservice of the Prince of Luxembourg, forced him to write a letter to\nthe latter containing such information as enabled himself to effect a\nmarch he wished to conceal. Might not, then, prisoners of war be used\nfor the same compulsory service? For a spy just as much as a soldier\nis a recognised and accredited military agent, and, if the former\nmay be made the channel of falsehood, why not the prisoner of war?\nThe Romans made use of the latter to acquire information about their\nenemy\u2019s plans, if in no other way, by torture or the threat of it;\nthe Germans forced some of their French prisoners to perform certain\nmilitary services connected with carrying on their campaign--would it\nbe therefore unfair to make use of them as the Prince of Orange made\nuse of his secretary?\n\nTo such questions there is no answer from the international law\nwriters. Still less is there any authoritative military doctrine\nconcerning them, and, if the stratagems in debate are excluded from\n\u2018good\u2019 war by the military honour of to-day, the above study of warlike\nartifices has been made to little purpose if it has not taught us how\nchangeable and capricious that standard is, and of what marvellous\nadjustment it is capable.\n\nIt were a treat at which the gods themselves might smile to see and\nhear a moral philosopher and a military officer brought into conference\ntogether concerning the stratagems permissible in war. Let the reader\nimagine them trying to distribute in just and equal parts the due share\nof blame attaching severally to the following agents--to the man who\nbetrays his country or his cause for gold, and the general who tempts\nhim to his crime or accepts it gladly; to the man who serves as a spy,\nto the general who on the one side sends or employs him as a spy, and\nto the general who on the other side hangs him as a spy; to the man\nwho discovers the strength of a town in the disguise of a butcher, and\nto his fellow-soldiers who enter it disguised as peasants or under the\nplea of shelter from sickness or a snowstorm; to the man who gains an\nadvantage by propagating false intelligence, and the man who does so\nby the use of forged despatches; the man who, like Scipio, plays at\nnegotiations for peace in order the better to spy out and avail himself\nof an enemy\u2019s weakness, and the man who makes offers of treason to\nan enemy in order the more easily to take him at a disadvantage--and\nthe conclusion will be not unlikely to occur to him, when he shudders\nat the possible length and futility of that imaginary disputation,\nthat, whatever havoc is caused by a state of war to life, to property,\nto wealth, to family affections, to domestic honour, it is a havoc\nabsolutely incomparable to that which it produces among the received\nmoral principles of mankind. The military code regarding the fair and\nlegitimate use of fraud and deception has nothing whatever in common\nwith the ordinary moral code of civil life, the principles openly\nprofessed in it being so totally foreign to our simplest rules of\nupright and worthy conduct that in any other than the fighting classes\nof our civilised societies they would not be advocated for very shame,\nnor listened to for a moment without resentment.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nBARBARIAN WARFARE.\n\n    _Non avaritia, non crudelitas modum novit.... Qu\u00e6 clam commissa\n    capite luerentur, quia paludati fecere laudamus._--SENECA.\n\n    Variable notions of honour--Primitive ideas of a military\n    life--What is civilised warfare--Advanced laws of war among\n    several savage tribes--Symbols of peace among savages--The Samoan\n    form of surrender--Treaties of peace among savages--Abeyance of\n    laws of war in hostilities with savages--Zulus blown up in caves\n    with gun-cotton--Women and men kidnapped for transport service\n    on the Gold Coast--Humane intentions of the Spaniards in the\n    New World contrasted with the inhumanity of their actions--Wars\n    with natives of English and French in America--High rewards\n    offered for scalps--The use of bloodhounds in war--The use of\n    poison and infected clothes--Penn\u2019s treaty with the Indians--How\n    Missionaries come to be a cause of war--Explanation of the failure\n    of modern Missions--The Mission Stations as centres of hostile\n    intrigue--Plea for the State-regulation of Missions--Depopulation\n    under Protestant influences--The prevention of false rumours,\n    _Tendenzl\u00fcgen_--Civilised and barbarian warfare--No real\n    distinction between them.\n\n\nA missionary, seeing once a negro furrowing his face with scars, asked\nhim why he put himself to such needless pain, and the reply was: \u2018For\nhonour, and that people on seeing me may say, There goes a man of\nheart.\u2019\n\nRidiculous as this negro\u2019s idea of honour must appear to us, it bears\na sufficient resemblance to other notions of the same kind that have\npassed current in the world at different times to satisfy us of the\nextreme variability of the sentiment in question. C\u00e6sar built with\ndifficulty a bridge across the Rhine, chiefly because he held it\nbeneath his own dignity, or the Roman people\u2019s, for his army to cross\nit in boats. The Celts of old thought it as ignominious to fly from an\ninundation, or from a burning or falling house, as to retreat from an\nenemy. The Spartans considered it inglorious to pursue a flying foe, or\nto be killed in storming a besieged city. The same Gauls who gloried\nin broadsword-wounds would almost go mad with shame if wounded by an\narrow or other missile that only left an imperceptible mark. The use\nof letters was once thought dishonourable by all the European nations.\nMarshal Montluc, in the sixteenth century, considered it a sign of\nabnormal overbookishness for a man to prefer to spend a night in his\nstudy than to spend it in the trenches, though, now, a contrary taste\nwould be thought by most men the mark of a fool.\n\nSuch are some of the curious ideas of honour that have prevailed at\ndifferent times. Wherein we seem to recognise not merely change but\nadvance; one chief difference between the savage and civilised state\nlying in the different estimates entertained in either of martial\nprowess and of military honour. We laugh nowadays at the ancient\nBritons who believed that the souls of all who had followed any other\npursuit than that of arms, after a despised life and an unlamented\ndeath, hovered perforce over fens and marshes, unfit to mingle with\nthose of warriors in the higher and brighter regions; or at the\nhorsemen who used before death to wound themselves with their spears,\nin order to obtain that admission to Walhalla which was denied to all\nwho failed to die upon a battle-field; or at the Spaniards, who, when\nCato disarmed them, preferred a voluntary death to a life destined to\nbe spent without arms.[204] No civilised warrior would pride himself,\nas Fijian warriors did, on being generally known as the \u2018Waster\u2019 or\n\u2018Devastator\u2019 of such-and-such a district; the most he would look for\nwould be a title and perhaps a perpetual pension for his descendants.\nWe have nothing like the custom of the North American tribes, among\nwhom different marks on a warrior\u2019s robe told at a glance whether his\nfame rested on the slaughter of a man or a woman, or only on that of a\nboy or a girl. We are inferior in this respect to the Dacota tribes,\namong whom an eagle\u2019s feather with a red spot on it denoted simply\nthe slaughter of an enemy, the same feather with a notch and the\nsides painted red, that the said enemy had had his throat cut, whilst\naccording as the notches were on one side or on both, or the feather\npartly denuded, anyone could tell after how many others the hero had\nsucceeded in touching the dead body of a fallen foe. The stride is\nclearly a great one from Pyrrhus, the Epirot king, who, when asked\nwhich of two musicians he thought the better, only deigned to reply\nthat Polysperchon was the general, to Napoleon, the French emperor, who\nconferred the cross of the Legion of Honour on Crescentini the singer.\n\nAnd as the pursuit of arms comes with advancing civilisation to occupy\na lower level as compared with the arts of peace, so the belief is the\nmark of a more polished people that the rapacity and cruelty which\nbelong to the war customs of a more backward nation, or of an earlier\ntime, are absent from their own. They invent the expression _civilised\nwarfare_ to emphasise a distinction they would fain think inherent\nin the nature of things; and look, by its help, even on the mode of\nkilling an enemy, with a moral vision that is absurdly distorted. How\nfew of us, for example, but see the utmost barbarity in sticking a man\nwith an assegai, yet none whatever in doing so with a bayonet? And why\nshould we pride ourselves on not mutilating the dead, while we have\nno scruples as to the extent to which we mutilate the living? We are\nshocked at the mention of barbarian tribes who poison their arrows,\nor barb their darts, yet ourselves think nothing of the frightful\ngangrenes caused by the copper cap in the Mini\u00e9 rifle-ball, and reject,\non the score of the expense of the change, the proposal that bullets of\nsoft lead, which cause needless pain, should no longer be used among\nthe civilised Powers for small-arm ammunition.[205]\n\nBut whilst the difference in these respects between barbarism and\ncivilisation is thus one that rather touches the surface than the\nsubstance of war, the result is inevitably in either state a different\ncode of military etiquette and sentiment, though the difference is\nfar less than in any other points of comparison between them. When\nthe nations of Christendom therefore came in contact with unknown\nand savage races, whose customs seemed different from their own and\nlittle worthy of attention, they assumed that the latter recognised\nno laws of war, much as some of the earlier travellers denied the\npossession or faculty of speech to people whose language they could not\ninterpret. From which assumption the practical inference followed, that\nthe restraints which were held sacred between enemies who inherited\nthe same traditions of military honour had no need to be observed in\nhostilities with the heathen world. It is worth while, therefore, to\nshow how baseless was the primary assumption, and how laws of war, in\nno way dissimilar to those of Europe, may be detected in the military\nusages of barbarism.\n\nTo spare the weak and helpless was and is a common rule in the warfare\nof the less civilised races. The Guanches of the Canary Islands, says\nan old Spanish writer, \u2018held it as base and mean to molest or injure\nthe women and children of the enemy, considering them as weak and\nhelpless, therefore improper objects of their resentment; neither\ndid they throw down or damage houses of worship.\u2019[206] The Samoans\nconsidered it cowardly to kill a woman:[207] and in America the Sioux\nIndians and Winnebagoes, though barbarous enough in other respects, are\nsaid to have shown the conventional respect to the weaker sex.[208]\nThe Basutos of South Africa, whatever may be their customs now, are\ndeclared by Casalis, one of the first French Protestant missionaries\nto their country, to have respected in their wars the persons of\nwomen, children, and travellers, and to have spared all prisoners who\nsurrendered, granting them their liberty on the payment of ransom.[209]\n\nFew savage races were of a wilder type than the Abipones of South\nAmerica; yet Dobritzhoffer, the Jesuit missionary, assures us not only\nthat they thought it unworthy of them to mangle the bodies of dead\nSpaniards, as other savages did, but that they generally spared the\nunwarlike, and carried away boys and girls uninjured. The Spaniards,\nIndians, negroes, or mulattoes whom they took in war they did not\ntreat like captives, but with kindness and indulgence like children.\nDobritzhoffer never saw a prisoner punished by so much as a word or a\nblow, but he bears testimony to the compassion and confidence often\ndisplayed to captives by their conquerors. It is common to read of the\ncruelty of the Red Indians to their captives; but Loskiel, another\nmissionary, declares that prisoners were often adopted by the victors\nto supply the place of the slain, and that even Europeans, when it came\nto an exchange of prisoners, sometimes refused to return to their own\ncountrymen. In Virginia notice was sent before war to the enemy, that\nin the event of their defeat, the lives of all should be spared who\nshould submit within two days\u2019 time.\n\nLoskiel gives some other rather curious testimony about the Red\nIndians. \u2018When war was in contemplation they used to admonish each\nother to hearken to the good and not to the evil spirits, the former\nalways recommending peace. They seem,\u2019 he adds with surprise, \u2018to\nhave had no idea of the devil as the prince of darkness before the\nEuropeans came into the country.\u2019 The symbol of peace was the burial\nof the hatchet or war-club in the ground; and when the tribes renewed\ntheir covenants of peace, they exchanged certain belts of friendship\nwhich were singularly expressive. The principal belt was white, with\nblack streaks down each side and a black spot at each end: the black\nspots represented the two people, and the white streak between them\nsignified, that the road between them was now clear of all trees,\nbrambles, and stones, and that every hindrance was therefore removed\nfrom the way of perfect harmony.\n\nThe Athenians used the same language of symbolism when they declared\nwar by letting a lamb loose into the enemy\u2019s country: this being\nequivalent to saying, that a district full of the habitations of men\nshould shortly be turned into a pasture for sheep.[210]\n\nThe Fijians used to spare their enemy\u2019s fruit trees; the Tongan\nislanders held it as sacrilege to fight within the precincts of the\nburial place of a chief, where the greatest enemies were obliged to\nmeet as friends.\n\nMost of the lower races recognise the inviolability of ambassadors and\nheralds, and have well-established emblems of a truce or armistice.\nThe wish for peace which the Zulu king in vain sought from his English\ninvaders by the symbol of an elephant\u2019s tusk (1879), was conveyed\nin the Fiji Islands by a whale\u2019s tooth, in the Sandwich by a young\nplantain tree or green branch of the ti plant, and among most North\nAmerican tribes by a white flag of skin or bark. The Samoan symbol\nfor an act of submission in deprecation of further hostilities conveys\nsome indication of the possible origin of these pacific symbols. The\nconquered Samoan would carry to his victor some bamboo sticks, some\nfirewood, and some small stones; for as a piece of split bamboo was\nthe original Samoan knife, and small stones and firewood were used for\nthe purpose of roasting pigs, this symbol of submission was equivalent\nto saying: \u2018Here we are, your pigs, to be cooked if you please, and\nhere are the materials wherewith to do it.\u2019[211] In the same way the\nelephant\u2019s tusk or the whale\u2019s tooth may be a short way of saying to\nthe victor: \u2018Yours is the strength of the elephant or the whale; we\nrecognise the uselessness of fighting with you.\u2019\n\nIn the same way many savage tribes take the greatest pains to impress\nthe terms of treaties as vividly as possible on the memory of the\ncontracting parties by striking and intelligible ceremonies. In the\nSandwich Islands a wreath woven conjointly by the leaders of either\nside and placed in a temple was the chief symbol of peace. On the Fiji\nIslands, the combatant forces would meet and throw down their weapons\nat one another\u2019s feet. The Tahitians wove a wreath of green boughs,\nfurnished by each side; exchanged two young dogs; and having also\nmade a band of cloth together, deposited the wreath and the band in\nthe temple, with imprecations on the side which should first violate\nso solemn a treaty of peace.[212] On the Hervey Islands, the token of\nthe cessation of war was the breaking of a number of spears against\na large chestnut tree; the almost imperishable coral tree was planted\nin the valleys to signify the hope that the peace might last as long\nas the tree; and after the drum of peace had been solemnly beaten\nround the island, it was unlawful for any man to carry a weapon, or\nto cut down any iron-wood, which he might turn into an implement of\ndestruction.\n\nEven our custom of proclaiming that a war is not undertaken against\na people but against its rulers is not unknown in savage life. The\nAshantee army used to strew leaves on their march, to signify that\ntheir hostility was not with the country they passed through but only\nwith the instigators of the war; they told the Fantees that they had\nno war with them collectively, but only with some of them.[213] How\ncommon a military custom this appeal to the treason of an enemy is,\nnotwithstanding the rarity of its success, everybody knows. When,\nfor instance, the Anglo-Zulu war began, it was solemnly proclaimed\nthat the British Government had no quarrel with the Zulu people; it\nwas a war against the Zulu king, not against the Zulu nation. (Jan.\n11, 1879.) So were the Ashantees told by the English invading force;\nso were the Afghans; so were the Egyptians; and so were the French\nby the Emperor William before his merciless hordes laid waste and\ndesolate some of the fairest provinces of France; so, no doubt, will\nbe told the Soudan Arabs. And yet this appeal to treason, this premium\non a people\u2019s disloyalty, is the regular precursor of wars, wherein\ndestruction for its own sake, the burning of grain and villages for\nthe mere pleasure of the flames, forms almost invariably the most\nprominent feature. The military view always prevails over the civil,\nof the meaning of hostilities that have no reference to a population\nbut only to its government. In the Zulu war, for instance, in spite\nof the above proclamation, the lieutenant-general ordered raids to be\nmade into Zululand for the express purpose of burning empty kraals or\nvillages; defending such procedure by the usual military logic, that\nthe more the natives at large felt the strain of the war, the more\nanxious they would be to see it concluded; and it was quite in vain for\nthe Lieutenant-Governor of Natal to argue that the burning of empty\nkraals would neither do much harm to the Zulus nor good to the English;\nand that whereas the war had been begun on the ground that it was waged\nagainst the Zulu king and not against his nation, such conduct was\ncalculated to alienate from the invaders the whole of the Zulu people,\nincluding those who were well disposed to them. Such arguments hardly\never prevail over that passion for wanton destruction and for often\nquite unnecessary slaughter, which finds a ready and comprehensive\nshelter under the wing of military exigencies.\n\nThe assumption, therefore, that savage races are ignorant of all laws\nof war, or incapable of learning them, would seem to be based rather on\nour indifference about their customs than on the realities of the case,\nseeing that the preceding evidence to the contrary results from the\nmost cursory inquiry. But whatever value there may be in our own laws\nof war, as helping to constitute a real difference between savage and\ncivilised warfare, the best way to spread the blessing of a knowledge\nof them would clearly be for the more civilised races to adhere to\nthem strictly in all wars waged with their less advanced neighbours.\nAn English commander, for instance, should no more set fire to the\ncapital of Ashantee or Zululand for so paltry a pretext as the display\nof British power than he would set fire to Paris or Berlin; he should\nno more have villages or granaries burnt in Africa or Afghanistan\nthan he would in Normandy; and he should no more keep a Zulu envoy or\ntruce-bearer in chains[214] than he would so deal with the bearer of a\nwhite flag from a Russian or Italian enemy.\n\nThe reverse principle, which is yet in vogue, that with barbarians\nyou must or may be barbarous, leads to some curious illustrations of\ncivilised warfare when it comes in conflict with the less civilised\nraces. In one of the Franco-Italian wars of the sixteenth century,\nmore than 2,000 women and children took refuge in a large mountain\ncavern, and were there suffocated by a party of French soldiers, who\nset fire to a quantity of wood, straw, and hay, which they stacked\nat the mouth of the cave; but it was considered so shameful an act,\nthat the Chevalier Bayard had two of the ringleaders hung at the\ncavern\u2019s mouth.[215] Yet when the French General P\u00e9lissier in this\ncentury suffocated the unresisting Algerians in their caves, it was\neven defended as no worse than the shelling of a fortress; and there\nis evidence that gun-cotton was not unfrequently used to blast the\nentrance to caves in Zululand in which men, women, and children had\nhoped to find shelter against an army which professed only to be\nwarring with their king.[216]\n\nThe following description of the way in which, in the Ashantee war, the\nEnglish forces obtained native carriers for their transport service is\nnot without its instruction in this respect:--\n\n\u2018We took to kidnapping upon a grand scale. Raids were made on all\nthe Assin villages within reach of the line of march, and the men,\nand sometimes the women, carried off and sent up the country under\nguard, with cases of provisions. Lieutenant Bolton, of the 1st West\nIndia Regiment, rendered immense service in this way. Having been\nfor some time commandant of Accra, he knew the coast and many of the\nchiefs; and having a man-of-war placed at his disposal, he went up and\ndown the coast, landing continually, having interviews with chiefs,\nand obtaining from them large numbers of men and women; or when\nthis failed, landing at night with a party of soldiers, surrounding\nvillages, and sweeping off the adult population, leaving only a few\nwomen to look after the children. In this way, in the course of a\nmonth, he obtained several thousands of carriers.\u2019[217]\n\nAnd then a certain school of writers talks of the love and respect for\nthe British Empire which these exhibitions of our might are calculated\nto win from the inferior races! The Ashantees are disgraced by the\npractice of human sacrifices, and the Zulus have many a barbarous\nusage; but no amount of righteous indignation on that account justifies\nsuch dealings with them as those above described. If it does, we can\nno longer condemn the proceedings of the Spaniards in the New World.\nFor we have to remember that it was not only the Christianity of the\nInquisition, or Spanish commerce that they wished to spread; not mere\ngold nor new lands that they coveted, but that they also strove for\nsuch humanitarian objects as the abolition of barbarous customs like\nthe Mexican human sacrifices. \u2018The Spaniards that saw these cruel\nsacrifices,\u2019 wrote a contemporary, the Jesuit Acosta, \u2018resolved with\nall their power to abolish so detestable and cursed a butchery of\nmen.\u2019 The Spaniards of the sixteenth century were in intention or\nexpression every whit as humane as we English of the nineteenth. Yet\ntheir actions have been a reproach to their name ever since. Cortes\nsubjected Guatamozin, king of Mexico, to torture. Pizarro had the Inca\nof Peru strangled at the stake. Alvarado invited a number of Mexicans\nto a festival, and made it an opportunity to massacre them. Sandoval\nhad 60 caziques and 400 nobles burnt at one time, and compelled their\nrelations and children to witness their punishment. The Pope Paul had\nvery soon (1537) to issue a bull, to the effect that the Indians were\nreally men and not brutes, as the Spaniards soon affected to regard\nthem.\n\nThe whole question was, moreover, argued out at that time between\nLas Casas and Sepulveda, historiographer to the Emperor Charles V.\nSepulveda contended that more could be effected against barbarism by a\nmonth of war than by 100 years of preaching; and in his famous dispute\nwith Las Casas at Valladolid in 1550, defended the justice of all wars\nundertaken against the natives of the New World, either on the ground\nof the latter\u2019s sin and wickedness, or on the plea of protecting them\nfrom the cruelties of their own fellow-countrymen; the latter plea\nbeing one to which in recent English wars a prominent place has been\nalways given. Las Casas replied--and his reply is unanswerable--that\neven human sacrifices are a smaller evil than indiscriminate warfare.\nHe might have added that military contact between people unequally\ncivilised does more to barbarise the civilised than to civilise the\nbarbarous population. It is well worthy of notice and reflection\nthat the European battle-fields became distinctly more barbarous\nafter habits of greater ferocity had been acquired in wars beyond the\nAtlantic, in which the customary restraints were forgotten, and the\nties of a common human nature dissolved by the differences of religion\nand race.\n\nThe same effect resulted in Roman history, when the extended dominion\nof the Republic brought its armies into contact with foes beyond the\nsea. The Roman annalists bear witness to the deterioration that ensued\nboth in their modes of waging war and in the national character.[218]\nIt is in an Asiatic war that we first hear of a Roman general poisoning\nthe springs;[219] in a war for the possession of Crete that the\nCretan captives preferred to poison themselves rather than suffer the\ncruelties inflicted on them by Metellus;[220] in the Thracian war\nthat the Romans cut off their prisoners\u2019 hands, as C\u00e6sar afterwards\ndid those of the Gauls.[221] And we should remember that a practical\nEnglish statesman like Cobden foresaw, as a possible evil result of the\ncloser relations between England and the East, a similar deterioration\nin the national character of his countrymen. \u2018With another war or\ntwo,\u2019 he wrote, \u2018in India and China, the English people would have an\nappetite for bull-fights if not for gladiators.\u2019[222]\n\nNor is there often any compensation for such results in the improved\ncondition of the tribes whom it is sought to civilise after the method\nrecommended by Sepulveda. The happiest fate of the populations he\nwished to see civilised by the sword was where they anticipated their\nextermination or slavery by a sort of voluntary suicide. In Cuba, we\nare told that \u2018they put themselves to death, whole families doing\nso together, and villages inviting other villages to join them in a\ndeparture from a world that was no longer tolerable.\u2019[223] And so it\nwas in the other hemisphere; the Ladrone islanders, reduced by the\nsword and the diseases of the Spaniards, took measures intentionally to\ndiminish their numbers and to check population, preferring voluntary\nextinction to the foul mercies of the Jesuits: till now a lepers\u2019\nhospital is the only building left on what was once one of the most\npopulous of their islands.\n\nIt must, however, be admitted in justice to the Spaniards, that the\nprinciples which governed their dealings with heathen races infected\nmore or less the conduct of colonists of all nationalities. A real\nor more often a pretended zeal for the welfare of native tribes came\namong all Christian nations to co-exist with the doctrine, that in\ncase of conflict with them the common restraints of war might be put\nin abeyance. What, for instance, can be worse than this, told of the\nearly English settlers in America by one of themselves? \u2018The Plymouth\nmen came in the mean time to Weymouth, and there pretended to feast\nthe savages of those parts, bringing with them forks and things for\nthe purpose, which they set before the savages. They ate thereof\nwithout any suspicion of any mischief, who were taken upon a watchword\ngiven, and with their own knives hanging about their necks were by the\nPlymouth planters stabbed and slain.\u2019[224]\n\nAmong the early English settlers it soon came to be thought, says\nMather, a religious act to kill an Indian. In the latter half of the\nseventeenth century both the French and English authorities adopted\nthe custom of scalping and of offering rewards for the scalps of their\nIndian enemies. In 1690 the most healthy and vigorous Indians taken\nby the French \u2018were sold in Canada, the weaker were sacrificed and\nscalped, and for every scalp they had a premium.\u2019[225] Caleb Lyman, who\nafterwards became an elder of a church at Boston, left an account of\nthe way in which he himself and five Indians surprised a wigwam, and\nscalped six of the seven persons inside, so that each might receive\nthe promised reward. On their petition to the great and general court\nthey received 30_l._ each, and Penhallow says not only that they\nprobably expected eight times as much, but that at the time of writing\nthe province would have readily paid a sum of 800_l._ for a similar\nservice.