{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_44929/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_44929","id":"gutenberg_44929","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44929","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Ethics"],"text":"THE BASIS OF MORALITY\n\nBY\n\nARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER\n\n_Translated with Introduction and Notes by_\n\nARTHUR BRODRICK BULLOCK, MA.\n\nTRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE\n\nLONDON\n\nSWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIMITED\n\nPATERNOSTER SQUARE\n\n1903\n\n\nPRIZE ESSAY\n\nON\n\nTHE BASIS OF MORALITY\n\nNOT APPROVED\n\nBY\n\nTHE DANISH ROYAL SOCIETY OF SCIENCES\n\nCOPENHAGEN, 30 _January_, 1840.\n\n\"To preach Morality is easy, to found it difficult.--\"\n\n(SCHOPENHAUER: _Ueber den Willen in der Natur_; p. 128)\n\n\nMATRI CARISSIMAE.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR'S PREFACE\n\nTRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION\n\nTHE QUESTION\n\nPART I.\n\n_INTRODUCTION._\n\n     I.  THE PROBLEM\n    II.  GENERAL RETROSPECT\n\nPART II.\n\n_CRITIQUE OF KANT'S BASIS OF ETHICS._\n\n     I.  PRELIMINARY REMARKS\n    II.  ON THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS\n   III.  ON THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES IN PARTICULAR\n    IV.  ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.\n  NOTE.\n     V.  ON THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS\n    VI.  ON THE DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS\n   VII.  KANT'S DOCTRINE OF CONSCIENCE\n  VIII.  KANT'S DOCTRINE OP THE INTELLIGIBLE AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER,\n         THEORY OF FREEDOM\n  NOTE\n    IX.  FICHTE'S ETHICS AS A MAGNIFYING GLASS FOR THE ERRORS OF THE KANTIAN\n\nPART III.\n\n_THE FOUNDING OF ETHICS._\n\n     I.  CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM\n    II.  SCEPTICAL VIEW\n   III.  ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES\n    IV.  CRITERION OF ACTIONS OF MORAL WORTH\n     V.  STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE\n    VI.  THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE\n   VII.  THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS\n  VIII.  THE PROOF NOW GIVEN CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE\n    IX.  ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER.\n\nPART IV.\n\n_ON THE METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PRIMAL ETHICAL PHAENOMENON._\n\n     I.  HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD\n    II.  THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK\n\nJUDICIUM REGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.\n\n\nThis translation was undertaken in the belief that there are many\nEnglish-speaking people who feel more than a merely superficial\ninterest in ethical research, but who may not read German with\nsufficient ease to make them care to take up the original. The\npresent Essay is one of the most important contributions to Ethics\nsince the time of Kant, and, as such, is indispensable to a thorough\nknowledge of the subject. Moreover, from whatever point of view it be\nregarded,--whether the reader find, when he closes the book, that his\nconviction harmonises with the conclusion reached, or not; it would\nbe difficult to find any treatise on Moral Science more calculated\nto stimulate thought, and lift it out of infantile imitation of some\nprescribed pattern. The believer in the Kantian, or any other, basis of\nEthics, could hardly measure the strength or the weakness of his own\nposition more surely than by comparing it with the Schopenhauerian;\nwhile he who is yet in search of a foundation will find much in the\nfollowing pages to claim his attention.\n\nThose acquainted with the luminous imagery, the subtle irony, the\nbrusque and penetrating vigour of the German, will doubtless admit that\nit is no easy task to reduce Schopenhauer to adequate English prose;\nand if this has been attempted by the present writer, no one can be\nmore conscious than he of the manifold shortcomings discoverable. But\nsuch as it is, the work is heartily offered to all who still follow the\ntrue student's rule, \"Gladig wolde he lerne und gladig teche,\" with\nthe single hope that it may help, however slightly, to widen their\nknowledge, and ripen their judgment.\n\nMy friend, R. E. Candy, Esq., I.C.S., has kindly given me information\nconcerning several Indian names.\n\nROME: _June_, 1902.\n\n\n\n\nTRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION.\n\n\n \u1f4b\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03b8\u03b5\u03bf\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f41 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03c9\u03bc\u03b5\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f30\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd1.\n                                 --Theognis: 169.\n\n\nIn 1837 the Danish Royal Society of Sciences propounded, as subject\nfor a prize competition, the question with which this treatise opens;\nand Schopenhauer, who was glad to seize the opportunity of becoming\nbetter known, prepared, and sent to Copenhagen, the earliest form of\n\"The Basis of Morality.\" In January, 1840, the work was pronounced\nunsuccessful, though there was no other candidate. In September of the\nsame year it was published by the author, with only a few unimportant\nadditions, but preceded by a long introduction, which, cast in the form\nof an exceedingly caustic philippic, is, in its way, a masterpiece. In\n1860, (only a month before Schopenhauer's death,) the second edition\nwas printed with many enlargements and insertions, the short preface,\ndated August being one of the last things he wrote.[1]\n\nThe reason why the prize was withheld is not far to seek, and need not\ndetain us. At that time the philosophical atmosphere was saturated with\nHegel, and, to a certain extent, with Fichte; hence it is easy to\nimagine with what ruffled, not to say, scandalised feelings the Academy\nmust have risen from its perusal of the work. Moreover, putting Hegel\nand Fichte out of the question, the position advanced was in 1840 so\nnew, indeed so paradoxical (as Schopenhauer himself admits); there is\nat times such an aggressiveness in the style; the whole essay is so\nmuch more calculated to startle than to conciliate; that we cannot feel\nmuch surprise at the official decision.\n\nIn the Judgment published by the Society three reasons are given for\nits unfavourable attitude. The second is declared to be not only\ndissatisfaction with the mode of discussion (_ipsa disserendi forma_),\nbut also inability to see that Schopenhauer proves his case. As the\nthird is alleged the \"unseemly\" language employed in connection with\ncertain \"_summi philosophi_\" (Hegel and Fichte). These two objections\nare of course in themselves perfectly legitimate, and how far the\nAcademy was right or wrong may be left for the reader to determine.\n\nBut the first reason stated is of a different kind, and affords as neat\nan instance of self-stultification proceeding _ex cathedra_ as can well\nbe found. It is true that the question is worded vaguely enough, but\nif it means anything, it asks where the \"_philosophiae moralis fons\net fundamentum_\"--the foundation of moral science--is to be sought\nfor, _i.e._, where it is to be found. Turning to the Judgment we read:\n\"He\" (Schopenhauer) \"has omitted to deal with the essential part of\nthe question, apparently thinking that he was required to establish\nsome fundamental principle of Ethics\": which he was required to do,\nunless the Society's Latin is borrowed from _\u039d\u03b5\u03d5\u03b1\u03bb\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u03ba\u03ba\u03c5\u03b3\u03af\u03b1._ And then\nit goes on to declare that he treated as secondary, indeed as an _opus\nsupererogationis,_ the very thing which the Academy intended should\noccupy the first place, namely, the connection between Metaphysics\nand Ethics.[2] But the \"_metaphysicae et ethicae nexus_,\" so far from\nbeing formulated in the question as the chief point to be considered,\nis not even mentioned! The Society thus denies having asked what it\nactually did ask, while the discussion, which it asserts was specially\nindicated, is not suggested by a single word. Its embarrassment is\nsufficiently shown by this unworthy shifting, to enlarge upon which\nwould here be out of place.[3]\n\nIt is not intended to offer any criticism either on Schopenhauer's main\nposition in this essay, or on the various side-issues involved. The\nreader is supposed to be accurately acquainted with the fundamentals of\nhis philosophy, as contained in _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_,\nand is invited to be the critic himself. But perhaps a few remarks on\nthe structure and general trend of the work may not be amiss.\n\nAfter preliminary considerations, partly to show the difficulty of the\nsubject, partly to clear the ground (Part I.), the treatise opens with\na searching critique of Kant's Ethical Basis, of the Leading Principle\nof his system, and of its derived forms. (Part II., Chapters I.-VI.)[4]\nSchopenhauer's conclusion is that the Categorical Imperative is a very\ncleverly woven web, yet in reality nothing but the old theological\nbasis in disguise, the latter being the indispensable, if invisible,\nclothes' peg for the former; and that Kant's _tour de main_ of deducing\nhis Moral Theology from Ethics is like inverting a pyramid. The theory\nof Conscience is next discussed (Chapter VII.). The half-supernatural\nelement which Kant introduced under the highly dramatic form of a court\nof justice holding secret session in the breast, is examined, and\neliminated; and Conscience is defined as the knowledge that we have of\nourselves through our acts.\n\nBut if, so far, the result obtained is distinctly unfavourable to\nKant, Schopenhauer is glad to agree with him on one point, namely, the\ntheory of Freedom, to a brief notice of which he now passes (Chapter\nVIII.). He points out that the solution of this question is found in\nthe doctrine of the co-existence of Liberty and Necessity: according to\nwhich the basis of our nature, the so-called Intelligible Character,\nthat lies outside the forms attaching to phaenomena, namely, Time,\nSpace, and Causality, is transcendentally free; while the Empirical\nCharacter, together with the whole person, being, as a phaenomenon,\nthe transient objectivation of the Intelligible Character, under the\nlaws of the _principium individuationis_, is strictly determined.[5]\nPart II. closes with a sufficiently amusing examination of Fichte\n(Chapter IX.). His proper function is shown to be that of a magnifying\nglass for Kant. By means of this powerful human lens we can see the\nmonstrous shapes into which the Kantian pet creations are capable of\ndeveloping. Thus we find the Categorical Imperative become a Despotic\nImperative, the \"Absolute Ought\" grown into a fathomless inscrutable\n_\u0395\u1f31\u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7_, etc.\n\nWith Part III. we reach the positive part of the work. Schopenhauer\nbegins (Chapter I.) by emphasising the necessity of finding a basis\nfor Ethics that appeals, not to the intellect, but to the intuitive\nperception. Such (he says) can never be any artificial formula, which\nsurely crumbles to powder beneath the rough touch of real life;\nrather must it be something springing out of the heart of things, and\ntherefore lying at the root of man's nature. But is there, he asks\n(Chapter II.), after all, such a thing as natural morality? Is anything\ngood ever done absolutely without an egoistic motive? The conclusion\narrived at is that, although much may be, and has been, at all times,\nsaid in favour of the Sceptical View, and although this view is in\nfact true as regards the greater number of apparently unselfish\nacts, yet there can be no doubt that truly moral conduct does occur,\nthat deeds of justice and loving-kindness are occasionally performed\nwithout the smallest hope of reward, or fear of punishment involved\nin their omission. The last paragraph of chis chapter is important\nbecause it puts in the clearest light what, according to Schopenhauer,\nis the end of Ethics. Its aim, he says, is =not= to treat of that\nwhich people =ought to do= (for \"ought\" has no place except in\ntheological Morals, whether explicit, or implicit); but \"to point out\nall the varied moral lines of human conduct; to explain them; and to\ntrace them to their ultimate source.\" This definition, which assigns no\neducative function to Ethics, strictly agrees with the doctrine of the\nunchangeableness of character. (_V_. Chapter IX. of this Part.)\n\nOur philosopher then proceeds to show (Chapter III.) that there are two\nfundamental \"antimoral\" incentives in man's nature: Egoism and Malice.\nBe it, however, here remarked that a still simpler classification would\nreduce these two to one. Malice may well be regarded as nothing but\nEgoism carried to its extreme, developed to gigantic proportions. It is\na distinct source of gratification to certain natures to witness the\nsuffering of another; because a diminution of the latter's capacity\nfor action, whether effected by itself, or not, is regarded by an ego\nof this kind as an increase of its own power to do as it likes,--as an\nenhancement of its own glorification.\n\nIn Chapter IV. the ultimate test of truly moral conduct is explained to\nbe the absence of all egoistic motivation; and in Chapters V.-VII.,\nby a process of careful reasoning, every human act is traced to one\nof three original springs, namely, (1) Egoism, (2) Malice, and (3)\nCompassion; or to a combination of (1) and (3), or (1) and (2).[6] Of\nthese the third is shown to be the only counter-motive to the first\nand second, and in fact the sole source of the two cardinal virtues,\njustice and loving-kindness, which are explained as the manifestation\nof Compassion in a lower, and a higher, degree, respectively. In\nthe course of the demonstration the question as to how far a lie is\nlegitimate comes incidentally under discussion; as also the theory of\nDuty; duties being defined as \"actions, the simple omission of which\nconstitutes a wrong.\" (Cf. Part II., Chapter III.)\n\nThe position now reached, namely, that Compassion is the one and only\nfount of true morality, because it is the sole non-egoistic source of\naction, is (says Schopenhauer) a strange paradox; hence the testimony\nof experience and of universal human sentiment is appealed to, in\nconfirmation of it, under nine different considerations (Chapter\nVIII.). They are as follows:--\n\n(1) An imaginary case.\n\n(2) Cruelty, which means the maximum deficiency in Compassion, is the\nmark of the deepest moral depravity. Therefore the real moral incentive\nmust be Compassion.\n\n(3) Compassion is the only thoroughly effective spring of moral conduct.\n\n(4) Limitless Compassion for all living things is the surest and most\ncertain token of a really good man.\n\n(5) The evidence of separate matters of detail.\n\n(6) Compassion is more easily discerned in its higher power; it is more\nobviously the root of loving-kindness than of justice.\n\n(7) Compassion does not stop short with men; it includes all living\nbeings.\n\n(8) Considered simply from the empirical point of view, Compassion is\nthe best possible antidote to Egoism, no less than the most soothing\nbalsam for the world's inevitable suffering.\n\n(9) Rousseau's testimony is quoted, as well as passages from the\nPa\u1e45\u0107a-tantra, Pausanias, Lucian, Stobaeus, and Lessing; and reference\nis made to Chinese Ethics and Hindu customs.\n\nPart III. closes (Chapter IX.) with an inquiry into the Ethical\nDifference of Character. The theory that this difference is innate\nand immutable is supported by numerous extracts from various writers\nof all periods, and illustrated in many ways. But all the evidence\naccumulated hardly amounts to more than so many hints and indications,\nand the matter (says Schopenhauer) was only satisfactorily explained\nby Kant's doctrine of the Intelligible and Empirical Character. (Cf.\nPart II., Chapter VIII.) According to this, the ethical difference\nbetween man and man is an original and ultimate datum, caused by\nthe transcendentally free act of the Intelligible Character, that\nis, the Will, as Thing in itself, outside phaenomena; the Empirical\nCharacter being, so to say, the reflection of the Intelligible,\nmirrored through the functions of our perceptive faculty, namely,\nTime, Space, and Causality. Hence the former, while manifested in\nplurality and difference of acts, yet necessarily always wears the same\nunchangeable features, inasmuch as it is but the appearance-form of\nthe unity behind. If the reader asks why \"the essential constitution\nof the Thing in itself underlying the phaenomenon\" is so enormously\ndifferent in different individuals, it can only be said that our\nintellect, conditioned, as it is, by the laws of Causality, Space, and\nTime, has no power to deal with noumena, its range being limited to\nphaenomena; and that therefore this question is one of those which have\nno conceivable answer. (Cf. _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, vol.\nii., chap. 50., Epiphilosophie.)[7]\n\nThe discussion now terminated points to the conclusion that\nnine-tenths, or perhaps nineteen-twentieths, of what we do is, more\nor less, due to Egoism, conscious or unconscious; while acts of real\nmorality, that is, of unselfish justice and pure loving-kindness\n(admitting that they occur) are to be attributed to Compassion, that\nis, the sense of =suffering with= another. Nor is the principle of\nAltruism new. It is as old as man himself. All the rare and sensitive\nnatures in the world have given utterance to it, each in his own way.\nLike a golden thread it runs from the earliest Indian literature to\nGeorge Eliot, to Tolsto\u00ef; and every day, for unnumbered ages, \"from\nyouth to eld, from sire to son,\" in lowly dwellings and in princes'\npalaces, it has been unawares translated into action.\n\nAnd if we may forecast the future from the past, it would appear that\nin all the stormy seas yet to be traversed by the human race, before\nits little day is spent, Compassion will ever be the surest guide to\nbetter things; and that the light of knowledge illuminating the path,\nwhereby the world may become relatively happier, will always vary\ndirectly as man's susceptibility to its promptings: for \"=Durch\nMitleid wissend=\" is not truer of Parsifal than of all other\nsaviours.\n\nIn the fourth Part of the treatise Schopenhauer attempts the\nmetaphysical explanation of Compassion, which for those, who still\nthink that Metaphysics is something more than a pseudo-science of the\npast--like Alchemy or Astrology--will have special interest.\n\nIt should be observed (as is pointed out in our author's Preface\nto the first edition) that the line of thought followed does not\nbelong to any particular metaphysical school, but to many; being in\nfact a principle at the root of the oldest systems in the world, and\ntraceable in one form or another down to Kant. As in the dawn of\nhistory it was our own Aryan forefathers, who divined with subtle\nintuition the ideality of Time and Space; so in the fulness of the\nages it was reserved for another Aryan of Scotch descent to formulate\nthe same in exact language. Now, by the vast majority of men the\nideality of the _principium individuationis_ is undoubtedly either\nnot consciously realised at all, or else but dimly perceived under\nthe form of allegories and mythologies. Yet, if this theory be true,\nif individuation be only a phaenomenon depending on the subjectivity\nof Time and Space, then Compassion, and its external expression, the\n_\u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7_ that is greater than Faith and Hope, receive their final\nexplanation. And every _\u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03b1_; every word that vibrates in\nharmony with the inspired rhapsody of 1 Corinthians xiii.; every act\nof genuine justice, or of true loving-kindness, done by man to man, as\nwell as the uplifting emotion which stirs our hearts at the sight of\nsuch conduct:--all these things become fraught with a new and luminous\nsignificance: the secret writing is interpreted, its deepest meaning\ndisclosed.\n\nMoreover, the \"thou shalt,\" and the \"thou shalt not,\" no less of the\nvarious theologies than of the Categorical Imperative, may from this\npoint of view be accounted for, on the ground of the =identity=\nof man, so far as he is =noumenal=, with the transcendental\nReality behind phaenomena. The crude threats of punishment and promises\nof reward, the stern Moral Law, poised in mid air,--these hypotheses,\nand all their varieties (whose function is in reality nothing\nelse but to check Egoism), are seen to be due to the intellect's\nimperfect comprehension of, or rather, its vague groping after, the\ntranscendental unity of life, however individualised and differentiated\nas a phaenomenon in Time and Space.[8] It thus becomes apparent\nthat the position developed by Schopenhauer in the third and fourth\nparts of the Essay is not so much destructive, as explanatory, of\nthe usual theories, which, if once the former be fully grasped, lose\nthemselves in it as stars and moon in the light of day. They are at\nonce interpreted, and shown to be no longer of importance. Similarly,\nall the religions of the world, \"which are the Metaphysics of the\npeople,\" find their _raison d'\u00eatre_ in the same doctrine. The theory\nof an =external= _\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03c5\u03c1\u03b3\u1f78\u03c2_ takes its place as the natural mode\nof denoting, in children's language, the =internal= metaphysical\nEntity, whose appearance-form, in terms of our consciousness, is\ncalled the Universe. The circle is completed; the discords vanish,\nand an ultimate harmony is reached. And so over the thrice-tangled\nskein of phaenominal existence a simplifying and integrating light\nis shed, showing that the _\u03c0\u1fb1\u03bd_ is but the reflection of the _\u1f15\u03bd_,\nunder the forms of our faculty of perception, namely, Time, Space, and\nCausality--forms, which necessarily imply plurality and change, on\nwhich, again, in the last resort the _Welt-Schmerz_ depends.\n\n    \"The One remains, the many change and pass;\n    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .\n    Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,\n       Stains the white radiance of Eternity,\n       Until Death tramples it to fragments.\"\n\n\"What an unspeakable gain,\" says Richard Wagner,[9] \"we should bring\nto those who are terrified by the threats of the Church, and, on the\nother hand, to those who are reduced to despair by our physicists, if\nwe could quicken the noble edifice of 'Love, Faith, and Hope,' with a\nclear consciousness of the ideality of the world, conditioned by the\nlaws of Space and Time, which form the sole basis of our perceptive\ncapacity! In that case all anxious inquiries as to a 'Where' and 'When'\nof the 'other world' would be understood to be only answerable by a\nblissful smile. For, if there is a solution to these questions, which\nseem of such boundless importance, our philosopher has given it with\nincomparable precision and beauty in the following sentence, which, to\na certain extent, is only a corollary to the definition of the ideality\nof Time and Space: 'Peace, Rest, and Bliss dwell only there where there\nis =no where, and no when=.'\" (_V_. Schopenhauer: _Parerga and\nParalipomena,_ vol. ii., chap. 3, \u00a7 30 bis.)\n\n\n\n[1] He died September 21st.\n\n[2] It should be noticed that this \"essential part of the question,\" a\nfew lines before, is said to have been passed over altogether (_omisso\nenim eo, quod potissimum postulabatur_).\n\n[3] Any one who cares to see how this Judgment, the Danish Royal\nSociety of Sciences, Hegel, Fichte, and \"Professors of Philosophy\" in\ngeneral, are all pulverised together under our sage's withering wrath\nand trenchant irony, should read his Introduction to each Edition.\n\n[4] Incidentally (Chapter III.), duties towards ourselves, properly\nso called, are shown to be non-existent from the Schopenhauerian\nstandpoint. Cf. the definition of Duty in Part III., Chapter VI.\n\n[5] Schopenhauer treated this subject exhaustively in his Essay on\n\"The Freedom of the Will,\" which, written immediately before, and more\nfortunate than, the present treatise, was awarded the prize by the\nRoyal Norwegian Society of Sciences in January, 1839.\n\n[6] If, as above suggested, Malice be taken as a form of Egoism, we may\nsimplify as follows:--\n\nEgoism. Compassion. (_a_) Lower power: seen in (_a_) Lower power: seen\nin selfishness, covetousness, etc. justice. (_b_) Higher power: seen in\n(_d_) Higher power: seen in malice, cruelty, etc. loving-kindness.\n\n\nEgoism (not in its higher power) may be simultaneously operative with\nCompassion in every possible proportion.\n\n\n[7] _V_. Also the _Neue Paralipomena_, chap. vii.; _Zur Ethik,_ \u00a7\n248, where Schopenhauer calls this \"the hardest of all problems.\" On\nthe one hand, we have the metaphysical unity of the Will, as Thing in\nitself, which, as the Intelligible Character, is present, whole and\nundivided, in all phaenomena, in every individual; on the other hand,\nwe find, as a fact of experience, the widest possible difference in the\nEmpirical Character, no less of animals than of men. That is to say,\n\"_difference_\" must be predicated of the Thing in itself! It is obvious\nthat we here touch a contradiction, which, for the rest, lies at the\nroot of the Schopenhauerian doctrine of the Will.\n\n[8] The reader will remember the fine poetic presentment of this view\nof things, which Goethe with intuitive perception gives in the Faust,\nPart I., where the Erdgeist says:\n\n\"_So schaff' ich am sausenden_ WEBSTUHL DER ZEIT, _Und wirke_ DER\nGOTTHEIT LEBENDIGES KLEID.\" ]\n\n[9] V. _Gesammelte Schriften und Dichtungen_ von Richard Wagner. Zweite\nAuflage, vol. x. \"Was n\u00fctzt diese Erkenntnis?\" p. 361:--_Welchen\nuns\u00e4glichen Gewinn w\u00fcrden wir aber den einerseits von den Drohungen\nder Kirche Erschreckten, andererseits den durch unsere Physiker zur\nVerzweiflung Gebrachten zuf\u00fchren, wenn wir dein erhabenen Geb\u00e4ude von\n\"Liebe, Glaube und Hoffnung\" eine deutliche Erkenntnis der, durch die\nunserer Wahrnehmung einzig zu Grunde liegenden Gesetze des Raumes\nund der Zeit bedingten, Idealit\u00e4t der Welt einf\u00fcgen k\u00f6nnten, durch\nwelche dann alle die Fragen des be\u00e4ngstigten Gem\u00fcthes nach einem\n\"Wo\" und \"Wann\" der \"anderen Welt\" als nur durch ein seliges L\u00e4cheln\nbeantwortbar erkannt werden m\u00fcssten? Denn, giebt es auf diese, so\ngrenzenlos wichtig d\u00fcnkenden Fragen eine Antwort, so hat sie unser\nPhilosoph, mit un\u00fcbertrefflicher Pr\u00e4zision und Sch\u00f6nheit, mit diesem,\ngewissermaassen nur der Definition der Idealit\u00e4t von Zeit und Raum\nbeigegebenen Ausspruche ertheilt: \"Frieda, Ruhe, und Gl\u00fcckseligkeit\nwohnt allein da, wo es_ KEIN WO UND KEIN WANN _giebt.\"_\n\n\n\n\nTHE QUESTION\n\n\nThe question advanced by the Royal Society, together with the\nconsiderations leading up to it, is as follows:--\n\n_Quum primitiva,', moralitatis idea, sive de summa lege morali\nprincipalis notio, sua quadam 'propria eaque minime logica necessitate,\nturn in ea disciplina appareat, cui propositum est cognitionem_ \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1\n\u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe1 _explicare, turn in vita, partim in conscientiae judicio de\nnostris actionibus, partim in censura morali de actionibus aliorum\nhominum; quumque complures, quae ab illa ider inseparables sunt,\neamque tanquam originem respiciunt, notiones principales ad_ \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd\n_spectantes, velut officii notio et imputationis, eadem necessitate\neodemque ambitu vim suam exserant,--et tamen inter eos cursus viasque,\nquas nostrae aetatis meditatio philosophica persequitur, magni momenti\nesse videatur, hoc argumentum ad disputationem revocare,--cupit\nSocietas, ut accurate haec quaestio perpendatur et pertractetur:_\n\n_=Philosophiae moralis fons et fundamentum= utrum in idea\nmoralitatis, quae immediate conscientia contineatur, et ceteris\nnotionibus fundamentalibus, quae ex illa prodeant, explicandis\n=quaerenda sunt=, an in alio cognoscendi principio?_\n\n(The original idea of morality, or the leading conception of the\nsupreme moral law, occurs by a necessity which seems peculiar to the\nsubject, but which is by no means a logical one, both in that science,\nwhose object it is to set forth the knowledge of what is moral, and\nalso in real life, where it shows itself partly in the judgment passed\nby conscience on our own actions, partly in our moral estimation of the\nactions of others; moreover, most of the chief conceptions in Ethics,\nspringing as they do out of that idea, and inseparable from it (as,\nfor instance, the conception of duty, and the ascription of praise\nor blame) assert themselves with the same necessity, and under the\nsame conditions. In view of these facts and because it appears highly\ndesirable, considering the trend of philosophic investigation in our\ntime, to submit this matter to further scrutiny; the Society desires\nthat the following question be carefully considered and discussed:--\n\n=Is the fountain and basis of Morals to be sought for= in an idea\nof morality which lies directly in the consciousness (or conscience),\nand in the analysis of the other leading ethical conceptions which\narise from it? or is it to be found an some other source of knowledge?)\n\n\n\n\nPART I.\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE PROBLEM.\n\n\n\"Why do philosophers differ so widely as to the first principles of\nMorals, but agree respecting the conclusions and duties which they\ndeduce from those principles?\"\n\nThis is the question which was set as subject for a prize essay by\nthe Royal Society of Holland at Harlem, 1810, and solved by J.C.F.\nMeister; and in comparison with the task before us, the inquiry\npresented no extraordinary difficulty. For:--\n\n(1) The present question of the Royal Society has to do with nothing\nless important than the objectively true basis of morals, and\nconsequently of morality. It is an Academy, be it observed, which\ninvites this inquiry; and hence, from its position, it has no practical\npurpose in view; it asks for no discourse inculcating the exercise of\nuprightness and virtue, with arguments based on evidence, of which\nthe plausibility is dwelt on, and the sophistry evaded, as is done\nin popular manuals. Rather, as its aim is not practical, but only\ntheoretical, it desires nothing but the purely philosophical, that\nis, the objective, undisguised, and naked exposition of the ultimate\nbasis of all good moral conduct, independent of every positive law, of\nevery improved assumption, and hence free from all groundwork, whether\nmetaphysical or mythical. This, however, is a problem whose bristling\ndifficulties are attested by the circumstance that all philosophers in\nevery age and land have blunted their wits on it, and still more by\nthe fact that all gods, oriental and occidental, actually derive their\nexistence therefrom. Should therefore this opportunity serve to solve\nit, assuredly the Royal Society will not have expended its money amiss.\n\n(2) Apart from this, a peculiar disadvantage will be found to attach\nto any theoretical examination of the basis of morals, because such\nan investigation is suspiciously like an attempt to undermine, and\noccasion the collapse of, the structure itself. The fact is, that in\nthis matter we are apt to so closely associate practical aims with\ntheory, that the well-meant zeal of the former is with difficulty\nrestrained from ill-timed intervention. Nor is it within the power\nof every one to clearly dissociate the purely theoretical search for\nobjective truth, purged of all interest, even of that of morality as\npractised, from a shameless attack on the heart's sacred convictions.\nTherefore he, who here puts his hand to the plough, must, for his\nencouragement, ever bear in mind that from the doings and affairs of\nthe populace, from the turmoil and bustle of the market-place, nothing\nis further removed than the quiet retreat and sanctuary of the Academy,\nwhere no noise of the world may enter, and where the only god raised on\na pedestal is Truth, in solitary, naked sublimity.\n\nThe conclusion from these two premises is that I must be allowed\ncomplete freedom of speech, as well as the right of questioning\neverything; and furthermore, that if I succeed in really contributing\nsomething, however small, to this subject, then that contribution will\nbe of no little importance.\n\nBut there are still other difficulties obstructing my path. The\nRoyal Society asks for a short monograph setting forth the basis of\nEthics entirely by itself; which means to say, independent of its\nconnection with the general system, _i.e._, the actual metaphysics of\nany philosophy. Such a demand must not only render the accomplishment\nof the task more difficult, but necessarily make it imperfect. Long\nago Christian Wolff, in his _Philosophia Practica_ (P. II., \u00a7 28)\nobserved: \"_Tenebrae in philosophia practica non dispelluntur, nisi\nluce metaphysica effulgente_\" (Darkness in practical philosophy is\nonly dispersed, when the light of metaphysics shines on it;) and Kant\nin the Preface to his _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_ remarks:\n\"Metaphysics must precede, and is in every case indispensable to,\nmoral philosophy.\" For, just as every religion on earth, so far as\nit prescribes morality, does not leave the latter to rest on itself,\nbut backs it by a body of dogmas (the chief end of which is precisely\nto be the prop of the moral sense); so with philosophy, the ethical\nbasis, whatever it be, must itself attach to, and find its support in,\none system of metaphysics or another, that is to say, in a presupposed\nexplanation of the world, and of existence in general. This is so,\nbecause the ultimate and true conclusion concerning the essential\nnature of the Universe must necessarily be closely connected with that\ntouching the ethical significance of human action; and because, in any\ncase, that which is presented as the foundation of morality, if it is\nnot to be merely an abstract formula, floating in the clouds, and out\nof contact with the real world, must be some fact or other discoverable\neither in the objective kosmos, or else in man's consciousness; but,\nas such, it can itself be only a phaenomenon; and consequently, like\nall other phaenomena, it requires a further explanation; and this\nexplanation is supplied by Metaphysics. Philosophy indeed is such a\nconnected whole that it is impossible to exhaustively discuss any one\npart without all the others being involved. Thus Plato says quite\ncorrectly: _\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fc6s o\u1f57\u03bd \u03d5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd\u03bf\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 o\u1f34\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b5\u1f37\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03d5\u03c5\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2_; (Phaedr., p. 371, Ed. Bip.) (Do you think\nthen it is possible to understand at all adequately the nature of\nthe soul, without at the same time understanding the nature of the\nWhole, _i.e._, the totality of things?) The metaphysics of nature, the\nmetaphysics of morals, and the metaphysics of the beautiful mutually\npresuppose each other, and only when taken as connected together do\nthey complete the explanation of things as they really are, and of\nexistence in general. So that whoever should exactly trace one of\nthese three to its ultimate origin, would be found to have necessarily\nbrought the others into his solution of the problem; just as an\nabsolutely clear and exhaustive understanding of any single thing in\nthe world would imply a perfect comprehension of everything else.\n\nNow if we were to start from a given system of metaphysics, which is\nassumed to be true, we should reach synthetically a basis of morals,\nand this basis, being, so to say, built up from below, would provide\nthe resulting ethical structure with a sure foundation. But in the\npresent case, since the terms of the question enforce the separation\nof ethics from all metaphysics, there remains nothing but the analytic\nmethod, which proceeds from facts either of external experience, or of\nconsciousness. It is true that thus the ultimate origin of the latter\nmay be traced back to the human spirit, a source which then, however,\nmust be taken as a fundamental fact, a primary phaenomenon, underivable\nfrom anything else, with the result that the whole explanation remains\nsimply a psychological one. At best its connection with any general\nmetaphysical standpoint can only be described as accessory. On the\nother hand, the fundamental datum, the primary phaenomenon of Ethics,\nso found in man's nature, could itself in its turn be accounted for\nand explained, if we might first treat of metaphysics, and then by\nthe synthetic method deduce Ethics from it. This would mean, however,\nnothing less than the construction of a complete system, of philosophy,\nwhereby the limits of the given question would be far exceeded. I\nam, therefore, compelled to answer it within the lines which its own\nisolated narrowness has laid down.\n\nAnd lastly, there is the following consideration. The basis on which\nit is here intended to place Ethics will prove to be a very small\none; and the consequence is that of the many lawful, approvable, and\npraiseworthy actions of mankind, only the minority will be found to\nspring from purely moral motives, while the majority will have to be\nattributed to other sources. This gives less satisfaction, has not such\na specious glitter as, let us say, a Categorical Imperative, which\nalways stands ready for commands, only that itself in its turn may\ncommand what ought to be done, and what ought to be left undone;[1] not\nto mention other foundations that are entirely material.\n\nI can only, therefore, remind the reader of the saying in Ecclesiastes\n(iv. 6): \"Better is an handful with quietness, than both the hands full\nwith travail and vexation of spirit.\" In all knowledge the genuine,\nproof-resisting, indestructible coefficient is never large; just as in\nthe earth's metallic strata a hundredweight of stone hides but a few\nounces of gold. But whether others will prefer--as I do--the assured\nto the bulky possession, the small quantity of gold which remains in\nthe crucible to the big lump of matter that was brought along with\nit; or whether I shall rather be charged with having removed from\nEthics its basis, instead of providing one, in so far as I prove that\nthe lawful and commendable actions of mankind often do not contain a\nparticle of pure moral worth, and in most cases only a very little,\nresting, as they do, otherwise on motives, the sufficiency of which\nmust ultimately be referred to the egoism of the doer; all this I must\nleave undecided; and I do so, not without anxiety, nay, rather with\nresignation, because I have long since been of the same mind as Johann\nGeorg von Zimmermann, when he said: \"Rest assured until your dying day,\nthat nothing in the world is so rare as a good judge.\" (_Ueber die\nEinsamkeit_; Pt. I., Ch. iii., p. 93.)\n\nFor all true and voluntary righteousness, for all loving-kindness, for\nall nobleness, wherever these qualities may be found, my theory can\nonly point to a very small foundation; whereas my opponents confidently\nconstruct broad bases for Morals, which are made strong enough for\nevery possible burden, and are at the same time thrust upon every\ndoubter's conscience, accompanied with a threatening side-glance at his\nown morality. As contrasted with these, my own position is indeed in\nsore and sorry plight. It is like that of Cordelia before King Lear,\nwith her weakly worded assurance of dutiful affection, compared with\nthe effusive protestations of her more eloquent sisters. So that there\nseems to be need of a cordial that may be furnished by some maxim taken\nfrom intellectual hunting grounds, such as, _Magna est vis veritatis,\net praevalebit_. (Great is the strength of truth, and it will prevail.)\nBut to a man who has lived and laboured even this fails to give much\nencouragement. Meanwhile, I will for once make the venture with truth\non my side; and what opposes me will at the same time oppose truth.\n\n\n[1] That is, the Categorical Imperative appears at first as your\n\"obedient humble servant,\" ready to perform any useful service, _e.g._,\nthe solving of ethical riddles; while it ends by gaining the upper\nhand, and commanding.--(_Translator_.)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nGENERAL RETROSPECT.\n\n\nFor the people morality comes through, and is founded on, theology, as\nthe express will of God. On the other hand, we see philosophers, with\nfew exceptions, taking special pains to entirely exclude this kind of\nfoundation; indeed, so they may but avoid it, they prefer even to find\na refuge in sophistry. Whence comes this antithesis? Assuredly no more\nefficient basis for Ethics can be imagined than the theological; for\nwho would be so bold as to oppose the will of the Almighty and the\nOmniscient? Unquestionably, no one; if only this will were proclaimed\nin an authentic, official manner (if one may say so), whereby no\npossible room for doubt could be left. This, however, is precisely the\ncondition which does not admit of being realised. It is rather the\ninverse process which is attempted. The law declared to be the will of\nGod men try to accredit as such, by demonstrating its agreement with\nour own independent, and hence, natural moral views, and an appeal\nis consequently made to these as being more direct and certain. But\nthis is not all. We perceive that an action performed solely through\nthreat of punishment and promise of reward would be moral much more\nin appearance than in reality; since, after all, it would have its\nroot in Egoism, and in the last resort the scale would be turned by\nthe greater or less amount of credulity evinced in each case. Now it\nwas none other than Kant who destroyed the foundations of Speculative\nTheology, which up to his time were accounted unshakable. Speculative\nTheology had hitherto sustained Ethics, and in order to procure for the\nformer an existence of some sort, if only an imaginary one, his wish\nwas to proceed inversely, and make Ethics sustain Speculative Theology.\nSo that it is now more than ever impossible to think of basing Ethics\non Theology; for no one knows any longer which of the two is to be the\nsupporter, and which the supported, and the consequence is a _circulus\nvitiosus_.\n\nIt is precisely through the influence of Kant's philosophy; through the\ncontemporaneous effect of the unparalleled progress made in all the\nnatural sciences, with regard to which every past age in comparison\nwith our own appears childish; and lastly, through the knowledge of\nSanskrit literature, and of those most ancient and widest spread\nfaiths, Brahmanism and Buddhism, which, as far as time and space go,\nare the most important religions systems of mankind, and, as a matter\nof fact, are the original native religions of our own race, now well\nknown to be of Asiatic descent--our race, to which in its new strange\nhome they once more send a message across the centuries;--it is because\nof all this, I say, that the fundamental philosophical convictions of\nlearned Europe have in the course of the last fifty years undergone a\nrevolution, which perhaps many only reluctantly admit, but which cannot\nbe denied. The result of this change is that the old supports of Ethics\nhave been shown to be rotten, while the assurance remains that Ethics\nitself can never collapse; whence the conviction arises that for it\nthere must exist a groundwork different from any hitherto provided,\nand adaptable to the advanced views of the age. The need of such is\nmaking itself felt more and more, and in it we undoubtedly find the\nreason that has induced the Royal Society to make the present important\nquestion the subject of a prize essay.\n\nIn every age much good morality has been preached; but the explanation\nof its _raison d'\u00eatre_ has always been encompassed with difficulties.\nOn the whole we discern an endeavour to get at some objective truth,\nfrom which the ethical injunctions could-be logically deduced; and\nit has been sought for both in the nature of things, and in the\nnature of man; but in vain. The result was always the same. The will\nof each human unit was found to gravitate solely towards its own\nindividual welfare, the idea of which in its entirety is designated\nby the term \"blissfulness\" (_Gl\u00fcckseligkeit_); and this striving\nafter self-satisfaction leads mankind by a path very, different to\nthe one morality would fain point out. The endeavour was next made\nnow to identify \"blissfulness\" with virtue, now to represent it as\nvirtue's consequence and effect. Both attempts have always failed; and\nthis for no want of sophistry. Then recourse was had to artificial\nformulas, purely objective and abstract, as well _a posteriori_ as\n_a priori_, from which correct ethical conduct undoubtedly admitted\nof being deduced. But there was nothing found in man's nature to\nafford these a footing, whereby they might have availed to guide the\nstrivings of his volition, in face of its egoistic tendency. It appears\nto me superfluous to verify all this by describing and criticising\nevery hitherto existing foundation of morality; not only because I\nshare Augustine's opinion, _non est pro magno habendum quid homines\nsenserint, sed quae sit rei veritas_ (It is the truth about a thing,\nnot men's opinions thereon, that is of importance); but also because it\nwould be like _\u03b3\u03bb\u03b1\u03cd\u03ba\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 'A\u03b8\u03ae\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd_ (_i.e._, carrying coals to\nNewcastle); for previous attempts to give a foundation to Ethics are\nsufficiently well-known to the Royal Society, and the very question\nproposed shows that it is also convinced of their inadequateness.\nAny reader less well-informed will find a careful, if not complete,\npresentment of the attempts hitherto made, in Garve's _Uebersicht der\nvornehmsten Principien der Sittenlehre_, and again, in St\u00e4udlin's\n_Geschichte der Moralphilosophie._ It is of course very disheartening\nto reflect that Ethics, which so directly concerns life, has met with\nthe same unhappy fate as the abstruse science of Metaphysics, and that\nits first principle, though perpetually sought for ever since the time\nof Socrates, has still to be found. Moreover, we must remember that\nin Ethics, much more than in any other science, what is essential\nis contained in its fundamental propositions; the deductions are so\nsimple that they come of themselves. For all are capable of drawing\na conclusion, but few of judging. And this is exactly the reason why\nlengthy text-books and dissertations on Morals are as superfluous as\nthey are tedious. Meantime, if I may postulate an acquaintance with all\nthe former foundations of Ethics, my task will be lightened. Whoever\nobserves how ancient as well as modern philosophers (the Church creed\nsufficed for the middle ages) have had recourse to the most diverse\nand extraordinary arguments, in order to provide for the generally\nrecognised requirements of morality a basis capable of proof, and how\nnotwithstanding they admittedly failed; he will be able to measure the\ndifficulty of the problem, and estimate my contribution accordingly.\nAnd he who has learned to know that none of the roads hitherto struck\non lead to the goal, will be the more willing to tread with me a very\ndifferent path from these--a path which up to now either has not been\nnoticed, or else has been passed over with contempt; perhaps because\nit was the most natural one.[1] As a matter of fact my solution of the\nquestion will remind many of Columbus' egg.\n\nIt is solely to the latest attempt at giving, a basis to Ethics--I mean\nthe Kantian--that a critical examination will be devoted. I shall make\nit all the more exhaustive, partly because the great ethical reform of\nKant gave to this science a foundation having a real superiority to\nprevious ones and partly because it still remains the last important\npronouncement in this domain; for which reason it has obtained general\nacceptance up to the present day, and is universally taught, although\ndifferently garnished by certain changes in the demonstration and in\nthe terminology. It is the ethical system of the last sixty years,\nwhich must be removed ere we enter on another path. Furthermore, my\ncriticism of the Kantian basis will give me occasion to examine and\ndiscuss most of the fundamental conceptions of Ethics, and the outcome\nof this investigation I shall later on be able to postulate. Besides,\ninasmuch as opposites illustrate each other, it is exactly this course\nwhich will be the best preparation and guide, indeed the direct way, to\nmy own position, which in its essential points is diametrically opposed\nto Kant's. It would therefore be a very perverse beginning to skip\nthe following criticism, and turn at once to the positive part of my\nexposition, which then would remain only half intelligible.\n\nIn any case the time has assuredly arrived for once to cite Ethics\nbefore the bar of a searching scrutiny. During more than half a century\nit has been lying comfortably on the restful cushion which Kant\narranged for it--the cushion of the Categorical Imperative of Practical\nReason. In our day this Imperative is mostly introduced to us under\na name which, being smoother and less ostentatious, has obtained more\ncurrency. It is called \"the Moral Law\"; and thus entitled, with a\npassing bow to reason and experience, it slips through unobserved into\nthe house. Once inside, there is no end to its orders and commands; nor\ncan it ever afterwards be brought to account. It was proper, indeed\ninevitable, that Kant, as the inventor of the thing, should remain\nsatisfied with his creation, particularly as he shelved by its means\nerrors still more glaring. But to be obliged to look on and see asses\ndisporting themselves on the comfortable cushion which he prepared, and\nwhich since his time has been more and more trampled on and flattened\nout--this truly is hard. I allude to the daily hackney compilers, who,\nwith the ready confidence born of stupidity, imagine that they have\ngiven a foundation to Ethics, if they do but appeal to that \"Moral\nLaw\" which Is alleged to be inherent in our reason; and then they\ncomplacently weave upon this such a confused and wide-reaching tissue\nof phrases that they succeed in rendering unintelligible the clearest\nand simplest relations of life: and all this, without ever once\nseriously asking themselves whether in point of fact there really does\nexist such a \"Moral Law,\" as a convenient code of morality, graven in\nour heads or hearts.\n\nHence I admit the especial pleasure I feel in proceeding to remove\nfrom Ethics its broad cushion of repose, and I unreservedly\ndeclare my intention of proving that Kant's Practical Reason and\nCategorical Imperative are completely unwarrantable, baseless,\nand fabricated assumptions; and I shall further show that Kant's\nwhole system, like those of his predecessors, is in want of a solid\nfoundation. Consequently Ethics will again be consigned to its\nformer entirely helpless condition, there to remain, until I come to\ndemonstrate the true moral principle of human nature--a principle\nwhich is incontestably efficient, and has its root in our very\nbeing. The latter, however, has no such broad basis to offer as the\nabove-mentioned cushion; so that, doubtless, those who are accustomed\nto take things easily, will not abandon their comfortable old seat,\nbefore they are thoroughly aware how deeply the ground on which it\nstands is undermined.\n\n\n[1]\n\n_Io dir non vi saprei per qual sventura,_\n   _O piuttosto per qual fatalit\u00e0,_\n_Da noi credito ottien pi\u00f9 l'impostura,_\n   _Che la semplice e nuda verit\u00e0._\n                                        CASTI.\n\n[I cannot tell what mischief sly,\n   Or rather what fatality,\nLeads man to credit more the lie\n   Than truth in naked purity.] (_Translator_)\n\n\n\n\n\nPART II.\n\nCRITIQUE OF KANT'S BASIS OF ETHICS.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nPRELIMINARY REMARKS.\n\n\nIt is Kant's great service to moral science that he purified it of all\nEudaemonism. With the ancients, Ethics was a doctrine of Eudaemonism;\nwith the moderns for the most part it has been a doctrine of salvation.\nThe former wished to prove that virtue and happiness are identical;\nbut this was like having two figures which never coincide with each\nother, no matter how they may be placed. The latter have endeavoured\nto connect the two, not by the principle of identity, but by that of\ncausation, thus making happiness the result of virtue; but to do this,\nthey were obliged to have recourse to sophisms, or else to assume the\nexistence of a world beyond any possible perception of the senses.\n\nAmong the ancients Plato alone forms an exception: his system is not\neudaemonistic; it is mystic, instead. Even the Ethics of the Cynics\nand Stoics is nothing but a special form of Eudaemonism, to prove\nwhich, there is no lack of evidence and testimony, but the nature of my\npresent task forbids the space.[1]\n\nThe ancients, then, equally with the moderns, Plato being the single\nexception, agree in making virtue only a means to an end. Indeed,\nstrictly speaking, even Kant banished Eudaemonism from Ethics more in\nappearance than in reality, for between virtue and happiness he still\nleaves a certain mysterious connection;--there is an obscure and\ndifficult passage in his doctrine of the Highest Good, where they occur\ntogether; while it is a patent fact that the course of; virtue runs\nentirely counter to that of happiness. But, passing over this, we may\nsay that with Kant the ethical principle appears as something quite\nindependent of experience and its teaching; it is transcendental, or\nmetaphysical. He recognises that human conduct possesses a significance\nthat oversteps all possibility of experience, and is therefore actually\nthe bridge leading to that which he calls the \"intelligible\"[2] world,\nthe _mundus noumen\u00f4n_, the world of Things in themselves.\n\nThe fame, which the Kantian Ethics has won, is due not only to this\nhigher level, which it reached, but also to the moral purity and\nloftiness of its conclusions. It is by the latter that most people have\nbeen attracted, without paying much attention to the foundation, which\nis propounded in a very complex, abstract and artificial form; and Kant\nhimself required all his powers of acumen and synthesis to give it an\nappearance of solidity. Fortunately, he separated his Ethics from the\nexposition of its basis, devoting to the latter a special work entitled\nthe _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_, the theme of which will\nbe found to be precisely the same as that of our prize essay. For on\npage xiii of the preface he says: \"The present treatise is nothing\nelse but an attempt to find out and establish the supreme principle of\nmorality. This is an investigation, whose scope is complete in itself,\nand which should be kept apart from all other moral researches.\". It\nis in this book that we find the basis, that is to say, the essentials\nof his Ethics set forth with an acute penetration and systematic\nconciseness, as in no other of his writings. It has, moreover, the\ngreat advantage of being the first of Kant's moral works, appearing,[3]\nas it did, only four years later than the _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_,\nand consequently it dates from the period when, although he was\nsixty-one, the detrimental effect of old age on his intellect was not\nyet perceptible. On the other hand, this is distinctly traceable in\nthe _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_, which was published in 1788, or\none year later than the unhappy remodelling of the _Kritik der Reinen\nVernunft_ in the second edition, whereby the latter, his immortal\nmaster-piece, was obviously marred. An analysis of this question is\nto be found in the preface to the new edition by Rosenkranz,[4] from\nwhich my own investigation makes it impossible for me to dissent. The\n_Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_ contains in its essentials the same\nmaterial as the above-mentioned--_Grundlegung_; only the latter has\na more concise and rigorous form, while in the former the subject is\nhandled with greater prolixity, interspersed with digressions and even\npadded with some pieces of moral rhetoric, to heighten the impression.\nWhen Kant wrote it, he had at last, and late in life, become deservedly\nfamous; hence, being certain of boundless attention, he allowed greater\nplay to the garrulity of old age.\n\nBut the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_ contains two sections\nwhich are peculiar to itself. First: the exposition of the relation\nbetween Freedom and Necessity (pp. 169-179 of the fourth edition,\nand pp. 223-231 in Rosenkranz). This passage is above all praise,\nand undoubtedly was framed earlier in his life, as it is entirely\nin harmony with his treatment of the same subject in the _Kritik\nder Reinen Vernunft_ (pp. 560-586; Rosenkranz, p. 438, sqq.). And\nsecondly: the _Moraltheologie_, which will more and more come to be\nrecognised as the real object Kant had in view. In his _Metaphysische\nAnfangsgr\u00fcnde der Tugendlehre_ this _pendant_ to the deplorable\n_Rechtslehre_, written in 1797, the debility of old age is at length\nfully pre-ponderant. For all these reasons the present criticism will\nmainly deal with the treatise first mentioned, _viz.,_ the _Grundlegung\nzur Metaphysik der Sitten_, and the reader will please understand\nthat all the page numbers given by themselves refer to it. Both the\nother works will only be considered as accessory and secondary. For a\nproper comprehension of the present criticism, which, in probing the\nKantian Ethics to its depths, bears directly and principally on this\n_Grundlegung_, it is very desirable that the latter be carefully read\nthrough again, so that the mind may have a perfectly clear and fresh\npresentment of what it contains. It is but a matter of 128 and xiv\npages (in Rosenkranz only 100 pages altogether). I shall quote from\nthe third edition of 1792, adding the page number of the new complete\npublication by Rosenkranz, with an R. prefixed.\n\n\n[1] For a complete demonstration v. _Die Welt als Wille und\nVorstellung_, Vol. I., \u00a7 16, p. 103, sqq., and Vol. II., Chap. 16, p.\n166, sqq. of the third edition. _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_,\nthat is, _The World as Will and Idea_; \"Idea\" being used much as\n_\u03b5\u1f35\u03b4\u03c9\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd_ sometimes is (cf. Xen. _Sym.,_ 4, 21), in the sense of \"an\nimage in the mind,\" \"a mental picture.\"--(_Translator_.)