{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_4557/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_4557","id":"gutenberg_4557","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/4557","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Modern (1750+)","Category: History - Other","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","History -- Philosophy","Progress"],"text":"Produced by Steve Harris, Charles Franks and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTHE IDEA OF PROGRESS\n\nAN INQUIRY INTO ITS ORIGIN AND GROWTH\n\n\nBy J. B. Bury\n\nRegius Professor Of Modern History, And Fellow Of King's\nCollege, In The University Of Cambridge\n\n\nDedicated to the memories of Charles Francois Castel de Saint-Pierre,\nMarie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat de Condorcet, Auguste Comte, Herbert\nSpencer, and other optimists mentioned in this volume.\n\n\n     Tantane uos generis tenuit fiducia uestri?\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\nWe may believe in the doctrine of Progress or we may not, but in either\ncase it is a matter of interest to examine the origins and trace the\nhistory of what is now, even should it ultimately prove to be no more\nthan an idolum saeculi, the animating and controlling idea of western\ncivilisation. For the earthly Progress of humanity is the general test\nto which social aims and theories are submitted as a matter of course.\nThe phrase CIVILISATION AND PROGRESS has become stereotyped, and\nillustrates how we have come to judge a civilisation good or bad\naccording as it is or is not progressive. The ideals of liberty and\ndemocracy, which have their own ancient and independent justifications,\nhave sought a new strength by attaching themselves to Progress. The\nconjunctions of \"liberty and progress,\" \"democracy and progress,\"\nmeet us at every turn. Socialism, at an early stage of its modern\ndevelopment, sought the same aid. The friends of Mars, who cannot bear\nthe prospect of perpetual peace, maintain that war is an indispensable\ninstrument of Progress. It is in the name of Progress that the\ndoctrinaires who established the present reign of terror in Russia\nprofess to act. All this shows the prevalent feeling that a social or\npolitical theory or programme is hardly tenable if it cannot claim that\nit harmonises with this controlling idea.\n\nIn the Middle Ages Europeans followed a different guiding star. The idea\nof a life beyond the grave was in control, and the great things of\nthis life were conducted with reference to the next. When men's deepest\nfeelings reacted more steadily and powerfully to the idea of saving\ntheir souls than to any other, harmony with this idea was the test by\nwhich the opportuneness of social theories and institutions was judged.\nMonasticism, for instance, throve under its aegis, while liberty of\nconscience had no chance. With a new idea in control, this has been\nreversed. Religious freedom has thriven under the aegis of Progress;\nmonasticism can make no appeal to it.\n\nFor the hope of an ultimate happy state on this planet to be enjoyed by\nfuture generations--or of some state, at least, that may relatively be\nconsidered happy--has replaced, as a social power, the hope of felicity\nin another world. Belief in personal immortality is still very widely\nentertained, but may we not fairly say that it has ceased to be a\ncentral and guiding idea of collective life, a criterion by which social\nvalues are measured? Many people do not believe in it; many more regard\nit as so uncertain that they could not reasonably permit it to affect\ntheir lives or opinions. Those who believe in it are doubtless the\nmajority, but belief has many degrees; and one can hardly be wrong\nin saying that, as a general rule, this belief does not possess the\nimaginations of those who hold it, that their emotions react to it\nfeebly, that it is felt to be remote and unreal, and has comparatively\nseldom a more direct influence on conduct than the abstract arguments to\nbe found in treatises on morals.\n\nUnder the control of the idea of Progress the ethical code recognised in\nthe Western world has been reformed in modern times by a new principle\nof far-reaching importance which has emanated from that idea. When\nIsocrates formulated the rule of life, \"Do unto others,\" he probably did\nnot mean to include among \"others\" slaves or savages. The Stoics and the\nChristians extended its application to the whole of living humanity. But\nin late years the rule has received a vastly greater extension by the\ninclusion of the unborn generations of the future. This principle of\nduty to posterity is a direct corollary of the idea of Progress. In\nthe recent war that idea, involving the moral obligation of making\nsacrifices for the sake of future ages, was constantly appealed to;\njust as in the Crusades, the most characteristic wars of our medieval\nancestors, the idea of human destinies then in the ascendant lured\nthousands to hardship and death.\n\nThe present attempt to trace the genesis and growth of the idea in broad\noutline is a purely historical inquiry, and any discussion of the\ngreat issue which is involved lies outside its modest scope. Occasional\ncriticisms on particular forms which the creed of Progress assumed,\nor on arguments which were used to support it, are not intended as a\njudgment on its general validity. I may, however, make two observations\nhere. The doubts which Mr. Balfour expressed nearly thirty years ago,\nin an Address delivered at Glasgow, have not, so far as I know, been\nanswered. And it is probable that many people, to whom six years ago the\nnotion of a sudden decline or break-up of our western civilisation, as\na result not of cosmic forces but of its own development, would have\nappeared almost fantastic, will feel much less confident to-day,\nnotwithstanding the fact that the leading nations of the world have\ninstituted a league of peoples for the prevention of war, the measure to\nwhich so many high priests of Progress have looked forward as meaning a\nlong stride forward on the road to Utopia.\n\nThe preponderance of France's part in developing the idea is an\noutstanding feature of its history. France, who, like ancient Greece,\nhas always been a nursing-mother of ideas, bears the principal\nresponsibility for its growth; and if it is French thought that will\npersistently claim our attention, this is not due to an arbitrary\npreference on my part or to neglect of speculation in other countries.\n\nJ. B. BURY. January, 1920.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n               INTRODUCTION\n\n    CHAPTER I  SOME INTERPRETATIONS OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY: BODIN AND\n               LE ROY\n\n   CHAPTER II  UTILITY THE END OF KNOWLEDGE: BACON\n\n  CHAPTER III  CARTESIANISM\n\n   CHAPTER IV  THE DOCTRINE OF DEGENERATION: THE ANCIENTS AND\n               MODERNS\n\n    CHAPTER V  THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE: FONTENELLE\n\n   CHAPTER VI  THE GENERAL PROGRESS OF MAN: ABBE DE SAINT-PIERRE\n\n  CHAPTER VII  NEW CONCEPTIONS OF HISTORY: MONTESQUIEU, VOLTAIRE,\n               TURGOT\n\n CHAPTER VIII  THE ENCYCLOPAEDISTS AND ECONOMISTS\n\n   CHAPTER IX  WAS CIVILISATION A MISTAKE? ROUSSEAU, CHASTELLUX\n\n    CHAPTER X  THE YEAR 2440\n\n   CHAPTER XI  THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: CONDORCET\n\n  CHAPTER XII  THE THEORY OF PROGRESS IN ENGLAND\n\n CHAPTER XIII  GERMAN SPECULATIONS ON PROGRESS\n\n  CHAPTER XIV  CURRENTS OF THOUGHT IN FRANCE AFTER THE REVOLUTION\n\n   CHAPTER XV  THE SEARCH FOR A LAW OF PROGRESS: I. SAINT-SIMON\n\n  CHAPTER XVI  SEARCH FOR A LAW OF PROGRESS: II. COMTE\n\n CHAPTER XVII  \"PROGRESS\" IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT\n               (1830-1851)\n\nCHAPTER XVIII MATERIAL PROGRESS: THE EXHIBITION OF 1851\n\n  CHAPTER XIX  PROGRESS IN THE LIGHT OF EVOLUTION\n\n               EPILOGUE\n\n               APPENDIX: NOTES TO THE TEXT\n               [Proofreaders note: these notes have been\n               interspersed in the main text as Footnotes]\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nWhen we say that ideas rule the world, or exercise a decisive power in\nhistory, we are generally thinking of those ideas which express human\naims and depend for their realisation on the human will, such as\nliberty, toleration, equality of opportunity, socialism. Some of these\nhave been partly realised, and there is no reason why any of them should\nnot be fully realised, in a society or in the world, if it were the\nunited purpose of a society or of the world to realise it. They are\napproved or condemned because they are held to be good or bad, not\nbecause they are true or false. But there is another order of ideas\nthat play a great part in determining and directing the course of man's\nconduct but do not depend on his will--ideas which bear upon the mystery\nof life, such as Fate, Providence, or personal immortality. Such ideas\nmay operate in important ways on the forms of social action, but they\ninvolve a question of fact and they are accepted or rejected not because\nthey are believed to be useful or injurious, but because they are\nbelieved to be true or false.\n\nThe idea of the progress of humanity is an idea of this kind, and it\nis important to be quite clear on the point. We now take it so much for\ngranted, we are so conscious of constantly progressing in knowledge,\narts, organising capacity, utilities of all sorts, that it is easy to\nlook upon Progress as an aim, like liberty or a world-federation, which\nit only depends on our own efforts and good-will to achieve. But though\nall increases of power and knowledge depend on human effort, the idea\nof the Progress of humanity, from which all these particular progresses\nderive their value, raises a definite question of fact, which man's\nwishes or labours cannot affect any more than his wishes or labours can\nprolong life beyond the grave.\n\nThis idea means that civilisation has moved, is moving, and will move\nin a desirable direction. But in order to judge that we are moving in\na desirable direction we should have to know precisely what the\ndestination is. To the minds of most people the desirable outcome of\nhuman development would be a condition of society in which all the\ninhabitants of the planet would enjoy a perfectly happy existence. But\nit is impossible to be sure that civilisation is moving in the right\ndirection to realise this aim. Certain features of our \"progress\" may be\nurged as presumptions in its favour, but there are always offsets, and\nit has always been easy to make out a case that, from the point of view\nof increasing happiness, the tendencies of our progressive civilisation\nare far from desirable. In short, it cannot be proved that the unknown\ndestination towards which man is advancing is desirable. The movement\nmay be Progress, or it may be in an undesirable direction and therefore\nnot Progress. This is a question of fact, and one which is at present as\ninsoluble as the question of personal immortality. It is a problem which\nbears on the mystery of life.\n\nMoreover, even if it is admitted to be probable that the course of\ncivilisation has so far been in a desirable direction, and such as would\nlead to general felicity if the direction were followed far enough, it\ncannot be proved that ultimate attainment depends entirely on the human\nwill. For the advance might at some point be arrested by an insuperable\nwall. Take the particular case of knowledge, as to which it is generally\ntaken for granted that the continuity of progress in the future depends\naltogether on the continuity of human effort (assuming that human brains\ndo not degenerate). This assumption is based on a strictly limited\nexperience. Science has been advancing without interruption during the\nlast three or four hundred years; every new discovery has led to new\nproblems and new methods of solution, and opened up new fields for\nexploration. Hitherto men of science have not been compelled to halt,\nthey have always found means to advance further. But what assurance have\nwe that they will not one day come up against impassable barriers? The\nexperience of four hundred years, in which the surface of nature has\nbeen successfully tapped, can hardly be said to warrant conclusions\nas to the prospect of operations extending over four hundred or four\nthousand centuries. Take biology or astronomy. How can we be sure that\nsome day progress may not come to a dead pause, not because knowledge\nis exhausted, but because our resources for investigation are\nexhausted--because, for instance, scientific instruments have reached\nthe limit of perfection beyond which it is demonstrably impossible to\nimprove them, or because (in the case of astronomy) we come into the\npresence of forces of which, unlike gravitation, we have no terrestrial\nexperience? It is an assumption, which cannot be verified, that we shall\nnot soon reach a point in our knowledge of nature beyond which the human\nintellect is unqualified to pass.\n\nBut it is just this assumption which is the light and inspiration of\nman's scientific research. For if the assumption is not true, it means\nthat he can never come within sight of the goal which is, in the case\nof physical science, if not a complete knowledge of the cosmos and\nthe processes of nature, at least an immeasurably larger and deeper\nknowledge than we at present possess.\n\nThus continuous progress in man's knowledge of his environment, which is\none of the chief conditions of general Progress, is a hypothesis which\nmay or may not be true. And if it is true, there remains the further\nhypothesis of man's moral and social \"perfectibility,\" which rests on\nmuch less impressive evidence. There is nothing to show that he may not\nreach, in his psychical and social development, a stage at which the\nconditions of his life will be still far from satisfactory, and beyond\nwhich he will find it impossible to progress. This is a question of fact\nwhich no willing on man's part can alter. It is a question bearing on\nthe mystery of life.\n\nEnough has been said to show that the Progress of humanity belongs to\nthe same order of ideas as Providence or personal immortality. It is\ntrue or it is false, and like them it cannot be proved either true or\nfalse. Belief in it is an act of faith.\n\nThe idea of human Progress then is a theory which involves a\nsynthesis of the past and a prophecy of the future. It is based on\nan interpretation of history which regards men as slowly\nadvancing--pedetemtim progredientes--in a definite and desirable\ndirection, and infers that this progress will continue indefinitely. And\nit implies that, as\n\n\n   The issue of the earth's great business,\n\n\na condition of general happiness will ultimately be enjoyed, which will\njustify the whole process of civilisation; for otherwise the direction\nwould not be desirable. There is also a further implication. The process\nmust be the necessary outcome of the psychical and social nature of man;\nit must not be at the mercy of any external will; otherwise there\nwould be no guarantee of its continuance and its issue, and the idea of\nProgress would lapse into the idea of Providence.\n\nAs time is the very condition of the possibility of Progress, it is\nobvious that the idea would be valueless if there were any cogent\nreasons for supposing that the time at the disposal of humanity is\nlikely to reach a limit in the near future. If there were good cause for\nbelieving that the earth would be uninhabitable in A.D. 2000 or 2100\nthe doctrine of Progress would lose its meaning and would automatically\ndisappear. It would be a delicate question to decide what is the minimum\nperiod of time which must be assured to man for his future development,\nin order that Progress should possess value and appeal to the emotions.\nThe recorded history of civilisation covers 6000 years or so, and if we\ntake this as a measure of our conceptions of time-distances, we might\nassume that if we were sure of a period ten times as long ahead of us\nthe idea of Progress would not lose its power of appeal. Sixty thousand\nyears of HISTORICAL time, when we survey the changes which have come to\npass in six thousand, opens to the imagination a range vast enough to\nseem almost endless.\n\nThis psychological question, however, need not be decided. For science\nassures us that the stability of the present conditions of the solar\nsystem is certified for many myriads of years to come. Whatever gradual\nmodifications of climate there may be, the planet will not cease to\nsupport life for a period which transcends and flouts all efforts of\nimagination. In short, the POSSIBILITY of Progress is guaranteed by the\nhigh probability, based on astro-physical science, of an immense time to\nprogress in.\n\nIt may surprise many to be told that the notion of Progress, which now\nseems so easy to apprehend, is of comparatively recent origin. It has\nindeed been claimed that various thinkers, both ancient (for instance,\nSeneca) and medieval (for instance, Friar Bacon), had long ago conceived\nit. But sporadic observations--such as man's gradual rise from primitive\nand savage conditions to a certain level of civilisation by a series of\ninventions, or the possibility of some future additions to his knowledge\nof nature--which were inevitable at a certain stage of human reflection,\ndo not amount to an anticipation of the idea. The value of such\nobservations was determined, and must be estimated, by the whole context\nof ideas in which they occurred. It is from its bearings on the future\nthat Progress derives its value, its interest, and its power. You may\nconceive civilisation as having gradually advanced in the past, but you\nhave not got the idea of Progress until you go on to conceive that it\nis destined to advance indefinitely in the future. Ideas have\ntheir intellectual climates, and I propose to show briefly in this\nIntroduction that the intellectual climates of classical antiquity and\nthe ensuing ages were not propitious to the birth of the doctrine of\nProgress. It is not till the sixteenth century that the obstacles to\nits appearance definitely begin to be transcended and a favourable\natmosphere to be gradually prepared.\n\n[Footnote: The history of the idea of Progress has been treated\nbriefly and partially by various French writers; e.g. Comte, Cours de\nphilosophie positive, vi. 321 sqq.; Buchez, Introduction a la science\nde l'histoire, i. 99 sqq. (ed. 2, 1842); Javary, De l'idee de progres\n(1850); Rigault, Histoire de la querelle des Anciens et des Modernes\n(1856); Bouillier, Histoire de la philosophie cartesienne (1854); Caro,\nProblemes de la morale sociale (1876); Brunetiere, La Formation de\nl'idee de progres, in Etudes critiques, 5e serie. More recently M. Jules\nDelvaille has attempted to trace its history fully, down to the end\nof the eighteenth century. His Histoire de l'idee de progres (1910) is\nplanned on a large scale; he is erudite and has read extensively. But\nhis treatment is lacking in the power of discrimination. He strikes one\nas anxious to bring within his net, as theoriciens du progres, as many\ndistinguished thinkers as possible; and so, along with a great deal\nthat is useful and relevant, we also find in his book much that is\nirrelevant. He has not clearly seen that the distinctive idea of\nProgress was not conceived in antiquity or in the Middle Ages, or even\nin the Renaissance period; and when he comes to modern times he fails to\nbring out clearly the decisive steps of its growth. And he does not seem\nto realise that a man might be \"progressive\" without believing in, or\neven thinking about, the doctrine of Progress. Leonardo da Vinci and\nBerkeley are examples. In my Ancient Greek Historians (1909) I dwelt on\nthe modern origin of the idea (p. 253 sqq.). Recently Mr. R. H. Murray,\nin a learned appendix to his Erasmus and Luther, has developed the\nthesis that Progress was not grasped in antiquity (though he makes an\nexception of Seneca),--a welcome confirmation.]\n\nI\n\nIt may, in particular, seem surprising that the Greeks, who were so\nfertile in their speculations on human life, did not hit upon an idea\nwhich seems so simple and obvious to us as the idea of Progress. But if\nwe try to realise their experience and the general character of their\nthought we shall cease to wonder. Their recorded history did not go back\nfar, and so far as it did go there had been no impressive series of new\ndiscoveries suggesting either an indefinite increase of knowledge or a\ngrowing mastery of the forces of nature. In the period in which their\nmost brilliant minds were busied with the problems of the universe\nmen might improve the building of ships, or invent new geometrical\ndemonstrations, but their science did little or nothing to transform the\nconditions of life or to open any vista into the future. They were\nin the presence of no facts strong enough to counteract that profound\nveneration of antiquity which seems natural to mankind, and the\nAthenians of the age of Pericles or of Plato, though they were\nthoroughly, obviously \"modern\" compared with the Homeric Greeks, were\nnever self-consciously \"modern\" as we are.\n\n1.\n\nThe indications that human civilisation was a gradual growth, and that\nman had painfully worked his way forward from a low and savage state,\ncould not, indeed, escape the sharp vision of the Greeks. For instance,\nAeschylus represents men as originally living at hazard in sunless\ncaves, and raised from that condition by Prometheus, who taught them the\narts of life. In Euripides we find a similar recognition of the ascent\nof mankind to a civilised state, from primitive barbarism, some god or\nother playing the part of Prometheus. In such passages as these we have,\nit may be said, the idea that man has progressed; and it may fairly be\nsuggested that belief in a natural progress lay, for Aeschylus as\nwell as for Euripides, behind the poetical fiction of supernatural\nintervention. But these recognitions of a progress were not incompatible\nwith the widely-spread belief in an initial degeneration of the human\nrace; nor did it usually appear as a rival doctrine. The old legend of\na \"golden age\" of simplicity, from which man had fallen away, was\ngenerally accepted as truth; and leading thinkers combined it with\nthe doctrine of a gradual sequence of social and material improvements\n[Footnote: In the masterly survey of early Greek history which\nThucydides prefixed to his work, he traces the social progress of the\nGreeks in historical times, and finds the key to it in the increase of\nwealth.] during the subsequent period of decline. We find the two\nviews thus combined, for instance, in Plato's Laws, and in the earliest\nreasoned history of civilisation written by Dicaearchus, a pupil of\nAristotle. [Footnote: Aristotle's own view is not very clear. He thinks\nthat all arts, sciences, and institutions have been repeatedly, or\nrather an infinite number of times (word in Greek) discovered in the\npast and again lost. Metaphysics, xi. 8 ad fin.; Politics, iv. 10,\ncp. ii. 2. An infinite number of times seems to imply the doctrine of\ncycles.] But the simple life of the first age, in which men were not\nworn with toil, and war and disease were unknown, was regarded as\nthe ideal State to which man would lie only too fortunate if he could\nreturn. He had indeed at a remote time ill the past succeeded in\nameliorating some of the conditions of his lot, but such ancient\ndiscoveries as fire or ploughing or navigation or law-giving did\nnot suggest the guess that new inventions might lead ultimately to\nconditions in which life would be more complex but as happy as the\nsimple life of the primitive world.\n\nBut, if some relative progress might be admitted, the general view of\nGreek philosophers was that they were living in a period of inevitable\ndegeneration and decay--inevitable because it was prescribed by the\nnature of the universe. We have only an imperfect knowledge of the\ninfluential speculations of Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and Empedocles, but\nwe may take Plato's tentative philosophy of history to illustrate the\ntrend and the prejudices of Greek thought on this subject. The world was\ncreated and set going by the Deity, and, as his work, it was perfect;\nbut it was not immortal and had in it the seeds of decay. The period of\nits duration is 72,000 solar years. During the first half of this period\nthe original uniformity and order, which were impressed upon it by the\nCreator, are maintained under his guidance; but then it reaches a point\nfrom which it begins, as it were, to roll back; the Deity has loosened\nhis grip of the machine, the order is disturbed, and the second 36,000\nyears are a period of gradual decay and degeneration. At the end of this\ntime, the world left to itself would dissolve into chaos, but the Deity\nagain seizes the helm and restores the original conditions, and\nthe whole process begins anew. The first half of such a world-cycle\ncorresponds to the Golden Age of legend in which men lived happily and\nsimply; we have now unfortunately reached some point in the period of\ndecadence.\n\nPlato applies the theory of degradation in his study of political\ncommunities. [Footnote: Plato's philosophy of history. In the myth of\nthe Statesman and the last Books of the Republic. The best elucidation\nof these difficult passages will be found in the notes and appendix to\nBook viii. in J. Adam's edition of the Republic (1902).] He conceives\nhis own Utopian aristocracy as having existed somewhere towards the\nbeginning of the period of the world's relapse, when things were not so\nbad, [Footnote: Similarly he places the ideal society which he describes\nin the Critias 9000 years before Solon. The state which he plans in the\nLaws is indeed imagined as a practicable project in his own day, but\nthen it is only a second-best. The ideal state of which Aristotle\nsketched an outline (Politics, iv. v.) is not set either in time or in\nplace.] and exhibits its gradual deterioration, through the successive\nstages of timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and despotism. He explains\nthis deterioration as primarily caused by a degeneration of the race,\ndue to laxity and errors in the State regulation of marriages, and the\nconsequent birth of biologically inferior individuals.\n\nThe theories of Plato are only the most illustrious example of the\ntendency characteristic of Greek philosophical thinkers to idealise\nthe immutable as possessing a higher value than that which varies. This\naffected all their social speculations. They believed in the ideal of an\nabsolute order in society, from which, when it is once established, any\ndeviation must be for the worse. Aristotle, considering the subject\nfrom a practical point of view, laid down that changes in an established\nsocial order are undesirable, and should be as few and slight as\npossible. [Footnote: Politics, ii. 5.] This prejudice against change\nexcluded the apprehension of civilisation as a progressive movement.\nIt did not occur to Plato or any one else that a perfect order might be\nattainable by a long series of changes and adaptations. Such an order,\nbeing an embodiment of reason, could be created only by a deliberate and\nimmediate act of a planning mind. It might be devised by the wisdom of a\nphilosopher or revealed by the Deity. Hence the salvation of a community\nmust lie in preserving intact, so far as possible, the institutions\nimposed by the enlightened lawgiver, since change meant corruption and\ndisaster. These a priori principles account for the admiration of the\nSpartan state entertained by many Greek philosophers, because it was\nsupposed to have preserved unchanged for an unusually long period a\nsystem established by an inspired legislator.\n\n2.\n\nThus time was regarded as the enemy of humanity. Horace's verse,\n\n\n  Damnosa quid non imminuit dies?\n\n\n\"time depreciates the value of the world,\" expresses the pessimistic\naxiom accepted in most systems of ancient thought.\n\nThe theory of world-cycles was so widely current that it may almost be\ndescribed as the orthodox theory of cosmic time among the Greeks, and it\npassed from them to the Romans.\n\n[Footnote: Plato's world-cycle. I have omitted details not essential;\ne.g. that in the first period men were born from the earth and only in\nthe second propagated themselves. The period of 36,000 years, known as\nthe Great Platonic Year, was probably a Babylonian astronomical period,\nand was in any case based on the Babylonian sexagesimal system and\nconnected with the solar year conceived as consisting of 360 days.\nHeraclitus seems to have accepted it as the duration of the world\nbetween his periodic universal conflagrations. Plato derived the number\nfrom predecessors, but based it on operations with the numbers 3, 4, 5,\nthe length of the sides of the Pythagorean right-angled triangle. The\nGreat Year of the Pythagorean Philolaus seems to have been different,\nand that of the Stoics was much longer (6,570,000 years).\n\nI may refer here to Tacitus, Dialogus c. 16, as an appreciation of\nhistorical perspective unusual in ancient writers: \"The four hundred\nyears which separate us from the ancients are almost a vanishing\nquantity if you compare them with the duration of the ages.\" See the\nwhole passage, where the Magnus Annus of 12,954 years is referred to.]\n\nAccording to some of the Pythagoreans [Footnote: See Simplicius, Phys.\n732, 26.] each cycle repeated to the minutest particular the course and\nevents of the preceding. If the universe dissolves into the original\nchaos, there appeared to them to be no reason why the second chaos\nshould produce a world differing in the least respect from its\npredecessor. The nth cycle would be indeed numerically distinct from\nthe first, but otherwise would be identical with it, and no man could\npossibly discover the number of the cycle in which he was living. As no\nend seems to have been assigned to the whole process, the course of\nthe world's history would contain an endless number of Trojan Wars, for\ninstance; an endless number of Platos would write an endless number\nof Republics. Virgil uses this idea in his Fourth Eclogue, where he\nmeditates a return of the Golden Age:\n\n\n  Alter erit tum Tiphys, et altera quae uehat Argo\n   Delectos heroas; erunt etiam altera bella,\n   Atque iterum ad Troiam magnus mittetur Achilles.\n\n\nThe periodic theory might be held in forms in which this uncanny\ndoctrine of absolute identity was avoided; but at the best it meant an\nendless monotonous iteration, which was singularly unlikely to stimulate\nspeculative interest in the future. It must be remembered that no\nthinker had any means of knowing how near to the end of his cycle the\npresent hour might be. The most influential school of the later\nGreek age, the Stoics, adopted the theory of cycles, and the natural\npsychological effect of the theory is vividly reflected in Marcus\nAurelius, who frequently dwells on it in his Meditations. \"The\nrational soul,\" he says, \"wanders round the whole world and through\nthe encompassing void, and gazes into infinite time, and considers the\nperiodic destructions and rebirths of the universe, and reflects that\nour posterity will see nothing new, and that our ancestors saw nothing\ngreater than we have seen. A man of forty years, possessing the most\nmoderate intelligence, may be said to have seen all that is past and\nall that is to come; so uniform is the world.\" [Footnote: xi. I. The\ncyclical theory was curiously revived in the nineteenth; century by\nNietzsche, and it is interesting to note his avowal that it took him\na long time to overcome the feeling of pessimism which the doctrine\ninspired.]\n\n3.\n\nAnd yet one Stoic philosopher saw clearly, and declared emphatically,\nthat increases in knowledge must be expected in the future.\n\n\"There are many peoples to-day,\" Seneca wrote, \"who are ignorant of\nthe cause of eclipses of the moon, and it has only recently been\ndemonstrated among ourselves. The day will come when time and human\ndiligence will clear up problems which are now obscure. We divide the\nfew years of our lives unequally between study and vice, and it will\ntherefore be the work of many generations to explain such phenomena as\ncomets. One day our posterity will marvel at our ignorance of causes so\nclear to them.\n\n\"How many new animals have we first come to know in the present age? In\ntime to come men will know much that is unknown to us. Many discoveries\nare reserved for future ages, when our memory will have faded from men's\nminds. We imagine ourselves initiated in the secrets of nature; we are\nstanding on the threshold of her temple.\"\n\n[Footnote: The quotations from Seneca will be found in Naturales\nQuaestiones, vii. 25 and 31. See also Epist. 64. Seneca implies\ncontinuity in scientific research. Aristotle had stated this expressly,\npointing out that we are indebted not only to the author of the\nphilosophical theory which we accept as true, but also to the\npredecessors whose views it has superseded (Metaphysics, i. ii. chap.\n1). But he seems to consider his own system as final.]\n\nBut these predictions are far from showing that Seneca had the least\ninkling of a doctrine of the Progress of humanity. Such a doctrine is\nsharply excluded by the principles of his philosophy and his profoundly\npessimistic view of human affairs. Immediately after the passage which\nI have quoted he goes on to enlarge on the progress of vice. \"Are you\nsurprised to be told that human knowledge has not yet completed its\nwhole task? Why, human wickedness has not yet fully developed.\"\n\nYet, at least, it may be said, Seneca believed in a progress of\nknowledge and recognised its value. Yes, but the value which he\nattributed to it did not lie in any advantages which it would bring\nto the general community of mankind. He did not expect from it any\nimprovement of the world. The value of natural science, from his point\nof view, was this, that it opened to the philosopher a divine region, in\nwhich, \"wandering among the stars,\" he could laugh at the earth and all\nits riches, and his mind \"delivered as it were from prison could return\nto its original home.\" In other words, its value lay not in its results,\nbut simply in the intellectual activity; and therefore it concerned not\nmankind at large but a few chosen individuals who, doomed to live in a\nmiserable world, could thus deliver their souls from slavery.\n\nFor Seneca's belief in the theory of degeneration and the hopeless\ncorruption of the race is uncompromising. Human life on the earth is\nperiodically destroyed, alternately by fire and flood; and each period\nbegins with a golden age in which men live in rude simplicity,\ninnocent because they are ignorant not because they are wise. When they\ndegenerate from this state, arts and inventions promote deterioration by\nministering to luxury and vice.\n\nInteresting, then, as Seneca's observations on the prospect of some\nfuture scientific discoveries are, and they are unique in ancient\nliterature, [Footnote: They are general and definite. This distinguishes\nthem, for instance, from Plato's incidental hint in the Republic as to\nthe prospect of the future development of solid geometry.] they were\nfar from adumbrating a doctrine of the Progress of man. For him, as for\nPlato and the older philosophers, time is the enemy of man. [Footnote:\nThe quotations and the references here will be found in Nat. Quaest. i.\nPraef.; Epist. 104, Sec. 16 (cp. 110, Sec. 8; 117, Sec. 20, and the fine\npassage in 65, Sec. 16-21); Nat. Quaest. iii. 28-30; and finally Epist.\n90, Sec. 45, cp. Sec. 17. This last letter is a criticism on Posidonius,\nwho asserted that the arts invented in primitive times were due to\nphilosophers. Seneca repudiates this view: omnia enim ista sagacitas\nhominum, non sapientia inuenit.\n\nSeneca touches on the possibility of the discovery of new lands beyond\nthe ocean in a passage in his Medea (374 sqq.) which has been often\nquoted:\n\n\n        uenient annis\n secula seris, quibus oceanus\n uincula rerum laxet et ingens\n pateat tellus Tiphysque novos\n detegat orbes,...\n nec sit terris ultima Thule.]\n\n4.\n\nThere was however a school of philosophical speculation, which might\nhave led to the foundation of a theory of Progress, if the historical\noutlook of the Greeks had been larger and if their temper had been\ndifferent. The Atomic theory of Democritus seems to us now, in many\nways, the most wonderful achievement of Greek thought, but it had a\nsmall range of influence in Greece, and would have had less if it had\nnot convinced the brilliant mind of Epicurus. The Epicureans developed\nit, and it may be that the views which they put forward as to the\nhistory of the human race are mainly their own superstructure. These\nphilosophers rejected entirely the doctrine of a Golden Age and a\nsubsequent degeneration, which was manifestly incompatible with their\ntheory that the world was mechanically formed from atoms without\nthe intervention of a Deity. For them, the earliest condition of men\nresembled that of the beasts, and from this primitive and miserable\ncondition they laboriously reached the existing state of civilisation,\nnot by external guidance or as a consequence of some initial design, but\nsimply by the exercise of human intelligence throughout a long\nperiod. [Footnote: Lucretius v. 1448 sqq. (where the word PROGRESS is\npronounced):\n\n Usus et impigrae simul experientia mentis\n Paulatim docuit pedetemtim progredientis.\n Sic unum quicquid paulatim protrahit aetas\n In medium ratioque in luminis erigit oras.\n Namque alid ex alio clarescere et ordine debet\n Artibus, ad summum donee uenere cacumen.]\n\nThe gradual amelioration of their existence was marked by the discovery\nof fire and the use of metals, the invention of language, the invention\nof weaving, the growth of arts and industries, navigation, the\ndevelopment of family life, the establishment of social order by means\nof kings, magistrates, laws, the foundation of cities. The last great\nstep in the amelioration of life, according to Lucretius, was the\nilluminating philosophy of Epicurus, who dispelled the fear of invisible\npowers and guided man from intellectual darkness to light.\n\nBut Lucretius and the school to which he belonged did not look forward\nto a steady and continuous process of further amelioration in the\nfuture. They believed that a time would come when the universe would\nfall into ruins, [Footnote: Ib. 95.] but the intervening period did not\ninterest them. Like many other philosophers, they thought that their\nown philosophy was the final word on the universe, and they did not\ncontemplate the possibility that important advances in knowledge might\nbe achieved by subsequent generations. And, in any case, their scope was\nentirely individualistic; all their speculations were subsidiary to the\naim of rendering the life of the individual as tolerable as possible\nhere and now. Their philosophy, like Stoicism, was a philosophy of\nresignation; it was thoroughly pessimistic and therefore incompatible\nwith the idea of Progress. Lucretius himself allows an underlying\nfeeling of scepticism as to the value of civilisation occasionally\nto escape. [Footnote: His eadem sunt omnia semper (iii. 945) is the\nconstant refrain of Marcus Aurelius.]\n\nIndeed, it might be said that in the mentality of the ancient Greeks\nthere was a strain which would have rendered them indisposed to take\nsuch an idea seriously, if it had been propounded. No period of their\nhistory could be described as an age of optimism. They were never, by\ntheir achievements in art or literature, in mathematics or philosophy,\nexalted into self-complacency or lured into setting high hopes on\nhuman capacity. Man has resourcefulness to meet everything--[words in\nGreek],--they did not go further than that.\n\nThis instinctive pessimism of the Greeks had a religious tinge which\nperhaps even the Epicureans found it hard entirely to expunge. They\nalways felt that they were in the presence of unknown incalculable\npowers, and that subtle dangers lurked in human achievements and gains.\nHorace has taken this feeling as the motif of a criticism on man's\ninventive powers. A voyage of Virgil suggests the reflection that his\nfriend's life would not be exposed to hazards on the high seas if the\nart of navigation had never been discovered--if man had submissively\nrespected the limits imposed by nature. But man is audacious:\n\n\n  Nequiquam deus abscidit\n    Prudens oceano dissociabili   Terras.\n\n\n  In vain a wise god sever'd lands\n    By the dissociating sea.\n\n\nDaedalus violated the air, as Hercules invaded hell. The discovery\nof fire put us in possession of a forbidden secret. Is this unnatural\nconquest of nature safe or wise? Nil mortalibus ardui est:\n\n   Man finds no feat too hard or high;\n    Heaven is not safe from man's desire.\n    Our rash designs move Jove to ire,\n   He dares not lay his thunder by.\n\n\nThe thought of this ode [Footnote: i. 3.] roughly expresses what would\nhave been the instinctive sense of thoughtful Greeks if the idea of\nProgress had been presented to them. It would have struck them as\naudacious, the theory of men unduly elated and perilously at ease in the\npresence of unknown incalculable powers.\n\nThis feeling or attitude was connected with the idea of Moira. If we\nwere to name any single idea as generally controlling or pervading Greek\nthought from Homer to the Stoics, [Footnote: The Stoics identified\nMoira with Pronoia, in accordance with their theory that the universe is\npermeated by thought.] it would perhaps be Moira, for which we have no\nequivalent. The common rendering \"fate\" is misleading. Moira meant a\nfixed order in the universe; but as a fact to which men must bow, it had\nenough in common with fatality to demand a philosophy of resignation and\nto hinder the creation of an optimistic atmosphere of hope. It was this\norder which kept things in their places, assigned to each its proper\nsphere and function, and drew a definite line, for instance, between\nmen and gods. Human progress towards perfection--towards an ideal of\nomniscience, or an ideal of happiness, would have been a breaking down\nof the bars which divide the human from the divine. Human nature does\nnot alter; it is fixed by Moira.\n\n5.\n\nWe can see now how it was that speculative Greek minds never hit on\nthe idea of Progress. In the first place, their limited historical\nexperience did not easily suggest such a synthesis; and in the second\nplace, the axioms of their thought, their suspiciousness of change,\ntheir theories of Moira, of degeneration and cycles, suggested a view\nof the world which was the very antithesis of progressive development.\nEpicurean, philosophers made indeed what might have been an important\nstep in the direction of the doctrine of Progress, by discarding the\ntheory of degeneration, and recognising that civilisation had been\ncreated by a series of successive improvements achieved by the effort of\nman alone. But here they stopped short. For they had their eyes fixed on\nthe lot of the individual here and now, and their study of the history\nof humanity was strictly subordinate to this personal interest. The\nvalue of their recognition of human progress in the past is conditioned\nby the general tenor and purpose of their theory of life. It was simply\none item in their demonstration that man owed nothing to supernatural\nintervention and had nothing to fear from supernatural powers. It is\nhowever no accident that the school of thought which struck on a path\nthat might have led to the idea of Progress was the most uncompromising\nenemy of superstition that Greece produced.\n\nIt might be thought that the establishment of Roman rule and order in a\nlarge part of the known world, and the civilising of barbarian peoples,\ncould not fail to have opened to the imagination of some of those who\nreflected on it in the days of Virgil or of Seneca, a vista into the\nfuture. But there was no change in the conditions of life likely to\nsuggest a brighter view of human existence. With the loss of freedom\npessimism increased, and the Greek philosophies of resignation were\nneeded more than ever. Those whom they could not satisfy turned their\nthoughts to new mystical philosophies and religions, which were little\ninterested in the earthly destinies of human society.\n\nII\n\n1.\n\nThe idea of the universe which prevailed throughout the Middle Ages, and\nthe general orientation of men's thoughts were incompatible with some of\nthe fundamental assumptions which are required by the idea of Progress.\nAccording to the Christian theory which was worked out by the Fathers,\nand especially by St. Augustine, the whole movement of history has the\npurpose of securing the happiness of a small portion of the human race\nin another world; it does not postulate a further development of human\nhistory on earth. For Augustine, as for any medieval believer, the\ncourse of history would be satisfactorily complete if the world came\nto an end in his own lifetime. He was not interested in the question\nwhether any gradual amelioration of society or increase of knowledge\nwould mark the period of time which might still remain to run before the\nday of Judgment. In Augustine's system the Christian era introduced the\nlast period of history, the old age of humanity, which would endure only\nso long as to enable the Deity to gather in the predestined number\nof saved people. This theory might be combined with the widely-spread\nbelief in a millennium on earth, but the conception of such a\ndispensation does not render it a theory of Progress.\n\nAgain, the medieval doctrine apprehends history not as a natural\ndevelopment but as a series of events ordered by divine intervention and\nrevelations. If humanity had been left to go its own way it would have\ndrifted to a highly undesirable port, and all men would have incurred\nthe fate of everlasting misery from which supernatural interference\nrescued the minority. A belief in Providence might indeed, and in a\nfuture age would, be held along with a belief in Progress, in the same\nmind; but the fundamental assumptions were incongruous, and so long as\nthe doctrine of Providence was undisputedly in the ascendant, a doctrine\nof Progress could not arise. And the doctrine of Providence, as it was\ndeveloped in Augustine's \"City of God,\" controlled the thought of the\nMiddle Ages.\n\nThere was, moreover, the doctrine of original sin, an insuperable\nobstacle to the moral amelioration of the race by any gradual process of\ndevelopment. For since, so long as the human species endures on earth,\nevery child will be born naturally evil and worthy of punishment,\na moral advance of humanity to perfection is plainly impossible.\n[Footnote: It may be added that, as G. Monod observed, \"les hommes du\nmoyen age n'avaient pas conscience des modifications successives que le\ntemps apporte avec lui dans les choses humaines\" (Revue Historique, i.\np. 8).]\n\n2.\n\nBut there are certain features in the medieval theory of which we must\nnot ignore the significance. In the first place, while it maintained\nthe belief in degeneration, endorsed by Hebrew mythology, it definitely\nabandoned the Greek theory of cycles. The history of the earth was\nrecognised as a unique phenomenon in time; it would never occur again\nor anything resembling it. More important than all is the fact that\nChristian theology constructed a synthesis which for the first time\nattempted to give a definite meaning to the whole course of human\nevents, a synthesis which represents the past as leading up to a\ndefinite and desirable goal in the future. Once this belief had been\ngenerally adopted and prevailed for centuries men might discard it along\nwith the doctrine of Providence on which it rested, but they could not\nbe content to return again to such views as satisfied the ancients,\nfor whom human history, apprehended as a whole, was a tale of little\nmeaning. [Footnote: It may be observed that Augustine (De Civ. Dei, x.\n14) compares the teaching (recta eruditio) of the people of God, in\nthe gradual process of history, to the education of an individual.\nPrudentius has a similar comparison for a different purpose (c.\nSymmachum, ii. 315 sqq.):\n\nTardis semper processibus aucta Crescit vita hominis et longo proficit\nusu. Sic aevi mortalis habet se mobilis ordo, Sic variat natura vices,\ninfantia repit, etc.\n\nFloras (Epitome, ad init.) had already divided Roman history into four\nperiods corresponding to infancy, adolescence, manhood, and old age.]\n\nThey must seek for some new synthesis to replace it.\n\nAnother feature of the medieval theory, pertinent to our inquiry, was an\nidea which Christianity took over from Greek and Roman thinkers. In\nthe later period of Greek history, which began with the conquests of\nAlexander the Great, there had emerged the conception of the whole\ninhabited world as a unity and totality, the idea of the whole human\nrace as one. We may conveniently call it the ecumenical idea--the\nprinciple of the ecumene or inhabited world, as opposed to the principle\nof the polis or city. Promoted by the vast extension of the geographical\nlimits of the Greek world resulting from Alexander's conquests, and by\nhis policy of breaking down the barriers between Greek and barbarian,\nthe idea was reflected in the Stoic doctrine that all men are brothers,\nand that a man's true country is not his own particular city, but the\necumene. [Footnote: Plutarch long ago saw the connection between the\npolicy of Alexander and the cosmopolitan teaching of Zeno. De Alexandri\nMagni virtute, i. Sec. 6.] It soon became familiar, popularised by the\nmost popular of the later philosophies of Greece; and just as it had\nbeen implied in the imperial aspiration and polity of Alexander, so it\nwas implied, still more clearly, in the imperial theory of Rome. The\nidea of the Roman Empire, its theoretical justification, might\nbe described as the realisation of the unity of the world by the\nestablishment of a common order, the unification of mankind in a single\nworld-embracing political organism. The term \"world,\" orbis (terrarum),\nwhich imperial poets use freely in speaking of the Empire, is more than\na mere poetical or patriotic exaggeration; it expresses the idea, the\nunrealised ideal of the Empire. There is a stone from Halicarnassus in\nthe British Museum, on which the idea is formally expressed from another\npoint of view. The inscription is of the time of Augustus, and the\nEmperor is designated as \"saviour of the community of mankind.\" There we\nhave the notion of the human race apprehended as a whole, the ecumenical\nidea, imposing upon Rome the task described by Virgil as regere\nimperio populos, and more humanely by Pliny as the creation of a single\nfatherland for all the peoples of the world. [Footnote: Pliny, Nat.\nHist. iii. 6. 39.]\n\nThis idea, which in the Roman Empire and in the Middle Ages took the\nform of a universal State and a universal Church, passed afterwards\ninto the conception of the intercohesion of peoples as contributors to\na common pool of civilisation--a principle which, when the idea of\nProgress at last made its appearance in the world, was to be one of the\nelements in its growth.\n\n3.\n\nOne remarkable man, the Franciscan friar Roger Bacon, [Footnote: c. A.D.\n1210-92. Of Bacon's Opus Majus the best and only complete edition is\nthat of J. H. Bridges, 2 vols. 1897 (with an excellent Introduction).\nThe associated works, Opus Minus and Opus Tertium, have been edited by\nBrewer, Fr. Rogeri Bacon Opera Inedita, 1859.]who stands on an\nisolated pinnacle of his own in the Middle Ages, deserves particular\nconsideration. It has been claimed for him that he announced the idea of\nProgress; he has even been compared to Condorcet or Comte. Such claims\nare based on passages taken out of their context and indulgently\ninterpreted in the light of later theories. They are not borne out by an\nexamination of his general conception of the universe and the aim of his\nwritings.\n\nHis aim was to reform higher education and introduce into the\nuniversities a wide, liberal, and scientific programme of secular\nstudies. His chief work, the \"Opus Majus,\" was written for this purpose,\nto which his exposition of his own discoveries was subordinate. It was\naddressed and sent to Pope Clement IV., who had asked Bacon to give him\nan account of his researches, and was designed to persuade the Pontiff\nof the utility of science from an ecclesiastical point of view, and\nto induce him to sanction an intellectual reform, which without the\napprobation of the Church would at that time have been impossible. With\ngreat ingenuity and resourcefulness he sought to show that the\nstudies to which he was devoted--mathematics, astronomy, physics,\nchemistry--were indispensable to an intelligent study of theology and\nScripture. Though some of his arguments may have been urged simply to\ncapture the Pope's good-will, there can be no question that Bacon\nwas absolutely sincere in his view that theology was the mistress\n(dominatrix) of the sciences and that their supreme value lay in being\nnecessary to it.\n\nIt was, indeed, on this principle of the close interconnection of\nall branches of knowledge that Bacon based his plea and his scheme of\nreform. And the idea of the \"solidarity\" of the sciences, in which\nhe anticipated a later age, is one of his two chief claims to be\nremembered. [Footnote: Cp. Opus Tertium, c. iv. p. 18, omnes scientiae\nsunt connexae et mutuis se fovent auxiliis sicut partes ejusdem totius,\nquarum quaelibet opus suum peragit non solum propter se sed pro aliis.]\nIt is the motif of the Opus Majus, and it would have been more fully\nelaborated if he had lived to complete the encyclopaedic work, Scriptum\nPrincipale, which he had only begun before his death. His other title\nto fame is well-known. He realised, as no man had done before him, the\nimportance of the experimental method in investigating the secrets of\nnature, and was an almost solitary pioneer in the paths to which his\ngreater namesake, more than three hundred years later, was to invite the\nattention of the world.\n\nBut, although Roger Bacon was inspired by these enlightened ideas,\nalthough he cast off many of the prejudices of his time and boldly\nrevolted against the tyranny of the prevailing scholastic philosophy,\nhe was nevertheless in other respects a child of his age and could not\ndisencumber himself of the current medieval conception of the universe.\nHis general view of the course of human history was not materially\ndifferent from that of St. Augustine. When he says that the practical\nobject of all knowledge is to assure the safety of the human race, he\nexplains this to mean \"things which lead to felicity in the next life.\"\n[Footnote: Opus Majus, vii. p. 366.]\n\nIt is pertinent to observe that he not only shared in the belief in\nastrology, which was then universal, but considered it one of the most\nimportant parts of \"mathematics.\" It was looked upon with disfavour by\nthe Church as a dangerous study; Bacon defended its use in the\ninterests of the Church itself. He maintained, like Thomas Aquinas,\nthe physiological influence of the celestial bodies, and regarded the\nplanets as signs telling us what God has decreed from eternity to come\nto pass either by natural processes or by acts of human will or directly\nat his own good pleasure. Deluges, plagues, and earthquakes were capable\nof being predicted; political and religious revolutions were set in the\nstarry rubric. The existence of six principal religions was determined\nby the combinations of Jupiter with the other six planets. Bacon\nseriously expected the extinction of the Mohammedan religion before the\nend of the thirteenth century, on the ground of a prediction by an Arab\nastrologer. [Footnote: Ib. iv. p. 266; vii. p. 389.]\n\nOne of the greatest advantages that the study of astrological lore\nwill bring to humanity is that by its means the date of the coming of\nAnti-Christ may be fixed with certainty, and the Church may be prepared\nto face the perils and trials of that terrible time. Now the arrival\nof Anti-Christ meant the end of the world, and Bacon accepted the view,\nwhich he says was held by all wise men, that \"we are not far from the\ntimes of Anti-Christ.\" Thus the intellectual reforms which he urged\nwould have the effect, and no more, of preparing Christendom to resist\nmore successfully the corruption in which the rule of Anti-Christ would\ninvolve the world. \"Truth will prevail,\" by which he meant science\nwill make advances, \"though with difficulty, until Anti-Christ and his\nforerunners appear;\" and on his own showing the interval would probably\nbe short.\n\nThe frequency with which Bacon recurs to this subject, and the emphasis\nhe lays on it, show that the appearance of Anti-Christ was a fixed\npoint in his mental horizon. When he looked forward into the future,\nthe vision which confronted him was a scene of corruption, tyranny, and\nstruggle under the reign of a barbarous enemy of Christendom; and after\nthat, the end of the world. [Footnote: (1) His coming may be fixed by\nastrology: Opus Majus, iv. p. 269 (inveniretur sufficiens suspicio vel\nmagis certitudo de tempore Antichristi; cp. p. 402). (2) His coming\nmeans the end of the world: ib. p. 262. (3) We are not far from it: ib.\np. 402. One of the reasons which seem to have made this view probable to\nBacon was the irruption of the Mongols into Europe during his lifetime;\ncp. p. 268 and vii. p. 234. Another was the prevalent corruption,\nespecially of the clergy, which impressed him deeply; see Compendium\nstudii philosophiae, ed. Brewer, p. 402. (4) \"Truth will prevail,\" etc.:\nOpus Majus, i. pp. 19, 20. He claimed for experimental science that\nit would produce inventions which could be usefully employed against\nAntichrist: ib. vii. p. 221.] It is from this point of view that we\nmust appreciate the observations which he made on the advancement of\nknowledge. \"It is our duty,\" he says, \"to supply what the ancients have\nleft incomplete, because we have entered into their labours, which,\nunless we are asses, can stimulate us to achieve better results\";\nAristotle corrected the errors of earlier thinkers; Avicenna and\nAverroes have corrected Aristotle in some matters and have added much\nthat is new; and so it will go on till the end of the world. And Bacon\nquotes passages from Seneca's \"Physical Inquiries\" to show that the\nacquisition of knowledge is gradual. Attention has been already called\nto those passages, and it was shown how perverse it is, on the strength\nof such remarks, to claim Seneca as a teacher of the doctrine\nof Progress. The same claim has been made for Bacon with greater\nconfidence, and it is no less perverse. The idea of Progress is\nglaringly incongruous with his vision of the world. If his programme of\nrevolutionising secular learning had been accepted--it fell completely\ndead, and his work was forgotten for many ages,--he would have been the\nauthor of a progressive reform; but how many reformers have there been\nbefore and after Bacon on whose minds the idea of Progress never dawned?\n\n[Footnote: Bacon quotes Seneca: See Opus Majus, i. pp. 37, 55, 14.\n\nMuch has been made out of a well-known passage in his short Epistle de\nsecretis operibus artis et naturae et de militate magiae, c. iv. (ed.\nBrewer, p. 533), in which he is said to PREDICT inventions which have\nbeen realised in the locomotives, steam navigation, and aeroplanes of\nmodern times. But Bacon predicts nothing. He is showing that science can\ninvent curious and, to the vulgar, incredible things without the aid of\nmagic. All the inventions which he enumerates have, he declares, been\nactually made in ancient times, with the exception of a flying-machine\n(instrumentum volandi quod non vidi nec hominem qui vidisset cognovi,\nsed sapientem qui hoc artificium excogitavit explere cognosco).\n\nCompare the remarks of S. Vogl, Die Physik Roger Bacos (1906), 98 sqq.]\n\n4.\n\nThus Friar Bacon's theories of scientific reform, so far from amounting\nto an anticipation of the idea of Progress, illustrate how impossible it\nwas that this idea could appear in the Middle Ages. The whole spirit\nof medieval Christianity excluded it. The conceptions which were\nentertained of the working of divine Providence, the belief that the\nworld, surprised like a sleeping household by a thief in the night,\nmight at any moment come to a sudden end, had the same effect as the\nGreek theories of the nature of change and of recurring cycles of the\nworld. Or rather, they had a more powerful effect, because they were\nnot reasoned conclusions, but dogmas guaranteed by divine authority. And\nmedieval pessimism as to man's mundane condition was darker and sterner\nthan the pessimism of the Greeks. There was the prospect of happiness in\nanother sphere to compensate, but this, engrossing the imagination, only\nrendered it less likely that any one should think of speculating about\nman's destinies on earth.\n\nIII\n\n1.\n\nThe civilised countries of Europe spent about three hundred years in\npassing from the mental atmosphere of the Middle Ages into the mental\natmosphere of the modern world. These centuries were one of the\nconspicuously progressive periods in history, but the conditions were\nnot favourable to the appearance of an idea of Progress, though the\nintellectual milieu was being prepared in which that idea could be born.\nThis progressive period, which is conveniently called the Renaissance,\nlasted from the fourteenth into the seventeenth century. The great\nresults, significant for our present purpose, which the human mind\nachieved at this stage of its development were two. Self-confidence\nwas restored to human reason, and life on this planet was recognised as\npossessing a value independent of any hopes or fears connected with a\nlife beyond the grave.\n\nBut in discarding medieval naivete and superstition, in assuming a\nfreer attitude towards theological authority, and in developing a new\nconception of the value of individual personality, men looked to the\nguidance of Greek and Roman thinkers, and called up the spirit of the\nancient world to exorcise the ghosts of the dark ages. Their minds were\nthus directed backwards to a past civilisation which, in the ardour of\nnew discovery, and in the reaction against medievalism, they enthroned\nas ideal; and a new authority was set up, the authority of ancient\nwriters. In general speculation the men of the Renaissance followed\nthe tendencies and adopted many of the prejudices of Greek philosophy.\nAlthough some great discoveries, with far-reaching, revolutionary\nconsequences, were made in this period, most active minds were engaged\nin rediscovering, elaborating, criticising, and imitating what was old.\nIt was not till the closing years of the Renaissance that speculation\nbegan to seek and feel its way towards new points of departure. It\nwas not till then that a serious reaction set in against the deeper\ninfluences of medieval thought.\n\n2.\n\nTo illustrate the limitations of this period let us take Machiavelli,\none of the most original thinkers that Italy ever produced.\n\nThere are certain fundamental principles underlying Machiavelli's\nscience of politics, which he has indicated incidentally in his\nunsystematic way, but which are essential to the comprehension of his\ndoctrines. The first is that at all times the world of human beings has\nbeen the same, varying indeed from land to land, but always presenting\nthe same aspect of some societies advancing towards prosperity, and\nothers declining. Those which are on the upward grade will always reach\na point beyond which they cannot rise further, but they will not remain\npermanently on this level, they will begin to decline; for human things\nare always in motion and therefore must go up or down. Similarly,\ndeclining states will ultimately touch bottom and then begin to ascend.\nThus a good constitution or social organisation can last only for a\nshort time. [Footnote: Machiavelli's principle of advance and decline:\nDiscorsi, ii. Introduction; Istorie fiorentine, v. ad init. For the\ncycle of constitutions through which all states tend to move see\nDiscorsi, ii. 2 (here we see the influence of Polybius).]\n\nIt is obvious that in this view of history Machiavelli was inspired and\ninstructed by the ancients. And it followed from his premisses that the\nstudy of the past is of the highest value because it enables men to\nsee what is to come; since to all social events at any period there are\ncorrespondences in ancient times. \"For these events are due to men, who\nhave and always had the same passions, and therefore of necessity the\neffects must be the same.\" [Footnote: Discorsi, iii. 43.]\n\nAgain, Machiavelli follows his ancient masters in assuming as evident\nthat a good organisation of society can be effected only by the\ndeliberate design of a wise legislator. [Footnote: Ib. iii. 1. The\nlawgiver must assume for his purposes that all men are bad: ib. i. 3.\nVillari has useful remarks on these principles in his Machiavelli,\nBook ii. cap. iii.] Forms of government and religions are the personal\ncreations of a single brain; and the only chance for a satisfactory\nconstitution or for a religion to maintain itself for any length of\ntime is constantly to repress any tendencies to depart from the original\nconceptions of its creator.\n\nIt is evident that these two assumptions are logically connected. The\nlawgiver builds on the immutability of human nature; what is good for\none generation must be good for another. For Machiavelli, as for Plato,\nchange meant corruption. Thus his fundamental theory excluded any\nconception of a satisfactory social order gradually emerging by the\nimpersonal work of successive generations, adapting their institutions\nto their own changing needs and aspirations. It is characteristic, and\nanother point of resemblance with ancient thinkers that he sought the\nideal state in the past--republican Rome.\n\nThese doctrines, the sameness of human nature and the omnipotent\nlawgiver, left no room for anything resembling a theory of Progress.\nIf not held afterwards in the uncompromising form in which Machiavelli\npresented them, yet it has well been pointed out that they lay at the\nroot of some of the most famous speculations of the eighteenth century.\n[Footnote: Villari, loc. cit.]\n\nMachiavelli's sameness of human nature meant that man would always have\nthe same passions and desires, weaknesses and vices. This assumption was\ncompatible with the widely prevailing view that man had degenerated in\nthe course of the last fifteen hundred years. From the exaltation of\nGreek and Roman antiquity to a position of unattainable superiority,\nespecially in the field of knowledge, the degeneration of humanity was\nan easy and natural inference. If the Greeks in philosophy and\nscience were authoritative guides, if in art and literature they were\nunapproachable, if the Roman republic, as Machiavelli thought, was an\nideal state, it would seem that the powers of Nature had declined, and\nshe could no longer produce the same quality of brain. So long as this\nparalysing theory prevailed, it is manifest that the idea of Progress\ncould not appear.\n\nBut in the course of the sixteenth century men began here and there,\nsomewhat timidly and tentatively, to rebel against the tyranny of\nantiquity, or rather to prepare the way for the open rebellion which was\nto break out in the seventeenth. Breaches were made in the proud citadel\nof ancient learning. Copernicus undermined the authority of Ptolemy\nand his predecessors; the anatomical researches of Vesalius injured the\nprestige of Galen; and Aristotle was attacked on many sides by men like\nTelesio, Cardan, Ramus, and Bruno. [Footnote: It has been observed that\nthe thinkers who were rebelling against the authority of Aristotle--the\nmost dangerous of the ancient philosophers, because he was so closely\nassociated with theological scholasticism and was supported by the\nChurch--frequently attacked under the standard of some other ancient\nmaster; e.g. Telesio resorted to Parmenides, Justus Lipsius to\nthe Stoics, and Bruno is under the influence of Plotinus and Plato\n(Bouillier, La Philosophie cartesienne, vol. i. p. 5). The idea of\n\"development\" in Bruno has been studied by Mariupolsky (Zur Geschichte\ndes Entwicklungsbegriffs in Berner Studien, Bd. vi. 1897), who pointed\nout the influence of Stoicism on his thought.] In particular branches of\nscience an innovation was beginning which heralded a radical revolution\nin the study of natural phenomena, though the general significance of\nthe prospect which these researches opened was but vaguely understood at\nthe time. The thinkers and men of science were living in an intellectual\ntwilight. It was the twilight of dawn. At one extremity we have\nmysticism which culminated in the speculations of Bruno and Campanella;\nat the other we have the scepticism of Montaigne, Charron, and Sanchez.\nThe bewildered condition of knowledge is indicated by the fact that\nwhile Bruno and Campanella accepted the Copernican astronomy, it was\nrejected by one who in many other respects may claim to be reckoned as a\nmodern--I mean Francis Bacon.\n\nBut the growing tendency to challenge the authority of the ancients does\nnot sever this period from the spirit which informed the Renaissance.\nFor it is subordinate or incidental to a more general and important\ninterest. To rehabilitate the natural man, to claim that he should be\nthe pilot of his own course, to assert his freedom in the fields of art\nand literature had been the work of the early Renaissance. It was the\nproblem of the later Renaissance to complete this emancipation in the\nsphere of philosophical thought. The bold metaphysics of Bruno, for\nwhich he atoned by a fiery death, offered the solution which was most\nunorthodox and complete. His deification of nature and of man as part of\nnature involved the liberation of humanity from external authority. But\nother speculative minds of the age, though less audacious, were equally\ninspired by the idea of freely interrogating nature, and were all\nengaged in accomplishing the programme of the Renaissance--the\nvindication of this world as possessing a value for man independent of\nits relations to any supermundane sphere. The raptures of Giordano Bruno\nand the sobrieties of Francis Bacon are here on common ground. The whole\nmovement was a necessary prelude to a new age of which science was to be\nthe mistress.\n\nIt is to be noted that there was a general feeling of complacency as to\nthe condition of learning and intellectual pursuits. This optimism is\nexpressed by Rabelais. Gargantua, in a letter to Pantagruel, studying\nat Paris, enlarges to his son on the vast improvements in learning and\neducation which had recently, he says, been brought about. \"All the\nworld is full of savants, learned teachers, large libraries; and I am of\nopinion that neither in the time of Plato nor of Cicero nor of Papinian\nwere there such facilities for study as one sees now.\" It is indeed the\nstudy of the ancient languages and literatures that Gargantua considers\nin a liberal education, but the satisfaction at the present diffusion of\nlearning, with the suggestion that here at least contemporaries have\nan advantage over the ancients, is the significant point. [Footnote:\nRabelais, Book ii. chap. 8.] This satisfaction shines through the\nobservation of Ramus that \"in one century we have seen a greater\nprogress in men and works of learning than our ancestors had seen in the\nwhole course of the previous fourteen centuries.\" [Footnote: Praefat.\nScholarum Mathematicarum, maiorem doctorum hominum et operum proventum\nseculo uno vidimus quam totis antea 14 seculis maiores nostri viderent.\n(Ed. Basel, 1569.)] [Footnote 1. Guillaume Postel observed in his\nDe magistratibus Atheniensium liber (1541) that the ages are always\nprogressing (secula semper proficere), and every day additions are made\nto human knowledge, and that this process would only cease if Providence\nby war, or plague, or some catastrophe were to destroy all the\naccumulated stores of knowledge which have been transmitted from\nantiquity in books (Praef., B verso). What is known of the life of this\nalmost forgotten scholar has been collected by G. Weill (De Gulielmi\nPostelli vita et indole, 1892). He visited the East, brought back\noriental MSS., and was more than once imprisoned on charges of heresy.\nHe dreamed of converting the Mohammedans, and of uniting the whole world\nunder the empire of France.]\n\nIn this last stage of the Renaissance, which includes the first quarter\nof the seventeenth century, soil was being prepared in which the idea of\nProgress could germinate, and our history of it origin definitely begins\nwith the work of two men who belong to this age, Bodin, who is hardly\nknown except to special students of political science, and Bacon, who\nis known to all the world. Both had a more general grasp of the\nsignificance of their own time than any of their contemporaries, and\nthough neither of them discovered a theory of Progress, they both made\ncontributions to thought which directly contributed to its subsequent\nappearance.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I. SOME INTERPRETATIONS OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY: BODIN AND LE ROY\n\n1.\n\nIt is a long descent from the genius of Machiavelli to the French\nhistorian, Jean Bodin, who published his introduction to historical\nstudies [Footnote: Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem, 1566.]\nabout forty years after Machiavelli's death. His views and his method\ndiffer widely from those of that great pioneer, whom he attacks. His\nreaders were not arrested by startling novelties or immoral doctrine; he\nis safe, and dull.\n\nBut Bodin had a much wider range of thought than Machiavelli, whose mind\nwas entirely concentrated on the theory of politics; and his importance\nfor us lies not in the political speculations by which he sought to\nprove that monarchy is the best form of government [Footnote: Les six\nlivres de la Republique, 1576.], but in his attempt to substitute a new\ntheory of universal history for that which prevailed in the Middle Ages.