{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_45592/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_45592","id":"gutenberg_45592","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/45592","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Ancient","Category: History - British","Category: Politics","History, Ancient -- Philosophy","Republics"],"text":"Note: Images of the original pages are available through\n      the Google Books Library Project. See\n      http://www.google.com/books?id=yb4XAAAAYAAJ\n\n\n\n\n\nREFLECTIONS ON THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.\n\nAdapted to the Present State of Great Britain.\n\n   \u039f\u1f50 \u03c4\u03af \u03c4\u1ff7\u03b4\u03b5, \u1f22 \u03c4\u1ff7\u03b4\u03b5 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u03bb\u03bf\u03b3\u03b9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2\n   \u1f08\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u03af \u03c0\u03ad\u03c0\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd.\n\n   Lucian. Histor. Scribend.\n\nby\n\nEDWARD W. MONTAGU, JUN.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nPhiladelphia:\nPrinted and Published by C. P. Wayne.\n1806.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\n\n                                                       Page.\n\n   PREFACE,                                                i\n\n   INTRODUCTION,                                         vii\n\n   CHAP. i. OF THE REPUBLICK OF SPARTA                     1\n\n   CHAP. ii.                 OF ATHENS                    54\n\n   CHAP. iii.                OF THEBES                   127\n\n   CHAP. iv.                 OF CARTHAGE                 144\n\n   CHAP. v.                  OF ROME                     184\n\n   CHAP. vi. OF THE REAL CAUSE OF THE RAPID\n               DECLENSION OF THE ROMAN\n               REPUBLICK                                 249\n\n   CHAP. vii. CARTHAGINIANS AND ROMANS\n               COMPARED                                  270\n\n   CHAP. viii. OF REVOLUTIONS IN MIXED GOVERNMENTS       311\n\n   CHAP. ix. OF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION                 322\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nPlutarch takes notice of a very remarkable law of Solon\u2019s,[1] \u201cwhich\ndeclared every man infamous, who, in any sedition or civil dissension in\nthe state, should continue neuter, and refuse to side with either\nparty.\u201d Aulus Gellius,[2] who gives a more circumstantial detail of this\nuncommon law, affirms the penalty to be \u201cno less than confiscation of\nall the effects, and banishment of the delinquent.\u201d Cicero mentions the\nsame law to his friend Atticus,[3] and even makes the punishment\ncapital, though he resolves at the same time not to conform to it under\nhis present circumstances, unless his friend should advise him to the\ncontrary.\n\nWhich of these relators has given us the real penalty annexed to this\nlaw by Solon, is scarce worth our inquiry. But I cannot help observing,\nthat strange as this law may appear at first sight, yet if we reflect\nupon the reasons of it, as they are assigned by Plutarch and A. Gellius,\nit will not appear unworthy of that great legislator.\n\nThe opinion of Plutarch is; \u201cthat Solon intended no citizen, as soon as\never he had provided for the security of his own private affairs, should\nbe so unfeeling with respect to the publick welfare, as to affect a\nbrutal insensibility,[4] and not to sympathize with the distress and\ncalamities of his country: but that he should immediately join the\nhonester and juster party; and rather risque his all in defence of the\nside he had espoused, than keep aloof from danger until he saw which\nparty proved the stronger.\u201d\n\nThe reason given by A. Gellius is more striking, and less liable to\nobjections than that of Plutarch. \u201cIf (says that writer) all the good\nmen in any state, when they find themselves too weak to stem the torrent\nof a furious divided populace, and unable to suppress a sedition at its\nfirst breaking out, should immediately divide, and throw themselves into\nthe opposite sides, the event in such a case would be that each party,\nwhich they had differently espoused, would naturally begin to cool, and\nput themselves under their direction, as persons of the greatest weight\nand authority: thus it would be greatly in the power of such men so\ncircumstanced, to reconcile all differences, and restore peace and\nunion, while they mutually restrained and moderated the fury of their\nown party, and convinced the opposite side, that they sincerely wished\nand laboured for their safety, not for their destruction.\u201d\n\nWhat effect this law had in the Athenian state is no where mentioned.\nHowever, as it is plainly founded upon that relation which every member\nbears to the body politick, and that interest which every individual is\nsupposed to have in the good of the whole community; it is still, though\nnot in express terms, yet virtually received in every free country. For\nthose who continue neuter in any civil dissension, under the\ndenomination of moderate men, who keep aloof and wait quietly in order\nto follow the fortune of the prevailing side, are generally stigmatized\nwith the opprobious name of _time servers_, and consequently neither\nesteemed, nor trusted by either party.\n\nAs our own country is blessed with the greatest share of liberty, so is\nit more subject to civil dissensions than any other nation in Europe.\nEvery man is a politician, and warmly attached to his respective party;\nand this law of Solon\u2019s seems to take place as strongly in Britain, as\never it did in the most factious times at Athens. Freedom of thought, or\nthe liberty of the mind, arises naturally from the very essence of our\nconstitution; and the liberty of the press, that peculiar privilege of\nthe British subject, gives every man a continual opportunity of laying\nhis sentiments before the publick. Would our political writers pursue\nthe salutary intention of Solon, as delivered to us by A. Gellius in his\nexplication of that extraordinary law, they might contribute greatly to\nthe establishment of that harmony and union, which can alone preserve\nand perpetuate the duration of our constitution. But the opposite views\nand interests of parties make the altercation endless; and the victory\nover an antagonist is generally the aim, whilst the investigation of\ntruth only, ought ever to be the real end proposed in all controversial\ninquiries. The points which have lately exercised so many pens, turn\nupon the present expediency, or absolute insignificancy, of a _militia_;\nor, what principles conduce most to the power, the happiness, and the\nduration of a free people. The dispute has been carried on, not only\nwith warmth, but even with virulence. The chicane of sophistry has been\nemployed, whilst indecent personal reflections, and the unfair charge of\ndisaffection, have been too often made use of to supply the defect of\nargument, and to prejudice the reader, where they despaired of confuting\nthe writer. Historical facts have been either misrepresented, or\nascribed to wrong principles; the history of ancient nations has been\nquoted in general terms, without marking the different periods\ndistinguished by some memorable change in the manners or constitution of\nthe same people, which will ever make a wide difference in the\napplication.\n\nAnxious after truth, and unsatisfied with so many bold assertions\ndestitute of all proof but the writer\u2019s word, which I daily met with, I\ndetermined coolly and impartially to examine the evidence arising from\nancient history, which both sides so frequently appealed to: for bare\nspeculative reasoning is no more conclusive in political inquiries than\nin physical. Facts and experience alone must decide: and political facts\nand experience must alone be learned from history. Determined therefore\nto judge for myself, I carefully read over the histories of the most\ncelebrated republicks of antiquity in their original languages, unbiased\neither by comments or translations; a part of history of all others the\nmost instructive, and most interesting to an Englishman.\n\nAs instruction was the sole end of my inquiries, I here venture to offer\nthe result of them to the candour of the publick, since my only motive\nfor writing was a most ardent concern for the welfare of my country. The\ndesign therefore of these papers is, to warn my countrymen, by the\nexample of others, of the fatal consequences which must inevitably\nattend our intestine divisions at this critical juncture; and to\ninculcate the necessity of that national union, upon which the strength,\nthe security, and the duration of a free state must eternally depend.\nHappy, if my weak endeavours could in the least contribute to an end so\nsalutary, so truly desirable!\n\nIn the numerous quotations from the Greek and Latin historians, which\nare unavoidable in a treatise of this nature, I have endeavoured to give\nthe genuine sense and meaning of the author, to the best of my\nabilities. But as every reader has an equal right of judging for\nhimself, I have subjoined in the margin, the original words of the\nauthor, with the book, page, name, and date of the respective edition, I\nmade use of, for the ease as well as the satisfaction of the candid and\njudicious: for that vague and careless manner, which some writers\naffect, of quoting an author by name only, without specifying the\nparticular passage referred to in evidence, is neither useful, nor\nsatisfactory to the generality of readers; whilst the unfair method, too\noften practised, of quoting disjointed scraps, or unconnected sentences,\nis apt to raise strong suspicions, that the real sentiments and\nintention of the author are kept out of sight, and that the writer is\nendeavouring to palm false evidence upon his readers.\n\nI must take the liberty of offering another reason, which, I confess,\nwas of more weight with me, because more personally interesting. As the\nBritish state and the ancient free republicks were founded upon the same\nprinciples, and their policy and constitution nearly similar, so, as\nlike causes will ever produce like effects, it is impossible not to\nperceive an equal resemblance between their and our manners, as they and\nwe equally deviated from those first principles. Unhappily, the\nresemblance between the manners of our own times, and the manners of\nthose republicks in their most degenerate periods, is, in many respects,\nso striking, that unless the words in the original were produced as\nvouchers, any well-meaning reader, unacquainted with those historians,\nwould be apt to treat the descriptions of those periods, which he may\nfrequently meet with, as licentious, undistinguished satire upon the\npresent age.\n\nThe behaviour of some of our political writers makes an apology of this\nnature in some measure necessary; on the one hand, that I may avoid the\nimputation of pedantry, or being thought fond of an idle ostentatious\nparade of learning; on the other, _lest a work calculated to promote\ndomestick peace and union, should be strained, by the perverseness of\nparty construction, into an inflammatory libel_.\n\n  [1] Plut. in Vit. Solon. \u1f04\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n  [2] A. Gellii Noct. Attic. lib. 2. c. 12.\n\n  [3] Epist. ad Attic. lib. 10. epist. 1.\n\n  [4] \u039c\u1f74 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bb\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u1f72 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd.\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION.\n\n\nI am not at all surprised at those encomiums which the philosophers and\npoets so lavishly bestow upon the pleasures of a country retirement. The\nprofusion of varying beauties, which attend the returning seasons,\nfurnishes out new and inexhaustible subjects for the entertainment of\nthe studious and contemplative. Even winter carries charms for the\nphilosophick eye, and equally speaks the stupendous power of the great\nauthor of nature. To search out and adore the Creator through his works,\nis our primary duty, and claims the first place in every rational mind.\nTo promote the publick good of the community of which we are born\nmembers, in proportion to our situation and abilities, is our secondary\nduty as men and citizens. I judged therefore a close attention to the\nstudy of history the most useful way of employing that time which my\ncountry recess afforded, as it would enable me to fulfil this\nobligation: and upon this principle I take the liberty of offering these\npapers as my mite towards the publick good.\n\nIn the course of these researches nothing gave me so much pleasure as\nthe study of ancient history: because it made me so truly sensible of\nthe inestimable value of our own constitution, when I observed the very\ndifferent maxims and conduct, and the strong contrast between the\nfounders of despotick monarchies, and the legislators of the free states\nof antiquity. In the former, that absurd and impious doctrine of\nmillions created for the sole use and pleasure of one individual, seems\nto have been the first position in their politicks, and the general rule\nof their conduct. The latter fixed the basis of their respective states\nupon this just and benevolent plan, \u201cthat the safety and happiness of\nthe whole community was the only end of all government.\u201d The former\ntreated mankind as brutes, and lorded it over them by force. The latter\nreceived them as their fellow-creatures, and governed them by reason:\nhence whilst we detest the former as the enemies and destroyers; we\ncannot help admiring and revering the latter, as the lovers and\nbenefactors of mankind.\n\nThe histories which I considered with the greatest attention, gave me\nthe highest entertainment, and affected me most, were those of the free\nstates of Greece, Carthage, and Rome. I saw with admiration the profound\nwisdom and sagacity, the unwearied labour and disinterested spirit of\nthose amiable and generous men, who contributed most towards forming\nthose states, and settling them upon the firmest foundations. I traced\nwith pleasure their gradual progress towards that height of power, to\nwhich in process of time they arrived; and I remarked the various steps\nand degrees by which they again declined, and at last sunk gradually\ninto their final dissolution, not without a just mixture of sorrow and\nindignation.\n\nIt would be a labour of more curiosity, than of real use at this time,\nto give a long detail of the original formation of those states, and the\nwise laws and institutions by which they were raised to that envied\ndegree of perfection; yet a concise account of the primitive\nconstitution of each state may be so far necessary, as it will render\nthe deviations from that constitution more intelligible, and more fully\nillustrate the causes of their final subversion. But to point out and\nexpose the principal causes, which contributed gradually to weaken, and\nat length demolish and level with the ground, those beautiful fabricks\nraised by the publick virtue, and cemented by the blood of so many\nillustrious patriots, will, in my opinion, be more interesting and more\ninstructive.\n\nWhen I consider the constitution of our own country, I cannot but think\nit the best calculated for promoting the happiness, and preserving the\nlives, liberty, and property of mankind, of any yet recorded in profane\nhistory. I am persuaded too, that our wise ancestors, who first formed\nit, adopted whatever they judged most excellent and valuable in those\nstates when in their greatest perfection; and did all that human wisdom\ncould do for rendering it durable, and transmitting it pure and entire\nto future generations. But as all things under the sun are subject to\nchange, and children are too apt to forget and degenerate from the\nvirtues of their fathers, there seems great reason to fear, that what\nhas happened to those free states may at length prove the melancholy\nfate of our own country; especially when we reflect, that the same\ncauses, which contributed to their ruin, operate at this time so very\nstrongly amongst us. As I thought therefore that it might be of some use\nto my country at this dangerous crisis, I have selected the interesting\nexamples of those once free and powerful nations, who by totally\ndeviating from those principles upon which they were originally founded,\nlost first their liberty, and at last their very existence, so far as to\nleave no other vestiges remaining of them as a people, but what are to\nbe found in the records of history.\n\nIt is an undoubted truth, that our own constitution has at different\ntimes suffered very severe shocks, and been reduced more than once to\nthe very point of ruin: but because it has hitherto providentially\nescaped, we are not to flatter ourselves that opportunities of recovery\nwill always offer. To me therefore the method of proof drawn from\nexample, seemed more striking, as well as more level to every capacity,\nthan all speculative reasoning: for as the same causes will, by the\nstated laws of sublunary affairs, sooner or later invariably produce\nthe same effects, so whenever we see the same maxims of government\nprevail, the same measures pursued, and the same coincidences of\ncircumstances happen in our own country, which brought on, and attend\nthe subversion of those states, we may plainly read our own fate in\ntheir catastrophe, unless we apply speedy and effectual remedies, before\nour case is past recovery. It is the best way to learn wisdom in time\nfrom the fate of others; and if examples will not instruct and make us\nwiser, I confess myself utterly at a loss to know what will.\n\nIn my reflections, which naturally arose in the course of these\nresearches, truth and impartiality have been my only guides. I have\nendeavoured to show the principal causes of that degeneracy of manners,\nwhich reduced those once brave and free people into the most abject\nslavery. I have marked the alarming progress which the same evils have\nalready made, and still continue to make amongst us, with that honest\nfreedom which is the birthright of every Englishman. My sole aim is to\nexcite those who have the welfare of their country at heart, to unite\ntheir endeavours in opposing the fatal tendency of those evils, whilst\nthey are within the power of remedy. With this view, and this only, I\nhave marked out the remote as well as immediate causes of the ruin of\nthose states, as so many beacons warning us to avoid the same rocks upon\nwhich they struck, and at last suffered shipwreck.\n\nTruth will ever be unpalatable to those who are determined not to\nrelinquish error, but can never give offence to the honest and\nwell-meaning amongst my countrymen. For the plain-dealing remonstrances\nof a friend differ as widely from the rancour of an enemy, as the\nfriendly probe of the physician from the dagger of the assassin.\n\n\n\n\nREFLECTIONS ON THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ANCIENT REPUBLICKS.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nOF THE REPUBLICK OF SPARTA.\n\n\nAll the free states of Greece were at first monarchical,[5] and seem to\nowe their liberty rather to the injudicious oppressions of their\nrespective kings, than to any natural propensity in the people to alter\ntheir form of government. But as they had smarted so severely under an\nexcess of power lodged in the hands of one man, they were too apt to run\ninto the other extreme, democracy; a state of government the most\nsubject of all others to disunion and faction.\n\nOf all the Grecian states, that of Sparta seems to have been the most\nunhappy, before their government was new modelled by Lycurgus. The\nauthority of their kings and their laws (as Plutarch informs us) were\nalike trampled upon and despised. Nothing could restrain the insolence\nof the headstrong encroaching populace; and the whole government sunk\ninto anarchy and confusion. From this deplorable situation the wisdom\nand virtue of one great man raised his country to that height of power,\nwhich was the envy and the terror of her neighbours. A convincing proof\nhow far the influence of one great and good man will operate towards\nreforming the most bold licentious people, when he has once thoroughly\nacquired their esteem and confidence! Upon this principle Lycurgus\nfounded his plan of totally altering and new moulding the constitution\nof his country. A design, all circumstances considered, the most daring,\nand the most happily executed, of any yet immortalized in history.[6]\n\nLycurgus succeeded to the moiety of the crown of Sparta at the death of\nhis elder brother; but his brother\u2019s widow declaring herself with child,\nand that child proving to be a son, he immediately resigned the regal\ndignity to the new born infant, and governed as protector and guardian\nof the young prince during his minority. The generous and disinterested\nbehaviour of Lycurgus upon this occasion endeared him greatly to the\npeople; who had already experienced the happy effect of his wise and\nequitable administration. But to avoid the malice of the queen-mother\nand her faction, who accused him of designs upon the crown, he prudently\nquitted both the government and his country. In his travels during this\nvoluntary exile, he drew up and thoroughly digested his great scheme of\nreformation. He visited all those states which at that time were most\neminent for the wisdom of their laws, or the form of their constitution.\nHe carefully observed all the different institutions, and the good or\nbad effects which they respectively produced on the manners of each\npeople. He took care to avoid what he judged to be defects; but selected\nwhatever he found calculated to promote the happiness of a people; and\nwith these materials he formed his so much celebrated plan of\nlegislation, which he very soon had an opportunity of reducing to\npractice. For the Spartans, thoroughly sensible of the difference\nbetween the administration of Lycurgus and that of their kings, not only\nearnestly wished for his presence, but sent repeated deputations to\nentreat him to return, and free them from those numerous disorders under\nwhich their country at that time laboured. As the request of the people\nwas unanimous, and the kings no ways opposed his return, he judged it\nthe critical time for the execution of his scheme. For he found affairs\nat home in the distracted situation they had been represented, and the\nwhole body of the people in a disposition proper for his purpose.\n\nLycurgus began his reform with a change in the constitution, which at\nthat time consisted of a confused medley of hereditary monarchy divided\nbetween two families, and a disorderly democracy, utterly destitute of\nthe balance of a third intermediate power, a circumstance so essential\nto the duration of all mixed governments. To remedy this evil, he\nestablished a senate with such a degree of power, as might fix them the\ninexpugnable barrier of the constitution against the encroachments\neither of kings or people. The crown of Sparta had been long divided\nbetween two families descended originally from the same ancestor, who\njointly enjoyed the succession. But though Lycurgus was sensible that\nall the mischiefs which had happened to the state, arose from this\nabsurd division of the regal power, yet he made no alteration as to the\nsuccession of the two families. Any innovation in so nice a point might\nhave proved an endless source of civil commotions, from the pretensions\nof that line which should happen to be excluded. He therefore left them\nthe title and the ensignia of royalty, but limited their authority,\nwhich he confined to the business of war and religion. To the people he\ngave the privilege of electing the senators, and giving their sanction\nto those laws which the kings and senate should approve.\n\nWhen Lycurgus had regulated the government, he undertook a task more\narduous than any of the fabled labours of Hercules. This was to new\nmould his countrymen, by extirpating all the destructive passions, and\nraising them above every weakness and infirmity of human nature. A\nscheme which all the great philosophers had taught in theory, but none\nexcept Lycurgus was ever able to reduce to practice.\n\nAs he found the two extremes, of great wealth and great indigence, were\nthe source of infinite mischiefs in a free state, he divided the lands\nof the whole territory into equal lots proportioned to the number of the\ninhabitants. He appointed publick tables, at which he enjoined all the\ncitizens to eat together without distinction; and he subjected every\nman, even the kings themselves, to a fine if they should violate this\nlaw by eating at their own houses.[7] Their diet was plain, simple, and\nregulated by the law, and distributed amongst the guests in equal\nportions. Every member was obliged monthly to contribute his quota for\nthe provision of his respective table. The conversation allowed at these\npublick repasts, turned wholly upon such subjects as tended most to\nimprove the minds of the younger sort in the principles of wisdom and\nvirtue. Hence, as Xenophon observes, they were schools not only for\ntemperance and sobriety, but also for instruction. Thus Lycurgus\nintroduced a perfect equality amongst his countrymen. The highest and\nthe lowest fared alike as to diet, were all lodged and clothed alike,\nwithout the least variation either in fashion or materials.\n\nWhen by these means he had exterminated every species of luxury, he next\nremoved all temptation to the acquisition of wealth, that fatal source\nof the innumerable evils which prevailed in every other country. He\neffected this with his usual policy, by forbidding the currency of gold\nand silver money, and substituting an iron coinage of great weight and\nlittle value, which continued the only current coin through the whole\nSpartan dominions for several ages.\n\nTo bar up the entrance of wealth, and guard his citizens against the\ncontagion of corruption, he absolutely prohibited navigation and\ncommerce, though his country contained a large extent of sea coast\nfurnished with excellent harbours. He allowed as little intercourse as\npossible with foreigners, nor suffered any of his countrymen to visit\nthe neighbouring states, unless when the publick business required it,\nlest they should be infected with their vices. Agriculture, and such\nmechanick trades as were absolutely necessary for their subsistence, he\nconfined to their slaves the Helots; but he banished all those arts\nwhich tended either to debase the mind, or enervate the body. Musick he\nencouraged, and poetry he admitted, but both subject to the inspection\nof the magistrates.[8] Thus by the equal partition of the lands, and the\nabolition of gold and silver money, he at once preserved his country\nfrom luxury, avarice, and all those evils which arise from an irregular\nindulgence of the passions, as well as all contentions about property,\nwith their consequence, vexatious lawsuits.\n\nTo ensure the observance of his laws to the latest posterity, he next\nformed proper regulations for the education of their children, which he\nesteemed one of the greatest duties of a legislator. His grand maxim was\n\u201cthat children were the property of the state, to whom alone their\neducation was to be intrusted.\u201d In their first infancy, the nurses were\ninstructed to indulge them neither in their diet, nor in those little\nfroward humours which are so peculiar to that age; to inure them to bear\ncold and fasting; to conquer their first fears by accustoming them to\nsolitude and darkness; and to prepare them for that stricter state of\ndiscipline, to which they were soon to be initiated.\n\nWhen arrived at the age of seven years, they were taken from the nurses,\nand placed in their proper classes. The diet and clothing of all were\nthe same, just sufficient to support nature, and defend them from the\ninclemency of the seasons; and they all lodged alike in the same\ndormitory on beds of reeds, to which for the sake of warmth they were\nall allowed in winter to add the down of thistles. Their sports and\nexercises were such as contributed to render their limbs supple, and\ntheir bodies compact and firm. They were accustomed to run up the\nsteepest rocks barefoot; and swimming, dancing, hunting, boxing, and\nwrestling, were their constant diversions. Lycurgus was equally\nsolicitous in training up the youth to a habit of passive courage as\nwell as active. They were taught to despise pain no less than danger,\nand to bear the severest scourgings with the most invincible constancy\nand resolution. For to flinch under the strokes, or to exhibit the least\nsign of any sense of pain, was deemed highly infamous.\n\nNor were the minds of the Spartan youth cultivated with less care. Their\nlearning, as Plutarch informs us, was sufficient for their occasions,\nfor Lycurgus admitted nothing but what was truly useful. They carefully\ninstilled into their tender minds the great duties of religion, and the\nsacred indispensable obligation of an oath, and trained them up in the\nbest of sciences, the principles of wisdom and virtue. The love of\ntheir country seemed to be almost innate; and this leading maxim, \u201cthat\nevery Spartan was the property of his country, and had no right over\nhimself,\u201d was by the force of education incorporated into their very\nnature.\n\nWhen they arrived to manhood they were enrolled in their militia, and\nallowed to be present in their publick assemblies: privileges which only\nsubjected them to a different discipline. For the employments and way of\nliving of the citizens of Sparta were fixed, and settled by as strict\nregulations as in an army upon actual service. When they took the field,\nindeed, the rigour of their discipline with respect to diet and the\nornament of their persons was much softened, so that the Spartans were\nthe only people in the universe, to whom the toils of war afforded ease\nand relaxation. In fact, Lycurgus\u2019s plan of civil government was\nevidently designed to preserve his country free and independent, and to\nform the minds of his citizens for the enjoyment of that rational and\nmanly happiness, which can find no place in a breast enslaved by the\npleasures of the senses, or ruffled by the passions; and the military\nregulations which he established, were as plainly calculated for the\nprotection of his country from the encroachments of her ambitious\nneighbours.[9] For he left no alternative to his people, but death or\nvictory; and he laid them under a necessity of observing those\nregulations, by substituting the valour of the inhabitants in the place\nof walls and fortifications for the defence of their city.\n\nIf we reflect that human nature is at all times and in all places the\nsame, it seems to the last degree astonishing, how Lycurgus could be\nable to introduce such a self-denying plan of discipline amongst a\ndisorderly licentious people: a scheme, which not only levelled at once\nall distinction, as to property, between the richest and the poorest\nindividual, but compelled the greatest persons in the state to submit to\na regimen which allowed only the bare necessaries of life, excluding\nevery thing which in the opinion of mankind seems essential to its\ncomforts and enjoyments. I observed before that he had secured the\nesteem and confidence of his countrymen, and there was, besides, at that\ntime a very lucky concurrence of circumstances in his favour. The two\nkings were men of little spirit, and less abilities, and the people were\nglad to exchange their disorderly state for any settled form of\ngovernment. By his establishment of a senate consisting of thirty\npersons who held their seats for life, and to whom he committed the\nsupreme power in civil affairs, he brought the principal nobility into\nhis scheme, as they naturally expected a share in a government which\nthey plainly saw inclined so much to an aristocracy. Even the two kings\nvery readily accepted seats in his senate, to secure some degree of\nauthority. He awed the people into obedience by the sanction he procured\nfor his scheme from the oracle at Delphos, whose decisions were, at that\ntime, revered by all Greece as divine and infallible. But the greatest\ndifficulty he had to encounter was to procure the equal partition of the\nlands. The very first proposal met with so violent an opposition from\nthe men of fortune, that a fray ensued, in which Lycurgus lost one of\nhis eyes. But the people, struck with the sight of the blood of this\nadmired legislator, seized the offender, one Alcander, a young man of a\nhot, but not disingenuous disposition, and gave him up to Lycurgus to be\npunished at discretion. But the humane and generous behaviour of\nLycurgus quickly made a convert of Alcander, and wrought such a change,\nthat from an enemy he became his greatest admirer and advocate with the\npeople.\n\nPlutarch and the rest of the Greek historians leave us greatly in the\ndark as to the means by which Lycurgus was able to make so bitter a\npill, as the division of property, go down with the wealthy part of his\ncountrymen. They tell us indeed, that he carried his point by the gentle\nmethod of reasoning and persuasion, joined to that religious awe which\nthe divine sanction of the oracle impressed so deeply on the minds of\nthe citizens. But the cause, in my opinion, does not seem equal to the\neffect. For the furious opposition which the rich made to the very\nfirst motion for such a distribution of property, evinces plainly, that\nthey looked upon the responses of the oracle as mere priestcraft, and\ntreated it as the _esprits-forts_ have done religion in modern times; I\nmean as a state engine fit only to be played off upon the common people.\nIt seems most probable, in my opinion, that as he effected the change in\nthe constitution by the distribution of the supreme power amongst the\nprincipal persons, when he formed his senate; so the equal partition of\nproperty was the bait thrown out to bring over the body of the people\nentirely to his interest. I should rather think that he compelled the\nrich to submit to so grating a measure, by the assistance of the poorer\ncitizens, who were vastly the majority.\n\nAs soon as Lycurgus had thoroughly settled his new polity, and by his\ncare and assiduity imprinted his laws so deeply in the minds and manners\nof his countrymen, that he judged the constitution able to support\nitself, and stand upon its own bottom, his last scheme was to fix, and\nperpetuate its duration down to latest posterity, as far as human\nprudence and human means could effect it. To bring his scheme to bear,\nhe had again recourse to the same pious artifice which had succeeded so\nwell in the beginning. He told the people in a general assembly, that he\ncould not possibly put the finishing stroke to his new establishment,\nwhich was the most essential point, until he had again consulted the\noracle. As they all expressed the greatest eagerness for his undertaking\nthe journey, he laid hold of so fair an opportunity to bind the kings,\nsenate, and people, by the most solemn oaths, to the strict observance\nof his new form of government, and not to attempt the least alteration\nin any one particular until his return from Delphos. He had now\ncompleted the great design which he had long in view, and bid an eternal\nadieu to his country. The question he put to the oracle was \u201cwhether the\nlaws he had already established, were rightly formed to make and\npreserve his countrymen virtuous and happy?