\n\n[2] It seems better to keep this technical word than to attempt a\ncumbrous periphrasis. The meaning is perfectly clear. The _sensibilia_\n(_phaenomena_) are opposed to the _intelligibilia_ (_noumena_), which\ncompose the transcendental world. So the individual, in so far as he\nis a phaenomenon, has an empirical character; in so far as he is a\nnoumen\u00f4n, his character is intelligible (_intelligibilis_). The _mundus\nintelligibilis,_ or _mundus noumen\u00f4n_ is the _\u03ba\u03cc\u03c3\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bd\u03bf\u03b7\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2_ of New\nPlatonism.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[3] It was published in 1785: _The Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,_ first\nedition, in 1781.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[4] His analysis is really derived from myself, but in this place I am\nspeaking incognito.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nON THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.\n\n\nKant's _\u03c0\u03c1\u1ff6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03c8\u03b5\u1fe1\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2_ (first false step) lies in his conception of\nEthics itself, and this is found very clearly expressed on page 62\n(R., p. 54): \"In a system of practical philosophy we are not concerned\nwith adducing reasons for that which takes place, but with formulating\nlaws regarding that which =ought to take place, even if it never\ndoes take place=.\" This is at once a distinct _petitio principii._\nWho tells you that there are laws to which our conduct =ought= to\nbe subject? Who tells you that that =ought to take place, which in\nfact never does take place=? What justification have you for making\nthis assumption at the outset, and consequently for forcing upon us,\nas the only possible one, a system of Ethics couched in the imperative\nterms of legislation? I say, in contradistinction to Kant, that the\nstudent of Ethics, and no less the philosopher in general, must content\nhimself with explaining and interpreting that which is given, in\nother words, that which really is, or takes place, so as to obtain an\n=understanding= of it, and I maintain furthermore that there is\nplenty to do in this direction, much more than has hitherto been done,\nafter the lapse of thousands of years. Following the above _petitio\nprincipii_, Kant straightway, without any previous investigation,\nassumes in the preface (which is entirely devoted to the subject),\nthat purely moral laws exist; and this assumption remains thenceforth\nundisturbed, and forms the very foundation of his whole system. We,\nhowever, prefer first of all to examine the conception denoted by the\nword \"law.\" The true and original meaning of the term is limited to\nlaw as between citizens; it is the _lex_, _\u03bd\u03cc\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2_, of the Romans and\nGreeks, a human institution, and depending on human volition. It has\na secondary, derived, figurative, metaphorical meaning, when applied\nto Nature, whose operations, partly known _a priori_, partly learnt\nby experience, and which are always constant, we call natural laws.\nOnly a very small portion of these natural laws can be discerned _a\npriori_, and with admirable acuteness, Kant set them apart, and classed\nthem under the name \"Metaphysics of Nature.\" There is also undoubtedly\na law for the human will, in so far as man belongs to Nature; and\nthis law is strictly provable, admits of no exception, is inviolable,\nand immovable as the mountains, and does not, like the Categorical\nImperative, imply a quasi-necessity, but rather a complete and absolute\none. It is the law of motivation, a form of the law of causation; in\nother words, it is the causation which is brought about by the medium\nof the understanding. It is the sole demonstrable law to which the\nhuman will =as such= is subject. It means that every action can\nonly take place in consequence of a sufficient motive. Like causality\nin general, it is a natural law. On the other hand, moral laws, apart\nfrom human institution, state ordinance, or religious doctrine, cannot\nrightly be assumed as existing without proof. Kant, therefore, by\ntaking such laws for granted, is guilty of a _petitio principii_, which\nis all the bolder, in that he at once adds (page vi of the preface)\nthat a moral law ought to imply \"=absolute necessity=.\" But\n\"absolute necessity\" is everywhere characterised by an inevitable chain\nof consequence; how, then, can such a conception be attached to these\nalleged moral laws (as an instance of which he adduces \"thou shalt\nnot lie\"[1])? Every one knows, and he himself admits, that no such\nconsecution for the most part takes place; the reverse, indeed, is the\nrule.\n\nIn scientific Ethics before we admit as controlling the will other laws\nbesides that of motivation-laws which are original and independent of\nall human ordinance--we must first prove and deduce their existence;\nthat is, provided in things ethical we are concerned not merely with\nrecommending honesty, but with practising it. Until that proof be\nfurnished, I shall recognise only one source to which is traceable\nthe importation into Ethics of the conception =Law, Precept,\nObligation=. It is one which is foreign to philosophy. I mean the\nMosaic Decalogue. Indeed the spelling \"=du sollt=\"[2] in the\nabove instance of a moral law, the first put forward by Kant, na\u00efvely\nbetrays this origin. A conception, however, which can\\ point to no\nother source than this, has no right, without undergoing further\nscrutiny, thus to force its way into philosophical Ethics. It will\nbe rejected, until introduced by duly accredited proof. Thus on the\nthreshold of the subject Kant makes his first _petitio principii_, and\nthat no small one.\n\nOur philosopher, then, by begging the question in his preface, simply\nassumes the conception of =Moral Law= as given and existing\nbeyond all doubt; and he treats the closely related conception of Duty\n(page 8, R., p. 16) exactly in the same way. Without subjecting it\nto any further test, he admits it forthwith as a proper appurtenance\nof Ethics. But here, again, I am compelled to enter a protest. This\nconception, equally with the kindred notions of =Law, Command,\nObligation=, etc., taken thus unconditionally, has its source in\ntheological morals, and it will remain a stranger to philosophical\nmorals, so long as it fails to furnish sufficient credentials drawn\neither from man's nature, or from the objective world. Till then, I\ncan only recognise the Decalogue as the origin of all these connected\nconceptions. Since the rise of Christianity there is no doubt that\nphilosophical has been unconsciously moulded by theological ethics.\nAnd since the latter is essentially dictatorial, the former appears in\nthe shape of precepts and inculcation of Duty, in all innocence, and\nwithout any suspicion that first an ulterior sanction is needful for\nthis _r\u00f4le_; rather does she suppose it to be her proper and natural\nform. It is true that all peoples, ages, and creeds, and indeed all\nphilosophers (with the exception of the materialists proper) have\nundeniably recognised that the ethical significance of human conduct is\na metaphysical one, in other words, that it stretches out beyond this\nphaenomenal existence and reaches to eternity; but it is equally true\nthat the presentment of this fact in terms of Command and Obedience, of\nLaw and Duty, is no part of its essence. Furthermore, separated from\nthe theological hypotheses whence they have sprung, these conceptions\nlose in reality all meaning, and to attempt a substitute for the\nformer by talking with Kant of =absolute= obligation and of\n=unconditioned= duty, is to feed the reader with empty words, nay\nmore, is to give him a _contradictio in adjecto_[3] to digest.\n\nEvery obligation derives all sense and meaning; simply and solely from\nits relation to threatened punishment or promised reward. Hence, long\nbefore Kant was thought of, Locke says: \"For since it would be utterly\nin vain, to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without\nannexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his\nwill; we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or\npunishment annexed to that law.\" (_Essay on the Human Understanding_,\nBk. II., ch. 33, \u00a7 6). What =ought= to be done is therefore\nnecessarily conditioned by punishment or reward; consequently, to use\nKant's language, it is essentially and inevitably =hypothetical=,\nand never, as he maintains, =categorical=. If we think away these\nconditions, the conception of obligation becomes void of sense; hence\nabsolute obligation is most certainly a _contradictio in adjecto._\nA commanding voice, whether it come from within, or from without,\ncannot possibly be imagined except as threatening or promising.\nConsequently obedience to it, which may be wise or foolish according\nto circumstances, is yet always actuated by selfishness, and therefore\nmorally worthless.\n\nThe complete unthinkableness and nonsense of this conception of an\n=unconditioned obligation=, which lies at the root of the Kantian\nEthics, appears later in the system itself, namely in the _Kritik der\nPraktischen Vernunft_: just as some concealed poison in an organism\ncannot remain hid, but sooner or later must come out and show itself.\nFor this =obligation=, said to be so =unconditioned=,\nnevertheless postulates more than one condition in the background; it\nassumes a rewarder, a reward, and the immortality of the person to be\nrewarded.\n\nThis is of course unavoidable, if one really makes Duty and Obligation\nthe fundamental conception of Ethics; for these ideas are essentially\nrelative, and depend for their significance on the threatened penalty\nor the promised reward. The guerdon which is assumed to be in store\nfor virtue shows clearly enough that only in appearance she works\nfor nothing. It is, however, put forward modestly veiled, under the\nname of the =Highest Good=, which is the union of Virtue and\nHappiness. But this is at bottom nothing else but a morality that\nderives its origin from Happiness, which means, a morality resting on\nselfishness. In other words, it is Eudaemonism, which Kant had solemnly\nthrust out of the front door of his system as an intruder, only to\nlet it creep in again by the postern under the name of the =Highest\nGood=. This is how the assumption of =unconditioned absolute\nobligation=, concealing as it does a contradiction, avenges itself.\n=Conditioned= obligation, on the other hand, cannot of course be\nany first principle for Ethics, since everything done out of regard for\nreward or punishment is necessarily an egoistic transaction, and as\nsuch is without any real moral value. All this makes it clear that a\nnobler and wider view of Ethics is needed, if we are in earnest about\nour endeavour to truly account for the significance of human conduct--a\nsignificance which extends beyond phaenomena and is eternal.\n\nAs all obligation is entirely dependent on a condition, so also is\nall duty. Both conceptions are very closely related, indeed almost\nidentical. The only difference between them might be said to be that\nobligation in general may rest on mere force, whereas duty involves\nthe sense of obligation deliberately undertaken, such as we see\nbetween master and servant, principal and subordinate, rulers and the\nruled. And since no one undertakes a duty _gratis,_ every duty implies\nalso a right. The slave has no duties, because he has no rights; but\nhe is subject to an obligation which rests on sheer force. In the\nfollowing Part I shall explain the only meaning which the conception\n\"=Duty=\" has in Ethics.\n\nIf we put Ethics in an =imperative= form, making it a Doctrine of\nDuties, and regard the moral worth or worthlessness of human conduct\nas the fulfilment or violation of duties, we must remember that this\nview of Duty, and of Obligation in general, is undeniably derived\nsolely from theological Morals, and primarily from the Decalogue,\nand consequently that it rests essentially and inseparably on the\nassumption of man's dependence on another will which gives him commands\nand announces reward or punishment. But the more the assumption of\nsuch a will is in Theology positive and precise, the less should it\nbe quietly and unsuspectingly introduced into philosophical Morals.\nHence we have no right to assume beforehand that for the latter the\n=imperative Form=, the ordaining of commands, laws, and duties\nis an essential and a matter of course; and it is a very poor shift\nto substitute the word \"absolute\" or \"categorical\" for the external\ncondition which is indissolubly attached to such conceptions by\ntheir very nature: for this gives rise, as explained above, to a\n_contradictio in adjecto_.\n\nKant, then, without more ado or any close examination, borrowed\nthis =imperative Form= of Ethics from theological Morals. The\nhypotheses of the latter (in other words, Theology) really lie at\nthe root of his system, and as these alone in point of fact lend\nit any meaning or sense, so they cannot be separated from, indeed\nare implicitly contained in, it. After this, when he had expounded\nhis position the task of developing in turn a Theology out of his\nMorals--the famous _Moraltheologie_--was easy enough. For the\nconceptions which are implicitly involved in his Imperative, and which\nlie hidden at the base of his Morals, only required to be brought\nforward and expressed explicitly as postulates of Practical Reason. And\nso it was that, to the world's great edification, a Theology appeared\ndepending simply on Ethics, indeed actually derived therefrom. But\nthis came about because the ethical system itself rests on concealed\ntheological hypotheses. I mean no derisive comparison, but in its form\nthe process is analogous to that whereby a conjurer prepares a surprise\nfor us, when he lets us find something where he had previously employed\nhis art to place it. Described in the abstract, Kant's procedure is\nthis: what ought to have been his first principle, or hypothesis\n(_viz_., Theology) he made the conclusion, and what ought to have been\ndeduced as the conclusion (_viz_., the Categorical Command) he took as\nhis hypothesis.[4] But after he had thus turned the thing upside down,\nnobody, not even he himself, recognised it as being what it really was,\nnamely the old well-known system of theological Morals. How this trick\nwas accomplished we shall consider in the sixth and seventh chapters of\nthe present Part.\n\nEthics was of course frequently put in the imperative form, and treated\nas a doctrine of duties also in pre-Kantian philosophy; but it was\nalways then based upon the will of a God whose existence had been\notherwise proved, and so there was no inconsequence. As soon, however,\nas the attempt was made, as Kant attempted, to give a foundation to\nEthics independent of this will, and establish it without metaphysical\nhypotheses, there was no longer any justification for taking as its\nbasis the words \"thou shalt,\" and \"it is thy duty\" (that is, the\nimperative form), without first deducing the truth thereof from some\nother source.\n\n\n[1] Du sollt (_sic_) nicht l\u00fcgen.\n\n[2] Sollt is the old form for \"_sollst_.\" Cf. Eng., _shalt_: Icel;\n_skalt_--(_Translator_.)\n\n[3] A contradiction in the adjective. This occurs when the epithet\napplied to a noun contradicts its essential meaning.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[4] Like the converse of a geometrical proposition, this Kantian\ninversion is not necessarily true; its validity, in fact, depends\non the conclusion being implicitly contained in the hypothesis.\n--(_Translator_.)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nON THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES IN PARTICULAR.\n\n\nThis form of the doctrine of duties was very acceptable to Kant,\nand in working out his position he left it untouched; for, like his\npredecessors, along with the duties towards others he ranged also\nduties towards ourselves. I, however, entirely reject this assumption,\nand, as there will be no better opportunity, I shall here incidentally\nexplain my view.\n\nDuties towards ourselves must, just as all others, be based either\non right or on love. Duties towards ourselves based on right are\nimpossible, because of the self-evident fundamental principle _volenti\nnon fit injuria_ (where the will assents, no injury is done). For what\nI do is always what I will; consequently also what I do to myself is\nnever anything but what I will, therefore it cannot be unjust. Next, as\nregards duties towards ourselves based on love. Ethics here finds her\nwork already done, and comes too late. The impossibility of violating\nthe duty of self-love is at once assumed by the first law of Christian\nMorals: \"Love thy neighbour as thyself.\" According to this, the love\nwhich each man cherishes for himself is postulated as the _maximum_,\nand as the condition of all other love; while the converse, \"Love\nthyself as thy neighbour\" is never added; for every one would feel that\nthe latter does not claim enough. Moreover, self-love would be the sole\nduty regularly involving an _opus supererogationis_. Kant himself says\nin the _Metaphysische Anfangsgr\u00fcnde zur Tugendlehre_, p. 13 (R., p.\n230): \"That which each man inevitably wills of himself, does not belong\nto the conception of Duty.\" This idea of duties towards ourselves is\nnevertheless still held in repute, indeed it enjoys for the most part\nspecial favour; nor need we feel surprise. But it has an amusing effect\nin cases where people begin to show anxiety about their persons, and\ntalk quite earnestly of the duty of self-preservation; the while it is\nsufficiently clear that fear will lend them legs soon enough, and that\nthey have no need of any law of duty to help them along.\n\nFirst among the duties towards ourselves is generally placed that of\nnot committing suicide, the line of argument taken being extremely\nprejudiced and resting on the shallowest basis. Unlike animals, man is\nnot only a prey to =bodily= pain limited to the passing moment,\nbut also to those incomparably greater =mental= sufferings, which,\nreaching forwards and backwards, draw upon the future and the past; and\nnature, by way of compensation, has granted to man alone the privilege\nof being able to end his life at his own pleasure, before she herself\nsets a term to it; thus, while animals necessarily live so long as they\ncan, man need only live so long as he =will=.\n\nWhether he ought on ethical grounds to forego this privilege is a\ndifficult question, which in any case cannot be decided by the usual\nsuperficial reasoning. The arguments against suicide which Kant does\nnot deem unworthy of adducing (p. 53, R., p. 48 and p. 67, R., p.\n57), I cannot conscientiously describe as other than pitiable, and\nquite undeserving of an answer. It is laughable indeed to suppose that\nreflections of such a kind could have wrested the dagger from the hands\nof Cato, of Cleopatra, of Cocceius Nerva (Tac. _Ann_., vi. 26) or of\nArria the wife of Paetus (Plin., _Ep_., iii. 16). If real moral motives\nfor not committing suicide actually exist, it is certain that they lie\nvery deep, and cannot be reached by the plummet of ordinary Ethics.\nThey belong to a higher view of things than is adaptable even to the\nstandpoint of the present treatise.[1]\n\nThat which generally comes next on the rubric of duties towards\nourselves may be divided partly into rules of worldly wisdom, partly\ninto hygienic prescriptions; but neither class belongs to Morals in the\nproper sense. Last on the catalogue comes the prohibition of unnatural\nlust--onanism, _paederastia,_ and bestiality. Of these onanism is\nmainly a vice of childhood, and must be fought against much more with\nthe weapon of dietetics than with that of ethics; hence we find that\nthe authors of books directed against it are physicians (_e.g._,\nTissot and others) rather than moralists. After dietetics and hygiene\nhave done their work, and struck it down by irrefutable reasoning, if\nEthics desires to take up the matter, she finds little left for her to\ndo. Bestiality, again, is of very rare occurrence; it is thoroughly\nabnormal and exceptional, and, moreover, so loathsome and foreign to\nhuman nature, that itself, better than all arguments of reason, passes\njudgment on itself, and deters by sheer disgust. For the rest, as being\na degradation of human nature, it is in reality an offence against the\nspecies as such, and in the abstract; not against human units. Of the\nthree sexual perversions of which we are speaking it is consequently\nonly with _paederastia_ that Ethics has to do, and in treating of\nJustice this vice finds its proper place. For Justice is infringed by\nit, in face of which fact, the dictum _volenti non fit injuria_ is\nunavailing. The injustice consists in the seduction of the younger and\ninexperienced person, who is thereby ruined physically and morally.\n\n\n[1] There are ascetic reasons, which may be found in the Fourth Book,\nVol. I., \u00a7 69, of my chief work (_Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_).\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.\n\n\nWith the imperative Form of Ethics, which in Chapter II. we proved to\nbe a _petitio principii_, is directly connected a favourite idea of\nKant's, that may be excused, but cannot be adopted. Sometimes we see\na physician, after having employed a certain remedy with conspicuous\nsuccess, henceforth prescribing it for almost all diseases; to such\na one Kant may be likened. By separating the _a priori_ from the\n_a posteriori_ in human knowledge he made the most brilliant and\npregnant discovery that Metaphysics can boast of. What wonder then\nthat thereafter he should try to apply this method, this sundering of\nthe two forms, everywhere, and should consequently make Ethics also\nconsist of two parts, a pure, _i.e._ an _a priori_ knowable part, and\nan empirical? The latter of these he rejects as unreliable for the\npurpose of founding Ethics. To trace out the former and; exhibit it by\nitself is his purpose in the _Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten_,\nwhich he accordingly represents as a science purely _a priori_, exactly\nin the same way as he sets forth the _Metaphysische Anfangsgr\u00fcnde der\nNaturwissenschaft_. He asserts in fact that the =Moral Law=,\nwhich without warrant, without deduction, or proof of any sort, he\npostulates as existing, is furthermore a Law knowable _a priori_ and\nindependent of all =internal= or =external experience=; it\n\"_rests_\" (he says) \"=solely on conceptions of pure Reason; and is\nto be taken as a synthetic proposition a priori=\" (_Kritik der\nPraktischen Vernunft_: p. 56 of fourth Edition; R., p. 142). But\nfrom this definition the implication immediately follows that such a\nLaw can only be formal, like everything else known _a priori_, and\nconsequently has only to do with the =Form= of actions, not\nwith their =Essence=. Let it be thought what this means! He\nemphatically adds (p. vi of the preface to the _Grundlegung;_ R., p. 5)\nthat it is \"useless to look for it either subjectively in man's nature,\nor objectively in the accidents of the external world,\" and (preface\nof the same, page vii; R., p. 6) that \"nothing whatever connected\nwith it can be borrowed from knowledge relating to man, _i.e._, from\nanthropology.\" On page 59 (R., p. 52) he repeats, \"That one ought on no\naccount to fall into the mistake of trying to derive one's principle of\nmorality from the special constitution of human nature\"; and again, on\npage 60 (R., p. 52), he says that, \"Everything derived from any natural\ndisposition peculiar to man, or from certain feelings and propensities,\nor indeed from any special trend attaching solely to human nature,\nand not necessarily to be taken as the Will of =every rational\nbeing=,\" is incapable of affording a foundation for the moral law.\nThis shows beyond all possibility of contradiction that Kant does not\nrepresent the alleged moral law as a _fact of consciousness_, capable\nof empirical proof--which is how the later would-be philosophers, both\nindividually and collectively, wish to pass it off. In discarding every\nempirical basis for Morals, he rejects all internal, and still more\ndecidedly all external, experience., Accordingly he founds--and I call\nspecial attention to this--his moral principle not on any provable\n_fact of consciousness_, such as an inner natural disposition, nor yet\nupon any objective relation of things in the external world. No! That\nwould be an empirical foundation. Instead of this, _pure conceptions\na priori_, _i.e._, conceptions, which so far contain nothing derived\nfrom internal or external experience, and thus are simply shells\nwithout kernels--these are to be made the basis of Morals. Let us\nconsider the full meaning of such a position. Human consciousness as\nwell as the whole external world, together with all the experience and\nall the facts they comprise, are swept from under our feet. We have\nnothing to stand upon. And what have we to hold to? Nothing but a few\nentirely abstract, entirely unsubstantial conceptions, floating in the\nair equally with ourselves. It is from these, or, more correctly, from\nthe mere form of their connection with judgments made, that a _Law_ is\ndeclared to proceed, which by so-called =absolute necessity= is\nsupposed to be valid, and to be strong enough to lay bit and bridle on\nthe surging throng of human desires, on the storm of passion, on the\ngiant might of _egoism_. We shall see if such be the case.\n\nWith this preconceived notion that the basis of Morals must be\nnecessarily and strictly a priori, and entirely free from everything\nempirical, another of Kant's favourite ideas is closely connected.\nThe moral principle that he seeks to establish is, he says, a\n=synthetic proposition a priori, of merely formal contents=, and\nhence exclusively a matter of =Pure Reason=; and accordingly,\nas such, to be regarded as valid =not only for men=, but for\n=all possible rational beings=; indeed he declares it to hold\ngood for man \"on this account alone,\" _i.e._, because _per accidens_\nman comes under the category of rational beings. Here lies the cause\nof his basing the Moral principle not on any feeling, but on =pure\nReason= (which knows nothing but itself and the statement of its\nantithesis). So that this =pure Reason= is taken, not as it\nreally and exclusively is--an intellectual faculty of man--but =as\na self-existent hypostatic essence=, yet without the smallest\nauthority; the pernicious effects of such example and precedent being\nsufficiently shown in the pitiful philosophy of the present day.\nIndeed, this view of Morals as existing not for men, as men, but for\nall rational beings, as such, is with Kant a principle so firmly\nestablished, an idea so favourite, that he is never tired of repeating\nit at every opportunity.\n\nI, on the contrary, maintain that we are never entitled to raise\ninto a _genus_ that which we only know of in a single species. For\nwe could bring nothing into our idea of the _genus_ but what we had\nabstracted from this one species; so that what we should predicate of\nthe _genus_ could after all only be understood of the single species.\nWhile, if we should attempt to think away (without any warrant) the\nparticular attributes of the species, in order to form our _genus_,\nwe should perhaps remove the exact condition whereby the remaining\nattributes, hypostatised as a _genus_, are made possible. Just as we\nrecognise =intelligence in general= to be an attribute of animal\nbeings alone, and are therefore never justified in thinking of it as\nexisting outside, and independent, of animal nature; so we recognise\n=Reason= as the exclusive attribute of the human race, and have\nnot the smallest right to suppose that Reason exists externally to\nit, and then proceed to set up a _genus_ called \"Rational Beings,\"\ndiffering from its single known species \"Man\"; still less are we\nwarranted in laying down laws for such imaginary =rational beings\nin the abstract=. To talk of rational beings external to men is\nlike talking of =heavy beings= external to bodies. One cannot\nhelp suspecting that Kant was thinking a little of the dear cherubim,\nor at any rate counted on their presence in the conviction of the\nreader. In any case this doctrine contains a tacit assumption of an\n_anima rationalis,_ which as being entirely different from the _anima\nsensitiva_, and the _anima vegetativa_, is supposed to persist after\ndeath, and then to be indeed nothing else but _rationalis_. But in the\n_Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ Kant himself has expressly and elaborately\nmade an end of this most transcendent hypostasis. Nevertheless, in\nhis ethics generally, and in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_\nespecially, there seems always to hover in the background the thought\nthat the inner and eternal essence, of man consists of =Reason=.\nIn this connection, where the matter only occurs incidentally, I must\ncontent myself with simply asserting the contrary. Reason, as indeed\nthe intellectual faculty as a whole, is secondary, is an attribute of\nphaenomena, being in point of fact conditioned by the organism; whereas\nit is the =Will= in man which is his very self, the only part of\nhim which is metaphysical, and therefore indestructible.\n\nThe success with which Kant had applied his method to the theoretical\nside of philosophy led him on to extend it to the practical. Here\nalso he endeavoured to separate pure _a priori_ from empirical _a\nposteriori_ knowledge. For this purpose he assumed that just as\nwe know _a priori_ the laws of Space, of Time, and of Causality,\nso in like manner, or at any rate analogously, we have the moral\nplumb-line for our conduct given us prior to all experience, and\nrevealed in a Categorical Imperative, an absolute \"Ought.\" But how\nwide is the difference between this alleged moral law _a priori_, and\nour theoretical knowledge _a priori_ of Space, Time, and Causality!\nThe latter are nothing but the expression of the forms, _i.e._, the\nfunctions of our intellect, whereby alone we are capable of grasping\nan objective world, and wherein alone it can be mirrored; so that the\nworld (as we know it) is absolutely conditioned by these forms, and all\nexperience =must= invariably and exactly correspond to them--just\nas everything that I see through a blue glass must appear blue. While\nthe former, the so-called moral law, is something that experience pours\nridicule on at every step; indeed, as Kant himself says, it is doubtful\nwhether in practice it has ever really been followed on any single\noccasion. How completely unlike are the things which are here classed\ntogether under the conception of =apriority=! Moreover, Kant\noverlooked the fact that, according to his own teaching, in theoretical\nphilosophy, it is exactly the =Apriority= of our knowledge of\nTime, Space, and Causality--independent as this is of experience--that\nlimits it strictly to phaenomena, _i.e._, to the picture of the world\nas reflected in our consciousness, and makes it entirely invalid as\nregards the real nature of things, _i.e._, as regards whatever exists\nindependently of our capacity to grasp it.\n\nSimilarly, when we turn to practical philosophy, his alleged moral\nlaw, if it have an _a priori_ origin in ourselves, must also be only\nphaenomenal, and leave entirely untouched the essential nature of\nthings. Only this conclusion would stand in the sharpest contradiction\nas much to the facts themselves, as to Kant's view of them. For it is\nprecisely the moral principle in us that he everywhere (_e.g., Kritik\nder Praktischen Vernunft_, p. 175; R., p. 228) represents as being in\nthe closest connection with the real essence of things, indeed, as\ndirectly in contact with it; and in all passages in the _Kritik der\nReinen Vernunft,_ where the mysterious Thing in itself comes forward a\nlittle more clearly, it shows itself as the =moral principle= in\nus, as =Will=. But of this he failed to take account.\n\nIn Chapter II. of this Part, I explained how Kant took over bodily\nfrom theological Morals the =imperative form= of Ethics, _i.e._,\nthe conception of obligation, of law, and of duty; and how at the same\ntime he was constrained to leave behind that which in the realm of\ntheology alone lends force and significance to these ideas. But he\nfelt the need of some basis for them, and accordingly went so far as\nto require that the _conception of duty_ itself should be also the\n_ground of its fulfilment_; in other words, that it should itself be\nits own enforcement. An action, he says (p. 11; R., p. 18), has no\ngenuine moral worth, unless it be done simply as a matter of duty,\nand for duty's sake, without any liking for it being felt; and the\ncharacter only begins to have value, if a man, who has no sympathy in\nhis heart, and is cold and indifferent to others' sufferings, and who\nis =not by nature a lover of his kind=, is nevertheless a doer of\ngood actions, solely out of a pitiful sense of duty. This assertion,\nwhich is revolting to true moral sentiment; this apotheosis of\nlovelessness, the exact opposite, as it is, of the Christian doctrine\nof Morals, which places love before everything else, and teaches that\nwithout it nothing profiteth (1 Cor. xiii. 3); this stupid moral\npedantry has been ridiculed by Schiller in two apposite epigrams,\nentitled _Gewissensskrupel_ (Scruples of Conscience) and _Entscheidung_\n(Decision).[1]\n\nIt appears that some passages in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_,\nwhich exactly suit this connection, were the immediate occasion of the\nverses. Thus, for instance, on p. 150 (R., p. 211) we find: \"Obedience\nto the moral law, which a man feels incumbent on him, is based not on\nvoluntary inclination, nor on endeavour willingly put forth, without\nany authoritative command, but on a sense of duty.\" Yes, it must be\ncommanded! What slavish morality! And again on p. 213 (R., p. 257):\n\"Feelings of compassion, and of tender-hearted sympathy would be\nactually troublesome to persons who think aright, because through such\nemotions their well weighed maxims would become confused, and so the\ndesire would grow up to be rid of them, and to be subject solely to\nthe lawgiver--Reason.\" Now I maintain without hesitation that what\nopens the hand of the above-described (p. 11; R., p. 18) loveless doer\nof good, who is indifferent to the sufferings of other people, cannot\n(provided he have no secondary motives) be anything else than a slavish\n_\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1_ (fear of the gods), equally whether he calls his fetich\n\"Categorical Imperative\" or Fitzlipuzli.[2] For what but fear can move\na hard heart?\n\nFurthermore, on p. 13 (R., p. 19), in accordance with the above view,\nwe find that the moral worth of an action is supposed to lie, by\nno means in the =intention= which led to it, but in the maxim\nwhich was followed. Whereas I, on the contrary, ask the reader to\nreflect that it is the =intention alone= which decides as to the\nmoral worth, or worthlessness, off an action, so that the same act\nmay deserve condemnation or praise according to the intention which\ndetermined it. Hence it is that, whenever men discuss a proceeding\nto which some moral importance is attached, the =intention= is\nalways investigated, and by this standard alone the matter is judged;\nas, likewise, it is in the _intention_ alone that every one seeks\njustification, if he see his conduct misinterpreted or excuse, if its\nconsequence be mischievous.\n\nOn p. 14 (R., p. 20) we at last reach the definition of Duty, which\nis the fundamental conception of Kant's entire ethical system. It is:\n\"The necessity of an action out of respect for the law.\" But what is\n=necessary= takes place with absolute certainty while conduct\nbased on pure duty generally does not come off at all. And not only\nthis; Kant himself admits (p. 25; R., p. 28) that there are =no\ncertain instances= on record of conduct determined solely by pure\nduty; and on p. 26 (R., p. 29) he says: \"It is utterly impossible to\nknow with certainty from experience whether there has ever really\nbeen one single case in which an action, however true to duty, has\nrested simply on its idea.\"--And similarly on p. 28 (R., p. 30)\nand p. 49 (R., p. 50). In what sense then can =necessity= be\nattributed to such an action? As it is only fair always to put the\nmost favourable interpretation on an author's words, we will suppose\nhim to mean that an act true to duty is =objectively= necessary,\nbut =subjectively= accidental. Only it is precisely this that\nis more easily said than thought for where is the =Object= of\nthis =objective= necessity, the consequence of which for the\nmost part, perhaps indeed always, fails to be realised in objective\nreality! With every wish to be unbiassed, I cannot but think that\nthe expression--=necessity of an action=--is nothing but an\nartificially concealed, very forced paraphrase of the word \"ought.\"[3]\nThis will become clearer if we notice that in the same definition the\nword _Achtung_ (respect) is employed, where _Gehorsam_ (obedience) is\nmeant. Similarly in the note on p. 16 (R., p. 20) we read: \"_Achtung_\nsignifies simply the subordination of my will to a law. The direct\ndetermination of the will by a law, and the consciousness that it is\nso determined--this is what is denoted by _Achtung_\" In what language?\nIn German the proper term is _Gehorsam_. But the word _Achtung_, so\nunsuitable as it is, cannot without a reason have been put in place of\nthe word _Gehorsam._ It must serve some purpose; and this is obviously\nnone other than to veil the derivation of the imperative form, and of\nthe conception of duty, from theological Morals; just as we saw above\nthat the expression \"necessity of an action,\" which is such a forced\nand awkward substitute for the word \"shall,\" was only chosen because\n\"shall\" is the exact language of the Decalogue. The above definition:\n\"Duty is the necessity of an action out of respect for the law,\" would\ntherefore read in natural, undisguised, plain language: \"Duty signifies\nan action which =ought= to be done out of obedience to a law.\"\nThis is \"the real form of the poodle.\"[4]\n\nBut now as to the Law, which is the real foundation stone of the\nKantian Ethics. =What does it contain? And where is it inscribed?=\nThis is the chief point of inquiry. In the first place, be it observed\nthat we have two questions to deal with: the one has to do with the\n=Principle=, the other with the =Basis= of Ethics--two\nentirely different things, although they are frequently, and sometimes\nindeed intentionally, confused.\n\nThe principle or main proposition of an ethical system is the shortest\nand most concise definition of the line of conduct which it prescribes,\nor, if it have no imperative form, of the line of conduct to which it\nattaches real moral worth. It thus contains, in the general terms of\na single enunciation, the direction for following the path of virtue,\nwhich is derived from that system: in other words, it is the _\u1f45,\u03c4\u03b9_[5]\nof virtue. Whereas the =Basis= of any theory of Ethics is the\n_\u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b9_[6] of virtue, the =reason= of the obligation enjoined,\nof the exhortation or praise given, whether it be sought in human\nnature, or in the external conditions of the world, or in anything\nelse. As in all sciences, so also in Ethics the _\u1f45,\u03c4\u03b9_ must be clearly\ndistinguished from the _\u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b9_. But most teachers of Morals wilfully\nconfound this difference: probably because the _\u1f45,\u03c4\u03b9_ is so easy, the\n_\u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b9_ so exceedingly difficult, to give. They are therefore glad to\ntry to make up for the poverty on the one hand, by the riches on the\nother, and to bring about a happy marriage between _\u03a0\u03b5\u03bd\u03af\u03b1_ (poverty)\nand _\u03a0\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2_ (plenty), by putting them together in one proposition.[7]\nThis is generally done by taking the familiar _\u1f45,\u03c4\u03b9_ out of the simple\nform in which it can be expressed, and forcing it into an artificial\nformula, from which it is only to be deduced as the conclusion of\ngiven premises; and the reader is led by this performance to feel\nas if he had grasped not only the thing, but its cause as well. We\nmay easily convince ourselves of this by recalling all the most\nfamiliar principles of Morals. As, however, in what follows I have\nno intention of imitating acrobatic tricks of this sort, but purpose\nproceeding with all honesty and straightforwardness, I cannot make the\nprinciple of Ethics equivalent to its basis, but must keep the two\nquite separate. Accordingly, this _\u1f45,\u03c4\u03b9_--_i.e._, the principle, the\nfundamental proposition--as to which in its essence all teachers of\nMorals are really at one, however much they may clothe it in different\ncostumes, I shall at once express in the form which I take to be\nthe simplest and purest possible, _viz.: Neminem laede, immo omnes,\nquantum potes, juva_. (Do harm to no one; but rather help all people,\nas far as lies in your power.) This is in truth the proposition which\nall ethical writers expend their energies in endeavouring to account\nfor. It is the common result of their manifold and widely differing\ndeductions; it is the _\u1f45,\u03c4\u03b9_ for which the _\u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b9_ is still sought\nafter; the consequence, the cause of which is wanting. Hence it is\nitself nothing but the _Datum_ (the thing given), in relation to which\nthe _Quaesitum_ (the thing required) is the problem of every ethical\nsystem, as also of the present prize essay. The solution of this\nriddle will disclose the real foundation of Ethics, which, like the\nphilosopher's stone, has been searched for from time immemorial. That\nthe _Datum_, the _\u1f45,\u03c4\u03b9_, the principle is most purely expressed by the\nenunciation I have given, can be seen from the fact that it stands to\nevery other precept of Morals as a conclusion to given premises, and\ntherefore constitutes the real goal it is desired to attain; so that\nall other ethical commandments can only be regarded as paraphrases, as\nindirect or disguised statements, of the above simple proposition. This\nis true, for instance, even of that trite and apparently elementary\nmaxim: _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_[8] (Do not to\nanother what you are unwilling should be done to yourself.) The defect\nhere is that the wording only touches the duties imposed by law, not\nthose required by virtue;--a thing which can be easily remedied by\nthe omission of _non_ and _ne_. Thus changed, it really means nothing\nelse than: _Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes, juva._ But as\nthis sense is only reached by a periphrasis, the formula gains the\nappearance of having also revealed its own ultimate foundation, its\n_\u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b9_; which, however, is not the case, because it does not in the\nleast follow that, if I am unwilling that something be done to myself,\nI ought not to do it to others. The same is true of every other\nprinciple or leading proposition of Ethics that has hitherto been put\nforward.\n\nIf we now return to the above question:--how does the law read, in\nobeying which, according to Kant, duty consists? and on what is it\nbased?--we shall find that our philosopher, like most others, has in an\nextremely artificial manner closely connected the principle of Morals\nwith its basis. I again call attention to what I have already examined\nat the outset--I mean, the Kantian claim that the principle of Ethics\nmust be purely _a priori_ and purely formal, indeed an _a priori_\nsynthetical proposition, which consequently may not contain anything\nmaterial, nor rest upon anything empirical, whether objectively in\nthe external world, or subjectively in consciousness, such as any\nfeeling, inclination, impulse, and the like. Kant was perfectly aware\nof the difficulty of this position; for on p. 60 (R., p. 53) he says:\n\"It will be seen that philosophy has here indeed reached a precarious\nstandpoint, which yet is to be immovable, notwithstanding that it\nis neither dependent on, nor supported by, anything in heaven or on\nearth.\" We shall therefore with all the greater interest and curiosity\nawait the solution of the problem he has set himself, namely, how\nsomething is to arise out of nothing, that is, how out of purely _a\npriori_ conceptions, which contain nothing empirical or material, the\nlaws of material human action are to grow up. This is a process which\nwe may find symbolised in chemistry, where out of three invisible gases\n(Azote, Hydrogen, and Chlorine[9]), and thus in apparently empty space,\nsolid sal-ammoniac is evolved before our eyes.\n\nI will, however, explain, more clearly than Kant either would or\ncould, the method whereby he accomplishes this difficult task. The\ndemonstration is all the more necessary because what he did appears\nto be seldom properly understood. Almost all Kant's disciples have\nfallen into the mistake of supposing that he presents his Categorical\nImperative directly as a fact of consciousness. But in that case\nits origin would be anthropological, and, as resting on experience,\nalthough internal, it would have an empirical basis: a position which\nruns directly counter to the Kantian view, and which he repeatedly\nrejects. Thus on p. 48 (R., p. 44) he says: \"It cannot be empirically\ndetermined whether any such Categorical Imperative exists everywhere\";\nand again, on p. 49 (R., p. 45): \"The possibility of the Categorical\nImperative must be investigated entirely on _a priori_ grounds,\nbecause here we are not helped by any testimony of experience as to\nits reality.\" Even Reinhold, his first pupil, missed this point; for\nin his _Beitrage zur Uebersicht der Philosophie am Anfange des_ 19.\n_Jahrhunderts_, No. 2, p. 21, we find him saying: \"Kant assumes the\nmoral law to be a direct and certain reality, an original fact of the\nmoral consciousness.\" But if Kant had wished to make the Categorical\nImperative a fact of consciousness, and thus give it an empirical\nfoundation, he certainly would not have failed at least to put it\nforward as such. And this is precisely what he never does. As far as\nI know, the Categorical Imperative appears for the first time in the\n_Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ (p. 802 of the first, and p. 830 of the\nfifth edition), entirely ex nunc (unexpectedly), without any preamble,\nand merely connected with the preceding sentence by an altogether\nunjustifiable \"therefore.\"; It is only in the _Grundlage zur Metaphysik\nder Sitten_--a book to which we here devote especial attention--that\nit is first introduced expressly and formally, as a deduction from\ncertain concepts. Whereas in Reinhold's _Formula concordiae des\nKriticismus_,[10] we actually read on p. 122 the following sentence:\n\"We distinguish moral self-consciousness from the =experience=\nwith which it, as an original fact transcending all knowledge, is\nbound up in the human consciousness; and we understand by such\nself-consciousness the =direct consciousness of duty=, that is, of\nthe =necessity= we are under of admitting the legitimacy--whether\npleasurable or the reverse--of the will, as the stimulus and as the\nmeasure of its own operations.\"\n\nThis would of course be \"a charming _thesis_, with a very pretty\n_hypothesis_ to boot.\"[11] But seriously: into what an outrageous\n_petitio principii_ do we find Kant's moral law here developed! If\n=that= were true, Ethics would indubitably have a basis of\nincomparable solidity, and there would be no need of any questions\nbeing set for prize essays, to encourage inquiry in this direction.\nBut the greatest marvel would be, that men had been so slow in\ndiscovering such a fact of consciousness, considering that for the\nspace of thousands of years a basis for Morals has been sought after\nwith zealous patient toil. How Kant himself is responsible for this\ndeplorable mistake, I shall explain further on; nevertheless, one\ncannot but wonder at the undisputed predominance of such a radical\nerror among his disciples. Have they never, whilst writing all their\nnumberless books on the Kantian philosophy, noticed the disfigurement\nwhich the _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ underwent in the second\nedition, and which made it an incoherent, self-contradictory work?\nIt seems that this has only now come to light; and, in my opinion,\nthe fact has been quite correctly analysed in Rosenkranz's preface to\nthe second volume of his complete edition of Kant's works. We must,\nhowever, remember that many scholars, being unceasingly occupied as\nteachers and authors, find very little time left for private and exact\nresearch. It is certain that _docendo disco_ (I learn by teaching) is\nnot unconditionally true; sometimes indeed one is tempted to parody\nit by saying: _semper docendo nihil disco_ (by always teaching I\nlearn nothing); and even what Diderot puts into the mouth of Rameau's\nnephew is not altogether without reason: \"'And as for these teachers,\ndo you suppose they understand the sciences they give instruction\nin? Not a bit of it, my dear sir, not a bit of it. If they possessed\nsufficient knowledge to be able to teach them, they would not do so.'\n'Why?' 'Because they would have devoted their lives to the study of\nthem.'\"--(Goethe's translation, p. 104.) Lichtenberg too says: \"I have\nrather observed that professional people are often exactly those who\ndo not know best.\" But to return to the Kantian Ethics: most persons,\nprovided only the conclusion reached agrees with their moral feelings,\nimmediately assume that there is no flaw to be found in its derivation;\nand if the process of deduction looks difficult, they do not trouble\nthemselves much about it, but are content to trust the faculty.\n\nThus the foundation which Kant gave to his moral law by no means\nconsists in its being proved empirically to be a fact of consciousness;\nneither does he base it on an appeal to moral feeling, nor yet on\na _petitio principii_, under its fine modern name of an \"absolute\nPostulate.\" It is formed rather of a very subtle process of thought,\nwhich he twice advances, on p. 17 and p. 51 (R., p. 22, and p. 46), and\nwhich I shall now proceed to make clear.\n\nKant, be it observed, ridiculed all empirical stimuli of the will,\nand began by removing everything, whether subjective or objective, on\nwhich a law determining the will's action could be empirically based.\nThe consequence is, that he has nothing left for the substance of his\nlaw but simply its =Form=. Now this can only be the abstract\nconception of =lawfulness=. But the conception of lawfulness\nis built up out of what is valid for all persons equally. Therefore\nthe substance of the law consists of the conception of what is\nuniversally valid, and its contents are of course nothing else than its\n=universal validity=. Hence the formula will read as follows: \"Act\nonly in accordance with that precept which you can also wish should\nbe a general law for all rational beings.\" This, then, is the real\nfoundation--for the most part so greatly misunderstood--which Kant\nconstructed for his principle of Morals, and therefore for his whole\nethical system. Compare also the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_, p.\n61 (R., p. 147); the end of Note 1.\n\nI pay Kant a tribute of sincere admiration for the great acumen he\ndisplayed in carrying out this dexterous feat, but I continue in\nall seriousness my examination of his position according to the\nstandard of truth. I will only observe--and this point I shall take\nup again later on--that here =reason=, because, and in so far\nas, it works out the above explained special ratiocination, receives\nthe name of =practical reason=. Now the Categorical Imperative\nof Practical Reason is the law which results from this process of\nthought. Consequently Practical Reason is not in the least what most\npeople, including even Fichte, have regarded it--a special faculty\nthat cannot be traced to its source, a _qualitas occulta_, a sort of\nmoral instinct, like Hutcheson's \"moral sense\"; but it is (as Kant\nhimself in his preface, p. xii. [R., p. 8], and elsewhere, often enough\ndeclares) one and the same with =theoretical reason=--is, in fact,\n=theoretical reason= itself, in so far as the latter works out the\nratiocinative process I have described. It is noticeable that Fichte\ncalls the Categorical Imperative of Kant an =absolute Postulate=\n(_Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre_, T\u00fcbingen, 1802, p.\n240, Note). This is the modern, more showy, expression for _petitio\nprincipii_, and thus we see that he, too, regularly accepted the\nCategorical Imperative, and consequently must be included among those\nwho have fallen into the mistake above criticised.\n\nThe objection, to which this Kantian basis of Morals is at once and\ndirectly exposed, lies in the fact that such an origin of a moral law\nin us is impossible, because of its assumption that man would quite\nof his own accord hit on the idea of looking about for, and inquiring\nafter, a law to which his will should be subject, and which should\nshape its actions. This procedure, however, cannot possibly occur to\nhim of itself; at best it could only be after another moral; stimulus\nhad supplied the first impulse and motive thereto; and such a stimulus\nwould have to be positively operative, and real; and show itself to be\nsuch, as well as spontaneously influence, indeed force its presence\nupon, the mind. But anything of this sort would run counter to Kant's\nassumption, which, according to the chain of reasoning above described,\nis to be regarded as itself the origin of all moral conceptions--in\nfact, the _punctum saliens_ of Morality. Consequently, as long as there\nis no such antecedent incentive (because, _ex hypothesi_, there exists\nno other moral stimulus but the process of thought already explained),\nso long Egoism alone must remain as the plumb-line of human conduct,\nas the guiding thread of the law of motivation; so long the entirely\nempirical and egoistic motives of the moment, alone and unchecked,\nmust determine, in each separate case, the conduct of a man; since,\non this assumption, there is no voice to arrest him, neither does any\nreason whatever exist, why he should be minded to inquire after, to\nsay nothing of anxiously searching for, a law which should limit and\ngovern his will. And yet it is only possible on this supposition that\nhe should think out the above remarkable piece of mental legerdemain.\nIt matters not how far we may care to put a strict and exact\ninterpretation on this Kantian process, or whether we choose to tone it\ndown to some dim, obscurely felt operation of thought. No modification\nof it can attack the primary truths that out of nothing, nothing\ncomes, and that an effect requires a cause. The moral stimulus, like\nevery motive that effects the will, must in all cases make itself felt\nspontaneously, and therefore have a positive working, and consequently\nbe real. And because for men the only thing which has reality is the\nempirical, or else that which is supposed to have a possibly empirical\nexistence, therefore it follows that the moral stimulus cannot but\nbe empirical, and show itself as such of its own accord; and without\nwaiting for us to begin our search, it must come and press itself upon\nus, and this with such force that it may, at least possibly, overcome\nthe opposing egoistic motives in all their giant strength. For Ethics\nhas to do with actual human conduct, and not with the _a priori_\nbuilding of card houses--a performance which yields results that no man\nwould ever turn to in the stern stress and battle of life, and which,\nin face of the storm of our passions, would be about as serviceable as\na syringe in a great fire.\n\nI have already noticed above how Kant considered it a special merit of\nhis moral law that it is founded solely on abstract, pure _a priori_\nconceptions, consequently on =pure reason=; whereby its validity\nobtains (he says) not only for men, but for all rational beings as\nsuch. All the more must we regret that pure, abstract conceptions _a\npriori_, without real contents, and without any kind of empirical\nbasis can never move, at any rate, men; of other rational beings\nI am of course incapable of speaking. The second defect, then, in\nKant's ethical basis is its lack of real substance. So far this has\nescaped notice, because the real nature of his foundation has in all\nprobability been thoroughly understood only by an exceedingly small\nnumber of those who were its enthusiastic propagandists. The second\nfault, I repeat, is entire want of reality, and hence of possible\nefficacy. The structure floats in the air, like a web of the subtlest\nconceptions devoid of all contents; it is based on nothing, and can\ntherefore support nothing, and move nothing. And yet Kant loaded it\nwith a burden of enormous weight, namely, the hypothesis of the Freedom\nof the Will. In spite of his oft declared conviction that freedom in\nhuman action has absolutely no place; that theoretically not even its\npossibility is thinkable (_Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_, p. 168;\nR., p. 223); that, if the character of a man, and all the motives which\nwork on him were exactly known, his conduct could be calculated as\ncertainly and as precisely as an eclipse of the moon (_ibidem_, p. 177;\nR., p. 230): he nevertheless makes an assumption of freedom (although\nonly _idealiter_, and as a postulate) by his celebrated conclusion:\n\"You can, because you ought\"; and this on the strength of his precious\nethical basis, which, as we see, floats in the air incorporeal. But if\nit has once been clearly recognised that a thing =is not=, and\n=cannot be=, what is the use of all the postulates in the world?\nIt would be much more to the purpose to cast away that on which the\npostulate is based, because it is an impossible supposition; and this\ncourse would be justified by the rule _a non posse ad non esse valet\nconsequentia_;[12] and by a _reductio ad absurdum_, which would at the\nsame time be fatal to the Categorical Imperative. Instead of which one\nfalse doctrine is built up on the other.\n\nThe inadmissibility of a basis for Morals consisting of a few entirely\nabstract and empty conceptions must have been apparent to Kant himself\nin secret. For in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_, where (as I\nhave already said) he is not so strict and methodical in his work, and\nwhere we find him becoming bolder on account of the fame he had gained,\nit is remarkable how the ethical basis gradually changes its nature,\nand almost forgets that it is a mere web of abstract ideas; in fact,\nit seems distinctly desirous of becoming more substantial. Thus, for\ninstance, on p. 81 (R., p. 163) of the above work are the words: \"The\nMoral Law =in some sort a fact of Pure Reason=.\" What is one to\nthink of this extraordinary expression? In every other place that which\nis fact is opposed to what is knowable by pure reason. Similarly on\np. 83 (R., p. 164) we read of \"a Reason which directly determines the\nWill\"; and so on.