\nHe rejected the popular conception of a golden age and a subsequent\ndegeneration of mankind; and he refuted the view, generally current\namong medieval theologians, and based on the prophecies of Daniel, which\ndivided the course of history into four periods corresponding to the\nBabylonian Persian, Macedonian, and Roman monarchies, the last of which\nwas to endure till the day of Judgement. Bodin suggests a division into\nthree great periods: the first, of about two thousand years, in which\nthe South-Eastern peoples were predominant; the second, of the same\nduration, in which those whom he calls the Middle (Mediterranean)\npeoples came to the front; the third, in which the Northern nations\nwho overthrew Rome became the leaders in civilisation. Each period is\nstamped by the psychological character of the three racial groups. The\nnote of the first is religion, of the second practical sagacity, of the\nthird warfare and inventive skill. This division actually anticipates\nthe synthesis of Hegel. [Footnote: Hegel's division is (1) the Oriental,\n(2) a, the Greek, b, the Roman, and (3) the Germanic worlds.] But the\ninteresting point is that it is based on anthropological considerations,\nin which climate and geography are taken into account; and,\nnotwithstanding the crudeness of the whole exposition and the intrusion\nof astrological arguments, it is a new step in the study of universal\nhistory. [Footnote: Climates and geography. The fullest discussion\nwill be found in the Republique, Book v. cap. i. Here Bodin anticipated\nMontesquieu. There was indeed nothing new in the principle; it had been\nrecognised by Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, and other Greeks,\nand in a later age by Roger Bacon.\n\nBut Bodin first developed and applied it methodically. This part of\nhis work was ignored, and in the eighteenth century Montesquieu's\nspeculations on the physical factors in history were applauded as a new\ndiscovery.]\n\nI have said that Bodin rejected the theory of the degeneration of man,\nalong with the tradition of a previous age of virtue and felicity.\n[Footnote: See especially Methodus, cap. v. pp. 124, 130, 136.] The\nreason which he alleged against it is important. The powers of nature\nhave always been uniform. It is illegitimate to suppose that she could\nat one time produce the men and conditions postulated by the theory of\nthe golden age, and not produce them at another. In other words, Bodin\nasserts the principle of the permanent and undiminishing capacities\nof nature, and, as we shall see in the sequel, this principle was\nsignificant. It is not to be confounded with the doctrine of the\nimmutability of human things assumed by Machiavelli. The human scene has\nvastly changed since the primitive age of man; \"if that so-called golden\nage could be revoked and compared with our own, we should consider\nit iron.\" [Footnote: Methodus, cap. VII. p. 353.] For history largely\ndepends on the will of men, which is always changing; every day new\nlaws, new customs, new institutions, both secular and religious, come\ninto being, and new errors. [Footnote: Ib. cap. I. p. 12.]\n\nBut in this changing scene we can observe a certain regularity, a law of\noscillation. Rise is followed by fall, and fall by rise; it is a mistake\nto think that the human race is always deteriorating. [Footnote: Ib.\ncap. VII. p. 361: \"cum aeterna quadam lege naturae conversio rerum\nomnium velut in orbem redire videatur, ut aeque vitia virtutibus,\nignoratio scientiae, turpe honesto consequens sit, atque tenebrae luci,\nfallunt qui genus hominum semper deterius seipso evadere putant.\"] If\nthat were so, we should long ago have reached the lowest stage of vice\nand iniquity. On the contrary, there has been, through the series of\noscillations, a gradual ascent. In the ages which have been foolishly\ndesignated as gold and silver men lived like the wild beasts; and from\nthat state they have slowly reached the humanity of manners and the\nsocial order which prevail to-day. [Footnote: Ib. p. 356.]\n\nThus Bodin recognises a general progress in the past. That is nothing\nnew; it was the view, for instance, of the Epicureans. But much had\npassed in the world since the philosophy of Epicurus was alive, and\nBodin had to consider twelve hundred years of new vicissitudes. Could\nthe Epicurean theory be brought up to date?\n\n2.\n\nBodin deals with the question almost entirely in respect to human\nknowledge. In definitely denying the degeneration of man, Bodin was only\nexpressing what many thinkers of the sixteenth century had been coming\nto feel, though timidly and obscurely. The philosophers and men of\nscience, who criticised the ancients in special departments, did not\nformulate any general view on the privileged position of antiquity.\nBodin was the first to do so.\n\nKnowledge, letters, and arts have their vicissitudes, he says; they\nrise, increase, and nourish, and then languish and die. After the decay\nof Rome there was a long fallow period; but this was followed by a\nsplendid revival of knowledge and an intellectual productivity which\nno other age has exceeded. The scientific discoveries of the ancients\ndeserve high praise; but the moderns have not only thrown new light\non phenomena which they had incompletely explained, they have made new\ndiscoveries of equal or indeed greater importance. Take, for instance,\nthe mariner's compass which has made possible the circumnavigation of\nthe earth and a universal commerce, whereby the world has been\nchanged, as it were, into a single state. [Footnote: Cardan had\nalready signalised the compass, printing, and gunpowder as three modern\ninventions, to which \"the whole of antiquity has nothing equal to show.\"\nHe adds, \"I pass over the other inventions of this age which, though\nwonderful, form rather a development of ancient arts than surpass the\nintellects of our ancestors.\" De subtilitate, lib. 3 ad init. (Opera,\niii. p. 609).] Take the advances we have made in geography and\nastronomy; the invention of gunpowder; the development of the woollen\nand other industries. The invention of printing alone can be set against\nanything that the ancients achieved. [Footnote: Methodus, cap. VII.,\npp. 359-61. Bodin also points out that there was an improvement, in\nsome respects, in manners and morals since the early Roman Empire; for\ninstance, in the abolition of gladiatorial spectacles (p. 359).]\n\nAn inference from all this, obvious to a modern reader, would be that\nin the future there will be similar oscillations, and new inventions and\ndiscoveries as remarkable as any that have been made in the past. But\nBodin does not draw this inference. He confines himself to the past and\npresent, and has no word to say about the vicissitudes of the future.\nBut he is not haunted by any vision of the end of the world, or the\ncoming of Antichrist; three centuries of humanism lay between him and\nRoger Bacon.\n\n3.\n\nAnd yet the influence of medievalism, which it had been the work of\nthose three centuries to overcome, was still pervasively there. Still\nmore the authority of the Greeks and Romans, which had been set up by\nthe revival of learning, was, without their realising it, heavy even\nupon thinkers like Bodin, who did not scruple freely to criticise\nancient authors. And so, in his thoughtful attempt to find a clew to\nuniversal history, he was hampered by theological and cosmic theories,\nthe legacy of the past. It is significant of the trend of his mind that\nwhen he is discussing the periodic decline of science and letters, he\nsuggests that it may be due to the direct action of God, punishing those\nwho misapplied useful sciences to the destruction of men.\n\nBut his speculations were particularly compromised by his belief\nin astrology, which, notwithstanding the efforts of humanists like\nPetrarch, Aeneas Sylvius, and Pico to discredit it, retained its\nhold over the minds of many eminent, otherwise emancipated, thinkers\nthroughout the period of the Renaissance. [Footnote: Bodin was also a\nfirm believer in sorcery. His La Demonomanie (1578) is a monument of\nsuperstition.] Here Bodin is in the company of Machiavelli and Lord\nBacon. But not content with the doctrine of astral influence on human\nevents, he sought another key to historical changes in the influence of\nnumbers, reviving the ideas of Pythagoras and Plato, but working them\nout in a way of his own. He enumerates the durations of the lives of\nmany famous men, to show that they can be expressed by powers of 7 and\n9, or the product of these numbers. Other numbers which have special\nvirtues are the powers of 12, the perfect number [Footnote: I.e. a\nnumber equal to the sum of all its factors.] 496, and various others.\nHe gives many examples to prove that these mystic numbers determine the\ndurations of empires and underlie historical chronology. For instance,\nthe duration of the oriental monarchies from Ninus to the Conquest of\nPersia by Alexander the Great was 1728 (= 12 cubed) years. He gives the\nRoman republic from the foundation of Rome to the battle of Actium 729\n(=9 cubed) years. [Footnote: Methodus, cap. v. pp. 265 sqq.]\n\n4.\n\nFrom a believer in such a theory, which illustrates the limitations of\nmen's outlook on the world in the Renaissance period, we could perhaps\nhardly expect a vision of Progress. The best that can be said for it\nis that, both here and in his astrological creed, Bodin is crudely\nattempting to bring human history into close connection with the rest of\nthe universe, and to establish the view that the whole world is built\non a divine plan by which all the parts are intimately interrelated.\n[Footnote: Cp. Baudrillart, J. Bodin et son temps, p. 148 (1853). This\nmonograph is chiefly devoted to a full analysis of La Republique.] He is\ncareful, however, to avoid fatalism. He asserts, as we have seen, that\nhistory depends largely on the will of men. And he comes nearer to the\nidea of Progress than any one before him; he is on the threshold.\n\nFor if we eliminate his astrological and Pythagorean speculations, and\nvarious theological parentheses which do not disturb his argument, his\nwork announces a new view of history which is optimistic regarding man's\ncareer on earth, without any reference to his destinies in a future\nlife. And in this optimistic view there are three particular points\nto note, which were essential to the subsequent growth of the idea of\nProgress. In the first place, the decisive rejection of the theory of\ndegeneration, which had been a perpetual obstacle to the apprehension\nof that idea. Secondly, the unreserved claim that his own age was fully\nequal, and in some respects superior, to the age of classical antiquity,\nin respect of science and the arts. He leaves the ancients reverently on\ntheir pedestal, but he erects another pedestal for the moderns, and\nit is rather higher. We shall see the import of this when we come to\nconsider the intellectual movement in which the idea of Progress was\nafterwards to emerge. In the third place, he had a conception of the\ncommon interest of all the peoples of the earth, a conception which\ncorresponded to the old ecumenical idea of the Greeks and Romans,\n[Footnote: See above, p. 23.] but had now a new significance through the\ndiscoveries of modern navigators. He speaks repeatedly of the world as a\nuniversal state, and suggests that the various races, by their peculiar\naptitudes and qualities, contribute to the common good of the whole.\nThis idea of the \"solidarity\" of peoples was to be an important element\nin the growth of the doctrine of Progress. [Footnote: Republique, Book\nv. cap. 1 (p. 690; ed. 1593); Methodus, cap. vi. p. 194; cap. vii. p.\n360.]\n\nThese ideas were in the air. Another Frenchman, the classical scholar,\nLouis Le Roy, translator of Plato and Aristotle, put forward similar\nviews in a work of less celebrity, On the Vicissitude or Variety of\nthe Things in the Universe. [Footnote: De la vicissitude ou variete\ndes choses en l'univers, 1577, 2nd ed. (which I have used), 1584.] It\ncontains a survey of great periods in which particular peoples attained\nan exceptional state of dominion and prosperity, and it anticipates\nlater histories of civilisation by dwelling but slightly on political\nevents and bringing into prominence human achievements in science,\nphilosophy, and the arts. Beginning with the advance of man from\nprimitive rudeness to ordered society--a sketch based on the conjectures\nof Plato in the Protagoras--Le Roy reviews the history, and estimates\nthe merits, of the Egyptians, Assyrians and Persians, the Greeks, Romans\nand Saracens, and finally of the modern age. The facts, he thinks,\nestablish the proposition that the art of warfare, eloquence,\nphilosophy, mathematics, and the fine arts, generally flourish and\ndecline together.\n\nBut they do decline. Human things are not perpetual; all pass through\nthe same cycle--beginning, progress, perfection, corruption, end. This,\nhowever, does not explain the succession of empires in the world, the\nchanges of the scene of prosperity from one people or set of peoples\nto another. Le Roy finds the cause in providential design. God, he\nbelieves, cares for all parts of the universe and has distributed\nexcellence in arms and letters now to Asia, now to Europe, again to\nAfrica, letting virtue and vice, knowledge and ignorance travel from\ncountry to country, that all in their turn may share in good and bad\nfortune, and none become too proud through prolonged prosperity.\n\nBut what of the modern age in Western Europe? It is fully the equal, he\nassevers, of the most illustrious ages of the past, and in some respects\nit is superior. Almost all the liberal and mechanical arts of antiquity,\nwhich had been lost for about 1200 years, have been restored, and\nthere have been new inventions, especially printing, and the mariner's\ncompass, and \"I would give the third place to gunnery but that it seems\ninvented rather for the ruin than for the utility of the human race.\" In\nour knowledge of astronomy and cosmography we surpass the ancients. \"We\ncan affirm that the whole world is now known, and all the races of men;\nthey can interchange all their commodities and mutually supply their\nneeds, as inhabitants of the same city or world-state.\" And hence there\nhas been a notable increase of wealth.\n\nVice and suffering, indeed, are as grave as ever, and we are afflicted\nby the trouble of heresies; but this does not prove a general\ndeterioration of morals. If that inveterate complaint, the refrain\nchanted by old men in every age, were true, the world would already\nhave reached the extreme limit of wickedness, and integrity would have\ndisappeared utterly. Seneca long ago made the right criticism. Hoc\nmaiores nostri questi sunt, hoc nos querimur, hoc posteri nostri\nquerentur, eversos esse mores.... At ista stant loco eodem. Perhaps\nLe Roy was thinking particularly of that curious book the Apology for\nHerodotus, in which the eminent Greek scholar, Henri Estienne, exposed\nwith Calvinistic prejudice the iniquities of modern times and the\ncorruption of the Roman Church. [Footnote: L'Introduction au traite\nde la conformite des merveilles anciennes avec les modernes, ou traite\npreparatif a l'Apologie pour Herodote, ed. Ristelhuber, 2 vols., 1879.\nThe book was published in 1566.]\n\nBut if we are to judge by past experience, does it not follow that this\nmodern age must go the same way as the great ages of the past which\nit rivals or even surpasses? Our civilisation, too, having reached\nperfection, will inevitably decline and pass away: is not this the clear\nlesson of history? Le Roy does not shirk the issue; it is the point to\nwhich his whole exposition has led and he puts it vividly.\n\n\"If the memory of the past is the instruction of the present and the\npremonition of the future, it is to be feared that having reached\nso great excellence, power, wisdom, studies, books, industries\nwill decline, as has happened in the past, and disappear--confusion\nsucceeding to the order and perfection of to-day, rudeness to\ncivilisation, ignorance to knowledge. I already foresee in imagination\nnations, strange in form, complexion, and costume, overwhelming\nEurope--like the Goths, Huns, Vandals, Lombards, Saracens of\nold--destroying our cities and palaces, burning our libraries,\ndevastating all that is beautiful. I foresee in all countries wars,\ndomestic and foreign, factions and heresies which will profane all\nthings human and divine; famines, plagues, and floods; the universe\napproaching an end, world-wide confusion, and the return of things to\ntheir original chaos.\" [Footnote: It is characteristic of the age that\nin the last sentence the author goes beyond the issue and contemplates\nthe possibility which still haunted men's minds that the end of the\nworld might not be far off.]\n\nBut having conducted us to this pessimistic conclusion Le Roy finds\nit repugnant, and is unwilling to acquiesce in it. Like an embarrassed\ndramatist he escapes from the knot which he has tied by introducing the\ndeus ex machina.\n\n\"However much these things proceed according to the fatal law of the\nworld, and have their natural causes, yet events depend principally\non Divine Providence which is superior to nature and alone knows the\npredetermined times of events.\" That is to say, it depends, after all,\non Providence whether the argument from past experience is valid. Who\nknows whether the modern age may not prove the exception to the law\nwhich has hitherto prevailed? Let us act as if it would.\n\nThis is the practical moral that Le Roy enforces in the last book of his\ndissertation. We must not allow ourselves to be paralysed or dismayed by\nthe destinies of past civilisations, but must work hard to transmit to\nposterity all that has been achieved, and augment the discoveries of the\npast by new researches. For knowledge is inexhaustible. \"Let us not be\nso simple as to believe that the ancients have known and said everything\nand left nothing to their successors. Or that nature gave them all her\nfavours in order to remain sterile ever after.\" Here Le Roy lays\ndown Bodin's principle which was to be asserted more urgently in the\nfollowing century--the permanence of natural forces. Nature is the same\nnow as always, and can produce as great intellects as ever. The elements\nhave the same power, the constellations keep their old order, men are\nmade of the same material. There is nothing to hinder the birth in this\nage of men equal in brains to Plato, Aristotle, or Hippocrates.\n\nPhilosophically, Le Roy's conclusion is lame enough. We are asked to\nset aside the data of experience and act on an off-chance. But the\ndetermination of the optimist to escape from the logic of his own\nargument is significant. He has no conception of an increasing\npurpose or underlying unity in the history of man, but he thinks that\nProvidence--the old Providence of St. Augustine, who arranged the events\nof Roman history with a view to the coming of Christ--may, for some\nunknown reason, prolong indefinitely the modern age. He is obeying\nthe instinct of optimism and confidence which was already beginning to\ncreate the appropriate atmosphere for the intellectual revolution of the\ncoming century.\n\nHis book was translated into English, but neither in France nor in\nEngland had it the same influence as the speculations of Bodin. But it\ninsinuated, as the reader will have observed, the same three views which\nBodin taught, and must have helped to propagate them: that the world\nhas not degenerated; that the modern age is not inferior to classical\nantiquity; and that the races of the earth form now a sort of \"mundane\nrepublic.\"\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II. UTILITY THE END OF KNOWLEDGE: BACON\n\n1.\n\nAmong the great precursors of a new order of thought Francis Bacon\noccupies a unique position. He drew up a definite programme for a\n\"great Renovation\" of knowledge; he is more clearly conscious than his\ncontemporaries of the necessity of breaking with the past and making\na completely new start; and his whole method of thought seems\nintellectually nearer to us than the speculations of a Bruno or a\nCampanella. Hence it is easy to understand that he is often regarded,\nespecially in his own country, as more than a precursor, as the first\nphilosopher, of the modern age, definitely within its precincts.\n[Footnote: German critics have been generally severe on Bacon as\ndeficient in the scientific spirit. Kuno Fischer, Baco van Verulam\n(1856). Liebig, Ueber Francis Bacon van Verulam und die Methode der\nNaturforschung (1863). Lange (Geschichte des Materialismus, i. 195)\nspeaks of \"die aberglaubische und eitle Unwissenschaftlichkeit Bacos.\"]\n\nIt is not indeed a matter of fundamental importance how we classify\nthese men who stood on the border of two worlds, but it must\nbe recognised that if in many respects Bacon is in advance of\ncontemporaries who cannot be dissociated from the Renaissance, in other\nrespects, such as belief in astrology and dreams, he stands on the same\nground, and in one essential point--which might almost be taken as\nthe test of mental progress at this period--Bruno and Campanella have\noutstripped him. For him Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo worked in vain;\nhe obstinately adhered to the old geocentric system.\n\nIt must also be remembered that the principle which he laid down in his\nambitious programme for the reform of science--that experiment is the\nkey for discovering the secrets of nature--was not a new revelation. We\nneed not dwell on the fact that he had been anticipated by Roger Bacon;\nfor the ideas of that wonderful thinker had fallen dead in an age\nwhich was not ripe for them. But the direct interrogation of nature\nwas already recognised both in practice and in theory in the sixteenth\ncentury. What Bacon did was to insist upon the principle more strongly\nand explicitly, and to formulate it more precisely. He clarified and\nexplained the progressive ideas which inspired the scientific thought\nof the last period of the European Renaissance, from which he cannot, I\nthink, be dissociated.\n\nBut in clearing up and defining these progressive ideas, he made a\ncontribution to the development of human thought which had far-reaching\nimportance and has a special significance for our present subject. In\nthe hopes of a steady increase of knowledge, based on the application of\nnew methods, he had been anticipated by Roger Bacon, and further back\nby Seneca. But with Francis Bacon this idea of the augmentation of\nknowledge has an entirely new value. For Seneca the exploration of\nnature was a means of escaping from the sordid miseries of life. For the\nfriar of Oxford the principal use of increasing knowledge was to prepare\nfor the coming of Antichrist. Francis Bacon sounded the modern note; for\nhim the end of knowledge is utility. [Footnote; The passages specially\nreferred to are: De Aug. Sc. vii. i; Nov. Org. i. 81 and 3.]\n\n2.\n\nThe principle that the proper aim of knowledge is the amelioration\nof human life, to increase men's happiness and mitigate their\nsufferings--commodis humanis inservire--was the guiding star of Bacon\nin all his intellectual labour. He declared the advancement of \"the\nhappiness of mankind\" to be the direct purpose of the works he had\nwritten or designed. He considered that all his predecessors had gone\nwrong because they did not apprehend that the finis scientarum, the real\nand legitimate goal of the sciences, is \"the endowment of human life\nwith new inventions and riches\"; and he made this the test for defining\nthe comparative values of the various branches of knowledge.\n\nThe true object, therefore, of the investigation of nature is not, as\nthe Greek philosophers held, speculative satisfaction, but to establish\nthe reign of man over nature; and this Bacon judged to be attainable,\nprovided new methods of attacking the problems were introduced. Whatever\nmay be thought of his daring act in bringing natural science down from\nthe clouds and assigning to her the function of ministering to the\nmaterial convenience and comfort of man, we may criticise Bacon for his\ndoctrine that every branch of science should be pursued with a single\neye towards practical use. Mathematics, he thought, should conduct\nherself as a humble, if necessary, handmaid, without any aspirations\nof her own. But it is not thus that the great progress in man's command\nover nature since Bacon's age has been effected. Many of the most\nvaluable and surprising things which science has succeeded in doing for\ncivilisation would never have been performed if each branch of\nknowledge were not guided by its own independent ideal of speculative\ncompleteness. [Footnote: This was to be well explained by Fontenelle,\nPreface sur l'utilite des mathematiques, in Oeuvres (ed. 1729), iii,\nI sqq.] But this does not invalidate Bacon's pragmatic principle, or\ndiminish the importance of the fact that in laying down the utilitarian\nview of knowledge he contributed to the creation of a new mental\natmosphere in which the theory of Progress was afterwards to develop.\n\n3.\n\nBacon's respect for the ancients and his familiarity with their writings\nare apparent on almost every page he wrote. Yet it was one of his\nprincipal endeavours to shake off the yoke of their authority, which he\nrecognised to be a fatal obstacle to the advancement of science. \"Truth\nis not to be sought in the good fortune of any particular conjuncture of\ntime\"; its attainment depends on experience, and how limited was theirs.\nIn their age \"the knowledge both of time and of the world was confined\nand meagre; they had not a thousand years of history worthy of that\nname, but mere fables and ancient traditions; they were not acquainted\nwith but a small portion of the regions and countries of the world.\"\n[Footnote: Nov. Org. i. 84; 56, 72, 73, 74.] In all their systems and\nscientific speculation \"there is hardly one single experiment that has a\ntendency to assist mankind.\" Their theories were founded on opinion,\nand therefore science has remained stationary for the last two thousand\nyears; whereas mechanical arts, which are founded on nature and\nexperience, grow and increase.\n\nIn this connection, Bacon points out that the word \"antiquity\" is\nmisleading, and makes a remark which will frequently recur in writers\nof the following generations. Antiquitas seculi iuventus mundi; what we\ncall antiquity and are accustomed to revere as such was the youth of the\nworld. But it is the old age and increasing years of the world--the\ntime in which we are now living--that deserves in truth to be called\nantiquity. We are really the ancients, the Greeks and Romans were\nyounger than we, in respect to the age of the world. And as we look to\nan old man for greater knowledge of the world than from a young man, so\nwe have good reason to expect far greater things from our own age than\nfrom antiquity, because in the meantime the stock of knowledge has been\nincreased by an endless number of observations and experiments. Time\nis the great discoverer, and truth is the daughter of time, not of\nauthority.\n\nTake the three inventions which were unknown to the ancients-printing,\ngunpowder, and the compass. These \"have changed the appearance and state\nof the whole world; first in literature, then in warfare, and lastly in\nnavigation; and innumerable changes have been thence derived, so that\nno empire, sect, or star appears to have exercised a greater power\nor influence on human affairs than these mechanical discoveries.\"\n[Footnote: Nov. Org. 129. We have seen that these three inventions had\nalready been classed together as outstanding by Cardan and Le Roy. They\nalso appear in Campanella. Bodin, as we saw, included them in a longer\nlist.] It was perhaps the results of navigation and the exploration of\nunknown lands that impressed Bacon more than all, as they had impressed\nBodin. Let me quote one passage.\n\n\"It may truly be affirmed to the honour of these times, and in a\nvirtuous emulation with antiquity, that this great building of the world\nhad never through-lights made in it till the age of us and our fathers.\nFor although they [the ancients] had knowledge of the antipodes... yet\nthat mought be by demonstration, and not in fact; and if by travel, it\nrequireth the voyage but of half the earth. But to circle the earth, as\nthe heavenly bodies do, was not done nor enterprised till these later\ntimes: and therefore these times may justly bear in their word... plus\nultra in precedence of the ancient non ultra.... And this proficience in\nnavigation and discoveries may plant also an expectation of the further\nproficience and augmentation of all sciences, because it may seem that\nthey are ordained by God to be coevals, that is, to meet in one age. For\nso the prophet Daniel, speaking of the latter times foretelleth, Plurimi\npertransibunt, et multiplex erit scientia: as if the openness and\nthrough-passage of the world and the increase of knowledge were\nappointed to be in the same ages; as we see it is already performed in\ngreat part: the learning of these later times not much giving place to\nthe former two periods or returns of learning, the one of the Grecians,\nthe other of the Romans.\" [Footnote: Advancement of Learning, ii. 13,\n14.]\n\nIn all this we have a definite recognition of the fact that knowledge\nprogresses. Bacon did not come into close quarters with the history of\ncivilisation, but he has thrown out some observations which amount to a\nrough synthesis. [Footnote: Advancement, ii. 1, 6; Nov. Org. i. 78,\n79, 85.] Like Bodin, he divided, history into three periods--(1) the\nantiquities of the world; (2) the middle part of time which comprised\ntwo sections, the Greek and the Roman; (3) \"modern history,\" which\nincluded what we now call the Middle Ages. In this sequence three\nparticular epochs stand out as fertile in science and favourable to\nprogress--the Greek, the Roman, and our own--\"and scarcely two centuries\ncan with justice be assigned to each.\" The other periods of time are\ndeserts, so far as philosophy and science are concerned. Rome and Greece\nare \"two exemplar States of the world for arms, learning, moral virtue,\npolicy, and laws.\" But even in those two great epochs little progress\nwas made in natural philosophy. For in Greece moral and political\nspeculation absorbed men's minds; in Rome, meditation and labour were\nwasted on moral philosophy, and the greatest intellects were devoted to\ncivil affairs. Afterwards, in the third period, the study of theology\nwas the chief occupation of the Western European nations. It was\nactually in the earliest period that the most useful discoveries for\nthe comfort of human life were made, \"so that, to say the truth, when\ncontemplation and doctrinal science began, the discovery of useful works\nceased.\"\n\nSo much for the past history of mankind, during which many things\nconspired to make progress in the subjugation of nature slow, fitful,\nand fortuitous. What of the future? Bacon's answer is: if the errors\nof the past are understood and avoided there is every hope of steady\nprogress in the modern age.\n\nBut it might be asked. Is there not something in the constitution of\nthings which determines epochs of stagnation and vigour, some force\nagainst which man's understanding and will are impotent? Is it not\ntrue that in the revolutions of ages there are floods and ebbs of the\nsciences, which flourish now and then decline, and that when they have\nreached a certain point they can proceed no further? This doctrine of\nReturns or ricorsi [Footnote: Bodin's conversiones.] is denounced\nby Bacon as the greatest obstacle to the advancement of knowledge,\ncreating, as it does, diffidence or despair. He does not formally\nrefute it, but he marshals the reasons for an optimistic view, and these\nreasons supply the disproof The facts on which the fatalistic doctrine\nof Returns is based can be explained without resorting to any mysterious\nlaw. [Footnote: Nov. Org. i. 92 sqq.] Progress has not been steady or\ncontinuous on account of the prejudices and errors which hindered men\nfrom setting to work in the right way. The difficulties in advancing did\nnot arise from things which are not in our power; they were due to the\nhuman understanding, which wasted time and labour on improper objects.\n\"In proportion as the errors which have been committed impeded the past,\nso do they afford reason to hope for the future.\"\n\n4.\n\nBut will the new period of advance, which Bacon expected and strove to\nsecure, be of indefinite duration? He does not consider the question.\nHis view that he lived in the old age of the world implies that he did\nnot anticipate a vast tract of time before the end of mankind's career\non earth. And an orthodox Christian of that time could hardly be\nexpected to predict. The impression we get is that, in his sanguine\nenthusiasm, he imagined that a \"prudent interrogation\" of nature could\nextort all her secrets in a few generations. As a reformer he was so\nengaged in the immediate prospect of results that his imagination did\nnot turn to the possibilities of a remoter future, though these would\nlogically follow from his recognition of \"the inseparable propriety of\ntime which is ever more and more to disclose truth.\" He hopes everything\nfrom his own age in which learning has made her third visitation to the\nworld, a period which he is persuaded will far surpass that of Grecian\nand Roman learning. [Footnote: Advancement, ii. 24.] If he could have\nrevisited England in 1700 and surveyed what science had performed since\nhis death his hopes might have been more than satisfied.\n\nBut, animated though he was with the progressive spirit, as Leonardo\nda Vinci had been before him, all that he says of the prospects of an\nincrease of knowledge fails to amount to the theory of Progress. He\nprepares the way, he leads up to it; but his conception of his own time\nas the old age of humanity excludes the conception of an indefinite\nadvance in the future, which is essential if the theory is to have\nsignificance and value. And in regard to progress in the past, though he\nis clearer and more emphatic than Bodin, he hardly adds anything to what\nBodin had observed. The novelty of his view lies not in his recognition\nof the advance of knowledge and its power to advance still further, but\nin the purpose which he assigned to it. [Footnote: Campanella held its\npurpose to be the contemplation of the wisdom of God; cp., for instance,\nDe sensu rerum, Bk. iv. epilogus, where the world is described as statua\nDei altissimi (p. 370; ed. 1620).] The end of the sciences is their\nusefulness to the human race. To increase knowledge is to extend\nthe dominion of man over nature, and so to increase his comfort and\nhappiness, so far as these depend on external circumstances. To Plato\nor Seneca, or to a Christian dreaming of the City of God, this doctrine\nwould seem material and trivial; and its announcement was revolutionary:\nfor it implied that happiness on earth was an end to be pursued for its\nown sake, and to be secured by co-operation for mankind at large. This\nidea is an axiom which any general doctrine of Progress must presuppose;\nand it forms Bacon's great contribution to the group of ideas which\nrendered possible the subsequent rise of that doctrine.\n\nFinally, we must remember that by Bacon, as by most of his Elizabethan\ncontemporaries, the doctrine of an active intervening Providence, the\nProvidence of Augustine, was taken as a matter of course, and governed\nmore or less their conceptions of the history of civilisation. But, I\nthink, we may say that Bacon, while he formally acknowledged it, did not\npress it or emphasise it. [Footnote: See Advancement, iii. II. On\nthe influence of the doctrine on historical writing in England at the\nbeginning of the seventeenth century see Firth, Sir Walter Raleigh's\nHistory of the World (Proc. of British Academy, vol. viii., 1919), p.\n8.]\n\n5.\n\nBacon illustrated his view of the social importance of science in his\nsketch of an ideal state, the New Atlantis. He completed only a part of\nthe work, and the fragment was published after his death. [Footnote: In\n1627. It was composed about 1623. It seems almost certain that he\nwas acquainted with the Christianopolis of Johann Valentin Andreae\n(1586-1654), which had appeared in Latin in 1614, and contained a plan\nfor a scientific college to reform the civilised world. Andreae, who was\nacquainted both with More and with Campanella, placed his ideal society\nin an island which he called Caphar Salama (the name of a village in\nPalestine). Andreae's work had also a direct influence on the Nova\nSolyma of Samuel Gott (1648). See the Introduction of F. E. Held to his\nedition of Christianopolis (1916). In Macaria, another imaginary state\nof the seventeenth century (A description of the famous Kingdoms of\nMacaria, 1641, by Hartlib), the pursuit of science is not a feature.]\nIt is evident that the predominating interest that moved his imagination\nwas different from that which guided Plato. While Plato aimed at\nsecuring a permanent solid order founded on immutable principles,\nthe design of Bacon was to enable his imaginary community to achieve\ndominion over nature by progressive discoveries. The heads of Plato's\ncity are metaphysicians, who regulate the welfare of the people by\nabstract doctrines established once for all; while the most important\nfeature in the New Atlantis is the college of scientific investigators,\nwho are always discovering new truths which may alter the conditions of\nlife. Here, though only in a restricted field, an idea of progressive\nimprovement, which is the note of the modern age, comes in to modify\nthe idea of a fixed order which exclusively prevailed in ancient\nspeculation.\n\nOn the other hand, we must not ignore the fact that Bacon's ideal\nsociety is established by the same kind of agency as the ideal societies\nof Plato and Aristotle. It has not developed; it was framed by the\nwisdom of an original legislator Solamona. In this it resembles\nthe other imaginary commonwealths of the sixteenth and seventeenth\ncenturies. The organisation of More's Utopia is fixed initially once for\nall by the lawgiver Utopus. The origin of Campanella's Civitas Solis is\nnot expressly stated, but there can be no doubt that he conceived its\ninstitutions as created by the fiat of a single lawgiver. Harrington,\nin his Oceana, argues with Machiavelli that a commonwealth, to be\nwell turned, must be the work of one man, like a book or a building.\n[Footnote: Harrington, Oceana, pp. 77-8, 3rd ed. (1747).]\n\nWhat measure of liberty Bacon would have granted to the people of his\nperfect state we cannot say; his work breaks off before he comes\nto describe their condition. But we receive the impression that the\ngovernment he conceived was strictly paternal, though perhaps less\nrigorous than the theocratic despotism which Campanella, under Plato's\ninfluence, set up in the City of the Sun. But even Campanella has this\nin common with More--and we may be sure that Bacon's conception would\nhave agreed here--that there are no hard-and-fast lines between the\nclasses, and the welfare and happiness of all the inhabitants is\nimpartially considered, in contrast with Plato's scheme in the Laws,\nwhere the artisans and manual labourers were an inferior caste existing\nless for their own sake than for the sake of the community as a whole.\n[Footnote: This however does not apply to the Republic, as is so\ncommonly asserted. See the just criticisms of A. A. Trever, A History of\nGreek Economic Thought (Chicago, 1916), 49 sqq.]\n\nIt may finally be pointed out that these three imaginary commonwealths\nstand together as a group, marked by a humaner temper than the ancient,\nand also by another common characteristic which distinguishes them, on\none hand, from the ideal states of Plato and, on the other, from modern\nsketches of desirable societies. Plato and Aristotle conceived their\nconstructions within the geographical limits of Hellas, either in the\npast or in the present. More, Bacon, and Campanella placed theirs in\ndistant seas, and this remoteness in space helped to create a certain\nillusion, of reality. [Footnote: Civitas Solis, p. 461 (ed. 1620).\nExpectancy of end of world: Ib. p. 455.] The modern plan is to project\nthe perfect society into a period of future time. The device of More\nand his successors was suggested by the maritime explorations of the\nfifteenth and sixteenth centuries; the later method was a result of the\nrise of the idea of Progress. [Footnote: Similarly the ideal communistic\nstates imagined by Euemerus and Iambulus in the southern seas owed\ntheir geographical positions to the popular interest in seafaring in the\nIndian Ocean in the age after Alexander. One wonders whether Campanella\nknew the account of the fictitious journey of Iambulus to the Islands of\nthe Sun, in Diodorus Siculus, ii. 55-60.]\n\n6.\n\nA word or two more may be said about the City of the Sun. Campanella was\nas earnest a believer in the interrogation of nature as Bacon, and the\nplace which science and learning hold in his state (although research is\nnot so prominent as in the New Atlantis), and the scientific training of\nall the citizens, are a capital feature. The progress in inventions, to\nwhich science may look forward, is suggested. The men of the City of\nthe Sun \"have already discovered the one art which the world seemed\nto lack--the art of flying; and they expect soon to invent ocular\ninstruments which will enable them to see the invisible stars and\nauricular instruments for hearing the harmony of the spheres.\"\nCampanella's view of the present conditions and prospects of knowledge\nis hardly less sanguine than that of Bacon, and characteristically he\nconfirms his optimism by astrological data. \"If you only knew what their\nastrologers say about the coming age. Our times, they assert, have more\nhistory in a hundred years than the whole world in four thousand. More\nbooks have been published in this century than in five thousand\nyears before. They dwell on the wonderful inventions of printing, of\nartillery, and of the use of the magnet,--clear signs of the times--and\nalso instruments for the assembling of the inhabitants of the world into\none fold,\" and show that these discoveries were conditioned by stellar\ninfluences.\n\nBut Campanella is not very sure or clear about the future. Astrology\nand theology cause him to hesitate. Like Bacon, he dreams of a great\nRenovation and sees that the conditions are propitious, but his faith is\nnot secure. The astronomers of his imaginary state scrutinise the stars\nto discover whether the world will perish or not, and they believe in\nthe oracular saying of Jesus that the end will come like a thief in the\nnight. Therefore they expect a new age, and perhaps also the end of the\nworld.\n\nThe new age of knowledge was about to begin. Campanella, Bruno, and\nBacon stand, as it were, on the brink of the dividing stream, tenduntque\nmanus ripae ulterioris amore.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III. CARTESIANISM\n\nIf we are to draw any useful lines of demarcation in the continuous flux\nof history we must neglect anticipations and announcements, and we need\nnot scruple to say that, in the realm of knowledge and thought, modern\nhistory begins in the seventeenth century. Ubiquitous rebellion against\ntradition, a new standard of clear and precise thought which affects\neven literary expression, a flow of mathematical and physical\ndiscoveries so rapid that ten years added more to the sum of knowledge\nthan all that had been added since the days of Archimedes, the\nintroduction of organised co-operation to increase knowledge by the\ninstitution of the Royal Society at London, the Academy of Sciences at\nParis, Observatories--realising Bacon's Atlantic dream--characterise the\nopening of a new era.\n\nFor the ideas with which we are concerned, the seventeenth century\ncentres round Descartes, whom an English admirer described as \"the grand\nsecretary of Nature.\" [Footnote: Joseph Glanvill, Vanity of Dogmatising,\np. 211, 64] Though his brilliant mathematical discoveries were the sole\npermanent contribution he made to knowledge, though his metaphysical and\nphysical systems are only of historical interest, his genius exercised\na more extensive and transforming influence on the future development of\nthought than any other man of his century.\n\nCartesianism affirmed the two positive axioms of the supremacy of\nreason, and the invariability of the laws of nature; and its instrument\nwas a new rigorous analytical method, which was applicable to history as\nwell as to physical knowledge. The axioms had destructive corollaries.\nThe immutability of the processes of nature collided with the theory\nof an active Providence. The supremacy of reason shook the thrones from\nwhich authority and tradition had tyrannised over the brains of men.\nCartesianism was equivalent to a declaration of the Independence of Man.\n\nIt was in the atmosphere of the Cartesian spirit that a theory of\nProgress was to take shape.\n\n1.\n\nLet us look back. We saw that all the remarks of philosophers prior to\nthe seventeenth century, which have been claimed as enunciations of the\nidea of Progress, amount merely to recognitions of the obvious fact that\nin the course of the past history of men there have been advances\nand improvements in knowledge and arts, or that we may look for some\nimprovements in the future. There is not one of them that adumbrates\na theory that can be called a theory of Progress. We have seen several\nreasons why the idea could not emerge in the ancient or in the\nMiddle Ages. Nor could it have easily appeared in the period of the\nRenaissance. Certain preliminary conditions were required, and these\nwere not fulfilled till the seventeenth century. So long as men believed\nthat the Greeks and Romans had attained, in the best days of their\ncivilisation, to an intellectual plane which posterity could never\nhope to reach, so long as the authority of their thinkers was set up as\nunimpeachable, a theory of degeneration held the field, which excluded\na theory of Progress. It was the work of Bacon and Descartes to liberate\nscience and philosophy from the yoke of that authority; and at the same\ntime, as we shall see, the rebellion began to spread to other fields.\n\nAnother condition for the organisation of a theory of Progress was a\nfrank recognition of the value of mundane life and the subservience of\nknowledge to human needs. The secular spirit of the Renaissance prepared\nthe world for this new valuation, which was formulated by Bacon, and has\ndeveloped into modern utilitarianism.\n\nThere was yet a third preliminary condition. There can be no certainty\nthat knowledge will continually progress until science has been\nplaced on sure foundations. And science does not rest for us on sure\nfoundations unless the invariability of the laws of nature is admitted.\nIf we do not accept this hypothesis, if we consider it possible that the\nuniformities of the natural world may be changed from time to time, we\nhave no guarantee that science can progress indefinitely. The philosophy\nof Descartes established this principle, which is the palladium of\nscience; and thus the third preliminary condition was fulfilled.\n\n2.\n\nDuring the Renaissance period the authority of the Greeks and Romans\nhad been supreme in the realm of thought, and in the interest of\nfurther free development it was necessary that this authority should\nbe weakened. Bacon and others had begun the movement to break down this\ntyranny, but the influence of Descartes was weightier and more decisive,\nand his attitude was more uncompromising. He had none of Bacon's\nreverence for classical literature; he was proud of having forgotten the\nGreek which he had learned as a boy. The inspiration of his work was the\nidea of breaking sharply and completely with the past, and constructing\na system which borrows nothing from the dead. He looked forward to an\nadvancement of knowledge in the future, on the basis of his own method\nand his own discoveries, [Footnote: Cf. for instance his remarks on\nmedicine, at the end of the Discours de la methode.] and he conceived\nthat this intellectual advance would have far-reaching effects on the\ncondition of mankind. The first title he had proposed to give to his\nDiscourse on Method was \"The Project of a Universal Science which can\nelevate our Nature to its highest degree of Perfection.\" He regarded\nmoral and material improvement as depending on philosophy and science.\n\nThe justification of an independent attitude towards antiquity, on\nthe ground that the world is now older and more mature, was becoming a\ncurrent view. [Footnote: Descartes wrote: Non est quod antiquis multum\ntribuamus propter antiquitatem, sed nos potius iis seniores dicendi. Jam\nenim senior est mundus quam tune majoremque habemus rerum experientiam.\n(A fragment quoted by Baillet, Vie de Descartes, viii. 10.) Passages\nto the same effect occur in Malebranche, Arnauld, and Nicole. (See\nBouillier, Histoire de la philosophie cartesienne, i. 482-3.)\n\nA passage in La Mothe Le Vayer's essay Sur l'opiniatrete in Orasius\nTubero (ii. 218) is in point, if, as seems probable, the date of that\nwork is 1632-33. \"Some defer to the ancients and allow themselves to be\nled by them like children; others hold that the ancients lived in the\nyouth of the world, and it is those who live to-day who are really the\nancients, and consequently ought to carry most weight.\" See Rigault,\nHistoire de la querelle des Anciens et des Modernes, p. 52.\n\nThe passage of Pascal occurs in the Fragment d'un traite du vide, not\npublished till 1779 (now included in the Pensees, Premiere Partie, Art.\nI), and therefore without influence on the origination of the theory of\nprogress. It has been pointed out that Guillaume Colletet had in 1636\nexpressed a similar view (Brunetiere, Etudes critiques, v. 185-6).]\n\nDescartes expressed it like Bacon, and it was taken up and repeated\nby many whom Descartes influenced. Pascal, who till 1654 was a man of\nscience and a convert to Cartesian ideas, put it in a striking way.\nThe whole sequence of men (he says) during so many centuries should\nbe considered as a single man, continually existing and continually\nlearning. At each stage of his life this universal man profited by the\nknowledge he had acquired in the preceding stages, and he is now in his\nold age. This is a fuller, and probably an independent, development of\nthe comparison of the race to an individual which we found in Bacon. It\noccurs in a fragment which remained unpublished for more than a hundred\nyears, and is often quoted as a recognition, not of a general progress\nof man, but of a progress in human knowledge.\n\nTo those who reproached Descartes with disrespect towards ancient\nthinkers he might have replied that, in repudiating their authority, he\nwas really paying them the compliment of imitation and acting far more\nin their own spirit than those who slavishly followed them. Pascal saw\nthis point. \"What can be more unjust,\" he wrote, \"than to treat our\nancients with greater consideration than they showed towards their own\npredecessors, and to have for them this incredible respect which they\ndeserve from us only because they entertained no such regard for\nthose who had the same advantage (of antiquity) over them?\" [Footnote:\nPensees, ib.]\n\nAt the same time Pascal recognised that we are indebted to the ancients\nfor our very superiority to them in the extent of our knowledge. \"They\nreached a certain point, and the slightest effort enables us to mount\nhigher; so that we find ourselves on a loftier plane with less trouble\nand less glory.\" The attitude of Descartes was very different. Aspiring\nto begin ab integro and reform the foundations of knowledge, he ignored\nor made little of what had been achieved in the past. He attempted\nto cut the threads of continuity as with the shears of Atropos. This\nillusion [Footnote: He may be reproached himself with scholasticism in\nhis metaphysical reasoning.] hindered him from stating a doctrine of\nthe progress of knowledge as otherwise he might have done. For any such\ndoctrine must take account of the past as well as of the future.\n\nBut a theory of progress was to grow out of his philosophy, though he\ndid not construct it. It was to be developed by men who were imbued with\nthe Cartesian spirit.\n\n3.\n\nThe theological world in France was at first divided on the question\nwhether the system of Descartes could be reconciled with orthodoxy\nor not. The Jesuits said no, the Fathers of the Oratory said yes.\nThe Jansenists of Port Royal were enthusiastic Cartesians. Yet it was\nprobably the influence of the great spiritual force of Jansenism that\ndid most to check the immediate spread of Cartesian ideas. It was\npreponderant in France for fifty years. The date of the Discourse of\nMethod is 1637. The Augustinus of Jansenius was published in 1640, and\nin 1643 Arnauld's Frequent Communion made Jansenism a popular power.\nThe Jansenist movement was in France in some measure what the Puritan\nmovement was in England, and it caught hold of serious minds in much\nthe same way. The Jesuits had undertaken the task of making Christianity\neasy, of finding a compromise between worldliness and religion, and they\nflooded the world with a casuistic literature designed for this purpose.\nEx opinionum varietate jugum Christi suavius deportatur. The doctrine of\nJansenius was directed against this corruption of faith and morals.\nHe maintained that there can be no compromise with the world; that\ncasuistry is incompatible with morality; that man is naturally corrupt;\nand that in his most virtuous acts some corruption is present.\n\nNow the significance of these two forces--the stern ideal of the\nJansenists and the casuistry of the Jesuit teachers--is that they both\nattempted to meet, by opposed methods, the wave of libertine thought and\nconduct which is a noticeable feature in the history of French society\nfrom the reign of Henry IV. to that of Louis XV. [Footnote: For the\nprevalence of \"libertine\" thought in France at the beginning of the\nseventeenth century see the work of the Pere Garasse, La Doctrine\ncurieuse des beaux esprits de ce temps ou pretendus tels, etc. (1623).\nCp. also Brunetiere's illuminating study, \"Jansenistes et Cartesiens\"\nin Etudes critiques, 4me serie.] This libertinism had its philosophy, a\nsort of philosophy of nature, of which the most brilliant exponents\nwere Rabelais and Moliere. The maxim, \"Be true to nature,\" was evidently\nopposed sharply to the principles of the Christian religion, and it was\nassociated with sceptical views which prevailed widely in France from\nthe early years of the seventeenth century. The Jesuits sought to make\nterms by saying virtually: \"Our religious principles and your philosophy\nof nature are not after all so incompatible in practice. When it comes\nto the application of principles, opinions differ. Theology is as\nelastic as you like. Do not abandon your religion on the ground that her\nyoke is hard.\" Jansenius and his followers, on the other hand, fought\nuncompromisingly with the licentious spirit of the time, maintaining\nthe austerest dogmas and denouncing any compromise or condescension. And\ntheir doctrine had a wonderful success, and penetrated everywhere. Few\nof the great literary men of the reign of Louis XIV. escaped it. Its\ninfluence can be traced in the Maximes of La Rochefoucauld and the\nCaracteres of La Bruyere. It was through its influence that Moliere\nfound it difficult to get some of his plays staged. It explains the fact\nthat the court of Louis XIV., however corrupt, was decorous compared\nwith the courts of Henry IV. and Louis XV.; a severe standard was set\nup, if it was not observed.\n\nThe genius of Pascal made the fortunes of Jansenism. He outlived his\nCartesianism and became its most influential spokesman. His\nProvinciales (1656) rendered abstruse questions of theology more or less\nintelligible, and invited the general public to pronounce an opinion on\nthem. His lucid exposition interested every one in the abstruse problem,\nIs man's freedom such as not to render grace superfluous? But Pascal\nperceived that casuistry was not the only enemy that menaced the true\nspirit of religion for which Jansenism stood. He came to realise that\nCartesianism, to which he was at first drawn, was profoundly opposed to\nthe fundamental views of Christianity. His Pensees are the fragments of\na work which he designed in defence of religion, and it is easy to see\nthat this defence was to be specially directed against the ideas of\nDescartes.\n\nPascal was perfectly right about the Cartesian conception of the\nUniverse, though Descartes might pretend to mitigate its tendencies, and\nhis fervent disciple, Malebranche, might attempt to prove that it was\nmore or less reconcilable with orthodox doctrine. We need not trouble\nabout the special metaphysical tenets of Descartes. The two axioms\nwhich he launched upon the world--the supremacy of reason, and the\ninvariability of natural laws--struck directly at the foundations of\northodoxy. Pascal was attacking Cartesianism when he made his memorable\nattempt to discredit the authority of reason, by showing that it is\nfeeble and deceptive. It was a natural consequence of his changed\nattitude that he should speak (in the Pensees) in a much less confident\ntone about the march of science than he had spoken in the passage which\nI quoted above. And it was natural that he should be pessimistic about\nsocial improvement, and that, keeping his eyes fixed on his central fact\nthat Christianity is the goal of history, he should take only a slight\nand subsidiary interest in amelioration.\n\nThe preponderant influence of Jansenism only began to wane during the\nlast twenty years of the seventeenth century, and till then it seems\nto have been successful in counteracting the diffusion of the Cartesian\nideas. Cartesianism begins to become active and powerful when Jansenism\nis beginning to decline. And it is just then that the idea of Progress\nbegins definitely to emerge. The atmosphere in France was favourable for\nits reception.\n\n4.\n\nThe Cartesian mechanical theory of the world and the doctrine of\ninvariable law, carried to a logical conclusion, excluded the doctrine\nof Providence. This doctrine was already in serious danger. Perhaps\nno article of faith was more insistently attacked by sceptics in the\nseventeenth century, and none was more vital. The undermining of the\ntheory of Providence is very intimately connected with our subject;\nfor it was just the theory of an active Providence that the theory of\nProgress was to replace; and it was not till men felt independent of\nProvidence that they could organise a theory of Progress.\n\nBossuet was convinced that the question of Providence was the most\nserious and pressing among all the questions of the day that were at\nissue between orthodox and heretical thinkers. Brunetiere, his fervent\nadmirer, has named him the theologian of Providence, and has shown that\nin all his writings this doctrine is a leading note. It is sounded\nin his early sermons in the fifties, and it is the theme of his most\nambitious work, the Discourse on Universal History, which appeared\nin 1681. [Footnote; It has been shown that on one hand he controverts\nSpinoza's Tractatus theologico-politicus, and on the other the dangerous\nmethods of Richard Simon, one of the precursors of modern biblical\ncriticism. Brunetiere, op. cit. 74-85.] This book, which has received\nhigh praise from those who most heartily dissent from its conclusions,\nis in its main issue a restatement of the view of history which\nAugustine had worked out in his memorable book. The whole course of\nhuman experience has been guided by Providence for the sake of the\nChurch; that is, for the sake of the Church to which Bossuet belonged.\nRegarded as a philosophy of history the Discourse may seem little more\nthan the theory of the De Civitate Dei brought up to date; but this is\nits least important aspect. We shall fail to understand it unless we\nrecognise that it was a pragmatical, opportune work, designed for the\nneeds of the time, and with express references to current tendencies of\nthought.\n\nOne main motive of Bossuet in his lifelong concern for Providence\nwas his conviction that the doctrine was the most powerful check on\nimmorality, and that to deny it was to remove the strongest restraint\non the evil side of human nature. There is no doubt that the free-living\npeople of the time welcomed the arguments which called Providence in\nquestion, and Bossuet believed that to champion Providence was the\nmost efficient means of opposing the libertine tendencies of his day.\n\"Nothing,\" he declared in one of his sermons (1662), \"has appeared\nmore insufferable to the arrogance of libertines than to see themselves\ncontinually under the observation of this ever-watchful eye of\nProvidence. They have felt it as an importunate compulsion to recognise\nthat there is in Heaven a superior force which governs all our movements\nand chastises our loose actions with a severe authority. They have\nwished to shake off the yoke of this Providence, in order to maintain,\nin independence, an unteachable liberty which moves them to live at\ntheir own fancy, without fear, discipline, or restraint.\" [Passage from\nBossuet, quoted by Brunetiere, op. cit. 58.] Bossuet was thus working in\nthe same cause as the Jansenists.\n\nHe had himself come under the influence of Descartes, whose work he\nalways regarded with the deepest respect. The cautiousness of the master\nhad done much to disguise the insidious dangers of his thought, and it\nwas in the hands of those disciples who developed his system and sought\nto reconcile it at all points with orthodoxy that his ideas displayed\ntheir true nature. Malebranche's philosophy revealed the incompatibility\nof Providence--in the ordinary acceptation--with immutable natural laws.\nIf the Deity acts upon the world, as Malebranche maintained, only by\nmeans of general laws, His freedom is abolished, His omnipotence is\nendangered, He is subject to a sort of fatality. What will become of the\nChristian belief in the value of prayers, if God cannot adapt or modify,\non any given occasion, the general order of nature to the needs of human\nbeings? These are some of the arguments which we find in a treatise\ncomposed by Fenelon, with the assistance of Bossuet, to demonstrate\nthat the doctrine of Malebranche is inconsistent with piety and orthodox\nreligion. They were right. Cartesianism was too strong a wine to\nbe decanted into old bottles. [Footnote: Fenelon's Refutation of\nMalebranche's Traite de la nature et de la grace was not published till\n1820. This work of Malebranche also provoked a controversy with Arnauld,\nwho urged similar arguments.]\n\nMalebranche's doctrine of what he calls divine Providence was closely\nconnected with his philosophical optimism. It enabled him to maintain\nthe perfection of the universe. Admitting the obvious truth that the\nworld exhibits many imperfections, and allowing that the Creator\ncould have produced a better result if he had employed other means,\nMalebranche argued that, in judging the world, we must take into account\nnot only the result but the methods by which it has been produced. It is\nthe best world, he asserts, that could be framed by general and simple\nmethods; and general and simple methods are the most perfect, and alone\nworthy of the Creator. Therefore, if we take the methods and the\nresult together, a more perfect world is impossible. The argument was\ningenious, though full of assumptions, but it was one which could only\nsatisfy a philosopher. It is little consolation to creatures suffering\nfrom the actual imperfections of the system into which they are born to\nbe told that the world might have been free from those defects, only in\nthat case they would not have the satisfaction of knowing that it was\ncreated and conducted on theoretically superior principles.\n\nThough Malebranche's conception was only a metaphysical theory,\nmetaphysical theories have usually their pragmatic aspects; and the\ntheory that the universe is as perfect as it could be marks a stage\nin the growth of intellectual optimism which we can trace from the\nsixteenth century. It was a view which could appeal to the educated\npublic in France, for it harmonised with the general spirit of\nself-complacency and hopefulness which prevailed among the higher\nclasses of society in the reign of Louis XIV. For them the conditions\nof life under the new despotism had become far more agreeable than in\nprevious ages, and it was in a spirit of optimism that they devoted\nthemselves to the enjoyment of luxury and elegance. The experience of\nwhat the royal authority could achieve encouraged men to imagine that\none enlightened will, with a centralised administration at its command,\nmight accomplish endless improvements in civilisation. There was no age\nhad ever been more glorious, no age more agreeable to live in.\n\nThe world had begun to abandon the theory of corruption, degeneration,\nand decay.\n\nSome years later the optimistic theory of the perfection of the universe\nfound an abler exponent in Leibnitz, whom Diderot calls the father of\noptimism. [Footnote: See particularly Monadologie, ad fin. published\nposthumously in German 1720, in Latin 1728; Theodicee, Section 341\n(1710); and the paper, De rerum originatione radicali, written in 1697,\nbut not published till 1840 (Opera philosophica, ed. Erdmann, p. 147\nsqq).] The Creator, before He acted, had considered all possible worlds,\nand had chosen the best. He might have chosen one in which humanity\nwould have been better and happier, but that would not have been\nthe best possible, for He had to consider the interests of the whole\nuniverse, of which the earth with humanity is only an insignificant\npart. The evils and imperfections of our small world are negligible\nin comparison with the happiness and perfection of the whole cosmos.\nLeibnitz, whose theory is deduced from the abstract proposition that\nthe Creator is perfect, does not say that now or at any given moment\nthe universe is as perfect as it could be; its merit lies in its\npotentialities; it will develop towards perfection throughout infinite\ntime.\n\nThe optimism of Leibnitz therefore concerns the universe as a whole, not\nthe earth, and would obviously be quite consistent with a pessimistic\nview of the destinies of humanity. He does indeed believe that it would\nbe impossible to improve the universal order, \"not only for the\nwhole, but for ourselves in particular,\" and incidentally he notes\nthe possibility that \"in the course of time the human race may reach a\ngreater perfection than we can imagine at present.\" But the significance\nof his speculation and that of Malebranche lies in the fact that the old\ntheories of degeneration are definitely abandoned.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV. THE DOCTRINE OF DEGENERATION: THE ANCIENTS AND MODERNS\n\n1.\n\nOutside the circle of systematic thinkers the prevalent theory of\ndegeneration was being challenged early in the seventeenth century. The\nchallenge led to a literary war, which was waged for about a hundred\nyears in France and England; over the comparative merits of the ancients\nand the moderns. It was in the matter of literature, and especially\npoetry, that the quarrel was most acrimonious, and that the interest of\nthe public was most keenly aroused, but the ablest disputants extended\nthe debate to the general field of knowledge. The quarrel of the\nAncients and Moderns used commonly to be dismissed as a curious and\nrather ridiculous episode in the history of literature. [Footnote:\nThe best and fullest work on the subject is Rigault's \"Histoire de la\nquerelle des Anciens et des Modernes\" (1856).] Auguste Comte was, I\nthink, one of the first to call attention to some of its wider bearings.\n\nThe quarrel, indeed, has considerable significance in the history of\nideas. It was part of the rebellion against the intellectual yoke of\nthe Renaissance; the cause of the Moderns, who were the aggressors,\nrepresented the liberation of criticism from the authority of the\ndead; and, notwithstanding the perversities of taste of which they were\nguilty, their polemic, even on the purely literary side, was distinctly\nimportant, as M. Brunetiere has convincingly shown, [Footnote: See his\n\"L'evolution des genres dans l'histoire de la litterature.\"] in the\ndevelopment of French criticism. But the form in which the critical\nquestions were raised forced the debate to touch upon a problem of\ngreater moment. The question, Can the men of to-day contend on equal\nterms with the illustrious ancients, or are they intellectually\ninferior? implied the larger issue, Has nature exhausted her powers;\nis she no longer capable of producing men equal in brains and vigour to\nthose whom she once produced; is humanity played out, or are her forces\npermanent and inexhaustible?\n\nThe assertion of the permanence of the powers of nature by the\nchampions of the Moderns was the direct contradiction of the theory of\ndegeneration, and they undoubtedly contributed much towards bringing\nthat theory into discredit. When we grasp this it will not be surprising\nto find that the first clear assertions of a doctrine of progress\nin knowledge were provoked by the controversy about the Ancients and\nModerns.\n\nAlthough the great scene of the controversy was France, the question had\nbeen expressly raised by an Italian, no less a person than Alessandro\nTassoni, the accomplished author of that famous ironical poem, \"La\nSecchia rapita,\" which caricatured the epic poets of his day. He was\nbent on exposing the prejudices of his time and uttering new doctrine,\nand he created great scandal in Italy by his attacks on Petrarch, as\nwell as on Homer and Aristotle. The earliest comparison of the merits of\nthe ancients and the moderns will be found in a volume of Miscellaneous\nThoughts which he published in 1620. [Footnote: Dieci libri di pensieri\ndiversi (Carpi, 1620). The first nine books had appeared in 1612. The\ntenth contains the comparison. Rigault was the first to connect this\nwork with the history of the controversy.] He speaks of the question\nas a matter of current dispute, [Footnote: It was incidental to the\ncontroversy which arose over the merits of Tasso's Jerusalem Delivered.\nThat the subject had been discussed long before may be inferred from a\nremark of Estienne in his Apology for Herodotus, that while some of\nhis contemporaries carry their admiration of antiquity to the point of\nsuperstition, others depreciate and trample it underfoot.] on which he\nproposes to give an impartial decision by instituting a comprehensive\ncomparison in all fields, theoretical, imaginative, and practical.\n\nHe begins by criticising the a priori argument that, as arts are\nbrought to perfection by experience and long labour, the modern age must\nnecessarily have the advantage. This reasoning, he says, is unsound,\nbecause the same arts and studies are not always uninterruptedly pursued\nby the most powerful intellects, but pass into inferior hands, and\nso decline or are even extinguished, as was the case in Italy in the\ndecrepitude of the Roman Empire, when for many centuries the arts fell\nbelow mediocrity. Or, to phrase it otherwise, the argument would be\nadmissible only if there were no breaches of continuity. [Footnote:\nTassoni argues that a decline in all pursuits is inevitable when\na certain point of excellence has been reached, quoting Velleius\nPaterculus (i. 17): difficilisque in perfecto mora est naturaliterque\nquod procedere non potest recedit.]\n\nIn drawing his comparison Tassoni seeks to make good his claim that he\nis not an advocate. But while he awards superiority here and there to\nthe ancients, the moderns on the whole have much the best of it. He\ntakes a wide enough survey, including the material side of civilisation,\neven costume, in contrast with some of the later controversialists, who\nnarrowed the field of debate to literature and art.\n\nTassoni's Thoughts were translated into French, and the book was\nprobably known to Boisrobert, a dramatist who is chiefly remembered\nfor the part he took in founding the Academie francaise. He delivered a\ndiscourse before that body immediately after its institution (February\n26, 1635), in which he made a violent and apparently scurrilous attack\non Homer. This discourse kindled the controversy in France, and even\nstruck a characteristic note. Homer--already severely handled by\nTassoni--was to be the special target for the arrows of the Moderns, who\nfelt that, if they could succeed in discrediting him, their cause would\nbe won.\n\nThus the gauntlet was flung--and it is important to note this--before\nthe appearance of the Discourse of Method (1637); but the influence\nof Descartes made itself felt throughout the controversy, and the most\nprominent moderns were men who had assimilated Cartesian ideas. This\nseems to be true even of Desmarets de Saint Sorlin, who, a good many\nyears after the discourse of Boisrobert, opened the campaign. Saint\nSorlin had become a fanatical Christian; that was one reason for hating\nthe ancients. [Footnote: For the views of Saint Sorlin see the Preface\nto his Clovis and his Traite pour juger des poefes grecs, latins, et\nfrancais, chap. iv. (1670). Cp. Rigault, Hist. de la querelle, p. 106.\nThe polemic of Saint Sorlin extended over about five years (1669-73).]\nHe was also, like Boisrobert, a bad poet; that was another. His thesis\nwas that the history of Christianity offered subjects far more inspiring\nto a poet than those which had been treated by Homer and Sophocles, and\nthat Christian poetry must bear off the palm from pagan. His own Clovis\nand Mary Magdalene or the Triumph of Grace were the demonstration of\nHomer's defeat. Few have ever heard of these productions; how many have\nread them? Curiously, about the same time an epic was being composed\nin England which might have given to the foolish contentions of Saint\nSorlin some illusory plausibility.\n\nBut the literary dispute does not concern us here. What does concern\nus is that Saint Sorlin was aware of the wider aspects of the question,\nthough he was not seriously interested in them. Antiquity, he says, was\nnot so happy or so learned or so rich or so stately as the modern age,\nwhich is really the mature old age, and as it were the autumn of the\nworld, possessing the fruits and the spoils of all the past centuries,\nwith the power to judge of the inventions, experiences, and errors of\npredecessors, and to profit by all that. The ancient world was a spring\nwhich had only a few flowers. Nature indeed, in all ages, produces\nperfect works but it is not so with the creations of man, which require\ncorrection; and the men who live latest must excel in happiness and\nknowledge. Here we have both the assertion of the permanence of the\nforces of nature and the idea, already expressed by Bacon and others,\nthat the modern age has advantages over antiquity comparable to those of\nold age over childhood.\n\n2.\n\nHow seriously the question between the Moderns and the Ancients--on\nwhose behalf Boileau had come forward and crossed swords with Saint\nSorlin--was taken is shown by the fact that Saint Sorlin, before his\ndeath, solemnly bequeathed the championship of the Moderns to a younger\nman, Charles Perrault. We shall see how he fulfilled the trust. It\nis illustrated too by a book which appeared in the seventies, Les\nEntretiens d'Ariste et Eugene, by Bouhours, a mundane and popular Jesuit\nFather. In one of these dialogues the question is raised, but with a\ncurious caution and evasiveness, which suggests that the author was\nafraid to commit himself; he did not wish to make enemies. [Footnote:\nRigault notes that he makes one contribution to the subject, the idea\nthat the torch of civilisation has passed from country to country, in\ndifferent ages, e.g. from Greece to Rome, and recently from Italy to\nFrance. In the last century the Italians were first in doctrine and\npolitesse. The present century is for France what the last was for\nItaly: \"We have all the esprit and all the science, all other countries\nare barbarous in comparison\" (p. 239, ed. 1782, Amsterdam). But, as we\nshall see, he had been anticipated by Hakewill, whose work was unknown\nto Rigault.]