\u201d The answer he received was\njust as favourable as he desired. It was \u201cthat his laws were excellently\nwell calculated for that purpose; and that Sparta should continue to be\nthe most renowned city in the world, as long as her citizens persisted\nin the observance of the laws of Lycurgus.\u201d He transmitted both the\nquestion and the answer home to Sparta in writing, and devoted the\nremainder of his life to voluntary banishment. The accounts in history\nof the end of this great man are very uncertain. Plutarch affirms, that\nas his resolution was never to release his countrymen from the\nobligation of the oath he had laid them under, he put a voluntary end to\nhis life at Delphos by fasting. Plutarch extols the death of Lycurgus in\nvery pompous terms, as a most unexampled instance of heroic patriotism,\nsince he bequeathed, as he terms it, his death to his country, as the\nperpetual guardian to that happiness, which he had procured for them\nduring his lifetime. Yet the same historian acknowledges another\ntradition, that Lycurgus ended his days in the island of Crete, and\ndesired, as his last request, that his body should be burnt, and his\nashes thrown into the sea;[10] lest, if his remains should at any time\nbe carried back to Sparta, his countrymen might look upon themselves as\nreleased from their oath as much as if he had returned alive, and be\ninduced to alter his form of government. I own, I prefer this latter\naccount, as more agreeable to the genius and policy of that wise and\ntruly disinterested legislator.\n\nThe Spartans, as Plutarch asserts, held the first rank in Greece for\ndiscipline and reputation full five hundred years, by strictly adhering\nto the laws of Lycurgus; which not one of their kings ever infringed for\nfourteen successions quite down to the reign of the first Agis. For he\nwill not allow the creation of those magistrates called the ephori, to\nbe any innovation in the constitution, since he affirms it to have been,\n\u201cnot a relaxation, but an extension, of the civil polity.\u201d[11] But\nnotwithstanding the gloss thrown over the institution of the ephori by\nthis nice distinction of Plutarch\u2019s, it certainly induced as fatal a\nchange into the Spartan constitution, as the tribuneship of the people,\nwhich was formed upon that model, did afterwards into the Roman. For\ninstead of enlarging and strengthening the aristocratical power, as\nPlutarch asserts, they gradually usurped the whole government, and\nformed themselves into a most tyrannical oligarchy.\n\nThe ephori (a Greek word signifying inspectors or overseers) were five\nin number, and elected annually by the people out of their own body. The\nexact time of the origin of this institution and of the authority\nannexed to their office, is quite uncertain. Herodotus ascribes it to\nLycurgus; Xenophon to Lycurgus jointly with the principal citizens of\nSparta. Aristotle and Plutarch fix it under the reign of Theopompus and\nPolydorus, and attribute the institution expressly to the former of\nthose princes about one hundred and thirty years after the death of\nLycurgus. I cannot but subscribe to this opinion as the most probable,\nbecause the first political contest we meet with at Sparta happened\nunder the reign of those princes, when the people endeavoured to extend\ntheir privileges beyond the limits prescribed by Lycurgus. But as the\njoint opposition of the kings and senate was equally warm, the creation\nof this magistracy out of the body of the people, seems to have been the\nstep taken at that time to compromise the affair, and restore the\npublick tranquility: a measure which the Roman senate copied afterwards,\nin the erection of the tribuneship, when their people mutinied, and made\nthat memorable secession to the _mons sacer_. I am confirmed in this\nopinion by the relation which Aristotle gives us of a remarkable dispute\nbetween Theopompus and his wife upon that occasion.[12] The queen much\ndissatisfied with the institution of the ephori, reproached her husband\ngreatly for submitting to such a diminution of the regal authority, and\nasked him if he was not ashamed to transmit the crown to his posterity\nso much weaker and worse circumstanced, than he received it from his\nfather. His answer, which is recorded amongst the laconick _bons mots_,\nwas, \u201cno, for I transmit it more lasting.\u201d[13] But the event showed that\nthe lady was a better politician, as well as truer prophet, than her\nhusband. Indeed the nature of their office, the circumstances of their\nelection, and the authority they assumed, are convincing proofs that\ntheir office was first extorted, and their power afterwards gradually\nextended, by the violence of the people, irritated too probably by the\noppressive behaviour of the kings and senate. For whether their power\nextended no farther than to decide, when the two kings differed in\nopinion, and to overrule in favour of him whose sentiments should be\nmost conducive to the publick interest, as we are told by Plutarch in\nthe life of Agis; or whether they were at first only select friends,\nwhom the kings appointed as deputies in their absence, when they were\nboth compelled to take the field together in their long wars with the\nMessenians, as the same author tells us by the mouth of his hero\nCleomenes, is a point, which history does not afford us light enough to\ndetermine. This however is certain, from the concurrent voice of all the\nancient historians, that at last they not only seized upon every branch\nof the administration, but assumed the power of imprisoning, deposing,\nand even putting their kings to death by their own authority. The kings\ntoo, in return, sometimes bribed, sometimes deposed or murdered the\nephori, and employed their whole interest to procure such persons to be\nelected, as they judged would be most tractable. I look therefore on the\ncreation of the ephori as a breach in the Spartan constitution, which\nproved the first inlet to faction and corruption. For that these evils\ntook rise from the institution of the ephori is evident from the\ntestimony of Aristotle, \u201cwho thought it extremely impolitick to elect\nmagistrates, vested with the supreme power in the state, out of the body\nof the people;[14] because it often happened, that men extremely\nindigent were raised in this manner to the helm, whom their very poverty\ntempted to become venal. For the ephori, as he affirms, had not only\nbeen frequently guilty of bribery before his time, but, even at the very\ntime he wrote, some of those magistrates, corrupted by money, used their\nutmost endeavours, at the publick repasts, to accomplish the destruction\nof the whole city. He adds too, that as their power was so great as to\namount to a perfect tyranny, the kings themselves were necessitated to\ncourt their favour by such methods as greatly hurt the constitution,\nwhich from an aristocracy degenerated into an absolute democracy. For\nthat magistracy alone had engrossed the whole government.\u201d\n\nFrom these remarks of the judicious Aristotle, it is evident that the\nephori had totally destroyed the balance of power established by\nLycurgus. From the tyranny therefore of this magistracy proceeded those\nconvulsions which so frequently shook the state of Sparta, and at last\ngradually brought on its total subversion. But though this fatal\nalteration in the Spartan constitution must be imputed to the intrigues\nof the ephori and their faction, yet it could never, in my opinion, have\nbeen effected without a previous degeneracy in their manners; which must\nhave been the consequence of some deviation from the maxims of Lycurgus.\n\nIt appears evidently from the testimony of Polybius and Plutarch, that\nthe great scheme of the Spartan legislator was, to provide for the\nlasting security of his country against all foreign invasions, and to\nperpetuate the blessings of liberty and independency to the people. By\nthe generous plan of discipline which he established, he rendered his\ncountrymen invincible at home. By banishing gold and silver, and\nprohibiting commerce and the use of shipping, he proposed to confine\nthe Spartans within the limits of their own territories; and by taking\naway the means, to repress all desires of making conquests upon their\nneighbours. But the same love of glory and of their country which made\nthem so terrible in the field, quickly produced ambition and a lust of\ndomination; and ambition as naturally opened the way for avarice and\ncorruption. For Polybius truly observes, that as long as they extended\ntheir views no farther than the dominion over their neighbouring states,\nthe produce of their own country was sufficient for what supplies they\nhad occasion for in such short excursions.[15] But when, in direct\nviolation of the laws of Lycurgus, they began to undertake more distant\nexpeditions both by sea and land, they quickly felt the want of a\npublick fund to defray their extraordinary expenses. For they found by\nexperience, that neither their iron money, nor their method of trucking\nthe annual produce of their own lands for such commodities as they\nwanted (which was the only traffick allowed by the laws of Lycurgus)\ncould possibly answer their demands upon those occasions. Hence their\nambition, as the same historian remarks, laid them under the scandalous\nnecessity of paying servile court to the Persian monarchs for pecuniary\nsupplies and subsidies, to impose heavy tributes upon the conquered\nislands, and to exact money from the other Grecian states, as occasions\nrequired.\n\nHistorians unanimously agree, that wealth with its attendants, luxury\nand corruption, gained admission at Sparta in the reign of the first\nAgis. Lysander, alike a hero and a politician; a man of the greatest\nabilities and the greatest dishonesty that Sparta ever produced;\nrapacious after money, which at the same time he despised, and a slave\nonly to ambition, was the author of an innovation so fatal to the\nmanners of his countrymen. After he had enabled his country to give law\nto all Greece by his conquest of Athens, he sent home that immense mass\nof wealth, which the plunder of so many states had put into his\npossession. The most sensible men amongst the Spartans, dreading the\nfatal consequences of this capital breach of the institutions of their\nlegislator, protested strongly before the ephori against the\nintroduction of gold and silver, as pests destructive to the publick.\nThe ephori referred it to the decision of the senate, who, dazzled with\nthe lustre of that money, to which until that time they had been utter\nstrangers, decreed \u201cthat gold and silver money might be admitted for the\nservice of the state; but made it death, if any should ever be found in\nthe possession of a private person.\u201d This decision Plutarch censures as\nweak and sophistical.[16] As if Lycurgus was only afraid simply of\nmoney, and not of that dangerous love of money which is generally its\nconcomitant; a passion which was so far from being rooted out by the\nrestraint laid upon private persons, that it was rather inflamed by the\nesteem and value which was set upon money by the publick. Thus, as he\njustly remarks, whilst they barred up the houses of private citizens\nagainst the entrance of wealth by the terror and safeguard of the law,\nthey left their minds more exposed to the love of money and the\ninfluence of corruption, by raising an universal admiration and desire\nof it, as something great and respectable. The truth of this remark\nappears by the instance given us by Plutarch, of one Thorax, a great\nfriend of Lysander\u2019s, who was put to death by the ephori, upon proof\nthat a quantity of silver had been actually found in his possession.\n\nFrom that time Sparta became venal, and grew extremely fond of subsidies\nfrom foreign powers. Agesilaus, who succeeded Agis, and was one of the\ngreatest of their kings, behaved in the latter part of his life more\nlike the captain of a band of mercenaries, than a king of Sparta. He\nreceived a large subsidy from Tachos, at that time king of Egypt, and\nentered into his service with a body of troops which he had raised for\nthat purpose. But when Nectanabis, who had rebelled against his uncle\nTachos, offered him more advantageous terms, he quitted the unfortunate\nmonarch and went over to his rebellious nephew, pleading the interest of\nhis country in excuse for so treacherous and infamous an action.[17] So\ngreat a change had the introduction of money already made in the\nmanners of the leading Spartans!\n\nPlutarch dates the first origin of corruption, that disease of the body\npolitick, and consequently the decline of Sparta, from that memorable\nperiod, when the Spartans having subverted the domination of Athens,\nglutted themselves (as he terms it) with gold and silver.[18] For when\nonce the love of money had crept into their city, and avarice and the\nmost sordid meanness grew up with the possession, as luxury, effeminacy\nand dissipation did with the enjoyment of wealth, Sparta was deprived of\nmany of her ancient glories and advantages, and sunk greatly both in\npower and reputation, until the reign of Agis and Leonidas.[19] But as\nthe original allotments of land were yet preserved (the number of which\nLycurgus had fixed and decreed to be kept by a particular law) and were\ntransmitted down from father to son by hereditary succession, the same\nconstitutional order and equality still remaining, raised up the state\nagain, however, from other political lapses.\n\nUnder the reign of those two kings happened the mortal blow, which\nsubverted the very foundation of their constitution. Epitadeus, one of\nthe ephori, upon a quarrel with his son, carried his resentment so far\nas to procure a law which permitted every one to alienate their\nhereditary lands, either by gift or sale, during their lifetime, or by\nwill at their decease. This law produced a fatal alteration in the\nlanded property. For as Leonidas, one of their kings, who had lived a\nlong time at the court of Seleucus, and married a lady of that country,\nhad introduced the pomp and luxury of the east at his return to Sparta,\nthe old institutions of Lycurgus, which had fallen into disuse, were by\nhis example soon treated with contempt.[20] Hence the necessity of the\nluxurious, and the extortion of the avaricious, threw the whole property\ninto so few hands, that out of seven hundred, the number to which the\nancient Spartan families were then reduced, about one hundred only were\nin possession of their respective hereditary lands allotted by\nLycurgus.[21] The rest, as Plutarch observes, lived an idle life in the\ncity, an indigent abject herd, alike destitute of fortune and\nemployment; in their wars abroad, indolent dispirited dastards; at home\never ripe for sedition and insurrections, and greedily catching at every\nopportunity of embroiling affairs in hope of such a change as might\nenable them to retrieve their fortunes. Evils, which the extremes of\nwealth and indigence are ever productive of in free countries.\n\nYoung Agis, the third of that name, and the most virtuous and\naccomplished king that ever sat upon the throne of Sparta since the\nreign of the great Agesilaus, undertook the reform of the state, and\nattempted to re-establish the old Lycurgic constitution, as the only\nmeans of extricating his country out of her distresses, and raising her\nto her former dignity and lustre. An enterprise attended not only with\nthe greatest difficulties, but, as the times were so corrupt, with the\ngreatest danger.[22] He began with trying the efficacy of example, and\nthough he had been bread in all the pleasures and delicacy which\naffluence could procure, or the fondness of his mother and grandmother,\nwho were the wealthiest people in Sparta, could indulge him in, yet he\nat once changed his way of life as well as his dress, and conformed to\nthe strictest discipline of Lycurgus in every particular. This generous\nvictory over his passions, the most difficult and most glorious of all\nothers, had so great an effect amongst the younger Spartans, that they\ncame into his measures with more alacrity and zeal than he could\npossibly have hoped for.[23] Encouraged by this success, Agis brought\nover some of the principal Spartans, amongst whom was his uncle\nAgesilaus, whose influence he made use of to persuade his mother, who\nwas sister to Agesilaus, to join his party.[24] For her wealth, and the\ngreat number of her friends, dependants, and debtors, made her extremely\npowerful, and gave her great weight in all publick transactions.\n\nHis mother, terrified at first at her son\u2019s rashness, condemned the\nwhole as the visionary scheme of a young man, who was attempting a\nmeasure not only prejudicial to the state, but quite impracticable. But\nwhen the reasonings of Agesilaus had convinced her that it would not\nonly be of the greatest utility to the publick but might be effected\nwith great ease and safety, and the king himself entreated her to\ncontribute her wealth and interest to promote an enterprise which would\nredound so much to his glory and reputation;[25] she and the rest of her\nfemale friends at last changed their sentiments. Fired then with the\nsame glorious emulation, and stimulated to virtue; as it were by some\ndivine impulse, they not only voluntarily spurred on Agis, but summoned\nand encouraged all their friends, and incited the other ladies to engage\nin so generous an enterprise.[26] For they were conscious (as Plutarch\nobserves) of the great ascendency which the Spartan women had always\nover their husbands, who gave their wives a much greater share in the\npublick administration, than their wives allowed them in the management\nof their domestic affairs. A circumstance which at that time had drawn\nalmost all the wealth of Sparta into the hands of the women, and proved\na terrible, and almost unsurmountable obstacle to Agis. For the ladies\nhad violently opposed a scheme of reformation, which not only tended to\ndeprive them of those pleasures and trifling ornaments, which, from\ntheir ignorance of what was truly good and laudable, they absurdly\nlooked upon as their supreme happiness, but to rob them of that respect\nand authority which they derived from their superior wealth. Such of\nthem therefore as were unwilling to give up these advantages, applied to\nLeonidas, and entreated him, as he was the more respectable man for his\nage and experience, to check his young hotheaded colleague, and quash\nwhatever attempts he should make to carry his designs into execution.\nThe older Spartans were no less averse to a reformation of that nature.\nFor as they were deeply immersed in corruption, they trembled at the\nvery name of Lycurgus, as much as runaway slaves, when retaken, do at\nthe sight of their master.\n\nLeonidas was extremely ready to side with and assist the rich, but durst\nnot openly oppose Agis for fear of the people, who were eager for such a\nrevolution. He attempted therefore to counteract all his attempts\nunderhand, and insinuated to the magistrates, that Agis aimed at setting\nup a tyranny, by bribing the poor with the fortunes of the rich; and\nproposed the partition of lands and the abolition of debts as the means\nfor purchasing guards for himself only, not citizens, as he pretended,\nfor Sparta.\n\nAgis, however, pursued his design, and having procured his friend\nLysander to be elected one of the ephori, immediately laid his scheme\nbefore the senate. The chief heads of his plan were: \u201cthat all debts\nshould be totally remitted; that the whole land should be divided into a\ncertain number of lots; and that the ancient discipline and customs of\nLycurgus should be revived.\u201d Warm debates were occasioned in the senate\nby this proposal, which at last was rejected by a majority of one\nonly.[27] Lysander in the meantime convoked an assembly of the people,\nwhere after he had harangued, Mondroclidas and Agesilaus beseeched them\nnot to suffer the majesty of Sparta to be any longer trampled upon for\nthe sake of a few luxurious overgrown citizens, who imposed upon them at\npleasure.[28] They reminded them not only of the responses of ancient\noracles, which enjoined them to beware of avarice, as the pest of\nSparta, but also of those so lately given by the oracle at Pasiphae,\nwhich, as they assured the people, commanded the Spartans to return to\nthat perfect equality of possessions, which was settled by the law first\ninstituted by Lycurgus.[29] Agis spoke last in this assembly, and to\nenforce the whole by example, told them in a very few words, \u201cthat he\noffered a most ample contribution towards the establishment of that\npolity, of which he himself was the author. That he now resigned his\nwhole patrimony into the common stock, which consisted not only of rich\narable and pasture land, but of six hundred talents besides in coined\nmoney. He added, that his mother, grandmother, friends and relations,\nwho were the most wealthy of all the citizens of Sparta, were ready to\ndo the same.\u201d\n\nThe people, struck with the magnanimity and generosity of Agis, received\nhis offer with the loudest applause, and extolled him, as the only king\nwho for three hundred years past had been worthy of the throne of\nSparta. This provoked Leonidas to fly out into the most open and violent\nopposition from the double motive of avarice and envy. For he was\nsensible, that if this scheme took place, he should not only be\ncompelled to follow their example, but that the surrender of his estate\nwould then come from him with so ill a grace, that the honour of the\nwhole measure would be attributed solely to his colleague. Lysander,\nfinding Leonidas and his party too powerful in the senate, determined to\nprosecute and expel him for the breach of a very old law, which forbid\nany of the royal family to intermarry with foreigners, or to bring up\nany children which they might have by such marriage, and inflicted the\npenalty of death upon any one who should leave Sparta to reside in\nforeign countries.\n\nAfter Lysander had taken care that Leonidas should be informed of the\ncrime laid to his charge, he with the rest of the ephori, who were of\nhis party, addressed themselves to the ceremony of observing a sign from\nheaven.[30] A piece of state craft most probably introduced formerly by\nthe ephori to keep the kings in awe, and perfectly well adapted to the\nsuperstition of the people. Lysander affirming that they had seen the\nusual sign, which declared that Leonidas had sinned against the gods,\nsummoned him to his trial, and produced evidence sufficient to convict\nhim. At the same time he spirited up Cleombrotus, who had married the\ndaughter of Leonidas, and was of the royal blood, to put in his claim to\nthe succession. Leonidas, terrified at these daring measures, fled, and\ntook sanctuary in the temple of Minerva: he was deposed therefore for\nnon-appearance, and his crown given to his son-in-law Cleombrotus.\n\nBut as soon as the term of Lysander\u2019s magistracy expired, the new\nephori, who were elected by the prevailing interest of the opposite\nparty, immediately undertook the protection of Leonidas. They summoned\nLysander and his friends to answer for their decrees for cancelling\ndebts, and dividing the lands, as contrary to the laws, and treasonable\ninnovations; for so they termed all attempts to restore the ancient\nconstitution of Lycurgus. Alarmed at this, Lysander persuaded the two\nkings to join in opposing the ephori; who, as he plainly proved, assumed\nan authority which they had not the least right to, as long as the\nkings acted together in concert. The kings, convinced by his reasons,\narmed a great number of the youth, released all who were prisoners for\ndebt, and thus attended went into the forum, where they deposed the\nephori, and procured their own friends to be elected into that office,\nof whom Agesilaus the uncle of Agis was one. By the care and humanity of\nAgis, no blood was spilt on this memorable occasion. He even protected\nhis antagonist Leonidas against the designs which Agesilaus had formed\nupon his life, and sent him under a safe convoy to Tegea.\n\nAfter this bold stroke, all opposition sunk before them, and every thing\nsucceeded to their wishes; when the single avarice of Agesilaus, that\nmost baneful pest, as Plutarch terms it, which had subverted a\nconstitution the most excellent, and the most worthy of Sparta that had\never yet been established, overset the whole enterprise. By the\ncharacter which Plutarch gives of Agesilaus, he appears to have been\nartful and eloquent, but at the same time effeminate, corrupt in his\nmanners, avaricious, and so bad a man, that he engaged in this projected\nrevolution with no other view but that of extricating himself from an\nimmense load of debt, which he had most probably contracted to support\nhis luxury.[31] As soon therefore as the two kings, who were both young\nmen, agreed to proceed upon the abolition of debts, and the partition of\nlands, Agesilaus artfully persuaded them not to attempt both at once,\nfor fear of exciting some terrible commotion in the city. He assured\nthem farther that if the rich should once be reconciled to the law for\ncancelling the debts, the law for dividing the lands would go down with\nthem quietly and without the least obstruction. The kings assented to\nhis opinion, and Lysander himself was brought over to it, deceived by\nthe same specious, though pernicious reasoning: calling in therefore all\nthe bills, bonds, and pecuniary obligations, they piled them up, and\nburnt them all publickly in the forum, to the great mortification of the\nmoneyed men, and the usurers. But Agesilaus in the joy of his heart\ncould not refrain from joking upon the occasion, and told them with a\nsneer, that whatever they might think of the matter, it was the\nbrightest and most cheerful flame, and the purest bonfire, he had ever\nbeheld in his lifetime.[32] Agesilaus had now carried his point, and his\nconduct proves, that the Spartans had learned the art of turning publick\nmeasures into private jobs, as well as their politer neighbours. For\nthough the people called loudly for the partition of lands, and the\nkings gave orders for it to be done immediately, Agesilaus contrived to\nthrow new obstacles in the way, and protracted the time by various\npretences, until Agis was obliged to march with the Spartan auxiliaries\nto assist their allies the Ach\u00e6ans. For he was in possession of a most\nfertile and extensive landed estate at the very time when he owed more\nthan he was worth; and as he had got rid of all his incumbrances at once\nby the first decree, and never intended to part with a single foot of\nhis land, it was by no means his interest to promote the execution of\nthe second.\n\nThe Spartan troops were mostly indigent young men, who elate with their\nfreedom from the bonds of usury, and big with the hopes of a share in\nthe lands at their return, followed Agis with the greatest vigour and\nalacrity, and behaved so well in their march, that they reminded the\nadmiring Greeks of the excellent discipline and decorum for which the\nSpartans were formerly so famous under the most renowned of their\nancient leaders. But whilst Agis was in the field, affairs at home took\na very unhappy turn in his disfavour. The tyrannical behaviour of\nAgesilaus, who fleeced the people with insupportable exactions, and\nstuck at no measure, however infamous or criminal, which would bring in\nmoney, produced another revolution in favour of Leonidas. For the\npeople, enraged at being tricked out of the promised partition of the\nlands, which they imputed to Agis and Cleombrotus, and detesting the\nrapaciousness of Agesilaus, readily joined that party which conspired to\nrestore Leonidas. Agis finding affairs in this desperate situation at\nhis return, gave up all for lost, and took sanctuary in the temple of\nMinerva, as Cleombrotus had done in the temple of Neptune.\n\nThough Cleombrotus was the chief object of Leonidas\u2019s resentment, yet he\nspared his life at the intercession of his daughter Chelonis, the wife\nof Cleombrotus; but condemned him to perpetual exile. The generous\nChelonis gave a signal instance, upon this occasion, of that heroick\nvirtue, for which the Spartan ladies were once so remarkably eminent.\nWhen her father was expelled by the intrigues of Lysander, she followed\nhim into exile, and refused to share his crown with Cleombrotus. In this\ncalamitous reverse of fortune, she was deaf to all entreaties, and\nrather chose to partake of the miseries of banishment with her husband,\nthan all the pleasures and grandeur of Sparta with her father. Plutarch\npays the ladies a fine compliment, upon this occasion, when he says,\n\u201cthat unless Cleombrotus should have been wholly corrupted by false\nambition, he must have deemed himself more truly happy in a state of\nbanishment with such a wife, than he could have been upon a throne\nwithout her.\u201d[33]\n\nBut though Cleombrotus escaped death, yet nothing but the blood of Agis\ncould satisfy the vindictive rage of the ungrateful Leonidas, who, in\nthe former revolution, owed his life to that unfortunate prince\u2019s\ngenerosity. After many ineffectual attempts to entice Agis from his\nasylum, three of his intimate friends in whom he most confided, who used\nto accompany and guard him to the baths and back again to the temple,\nbetrayed him to his enemies. Amphares, the chief of these, and the\ncontriver of the plot, was one of the new ephori created after the\ndeposition of Agesilaus. This wretch had lately borrowed a quantity of\nvaluable plate, and a number of magnificent vestments, of Agis\u2019s mother\nAgesistrata, and determined to make them his own by the destruction of\nAgis and his family; at their return therefore in their usual friendly\nmanner from the baths, he first attacked Agis by virtue of his office,\nwhilst Demochares and Arcesilaus, the other two, seized and dragged him\nto the publick prison. Agis supported all these indignities with the\nutmost magnanimity: and when the ephori questioned him, whether\nAgesilaus and Lysander did not constrain him to do what he had done, and\nwhether he did not repent of the steps he had taken; he undauntedly took\nthe whole upon himself, and told them that he gloried in his scheme,\nwhich was the result of his emulation to follow the example of the great\nLycurgus. Stung with this answer, the ephori condemned him to die by\ntheir own authority, and ordered the officers to carry him to the place\nin the prison where the malefactors were strangled. But when the\nofficers and even the mercenary soldiers of Leonidas refused to be\nconcerned in so infamous and unprecedented an action as laying hands\nupon their king, Demochares threatening and abusing them greatly for\ntheir disobedience, seized Agis with his own hands, and dragged him to\nthe execution room, where he was ordered to be dispatched immediately.\nAgis submitted to his fate with equal intrepidity and resignation,\nreproving one of the executioners who deplored his calamities, and\ndeclaring himself infinitely happier than his murderers. The unfeeling\nand treacherous Amphares attended the execution, and as soon as Agis was\ndead, he admitted his mother and grandmother into the prison, who came\nto intercede that Agis might be allowed to make his defence before the\npeople. The wretch assured the mother, with an insulting sneer, that her\nson should suffer no heavier punishment than he had done already; and\nimmediately ordered her mother Archidamia, who was extremely old, to\nexecution. As soon as she was dead, he bid Agesistrata enter the room,\nwhere, at the sight of the dead bodies, she could not refrain from\nkissing her son, and crying out, that his too great lenity and\ngood-nature had been their ruin. The savage Amphares, laying hold of\nthose words, told her, that as she approved of her son\u2019s actions she\nshould share his fate. Agesistrata met death with the resolution of an\nold Spartan heroine, praying only that this whole affair might not prove\nprejudicial to her country.\n\nThus fell the gallant Agis in the cause of liberty and publick virtue,\nby the perfidy of his mercenary friends, and the violence of a corrupt\nand most profligate faction. I have given a more particular detail of\nthe catastrophe of this unfortunate prince as transmitted to us by\nPlutarch, because it furnishes convincing proofs, how greatly the\nintroduction of wealth had corrupted and debased the once upright and\ngenerous spirit of the Spartans.\n\nArchidamas, the brother of Agis, eluded the search made for him by\nLeonidas, and escaped the massacre by flying from Sparta. But Leonidas\ncompelled his wife Agiatis, who was a young lady of the greatest beauty\nin all Greece, and sole heiress to a vast estate, to marry his own son\nCleomenes, though Agiatis had but just lain-in of a son, and the match\nwas entirely contrary to her inclinations. This event however produced a\nvery different effect from what Leonidas intended, and after his death\nproved the ruin of his party, and revenged the murder of Agis.[34] For\nCleomenes, who was very young, and extremely fond of his wife, would\nshed sympathizing tears whenever she related the melancholy fate of\nAgis, and occasionally desire her to explain his intentions, and the\nnature of his scheme, to which he would listen with the greatest\nattention. From that time he determined to follow so glorious an\nexample, but kept the resolution secret in his own breast until the\nmeans and opportunity should offer. He was sensible that an attempt of\nthat nature would be utterly impracticable whilst his father lived; who,\nlike the rest of the leading citizens, had wholly given himself up to a\nlife of ease and luxury. Warned too by the fate of Agis, he knew how\nextremely dangerous it was even once to mention the old frugality and\nsimplicity of manners, which depended upon the observance of the\ndiscipline and institutions of Lycurgus. But as soon as ever he\nsucceeded to the crown at the death of his father, and found himself the\nsole reigning king of Sparta without a colleague, he immediately applied\nhis whole care and study to accomplish that great change which he had\nbefore projected. For he observed the manners of the Spartans in general\nwere grown extremely corrupt and dissolute, the rich sacrificing the\npublick interest to their own private avarice and luxury; the poor, from\ntheir extreme indigence, averse to the toils of war, careless and\nnegligent of education and discipline; whilst the ephori had engrossed\nthe whole royal power, and left him in reality nothing but the empty\ntitle: circumstances greatly mortifying to an aspiring young monarch,\nwho panted eagerly after glory, and impatiently wished to retrieve the\nlost reputation of his countrymen.