\n\nNow let us remember that in laying his foundation Kant expressly and\nrepeatedly rejects every anthropological basis, everything that\ncould prove the Categorical Imperative to be a fact of consciousness,\nbecause such a proof would be empirical. Nevertheless, his successors\nwere so emboldened by incidental utterances like the above that\nthey went to much greater lengths. Fichte in his work, _System der\nSittenlehre_, p. 49, warns us expressly \"not to allow ourselves to be\nmisled into trying to explain, and derive from external sources, the\nconsciousness that we have duties, because this would be detrimental\nto the dignity and absoluteness of the law.\" A very nice excuse! Again\non p. 66 he says: \"The principle of Morality is a thought which is\nbased on the =intellectual intuition= of the absolute activity\nof the intelligence, and which is directly conceived by the pure\nintelligence of its own accord.\" What a fine flourish to conceal the\nhelplessness of this clap-trap! Whoever may like to convince himself\nhow Kant's disciples, little by little, totally forgot and ignored\nthe real nature of the foundation and derivation which their master\noriginally gave to the moral law, should read a very interesting essay\nin Reinhold's _Beitrage zur Uebersicht der Philosophie im Anfange des_\n19. _Jahrhunderts_, No. 2, 1801. In it, on pp. 105 and 106, it is\nmaintained \"that in the Kantian philosophy Autonomy (which is the same\nthing as the Categorical Imperative) is a fact of consciousness, and\ncannot be traced further back, inasmuch as it declares itself by means\nof a direct consciousness.\"\n\nBut in this case, it would have an anthropological, and consequently\nempirical, foundation--a position which is diametrically opposed to\nKant's explicit and repeated utterances. Again, on p. 108 we find:\n\"Both in the practical philosophy of criticism, and in the whole of the\npurified or higher transcendental philosophy, Autonomy is that which\nis founded, and which founds, by itself alone; and which is neither\ncapable of, nor requires, any other foundation; it is that which is\nabsolutely original, true and certain _per se;_ the primal truth; the\n_prius \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4' \u1f10\u03be\u03bf\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd (par excellence)_; the absolute principle. Whoever,\ntherefore, imagines, requires, or seeks any basis for this Autonomy\nexternal to itself, can only be regarded by the Kantian School as\nwanting in moral consciousness;[13] or else as failing to interpret\nthis consciousness correctly, through the employment of false first\nprinciples in his speculations. The School of Fichte and Schelling\ndeclares him to be afflicted with a dulness of intellect that renders\nhim incapable of being a philosopher, and forms the characteristic of\nthe unholy _canaille_, and the sluggish brute, or (to use Schelling's\nmore veiled expression) of the _profanum vulgus_ and the _ignavum\npecus_.\" Every one will understand how much truth there can be in a\ndoctrine which it is sought to uphold by such defiant and dogmatic\nrhetoric. Meanwhile, we must doubtless explain by the respect that this\nlanguage inspired, the really childish credulity with which Kant's\nfollowers accepted the Categorical Imperative, and at once treated\nit as a matter beyond dispute. The truth is that in this case any\nobjections raised to a theoretical assertion might easily be confounded\nwith moral obliquity; so that every one, although he had no very clear\nidea in his own mind of the Categorical Imperative, yet preferred to\nbe silent, believing, as he did, in secret, that others were probably\nbetter off, and had succeeded in evolving a clearer and more definite\nmental picture of it. For no one likes to turn his conscience inside\nout.\n\nThus in the Kantian School Practical Reason with its Categorical\nImperative appears more and more as a hyperphysical fact, as a Delphian\ntemple in the human soul, out of whose dark recesses proceed oracles\nthat infallibly declare not, alas! what will, but what ought to,\nhappen. This doctrine of Practical Reason, as a direct and immediate\nfact, once it had been adopted, or rather introduced by artifice\ncombined with defiance, was unhappily later on extended also to\nTheoretical Reason; and not unnaturally: for Kant himself had often\nsaid that both are but one and the same Reason (_e.g_., Preface, p.\nxii; R., p. 8). After it had been once admitted that in the domain of\nthe Practical there is a Reason which dictates _ex tripode_,[14] it was\nan easy step to concede the same privilege to Theoretical Reason also,\nclosely related as the latter is to the former--indeed, consubstantial\nwith it. The one was thus pronounced to be just as immediate as the\nother, the advantage of this being no less immense than obvious.\n\nThen it was that all philosophasters and fancy-mongers, with J.H.\nJacobi--the denouncer of atheists--at their head, came crowding to\nthis postern which was so unexpectedly opened to them. They wanted\nto bring their small wares to market, or at least to save what they\nmost valued of the old heirlooms which Kant's teaching threatened\nto pulverise. As in the life of the individual a single youthful\nmistake often ruins the whole career; so when Kant made that one\nfalse assumption of a Practical Reason furnished with credentials\nexclusively transcendent, and (like the supreme courts of appeal)\nwith powers of decision \"without grounds,\" the result was that out of\nthe austere gravity of the Critical Philosophy was evolved a teaching\nutterly heterogeneous to it. We hear of a Reason at first only dimly\n\"surmising,\" then clearly \"comprehending\" the \"Supersensuous,\" and\nat last endowed with a perfect \"intellectual intuition\" of it. Every\ndreamer could now promulgate his mental freaks as the \"absolute,\"\n_i.e._, officially issued, deliverances, and revelations of this\nReason. Nor need we be surprised if the new privilege was fully taken\nadvantage of.\n\nHere, then, is the origin of that philosophical method which appeared\nimmediately after Kant, and which is made up of clap-trap, of\nmystification, of imposture, of deception, and of throwing dust in the\neyes. This era will be known one day in the History of Philosophy as\n\"The Period of Dishonesty.\" For it was signalised by the disappearance\nof the characteristic of honesty, of searching after truth in common\nwith the reader, which was well marked in the writings of all previous\nphilosophers. The philosophaster's object was not to instruct, but\nto befool his hearers, as every page attests. At first Fichte and\nSchelling shine as the heroes of this epoch; to be followed by the man\nwho is quite unworthy even of them, and greatly their inferior in point\nof talent--I mean the stupid and clumsy charlatan Hegel. The Chorus is\ncomposed of a mixed company of professors of philosophy, who in solemn\nfashion discourse to their public about the Endless, the Absolute, and\nmany other matters of which they can know absolutely nothing.\n\nAs a stepping-stone to raise Reason to her prophetic throne a\nwretched _jeu d'esprit_ was actually dragged in, and made to serve.\nIt was asserted that, as the word _Vernunft_ (Reason) comes from\n_vernehmen_ (to comprehend), therefore _Vernunft_ means a capacity\nto =comprehend= the so-called \"Supersensuous,\" _i.e._,\n_\u039d\u03b5\u03d5\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u03ba\u03ba\u03c5\u03b3\u03af\u03b1_,[15] or Cloud-cuckoo-town. This pretty notion met\nwith boundless, approval, and for the space of thirty years was\nconstantly repeated in Germany with immense satisfaction; indeed, it\nwas made the foundation of philosophic manuals. And yet it is as clear\nas noon-day that of course _Vernunft_ (Reason) comes from. _vernehmen_\n(to comprehend), but only because Reason makes man superior to animals,\nso that he not only hears, but also =comprehends= (_vernimmt_)--by\nno means, what is going on in Cloud-cuckoo-town--but what is said,\nas by one reasonable person to another, the words spoken being\n=comprehended= (_vernommen_) by the listener; and this capacity is\ncalled _Reason_ (_Vernunft_).\n\nSuch is the interpretation that all peoples, ages, and languages\nhave put on the word Reason. It has always been understood to mean\nthe possession of general, abstract, non-intuitive ideas, named\n=concepts=, which are denoted and fixed by means of words. This\nfaculty alone it is which in reality gives to men their advantage\nover animals. For these abstract ideas, or concepts, that is, mental\nimpressions formed of the sum of many separate things, are the\ncondition of =language= and through it of actual =thought=;\nthrough which again they determine the consciousness not only of the\npresent (which animals also have), but of the past and the future as\nsuch; whence it results that they are the _modulus_, so to say, of\nclear recollection, of circumspection, of foresight, and of intention;\nthe constant factor in the evolution of systematic co-operation, of\nthe state, of trades, arts, sciences, religions, and philosophies,\nin short, of everything that so sharply distinguishes human from\nanimal life. Beasts have only intuitive ideas, and therefore also\nonly intuitive motives; consequently the dependence of their volition\non motives is manifest. With man this dependence is no less a fact;\nhe, too (with due allowance for individual character), is affected\nby motives under the strictest law of necessity. Only these are\nfor the most part not _intuitive_ but _abstract_ ideas, that is,\nconceptions, or thoughts, which nevertheless are the result of previous\nintuitions, hence of external influences. This, however, gives him\na relative freedom--relative, that is, as compared with an animal.\nFor his action is not determined (as it is in all other creatures) by\nthe surroundings of the moment as intuitively perceived, but by the\nthoughts he has derived from experience, or gained by instruction.\nConsequently the motive, by which he, too, is necessarily swayed, is\nnot always at once obvious to the looker-on simultaneously with the\nact; it lies concealed in the brain. It is this that lends to all his\nmovements, as well as to his conduct and work as a whole, a character\nmanifestly different from that observable in the habits of beasts. He\nseems as though guided by finer, invisible threads; whence all his\nacts bear the stamp of deliberation and premeditation, thus gaining\nan appearance of independence, which sufficiently distinguishes them\nfrom those of animals. All these great differences, however, spring\nsolely out of the capacity for =abstract ideas, concepts=. This\ncapacity is therefore the essential part of =Reason=, that is,\nof the faculty peculiar to man, and it is called _\u03c4\u03bf \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd_,[16]\n_\u03c4\u03bf \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd,_ =ratio, la ragione, il discorso, raison, reason,\ndiscourse of reason=. If I were asked what the distinction is\nbetween it and =Verstand=, _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe1\u03c2_, =intellectus, entendement,\nunderstanding=; I should reply thus: The latter is that capacity\nfor knowledge which animals also possess in varying degrees, and which\nis seen in us at its highest development; in other words, it is the\ndirect consciousness of the law of =Causality=--a consciousness\nwhich precedes all experience, being constituted by the very form\nof the understanding, whose essential nature is, in fact, therein\ncontained. On it depends in the first place the intuitive perception of\nthe external world; for the senses by themselves are only capable of\n=impression=, a thing which is very far from being =intuitive\nperception=; indeed, the former is nothing but the material of the\nlatter: _\u03bd\u03bf\u1fe1\u03c2 \u1f41\u03c1\u1fb7, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03ba\u03bf\u03cd\u03b5\u03b9, \u03c4'\u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1 \u03ba\u03c9\u03d5\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03c5\u03d5\u03bb\u03ac._ (The mind\nsees, the mind hears; everything else is deaf and blind.) =Intuitive\nperception= is the result of our directly referring the impressions\nof the sense-organs to their cause, which, exactly because of this\nact of the intelligence, presents itself as an =external object=\nunder the mode of intuition proper to us, _i.e._, in =space=.\nThis is a proof that the Law of Causality is known to us _a priori_,\nand does not arise from experience, since experience itself, inasmuch\nas it presupposes intuitive perception, is only possible through the\nsame law. All the higher qualities of the intellect, all cleverness,\nsagacity, penetration, acumen are directly proportional to the\nexactness and fulness with which the workings of Causality in all its\nrelations are grasped; for all knowledge of the =connection=\nof things, in the widest sense of the word, is based on the\ncomprehension of this law, and the clearness and accuracy with which\nit is understood is the measure of one man's superiority to another\nin =understanding=, shrewdness, cunning. On the other hand, the\nepithet =reasonable= has at all times been applied to the man who\ndoes not allow himself to be guided by intuitive impressions, but by\n=thoughts= and =conceptions=, and who therefore always sets\nto work logically after due reflection and forethought. Conduct of this\nsort is everywhere known as =reasonable=. Not that this by any\nmeans implies uprightness and love for one's fellows. On the contrary,\nit is quite possible to act in the most reasonable way, that is,\naccording to conclusions scientifically deduced, and weighed with the\nnicest exactitude; and yet to follow the most selfish, unjust, and even\niniquitons maxims. So that never before Kant did it occur to any one\nto identify just, virtuous, and noble conduct with =reasonable=;\nthe two lines of behaviour have always been completely separated, and\nkept apart. The one depends on the =kind of motivation=; the\nother on the difference in fundamental principles. Only after Kant\n(because he taught that virtue has its source in Pure Reason) did the\nvirtuous and the reasonable become one and the same thing, despite the\nusage of these words which all languages have adopted--a usage which\nis not fortuitous, but the work of universal, and therefore uniform,\nhuman judgment. \"Reasonable\" and \"vicious\" are terms that go very\nwell together; indeed great, far-reaching crimes are only possible\nfrom their union. Similarly, \"unreasonable\" and \"noble-minded\" are\noften found associated; _e.g._, if I give to-day to the needy man\nwhat I shall myself require to-morrow more urgently than he; or,\nif I am so far affected as to hand over to one in distress the sum\nwhich my creditor is waiting for; and such cases could be multiplied\nindefinitely.\n\nWe have seen that this exaltation of Reason to be the source of all\nvirtue rests on two assertions. First, as =Practical Reason=,\nit is said to issue, like an oracle, peremptory Imperatives purely\n_a priori._ Secondly, taken in connection with the false explanation\nof =Theoretical Reason=, as given in the _Kritik der Reinen\nVernunft_, it is presented as a certain faculty essentially concerned\nwith the =Unconditioned=, as manifested in three alleged Ideas[17]\n(the impossibility of which the intellect at the same time recognises\n_a priori_). And we found that this position, as an _exemplar vitiis\nimitabile_,[18] led our muddy-headed philosophers, Jacobi at their\nhead, from bad to worse. They talked of =Reason= (_Vernunft_)\nas directly comprehending (_vernehmend_) the \"=Supersensuous=,\"\nand absurdly declared that it is a certain mental property which has\nto do essentially with things transcending all experience, _i.e._,\nwith metaphysics; and that it perceives directly and intuitively the\nultimate causes of all things, and of all Being, the Supersensuous,\nthe Absolute, the Divine, etc. Now, had it been wished to use Reason,\ninstead of deifying it, such assertions as these must long ago have\nbeen met by the simple remark that, if man, by virtue of a special\norgan, furnished by his Reason, for solving the riddle of the world,\npossessed an innate metaphysics that only required development; in\nthat case there would have to be just as complete agreement on\nmetaphysical matters as on the truths of arithmetic and geometry; and\nthis would make it totally impossible that there should exist on the\nearth a large number of radically different religions, and a still\nlarger number of radically different systems of philosophy. Indeed,\nwe may rather suppose that, if any one were found to differ from the\nrest in his religious or philosophical views, he would be at once\nregarded as a subject for mental pathology. Nor would the following\nplain reflection have failed to present itself. If we discovered a\nspecies of apes which intentionally prepared instruments for fighting,\nor building, or for any other purpose; we should immediately admit\nthat it was endowed with Reason. On the other hand, if we meet with\nsavages destitute of all metaphysics, or of all religion (and there are\nsuch); it does not occur to us to deny them Reason on that account.\nThe Reason that =proves= its pretended supersensuous knowledge\nwas duly brought back to bounds by Kant's critique; but Jacobi's\nwonderful Reason, that directly =comprehends= the supersensuous,\nhe must indeed have thought =beneath= all criticism. Meanwhile, a\ncertain imperious and oracular Reason of the same kind is still, at the\nUniversities, fastened on the shoulders of our innocent youth.\n\nNOTE.\n\nIf we wish to reach the real origin of this hypothesis of Practical\nReason, we must trace its descent a little further back. We shall find\nthat it is derived from a doctrine, which Kant totally confuted,\nbut which nevertheless, in this connection, lies secretly (indeed\nhe himself is not aware of it) at the root of his assumption of a\nPractical Reason with its Imperatives and its Autonomy--a reminiscence\nof a former mode of thought. I mean the so-called Rational Psychology,\naccording to which man is composed of two entirely heterogeneous\nsubstances--the material body, and the immaterial soul. Plato was\nthe first to formulate this dogma, and he endeavoured to prove it\nas an objective truth. But it was Descartes who, by working it out\nwith scientific exactness, perfectly developed and completed it. And\nthis is just what brought its fallacy to light, as demonstrated by\nSpinoza, Locke, and Kant successively. It was demonstrated by Spinoza;\nbecause his philosophy consists chiefly in the refutation of his\nmaster's twofold dualism, and because he entirely and expressly denied\nthe two Substances of Descartes, and took as his main principle the\nfollowing proposition: \"_Substantia cogitans et substantia externa\nuna eademque est substantia, quae jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attribute\ncomprehenditur._\"[19] It was demonstrated by Locke; for he combated\nthe theory of innate ideas, derived all knowledge from the sensuous,\nand taught that it is not impossible that Matter should think. And\nlastly, it was demonstrated by Kant, in his _Kritik der Rationalen\nPsychologie_, as given in the first edition. Leibnitz and Wolff were\nthe champions on the bad side; and this brought Leibnitz the undeserved\nhonour of being compared to the great Plato, who was really so unlike\nhim.\n\nBut to enter into details here would be out of place. According to\nthis Rational Psychology, the soul was originally and in its essence\na =perceiving= substance, and only as a consequence thereof did\nit become possessed of volition. According as it carried on these two\nmodes of its activity, Perception and Volition, conjoined with the\nbody, or incorporeal, and entirely _per se_, so it was endowed with a\nlower or higher faculty of perception, and of volition in like kind.\nIn its higher faculty the immaterial soul was active solely by itself,\nand without co-operation of the body. In this case it was _intellectus\npurus_, being composed of concepts, belonging exclusively to itself,\nand of the corresponding acts of will, both of which were absolutely\nspiritual, and had nothing sensuous about them--the sensuous being\nderived from the body.[20] So that it perceived nothing else but pure\nAbstracts, Universals, innate conceptions, _aeternae veritates_,\netc.; wherefore also its volition was entirely controlled by purely\nspiritual ideas like these. On the other hand, the soul's =lower=\nfaculty of Perception and Volition was the result of its working in\nconcert and close union with the various organs of the body, whereby a\nprejudicial effect was produced on its an mixed spiritual activity.\nHere, _i.e._, to this =lower= faculty, was supposed to belong\nevery =intuitive= perception, which consequently would have\nto be obscure and confused, while the =abstract=, formed by\nseparating from objects their qualities, would be clear! The will,\nwhich was determined by preceptions thus sensuously conditioned, formed\nthe lower Volition, and it was for the most part bad; for its acts\nwere guided by the impulse of the senses; while the other will (the\nhigher) was untrammelled, was guided by Pure Reason, and appertained\nonly to the immaterial soul. This doctrine of the Cartesians has been\nbest expounded by De la Forge, in his _Tractatus de Mente Humana_,\nwhere in chap. 23 we read:[21] _Non nisi eadem voluntas est, quae\nappellatur appetitus sensitivus, quando excitatur per judicia, quae\nformantur consequenter ad perceptiones sensuum; et quae appetitus\nrationalis nominatur, cum mens judicia format de propriis suis ideis,\nindependenter a cogitationibus sensuum confusis, quae inclinationum\nejus sunt causae.... Id, quod occasionem dedit, ut duae istae diversae\nvoluntatis propensiones pro duobus diversis appetitibus sumerentur,\nest, quod saepissime unus alteri opponatur, quia propositum, quod mens\nsuperaedificat propriis suis perceptionibus, non semper consentit cum\ncogitationibus, quae menti a corporis dispositione suggeruntur, per\nquam saepe obligatur ad aliquid volendum, dum ratio ejus earn aliud\noptare facit._\n\nOut of the dim reminiscence of such views there finally arose Kant's\ndoctrine of the Autonomy of the Will, which, as the mouth-piece of\nPure, Practical Reason, lays down the law for all rational beings as\nsuch, and recognises nothing but =formal= motives, as opposed\nto =material=; the latter determining only the lower faculty of\ndesires, to which the higher is hostile. For the rest, this whole\ntheory, which was not really systematically set forth till the time\nof Descartes, is nevertheless to be found as far back as Aristotle.\nIn his _De Anima_ I. 1, it is sufficiently clearly stated; while\nPlato in the _Phaedo_ (pp. 188 and 189, edit. Bipont.) had already\npaved the way, with no uncertain hints. After being elaborated to\ngreat perfection by the Cartesian doctrine, we find it a hundred\nyears later waxed bold and strong, and occupying the foremost place;\nbut precisely for this reason forced to reveal its true nature. An\nexcellent _r\u00e9sum\u00e9_ of the view which then prevailed is presented in\nMuratori's _Della Forza della Fantasia,_ chaps. 1-4 and 13. In this\nwork the imagination is regarded as a purely material, corporeal organ\nof the brain (the lower faculty of perception), its function being to\nintuitively apprehend the external world on the data of the senses;\nand nought remains for the immaterial soul but thinking, reflecting,\nand determining. It must have been felt how obviously this position\ninvolves the whole subject in doubt. For if Matter is capable of the\nintuitive apprehension of the world in all its complexity, it is\ninconceivable that it should not also be capable of abstracting this\nintuition; wherefrom everything else would follow. Abstraction is of\ncourse nothing else than an elimination of the qualities attaching to\nthings which are not necessary for general purposes, in other words,\nthe individual and special differences. For instance, if I disregard,\nor abstract, that which is peculiar to the sheep, ox, stag, camel,\netc., I reach the conception of ruminants. By this operation the ideas\nlose their intuitiveness, and as merely abstract, non-intuitive notions\nor concepts, they require words to fix them in the consciousness, and\nallow of their being adequately handled. All this shows that Kant\nwas still under the influence of the after-effect of that old-time\ndoctrine, when he propounded his Practical Reason with its Imperatives.\n\n\n[1] These epigrams form the close of Schiller's poem \"Die Philosophen,\"\nwhich is worth reading in this connection--(_Translator_.)\n\n[2] More correctly, Huitzilopochtli: a Mexican deity.\n\n[3] Or \"shall,\" as in the \"thou shall,\" of the Decalogue\n--(_Translator_.)\n\n[4] \"_Des Pudels Kern_\"; _V._ Goethe's _Faust_, Part I. _Studirzimmer._\nSchopenhauer means that his analysis has forced the real meaning\nout of Kant's language, just as Faust by his exorcism compels\nMephistopheles, who was in the form of a poodle, to resume his true\nform.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[5] _\u1f45,\u03c4\u03b9_: _i.e._, the \"what\" a thing is; its principle, or\nessence.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[6] _\u03b4\u03b9\u03cc\u03c4\u03b9_: _i.e._, the \"wherefore\" of a thing; its _raison d'\u00eatre,_\nits underlying cause.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[7] Schopenhauer was doubtless thinking of the famous myth in\nPlato's _Symposium_ Chap. 23 (Teubner's edition, Leipzig, 1875),\nwhere Eros is represented as the offspring of _\u03a0\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2_ and _\u03a0\u03b5\u03bd\u03af\u03b1_,\nwho on the birthday of Aphrodite were united in the garden of\nZeus.--(_Translator._)\n\n[8] Hugo Grotius attributes it to the Emperor Severus.\n\n[9] Azote=Nitrogen. The formula for Ammonium Chloride or Sal-ammoniac\nis NH4Cl.--(_Translator_).\n\n[10] To be found in the fifth number of the _Beitr\u00e4ge zur Uebersicht\nder Philosophie am Anfange des_ 19. _Jahrhunderts_--a journal of the\ngreatest importance for critical philosophy.\n\n[11] \"_Einen erklecklichen_ SATZ, _ja, und der auch was_ SETZT.\"\nSCHILLER.\n\n[12] To argue from impossibility to non-existence is valid--_i.e._\nthe impossibility of a thing makes its non-existence a safe\nconclusion.--(_Translator._)\n\n[13]\n\n_Dacht' ich's doch! Wissen sie nichts Vern\u00fcnftiges mehr_\n    _zu erwidern,_\n_Schieben sie's Einem geschwind in das Gewissen hinein_.\n                                  --SCHILLER, _Die Philosophen._\n\n_Just as I thought! Can they give no more any answer of reason,_\n_Quickly the ground is changed: Conscience, they say, is at fault._\n                                            --(_Translator._)\n\n\n[14] As from the Pythian tripod: _i.e._,--with official authority, _ex\ncathedra._\n\n[15] _V_. Aristoph., _Aves_, 819 _et alibi_.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[16] _\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2_ means \"remarkable,\" being never used in the sense of\n\"rational.\" _T\u1f78 logik\u1f78n_ is perhaps a possible expression; the right\nword is _\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2_.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[17] The three Ideas are: (1) The Psychological; (2) The Cosmological;\n(3) The Theological. _V_. The Paralogisms of Pure Reasons, in the\nDialectics: _Kritik der Reinen Vernunft,_ Part I.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[18] An example easy to be imitated in its faults. _V_. Horace, _Ep._\nLib. I., xix. 17.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[19] The thinking substance, and substance in extension are one and the\nself-same substance, which is contained now under the latter attribute\n(_i.e._, extension), now under the former (_i.e._, the attribute of\nthinking).--_Ethica_, Part II., Prop. 7. Corollary.\n\n[20] _Intellectio pura est intellectio, quae circa nullas imagines\ncorporeas versatur_. (Pure intelligence is intelligence that has\nnothing to do with any bodily forms.)--Cart., _Medit_., p. 188.\n\n[21] It is nothing but one and the same will, which at one time is\ncalled sensuous desire, when it is stimulated by acts of judgment,\nformed in consequence of perceptions of the senses; and which at\nanother time is called rational desire (_i.e._ desire of the reason),\nwhen the mind forms acts of judgment about its own proper ideas,\nindependently of the thoughts belonging to, and mixed up with, the\nsenses; which thoughts are the causes of the mind's tendencies....\nThat these two diverse propensities of the will should be regarded as\ntwo distinct desires is occasioned by the fact that very often the\none is opposed to the other, because the intention, which is built\nup by the mind on the foundation of its own proper perceptions, does\nnot always agree with the thoughts which are suggested to the mind by\nthe body's disposition; whereby it (the mind) is often constrained\nto will something, while its reason makes it choose something\ndifferent.--(_Translator_.)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nON THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.\n\n\nAfter having tested in the preceding chapter the actual basis of Kant's\nEthics, I now turn to that which rests on it--his =leading principle\nof Morals=. The latter is very closely connected with the former;\nindeed, in a certain sense, they both grew up together. We have seen\nthat the formula expressing the principle reads as follows: \"Act only\nin accordance with that precept which you can also wish should be a\ngeneral law for all rational beings.\" It is a strange proceeding for a\nman, who _ex hypothesi_ is seeking a law to determine what he should\ndo, and what he should leave undone, to be instructed first to search\nfor one fit to regulate the conduct of all possible rational beings;\nbut we will pass over that. It is sufficient only to notice the fact\nthat in the above guiding rule, as put forth by Kant, we have obviously\nnot reached the moral law itself, but only a finger-post, or indication\nwhere it is to be looked for. The money, so to say, is not yet paid\ndown, but we hold a safe draft for it. And who, then, is the cashier?\nTo say the truth at once: a paymaster in this connection surely very\nunexpected, being neither more nor less than =Egoism=, as I shall\nnow demonstrate.\n\nThe precept, it is said, which =I can wish= were the guide of all\nmen's conduct, is itself the real moral principle. That which =I can\nwish= is the hinge on which the given direction turns. But what can\nI truly wish, and what not? Clearly, in order to determine what I can\nwish in the matter under discussion, I require yet another criterion;\nfor without such I could never find the key to the instruction which\ncomes to me like a sealed order. Where, then, is this criterion to\nbe discovered? Certainly nowhere else but in my Egoism, which is the\nnearest, ever ready, original, and living standard of all volition, and\nwhich has at any rate the _jus primi occupantis_ before every moral\nprinciple. The direction for finding the real moral law, which is\ncontained in the Kantian rule, rests, as a matter of fact, on the tacit\nassumption that I can only wish for that which is most to my advantage.\nNow because, in framing a precept to be generally followed, I cannot\nregard myself as always active, but must contemplate my playing a\n=passive= part _eventualiter_ and at times; therefore from this\npoint of view my =egoism= decides for justice and loving-kindness;\nnot from any wish to =practise= these virtues, but because it\ndesires to =experience= them. We are reminded of the miser, who,\nafter listening to a sermon on beneficence, exclaims:\n\n    \"_Wie gr\u00fcndlich ausgef\u00fchrt, wie sch\u00f6n!_--\n       _Fast m\u00f6cht' ich betteln gehn.\"_\n    (How well thought out, how excellent!--\n         Almost I'd like to beg.)\n\nThis is the indispensable key to the direction in which Kant's leading\nprinciple of Ethics is embedded; nor can he help supplying it\nhimself. Only he refrains from doing so at the moment of propounding\nhis precept, lest we should feel shocked. It is found further on in\nthe text, at a decent distance, so as to prevent the fact at once\nleaping to light, that here, after all, in spite of his grand _a\npriori_ edifice, =Egoism= is sitting on the judge's seat, scales\nin hand. Moreover, it does not occur, till after he has decided,\nfrom the point of view of the _eventualiter_ passive side, that this\nposition holds good for the active _r\u00f4le_ as well. Thus, on p. 19 (R.,\np. 24) we read: \"That I could not =wish= for a general law to\nestablish lying, because people would no longer believe me, or else\npay me back in the =same coin=.\" Again on p. 55 (R., p. 49): \"The\nuniversality of a law to the effect that every one could promise what\nhe likes, without any intention of keeping his word, would make the\npromise itself, together with the object in view, whatever that might\nbe, impossible; for no one would =believe= it.\" On p. 56 (R., p.\n50), in connection with the maxim of =hard-heartedness=, we find\nthe following: \"A will, which should determine this, would contradict\nitself; for cases can occur, in which a man needs the love and sympathy\nof others, and in which he, by virtue of such a natural law, evolved\nfrom his own will, would deprive himself of all hope of the help,\nwhich he desires.\" Similarly in the _Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_\n(Part I., vol. i., chap. 2, p. 123; R., p. 192): \"If every one were to\nregard others' distress with total indifference, and you were to belong\nto such an order of things; would you be there with the concurrence\nof your will?\" _Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam_![1]\none could reply. These passages sufficiently show in what sense the\nphrase, \"to be able to wish,\" in Kant's formula is to be understood.\nBut it is in the _Metaphysische Anfangsgr\u00fcnde der Tugendlehre_, that\nthis real nature of his ethical principle is most clearly stated. In\n\u00a7 30 we read: \"For every one wishes to be helped. If, however, a man\nwere to give utterance to his rule of unwillingness to help others,\nall people would be justified in refusing him assistance. Thus this\nrule of selfishness contradicts itself.\" =Would be justified=,\nhe says, =would be justified=! Here, then, it is declared, as\nexplicitly as anything can be, that moral obligation rests solely and\nentirely on presupposed =reciprocity=; consequently it is utterly\nselfish, and only admits of being interpreted by egoism, which, under\nthe condition of =reciprocity=, knows how to make a compromise\ncleverly enough. Such a course would be quite in place if it were a\nquestion of laying down the fundamentals of state-organisation, but\nnot, when we come to construct those of ethics. In the _Grundlegung_,\np. 81 (R., p. 67), the following sentence occurs: \"The principle of\nalways acting in accordance with that precept which you can also wish\nwere universally established as law--this is the only condition under\nwhich a man's will can never be in antagonism with itself.\" From what\nhas been said above, it will be apparent that the true meaning of the\nword \"antagonism\" may be thus explained: if a man should sanction the\nprecept of injustice and hard-heartedness, he would subsequently, in\nthe event of his playing a =passive= part, recall it, and so his\nwill would =contradict= itself.\n\nFrom this analysis it is abundantly clear that Kant's famous leading\nprinciple is not--as he maintains with tireless repetition--a\n=categorical=, but in reality a =hypothetical= Imperative;\nbecause it tacitly presupposes the condition that the law to be\nestablished for what I do--inasmuch as I make it universal--shall\nalso be a law for what is done to me; and because I, under this\ncondition, as the _eventualiter_ non-active party, =cannot=\npossibly =wish= for injustice and hard-heartedness. But if I\nstrike out this proviso, and, trusting perhaps to my surpassing\nstrength of mind and body, think of myself as always =active=,\nand never =passive=; then, in choosing the precept which is to\nbe universally valid, if there exists no basis for ethics other than\nKant's, I can perfectly well wish that injustice and hard-heartedness\nshould be the general rule, and consequently order the world\n\n                        Upon the simple plan,\n    That they should take, who have the power,\n    And they should keep, who can.\n                                 --(WORDSWORTH.)\n\nIn the foregoing chapter we showed that the Kantian leading principle\nof Ethics is devoid of all real foundation. It is now clear that to\nthis singular defect must be added, notwithstanding Kant's express\nassertion to the contrary, its concealed hypothetical nature, whereby\nits basis turns out to be nothing else than Egoism, the latter being\nthe secret interpreter of the direction which it contains. Furthermore,\nregarding it solely as a formula, we find that it is only a\nperiphrasis, an obscure and disguised mode of expressing the well-known\nrule: _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_ (do not to another\nwhat you are unwilling should be done to yourself); if, that is, by\nomitting the _non_ and _ne_, we remove the limitation, and include the\nduties taught by love as well as those prescribed by law. For it is\nobvious that this is the only precept which I can wish should regulate\nthe conduct of all men (speaking, of course, from the point of view of\nthe possibly =passive part= I may play, where my =Egoism=\nis touched). This rule, _Quod tibi fieri, etc._, is, however, in its\nturn, merely a circumlocution for, or, if it be preferred, a premise\nof, the proposition which I have laid down as the simplest and purest\ndefinition of the conduct required by the common consent of all ethical\nsystems; namely, _Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes, juva_ (do\nharm to no one; but rather help all people, as far as lies in your\npower). The true and real substance of Morals is this, and never can\nbe anything else. But on what is it based? What is it that lends force\nto this command? This is the old and difficult problem with which man\nis still to-day confronted. For, on the other side, we hear Egoism\ncrying with a loud voice: _Neminem juva, immo omnes, si forte conducit,\nlaede_ (help nobody, but rather injure all people, if it brings you any\nadvantage); nay more, Malice gives us the variant: _Immo omnes, quantum\npotes, laede_ (but rather injure all people as far as you can). To\nbring into the lists a combatant equal, or rather superior to Egoism\nand Malice combined--this is the task of all Ethics. _Heic Rhodus, heic\nsalta!_[2]\n\nThe division of human duty into two classes has long been recognised,\nand no doubt owes its origin to the nature of morality itself. We\nhave. (1) the duties ordained by law (otherwise called the--perfect,\nobligatory, narrower duties), and (2) those prescribed by virtue\n(otherwise called imperfect, wider, meritorious, or, preferably, the\nduties taught by love). On p. 57 (R., p. 60) we find Kant desiring\nto give a further confirmation to the moral principle, which he\npropounded, by undertaking to derive this classification from it. But\nthe attempt turns out to be so forced, and so obviously bad, that\nit only testifies in the strongest way against the soundness of his\nposition. For, according to him, the duties laid down by statutes rest\non a precept, the contrary of which, taken as a general natural law, is\ndeclared to be quite =unthinkable= without contradiction; while\nthe duties inculcated by virtue are made to depend on a maxim, the\nopposite of which can (he says) be conceived as a general natural law,\nbut cannot possibly be wished for. I beg the reader to reflect that the\nrule of injustice, the reign of might instead of right, which in the\nKantian view is not even thinkable as a natural law, is in reality,\nand in point of fact, the dominant order of things not only in the\nanimal kingdom, but among men as well. It is true that an attempt has\nbeen made among civilised peoples to obviate its injurious effects by\nmeans of all the machinery of state government; but as soon as this,\nwherever, or of whatever kind, it be, is suspended or eluded, the\nnatural law immediately resumes its sway. Indeed between nation and\nnation it never ceases to prevail; the customary jargon about justice\nis well known to be nothing but diplomacy's official style; the real\narbiter is brute force. On the other hand, genuine, _i.e._, voluntary,\nacts of justice, do occur beyond all doubt, but always only as\nexceptions to the rule. Furthermore: wishing to give instances by way\nof introducing the above-mentioned classification, Kant establishes the\nduties prescribed by law first (p. 53; R., p. 48) through the so-called\nduty towards oneself,--the duty of not ending one's life voluntarily,\nif the pain outweigh the pleasure. Accordingly, the rule of suicide is\nheld to be not even =thinkable= as a general natural law. I, on\nthe contrary, maintain that, since here there can be no intervention\nof state control, it is exactly this rule which is proved to be an\nactually existing, unchecked natural law. For it is absolutely certain\n(as daily experience attests) that men in the vast majority of cases\nturn to self-destruction directly the gigantic strength of the innate\ninstinct of self-preservation is distinctly overpowered by great\nsuffering. To suppose that there is any thought whatever that can have\na deferring effect, after the fear of death, which is so strong and\nso closely bound up with the nature of every living thing, has shown\nitself powerless; in other words, to suppose that there is a thought\nstill mightier than this fear--is a daring assumption, all the more so,\nwhen we see, that it is one which is so difficult to discover that the\nmoralists are not yet able to determine it with precision. In any case,\nit is certain that arguments against suicide of the sort put forward\nby Kant in this connection (p. 53: R., p. 48, and p. 67; R., p. 57)\nhave never hitherto restrained any one tired of life even for a moment.\nThus a natural law, which incontestably exists, and is operative every\nday, is declared by Kant to be simply =unthinkable= without\ncontradiction, and all for the sake of making his Moral Principle the\nbasis of the classification of duties! At this point it is, I confess,\nnot without satisfaction that I look forward to the groundwork which I\nshall give to Ethics in the sequel. From it the division of Duty into\nwhat is prescribed by law, and what is taught by love, or, better,\ninto justice and loving-kindness, results quite naturally though a\nprinciple of separation which arises from the nature of the subject,\nand which entirely of itself draws a sharp line of demarkation; so that\nthe foundation of Morals, which I shall present, has in fact ready to\nhand that confirmation, to which Kant, with a view to support his own\nposition, lays a completely groundless claim.\n\n\n[1] How rashly do we sanction an unjust law, which will come home to\nourselves!--(Hor., _Sat_., Lib. I., iii. 67.)\n\n[2] \"Here is Rhodes, here make your leap!\" _I.e._, \"Here is the place\nof trial, here let us see what you can do!\" This Latin proverb is\nderived from one of Aesop's fables. A braggart boasts of having once\naccomplished a wonderful jump in Rhodes, and appeals to the evidence\nof the eye-witnesses. The bystanders then exclaim: \"Friend, if this\nbe true, you have no need of witnesses; for this is Rhodes, and your\nleap you can make here.\" The words are: _\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb', \u1f66 \u03d5\u03af\u03bb\u03b5, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1t\u03bf \u1f00\u03bb\u03b7\u03b8\u03ad\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd, o\u1f50\u03b4\u1f72\u03bd \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd1 \u03c3\u03bf\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b1\u03c1\u03c4\u03cd\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f55t\u03b7 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 'R\u03cc\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03ae\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1_. _V._\n_Fabulae Aesopicae Collectae_. Edit. Halm, Leipzig: Teubner. 1875. Nr.\n203b, p. 102. The other version of the fable (Nr. 203, p. 101) gives:\n_\u1f66 o\u1f57tos, e\u1f30 \u1f00l\u00eath\u00e8s \u03c4o\u1fe1\u03c4 \u1f10stin, o\u1f50d\u1f72n de\u1fd1 soi martyr\u00f4n \u1f30do\u1f7a \u1f21 \u03a1\u03cc\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2,\n\u1f30do\u1f7a ka\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03ae\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1._--(_Translator_.)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nON THE DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.\n\n\nIt is well known that Kant put the leading principle of his Ethics\ninto another quite different shape, in which it is expressed directly;\nthe first being indirect, indeed nothing more than an indication as\nto how the principle is to be sought for. Beginning at p. 63 (R.,\np. 55), he prepares the way for his second formula by means of very\nstrange, ambiguous, not to say distorted,[1] definitions of the\nconceptions =End= and =Means=, which may be much more simply\nand correctly denoted thus: an =End= is the direct motive of an\nact of the Will, a =Means= the indirect: _simplex sigillum veri_\n(simplicity is the seal of truth). Kant, however, slips through his\nwonderful enunciations to the statement: \"=Man=, indeed every\nrational being, exists =as an end in himself=.\" On this I must\nremark that \"to exist as an end in oneself==\" is an unthinkable\nexpression, a _contradictio in adjecto_.[2] To be an end means to\nbe an object of volition. Every end can only exist in relation to a\nwill, whose end, _i.e._, (as above stated), whose direct motive it is.\nOnly thus can the idea, \"end\" have any sense, which is lost as soon as\nsuch connection is broken. But this relation, which is essential to\nthe thing, necessarily excludes every \"in itself.\" \"End in oneself\"\nis exactly like saying: \"Friend in oneself;--enemy in oneself;--uncle\nin oneself;--north or east in itself;--above or below in itself;\"\nand so on. At bottom the \"end in itself\" is in the same case as the\n\"absolute ought\"; the same thought--the theological--secretly, indeed,\nunconsciously lies at the root of each as its condition. Nor is the\n\"absolute worth,\" which is supposed to be attached to this alleged,\nthough unthinkable, \"end in itself,\" at all better circumstanced.\nIt also must be characterised, without pity, as a _contradictio in\nadjecto_. Every \"worth\" is a valuation by comparison, and its bearing\nis necessarily twofold. First, it is =relative=, since it exists\nfor some one; and secondly, it is =comparative=, as being compared\nwith something else, and estimated accordingly. Severed from these two\nconditions, the conception, \"worth,\" loses all sense and meaning, and\nso obviously, that further demonstration is needless. But more: just\nas the phrases \"end in itself\" and \"absolute worth\" outrage logic, so\ntrue morality is outraged by the statement on p. 65 (R., p. 56), that\nirrational beings (that is, animals) are =things=, and should\ntherefore be treated simply as =means=, which are not at the same\ntime ends. In harmony with this, it is expressly declared in the\n_Metaphysische Anfanggr\u00fcnde der Tugendlehre,_ \u00a7 16: \"A man can have no\nduties towards any being, except towards his fellow-men;\" and then, \u00a7\n17, we read: \"To treat animals cruelly runs counter to the duty of man\n=towards himself=; because it deadens the feeling of sympathy for\nthem in their sufferings, and thus weakens a natural tendency which\nis very serviceable to morality in relation to =other men=.\" So\none is only to have compassion on animals for the sake of practice,\nand they are as it were the pathological phantom on which to train\none's sympathy with men! In common with the whole of Asia that is not\ntainted by Isl\u00e2m (which is tantamount to Judaism), I regard such tenets\nas odious and revolting. Here, once again, we see withal how entirely\nthis philosophical morality, which is, as explained above, only a\ntheological one in disguise, depends in reality on the biblical Ethics.\nThus, because Christian morals leave animals out of consideration\n(of which more later on); therefore in philosophical morals they\nare of course at once outlawed; they are merely \"things,\" simply\n=means= to ends of any sort; and so they are good for vivisection,\nfor deer-stalking, bull-fights, horse-races, etc., and they may be\nwhipped to death as they struggle along with heavy quarry carts.\nShame on such a morality which is worthy of Pariahs, Chandalas and\nMlechchas[3]; which fails to recognise the Eternal Reality immanent\nin everything that has life, and shining forth with inscrutable\nsignificance from all eyes that see the sun! This is a morality which\nknows and values only the precious species that gave it birth; whose\ncharacteristic--=reason=--it makes the condition under which a\nbeing may be an object of moral regard.\n\nBy this rough path, then,--indeed, _per fas et nefas_ (by fair means\nand by foul), Kant reaches the second form in which he expresses the\nfundamental principle of his Ethics: \"Act in such a way that you at\nall times treat mankind, as much in your own person, as in the person\nof every one else, not only as a Means, but also as an End.\" Such a\nstatement is a very artificial and roundabout way of saying: \"Do not\nconsider yourself alone, but others also;\" this in turn is a paraphrase\nfor: _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_ (do not to another\nwhat you are unwilling should be done to yourself); and the latter,\nas I have said, contains nothing but the premises to the conclusion,\nwhich is the true and final goal of all morals and of all moralising;\n_Neminem laede, immo omnes, quantum potes juva_ (do harm to no one;\nbut rather help all people as far as lies in your power). Like all\nbeautiful things, this proposition looks best unveiled. Be it only\nobserved that the alleged duties towards oneself are dragged into this\nsecond Kantian edict intentionally and not without difficulty. Some\nplace of course had to be found for them.[4]\n\nAnother objection that could be raised against the formula is that the\nmalefactor condemned to be executed is treated merely as an instrument,\nand not as an end, and this with perfectly good reason; for he is\nthe indispensable means of upholding the terror of the law by its\nfulfilment, and of thus accomplishing the law's end--the repression of\ncrime.\n\nBut if this second definition helps nothing towards laying a foundation\nfor Ethics, if it cannot even pass muster as its leading principle,\nthat is, as an adequate and direct summary of ethical precepts; it\nhas nevertheless the merit of containing a fine _aper\u00e7u_ of moral\npsychology, for it marks =egoism= by an exceedingly characteristic\ntoken, which is quite worth while being here more closely considered.\nThis =egoism=, then, of which each of us is full, and to conceal\nwhich, as our _partie honteuse_, we have invented =politeness=,\nis perpetually peering through every veil cast over it, and may\nespecially be detected in the fact that our dealings with all those,\nwho come across our path, are directed by the one object of trying\nto find, before everything else, and as if by instinct, a possible\n=means= to any of the numerous =ends= with which we are\nalways engrossed. When we make a new acquaintance, our first thought,\nas a rule, is whether the man can be useful to us in some way. If he\ncan do =nothing= for our benefit, then as soon as we are convinced\nof this, he himself generally becomes nothing to us. To seek in all\nother people a possible means to our ends, in other words, to make\nthem our instruments, is almost part of the very nature of human\neyes; and whether the instrument will have to suffer more or less\nin the using, is a thought which comes much later, sometimes not at\nall. That we assume others to be similarly disposed is shown in many\nways; _e.g._, by the fact that, when we ask any one for information\nor advice, we lose all confidence in his words directly we discover\nthat he may have some =interest= in the matter, however small or\nremote. For then we immediately take for granted that he will make us\na means to his ends, and hence give his advice not in accordance with\nhis =discernment=, but with his =desire=, and this, no matter\nhow exact the former may be, or how little the latter seem involved;\nsince we know only too well that a cubic inch of desire weighs much\nmore than a cubic yard of discernment. Conversely, when we ask in such\ncases: \"What ought I to do?\" as a rule, nothing else will occur to our\ncounsellor, but how we should shape our action to suit his own ends;\nand to this effect he will give his reply immediately, and as it were\nmechanically, without so much as bestowing a thought on our ends;\nbecause it is his Will that directly dictates the answer, or ever the\nquestion can come before the bar of his real judgment. Hence he tries\nto mould our conduct to his own benefit, without even being conscious\nof it, and while he supposes that he is speaking out of the abundance\nof his discernment, in reality he is nothing but the mouth-piece of\nhis own desire; indeed, such self-deception may lead him so far as to\nutter lies, without being aware of it. So greatly does the influence of\nthe Will preponderate that of the Intelligence. Consequently, it is not\nthe testimony of our own consciousness, but rather, for the most part,\nthat of our interest, which avails to determine whether our language be\nin accordance with what we discern, or what we desire. To take another\ncase. Let us suppose that a man pursued by enemies and in danger of\nlife, meets a pedlar and inquires for some by-way of escape; it may\nhappen that the latter will answer him by the question: \"Do you need\nany of my wares?\" It is not of course meant that matters are always\nlike this. On the contrary, many a man is found to show a direct and\nreal participation in another's weal and woe, or (in Kant's language)\nto regard him as an end and not as a means. How far it seems natural,\nor the reverse, to each one to treat his neighbour for once in the way\nas an end, instead of (as usual) a means,--this is the criterion of the\ngreat ethical difference existing between character and character; and\nthat on which the mental attitude of sympathy rests in the last resort\nwill be the true basis of Ethics, and will form the subject of the\nthird part of this Essay.\n\nThus, in his second formula, Kant distinguishes Egoism and its opposite\nby a very characteristic trait; and this point of merit I have all the\nmore gladly brought out into strong light and illustrated, because in\nother respects there is little in the groundwork of his Ethics that I\ncan admit.\n\nThe third and last form in which Kant put forward his Moral Principle\nis the =Autonomy= of the Will: \"The Will of every rational\nbeing is universally legislative for all rational beings.\" This of\ncourse follows from the first form. As a consequence of the third,\nhowever, we are asked to believe (see p. 71; R., p. 60) that the\nspecific characteristic of the Categorical Imperative lies in the\n=renunciation of all interest= by the Will when acting from a\nsense of duty. All previous moral principles had thus (he says) broken\ndown, \"because the latter invariably attributed to human actions at\nbottom a certain interest, whether originating in compulsion, or\nin pleasurable attraction--an interest which might be one's own,\nor another's\" (p. 73; R., p. 62). (=Another's=: let this be\nparticularly noticed.) \"Whereas a universally legislative Will must\nprescribe actions which are =not= based on any =interest= at\nall, but solely on a feeling of duty.\" I beg the reader to think what\nthis really means. As a matter of fact, nothing less than volition\nwithout motive, in other words, effect without cause. Interest and\nMotive are interchangeable ideas; what is interest but _quod mea\ninterest_, that which is of importance to me? And is not this, in one\nword, whatever stirs and sets in motion my Will? Consequently, what is\nan interest other than the working of a motive upon the Will? Therefore\nwhere a motive moves the Will, there the latter has an interest; but\nwhere the Will is affected by no motive, there in truth it can be as\nlittle active, as a stone is able to leave its place without being\npushed or pulled. No educated person will require any demonstration of\nthis. It follows that every action, inasmuch as it necessarily must\nhave a motive, necessarily also presupposes an interest. Kant, however,\npropounds a second entirely new class of actions which are performed\nwithout any interest, _i.e._, without motive. And these actions\nare--all deeds of justice and loving-kindness! It will be seen that\nthis monstrous assumption, to be refuted, needed only to be reduced to\nits real meaning, which was concealed through the word \"interest\" being\ntrifled with. Meanwhile Kant celebrates (p. 74 sqq.; R., p. 62) the\ntriumph of his Autonomy of the Will by setting up a moral Utopia called\nthe Kingdom of Ends, which is peopled with nothing but =rational\nbeings= _in abstracto_. These, one and all, are always willing,\nwithout willing any actual =thing= (_i.e._, without interest):\nthe only thing that they will is that they may all perpetually will in\naccordance with one maxim (_i.e._, Autonomy). _Difficile est satiram\nnon scribere_[5] (it is difficult to refrain from writing a satire).\n\nBut there is something else to which Kant is led by his autonomy of\nthe will; and it involves more serious consequences than the little\ninnocent Kingdom of Ends, which is perfectly harmless and may be left\nin peace. I mean the conception of =human dignity=. Now this\n\"dignity\" is made to rest solely on man's autonomy, and to lie in the\nfact that the law which he ought to obey is his own work, his relation\nto it thus being the same as that of the subjects of a constitutional\ngovernment to their statutes. As an ornamental finish to the Kantian\nsystem of morals such a theory might after all be passed over. Only\nthis expression \"=Human Dignity=,\" once it was uttered by Kant,\nbecame the shibboleth of all perplexed and empty-headed moralists. For\nbehind that imposing formula they concealed their lack, not to say,\nof a real ethical basis, but of any basis at all which was possessed\nof an intelligible meaning; supposing cleverly enough that their\nreaders would be so pleased to see themselves invested with such a\n\"dignity\" that they would be quite satisfied.[6] Let us, however,\nlook at this conception a little more carefully, and submit it to\nthe test of reality. Kant (p. 79; R., p. 66) defines =dignity=\nas \"an unconditioned, incomparable value.\" This is an explanation\nwhich makes such an effect by its magnificent sound that one does\nnot readily summon up courage to examine it at close quarters; else\nwe should find that it too is nothing but a hollow hyperbole, within\nwhich there lurks like a gnawing worm, the _contradictio in adjecto_.