[226] Captain Lovewell, says the same contemporary eulogist of\nthe war that lasted from July 1722 to December 1725, \u2018from Dunstable\nwith thirty volunteers went northward, who marching several miles up\ncountry came on a wigwam where were two Indians, one of whom they\nkilled and the other took, for which they received the promised bounty\nof 100_l._ a scalp, and two shillings and sixpence a day besides.\u2019\n(December 19, 1724.)[227] At the surprise of Norridjwock \u2018the number of\ndead which we scalped were 26, besides Mr. Rasle the Jesuit, who was a\nbloody incendiary.\u2019[228] It is evident that these very liberal rewards\nmust have operated as a frequent cause of Indian wars, and made the\ncolonists open-eared to tales of native outrages; indeed the whites\nsometimes disguised themselves like Indians, and robbed like Indians,\nin order, it would appear, the more effectually to raise the war-cry\nagainst them.[229]\n\nSince the Spaniards first trained bloodhounds in Cuba to hunt the\nIndians, the alliance between soldiers and dogs has been a favourite\none in barbarian warfare. The Portuguese used them in Brazil when\nthey hunted the natives for slaves.[230] And an English officer in\na treatise he wrote in the last century as a sort of military guide\nto Indian warfare suggested coolly: \u2018Every light horseman ought to\nbe provided with a bloodhound, which would be useful to find out the\nenemy\u2019s ambushes and to follow their tracks. They would seize the\nnaked savages, and at least give time to the horsemen to come up with\nthem.\u2019[231] In the Molucca Islands the use of two bloodhounds against\na native chief was the cause of a great confederacy between all the\nislands to shake off the Spanish and Portuguese yoke.[232] And even\nin the war waged by the United States in Florida from 1838 to 1840,\nGeneral Taylor was authorised to send to Cuba for bloodhounds to scent\nout the Indians; nor, according to one account, was their aid resorted\nto in vain.[233]\n\nPoison too has been called in aid. Speaking of the Yuta Indians, a\ntraveller assures us that \u2018as in Australia, arsenic and corrosive\nsublimate in springs and provisions have diminished their number.\u2019[234]\nAnd in the same way \u2018poisoned rum helped to exterminate the\nTasmanians.\u2019[235]\n\nBut there is worse yet in this direction. The Portuguese in Brazil,\nwhen the importation of slaves from Africa rendered the capture of the\nnatives less desirable than their extermination, left the clothes\nof persons who had died of small-pox or scarlet fever to be found by\nthem in the woods.[236] And the caravan traders from the Missouri to\nSanta F\u00e9 are said by the same method or in presents of tobacco to have\ncommunicated the small-pox to the Indian tribes of that district in\n1831.[237] The enormous depopulation of most tribes by the small-pox\nsince their acquaintance with the whites is one of the most remarkable\nresults in the history of their mutual connection; nor is it likely\never to be known to what extent the coincidence was accidental.\n\nIt is pleasant to turn from these practical illustrations of the theory\nthat no laws of war need be regarded in hostilities with savage tribes\nto the only recorded trial of a contrary system, and to find, not\nonly that it is associated with one of the greatest names in English\nhistory, but also that the success it met with fully justifies the\nsuspicion and disfavour with which the commoner usage is beginning to\nbe regarded. The Indians with whom Penn made his famous treaty in 1682\n(of which Voltaire said that it was the only treaty that was never\nratified by an oath, and the only treaty that was never broken), were\nof the same Algonquin race with whom the Dutch had scarcely ever kept\nat peace, and against whom they had warred in the customary ruthless\nfashion of those times. The treaty was based on the principle of an\nadjustment of differences by a tribunal of an equal number of Red\nmen and of White. \u2018Penn,\u2019 says the historian, \u2018came without arms;\nhe declared his purpose to abstain from violence, he had no message\nbut peace, and not one drop of Quaker blood was ever shed by an\nIndian\u2019[238] For more than seventy years, from 1682 to 1754, when the\nFrench war broke out, in short, during the whole time that the Quakers\nhad the principal share in the government of Pennsylvania, the history\nof the Indians and Whites in that province was free from the tale of\nmurders and hostilities that was so common in other districts; so\nthat the single instance in which the experiment of equal laws and\nforbearance has been patiently persevered in, can at least boast of a\nsuccess that in support of the contrary system it were very difficult\nto find for an equal number of years in any other part of the world.\n\nIt may also be said against Sepulveda\u2019s doctrine, that the habits of\na higher civilisation, where they are really worth spreading, spread\nmore easily and with more permanent effect among barbarous neighbours\nby the mere contagion of a better example than by the teaching of\nfire and sword. Some of the Dyak tribes in Borneo are said to have\ngiven up human sacrifices from the better influences of the Malays\non the coast district.[239] The Peruvians, according to Prescott,\nspread their civilisation among their ruder neighbours more by\nexample than by force. \u2018Far from provoking hostilities, they allowed\ntime for the salutary example of their own institutions to work its\neffect, trusting that their less civilised neighbours would submit to\ntheir sceptre from a conviction of the blessings it would secure to\nthem.\u2019 They exhorted them to lay aside their cannibalism, their human\nsacrifices, and their other barbarities; they employed negotiation,\nconciliatory treatment, and presents to leading men among the tribes;\nand only if all these means failed did they resort to war, but to war\nwhich at every stage was readily open to propositions of peace, and in\nwhich any unnecessary outrage on the persons or property of their enemy\nwas punished with death.\n\nSomething will have been done for the cause of this better method\nof civilising the lower races, if we forewarn and forearm ourselves\nagainst the symptoms of hostilities with them by a thorough\nunderstanding of the conditions which render such hostilities probable.\nFor as an outbreak of fever is to some extent preventable by a\nknowledge of the conditions which make for fevers, so may the outbreak\nof war be averted by a knowledge of the laws which govern their\nappearance. The experience which we owe to history in this respect\nis amply sufficient to enable us to generalise with some degree of\nconfidence and certainty as to the causes or steps which produce wars\nor precede them; and from the remembrance of our dealings with the\nsavage races of South Africa we may forecast with some misgivings the\nprobable course of our connection with a country like New Guinea.\n\nA colony of Europeans in proximity with barbarian neighbours naturally\ndesires before long an increase of territory at the expense of\nthe latter. The first sign of such a desire is the expedition of\nmissionaries into the country, who not only serve to spy it out for\nthe benefit of the colony, but invariably weaken the native political\nforce by the creation of a division of feeling, and of an opposition\nbetween the love of old traditions and the temptation of novel customs\nand ideas. The innovating party, being at first the smaller, consisting\nof the feeblest and poorest members of the community, and of those who\ngladly flock to the mission-stations for refuge from their offences\nagainst tribal law, the missionaries soon perceive the impossibility of\nfurther success without the help of some external aid. The help of a\nfriendly force can alone turn the balance of influence in their favour,\nand they soon learn to contemplate with complacency the advantages of\na military conquest of the natives by the colony or mother-country.\nThe evils of war are cancelled, in their eyes, by the delusive visions\nof ultimate benefit, and, in accordance with a not uncommon perversion\nof the moral sense, an end that is assumed to be religious is made to\njustify measures that are the reverse.\n\nWhen the views and interests of the colonial settlers and of the\nmissionaries have thus, inevitably but without design, fallen into\nharmony, a war is certain to be not far distant. Apparently accidental,\nit is in reality as certain as the production of green from a mixture\nof blue and yellow. Some dispute about boundaries, some passing act of\nviolence, will serve for a reason of quarrel, which will presently be\nsupported by a fixed array of collateral pretexts. The Press readily\nlends its aid; and in a week the colony trembles or affects to tremble\nfrom a panic of invasion, and vials of virtue are expended on the vices\nof the barbarians which have been for years tolerated with equanimity\nor indifference. Their customs are painted in the blackest colours; the\ndetails of savage usages are raked up from old books of travel; rumours\nof massacres and injuries are sedulously propagated; and the whole\ncountry is represented as in such a state of anarchy, that the majority\nof the population, in their longing for deliverance from their own\nrulers, would gladly welcome even a foreign conqueror. In short, a war\nagainst them comes speedily to be regarded as a war in their behalf,\nas the last word of philanthropy and beneficence; and the atrocities\nthat subsequently ensue are professedly undertaken, not against the\nunfortunate people who endure them, but to liberate them from the ruler\nof their choice or sufferance, in whose behalf however they fight to\nthe death.\n\nTo every country, therefore, which would fain be spared from these\ndiscreditable wars with barbarian tribes on the borders of its\ncolonies, it is clear that the greatest caution is necessary against\nthe abuses of missionary propagandism. The almost absolute failure of\nmissions in recent centuries, and more especially in the nineteenth,\nis intimately associated with the greater political importance which\nthe improved facilities of travel and intercourse have conferred upon\nthem. Everyone has heard how Catholicism was persecuted in Japan, till\nat last the very profession of Christianity was made a capital crime in\nthat part of the world. But a traveller, who knew the East intimately\nat the time, explains how it was that the Jesuits\u2019 labours resulted\nso disastrously. On the outbreak of civil dissensions in Japan, \u2018the\nChristian priests thought it a proper time for them to settle their\nreligion on the same foundation that Mahomet did his, by establishing\nit in blood. Their thoughts ran on nothing less than extirpating the\nheathen out of the land, and they framed a conspiracy of raising an\narmy of 50,000 Christians to murder their countrymen, that so the whole\nisland might be illuminated by Christianity such as it was then.\u2019[240]\nAnd in the same way, a modern writer, speaking of the very limited\nsuccess of missions in India, has asserted frankly that \u2018in despair\nmany Christians in India are driven to wish and pray that some one, or\nsome way, may arise for converting the Indians by the sword.\u2019[241]\n\nNor are the heathen themselves blind to the political dangers which\nare involved in the presence of missionaries among them. All over the\nworld conversion is from the native point of view the same thing as\ndisaffection, and war is dreaded as the certain consequence of the\nadoption of Christianity. The French bishop, Lefebvre, when asked by\nthe mandarins of Cochin China, in 1847, the purpose of his visit, said\nthat he read in their faces that they suspected him \u2018of having come\nto excite some outbreak among the neophytes, and perhaps prepare the\nway for an European army;\u2019 and the king was \u2018afraid to see Christians\nmultiply in his kingdom, and in case of war with European Powers,\ncombine with his enemies.\u2019[242] How right events have proved him to\nhave been!\n\nThe story is the same in Africa. \u2018Not long after I entered the\ncountry,\u2019 said the missionary, Mr. Calderwood, of Caffraria, \u2018a leading\nchief once said to me, \u201cWhen my people become Christians, they cease to\nbe my people.\u201d\u2019[243] The Norwegian missionaries were for twenty years\nin Zululand without making any converts but a few destitute children,\nmany of whom had been given to them out of pity by the chiefs,[244]\nand their failure was actually ascribed by the Zulu king to their\nhaving taught the incompatibility of Christianity with allegiance\nto a heathen ruler.[245] In 1877, a Zulu of authority expressed the\nprevalent native reasoning on this point in language which supplies\nthe key to disappointments that extend much further than Zululand: \u2018We\nwill not allow the Zulus to become so-called Christians. It is not the\nking says so, but every man in Zululand. If a Zulu does anything wrong,\nhe at once goes to a mission-station, and says he wants to become a\nChristian; if he wants to run away with a girl, he becomes a Christian;\nif he wishes to be exempt from serving the king, he puts on clothes,\nand is a Christian; if a man is an umtagati (evil-doer), he becomes a\nChristian.\u2019[246]\n\nIt is on this account that in wars with savage nations the destruction\nof mission-stations has always been so constant an episode. Nor can\nwe wonder at this when we recollect that in the Caffre war of 1851,\nfor instance, it was a subject of boast with the missionaries that\nit was Caffres trained on the mission-stations who had preserved the\nEnglish posts along the frontiers, carried the English despatches, and\nfought against their own countrymen for the preservation and defence\nof the colony.[247] It is rather a poor result of all the money and\nlabour that has been spent in the attempt to Christianise South Africa,\nthat the Wesleyan mission-station at Edendale should have contributed\nan efficient force of cavalry to fight against their countrymen in\nthe Zulu campaign; and we may hesitate whether most to despise the\nmissionaries who count such a result as a triumph of their efforts, or\nthe converts whom they reward with tea and cake for military service\nwith the enemies of their countrymen.[248]\n\nIt needs no great strain of intelligence to perceive that this use of\nmission-stations as military training-schools scarcely tends to enhance\nthe advantages of conversion in the minds of the heathen among whom\nthey are planted.\n\nFor these reasons, and because it is becoming daily more apparent that\nwars are less a necessary evil than an optional misery of human life,\nthe principal measure for a country which would fain improve, and\nlive at peace with, the less civilised races which touch the numerous\nborders of its empire, would be the legal restraint or prevention\nof missionary enterprise: a proposal that will appear less startling\nif we reflect that in no quarter of the globe can that method of\ncivilising barbarism point to more than local or ephemeral success.\nThe Protestant missions of this century are in process of failure,\nas fatal and decided as that which befel the Catholic missions of\nthe French, Portuguese, or Spanish, in the sixteenth and seventeenth\ncenturies, and very much from the same causes. The English wars in\nSouth Africa, with which the Protestant missionaries have been so\nclosely connected, have frustrated all attempts to Christianise that\nregion, just as \u2018the fearful wars occasioned directly or indirectly by\nthe missionaries\u2019 sent by the Portuguese to the kingdoms of Congo and\nAngola in the sixteenth century rendered futile similar attempts on the\nWest Coast.[249]\n\nThe same process of depopulation under Protestant influences may now\nbe observed in the Sandwich Islands or New Zealand that reduced the\npopulation of Hispaniola, under Spanish Christianity, from a million to\n14,000 in a quarter of a century.[250] No Protestant missionary ever\nlaboured with more zeal than Eliot did in America in the seventeenth\ncentury, but the tribes he taught have long since been extinct:\n\u2018like one of their own forest trees, they have withered from core to\nbark;\u2019[251] and, in short, the history of both Catholic and Protestant\nmissions alike may be summed up in this one general statement: either\nthey have failed altogether of results on a sufficient scale to be\nworthy of notice, or the impartial page of history unfolds to us one\nuniform tale of civil war, persecution, conquest, and extirpation in\nwhatever regions they can boast of more at least of the semblance of\nsuccess.\n\nAnother measure in the interests of peace would be the organisation of\na class of well-paid officials whose duty it should be to examine on\nthe spot into the truth of all rumours of outrages or atrocities which\nare circulated from time to time, in order to set the tide of public\nopinion in favour of hostile measures. Such rumours may, of course,\nhave some foundation, but in nine cases out of ten they are false. So\nlately as the year 1882, the _Times_ and other English papers were\nso far deceived as to give their readers a horrible account of the\nsacrifice of 200 young girls to the spirits of the dead in Ashantee;\nand people were beginning to ask themselves whether such things could\nbe suffered within reach of an English army, when it was happily\ndiscovered that the whole story was fictitious. Stories of this sort\nare what the Germans call _Tendenzl\u00fcgen_, or lies invented to produce a\ncertain effect. Their effect in rousing the war-spirit is undeniable;\nand, although the healthy scepticism which has of recent years been\nborn of experience affords us some protection, no expenditure could be\nmore economical than one which should aim at rendering them powerless\nby neutralising them at the fountain-head.\n\nIn the preceding historical survey of the relations in war between\ncommunities standing on different levels of civilisation, the\nallusion, among some of the rudest tribes, to laws of war very similar\nto those supposed to be binding between more polished nations tends to\ndiscredit the distinction between civilised and barbarian warfare. The\nprogress of knowledge threatens the overthrow of the distinction, just\nas it has already reduced that between organic and inorganic matter,\nor between animal and vegetable life, to a distinction founded rather\non human thought than on the nature of things. And it is probable that\nthe more the military side of savage life is studied, the fewer will be\nfound to be the lines of demarcation which are thought to establish a\ndifference in kind in the conduct of war by belligerents in different\nstages of progress. The difference in this respect is chiefly one of\nweapons, of strategy, and of tactics; and it would seem that whatever\nsuperiority the more civilised community may claim in its rules of\nwar is more than compensated in savage life both by the less frequent\noccurrence of wars and by their far less fatal character.\n\nBut, however much the frequency and ferocity of the wars waged by\nbarbarian races as compared with those waged by civilised nations has\nbeen exaggerated, there is no doubt but that in warfare, more than\nin anything else, there is most in common between civilisation and\nsavagery, and that the distinction between them most nearly disappears.\nIn art and knowledge and religion the distinction between the two is so\nwide that the evolution of one from the other seems still to many minds\nincredible; but in war, and the thoughts which relate to it, the points\nof analogy cannot fail to strike the most indifferent. We see still\nin either condition, the same notions of the glory of fighting, the\nsame belief in war as the only source of strength and honour, the same\nhope from it of personal advancement, the same readiness to seize any\npretext for resorting to it, the same foolish sentiment that it is mean\nto live without it.\n\nThen only will the distinction between the two be final, complete,\nand real, when all fighting is relegated to barbarism, and regarded\nas unworthy of civilised humanity; when the enlightenment of\nopinion, which has freed us already from such curses as slavery, the\ntorture-chamber, or duelling, shall demand instinctively the settlement\nof all causes of quarrel by peaceful arbitration, and leave to the\nlower races and the lower creation the old-fashioned resort to a trial\nof violence and might, to competition in fraud and ferocity.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nWAR AND CHRISTIANITY.\n\n    _Etsi adierant milites ad Joannem et formam observationis\n    acceperant, si etiam centurio crediderat, omnem postea militem\n    Dominus in Petro exarmando discinxit._--TERTULLIAN.\n\n    The war question at the time of the Reformation--The remonstrances\n    of Erasmus against the custom--Influence of Grotius on the side of\n    war--The war question in the early Church--The Fathers against the\n    lawfulness of war--Causes of the changed views of the Church--The\n    clergy as active combatants for over one thousand years--Fighting\n    Bishops--Bravery in war and ecclesiastical preferment--Pope Julius\n    II. at the siege of Mirandola--The last fighting Bishop--Origin\n    and meaning of the declaration of war--Superstition in the naming\n    of weapons, ships, &c.--The custom of kissing the earth before a\n    charge--Connection between religious and military ideas--The Church\n    as a pacific agency--Her efforts to set limits to reprisals--The\n    altered attitude of the modern Church--Early reformers only\n    sanctioned just wars--Voltaire\u2019s reproach against the Church--Canon\n    Mozley\u2019s sermon on war--The answer to his apology.\n\n\nWhether military service was lawful for a Christian at all was at the\ntime of the Reformation one of the most keenly debated questions;\nand considering the force of opinion arrayed on the negative side,\nits ultimate decision in the affirmative is a matter of more wonder\nthan is generally given to it. Sir Thomas More charges Luther and his\ndisciples with carrying the doctrines of peace to the extreme limits\nof non-resistance; and the views on this subject of the Mennonites\nand Quakers were but what at one time seemed not unlikely to have been\nthose of the Reformed Church generally.\n\nBy far the foremost champion on the negative side was Erasmus, who\nbeing at Rome at the time when the League of Cambray, under the\nauspices of Julius II., was meditating war against the Republic of\nVenice, wrote a book to the Pope, entitled \u2018Antipolemus,\u2019 which, though\nnever completed, probably exists in part in his tract known under the\ntitle of \u2018Dulce Bellum inexpertis,\u2019 and printed among his \u2018Adagia.\u2019\nIn it he complained, as one might complain still, that the custom of\nwar was so recognised as an incident of life that men wondered there\nshould be any to whom it was displeasing; and likewise so approved of\ngenerally, that to find any fault with it savoured not only of impiety,\nbut of actual heresy. To speak of it, therefore, as he did in the\nfollowing passage, required some courage: \u2018If there be anything in the\naffairs of mortals which it is the interest of men not only to attack,\nbut which ought by every possible means to be avoided, condemned, and\nabolished, it is of all things war, than which nothing is more impious,\nmore calamitous, more widely pernicious, more inveterate, more base,\nor in sum more unworthy of a man, not to say of a Christian.\u2019 In a\nletter to Francis I. on the same subject, he noticed as an astonishing\nfact, that out of such a multitude of abbots, bishops, archbishops, and\ncardinals as existed in the world, not one of them should step forward\nto do what he could, even at the risk of his life, to put an end to so\ndeplorable a practice.\n\nThe failure of this view of the custom of war, which is in its essence\nmore opposed to Christianity than the custom of selling men for slaves\nor sacrificing them to idols, to take any root in men\u2019s minds, is a\nmisfortune on which the whole history of Europe since Erasmus forms\na sufficient commentary. That failure is partly due to the unlucky\naccident which led Grotius in this matter to throw all his weight into\nthe opposite scale. For this famous jurist, entering at much length\ninto the question of the compatibility of war with the profession of\nChristianity (thereby proving the importance which in his day still\nattached to it), came to conclusions in favour of the received opinion,\nwhich are curiously characteristic both of the writer and his time.\nHis general argument was, that if a sovereign was justified in putting\nhis own subjects to death for crimes, much more was he justified in\nusing the sword against people who were not his subjects, but strangers\nto him. And this absurd argument was enforced by considerations as\nfeeble as the following: that laws of war were laid down in the Book\nof Deuteronomy; that John the Baptist did not bid the soldiers, who\nconsulted him, to forsake their calling, but to abstain from extortion\nand be content with their wages; that Cornelius the centurion, whom St.\nPeter baptized, neither gave up his military life, nor was exhorted by\nthe apostle to do so; that the Emperor Constantine had many Christians\nin his armies, and the name of Christ inscribed upon his banners; and\nthat the military oath after his time was taken in the name of the\nThree Persons of the Trinity.\n\nOne single reflection will suffice to display the utter shallowness of\nthis reasoning, which was after all only borrowed from St. Augustine.\nFor if Biblical texts are a justification of war, they are clearly a\njustification of slavery; whilst, on the other hand, the general spirit\nof the Christian religion, to say nothing of several positive passages,\nis at least equally opposed to one custom as to the other. If then the\nabolition of slavery is one of the services for which Christianity as\nan influence in history claims a large share of the credit, its failure\nto abolish the other custom must in fairness be set against it; for\nit were easier to defend slave-holding out of the language of the New\nTestament than to defend military service, far more being actually said\nthere to inculcate the duty of peace than to inculcate the principles\nof social equality: and the same may be said of the writings of the\nFathers.\n\nThe different attitude of the Church towards these two customs in\nmodern times, her vehement condemnation of the one, and her tolerance\nor encouragement of the other, appears all the more surprising when\nwe remember that in the early centuries of our era her attitude was\nexactly the reverse, and that, whilst slavery was permitted, the\nunlawfulness of war was denounced with no uncertain or wavering voice.\n\nWhen Tertullian wrote his treatise \u2018De Corona\u2019 (201) concerning the\nright of Christian soldiers to wear laurel crowns, he used words on\nthis subject which, even if at variance with some of his statements\nmade in his \u2018Apology\u2019 thirty years earlier, may be taken to express his\nmaturer judgment. \u2018Shall the son of peace\u2019 (that is, a Christian),\nhe asks, \u2018act in battle when it will not befit him even to go to\nlaw? Shall he administer bonds and imprisonments and tortures and\npunishments who may not avenge even his own injuries?... The very\ntransference of his enrolment from the army of light to that of\ndarkness is sin.\u2019 And again: \u2018What if the soldiers did go to John\nand receive the rule of their service, and what if the Centurion did\nbelieve; the Lord by his disarming of Peter disarmed every soldier\nfrom that time forward.\u2019 Tertullian made an exception in favour of\nsoldiers whose conversion was subsequent to their enrolment (as was\nimplied in discussing their duty with regard to the laurel-wreath),\nthough insisting even in their case that they ought either to leave the\nservice, as many did, or to refuse participation in its acts, which\nwere inconsistent with their Christian profession. So that at that time\nChristian opinion was clearly not only averse to a military life being\nentered upon after baptism (of which there are no instances on record),\nbut in favour of its being forsaken, if the enrolment preceded the\nbaptism. The Christians who served in the armies of Rome were not men\nwho were converts or Christians at the time of enrolling, but men who\nremained with the colours after their conversion. If it is certain that\nsome Christians _remained_ in the army, it appears equally certain that\nno Christian at that time thought of _entering_ it.\n\nThis seems the best solution of the much-debated question, to what\nextent Christians served at all in the early centuries. Iren\u00e6us\nspeaks of the Christians in the second century as not knowing how\nto fight, and Justin Martyr, his contemporary, considered Isaiah\u2019s\nprophecy about the swords being turned into ploughshares as in part\nfulfilled, because his co-religionists, who in times past had killed\none another, did not then know how to fight even with their enemies.