{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_45005/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_45005","id":"gutenberg_45005","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/45005","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Latter Day Saint churches -- Controversial literature","Latter Day Saints","Taylder, T. W. P. Materialism of the Mormons or Latter-day Saints, examined and exposed"],"text":"Absurdities of Immaterialism,\n\nOr,\n\nA Reply to T. W. P. Taylder's Pamphlet,\n\nEntitled,\n\n\"The Materialism of the Mormons or Latter-day Saints, Examined and\nExposed.\"\n\n\n\n\nBy Orson Pratt,\n\nOne of the Twelve Apostles of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day\nSaints.\n\n\n\n\"What is truth?\" This is a question which has been asked by many. It\nis a question supposed to be of difficult solution. Mr. Taylder in\nhis tract against materialism, says, \"It is a question which all the\nphilosophers of the Grecian and Roman schools could not answer.\" He\nseems to think the question was unanswerable until the introduction of\nthe gospel; since which time he considers that the veil is taken away,\nand that \"we now enjoy the full blaze of truth.\" He further confidently\nasserts, that \"with the materials afforded us in that sacred book,\n(meaning the New Testament,) we are enabled satisfactorily to answer\nthe question, What is truth?\"\n\nWhat does this author mean by the foregoing assertions? Does he mean,\nthat no truth was understood by the Grecian and Roman schools? That\nno truth was discerned by the nations, during the first four thousand\nyears after the creation? Or, does he mean, that the gospel truths\nwere not understood until they were revealed? He certainly must mean\nthe latter and not the former. Both the Romans and Grecians could,\nwithout the least difficulty, answer the question. \"What is truth?\"\nNothing is more simple than an answer to this question. It is a truth,\n_that something exists in space,_ and this truth was just as well\nperceived by all nations before the book called the New Testament\nexisted as afterwards. It is a truth that, \"the three angles of a\ntriangle are equal to two right angles.\" This was not learned from that\nsacred book--the Bible. We admit that the question, what is _gospel_\ntruth, could not be answered by any one to whom the gospel had never\nbeen revealed. Dr. Good, in his \"Book of Nature,\" says, \"general\ntruth may be defined, the connexion and agreement, or repugnancy and\ndisagreement, of our ideas.\" This definition we consider erroneous;\nfor it makes general truth depend on the existence of ideas. Now\ntruth is independent of all ideas. It is a necessary truth that,\n_space is boundless,_ and that _duration is endless,_ abstract from\nall connexion and agreement of our ideas, or even of our existence,\nor the existence of any other being. If neither the universe nor its\nCreator existed, these eternal unchangeable, and necessary truths would\nexist, unperceived and unknown. Truth is the relation which things bear\nto each other. Knowledge is the perception of truth. Truth may exist\nwithout knowledge, but knowledge cannot exist without truth.\n\nThe New Testament unfolds, not all the truths which exist, but some\nfew truths of infinite importance. The vast majority of truths of less\nimportance were discovered independently of that book.\n\n\"The followers of Joseph Smith,\" says this author, \"hold the doctrine\nof the materiality of all existence in common with the ancient\nacademics.\" This, sir, we admit. Our belief, however, in this doctrine,\nis founded, not on any modern supernatural revelation, unfolding this\ndoctrine, as this author insinuates, but on reason and common sense.\nThe doctrine of immaterialism, in our estimation, is false, and in the\nhighest degree absurd, and unworthy the belief of any true Christian\nphilosopher.\n\nThe author of the treatise against materialism has stated his first\nproposition as follows:--\n\n\"_The Philosophy of the Mormons is_ IRRATIONAL.\"\n\nWhat the author means by this proposition is, that it is \"irrational\"\nto believe _all substance material._ To substantiate this proposition\nhe sets out in quest of proof. An _immaterial substance_ is the thing\nwanted. No other proof will answer. If he can prove the existence of an\nimmaterial substance his point is gained,--his proposition established,\nand the irrationality of the material theory will be demonstrated.\n\nAs we are about to launch forth into the wide field of existence in\nsearch of an \"immaterial substance,\" it may be well to have the _term_\ncorrectly defined, so as to be able to distinguish such a substance\nfrom _matter. _It is of the utmost importance that every reasoner\nshould clearly define the terms he employs. Two contending parties\nmay use the same word in altogether different meanings; and each draw\ncorrect conclusions from the meaning which he attaches to the same\nword; hence arise endless disputes. As we have no confidence in the\nimmaterial theory, we shall let the immaterialist define his own terms.\nWe shall give,\n\nTaylder's Definition.--\"What is meant by an _immaterial substance_\nis merely this, that something exists which is _not matter_ and is\nevidently _distinct_ from matter, which is _not dependent_ on matter\nfor its existence, and which possesses properties and qualities\n_entirely different_ from those possessed by matter.\" (Taylder's Tract\nagainst Materialism. Page 14.)\n\nThis definition of an \"immaterial substance\" is ambiguous. It needs\nanother definition to inform us what he means. Does he mean that ALL\nof \"the properties and qualities\" of an immaterial substance are\n\"entirely different from those possessed by matter;\" and that it\npossesses NO properties in common with matter? Or does he mean that\nwhile it \"possesses SOME properties and qualities entirely different\"\nfrom matter it inherits OTHERS in common with matter? If the latter be\nhis meaning, we see no reason for calling _any_ substance \"immaterial.\"\nIron possesses SOME properties and qualities \"entirely different\"\nfrom all other kinds of matter, and other properties it inherits in\ncommon with every other kind. Shall we therefore say that iron is not\nmatter? Among the various kind of matter, each has its _distinct_\nproperties, and its _common_ properties; and notwithstanding each\npossesses \"entirely different\" properties and qualities from all other\nkinds, yet each is called matter because it possesses some properties\nin common with all other kinds. Hence the term _matter_ should be\ngiven to all substances which possess _any_ properties in common,\nhowever wide they may differ in other respects. A substance to be\n_immaterial_ must possess NO properties or qualities in common with\nmatter. All its qualities must be entirely _distinct_ and _different_.\nIt is to be regretted that our opponent has not defined an _immaterial\nsubstance_ more clearly. As he is ambiguous in his definition, we shall\npresume that he entertains the same views as the modern advocates of\nimmaterialism generally entertain.\n\nThat celebrated writer, Isaac Taylor, says,--\"a disembodied spirit,\nor we should rather say, an unembodied spirit, or sheer mind, is\nNOWHERE. Place is a relation belonging to extension; and extension is\na property of matter; but that which is wholly abstracted from matter,\nand in speaking of which we deny that it has _any property_ in common\ntherewith, can in itself be subjected to none of its conditions; and\nwe might as well say of a pure spirit that it is hard, heavy, or red,\nor that it is a cubic foot in dimensions, as say that it is _here_\nor _there._ It is only in a popular and improper sense that any such\naffirmation is made concerning the Infinite Spirit, or that we speak of\nGod as _everywhere_ present.\" * * * \"Using the term as we use them of\nourselves, God is not _here_ or _there_.\" * * * \"When we talk of an\nabsolute immateriality,\" continues this author, \"and wish to withdraw\nmind altogether from matter, we must no longer allow ourselves to\nimagine that it is, or can be, in any place, or that it has any kind of\nrelationship to the visible and extended universe.\" (Taylor's \"Physical\nTheory of Another Life.\" Chapter II.) Dr. Good says, \"The metaphysical\nimmaterialists of modern times freely admit that the mind has NO PLACE\nof existence, that it does exist NOWHERE; while at the same time they\nare compelled to allow that the immaterial Creator or universal spirit\nexists EVERYWHERE, substantially as well as virtually.\" (Good's \"Book\nof Nature,\" Series III., Lecture I.)\n\nDr. Abercrombie, in speaking upon _matter_ and _mind,_ says, that \"in\nas far as our utmost conception of them extends, we have no grounds for\nbelieving that they have _anything_ in common.\" (Abercrombie on the\n\"Intellectual Powers.\" Part I. Sec. I.)\n\nWith these definitions, we shall follow our opponent in his researches\nafter an \"immaterial substance.\" After taking a minute survey of man,\nhe believes he has found in his composition, and in connexion with his\nbodily organization, something _immaterial._ He says, \"the spirit is\nthe purely immaterial part, which is capable of separation from the\nbody, and can exist independently of the body.\"\n\n\"The _body_ is that _material_ part, 'formed out of the dust of the\nground,' and is the medium through which the mind is manifested.\"\n(Taylder's Tract against Materialism. Page 8.)\n\nThat the mind or _spirit_, \"is capable of separation from the body,\nand can exist independently of the body,\" we most assuredly believe;\nbut that it is \"immaterial\" we deny; and it remains for Mr. Taylder\nto _prove_ its _immateriality_. His first proof is founded on his\nown assertion, that \"mind is simple, not compounded.\" If this\nassertion be admitted as true, it affords not the least evidence\nfor the _immateriality_ of _mind._ Every material atom is simple,\nnot compounded. Is it, therefore, not matter? Must each simple,\nuncompounded elementary atom be _immaterial?_\n\nMr. Taylder next says, \"Mind is not perceivable to corporeal organs,\nmatter is so perceivable.\" This assertion is altogether unfounded.\n\"Corporeal organs\" can perceive neither _matter_ nor _mind_. The\nmind alone can perceive: corporeal organs are only the instruments\nof perception. Bishop Butler, in his Analogy, expressly says, that\n\"our organs of sense prepare and convey on objects, in order to their\nbeing perceived, in like matter as foreign matter does, without\naffording any shadow of appearance, that they themselves perceive.\"\n(Butler's Analogy. Part I. Chap. I.) The mind clearly perceives its\nown existence as well as the existence of other matter. _Perception_,\nthen, is a quality peculiar to that kind of matter called mind. Mr.\nTaylder further remarks, that \"All the qualities of matter are not\ncomparable with the more excellent qualities of mind, such as power and\nintelligence.\" We willing to admit that _power_ and _intelligence,_\nand some other qualities of mind, are far superior to the qualities of\nother matter; but we do not admit that the superiority of some of the\nqualities of a substance prove its _immateriality_. The superiority\nof some qualities has nothing to do with the _immateriality_ of the\n_substance_. OXYGEN possesses some qualities, not only distinct from,\nbut superior to, those qualities possessed by BARIUM, STRONTIUM,\nSILICIUM, GLUCINIUM, ZIRCONIUM, and many other metals and material\nsubstances; yet no one from this will draw the conclusion, that\n_oxygen_ is _immaterial_. Oxygen is material though it possesses some\ndistinct and superior qualities to other matter; so mind or spirit is\nmaterial, though it differs in the superiority of some of its qualities\nfrom other matter.\n\nIt is strange, indeed, to see the inconsistencies of this learned\nauthor: he remarks, \"Mind thinks, matter cannot think. It is the\nexistence of this thinking principle which clearly proves the\nimmateriality of the mind or spirit.\" This method of reasoning may\nbe termed (_petitio principii_), begging the question. First, he\nassumes that \"matter cannot think;\" and, second, draws the conclusion\nthat a _thinking substance_ is _immaterial._ This conclusion is a\nlegitimate one if the premises are granted; but the premises are\nassumed, therefore the conclusion is false. Prove that _mind_ is _not_\nmatter before you assume that \"matter cannot think.\" It would seem\nfrom the assertions of this author, that the quality of \"thinking\" is\nto be the touchstone--the infallible test--the grand distinguishing\ncharacteristic between _material_ and _immaterial_ substances.\nIt matters not, in his estimation, how many qualities different\nsubstances inherit in common, if one can be found that thinks, it must\nbe immaterial. There is no one substance out of the fifty or more\nsubstances discovered by chemists, but what possesses some qualities\n\"entirely different\" from any of the rest; therefore, each substance,\nwhen compared with others, has equal claims with that of mind to be\nplaced in the _immaterial_ list. In proving that mind is immaterial, it\nis not enough to prove that it has _some_ properties entirely distinct\nfrom other substances; but it must be proved to have no properties in\ncommon with matter. Nothing short of this will agree with the modern\nnotions of _immateriality._ It must be shown that mind or spirit has\nno relation to _duration_ or _space_--no _locality_--that it must\nexist \"NOWHERE\"--that it has no _extension_--that it exists not \"Now\"\nand \"Then,\" neither \"Here\" nor \"There\"--that it cannot be moved from\n_place_ to _place_--that it has no _form_ or _figure_--no _boundaries_\nor _limits_ of extension. These, according to the definitions of modern\nimmaterialists, are the negative conditions or qualities absolutely\nnecessary to the existence of all _immaterial substance_. While\nthe opposite of these, or the positive qualities or conditions are\nabsolutely necessary to the existence of all _material_ substance.\n\n\"How do you distinguish,\" inquires Mr. Taylder, \"between any two given\nsubstances, such as, that a block of stone is not a log of wood?\" He\nanswers, \"Because they possess different qualities.\" And then declares,\n\"So also you distinguish between mind and matter.\" But the \"different\nqualities\" by which \"a block of stone\" is distinguished from \"a log of\nwood,\" do not prove either the stone or the wood to be _immaterial_;\nneither do the different qualities by which the substance called mind\nis distinguished from other substances, prove either the mind or the\nother substances to be _immaterial_. So far as the different qualities\nare evidences, the mind has as good a claim to materiality as the stone\nor wood.\n\n\"The properties of body,\" continues our learned opponent, \"are size,\nweight, solidity, resistance, &c.; those of the mind are joy, hope,\nfear, &c.; but weight is not joy, resistance is not hope, size is not\nfear; therefore, as a block of stone is not a log of wood, so mind\nis not matter.\" That a _stone_ possesses many _different qualities_\nfrom _wood,_ and that mind possesses many different qualities from\nother substances, we by no means deny; but that these _different\nqualities_ prove stone, or wood, or mind, or any other substance to be\n_immaterial,_ we do deny. We care not how many different properties\nmind possesses over and above other substances; that is altogether\nforeign from the question. But is it destitute of any or of all the\nproperties which other substances possess? is the question. Is it\ndestitute of \"size, weight, solidity, resistance, &c?\" If not, then the\nmind possesses all the essential characteristics of matter, though its\npeculiar and distinct properties should be multiplied to infinity.\n\nThis author calls \"weight\" one of the properties of matter. What is\n_weight?_ It is nothing more nor less than force. Matter approaches\nto, or presses on, other matter with _weight,_ or _force,_ or _power_.\nNow matter either exerts this _force_ of itself, or else it is\nimpelled either directly or indirectly by other substances, possessing\nintelligence, power, and other properties of mind. If matter exerts\nthis power of itself, then it exhibits one of the properties of mind;\nbut if the seat of this power is in that substance called mind, then\nit is mind that exhibits the power called weight, and not other\nsubstances. Mr. Taylder informs us that \"it is mind, and _mind alone,_\nwhich is the _seat of power_.\" (Taylder against Materialism. Page 12.)\nIf this be true, (and we feel no disposition to deny it), then _weight_\nis not the property of unintelligent matter, but a property of mind.\nAnd the same reasoning will apply to all other _powers or forces_\nwhich are generally ascribed to unintelligent matter. They are only\nthe powers or forces of mind, or else other substances exhibit powers\nor forces which are common to mind: in the latter case, mind could not\nbe _immaterial_: in the former case, unintelligent matter (if such\nexist) is deprived of every force usually ascribed to it. It can have\nneither gravitation, attraction, repulsion, chemical affinity, nor\nany other conceivable force. Though deprived of all energy or force,\nunintelligent matter would still be possessed of those inert qualities\n(if, indeed, they may be called qualities) essential to its existence.\nThese qualities, or rather conditions necessary to its existence, are\nduration, extension or place, solidity, figure, &c. An _immaterial\nsubstance_ must have none of those conditions or qualities.\n\nIt is amusing to trace this author's process of reasoning. He first\nassumes premises entirely false, argues from the same, shows the\ndeductions to be absurd and triumphantly exclaims, \"Mind then is not\nmatter.\" We will quote the following specimen: \"If the mind,\" says\nthis author, \"be material and the brain nothing but a large gland,\nsecreting the various affections of thought, hope, joy, memory, &c,\nthen all these _affections_ or _qualities_ are _material,_ and must be\nalso little particles of matter, of different forms and dimensions, and\nperhaps of various colours, Then we might, with the utmost propriety,\nwithout the shadow of an absurdity, logically say, 'the twentieth\npart of our belief, the half of a hope, the top of memory, the corner\nof a fear, the north side of a doubt,' &c. Mind then is not matter.