\nEvery value is the estimation of one thing compared with another; it\nis thus a conception of comparison, and consequently relative; and\nthis relativity is precisely that which forms the essence of the idea.\nAccording to Diogenes Laertius (Book VII., chap. 106),[7] this was\nalready correctly taught by the Stoics. He says: _\u03c4\u1f74n \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f00\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9\n\u1f00\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03b2\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03c5, \u1f22\u03bd \u1f02\u03bd \u1f41 \u1f14\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03a0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u1fc3 \u1f45\u03bc\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f10\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd1\u03bd,\n\u1f00\u03bc\u03b5\u03af\u03b2\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c3\u1f7a\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd\u00f4 \u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03b8\u03ac\u03c2._[8] An =incomparable,\nunconditioned, absolute value=, such as \"dignity\" is declared by\nKant to be, is thus, like so much else in Philosophy, the statement in\nwords of a thought which is really unthinkable; just as much as \"the\nhighest number,\" or \"the greatest space.\"\n\n       \"_Doch eben wo Begriffe fehlen_,\n    _Da stellt ein WORT zu rechter Zeit sich ein._\"\n           (But where conceptions fail,\n    Just there a WORD comes in to fill the blank.)\n\nSo it was with this expression, \"=Human Dignity=.\" A most\nacceptable phrase was brought into currency. Thereon every system of\nMorals, that was spun out through all classes of duty, and all forms of\ncasuistry, found a broad basis; from which serene elevation it could\ncomfortably go on preaching.\n\nAt the end of his exposition (p. 124; E., p. 97), Kant says: \"But how\nit is that =Pure Reason= without other motives, that may have\ntheir derivation elsewhere, can by itself be =practical=; that is,\nhow, without there being any object for the Will to take an antecedent\ninterest in, the simple principle of the universal validity of all the\nprecepts of Pure Reason, as laws, can of itself provide a motive and\nbring about an interest which may be called purely moral; or, in other\nwords, how it is that Pure Reason can be practical;--to explain this\nproblem, all human reason is inadequate, and all trouble and work spent\non it are vain.\" Now it should be remembered that, if any one asserts\nthe existence of a thing which cannot even be conceived as possible, it\nis incumbent on him to prove that it is an actual reality; whereas the\nCategorical Imperative of Practical Reason is expressly not put forward\nas a fact of consciousness, nor otherwise founded on experience. Rather\nare we frequently cautioned not to attempt to explain it by having\nrecourse to empirical anthropology. (Cf. _e.g._, p. vi. of the preface;\nR., p. 5; and pp. 59, 60; R., p. 52). Moreover, we are repeatedly\n(_e.g._, p. 48; R., p. 44) assured \"that no instance can show, and\nconsequently there can be no empirical proof, that an Imperative of\nthis sort exists everywhere.\" And further, on p. 49 (R., p. 45), we\nread, \"that the reality of the Categorical Imperative is not a fact of\nexperience.\" Now if we put all this together, we can hardly avoid the\nsuspicion that Kant is jesting at his readers' expense. But although\nthis practice may be allowed by the present philosophical public of\nGermany, and seem good in their eyes, yet in Kant's time it was not so\nmuch in vogue; and besides, Ethics, then, as always, was precisely the\nsubject that least of all could lend itself to jokes. Hence we must\ncontinue to hold the conviction that what can neither be conceived as\npossible, nor proved as actual, is destitute of all credentials to\nattest its existence. And if, by a strong effort of the imagination,\nwe try to picture to ourselves a man, possessed, as it were, by a\n_daemon_, in the form of an =absolute Ought=, that speaks only in\nCategorical Imperatives, and, confronting his wishes and inclinations,\nclaims to be the perpetual controller of his actions; in this figure\nwe see no true portrait of human nature, or of our inner life; what we\n=do= discern is an artificial substitute for theological Morals,\nto which it stands in the same relation as a wooden leg to a living one.\n\nOur conclusion, therefore, is, that the Kantian Ethics, like all\nanterior systems, is devoid of any sure foundation. As I showed at\nthe outset, in my examination of its =imperative Form=, the\nstructure is at bottom nothing but an inversion of theological Morals,\ncloaked in very abstract formulae of an apparently _a priori_ origin.\nThat this disguise was most artificial and unrecognisable is the more\ncertain, from the fact that Kant, in all good faith, was actually\nhimself deceived by it, and really believed that he could establish,\nindependently of all theology, and on the basis of pure intelligence _a\npriori_, those conceptions of the Law and of the hests of Duty, which\nobviously have no meaning except in =theological Ethics=; whereas\nI have sufficiently proved that with him they are destitute of all real\nfoundation, and float loosely in mid air. However, the mask at length\nfalls away in his own workshop, and theological Ethics stands forth\nunveiled, as witness his doctrine of the Highest Good, the Postulates\nof Practical Reason; and lastly, his Moral Theology. But this\nrevelation freed neither Kant nor the public from their illusion as to\nthe real state of things; on the contrary, both he and they rejoiced to\nsee all those precepts, which hitherto had been sanctioned by Faith,\nnow ratified and established by Ethics (although only _idealiter_, and\nfor practical purposes). The truth is that they, in all sincerity, put\nthe effect for the cause, and the cause for the effect, inasmuch as\nthey failed to perceive that at the root of this system of Morals there\nlay, as absolutely necessary assumptions, however tacit and concealed,\nall the alleged consequences that had been drawn from it.\n\nAt the end of this severe investigation, which must also have been\ntiring to my readers, perhaps I may be allowed, by way of diversion, to\nmake a jesting, indeed frivolous comparison. I would liken Kant, in his\nself-mystification, to a man who at a ball has been flirting the whole\nevening with a masked beauty, in hopes of making a conquest; till at\nlast, throwing off her disguise, she reveals herself--as his wife.\n\n\n[1] To keep the play of words in \"_geschrobene,\" \"verschrobene,\"_ we\nmay perhaps render them: \"twisted ... mistwisted.\"--(_Translator._)\n\n[2] A contradiction in that which is added. A term applied to two ideas\nwhich cannot be brought into a thinkable relationship.--(_Translator._)\n\n[3] A Cha\u1e47\u1e0d\u0101la (or \u0106a\u1e47\u1e0d\u0101la) means one who is born of a Brahman woman\nby a \u015a\u016bdra husband, such a union being an abomination. Hence it is a\nterm applied to a low common person. Mlechcha (or Mle\u0107\u0107ha) means a\nforeigner; one who does not speak Sansk\u1e5bit, and is not subject to Hindu\ninstitutions. The transition from a \"a barbarian\" to a bad or wicked\nman, is easy.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[4] These so-called duties have been discussed in Chapter III. of this\nPart.\n\n[5] Juvenal, _Sat_. I. 30.\n\n[6] It appears that G. W. Block in his _Neue Grundlegung der\nPhilosophie der Sitten_, 1802, was the first to make \"Human Dignity\"\nexpressly and exclusively the foundation-stone of Ethics, which he then\nbuilt up entirely on it.\n\n[7] _V_. Diogenes Laertius, _de Clarorum Philosophorum Vitis, etc._,\nedit. O. Gabr. Cobet. Paris; Didot, 1862. In this edition the passage\nquoted is in chap. 105 _ad fin.,_, p. 182.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[8] They teach that \"worth\" is the equivalent value of a thing\nwhich has been tested, whatever an expert may fix that value to\nbe; as, for instance, to take wheat in exchange for barley and a\nmule.--(_Translator._)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nKANT'S DOCTRINE OF CONSCIENCE.\n\n\nThe alleged Practical Reason with its Categorical Imperative, is\nmanifestly very closely connected with Conscience, although essentially\ndifferent from it in two respects. In the first place, the Categorical\nImperative, as commanding, necessarily speaks =before= the\nact, whereas Conscience does not till afterwards. =Before=\nthe act Conscience can at best only speak =indirectly=, that\nis, by means of reflection, which holds up to it the recollection\nof previous cases, in which similar acts after they were committed\nreceived its disapproval. It is on this that the etymology of the word\n=Gewissen= (Conscience) appears to me to rest, because =only\nwhat has already taken place is gewiss=[1] (certain). Undoubtedly,\nthrough external inducement and kindled emotion, or by reason of the\ninternal discord of bad humour, impure, base thoughts, and evil desires\nrise up in all people, even in the best. But for these a man is not\nmorally responsible, and need not load his conscience with them;\nsince they only show what the genus _homo,_ not what the individual,\nwho thinks them, would be capable of doing. Other motives, if not\nsimultaneously, yet almost immediately, come into his consciousness,\nand confronting the unworthy inclinations prevent them from ever being\ncrystallised into deeds; thus causing them to resemble the out-voted\nminority of an acting committee. By deeds alone each person gains an\nempirical knowledge no less of himself than of others, just as it is\ndeeds alone that burden the conscience. For, unlike thoughts, these are\nnot problematic; on the contrary, they are certain (_gewiss_), they are\nunchangeable, and are not only thought, but =known= (_gewusst_).\nThe Latin _conscientia_,[2] and the Greek _\u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2_[3] have the same\nsense. Conscience is thus the =knowledge= that a man has about\nwhat he has done.\n\nThe second point of difference between the alleged Categorical\nImperative and Conscience is, that the latter always draws its\nmaterial from experience; which the former cannot do, since it is\npurely _a priori_. Nevertheless, we may reasonably suppose that Kant's\nDoctrine of Conscience will throw some light on this new conception\nof an =absolute Ought= which he introduced. His theory is\nmost completely set forth in the _Metaphysische Anfangsgr\u00fcnde zur\nTugendlehre_, \u00a7 13, and in the following criticism I shall assume that\nthe few pages which contain it are lying before the reader.\n\nThe Kantian interpretation of Conscience makes an exceedingly imposing\neffect, before which one used to stand with reverential awe, and\nall the less confidence was felt in demurring to it, because there\nlay heavy on the mind the ever-present fear of having theoretical\nobjections construed as practical, and, if the correctness of Kant's\nview were denied, of being regarded as devoid of conscience. I,\nhowever, cannot be led astray in this manner, since the question\nhere is of theory, not of practice; and I am not concerned with the\npreaching of Morals, but with the exact investigation of the ultimate\nethical basis.\n\nWe notice at once that Kant employs exclusively Latin legal\nterminology, which, however, would seem little adapted to reflect the\nmost secret stirrings of the human heart. Yet this language, this\njudicial way of treating the subject, he retains from first to last,\nas though it were essential and proper to the matter. And so we find\nbrought upon the stage of our inner self a complete Court of justice,\nwith indictment, judge, plaintiff, defendant, and sentence;--nothing is\nwanting. Now if this tribunal, as portrayed by Kant, really existed in\nour breasts, it would be astonishing if a single person could be found\nto be, I do not say, =so bad=, but =so stupid=, as to act\nagainst his conscience. For such a supernatural assize, of an entirely\nspecial kind, set up in our consciousness, such a secret court--like\nanother Fehmgericht[4]--held in the dark recesses of our inmost being,\nwould inspire everybody with a terror and fear of the gods strong\nenough to really keep him from grasping at short transient advantages,\nin face of the dreadful threats of superhuman powers, speaking in tones\nso near and so clear. In real life, on the contrary, we find, that\nthe efficiency of conscience is generally considered such a vanishing\nquantity that all peoples have bethought themselves of helping it out\nby means of positive religion, or even of entirely replacing it by the\nlatter. Moreover, if Conscience were indeed of this peculiar nature,\nthe Royal Society could never have thought of the question put for the\npresent Prize Essay.\n\nBut if we look more closely at Kant's exposition, we shall find\nthat its imposing effect is mainly produced by the fact that he\nattributes to the moral verdict passed on ourselves, as its peculiar\nand essential characteristic, a form which in fact is not so at all.\nThis metaphorical bar of judgment is no more applicable to moral\nself-examination than it is to every other reflection as regards\nwhat we have done, and might have done otherwise, where no ethical\nquestion is involved. For it is not only true that the same procedure\nof indictment, defence, and sentence is occasionally assumed by that\nobviously spurious and artificial conscience which is based on mere\nsuperstition; as, for instance, when a Hindu reproaches himself with\nhaving been the murderer of a cow, or when a Jew remembers that he has\nsmoked his pipe at home on the Sabbath; but even the self-questioning\nwhich springs from no ethical source, being indeed rather unmoral than\nmoral, often appears in a shape of this sort, as the following case\nmay exemplify. Suppose I, good-naturedly, but thoughtlessly, have made\nmyself surety for a friend, and suppose there comes with evening the\nclear perception of the heavy responsibility I have taken on myself--a\nresponsibility that may easily involve me in serious trouble, as the\nwise old saying, _\u1f10\u03b3\u03b3\u03cd\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac \u03b4' \u1f03\u03c4\u03b1_![5] predicts; then at once there\nrise up within me the Accuser and the Counsel for the defence, ready\nto confront each other. The latter endeavours to palliate my rashness\nin giving bail so hastily, by pointing out the stress of circumstance\nor of obligation, or, it may be, the simple straightforwardness of\nthe transaction; perhaps he even seeks excuse by commending my kind\nheart. Last of all comes the Judge who inexorably passes the sentence:\n\"A fool's piece of work!\" and I am overwhelmed with confusion So much\nfor this judicial form of which Kant is so fond; his other modes of\nexpression are, for the most part, open to the same criticism. For\ninstance, that which he attributes to conscience, at the beginning of\nthe paragraph, as its peculiar property, applies equally to all other\nscruples of an entirely different sort. He says: \"It (conscience)\nfollows him like his shadow, try though he may to escape. By pleasures\nand distractions he may be stupefied and billed to sleep, but he\ncannot avoid occasionally waking up and coming to himself; and then he\nis immediately aware of the terrible voice,\" etc. Obviously, this may\nbe just as well understood, word for word, of the secret consciousness\nof some person of private means, who feels that his expenses far exceed\nhis income, and that thus his capital is being affected, and will\ngradually melt away.\n\nWe have seen that Kant represents the use of legal terms as essential\nto the subject, and that he keeps to them from beginning to end; let\nit now be noted how he employs the same style for the following finely\ndevised sophism. He says: \"That a person accused by his conscience\nshould be identified with the judge is an absurd way of portraying a\ncourt of justice; for in that case the accuser would invariably lose.\"\nAnd he adds, by way of elucidating this statement, a very ambiguous\nand obscure note. His conclusion is that, if we would avoid falling\ninto a contradiction, we must think of the judge (in the judicial\nconscience-drama that is enacted in our breasts) as different from us,\nin fact, as another person; nay more, as one that is an omniscient\nknower of hearts, whose hests are obligatory on all, and who is\nalmighty for every purpose of executive authority.[6] He thus passes by\na perfectly smooth path from conscience to superstition, making the\nlatter a necessary consequence of the former; while he is secretly sure\nthat he will be all the more willingly followed because the reader's\nearliest training will have certainly rendered him familiar with such\nideas, if not have made them his second nature. Here, then, Kant finds\nan easy task,--a thing he ought rather to have despised; for he\nshould have concerned himself not only with preaching, but also with\npractising truthfulness. I entirely reject the above quoted sentence,\nand all the conclusions consequent thereon, and I declare it to be\nnothing but a shuffling trick. It is =not true= that the accuser\nmust always lose, when the accused is the same person as the judge;\nat least not in the court of judgment in our hearts. In the instance\nI gave of one man going surety for another, did the accuser lose? Or\nmust we in this case also, if we wish to avoid a contradiction, really\nassume a personification after Kant's fashion, and be driven to view\nobjectively as =another person= that voice whose deliverance would\nhave been those terrible words: \"A fool's piece of work!\"? A sort of\nMercury, forsooth, in living flesh? Or perhaps a prosopopoeia of the\n_\u039c\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b9\u03c2_ (cunning) recommended by Homer (_Il._ xxiii. 313 sqq.)?[7]\nBut thus we should only be landed, as before, on the broad path of\nsuperstition, aye, and pagan superstition too.\n\nIt is in this passage that Kant indicates his Moral Theology, briefly\nindeed, yet not without all its vital points. The fact that he takes\ncare, not to attribute to it any objective validity, but rather to\npresent it merely as a form subjectively unavoidable, does not free him\nfrom the arbitrariness with which he constructs it, even though he only\nclaims its necessity for human consciousness. His fabric rests, as we\nhave seen, on a tissue of baseless assumptions.\n\nSo much, then, is certain. The entire imagery--that of a judicial\ndrama--whereby Kant depicts conscience is wholly unessential and in\nno way peculiar to it; although he keeps this figure, as if it were\nproper to the subject, right through to the end, in order finally\nto deduce certain conclusions from it. As a matter of fact it is a\nsufficiently common form, which our thoughts easily take when we\nconsider any circumstance of real life. It is due for the most part to\nthe conflict of opposing motives which usually spring up, and which\nare successively weighed and tested by our reflecting reason. And no\ndifference is made whether these motives are moral or egoistic in their\nnature, nor whether our deliberations are concerned with some action in\nthe past, or in the future. Now if we strip from Kant's exposition its\ndress of legal metaphor, which is only an optional dramatic appendage,\nthe surrounding nimbus with all its imposing effect immediately\ndisappears as well, and there remains nothing but the fact that\nsometimes, when we think over our actions, we are seized with a certain\nself-dissatisfaction, which is marked by a special characteristic.\nIt is with our conduct _per se_ that we are discontented, not with\nits result, and this feeling does not, as in every other case in\nwhich we regret the stupidity of our behaviour, rest on egoistic\ngrounds. For on these occasions the cause of our dissatisfaction is\nprecisely because we have been too egoistic, because we have taken\ntoo much thought for ourselves, and not enough for our neighbour; or\nperhaps even because, without any resulting advantage, we have made\nthe misery of others an object in itself. That we may be dissatisfied\nwith ourselves, and saddened by reason of sufferings which we have\ninflicted, not undergone, is a plain fact and impossible to be denied.\nThe connection of this with the only ethical basis that can stand an\nadequate test we shall examine further on. But Kant, like a clever\nspecial pleader, tried by magnifying and embellishing the original\n_datum_ to make all that he possibly could of it, in order to prepare a\nvery broad foundation for his Ethics and Moral Theology.\n\n\n[1] Both words are, of course, derived from _wissen = scire_ =\n_\u03b5\u1f31\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9_.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[2] Cf. Horace's _conscire sibi, pallescere culpa: Epist_. I. 1, 61. To\nbe conscious of having done wrong, to turn pale at the thought of the\ncrime.\n\n[3] _\u03a3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b5\u03af\u03b4\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2 = consciousness_ (of right or wrong\ndone).--(_Translator._)\n\n[4] The celebrated Secret Tribunal of Westphalia, which came into\nprominence about A.D. 1220. In A.D. 1335 the Archbishop of Cologne was\nappointed head of all the Fehme benches in Westphalia by the Emperor\nCharles IV. The reader will remember the description of the trial scene\nin Scott's _Anne of Geierstein_. Perhaps the Court of Star Chamber\ncomes nearest to it in English History.--(_Translator._)\n\n[5] If you give a pledge, be sure that Ate (the goddess of mischief)\nis beside you; _i.e._, beware of giving pledges.--Thales ap. Plat.\n_Charm_. 165 A.\n\n[6] Kant leads up to this position with great ingenuity, by having\nrecourse to the theory of the two characters coexistent in man--the\n_noumenal_ (or _intelligible_) and the _empirical_; the one being in\ntime, the other, timeless; the one, fast bound by the law of causality,\nthe other free.--(_Translator._)\n\n[7] Greek: _\u0386\u03bb\u03bb' \u1f04\u03b3\u03b5 \u03b4\u1f74 \u03c3\u03cd, \u03d5\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bc\u00ea\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bc\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03bf \u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u1ff7, \u03ba.\u03c4.\u03bb._\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nKANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE[1] AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER. THEORY\nOF FREEDOM.\n\n\nThe attack I have made, in the cause of truth, on Kant's system of\nMorals, does not, like those of my predecessors, touch the surface\nonly, but penetrates to its deepest roots. It seems, therefore,\nonly just that, before I leave this part of my subject, I should\nbring to remembrance the brilliant and conspicuous service which he\nnevertheless rendered to ethical science. I allude to his doctrine of\nthe co-existence of Freedom and Necessity. We find it first in the\n_Kritik der Reinen Vernunft_ (pp. 533-554 of the first, and pp. 561-582\nof the fifth, edition); but it is still more clearly expounded in the\n_Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft_ (fourth edition, pp. 169-179; R., pp.\n224-231).\n\nThe strict and absolute necessity of the acts of Will, determined by\nmotives as they arise, was first shown by Hobbes, then by Spinoza,\nand Hume, and also by Dietrich von Holbach in his _Syst\u00e8me de la\nNature_; and lastly by Priestley it was most completely and precisely\ndemonstrated. This point, indeed, has been so clearly proved, and\nplaced beyond all doubt, that it must be reckoned among the number of\nperfectly established truths, and only crass ignorance could continue\nto speak of a freedom, of a _liberum arbitrium indifferentiae_ (a\nfree and indifferent choice) in the individual acts of men. Nor did\nKant, owing to the irrefutable reasoning of his predecessors, hesitate\nto consider the Will as fast bound in the chains of Necessity, the\nmatter admitting, as he thought, of no further dispute or doubt. This\nis proved by all the passages in which he speaks of freedom only from\nthe =theoretical= standpoint. Nevertheless, it is true that our\nactions are attended with a consciousness of independence and original\ninitiative, which makes us recognise them as our own work, and every\none with ineradicable certainty feels that he is the real author\nof his conduct, and morally =responsible= for it. But since\nresponsibility implies the possibility of having acted otherwise,\nwhich possibility means freedom in some sort or manner; therefore\nin the consciousness of responsibility is indirectly involved also\nthe consciousness of freedom. The key to resolve the contradiction,\nthat thus arises out of the nature of the case, was at last found by\nKant through the distinction he drew with profound acumen, between\nphaenomena and the Thing in itself (_das Ding an sich_). This\ndistinction is the very core of his whole philosophy, and its greatest\nmerit.\n\nThe individual, with his immutable, innate character strictly\ndetermined in all his modes of expression by the law of Causality,\nwhich, as acting through the medium of the intellect, is here called\nby the name of Motivation,--the individual so constituted is only the\n=phaenomenon= (_Erscheinung_). The =Thing= in itself which\nunderlies this phaenomenon is outside of Time and Space, consequently\nfree from all succession and plurality, one, and changeless. Its\nconstitution in itself is the =intelligible character=, which\nis equally present in all the acts of the individual, and stamped on\nevery one of them, like the impress of a signet on a thousand seals.\nThe empirical character of the phaenomenon--the character which\nmanifests itself in time, and in succession of acts--is thus determined\nby the intelligible character; and consequently, the individual, as\nphaenomenon, in all his modes of expression, which are called forth\nby motives, must show the invariableness of a natural law. Whence it\nresults that all his actions are governed by strict necessity. Now\nit used to be commonly maintained that the character of a man may\nbe transformed by moral admonitions and remonstrances appealing to\nreason; but when the distinction between the intelligible and empirical\ncharacter had once been drawn, it followed that the unchangeableness,\nthe inflexible rigidity of the empirical character, which thinking\npeople had always observed, was explained and traced to a rational\nbasis, and consequently accepted as an established fact by Philosophy.\nThus the latter was so far harmonised with experience, and ceased to\nstand abashed, before popular wisdom, which long before had spoken the\nwords of truth in the Spanish proverb: _Lo que entra con el capillo,\nsale con la mortaja_ (that which comes in with the child's cap, goes\nout with the winding-sheet); or: _Lo que en la leche se mama, en la\nmortaja se derrama_ (what is imbibed with the milk, is poured out again\nin the winding-sheet).\n\nThis doctrine of the co-existence of Freedom and Necessity I regard\nas the greatest of all the achievements of human sagacity. With the\nTranscendental Aesthetics it forms the two great diamonds in the crown\nof Kant's fame, which will never pass away. In his Treatise on Freedom,\nSchelling obviously served up the Kantian teaching in a paraphrase,\nwhich by reason of its lively colouring and graphic delineation, is for\nmany people more comprehensible. The work would deserve praise if its\nauthor had had the honesty to say that he is drawing on Kant's wisdom,\nnot on his own. As it is, a certain part of the philosophic public\nstill credits him with the entire performance.\n\nThe theory itself, and the whole question regarding the nature of\nFreedom, can be better understood if we view them in connection with\na general truth, which I think, is most concisely expressed by a\nformula frequently occurring in the scholastic writings: _Operari\nsequitur esse_.[2] In other words, everything in the world operates in\naccordance with what it is, in accordance with its inherent nature, in\nwhich, consequently, all its modes of expression are already contained\npotentially, while actually they are manifested when elicited by\nexternal causes; so that external causes are the means whereby the\nessential constitution of the thing is revealed. And the modes of\nexpression so resulting form the =empirical= character; whereas\nits hidden, ultimate basis, which is inaccessible to experience, is\nthe =intelligible= character, that is, the real nature _per se_\nof the particular thing in question. Man forms no exception to the\nrest of nature; he too has a changeless character, which, however,\nis strictly individual and different in each case. This character is\nof course =empirical= as far as we can grasp it, and therefore\nonly =phaenomenal=; while the =intelligible= character is\nwhatever may be the real nature in itself of the person. His actions\none and all, being, as regards their external constitution, determined\nby motives, can never be shaped otherwise than in accordance with the\nunchangeable individual character. As a man is, so he his bound to act.\nHence for a given person in every single case, there is absolutely only\none way of acting possible: _Operari sequitur esse_[3] Freedom belongs\nonly to the intelligible character, not to the empirical. The _operari_\n(conduct) of a given individual is necessarily determined externally\nby motives, internally by his character; therefore everything that he\ndoes necessarily takes place. But in his _esse_ (_i.e._, in what he\nis), =there=, we find Freedom. He =might have been= something\ndifferent; and guilt or merit attaches to that which he is. All that\nhe does follows from what he is, as a mere corollary. Through Kant's\ndoctrine we are freed from the primary error of connecting Necessity\nwith _esse_ (what one is), and Freedom with _operari_ (what one does);\nwe become aware that this is a misplacement of terms, and that exactly\nthe inverse arrangement is the true one. Hence it is clear that the\nmoral responsibility of a man, while it, first of all, and obviously,\nof course, touches what he does, yet at bottom touches what he is;\nbecause, what he is being the original =datum=, his conduct, as\nmotives arise, could never take any other course than that which it\nactually does take. But, however strict be the necessity, whereby,\nin the individual, acts are elicited by motives, it yet never occurs\nto anybody--not even to him who is convinced of this necessity--to\nexonerate himself on that account, and cast the blame on the motives;\nfor he knows well enough that, objectively considered, any given\ncircumstance, and its causes, perfectly admitted quite a different,\nindeed, a directly opposite course of action; nay, that such a course\nwould actually have taken place, =if only he had been a different\nperson=. That he is precisely such a one as his conduct proclaims\nhim to be, and no other--this it is for which he feels himself\nresponsible; in his _esse_ (what he is) lies the vulnerable place,\nwhere the sting of conscience penetrates. For Conscience is nothing\nbut acquaintance with one's own self--an acquaintance that arises out\nof one's actual mode of conduct, and which becomes ever more intimate.\nSo that it is the _esse_ (what one is) which in reality is accused\nby conscience, while the _operari_ (what one does) supplies the\nincriminating evidence. Since we are only conscious of =Freedom=\nthrough the sense of =responsibility=; therefore where the latter\nlies the former must also be; in the _esse_ (in one's being). It is\nthe _operari_ (what one does) that is subject to necessity. But we can\nonly get to know ourselves, as well as others =empirically=; we\nhave no _a priori_ knowledge of our character. Certainly our natural\ntendency is to cherish a very high opinion of it, because the maxim:\n_Quisque praesumitur bonus, donec probetur contrarium_ (every one is\npresumed to be good, until the contrary is proved), is perhaps even\nmore true of the inner court of justice than of the world's tribunals.\n\n\n\nNOTE.\n\n\nHe who is capable of recognising the essential part of a thought,\nthough clothed in a dress very different from what he is familiar with,\nwill see, as I do, that this Kantian doctrine of the intelligible and\nempirical character is a piece of insight already possessed by Plato.\nThe difference is, that with Kant it is sublimated to an abstract\nclearness; with Plato it is treated mythically, and connected with\nmetempsychosis, because, as he did not perceive the ideality of Time,\nhe could only represent it under a temporal form. The identity of the\none doctrine with the other becomes exceedingly plain, if we read the\nexplanation and illustration of the Platonic myth, which Porphyrius has\ngiven with such clear exactitude, that its agreement with the abstract\nlanguage of Kant comes out unmistakably. In the second book of his\nEclogues, chap. 8, \u00a7\u00a7 37-40,[4] Stobaeus has preserved for us _in\nextenso_ that part of one of Porphyrius' lost writings which specially\ncomments on the myth in question, as Plato gives it in the second half\nof the tenth book of the Republic.[5] The whole section is eminently\nworth reading. As a specimen I shall quote the short \u00a7 39, in the hope\nof inducing any one who cares for these things to study Stobaeus for\nhimself. It will then immediately become apparent that this Platonic\nmyth is nothing less than an allegory of the profound truth which Kant\nstated in its abstract purity, as the doctrine of the intelligible and\nempirical character, and consequently that the latter had been reached,\nin its essentials, by Plato thousands of years ago. Indeed, this view\nseems to go back much further still, for Porphyrins is of opinion that\nPlato took it from the Egyptians. Certainly we already find the same\ntheory in the Brahmanical doctrine of metempsychosis, and it is from\nthis Indian source that the Egyptian priests, in all probability,\nderived their wisdom. \u00a7 39 is as follows:--\n\n_\u03a4\u1f78 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f45\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe1\u03c4' \u1f14\u03bf\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1 \u03a0\u03bb\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03b5\u03be\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1f70\u03c2, \u03c0\u03c1\u1f76\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03d5\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd,\n\u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f22 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1\u03c4o\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u1f15\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u1f22 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f45\u03bd, \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u1fb1\u03c2 \u03b6\u03c9\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n\u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b6\u03c9\u1fc7, \u03ba\u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9 (\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bb\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0'\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bdai \u1f14\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2). Kake\u1fd1\u03bd\u03bf \u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4e\u03beo\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f05\u03bc\u03b1\n\u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c0\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c4\u03ce\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03cc\u03b4\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9. \u039a\u03b1\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe1\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03c3\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u1f76 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1ff6\u03bd a\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u1fd1\u03c5\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b6\u03ce\u03c9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78\n\u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03b5\u03be\u03bf\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03d5\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f30\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1 \u03b6\u03ce\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u1fc7, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f10\u03d5' \u1f67\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd\n\u03b5\u1f36\u03bdai \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03cd\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0' \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f10\u03d5' \u1f61\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bb\u03c5\u03b3\u03bf\u03ba\u03af\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c3\u03c7\u03b5\u03b4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b6\u03ce\u03c9\u03bd. \u0389\u03c1\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4e\u03beo\u03cd\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1\u03c4o \u1f00\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03cd\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f10\u03be \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1,\n\u03d5\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03ba\u03b5\u03c5\u1fc7\u03c2 \u03b3\u03c5\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b8\u03c5\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03c2._[6]\n\n\n\n[1] _V_. Note on \"intelligible\" in Chapter I. of this\nPart.--(_Translator_)\n\n[2] _I.e._, what is done is a consequence of that which is.\n\n[3] _I.e._, his acts are a consequence of what he is.\n\n[4] _V_. Joannes Stobaeus. _Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae_, edit.\nCurtius Wachsmuth et Otto Hense; Weidmann, Berlin, 1884. Vol. II., pp.\n163-168.--(_Translator._)\n\n[5] _V_. Plat., _Rep_., edit. Stallbaum, 614 sqq. It is the _\u1f00\u03c0\u03cc\u03bbo\u03b3os\n\u0389\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1 \u0386\u03c1\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03af\u03bf\u03bd_.--(_translator._)\n\n[6] To sum up. What Plato meant seems to be this. Souls (he said) have\nfree power, before passing into bodies and different modes of being,\nto choose this or that form of life, which they will pass through in a\ncertain kind of existence, and in a body adapted thereto. (For a soul\nmay choose a lion's, equally with a man's, mode of being.) But this\nfree power of choice is removed simultaneously with entrance into one\nor other of such forms of life. For when once they have descended into\nbodies, and instead of unfettered souls have become the souls of living\nthings, then they take that measure of free power which belongs in each\ncase to the organism of the living thing. In some forms this power\nis very intelligent and full of movement, as in man; in some it has\nbut little energy, and is of a simple nature, as in almost all other\ncreatures. Moreover, this free power depends on the organism in such a\nway that while its capability of action is caused by itself alone, its\nimpulses are determined by the desires which have their origin in the\norganism.--(_Translator._)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nFICHTE'S ETHICS AS A MAGNIFYING GLASS FOR THE ERRORS OF THE KANTIAN.\n\n\nJust as in Anatomy and Zoology, many things are not so obvious to the\npupil in preparations and natural products as in engravings where there\nis some exaggeration; so if there is any one who, after the above\ncriticism, is still not entirely satisfied as to the worthlessness\nof the Kantian foundation of Ethics, I would recommend him Fichte's\n_System der Sittenlehre_, as a sure means of freeing him from all doubt.\n\nIn the old German Marionnettes a fool always accompanied the emperor,\nor hero, so that he might afterwards give in his own way a highly\ncoloured version of what had been said or done In like manner behind\nthe great Kant there stands the author of the _Wissenschaftslehre_,[1]\na true _Wissenschaftsleere[2]._ In order to secure his own, and his\nfamily's welfare, Fichte formed the idea of creating a sensation by\nmeans of subtle mystification. It was a very suitable and reasonable\nplan, considering the nature of the German philosophic public, and he\nexecuted it admirably by outdoing Kant in every particular. He appeared\nas the latter's living superlative, and produced a perfect caricature\nof his philosophy by magnifying all its salient points. Nor did the\nEthics escape similar treatment? In his _System der Sittenlehre_, we\nfind the Categorical Imperative grown into a Despotic Imperative; while\nthe absolute \"Ought,\" the law-giving Reason, and the Hest of Duty\nhave developed into a =moral Fate=, an unfathomable Necessity,\nrequiring mankind to act strictly in accordance with certain maxims.\nTo judge (pp. 308, 309) from the pompous show made, a great deal must\ndepend on these formulae, although one never quite discovers what.\nSo much only seems clear. As in bees there is implanted an instinct\nto build cells and a hive for life in common, so men (it is alleged)\nare endowed with an impulse leading them to play in common a great,\nstrictly moral, world-embracing Comedy, their part being merely to\nfigure as puppets--nothing else. But there is this important difference\nbetween the bees and men. The hive is really brought to completion;\nwhile instead of a moral World-Comedy, as a matter of fact, an\nexceedingly immoral one is enacted. Here, then, we see the imperative\nform of the Kantian Ethics, the moral Law, and the absolute \"Ought\"\npushed further and further till a system of ethical =Fatalism= is\nevolved, which, as it is worked out, lapses at times into the comic.[3]\n\nIf in Kant's doctrine we trace a certain moral pedantry; with Fichte\nthis pedantry reaches the absurd, and furnishes abundant material\nfor satire. Let the reader notice, for example (pp. 407-409), how he\ndecides the well-known instance of casuistry, where of two human lives\none must be lost. We find indeed all the errors of Kant raised to the\nsuperlative. Thus, on p. 199, we read: \"To act in accordance with\nthe dictates of sympathy, of compassion, and of loving-kindness is\ndistinctly unmoral; indeed this line of conduct, as such, is contrary\nto morality.\" Again, on p. 402: \"The impulse that makes us ready to\nserve others must never be an inconsiderate good-nature, but a clearly\nthought-out purpose; that, namely, of furthering as much as possible\nthe causality of Reason.\" However, between these sallies of ridiculous\npedantry, Fichte's real philosophic crudeness peeps out clearly\nenough, as we might only expect in the case of a man whose teaching\nleft no time for learning. He seriously puts forward the _liberum\narbitrium indifferentiae_ (a free and indifferent choice), giving as\nits foundation the most trivial and frivolous reasons. (Pp. 160, 173,\n205, 208, 237, 259, 261.) There can be no doubt that a motive, although\nworking through the medium of the intelligence, is, nevertheless, a\ncause, and consequently involves the same necessity of effect as all\nother causes; the corollary being that all human action is a strictly\nnecessary result. Whoever remains unconvinced of this, is still,\nphilosophically speaking, barbarous, and ignorant of the rudiments\nof exact knowledge. The perception of the strict necessity governing\nman's conduct forms the line of demarcation which separates philosophic\nheads from all others; arrived at this limit Fichte clearly showed that\nhe belonged to the others. Moreover, following the footsteps of Kant\n(p. 303), he proceeds to make various statements which are in direct\ncontradiction to the above mentioned passages; but this inconsistency,\nlike many more in his writings, only proves that he, being one\nwho was never serious in the search for truth, possessed no strong\nconvictions to build on; as indeed for his purpose they were not in\nthe least necessary. Nothing is more laughable than the fact that this\nman has received so much posthumous praise for strictly consequential\nreasoning; his pedantic style full of loud declamation about trifling\nmatters being actually mistaken for such.\n\nThe most complete development of Fichte's system of =moral\nFatalism= is found in his last work: _Die Wissenschaftslehre in\nihrem Allgemeinen Umrisse Dargestellt_, Berlin, 1810. It has the\nadvantage of being only forty-six pages (duodecimo) long, while it\ncontains his whole philosophy in a nutshell. It is therefore to be\nrecommended to all those who consider their time too precious to be\nwasted on his larger productions, which are framed with a length and\ntediousness worthy of Christian Wolff, and with the intention, in\nreality, of deluding, not of instructing the reader. In this little\ntreatise we read on p. 32: \"The intuitive perception of a phaenomenal\nworld only came about, to the end that in such a world the Ego as the\n=absolute Ought= might be visible to itself.\" On p. 33 we actually\nfind: \"The =ought=,\" (_i.e._, the moral necessity,) \"of the\n=Ought's= visibility;\" and on p. 36: \"An =ought=,\" (_i.e._, a\nmoral necessity,) \"of the perception that I =ought=.\" This, then,\nis what we have come to so soon after Kant! =His imperative Form=,\nwith its unproved =Ought=, which it secured as a most convenient\n_\u03c0\u03bf\u1fe1 \u03c3\u03c4\u1ff6_ (standpoint), is indeed an _exemplar vitiis imitabile_!\n\nFor the rest, all that I have said does not overthrow the service\nFichte rendered. Kant's philosophy, this late masterpiece of human\nsagacity, in the very land where it arose, he obscured, nay, supplanted\nby empty, bombastic superlatives, by extravagances, and by the nonsense\nwhich is found, in his _Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre,_\nappearing under the disguise of profound penetration. His merit was\nthus to show the world unmistakably what the capacity of the German\nphilosophical public is; for he made it play the part of a child who\nis coaxed into giving up a precious gem in exchange for a N\u00fcrnberg\ntoy. The fame he obtained in this fashion still lives on credit; and\nstill Fichte is always mentioned in the same breath with Kant as being\nanother such _\u1f29\u03c1\u03b1k\u03bb\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03af\u03b8\u03b7\u00ea\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2!_[4] Indeed his name is often\nplaced above the latter's.[5] It was, of course, Fichte's example that\nencouraged his successors in the art of enveloping the German people,\nin philosophic fog. These were animated by the same spirit, and crowned\nwith the same prosperity. Every one knows their names; nor is this the\nplace to consider them at length. Needless to say, their different\nopinions, down to the minutest details, are still set forth, and\nseriously discussed, by the Professors of Philosophy; as if one had\nreally to do with philosophers! We must, then, thank Fichte for lucid\ndocuments now existing, which will have to be revised one day before\nthe Tribunal of posterity, that Court of Appeal from the verdicts of\nthe present, which--like the Last Judgment looked forward to by the\nSaints--at almost all periods, has been left to give to true merit its\njust award.\n\n\n[1] _I.e._ Scientific Doctrine.\n\n[2] _I.e._ Scientific Blank. Perhaps we might translate:--\"Scientific\nInstruction\" and \"Scientific Misinstruction.\"--(_Translator._)\n\n[3] As evidence of the truth of my words, space prevents me from\nquoting more than a few passages. P. 196: \"The moral instinct is\nabsolute, and its requirements are peremptory, without any object\noutside itself.\" P. 232: \"In consequence of the Moral Law, the\nempirical Being in Time must be an exact copy of the original Ego.\" P.\n308: \"The whole man is a vehicle of the Moral Law.\" P. 342: \"I am only\nan instrument, a mere tool of the Moral Law, not in any sense an end.\"\nP. 343: \"The end laid before every one is to be the means of realising\nReason: this is the ultimate purpose of his existence; for this alone\nhe has his being, and if this end should not be attained, there is not\nthe least occasion for him to live.\" P. 347: \"I am an instrument of the\nMoral Law in the phaenomenal world.\" P. 360: \"It is an ordinance of the\nMoral Law to nourish one's body, and study one's health; this of course\nshould be done in no way, and for no other purpose, except to provide\nan _efficient instrument_ for furthering the end decreed by Reason,\n_i.e._, its realisation,\"--(cf. p. 371.) P. 376: \"Every human body is\nan instrument for furthering the end decreed by Reason, _i.e._, its\nrealisation; therefore the greatest possible fitness of each instrument\nmust constitute for me an end: consequently I must take thought for\nevery one.\"--This is Fichte's derivation of loving-kindness! P. 377: \"I\ncan and dare take thought for myself, solely because, and is so far as\nI am, _an instrument of the Moral Law_.\" P. 388: \"To defend a hunted\nman at the risk of one's own life, is an absolute duty; whenever the\nlife of another human being is in danger, you have no right to think\nof the safety of your own.\" P. 420: \"In the province of the Moral\nLaw there is no way whatever of regarding my fellow-man except as an\n_instrument_ of Reason.\"\n\n[4] _I.e._, Hercules and an ape. A Greek proverb denoting the\njuxtaposition of the sublime and the ridiculous. _V_. Greg. Cypr.\n_M._3, 66; Macar. 4, 53; Luc. _pisc._ 37; and _Schol. Bachm. An._ 2,\n332.--(_Translator._)\n\n[5] My proof for this is a passage from the latest philosophical\nliterature. Herr Feuerbach, an Hegelian (_c'est tout dire!_) in his\nbook, _Pierre Bayle: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie_, 1838,\np. 80, writes as follows: \"But still more sublime than Kant's are\nFichte's ideas as expressed in his Doctrine of Morals and elsewhere.\nChristianity has nothing in sublimity that could bear comparison with\nthem.\"\n\n\n\n\nPART III.\n\nTHE FOUNDING OF ETHICS.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nCONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM.\n\n\nThus the foundation which Kant gave to Ethics, which for the last sixty\nyears has been regarded as a sure basis, proves to be an inadmissible\nassumption, and merely theological Morals in disguise; it sinks\ntherefore before our eyes into the deep gulf of philosophic error,\nwhich perhaps will never be filled up. That the previous attempts to\nlay a foundation are still less satisfactory, I take for granted, as\nI have already said. They consist, for the most part, of unproved\nassertions, drawn from the impalpable world of dreams, and at the\nsame time--like Kant's system itself--full of an artificial subtlety\ndealing with the finest distinctions, and resting on the most abstract\nconceptions. We find difficult combinations; rules invented for the\npurpose; formulae balanced on a needle's point; and stilted maxims,\nfrom which it is no longer possible to look down and see life as it\nreally is with all its turmoil. Such niceties are doubtless admirably\nadapted for the lecture-room, if only with a view to sharpening\nthe wits; but they can never be the cause of the impulse to act\njustly and to do good, which is found in every man; as also they are\npowerless to counterbalance the deep-seated tendency to injustice and\nhardness of heart. Neither is it possible to fasten the reproaches of\nconscience upon them; to attribute the former to the breaking of such\nhair-splitting precepts only serves to make the same ridiculous. In a\nword, artificial associations of ideas like these cannot possibly--if\nwe take the matter seriously--contain the true incentive to justice and\nloving-kindness. Rather must this be something that requires but little\nreflection, and still less abstraction and complicated synthesis;\nsomething that, independent of the training of the understanding,.\nspeaks to every one, even to the rudest,--a something resting simply on\nintuitive perception, and forcing its way home as a direct emanation\nfrom the reality of things. So long as Ethics cannot point to a\nfoundation of this sort, she may go on with her discussions, and make\na great display in the lecture-rooms; but real life will only pour\ncontempt upon her. I must therefore give our moralists the paradoxical\nadvice, first to look about them a little among their fellow-men.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II\n\nSCEPTICAL VIEW.\n\n\nBut when we cast a retrospect over the attempts made, and made in vain,\nfor more than two thousand years, to find a sure basis for Ethics,\nought we not perhaps to think that after all there is no natural\nmorality, independent of human institution? Shall we not conclude that\nall moral systems are nothing but artificial products, means invented\nfor the better restraint of the selfish and wicked race of men; and\nfurther, that, as they have no internal credentials and no natural\nbasis, they would fail in their purpose, if without the support of\npositive religion? The legal code and the police are not sufficient in\nall cases; there are offences, the discovery of which is too difficult;\nsome, indeed, where punishment is a precarious matter; where, in short,\nwe are left without public protection. Moreover, the civil law can at\nmost enforce justice, not loving-kindness and beneficence; because,\nof course, these are qualities as regards which every one would like\nto play the passive, and no one the active, part. All this has given\nrise to the hypothesis that morality rests solely on religion, and that\nboth have the same aim--that of being complementary to the necessary\ninadequacy of state machinery and legislation. Consequently, there\ncannot be (it is said) a natural morality, _i.e._, one based simply\non the nature of things, or of man, and the fruitless search of\nphilosophers for its foundation is explained. This view is not without\nplausibility; and we find it as far back as the Pyrrhonians:\n\n    _\u03bf\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03b8\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03af \u03d5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9, o\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u03cc\u03bd,_\n       _\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u03c0\u03ce\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1f52\u03c4\u03b1 \u03bd\u03cc \u03ba\u03ad\u03ba\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9,_\n    _\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd T\u03af\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd\u03b1_[1]\n                   --_Sext. Emp. adv. Math_., XI., 140.\n\nAlso in modern times distinguished thinkers have given their adherence\nto it. A careful examination therefore it deserves; although the easier\ncourse would be to shelve it by giving an inquisitorial glance at the\nconsciences of those in whom such a theory could arise.\n\nWe should fall into a great, a very childish blunder, if we believed\nall the just and legal actions of mankind to have a moral origin. This\nis far from being the case. As a rule, between the justice, which men\npractise, and genuine singleness of heart, there exists a relation\nanalogous to that between polite expressions, and the true love of\none's neighbour, which, unlike the former, does not ostensibly overcome\nEgoism, but really does so. That honesty of sentiment, everywhere\nso carefully exhibited, which requires to be regarded as above all\nsuspicion; that deep indignation, which is stirred by the smallest\nsign of a doubt in this direction, and is ready to break out into\nfurions anger;--to what are we to attribute these symptoms? None but\nthe inexperienced and simple will take them for pure coin, for the\nworking of a fine moral feeling, or conscience. In point of fact, the\ngeneral correctness of conduct which is adopted in human intercourse,\nand insisted on as a rule no less immovable than the hills, depends\nprincipally on two external necessities; first, on legal ordinance,\nby virtue of which the rights of every man are protected by public\nauthority; and secondly, on the recognised need of possessing civil\nhonour, in other words, a good name, in order to advance in the world.\nThis is why the steps taken by the individual are closely watched by\npublic opinion, which is so inexorably severe that it never forgives\neven a single false move or slip, but remembers it against the guilty\nperson as an indelible blot, all his life long. As far as this goes,\npublic opinion is wise enough; for, starting from the fundamental\nprinciple: _Operari sequitur esse_ (what one does is determined by what\none is), it shows its conviction that the character is unchangeable,\nand that therefore what a man has once done, he will assuredly do\nagain, if only the circumstances be precisely similar. Such are the two\ncustodians that keep guard on the correct conduct of people, without\nwhich, to speak frankly, we should be in a sad case, especially with\nreference to property, this central point in human life, around which\nthe chief part of its energy and activity revolves. For the purely\nethical motives to integrity, assuming that they exist, cannot as a\nrule be applied, except very indirectly, to the question of ownership\nas guaranteed by the state. These motives, in fact, have a direct and\nessential bearing only on =natural= right; with =positive=\nright their connection is merely indirect, in so far as the latter\nis based on the former. Natural right, however, attaches to no other\nproperty than that which has been gained by one's own exertion;\nbecause, when this is seized, the owner is at the same time robbed of\nall the efforts he expended in acquiring it. The theory of preoccupancy\nI reject absolutely, but cannot here set forth its refutation.[2]\nNow of course all estate based on positive right ought ultimately\nand in the last instance (it matters not how many intermediate links\nare involved) to rest on the natural right of possession. But what\na distance there is, in most cases, between the title-deeds, that\nbelong to our civil life, and this natural right--their original\nsource! Indeed their connection with the latter is generally either\nvery difficult, or else impossible, to prove. What we hold is ours by\ninheritance, by marriage, by success in the lottery; or if in no way\nof this kind, still it is not gained by our own work, with the sweat\nof the brow, but rather by shrewdness and bright ideas (_e.g._, in the\nfield of speculation), yes, and sometimes even by our very stupidity,\nwhich, through a conjunction of circumstances, is crowned and glorified\nby the _Deus eventus._ It is only in a very small minority of cases\nthat property is the fruit of real labour and toil; and even then\nthe work is usually mental, like that of lawyers, doctors, civilians,\nteachers, etc.; and this in the eyes of the rude appears to cost but\nlittle effort.\n\nNow, when wealth is acquired in any such fashion, there is need of\nconsiderable education before the ethical right can be recognised and\nrespected out of a purely moral impulse. Hence it comes about that\nnot a few secretly regard the possessions of others as held merely by\nvirtue of positive right. So, if they find means to wrest from another\nman his goods, by using, or perhaps by evading, the laws, they feel\nno scruples; for in their opinion he would lose what he holds, in the\nsame way in which he had previously obtained it, and they consequently\nregard their own claims as equal to his. From their point of view, the\nright of the stronger in civil society is superseded by the right of\nthe cleverer.