\nThe charge made by Celsus against the Christians, that they refused\nto bear arms even in case of necessity, was admitted by Origen, but\njustified on the ground of the unlawfulness of war. \u2018We indeed,\u2019 he\nsays, \u2018fight in a special way on the king\u2019s behalf, but we do not go\non campaigns with him, even should he press us to do so; we do battle\non his behalf as a peculiar army of piety, prevailing by our prayers\nto God for him.\u2019 And again: \u2018We no longer take up the sword against\npeople, nor learn to make war any more, having become through Jesus,\nwho is our general, sons of peace.\u2019 Nothing could be clearer nor more\nconclusive than this language; and the same attitude towards war was\nexpressed or implied by the following Fathers in chronological order:\nJustin Martyr, Tatian, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Cyprian,\nLactantius, Archelaus, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Jerome, and Cyril. Eusebius\nsays that many Christians in the third century laid aside the military\nlife rather than abjure their religion. Of 10,050 pagan inscriptions\nthat have been collected, 545 were found to belong to pagan soldiers,\nwhile of 4,734 Christian inscriptions of the same period, only 27 were\nthose of soldiers; from which it seems rather absurd to infer, as a\nFrench writer has inferred, not that there was a great disproportion\nof Christian to pagan soldiers in the imperial armies, but that most\nChristian soldiers being soldiers of Christ did not like to have it\nrecorded on their epitaphs that they had been in the service of any\n_man_.[252]\n\nOn the other hand, there were certainly always some Christians who\nremained in the ranks after their conversion, in spite of the military\noath in the names of the pagan deities and the quasi-worship of the\nstandards which constituted some part of the early Christian antipathy\nto war. This is implied in the remarks of Tertullian, and stands in\nno need of the support of such legends as the Thundering Legion of\nChristians, whose prayers obtained rain, or of the Theban legion of\n6,000 Christians martyred under Maximian. It was left as a matter of\nindividual conscience. In the story of the martyr Maximilian, when Dion\nthe proconsul reminded him that there were Christian soldiers among the\nlife-guards of the Emperors, the former replied, \u2018They know what is\nbest for them to do; but I am a Christian and cannot fight.\u2019 Marcellus,\nthe converted centurion, threw down his belt at the head of his legion,\nand suffered death rather than continue in the service; and the annals\nof the early Church abound in similar martyrdoms. Nor can there be\nmuch doubt but that a love of peace and dislike of bloodshed were the\nprincipal causes of this early Christian attitude towards the military\nprofession, and that the idolatry and other pagan rites connected with\nit only acted as minor and secondary deterrents. Thus, in the Greek\nChurch St. Basil would have excluded from communion for three years\nany one who had shed an enemy\u2019s blood; and a similar feeling explains\nTheodosius\u2019 refusal to partake of the Eucharist after his great victory\nover Eugenius. The canons of the Church excluded from ordination all\nwho had served in an army after baptism; and in the fifth century\nInnocent I. blamed the Spanish churches for their laxity in admitting\nsuch persons into holy orders.[253]\n\nThe anti-military tendency of opinion in the early period of\nChristianity appears therefore indisputable, and Tertullian would\nprobably have smiled at the prophet who should have predicted that\nChristians would have ceased to keep slaves long before they should\nhave ceased to commit murder and robbery under the fiction of\nhostilities. But it proves the strength of the original impetus, that\nUlphilas, the first apostle to the Goths, should purposely, in his\ntranslation of the Scriptures, have omitted the Books of Kings, as too\nstimulative of a love of war.\n\nHow utterly in this matter Christianity came to forsake its earlier\nideal is known to all. This resulted partly from the frequent use of\nthe sword for the purpose of conversion, and partly from the rise of\nthe Mahometan power, which made wars with the infidel appear in the\nlight of acts of faith, and changed the whole of Christendom into a\nkind of vast standing military order. But it resulted still more from\nthat compromise effected in the fourth century between paganism and\nthe new religion, in which the former retained more than it lost, and\nthe latter gave less than it received. Considering that the Druid\npriests of ancient Gaul or Britain, like those of pagan Rome, were\nexempt from military service,[254] and often, according to Strabo, had\nsuch influence as to part combatants on the point of an engagement,\nnothing is more remarkable than the extent to which the Christian\nclergy, bishops, and abbots came to lead armies and fight in battle,\nin spite of canons and councils of the Church, at a time when that\nChurch\u2019s power was greater, and its influence wider, than it has ever\nbeen since. Historians have scarcely given due prominence to this\nfact, which covers a period of at least a thousand years; for Gregory\nof Tours mentions two bishops of the sixth century who had killed\nmany enemies with their own hands, whilst Erasmus, in the sixteenth,\ncomplains of bishops taking more pride in leading three or four hundred\ndragoons, with swords and guns, than in a following of deacons and\ndivinity students, and asks, with just sarcasm, why the trumpet and\nfife should sound sweeter in their ears than the singing of psalms or\nthe words of the Bible.\n\nIn the fourteenth century, when war and chivalry were at their\nheight, occurred a remarkable protest against this state of things\nfrom Wycliffe, who, in this, as in other respects, anticipated the\nReformation: \u2018Friars now say that bishops can fight best of all men,\nand that it falleth most properly to them, since they are lords of\nall this world. They say, Christ bade his disciples sell their coats,\nand buy them swords; but whereto, if not to fight? Thus friars make\na great array, and stir up men to fight. But Christ taught not his\napostles to fight with a sword of iron, but with the sword of God\u2019s\nword, which standeth in meekness of heart and in the prudence of man\u2019s\ntongue.... If manslaying in others be odious to God, much more in\npriests who should be vicars of Christ.\u2019 And Wycliffe proceeds not only\nto protest against this, but to advocate the general cause of peace on\nearth, on grounds which he is aware that men of the world will scorn\nand reject as fatal to the existence of kingdoms.[255]\n\nIt was no occasional, but an inveterate practice, and, apparently,\ncommon in the world, long before the system of feudalism gave it\nsome justification by the connection of military service with the\nenjoyment of lands. Yet it has now so completely disappeared that--as\na proof of the possible change of thought which may ultimately render\na Christian soldier as great an anomaly as a fighting bishop--it is\nworth recalling from history some instances of so curious a custom.\n\u2018The bishops themselves--not all, but many\u2019--says a writer of King\nStephen\u2019s reign, \u2018bound in iron, and completely furnished with arms,\nwere accustomed to mount war-horses with the perverters of their\ncountry, to share in their spoil; to bind and torture the knights whom\nthey took in the chance of war, or whom they met full of money.\u2019[256]\nIt was at the battle of Bouvines (1214) that the famous Bishop of\nBeauvais fought with a club instead of a sword, out of respect for\nthe rule of the canon which forbade an ecclesiastic to shed blood.\nMatthew Paris tells the story how Richard I. took the said bishop\nprisoner, and when the Pope begged for his release as being his own\nson and a son of the Church, sent to Innocent III. the episcopal coat\nof mail, with the inquiry whether he recognised it as that of his son\nor of a son of the Church; to which the Pope had the wit to reply that\nhe could not recognise it as belonging to either.[257] The story also\nbears repeating of the impatient knight who, sharing the command of a\ndivision at the battle of Falkirk with the Bishop of Durham, cried out\nto his slower colleague, before closing with the Scots, \u2018It is not for\nyou to teach us war; to your Mass, bishop!\u2019 and therewith rushed with\nhis followers into the fray (1298).[258]\n\nIt is, however, needless to multiply instances, which, if Du Cange\nmay be credited, became more common during the devastation of France\nby the Danes in the ninth century, when all the military aid that was\navailable became a matter of national existence. That event rendered\nCharlemagne\u2019s capitulary a dead letter, by which that monarch had\nforbidden any ecclesiastic to march against an enemy, save two or\nthree bishops to bless the army or reconcile the combatants, and a few\npriests to give absolution and celebrate the Mass.[259] It appears that\nthis law was made in response to an exhortation by Pope Adrian II.,\nsimilar to one addressed in the previous century by Pope Zachary to\nCharlemagne\u2019s ancestor, King Pepin. But though military service and the\ntenure of ecclesiastical benefices became more common from the time of\nthe Danish irruptions, instances are recorded of abbots and archbishops\nwho chose rather to surrender their temporalities than to take part in\nactive service; and for many centuries the whole question seems to have\nrested on a most uncertain footing, law and custom demanding as a duty\nthat which public and ecclesiastical opinion condoned, but which the\nChurch herself condemned.\n\nIt is a signal mark of the degree to which religion became enveloped\nin the military spirit of those miserable days of chivalry, that\necclesiastical preferment was sometimes the reward of bravery on the\nfield, as in the case of that chaplain to the Earl of Douglas who, for\nhis courage displayed at the battle of Otterbourne, was, Froissart\ntells us, promoted the same year to a canonry and archdeaconry at\nAberdeen.\n\nVasari, in his \u2018Life of Michael Angelo,\u2019 has a good story which is\nnot only highly typical of this martial Christianity, but may be also\ntaken to mark the furthest point of divergence reached by the Church in\nthis respect from the standpoint of her earlier teaching. Pope Julius\nII. went one day to see a statue of himself which Michael Angelo was\nexecuting. The right hand of the statue was raised in a dignified\nattitude, and the artist consulted the Pope as to whether he should\nplace a book in the left. \u2018Put a sword into it,\u2019 quoth Julius, \u2018for of\nletters I know but little.\u2019 This was the Pope of whom Bayle says that\nnever man had a more warlike soul, and of whom, with some doubt, he\nrepeats the anecdote of his having thrown into the Tiber the keys of\nSt. Peter, with the declaration that he would thenceforth use the sword\nof St. Paul. However this may be, he went in person to hasten the siege\nof Mirandola, in opposition to the protests of the cardinals and to\nthe scandal of Christendom (1510). There it was that to encourage the\nsoldiers he promised them, that if they exerted themselves valiantly\nhe would make no terms with the town, but would suffer them to sack\nit;[260] and though this did not occur, and the town ultimately\nsurrendered on terms, the head of the Christian Church had himself\nconveyed into it by the breach.\n\nThe scandal of this proceeding contributed its share to the discontent\nwhich produced the Reformation; and that movement continued still\nfurther the disfavour with which many already viewed the connection of\nthe clergy with actual warfare. It has, however, happened occasionally\nsince that epoch that priests of martial tastes have been enabled\nto gratify them, the custom having become more and more rare as\npublic opinion grew stronger against it. The last recorded instance\nof a fighting divine was, it would seem, the Bishop of Derry, who,\nhaving been raised to that see by William III. in gratitude for the\ndistinguished bravery with which, though a clergyman, he had conducted\nthe defence of Londonderry against the forces of James II., and for\nwhich the University of Oxford rewarded him with the title of Doctor\nof Divinity, was shot dead at the battle of the Boyne. He had, says\nMacaulay, \u2018during the siege in which he had so highly distinguished\nhimself, contracted a passion for war,\u2019 but his zeal to gratify it on\nthat second occasion cost him the favour of the king. It is, however,\nsomewhat remarkable that history should have called no special\nattention to the last instance of a bishop who fought and died upon a\nbattle-field, nor have sufficiently emphasised the great revolution of\nthought which first changed a common occurrence into something unusual,\nand finally into a memory that seems ridiculous. No historical fact\naffords a greater justification than this for the hope that, absurd as\nis the idea of a fighting bishop to our own age, that of a fighting\nChristian may be to our posterity.\n\nAs bishops were in the middle ages warriors, so they were also the\ncommon bearers of declarations of war. The Bishop of Lincoln bore, for\ninstance, the challenge of Edward III. and his allies to Charles V.\nat Paris; and greatly offended was the English king and his council\nwhen Charles returned the challenge by a common valet--they declared\nit indecent for a war between two such great lords to be declared by a\nmere servant, and not by a prelate or a knight of valour.\n\nThe declaration of war in those times appears to have meant simply a\nchallenge or defiance like that then and afterwards customary in a\nduel. It appears to have originated out of habits that governed the\nrelations between the feudal barons. We learn from Froissart that when\nEdward was made Vicar of the German Empire an old statute was renewed\nwhich had before been made at the emperor\u2019s court, to the effect that\nno one, intending to injure his neighbour, might do so without sending\nhim a defiance three days beforehand. The following extract from the\nchallenge of war sent by the Duke of Orleans, the brother of the King\nof France, to Henry IV. of England, testifies to the close resemblance\nbetween a declaration of war and a challenge to a deed of arms, and to\nthe levity which often gave rise to either: \u2018I, Louis, write and make\nknown to you, that with the aid of God and the blessed Trinity, in the\ndesire which I have to gain renown, and which you likewise should feel,\nconsidering idleness as the bane of lords of high birth who do not\nemploy themselves in arms, and thinking I can no way better seek renown\nthan by proposing to you to meet me at an appointed place, each of us\naccompanied with 100 knights and esquires, of name and arms without\nreproach, there to combat till one of the parties shall surrender; and\nhe to whom God shall grant the victory shall do with his prisoners as\nhe pleases. We will not employ any incantations that are forbidden by\nthe Church, but make use of the bodily strength given us by God, with\narmour as may be most agreeable to everyone for the security of his\nperson, and with the usual arms, that is lance, battle-axe, sword, and\ndagger ... without aiding himself by any bodkins, hooks, bearded darts,\npoisoned needles or razors, as may be done by persons unless they are\npositively ordered to the contrary....\u2019[261] Henry IV. answered the\nchallenge with some contempt, but expressed his readiness to meet\nthe duke in single combat, whenever he should visit his possessions\nin France, in order to prevent any greater effusion of Christian\nblood, since a good shepherd, he said, should expose his own life for\nhis flock. It even seemed at one time as if wars might have resolved\nthemselves into this more rational mode of settlement. The Emperor\nHenry IV. challenged the Duke of Swabia to single combat. Philip\nAugustus of France is said to have proposed to Richard I. to settle\ntheir differences by a combat of five on each side; and when Edward\nIII. challenged the realm of France, he offered to settle the question\nby a duel or a combat of 100 men on each side, with which the French\nking would, it appears, have complied, had Edward consented to stake\nthe kingdom of England against that of France.\n\nIn the custom of naming the implements of war after the most revered\nnames of the Christian hagiology may be observed another trace of\nthe close alliance that resulted between the military and spiritual\nsides of human life, somewhat like that which prevailed in the sort of\nworship paid to their lances, pikes, and battle-axes by the ancient\nScandinavians.[262] Thus the two first forts which the Spaniards built\nin the Ladrone Islands they called respectively after St. Francis\nXavier and the Virgin Mary. Twelve ships in the Armada were called\nafter the Twelve Apostles, and so were twelve of his cannons by Henry\nVIII., one of which, St. John by name, was captured by the French in\n1513.[263] It is probable that mere irreverence had less to do with\nthis custom than the hope thereby of obtaining favour in war, such as\nmay also be traced in the ceremony of consecrating military banners,\nwhich has descended to our own times.[264]\n\nTo the same order of superstition belongs the old custom of falling\ndown and kissing the earth before starting on a charge or assault\nof battle. The practice is alluded to several times in Montluc\u2019s\nCommentaries, but so little was it understood by a modern French editor\nthat in one place he suggests the reading _baiss\u00e8rent la t\u00eate_ (they\nlowered their heads) for _bais\u00e8rent la terre_ (they kissed the earth).\nBut the latter reading is confirmed by passages elsewhere; as, for\ninstance, in the \u2018Memoirs of Fleurange,\u2019 where it is stated that Gaston\nde Foix and his soldiers kissed the earth, according to custom, before\nproceeding to march against the enemy;[265] and, again, in the \u2018Life\nof Bayard,\u2019 by his secretary, who records it among the virtues of that\nknight that he would rise from his bed every night to prostrate himself\nat full length on the floor and kiss the earth.[266] This kissing of\nthe earth was an abbreviated form of taking a particle of it in the\nmouth, as both Elmham and Livius mention to have been done by the\nEnglish at Agincourt before attacking the French; and this again was an\nabbreviated form of receiving the sacrament, for Villani says of the\nFlemish at Cambray (1302) that they made a priest go all over the field\nwith the sacred elements, and that, instead of communicating, each man\ntook a little earth and put it into his mouth.[267] This seems a more\nlikely explanation than that the custom was intended as a reminder to\nthe soldier of his mortality, as if in a trade like his there could be\nany lack of testimony of that sort.\n\nIt is curious to observe how war in every stage of civilisation has\nbeen the central interest of public religious supplication; and how,\nfrom the pagans of old to modern savages, the pettiest quarrels and\nconflicts have been deemed a matter of interest to the immortals. The\nSandwich islanders and Tahitians sought the aid of their gods in war\nby human sacrifices. The Fijians before war were wont to present their\ngods with costly offerings and temples, and offer with their prayers\nthe best they could of land crabs or whales\u2019 teeth; being so convinced\nthat they thereby ensured to themselves the victory, that once, when\na missionary called the attention of a war party to the scantiness of\ntheir numbers, they only replied, with disdainful confidence, \u2018Our\nallies are the gods.\u2019 The prayer which the Roman pontifex addressed\nto Jupiter on behalf of the Republic at the opening of the war with\nAntiochus, king of Syria, is extremely curious: \u2018If the war which the\npeople has ordered to be waged with King Antiochus shall be finished\nafter the wish of the Roman senate and people, then to thee, O Jupiter,\nwill the Roman people exhibit the great games for ten successive days,\nand offerings shall be presented at all the shrines of such value as\nthe senate shall decree.\u2019[268] This rude state of theology, wherein\na victory from the gods may be obtained for a fair consideration in\nexchange, tends to keep alive, if it did not originate, that sense of\ndependence on invisible powers which constitutes the most rudimentary\nform of religion; for it is a remarkable fact that the faintest\nnotions of supernatural agencies are found precisely among tribes\nwhose military organisation or love for war is the lowest and least\ndeveloped. In proportion as the war-spirit is cultivated does the\nworship of war-presiding deities prevail; and since these are formed\nfrom the memories of warriors who have died or been slain, their\nattributes and wishes remain those of the former earthly potentate, who\nthough no longer visible, may still be gratified by presents of fruit,\nor by slaughtered oxen or slaves.\n\nThe Khonds of Orissa, in India, afford an instance of this close and\npernicious association between religious and military ideas, which may\nbe traced through the history of many far more advanced communities.\nFor though they regard the joy of the peace dance as the very highest\nattainable upon earth, they attribute, not to their own will, but\nto that of their war god, Loha Pennu, the source of all their wars.\nThe devastation of a fever or tiger is accepted as a hint from that\ndivinity that his service has been too long neglected, and they acquit\nthemselves of all blame for a war begun for no better reason, by the\nfollowing philosophy of its origin: \u2018Loha Pennu said to himself, Let\nthere be war, and he forthwith entered into all weapons, so that from\ninstruments of peace they became weapons of war; he gave edge to the\naxe and point to the arrow; he entered into all kinds of food and\ndrink, so that men in eating and drinking were filled with rage, and\nwomen became instruments of discord instead of soothers of anger.\u2019 And\nthey address this prayer to Loha Pennu for aid against their enemies:\n\u2018Let our axes crush cloth and bones as the jaws of the hy\u00e6na crush\nits prey. Make the wounds we give to gape.... When the wounds of our\nenemies heal, let lameness remain. Let their stones and arrows fall\non us as the flowers of the mowa-tree fall in the wind.... Make their\nweapons brittle as the long pods of the karta-tree.\u2019\n\nIn their belief that wars were of external causation to themselves,\nand in their endeavour to win by prayer a favourable issue to their\nappeal to arms, it could scarcely be maintained that the nations\nof Christendom have at all times shown any marked superiority over\nthe modern Khonds. But in spite of this, and of the fierce military\ncharacter that Christianity ultimately assumed, the Church always kept\nalive some of her earlier traditions about peace, and even in the\ndarkest ages set some barriers to the common fury of the soldier. When\nthe Roman Empire was overthrown, her influence in this direction was\nin marked contrast with what it has been ever since. Even Alaric when\nhe sacked Rome (410) was so far affected by Christianity as to spare\nthe churches and the Christians who fled to them. Leo the Great, Bishop\nof Rome, inspired even Attila with respect for his priestly authority,\nand averted his career of conquest from Rome; and the same bishop,\nthree years later (455), pleaded with the victorious Genseric that\nhis Vandals should spare the unresisting multitude and the buildings\nof Rome, nor allow torture to be inflicted on their prisoners. At the\ninstance of Gregory II., Luitprand, the Lombard king, withdrew his\ntroops from the same city, resigned his conquests, and offered his\nsword and dagger on the tomb of St. Peter (730).\n\nYet more praiseworthy and perhaps more effective were the efforts of\nthe Church from the tenth century onwards to check that system of\nprivate war which was then the bane of Europe, as the system of public\nand international wars has been since. In the south of France several\nbishops met and agreed to exclude from the privileges of a Christian\nin life and after death all who violated their ordinances directed\nagainst that custom (990). Only four years later the Council of Limoges\nexhorted men to swear by the bodies of the saints that they would cease\nto violate the public peace. Lent appears to have been to some extent\na season of abstinence from fighting as from other pleasures, for one\nof the charges against Louis le D\u00e9bonnaire was that he summoned an\nexpedition for that time of the year.\n\nIn 1032 a Bishop of Aquitaine declared himself the recipient of a\nmessage from heaven, ordering men to cease from fighting; and, not\nonly did a peace, called the Truce of God, result for seven years,\nbut it was resolved that such peace should always prevail during\nthe great festivals of the Church, and from every Thursday evening\nto Monday morning. And the regulation for one kingdom was speedily\nextended over Christendom, confirmed by several Popes, and enforced by\nexcommunication.[269] If such efforts were not altogether successful,\nand the wars of the barons continued till the royal power in every\ncountry was strong enough to suppress them, it must none the less be\nrecognised that the Church fought, if she fought in vain, against the\nbarbarism of a military society, and with an ardour that is in striking\ncontrast with her apathy in more recent history.\n\nIt must also be granted that the idea of what the Papacy might do\nfor the peace of the world, as the supreme arbiter of disputes and\nmediator between contending Powers, gained possession of men\u2019s minds,\nand entered into the definite policy of the Church about the twelfth\ncentury, in a manner that might suggest reflection for the nineteenth.\nThe name of Gerohus de Reigersperg is connected with a plan for the\npacification of the world, by which the Pope was to forbid war to\nall Christian princes, to settle all disputes between them, and to\nenforce his decisions by the greatest powers that have ever yet been\ndevised for human authority--namely, by excommunication and deposition.\nAnd the Popes attempted something of this sort. When, for instance,\nInnocent III. bade the King of France to make peace with Richard I.,\nand was told that the dispute concerned a matter of feudal relationship\nwith which the Pope had no right of interference, he replied that he\ninterfered by right of his power to censure what he thought sin, and\nquite irrespective of feudal rights. He also refused to consider the\ndestruction of places and the slaughter of Christians as a matter of no\nconcern to him; and Honorius III. forbade an attack upon Denmark, on\nthe ground that that kingdom lay under the special protection of the\nPapacy.[270]\n\nThe clergy, moreover, were even in the most warlike times of history\nthe chief agents in negotiations for peace, and in the attempt to\nset limits to military reprisals. When, for instance, the French and\nEnglish were about to engage at Poitiers, the Cardinal of Perigord\nspent the whole of the Sunday that preceded the day of battle in\nlaudable but ineffectual attempts to bring the two sides to an\nagreement without a battle. And when the Duke of Anjou was about to\nput 600 of the defenders of Montpellier to death by the sword, by the\nhalter, and by fire, it was the Cardinal of Albany and a Dominican monk\nwho saved him from the infamy of such a deed by reminding him of the\nduty of Christian forgiveness.\n\nIn these respects it must be plain to every one that the attitude\nand power of the Church has entirely changed. She has stood apart\nmore and more as time has gone on from her great opportunities as a\npromoter of peace. Her influence, it is notorious, no longer counts for\nanything, where it was once so powerful, in the field of negotiation\nand reconcilement. She lifts no voice to denounce the evils of war, nor\nto plead for greater restraint in the exercise of reprisals and the\nabuse of victory. She lends no aid to teach the duty of forbearance\nand friendship between nations, to diminish their idle jealousies, nor\nto explain the real identity of their interests. It may even be said\nwithout risk of contradiction, that whatever attempt has been made to\nfurther the cause of peace upon earth or to diminish the horror of the\ncustoms of war, has come, not from the Church, but from the school of\nthought to which she has been most opposed, and which she has studied\nmost persistently to revile.\n\nIn respect, too, of the justice of the cause of war, the Church within\nrecent centuries has entirely vacated her position. It is noticeable\nthat in the 37th article of the English Church, which is to the effect\nthat a Christian at the command of the magistrate may wear weapons\nand serve in the wars, the word _justa_, which in the Latin form\npreceded the word _bella_ or wars, has been omitted.