\n\nHe began by sounding his most intimate friend, one Xenares, at a\ndistance only, inquiring what sort of a man Agis was, and which way, and\nby whose advice, he was drawn into those unfortunate measures. Xenares,\nwho attributed all his questions to the curiosity natural to a young\nman, very readily told him the whole story, and explained ingenuously\nevery particular of the affair as it really happened. But when he\nremarked that Cleomenes often returned to the charge, and every time\nwith greater eagerness, more and more admiring and applauding the scheme\nand character of Agis, he immediately saw through his design. After\nreproving him, therefore, severely for talking and behaving thus like a\nmadman, Xenares broke off all friendship and intercourse with him,\nthough he had too much honour to betray his friend\u2019s secret. Cleomenes,\nnot in the least discouraged at this repulse, but concluding that he\nshould meet with the same reception from the rest of the wealthy and\npowerful citizens, determined to trust none of them, but to take upon\nhimself the whole care and management of his scheme.[35] However, as he\nwas sensible that the execution of it would be much more feasible, when\nhis country was involved in war, than in a state of profound peace, he\nwaited for a proper opportunity; which the Ach\u00e6ans quickly furnished him\nwith. For Aratus, the great projector of the famous Ach\u00e6an league, into\nwhich he had already brought many of the Grecian states, holding\nCleomenes extremely cheap, as a raw unexperienced boy, thought this a\nfavourable opportunity of trying how the Spartans stood affected\ntowards that union. Without the least previous notice therefore, he\nsuddenly invaded such of the Arcadians as were in alliance with Sparta,\nand committed great devastations in that part of the country which lay\nin the neighbourhood of Achaia.\n\nThe ephori, alarmed at this unexpected attack, sent Cleomenes at the\nhead of the Spartan forces to oppose the invasion. The young hero\nbehaved well, and frequently baffled that old experienced commander. But\nhis countrymen growing weary of the war, and refusing to concur in the\nmeasures he proposed for carrying it on, he recalled Archidamus the\nbrother of Agis from banishment, who had a strict hereditary right to\nthe other moiety of the kingdom; imagining that when the throne was\nproperly filled according to law, and the regal power preserved entire\nby the union of the two kings, it would restore the balance of\ngovernment and weaken the authority of the ephori. But the faction which\nhad murdered Agis, justly dreading the resentment of Archidamus for so\natrocious a crime, took care privately to assassinate him upon his\nreturn.\n\nCleomenes now more than ever intent upon bringing his great project to\nbear, bribed the ephori with large sums to intrust him with the\nmanagement of the war.[36] His mother Cratesiclea not only supplied him\nwith money upon this occasion, but married one Megistonus, a man of the\ngreatest weight and authority in the city, purposely to bring him over\nto her son\u2019s interest. Cleomenes taking the field, totally defeated the\narmy of Aratus, and killed Lydiadas the Megalopolitan general. This\nvictory, which was entirely owing to the conduct of Cleomenes, not only\nraised the courage of his soldiers, but gave them so high an opinion of\nhis abilities, that he seems to have been recalled by his enemies,\njealous most probably of his growing interest with the army. For\nPlutarch, who is not very methodical in his relations, informs us, that\nafter this affair, Cleomenes convinced his father-in-law, Megistonus, of\nthe necessity of taking off the ephori, and reducing the citizens to\ntheir ancient equality according to the institutions of Lycurgus, as the\nonly means of restoring Sparta to her former sovereignty over\nGreece.[37] This scheme therefore must have been privately settled in\nSparta. For we are next told, that Cleomenes again took the field,\ncarrying with him such of the citizens as he suspected were most likely\nto oppose him. He took some cities from the Ach\u00e6ans that campaign, and\nmade himself master of some important places, but harrassed his troops\nso much with many marches and countermarches, that most of the Spartans\nremained behind in Arcadia at their own request, whilst he marched back\nto Sparta with his mercenary forces and such of his friends as he could\nmost confide in. He timed his march so well that he entered Sparta\nwhilst the ephori were at supper, and despatched Euryclidas before with\nthree or four of his most trusty friends and a few soldiers to perform\nthe execution. For Cleomenes well knew that Agis owed his ruin to his\ntoo cautious timidity, and his too great lenity and moderation. Whilst\nEuryclidas therefore amused the ephori with a pretended message from\nCleomenes, the rest fell upon them sword in hand, and killed four upon\nthe spot, with above ten persons more who came to their assistance.\nAgesilaus the surviver of them fell, and counterfeiting himself dead,\ngained an opportunity of escaping. Next morning as soon as it was light,\nCleomenes proscribed and banished fourscore of the most dangerous\ncitizens, and removed all the chairs of the ephori out of the forum,\nexcept one which he reserved for his own seat of judicature. He then\nconvoked an assembly of the people, to whom he apologized for his late\nactions. He showed them, in a very artful and elaborate speech, \u201cthe\nnature and just extent of the power of the ephori, the fatal\nconsequences of the authority they had usurped of governing the state by\ntheir own arbitrary will, and of deposing and putting their kings to\ndeath without allowing them a legal hearing in their own defence.[38]\nHe urged the example of Lycurgus himself, who came armed into the forum\nwhen he first proposed his laws, as a proof that it was impossible to\nroot out those pests of the commonwealth, which had been imported from\nother countries, luxury, the parent of that vain expense which runs such\nnumbers in debt, usury, and those more ancient evils, wealth and\npoverty, without violence and bloodshed: that he should have thought\nhimself happy, if like an able physician he could have radically cured\nthe diseases of his country without pain: but that necessity had\ncompelled him to do what he had already done, in order to procure an\nequal partition of the lands, and the abolition of their debts, as well\nas to enable him to fill up the number of the citizens with a select\nnumber of the bravest foreigners, that Sparta might be no longer exposed\nto the depredations of her enemies for want of hands to defend her.\u201d\n\nTo convince the people of the sincerity of his intentions, he first gave\nup his whole fortune to the publick stock; Megistonus, his\nfather-in-law, with his other friends, and all the rest of the citizens,\nfollowed his example. In the division of the lands, he generously set\napart equal portions for all those citizens he had banished, and\npromised to recall them as soon as the publick tranquillity was\nrestored. He next revived the ancient method of education, the\ngymnastick exercises, publick meals, and all other institutions of\nLycurgus; and lest the people, unaccustomed to the denomination of a\nsingle king, should suspect that he aimed at establishing a tyranny, he\nassociated his brother Euclidas with him in the kingdom. By training up\nthe youth in the old military discipline, and arming them in a new and\nbetter manner, he once more recovered the reputation of the Spartan\nmilitia, and raised his country to so great a height of power, that\nGreece in a very short time saw Sparta giving law to all\nPeloponnesus.[39]\n\nThe Ach\u00e6ans, humbled by repeated defeats, and begging peace of Cleomenes\nupon his own terms, the generous victor desired only to be appointed\ngeneral of their famous league, and offered upon that condition to\nrestore all the cities and prisoners he had taken. The Ach\u00e6ans gladly\nconsenting to such easy terms, Cleomenes released and sent home all the\npersons of rank amongst his prisoners, but was obliged by sickness to\ndefer the day appointed for the convention, until his return from\nSparta. This unhappy delay was fatal to Greece.[40] For Aratus, who had\nenjoyed that honour thirty-three years, could not bear the thought of\nhaving it wrested from him by so young a prince, whose glory he envied\nas much as he dreaded his valour. Finding therefore all other methods\nineffectual, he had recourse to the desperate remedy of calling in the\nMacedonians to his assistance, and sacrificed the liberty of his own\ncountry, as well as that of Greece, to his own private pique and\njealousy. Thus the most publick-spirited assertor of liberty, and the\nmost implacable enemy to all tyrants in general, brought back those very\npeople into the heart of Greece, whom he had driven out formerly purely\nfrom his hatred to tyranny, and sullied a glorious life with a blot\nnever to be erased, from the detestable motives of envy and revenge. A\nmelancholy proof, as Plutarch moralizes upon the occasion, of the\nweakness of human nature, which with an assemblage of the most excellent\nqualities is unable to exhibit the model of a virtue completely perfect.\nA circumstance which ought to excite our compassion towards those\nblemishes which we unavoidably meet with in the most exalted characters.\n\nCleomenes supported this unequal war against the Ach\u00e6ans and the whole\npower of Macedon with the greatest vigour, and by his success gave many\nconvincing proofs of his abilities; but venturing a decisive battle at\nSallasia, he was totally defeated by the superior number of his enemies,\nand the treachery of Damoteles, an officer in whom he greatly confided,\nwho was bribed to betray him by Antigonus. Out of six thousand Spartans,\ntwo hundred only escaped, the rest with their king Euclidas were left\ndead on the field of battle. Cleomenes retired to Sparta, and from\nthence passed over to Ptolemy Euergetes king of Egypt, with whom he was\nthen in alliance, to claim the assistance he had formerly promised. But\nthe death of that monarch, which followed soon after, deprived him of\nall hopes of succour from that quarter. The Spartan manners were as\nodious to his successor Ptolemy Philopater, a weak and dissolute prince,\nas the Spartan virtue was terrible to his debauched effeminate\ncourtiers. Whenever Cleomenes appeared at court, the general whisper\nran, that he came as a lion in the midst of sheep; a light in which a\nbrave man must necessarily appear to a herd of such servile dastards.\nConfined at last by the jealousy of Ptolemy, who was kept in a perpetual\nalarm by the insinuations of his iniquitous minister Sosybius, he with\nabout twelve more of his generous Spartan friends broke out of prison\ndetermined upon death or liberty. In their progress through the streets,\nthey first slew one Ptolemy, a great favourite of the king, who had been\ntheir secret enemy; and meeting the governor of the city, who came at\nthe first noise of the tumult, they routed his guards and attendants,\ndragged him out of his chariot, and killed him. After this they ranged\nuncontrouled through the whole city of Alexandria, the inhabitants\nflying every where before them, and not a man daring either to assist or\noppose them. Such terror could thirteen brave men only strike into one\nof the most populous cities in the universe, where the citizens were\nbred up in luxury, and strangers to the use of arms! Cleomenes,\ndespairing of assistance from the citizens, whom he had in vain summoned\nto assert their liberty, declared such abject cowards fit only to be\ngoverned by women. Scorning therefore to fall by the hands of the\ndespicable Egyptians, he with the rest of the Spartans fell desperately\nby their own swords, according to the heroism of those ages.[41]\n\nThe liberty and happiness of Sparta expired with Cleomenes.[42] For the\nremains of the Spartan history furnishes us with very little after his\ndeath, besides the calamities and miseries of that unhappy state,\narising from their intestine divisions. Machanidas, by the aid of one of\nthe factions which at that time rent that miserable republick, usurped\nthe throne, and established an absolute tyranny. One Nabis, a tyrant,\ncompared to whom even Nero himself may be termed merciful, succeeded at\nthe death of Machanidas, who fell in battle by the hand of the great\nPhilop\u0153men. The \u00c6tolians treacherously murdered Nabis, and endeavoured\nto seize the dominion of Sparta; but they were prevented by Philop\u0153men,\nwho partly by force, partly by persuasion, brought the Spartans into the\nAch\u00e6an league, and afterwards totally abolished the institutions of\nLycurgus.[43] A most inhuman and most iniquitous action, as Plutarch\nterms it, which must brand the character of that hero with eternal\ninfamy. As if he was sensible that as long as the discipline of Lycurgus\nsubsisted, the minds of the Spartan youth could never be thoroughly\ntamed, or effectually broke to the yoke of foreign government. Wearied\nout at last by repeated oppressions, the Spartans applied to the Romans\nfor redress of all their grievances; and their complaints produced that\nwar which ended in the dissolution of the Ach\u00e6an league, and the\nsubjection of Greece to the Roman domination.\n\nI have entered into a more minute detail of the Spartan constitution, as\nsettled by Lycurgus, than I at first proposed; because the maxims of\nthat celebrated lawgiver are so directly opposite to those which our\nmodern politicians lay down as the basis of the strength and power of a\nnation.\n\nLycurgus found his country in the most terrible of all situations, a\nstate of anarchy and confusion. The rich, insolent and oppressive; the\npoor groaning under a load of debt, mutinous from despair, and ready to\ncut the throats of their usurious oppressors. To remedy these evils, did\nthis wise politician encourage navigation, strike out new branches of\ncommerce, and make the most of those excellent harbours, and other\nnatural advantages which the maritime situation of his country afforded?\nDid he introduce and promote arts and sciences, that by acquiring\nand diffusing new wealth amongst his countrymen, he might make his\nnation, in the language of our political writers, secure, powerful, and\nhappy? just the reverse. After he had new-modelled the constitution, and\nsettled the just balance between the powers of government, he abolished\nall debts, divided the whole land amongst his countrymen by equal lots,\nand put an end to all dissensions about property by introducing a\nperfect equality. He extirpated luxury and a lust of wealth, which he\nlooked upon as the pests of every free country, by prohibiting the use\nof gold and silver; and barred up the entrance against their return by\ninterdicting navigation and commerce, and expelling all arts, but what\nwere immediately necessary to their subsistence. As he was sensible that\njust and virtuous manners are the best support of the internal peace and\nhappiness of every kingdom, he established a most excellent plan of\neducation for training up his countrymen, from their very infancy, in\nthe strictest observance of their religion and laws, and the habitual\npractice of those virtues which can alone secure the blessings of\nliberty and perpetuate their duration. To protect his country from\nexternal invasions, he formed the whole body of the people, without\ndistinction, into one well armed, well disciplined national militia,\nwhose leading principle was the love of their country, and who esteemed\ndeath in its defence, the most exalted height of glory to which a\nSpartan was capable of attaining. Nor were these elevated sentiments\nconfined solely to the men; the colder breasts of the women caught fire\nat the glorious flame, and glowed even with superior ardour. For when\ntheir troops marched against an enemy, \u201cto bring back their shields, or\nto be brought home upon them,\u201d was the last command which the Spartan\nmothers gave their sons at parting.[44]\n\nSuch was the method which Lycurgus took to secure the independency and\nhappiness of his country; and the event showed, that his institutions\nwere founded upon maxims of the truest and justest policy. For I cannot\nhelp observing upon the occasion, that from the time of Lycurgus to the\nintroduction of wealth by Lysander in the reign of the first Agis, a\nspace of five hundred years, we meet with no mutiny amongst the people,\nupon account of the severity of his discipline, but on the contrary the\nmost religious reverence for, and the most willing and cheerful\nobedience to the laws he established. As on the other hand, the wisdom\nof his military institutions is evident from this consideration; that\nthe national militia alone of Sparta, a small insignificant country as\nto extent, situated in a nook only of the Morea, not only gave laws to\nGreece, but made the Persian monarchs tremble at their very name, though\nabsolute masters of the richest and most extensive empire the world\nthen knew.\n\nI observe farther, that the introduction of wealth by Lysander, after\nthe conquest of Athens, brought back all those vices and dissensions\nwhich the prohibition of the use of money had formerly banished; and\nthat all historians assign that open violation of the laws of Lycurgus,\nas the period from which the decadence of Sparta is to be properly\ndated. I observe too, with Plutarch, that though the manners of the\nSpartans were greatly corrupted by the introduction of wealth, yet that\nthe landed interest (as I may term it) which subsisted as long as the\noriginal allotments of land remained unalienable, still preserved their\nstate; notwithstanding the many abuses which had crept into their\nconstitution. But that as soon as ever the landed estates became\nalienable by law, the moneyed interest prevailed, and at last totally\nswallowed up the landed, which the historians remark as the\ndeath\u2019s-wound of their constitution. For the martial virtue of the\ncitizens not only sunk with the loss of their estates, but their number,\nand consequently the strength of the state, diminished in the same\nproportion. Aristotle, who wrote about sixty years after the death of\nLysander, in his examen of the Spartan republick, quite condemns that\nlaw which permitted the alienation of their lands.[45] For he affirms,\nthat the same quantity of land which, whilst equally divided, supplied\na militia of fifteen hundred horse, and thirty thousand heavy armed\nfoot, could not in his time furnish one thousand; so that the state was\nutterly ruined for want of men to defend it.[46] In the reign of Agis\nthe 3d, about a hundred years after the time of Aristotle, the number of\nthe old Spartan families was dwindled (as I remarked before) to seven\nhundred; out of which about one hundred rich overgrown families had\nengrossed the whole land of Sparta, which Lycurgus had formerly divided\ninto thirty-nine thousand shares, and assigned for the support of as\nmany families. So true it is, that a landed interest diffused through a\nwhole people is not only the real strength, but the surest bulwark of\nthe liberty and independency, of a free country.\n\nFrom the tragical fate of the third Agis we learn, that when abuses\nintroduced by corruption are suffered by length of time to take root in\nthe constitution, they will be termed by those whose interest it is to\nsupport them, essential parts of the constitution itself; and all\nattempts to remove them will ever be clamoured against by such men, as\nattempts to subvert it: As the example of Cleomenes will teach us, that\nthe publick virtue of one great man may not only save his falling\ncountry from ruin, but raise her to her former dignity and lustre, by\nbringing her back to those principles on which her constitution was\noriginally founded. Though the violent remedies made use of by Cleomenes\nnever ought to be applied, unless the disease is grown too desperate to\nadmit of a cure by milder methods.\n\nI shall endeavour to show in its proper place, that the constitution\nestablished by Lycurgus, which seemed to Polybius to be rather of divine\nthan of human institution, and was so much celebrated by the most\neminent philosophers of antiquity, is much inferior to the British\nconstitution as settled at the revolution.[47] But I cannot quit this\nsubject without recommending that excellent institution of Lycurgus\nwhich provided for the education of the children of the whole community\nwithout distinction. An example which under proper regulations would be\nhighly worthy of our imitation, since nothing could give a more\neffectual check to the reigning vices and follies of the present age, or\ncontribute so much to a reformation of manners, as to form the minds of\nthe rising generation by the principles of religion and virtue. Where\nthe manners of a people are good, very few laws will be wanting; but\nwhen their manners are depraved, all the laws in the world will be\ninsufficient to restrain the excesses of the human passions. For as\nHorace justly observes....\n\n   _Quid legis sine moribus\n     Van\u00e6 proficiunt._ Ode 24. lib. 3.\n\n  [5] Dion. Halicarn. p. 248. edit. Rob. Steph. 1546.\n\n  [6] Plutarch relates this affair greatly to the honour of\n  Lycurgus in the beginning of his life.\n\n  [7]\n\n      \u1f0c\u03b3\u03b9\u03b4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03b3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03ad\u03c9\u03c2\n      \u1f10\u03b6\u03b7\u03bc\u03af\u03c9\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\n\n  Plut. vita Lycur. pag. 46. lit. c. Edit. Xiglandri.\n\n  [8] Lycurgus was the first who collected the entire works of\n  Homer; which he brought into Greece out of Asia-Minor.\n\n  [9] Plutarch has taken no notice of them. But Xenophon has\n  fully explained them in his treatise on the Spartan republick,\n  p. 542, and seq.\n\n  [10] Plut. Vit. Lycurg. ad finem.\n\n  [11] Plut. ibid. p. 58. A. \u1f29 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f18\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2, &c.\n\n  [12] De Rebuspubl. cap. 11. p. 154. vol. 2. Edit Basil. 1550.\n\n  [13] \u039f\u1f50 \u03b4\u1fc6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c6\u03ac\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03b4\u03af\u03b4\u03c9\u03bc\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03c5\u03c7\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03b9\u03c9\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd.\n\n  [14] Arist. de. Rebuspubl. lib. 2. c. 7. p. 122. lit. 1. vol.\n  2.\n\n  [15] Polyb. lib. 6. p. 685. vol. 1. edit. Isaac Gronov. 1670.\n\n  [16] Plut. in Vit. Lysand. p. 442. lit. E.\n\n  [17] Plut. it Vit. Agesi. p. 617. lit. C.\n\n  [18] In Vit. Agid. p. 796. lit. C.\n\n  [19] Ibid. p. 797. lit. C.\n\n  [20] In Vit Agid. p. 797. lit. A.\n\n  [21] Ibid. lit. E.\n\n  [22] Vita Agid. p. 797. lit. B.\n\n  [23] Ibid. lit. C.\n\n  [24] Ibid. p. 798. lit. B.\n\n  [25] Something seems plainly to be wanting in this passage,\n  which is strangely obscure and intricate. It is evident that\n  Agis employed his uncle Agesilaus to persuade his mother, who\n  was Agesilaus\u2019s sister, \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1 \u03c0\u03b5\u03af\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f00\u03b4\u03b5\u03bb\u03c6\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\n  \u1f08\u03b3\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03ac\u03bf\u03c5. The king himself entreats his mother to assist him,\n  &c \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f41 \u03b2\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f10\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03c1\u03cc\u03c2. And after he has\n  enumerated the advantages which would result from his scheme,\n  Plutarch abruptly adds \u03bf\u1f55\u03c4\u03c9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f31 \u03b3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u1fd6\u03ba\u03b5\u03c2\n  &c. in the plural number, though he had just before mentioned\n  Agis\u2019s mother only, as the woman applied to on this occasion.\n  It is evident therefore that his grandmother and all their\n  female friends and relations must have been present that time,\n  though not mentioned, and that they were the only Spartan\n  ladies who came heartily into his scheme. For when Agis\n  afterwards offers his whole fortune to the publick, he assures\n  the people that his mother and grandmother, \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b7\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2, and\n  his friends and relations, who were the richest families in\n  Sparta, were ready to do the same. As Agis certainly includes\n  the wives of his friends and relations, and mentions no other\n  women, I have taken that speech for my guide in giving the\n  sense of this whole passage, in which I could get no assistance\n  from any of the commentators.\n\n  [26] In Vit. Agid. p. 798. lit. D.\n\n  [27] Vit. Agid. p. 800. lit. A.\n\n  [28] Ibid. 799. lit. A.\n\n  [29] This is an oracle mentioned by Plutarch, about which the\n  learned are not agreed: however, it seems to have given its\n  responses in dreams.\n\n  [30] The reader may be glad perhaps to find here the ceremony\n  made use of upon this occasion. Vit. Agid. p. 800. lit. B.\n  \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u1f10\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03ad\u03b1 \u03bb\u03b1\u03b2\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f31 \u1f1c\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9, &c. Every ninth year the\n  ephori taking the opportunity of a clear and still night, when\n  the moon did not appear, sat silently and observed the sky with\n  great attention, and if they saw a star shoot, they judged the\n  kings had offended the gods; and removed them from government,\n  until an oracle came from Delphos which was favourable to them.\n\n  [31] Plut. Vit. Agid. p. 798. lit. A.\n\n  [32] Ibid. p. 801. lit. B.\n\n  [33] Vit. Agid. p. 803. lit. A.\n\n  [34] Plut. Vit. Cleom. p. 805. lit. B.\n\n  [35] Plut. Vit. Cleom. p. 809. lit. A.\n\n  [36] Plut. Vit. Cleom. p. 807. lit. B.\n\n  [37] Vit. Cleom. p. 808. lit. A.\n\n  [38] Vit. Cleom. p. 809. lit. A.\n\n  [39] Parallel. inter Agid. et Cleom. et T. et C. Gracch. p.\n  844. lit. D.\n\n  [40] Vit. Cleom. p. 811. lit. C.\n\n  [41] Plut. Vit. Cleom. p. 822. lit. E.\n\n  [42] Polyb. lib. 4. p. 479.\n\n  [43] Plut. Vit. Philop\u0153m. p. 365. lit. E.\n\n  [44] To bring back their shields, implied victory; to be\n  brought home upon them, a glorious death in defence of their\n  country; because the Spartans, if possible, brought back and\n  buried all who fell in battle in their native country.\n\n  [45] Aristot. de Rebuspubl. lib. 2. cap. 7. fol. 122. lit.\n  \u0398.\n\n  [46] \u1f29 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03ce\u03bb\u03b5\u03c4\u03bf \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f40\u03bb\u03b9\u03b3\u03b1\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03af\u03b1\u03bd. Aristot. ibid.\n\n  [47] \u1f6d\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u03b9\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u1f22 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f04\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03c9\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\n  \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03bd\u03bf\u03bc\u03af\u03b6\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd. Polyb. lib. 6. p. 683.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nOF ATHENS.\n\n\nThe republick of Athens, once the seat of learning and eloquence, the\nschool of arts and sciences, and the centre of wit, gaiety, and\npoliteness, exhibits a strong contrast to that of Sparta, as well in her\nform of government, as in the genius and manners of her inhabitants.\n\nThe government of Athens, after the abolition of monarchy, was truly\ndemocratick, and so much convulsed by those civil dissensions, which are\nthe inevitable consequences of that kind of government, that of all the\nGrecian states, the Athenian may be the most strictly termed the seat of\nfaction. I observe that the history of this celebrated republick is\nneither very clear nor interesting until the time of Solon. The laws of\nDraco (the first legislator of the Athenians who gave his laws in\nwriting) affixed death as the common punishment of the most capital\ncrimes, or the most trivial offences; a circumstance which implies\neither the most cruel austerity in the temper of the lawgiver, or such\nan abandoned profligacy in the manners of the people, as laid him under\na necessity of applying such violent remedies. As the historians have\nnot clearly decided which of these was the case, I shall only remark,\nthat the humanity of the people, so natural to the human species, was\ninterested upon the occasion, and the excessive rigour of the laws\nobstructed the very means of their being carried into execution. A plain\nproof that a multiplicity of rigorous penal laws are not only\nincompatible with the liberty of a free state, but even repugnant to\nhuman nature. For the natural equity of mankind can easily distinguish\nbetween the nature and degree of crimes; and the sentiments of humanity\nwill naturally be excited when the punishment seems to be too rigorous\nin proportion to the demerits of the offender. The chief reason, in my\nopinion, why so many offenders in our nation escape with impunity for\nwant of prosecution, is because our laws make no distinction, as to the\npunishment, between the most trifling robbery on the highway, and the\nmost atrocious of all crimes, premeditated murder.\n\nThe remedy which Draco proposed by his laws, proving worse than the\ndisease, the whole body of the people applied to Solon, as the only\nperson equal to the difficult task of regulating their government. The\nsupreme power of the state was at that time vested in nine magistrates,\ntermed archons or governors, elected annually by the people out of the\nbody of the nobility. But the community in general was split into three\nfactions, each contending for such a form of government as was most\nagreeable to their different interests. The most sensible amongst the\nAthenians, dreading the consequence of these divisions, were willing, as\nPlutarch informs us, to invest Solon with absolute power; but our\ndisinterested philosopher was a stranger to that kind of ambition, and\npreferred the freedom and happiness of his countrymen to the splendour\nof a crown.[48] He continued the archons in their office as usual, but\nlimited their authority by instituting a senate of four hundred persons\nelected by the people, by way of ballot, out of the four tribes into\nwhich the community was at that time divided. He revived and improved\nthe senate and court of Areopagus, the most sacred and most respectable\ntribunal, not only of Greece, but of all which we ever read of in\nhistory.[49] The integrity and equity of this celebrated court was so\nremarkable, that not only the Greeks, but the Romans, sometimes,\nsubmitted such causes to their determination which they found too\nintricate and difficult for their own decision. To prevent all suspicion\nof partiality either to plaintiff or defendant, this venerable court\nheard all causes and passed their definitive sentence in the dark, and\nthe pleaders on either side were strictly confined to a bare\nrepresentation of the plain truth of the fact, without either\naggravation or embellishment. For all the ornament of fine language, and\nthose powers of rhetorick which tended to bias the judgment by\ninteresting the passions of the judges, were absolutely prohibited.\nHappy if the pleaders were restricted to this righteous method in our\nown courts of judicature, where great eloquence and great abilities are\ntoo often employed to confound truth and support injustice!\n\nIt is evident from history that Solon at first proposed the institutions\nof Lycurgus as the model for his new establishment. But the difficulty\nwhich he met with in the abolition of all debts, the first part of his\nscheme, convinced him of the utter impracticability of introducing the\nlaconick equality, and deterred him from all farther attempts of that\nnature. The laws of Athens gave the creditor so absolute a power over\nhis insolvent debtor, that he could not only oblige the unhappy wretch\nto do all his servile drudgery, but could sell him and his children for\nslaves in default of payment. The creditors had made so oppressive an\nuse of their power, that many of the citizens were actually obliged to\nsell their children to make good their payments; and such numbers had\nfled their country to avoid the effects of their detestable inhumanity,\nthat, as Plutarch observes, the city was almost unpeopled by the\nextortion of the usurers.[50] Solon, apprehensive of an insurrection\namongst the poorer citizens, who openly threatened to alter the\ngovernment, and make an equal partition of the lands, thought no method\nso effectual to obviate this terrible evil, as to cancel all debts, as\nLycurgus had done formerly at Sparta. But some of his friends, to whom\nhe had privately communicated his scheme, with an assurance that he did\nnot propose to meddle with the lands, were too well versed in the art of\njobbing to neglect so fair an opportunity of making a fortune. For they\nstretched their credit to the utmost in loans of large sums from the\nmoneyed men, which they immediately laid out in the purchase of landed\nestates. A precedent which the treacherous Agesilaus copied too\nsuccessfully afterwards at Sparta. The cheat appeared as soon as the\nedict for abolishing all debts was made publick: but the odium of so\nflagitious a piece of roguery was thrown wholly upon Solon; as the\ncensure of the publick for all frauds and exactions committed by\nofficers in the inferior departments will naturally fall upon the\nminister at the helm, however disinterested and upright.\n\nThis edict was equally disagreeable to the rich and to the poor. For the\nrich were violently deprived of all that part of their property which\nconsisted in their loans, and the poor were disappointed of that share\nof the lands which they so greedily expected. How Solon drew himself out\nof this difficulty, historians have no where informed us. All we can\nlearn from them is, that the decree was at last received and submitted\nto, and that Solon was still continued in his office with the same\nauthority as before.