\n\nThe general atmosphere in France, in the reign of Louis XIV., was\npropitious to the cause of the Moderns. Men felt that it was a great\nage, comparable to the age of Augustus, and few would have preferred\nto have lived at any other time. Their literary artists, Corneille, and\nthen Racine and Moliere, appealed so strongly to their taste that they\ncould not assign to them any rank but the first. They were impatient\nof the claims to unattainable excellence advanced for the Greeks and\nRomans. \"The ancients,\" said Moliere, \"are the ancients, we are the\npeople of to-day.\" This might be the motto of Descartes, and it probably\nexpressed a very general feeling.\n\nIt was in 1687 that Charles Perrault--who is better remembered for his\ncollection of fairy-tales than for the leading role which he played in\nthis controversy--published his poem on \"The Age of Louis the Great.\"\nThe enlightenment of the present age surpasses that of antiquity,--this\nis the theme.\n\n\n  La docte Antiquite dans toute sa duree\n   A l'egal de nos jours ne fut point eclairee.\n\n\nPerrault adopts a more polite attitude to \"la belle antiquite\" than\nSaint Sorlin, but his criticism is more insidious. Greek and Roman men\nof genius, he suggests, were all very well in their own times, and might\nbe considered divine by our ancestors. But nowadays Plato is rather\ntiresome; and the \"inimitable Homer\" would have written a much better\nepic if he had lived in the reign of Louis the Great. The important\npassage, however, in the poem is that in which the permanent power of\nnature to produce men of equal talent in every age is affirmed.\n\n\n  A former les esprits comme a former les corps\n   La Nature en tout temps fait les mesmes efforts;\n   Son etre est immuable, et cette force aisee\n   Dont elle produit tout ne s'est point epuisee;\n.....   De cette mesme main les forces infinies\n   Produisent en tout temps de semblables genies.\n\n\nThe \"Age of Louis the Great\" was a brief declaration of faith. Perrault\nfollowed it up by a comprehensive work, his Comparison of the Ancients\nand the Moderns (Parallele des Anciens et des Modernes), which appeared\nin four parts during the following years (1688-1696). Art, eloquence,\npoetry the sciences, and their practical applications are all discussed\nat length; and the discussion is thrown into the form of conversations\nbetween an enthusiastic champion of the modern age, who conducts the\ndebate, and a devotee of antiquity, who finds it difficult not to admit\nthe arguments of his opponent, yet obstinately persists in his own\nviews.\n\nPerrault bases his thesis on those general considerations which we\nhave met incidentally in earlier writers, and which were now almost\ncommonplaces among those who paid any attention to the matter. Knowledge\nadvances with time and experience; perfection is not necessarily\nassociated with antiquity; the latest comers have inherited from their\npredecessors and added new acquisitions of their own. But Perrault has\nthought out the subject methodically, and he draws conclusions which\nhave only to be extended to amount to a definite theory of the progress\nof knowledge.\n\nA particular difficulty had done much to hinder a general admission of\nprogressive improvement in the past. The proposition that the\nposterior is better and the late comers have the advantage seemed to be\nincompatible with an obvious historical fact. We are superior to the men\nof the dark ages in knowledge and arts. Granted. But will you say that\nthe men of the tenth century were superior to the Greeks and Romans? To\nthis question--on which Tassoni had already touched--Perrault replies:\nCertainly not. There are breaches of continuity. The sciences and arts\nare like rivers, which flow for part of their course underground, and\nthen, finding an opening, spring forth as abundant as when they plunged\nbeneath the earth. Long wars, for instance, may force peoples to\nneglect studies and throw all their vigour into the more urgent needs\nof self-preservation; a period of ignorance may ensue but with peace\nand felicity knowledge and inventions will begin again and make further\nadvances. [Footnote: The passages in Perrault's Parallele specially\nreferred to in the text will be found in vol. i. pp. 35-7, 60-61, 67,\n231-3.]\n\nIt is to be observed that he does not, claim any superiority in talents\nor brain power for the moderns. On the contrary, he takes his stand on\nthe principle which he had asserted in the \"Age of Louis the Great,\"\nthat nature is immutable. She still produces as great men as ever, but\nshe does not produce greater. The lions of the deserts of Africa in our\ndays do not differ in fierceness from those the days of Alexander the\nGreat, and the best men of all times are equal in vigour. It is their\nwork and productions that are unequal, and, given equally favourable\nconditions, the latest must be the best. For science and the arts depend\nupon the accumulation of knowledge, and knowledge necessarily increases\nas time goes on.\n\nBut could this argument be applied to poetry and literary art, the field\nof battle in which the belligerents, including Perrault himself, were\nmost deeply interested? It might prove that the modern age was capable\nof producing poets and men of letter no less excellent than the ancient\nmasters, but did it prove that their works must be superior? The\nobjection did not escape Perrault, and he answers it ingeniously. It is\nthe function of poetry and eloquence to please the human heart, and\nin order to please it we must know it. Is it easier to penetrate the\nsecrets of the human heart than the secrets of nature, or will it take\nless time? We are always making new discoveries about its passions and\ndesires. To take only the tragedies of Corneille you will find there\nfiner and more delicate reflections on ambition, vengeance, and jealousy\nthan in all the books of antiquity. At the close of his Parallel,\nhowever, Perrault, while he declares the general superiority of the\nmoderns, makes a reservation in regard to poetry and eloquence \"for the\nsake of peace.\"\n\nThe discussion of Perrault falls far short of embodying a full idea\nof Progress. Not only is he exclusively concerned with progress in\nknowledge--though he implies, indeed, without developing, the doctrine\nthat happiness depends on knowledge--but he has no eyes for the future,\nand no interest in it. He is so impressed with the advance of knowledge\nin the recent past that he is almost incapable of imagining further\nprogression. \"Read the journals of France and England,\" he says, \"and\nglance at the publications of the Academies of these great kingdoms, and\nyou will be convinced that within the last twenty or thirty years more\ndiscoveries have been made in natural science than throughout the period\nof learned antiquity. I own that I consider myself fortunate to know the\nhappiness we enjoy; it is a great pleasure to survey all the past ages\nin which I can see the birth and the progress of all things, but nothing\nwhich has not received a new increase and lustre in our own times. Our\nage has, in some sort, arrived at the summit of perfection. And since\nfor some years the rate of the progress is much slower and appears\nalmost insensible--as the days seem to cease lengthening when the\nsolstice is near--it is pleasant to think that probably there are not\nmany things for which we need envy future generations.\"\n\nIndifference to the future, or even a certain scepticism about it, is\nthe note of this passage, and accords with the view that the world\nhas reached its old age. The idea of the progress of knowledge, which\nPerrault expounds, is still incomplete.\n\n3.\n\nIndependently of this development in France, the doctrine of\ndegeneration had been attacked, and the comparison of the ancients with\nthe moderns incidentally raised, in England.\n\nA divine named George Hakewill published in 1627 a folio of six hundred\npages to confute \"the common error touching Nature's perpetual and\nuniversal decay.\" [Footnote: An Apologie or Declaration of the Power\nand Providence of God in the Government of the World, consisting in an\nExamination and Censure of the common Errour, etc. (1627, 1630, 1635).]\nHe and his pedantic book, which breathes the atmosphere of the sixteenth\ncentury, are completely forgotten; and though it ran to three editions,\nit can hardly have attracted the attention of many except theologians.\nThe writer's object is to prove that the power and providence of God\nin the government of the world are not consistent with the current view\nthat the physical universe, the heavens and the elements, are undergoing\na process of decay, and that man is degenerating physically, mentally,\nand morally. His arguments in general are futile as well as tedious.\nBut he has profited by reading Bodin and Bacon, whose ideas, it would\nappear, were already agitating theological minds.\n\nA comparison between the ancients and the moderns arises in a general\nrefutation of the doctrine of decay, as naturally as the question of\nthe stability of the powers of nature arises in a comparison between the\nancients and moderns. Hakewill protests against excessive admiration of\nantiquity, just because it encourages the opinion of the world's\ndecay. He gives his argument a much wider scope than the French\ncontroversialists. For him the field of debate includes not only\nscience, arts, and literature, but physical qualities and morals. He\nseeks to show that mentally and physically there has been no decay, and\nthat the morals of modern Christendom are immensely superior to those\nof pagan times. There has been social progress, due to Christianity; and\nthere has been an advance in arts and knowledge.\n\n  Multa dies uariusque labor mutabilis aeui\n   Rettulit in melius.\n\n\nHakewill, like Tassoni, surveys all the arts and sciences, and concludes\nthat the moderns are equal to the ancients in poetry, and in almost\nall other things excel them. [Footnote: Among modern poets equal to\nthe ancients, Hakewill signalises Sir Philip Sidney, Spenser, Marot,\nRonsard, Ariosto, Tasso (Book iii. chap. 8, Section 3).]\n\nOne of the arguments which he urges against the theory of degeneration\nis pragmatic--its paralysing effect on human energy. \"The opinion of the\nworld's universal decay quails the hopes and blunts the edge of men's\nendeavours.\" And the effort to improve the world, he implies, is a duty\nwe owe to posterity.\n\n\"Let not then the vain shadows of the world's fatal decay keep us either\nfrom looking backward to the imitation of our noble predecessors or\nforward in providing for posterity, but as our predecessors worthily\nprovided, for us, so let our posterity bless us in providing for them,\nit being still as uncertain to us what generations are still to ensue,\nas it was to our predecessors in their ages.\"\n\nWe note the suggestion that history may be conceived as a sequence of\nimprovements in civilisation, but we note also that Hakewill here is\nfaced by the obstacle which Christian theology offered to the logical\nexpansion of the idea. It is uncertain what generations are still to\nensue. Roger Bacon stood before the same dead wall. Hakewill thinks that\nhe is living in the last age of the world; but how long it shall last\nis a question which cannot be resolved, \"it being one of those secrets\nwhich the Almighty hath locked up in the cabinet of His own counsel.\"\nYet he consoles himself and his readers with a consideration which\nsuggests that the end is not yet very near. [Footnote: See Book i.\nchap. 2, Section 4, p. 24.] \"It is agreed upon all sides by Divines that\nat least two signs forerunning the world's end remain unaccomplished--the\nsubversion of Rome and the conversion of the Jews. And when they shall\nbe accomplished God only knows, as yet in man's judgment there being\nlittle appearance of the one or the other.\"\n\nIt was well to be assured that nature is not decaying or man\ndegenerating. But was the doctrine that the end of the world does\nnot \"depend upon the law of nature,\" and that the growth of human\ncivilisation may be cut off at any moment by a fiat of the Deity, less\ncalculated to \"quail the hopes and blunt the edge of men's endeavours?\"\nHakewill asserted with confidence that the universe will be suddenly\nwrecked by fire. Una dies dabit exitio. Was the prospect of an arrest\nwhich might come the day after to-morrow likely to induce men to exert\nthemselves to make provision for posterity?\n\nThe significance of Hakewill lies in the fact that he made the current\ntheory of degeneration, which stood in the way of all possible theories\nof progress, the object of a special inquiry. And his book illustrates\nthe close connection between that theory and the dispute over the\nAncients and Moderns. It cannot be said that he has added anything\nvaluable to what may be found in Bodin and Bacon on the development\nof civilisation. The general synthesis of history which he attempts is\nequivalent to theirs. He describes the history of knowledge and arts,\nand all things besides, as exhibiting \"a kind of circular progress,\" by\nwhich he means that they have a birth, growth, nourishing, failing and\nfading, and then within a while after a resurrection and reflourishing.\n[Footnote: Book iii. chap. 6, Section i, p. 259.] In this method of\nprogress the lamp of learning passed from one people to another. It\npassed from the Orientals (Chaldeans and Egyptians) to the Greeks; when\nit was nearly extinguished in Greece it began to shine afresh among the\nRomans; and having been put out by the barbarians for the space of\na thousand years it was relit by Petrarch and his contemporaries. In\nstating this view of \"circular progress,\" Hakewill comes perilously near\nto the doctrine of Ricorsi or Returns which had been severely denounced\nby Bacon.\n\nIn one point indeed Hakewill goes far beyond Bodin. It was suggested,\nas we saw, by the French thinker that in some respects the modern age is\nsuperior in conduct and morals to antiquity, but he said little on the\nmatter. Hakewill develops the suggestion at great length into a severe\nand partial impeachment of ancient manners and morals. Unjust and\nunconvincing though his arguments are, and inspired by theological\nmotives, his thesis nevertheless deserves to be noted as an assertion of\nthe progress of man in social morality. Bacon, and the thinkers of the\nseventeenth century generally, confined their views of progress in the\npast to the intellectual field. Hakewill, though he overshot the mark\nand said nothing actually worth remembering, nevertheless anticipated\nthe larger problem of social progress which was to come to the front in\nthe eighteenth century.\n\n4.\n\nDuring the forty years that followed the appearance of Hakewill's book\nmuch had happened in the world of ideas, and when we take up Glanvill's\nPlus ultra, or the Progress and Advancement of Knowledge since the days\nof Aristotle, [Footnote: The title is evidently suggested by a passage\nin Bacon quoted above, p. 55.] we breathe a different atmosphere. It was\npublished in 1668, and its purpose was to defend the recently founded\nRoyal Society which was attacked on the ground that it was inimical\nto the interests of religion and sound learning. For the Aristotelian\ntradition was still strongly entrenched in the English Church and\nUniversities, notwithstanding the influence of Bacon; and the Royal\nSociety, which realised \"the romantic model\" of Bacon's society\nof experimenters, repudiated the scholastic principles and methods\nassociated with Aristotle's name.\n\nGlanvill was one of those latitudinarian clergymen, so common in the\nAnglican Church in the seventeenth century, who were convinced that\nreligious faith must accord with reason, and were unwilling to abate in\nits favour any of reason's claims. He was under the influence of\nBacon, Descartes, and the Cambridge Platonists, and no one was more\nenthusiastic than he in following the new scientific discoveries of his\ntime. Unfortunately for his reputation he had a weak side. Enlightened\nthough he was, he was a firm believer in witchcraft, and he is chiefly\nremembered not as an admirer of Descartes and Bacon, and a champion\nof the Royal Society, but as the author of Saducismus Triumphatus,\na monument of superstition, which probably contributed to check the\ngradual growth of disbelief in witches and apparitions.\n\nHis Plus ultra is a review of modern improvements of useful knowledge.\nIt is confined to mathematics and science, in accordance with its\npurpose of justifying the Royal Society; and the discoveries of the past\nsixty years enable the author to present a far more imposing picture\nof modern scientific progress than was possible for Bodin or Bacon.\n[Footnote: Bacon indeed could have made out a more impressive picture of\nthe new age if he had studied mathematics and taken the pains to master\nthe evidence which was revolutionising astronomy. Glanvill had the\nadvantage of comprehending the importance of mathematics for the advance\nof physical science.] He had absorbed Bacon's doctrine of utility. His\nspirit is displayed in the remark that more gratitude is due to the\nunknown inventor of the mariners' compass\n\n\"than to a thousand Alexanders and Caesars, or to ten times the number\nof Aristotles. And he really did more for the increase of knowledge\nand the advantage of the world by this one experiment than the numerous\nsubtile disputers that have lived ever since the erection of the school\nof talking.\"\n\nGlanvill, however, in his complacency with what has already been\naccomplished, is not misled into over-estimating its importance. He\nknows that it is indeed little compared with the ideal of attainable\nknowledge. The human design, to which it is the function of the Royal\nSociety to contribute, is laid as low, he says, as the profoundest\ndepths of nature, and reaches as high as the uppermost storey of the\nuniverse, extends to all the varieties of the great world, and aims at\nthe benefit of universal mankind. Such a work can only proceed slowly,\nby insensible degrees. It is an undertaking wherein all the generations\nof men are concerned, and our own age can hope to do little more than\nto remove useless rubbish, lay in materials, and put things in order for\nthe building. \"We must seek and gather, observe and examine, and lay up\nin bank for the ages that come after.\"\n\nThese lines on \"the vastness of the work\" suggest to the reader that\na vast future will be needed for its accomplishment. Glanvill does not\ndwell on this, but he implies it. He is evidently unembarrassed by the\ntheological considerations which weighed so heavily on Hakewill. He does\nnot trouble himself with the question whether Anti-Christ has still to\nappear. The difference in general outlook between these two clergymen is\nan indication how the world had travelled in the course of forty years.\n\nAnother point in Glanvill's little book deserves attention. He takes\ninto his prospect the inhabitants of the Transatlantic world; they, too,\nare to share in the benefits which shall result from the subjugation of\nnature.\n\n\"By the gaining that mighty continent and the numerous fruitful isles\nbeyond the Atlantic, we have obtained a larger field of nature, and\nhave thereby an advantage for more phenomena, and more helps both for\nknowledge and for life, which 'tis very like that future ages will make\nbetter use of to such purposes than those hitherto have done; and that\nscience also may at last travel into those parts and enrich Peru with\na more precious treasure than that of its golden mines, is not\nimprobable.\"\n\nSprat, the Bishop of Rochester, in his interesting History of the Royal\nSociety, so sensible and liberal--published shortly before Glanvill's\nbook,--also contemplates the extension of science over the world.\nSpeaking of the prospect of future discoveries, he thinks it will partly\ndepend on the enlargement of the field of western civilisation \"if this\nmechanic genius which now prevails in these parts of Christendom shall\nhappen to spread wide amongst ourselves and other civil nations, or if\nby some good fate it shall pass farther on to other countries that were\nyet never fully civilised.\"\n\nThis then being imagin'd, that there may some lucky tide of civility\nflow into those lands which are yet salvage, then will a double\nimprovement thence arise both in respect of ourselves and them. For even\nthe present skilful parts of mankind will be thereby made more skilful,\nand the other will not only increase those arts which we shall bestow\nupon them, but will also venture on new searches themselves.\n\nHe expects much from the new converts, on the ground that nations which\nhave been taught have proved more capable than their teachers, appealing\nto the case of the Greeks who outdid their eastern masters, and to that\nof the peoples of modern Europe who received their light from the Romans\nbut have \"well nigh doubled the ancient stock of trades delivered to\ntheir keeping.\"\n\n5.\n\nThe establishment of the Royal Society in 1660 and the Academy of\nSciences in 1666 made physical science fashionable in London and Paris.\nMacaulay, in his characteristic way, describes how \"dreams of perfect\nforms of government made way for dreams of wings with which men were to\nfly from the Tower to the Abbey, and of double-keeled ships which were\nnever to founder in the fiercest storm. All classes were hurried along\nby the prevailing sentiment. Cavalier and Roundhead, Churchman and\nPuritan were for once allied. Divines, jurists, statesmen, nobles,\nprinces, swelled the triumph of the Baconian philosophy.\" The seeds sown\nby Bacon had at last begun to ripen, and full credit was given to him by\nthose who founded and acclaimed the Royal Society. The ode which Cowley\naddressed to that institution might have been entitled an ode in honour\nof Bacon, or still better--for the poet seized the essential point of\nBacon's labours--a hymn on the liberation of the human mind from the\nyoke of Authority.\n\n  Bacon has broke that scar-crow Deity.\n\n\nDryden himself, in the Annus Mirabilis, had turned aside from his\nsubject, the defeat of the Dutch and England's mastery of the seas, to\npay a compliment to the Society, and to prophesy man's mastery of the\nuniverse.\n\n  Instructed ships shall sail to rich commerce,\n    By which remotest regions are allied;\n   Which makes one city of the universe,\n    Where some may gain and all may be supplied.\n\n\n  Then we upon our globe's last verge shall go,\n    And view the ocean leaning on the sky,\n   From thence our rolling neighbours we shall know,\n    And on the lunar world securely pry.\n\n\n[Footnote: It may be noted that John Wilkins (Bishop of Chester)\npublished in 1638 a little book entitled Discovery of a New World,\narguing that the moon is inhabited. A further edition appeared in 1684.\nHe attempted to compose a universal language (Sprat, Hist. of Royal\nSociety, p. 251). His Mercury or the Secret and Swift Messenger (1641)\ncontains proposals for a universal script (chap. 13). There is also an\ningenious suggestion for the communication of messages by sound, which\nmight be described as an anticipation of the Morse code. Wilkins and\nanother divine, Seth Ward, the Bishop of Salisbury, belonged to the\ngroup of men who founded the Royal Society.]\n\nMen did not look far into the future; they did not dream of what the\nworld might be a thousand or ten thousand years hence. They seem to have\nexpected quick results. Even Sprat thinks that \"the absolute perfection\nof the true philosophy\" is not far off, seeing that \"this first great\nand necessary preparation for its coming\"--the institution of scientific\nco-operation--has been accomplished. Superficial and transient though\nthe popular enthusiasm was, it was a sign that an age of intellectual\noptimism had begun, in which the science of nature would play a leading\nrole.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V. THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE: FONTENELLE\n\n1.\n\nNine months before the first part of Perrault's work appeared a younger\nand more brilliant man had formulated, in a short tract, the essential\npoints of the doctrine of the progress of knowledge. It was Fontenelle.\n\nFontenelle was an anima naturaliter moderna. Trained in the principles\nof Descartes, he was one of those who, though like Descartes himself,\ntoo critical to swear by a master, appreciated unreservedly the value of\nthe Cartesian method. Sometimes, he says, a great man gives the tone\nto his age; and this is true of Descartes, who can claim the glory\nof having established a new art of reasoning. He sees the effects\nin literature. The best books on moral and political subjects are\ndistinguished by an arrangement and precision which he traces to the\nesprit geometrique characteristic of Descartes. [Footnote: Sur l'utilite\ndes mathematiques el de la physique (Oeuvres, iii. p. 6, ed. 1729).]\nFontenelle himself had this \"geometrical mind,\" which we see at its best\nin Descartes and Hobbes and Spinoza.\n\nHe had indeed a considerable aptitude for letters. He wrote poor verses,\nand could not distinguish good poetry from bad. That perhaps was the\ndefect of l'esprit geometrique. But he wrote lucid prose. There was an\nironical side to his temper, and he had an ingenious paradoxical wit,\nwhich he indulged, with no little felicity, in his early work, Dialogues\nof the Dead. These conversations, though they show no dramatic power and\nare simply a vehicle for the author's satirical criticisms on life, are\nwritten with a light touch, and are full of surprises and unexpected\nturns. The very choice of the interlocutors shows a curious fancy,\nwhich we do not associate with the geometrical intellect. Descartes\nis confronted with the Third False Demetrius, and we wonder what the\ngourmet Apicius will find to say to Galileo.\n\n2.\n\nIn the Dialogues of the Dead, which appeared in 1683, the Ancient and\nModern controversy is touched on more than once, and it is the subject\nof the conversation between Socrates and Montaigne. Socrates ironically\nprofesses to expect that the age of Montaigne will show a vast\nimprovement on his own; that men will have profited by the experience\nof many centuries; and that the old age of the world will be wiser and\nbetter regulated than its youth. Montaigne assures him that it is not\nso, and that the vigorous types of antiquity, like Pericles, Aristides,\nand Socrates himself, are no longer to be found. To this assertion\nSocrates opposes the doctrine of the permanence of the forces of Nature.\nNature has not degenerated in her other works; why should she cease to\nproduce reasonable men?\n\nHe goes on to observe that antiquity is enlarged and exalted by\ndistance: \"In our own day we esteemed our ancestors more than they\ndeserved, and now our posterity esteems us more than we deserve. There\nis really no difference between our ancestors, ourselves, and our\nposterity. C'est toujours la meme chose.\" But, objects Montaigne, I\nshould have thought that things were always changing; that different\nages had their different characters. Are there not ages of learning and\nages of ignorance, rude ages and polite? True, replies Socrates, but\nthese are only externalities. The heart of man does not change with\nthe fashions of his life. The order of Nature remains constant (l'ordre\ngeneral de la Nature a l'air bien constant).\n\nThis conclusion harmonises with the general spirit of the Dialogues. The\npermanence of the forces of Nature is asserted, but for the purpose\nof dismissing the whole controversy as rather futile. Elsewhere modern\ndiscoveries, like the circulation of the blood and the motions of the\nearth, are criticised as useless; adding nothing to the happiness and\npleasures of mankind. Men acquired, at an early period, a certain amount\nof useful knowledge, to which they have added nothing; since then they\nhave been slowly discovering things that are unnecessary. Nature has not\nbeen so unjust as to allow one age to enjoy more pleasures than\nanother. And what is the value of civilisation? It moulds our words, and\nembarrasses our actions; it does not affect our feelings. [Footnote:\nSee the dialogues of Harvey with Erasistratus (a Greek physician of\nthe third century B.C.); Galileo with Apicius; Montezuma with Fernando\nCortez.]\n\nOne might hardly have expected the author of these Dialogues to come\nforward a few years later as a champion of the Moderns, even though, in\nthe dedicatory epistle to Lucian, he compared France to Greece. But he\nwas seriously interested in the debated question, as an intellectual\nproblem, and in January 1688 he published his Digression on the Ancients\nand Moderns, a short pamphlet, but weightier and more suggestive than\nthe large work of his friend Perrault, which began to appear nine months\nlater.\n\n3.\n\nThe question of pre-eminence between the Ancients and Moderns is\nreducible to another. Were trees in ancient times greater than to-day?\nIf they were, then Homer, Plato, and Demosthenes cannot be equalled in\nmodern times; if they were not, they can.\n\nFontenelle states the problem in this succinct way at the beginning of\nthe Digression. The permanence of the forces of Nature had been asserted\nby Saint Sorlin and Perrault; they had offered no proof, and had used\nthe principle rather incidentally and by way of illustration. But\nthe whole inquiry hinged on it. If it can be shown that man has not\ndegenerated, the cause of the Moderns is practically won. The issue\nof the controversy must be decided not by rhetoric but by physics. And\nFontenelle offers what he regards as a formal Cartesian proof of the\npermanence of natural forces.\n\nIf the Ancients had better intellects than ours, the brains of that\nage must have been better arranged, formed of firmer or more delicate\nfibres, fuller of \"animal spirits.\" But if such a difference existed,\nNature must have been more vigorous; and in that case the trees must\nhave profited by that superior vigour and have been larger and finer.\nThe truth is that Nature has in her hands a certain paste which is\nalways the same, which she is ever turning over and over again in a\nthousand ways, and of which she forms men, animals, and plants. She has\nnot formed Homer, Demosthenes, and Plato of a finer or better kneaded\nclay than our poets, orators, and philosophers. Do not object that minds\nare not material. They are connected by a material bond with the brain,\nand it is the quality of this material bond that determines intellectual\ndifferences.\n\nBut although natural processes do not change from age to age, they\ndiffer in their effects in different climates. \"It is certain that as\na result of the reciprocal dependence which exists between all parts of\nthe material world, differences of climate, which so clearly affect the\nlife of plants, must also produce some effect on human brains.\" May it\nnot be said then that, in consequence of climatic conditions, ancient\nGreece and Rome produced men of mental qualities different from those\nwhich could be produced in France? Oranges grow easily in Italy; it is\nmore difficult to cultivate them in France. Fontenelle replies that art\nand cultivation exert a much greater influence on human brains than\non the soil; ideas can be transported more easily from one country\nto another than plants; and as a consequence of commerce and mutual\ninfluence, peoples do not retain the original mental peculiarities due\nto climate. This may not be true of the extreme climates in the torrid\nand glacial zones, but in the temperate zone we may discount entirely\nclimatic influence. The climates of Greece and Italy and that of France\nare too similar to cause any sensible difference between the Greeks or\nLatins and the French.\n\nSaint Sorlin and Perrault had argued directly from the permanence of\nvigour in lions or trees to the permanence of vigour in man. If trees\nare the same as ever, brains must also be the same. But what about the\nminor premiss? Who knows that trees are precisely the same? It is an\nindemonstrable assumption that oaks and beeches in the days of Socrates\nand Cicero were not slightly better trees than the oaks and beeches of\nto-day. Fontenelle saw the weakness of this reasoning. He saw that it\nwas necessary to prove that the trees, no less than human brains, have\nnot degenerated. But his a priori proof is simply a statement of the\nCartesian principle of the stability of natural processes, which he put\nin a thoroughly unscientific form. The stability of the laws of nature\nis a necessary hypothesis, without which science would be impossible.\nBut here it was put to an illegitimate use. For it means that, given\nprecisely the same conditions, the same physical phenomena will occur.\nFontenelle therefore was bound to show that conditions had not altered\nin such a way as to cause changes in the quality of nature's organic\nproductions. He did not do this. He did not take into consideration, for\ninstance, that climatic conditions may vary from age to age as well as\nfrom country to country.\n\n4.\n\nHaving established the natural equality of the Ancients and Moderns,\nFontenelle inferred that whatever differences exist are due to external\nconditions--(1) time; (2) political institutions and the estate of\naffairs in general.\n\nThe ancients were prior in time to us, therefore they were the authors\nof the first inventions. For that, they cannot be regarded as our\nsuperiors. If we had been in their place we should have been the\ninventors, like them; if they were in ours, they would add to those\ninventions, like us. There is no great mystery in that. We must impute\nequal merit to the early thinkers who showed the way and to the later\nthinkers who pursued it. If the ancient attempts to explain the universe\nhave been recently replaced by the discovery of a simple system (the\nCartesian), we must consider that the truth could only be reached by\nthe elimination of false routes, and in this way the numbers of the\nPythagoreans, the ideas of Plato, the qualities of Aristotle, all served\nindirectly to advance knowledge. \"We are under an obligation to the\nancients for having exhausted almost all the false theories that could\nbe formed.\" Enlightened both by their true views and by their errors, it\nis not surprising that we should surpass them.\n\nBut all this applies only to scientific studies, like mathematics,\nphysics, and medicine, which depend partly on correct reasoning and\npartly on experience. Methods of reasoning improve slowly, and the most\nimportant advance which has been made in the present age is the method\ninaugurated by Descartes. Before him reasoning was loose; he introduced\na more rigid and precise standard, and its influence is not only\nmanifest in our best works on physics and philosophy, but is even\ndiscernible in books on ethics and religion.\n\nWe must expect posterity to excel us as we excel the Ancients, through\nimprovement of method, which is a science in itself--the most difficult\nand least studied of all--and through increase of experience. Evidently\nthe process is endless (il est evident que tout cela n'a point de fin),\nand the latest men of science must be the most competent.\n\nBut this does not apply to poetry or eloquence, round which the\ncontroversy has most violently raged. For poetry and eloquence do not\ndepend on correct reasoning. They depend principally on vivacity of\nimagination, and \"vivacity of imagination does not require a long\ncourse of experiments, or a great multitude of rules, to attain all the\nperfection of which it is capable.\" Such perfection might be attained in\na few centuries. If the ancients did achieve perfection in imaginative\nliterature, it follows that they cannot be surpassed; but we have no\nright to say, as their admirers are fond of pretending, that they cannot\nbe equalled.\n\n5.\n\nBesides the mere nature of time, we have to take into account external\ncircumstances in considering this question.\n\nIf the forces of nature are permanent, how are we to explain the fact\nthat in the barbarous centuries after the decline of Rome--the term\nMiddle Ages has not yet come into currency--ignorance was so dense and\ndeep? This breach of continuity is one of the plausible arguments of\nthe advocates of the Ancients. Those ages, they say, were ignorant and\nbarbarous because the Greek and Latin writers had ceased to be read;\nas soon as the study of the classical models revived there was a\nrenaissance of reason and good taste. That is true, but it proves\nnothing. Nature never forgot how to mould the head of Cicero or Livy.\nShe produces in every age men who might be great men; but the age does\nnot always allow them to exert their talents. Inundations of barbarians,\nuniversal wars, governments which discourage or do not favour science\nand art, prejudices which assume all variety of shapes--like the\nChinese prejudice against dissecting corpses--may impose long periods of\nignorance or bad taste.\n\nBut observe that, though the return to the study of the ancients\nrevived, as at one stroke, the aesthetic ideals which they had created\nand the learning which they had accumulated, yet even if their works\nhad not been preserved we should, though it would have cost us many long\nyears of labour, have discovered for ourselves \"ideas of the true and\nthe beautiful.\" Where should we have found them? Where the ancients\nthemselves found them, after much groping.\n\n6.\n\nThe comparison of the life of collective humanity to the life of a\nsingle man, which had been drawn by Bacon and Pascal, Saint Sorlin and\nPerrault, contains or illustrates an important truth which bears on\nthe whole question. Fontenelle puts it thus. An educated mind is, as it\nwere, composed of all the minds of preceding ages; we might say that a\nsingle mind was being educated throughout all history. Thus this secular\nman, who has lived since the beginning of the world, has had his infancy\nin which he was absorbed by the most urgent needs of life; his youth in\nwhich he succeeded pretty well in things of imagination like poetry\nand eloquence, and even began to reason, but with more courage than\nsolidity. He is now in the age of manhood, is more enlightened, and\nreasons better; but he would have advanced further if the passion for\nwar had not distracted him and given him a distaste for the sciences to\nwhich he has at last returned.\n\nFigures, if they are pressed, are dangerous; they suggest unwarrantable\nconclusions. It may be illuminative to liken the development of humanity\nto the growth of an individual; but to infer that the human race is now\nin its old age, merely on the strength of the comparison, is obviously\nunjustifiable. That is what Bacon and the others had done. The fallacy\nwas pointed out by Fontenelle.\n\nFrom his point of view, an \"old age\" of humanity, which if it meant\nanything meant decay as well as the wisdom of experience, was contrary\nto the principle of the permanence of natural forces. Man, he asserts,\nwill have no old age. He will be always equally capable, of achieving\nthe successes of his youth; and he will become more and more expert in\nthe things which become the age of virility. Or \"to drop metaphor,\nmen will never degenerate.\" In ages to come we may be regarded--say in\nAmerica--with the same excess of admiration with which we regard the\nancients. We might push the prediction further. In still later ages the\ninterval of time which divides us from the Greeks and Romans will appear\nso relatively small to posterity that they will classify us and the\nancients as virtually contemporary; just in the same way as we group\ntogether the Greeks and Romans, though the Romans in their own day were\nmoderns in relation to the Greeks. In that remote period men will be\nable to judge without prejudice the comparative merits of Sophocles and\nCorneille.\n\nUnreasonable admiration for the ancients is one of the chief obstacles\nto progress (le progres des choses). Philosophy not only did not\nadvance, but even fell into an abyss of unintelligible ideas, because,\nthrough devotion to the authority of Aristotle, men sought truth in his\nenigmatic writings instead of seeking it in nature. If the authority of\nDescartes were ever to have the same fortune, the results would be no\nless disastrous.\n\n7.\n\nThis memorable brochure exhibits, without pedantry, perspicuous\narrangement and the \"geometrical\" precision on which Fontenelle remarked\nas one of the notes of the new epoch introduced by Descartes. It\ndisplays too the author's open-mindedness, and his readiness to\nfollow where the argument leads. He is able already to look beyond\nCartesianism; he knows that it cannot be final. No man of his time was\nmore open-minded and free from prejudice than Fontenelle. This quality\nof mind helped him to turn his eyes to the future. Perrault and his\npredecessors were absorbed in the interest of the present and the past.\nDescartes was too much engaged in his own original discoveries to do\nmore than throw a passing glance at posterity.\n\nNow the prospect of the future was one of the two elements which were\nstill needed to fashion the theory of the progress of knowledge. All the\nconditions for such a theory were present. Bodin and Bacon, Descartes\nand the champions of the Moderns--the reaction against the Renaissance,\nand the startling discoveries of science--had prepared the way; progress\nwas established for the past and present. But the theory of the progress\nof knowledge includes and acquires its value by including the indefinite\nfuture. This step was taken by Fontenelle. The idea had been almost\nexcluded by Bacon's misleading metaphor of old age, which Fontenelle\nexpressly rejects. Man will have no old age; his intellect will never\ndegenerate; and \"the sound views of intellectual men in successive\ngenerations will continually add up.\"\n\nBut progress must not only be conceived as extending indefinitely into\nthe future; it must also be conceived as necessary and certain. This is\nthe second essential feature of the theory. The theory would have\nlittle value or significance, if the prospect of progress in the future\ndepended on chance or the unpredictable discretion of an external will.\nFontenelle asserts implicitly the certainty of progress when he declares\nthat the discoveries and improvements of the modern age would have been\nmade by the ancients if they exchanged places with the moderns; for\nthis amounts to saying that science will progress and knowledge increase\nindependently of particular individuals. If Descartes had not been born,\nsome one else would have done his work; and there could have been no\nDescartes before the seventeenth century. For, as he says in a later\nwork, [Footnote: Preface des elemens de la geometrie de l'infini\n(OEuvres, x. p. 40, ed. 1790).] \"there is an order which regulates our\nprogress. Every science develops after a certain number of preceding\nsciences have developed, and only then; it has to await its turn to\nburst its shell.\"\n\nFontenelle, then, was the first to formulate the idea of the progress,\nof knowledge, as a complete doctrine. At the moment the import and\nfar-reaching effects of the idea were not realised, either by himself or\nby others, and his pamphlet, which appeared in the company of a perverse\ntheory of pastoral poetry, was acclaimed merely as an able defence of\nthe Moderns.\n\n8.\n\nIf the theory of the indefinite progress of knowledge is true, it is one\nof those truths which were originally established by false reasoning. It\nwas established on a principle which excluded degeneration, but equally\nexcluded evolution; and the whole conception of nature which Fontenelle\nhad learned from Descartes is long since dead and buried.\n\nBut it is more important to observe that this principle, which seemed\nto secure the indefinite progress of knowledge, disabled Fontenelle from\nsuggesting a theory of the progress of society. The invariability of\nnature, as he conceived it, was true of the emotions and the will,\nas well as of the intellect. It implied that man himself would be\npsychically always the same--unalterable, incurable. L'ordre general\nde la Nature a Fair bien constant. His opinion of the human race was\nexpressed in the Dialogues of the Dead, [Footnote: It may be seen too in\nthe Plurality of Worlds.] and it never seems to have varied. The world\nconsists of a multitude of fools, and a mere handful of reasonable men.\nMen's passions will always be the same and will produce wars in the\nfuture as in the past. Civilisation makes no difference; it is little\nmore than a veneer.\n\nEven if theory had not stood in his way, Fontenelle was the last man who\nwas likely to dream dreams of social improvement. He was temperamentally\nan Epicurean, of the same refined stamp as Epicurus himself, and he\nenjoyed throughout his long life--he lived to the age of a hundred--the\ntranquillity which was the true Epicurean ideal. He was never troubled\nby domestic cares, and his own modest ambition was satisfied when, at\nthe age of forty, he was appointed permanent Secretary of the Academy of\nSciences. He was not the man to let his mind dwell on the woes and\nevils of the world; and the follies and perversities which cause them\ninterested him only so far as they provided material for his wit.\n\nIt remains, however, noteworthy that the author of the theory of the\nprogress of knowledge, which was afterwards to expand into a general\ntheory of human Progress, would not have allowed that this extension was\nlegitimate; though it was through this extension that Fontenelle's idea\nacquired human value and interest and became a force in the world.\n\n9.\n\nFontenelle did a good deal more than formulate the idea. He reinforced\nit by showing that the prospect of a steady and rapid increase of\nknowledge in the future was certified.\n\nThe postulate of the immutability of the laws of nature, which has\nbeen the indispensable basis for the advance of modern science, is\nfundamental with Descartes. But Descartes did not explicitly insist on\nit, and it was Fontenelle, perhaps more than any one else, who made it\ncurrent coin. That was a service performed by the disciple; but he seems\nto have been original in introducing the fruitful idea of the sciences\nas confederate and intimately interconnected [Footnote: Roger Bacon,\nas we saw, had a glimpse of this principle.]; not forming a number of\nisolated domains, as hitherto, but constituting a system in which the\nadvance of one will contribute to the advance of the others. He\nexposed with masterly ability the reciprocal relations of physics and\nmathematics. No man of his day had a more comprehensive view of all the\nsciences, though he made no original contributions to any. His curiosity\nwas universal, and as Secretary of the Academy he was obliged, according\nto his own high standard of his duty, to keep abreast of all that was\nbeing done in every branch of knowledge. That was possible then; it\nwould be impossible now.\n\nIn the famous series of obituary discourses which he delivered on\nsavants who were members of the Academy, Fontenelle probably\nthought that he was contributing to the realisation of this ideal of\n\"solidarity,\" for they amounted to a chronicle of scientific progress in\nevery department. They are free from technicalities and extraordinarily\nlucid, and they appealed not only to men of science, but to those of the\neducated public who possessed some scientific curiosity. This brings us\nto another important role of Fontenelle--the role of interpreter of\nthe world of science to the world outside. It is closely related to our\nsubject.\n\nFor the popularisation of science, which was to be one of the features\nof the nineteenth century, was in fact a condition of the success of the\nidea of Progress. That idea could not insinuate itself into the public\nmind and become a living force in civilised societies until the meaning\nand value of science had been generally grasped, and the results of\nscientific discovery had been more or less diffused. The achievements of\nphysical science did more than anything else to convert the imaginations\nof men to the general doctrine of Progress.\n\nBefore the later part of the seventeenth century, the remarkable\nphysical discoveries of recent date had hardly escaped beyond academic\ncircles. But an interest in these subjects began to become the fashion\nin the later years of Louis XIV. Science was talked in the salons;\nladies studied mechanics and anatomy. Moliere's play, Les Femmes\nsavantes, which appeared in 1672, is one of the first indications. In\n1686 Fontenelle published his Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds,\nin which a savant explains the new astronomy to a lady in the park of\na country house. [Footnote: The Marquise of the Plurality of Worlds\nis supposed to be Madame de la Mesangere, who lived near Rouen,\nFontenelle's birthplace. He was a friend and a frequent visitor at her\nchateau. See Maigron, Fontenelle, p. 42. The English translation of 1688\nwas by Glanvill. A new translation was published at Dublin as late as\n1761.] It is the first book--at least the first that has any claim to be\nremembered--in the literature of popular science, and it is one of\nthe most striking. It met with the success which it deserved. It was\nreprinted again and again, and it was almost immediately translated into\nEnglish.\n\nThe significance of the Plurality of Worlds is indeed much greater\nthan that of a pioneer work in popularisation and a model in the art\nof making technical subjects interesting. We must remember that at this\ntime the belief that the sun revolves round the earth still prevailed.\nOnly the few knew better. The cosmic revolution which is associated with\nthe names of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo was slow in producing its\neffects. It was rejected by Bacon; and the condemnation of Galileo by\nthe Church made Descartes, who dreaded nothing so much as a collision\nwith the ecclesiastical authorities unwilling to insist on it.\n[Footnote: Cp. Bouillier, Histoire de la philosophie cartesienne, i. p.\n42-3.] Milton's Raphael, in the Eighth Book of Paradise Lost (published\n1667), does not venture to affirm the Copernican system; he explains\nit sympathetically, but leaves the question open. [Footnote: Masson\n(Milton's Poetical Works, vol. 2) observes that Milton's life (1608-74)\n\"coincides with the period of the struggle between the two systems\"\n(p. 90). Milton's friends, the Smectymnians, in answer to Bishop Hall's\nHumble Remonstrance (1641), \"had cited the Copernican doctrine as\nan unquestionable instance of a supreme absurdity.\" Masson has some\napposite remarks on the influence of the Ptolemaic system \"upon the\nthinkings and imaginations of mankind everywhere on all subjects\nwhatsoever till about two hundred years ago.\"] Fontenelle's book was an\nevent. It disclosed to the general public a new picture of the universe,\nto which men would have to accustom their imaginations.\n\nWe may perhaps best conceive all that this change meant by supposing\nwhat a difference it would make to us if it were suddenly discovered\nthat the old system which Copernicus upset was true after all, and that\nwe had to think ourselves back into a strictly limited universe of which\nthe earth is the centre. The loss of its privileged position by our own\nplanet; its degradation, from a cosmic point of view, to insignificance;\nthe necessity of admitting the probability that there may be many other\ninhabited worlds--all this had consequences ranging beyond the field of\nastronomy. It was as if a man who dreamed that he was living in Paris or\nLondon should awake to discover that he was really in an obscure island\nin the Pacific Ocean, and that the Pacific Ocean was immeasurably vaster\nthan he had imagined. The Marquise, in the Plurality of Worlds, reacts\nto the startling illumination: \"Voila l'univers si grand que je m'y\nperds, je ne sais plus ou je suis; je ne suis plus rien.--La terre est\nsi effroyablement petite!\"\n\nSuch a revolution in cosmic values could not fail to exert a penetrating\ninfluence on human thought. The privileged position of the earth had\nbeen a capital feature of the whole doctrine, as to the universe and\nman's destinies, which had been taught by the Church, and it had made\nthat doctrine more specious than it might otherwise have seemed. Though\nthe Churches could reform their teaching to meet the new situation, the\nfact remained that the Christian scheme sounded less plausible when the\ncentral importance of the human race was shown to be an illusion. Would\nman, stripped of his cosmic pretensions, and finding himself lost in\nthe immensities of space, invent a more modest theory of his destinies\nconfined to his own little earth--si effroyablement petite? The\neighteenth century answered this question by the theory of Progress.\n\n10.\n\nFontenelle is one of the most representative thinkers of that\nperiod--we have no distinguishing name for it--which lies between\nthe characteristic thinkers of the seventeenth century and the\ncharacteristic thinkers of the eighteenth. It is a period of over sixty\nyears, beginning about 1680, for though Montesquieu and Voltaire were\nwriting long before 1740, the great influential works of the \"age of\nillumination\" begin with the Esprit des lois in 1748. The intellectual\ntask of this intervening period was to turn to account the ideas\nprovided by the philosophy of Descartes, and use them as solvents of\nthe ideas handed down from the Middle Ages. We might almost call it the\nCartesian period for, though Descartes was dead, it was in these years\nthat Cartesianism performed its task and transformed human thought.\n\nWhen we speak of Cartesianism we do not mean the metaphysical system of\nthe master, or any of his particular views such as that of innate\nideas. We mean the general principles, which were to leave an abiding\nimpression on the texture of thought: the supremacy of reason over\nauthority, the stability of the laws of Nature, rigorous standards of\nproof. Fontenelle was far from accepting all the views of Descartes,\nwhom he does not scruple to criticise; but he was a true Cartesian\nin the sense that he was deeply imbued with these principles, which\ngenerated, to use an expression of his own, \"des especes de rebelles,\nqui conspiraient contre l'ignorance et les prejuges dominants.\"\n[Footnote: Eloge de M. Lemery.] And of all these rebels against ruling\nprejudices he probably did more than any single man to exhibit the\nconsequences of the Cartesian ideas and drive them home.\n\nThe Plurality of Worlds was a contribution to the task of transforming\nthought and abolishing ancient error; but the History of Oracles which\nappeared in the following year was more characteristic. It was a free\nadaptation of an unreadable Latin treatise by a Dutchman, which in\nFontenelle's skilful hands becomes a vehicle for applying Cartesian\nsolvents to theological authority. The thesis is that the Greek oracles\nwere a sacerdotal imposture, and not, as ecclesiastical tradition said,\nthe work of evil spirits, who were stricken silent at the death of Jesus\nChrist. The effect was to discredit the authority of the early Fathers\nof the Church, though the writer has the discretion to repudiate such\nan intention. For the publication was risky; and twenty years later a\nJesuit Father wrote a treatise to confute it, and exposed the secret\npoison, with consequences which might have been disastrous for\nFontenelle if he had not had powerful friends among the Jesuits\nthemselves. Fontenelle had none of the impetuosity of Voltaire,\nand after the publication of the History of Oracles he confined his\ncriticism of tradition to the field of science. He was convinced that\n\"les choses fort etablies ne peuvent etre attaquees que par degrez.\"\n[Footnote: Eloge de M. Lemery.]\n\nThe secret poison, of which Fontenelle prepared this remarkable dose\nwith a touch which reminds us of Voltaire, was being administered in\nthe same Cartesian period, and with similar precautions, by Bayle. Like\nFontenelle, this great sceptic, \"the father of modern incredulity\" as\nhe was called by Joseph de Maistre, stood between the two centuries and\nbelonged to both. Like Fontenelle, he took a gloomy view of humanity;\nhe had no faith in that goodness of human nature which was to be a\ncharacteristic dogma of the age of illumination. But he was untouched\nby the discoveries of science; he took no interest in Galileo or Newton;\nand while the most important work of Fontenelle was the interpretation\nof the positive advances of knowledge, Bayle's was entirely subversive.\n\nThe principle of unchangeable laws in nature is intimately connected\nwith the growth of Deism which is a note of this period. The function of\nthe Deity was virtually confined to originating the machine of nature,\nwhich, once regulated, was set beyond any further interference on His\npart, though His existence might be necessary for its conservation. A\nview so sharply opposed to the current belief could not have made way\nas it did without a penetrating criticism of the current theology.\nSuch criticism was performed by Bayle. His works were a school for\nrationalism for about seventy years. He supplied to the thinkers of the\neighteenth century, English as well as French, a magazine of subversive\narguments, and he helped to emancipate morality both from theology and\nfrom metaphysics.\n\nThis intellectual revolutionary movement, which was propagated in salons\nas well as by books, shook the doctrine of Providence which Bossuet had\nso eloquently expounded. It meant the enthronement of reason--Cartesian\nreason--before whose severe tribunal history as well as opinions were\ntried. New rules of criticism were introduced, new standards of proof.\nWhen Fontenelle observed that the existence of Alexander the Great\ncould not be strictly demonstrated and was no more than highly probable,\n[Footnote: Plurality des mondes, sixieme soir.] it was an undesigned\nwarning that tradition would receive short shrift at the hands of men\ntrained in analytical Cartesian methods.\n\n11.\n\nThat the issue between the claims of antiquity and the modern age should\nhave been debated independently in England and France indicates that the\ncontroversy was an inevitable incident in the liberation of the human\nspirit from the authority of the ancients. Towards the end of the\ncentury the debate in France aroused attention in England and led to\na literary quarrel, less important but not less acrimonious than that\nwhich raged in France. Sir William Temple's Essay, Wotton's Reflexions,\nand Swift's satire the Battle of the Books are the three outstanding\nworks in the episode, which is however chiefly remembered on account\nof its connection with Bentley's masterly exposure of the fabricated\nletters of Phalaris.\n\nThe literary debate in France, indeed, could not have failed to\nreverberate across the Channel; for never perhaps did the literary world\nin England follow with more interest, or appreciate more keenly the\nproductions of the great French writers of the time. In describing\nWill's coffee-house, which was frequented by Dryden and all who\npretended to be interested in polite letters, Macaulay says, \"there was\na faction for Perrault and the moderns, a faction for Boileau and the\nancients.\" In the discussions on this subject a remarkable Frenchman who\nhad long lived in England as an exile, M. de Saint Evremond, must have\nconstantly taken part. The disjointed pieces of which Saint Evremond's\nwritings consist are tedious and superficial, but they reveal a mind\nof much cultivation and considerable common sense. His judgement on\nPerrault's Parallel is that the author \"has discovered the defects of\nthe ancients better than he has made out the advantage of the moderns;\nhis book is good and capable of curing us of abundance of errors.\"\n[Footnote: In a letter to the Duchess of Mazarin, Works, Eng. tr., iii.\n418.] He was not a partisan. But his friend, Sir William Temple, excited\nby the French depreciations of antiquity, rushed into the lists with\ngreater courage than discretion.\n\nTemple was ill equipped for the controversy, though his Essay on\nAncient and Modern Learning (1690) is far from deserving the disdain of\nMacaulay, who describes its matter as \"ludicrous and contemptible to the\nlast degree.\" [Footnote: The only point in it which need be noted here\nis that the author questioned the cogency of Fontenelle's argument, that\nthe forces of nature being permanent human ability is in all ages\nthe same. \"May there not,\" he asks, \"many circumstances concur to one\nproduction that do not to any other in one or many ages?\" Fontenelle\nspeaks of trees. It is conceivable that various conditions and accidents\n\"may produce an oak, a fig, or a plane-tree, that shall deserve to\nbe renowned in story, and shall not perhaps be paralleled in other\ncountries or times. May not the same have happened in the production,\ngrowth, and size of wit and genius in the world, or in some parts or\nages of it, and from many more circumstances that contributed towards it\nthan what may concur to the stupendous growth of a tree or animal?\"] And\nit must be confessed that the most useful result of the Essay was the\nanswer which it provoked from Wotton. For Wotton had a far wider\nrange of knowledge, and a more judicious mind, than any of the other\ncontroversialists, with the exception of Fontenelle; and in knowledge\nof antiquity he was Fontenelle's superior. His inquiry stands out as\nthe most sensible and unprejudiced contribution to the whole debate. He\naccepts as just the reasoning of Fontenelle \"as to the comparative force\nof the geniuses of men in the several ages of the world and of the equal\nforce of men's understandings absolutely considered in all times since\nlearning first began to be cultivated amongst mankind.\" But this is not\nincompatible with the thesis that in some branches the ancients excelled\nall who came after them. For it is not necessary to explain such\nexcellence by the hypothesis that there was a particular force of genius\nevidently discernible in former ages, but extinct long since, and that\nnature is now worn out and spent. There is an alternative explanation.\nThere may have been special circumstances \"which might suit with those\nages which did exceed ours, and with those things wherein they did\nexceed us, and with no other age nor thing besides.\"\n\nBut we must begin our inquiry by sharply distinguishing two fields\nof mental activity--the field of art, including poetry, oratory,\narchitecture, painting, and statuary; and the field of knowledge,\nincluding mathematics, natural science, physiology, with all their\ndependencies. In the case of the first group there is room for variety\nof opinion; but the superiority of the Greeks and Romans in poetry and\nliterary style may be admitted without prejudice to the mental equality\nof the moderns, for it may be explained partly by the genius of their\nlanguages and partly by political circumstances--for example, in the\ncase of oratory, [Footnote: This had been noted by Fontenelle in his\nDigression.] by the practical necessity of eloquence. But as regards\nthe other group, knowledge is not a matter of opinion or taste, and\na definite judgement is possible. Wotton then proceeds to review\nsystematically the field of science, and easily shows, with more\ncompleteness and precision than Perrault, the superiority of modern\nmethods and the enormous strides which had been made.\n\nAs to the future, Wotton expresses himself cautiously. It is not easy to\nsay whether knowledge will advance in the next age proportionally to\nits advance in this. He has some fears that there may be a falling away,\nbecause ancient learning has still too great a hold over modern books,\nand physical and mathematical studies tend to be neglected. But he ends\nhis Reflexions by the speculation that \"some future age, though perhaps\nnot the next, and in a country now possibly little thought of, may do\nthat which our great men would be glad to see done; that is to say, may\nraise real knowledge, upon foundations laid in this age, to the utmost\npossible perfection to which it may be brought by mortal men in this\nimperfect state.\"\n\nThe distinction, on which Wotton insisted, between the sciences which\nrequire ages for their development and the imaginative arts which may\nreach perfection in a short time had been recognised by Fontenelle,\nwhose argument on this point differs from that of his friend Perrault.\nFor Perrault contended that in literature and art, as well as in\nscience, later generations can, through the advantage of time and longer\nexperience, attain to a higher excellence than their predecessors.\nFontenelle, on the other hand, held that poetry and eloquence have a\nrestricted field, and that therefore there must be a time at which\nthey reach a point of excellence which cannot be exceeded. It was his\npersonal opinion that eloquence and history actually reached the highest\npossible perfection in Cicero and Livy.\n\nBut neither Fontenelle nor Wotton came into close quarters with the\nproblem which was raised--not very clearly, it is true--by Perrault. Is\nthere development in the various species of literature and art? Do they\nprofit and enrich themselves by the general advance of civilisation?\nPerrault, as we have seen, threw out the suggestion that increased\nexperience and psychological study enabled the moderns to penetrate more\ndeeply into the recesses of the human soul, and therefore to bring to a\nhigher perfection the treatment of the character, motives, and passions\nof men. This suggestion admits of being extended. In the Introduction\nto his Revolt of Islam, Shelley, describing his own intellectual and\naesthetic experiences, writes:\n\nThe poetry of ancient Greece and Rome, and modern Italy, and our\nown country, has been to me like external nature, a passion and an\nenjoyment.... I have considered poetry in its most comprehensive sense;\nand have read the poets and the historians and the metaphysicians whose\nwritings have been accessible to me--and have looked upon the beautiful\nand majestic scenery of the earth--as common sources of those elements\nwhich it is the province of the Poet to embody and combine. And he\nappends a note:\n\nIn this sense there may be such a thing as perfectibility in works of\nfiction, notwithstanding the concession often made by the advocates\nof human improvement, that perfectibility is a term applicable only to\nscience.\n\nIn other words, all the increases of human experience, from age to age,\nall the speculative adventures of the intellect, provide the artist,\nin each succeeding generation, with more abundant sources for aesthetic\ntreatment. As years go on, life in its widest sense offers more and more\nmaterials \"which it is the province of the Poet to embody and combine.\"\nThis is evidently true; and would it not seem to follow that literature\nis not excluded from participating in the common development of\ncivilisation? One of the latest of the champions of the Moderns, the\nAbbe Terrasson, maintained that \"to separate the general view of the\nprogress of the human mind in regard to natural science, and in regard\nto belles-lettres, would be a fitting expedient to a man who had two\nsouls, but it is useless to him who has only one.\" [Footnote: Abbe\nTerrasson, 1670-1750. His Philosophie applicable a tons les objets\nde l'esprit et de la raison was issued posthumously in 1754. His\nDissertation critique sur l'Iliade appeared in 1715.]He put the matter\nin too abstract a way to carry conviction; but the nineteenth century\nwas to judge that he was not entirely wrong. For the question was, as we\nshall see, raised anew by Madame de Stael, and the theory was finally\nto emerge that art and literature, like laws and institutions, are an\nexpression of society and therefore inextricably linked with the other\nelements of social development--a theory, it may be observed, which\nwhile it has discredited the habit of considering works of art in a\nvacuum, dateless and detached, as they were generally considered by\ncritics of the seventeenth century, leaves the aesthetic problem much\nwhere it was.\n\nPerrault's suggestion as to the enrichment of the material of the artist\nby new acquisitions would have served to bring literature and art\ninto the general field of human development, without compromising the\ndistinction on which Wotton and others insisted between the natural\nsciences and the aesthetic arts. But that distinction, emphatically\nendorsed by Voltaire, had the effect of excluding literature and art\nfrom the view of those who in the eighteenth century recognised progress\nin the other activities of man.\n\n12.\n\nIt is notable that in this literary controversy the Moderns, even\nFontenelle, seem curiously negligent of the import of the theory which\nthey were propounding of the intellectual progress of man. They treat\nit almost incidentally, as part of the case for the defence, not as\nan immensely important conclusion. Its bearings were more definitely\nrealised by the Abbe Terrasson, whom I have just named. A geometer and a\nCartesian, he took part in the controversy in its latest stage, when La\nMotte and Madame Dacier were the principal antagonists. The human mind,\nhe said, has had its infancy and youth; its maturity began in the age\nof Augustus; the barbarians arrested its course till the Renaissance;\nin the seventeenth century, through the illuminating philosophy of\nDescartes, it passed beyond the stage which it had attained in the\nAugustan age, and the eighteenth century should surpass the seventeenth.\nCartesianism is not final; it has its place in a development. It was\nmade possible by previous speculations, and it will be succeeded by\nother systems. We must not pursue the analogy of humanity with an\nindividual man and anticipate a period of old age. For unlike the\nindividual, humanity \"being composed of all ages,\" is always gaining\ninstead of losing. The age of maturity will last indefinitely, because\nit is a progressive, not a stationary, maturity. Later generations\nwill always be superior to the earlier, for progress is \"a natural and\nnecessary effect of the constitution of the human mind.\"\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI. THE GENERAL PROGRESS OF MAN: ABBE DE SAINT-PIERRE\n\nThe revolutionary speculations on the social and moral condition of man\nwhich were the outstanding feature of the eighteenth century in France,\nand began about 1750, were the development of the intellectual movement\nof the seventeenth, which had changed the outlook of speculative\nthought. It was one continuous rationalistic movement. In the days\nof Racine and Perrault men had been complacently conscious of the\nenlightenment of the age in which they were living, and as time went on,\nthis consciousness became stronger and acuter; it is a note of the age\nof Voltaire. In the last years of Louis XIV., and in the years which\nfollowed, the contrast between this mental enlightenment and the dark\nbackground--the social evils and miseries of the kingdom, the gross\nmisgovernment and oppression--began to insinuate itself into men's\nminds. What was the value of the achievements of science, and\nthe improvement of the arts of life, if life itself could not be\nameliorated? Was not some radical reconstruction possible, in the social\nfabric, corresponding to the radical reconstruction inaugurated by\nDescartes in the principles of science and in the methods of thought?\nYear by year the obscurantism of the ruling powers became more glaring,\nand the most gifted thinkers, towards the middle of the century, began\nto concentrate their brains on the problems of social science and to\nturn the light of reason on the nature of man and the roots of society.\nThey wrought with unscrupulous resolution and with far-reaching effects.\n\nWith the extension of rationalism into the social domain, it came about\nnaturally that the idea of intellectual progress was enlarged into the\nidea of the general Progress of man. The transition was easy. If\nit could be proved that social evils were due neither to innate and\nincorrigible disabilities of the human being nor to the nature of\nthings, but simply to ignorance and prejudices, then the improvement of\nhis state, and ultimately the attainment of felicity, would be only\na matter of illuminating ignorance and removing errors, of increasing\nknowledge and diffusing light. The growth of the \"universal human\nreason\"--a Cartesian phrase, which had figured in the philosophy of\nMalebranche--must assure a happy destiny to humanity.\n\nBetween 1690 and 1740 the conception of an indefinite progress of\nenlightenment had been making its way in French intellectual circles,\nand must often have been a topic of discussion in the salons, for\ninstance, of Madame de Lambert, Madame de Tencin, and Madame Dupin,\nwhere Fontenelle was one of the most conspicuous guests. To the same\ncircle belonged his friend the Abbe de Saint-Pierre, and it is in his\nwritings that we first find the theory widened in its compass to embrace\nprogress towards social perfection. [Footnote: For his life and works\nthe best book is J. Drouet's monograph, L'Abbe de Saint-Pierre: l'homme\net l'oeuvre (1912), but on some points Goumy's older study (1859) is\nstill worth consulting. I have used the edition of his works in 12\nvolumes published during his lifetime at Rotterdam, 1733-37.]\n\n1.\n\nHe was brought up on Cartesian principles, and he idealised Descartes\nsomewhat as Lucretius idealised Epicurus. But he had no aptitude for\nphilosophy, and he prized physical science only as far as it directly\nadministered to the happiness of men. He was a natural utilitarian, and\nperhaps no one was ever more consistent in making utility the criterion\nof all actions and theories. Applying this standard he obliterated from\nthe roll of great men most of those whom common opinion places among\nthe greatest. Alexander, Julius Caesar, Charlemagne receive short shrift\nfrom the Abbe de Saint-Pierre. [Footnote: Compare Voltaire, Lettres sur\nles Anglais, xii., where Newton is acclaimed as the greatest man who\never lived.] He was superficial in his knowledge both of history and of\nscience, and his conception of utility was narrow and a little vulgar.\nGreat theoretical discoverers like Newton and Leibnitz he sets in a\nlower rank than ingenious persons who used their scientific skill to\nfashion some small convenience of life. Monuments of art, like Notre\nDame, possessed little value in his eyes compared with a road, a bridge,\nor a canal.