[271] The leaders\nof the Reformation decided on the whole in favour of the lawfulness of\nmilitary service for a Christian, but with the distinct reservation\nthat the cause of war should be just. Bullinger, who was Zwingli\u2019s\nsuccessor in the Reformed Church at Zurich, decided that though a\nChristian might take up arms at the command of the magistrate, it\nwould be his duty to disobey the magistrate if he purposed to make\nwar on the guiltless; and that only the death of those soldiers on\nthe battle-field was glorious who fought for their religion or their\ncountry. Thomas Becon, chaplain to Archbishop Cranmer, complained of\nthe utter disregard of a just and patriotic motive for war in the code\nof military ethics then prevalent. Speaking of the fighters of his day,\nhe thus characterised their position in the State: \u2018The rapacity of\nwolves, the violence of lions, the fierceness of tigers is nothing in\ncomparison of their furious and cruel tyranny; and yet do many of them\nthis not for the safeguard of their country (for so it would be the\nmore tolerable), but to satisfy their butcher-like affects, to boast\nanother day of how many men they have been the death, and to bring\nhome the more preys that they may live the fatter ever after for these\nspoils and stolen goods.\u2019[272] From military service he maintained\nthat all considerations of justice and humanity had been entirely\nbanished, and their stead been taken by robbery and theft, \u2018the\ninsatiable spoiling of other men\u2019s goods, and a whole sea of barbarous\nand beast-like manners.\u2019 In this way the necessity of a just cause as\na reason for taking part in actual warfare was reasserted at the time\nof the Reformation, and has only since then been allowed to drop out\nof sight altogether; so that now public opinion has no guide in the\nmatter, and even less than it had in ancient Rome, the attitude of the\nChurch towards the State on this point being rather that of Anaxarchus\nthe philosopher to Alexander the Great, when, to console that conqueror\nfor his murder of Clitus, he said to him: \u2018Know you not that Jupiter is\nrepresented with Law and Justice at his side, to show that whatever is\ndone by sovereign power is right?\u2019\n\nConsidering, therefore, that no human institution yet devised or\nactually in existence has had or has a moral influence or facilities\nfor exercising it at all equal to that enjoyed by the Church, it is all\nthe more to be regretted that she has never taken any real interest\nin the abolition of a custom which is at the root of half the crime\nand misery with which she has to contend. Whatever hopes might at\none time have been reasonably entertained of the Reformed Church as\nan anti-military agency, the cause of peace soon sank into a sort\nof heresy, or what was worse, an unfashionable tenet, associated,\ncondemned, and contemned with other articles of religious dissent.\n\u2018Those who condemn the profession or art of soldiery,\u2019 said Sir James\nTurner, \u2018smell rank of anabaptism and quakery.\u2019[273]\n\nIt would be difficult to find in the whole range of history any such\nexample of wasted moral force. As Erasmus had cause to deplore it in\nthe sixteenth century, so had Voltaire in the eighteenth. The latter\ncomplained that he did not remember a single page against war in the\nwhole of Bourdaloue\u2019s sermons, and he even suggested that the real\nexplanation might be a literal want of courage on the part of the\nclergy. The passage is worth quoting from the original, both for its\ncharacteristic energy of expression and for its clear insight into\nthe real character of the custom of war:--\u2018Pour les autres moralistes\n\u00e0 gages que l\u2019on nomme pr\u00e9dicateurs, ils n\u2019ont jamais seulement os\u00e9\npr\u00eacher contre la guerre.... Ils se gardent bien de d\u00e9crier la guerre,\nqui r\u00e9unit tout ce que la perfidie a de plus l\u00e2che dans les manifestes,\ntout ce que l\u2019inf\u00e2me friponnerie a de plus bas dans les fournitures des\narm\u00e9es, tout ce que le brigandage a d\u2019affreux dans le pillage, le viol,\nle larcin, l\u2019homicide, la d\u00e9vastation, la destruction. Au contraire,\nces bons pr\u00eatres b\u00e9nissent en c\u00e9r\u00e9monie les \u00e9tendards de meurtre; et\nleurs confr\u00e8res chantent pour de l\u2019argent des chansons juives, quand\nla terre a \u00e9t\u00e9 inond\u00e9e de sang.\u2019[274]\n\nIf Voltaire\u2019s reproach is unjust, it can of course be easily refuted.\nThe challenge is a fair one. Let him be convicted of overstating his\ncharge, by the mention of any ecclesiastic of mark from either the\nCatholic or the Protestant school within the last two centuries whose\nname is associated with the advocacy of the mitigation or the abolition\nof contests of force; or any war in the same period which the clergy\nof either denomination have as a body resisted either on the ground\nof the injustice of its origin or of the ruthless cruelty with which\nit has been waged. Whatever has yet been attempted in this direction,\nor whatever anti-military stimulus has been given to civilisation,\nhas come distinctly from men of the world or men of letters, not from\nmen of distinction in the Church: not from F\u00e9nelon or Paley, but from\nWilliam Penn, the Abb\u00e9 St.-Pierre (whose connection with the Church\nwas only nominal), from Vattel, Voltaire, and Kant. In other words,\nthe Church has lost her old position of spiritual ascendency over\nthe consciences of mankind, and has surrendered to other guides and\nteachers the influence she once exercised over the world.\n\nThis is especially the case with our own Church; for before the most\ngigantic evil of our time, her pulpit stands mute, and colder than\nmute. Whatever sanction or support a body like the Peace Society has\nmet with from the Church or churches of England during its seventy\nyears\u2019 struggle on behalf of humanity has been, not the general rule,\nbut the rare exception; and recent events would even seem to show that\nthe voice of the pulpit, so far from ever becoming a pacific agency, is\ndestined to become in the future the great tocsin of war, the loudest\nclamourer for counsels of aggression.\n\nThis attitude on the part of the Church having become more and more\nmarked and conspicuous, as wars in recent centuries have become more\nfrequent and more fierce, it was not unnatural that some attempt should\nat last have been made to give some sort of justification of a fact\nwhich has undoubtedly become an increasing source of perplexity and\ndistress to all sincere and reflective Christians. In default of a\nbetter, let us take the justification offered by Canon Mozley in his\nsermon on \u2018War,\u2019 preached before the University of Oxford on March 12,\n1871, of which the following summary conveys a faithful, though of\nnecessity an abbreviated, reflection. The main points dwelt upon in\nthat explanation or apology are: That Christianity, by its original\nrecognition of the division of the world into nations, with all their\ninherent rights, thereby recognised the right of war, which was plainly\none of them; that the Church, never having been constituted a judge\nof national questions or motives, can only stand neutral between\nopposing sides, contemplating war as it were forensically, as a mode\nof international settlement that is amply justified by the want of\nany other; that a natural justice is inherent not only in wars of\nself-defence, but in wars for rectifying the political distribution of\nthe world\u2019s races or nationalities, and in wars that aim at progress\nand improvement; that the spirit of self-sacrifice inseparable from war\nconfers upon it a moral character that is in special harmony with the\nChristian type; that as war is simply the working out of a problem by\nforce, there is no more hatred between the individual combatants than\nthere is in the working out of an argument by reasoning, \u2018the enmity\nis in the two wholes--the abstractions--the individuals are at peace;\u2019\nthat the impossibility of a substitution of a universal empire for\nindependent nations, or of a court of arbitration, bars all hope of the\nattainment of an era of peace through the natural progress of society;\nthat the absence of any head to the nations of the world constitutes\na defect or want of plan in its system, which as it has been given to\nit by nature cannot be remedied by other means; that it is no part\nof the mission of Christianity to reconstruct that system, or rather\nwant of system, of the world, from which war flows, nor to provide\nanother world for us to live in; but that, nevertheless, Christianity\nonly sanctions it through the medium of natural society, and on the\nhypothesis of a world at discord with itself.\n\nOne may well wonder that such a tissue of irrelevant arguments could\nhave been addressed by any man in a spirit of seriousness to an\nassembly of his fellows. Imagine such utterances being the last word of\nChristianity! Surely a son of the Church were more recognisable under\nthe fighting Bishop of Beauvais\u2019 coat of mail than under the disguise\nof such language as this. Why should it be assumed, one might ask,\nthat the existence of distinct nations, each enjoying the power, and\ntherefore the right to make war upon its neighbours, is incompatible\nwith the existence of an international morality which should render the\nexercise of the war-right impossible, or very difficult; or that the\nChurch, had she tried, could have contributed nothing to so desirable\na result? It is begging the question altogether to contend that a\nstate of things is impossible which has never been attempted, when\nthe very point at issue is whether, had it been attempted, it might\nnot by this time have come to be realised. The right of the medi\u00e6val\nbarons and their vassals to wage private war together belonged once\nas much to the system, or want of system, of the world as the right\nof nations to attack one another in our own or an earlier period of\nhistory; yet so far was the Church, even in those days, from shrinking\nfrom contact with so barbarous a custom as something beyond her power\nor her mission, that she was herself the main social instrument that\nbrought it to an end. The great efforts made by the Church to abolish\nthe custom of private war have already been mentioned: a point which\nCanon Mozley, perhaps, did wisely to ignore. Yet there is, surely, no\nsufficient reason why the peace of the world should be an object of\nless interest to the Church in these days than it was in those; or\nwhy her influence should be less as one chief element in the natural\nprogress of society than it was when she fought to release human\nsociety from the depraving custom of the right of private war. It is\nimpossible to contend that, had the Church inculcated the duties of\nthe individual to other nations as well as to his own, in the way to\nwhich human reason would naturally respond, such a course would have\nhad no effect in solving the problem of enabling separate nationalities\nto coexist in a state of peace as well as of independence. It is at\nleast the reverse of self-evident that the promotion of feelings of\ninternational fraternity, the discouragement of habits of international\njealousy, the exercise of acts of international friendship, the\nteaching of the real identity of international interests, in all of\nwhich the pulpit might have lent, or might yet lend, an invaluable\naid, would have had, or would still have any detrimental effect on\nthe political system of distinct nationalities, or on the motives and\nactions of a rational patriotism. It is difficult to believe that\nthe denunciations of a Church whose religious teaching had power to\nrestrain the military fury of an Alaric or a Genseric would have been\naltogether powerless over the conduct of those German hordes whose\nmilitary excesses in France, in 1870, have left a lasting blot on\ntheir martial triumph and the character of their discipline; or that\nher efforts on behalf of peace, which more than a thousand years\nago effectually reconciled the Angles and Mercians, the Franks and\nLombards, would be wasted in helping to remove any standing causes of\nquarrel that may still exist between France and Germany, England and\nRussia, Italy and Austria.\n\nThere are, indeed, hopeful signs, in spite of Canon Mozley\u2019s apology\nof despair, that the priesthood of Christendom may yet reawake to a\nsense of its power and opportunities for removing from the world an\nevil custom which lies at the root of almost every other, and is the\nmain cause and sustenance of crime and pauperism and disease. It is\npossible that we have already passed the worst period of indifference\nin this respect, or that it may some day prove only to have been\nconnected with the animosities of rival sects, ever ready to avail\nthemselves of the chances that war between different nations might\nseverally bring to their several petty interests. With the subsidence\nof such animosities, it were reasonable to expect the Church to\nreassert the more genuine principle of her action and attitude--that no\nevil incident to human society is to be regarded as irremediable till\nevery resource has been exhausted to cope with it, and every outlet of\nescape from it been proved to be a failure. Then, but not till then, is\nit becoming in Christian priests to utter the language of helplessness;\nthen, but not till then, should the Church fold her hands in despair.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nCURIOSITIES OF MILITARY DISCIPLINE.\n\n    _La discipline n\u2019est que l\u2019art d\u2019inspirer aux soldats plus de peur\n    de leurs officiers que des ennemis._--HELVETIUS.\n\n    Increased severity of discipline--Limitation of the right of\n    matrimony--Compulsory Church parade, and its origin--Atrocious\n    military punishments--Reasons for the military love of\n    red--The origin of bear-skin hats--Different qualities of\n    bravery--Historical fears for the extinction of courage--The\n    conquests of the cause of peace--Causes of the unpopularity of\n    military service--The dulness of life in the ranks--The prevalence\n    of desertion--Articles of war against malingering--Military\n    artificial ophthalmia--The debasing influence of discipline\n    illustrated from the old flogging system--The discipline of the\n    Peninsular army--Attempts to make the service more popular,\n    by raising the private\u2019s wages, by shortening his term of\n    service--The old recruiting system of France and Germany--The\n    conscription imminent in England--The question of military service\n    for women--The probable results of the conscription--Militarism\n    answerable for Socialism.\n\n\nTwo widely different conceptions of military discipline are contained\nin the words of an English writer of the seventeenth century, and in\nthose of the French philosopher, Helvetius, in the eighteenth century.\nThere is a fine ring of the best English spirit in the sentence of\nGittins: \u2018A soldier ought to fear nothing but God and dishonour.\u2019\nAnd there is the true French wit and insight in that of Helvetius:\n\u2018Discipline is but the art of inspiring soldiers with more fear for\ntheir own officers than they have for the enemy.\u2019[275]\n\nBut the difference involved lies less in the national character of the\nwriters than in the lapse of time between them, discipline having by\ndegrees gained so greatly in severity that a soldier had come to be\nregarded less as a moral free agent than as a mechanical instrument,\nwho, if he had any fear left for God and dishonour, felt it in a very\nminor degree to that which he cherished for his colonel or commander.\nThis is the broad fact which explains and justifies the proposition of\nHelvetius; though no one, recollecting the evils of the days of looser\ndiscipline, might see cause to regret the change which deprived a\nsoldier almost entirely of the moral liberty that naturally belonged to\nhim as a man.\n\nThe tendency of discipline to become more and more severe has of course\nthe effect of rendering military service less popular, and consequently\nrecruiting more difficult, without, unhappily, any corresponding\ndiminution in the frequency of wars, which are independent of the\nhirelings who fight them. Were it otherwise, something might be said\nfor the military axiom, that a soldier enjoys none of the common rights\nof man. There is therefore no gain from any point of view in denying\nto the military class the enjoyment of the rights and privileges of\nordinary humanity.\n\nThe extent of this denial and its futility may be shown by reference\nto army regulations concerning marriage and religious worship. In the\nPrussian army, till 1870, marriages were legally null and void and the\noffspring of them illegitimate in the case of officers marrying without\nroyal consent, or of subordinate officers without the consent of the\ncommander of their regiments. But after the Franco-German war so great\nwas the social disorder found to be consequent upon these restrictions,\nthat a special law had to be made to remove the bar of illegitimacy\nfrom the marriages in question.[276] In the English army the inability\nof privates to marry before the completion of seven years\u2019 service, and\nthe possession of at least one badge, and then only with the consent\nof the commanding officer, is a custom so entirely contrary to the\nliberty enjoyed in other walks of life, that, whatever its incidental\nadvantages, it can scarcely fail to act as a deterring motive when the\nchoice of a career becomes a subject of reflection.\n\nThe custom of what is known in the army as Church Parade affords\nanother instance of the unreasonable curtailments of individual\nliberty that are still regarded as essential to discipline. A soldier\nis drummed to church just as he is drummed to the drill-ground or the\nbattle-field. His presence in church is a matter of compulsion, not of\nchoice or conviction; and the general principle that such attendance is\nvalueless unless it is voluntary is waived in his case as in that of\nvery young children, with whom, in this respect, he is placed on a par.\nIf we inquire for the origin of the practice, we shall probably find it\nin certain old Saxon and imperial articles of war, which show that the\nprayers of the military were formerly regarded as equally efficacious\nwith their swords in obtaining victories over their enemies; and\ntherefore as a very necessary part of their duty.[277] The American\narticles of war, since 1806, enact that \u2018it is earnestly recommended\nto all officers and soldiers to attend divine service,\u2019 thus obviating\nin a reasonable way all the evils inevitably connected with a purely\ncompulsory, and therefore humiliating, church parade.[278]\n\nIt may be that these restrictions of a soldier\u2019s liberty are necessary;\nbut if they are, and if, as Lord Macaulay says, soldiers must, \u2018for the\nsake of public freedom, in the midst of public freedom, be placed under\na despotic rule,\u2019 \u2018must be subject to a sharper penal code and to a\nmore stringent code of procedure than are administered by the ordinary\ntribunals,\u2019 so that acts, innocent in the citizen or only punished\nslightly, become crimes, capitally punishable, when committed by them,\nthen at least we need no longer be astonished that it should be almost\nas difficult to entrap a recruit as to catch a criminal.\n\nBut over and above the intrinsic disadvantages of military service,\nit would almost seem as if the war-presiding genii had of set purpose\nessayed to make it as distasteful as possible to mankind. For they have\nmade discipline not merely a curtailment of liberty and a forfeiture of\nrights, but, as it were, an experiment on the extreme limits of human\nendurance. There has been no tyranny in the world, political, judicial,\nor ecclesiastical, but has had its parent and pattern in some military\nsystem. It has been from its armies more than from its kings that\nour world has learnt its lesson of arbitrary tribunals, tortures, and\ncruel punishments. The Inquisition itself could scarcely have devised\na more excruciating punishment than the old English military one of\nriding the Wooden Horse, when the victim was made to sit astride planks\nnailed together in a sharp ridge, so as roughly to resemble a horse,\nwith his hands tied behind him, and muskets fixed to his legs to drag\nthem downwards; or again, than the punishment of the Picket, in which\nthe hand was fastened to a hook in a post above the head, and the\nman\u2019s suspended body left to be supported by his bare heel resting on\na wooden stump, of which the end was cut to the sharpness of a sword\npoint.[279] The punishment of running the gauntlet (from the German\n_Gassenlaufen_, street running, because the victim ran through the\nstreet between two lines of soldiers who tormented him on his course)\nis said to have been invented by Gustavus Adolphus; and is perhaps,\nfrom the fact of thus bringing the cruelty of many men to bear on a\nsingle comrade, the most cowardly form of torture that has ever yet\nfound favour among military authorities.[280]\n\nBut the penal part of military discipline, with its red-hot irons,\nits floggings, and its various forms of death, is too repulsive to do\nmore than glance at as testimony of the cruelty and despotism that\nhave never been separated from the calling of arms. The art of the\ndisciplinarian has ever been to bring such a series of miseries to\nbear upon a man\u2019s life that the prospect of death upon the battle-field\nshould have for him rather charms than terrors; and the tale of the\nsoldier who, when his regiment was to be decimated, drew a blank\nwithout the fatal D upon it, and immediately offered it to a comrade,\nwho had not yet drawn, for half-a-crown, shows at how cheap a rate men\nmay be reduced to value their lives after experience of the realities\nof a military career.\n\nMany of the devices are curious by which this indifference to life has\nbeen matured and sustained. In ancient Athens the public temples were\nclosed to those who refused military service, who deserted their ranks\nor lost their bucklers; whilst a law of Charondas of Catana constrained\nsuch offenders to sit for three days in the public forum dressed in the\ngarments of women. Many a Spartan mother would stab her son who came\nback alive from a defeat; and such a man, if he escaped his mother, was\ndebarred not only from public offices but from marriage; exposed to\nthe blows of all who chose to strike him; compelled to dress in mean\nclothing, and to wear his beard negligently trimmed. And in the same\nway a Norse soldier who fled, or lost his shield, or received a wound\nin any save the front part of his body, was by law prevented from ever\nafterwards appearing in public.[281]\n\nThere are, indeed, few military customs but have their origin and\nexplanation in the artificial promotion of courage in the minds of\nthe combatants. This is true even to the details and peculiarities\nof costume. English children are, perhaps, still taught that French\nsoldiers wear red trousers in order that the sight of blood may not\nfrighten them in war-time; and doubtless French children imbibe a\nsimilar theory regarding the red coats of the English. The same reason\nwas given by Julius Ferretus in the middle of the sixteenth century\nfor the short red frock then generally worn by the military.[282] The\nfirst mention of red as a special military colour in England is said to\nhave been the order issued in 1526 for the coats of all yeomen of the\nhousehold to be of red cloth.[283] But the colour goes, at least, as\nfar back as Lycurgus, the Spartan lawgiver, who chose it, according to\nXenophon, because red is most easily taken by cloth and most lasting;\naccording to Plutarch, that its brightness might help to raise the\nspirits of its wearers; or, according to \u00c6lian and Valerius Maximus,\nin order to conceal the sight of blood, that raw soldiers might not be\ndispirited and the enemy proportionately encouraged.\n\nThe bear-skin hats, which still make some English regiments so\nridiculous and unsightly, were originally no doubt intended to inspire\nterror. Evelyn, writing of the year 1678, says: \u2018Now were brought into\nservice a new sort of soldiers called Grenadiers, who were dexterous\nin flinging hand-grenades, every man having a handful. They had furred\ncaps with coped crowns like Janizaries, which made them look very\nfierce; and some had long hoods hanging down behind as we picture\nfools.\u2019 We may fairly identify the motive of such headgear with the\nresult; and the more so since the looking fierce with the borrowed\nskins of bears was a well-known artifice of the ancient Romans. Thus\nVegetius speaks of helmets as covered with bear-skins in order to\nterrify the enemy,[284] and Virgil has a significant description of a\nwarrior as\n\n    Horridus in jaculis et pelle Libystidis urs\u00e6.\n\nWe may trace the same motive again in the figures of fierce birds or\nbeasts depicted on flags and shields and helmets, whence they have\ndescended with less harmful purpose to crests and armorial bearings.\nThus the Cimbri, whom Marius defeated, wore on their plume-covered\nhelmets the head of some fierce animal with its mouth open, vainly\nhoping thereby to intimidate the Romans. The latter, before it became\ncustomary to display the images of their emperors on their standards,\nreared aloft the menacing representations of dragons, tigers, wolves,\nand such like; and the figure of a dragon in use among the Saxons\nat the time of the Conquest, and after that event retained by the\nearly Norman princes among the ensigns of war,[285] may reasonably\nbe attributed to the same motive. The legend of St. George killing\nthe Dragon, if it is not a survival of Theseus and the Minotaur, very\nlikely originated as a myth, intended to be explanatory of the custom.\n\nLastly, under this head should be mentioned Villani\u2019s account of the\nEnglish armour worn in the thirteenth century, where he describes how\nthe pages studied to keep it clean and bright, so that when their\nmasters came to action their armour shone like looking glass and gave\nthem a more terrifying appearance.[286] Was the result here again the\nmotive, and must we look for the primary cause of the great solicitude\nstill paid to the brightness of accoutrements to the hope thereby to\nadd a pang the more to the terror desirable to instil into an enemy?\n\nSuch were some of the artificial supports supplied to bravery in former\ntimes. But there is all the difference in the world between the bravery\nappealed to by our ancestors and that required since the revolution\neffected in warfare by the invention of gunpowder. Before that epoch,\nthe use of catapults, bows, or other missiles did not deduct from the\nparamount importance of personal valour. The brave soldier of olden\ntimes displayed the bravery of a man who defied a force similar or\nequal to his own, and against which the use of his own right hand and\nintellect might help him to prevail; but his modern descendant pits his\nbravery mainly against hazard, and owes it to chance alone if he escape\nalive from a battle. However higher in kind may be the bravery required\nto face a shower of shrapnel than to contend against swords and spears,\nit is assuredly a bravery that involves rather a blind trust in luck\nthan a rational trust in personal fortitude.\n\nSo thoroughly indeed was this change foreseen and appreciated that at\nevery successive advance in the methods of slaughter curious fears\nfor the total extinction of military courage have haunted minds too\nreadily apprehensive, and found sometimes remarkable expression.\nWhen the catapult[287] was first brought from Sicily to Greece, King\nArchidamus saw in it the grave of true valour; and the sentiment\nagainst firearms, which led Bayard to exclaim, \u2018C\u2019est une honte qu\u2019un\nhomme de c\u0153ur soit expos\u00e9 \u00e0 p\u00e9rir par une miserable friquenelle,\u2019 was\none that was traceable even down to the last century in the history of\nEurope. For Charles XII. of Sweden is declared by Berenhorst to have\nfelt keenly the infamy of such a mode of fighting; and Marshal Saxe\nheld musketry fire in such contempt that he even went so far as to\nadvocate the reintroduction of the lance, and a return to the close\ncombats customary in earlier times.