\"\n(Taylder against Materialism. Page 15.) It will be perceived that this\nlogical author, in the foregoing quotation, confounds _affections_ or\n_qualities_ with _mind;_ that is, he supposes \"thought, hope, joy,\nmemory,\" &c. all to be material as well as the mind; he then introduces\na material brain that secretes the material affections; but what\nbecomes of the material mind he does not tell us; probably the material\nmind is stowed away in some extremity of the body--in the foot or big\ntoe, so as not to interfere with its material affections, which are\nsecreted in the material brain at the other extremity. After imagining\nup such an unheard of being, no wonder that he should discover some\nabsurdities in its composition. No wonder that in such a creature of\nhis own invention, there should be, not only \"the corner of a fear,\"\nand \"the north side of a doubt,\" but a cubical imagination with horns\nto it. No wonder that such frightful absurdities should cause as great\na man as Taylder to exclaim with the upper part of a five-cornered\nassurance, that \"Mind then is not matter.\" It would be a logical\nconclusion from his logical absurdities, founded on his _material\naffections_ of a material mind.\n\nBut who does not know that \"thought, hope, joy, memory,\" and all\nother _affections_ or _qualities_ are not substances of any kind, but\nmerely different operations or states of the mind? A material mind,\npossessing the power to think, to feel, to reason, to remember, is\nnot the brain, nor secretions of the brain, nor any other part of the\nfleshy tabernacle; but it is the being that inhabits it, that preserves\nits own identity, whether in the body or out of it, and remains\nunchangeable in its substance whatever changes may happen to the body.\nThis material spirit or mind existed before it entered the body, exists\nin the body, will exist after it leaves the body, and will be reunited\nagain with the body in the resurrection.\n\nAs another specimen of monstrous absurdities logically deduced from\nabsurd premises, we quote the following:--\"Materialism\" he remarks,\n\"is not only relatively but absolutely absurd. If mind be matter, or\nmatter mind, then we may have the square or cube of joy or grief, of\npain or pleasure. We may divide a great joy into a number of little\njoys, or we may accumulate a great joy by heaping together the solid\nparts of several little joys. We shall then have the color and shape of\na thought. It will be either white, grey, brown, crimson, purple, or it\nmay be a mixture of two or more colors. Then we shall have a dark grey\nhope, a bright yellow sorrow, a round brown tall pain, and an octagonal\ngreen belief; an inch of thought, a mile of joy.\" We do most cordially\nagree with Mr. Taylder that these results would be \"not only relatively\nbut absolutely absurd;\" and only equalled by the absurdity of the\npremises from which they were deduced. He has assumed that the several\nSTATES or CONDITIONS of the mind, such as joy, grief, pain, pleasure,\nthought, &c., are material as well as the mind. With the same propriety\nhe might have assumed that MOTION is material as well as the matter\nmoved. Joy is no more a _substance_ than _motion,_ both are merely the\n_states_ or _conditions_ of substance. As great absurdities could be\ndeduced from assuming that _motion_ is material, as there can be from\nMr. Taylder's assumption that _joy_ is material. As an illustration,\nlet us take this author's own words, with the exception of substituting\n_iron_ for _mind, motion_ for the _affections_ of the mind; it will\nthen read thus:--\"If\" _iron_ \"be matter, or matter\" _iron,_ \"then we\nmay have the square or cube of\" a _solid motion._ \"We may divide a\ngreat\" _solid motion_ \"into a number of little\" _solid motions,_ \"or\nwe may accumulate a great\" _solid motion_ \"by heaping together the\nsolid parts of several little\" _solid motions._ \"We shall then have a\ncolor and shape of a\" _motion._ \"It will be either white, grey, brown,\ncrimson, purple, or it may be a mixture of two or more colors. Then we\nshall have a dark grey\" _motion_ \"a round, brown, tall\" _motion_; \"an\ninch\" or \"a mile of\" _solid motion_, &c. It is strange that Mr. Taylder\ndid not close his train of reasoning, by saying, \"Mind, therefore,\nis not matter;\" and then we could have completed the parallel by\nsaying, _iron, therefore, is not matter._ If such reasoning proves\nmind _immaterial,_ similar reasoning will prove any other substance\nimmaterial.\n\n\"Mr. Orson Pratt,\" observes our author, \"calls matter into existence,\nof which the world knows but little. He has not only 'intelligent\nmatter,' but 'all-wise,' and 'all-powerful' matter. This matter is\ncapable of division into parts; for all matter has length, breadth,\nand thickness. Then we shall have the half of an intelligent atom of\nmatter, the eighth of an all-wise atom, the thousandth part of an\nall-powerful atom &c. Such are the absurdities which 'the Latter-day\nSaint' embraces.\" Here the author seems to have recovered partially\nfrom the wild absurd notions of applying the term _material_ to the\naffections, and is willing to apply it to substance where it belongs.\nBut he speaks of the division of atoms which does not accord with the\ngeneral notions of modern philosophy. The immortal Newton says, \"It\nseems probable that God, in the beginning, formed matter in _solid,\nmasses, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles_.\" This does not favor\nthe divisibility of atoms. Newton further observes, \"That nature may\nbe lasting, the changes of corporeal things are to be placed only\nin the _various separations,_ and _new associations,_ and _motions_\nof these _permanent_ particles; compound bodies being apt to break,\nnot in the midst of solid particles, but where those particles are\nlaid together, and touch only in a few points.\" These are the views\nentertained by philosophers generally at the present day, with the\nexception of here and there an isolated individual who advocates the\ntheory of the infinite divisibility of matter. Perhaps our author\nmay be of that class; for he speaks of the division of atoms. It is\nadmitted that substance is capable of division and subdivision until\narriving at its ultimate atoms, after which all further separation\nceases. This division of the same kind of substance does not alter\nor change the nature or properties of the respective parts; if they\npossessed attraction when united, they also possess it when separated\nor else attraction is the result of union and ceases with it. So in\nrelation to intelligent substance, without regard to its materiality\nor immateriality; if it is intelligent as a whole, it is intelligent\nin its respective parts after division, or else the intelligent power\nis the result of the union of unintelligent parts, and ceases when the\nunion ceases. Therefore if the intelligent substance, called mind,\nis intelligent, as a whole, it is intelligent in all its parts; and\nthere would be no more absurdity in speaking of the half, the eighth,\nor the thousandth part of an intelligent substance, than there would\nbe in speaking of the half, the eighth, or the thousandth part of an\nattracting substance. And yet Mr. Taylder exclaims, \"Such are the\nabsurdities which the 'Latter-day Saint' embraces.\"\n\nPerhaps our author's _immaterial mind_ or _spirit_ will not suffer him\nto believe that the _whole_ spirit of man is made up or consists _of\nparts._ If the spirit of man is a _substance,_ as Mr. Taylder admits,\nthough he denies its _materiality,_ then it must be either a simple\nuncompounded being or atom, or a united collection of such beings or\natoms.\n\nBishop Butler supposes the spirit of man to be a single, simple,\nindivisible being. He remarks, that \"since consciousness is a single\nand individual power, it should seem that the subject in which it\nresides must be so too,\" \"that is the conscious being.\" He further\nsays, \"That we have no way of determining by experience what is the\ncertain bulk of the living being each man calls himself; and yet,\n(continues he), till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than\nthe solid elementary particles of matter, which there is no ground to\nthink any natural power can dissolve, there is no sort of reason to\nthink death to be the dissolution of it, of the living being, even\nthough it should not be absolutely indiscerptible.\" (Butler's Analogy.\nPart I, Chap. I.) Our author seems to be a little more positive than\nButler, and asserts apparently without any doubt, that \"mind is simple\nnot compounded.\" (Taylder against Materialism. Page 14.) Here, then,\naccording to both Butler and Taylder, we have a simple, uncompounded,\nindivisible, little atom of conscious substance, or, in other words,\nan _intelligent atom._ The terms _atoms_ and _being_ are synonymous\nwhen applied to a simple indivisible substance so small that Butler\nintimates that its \"bulk\" has not been determined to exceed \"the solid\nelementary particles of matter.\"\n\nIf the spirit of one man is a little atom of intelligent substance\nhaving \"bulk,\" the spirit of every other man is a similar atom; hence\nin the human bodies now living on the earth, there must exist nearly\none thousand million _of intelligent atoms,_ each conscious of its\nown existence, and capable of originating motion independently of\nthe others. Mr. Taylder says this intelligent _atom_ or _spirit_ \"is\ncapable of separation from the body, and can exist independently of\nthe body.\" This being admitted, then there must be many thousand\nmillion of intelligent atoms which once inhabited bodies but now exist\nindependently of them. This is the legitimate result of the theory\nwhich assumes that the spirit of a man is a little conscious being--a\nsubstance, simple, uncompounded and indivisible, capable of existing\neither in or out of a body. Where, then, Mr. Taylder, is the absurdity\nin believing as the \"Saints\" do, in the existence of immense numbers\nof intelligent atoms? It agrees most perfectly with the results of\nyour own theory--the only difference is in the name. You call these\nlittle indivisible substances _immaterial,_ we call them _material._\nYou apply to them the same powers that we do. You believe them to be\nconscious, intelligent, and thinking atoms as well as we. The name of\na substance does not alter its nature; as for instance some call one\nof the constituent elements of the atmosphere \"azote,\" others call\nit \"nitrogen,\" but all admit that it possesses the same nature and\nproperties. If this indivisible conscious being, or atom of substance,\npossesses \"bulk,\" as Bishop Butler intimates, then in this respect it\nis like the atoms of all other substances, and therefore it must be\nmatter.\n\nIf some atoms can possess various degrees of intelligence, wisdom, and\npower, whether in the body or out of it, then there is no absurdity\nin the theory that there are other atoms which are \"all-wise\" and\n\"all-powerful.\" Mr. Taylder admits that there must be a God, and that\nhe is an all-wise and all-powerful being or substance,--that substance\nmust be either a simple uncompounded indivisible being or atom, or a\ncollection of such beings or atoms. If it be an indivisible being or\natom, it would prove the existence of one all-wise and all-powerful\nbeing or atom: if it be a collection of such beings or atoms, then the\ntheory of all-wise and all-powerful atoms of substance is established.\nAll theistical writers admit the existence of such a substance. It is\nnot the _existence_ of the substance that is questioned, but it is its\n_nature._ One class calls it _immaterial,_ another _material._ Mr.\nTaylder has undertaken to prove that it is _immaterial,_ but as yet he\nhas not furnished us with even the most distant shadow of an evidence,\nunless, indeed, his own assertions are evidence. Indeed, he has nowhere\nattempted to prove that the spiritual substance of either man or the\nDeity possesses no properties in common with other substance admitted\nto be matter.\n\nAs another specimen of Taylder's logic we quote the following:--\n\n\"There is another conclusion equally absurd, if the existence of an\nimmaterial substance be denied, and thinking be ascribed to matter,\nand that is, the mind must always think in the same way, in the\nsame direction.\" As a proof of this assumption our author refers to\nthe writings of Priestly, as follows:--\"If man,\" says Dr. Priestly,\n\"be a material being, and the power of thinking the _result_ of a\n_certain organization_ of the _brain,_ does it not follow, that all\nhis functions must be regulated by the laws of mechanism, and that, of\nconsequence, all his actions proceed from an irresistible necessity?\"\n\"The doctrine of necessity,\" continues Priestly, \"is the immediate\nresult of the doctrine of the materiality of man; for mechanism is the\nundoubted consequence of materialism.\"\n\nWe are willing to admit that \"an irresistible necessity\" would be\nthe inevitable consequence of assuming that \"the power of thinking\nis the RESULT of a CERTAIN ORGANIZATION of the BRAIN.\" But this is a\nmost absurd assumption; for if \"the power of thinking be the result\nof a certain organization of the brain,\" then, when that organization\nceases, the power of thinking would cease also, and there could be no\nseparate existence for the mind or spirit.\n\nBut we believe that the power of thinking is not the RESULT of a brain\norganization, but the original property of that substance called spirit\nor mind, which can exist independently of a brain organization, and\nentirely separate and apart from the body.\n\nPriestly asserts that \"mechanism is the undoubted consequence of\nmaterialism.\" But this is a baseless assertion. Mechanism implies the\nincapability of acting only according to the laws of Mechanism, as it\nis acted upon: hence, \"an irresistible necessity characterizes all of\nits movements.\" But not so with an intelligent thinking substance:\nit can originate its own motions, and act according to its own will,\nindependently of the laws of mechanism: hence a perfect freedom\ncharacterizes all of its movements. Before Priestly or any other man\ncan logically assert that \"mechanism is the undoubted consequence of\nmaterialism,\" he must first prove that matter cannot think, and will,\nand move, or, in other words, he must prove that mind is not matter.\n\nOur author endeavours to overthrow materialism because of the\nabsurdities which Darwin advocated. He quotes the words of that author\nas follows:--\"Ideas are material things: they are contractions,\nmotions, or configurations of the fibres of the organs of sense.\"\n\"Here,\" exclaims Mr. Taylder, \"is the real _perfection of materialism!\nIt destroys man's accountability to God!_\" There is then no such\nthing as praise or blame, fear or hope, reward or punishment, and,\nconsequently, no religion. \"How,\" inquires our author, \"can the\nMormons reconcile this conclusion with their religious fabric, built\non revelations and visions?\" \"If _their God_ be a material being, he\nmust _necessarily act mechanically_.\" We reply that we do not wish to\nreconcile our religious fabric with Darwin's absurdities. Darwin has\nassumed that \"ideas, contractions, motions, or configurations,\" are all\n_material_.\n\nWhat man, disencumbered of a strait waistcoat, could ever believe in\nsuch ridiculous nonsense! It is only equalled by Taylder's material\njoys and sorrows, of which we have already had occasion to speak.\nThe substance of the Deity, nor no other intelligent substance, is\ndependent on the \"_contractions, motions, or configurations_\" of\norganical fibres for its actions, but it is a self-moving substance,\nnot subject to the law of necessity or mechanism like unintelligent\nmatter.\n\n\"The last consideration,\" says this immaterialist author, \"which\nit is necessary to advance for the real existence of mind, is\n_consciousness_.\" (Taylder's Tract against Materialism. Page 18.)\n\n\"The real existence of mind\" is not doubted by us. Mr. Taylder has\nstrayed entirely from the question. The question is not whether mind\nhas a _real existence,_ but whether it is _immaterial._\n\n\"It is generally considered,\" remarks this author, \"that in a few years\nour bodies are entirely changed. How, then, on the material scheme,\ncan a Mormon tell that he is the same person now that he was _twenty\nyears since,_ or shall be _ten years hence?_\" We reply that it is only\nthe substance of the material body that is constantly changing, while\nthe material spirit which inhabits the body, remains unchangeable.\nPersonal identity consists, not in the identity of a changeable body,\nbut in the identity of an unchangeable substance called spirit, which\nfeels, thinks, reasons, and remembers. The Athenian galley, which\nwas sent every year to Delos for a thousand years, had been repaired\nso often that every part of its materials had been changed more than\nonce, therefore it did not remain the same identical substance during\nthat period of time; but if a certain unchangeable diamond had been\ncarried within this galley for one thousand years, it would be the same\nidentical substance still, though the galley that carried it had been\nchanged ever so often; so likewise let the material body meet with an\nentire change every few years, the unchangeable material spirit which\nit carries within will remain the same identical substance still.\n\nIndeed, if Bishop Butler's intimation be correct, that the spirit of\nman is a small indivisible being or atom, whose bulk has not been\ndetermined to exceed the size of small elementary particles of matter,\nthen it would be impossible for such a small conscious indivisible atom\nto change its substance in the least degree, and therefore it must\npreserve its entire identity under all possible circumstances.\n\nOur author next inquires, \"How can _spiritual_ matter occupy the same\nspace with the matter of which the body consists?\" We answer that it\ncannot occupy the same identical space with other matter, for this\nis in all cases an absolute impossibility. It can only occupy its\nown space in union with the matter of which the body consists. Every\nparticle of the body occupies a distinct space of its own, and no two\nparticles of the body can exist in the same space at the same time,\nneither can any atom of spirit occupy the same space at the same time\nwith any other atom or substance. All substances are porous. It can\nbe proved that the component particles of all known substances are\nnot in absolute contact, for all bodies composed of these particles\ncan be compressed, and their dimensions reduced without diminishing\ntheir mass. All organized substances are porous in a high degree, that\nis their \"volume consists partly of material particles and partly of\ninterstitial spaces, which spaces are either absolutely void and empty,\nor filled by some substance of a different species from the body in\nquestion.\" (Lardner's Scientific Lectures. Vol. II. Lecture 1.) The\nmaterial body being porous, there is room for the material spirit to\nexist in close connexion with its component parts, and this too without\ninfringing upon the impenetrability of substances. If the material\nspirit be as small as Bishop Butler intimates, it will not occupy much\nroom in the body. Many millions of millions of such spirits, if \"not\nlarger in bulk than the elementary particles of bodies,\" could occupy\nmuch less room that a cubic inch of space.