\n\nLike most of his distinguished contemporaries he was a Deist. On his\ndeathbed he received the usual rites of the Church in the presence of\nhis household, and then told the priest that he did not believe a word\nof all that. His real views are transparent in some of his works through\nthe conventional disguises in which prudent writers of the time were\nwont to wrap their assaults on orthodoxy. To attack Mohammedanism by\narguments which are equally applicable to Christianity was a device for\npropagating rationalism in days when it was dangerous to propagate\nit openly. This is what the Abbe did in his Discourse against\nMohammedanism. Again, in his Physical Explanation of an Apparition he\nremarks: \"To diminish our fanatical proclivities, it would be useful if\nthe Government were to establish an annual prize, to be awarded by the\nAcademy of Sciences, for the best explanation, by natural laws, of the\nextraordinary effects of imagination, of the prodigies related in Greek\nand Latin literature, and of the pretended miracles told by Protestants,\nSchismatics, and Mohammedans.\" The author carefully keeps on the right\nside of the fence. No Catholic authorities could take exception to\nthis. But no intelligent reader could fail to see that all miracles were\nattacked. The miracles accepted by the Protestants were also believed in\nby the Catholics.\n\nHe was one of the remarkable figures of his age. We might almost say\nthat he was a new type--a nineteenth century humanitarian and pacifist\nin an eighteenth century environment. He was a born reformer, and he\ndevoted his life to the construction of schemes for increasing human\nhappiness. He introduced the word bienfaisance into the currency of\nthe French language, and beneficence was in his eyes the sovran virtue.\nThere were few departments of public affairs in which he did not point\nout the deficiencies and devise ingenious plans for improvement. Most\nof his numerous writings are projets--schemes of reform in government,\neconomics, finance, education, all worked out in detail, and all aiming\nat the increase of pleasure and the diminution of pain. The Abbe's\nnimble intelligence had a weak side, which must have somewhat\ncompromised his influence. He was so confident in the reasonableness of\nhis projects that he always believed that if they were fairly considered\nthe ruling powers could not fail to adopt them in their own interests.\nIt is the nature of a reformer to be sanguine, but the optimism of\nSaint-Pierre touched naivete. Thousands might have agreed with his view\nthat the celibacy of the Catholic clergy was an unwholesome institution,\nbut when he drew up a proposal for its abolition and imagined that the\nPope, unable to resist his arguments, would immediately adopt it, they\nmight be excused for putting him down as a crank who could hardly be\ntaken seriously. The form in which he put forward his memorable scheme\nfor the abolition of war exhibits the same sanguine simplicity. All his\nplans, Rousseau observed, showed a clear vision of what their effects\nwould be, \"but he judged like a child of means to bring them about.\" But\nhis abilities were great, and his actual influence was considerable. It\nwould have been greater if he had possessed the gift of style.\n\n2.\n\nHe was not the first to plan a definite scheme for establishing a\nperpetual peace. Long ago Emeric Cruce had given to the world a proposal\nfor a universal league, including not only the Christian nations of\nEurope, but the Turks, Persians, and Tartars, which by means of a court\nof arbitration sitting at Venice should ensure the settlement of all\ndisputes by peaceful means. [Footnote: Le Nouveau Cynee (Paris, 1623).\nIt has recently been reprinted with an English translation by T. W.\nBalch, Philadelphia (1909).] The consequence of universal peace, he\nsaid, will be the arrival of \"that beautiful century which the ancient\ntheologians promise after there have rolled by six thousand years. For\nthey say that then the world will live happily and in repose. Now it\nhappens that that time has nearly expired, and even if it is not, it\ndepends only on the Princes to give beforehand this happiness to their\npeoples.\" Later in the century, others had ventilated similar projects\nin obscure publications, but the Abbe does not refer to any of his\npredecessors.\n\nHe was not blinded by the superficial brilliancy of the reign of Louis\nXIV. to the general misery which the ambitious war-policy of that sovran\nbrought both upon France and upon her enemies. His Annales politiques\nare a useful correction to the Siecle de Louis Quatorze. It was in the\ncourse of the great struggle of the Spanish Succession that he\nturned his attention to war and came to the conclusion that it is an\nunnecessary evil and even an absurdity. In 1712 he attended the congress\nat Utrecht in the capacity of secretary to Cardinal de Polignac, one\nof the French delegates. His experiences there confirmed his optimistic\nmind in the persuasion that perpetual peace was an aim which might\nreadily be realised; and in the following year he published the memoir\nwhich he had been preparing, in two volumes, to which he added a third\nfour years later.\n\nThough he appears not to have known the work of Cruce he did not claim\noriginality. He sheltered his proposal under an august name, entitling\nit Project of Henry the Great to render Peace Perpetual, explained\nby the Abbe de Saint-Pierre. The reference is to the \"great design\"\nascribed to Henry IV. by Sully, and aimed at the abasement of the power\nof Austria: a federation of the Christian States of Europe arranged\nin groups and under a sovran Diet, which would regulate international\naffairs and arbitrate in all quarrels. [Footnote: It is described\nin Sully's Memoires, Book XXX.] Saint-Pierre, ignoring the fact that\nSully's object was to eliminate a rival power, made it the text for\nhis own scheme of a perpetual alliance of all the sovrans of Europe\nto guarantee to one another the preservation of their states and to\nrenounce war as a means of settling their differences. He drew up the\nterms of such an alliance, and taking the European powers one by\none demonstrated that it was the plain interest of each to sign the\narticles. Once the articles were signed the golden age would begin.\n[Footnote: For Sully's grand Design compare the interesting article of\nSir Geoffrey Butler in the Edinburgh Review, October 1919.]\n\n It is not to our present purpose to comment on this plan which the\nauthor with his characteristic simplicity seriously pressed upon the\nattention of statesmen. It is easy to criticise it in the light of\nsubsequent history, and to see that, if the impossible had happened and\nthe experiment had been tried and succeeded, it might have caused more\nsuffering than all the wars from that day to this. For it was based on a\nperpetuation of the political status quo in Europe. It assumed that the\nexisting political distribution of power was perfectly satisfactory and\nconformable to the best interests of all the peoples concerned. It would\nhave hindered the Partition of Poland, but it would have maintained the\nAustrian oppression of Italians. The project also secured to the sovrans\nthe heritage of their authority and guarded against civil wars. This\nassumed that the various existing constitutions were fundamentally just.\nThe realisation of the scheme would have perpetuated all the evils of\nautocratic governments. Its author did not perceive that the radical\nevil in France was irresponsible power. It needed the reign of Louis XV.\nand the failure of attempts at reform under his successor to bring this\nhome. The Abbe even thought that an increase of the despotic authority\nof the government was desirable, provided this were accompanied by an\nincrease in the enlightenment and virtue of its ministers.\n\nIn 1729 he published an abridgment of his scheme, and here he looks\nbeyond its immediate results to its value for distant posterity. No one,\nhe says, can imagine or foresee the advantages which such an alliance\nof European states will yield to Europe five hundred years after its\nestablishment. Now we can see the first beginnings, but it is beyond the\npowers of the human mind to discern its infinite effects in the future.\nIt may produce results more precious than anything hitherto experienced\nby man. He supports his argument by observing that our primitive\nancestors could not foresee the improvements which the course of ages\nwould bring in their rudimentary arrangements for securing social order.\n\n3.\n\nIt is characteristic that the Abbe de Saint-Pierre's ideas about\nProgress were a by-product of his particular schemes. In 1773 he\npublished a Project to Perfect the Government of States, and here he\nsketched his view of the progressive course of civilisation. The old\nlegend of the golden age, when men were perfectly happy, succeeded by\nthe ages of silver, bronze, and iron, exactly reverses the truth of\nhistory. The age of iron came first, the infancy of society, when men\nwere poor and ignorant of the arts; it is the present condition of the\nsavages of Africa and America. The age of bronze ensued, in which there\nwas more security, better laws, and the invention of the most necessary\narts began. There followed the age of silver, and Europe has not yet\nemerged from it. Our reason has indeed reached the point of considering\nhow war may be abolished, and is thus approaching the golden age of the\nfuture; but the art of government and the general regulation of society,\nnotwithstanding all the improvements of the past, is still in its\ninfancy. Yet all that is needed is a short series of wise reigns in our\nEuropean states to reach the age of gold or, in other words, a paradise\non earth.\n\nA few wise reigns. The Abbe shared the illusion of many that government\nis omnipotent and can bestow happiness on men. The imperfections\nof governments were, he was convinced, chiefly due to the fact that\nhitherto the ablest intellects had not been dedicated to the study of\nthe science of governing. The most essential part of his project was the\nformation of a Political Academy which should do for politics what the\nAcademy of Sciences did for the study of nature, and should act as\nan advisory body to ministers of state on all questions of the public\nwelfare. If this proposal and some others were adopted, he believed that\nthe golden age would not long be delayed. These observations--hardly\nmore than obiter dicta--show that Saint-Pierre's general view of the\nworld was moulded by a conception of civilisation progressing towards a\ngoal of human happiness. In 1737 he published a special work to\nexplain this conception: the Observations on the Continuous Progress of\nUniversal Reason.\n\nHe recurs to the comparison of the life of collective humanity to that\nof an individual, and, like Fontenelle and Terrasson, accentuates the\npoint where the analogy fails. We may regard our race as composed of all\nthe nations that have been and will be--and assign to it different ages.\nFor instance, when the race is ten thousand years old a century will be\nwhat a single year is in the life of a centenarian. But there is this\nprodigious difference. The mortal man grows old and loses his reason and\nhappiness through the enfeeblement of his bodily machine; whereas the\nhuman race, by the perpetual and infinite succession of generations,\nwill find itself at the end of ten thousand years more capable of\ngrowing in wisdom and happiness than it was at the end of four thousand.\n\nAt present the race is apparently not more than seven or eight thousand\nyears old, and is only \"in the infancy of human reason,\" compared with\nwhat it will be five or six thousand years hence. And when that stage is\nreached, it will only have entered on what we may call its first youth,\nwhen we consider what it will be when it is a hundred thousand years\nolder still, continually growing in reason and wisdom.\n\nHere we have for the first time, expressed in definite terms, the vista\nof an immensely long progressive life in front of humanity. Civilisation\nis only in its infancy. Bacon, like Pascal, had conceived it to be in\nits old age. Fontenelle and Perrault seem to have regarded it as in its\nvirility; they set no term to its duration, but they did not dwell on\nfuture prospects. The Abbe was the first to fix his eye on the remote\ndestinies of the race and name immense periods of time. It did not occur\nto him to consider that our destinies are bound up with those of the\nsolar system, and that it is useless to operate with millennial periods\nof progress unless you are assured of a corresponding stability in the\ncosmic environment.\n\nAs a test of the progress which reason has already made, Saint-Pierre\nasserts that a comparison of the best English and French works on morals\nand politics with the best works of Plato and Aristotle proves that the\nhuman race has made a sensible advance. But that advance would have been\ninfinitely greater were it not that three general obstacles retarded it\nand even, at some times and in some countries, caused a retrogression.\nThese obstacles were wars, superstition, and the Jealousy of rulers who\nfeared that progress in the science of politics would be dangerous to\nthemselves. In consequence of these impediments it was only in the time\nof Bodin and Bacon that the human race began to start anew from the\npoint which it had reached in the days of Plato and Aristotle.\n\nSince then the rate of progress has been accelerated, and this has been\ndue to several causes. The expansion of sea commerce has produced more\nwealth, and wealth means greater leisure, and more writers and readers.\nIn the second place, mathematics and physics are more studied in\ncolleges, and their tendency is to liberate us from subjection to the\nauthority of the ancients. Again, the foundation of scientific Academies\nhas given facilities both for communicating and for correcting new\ndiscoveries; the art of printing provides a means for diffusing them;\nand, finally, the habit of writing in the vulgar tongue makes them\naccessible. The author might also have referred to the modern efforts to\npopularise science, in which his friend Fontenelle had been one of the\nleaders.\n\nHe proceeds, in this connection, to lay down a rather doubtful\nprinciple, that in any two countries the difference in enlightenment\nbetween the lowest classes will correspond to the difference between the\nmost highly educated classes. At present, he says, Paris and London are\nthe places where human wisdom has reached the most advanced stage. It\nis certain that the ten best men of the highest class at Ispahan or\nConstantinople will be inferior in their knowledge of politics and\nethics to the ten most distinguished sages of Paris or London. And this\nwill be true in all classes. The thirty most intelligent children of the\nage of fourteen at Paris will be more enlightened than the thirty most\nintelligent children of the same age at Constantinople, and the same\nproportional difference will be true of the lowest classes of the two\ncities.\n\nBut while the progress of speculative reason has been rapid, practical\nreason--the distinction is the Abbe's--has made little advance. In point\nof morals and general happiness the world is apparently much the same\nas ever. Our mediocre savants know twenty times as much as Socrates and\nConfucius, but our most virtuous men are not more virtuous than they.\nThe growth of science has added much to the arts and conveniences of\nlife, and to the sum of pleasures, and will add more. The progress\nin physical science is part of the progress of the \"universal human\nreason,\" whose aim is the augmentation of our happiness. But there are\ntwo other sciences which are much more important for the promotion of\nhappiness--Ethics and Politics--and these, neglected by men of genius,\nhave made little way in the course of two thousand years. It is a\ngrave misfortune that Descartes and Newton did not devote themselves to\nperfecting these sciences, so incomparably more useful for mankind\nthan those in which they made their great discoveries. They fell into a\nprevailing error as to the comparative values of the various domains of\nknowledge, an error to which we must also ascribe the fact that while\nAcademies of Sciences and Belles-Lettres exist there are no such\ninstitutions for Politics or Ethics.\n\nBy these arguments he establishes to his own satisfaction that there\nare no irremovable obstacles to the Progress of the human race towards\nhappiness, no hindrances that could not be overcome if governments only\nsaw eye to eye with the Abbe de Saint-Pierre. Superstition is already\non the decline; there would be no more wars if his simple scheme for\npermanent peace were adopted. Let the State immediately found Political\nand Ethical Academies; let the ablest men consecrate their talents to\nthe science of government; and in a hundred years we shall make more\nprogress than we should make in two thousand at the rate we are moving.\nIf these things are done, human reason will have advanced so far in\ntwo or three millenniums that the wisest men of that age will be as\nfar superior to the wisest of to-day as these are to the wisest African\nsavages. This \"perpetual and unlimited augmentation of reason\" will one\nday produce an increase in human happiness which would astonish us more\nthan our own civilisation would astonish the Kaffirs.\n\n4.\n\nThe Abbe de Saint-Pierre was indeed terribly at ease in confronting the\ndeepest and most complex problems which challenge the intellect of man.\nHe had no notion of their depth and complexity, and he lightly essayed\nthem, treating human nature, as if it were an abstraction, by a method\nwhich he would doubtless have described as Cartesian. He was simply\noperating with the ideas which were all round him in a society\nsaturated with Cartesianism,--supremacy of human reason, progressive\nenlightenment, the value of this life for its own sake, and the standard\nof utility. Given these ideas and the particular bias of his own mind,\nit required no great ingenuity to advance from the thought of the\nprogress of science to the thought of progress in man's moral nature\nand his social conditions. The omnipotence of governments to mould the\ndestinies of peoples, the possibility of the creation of enlightened\ngovernments, and the indefinite progress of enlightenment--all articles\nof his belief--were the terms of an argument of the sorites form, which\nit was a simple matter to develop in his brief treatise.\n\nBut we must not do him injustice. He was a much more considerable\nthinker than posterity for a long time was willing to believe. It is\neasy to ridicule some of his projets, and dismiss him as a crank who was\nalso somewhat of a bore. The truth, however, is that many of his schemes\nwere sound and valuable. His economic ideas, which he thought out for\nhimself, were in advance of his time, and he has even been described by\na recent writer as \"un contemporain egare au xviii siecle.\" Some of\nhis financial proposals were put into practice by Turgot. But his\nsignificance in the development of the revolutionary ideas which were\nto gain control in the second half of the eighteenth century has\nhardly been appreciated yet, and it was imperfectly appreciated by his\ncontemporaries.\n\nIt is easy to see why. His theories are buried in his multitudinous\nprojets. If, instead of working out the details of endless particular\nreforms, he had built up general theories of government and society,\neconomics and education, they might have had no more intrinsic\nvalue, but he would have been recognised as the precursor of the\nEncyclopaedists.\n\nFor his principles are theirs. The omnipotence of government and laws to\nmould the morals of peoples; the subordination of all knowledge to the\ngoddess of utility; the deification of human reason; and the doctrine\nof Progress. His crude utilitarianism led him to depreciate the study of\nmathematical and physical sciences--notwithstanding his veneration for\nDescartes--as comparatively useless, and he despised the fine arts as\nwaste of time and toil which might be better spent. He had no\nknowledge of natural science and he had no artistic susceptibility. The\nphilosophers of the Encyclopaedia did not go so far, but they tended\nin this direction. They were cold and indifferent towards speculative\nscience, and they were inclined to set higher value on artisans than on\nartists.\n\nIn his religious ideas the Abbe differed from Voltaire and the later\nsocial philosophers in one important respect, but this very difference\nwas a consequence of his utilitarianism. Like them he was a Deist, as we\nsaw; he had imbibed the spirit of Bayle and the doctrine of the English\nrationalists, which were penetrating French society during the later\npart of his life. His God, however, was more than the creator and\norganiser of the Encyclopaedists, he was also the \"Dieu vengeur et\nremunerateur\" in whom Voltaire believed. But here his faith was larger\nthan Voltaire's. For while Voltaire referred the punishments and rewards\nto this life, the Abbe believed in the immortality of the soul,\nin heaven and hell. He acknowledged that immortality could not be\ndemonstrated, that it was only probable, but he clung to it firmly and\neven intolerantly. It is clear from his writings that his affection for\nthis doctrine was due to its utility, as an auxiliary to the magistrate\nand the tutor, and also to the consideration that Paradise would add to\nthe total of human happiness.\n\nBut though his religion had more articles, he was as determined a foe of\n\"superstition\" as Voltaire, Diderot, and the rest. He did not go so\nfar as they in aggressive rationalism--he belonged to an older\ngeneration--but his principles were the same.\n\nThe Abbe de Saint-Pierre thus represents the transition from the earlier\nCartesianism, which was occupied with purely intellectual problems, to\nthe later thought of the eighteenth century, which concentrated itself\non social problems. He anticipated the \"humanistic\" spirit of the\nEncyclopaedists, who were to make man, in a new sense, the centre of\nthe world. He originated, or at least was the first to proclaim, the new\ncreed of man's destinies, indefinite social progress.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII. NEW CONCEPTIONS OF HISTORY: MONTESQUIEU, VOLTAIRE, TURGOT\n\nThe theory of human Progress could not be durably established by\nabstract arguments, or on the slender foundations laid by the Abbe de\nSaint-Pierre. It must ultimately be judged by the evidence afforded\nby history, and it is not accidental that, contemporaneously with the\nadvent of this idea, the study of history underwent a revolution. If\nProgress was to be more than the sanguine dream of an optimist it must\nbe shown that man's career on earth had not been a chapter of accidents\nwhich might lead anywhere or nowhere, but is subject to discoverable\nlaws which have determined its general route, and will secure his\narrival at the desirable place. Hitherto a certain order and unity had\nbeen found in history by the Christian theory of providential design and\nfinal causes. New principles of order and unity were needed to replace\nthe principles which rationalism had discredited. Just as the advance of\nscience depended on the postulate that physical phenomena are subject\nto invariable laws, so if any conclusions were to be drawn from history\nsome similar postulate as to social phenomena was required.\n\nIt was thus in harmony with the general movement of thought that about\nthe middle of the eighteenth century new lines of investigation were\nopened leading to sociology, the history of civilisation, and the\nphilosophy of history. Montesquieu's De l'esprit des lois, which may\nclaim to be the parent work of modern social science, Voltaire's Essai\nsur les moeurs, and Turgot's plan of a Histoire universelle begin a new\nera in man's vision of the past.\n\n1.\n\nMontesquieu was not among the apostles of the idea of Progress. It\nnever secured any hold upon his mind. But he had grown up in the same\nintellectual climate in which that idea was produced; he had been\nnurtured both on the dissolving, dialectic of Bayle, and on the\nCartesian enunciation of natural law. And his work contributed to the\nservice, not of the doctrine of the past, but of the doctrine of the\nfuture.\n\nFor he attempted to extend the Cartesian theory to social facts. He laid\ndown that political, like physical, phenomena are subject to general\nlaws. He had already conceived this, his most striking and important\nidea, when he wrote the Considerations on the Greatness and Decadence of\nthe Romans (1734), in which he attempted to apply it:\n\nIt is not Fortune who governs the world, as we see from the history of\nthe Romans. There are general causes, moral or physical, which operate\nin every monarchy, raise it, maintain it, or overthrow it; all that\noccurs is subject to these causes; and if a particular cause, like the\naccidental result of a battle, has ruined a state, there was a general\ncause which made the downfall of this state ensue from a single battle.\nIn a word, the principal movement (l'allure principale) draws with it\nall the particular occurrences.\n\nBut if this excludes Fortune it also dispenses with Providence, design,\nand final causes; and one of the effects of the Considerations which\nMontesquieu cannot have overlooked was to discredit Bossuet's treatment\nof history.\n\nThe Esprit des lois appeared fourteen years later. Among books which\nhave exercised a considerable influence on thought few are more\ndisappointing to a modern reader. The author had not the gift of what\nmight be called logical architecture, and his work produces the effect\nof a collection of ideas which he was unable to co-ordinate in the\nclarity of a system. A new principle, the operation of general causes,\nis enthroned; but, beyond the obvious distinction of physical and moral,\nthey are not classified. We have no guarantee that the moral causes are\nfully enumerated, and those which are original are not distinguished\nfrom those which are derived. The general cause which Montesquieu\nimpresses most clearly on the reader's mind is that of physical\nenvironment--geography and climate.\n\nThe influence of climate on civilisation was not a new idea. In modern\ntimes, as we have seen, it was noticed by Bodin and recognised by\nFontenelle. The Abbe de Saint-Pierre applied it to explain the origin of\nthe Mohammedan religion, and the Abbe Du Bos in his Reflexions on Poetry\nand Painting maintained that climate helps to determine the epochs\nof art and science. Chardin in his Travels, a book which Montesquieu\nstudied, had also appreciated its importance. But Montesquieu drew\ngeneral attention to it, and since he wrote, geographical conditions\nhave been recognised by all inquirers as an influential factor in the\ndevelopment of human societies. His own discussion of the question did\nnot result in any useful conclusions. He did not determine the limits of\nthe action of physical conditions, and a reader hardly knows whether to\nregard them as fundamental or accessory, as determining the course of\ncivilisation or only perturbing it. \"Several things govern men,\" he\nsays, \"climate, religion, laws, precepts of government, historical\nexamples, morals, and manners, whence is formed as their result a\ngeneral mind (esprit general).\" This co-ordination of climate with\nproducts of social life is characteristic of his unsystematic thought.\nBut the remark which the author went on to make, that there is always\na correlation between the laws of a people and its esprit general, was\nimportant. It pointed to the theory that all the products of social life\nare closely interrelated.\n\nIn Montesquieu's time people were under the illusion that legislation\nhas an almost unlimited power to modify social conditions. We have seen\nthis in the case of Saint-Pierre. Montesquieu's conception of general\nlaws should have been an antidote to this belief. It had however less\neffect on his contemporaries than we might have expected, and they\nfound more to their purpose in what he said of the influence of laws on\nmanners. There may be something in Comte's suggestion that he could not\ngive his conception any real consistency or vigour, just because he\nwas himself unconsciously under the influence of excessive faith in the\neffects of legislative action.\n\nA fundamental defect in Montesquieu's treatment of social phenomena is\nthat he abstracted them from their relations in time. It was his merit\nto attempt to explain the correlation of laws and institutions with\nhistorical circumstances, but he did not distinguish or connect stages\nof civilisation. He was inclined to confound, as Sorel has observed,\nall periods and constitutions. Whatever be the value of the idea of\nProgress, we may agree with Comte that, if Montesquieu had grasped\nit, he would have produced a more striking work. His book announces a\nrevolution in the study of political science, but in many ways belongs\nitself to the pre-Montesquieu era.\n\n2.\n\nIn the same years in which Montesquieu was busy on the composition of\nthe Esprit des lois, Voltaire was writing his Age of Louis XIV. and his\nEssay on the Manners and Mind of Nations, and on the Principal Facts of\nHistory from Charlemagne to the Death of Louis XIII. The former work,\nwhich everybody reads still, appeared in 1751. Parts of the Essay, which\nhas long since fallen into neglect, were published in the Mercure de\nFrance between 1745 and 1751; it was issued complete in 1756, along with\nthe Age of Louis XIV., which was its continuation. If we add the Precis\nof the Reign of Louis XV. (1769), and observe that the Introduction and\nfirst fourteen chapters of the Essay sketch the history of the world\nbefore Charlemagne, and that China, India, and America are included\nin the survey, Voltaire's work amounts to a complete survey of the\ncivilisation of the world from the earliest times to his own. If\nMontesquieu founded social science, Voltaire created the history of\ncivilisation, and the Essay, for all its limitations, stands out as one\nof the considerable books of the century.\n\nIn his Age of Louis XIV. he announced that his object was \"to paint not\nthe actions of a single man, but the mind of men (l'esprit des hommes)\nin the most enlightened age that had ever been,\" and that \"the progress\nof the arts and sciences\" was an essential part of his subject. In\nthe same way he proposed in the Essay to trace \"l'histoire de l'esprit\nhumain,\" not the details of facts, and to show by what steps man\nadvanced \"from the barbarous rusticity\" of the times of Charlemagne and\nhis successors \"to the politeness of our own.\" To do this, he said, was\nreally to write the history of opinion, for all the great successive\nsocial and political changes which have transformed the world were due\nto changes of opinion. Prejudice succeeded prejudice, error followed\nerror; \"at last, with time men came to correct their ideas and learn to\nthink.\"\n\nThe motif of the book is, briefly, that wars and religions have been\nthe great obstacles to the progress of humanity, and that if they were\nabolished, with the prejudices which engender them, the world would\nrapidly improve.\n\n\"We may believe,\" he says, \"that reason and industry will always\nprogress more and more; that the useful arts will be improved; that\nof the evils which have afflicted men, prejudices, which are not their\nleast scourge, will gradually disappear among all those who govern\nnations, and that philosophy, universally diffused, will give some\nconsolation to human nature for the calamities which it will experience\nin all ages.\"\n\nThis indeed is not the tone of the Abbe de Saint-Pierre. Voltaire's\noptimism was always tempered with cynicism. But the idea of Progress\nis there, though moderately conceived. And it is based on the same\nprinciple--universal reason implanted in man, which \"subsists in spite\nof all the passions which make war on it, in spite of all the tyrants\nwho would drown it in blood, in spite of the imposters who would\nannihilate it by superstition.\" And this was certainly his considered\nview. His common sense prevented him from indulging in Utopian\nspeculations about the future; and his cynicism constantly led him to\nuse the language of a pessimist. But at an early stage of his career he\nhad taken up arms for human nature against that \"sublime misanthrope\"\nPascal, who \"writes against human nature almost as he wrote against\nthe Jesuits\"; and he returned to the attack at the end of his life. Now\nPascal's Pensees enshrined a theory of life--the doctrine of original\nsin, the idea that the object of life is to prepare for death--which was\nsternly opposed to the spirit of Progress. Voltaire instinctively felt\nthat this was an enemy that had to be dealt with. In a lighter vein he\nhad maintained in a well-known poem, Le Mondain, [Footnote: 1756.] the\nvalue of civilisation and all its effects, including luxury, against\nthose who regretted the simplicity of ancient times, the golden age of\nSaturn.\n\n  O le bon temps que ce siecle de fer!\n\n\nLife in Paris, London, or Rome to-day is infinitely preferable to life\nin the garden of Eden.\n\n  D'un bon vin frais ou la mousse ou la seve\n   Ne gratta point le triste gosier d'Eve.\n   La soie et l'or ne brillaient point chez eux.\n   Admirez-vous pour cela nos aieux?\n   Il leur manquait l'industrie et l'aisance:\n   Est-ce vertu? c'etait pure ignorance.\n\n\nTo return to the Essay, it flung down the gage of battle to that\nconception of the history of the world which had been brilliantly\nrepresented by Bossuet's Discours sur l'histoire universelle. This work\nwas constantly in Voltaire's mind. He pointed out that it had no claim\nto be universal; it related only to four or five peoples, and especially\nthe little Jewish nation which \"was unknown to the rest of the world or\njustly despised,\" but which Bossuet made the centre of interest, as\nif the final cause of all the great empires of antiquity lay in their\nrelations to the Jews. He had Bossuet in mind when he said \"we will\nspeak of the Jews as we would speak of Scythians or Greeks, weighing\nprobabilities and discussing facts.\" In his new perspective the\nsignificance of Hebrew history is for the first time reduced to moderate\nlimits.\n\nBut it was not only in this particular, though central, point that\nVoltaire challenged Bossuet's view. He eliminated final causes\naltogether, and Providence plays no part on his historical stage. Here\nhis work reinforced the teaching of Montesquieu. Otherwise Montesquieu\nand Voltaire entirely differed in their methods. Voltaire concerned\nhimself only with the causal enchainment of events and the immediate\nmotives of men. His interpretation of history was confined to the\ndiscovery of particular causes; he did not consider the operation of\nthose larger general causes which Montesquieu investigated. Montesquieu\nsought to show that the vicissitudes of societies were subject to law;\nVoltaire believed that events were determined by chance where they\nwere not consciously guided by human reason. The element of chance is\nconspicuous even in legislation: \"almost all laws have been instituted\nto meet passing needs, like remedies applied fortuitously, which have\ncured one patient and kill others.\"\n\nOn Voltaire's theory, the development of humanity might at any moment\nhave been diverted into a different course; but whatever course it\ntook the nature of human reason would have ensured a progress in\ncivilisation. Yet the reader of the Essay and Louis XIV. might well\nhave come away with a feeling that the security of Progress is frail\nand precarious. If fortune has governed events, if the rise and fall\nof empires, the succession of religions, the revolutions of states, and\nmost of the great crises of history were decided by accidents, is there\nany cogent ground for believing that human reason, the principle to\nwhich Voltaire attributes the advance of civilisation, will prevail in\nthe long run? Civilisation has been organised here and there, now and\nthen, up to a certain point; there have been eras of rapid progress,\nbut how can we be sure that these are not episodes, themselves also\nfortuitous? For growth has been followed by decay, progress by regress;\ncan it be said that history, authorises the conclusion that reason will\never gain such an ascendancy that the play of chance will no longer\nbe able to thwart her will? Is such a conclusion more than a hope,\nunsanctioned by the data of past experience, merely one of the\ncharacteristics of the age of illumination?\n\nVoltaire and Montesquieu thus raised fundamental questions of great\nmoment for the doctrine of Progress, questions which belong to what\nwas soon to be known as the Philosophy of History, a name invented by\nVoltaire, though hardly meant by him in the sense which it afterwards\nassumed.\n\n3.\n\nSix years before Voltaire's Essay was published in its complete form a\nyoung man was planning a work on the same subject. Turgot is honourably\nremembered as an economist and administrator, but if he had ever written\nthe Discourses on Universal History which he designed at the age\nof twenty-three his position in historical literature might have\novershadowed his other claims to be remembered. We possess a partial\nsketch of its plan, which is supplemented by two lectures he delivered\nat the Sorbonne in 1750; so that we know his general conceptions.\n\nHe had assimilated the ideas of the Esprit des lois, and it is probable\nthat he had read the parts of Voltaire's work which had appeared in\na periodical. His work, like Voltaire's, was to be a challenge to\nBossuet's view of history; his purpose was to trace the fortunes of the\nrace in the light of the idea of Progress. He occasionally refers to\nProvidence but this is no more than a prudent lip-service. Providence\nhas no functions in his scheme. The part which it played in Bossuet is\nusurped by those general causes which he had learned from Montesquieu.\nBut his systematic mind would have organised and classified the ideas\nwhich Montesquieu left somewhat confused. He criticised the inductions\ndrawn in the Esprit des lois concerning the influence of climate as\nhasty and exaggerated; and he pointed out that the physical causes can\nonly produce their effects by acting on \"the hidden principles which\ncontribute to form our mind and character.\" It follows that the\npsychical or moral causes are the first element to consider, and it is\na fault of method to try to evaluate physical causes till we have\nexhausted the moral, and are certain that the phenomena cannot be\nexplained by these alone. In other words, the study of the development\nof societies must be based on psychology; and for Turgot, as for all his\nprogressive contemporaries, psychology meant the philosophy of Locke.\n\nGeneral necessary causes, therefore, which we should rather call\nconditions, have determined the course of history--the nature of man,\nhis passions, and his reason, in the first place; and in the second, his\nenvironment,--geography and climate. But its course is a strict sequence\nof particular causes and effects, \"which bind the state of the world (at\na given moment) to all those which have preceded it.\" Turgot does not\ndiscuss the question of free-will, but his causal continuity does not\nexclude \"the free action of great men.\" He conceives universal history\nas the progress of the human race advancing as an immense whole\nsteadily, though slowly, through alternating periods of calm and\ndisturbance towards greater perfection. The various units of the entire\nmass do not move with equal steps, because nature is not impartial with\nher gifts. Some men have talents denied to others, and the gifts of\nnature are sometimes developed by circumstances, sometimes left buried\nin obscurity. The inequalities in the march of nations are due to the\ninfinite variety of circumstances; and these inequalities may be taken\nto prove that the world had a beginning, for in an eternal duration they\nwould have disappeared.\n\nBut the development of human societies has not been guided by human\nreason. Men have not consciously made general happiness the end of their\nactions. They have been conducted by passion and ambition and have\nnever known to what goal they were moving. For if reason had presided,\nprogress would soon have been arrested. To avoid war peoples would have\nremained in isolation, and the race would have lived divided for ever\ninto a multitude of isolated groups, speaking different tongues. All\nthese groups would have been limited in the range of their ideas,\nstationary in science, art, and government, and would never have risen\nabove mediocrity. The history of China is an example of the results of\nrestricted intercourse among peoples. Thus the unexpected conclusion\nemerges, that without unreason and injustice there would have been no\nprogress.\n\nIt is hardly necessary to observe that this argument is untenable.\nThe hypothesis assumes that reason is in control among the primitive\npeoples, and at the same time supposes that its power would completely\ndisappear if they attempted to engage in peaceful intercourse. But\nthough Turgot has put his point in an unconvincing form, his purpose was\nto show that as a matter of fact \"the tumultuous and dangerous passions\"\nhave been driving-forces which have moved the world in a desirable\ndirection till the time should come for reason to take the helm.\n\nThus, while Turgot might have subscribed to Voltaire's assertion that\nhistory is largely \"un ramas de crimes, de folies, et de malheurs,\" his\nview of the significance of man's sufferings is different and almost\napproaches the facile optimism of Pope--\"whatever is, is right.\" He\nregards all the race's actual experiences as the indispensable mechanism\nof Progress, and does not regret its mistakes and calamities. Many\nchanges and revolutions, he observes, may seem to have had most\nmischievous effects; yet every change has brought some advantage, for\nit has been a new experience and therefore has been instructive.\nMan advances by committing errors. The history of science shows (as\nFontenelle had pointed out) that truth is reached over the ruins of\nfalse hypotheses.\n\nThe difficulty presented by periods of decadence and barbarism\nsucceeding epochs of enlightenment is met by the assertion that in\nsuch dark times the world has not stood still; there has really been a\nprogression which, though relatively inconspicuous, is not unimportant.\nIn the Middle Ages, which are the prominent case, there were\nimprovements in mechanical arts, in commerce, in some of the habits of\ncivil life, all of which helped to prepare the way for happier times.\nHere Turgot's view of history is sharply opposed to Voltaire's. He\nconsiders Christianity to have been a powerful agent of civilisation,\nnot a hinderer or an enemy. Had he executed his design, his work might\nwell have furnished a notable makeweight to the view held by Voltaire,\nand afterwards more judicially developed by Gibbon, that \"the triumph of\nbarbarism and religion\" was a calamity for the world.\n\nTurgot also propounded two laws of development. He observed that when a\npeople is progressing, every step it takes causes an acceleration in the\nrate of progress. And he anticipated Comte's famous \"law\" of the three\nstages of intellectual evolution, though without giving it the extensive\nand fundamental significance which Comte claimed for it. \"Before man\nunderstood the causal connection of physical phenomena, nothing was\nso natural as to suppose they were produced by intelligent beings,\ninvisible and resembling ourselves; for what else would they have\nresembled?\" That is Comte's theological stage. \"When philosophers\nrecognised the absurdity of the fables about the gods, but had not yet\ngained an insight into natural history, they thought to explain the\ncauses of phenomena by abstract expressions such as essences and\nfaculties.\" That is the metaphysical stage. \"It was only at a later\nperiod, that by observing the reciprocal mechanical action of bodies\nhypotheses were formed which could be developed by mathematics and\nverified by experience.\" There is the positive stage. The observation\nassuredly does not possess the far-reaching importance which Comte\nattached to it; but whatever value it has, Turgot deserves the credit of\nhaving been the first to state it.\n\nThe notes which Turgot made for his plan permit us to conjecture that\nhis Universal History would have been a greater and more profound work\nthan the Essay of Voltaire. It would have embodied in a digested form\nthe ideas of Montesquieu to which Voltaire paid little attention, and\nthe author would have elaborated the intimate connection and mutual\ninteraction among all social phenomena--government and morals, religion,\nscience, and arts. While his general thesis coincided with that\nof Voltaire--the gradual advance of humanity towards a state of\nenlightenment and reasonableness,--he made the idea of Progress more\nvital; for him it was an organising conception, just as the idea of\nProvidence was for St. Augustine and Bossuet an organising conception,\nwhich gave history its unity and meaning. The view that man has\nthroughout been blindly moving in the right direction is the counterpart\nof what Bossuet represented as a divine plan wrought out by the actions\nof men who are ignorant of it, and is sharply opposed to the views, of\nVoltaire and the other philosophers of the day who ascribed Progress\nexclusively to human reason consciously striving against ignorance and\npassion.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII. THE ENCYCLOPAEDISTS AND ECONOMISTS\n\n1.\n\nThe intellectual movement which prepared French opinion for the\nRevolution and supplied the principles for reconstituting society may\nbe described as humanistic in the sense that man was the centre of\nspeculative interest.\n\n\"One consideration especially that we ought never to lose from sight,\"\nsays Diderot, \"is that, if we ever banish a man, or the thinking and\ncontemplative being, from above the surface of the earth, this pathetic\nand sublime spectacle of nature becomes no more than a scene of\nmelancholy and silence... It is the presence of man that gives its\ninterest to the existence of other beings... Why should we not make him\na common centre?... Man is the single term from which we ought to set\nout.\" [Footnote: The passage from Diderot's article Encyclopedie is\ngiven as translated by Morley, Diderot, i, 145.] Hence psychology,\nmorals, the structure of society, were the subjects which riveted\nattention instead of the larger supra-human problems which had occupied\nDescartes, Malebranche, and Leibnitz. It mattered little whether the\nuniverse was the best that could be constructed; what mattered was the\nrelation of man's own little world to his will and capacities.\n\nPhysical science was important only in so far as it could help social\nscience and minister to the needs of man. The closest analogy to this\ndevelopment of thought is not offered by the Renaissance, to which the\ndescription HUMANISTIC has been conventionally appropriated, but rather\nby the age of illumination in Greece in the latter half of the fifth\ncentury B.C., represented by Protagoras, Socrates, and others who turned\nfrom the ultimate problems of the cosmos, hitherto the main study of\nphilosophers, to man, his nature and his works.\n\nIn this revised form of \"anthropo-centrism\" we see how the general\nmovement of thought has instinctively adapted itself to the astronomical\nrevolution. On the Ptolemaic system it was not incongruous or absurd\nthat man, lord of the central domain in the universe, should regard\nhimself as the most important cosmic creature. This is the view,\nimplicit in the Christian scheme, which had been constructed on the old\nerroneous cosmology. When the true place of the earth was shown and\nman found himself in a tiny planet attached to one of innumerable solar\nworlds, his cosmic importance could no longer be maintained. He was\nreduced to the condition of an insect creeping on a \"tas de boue,\" which\nVoltaire so vividly illustrated in Micromegas. But man is resourceful;\n[words in Greek]. Displaced, along with his home, from the centre of\nthings, he discovers a new means of restoring his self-importance;\nhe interprets his humiliation as a deliverance. Finding himself in an\ninsignificant island floating in the immensity of space, he decides that\nhe is at last master of his own destinies; he can fling away the old\nequipment of final causes, original sin, and the rest; he can construct\nhis own chart and, bound by no cosmic scheme, he need take the universe\ninto account only in so far as he judges it to be to his own profit. Or,\nif he is a philosopher, he may say that, after all, the universe for\nhim is built out of his own sensations, and that by virtue of this\nrelativity \"anthropo-centrism\" is restored in a new and more effective\nform.\n\nBuilt out of his own sensations: for the philosophy of Locke was now\ntriumphant in France. I have used the term Cartesianism to designate,\nnot the metaphysical doctrines of Descartes (innate ideas, two\nsubstances, and the rest), but the great principles which survived the\npassing of his metaphysical system--the supremacy of reason, and the\nimmutability of natural laws, not subject to providential interventions.\nThese principles still controlled thought, but the particular views\nof Descartes on mental phenomena were superseded in France by the\npsychology of Locke, whose influence was established by Voltaire and\nCondillac. The doctrine that all our ideas are derived from the senses\nlay at the root of the whole theory of man and society, in the light of\nwhich the revolutionary thinkers, Diderot, Helvetius, and their fellows,\ncriticised the existing order and exposed the reigning prejudices. This\nsensationalism (which went beyond what Locke himself had really meant)\ninvolved the strict relativity of knowledge and led at once to the old\npragmatic doctrine of Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things.\nAnd the spirit of the French philosophers of the eighteenth century was\ndistinctly pragmatic. The advantage of man was their principle, and the\nvalue of speculation was judged by its definite service to humanity.\n\"The value and rights of truth are founded on its utility,\" which is\n\"the unique measure of man's judgements,\" one thinker asserts; another\ndeclares that \"the useful circumscribes everything,\" l'utile circonscrit\ntout; another lays down that \"to be virtuous is to be useful; to be\nvicious is to be useless or harmful; that is the sum of morality.\"\nHelvetius, anticipating Bentham, works out the theory that utility is\nthe only possible basis of ethics. Bacon, the utilitarian, was\nextolled like Locke. [Footnote: The passages quoted on utility are\nfrom d'Holbach, Systems de la nature, i. c. 12, p. 224; c. 15, p. 312;\nDiderot, De I'interpretation de la nature in OEuvres, ii. p. 13; Raynal,\nHistoire des deux Indes, vii. p. 416. The effectiveness of the teaching\nmay be illustrated from the Essay on Man, by Antoine Rivarol, whom Burke\ncalled the Tacitus of the Revolution. \"The virtues are only virtues\nbecause they are useful to the human race.\" OEuvres choisis (ed. de\nLescure), i. p. 211.] As, a hundred years before, his influence had\ninspired the foundation of the Royal Society, so now his name\nwas invoked by the founders of the Encyclopaedia. [Footnote: See\nd'Alembert's tribute to him in the Discours preliminaire.]\n\nBeneath all philosophical speculation there is an undercurrent of\nemotion, and in the French philosophers of the eighteenth century this\nemotional force was strong and even violent. They aimed at practical\nresults. Their work was a calculated campaign to transform the\nprinciples and the spirit of governments and to destroy sacerdotalism.\nThe problem for the human race being to reach a state of felicity by its\nown powers, these thinkers believed that it was soluble by the gradual\ntriumph of reason over prejudice and knowledge over ignorance. Violent\nrevolution was far from their thoughts; by the diffusion of knowledge\nthey hoped to create a public opinion which would compel governments to\nchange the tenor of their laws and administration and make the happiness\nof the people their guiding principle. The optimistic confidence that\nman is perfectible, which means capable of indefinite improvement,\ninspired the movement as a whole, however greatly particular thinkers\nmight differ in their views.\n\nBelief in Progress was their sustaining faith, although, occupied by\nthe immediate problems of amelioration, they left it rather vague and\nill-defined. The word itself is seldom pronounced in their writings. The\nidea is treated as subordinate to the other ideas in the midst of which\nit had grown up: Reason, Nature, Humanity, Illumination (lumieres). It\nhas not yet entered upon an independent life of its own and received a\ndistinct label, though it is already a vital force.\n\nIn reviewing the influences which were forming a new public opinion\nduring the forty years before the Revolution, it is convenient for the\npresent purpose to group together the thinkers (including Voltaire)\nassociated with the Encyclopaedia, who represented a critical and\nconsciously aggressive force against traditional theories and existing\ninstitutions. The constructive thinker Rousseau was not less\naggressive, but he stands apart and opposed, by his hostility to modern\ncivilisation. Thirdly, we must distinguish the school of Economists,\nalso reformers and optimists, but of more conservative temper than the\ntypical Encyclopaedists.\n\n2.\n\nThe Encyclopaedia (1751-1765) has rightly been pronounced the central\nwork of the rationalistic movement which made the France of 1789 so\ndifferent from the France of 1715. [Footnote: The general views which\ngoverned the work may be gathered from d'Alembert's introductory\ndiscourse and from Diderot's article Encyclopedie. An interesting sketch\nof the principal contributors will be found in Morley's Diderot, i.\nchap. v. Another modern study of the Encyclopaedic movement is the\nmonograph of L. Ducros, Les Encyclopidistes (1900). Helvetius has\nrecently been the subject of a study by Albert Keim (Helvetius, sa vie\net son oeuvre, 1907). Among other works which help the study of the\nspeculations of this age from various points of view may be mentioned:\nMarius Roustan, Les Philosophes et la societe francaise au xviii\nsiecle(1906); Espinas, La Philosophie sociale du xviii siecle et la\nRevolution (1898); Lichtenberger, Le Socialisme au xviii siecle(1895).\nI have not mentioned in the text Boullanger (1722-1758), who contributed\nto the Encyclopaedia the article on Political Economy (which has nothing\nto do with economics but treats of ancient theocracies); the emphasis\nlaid on his views on progress by Buchez (op. cit. i. III sqq.) is\nquite excessive.] It was the organised section of a vast propaganda,\nspeculative and practical, carried on by men of the most various\nviews, most of whom were associated directly with it. As has well been\nobserved, it did for the rationalism of the eighteenth century in France\nmuch what the Fortnightly Review, under the editorship of Mr. Morley\n(from 1868 to 1882) did for that of the nineteenth in England, as an\norgan for the penetrating criticism of traditional beliefs. If Diderot,\nwho directed the Encyclopaedia with the assistance of d'Alembert the\nmathematician, had lived a hundred years later he would probably have\nedited a journal.\n\nWe saw that the \"solidarity\" of the sciences was one of the conceptions\nassociated with the theory of intellectual progress, and that the\npopularisation of knowledge was another. Both these conceptions\ninspired the Encyclopaedia, which was to gather up and concentrate\nthe illumination of the modern age. It was to establish the lines of\ncommunication among all departments, \"to enclose in the unity of a\nsystem the infinitely various branches of knowledge.\" And it was to be a\nlibrary of popular instruction. But it was also intended to be an organ\nof propaganda. In the history of the intellectual revolution it is\nin some ways the successor of the Dictionary of Bayle, which,\ntwo generations before, collected the material of war to demolish\ntraditional doctrines. The Encyclopaedia carried on the campaign against\nauthority and superstition by indirect methods, but it was the work of\nmen who were not sceptics like Bayle, but had ideals, positive purposes,\nand social hopes. They were not only confident in reason and in\nscience, but most of them had also a more or less definite belief in the\npossibility of an advance of humanity towards perfection.\n\nAs one of their own band afterwards remarked, they were less occupied in\nenlarging the bounds of knowledge than in spreading the light and making\nwar on prejudice. [Footnote: Condorcet, Esquisse, p. 206 (ed. 1822).]\nThe views of the individual contributors differed greatly, and they\ncannot be called a school, but they agreed so far in common tendencies\nthat they were able to form a co-operative alliance.\n\nThe propaganda of which the Encyclopaedia was the centre was reinforced\nby the independent publications of some of the leading men who\ncollaborated or were closely connected with their circle, notably those\nof Diderot himself, Baron d'Holbach, and Helvetius.\n\n3.\n\nThe optimism of the Encyclopaedists was really based on an intense\nconsciousness of the enlightenment of their own age. The progressiveness\nof knowledge was taken as axiomatic, but was there any guarantee that\nthe light, now confined to small circles, could ever enlighten the world\nand regenerate mankind? They found the guarantee they required, not in\nan induction from the past experience of the race, but in an a priori\ntheory: the indefinite malleability of human nature by education\nand institutions. This had been, as we saw, assumed by the Abbe de\nSaint-Pierre. It pervaded the speculation of the age, and was formally\ndeduced from the sensational psychology of Locke and Condillac. It was\ndeveloped, in an extreme form, in the work of Helvetius, De l'esprit\n(1758).\n\nIn this book, which was to exert a large influence in England, Helvetius\nsought, among other things, to show that the science of morals is\nequivalent to the science of legislation, and that in a well-organised\nsociety all men are capable of rising to the highest point of mental\ndevelopment. Intellectual and moral inequalities between man and man\narise entirely from differences in education and social circumstances.\nGenius itself is not a gift of nature; the man of genius is a product of\ncircumstances--social, not physical, for Helvetius rejects the\ninfluence of climate. It follows that if you change education and social\ninstitutions you can change the character of men.\n\nThe error of Helvetius in ignoring the irremovable physical differences\nbetween individuals, the varieties of cerebral organisation, was at once\npointed out by Diderot. This error, however, was not essential to the\ngeneral theory of the immeasurable power of social institutions over\nhuman character, and other thinkers did not fall into it. All alike,\nindeed, were blind to the factor of heredity. But the theory in its\ncollective application contains a truth which nineteenth century\ncritics, biassed by their studies in heredity, have been prone to\noverlook. The social inheritance of ideas and emotions to which\nthe individual is submitted from infancy is more important than the\ntendencies physically transmitted from parent to child. The power\nof education and government in moulding the members of a society\nhas recently been illustrated on a large scale in the psychological\ntransformation of the German people in the life of a generation.\n\nIt followed from the theory expounded by Helvetius that there is no\nimpassable barrier between the advanced and the stationary or retrograde\nraces of the earth. [Footnote: The most informing discussion of the\nrelations between the Advanced and Backward races is Bryce's Romanes\nLecture (1902).] \"True morality,\" Baron d'Holbach wrote, \"should be\nthe same for all the inhabitants of the globe. The savage man and\nthe civilised; the white man, the red man, the black man; Indian and\nEuropean, Chinaman and Frenchman, Negro and Lapp have the same nature.\nThe differences between them are only modifications of the common nature\nproduced by climate, government, education, opinions, and the various\ncauses which operate on them. Men differ only in the ideas they form\nof happiness and the means which they have imagined to obtain it.\" Here\nagain the eighteenth century theorists held a view which can no longer\nbe dismissed as absurd. Some are coming round to the opinion that\nenormous differences in capacity which seem fundamental are a result of\nthe differences in social inheritance, and that these again are due to\na long sequence of historical circumstances; and consequently that there\nis no people in the world doomed by nature to perpetual inferiority\nor irrevocably disqualified by race from playing a useful part in the\nfuture of civilisation.\n\n4.\n\nThis doctrine of the possibility of indefinitely moulding the characters\nof men by laws and institutions--whether combined or not with a belief\nin the natural equality of men's faculties--laid a foundation on which\nthe theory of the perfectibility of humanity could be raised. It marked,\ntherefore, an important stage in the development of the doctrine of\nProgress.\n\nIt gave, moreover, a new and larger content to that doctrine by its\napplicability, not only to the peoples which are at present in the van\nof civilisation, but also to those which have lagged far behind and may\nappear irreclaimably barbarous--thus potentially including all humanity\nin the prospect of the future. Turgot had already conceived \"the total\nmass of the human race moving always slowly forward\"; he had declared\nthat the human mind everywhere contains the germs of progress and\nthat the inequality of peoples is due to the infinite variety of their\ncircumstances. This enlarging conception was calculated to add strength\nto the idea of Progress, by raising it to a synthesis comprehending not\nmerely the western civilised nations but the whole human world.\n\nInterest in the remote peoples of the earth, in the unfamiliar\ncivilisations of the East, in the untutored races of America and Africa,\nwas vivid in France in the eighteenth century. Everyone knows how\nVoltaire and Montesquieu used Hurons or Persians to hold up the glass to\nWestern manners and morals, as Tacitus used the Germans to criticise the\nsociety of Rome. But very few ever look into the seven volumes of the\nAbbe Raynal's History of the Two Indies which appeared in 1772. It\nis however, one of the remarkable books of the century. Its immediate\npractical importance lay in the array of facts which it furnished to the\nfriends of humanity in the movement against negro slavery. But it was\nalso an effective attack on the Church and the sacerdotal system. The\nauthor's method was the same which his greater contemporary Gibbon\nemployed on a larger scale. A history of facts was a more formidable\nindictment than any declamatory attack.\n\nRaynal brought home to the conscience of Europeans the miseries\nwhich had befallen the natives of the New World through the Christian\nconquerors and their priests. He was not indeed an enthusiastic preacher\nof Progress. He is unable to decide between the comparative advantages\nof the savage state of nature and the most highly cultivated society.\nBut he observes that \"the human race is what we wish to make it,\" that\nthe felicity of man depends entirely on the improvement of legislation;\nand in the survey of the history of Europe to which the last Book of\nhis work is devoted, his view is generally optimistic. [Footnote:\ncp. Raynal, Histoire, vii. 214, 256. This book was first published\nanonymously; the author's name appeared in the edition of 1780.]\n\n5. Baron d'Holbach had a more powerful brain than Helvetius, but his\nwritings had probably less influence, though he was the spiritual father\nof two prominent Revolutionaries, Hebert and Chaumette. His System of\nNature (1770) develops a purely naturalistic theory of the universe, in\nwhich the prevalent Deism is rejected: there is no God; material Nature\nstands out alone, self-sufficing, dominis privata superbis. The book\nsuggests how the Lucretian theory of development might have led to the\nidea of Progress. But it sent a chilly shock to the hearts of many\nand probably convinced few. The effective part was the outspoken and\npassionate indictment of governments and religions as causes of most of\nthe miseries of mankind.\n\nIt is in other works, especially in his Social System, that his views\nof Progress are to be sought. Man is simply a part of nature; he has\nno privileged position, and he is born neither good nor bad. Erras, as\nSeneca said, si existumas vitia nobiscum esse: supervenerunt, ingesta\nsunt. [Footnote: Seneca, Ep. 124.] We are made good or bad by education,\npublic opinion, laws, government; and here the author points to the\nsignificance of the instinct of imitation as a social force, which a\nmodern writer, M. Tarde, has worked into a system.\n\nThe evils, which are due to the errors of tyranny and superstition, the\nforce of truth will gradually diminish if it cannot completely banish\nthem; for our governments and laws may be perfected by the progress\nof useful knowledge. But the process will be a long one: centuries of\ncontinuous mental effort in unravelling the causes of social ill-being\nand repeated experiments to determine the remedies (des experiences\nreiterees de la societe). In any case we cannot look forward to the\nattainment of an unchangeable or unqualified felicity. That is a mere\nchimera \"incompatible with the nature of a being whose feeble machine\nis subject to derangement and whose ardent imagination will not always\nsubmit to the guidance of reason. Sometimes to enjoy, sometimes to\nsuffer, is the lot of man; to enjoy more often than to suffer is what\nconstitutes well-being.\"\n\nD'Holbach was a strict determinist; he left no room for freewill in\nthe rigorous succession of cause and effect, and the pages in which he\ndrives home the theory of causal necessity are still worth reading. From\nhis naturalistic principles he inferred that the distinction between\nnature and art is not fundamental; civilisation is as rational as the\nsavage state. Here he was at one with Aristotle.\n\nAll the successive inventions of the human mind to change or perfect\nman's mode of existence and render it happier were only the necessary\nconsequence of his essence and that of the existences which act upon\nhim. All we do or think, all we are or shall be, is only an effect of\nwhat universal nature has made us. Art is only nature acting by the aid\nof the instruments which she has fashioned. [Footnote: The passages of\nd'Holbach specially referred to are: Systeme social, i. 1, p. 13; Syst.\nde la nature, i. 6, p. 88; Syst. soc. i. 15, p. 271; Syst. de la n. i.\n1, p. 3.]\n\nProgress, therefore, is natural and necessary, and to criticise or\ncondemn it by appealing to nature is only to divide the house of nature\nagainst itself.\n\nIf d'Holbach had pressed his logic further, he would have taken a more\nindulgent and calmer view of the past history of mankind. He would have\nacknowledged that institutions and opinions to which modern reason may\ngive short shrift were natural and useful in their day, and would have\nrecognised that at any stage of history the heritage of the past is no\nless necessary to progress than the solvent power of new ideas. Most\nthinkers of his time were inclined to judge the past career of humanity\nanachronistically. All the things that had been done or thought which\ncould not be justified in the new age of enlightenment, were regarded\nas gratuitous and inexcusable errors. The traditions, superstitions, and\ncustoms, the whole \"code of fraud and woe\" transmitted from the past,\nweighed then too heavily in France to allow the school of reform to\ndo impartial justice to their origins. They felt a sort of resentment\nagainst history. D'Alembert said that it would be well if history could\nbe destroyed; and the general tendency was to ignore the social memory\nand the common heritage of past experiences which mould a human\nsociety and make it something very different from a mere collection of\nindividuals.\n\nBelief in Progress, however, took no extravagant form. It did\nnot beguile d'Holbach or any other of the leading thinkers of the\nEncyclopaedia epoch into optimistic dreams of the future which might\nawait mankind. They had a much clearer conception of obstacles than the\ngood Abbe de Saint-Pierre. Helvetius agrees with d'Holbach that progress\nwill be slow, and Diderot is wavering and sceptical of the question of\nindefinite social improvement. [Footnote: De l'esprit, Disc. ii. cc. 24,\n25.]\n\n6.\n\nThe reformers of the Encyclopaedia group were not alone in disseminating\nthe idea of Progress. Another group of thinkers, who widely differed in\ntheir principles, though some of them had contributed articles to\nthe Encyclopaedia, [Footnote: Quesnay and Turgot, who, though not\nprofessedly a Physiocrat, held the same views as the sect.] also did\nmuch to make it a power. The rise of the special study of Economics\nwas one of the most significant facts in the general trend of thought\ntowards the analysis of civilisation. Economical students found that in\nseeking to discover a true theory of the production, distribution, and\nemployment of wealth, they could not avoid the consideration of the\nconstitution and purpose of society. The problems of production and\ndistribution could not be divorced from political theory: production\nraises the question of the functions of government and the limits of its\nintervention in trade and industry; distribution involve questions of\nproperty, justice, and equality. The employment of riches leads into the\ndomain of morals.\n\nThe French Economists or \"Physiocrats,\" as they were afterwards called,\nwho formed a definite school before 1760--Quesnay the master, Mirabeau,\nMercier de la Riviere, and the rest--envisaged their special subject\nfrom a wide philosophical point of view; their general economic theory\nwas equivalent to a theory of human society. They laid down the doctrine\nof a Natural Order in political communities, and from it they deduced\ntheir economic teaching.\n\nThey assumed, like the Encyclopaedists, that the end of society is the\nattainment of terrestrial happiness by its members, and that this is the\nsole purpose of government. The object of a treatise by Mercier de la\nRiviere [Footnote: L'ordre naturel et essentiel des societes politiqes,\n1767.] (a convenient exposition of the views of the sect) is, in his own\nwords, to discover the natural order for the government of men living in\norganised communities, which will assure to them temporal felicity: an\norder in which everything is well, necessarily well, and in which the\ninterests of all are so perfectly and intimately consolidated that all\nare happy, from the ruler to the least of his subjects.\n\nBut in what does this happiness consist? His answer is that \"humanly\nspeaking, the greatest happiness possible for us consists in the\ngreatest possible abundance of objects suitable to our enjoyment and in\nthe greatest liberty to profit by them.\" And liberty is necessary not\nonly to enjoy them but also to produce them in the greatest abundance,\nsince liberty stimulates human efforts. Another condition of abundance\nis the multiplication of the race; in fact, the happiness of men and\ntheir numbers are closely bound up together in the system of nature.\nFrom these axioms may be deduced the Natural Order of a human society,\nthe reciprocal duties and rights whose enforcement is required for the\ngreatest possible multiplication of products, in order to procure to the\nrace the greatest sum of happiness with the maximum population.\n\nNow, individual property is the indispensable condition for full\nenjoyment of the products of human labour; \"property is the measure\nof liberty, and liberty is the measure of property.\" Hence, to realise\ngeneral happiness it is only necessary to maintain property and\nconsequently liberty in all their natural extent. The fatal error which\nhas made history what it is has been the failure to recognise this\nsimple fact; for aggression and conquest, the causes of human miseries,\nviolate the law of property which is the foundation of happiness.\n\nThe practical inference was that the chief function of government was\nto protect property and that complete freedom should be left to private\nenterprise to exploit the resources of the earth. All would be well if\ntrade and industry were allowed to follow their natural tendencies. This\nis what was meant by Physiocracy, the supremacy of the Natural Order. If\nrulers observed the limits of their true functions, Mercier thought that\nthe moral effect would be immense. \"The public system of government\nis the true education of moral man. Regis ad exemplum totus componitur\norbis.\" [Footnote: The particulars of the Physiocratic doctrine as to\nthe relative values of agriculture and commerce which Adam Smith was\nsoon to criticise do not concern us; nor is it necessary to repeat the\nobvious criticisms on a theory which virtually reduced the science of\nsociety to a science of production and distribution.]\n\nWhile they advocated a thorough reform of the principles which ruled the\nfiscal policy of governments, the Economists were not idealists, like\nthe Encyclopaedic philosophers; they sowed no seeds of revolution. Their\nstarting-point was that which is, not that which ought to be. And, apart\nfrom their narrower point of view, they differed from the philosophers\nin two very important points. They did not believe that society was of\nhuman institution, and therefore they did not believe that there could\nbe any deductive science of society based simply on man's nature.\nMoreover, they held that inequality of condition was one of its\nimmutable features, immutable because it is a consequence of the\ninequality of physical powers.\n\nBut they believed in the future progress of society towards a state of\nhappiness through the increase of opulence which would itself depend on\nthe growth of justice and \"liberty\"; and they insisted on the importance\nof the increase and diffusion of knowledge. Their influence in promoting\na belief in Progress is vouched for by Condorcet, the friend and\nbiographer of Turgot. As Turgot stands apart from the Physiocrats\n(with whom indeed he did not identify himself) by his wider views on\ncivilisation, it might be suspected that it is of him that Condorcet was\nchiefly thinking. Yet we need not limit the scope of his statement\nwhen we remember that as a sect the Economists assumed as their first\nprinciple the eudaemonic value of civilisation, declared that temporal\nhappiness is attainable, and threw all their weight into the scales\nagainst the doctrine of Regress which had found a powerful advocate in\nRousseau.\n\n7.