[288]\n\nBut our military codes contain no reflection of the different aspects\nunder which personal bravery enters into modern, as compared with\nancient, warfare; and this omission has tended to throw governments\nback upon pure force and compulsion, as the only possible way of\nrecruiting their regiments. The old Roman military punishments, such as\ncruelly scourging a man before putting him to death, afford certainly\nno models of a lenient discipline; but when we read of companies who\nlost their colours being for punishment only reduced to feed on barley\ninstead of wheat, and reflect that death by shooting would be the\npenalty under the discipline of most modern nations[289] for an action\nbearing any complexion of cowardice, it is impossible to admit that\na rational adjustment of punishments to offences is at all better\nobserved in the war articles of the moderns than in the military codes\nof pagan antiquity.\n\nThis, at least, is clear, from the history of military discipline,\nthat only by the most repressive laws, and by a tyranny subversive\nof the commonest rights of men, is it possible to retain men in the\nfighting service of a country, after forcing or cajoling them into\nit. And this consideration fully meets the theory of an inherent love\nof fighting dominating human nature, such as that contended for in a\nletter from Lord Palmerston to Cobden, wherein he argues that man is\nby nature a fighting and quarrelling animal. The proposition is true\nundoubtedly of some savage races, and of the idle knights of the days\nof chivalry, but, not even in those days, of the lower classes, who\nincurred the real dangers of war, and still less of the unfortunate\nprivates or conscripts of modern armies. Fighting is only possible\nbetween civilised countries, because discipline first fits men for war\nand for nothing else, and then war again necessitates discipline. Nor\nis anything gained by ignoring the conquests that have already been\nwon over the savage propensity to war. Single States no longer suffer\nprivate wars within their boundaries, like those customary between\nthe feudal barons; we decide most of our quarrels in law courts, not\nupon battle-fields, and wisely prefer arguments to arms. A population\nas large as that of Ireland and about double as large as that of all\nour colonies in Australia put together lives in London alone, not only\nwithout weapons of defence in their hands, but with so little taste\nfor blood-encounters that you may walk for whole days through its\nlength and breadth without so much as seeing a single street-fight.\nIf then this miracle of social order has been achieved, why not the\nwider one of that harmony between nations which requires but a little\ncommon-sense and determination on the part of those most concerned in\norder to become an accomplished reality?\n\nThe limitations of personal liberty already alluded to would of\nthemselves suffice in a country of free institutions to render the\nmilitary profession distasteful and unpopular. The actual perils\nof war, at no time greater than those of mines, railways, or\nmerchant-shipping, would never alone deter men from service; so that\nwe must look for other causes to explain the difficulty of recruiting\nand the frequency of desertion, which are the perplexity of military\nsystems still based, as our own is, on the principle of voluntary not\ncompulsory enlistment.\n\nWhat then makes a military life so little an object of desire in\ncountries where it can be avoided is more than its dangers, more even\nthan its loss of liberty, its irredeemable and appalling dulness. The\nshades in point of cheerfulness must be few and fine which distinguish\na barrack from a convict prison. In none of the employments of civil\nlife is there anything to compare with the unspeakable monotony of\nparades, recurring three or four times every day, varied perhaps in\nwet weather by the military catechism, and with the intervals of time\nspent in occupations of neither interest nor dignity. The length of\ntime devoted to the mere cleaning and polishing of accoutrements is\nsuch, that the task has actually come to have the name \u2018soldiering\u2019;\nand the work which comes next in importance to this soldiering is the\nhumble one of peeling potatoes for dinner. Even military greatcoats\nrequire on a moderate estimate half a hour or more every day to be\nproperly folded, the penalty of an additional hour\u2019s drill being the\nprobable result of any carelessness in this highly important military\nfunction. But for the attention thus given to military dress the author\nof the \u2018Soldier\u2019s Pocket Book\u2019 supplies us with a reason: \u2018The better\nyou dress a soldier, the more highly he will be thought of by women and\nconsequently by himself.\u2019\n\nStill less calculated to lend attractiveness to the life of the ranks\nare the daily fatigue works, or extra duties which fall in turn on the\nmen of every company, such as coal carrying, passage cleaning, gutter\nclearing, and other like menial works of necessity.\n\nBut it is the long hours of sentry duty, popularly called \u2018Sentry-go,\u2019\nwhich constitute the soldier\u2019s greatest bane. Guard duty in England,\nrecurring at short periods, lasts a whole day and night, every four\nhours of the twenty-four being spent in full accoutrements in the\nguard-room, and every intervening two hours on active sentry, thus\nmaking in all--sixteen hours in the guard-room, and eight on the sentry\npost. The voluntary sufferings of the saints, the tortures devised by\nthe religious orders of olden days, or the self-inflicted hardships of\nsport, pale before the two hours\u2019 sentry-go on a winter\u2019s night. This\nit is that kills our soldiers more fatally than an enemy\u2019s cannon, and\nis borne with more admirable patience than even the hardships of a\nsiege. \u2018After about thirty-one or thirty-two years of age,\u2019 says Sir\nF. Roberts, \u2018the private soldier usually ages rapidly, and becomes a\nveteran both in looks and habits;\u2019[290] and this distinguished military\ncommander points to excessive sentry duty as the cause.\n\nBut, possible as it thus is, by rigour of discipline, to produce in a\nsoldier total indifference to death, by depriving him of everything\nthat makes life desirable, it is impossible to produce indifference to\ntedium; and a policy is evidently self-destructive which, by aiming\nexclusively at producing a mechanical character, renders military\nservice itself so unpopular that only the young, the inexperienced,\nor the ill-advised will join the colours at all; that 10 per cent. of\nthose who do join them will desert; and that the rest will regard it as\nthe gala day of their lives when they become legally entitled to their\ndischarge from the ranks.\n\nIn England about 10 per cent. of the recruits desert every year, as\ncompared with 50 per cent. from the small army of the United States.\nThe reason for so great a difference is probably not so much that the\nAmerican discipline is more severe or dull than the English, as that in\nthe newer country, where subsistence is easier, the counter-attractions\nof peaceful trades offer more plentiful inducements to desertion.\n\nDesertion from the English ranks has naturally diminished since the\nintroduction of the short-service system has set a visible term to\nthe hardships of a military life. Adherence to the colours for seven\nor eight years, or even for twelve, which is now the longest service\npossible at the time of enlistment, and adherence to them for life,\nclearly place a very different complexion on the desirability of an\nillegal escape from them. So that considering the reductions that\nhave been made in the term of service, and the increase of pay made\nin 1867, and again in 1873, nothing more strongly demonstrates the\nnational aversion of the English people to arms than the exceeding\ndifficulty with which the ranks are recruited, and the high average\nof the percentage of desertions. If of recent years recruiting has\nbeen better, the explanation is simply that trade has been worse;\nstatistics of recruiting being the best possible barometer of the state\nof the nation, since the scarcity or abundance of recruits varies\nconcomitantly with the brisk or slack demand for labour in other\nemployments.\n\nIn few things has the world grown more tolerant than in its opinion and\ntreatment of Desertion. Death was once its certain penalty, and death\nwith every aggravation that brutal cruelty could add. Two of Rome\u2019s\nmost famous generals were Scipio \u00c6milianus and Paulus \u00c6milius; yet the\nformer consigned deserters to fight wild beasts at the public games,\nand the latter had them trodden to death by elephants.\n\nA form of desertion, constituting one of the most curious but least\nnoticed chapters in the history of military discipline, is that\nof Malingering, or the feigning of sickness, and self-mutilation,\ndisabling from service. The practice goes far back into history.\nCicero tells of a man who was sold for a slave for having cut off a\nfinger, in order to escape from a campaign in Sicily. Vegetius, the\ngreat authority on Roman discipline, speaks of soldiers who simulated\nsickness being punished as traitors;[291] and an old English writer on\nthe subject says of the Romans: \u2018Whosoever mutilated their own or their\nchildren\u2019s bodies so as thereby designedly to render them unfit to\ncarry arms (a practice common enough in those elder times when all were\npressed to the wars), were adjudicated to perpetual exile.\u2019[292]\n\nThe writer here referred to lived long before the days of the\nconscription, with which he fancied self-mutilation to be connected.\nAnd it certainly seems that whereas all the military codes of modern\nnations contain articles dealing with that offence, and decreeing\npenalties against it, there was less of it in the days before\ncompulsory service. There is, for instance, no mention of it in the\nGerman articles of war of the seventeenth century, though the other\nmilitary crimes were precisely those that are common enough still.[293]\n\nBut even in England, where soldiers are not yet military slaves, it\nhas been found necessary to deal, by specific clauses in the army\nregulations, with a set of facts of which there is no notice in the war\narticles of the seventeenth or eighteenth century.[294] The inference\ntherefore is, that the conditions of military service have become\nuniversally more disagreeable. The clauses in the actual war articles\ndeserve to be quoted, that it may appear, by the provisions against it,\nto what lengths the arts of self-mutilation are carried by despairing\nmen. The 81st Article of War provides punishment against any soldier\nin Her Majesty\u2019s army \u2018who shall malinger, feign or produce disease or\ninfirmity, or shall wilfully do any act or wilfully disobey any orders\nwhether in hospital or otherwise, thereby producing or aggravating\ndisease or infirmity or delaying his cure, ... or who shall maim or\ninjure himself or any other soldier, whether at the instance of such\nother soldier or not, or cause himself to be maimed or injured by\nany other person with intent thereby to render himself or such other\nsoldier unfit for service, ... or who shall tamper with his eyes with\nintent thereby to render himself unfit for service.\u2019\n\nThat it should be necessary thus to provide against self-inflicted\ninjuries is surely commentary enough on the condition of life in the\nranks. The allusion to tampering with the eyes may be illustrated from\na passage in the \u2018Life of Sir C. Napier,\u2019 wherein we are told how in\nthe year 1808 a private of the 28th Regiment taught his fellow-soldiers\nto produce artificial ophthalmia by holding their eyelids open, whilst\na comrade in arms would scrape some lime from the barrack ceiling into\ntheir eyes.[295] For a profession of which such things are common\nincidents, surely the wonder is, not that it should be difficult, but\nthat it should be possible at all, to make recruits. In the days of\nMehemet Ali in Egypt, so numerous were the cases in which the natives\nvoluntarily blinded themselves, and even their children, of one eye in\norder to escape the conscription, that Mehemet Ali is said to have\nfound himself under the necessity of raising a one-eyed regiment.\nOthers for the same purpose would chop off the trigger finger of the\nright hand, or disable themselves from biting cartridges by knocking\nout some of their upper teeth. Scarcely a peasant in the fields but\nbore the trace of some such voluntarily inflicted disfigurement. But\nwith such facts it seems idle to talk of any inherent love for fighting\ndominating the vast majority of mankind.\n\nThe severity of military discipline has even a worse effect than those\nyet alluded to in its tendency to demoralise those who are long subject\nto it, by inducing mental habits of servility and baseness. After\nAlexander the Great had killed Clitus in a fit of drunken rage, the\nMacedonian soldiery voted that Clitus had been justly slain, and prayed\nthat he might not enjoy the rites of sepulture.[296] Military servility\ncould scarcely go further than that, but such baseness is only possible\nunder a state of discipline which, to make a soldier, unmakes a man,\nby depriving him of all that distinguishes his species. Under no other\nthan military training, and in no other than the military class, would\nthe atrocities have been possible which used to be perpetrated in the\nbarrack riding-school in the old flogging days. Officers and privates\nneeded the debasing influence of discipline to enable them to look on\nas patient spectators at the sufferings of a helpless comrade tortured\nby the cat-o\u2019-nine tails. Sir C. Napier said that as a subaltern\nhe \u2018frequently saw 600, 700, 800, 900, and 1,000 lashes sentenced\nby regimental courts-martial and generally every lash inflicted;\u2019\na feeling of horror would run through the ranks at the first blows\nand some recruits would faint, but that was all.[297] Had they been\nmen and not soldiers, they would not have stood such iniquities.\nA typical instance of this martial justice or law (to employ the\nconventional profanation of those words) was that of a sergeant who in\n1792 was sentenced to 1,000 lashes for having enlisted two drummers\nfor the East India Company whom he knew to belong already to the Foot\nGuards; but the classical description of an English flogging will\nalways be Somerville\u2019s account of its infliction upon himself in his\n\u2018Autobiography of a Working Man.\u2019[298] There you may read how the\nregiment was drawn up four-deep inside the riding-school; how the\nofficers (men of gentle birth and breeding) stood within the lines of\nthe men; how the basin of water and towels were ready prepared in case\nthe victim should faint; how the hands and feet of the latter were\nfastened to a ladder by a rope; and how the regimental sergeant-major\nstood with book and pencil coolly counting each stroke as it was\ndelivered with slow and deliberate torture till the full complement of\na hundred lashes had been inflicted. The mere reading of it even now\nis enough to make the blood boil, but that men, brave and freeborn,\nshould have stood by in their hundreds and seen the actual reality\nwithout stirring, proves how utterly all human feeling is eradicable by\ndiscipline, and how sure is the training it supplies in disregard for\nthe common claims of humanity.\n\nHappily, floggings in the English army now count among the curiosities\nof military discipline, like the wooden horse or the thumb-screw;\nbut the striking thing is that the discipline, in the sense of the\ngood conduct of the army in the field, was never worse than in the\ndays when 1,000 lashes were common sentences. It was precisely when\ncourts-martial had the legal power to exercise such tyranny that\nthe Duke of Wellington complained to Lord Castlereagh that the law\nwas not strong enough to maintain discipline in an army upon actual\nservice.[299] Speaking of the army in the Peninsula he says: \u2018It is\nimpossible to describe to you the irregularities and outrages committed\nby the troops; ... there is not an outrage of any description which\nhas not been committed on a people who have received us as friends\nby soldiers who never yet for one moment suffered the slightest want\nor the smallest privation.... We are an excellent army on parade, an\nexcellent one to fight, but we are worse than an enemy in a country.\u2019\nAnd again a few months later: \u2018I really believe that more plunder and\noutrage have been committed by this army than by any other that was\never in the field.\u2019 In the general order of May 19, 1809, are these\nwords: \u2018The officers of companies must attend to the men in their\nquarters as well as on the march, or the army will soon be no better\nthan a banditti.\u2019[300]\n\nWhence it is fair to infer that severity of discipline has no necessary\nconnection with the good behaviour or easy control of troops in\nthe field, such discipline under the Iron Duke himself having been\nconspicuous for so lamentable a failure. The real fact would seem\nto be, that troops are difficult to manage just in proportion to the\nrigour, the monotony, and the dulness of the discipline imposed upon\nthem in time of peace; the rebound corresponding to the compression,\nby a moral law that seems to follow the physical one. This fact is\nnowhere better noticed than in Lord Wolseley\u2019s narrative of the China\nwar of 1860, where he says, in allusion to the general love of pillage\nand destruction that characterises soldiers and was so conspicuously\ndisplayed at the shameful burning of the beautiful palaces in and\nround Pekin: \u2018Soldiers are nothing more than grown-up schoolboys.\nThe wild moments of enjoyment passed in the pillage of a place live\nlong in a soldier\u2019s memory.... Such a time forms so marked a contrast\nwith the ordinary routine of existence passed under the tight hand of\ndiscipline that it becomes a remarkable event in life and is remembered\naccordingly.\u2019[301]\n\nThe experience of the Peninsular war proves how slender is the\nlink between a well-drilled and a well-disciplined army. The best\ndisciplined army is the one which conducts itself with least excess\nin the field and is least demoralised by victory. It is the hour of\nvictory that is the great test of the value of military regulations;\nand so well aware of this was the best disciplined State of antiquity,\nthat the soldiers of Sparta desisted from pursuit as soon as victory\nwas assured to them, partly because it was deemed ungenerous to destroy\nthose who could make no further resistance (a sentiment absolutely\nwanting from the boasted chivalry of Christian warfare), and partly\nthat the enemy might be tempted to prefer flight to resistance. It is a\nreproach to modern generalship that it has been powerless to restrain\nsuch excesses as those which have made the successful storming of\ncities rather a disgrace than an honour to those who have won them.\nThe only way to check them is to make the officers responsible for\nwhat occurs, as might be done, for instance, by punishing a general\ncapitally for storming a city with forces so badly disciplined as\nto nullify the advantages of success. An English military writer,\nspeaking of the storming of Ismail and Praga by the Russians under\nSuwarrow, says truly that \u2018posterity will hold the fame and honour of\nthe commander responsible for the life of every human being sacrificed\nby disciplined armies beyond the fair verge of battle;\u2019 but it is idle\nto speak as if only Russian armies were guilty of such excesses, or\nto say that nothing but the prospect of them could tempt the Russian\nsoldier to mount the breach or the scaling-ladder. The Russian soldier\nin history yields not one whit to the English or French in bravery, nor\nis there a grain of difference between the Russian storming of Ismail\nand Praga and the English storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, or San\nSebastian, that tarnished the lustre of the British arms in the famous\nPeninsular war.\n\nAnd should we be tempted to think that successes like these associated\nwith the names of these places may be so important in war as to\noutweigh all other considerations, we must also not forget that the\npermanent military character of nations, for humanity or the reverse,\ncounts for more in the long run of a people\u2019s history than any\nadvantage that can possibly be gained in a single campaign.\n\nEnough has, perhaps, been said of the unpopularity of military service,\nand of the obvious causes thereof, to make it credible that, had the\nsystem of conscription never been resorted to in Europe, and the\nprinciple of voluntary enlistment remained intact and universal, the\ndifficulty of procuring the human fighting material in sufficient\nquantities would in course of time have rendered warfare impossible. As\nother industries than mere fighting have won their way in the world,\nthe difficulty of hiring recruits to sell their lives to their country\nhas kept even pace with the facility of obtaining livelihoods in more\nregular and more lucrative as well as less miserable avocations. In the\nfourteenth century soldiers were very highly paid compared with other\nclasses, and the humblest private received a daily wage equivalent to\nthat of a skilled mechanic;[302] but the historical process has so\nfar reversed matters that now the pay of the humblest mechanic would\ncompare favourably with that of all the fighting grades lower than\nthe commissioned and warrant ranks. Consequently, every attempt to\nmake the service popular has as yet been futile, no amelioration of\nit enabling it to compete with pacific occupations. The private\u2019s pay\nwas raised from sixpence to a shilling during the wars of the French\nRevolution;[303] and before that it was found necessary, about the\ntime of the war with the American colonies, to bribe men to enlist\nby the system (since abolished) of giving bounties at the time of\nenlistment. Previous to the introduction of the bounty system, a guinea\nto provide the recruit with necessaries and a crown wherewith to drink\nthe king\u2019s health was all that was given upon enlistment, the service\nitself (with the chances of loot and the allied pleasures) having been\nbounty enough.[304] Even the system of bounties proved attractive only\nto boys; for as the English statesman said, whose name is honourably\nassociated with the first change in our system from enlistment for\nlife to enlistment for a limited period, \u2018men grown up with all the\ngrossness and ignorance and consequent want of consideration incident\nto the lower classes\u2019 were too wary to accept the offers of the\nrecruiting department.[305]\n\nThe shortening of the term of service in 1806 and subsequently\nthe increase of pay, the mitigation of punishments, must all be\nunderstood as attempts to render the military life more attractive\nand more capable of competing with other trades; but that they have\nall signally failed is proved by the chronic and ever-increasing\ndifficulty of decoying recruits. The little pamphlet, published by\nauthority and distributed gratis at every post-office in the kingdom,\nshowing forth \u2018the Advantages of the Army\u2019 in their rosiest colours,\ncannot counteract the influence of the oral evidence of men, who,\nafter a short period of service, are dispersed to all corners of the\ncountry, with their tales of military misery to tell, confirming and\npropagating that popular theory of a soldier\u2019s life which sees in it a\nsort of earthly purgatory for faults of character acquired in youth, a\ncalling only to be adopted by those whose antecedents render industry\ndistasteful to them, and unfit them for more useful pursuits.\n\nThe same difficulty of recruiting was felt in France and Germany in the\nlast century, when voluntary enlistment was still the rule. In that\ncurious old military book, Fleming\u2019s \u2018Volkommene Teutsche Soldat,\u2019 is a\npicture of the recruiting officer, followed by trumpeters and drummers,\nparading the streets, and shaking a hat full of silver coins near a\ntable spread with the additional temptations of wine and beer.[306] But\nit soon became necessary to supplement this system by coercive methods;\nand when the habitual neglect of the wounded and the great number of\nneedless wars made it difficult or impossible to fill up the ranks with\nfresh recruits, the German authorities resorted to a regular system of\nkidnapping, taking men as they could get them from their ploughs, their\nchurches, or even from their very beds.\n\nIn France, too, Louis XIV. had to resort to force for filling his ranks\nin the war of the Spanish Succession; although the system of recruiting\nremained nominally voluntary till very much later. The total cost of\na French recruit amounted to ninety-two livres; but the length of his\nservice, though it was changed from time to time from periods varying\nfrom three to eight years, never exceeded the latter limit, nor came to\nbe for life as it did practically in England.\n\nThe experience of other countries proves, therefore, that England\nwill sooner or later adopt the principle of conscription or cease to\nwaste blood and money in Continental quarrels. The conscription will\nbe for her the only possible way of obtaining an army at all, or one\nat all commensurate with those of her possible European rivals. We\nshould not forget that in 1878, when we were on the verge of a war with\nRussia (and we live always on the verge of a war with Russia), our\nbest military experts met and agreed that only by means of compulsory\nservice could we hope to cope with our enemy with any chance of\nsuccess. And the conscription, whether under a free government or\nnot, means a tyranny compared to which the tyrannies of the Tudors\nor Stuarts were as a yoke of silk to a yoke of iron. It would matter\nlittle that it should lead to or involve a political despotism, for\nthe greater despotism would ever be the military one, crushing out\nall individuality, moral liberty, and independence, and consigning to\nthe soul-destroying routine of petty military details all the talent,\ntaste, knowledge, and wealth of our country, which have hitherto given\nit a distinctive character in history, and a foremost place among the\nnations of the earth.\n\nIn the year 1702 a woman served as a captain in the French army with\nsuch signal bravery that she was rewarded with the Order of St. Louis.\nNor was this the only result; for the episode roused a serious debate\nin the world, whether, or not, military service might be expected of,\nor exacted from, the female sex generally.[307] Why, then, should the\nconscription be confined to one half only of a population, in the face\nof so many historical instances of women who have shown pre-eminent,\nor at least average, military capacity? And if military service is so\nennobling and excellent a thing, as it is said to be, for the male\npopulation of a country, why not also for the female? Or as we may be\nsure that it would be to the last degree debasing for the latter half\nof the community, may we not suspect that the reasoning is altogether\nsophistical which claims other effects as the consequence of its\noperation on the stronger sex?\n\nWhat those effects are likely to be on the further development of\nEuropean civilisation, we are as yet scarcely in a position to judge.\nWe are still living only on the threshold of the change, and can\nhardly estimate the ultimate effect on human life of the transference\nto the whole male population of a country of the habits and vices\npreviously confined to only a section of it. But this at least is\ncertain, that at present every prediction which ushered in the change\nis being falsified from year to year. This universal service which\nwe call the conscription was, we were told, to usher in a sort of\nmillennium; it was to have the effect of humanising warfare; of\nraising the moral tone of armies; and of securing peace, by making\nthe prospect of its alternative too appalling to mankind. Not only\nhas it done none of these things, but there are even indications of\nconsequences the very reverse. The amenities that cast occasional\ngleams over the professional hostilities of the eighteenth century, as\nwhen, for instance, Crillon besieging Gibraltar sent a cart-load of\ncarrots to the English governor, whose men were dying of scurvy, have\npassed altogether out of the pale of possibility, and given place to\na hatred between the combatant forces that is tempered by no courtesy\nnor restrained by the shadow of humanity. Whole nations, instead of\na particular class, have been familiarised with deeds of robbery and\nbloodshed, and parted with a large part of their leisure once available\nfor progress in industry. War itself is at any given moment infinitely\nmore probable than it used to be, from the constant expectation of it\nwhich comes of constant preparation; nothing having been proved falser\nby history than the popular paradox which has descended to us from\nVegetius that the preparation for war is the high road to peace.