\n\nThis experiment gave Solon a thorough insight into the temper of his\ncountrymen, and most probably induced him to accommodate his subsequent\nregulations to the humour and prejudices of the people. For as he wanted\nthe authority which naturally arises from royal birth, as well as that\nwhich is founded on the unlimited confidence of the people, advantages\nwhich Lycurgus possessed in so eminent a degree, he was obliged to\nconsult rather what was practicable, than what was strictly right; and\nendeavour, as far as he was able, to please all parties. That he\nacknowledged this, seems evident from his answer to one who asked him\n\u201cwhether the laws he had given the Athenians were the best he could\npossibly have made?\u201d[51] \u201cThey are the best,\u201d replied Solon, \u201cwhich the\nAthenians are capable of receiving.\u201d Thus whilst he confined the\nmagistracies and the executive part of the government solely to the\nrich, he lodged the supreme power in the hands of the poorer citizens.\nFor though every freeman whose fortune did not amount to a particular\ncensus or estimate, was excluded from all state offices by the laws of\nSolon; yet he had a legal right of giving his opinion and suffrage in\nthe \u0395\u03ba\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1 or assembly of the people, which was wholly composed of\nthis inferior class of citizens. But as all elections, and all cases of\nappeal from the superior courts were determined by the voices of this\nassembly; as no law could pass without their approbation, and the\nhighest officers in the republick were subject to their censure, this\nassembly became the _dernier resort_ in all causes, and this mob\ngovernment, as it may be justly termed, was the great leading cause of\nthe ruin of their republick. Anacharsis the Scythian philosopher, who at\nthat time resided with Solon, justly ridiculed this excess of power\nwhich he had lodged in the people.[52] For when he had heard some points\ndebated, first in the senate, and afterwards decided in the assembly of\nthe people, he humourously told Solon, that at Athens \u201cwise men debated,\nbut fools decided.\u201d Solon was as sensible of this capital defect as\nAnacharsis; but he was too well acquainted with the licentiousness and\nnatural levity of the people, to divest them of a power, which he knew\nthey would resume by violence at the first opportunity. The utmost\ntherefore he could do was to fix his two senates as the moorings of the\nconstitution.[53] That of four hundred, to secure the state against the\nfluctuating temper and tumultuous fury of the people;[54] that of the\nareopagus, to restrain the dangerous encroachments of the great and\nwealthy.[55] He repealed all the laws of Draco, those against murder\nalone excepted; rightly judging, as Plutarch remarks, that it was not\nonly most iniquitous, but most absurd, to inflict the same punishment\nupon a man for being idle, or stealing a cabbage or an apple out of a\ngarden, as for committing murder or sacrilege.[56] But as the account\nhanded down to us of the laws which Solon established is extremely lame\nand imperfect, I shall only mention the sarcasm of Anacharsis upon that\noccasion, as a proof of their insufficiency to answer that end for which\nSolon designed them. For that philosopher comparing the corrupt manners\nof the Athenians with the coercive power of Solon\u2019s laws, resembled the\nlatter to cobwebs which would entangle only the poor and feeble;[57] but\nwere easily broke through by the rich and powerful. Solon is said to\nhave replied,[58] \u201cthat men would readily stand to those mutual\ncompacts, which it was the interest of neither party to violate; and\nthat he had so rightly adapted his laws to the reason of his countrymen,\nas to convince them how much more advantageous it was to adhere to what\nwas just, than to be guilty of injustice.\u201d The event, as Plutarch truly\nobserves, proved more correspondent to the opinion of Anacharsis, than\nto the hopes of Solon. For Pisistratus, a near relation of Solon\u2019s,\nhaving artfully formed a strong party among the poorer citizens, by\ndistributing bribes under the specious pretence of relieving their\nnecessities, procured a guard of fifty men armed with clubs only for the\nsafety of his person, by the help of which he seized the citadel,\nabolished the democracy, and established a single tyranny in spite of\nall the efforts of Solon.[59]\n\nThis usurpation proved the source of endless faction, and brought\ninnumerable calamities upon the republick. Pisistratus was expelled more\nthan once by the opposite party, and as often brought back in triumph\neither by the fraud or force of his prevailing faction. At his death he\nleft the kingdom to his two sons Hipparchus and Hippias. The former of\nthese was assassinated by Harmodius and Aristogiton for a personal\ninjury they had received;[60] Hippias was soon after driven out of\nAthens by the Spartans at the instigation of some of his discontented\ncountrymen. Despairing of recovering his former sovereignty by any other\nmeans, he fled to Darius for assistance, and was the cause of the first\ninvasion of Greece by the Persians, in which he died fighting against\nhis country in the ever memorable battle of Marathon. But the most fatal\nevil which resulted from the usurpation of Pisistratus, was, that\nperpetual fear of seeing the supreme power again lodged in the hands of\na single person.[61] For this fear kept the jealousy of the people in a\nconstant alarm, and threw them at last into the hands of the factious\ndemagogues. Hence superior merit was frequently represented as an\nunpardonable crime, and a kind of high treason against the\nrepublick.[62] And the real patriots were rendered suspected to the\npeople, just as the demagogues were influenced by envy or private pique,\nor even bribed by ambitious or designing men, who aspired at the very\nthing of which the others were unjustly accused. The history of Athens\nabounds with instances of the levity and inconstancy of that unsteady\npeople. For how frequently do we find their best and ablest citizens\nimprisoned or sentenced to banishment by the ostracism, in honour of\nwhom the same people had just before erected statues:[63] nay not\nunfrequently raising statues to the memory of those illustrious and\ninnocent men, whom they had illegally doomed to death in the wantonness\nof their power;[64] at once the monuments of their injustice and too\nlate repentance! This evil was the natural consequence of that capital\nerror in Solon\u2019s polity, when he entrusted the supreme power to the\ngiddy and fluctuating populace. A defect which (as I observed before)\nwas the great leading cause of the loss of that liberty which they had\nso licentiously abused. For as the removal of all the honest citizens\neither by death or banishment paved an easy way for usurpation and\ntyranny; so it was a measure invariably pursued, in the democratick\ngovernments of Greece, by all those ambitious men who aimed at\nsubverting the liberties of their country. This truth is so clearly\nexplained, and so incontestably proved, by the great Thucydides, that\nwhilst I peruse the annals of that admirable historian, I cannot help\ngrieving over the tragick pages stained with the blood of so many\npatriot citizens, who fell a sacrifice to the dire ambition and avarice\nof faction. What a striking detail does he give us of the most\ncalamitous situation of all the Grecian republicks during the\nPeloponnesian war! How does he labour for expression in his pathetick\nenumeration of the horrible consequences of faction, after his\ndescription of the destructive sedition at Corcyra! A contempt of all\nreligion, the open violation of the most sacred ties and compacts;\ndevastations, massacres, assassinations, and all the savage horrors of\ncivil discord inflamed even to madness, are the perpetual subjects of\nhis instructive history. Calamities of which he himself was at once an\neyewitness and a most faithful recorder.\n\nThucydides truly ascribes this destructive war to the mutual jealousy\nwhich then subsisted between the Spartans and Athenians.[65][66] The\nmost stale frivolous pretences were trumped up by the Spartans, and as\nstrongly retorted by the Athenians. Both states made the interests or\ngrievances of their allies, the constant pretext for their mutual\naltercations, whilst the real cause was that ambitious scheme which each\nstate had formed of reducing all Greece under its respective dominion.\nBut an event which both states seemed to have waited for, quickly blew\nup the latent sparks of jealousy into the most violent flame.[67] The\nThebans privately entered the city of Plat\u00e6a in the night (a small state\nat that time allied to Athens) which had been betrayed to them by a\ntreacherous faction, who were enemies to the Athenians. But the honester\npart of the Plat\u00e6ans recovering from their surprise, and taking notice\nof the small number of the Thebans, quickly regained possession of their\ncity by the slaughter of most of the invaders. The Plat\u00e6ans immediately\napplied to the Athenians for assistance; the Thebans to the\nSpartans.[68] Both states entered eagerly into the quarrel between their\nrespective allies, and engaged as principals in that destructive war\nwhich at last involved all Greece in the common calamity. Wherever the\nfortune of the Spartan prevailed, an oligarchical aristocracy was\nestablished, and the friends to a popular government destroyed or\nbanished. Where the Athenians were victors, democracy was settled or\nrestored, and the people glutted their revenge with the blood of the\nnobility. Alternate revolts, truces violated as soon as made, massacres,\nproscriptions, and confiscations, were the perpetual consequences, in\nall the petty republicks, of the alternate good or bad success of those\ntwo contending rivals. In a word, all Greece seems to have been seized\nwith an epidemick madness; and the polite, the humane Grecians treated\none another, during the whole course of this unnatural war, with a\nferocity unknown even to the most savage barbarians. The real cause,\nassigned by Thucydides, of all these atrocious evils, was, \u201cthe lust of\ndomination arising from avarice and ambition:\u201d for the leading men in\nevery state, whether of the democratick or aristocratick party, affected\noutwardly the greatest concern for the welfare of the republick, which\nin reality was made the prize for which they all contended.[69] Thus,\nwhilst each endeavoured by every possible method to get the better of\nhis antagonist, the most audacious villanies, and the most flagrant acts\nof injustice were equally perpetrated by both sides. Whilst the moderate\nmen amongst the citizens, who refused to join with either side, were\nalike the objects of their resentment or envy, and equally destroyed\nwithout mercy by either faction.[70]\n\nHistorians unanimously agree, that the Athenians were instigated to this\nfatal war by the celebrated Pericles. Thucydides, who was not only\ncotemporary with Pericles, but actually bore a command in that war, does\nreal honour to that great man\u2019s character; for he assigns his desire of\nhumbling the Spartans, and his zeal for the glory and interest of his\ncountry, as the real motives of his conduct upon that occasion.[71] But,\nas a detail of this tedious and ruinous war is wholly foreign to my\npurpose, I shall only remark, that if ever union and harmony are\nnecessary to the preservation of a state, they are more essentially so\nwhen that state is engaged in a dubious war with a powerful enemy. For\nnot only the continuation, but the event, of that long war, so fatal to\nthe Athenians, must (humanly speaking) be wholly attributed to the\ndisunion of their counsels, and the perpetual fluctuation in their\nmeasures, occasioned by the influence of the ambitious and factious\ndemagogues. Not the calamities of war, nor the most dreadful plague,\never yet recorded in history, were able to fix the volatile temper of\nthat unsteady people.[72] Elate beyond measure with any good success,\nthey were deaf to the most reasonable overtures of peace from their\nenemies, and their views were unbounded. Equally dejected with any\ndefeat, they thought the enemy just at their doors, and threw the whole\nblame upon their commanders, who were always treated as unpardonably\ncriminal when unsuccessful. The demagogues, who watched every turn of\ntemper in that variable people, took care to adapt every circumstance\nthat offered to their own ambitious views, either of gaining or\nsupporting an ascendency in the state, which kept up a perpetual spirit\nof faction in that unhappy republick. Thus, in the beginning of the\nPeloponnesian war, Cleon, a noisy seditious demagogue, declaimed\nviolently against Pericles, and was the constant opposer of all his\nmeasures:[73] but the firmness and superior abilities of that great man\nenabled him to baffle all his antagonists. When Pericles was carried off\nby that fatal pestilence which almost depopulated Athens, the nobility,\njealous of that sway which Cleon had acquired over the people, set up\nNicias in opposition. Nicias was honest, and a real lover of his\ncountry, but a man of no great abilities; and though an experienced\nofficer, yet cautious and diffident even to timidity.[74] In his temper\nhe was mild, humane, and averse to bloodshed, and laboured to put an end\nto a war which spread such general destruction: but all his measures\nwere opposed by the turbulent Cleon; for when the Spartans proposed an\naccommodation, Cleon persuaded the Athenians to insist upon such high\nterms that the treaty broke off, and war was again renewed with the same\ninveterate fury: but the incendiary Cleon, the chief obstacle to all\npacifick measures, falling in battle in the tenth year of that war,\nnegociations were again set on foot, and a peace for fifty years\nconcluded between the Athenians and the Spartans by the unwearied\nendeavours of Nicias.[75] But whilst Nicias was intent upon the\nenjoyment of that repose which he had procured, a new and infinitely\nmore formidable rival started up, and again involved his country and all\nGreece in the same calamities by his restless and insatiable ambition.\n\nAlcibiades now appeared upon the stage; a man composed of a motley\nmixture of virtues and vices, of good and bad qualities; one who could\nassume even the most opposite characters; and with more ease, than a\nchameleon can change its colours, appear a very contrast to himself just\nas his interest or ambition required.[76] This state Proteus was\nstrongly piqued at the growing power and reputation of Nicias. His lust\nof power was too great to bear either a superior or an equal;[77] and he\ndetermined at all events to supplant him, alike regardless either of the\nequity of the means, or of the consequences of it to his country. The\nAthenians were not a little displeased with the Spartans, who had not\nbeen very punctual in fulfilling the conditions of the treaty.[78]\nAlcibiades finding his countrymen in a humour very proper for his\npurpose, inflamed them violently against Nicias, whom he publickly\naccused as a secret friend and wellwisher to that people. Nicias\nendeavoured to ward off the blow, and prevent his countrymen from coming\nto an open rupture; but the intrigues of Alcibiades prevailed, who\nprocured himself to be elected general, and fresh hostilities to be\ncommenced against the allies of Sparta.[79]\n\nThe seventeenth year of this memorable war is remarkable for that fatal\nexpedition against Sicily, which gave a mortal blow to the Athenian\ngrandeur, and affords a signal instance of the terrible consequences of\nfaction. The Egestians, a small state in Sicily, applied to the\nAthenians for assistance against the oppressions of the Syracusans.\nAlcibiades, looking upon it as an object worthy of his ambition,\nundertook the cause of these suppliants, and knew so well how to flatter\nthe vanity of his countrymen, that a large armament was decreed by the\npeople for that purpose, and Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus, a daring\nbut able officer, were elected generals.[80] Nicias was the only person\nwho had the honesty or courage to oppose a measure which he judged not\nonly rash, but to the last degree impolitick; but the Athenians were\ndeaf to all his remonstrances. The relief of the Egestians was only the\npretext; for the entire dominion of Sicily, as Thucydides assures us,\nwas the real object they had in view when they gave orders for that\npowerful armament.[81] Alcibiades had promised them an easy conquest of\nthat island, which he looked upon only as a prelude to much greater\nenterprises; and the besotted people had already swallowed up Italy,\nCarthage, and Africa in their idle imaginations.[82] Both factions\nconcurred in the vigorous prosecution of this measure, though from very\ndifferent motives: the friends of Alcibiades, from the view of\naggrandizing their chief by that vast accession of wealth and glory\nwhich they hoped for from this expedition: his enemies, from the hopes\nof supplanting him in his absence, and gaining the lead in the\nadministration.[83] Thus the true interest of the state was equally\nsacrificed to the selfish and private views of each party! But, in the\nmidst of these vast preparations, an odd accident threw the whole city\ninto confusion, and at once alarmed the superstition and jealousy of the\npeople. The terms, or statues of Mercury, were all defaced in one and\nthe same night by some unknown persons; nor could the Athenians ever\ndiscover the real authors of this reputed sacrilege.[84] Proclamations\nwere issued with a free pardon, and reward for any of the accomplices\nwho could make a discovery, and the information of strangers and slaves\nwas allowed as legal evidence; but no information could be procured as\nto the true authors of that particular fact; a circumstance which to me\ndoes not appear at all surprising: for it was evidently, in my opinion,\na piece of party-craft played off against Alcibiades by the opposite\nfaction, who knew that to attack the established religion, was to touch\nthe master-spring of the passions of their countrymen.[85] Some slaves\nindeed, and other low persons (suborned, as Plutarch asserts, by\nAndrocles,[86] one of the demagogues) deposed, that long before that,\nsome statues had been mutilated, and the most sacred mysteries of their\nreligion ridiculed, in a drunken frolick by some wild young fellows, and\nthat Alcibiades was of the party.[87] This information, which, according\nto Plutarch, was a palpable contrivance of his enemies, enabled them to\nfix the odium of the last action upon Alcibiades.[88] The demagogues of\nthe opposite faction greatly exaggerated the whole affair to the people.\nThey accused him of a treasonable design against the popular government,\nand produced his contemptuous ridicule of the sacred mysteries, and the\nmutilation of Mercury\u2019s statues, in support of their charge; as they\nurged his well known libertinism, and licentious life as a proof that he\nmust be the author of those insults upon their religion. Alcibiades not\nonly denied the charge, but insisted upon being brought immediately to a\nlegal trial; declaring himself ready to undergo the punishment inflicted\nby the laws, if he should be found guilty.[89] He beseeched the people\nnot to receive any informations against him in his absence, but rather\nto put him to death upon the spot if they judged him to be the\noffender. He urged too, how impolitick it would be to send him with the\ncommand of so great an army, whilst he lay under the imputation of a\ncrime of that nature, before they had taken thorough cognizance of the\naffair: but his accusers dreading the effect which his interest with the\narmy, and his well known influence over the allied troops, which had\nengaged in the expedition from their personal attachment to him, might\nhave upon the people, if he should be brought to immediate trial,\nprocured other demagogues of their party to dissuade the people from a\nmeasure which they judged would disconcert their scheme. These men\npleaded the dangerous delay which such a proceeding might occasion, and\nurged the necessity of dispatch in an enterprise of such vast\nimportance. They proposed therefore that the fleet should sail\nimmediately, but that Alcibiades should return when a day was appointed\nfor his trial.[90] For their intention was, as Thucydides remarks, to\nrecall and bring him to his trial when the popular prejudice ran strong\nagainst him, which they knew they could easily spirit up in his absence.\nIt was decreed, therefore, that Alcibiades should depart immediately\nupon the expedition.\n\nThis mighty armament, which carried the flower of the Athenian forces,\nwas the most splendid, the best fitted out, and the most expensive, that\nhad ever sailed from any of the Grecian ports to that very time.[91]\nBut the first thing we meet with in this expedition, is (what might\nnaturally be expected) a disagreement between the three generals as to\nthe manner of beginning their operations.[92] Alcibiades indeed brought\nthem both over to his opinion; but whilst he was disputing with his\ncolleagues in Sicily, his enemies at Athens were by no means idle. The\naffair of the statues, and the pollution of the sacred mysteries, were\nagain brought upon the carpet. The people, naturally suspicious, never\ninquired into the character of the informers, or the validity of the\nevidence, but admitted all that offered without distinction; and, giving\neasy credit to the most abandoned wretches, apprehended several of the\nmost eminent citizens, and committed them to prison.[93] One of these\npersuaded another of his fellow prisoners, who was most liable to\nsuspicion, to take the crime upon himself, and to impeach some others as\nhis accomplices.[94] Urging this as a reason, that whether what he\nconfessed should be true or false, he would at least secure his own\npardon, and calm the present suspicions of the people. Andocides, for\nthat was the name of this person according to Plutarch, though it is\nomitted by Thucydides, was prevailed upon by this kind of reasoning to\nacknowledge himself guilty of defacing the statues, and to inform\nagainst some others as accomplices in the same act of impiety.[95] Upon\nthis declaration the informer received his pardon, and all those who\nwere not mentioned in his information their liberty:[96] but processes\nwere made out against as many as he had named, and all who were\napprehended were tried, condemned, and executed upon his single\nevidence. Those who escaped by flight were sentenced to die, and a price\nset upon their heads by a publick proclamation. Whether the persons\ncondemned were guilty or innocent was not at all clear, according to\nThucydides. Plutarch tells us, that the friends and acquaintance of\nAlcibiades, who fell into the hands of the people, were severely handled\non this occasion.[97] It is certain therefore that the information was\nchiefly levelled at him by the artifice of the opposite faction; for\nThucydides informs us almost in the very next sentence, that the people\nreceived the information against Alcibiades with all the fury of\nprejudice, at the instigation of such of his enemies as had accused him\nbefore he sailed upon the expedition.[98] And since they now had not the\nleast doubt of his being concerned in the affair of defacing the\nstatues, they were more than ever convinced that he was equally guilty\nof the pollution of the mysteries, and that both those crimes were\ncommitted by him and his associates with the same design of subverting\nthe popular government. For a body of Spartan troops happened to make an\nincursion, in that very juncture, as far as the Isthmus, upon some\ndesign or other against the B\u0153otians. This unlucky incident confirmed\nthe people in their suspicions that this was a scheme concerted\nbeforehand with Alcibiades, covered with the specious pretext of\nattacking the B\u0153otians;[99] and that if the plot had not been happily\ndiscovered in time, and the execution of it prevented by the death of\nthe conspirators, their city would most inevitably have been betrayed to\nthe Spartans.[100] Thus on every side suspicions fell strongly upon\nAlcibiades, and the people determining to put him to death, sent a\nprivate express to Sicily to recall him and such of his friends as were\nnamed in the information. The officers dispatched in the Salaminian\ngalley, which was sent on that occasion, were ordered to acquaint\nAlcibiades, that he was desired to return with them to Athens to clear\nhimself of those things which were objected to him before the people;\nbut they received a strict charge not to offer to take him or his\nfriends into custody; not only from the dread of some mutiny amongst\ntheir own soldiers upon his account, but for fear the allied troops,\nwhom his influence had engaged, should desert and abandon the\nenterprise.[101] Alcibiades obeyed the summons, and taking his friends,\nwho were included in the information, into his own ship, left Sicily in\ncompany with the Salaminian galley, seemingly as if returning to Athens;\nbut, whether he only suspected, or, which is more probable, had received\nintelligence of the measures taken by his enemies in his absence, he,\nwith his friends, went ashore at Thuria, and gave the Athenian officers\nthe slip, not caring to stand the sentence of the credulous and\nprejudiced people.[102] The officers finding all their search after him\nquite fruitless, returned to Athens without him, and the Athenians\npassed sentence of death upon him and all those who accompanied him, and\nconfiscated their estates for non-appearance.[103] Thus, instead of\nuniting their joint efforts to promote the success of an enterprise upon\nwhich they had staked their all, the infatuated Athenians were intent\nupon nothing but the cabals and intrigues of faction; and the folly of\nthe people, managed by their ambitious and selfish demagogues, deprived\nthe state of the only commander from whom they could rationally hope for\nsuccess in that hazardous expedition. A measure which occasioned the\ntotal ruin both of their fleet and army, and gave a fatal shock to\ntheir republick; for the soldiers were not only greatly dispirited at\nthe loss of a chief, in whose abilities they placed the most entire\nconfidence, but Alcibiades, in revenge for his usage, took refuge\namongst the Spartans, and prevailed upon them to send such supplies to\nthe Syracusans as completed the destruction of the Athenians in that\ncountry.[104] Nicias was taken and put to death by the enemy; not a\nsingle ship returned, and few of the men escaped either slaughter or\ncaptivity.[105] The news of this terrible defeat threw the city into the\nutmost consternation.[106] They at first gave up all hopes, and imagined\nthey should quickly see the enemy\u2019s fleet in the Pyr\u00e6um whilst they were\nin this exhausted and defenceless condition. However, the dread of the\nimpending danger had this good effect that it made the populace\nextremely tractable, and ready to support their magistrates in whatever\nmeasures they judged most conducive to the common safety.[107] Nor could\nany thing but union and harmony amongst themselves have possibly saved\nthem in the midst of so many enemies, with which they were surrounded.\nFor all the Greeks in general were highly elated, as Thucydides tells\nus, with the ill success of the Athenians in Sicily.[108] Those who had\nhitherto observed a strict neutrality in this war wanted no\nsolicitations to join in crushing that unhappy people, but rather\nthought it glorious to have a share in a war which they concluded would\nbe but of short duration. The Spartan allies were more than ever\ndesirous of delivering themselves from the calamities of war which they\nhad so long suffered; whilst those states, which until that time had\nreceived laws from the Athenians, exerted themselves above their\nstrength to support the revolt which they were then meditating. They\njudged of the situation of affairs from the blind impulse of passion,\nregardless of the dictates of reason, and fancied the next campaign\nwould finish the ruin of the Athenians. The Spartans, promising\nthemselves the certain dominion over all Greece, if the Athenians were\nonce reduced, made vast preparations for the war, to which all their\nallies contributed their utmost; all got ready for opening the campaign\nthe spring following.[109]\n\nThe Athenians, now harmony was restored in the state, recovered their\nspirits, and begun to act with vigour.[110] They applied themselves to\nthe re-establishment of their marine, the repairs of their\nfortifications, and the care of storing their magazines with the\ngreatest diligence and economy, retrenching all such expenses as they\njudged useless or superfluous. The good effects of this unanimity were\nvisible when the campaign opened, for they found themselves in a\ncondition to make head against their numerous enemies, though\nstrengthened by a new alliance with the Persians, and assisted with\nPersian money; and they even gained some considerable advantages. An\nevent too happened, which greatly disconcerted the measures of their\nenemies, and raised their state once more to its former power and\nlustre. Alcibiades, a thorough libertine, who never stuck at the most\ninfamous means of gratifying his passions, debauched Tim\u00e6a, the wife of\nAgis, king of Sparta, his great friend and protector.[111] Dreading the\nresentment of that prince for so shameful a breach of friendship and\nhospitality, as well as the jealousy of the Peloponnesians, who had sent\nprivate orders to Astyochus, the Lacedemonian admiral, to cut him off,\nhe fled to Tissaphernes, at that time governor of the provinces in the\nlower Asia under the Persian monarch.[112] Alcibiades, who was a\nconsummate master in the art of address, quickly insinuated himself into\nhis good graces, and explained to him the true interest of the Persians\nwith respect to the Grecian republicks.[113] He showed him the bad\npolicy of raising one state to a superiority over all the rest, which\nwould deprive his master of all his allies, and oblige him to contend\nalone with the whole power of Greece. He advised him to permit every\nstate to enjoy its own separate independent government; and\ndemonstrated, that by keeping them thus divided, his master might set\nthem together by the ears, and, by playing them one against another,\ncrush them all at last without the least danger. He added too, that an\nalliance with the Athenians would be more advantageous to the Persian\ninterest, and preferable to that which he had made with the\nLaced\u00e6monians. The crafty Persian was too able a politician not to\nrelish his advice; he paid the Peloponnesians their subsidy so ill, and\nput off a naval engagement so long, under pretence of waiting for the\nPh\u0153nician fleet, that he wasted the strength of their navy, which was\nfar superior to the Athenian, and ruined all their measures.[114]\n\nWhilst Alcibiades resided with Tissaphernes, and gave the Persians the\nbest instructions he could for regulating their conduct, he at the same\ntime formed a scheme for procuring the repeal of his sentence, and\nliberty to return once more to his native country.[115] He judged the\nbest way to obtain this favour would be to convince the Athenians of his\nintimacy with Tissaphernes. To effect this, he wrote to the chief\nofficers of the Athenian forces, which then lay at Samos, directing them\nto inform all those of the greatest weight and authority how desirous he\nwas of revisiting Athens if the government should be once lodged in the\nhands of a small number of the principal citizens; but that he could by\nno means think of returning whilst the democracy subsisted, and the\nstate was governed by a parcel of abandoned wretches, who had so\nscandalously driven him out of his country. Upon that condition he\npromised to procure the friendship of Tissaphernes, and declared himself\nready to accept a share with them in the administration. The event\nanswered his expectations; for the officers and the leading men, both of\nthe sea and land forces, which were at Samos, were eagerly bent upon\nsubverting the democracy. Thus the treaty was set on foot at Samos, and\nthe scheme laid for altering the government.[116] The principal men were\nin hopes of a share in the administration, and the inferior people\nacquiesced from the expectation of large subsidies from the Persians.\nPhrynicus, one of the generals, alone opposed it, sensible that\nAlcibiades cared as little for an aristocratick government as for a\ndemocracy, and had no other point in view (which, as Thucydides\nacknowledges, was the real truth) than to procure such a change in the\npresent administration as might enable his friends to recall him. The\nterms, however, which Alcibiades offered, were agreed to by the rest,\nand Pisander, one of the leading men, was sent to Athens to manage the\naffair.[117]\n\nPisander at first met with violent opposition from the people;[118] and\nthe enemies of Alcibiades in particular clamoured loudly against the\nviolation of the laws, when his return was proposed, which they chiefly\ndreaded. But Pisander applied so artfully to the fears of the people,\nand showed them so plainly that it was the only resource they had left\nwhich could possibly save the state, that they at last agreed to it,\nthough with great reluctance.[119] He therefore, with ten others, was\nappointed to settle the affair with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades as they\nshould judge most conducive to the interest of the republick; but\nTissaphernes, who dreaded the power of the Peloponnesians, was not so\nready to enter into a convention with the Athenians, as they were taught\nto believe.[120] Alcibiades therefore, to save his credit, and conceal\nfrom the Athenians his inability to make good what he had promised,\ninsisted, in the name of Tissaphernes, upon such high terms that the\ntreaty broke off, and the deputies returned to Samos, enraged at the\ntrick which they thought had been put upon them by Alcibiades.\nDetermined however, at all events, to pursue their scheme, Pisander,\nwith some of the deputies, returned to Athens, where their party had\nalready made a considerable progress, for they had privately\nassassinated such of the leading men as were averse to an aristocracy,\nand though they permitted the senate and people to assemble and vote as\nusual, yet they would not allow any thing to be decreed but what they\nthought proper;[121] besides, none but those of their own faction durst\nventure to harangue the people; for if any one attempted to speak in\nopposition, he was sure to be dispatched at the first convenient\nopportunity; nor was any inquiry made after the assassins, or any\nprocess issued out against those who were strongly suspected of the\nmurders. The people were so terrified with these bloody executions, that\nthey acquiesced to whatever was proposed, and every man thought himself\nhappy if no violence was offered him, even though he continued quiet and\nsilent. They were deprived even of the power of bewailing the common\ncalamity to each other, in order to concert measures for revenge: for\nthe faction had artfully spread so strong and so universal a diffidence\namongst the popular party, that no one durst venture to confide in his\nneighbour, but each man suspected every other as an accomplice of the\ncrimes which were daily perpetrated.