\n\nBy liberty the Economists meant economic liberty. Neither they nor the\nphilosophers nor Rousseau, the father of modern democracy, had any just\nconception of what political liberty means. They contributed much to its\nrealisation, but their own ideas of it were narrow and imperfect. They\nnever challenged the principle of a despotic government, they only\ncontended that the despotism must be enlightened. The paternal rule of\na Joseph or a Catherine, acting under the advice of philosophers, seemed\nto them the ideal solution of the problem of government; and when the\nprogressive and disinterested Turgot, whom they might regard as one of\nthemselves, was appointed financial minister on the accession of Louis\nXVI., it seemed that their ideal was about to be realised. His speedy\nfall dispelled their hopes, but did not teach them the secret of\nliberty. They had no quarrel with the principle of the censorship,\nthough they writhed under its tyranny; they did not want to abolish it.\nThey only complained that it was used against reason and light, that is\nagainst their own writings; and, if the Conseil d'Etat or the Parlement\nhad suppressed the works of their obscurantist opponents, they would\nhave congratulated themselves that the world was marching quickly\ntowards perfection. [Footnote: The principle that intolerance on the\npart of the wise and strong towards the ignorant and weak is a good\nthing is not alien to the spirit of the French philosophers, though I do\nnot think any of them expressly asserted it. In the following century\nit was formulated by Colins, a Belgian (author of two works on\nsocial science, 1857-60), who believed that an autocratic government\nsuppressing liberty of conscience is the most effective instrument of\nProgress. It is possible that democracy may yet try the experiment.]\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX. WAS CIVILISATION A MISTAKE? ROUSSEAU, CHASTELLUX. 1.\n\nThe optimistic theory of civilisation was not unchallenged by\nrationalists. In the same year (1750) in which Turgot traced an outline\nof historical Progress at the Sorbonne, Rousseau laid before the Academy\nof Dijon a theory of historical Regress. This Academy had offered a\nprize for the best essay on the question whether the revival of sciences\nand arts had contributed to the improvement of morals. The prize was\nawarded to Rousseau. Five years later the same learned body proposed\nanother subject for investigation, the origin of Inequality among men.\nRousseau again competed but failed to win the prize, though this second\nessay was a far more remarkable performance.\n\nThe view common to these two discourses, that social development has\nbeen a gigantic mistake, that the farther man has travelled from\na primitive simple state the more unhappy has his lot become, that\ncivilisation is radically vicious, was not original. Essentially the\nsame issue had been raised in England, though in a different form,\nby Mandeville's Fable of the Bees, the scandalous book which aimed at\nproving that it is not the virtues and amiable qualities of man that are\nthe cement of civilised society, but the vices of its members which\nare the support of all trades and employments. [Footnote: The expanded\nedition was published in 1723.] In these vices, he said, \"we must look\nfor the true origin of all arts and sciences\"; \"the moment evil ceases\nthe society must be spoiled, if not totally dissolved.\"\n\nThe significance of Mandeville's book lay in the challenge it flung to\nthe optimistic doctrines of Lord Shaftesbury, that human nature is good\nand all is for the best in this harmonious world. \"The ideas he had\nformed,\" wrote Mandeville, \"of the goodness and excellency of our nature\nwere as romantic and chimerical as they are beautiful and amiable;\nhe laboured hard to unite two contraries that can never be reconciled\ntogether, innocence of manners and worldly greatness.\"\n\nOf these two views Rousseau accepted one and rejected the other. He\nagreed with Shaftesbury as to the natural goodness of man; he agreed\nwith Mandeville that innocence of manners is incompatible with the\nconditions of a civilised society. He was an optimist in regard to human\nnature, a pessimist in regard to civilisation.\n\nIn his first Discourse he begins by appreciating the specious splendour\nof modern enlightenment, the voyages of man's intellect among the stars,\nand then goes on to assever that in the first place men have lost,\nthrough their civilisation, the original liberty for which they were\nborn, and that arts and science, flinging garlands of flowers on the\niron chains which bind them, make them love their slavery; and secondly\nthat there is a real depravity beneath the fair semblance and \"our souls\nare corrupted as our sciences and arts advance to perfection.\" Nor is\nthis only a modern phenomenon; \"the evils due to our vain curiosity are\nas old as the world.\" For it is a law of history that morals fall and\nrise in correspondence with the progress and decline of the arts and\nsciences as regularly as the tides answer to the phases of the moon.\nThis \"law\" is exemplified by the fortunes of Greece, Rome, and China, to\nwhose civilisations the author opposes the comparative happiness of\nthe ignorant Persians, Scythians, and ancient Germans. \"Luxury,\ndissoluteness, and slavery have been always the chastisement of the\nambitious efforts we have made to emerge from the happy ignorance\nin which the Eternal Wisdom had placed us.\" There is the theological\ndoctrine of the tree of Eden in a new shape.\n\nRousseau's attempt to show that the cultivation of science produces\nspecific moral evils is feeble, and has little ingenuity; it is a\ndeclamation rather than an argument; and in the end he makes concessions\nwhich undo the effect of his impeachment. The essay did not establish\neven a plausible case, but it was paradoxical and suggestive, and\nattracted more attention than Turgot's thoughtful discourse in the\nSorbonne. D'Alembert deemed it worthy of a courteous expression of\ndissent; [Footnote: In the Disc. Prel. to the Encyclopaedia.] and\nVoltaire satirised it in his Timon.\n\n2.\n\nIn the Discourse on Inequality Rousseau dealt more directly with the\neffect of civilisation on happiness. He proposed to explain how it came\nabout that right overcame the primitive reign of might, that the strong\nwere induced to serve the weak, and the people to purchase a fancied\ntranquillity at the price of a real felicity. So he stated his problem;\nand to solve it he had to consider the \"state of nature\" which Hobbes\nhad conceived as a state of war and Locke as a state of peace. Rousseau\nimagines our first savage ancestors living in isolation, wandering in\nthe forests, occasionally co-operating, and differing from the animals\nonly by the possession of a faculty for improving themselves (la faculte\nde se perfectionner). After a stage in which families lived alone in\na more or less settled condition, came the formation of groups of\nfamilies, living together in a definite territory, united by a common\nmode of life and sustenance, and by the common influence of climate, but\nwithout laws or government or any social organisation.\n\nIt is this state, which was reached only after a long period, not the\noriginal state of nature, that Rousseau considers to have been the\nhappiest period of the human race.\n\nThis period of the development of human faculties, holding a just mean\nbetween the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity\nof our self-love, must be the happiest and most durable epoch. The more\nwe reflect on it, the more we find that this state was the least exposed\nto revolutions and the best for man; and that he can have left it only\nthrough some fatal chance which, for the common advantage, should never\nhave occurred. The example of the savages who have almost all been found\nin this state seems to bear out the conclusion that humanity was made to\nremain in it for ever, that it was the true youth of the world, and that\nall further progresses have been so many steps, apparently towards the\nperfection of the individual, and really towards the decrepitude of the\nspecies.\n\nHe ascribes to metallurgy and agriculture the fatal resolution which\nbrought this Arcadian existence to an end. Agriculture entailed the\norigin of property in land. Moral and social inequality were introduced\nby the man who first enclosed a piece of land and said, This is mine,\nand found people simple enough to believe him. He was the founder of\ncivil society.\n\nThe general argument amounts to this: Man's faculty of improving himself\nis the source of his other faculties, including his sociability, and\nhas been fatal to his happiness. The circumstances of his primeval life\nfavoured the growth of this faculty, and in making man sociable they\nmade him wicked; they developed the reason of the individual and thereby\ncaused the species to deteriorate. If the process had stopped at\na certain point, all would have been well; but man's capacities,\nstimulated by fortuitous circumstances, urged him onward, and leaving\nbehind him the peaceful Arcadia where he should have remained safe and\ncontent, he set out on the fatal road which led to the calamities of\ncivilisation. We need not follow Rousseau in his description of those\ncalamities which he attributes to wealth and the artificial conditions\nof society. His indictment was too general and rhetorical to make much\nimpression. In truth, a more powerful and comprehensive case against\ncivilised society was drawn up about the same time, though with a very\ndifferent motive, by one whose thought represented all that was opposed\nto Rousseau's teaching. Burke's early work, A Vindication of Natural\nSociety, [Footnote: A.D. 1756.] was written to show that all the\nobjections which Deists like Bolingbroke urged against artificial\nreligion could be brought with greater force against artificial society,\nand he worked out in detail a historical picture of the evils of\ncivilisation which is far more telling than Rousseau's generalities.\n[Footnote: In his admirable edition of The Political Writings of\nJean-Jacques Rousseau (1915), p. 89, Vaughan suggests that in Rousseau's\nlater works we may possibly detect \"the first faint beginnings\" of\na belief in Progress, and attributes this to the influence of\nMontesquieu.]\n\n3.\n\nIf civilisation has been the curse of man, it might seem that the\nlogical course for Rousseau to recommend was its destruction. This was\nthe inference which Voltaire drew in Timon, to laugh the whole theory\nout of court. But Rousseau did not suggest a movement to destroy all\nthe libraries and all the works of art in the world, to put to death or\nsilence all the savants, to pull down the cities, and burn the ships.\nHe was not a mere dreamer, and his Arcadia was no more than a Utopian\nideal, by the light of which he conceived that the society of his\nown day might be corrected and transformed. He attached his hopes to\nequality, democracy, and a radical change in education.\n\nEquality: this revolutionary idea was of course quite compatible with\nthe theory of Progress, and was soon to be closely associated with\nit. But it is easy to understand that the two ideas should first have\nappeared in antagonism to each other. The advance of knowledge and\nthe increase of man's power over nature had virtually profited only a\nminority. When Fontenelle or Voltaire vaunted the illumination of their\nage and glorified the modern revolution in scientific thought, they took\naccount only of a small class of privileged people. Higher education,\nVoltaire observed, is not for cobblers or kitchenmaids; \"on n'a jamais\npretendu eclairer les cordonniers et les servantes.\" The theory of\nProgress had so far left the masses out of account. Rousseau contrasted\nthe splendour of the French court, the luxury of the opulent, the\nenlightenment of those who had the opportunity of education, with the\nhard lot of the ignorant mass of peasants, whose toil paid for the\nluxury of many of the idle enlightened people who amused themselves at\nParis. The horror of this contrast, which left Voltaire cold, was\nthe poignant motive which inspired Rousseau, a man of the people,\nin constructing his new doctrine. The existing inequality seemed an\ninjustice which rendered the self-complacency of the age revolting. If\nthis is the result of progressive civilisation, what is progress worth?\nThe next step is to declare that civilisation is the causa malorum and\nthat what is named progress is really regress. But Rousseau found a\nway of circumventing pessimism. He asked himself, cannot equality be\nrealised in an organised state, founded on natural right? The Social\nContract was his answer, and there we can see the living idea of\nequality detaching itself from the dead theory of degradation.\n[Footnote: The consistency of the Social Contract with the Discourse on\nInequality has been much debated. They deal with two distinct problems,\nand the Social Contract does not mark any change in the author's views.\nThough it was not published till 1762 he had been working at it since\n1753.]\n\nArcadianism, which was thus only a side-issue for Rousseau, was the\nextreme expression of tendencies which appear in the speculations of\nother thinkers of the day. Morelly and Mably argued in favour of a\nreversion to simpler forms of life. They contemplated the foundation\nof socialistic communities by reviving institutions and practices which\nbelonged to a past period of social evolution. Mably, inspired by Plato,\nthought it possible by legislation to construct a state of antique\npattern. [Footnote: For Mably's political doctrines see Guerrier's\nmonograph, L'Abbe de Mably (1886), where it is shown that among \"the\ntheories which determined in advance the course of the events of 1789\"\nthe Abbe's played a role which has not been duly recognised.] They\nascribed evils of civilisation to inequality arising from the existence\nof private property, but Morelly rejected the view of the \"bold sophist\"\nRousseau that science and art were to blame. He thought that aided\nby science and learning man might reach a state based on communism,\nresembling the state of nature but more perfect, and he planned an ideal\nconstitution in his romance of the Floating Islands. [Footnote: Naufrage\ndes isles flottantes ou Basiliade du celebre Pilpai (1753). It begins:\n\"je chante le regne aimable de la Verite et de la Nature.\" Morelly's\nother work, Code de la Nature, appeared in 1755.] Different as\nthese views were, they represent the idea of regress; they imply\na condemnation of the tendencies of actual social development and\nrecommend a return to simpler and more primitive conditions.\n\nEven Diderot, though he had little sympathy with Utopian speculations,\nwas attracted by the idea of the simplification of society, and met\nRousseau so far as to declare that the happiest state was a mean between\nsavage and civilised life.\n\n\"I am convinced,\" he wrote, \"that the industry of man has gone too far\nand that if it had stopped long ago and if it were possible to simplify\nthe results, we should not be the worse. I believe there is a limit in\ncivilisation, a limit more conformable to the felicity of man in general\nand far less distant from the savage state than is imagined; but how to\nreturn to it, having left it, or how to remain in it, if we were there?\nI know not.\" [Footnote: Refutation de l'ouvrage d'Helvetius in OEuvres\nii. p. 431. Elsewhere (p. 287) he argues that in a community without\narts and industries there are fewer crimes than in a civilised state,\nbut men are not so happy.]\n\nHis picture of the savages of Tahiti in the Supplement au voyage de\nBougainville was not seriously meant, but it illustrates the fact that\nin certain moods he felt the fascination of Rousseau's Arcadia.\n\nD'Holbach met all these theories by pointing out that human development,\nfrom the \"state of nature\" to social life and the ideas and commodities\nof civilisation, is itself natural, given the innate tendency of man to\nimprove his lot. To return to the simpler life of the forests--or to\nany bygone stage--would be denaturer l'homme, it would be contrary to\nnature; and if he could do so, it would only be to recommence the career\nbegun by his ancestors and pass again through the same successive phases\nof history. [Footnote: Syst. soc. i. 16, p. 190.]\n\nThere was, indeed, one question which caused some embarrassment to\nbelievers in Progress. The increase of wealth and luxury was evidently\na salient feature in modern progressive states; and it was clear that\nthere was an intimate connection between the growth of knowledge and the\ngrowth of commerce and industrial arts, and that the natural progress of\nthese meant an ever-increasing accumulation of riches and the practice\nof more refined luxury. The question, therefore, whether luxury is\ninjurious to the general happiness occupied the attention of the\nphilosophers. [Footnote: D'Holbach, ib. iii. 7; Diderot, art. Luxe in\nthe Encylopaedia; Helvetius, De l'esprit, i. 3.] If it is injurious,\ndoes it not follow that the forces on which admittedly Progress depends\nare leading in an undesirable direction? Should they be obstructed, or\nis it wiser to let things follow their natural tendency (laisser aller\nles choses suivant leur pente naturelle)? Voltaire accepted wealth with\nall its consequences. D'Holbach proved to his satisfaction that luxury\nalways led to the ruin of nations. Diderot and Helvetius arrayed\nthe arguments which could be urged on both sides. Perhaps the most\nreasonable contribution to the subject was an essay of Hume.\n\n4.\n\nIt is obvious that Rousseau and all other theorists of Regress would be\ndefinitely refuted if it could be proved by an historical investigation\nthat in no period in the past had man's lot been happier than in the\npresent. Such an inquiry was undertaken by the Chevalier de Chastellux.\nHis book On Public Felicity, or Considerations on the lot of Men in the\nvarious Epochs of History, appeared in 1772 and had a wide circulation.\n[Footnote: There was a new edition in 1776 with an important additional\nchapter.] It is a survey of the history of the western world and aims at\nproving the certainty of future Progress. It betrays the influence both\nof the Encyclopaedists and of the Economists. Chastellux is convinced\nthat human nature can be indefinitely moulded by institutions; that\nenlightenment is a necessary condition of general happiness; that war\nand superstition, for which governments and priests are responsible, are\nthe principal obstacles.\n\nBut he attempted to do what none of his masters had done, to test the\nquestion methodically from the data of history. Turgot, and Voltaire\nin his way, had traced the growth of civilisation; the originality of\nChastellux lay in concentrating attention on the eudaemonic issue, in\nexamining each historical period for the purpose of discovering whether\npeople on the whole were happy and enviable. Has there ever been a time,\nhe inquired, in which public felicity was greater than in our own, in\nwhich it would have been desirable to remain for ever, and to which it\nwould now be desirable to return?\n\nHe begins by brushing away the hypothesis of an Arcadia. We know\nreally nothing about primitive man, there is not sufficient evidence to\nauthorise conjectures. We know man only as he has existed in organised\nsocieties, and if we are to condemn modern civilisation and its\nprospects, we must find our term of comparison not in an imaginary\ngolden age but in a known historical epoch. And we must be careful not\nto fall into the mistakes of confusing public prosperity with general\nhappiness, and of considering only the duration or aggrandisement of\nempires and ignoring the lot of the common people.\n\nHis survey of history is summary and superficial enough. He gives\nreasons for believing that no peoples from the ancient Egyptians and\nAssyrians to the Europeans of the Renaissance can be judged happy. Yet\nwhat about the Greeks? Theirs was an age of enlightenment. In a few\npages he examines their laws and history, and concludes, \"We are\ncompelled to acknowledge that what is called the bel age of Greece was\na time of pain and torture for humanity.\" And in ancient history,\ngenerally, \"slavery alone sufficed to make man's condition a hundred\ntimes worse than it is at present.\" The miseries of life in the Roman\nperiod are even more apparent than in the Greek. What Englishman\nor Frenchman would tolerate life as lived in ancient Rome? It is\ninteresting to remember that four years later an Englishman who had an\nincomparably wider and deeper knowledge of history declared it to be\nprobable that in the age of the Antonines civilised Europe enjoyed\ngreater happiness than at any other period.\n\nRome declined and Christianity came. Its purpose was not to render men\nhappy on earth, and we do not find that it made rulers less avaricious\nor less sanguinary, peoples more patient or quiet, crimes rarer,\npunishments less cruel, treaties more faithfully observed, or wars\nwaged more humanely. The conclusion is that it is only those who are\nprofoundly ignorant of the past who can regret \"the good old times.\"\n\nThroughout this survey Chastellux does not, like Turgot, make any\nattempt to show that the race was progressing, however slowly. On\nthe contrary, he sets the beginning of continuous Progress in\nthe Renaissance--here agreeing with d'Alembert and Voltaire. The\nintellectual movement, which originated then and resulted in the\nenlightenment of his own day, was a condition of social progress. But\nalone it would not have been enough, as is proved by the fact that the\nintellectual brilliancy of the great age of Greece exerted no beneficent\neffects on the well-being of the people. Nor indeed was there any\nperceptible improvement in the prospect of happiness for the people at\nlarge during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, notwithstanding\nthe progress of science and the arts. But the terrible wars of this\nperiod exhausted Europe, and this financial exhaustion has supplied the\nrequisite conditions for attaining a measure of felicity never realised\nin the past.\n\nPeace is an advantageous condition for the progress of reason, but\nespecially when it is the result of the exhaustion of peoples and their\nsatiety of fighting. Frivolous ideas disappear; political bodies, like\norganisms, have the care of self-preservation impressed upon them by\npain; the human mind, hitherto exercised on agreeable objects, falls\nback with more energy on useful objects; a more successful appeal can be\nmade to the rights of humanity; and princes, who have become creditors\nand debtors of their subjects, permit them to be happy in order that\nthey may be more solvent or more patient.\n\nThis is not very lucid or convincing; but the main point is that\nintellectual enlightenment would be ineffective without the co-operation\nof political events, and no political events would permanently help\nhumanity without the progress of knowledge.\n\nPublic felicity consists--Chastellux follows the Economists--in external\nand domestic peace, abundance and liberty, the liberty of tranquil\nenjoyment of one's own; and ordinary signs of it are flourishing\nagriculture, large populations, and the growth of trade and industry.\nHe is at pains to show the superiority of modern to ancient agriculture,\nand he avails himself of the researches of Hume to prove the\ncomparatively greater populousness of modern European countries. As for\nthe prospect of peace, he takes a curiously optimistic view. A system\nof alliances has made Europe a sort of confederated republic, and the\nbalance of power has rendered the design of a universal monarchy, such\nas that which Louis XIV. essayed, a chimera. [Footnote: So Rivarol,\nwriting in 1783 (OEuvres, i. pp. 4 and 52): \"Never did the world offer\nsuch a spectacle. Europe has reached such a high degree of power that\nhistory has nothing to compare with it. It is virtually a federative\nrepublic, composed of empires and kingdoms, and the most powerful that\nhas ever existed.\"] All the powerful nations are burdened with debt.\nWar, too, is a much more difficult enterprise than it used to be; every\ncampaign of the king of Prussia has been more arduous than all the\nconquests of Attila. It looks as if the Peace of 1762-3 possessed\nelements of finality. The chief danger he discerns in the overseas\npolicy of the English--auri sacra fames. Divination of this kind has\nnever been happy; a greater thinker, Auguste Comte, was to venture on\nmore dogmatic predictions of the cessation of wars, which the event was\nno less utterly to belie. As for equality among men, Chastellux admits\nits desirability, but observes that there is pretty much the same amount\nof happiness (le bonheur se compense assez) in the different classes of\nsociety. \"Courtiers and ministers are not happier than husbandmen and\nartisans.\" Inequalities and disportions in the lots of individuals\nare not incompatible with a positive measure of felicity. They are\ninconveniences incident to the perfectibility of the species, and they\nwill be eliminated only when Progress reaches its final term. The best\nthat can be done to remedy them is to accelerate the Progress of the\nrace which will conduct it one day to the greatest possible happiness;\nnot to restore a state of ignorance and simplicity, from which it would\nagain escape.\n\nThe general argument of the book may be resumed briefly. Felicity has\nnever been realised in any period of the past. No government, however\nesteemed, set before itself to achieve what ought to be the sole\nobject of government, \"the greatest happiness of the greatest number\nof individuals.\" Now, for the first time in human history, intellectual\nenlightenment, other circumstances fortunately concurring, has brought\nabout a condition of things, in which this object can no longer be\nignored, and there is a prospect that it will gradually gain the\nascendant. In the meantime, things have improved; the diffusion of\nknowledge is daily ameliorating men's lot, and far from envying any\nage in the past we ought to consider ourselves much happier than the\nancients.\n\nWe may wonder at this writer's easy confidence in applying the criterion\nof happiness to different societies. Yet the difficulty of such\ncomparisons was, I believe, first pointed out by Comte. [Footnote: Cours\nde philosophie positive, iv. 379.] It is impossible, he says, to compare\ntwo states of society and determine that in one more happiness was\nenjoyed than in the other. The happiness of an individual requires a\ncertain degree of harmony between his faculties and his environment. But\nthere is always a natural tendency towards the establishment of such\nan equilibrium, and there is no means of discovering by argument or by\ndirect experience the situation of a society in this respect. Therefore,\nhe concludes, the question of happiness must be eliminated from any\nscientific treatment of civilisation.\n\nChastellux won a remarkable success. His work was highly praised by\nVoltaire, and was translated into English, Italian, and German.\nIt condensed, on a single issue, the optimistic doctrines of the\nphilosophers, and appeared to give them a more solid historical\nfoundation than Voltaire's Essay on Manners had supplied. It provided\nthe optimists with new arguments against Rousseau, and must have done\nmuch to spread and confirm faith in perfectibility. [Footnote: Soon\nafter the publication of the book of Chastellux--though I do not\nsuggest any direct connection--a society of Illuminati, who also called\nthemselves the Perfectibilists, was founded at Ingoldstadt, who proposed\nto effect a pacific transformation of humanity. See Javary, De l'idee de\nprogres, p. 73.]\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X. THE YEAR 2440\n\n1.\n\nThe leaders of thought in France did not look far forward into the\nfuture or attempt to trace the definite lines on which the human race\nmight be expected to develop. They contented themselves with principles\nand vague generalities, and they had no illusions as to the slowness of\nthe process of social amelioration; a rational morality, the condition\nof improvement, was only in its infancy. A passage in a work of the Abbe\nMorellet probably reflects faithfully enough the comfortable though not\nextravagant optimism which was current. [Footnote: Reflexions sur les\navantages d'ecrire et d'imprimer sur les matieres de l'administration\n(1764); in Melanges, vol. iii. p. 55. Morellet held, like d'Holbach,\nthat society is only the development and improvement of nature itself\n(ib. p. 6).]\n\nLet us hope for the amelioration of man's lot as a consequence of the\nprogress of the enlightenment (des lumieres) and labours of the\neducated (des gens instruits); let us trust that the errors and even the\ninjustices of our age may not rob us of this consoling hope. The history\nof society presents a continuous alternation of light and darkness,\nreason and extravagance, humanity and barbarism; but in the succession\nof ages we can observe good gradually increasing in ever greater\nproportion. What educated man, if he is not a misanthrope or misled by\nvain declamations, would really wish he had lived in the barbarous and\npoetical time which Homer paints in such fair and terrifying colours?\nWho regrets that he was not born at Sparta among those pretended heroes\nwho made it a virtue to insult nature, practised theft, and gloried in\nthe murder of a Helot; or at Carthage, the scene of human sacrifices,\nor at Rome amid the proscriptions or under the rule of a Nero or a\nCaligula? Let as agree that man advances, though slowly, towards light\nand happiness.\n\nBut though the most influential writers were sober in speculating about\nthe future, it is significant of their effectiveness in diffusing the\nidea of Progress that now for the first time a prophetic Utopia was\nconstructed. Hitherto, as I have before observed, ideal states\nwere either projected into the remote past or set in some distant,\nvaguely-known region, where fancy could build freely. To project them\ninto the future was a new thing, and when in 1770 Sebastien Mercier\ndescribed what human civilisation would be in A.D. 2440, it was a\ntelling sign of the power which the idea of Progress was beginning to\nexercise.\n\n2.\n\nMercier has been remembered, or rather forgotten, as an inferior\ndramatist. He was a good deal more, and the researches of M. Beclard\ninto his life and works enable us to appreciate him. If it is an\noverstatement to say that his soul reflected in miniature the very\nsoul of his age, [Footnote: L. Beclard, Sebastien Mercier, sa vie,\nson oeuvre, son temps (1903), p. vii.] he was assuredly one of its\ncharacteristic products. He reminds us in some ways of the Abbe de\nSaint-Pierre, who was one of his heroes. All his activities were urged\nby the dream of a humanity regenerated by reason, all his energy devoted\nto bringing about its accomplishment. Saint-Pierre's idea of perpetual\npeace inspired an early essay on the scourge of war.\n\nThe theories of Rousseau exercised at first an irresistible attraction,\nbut modern civilisation had too strong a hold on him; he was too\nParisian in temper to acquiesce for long in the doctrine of Arcadianism.\nHe composed a book on The Savage to illustrate the text that the true\nstandard of morality is the heart of primitive man, and to prove that\nthe best thing we could do is to return to the forest; but in the\nprocess of writing it he seems to have come to the conclusion that the\nwhole doctrine was fallacious. [Footnote: Mercier's early essay: Des\nmalheurs de la guerre et des avantages de la paix (1766). On the\nsavage: L'homme sauvage (1767). For the opposite thesis see the Songes\nphilosophiques (1768). He describes a state of perfect happiness in a\nplanet where beings live in perpetual contemplation of the infinite.\nHe appreciates the work of philosophers from Socrates to Leibnitz, and\ndescribes Rousseau as standing before the swelling stream, but cursing\nit. It may be suspected that the writings of Leibnitz had much to do\nwith Mercier's conversion.] The transformation of his opinions was the\nwork of a few months. He then came forward with the opposite thesis that\nall events have been ordered for man's felicity, and he began to work on\nan imaginary picture of the state to which man might find his way within\nseven hundred years.\n\nL'an 2440 was published anonymously at Amsterdam in 1770. [Footnote: The\nauthor's name first appeared in the 3rd ed., 1799. A German translation,\nby C. F. Weisse, was published in London in 1772. The English version,\nby Dr. Hooper, appeared in the same year, and a new edition in 1802; the\ntranslator changed the title to Memoirs of the year Two thousand five\nhundred.] Its circulation in France was rigorously forbidden, because it\nimplied a merciless criticism of the administration. It was reprinted in\nLondon and Neuchatel, and translated into English and German.\n\n3.\n\nAs the motto of his prophetic vision Mercier takes the saying of\nLeibnitz that \"the present is pregnant of the future.\" Thus the phase of\ncivilisation which he imagines is proposed as the outcome of the natural\nand inevitable march of history. The world of A.D. 2440 in which a man\nborn in the eighteenth century who has slept an enchanted sleep awakes\nto find himself, is composed of nations who live in a family concord\nrarely interrupted by war. But of the world at large we hear little;\nthe imagination of Mercier is concentrated on France, and particularly\nParis. He is satisfied with knowing that slavery has been abolished;\nthat the rivalry of France and England has been replaced by an\nindestructible alliance; that the Pope, whose authority is still august,\nhas renounced his errors and returned to the customs of the primitive\nChurch; that French plays are performed in China. The changes in Paris\nare a sufficient index of the general transformation.\n\nThe constitution of France is still monarchical. Its population has\nincreased by one half; that of the capital remains about the same. Paris\nhas been rebuilt on a scientific plan; its sanitary arrangements have\nbeen brought to perfection; it is well lit; and every provision has been\nmade for the public safety. Private hospitality is so large that inns\nhave disappeared, but luxury at table is considered a revolting crime.\nTea, coffee, and tobacco are no longer imported. [Footnote: In the\nfirst edition of the book commerce was abolished.] There is no system of\ncredit; everything is paid for in ready money, and this practice has\nled to a remarkable simplicity in dress. Marriages are contracted only\nthrough mutual inclination; dowries have been abolished. Education is\ngoverned by the ideas of Rousseau, and is directed, in a narrow spirit,\nto the promotion of morality. Italian, German, English, and Spanish\nare taught in schools, but the study of the classical languages has\ndisappeared; Latin does not help a man to virtue. History too is\nneglected and discouraged, for it is \"the disgrace of humanity, every\npage being crowded with crimes and follies.\" Theatres are government\ninstitutions, and have become the public schools of civic duties and\nmorality. [Footnote: In 1769 Mercier began to carry out his programme of\ncomposing and adapting plays for instruction and edification. His theory\nof the true functions of the theatre he explained in a special treatise,\nDu theatre ou Nouvel Essai sur l'art dramatique (1773).]\n\nThe literary records of the past had been almost all deliberately\ndestroyed by fire. It was found expedient to do away with useless\nand pernicious books which only obscured truth or contained perpetual\nrepetitions of the same thing. A small closet in the public library\nsufficed to hold the ancient books which were permitted to escape the\nconflagration, and the majority of these were English. The writings of\nthe Abbe de Saint-Pierre were placed next those of Fenelon. \"His pen was\nweak, but his heart was sublime. Seven ages have given to his great and\nbeautiful ideas a just maturity. His contemporaries regarded him as a\nvisionary; his dreams, however, have become realities.\"\n\nThe importance of men of letters as a social force was a favourite theme\nof Mercier, and in A.D. 2440 this will be duly recognised. But the State\ncontrol which weighed upon them so heavily in 1770 is not to be entirely\nabolished. There is no preventive censorship to hinder publication, but\nthere are censors. There are no fines or imprisonment, but there are\nadmonitions. And if any one publishes a book defending principles which\nare considered dangerous, he is obliged to go about in a black mask.\n\nThere is a state religion, Deism. There is probably no one who does\nnot believe in God. But if any atheist were discovered, he would be put\nthrough a course of experimental physics. If he remained obdurate in his\nrejection of a \"palpable and salutary truth,\" the nation would go into\nmourning and banish him from its borders.\n\nEvery one has to work, but labour no longer resembles slavery. As there\nare no monks, nor numerous domestics, nor useless valets, nor work-men\nemployed on the production of childish luxuries, a few daily hours of\nlabour are sufficient for the public wants. Censors inquire into men's\ncapacities, assign tasks to the unemployed, and if man be found fit for\nnothing but the consumption of food he is banished from the city.\n\nThese are some of the leading features of the ideal future to which\nMercier's imagination reached. He did not put it forward as a final\nterm. Later ages, he said, will go further, for \"where can the\nperfectibility of man stop, armed with geometry and the mechanical\narts and chemistry?\" But in his scanty prophecies of what science might\neffect he showed curiously little resource. The truth is that this\nhad not much interest for him, and he did not see that scientific\ndiscoveries might transmute social conditions. The world of 2440, its\nintolerably docile and virtuous society, reflects two capital weaknesses\nin the speculation of the Encyclopaedist period: a failure to allow\nfor the strength of human passions and interests, and a deficient\nappreciation of the meaning of liberty. Much as the reformers acclaimed\nand fought for toleration, they did not generally comprehend the value\nof the principle. They did not see that in a society organised and\ngoverned by Reason and Justice themselves, the unreserved toleration\nof false opinions would be the only palladium of progress; or that\na doctrinaire State, composed of perfectly virtuous and deferential\npeople, would arrest development and stifle origiality, by its ungenial\nif mild tyranny. Mercier's is no exception to the rule that ideal\nsocieties are always repellent; and there are probably few who would\nnot rather be set down in Athens in the days of the \"vile\" Aristophanes,\nwhose works Mercier condemned to the flames, than in his Paris of 2440.\n\n4.\n\nThat Bohemian man of letters, Restif de la Bretonne, whose unedifying\nnovels the Parisians of 2440 would assuredly have rejected from their\nlibraries, published in 1790 a heroic comedy representing how marriages\nwould be arranged in \"the year 2000,\" by which epoch he conceived that\nall social equalities would have disappeared in a fraternal society\nand twenty nations be allied to France under the wise supremacy of \"our\nwell-beloved monarch Louis Francois XXII.\" It was the Revolution that\nconverted Restif to the conception of Progress, for hitherto his master\nhad been Rousseau; but it can hardly be doubted that the motif and title\nof his play were suggested by the romance of Mercier. L'an 2440 and L'an\n2000 are the first examples of the prophetic fiction which Mr. Edward\nBellamy's Looking Backward was to popularise a hundred years later.\n\nThe Count de Volney's Ruins was another popular presentation of the\nhopes which the theory of Progress had awakened in France. Although\nthe work was not published till after the outbreak of the Revolution,\n[Footnote: Les Ruines des empires, 1789. An English translation ran to\na second edition (1795).] the plan had been conceived some years before.\nVolney was a traveller, deeply interested in oriental and classical\nantiquities, and, like Louis Le Roy, he approached the problem of man's\ndestinies from the point of view of a student of the revolutions of\nempires.\n\nThe book opens with melancholy reflections amid the ruins of Palmyra.\n\"Thus perish the works of men, and thus do nations and empires vanish\naway... Who can assure us that desolation like this will not one day be\nthe lot of our own country?\" Some traveller like himself will sit by the\nbanks of the Seine, the Thames, or the Zuyder Zee, amid silent ruins,\nand weep for a people inurned and their greatness changed into an empty\nname. Has a mysterious Deity pronounced a secret malediction against the\nearth?\n\nIn this disconsolate mood he is visited by an apparition, who unveils\nthe causes of men's misfortunes and shows that they are due to\nthemselves. Man is governed by natural invariable laws, and he has only\nto study them to know the springs of his destiny, the causes of his\nevils and their remedies. The laws of his nature are self-love, desire\nof happiness, and aversion to pain; these are the simple and prolific\nprinciples of everything that happens in the moral world. Man is the\nartificer of his own fate. He may lament his weakness and folly; but \"he\nhas perhaps still more reason to be confident in his energies when he\nrecollects from what point he has set out and to what heights he has\nbeen capable of elevating himself.\"\n\nThe supernatural visitant paints a rather rosy picture of the ancient\nEgyptian and Assyrian kingdoms. But it would be a mistake to infer from\ntheir superficial splendour that the inhabitants generally were wise\nor happy. The tendency of man to ascribe perfection to past epochs is\nmerely \"the discoloration of his chagrin.\" The race is not degenerating;\nits misfortunes are due to ignorance and the mis-direction of self-love.\nTwo principal obstacles to improvement have been the difficulty of\ntransmitting ideas from age to age, and that of communicating them\nrapidly from man to man. These have been removed by the invention of\nprinting. The press is \"a memorable gift of celestial genius.\" In time\nall men will come to understand the principles of individual happiness\nand public felicity. Then there will be established among the peoples of\nthe earth an equilibrium of forces; there will be no more wars, disputes\nwill be decided by arbitration, and \"the whole species will become one\ngreat society, a single family governed by the same spirit and by common\nlaws, enjoying all the felicity of which human nature is capable.\" The\naccomplishment of this will be a slow process, since the same leaven\nwill have to assimilate an enormous mass of heterogeneous elements, but\nits operation will be effectual.\n\nHere the genius interrupts his prophecy and exclaims, turning toward the\nwest, \"The cry of liberty uttered on the farther shores of the Atlantic\nhas reached to the old continent.\" A prodigious movement is then visible\nto their eyes in a country at the extremity of the Mediterranean;\ntyrants are overthrown, legislators elected, a code of laws is drafted\non the principles of equality, liberty, and justice. The liberated\nnation is attacked by neighbouring tyrants, but her legislators propose\nto the other peoples to hold a general assembly, representing the whole\nworld, and weigh every religious system in the balance. The proceedings\nof this congress follow, and the book breaks off incomplete.\n\nIt is not an arresting book; to a reader of the present day it is\npositively tedious; but it suited contemporary taste, and, appearing\nwhen France was confident that her Revolution would renovate the earth,\nit appealed to the hopes and sentiments of the movement. It made no\ncontribution to the doctrine of Progress, but it undoubtedly helped to\npopularise it.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: CONDORCET\n\nI.\n\nThe authority which the advanced thinkers of France gained among the\nmiddle classes during the third quarter of the eighteenth century was\npromoted by the influence of fashion. The new ideas of philosophers,\nrationalists, and men of science had interested the nobles and higher\nclasses of society for two generations, and were a common subject of\ndiscussion in the most distinguished salons. Voltaire's intimacy with\nFrederick the Great, the relations of d'Alembert and Diderot with the\nEmpress Catherine, conferred on these men of letters, and on the ideas\nfor which they stood, a prestige which carried great weight with the\nbourgeoisie. Humbler people, too, were as amenable as the great to\nthe seduction of theories which supplied simple keys to the universe\n[Footnote: Taine said of the Contrat Social that it reduces political\nscience to the strict application of an elementary axiom which renders\nall study unnecessary (La Revolution, vol. i. c. iv. Sec. iii.).] and\nassumed that everybody was capable of judging for himself on the most\ndifficult problems. As well as the Encyclopaedia, the works of nearly\nall the leading thinkers were written for the general public not merely\nfor philosophers. The policy of the Government in suppressing these\ndangerous publications did not hinder their diffusion, and gave them\nthe attraction of forbidden fruit. In 1770 the avocat general (Seguier)\nacknowledged the futility of the policy. \"The philosophers,\" he said,\n\"have with one hand sought to shake the throne, with the other to upset\nthe altars. Their purpose was to change public opinion on civil and\nreligious institutions, and the revolution has, so to speak, been\neffected. History and poetry, romances and even dictionaries, have\nbeen infected with the poison of incredulity. Their writings are hardly\npublished in the capital before they inundate the provinces like\na torrent. The contagion has spread into workshops and cottages.\"\n[Footnote: Rocquain, L'Esprit revolutionnaire avant la Revolution, p.\n278.]\n\nThe contagion spread, but the official who wrote these words did not see\nthat it was successful because it was opportune, and that the minds\nof men were prepared to receive the seed of revolutionary ideas by the\nunspeakable corruption of the Government and the Church. As Voltaire\nremarked about the same time, France was becoming Encyclopaedist, and\nEurope too.\n\n2.\n\nThe influence of the subversive and rationalistic thinkers in bringing\nabout the events of 1789 has been variously estimated by historians.\nThe truth probably lies in the succinct statement of Acton that \"the\nconfluence of French theory with American example caused the Revolution\nto break out\" when it did. The theorists aimed at reform, not at\npolitical revolution; and it was the stimulus of the Declaration\nof Rights of 1774 and the subsequent victory of the Colonies that\nprecipitated the convulsion, at a time when the country had a better\nprospect of improvement than it ever had before 1774, when Louis XVI.\ncame to the throne. But the theories had prepared France for radical\nchanges, and they guided the phases of the Revolution. The leaders had\nall the optimism of the Encyclopaedists; yet the most powerful single\nforce was Rousseau, who, though he denied Progress and blasphemed\ncivilisation, had promulgated the doctrine of the sovereignty of the\npeople, giving it an attractive appearance of mathematical precision;\nand to this doctrine the revolutionaries attached their optimistic\nhopes. [Footnote: It is interesting to observe how Robespierre, to whom\nthe doctrines of Rousseau were oracles, could break out into admiration\nof the progress of civilised man, as he did in the opening passage of\nhis speech of 7th May 1794. proposing the decree for the worship of\nthe Supreme Being (see the text in Stephen, Orators of the French\nRevolution, ii. 391-92).] The theory of equality seemed no longer merely\nspeculative; for the American constitution was founded on democratic\nequality, whereas the English constitution, which before had seemed\nthe nearest approximation to the ideal of freedom, was founded on\ninequality. The philosophical polemic of the masters was waged with\nweapons of violence by the disciples. Chaumette and Hebert, the\nfollowers of d'Holbach, were destroyed by the disciples of Rousseau. In\nthe name of the creed of the Vicaire Savoyard the Jacobin Club shattered\nthe bust of Helvetius. Mably and Morelly had their disciples in Babeuf\nand the socialists.\n\nA naive confidence that the political upheaval meant regeneration and\ninaugurated a reign of justice and happiness pervaded France in the\nfirst period of the Revolution, and found a striking expression in the\nceremonies of the universal \"Federation\" in the Champ-de-Mars on 14th\nJuly 1790. The festival was theatrical enough, decreed and arranged by\nthe Constituent Assembly, but the enthusiasm and optimism of the people\nwho gathered to swear loyalty to the new Constitution were genuine and\nspontaneous. Consciously or subconsciously they were under the influence\nof the doctrine of Progress which leaders of opinion had for several\ndecades been insinuating into the public mind. It did not occur to them\nthat their oaths and fraternal embraces did not change their minds\nor hearts, and that, as Taine remarked, they remained what ages of\npolitical subjection and one age of political literature had made them.\nThe assumption that new social machinery could alter human nature and\ncreate a heaven upon earth was to be swiftly and terribly confuted.\n\n\n Post uarios casus et tot discrimina rerum\n uenimus in Latium,\n\n\nbut Latium was to be the scene of sanguinary struggles.\n\nAnother allied and fundamental fallacy, into which all the philosophers\nand Rousseau had more or less fallen, was reflected and exposed by the\nRevolution. They had considered man in vacuo. They had not seen that\nthe whole development of a society is an enormous force which cannot be\ntalked or legislated away; they had ignored the power of social memory\nand historical traditions, and misvalued the strength of the links which\nbind generations together. So the Revolutionaries imagined that they\ncould break abruptly with the past, and that a new method of government,\nconstructed on mathematical lines, a constitution (to use words of\nBurke) \"ready made and ready armed, mature in its birth, a perfect\ngoddess of wisdom and of war, hammered by our blacksmith midwives out\nof the brain of Jupiter himself,\" would create a condition of idyllic\nfelicity in France, and that the arrival of the millennium depended only\non the adoption of the same principles by other nations. The illusions\ncreated by the Declaration of the Rights of Man on the 4th of August\ndied slowly under the shadow of the Terror; but though the hopes of\nthose who believed in the speedy regeneration of the world were belied,\nsome of the thoughtful did not lose heart. There was one at least who\ndid not waver in his faith that the movement was a giant's step on\nthe path of man towards ultimate felicity, however far he had still to\ntravel. Condorcet, one of the younger Encyclopaedists, spent the last\nmonths of his life, under the menace of the guillotine, in projecting a\nhistory of human Progress.\n\n3.\n\nCondorcet was the friend and biographer of Turgot, and it was not\nunfitting that he should resume the design of a history of civilisation,\nin the light of the idea of Progress, for which Turgot had only left\nluminous suggestions. He did not execute the plan, but he completed an\nelaborate sketch in which the controlling ideas of the scheme are fully\nset forth. His principles are to be found almost entirely in Turgot. But\nthey have a new significance for Condorcet. He has given them wings. He\nhas emphasised, and made deductions. Turgot wrote in the calm spirit\nof an inquirer. Condorcet spoke with the verve of a prophet. He was\nprophesying under the shadow of death. It is amazing that the optimistic\nSketch of a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind\nshould have been composed when he was hiding from Robespierre in 1793.\n[Footnote: Published in 1795.]\n\nCondorcet was penetrated with the spirit of the Encyclopaedists, of whom\nhe had been one, and his attitude to Christianity was that of Voltaire\nand Diderot. Turgot had treated the received religion respectfully. He\nhad acknowledged Providence, and, though the place which he assigned to\nProvidence was that of a sort of honorary President of the development\nof civilisation who might disappear without affecting the proceedings,\nthere was a real difference between his views and those of his friend as\nto the role of Christianity and the civilisation of the Middle Ages.\n\nA more important difference between the two thinkers is connected with\nthe different circumstances in which they wrote. Turgot did not believe\nin the necessity of violent changes; he thought that steady reforms\nunder the existing regime would do wonders for France. Before\nthe Revolution Condorcet had agreed, but he was swept away by its\nenthusiasm. The victory of liberty in America and the increasing volume\nof the movement against slavery--one of the causes which most deeply\nstirred his heart--had heightened his natural optimism and confirmed his\nfaith in the dogma of Progress. He felt the exhilaration of the belief\nthat he was living through \"one of the greatest revolutions of the human\nrace,\" and he deliberately designed his book to be opportune to a crisis\nof mankind, at which \"a picture of revolutions of the past will be the\nbest guide.\"\n\nFeeling that he is personally doomed, he consoles himself with brooding\non the time, however remote, when the sun will shine \"on an earth of\nnone but freemen, with no master save reason; for tyrants and\nslaves, priests and their stupid or hypocritical tools, will all have\ndisappeared.\" He is not satisfied with affirming generally the certainty\nof an indefinite progress in enlightenment and social welfare. He\nsets himself to think out its nature, to forecast its direction, and\ndetermine its goal, and insists, as his predecessors had never done, on\nthe prospects of the distant future.\n\n4.\n\nHis ambitious design is, in his own words, to show \"the successive\nchanges in human society, the influence which each instant exerts on\nthe succeeding instant, and thus, in its successive modifications,\nthe advance of the human species towards truth or happiness.\" Taken\nliterally, this is an impossible design, and to put it forward as a\npractical proposition is as if a man were to declare his intention of\nwriting a minute diary of the life of Julius Caesar from his birth to\nhis death. By stating his purpose in such terms, Condorcet reveals that\nhe had no notion of the limitations which confine our knowledge of the\npast, and that even if he had conceived a more modest and practicable\nprogramme he would have been incapable of executing it. His formula,\nhowever, is worth remembering. For the unattainable ideal which it\nexpresses reminds us how many periods and passages of human experience\nmust always remain books with seven seals.\n\nCondorcet distinguished ten periods of civilisation, of which the tenth\nlies in the future, but he has not justified his divisions and his\nepochs are not co-ordinate in importance. Yet his arrangement of the map\nof history is remarkable as an attempt to mark its sections not by great\npolitical changes but by important steps in knowledge. The first three\nperiods--the formation of primitive societies, followed by the pastoral\nage, and the agricultural age--conclude with the invention of alphabetic\nwriting in Greece. The fourth is the history of Greek thought, to the\ndefinite division of the sciences in the time of Aristotle. In the fifth\nknowledge progresses and suffers obscuration under Roman rule, and the\nsixth is the dark age which continues to the time of the Crusades. The\nsignificance of the seventh period is to prepare the human mind for the\nrevolution which would be achieved by the invention of printing, with\nwhich the eighth period opens. Some of the best pages of the book\ndevelop the vast consequences of this invention. The scientific\nrevolution effected by Descartes begins a new period, which is now\nclosed by the creation of the French Republic.\n\nThe idea of the progress of knowledge had created the idea of social\nProgress and remained its foundation. It was therefore logical and\ninevitable that Condorcet should take advance in knowledge as the clew\nto the march of the human race. The history of civilisation is the\nhistory of enlightenment. Turgot had justified this axiom by formulating\nthe cohesion of all modes of social activity. Condorcet insists on \"the\nindissoluble union\" between intellectual progress and that of liberty,\nvirtue, and the respect for natural rights, and on the effect of science\nin the destruction of prejudice. All errors in politics and ethics have\nsprung, he asserts, from false ideas which are closely connected with\nerrors in physics and ignorance of the laws of nature. And in the new\ndoctrine of Progress he sees an instrument of enlightenment which is to\ngive \"the last blow to the tottering edifice of prejudices.\"\n\nIt would not be useful to analyse Condorcet's sketch or dwell on his\nobsolete errors and the defects of his historical knowledge. His\nslight picture of the Middle Ages reflects the familiar view of all\nthe eighteenth century philosophers. The only contribution to social\namelioration which he can discover in a period of nearly a millennium\nis the abolition of domestic slavery. And so this period appears as\nan interruption of the onward march. His inability to appreciate the\nhistorical role of the Roman Empire exhibits more surprising ignorance\nand prejudice. But these particular defects are largely due to a\nfundamental error which runs through his whole book and was inherent in\nthe social speculations of the Encyclopaedists. Condorcet, like all his\ncircle, ignored the preponderant part which institutions have played in\nsocial development. So far as he considered them at all, he saw in\nthem obstacles to the free play of human reason; not the spontaneous\nexpression of a society corresponding to its needs or embodying its\nideals, but rather machinery deliberately contrived for oppressing the\nmasses and keeping them in chains. He did not see that if the Progress\nin which he believed is a reality, its possibility depends on the\ninstitutions and traditions which give to societies their stability. In\nthe following generation, it would be pointed out that he fell into a\nmanifest contradiction when he praised the relative perfection reached\nin some European countries in the eighteenth century, and at the\nsame time condemned as eminently retrograde all the doctrines and\ninstitutions which had been previously in control. [Footnote: Comte.\nCours de philosophie positive, iv. 228.] This error is closely connected\nwith the other error, previously noticed, of conceiving man abstracted\nfrom his social environment and exercising his reason in vacuo.\n\n5.\n\nThe study of the history of civilisation has, in Condorcet's eyes, two\nuses. It enables us to establish the fact of Progress, and it should\nenable us to determine its direction in the future, and thereby to\naccelerate the rate of progression.\n\nBy the facts of history and the arguments they suggest, he undertakes\nto show that nature has set no term to the process of improving human\nfaculties, and that the advance towards perfection is limited only by\nthe duration of the globe. The movement may vary in velocity, but it\nwill never be retrograde so long as the earth occupies its present place\nin the cosmic system and the general laws of this system do not produce\nsome catastrophe or change which would deprive the human race of the\nfaculties and resources which it has hitherto possessed. There will be\nno relapse into barbarism. The guarantees against this danger are the\ndiscovery of true methods in the physical sciences, their application to\nthe needs of men, the lines of communication which have been established\namong them, the great number of those who study them, and finally\nthe art of printing. And if we are sure of the continuous progress of\nenlightenment, we may be sure of the continuous improvement of social\nconditions.\n\nIt is possible to foresee events, if the general laws of social\nphenomena are known, and these laws can be inferred from the history\nof the past. By this statement Condorcet justifies his bold attempt to\nsketch his tenth period of human history which lies in the future; and\nannounces the idea which was in the next generation to be worked out by\nComte. But he cannot be said to have deduced himself any law of social\ndevelopment. His forecast of the future is based on the ideas and\ntendencies of his own age. [Footnote: It is interesting to notice\nthat the ablest of medieval Arabic historians, Ibn Khaldun (fourteenth\ncentury), had claimed that if history is scientifically studied future\nevents may be predicted.]\n\nApart from scientific discoveries and the general diffusion of a\nknowledge of the laws of nature on which moral improvement depends,\nhe includes in his prophetic vision the cessation of war and the\nrealisation of the less familiar idea of the equality of the sexes. If\nhe were alive to-day, he could point with triumph to the fact that of\nthese far-reaching projects one is being accomplished in some of the\nmost progressive countries and the other is looked upon as an attainable\naim by statesmen who are not visionaries. The equality of the sexes was\nonly a logical inference from the general doctrine of equality to which\nCondorcet's social theory is reducible. For him the goal of political\nprogress is equality; equality is to be the aim of social effort--the\nideal of the Revolution.\n\nFor it is the multitude of men that must be considered--the mass of\nworkers, not the minority who live on their labours. Hitherto they have\nbeen neglected by the historian as well as by the statesman. The true\nhistory of humanity is not the history of some men. The human race is\nformed by the mass of families who subsist almost entirely on the fruits\nof their own work, and this mass is the proper subject of history, not\ngreat men.\n\nYou may establish social equality by means of laws and institutions,\nyet the equality actually enjoyed may be very incomplete. Condorcet\nrecognises this and attributes it to three principal causes: inequality\nin wealth; inequality in position between the man whose means of\nsubsistence are assured and can be transmitted to his family and the man\nwhose means depend on his work and are limited by the term of his own\nlife [Footnote: He looked forward to the mitigation of this inequality\nby the development of life insurance which was then coming to the\nfront.]; and inequality in education. He did not propose any radical\nmethods for dealing with these difficulties, which he thought would\ndiminish in time, without, however, entirely disappearing. He was too\ndeeply imbued with the views of the Economists to be seduced by the\ntheories of Rousseau, Mably, Babeuf, and others, into advocating\ncommunism or the abolition of private property.\n\nBesides equality among the individuals composing a civilised society,\nCondorcet contemplated equality among all the peoples of the earth,--a\nuniform civilisation throughout the world, and the obliteration of the\ndistinction between advanced and retrograde races. The backward peoples,\nhe prophesied, will climb up to the condition of France and the United\nStates of America, for no people is condemned never to exercise its\nreason. If the dogma of the perfectibility of human nature, unguarded by\nany restrictions, is granted, this is a logical inference, and we\nhave already seen that it was one of the ideas current among the\nphilosophers.\n\nCondorcet does not hesitate to add to his picture adventurous\nconjectures on the improvement of man's physical organisation, and a\nconsiderable prolongation of his life by the advance of medical science.\nWe need only note this. More interesting is the prediction that, even\nif the compass of the human being's cerebral powers is inalterable,\nthe range, precision, and rapidity of his mental operations will be\naugmented by the invention of new instruments and methods.\n\nThe design of writing a history of human civilisation was premature, and\nto have produced a survey of any durable value would have required\nthe equipment of a Gibbon. Condorcet was not even as well equipped as\nVoltaire. [Footnote: But as he wrote without books the Sketch was a\nmarvellous tour de force.] The significance of his Sketch lies in this,\nthat towards the close of an intellectual movement it concentrated\nattention on the most important, though hitherto not the most prominent,\nidea which that movement had disseminated, and as it were officially\nannounced human Progress as the leading problem that claimed the\ninterest of mankind. With him Progress was associated intimately with\nparticular eighteenth century doctrines, but these were not essential\nto it. It was a living idea; it survived the compromising theories which\nbegan to fall into discredit after the Revolution, and was explored from\nnew points of view. Condorcet, however, wedded though his mind was to\nthe untenable views of human nature current in his epoch and his circle,\ndid not share the tendency of leading philosophers to regard history\nas an unprofitable record of folly and crime which it would be well to\nobliterate or forget. He recognised the interpretation of history as\nthe key to human development, and this principle controlled subsequent\nspeculations on Progress in France.\n\n6.\n\nCabanis, the physician, was Condorcet's literary executor, and a no less\nardent believer in human perfectibility. Looking at life and man from\nhis own special point of view, he saw in the study of the physical\norganism the key to the intellectual and moral improvement of the race.\nIt is by knowledge of the relations between his physical states and\nmoral states that man can attain happiness, through the enlargement of\nhis faculties and the multiplication of enjoyments, and that he will\nbe able to grasp, as it were, the infinite in his brief existence by\nrealising the certainty of indefinite progress. His doctrine was\na logical extension of the theories of Locke and Condillac. If our\nknowledge is wholly derived from sensations, our sensations depend on\nour sensory organs, and mind becomes a function of the nervous system.\n\nThe events of the Revolution quenched in him as little as in Condorcet\nthe sanguine confidence that it was the opening of a new era for science\nand art, and thereby for the general Progress of man. \"The present is\none of those great periods of history to which posterity will often\nlook back\" with gratitude. [Footnote: Picavet, Les Ideologues, p. 203.\nCabanis was born in 1757 and died in 1808.] He took an active part in\nthe coup d'etat of the 18th of Brumaire (1799) which was to lead to the\ndespotism of Napoleon. He imagined that it would terminate oppression,\nand was as enthusiastic for it as he and Condorcet had been for the\nRevolution ten years before. \"You philosophers,\" he wrote, [Footnote:\nIb. p. 224.] \"whose studies are directed to the improvement and\nhappiness of the race, you no longer embrace vain shadows. Having\nwatched, in alternating moods of hope and sadness, the great spectacle\nof our Revolution, you now see with joy the termination of its last act;\nyou will see with rapture this new era, so long promised to the French\npeople, at last open, in which all the benefits of nature, all the\ncreations of genius, all the fruits of time, labour, and experience will\nbe utilised, an era of glory and prosperity in which the dreams of your\nphilanthropic enthusiasm should end by being realised.\"\n\nIt was an over-sanguine and characteristic greeting of the eighteenth to\nthe nineteenth century. Cabanis was one of the most important of those\nthinkers who, living into the new period, took care that the ideas of\ntheir own generation should not be overwhelmed in the rising flood of\nreaction.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII. THE THEORY OF PROGRESS IN ENGLAND\n\n1.\n\nThe idea of Progress could not help crossing the Channel. France and\nEngland had been at war in the first year of the eighteenth century,\nthey were at war in the last, and their conflict for supremacy was the\nleading feature of the international history of the whole century.\nBut at no period was there more constant intellectual intimacy or\nmore marked reciprocal influence between the two countries. It was\na commonplace that Paris and London were the two great foci of\ncivilisation, and they never lost touch of each other in the\nintellectual sphere. Many of the principal works of literature that\nappeared in either country were promptly translated, and some of the\nFrench books, which the censorship rendered it dangerous to publish in\nParis, were printed in London.\n\nIt was not indeed to be expected that the theory should have the same\nkind of success, or exert the same kind of effect in England as in\nFrance. England had her revolution behind her, France had hers\nbefore her. England enjoyed what were then considered large political\nliberties, the envy of other lands; France groaned under the tyranny of\nworthless rulers. The English constitution satisfied the nation, and\nthe serious abuses which would now appear to us intolerable were not\nsufficient to awaken a passionate desire for reforms. The general\ntendency of British thought was to see salvation in the stability\nof existing institutions, and to regard change with suspicion. Now\npassionate desire for reform was the animating force which propagated\nthe idea of Progress in France. And when this idea is translated from\nthe atmosphere of combat, in which it was developed by French men\nof letters, into the calm climate of England, it appears like a cold\nreflection.\n\nAgain, English thinkers were generally inclined to hold, with Locke,\nthat the proper function of government is principally negative, to\npreserve order and defend life and property, not to aim directly at the\nimprovement of society, but to secure the conditions in which men may\npursue their own legitimate aims. Most of the French theorists believed\nin the possibility of moulding society indefinitely by political action,\nand rested their hopes for the future not only on the achievements of\nscience, but on the enlightened activity of governments. This difference\nof view tended to give to the doctrine of Progress in France more\npractical significance than in England.\n\nBut otherwise British soil was ready to receive the idea. There was the\nsame optimistic temper among the comfortable classes in both countries.\nShaftesbury, the Deist, had struck this note at the beginning of the\ncentury by his sanguine theory, which was expressed in Pope's banal\nphrase: \"Whatever is, is right,\" and was worked into a system by\nHutcheson. This optimism penetrated into orthodox circles. Progress, far\nfrom appearing as a rival of Providence, was discussed in the interests\nof Christianity by the Scotch theologian, Turnbull. [Footnote: The\nPrinciples of Modern Philosophy, 1740.]\n\n2.\n\nThe theory of the indefinite progress of civilisation left Hume cold.\nThere is little ground, he argued, to suppose that \"the world\" is\neternal or incorruptible. It is probably mortal, and must therefore,\nwith all things in it, have its infancy, youth, manhood, and old age;\nand man will share in these changes of state. We must then expect that\nthe human species should, when the world is in the age of manhood,\npossess greater bodily and mental vigour, longer life, and a stronger\ninclination and power of generation. But it is impossible to determine\nwhen this stage is reached. For the gradual revolutions are too slow to\nbe discernible in the short period known to us by history and tradition.\nPhysically and in mental powers men have been pretty much the same in\nall known ages. The sciences and arts have flourished now and have again\ndecayed, but when they reached the highest perfection among one people,\nthe neighbouring peoples were perhaps wholly unacquainted with them. We\nare therefore uncertain whether at present man is advancing to his point\nof perfection or declining from it. [Footnote: Essay on the Populousness\nof Ancient Nations, ad init. ]\n\nThe argument is somewhat surprising in an eighteenth century thinker\nlike Hume, but it did not prevent him from recognising the superiority\nof modern to ancient civilisation. This superiority forms indeed the\nminor premiss in the general argument by which he confuted the commonly\nreceived opinion as to the populousness of ancient nations. He insisted\non the improvements in art and industry, on the greater liberty and\nsecurity enjoyed by modern men. \"To one who considers coolly on the\nsubject,\" he remarked, \"it will appear that human nature in general\nreally enjoys more liberty at present in the most arbitrary government\nof Europe than it ever did during the most flourishing period of ancient\ntimes.\" [Footnote: The justification of this statement was the abolition\nof slavery in Europe.]\n\nHe discussed many of the problems of civilisation, especially the\nconditions in which the arts and sciences flourish, [Footnote: Essay on\nthe Rise of Arts and Sciences.] and drew some general conclusions, but\nhe was too sceptical to suppose that any general synthesis of history is\npossible, or that any considerable change for the better in the manners\nof mankind is likely to occur. [Footnote: Cf. Essay on the Idea of a\nPerfect Commonwealth, ad init.]\n\nThe greatest work dealing with social problems, that Britain produced\nin the eighteenth century, was Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, and his\nluminous exposition of the effects of the division of labour was the\nmost considerable contribution made by British thinkers of the age\nto the study of human development. It is much more than a treatise\non economic principles; it contains a history of the gradual economic\nprogress of human society, and it suggests the expectation of an\nindefinite augmentation of wealth and well-being. Smith was entirely\nat one with the French Economists on the value of opulence for the\ncivilisation and happiness of mankind. But it was indirectly perhaps\nthat his work contributed most effectively to the doctrine of the\nProgress of collective mankind. [Footnote: It has been observed by\nMr. Leslie Stephen that the doctrine of the rights of man lies in the\nbackground of Adam Smith's speculations.] His teaching that the free\ncommercial intercourse of all the peoples of the world, unfettered by\ngovernment policies, was to the greatest advantage of each, presented an\nideal of the economic \"solidarity\" of the race, which was one element in\nthe ideal of Progress. And this principle soon began to affect practice.\nPitt assimilated it when he was a young man, and it is one of the\ndistinctions of his statesmanship that he endeavoured to apply the\ndoctrines of his master so far as the prevailing prejudices would allow\nhim.