[308]\nWhen, one may ask, has the world not been prepared for war, and how\nthen has it had so much of it? And as to the higher moral tone likely\nto spring from universal militarism, of what kind may we expect it to\nbe, when we read in a work by the greatest living English general,\ndestined, Carlyle hoped, one day to make short work of Parliament, such\nan exposition as the following of the relation between the moral duties\nof a soldier and those of a civilian: \u2018He (the soldier) must be taught\nto believe that his duties are the noblest which fall to a man\u2019s lot.\nHe must be taught to despise all those of civil life. Soldiers, like\nmissionaries, must be fanatics.\u2019[309]\n\nErasmus once observed in a letter to a friend how little it mattered\nto most men to what nationality they belonged, seeing that it was only\na question of paying taxes to Thomas instead of to John, or to John\ninstead of to Thomas; but it becomes a matter of even less importance\nwhen it is only a question of being trained for murder and bloodshed in\nthe drill-yards of this or that government. What is it to a conscript\nwhether it is for France or Germany that he is forced to undergo drill\nand discipline, when the insipidity of the drill and the tyranny of the\ndiscipline is the same in either case? If the old definition of a man\nas a reasoning animal is to be exchanged for that of a fighting animal,\nand the claims of a country upon a man are to be solely or mainly in\nrespect of his fighting utility, it is evident that the relation is\naltered between the individual and his country, and that there is no\nlonger any tie of affection between them, nor anything to make one\nnationality different from or preferable to another. This is clearly\nthe tendency of the conscription; and it is already remarkable how it\nhas lessened those earlier and narrower views of patriotism which were\nthe pretext formerly for so many trials of strength between nations.\nWhat, then, are the probable ultimate effects of this innovation on the\ndevelopment and maintenance of the peace in Europe?\n\nThe conscription, by reducing the idea of a country to that merely of\na military despotism, has naturally caused the differences between\nnations to sink into a secondary place, and to be superseded by those\ndifferences of class, opinions, and interests which are altogether\nindependent of nationality, and regardless of the barriers of language\nor geography. Thus the artisan of one country has learnt to regard\nhis fellow-worker of another country as in a much truer sense his\ncountryman than the priest or noble who, because he lives in the same\ngeographical area as himself, pays his taxes to the same central\ngovernment; and the different political schools in the several\ncountries of Europe have far more in common with one another than with\nthe opposite party of their own nationality. So that the first effect\nof that great military engine, the conscription, has been to unloosen\nthe bonds of the idea of nationality which has so long usurped the\ntitle to patriotism; to free us from that notion of our duty towards\nour neighbour which bids us hate him because he is our neighbour; and\nto diminish to that extent the chances of war by the undermining of the\nprejudice which has ever been its mainstay.\n\nBut the conscription in laying one spectre has raised another; for over\nagainst Nationalism, the jealousy of nations, it has reared Socialism,\nthe jealousy of classes. It has done so, not only by weakening the old\nnational idea which kept the rivalry of classes in abeyance, but by\nthe pauperism, misery, and discontent which are necessarily involved\nin the addition it causes to military expenditure. The increase caused\nby it is so enormous as to be almost incredible. In France the annual\nmilitary expenditure is now about twenty-five million pounds, whereas\nin 1869, before the new law of universal liability to service, the\ntotal annual cost of the army was little over fifteen millions, or the\naverage annual cost of the present army of Great Britain. \u2018Nothing,\u2019\nsaid Froissart, \u2018drains a treasury like men-at-arms;\u2019 and it is\nprobably below the truth to say that a country is the poorer by a\npound for every shilling it expends upon its army. Thus by the nature\nof things is Socialism seen to flow from the conscription; and we have\nonly to look at the recent history of Europe to see how the former has\ngrown and spread in exact ratio to the extension of the latter. That it\ndoes not yet prevail so widely in England as in France, or Germany, or\nRussia is because as yet we have not that compulsory military service\nfor which our military advisers are beginning to clamour.\n\nThe growth of Socialism in its turn is not without an effect that\nmay prove highly beneficial as a solvent of the militarism which is\nthe uncompensated evil of modern times. For it tends to compel the\ngovernments of our different nationalities to draw closer together,\nand, adopting some of the cosmopolitanism of their common foe, to enter\ninto league and union against those enemies to actual institutions for\nwhom militarism itself is primarily responsible, owing to the example\nso long set by it in methods of lawlessness, to the sanction so long\ngiven by it to crime. With Socialistic theories permeating every\ncountry, but more especially those that groan under the conscription,\ninternational jealousies are smothered and kept down, and must, if the\ncause continues, ultimately die out. Hence the curious result, but\na result fraught with hopefulness for the future, that the peace of\nthe world should owe itself now, in an indirect but clearly traceable\nmanner, to the military system which of all others that was ever\ninvented is the best calculated to prevent and endanger it. But since\nthis is merely to say that the danger of foreign war is lessened by\nthe imminent fear of civil war, little is gained by the exchange of\none peril for another. Socialism can only be averted by removing the\ncause which gives birth to it--namely, that unproductive expenditure on\nmilitary forces which intensifies and perpetuates pauperism. So that\nthe problem of the times for us in England is not how we may obtain\na more liberal military expenditure, still less how we may compass\ncompulsory service; but rather how most speedily we can disband our\narmy--an ever-growing danger to our peace and liberty--and how we can\nadvance elsewhere the cause of universal disarmament.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nTHE LIMITS OF MILITARY DUTY.\n\n    _\u2018I confess when I went into arms at the beginning of this war,\n    I never troubled myself to examine sides; I was glad to hear the\n    drums beat for soldiers, as if I had been a mere Swiss, that had\n    not cared which side went up or down, so I had my pay.\u2019_--MEMOIRS\n    OF A CAVALIER.\n\n    The old feeling of the moral stain of bloodshed--Military\n    purificatory customs--Modern change of feeling about\n    warfare--Descartes on the profession of arms--The old-world\n    sentiment in favour of piracy--The central question of military\n    ethics--May a soldier be indifferent to the cause of war?--The\n    right to serve made conditional on a good cause, by St. Augustine,\n    Bullinger, Grotius, and Sir James Turner--Old Greek feeling about\n    mercenary service--Origin of our mercenary as opposed to gratuitous\n    service--Armies raised by military contractors--The value of the\n    distinction between foreign and native mercenaries--Original\n    limitation of military duty to the actual defence of the\n    realm--Extension of the notion of allegiance--The connection of the\n    military oath with the first Mutiny Act--Recognised limits to the\n    claims on a soldier\u2019s obedience--The falsity of the common doctrine\n    of duty illustrated by the devastation of the Palatinate by the\n    French and by the bombardment of Copenhagen by the English--The\n    example of Admiral Keppel--Justice between nations--Its observation\n    in ancient India and Rome--St. Augustine and Bayard on justice\n    in war--Grotius on good grounds of war--The military claim to\n    exemption from moral responsibility--The soldier\u2019s first duty to\n    his conscience--The admission of this principle involves the end of\n    war.\n\n\nIt must needs be that new questions arise, or old perplexities in\na fresh form; and of these one that has risen again in our time is\nthis: Does any moral stain attach to bloodshed committed upon the\nbattle-field? Or is the difference between military and ordinary\nhomicide a real one, and does the plea of duty sanction any act,\nhowever atrocious in the abstract, provided it be committed under the\nuniform of the State?\n\nThe general opinion is, of course, that no soldier in his military\ncapacity can be guilty of crime; but opinion has not always been so\nfixed, and it is worth noticing that in the forms of civilisation that\npreceded our own, and in some existing modern races of lower type\nthan our own, traces clearly appear of a sense of wrong attaching to\nany form of bloodshed whatever, whether of fair battle or of base\ntreachery, calling alike for the purifying influences of expiation and\ncleansing. In South Africa, for instance, the Basuto returning from\nwar proceeds with all his arms to the nearest stream, to purify not\nonly his own person but his javelins and his battle-axe. The Zulu, too,\npractises ablutions on the same occasion; and the Bechuana warrior\nwears a rude kind of necklace, to remind him of the expiation due from\nhim to the slain, and to disperse the dreams that might otherwise\ntrouble him, and perhaps even drive him to die of remorse.[310]\n\nThe same feelings may be detected in the old world. The Macedonians\nhad a peculiar form of sacrificatory purification, which consisted\nin cutting a dog in half and leading the whole army, arrayed in full\narmour, between the two parts.[311] As the B\u0153otians had the same\ncustom, it was probably for the same reason. At Rome, for the same\npurpose, a sheep, and a bull, and a pig or boar, were every year led\nthree times round the army and then sacrificed to Mars. In Jewish\nhistory the prohibition to King David to build the temple was expressly\nconnected with the blood he had shed in battle. In old Greek mythology\nTheseus held himself unfit, without expiation, to be admitted to the\nmysteries of Ceres, though the blood that stained his hands was only\nthat of thieves and robbers. And in the same spirit Hector refused to\nmake a libation to the gods before he had purified his hands after\nbattle. \u2018With unwashen hands,\u2019 he said, \u2018to pour out sparkling wine\nto Zeus I dare not, nor is it ever the custom for one soiled with the\nblood and dust of battle to offer prayers to the god whose seat is in\nthe clouds.\u2019[312]\n\nFor the cause of this feeling we may perhaps choose between an almost\ninstinctive reluctance to take human life, and some such superstition\nas explains the necessity for purification among the Basutos,--the\nidea, namely, of escaping the revenge of the slain by the medium of\nwater.[313] The latter explanation would be in keeping with the not\nuncommon notion in savage life of the inability of a spirit to cross\nrunning water, and would help to account for the necessity there was\nfor a Hebrew to flee, or for a Greek to make some expiation, even\nthough only guilty of an act of unintentional homicide. And in this way\nit is possible that the sanctity of human life, which is one of the\nchief marks, and should be one of the chief objects, of civilisation,\noriginated in the very same fear of a post-mortem vengeance, which\nleads some savage tribes to entreat pardon of the bear or elephant\nthey have slain after a successful chase.\n\nBut, account as we like for the origin of the feeling, its undoubted\nexistence is the point of interest, for it is easy to see that under\nslightly more favourable conditions of history it might have ripened\ninto a state of thought which would have held the soldier and the\nmanslayer in equal abhorrence. Christianity in its primitive form\ncertainly aimed at and very nearly effected the transition. In the\nGreek Church a Christian soldier was debarred from the Eucharist for\nthree years if he had slain an enemy in battle; and the Christian\nChurch of the first three centuries would have echoed the sentiment\nexpressed by St. Cyprian in his letter to Donatus: \u2018Homicide when\ncommitted by an individual is a crime, but a virtue when committed in\na public war; yet in the latter case it derives its impunity, not from\nits abstract harmlessness, but solely from the scale of its enormity.\u2019\n\nThe education of centuries has long since effaced the earlier scruple;\nbut there are tens of thousands of Englishmen to whom the military\nprofession is the last they would voluntarily adopt, and it would be\nrash to predict the impossibility of the revival of the older feeling,\nor the dimensions it may ultimately assume. The greatest poet of our\ntime, who more than any other living man has helped to lead European\nopinion into new channels, may, perhaps, in the following lines have\nanticipated the verdict of the coming time, and divined an undercurrent\nof thought that is beginning to flow even now amongst us with no\ninconsiderable force of feeling:--\n\n    La phrase, cette alti\u00e8re et vile courtisane,\n    Dore le meurtre en grand, fourbit la pertuisane,\n    Prot\u00e8ge les soudards contre le sens commun,\n    Persuade les niais que tous sont faits pour un,\n    Prouve que la tuerie est glorieuse et bonne,\n    D\u00e9route la logique et l\u2019\u00e9vidence, et donne\n    Un sauf-conduit au crime \u00e0 travers la raison.[314]\n\nThe destruction of the romance of war by the greater publicity given to\nits details through the medium of the press clearly tends to strengthen\nthis feeling, by tempering popular admiration for military success\nwith a cooling admixture of horror and disgust. Take, for instance,\nthe following description of the storming of the Egyptian trenches at\nTel-el-Kebir, by an eye-witness of it:--\u2018In the redoubts into which\nour men were swarming the Egyptians, throwing away their arms, were\nfound cowering, terror-stricken, in the corners of the works, to hide\nthemselves from our men. Although they had made such a contemptible\nexhibition, from a soldierly point of view, it was impossible to help\npitying the poor wretches as they huddled together; _it seemed so much\nlike rats in a pit when the terrier has set to work_.\u2019 And some 2,500\nof them were afterwards buried on the spot, most of them killed by\nbayonet wounds in the back.\n\nThis is an instance of the _tuerie_ that Victor Hugo speaks of, which\nwe all call glorious when we meet in the streets, reserving, some of\nus, another opinion for the secret chamber. Still, when it comes to\ncomparing the work of a victory to that of a terrier in a rat-pit, it\nmust be admitted that the realism of war threatens to become more\nrepellent than its romance was once attractive, and to deter men more\nand more from the choice of a profession of which similar disgusting\nscenes are the common and the probable episodes.\n\nDescartes, the father of modern philosophy and of free thought, who,\nfrom a youthful love for arms and camp-life, which he attributed to a\ncertain heat of liver, began life in the army, actually gave up his\nmilitary career for the reasons which he thus expressed in a letter\nto a friend: \u2018Although custom and example render the profession of\narms the noblest of all, I, for my own part, who only regard it like a\nphilosopher, value it at its proper worth, and, indeed, I find it very\ndifficult to give it a place among the honourable professions, seeing\nthat idleness and licentiousness are the two principal motives which\nnow attract most men to it.\u2019[315]\n\nOf course no one in modern times would come to the same conclusions\nas Descartes for the same reasons, the discipline of our armies being\nsomewhat more serious than it was in the first half of the seventeenth\ncentury. Nevertheless, it is impossible to read of the German campaign\nin France without hoping, for the good of the world, that the\ninevitable association of war with the most revolting forms of crime\ntherein displayed, may some day produce a general state of sentiment\nsimilar to that anticipated by Descartes.\n\nIt may be, said that the example of Descartes proves and indicates\nnothing; and we may feel pretty sure that his scruples seemed\nextravagantly absurd to his contemporaries, if he suffered them to\nknow them. Nevertheless, he might have appealed to several well-known\nhistorical facts as a reason against too hasty a condemnation of his\napparent super-sensitiveness. He might have argued that the profession\nof a pirate once reflected no more moral discredit than that of a\nsoldier did in his days; that the pirate\u2019s reply to Alexander, that he\ninfested the seas by the same right wherewith the conqueror devastated\nthe land, conveyed a moral sentiment once generally accepted, nor even\nthen quite extinct; that in the days of Homer it was as natural to ask\na seafarer whether he were a freebooter as whether he were a merchant;\nthat so late in Greek history as the time of Thucydides, several tribes\non the mainland of Greece still gloried in piracy, and accounted their\nplunder honourably won; and that at Rome the Cilician pirates, whom\nit devolved on Pompey to disperse, were joined by persons of wealth,\nbirth, and education, \u2018as if,\u2019 says Plutarch, \u2018their employment were\nworthy of the ambition of men of honour.\u2019\n\nRemembering, therefore, these things, and the fact that not so very\nmany centuries ago public opinion was so lenient to the practice of\nbishops and ecclesiastics taking an active part in warfare that they\ncommonly did so in spite of canons and councils to the contrary, it is\na fair subject for speculation whether the moral opinion of the future\nmay not come to coincide with the feeling of Descartes, and it behoves\nus to keep our minds alive to possibilities of change in this matter,\nalready it would seem in process of formation. Who will venture to\npredict what may be the effect of the rise of the general level of\neducation, and of the higher moral life of our time, on the popular\njudgment of even fifty years hence regarding a voluntarily adopted\nmilitary life?\n\nWe may, perhaps, attribute it to the extreme position taken up with\nregard to military service by the Quakers and Mennonites that the\nexample of Descartes had so slight a following. That thick phalanx of\nour kind who fondly mistake their own mental timidity for moderation,\nperpetually make use of the doctrines of extremists as an excuse for\ntolerating or even defending what in the abstract they admit to be\nevil; and it was unfortunately with this moderate party that Grotius\nelected to throw in his lot. No one admitted more strongly the evils\nof war. The reason he himself gave for writing his \u2018De Jure Pacis et\nBelli\u2019 was the licence he saw prevailing throughout Christendom in\nresorting to hostilities; recourse had to arms for slight motives\nor for none; and when war was once begun an utter rejection of all\nreverence for divine or human law, just as if the unrestrained\ncommission of every crime became thenceforth legitimate. Yet, instead\nof throwing the weight of his judgment into the scale of opinion which\nopposed the custom altogether (though he did advocate an international\ntribunal that should decide differences and compel obedience to its\ndecisions), he only tried to shackle it with rules of decency that are\nabsolutely foreign to it, with the result, after all, that he did very\nlittle to humanise wars, and nothing to make them less frequent.\n\nNevertheless, though Grotius admitted the abstract lawfulness of\nmilitary service, he made it conditional on a thorough conviction\nof the righteousness of the cause at issue. This is the great and\npermanent merit of his work, and it is here that we touch on the pivot\nor central question of military ethics. The orthodox theory is, that\nwith the cause of war a soldier has no concern, and that since the\nmatter in contention is always too complicated for him to judge of\nits merits, his only duty is to blindfold his reason and conscience,\nand rush whithersoever his services are commanded. Perhaps the best\nexposition of this simple military philosophy is that given by\nShakespeare in his scene of the eve of Agincourt, where Henry V., in\ndisguise, converses with some soldiers of the English army. \u2018Methinks,\u2019\nsays the king, \u2018I could not die anywhere so contented as in the king\u2019s\ncompany, his cause being just and his quarrel honourable.\u2019\n\n_William._ \u2018That\u2019s more than we know.\u2019\n\n_Bates._ \u2018Ay, or more than we should seek after, for we know enough\nif we know we are the king\u2019s subjects. If his cause be wrong, our\nobedience to the king wipes the crime of it out of us.\u2019\n\nYet the whisper of our own day is, Does it? For a soldier, nowadays,\nenjoys equally with the civilian, who by his vote contributes to\nprevent or promote hostilities, the greater facilities afforded by\nthe spread of knowledge for the exercise of his judgment; and it is\nto subject him to undeserved ignominy to debar him from the free use\nof his intellect, as if he were a minor or an imbecile, incompetent\nto think for himself. Putting even the difficulty of decision at its\nworst, it can never be greater for the soldier than it is for the\nvoter; and if the former is incompetent to form an opinion, whence does\nthe peasant or mechanic derive his ability? Moreover, the existence\nof a just and good cause has always been the condition insisted on as\nalone capable of sanctioning military service by writers of every shade\nof thought--by St. Augustine as representing the early Catholic Church,\nby Bullinger or Becon as representatives of the early Reformed Church,\nand by Grotius as representative of the modern school of publicists.\nGrotius contends that no citizen or subject ought to take part in an\nunjust war, even if he be commanded to do so. He openly maintains\nthat disobedience to orders is in such a case a lesser evil than the\nguilt of homicide that would be incurred by fighting. He inclines to\nthe opinion that, where the cause of war seems doubtful, a man would\ndo better to refrain from service, and to leave the king to employ\nthose whose readiness to fight might be less hampered by questions of\nright and wrong, and of whom there would always be a plentiful supply.\nWithout these reservations he regards the soldier\u2019s task as so much the\nmore detestable than the executioner\u2019s, as manslaughter without a cause\nis more heinous than manslaughter with one,[316] and thinks no kind of\nlife more wicked than that of men who, without regard for the cause of\nwar, fight for hire, and to whom the question of right is equivalent to\nthe question of the highest wage.[317]\n\nThese are strong opinions and expressions, and as their general\nacceptance would logically render war impossible, it is no small gain\nto have in their favour so great an authority as Grotius. But it is\nan even greater gain to be able to quote on the same side an actual\nsoldier. Sir James Turner at the end of his military treatise called\n\u2018Pallas Armata,\u2019 published in 1683, came to conclusions which, though\nadverse to Grotius, contain some remarkable admissions and show the\ndifference that two centuries have made on military maxims with regard\nto this subject. \u2018It is no sin for a mere soldier,\u2019 he says, \u2018to serve\nfor wages, unless his conscience tells him he fights in an unjust\ncause.\u2019 Again, \u2018That soldier who serves or fights for any prince or\nState for wages in a cause he knows to be unjust, sins damnably.\u2019 He\neven argues that soldiers whose original service began for a just\ncause, and who are constrained by their military oaths to continue\nin service for a new and unjust cause of war, ought to \u2018desert their\nemployment and suffer anything that could be done to them before they\ndraw their swords against their own conscience and judgments in an\nunjust quarrel.\u2019[318]\n\nThese moral sentiments of a military man of the seventeenth century\nare absolutely alien to the military doctrines of the present day;\nand his remarks on wages recall yet another important landmark of\nancient thought that has been removed by the progress of time. Early\nGreek opinion justly made no distinction between the mercenary who\nserved a foreign country and the mercenary who served his own. All\nhired military service was regarded as disgraceful, nor would anyone\nof good birth have dreamt of serving his own country save at his own\nexpense. The Carians rendered their names infamous as the first of the\nGreek race who served for pay; whilst at Athens Pericles introduced the\ncustom of supporting the poorer defenders of their country out of the\nexchequer.[319] Afterwards, of course, no people ever committed itself\nmore eagerly to the pursuit of mercenary warfare.\n\nIn England also gratuitous military service was originally the\ncondition of the feudal tenure of land, nor was anyone bound to serve\nthe king for more than a certain number of days in the year, forty\nbeing generally the longest term. For all service in excess of the\nlegal limit the king was obliged to pay; and in this way, and by\nthe scutage tax, by which many tenants bought themselves off from\ntheir strict obligations, the principle of a paid military force was\nrecognised from the time of the Conquest. But the chief stipendiary\nforces appear to have been foreign mercenaries, supported, not out\nof the commutation tax, but out of the king\u2019s privy purse, and still\nmore out of the loot won from their victims in war. These were those\nsoldiers of fortune, chiefly from Flanders, Braban\u00e7ons, or Routers,\nwhose excesses as brigands led to their excommunication by the Third\nLateran Council (1179), and to their destruction by a crusade three\nyears later.[320]\n\nBut the germ of our modern recruiting system must rather be looked for\nin those military contracts or indentures, by which from about the time\nof Edward III. it became customary to raise our forces: some powerful\nsubject contracting with the king, in consideration of a certain sum,\nto provide soldiers for a certain time and task. Thus in 1382 the\nwar-loving Bishop of Norwich contracted with Richard II. to provide\n2,500 men-at-arms and 2,500 archers for a year\u2019s service in France, in\nconsideration of the whole fifteenth that had been voted by Parliament\nfor the war.[321] In the same way several bishops indented to raise\nsoldiers for Henry V. And thus a foreign war became a mere matter\nof business and hire, and armies to fight the French were raised by\nspeculative contractors, very much as men are raised nowadays to make\nrailways or take part in other works needful for the public at large.\nThe engagement was purely pecuniary and commercial, and was entirely\ndivested of any connection with conscience or patriotism. On the other\nhand, the most obviously just cause of war, that of national defence in\ncase of invasion, continued to be altogether disconnected with pay, and\nremained so much the duty of the militia or capable male population of\nthe country, that both Edward III. and Richard II. directed writs even\nto archbishops and bishops to arm and array all abbots, priors, and\nmonks, between the ages of sixteen and sixty, for the defence of the\nkingdom.[322]\n\nOriginally, therefore, the paid army of England, as opposed to the\nmilitia, implied the introduction of a strictly mercenary force\nconsisting indifferently of natives or foreigners, into our military\nsystem. But clearly there was no moral difference between the two\nclasses of mercenaries so engaged. The hire, and not the cause, being\nthe main consideration of both, the Englishman and the Braban\u00e7on were\nequally mercenaries in the ordinary acceptation of the term. The\nprejudice against mercenaries either goes too far or not far enough.\nIf a Swiss or an Italian hiring himself to fight for a cause about\nwhich he was ignorant or indifferent was a mercenary soldier, so was\nan Englishman who with equal ignorance and indifference accepted the\nwages offered him by a military contractor of his own nation. Either\nthe conduct of the Swiss was blameless, or the Englishman\u2019s moral\ndelinquency was the same as his.\n\nThe public opinion of former times regarded both, of course, as equally\nblameless, or rather as equally meritorious. And it is worth noticing\nthat the word _mercenary_ was applied alike to the hired military\nservant of his own as of another country. Shakespeare, for instance,\napplies the term mercenary to the 1,600 Frenchmen of low degree slain\nat Agincourt, whom Monstrelet distinguishes from the 10,000 Frenchmen\nof position who lost their lives on that memorable day--\n\n          In this ten thousand they have lost,\n    There are but sixteen hundred mercenaries.