\n\nIn this situation Pisander found the city at his arrival,[122] and\nimmediately prepared to finish what his friends had so successfully\nbegun: convoking therefore an assembly of the people, the aristocratick\nfaction openly declared their resolution to abolish the ancient form of\ngovernment, and to lodge the supreme power in the hands of four hundred\nof the nobility, who should govern the state in the manner they thought\nbest, with the power of assembling five thousand of the citizens to\nconsult with as oft as they thought proper. Pisander was the man who\nacquainted the people with this definitive resolution,[123] but Antiphon\nwas the person who formed the plan, and was chief manager of the whole\naffair: a man, according to the testimony of Thucydides, who knew him\npersonally, master of the greatest abilities, and of by far the most\nnervous eloquence of any of his contemporaries. Thus the oligarchy was\nestablished, and the Athenians deprived of that liberty which they had\nenjoyed near one hundred years from the expulsion of Hippias: during\nwhich whole space they had been subject to none, but had been\naccustomed, above half that time, to lord it over others; for as soon as\nthis decree had passed in the assembly without opposition,[124] the\nchiefs of the conspiracy artfully permitted such citizens as were upon\nduty, but had not been let into the secret, to go wherever they pleased;\nbut directed their own friends to continue under arms, and disposed them\nin such a manner as might best favour their enterprise: for the\nAthenians kept at that time a constant guard upon their walls, as the\nSpartan army was encamped in their neighbourhood. When they had made\ntheir disposition, the four hundred nobles with poignards concealed\nunder their habits, and attended by an hundred and twenty daring young\nfellows, whom they employed in their assassinations, surrounded the\nsenators,[125] and paying them what was due upon their salaries,\ncommanded them to depart the court. The senators tamely submitting,[126]\nand not the least stir happening amongst the citizens, they proceeded to\nelect magistrates out of their own body, and performed all the religious\nceremonies usually practised upon those occasions. When they had thus\ngot possession of the government, they did not think proper to recall\nthose whom the people had formerly banished, for fear of being obliged\nto include Alcibiades in the number, whose enterprising genius they\ndreaded extremely; but they behaved most tyrannically to the citizens,\nputting some to death, throwing some into prison, and banishing others.\n\nThe spirit of liberty however is not so easily extinguished. Pisander\nhad brought mercenary troops with him out of some of the cities which he\npassed through on his return to Athens, who were of great service to the\nnew governors in their enterprise:[127] but the forces at Samos\nconsisted of Athenian citizens, jealous even of the least attempt upon\nthe liberty of their country, and declared enemies to every species of\ntyranny. The first news which these brave fellows received of the\nusurpation, brought such exaggerated accounts of the cruelty and\ninsolence of the four hundred, that they were with great difficulty\nrestrained from cutting every one to pieces who was in the interest of\nthe oligarchy. However,[128] they took the command from their former\ngenerals, and cashiered every officer they suspected, substituting\nothers in their places; the chief of whom were Thrasybulus and\nThrasyllus. Alcibiades was recalled,[129] and unanimously declared their\ncaptain general both by the sea and land forces; which gave such a turn\nto affairs at Athens, that the four hundred were deposed, in spite of\nall their efforts to continue in power, and the publick tranquillity\nonce more established.\n\nThe people confirmed Alcibiades in the command, and committed the whole\nmanagement of the war to his conduct.[130] But his soul was too great to\nreceive his recall from banishment, and even his high post as an act of\nfavour.[131] He determined to merit both by some signal service, and not\nto revisit Athens until he could return with glory. His usual success\nattended him in this war, and he seemed to bring victory with him\nwherever he appeared; for he gained so many victories both by sea and\nland, and distressed the Peloponnesians so much by his address and\nconduct, that he once more retrieved the dominion of the sea, and\nreturned triumphant to Athens.[132] His entry was splendidly\nmagnificent, adorned with the trophies of two hundred ships of war,\nwhich he had destroyed or taken, and a vast number of prisoners.[133]\nHis reception was attended with all the honours and applause he had so\njustly merited. The people, conscious of the late happy change in their\naffairs under the administration of Alcibiades, lamented with tears\ntheir miscarriage in Sicily, and other subsequent calamities; all which\nthey imputed to their own fatal error in not trusting the sole command\nto so able and successful a commander.\n\nThe fortune however of this great man was perpetually fluctuating, and\nseemed to be ever on the extreme; and Plutarch remarks,[134] that if\never man owed his ruin to his own glory, it must be Alcibiades; for the\npeople were so prepossessed with the opinion of his courage and conduct,\nthat they looked upon him as absolutely invincible. Whenever therefore\nhe failed in any one point, they imputed it entirely to his neglect, or\nwant of will; for they could imagine nothing so difficult, but what they\nthought him able to surmount, if he applied to it with earnestness and\nvigour. Thus, in the same campaign, he sailed to the isle of Andros\nwith a powerful fleet, where he defeated the joint forces of the\ninhabitants and Spartans; but, as he did not take the city, he gave his\nenemies a fresh handle for renewing their usual accusations; for the\npeople already fancied themselves masters of Chios and the rest of\nIonia, and were extremely out of humour because his conquests did not\nkeep pace with their heated imaginations. They made no allowance for the\nwretched state of their finances, which frequently obliged him to quit\nhis army to go in search of money to pay, and provisions to subsist, his\nforces, whilst their enemies had a constant resource for all their wants\nin the treasures of Persia. To one of these excursions, which necessity\nobliged him to make in order to raise money, he properly owed his ruin:\nfor leaving the command of the fleet to one Antiochus, an able seaman\nindeed, but rash, in every other respect unequal to such a charge, he\ngave him the most positive orders not to fight the enemy upon any\naccount whatsoever during his absence; but the vain Antiochus treated\nhis orders with so much contempt, that he sailed out with a few ships to\nbrave the Spartan admiral Lysander, which brought on a general\nengagement. The event was, the death of Antiochus, the defeat of the\nAthenians, who lost many of their ships, and a trophy erected by the\nSpartans in honour of their victory. Alcibiades, at the first news of\nthis misfortune, returned to Samos with precipitation, and endeavoured\nto bring Lysander to a decisive action; but the wary Spartan knew too\nwell how different a man he had now to deal with, and would by no means\nhazard a second engagement.\n\nIn the mean time one Thrasybulus,[135] who bore a mortal enmity to\nAlcibiades, posted to Athens, and impeached him as the cause of the late\ndefeat, affirming that he committed the care of the fleet to his\npotcompanions, whilst he rambled at pleasure amongst the provinces,\nraising money, and living in a state of riot and dissipation with wine\nand women. A violent charge, besides, was brought against him for\nfortifying a place near Bizanthe,[136] as a retreat upon occasion, which\nhis enemies urged as a proof that he either was not able, or not\nwilling, to reside in his native country.\n\nJealousy and inconstancy were the characteristicks of the Athenian\npeople. They gave implicit belief to the suggestions of his enemies, and\ndischarged, as Plutarch tells us, the fury of their gall upon the\nunfortunate Alcibiades, whom they deprived immediately of the command.\n\nThucydides,[137] speaking of the behaviour of his countrymen to\nAlcibiades upon the impeachment brought against him for defacing the\nstatues, imputes their ruin to that jealousy which they constantly\nharboured both of his ambition and abilities. For though he had done the\nstate many great and signal services, yet his way of life made him so\nodious to every individual, that the command was taken from him and\ngiven to others, which not long after drew on the destruction of the\nrepublick.\n\nFor Tydeus,[138] Menander, and Adimantus, the new generals, who lay with\nthe Athenian fleet, in the river \u00c6gos, were so weak as to sail out every\nmorning at daybreak to defy Lysander, who kept his station at Lampsacus;\nand, at their return from this idle bravado, spent the rest of the day\nwithout order or discipline, or keeping any look-out, from an affected\ncontempt of the enemy. Alcibiades, who was at that time in the\nneighbourhood, and thoroughly sensible of their danger, came and\ninformed them of the inconveniences of the place where their fleet then\nlay, and the absurdity of suffering their men to go ashore and ramble\nabout the country. He assured them too, that Lysander was an experienced\nand vigilant enemy, who knew how to make the most of every advantage:\nbut they, vain of their new power, despised his advice, and treated him\nwith the utmost rudeness. Tydeus, in particular, ordered him to be gone,\nand told him insolently, that not he, but they were now commanders, and\nknew best what to do. The event happened as Alcibiades had foreseen.\nLysander attacked them unexpectedly whilst they lay in their usual\ndisorder, and gained so complete a victory, that of all their fleet\neight vessels alone escaped, which fled at the first onset. The able\nSpartan, who knew as well how to make use of, as to gain, a victory,\nsoon after compelled Athens itself to surrender at discretion. As soon\nas he was master of the city,[139] he burnt all their shipping, placed a\ngarrison in their citadel, and demolished the rest of their\nfortifications. When he had thus reduced them to a state of absolute\nsubjection, he abolished their constitution, and left them to the mercy\nof thirty governors of his own choosing, well known in history by the\nappellation of the Thirty Tyrants.\n\nThis tyranny, though of very short duration, was to the last degree\ninhuman. The tyrants sacrificed all whom they suspected to their fear,\nand all who were rich to their avarice. The carnage was so great, that,\naccording to Xenophon,[140] the thirty put more Athenians to death in\neight months only, than had fallen in battle, against the whole force of\nthe Peloponnesians, during ten years of the war. But the publick virtue\nof Thrasybulus[141] could not bear to see his country enslaved by such\ninhuman monsters: collecting therefore about seventy determined\ncitizens, who, like him, had fled to Thebes for refuge, he first seized\nupon Phyle,[142] a strong fort near Athens; and, strengthened by the\naccession of fresh numbers, which flocked in to him from every side, he\ngot possession of the Pyr\u00e6um.[143] The thirty tyrants endeavoured to\nretake it, but were repulsed, and Critias[144] and Hippomachus, two of\ntheir number, slain in the attempt. The people now, weary of the\ntyrants,[145] drove them out of the city, and chose ten magistrates, one\nout of each tribe, to supply their places. The tyrants applied to their\nfriend Lysander, who sailed and invested the Pyr\u00e6um, and reduced\nThrasybulus, and his party, to an extreme want of necessaries, for they\nwere yet confined to the Pyr\u00e6um, as the people, though they had deposed\nthe tyrants, yet refused to receive them into the city; but\nPausanias,[146] one of the kings of Sparta, who commanded the land\nforces in this expedition, jealous of the reputation which that great\nman had acquired, gained over two of the ephori, who accompanied him,\nand granted peace to the Athenians notwithstanding all the opposition of\nLysander. Pausanias returned to Sparta with his army, and the\ntyrants,[147] despairing of assistance, began to hire foreign troops,\nand were determined to re-establish themselves by force in that power of\nwhich they had been so lately deprived. But Thrasybulus, informed of\ntheir design, marched out with all his forces, and, drawing them to a\nparley, punished them with that death their crimes so justly merited.\nAfter the execution of the tyrants, Thrasybulus proclaimed a general act\nof indemnity and oblivion, and by that salutary measure restored peace\nand liberty to his country without further bloodshed.\n\nThe conclusion of the Peloponnesian war may properly be termed the\nperiod of the Athenian grandeur; for though, by the assistance of the\nPersians, they made some figure after that time, yet it was of but short\nduration. The manners of the people were greatly degenerated, and the\nextreme scarcity of virtuous characters, so visible in their subsequent\nhistory, marks at once the progress and the degree of their degeneracy.\nConon, who escaped with eight ships only when they were so totally\ndefeated by Lysander, had convinced the Persian monarch how much his\ninterest was concerned in supporting the Athenians, and obtained the\ncommand of a powerful armament in their favour. Whilst the artful\nTithraustus,[148] general of the Persian forces in Asia, raised a\nstrong confederacy against the Spartans by properly distributing large\nsums amongst the leading men of the Grecian republicks. Conon[149]\ntotally defeated the Spartan fleet commanded by Pisander, and, by the\nhelp of the Persian money, rebuilt[150] the strong walls and other\nfortifications of Athens, which Lysander had demolished. The\nSpartans,[151] jealous of the rising power of the Athenians who seemed\nto aspire at recovering their former grandeur, made such advantageous\noffers to the Persians by their admiral Antalcidas, that they once more\ndrew them over to their party. Conon[152] was recalled and imprisoned\nupon the suggestions of Antalcidas, that he had embezzled the money\nallotted for the re-establishment of Athens, and was no friend to the\nPersian interest. The Athenians now sent Thrasybulus, their great\ndeliverer, with a fleet of forty sail to annoy the Spartans: he reduced\nseveral cities which had revolted to the enemy, but was slain by the\nRhodians in an unsuccessful attempt upon their island. Conon,[153]\naccording to Justin, was executed at Susa by the Persians. Xenophon, who\nlived at the same time, is silent as to his death; but, whatever might\nbe his fate, it is certain he is no more mentioned in history. After the\ndeath of these two great men we meet with none but Chabrias, Iphicrates,\nand Timotheus, the son of Conon, whose characters are worthy of our\nnotice, until the time of Demosthenes and Phocion. The martial spirit of\nthe Athenians subsided in proportion as luxury and corruption gained\nground amongst them. The love of ease, and a most insatiable fondness\nfor diversions, now took place of those generous sentiments which before\nknew no other object but the liberty and glory of their country. If we\ntrace the rise of publick virtue up to its first source, and show the\ndifferent effects arising from the prevailing influence of the different\nruling passions, we may justly account for the fatal and amazing change\nin that once glorious republick. A short digression therefore, on that\nsubject, may perhaps be neither unuseful nor unentertaining.\n\nOf all human passions, ambition may prove the most useful, or the most\ndestructive to a people. The ...\n\n   _... Digito ... monstrari et dicier hic est_;[154]\n\nthe fondness for admiration and applause seems coeval with man, and\naccompanies us from the cradle to the grave. Every man pants after\ndistinction, and even in this world affects a kind of immortality. When\nthis love of admiration and applause is the only end proposed by\nambition, it then becomes a primary passion; all the other passions are\ncompelled to be subservient, and will be wholly employed on the means\nconducive to that end. But whether this passion for fame, this eagerness\nafter that imaginary life, which exists only in the breath of other\npeople, be laudable or criminal, useful or frivolous, must be determined\nby the means employed, which will always be directed to whatever happens\nto be the reigning object of applause. Upon this principle, however the\nmeans may differ, the end will be still the same; from the hero down to\nthe boxer in the bear-garden; from the legislator who new-models a\nstate, down to the humbler genius who strikes out the newest cut for a\ncoat-sleeve. For it was the same principle directing to the same end,\nwhich impelled Erostratus to set fire to the temple of Diana, and\nAlexander to set the world in a flame so quickly after.\n\nThere is no mark which so surely indicates the reigning manners of a\npeople at different periods, as that quality or turn of mind, which\nhappens to be the reigning object of publick applause. For as the\nreigning object of applause will necessarily constitute the leading\nfashion, and as the leading fashion always takes rise among the great or\nleading people; if the object of applause be praiseworthy, the example\nof the great will have a due influence upon the inferior classes; if\nfrivolous or vicious, the whole body of the people will take the same\ncast, and be quickly infected by the contagion. There cannot, therefore,\nbe a more certain criterion, by which we may form our judgment of the\nnational virtue or national degeneracy of any people, in any period of\ntheir existence, than from those characters, which are the most\ndistinguished in every period of their respective histories. To analyze\nthese remarkable characters, to investigate the end proposed by all\ntheir actions, which opens to us all their secret springs; and to\ndevelop the means employed for the acquisition of that end, is not only\nthe most entertaining, but, in my opinion, by much the most useful, part\nof history. For as the reigning object of applause arises from the\nprevailing manners of a people, it will necessarily be the reigning\nobject of desire, and continue to influence the manners of succeeding\ngenerations, until it is opposed, and gradually gives way to some new\nobject. Consequently the prevailing manners of any people may be\ninvestigated without much difficulty, in my opinion, if we attend to the\nincrease or decrease of good or bad characters, as recorded in any\nperiod of their history; because the greater number will generally\nendeavour to distinguish themselves by whatever happens at that time to\nbe the reigning object of applause. Hence too we may observe the\nprogressive order, in which the manners of any people prepared the way\nfor every remarkable mutation in their government. For no essential\nmutation can ever be effected in any government (unless by the violence\nof external force) until the prevailing manners of the people are ripe\nfor such a change. Consequently, as like causes will ever produce like\neffects; when we observe the same similarity of manners prevailing\namongst our own people, with that which preceded the last fatal mutation\nof government in any other free nation; we may, at such a time, give a\nshrewd guess at the approaching fate of our constitution and country.\nThus in the infancy and rise of the Grecian republicks, when necessity\nof self-defence had given a manly and warlike turn to the temper of the\npeople, and the continuance of the same necessity had fixed it into a\nhabit, the love of their country soon became the reigning object of\npublick applause. As this reigning object consequently became the chief\nobject of desire to every one who was ambitious of publick applause, it\nquickly grew to be the fashion. The whole people in those states glowed\nwith the generous principle of publick virtue to the highest degree of\nenthusiasm. Wealth had then no charms, and all the bewitching pleasures\nof luxury were unknown, or despised. And those brave people courted and\nembraced toils, danger, and even death itself, with the greatest ardour,\nin pursuit of this darling object of their universal wishes. Every man\nplanned, toiled, and bled, not for himself, but for his country. Hence\nthe produce of those ages was a race of patriot statesmen and real\nheroes. This generous principle gave rise to those seminaries of manly\nbravery and heroick emulation, the Olympick, Isthmian, and other publick\ngames. To obtain the victory at those scenes of publick glory was\nesteemed the utmost summit of human felicity, a wreath of wild olive,\nlaurel or parsley (the victor\u2019s prize) that _palma nobilis_, as Horace\nterms it, which\n\n   _Terrarum dominos evehit ad Deos_,\n\nwas infinitely more the object of emulation in those generous times,\nthan coronets and garters are of modern ambition. Let me add too, that\nas the former were invariably the reward of merit only, they reflected a\nvery different lustre upon the wearer. The honours acquired at these\ngames quickly became the darling themes of the poets, and the charms of\nmusick were called in to give additional graces to poetry. Panegyrick\nswelled with the most nervous strokes of eloquence, and decked up with\nall the flowers of rhetorick, was joined to the fidelity and dignity of\nhistory; whilst the canvass glowing with mimick life, and the animated\nmarble contributed all the powers of art to perpetuate the memory of the\nvictors. These were the noble incentives, which fired the Grecian youth\nwith the glorious emulation of treading in the steps of those\npublick-spirited heroes, who were the first institutors of these\ncelebrated games. Hence that refined taste for arts and sciences arose\nin Greece, and produced those masterpieces of every kind, the\ninimitable remains of which not only charm, but raise the justest\nadmiration of the present times.\n\nThis taste raised a new object of applause, and at last supplanted the\nparents which gave it birth. Poetry, eloquence, and musick became\nequally the subjects of emulation at the publick games, were allotted\ntheir respective crowns, and opened a new road to fame and immortality.\nFame was the end proposed and hoped for by all; and those who despaired\nof attaining it by the rugged and dangerous paths of honour, struck into\nthe new and flowery road,[155] which was quickly crowded with the\nservile herd of imitators. Monarchs turned poets,[156] and great men,\nfiddlers; and money was employed to bias the judges at the publick games\nto crown wretched verses and bungling performers with the wreaths\nappropriated only to superior merit. This taste prevailed more or less\nin every state of Greece (Sparta alone excepted) according to the\ndifferent turn of genius of each people; but it obtained the most ready\nadmission at Athens, which quickly became the chief seat of the muses\nand graces.\n\nThus a new object of applause introducing a new taste, produced that\nfatal alteration in the manners of the Athenians, which became a\nconcurrent cause of the ruin of their republick. For though the manners\nof the Athenians grew more polite, yet they grew more corrupt, and\npublick virtue ceased gradually to be the object of publick applause and\npublick emulation. As dramatick poetry affected most the taste of the\nAthenians; the ambition of excelling in that species of poetry was so\nviolent, that \u00c6schylus died with grief, because in a publick contention\nwith Sophocles the prize was adjudged to his antagonist.[157] But though\nwe owe the finest pieces of that kind now extant to that prevailing\ntaste, yet it introduced such a rage for theatrical entertainments as\nfatally contributed to the ruin of the republick.\n\nJustin informs us that the publick virtue of Athens declined immediately\nafter the death of Epaminondas.[158] No longer awed by the virtue of\nthat great man, which had been a perpetual spur to their ambition, they\nsunk into a lethargy of effeminate indolence. The publick revenues\nappropriated for the service of the fleet and army were squandered in\npublick festivals and publick entertainments. The stage was the chief\nobject of the publick concern, and the theatres were crowded whilst the\ncamp was a desert. Who trod the stage with the greatest dignity, or who\nexcelled most in the conduct of the drama; not who was the ablest\ngeneral, or most experienced admiral, was the object of the publick\nresearch and publick applause. Military virtue and the science of war\nwere held cheap, and poets and players engrossed those honours due only\nto the patriot and the hero; whilst the hard-earned pay of the soldier\nand the sailor was employed in corrupting the indolent pleasure-taking\ncitizen. The fatal consequence of this degeneracy of manners, as Justin\nassures, was this: that the able Philip, taking advantage of the\nindolence and effeminacy of the Athenians, who before took the lead in\ndefence of the liberty of Greece, drew his beggarly kingdom of Macedon\nout of its primitive obscurity, and at last reduced all Greece under the\nyoke of servitude. Plutarch, in his inquiry whether the Athenians were\nmore eminent in the arts of war or in the arts of peace, severely\ncensures their insatiable fondness for diversions.[159] He asserts, that\nthe money idly thrown away upon the representation of the tragedies of\nSophocles and Euripides alone, amounted to a much greater sum than had\nbeen expended in all their wars against the Persians, in defence of\ntheir liberty and common safety. That judicious philosopher and\nhistorian, to the eternal infamy of the Athenians, records a severe but\nsensible reflection of a Lacedemonian who happened to be present at\nthese diversions. The generous Spartan, trained up in a state where\npublick virtue still continued to be the object of publick applause\ncould not behold the ridiculous assiduity of the choragi, or magistrates\nwho presided at the publick shows, and the immense sums which they\nlavished in the decorations of a new tragedy, without indignation. \u201cHe\ntherefore, frankly told the Athenians, that they were highly criminal in\nwasting so much time, and giving that serious attention to trifles,\nwhich ought to be dedicated to the affairs of the publick.[160] That it\nwas still more criminal to throw away upon such bawbles as the\ndecorations of a theatre, that money which ought to be applied to the\nequipment of their fleet, or the support of their army. That diversions\nought to be treated merely as diversions, and might serve to relax the\nmind at our idle hours,[161] or when over a bottle; if any kind of\nutility could arise from such trifling pleasures. But to see the\nAthenians make the duty they owed to their country give way to their\npassion for the entertainments of the theatre, and to waste unprofitably\nthat time and money upon such frivolous diversions, which ought to be\nappropriated to the affairs and the necessities of the state, appeared\nto him to be the height of infatuation.\u201d\n\nCould we raise the venerable philosopher from the grave to take a short\nsurvey of the present manners of our own countrymen, would he not find\nthem an amazingly exact copy of those of the Athenians, in the times\nimmediately preceding their subjection to Macedon? Would he not see the\nsame series of daily and nightly diversions, adapted to the taste of\nevery class of people, from the publick breakfasting (that bane to the\ntime and industry of the tradesman) up to our modern orgies, the\nmidnight-revels of the masquerade? If he censured the Athenians for\nthrowing away so much time and attention upon the chaste and manly\nscenes of Sophocles and Euripides, what must he have thought of that\nstrange _Shakespearomania_ (as I may term it) which prevailed so lately,\nand so universally amongst all ranks and all ages? Had he inquired of\nthose multitudes who so long crowded both theatres at the representation\nof Romeo and Juliet, what were the striking beauties which so strongly\nand so repeatedly engaged their attention, could a tenth part of the\naffected admirers of that pathetick poet, have given him a more\nsatisfactory answer than, \u201cthat it was the fashion?\u201d would he not be\nconvinced that fashion was the only motive, when he saw the same people\nthronging with the same eagerness, and swallowing the ribaldry of modern\nfarce, and the buffoonery of pantomime with the same fury of applause?\nmust he not have pronounced, that they as much exceeded the Athenians in\nthoughtless levity and folly, as they sunk beneath them in taste and\njudgment? For Plutarch does not find fault with the fine taste of the\nAthenians for the noble compositions of those incomparable poets; but\nfor that excess of passion for the theatre, which, by setting up a new\nobject of applause, had almost extinguished that publick virtue, for\nwhich they had been so greatly eminent; and made them more solicitous\nabout the fate of a new tragedy, or the decision of the pretensions of\ntwo rival players, than about the fate of their country. But what idea\nmust he have of the higher class of our people, when he saw those who\nshould be foremost in a time of distress and danger, to animate the\ndrooping spirit of their countrymen by the lustre of their example,\nattentive only to the unmanning trills of an opera; a degree of\neffeminacy which would have disgraced even the women of Greece, in times\nof greatest degeneracy. If he was informed that this species of\ndiversion was so little natural to the rougher genius, as well as\nclimate of Britain, that we were obliged to purchase and fetch over the\nworst performers of Italy at the expense of vast sums; what opinion must\nhe form of our understanding? but if he was to see the insolence of\nthese hirelings, and the servile prostration of their paymasters to\nthese idols of their own making, how must such egregious folly excite\nhis contempt and indignation! In the midst of these scenes of\ndissipation, this varying round of unceasing diversions, how must he be\nastonished at the complaint of poverty, taxes, the decay of trade, and\nthe great difficulty of raising the necessary supplies for the publick\nservice, which would strike his ear from every quarter! would not his\ncensure upon our inconsistent conduct be just the same which the honest\nSpartan passed upon the infatuated Athenians? when a national militia of\nsixty thousand men only was asked for, would he not have blushed for\nthose who opposed a measure (once the support and glory of every free\nstate in Greece) and whittled it down to half the number from a\npretended principle of economy? but could his philosophick gravity\nrefrain a smile, when he saw the same people lavishing their thousands\nin subscriptions to balls, concerts, operas, and a long train of\nexpensive et c\u00e6tera\u2019s, yet so wonderous frugal in pounds, shillings, and\npence, in a measure so essential to the very safety of the nation? If\ntherefore he saw a people bending under an accumulating load of debt,\nalmost to bankruptcy, yet sinking more and more into a luxury, known in\nhis time only to the effeminate Persians, and which required the wealth\nof Persia to support it: involved in a war, unsuccessful until measures\nwere changed with ministers; yet indulging in all the pleasures of pomp\nand triumph, in the midst of national losses and national dishonour: ...\ncontracting daily fresh debts of millions, to carry on that war, yet\nidly consuming more wealth in the useless pageantry of equipage, dress,\ntable, and the almost innumerable articles of expensive luxury, than\nwould support their fleets and armies; he could not help pronouncing\nsuch a people mad past the cure of Hellebore, and self-devoted to\ndestruction.\n\nThis strange degeneracy of the Athenian manners, which Plutarch so\nseverely censures, was first introduced (as that great man informs us)\nby Pericles.[162] That ambitious man determined to supplant his rival\nCimon, who, by the _eclat_ of his victories, and the services he had\ndone the publick, was considered as the first man in Athens, and\nsupported his popularity by the distribution of a large fortune.\nPericles, greatly inferior in point of fortune, and no way able to\ncontend with him in liberality and magnificence, struck out a new method\nof gaining over the people to his party. He procured a law, by which\nevery citizen was entitled to a gratuity out of the publick money, not\nonly for attending at the courts of judicature, and assemblies of the\nstates; but even at the entertainments of the theatre, and the publick\ngames and sacrifices on their numerous days of festivity. Thus Pericles\nbought the people with their own money; a precedent which has been so\nsuccessfully followed by corrupt and ambitious statesmen in all\nsucceeding ages. To this piece of state-craft, not to superior\nabilities, late ministers owed their long reigns, which enabled them to\nreduce corruption into system.\n\nThe consequence of this corruption, as we may gather from the writings\nof Demosthenes, was, that in a few years time the Athenians were no more\nthe same people. The annual fund, appropriated to the publick service\nfor the army and navy, was wholly diverted to the support of the\ntheatre. Their officers regarding nothing but their rank and pay,\ninstead of patriots, were degenerated into mere mercenaries.[163] The\nemulation, of who should serve their country best, no longer subsisted\namongst them; but of who should obtain the most lucrative command. The\npeople tasting the sweets of corruption, and enervated by the luxury of\na city, which was one perpetual scene of festivals and diversions, grew\naverse to the toils and dangers of war, which now seemed an\ninsupportable slavery, and beneath the dignity of free citizens. The\ndefence of the state was committed to mercenary hirelings, who behaved\nso ill that their affairs were in the utmost disorder. Of all their\nleading men, Demosthenes and Phocion were alone proof against the gold\nof Macedon; the rest were Philip\u2019s known and avowed pensioners.\nDemosthenes, at this alarming juncture, laid before the people the\nambitious views of Philip, and the distressed situation of their\ncountry, with the utmost freedom. He employed all the energy and pathos\nof eloquence, to rouse them out of that lethargy of indolence and\ninattention to the publick safety, into which their own luxury, and the\nflatteries of their corrupt demagogues, had thrown them.