\n\nIncidentally we may notice that the =rich= man often shows an\ninflexible correctness of conduct. Why? Because with his whole heart\nhe is attached to, and rigidly maintains, a rule, on the observance of\nwhich his entire wealth, and all its attendant advantages, depend. For\nthis reason his profession of the principle: _Suum cuique_ (to each his\nown), is thoroughly in earnest, and shows an unswerving consistency.\nNo doubt there is an =objective= loyalty to sincerity and good\nfaith, which avails to keep them sacred; but such loyalty is based\nsimply on the fact that sincerity and good faith are the foundation of\nall free intercourse among men; of good order; and of secure ownership.\nConsequently they very often benefit =ourselves=, and with this\nend in view they must be preserved even at some cost: just as a good\npiece of land is worth a certain outlay. But integrity thus derived\nis, as a rule, only to be met with among wealthy people, or at least\nthose who are engaged in a lucrative business. It is an especial\ncharacteristic of tradesmen; because they have the strongest conviction\nthat for all the operations of commerce the one thing indispensable\nis mutual trust and credit; and this is why mercantile honour stands\nquite by itself. On the other hand, the _poor_ man, who cannot make\nboth ends meet, and who, by reason of the unequal division of property,\nsees himself condemned to want and hard work, while others before his\neyes are lapped in luxury and idleness, will not easily perceive that\nthe _raison d'\u00eatre_ of this inequality is a corresponding inequality of\nservice and honest industry. And if he does =not= recognise this,\nhow is he to be governed by the purely ethical motive to uprightness,\nwhich should keep him from stretching out his hand to grasp the\nsuperfluity of another? Generally, it is the order of government\nas established by law that restrains him. But should ever the rare\noccasion present itself when he discovers that he is beyond the reach\nof the police, and that he could by a single act throw off the galling\nburden of penury, which is aggravated by the sight of others' opulence;\nif he feels this, and realises that he could thus enter into the\npossession and enjoyment of all that he has so often coveted: what is\nthere then to stay his hand? Religions dogmas? It is seldom that faith\nis so firm. A purely moral incentive to be just and upright? Perhaps\nin a few isolated cases. But in by far the greater number there is in\nreality nothing but the anxiety a man feels to keep his good name,\nhis civil honour--a thing that touches closely even those in humble\ncircumstances. He knows the imminent danger incurred of having to pay\nfor dishonest conduct by being expelled from the great Masonic Lodge\nof honourable people who live correct lives. He knows that property\nall over the world is in their hands, and duly apportioned among\nthemselves, and that they wield the power of making him an outcast for\nlife from good society, in case he commit a single disgraceful action.\nHe knows that whoever takes one false step in this direction is marked\nas a person that no one trusts, whose company every one shuns, and from\nwhom all advancement is cut off; to whom, as being \"a fellow that has\nstolen,\" the proverb is applied: \"He who steals once is a thief all his\nlife.\"\n\nThese, then, are the guards that watch over correct behaviour between\nman and man, and he who has lived, and kept his eyes open, will admit\nthat the vast majority of honourable actions in human intercourse must\nbe attributed to them; nay, he will go further, and say that there are\nnot wanting people who hope to elude even their vigilance, and who\nregard justice and honesty merely as an external badge, as a flag,\nunder the protection of which they can carry out their own freebooting\npropensities with better success. We need not therefore break out into\nholy wrath, and buckle on our armour, if a moralist is found to suggest\nthat perhaps all integrity and uprightness may be at bottom only\nconventional. This is what Holbach, Helvetius, d'Alembert, and others\nof their time did; and, following out the theory, they endeavoured\nwith great acumen to trace back all moral conduct to egoistic motives,\nhowever remote and indirect. That their position is literally true of\nmost just actions, as having an ultimate foundation centred in the\nSelf, I have shown above. That it is also true to a large extent of\nwhat is done in kindness and humanity, there can be no doubt; acts of\nthis sort often arise from love of ostentation, still oftener from\nbelief in a retribution to come, which may be dealt out in the second\nor even the third power;[3] or they can be explained by other egoistic\nmotives. Nevertheless, it is equally certain that there occur actions\nof disinterested good-will and entirely voluntary justice. To prove\nthe latter statement, I appeal only to the facts of experience, not\nto those of consciousness. There are isolated, yet indisputable cases\non record, where not only the danger of legal prosecution, but also\nall chance of discovery, and even of suspicion has been excluded, and\nwhere, notwithstanding, the poor man has rendered to the rich his own.\nFor example, things lost, and found, have been given back without any\nthought or hope of reward; a deposit made by a third person has been\nrestored after his death to the rightful owner; a poor man, secretly\nintrusted with a treasure by a fugitive, has faithfully kept, and\nthen returned, it. Instances of this sort can be found, beyond all\ndoubt; only the surprise, the emotion, and the high respect awakened,\nwhen we hear of them, testify to the fact that they are unexpected\nand very exceptional. There are in truth really honest people: like\nfour-leaved clover, their existence is not a fiction. But Hamlet uses\nno hyperbole when he says: \"To be honest, as this world goes, is to be\none man pick'd out of ten thousand.\" If it be objected that, after all,\nreligious dogmas, involving rewards and penalties in another world,\nare at the root of conduct as above described; cases could probably be\nadduced where the actors possessed no religions faith whatever. And\nthis is a thing by no means so infrequent as is generally maintained.\n\nThose who combat the =sceptical view= appeal specially to the\ntestimony of =conscience=. But conscience itself is impugned,\nand doubts are raised about its natural origin. Now, as a matter of\nfact, there is a _conscientia spuria_ (false conscience), which is\noften confounded with the true. The regret and anxiety which many a\nman feels for what he has done is frequently, at bottom, nothing but\nfear of the possible consequences. Not a few people, if they break\nexternal, voluntary, and even absurd rules, suffer from painful\nsearchings of heart, exactly similar to those inflicted by the real\nconscience. Thus, for instance, a bigoted Jew, if on Saturday he\nshould smoke a pipe at home, becomes really oppressed with the sense\nof having disobeyed the command in Exodus xxxv. 3: \"Ye shall kindle\nno fire throughout your habitations upon the Sabbath day.\" How often\nit happens that a nobleman or officer is the victim of self-reproach,\nbecause on some occasion or other he has not properly complied with\nthat fools' codex, which is called knightly honour! Nay more: there\nare many of this class, who, if they see the impossibility of merely\ndoing enough in some quarrel to satisfy the above-named code--to say\nnothing of keeping their pledged word of honour--are ready to shoot\nthemselves. (Instances of both have come under my knowledge.) And this,\nwhile the self-same man would with an easy mind break his promise every\nday, if only the shibboleth \"Honour\" be not involved. In short, every\ninconsequent, and thoughtless action, all conduct contrary to our\nprejudices, principles, or convictions, whatever these may be; indeed,\nevery indiscretion, every mistake, every piece of stupidity rankles\nin us secretly, and leaves its sting behind. The average individual,\nwho thinks his conscience such an imposing structure, would be\nsurprised, could he see of what it actually consists: probably of about\none-fifth, fear of men; one-fifth, superstition; one-fifth, prejudice;\none-fifth, vanity; and one-fifth, habit. So that in reality he is no\nbetter than the Englishman, who said quite frankly: \"I cannot afford\nto keep a conscience.\" Religious people of every creed, as a rule,\nunderstand by conscience nothing else than the dogmas and injunctions\nof their religion, and the self-examination based thereon; and it\nis in this sense that the expressions =coercion of conscience=\nand =liberty of conscience= are used. The same interpretation\nwas always given by the theologians, schoolmen, and casuists of the\nmiddle ages and of later times. Whatever a man knew of the formulae and\nprescriptions of the Church, coupled with a resolution to believe and\nobey it, constituted his conscience. Thus we find the terms \"a doubting\nconscience,\" \"an opinionated conscience,\" \"an erring conscience,\" and\nthe like; and councils were held, and confessors employed, for the\nspecial purpose of setting such irregularities straight. How little the\nconception of conscience, just as other conceptions, is determined by\nits own object; how differently it is viewed by different people; how\nwavering and uncertain it appears in books; all this is briefly but\nclearly set forth in St\u00e4udlin's _Geschichte der Lehre vom Gewissen_.\nThese facts taken in conjunction are not calculated to establish the\nreality of the thing; they have rather given rise to the question\nwhether there is in truth a genuine, inborn conscience. I have already\nhad occasion in Part II., Chapter VIII., where the theory of Freedom is\ndiscussed, to touch on my view of conscience, and I shall return to it\nbelow.\n\nAll these sceptical objections added together do not in the least avail\nto prove that no true morality exists, however much they may moderate\nour expectations as to the moral tendency in man, and the natural basis\nof Ethics. Undoubtedly a great deal that is ascribed to the ethical\nsense can be proved to spring from other incentives; and when we\ncontemplate the moral depravity of the world, it is sufficiently clear\nthat the stimulus for good cannot be very powerful, especially as it\noften does not work even in cases where the opposing motives are weak,\nalthough then the individual difference of character makes itself fully\nfelt.\n\nIt should be observed that this moral depravity is all the more\ndifficult to discern, because its manifestations are checked and\ncloaked by public order, as enforced by law; by the necessity of\nhaving a good name; and even by ordinary polite manners. And this is\nnot all. People commonly suppose that in the education of the young\ntheir moral interests are furthered by representing uprightness and\nvirtue as principles generally followed by the world. Later on, it is\noften to their great harm that experience teaches them something else;\nfor the discovery, that the instructors of their early years were the\nfirst to deceive them, is likely to have a more mischievous effect on\ntheir morality than if these persons had given them the first example\nof ingenuous truthfulness, by saying frankly: \"The world is sunk in\nevil, and men are not what they ought to be; but be not misled thereby,\nand see that you do better.\" All this, as I have said, increases the\ndifficulty of recognising the real immorality of mankind. The state\n--this masterpiece, which sums up the self-conscious, intelligent\negoism of all--consigns the rights of each person to a power, which,\nbeing enormously superior to that of the individual, compels him to\nrespect the rights of all others. This is the leash that restrains\nthe limitless egoism of nearly every one, the malice of many, the\ncruelty of not a few. The illusion thus arising is so great that,\nwhen in special cases, where the executive power is ineffective, or\nis eluded, the insatiable covetousness, the base greed, the deep\nhypocrisy, or the spiteful tricks of men are apparent in all their\nugliness, we recoil with horror, supposing that we have stumbled on\nsome unheard-of monster: whereas, without the compulsion of law, and\nthe necessity of keeping an honourable name, these sights would be of\nevery day occurrence. In order to discover what, from a moral point\nof view, human beings are made of, we must study anarchist records,\nand the proceedings connected with criminals. The thousands that\nthrong before our eyes, in peaceful intercourse each with the other,\ncan only be regarded as so many tigers and wolves, whose teeth are\nsecured by a strong muzzle. Let us now suppose this muzzle cast off,\nor, in other words, the power of the state abolished; the contemplation\nof the spectacle then to be awaited would make all thinking people\nshudder; and they would thus betray the small amount of trust they\nreally have in the efficiency either of religion, or of conscience, or\nof the natural basis of Morals, whatever it be. But if these immoral,\nantinomian forces should be unshackled and let loose, it is precisely\nthen that the true moral incentive, hidden before, would reveal its\nactivity, and consequently be most easily recognised. And nothing\nwould bring out so clearly as this the prodigious moral difference of\ncharacter between man and man; it would be found to be as great as the\nintellectual, which is saying much.\n\nThe objection will perhaps be raised that Ethics is not concerned with\nwhat men actually do, but that it is the science which treats of what\ntheir conduct =ought= to be. Now this is exactly the position\nwhich I deny. In the critical part of the present treatise I have\nsufficiently demonstrated that the conception of =ought=, in\nother words, the =imperative form= of Ethics, is valid only in\ntheological morals, outside of which it loses all sense and meaning.\nThe end which I place before Ethical Science is to point out all the\nvaried moral lines of human conduct; to explain them; and to trace\nthem to their ultimate source. Consequently there remains no way of\ndiscovering the basis of Ethics except the empirical. We must search\nand see whether we can find any actions to which we are obliged to\nascribe =genuine moral worth=: actions, that is, of voluntary\njustice, of pure loving-kindness, and of true nobleness. Such conduct,\nwhen found, is to be regarded as a given phaenomenon, which has to\nbe properly accounted for; in other words, its real origin must be\nexplored, and this will involve the investigation and explanation of\nthe peculiar motives which lead men to actions so radically distinct\nfrom all others, that they form a class by themselves. These motives,\ntogether with a responsive susceptibility for them, will constitute\nthe ultimate basis of morality, and the knowledge of them will be\nthe foundation of Ethics. This is the humble path to which I direct\nthe Science of Morals. It contains no construction _a priori_, no\nabsolute legislation for all rational beings _in abstracto_; it lacks\nall official, academic sanction. Therefore, whoever thinks it not\nsufficiently fashionable, may return to the Categorical Imperative;\nto the Shibboleth of \"Human Dignity\"; to the empty phrases, the\ncobwebs, and the soap-bubbles of the Schools; to principles on which\nexperience pours contempt at every step, and of which no one, outside\nthe lecture-rooms knows anything, or has ever had the least notion. On\nthe other hand, the foundation which is reached by following my path\nis upheld by experience; and it is experience which daily and hourly\ndelivers its silent testimony in favour of my theory.\n\n\n[1] _I.e._, there is nothing either good or bad by nature, but these\nthings are decided by human judgment, as Timon says. _V_. Sexti\nEmpirici _Opera Quae Exstant: Adversus Mathematicos;_ p. 462 A _ad\nfin_. Aurelianae: Petrus et Jacobus Chou\u00ebt, 1621. _V_. also: Sexti\nEmpirici _Opera_, edit. Jo. Albertus Fabricius: Lipsiae, 1718, Lib.\nXI., 140, p. 716.\n\n[2] See _Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, Vol I., \u00a7 62, p. 396\nsqq., and Vol. II., chap. 47, p. 682.\n\n[3] In other words: If _a_ be a given offence, or virtuous act, and _x_\nthe punishment, or reward, proportional to it; then the punishment,\nor reward, actually inflicted, instead of being _x_, may be _x_^2 or\n_x_^3.--(Translator.)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nANTIMORAL[1] INCENTIVES.\n\n\nThe chief and fundamental incentive in man, as in animals, is\n=Egoism=, that is, the urgent impulse to exist, and exist under\nthe best circumstances. The German word _Selbstsucht_ (self-seeking)\ninvolves a false secondary idea of disease (_Sucht_).[2] The term\n_Eigennutz_ (self-interest) denotes Egoism, so far as the latter\nis guided by reason, which enables it, by means of reflection, to\nprosecute its purposes systematically; so that animals may be called\negoistic, but not self-interested (_eigennutzig_). I shall therefore\nretain the word =Egoism= for the general idea. Now this Egoism\nis, both in animals and men, connected in the closest way with their\nvery essence and being; indeed, it is one and the same thing. For this\nreason all human actions, as a rule, have their origin in Egoism, and\nto it, accordingly, we must always first turn, when we try to find the\nexplanation of any given line of conduct; just as, when the endeavour\nis made to guide a man in any direction, the means to this end are\nuniversally calculated with reference to the same all-powerful motive.\nEgoism is, from its nature, limitless. The individual is filled with\nthe unqualified desire of preserving his life, and of keeping it free\nfrom all pain, under which is included all want and privation. He\nwishes to have the greatest possible amount of pleasurable existence,\nand every gratification that he is capable of appreciating; indeed,\nhe attempts, if possible, to evolve fresh capacities for enjoyment.\nEverything that opposes the strivings of his Egoism awakens his\ndislike, his anger, his hate: this is the mortal enemy, which he tries\nto annihilate. If it were possible, he would like to possess everything\nfor his own pleasure; as this is impossible, he wishes at least to\ncontrol everything. \"All things for me, and nothing for others\" is his\nmaxim. Egoism is a huge giant overtopping the world. If each person\nwere allowed to choose between his own destruction and that of the\nrest of mankind, I need not say what the decision would be in most\ncases. Thus, it is that every human unit makes himself the centre of\nthe world, which he views exclusively from that standpoint. Whatever\noccurs, even, for instance, the most sweeping changes in the destinies\nof nations, he brings into relation first and foremost with his own\ninterests, which, however slightly and indirectly they may be affected,\nhe is sure to think of before anything else. No sharper contrast can\nbe imagined than that between the profound and exclusive attention\nwhich each person devotes to his own self, and the indifference with\nwhich, as a rule, all other people regard that self,--an indifference\nprecisely like that with which he in turn looks upon them. To a\ncertain extent it is actually comic to see how each individual out of\ninnumerable multitudes considers himself, at least from the practical\npoint of view, as the only real thing, and all others in some sort\nas mere phantoms. The ultimate reason of this lies in the fact that\nevery one is =directly= conscious of himself, but of others only\n_indirectly_, through his mind's eye; and the direct impression asserts\nits right. In other words, it is in consequence of the subjectivity\nwhich is essential to our consciousness that each person is himself\nthe whole world; for all that is objective exists only indirectly, as\nsimply the mental picture of the subject; whence it comes about that\neverything is invariably expressed in terms of self-consciousness. The\nonly world which the individual really grasps, and of which he has\ncertain knowledge, he carries in himself, as a mirrored image fashioned\nby his brain; and he is, therefore, its centre. Consequently he is all\nin all to himself; and since he feels that he contains within his ego\nall that is real, nothing can be of greater importance to him than his\nown self.[3] Moreover this supremely important self, this microcosm,\nto which the macrocosm stands in relation as its mere modification\nor accident,--this, which is the individual's whole world, he knows\nperfectly well must be destroyed by death; which is therefore for him\nequivalent to the destruction of all things.\n\nSuch, then, are the elements out of which, on the basis of the Will to\nlive, Egoism grows up, and like a broad trench it forms a perennial\nseparation between man and man. If on any occasion some one actually\njumps across, to help another, such an act is regarded as a sort of\nmiracle, which calls forth amazement and wins approval. In Part II.,\nChapter VI., where Kant's principle of Morals is discussed, I had\nthe opportunity of describing how Egoism behaves in everyday life,\nwhere it is always peering out of some corner or other, despite\nordinary politeness, which, like the traditional fig-leaf, is used\nas a covering. In point of fact, politeness is the conventional and\nsystematic disavowal of Egoism in the trifles of daily intercourse,\nand is, of course, a piece of recognised hypocrisy. Gentle manners are\nexpected and commended, because that which they conceal--Egoism--is so\nodious, that no one wishes to see it, however much it is known to be\nthere; just as people like to have repulsive objects hidden at least by\na curtain. Now, unless external force (under which must be included\nevery source of fear whether of human or superhuman powers), or else\nthe real moral incentive is in effective operation, it is certain that\nEgoism always pursues its purposes with unqualified directness; hence\nwithout these checks, considering the countless number of egoistic\nindividuals, the _bellum omnium contra omnes_[4] would be the order\nof the day, and prove the ruin of all. Thus is explained the early\nconstruction by reflecting reason of state government, which, arising,\nas it does, from a mutual fear of reciprocal violence, obviates the\ndisastrous consequences of the general Egoism, as far as it is possible\nto do by =negative= procedure. Where, however, the two forces\nthat oppose Egoism fail to be operative, the latter is not slow to\nreveal all its horrible dimensions, nor is the spectacle exactly\nattractive. In order to express the strength of this antimoral power\nin a few words, to portray it, so to say, at one stroke, some very\nemphatic hyperbole is wanted. It may be put thus: many a man would\nbe quite capable of killing another, simply to rub his boots over\nwith the victim's fat. I am only doubtful whether this, after all, is\nany exaggeration. =Egoism=, then, is the first and principal,\nthough not the only, power that the =moral Motive= has to contend\nagainst; and it is surely sufficiently clear that the latter, in order\nto enter the lists against such an opponent, must be something more\nreal than a hair-splitting sophism or an _a priori_ soap-bubble. In war\nthe first thing to be done is to know the enemy well; and in the shock\nof battle, now impending, =Egoism=, as the chief combatant on its\nown side, is best set against the virtue of =Justice=, which, in\nmy opinion, is the first and original cardinal virtue.\n\nThe virtue of =loving-kindness=, on the other hand, is rather to\nbe matched with =ill-will=, or =spitefulness=, the origin\nand successive stages of which we will now consider. Ill-will, in\nits lower degrees, is very frequent, indeed, almost a common thing;\nand it easily rises in the scale. Goethe is assuredly right when\nhe says that in this world indifference and aversion are quite at\nhome.--(_Wahlverwandtschaften,_ Part I., chap. 3.) It is very fortunate\nfor us that the cloak, which prudence and politeness throw over this\nvice, prevents us from seeing how general it is, and how the _bellum\nomnium contra omnes_ is constantly waged, at least in thought. Yet\never and anon there is some appearance of it: for instance, in the\nrelentless backbiting so frequently observed; while its clearest\nmanifestation is found in all out-breaks of anger, which, for the most\npart, are quite disproportional to their cause, and which could hardly\nbe so violent, had they not been compressed--like gunpowder--into the\nexplosive compound formed of long cherished brooding hatred. Ill-will\nusually arises from the unavoidable collisions of Egoism which occur\nat every step. It is, moreover, objectively excited by the view of\nthe weakness, the folly, the vices, failings, shortcomings, and\nimperfections of all kinds, which every one more or less, at least\noccasionally, affords to others. Indeed, the spectacle is such, that\nmany a man, especially in moments of melancholy and depression, may\nbe tempted to regard the world, from the aesthetic standpoint, as a\ncabinet of caricatures; from the intellectual, as a madhouse; and\nfrom the moral, as a nest of sharpers. If such a mental attitude be\nindulged, misanthropy is the result. Lastly, one of the chief sources\nof ill-will is envy; or rather, the latter is itself ill-will, kindled\nby the happiness, possessions, or advantages of others. No one is\nabsolutely free from envy; and Herodotus (III. 80) said long ago:\n_\u03d5\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1fc6\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u1f10\u03bc\u03d5\u03cd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u1ff3_ (envy is a natural growth in man from\nthe beginning). But its degrees vary considerably. It is most poisonous\nand implacable when directed against personal qualities, because then\nthe envious have nothing to hope for. And precisely in such cases\nits vilest form also appears, because men are made to hate what they\nought to love and honour. Yet so \"the world wags,\" even as Petrarca\ncomplained:\n\n_Di lor par pi\u00f9, che d'altri, invidia s'abbia,_\n_Che per se stessi son levati a volo,_\n_Uscendo fuor della commune gabbia._\n(For envy fastens most of all on those,\nWho, rising on their own strong wings, escape\nThe bars wherein the vulgar crowd is cag'd.)\n\nThe reader is referred to the Parerga, vol. ii., \u00a7 114, for a more\ncomplete examination of envy.\n\nIn a certain sense the opposite of envy is the habit of gloating over\nthe misfortunes of others, At any rate, while the former is human, the\nlatter is diabolical. There is no sign more infallible of an entirely\nbad heart, and of profound moral worthlessness than open and candid\nenjoyment in seeing other people suffer. The man in whom this trait is\nobserved ought to be for ever avoided: _Hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane,\ncaveto_.[5] These two vices are in themselves merely theoretical; in\npractice they become malice and cruelty. It is true that Egoism may\nlead to wickedness and crime of every sort; but the resulting injury\nand pain to others are simply the means, not the end, and are therefore\ninvolved only as an accident. Whereas malice and cruelty make others'\nmisery the end in itself, the realisation of which affords distinct\npleasure. They therefore constitute a higher degree of moral turpitude.\nThe maxim of Egoism, at its worst is: _Neminem juva, immo omnes, si\nforte conducit_ (thus there is always a condition), _laede_ (help no\nbody, but rather injure all people, if it brings you any advantage).\nThe guiding rule of malice is: _Omnes, quantum potes, laede_ (injure\nall people as far as you can). As malicious joy is in fact theoretical\ncruelty, so, conversely, cruelty is nothing but malicious joy put into\npractice; and the latter is sure to show itself in the form of cruelty,\ndirectly an opportunity offers.\n\nAn examination of the special vices that spring from these two primary\nantimoral forces forms no part of the present treatise: its proper\nplace would be found in a detailed system of Ethics. From =Egoism=\nwe should probably derive greed, gluttony, lust, selfishness, avarice,\ncovetousness, injustice, hardness of heart, pride, arrogance, etc.;\nwhile to =spitefulness= might be ascribed disaffection, envy,\nill-will, malice, pleasure in seeing others suffer, prying curiosity,\nslander, insolence, petulance, hatred, anger, treachery, fraud, thirst\nfor revenge, cruelty, etc. The first root is more bestial, the second\nmore devilish; and according as either is the stronger; or according\nas the moral incentive, to be described below, predominates, so\nthe salient points for the ethical classification of character are\ndetermined. No man is entirely free from some traces of all three.\n\nHere I bring to an end my review of these terrible powers of evil;\nit is an array reminding one of the Princes of Darkness in Milton's\nPandemonium. But my plan, which in this respect of course differs from\nthat of all other moralists, required me to consider at the outset\nthis gloomy side of human nature, and, like Dante, to descend first to\nTartarus.\n\nIt will now be fully apparent how difficult our problem is. We have\nto find a motive capable of making a man take up a line of conduct\ndirectly opposed to all those propensities which lie deeply ingrained\nin his nature; or, given such conduct as a fact of experience, we must\nsearch for a motive capable of supplying an adequate and non-artificial\nexplanation of it. The difficulty, in fact, is so great that, in order\nto solve it, for the vast majority of mankind, it has been everywhere\nnecessary to have recourse to machinery from another world. Gods have\nbeen pointed to, whose will and command the required mode of behaviour\nwas said to be, and who were represented as emphasising this command\nby penalties and rewards either in this, or in another world, to\nwhich death would be the gate. Now let us assume that belief in a\ndoctrine of this sort took general root (a thing which is certainly\npossible through strenuous inculcation at a very early age); and let\nus also assume that it brought about the intended effect,--though this\nis a much harder matter to admit, and not nearly so well confirmed\nby experience; we should then no doubt succeed in obtaining strict\nlegality of action, even beyond the limits that justice and the police\ncan reach; but every one feels that this would not in the least imply\nwhat we mean by morality of the heart. For obviously, every act arising\nfrom motives like those just mentioned is after all derived simply from\npure Egoism. How can I talk of unselfishness when I am enticed by a\npromised guerdon, or deterred by a threatened punishment? A recompense\nin another world, thoroughly believed in, must be regarded as a bill\nof exchange, which is perfectly safe, though only payable at a very\ndistant date. It is thus quite possible that the profuse assurances,\nwhich beggars so constantly make, that those, who relieve them, will\nreceive a thousandfold more for their gifts in the next world, may lead\nmany a miser to generous alms-giving; for such a one complacently views\nthe matter as a good investment of money, being perfectly convinced\nthat he will rise again as a Croesus. For the mass of mankind, it\nwill perhaps be always necessary to continue the appeal to incentives\nof this nature, and we know that such is the teaching promulgated by\nthe different religions, which are in fact the =metaphysics of the\npeople=. Be it, however, observed in this connection that a man is\nsometimes just as much in error as to the true motives that govern\nhis own acts, as he is with regard to those of others. Hence it is\ncertain that many persons, while they can only account to themselves\nfor their noblest actions by attributing them to motives of the kind\nabove described, are, nevertheless, really guided in their conduct by\nfar higher and purer incentives, though the latter may be much more\ndifficult to discover. They are doing, no doubt, out of direct love\nof their neighbour, that which they can but explain as the command of\ntheir God. On the other hand, Philosophy, in dealing with this, as with\nall other problems, endeavours to extract the true and ultimate cause\nof the given phaenomena from the disclosures which the nature itself\nof man yields, and which, freed as they must be from all mythical\ninterpretation, from all religious dogmas, and transcendent hypostases,\nshe requires to see confirmed by external or internal experience. Now,\nas our present task is a philosophical one, we must entirely disregard\nall solutions conditioned by any religion; and I have here touched on\nthem merely in order to throw a stronger light on the magnitude of the\ndifficulty.\n\n\n[1] I venture to use this word although irregularly formed, because\n\"antiethical\" would not here give an adequate meaning. _Sittlich_\n(in accordance with good manners) and _unsittlich_ (contrary to good\nmanners), which have lately come into vogue, are bad substitutes\nfor _moralisch_ (moral) and _unmoralisch_ (immoral): first, because\n_moralisch_ is a scientific conception, which, as such, requires to be\ndenoted by a Greek or Latin term, for reasons which may be found in\n_Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung_, vol. ii., chap. 12, p. 134 sqq.;\nand secondly, because _sittlich_ is a weaker and tamer expression,\ndifficult to distinguish from _sittsam_ (modest) which in popular\nacceptation means _zimperlich_ (simpering). No concessions must be made\nto this extravagant love of germanising!\n\n[2] In _Sucht_ (_siech_ = sick) and _Selbst-sucht_ (_suchen_=\nseek) there is an apparent confusion between the two bases SUK\n(_seuka_) to be ill, and S\u00d4KYAN, to seek. _V_. Skeat's _Etymological\nDictionary._--(_Translator._)\n\n[3] It should be noticed that while from the _subjective_ side a man's\nself assumes these gigantic proportions, _objectively_ it shrinks to\nalmost nothing--namely, to about the one-thousand-millionth part of the\nhuman race.\n\n[4] The war of all against all. Hobbes uses this expression.\n--(_Translator._)\n\n[5] This man is black; of him shalt thou, O Roman, beware. _V_. Horace,\n_Sat_., Lib. I. 4. 85.--(_Translator_.)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nCRITERION OF ACTIONS OF MORAL WORTH.\n\n\nThere is first the empirical question to be settled, whether actions\nof voluntary justice and unselfish loving-kindness, which are capable\nof rising to nobleness and magnanimity, actually occur in experience.\nUnfortunately, this inquiry cannot be decided altogether empirically,\nbecause it is invariably only the act that experience gives, the\n=incentives= not being apparent. Hence the possibility always\nremains that an egoistic motive may have had weight in determining a\njust or good deed. In a theoretical investigation like the present,\nI shall not avail myself of the inexcusable trick of shifting the\nmatter on to the reader's conscience. But I believe there are few\npeople who have any doubt about the matter, and who are not convinced\nfrom their own experience that just acts are often performed simply\nand solely to prevent a man suffering from injustice. Most of as, I\ndo not hesitate to say, are persuaded that there are persons in whom\nthe principle of giving others their due seems to be innate, who\nneither intentionally injure any one, nor unconditionally seek their\nown advantage, but in considering themselves show regard also for the\nrights of their neighbours; persons who, when they undertake matters\ninvolving reciprocal obligations, not only see that the other party\ndoes his duty, but also that he gets his own, because it is really\nagainst their will that any one, with whom they have to do, should be\nshabbily treated. These are the men of true probity, the few _aequi_\n(just) among the countless number of the _iniqui_ (unjust). Such\npeople exist. Similarly, it will be admitted, I think, that many help\nand give, perform services, and deny themselves, without having any\nfurther intention in their hearts than that of assisting another, whose\ndistress they see. When Arnold von Winkelried exclaimed: \"_Tr\u00fcwen,\nlieben Eidgenossen, wullt's minem Wip und Kinde gedenken_,\"[1] and then\nclasped in his arms as many hostile spears as he could grasp; can any\none believe that he had some selfish purpose? I cannot. To cases of\nvoluntary justice, which cannot be denied without deliberate and wilful\ntrifling with facts, I have already drawn attention in Chapter II. of\nthis Part. Should any one, however, persist in refusing to believe that\nsuch actions ever happen, then, according to his view, Ethics would\nbe a science without any real object, like Astrology and Alchemy, and\nit would be waste of time to discuss its basis any further. With him,\ntherefore, I have nothing to do, and address myself to those who allow\nthat we are dealing with something more than an imaginary citation.\n\nIt is, then, only to conduct of the above kind that genuine moral worth\ncan be ascribed. Its special mark is that it rejects and excludes\nthe whole class of motives by which otherwise all human action is\nprompted: I mean the =self-interested= motives, using the word in\nits widest sense. Consequently the moral value of an act is lowered by\nthe disclosure of an accessory selfish incentive; while it is entirely\ndestroyed, if that incentive stood alone. The absence of all egoistic\nmotives is thus the =Criterion= of an action of moral value. It\nmay, no doubt, be objected that also acts of pure malice and cruelty\nare not selfish.[2] But it is manifest that the latter cannot be\nmeant, since they are, in kind, the exact opposite of those now being\nconsidered. If, however, the definition be insisted on in its strict\nsense, then we may expressly except such actions, because of their\nessential token--the compassing of others' suffering.\n\nThere is also another characteristic of conduct having real moral\nworth, which is entirely internal and therefore less obvious. I allude\nto the fact that it leaves behind a certain self-satisfaction which\nis called the approval of conscience: just as, on the other hand,\ninjustice and unkindness, and still more malice and cruelty, involve\na secret self-condemnation. Lastly, there is an external, secondary,\nand accidental sign that draws a clear line between the two classes.\nActs of the former kind win the approval and respect of disinterested\nwitnesses: those of the latter incur their disapproval and contempt.\n\nThose actions that bear the stamp of moral value, so determined,\nand admitted to be realities, constitute the phaenomenon that lies\nbefore us, and which we have to explain. We must accordingly search\nout what it is that moves men to such conduct. If we succeed in our\ninvestigation, we shall necessarily bring to light the true moral\nincentive; and, as it is upon this that all ethical science must\ndepend, our problem will then be solved.\n\n\n[1] Comrades, true and loyal to our oath, care for my wife and child in\nremembrance of this.\n\n[2] Acts of malice and cruelty are so many gratifications of the ego,\nand are therefore, in a certain sense, selfish. _V_. Introduction, pp.\nxvi. and xvii.--(_Translator._)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nSTATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE.\n\n\nThe preceding considerations, which were unavoidably necessary in order\nto clear the ground, now enable me to indicate the true incentive\nwhich underlies all acts of real moral worth. The seriousness, and\nindisputable genuineness, with which we shall find it is distinguished,\nremoves it far indeed from the hair-splittings, subtleties,\nsophisms, assertions formulated out of airy nothings, and _a priori_\nsoap-bubbles, which all systems up to the present have tried to make\nat once the source of moral conduct and the basis of Ethics. This\nincentive I shall not put forward as an hypothesis to be accepted or\nrejected, as one pleases; I shall actually =prove= that it is\nthe only possible one. But as this demonstration requires several\nfundamental truths to be borne in mind, the reader's attention is first\ncalled to certain propositions which we must presuppose, and which may\nproperly be considered as axioms; except the last two, which result\nfrom the analysis contained in the preceding chapter, and in Part II.,\nChapter III.\n\n(1) No action can take place without a sufficient motive; as little as\na stone can move without a sufficient push or pull.\n\n(2) Similarly, no action can be left undone, when, given the character\nof the doer, a sufficient motive is present; unless a stronger\ncounter-motive necessarily prevents it.\n\n(3) Whatever moves the Will,--this, and this alone, implies the sense\nof weal and woe, in the widest sense of the term; and conversely, weal\nand woe signify \"that which is in conformity with, or which is contrary\nto, a Will.\" Hence every motive must have a connection with weal and\nwoe.\n\n(4) Consequently every action stands in relation to, and has as its\nultimate object, a being susceptible of weal and woe.\n\n(5) This being is either the doer himself; or another, whose position\nas regards the action is therefore =passive=; since it is done\neither to his harm, or to his benefit and advantage.\n\n(6) Every action, which has to do, as its ultimate object, with the\nweal and woe of the agent himself, is =egoistic=.\n\n(7) The foregoing propositions with regard to what is done apply\nequally to what is left undone, in all cases where motive and\ncounter-motive play their parts.\n\n(8) From the analysis in the foregoing chapter, it results that\n=Egoism= and the =moral worth= of an action absolutely\nexclude each other. If an act have an =egoistic= object as its\nmotive, then no moral value can be attached to it; if an act is to\nhave moral value, then no egoistic object, direct or indirect, near or\nremote, may be its motive.\n\n(9) In consequence of my elimination in Part II., Chapter III., of\nalleged duties towards ourselves, the moral significance of our conduct\ncan only lie in the effect produced upon others; its relation to the\nlatter is alone that which lends it moral worth, or worthlessness, and\nconstitutes it an act of justice, loving-kindness, etc., or the reverse.\n\nFrom these propositions the following conclusion is obvious: The\n=weal and woe=, which (according to our third axiom) must, as its\nultimate object, lie at the root of everything done, or left undone,\nis either that of the doer himself, or that of some other person,\nwhose _r\u00f4le_ with reference to the action is passive. Conduct in the\nfirst case is necessarily =egoistic=, as it is impelled by an\ninterested motive. And this is not only true when men--as they nearly\nalways do--plainly shape their acts for their own profit and advantage;\nit is equally true when from anything done we expect some benefit to\nourselves, no matter how remote, whether in this or in another world.\nNor is it less the fact when our honour, our good name, or the wish\nto win the respect of some one, the sympathy of the lookers on, etc.,\nis the object we have in view; or when our intention is to uphold a\nrule of conduct, which, if generally followed, would occasionally be\nuseful to ourselves, for instance, the principle of justice, of mutual\nsuccour and aid, and so forth. Similarly, the proceeding is at bottom\negoistic, when a man considers it a prudent step to obey some absolute\ncommand issued by an unknown, but evidently supreme power; for in such\na case nothing can be the motive but =fear= of the disastrous\nconsequences of disobedience, however generally and indistinctly these\nmay be conceived. Nor is it a whit the less Egoism that prompts us\nwhen we endeavour to emphasise, by something done or left undone,\nthe high opinion (whether distinctly realised or not) which we have\nof ourselves, and of our value or dignity; for the diminution of\nself-satisfaction, which might otherwise occur, would involve the\nwounding of our pride. Lastly, it is still Egoism that is operative,\nwhen a man, following Wolff's principles, seeks by his conduct to work\nout his own perfection. In short, one may make the ultimate incentive\nto an action what one pleases; it will always turn out, no matter by\nhow circuitous a path, that in the last resort what affects the actual\nweal and woe of the agent himself is the real motive; consequently what\nhe does is =egoistic=, and therefore =without moral worth=.\nThere is only a single case in which this fails to happen: namely,\nwhen the ultimate incentive for doing something, or leaving it undone,\nis precisely and exclusively centred in the weal and woe of some one\nelse, who plays a passive part; that is to say, when the person on the\nactive side, by what he does, or omits to do, simply and solely regards\nthe weal and woe of another, and has absolutely no other object than\nto benefit him, by keeping harm from his door, or, it may be, even\nby affording help, assistance, and relief. It is this aim alone that\ngives to what is done, or left undone, the stamp of moral worth; which\nis thus seen to depend exclusively on the circumstance that the act\nis carried out, or omitted, purely for the benefit and advantage of\nanother. If and when this is not so, then the question of weal and woe\nwhich incites to, or deters from, every action contemplated, can only\nrelate to the agent himself; whence its performance, or non-performance\nis entirely egoistic, and without moral value.\n\nBut if what I do is to take place solely on account of some one else;\nthen it follows that =his= weal and woe must directly constitute\n=my= motive; just is, ordinarily, =my own= weal and woe\nform it. This narrows the limits of our problem, which may now be\nstated as follows: How is it possible that another's weal and woe\nshould influence my will directly, that is, exactly in the same way\nas otherwise my own move it? How can that which affects another for\ngood or bad become my immediate motive, and actually sometimes assume\nsuch importance that it more or less supplants my own interests, which\nare, as a rule, the single source of the incentives that appeal to me?\nObviously, only because that other person becomes the ultimate object\nof my will, precisely as usually I myself am that object; in other\nwords, because I directly desire weal, and not woe, for him, just as\nhabitually I do for myself. This, however, necessarily implies that I\nsuffer with him, and feel his woe, exactly as in most cases I feel only\nmine, and therefore desire his weal as immediately as at other times I\ndesire only my own. But, for this to be possible, I must in some way\nor other be =identified= with him; that is, the =difference=\nbetween myself and him, which is the precise _raison d'\u00eatre_ of my\nEgoism, must be =removed=, at least to a certain extent. Now,\nsince I do not live in his skin, there remains only the knowledge, that\nis, the mental picture, I have of him, as the possible means whereby\nI can so far identify myself with him, that my action declares the\ndifference to be practically effaced. The process here analysed is not\na dream, a fancy floating in the air; it is perfectly real, and by\nno means infrequent. It is, what we see every day,--the phaenomenon\nof =Compassion=; in other words, the direct participation,\nindependent of all ulterior considerations, in the sufferings of\nanother, leading to sympathetic assistance in the effort to prevent\nor remove them; whereon in the last resort all satisfaction and all\nwell-being and happiness depend. It is this Compassion alone which is\nthe real basis of all =voluntary= justice and all =genuine=\nloving-kindness. Only so far as an action springs therefrom, has it\nmoral value; and all conduct that proceeds from any other motive\nwhatever has none. When once compassion is stirred within me, by\nanother's pain, then his weal and woe go straight to my heart, exactly\nin the same way, if not always to the same degree, as otherwise I feel\nonly my own. Consequently the difference between myself and him is no\nlonger an absolute one.\n\nNo doubt this operation is astonishing, indeed hardly comprehensible.\nIt is, in fact, the great mystery of Ethics, its original phaenomenon,\nand the boundary stone, past which only transcendental speculation\nmay dare to take a step. Herein we see the wall of partition,\nwhich, according to the light of nature (as reason is called by old\ntheologians), entirely separates being from being, broken down, and\nthe non-ego to a certain extent identified with the ego. I wish\nfor the moment to leave the metaphysical explanation of this enigma\nuntouched, and first to inquire whether all acts of voluntary justice\nand true loving-kindness really arise from it. If so, our problem will\nbe solved, for we shall have found the ultimate basis of morality, and\nshown that it lies in human nature itself. This foundation, however,\nin its turn cannot form a problem of Ethics, but rather, like every\nother ultimate fact as such, of Metaphysics. Only the solution, that\nthe latter offers of the primary ethical phaenomenon, lies outside\nthe limits of the question put by the Danish Royal Society, which is\nconcerned solely with the basis; so that the transcendental explanation\ncan be given merely as a voluntary and unessential appendix.\n\nBut before I turn to the derivation of the Cardinal virtues from\nthe original incentive, as here disclosed, I have still to bring to\nthe notice of the reader two observations which the subject renders\nnecessary.\n\n(1) For the purpose of easier comprehension I have simplified the\nabove presentation of compassion as the sole source of truly moral\nactions, by intentionally leaving out of consideration the incentive\nof =Malice=, which while it is equally useless to the self as\ncompassion, makes the =pain= of others its ultimate purpose. We\nare now, however, in a position, by including it, to state the above\nproof more completely, and rigorously, as follows:--\n\nThere are only =three= fundamental springs of human conduct, and\nall possible motives arise from one or other of these. They are:\n\n(_a_) Egoism; which desires the weal of the self, and is limitless.\n\n(_b_) Malice; which desires the woe of others, and may develop to the\nutmost cruelty.\n\n(_c_) Compassion; which desires the weal of others, and may rise to\nnobleness and magnanimity.\n\nEvery human act is referable to one of these springs; although two of\nthem may work together. Now, as we have assumed that actions of moral\nworth are in point of fact realities; it follows that they also must\nproceed from one of these primal sources. But, by the eighth axiom,\nthey cannot arise from the first, and still less from the second; since\nall conduct springing from the latter is morally worthless, while the\noffshoots of the former are in part neither good nor bad in themselves.\nHence they must have their origin in the third incentive; and this will\nbe established _a posteriori_ in the sequel.\n\n(2) Direct sympathy with another is limited to his sufferings, and is\nnot immediately awakened by his well-being: the latter _per se_ leaves\nus indifferent. J. J. Rousseau in his _\u00c9mile_ (Bk. IV.) expresses the\nsame view: \"_Premi\u00e8re maxime: il n'est pas dans le c\u0153ur humain, de\nse mettre \u00e0 la place des gens, qui sont plus heureux que nous, mais\nseulement de ceux, qui sont plus \u00e0 plaindre_,\"[1] etc.\n\nThe reason of this is that pain or suffering, which includes all\nwant, privation, need, indeed every wish, is =positive=, and\nworks =directly= on the consciousness. Whereas the nature of\nsatisfaction, of enjoyment, of happiness, and the like, consists solely\nin the fact that a hardship is done away with, a pain lulled: whence\ntheir effect is =negative=. We thus see why need or desire is the\ncondition of every pleasure. Plato understood this well enough, and\nonly excepted sweet odours, and intellectual enjoyment. (_De Rep.,_\nIX., p. 264 sq., edit. Bipont.)[2] And Voltaire says: \"_Il n'est pas\nde vrais plaisirs, qu'avec de vrais besoins_.\"[3] Pain, then, is\n=positive=, and makes itself known by itself: satisfaction or\npleasure is =negative=--simply the removal of the former. This\nprinciple explains the fact that only the suffering, the want, the\ndanger, the helplessness of another awakens our sympathy directly\nand as such. The lucky or contented man, =as such=, leaves us\nindifferent--in reality because his state is negative; he is without\npain, indigence, or distress. We may of course take pleasure in the\nsuccess, the well-being, the enjoyment of others: but if we do, it is\na secondary pleasure, and caused by our having previously sorrowed\nover their sufferings and privations. Or else we share the joy and\nhappiness of a man, not =as such=, but because, and in so far as,\nhe is our child, father, friend, relation, servant, subject, etc. In a\nword, the good fortune, or pleasure of another, =purely as such=,\ndoes not arouse in us the same direct sympathy as is certainly elicited\nby his misfortune, privation, or misery, =purely as such=. If\neven on =our own behalf= it is only suffering (under which must\nbe reckoned all wants, needs, wishes, and even ennui) that stirs our\nactivity; and if contentment and prosperity fill us with indolence and\nlazy repose; why should it not be the same when others are concerned?\nFor (as we have seen) our sympathy rests on an identification of\nourselves with them. Indeed, the sight of success and enjoyment,\n=purely as such=, is very apt to raise the envy, to which every\nman is prone, and which has its place among the antimoral forces\nenumerated above.\n\nIn connection with the exposition of Compassion here given, as the\ncoming into play of motives directly occasioned by another's calamity,\nI take the opportunity of condemning the mistake of Cassina,[4] which\nhas been so often repeated. His view is that compassion arises from\na sudden hallucination, which makes us put ourselves in the place\nof the sufferer, and then imagine that we are undergoing =his=\npain in =own own person=. This is not in the least the case. The\nconviction never leaves us for a moment that he is the sufferer, not\nwe; and it is precisely in his person, not in ours, that we feel the\ndistress which afflicts us. We suffer =with= him, and therefore in\nhim; we feel his trouble as =his=, and are not under the delusion\nthat it is ours; indeed, the happier we are, the greater the contrast\nbetween our own state and his, the more we are open to the promptings\nof Compassion. The explanation of the possibility of this extraordinary\nphaenomenon is, however, not so easy; nor is it to be reached by the\npath of pure psychology, as Cassina supposed. The key can be furnished\nby Metaphysics alone; and this I shall attempt to give in the last Part\nof the present treatise.\n\nI now turn to consider the derivation of actions of real moral worth\nfrom the source which has been indicated. The general rule by which to\ntest such conduct, and which, consequently, is the leading principle\nof Ethics, I have already enlarged upon in the foregoing Part, and\nenunciated as follows: _Neminem laede; immo omnes, quantum potes,\njuva._ (Do harm to no one; but rather help all people, as far as lies\nin your power.) As this formula contains two clauses, so the actions\ncorresponding to it fall naturally into two classes.\n\n\n[1] First maxim: it is not in our hearts to identify ourselves with\nthose who are happier than we are, but only with those who are less\nhappy.\n\n[2] Stallbaum: p. 584, sq.--(_Translator._)\n\n[3] There are no real pleasures, without real needs.\n\n[4] _V_. his _Saggio Analitico sulla Compassione_, 1788; German\ntranslation by Pockels, 1790.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE.\n\n\nIf we look more closely at this process called Compassion, which we\nhave shown to be the primary ethical phaenomenon, we remark at once\nthat there are two distinct degrees in which another's suffering may\nbecome directly my motive, that is, may urge me to do something, or\nto leave it undone. The first degree of Compassion is seen when,\nby counter-acting egoistic and malicious motives, it keeps me from\nbringing pain on another, and from becoming myself the cause of\ntrouble, which so far does not exist. The other higher degree is\nmanifested, when it works positively, and incites me to active help.\nThe distinction between the so-called duties of law and duties of\nvirtue, better described as justice and loving-kindness, which was\neffected by Kant in such a forced and artificial manner, here results\nentirely of itself; whence the correctness of the principle is\nattested. It is the natural, unmistakable, and sharp separation between\nnegative and positive, between doing no harm, and helping. The terms in\ncommon use--namely, \"the duties of law,\" and \"the duties of virtue,\"\n(the latter being also called \"duties of love,\" or \"imperfect duties,\")\nare in the first place faulty because they co-ordinate the _genus_\nwith the _species_; for justice is one of the virtues. And next, they\nowe their origin to the mistake of giving a much too wide extension to\nthe idea \"Duty\"; which I shall reduce to its proper limits below. In\nplace, therefore, of these duties I put two virtues; the one, justice,\nand the other, loving-kindness; and I name them cardinal virtues,\nsince from them all others not only in fact proceed, but also may be\ntheoretically derived.... Both have their root in natural Compassion.\nAnd this Compassion is an undeniable fact of human consciousness,\nis an essential part of it, and does not depend on assumptions,\nconceptions, religions, dogmas, myths, training, and education. On\nthe contrary, it is original and immediate, and lies in human nature\nitself. It consequently remains unchanged under all circumstances, and\nreveals itself in every land, and at all times. This is why appeal is\neverywhere confidently made to it, as to something necessarily present\nin every man; and it is never an attribute of the \"strange gods.\" [1]\nAs he, who appears to be without compassion, is called inhuman; so\n\"humanity\" is often used as its synonyme.\n\nThe first degree, then, in which this natural and genuine moral\nincentive shows itself is only =negative=. Originally we are all\ndisposed to injustice and violence, because our need, our desire, our\nanger and hate pass into the consciousness directly, and hence have\nthe _Jus primi occupantis_. (The right of the first occupant.) Whereas\nthe sufferings of others, caused by our injustice and violence, enter\nthe consciousness indirectly, that is, by the secondary channel of a\nmental picture, and not till they are understood by experience. Thus\nSeneca (_Ep._ 50) says: _Ad neminem ante bona mens venit, quam mala_.\n(Good feelings never come before bad ones.) In its first degree,\ntherefore, Compassion opposes and baffles the design to which I am\nurged by the antimoral forces dwelling within me, and which will bring\ntrouble on a fellow-being. It calls out to me: \"Stop!