\n\nWe have now examined all of Mr. Taylder's arguments (if, indeed,\nthey may be called arguments) which have been adduced in support of\nhis first proposition, which it will be recollected, was stated in\nthese words--\"The philosophy of the Mormons is IRRATIONAL?\" or, in\nother words, it is irrational to believe in the materiality of all\nsubstance. How far he has supported this proposition our readers can\njudge for themselves. He has not brought forth the least shadow of\nevidence to prove that such a thing as an immaterial substance exists.\nHe has, indeed, argued, that such a thing as mind or spirit has a\nreal existence--that it thinks, and feels, and is conscious. In all\nthese things he agrees with us, without the least variation. He argues\nthat the substance called mind, possesses many different and superior\nqualities to all other substance; his views in this respect do not\ndiffer in the least from ours. He has clearly exhibited the absurdities\nof Priestly, Darwin, and various other writers, who have made mind the\nresult of the motions of the brain or of its organization. We agree\nwith him most perfectly in the rejection of such absurdities, but in\nno place has he brought forward argument, reason, or evidence to prove\nthat the substance called mind possesses no properties in common with\nother substances; therefore he has utterly failed in establishing his\nproposition. As no immaterialist can, from experiment, reason, or any\nother process whatsoever, glean the least shadow of evidence in favour\nof the immateriality of any substance, therefore we shall now on our\npart show--\n\nI.--THAT IMMATERIALISM IS IRRATIONAL, OPPOSED TO TRUE PHILOSOPHY.\n\nII.--THAT AN IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE CANNOT EXIST.\n\n\n\nI.--Immaterialism is absurd, and opposed to true Philosophy.\n\n1. The immaterialist assumes that God consists of an immaterial\nsubstance, indivisible in its nature, \"whose centre is everywhere and\ncircumference nowhere.\" The indivisibility of a substance implies\nimpenetrability; that is, two substances cannot exist in the same space\nat the same time; hence, if an indivisible substance exist everywhere,\nas it cannot be penetrated, it will absolutely exclude the existence of\nall other substances. Such a substance would be a boundless, infinite\nsolid, without pores, incapable of condensation, or expansion, or\nmotion, for there would be no empty space left to move to. Observation\nteaches us that this is not the case; therefore an infinitely extended,\nindivisible, immaterial substance is absurd in the highest degree, and\nopposed to all true philosophy.\n\n2. The immaterialist teaches that the godhead consists of three persons\nof one substance, and that each of these persons can be everywhere\npresent. Now in order to be everywhere present, each of these persons\nmust be infinitely extended, or else each must be susceptible of\noccupying two or more places at the same time. If a substance be\ninfinitely extended it ceases to be a person; for to all persons there\nare limits of extension called figure; but that which is not limited\ncan have no figure, and therefore cannot be a person. Therefore, it\nis absolutely necessary that a person should be included in a finite\nextent. Now that which is limited within one finite extent, cannot be\nincluded within some other extent at the same time; therefore it is\nutterly impossible for a person to be in two or more places at the same\ntime, hence immaterialism is totally absurd and unphilosophical.\n\n3. The immaterialist teaches that the substance of the Deity is not\nonly omnipresent and indivisible, but that all other substances are\ncontained in his substance and perform all their motions in it without\nany mutual action or resistance. The profound and illustrious Newton,\nin the Scholium at the end of the \"Principia,\" has fallen into this\nerror; he says, \"God is one and the same God always and everywhere. He\nis omnipresent, not by means of his _virtue_ alone, but also by his\n_substance,_ for virtue cannot subsist without substance. In him all\nthings are contained, and move, but without mutual passions _God is not\nacted upon by motions of the bodies; and they suffer no resistance from\nthe omnipresence of God_.\" Here we have an omnipresent substance, which\nis said by immaterialists to be so compact as to be _indivisible,_\nwith worlds moving in it without suffering any resistance: this is\nthe climax of absurdity. All masses of substance with which we are\nacquainted, are susceptible of division, yet even in these, bodies\ncannot move without being resisted; how much more impossible it\nwould be for worlds to exist and move in an indivisible substance\nwithout resistance, yet this is the absurdity of the immaterial\nhypothesis. There is nothing too ridiculous or too unphilosophical to\nbe incorporated in an immaterial substance when its existence has been\nonce assumed.\n\nThe reflecting mind turns away from such fooleries with the utmost\ndisgust, and feels to pity those men who have degraded the great and\nall-wise Creator and Governor of the universe by applying to him such\nimpossible, unheard of, and contradictory qualities. The heathen, in\ntheir wildest imaginations never fancied up a god that could begin to\ncompare with the absurd qualities ascribed to the immaterialists' god.\n\n\n\nII.--AN IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE CANNOT EXIST.\n\n1. We shall first endeavour to show what is absolutely _essential_\nto the existence of all substance. It will be generally admitted\nthat space is essential to existence. Space, being boundless, all\nsubstances must exist in space. Space is not the property of substance,\nbut the place of its existence. Infinite space has no qualities or\nproperties of any description excepting divisibility. Some eminent\nphilosophers have supposed _extension_ to be a property of space, but\nsuch a supposition is absurd. Extension is space itself, and not a\nproperty of space. As well might we say that _azote_ is a property of\nnitrogen, whereas they are only two different names given to the same\nsubstance, as to say that extension is a property of space. Infinite\nspace is divisible, but otherwise it cannot possibly be described,\nfor it has no other properties or qualities by which to describe it.\nIt has no boundaries--no figure--no other conceivable properties of\nany description. It has a variety of names such as space, extension,\nvolume, magnitude, distance, &c., all of which are synonymous terms.\n\n2. Duration is also essential to the existence of substance. There\ncan be no such thing as existence without duration. Duration, like\ninfinite space, is divisible, but otherwise it has no properties or\nqualities of any description. Like space we can call it by different\nnames, as duration, time, period, &c; but to give it any other kind of\ndescription would be absolutely impossible. Infinite space can only\nbe distinguished from duration by certain imaginary qualities, which\ncan be assigned to finite portions of it, but which cannot be assigned\nto duration. We can conceive of cubical, prismatical and spherical\nportions of space, but we cannot conceive of portions of duration under\nany kind of shape. Both space and duration are entirely powerless,\nbeing immovable, yet both are susceptible _of division_ to infinity.\nTo assist us in our future remarks we shall give the following\ndefinitions:--\n\n_Definition_ 1_.--_SPACE is magnitude, susceptible of division.\n\n_Definition_ 2.--A POINT is the negative of space, or the zero at which\na magnitude begins or terminates; it is not susceptible of division.\n\n_Definition_ 3.--DURATION is not magnitude, but time susceptible of\ndivision.\n\n_Definition_ 4.--AN INSTANT is the negative of duration, or the zero at\nwhich duration begins or terminates; it is not susceptible of division.\n\n_Definition_ 5.--MATTER is something that occupies space between any\ntwo instants, and is susceptible of division and of being removed from\none portion of space to another.\n\n_Definition_ 6.--NOTHING is the negative of space, of duration, and of\nmatter; it is the zero of all existence.\n\n3. Modern immaterialists freely admit, as we have already shown, that\n\"_a disembodied spirit_\" is NOWHERE. \"We must no longer allow ourselves\nto imagine,\" says the immaterialist, \"that it is or can be, in any\nplace.\" (Taylor's Physical Theory of another Life. Chapter II.) But\nthat which does not occupy any place or space, has no magnitude, and is\nnot susceptible of division; therefore it must be an unextended _point_\nor _nothing--_(see definitions 2 and 6,) the negative of both space and\nmatter, that is, the negative of all existence. _Immateriality_ is a\nrepresentative of _nothing: immaterial_ substance is only another name\nfor _no_ substance; therefore such a substance does not, and cannot\nexist.\n\n4. Having shown that an immaterial substance can have no existence,\nbecause it has no relation to space, we shall next show that it can\nhave no existence, because it has no relation to duration. Isaac\nTaylor says, \"that which is wholly abstracted from matter, and in\nspeaking of which we deny that it has any property in common therewith,\n_can in itself be subjected to none of its_ CONDITIONS.\" One of the\n_conditions_ absolutely essential to the existence of matter is\nduration or time. (See definition 5.) That which is not subjected\nto the condition of duration, must be subjected to the condition of\nan instant, which is the negative of duration; but nothing is also\nthe negative of duration and of substance; (see definition 4 and 6;)\ntherefore that which has no duration is _nothing,_ and cannot be a\nsubstance; hence an immaterial substance cannot exist.\n\nThere are many truths which may be called FIRST TRUTHS, or self-evident\ntruths, which cannot be demonstrated, because there are no truths of\na simpler nature that can be adduced to establish them. Such truths\nare the foundation of all reasoning. They must be admitted without\ndemonstration, because they are self-evident. That space and duration\nare essential conditions to the existence of all substance, may be\ndenominated a self-evident truth; if so, it is useless to undertake to\nprove it. And in this case, the foregoing need not be considered as a\ndemonstration, but merely different forms of expression representing\nthe same self-evident truth.\n\n\n\nIMMATERIALISTS ARE ATHEISTS.\n\nThere are two classes of Atheists in the world. One class denies the\nexistence of God in the most positive language: the other denies his\nexistence in duration or space. One says, \"There is no God;\" the other\nsays, \"God is not _here_ or _there,_ any more than he exists now and\n_then_.\" (Isaac Taylor's Physical Theory of Another Life Chap. II.) The\ninfidel says, God does not exist anywhere. The Immaterialist says, \"He\nexists _Nowhere_.\" (Good's Book of Nature.) The infidel says, There\nis no such substance as God. The Immaterialist says, There is such a\nsubstance as God, but it is \"_without Parts_.\" (First of the Thirty\nNine Articles; also I Art. Methodist Discipline.) The Atheist says,\nThere is no such substance as _Spirit._ The Immaterialist says, \"A\nSpirit, though he lives and acts, occupies no room, and fills no space,\nin the same way and after the same manner as matter, not even so much\nas does the minutest grain of sand.\" (Rev. David James on the Trinity,\nin Unitarianism Confuted. Lec. VII., page 382.) The Atheist does not\nseek to hide his infidelity: but the Immaterialist, whose declared\nbelief amounts to the same thing as the Atheist's endeavours to hide\nhis infidelity under the shallow covering of a few words.\n\nThe \"thinking principle,\" says Dr. Thomas Brown, \"is essentially one,\nnot extended and divisible, but incapable by its very nature, of any\nsubdivision into integral parts.\" (Brown's \"Philosophy of the Human\nMind.\" Lec. XCVII.) What is this but the rankest kind of infidelity\ncouched in a blind, plausible form. That which is \"not extended and not\ndivisible\" and \"without parts,\" cannot be anything else than nothing.\nTake away these qualities and conditions, and no power of language can\ngive us the least idea of existence. The very idea conveyed by the\nterm existence is something extended, divisible, and with parts. Take\nthese away, and you take away existence itself. It cannot be so much\nas the negative of space, or, what is generally called, an indivisible\npoint, for that has a relation to the surrounding spaces. It cannot be\nso much as the negative of duration, or, what is generally called, an\nindivisible instant, for that has a relation to the past and future.\nTherefore, it must be the negative of all existence, or what is called\nabsolutely NOTHING. Nothing, and nothing only, is a representative\nof that which has no relation to space or time--that is, unextended,\nindivisible, and without parts. Therefore, the immaterialist is a\nreligious Atheist; he only differs from the other classes of Atheists,\nby clothing an indivisible unextended NOTHING with the powers of a god.\nOne class believes in no God; the other class believes that NOTHING\nis god, and worships it as such. There is no twisting away from this.\nThe most profound philosopher in all the ranks of modern Christianity,\ncannot extricate the Immaterialists from atheism. He cannot show the\nleast difference between the idea represented by the word _nothing_,\nand the idea represented by that which is unextended, indivisible,\nand without parts, having no relation to space or time. All the\nphilosophers of the universe could not give a better or more correct\ndefinition of _Nothing._ And yet this is the god worshipped by the\nChurch of England--the Methodists--and millions of other atheistical\nidolaters, according to their own definitions, as recorded in their\nrespective articles of faith. An open Atheist is not so dangerous as\nthe Atheist who couches his atheistical doctrines under the head of\n\"ARTICLES OF RELIGION.\" The first stands out with open colours and\nboldly avows his infidelity; the latter, under the sacred garb of\nreligion, draws into his yawning vortex, the unhappy millions who\nare persuaded to believe in, and worship an unextended indivisible\n_nothing_ without parts, deified into a god. A pious Atheist is much\nmore serviceable in building up the kingdom of darkness than one who\nopenly, and without any deception, avows his infidelity.\n\nNo wonder that this modern god has wrought no miracles and given no\nrevelations since his followers invented their \"Articles of Religion.\"\nA being without parts must be entirely powerless, and can perform\nno miracles. Nothing can be communicated from such a being; for, if\nnothing give nothing, nothing will be received. If, at death, his\nfollowers are to be made like him, they will enjoy, with some of the\nmodern Pagans, all the beauties of annihilation. To be made like him!\nAdmirable thought! How transcendently sublime to behold an innumerable\nmultitude of unextended nothings, casting their crowns at the feet of\nthe great, unextended, infinite Nothing, filling all space, and yet\n\"without parts!\" There will be no danger of quarrelling for want of\nroom; for the Rev. David James says, \"Ten thousand spirits might be\nbrought together into the smallest compass imaginable, and there exist\nwithout any inconvenience for want of room. As materiality,\" continues\nhe, \"forms no property of a spirit, the space which is sufficient for\none, must be amply sufficient for myriads, yea, for all that exist.\"\n(Rev. David James on the Trinity, in Unitarianism Confuted. Lec. VII.,\npage 382.) According to this, all the spirits that exist, \"could be\nbrought together into the smallest compass imaginable,\" or, in other\nwords into no compass at all; for, he says, a spirit occupies \"no\nroom, and fills no space.\" What an admirable description of Nothing!\n_Nothing_ \"occupies no room, and fills no space!\" If myriads of\nNothings were \"brought together into the smallest compass imaginable,\"\nthey would \"there exist without any inconvenience for want of room.\"\nEverything which the Immaterialist says, of the existence of _Spirit,_\nwill apply without any variation, to the existence of _Nothing._ If\nhe says that his god cannot exist \"Here\" or \"There,\" the same is true\nof _Nothing._ If he affirms that he cannot exist \"Now\" and \"Then,\"\nthe same can, in all truth, be affirmed of _Nothing._ If he declares,\nthat he is \"unextended,\" so is _Nothing._ If he asserts that he is\n\"indivisible\" and \"without parts,\" so is _Nothing._ If he declares\nthat a spirit \"occupies no room and fills no space,\" neither does\n_Nothing._ If he says a spirit is \"Nowhere,\" so is _Nothing._ All that\nhe affirms of the one, can, in like manner, and, with equal truth, be\naffirmed of the other. Indeed, they are only two words, each of which\nexpress precisely the same idea. There is no more absurdity in calling\n_Nothing_ a substance, and clothing it with Almighty powers, than there\nis in making a substance out of that which is precisely like nothing,\nand imagining it to have Almighty powers. Therefore, an immaterial god\nis a deified Nothing, and all his worshippers are atheistical idolators.\n\n\n\nA SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE IS MATERIAL.\n\nThat spirit or mind has a relation to space, is evident from the fact\nof its location in the body. The body itself exists in space, therefore\nevery particle of substance which it contains must exist in space.\nNo point can be assumed in the body but what has a relation to the\nsurrounding space or extension. Therefore spirit must have a relation\nto extension or it cannot exist in the body. All unextended points\nhave a relation to space, though they are no part of space, and do not\noccupy space; but an unextended substance to have no relation to space\ncannot be as much as a point. A point is a _located_ nothing, but an\nunextended substance is nothing, having no _location._\n\nWhat can be more unphilosophical, contradictory, and absurd, than to\nassume that something can exist that is \"unextended,\"--that \"occupies\nno room, fills no space,\"--has \"no parts?\" We ask our readers to pause\nfor a moment, and endeavour to conceive of a substance that has no\nparts. Grasp it if you can in your imaginations. Think of its existing\nwhere there is no space. Conceive, if you can in your imaginations.\nThink of its existing where there is no space. Conceive, if you can,\nof a locality outside of the bounds of a boundless space. Do not\nyour judgments, and every power of your minds revolt at the absolute\nabsurdities and palpable contradictions? By this time, perhaps, you\nare ready to inquire, can it be possible that any man in all the world\ncould believe in such impossibilities? Yes, it is possible. These very\nabsurdities now stand in bold relief, not only in the most approved\nphilosophical works of modern times, but incorporated in the very\n\"Articles of Religion\" which millions have received as their rule of\nfaith.