\n\nHe demonstrated to them, that the glorious principle, which had so long\npreserved the liberty of Greece, and had enabled them to triumph over\nthe whole force and opulence of the mighty power of Persia, was that\ncommon hatred, that general detestation of corruption, which prevailed\nso universally amongst their generous forefathers.[164] That, in those\ntimes of publick virtue, to receive presents from any foreign power was\ndeemed a capital crime. That if any man should be found so shamefully\nprofligate, as to sell himself to any one, who had designs upon the\nliberty of Greece; or should endeavour to introduce corruption into his\nown country; death without mercy would have been his punishment here,\nand his memory branded with indelible and eternal infamy hereafter. That\nthe statesmen and generals of those happier times, were absolute\nstrangers to that most criminal and infamous kind of traffick; which was\ngrown so common and so universal, that honour, fame, character, the\nliberty and welfare of their country were all set to sale, and sold\npublickly by auction to the best bidder.[165] He then made use of his\nutmost art, backed with the greatest strength of reasoning, to persuade\nthe people, to give up that fund to the support of the army and navy\n(the service to which it had been originally appropriated) which from\nthe time of Pericles had been applied solely to defray the expenses of\nthe theatre. He showed next the folly and danger of confiding the\ndefence of the state to mercenary forces, who had already served them so\nill. He informed them, that their allies the Olynthians earnestly\ninsisted, that the troops sent to their assistance might no longer be\ncomposed of venal hirelings as before, but of native Athenians, animated\nwith a zeal for the glory of their country, and warm in the interest of\nthe common cause. Both these motions were opposed by the corrupt party\nwho adhered to Philip. The people were unwilling to give up that fund,\neven to the most pressing exigencies of the state, which enabled them to\ngratify their favourite passion; thus the opposition of the people\nquashed the former of these motions. But though the urgent, and repeated\nremonstrances of Demosthenes prevailed in favour of the latter, yet the\ndemagogues, who omitted no opportunity of convincing Philip, how well he\nemployed his money, took care to reduce the promised succours to a very\nsmall number, and to procure Chares, a creature of their own, to be\nplaced at the head of the expedition.[166] Small as those succours were,\nyet they did the Olynthians essential service. But as all the eloquence\nof Demosthenes could not prevail upon his countrymen to make more\nvigorous efforts, the city of Olynthus fell the year following into the\nhands of Philip by the treachery of Euthycrates and Lasthenes, two of\nthe leading citizens.[167] Philip still continued his encroachments\nupon the allies of Athens; sometimes cajoling, sometimes bullying the\nAthenians; just as he found either method most conducive to his purpose,\nin which he was punctually seconded by the corrupt demagogues. But at\nlast the joint attack which he made upon the cities of Perynthus and\nByzantium, from whose territories the Athenians drew their chief\nsupplies of corn, at once opened their eyes, and roused them from their\nindolence. They equipped a very large armament with great expedition;\nbut the Philippick faction had still influence enough with the people,\nto obtain the command of it for their friend Chares. The conduct of this\ngeneral was exactly answerable to the opinion and hopes of his friends,\nwho had procured him that employment. Chares, voluptuous, yet sordidly\navaricious; vain and assuming, yet without either courage or capacity;\nrapacious, and intent only upon enriching himself at the expense either\nof friend or foe, was refused admittance by the inhabitants of\nByzantium; who from experience were too well acquainted with his\ncharacter. Enraged at such an unexpected affront; this doughty general\nemployed his time in parading along the coasts, detested by his allies\nwhom he plundered, and despised by his enemies whom he had not the\ncourage to face. The Athenians, sensible of their folly, displaced\nChares, and gave the command to Phocion. The able and honest Phocion was\nreceived with open arms by the Byzantines, and quickly convinced his\ncountrymen, that he was more than a match for Philip. He not only drove\nthat ambitious monarch out of the territories of the allies; but\ncompelled him to retire with great loss and precipitation into his own\ndominions, where Phocion made several glorious and successful\nincursions. Philip now throwing off the masque, marched his army towards\nAthens, with a resolution to humble that people, who were the chief\nobstacle to his ambitious views. Demosthenes alone took the lead upon\nthis occasion, and persuaded his countrymen to join the Thebans with all\nthe force they could raise, and make head against the invader. Philip\nfinding his measures quite disconcerted by this confederacy, sent an\nembassy to Athens to propose terms of peace, and to profess his desire\nof living in amity with the Athenians. Phocion, anxious about the\nsuccess of a war, which he knew his countrymen had not virtue enough to\nsupport, and where the loss of a single battle must be fatal to the\nstate, pleaded strongly for pacifick measures. But the flaming zeal of\nDemosthenes prevailed. Phocion was not only insulted, but excluded from\nall share in the command of the army by the infatuated people. Chares,\nso notorious for his cowardice and incapacity, who (as Diodorus Siculus\ninforms us[168]) knew no more the duty of a general than the meanest\nprivate soldier in the army, and one Lysicles, a man of daring courage,\nbut rash and ignorant, were appointed commanders in chief. As\nDemosthenes had pushed on the people to this war, and was at that time\nat the head of affairs, this fatal step must be entirely attributed to\nhis private pique at Phocion for opposing his measures. Phocion had more\nthan once beaten Philip with much inferior forces, and was indisputably\nthe ablest general of the age, and the only man whom Philip was afraid\nof. The conduct therefore of Demosthenes was so rash and weak in the\nmanagement of this war,[169] that Plutarch resolves the whole into a\ncertain divine fatality; which, in the circumvolution of mundane\naffairs, had limited the freedom of Greece to that particular point of\ntime. The battle of Ch\u00e6ronea, which ensued quickly after, gave the\nAthenians a too fatal proof of the superior foresight and sagacity of\nPhocion, and their own superlative folly in the choice of their\ngenerals. The battle was fought with equal bravery and obstinacy on both\nsides, and the confederates behaved as well as men could do upon the\noccasion; but their defeat was owing entirely to the incapacity of the\nAthenian commanders. This was so apparent,[170] that Philip observing a\ncapital blunder committed by Lysicles in the heat of the action,[171]\nturned about coolly, and remarked to his officers, \u201cthat the Athenians\nknew not how to conquer.\u201d This fault in point of generalship quickly\nturned the scale in favour of the abler Philip, who knew his trade too\nwell to let slip so material an advantage. The Athenians were totally\nrouted, and that fatal day put a period to the liberty and independency\nof Greece.[172]\n\nThus fell the Athenians, and their fall involved the rest of Greece in\none common ruin. The decadence of this once glorious and free state was\nbegun by Pericles, who first introduced venality amongst the people for\nthe support of luxury; continued by the venal orators, who encouraged\nthat corruption to maintain their influence over the people; but\nfinished by that fatal disunion between the only two men, whose publick\nvirtue and abilities could have saved their country from destruction.\n\nAthens, however, by her fall, has left us some instructions highly\nuseful for our present conduct. Warned by her fate we may learn ... that\nthe most effectual method which a bad minister can take, to tame the\nspirit of a brave and free people, and to melt them down to slavery, is\nto promote luxury, and encourage and diffuse a taste for publick\ndiversions ... that luxury, and a prevailing fondness for publick\ndiversions, are the never-failing forerunners of universal idleness,\neffeminacy, and corruption ... that there cannot be a more certain\nsymptom of the approaching ruin of a state than when a firm adherence\nto party is fixed upon as the only test of merit, and all the\nqualifications requisite to a right discharge of every employment, are\nreduced to that single standard ... that these evils take root, and\nspread by almost imperceptible degrees in time of peace and national\naffluence; but, if left to their full and natural effects without\ncontroul, they will inevitably undermine and destroy the most\nflourishing and best founded constitution ... that in times of peace and\naffluence, luxury, and a fondness for diversions, will assume the\nspecious names of politeness, taste, and magnificence. Corruption will\nput on different masks. In the corruptors it will be termed able\nmanagement, encouraging the friends of the administration, and cementing\na mutual harmony, and mutual dependence between the three different\nestates of the government.[173] In the corrupted it will be denominated\nloyalty, attachment to the government, and prudence in providing for\none\u2019s own family. That in such times these evils will gain a fresh\naccession of strength from their very effects; because corruption will\noccasion a greater circulation of the publick money; and the dissipation\nof luxury, by promoting trade,[174] will gild over private vices with\nthe plausible appearance of publick benefits ... that when a state so\ncircumstanced, is forced into a war with any formidable power, then, and\nnot until then, these baleful evils will show themselves in their true\ncolours, and produce their proper effects. The counsels in such a state\nwill be weak and pusillanimous, because the able and honest citizens,\nwho aim solely at the publick welfare, will be excluded from all share\nin the government from party motives ... their measures will terminate\nin poor shifts, and temporary expedients, calculated only to amuse, or\ndivert the attention of the people from prying too closely into their\niniquitous conduct. Their fleets and armies will be either employed in\nuseless parade, or will miscarry in action from the incapacity of their\ncommanders, because, as all the chief posts will be filled up with the\ncreatures of the prevailing faction, such officers will be more intent\nupon enriching themselves than annoying the enemy; and will act as shall\nbe judged most conducive to the private interest of their party, not to\nthe publick service of their country. For they will naturally imagine,\nthat the same power, which placed them in the command, will have weight\nenough to screen them from the resentment of an injured people ... their\nsupplies for the extraordinary expenses of the war will be raised with\ndifficulty; ... because, as so great a part of the publick money will be\nabsorbed by the number of pensions and lucrative employments, and\ndiverted to other purposes of corruption, the funds destined for the\npublick service will be found greatly deficient. If the rich are\napplied to, in such depraved times, to contribute their superfluous\nwealth towards the publick expenses, their answer will be the same which\nScopas the rich Thessalian made to a friend, who asked him for a piece\nof furniture, which he judged wholly useless to the possessor, because\nit was quite superfluous.[175] \u201cYou mistake, my friend; the supreme\nhappiness of our lives consists in those things which you call\nsuperfluous, not in those things which you call necessaries.\u201d The\npeople, accustomed to sell themselves to the best bidder, will look upon\nthe wages of corruption as their birthright, and will necessarily rise\nin their demands, in proportion as luxury, like other fashions, descends\nfrom the higher to the lower classes. Heavy and unequal taxes must\nconsequently be imposed to make up this deficiency; and the operations\nof the war must either be retarded by the slowness in collecting the\nproduce, or the money must be borrowed at high interest and excessive\npremiums, and the publick given up a prey to the extortion of usurers.\nIf a venal and luxurious Demades should be at the head of the ruling\nparty,[176] such an administration would hardly find credit sufficient\nto support their measures, as the moneyed men would be averse to\ntrusting their property in such rapacious hands;[177] for the chain of\nself-interest, which links such a set of men together, will reach from\nthe highest quite down to the lowest officer of the state; because the\nhigher officers, for the mutual support of the whole, must connive at\nthe frauds and rapines of the inferior, or screen them if detected.\n\nIf therefore the united voice of a people, exhausted by the oppressions\nof a weak and iniquitous administration, should call a truly\ndisinterested patriot to the helm, such a man must be exposed to all the\nmalice of detected villany, backed by the whole weight of disappointed\nfaction. Plutarch has handed down to us a striking instance of this\ntruth in the case of Aristides, which is too remarkable to be omitted.\n\nWhen Aristides was created qu\u00e6stor, or high treasurer of Athens, he\nfairly laid before the Athenians what immense sums the publick had been\nrobbed of by their former treasurers,[178] but especially by\nThemistocles, whom he proved to be more criminal than any of the others.\nThis warm and honest remonstrance produced such a powerful coalition\nbetween these publick plunderers, that when Aristides, at the expiration\nof his office, (which was annual and elective) came to give up his\naccompts to the people, Themistocles publickly impeached him of the same\ncrime, and, by the artifice of his corrupt party, procured him to be\ncondemned and fined; but the honester, and more respectable part of the\ncitizens highly resenting such an infamous method of proceeding, not\nonly acquitted Aristides honourably, and remitted his fine, but, to show\ntheir approbation of his conduct, elected him treasurer for the\nfollowing year. At his entrance upon his office the second time, he\naffected to appear sensible of his former error, and, by winking at the\nfrauds of the inferior officers, and neglecting to scrutinize into their\naccompts, he suffered them to plunder with impunity. These state-leeches\nthus gorged with the publick money, grew so extremely fond of Aristides,\nthat they employed all their interest to persuade the people to elect\nhim a third time to that important office. On the day of election, when\nthe voices of the Athenians were unanimous in his favour, this real\npatriot stood up with honest indignation, and gave the people this\nsevere, but just reprimand. \u201cWhen,\u201d says he, \u201cI discharged my duty in\nthis office the first time, with that zeal and fidelity which every\nhonest man owes to his country, I was vilified, insulted, and condemned.\nNow I have given full liberty to all these robbers of the publick here\npresent to pilfer, and prey upon your finances at pleasure, I am, it\nseems, a most upright minister, and a most worthy citizen. Believe me, O\nAthenians! I am more ashamed of the honour, which you have so\nunanimously conferred upon me this day, than of that unjust sentence\nwhich you passed upon me with so much infamy the year before. But it\ngives me the utmost concern, upon your account, when I see that it is\neasier to merit your favour and applause by flattering, and conniving at\nthe rogueries of a pack of villains, than by a frugal and uncorrupt\nadministration of the publick revenues.\u201d He then disclosed all the\nfrauds and thefts, which had been committed that year in the treasury,\nwhich he had privately minuted down for that purpose. The consequence\nwas, that all those, who just before had been so loud in his praise,\nwere struck dumb with shame and confusion; but he himself received those\nhigh encomiums, which he had so justly merited, from every honest\ncitizen. It is evident from this whole passage, as related by Plutarch,\nthat Aristides might have made his own fortune, at the expense of the\npublick, with the same ease, and to as great a degree, as any of his\npredecessors had done before, or any ministers in modern states have\ndone since. For the rest of the officers, who seemed to think their\nchief duty consisted in making the most of their places, showed\nthemselves extremely ready to conceal the speculation of their chief,\nbecause it gave them a right to claim the same indulgence from him in\nreturn. A remark not restricted to the Athenians alone, but equally\napplicable to every corrupt administration under every government.\nHistory, both ancient and modern, will furnish us with numerous\ninstances of this truth, and posterity will probably make the same\nremark, when the genuine history of some late administrations shall see\nthe light in a future age.\n\nIf the Athenians were so corrupt in the time when Aristides lived, ought\nwe to wonder at that amazing height to which that corruption arrived in\nthe time of Demosthenes, when left to its full effects for so long a\nterm of years? Could the state of Athens at that time have been\npreserved by human means; the indefatigable zeal of Demosthenes, joined\nto the strict economy, the inflexible integrity, and superior abilities\nof Phocion, might have raised her once more to her ancient lustre. But\nthe event showed, that luxury, corruption and faction, the causes of her\nruin, had taken too deep root in the very vitals of the republick. The\nGrecian history indeed affords us ever memorable instances of republicks\nbending under the yoke of foreign or domestick oppression, yet freed and\nrestored to their former liberty and dignity by the courage and virtue\nof some eminent patriot-citizen. But if we reflect upon the means, by\nwhich these great events were so successfully conducted, we shall always\nfind, that there yet remained in the people a fund of publick virtue\nsufficient to support their chiefs in those arduous enterprises. The\nspirit of liberty in a free people may be cramped and pressed down by\nexternal violence; but can scarce ever be totally extinguished.\nOppression will only increase its elastick force, and when roused to\naction by some daring chief, it will break out, like fired gunpowder,\nwith irresistible impetuosity. We have no occasion to look back to\nantiquity for convincing proofs of this most important truth. Our own\nhistory is but one continued scene of alternate struggles between\nencroaching princes, aiming at absolute power, and a brave people\nresolutely determined to vindicate their freedom. The genius of liberty\nhas hitherto rose superior in all those conflicts, and acquired strength\nfrom opposition. May it continue to prevail to the end of time! The\nUnited Provinces are a striking proof that the spirit of liberty, when\nanimated and conducted by publick virtue, is invincible. Whilst under\nthe dominion of the house of Austria, they were little better than a\npoor assemblage of fishing towns and villages. But the virtue of one\ngreat man not only enabled them to throw off that inhuman yoke, but to\nmake a respectable figure amongst the first powers in Europe. All the\ndifferent states in Europe, founded by our Gothic ancestors, were\noriginally free. Liberty was as truly their birthright as it is ours,\nand though they have been wormed out of it by fraud, or robbed of it by\nviolence, yet their inherent right to it still subsists, though the\nexercise of that right is superseded, and restrained by force. Hence no\ndespotick government can ever subsist without the support of that\ninstrument of tyranny and oppression, a standing army. For all illegal\npower must ever be supported by the same means by which it was at first\nacquired. France was not broke into the yoke of slavery until the\ninfamous administrations of Richelieu and Mazarin. But though loyalty\nand zeal for the glory of their prince seem to form the characteristick\nof the French nation, yet the late glorious stand against the arbitrary\nimpositions of the crown, which will immortalize the parliament of\nParis, proves that they submit to their chains with reluctance. Luxury\nis the real bane of publick virtue, and consequently of liberty, which\ngradually sinks in proportion as the manners of a people are softened\nand corrupted. Whenever, therefore, this essential spirit, as I may term\nit, of a free nation is totally dissipated, the people become a mere\n_caput mortuum_, a dead inert mass, incapable of resuscitation, and\nready to receive the deepest impressions of slavery. Thus the publick\nvirtue of Thrasybulus, Pelopidas, and Epaminondas, Philop\u0153men, Aratus,\nDion, &c. restored their respective states to freedom and power, because\nthough liberty was suppressed, yet the spirit of it still remained, and\nacquired new vigour from oppression. Phocion and Demosthenes failed,\nbecause corruption had extinguished publick virtue, and luxury had\nchanged the spirit of liberty into licentiousness and servility.\n\nThat luxury and corruption, encouraged and propagated by a most\nabandoned faction, have made an alarming progress in our nation, is a\ntruth too evident to be denied. The effects have been too sensibly felt\nduring the course of the late and present wars, which, until the last\ncampaign, were the most expensive, and the least successful of any we\never yet engaged in. But a late signal change must convince our enemies,\nthat we have a fund of publick virtue still remaining capable of\nvindicating our just rights, and raising us out of that calamitous\nsituation, into which we were plunged, under some late administrations.\nWhen the publick imagined the helm in the hands of corruption,\npusillanimity and ignorance, they transferred it to a virtuous citizen,\npossessed, in their opinion, of the zeal and eloquence of Demosthenes,\njoined to the publick economy, incorrupt honesty, and immovable\nfortitude of Aristides and Phocion. The numerous disinterested marks of\napprobation, so lately given from every part of this kingdom,\ndemonstrate the resolution and ability of the publick to support that\nminister, as long as he pursues his upright plan of conduct with\nundeviating firmness.\n\nFrom the time of Phocion, the Athenian history affords little more than\na detail of scandalous decrees, and despicable instances of the levity\nand servile adulation of that abject people.[179] Reduced at last to a\nprovince of the Romans, Athens contributed her taste for arts and\nsciences towards polishing, and her passion for theatrical performances\ntowards corrupting the manners of that warlike people.\n\n  [48] Vita Solon, p. 85. lit. D.\n\n  [49] The time of the first institution of this court (so\n  denominated from \u1f0c\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03ac\u03b3\u03bf\u03c2, i. e. Hill of Mars, an eminence\n  where they always assembled) is quite uncertain; nor are the\n  historians at all agreed about the number of the members of\n  which it was composed. However this was the supreme court,\n  which had cognizance of wilful murders, and all matters which\n  were of the greatest consequence to the republick. Suidas. They\n  had also cognizance of all matters of religion, as we find by\n  the instance of St. Paul.\n\n  [50] Plut. 85. lit. A.\n\n  [51] Plut. in Vit. Solon, p. 86. lit. C.\n\n  [52] Plut. in Vit. Solon, p. 81. lit. B.\n\n  [53] Plut. in Vit. Solon, p. 88. lit. D.\n\n  [54] The new Senate, which he had instituted.\n\n  [55] Which he had revived. Vide note p. 76.\n\n  [56] Ibid. p. 87. lit. E.\n\n  [57] Ibid. p. 81. lit. A.\n\n  [58] Ibid. p. 81.\n\n  [59] Solon in his letter to Epimenides, says 400, which seems\n  most probable. Diog. Laert.\n\n  [60] Thucyd.\n\n  [61] Thucid. lib. 6. p. 415. sect. 60.\n\n  [62] Xenoph. de Republ. Athen. p. 55. Edit. Luvenel. Bas. 1572.\n\n  [63] Miltiades, Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, Thucydides the\n  historian, &c.\n\n  [64] Socrates, Phocion, &c.\n\n  [65] Thucyd. edit. Duker. lib. 1. p. 58. sect. 88.\n\n  [66] Thucyd. lib. 1. p. 82. sect. 127, 128.\n\n  [67] Thucyd. lib. 2. p. 98. sect. 2, 3, 4, et sequent.\n\n  [68] Thucyd. lib. 2. p. 101, &c. sect. 6.\n\n  [69] Thucyd. \u03a0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f34\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f21 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74 \u03b4\u03b9\u1f70 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03be\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n  \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03bf\u03c4\u03b9\u03bc\u03af\u03b1\u03bd. lib. 3. p. 218. sect. 82.\n\n  [70] \u03a4\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c3\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u2019 \u1f00\u03bc\u03c6\u03bf\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f22 \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\n  \u03be\u03c5\u03bd\u03b7\u03b3\u03c9\u03bd\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf, \u1f22 \u03c6\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c6\u03b8\u03b5\u03af\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf Thucyd. p.\n  219.\n\n  [71] Thucyd. lib. 1 p. 91. sect. 140.\n\n  [72] Thucyd. lib. 2. p. 127. sect. 47. et seq.\n\n  [73] Plut. in Vit. Pericl. p. 171. lit. E.\n\n  [74] Plut. in Vit. Nic. p. 524. lit. B.\n\n  [75] Hence, as Plutarch informs us, it was termed the Nician\n  peace, lib. 5.\n\n  [76] Plut. in Vit. Alcib. p. 203. lit. B.\n\n  [77] Plut. Vit. Alcib. p. 197. lit. C.\n\n  [78] Thucyd. lib. 5. p. 339. sect. 35, 42.\n\n  [79] Thucyd. lib. 5. p. 350. sect. 52.\n\n  [80] Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 383. sect. 8.\n\n  [81] Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 381. sect. 6.\n\n  [82] Plut. in Vita Alcibid. Item. Thucyd. in orat. Alcib. ad\n  Laced\u00e6m. lib. 6. p. 436. sect. 90.\n\n  [83] Thucyd. lib. 6. 395, 396. sect. 28, 29.\n\n  [84] Thucyd. The terms were statues of Mercury, placed at the\n  doors of their houses, made of square stones of a cubical form.\n\n  [85] A similar measure was taken in the latter end of queen\n  Anne\u2019s reign.\n\n  [86] Plut. in Vit. Alcib. p. 200. lit. D.\n\n  [87] Thucyd. lib. 6. 395. sect. 28.\n\n  [88] Thucyd. ibid.\n\n  [89] Thucyd. ibid. sect. 29. passim.\n\n  [90] Thucyd. lib. 6. 395. sect. 23. ad finem.\n\n  [91] Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 396. sect. 31.\n\n  [92] Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 408. sect. 47, 48, 49.\n\n  [93] Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 411. sect. 53.\n\n  [94] Ibid. p. 415. sect. 60.\n\n  [95] Plut. in Vit. Alcib. p. 202.\n\n  [96] Thucyd. p. 416. sect. 60.\n\n  [97] Plut. in Vit. Alcib. p. 201. lit. C.\n\n  [98] Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 416. sect. 61.\n\n  [99] Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 416. sect. 61.\n\n  [100] Ibid.\n\n  [101] This vessel may properly be termed the Athenian\n  State-packet-boat, and was never sent out but upon very\n  extraordinary occasions. Plut.\n\n  [102] Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 417. sect. 61.\n\n  [103] Thucyd. ibid.\n\n  [104] Plut. in Vit. Alcib. p. 202.\n\n  [105] Thucyd. lib. 7. p. 505. ad finem.\n\n  [106] Thucyd. lib. 8. p. 506. &c.\n\n  [107] Thucyd. ibid. p. 507.\n\n  [108] Thucyd. ibid. p. 508. sect. 2.\n\n  [109] Thucyd. lib. 8. sect. 2....3.\n\n  [110] Thucyd. ibid. sect. 4.\n\n  [111] Plut. in Vit. Alcib. p. 203.\n\n  [112] Thucyd. lib. 8. p. 531. sect. 45.\n\n  [113] Thucyd. ibid. sect. 46.\n\n  [114] Thucyd. ibid. p. 531. sect. 45.\n\n  [115] Thucyd. ibid. sect. 47.\n\n  [116] Thucyd. ibid. sect. 48.\n\n  [117] Thucyd. ibid. sect. 49.\n\n  [118] Thucyd. ibid. sect. 53.\n\n  [119] Thucyd. ibid. sect. 54.\n\n  [120] Thucyd. ibid. sect. 56.\n\n  [121] Thucyd. ibid. 66.\n\n  [122] Thucyd. ibid. 67.\n\n  [123] Thucyd. ibid. 68.\n\n  [124] Thucyd. ibid. 69.\n\n  [125] Solon\u2019s new senate of four hundred.\n\n  [126] Thucyd. ibid. 70.\n\n  [127] Thucyd. lib. 8. p. 543, sect. 65.\n\n  [128] Thucyd. lib. 8. p. 551. sect. 76.\n\n  [129] Thucyd. ibid. p. 553. sect. 81.\n\n  [130] Thucyd. ibid. p. 567. sect. 97.\n\n  [131] Plut. in Vit. Alcib. p. 206.\n\n  [132] Plut. ibid. p. 207, 208.\n\n  [133] Plut. ibid. p. 209.\n\n  [134] Ibid. p. 211.\n\n  [135] The son of Thrason; the other of that name is called by\n  Thucydides, the son of Lycus. Thucyd. lib. 8. p. 549. sect. 75.\n\n  [136] A city in Thrace.\n\n  [137] Thucyd. lib. 6. p. 387. sect. 15.\n\n  [138] Plut. in Vit. Alcib. p. 211-212.\n\n  [139] Plut. in Vit. Lysand. p. 441.\n\n  [140] \u03a4\u03c1\u03b9\u03ac\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c0\u03bb\u03ae\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c0\u03b5\u03ba\u03c4\u03cc\u03bd\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f08\u03b8\u03b7\u03bd\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f40\u03ba\u03c4\u1f7c \u03bc\u03b7\u03c3\u1f76\u03bd, \u1f22\n  \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03a0\u03b5\u03bb\u03bf\u03c0\u03cc\u03bd\u03bd\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03ad\u03ba\u03b1 \u1f14\u03c4\u03b7 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b5\u03bc\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2. Xenoph. Hellenic.\n  lib. 2. p. 370. Edit. Lewencl. Basil.\n\n  [141] Most probably the son of Lycus, mentioned by Thucydides,\n  who had so great a share in deposing the Four Hundred, and\n  restoring the ancient constitution.\n\n  [142] Xenoph. ibid. p. 367.\n\n  [143] Xenoph. ibid. p. 368.\n\n  [144] Xenoph. ibid. 370.\n\n  [145] Xenoph. ibid. 371.\n\n  [146] Xenoph. ibid. 372.-373.\n\n  [147] Xenoph. ibid. p. 375.\n\n  [148] Xenoph. lib. 3. p. 392.\n\n  [149] Xenoph. lib. 4. p. 404.\n\n  [150] Ibid. p. 420.\n\n  [151] Ibid.\n\n  [152] Ibid. 421.\n\n  [153] Justin. in Vit. Conon.\n\n  [154] Persius, sat. 1.\n\n  [155] Lucian, p. 328. Edit. Bourdel. 1615.\n\n  [156] Dionysius the tyrant of Syracuse.\n\n  Diodor. Sicul. lib. 14. p. 318, 319.\n\n  [157] Plut. in Vit. Cim. p. 483.\n\n  [158] Justin. p. 67. Edit. Elziv.\n\n  [159] Plut. de Glor. Athen. p. 349. Vol. 2.\n\n  [160] Plut. Symposiac. p. 710.\n\n  [161] \u1f18\u03bd \u03c0\u03cc\u03c4\u1ff3 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bd\u03ad\u03c3\u03b5\u03b9.\n\n  [162] Plut. in Vit. Pericl. p. 156.\n\n  [163] Plut. in Vit. Phocion, p. 744. Item Demos. Olynth. 2. p.\n  25. Edit. Wolf. 1604.\n\n  [164] Demost. Orat. in Philip. 3. p. 86, 92.\n\n  [165] Demost. ibid.\n\n  [166] Plut. in Vit. Phocion, p. 747.\n\n  [167] Diodor. Sicul. lib. 16. p. 450.\n\n  [168] Diodor. Sicul. lib. 16. p. 476.\n\n  [169] Plut. in Vit. Demost. p. 854.\n\n  [170] Poly\u00e6n. Stratagem, lib. 4. c. 3. p. 311.\n\n  [171] Poly\u00e6nus calls this general Stratocles.\n\n  [172] Hic dies univers\u00e6 Greci\u00e6 et gloriam dominationis, et\n  vetustissimam libertatem finivit. Justin. lib. 9. p. 79. Edit.\n  Elziv.\n\n  [173] Thus Demades termed the gratuities given to the people\n  out of the publick money, the glue or cement of the different\n  parts of the republick. Plut. Qu\u00e6st. Platon. p. 1011.\n\n  [174] Fable of the bees.\n\n  [175] \u1f08\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03c3\u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u1f21\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f50\u03b4\u03b1\u03af\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b1\u03ba\u03ac\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2\n  \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b9\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u2019 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f10\u03ba\u03b5\u03af\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2. Plut. de Cupidit.\n  p. 527.\n\n  [176] Demades, according to Plutarch, by the dissoluteness of\n  his life, and conduct in the administration, shipwrecked the\n  Athenian republick. Plut. in Vit. Phocion, p. 741.\n\n  [177] Plut. Apotheg. p. 188.\n\n  [178] Plut. in Vit. Aristid. p. 320.\n\n  [179] Plut. in Vit. Demet. p. 893 ... 94 ... 900.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nOF THEBES.\n\n\nThe accounts of the earlier ages of this ancient republick are so\nenveloped in fable, that we must rather apply for them to the poets than\nto the historians. Pausanias gives us a list of sixteen kings of this\ncountry, down from Cadmus inclusive, who evidently belong to the\nfabulous times of the heroes.[180] He seems indeed to acknowledge as\nmuch, since he confesses, that as he could find no better account of\ntheir origin, he was obliged to take up with fable.[181] After the death\nof Xanthus,[182] the last of those kings, the Thebans, as the same\nauthor relates, disgusted at monarchy, changed the form of their\ngovernment into a republick. But it is in vain to search for the cause,\nor manner how this revolution was effected either in Pausanias, or any\nother historian. All we can learn of the Thebans or B\u0153otians from\nhistory,[183] is, that they were remarkable for their dulness and\nstupidity, even to a proverb,[184] that, until the time of Pelopidas and\nEpaminondas, they made as poor a figure in the art of war as in the\nsciences: that their form of government was democratick, and that, as\nusually happens in that kind of government, they were divided into\nfactions.\n\nAfter the famous peace of Antalcidas, by which the honour and true\ninterest of Greece was sacrificed to the ambition of the Spartans,\nwhatever state refused to come into their measures, was condemned to\nfeel the effects of their resentment. They had compelled the Thebans to\naccede to that treaty, though it deprived them of the dominion over\nB\u0153otia; and afterwards, by the perfidy of the aristocratick faction, got\npossession of their citadel, and reduced them to a state of absolute\nsubjection. This was the wretched state of the Thebans, until they were\ndelivered both from foreign and domestick slavery, and raised to a\nheight of power superior to every other state of Greece by the virtue of\nPelopidas and Epaminondas. I have selected therefore this revolution as\nthe most interesting, and most worthy of our attention; because it\nexhibits a convincing proof, that a brave and warlike people are not the\nproduce of any particular spot,[185] but are the growth of every place\nand country, where the natives are trained up in a true sense of shame\nat mean and base actions, and inspired with that manly courage which\narises from the emulation after what is just and honourable. And that\nthose who are taught to dread infamy more than the greatest dangers,\nprove the most invincible, and the most formidable to an enemy. It\ninstructs us too, that the most depressed, and most abject state may be\nextricated from the calamities of oppression, and raised to superior\ndignity and lustre by a very small number of virtuous patriots, whilst\nthe spirit of liberty yet remains, and the people second the efforts of\ntheir leaders with unanimity and vigour.