\" and encircles\nthe other as with a fence, so as to protect him from the injury which\notherwise my egoism or malice would lead me to inflict on him. So\narises out of this first degree of compassion the rule: _Neminem\nlaede_. (Do harm to no one.) This is the fundamental principle of the\nvirtue of justice, and here alone is to be found its origin, pure and\nsimple,--an origin which is truly moral, and free from all extraneous\nadmixture. Otherwise derived, justice would have to rest on Egoism,--a\n_reductio ad absurdum_. If my nature is susceptible of Compassion up\nto this point, then it will avail to keep me back, whenever I should\nlike to use others' pain as a means to obtain my ends; equally, whether\nthis pain be immediate, or an after-consequence, whether it be effected\ndirectly, or indirectly, through intermediate links. I shall therefore\nlay hands on the property as little as on the person of another, and\navoid causing him distress, no less mental than bodily. I shall thus\nnot only abstain from doing him physical injury, but also, with equal\ncare I shall guard against inflicting on him the suffering of mind,\nwhich mortification and calumny, anxiety and vexation so surely work.\nThe same sense of Compassion will check me from gratifying my desires\nat the cost of women's happiness for life, or from seducing another\nman's wife, or from ruining youths morally and physically by tempting\nthem to _paederastia_. Not that it is at all necessary in each single\ncase that Compassion should be definitely excited; indeed it would\noften come too late; but rather the rule: _Neminem laede_, is formed by\nnoble minds out of the knowledge, gained once for all, of the injury\nwhich every unjust act necessarily entails upon others, and which is\naggravated by the feeling of having to endure wrong through a _force\nmajeure_. Such natures are led by reflecting reason to carry out this\nprinciple with unswerving resolution. They respect the rights of every\nman, and abstain from all encroachment on them; they keep themselves\nfree from self-reproach, by refusing to be the cause of others'\ntrouble; they do not shift on to shoulders not their own, by force or\nby trickery, the burdens and sorrows of life, which circumstances bring\nto every one; they prefer to bear themselves the portions allotted\nto them, so as not to double those of their neighbours. For although\ngeneralising formulae, and abstract knowledge of whatever kind, are\nnot in the least the cause, or the real basis of morality; these are\nnevertheless indispensable for a moral course of life. They are the\ncistern or reservoir, in which the habit of mind, that springs from\nthe fount of all morality (a fount not at all moments flowing), may\nbe stored up, thence to be drawn off, as occasion requires. There is\nthus an analogy between things moral and things physiological; among\nmany instances of which we need only mention that of the gall-bladder,\nwhich is used for keeping the secretion of the liver. Without\nfirmly held principles we should inevitably be at the mercy of the\nantimoral incentives, directly they are roused to activity by external\ninfluences; and =self-control= lies precisely in steadfast\nadherence and obedience to such principles, despite the motives which\noppose them.\n\nIn general, the feminine half of humanity is inferior to the\nmasculine in the virtue of justice, and its derivatives, uprightness,\nconscientiousness, etc.; the explanation is found in the fact that,\nowing to the weakness of its reasoning powers the former is much less\ncapable than the latter of understanding and holding to general laws,\nand of taking them as a guiding thread. Hence injustice and falseness\nare women's besetting sins, and lies their proper element. On the\nother hand, they surpass men in the virtue of loving-kindness; because\nusually the stimulus to this is =intuitive=, and consequently\nappeals directly to the sense of Compassion, of which females are\nmuch more susceptible than males. For the former nothing but what\nis intuitive, present, and immediately real has a true existence;\nthat which is knowable only by means of concepts, as for instance,\nthe absent, the distant, the past, the future, they do not readily\ngrasp. We thus find compensation here, as in so much else; justice\nis more the masculine, loving-kindness more the feminine virtue.\nThe mere idea of seeing women sitting on the judges' bench raises a\nsmile; but the sisters of mercy far excel the brothers of charity.\nNow animals, as they have no power of gaining knowledge by reason,\nthat is, of forming abstract ideas, are entirely incapable of fixed\nresolutions, to say nothing of principles; they consequently totally\nlack =self-control=, and are helplessly given over to external\nimpressions and internal impulses. This is why they have no conscious\nmorality; although the different species show great contrasts of good\nand evil in their characters, and as regards the highest races these\nare traceable even in individuals.\n\nFrom the foregoing considerations we see that in the single acts of\nthe just man Compassion works only indirectly through his formulated\nprinciples, and not so much _actu_ as _potenti\u00e2_; much in the same way\nas in statics the greater length of one of the scale-beams, owing to\nits greater power of motion, balances the smaller weight attached to\nit with the larger on the other side, and works, while at rest, only\n_potenti\u00e2,_ not _actu_; yet with the same efficiency.\n\nNevertheless, Compassion is always ready to pass into active operation.\nTherefore, whenever, in special cases, the established rule shows signs\nof breaking down, the one incentive (for we exclude of course those\nbased on Egoism), which is capable of infusing fresh life into it, is\nthat drawn from the fountain-head itself--Compassion. This is true\nnot only where it is a question of personal violence, but also where\nproperty is concerned, for instance, when any one feels the desire to\nkeep some valuable object which he has found. In such cases,--if we set\naside all motives prompted by worldly wisdom, and by religion--nothing\nbrings a man back so easily to the path of justice, as the realisation\nof the trouble, the grief, the lamentation of the loser. It is because\nthis is felt to be true, that, when publicity is given to the loss of\nmoney, the assurance is so often added that the loser is a poor man, a\nservant, etc.\n\nIt is hoped that these considerations have made it clear that, however\ncontrary appearances may be at first sight, yet undoubtedly justice, as\na genuine and voluntary virtue has its origin in Compassion. But if any\none should suppose such a soil too barren and meagre to bear this great\ncardinal virtue, let him reflect on what is said above, and remember\nhow small is the amount of true, spontaneous, unselfish, unfeigned\njustice among men; how the real thing only occurs as a surprising\nexception, and how, to its counterfeit,--the justice that rests on mere\nworldly wisdom and is everywhere published abroad--it is related, both\nin quality and quantity, as gold is to copper. I should like to call\nthe one _\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2_ (common, ordinary justice), the other\n_\u03bf\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03af\u03b1_ (heavenly justice).[2] For the latter is she, who, according\nto Hesiod,[3] leaves the earth in the iron age, to dwell with the\ncelestial gods. To produce such a rare exotic as this the root we have\nindicated is surely vigorous enough.\n\nIt will now be seen that =injustice= or =wrong= always\nconsists in =working harm= on another. Therefore the conception of\nwrong is =positive=, and antecedent to the conception of right,\nwhich is =negative=, and simply denotes the actions performable\nwithout injury to others; in other words, without wrong being done.\nThat to this class belongs also whatever is effected with no other\nobject than that of warding off from oneself meditated mischief is\nan easy inference. For no participation in another's interests, and\nno sympathy for him, can require me to let myself be harmed by him,\nthat is, to undergo wrong. The theory that right is negative, in\ncontradistinction to wrong as positive, we find supported by Hugo\nGrotius, the father of philosophical jurisprudence. The definition of\njustice which he gives at the beginning of his work, _De Jure Belli et\nPacis_ (Bk. I., chap. 1., \u00a7 3), runs as follows:--_Jus hic nihil aliud,\nquam quod justum est, significant, idque negante magis sensu, quam\naiente, ut jus sit, quod injustum non est._[4] The negative character\nof justice is also established, little as it may appear, even by the\nfamiliar formula: \"Give to each one his own.\" Now, there is no need\nto give a man his own, if he has it. The real meaning is therefore:\n\"Take from none his own.\" Since the requirements of justice are only\nnegative, they may be effected by coercion; for the _Neminem laede_\ncan be practised by all alike. The coercive apparatus is the state,\nwhose sole _raison d'\u00eatre_ is to protect its subjects, individually\nfrom each other, and collectively from external foes. It is true that\na few German would-be philosophers of this venal age wish to distort\nthe state into an institution for the spread of morality, education,\nand edifying instruction. But such a view contains, lurking in the\nbackground, the Jesuitical aim of doing away with personal freedom\nand individual development, and of making men mere wheels in a huge\nChinese governmental and religious machine. And this is the road that\nonce led to Inquisitions, to Autos-da-f\u00e9, and religious wars. Frederick\nthe Great showed that he at least never wished to tread it, when he\nsaid: \"In my land every one shall care for his own salvation, as he\nhimself thinks best.\" Nevertheless, we still see everywhere (with the\nmore apparent than real exception of North America) that the state\nundertakes to provide for the metaphysical needs of its members. The\ngovernments appear to have adopted as their guiding principle the tenet\nof Quintus Curtius: _Nulla res efficacius multitudinem regit, quam\nsuperstitio: alioquin impotens, saeva, mutabilis; ubi vana religione\ncapta est, melius vatibus, quam ducibus suis paret._[5]\n\nWe have seen that \"wrong\" and \"right\" are convertible synonymes of \"to\ndo harm\" and \"to refrain from doing it,\" and that under \"right\" is\nincluded the warding off of injury from oneself. It will be obvious\nthat these conceptions are independent of, and antecedent to, all\npositive legislation. There is, therefore, a pure ethical right, or\nnatural right, and a pure doctrine of right, detached from all positive\nstatutes. The first principles of this doctrine have no doubt an\nempirical origin, so far as they arise from the idea of harm done,\nbut _per se_ they rest on the pure understanding, which _a priori_\nfurnishes ready to hand the axiom: _causa causae est causa effectus_.\n(The cause of a cause is the cause of the effect.) Taken in this\nconnection the words mean: if any one desires to injure me, it is\nnot I, but he, that is the cause of whatever I am obliged to do in\nself-defence; and I can consequently oppose all encroachments on his\npart, without wronging him. Here we have, so to say, a law of moral\nrepercussion. Thus it comes about that the union of the empirical idea\nof injury done with the axiom supplied by the pure understanding, gives\nrise to the fundamental conceptions of wrong and right, which every one\ngrasps _a priori_, and learns by actual trial to immediately adopt.\nThe empiric, who denies this, and refuses to accept anything but the\nverdict of experience, may be referred to the testimony of the savage\nraces, who all distinguish between wrong and right quite correctly,\noften indeed with nice precision; as is strikingly manifested when\nthey are engaged in bartering and other transactions with Europeans,\nor visit their ships. They are bold and self-assured, when they are in\nthe right; but uneasy, when they know they are wrong. In disputes a\njust settlement satisfies them, whereas unjust procedure drives them to\nwar. The Doctrine of Eight is a branch of Ethics, whose function is to\ndetermine those actions which may not be performed, unless one wishes\nto injure others, that is, to be guilty of wrong-doing; and here the\n=active= part played is kept in view. But legislation applies this\nchapter of moral science conversely, that is, with reference to the\n=passive= side of the question, and declares that the same actions\nneed not be endured, since no one ought to have wrong inflicted on him.\nTo frustrate such conduct the state constructs the complete edifice\nof the law, as positive Right. Its intention is that no one shall\n=suffer= wrong; the intention of the Doctrine of Moral Right is\nthat no one shall =do= wrong.[6]\n\nIf by unjust action I molest some one, whether in his person,\nhis freedom, his property, or his honour, the wrong as regards\n=quality= remains the same. But with respect to =quantity=\nit may vary very much. This difference in the amount of wrong effected\nappears not to have been as yet investigated by moralists, although it\nis everywhere recognised in real life, because the censure passed is\nalways proportional to the harm inflicted. So also with just actions,\nthe right done is constant in quality, but not in quantity. To explain\nthis better: he, who when dying of starvation steals a loaf, commits\na wrong; but how small is this wrong in comparison with the act of an\nopulent proprietor, who, in whatever way, despoils a poor man of his\nlast penny! Again: the rich person who pays his hired labourer, acts\njustly; but how insignificant is this piece of justice when contrasted\nwith that of a penniless toiler, who voluntarily returns to its wealthy\nowner a purse of gold which he has found! The measure, however, of this\nstriking difference in the quantity of justice, and injustice (the\n=quality= being always constant), is not direct and absolute, as\non a graduated scale; it is indirect and relative, like the ratio of\nsines and tangents. I give therefore the following definition: the\namount of injustice in my conduct varies as the amount of evil, which\nI thereby bring on another, divided by the amount of advantage, which\nI myself gain; and the amount of justice in my conduct varies as the\namount of advantage, which injury done to another brings me, divided by\nthe amount of harm which he thereby suffers.\n\nWe have further to notice a =double= form of injustice which is\nspecifically different from the simple kind, be it never so great. This\nvariety may be detected by the fact that the amount of indignation\nshown by disinterested witnesses, which is always proportional to the\namount of wrong inflicted, never reaches the =maximum= except\nwhen it is present. We then see how the deed is loathed, as something\nrevolting and heinous, as an _\u1f04\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2_ (_i.e._, abomination), before\nwhich, as it were, the gods veil their faces. =Double= injustice\noccurs when some one, after definitely undertaking the obligation of\nprotecting his friend, master, client, etc., in a special way, not\nonly is guilty of non-fulfilment of that duty (which of itself would\nbe injurious to the other, and therefore a wrong); but when, in\naddition, he turns round, and attacks the man, and strikes at the very\nspot which he promised to guard. Instances are: the appointed watch,\nor guide, who becomes an assassin; the trusted caretaker, who becomes\na thief; the guardian, who robs his ward of her property; the lawyer,\nwho prevaricates; the judge, who is corruptible; the adviser, who\ndeliberately gives some fatal counsel. All such conduct is known by the\nname of =treachery=, and is viewed with abhorrence by the whole\nworld. Hence Dante puts traitors in the lowest circle of Hell, where\nSatan himself is found (_Inferno_: xi, 61-60).\n\nAs we have here had occasion to mention the word \"obligation,\" this\nis the place to determine the conception of =Duty=, which is so\noften spoken of both in Ethics and in real life, but with too wide\nan extension of meaning. We have seen that wrong always signifies\ninjury done to another, whether it be in his person, his freedom, his\nproperty, or his honour. The consequence appears to be that every wrong\nmust imply a positive aggression, and so a definite act. Only there are\nactions, the simple omission of which constitutes a wrong; and these\nare Duties. This is the true philosophic definition of the conception\n\"Duty,\"--a term which loses its characteristic note, and hence becomes\nvalueless, if it is used (as hitherto it has been in Moral Science)\nto designate all praiseworthy conduct. It is forgotten that \"Duty\"[7]\nnecessarily means a =debt= which is owing, being thus an action,\nby the simple omission of which another suffers harm, that is, a wrong\ncomes about. Clearly in this case the injury only takes place through\nthe person, who neglects the duty, having distinctly pledged or bound\nhimself to it. Consequently all duties depend on an obligation which\nhas been entered into. This, as a rule, takes the form of a definite,\nif sometimes tacit, agreement between two parties: as for instance,\nbetween prince and people, government and its servants, master and\nman, lawyer and client, physician and patient; in a word, between any\nand every one who undertakes to perform some task, and his employer\nin the widest sense of the word. Hence every duty involves a right;\nsince no one undertakes an obligation without a motive, which means,\nin this case, without seeing some advantage for himself. There is\nonly =one= obligation that I know of which is not subject to an\nagreement, but arises directly and solely through an act; this is\nbecause one of the persons with whom it has to do was not in existence\nwhen it was contracted. I refer to the duty of parents towards their\nchildren. Whoever brings a child into the world, has incumbent on him\nthe duty of supporting his offspring, until the latter is able to\nmaintain himself; and should this time never come, owing to incapacity\nfrom blindness, deformity, cretinism, and the like, neither does the\nduty ever come to an end. It is clear that merely by failing to provide\nfor the needs of his son, that is, by a simple omission, the father\nwould injure him, indeed jeopardise his life. Children's duty towards\ntheir parents is not so direct and imperative. It rests on the fact\nthat, as every duty involves a right, parents also must have some just\nclaim on their issue. This is the foundation of the duty of filial\nobedience, which, however, in course of time ceases simultaneously\nwith the right out of which it sprang. It is replaced by gratitude for\nthat which was done by father and mother over and above their strict\nduty. Nevertheless, although ingratitude is a hateful, often indeed a\nrevolting vice, gratitude cannot be called a =duty=; because its\nomission inflicts no injury on the other side, and is therefore no\n=wrong=. Otherwise we should have to suppose that in his heart\nof hearts the benefactor aims at making a good bargain. It should be\nnoticed that reparation made for harm done may also be regarded as a\nduty arising directly through an action. This, however, is something\npurely negative, as it is nothing but an attempt to remove and blot out\nthe consequences of an unjust deed, as a thing that ought never to have\ntaken place. Be it also observed that equity[8] is the foe of justice,\nand often comes into harsh collision with it; so that the former ought\nonly to be admitted within certain limits. The German is a friend of\nequity, while the Englishman holds to justice.\n\nThe law of motivation is just as strict as that of physical causality,\nand hence involves the same irresistible necessity. Consequently\nwrong may be compassed not only by violence, but also by cunning. If\nby violence I am able to kill or rob another, or compel him to obey\nme, I can equally use cunning to accomplish the same ends; that is, I\ncan place false motives before his intellect, by reason of which he\nmust do what otherwise he would not. These false motives are effected\nby lies. In reality lies are unjustifiable solely in so far as they\nare instruments of cunning, in other words, of compulsion, by means of\nmotivation.[9] And this is precisely their function, as a rule. For,\nin the first place, I cannot tell a falsehood without a motive, and\nthis motive will certainly be, with the rarest exceptions, an unjust\none; namely, the intention of holding others, over whom I have no\npower, under my will, that is, of coercing them through the agency of\nmotivation. Also in mere exaggerations and untruthful bombast there\nis the same purpose at work; for, by employing such language, a man\ntries to place himself higher in the sight of others than is his due.\nThe binding force of a promise or a compact is contained in the fact\nthat, if it be not observed, it is a deliberate lie, pronounced in the\nmost solemn manner,--a lie, whose intention (that of putting others\nunder moral compulsion) is, in this case, all the clearer, because\nits motive, the desired performance of something on the other side,\nis expressly declared. The contemptible part of the fraud is that\nhypocrisy is used to disarm the victim before he is attacked. The\nhighest point of villainy is reached in =treachery=, which, as we\nhave seen, is a =double= injustice, and is always, regarded with\nloathing.\n\nIt is, then, obvious that, just as I am not wrong, that is, right in\nresisting violence by violence, so where violence is not feasible,\nor it appears more convenient, I am at liberty to resort to cunning;\naccordingly, whenever I am entitled to use force, I may, if I please,\nemploy falsehood; for instance, against robbers and miscreants of\nevery sort, whom in this way I entice into a trap. Hence a promise\nwhich is extorted by violence is not binding. But, as a matter of\nfact, the right to avail myself of lies extends further. It occurs\nwhenever an unjustifiable question is asked, which has to do with my\nprivate, or business affairs, and is hence prompted by curiosity; for\nto answer it, or even to put it off by the suspicion-awakening words,\n\"I can't tell you,\" would expose me to danger. Here an untruth is\nthe indispensable weapon against unwarranted inquisitiveness, whose\nmotive is hardly ever a well-meaning one. For, just as I have the\nright to oppose the apparent bad will of another, and to anticipate\nwith physical resistance, to the danger of my would-be aggressor, the\nphysical violence presumably thence resulting; so that, for instance,\nas a precaution, I can protect my garden wall with sharp spikes, let\nloose savage dogs in my court at night, and even, if circumstances\nrequire it, set man-traps and spring-guns, for the evil consequences of\nwhich the burglar has only himself to thank:--if I have the right to do\nthis, then I am equally authorised in keeping secret, at any price,\nthat which, if known, would lay me bare to the attack of others. And I\nhave good reason for acting thus, because, in moral, no less than in\nphysical, relations, I am driven to assume that the bad will of others\nis very possible, and must therefore take all necessary preventive\nmeasures beforehand. Whence Ariosto says:--\n\n    _Quantunque il similar sia le pi\u00f9 volte_\n    _Ripreso, e dia di mala mente indict,_\n    _Si trova pure in molte cose e molte_\n    _Avere fatti evidenti benefici,_\n    _E danni e biasmi e morti avere tolte:_\n    _Che non conversiam' sempre con gli amici,_\n    _In questa assai pi\u00f9 oscura che serena_\n    _Vita mortal, tutta d'invidia piena_[10]\n                           _--Orl. Fur._, IV., 1.\n\nI may, then, without any injustice match cunning with cunning, and\nanticipate all crafty encroachments on me, even if they be only\nprobable; and I need neither render an account to him who unwarrantably\npries into my personal circumstances, nor by replying: \"I cannot\nanswer this,\" show him the spot where I have a secret, which perilous\nto me, and perhaps advantageous to him, in any case puts me in his\npower, if divulged: _Scire volunt secreta domus, atque inde timeri_.\n(They wish to know family secrets, and thus become feared.) On the\ncontrary, I am justified in putting him off with a lie, involving\ndanger to himself, in case he is thereby led into a mistake that\nworks him harm. Indeed, a falsehood is the only means of opposing\ninquisitive and suspicious curiosity; to meet which it is the one\nweapon of necessary self-defence. \"Ask me no questions, and I'll tell\nyou no lies\" is here the right maxim. For among the English, who regard\nthe reproach of being a liar as the deepest insult, and who on that\naccount are really more truthful than other nations, all unjustifiable\nquestions, having to do with another's affairs, are looked upon as\na piece of ill-breeding, which is denoted by the expression, \"to\nask questions.\" Certainly every sensible person, even when he is\nof the strictest rectitude, follows the principle above set forth.\nSuppose, for instance, such a one is returning from a remote spot,\nwhere he has raised a sum of money; and suppose an unknown traveller\njoins him, and after the customary \"whither\" and \"whence\" gradually\nproceeds to inquire what may have taken him to that place; the former\nwill undoubtedly give a false answer in order to avoid the danger\nof robbery. Again: if a man be found in the house of another, whose\ndaughter he is wooing; and he is asked the cause of his unexpected\npresence; unless he has entirely lost his head, he will not give the\ntrue reason, but unhesitatingly invent a pretext. And the cases are\nnumberless in which every reasonable being tells an untruth, without\nthe least scruple of conscience. It is this view of the matter alone\nthat removes the crying contradiction between the morality which is\ntaught, and that which is daily practised, even by the best and most\nupright of men. At the same time, the restriction of a falsehood to\nthe single purpose of self-defence must be rigidly observed; for\notherwise this doctrine would admit of terrible abuse, a lie being in\nitself a very dangerous instrument. But just as, even in time of public\npeace, the law allows every one to carry weapons and to use them, when\nrequired for self-defence, so Ethics permits lies to be employed for\nthe same purpose, and--be it observed--for this one purpose only. Every\nmendacious word is a wrong, excepting only when the occasion arises of\ndefending oneself against violence or cunning. Hence justice requires\ntruthfulness towards all men. But the entirely unconditional and\nunreserved condemnation of lies, as properly involved in their nature,\nis sufficiently refuted by well known facts. Thus, there are cases\nwhere a falsehood is a =duty=, especially for doctors; and there\nare =magnanimous= lies, as, for instance, that of the Marquis\nPosa in _Don Carlos_[11] or that in the _Gerusalemme Liberata_, II.,\n22;[12] they occur, indeed, whenever a man wills to take on himself\nthe guilt of another; and lastly, Jesus Christ himself is reported\n(_John_ vii. 8; cf. ver. 10) on one occasion to have intentionally\ntold an untruth. The reader will remember that Campanella, in his\n_Poesie Filosofiche_ (Delia Bellezza: Madr. 9), does not hesitate to\nsay: \"_Bello \u00e8 il mentir, se a fare gran ben' si trova_.\"[13] On the\nother hand, the current teaching as regards necessary falsehoods is a\nwretched patch on the dress of a poverty-stricken morality. Kant is\nresponsible for the theory found in many text-books, which derives\nthe unjustifiableness of lies from man's faculty of speech; but the\narguments are so tame, childish and absurd that one might well be\ntempted, if only to pour contempt on them, to join sides with the\ndevil, and say with Talleyrand: _l'homme a re\u00e7u la parole pour pouvoir\ncacher sa pens\u00e9e_[14]. The unqualified and boundless horror shown by\nKant for falsehoods, whenever he has the opportunity, is due either to\naffectation, or to prejudice. In the chapter of his \"_Tugendlehre_,\"\ndealing with lies, he loads them with every kind of defamatory epithet,\nbut does not adduce a single adequate reason for their condemnation;\nwhich would have been more to the point. Declamation is easier than\ndemonstration, and to moralise less difficult than to be sincere. Kant\nwould have done better to open the vials of his wrath on that vice\nwhich takes pleasure in seeing others suffer; it is the latter, and not\na falsehood, which is truly fiendish. For malignant joy is the exact\nopposite of Compassion, and nothing else but powerless cruelty, which,\nunable itself to bring about the misery it so gladly beholds others\nenduring, is thankful to _\u03a4\u03cd\u03c7\u03b7_ for having done so instead. According\nto the code of knightly honour, the reproach of being a liar is of\nextreme gravity, and only to be washed out with the accuser's blood.\nNow this obtains, not because the lie is wrong in itself, since, were\nsuch the reason, to accuse a man of an injury done by violence would\ncertainly be regarded as equally outrageous,--which is not the case,\nas every one knows; but it is due to that principle of chivalry, which\nin reality bases right on might; so that whoever, when trying to work\nmischief, has recourse to falsehood, proves that he lacks either power,\nor the requisite courage. Every untruth bears witness of his fear; and\nthis is why a fatal verdict is passed on him.\n\n\n[1] Thus, when the first gleam of _Mitleid_ stole into her heart,\nBr\u00fcnhilde could no longer remain a Walk\u00fcre; and Wotan's end comes, when\nby the same solvent he is at length set free from the delusion of the\n_principium individuationis._--(_Translator._)\n\n[2] There is here an allusion to the _\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03b4\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f1b\u03c1\u03c9\u03c2_ and _O\u1f50\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03af\u03b1_ in\nPlato's _Symposium. V_. Chap. 8, sq. Edit. Schmelzer: Weidmann, Berlin,\n1882.--(_Translator._)\n\n[3] _V_. Hesiod, _Opera et Dies_, 174-201.--(_Translator._)\n\n[4] Justice here denotes nothing else than that which is just, and\nthis, rather in a negative than in a positive sense; so that what is\nnot unjust is to be regarded as justice.\n\n[5] There is no more efficient instrument in ruling the masses than\nsuperstition. Without this they have no self-control; they are brutish;\nthey are changeable; but once they are caught by some vain form of\nreligion, they lend a more willing ear to its soothsayers than to their\nown leaders.\n\n[6] The Doctrine of Eight in detail may be found in _Die Welt als Wille\nund Vorstellung_, vol. i., \u00a7 62.\n\n[7] Duty = _\u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd_ = le devoir = Pflicht [cf. _plight_, O. H. G.\n_plegan_.]--(_Translator_.)\n\n[8] The word here translated \"equity\" (_Billigkeit_: Lat. _aequitas_)\nmeans the sense of fairness, or of natural justice which determines\nwhat is fitting and due in all human relations, as opposed to justice\n(_Gerechtigkeit_) taken as positive written law.--(_Translator._)\n\n[9] Motivation is defined in Part II., Chapter VIII., as \"the law of\nCausality acting through the medium of the intellect.\" It is thus the\nlaw of the determination of conduct by motives.--(_Translator._)\n\n[10]\n\nHowever much we're won't to blame a lie,\nAs index of a mind estranged from right,\nYet times unnumber'd it hath shap'd results\nOf good most evident; disgrace and loss,\nIt chang'd; e'en death it cheated. For with friends,\nAlas! not always in this mortal life,\nWhere envy fills all hearts, and gloom prevails\nMuch more than light, are we in converse join'd.\n                               --(_Translator._)\n\n\n[11] _Vide_, Schiller's _Don Carlos_: Act V., Sc. 3.--(_Translator._)\n\n[12]\n\n    \"_Magnanima menzogna, or quando \u00e8 il vero_\n    _Si hello che si possa a te preporre?\"_\n\nCf. also the Horatian _splendid mendax. Carm._ III., 11, 35.--(_Translator._)\n\n[13] 'Tis well to lie, an there result much good therefrom. _Vide,\nOpere_ di Tommaso Campanella, da Alessandro d'Ancona, Torino,\n1854.--(_Translator._)\n\n[14] Man has received the gift of language, so as to be able to conceal\nhis thoughts.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nTHE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS.\n\n\nThus justice is the primary and essentially cardinal virtue. Ancient\nphilosophers recognised it as such, but made it co-ordinate with three\nothers unsuitably chosen.[1] Loving-kindness (_caritas, \u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7_) was not\nas yet ranked as a virtue. Plato himself, who rises highest in moral\nscience, reaches only so far as voluntary, disinterested justice. It\nis true that loving-kindness has existed at all times in practice and\nin fact; but it was reserved for Christianity,--whose greatest service\nis seen in this--to theoretically formulate, and expressly advance it\nnot only as a virtue, but as the queen of all; and to extend it even\nto enemies. We are thinking of course only of Europe. For in Asia, a\nthousand years before, the boundless love of one's neighbour had been\nprescribed and taught, as well as practised: the Vedas[2] are full\nof it; while in the Dharma-\u015a\u0101stra,[3] Itih\u0101sa,[4] and Pur\u0101na[5] it\nconstantly recurs, to say nothing of the preaching of \u015aakya-muni, the\nBuddha. And to be quite accurate we must admit that there are traces\nto be found among the Greeks and Romans of a recommendation to follow\nloving-kindness; for instance, in Cicero, _De Finibus_, V., 23;[6] and\nalso in Pythagoras, according to Iamblichus, _De vita Pythagorae_,\nchap. 33.[7] My task is now to give a philosophical derivation of this\nvirtue from the principle I have laid down.\n\nIt has been demonstrated in Chapter V. of this Part, that the sense of\nCompassion, however much its origin is shrouded in mystery, is the one\nand sole cause whereby the suffering I see in another, of itself, and\nas such, becomes directly my motive; and we have seen that the first\nstage of this process is =negative=. The second degree is sharply\ndistinguished from the first, through the =positive= character\nof the actions resulting therefrom; for at this point Compassion\ndoes more than keep me back from injuring my neighbour; it impels me\nto help him. And according as, on the one hand, my sense of direct\nparticipation is keen and deep, and, on the other hand, the distress\nis great and urgent, so shall I be constrained by this motive, which\n(be it noted) is purely and wholly moral, to make a greater or less\nsacrifice in order to meet the need or the calamity which I observe;\nand this sacrifice may involve the expenditure of my bodily or mental\npowers, the loss of my property, freedom, or even life. So that in\nthis direct =suffering with= another, which rests on no arguments\nand requires none, is found the one simple origin of loving-kindness,\n_caritas, a\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7_ in other words, that virtue whose rule is: _Omnes,\nquantum potes, juva_ (help all people, as far as lies in your power);\nand from which all those actions proceed which are prescribed by\nEthics under the name of duties of virtue, otherwise called duties of\nlove, or imperfect duties. It is solely by direct and, as it were,\ninstinctive participation in the sufferings which we see, in other\nwords, by Compassion, that conduct so defined is occasioned; at least\nwhen it can be said to have moral worth, that is, be declared free\nfrom all egoistic motives, and when on that account it awakens in us\nthat inward contentment which is called a good, satisfied, approving\nconscience, and elicits from the spectator (not without making him\ncast a humiliating glance at himself), that remarkable commendation,\nrespect, and admiration which are too well-known to be denied.\n\nBut if a beneficent action have any other motive whatever, then it\nmust be egoistic, if not actually malicious. For as the fundamental\nsprings of all human conduct (_v_. Chapter V. of this Part), are three,\nnamely, Egoism, Malice, Compassion; so the various motives which are\ncapable of affecting men may be grouped under three general heads: (1)\none's own weal; (2) others' woe; (3) others' weal. Now if the motive\nof a kind act does not belong to the third class, it must of course\nbe found in the first or second. To the second it is occasionally to\nbe ascribed; for instance, if I do good to some one, in order to vex\nanother, to whom I am hostile; or to make the latter's sufferings more\nacute; or, it may be, to put to shame a third person, who refrained\nfrom helping; or lastly, to inflict a mortification on the man whom I\nbenefit. But it much more usually springs from the first class. And\nthis is the case whenever, in doing some good, I have in view my own\nweal, no matter how remote or indirect it may be; that is, whenever\nI am influenced by the thought of reward whether in this, or in\nanother, world, or by the hope of winning high esteem, and of gaining\na reputation for nobleness of character; or again, when I reflect that\nthe person, whom I now aid, may one day be able to assist me in return,\nor otherwise be of some service and benefit; or when, lastly, I am\nguided by the consideration that I must keep the rules of magnanimity\nand beneficence, because I too may on some occasion profit thereby. In\na word, my motive is egoistic as soon as it is anything other than\nthe purely objective desire of simply knowing, without any ulterior\npurpose, that my neighbour is helped, delivered from his distress and\nneed, or freed from his suffering. If such an aim--shorn, as it is, of\nall subjectivity--be really mine, then, and then only, have I given\nproof of that loving-kindness, _caritas, \u1f00\u03b3\u03ac\u03c0\u03b7_, which it is the great\nand distinguishing merit of Christianity to have preached. It should\nbe observed, in this connection, that the injunctions which the Gospel\nadds to its commandment of love, _e.g., \u03bc\u1f74 \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03c4\u03c9 \u1f21 \u1f00\u03c1\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c3\u03bf\u03c5, \u03c4\u03af\n\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd1 \u1f21 \u03b4\u03b5\u03be\u03b9\u03ac \u03c3\u03bf\u03c5_ (let not thy left hand know what thy right hand\ndoeth), and the like, are, in point of fact, based on a consciousness\nof the conclusion I have here reached,--namely, that another's\ndistress, of itself alone, without any further consideration, must be\nmy motive, if what I do is to be of moral value. And in the same place\n(_Matth_. vi. 2) we find it stated with perfect truth that ostentations\nalmsgivers _\u1f00\u03c0\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bc\u03b9\u03c3\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd_. (Get in full--exhaust their\nreward.) Although, in this respect too, the Vedas shed on us the light\nof a higher teaching. They repeatedly declare that he, who desires any\nsort of recompense for his work, is still wandering in the path of\ndarkness, and not yet ripe for deliverance. If any one should ask me\nwhat he gets from a charitable act, my answer in all sincerity would\nbe: \"This, that the lot of the poor man you relieve is just so much the\nlighter; otherwise absolutely nothing. If you are not satisfied, and\nfeel that such is not a sufficient end, then your wish was not to give\nalms, but to make a purchase; and you have effected a bad bargain.\nBut if the one thing you are concerned with is that he should feel the\npressure of poverty less; then you have gained your object; you have\ndiminished his suffering, and you see exactly how far your gift is\nrequited.\"\n\nNow, how is it possible that trouble which is not mine, and by which\nI am untouched, should become as direct a motive to me as if it were\nmy own, and incite me to action? As already explained, only through\nthe fact that, although it comes before me merely as something outside\nmyself, by means of the external medium of sight or hearing; I am,\nnevertheless, sensible of it with the sufferer; I feel it as my own,\nnot indeed in myself, but in him And so what Calderon said comes to\npass:\n\n                    _que entre el ver_\n           _Padecer y el padecer_\n           _Ninguna distancia habia_.\n  (_No Siempre lo Peor es Cierto_. Jorn. II., Esc. 9.)[8]\n\nThis, however, presupposes that to a certain extent I have become\nidentified with the other, and consequently that the barrier between\nthe ego and the non-ego is, for the moment, broken down. It is then,\nand then only, that I make his interests, his need, his distress, his\nsuffering directly my own; it is then that the empirical picture I have\nof him vanishes, and I no longer see the stranger, who is entirely\nunlike myself, and to whom I am indifferent; but I share his pain in\nhim, despite the certainty that his skin does not enclose my nerves.\nOnly in this way is it possible for =his= woe, =his= distress\nto become a motive =for me=; otherwise I should be influenced\nsolely by my own. This process is, I repeat, =mysterious=. For it\nis one which Reason can give no direct account of, and its causes lie\noutside the field of experience. And yet it is of daily occurrence.\nEvery one has often felt its working within himself; even to the most\nhard-hearted and selfish it is not unknown. Each day that passes brings\nit before our eyes, in single acts, on a small scale; whenever a man,\nby direct impulse, without much reflection, helps a fellow-creature and\ncomes to his aid, sometimes even exposing himself to the most imminent\nperil for the sake of one he has never seen before, and this, without\nonce thinking of anything but the fact that he witnesses another's\ngreat distress and danger. It was manifested on a large scale, when\nafter long consideration, and many a stormy debate, the noble-hearted\nBritish nation gave twenty millions of pounds to ransom the negroes in\nits colonies, with the approbation and joy of a whole world. If any one\nrefuses to recognise in Compassion the cause of this deed, magnificent\nas it is in its grand proportions, and prefers to ascribe it to\nChristianity; let him remember that in the whole of the New Testament\nnot one word is said against slavery, though at that time it was\npractically universal; and further, that as late as A.D. 1860, in North\nAmerica, when the question was being discussed, a man was found who\nthought to strengthen his case by appealing to the fact that Abraham\nand Jacob kept slaves!\n\nWhat will be in each separate case the practical effect of this\nmysterious inner process may be left to Ethics to analyse, in chapters\nand paragraphs entitled \"Duties of Virtue,\" \"Duties of Love,\"\n\"Imperfect Duties,\" or whatever other name be used. The root, the\nbasis of all these is the one here indicated; for out of it arises\nthe primary precept: _Omnes, quantum potes, juva_; from which in turn\neverything else required can very easily be deduced; just as out of the\n_Neminem laede_--the first half of my principle--all duties of justice\nare derivable. Ethics is in truth the easiest of all sciences. And\nthis is only to be expected, since it is incumbent on each person to\nconstruct it for himself, and himself form the rule for every case, as\nit occurs, out of the fundamental law which lies deep in his heart; for\nfew have leisure and patience enough to learn a ready-made system of\nMorals. From justice and loving-kindness spring all the other virtues;\nfor which reason these two may properly be called cardinal, and the\ndisclosure of their origin lays the corner-stone of Moral Science. The\nentire ethical content of the Old Testament is justice; loving-kindness\nbeing that of the New. The latter is the _\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bd\u1f74 \u1f10\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03bb\u1f74_ (the new\ncommandment [_John_ xiii. 34]), which according to Paul (_Romans_ xiii.\n8-10) includes all Christian virtues.\n\n\n[1] Plato taught that Justice (_\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7_) includes in itself the\nthree other virtues of Wisdom (\u03c3\u03bf\u03d5\u03af\u03b1), Fortitude (_\u1f00\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1\u03b5\u03af\u03b1,_) and\nTemperance (_\u03c3\u03c9\u03d5\u03c1\u03bf\u03cd\u03c5\u03bd_). With Aristotle, too, Justice is the chief\nof virtues; while the Stoic doctrine is that Virtue is manifested\nin four leading co-ordinate forms: Wisdom, Justice, Fortitude, and\nTemperance.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[2] There are four Vedas: the _Big-Veda, Yajur-Veda, S\u0101ma-Veda,_ and\n_Atharva-Veda_.--(_Translator._)\n\n[3] _Dharma-\u015a\u0101stra_ (\"a law book\"): the body or code of Hindu\nlaw.--(_Translator._)\n\n[4] _Itih\u0101sa_ (iti-ha-\u0101sa, \"so indeed it is\"): talk, legend,\ntraditional accounts of former events, heroic history; _e.g._, the\nMah\u0101-bh\u0101rata.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[5] _Pur\u0101na_ (ancient, legendary): the name given to certain\nwell-known sacred works, eighteen in number, comprising the whole\nbody of modern Hindu mythology. _V_. Monier Williams' _Sanskrit\nDictionary_.--(_Translator._)\n\n[6] _Ipsa_ CARITAS _generis humani, quae nata a primo satu, quod a\nprocreatoribus nati diliguntur, et tota domus conjugio et stirpe\nconjungitur, serpit sensim foras, cognationibus primum, tum\naffinitatibus, deinde amicitiis, post vicinitatibus tum civibus et iis,\nqui publice socii atque amici sunt, deinde_ TOTIUS COMPLEXU GENTIS\nHUMANAE.\n\n[7] This chapter describes the Pythagorean \u03d5\u03af\u03bb\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f03\u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2,\nwhich comes very near to loving-kindness. It contains also certain\n_\u03ba\u03b1\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03d5\u03af\u03bb\u03b9\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5\u03ba\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03b1_.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[8]\n\nFor between the view Of pain, and pain itself, I never knew A distance\nlie.\n\nIt is not Always the Worst that is Certain: Act II., Sc.\n9.--(_Translator._)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nTHE PROOF NOW GIVEN CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE.\n\n\nThe truth I have here laid down, that Compassion is the sole\nnon-egoistic stimulus, and therefore the only really moral one, is\na strange, indeed almost incomprehensible paradox. I shall hope,\ntherefore, to render it less extraordinary to the reader, if I show\nthat it is confirmed by experience, and by the universal testimony of\nhuman sentiment.\n\n(1) For this purpose I shall, in the first place, state an imaginary\ncase, which in the present investigation may serve as an _experimentum\ncrucis_[1] (a crucial test). But not to make the matter too easy, I\nshall take no instance of loving-kindness, but rather a breach of\nlawful right, and that of the worse kind. Let us suppose two young\npeople, Caius and Titus, to be passionately in love, each with a\ndifferent girl, and that both are completely thwarted by two other men\nwho are preferred because of certain external circumstances. They have\nboth resolved to put their rivals out of the way, and are perfectly\nsecure from every chance of detection, even from all suspicion. But\nwhen they come to actually prepare for the murder, each of them, after\nan inward struggle, draws back. They are now to give us a truthful\nand clear account of the reasons why they abandoned their project. As\nfor Caius, I leave it entirely to the reader to choose what motive he\nlikes. It may be that religions grounds checked him; for instance, the\nthought of the Divine Will, of future retribution, of the judgment to\ncome, etc. Or perhaps he may say: \"I reflected that the principle I\nwas going to apply in this case would not be adapted to provide a rule\nuniversally valid for all possible rational beings; because I should\nhave treated my rival only as a means, and not at the same time as an\nend.\" Or, following Fichte, he may deliver himself as follows: \"Every\nhuman life is a means towards realising the moral law; consequently,\nI cannot, without being indifferent to this realisation, destroy a\nbeing ordained to do his part in effecting it.\"--(_Sittenlehre_, p.\n373.) (This scruple, be it observed in passing, he might well overcome\nby the hope of soon producing a new instrument of the moral law, when\nonce in possession of his beloved.) Or, again, he may speak after the\nfashion of Wollaston: \"I considered that such an action would be the\nexpression of a false tenet.\" Or like Hutcheson: \"The Moral Sense,\nwhose perceptions, equally with those of every other sense, admit\nof no final explanation, forbade me to commit such a deed.\" Or like\nAdam Smith: \"I foresaw that my act would awaken no sympathy with me\nin the minds of the spectators.\" Or his language may be borrowed from\nChristian Wolff: \"I recognised that I should thereby advance neither\nthe work of making myself perfect, nor the same process in any one\nelse.\" Or from Spinoza: \"_Homini nihil utilius homine: ergo hominem\ninterimere nolui_.\" (To man nothing is more useful than man: therefore\nI was unwilling to destroy a man.) In short, he may say what one\npleases. But Titus, whose explanation is supplied by myself, will speak\nas follows: \"When I came to make arrangements for the work, and so, for\nthe moment, had to occupy myself not with my own passion, but with my\nrival; then for the first time I saw clearly what was going to happen\nto him. But simultaneously I was seized with compassion and pity;\nsorrow for him laid hold upon me, and overmastered me: I could not\nstrike the blow.\" Now I ask every honest and unprejudiced reader: Which\nof these two is the better man? To which would he prefer to entrust his\nown destiny? Which is restrained by the purer motive? Consequently,\nwhere does the basis of morality lie?\n\n(2) There is nothing that revolts our moral sense so much as cruelty.\nEvery other offence we can pardon, but not cruelty. The reason is found\nin the fact that cruelty is the exact opposite of Compassion. When we\nhear of intensely cruel conduct, as, for instance, the act, which\nhas just been recorded in the papers, of a mother, who murdered her\nlittle son of five years, by pouring boiling oil into his throat, and\nher younger child, by burying it alive; or what was recently reported\nfrom Algiers: how a casual dispute between a Spaniard and an Algerine\nended in a fight; and how the latter, having vanquished the other, tore\nout the whole of his lower jaw bone, and carried it off as a trophy,\nleaving his adversary still alive;--when we hear of cruelty like this,\nwe are seized with horror, and exclaim: \"How is it possible to do such\na thing?\" Now, let me ask what this question signifies. Does it mean:\n\"How is it possible to fear so little the punishments of the future\nlife?\" It is difficult to admit this interpretation. Then perhaps it\nintends to say: \"How is it possible to act according to a principle\nwhich is so absolutely unfitted to become a general law for all\nrational beings?\" Certainly not. Or, once more: \"How is it possible to\nneglect so utterly one's own perfection as well as that of another?\"'\nThis is equally unimaginable. The sense of the question is assuredly\nnothing but this: \"How is it possible to be so utterly bereft of\ncompassion?\" The conclusion is that when an action is characterised by\nan extraordinary absence of compassion, it bears the certain stamp of\nthe deepest depravity and loathsomeness. Hence Compassion is the true\nmoral incentive.\n\n(3) The ethical basis, or the original moral stimulus, which I have\ndisclosed, is the only one that can be justly said to have a real\nand extended sphere of effective influence. No one will surely\nventure to maintain as much of all the other moral principles that\nphilosophers have set up; for these are composed of abstract, sometimes\neven of hair-splitting propositions, with no foundation other than\nan artificial combination of ideas; such that their application to\nactual conduct would often incline to the comic. A good action,\ninspired solely by Kant's Moral Principle, would be at bottom the\nwork of philosophic pedantry; or else would lead the doer into\nself-deception, through his reason interpreting conduct, which had\nother, perhaps nobler, incentives, as the product of the Categorical\nImperative, and of the conception of Duty, which, as we have seen,\nrests on nothing. But not only is it true that the =philosophic=\nmoral principles, purely theoretical as they are, have seldom any\noperative power; of those established by =religion=, and expressly\nframed for practical purposes, it is equally difficult to predicate\nany marked efficiency. The chief evidence of this lies in the fact\nthat in spite of the great religious differences in the world, the\namount of morality, or rather of immorality, shows no corresponding\nvariation, but in essentials is pretty much the same everywhere. Only\nit is important not to confound rudeness and refinement with morality\nand immorality. The religion of Hellas had an exceedingly small moral\ntendency,--it hardly went further than respect for oaths. No dogma was\ntaught, and no system of Ethics publicly preached; nevertheless, all\nthings considered, it does not appear that the Greeks were morally\ninferior to the men of the Christian era. The morality of Christianity\nis of a much higher kind than that of any other religion which\npreviously appeared in Europe. But if any one should believe for this\nreason that European morals have improved proportionally, and that\nnow at any rate they surpass what obtains elsewhere, it would not be\ndifficult to demonstrate that among the Mohammedans, Gnebres, Hindus,\nand Buddhists, there is at least as much honesty, fidelity, toleration,\ngentleness, beneficence, nobleness, and self-denial as among Christian\npeoples. Indeed, the scale will be found rather to turn unfavourably\nfor Christendom, when we put into the balance the long list of inhuman\ncruelties which have constantly been perpetrated within its limits\nand often in its name. We need only recall for a moment the numerous\nreligious wars; the crusades that nothing can justify; the extirpation\nof a large part of the American aborigines, and the peopling of that\ncontinent by negroes, brought over from Africa, without the shadow of\na right, torn from their families, their country, their hemisphere,\nand, as slaves, condemned for life to forced labour;[2] the tireless\npersecution of heretics; the unspeakable atrocities of the Inquisition,\nthat cried aloud to heaven; the Massacre of St. Bartholomew; the\nexecution of 18,000 persons in the Netherlands by the Duke of Alva; and\nthese are but a few facts among many. Speaking generally, however,\nif we compare with the performances of its followers the excellent\nmorality which Christianity, and, more or less, every creed preaches,\nand then try to imagine how far theory would become practice, if crime\nwere not impeded by the secular arm of the state; nay more, what would\nprobably happen, if, for only one day all laws should be suspended; we\nshall be obliged to confess that the effect of the various religions\non Morals is in fact very small. This is of course due to weakness of\nfaith. Theoretically, and so long as it is only a question of piety in\nthe abstract, every one supposes his belief to be firm enough. Only\nthe searching touch-stone of all our convictions is--what we do. When\nthe moment for acting arrives, and our faith has to be tested by great\nself-denial and heavy sacrifices, then its feebleness becomes evident.\nIf a man is seriously planning some evil, he has already broken the\nbounds of true and pure morality. Thenceforward the chief restraint\nthat checks him is invariably the dread of justice and the police.\nShould he be so hopeful of escaping detection as to cast such fears\naside, the next barrier that meets him is regard for his honour. If\nthis second rampart be crossed, there is very little likelihood, after\nboth these powerful hindrances are withdrawn, that any religious dogma\nwill appeal to him strongly enough to keep him back from the deed. For\nif he be not frightened by near and immediate dangers, he will hardly\nbe curbed by terrors which are distant, and rest merely on belief.\nMoreover, there is a positive objection that may be brought against\nall good conduct proceeding solely from religions conviction; it is\nnot purged of self-interest, but done out of regard for reward and\npunishment, and hence can have no purely moral value. This view we find\nvery clearly expressed in a letter of the celebrated Grand-Duke of\nWeimar, Karl August. He writes: \"Baron Weyhers was himself of opinion\nthat he, who is good through religion, and not by natural inclination,\nmust be a bad fellow at heart. _In vino veritas.\"[3]--(Letters to\nJ. H. Merck_; No. 229.) But now let us turn to the moral incentive\nwhich I have disclosed. Who ventures for a moment to deny that it\ndisplays a marked and truly wonderful influence at all times, among all\npeoples, in all circumstances of life; even when constitutional law is\nsuspended, and the horrors of revolutions and wars fill the air; in\nsmall things and in great, every day and every hour? Who will refuse\nto admit that it is constantly preventing much wrong, and calling into\nexistence many a good action, often quite unexpectedly, and where there\nis no hope of reward? Is there any one who will gainsay the fact that,\nwhere it and it alone has been operative, we all with deep respect and\nemotion unreservedly recognise the presence of genuine moral worth?\n\n(4) Boundless compassion for all living beings is the surest and most\ncertain guarantee of pure moral conduct, and needs no casuistry.\nWhoever is filled with it will assuredly injure no one, do harm to\nno one, encroach on no man's rights; he will rather have regard for\nevery one, forgive every one, help every one as far as he can, and\nall his actions will bear the stamp of justice and loving-kindness.\nOn the other hand, if we try to say: \"This man is virtuous, but he is\na stranger to Compassion\"; or: \"he is an unjust and malicious man,\nyet very compassionate;\" the contradiction at once leaps to light. In\nformer times the English plays used to finish with a petition for the\nKing. The old Indian dramas close with these words: \"May all living\nbeings be delivered from pain.\" Tastes differ; but in my opinion there\nis no more beautiful prayer than this.\n\n(5) Also from separate matters of detail it may be inferred that\nthe original stimulus of true morality is Compassion. For instance,\nto make a man lose a hundred thalers, by legal tricks involving no\ndanger, is equally unjust, whether he be rich or poor; but in the\nlatter case the rapping of conscience is much louder, the censure of\ndisinterested witnesses more emphatic. Aristotle was well aware of\nthis, and said: _\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f00\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03bf\u1fe1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1, \u1f22 \u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u03c4\u1f50\u03c7\u03bf\u1fe1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1,\n\u1f00\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd1\u03bd_. (It is worse to injure a man in adversity than one who is\nprosperous.)