\n\nThat spirit or mind has a relation to duration is manifest in the act\nof remembering. Through the memory the mind perceives itself to be\nthe same conscious being _now_, that it was, an hour, a day, a year\nago; it perceives that itself has existed through a certain period of\nduration. There is as much certainty of its own relations to duration\nas there is of any such relation in any other substance whatever. If\nthere is no certainty that mind has a relation to duration, there is\nno certainty that any other substance has such a relation; hence all\nwould be uncertainty, even our own existence. Bishop Berkeley denied\nthe existence of the material world, and the first Article of his\nreligion swept away the immaterial world from _space;_ and the modern\nimmaterialist sweeps it away from all relation to _time_. So between\nthem all, space and time are pretty well cleaned out; not so much as a\nnest egg left to replenish the great infinite void.\n\nMind, like all other matter, is susceptible of being moved from\nplace to place. We see this exemplified in the movements of the mind\nthrough the medium of the body which conveys it from place to place\non the surface of the earth. But though man was stationary upon the\nearth's surface, the earth itself with all its inhabitants, is moving\nwith the rapid velocity of nineteen miles every second, which proves\nto a demonstration that mind is capable of being moved from place\nto place with a velocity far exceeding that of a cannon ball. But\n_motion_ involves the ideas of both space and time. Mind cannot be\nmoved without being moved in space; it cannot pass from point to point\ninstantaneously. However rapid the velocity, time is an essential\ningredient to all motion. That eminent and profound philosopher, the\nlate Professor Robison of Edinburgh, says, \"In motion we observe the\n_successive_ appearance of the thing moved in _different_ parts of\nspace. Therefore, in our idea of motion are involved the ideas or\nconceptions of space and time.\"\n\n\"All things are placed in space, in the order of situation. All events\nhappen in time, in the order of succession.\"\n\n\"No motion can be conceived as instantaneous. For, since a moveable,\nin passing from the beginning to the end of its path, passes through\nthe intermediate points; to suppose the motion along the most minute\nportion of the path instantaneous, is to suppose the moveable in\nevery intervening point at the same instant. This is inconceivable\nand absurd.\" (Robison's Mechanical Philosophy. Vol I. Introduction.)\nThe motion of mind, therefore is another positive proof that it has a\nrelation to both space and duration.\n\n\"Extension and resistance,\" says Dr. Thomas Brown, \"are the complex\nelements of what we term matter; and nothing is matter to our\nconception, or a body, to use the simpler synonymous term which does\nnot involve these elements.\" Figure, magnitude, divisibility, are only\ndifferent modifications of extension. Solidity, liquidity, viscidity,\nhardness, softness, roughness, smoothness, are different modifications\nof resistance. All these terms are only extension and resistance,\nmodified in a certain degree, and under other names. Our notion of\nextension is supposed by Dr. Brown to be acquired from our notion of\ntime as successive, involving length and divisibility. Our notion of\nresistance he supposes to be obtained through our muscular organs.\nThese organs are first exerted, and then excited by something without,\nand in their turn excite the mind with a feeling of resistance. The\nfeeling of resistance combined with the feeling of extension gives\nus the notion of matter. If Dr. Brown's views be correct, no one can\nacquire a notion of matter, by seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling,\nor simple touch. Either or all of these will only produce certain\nfeelings in the mind without giving us any notion of an external\nextended resistance. A muscular effort opposed by some substance or\nforeign body is the only possible way, according to his theory, for\nthe infant mind to obtain a notion of extended solidity or resistance.\n(Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind. From the XX to the XXIX Lecture\ninclusive.)\n\nIf solidity and extension then are the essential characteristics of\nmatter; and if the resistance of a muscular effort be the only possible\nway of learning these characteristics; it may be asked, how did Dr.\nBrown learn that the rays of light are material? He has frequently in\nhis philosophy called light material. Has light in any way resisted his\nmuscular efforts? Have the muscular organs ever been able to grasp a\nray of light? Have the particles of light either singly or collectively\never acted upon our muscular organs in such manner as to give us a\nnotion of extension and resistance? Have they ever affected the mind in\nany way only to impart to it the feeling of color? Does not Dr. Brown\nhimself repeatedly affirm, that light can only impart the sensation\nof color; and that extension, magnitude, figure, solidity, can never\nbe known by the sense of seeing? Does he not assert, that \"nothing is\nmatter to our conception which does not involve these elements?\" Why\nthen does he assume light to be material?\n\nIf, then, light can be ranked as a material substance without\nexhibiting the least resistance to the muscular organs, why not mind or\nspirit be considered material also? Why believe that light consists of\ninconceivably small vibratory or emanating particles of matter from the\nmere affection of mind called color, and yet be unwilling to believe\nthat the mind affected is material? If that which produces a sensation\nor feeling be regarded a solid extended substance, independently of\nmuscular resistance, where is the impropriety, in regarding that which\nreceives the sensation or feeling, as a solid extended substance also?\n\nDr. Brown, and all other immaterialists, universally believe that the\nsensation of smell is produced by small material particles, acting\nupon our olfactory nerves. But we ask, how is Dr. Brown or any other\nperson to determine those odorous particles to be material? It may be\nsaid, that we determine them to be solid and extended by tracing them\nto the substances from which they emanate. But can it be proved that\nthey constitute any part of the solid extended substance from which\nthey emanate, any more than light is a part of the substance from\nwhich it emanates? We know a rose to be solid and extended, not from\nthe sensation of vision or smell, but from the sensation of resistance\nwhich it offers to our muscular organs when we attempt to grasp it. But\nbecause a rose is solid and extended, that does not prove that light\nand fragrance, by which we discern its color and smell, are any part of\nthe rose.\n\nIf Dr. Brown's theory be true, it is absolutely impossible to prove\nthat the odoriferous particles which affect us with the sensation of\nfragrance, are a solid extended substance. These particles of odour\nappear, indeed, to have been connected in some way with bodies from\nwhich they emanate; but there is no possible means for the muscular\npowers to determine them to be parts of those bodies, any more than\nthe colored light or the heat which are also transmitted from them. No\none in speaking of a rose would think of classifying heat and light\nas a portion of its solid substance; yet both heat and light, like\nthe particles of odour, are intimately connected with it, and are\nconstantly being thrown off from it.\n\n\"What is there,\" inquires Dr. Brown, \"which we can discover in the\nmere sensation of fragrance, that is itself significant of solidity,\nextension, or whatever we may regard as essential to the existence\nof things without? As a mere change in the form of our being, it may\nsuggest to us the necessity of some cause or antecedent of the change.\nBut it is far from implying the necessity of a corporeal cause;--any\nmore than such a direct corporeal cause is implied in any other\nmodification of our being, intellectual or moral--in our belief, for\nexample, of the most abstract truth, at which we may have arrived by\na slow development of proposition after proposition in a process of\ninternal reflective analysis, or in the most refined and sublime of\nour emotions, when, without thinking of any one of the objects around,\nwe have been meditating on the divinity who formed them--himself the\npurest of spiritual existences. Our belief of a system of external\nthings, then, does not, as far as we can judge from the nature of the\nfeelings, arise from our sensations of smell, more than from any of our\ninternal pleasures or pains.\" (Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind.\nLecture XX.)\n\nOdorous particles, then, have never been submitted to Dr. Brown's only\ntest of materiality, and yet he, and all other immaterialists, without\nany hesitation, pronounce them to be matter. The spirit, like these\nparticles of odour, can exist in connexion with the body or separate\nfrom it; and yet it forms no part of the fleshy tabernacle. If like\nthe particles of odour, it really eludes the grasp of the muscular\norgans, and if neither these odoriferous particles, nor the spirit, can\nbe proved by any muscular effort to have solidity and extension; why,\nthen, should one be called _material,_ and the other _immaterial?_\n\nIf the mind be unextended, how can it receive any sensations from\nthings without? It could not act upon bodily organs, for they are\nextended. Neither could bodily organs act upon it.\n\nPhilosophers have endeavoured to invent numberless hypothesis to\naccount for the action of matter on the mind, which they have assumed\nto be immaterial. The old Peripatetic doctrine of perception, by\nspecies or phantasms, which for so many centuries held so unlimited\na sway in the philosophic world, was probably originated to connect\nmaterial with immaterial substances. When this absurdity slowly died\naway, other hypothesis, no less erroneous, immediately supplied its\nplace. Des Cartes, seeing no possibility of any reciprocal action\nbetween matter and something that was inextended, invented his system\nof occasional causes, and represented the external world entirely\nincapable of affecting the mind in any way whatever. He ascribed all\nthe sensations and affections of the mind to the immediate agency of\nthe Deity, virtually rendering external objects entirely useless to\nthe mind. This conjecture has been modified by succeeding philosophers\nwithout, however, removing its absurdities. It is useless to revert\nto all the absurd theories which have from time to time distracted\nthe metaphysical world, and which have been originated for no other\npurpose than to uphold the still greater absurdity of immaterialism.\nPhilosophers of ancient times imagined the existence of an immaterial\nsubstance, unextended in its nature, like nothing. To support this\nwild and vague imagination, learned metaphysicians have given birth to\ninnumerable conjectures, in order to connect this imaginary substance\nwith the material world.\n\nDr. Brown, however, being a little more wise than the immaterialists\nwho preceded him, does not attempt to connect the mutual affections,\nexisting between matter and mind, by substituting some conjectural\nintervening _causes._ Instead of this, he advocates the direct\naffection of the mind by the presence of material objects--that the\nchange of state in the one is produced by the change of state in the\nother, independently of intervening causes. Now this, in our view, is\nreally what happens.\n\nWe believe that matter can only act upon mind because mind is an\nextended material substance. But Dr. Brown supposes there is no\nabsurdity in matter acting upon that which is unextended. He endeavours\nto substantiate the possibility of the direct mutual affections of mind\nand matter, by referring to some examples of matter acting upon matter\nas in gravitation. (Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind. Lecture\nXXX.) But we do not conceive these cases to be in the least analogous;\nfor there is no absurdity in supposing one extended substance to act\nupon another which is also extended. But for extended substances\nwith parts to act upon unextended substances is without a parallel,\nand inconceivably absurd. Indeed there could be no action at all;\nan immaterial mind could not act upon an immaterial mind any more\nthan nothing could act upon nothing. To talk about matter affecting\nthat which is inextended and without parts, is to talk about matter\naffecting nothing.\n\nThe very fact of the external organs affecting the mind without any\nintervening cause, the same as other matter affects other matter, is an\nargument of the strongest kind in favour of the materiality of mind. A\npiece of iron is affected in a certain manner by introducing into its\npresence a loadstone, so the mind is affected in a certain manner by\nthe presence of light upon the retina, or by the presence or odour upon\nthe olfactory nerve. If, then, mind can be directly affected by other\nsubstances, the same as matter directly affects matter, why should it\nbe called an immaterial substance?\n\nIf resistance to our muscular efforts, as Dr. Brown supposes, be our\nonly test of solidity and extension, and consequently of matter, then\nmind itself has the greatest claims to materiality. A muscular effort\nis nothing more than an effort of the mind. Without the mind the\nmuscles are incapable of any effort whatsoever. Two men stretch out\ntheir arms, press their hands together, and resist each other with\ngreat force. In this example as it is commonly said, the muscular\nefforts of the one are resisted by the muscular efforts of the other;\nbut as the muscles have no power of themselves, the facts of the case\nare, that the mind of the one truly resists the mind of the other\nthrough the medium of their respective muscles. If that which causes\nresistance then be material, mind must be material.\n\nIf two bodies of iron of equal size were moving with equal velocities\ntowards each other, upon meeting they would destroy each others\nmotion, and the next moment, though in contact, there would be no\nsigns of resistance; not so with the resistance which mind offers to\nmind through the medium of the muscular organs; the resistance can be\ncontinued at the option of the two resisting minds; hence mind exhibits\nresistance in a greater degree than other substances, and should,\ntherefore, according to Dr. Brown's test, be considered material in\npreference to all other substances.\n\nNo two atoms of spirit or any other matter can occupy two or more\nplaces at the same time. We have never known of a circumstance of the\nspirit of man residing in the body and out of it at the same time. No\nparticles of light, odour, heat, electricity, can occupy two places\nat once. These substances can only be extensively diffused by being\nextensive in quantity. The particles of light which enter the right eye\nare not the same which enter the left eye. Though their qualities may\nbe exactly alike, yet they are separate individual substance, as much\nso as if they were millions of miles asunder. The same is true of the\natoms of spirit and all other substances.\n\n\n\nOF THE ESSENCE OF SUBSTANCES.\n\nPhilosophers of modern times have asserted that we know nothing of\nthe _essence_ of bodies. It is affirmed that all that can be known\nof mind or matter, are merely its properties. Dr. Abercrombie, says,\n\"We talk, indeed, about matter, and we talk about mind; we speculate\nconcerning materiality and immateriality, until we argue ourselves into\na kind of belief that we really understand something of the subject.\nThe truth is, we understand nothing. Matter and mind are known to us\nby certain properties: but in regard to both it is entirely out of the\nreach of our faculties to advance a single step beyond the facts which\nare before us. Whether in their substratum or ultimate essence, they\nare the same, or whether they are different we know not, and never can\nknow in our present state of being.\" (Abercrombie on the Intellectual\nPowers. Part I. Sec. I.)\n\nThere are many truths which we ascertain by reflection, independently\nin a great measure of our senses. We are assured and know in our own\nminds that duration must be endless, and that space must be boundless,\nnot because we have learned these truths directly through the medium\nof our senses, or have been able to demonstrate them by any process\nof reasoning. In the same way we know concerning the essence of\nbodies. Instead of being entirely ignorant on the subject, as modern\nphilosophers assert, it is directly the opposite; we know the essence\nof all substances. Solidity is the only essence in existence. Although\nthe ultimate atoms of matter cannot come under the cognizance of our\nsenses, and we cannot demonstrate their solidity by any process of\nreasoning, yet we are none the less assured of their solidity. We\nbelieve that they are solid because it is impossible for us to believe\notherwise. We are as certain that the ultimate atoms of all substances\nare solid, as we are that they exist. What we mean by solidity is, that\nall substances completely fill a certain amount of space, and that it\nis impossible for them ever to fill a greater or less amount of space.\n\nThe amount of absolute space occupied by any substance is constant,\nthat is the elementary atoms cannot be increased or decreased in\nmagnitude in the least degree. Particles may be divided, but their\nrespective parts occupy the same amount of space when separated as when\nunited. Condensation or expansion is not a property of the ultimate\natoms of bodies, but merely the relation which these atoms sustain to\neach other. When a collection of atoms called body are forced into a\ncloser connexion with each other, the body is said to be condensed.\nWhen their relative distances are increased the body is expanded. The\nmaximum of density excludes all pores. In such a condition the space\nis wholly occupied--any further condensation is absolutely impossible.