\n\nThe Thebans, by a fatal error in politicks, had chosen Ismenias and\nLeontidas, who were at that time heads of two opposite parties, their\nsupreme annual magistrates. Ismenias was a steady assertor of the\nliberty and just rights of the people, and laboured to preserve a due\nbalance in the powers of the constitution. Leontidas wanted to engross\nthe whole power into his own hands, and to govern, by a small, but\nselect number of his own creatures. It was impossible for union and\nharmony to subsist between two men, who had views so diametrically\nopposite. Leontidas therefore, who found his party the weakest,\nbargained by a private convention with Ph\u00e6bidas, the Spartan general, to\ndeliver up his country to the Laced\u00e6monians upon condition that the\ngovernment should be lodged in himself, and such as he should think\nproper to intrust. The agreement was made, and Leontidas conveyed\nPh\u00e6bidas with a strong body of troops into the citadel, at a time when\nthe poor Thebans, wholly unapprehensive of any danger from the Spartans,\nwith whom they had lately concluded a peace, were celebrating a publick\nreligious festival. Leontidas, now sole governor, gave an immediate\nloose to his passions. He seized his colleague Ismenias, and, by the\nassistance of the Spartans, procured him to be tried, condemned and\nexecuted, for caballing against the state. A pretence however stale, yet\nconstantly urged by every iniquitous administration against all who have\nthe resolution to oppose their measures. The party of Ismenias, upon the\nfirst news of the imprisonment of their chief, fled the city, and were\nafterwards banished by a publick decree. A strong proof of the fatal\nlengths a faction will run, which is composed of those profligate\nwretches whose sole aim is their own private emolument! Yet such a\nfaction, in all free states, when once luxury and corruption are\nintroduced, is generally the most numerous, and most prevalent. Athens,\nnot long before, had been betrayed to the Spartans in the same manner,\nand on the same infamous terms by a detestable faction, composed of the\nmost abandoned of her citizens, and groaned under the same species of\ntyranny until she was freed by the great Thrasybulus. And, I believe, we\nhave not yet forgot the strong apprehensions we were lately under, that\na certain free state, upon the continent, was on the point of being sold\nto a powerful neighbour by a similar faction, and by a like iniquitous\ncontract. We must remember too, after what manner that scheme was\ndefeated by the glorious efforts of patriotism and publick spirit. I\nshall make no apology for this digression, because I thought the remark\ntoo apposite to be omitted.\n\nThe honest citizens, who had fled Athens, enraged to see their country\nthus tricked out of her liberty, and groaning under the most ignominious\nservitude, determined to set her free, or perish in so glorious an\nattempt. The scheme was well concerted, and as boldly executed by\nPelopidas, who entering the city with a small number of the most\nresolute of his party in disguise, destroyed Leontidas and his colleague\nArchias, with the most dangerous of his faction; and, by the assistance\nof Epaminondas and his friends,[186] with the additional aid of a large\nbody of Athenians, recovered the citadel. The Spartans,[187] at the\nfirst news of this surprising event, entered the Theban territories with\na powerful army to take vengeance of the authors of this rebellion, as\nthey termed it, and to reduce Thebes to its former subjection. The\nAthenians, conscious of their own weakness, and the mighty power of\nSparta, which they were by no means able to cope with, not only\nrenounced all friendship with the Thebans, but proceeded with the utmost\nseverity against such of their citizens as favoured that people. Thus\nthe Thebans, deserted by their allies, and destitute of friends,\nappeared to the rest of Greece as devoted to inevitable destruction. In\nthis desperate situation of affairs, the virtue and abilities of these\ntwo great men shone forth with greater lustre. They began by training\ntheir countrymen to the use of arms as well as the shortness of the time\nwould permit, and inspiring them with a hatred of servitude, and the\ngenerous resolution of dying in defence of the liberty and glory of\ntheir country. As they judged it imprudent to hazard a decisive battle\nagainst the best troops in the world, with their new raised militia,\nthey harrassed the Spartans with daily skirmishes to instruct their men\nin military discipline, and the trade of war. By this method they\nanimated the minds of their people with the love of glory, and inured\ntheir bodies to the fatigues of war by exercise and labour, whilst they\nacquired experience and courage by those frequent encounters. Thus, as\nPlutarch remarks, when these able generals, by never engaging rashly,\nbut watching every favourable opportunity, had fleshed the Thebans, like\nyoung stag-hounds, upon their enemies, and rendered them staunch by\ntasting the sweets of victory, and bringing them off in safety, they\nmade them fond of the sport, and eager after the most arduous\nenterprises. By this able management they defeated the Spartans at\nPlatea and Thespia,[188] where they killed Ph\u00e6bidas who had before so\ntreacherously surprised their citadel, and again routed them at\nTenagra, the Spartan general himself falling by the hand of Pelopidas.\nFlushed with this success, the Thebans feared no enemy, however superior\nin number; and the battle of Tegyra soon after raised the reputation of\ntheir arms to a degree unknown before.[189] In this action the brave\nPelopidas, with a small body of horse, and no more than three hundred\nfoot, broke through, and dispersed a body of Spartans consisting of\nabove three times that number, made a terrible slaughter of the enemy,\nkilled both their generals upon the spot, took the spoils of the dead,\nraised a trophy on the field of battle, and brought his little army home\nin triumph. Here the astonished Greeks first saw the Spartans defeated\nby a much inferior number, and by an enemy too whom they had always held\nin the greatest contempt. They had never, until that time, been beaten\nby equal, and rarely by much superior numbers, and, until that fatal\nday, were justly reputed invincible. But this action was only the\nprelude to that decisive stroke at Leuctra, which gave a fatal turn to\nthe Spartan affairs, and stripped them of that dominion which they had\nso long exercised over the rest of Greece. For this series of success,\nthough it greatly elated the Thebans, yet rather enraged than\ndiscouraged the Spartans. The Athenians, jealous of the growing power of\nThebes, struck up a peace with their ancient rivals, in which all the\nGrecian states were included, except the Thebans, who were given up a\nsacrifice to the Spartan vengeance. Cleombrotus, joint king with\nAgesilaus, entered B\u0153otia with the largest, and finest army the Spartans\nhad ever sent into the field. The great Epaminondas engaged them at\nLeuctra with a body of six thousand Thebans, which scarce equalled a\nthird part of their enemies, but the admirable disposition he made,\njoined to the skill and dexterity of Pelopidas, and the bravery of their\ntroops supplied the defect of numbers. Cleombrotus was slain on the\nspot, his army totally routed, and the greatest slaughter made of the\nnative Spartans that had ever happened until that day, with the loss\nonly of three hundred Thebans. Diodorus Siculus gives a concise account\nof this action in these remarkable words,[190] \u201cthat Epaminondas, being\nreduced to the necessity of engaging the whole confederate force of the\nLaced\u00e6monians, and their allies, with only a handful of his city\nmilitia, gained so complete a victory over those hitherto invincible\nwarriors, that he slew their king Cleombrotus, and cut off the Spartan\ndivision, which was opposed to him, almost to a man.\u201d\n\nThis victory gave so happy a turn to the affairs of the Thebans, that\ntheir alliance was now as much courted as before it had been despised\nand shunned. The Arcadians applied to them for succours against the\nSpartans. Epaminondas and Pelopidas were sent with a powerful army to\ntheir assistance. At the head of the joint forces these two great men\nentered Laconia, and appeared with a hostile army at the gates of\nSparta. The first sight of that kind ever seen by that haughty people.\nThe masterly conduct of Agesilaus, and the desperate valour of the\nSpartans saved the city, but could not prevent the ravage of their\nterritories by the two Theban generals, who restored the Messenians to\ntheir kingdom, of which the Spartans had deprived them near three\nhundred years before, defeated the Athenians, who came to the assistance\nof the Spartans, and returned home with glory.\n\nThe Theban arms were now so terrible, and their power grown so\nformidable, that whilst some states applied to them for protection, and\nothers for assistance, the Macedonians referred the disputes about the\nsuccession to that crown to their decision, and gave hostages as a\nsecurity that they would abide by their determination. The chief of\nthese hostages was the famous Philip, father of Alexander the Great, who\nemployed his time so well, under those two able masters, in the art of\nwar, that from them he acquired that military knowledge which proved\nafterwards so fatal to all Greece in general. Thus the publick virtue of\ntwo private citizens not only restored Thebes to her former liberty,\nbut raised her to a much more respectable rank than she had ever held\nbefore amongst the Grecian republicks.\n\nBut this eminent, and newly acquired degree of power was but of short\nduration. Pelopidas had freed the Thessalians from the insults of\nAlexander the Pherean; but going to him afterwards, accompanied only by\nIsmenias, to compose some differences, he was not only unjustly made\nprisoner, but treated with the most spiteful cruelty by that perfidious\ntyrant. The Thebans, enraged at this treacherous act, sent an army\nagainst the tyrant, under the command of two new generals, who returned\nwith loss and dishonour. The command was again committed to Epaminondas,\nwho, by the terror of his name alone, brought the tyrant to reason, and\nprocured the release of his friend Pelopidas and Ismenias. But the\ntyrant soon after renewing his usual depredations upon the Thessalians,\nPelopidas was once more sent with forces to their assistance. The two\narmies came soon to action, when Pelopidas, blinded by resentment, and\neager after revenge, rushed into the right wing, where the tyrant\ncommanded in person, and fell, covered with wounds, in the midst of his\nsurrounding enemies. His death however was not unrevenged, for his\ntroops, quite furious at the loss of a general they so much revered and\nloved, routed the enemy, and sacrificed three thousand of them to his\n_manes_.\n\nThough the death of this truly great man was an irretrievable loss to\nThebes, yet Epaminondas still survived, and whilst he lived, the good\nfortune and power of his country remained unaltered. But new\ndisturbances breaking out not long after, Epaminondas, at the head of\nhis Thebans, broke again into Peloponnesus, eluded the vigilance of\nAgesilaus, and advanced into the very suburbs of Sparta. But as they had\njust before received intelligence of his approach by a messenger from\nAgesilaus, they were so well prepared for his reception, that he judged\nproper to retire, and, in his return, fell unexpectedly upon the\nSpartans and their allies at Mantinea. The disposition of his forces\nupon this occasion is esteemed a masterpiece of generalship; nor was his\nvalour inferior to his conduct. He routed and made a terrible slaughter\nof the Spartans, but, pushing on too eagerly to complete his victory, he\nreceived a mortal wound in his breast, and was carried to his tent. As\nsoon as he recovered his speech, and was satisfied that his shield was\nsafe, and the Thebans were victors, he ordered the broken part of the\nweapon to be drawn out of his wound, and died rejoicing at the good\nfortune of his country. Thus fell the incomparable Epaminondas, who, as\nPolybius observes, overcame his enemies, but was overcome by\nfortune.[191] The same judicious historian,[192] in his remarks on the\ndifferent constitutions of the ancient republicks, observes, \u201cthat the\nflourishing state of the Thebans was but of short duration, nor was\ntheir decay gradual, because their sudden rise was not founded on right\nprinciples. He affirms that the Thebans took the opportunity of\nattacking the Spartans when the imprudence and haughtiness of that\npeople had made them quite odious to their allies; and that they had\nacquired amongst the Greeks their high reputation for valour by the\nvirtue and abilities of one or two great men, who knew how to make the\nbest use of those unexpected incidents, which so fortunately offered. He\nadds, that the sudden change in their affairs made it quickly appear to\nall, that their remarkable success was not owing to the system of their\ngovernment, but to the publick virtue of those who were at the head of\nthe administration. For that the power and grandeur of the Thebans\narose, flourished, and fell with Epaminondas and Pelopidas is too\nevident, he says, to be denied. Whence he concludes, that the splendid\nfigure the Thebans at that time made in the world must not be ascribed\nto their civil polity, but to those two great men only.\u201d I have hitherto\nconsidered them only in the light of virtuous citizens, and able\ngenerals; perhaps a short sketch of their characters as\npatriot-statesmen may not be unacceptable nor uninstructing.\n\nPelopidas and Epaminondas were both descended from ancient and worthy\nfamilies. Pelopidas inherited a large fortune, which he enjoyed with\nhonour to himself and utility to his friends, and by avoiding the two\nextremes of avarice and dissipation, showed that he was the master of,\nnot the slave to riches. The patrimony of Epaminondas on the contrary\nwas extremely small, yet equal to his utmost wants or desires. Devoted\nwholly to the sciences and the study of history and philosophy, which\nmend the heart, whilst they instruct the head, he preferred the sweets\nof retirement and study to a life of pleasure and ostentation. He\navoided all lucrative employments and state honours, with as much\nassiduity, as they were courted and intrigued for by others: nor did he\naccept of the highest office in the state, until he was called to it by\nthe united cry of the people, and the exigencies of the publick. When\ndragged out of his retirement, and placed by force, as it were, at the\nhead of affairs, he convinced his countrymen, as Justin informs us, that\nhe was fully equal to the task, and seemed rather to give lustre to,\nthan receive any from the dignity of his employment.[193] He excelled in\nthe art of speaking, and was the most consummate orator of his time;\npersuasion hung upon his tongue, and he was the master of the passions\nof his auditors by his eloquence, and of his own by philosophy. With\nthis truly great man Pelopidas was joined as colleague, who, when he\ncould not prevail upon his friend Epaminondas to share the enjoyment of\nhis own fortune with him, copied him in the humble virtues of private\nlife. Thus both became the admiration of their countrymen for their\ntemperance and moderation, as well as their plainness in dress; and\nfrugality at their table. But the most striking part of their character,\nwas that unexampled union and perfect harmony which subsisted between\nthese two great men, and ended only with their lives. They filled at one\nand the same time the two highest posts in the state. The whole\nmanagement of publick affairs was intrusted to their conduct, and all\nbusiness passed through their hands. Yet during all that time, no latent\nspark of envy, jealousy or ambition, no private or selfish views or\ndifference of sentiments (the fatal, but too general sources of disunion\namongst statesmen) could in the least affect their friendship, or ever\nmake any impression upon an union, which was founded upon the immovable\nbasis of publick virtue. Animated, as Plutarch observes, and directing\nall their actions by this principle only, they had no other in view but\nthat of the publick; and instead of enriching or aggrandizing their own\nfamilies, the only emulation between them was, which should contribute\nmost to the advancement of the dignity and happiness of his country. To\ncrown all, they both died gloriously in defence of that independency,\nwhich they had acquired and preserved to the state, and left the Thebans\nfree, great, and flourishing.\n\nIt is natural to think, that men of such superior merit, and so\neminently disinterested, could never possibly be the objects of party\nresentment. Yet we are assured in history, that they were frequently\npersecuted by a virulent faction composed of the selfish, those leeches\nwhom these two virtuous men prevented from fattening upon the blood of\nthe publick, and of the envious, from that strong antipathy which bad\nmen naturally bear to the good.[194] For envy, that passion of low\nuncultivated minds, has a greater share in party opposition than we are\napt to imagine. A truth of which we have strong proof in that celebrated\npassage, recorded by Plutarch,[195] between Aristides and the Athenian\ncountrymen. Though the virtue of these great men triumphed over all the\nmalicious efforts of these domestick enemies; yet they had power enough\nat one time to impeach and bring them both to a publick trial for a\nbreach of formality relative to their office, though that very act had\nenabled them to render the most signal services to their country.[196]\nThey were tried however, but honourably acquitted. At another time,\nwhilst Pelopidas was detained prisoner by Alexander the Pherean, this\nmalignant faction had weight enough to exclude Epaminondas from the\noffice of polemarque or general, and to procure for two of their\nfriends, the command of that army which was sent to punish the tyrant\nfor his treachery. But the new generals made such wretched work of it,\nwhen they came to face the enemy, that the whole army was quickly thrown\ninto the utmost confusion, and compelled for their own preservation, to\nput Epaminondas at their head, who was present at the action only as a\nvolunteer: for the malice of his enemies had excluded him from the least\nshadow of trust or power. This able man, by a _man\u0153uvre_ peculiar to\nhimself, extricated the Theban troops out of those difficulties in which\nthe ignorance and incapacity of their generals had involved them,\nrepulsed the enemy, and by a fine retreat brought the army safe to\nThebes. His countrymen, now sensible of their error, and how greatly\nthey had been imposed upon by the faction, immediately recalled him to\nthe highest offices in the state, which he continued to execute until\nhis death, with the greatest honour to himself, and emolument, as well\nas glory, to his country. As the management of publick affairs, after\nthe death of these two illustrious patriots fell by the intrigues of\nfaction, into the hands of men of a quite different character, we need\nnot wonder that the Thebans sunk alike in power and reputation until\nThebes itself was totally destroyed by Alexander the Great, and their\ncountry, with the rest of Greece, swallowed up at last by the insatiable\nambition of the Romans.\n\n  [180] Pausan, Grec. Descript. lib. 9. c. 5 p. 718. Edit.\n  Ketchnii.\n\n  [181] \u039f\u1f50 \u03b3\u03ac\u03c1 \u03c4\u03b9 \u1f20\u03b4\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03bc\u03b7\u03bd \u1f10\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03c5\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u1f15\u03c0\u03bf\u03bc\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03bc\u03cd\u03b8\u1ff3.\n  Id. Ibid.\n\n  [182] Ibid. p. 723\n\n  [183] Thebes was the capital of B\u0153otia.\n\n  [184] B\u0153otum in crasso jurares aere natum. Hor. epis. 1. lib.\n  2. lin. 244.\n\n  [185] Plut. in Vit. Pelopid. p. 287.\n\n  [186] Diodor. Sicul. lib. 15. p. 470.\n\n  [187] Plut. in Vit. Pelop. p. 284. et sequent.\n\n  [188] Plut. in Vit. Pelop. p. 285.\n\n  [189] Id. p. 286, 287.\n\n  [190] \u0394\u03b9\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03b1\u03b3\u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03b5\u1f76\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bb\u03af\u03b3\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2, &c. Diodor.\n  Sicul. lib. 15. p. 477. Edit. Henr. Stephani.\n\n  [191] Polyb. Comparat. Epaminond. et Hannib. lib. 9. p. 762.\n\n  [192] Id. lib. 6. p. 678....79.\n\n  [193] Justin. lib. 6. p. 74.\n\n  [194] Plutarch, Justin, Corn. Nepos.\n\n  [195] When Aristides had acquired the surname of Just he became\n  the object of the Athenian envy, and the Ostracism was demanded\n  against him. Whilst the people were preparing their shells, a\n  country voter, who could neither read nor write, brought his\n  shell to Aristides, and desired him to write the name of\n  Aristides upon it. Aristides, not a little surprised at his\n  request, asked him what injury that Aristides had done him. Me!\n  none, replied the fellow, for I do not so much as know the man\n  by sight, but it galls me to the soul to hear him every where\n  called the Just.... Plut. in Vit. Aristid. p. 322, 323.\n\n  [196] They kept the field and attacked Sparta, when the time of\n  their office was near expired, by which means they were in\n  office more than the regular time.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nOF CARTHAGE.\n\n\nOf all the free states whose memory is preserved to us in history,\nCarthage bears the nearest resemblance to Britain, both in her commerce,\nopulence, sovereignty of the sea, and her method of carrying on her land\nwars by foreign mercenaries. If to these we add the vicinity of the\nCarthaginians to the Romans, the most formidable and most rapacious\npeople at that time in Europe, and the specifick difference, as I may\nterm it, of the respective military force of each nation, the situation\nof Carthage with respect to Rome, seems greatly analogous to that of\nBritain with respect to France, at least for this last century.\nConsequently, the dreadful fate of that republick, once the most\nflourishing state in the universe, and the most formidable rival Rome\never had to cope with, must merit our highest attention at this\njuncture: both as the greatness of her power arose from, and was\nsupported by commerce, and as she owed her ruin more to her own\nintestine divisions, than to the arms of the Romans.\n\nWe know very little of this opulent and powerful people until the time\nof the first Punick war. For as not one of their own historians has\nreached our times, we have no accounts of them but what are transmitted\nto us by their enemies. Such writers consequently deserve little credit,\nas well from their ignorance of the Carthaginian constitution, as their\ninveterate prejudice against that great people. Hence it is that we know\nso little of their laws, and have but an imperfect idea of their\nconstitutional form of government.\n\nThe government of Carthage, if we may credit the judicious Aristotle,\nseems to have been founded on the wisest maxim of policy. For he\naffirms, the different branches of their legislature were so exactly\nbalanced,[197] that for the space of five hundred years, from the\ncommencement of the republick down to his time, the repose of Carthage\nhad never been disturbed by any considerable sedition, or her liberty\ninvaded by any single tyrant: the two fatal evils to which every\nrepublican government is daily liable, from the very nature of their\nconstitution. An additional proof too may be drawn from this\nconsideration, that Carthage was able to support herself upwards of\nseven hundred years in opulence and splendour in the midst of so many\npowerful enemies, and during the greater part of that time, was the\ncentre of commerce of the known world, and enjoyed the uninterrupted\nsovereignty of the sea without a rival.\n\nThe genius of the Carthaginians was warlike as well as commercial, and\naffords undeniable proof, that those qualities are by no means\nincompatible to the same people. It is almost impossible indeed to\ndiscover the real character of this great people. The Roman historians,\ntheir implacable enemies, constantly paint them in the blackest colours,\nto palliate the perfidious and merciless behaviour of their own\ncountrymen towards that unfortunate republick. A fact so notorious, that\nneither Livy, nor any other of their writers, with all their art, were\nable to conceal it. The Greek historians, whose countrymen had suffered\nso greatly by the Carthaginian arms in Sicily and all the other islands\nin the Mediterranean, betray as strong a prejudice against them as the\nRoman. Even the respectable Polybius, the only author amongst them who\ndeserves any degree of credit, is plainly partial, when he speaks of the\nCarthaginian manners. The Romans continually charge them with the want\nof publick faith, and have handed down the _Punica fides_ as a proverb.\nI shall take notice of this scandalous charge in another place, where I\nshall show how much more justly it may be retorted upon the Romans.\n\nAs the desire of gain is the chief spur to commerce, and as the greatest\nmen in Carthage never thought it beneath them to engage in that\nlucrative employment, all the historians have represented the whole body\nof the people as so insatiably fond of amassing wealth, that they\nesteemed even the lowest and dirtiest means lawful, that tended to the\nacquisition of their darling object. \u201cAmongst the Carthaginians,\u201d says\nPolybius, when he compares the manners of that people with those of the\nRomans, \u201cnothing was infamous that was attended with gain.[198] Amongst\nthe Romans nothing so infamous as bribery,[199] and to enrich themselves\nby unwarrantable means.\u201d He adds in proof of his assertion, that, \u201cat\nCarthage all the dignities, and highest employments in the state were\nopenly sold.[200] A practice, he affirms, which at Rome was a capital\ncrime.\u201d Yet but a few pages before, where he inveighs bitterly against\nthe sordid love of money, and rapacious avarice of the Cretans, he\nremarks that, \u201cthey were the only people in the world to whom no kind of\ngain appeared either infamous or unlawful.\u201d[201] In another place where\nhe censures the Greeks for aspersing Titus Flamius the Roman general, as\nif he had not been proof against the gold of Macedon, he affirms, \u201cthat\nwhilst the Romans preserved the virtuous manners of their forefathers,\nand had not yet carried their arms into foreign countries, not a single\nman of them would have been guilty of a crime of that nature.\u201d[202] But\nthough he can boldly assert, as he says, \u201cthat in his time many of the\nRomans, if taken man by man, were able to preserve he trust reposed in\nthem inviolable as to that point, yet he owns he durst not venture to\nsay the same of all.\u201d Though he speaks as modestly as he can to avoid\ngiving offence, yet this hint is sufficient to convince us, that\ncorruption was neither new nor uncommon at that time amongst the Romans.\nBut as I shall resume this subject in a more proper place, I shall only\nobserve from Polybius\u2019s own detail of the history of the Carthaginians,\nthat unless when the intrigues of faction prevailed, all their great\nposts were generally filled by men of the most distinguished merit.\n\nThe charge of cruelty is brought against them with a very ill grace by\nthe Romans, who treated even monarchs themselves, if they were so\nunhappy as to become their prisoners of war, with the utmost inhumanity,\nand threw them to perish in dungeons, after they had exposed them in\ntriumph to the insults of their own populace.[203]\n\nThe story indeed of Regulus has afforded a noble subject for Horace,\nwhich he has embellished with some of the most beautiful strokes of\npoetry, and that fine ode has propagated and confirmed the belief of it,\nmore perhaps than the writings of all their historians. But as neither\nPolybius nor Diodorus Siculus makes the least mention of such an event\n(though the Greeks bore an equal aversion to the Carthaginians) and as\nthe Roman writers from whom we received it, differ greatly in their\naccounts of it, I cannot help joining in opinion with many learned men,\nthat it was a Roman forgery.\n\nThe Greek writers accuse them of barbarism and a total ignorance of the\n_belles lettres_, the study of which was the reigning taste of Greece.\nRollin contemptuously affirms, that their education in general amounted\nto no more than writing and the knowledge of merchants accounts; that a\nCarthaginian philosopher would have been a prodigy amongst the learned;\nand then asks, \u201cwhat would they have thought of a geometrician or\nastronomer of that nation?\u201d Rollin seems to have put this question too\nhastily, since it is unanimously confessed; that they were the best ship\nbuilders, the ablest navigators, and the most skilful mechanicks at that\ntime in the world: that they raised abundance of magnificent structures,\nand very well understood the art of fortification; all which (especially\nas the use of the compass was then unknown) must of necessity imply a\nmore than common knowledge of astronomy, geometry, and every other\nbranch of mathematicks. Let me add too that their knowledge in\nagriculture was so eminent;[204] that the works of Mago the Carthaginian\nupon that subject were ordered to be translated by a decree of the\nsenate for the use of the Romans and their colonies.\n\nThat the education of their youth was not confined to the mercantile\npart only, must be evident from that number of great men, who make such\na figure in their history; particularly Hannibal, perhaps the greatest\ncaptain which any age has ever yet produced, and at the same time the\nmost consummate statesman, and disinterested patriot. Painting,\nsculpture, and poetry, they seem to have left to their more idle and\nmore luxurious neighbours the Greeks, and applied their wealth to the\ninfinitely nobler uses of supporting their marine, enlarging and\nprotecting their commerce and colonies. What opinion even the wiser part\nof the Romans had of these specious arts, and how unworthy they judged\nthem of the close attention of a brave and free people, we may learn\nfrom the advice which Virgil gives his countrymen by the mouth of his\nhero\u2019s father Anchises.[205] I have endeavoured here to clear the much\ninjured character of this great people from the aspersions and gross\nmisrepresentations of historians, by proofs drawn from the concessions\nand self-contradictions of the historians themselves.\n\nThe state of Carthage bears so near a resemblance to that of our own\nnation, both in their constitution (as far as we are able to judge of\nit) maritime power, commerce, party divisions, and long as well as\nbloody war which they carried on with the most powerful nation in the\nuniverse, that their history, I again repeat it, affords us, in my\njudgment, more useful rules for our present conduct than that of any\nother ancient republick. As we are engaged in a war (which was until\nvery lately unsuccessful) with an enemy, less powerful indeed, but\nequally rapacious as the Romans, and acting upon the same principles, we\nought most carefully to beware of those false steps both in war and\npolicy, which brought on the ruin of the Carthaginians. For should we be\nso unhappy as to be compelled to receive law from that haughty nation,\nwe must expect to be reduced to the same wretched situation in which the\nRomans left Carthage at the conclusion of the second Punick war. This\nisland has been hitherto the inexpugnable barrier of the liberties of\nEurope, and is as much the object of the jealousy and hatred of the\nFrench as ever Carthage was of the Romans. As they are sensible that\nnothing but the destruction of this country can open them a way to their\ngrand project of universal monarchy, we may be certain that _delenda est\nBritannia_ will be as much the popular maxim at Paris, as _delenda est\nCarthago_ was at Rome.... But I shall wave these reflections at present,\nand point out the real causes of the total ruin of that powerful\nrepublick.\n\nCarthage took its rise from a handful of distressed Tyrians who settled\nin that country by permission of the natives, like our colonies in\nAmerica, and actually paid a kind of rent, under the name of tribute,\nfor the very ground on which their city was founded. As they brought\nwith them the commercial genius of their mother country they soon\narrived at such a state of opulence by their frugality and indefatigable\nindustry, as occasioned the envy of their poorer neighbours. Thus\njealousy on the one hand, and pride naturally arising from great wealth\non the other, quickly involved them in a war. The natives justly feared\nthe growing power of the Carthaginians, and the latter feeling their own\nstrength, wanted to throw off the yoke of tribute, which they looked\nupon as dishonourable and even galling to a free people. The contest was\nby no means equal. The neighbouring princes were poor and divided by\nseparate interests, the Carthaginians were rich and united in one common\ncause. Their commerce made them masters of the sea, and their wealth\nenabled them to bribe one part of their neighbours to fight against the\nother, and thus by playing one against the other alternately, they\nreduced all at last to be their tributaries, and extended their\ndominions near two thousand miles upon that continent. It may be\nobjected that the conduct of the Carthaginians in this case was highly\ncriminal. I grant it: but if we view all those master strokes of policy,\nand all those splendid conquests which shine so much in history, in\ntheir true colours, they will appear to be nothing more than fraud and\nrobbery, gilded over with those pompous appellations. Did not every\nnation that makes a figure in history rise to empire upon the ruin of\ntheir neighbours? did not France acquire her present formidable power,\nand is she not at this time endeavouring to worm us out of our American\nsettlements by the very same means? but though the motives are not to be\njustified, yet the conduct of the Carthaginians upon these occasions,\nwill afford us some very useful and instructive lessons in our present\nsituation.