\n\n3.\n\nA few writers of less weight and fame than Hume or Smith expressly\nstudied history in the light of Progress. It would not help us, in\nfollowing the growth of the idea, to analyse the works of Ferguson,\nDunbar, or Priestley. [Footnote: In his Essay on the History of Civil\nSociety Adam Ferguson treated the growth of civilisation as due to the\nprogressive nature of man, which insists on carrying him forward to\nlimits impossible to ascertain. He formulated the process as a\nmovement from simplicity to complexity, but contributed little to its\nexplanation.] But I will quote one passage from Priestley, the most\neminent of the three, and the most enthusiastic for the Progress of man.\nAs the division of labour--the chief principle of organised society--is\ncarried further he anticipates that\n\n... nature, including both its materials and its laws, will be more at\nour command; men will make their situation in this world abundantly more\neasy and comfortable; they will probably prolong their existence in it\nand will grow daily more happy.... Thus, whatever was the beginning of\nthis world, the end will be glorious and paradisiacal beyond what our\nimaginations can now conceive. Extravagant as some people may suppose\nthese views to be, I think I could show them to be fairly suggested by\nthe true theory of human nature and to arise from the natural course of\nhuman affairs.\n\n[Footnote: This passage of Priestley occurs in his Essay on the First\nPrinciples of Government and on the Nature of Political, Civil, and\nReligious Liberty (1768, 2nd ed. 1771), pp. 2-4. His Lectures on History\nand General Policy appeared in 1788.\n\nPriestley was a strict utilitarian, who held that there is nothing\nintrinsically excellent in justice and veracity apart from their\nrelation to happiness. The degree of public happiness is measured by\nthe excellence of religion, science, government, laws, arts, commerce,\nconveniences of life, and especially by the degrees of personal security\nand personal liberty. In all these the ancients were inferior, and\ntherefore they enjoyed less happiness. The present state of Europe is\nvastly preferable to what it was in any former period. And \"the plan of\nthis divine drama is opening more and more.\" In the future, Knowledge\nwill increase and accumulate and diffuse itself to the lower ranks of\nsociety, who, by degrees, will find leisure for speculation; and looking\nbeyond their immediate employment, they will consider the complex\nmachine of society, and in time understand it better than those who now\nwrite about it.\n\nSee his Lectures, pp. 371, 388 sqq., 528-53.\n\nThe English thinker did not share all the views of his French masters.\nAs a Unitarian, he regarded Christianity as a \"great remedy of vice and\nignorance,\" part of the divine plan; and he ascribed to government\na lesser role than they in the improvement of humanity. He held, for\ninstance, that the state should not interfere in education, arguing that\nthis art was still in the experimental stage, and that the intervention\nof the civil power might stereotype a bad system.\n\nNot less significant, though less influential, than the writings of\nPriestley and Ferguson was the work of James Dunbar, Professor of\nPhilosophy at Aberdeen, entitled Essays on the History of Mankind\nin Rude and Cultivated Ages (2nd ed., 1781). He conceived history as\nprogressive, and inquired into the general causes which determine\nthe gradual improvements of civilisation. He dealt at length with\nthe effects of climate and local circumstances, but unlike the French\nphilosophers did not ignore heredity. While he did not enter upon any\ndiscussion of future developments, he threw out incidentally the idea\nthat the world may be united in a league of nations.\n\nPosterity, he wrote, \"may contemplate, from a concurrence of various\ncauses and events, some of which are hastening into light, the greater\npart, or even the whole habitable globe, divided among nations free and\nindependent in all the interior functions of government, forming one\npolitical and commercial system\" (p. 287).\n\nDunbar's was an optimistic book, but his optimism was more cautious than\nPriestley's. These are his final words:\n\nIf human nature is liable to degenerate, it is capable of proportionable\nimprovement from the collected wisdom of ages. It is pleasant to infer\nfrom the actual progress of society, the glorious possibilities of human\nexcellence. And, if the principles can be assembled into view, which\nmost directly tend to diversify the genius and character of nations,\nsome theory may be raised on these foundations that shall account\nmore systematically for past occurrences and afford some openings and\nanticipations into the eventual history of the world.]\n\nThe problem of dark ages, which an advocate of Progress must explain,\nwas waved away by Priestley in his Lectures on History with the\nobservation that they help the subsequent advance of knowledge by\n\"breaking the progress of authority.\" [Footnote: This was doubtless\nsuggested to him by some remarks of Hume in The Rise of Arts and\nSciences.] This is not much of a plea for such periods viewed as\nmachinery in a Providential plan. The great history of the Middle Ages,\nwhich in the words of its author describes \"the triumph of barbarism and\nreligion,\" had been completed before Priestley's Lectures appeared, and\nit is remarkable that he takes no account of it, though it might seem to\nbe a work with which a theory of Progress must come to terms.\n\nYet the sceptical historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman\nEmpire, who was more at home in French literature than any of his\nfellow-countrymen, was not opposed to the theory of Progress, and he\neven states it in a moderate form. Having given reasons for believing\nthat civilised society will never again be threatened by such\nan irruption of barbarians as that which oppressed the arms and\ninstitutions of Rome, he allows us to \"acquiesce in the pleasing\nconclusion that every age of the world has increased, and still\nincreases, the real wealth, the happiness, the knowledge and perhaps the\nvirtue of the human race.\"\n\n\"The discoveries of ancient and modern navigators, and the domestic\nhistory or tradition of the most enlightened nations, represent the\nHUMAN SAVAGE, naked both in mind and body, and destitute of laws, of\narts, of ideas, and almost of language. From this abject condition,\nperhaps the primitive and universal state of man, he has gradually\narisen to command the animals, to fertilise the earth, to traverse the\nocean, and to measure the heavens. His progress in the improvement and\nexercise of his mental and corporeal faculties has been irregular and\nvarious, infinitely slow in the beginning, and increasing by degrees\nwith redoubled velocity; ages of laborious ascent have been followed by\na moment of rapid downfall; and the several climates of the globe have\nfelt the vicissitudes of light and darkness. Yet the experience of four\nthousand years should enlarge our hopes and diminish our apprehensions;\nwe cannot determine to what height the human species may aspire in\ntheir advances towards perfection; but it may safely be presumed that\nno people, unless the face of nature is changed, will relapse into their\noriginal barbarism.\" [Footnote: Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,\nch. xxxviii. ad fin.]\n\nBut Gibbon treats the whole subject as a speculation, and he treats\nit without reference to any of the general principles on which French\nthinkers had based their theory. He admits that his reasons for holding\nthat civilisation is secure against a barbarous cataclysm may be\nconsidered fallacious; and he also contemplates the eventuality that\nthe fabric of sciences and arts, trade and manufacture, law and policy,\nmight be \"decayed by time.\" If so, the growth of civilisation would have\nto begin again, but not ab initio. For \"the more useful or at least\nmore necessary arts,\" which do not require superior talents or national\nsubordination for their exercise, and which war, commerce, and religious\nzeal have spread among the savages of the world, would certainly\nsurvive.\n\nThese remarks are no more than obiter dicta but they show how the\ndoctrine of Progress was influencing those who were temperamentally the\nleast likely to subscribe to extravagant theories.\n\n4.\n\nThe outbreak of the French Revolution evoked a sympathetic movement\namong English progressive thinkers which occasioned the Government\nno little alarm. The dissenting minister Dr. Richard Price, whose\nObservations on Civil Liberty (1776), defending the action of the\nAmerican colonies, had enjoyed an immense success, preached the sermon\nwhich provoked Burke to write his Reflections; and Priestley, no\nless enthusiastic in welcoming the Revolution, replied to Burke. The\nGovernment resorted to tyrannous measures; young men who sympathised\nwith the French movement and agitated for reforms at home were sent to\nBotany Bay. Paine was prosecuted for his Rights of Man, which directly\npreached revolution. But the most important speculative work of the\ntime, William Godwin's Political Justice, escaped the censorship because\nit was not published at a popular price. [Footnote: Godwin had helped to\nget Paine's book published in 1791, and he was intimate with the group\nof revolutionary spirits who were persecuted by the Government. A good\naccount of the episode will be found in Brailsford's Shelley, Godwin,\nand their Circle.]\n\nThe Enquiry concerning Political Justice, begun in 1791, appeared in\n1793. The second edition, three years later, shows the influence of\nCondorcet's Sketch, which had appeared in the meantime. Godwin says\nthat his original idea was to produce a work on political science to\nsupersede Montesquieu. The note of Montesquieu's political philosophy\nwas respect for social institutions. Godwin's principle was that social\ninstitutions are entirely pernicious, that they perpetuate harmful\nprejudices, and are an almost insuperable obstacle to improvement. If\nhe particularly denounced monarchical government, he regarded all\ngovernment as evil, and held that social progress would consist, not in\nthe reformation of government, but in its abolition. While he recognised\nthat man had progressed in the past, he considered history mainly a\nsequence of horrors, and he was incapable of a calm survey of the course\nof civilisation. In English institutions he saw nothing that did not\noutrage the principles of justice and benevolence. The present state of\nhumanity is about as bad as it could be.\n\nIt is easy to see the deep influence which the teaching of Rousseau\nexercised on Godwin. Without accepting the theory of Arcadia Godwin\nfollowed him in unsparing condemnation of existing conditions. Rousseau\nand Godwin are the two great champions in the eighteenth century of the\ntoiling and suffering masses. But Godwin drew the logical conclusion\nfrom Rousseau's premisses which Rousseau hesitated to draw himself. The\nFrench thinker, while he extolled the anarchical state of uncivilised\nsociety, and denounced government as one of the sources of its\ncorruption, nevertheless sought the remedy in new social and political\ninstitutions. Godwin said boldly, government is the evil; government\nmust go. Humanity can never be happy until all political authority and\nsocial institutions disappear.\n\nNow the peculiarity of Godwin's position as a doctrinaire of Progress\nlies in the fact that he entertained the same pessimistic view of\nsome important sides of civilisation as Rousseau, and at the same time\nadopted the theories of Rousseau's opponents, especially Helvetius. His\nsurvey of human conditions seems to lead inevitably to pessimism; then\nhe turns round and proclaims the doctrine of perfectibility.\n\nThe explanation of this argument was the psychological theory of\nHelvetius. He taught, as we saw, and Godwin developed the view in his\nown way, that the natures and characters of men are moulded entirely by\ntheir environment--not physical, but intellectual and moral environment,\nand therefore can be indefinitely modified. A man is born into the world\nwithout innate tendencies. His conduct depends on his opinions. Alter\nmen's opinions and they will act differently. Make their opinions\nconformable to justice and benevolence, and you will have a just and\nbenevolent society. Virtue, as Socrates taught, is simply a question of\nknowledge. The situation, therefore, is not hopeless. For it is not due\nto the radical nature of man; it is caused by ignorance and prejudice,\nby governments and institutions, by kings and priests. Transform the\nideas of men, and society will be transformed. The French philosopher\nconsidered that a reformed system of educating children would be one of\nthe most powerful means for promoting progress and bringing about the\nreign of reason; and Condorcet worked out a scheme of universal state\neducation. This was entirely opposed to Godwin's principles. State\nschools would only be another instrument of power in the hands of a\ngovernment, worse even than a state Church. They would strengthen the\npoisonous influence of kings and statesmen, and establish instead of\nabolishing prejudices. He seems to have relied entirely on the private\nefforts of enlightened thinkers to effect a gradual conversion of public\nopinion.\n\nIn his study of the perfectibility of man and the prospect of a future\nreign of general justice and benevolence, Godwin was even more visionary\nthan Condorcet, as in his political views he was more radical than the\nRevolutionists. Condorcet had at least sought to connect his picture of\nthe future with a reasoned survey of the past, and to find a chain of\nconnection, but the perfectibility of Godwin hung in the air, supported\nonly by an abstract theory of the nature of man.\n\nIt can hardly be said that he contributed anything to the theoretical\nproblem of civilisation. His significance is that he proclaimed in\nEngland at an opportune moment, and in a more impressive and startling\nway than a sober apostle like Priestley, the creed of progress taught by\nFrench philosophers, though considerably modified by his own anarchical\nopinions.\n\n5.\n\nPerfectibility, as expounded by Condorcet and Godwin, encountered\na drastic criticism from Malthus, whose Essay on the Principle of\nPopulation appeared in its first form anonymously in 1798. Condorcet had\nforeseen an objection which might be raised as fatal to the realisation\nof his future state. Will not the progress of industry and happiness\ncause a steady increase in population, and must not the time come when\nthe number of the inhabitants of the globe will surpass their means of\nsubsistence? Condorcet did not grapple with this question. He contented\nhimself with saying that such a period must be very far away, and that\nby then \"the human race will have achieved improvements of which we can\nnow scarcely form an idea.\" Similarly Godwin, in his fancy picture of\nthe future happiness of mankind, notices the difficulty and shirks it.\n\"Three-fourths of the habitable globe are now uncultivated. The parts\nalready cultivated are capable of immeasurable improvement. Myriads of\ncenturies of still increasing population may pass away and the earth be\nstill found sufficient for the subsistence of its inhabitants.\"\n\nMalthus argued that these writers laboured under an illusion as to the\nactual relations between population and the means of subsistence. In\npresent conditions the numbers of the race are only kept from increasing\nfar beyond the means of subsistence by vice, misery, and the fear of\nmisery. [Footnote: This observation had been made (as Hazlitt pointed\nout) before Malthus by Robert Wallace (see A Dissertation on the Numbers\nof Mankind, p. 13, 1753). It was another book of Wallace that suggested\nthe difficulty to Godwin.] In the conditions imagined by Condorcet and\nGodwin these checks are removed, and consequently the population would\nincrease with great rapidity, doubling itself at least in twenty-five\nyears. But the products of the earth increase only in an arithmetical\nprogression, and in fifty years the food supply would be too small for\nthe demand. Thus the oscillation between numbers and food supply would\nrecur, and the happiness of the species would come to an end.\n\nGodwin and his adherents could reply that one of the checks on\nover-population is prudential restraint, which Malthus himself\nrecognised, and that this would come more extensively into operation\nwith that progress of enlightenment which their theory assumed.\n[Footnote: This is urged by Hazlitt in his criticism of Malthus in the\nSpirit of the Age.] But the criticisms of Malthus dealt a trenchant\nblow to the doctrine that human reason, acting through legislation and\ngovernment, has a virtually indefinite power of modifying the condition\nof society. The difficulty, which he stated so vividly and definitely,\nwas well calculated to discredit the doctrine, and to suggest that the\ndevelopment of society could be modified by the conscious efforts of man\nonly within restricted limits. [Footnote: The recent conclusions of Mr.\nKnibbs, statistician to the Commonwealth of Australia, in vol. i. of\nhis Appendix to the Census of the Commonwealth, have an interest in this\nconnection. I quote from an article in the Times of August 5, 1918: \"An\neminent geographer, the late Mr. E. G. Ravenstein, some years ago, when\nthe population of the earth was estimated at 1400 million, foretold that\nabout the middle of this century population would have reached a\nlimit beyond which increase would be disastrous. Mr. Knibbs is not so\npessimistic and is much more precise; though he defers the disastrous\nculmination, he has no doubt as to its inevitability. The limits of\nhuman expansion, he assures us, are much nearer than popular opinion\nimagines; the difficulty of food supplies will soon be most grave; the\nexhaustion of sources of energy necessary for any notable increase of\npopulation, or advance in the standards of living, or both combined, is\nperilously near. The present rate of increase in the world's population\ncannot continue for four centuries.\"]\n\n6.\n\nThe Essay of Malthus afterwards became one of the sacred books of the\nUtilitarian sect, and it is interesting to notice what Bentham himself\nthought of perfectibility. Referring to the optimistic views of\nChastellux and Priestley on progressive amelioration he observed that\n\"these glorious expectations remind us of the golden age of poetry.\"\nFor perfect happiness \"belongs to the imaginary region of philosophy and\nmust be classed with the universal elixir and the philosopher's stone.\"\nThere will always be jealousies through the unequal gifts of nature and\nof fortune; interests will never cease to clash and hatred to ensue;\n\"painful labour, daily subjection, a condition nearly allied to\nindigence, will always be the lot of numbers\"; in art and poetry the\nsources of novelty will probably be exhausted. But Bentham was far from\nbeing a pessimist. Though he believes that \"we shall never make this\nworld the abode of happiness,\" he asserts that it may be made a most\ndelightful garden \"compared with the savage forest in which men so long\nhave wandered.\" [Footnote: Works, vol. i. p. 193 seq.]\n\n7.\n\nThe book of Malthus was welcomed at the moment by all those who had been\nthoroughly frightened by the French Revolution and saw in the \"modern\nphilosophy,\" as it was called, a serious danger to society. [Footnote:\nBoth Hazlitt and Shelley thought that Malthus was playing to the\nboxes, by sophisms \"calculated to lull the oppressors of mankind into\na security of everlasting triumph\" (Revolt of Islam, Preface). Bentham\nrefers in his Book of Fallacies (Works, ii. p. 462) to the unpopularity\nof the views of Priestley, Godwin, and Condorcet: \"to aim at perfection\nhas been pronounced to be utter folly or wickedness.\"] Vice and misery\nand the inexorable laws of population were a godsend to rescue the state\nfrom \"the precipice of perfectibility.\" We can understand the alarm\noccasioned to believers in the established constitution of things, for\nGodwin's work--now virtually forgotten, while Malthus is still appealed\nto as a discoverer in social science--produced an immense effect on\nimpressionable minds at the time. All who prized liberty, sympathised\nwith the downtrodden, and were capable of falling in love with social\nideals, hailed Godwin as an evangelist. \"No one,\" said a contemporary,\n\"was more talked of, more looked up to, more sought after; and wherever\nliberty, truth, justice was the theme, his name was not far off.\" Young\ngraduates left the Universities to throw themselves at the feet of the\nnew Gamaliel; students of law and medicine neglected their professional\nstudies to dream of \"the renovation of society and the march of\nmind.\" Godwin carried with him \"all the most sanguine and fearless\nunderstandings of the time.\" [Footnote: Hazlitt, Spirit of the Age:\narticle on Godwin (written in 1814).]\n\nThe most famous of his disciples were the poets Wordsworth, Coleridge,\nSouthey, and afterwards Shelley. Wordsworth had been an ardent\nsympathiser with the French Revolution. In its early days he had visited\nParis:\n\n\n         An emporium then\n   Of golden expectations and receiving\n   Freights every day from a new world of hope.\n\n\nHe became a Godwinian in 1795, when the Terror had destroyed his faith\nin Revolutionary France. Southey, who had come under the influence of\nRousseau, was initiated by Coleridge into Godwin's theories, and\nin their utopian enthusiasm they formed the design of founding a\n\"pantisocratic\" settlement in America, to show how happiness could be\nrealised in a social environment in which duty and interest coincide and\nconsequently all are virtuous. The plan anticipated the experiments\nof Owen and Cabet; but the pantisocrats did not experience the\ndisappointments of the socialists, for it was never carried out.\nColeridge and Southey as well as Wordsworth soon abandoned their\nGodwinian doctrines. [Footnote: In letters of 1797 and 1798 Coleridge\nrepudiated the French doctrines and Godwin's philosophy. See Cestre, La\nRevolution francaise et les poetes anglais (1789-1809), pp. 389, 414.]\nThey had, to use a phrase of Hazlitt, lost their way in Utopia, and they\ngave up the abstract and mechanical view of society which the French\nphilosophy of the eighteenth century taught, for an organic conception\nin which historic sentiment and the wisdom of our ancestors had their\ndue place. Wordsworth could presently look back and criticise his\nGodwinian phase as that of\n\n\n  A proud and most presumptuous confidence\n   In the transcendent wisdom of the age\n   And its discernment. [Footnote: Excursion, Book ii.]\n\n\nHe and Southey became conservative pillars of the state. Yet Southey,\nreactionary as he was in politics, never ceased to believe in social\nProgress. [Footnote: See his Colloquies; and Shelley, writing in 1811,\nsays that Southey \"looks forward to a state when all shall be perfected\nand matter become subjected to the omnipotence of mind\" (Dowden, Life of\nShelley, i. p. 212). Compare below, p. 325.] Amelioration was indeed to\nbe effected by slow and cautious reforms, with the aid of the Church,\nbut the intellectual aberrations of his youth had left an abiding\nimpression.\n\nWhile these poets were sitting at Godwin's feet, Shelley was still a\nchild. But he came across Political Justice at Eton; in his later life\nhe reread it almost every year; and when he married Godwin's daughter he\nwas more Godwinian than Godwin himself. Hazlitt, writing in 1814, says\nthat Godwin's reputation had \"sunk below the horizon,\" but Shelley\nnever ceased to believe in his theory, though he came to see that the\nregeneration of man would be a much slower process than he had at first\nimagined. In the immature poem Queen Mab the philosophy of Godwin was\nbehind his description of the future, and it was behind the longer and\nmore ambitious poems of his maturer years. The city of gold, of the\nRevolt of Islam, is Godwin's future society, and he describes that\npoem as \"an experiment on the temper of the public mind as to how far a\nthirst for a happier condition of moral and political society survives,\namong the enlightened and refined, the tempests which have shaken the\nage in which we live.\" As to Prometheus Unbound his biographer observes:\n[Footnote: Dowden, ib. ii. p. 264. Elsewhere Dowden remarks on the\nsingular insensibility of Shelley's mind \"to the wisdom or sentiment of\nhistory\" (i. p. 55).]\n\nAll the glittering fallacies of \"Political Justice\"--now sufficiently\ntarnished--together with all its encouraging and stimulating truths,\nmay be found in the caput mortuum left when the critic has reduced the\npoetry of the \"Prometheus\" to a series of doctrinaire statements.\n\nThe same dream inspired the final chorus of Hellas. Shelley was the poet\nof perfectibility.\n\n8.\n\nThe attraction of perfectibility reached beyond the ranks of men of\nletters, and in Robert Owen, the benevolent millowner of Lanark, it\nhad an apostle who based upon it a very different theory from that of\nPolitical Justice and became one of the founders of modern socialism.\n\nThe success of the idea of Progress has been promoted by its association\nwith socialism. [Footnote: The word was independently invented in\nEngland and France. An article in the Poor Man's Guardian (a periodical\nedited by H. Hetherington, afterwards by Bronterre O'Brien), Aug. 24,\n1833, is signed \"A Socialist\"; and in 1834 socialisme is opposed to\nindividualism by P. Leroux in an article in the Revue Encyclopedique.\nThe word is used in the New Moral World, and from 1836 was applied to\nthe Owenites. See Dolleans, Robert Owen (1907), p. 305.] The first phase\nof socialism, what has been called its sentimental phase, was originated\nby Saint-Simon in France and Owen in England at about the same time;\nMarx was to bring it down from the clouds and make it a force in\npractical politics. But both in its earlier and in its later forms the\neconomical doctrines rest upon a theory of society depending on the\nassumption, however disguised, that social institutions have been solely\nresponsible for the vice and misery which exist, and that institutions\nand laws can be so changed as to abolish misery and vice. That is\npure eighteenth century doctrine; and it passed from the revolutionary\ndoctrinaires of that period to the constructive socialists of the\nnineteenth century.\n\nOwen learned it probably from Godwin, and he did not disguise it. His\nnumerous works enforce it ad nauseam. He began the propagation of his\ngospel by his \"New View of Society, or Essays on the formation of the\nhuman character, preparatory to the development of a plan for gradually\nameliorating the condition of mankind,\" which he dedicated to the Prince\nRegent. [Footnote: 3rd ed. 1817. The Essays had appeared separately in\n1813-14.] Here he lays down that \"any general character, from the best\nto the worst, may be given to any community, even to the world at large,\nby the application of proper means; which means are to a great extent\nat the command and under the control of those who have influence in the\naffairs of men.\" [Footnote: P. 19.] The string on which he continually\nharps is that it is the cardinal error in government to suppose that\nmen are responsible for their vices and virtues, and therefore for their\nactions and characters. These result from education and institutions,\nand can be transformed automatically by transforming those agencies.\nOwen founded several short-lived journals to diffuse his theories. The\nfirst number of the New Moral World (1834-36) [Footnote: This was not\na journal, but a series of pamphlets which appeared in 1836-1844. Other\npublications of Owen were: Outline of the Rational System of Society\n(6th ed., Leeds, 1840); The Revolution in the Mind and Practice of\nthe Human Race, or the coming change from Irrationality to Rationality\n(1849); The Future of the Human Race, or a great, glorious and peaceful\nRevolution, near at hand, to be effected through the agency of departed\nspirits of good and superior men and women (1853); The New Existence of\nMan upon Earth, Parts i.-viii., 1854-55.] proclaimed the approach of an\nideal society in which there will be no ignorance, no poverty, and no\ncharity--a system \"which will ensure the happiness of the human race\nthroughout all future ages,\" to replace one \"which, so long as it shall\nbe maintained, must produce misery to all.\" His own experimental\nattempt to found such a society on a miniature scale in America proved a\nludicrous failure.\n\nIt is to be observed that in these socialist theories the conception of\nProgress as indefinite tends to vanish or to lose its significance. If\nthe millennium can be brought about at a stroke by a certain arrangement\nof society, the goal of development is achieved; we shall have reached\nthe term, and shall have only to live in and enjoy the ideal state--a\nmenagerie of happy men. There will be room for further, perhaps\nindefinite, advance in knowledge, but civilisation in its social\ncharacter becomes stable and rigid. Once man's needs are perfectly\nsatisfied in a harmonious environment there is no stimulus to cause\nfurther changes, and the dynamic character of history disappears.\n\nTheories of Progress are thus differentiating into two distinct types,\ncorresponding to two radically opposed political theories and appealing\nto two antagonistic temperaments. The one type is that of constructive\nidealists and socialists, who can name all the streets and towers\nof \"the city of gold,\" which they imagine as situated just round a\npromontory. The development of man is a closed system; its term is known\nand is within reach. The other type is that of those who, surveying\nthe gradual ascent of man, believe that by the same interplay of forces\nwhich have conducted him so far and by a further development of\nthe liberty which he has fought to win, he will move slowly towards\nconditions of increasing harmony and happiness. Here the development\nis indefinite; its term is unknown, and lies in the remote future.\nIndividual liberty is the motive force, and the corresponding political\ntheory is liberalism; whereas the first doctrine naturally leads to a\nsymmetrical system in which the authority of the state is preponderant,\nand the individual has little more value than a cog in a well-oiled\nwheel: his place is assigned; it is not his right to go his own way. Of\nthis type the principal example that is not socialistic is, as we shall\nsee, the philosophy of Comte.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII. GERMAN SPECULATIONS ON PROGRESS\n\n1.\n\nThe philosophical views current in Germany during the period in which\nthe psychology of Locke was in fashion in France and before the genius\nof Kant opened a new path, were based on the system of Leibnitz. We\nmight therefore expect to find a theory of Progress developed there,\nparallel to the development in France though resting on different\nprinciples. For Leibnitz, as we saw, provided in his cosmic optimism\na basis for the doctrine of human Progress, and he had himself\nincidentally pointed to it. This development, however, was delayed. It\nwas only towards the close of the period--which is commonly known as\nthe age of \"Illumination\"--that Progress came to the front, and it is\ninteresting to observe the reason.\n\nWolf was the leading successor and interpreter of Leibnitz. He\nconstrained that thinker's ideas into a compact logical system which\nswayed Germany till Kant swept it away. In such cases it usually\nhappens that some striking doctrines and tendencies of the master are\naccentuated and enforced, while others are suffered to drop out of\nsight.\n\nSo it was here. In the Wolfian system, Leibnitz's conception of\ndevelopment was suffered to drop out of sight, and the dynamic element\nwhich animated his speculation disappeared. In particular, he had laid\ndown that the sum of motive forces in the physical world is constant.\nHis disciples proceeded to the inference that the sum of morality in\nthe ethical world is constant. This dogma obviously eliminates the\npossibility of ethical improvement for collective humanity. And so we\nfind Mendelssohn, who was the popular exponent of Wolf's philosophy,\ndeclaring that \"progress is only for the individual; but that the whole\nof humanity here below in the course of time shall always progress and\nperfect itself seems to me not to have been the purpose of Providence.\"\n[Footnote: See Bock, Jakob Wegelin als Geschichtstheoretiker, in\nLeipsiger Studien, ix. 4, pp. 23-7 (1902).]\n\nThe publication of the Nouveaux Essais in 1765 induced some thinkers to\nturn from the dry bones of Wolf to the spirit of Leibnitz himself. And\nat the same time French thought was penetrating. In consequence of these\ninfluences the final phase of the German \"Illumination\" is marked by the\nappearance of two or three works in which Progress is a predominating\nidea.\n\nWe see this reaction against Wolf and his static school in a little\nwork published by Herder in 1774--\"a philosophy of history for the\ncultivation of mankind.\" There is continuous development, he declares,\nand one people builds upon the work of another. We must judge past ages,\nnot by the present, but relatively to their own particular conditions.\nWhat exists now was never possible before, for everything that man\naccomplishes is conditioned by time, climate, and circumstances.\n\nSix years later Lessing's pamphlet on the Education of the Human Race\nappeared, couched in the form of aphoristic statements, and to a modern\nreader, one may venture to say, singularly wanting in argumentative\nforce. The thesis is that the drama of history is to be explained as the\neducation of man by a progressive series of religions, a series not yet\ncomplete, for the future will produce another revelation to lift him\nto a higher plane than that to which Christ has drawn him up. This\ninterpretation of history proclaimed Progress, but assumed an ideal and\napplied a measure very different from those of the French philosophers.\nThe goal is not social happiness, but a full comprehension of God.\nPhilosophy of religion is made the key to the philosophy of history. The\nwork does not amount to more than a suggestion for a new synthesis, but\nit was opportune and arresting.\n\nHerder meanwhile had been thinking, and in 1784 he gave the German world\nhis survey of man's career--Ideas of the Philosophy of the History of\nHumanity. In this famous work, in which we can mark the influence of\nFrench thinkers, especially Montesquieu, as well as of Leibnitz, he\nattempted, though on very different lines, the same task which Turgot\nand Condorcet planned, a universal history of civilisation.\n\nThe Deity designed the world but never interferes in its process,\neither in the physical cosmos or in human history. Human history itself,\ncivilisation, is a purely natural phenomenon. Events are strictly\nenchained; continuity is unbroken; what happened at any given time could\nhave happened only then, and nothing else could have happened.\nHerder's rigid determinism not only excludes Voltaire's chance but also\nsuppresses the free play of man's intelligent will. Man cannot guide his\nown destinies; his actions and fortunes are determined by the nature\nof things, his physical organisation and physical environment. The\nfact that God exists in inactive ease hardly affects the fatalistic\ncomplexion of this philosophy; but it is perhaps a mitigation that the\nworld was made for man; humanity is its final cause.\n\nThe variety of the phases of civilisation that have appeared on earth\nis due to the fact that the possible manifestations of human nature are\nvery numerous and that they must all be realised. The lower forms are\nthose in which the best, which means the most human, faculties of our\nnature are undeveloped. The highest has not yet been realised. \"The\nflower of humanity, captive still in its germ, will blossom out one\nday into the true form of man like unto God, in a state of which no\nterrestrial man can imagine the greatness and the majesty.\" [Footnote:\nIdeen, v. 5.]\n\nHerder is not a systematic thinker--indeed his work abounds in\ncontradictions--and he has not made it clear how far this full epiphany\nresults from the experiences of mankind in preceding phases. He believes\nthat life is an education for humanity (he has taken the phrase of\nLessing), that good progressively develops, that reason and justice\nbecome more powerful. This is a doctrine of Progress, but he distinctly\nopposes the hypothesis of a final and unique state of perfection as the\ngoal of history, which would imply that earlier generations exist for\nthe sake of the later and suffer in order to ensure the felicity of\nremote posterity--a theory which offends his sense of justice and\nfitness. On the contrary, man can realise happiness equally in every\nstage of civilisation. All forms of society are equally legitimate, the\nimperfect as well as the perfect; all are ends in themselves, not mere\nstages on the way to something better. And a people which is happy in\none of these inferior states has a perfect right to remain in it.\n\nThus the Progress which Herder sees is, to use his own geometrical\nillustration, a sequence of unequal and broken curves, corresponding\nto different maxima and minima. Each curve has its own equation, the\nhistory of each people is subject to the laws of its own environment;\nbut there is no general law controlling the whole career of humanity.\n[Footnote: Ib. xv. 3. The power of ideas in history, which Herder failed\nto appreciate, was recognised by a contemporary savant from whom he\nmight have learned. Jakob Wegelin, a Swiss, had, at the invitation of\nFrederick the Great, settled in Berlin, where he spent the last years of\nhis life and devoted his study to the theory of history. His merit was\nto have perceived that \"external facts are penetrated and governed by\nspiritual forces and guiding ideas, and that the essential and permanent\nin history is conditioned by the nature and development of ideas.\"\n(Dierauer, quoted by Bock, op. cit. p. 13.) He believed in the\nprogressive development of mankind as a whole, but as his learned\nbrochures seem to have exerted no influence, it would be useless here to\nexamine more closely his views, which are buried in the transactions\nof the Prussian Academy of Science. In Switzerland he came under the\ninfluence of Rousseau and d'Alembert. After he moved to Berlin (1765)\nhe fell under that of Leibnitz. It may be noted (1) that he deprecated\nattempts at writing a universal history as premature until an adequate\nknowledge of facts had been gained, and this would demand long\npreliminary labours; (2) that he discussed the question whether history\nis an indefinite progression or a series of constant cycles, and decided\nfor the former view. (Memoire sur le cours periodique, 1785).\nBock's monograph is the best study of Wegelin; but see also Flint's\nobservations in Philosophy of History, vol. i. (1874).]\n\nHerder brought down his historical survey only as far as the sixteenth\ncentury. It has been suggested [Footnote: Javary, De l'idee de progres,\np. 69.] that if he had come down further he might have comprehended\nthe possibility of a deliberate transformation of societies by the\nintelligent action of the human will--an historical force to which he\ndoes not do justice, apparently because he fancied it incompatible\nwith strict causal sequence. The value of his work does not lie in\nthe philosophical principles which he applied. Nor was it a useful\ncontribution to history; of him it has been said, as of Bossuet, that\nfacts bent like grass under his feet. [Footnote: Jouffroy, Melanges,\np. 81.] But it was a notable attempt to do for human phenomena what\nLeibnitz in his Theodicy sought to do for the cosmos, and it pointed\nthe way to the rationalistic philosophies of history which were to be a\nfeature of the speculations of the following century.\n\n2.\n\nThe short essay of Kant, which he clumsily called the Idea of a\nUniversal History on a Cosmopolitical Plan, [Footnote: 1784. This work\nof Kant was translated by De Quincey (Works, vol. ix. 428 sqq., ed.\nMasson), who is responsible for cosmopolitical as the rendering of\nweltburgerlich.] approaches the problems raised by the history of\ncivilisation from a new point of view.\n\nHe starts with the principle of invariable law. On any theory of free\nwill, he says, human actions are as completely under the control of\nuniversal-laws of nature as any other physical phenomena. This is\nillustrated by statistics. Registers of births, deaths, and marriages\nshow that these events occur with as much conformity to laws of nature\nas the oscillations of the weather.\n\nIt is the same with the great sequence of historical events. Taken alone\nand individually, they seem incoherent and lawless; but viewed in their\nconnection, as due to the action not of individuals but of the human\nspecies, they do not fail to reveal \"a regular stream of tendency.\"\nPursuing their own often contradictory purposes, individual nations and\nindividual men are unconsciously promoting a process to which if they\nperceived it they would pay little regard.\n\nIndividual men do not obey a law. They do not obey the laws of instinct\nlike animals, nor do they obey, as rational citizens of the world would\ndo, the laws of a preconcerted plan. If we look at the stage of history\nwe see scattered and occasional indications of wisdom, but the general\nsum of men's actions is \"a web of folly, childish vanity, and often even\nof the idlest wickedness and spirit of destruction.\"\n\nThe problem for the philosopher is to discover a meaning in this\nsenseless current of human actions, so that the history of creatures who\npursue no plan of their own may yet admit of a systematic form. The clew\nto this form is supplied by the predispositions of human nature.\n\nI have stated this problem almost in Kant's words, and as he might have\nstated it if he had not introduced the conception of final causes. His\nuse of the postulate of final causes without justifying it is a defect\nin his essay. He identifies what he well calls a stream of tendency with\n\"a natural purpose.\" He makes no attempt to show that the succession of\nevents is such that it cannot be explained without the postulate of a\npurpose. His solution of the problem is governed by this conception of\nfinality, and by the unwarranted assumption that nature does nothing in\nvain.\n\nHe lays down that all the tendencies to which any creature is\npredisposed by its nature must in the end be developed perfectly and\nagreeably to their final purpose. Those predispositions in man\nwhich serve the use of his reason are therefore destined to be fully\ndeveloped. This destiny, however, cannot be realised in the individual;\nit can only be realised in the species. For reason works tentatively,\nby progress and regress. Each man would require an inordinate length of\ntime to make a perfect use of his natural tendencies. Therefore, as life\nis short, an incalculable series of generations is needed.\n\nThe means which nature employs to develop these tendencies is the\nantagonism which in man's social state exists between his gregarious\nand his antigregarious tendencies. His antigregarious nature expresses\nitself in the desire to force all things to comply to his own humour.\nHence ambition, love of honour, avarice. These were necessary to raise\nmankind from the savage to the civilised state. But for these antisocial\npropensities men would be gentle as sheep, and \"an Arcadian life would\narise, of perfect harmony and mutual love, such as must suffocate and\nstifle all talents in their very germs.\" Nature, knowing better than man\nwhat is good for the species, ordains discord. She is to be thanked\nfor competition and enmity, and for the thirst of power and wealth. For\nwithout these the final purpose of realising man's rational nature would\nremain unfulfilled. This is Kant's answer to Rousseau.\n\nThe full realisation of man's rational nature is possible only in\na \"universal civil society\" founded on political justice. The\nestablishment of such a society is the highest problem for the human\nspecies. Kant contemplates, as the political goal, a confederation of\nstates in which the utmost possible freedom shall be united with the\nmost rigorous determination of the boundaries of freedom.\n\nIs it reasonable to suppose that a universal or cosmopolitical society\nof this kind will come into being; and if so, how will it be brought\nabout? Political changes in the relations of states are generally\nproduced by war. Wars are tentative endeavours to bring about new\nrelations and to form new political bodies. Are combinations and\nrecombinations to continue until by pure chance some rational\nself-supporting system emerges? Or is it possible that no such condition\nof society may ever arrive, and that ultimately all progress may be\noverwhelmed by a hell of evils? Or, finally, is Nature pursuing her\nregular course of raising the species by its own spontaneous efforts\nand developing, in the apparently wild succession of events, man's\noriginally implanted tendencies?\n\nKant accepts the last alternative on the ground that it is not\nreasonable to assume a final purpose in particular natural processes and\nat the same time to assume that there is no final purpose in the whole.\nThus his theory of Progress depends on the hypothesis of final causes.\n\nIt follows that to trace the history of mankind is equivalent to\nunravelling a hidden plan of Nature for accomplishing a perfect civil\nconstitution for a universal society; since a universal society is\nthe sole state in which the tendencies of human nature can be fully\ndeveloped. We cannot determine the orbit of the development, because the\nwhole period is so vast and only a small fraction is known to us, but\nthis is enough to show that there is a definite course.\n\nKant thinks that such a \"cosmopolitical\" history, as he calls it, is\npossible, and that if it were written it would give us a clew opening up\n\"a consolatory prospect into futurity, in which at a remote distance we\nshall discover the human species seated upon an eminence won by infinite\ntoil, where all the germs are unfolded which nature has implanted and\nits own destination upon this earth accomplished.\"\n\n3.\n\nBut to see the full bearing of Kant's discussion we must understand its\nconnection with his ethics. For his ethical theory is the foundation and\nthe motive of his speculation on Progress. The progress on which he lays\nstress is moral amelioration; he refers little to scientific or material\nprogress. For him morality was an absolute obligation founded in the\nnature of reason. Such an obligation presupposes an end to be attained,\nand this end is a reign of reason under which all men obeying the moral\nlaw mutually treat each other as ends in themselves. Such an ideal state\nmust be regarded as possible, because it is a necessary postulate of\nreason. From this point of view it may be seen that Kant's speculation\non universal history is really a discussion whether the ideal state,\nwhich is required as a subjective postulate in the interest of ethics,\nis likely to be realised objectively.\n\nNow, Kant does not assert that because our moral reason must assume the\npossibility of this hypothetical goal civilisation is therefore moving\ntowards it. That would be a fallacy into which he was incapable of\nfalling. Civilisation is a phenomenon, and anything we know about it can\nonly be inferred from experience. His argument is that there are actual\nindications of progress in this desirable direction. He pointed to the\ncontemporary growth of civil liberty and religious liberty, and these\nare conditions of moral improvement. So far his argument coincides in\nprinciple with that of French theorists of Progress. But Kant goes on\nto apply to these data the debatable conception of final causes, and to\ninfer a purpose in the development of humanity. Only this inference is\nput forward as a hypothesis, not as a dogma.\n\nIt is probable that what hindered Kant from broaching his theory of\nProgress with as much confidence as Condorcet was his perception that\nnothing could be decisively affirmed about the course of civilisation\nuntil the laws of its movement had been discovered. He saw that this was\na matter for scientific investigation. He says expressly that the laws\nare not yet known, and suggests that some future genius may do for\nsocial phenomena what Kepler and Newton did for the heavenly bodies. As\nwe shall see, this is precisely what some of the leading French thinkers\nof the next generation will attempt to do.\n\nBut cautiously though he framed the hypothesis Kant evidently considered\nProgress probable. He recognised that the most difficult obstacle to the\nmoral advance of man lies in war and the burdens which the possibility\nof war imposes. And he spent much thought on the means by which war\nmight be abolished. He published a philosophical essay on Perpetual\nPeace, in which he formulated the articles of an international treaty to\nsecure the disappearance of war. He considered that, while a universal\nrepublic would be the positive ideal, we shall probably have to be\ncontented with what he calls a negative substitute, consisting in\na federation of peoples bound by a peace-alliance guaranteeing the\nindependence of each member. But to assure the permanence of this system\nit is essential that each state should have a democratic constitution.\nFor such a constitution is based on individual liberty and civil\nequality. All these changes should be brought about by legal reforms;\nrevolutions--he was writing in 1795---cannot be justified.\n\nWe see the influence of Rousseau's Social Contract and that of the Abbe\nde Saint-Pierre, with whose works Kant was acquainted. There can be\nlittle doubt that it was the influence of French thought, so powerful\nin Germany at this period, that turned Kant's mind towards these\nspeculations, which belong to the latest period of his life and form a\nsort of appendix to his philosophical system. The theory of Progress,\nthe idea of universal reform, the doctrine of political equality--Kant\nexamined all these conceptions and appropriated them to the service of\nhis own highly metaphysical theory of ethics. In this new association\ntheir spirit was changed.\n\nIn France, as we saw, the theory of Progress was generally associated\nwith ethical views which could find a metaphysical basis in the\nsensationalism of Locke. A moral system which might be built on\nsensation, as the primary mental fact, was worked out by Helvetius. But\nthe principle that the supreme law of conduct is to obey nature had\ncome down as a practical philosophy from Rabelais and Montaigne through\nMoliere to the eighteenth century. It was reinforced by the theory of\nthe natural goodness of man. Jansenism had struggled against it and was\ndefeated. After theology it was the turn of metaphysics. Kant's moral\nimperative marked the next stage in the conflict of the two opposite\ntendencies which seek natural and ultra-natural sanctions for morality.\n\nHence the idea of progress had a different significance for Kant and for\nits French exponents, though his particular view of the future possibly\nin store for the human species coincided in some essential points with\ntheirs. But his theory of life gives a different atmosphere to the idea.\nIn France the atmosphere is emphatically eudaemonic; happiness is the\ngoal. Kant is an uncompromising opponent of eudaemonism. \"If we take\nenjoyment or happiness as the measure, it is easy,\" he says, \"to\nevaluate life. Its value is less than nothing. For who would begin one's\nlife again in the same conditions, or even in new natural conditions, if\none could choose them oneself, but of which enjoyment would be the sole\nend?\"\n\nThere was, in fact, a strongly-marked vein of pessimism in Kant. One\nof the ablest men of the younger generation who were brought up on his\nsystem founded the philosophical pessimism--very different in range and\ndepth from the sentimental pessimism of Rousseau--which was to play a\nremarkable part in German thought in the nineteenth century. [Footnote:\nKant's pessimism has been studied at length by von Hartmann, in Zur\nGeschichte und Begrundung des Pessimismus (1880).] Schopenhauer's\nunpleasant conclusion that of all conceivable worlds this is the\nworst, is one of the speculations for which Kant may be held ultimately\nresponsible. [Footnote: Schopenhauer recognised progress social,\neconomic, and political, but as a fact that contains no guarantee\nof happiness; on the contrary, the development of the intelligence\nincreases suffering. He ridiculed the optimistic ideals of comfortable,\nwell-regulated states. His views on historical development have been\ncollected by G. Sparlinsky, Schopenhauers Verhaltnis zur Geschichte, in\nBerner Studien s. Philosophie, Bd. lxxii. (1910).]\n\n4.\n\nKant's considerations on historical development are an appendix to his\nphilosophy; they are not a necessary part, wrought into the woof of his\nsystem. It was otherwise with his successors the Idealists, for whom his\nsystem was the point of departure, though they rejected its essential\nfeature, the limitation of human thought. With Fichte and Hegel\nprogressive development was directly deduced from their principles. If\ntheir particular interpretations of history have no permanent value, it\nis significant that, in their ambitious attempts to explain the universe\na priori, history was conceived as progressive, and their philosophies\ndid much to reinforce a conception which on very different principles\nwas making its way in the world. But the progress which their systems\ninvolved was not bound up with the interest of human happiness, but\nstood out as a fact which, whether agreeable or not, is a consequence of\nthe nature of thought.\n\nThe process of the universe, as it appeared to Fichte, [Footnote:\nFichte's philosophy of history will be found in Die Grundzuge des\ngegenwartigen Zeitalters (1806), lectures which he delivered at Berlin\nin 1804-5.] tends to a full realisation of \"freedom\"; that is its end\nand goal, but a goal that always recedes. It can never be reached; for\nits full attainment would mean the complete suppression of Nature. The\nprocess of the world, therefore, consists in an indefinite approximation\nto an unattainable ideal: freedom is being perpetually realised more and\nmore; and the world, as it ascends in this direction, becomes more and\nmore a realm of reason.\n\nWhat Fichte means by freedom may be best explained by its opposition to\ninstinct. A man acting instinctively may be acting quite reasonably,\nin a way which any one fully conscious of all the implications and\nconsequences of the action would judge to be reasonable. But in order\nthat his actions should be free he must himself be fully conscious of\nall those implications and consequences.\n\nIt follows that the end of mankind upon earth is to reach a state in\nwhich all the relations of life shall be ordered according to reason,\nnot instinctively but with full consciousness and deliberate purpose.\nThis end should govern the ethical rules of conduct, and it determines\nthe necessary stages of history.\n\nIt gives us at once two main periods, the earliest and the latest: the\nearliest, in which men act reasonably by instinct, and the latest, in\nwhich they are conscious of reason and try to realise it fully. But\nbefore reaching this final stage they must pass through an epoch in\nwhich reason is conscious of itself, but not regnant. And to reach this\nthey must have emancipated themselves from instinct, and this process\nof emancipation means a fourth epoch. But they could not have wanted\nto emancipate themselves unless they had felt instinct as a servitude\nimposed by an external authority, and therefore we have to distinguish\nyet another epoch wherein reason is expressed in authoritarian\ninstitutions to which men blindly submit. In this way Fichte deduces\nfive historical epochs: two in which progress is blind, two in which it\nis free, and an intermediate in which it is struggling to consciousness.\n[Footnote: First Epoch: that of instinctive reason; the age of\ninnocence. Second: that of authoritarian reason. Third: that of\nenfranchisement; the age of scepticism and unregulated liberty. Fourth:\nthat of conscious reason, as science. Fifth: that of regnant reason, as\nart.] But there are no locked gates between these periods; they overlap\nand mingle; each may have some of the characteristics of another; and in\neach there is a vanguard leading the way and a rearguard lagging behind.\n\nAt present (1804) we are in the third age; we have broken with\nauthority, but do not yet possess a clear and disciplined knowledge of\nreason. [Footnote: Three years later, however, Fichte maintained in his\npatriotic Discourses to the German Nation (1807) that in 1804 man had\ncrossed the threshold of the fourth epoch. He asserted that the progress\nof \"culture\" and science will depend henceforward chiefly on Germany.]\nFichte has deduced this scheme purely a priori without any reference\nto actual experience. \"The philosopher,\" he says, \"follows the a priori\nthread of the world-plan which is clear to him without any history;\nand if he makes use of history, it is not to prove anything, since his\ntheses are already proved independently of all history.\"\n\nHistorical development is thus presented as a necessary progress towards\na goal which is known but cannot be reached. And this fact as to the\ndestiny of the race constitutes the basis of morality, of which\nthe fundamental law is to act in such a way as to promote the free\nrealisation of reason upon earth. It has been claimed by a recent critic\nthat Fichte was the first modern philosopher to humanise morals. He\ncompletely rejected the individualistic conception which underlay\nKantian as well as Christian ethics. He asserted that the true motive of\nmorality is not the salvation of the individual man but the Progress of\nhumanity. In fact, with Fichte Progress is the principle of ethics. That\nthe Christian ideal of ascetic saintliness detached from society has\nno moral value is a plain corollary from the idea of earthly Progress.\n[Footnote: X. Leon, La Philosophie de Fichte (1902), pp. 477-9.]\n\nOne other point in Fichte's survey of history deserves notice--the\nsocial role of the savant. It is the function of the savant to discover\nthe truths which are a condition of moral progress; he may be said\nto incarnate reason in the world. We shall see how this idea played\na prominent part in the social schemes of Saint-Simon and Comte.\n[Footnote: Fichte, Ueber die Bestimmung des Gelehrten (1794).]\n\n5.\n\nHegel's philosophy of history is better known than Fichte's. Like\nFichte, he deduced the phases a priori from his metaphysical principles,\nbut he condescended to review in some detail the actual phenomena. He\nconceived the final cause of the world as Spirit's consciousness of its\nown freedom. The ambiguous term \"freedom\" is virtually equivalent\nto self-consciousness, and Hegel defines Universal History as the\ndescription of the process by which Spirit or God comes to the\nconsciousness of its own meaning. This freedom does not mean that Spirit\ncould choose at any moment to develop in a different way; its actual\ndevelopment is necessary and is the embodiment of reason. Freedom\nconsists in fully recognising the fact.\n\nOf the particular features which distinguish Hegel's treatment, the\nfirst is that he identifies \"history\" with political history, the\ndevelopment of the state. Art, religion, philosophy, the creations\nof social man, belong to a different and higher stage of Spirit's\nself-revelation. [Footnote: The three phases of Spirit are (1)\nsubjective; (2) objective; (3) absolute. Psychology, e.g., is included\nin (1), law and history in (2), religion in (3).] In the second place,\nHegel ignores the primitive prehistoric ages of man, and sets the\nbeginning of his development in the fully-grown civilisation of China.\nHe conceives the Spirit as continually moving from one nation to another\nin order to realise the successive stages of its self-consciousness:\nfrom China to India, from India to the kingdoms of Western Asia; then\nfrom the Orient to Greece, then to Rome, and finally to the Germanic\nworld. In the East men knew only that ONE is free, the political\ncharacteristic was despotism; in Greece and Rome they knew that SOME\nare free, and the political forms were aristocracy and democracy; in\nthe modern world they know that ALL are free, and the political form\nis monarchy. The first period, he compared to childhood, the second to\nyouth (Greece) and manhood (Rome), the third to old age, old but not\nfeeble. The third, which includes the medieval and modern history of\nEurope, designated by Hegel as the Germanic world--for \"the German\nspirit is the spirit of the modern world\"--is also the final period. In\nit God realises his freedom completely in history, just as in Hegel's\nown absolute philosophy, which is final, God has completely understood\nhis own nature.\n\nAnd here is the most striking difference between the theories of Fichte\nand Hegel. Both saw the goal of human development in the realisation of\n\"freedom,\" but, while with Fichte the development never ends as the goal\nis unattainable, with Hegel the development is already complete, the\ngoal is not only attainable but has now been attained. Thus Hegel's is\nwhat we may call a closed system. History has been progressive, but no\npath is left open for further advance. Hegel views this conclusion\nof development with perfect complacency. To most minds that are not\nintoxicated with the Absolute it will seem that, if the present is the\nfinal state to which the evolution of Spirit has conducted, the result\nis singularly inadequate to the gigantic process. But his system is\neminently inhuman. The happiness or misery of individuals is a matter of\nsupreme indifference to the Absolute, which, in order to realise itself\nin time, ruthlessly sacrifices sentient beings.\n\nThe spirit of Hegel's philosophy, in its bearing on social life, was\nthus antagonistic to Progress as a practical doctrine. Progress there\nhad been, but Progress had done its work; the Prussian monarchical state\nwas the last word in history. Kant's cosmopolitical plan, the liberalism\nand individualism which were implicit in his thought, the democracies\nwhich he contemplated in the future, are all cast aside as a\nmisconception. Once the needs of the Absolute Spirit have been\nsatisfied, when it has seen its full power and splendour revealed in\nthe Hegelian philosophy, the world is as good as it can be. Social\namelioration does not matter, nor the moral improvement of men, nor the\nincrease of their control over physical forces.\n\n6.\n\nThe other great representative of German idealism, who took his\ndeparture from Kant, also saw in history a progressive revelation of\ndivine reason. But it was the processes of nature, not the career\nof humanity, that absorbed the best energies of Schelling, and the\nelaboration of a philosophical idea of organic evolution was the\nprominent feature of his speculation. His influence--and it was wide,\nreaching even scientific biologists--lay chiefly in diffusing this\nidea, and he thus contributed to the formation of a theory which was\nafterwards to place the idea of Progress on a more imposing base.\n[Footnote: Schelling's views notoriously varied at various stages of his\ncareer. In his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) he distinguished\nthree historical periods, in the first of which the Absolute reveals\nitself as Fate, in the second as Nature, in the third as Providence, and\nasserted that we are still living in the second, which began with the\nexpansion of Rome (Werke, i. 3, p. 603). In this context he says\nthat the conception of an infinite \"progressivity\" is included in the\nconception of \"history,\" but adds that the perfectibility of the race\ncannot be directly inferred. For it may be said that man has no\nproper history but turns round on a wheel of Ixion. The difficulty of\nestablishing the fact of Progress from the course of events lies in\ndiscovering a criterion. Schelling rejects the criterion of moral\nimprovement and that of advance in science and arts as unpractical\nor misleading. But if we see the sole object of history in a gradual\nrealisation of the ideal state, we have a measure of Progress which can\nbe applied; though it cannot be proved either by theory or by experience\nthat the goal will be attained. This must remain an article of faith\n(ib. 592 sqq.).]\n\nSchelling influenced, among others, his contemporary Krause, a less\nfamiliar name, who worked out a philosophy of history in which this idea\nis fundamental. Krause conceived history, which is the expression of the\nAbsolute, as the development of life; society as an organism; and\nsocial growth as a process which can be deduced from abstract biological\nprinciples.\n\n[Footnote: Krause divided man's earthly career into three Ages--infancy,\ngrowth, and maturity. The second of these falls into three periods\ncharacterised by (1) polytheism, (2) monotheism (Middle Ages), (3)\nscepticism and liberty, and we are now in the third of these periods.\nThe third Age will witness the union of humanity in a single social\norganism, and the universal acceptance of \"panentheism\" (the doctrine of\nthe unity of all in God), which is the principle of Krause's philosophy\nand religion. But though this will be the final stage on the earth,\nKrause contemplates an ulterior career of humanity in other solar\nsystems.\n\nKrause never attracted attention in England, but he exerted\nsome influence in France and Spain, and especially in Belgium,\nnotwithstanding the grotesque jargon in which he obscured his thoughts.\nSee Flint, Philosophy of History, pp. 474-5. Flint's account of his\nspeculations is indulgent. The main ideas of his philosophy of history\nwill be found in the Introduction a la philosophie (ed. 2, 1880) of G.\nTiberghien, a Belgian disciple.]\n\nAll these transcendent speculations had this in common that they\npretended to discover the necessary course of human history on\nmetaphysical principles, independent of experience. But it has been\nrightly doubted whether this alleged independence was genuine. We may\nquestion whether any of them would have produced the same sequence of\nperiods of history, if the actual facts of history had been to them a\nsealed book. Indeed we may be sure that they were surreptitiously and\nsubconsciously using experience as a guide, while they imagined that\nabstract principles were entirely responsible for their conclusions. And\nthis is equivalent to saying that their ideas of progressive movement\nwere really derived from that idea of Progress which the French thinkers\nof the eighteenth century had attempted to base on experience.\n\nThe influence, direct and indirect, of these German philosophers reached\nfar beyond the narrow circle of the bacchants or even the wandbearers\nof idealism. They did much to establish the notion of progressive\ndevelopment as a category of thought, almost as familiar and\nindispensable as that of cause and effect. They helped to diffuse the\nidea of \"an increasing purpose\" in history. Augustine or Bossuet might\nindeed have spoken of an increasing purpose, but the \"purpose\" of their\nspeculations was subsidiary to a future life. The purpose of the German\nidealists could be fulfilled in earthly conditions and required no\ntheory of personal immortality.\n\nThis atmosphere of thought affected even intelligent reactionaries who\nwrote in the interest of orthodox Christianity and the Catholic Church.\nProgressive development is admitted in the lectures on the Philosophy of\nHistory of Friedrich von Schlegel. [Footnote: Translated into English\nin 2 vols., 1835.] He denounced Condorcet, and opposed to perfectibility\nthe corruptible nature of man. But he asserted that the philosophy\nof history is to be found in \"the principles of social progress.\"\n[Footnote: Op. cit. ii, p. 194, sqq.] These principles are three: the\nhidden ways of Providence emancipating the human race; the freewill of\nman; and the power which God permits to the agents of evil,--principles\nwhich Bossuet could endorse, but the novelty is that here they are\narrayed as forces of Progress. In fact, the point of von Schlegel's\npretentious, unilluminating book is to rehabilitate Christianity by\nmaking it the key to that new conception of life which had taken shape\namong the enemies of the Church.\n\n7.\n\nAs biological development was one of the constant preoccupations of\nGoethe, whose doctrine of metamorphosis and \"types\" helped to prepare\nthe way for the evolutionary hypothesis, we might have expected to find\nhim interested in theories of social progress, in which theories\nof biological development find a logical extension. But the French\nspeculations on Progress did not touch his imagination; they left him\ncool and sceptical. Towards the end of his life, in conversation with\nEckermann, he made some remarks which indicate his attitude. [Footnote:\nGesprache mit Goethe, 23 Oktober 1828.] \"'The world will not reach its\ngoal so quickly as we think and wish. The retarding demons are always\nthere, intervening and resisting at every point, so that, though there\nis an advance on the whole, it is very slow. Live longer and you will\nfind that I am right.'\n\n\"'The development of humanity,' said Eckermann, 'appears to be a matter\nof thousands of years.'\n\n\"'Who knows?' Goethe replied, 'perhaps of millions. But let humanity\nlast as long as it will, there will always be hindrances in its way, and\nall kinds of distress, to make it develop its powers. Men will become\nmore clever and discerning, but not better nor happier nor more\nenergetic, at least except for limited periods. I see the time coming\nwhen God will take no more pleasure in the race, and must again proceed\nto a rejuvenated creation. I am sure that this will happen and that the\ntime and hour in the distant future are already fixed for the beginning\nof this epoch of rejuvenation. But that time is certainly a long\nway off, and we can still for thousands and thousands of years enjoy\nourselves on this dear old playing-ground, just as it is.'\"\n\nThat is at once a plain rejection of perfectibility, and an opinion that\nintellectual development is no highroad to the gates of a golden city.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV. CURRENTS OF THOUGHT IN FRANCE AFTER THE REVOLUTION\n\n1.\n\nThe failure of the Revolution to fulfil the visionary hopes which had\ndazzled France for a brief period--a failure intensified by the horrors\nthat had attended the experiment--was followed by a reaction against the\nphilosophical doctrines and tendencies which had inspired its leaders.\nForces, which the eighteenth century had underrated or endeavoured to\nsuppress, emerged in a new shape, and it seemed for a while as if the\nnew century might definitely turn its back on its predecessor. There\nwas an intellectual rehabilitation of Catholicism, which will always\nbe associated with the names of four thinkers of exceptional talent,\nChateaubriand, De Maistre, Bonald, and Lamennais.\n\nBut the outstanding fame of these great reactionaries must not mislead\nus into exaggerating the reach of this reaction. The spirit and\ntendencies of the past century still persisted in the circles which were\nmost permanently influential. Many eminent savants who had been imbued\nwith the ideas of Condillac and Helvetius, and had taken part in\nthe Revolution and survived it, were active under the Empire and the\nrestored Monarchy, still true to the spirit of their masters, and\ncommanding influence by the value of their scientific work. M. Picavet's\nlaborious researches into the activities of this school of thinkers has\nhelped us to understand the transition from the age of Condorcet to\nthe age of Comte. The two central figures are Cabanis, the friend of\nCondorcet, [Footnote: He has already claimed our notice, above, p. 215.]\nand Destutt de Tracy. M. Picavet has grouped around them, along with\nmany obscurer names, the great scientific men of the time, like Laplace,\nBichat, Lamarck, as all in the direct line of eighteenth century\nthought. \"Ideologists\" he calls them. [Footnote: Ideology is now\nsometimes used to convey a criticism; for instance, to contrast the\nmethods of Lamarck with those of Darwin.] Ideology, the science\nof ideas, was the word invented by de Tracy to distinguish the\ninvestigation of thought in accordance with the methods of Locke and\nCondillac from old-fashioned metaphysics. The guiding principle of the\nideologists was to apply reason to observed facts and eschew a priori\ndeductions. Thinkers of this school had an influential organ, the Decade\nphilosophique, of which J. B. Say the economist was one of the founders\nin 1794. The Institut, which had been established by the Convention, was\ncrowded with \"ideologists,\" and may be said to have continued the work\nof the Encyclopaedia. [Footnote: Picavet, op. cit. p. 69. The members of\nthe 2nd Class of the Institut, that of moral and political science, were\nso predominantly Ideological that the distrust of Napoleon was excited,\nand he abolished it in 1803, distributing its members among the other\nClasses.] These men had a firm faith in the indefinite progress of\nknowledge, general enlightenment, and \"social reason.\"\n\n2.\n\nThus the ideas of the \"sophists\" of the age of Voltaire were alive\nin the speculative world, not withstanding political, religious, and\nphilosophical reaction. But their limitations were to be transcended,\nand account taken of facts and aspects which their philosophy had\nignored or minimised. The value of the reactionary movement lay in\npressing these facts and aspects on the attention, in reopening chambers\nof the human spirit which the age of Voltaire had locked and sealed.\n\nThe idea of Progress was particularly concerned in the general change of\nattitude, intellectual and emotional, towards the Middle Ages. A fresh\ninterest in the great age of the Church was a natural part of the\nreligious revival, but extended far beyond the circle of ardent\nCatholics. It was a characteristic feature, as every one knows, of\nthe Romantic movement. It did not affect only creative literature, it\noccupied speculative thinkers and stimulated historians. For Guizot,\nMichelet, and Auguste Comte, as well as for Chateaubriand and Victor\nHugo, the Middle Ages have a significance which Frenchmen of the\nprevious generation could hardly have comprehended.\n\nWe saw how that period had embarrassed the first pioneers who attempted\nto trace the course of civilisation as a progressive movement, how\nlightly they passed over it, how unconvincingly they explained it away.