\n\nAnd even so late as 1756, the original signification of the word had so\nlittle changed, that in the great debate in the House of Lords on the\nMilitia Bill of that year Lord Temple and several other orators spoke\nof the national standing army as an army of _mercenaries_, without\nmaking any distinction between the Englishmen and the Hessians who\nserved in it.[323]\n\nThe moral distinction that now prevails between the paid service of\nnatives and of foreigners is, therefore, of comparatively recent\norigin. It was one of the features of the Reformation in Switzerland\nthat its leaders insisted for the first time on a moral difference\nbetween Swiss soldiers who served their own country for pay, and those\nwho with equal bravery and credit sold their strength to the service of\nthe highest foreign bidder.\n\nZwingli, and after him his disciple Bullinger, effected a change in the\nmoral sentiment of Switzerland equivalent to that which a man would\neffect nowadays who should persuade men to discountenance or abandon\nmilitary service of any kind for pay. One of the great obstacles to\nZwingli\u2019s success was his decided protest against the right of any\nSwiss to sell himself to foreign governments for the commission of\nbloodshed, regardless of any injury in justification; and it was\nmainly on that account that Bullinger succeeded in 1549 in preventing\na renewal of the alliance or military contract between the cantons\nand Henry II. of France. \u2018When a private individual,\u2019 he said, \u2018is\nfree to enrol himself or not, and engages himself to fight against the\nfriends and allies of his sovereign, I know not whether he does not\nhire himself to commit homicide, and whether he does not act like the\ngladiators, who, to amuse the Roman people, let themselves to the first\ncomer to kill one another.\u2019\n\nBut it is evident that, except with a reservation limiting a man\u2019s\nservice to a just national cause, Bullinger\u2019s argument will also apply\nto the case of a hired soldier of his own country. The duty of every\nman to defend his country in case of invasion is intelligible enough;\nand it is very important to notice that originally in no country did\nthe duty of military obedience mean more. In 1297 the High Constable\nand Marshal of England refused to muster the forces to serve Edward I.\nin Flanders, on the plea that neither they nor their ancestors were\nobliged to serve the king outside his dominions;[324] and Sir E. Coke\u2019s\nruling in Calvin\u2019s case,[325] that Englishmen are bound to attend the\nking in his wars as well without as within the realm, and that their\nallegiance is not local but indefinite, was not accepted by writers\non the constitution of the country. The existing militia oath, which\nstrictly limits obedience to the defence of the realm, covered the\nwhole military duty of our ancestors; and it was only the innovation of\nthe military contract that prepared the way for our modern idea of the\nsoldier\u2019s duty as unqualified and unlimited with regard to cause and\nplace and time. The very word _soldier_ meant originally stipendiary,\nhis pay or _solde_ (from the Latin _solidum_) coming to constitute\nhis chief characteristic. From a servant hired for a certain task\nfor a certain time the steps were easy to a servant whose hire bound\nhim to any task and for the whole of his life. The existing military\noath, which binds a recruit and practically compels him as much to a\nwar of aggression as of defence at the bidding of the executive, owes\nits origin to the revolution of 1689, when the refusal of Dumbarton\u2019s\nfamous Scotch regiment to serve their new master, William III., in the\ndefence of Holland against France, rendered it advisable to pass the\nMutiny Act, containing a more stringent definition of military duty by\nan oath couched in extremely general terms. Such has been the effect\nof time in confirming this newer doctrine of the contract implied by\nthe military status, that the defence of the monarch \u2018in person, crown,\nand dignity against all enemies,\u2019 to which the modern recruit pledges\nhimself at his attestation, would be held to bind the soldier not to\nwithhold his services were he called upon to exercise them in the\nplanet Mars itself.\n\nHence it appears to be an indisputable fact of history that the\nmodern military theory of Europe, which demands complete spiritual\nself-abandonment and unqualified obedience on the part of a soldier,\nis a distinct trespass outside the bounds of the original and, so\nto speak, constitutional idea of military duty; and that in our own\ncountry it is as much an encroachment on the rights of Englishmen as it\nis on the wider rights of man.\n\nBut what is the value of the theory itself, even if we take no account\nof the history of its growth? If military service precludes a man from\ndiscussing the justice of the end pursued in a war, it can hardly be\ndisputed that it equally precludes him from inquiries about the means,\nand that if he is bound to consider himself as fighting in any case\nfor a lawful cause he has no right to bring his moral sense to bear\nupon the details of the service required of him. But here occurs a\nloophole, a flaw, in the argument; for no subject nor soldier can be\ncompelled to serve as a spy, however needful such service may be. That\nproves that a limit does exist to the claims on a soldier\u2019s obedience.\nAnd Vattel mentions as a common occurrence the refusal of troops to\nact when the cruelty of the deeds commanded of them exposed them to\nthe danger of savage reprisals. \u2018Officers,\u2019 he says, \u2018who had the\nhighest sense of honour, though ready to shed their blood in a field\nof battle for their prince\u2019s service, have not thought it any part of\ntheir duty to run the hazard of an ignominious death,\u2019 such as was\ninvolved in the execution of such behests. Yet why not, if their prince\nor general commanded them? By what principle of morality or common\nsense were they justified in declining a particular service as too\niniquitous for them and yet in holding themselves bound to the larger\niniquity of an aggressive war? What right has a machine to choose or\ndecide between good and bad any more than between just and unjust? Its\nmoral incompetence must be thoroughgoing, or else in no case afford an\nextenuating plea. You must either grant it everything or nothing, or\nelse offer a rational explanation for your rule of distinction. For it\nclearly needs explaining, why, if there are orders which a soldier is\nnot bound to obey, if there are cases where he is competent to discuss\nthe moral nature of the services required of him, it should not also\nbe open to him to discuss the justice of the war itself of which those\nservices are merely incidents.\n\nLet us turn from the abstract to the concrete, and take two instances\nas a test of the principle. In 1689, Marshal Duras, commander of the\nFrench army of the Rhine, received orders to destroy the Palatinate,\nand make a desert between France and Germany, though neither the\nElector nor his people had done the least injury to France. Did a\nsingle soldier, did a single officer quail or hesitate? Voltaire tells\nus that many officers felt shame in acting as the instrument of this\niniquity of Louis XIV., but they acted nevertheless in accordance with\ntheir supposed honour, and with the still orthodox theory of military\nduty. They stopped short at no atrocity. They cut down the fruit-trees,\nthey tore down the vines, they burnt the granaries; they set fire to\nvillages, to country-houses, to castles; they desecrated the tombs of\nthe ancient German emperors at Spiers; they plundered the churches;\nthey reduced well-nigh to ashes Oppenheim, Spiers, Worms, Mannheim,\nHeidelberg, and other flourishing cities; they reduced 400,000 human\nbeings to homelessness and destruction--and all in the name of military\nduty and military honour! Yet, of a truth, those were dastardly deeds\nif ever dastardly deeds have been done beneath the sun; and it is the\nsheerest sophistry to maintain that the men who so implicitly carried\nout their orders would not have done more for their miserable honour,\nwould not have had a higher conception of duty, had they followed the\ndictates of their reason and conscience rather than those of their\nmilitary superiors, and refused to sacrifice their humanity to an\noverstrained theory of their military obligation, and their memory to\neverlasting execration.\n\nIn the case of these destroyers military duty meant simply military\nservility, and it was this reckless servility that led Voltaire in his\n\u2018Candide\u2019 to put into the mouth of his inimitable philosopher, Martin,\nthat definition of an army which tales like the foregoing suggested and\njustified: \u2018A million of assassins, in regiments, traversing Europe\nfrom end to end, and committing murder and brigandage by rules of\ndiscipline for the sake of bread, because incompetent to exercise any\nmore honest calling.\u2019[326]\n\nAn English case of this century may be taken as a parallel one to the\nFrench of the seventeenth, and as an additional test of the orthodox\nmilitary dogma that with the cause of war a soldier has no concern.\nIt is the Copenhagen expedition of 1807, than which no act of might\nwithin this century was more strongly reprobated by the public opinion\nof Europe, and by all but the Tory opinion of England. A fleet and\narmy having been sent to the Danish capital, and the Danish Government\nhaving refused to surrender their fleet, which was demanded as the\nalternative of bombardment, the English military officials proceeded\nto bombard the city, with infinite destruction and slaughter, which\nwere only stayed at last by the surrender of the fleet as originally\ndemanded. There was no quarrel with Denmark at the time, there was no\ncomplaint of injury; only the surrender of the fleet was demanded.\nEnglish public opinion was both excited and divided about the morality\nof this act, which was only justified on the plea that the Government\nwas in possession of a secret article of the Treaty of Tilsit between\nNapoleon and the Czar of Russia, by which the Danish fleet was to be\nmade use of in an attack upon England. But this secret article was\nnot divulged, according to Alison, till ten years afterwards,[327]\nand many disbelieved in its existence altogether, even supposing that\nits existence would have been a good case for war. Many military men\ntherefore shared in the feeling that condemned the act, yet they\nscrupled not to contribute their aid to it. Were they right? Read Sir\nC. Napier\u2019s opinion of it at the time, and then say where, in the\ncase of a man so thinking, would have lain his duty: \u2018This Copenhagen\nexpedition--is it an unjust action for the general good? Who can say\nthat such a precedent is pardonable? When once the line of justice has\nbeen passed, there is no shame left. England has been unjust.... Was\nnot our high honour worth the danger we might perhaps have risked in\nmaintaining that honour inviolate?\u2019[328]\n\nThese opinions, whether right or wrong, were shared by many men in\nboth services. Sir C. Napier himself says: \u2018Were there not plenty of\nsoldiers who thought these things wrong? ... but would it have been\npossible to allow the army and navy ... to decide upon the propriety of\nsuch attacks?\u2019[329] The answer is, that if they did, whether allowed or\nnot, such things would be impossible, or, at all events, less probable:\nwhich is the best reason possible for the contention that they should.\nHad they done so in this very instance, our historians would have been\nspared the explanation of an episode that is a dark blot upon our\nannals.\n\nA more pleasing precedent, therefore, than that of the French officers\nin the Palatinate, or of the English at Copenhagen, is the case of\nAdmiral Keppel, who, whilst numbers of naval officers flocked to the\nAdmiralty to offer their services or to request employment, steadily\ndeclined to take part in the war of England against her American\ncolonies, because he deemed her cause a bad one.[330] He did no\nviolence to his reason or conscience nor tarnished his fame by acting a\npart, of which in his individual capacity he disapproved. His example\nis here held up as illustrating the only true doctrine, and the only\none that at all accords with the most rudimentary principles of either\nreligion or morality. The contrary doctrine bids a man to forswear the\nuse of both his reason and his conscience in consideration for his pay,\nand deprives him of that liberty of thought and moral action compared\nwith which his civil and political liberty are nothing worth. For what\nindeed is this contrary time-honoured doctrine when stripped of all\nsuperfluities, and displayed in the outfit of common sense and common\nwords? What is it but that the duty of military obedience overrides\nall duty of a man towards himself; that, though he may not voluntarily\ndestroy his body, he cannot do too much violence to his soul; that it\nis his duty to annihilate his moral and intellectual being, to commit\nspiritual suicide, to forego the use of the noblest faculties which\nbelong to him as a man; that to do all this is a just cause of pride\nto him, and that he is in all respects the nobler and better for\nassimilating himself to that brainless and heartless condition which is\nthat also of his charger or his rifle?\n\nIf this doctrine is true and sound, then it may be asked whether there\nhas ever been or exists upon the earth any tyranny, ecclesiastical or\npolitical, comparable to this military one; whether any but the baser\nforms of priestcraft have ever sought to deprive a man so completely\nof the enjoyment of his highest human attributes, or to absolve him so\nutterly from all moral responsibility for his actions.\n\nThis position can scarcely be disputed, save by denying the reality\nof any distinction between just and unjust in international conduct;\nand against this denial may be set not only the evidence of every age,\nbut of every language above the stage of mere barbarism. Disregard of\nthe difference is one of the best measures of the civilisation of a\npeople or epoch. We at once, for instance, form a higher estimate of\nthe civilisation of ancient India, when we read in Arrian that her\nkings were so apprehensive of committing an unjust aggression that\nthey would not lead their armies out of India for the conquest of\nother nations.[331] One of the best features in the old pagan world\nwas the importance attached to the justice of the motives for breaking\nthe peace. The Romans appear never to have begun a war without a\nprevious consultation with the College of Fecials as to its justice;\nand in the same way, and for the same purpose, the early Christian\nemperors consulted the opinion of the bishops. If a Roman general made\nan unjust attack upon a people his triumph was refused, or at least\nresisted; nor are the instances infrequent in which the senate decreed\nrestitution where a consul, acting on his own responsibility, had\ndeprived a population of its arms, its lands, or its liberties.[332]\nHence the Romans, with all their apparent aggressiveness, won the\ncharacter of a strict regard to justice, which was no small part of the\nsecret of their power. \u2018You boast,\u2019 the Rhodians said to them, \u2018that\nyour wars are successful because they are just, and plume yourselves\nnot so much on the victory which concludes them as on the fact that\nyou never begin them without good cause.\u2019[333] Conquest corrupted the\nRomans in these respects as it has done many another people; but even\nto the end of the Republic the tradition of justice survived; nor is\nthere anything finer in the history of that people than the attempt\nof the party headed by Ateius the tribune to prevent Crassus leaving\nRome when he was setting out to make war upon the Parthians, who not\nonly had committed no injury, but were the allies of the Republic; or\nthan the vote of Cato, that C\u00e6sar, who, in time of peace, had slain or\nrouted 300,000 Germans, should be given up to the people he had injured\nin atonement for the wrong he had done to them.\n\nThe idea of the importance of a just cause of war may be traced, of\ncourse, in history, after the extinction of the grand pagan philosophy\nin which it had its origin. It was insisted on even by Christian\nwriters who, like St. Augustine, did not regard all military service\nas wicked. What, he asked, were kingdoms but robberies on a vast scale,\nif their justice were put out of the reckoning.[334] A French writer\nof the time of Charles V. concluded that while soldiers who fell in a\njust cause were saved, those who died for an unjust cause perished in\na state of mortal sin.[335] Even the Chevalier Bayard, who accompanied\nCharles VIII. without any scruple in his conquest of Naples, was fond\nof saying that all empires, kingdoms, and provinces were, if without\nthe principle of justice, no better than forests full of brigands;[336]\nand the fine saying is attributed to him, that the strength of arms\nshould only be employed for the establishment of right and equity. But\non the whole the justice of the cause of war became of less and less\nimportance as time went on; nor have our modern Christian societies\never derived benefit in that respect from the instruction or guidance\nof their churches at all equal to that which the society of pagan Rome\nderived from the institution of its Fecials, as the guardians of the\nnational conscience.\n\nIt was among the humane endeavours of Grotius to try to remedy this\ndefect in modern States by establishing certain general principles by\nwhich it might be possible to test the pretext of any given war from\nthe side of its justice. At first sight it appears obvious that a\ndefinite injury is the only justification for a resort to hostilities,\nor, in other words, that only a defensive war is just; but then the\nquestion arises how far defence may be anticipatory, and an injury\nfeared or probable give the same rights as one actually sustained.\nThe majority of wars, that have not been merely wars of conquest and\nrobbery, may be traced to that principle in history, so well expressed\nby Livy, that men\u2019s anxiety not to be afraid of others causes them\nto become objects of dread themselves.[337] For this reason Grotius\nrefused to admit as a good _casus belli_ the fact that another nation\nwas making warlike preparations, building garrisons and fortresses,\nor that its power might, if unchecked, grow to be dangerous. He also\nrejected the pretext of mere utility as a good ground for war, or such\npleas as the need of better territory, the right of first discovery, or\nthe improvement or punishment of barbarous nations.\n\nA strict adherence to these principles, vague as they are, would\nhave prevented most of the bloodshed that has occurred in Europe\nsince Grotius wrote. The difficulty, however, is, that, as between\nnations, the principle of utility easily overshadows that of justice;\nand although the two are related as the temporary to the permanent\nexpediency, and therefore as the lesser to the greater expediency,\nthe relation between them is seldom obvious at the time of choice,\nand it is easy beforehand to demonstrate the expediency of a war of\nwhich time alone can show both the inexpediency and the injustice.\nAny war, therefore, however unjust it may seem, when judged by the\ncanons of Grotius, is easily construed as just when measured by the\nlight of an imperious and magnified passing interest; and the absence\nof any recognised definition or standard of just dealing between\nnations affords a salve to many a conscience that in the matters of\nprivate life would be sensitive and scrupulous enough. The story of\nKing Agesilaus is a mirror in which very few ages or countries may not\nsee their own history reflected. When Ph\u0153bidas, the Spartan general,\nseized the Cadmeia of Thebes in the time of peace, the greater part\nof Greece and many Spartans condemned it as a most iniquitous act of\nwar; but Agesilaus, who at other times was wont to talk of justice\nas the greatest of all the virtues, and of valour without it as of\nlittle worth, defended his officer\u2019s action, on the plea that it was\nnecessary to regard the tendency of the action, and to account it even\nas glorious if it resulted in an advantage to Sparta.\n\nBut when every allowance is made for wars of which the justice is not\nclearly defined from the expediency, many wars have occurred of so\npalpably unjust a character, that they could not have been possible\nbut for the existence of the loosest sentiments with regard to the\nresponsibility of those who took part in them. We read of wars or the\npretexts of wars in history of which we all, whether military men or\ncivilians, readily recognise the injustice; and by applying the same\nprinciples of judgment to the wars of our own country and time we are\neach and all of us furnished for the direction of our conscience\nwith a standard which, if not absolutely scientific or consistent, is\nsufficient for all the practical purposes of life, and is completely\nsubversive of the excuse which is afforded by occasional instances of\ndifficult and doubtful decision. The same facilities which exist for\nthe civilian when he votes for or against taxation for a given war,\nor in approval or disapproval of the government which undertakes it,\nexist also for the soldier who lends his active aid to it; nor is it\nunreasonable to claim for the action of the one the same responsibility\nto his own conscience which by general admission attaches to the other.\n\nIt is surely something like a degradation to the soldier that he\nshould not enjoy in this respect the same rights as the civilian; that\nhis merit alone should be tested by no higher a theory of duty than\nthat which is applied to the merit of a horse; and that his capacity\nfor blind and unreasoning obedience should be accounted his highest\nattainable virtue. The transition from the idea of military vassalage\nto that of military allegiance has surely produced a strange conception\nof honour, and one fitter for conscripts than for free men, when a\nman is held as by a vice to take part in a course of action which he\nbelieves to be wrong. Not only does no other profession enforce such an\nobligation, but in every other walk of life a man\u2019s assertion of his\nown personal responsibility is a source rather of credit to him than of\ninfamy. That in the performance of any social function a man should be\ncalled upon to make an unconditional surrender of his free will, and\nyield an obedience as thoughtless as a dummy\u2019s to superior orders,\nwould seem to be a principle of conduct pilfered from the Society of\nJesus, and utterly unworthy of the nobility of a soldier. As a matter\nof history, the priestly organisation took the military one for its\nmodel: which should lead us to suspect that the tyranny we find fault\nwith in the copy is equally present in the original, and that the\nlatter is marked by the same vices that it transmitted to the borrowed\norganisation.\n\nThe principle here contended for, that the soldier should be fully\nsatisfied in his own mind of the justice of the cause he fights for, is\nthe condition that Christian writers, from Augustine to Grotius, have\nplaced on the lawfulness of military service. The objection to it, that\nits adoption would mean the ruin of military discipline, will appear\nthe greatest argument of all in its favour when we reflect that its\nuniversal adoption would make war itself, which is the only reason for\ndiscipline, altogether impossible. Where would have been the wars of\nthe last two hundred years had it been in force? Or where the English\nwars of the last six, with their thousands of lives and their millions\nof money spent for no visible good nor glory in fighting with Afghans,\nZulus, Egyptians, and Arabs? Once restrict legitimate warfare to the\nlimits of national defence, and it is evident that the refusal of men\nto take part in a war of aggression would equally put an end to the\nnecessity of defensive exertion. If no government could rely on its\nsubjects for the purposes of aggression and injustice, it goes without\nsaying that the just cause of war would perish simultaneously. It is\ntherefore altogether to be wished that that reliance should be weakened\nand destroyed.\n\nThe reasoning, then, which contains the key that is alone capable of\nclosing permanently the portals of Janus is this: that there exists a\ndistinction between a just and an unjust war, between a good and a bad\ncause, and that no man has a right either to take part knowingly and\nwilfully in a cause he believes to be unjust, nor to commit himself\nservilely to a theory of duty which deprives him, at the very outset,\nof his inalienable human birthright of free thought and free will. This\nis the principle of personal responsibility which has long since won\nadmission everywhere save in the service of Mars, and which requires\nbut to be extended there to free the world from the custom that has\nlongest and most ruinously afflicted it. For it attacks that custom\nwhere it has never yet been seriously attacked before, at its real\nsource--namely, in the heart, the brain, and the conscience, that,\nin spite of all warping and training, still belong to the individual\nunits who alone make it possible. It behoves all of us, therefore,\nwho are interested in abolishing military barbarism, not merely to\nyield a passive assent to it ourselves, but to claim for it assent and\nassertion from others. We must ask and reask the question: What is the\ntitle by which a man, through the mere fact of his military cloth,\nclaims exemption from the moral law that is universally binding upon\nhis fellows?\n\nFor this principle of individual military responsibility is of such\npower, that if carried to its consequences, it must ultimately prove\nfatal to militarism; and if it has not yet the prescription of time\nand common opinion in its favour, it is sealed nevertheless with the\nauthority of many of the best intellects that have helped to enlighten\nthe past, and is indissolubly contained in the teaching alike of our\nreligious as of our moral code. It can, in fact, only be gainsaid by a\ndenial of the fundamental maxims of those two guides of our conduct,\nand for that reason stands absolutely proof against the assaults\nof argument. Try to reconcile with the ordinary conceptions of the\nduties of a man or a Christian the duty of doing what his conscience\ncondemns, and it may be safely predicted that you will try in vain.\nThe considerations that may occur of utility and expediency beat in\nvain against the far greater expediency of a world at peace, freed from\nthe curse of the warrior\u2019s destructiveness; nor can the whole armoury\nof military logic supply a single counter-argument which does not\nresolve itself into an argument of supposed expediency, and which may\nnot therefore be effectually parried, even on this narrower debating\nground, by the consideration of the overwhelming advantages which could\nnot but flow from the universal acceptance of the contrary and higher\nprinciple--the principle that for a soldier, as for anyone else, his\nfirst duty is to his conscience.\n\nOr, to put the conclusion in the fewest words: The soldier claims to\nbe a non-moral agent. That is the corner-stone of the whole military\nsystem. Challenge then the claimant to justify his first principle,\nand the custom of war will shake to its foundation, and in time go the\nway that other evil customs have gone before it, when once their moral\nsupport has been undermined or shattered.\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n\n[1] Halleck\u2019s _International Law_, ii. 21. Yet within three weeks of\nthe beginning of the war with France 60,000 Prussians were _hors de\ncombat_.\n\n[2] \u2018Artem illam _mortiferam et Deo odibilem_ balistrariorum et\nsagittariorum adversus Christianos et Catholicos exerceri de c\u00e6tero sub\nanathemate prohibemus.\u2019\n\n[3] Fauchet\u2019s _Origines des Chevaliers_, &c. &c., ii. 56; Grose\u2019s\n_Military Antiquities_, i. 142; and Demmin\u2019s _Encyclop\u00e9die d\u2019Armurerie_,\n57, 496.\n\n[4] Fauchet, ii. 57. \u2018Lequel engin, pour le mal qu\u2019il faisait (pire que\nle venin des serpens), fut nomm\u00e9 serpentine,\u2019 &c.\n\n[5] Grose, ii. 331.\n\n[6] Dyer, _Modern Europe_, iii. 158.\n\n[7] Scoffern\u2019s _Projectile Weapons_, &c., 66.\n\n[8] _Sur l\u2019Esprit_, i. 562.\n\n[9] Reade, _Ashantee Campaign_, 52.\n\n[10] Livy, xliv. 42.\n\n[11] These Instructions are published in Halleck\u2019s _International Law_,\nii. 36-51; and at the end of Edwards\u2019s _Germans in France_.\n\n[12] \u2018It would have been desirable,\u2019 said the Russian Government,\n\u2018that the voice of a great nation like England should have been heard\nat an inquiry of which the object would appear to have met with its\nsympathies.\u2019\n\n[13] _Jus Gentium_, art. 887, 878.\n\n[14] Florus, ii. 20.\n\n[15] Edwards\u2019s _Germans in France_, 164.\n\n[16] This remarkable fact is certified by Mr. Russell, in his _Diary in\nthe last Great War_, 398, 399.