--(_Probl._ xxix. 2.) If the man have wealth, self-reproach\nis proportionally faint, and grows still fainter, if it be the treasury\nthat has been overreached; for state coffers can form no object of\nCompassion. It thus appears that the grounds for self-accusation as\nwell as for the spectators' blame are not furnished directly by the\ninfringement of the law, but chiefly by the suffering thereby brought\nupon others. The violation of right, by itself and as such, which is\ninvolved in cheating the exchequer, (to take the above instance,)\nwill be disapproved by the conscience alike of actor and witness; but\nonly because, and in so far as, the rule of respecting =every=\nright, which forms the _sine qua non_ of all honourable conduct, is in\nconsequence broken. The stricture passed will, in fact, be indirect and\nlimited. If, however, it be a confidential _employ\u00e9_ in the service\nthat commits the fraud, the case assumes quite another aspect; it\nthen has all the specific attributes of, and belongs to, that class\nof actions described above, whose characteristic is a =double\ninjustice=. The analysis here given explains why the worst charge\nwhich can ever be brought against rapacious extortioners and legal\nsharpers is, that they appropriate for themselves the goods of widows\nand orphans. The reason appears in the fact that the latter, more\nthan others, owing to their helplessness, might be expected to excite\nCompassion in the most callous heart. Hence we conclude that the entire\nabsence of this sense is sufficient to lower a man to the last degree\nof villainy.\n\n(6) Compassion is the root no less of justice than of loving-kindness;\nbut it is more clearly evidenced in the latter than in the former.\nWe never receive proofs of genuine loving-kindness on the part of\nothers, so long as we are in all respects prosperous. The happy man\nmay, no doubt, often hear the words of good-will on his relations'\nand friends' lips; but the expression of that pure, disinterested,\nobjective participation in the condition and lot of others, which\nloving-kindness begets, is reserved for him who is stricken with some\nsorrow or suffering, whatever it be. For the fortunate =as such=\nwe do not feel sympathy; unless they have some other claim on us, they\nremain alien to our hearts: _habeant sibi sua._ (They may keep their\nown affairs, pleasures, etc., to themselves.) Nay, if a man has many\nadvantages over others, he will easily become an object of envy, which\nis ready, should he once fall from his height of prosperity, to turn\ninto malignant joy. Nevertheless this menace is, for the most part,\nnot fulfilled; the Sophoclean _\u03b3\u03b5\u03bb\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b4' \u1f10\u03c7\u03b8\u03c1\u03bf\u03af _ (his enemies laugh)\ndoes not generally become an actual fact. As soon as the day of ruin\ncomes to one of fortune's spoiled children, there usually takes place\na great transformation in the minds of his acquaintances, which for us\nin this connection is very instructive. In the first place this change\nclearly reveals the real nature of the interest that the friends of his\nhappiness took in him: _diffugiunt cadis cum faece siccatis amici._\n(When the casks are drained to the dregs, one's friends run away.)[4]\nOn the other hand, the exultation of those who envied his prosperity,\nthe mocking laugh of malicious satisfaction, which he feared more than\nadversity itself, and the contemplation of which he could not face,\nare things usually spared him. Jealousy is appeased, and disappears\nwith its cause; while Compassion which takes its place is the parent\nof loving-kindness. Those who were envious of, and hostile to, a man\nin the full tide of success, after his downfall, have not seldom\nbecome his friends, ready to protect, comfort, and help. Who has not,\nat least in a small way, himself experienced something of the sort?\nWhere is the man, who, when overtaken by some calamity, of whatever\nnature, has not noticed with surprise how the persons that previously\nhad displayed the greatest coldness, nay, ill-will towards him, then\ncame forward with unfeigned sympathy? For misfortune is the condition\nof Compassion, and Compassion the source of loving-kindness. When our\nwrath is kindled against a person, nothing quenches it so quickly, even\nwhen it is righteous, as the words: \"He is an unfortunate man.\" And the\nreason is obvious: Compassion is to anger as water to fire. Therefore,\nwhoever would fain have nothing to repent of, let him listen to my\nadvice. When he is inflamed with rage, and meditates doing some one a\ngrievous injury, he should bring the thing vividly before his mind,\nas a _fait accompli_; he should clearly picture to himself this other\nfellow-being tormented with mental or bodily pain, or struggling with\nneed and misery; so that he is forced to exclaim: \"This is my work!\"\nSuch thoughts as these, if anything, will avail to moderate his wrath.\nFor Compassion is the true antidote of anger; and by practising on\noneself this artifice of the imagination, one awakes beforehand, while\nthere is yet time,\n\n                 _la piti\u00e9, dont la voix,_\n_Alors qu'on est veng\u00e9, fait entendre ses lois_.[5]\n                   --(Voltaire, _S\u00e9miramis_, V. 6.)\n\nAnd in general, the hatred we may cherish for others is overcome by\nnothing so easily as by our taking a point of view whence they can\nappeal to our Compassion. The reason indeed why parents, as a rule,\nspecially love the sickly one of their children is because the sight of\nit perpetually stirs their Compassion.\n\n(7) There is another proof that the moral incentive disclosed by me\nis the true one. I mean the fact that animals also are included under\nits protecting aegis. In the other European systems of Ethics no place\nis found for them,--strange and inexcusable as this may appear. It is\nasserted that beasts have no rights; the illusion is harboured that our\nconduct, so far as they are concerned, has no moral significance, or,\nas it is put in the language of these codes, that \"there are no duties\nto be fulfilled towards animals.\" Such a view is one of revolting\ncoarseness, a barbarism of the West, whose source is Judaism. In\nphilosophy, however, it rests on the assumption, despite all evidence\nto the contrary, of the radical difference between man and beast,--a\ndoctrine which, as is well known, was proclaimed with more trenchant\nemphasis by Descartes than by any one else: it was indeed the necessary\nconsequence of his mistakes. When Leibnitz and Wolff, following out\nthe Cartesian view, built up out of abstract ideas their Rational\nPsychology, and constructed a deathless _anima rationalis_ (rational\nsoul); then the natural claims of the animal kingdom visibly rose up\nagainst this exclusive privilege, this human patent of immortality, and\nNature, as always in such circumstances, entered her silent protest.\nOur philosophers, owing to the qualms of their intellectual conscience,\nwere soon forced to seek aid for their Rational Psychology from the\nempirical method; they accordingly tried to reveal the existence of\na vast chasm, an immeasurable gulf between animals and men, in order\nto represent them, in the teeth of opposing testimony, as existences\nessentially different. These efforts did not escape the ridicule of\nBoileau; for we find him saying:\n\n_Les animaux ont-ils des universit\u00e9s?_\n_Voit-on fleurir chez eux des quatre facult\u00e9s?_[6]\n\nSuch a supposition would end in animals being pronounced incapable\nof distinguishing themselves from the external world, and of having\nany self-consciousness, any ego! As answer to such absurd tenets, it\nwould only be necessary to point to the boundless Egoism innate in\nevery animal, even the smallest and humblest; this amply proves how\nperfectly they are conscious of their self, as opposed to the world,\nwhich lies outside it. If any one of the Cartesian persuasion, with\nviews like these in his head, should find himself in the claws of a\ntiger, he would be taught in the most forcible manner what a sharp\ndistinction such a beast draws between his ego and the non-ego.\nCorresponding to these philosophical fallacies we notice a peculiar\nsophism in the speech of many peoples, especially the Germans. For the\ncommonest matters connected with the processes of life,--for food,\ndrink, conception, the bringing forth of young; for death, and the dead\nbody; such languages have special words applicable only to animals,\nnot to men. In this way the necessity of using the same terms for\nboth is avoided, and the perfect identity of the thing concealed under\nverbal differences. Now, since the ancient tongues show no trace of\nsuch a dual mode of expression, but frankly denote the same things\nby the same words; it follows that this miserable artifice is beyond\nall doubt the work of European priestcraft, which, in its profanity,\nknows no limit to its disavowal of, and blasphemy against, the Eternal\nReality that lives in every animal. Thus was laid the foundation of\nthat harshness and cruelty towards beasts which is customary in Europe,\nand on which a native of the Asiatic uplands could not look without\nrighteous horror. In English this infamous invention is not to be\nfound; assuredly because the Saxons, when they conquered England, were\nnot yet Christians. Nevertheless the English language shows something\nanalogous in the strange fact that it makes all animals of the neuter\ngender, the pronoun \"it\" being employed for them, just as if they\nwere lifeless things. This idiom has a very objectionable sound,\nespecially in the case of dogs, monkeys, and other Primates, and is\nunmistakably a priestly trick, designed to reduce beasts to the level\nof inanimate objects. The ancient Egyptians, who dedicated all their\ndays to religion, were accustomed to place in the same vault with a\nhuman mummy that of an ibis, a crocodile, etc.; in Europe it is a\ncrime, an abomination to bury a faithful dog beside the resting-place\nof his master, though it is there perhaps that he, with a fidelity\nand attachment unknown to the sons of men, awaited his own end. To a\nrecognition of the identity, in all essentials, of the phaenomena\nwhich we call \"man\" and \"beast,\" nothing leads more surely than the\nstudy of zoology and anatomy. What shall we say then, when in these\ndays (1839) a canting dissector has been found, who presumes to insist\non an absolute and radical difference between human beings and animals,\nand who goes so far as to attack and calumniate honest zoologists that\nkeep aloof from all priestly guile, eye-service, and hypocrisy, and\ndare to follow the leading of nature and of truth?\n\nThose persons must indeed be totally blind, or else completely\nchloroformed by the _foetor Judaicus_ (Jewish stench), who do not\ndiscern that the truly essential and fundamental part in man and beast\nis identically the same thing. That which distinguishes the one from\nthe other does not lie in the primary and original principle, in the\ninner nature, in the kernel of the two phaenomena (this kernel being\nin both alike the Will of the individual); it is found in what is\nsecondary, in the intellect, in the degree of perceptive capacity. It\nis true that the latter is incomparably higher in man, by reason of\nhis added faculty of abstract knowledge, called Reason; nevertheless\nthis superiority is traceable solely to a greater cerebral development,\nin other words, to the corporeal difference, which is quantitative,\nnot qualitative, of a single part, the brain. In all other respects\nthe similarity between men and animals, both psychical and bodily, is\nsufficiently striking. So that we must remind our judaised friends\nin the West, who despise animals, and idolise Reason, that if they\nwere suckled by their mothers, so also was the dog by his. Even Kant\nfell into this common mistake of his age, and of his country, and I\nhave already administered the censure[7] which it is impossible to\nwithhold. The fact that Christian morality takes no thought for beasts\nis a defect in the system which is better admitted than perpetuated.\nOne's astonishment is, however, all the greater, because, with this\nexception, it shows the closest agreement with the Ethics of Brahmanism\nand Buddhism, being only less strongly expressed, and not carried to\nthe last consequences imposed by logic. On the whole, there seems\nlittle room for doubting that, in common with the idea of a god become\nman, or Avatar,[8] it has an Asiatic origin, and probably came to\nJudaea by way of Egypt; so that Christianity would be a secondary\nreflection of the primordial light that shone in India, which,\nfalling first on Egypt, was unhappily refracted from its ruins upon\nJewish soil. An apt symbol of the insensibility of Christian Ethics\nto animals, while in other points its similarity to the Indian is so\ngreat, may be found in the circumstance that John the Baptist comes\nbefore us in all respects like a Hindu Sannyasin,[9] except that he\nis clothed in skins: a thing which would be, as is well known, an\nabomination in the eyes of every follower of Brahmanism or Buddhism.\nThe Royal Society of Calcutta only received their copy of the Vedas\non their distinctly promising that they would not have it bound in\nleather, after European fashion. In silken binding, therefore, it is\nnow to be seen on the shelves of their library. Again: the Gospel story\nof Peter's draught of fishes, which the Saviour blesses so signally\nthat the boats are overladen, and begin to sink (_Luke_ v. 1-10),\nforms a characteristic contrast to what is related of Pythagoras. It\nis said that the latter, initiated as he was in all the wisdom of the\nEgyptians, bought the draught from the fishermen, while the net was\nstill under water, in order to at once set at liberty the captive\ndenizens of the sea. (Apuleius: _De Magia_, p. 36: edit. Bipont.)[10]\nCompassion for animals is intimately connected with goodness of\ncharacter, and it may be confidently asserted that he, who is cruel\nto living creatures, cannot be a good man. Moreover, this compassion\nmanifestly flows from the same source whence arise the virtues of\njustice and loving-kindness towards men. Thus, for instance, people\nof delicate sensitiveness, on realising that in a fit of ill-humour,\nor anger, or under the influence of wine, they punished their dog,\ntheir horse, their ape undeservedly, or unnecessarily, or excessively,\nare seized with the same remorse, feel the same dissatisfaction with\nthemselves, as when they are conscious of having done some wrong to\none of their fellows. The only difference--a purely nominal one--is\nthat in the latter case this remorse, this dissatisfaction is called\nthe voice of conscience rising in rebuke. I remember having read of\nan Englishman, who, when hunting in India, had killed a monkey, that\nhe could not forget the dying look which the creature cast on him; so\nthat he never fired at these animals again. Another sportsman, William\nHarris by name, a true Nimrod, has much the same story to tell. During\nthe years 1836-7 he travelled far into the heart of Africa, merely to\nindulge his passion for the chase. A passage in his book, published at\nBombay in 1838, describes how he shot his first elephant, a female.\nNext morning on going to look for his game, he found that all the\nelephants had fled from the neighbourhood, except a young one which had\nspent the night beside its dead mother. Seeing the huntsmen, it forgot\nall fear, and came to meet them, with the clearest and most lively\nsigns of disconsolate grief, and put its tiny trunk about them, as if\nto beg for help. \"Then,\" says Harris, \"I was filled with real remorse\nfor what I had done, and felt as if I had committed a murder.\"\n\nThe English nation, with its fine sensibility, is, in fact,\ndistinguished above all others for extraordinary compassion towards\nanimals, which appears at every opportunity, and is so strong that,\ndespite the \"cold superstition\" which otherwise degrades them, these\nAnglo-Saxons have been led through its operation to fill up by\nlegislation the _lacuna_ that their religion leaves in morality. For\nthis gap is precisely the reason why in Europe and America there is\nneed of societies for the protection of animals, which are entirely\ndependent on the law for their efficiency. In Asia the religions\nthemselves suffice, consequently no one there ever thinks of such\nassociations. Meanwhile Europeans are awakening more and more to a\nsense that beasts have rights, in proportion as the strange notion\nis being gradually overcome and outgrown, that the animal kingdom\ncame into existence solely for the benefit and pleasure of man. This\nview,[11] with the corollary that non-human living creatures are to be\nregarded merely as things, is at the root of the rough and altogether\nreckless treatment of them, which obtains in the West. To the honour,\nthen, of the English be it said that they are the first people who\nhave, in downright earnest, extended the protecting arm of the law to\nanimals: in England the miscreant, that commits an outrage on beasts,\nhas to pay for it, equally whether they are his own or not. Nor is this\nall. There exists in London the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty\nto Animals, a corporate body voluntarily formed, which, without state\nassistance, and at great cost, is of no small service in lessening the\ntale of tortures inflicted on animals. Its emissaries are ubiquitous,\nand keep secret watch in order to inform against the tormentors of\ndumb, sensitive creatures; and such persons have therefore good reason\nto stand in fear of them.[12] At all the steep bridges in London this\nSociety stations a pair of horses, which without any charge is attached\nto heavy freight-waggons. Is not this admirable? Does it not elicit our\napproval, as unfailingly as any beneficent action towards men? Also the\nPhilanthropic Society of London has done its part. In 1837 it offered a\nprize of \u00a330 for the best exposition of the moral reasons which exist\nto keep men from torturing animals. The line of argument, however,\nhad to be taken almost exclusively from Christianity, whereby the\ndifficulty of the task was, of course, increased; but two years later,\nin 1839, Mr. Macnamara was the successful competitor. At Philadelphia\nthere is an Animals' Friends' Society, having the same aims; and it\nis to the President of the latter that a book called _Philozoia; or,\nMoral Reflections on the Actual Condition of Animals, and the Means\nof Improving the Same_ (Brussels, 1839), has been dedicated by its\nauthor, T. Forster. It is original and well written. Mr. Forster\nearnestly commends to his readers the humane treatment of animals. As\nan Englishman he naturally tries to strengthen his position by the\nsupport of the Bible; but he is on slippery ground, and meets with\nsuch poor success that he ends by catching at the following ingenious\nposition: Jesus Christ (he says) was born in a stable among oxen and\nasses; which was meant to indicate symbolically that we ought to regard\nthe beasts as our brothers, and treat them accordingly. All that I\nhave here adduced sufficiently proves that the moral chord, of which\nwe are speaking, is now at length beginning to vibrate also in the\nWest. For the rest, we may observe that compassion for sentient beings\nis not to carry us to the length of abstaining from flesh, like the\nBrahmans. This is because, by a natural law, capacity for pain keeps\npace with the intelligence; consequently men, by going without animal\nfood, especially in the North, would suffer more than beasts do through\na quick death, which is always unforeseen; although the latter ought\nto be made still easier by means of chloroform. Indeed without meat\nnourishment mankind would be quite unable to withstand the rigours of\nthe Northern climate. The same reasoning explains, too, why we are\nright in making animals work for us; it is only when they are subjected\nto an excessive amount of toil that cruelty begins.\n\n(8) It is perhaps not impossible to investigate and explain\nmetaphysically the ultimate cause of that Compassion in which alone all\nnon-egoistic conduct can have its source; but let us for the moment put\naside such inquiries, and consider the phaenomenon in question, from\nthe empirical point of view, simply as a natural arrangement. Now if\nNature's intention was to soften as much as possible the numberless\nsufferings of every sort, to which our life is exposed, and which no\none altogether escapes; if she wished to provide some counterbalance\nfor the burning Egoism, which fills all beings, and often develops into\nmalice; it will at once strike every one as obvious that she could not\nhave chosen any method more effectual than that of planting in the\nhuman heart the wonderful disposition, which inclines one man to share\nthe pain of another, and from which proceeds the voice that bids us, in\ntones strong and unmistakable, take thought for our neighbour; calling,\nat one time, \"Protect!\" at another, \"Help!\" Assuredly, from the mutual\nsuccour thus arising, there was more to be hoped for, towards the\nattainment of universal well-being, than from a stern Command of duty,\ncouched in general, abstract terms,--the product of certain reasoning\nprocesses, and of artificial combinations of conceptions. From such\nan Imperative, indeed, all the less result could be expected because\nto the rough human unit general propositions and abstract truths are\nunintelligible, the concrete only having some meaning for him. And\nit should be remembered that mankind in its entirety, a very small\npart alone excepted, has always been rude, and must remain so, since\nthe large amount of bodily toil, which for the race as a whole is\ninevitable, leaves no time for mental culture. Whereas, in order to\nawaken that sense, which has been proved to be the sole source of\ndisinterested action, and consequently the true basis of Morals, there\nis no need of abstract knowledge, but only of intuitive perception, of\nthe simple comprehension of a concrete case. To this Compassion is at\nonce responsive, without the mediation of other thoughts.\n\n(9) The following circumstance will be found in complete accord with\nthe last paragraph. The foundation, which I have given to Ethics,\nleaves me without a forerunner among the School Philosophers; indeed,\nmy position is paradoxical, as far as their teaching goes, and many\nof them, for instance, the Stoics (Seneca, _De Clementia_, II., 5),\nSpinoza (_Ethica_, IV., prop. 50), and Kant (_Kritik der Praktischen\nVernunft,_ p. 213; R. p. 257) only notice the motive of Compassion to\nutterly reject and contemn it. On the other hand, my basis is supported\nby the authority of the greatest moralist of modern times; for such,\nundoubtedly, J. J. Rousseau is,--that profound reader of the human\nheart, who drew his wisdom not from books, but from life, and intended\nhis doctrine not for the professorial chair, but for humanity; he,\nthe foe of all prejudice, the foster-child of nature, whom alone she\nendowed with the gift of being able to moralise without tediousness,\nbecause he hit the truth and stirred the heart. I shall therefore\nventure here to cite some passages from his works in support of my\ntheory, observing that, so far, I have been as sparing as possible with\nregard to quotations.\n\nIn the _Discours sur l'Origine de l'In\u00e9galit\u00e9_, p. 91 (edit. Bipont.),\nhe says: _Il y a un autre principe, que Hobbes n'a point aper\u00e7u, et qui\nayant \u00e9t\u00e9 donn\u00e9 \u00e0 l'homme pour adoucir, en certaines circonstances,\nla f\u00e9rocit\u00e9 de son amour-propre, temp\u00e8re l'ardeur qu'il a pour son\nbien-\u00eatre par une R\u00c9PUGNANCE INN\u00c9E \u00c0 VOIR SOUFFRIR SON SEMBLABLE. Je ne\ncrois pas avoir aucune contradiction \u00e0 craindre en accordant \u00e0 l'homme\nla SEULE VERTU NATURELLE qu'ait \u00e9t\u00e9 forc\u00e9 de reconna\u00eetre le d\u00e9tracteur\nle plus outr\u00e9 des vertus humaines. Je parle DE LA PITI\u00c9_, etc.[13]\n\nP. 92: _Mandeville a bien senti qu'avec toute leur morale les hommes\nn'eussent jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 que des monstres, si la nature ne leur eut donn\u00e9\nLA PITI\u00c9 \u00e0 l'appui de la raison: mais il n'a pas vu, que DE CETTE SEULE\nQUALIT\u00c9 DECOULENT TOUTES LES VERTUS SOCIALES, qu'il veut disputer aux\nhommes. En effet, qu'est-ce que la g\u00e9n\u00e9rosit\u00e9, la cl\u00e9mence, l'humanit\u00e9,\nsinon LA PITI\u00c9, appliqu\u00e9e aux faibles, aux coupables, ou a l'esp\u00e8ce\nhumaine en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral? La bienveillance et l'amiti\u00e9 m\u00eame sont, \u00e0 le bien\nprendre, des productions d'une piti\u00e9 constante, fix\u00e9e sur un objet\nparticulier; car d\u00e9sirer que quelqu'un ne souffre point, qu'est-ce\nautre chose, que d\u00e9sirer qu'il soit heureux?... La commis\u00e9ration sera\nd'autant plus \u00e9nergique, que L'ANIMAL SPECTATEUR S'IDENTIFIERA plus\nintimement avec L'ANIMAL SOUFFRANT._[14]\n\nP. 94: _Il est donc bien certain, que la piti\u00e9 est un sentiment\nnaturel, qui, mod\u00e9rant dans chaque individu l'amour de soi-m\u00eame,\nconcourt \u00e0 la conservation mutuelle de toute l'esp\u00e8ce. C'est elle, qui\ndans l'\u00e9tat de nature, tient lieu de lois, de m\u0153urs, et de vertus, avec\ncet avantage, que nul ne sera tent\u00e9 de d\u00e9sob\u00e9ir \u00e0 sa douce voix: c'est\nelle, qui d\u00e9tournera tout sauvage robuste d'enlever \u00e0 un faible enfant,\nou \u00e0 un vieillard infirme, sa subsistence acquise avec peine, si lui\nm\u00eame esp\u00e8re pouvoir trouver la sienne ailleurs: c'est elle qui, au lieu\nde cette maxime sublime de justice raisonn\u00e9e: \"Fais \u00e0 autrui comme tu\nveux qu'on te fasse;\" inspire \u00e0 tous les hommes cette autre maxime de\nbont\u00e9 naturelle, bien moins parfaite, mais plus utile peut-\u00eatre que\nla pr\u00e9c\u00e9dente: \"Fais ton bien avec le moindre mal d'autrui qu'il est\npossible.\" C'est, en un mot, DANS CE SENTIMENT NATUREL PLUT\u00d4T, QUE DANS\nLES ARGUMENTS SUBTILS, qu'il faut chercher la cause de la repugnance\nqu'\u00e9prouverait tout homme \u00e0 mal faire, m\u00eame ind\u00e9pendamment des maximes\nde l'\u00e9ducation._[15]\n\nLet this be compared with what he says in _\u00c9mile,_ Bk. IV., pp. 115-120\n(edit. Bipont.), where the following passage occurs among others:--\n\n_En effet, comment nous laissons-nous \u00e9mouvoir \u00e0 la piti\u00e9, si ce n'est\nen nous transportant hors de nous et en nous IDENTIFIANT AVEC L'ANIMAL\nSOUFFRANT: EN QUITTANT, pour ainsi dire, NOTRE \u00caTRE, POUR PRENDRE LE\nSIEN? Nous ne souffrons qu'autant que nous jugeons qu'il souffre: CE\nN'EST PAS DANS NOUS, C'EST DANS LUI, que nous souffrons ... offrir au\njeune homme des objets, sur lesquels puisse agir la force expansive de\nson c\u0153ur, qui le dilatent, qui l'\u00e9tendent sur les autres \u00eatres, qui le\nfassent partout SE RETROUVER HORS DE LUI: \u00e9carter avec soin ceux, qui\nle resserrent, le concentrent, et tendent le ressort DU MOI HUMAIN_,\netc.[16]\n\nInside the pale of the Schools, as above remarked, there is not a\nsingle authority in favour of my position; but outside, I have other\ntestimony to cite, in addition to Rousseau's. The Chinese admit five\ncardinal virtues (Tschang), of which the chief is Compassion (*Sin).\nThe other four are: justice, courtesy, wisdom, and sincerity.[17]\nSimilarly, among the Hindus, we find that on the tablets placed to\nthe memory of dead chieftains, compassion for men and animals takes\nthe first place in the record of their virtues. At Athens there was\nan altar to Compassion in the Agora, as we know from Pausanias, I.\n17: _\u0386\u03b8\u03b7\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u1f00\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u1fb7 \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f18\u03bb\u03ad\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b2\u03c9\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2, \u1fa7, \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c2\n\u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f43\u03c4\u03b9 \u1f60-\u03d5\u03ad\u03bb\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u1f70\u03c2\n\u1f19\u03bb\u03bb\u03ae\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03bd\u03ad\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f08\u03b8\u03b7\u03bd\u1fb1\u03af\u03bf\u03b9_.[18]\n\nLucian also mentions this altar in the Timon, \u00a7 99.[19] A phrase of\nPhocion, preserved by Stobaeus, describes Compassion as the most sacred\nthing in human life: _\u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f10\u03be \u1f31\u03b5\u03c1\u03bfn \u03b2\u03c9\u03bc\u03cc\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03b5 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03af\u03c5\u03b7\u03c2\n\u03d5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03d5\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u1f14\u03bb\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd._[20] In the _Sapientia Indorum,_ the Greek\ntranslation of the Pa\u1e45\u0107a-tantra, we read (Section 3, p. 220): _\u0394\u03ad\u03b3\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\n\u03b3\u03ac\u03c1, \u1f61\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u03ce\u03c4\u03b7 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f21 \u1f10\u03bb\u03b5\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03c3\u03cd\u03bd\u03b7_.[21] It is clear, then, that the\nreal source of morality has been distinctly recognised at all times and\nin all countries; Europe alone excepted, owing to the _foetor Judaicus_\n(Jewish stench), which here pervades everything, and is the reason why\nthe Western races require for the object of their obedience a command\nof duty, a moral law, an imperative, in short, an order and decree.\nThey remain wedded to this habit of thought, and refuse to open their\neyes to the fact that such a view is, after all, based upon nothing\nbut Egosim. Of course, now and then, isolated individuals of fine\nperception have felt the truth, and given it utterance: such a one was\nRousseau; and such, Lessing. In a letter written by the latter in 1756\nwe read: \"The best man, and the one most likely to excel in all social\nvirtues, in all forms of magnanimity, is he who is most compassionate.\"\n\n\n[1] This term appears to have been first used by Newton and Boyle.\nThe sense is undoubtedly derived from Bacon's phrase \"_instantia\ncrucis_,\" which is one of his \"Prerogative Instances.\" _Vide, Novum\nOrganum_: Lib. II., xxxvi., where it is explained as follows: _Inter\nPraerogativas Instantiarum ponemus loco decimo quarto_ INSTANTIAS\nCRUCIS; _translate vocabulo a Crucibus, quae erectae in Biviis,\nindicant et signant viarum separationes. Has etiam Instantias\nDecisorias et Judiciales, et in Casibus nonnullis Instantias Oraculi et\nMandati, appellare consuevimus_, etc.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[2] According to Buxton (_The African Slave-trade_, 1839), their number\nis even now yearly increased by about 150,000 freshly imported; and to\nthese more than 200,000 must be added, who perish miserably at the time\nof their capture, or on the voyage.\n\n[3] _I.e_., under the influence of wine one speaks the truth. Cf.\nPliny, _Nat. Hist_, xiv., chap. 22, \u00a7 28, 141, edit. Teubner;\n_vulgoque_ VERITAS _jam attributa_ VINO _est_. Gk. _\u03bf\u1f36\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1.\nV. Paroemiographi_, edit. Gaisford.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[4] Hor., _Carm_., I., 35, 26.--(_Translator. _)\n\n[5]\n\n    Compassion, who with no uncertain tone,\n    The work of vengeance done, her laws makes known.\n\n\n[6]\n\n    Have beasts, forsooth, their universities,\n    Endowed, like ours, with all four faculties?\n\n\n[7] _V_. Part II., Chapter VI.\n\n[8] Avat\u0101ra (ava-t\u1e5b\u012b to descend), descent of a deity from heaven;\n_e.g._, the ten incarnations of Vish\u1e47u. _V_. Monier Williams' _Sanskrit\nDictionary_.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[9] Sanny\u0101sin (one who lays down, or resigns), an ascetic; a religious\nmendicant, or Br\u0101hman of the fourth order. _V._ Monier Williams'\n_Sanskrit Dictionary_.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[10] _V_. Apuleius: _Apologia sive De Magia Liber_ (Lipsiae, Teubner,\n1900: page 41, chap, xxxi): _Pythagoram ... memoriae prodiderunt,\ncum animaduertisset proxime Metapontum in litore Italiae suae, quam\nsubsiciuam Graeciam fecerat, a quibusdam piscatoribus euerriculum\ntrahi, fortunam iactus eius emisse et pretio dato iussisse,\nilico piscis eos qui capti tenebantur solui retibus et reddi\nprofundo._--(_Translator_.)\n\n[11] In Vol. II. of my _Parerga_, \u00a7 177, I have shown that its origin\ncan be traced to the Old Testament.\n\n[12] How seriously the matter is being taken up may be seen from the\nfollowing case which is quite recent. I quote from the _Birmingham\nJournal_ of December, 1839. \"Arrest of a company of eighty-four\nabettors of dog-fights.--It had come to the knowledge of the Society\nof Animals' Friends that the Square in Fox Street, Birmingham, was\nyesterday to be the scene of a dog-fight. Measures were accordingly\ntaken to secure the assistance of the police, and a strong detachment\nof constables was sent to the spot. At the right moment all the persons\npresent were arrested. These precious conspirators were then handcuffed\ntogether in pairs, and the whole party was made fast by a long rope\npassing between each couple. In this fashion they were marched off\nto the Police Station, where mayor and magistrate were sitting in\nreadiness for them. The two ringleaders were condemned to pay, each,\na fine of \u00a31, and 8s. _6d_. costs; in default, to undergo 14 days'\nhard labour.\" The coxcombs whose habit is never to miss noble sport of\nthis sort, must have looked somewhat crestfallen in the midst of the\nprocession. But the _Times_ of April 6, 1855, p. 6, supplies a still\nmore striking instance from the present day; and here we find the paper\nitself assuming judicial functions, and imposing the right punishment.\nIt recounts the case of a very wealthy Scotch baronet's daughter. The\nmatter had been brought before the law, and the evidence showed that\nthe girl had used a cudgel and knife on her horse with the greatest\ncruelty; for which she was ordered to pay a fine of \u00a35. But for one\nin her position such a sum means nothing, and she would practically\nhave got off scot-free, had not the _Times_ intervened to inflict\non her a proper correction, such as she would really feel. It twice\nmentions the young lady's name in full, printing it in large type,\nand concludes as follows: \"We cannot help saying that a few months'\nimprisonment with the addition of an occasional whipping administered\nin private, but by the most muscular woman in Hampshire, would have\nbeen a much more suitable penalty for Miss M. N. A wretched being of\nthis sort has forfeited all the consideration and the privileges that\nattach to her sex; we cannot regard her any longer as a woman.\" These\nnewspaper paragraphs I would especially recommend to the notice of the\nassociations now formed in Germany against cruelty to animals; for they\nshow what lines should be adopted, in order to reach some solid result.\nAt the same time I desire to express my cordial appreciation of the\npraiseworthy zeal shown by Herrn Hofrath Perner, of Munich, who has\nentirely devoted himself to this branch of well-doing, and succeeded in\narousing interest in it all over the country. [It should be observed\nthat the first portion of this note belongs to the earliest edition\nof the work, published September, 1840; the latter part was written\nfor the second edition, which appeared in August, 1860. This explains\nwhy Schopenhauer says that the first instance, dated 1839, is \"quite\nrecent,\" and that the second, dated 1855, is taken \"from the present\nday.\"--(_Translator_.)\n\n[13] There is another principle which Hobbes did not perceive\nat all. It was implanted in man in order to soften, in certain\ncircumstances, the fierceness of his self-love, and it moderates the\nardour, which he feels for his own well-being, by producing a certain\n_innate aversion to the sight of a fellow-creature's suffering_. In\nattributing to man _the only natural virtue,_ which even the most\nadvanced scepticism has been forced to recognise, I stand, assuredly,\nin no fear of any contradiction. I allude to _compassion_, etc.\n\n[14] Mandeville was right in thinking that with all their\nsystems of morality, men would never have been anything but monsters,\nif nature had not given them _compassion_ to support their reason; but\nhe failed to see that _from this one quality spring all the social\nvirtues_, which he was unwilling to credit mankind with. In reality,\nwhat is generosity, clemency, humanity, if not _compassion_, applied\nto the weak, to the guilty, or to the human race, as a whole? Even\nbenevolence and friendship, if we look at the matter rightly, are\nseen to result from a constant compassion, directed upon a particular\nobject; for to desire that some one should not suffer is nothing else\nthan to desire that he should be happy.... The more closely _the living\nspectator identifies himself with the living sufferer,_ the more active\ndoes pity become.\n\n[15] It is, then, quite certain that compassion is a natural\nfeeling, which checking, as it does, the love of self in each\nindividual, helps by a reciprocal process to preserve the whole race.\nThis it is, which in the state of nature, takes the place of laws,\ncustoms, and virtues, with the added advantage that no one will be\ntempted to disobey its gentle voice; this it is, which will restrain\nevery able-bodied savage, provided he hope to find his own livelihood\nelsewhere, from robbing a weak child, or depriving an infirm old man of\nthe subsistence won by hard toil; this it is, which inspires all men,\nnot indeed with that sublime maxim of reasoned justice: \"Do to others\nas you would they should do unto you;\" but with another rule of natural\ngoodness, no doubt less perfect, but perhaps more useful, namely: \"Do\nwhat is good for yourself with the least possible harm to others.\" In a\nword, it is _in this natural feeling rather than in subtle arguments_\nthat we must look for the reason of the repugnance with which every\none is accustomed to view bad conduct, quite independently of the\nprinciples laid down by education.\n\n[16] In fact, how is it that we let ourselves be moved to\npity, if not by getting out of our own consciousness, and _becoming\nidentified with the living sufferer; by leaving_, so to say, _our own\nbeing, and entering into his?_ We do not suffer, except as we suppose\nhe suffers; _it is not in us, it is in him_, that we suffer ... offer\na young man objects, on which the expansive force of his heart can\nact; objects such as may enlarge his nature, and incline it to go out\nto _other beings_, in whom he may everywhere _find himself again_.\nKeep carefully away those things which narrow his view, and make\nhim self-centred, and which tighten the strings of the _human ego_.\n(_Tendent le ressort_ (stretch the spring) _du moi humain: i.e._,\nstimulate the _egoistic tendency_.)--(_Translator_.)\n\n[17] _Journal Asiatique_, Vol. ix., p. 62. Cf. Meng-Tseu\n(otherwise called Mencius), edited by Stanislas Julien, 1824, Bk. I, \u00a7\n45; also Meng-Tseu in the _Livres Sacr\u00e9s de l'Orient_, by Panthier p.\n281.\n\n_V. Dictionnaire Fran\u00e7ais--Latin--Chinois_, par Paul Perny (Didot Fr\u00e8res, Paris,\n1869); where the five cardinal virtues (image) are transliterated] ou\nch\u00e2ng. _V_. also: _A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese Language_; by\nS. Wells Williams, LL.B. (Shanghai: 1874); where Sin (Sin), _i.e._,\nhumanity, love of one's neighbour, is written Sin'.--(_Translator._)\n\n[18] The Athenians have an altar in their Agora to Compassion;\nfor this deity, they believe, is of all the gods the most helpful in\nhuman life, and its vicissitudes. They are the only Greeks who have\ninstituted this cultus.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[19] _V_. Lucian, _Timon_, chap. 42 (_Ausgew\u00e4hlte Schriften des\nLucian_, edit. Julius Sommerbrodt; Weidmann, Berlin, 1872, p. 75):\n_\u03d5\u03af\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f23 \u03be\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f23 \u1f11\u03c4\u03b1\u1fd1\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f23 \u0388\u03bb\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd \u03b2\u03c9\u03bc\u03cc\u03c2 \u1f54\u03b8\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03cd\u03c2_. _V_. also\nApollodorus (edit. J. Bekker); 2, 8, 1. 3, 7, 1. Dem. (edit. Reisk.),\n57. Scholiast on Soph. _\u0152d. Col._,258.--(_Translator_.)\n\n\n[20] A temple must not be despoiled of its altar, nor human\nnature of compassion. _V_. Joannis Stobaei _Anthologium,_ edit. Curtius\nWachsmuth et Otto Hense; Weidmann, Berlin, 1894; Vol. III., p. 20, Nr.\n52.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[21] The chief of virtues is said to be Compassion. The\n_Pa\u1e45\u0107a-tantra_ is a well-known collection of moral stories and fables\nin five (_pa\u1e45\u0107an_) books or chapters (_tantra_), from which the author\nof the _Hitopade\u015ba_ drew a large portion of his materials. _V_. Monier\nWilliams' _Sanskrit Dictionary_.--(_Translator_.)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER.\n\n\nThere still remains a question to be resolved, before the basis which\nI have given to Ethics can be presented in all its completeness. It\nis this. On what does the great difference in the moral behaviour of\nmen rest? If Compassion be the original incentive of all true, that\nis, disinterested justice and loving-kindness; how comes it that some\nare, while others are not, influenced thereby? Are we to suppose that\nEthics, which discloses the moral stimulus, is also capable of setting\nit in motion? Can Ethics fashion the hard-hearted man anew, so that\nhe becomes compassionate, and, as a consequence, just and humane?\nCertainly not. The difference of character is innate, and ineradicable.\nThe wicked man is born with his wickedness as much as the serpent is\nwith its poison-fangs and glands, nor can the former change his nature\na whit more than the latter.[1] _Velle non discitur_ (to use one's will\nis not a thing that can be taught) is a saying of Nero's tutor. In the\n_Meno_, Plato minutely investigates the nature of virtue, and inquires\nwhether it can, or cannot, be taught. He quotes a passage from Theognis:\n\n                                   _\u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03ac\u03c3\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd_\n   _\u039f\u1f54\u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03ae\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u1f04\u03bd\u03b4\u03c1' \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd._\n\n                            (But thou wilt ne'er,\n   By teaching make the bad man virtuous.)\n\nand finally reaches this conclusion: _\u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74 \u1f03\u03bd \u03b5\u1f34\u03b7 o\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03d5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9,\no\u1f54\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c1\u1fb3 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03c5\u03b3\u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7, \u1f04\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5 \u03bd\u03bf\u1fe1, \u03bf\u1f37\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\n\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9_.[2] Here the terms _\u03d5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9_ and _\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c1\u1fb3_, form a\ndistinction, in my opinion, much the same as that between \"physical\"\nand \"metaphysical.\" Socrates, the father of Ethics, if we may trust\nAristotle, declared that _o\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03d5' \u1f21 \u03bc\u1fd1\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c3\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9,\n\u1f22 \u03d5\u03b1\u03cd\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2._[3] (_Moralia Magna_, i. 9.) Moreover, Aristotle himself\nexpresses the same view; _\u03c0\u03b1\u03c2\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd1 \u1f15\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f20\u03b8\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03ac\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd\n\u03d5\u03cd\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u03c9\u03c2' \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c9\u03d5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f76, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f04\u03bb\u03bba \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8y\u03c2\n\u1f10\u03ba \u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2._[4] (_Eth. Nicom._ vi. 13.) We find also a similar\nconviction very decidedly expressed in the fragments attributed\nto the Pythagorean Archytas, and preserved by Stobaeus in the\n_Florilegium_ (Chap. i. \u00a7 77).[5] If not authentic, they are certainly\nvery old. Orelli gives them in his _Opuscula Graecorum Sententiosa et\nMoralia_. There (Vol. II., p. 240) we read in the Dorian dialect as\nfollows:--_\u03a4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b5\u03af\u03be\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03c7\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd\n\u03ad\u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03bc\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03b5\u03cd\u03b5\u03bd, \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad, \u03c4\u1f70\u03bd \u1f20\u03b8\u03b9\u03ba\u1f70\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b2\u03b5\u03bb\u03c4\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03bd \u1f15\u03be\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\n\u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fb1\u03c2 \u00b7\u03c8\u03c5\u03c7\u1fb1\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8' \u1f03\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u03af \u03c4\u03b9\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f26\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd \u03bb\u03b5\u03b3\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03b8\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70\n\u03c4\u1f78 \u1f26\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03b8\u03ad\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9, \u03b4\u03af\u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03ce\u03d5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2_.[6] On examining the\nvirtues and vices, as summarised by Aristotle in the _De Virtutibus\net Vitiis_, it will be found that all of them, without exception, are\nnot properly thinkable unless assumed to be inborn qualities, and\nthat only as such can they be genuine. If, in consequence of reasoned\nreflection, we take them as voluntary, they are then seen to lose their\nreality, and pass into the region of empty forms; whence it immediately\nfollows that their permanence and resistance under the storm and stress\nof circumstance could not be counted on. And the same is true of the\nvirtue of loving-kindness, of which Aristotle, in common with all the\nancients, knows nothing. Montaigne keeps, of course, his sceptical\ntone, but he practically agrees with the venerable authorities\nabove quoted, when he says: _Serait-il vrai, que pour \u00eatre bon tout\n\u00e0 fait, il nous le faille \u00eatre par occulte, naturelle et universelle\npropri\u00e9t\u00e9, sans lot, sans raison, sans exemple_?[7]--(Liv. II., chap.\n11.) Lichtenberg hits the mark exactly in his _Vermischte Schriften_,\n(_v. Moralische Bemerkungen_). He writes: \"All virtue arising from\npremeditation is not worth much. What is wanted is feeling or habit.\"\nLastly, it should be noted that Christianity itself, in its original\nteaching, recognises, and bears witness to this inherent, immutable\ndifference between character and character. In the Sermon on the Mount\nwe find the allegory of the fruit which is determined by the nature of\nthe tree that bears it (_Luke_ vi. 43, 44; cf. _Matthew_ vii. 16-18);\nand then in the following verse (_Luke_ vi. 45), we read: _\u1f41 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2\n\u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u1fe1 \u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03d5\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u1f00\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03bd\n\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03bc\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1 \u03c0o\u03bd\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe1 \u03b8\u03b7\u03c3\u03b1\u03c5\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c1\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1\n\u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03d5\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03b7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd._[8] (Cf. _Matthew_ xii. 35.)\n\nBut it was Kant who first completely cleared up this important\npoint through his profound doctrine of the =empirical= and\n=intelligible=[9] character. He showed that the empirical\ncharacter, which manifests itself in time and in multiplicity\nof action, is a phaenomenon; while the reality behind it is the\nintelligible character, which, being the essential constitution of the\nThing in itself underlying the phaenomenon, is independent of time,\nspace, plurality, and change. In this way alone can be explained what\nis so astonishing, and yet so well known to all who have learnt life's\nlessons,--the fixed unchangeableness of human character. There are\ncertain ethical writers, whose aim is the moral improvement of men, and\nwho talk of progress made in the path of virtue; but their assurances\nare always met and victoriously confuted by the irrefragable facts\nof experience, which prove that virtue is nature's work and cannot\nbe inculcated. The character is an original datum, immutable, and\nincapable of any amelioration through correction by the intellect. Now,\nwere this not so; and further: if (as the above-mentioned dull-headed\npreachers maintain) an improvement of the character, and hence \"a\nconstant advance towards the good\" were possible by means of moral\ninstruction; then, unless we are prepared to suppose that all the\nvarious religious institutions, and all the efforts of the moralists\nfail in their purpose, we should certainly expect to find that the\nolder half of mankind, at least on an average, is distinctly better\nthan the younger. This, however, is so far from being the case, that it\nis not to the old, who have, as we see, grown worse by experience, but\nto the young that we look for something good. It may happen that in his\nold age one man appears somewhat better, another worse, than he was in\nhis youth. But the reason is not far to seek. It is simply because with\nlength of days the intelligence by constant correction becomes riper,\nand hence the character stands out in purer and clearer shape; while\nearly life is a prey to ignorance, mistakes, and chimeras, which now\npresent false motives, and now veil the real. For a fuller explanation\nI would refer the reader to the principles laid down in Chapter III. of\nthe preceding Essay, on \"The Freedom of the Will.\"[10] It is true that\namong convicts the young have a large majority; but this is because,\nwhen a tendency to crime exists in the character, it soon finds a way\nof expressing itself in acts, and of reaching its goal--the galleys, or\nthe gibbet; while he, whom all the inducements to wrong doing, which\na long life offers, have failed to lead astray, is not likely to fall\nat the eleventh hour. Hence the respect paid to age is, in my opinion,\ndue to the fact that the old are considered to have passed through a\ntest of sixty or seventy years, and kept their integrity unsullied; for\nthis of course is the _sine qua non_ of the honour accorded them. These\nthings are too well known for any one, in real life, to be misled by\nthe promises of the moralists we have spoken of. He who has once been\nproved guilty of evil-doing, is never again trusted, just as the noble\nnature, of which a man has once given evidence, is always confidently\nbelieved in, whatever else may have changed. _Operari sequitur esse_\n(what one does follows from what one is) forms, as we have seen in Part\nII., Chapter VIII., a pregnant tenet of the Schoolmen. Everything in\nthe world works according to the unchangeable constitution of which\nits being, its =essentia= is composed. And man is no exception.\nAs the individual is, so will he, so must he, act: and the _liberum\narbitrium indifferentiae_ (free and indifferent choice) is an invention\nof philosophy in her childhood, long since exploded; although there\nare some old women, in doctor's academicals, who still like to drag it\nabout with them.\n\nThe three fundamental springs of human action--Egoism, Malice,\nCompassion--are inherent in every one in different and strangely\nunequal proportions. Their combination in any given case determines\nthe weight of the motives that present themselves, and shapes the\nresulting line of conduct. To an egoistic character egoistic motives\nalone appeal, and those, which suggest either compassion or malice,\nhave no appreciable effect. Thus, a man of this type will sacrifice\nhis interests as little to take vengeance on his foes, as to help his\nfriends. Another, whose nature is highly susceptible to malicious\nmotives, will not shrink from doing great harm to himself, so only he\nmay injure his neighbour. For there are characters which take such\ndelight in working mischief on others, that they forget their own\nloss, which is perhaps, equal to what they inflict. One may say of\nsuch: _Dum alteri noceat sui negligens_[11] (disregarding himself so\nlong as he injures the other). These are the people that plunge with\npassionate joy into the battle in which they expect to receive quite\nas many wounds as they deal; indeed, experience not seldom testifies\nthat they are ready deliberately, first to kill the man who thwarts\ntheir purposes, and then themselves, in order to escape the penalty\nof the law. On the other hand, =goodness of heart= consists of a\ndeeply felt, all-embracing Compassion for everything that has breath,\nand especially for man; because, in proportion as the intelligence\ndevelops, capacity for pain increases; and hence, the countless\nsufferings of human beings, in mind and body, have a much stronger\nclaim to Compassion than those of animals, which are only physical,\nand in any case less acute. This goodness of heart, therefore, in the\nfirst place restrains a man from doing any sort of harm to others, and,\nnext, it bids him give succour whenever and wherever he sees distress.\nAnd the path of Compassion may lead as far in one direction as Malice\ndoes in the other. Certain rare characters of fine sensibility take to\nheart the calamities of others more than their own, so that they make\nsacrifices, which, it may be, entail on themselves a greater amount\nof suffering than that removed from those they benefit. Nay, in cases\nwhere several, or, perhaps, a large number of persons, at one time,\ncan be helped in this way, such men do not, if need be, flinch from\nabsolute self-effacement. Arnold von Winkelried was one of these. So\nwas Paulinus, Bishop of Nola, in the fifth century, when the Vandals\ncrossed over from Africa and invaded Italy. Of him we read in Johann\nvon M\u00fcller's _Weltgeschichte_ (Bk. X., chap. 10) that \"in order to\nransom some of the prisoners, he had already disposed of all the church\nplate, his own and his friends' private property. Then, on seeing the\nanguish of a widow, whose only son was being carried off, he offered\nhimself for servitude in the other's stead. For whoever was of suitable\nage, and had not fallen by the sword, was taken captive to Carthage.\"\n\nThere is, then, an enormous difference between character and character.\nBeing original and innate, it measures the responsiveness of the\nindividual to this or that motive, and those alone, to which he is\nspecially sensitive, will appeal to him with anything like compelling\nforce. As in chemistry, with unchangeable certainty, one substance\nreacts only upon acids, another only upon alkalies, so, with equal\ninvariableness, different natures respond to different stimuli. The\nmotives suggesting loving-kindness, which stir so deeply a good\ndisposition, can, of themselves, effect nothing in a heart that listens\nonly to the promptings of Egoism. If it be wished to induce the egoist\nto act with beneficence and humanity, this can be done but in one way:\nhe must be made to believe that the assuaging of others' suffering\nwill, somehow or other, surely turn out to his =own advantage=.\nWhat, indeed, are most moral systems but attempts of different kinds in\nthis direction? But such procedure only misleads, does not better, the\nwill. To make a real improvement, it would be necessary to transform\nthe entire nature of the individual's susceptibility for motives. Thus,\nfrom one we should have to remove his indifference to the suffering\nof others as such; from another, the delight which he feels in causing\npain; from a third, the natural tendency which makes him regard the\nsmallest increase of his own well-being as so far outweighing all other\nmotives, that the latter become as dust in the balance. Only it is far\neasier to change lead into gold than to accomplish such a task. For\nit means the turning round, so to say, of a man's heart in his body,\nthe remoulding of his very being. In point of fact, all that can be\ndone is to clear the =intellect=, correct the =judgment=,\nand so bring him to a better comprehension of the objective realities\nand actual relations of life. This effected, the only result gained is\nthat his will reveals itself more logically, distinctly, and decidedly,\nwith no false ring in its utterance. It should be noted that just as\nmany a good act rests at bottom on false motives, on well-meant, yet\nillusory representations of an advantage to be obtained thereby in\nthis, or another, world; so not a few misdeeds are due solely to an\nimperfect understanding of the conditions of human life. It is on this\nlatter truth that the American penitentiary system is based. Here the\naim is not, to improve the =heart=, but simply, to educate the\n=head= of the criminal, so that he may intellectually come to\nperceive that prosperity is more surely, indeed more easily, reached by\nwork and honesty than by idleness and knavery.\n\nBy the proper presentment of motives =legality= may be secured,\nbut not =morality=. It is possible to remodel what one does, but\nnot what one =wills to do=; and it is to the will alone that\nreal moral worth belongs. It is not possible to change the goal which\nthe will strives after, but only the path expected to lead thither.