\nA bar of iron varies its dimensions with its temperature, while the\natoms of which the bar consists remain unchangeable in size. The pores\nof the iron increase in the same proportion as the bar increases, and\ndiminish as the bar diminishes. Solidity is universally supposed to be\na property of atoms, but this is an error. Solidity is not a property,\nbut only another name for the essence. A property must be a property of\nsomething; but solidity is not a property of _anything_--it is the\nessence itself--the thing that exists, aside from all properties and\npowers. If we suppose _solidity_ to be a _property,_ then it is evident\nthat there must be a distinction between atoms as possessors, and\nsolidity as the thing or property possessed; but we find it impossible\nto conceive of atoms separate and apart from solidity. Deprive atoms\nof solidity, and they are deprived not of a property, but of existence\nitself, and nothing remains. Solidity is associated with existence, and\nwe cannot conceive of the one independently of the other. Solidity,\nthen, is the essence to which all qualities belong--taste, smell,\ncolour, weight, &c., are the affections of solids. Every feeling or\nthought is the feeling or thought of solids. All the powers of the\nuniverse, from the almighty powers of Jehovah down to the most feeble\npowers that operate, are the powers of solid atoms. We can conceive of\nsolid atoms existing without powers, but we cannot conceive of atoms\nexisting without solidity; therefore the very essence of all substance\nis solidity. Love, joy, and all other affections are only the different\nstates of this essence.\n\nWhen the essence or solidity of substance is considered by itself,\nindependently of its powers, there cannot possibly be any difference\nin atoms only in their _magnitude_ and _form_. The essence of\nall substance is precisely alike when the essence alone is\nconsidered. Substances can only differ in their magnitude, form, and\nsusceptibilities, but not in their essences, for they are and must be\nalike.\n\n\n\nTHE IMMATERIALISTS ONLY POSSIBLE ARGUMENT REFUTED.\n\nThe only possible argument which the immaterialist pretends to bring\nforward in support of the _inextension_ and _indivisibility_ of a\nthinking substance, and consequently of its immateriality--is founded\non the self-consciousness of such substance.\n\nA thinking substance is conscious of its own individual unity: it\nis conscious that itself is not _many_ beings, but one. Mankind\nuniversally feel their own individual unity when each contemplates\nhimself. Each one is certain that it is the same being that rejoiced\nyesterday who remembers to-day--that all past and present affections\nare the affections of _one_ being, and not of many. The absolute\n_oneness_ of a thinking being is supposed to be inconsistent with\na _plurality_ of parts. To avoid this supposed inconsistency the\nimmaterialist assumes that such a substance is without parts.\n\nDr. Brown says \"that the very notion _of plurality_ and division is as\ninconsistent with the notion of self as the notions of existence and\nnonexistence.\" (Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind. Lecture XCVI.)\nThat by the term \"_plurality_,\" he means the plurality of parts, as\nwell as a plurality of atoms,--is very evident from the whole tenor of\nhis reasoning. If the materialist, as Dr. Brown again says, \"assert\nthought to be the affection of a single particle, a monade; he must\nremember that if what he chooses to term a single particle, be a\nparticle or matter, it too must still admit of division; it must have a\ntop and bottom, a right side and a left; it must, as it is demonstrable\nin geometry, admit of being cut in different points, by an infinite\nnumber of straight lines; and all the difficulty of the composition of\nthought, therefore, remains precisely as before.\" \"If it be supposed,\"\ncontinues he, \"so completely divested of all the qualities of matter,\nas not to be _extended,_ nor consequently divisible, it is then mind\nwhich is asserted under another name, and every thing which is at all\nimportant in the controversy is conceded.\" (Brown's Philosophy of the\nHuman Mind. Lecture XCVI.)\n\nA unity of substance, consisting of parts, is supposed by Dr. Brown and\nother immaterialists to be, not only relatively, but absolutely absurd.\nBut this supposed absurdity is only imaginary, and is founded wholly\non supposition and false reasoning, and not on our self-consciousness.\nSelf-consciousness teaches us the _unity_ of self, but it does not\nteach us that a unity of self is inconsistent with a plurality of\nparts, and consequently inextended.\n\nThe absolute _oneness_ or _unity_ of a thinking being can, by no means,\nbe denied. Every man in all the world,--the savage as well as the\nphilosopher,--is conscious that what he calls himself is not _many_\nbut _one_; but no man is conscious that the thinking substance called\nself does not consist of a plurality of parts--no one is conscious that\nself is inextended. Indeed, in the very notion of unity is involved the\nnotion of a plurality of parts. In abstract numbers themselves a unit\nconsists of an unlimited number of fractional parts. A unit of time is\ncomposed of innumerable parts called moments. A unit of space embraces\na countless number of fractional spaces. A unit of substance is\ncomposed of an immense number of fractional parts. Without a plurality\nof parts we can form no notion whatsoever of unity. If consciousness,\ntherefore, teaches us of the unity of self, it must teach us of a unity\nconsisting of parts; otherwise it teaches us nothing. The unity of the\nthinking being, then, proves to a demonstration that it consists of\nparts, and consequently must be extended.\n\nThe term _unity_ when applied to time, space, or substance, is entirely\nindefinite as to quantity. Any quantity, either great or small, may be\nassumed as a unit. In a multitude of human beings a man; in a bodily\norgan a molecule of any compounded substance which enters into its\ncomposition; and, in a molecule, an atom may be assumed as the unit.\nIn an atom there is an indefinite number of parts, either of which may\nbe chosen as a unit. But when we descend the scale still farther, and\nspeak of that which has no parts, we can form no possible conception\nof a unit of inextension. The term nothing, instead of unity, is the\nonly applicable term for that which is inextended. To think of unity in\nreference to external things, we think of something that has parts; so\nlikewise to feel the unity of the mind is to feel that it has parts.\n\nIf the unity or oneness of the mind is any evidence in favor of its\nbeing inextended and without parts, the unity or oneness of all other\nsubstances is equal evidence of their inextension. All the atoms of\nevery substance in the immensity of space, when considered separately\nand apart, are units, that is each atom is not _many_ substances, but\none. Therefore, if the unity of substance necessarily implies the\ninextension of substance, every atom in the universe must be inextended\nand without parts, and consequently immaterial.\n\nIf it be said that the universe contains no substances that can be\ncalled _units,_ but that each atom is a _plurality_ of substances,\nthis would not obviate the difficulty in the least; it would only be\nadding absurdity to absurdity; for a _plurality_ to exist without\nthe possibility of a _unity's_ existing, is inconceivable nonsense.\nA plural number, without a singular, or many substances to co-exist\nwithout the possibility of the existence of any single one, is as\ngrossly absurd as immaterialism itself. Hence _unity_ implies parts\nas much as _plurality._ Therefore, wherever a unity or plurality\nof substance exists, there matter exists, with all its essential\ncharacteristics.\n\nNo doubt but that the immaterialist absurdity was invented principally\nto combat the gross errors which have been embraced by some\nmaterialists, both of ancient and modern times. The great majority\nof materialists have contended that thought and feeling are the\n_results_ of organization, beginning and ceasing with it. Hobbes,\nSpinosa, Priestley, Darwin, and numerous other individuals, have\nstrenuously advocated this inconsistency. They have asserted that\nparticles of matter have no susceptibilities of thought and feeling\nwhen unorganized, but as soon as they were brought together into a\ncertain system, the result of such union is thought and feeling. Dr.\nBrown, in combating this vague conjecture, has clearly shown that a\nsystem of particles can have no properties as a whole which it does not\npossess in its individual parts; and, consequently, that a thought, or\na joy, or a fear, or any other affections of the mind, cannot possibly\nbe the affections resulting from a plurality, but in all cases must\nbe the affections or feelings of every part of a substance. We most\ncordially believe with Dr. Brown, that a system of particles cannot\npossibly possess a property which the individuals composing the system\ndo not possess. Had this great philosopher and metaphysician stopped\nhere, his reasoning would have been amply sufficient to have overthrown\nthe errors of Priestly, Darwin, and others who have supposed thought\nto begin and end with organization. But by supposing an individual\nunity to be inconsistent with extension and parts, he has advocated an\nabsurdity still more glaring than the one which a part of his reasoning\nhas so successfully overthrown.\n\nThere is another gross error of a very different nature from the one\nadvocated by Priestley and his followers, which Dr. Brown also very\nclearly exposes. This error consists in assuming thought, hope, fear,\njoy, sorrow, desire, and all other affections to be little particles of\nmatter. We are not aware, however, that there was ever a human being\nso void of common sense as to advocate this palpable inconsistency. It\nis very evident that this error is not necessarily incorporated with\nthat absurd notion which supposes thought and other affections to be\na _property_ of an organized system of particles, but not a property\nof each individual particle. The two errors are widely different: the\none supposes a thought or feeling to be a _property,_ not of a single\nparticle, but of a collection of particles; the other supposes a\nthought or feeling to be a little particle of matter itself, and not a\n_property_ of either a particle or collection of particles. The former\nerror has had numerous advocates in such men as Priestley, Darwin,\n&c.; but the latter, so far as we are aware, has had no advocates. Dr.\nBrown, however, has attacked not only the former, but the latter error,\nas though it really had an existence in some popular theory.\n\nIf thought be little particles of matter, Dr. Brown justly argues,\n\"that it will be not more absurd to talk of the twentieth part of an\naffirmation, or the quarter of a hope, of the top of a remembrance, and\nthe north and east corners of a comparison, than of the twentieth part\nof a pound, or of the different points of the compass in reference to\nany part of the globe of which we may be speaking.\" We agree with him\nmost perfectly in saying, \"that with every effort of attention which\nwe can give to our mental analysis, we are as incapable of forming any\nconception of what is meant by the quarter of a doubt, or the half of\na belief, as of forming to ourselves an image of a circle without a\ncentral point, or of a square without a single angle.\"\n\nDr. Brown also endeavours to bring this mode of reasoning to bear\nagainst the absurdity which supposes thought to be a _quality_ of a\ncollection of particles arranged in the form of an organ, but not a\nquality of single particles. But it is evident that the arguments which\nentirely demolish one error, leave the other entirely untouched. The\nweakness of Dr. Brown's argument, when wrongfully applied against the\nlast-named error, will more fully appear by reference to his own words\nwhich read as follows:--\n\n\"Even though it were admitted, however, in opposition to one of the\nclearest truths in science, that an organ is something more than a mere\nname for the separate and independent bodies which it denotes, and\nthat our various feelings are states of the sensorial organ, it must\nstill be allowed that, if two hundred particles existing in a certain\nstate form a doubt, the division of these into two equal aggregates\nof the particles, as they exist in this state at the moment of that\nparticular feeling, would form halves of a doubt; that all the truths\nof arithmetic would be predicable of each separate thought, if it were\na state of a number of particles.\"\n\nBy a little reflection it will be seen that Dr. Brown's inference is\nentirely unfounded. \"If two hundred particles existing in a certain\nstate form a doubt,\" it does not necessarily follow that \"the division\nof these into two equal aggregates of the particles,\" would form\nhalves of a doubt. If two hundred pounds weight attached to a certain\nmachine will produce a result called _motion,_ it does not necessarily\nfollow that one hundred pounds will produce a result called _half of\na motion._ If exactly two hundred particles organized in a certain\nform, were requisite to produce a certain thought, then it is evident\nthat to alter in the least either the number or organization would\nbe a complete destruction of that particular thought, instead of\nforming fractions of it. This is what Priestley and his followers\nassert. They say that thought begins and ends with the organization,\nand that the single individuals entering into the system, form no\nthought nor fractions of a thought. This absurdity, therefore, remains\nuntouched by this argument of Dr. Brown. It is effectually demolished,\nhowever, by another species of argument, used by him to which we have\nalready referred. He has proved Priestley's theory to be false, not\nby supposing that the fractions of a doubt could be made to result\nfrom it, but by clearly showing that an organ is only a name for a\ncollection of many substances, which cannot possibly possess any\nproperty as a whole, which the individuals do not possess when existing\nsingly. He has also proved the theory which asserts that a thought\nor a feeling is a little particle of matter, to be false, because it\ninvolves the absurdity of fractional thoughts, hopes, fears, &c.\n\nBut there is one more theory which we venture to propose, that we\nbelieve to be impregnable, which no philosopher or metaphysician ever\nhas or ever can refute. This theory may be stated as follows:--\n\nA thought, hope, fear, joy, or any other feeling is not a little\nparticle of matter, nor the result or quality of a collection of\nparticles, called an organ or a system or organs, but it is the state\nor affection of a single individual substance, having extension and\nparts, and all the essential characteristics belonging to all other\nmatter.\n\nThere is no absurdity in speaking of the half, or of a quarter, or of\nany other fractional part of this substance, but there would be a great\nabsurdity in speaking of the fractional parts of its mere _states_ or\n_affections._ The half or a thousandth part of a thinking substance\nis as reasonable as the half or a thousandth part of an attracting\nsubstance; but the top or bottom of a thought would be as absurd as\nthe top or bottom of attraction. The north or east side of a substance\nwhich remembers, is just as correct as the north or east corners of a\nsubstance which possesses a chemical affinity; but the north side of a\nremembrance would be as inconsistent as the north side of a chemical\naffinity. Hence, none of the arguments which are so successfully\nbrought to bear against the other two theories, will in the least\naffect this. It is invulnerable in every point at which it may be\nassailed.\n\nEvery conceivable part of this substance, however minute, possesses\nthe same property as the whole. A thought, or any other state of\nfeeling is, therefore, perceived by every possible part of which a\nwhole consists. A unity of substance, as we have already had occasion\nto remark, consists of an immense number of fractional parts. These,\nin order to constitute _unity,_ must be so closely connected with, and\nrelated to each other, that whatever state or affection one may happen\nto be in, all the rest must immediately be notified of the same. If one\npart be affected with pain, every other part most be conscious of it.\nIf one part rejoices, hopes, or fears, the whole must, by sympathy,\nrejoice, hope, or fear in the same manner. But if one part could\nsuffer, while another part was unconscious of such suffering; or if\nthe affection of one part had no tendency to affect another, then the\nindividual unity would be destroyed, and the substance would be as many\ndistinct, thinking, feeling beings as there were parts unconscious of\nthe affections of the others.\n\nIt is not necessary that a thinking substance should be limited to\nmagnitudes or quantities that are exceedingly minute in order to\nconstitute a unity. Large amounts of substance are as consistent with\nunity as small ones. But in all cases, whether the quantity be large\nor small, it is necessary that the parts should bear that relation to\neach other, that when one is affected every other should be affected\nalso; otherwise, it could not be a unity. The feeling or thinking\nsubstance of an elephant or whale is as much an individual unity as\nthe feeling substance or spirit of a gnat or animalcul\u0102\u00a6, though the\nmagnitude of the former far exceeds that of the latter. It is the\npeculiar organization or relation of parts in such a manner as to be\nall conscious of each other's affection which constitutes the unity,\nwithout any regard to the size or amount of substance organized.\nWhen the several parts are so organized as to think, remember, hate,\nlove, and feel alike, under the different circumstances to which the\norganization may be exposed, the whole is one individual unity or being.\n\nIf the mind or spirit be of the same magnitude as the body, then the\nimpressions received through the various organs of a human body would\nonly have to be transferred to the distance of about five feet, in\norder that every part of the mind might be alike conscious of such\nimpressions. Let the velocity be ever so rapid, time would be an\nessential ingredient to the transfer of these communications from part\nto part. If they were communicated with the velocity of sound, those\nparts of the mind the most distant from the one first affected, would\nreceive the impression in the two hundredth part of a second. If the\ntransfer were as rapid as light, the impression would be conveyed to\nthe most distant extremities of the mind in the two hundred millionth\npart of a second. These inconceivably minute portions of time would be\naltogether imperceptible to the mind. Hence, whenever any part of the\nmind is affected through its sensorial organs, every other part seems\nto be affected in the same instant, whereas, in reality, the affection\nis conveyed successively from part to part, the same as sound or light\nis conveyed from a sounding or a luminous body.\n\nThe conveyance of internal thoughts or emotions of any kind form one\npart of the mind to the other, is probably equal in velocity to the\ntransfer of the various notions gained by sensation. Therefore, in\nconsequence of the inconceivable velocity with which all thoughts and\nsensations are conveyed from one extremity of the mind to another, it\nis impossible for one part of the mind to have a thought, sensation, or\nfeeling of any kind which the other parts of the mind can, during any\nterm of time that is appreciable, be ignorant of. It is for this reason\nthat the _whole_ of the mind thinks,--the whole of the mind loves,--the\n_whole_ of the mind hates,--the _whole_ of the mind wills, &c.