\nAt the beginning of the nineteenth century the medieval question was\nposed in such a way that any one who undertook to develop the doctrine\nof Progress would have to explore it more seriously. Madame de Stael saw\nthis when she wrote her book on Literature considered in its Relation\nto Social Institutions (1801). She was then under the influence of\nCondorcet and an ardent believer in perfectibility, and the work is\nan attempt to extend this theory, which she testifies was falling into\ndiscredit, to the realm of literature. She saw that, if man regressed\ninstead of progressing for ten centuries, the case for Progress was\ngravely compromised, and she sought to show that the Middle Ages\ncontributed to the development of the intellectual faculties and to\nthe expansion of civilisation, and that the Christian religion was an\nindispensable agent. This contention that Progress was uninterrupted is\nan advance on Condorcet and an anticipation of Saint-Simon and Comte.\n\nA more eloquent and persuasive voice was raised in the following year\nfrom the ranks of reaction. Chateaubriand's Genie du Christianisme\nappeared in 1802, \"amidst the ruins of our temples,\" as the author\nafterwards said, when France was issuing from the chaos of her\nrevolution. It was a declaration of war against the spirit of the\neighteenth century which had treated Christianity as a barbarous system\nwhose fall was demanded in the name of Progress. But it was much more\nthan polemic. Chateaubriand arrayed arguments in support of orthodox\ndogmas, original sin, primitive degeneration, and the rest; but the\nappeal of the book did not lie in its logic, it lay in the appreciation\nof Christianity from a new point of view. He approached it in the spirit\nof an artist, as an aesthete, not as a philosopher, and so far as he\nproved anything he proved that Christianity is valuable because it\nis beautiful, not because it is true. He aimed at showing that it can\n\"enchanter l'ame aussi divinement que les dieux de Virgile et d'Homere.\"\nHe might call to his help the Fathers of the Church, but it was on\nDante, Milton, Racine that his case was really based. The book is an\napologia, from the aesthetic standpoint of the Romantic school. \"Dieu ne\ndefend pas les routes fleuries quand elles servent a revenir a lui.\"\n\nIt was a matter of course that the defender of original sin should\nreject the doctrine of perfectibility. \"When man attains the highest\npoint of civilisation,\" wrote Chateaubriand in the vein of Rousseau,\n\"he is on the lowest stair of morality; if he is free, he is rude; by\ncivilising his manners, he forges himself chains. His heart profits at\nthe expense of his head, his head at the expense of his heart.\" And,\napart from considerations of Christian doctrine, the question of\nProgress had little interest for the Romantic school. Victor Hugo, in\nthe famous Preface to his Cromwell (1827), where he went more deeply\nthan Chateaubriand into the contrasts between ancient and modern art,\nrevived the old likeness of mankind to an individual man, and declared\nthat classical antiquity was the time of its virility and that we are\nnow spectators of its imposing old age.\n\nFrom other points of view powerful intellects were reverting to the\nMiddle Ages and eager to blot out the whole development of modern\nsociety since the Reformation, as the Encyclopaedic philosophers had\nwished to blot out the Middle Ages. The ideal of Bonald, De Maistre,\nand Lamennais was a sacerdotal government of the world, and the\nEnglish constitution was hardly less offensive to their minds than the\nRevolution which De Maistre denounced as \"satanic.\" Advocates as they\nwere of the dead system of theocracy, they contributed, however, to the\nadvance of thought, not only by forcing medieval institutions on the\nnotice of the world but also by their perception that society had\nbeen treated in the eighteenth century in too mechanical a way, that\ninstitutions grow, that the conception of individual men divested of\ntheir life in society is a misleading abstraction. They put this in\nextravagant and untenable forms, but there was a large measure of truth\nin their criticism, which did its part in helping the nineteenth century\nto revise and transcend the results of eighteenth century speculation.\n\nIn this reactionary literature we can see the struggle of the doctrine\nof Providence, declining before the doctrine of Progress, to gain the\nupper-hand again. Chateaubriand, Bonald, De Maistre, Lamennais firmly\nheld the dogma of an original golden age and the degradation of man,\nand denounced the whole trend of progressive thought from Bacon to\nCondorcet. These writers were unconsciously helping Condorcet's doctrine\nto assume a new and less questionable shape. [Footnote: Bonald indeed in\nhis treatise De pouvoir adopted the idea of development and applied it\nto religion (as Newman did afterwards) for the purpose of condemning the\nReformation as a retrograde movement.]\n\n3.\n\nAlong with the discovery of the Middle Ages came the discovery of German\nliterature. In the intellectual commerce between the two countries in\nthe age of Frederick the Great, France had been exclusively the giver,\nGermany the recipient. It was due, above all, to Madame de Stael\nthat the tide began to flow the other way. Among the writers of the\nNapoleonic epoch, Madame de Stael is easily first in critical talent\nand intellectual breadth. Her study of the Revolution showed a\nmore dispassionate appreciation of that convulsion than any of her\ncontemporaries were capable of forming. But her chef-d'oeuvre is her\nstudy of Germany, De l'Allemagne, [Footnote: A.D. 1813.] which revealed\nthe existence of a world of art and thought, unsuspected by the French\npublic. Within the next twenty years Herder and Lessing, Kant and Hegel\nwere exerting their influence at Paris. She did in France what Coleridge\nwas doing in England for the knowledge of German thought.\n\nMadame de Stael had raised anew the question which had been raised in\nthe seventeenth century and answered in the negative by Voltaire: is\nthere progress in aesthetic literature? Her early book on Literature had\nclearly defined the issue. She did not propose the thesis that there is\nany progress or improvement (as some of the Moderns had contended in the\nfamous Quarrel) in artistic form. Within the limits of their own thought\nand emotional experience the ancients achieved perfection of expression,\nand perfection cannot be surpassed. But as thought progresses, as the\nsum of ideas increases and society changes, fresh material is supplied\nto art, there is \"a new development of sensibility\" which enables\nliterary artists to compass new kinds of charm. The Genie du\nChristianisme embodied a commentary on her contention, more arresting\nthan any she could herself have furnished. Here the reactionary joined\nhands with the disciple of Condorcet, to prove that there is progress in\nthe domain of art. Madame de Stael's masterpiece, Germany, was a further\nimpressive illustration of the thesis that the literature of the modern\nEuropean nations represents an advance on classical literature, in the\nsense that it sounds notes which the Greek and Roman masters had not\nheard, reaches depths which they had not conjectured, unlocks chambers\nwhich to them were closed,--as a result of the progressive experiences\nof the human soul. [Footnote: German literature was indeed already\nknown, in some measure, to readers of the Decade philosophique, and Kant\nhad been studied in France long before 1813, the year of the publication\nof De l'Allemagne. See Picavet, Les Ideologues, p. 99.] [Footnote: We\ncan see the effect of her doctrine in Guizot's remarks (Histoire de la\ncivilisation en Europe, 2e lecon) where he says of modern literatures\nthat \"sous le point de vue du fond des sentiments et des idees elles\nsont plus fortes et plus riches [than the ancient]. On voit que l'ame\nhumaine a ete remuee sur un plus grand nombre de points a une plus\ngrande profondeur\"--and to this very fact he ascribes their comparative\nimperfection in form.]\n\nThis view is based on the general propositions that all social phenomena\nclosely cohere and that literature is a social phenomenon; from which\nit follows that if there is a progressive movement in society generally,\nthere is a progressive movement in literature. Her books were true to\nthe theory; they inaugurated the methods of modern criticism, which\nstudies literary works in relation to the social background of their\nperiod.\n\n4.\n\nFrance, then, under the Bourbon Restoration began to seek new light from\nthe obscure profundities of German speculation which Madame de Stael\nproclaimed. Herder's \"Ideas\" were translated by Edgar Quinet, Lessing's\nEducation by Eugene Rodrigues. Cousin sat at the feet of Hegel. At\nthe same time a new master, full of suggestiveness for those who were\ninterested in the philosophy of history, was discovered in Italy. The\n\"Scienza nuova\" of Vico was translated by Michelet.\n\nThe book of Vico was now a hundred years old. I did not mention him in\nhis chronological place, because he exercised no immediate influence on\nthe world. His thought was an anachronism in the eighteenth century, it\nappealed to the nineteenth. He did not announce or conceive any theory\nof Progress, but his speculation, bewildering enough and confused in its\nexposition, contained principles which seemed predestined to form\nthe basis of such a doctrine. His aim was that of Cabanis and the\nideologists, to set the study of society on the same basis of certitude\nwhich had been secured for the study of nature through the work of\nDescartes and Newton. [Footnote: Vico has sometimes been claimed as a\ntheorist of Progress, but incorrectly. See B. Croce, The Philosophy of\nGiambattista Vico (Eng. tr., 1913), p. 132--an indispensable aid to the\nstudy of Vico. The first edition of the Scienza nuova appeared in 1725;\nthe second, which was a new work, in 1730.\n\nVico influenced Ballanche, a writer who enjoyed a considerable repute\nin his day. He taught the progressive development of man towards liberty\nand equality within the four corners of the Christian religion, which he\nregarded as final. His Palingenesie sociale appeared in 1823-30.]\n\nHis fundamental idea was that the explanation of the history of\nsocieties is to be found in the human mind. The world at first is felt\nrather than thought; this is the condition of savages in the state of\nnature, who have no political organisation. The second mental state is\nimaginative knowledge, \"poetical wisdom\"; to this corresponds the higher\nbarbarism of the heroic age. Finally, comes conceptual knowledge, and\nwith it the age of civilisation. These are the three stages through\nwhich every society passes, and each of these types determines law,\ninstitutions, language, literature, and the characters of men.\n\nVico's strenuous researches in the study of Homer and early Roman\nhistory were undertaken in order to get at the point of view of the\nheroic age. He insisted that it could not be understood unless we\ntranscended our own abstract ways of thinking and looked at the world\nwith primitive eyes, by a forced effort of imagination. He was convinced\nthat history had been vitiated by the habit of ignoring psychological\ndifferences, by the failure to recapture the ancient point of view. Here\nhe was far in advance of his own times.\n\nConcentrating his attention above all on Roman antiquity, he\nadopted--not altogether advantageously for his system--the revolutions\nof Roman history as the typical rule of social development. The\nsuccession of aristocracy (for the early kingship of Rome and Homeric\nroyalty are merely forms of aristocracy in Vico's view), democracy, and\nmonarchy is the necessary sequence of political governments. Monarchy\n(the Roman Empire) corresponds to the highest form of civilisation. What\nhappens when this is reached? Society declines into an anarchical state\nof nature, from which it again passes into a higher barbarism or heroic\nage, to be followed once more by civilisation. The dissolution of the\nRoman Empire and the barbarian invasions are followed by the Middle\nAges, in which Dante plays the part of Homer; and the modern period with\nits strong monarchies corresponds to the Roman Empire. This is Vico's\nprinciple of reflux. If the theory were sound, it would mean that the\ncivilisation of his day must again relapse into barbarism and the\ncycle begin again. He did not himself state this conclusion directly or\nventure on any prediction. It is obvious how readily his doctrine could\nbe adapted to the conception of Progress as a spiral movement. Evidently\nthe corresponding periods in his cycles are not identical or really\nhomogeneous. Whatever points of likeness may be discovered between early\nGreek or Roman and medieval societies, the points of unlikeness are\nstill more numerous and manifest. Modern civilisation differs in\nfundamental and far-reaching ways from Greek and Roman. It is absurd to\npretend that the general movement brings man back again and again to\nthe point from which he started, and therefore, if there is any value\nin Vico's reflux, it can only mean that the movement of society may be\nregarded as a spiral ascent, so that each stage of an upward progress\ncorresponds, in certain general aspects, to a stage which has already\nbeen traversed, this correspondence being due to the psychical nature of\nman.\n\nA conception of this kind could not be appreciated in Vico's day or by\nthe next generation. The \"Scienza nuova\" lay in Montesquieu's library,\nand he made no use of it. But it was natural that it should arouse\ninterest in France at a time when the new idealistic philosophies\nof Germany were attracting attention, and when Frenchmen, of the\nideological school, were seeking, like Vico himself, a synthetic\nprinciple to explain social phenomena. Different though Vico was in\nhis point of departure as in his methods from the German idealists,\nhis speculations nevertheless had something in common with theirs.\nBoth alike explained history by the nature of mind which necessarily\ndetermined the stages of the process; Vico as little as Fichte or Hegel\ntook eudaemonic considerations into account. The difference was that the\nGerman thinkers sought their principle in logic and applied it a priori,\nwhile Vico sought his in concrete psychology and engaged in laborious\nresearch to establish it a posteriori by the actual data of history.\nBut both speculations suggested that the course of human development\ncorresponds to the fundamental character of mental processes and is not\ndiverted either by Providential intervention or by free acts of human\nwill.\n\n5.\n\nThese foreign influences co-operated in determining the tendencies of\nFrench speculation in the period of the restored monarchy, whereby the\nidea of Progress was placed on new basements and became the headstone of\nnew \"religions.\" Before we consider the founders of sects, we may glance\nbriefly at the views of some eminent savants who had gained the ear of\nthe public before the July Revolution--Jouffroy, Cousin, and Guizot.\n\nCousin, the chief luminary in the sphere of pure philosophy in France\nin the first half of the nineteenth century, drew his inspiration from\nGermany. He was professedly an eclectic, but in the main his philosophy\nwas Hegelian. He might endow God with consciousness and speak of\nProvidence, but he regarded the world-process as a necessary evolution\nof thought, and he saw, not in religion but in philosophy, the highest\nexpression of civilisation. In 1828 he delivered a course of lectures on\nthe philosophy of history. He divided history into three periods, each\ngoverned by a master idea: the first by the idea of the infinite (the\nOrient); the second by that of the finite (classical antiquity); the\nthird by that of the relation of finite to infinite (the modern age). As\nwith Hegel, the future is ignored, progress is confined within a closed\nsystem, the highest circle has already been reached. As an opponent of\nthe ideologists and the sensational philosophy on which they founded\ntheir speculations, Cousin appealed to the orthodox and all those\nto whom Voltairianism was an accursed thing, and for a generation\nhe exercised a considerable influence. But his work--and this is\nthe important point for us--helped to diffuse the idea, which the\nideologists were diffusing on very different lines--that human history\nhas been a progressive development.\n\nProgressive development was also the theme of Jouffroy in his slight but\nsuggestive introduction to the philosophy of history (1825),\n[Footnote: \"Reflexions sur la philosophie de l'histoire,\" in Melanges\nphilosophiques, 2nd edition, 1838.] in which he posed the same problem\nwhich, as we shall see, Saint-Simon and Comte were simultaneously\nattempting to solve. He had not fallen under the glamour of German\nidealism, and his results have more affinity with Vico's than with\nHegel's.\n\nHe begins with some simple considerations which conduct to the doubtful\nconclusion that all the historical changes in man's condition are due to\nthe operation of his intelligence. The historian's business is to trace\nthe succession of the actual changes. The business of the philosopher of\nhistory is to trace the succession of ideas and study the correspondence\nbetween the two developments. This is the true philosophy of history:\n\"the glory of our age is to understand it.\"\n\nNow it is admitted to-day, he says, that the human intelligence\nobeys invariable laws, so that a further problem remains. The actual\nsuccession of ideas has to be deduced from these necessary laws. When\nthat deduction is effected--a long time hence--history will disappear;\nit will be merged in science.\n\nJouffroy then presented the world with what he calls the FATALITY OF\nINTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT, to take the place of Providence or Destiny.\nIt is a fatality, he is careful to explain, which, so far from\ncompromising, presupposes individual liberty. For it is not like the\nfatality of sensual impulse which guides the brute creation. What it\nimplies is this: if a thousand men have the same idea of what is good,\nthis idea will govern their conduct in spite of their passions, because,\nbeing reasonable and free, they are not blindly submissive to passion,\nbut can deliberate and choose.\n\nThis explanation of history as a necessary development of society\ncorresponding to a necessary succession of ideas differs in two\nimportant points from the explanations of Hegel and Cousin. The\nsuccession of ideas is not conceived as a transcendent logic, but is\ndetermined by the laws of the HUMAN mind and belongs to the domain of\npsychology. Here Jouffroy is on the same ground as Vico. In the second\nplace, it is not a closed system; room remains for an indefinite\ndevelopment in the future.\n\n6.\n\nWhile Cousin was discoursing on philosophy at Paris in the days of the\nlast Bourbon king, Guizot was drawing crowded audiences to his lectures\non the history of European civilisation, [Footnote: Histoire de la\ncivilisation en Europe.] and the keynote of these lectures was Progress.\nHe approached it with a fresh mind, unencumbered with any of the\nphilosophical theories which had attended and helped its growth.\n\nCivilisation, he said, is the supreme fact so far as man is concerned,\n\"the fact par excellence, the general and definite fact in which all\nother facts merge.\" And \"civilisation\" means progress or development.\nThe word \"awakens, when it is pronounced, the idea of a people which\nis in motion, not to change its place but to change its state, a people\nwhose condition is expanding and improving. The idea of progress,\ndevelopment, seems to me to be the fundamental idea contained in the\nword CIVILISATION.\"\n\nThere we have the most important positive idea of eighteenth century\nspeculation, standing forth detached and independent, no longer bound\nto a system. Fifty years before, no one would have dreamed of defining\ncivilisation like that and counting on the immediate acquiescence of his\naudience. But progress has to be defined. It does not merely imply the\nimprovement of social relations and public well-being. France in the\nseventeenth and eighteenth centuries was behind Holland and England in\nthe sum and distribution of well-being among individuals, and yet she\ncan claim that she was the most \"civilised\" country in those ages.\nThe reason is that civilisation also implies the development of the\nindividual life, of men's private faculties, sentiments, and ideas. The\nprogress of man therefore includes both these developments. But they\nare intimately connected. We may observe how moral reformers generally\nrecommend their proposals by promising social amelioration as a result,\nand that progressive politicians maintain that the progress of society\nnecessarily induces moral improvement. The connection may not always\nbe apparent, and at different times one or other kind of progress\npredominates. But one is followed by the other ultimately, though it may\nbe after a long interval, for \"la Providence a ses aises dans le temps.\"\nThe rise of Christianity was one of the crises of civilisation, yet it\ndid not in its early stages aim at any improvement of social conditions;\nit did not attack the great injustices which were wrought in the world.\nIt meant a great crisis because it changed the beliefs and sentiments of\nindividuals; social effects came afterwards.\n\nThe civilisation of modern Europe has grown through a period of fifteen\ncenturies and is still progressing. The rate of progress has been slower\nthan that of Greek civilisation, but on the other hand it has been\ncontinuous, uninterrupted, and we can see \"the vista of an immense\ncareer.\"\n\nThe effects of Guizot's doctrine in propagating the idea of Progress\nwere all the greater for its divorce from philosophical theory. He did\nnot touch perplexing questions like fatality, or discuss the general\nplan of the world; he did not attempt to rise above common-sense; and he\ndid not essay any premature scheme of the universal history of man. His\nmasterly survey of the social history of Europe exhibited progressive\nmovement as a fact, in a period in which to the thinkers of the\neighteenth century it had been almost invisible. This of course was far\nfrom proving that Progress is the key to the history of the world and\nhuman destinies. The equation of civilisation with progress remains an\nassumption. For the question at once arises: Can civilisation reach a\nstate of equilibrium from which no further advance is possible; and\nif it can, does it cease to be civilisation? Is Chinese civilisation\nmis-called, or has there been here too a progressive movement all the\ntime, however slow? Such questions were not raised by Guizot. But his\nview of history was effective in helping to establish the association\nof the two ideas of civilisation and progress, which to-day is taken for\ngranted as evidently true.\n\n7.\n\nThe views of these eminent thinkers Cousin, Jouffroy, and Guizot\nshow that--quite apart from the doctrines of ideologists and of\nthe \"positivists,\" Saint-Simon and Comte, of whom I have still to\nspeak--there was a common trend in French thought in the Restoration\nperiod towards the conception of history as a progressive movement.\nPerhaps there is no better illustration of the infectiousness of this\nconception than in the Historical Studies which Chateaubriand gave\nto the world in 1831. He had learned much, from books as well as from\npolitics, since he wrote the GENIUS OF CHRISTIANITY. He had gained some\nacquaintance with German philosophy and with Vico. And in this work of\nhis advanced age he accepts the idea of Progress, so far as it could be\naccepted by an orthodox son of the Church. He believes that the advance\nof knowledge will lead to social progress, and that society, if it seems\nsometimes to move backward, is always really moving forward. Bossuet,\nfor whom he had no word of criticism thirty years before, he now\nconvicts of \"an imposing error.\" That great man, he writes, \"has\nconfined historical events in a circle as rigorous as his genius. He has\nimprisoned them in an inflexible Christianity--a terrible hoop in which\nthe human race would turn in a sort of eternity, without progress or\nimprovement.\" The admission from such a quarter shows eloquently how the\nwind was setting.\n\nThe notions of development and continuity which were to control all\ndepartments of historical study in the later nineteenth century were\nat the same time being independently promoted by the young historical\nschool in Germany which is associated with the names of Eichhorn,\nSavigny, and Niebuhr. Their view that laws and institutions are a\nnatural growth or the expression of a people's mind, represents another\ndeparture from the ideas of the eighteenth century. It was a repudiation\nof that \"universal reason\" which desired to reform the world and its\npeoples indiscriminately without taking any account of their national\nhistories.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV. THE SEARCH FOR A LAW OF PROGRESS:\n\nI. SAINT-SIMON\n\nAmid the intellectual movements in France described in the last chapter\nthe idea of Progress passed into a new phase of its growth. Hitherto it\nhad been a vague optimistic doctrine which encouraged the idealism of\nreformers and revolutionaries, but could not guide them. It had waited\nlike a handmaid on the abstractions of Nature and Reason; it had hardly\nrealised an independent life. The time had come for systematic attempts\nto probe its meaning and definitely to ascertain the direction in which\nhumanity is moving. Kant had said that a Kepler or a Newton was needed\nto find the law of the movement of civilisation. Several Frenchmen\nnow undertook to solve the problem. They did not solve it; but the\nnew science of sociology was founded; and the idea of Progress, which\npresided at its birth, has been its principal problem ever since.\n\n1.\n\nThe three thinkers who claimed to have discovered the secret of social\ndevelopment had also in view the practical object of remoulding society\non general scientific principles, and they became the founders of\nsects, Fourier, Saint-Simon, and Comte. They all announced a new era\nof development as a necessary sequel of the past, an inevitable and\ndesirable stage in the march of humanity, and delineated its features.\n\nComte was the successor of Saint-Simon, as Saint-Simon himself was the\nsuccessor of Condorcet. Fourier stands quite apart. He claimed that\nhe broke entirely new ground, and acknowledged no masters. He regarded\nhimself as a Newton for whom no Kepler or Galileo had prepared the\nway. The most important and sanest part of his work was the scheme for\norganising society on a new principle of industrial co-operation. His\ngeneral theory of the universe and man's destinies which lay behind\nhis practical plans is so fantastic that it sounds like the dream of a\nlunatic. Yet many accepted it as the apocalypse of an evangelist.\n\nFourier was moved by the far-reaching effects of Newton's discovery\nto seek a law which would coordinate facts in the moral world as the\nprinciple of gravitation had co-ordinated facts in the physical world,\nand in 1808 he claimed to have found the secret in what he called the\nlaw of Passional Attraction. [Footnote: Theorie des quatre mouvements et\ndes destinees generales. General accounts of his theories will be\nfound in Charles Fourier, sa vie et sa theorie, by his disciple Dr. Ch.\nPellarin (2nd ed., 1843), and in Flint, Hist. of Philosophy of History\nin France, etc., pp. 408 sqq.] The human passions have hitherto been\nsources of misery; the problem for man is to make them sources of\nhappiness. If we know the law which governs them, we can make such\nchanges in our environment that none of the passions will need to be\ncurbed, and the free indulgence of one will not hinder or compromise the\nsatisfaction of the others.\n\nHis worthless law for harmonising the passions without restraining them\nneed not detain us. The structure of society, by which he proposed to\nrealise the benefits of his discovery, was based on co-operation, but\nwas not socialistic. The family as a social unit was to be replaced by\na larger unit (PHALANGE), economically self-sufficing, and consisting\nof about 1800 persons, who were to live together in a vast building\n(PHALANSTERE), surrounded by a domain sufficient to produce all they\nrequired. Private property is not abolished; the community will include\nboth rich and poor; all the products of their work are distributed in\nshares according to the labour, talents, and capital of each member, but\na fixed minimum is assured to every one. The scheme was actually tried\non a small scale near the forest of Rambouillet in 1832.\n\nThis transformation of society, which is to have the effect of\nintroducing harmony among the passions, will mark the beginning of a new\nepoch. The duration of man's earthly career is 81,000 years, of which\n5000 have elapsed. He will now enter upon a long period of increasing\nharmony, which will be followed by an equal period of decline--like the\nway up and the way down of Heraclitus. His brief past, the age of\nhis infancy, has been marked by a decline of happiness leading to the\npresent age of \"civilisation\" which is thoroughly bad--here we see the\ninfluence of Rousseau--and from it Fourier's discovery is the clue to\nlead humanity forth into the epoch in which harmony begins to emerge.\nBut men who have lived in the bad ages need not be pitied, and those\nwho live to-day need not be pessimistic. For Fourier believed in\nmetempsychosis, and could tell you, as if he were the private secretary\nof the Deity calculating the arithmetical details of the cosmic plan,\nhow many very happy, tolerably happy, and unhappy lives fall to the lot\nof each soul during the whole 81,000 years. Nor does the prospect end\nwith the life of the earth. The soul of the earth and the human souls\nattached to it will live again in comets, planets, and suns, on a system\nof which Fourier knew all the particulars. [Footnote: Details will be\nfound in the Theorie de l'unite universelle, originally published under\nthe title Association domestique-agricole in 1822.]\n\nThese silly speculations would not deserve even this slight indication\nof their purport were it not that Fourier founded a sect and had a\nconsiderable body of devoted followers. His \"discovery\" was acclaimed by\nBeranger:\n\n\n   Fourier nous dit: Sors de la fange,\n    Peuple en proie aux deceptions,\n    Travaille, groupe par phalange,\n    Dans un cercle d'attractions;\n    La terre, apres tant de desastres,\n    Forme avec le ciel un hymen,\n    Et la loi qui regit les astres,\n    Donne la paix au genre humain.\n\n\nTen years after his death (1837) an English writer tells us that\n\"the social theory of Fourier is at the present moment engrossing the\nattention and exciting the apprehensions of thinking men, not only in\nFrance but in almost every country in Europe.\" [Footnote: R. Blakey,\nHistory of the Philosophy of Mind, vol. iv. p. 293 (1848). Fourier,\nborn 1772, died in 1837. His principal disciple was Victor Considerant.]\nGrotesque as was the theoretical background of his doctrines, he helped\nto familiarise the world with the idea of indefinite Progress.\n\n2.\n\n\"The imagination of poets has placed the golden age in the cradle of the\nhuman race. It was the age of iron they should have banished there. The\ngolden age is not behind us, but in front of us. It is the perfection\nof social order. Our fathers have not seen it; our children will arrive\nthere one day, and it is for us to clear the way for them.\"\n\nThe Comte de Saint-Simon, who wrote these words in 1814, was one of\nthe liberal nobles who had imbibed the ideas of the Voltairian age and\nsympathised with the spirit of the Revolution. In his literary career\nfrom 1803 to his death in 1825 he passed through several phases of\nthought, [Footnote: They are traced in G. Weill's valuable monograph,\nSaint-Simon et son oeuvre, 1894.] but his chief masters were always\nCondorcet and the physiologists, from whom he derived his two guiding\nideas that ethics and politics depend ultimately on physics and that\nhistory is progress.\n\nCondorcet had interpreted history by the progressive movement of\nknowledge. That, Saint-Simon said, is the true principle, but Condorcet\napplied it narrowly, and committed two errors. He did not understand\nthe social import of religion, and he represented the Middle Ages as a\nuseless interruption of the forward movement. Here Saint-Simon learned\nfrom the religious reaction. He saw that religion has a natural and\nlegitimate social role and cannot be eliminated as a mere perversity.\nHe expounded the doctrine that all social phenomena cohere. A religious\nsystem, he said, always corresponds to the stage of science which the\nsociety wherein it appears has reached; in fact, religion is merely\nscience clothed in a form suitable to the emotional needs which it\nsatisfies. And as a religious system is based on the contemporary\nphase of scientific development, so the political system of an epoch\ncorresponds to the religious system. They all hang together. Medieval\nEurope does not represent a temporary triumph of obscurantism, useless\nand deplorable, but a valuable and necessary stage in human progress. It\nwas a period in which an important principle of social organisation was\nrealised, the right relation of the spiritual and temporal powers.\n\nIt is evident that these views transformed the theory of Condorcet into\na more acceptable shape. So long as the medieval tract of time appeared\nto be an awkward episode, contributing nothing to the forward movement\nbut rather thwarting and retarding it, Progress was exposed to the\ncriticism that it was an arbitrary synthesis, only partly borne out by\nhistorical facts and supplying no guarantees for the future. And so\nlong as rationalists of the Encyclopaedic school regarded religion as\na tiresome product of ignorance and deceit, the social philosophy\nwhich lay behind the theory of Progress was condemned as unscientific;\nbecause, in defiance of the close cohesion of social phenomena, it\nrefused to admit that religion, as one of the chief of those phenomena,\nmust itself participate and co-operate in Progress.\n\nCondorcet had suggested that the value of history lies in affording\ndata for foreseeing the future. Saint-Simon raised this suggestion to a\ndogma. But prevision was impossible on Condorcet's unscientific method.\nIn order to foretell, the law of the movement must be discovered, and\nCondorcet had not found or even sought a law. The eighteenth\ncentury thinkers had left Progress a mere hypothesis based on a very\ninsufficient induction; their successors sought to lift it to the rank\nof a scientific hypothesis, by discovering a social law as valid as the\nphysical law of gravitation. This was the object both of Saint-Simon and\nof Comte.\n\nThe \"law\" which Saint-Simon educed from history was that epochs of\norganisation or construction, and epochs of criticism or revolution,\nsucceed each other alternately. The medieval period was a time of\norganisation, and was followed by a critical, revolutionary period,\nwhich has now come to an end and must be succeeded by another epoch of\norganisation. Having discovered the clew to the process, Saint-Simon\nis able to predict. As our knowledge of the universe has reached or\nis reaching a stage which is no longer conjectural but POSITIVE in all\ndepartments, society will be transformed accordingly; a new PHYSICIST\nreligion will supersede Christianity and Deism; men of science will play\nthe role of organisers which the clergy played in the Middle Ages.\n\nAs the goal of the development is social happiness, and as the working\nclasses form the majority, the first step towards the goal will be\nthe amelioration of the lot of the working classes. This will be\nthe principal problem of government in reorganising society, and\nSaint-Simon's solution of the problem was socialism. He rejected the\nwatchwords of liberalism--democracy, liberty, and equality--with as much\ndisdain as De Maistre and the reactionaries.\n\nThe announcement of a future age of gold, which I quoted above, is taken\nfrom a pamphlet which he issued, in conjunction with his secretary,\nAugustin Thierry the historian, after the fall of Napoleon. [Footnote:\nDe la reorganisation de la societe europeenne, p. 111 (1814).] In it he\nrevived the idea of the Abbe de Saint-Pierre for the abolition of war,\nand proposed a new organisation of Europe more ambitious and Utopian\nthan the Abbe's league of states. At this moment he saw in parliamentary\ngovernment, which the restored Bourbons were establishing in France,\na sovran remedy for political disorder, and he imagined that if this\npolitical system were introduced in all the states of Europe a long step\nwould have been taken to the perpetuation of peace. If the old enemies\nFrance and England formed a close alliance there would be little\ndifficulty in creating ultimately a European state like the American\nCommonwealth, with a parliamentary government supreme over the state\ngovernments. Here is the germ of the idea of a \"parliament of man.\"\n\n3.\n\nSaint-Simon, however, did not construct a definite system for the\nattainment of social perfection. He left it to disciples to develop\nthe doctrine which he sketched. In the year of his death (1825) Olinde\nRodrigues and Enfantin founded a journal, the Producteur, to present to\nhumanity the one thing which humanity, in the opinion of their master,\nthen most needed, a new general doctrine. [Footnote: The best study of\nthe Saint-Simonian school is that of G. Weill, L'Ecole saint-simonienne,\nson histoire, son influence jusqu'a nos jours (1896), to which I am much\nindebted.]\n\nHistory shows that peoples have been moving from isolation to union,\nfrom war to peace, from antagonism to association. The programme for the\nfuture is association scientifically organised. The Catholic Church\nin the Middle Ages offered the example of a great social organisation\nresting on a general doctrine. The modern world must also be a\nsocial organisation, but the general doctrine will be scientific,\nnot religious. The spiritual power must reside, not in priests but in\nsavants, who will direct the progress of science and public education.\nEach member of the community will have his place and duties assigned to\nhim. Society consists of three classes of workers--industrial workers,\nsavants, and artists. A commission of eminent workers of each class will\ndetermine the place of every individual according to his capacities.\nComplete equality is absurd; inequality, based on merit, is reasonable\nand necessary. It is a modern error to distrust state authority. A power\ndirecting national forces is requisite, to propose great ideas and to\nmake the innovations necessary for Progress. Such an organisation will\npromote progress in all domains: in science by co-operation, in industry\nby credit, and in art too, for artists will learn to express the ideas\nand sentiments of their own age. There are signs already of a tendency\ntowards something of this kind; its realisation must be procured, not by\nrevolution but by gradual change.\n\nIn the authoritarian character of the organisation to which these\napostles of Progress wished to entrust the destinies of man we may see\nthe influence of the great theocrat and antagonist of Progress, Joseph\nde Maistre. He taught them the necessity of a strong central power and\nthe danger of liberty.\n\nBut the fullest exposition of the Saint-Simonian doctrine of development\nwas given by Bazard, one of the chief disciples, a few years later.\n[Footnote: Exposition de la doctrine saint-simonienne, 2 vols., 1830-1.]\nThe human race is conceived as a collective being which unfolds its\nnature in the course of generations, according to a law--the law\nof Progress--which may be called the physiological law of the human\nspecies, and was discovered by Saint-Simon. It consists in the\nalternation of ORGANIC and CRITICAL epochs. [Footnote: In the Globe,\nwhich became an organ of Saint-Simonism in 1831, Enfantin announced a\nnew principle (Weill, op. cit. 107). He defined the law of history as\n\"the harmony, ceaselessly progressive, of flesh and spirit, of industry\nand science, of east and west, of woman and man.\" The role of woman\nplayed a large part in the teaching of the sect.\n\nSaint-Simon's law of organic and critical ages was definitely accepted\nby H. de Ferron, a thinker who did not belong to the school, as late as\n1867. See his Theorie du progres, vol. ii. p. 433.]\n\nIn an organic epoch men discern a destination and harmonise all their\nenergies to reach it. In a critical epoch they are not conscious of\na goal, and their efforts are dispersed and discordant. There was an\norganic period in Greece before the age of Socrates. It was succeeded\nby a critical epoch lasting to the barbarian invasions. Then came an\norganic period in the homogeneous societies of Europe from Charlemagne\nto the end of the fifteenth century, and a new critical period opened\nwith Luther and has lasted till to-day. Now it is time to prepare the\nadvent of the organic age which must necessarily follow.\n\nThe most salient fact observable in history is the continual extension\nof the principle of association, in the series of family, city, nation,\nsupernational Church. The next term must be a still vaster association\ncomprehending the whole race.\n\nIn consequence of the incompleteness of association, the exploitation\nof the weak by the strong has been a capital feature in human societies,\nbut its successive forms exhibit a gradual mitigation. Cannibalism is\nfollowed by slavery, slavery by serfdom, and finally comes industrial\nexploitation by the capitalist. This latest form of the oppression of\nthe weak depends on the right of property, and the remedy is to transfer\nthe right of inheriting the property of the individual from the family\nto the state. The society of the future must be socialistic.\n\nThe new social doctrine must not only be diffused by education and\nlegislation, it must be sanctioned by a new religion. Christianity will\nnot serve, for Christianity is founded on a dualism between matter\nand spirit, and has laid a curse on matter. The new religion must be\nmonistic, and its principles are, briefly: God is one, God is all that\nis, all is God. He is universal love, revealing itself as mind and\nmatter. And to this triad correspond the three domains of religion,\nscience, and industry.\n\nIn combining their theory with a philosophical religion the\nSaint-Simonian school was not only true to its master's teaching\nbut obeying an astute instinct. As a purely secular movement for the\ntransformation of society, their doctrine would not have reaped the same\nsuccess or inspired the same enthusiasm. They were probably influenced\ntoo by the pamphlet of Lessing to which Madame de Stael had invited\nattention, and which one of Saint-Simon's disciples translated.\n\nThe fortunes of the school, the life of the community at Menilmontant\nunder the direction of Enfantin, the persecution, the heresies,\nthe dispersion, the attempt to propagate the movement in Egypt, the\nphilosophical activity of Enfantin and Lemonnier under the Second\nEmpire, do not claim our attention; the curious story is told in\nM. Weill's admirable monograph. [Footnote: It may be noticed that\nSaint-Simonians came to the front in public careers after the revolution\nof 1848; e.g. Carnot, Reynaud, Charton.] The sect is now extinct, but\nits influence was wide in its day, and it propagated faith in Progress\nas the key to history and the law of collective life.[Footnote: Two able\nconverts to the ideas of Saint-Simon seceded from the school at an early\nstage in consequence of Enfantin's aberrations: Pierre Leroux, whom\nwe shall meet again, and P. J. B. Buchez, who in 1833 published a\nthoughtful \"Introduction a la science de l'histoire,\" where history is\ndefined as \"a science whose end is to foresee the social future of the\nhuman species in the order of its free activity\" (vol. i. p. 60,. ed. 2,\n1842).]\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI. THE SEARCH FOR A LAW OF PROGRESS: II. COMTE\n\n1.\n\nAuguste Comte did more than any preceding thinker to establish the\nidea of Progress as a luminary which could not escape men's vision.\nThe brilliant suggestions of Saint-Simon, the writings of Bazard and\nEnfantin, the vagaries of Fourier, might be dismissed as curious rather\nthan serious propositions, but the massive system wrought out by Comte's\nspeculative genius--his organic scheme of human knowledge, his elaborate\nanalysis of history, his new science of sociology--was a great fact with\nwhich European thought was forced to reckon. The soul of this system\nwas Progress, and the most important problem he set out to solve was the\ndetermination of its laws.\n\nHis originality is not dimmed by the fact that he owed to Saint-Simon\nmore than he afterwards admitted or than his disciples have been willing\nto allow. He collaborated with him for several years, and at this time\nenthusiastically acknowledged the intellectual stimulus he received from\nthe elder savant. [Footnote: Comte collaborated with Saint-Simon\nfrom 1818-1822. The final rupture came in 1824. The question of their\nrelations is cleared up by Weill (Saint-Simon, chap. xi.). On the\nquarrel see also Ostwald, Auguste Comte (1914), 13 sqq.] But he derived\nfrom Saint-Simon much more than the stimulation of his thoughts in a\ncertain direction. He was indebted to him for some of the characteristic\nideas of his own system. He was indebted to him for the principle which\nlay at the very basis of his system, that the social phenomena of\na given period and the intellectual state of the society cohere and\ncorrespond. The conception that the coming age was to be a period of\norganisation like the Middle Ages, and the idea of the government of\nsavants, are pure Saint-Simonian doctrine. And the fundamental idea of\na POSITIVE philosophy had been apprehended by Saint-Simon long before he\nwas acquainted with his youthful associate.\n\nBut Comte had a more methodical and scientific mind, and he thought that\nSaint-Simon was premature in drawing conclusions as to the reformation\nof societies and industries before the positive philosophy had been\nconstructed. He published--he was then only twenty-two--in 1822 a\n\"Plan of the scientific operations necessary for the re-organisation\nof society,\" which was published under another title two years later by\nSaint-Simon, and it was over this that the friends quarrelled. This work\ncontains the principles of the positive philosophy which he was soon to\nbegin to work out; it announces already the \"law of the Three Stages.\"\n\nThe first volume of the \"Cours de philisophie positive\" appeared in\n1830; it took him twelve years more to complete the exposition of his\nsystem. [Footnote: With vol. vi., 1842.]\n\n2.\n\nThe \"law of Three Stages\" is familiar to many who have never read a line\nof his writings. That men first attempted to explain natural phenomena\nby the operation of imaginary deities, then sought to interpret them by\nabstractions, and finally came to see that they could only be understood\nby scientific methods, observation, and experiment--this was a\ngeneralisation which had already been thrown out by Turgot. Comte\nadopted it as a fundamental psychological law, which has governed\nevery domain of mental activity and explains the whole story of\nhuman development. Each of our principal conceptions, every branch of\nknowledge, passes successively through these three states which he names\nthe theological, the metaphysical, and the positive or scientific. In\nthe first, the mind invents; in the second, it abstracts; in the third,\nit submits itself to positive facts; and the proof that any branch of\nknowledge has reached the third stage is the recognition of invariable\nnatural laws.\n\nBut, granting that this may be the key to the history of the sciences,\nof physics, say, or botany, how can it explain the history of man, the\nsequence of actual historical events? Comte replies that history has\nbeen governed by ideas; \"the whole social mechanism is ultimately\nbased on opinions.\" Thus man's history is essentially a history of his\nopinions; and these are subject to the fundamental psychological law.\n\nIt must, however, be observed that all branches of knowledge are not in\nthe same stage simultaneously. Some may have reached the metaphysical,\nwhile others are still lagging behind in the theological; some may have\nbecome scientific, while others have not passed from the metaphysical.\nThus the study of physical phenomena has already reached the positive\nstage; but the study of social phenomena has not. The central aim of\nComte, and his great achievement in his own opinion, was to raise the\nstudy of social phenomena from the second to the third stage.\n\nWhen we proceed to apply the law of the three stages to the general\ncourse of historical development, we are met at the outset by the\ndifficulty that the advance in all the domains of activity is not\nsimultaneous. If at a given period thought and opinions are partly\nin the theological, partly in the metaphysical, and partly in the\nscientific state, how is the law to be applied to general development?\nOne class of ideas, Comte says, must be selected as the criterion, and\nthis class must be that of social and moral ideas, for two reasons.\nIn the first place, social science occupies the highest rank in the\nhierarchy of sciences, on which he laid great stress. [Footnote: Cours\nde phil. pos. v. 267. Law of consensus: op. cit. iv. 347 sqq., 364, 505,\n721, 735.] In the second, those ideas play the principal part for the\nmajority of men, and the most ordinary phenomena are the most important\nto consider. When, in other classes of ideas, the advance is at any time\nmore rapid, this only means an indispensable preparation for the ensuing\nperiod.\n\nThe movement of history is due to the deeply rooted though complex\ninstinct which pushes man to ameliorate his condition incessantly, to\ndevelop in all ways the sum of his physical, moral, and intellectual\nlife. And all the phenomena of his social life are closely cohesive,\nas Saint-Simon had pointed out. By virtue of this cohesion, political,\nmoral, and intellectual progress are inseparable from material progress,\nand so we find that the phases of his material development correspond to\nintellectual changes. The principle of consensus or \"solidarity,\" which\nsecures harmony and order in the development, is as important as the\nprinciple of the three stages which governs the onward movement. This\nmovement, however, is not in a right line, but displays a series of\noscillations, unequal and variable, round a mean motion which tends to\nprevail. The three general causes of variation, according to Comte, are\nrace, climate, and deliberate political action (such as the retrograde\npolicies of Julian the Apostate or Napoleon). But while they cause\ndeflections and oscillation, their power is strictly limited; they may\naccelerate or retard the movement, but they cannot invert its order;\nthey may affect the intensity of the tendencies in a given situation,\nbut cannot change their nature.\n\n3.\n\nIn the demonstration of his laws by the actual course of civilisation,\nComte adopts what he calls \"the happy artifice of Condorcet,\" and treats\nthe successive peoples who pass on the torch as if they were a single\npeople running the race. This is \"a rational fiction,\" for a people's\ntrue successors are those who pursue its efforts. And, like Bossuet\nand Condorcet, he confined his review to European civilisation; he\nconsidered only the ELITE or advance guard of humanity. He deprecated\nthe introduction of China or India, for instance, as a confusing\ncomplication. He ignored the ROLES of Brahmanism, Buddhism,\nMohammedanism. His synthesis, therefore, cannot claim to be a synthesis\nof universal history; it is only a synthesis of the movement of European\nhistory. In accordance with the law of the three stages, the development\nfalls into three great periods. The first or Theological came to an\nend about A.D. 1400, and the second or Metaphysical is now nearing\nits close, to make way for the third or Positive, for which Comte was\npreparing the way.\n\nThe Theological period has itself three stages, in which Fetishism,\nPolytheism, and Monotheism successively prevail. The chief social\ncharacteristics of the Polytheistic period are the institution of\nslavery and the coincidence or \"confusion\" of the spiritual and temporal\npowers. It has two stages: the theocratic, represented by Egypt, and the\nmilitary, represented by Rome, between which Greece stands in a rather\nembarrassing and uneasy position.\n\nThe initiative for the passage to the Monotheistic period came from\nJudaea, and Comte attempts to show that this could not have been\notherwise. His analysis of this period is the most interesting part of\nhis survey. The chief feature of the political system corresponding to\nmonotheism is the separation of the spiritual and temporal powers; the\nfunction of the spiritual power being concerned with education, and\nthat of the temporal with action, in the wide senses of those terms. The\ndefects of this dual system were due to the irrational theology. But\nthe theory of papal infallibility was a great step in intellectual\nand social progress, by providing a final jurisdiction, without which\nsociety would have been troubled incessantly by contests arising from\nthe vague formulae of dogmas. Here Comte had learned from Joseph de\nMaistre. But that thinker would not have been edified when Comte went\non to declare that in the passage from polytheism to monotheism the\nreligious spirit had really declined, and that one of the merits of\nCatholicism was that it augmented the domain of human wisdom at the\nexpense of divine inspiration. [Footnote: Cours de philosophic positive,\nvi. 354.] If it be said that the Catholic system promoted the empire of\nthe clergy rather than the interests of religion, this was all to the\ngood; for it placed the practical use of religion in \"the provisional\nelevation of a noble speculative corporation eminently able to direct\nopinions and morals.\"\n\nBut Catholic monotheism could not escape dissolution. The metaphysical\nspirit began to operate powerfully on the notions of moral philosophy,\nas soon as the Catholic organisation was complete; and Catholicism,\nbecause it could not assimilate this intellectual movement, lost its\nprogressive character and stagnated.\n\nThe decay began in the fourteenth century, where Comte dates the\nbeginning of the Metaphysical period--a period of revolution and\ndisorder. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the movement is\nspontaneous and unconscious; from the sixteenth till to-day it has\nproceeded under the direction of a philosophical spirit which is\nnegative and not constructive. This critical philosophy has only\naccelerated a decomposition which began spontaneously. For as theology\nprogresses it becomes less consistent and less durable, and as its\nconceptions become less irrational, the intensity of the emotions which\nthey excite decreases. Fetishism had deeper roots than polytheism\nand lasted longer; and polytheism surpassed monotheism in vigour and\nvitality.\n\nYet the critical philosophy was necessary to exhibit the growing need of\nsolid reorganisation and to prove that the decaying system was incapable\nof directing the world any longer. Logically it was very imperfect, but\nit was justified by its success. The destructive work was mainly done\nin the seventeenth century by Hobbes, Spinoza, and Bayle, of whom\nHobbes was the most effective. In the eighteenth all prominent thinkers\nparticipated in developing this negative movement, and Rousseau gave\nit the practical stimulus which saved it from degenerating into an\nunfruitful agitation. Of particular importance was the great fallacy,\nwhich Helvetius propagated, that human intellects are equal. This error\nwas required for the full development of the critical doctrine. For\nit supported the dogmas of popular sovranty and social equality, and\njustified the principle of the right of private judgement.\n\nThese three principles--popular sovranty, equality, and what he\ncalls the right of free examination--are in Comte's eyes vicious and\nanarchical.[Footnote #1 Op. cit. iv. 36-38.] But it was necessary that\nthey should be promulgated, because the transition from one organised\nsocial system to another cannot be direct; it requires an anarchical\ninterregnum. Popular sovranty is opposed to orderly institutions and\ncondemns all superior persons to dependence on the multitude of their\ninferiors. Equality, obviously anarchical in its tendency, and obviously\nuntrue (for, as men are not equal or even equivalent to one another,\ntheir rights cannot be identical), was similarly necessary to break down\nthe old institutions. The universal claim to the right of free judgement\nmerely consecrates the transitional state of unlimited liberty in the\ninterim between the decline of theology and the arrival of positive\nphilosophy. Comte further remarks that the fall of the spiritual power\nhad led to anarchy in international relations, and if the spirit of\nnationality were to prevail too far, the result would be a state of\nthings inferior to that of the Middle Ages.\n\nBut Comte says for the metaphysical spirit in France that with all its\nvices it was more disengaged from the prejudices of the old theological\nregime, and nearer to a true rational positivism than either the German\nmysticism or the English empiricism of the same period.\n\nThe Revolution was a necessity, to disclose the chronic decomposition\nof society from which it resulted, and to liberate the modern social\nelements from the grip of the ancient powers. Comte has praise for the\nConvention, which he contrasts with the Constituent Assembly with its\npolitical fictions and inconsistencies. He pointed out that the great\nvice in the \"metaphysics\" of the crisis--that is, in the principles of\nthe revolutionaries--lay in conceiving society out of relation to the\npast, in ignoring the Middle Ages, and borrowing from Greek and Roman\nsociety retrograde and contradictory ideals.\n\nNapoleon restored order, but he was more injurious to humanity than\nany other historical person. His moral and intellectual nature was\nincompatible with the true direction of Progress, which involves the\nextinction of the theological and military regime of the past. Thus his\nwork, like Julian the Apostate's, exhibits an instance of deflection\nfrom the line of Progress. Then came the parliamentary system of\nthe restored Bourbons which Comte designates as a political Utopia,\ndestitute of social principles, a foolish attempt to combine political\nretrogression with a state of permanent peace.\n\n4.\n\nThe critical doctrine has performed its historical function, and the\ntime has come for man to enter upon the Positive stage of his career. To\nenable him to take this step forward, it is necessary that the study of\nsocial phenomena should become a positive science. As social science is\nthe highest in the hierarchy of sciences, it could not develop until\nthe two branches of knowledge which come next in the scale, biology and\nchemistry, assumed a scientific form. This has recently been achieved,\nand it is now possible to found a scientific sociology.\n\nThis science, like mechanics and biology, has its statics and its\ndynamics. The first studies the laws of co-existence, the second those\nof succession; the first contains the theory of order, the second\nthat of progress. The law of consensus or cohesion is the fundamental\nprinciple of social statics; the law of the three stages is that of\nsocial dynamics. Comte's survey of history, of which I have briefly\nindicated the general character, exhibits the application of these\nsociological laws.\n\nThe capital feature of the third period, which we are now approaching,\nwill be the organisation of society by means of scientific sociology.\nThe world will be guided by a general theory, and this means that it\nmust be controlled by those who understand the theory and will know\nhow to apply it. Therefore society will revive the principle which\nwas realised in the great period of Monotheism, the distinction of a\nspiritual and a temporal order. But the spiritual order will consist of\nsavants who will direct social life not by theological fictions but\nby the positive truths of science. They will administer a system of\nuniversal education and will draw up the final code of ethics. They will\nbe able, more effectively than the Church, to protect the interests of\nthe lower classes.\n\nComte's conviction that the world is prepared for a transformation\nof this kind is based principally on signs of the decline of the\ntheological spirit and of the military spirit, which he regarded as the\ntwo main obstacles to the reign of reason. Catholicism, he says, is now\nno more than \"an imposing historical ruin.\" As for militarism, the epoch\nhas arrived in which serious and lasting warfare among the ELITE nations\nwill totally cease. The last general cause of warfare has been the\ncompetition for colonies. But the colonial policy is now in its\ndecadence (with the temporary exception of England), so that we need not\nlook for future trouble from this source. The very sophism, sometimes\nput forward to justify war, that it is an instrument of civilisation, is\na homage to the pacific nature of modern society.\n\nWe need not follow further the details of Comte's forecast of the\nPositive period, except to mention that he did not contemplate a\npolitical federation. The great European nations will develop each\nin its own way, with their separate \"temporal\" organisations. But he\ncontemplated the intervention of a common \"spiritual\" power, so that all\nnationalities \"under the direction of a homogeneous speculative class\nwill contribute to an identical work, in a spirit of active European\npatriotism, not of sterile cosmopolitanism.\"\n\nComte claimed, like Saint-Simon, that the data of history,\nscientifically interpreted, afford the means of prevision. It is\ninteresting to observe how he failed himself as a diviner; how utterly\nhe misapprehended the vitality of Catholicism, how completely his\nprophecy as to the cessation of wars was belied by the event. He lived\nto see the Crimean war. [Footnote: He died in 1857.] As a diviner he\nfailed as completely as Saint-Simon and Fourier, whose dream that the\nnineteenth century would see the beginning of an epoch of harmony and\nhappiness was to be fulfilled by a deadly struggle between capitalism\nand labour, the civil war in America, the war of 1870, the Commune,\nRussian pogroms, Armenian massacres, and finally the universal\ncatastrophe of 1914.\n\n5.\n\nFor the comprehension of history we have perhaps gained as little from\nComte's positive laws as from Hegel's metaphysical categories. Both\nthinkers had studied the facts of history only slightly and partially,\na rather serious drawback which enabled them to impose their own\nconstructions with the greater ease. Hegel's method of a PRIORI\nsynthesis was enjoined by his philosophical theory; but in Comte we also\nfind a tendency to a PRIORI treatment. He expressly remarks that\nthe chief social features of the Monotheistic period might almost be\nconstructed a PRIORI.\n\nThe law of the Three Stages is discredited. It may be contended that\ngeneral Progress depends on intellectual progress, and that theology,\nmetaphysics, and science have common roots, and are ultimately\nidentical, being merely phases in the movement of the intelligence. But\nthe law of this movement, if it is to rank as a scientific hypothesis,\nmust be properly deduced from known causes, and must then be verified\nby a comparison with historical facts. Comte thought that he fulfilled\nthese requirements, but in both respects his demonstration was\ndefective. [Footnote: Criticism of Comte's assumption that civilisation\nbegins with animism: Weber's criticisms from this point of view are\ntelling (Le Rythme du progres, 73-95). He observes that if Comte had\nnot left the practical and active side of intelligence in the shade and\nconsidered only its speculative side, he could not have formulated\nthe law of the Three Stages. He would have seen that \"the positive\nexplanation of phenomena has played in every period a preponderant role,\nthough latent, in the march of the human mind.\" Weber himself suggests\na scheme of two states (corresponding to the two-sidedness of the\nintellect), technical and speculative, practical and theoretical,\nthrough the alternation of which intellectual progress has been\neffected. The first stage was probably practical (he calls it\nproto-technic). It is to be remembered that when Comte was constructing\nhis system palaeontology was in its infancy.]\n\nThe gravest weakness perhaps in his historical sketch is the gratuitous\nassumption that man in the earliest stage of his existence had animistic\nbeliefs and that the first phase of his progress was controlled by\nfetishism. There is no valid evidence that fetishism is not a relatively\nlate development, or that in the myriads of years stretching back beyond\nour earliest records, during which men decided the future of the human\nspecies by their technical inventions and the discovery of fire, they\nhad any views which could be called religious or theological. The\npsychology of modern savages is no clew to the minds of the people who\nwrought tools of stone in the world of the mammoth and the RHINOCEROS\nTICHIRHINUS. If the first stage of man's development, which was of such\ncritical importance for his destinies, was pre-animistic, Comte's law of\nprogress fails, for it does not cover the ground.\n\nIn another way, Comte's system may be criticised for failing to cover\nthe ground, if it is regarded as a philosophy of history. In accordance\nwith \"the happy artifice of Condorcet,\" he assumes that the growth of\nEuropean civilisation is the only history that matters, and discards\nentirely the civilisations, for instance, of India and China. This\nassumption is much more than an artifice, and he has not scientifically\njustified it. [Footnote: A propos of the view that only European\ncivilisation matters it has been well observed that \"human history is\nnot unitary but pluralistic\": F. J. Teggart, The Processes of History,\np. 24 (1918).]\n\nThe reader of the PHILOSOPHIE POSITIVE will also observe that Comte\nhas not grappled with a fundamental question which has to be faced in\nunravelling the woof of history or seeking a law of events. I mean the\nquestion of contingency. It must be remembered that contingency does not\nin the least affect the doctrine of determinism; it is compatible with\nthe strictest interpretation of the principle of causation. A particular\nexample may be taken to show what it implies. [Footnote: On contingency\nand the \"chapter of accidents\" see Cournot, Considerations sur la marche\ndes idees et des evenements dans les temps modernes (1872), i. 16 sqq.\nI have discussed the subject and given some illustrations in a short\npaper, entitled \"Cleopatra's Nose,\" in the Annual of the Rationalist\nPress Association for 1916.]\n\nIt may plausibly be argued that a military dictatorship was an\ninevitable sequence of the French Revolution. This may not be true, but\nlet us assume it. Let us further assume that, given Napoleon, it was\ninevitable that he should be the dictator. But Napoleon's existence was\ndue to an independent causal chain which had nothing whatever to do with\nthe course of political events. He might have died in his boyhood by\ndisease or by an accident, and the fact that he survived was due to\ncauses which were similarly independent of the causal chain which, as we\nare assuming, led necessarily to an epoch of monarchical government. The\nexistence of a man of his genius and character at the given moment was\na contingency which profoundly affected the course of history. If he\nhad not been there another dictator would have grasped the helm, but\nobviously would not have done what Napoleon did.\n\nIt is clear that the whole history of man has been modified at every\nstage by such contingencies, which may be defined as the collisions\nof two independent causal chains. Voltaire was perfectly right when he\nemphasised the role of chance in history, though he did not realise what\nit meant. This factor would explain the oscillations and deflections\nwhich Comte admits in the movement of historical progression. But the\nquestion arises whether it may not also have once and again definitely\naltered the direction of the movement. Can the factor be regarded as\nvirtually negligible by those who, like Comte, are concerned with the\nlarge perspective of human development and not with the details of an\nepisode? Or was Renouvier right in principle when he maintained \"the\nreal possibility that the sequence of events from the Emperor Nerva to\nthe Emperor Charlemagne might have been radically different from what it\nactually was\"? [Footnote: He illustrated this proposition by a fanciful\nreconstruction of European history from 100 to 800 A.D. in his UCHRONIE,\n1876. He contended that there is no definite law of progress: \"The true\nlaw lies in the equal possibility of progress or regress for societies\nas for individuals.\"]\n\n6.\n\nIt does not concern us here to examine the defects of Comte's view of\nthe course of European history. But it interests us to observe that\nhis synthesis of human Progress is, like Hegel's, what I have called a\nclosed system. Just as his own absolute philosophy marked for Hegel the\nhighest and ultimate term of human development, so for Comte the coming\nsociety whose organisation he adumbrated was the final state of humanity\nbeyond which there would be no further movement. It would take time\nto perfect the organisation, and the period would witness a continuous\nincrease of knowledge, but the main characteristics were definitely\nfixed. Comte did not conceive that the distant future, could he survive\nto experience it, could contain any surprises for him. His theory of\nProgress thus differed from the eighteenth century views which vaguely\ncontemplate an indefinite development and only profess to indicate some\ngeneral tendencies. He expressly repudiated this notion of INDEFINITE\nprogress; the data, he said, justify only the inference of CONTINUOUS\nprogress, which is a different thing.\n\nA second point in which Comte in his view of Progress differed from\nthe French philosophers of the preceding age is this. Condorcet and his\npredecessors regarded it exclusively from the eudaemonic point of view.\nThe goal of Progress for them was the attainment of human felicity. With\nfelicity Comte is hardly more concerned than Hegel. The establishment\nof a fuller harmony between men and their environment in the third stage\nwill no doubt mean happiness. But this consideration lies outside the\ntheory, and to introduce it would only intrude an unscientific\nelement into the analysis. The course of development is determined\nby intellectual ideas, and he treats these as independent of, and\nindifferent to, eudaemonic motives.\n\nA third point to be noted is the authoritarian character of the regime\nof the future. Comte's ideal state would be as ill to live in for any\nunfortunate being who values personal liberty as a theocracy or any\nsocialistic Utopia. He had as little sympathy with liberty as Plato\nor as Bossuet, and less than the eighteenth century philosophers. This\nfeature, common to Comte and the Saint-Simonians, was partly due to the\nreaction against the Revolution, but it also resulted from the logic of\nthe man of science. If sociological laws are positively established as\ncertainly as the law of gravitation, no room is left for opinion; right\nsocial conduct is definitely fixed; the proper functions of every member\nof society admit of no question; therefore the claim to liberty is\nperverse and irrational. It is the same argument which some modern\nexponents of Eugenics use to advocate a state tyranny in the matter of\nhuman breeding.\n\nWhen Comte was writing, the progressive movement in Europe was towards\nincrease of liberty in all its forms, national, civic, political, and\neconomical. On one hand there was the agitation for the release of\noppressed nationalities, on the other the growth of liberalism in\nEngland and France. The aim of the liberalism of that period was to\nrestrict the functions of government; its spirit was distrust of the\nstate. As a political theory it was defective, as modern Liberals\nacknowledge, but it was an important expression of the feeling that\nthe interests of society are best furthered by the free interplay of\nindividual actions and aims. It thus implicitly contained or pointed to\na theory of Progress sharply opposed to Comte's: that the realisation of\nthe fullest possible measure of individual liberty is the condition\nof ensuring the maximum of energy and effectiveness in improving our\nenvironment, and therefore the condition of attaining public felicity.\nRight or wrong, this theory reckons with fundamental facts of human\nnature which Comte ignored.\n\n7.\n\nComte spent the later years of his life in composing another huge work,\non social reorganisation. It included a new religion, in which Humanity\nwas the object of worship, but made no other important addition to the\nspeculations of his earlier manhood, though he developed them further.\n\nThe Course of Positive Philosophy was not a book that took the public by\nstorm. We are told by a competent student of social theories in France\nthat the author's name was little known in his own country till about\n1855, when his greatness began to win recognition, and his influence to\noperate. [Footnote: Weill, Hist. du mouvement social, p. 21.] Even then\nhis work can hardly have been widely read. But through men like Littre\nand Taine, whose conceptions of history were moulded by his teaching,\nand men like Mill, whom he stimulated, as well as through the disciples\nwho adopted Positivism as a religion, his leading principles, detached\nfrom his system, became current in the world of speculation.\n\n[Footnote: The influence of Comte. The manner in which ideas filter\nthrough, as it were, underground and emerge oblivious of their source\nis illustrated by the German historian Lamprecht's theory of historical\ndevelopment. He surveyed the history of a people as a series of what\nhe called typical periods, each of which is marked by a collective\npsychical character expressing itself in every department of life. He\nnamed this a diapason. Lamprecht had never read Comte, and he imagined\nthat this principle, on which he based his kulturhistorische Methode,\nwas original. But his psychical diapason is the psychical consensus of\nComte, whose system, as we have seen, depended on the proposition that\na given social organisation corresponds in a definite way to the\ncontemporary stage of mental development; and Comte had derived the\nprinciple from Saint-Simon. Cf. his pamphlet Die kulturhistorische\nMethode (1900). The succession of \"typical period\" was worked out for\nGermany in his History of the German People.]