\nInstruction may alter the selection of means, but not the choice of\nthe ultimate object which the individual keeps before him in all he\ndoes; this is determined by his will in accordance with its original\nnature. It is true that the egoist may be brought to understand that,\nif he gives up certain small advantages, he will gain greater; and the\nmalicious man may be taught that by injuring others he will injure\nhimself still more. But Egoism itself, and Malice itself, will never\nbe argued out of a person; as little as a cat can be talked out of her\ninclination for mice. Similarly with goodness of heart. If the judgment\nbe trained, if the relations and conditions of life become understood,\nin a word, if the intellect be enlightened; the character dominated by\nloving-kindness will be led to express itself more consistently and\ncompletely than it otherwise could. This happens when we perceive the\nremoter consequences which our conduct has for others: the sufferings,\nperhaps, that overtake them indirectly, and only after lapse of\ntime, through one act or another of ours, which we had no idea was\nso harmful. It occurs, too, when we come to discern the evil results\nof many a well-meant action, as, for instance, the screening of a\ncriminal; and it is especially true when we realise that the _Neminem\nlaede_ (injure no one) has in all cases precedence over the _Omnes\njuva_ (help all men). In this sense there is undoubtedly such a thing\nas a moral education, an ethical training capable of making men better.\nBut it goes only as far as I have indicated, and its limits are quickly\ndiscovered. The head is filled with the light of knowledge; the heart\nremains unimproved. The fundamental and determining element, in things\nmoral, no less than in things intellectual, and things physical, is\nthat which is inborn. Art is always subordinate, and can only lend a\nhelping hand. Each man is, what he is, as it were, \"by the grace of\nGod,\" _jure divino, \u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3, \u03bc\u03bf\u03af\u03c1\u1fb3_, (by divine dispensation).\n\n    _Du bist am Ende--WAS DU BIST._\n    _Setz' dir Perr\u00fccken auf von Millionen Locken,_\n    _Setz' deinen Fuss auf ellenhohe Socken:_\n    _DU BLEIBST DOCH IMMER WAS DU BIST._[12]\n\nBut the reader, I am sure, has long been wishing to put the question:\nWhere, then, does blame and merit come in? The answer is fully\ncontained in Part IL, Chapter VIII., to which I therefore beg to call\nparticular attention. It is there that the explanation, which otherwise\nwould now follow, found a natural place; because the matter is closely\nconnected with Kant's doctrine of the co-existence of Freedom and\nNecessity. Our investigation led to the conclusion that, once the\nmotives are brought into play, the _Operari_ (what, is done) is a thing\nof absolute necessity; consequently, Freedom, the existence of which\nis betokened solely by the sense of =responsibility=, cannot\nbut belong to the _Esse_ (what one is). No doubt the reproaches of\nconscience have to do, in the first place, and ostensibly, with our\nacts, but through these they, in reality, reach down to what we are;\nfor what we do is the only indisputable index of what we =are=,\nand reflects our character just as faithfully as symptoms betray the\nmalady. Hence it is to this _Esse_, to what we =are=, that blame\nand merit must ultimately be attributed. Whatever we esteem and love,\nor else despise and hate, in others, is not a changeable, transient\nappearance, but something constant, stable, and persistent; it is that\nwhich they are. If we find reason to alter our first opinion about\nany one, we do not suppose that he is changed, but that we have been\nmistaken in him. In like manner, when we are pleased or displeased\nwith our own conduct, we say that we are satisfied or dissatisfied\nwith ourselves, meaning, in reality, with that which we are, and are\nunalterably, irreversibly; and the same is true with regard to our\nintellectual qualities, nay, it even applies to the physiognomy. How\nis it possible, then, for blame and merit to lie otherwise than in\nwhat we =are=? As we saw in Part II., Chapter VII., Conscience\nis that =register= of our acts, which is always growing longer,\nand therefore that acquaintance with ourselves which every day becomes\nmore complete. Conscience concerns itself directly with all that we\ndo; when, at one time, actuated by Egoism, or perhaps Malice, we\nturn a deaf ear to Compassion, which bids us at least refrain from\nharming others, if we will not afford them help and protection; or\nwhen again, at another time, we overcome the first two incentives,\nand listen to the voice of the third. Both cases measure the\n=distinction= we =draw between ourselves and others=. And on\n=this distinction= depends in the last resort the degree of our\nmorality or immorality, that is, of our justice and loving-kindness,\nor the reverse. Little by little the number of those actions, whose\ntestimony is significant on this point, accumulates in the storehouse\nof our memory; and thus the lineaments of our character are depicted\nwith ever greater clearness, and a true knowledge of ourselves is\nnearer attainment. And out of such knowledge there springs a sense of\nsatisfaction, or dissatisfaction with ourselves, with that which we\nare, according as we have been ruled by Egoism, by Malice, or else by\nCompassion; in other words, according as the difference we have made\nbetween ourselves and others is greater or smaller. And when we look\noutside ourselves, it is by the same standard that we judge those about\nus; and we become acquainted with their character--less perfectly\nindeed--yet by the same empirical method as we employ with reference to\nour own. In this case our feelings take the form of praise, approval,\nrespect, or, on the other hand, of reproach, displeasure, contempt,\nand they are the objective translation, so to say, of the subjective\nsatisfaction or dissatisfaction (the latter deepening perhaps into\nremorse), which arises in us when we sit in judgment on ourselves.\nLastly, there is the evidence of language. We find certain constantly\noccurring forms of speech which bear eloquent testimony to the fact\nthat the blame we cast upon others is in reality directed against their\nunchangeable character, touching but superficially what they do; that\nvirtue and vice are practically, if tacitly, regarded as inherent\nunalterable qualities. The following are some of these expressions:\n_Jetzt sehe ich, wie du bist_! (Now I know your nature!) _In dir habe\nich mich geirrt_. (I was mistaken in you.) \"Now I see what you are!\"\n_Voil\u00e0 donc, comme tu es!_ (This, then, is what you are!) _So bin ich\nnicht!_ (I am not a person of that sort!) _Ich bin nicht der Mann, der\nf\u00e4hig w\u00e4re, Sie zu hintergehen_. (I am not the man to impose upon you.)\nAlso: _les \u00e2mes bien n\u00e9es_ (persons well-born, _i.e._, noble-minded),\nthe Spanish _bien nacido; \u03b5\u1f50\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u03ae\u03c2_ (properly \"well-born\"), _\u03b5\u1f50\u03b3\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1_\n(properly \"nobility of birth\") used for \"virtuous\" and \"virtue\";\n_generosioris animi amicus_ (a friend of lofty mind. _Generosus_: lit.\n\"of noble birth\"), etc.\n\nReason is a necessary condition for conscience, but only because\nwithout the former a clear and connected recollection is impossible.\nFrom its very nature conscience does not speak till =after=\nthe act; hence we talk of being arraigned before its =bar=.\nStrictly speaking, it is improper to say that conscience speaks\n=beforehand=; for it can only do so indirectly; that is, when\nthe remembrance of particular cases in the past leads us, through\nreflection, to disapprove of some analogous course of action, while yet\nin embryo.\n\nSuch is the ethical fact as delivered by consciousness. It forms of\nitself a metaphysical problem, which does not directly belong to the\npresent question, but which will be touched on in the last part.\n\nConscience, then, is nothing else than the acquaintance we make\nwith our own changeless character through the instrumentality of\nour acts. A little consideration will show that this definition\nharmonises perfectly with, and hence receives additional confirmation\nfrom, what I have here specially emphasised: namely, the fact that\n=susceptibility= for the motives of Egoism, of Malice, and of\nCompassion, which is so widely dissimilar in different individuals, and\non which the whole moral value of a man depends, cannot be interpreted\nby anything else, nor be gained, or removed, by instruction, as if it\nwere something born in time, and therefore variable, and subject to\nchance. On the contrary, we have seen that it is innate and fixed, an\nultimate datum, admitting of no further explanation. Thus an entire\nlife, with the whole of its manifold activity, may be likened to a\nclock-dial, that marks every movement of the internal works, as they\nwere made once for all; or it resembles a mirror, wherein alone, with\nthe eye of his intellect, each person sees reflected the essential\nnature of his own Will, that is, the core of his being.\n\nWhoever takes the trouble to thoroughly think out what has been put\nforward here, and in Part. II., Chapter VIII., will discover in the\nfoundation given by me to Ethics a logical consecution, a rounded\ncompleteness, wanting to all other theories; to say nothing of the\nconsonance of my view with the facts of experience,--a consonance which\nhe will look for in vain elsewhere. For only the truth can uniformly\nand consistently agree with itself and with nature; while all false\nprinciples are internally at variance with themselves, and externally\ncontradict the testimony of experience, which at every step records its\nsilent protest.\n\nI am perfectly aware that the truths advanced in this Essay, and\nparticularly here at the close, strike directly at many deeply rooted\nprejudices and mistakes, and especially at those attaching to a\ncertain rudimentary system of morals, now much in vogue, and suitable\nfor elementary schools. But I cannot own to feeling any penitence or\nregret. For, in the first place, I am addressing neither children, nor\nthe _profanum vulgus_, but an Academy of light and learning. Their\ninquiry is a purely theoretical one, concerned with the ultimate\nfundamental verities of Ethics; and to a most serious question a\nserious answer is undoubtedly expected. And secondly, in my opinion,\nthere can be no such thing as harmless mistakes, still less privileged\nor useful ones. On the contrary, every error works infinitely more evil\nthan good. If, however, it is wished to make existing prepossessions\nthe standard of truth, or the boundary beyond which its investigation\nis not to go, then it would be more honest to abolish philosophical\nFaculties and Academies altogether. For where no reality exists, there\nalso no semblance of it should be. <hr class=\"r5\" />\n\n[1] Cf. _Jeremiah_ xiii. 23.--(_Translator._)\n\n[2] Virtue would appear not to come naturally (_i.e_., through\nthe physical order of things), nor can it be taught; but in whomsoever\nit dwells, there it is present, _apart from the intellect, under divine\nordinance. [V_. Platonis _Opera_, edit. Didot, Paris, 1856; Vol. I.\n_Meno_, 96 and 99, _ad fin_.-- (_Translator_.)\n\n[3] _It is not in our power_ to be either good or bad.\n\n[4] For it appears that the different characters of all men\nare in some way implanted in them _by nature_; if we are just, and\ntemperate, and otherwise virtuous, we are so _straightway from our\nbirth._\n\n[5] _V_. Joannis Stobaei _Florilegium_, edit. Meineke, publ.\nLipsiae, Teubner, 1855; Vol. I., p. 33,1. 14, sqq.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[6] For the so-called virtues, that require reasoning and\ndemonstration, ought to be called sciences. By the term \"virtue\" we\nmean rather a certain moral and excellent disposition of _the soul's\nunreasoning part_. This disposition determines the character which we\nshow, and in accordance with which we are called generous, just, or\ntemperate.\n\n[7] Are we to believe it true that we can only be thoroughly\ngood by virtue of a certain occult, natural, and universal faculty,\nwithout law, without reason, without precedent?\n\n[8] The good man out of the good treasure of his heart\nbringeth forth that which is good; and the evil man out of the evil\ntreasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil.\n\n[9] _V_. Note on \"intelligible,\" Part. II., Chapter\nI.--(_translator_.)\n\n[10] _Die Freiheit des Willens_ and the present treatise\nwere published by Schopenhauer together, under the title of\n_Die Beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik. V_. Introduction, p. xv.,\nnote.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[11] Seneca, _De Ira_, I. 1.\n\n[12]\n\nIn spite of all, thou art still--_what thou art._\nThough wigs with countless curls thy head-gear be,\nThough shoes an ell in height adorn thy feet:\n_Unchang'd thou e'er remainest what thou art._\n\n_V_. Goethe's _Faust_, Part I., Studirzimmer.--(_Translator_.)]\n\n\n\n\nPART IV.\n\nON THE METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PRIMAL ETHICAL PHAENOMENON.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nHOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD.\n\n\nIn the foregoing pages the moral incentive (Compassion) has been\nestablished as a fact, and I have shown that from it alone can proceed\nunselfish justice and genuine loving-kindness, and that on these two\ncardinal virtues all the rest depend. Now, for the purpose of supplying\nEthics with a foundation, this is sufficient, in a certain sense; that\nis, in so far as Moral Science necessarily requires to be supported by\nsome actual and demonstrable basis, whether existing in the external\nworld, or in the consciousness. The only alternative is to tread in the\nfootsteps that so many of my predecessors have left, in other words, to\nchoose arbitrarily some proposition or other,--some bare and abstract\nformula--and make it the source of all that morality prescribes;\nor, like Kant, to sublimate a mere idea, that of =law=, into\nthe key-stone of the ethical arch. But, dismissing this method for\nthe reasons discussed above, in the Second Part, the investigation\nproposed by the Royal Society appears to me now completed. For their\nquestion, as it stands, deals only with the foundation of Ethics; as\nto a possible metaphysical explanation of this foundation nothing\nwhatever is asked. Nevertheless, at the point we have reached, I am\nvery sensible that the human spirit can find no abiding satisfaction,\nno real repose. As in all branches of practical research, so also\nin Ethical Science, when all is said, man is inevitably confronted\nwith an ultimate phaenomenon, which while it renders an account\nof everything that it includes, and everything deducible from it,\nremains itself an unexplained riddle. So that here, as elsewhere, the\nwant is felt of a final interpretation (which, obviously, cannot but\nbe =metaphysical=) of the ultimate data, as such, and through\nthese,--if they be taken in their entirety--of the world. And here,\ntoo, this want finds utterance in the question: How is it that, what\nis present to our senses, and grasped by our intellect, is as it is,\nand not otherwise? And how does the character of the phaenomenon, as\nmanifest to us, shape itself out of the essential nature of things?\nIndeed, in Moral Science the need of a metaphysical basis is more\nurgent than in any other, because all systems, philosophical no less\nthan religious, are at one in persistently attaching to =conduct=\nnot only an ethical, but also a metaphysical significance, which,\npassing beyond the mere appearance of things, transcends every\npossibility of experience, and therefore stands in the closest\nconnection with human destiny and with the whole cosmic process. For\nif life (it is averred) have a meaning, then the supreme goal to which\nit points is undoubtedly ethical. Nor is this view a bare unsupported\ntheory; it is sufficiently established by the undeniable fact that,\nas death draws nigh, the thoughts of each individual assume a moral\ntrend, equally whether he be credulous of religious dogmas, or not;\nhe is manifestly anxious to wind up the affairs of his life, now\nverging to its end, entirely from the =moral= standpoint. In\nthis particular the testimony of the ancients is of special value,\nstanding, as they do, outside the pale of Christian influence. I shall\ntherefore here quote a remarkable passage preserved by Stobaeus, in his\n_Florilegium_ (chap. 44, \u00a7. 20). It has been attributed to the earliest\nHellenic lawgiver, Zaleucus, though, according to Bentley and Heyne,\nits source is Pythagorean. The language is graphic and unmistakable.\n_\u0394\u03b5\u1fd1 \u03c4\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78 \u1f40\u03bc\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f10\u03bd \u1fa7 \u03b3\u03af\u03b3\u03bd\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u03ad\u03bb\u03bf\u03c2\n\u1f11\u03ba\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1 \u03be\u1fc6\u03bd. \u03a0\u1fb1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bc\u03c0\u03af\u03c0\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd1\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\n\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u1fb1\u03bd, \u03bc\u03b5\u03bc\u03bd\u03b7\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f67\u03bd \u1f20\u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03ae\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f41\u03c1\u03bc\u1f74 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe1 \u03b2\u03bf\u03cd\u03bb\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\n\u03c0\u03b5\u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03c7\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd1\u03c2_.[1]\n\nFurthermore, to come to an historical personage, we find Pericles, on\nhis death-bed, unwilling to hear anything about his great achievements,\nand only anxious to know that he had never brought trouble on a\ncitizen. (Plutarch, _Life of Pericles_.) Turning to modern times, if\na very different case may be placed beside the preceding, I remember\nhaving noticed in a report of depositions made before an English jury\nthe following occurrence. A rough negro lad, fifteen years old, had\nbeen mortally injured in some brawl on board a ship. As he was dying,\nhe eagerly begged that all his companions might be fetched in haste:\nhe wanted to ask if he had ever vexed or insulted any one of them, and\nafter hearing that he had not, his mind appeared greatly relieved. It\nis indeed the uniform teaching of experience that those near death wish\nto be reconciled with every one before they pass away.\n\nBut there is evidence of another kind that Ethics can only be finally\nexplained by Metaphysics. It is well known that, while the author of an\nintellectual performance,--even should it be a supreme masterpiece--is\nquite willing to take whatever remuneration he can get, those, on the\nother hand, who have done something morally excellent, almost without\nexception, refuse compensation for it. The latter fact is specially\nobservable where conduct rises to the heroic. For instance, when a\nman at the risk of his life has saved another, or perhaps many, from\ndestruction, as a rule, he simply declines all reward, poor though he\nmay be; because he instinctively feels that the metaphysical value\nof his act would be thereby impaired. At the end of B\u00fcrger's song,\n\"The Brave Man,\" we find a poetical presentment of this psychological\nprocess. Nor does the reality, for the most part, differ at all from\nthe ideal, as I have frequently noticed in English papers. Conduct\nof this kind occurs in every part of the world, and independently of\nall religious differences. In human beings there is an undeniable\nethical tendency, rooted (however unconsciously) in Metaphysics, and\nwithout an explanation of life on these lines, no religion could gain\nstanding-ground; for it is by virtue of their ethical side that they\nall alike keep their hold on the mind. Every religion makes its body\nof dogmas the basis of the moral incentive which each man feels, but\nwhich he does not, on that account, understand; and it unites the two\nso closely, that they appear to be inseparable. Indeed the priests take\nspecial pains to proclaim unbelief and immorality as one and the same\nthing. The reason is thus apparent, why believers regard unbelievers\nas identical with the vicious, and why expressions such as \"godless,\"\n\"atheistic,\" \"unchristian,\" \"heretic,\" etc., are used as synonymes\nfor moral depravity. The religions have, in fact, a sufficiently easy\ntask. =Faith= is the principle they start from. Hence they are\nin a position to simply insist on its application to their dogmas,\nand this, even to the point of employing threats. But philosophy\nhas no such convenient instrument ready to hand. If the different\nsystems be examined, it will be found that the situation is beset with\ndifficulties, both as regards the foundation to be provided for Ethics,\nand in relation to the point of connection discoverable in any such\nfoundation with the given metaphysical theory. And yet,--as I have\nemphasised in the introduction, with an appeal to the authority of\nWolff and Kant--we are under the stringent necessity of obtaining from\nMetaphysics a support for Moral Science.\n\nNow, of all the problems that the human intellect has to grapple with,\nthat of Metaphysics is by far the hardest; so much so that it is\nregarded by many thinkers as absolutely insoluble. Apart from this,\nin the present case, I labour under the special disadvantage which\nthe form of a detached monograph involves. In other words, I am not\nat liberty to start from some definite metaphysical system, of which\nI may be an adherent; because, if I did, either it would have to be\nexpounded in detail, which would take too much space; or else there\nwould be the necessity of supposing it granted and unquestioned,--an\nexceedingly precarious proceeding. The consequence is that I am as\nlittle able to use the synthetic method here as in the foregoing Part.\nAnalysis alone is possible: that is, I must work backwards from the\neffects to their cause, and not _vice vers\u00e2_. This stern obligation,\nhowever, of having at the outset no previous hypothesis, no standpoint\nother than the commonly accepted one, made the discovery of the ethical\nbasis so laborious that, as I look back upon the task, I seem to have\naccomplished some wondrous feat of dexterity, not unlike that of a man\nwho executes with subtlest skill in mid air what otherwise is only\ndone on a solid support. But now that we have come to the question\nwhether there can be given a metaphysical explanation of the foundation\nobtained, the difficulty of proceeding without any assumption becomes\nso enormous, that but one course appears to me open, namely, to attempt\nnothing beyond a general sketch of the subject. I shall, therefore,\nindicate rather than elaborate the line of thought: I shall point out\nthe way leading to the goal, but not follow it thither; in short, I\nshall present but a very small part of what, under other circumstances,\ncould be adduced. In adopting this attitude for the reasons stated, I\nwish, before beginning, to emphatically remark, that in any case the\nactual problem put forward has now been solved; consequently, that what\nI here add is an _opus supererogationis_, an appendix to be given and\ntaken entirely at will.\n\n\n[1] We ought to realise as if before our eyes that moment\nof time when the end comes to each one for deliverance from living.\nBecause all who are about to die are seized with repentance,\nremembering, as they do, their unjust deeds, and being filled with the\nwish that they had always acted justly.-- _\u1f08\u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03b1\u03b3\u03ae = Erl\u00f6sung. V_.\nJoannes Stobeaus, _Florilegium,_ edit. Meineke; publ. Lipsiae: Teubner,\n1855. Vol. ii., p. 164, l. 7 sqq.--(_Translator_.)\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTHE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK.\n\n\nSo far all our steps have been supported by the firm rock of\nexperience. But at this point it fails us, and the solid earth sinks\nfrom under our feet, as we press forward in our search after a final\ntheoretical satisfaction, there, where no experience can ever by any\npossibility penetrate; and happy shall we be, if perchance we gain\none hint, one transient gleam, that may bring us a certain measure\nof content. What, however, shall not desert us is the honesty that\nhas hitherto attended our procedure. We shall not make shift with\ndreams, and serve up fairy tales, after the fashion of the so-called\npost-Kantian philosophers; nor shall we, like them, seek, by a wordy\nexuberance, to impose upon the reader, and cast dust in his eyes. A\nlittle is all we promise; but that little will be presented in perfect\nsincerity.\n\nThe principle, which we discovered to be the final explanation of\nEthics, now in turn itself requires explaining; so that our present\nproblem has to deal with that natural Compassion, which in every man\nis innate and indestructible, and which has been shown to be the sole\nsource of =non-egoistic= conduct, this kind alone being of real\nmoral worth. Now many modern thinkers treat the conceptions of Good\nand Bad as =simple=, that is, as neither needing, nor admitting\nany elucidation, and then they go on, for the most part, to talk very\nmysteriously and devoutly of an \"Idea of the Good,\" out of which\nthey make a pedestal for their moral system, or at least a cloak for\ntheir poverty.[1] Hence I am obliged in this connection to point out\nparenthetically, that these conceptions are anything but =simple=,\nmuch less _a priori_; that they in fact express a relation, and are\nderived from the commonest daily experience. Whatever is in conformity\nwith the desires of any individual will, is, relatively to it, termed\n=good=; for instance, good food, good roads, a good omen; the\ncontrary is called =bad=, and, in the case of living beings,\n=malicious=. And so one, who by virtue of his character, has\nno wish to oppose what others strive after, but rather, as far as\nhe reasonably may, shows himself favourable and helpful to them;\none, who, instead of injuring, assists his neighbours, and promotes\ntheir interests, when he can; is named by the latter, in respect to\nthemselves, a =good man=; the term =good= being applied to\nhim in the sense of the above definition, and from their own point of\nview, which is thus relative, empirical, and centred in the passive\nsubject. Now, if we examine the nature of such a man, not only as it\naffects others, but as it is in itself, we are enabled by the foregoing\nexposition to perceive that the virtues of justice and loving-kindness,\nwhich he practises, are due to a direct participation in weal and\nwoe external to himself; and we have learnt that the source of such\nparticipation is Compassion. If, further, we pause to consider what is\nthe essential part in this type of character, we shall certainly find\nit to lie in the fact that such a person =draws less distinction\nbetween himself and others than is usually done=.\n\nIn the eyes of the malicious individual this difference is so great\nthat he takes direct delight in the spectacle of suffering,--a delight,\nwhich he accordingly seeks without thought of any other benefit to\nhimself, nay, sometimes, even to his own hurt. From the egoist's point\nof view the same difference is still large enough to make him bring\nmuch trouble on his neighbours, in order to obtain a small personal\nadvantage. Hence for both of these, between the =ego=, which is\nlimited to their own persons, and the =non-ego=, which includes\nall the rest of the world, there is fixed a great gulf, a mighty abyss:\n_Pereat mundus, dum ego salvus sim_ (the world may perish, provided\nI be safe), is their maxim. For the good man, on the contrary, this\ndistinction is by no means so pronounced; indeed, in the case of\nmagnanimous deeds, it appears to become a vanishing quantity, because\nthen the weal of another is advanced at the cost of the benefactor, the\nself of another placed on an equality with his own. And when it is a\nquestion of saving a number of fellow-beings, total self-obliteration\nmay be developed, the one giving his life for many.\n\nThe inquiry now presents itself, whether the latter way of looking at\nthe relation subsisting between the ego and the non-ego, which forms\nthe mainspring of a good man's conduct, is mistaken and due to an\nillusion; or whether the error does not rather attach to the opposite\nview, on which Egoism and Malice are based.\n\nNo doubt the theory lying at the root of Egoism is, from the\n=empirical standpoint=, perfectly justified. From the testimony of\nexperience, the =distinction= between one's own person and that of\nanother appears to be absolute. I do not occupy the same space as my\nneighbour, and this difference, which separates me from him physically,\nseparates me also from his weal and woe. But in the first place, it\nshould be observed that the knowledge we have Of our own selves is by\nno means exhaustive and transparent to its depths. By means of the\nintuition, which the brain constructs out of the data supplied by the\nsenses, that is to say, in an indirect manner, we recognise our body as\nan object in space; through an inward perception, we are aware of the\ncontinuous series of our desires, of our volitions, which arise through\nthe agency of external motives; and finally, we come to discern the\nmanifold movements, now stronger, now weaker, of our will itself, to\nwhich all feelings from within are ultimately traceable. And that is\nall: =for the perceiving faculty is not in its turn perceived=.\nOn the contrary, the real substratum of our whole phaenomenal nature,\nour inmost essence in itself, that which wills and perceives, is not\naccessible to us. We see only the outward side of the ego; its inward\npart is veiled in darkness. Consequently, the knowledge we possess\nof ourselves is in no sort radical and complete, but rather very\nsuperficial. The larger and more important part of our being remains\nunknown, and forms a riddle to speculate about; or, as Kant puts it:\n\"The ego knows itself only as a phaenomenon; of its real essence,\nwhatever that may be, it has no knowledge.\" Now, as regards that side\nof the self which falls within our ken, we are, undoubtedly, sharply\ndistinguished, each from the other; but it does not follow therefrom\nthat the same is true of the remainder, which, shrouded in impenetrable\nobscurity, is yet, in fact, the very substance of which we consist.\nThere remains at least the possibility that the latter is in all men\nuniform and identical.\n\nWhat is the explanation of all plurality, of all numerical diversity of\nexistence? Time and Space. Indeed it is only through the latter that\nthe former is possible: because the concept \"many\" inevitably connotes\nthe idea either of succession (time), or of relative position (space).\nNow, since a homogeneous plurality is composed of =Individuals=,\nI call Space and Time, as being the conditions of multiplicity, the\n_principium individuationis_ (the principle of individuation); and I\ndo not here pause to consider whether this expression was exactly so\nemployed by the Schoolmen.\n\nIf in the disclosures which Kant's wonderful acumen gave to the world\nthere is anything true beyond the shadow of a doubt, this is to be\nfound in the Transcendental Aesthetics, that is to say, in his\ndoctrine of the ideality of Space and Time. On such solid foundations\nis the structure built that no one has been able to raise even an\napparent objection. It is Kant's triumph, and belongs to the very small\nnumber of metaphysical theories which may be regarded as really proved,\nand as actual conquests in that field of research. It teaches us that\nSpace and Time are the forms of our own faculty of intuition, to which\nthey consequently belong, and not to the objects thereby perceived;\nand further, that they can in no way be a condition of things in\nthemselves, but rather attach only to their mode of =appearing=,\nsuch as is alone possible for us who have a consciousness of the\nexternal world determined by strictly physiological limits. Now, if to\nthe Thing in itself, that is, to the Reality underlying the kosmos, as\nwe perceive it, Time and Space are foreign; so also must multiplicity\nbe. Consequently that which is objectivated in the countless phaenomena\nof this world of the senses cannot but be a unity, a single indivisible\nentity, manifested in each and all of them. And conversely, the web of\nplurality, woven in the loom of Time and Space, is not the Thing in\nitself, but only its =appearance-form=. Externally to the thinking\nsubject, this appearance-form, as such, has no existence; it is merely\nan attribute of our consciousness, bounded, as the latter is, by\nmanifold conditions, indeed, depending on an organic function.\n\nThe view of things as above stated,--that all plurality is only\napparent, that in the endless series of individuals, passing\nsimultaneously and successively into and out of life, generation\nafter generation, age after age, there is but one and the same entity\nreally existing, which is present and identical in all alike;--this\ntheory, I say, was of course known long before Kant; indeed, it may be\ncarried back to the remotest antiquity. It is the alpha and omega of\nthe oldest book in the world, the sacred *Vedas, whose dogmatic part,\nor rather esoteric teaching, is found in the *Upanishads.[2] There, in\nalmost every page this profound doctrine lies enshrined; with tireless\nrepetition, in countless adaptations, by many varied parables and\nsimiles it is expounded and inculcated. That such was, moreover, the\nfount whence Pythagoras drew his wisdom, cannot be doubted, despite\nthe scanty knowledge we possess of what he taught. That it formed\npractically the central point in the whole philosophy of the Eleatic\nSchool, is likewise a familiar fact. Later on, the New Platonists\nwere steeped in the same, one of their chief tenets being: _\u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n\u1f11\u03bd\u03cc\u03c4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1 \u1f00\u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03ac\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c8u\u03c7\u1f70\u03c2 m\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9_. (All souls are one, because\nall things form a unity.) In the ninth century we find it unexpectedly\nappearing in Europe. It kindles the spirit of no less a divine than\nJohannes Scotus Erigena, who endeavours to clothe it with the forms and\nterminology of the Christian religion. Among the Mohammedans we detect\nit again in the rapt mysticism of the *S\u00fbfi.[3] In the West Giordano\nBruno cannot resist the impulse to utter it aloud; but his reward is a\ndeath of shame and torture. And at the same time we find the Christian\nMystics losing themselves in it, against their own will and intention,\nwhenever and wherever we read of them![4] Spinoza's name is identified\nwith it. Lastly, in our own days, after Kant had annihilated the old\ndogmatism, and the world stood aghast at its smoking ruins, the same\nteaching was revived in Schelling's eclectic philosophy. The latter\ntook all the systems of Plotinus, Spinoza, Kant, and Jacob Boehm,\nand mixing them together with the results of modern Natural Science,\nspeedily served up a dish sufficient to satisfy for the moment the\npressing needs of his contemporaries; and then proceeded to perform a\nseries of variations on the original theme. The consequence is that\nin the learned circles of Germany this line of thought has come to be\ngenerally accepted; indeed even among people of ordinary education,\nit is almost universally diffused.[5] A solitary exception is formed\nby the University philosophers of the present day. They have the hard\ntask of fighting what is called =Pantheism=. Being brought\nthrough the stress of battle into great embarrassment and difficulty,\nthey anxiously catch now at the most pitiful sophisms, now at phrases\nof choicest bombast, so only they may patch together some sort of\nrespectable disguise, wherein to dress up the favourite petticoat\nPhilosophy, that has duly received official sanction. In a word, the\n_\u1f1d\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u1fb1\u03bd_[6] has been in all ages the laughing-stock of fools, for\nthe wise a subject of perpetual meditation. Nevertheless, the strict\ndemonstration of this theory is only to be obtained from the Kantian\nteaching, as I have just shown. Kant himself did not carry it out;\nafter the fashion of clever orators, he only gave the premises, leaving\nto his hearers the pleasure of drawing the conclusion.\n\nNow if plurality and difference belong only to the\n=appearance-form=; if there is but one and the same Entity\nmanifested in all living things: it follows that, when we obliterate\nthe distinction between the _ego_ and the _non-ego_, we are not the\nsport of an illusion. Rather are we so, when we maintain the reality of\nindividuation,--a thing the Hindus call *M\u00e2y\u00e2,[7] that is, a deceptive\nvision, a phantasma. The former theory we have found to be the actual\nsource of the phaenomenon of Compassion; indeed Compassion is nothing\nbut its translation into definite expression. This, therefore, is\nwhat I should regard as the metaphysical foundation of Ethics, and\nshould describe it as the sense which identifies the =ego= with\nthe =non-ego=, so that the individual directly recognises in\nanother his own self, his true and very being. From this standpoint\nthe profoundest teaching of theory pushed to its furthest limits may\nbe shown in the end to harmonise perfectly with the rules of justice\nand loving-kindness, as exercised; and conversely, it will be clear\nthat practical philosophers, that is, the upright, the beneficent,\nthe magnanimous, do but declare through their acts the same truth as\nthe man of speculation wins by laborious research, by the loftiest\nflights of intellect. Meanwhile moral excellence stands higher than\nall theoretical sapience. The latter is at best nothing but a very\nunfinished and partial structure, and only by the circuitous path of\nreasoning attains the goal which the former reaches in one step. He\nwho is morally noble, however deficient in mental penetration, reveals\nby his conduct the deepest insight, the truest wisdom; and puts to\nshame the most accomplished and learned genius, if the latter's acts\nbetray that his heart is yet a stranger to this great principle,--the\nmetaphysical unity of life.\n\n\"Individuation is real. The _principium individuationis,_ with the\nconsequent distinction of individuals, is the order of things in\nthemselves. Bach living unit is an entity radically different from all\nothers. In my own self alone I have my true being; everything outside\nit belongs to the =non-ego=, and is foreign to me.\" This is the\ncreed to the truth of which flesh and bone bear witness: which is at\nthe root of all egoism, and which finds its objective expression in\nevery loveless, unjust, or malicious act.\n\n\"Individuation is merely an appearance, born of Space and Time; the\nlatter being nothing else than the forms under which the external\nworld necessarily manifests itself to me, conditioned as they are\nby my brain's faculty of perception. Hence also the plurality and\ndifference of individuals is but a =phaenomenon=, that is, exists\nonly as my mental picture. My true inmost being subsists in every\nliving thing, just as really, as directly as in my own consciousness\nit is evidenced only to myself.\" This is the higher knowledge: for\nwhich there is in Sanskrit the standing formula, =tat tvam asi=,\n\"that art thou.\"[8] Out of the depths of human nature it wells up in\nthe shape of Compassion, and is therefore the source of all genuine,\nthat is, disinterested virtue, being, so to say, incarnate in every\ngood deed. It is this which in the last resort is invoked, whenever we\nappeal to gentleness, to loving-kindness; whenever we pray for mercy\ninstead of justice. For such appeal, such prayer is in reality the\neffort to remind a fellow-being of the ultimate truth that we are all\none and the same entity. On the other hand, Egoism and its derivatives,\nenvy, hatred, the spirit of persecution, hardness of heart, revenge,\npleasure at the sight of suffering, and cruelty, all claim support\nfrom the other view of things, and seek their justification in it. The\nemotion and joy we experience when we hear of, still more, when we see,\nand most of all, when we ourselves do, a noble act, are at bottom\ntraceable to the feeling of certainty such a deed gives, that, beyond\nall plurality and distinction of individuals, which the _principium\nindividuationis_, like a kaleidoscope, shows us in ever-shifting\nevanescent forms, there is an underlying unity, not only truly\nexisting, but actually accessible to us; for lo! in tangible, objective\nform, it stands before our sight.\n\nOf these two mental attitudes, according as the one or the other is\nadopted, so the _\u03d5\u03b9\u03bb\u03af\u03b1_ (Love) or the _\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd1\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2_ (Hatred) of Empedocles\nappears between man and man. If any one, who is animated by _\u03bd\u03b5\u1fd1\u03ba\u03bf\u03c2_,\ncould forcibly break in upon his most detested foe, and compel him to\nlay bare the inmost recesses of his heart; to his surprise, he would\nfind again in the latter his very self. For just as in dreams, all the\npersons that appear to us are but the masked images of ourselves; so\nin the dream of our waking life, it is our own being which looks on\nus from out our neighbours' eyes,--though this is not equally easy to\ndiscern. Nevertheless, =tat tvam asi=.\n\nThe preponderance of either mode of viewing life not only determines\nsingle acts; it shapes a man's whole nature and temperament. Hence the\nradical difference of mental habit between the =good= character\nand the =bad=. The latter feels everywhere that a thick wall\nof partition hedges him off from all others. For him the world is\nan =absolute non-ego=, and his relation to it an essentially\nhostile one; consequently, the key-note of his disposition is hatred,\nsuspicion, envy, and pleasure in seeing distress. The good character,\non the other hand, lives in an external world homogeneous with his\nown being; the rest of mankind is not in his eyes a non-ego; he\nthinks of it rather as \"myself once more.\" He therefore stands on an\nessentially amicable footing with every one: he is conscious of being,\nin his inmost nature, akin to the whole human race,[9] takes direct\ninterest in their weal and woe, and confidently assumes in their\ncase the same interest in him. This is the source of his deep inward\npeace, and of that happy, calm, contented manner, which goes out on\nthose around him, and is as the \"presence of a good diffused.\" Whereas\nthe bad character in time of trouble has no trust in the help of his\nfellow-creatures. If he invokes aid, he does so without confidence:\nobtained, he feels no real gratitude for it; because he can hardly\ndiscern therein anything but the effect of others' folly. For he is\nsimply incapable of recognising his own self in some one else; and\nthis, even after it has furnished the most incontestible signs of\nexistence in that other person: on which fact the repulsive nature of\nall unthankfulness in reality depends. The moral isolation, which thus\nnaturally and inevitably encompasses the bad man, is often the cause\nof his becoming the victim of despair. The good man, on the contrary,\nwill appeal to his neighbours for assistance, with an assurance equal\nto the consciousness he has of being ready himself to help them. As I\nhave said: to the one type, humanity is a =non-ego=; to the other,\n\"myself once more.\" The magnanimous character, who forgives his enemy,\nand returns good for evil, rises to the sublime, and receives the\nhighest meed of praise; because he recognises his real self even there\nwhere it is most conspicuously disowned.\n\nEvery purely beneficent act all help entirely and genuinely unselfish,\nbeing, as such, exclusively inspired by another's distress, is, in\nfact, if we probe the matter to the bottom, a dark enigma, a piece\nof mysticism put into practice; inasmuch as it springs out of, and\nfinds its only true explanation in, the same higher knowledge that\nconstitutes the essence of whatever is mystical.\n\nFor how, otherwise than metaphysically, are we to account for even\nthe smallest offering of alms made with absolutely no other object\nthan that of lessening the want which afflicts a fellow-creature? Such\nan act is only conceivable, only possible, in so far as the giver\n=knows= that it is his very self which stands before him, clad in\nthe garments of suffering; in other words, so far as he recognises the\nessential part of his own being, under a form not his =own=.[10]\nIt now becomes apparent, why in the foregoing part I have called\nCompassion the great mystery of Ethics.\n\nHe, who goes to meet death for his fatherland, has freed himself from\nthe illusion which limits a man's existence to his own person. Such a\none has broken the fetters of the _principium individuationis_. In his\nwidened, enlightened nature he embraces all his countrymen, and in them\nlives on and on. Nay, he reaches forward to, and merges himself in the\ngenerations yet unborn, for whom he works; and he regards death as a\nwink of the eyelids, so momentary that it does not interrupt the sight.\n\nWe may here sum up the characteristics of the two human types\nabove indicated. To the Egoist all other people are uniformly and\nintrinsically strangers. In point of fact, he considers nothing\nto be truly real, except his own person, and regards the rest of\nmankind practically as troops of phantoms, to whom he assigns merely\na relative existence, so far as they may be instruments to serve, or\nbarriers to obstruct, his purposes; the result being an immeasurable\ndifference, a vast gulf between =his ego= on the one side, and the\n=non-ego= on the other. In a word, he lives exclusively centred in\nhis own individuality, and on his death-day he sees all reality, indeed\nthe whole world, coming to an end along with himself.[11] Whereas the\nAltruist discerns in all other persons, nay, in every living thing,\nhis own entity, and feels therefore that his being is commingled, is\nidentical with the being of whatever is alive. By death he loses only\na small part of himself. Patting off the narrow limitations of the\nindividual, he passes into the larger life of all mankind, in whom he\nalways recognised, and, recognising, loved, his very self; and the\nillusion of Time and Space, which separated his consciousness from that\nof others, vanishes. These two opposite modes of viewing the world are\nprobably the chief, though not indeed the sole cause of the difference\nwe find between very good and exceptionally bad men, as to the manner\nin which they meet their last hour.\n\nIn all ages Truth, poor thing, has been put to shame for being\nparadoxical; and yet it is not her fault. She cannot assume the form\nof Error seated on his throne of world-wide sovereignty. So then, with\na sigh, she looks up to her tutelary god, Time, who nods assurance\nto her of future victory and glory, but whose wings beat the air so\nslowly with their mighty strokes, that the individual perishes or ever\nthe day of triumph be come. Hence I, too, am perfectly aware of the\nparadox which this metaphysical explanation of the ultimate ethical\nphaenomenon must present to Western minds, accustomed, as they are, to\nvery different methods of providing Morals with a basis. Nevertheless,\nI cannot offer violence to the truth. All that is possible for me to\ndo, out of consideration for European blindness, is to assert once\nmore, and demonstrate by actual quotation, that the Metaphysics of\nEthics, which I have here suggested, was thousands of years ago the\nfundamental principle of Indian wisdom. And to this wisdom I point\nback, as Copernicus did to the Pythagorean cosmic system, which was\nsuppressed by Aristotle and Ptolemaeus. In the Bhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2 (Lectio\nXIII.; 27, 28), according to A. W. von Schlegel's translation, we find\nthe following passage: _Eundem in omnibus animantibus consistentem\nsummum dominum, istis pereuntibus kaud pereuntem qui cernit, is vere\ncernit. Eundem vero cernens ubique praesentem dominum, non violat\nsemet ipsum sua ipsius culpa: exinde pergit ad summum iter_.[12]\n\nWith these hints towards the elaboration of a metaphysical basis for\nEthics I must close, although an important step still remains to be\ntaken. The latter would presuppose a further advance in Moral Science\nitself; and this can hardly be made, because in the West the highest\naim of Ethics is reached in the theory of justice and virtue. What lies\nbeyond is unknown, or at any rate ignored. The omission, therefore, is\nunavoidable; and the reader need feel no surprise, if the above slight\noutline of the Metaphysics of Ethics does not bring into view--even\nremotely--the corner-stone of the whole metaphysical edifice, nor\nreveal the connection of all the parts composing the _Divina Commedia_.\nSuch a presentment, moreover, is involved neither in the question set,\nnor in my own plan. A man cannot say everything in one day, and should\nnot answer more than he is asked.\n\nHe who tries to promote human knowledge and insight is destined to\nalways encounter the opposition of his age, which is like the dead\nweight of some mass that has to be dragged along: there on the ground\nit lies, a huge inert deformity, defying all efforts to quicken\nits shape with new life. But such a one must take comfort from the\ncertainty that, although prejudices beset his path, yet the truth is\nwith him. And Truth does but wait for her ally, Time, to join her; once\nhe is at her side, she is perfectly sure of victory, which, if to-day\ndelayed, will be won =to-morrow=.\n\n\n[1] The conception of _the Good_, in its purity, is an\n_ultimate_ one, \"an _absolute Idea_, whose substance loses itself in\ninfinity.\"--(Bouterweek: _Praktische Aphorismen_, p. 54.)\n\nIt is obvious that this writer would like to transform the familiar, nay,\ntrivial conception \"_Good_\" into a sort of _\u0394\u03b9\u1f34\u03c0\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae\u03c2,_ to be set up\nas an idol in his temple. _\u0394\u03b9\u1f34\u03c0\u03b5\u03c4\u03ae\u03c2_ lit., \"fallen from Zeus\"; and so\n\"heaven-sent,\" \"a thing of divine origin.\" Cf. Horn., _Il._. XVI, 174;\n_Od._. IV. 477. Eur., _Bacch._, 1268.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[2] The genuineness of the Oupnek'hat has been disputed on\nthe ground of certain marginal glosses which were added by Mohammedan\ncopyists, and then interpolated in the text, it has, however, been\nfully established by the Sanskrit scholar, F. H. H. Windischmann\n(junior) in his _Sancara, sive de Theologumenis Vedanticorum_, 1833,\np. xix; and also by Bochinger in his book _De la Vie Contemplative\nchez les Indous_, 1831, p. 12. The reader though ignorant of Sanskrit,\nmay yet convince himself that Anquetil Duperron's word for word Latin\ntranslation of the Persian version of the Upanishads made by the martyr\nof this creed, the Sultan D\u00e2r\u00e2-Shukoh, is based on a thorough and\nexact knowledge of the language. He has only to compare it with recent\ntranslations of some of the Upanishads by Rammohun Boy, by Poley, and\nespecially with that of Colebrooke, as also with R\u00f6er's, (the latest).\nThese writers are obviously groping in obscurity, and driven to make\nshift with hazy conjectures, so that without doubt their work is much\nless accurate. More will be found on this subject in Vol. II. of the\n_Parerga_, chap. 16, \u00a7 184. [_V. The Upanishads_, translated by Max\nM\u00fcller, in _The Sacred Books of the East_, Vols. I. and XV. Cf. also\nMax M\u00fcller, _The Science of Language_, Vol. I., p. 171. Now that an\nadequate translation of the original exists, the Oupnek'hat has only\nan historical interest. The value which Schopenhauer attached to the\nUpanishads is very clearly expressed also in the _Welt als Wille und\nVorstellung_, Preface to the first Edition; and in the _Parerga,_ II.,\nchap, xvi., \u00a7 184.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[3] For the S\u00fbfi, more correctly *S\u016bf\u012by a sect which appeared already\nin the first century of the Hijrah, the reader is referred to:\nTholuck's _Bl\u00fcthensammlung aus der Morgenl\u00e4ndischen Mystik_ (Berlin,\n1825); Tholuck's _S\u00fbfismus, sive Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica_\n(Berlin, 1821); Kremer's _Geschichte der Herrschenden Ideen des\nIsl\u00e2ms_ (Leipzig, 1868); _Palmer's Oriental Mysticism_ (London, 1867);\nGobineau's _Les Religions et les Philosophies dans l'Asie Centrale_\n(2nd edit. Paris, 1866); _A Dictionary of Isl\u00e2m_, by T. P. Hughes\n(London, 1885), p. 608 sqq.--(_Translator_.)]\n\n[4] This is too well-known to need verification by references.\nThe _Cantico del Sole_ by St. Francis of Assisi sounds almost like a\npassage from the Upanishads or the *Bhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2.--(_Translator_.)]\n\n5:\n    On ne peut assez longtemps, chez notre esp\u00e8ce,_\n    _Fermer la porte \u00e0 la Raison._\n    _Mais, d\u00e8s qu'elle entre avec adresse,_\n    _Elle reste dans la maison,_\n    _Et bient\u00f4t elle en est ma\u00eetresse._\n                                 --(Voltaire.)\n\n    (We men may, doubtless, all our lives\n      To Reason bar the door.\n    But if to enter she contrives,\n      The house she leaves no more,\n    And soon as mistress there presides.)\n\n[6] _\u03a4\u1f78 \u1f14\u03bd_= the eternal Reality outside Time and Space _T\u1f78\n\u03c0\u1fb1\u03bd_ = the phaenomenal universe.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[7] M\u00e2y\u00e2 is \"the delusive reflection of the true eternal\nEntity.\"--(_Translator_.)]\n\n[8] This expression is used in the Brahmanical philosophy\nto denote the relation between the world-fiction as a whole and its\nindividualised parts. _V._ A. E. Gough, _Philosophy of the Upanishads_,\n1882.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[9] _Homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto_. Terence,\n_Heaut_., I. 1, 25.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[10] It is probable that many, perhaps, most cases of truly\ndisinterested Compassion--when they really occur--are due not to any\nconscious _knowledge_ of this sort, but to an unconscious impulse\nspringing from the ultimate unity of all living things, and acting, so\nto say, automatically.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[11] Cf. Richard Wagner: _Jesus von Nazareth_; pp.\n79-90.--(_Translator_.)\n\n[12] That man is endowed with true insight who sees that\nthe same ruling power is inherent in all things, and that when these\nperish, it perishes not. For if he discerns the same ruling power\neverywhere present, he does not degrade himself by his own fault:\nthence he passes to the highest path.--For the _Bhagavadg\u00eet\u00e2_ the\nreader is referred to Vol. VIII. of _The Sacred Books of the East_\n(Oxford: Clarendon Press), where (p. 105) this passage is translated as\nfollows:--\"He sees (truly) who sees the supreme lord abiding alike in\nall entities, and not destroyed though they are destroyed. For he who\nsees the lord abiding everywhere alike, does not destroy himself[*] by\nhimself, and then reaches the highest goal.\"\n\n[*]Not to have true knowledge, is equivalent to self-destruction.\"\n\nCf. Fauche] Le Mah\u0101-bh\u0101rata: Paris, 1867; Vol. VII., p. 128:--\n\n\"Celui-l\u00e0 poss\u00e8de une vue nette des choses, qui voit ce principe\nsouverain en tous les \u00eatres d'une mani\u00e8re \u00e9gale, et leur survivre,\nquand ils p\u00e9rissent. Il ne se fait aucun tort \u00e0 soi-m\u00eame par cette vue\nd'un principe qui subsiste \u00e9galement partout: puis, apr\u00e8s cette vie, il\nentre dans la voie sup\u00e9rieure.\"\n\nThe obscurity of Schlegel's Latin in the second sentence is sufficiently\nremoved by these more recent translations.--(_Translator_.)\n\n\n\nJUDICIUM\n\nREGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS.\n\n\n_Quaestionem anno_ 1837 _propositam, \"utrum philosophiae moralis\nfons et fundamentum in idea moralitatis, quae immediate conscientia\ncontineatur, et ceteris notionibus fundamentalibus, quae ex ilia\nprodeant, explicandis quaerenda sint, an in alio cognoscendi\nprincipio,\" unus tantum scriptor explicare conatus est, cujus\ncommentationem, germanico sermone compositam, et his verbis\nnotatam_: \"MORAL PREDIGEN IST LEICHT, MORAL BEGR\u00dcNDEN IST SCHWER,\"\n_praemio dignam judicare nequivimus. Omisso enim eo, quod potissimum\npostulabatur, hoc expeti putavit, ut principium aliquod ethicae\nconderetur, itaqae eam partem commentationis suae, in qua principii\nethicae a se propositi et metaphysicae suae nexum exponit, appendices\nloco habuit, in qua plus quam postulatum esset praestaret, quum tamen\nipsum thema ejusmodi disputationem flagitaret, in qua vel praecipuo\nloco metaphysicae et ethicae nexus consideraretur. Quod autem scriptor\nin sympathia fundamentum ethicae constituere conatus est, neque ipsa\ndisserendi forma nobis satisfecit, neque reapse, hoc fundamentum\nsufficere, evicit; quin ipse contra esse confiteri coactus est. Neque\nreticendum videtur, plures recentioris aetatis summos philosophos tam\nindecenter commemorari, ut justam et gravem offensionem habeat._\n\nJUDGMENT OF THE DANISH ROYAL SOCIETY OF SCIENCES.\n\nIn 1837 the following question was set as subject for a Prize Essay:\n\"Is the fountain and basis of Morals to be sought for in an idea of\nmorality which lies directly in the consciousness (or conscience), and\nin the analysis of the other leading ethical conceptions which arise\nfrom it? Or is it to be found in some other source of knowledge?\" There\nwas only one competitor; but his dissertation, written in German,\nand bearing the motto: \"_To preach Morality is easy, to found it is\ndifficult_\"[1] we cannot adjudge worthy of the Prize. He has omitted\nto deal with the essential part of the question, apparently thinking\nthat he was asked to establish some fundamental principle of Ethics.\nConsequently, that part of the treatise, which explains how the moral\nbasis he proposes is related to his system of metaphysics, we find\nrelegated to an appendix, as an \"_opus supererogationis_,\" although\nit was precisely the connection between Metaphysics and Ethics that\nour question required to be put in the first and foremost place. The\nwriter attempts to show that compassion is the ultimate source of\nmorality; but neither does his mode of discussion appear satisfactory\nto us, nor has he, in point of fact, succeeded in proving that such a\nfoundation is adequate. Indeed he himself is obliged to admit that it\nis not.[2] Lastly, the Society cannot pass over in silence the fact\nthat he mentions several recent philosophers of the highest standing in\nan unseemly manner, such as to justly occasion serions offence.\n\n\n[1] The Academy has been good enough to insert the second \"is\" on its\nown account, by way of proving the truth of Longinus' theory (_V. De\nSublimitate_: chap. 39, _ad fin._), that the addition or subtraction\nof a single syllable is sufficient to destroy the whole force of a\nsentence. (P. Longinus: _De Sublimitate Libellus_; edit. Joannes\nVablen, Bonnae, 1887.)--(_Translator_)\n\n[2] I suppose this is the meaning of _contra esse\nconfiteri_.--(_Translator_.)","title":"The Basis of Morality","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":75506}