\n\nIf the term of time were of any appreciable length in which thoughts\nand feelings are conveyed from one part of the perceptive mind to the\nother, then, while one part of the mind was hating an object, another\npart of the same mind might be loving it because of newly discovered\nqualities; and while a part of the mind in one foot was suffering\nintense pain, caused by treading upon hot iron, another part of the\nmind in the other foot, not having had time to receive the information,\nwould venture also into the same danger.\n\nWere it possible for the different parts of the mind to feel and think\nwithout being able to communicate their respective feelings to each\nother, then every part that thus thought and felt, would be a distinct\nindividual, as much so as if it were separated for miles from all\nthe rest, or, as if it were a separate organization. In this case,\nthe whole being or mind which we before termed I, would cease its\nindividual unity; and each part which thought and felt independently,\ncould appropriate to itself the term I, and with the greatest propriety\ncould apply the term YOU to every other part which thought and felt\ndistinctly and differently from itself.\n\nIt is, therefore, because all parts of the mind seem to be affected in\nthe same way, and apparently at the same time, that it is felt to be\na single individual mind. It is this, and this only, that constitutes\nthe unity of a thinking being, and not, as the immaterialist asserts, a\nsomething \"without parts,\" which from its very nature could constitute\nneither a unity, nor a plurality, nor any thing else, but nothing.\n\nIf the human spirit be nearly the same form and magnitude as the\nfleshly tabernacle in which it dwells, it must be composed of an\nimmense number of particles, each of which is susceptible of almost an\ninfinite variety of thoughts, emotions, and feelings. Whence originated\nthese susceptibilities? Are they the results of organization? Did each\nparticle obtain its susceptibilities by being united with others? This\nwould be impossible; for if a particle were entirely destitute of the\ncapacity of thinking and feeling, no possible organization could impart\nto it that power. The power to think and feel, is not, nor can not be\nderived from any arrangement of particles. If they have not this power\nbefore organization, they can never have it afterwards. It follows\nthen, that if ever there were a time when the particles of the human\nspirit existed in a disorganized state, each particle so existing,\nmust have had all the susceptibilities of feeling and thought that it\nnow has; and, consequently, each particle must have been a separate\nindependent being of itself. Therefore, under such circumstances, one\nparticle would have been no more affected with the state or condition\nof others, than one man is affected with the pleasures or pains of\nothers with whom he is not associated.\n\nHow, then, it may be asked, can these separate independent beings,\nbe so united as to form but one being, possessing the same\nsusceptibilities as each of the individuals of which it is composed?\nThe answer to this question may be more clearly understood by the\nfollowing illustration. Let a certain number of iron filings exist\nin a scattered condition, widely separated from each other. It is\nevident that each possesses the susceptibility of magnetism. Such\nas are brought within the influence of a loadstone or magnet, under\nfavourable circumstances, will exhibit all the magnetic phenomena,\nwhile others unconnected and at a distance, will remain entirely\nunaffected. But let all these filings be firmly united together into\none bar of iron, and be exposed to the influence of a magnet or\nloadstone, and they will then be affected alike. Those which were\nbefore the union distinct individual particles, exhibiting at the\nsame time different susceptibilities and qualities, according to the\ndifferent circumstances in which they were placed,--are, by their\nunion, consolidated into one mass. In this condition, if one part\nbe magnetized, the whole will be magnetized; if one part be moved,\nthe whole will be moved. Therefore the particles in this bar, though\ndistinct parts of the same substance, can no longer be considered\ndistinct individuals, because they are no longer affected differently,\nbut alike. So it is with the human spirit: its particles previous to\nthe organization, are, as above stated, separate and distinct beings,\nand the affections of each are entirely independent of the state of\nthe others. But when organized into a person, all particles must from\nhenceforth be subject to the same influences; and though they are\ndistinct parts of the same substance, yet they are one in all their\nthoughts and feelings; and it is this which constitutes individuality\nin all intelligent organizations.\n\nIf a bar of iron, weighing one pound, had the power of expressing its\ndifferent qualities, it could with the greatest propriety say, I am\nheavy--I am magnetized--I move. The term I would represent the whole\nbar, consisting of an infinite number of parts,--all affected precisely\nin the same moment and in the same manner. Now no one would for a\nmoment suppose the pound of iron to be immaterial and without parts,\nbecause the term I was representative of a single individual bar. So\nlikewise in the expressions, I think,--I feel,--I remember; the term\nI is a representative of the whole being, every part of which thinks,\nfeels, and remembers in the same moment and in the same manner.\n\nThe arguments which Dr. Brown has used (Brown's Philosophy of the\nHuman Mind. Lecture XCVI.) against the materiality of the mind, would\napply with the same force against the materiality of iron or any other\nsubstance; for if thought or feeling prove the unity and inextension of\nmind,--weight, magnetism, or motion will, with as much reason, prove\nthe unity and inextension of iron.\n\nMr. Taylder has asserted that \"The Materialism of the Mormons is not\nonly unscriptural, but anti-scriptural.\" (Taylder against Materialism,\npage 21.)\n\n1.--He undertakes to show that it is unscriptural, by asserting that\nit is \"in opposition to the _spirituality_ of the Divinity.\" (Taylder\nagainst Materialism, page 22.)\n\nWe readily admit that any system which is \"in opposition to the\n_spirituality_ of the Divinity,\" is not only unscriptural but\ndangerously false. That the Spirits of the Father and the Son, as well\nas the Holy Spirit, consist of a substance purely spiritual, can by\nno means be denied by any believer in the sacred scriptures. It is a\ndoctrine firmly believed by us and all the Latter-day Saints. It is a\ndoctrine most definitely expressed and advocated in our pamphlet on the\nKingdom of God, and that, too, on the very page from which Mr. Taylder\nmakes copious extracts. It is there that we have definitely spoken of\n\"_the_ SPIRITS _of the Father and Son_:\" it is there that we speak of\nthe Holy SPIRIT: it there that we have expressly said that \"_God is a\nSPIRIT_.\" And yet in the face of all these declarations Mr. Taylder\nhas had the hardihood to say that our theory is \"in opposition to the\nspirituality of the Divinity.\" Instead of this, it is the material\ntheory alone that establishes the very existence, of Spirit. Take\naway the _materiality_ of Spirit, and you at once destroy its very\nexistence, as we have abundantly shown in the foregoing pages.\n\nThe immaterialists have aimed a deadly blow at the foundation of\nall spiritual existence, by denying it extension and parts. We, in\nopposition to this unphilosophic, unscriptural, and atheistical\ndoctrine, have most clearly expressed our belief in a real tangible\nsubstance called Spirit, which has extension and parts, like all other\nmatter.\n\n\"In the case of the angels' visit to Abraham, and of their partaking\nof food, who,\" inquiries Mr. Taylder, \"would conclude they must have\nfleshy bodies?\" (Taylder against Materialism, page 24.) We answer\nthat a \"_fleshly body_\" and a _spiritual body_ are entirely different\nthings. One is a body of material flesh; the other is a body of\nmaterial spirit--they are entirely different kinds of matter, as much\nso as iron and oxygen. Jesus says, \"God is a Spirit;\" and again he\nsays, \"a Spirit hath not flesh and bones.\" From these sayings of Jesus,\nwe can see that spiritual matter and fleshy or bony matter are distinct\nsubstances. These passages are sometimes quoted as a supposed proof of\nimmateriality. But everyone knows that there are millions of substances\nthat are not flesh and bones. A house, a stone, or a tree, \"hath not\nflesh and bones,\" any more than a spirit; shall we therefore say that\nall these substances are _immaterial_? If a spirit must be _immaterial_\nbecause it hath not flesh and bones, then every substance in the\nuniverse, except flesh and bones, must be immaterial.\n\nMr. Taylder supposes that the persons who appeared to Abraham, and\nate, and walked, and conversed with him, were only \"_bodily forms_,\"\n\"_assumed_ in _mercy_ to man.\" But, we ask, how does our author know\nbut what these bodily forms were the real, true, substantial forms of\nthese beings, instead of assumed ones? He seems to think that \"it might\nbe assumed, with equal propriety, that the Divine Being is 'a rock,' 'a\nfortress,' 'a tower,' 'a shield,' 'a buckler,' because he is so styled\nin the bible.\" But did he ever appear in the form of a \"rock,\" or \"a\nfortress,\" to any person anciently? Did he ever appear to Abraham,\nto Jacob, to Moses, to the Seventy Elders of Israel, to Micaiah, to\nIsaiah, or to the Jewish nation, when he walked among them, in the\nflesh, as a tower, a shield, or a buckler? No: he appeared to them all\nas a person. If the three persons whom Abraham saw had appeared like a\nshield, or any other inanimate thing, they would not have been called\nmen. It was because they resembled the human species that they were\nthus called.\n\nMr. Taylder says, \"this scheme contradicts itself; for if Christ were\npossessed of a body of flesh and blood, how could he become incarnate?\nThe Mormons believe,\" continues he, \"in the incarnation, but this\ncontradicts it. Their doctrine implies that he had a _body before_ he\nwas incarnate, or he had a body before he had a body, or he had a body\nand had not a body at the same time.\" (Taylder's Tract, page 26.)\n\nThis author must be very ignorant of our doctrine if he supposes\nthat we think that Christ had \"a body of flesh and blood\" before his\nincarnation. Christ, before his incarnation, was a spiritual body, and\nnot a body of flesh and bones. It was the body of his spirit and not\na fleshly body that was with the Father in the beginning, when God\nsaid, \"let us make man in our likeness and in our image.\" Whenever he\nappeared before he dwelt in flesh, it was the pure spiritual matter\nonly that was seen. The spiritual body of Christ has hands, face, feet,\nand all other members, the same as his body of flesh and bones. The\nspiritual bodies of all men were in the likeness of the spiritual body\nof Christ when they were first created.\n\nThat spiritual bodies are capable of condensation, is evident from\nthe fact of their occupying the small bodies of infants. The spirits\nof just men, who have departed from the fleshly tabernacle, have been\nseen by the inspired writers; and from their description of them, we\nshould not only judge them to be of the same _form_, but likewise of\nabout the same size as man in this life. These departed spirits, then,\nwhich are about the same magnitude as men in the flesh, once occupied\ninfant bodies. There are only two methods by which to account for their\nincrease in magnitude; one is by an additional quantity of spiritual\nmatter, being gradually and continually incorporated in the spiritual\nbody, by which its magnitude is increased in the same way and in the\nsame proportion as the fleshly body is increased. And the other is by\nits elasticity or expansive properties by which it increases in size,\nas the tabernacle of flesh and bones increases, until it attains to\nits natural magnitude, or until its expansive and cohesive properties\nbalance each other, or are in a state of equilibrium.\n\nThe latter method seems to be in accordance with scripture. The\nspiritual body of Christ, when seen previous to his incarnation, is not\nrepresented as an infant in stature, but as a man, and consequently his\nspirit must have been of the size of a man. Therefore, when he came and\ndwelt in the infant tabernacle of flesh, born of a virgin, his spirit\nmust have been greatly condensed; and did not completely regain its\nformer magnitude until the fleshly tabernacle had attained its full\ngrowth.\n\nAs a further evidence of the condensation of spiritual matter, we read\nof seven devils beings cast out of Mary Magdalene, and of a legion of\nothers inhabiting one man, and which, after being cast out, entered a\nlarge herd of swine. Now these devils were once angels who kept not\ntheir first estate. Those angels who kept their first estate, that have\nbeen seen, appear about the size and of the form of men, insomuch that\nthey are frequently called men in the scriptures: and it is reasonable\nto suppose that those angels who fell did not, to any great extent,\nalter their size and form. Therefore, they must have been very much\ncondensed and crowded when a legion of them entered one body.\n\nThat the different particles of a spirit are not all in actual contact\nis very evident from the fact that a spiritual body can alter its\ndimensions by condensation or expansion. It is also evident from\nthe fact of its entering into union with flesh and bones, and also\nwithdrawing itself at death. If the particles were in contact, and\ninseparably connected, there would be no possibility of getting in\nand out of a fleshly body, unless by entirely dissolving its parts.\nBut, as it is, each refined particle of the spirit can, like heat or\nelectricity, pass between the fleshly particles; and thus the whole\nbody of spiritual particles can liberate themselves; and by their own\nself-moving powers and free will, can still preserve and maintain their\nown organization. Here is manifested the great superiority of spiritual\nmatter to all other matter; each particle has the power of self-motion.\nThe whole mass of particles have power to preserve themselves in an\norganized form as long as they please. Should they, by any contingency,\nbe disarranged, as in passing in or out of a body, they can with the\ngreatest ease, resume their former position, and maintain their bodily\norganization either in or out of a fleshly tabernacle.\n\nMr. Taylder, in speaking of the seven devils which possessed Mary\nMagdalene, says, if they were material they must have \"_condensed_\nthemselves into a very small space.\" He then remarks, \"No doubt the\nreader questions the possibility of any sane person, first embracing\nand then calmly propagating such errors. (Taylder's Tract, page 28.)\nBut we calmly ask Mr. Taylder, which would be the most reasonable\nand philosophic,--to believe that seven substances could all occupy\nthe same space at the same time, or to believe, as we do, in the\n_condensation_ of substance? The former is an admitted absurdity, but\nthe latter is something that is constantly taking place in a great\nvariety of substances. None could believe the former, unless his mental\nvision was obscured and his eyes blinded by the absurd insane notions\nof priestcraft and false tradition; but any man of sound sense, who\ndares think for himself, could believe the latter, because it does not\ninvolve an absurdity.\n\n\"The Holy Ghost descended in a bodily shape like a dove\" upon the\nSaviour, and like \"as cloven tongues of fire\" on the apostles.\n\"How can a dove,\" inquires Mr. Taylder, \"extend through all space\nand intermingle with all the matter?\" \"It is (he asserts) a clear\nimpossibility.\" We readily admit that a dove or a cloven tongue of\nfire cannot be omnipresent. It is, as Mr. Taylder says, \"_a clear\nimpossibility_.\" And it is likewise just as impossible for a _person_\nto be everywhere present, as it is for a dove. Why should our author\nsuppose it possible for a person to be everywhere present, when he\nadmits that a dove could not be in such a condition? The \"_cloven\ntongues of fire_\" that appeared unto the disciples on the day of\npentecost, were only parts of that all-wise substance which extends\nthrough space. The cloven tongue of fire which rested upon one man,\nwas not the same that rested upon all the others; hence there was a\n_plurality_ of them that appeared. The prophet Joel informs us, that\nin the last days the Spirit shall be poured out upon _all flesh._ No\ntwo persons can receive the same identical particles of this Spirit at\nthe same instant; a part therefore of the Holy Spirit will rest upon\none man, and another part will rest upon another. If the Spirit rests\nupon all flesh at the same time, then there will be as many parts of\nthe Spirit as there are distinct individuals in whom it dwells. No one\nof these parts of the Spirit can be everywhere present any more than a\ndove. Each part can occupy only one place at a time. If the whole be\ninfinite in quantity, it can extend through infinite space; if it be\nfinite in quantity, it can only occupy finite space.\n\nThat different parts of this spirit can assume different shapes, is\nevident from its appearing as a dove at one time, and as cloven tongues\nof fire at another. It is also evident from the fact of the Saviour's\nspeaking of the Holy Spirit as a personage. \"Howbeit, when _he_ the\nSpirit of truth, is come, HE will guide you into all truth; for HE\nshall not speak of himself, but whatsoever HE shall hear, that shall HE\nspeak: and HE will shew you things to come.\" (John, xvi., 13.) There is\nno more inconsistency in one part of the Holy Spirit existing in the\nform of a person, than there is in another part existing in the form of\na dove, and several other parts existing in the form of cloven tongues\nof fire.\n\nThat the all-powerful matter called the Holy Spirit is very widely\ndiffused, is evident from the fact that the time will come when it will\nbe poured out upon all flesh. It is very certain that the Psalmist\nhad some idea of the immense quantities of this substance, and of its\nextensive diffusion, when he exclaims, \"Whither shall I go from thy\nSpirit?