\n\nHe laid the foundations of sociology, convincing many minds that the\nhistory of civilisation is subject to general laws, or, in other words,\nthat a science of society is possible. In England this idea was still a\nnovelty when Mill's System of Logic appeared in 1843.\n\nThe publication of this work, which attempted to define the rules for\nthe investigation of truth in all fields of inquiry and to provide tests\nfor the hypotheses of science, was a considerable event, whether we\nregard its value and range or its prolonged influence on education.\nMill, who had followed recent French thought attentively and was\nparticularly impressed by the system of Comte, recognised that a new\nmethod of investigating social phenomena had been inaugurated by the\nthinkers who set out to discover the \"law\" of human progression. He\nproclaimed and welcomed it as superior to previous methods, and at the\nsame time pointed out its limitations.\n\nTill about fifty years ago, he said, generalisations on man and society\nhave erred by implicitly assuming that human nature and society will for\never revolve in the same orbit and exhibit virtually the same phenomena.\nThis is still the view of the ostentatiously practical votaries of\ncommon sense in Great Britain; whereas the more reflective minds of the\npresent age, analysing historical records more minutely, have adopted\nthe opinion that the human race is in a state of necessary progression.\nThe reciprocal action between circumstances and human nature, from which\nsocial phenomena result, must produce either a cycle or a trajectory.\nWhile Vico maintained the conception of periodic cycles, his successors\nhave universally adopted the idea of a trajectory or progress, and are\nendeavouring to discover its law. [Footnote: Philosophical writers in\nEngland in the middle of the century paid more attention to Cousin than\nto Comte or Saint-Simon. J. D. Morell, in his forgotten History and\nCritical View of Speculative Philosophy (1846), says that eclecticism is\nthe philosophy of human progress (vol. ii. 635, 2nd ed.). He conceived\nthe movement of humanity as that of a spiral, ever tending to a higher\nperfection (638).]\n\nBut they have fallen into a misconception in imagining that if they can\nfind a law of uniformity in the succession of events they can infer the\nfuture from the past terms of the series. For such a law would only be\nan \"empirical law\"; it would not be a causal law or an ultimate law.\nHowever rigidly uniform, there is no guarantee that it would apply to\nphenomena outside those from which it was derived. It must itself depend\non laws of mind and character (psychology and ethology). When those\nlaws are known and the nature of the dependence is explained, when the\ndetermining causes of all the changes constituting the progress are\nunderstood, then the empirical law will be elevated to a scientific law,\nthen only will it be possible to predict.\n\nThus Mill asserted that if the advanced thinkers who are engaged on\nthe subject succeed in discovering an empirical law from the data of\nhistory, it may be converted into a scientific law by deducing it a\npriori from the principles of human nature. In the meantime, he argued\nthat what is already known of those principles justifies the important\nconclusion that the order of general human progression will mainly\ndepend on the order of progression in the intellectual convictions of\nmankind.\n\nThroughout his exposition Mill uses \"progress\" in a neutral sense,\nwithout implying that the progression necessarily means improvement.\nSocial science has still to demonstrate that the changes determined by\nhuman nature do mean improvement. But in warning the reader of this\nhe declares himself to be personally an optimist, believing that the\ngeneral tendency, saving temporary exceptions, is in the direction of a\nbetter and happier state.\n\n8.\n\nTwenty years later [Footnote: In later editions of the Logic.] Mill was\nable to say that the conception of history as subject to general\nlaws had \"passed into the domain of newspaper and ordinary political\ndiscussion.\" Buckle's HISTORY OF CIVILISATION IN ENGLAND [Footnote: 2\nVol. i. appeared in 1857, vol. ii. in 1861.] which enjoyed an immediate\nsuccess, did a great deal to popularise the idea. In this stimulating\nwork Buckle took the fact of Progress for granted; his purpose was to\ninvestigate its causes. Considering the two general conditions on which\nall events depend, human nature and external nature, he arrived at two\nconclusions: (1) In the early stage of history the influence of man's\nexternal environment is the more decisive factor; but as time goes on\nthe roles are gradually inverted, and now it is his own nature that is\nprincipally responsible for his development. (2) Progress is determined,\nnot by the emotional and moral faculties, but by the intellect;\n[Footnote: This was the view of Jouffroy, Comte, and Mill; Buckle\npopularised it.] the emotional and moral faculties are stationary, and\ntherefore religion is not a decisive influence in the onward movement\nof humanity. \"I pledge myself to show that the progress Europe has\nmade from barbarism to civilisation is entirely due to its intellectual\nactivity.... In what may be called the innate and original morals of\nmankind there is, so far as we are aware, no progress.\" [Footnote:\nBuckle has been very unjustly treated by some critics, but has found an\nable defender in Mr. J.M. Robertson (Buckle and his Critics (1895)). The\nremarks of Benn (History of Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century, ii.\n182 sqq.) are worth reading.]\n\nBuckle was convinced that social phenomena exhibit the same undeviating\nregularity as natural phenomena. In this belief he was chiefly\ninfluenced by the investigations of the Belgian statistician Quetelet\n(1835). \"Statistics,\" he said, \"has already thrown more light on the\nstudy of human nature than all the sciences put together.\" From the\nregularity with which the same crimes recur in the same state of\nsociety, and many other constant averages, he inferred that all actions\nof individuals result directly from the state of society in which they\nlive, and that laws are operating which, if we take large enough numbers\ninto account, scarcely undergo any sensible perturbation. [Footnote:\nKant had already appealed to statistics in a similar sense; see above,\np. 243.] Thus the evidence of statistics points to the conclusion that\nprogress is not determined by the acts of individual men, but depends\non general laws of the intellect which govern the successive stages of\npublic opinion. The totality of human actions at any given time depends\non the totality of knowledge and the extent of its diffusion.\n\nThere we have the theory that history is subject to general laws in its\nmost unqualified form, based on a fallacious view of the significance\nof statistical facts. Buckle's attempt to show the operation of general\nlaws in the actual history of man was disappointing. When he went on to\nreview the concrete facts of the historical process, his own political\nprinciples came into play, and he was more concerned with denouncing\nthe tendencies of which he did not approve than with extricating general\nlaws from the sequence of events. His comments on religious persecution\nand the obscurantism of governments and churches were instructive\nand timely, but they did not do much to exhibit a set of rigid laws\ngoverning and explaining the course of human development.\n\nThe doctrine that history is under the irresistible control of law\nwas also popularised by an American physiologist, J. W. Draper, whose\nHISTORY OF THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE appeared in 1864 and\nwas widely read. His starting-point was a superficial analogy between\na society and an individual. \"Social advancement is as completely under\nthe control of natural law as a bodily growth. The life of an individual\nis a miniature of the life of a nation,\" and \"particles\" in the\nindividual organism answer to persons in the political organism. Both\nhave the same epochs--infancy, childhood, youth, manhood, old age--and\ntherefore European progress exhibits five phases, designated as\nCredulity, Inquiry, Faith, Reason, Decrepitude. Draper's conclusion was\nthat Europe, now in the fourth period, is hastening to a long period\nof decrepitude. The prospect did not dismay him; decrepitude is\nthe culmination of Progress, and means the organisation of national\nintellect. That has already been achieved in China, and she owes to it\nher well-being and longevity. \"Europe is inevitably hastening to become\nwhat China is. In her we may see what we shall be like when we are old.\"\n\nJudged by any standard, Draper's work is much inferior to Buckle's, but\nboth these books, utterly different though they were in both conception\nand treatment, performed a similar function. Each in its own way\ndiffused the view which had originated in France, that civilisation is\nprogression and, like nature, subject to general laws.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII. \"PROGRESS\" IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (1830-1851)\n\n1.\n\nIn 1850 there appeared at Paris a small book by M. A. Javary, with the\ntitle DE L'IDEE DU PROGRES. Its interest lies in the express recognition\nthat Progress was the characteristic idea of the age, ardently received\nby some, hotly denounced by others. [Footnote: Lamartine denounced in\nhis monthly journal Le Conseiller du peuple, vol. i. (1849), all the\nprogressive gospels of the day, socialist, communist, Saint-Simonian,\nFourierist, Icarian--in fact every school of social reform since the\nFirst Republic--as purely materialistic, sprung from the \"cold seed of\nthe century of Helvetius\" (pp. 224, 287).]\n\n\"If there is any idea,\" he says, \"that belongs properly to one century,\nat least by the importance accorded to it, and that, whether accepted or\nnot, is familiar to all minds, it is the idea of Progress conceived as\nthe general law of history and the future of humanity.\"\n\nHe observes that some, intoxicated by the spectacle of the material\nimprovements of modern civilisation and the results of science, set no\nlimits to man's power or his hopes; while others, unable to deny the\nfacts, say that this progress serves only the lower part of human\nnature, and refuse to look with complacency on a movement which means,\nthey assert, a continuous decadence of the nobler part. To which it is\nreplied that, If moral decadence is a fact, it is only transient; it\nis a necessary phase of a development which means moral progress in\nthe end, for it is due to the process by which the beliefs, ideas,\nand institutions of the past disappear and make way for new and better\nprinciples.\n\nAnd Javary notes a prevailing tendency in France to interpret every\ncontemporary movement as progressive, while all the social doctrinaires\njustify their particular reforms by invoking the law of Progress. It was\nquite true that during the July monarchy nearly all serious speculations\non society and history were related to that idea. It was common to\nMichelet and Quinet, who saw in the march of civilisation the gradual\ntriumph of liberty; to Leroux and Cabet, who preached humanitarian\ncommunism; to Louis Blanc and to Proudhon; to the bourgeois, who were\nsatisfied with the regime of Louis Philippe and grew rich, following\nthe precept of Guizot, as well as to the workers who overthrew it. It is\nsignificant that the journal of Louis Blanc, in which he published his\nbook on the ORGANISATION OF WORK (1839), was entitled REVUS DES PROGRES.\nThe political question as to the due limits between government and\nindividual freedom was discussed in terms of Progress: is personal\nliberty or state authority the efficient means of progressing? The\nmetaphysical question of necessity and freewill acquired a new interest:\nis Progress a fatality, independent of human purposes, determined\nby general, ineluctable, historical laws? Quinet and Michelet argued\nvigorously against the optimism of Cousin, who with Hegel held that\nhistory is just what it ought to be and could not be improved.\n\n2.\n\nAmong the competing theories of the time, and sharply opposed to the\nviews of Comte, was the idea, derived from the Revolution, that the\nworld is moving towards universal equality and the obliteration of class\ndistinctions, that this is the true direction of Progress. This view,\nrepresented by leaders of the popular movement against the bourgeois\nascendency, derived powerful reinforcement from one of the most\nenlightened political thinkers of the day. The appearance of de\nTocqueville's renowned study of American democracy was the event of\n1834. He was convinced that he had discovered on the other side of the\nAtlantic the answer to the question whither the world is tending. In\nAmerican society he found that equality of conditions is the generating\nfact on which every other fact depends. He concluded that equality is\nthe goal of humanity, providentially designed.\n\n\"The gradual development of equality of conditions has the principal\ncharacteristics of a providential fact. It is universal, it is\npermanent, it eludes human power; all events and all men serve this\ndevelopment.... This whole book has been written under the impression of\na sort of religious terror produced in the author's soul by the view\nof this irresistible revolution which for so many centuries has been\nmarching across all obstacles, and which is to-day seen still advancing\nin the midst of the ruins it has made.... If the men of our time were\nbrought to see that the gradual and progressive development of equality\nis at once the past and the future of their history, this single\ndiscovery would give that development the sacred character of the will\nof the sovran master.\"\n\nHere we have a view of the direction of Progress and the meaning of\nhistory, pretending to be based upon the study of facts and announced\nwith the most intense conviction. And behind it is the fatalistic\ndoctrine that the movement cannot be arrested or diverted; that it is\nuseless to struggle against it; that men, whatever they may do, cannot\ndeflect the clock-like motion regulated by a power which de Tocqueville\ncalls Providence but to which his readers might give some other name.\n\n3.\n\nIt has been conjectured, [Footnote: Georges Sorel, Les Illusions\ndu progres, pp. 247-8 (1908).] and seems probable enough, that de\nTocqueville's book was one of the influences which wrought upon the\nmind of Proudhon. The speculations of this remarkable man, who, like\nSaint-Simon and Comte, sought to found a new science of society,\nattracted general attention in the middle of the century. [Footnote:\nCompare the appreciation by Weill in Histoire du mouvement social\nen France 1852-1910 (1911, ed. 2), p. 41: \"Le grande ecrivain\nrevolutionnaire et anarchiste n'etait au fond ni un revolutionnaire\nni un anarchiste, mais un reformateur pratique et modere qui a\nfait illusion par le ton vibrant de ses pamphlets centre la societe\ncapitaliste.\"]His hostility to religion, his notorious dictum that\n\"property is theft,\" his gospel of \"anarchy,\" and the defiant,\nprecipitous phrases in which he clothed his ideas, created an impression\nthat he was a dangerous anti-social revolutionary. But when his ideas\nare studied in their context and translated into sober language, they\nare not so unreasonable. Notwithstanding his communistic theory of\nproperty and his ideal of equality, he was a strong individualist.\nHe held that the future of civilisation depends on the energy of\nindividuals, that liberty is a condition of its advance, and that the\nend to be kept in view is the establishment of justice, which means\nequality. He saw the difficulty of reconciling liberty with complete\nequality, but hoped that the incompatibility would be overcome by a\ngradual reduction of the natural differences in men's capacities. He\nsaid, \"I am an anarchist,\" but his anarchy only meant that the time\nwould come when government would be superfluous, when every human\nbeing could be trusted to act wisely and morally without a restraining\nauthority or external sanctions. Nor was he a Utopian. He comprehended\nthat such a transformation of society would be a long, slow process, and\nhe condemned the schools of Saint-Simon and Fourier for imagining that a\nmillennium might be realised immediately by a change of organisation.\n\nHe tells us that all his speculations and controversial activities are\npenetrated with the idea of Progress, which he described as \"the railway\nof liberty\"; and his radical criticism on current social theories,\nwhether conservative or democratic, was that they did not take Progress\nseriously though they invoked it.\n\n\"What dominates in all my studies, what forms their beginning and end,\ntheir summit and their base, their reason, what makes my originality\nas a thinker (if I have any), is that I affirm Progress resolutely,\nirrevocably, and everywhere, and deny the Absolute. All that I have\never written, all I have denied or affirmed, I have written, denied or\naffirmed in the name of one unique idea, Progress. My adversaries, on\nthe other hand, are all partisans of the Absolute, IN OMNI GENERE, CASU,\nET NUMERO, to use the phrase of Sganarelle.\" [Footnote: Philosophie du\nprogres, Premiere lettre (1851).]\n\n4.\n\nA vague confidence in Progress had lain behind and encouraged the\nrevolution of 1789, but in the revolution of 1848 the idea was\ndefinitely enthroned as the regnant principle. It presided over the\nsession of the Committee which drew up the Constitution of the second\nRepublic. Armand Marrast, the most important of the men who framed that\ndocument, based the measure of universal suffrage upon \"the invisible\nlaw which rules societies,\" the law of progress which has been so long\ndenied but which is rooted in the nature of man. His argument was\nthis: Revolutions are due to the repression of progress, and are the\nexpression and triumph of a progress which has been achieved. But such\nconvulsions are an undesirable method of progressing; how can they be\navoided? Only by organising elastic institutions in which new ideas\nof amelioration can easily be incorporated, and laws which can be\naccommodated without struggle or friction to the rise of new opinions.\nWhat is needed is a flexible government open to the penetration of\nideas, and the key to such a government is universal suffrage.\n\n[Footnote: Marrast, \"the invisible law\"; \"Oui,\" he continues, \"toute\nsociete est progressive, parce que tout individu est educable,\nperfectible; on peut mesurer, limiter, peut-etre les facultes d'un\nindividu; on ne saurait limiter, mesurer ce que peuvent, dans l'ordre\ndes idees, les intelligences dont les produits ne s'ajoutent pas\nseulement mais se fecondent et se multiplient dans une progression\nindefinie.\" No. 393 Republique francoise. Assemblee nationale. Projet de\nConstitution... precede par un rapport fait au nom de la Commission par\nle citoyen Armand Marrast. Seance du 30 aout, 1848.]\n\nUniversal suffrage was practical politics, but the success of the\nrevolution fluttered agreeably all the mansions of Utopia, and social\nreformers of every type sought to improve the occasion. In the history\nof the political struggles of 1848 the names are written of Proudhon,\nof Victor Considerant the disciple of Fourier, of Pierre Leroux the\nhumanitarian communist, and his devoted pupil George Sand. The chief\ntitle of Leroux to be remembered is just his influence over the soul\nof the great novelist. Her later romances are pervaded by ideas derived\nfrom his teaching. His communism was vague and ineffectual, but he was\none of the minor forces in the thought of the period, and there are some\nfeatures in his theory which deserve to be pointed out.\n\nLeroux had begun as a member of the Saint-Simonian school, but he\ndiverged into a path of his own. He reinstated the ideal of equality\nwhich Saint-Simon rejected, and made the approach to that ideal the\nmeasure of Progress. The most significant process in history, he held,\nis the gradual breaking down of caste and class: the process is now\napproaching its completion; \"today MAN is synonymous with EQUAL.\"\n\nIn order to advance to the city of the future we must have a force and\na lever. Man is the force, and the lever is the idea of Progress. It is\nsupplied by the study of history which displays the improvement of our\nfaculties, the increase of our power over nature, the possibility of\norganising society more efficaciously. But the force and the lever are\nnot enough. A fulcrum is also required, and this is to be found in the\n\"solidarity\" of the human race. But this conception meant for Leroux\nsomething different from what is ordinarily meant by the phrase, a\ndeeper and even mystical bond. Human \"solidarity\" was a corollary from\nthe pantheistic religion of the Saint-Simonians, but with Leroux,\nas with Fourier, it was derived from the more difficult doctrine of\npalingenesis. We of this generation, he believed, are not merely the\nsons and descendants of past generations, we are the past generations\nthemselves, which have come to birth again in us.\n\nThrough many pages of the two volumes [Footnote: De l'humanite, 1840\n(dedicated to Beranger).] in which he set forth his thesis, Leroux\nexpended much useless learning in endeavouring to establish this\ndoctrine, which, were it true, might be the central principle in a\nnew religion of humanity, a transformed Pythagoreanism. It is easy to\nunderstand the attractiveness of palingenesis to a believer in Progress:\nfor it would provide a solution of the anomaly that generations after\ngenerations are sacrificed for the sake of posterity, and so appear to\nhave no value in themselves. Believers in Progress, who are sensitive to\nthe sufferings of mankind, past and present, need a stoical resolution\nto face this fact. We saw how Herder refused to accept it. A pantheistic\nfaith, like that of the Saint-Simonian Church, may help some, it cannot\ndo more, to a stoical acquiescence. The palingenesis of Leroux or\nFourier removes the radical injustice. The men of each generation are\nsacrificed and suffer for the sake of their descendants, but as their\ndescendants are themselves come to life again, they are really suffering\nin their own interests. They will themselves reach the desirable state\nto which the slow, painful process of history is tending.\n\nBut palingenesis, notwithstanding all the ancient opinions and\ntraditions that the researches of Leroux might muster, could carry\nlittle conviction to those who were ceasing to believe in the familiar\ndoctrine of a future life detached from earth, and Madame Dudevant was\nhis only distinguished convert.\n\n5.\n\nThe ascendency of the idea of Progress among thoughtful people in France\nin the middle of the last century is illustrated by the work which\nErnest Renan composed under the immediate impression of the events\nof 1848. He desired to understand the significance of the current\nrevolutionary doctrines, and was at once involved in speculation on\nthe future of humanity. This is the purport of L'AVENIR DE LA SCIENCE.\n[Footnote: L'Avenir de la science--Pensees de (1848). Published in\n1890.]\n\n[Footnote: The ascendency of the idea of Progress at this epoch may be\nfurther illustrated by E. Pelletan's Profession de foi du dix-neuvieme\nsiecle, 1852 (4th ed., 1857), where Progress is described as the general\nlaw of the universe; and by Jean Reynaud's Philosophie religieuse:\nTerre et ciel (3rd ed., 1858), a religious but not orthodox book, which\nacclaims the \"sovran principle of perfectibility\" (cp. p. 138). I may\nrefer also to the rhetorical pages of E. Vacherot on the Doctrine du\nprogres, printed (as part of an essay on the Philosophy of History) in\nhis Essais de philosophie critique (1864).]\n\nThe author was then convinced that history has a goal, and that mankind\ntends perpetually, though in an oscillating line, towards a more perfect\nstate, through the growing dominion of reason over instinct and caprice.\nHe takes the French Revolution as the critical moment in which humanity\nfirst came to know itself. That revolution was the first attempt of man\nto take the reins into his own hands. All that went before we may call,\nwith Owen, the irrational period of human existence.\n\nWe have now come to a point at which we must choose between two faiths.\nIf we despair of reason, we may find a refuge from utter scepticism in\na belief in the external authority of the Roman Church. If we trust\nreason, we must accept the march of the human mind and justify the\nmodern spirit. And it can be justified only by proving that it is a\nnecessary step towards perfection. Renan affirmed his belief in\nthe second alternative, and felt confident that science--including\nphilology, on the human bearings of which he enlarged,--philosophy, and\nart would ultimately enable men to realise an ideal civilisation,\nin which all would be equal. The state, he said, is the machine of\nProgress, and the Socialists are right in formulating the problem which\nman has to solve, though their solution is a bad one. For individual\nliberty, which socialism would seriously limit, is a definite conquest,\nand ought to be preserved inviolate.\n\nRenan wrote this work in 1848 and 1849, but did not publish it at the\ntime. He gave it to the world forty years later. Those forty years\nhad robbed him of his early optimism. He continues to believe that the\nunfortunate conditions of our race might be ameliorated by science, but\nhe denounces the view that men can ever be equal. Inequality is written\nin nature; it is not only a necessary consequence of liberty, but\na necessary postulate of Progress. There will always be a superior\nminority. He criticises himself too for having fallen into the error of\nHegel, and assigned to man an unduly important place in the universe.\n\n[Footnote: Renan, speaking of the Socialists, paid a high tribute\nto Bazard (L'Avenir de la science, p. 104). On the other hand, he\ncriticised Comte severely (p. 149).\n\nRenan returned to speculation on the future in 1863, in a letter to M.\nMarcellin-Berthelot (published in Dialogues et fragments philosophiques,\n1876): \"Que sera Ie monde quand un million de fois se sera reproduit ce\nqui s'est passe depuis 1763 quand la chimie, au lieu de quatre-vingt ans\nde progres, en aura cent millions?\" (p. 183). And again in the Dialogues\nwritten in 1871 (ib.), where it is laid down that the end of humanity is\nto produce great men: \"le grand oeuvre s'accomplira par la science, non\npar la democratic. Rien sans grands hommes; le salut se fera par des\ngrands hommes\" (p. 103).]\n\nIn 1890 there was nothing left of the sentimental socialism which he had\nstudied in 1848; it had been blown away by the cold wind of scientific\nsocialism which Marx and Engels created. And Renan had come to think\nthat in this new form socialism would triumph. [Footnote: He reckoned\nwithout the new forces, opposed to socialism as well as to parliamentary\ndemocracy, represented by Bakunin and men like Georges Sorel.] He had\ncriticised Comte for believing that \"man lives exclusively by science,\nor rather little verbal tags, like geometrical theorems, dry formulae.\"\nWas he satisfied by the concrete doctrine of Marx that all the phenomena\nof civilisation at a given period are determined by the methods of\nproduction and distribution which then prevail? But the future of\nsocialism is a minor issue, and the ultimate goal of humanity is quite\nuncertain. \"Ce qu'il y a de consolant, c'est qu'on arrive necessairement\nquelque part.\" We may console ourselves with the certainty that we must\nget somewhere.\n\n6.\n\nProudhon described the idea of Progress as the railway of liberty. It\ncertainly supplied motive power to social ideals which were repugnant\nand alarming to the authorities of the Catholic Church. At the Vatican\nit was clearly seen that the idea was a powerful engine driven by an\nenemy; and in the famous SYLLABUS of errors which Pope Pius IX. flung in\nthe face of the modern world at the end of 1864, Progress had the honour\nof being censured. The eightieth error, which closes the list, runs\nthus:\n\nRomanus Pontifex potest ac debet cum progressu, cum liberalismo et cum\nrecenti civilitate sese reconciliare et componere.\n\n\"The Roman Pontiff can, and ought to, be reconciled and come to terms\nwith progress, with liberalism, and with modern civilisation.\"\n\nNo wonder, seeing that Progress was invoked to justify every movement\nthat offended the nostrils of the Vatican--liberalism, toleration,\ndemocracy, and socialism. And the Roman Church well understood the\nintimate connection of the idea with the advance of rationalism.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII. MATERIAL PROGRESS: THE EXHIBITION OF 1851\n\n1.\n\nIt is not easy for a new idea of the speculative order to penetrate and\ninform the general consciousness of a community until it has assumed\nsome external and concrete embodiment or is recommended by some striking\nmaterial evidence. In the case of Progress both these conditions were\nfulfilled in the period 1820 to 1850. In the Saint-Simonian Church, and\nin the attempts of Owen and Cabet to found ideal societies, people saw\npractical enterprises inspired by the idea. They might have no sympathy\nwith these enterprises, but their attention was attracted. And at the\nsame time they were witnessing a rapid transformation of the external\nconditions of life, a movement to the continuation of which there seemed\nno reason for setting any limit in the future. The spectacular results\nof the advance of science and mechanical technique brought home to the\nmind of the average man the conception of an indefinite increase of\nman's power over nature as his brain penetrated her secrets. This\nevident material progress which has continued incessantly ever since\nhas been a mainstay of the general belief in Progress which is prevalent\nto-day.\n\nEngland was the leader in this material progress, of which the\nparticulars are familiar and need not be enumerated here. The discovery\nof the power of steam and the potentialities of coal revolutionised the\nconditions of life. Men who were born at the beginning of the\ncentury had seen, before they had passed the age of thirty, the rapid\ndevelopment of steam navigation, the illumination of towns and houses by\ngas, the opening of the first railway.\n\nIt was just before this event, the opening of the Liverpool and\nManchester railway, which showed how machinery would abbreviate space as\nit had SIR THOMAS MORE, OR COLLOQUIES ON THE PROGRESS OF SOCIETY (1829).\nThere we see the effect of the new force on his imagination. \"Steam,\" he\nsays, \"will govern the world next,... and shake it too before its empire\nis established.\" The biographer of Nelson devotes a whole conversation\nto the subject of \"steam and war.\" But the theme of the book is the\nquestion of moral and social progress, on which the author inclines\nto the view that \"the world will continue to improve, even as it has\nhitherto been continually improving; and that the progress of knowledge\nand the diffusion of Christianity will bring about at last, when men\nbecome Christian in reality as well as in name, something like that\nUtopian state of which philosophers have loved to dream.\" This admission\nof Progress, cautious though it was, circumscribed by reserves and\ncompromised by hesitations, coming from such a conservative pillar of\nChurch and State as Southey, is a notable sign of the times, when we\nremember that the idea was still associated then with revolution and\nheresy.\n\nIt is significant too that at the same time an octogenarian\nmathematician of Aberdeen was composing a book on the same subject.\nHamilton's PROGRESS OF SOCIETY is now utterly forgotten, but it must\nhave contributed in its day to propagating the same moderate view of\nProgress, consistent with orthodoxy, which Southey held. \"The belief of\nthe perfectibility of human nature and the attainment of a golden age\nin which vice and misery have no place, will only be entertained by an\nenthusiast; but an inquiry into the means of improving our nature and\nenlarging our happiness is consistent with sober reason, and is the\nmost important subject, merely human, that can engage the mind of\nman.\" [Footnote: P. 13. The book was published posthumously by Murray\nin 1830, a year after the author's death.] [Footnote: \"Progress of\nSociety.\" The phrase was becoming common; e.g. Russell's History\nof Modern Europe (1822) has the sub-title A view of the Progress of\nSociety, etc. The didactic poem of Payne Knight, The Progress of Civil\nSociety (1796), a very dull performance, was quite unaffected by\nthe dreams of Priestley or Godwin. It was towards the middle of the\nnineteenth century that Progress, without any qualifying phrase, came\ninto use.]\n\n2.\n\nWe have been told by Tennyson that when he went by the first train\nfrom Liverpool to Manchester (1830) he thought that the wheels ran in\ngrooves.\n\n\"Then I made this line:\n\nLet the great world spin for ever down the ringing grooves of change.\"\n[Footnote: See Tennyson, Memoir by his Son, vol. i. p. 195.]\n\nLOCKSLEY HALL, which was published in 1842, illustrates how the idea of\nProgress had begun to creep into the imagination of Englishmen. Though\nsubsidiary to a love story, it is the true theme of the poem. The\npulsation of eager interest in the terrestrial destinies of humanity,\nthe large excitement of living in a \"wondrous Mother-age,\" dreams of the\nfuture, quicken the passion of the hero's youth. His disappointment in\nlove disenchants him; he sees the reverse side of civilisation, but at\nlast he finds an anodyne for his palsied heart in a more sober version\nof his earlier faith, a chastened belief in his Mother-age. He can at\nleast discern an increasing purpose in history, and can be sure that\n\"the thoughts of men are widened with the process of the suns.\" The\nnovelty of the poem lay in finding a cathartic cure for a private\nsorrow, not in religion or in nature, but in the modern idea of\nProgress. It may be said to mark a stage in the career of the idea.\n\nThe view of civilisation which Tennyson took as his MOTIF had no\nrevolutionary implications, suggested no impatience or anger with the\npast. The startling prospect unfolding itself before \"the long result of\ntime,\" and history is justified by the promise of to-day:\n\nThe centuries behind me like a fruitful land reposed.\n\nVery different was the spirit in which another great poet composed,\nnearly twenty years later, a wonderful hymn of Progress. Victor Hugo's\nPLEIN CEIL, in his epic LA LEGENDE DES SIECLES,[Footnote: A.D. 1859.]\nannounces a new era of the world in which man, the triumphant rebel,\ndelivered from his past, will move freely forward on a glorious way. The\npoet is inspired not by faith in a continuous development throughout the\nages, but by the old spirit of the Revolution, and he sees in the past\nonly a heavy chain which the race at last flings off. The horrible past\nhas gone, not to return: \"ce monde est mort\"; and the poem is at once\na paean on man's victorious rebellion against it and a dithyramb on the\nprospect of his future.\n\nMan is imagined as driving through the heavens an aerial car to which\nthe four winds are harnessed, mounting above the clouds, and threatening\nto traverse the ether.\n\n Superbe, il plane, avec un hymne en ses agres;\n Et l'on voit voir passer la strophe du progres.\n Il est la nef, il est le phare!\n L'homme enfin prend son sceptre et jette son baton.\n Et l'on voit s'envoler le calcul de Newton\n Monte sur l'ode de Pindare.\n\n\nBut if this vision foreshadows the conquest of the air, its significance\nis symbolic rather than literal, and, like Pindar checking the steeds of\nhis song, Hugo returns to earth:\n\n Pas si loin! pas si haut! redescendons.\n Restons L'homme, restons Adam; mais non l'homme a tatons,\n Mais non l'Adam tombe! Tout autre reve altere\n L'espece d'ideal qui convient a la terre.\n Contentons-nous du mot: meilleur! ecrit partout.\n\n\nDawn has appeared, after six thousand years in the fatal way, and\nman, freed by \"the invisible hand\" from the weight of his chains, has\nembarked for new shores:\n\n Ou va-t-il ce navire? II va, de jour vetu,\n A l'avenir divin et pur, a la vertu,\n A la science qu'on voit luire,\n A la mort des fleaux, a l'oubli genereux,\n A l'abondance, au caime, au rire, a l'homme heureux,\n Il va, ce glorieux navire.\n\n\n Oh! ce navire fait le voyage sacre!\n C'est l'ascension bleue a son premier degre;\n Hors de l'antique et vil decombre,\n Hors de la pesanteur, c'est l'avenir fonde;\n C'est le destin de l'homme a la fin evade,\n Qui leve l'ancre et sort de l'ombre!\n\n\nThe union of humanity in a universal commonwealth, which Tennyson had\nexpressed as \"the Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World,\"\nthe goal of many theorists of Progress, becomes in Hugo's imagination\nsomething more sublime. The magic ship of man's destiny is to compass\nthe cosmopolis of the Stoics, a terrestrial order in harmony with the\nwhole universe.\n\n Nef magique et supreme! elle a, rien qu'eri marchant,\n Change le cri terrestre en pur et joyeux chant,\n Rajeuni les races fletries,\n Etabli l'ordre vrai, montre le chemin sur,\n Dieu juste! et fait entrer dans l'homme tant d'azur\n Qu'elle a supprime les patries!\n\n\n Faisant a l'homme avec le ciel une cite,\n Une pensee avec toute l'immensite,\n Elle abolit les vieilles regles;\n Elle abaisse les monts, elle annule les tours;\n Splendide, elle introduit les peuples, marcheurs lourds,\n Dans la communion des aigles.\n\n\n3.\n\nBetween 1830 and 1850 railway transport spread throughout Great Britain\nand was introduced on the Continent, and electricity was subdued to\nman's use by the invention of telegraphy. The great Exhibition of London\nin 1851 was, in one of its aspects, a public recognition of the material\nprogress of the age and the growing power of man over the physical\nworld. Its aim, said a contemporary, was \"to seize the living scroll\nof human progress, inscribed with every successive conquest of man's\nintellect.\"[Footnote: Edinburgh Review (October 1851), p. 562, in a\nreview of the Official Catalogue of the Exhibition.] The Prince Consort,\nwho originated the Exhibition, explained its significance in a public\nspeech:\n\n\"Nobody who has paid any attention to the peculiar features of our\npresent era will doubt for a moment that we are living at a period of\nmost wonderful transition, which tends rapidly to accomplish that great\nend to which indeed all history points--THE REALISATION OF THE UNITY\nOF MANKIND.... The distances which separated the different nations and\nparts of the globe are rapidly vanishing before the achievements of\nmodern invention, and we can traverse them with incredible ease; the\nlanguages of all nations are known, and their acquirements placed within\nthe reach of everybody; thought is communicated with the rapidity, and\neven by the power, of lightning. On the other hand, the GREAT PRINCIPLE\nOF DIVISION OF LABOUR, which may be called the moving power of\ncivilisation, is being extended to all branches of science, industry,\nand art... Gentlemen, the Exhibition of 1851 is to give us a true test\nand a living picture of the point of development at which the whole of\nmankind has arrived in this great task, and a new starting-point from\nwhich all nations will be able to direct their further exertions.\"\n[Footnote: Martin, Life of the Prince Consort (ed. 3), iii. p. 247.\nThe speech was delivered at a banquet at the Mansion House on March 21,\n1850.]\n\nThe point emphasised here is the \"solidarity\" of the world. The\nExhibition is to bring home to men's consciousness the community of all\nthe inhabitants of the earth. The assembled peoples, wrote Thackeray,\nin his \"May-day Ode,\" [Footnote: Published in the Times, April 30, 1851.\nThe Exhibition was opened on May I.] See the sumptuous banquet set, The\nbrotherhood of nations met Around the feast.\n\nAnd this was the note struck in the leading article of the Times on the\nopening day: \"The first morning since the creation that all peoples have\nassembled from all parts of the world and done a common act.\" It was\nclaimed that the Exhibition signified a new, intelligent, and moral\nmovement which \"marks a great crisis in the history of the world,\" and\nforeshadows universal peace.\n\nEngland, said another writer, produced Bacon and Newton, the two\nphilosophers \"who first lent direction and force to the stream of\nindustrial science; we have been the first also to give the widest\npossible base to the watch-tower of international progress, which seeks\nthe formation of the physical well-being of man and the extinction of\nthe meaner jealousies of commerce.\"[Footnote: Edinburgh Review, loc.\ncit.]\n\nThese quotations show that the great Exhibition was at the time\noptimistically regarded, not merely as a record of material\nachievements, but as a demonstration that humanity was at last well on\nits way to a better and happier state, through the falling of barriers\nand the resulting insight that the interests of all are closely\ninterlocked. A vista was suggested, at the end of which far-sighted\npeople might think they discerned Tennyson's \"Federation of the World.\"\n\n4.\n\nSince the Exhibition, western civilisation has advanced steadily, and\nin some respects more rapidly than any sober mind could have\npredicted--civilisation, at least, in the conventional sense, which\nhas been not badly defined as \"the development of material ease, of\neducation, of equality, and of aspirations to rise and succeed in life.\"\n[Footnote: B. Kidd, Social Evolution, p. 368.] The most striking advance\nhas been in the technical conveniences of life--that is, in the\ncontrol over natural forces. It would be superfluous to enumerate\nthe discoveries and inventions since 1850 which have abridged space,\neconomised time, eased bodily suffering, and reduced in some ways\nthe friction of life, though they have increased it in others. This\nuninterrupted series of technical inventions, proceeding concurrently\nwith immense enlargements of all branches of knowledge, has gradually\naccustomed the least speculative mind to the conception that\ncivilisation is naturally progressive, and that continuous improvement\nis part of the order of things.\n\nSo far the hopes of 1851 have been fulfilled. But against all this\ntechnical progress, with the enormous expansion of industry and\ncommerce, dazzling to the man in the market-place when he pauses to\nreflect, have to be set the exploitation and sufferings of industrial\nworkers, the distress of intense economic competition, the heavier\nburdens of preparation for modern war. The very increase of \"material\nease\" seemed unavoidably to involve conditions inconsistent with\nuniversal happiness; and the communications which linked the peoples of\nthe world together modified the methods of warfare instead of bringing\npeace. \"Toutes nos merveilleuses inventions sont aussi puissantes pour\nle mal que pour le bien.\" [Footnote: H. de Ferron, Theorie du progres\n(1867), ii. 439.] One fact indeed might be taken as an index that\nhumanity was morally advancing--the abolition of slavery in America\nat the price of a long and sanguinary war. Yet some triumphs of\nphilanthropy hardly seemed to endanger the conclusion that, while\nknowledge is indefinitely progressive, there is no good reason for\nsanguine hopes that man is \"perfectible\" or that universal happiness is\nattainable. A thoughtful writer observed, discussing Progress in 1864,\nthat the innumerable individual steps in the growth of knowledge and\nbusiness organisation have not been combined, so far, to produce a\ngeneral advance in the happiness of life; each step brings increase of\npressure. [Footnote: Lotze, Microcosmus (Eng. tr.), vol. ii. p. 396.]\n\nYet in spite of all adverse facts and many eminent dissenters the belief\nin social Progress has on the whole prevailed. This triumph of optimism\nwas promoted by the victory of a revolutionary hypothesis in another\nfield of inquiry, which suddenly electrified the world. [Footnote:\nAgainst Lotze we might set many opinions which do not seem to have been\ninfluenced by the doctrine of evolution. For instance, the optimism of\nM. Marcellin-Berthelot in a letter to Renan in 1863. He says (Renan,\nDialogues, p. 233) that one of the general results of historical study\nis \"the fact of the incessant progress of human societies in science, in\nmaterial conditions, and in morality, three correlatives.... Societies\nbecome more and more civilised, and I will venture to say more and more\nvirtuous. The sum of good is always increasing, and the sum of evil\ndiminishing, in the same measure as the sum of truth increases and the\nsum of ignorance diminishes.\"\n\nIn 1867 Emerson delivered an address at Harvard on the \"Progress\nof Culture\" (printed in his Letters and Social Aims), in which he\nenumerates optimistically the indications of social advance: \"the new\nscope of social science; the abolition of capital punishment and of\nimprisonment for debt: the improvement of prisons; the efforts for the\nsuppression of intemperance, vice, etc.,\" and asks: \"Who would live in\nthe stone age, or the bronze, or the iron, or the lacustrine? Who does\nnot prefer the age of steel, of gold, of coal, petroleum, cotton, steam,\nelectricity, and the spectroscope?\"\n\nThe discursive Thoughts on the Future of the Human Race, published in\n1866, by W. Ellis (1800-81), a disciple of J. S. Mill, would have been\nremarkable if it had appeared half a century earlier. He is untouched\nby the theory of evolution, and argues on common-sense grounds that\nProgress is inevitable.]\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX. PROGRESS IN THE LIGHT OF EVOLUTION\n\n1.\n\nIn the sixties of the nineteenth century the idea of Progress entered\nupon the third period of its history. During the FIRST period, up to the\nFrench Revolution, it had been treated rather casually; it was taken for\ngranted and received no searching examination either from philosophers\nor from historians. In the SECOND period its immense significance was\napprehended, and a search began for a general law which would define and\nestablish it. The study of sociology was founded, and at the same time\nthe impressive results of science, applied to the conveniences of life,\nadvertised the idea. It harmonised with the notion of \"development\"\nwhich had become current both in natural science and in metaphysics.\nSocialists and other political reformers appealed to it as a gospel.\n\nBy 1850 it was a familiar idea in Europe, but was not yet universally\naccepted as obviously true. The notion of social Progress had been\ngrowing in the atmosphere of the notion of biological development,\nbut this development still seemed a highly precarious speculation.\nThe fixity of species and the creation of man, defended by powerful\ninterests and prejudices, were attacked but were not shaken. The\nhypothesis of organic evolution was much in the same position as the\nCopernican hypothesis in the sixteenth century. Then in 1859 Darwin\nintervened, like Galileo. The appearance of the ORIGIN OF SPECIES\nchanged the situation by disproving definitely the dogma of fixity of\nspecies and assigning real causes for \"transformism.\" What might be\nset aside before as a brilliant guess was elevated to the rank of a\nscientific hypothesis, and the following twenty years were enlivened by\nthe struggle around the evolution of life, against prejudices chiefly\ntheological, resulting in the victory of the theory.\n\nThe ORIGIN OF SPECIES led to the THIRD stage of the fortunes of the idea\nof Progress. We saw how the heliocentric astronomy, by dethroning man\nfrom his privileged position in the universe of space and throwing him\nback on his own efforts, had helped that idea to compete with the\nidea of a busy Providence. He now suffers a new degradation within the\ncompass of his own planet. Evolution, shearing him of his glory as a\nrational being specially created to be the lord of the earth, traces a\nhumble pedigree for him. And this second degradation was the decisive\nfact which has established the reign of the idea of Progress.\n\n2.\n\nEvolution itself, it must be remembered, does not necessarily mean,\napplied to society, the movement of man to a desirable goal. It is a\nneutral, scientific conception, compatible either with optimism or with\npessimism. According to different estimates it may appear to be a cruel\nsentence or a guarantee of steady amelioration. And it has been actually\ninterpreted in both ways.\n\nIn order to base Progress on Evolution two distinct arguments are\nrequired. If it could be shown that social life obeys the same general\nlaws of evolution as nature, and also that the process involves an\nincrease of happiness, then Progress would be as valid a hypothesis as\nthe evolution of living forms. Darwin had concluded his treatise with\nthese words:\n\nAs all the living forms of life are the lineal descendants of those\nwhich lived long before the Silurian epoch, we may feel certain that the\nordinary succession by generation has never once been broken, and that\nno cataclysm has desolated the whole world. Hence we may look with some\nconfidence to a secure future of equally inappreciable length. And as\nnatural selection works solely by and for the good of each being,\nall corporeal and mental environments will tend to progress towards\nperfection.\n\nHere the evolutionist struck the note of optimism. And he suggested that\nlaws of Progress would be found in other quarters than those where they\nhad hitherto been sought.\n\nThe ablest and most influential development of the argument from\nevolution to Progress was the work of Spencer. He extended the principle\nof evolution to sociology and ethics, and was the most conspicuous\ninterpreter of it in an optimistic sense. He had been an evolutionist\nlong before Darwin's decisive intervention, and in 1851 he had published\nhis Social Statics, which, although he had not yet worked out the\nevolutionary laws which he began to formulate soon afterwards and was\nstill a theist, exhibits the general trend of his optimistic philosophy.\nProgress here appears as the basis of a theory of ethics. The title\nindicates the influence of Comte, but the argument is sharply opposed to\nthe spirit of Comte's teaching, and sociology is treated in a new\nway. [Footnote: Social Statics, or the Conditions Essential to Human\nHappiness specified, and the first of them developed, is the full\ntitle.]\n\nSpencer begins by arguing that the constancy of human nature, so\nfrequently alleged, is a fallacy. For change is the law of all things,\nof every single object as well as of the universe. \"Nature in its\ninfinite complexity is ever growing to a new development.\" It would be\nstrange if, in this universal mutation, man alone were unchangeable,\nand it is not true. \"He also obeys the law of indefinite variation.\"\nContrast the houseless savages with Newtons and Shakespeares; between\nthese extremes there are countless degrees of difference. If then\nhumanity is indefinitely variable, perfectibility is possible.\n\nIn the second place, evil is not a permanent necessity. For all evil\nresults from the non-adaptation of the organism to its conditions;\nthis is true of everything that lives. And it is equally true that evil\nperpetually tends to disappear. In virtue of an essential principle of\nlife, this non-adaptation of organisms to their conditions is ever being\nrectified, and one or both continue to be modified until the adaptation\nis perfect. And this applies to the mental as well as to the physical\nsphere.\n\nIn the present state of the world men suffer many evils, and this shows\nthat their characters are not yet adjusted to the social state. Now the\nqualification requisite for the social state is that each individual\nshall have such desires only as may fully be satisfied without trenching\nupon the ability of others to obtain similar satisfaction. This\nqualification is not yet fulfilled, because civilised man retains some\nof the characteristics which were suitable for the conditions of\nhis earlier predatory life. He needed one moral constitution for his\nprimitive state, he needs quite another for his present state. The\nresultant is a process of adaptation which has been going on for a long\ntime, and will go on for a long time to come.\n\nCivilisation represents the adaptations which have already been\naccomplished. Progress means the successive steps of the process. That\nby this process man will eventually become suited to his mode of life,\nSpencer has no doubts. All excess and deficiency of suitable faculties\nmust disappear; in other words, all imperfection. \"The ultimate\ndevelopment of the ideal man is logically certain--as certain as any\nconclusion in which we place the most implicit faith; for instance, that\nall men will die.\" Here is the theory of perfectibility asserted, on new\ngrounds, with a confidence not less assured than that of Condorcet or\nGodwin.\n\nProgress then is not an accident, but a necessity. Civilisation is a\npart of nature, being a development of man's latent capabilities under\nthe action of favourable circumstances which were certain at some time\nor other to occur. Here Spencer's argument assumes a final cause. The\nultimate purpose of creation, he asserts, is to produce the greatest\namount of happiness, and to fulfil this aim it is necessary that each\nmember of the race should possess faculties enabling him to experience\nthe highest enjoyment of life, yet in such a way as not to diminish the\npower of others to receive like satisfaction. Beings thus constituted\ncannot multiply in a world tenanted by inferior creatures; these,\ntherefore, must be dispossessed to make room; and to dispossess them\naboriginal man must have an inferior constitution to begin with; he\nmust be predatory, he must have the desire to kill. In general, given\nan unsubdued earth, and the human being \"appointed\" to overspread and\noccupy it, then, the laws of life being what they are, no other series\nof changes than that which has actually occurred could have occurred.\n\nThe argument might be put in a form free from the assumption of a final\ncause, and without introducing the conception of a divine Providence\nwhich in this work Spencer adopted, though in his later philosophy it\nwas superseded by the conception of the Unknowable existing behind all\nphenomena. But the ROLE of the Divine ruler is simply to set in motion\nimmutable forces to realise his design. \"In the moral as in the material\nworld accumulated evidence is gradually generating the conviction that\nevents are not at bottom fortuitous, but that they are wrought out in a\ncertain inevitable way by unchanging forces.\"\n\nThe optimism of Spencer's view could not be surpassed. \"After patient\nstudy,\" he writes, \"this chaos of phenomena into the midst of which\nhe [man] was born has begun to generalise itself to him\"; instead of\nconfusion he begins to discern \"the dim outlines of a gigantic plan. No\naccidents, no chance, but everywhere order and completeness One by one\nexceptions vanish, and all becomes systematic.\"\n\nAlways towards perfection is the mighty movement--towards a complete\ndevelopment and a more unmixed good; subordinating in its universality\nall petty irregularities and fallings back, as the curvature of the\nearth subordinates mountains and valleys. Even in evils the student\nlearns to recognise only a struggling beneficence. But above all he is\nstruck with the inherent sufficingness of things.\n\nBut the movement towards harmony, the elimination of evil, will not be\neffected by idealists imposing their constructions upon the world or\nby authoritarian governments. It means gradual adaptation, gradual\npsychological change, and its life is individual liberty. It proceeds by\nthe give and take of opposed opinions. Guizot had said, \"Progress, and\nat the same time resistance.\" And Spencer conceives that resistance is\nbeneficial, so long as it comes from those who honestly think that\nthe institutions they defend are really the best and the proposed\ninnovations absolutely wrong.\n\nIt will be observed that Spencer's doctrine of perfectibility rests on\nan entirely different basis from the doctrine of the eighteenth century.\nIt is one thing to deduce it from an abstract psychology which\nholds that human nature is unresistingly plastic in the hands of the\nlegislator and the instructor. It is another to argue that human nature\nis subject to the general law of change, and that the process by which\nit slowly but continuously tends to adapt itself more and more to the\nconditions of social life--children inheriting the acquired aptitudes\nof their parents--points to an ultimate harmony. Here profitable\nlegislation and education are auxiliary to the process of unconscious\nadaptation, and respond to the psychological changes in the community,\nchanges which reveal themselves in public opinion.\n\n3.\n\nDuring the following ten years Spencer was investigating the general\nlaws of evolution and planning his Synthetic Philosophy which was to\nexplain the development of the universe. [Footnote: In an article on\n\"Progress: its Law and Cause,\" in the Westminster Review, April 1857,\nSpencer explained that social progress, rightly understood, is not the\nincrease of material conveniences or widening freedom of action,\nbut changes of structure in the social organism which entail such\nconsequences, and proceeded to show that the growth of the individual\norganism and the growth of civilisation obey the same law of advance\nfrom homogeneity to heterogeneity of structure. Here he used progress\nin a neutral sense; but recognising that a word is required which has no\nteleological implications (Autobiography, i. 500), he adopted evolution\nsix months later in an article on \"Transcendental Physiology\" (National\nReview, Oct. 1857). In his study of organic laws Spencer was indirectly\ninfluenced by the ideas of Schelling through von Baer.] He aimed at\nshowing that laws of change are discoverable which control all phenomena\nalike, inorganic, biological, psychical, and social. In the light of\nthis hypothesis the actual progression of humanity is established as a\nnecessary fact, a sequel of the general cosmic movement and governed\nby the same principles; and, if that progression is shown to involve\nincreasing happiness, the theory of Progress is established. The first\nsection of the work, FIRST PRINCIPLES, appeared in 1862. The BIOLOGY,\nthe PSYCHOLOGY, and finally the SOCIOLOGY, followed during the next\ntwenty years; and the synthesis of the world-process which these volumes\nlucidly and persuasively developed, probably did more than any other\nwork, at least in England, both to drive home the significance of the\ndoctrine of evolution and to raise the doctrine of Progress to the\nrank of a commonplace truth in popular estimation, an axiom to which\npolitical rhetoric might effectively appeal.\n\nMany of those who were allured by Spencer's gigantic synthesis hardly\nrealised that his theory of social evolution, of the gradual psychical\nimprovement of the race, depends upon the validity of the assumption\nthat parents transmit to their children faculties and aptitudes which\nthey have themselves acquired. On this question experts notoriously\ndiffer. Some day it will probably be definitely decided, and perhaps in\nSpencer's favour. But the theory of continuous psychical improvement\nby a process of nature encounters an obvious difficulty, which did not\nescape some critics of Spencer, in the prominent fact of history that\nevery great civilisation of the past progressed to a point at which\ninstead of advancing further it stood still and declined, to become\nthe prey of younger societies, or, if it survived, to stagnate. Arrest,\ndecadence, stagnation has been the rule. It is not easy to reconcile\nthis phenomenon with the theory of mental improvement.\n\nThe receptive attitude of the public towards such a philosophy as\nSpencer's had been made possible by Darwin's discoveries, which were\nreinforced by the growing science of palaeontology and the accumulating\nmaterial evidence of the great antiquity of man. By the simultaneous\nadvances of geology and biology man's perspective in time was\nrevolutionised, just as the Copernican astronomy had revolutionised his\nperspective in space. Many thoughtful and many thoughtless people were\nready to discern--as Huxley suggested--in man's \"long progress through\nthe past, a reasonable ground of faith in his attainment of a nobler\nfuture.\" and Winwood Reade, a young African traveller, exhibited it in\na vivid book as a long-drawn-out martyrdom. But he was a disciple of\nSpencer, and his hopes for the future were as bright as his picture\nof the past was dark. THE MARTYRDOM OF MAN, published in 1872, was so\nwidely read that it reached an eighth edition twelve years later,\nand may be counted as one of the agencies which popularised Spencer's\noptimism.\n\nThat optimism was not endorsed by all the contemporary leaders of\nthought. Lotze had asserted emphatically in 1864 that \"human nature will\nnot change,\" and afterwards he saw no reason to alter his conviction.\n\nNever one fold and one shepherd, never one uniform culture for all\nmankind, never universal nobleness. Our virtue and happiness can only\nflourish amid an active conflict with wrong. If every stumbling-block\nwere smoothed away, men would no longer be like men, but like a flock\nof innocent brutes, feeding on good things provided by nature as at the\nvery beginning of their course. [Footnote: Microcosmus, Bk. vii. 5\nad fin. (Eng. trans. p. 300). The first German edition (three vols.)\nappeared in 1856-64, the third, from which the English translation\nwas made, in 1876. Lotze was optimistic as to the durability of modern\ncivilisation: \"No one will profess to foreknow the future, but as far\nas men may judge it seems that in our days there arc greater safeguards\nthan there were in antiquity against unjustifiable excesses and against\nthe external forces which might endanger the continued existence of\ncivilisation.\"]\n\nBut even if we reject with Spencer the old dictum, endorsed by Lotze as\nby Fontenelle, that human nature is immutable, the dictum of ultimate\nharmony encounters the following objection. \"If the social environment\nwere stable,\" it is easy to argue, \"it could be admitted that man's\nnature, variable EX HYPOTHESI, could gradually adapt itself to it,\nand that finally a definite equilibrium would be established. But the\nenvironment is continually changing as the consequence of man's very\nefforts to adapt himself; every step he takes to harmonise his needs\nand his conditions produces a new discord and confronts him with a\nnew problem. In other words, there is no reason to believe that the\nreciprocal process which goes on in the growth of society between men's\nnatures and the environment they are continually modifying will ever\nreach an equilibrium, or even that, as the character of the discords\nchanges, the suffering which they cause diminishes.\"\n\nIn fact, upon the neutral fact of evolution a theory of pessimism may\nbe built up as speciously as a theory of optimism. And such a theory was\nbuilt up with great power and ability by the German philosopher E. von\nHartmann, whose PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS appeared in 1869. Leaving\naside his metaphysics and his grotesque theory of the destiny of the\nuniverse, we see here and in his subsequent works how plausibly\na convinced evolutionist could revive the view of Rousseau that\ncivilisation and happiness are mutually antagonistic, and that Progress\nmeans an increase of misery.\n\nHuxley himself, [Footnote: See Agnosticism in Nineteenth Century (Feb.\n1889); Government: Anarchy or Regimentation, ib. (May 1890); Essays on\nEvolution and Ethics (1894).] one of the most eminent interpreters\nof the doctrine of evolution, did not, in his late years at least,\nentertain very sanguine views of mankind. \"I know of no study which is\nso saddening as that of the evolution of humanity as it is set forth\nin the annals of history.... Man is a brute, only more intelligent than\nother brutes\"; and \"even the best of modern civilisations appears to\nme to exhibit a condition of mankind which neither embodies any worthy\nideal nor even possesses the merit of stability.\" There may be some hope\nof a large improvement, but otherwise he would \"welcome a kindly comet\nto sweep the whole affair away.\" And he came to the final conclusion\nthat such an improvement could only set in by deliberately resisting,\ninstead of co-operating with, the processes of nature. \"Social\nprogress means the checking of the cosmic process at every step and the\nsubstitution for it of another which may be called the ethical process.\"\n[Footnote: Huxley considers progress exclusively from an ethical, not\nfrom an eudaemonic point of view.] How in a few centuries can man hope\nto gain the mastery over the cosmic process which has been at work for\nmillions of years? \"The theory of evolution encourages no millennial\nanticipations.\"\n\nI have quoted these views to illustrate that evolution lends itself to\na pessimistic as well as to an optimistic interpretation. The question\nwhether it leads in a desirable direction or not is answered according\nto the temperament of the inquirer. In an age of prosperity and\nself-complacency the affirmative answer was readily received, and the\nterm evolution attracted to itself in common speech the implications of\nvalue which belong to Progress.\n\nIt may be noticed that the self-complacency of the age was promoted by\nthe popularisation of scientific knowledge. A rapidly growing demand\n(especially in England) for books and lectures, making the results of\nscience accessible and interesting to the lay public, is a remarkable\nfeature of the second half of the nineteenth century; and to supply this\ndemand was a remunerative enterprise. This popular literature explaining\nthe wonders of the physical world was at the same time subtly flushing\nthe imaginations of men with the consciousness that they were living in\nan era which, in itself vastly superior to any age of the past, need\nbe burdened by no fear of decline or catastrophe, but trusting in the\nboundless resources of science might securely defy fate.\n\n4.\n\n[It was said in 1881 by an American writer (who strongly dissented from\nSpencer's theory) that the current view was \"fatalistic.\" See Henry\nGeorge, Progress and Poverty. But it may be doubted whether those of the\ngeneral public who optimistically accepted evolution without going very\ndeeply into the question really believed that the future of man is taken\nentirely out of his hands and is determined exclusively by the nature\nof the cosmic process. Bagehot was a writer who had a good deal of\ninfluence in his day; and in Physics and Politics (1872), where he\ndiscusses Progress, there is no suggestion of fatalism. In France, the\nchief philosophical writers who accepted Progress as a fact protested\nagainst a fatalistic interpretation (Renouvier, Cournot, Caro; and cf. L.\nCarrau's article on Progress in the Revue des deux Mondes (Oct. 1875)).\n\nProgress was discussed by Fiske in his Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy\n(1874), vol. ii. 192 sqq. For him (p. 201) \"the fundamental\ncharacteristic of social progress is the continuous weakening of\nselfishness and the continuous strengthening of sympathy.\"]\n\nThus in the seventies and eighties of the last century the idea of\nProgress was becoming a general article of faith. Some might hold it\nin the fatalistic form that humanity moves in a desirable direction,\nwhatever men do or may leave undone; others might believe that the\nfuture will depend largely on our own conscious efforts, but that there\nis nothing in the nature of things to disappoint the prospect of steady\nand indefinite advance. The majority did not inquire too curiously\ninto such points of doctrine, but received it in a vague sense as a\ncomfortable addition to their convictions. But it became a part of the\ngeneral mental outlook of educated people.\n\nWhen Mr. Frederic Harrison delivered in 1889 at Manchester an eloquent\ndiscourse on the \"New Era,\" in which the dominant note is \"the faith in\nhuman progress in lieu of celestial rewards of the separate soul,\"\nhis general argument could appeal to immensely wider circles than the\nPositivists whom he was specially addressing.\n\nThe dogma--for a dogma it remains, in spite of the confidence of Comte\nor of Spencer that he had made it a scientific hypothesis--has produced\nan important ethical principle. Consideration for posterity has\nthroughout history operated as a motive of conduct, but feebly,\noccasionally, and in a very limited sense. With the doctrine of Progress\nit assumes, logically, a preponderating importance; for the centre of\ninterest is transferred to the life of future generations who are to\nenjoy conditions of happiness denied to us, but which our labours and\nsufferings are to help to bring about. If the doctrine is held in an\nextreme fatalistic form, then our duty is to resign ourselves cheerfully\nto sacrifices for the sake of unknown descendants, just as ordinary\naltruism enjoins the cheerful acceptance of sacrifices for the sake of\nliving fellow-creatures. Winwood Reade indicated this when he wrote,\n\"Our own prosperity is founded on the agonies of the past. Is it\ntherefore unjust that we also should suffer for the benefit of those\nwho are to come?\" But if it is held that each generation can by its own\ndeliberate acts determine for good or evil the destinies of the race,\nthen our duties towards others reach out through time as well as through\nspace, and our contemporaries are only a negligible fraction of the\n\"neighbours\" to whom we owe obligations. The ethical end may still be\nformulated, with the Utilitarians, as the greatest happiness of the\ngreatest number; only the greatest number includes, as Kidd observed,\n\"the members of generations yet unborn or unthought of.\" This extension\nof the moral code, if it is not yet conspicuous in treatises on Ethics,\nhas in late years been obtaining recognition in practice.\n\n5.\n\nWithin the last forty years nearly every civilised country has produced\na large literature on social science, in which indefinite Progress is\ngenerally assumed as an axiom. But the \"law\" whose investigation Kant\ndesignated as the task for a Newton, which Saint-Simon and Comte did\nnot find, and to which Spencer's evolutionary formula would stand in\nthe same relation as it stands to the law of gravitation, remains\nstill undiscovered. To examine or even glance at this literature, or\nto speculate how theories of Progress may be modified by recent\nphilosophical speculation, lies beyond the scope of this volume, which\nis only concerned with tracing the origin of the idea and its growth up\nto the time when it became a current creed.\n\nLooking back on the course of the inquiry, we note how the history of\nthe idea has been connected with the growth of modern science, with the\ngrowth of rationalism, and with the struggle for political and religious\nliberty. The precursors (Bodin and Bacon) lived at a time when the world\nwas consciously emancipating itself from the authority of tradition and\nit was being discovered that liberty is a difficult theoretical problem.\nThe idea took definite shape in France when the old scheme of the\nuniverse had been shattered by the victory of the new astronomy and the\nprestige of Providence, CUNCTA SUPERCILIO MOUENTIS, was paling before\nthe majesty of the immutable laws of nature. There began a slow but\nsteady reinstatement of the kingdom of this world. The otherworldly\ndreams of theologians,\n\n     ceux qui reniaient la terre pour patrie,\n\nwhich had ruled so long lost their power, and men's earthly home again\ninsinuated itself into their affections, but with the new hope of its\nbecoming a place fit for reasonable beings to live in. We have seen how\nthe belief that our race is travelling towards earthly happiness was\npropagated by some eminent thinkers, as well as by some \"not very\nfortunate persons who had a good deal of time on their hands.\" And\nall these high-priests and incense-bearers to whom the creed owes its\nsuccess were rationalists, from the author of the Histoire des oracles\nto the philosopher of the Unknowable.\n\nEPILOGUE\n\nIn achieving its ascendency and unfolding its meaning, the Idea of\nProgress had to overcome a psychological obstacle which may be described\nas THE ILLUSION OF FINALITY.\n\nIt is quite easy to fancy a state of society, vastly different from\nours, existing in some unknown place like heaven; it is much more\ndifficult to realise as a fact that the order of things with which we\nare familiar has so little stability that our actual descendants may\nbe born into a world as different from ours as ours is from that of our\nancestors of the pleistocene age.\n\nThe illusion of finality is strong. The men of the Middle Ages would\nhave found it hard to imagine that a time was not far off in which the\nLast Judgement would have ceased to arouse any emotional interest.\nIn the sphere of speculation Hegel, and even Comte, illustrate this\npsychological limitation: they did not recognise that their own\nsystems could not be final any more than the system of Aristotle or\nof Descartes. It is science, perhaps, more than anything else--the\nwonderful history of science in the last hundred years--that has helped\nus to transcend this illusion.\n\nBut if we accept the reasonings on which the dogma of Progress is based,\nmust we not carry them to their full conclusion? In escaping from the\nillusion of finality, is it legitimate to exempt that dogma itself?\nMust not it, too, submit to its own negation of finality? Will not that\nprocess of change, for which Progress is the optimistic name, compel\n\"Progress\" too to fall from the commanding position in which it is now,\nwith apparent security, enthroned? [words in Greek]... A day will come,\nin the revolution of centuries, when a new idea will usurp its place\nas the directing idea of humanity. Another star, unnoticed now or\ninvisible, will climb up the intellectual heaven, and human emotions\nwill react to its influence, human plans respond to its guidance. It\nwill be the criterion by which Progress and all other ideas will be\njudged. And it too will have its successor.\n\nIn other words, does not Progress itself suggest that its value as a\ndoctrine is only relative, corresponding to a certain not very advanced\nstage of civilisation; just as Providence, in its day, was an idea of\nrelative value, corresponding to a stage somewhat less advanced? Or\nwill it be said that this argument is merely a disconcerting trick of\ndialectic played under cover of the darkness in which the issue of the\nfuture is safely hidden by Horace's prudent god?","title":"The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into Its Origin and Growth","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":98979}