\n\n[17] Cicero, _In Verrem_, iv. 54.\n\n[18] See even the _Annual Register_, lvi. 184, for a denunciation of\nthis proceeding.\n\n[19] Sismondi\u2019s _Hist. des Fran\u00e7ais_, xxv.\n\n[20] Edwards\u2019s _Germans in France_, 171.\n\n[21] Lieut-Col. Charras, _La Campagne de 1815_, i. 211, ii. 88.\n\n[22] Woolsey\u2019s _International Law_, p. 223.\n\n[23] Cf. lib. xii. 81, and xiii. 25, 26; quoted by Grotius, iii. xi.\nxiii.\n\n[24] iii. 41.\n\n[25] _Cambridge Essays_, 1855, \u2018Limitations to Severity in War,\u2019 by C.\nBuxton.\n\n[26] See Raumer\u2019s _Geschichte Europa\u2019s_, iii. 509-603, if any doubt is\nfelt about the fact.\n\n[27] General Order of October 9, 1813. Compare those of May 29, 1809,\nMarch 25, 1810, June 10, 1812, and July 9, 1813.\n\n[28] Vattel, iii. ix. 165.\n\n[29] Sir W. Napier (_Peninsular War_, ii. 322) says of the proceeding\nthat it was \u2018politic indeed, yet scarcely to be admitted within the\npale of civilised warfare.\u2019 It occurred in May 1810.\n\n[30] Bluntschli\u2019s _Modernes V\u00f6lkerrecht_, art. 573.\n\n[31] For the character of modern war see the account of the\nFranco-German war in the _Quarterly Review_ for April 1871.\n\n[32] Halleck, ii. 22.\n\n[33] Vehse\u2019s _Austria_, i. 369. Yet, as usual on such occasions, the\nexcesses were committed in the teeth of Tilly\u2019s efforts to oppose them.\n\n\u2018Imperavit Tillius a devictorum c\u00e6dibus et corporum castimonia\nabstinerent, quod imperium a quibusdam furentibus male servatum annales\naliqui fuere conquesti.\u2019--Adlzreiter\u2019s _Annales Boic\u00e6 Gentis_, Part\niii. l. 16, c. 38.\n\n[34] _Battles in the Peninsular War_, 181, 182.\n\n[35] _Ibid._ 396.\n\n[36] Foxe\u2019s _Actes and Monuments_, iii. 52.\n\n[37] Saint-Palaye, _M\u00e9moires sur la Chevalerie_, iii. 10, 133.\n\n[38] Vinsauf\u2019s _Itinerary of Richard I._, ii. 16.\n\n[39] Matthew of Westminster, 460; Grose, ii. 348.\n\n[40] Monstrelet, ii. 115.\n\n[41] _M\u00e9moires sur la Chevalerie_, i. 322.\n\n[42] Petitot, v. 102; and M\u00e9nard, _Vie de B. du Guesclin_, 440.\n\n[43] Petitot, v. 134.\n\n[44] Meyrick, _Ancient Armour_, ii. 5.\n\n[45] i. 123.\n\n[46] Monstrelet, i. 259.\n\n[47] ii. 5.\n\n[48] ii. 11.\n\n[49] ii. 22, compare ii. 56.\n\n[50] Monstrelet, ii. 111.\n\n[51] ii. 113.\n\n[52] See for some, Livy, xxix. 8, xxxi. 26, 30, xxxvii. 21, xliii. 7,\nxliv. 29.\n\n[53] Livy, xliv. 29.\n\n[54] Meyrick, i. 41.\n\n[55] Demmin, _Encyclop\u00e9die d\u2019Armurerie_, 490.\n\n[56] Meyrick, ii. 204.\n\n[57] Grose, ii. 114.\n\n[58] Petitot, xvi. 134.\n\n[59] Grose, ii. 343.\n\n[60] iv. 27.\n\n[61] iv. 36.\n\n[62] iii. 109.\n\n[63] _M\u00e9moires_, vi. 1.\n\n[64] Halleck, _International Law_, ii. 154.\n\n[65] _Elements of Morality_, sec. 1068.\n\n[66] _Des Droits et Devoirs des Nations neutres_, ii. 321-323.\n\n[67] _History of the Royal Navy_, i. 357.\n\n[68] Nicolas, ii. 341.\n\n[69] Nicolas, ii. 405.\n\n[70] Monstrelet, i. 12.\n\n[71] Nicolas, ii. 108.\n\n[72] _Ibid._ i. 333.\n\n[73] Froissart, ii. 85.\n\n[74] Entick, _New Naval History_ (1757), 823. \u2018Some of the Spanish\nprizes were immensely rich, a great many of the French were of\nconsiderable value, and so were many of the English; but the balance\nwas about two millions in favour of the latter.\u2019\n\n[75] From Entick\u2019s _New Naval History_ (1757), 801-817.\n\n[76] Martens, _Essai sur les Corsaires_ (Horne\u2019s translation), 86, 87.\n\n[77] _Ibid._ 93.\n\n[78] III. xv. 229.\n\n[79] Emerigon, _On Insurances_ (translation), 442.\n\n[80] Martens, 19.\n\n[81] Hautfeuille, _Des Droits et Devoirs des Nations neutres_, ii. 349.\n\n[82] _De Jure Maritimo_, i. 72.\n\n[83] _Despatches_, vi. 145.\n\n[84] _Despatches_, vi. 79.\n\n[85] The last occasion was on April 13, 1875.\n\n[86] Halleck, _International Law_, ii. 316.\n\n[87] Bluntschli, _Modernes V\u00f6lkerrecht_, art. 665.\n\n[88] James, _Naval History_, i. 255.\n\n[89] James, ii. 71.\n\n[90] _Ibid._ ii. 77.\n\n[91] Ortolan, _Diplomatie de la Mer_, ii. 32.\n\n[92] Campbell\u2019s _Admirals_, viii. 40.\n\n[93] _Campbell_, vii. 21. _James_, i. 161. Stinkpots are jars or shells\ncharged with powder, grenades, &c.\n\n[94] James, i. 283.\n\n[95] Brenton, ii. 471.\n\n[96] Caltrops, or crows\u2019-feet, are bits of iron with four spikes so\narranged that however they fall one spike always remains upwards.\nDarius planted the ground with caltrops before Arbela.\n\n[97] Chapter xix. of the _Tactica_.\n\n[98] Frontinus, _Strategematicon_, IV. vii. 9, 10. \u2018Amphoras pice et\nt\u00e6da plenas; ... vascula viperis plena.\u2019\n\n[99] Roger de Wendover, _Chronica_. \u2018Calcem vivam, et in pulverem\nsubtilem redactam, in altum projicientes, vento illam ferente,\nFrancorum oculos exc\u00e6caverunt.\u2019\n\n[100] Brenton, i. 635.\n\n[101] _De Jure Maritimo_, i. 265.\n\n[102] Rees\u2019s _Cyclop\u00e6dia_, \u2018Fire-ship.\u2019\n\n[103] Brenton, ii. 493, 494.\n\n[104] Halleck, ii. 317.\n\n[105] Woolsey, _International Law_, 187.\n\n[106] James, i. 277.\n\n[107] Phillimore, _International Law_, iii. 50-52.\n\n[108] _International Law_, ii. 95.\n\n[109] Villiaum\u00e9, _L\u2019Esprit de la Guerre_, 56.\n\n[110] De Commines, viii. 8.\n\n[111] Watson\u2019s _Philip II._, ii. 74.\n\n[112] _Ibid._ i. 213.\n\n[113] _Memoirs_, c. 19.\n\n[114] Villiaum\u00e9 (_L\u2019Esprit de la Guerre_, 71) gives the following\nversion: \u2018En 1793 et en 1794, le gouvernement anglais ayant viol\u00e9 le\ndroit des gens contre la R\u00e9publique Fran\u00e7aise, la Convention, dans\nun acc\u00e8s de brutale col\u00e8re, d\u00e9cr\u00e9ta qu\u2019il ne serait plus fait aucun\nprisonnier anglais ou hanovrien, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire que les vaincus seraient\nmis \u00e0 mort, encore qu\u2019ils se rendissent. Mais ce d\u00e9cret fut simplement\ncomminatoire; le Comit\u00e9 de Salut Public, sachant tr\u00e8s-bien que de\nmis\u00e9rables soldats n\u2019\u00e9taient point coupables, donna l\u2019ordre secret de\nfaire gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 tous les vaincus.\u2019\n\n[115] Herodotus, vii. 136.\n\n[116] Livy, xlv. 42.\n\n[117] _Ibid._ xlv. 43.\n\n[118] Ward, _Law of Nations_, i. 250.\n\n[119] Petitot\u2019s _M\u00e9moires_, xvi. 177.\n\n[120] Livy, xlii. 8, 9.\n\n[121] Monstrelet, _Chronicles_, i. 200.\n\n[122] _Ibid._ i. 224.\n\n[123] _Ibid._ i. 249.\n\n[124] _Ibid._ i. 259.\n\n[125] Monstrelet, ii. 156.\n\n[126] _Ibid._ 120.\n\n[127] Philip de Commines, ii. 1.\n\n[128] _Ibid._ ii. 2.\n\n[129] _Ibid._ ii. 14.\n\n[130] Philip de Commines, iii. 9.\n\n[131] Motley\u2019s _United Netherlands_, iii. 323.\n\n[132] Vattel, iii. 8, 143.\n\n[133] Borbstaedt, _Franco-German War_ (translation), 662.\n\n[134] Ward, i. 223.\n\n[135] Quintus Curtius, iv. 6, and Grote, viii. 368.\n\n[136] Quintus Curtius, vii. 11.\n\n[137] _Ibid._ iv. 15.\n\n[138] Arrian, iii. 18.\n\n[139] Quintus Curtius, vii. 5.\n\n[140] \u2018Tous deux furent tr\u00e8s braves, tr\u00e8s vaillants, fort bizarres et\ncruels.\u2019\n\n[141] Lyttleton, _Henry II._, i. 183.\n\n[142] Hoveden, 697.\n\n[143] 2 Samuel xii. 31.\n\n[144] _Memoirs of a Cavalier_, i. 47.\n\n[145] _Memoirs of a Cavalier_, 49.\n\n[146] \u2018Life of Bayard\u2019 in Petitot\u2019s _M\u00e9moires_, xvi. 9.\n\n[147] Major-General Mitchell\u2019s _Biographies of Eminent Soldiers_, 92.\n\n[148] Livy, xxxi. 40. When Pelium was taken by storm, only the slaves\nwere taken as spoil; the freemen were even let off without ransom.\n\n[149] _Ibid._ xxviii. 3.\n\n[150] _Ibid._ xxviii. 20, xxvii. 16, xxxi. 27.\n\n[151] _De Officiis_, i. 12. Yet on this passage is founded the common\nassertion that among the Romans \u2018the word which signified stranger was\nthe same with that which in its original denoted an enemy\u2019 (Ward, ii.\n174); implying that in their eyes a stranger and an enemy were one and\nthe same thing. Cicero says exactly the reverse.\n\n[152] _Recueil de Documents sur les exactions, vols, et cruaut\u00e9s des\narm\u00e9es prussiennes en France._ The book is out of print, but may be\nseen at the British Museum, under the title, \u2018Prussia--Army of.\u2019 It is\nto be regretted that, whilst every book, however dull, relating to that\nwar has been translated into English, this record has hitherto escaped\nthe publicity it so well deserves.\n\n[153] _Ibid._ 19.\n\n[154] _Ibid._ 8.\n\n[155] _Ibid._ 13.\n\n[156] Chaudordy\u2019s Circular of November 29, 1870, in the _Recueil_.\n\n[157] _Recueil_, 12, 15, 67, 119.\n\n[158] _Ibid._ 56.\n\n[159] _Ibid._ 54.\n\n[160] _Recueil_, 33-37, and Lady Bloomfield\u2019s _Reminiscences_, ii. 235,\n8, 9.\n\n[161] The _Times_, March 7, 1881.\n\n[162] _Recueil_, 29; compare 91.\n\n[163] Morley\u2019s _Cobden_, ii. 177.\n\n[164] Professor Sheldon Amos quotes the fact, but refrains from naming\nthe paper, in his preface to Manning\u2019s _Commentaries on the Law of\nNations_, xl. Was it not the _Journal de France_ for Nov. 21, 1871?\n\n[165] iii. i. viii. 4.\n\n[166] _De Officiis_, i. 13.\n\n[167] _Modernes V\u00f6lkerrecht_, Art. 565.\n\n[168] Poly\u00e6nus, _Strategematum libri octo_, i. 34.\n\n[169] Poly\u00e6nus, v. 41.\n\n[170] Ortolan\u2019s _Diplomatie de la mer_, ii. 31, 375-7.\n\n[171] James\u2019s _Naval History_, ii. 211; Campbell\u2019s _Admirals_, vii. 132.\n\n[172] James, _Naval History_, ii. 225.\n\n[173] Nicolas, _Royal Navy_, ii. 27.\n\n[174] Hautefeuille, _Droit Maritime_, iii. 433. \u2018Les vaisseaux de\nl\u2019Etat eux-m\u00eames ne rougissent pas de ces grossiers mensonges qui\nprennent le nom de ruses de guerre.\u2019\n\n[175] xiii. 1.\n\n[176] Montaigne, ch. v.\n\n[177] vii. 4. \u2018Quia appellatione nostra vix apte exprimi possunt, Gr\u00e6ca\npronuntiatione Stratagemata dicuntur.\u2019\n\n[178] Livy, xlii. 47.\n\n[179] _Histoire de la France_, iii. 401.\n\n[180] The word musket is from _muschetto_, a kind of hawk, implying\nthat its attack was equally destructive and unforeseen.\n\n[181] Poly\u00e6nus, ii. 19.\n\n[182] Poly\u00e6nus, iii. 2; from Thucydides, iii. 34.\n\n[183] _Ibid._ vii. 27, 2.\n\n[184] _Ibid._ iv. 2-4.\n\n[185] Liskenne, _Biblioth\u00e8que Historique et Militaire_, iii. 845.\n\n[186] _Memoirs_, ch. xix.\n\n[187] ix. 6, 3.\n\n[188] vi. 22.\n\n[189] vi. 15.\n\n[190] iv. 7, 17.\n\n[191] E. Fournier, _L\u2019Esprit dans l\u2019Histoire_, 145-150.\n\n[192] iii. 10.\n\n[193] Liskenne, v. 233-4.\n\n[194] _Soldier\u2019s Pocket-Book_, 81.\n\n[195] Poly\u00e6nus, viii. 16, 8. \u2018Lege Romanorum jubente hostium\nexploratores interficere.\u2019\n\n[196] Livy, xxx. 29. According to Poly\u00e6nus, he gave them a dinner and\nsent them back with instructions to tell what they had seen; viii. 16,\n8.\n\n[197] Watson\u2019s _Philip II._ iii. 311.\n\n[198] Liskenne, iii. 840.\n\n[199] Hoffman, _Kriegslist_, 15.\n\n[200] Petitot\u2019s _M\u00e9moires de la France_, xv. 317.\n\n[201] Poly\u00e6nus, ii. 27.\n\n[202] _Ibid._ v. 1, 4.\n\n[203] _Memoirs_, ch. xix.\n\n[204] Livy, xxxiv. 17.\n\n[205] As at the Brussels Conference, 1874, when such a proposal was\nmade by the member for Sweden and Norway.\n\n[206] In Pinkerton, xvi. 817.\n\n[207] Turner\u2019s _Nineteen Years in Samoa_, 304.\n\n[208] Schoolcraft\u2019s _Indian Tribes_, iv. 52.\n\n[209] _The Basutos_, 223.\n\n[210] Potter\u2019s _Grecian Antiquities_, ii. 69.\n\n[211] Turner\u2019s _Samoa_, 298.\n\n[212] Ellis\u2019s _Polynesian Researches_, i. 275.\n\n[213] Hutton\u2019s _Voyage to Africa_, 1821, 337.\n\n[214] Colenso and Durnford\u2019s _Zulu War_, 364, 379.\n\n[215] Petitot\u2019s _M\u00e9moires_, xv. 329.\n\n[216] The evidence is collected in _Cetschwayo\u2019s Dutchman_, 99-103.\n\n[217] Henty\u2019s _March to Coomassie_, 443. Compare Reade\u2019s _Ashantee\nCampaign_, 241-2.\n\n[218] Florus, ii. 19; iii. 4; Velleius Paterculus, ii. 1.\n\n[219] Florus, ii. 20.\n\n[220] _Ibid._ iii. 7.\n\n[221] Florus, iii. 4; C\u00e6sar, _De Bello Gallico_, ix. 44.\n\n[222] Morley\u2019s _Cobden_, ii. 355.\n\n[223] Sir A. Helps\u2019 _Las Casas_, 29.\n\n[224] T. Morton\u2019s _New England Canaan_, 1637, iii.\n\n[225] Belknap\u2019s _New Hampshire_, i. 262.\n\n[226] Penhallow\u2019s _Indian Wars_, 1826, republished 1859, 31-3.\n\n[227] _Ibid._ 105, 6.\n\n[228] _Ibid._ 103. For further details of this debased military\npractice, see Adair\u2019s _History of American Indians_, 245; Kercheval\u2019s\n_History of the Valley of Virginia_, 263; Drake\u2019s _Biography and\nHistory of the Indians_, 210, 373; Sullivan\u2019s _History of Maine_, 251.\n\n[229] Kercheval\u2019s _Virginia_, 113.\n\n[230] Eschwege\u2019s _Brazil_, i. 186; Tschudi\u2019s _Reisen durch S\u00fcdamerika_,\ni. 262.\n\n[231] Parkman\u2019s _Expedition against Ohio Indians_, 1764, 117.\n\n[232] Argensola, _Les Isles Molucques_, i. 60.\n\n[233] Drake\u2019s _Biography and History of the Indians_, 489, 490.\n\n[234] R. C. Burton\u2019s _City of the Saints_, 576; Eyre\u2019s _Central\nAustralia_, i. 175-9.\n\n[235] Borwick\u2019s _Last of the Tasmanians_, 58.\n\n[236] Tschudi\u2019s _Reisen_, ii. 262.\n\n[237] Maccoy\u2019s _Baptist Indian Missions_, 441; Froebel\u2019s _Seven Years\nin Central America_, 272; Wallace\u2019s _Travels on the Amazon_, 326.\n\n[238] Bancroft\u2019s _United States_, ii. 383-5; and compare Clarkson\u2019s\n_Life of Penn_, chaps. 45 and 46.\n\n[239] Brooke\u2019s _Ten Years in Sarawak_, i. 74.\n\n[240] Captain Hamilton\u2019s _East Indies_, in Pinkerton, viii. 514.\n\n[241] W. H. Russell\u2019s _My Diary in India_, 150.\n\n[242] _Annals of the Propagation of the Faith_, viii. 280-6.\n\n[243] _Caffres and Caffre Missions_, 210.\n\n[244] _Memorials of Henrietta Robertson_, 259, 308, 353.\n\n[245] _Ibid._ 353.\n\n[246] Colenso and Durnford\u2019s _Zulu War_, 215.\n\n[247] Holden\u2019s _History of Natal_, 210, 211.\n\n[248] Moister\u2019s _Africa, Past and Present_, 310, 311.\n\n[249] Tams\u2019s _Visit to Portuguese Possessions_, i. 181, ii. 28, 179.\n\n[250] Robertson\u2019s _America_; Works, vi. 177, 205.\n\n[251] Thomson\u2019s _Great Missionaries_, 30; Halkett\u2019s _Indians of North\nAmerica_, 247, 249, 256.\n\n[252] Le Blant, _Inscriptions Chr\u00e9tiennes_, i. 86.\n\n[253] Bingham, _Christian Antiquities_, i. 486.\n\n[254] C\u00e6sar, _De Bello Gallico_, vi. 14. \u2018Druides a bello abesse\nconsuerunt ... militi\u00e6 vacationem habent;\u2019 and Origen, _In Celsum_,\nviii. 73, for the Romans.\n\n[255] Vaughan\u2019s _Life of Wycliffe_, ii. 212-3.\n\n[256] Turner\u2019s _England_, iv. 458, from Duchesne, _Gesta Stephani_.\n\n[257] \u2018Non filius meus est vel ecclesi\u00e6; ad regis autem voluntatem\nredimetur, quia potius Martis quam Christi miles judicatur.\u2019\n\n[258] Turner\u2019s _England_, v. 92.\n\n[259] \u2018Sanxit ut nullus in posterum sacerdos in hostem pergeret,\nnisi duo vel tres episcopi electione c\u00e6terorum propter benedictionem\npopulique reconciliationem, et cum illis electi sacerdotes qui bene\nscirent populis p\u0153nitentias dare, missas celebrare, etc.\u2019 (in _Du\nCange_, \u2018Hostis\u2019).\n\n[260] Guicciardini. \u2018Prometteva che se i soldati procedevano\nvirilmente, che non accetterebbe la Mirandola con alcuno patto: ma\nlascierebbe in potest\u00e0 loro il saccheggiarla.\u2019\n\n[261] Monstrelet, i. 9.\n\n[262] Crichton\u2019s _Scandinavia_, i. 170.\n\n[263] _M\u00e9moires du Fleurange._ Petitot, xvi. 253.\n\n[264] See Palmer, _Origines Liturgic\u00e6_, ii. 362-65, for the form of\nservice.\n\n[265] _Petitot_, xvi. 229.\n\n[266] _Ibid._ 135.\n\n[267] Petitot, viii. 55. \u2018Feciono venire per tutto il campo un prete\nparato col corpo di Christo, e in luogo di communicarsi ciascuno prese\nuno poco di terra, e la si mise in boca.\u2019\n\n[268] Livy, xxxvi. 2.\n\n[269] Robertson, _Charles V._, note 21. Ryan, _History of Effects of\nReligion on Mankind_, 124.\n\n[270] M. J, Schmidt, _Histoire des Allemands traduite, etc._, iv. 232,\n3.\n\n[271] \u2018Christianis licet ex mandato magistratus arma portare et _justa_\nbella administrare.\u2019\n\n[272] _Policy of War a True Defence of Peace_, 1543.\n\n[273] _Pallas Armata_, 369, 1683.\n\n[274] In his treatise _Du droit de la guerre_.\n\n[275] _L\u2019Esprit_, i. 562.\n\n[276] _Strafgesetzbuch_, Jan. 20, 1872, 15, 75, 150.\n\n[277] Fleming\u2019s _Volkommene Teutsche Soldat_, 96.\n\n[278] Benet\u2019s _United States Articles of War_, 391.\n\n[279] Grose, ii. 199.\n\n[280] See Turner\u2019s _Pallas Armata_, 349, for these and similar military\ntortures.\n\n[281] Crichton\u2019s _Scandinavia_, i. 168.\n\n[282] Grose, ii. 6.\n\n[283] Sir S. Scott\u2019s _History of the British Army_, ii. 436.\n\n[284] ii. 16. \u2018Omnes autem signarii vel signiferi quamvis pedites\nloricas minores accipiebant, et _galeas ad terrorem hostium ursinis\npellibus tectas_.\u2019\n\n[285] Scott, ii. 9.\n\n[286] Scott, i. 311.\n\n[287] Said to have been invented about 400 B.C. by Dionysius, tyrant of\nSyracuse.\n\n[288] Mitchell\u2019s _Biographies of Eminent Soldiers_, 208, 287.\n\n[289] Compare article 14 of the German _Strafgesetzbuch_ of January 20,\n1872.\n\n[290] _Nineteenth Century_, November 1882: \u2018The Present State of the\nArmy.\u2019\n\n[291] _De Re Militari_, vi. 5.\n\n[292] Bruce\u2019s _Military Law_ (1717), 254.\n\n[293] See Fleming\u2019s _Teutsche Soldat_, ch. 29.\n\n[294] See the War Articles for 1673, 1749, 1794.\n\n[295] 82.\n\n[296] Quintus Curtius, viii. 2.\n\n[297] _Military Law_, 163.\n\n[298] 286, 290.\n\n[299] _Despatches_, iii. 302, June 17, 1809.\n\n[300] Compare also _Despatches_, iv. 457; v. 583, 704, 5.\n\n[301] _China War_, 225.\n\n[302] Scott\u2019s _British Army_, ii. 411.\n\n[303] _Wellington\u2019s Despatches_, v. 705.\n\n[304] See Windham\u2019s Speech in the House of Commons. April 3, 1806.\n\n[305] _Ibid._\n\n[306] P. 122.\n\n[307] Fleming, 109.\n\n[308] Preface to b. iii. \u2018Ergo qui desiderat pacem, pr\u00e6paret bellum.\u2019\n\n[309] Lord Wolseley\u2019s _Soldier\u2019s Pocket Book_, 5.\n\n[310] Arbousset\u2019s _Exploratory Tour_, 397-9.\n\n[311] Livy, xl. 6.\n\n[312] _Iliad_, vi. 266-8; and comp. _\u00c6neid_, ii. 717-20.\n\n[313] Casalis\u2019s _Basutos_, 258.\n\n[314] Victor Hugo\u2019s _L\u2019Ane_, 124.\n\n[315] Baillat\u2019s _Vie de Descartes_, i. 41.\n\n[316] ii. 25, 9, 1. \u2018Tanto carnifice detestabiliores quanto pejus est\nsine caus\u00e2 quam ex caus\u00e2 occidere.\u2019\n\n[317] _Ibid._ 2. \u2018Nullum vit\u00e6 genus est improbius quam eorum qui sine\ncaus\u00e6 respectu mercede conducti militant, et quibus ibi fas ubi plurima\nmerces.\u2019 Both the sentiment and the expression are borrowed from\nLucan\u2019s _Pharsalia_, x. 408: \u2018Nulla fides pietasque viris qui castra\nsequuntur Venalesque manus; ibi fas ubi plurima merces.\u2019\n\n[318] 364.\n\n[319] Potter\u2019s _Greek Antiquities_, ii. 9.\n\n[320] Henry\u2019s _Britain_, iii. 5, 1; Grose i. 56.\n\n[321] Grose, i. 58.\n\n[322] _Ibid._, i. 67.\n\n[323] _Parliamentary Debates_, May 24, 1756.\n\n[324] Sir S. Scott\u2019s _British Army_, ii. 333.\n\n[325] N. Bacon\u2019s Notes to _Selden\u2019s Laws_, ii. 60.\n\n[326] _Candide_, c. xx.\n\n[327] Alison\u2019s _Europe_, vi. 491.\n\n[328] _Life of Sir C. Napier_, i. 77.\n\n[329] _Military Law_, 17.\n\n[330] _Keppel\u2019s Life_, by T. Keppel, ii. 1.\n\n[331] _Indian Expedition_, ix.\n\n[332] Livy, 39, 3; 42, 21; 43, 5.\n\n[333] Livy, xlv. 22. \u2018Certe quidem vos estis Romani, qui ideo felicia\nbella vestra esse, quia justa sint, pr\u00e6 vobis fertis, nec tam exitu\neorum, quod vincatis, quam principiis quod non sine caus\u00e2 suscipiatis,\ngloriamini.\u2019\n\n[334] _De Civitate Dei_, iv. 4 and 6.\n\n[335] _Arbre des Batailles_, quoted in Kennedy\u2019s _Influence of\nChristianity on International Law_.\n\n[336] Petitot, xvi. 137.\n\n[337] III. 65. \u2018Cavendo ne metuant, homines metuendos ultro se\nefficiunt, et injuriam ab nobis repulsam, tamquam aut facere aut pati\nnecesse sit, injungimus aliis.\u2019\n\n\n\n\nINDEX.\n\n\n Ach\u00e6an, curious mode of warfare, 131\n\n Alexander II. of Russia, 3, 10\n\n Armed neutrality, the, 86\n\n Armour, 55, 224\n\n Ashantee battle song, 86\n\n\n Balloonists in war, 148\n\n Battles, allusions to:\n   Agincourt, 201, 262\n   Bouvines, 194\n   Camperdown, 80\n   Crecy, 9, 54\n   Dover, 84\n   Musselborough, 56\n   Navarette, 59\n   Neerwinden, 6\n   Nicopoli, 56\n   Nile, 81\n   Otterbourne, 196\n   Pavia, 141\n   Poitiers, 207\n   Tel-el-Kebir, 253\n\n Bearskin hats, 223, 224\n\n Becon, Thomas, on military service in the sixteenth century, 208\n\n Bishops in war, 35, 52-3, 193-8, 261\n\n Blinding of prisoners, 42-3\n\n Blockade, effective, 92\n\n Bloodhounds used in war, 171-2\n\n Bombardment, theory and practice of, 12, 15, 17, 106, 116\n\n Bounties for scalps, 156\n\n Brigand, meaning of, 57\n\n Britons, love for military life, 156\n\n Brussels Conference on laws of war, 10, 94, 95, 105, 123, 130,\n    141-6-7-8, 158\n\n Bullinger, limits to right of military service, 208, 263\n\n\n Cannons, 5\n\n Cannon-shot oath, 130\n\n Capitulations, 100-1\n\n Chain-shot, 6\n\n Chivalry, age of, 32\n\n Church, influence of, on war, 52, 185-193, 204-16, 252\n\n Churches, destruction of, 48\n\n Church parade, 219\n\n Cities, fate of, in war:\n   Amiens, surprise of, 148\n   Badajoz, storming of, 27\n   Barcelona, siege of, 138\n   Brescia, storming of, 103\n   Calais, siege of, 44\n   Constantine, storming of, 27\n   Copenhagen, bombardment of, 15, 268\n   Dinant, storming of, 102\n   Gaza, storming of, 107\n   Grammont, massacre at, 35\n   Gravelines, massacre at, 36\n   Haarlem, siege of, 97\n   Li\u00e8ge, storming of, 102\n   Limoges, massacre at, 37\n   Londonderry, siege of, 197-8\n   Magdeburg, massacre at, 27, 112\n   Malta, siege of, 97\n   Meaux, surrender of, 45, 101\n   Mirandola, siege of, 197\n   Oudenarde, siege of, 47\n   Pekin, English at, 237\n   Persepolis, burning of, 108\n   Poitiers, massacre at, 34\n   Rome, sack of, 103\n   Rouen, surrender of, 47, 101\n   San Sebastian, storming of, 28\n   Strasburg, bombardment of 15, 17, 106\n   Terouanne, destruction of, 137\n   Thebes, sack of, 103\n   Toledo, siege of, 42\n   Tyre, siege of, 108\n   Ulm, surprise of, 149\n   Washington, English in, 16\n\n Conference stratagem, 136\n\n Conscription, the, 242-8\n\n Consecration of banners, 201\n\n Contraband, 88\n\n Contributions, military, 20, 118\n\n Costume, military, 222-3\n\n Crossbow, 4, 133\n\n Cruelty and courage, 110\n\n Custom of war, character of, 186, 210\n\n\n Decimation, story of, 222\n\n Declaration of Paris, 73, 78, 86-9\n\n Declaration of St. Petersburg, 2, 3, 81\n\n Declaration of war, 19, 198\n\n Desertion, 230-1\n\n Discipline, 7, 218, 234, 236\n\n Dress, philosophy of military, 229\n\n Duty, 74, 121, 264\n\n\n Embargoes, 89\n\n Explosive bullets, 1-2, 81\n\n\n False flag, stratagem of the, 128-130\n\n False information in war, 152\n\n Fecials, Roman, 271\n\n Firearms, feeling against, 5, 226\n\n Fireships, 84-5\n\n Flogging, 234-5\n\n Forged despatches, 151\n\n Free Companies, 60, 260\n\n Free ships, free goods, 87\n\n Fruit-trees, 16, 17, 47, 161\n\n\n Germans, the, in war, 40, 106, 115-9\n\n Greek fire, 83-4\n\n Grenadiers, 223\n\n\n Hanging in war, 44-7\n\n Honour, variable notions of, 155-6, 267\n\n Hostages, taking of, revived, 117\n\n\n Innocent III., 206\n\n Invention of the bayonet, 6\n\n\n Jomini, Baron, President of Brussels Conference, 95\n\n Julius II., story of, 196\n\n Jus Angari\u00e6, 90\n\n Justice in war, 208, 258-9, 271, 273-80\n\n\n Khonds, theory of war, 203\n\n Kidnapping soldiers in Germany, 241\n\n Kissing the earth, custom of, 201\n\n\n Lateran Council, Third, 4\n\n Laws of war among savages, 159\n\n Lent, observation of, in war, 51, 205\n\n Leo the Great, 204\n\n Letters of marque, 74, 78\n\n Letters, military contempt for, 156\n\n Limoges, Council of, 203\n\n Loha Pennu, an Indian war-god, 203\n\n\n Macedonian warfare, 133\n\n Magic, use of, in war, 199\n\n Malingering, 231-4\n\n Marriage, restrictions on, 218-9\n\n Mercenary service, 260-3\n\n Military cant, 21, 105-6, 118, 163\n\n -- vandalism, 16, 48, 163, 237\n\n Missionaries, 176-182\n\n -- failure of, 177\n\n -- legal control of, 181\n\n Missionaries, Norwegian, in Zululand, 179\n\n Mission stations destroyed, 180\n\n Mozley, Canon, on war, 212\n\n Musket, 5, 133\n\n Mutiny Act, first, 265\n\n\n Names of weapons, 200\n\n Neutral ships and property, 86\n\n Night attacks, 133\n\n Numbers slain in war, 8-10\n\n\n Oath, military, 264-5\n\n Oath by cannon-shot, 130\n\n Ophthalmia, artificial, 233\n\n\n Palatinate, devastation of the, 17, 267\n\n Pay, soldiers\u2019, 239, 261\n\n Perfidy, cases of, 135\n\n Perjury, cases of, 139\n\n Perpetual peace, Von Moltke on, 119\n\n Piracy, 67-70, 255\n\n Plunder of property at sea, 67-70\n\n Plunder of property on land, 61-3, 66, 118\n\n Poison, use of, in war, 13, 14, 172-3\n\n Poisoning the air, 49\n\n Poisoning water, 14, 29\n\n Press, influence of, in war, 112, 177, 182, 253\n\n Prisoners, treatment of, 17, 18, 40, 85, 99, 113\n\n Prisoners, beheaded, 97, 106\n\n -- blinded, 43\n\n -- burnt, 103, 111\n\n -- drowned, 101-2-6\n\n -- hung, 46, 101-3\n\n -- maimed, 43, 103\n\n -- massacred, 41, 111\n\n -- tortured, 194\n\n Privateering, 70-9\n\n -- Lord Nelson on, 77\n\n Prizes and prize-money, 70\n\n Prize Court, 76\n\n Punishments, military, 221-6\n\n Purificatory battle rites, 250\n\n Pursers on privateers, 76\n\n\n Recruiting, difficulty of, 240\n\n -- former system of, in France and Germany, 241\n\n Red, the military colour, 223\n\n Red-hot shot, 5, 83\n\n Reprisals, 93-118\n\n -- savage German, 117-8\n\n Right of search, 88\n\n Right of wreck, 89\n\n Roman warfare, 114, 132, 271-2\n\n\n Sacred buildings in war, 16, 48-9\n\n Sea battles, 80, 83\n\n Scalping enemies, 170\n\n Sentry-go, 229\n\n Slavery, influence of its cessation on war, 112\n\n Socialism, chief cause of, 245-8\n\n Soldiers of mark:\n   Alaric, 204\n   Alexander the Great, 107-10, 133\n   Barbarossa, 100\n   Bayard, 6, 57, 149, 151, 165, 201, 226, 273\n   Bertrand du Guesclin, 40-1, 44\n   Black Prince, the, 37, 59\n   Bl\u00fccher, 16, 17\n   C\u00e6sar, 98, 156, 169, 272\n   Catinat, 145\n   Chandos, Sir John, 55\n   Charles of Anjou, 100\n   Charles the Bold, 111\n   Charles XII. of Sweden, 133, 226\n   Crillon, 22, 73, 243\n   Custine, 145\n   David, king of the Jews, 111, 251\n   David I. of Scotland, 111\n   Des Adretz, 111\n   Edward I., 106\n   Edward III., 44\n   Eugene, Prince, 149\n   Feuqui\u00e8res, 97, 138, 149\n   Francis I., 140\n   Francis de Vere, 104\n   Frederick the Great, 16, 142\n   Genseric, 205\n   Godfrey de Bouillon, 100\n   Gustavus Adolphus, 19-20, 22, 221\n   Henri Quatre, 30\n   Henry V., 101\n   Keppel, Admiral, 270\n   Manny, Sir Walter, 44, 57\n   Maurice, Prince, 150\n   Montluc, 107, 121, 133, 137, 145, 156\n   Moltke, 119\n   Orange, Prince of, 152\n   Parma, Prince of, 146\n   P\u00e9lissier, 165\n   Peterborough, Lord, 138\n   Pyrrhus, 157\n   Richard I., 111, 195\n   Saxe, Marshal, 226\n   Scipio, 146\n   Sertorius, 143, 145\n   Sully, 30\n   Suwarrow, 238\n   Wellington, Duke of, 20, 236\n   Wolseley, Lord, 143-4, 151, 244\n   Xerxes, 47, 99, 146\n\n Spaniards in war, 40, 42, 97, 167-9, 200\n\n Spies, 141-8\n   Vattel on, 141\n   Frederick the Great on, 142\n   Lord Wolseley on, 143-4\n\n Storming cities, 27, 238\n\n Surprises, 148-9\n\n Surrender at discretion, 45, 100, 123\n\n\n Ternate, island of, 131\n\n Torpedoes, first use of, 5\n\n -- introduced into European warfare, 85\n\n Treatise on Tactics by Leo VI., 83\n\n Truce of God, 205\n\n\n War, real character of, 27, 186, 210\n\n Wars, abolition of private, 205, 227\n\n Weapons, 50\n\n Women, imprisoned in war, 38\n\n Women and children, slaughter of, 23, 33-8, 117\n\n Women as soldiers, 242\n\n Writers, &c.:\n   Arrian, 109\n   Bluntschli, 127\n   Bynkershoeck, 14, 127\n   Cicero, 114, 126\n   Descartes, 254\n   Dobritzhoffer, 160\n   Emerigon, 73\n   Erasmus, 186, 244\n   Froissart, 23\n   Frontinus, 134\n   Grotius, 14, 17, 23, 126, 187, 256, 258, 273\n   Hallam, 32, 50\n   Hautefeuille, 67\n   Kant, 23, 30\n   Las Casas, 167\n   Molloy, 77\n   Origen, 190\n   Palmerston, Lord, 227\n   Penn, 173\n   Poly\u00e6nus, 135\n   Quintus Curtius, 109\n   St. Pierre, Abb\u00e9, 30\n   Sepulveda, 167\n   Tertullian, 189\n   Turner, Sir James, 259\n   Valin, 73\n   Vattel, 14, 18, 21, 73, 104-5, 139, 141, 266\n   Vauban, 15\n   Victor Hugo, 252\n   Voltaire, 210, 267-8\n   Whewell, 67\n   Wycliffe, 193\n   Zwingli, 263\n\n\n_Spottiswoode & Co., Printers, New-street Square, London._\n\n\n\n\n    Transcriber's notes:\n\n    The following is a list of changes made to the original.\n    The first line is the original line, the second the corrected one.\n\n    Page 11, footnote:\n\n    like England should have been heard an inquiry of which\n    like England should have been heard at an inquiry of which\n\n    Page 78:\n\n    which abolished privateering beween the signatory Powers,\n    which abolished privateering between the signatory Powers,\n\n    Page 244:\n\n    such an expositon as the following of the relation between\n    such an exposition as the following of the relation between","title":"Military Manners and Customs","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":80953}