\" &c. The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the deep, and by\nhis Spirit the heavens were garnished. When we speak of the Spirit of\nGod, extending through all space, we do not mean that it absolutely\nfills every minute portion of space, for if this were the case, there\nwould be no room for any other matter. A substance, to absolutely fill\nall space, would be an infinite solid, without pores and immovable\nin all its parts; therefore, the Spirit exists in different parts\nof space in greater or less degrees of density, like heat, light,\nor electricity. It is this glorious and all-powerful substance that\ngoverns and controls all other substances by its actual presence,\nproducing all the phenomena ascribed to the laws of nature; in it we\nexist, we live, we move, and by it we receive wisdom and knowledge, and\nare guided into truth in proportion as we permit it to dwell within us\nand receive its heavenly teachings.\n\n2.--\"The next consideration,\" says our author, \"is their denial of the\ninfinity, perfection, and omnipresence of the Godhead.\" (Taylder's\nTract, page 31.) Under this head he quotes many passages of scripture\nto show that the presence of God fills heaven and earth, and that\nthe heaven of heavens cannot contain him. All these things we freely\nadmit. The Holy Spirit is called God in the scriptures, as well as the\nFather and Son. This, we presume, Mr. Taylder will admit. It is God,\nthe Holy Spirit, then, that is everywhere, substantially and virtually.\nThe Holy Spirit is infinitely perfect and wise, one in substance, but\none in wisdom, power, glory, and goodness. Jesus prayed that all his\ndisciples might be made one, as he and his Father are one. If Jesus\nand the Father are one person, then all the disciples must, according\nto the prayer of Jesus, lose their individual identity and become one\nperson: this would be perfect nonsense. Therefore, Jesus and the Father\nare two persons or two substances, the same in kind but not the same in\nidentity--in the same sense that his disciples are different persons:\nand, consequently, distinct substances. His disciples are to be made\none with him, and with each other, the same as Jesus and the Father are\none; that is, they are to be one in wisdom, power, and glory, but not\nin person and substance. The substance of the Father, Son, and Holy\nGhost are three distinct substances, as much as the substance of three\nmen are distinct.\n\nThese three substances act in concert in the same way that all the\ninnumerable millions of his disciples, after they are glorified,\nwill act in concert. The disciples will then be like him. Their\nglorified bodies will be similar to that of Christ's but not the same\nas Christ's: they will all maintain their separate individualities,\nlike the Father and Son. The one-ness of the Godhead may be in some\nmeasure illustrated by two gallons of pure water, existing in separate\nvessels, representing the Father and Son, and an ocean of pure water,\nrepresenting the Holy Spirit. No one would say of these three portions\nof water that they were identically the same. Every portion would be a\nseparate substance of itself, but yet the separate portions would be\none in kind--one in quality, but three in separate distinct identities.\nSo it is with the Godhead so far as the spiritual matter is concerned.\nThere is the same power, wisdom, glory, and goodness in every part, and\nyet every part has its own work to perform, which accords in the most\nperfect harmony with the mind and will of every other part.\n\nEach atom of the Holy Spirit is intelligent, and like all other matter\nhas solidity, form, and size. It is because each acts in the most\nperfect unison with all the rest that the whole is considered one Holy\nSpirit. All these innumerable atoms are considered one Holy Spirit in\nthe same sense that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are considered\none God. The immense number of atoms, though each is all-wise and\nall-powerful, is, by virtue of their perfect concord and agreement,\nbut one Holy Spirit, the same as the intelligent particles of a man's\nspirit are, by their peculiar union, but one human spirit. Their unity\nor oneness does not consist in that inexplicable, incomprehensible,\nimaginary something without extension or parts, as taught in the first\nof the \"Thirty-nine Articles,\" but it consists in a unity or oneness of\nwisdom, power, and glory, each part performing its own splendid works\nand operations in union with the mind and will of every other part.\nNo one part can perform any work but what is the mind of the whole.\nTherefore, in this sense it is the same mind--the same will--the same\nwisdom that pervades the whole.\n\nMr. Taylder, in order to establish his views of a god without parts,\nquotes from the theological works of a very celebrated writer on the\nomnipresence of God, which reads as follows:--\n\n\"The essential presence is without any division of himself. I fill\nheaven and earth, not part in heaven and part in earth: I fill one\nas well as the other. One part of his essence is not in one place,\nand another part of his essence in another place; he would then be\nchangeable, for that part of his essence which was now in this place\nhe might alter to another, and place that part of his essence which\nwere in another place to this; but he is undivided everywhere. It is\nimpossible that one part of his essence can be separated from another:\nfor he is not a body, to have one part separable from another. The\nlight of the sun cannot be cut into parts; it cannot be shut into any\nplace, and kept there; it is entire in every place: shall not God, who\ngives the light that power, be much more present himself? Whatsoever\nhath parts is finite, but God is infinite; therefore, hath no parts\nof his essence. Besides, if there were such a division of his being,\nhe would not be the most simple and uncompounded being, but would be\nmade up of various parts; he would not be a spirit, for parts are\nevidences of composition, and it could not be said that God is here or\nthere, but only a part of God is here and a part of God is there. But\nhe fills heaven and earth; he is as much a God in the earth beneath as\nhe is in heaven above. 'The Lord he is God in heaven above and upon\nthe earth beneath; there is none else.'--Deut. iv. 39. Entirely in all\nplaces, not by scraps and fragments of his essence.\" (Charnock on the\n\"Omnipresence of God.\")\n\nOf all the absurdities ever imagined up by mortal man in relation\nto God, the above caps the climax. \"One part of his essence,\" says\nCharnock, \"is not in one place and another part of his essence in\nanother place.\" How does he exist? According to this theologian, the\nwhole of the essence of God entire must exist in every place. The whole\nof his essence, not a part, must exist in every cubic inch of space.\nIn one cubic foot of space, according to Charnock, there would be\nseventeen hundred and twenty eight cubic inches, each containing the\nwhole of the essence of God. As each cubic inch of space is susceptible\nof being divided into an infinite number of fractional spaces, each\nfractional space must contain the whole of the essence of God; hence\nthe whole of his essence would be repeated an infinite number of times\nin every cubic inch. Therefore, if the whole of the essence of God\nconstitutes God, we shall have an infinite number of gods in every\ncubic inch of space.\n\nBut the absurdity does not stop here. Charnock admits the omnipresence\nof God; he supposes his essence to fill the infinity of space. Now the\nwhole of this infinitely extended essence must exist in the smallest\nfractional space that can be imagined, and must be repeated an infinite\nnumber of times in all finite spaces, in order that the whole of his\nessence may be in every possible space.\n\n\"It is impossible,\" says Charnock, \"that one part of his essence can be\nseparated from another.\" But, we ask, are not the different parts of\nspace separated from each other? And if he fills all space, then his\nessence that is in one part of space must be separate from his essence\nin another part of space. If the whole of his essence occupies a cubic\nfoot of space on the earth, and the whole of his essence occupies\nanother cubic foot of space at the distance of the sun, how is it that\nthese essences at this great distance are not separate from each other?\nBut does not every school-boy know that the whole of any essence cannot\nbe in two separate places at the same instant? And does not every one\nknow that the whole of an essence, infinitely extended, cannot possibly\nexist in a finite space.\n\nCharnock endeavours to illustrate his absurdities by referring to\nthe rays of light. \"The light of the sun,\" he says, \"cannot be cut\ninto parts,\"--_it is entire in every place_.\" What does this great\ntheologian mean by this? Does he mean that the light of the sun is\nwithout parts like his god? or that the whole light of the sun is in\nevery place? Does the whole light of the sun enter our eyes or only a\npart of his rays? If the whole light of the sun \"is entire in every\nplace,\" then the intensity of his light must be equal in all places. If\nthis be the case, philosophers must be entirely mistaken, for they say\nthat light varies in intensity inversely as the square of the distance\nfrom the luminous body; they inform us that a body situated at twice\nor three times the distance of the earth from the sun will enjoy only\none-fourth or one-ninth of the amount of light that we enjoy; but how\ncould this be possible, if the whole light of the sun, instead of part,\n\"is entire in every place?\"\n\nIt takes light over eight minutes to come from the sun to the earth.\nCharnock says, \"The light of the sun cannot be cut into parts.\" This\nis not true; for if an opaque body, one million of miles in diameter,\nwere to be placed at any given instant half way between the earth and\nsun, the light of the sun would still continue to be seen for upwards\nof four minutes after the intervention of this body. The rays of light\nbetween the earth and the opaque body would be entirely cut off from\nthe rays on the opposite side of the body.\n\nIt matters not whether the corpuscular or the undulatory theory of\nlight be adopted--whether the particles of light emanate from the sun\nor merely vibrate; each atom is separate from every other atom, and\neach is only a part of the great whole. An infinite number of parts\nenter into the vast assemblage of luminous atoms. Light radiates from\nthe sun in all directions, and fills the surrounding spaces by a part\nbeing in one space and a part in another, and not, like Mr. Charnock's\ngod, the whole being repeated in every part of space. That part of the\nessence of light which is in one place, cannot by any possibility be in\nany other place at the same instant. In one sense it may be said to be\none light, or the same light, because the properties are alike. Each\nparticle is a distinct, separate essence from every other particle, but\nthe qualities of each are alike or similar. Therefore, in this sense we\nmay speak of the light of the sun as _one_ light, though it possesses\nan infinite number of parts, the same as we speak of God being one God,\nthough the parts of his essence are infinite in number. Mr. Charnock\nsays, \"Whatsoever hath parts is finite, but God is infinite, and,\ntherefore, hath not parts of his essence.\" Space likewise is infinite,\nand therefore, according to this gentleman's logic, it can have no\nparts. Duration is infinite, and, therefore, it also must be without\nparts. What would a cubic inch of space be? Any man that was not insane\nwould at once say that it is a part of space. Therefore, if an infinite\nspace or an infinite duration can have parts, why not an infinite\nessence have parts?\n\n\"The Lord he is God in heaven above and upon the earth beneath; there\nis none else.\"--Deut. iv. 39. Such a passage when referring to the\nperson of God, should be understood the same as we would understand\na similar expression concerning any earthly ruler: for instance, it\ncan be said of her Majesty, she is queen in Great Britain and also in\nCanada, and there is none else; that is, there is none else that is\nqueen in these two places. This would have no reference to her person\nbeing in these two places at the same time; it only shows that she\nshould be the only acknowledged queen in these two places. But when God\nsays, \"I fill heaven and earth,\" he has reference to his Holy Spirit,\na part of which fills heaven, and another part fills the earth. That\npart which fills the earth has the same wisdom, knowledge, glory,\nand power as the part that fills the heaven; hence, though distinct\nand separate essences, their perfections and attributes are one. One\nwisdom--one glory--one power, pervade every part of this glorious\nessence. This oneness is such that the part which fills the earth will\nnever act contrary to the will of the part which fills the heavens.\nThe essence possesses a plurality of parts, but the wisdom possesses\nno divisibility of parts; it is infinite wisdom in every part. Wisdom\ncannot be divided into parts any more than love, hope, joy, or fear.\nA truth is identically the same truth whether possessed by one or\na million of persons, and is not susceptible of being divided into\nfractions. The Holy Spirit is called \"_The Spirit of Truth_.\" Though\nthe essence that possesses this truth may be divided into an infinite\nnumber of parts, occupying an infinite number of separate spaces, yet\nthe truth that pervades them all is ONE truth. It is the indivisibility\nand unity of these perfections or qualities that constitute the oneness\nof the Godhead.\n\n3.--Mr. Taylder supposes my assertion that \"there is no such thing as\nmoral image,\" to be unscriptural, and that \"it denies in some respects\nthe moral perfections of the Godhead.\" (Taylder's Tract, page 33.)\n\nWe still maintain that there cannot be any such thing as moral image\nindependently of an essence or substance to which it belongs. And this\nis the only sense which we intended to convey in our tract on the\n\"KINGDOM OF GOD.\" Indeed, it is there expressly said, that \"Morality is\na property of some being or substance. A property without a substance\nor being to which it appertains is inconceivable. A property can never\nhave figure, shape, or image of any kind.\" This is a truth admitted\nby all philosophers. Sir Isaac Newton in the Scholium, at the end of\nthe \"_principia_,\" in speaking of God says, \"He is omnipresent, not by\nmeans of his _virtue_ alone, but also by his _substance,_ for virtue\ncannot subsist without substance.\" Virtue or morality cannot subsist\nwithout _substance;_ hence it can have no _image_ without substance.\nSubstance alone can have an image. Such an image may have the property\nof virtue, or of morality, and by reason of this property may be\ncalled a virtuous image, or a moral image. It is in this sense alone\nthat the apostle Paul applies the term image to the new man. \"Ye have\nput on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge, after the image\nof him that created him.\" Col. iii. 10. \"Ye have put on the new man,\nwhich after God is created in righteousness and true holiness.\" Eph.\niv. 24. Now what is this new man? It is the spirit of man renewed in\nits properties, but not changed in its substance or essence. This\nsubstance previously to the renewal of its qualities was immoral, after\nthe renewal it became moral or virtuous, possessing the same quality\nin a degree as the substance or image of the Deity. The substance of\nthe Deity may be termed a moral substance or image, the same as the\nsubstance of gold is called a yellow substance, or yellow image, if\nit resembles a person. The yellowness of gold could not be an image\nindependently of the substance, neither could the morality of the Deity\nbe an image independently of his essence.\n\nThe spiritual substance of man was formed in the beginning after the\nsame image as the spiritual substance of the persons of the Father\nand Son. Previously to the fall these spirits were all moral in their\nnature; by the fall the spirits of men lost their morality and virtue,\nbut not their essence--that continued the same; by the new birth man\nregains his morality and virtue, while the essence remains the same;\nit now becomes a moral virtuous image, whereas the same substance was\nbefore immoral. Paul, in speaking of the resurrection, says, \"As we\nhave borne the image of the earthly, we shall also bear the image of\nthe heavenly.\" I Cor. xv. 49.\n\nThis cannot mean a heavenly image without substance; for when man\nrises from the dead, he certainly will rise with flesh and bones. The\nimmortal bodies of the saints when they rise from the grave \"will\nbe fashioned,\" as Paul says, \"like unto the glorious body of Jesus\nChrist.\" As Jesus ascended into heaven with a body of flesh and bones,\nso will his saints bear the same image, having flesh and bones after\n\"the image of the heavenly.\" That these glorious bodies of immortal\nflesh and immortal bones will be moral images, in the sense above\nstated, there is no doubt. But such a thing as a moral image in the\nsense that the immaterialists use the term, is a clear impossibility.\nSuch an image, as we remarked in our treatise on the \"KINGDOM OF GOD,\"\nnever can and never will have \"an existence only in the brains of\nmodern idolaters.\"\n\n4.--Mr. Taylder falsely accuses us of denying \"the _personality_ of\neach person in the Trinity, making each to be only a part in the\nGodhead.\" (Taylder's Tract, page 34.)\n\nThis author very well knows that the personalities in the godhead\nare not denied by us. It will be seen on the very pages to which he\nhas so frequently referred, that we believe the Father and Son to be\ntwo separate distinct personages, as much so as fathers and sons of\nthe human race; it will there be seen that we also believe the Holy\nspirit to be a separate distinct substance from the two substances of\nthe Father and Son. That all may see that this author has wrongfully\naccused us of denying \"the personality of each person in the Trinity,\"\nwe make the following extract from our treatise on the \"KINGDOM OF GOD.\"\n\n\"The Godhead consists of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The\nFather is a material being. The substance of which he is composed is\nwholly material. It is a substance widely different in some respects\nfrom the various substances with which we are more immediately\nacquainted. In other respects it is precisely like all other materials.\nThe substance of his person occupies space the same as other matter.\nIt has solidity, length, breadth, and thickness, like all other\nmatter. The elementary materials of his body are not susceptible of\noccupying, at the same time, the same identical space with other\nmatter. The substance of his person, like other matter, cannot be in\ntwo places at the same instant. It also requires _time_ for him to\ntransport himself from place to place. It matters not how great the\nvelocity of his movements, _time_ is an essential ingredient to all\nmotion, whether rapid or slow. It differs from other matter in the\nsuperiority of its powers, being intelligent, all-wise, and possessing\nthe power of self-motion to a far greater extent than the coarser\nmaterials of nature. \"God is a _spirit_.\" But that does not make him\nan immaterial being--a being that has no properties in common with\nmatter. The expression, \"_an immaterial being_,\" is a contradiction\nin terms. Immateriality is only another name for nothing. It is the\nnegative of all existence. A \"_spirit_\" is as much _matter_ as oxygen\nor hydrogen. It has many properties in common with all other matter.\nChemists have discovered between fifty and sixty kinds of matter; and\neach kind has some properties in common with all other matter, and some\nproperties peculiar to itself which the others do not inherit. Now,\nno chemist in classifying his substances would presume to say, this\nsubstance is material, but that one is immaterial, because it differs\nin some respects from the first. He would call them all material,\nthough they in some respects differed widely. So the substance called\nspirit is material, though it differs in a remarkable degree from\nother substances. It is only the addition of another element of a more\npowerful nature than any yet discovered. He is not a being \"without\n_parts_,\" as modern idolators teach; for every whole is made up of\nparts. The whole person of the Father consists of innumerable parts;\nand each part is so situated as to bear certain relations of distance\nto every other part. There must also be, to a certain degree, a freedom\nof motion among these parts, which is an essential condition to the\nmovements of his limbs, without which he could only move as a whole.\n\n\"All the foregoing statements in relation to the person of the Father,\nare equally applicable to the person of the Son.\n\n\"The Holy Spirit being one part of the Godhead, is also a material\nsubstance, of the same nature and properties in many respects, as\nthe spirits of the Father and Son. It exists in vast immeasurable\nquantities, in connexion with all material worlds. This is called\nGod in the Scriptures, as well as the Father and Son. God the Father\nand God the Son cannot be everywhere present; indeed they cannot be\neven in two places at the same instant: but God the Holy Spirit is\nomnipresent--it extends through all space, intermingling with all other\nmatter, yet no one atom of the Holy Spirit can be in two places at\nthe same instant, which in all cases is an absolute impossibility. It\nmust exist in inexhaustible quantities, which is the only possible way\nfor any substance to be omnipresent. All the innumerable phenomena of\nuniversal nature are produced in their origin by the actual presence\nof this intelligent all-wise and all-powerful material substance\ncalled the Holy Spirit. It is the most active matter in the universe,\nproducing all its operations according to fixed and definite laws\nenacted by itself, in conjuction with the Father and the Son. What are\ncalled the laws of nature are nothing more nor less than the fixed\nmethod by which this spiritual matter operates. Each atom of the Holy\nSpirit is intelligent, and like other matter has solidity, form, and\nsize, and occupies space. Two atoms of this spirit cannot occupy the\nsame space at the same time. In all these respects it does not differ\nin the least from all other matter. Its distinguishing characteristics\nfrom other matter are its almighty powers and infinite wisdom, and\nmany other glorious attributes which other materials do not possess.\nIf several of the atoms of this Spirit should exist united together\nin the form of a person, then this person of the Holy Spirit would be\nsubject to the same necessity as the other two persons of the Godhead,\nthat is, it could not be everywhere present. No finite number of atoms\ncan be omnipresent. An infinite number of atoms is requisite to be\n_everywhere_ in infinite space. Two persons receiving the gift of the\nHoly spirit, do not each receive at the same time the same identical\nparticles, though they each receive a substance exactly similar in\nkind. It would be as impossible for each to receive the same identical\natoms at the same instant, as it would be for two men at the same time\nto drink the same identical pint of water.\" (Kingdom of God. Part I,\npage 4.)\n\nFrom this extract it will be perceived that the Father, Son, and Holy\nSpirit, are believed by us to be three distinct material substances,\nthe same in kind, but not the same in identity. The person of the\nFather is a body of Spirit, consisting of parts. Mr. Taylder enquires,\n\"What does the author mean by 'the _elementary_ materials of his\nbody?' Is his body a compounded substance, capable of being reduced to\noriginal and simple elements?\" We answer that the _elements_ of his\nbody are the different parts of which it consists. The _whole,_ being\n\"_compounded_\" of \"_elementary_\" parts.\n\nThe Godhead may be further illustrated by a council, consisting of\nthree men--all possessing equal wisdom, knowledge, and truth, together\nwith equal qualifications in every other respect. Each person would be\na separate distinct person or substance from the other two, and yet the\nthree would form but ONE council. Each alone possesses, by supposition,\nthe same wisdom and truth that the three united or the ONE council\npossesses. The union of the three men in one council would not increase\nthe knowledge or wisdom of either. Each man would be _one part_ of the\ncouncil when reference is made to his person; but the wisdom and truth\nof each man would be the _whole_ wisdom and truth of the council, and\nnot a part. If it were possible to divide truth, and other qualities\nof a similar nature into fractions, so that the Father should have\nthe third part of truth, the third part of wisdom, the third part of\nknowledge, the third part of love, while the Son and the Holy Spirit\npossessed the other two-thirds of these qualities or affections, then\nneither of these persons could make \"_one_ God,\" \"but only a _part_\nof a God.\" But because the divisibility of wisdom, truth, or love is\nimpossible, the _whole_ of these qualities dwell in the Father--the\n_whole_ dwells in the Son--the _whole_ is possessed by the Holy Spirit.\n\"The Holy Spirit is _one part_ of the Godhead\" in essence; the _whole_\nof God in wisdom, truth, and other similar qualities. If a truth\ncould become three truths, distinct from each other, by dwelling in\nthree persons or substances, then there would be _three_ Gods instead\nof _one_. But as it is, the Trinity is _three_ in essence but _one_\nin truth and other similar principles. The oneness of the Godhead,\nas described in the Scriptures, never was intended to apply to the\nessence, but only to the perfections and other attributes.\n\nIf the Father possess infinite wisdom and knowledge, why, some may ask,\ncan he not get along with his work without the assistance of the Son\nand Holy Spirit? We answer, the Son is necessary to reconcile fallen\nman to the Father: the Holy Spirit is necessary to sanctify and purify\nthe affections of men, and also to dwell in them as a teacher of truth.\nImmense quantities of this substance are also necessary in order to be\npresent in connexion with all other substances, to control and govern\nthem according to fixed and definite laws that good order and harmony\nmay obtain in every department of the universe. The Father and Son\ngovern the immensity of creation, not by their own actual presence, but\nby the actual presence of the Spirit. The union of the three does not\ngive any additional wisdom and knowledge to either, but by the union,\nthey are able to carry on certain works which could not be carried on\nby one singly. One singly, as for instance the Father, could have power\nto do all things not inconsistent with his perfections and attributes,\nthat is, he could act where he was present, but without the assistance\nof the Holy Spirit or some other being, he being a person, could not\nact where he is not present. By the union of the three, each is able to\nact in all places through the assistance of the others. The persons of\nthe Father and Son can be in heaven, and yet, through the agency of the\nspirit, act upon the earth. An omnipresent person is impossible, but an\nomnipresent substance, diffused through space, is not only consistent,\nbut reasonable. Persons through the medium of such an all-wise and\nall-powerful substance, can exercise Almighty power, at the same time\nin the most distant departments of creation. Without such a substance\nwith which they were in union, they could not carry on the grand and\npowerful operations of universal nature; for no substance can act where\nit is not present.\n\nPerhaps the objector may refer to matter attracting matter as a proof\nthat it can act where it is not present. But we are bold to affirm that\nsuch a thing as attraction cannot possibly exist. For matter to draw\ndistant matter towards itself, and consequently act where it is not\npresent, would be as utterly impossible as it would be for a person\nto be in two or more places at the same time. All the phenomena of\nuniversal gravitation can be accounted for upon principles infinitely\nmore simple and consistent, than to ascribe to matter the impossible\npower of acting where it is not present. The author may, at some future\ntime, give his views with regard to the powers of nature, and the\nlaws by which it is governed. But to enter in this work into a full\ndevelopment of our theory in relation to those intricate though sublime\nsubjects, would be a digression foreign to the objects we have in view\nin this treatise.\n\nNo doubt many apparent objections to our views of the Godhead will\narise in the minds of many who nave been traditionated in the absurd\ndoctrines of immaterialism. Not long since a series of questions were\npropounded to the Latter-day Saints by the Rev. F. Austin, a Roman\nCatholic minister, a few of which, relating to the nature of God, we\ninsert here together with our answers. (The whole series of questions,\ntogether with the answers, will be published in the \"Millenial Star.\")\n\nQuestion.--\"If the God of the Mormonites be like a man in figure,\nwe must suppose the organs of the senses to have the same uses, and\nto be dependent on the same sources for information; his ears, in\nconsequence, for hearing must be dependent on the transmission of\nsound. How, then, can he hear his people praying to him in Europe when\nhe is in America?\"\n\nAnswer.--Because the _figure_ of two substances are alike, that is no\nevidence that the _qualities_ of the two substances are alike. A wax\nfigure may be in the shape of a man, and yet, we all know, that it\nhas not the qualities of a man. A wise man may have the figure of a\nfoolish man, and yet be far superior to him in the qualities of wisdom,\nknowledge and understanding. God may have the figure of a man, and yet\nhave many qualities and susceptibilities which man has not got. The\nresemblance of figure, then, has nothing to do, as to whether other\nqualities shall be alike or unlike. The spiritual body of the Deity is\naltogether a different kind of substance from the fleshly body of man,\nyet they may resemble each other in figure. The substances are entirely\ndifferent, therefore, though the figures should resemble each other,\nthis is no evidence that all the qualities must be alike. The ear of\nthe fleshly body may be affected by the vibrations of our atmosphere;\nthe ear of a spiritual body may be affected in an entirely different\nmanner, and yet their figures may resemble each other. The ear of\nthe fleshly body may be affected by the vibrations of many elastic\nsubstances besides the atmosphere. Sound is conveyed through various\nmediums with different degrees of velocity. The ear of the spiritual\nbody may be affected, not only by the atmosphere and other elastic\nmediums which affect the ear of flesh, but it also may be affected\nby a vast number of other more subtle and refined mediums, which may\ntransfer sound with a velocity immensely superior to any motion with\nwhich we are acquainted. A refined medium which would convey sound with\nno greater velocity than that of light, would carry information from\nEurope to America in less than the sixtieth part of a second. But if\nGod foreknows all things, he must have foreknown all about our prayers\nmillions of ages before we were born, and must also have foreknown the\nprecise time when we would pray, and the kind of spirit or feeling, and\nthe degree of faith that would accompany each prayer; and if he knew\nall these things before they come to pass, he must certainly know them\nthe moment they do come to pass; and, therefore, with a foreknowledge\nof all things, there would be no necessity for his receiving\ninformation of our prayers by the transmission of sound; he would know\nand understand our prayers the moment they were offered up, the same\nas he knew them and understood them in ages before they were offered\nup. \"He that formed the ear shall he not hear.\" Because God knows the\nnature of music, that is no reason why he may not rejoice in hearing\nmusic. One use, then, of the ears of his spiritual body is, no doubt,\nto hear and rejoice in delightful music, not that it increases his\nknowledge, but it is joyful to his ear. The ear of man serves a double\npurpose; it is not only a medium of information, but a medium of sounds\nthat are delightful to the mind. The ear of the Lord may be delighted\nwith sounds, though he receive no additional knowledge by those sounds.\n\nQuestion--\"If he be like man, his legs must be the organs of motion; if\nnot, what purpose do they serve? If they are, are they good for walking\nthrough the air as well as on land? Or has he wings, or how? or some\norgan of motion we have not got? And if we have not sot this organ, how\ncan we be created to his image and likeness, supposing the resemblance\nin every thing?\"\n\nAnswer.--The resemblance between man and God has reference, as we\nhave already observed, to the shape or figure; other qualities may or\nmay not resemble each other. Man has legs, so has God, as is evident\nfrom his appearance to Abraham. Man walks with his legs, so does God\nsometimes, as is evident from his going with Abraham towards Sodom. God\ncan not only walk, but he can move up or down through the air without\nusing his legs as in the process of walking. (See Gen. xvii. 22; also\nxi. 5; also xxxv. 13.)--\"A man wrestled with Jacob until the breaking\nof day;\" after which, Jacob says--\"I have seen God face to face, and my\nlife is preserved.\"--Gen. xxxii. 24-30. That this person had legs is\nevident from his wrestling with Jacob. His image and likeness was so\nmuch like man's, that Jacob at first supposed him to be a man.--(See\n24th verse.) God, though in the figure of a man, has many powers that\nman has not got. He can go upwards through the air. He can waft himself\nfrom world to world by his own self-moving powers. These are powers not\npossessed by man only through faith, as in the instances of Enoch and\nElijah. Therefore, though in the figure of a man, he has powers far\nsuperior to man.\n\nQuestion--\"When God appears surrounded with glory, is this glory\nessential to him or not? If essential, how can he lay it aside, as he\nseems to have done when he appeared to Abraham? If his appearing so\ndoes not prove it essential, how does his appearance in the form of a\nman prove that form essential to him?\"\n\nAnswer--The glory of God is essential to him under all circumstances,\nwhether his person is visible or invisible--whether man is permitted\nto behold that glory or not. He never lays aside his glory, though he\nmay not always render it visible to mortals. \"The God of glory,\" says\nthe martyr Stephen, \"appeared unto our father Abraham when he was in\nMesopotamia, before he dwelt in Charran\"--Acts, vii. 2. But because he\nshowed Abraham his person, it did not necessarily follow that he must\nalso show him his glory. The person of God is one thing, and his glory\nis another; they are inseparably connected. He cannot divest his person\nof his glory, nor lay it aside, but he can hide his glory from the\ngaze of man, or he can reveal it and his person also, or he can reveal\nhis person and not his glory. The visibility or the invisibility of\nthe glory of God does not render it non-essential to him. The glory is\njust as essential as his image and likeness, and his image or likeness,\nresembling that of man's, is as essential as his glory--neither can be\nlaid aside, though one or both may be rendered visible or invisible.\n\nQuestion.--\"If his presence do not extend beyond his size, that is,\nthe size of a man, how could he divide the waters of the sea--how could\nhe hold them up? If they were a solid mass, it might be conceived;\nbut all the strength in the world won't hold up water; and it must be\nremembered that a person must be present where he acts.\"\n\nAnswer.--He could divide the waters of the sea, and hold them up by the\nactual presence of his Holy Spirit which not only moves upon the face\nof the waters, but is likewise in and through the waters, governing\nthem and controlling all the elements according to the mind of God. It\nis the actual presence of this Spirit that produces all the phenomena\nascribed to the laws of nature, as well as many of the deviations from\nthose laws, commonly called miracles; it extends, like the golden rays\nof the bright luminary of heaven, through all extent; it spreads life\nand happiness through all the varied species of animated beings, and\ngilds the starry firmament with a magnificent splendor, celestial,\nimmortal, and eternal.\n\n_15, Wilton Street, Liverpool, July 31st, 1849_.\n\n----\n\nR. James, Printer, 39, South Castle Street, Liverpool.\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Note\n\nThis ebook aims to reproduce the 1849 Liverpool edition. Signature\nBooks very kindly gave permission for the Mormon Texts Project to use\nthe text of \"Absurdities of Immaterialism\" they originally published\nin \"The Essential Orson Pratt\" (as made available on their website) as\na basis for this work. This text was compared to scans of the pamphlet\nthat Google has helpfully made available. The end of the pamphlet,\nwhich was not in the Signature Books text, was produced based off the\nGoogle scans, and the rest of the text was carefully compared to the\nscans and in a few cases edited to conform more closely.\n\nFootnote citations in the original have been converted to parenthetical\nform to improve readability. Some unmatched quotation marks have been\ncorrected in cases where the correct placement could be established. A\nfew typographical errors (wont for won't, actua for actual) have been\ncorrected.","title":"Absurdities of immaterialism : $b or, a reply to T. W. P. Taylder's pamphlet, entitled, \"The materialism of the Mormons or Latter-Day Saints, examined and exposed.\"","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":25508}