\n\nIt is evident that the mighty power of these people was founded in and\nsupported by commerce, and that they owed their vast acquisitions, which\nextended down both sides of the Mediterranean quite into the main ocean,\nto a right application of the publick money, and a proper exertion of\ntheir naval force. Had they bounded their views to this single point,\nviz. the support of their commerce and colonies, they either would not\nhave given such terrible umbrage to the Romans, who, as Polybius\nobserves, could brook no equal, or might safely have bid defiance to\ntheir utmost efforts. For the immense sums which they squandered away in\nsubsidies to so many foreign princes, and to support such numerous\narmies of foreign mercenaries, which they constantly kept in pay, to\ncomplete the reduction of Spain and Sicily, would have enabled them to\ncover their coasts with such a fleet as would have secured them from any\napprehension of foreign invasions. Besides ... the Roman genius was so\nlittle turned for maritime affairs, that at the time of their first\nbreach with Carthage they were not masters of one single ship of war,\nand were such absolute strangers to the mechanism of a ship, that a\nCarthaginian galley driven by accident on their coasts gave them the\nfirst notion of a model. But the ambition of Carthage grew as her wealth\nincreased; and how difficult a task is it to set bounds to that restless\npassion! thus by grasping at too much, she lost all. It is not probable\ntherefore that the Romans would ever have attempted to disturb any of\nthe Carthaginian settlements, when the whole coast of Italy lay open to\nthe insults and depredations of so formidable a maritime power. The\nRomans felt this so sensibly in the beginning of the first Punick war,\nthat they never rested until they had acquired the superiority at sea.\nIt is evident too, that the Romans always maintained that superiority:\nfor if Hannibal could possibly have passed by sea into Italy, so able a\ngeneral would never have harrassed his troops by that long and seemingly\nimpossible march over the Alps, which cost him above half his army; an\nexpedition which has been, and ever will be, the wonder of all\nsucceeding ages. Nor could Scipio have landed without opposition so\nvery near the city of Carthage itself, if the maritime force of that\npeople had not been at the very lowest ebb.\n\nThe Carthaginians were certainly greatly weakened by the long\ncontinuance of their first war with the Romans, and that savage and\ndestructive war with their own mercenaries, which followed immediately\nafter. They ought therefore, in true policy, to have turned their whole\nattention, during the interval between the first and second Punick wars,\nto the re-establishment of their marine; but the conquest of Spain was\ntheir favourite object, and their finances were too much reduced to be\nsufficient for both. Thus they expended that money in carrying on a\ncontinental war, which would have put their marine on so formidable a\nfooting, as to have enabled them to regain once more the dominion of the\nsea; and the fatal event of the second Punick war convinced them of the\nfalse step they had taken, when it was too late to retrieve it.\n\nI have here pointed out one capital error of the Carthaginians as a\nmaritime power, I mean their engaging in too frequent, and too extensive\nwars on the continent of Europe, and their neglect of their marine. I\nshall now mention another, which more than once brought them to the very\nbrink of destruction. This was ... their constantly employing such a\nvast number of foreign mercenary troops, and not trusting the defence of\ntheir country, nay not even Carthage itself wholly, to their own native\nsubjects.\n\nThe Carthaginians were so entirely devoted to commerce, that they seem\nto have looked upon every native employed in their armies as a member\nlost to the community; and their wealth enabled them to buy whatever\nnumber of soldiers they pleased from their neighbouring states in Greece\nand Africa, who traded (as I may term it) in war as much as the Swiss\nand Germans do now, and were equally ready to sell the blood and lives\nof their subjects to the best bidder. From hence they drew such\ninexhaustible supplies of men, both to form and recruit their armies,\nwhilst their own natives were at leisure to follow the more lucrative\noccupations of navigation, husbandry, and mechanick trades. For the\nnumber of native Carthaginians, which we read of, in any of their\narmies, was so extremely small as to bear no proportion to that of their\nforeign mercenaries. This kind of policy, which prevails so generally in\nall mercantile states, does, I confess, at first sight appear extremely\nplausible. The Carthaginians, by this method, spared their own people,\nand purchased all their conquests by the venal blood of foreigners: and,\nin case of a defeat, they could with great ease and expedition recruit\ntheir broken armies with any number of good troops, ready trained up to\ntheir hands in military discipline. But alas, these advantages were\ngreatly over-balanced by very fatal inconveniences. The foreign troops\nwere attached to the Carthaginians by no tie, but that of their pay.\nUpon the least failure of that, or if they were not humoured in all\ntheir licentious demands, they were just as ready to turn their arms\nagainst the throats of their masters. Strangers to that heartfelt\naffection, that enthusiastick love of their country which warms the\nhearts of free citizens, and fires them with the glorious emulation of\nfighting to the last drop of blood in defence of their common mother;\nthese sordid hirelings were always ripe for mutiny and sedition, and\never ready to revolt and change sides upon the least prospect of greater\nadvantages.\n\nBut a short detail of the calamities, which they drew upon themselves by\nthis mistaken policy, will better show the dangers which attend the\nadmission of foreign mercenaries into any country, where the natives are\nunaccustomed to the use of arms. A practice which is too apt to prevail\nin commercial nations.\n\nAt the conclusion of the first Punick war the Carthaginians were\ncompelled, by their treaty with the Romans, to evacuate Sicily. Gesco\ntherefore, who then commanded in that island, to prevent the disorders\nwhich might be committed by such a multitude of desperate fellows,\ncomposed of so many different nations, and so long inured to blood and\nrapine, sent them over gradually in small bodies, that his countrymen\nmight have time to pay off their arrears, and send them home to their\nrespective countries. But either the lowness of their finances, or the\nill timed parsimony of the Carthaginians totally defeated this salutary\nmeasure,[206] though the wisest that, as their affairs were at that time\ncircumstanced, could possibly have been taken. The Carthaginians\ndeferred their payment until the arrival of the whole body, in hopes of\nobtaining some abatement in their demands by fairly laying before them\nthe necessities of the publick. But the mercenaries were deaf to every\nrepresentation and proposal of that nature. They felt their own\nstrength, and saw too plainly the weakness of their masters. As fast as\none demand was agreed to, a more unreasonable one was started; and they\nthreatened to do themselves justice by military execution if their\nexorbitant demands were not immediately complied with. At last, when\nthey were just at the point of an accommodation with their masters, by\nthe mediation and address of Gesco, two desperate ruffians, named\nSpeudius and Mathos,[207] raised such a flame amongst this unruly\nmultitude as broke out instantly into the most bloody, and destructive\nwar ever yet recorded in history. The account we have of it from the\nGreek historians must strike the most callous breast with horror; and\nthough it was at last happily terminated by the superior conduct of\nHamilcar Barcas, the father of the great Hannibal, yet it continued near\nfour years, and left the territories around Carthage a most shocking\nscene of blood and devastation. Such was, and ever will be the\nconsequence, when a large body of mercenary troops is admitted into the\nheart of a rich and fertile country, where the bulk of the people are\ndenied the use of arms by the mistaken policy of their governors. For\nthis was actually the case with the Carthaginians, where the total\ndisuse of arms amongst the lower class of people, laid that opulent\ncountry open, an easy and tempting prey to every invader. This was\nanother capital error, and consequently another cause which contributed\nto their ruin.\n\nHow must any nation but our own, which with respect to the bulk of the\npeople, lies in the same defenceless situation; how, I say, must they\ncensure the mighty state of Carthage, spreading terror, and giving law\nto the most distant nations by her powerful fleets, when they see her at\nthe same time trembling, and giving herself up for lost at the landing\nof any invader in her own territories?\n\nThe conduct of that petty prince Agathocles, affords us a striking\ninstance of the defenceless state of the territories of Carthage. The\nCarthaginians were at that very time masters of all Sicily, except the\nsingle city of Syracuse, in which they had cooped up that tyrant both\nby land and sea. Agathocles, reduced to the last extremity, struck\nperhaps the boldest stroke ever yet met with in history.[208] He was\nperfectly well acquainted with the weak side of Carthage, and knew that\nhe could meet with little opposition from a people who were strangers to\nthe use of arms, and enervated by a life of ease and plenty. On this\ndefect of their policy he founded his hopes; and the event proved that\nhe was not mistaken in his judgment. He embarked with only thirteen\nthousand men on board the few ships he had remaining, eluded the\nvigilance of the Carthaginian fleet by stratagem, landed safely in\nAfrica, plundered and ravaged that rich country up to the very gates of\nCarthage, which he closely blocked up, and reduced nearly to the\nsituation in which he had left his own Syracuse. Nothing could equal the\nterror into which the city of Carthage was thrown at that time, but the\npanick which, in the late rebellion, struck the much larger, and more\npopulous city of London, at the approach of a poor handful of\nHighlanders, as much inferior even to the small army of Agathocles in\nnumber, as they were in arms and discipline. The success of that able\nleader compelled the Carthaginians to recall part of their forces out of\nSicily to the immediate defence of Carthage itself; and this occasioned\nthe raising of the siege of Syracuse, and ended in the total defeat of\ntheir army, and death of their general in that country. Thus\nAgathocles, by this daring measure, saved his own petty state, and,\nafter a variety of good and ill fortune, concluded a treaty with the\nCarthaginians, and died at Syracuse at a time when, from a thorough\nexperience of their defenceless state at home, he was preparing for a\nfresh invasion.\n\nLivy informs us, that this very measure of Agathocles set the precedent\nwhich Scipio followed with so much success in the second Punick war,\nwhen that able general, by a similar descent in Africa, compelled the\nCarthaginians to recall Hannibal out of Italy to their immediate\nassistance, and reduced them to that impotent state, from which they\nnever afterwards were able to recover.[209] How successfully the French\nplayed the same game upon us, when they obliged us to recall our forces\nout of Flanders to crush the rebellion, which they had spirited up with\nthat very view, is a fact too recent to need any mention of particulars.\nHow lately did they drive us to the expense, and I may say the ignominy,\nof fetching over a large body of foreign mercenaries for the immediate\ndefence of this nation, which plumes herself so much upon her power and\nbravery? How greatly did they cramp all our measures, how much did they\nconfine all our military operations to our own immediate self-defence,\nand prevent us from sending sufficient succours to our colonies by the\nperpetual alarm of an invasion?\n\nThough we may in part truly ascribe the ruin of Carthage to the two\nabove-mentioned errors in their policy, yet the cause which was\nproductive of the greatest evils, and consequently the more immediate\nobject of our attention at this dangerous juncture, was party disunion;\nthat bane of every free state, from which our own country has equal\nreason to apprehend the same direful effects, as the republicks of\nGreece, Rome, and Carthage experienced formerly.\n\nBy all the lights, which we receive from history, the state of Carthage\nwas divided into two opposite factions; the Hannonian and the Barcan, so\ndenominated from the respective leaders, who were heads of the two most\npowerful families in Carthage. The Hannonian family seems to have made\nthe greatest figure in the senate; the Barcan in the field. Both were\nstrongly actuated by ambition, but ambition of a different kind. The\nBarcan family seems to have had no other object in view but the glory of\ntheir country, and were always ready to give up their private\nanimosities, and even their passion for military glory to the publick\ngood. The Hannonian family acted from quite opposite principles,\nconstantly aiming at one point; the supporting themselves in power, and\nthat only. Ever jealous of the glory acquired by the Barcan family,\nthey perpetually thwarted every measure proposed from that quarter, and\nwere equally ready to sacrifice the honour and real interest of their\ncountry to that selfish view. In short, the one family seems to have\nproduced a race of heroes, the other of ambitious statesmen.\n\nThe chiefs of these two jarring families, best known to us in history,\nwere Hanno and Hamilcar Barcas, who was succeeded by his son Hannibal,\nthat terror of the Romans. The opposition between these two parties was\nso flagrant, that Appian does not scruple to call the party of Hanno,\nthe Roman faction;[210] and that of Barcas, the popular, or the\nCarthaginian, from the different interests which each party espoused.\n\nThe first instance, which we meet with in history, of the enmity\nsubsisting between the heads of these factions, was in that destructive\nwar with the Mercenaries, from which I have made this explanatory\ndigression.\n\nHanno was first sent with a powerful, and well provided army against\nthese mutinous desperadoes; but he knew little of his trade, and made\nperpetual blunders. Polybius,[211] who treats his character, as a\nsoldier, with the utmost contempt, informs us, that he suffered himself\nto be surprised, a great part of his fine army to be cut to pieces, and\nhis camp taken, with all the military stores, engines, and all the other\napparatus of war.\n\nThe Carthaginians, terrified and distressed by the bad conduct of their\ngeneral, were now compelled, by the necessity of their affairs, to\nrestore Hamilcar to the chief command of their forces, from which he\nmust have been excluded before by the influence of the Hannonian\nfaction. That able commander with his small army (for his whole force\namounted to no more than ten thousand men) quickly changed the face of\nthe war, defeated Spendius in two pitched battles, and pushed every\nadvantage to the utmost, which the incapacity of the rebel-generals\nthrew in his way. Sensible that he was too weak alone to cope with the\nunited forces of the rebels (which amounted to seventy thousand men) he\nordered Hanno (who had still influence enough to procure himself to be\ncontinued in the command of a separate body) to join him, that they\nmight finish this execrable war by one decisive action.[212] After they\nwere joined, the Carthaginians soon felt the fatal effects of disunion\nbetween their generals. No plan could now be followed, no measure could\nbe agreed on;[213] and the disagreement between these two leading men\narose to such a height at last, that they not only let slip every\nopportunity of annoying the enemy, but gave them many advantages against\nthemselves, which they could not otherwise have hoped for. The\nCarthaginians,[214] sensible of their error, and knowing the very\ndifferent abilities of the two generals, yet willing to avoid the\nimputation of partiality, empowered the army to decide which of the two\nthey judged most proper for their general, as they were determined to\ncontinue only one of them in the command. The decision of the army\nwas,[215] that Hamilcar should take the supreme command, and that Hanno\nshould depart the camp. A convincing proof that they threw the whole\nblame of that disunion, and the ill-success, which was the consequence\nof it, entirely upon the envy and jealousy of Hanno. One Hannibal, a man\nmore tractable, and more agreeable to Hamilcar, was sent in his room.\nUnion was restored, and the happy effects which attended it were quickly\nvisible. Hamilcar now pushed on the war with his usual vigilance and\nactivity, and soon convinced the generals of the rebels how greatly he\nwas their master in the art of war. He harrassed them perpetually, and,\nlike a skilful gamester,[216] (as Polybius terms him) drew them artfully\nevery day into his snares, and obliged them to raise the siege of\nCarthage. At last he cooped up Spendius with his army in so\ndisadvantageous a place, that he reduced them to such an extremity of\nfamine as to devour one another, and compelled them to surrender at\ndiscretion, though they were upwards of forty thousand effective men....\nThe army of Hamilcar, which was much inferior to that of Spendius in\nnumber, was composed partly of mercenaries and deserters, partly of the\ncity militia, both horse and foot (troops which the enemies to the\nmilitia-bill would have called raw and undisciplined, and treated as\nuseless) of which the major part of his army consisted.[217] The rebel\narmy was composed chiefly of brave and experienced veterans, trained up\nby Hamilcar himself in Sicily during the late war with the Romans, whose\ncourage was heightened by despair. It is worthy of our observation\ntherefore, that these very men who, under the conduct of Hamilcar, had\nbeen a terror to the Romans, and given them so many blows in Sicily\ntowards the latter end of the first Punick war, should yet be so little\nable to cope with an army so much inferior in number, and composed in a\ngreat measure of city militia only, when commanded by the same general.\nPolybius,[218] who esteems Hamilcar by far the greatest captain of that\nage, observes, that though the rebels were by no means inferior to the\nCarthaginian troops in resolution and bravery, yet they were frequently\nbeaten by Hamilcar by mere dint of generalship. Upon this occasion he\ncannot help remarking the vast superiority which judicious skill and\nability of generalship has over long military practice,[219] where this\nso essentially necessary skill and judgement is wanting. It might have\nbeen thought unpardonable in me, if I had omitted this just remark of\nPolybius, since it has been so lately verified by his Prussian majesty\nin those masterly strokes of generalship, which are the present\nadmiration of Europe. Hamilcar, after the destruction of Spendius and\nhis army, immediately blocked up Mathos, with the remaining corps of the\nrebels, in the city of Tunes. Hannibal, with the forces under his\ncommand, took post on that side of the city which looked towards\nCarthage. Hamilcar prepared to make his attack on the side which was\ndirectly opposite; but the conduct of Hannibal, when left to himself,\nwas the direct contrast to that of Hamilcar, and proves undeniably, that\nthe whole merit of their former success was entirely owing to that abler\ngeneral. Hannibal, who seems to have been little acquainted with the\ntrue genius of those daring veterans, lay secure, and careless in his\ncamp, neglected his out-guards, and treated the enemy with contempt, as\na people already conquered. But Mathos observing the negligence and\nsecurity of Hannibal,[220] and well knowing that he had not Hamilcar to\ndeal with, made a sudden and resolute sally, forced Hannibal\u2019s\nintrenchments, put great numbers of his men to the sword, took Hannibal\nhimself, with several other persons of distinction prisoners, and\npillaged his camp. This daring measure was so well concerted, and\nexecuted with so much rapidity, that Mathos, who made good use of his\ntime, had done his business before Hamilcar, who lay encamped at some\ndistance, was in the least apprized of his colleague\u2019s misfortune.\nMathos fastened Hannibal, whilst alive, on the same gibbet to which\nHamilcar had lately nailed the body of Spendius: A terrible, but just\nreward for the shameful carelessness in a commanding officer, who had\nsacrificed the lives of such a number of his fellow citizens by his own\nindolence and presumptuous folly. For Mathos crucified thirty of the\nfirst nobility of Carthage, who attended Hannibal in this expedition. A\ncommander who is surprised in the night-time, though guilty of an\negregious fault, may yet plead something in excuse; but, in point of\ndiscipline, for a general to be surprised by an enemy just under his\nnose in open daylight, and caught in a state of wanton security, from an\nover-weening presumption on his own strength, is a crime of so capital a\nnature as to admit neither of alleviation nor pardon. This dreadful and\nunexpected blow threw Carthage into the utmost consternation, and\nobliged Hamilcar to draw off his part of the army to a considerable\ndistance from Tunes. Hanno had again influence enough to procure the\ncommand, which he was compelled before by the army to give up to\nHamilcar. But the Carthaginians, sensible of the fatal consequences of\ndisunion between the two generals, especially at such a desperate\ncrisis, sent thirty of the most respectable amongst the senators to\nprocure a thorough reconciliation between Hamilcar and Hanno before they\nproceeded upon any operation;[221] which they effected at last, though\nnot without difficulty. Pleased with this happy event, the Carthaginians\n(as their last, and utmost effort) sent every man in Carthage,[222] who\nwas able to bear arms, to re-enforce Hamilcar, on whose superior\nabilities they placed their whole dependance. Hamilcar now resumed his\noperations, and, as he was no longer thwarted by Hanno, soon reduced\nMathos to the necessity of putting the whole issue of the war upon one\ndecisive action, in which the Carthaginians were most completely victors\nby the exquisite disposition and conduct of Hamilcar.\n\nI hope the enemies to a militia will at least allow these new levies,\nwho composed by far the greatest part of Hamilcar\u2019s army upon this\noccasion, to be raw, undisciplined, and ignorant of the use of arms;\nepithets which they bestow so plentifully upon a militia. Yet that able\ncommander, with an army consisting chiefly of this kind of men, totally\ndestroyed an army of desperate veterans, took their general, and all who\nescaped the slaughter prisoners, and put an end to the most ruinous, and\nmost inhuman war ever yet mentioned in history. These new levies had\ncourage (a quality never yet, I believe, disputed to the British\ncommonality) and were to fight _pro aris et focis_, for whatever was\ndear and valuable to a people; and Hamilcar, who well knew how to make\nthe proper use of these dispositions of his countrymen, was master of\nthose abilities which Mathos wanted. Of such infinite advantage is it to\nan army to have a commander superior to the enemy in the art of\ngeneralship; an advantage which frequently supplies a deficiency even in\nthe goodness of troops, as well as in numbers.\n\nThe enmity of Hanno did not expire with Hamilcar, who fell gloriously in\nthe service of his country, in Spain some years after. Hannibal the\neldest son, and a son worthy of so heroick a father, immediately became\nthe object of his jealousy and hatred. For when Asdrubal (son-in-law to\nHamilcar) had been appointed to the command of the army in Spain, after\nthe death of that general, he desired that Hannibal, at that time but\ntwenty-two years of age, might be sent to Spain to be trained up under\nhim in the art of war. Hanno opposed this with the utmost virulence in a\nrancorous speech (made for him by Livy) fraught with the most infamous\ninsinuations against Asdrubal, and a strong charge of ambition against\nthe Barcan family. But his malice, and the true reason of his\nopposition, varnished over with a specious concern for the publick\nwelfare, were so easily seen through, that he was not able to carry a\npoint which he so much wished for.\n\nAsdrubal not long after being assassinated by a Gaul,[223] in revenge\nfor some injury he had received, the army immediately appointed Hannibal\nto the command; and sending advice to Carthage of what they had done,\nthe senate was assembled, who unanimously confirmed the election then\nmade by the soldiers.[224] Hannibal in a short time reduced all that\npart of Spain which lay between New Carthage and the river Iberus,\nexcept the city of Saguntum, which was in alliance with the Romans. But\nas he inherited his father\u2019s hatred to the Romans, for their infamous\nbehaviour to his country at the conclusion of the war with the\nmercenaries,[225] he made great preparations for the siege of Saguntum.\nThe Romans (according to Polybius) receiving intelligence of his\ndesign,[226] sent ambassadors to him at New Carthage, who warned him of\nthe consequences of either attacking the Saguntines, or crossing the\nIberus, which, by the treaty with Asdrubal, had been made the boundary\nof the Carthaginian and Roman dominions in that country. Hannibal\nacknowledged his resolution to proceed against Saguntum, but the reasons\nhe assigned for his conduct were so unsatisfactory to the ambassadors,\nthat they crossed over to Carthage to know the resolution of their\nsenate upon that subject. Hannibal in the mean time, according to the\nsame author,[227] sent advice to Carthage of this embassy, and desired\ninstructions how to act, complaining heavily that the Saguntines\ndepending upon their alliance with the Romans, committed frequent\ndepredations upon the Carthaginian subjects.\n\nWe may conclude that the ambassadors met with as disagreeable a\nreception from the Carthaginian senate as they had done from Hannibal,\nand that he received orders from Carthage to proceed in his intended\nexpedition. For Polybius,[228] reflecting upon some writers, who\npretended to relate what passed in the Roman senate when the news\narrived of the capture of Saguntum, and even inserted the debates which\narose when the question was put, whether, or no, war should be declared\nagainst Carthage, treats their whole accounts as absurd and fictitious.\n\u201cFor how, says he, with indignation, could it possibly be, that the\nRomans, who had denounced war the year before at Carthage, if Hannibal\nshould invade the Saguntine territories, should now after that city was\ntaken by storm assemble to deliberate, whether war should be commenced\nagainst the Carthaginians or not.\u201d Now as this declaration of war was\nconditional, and not to take place unless Hannibal should attack the\nSaguntines, it must have been made before that event happened, and\nconsequently must be referred to the embassy above-mentioned. And as\nHannibal undertook the siege of Saguntum notwithstanding the Roman\nmenaces, he undoubtedly acted by orders from the Carthaginian senate.\n\nWhen the Romans received the news of the destruction of Saguntum, they\ndispatched another embassy to Carthage (as Polybius relates) with the\nutmost expedition;[229] their orders were to insist that Hannibal and\nall who advised him to commit hostilities against the Saguntines should\nbe delivered up to the Romans, and in case of a refusal, to declare\nimmediate war. Their demand was received by the Carthaginian senate with\nthe utmost indignation, and one of the senators, who was appointed to\nspeak in the name of the rest, begun in an artful speech to recriminate\nupon the Romans, and offered to prove, that the Saguntines were not\nallied to the Romans when the peace was made between the two nations,\nand consequently could not be included in the treaty. But the Romans cut\nthe affair short, and told them that they did not come there to dispute,\nbut only to insist upon a categorical answer to this plain question:\nwhether they would give up the authors of the hostilities, which would\nconvince the world that they had no share in the destruction of\nSaguntum, but that Hannibal had done it without their authority; or,\nwhether by protecting them, they chose to confirm the Romans in the\nbelief, that Hannibal had acted with their approbation? As their demand\nof Hannibal was refused, war was declared by the Romans,[230] and\naccepted with equal alacrity and fierceness by the majority of the\nCarthaginian senate.\n\nLivy affirms that the first embassy was decreed by the Roman\nsenate,[231] but not sent until Hannibal had actually invested Saguntum,\nand varies from Polybius in his relation of the particulars. For\naccording to Livy,[232] Hannibal received intelligence of the Roman\nembassy, but he sent them word, that he had other business upon his\nhands at that time than to give audience to ambassadors, and that he\nwrote at the same time to his friends of the Barcan faction to exert\nthemselves, and prevent the other party from carrying any point in\nfavour of the Romans.\n\nThe ambassadors, thus denied admittance by Hannibal, repaired to\nCarthage and laid their demands before the senate. Upon this occasion\nLivy introduces Hanno inveighing bitterly in a formal harangue against\nthe sending Hannibal into Spain, a measure which he foretells, must\nterminate in the utter destruction of Carthage.[233] And after\ntestifying his joy for the death of his father Hamilcar, whom he\nacknowledges he most cordially hated, as he did the whole Barcan family,\nwhom he terms the fire-brands of the state, he advises them to give up\nHannibal, and make full satisfaction for the injury then done to the\nSaguntines. When Hanno had done speaking, there was no occasion, as Livy\nobserves, for a reply.[234] For almost all the senate were so entirely\nin the interest of Hannibal, that they accused Hanno of declaiming\nagainst him, with more bitterness and rancour than even the Roman\nambassadors, who were dismissed with this short answer, \u201cthat not\nHannibal, but the Saguntines, were the authors of the war, and that the\nRomans treated them with great injustice, if they preferred the\nfriendship of the Saguntines before that of their most ancient allies\nthe Carthaginians.\u201d Livy\u2019s account of the second embassy, which followed\nthe destruction of Saguntum, differs so very little from that of\nPolybius, both as to the question put by the Romans, the answer given by\nthe Carthaginian senate, and the declaration of war which was the\nconsequence, that it is needless to repeat it.[235]\n\nIf what Hanno said in the speech above-mentioned, had been his real\nsentiments from any consciousness of the superior power of the Romans,\nand the imprudence of engaging in a war of that consequence before his\ncountry had recovered her former strength, he would have acted upon\nprinciples worthy of an honest and prudent patriot. For Polybius,[236]\nafter enumerating the superior excellencies of Hannibal as a general, is\nstrongly of opinion, that if he had begun with other nations, and left\nthe Romans for his last enterprise, he would certainly have succeeded in\nwhatever he had attempted against them, but he miscarried by attacking\nthose first, whom he ought to have reserved for his last enterprise. The\nsubsequent behaviour of Hanno, during the whole time that Italy was the\nseat of war, evidently proves, that his opposition to this war proceeded\nentirely from party motives, and his personal hatred to the Barcan\nfamily, consequently is by no means to be ascribed to any regard for the\ntrue interest of his country. Appian informs us,[237] that when Fabius\nhad greatly streightened Hannibal by his cautious conduct, the\nCarthaginian general sent a pressing message to Carthage for a supply\nboth of men and money. But according to that author, he was flatly\nrefused, and could obtain neither, by the influence of his enemies, who\nwere averse to that war, and cavilled perpetually at every enterprise\nwhich Hannibal undertook. Livy,[238] in his relation of the account,\nwhich Hannibal sent to the Carthaginian senate of his glorious victory\nat Cann\u00e6 by his brother Mago, with the demand for a large re-enforcement\nof men as well as money, introduces Hanno (in a speech of his own which\nhe gives us on that occasion) strongly opposing that motion, and\npersisting still in his former sentiments in respect both to the war and\nto Hannibal. But the Carthaginians, elated with that victory, which was\nthe greatest blow the Romans ever received in the field since the\nfoundation of their republick, and thoroughly sensible (as Livy informs\nus) of the enmity which Hanno and his faction bore to the Barcan family,\nimmediately decreed a supply of forty thousand Numidians, and\ntwenty-four thousand foot and horse to be immediately levied in Spain,\nbesides elephants, and a very large sum of money. Though Hanno at that\ntime had not weight enough in the senate to prevent that decree, yet he\nhad influence enough by his intrigues to retard the supply then voted,\nand not only to get it reduced to twelve thousand foot and twenty-five\nhundred horse, but even to procure that small number to be sent to Spain\nupon a different service. That Hanno was the true cause of this cruel\ndisappointment, and the fatal consequences which attended it, is equally\nevident from the same historian. For Livy tells us,[239] \u201cthat when\norders were sent to him by the Carthaginian senate to quit Italy, and\nhasten to the immediate defence of his own country, Hannibal inveighed\nbitterly against the malice of his enemies, who now openly and avowedly\nrecalled him from Italy, out of which they had long before endeavoured\nto drag him, when they tied up his hands by constantly refusing him any\nsupply either of men or money. That Hannibal affirmed he was not\nconquered by the Romans, whom he had so often defeated, but by the\ncalumny and envy of the opposite faction in the senate. That Scipio\nwould not have so much reason to plume himself upon the ignominy of his\nreturn, as his enemy Hanno, who was so implacably bent upon the\ndestruction of the Barcan family, that since he was not able to crush it\nby any other means, he had at last accomplished it, though by the ruin\nof Carthage itself.\u201d\n\nHad that large supply been sent to Hannibal with the same unanimity and\ndespatch with which it was voted, it is more than probable, that so\nconsummate a general would have soon been master of Rome, and\ntransferred the empire of the world to Carthage. For the Romans were so\nexhausted after the terrible defeat at Cann\u00e6, that Livy is of opinion,\nthat Hannibal would have given the finishing blow to that republick, if\nhe had marched directly to Rome from the field of battle, as he was\nadvised to do by his general of horse Maherbal.[240] That many of the\nnobility upon the first news of this fatal event, were in actual\nconsultation about the means of quitting Italy, and looking out for a\nsettlement in some other part of the world, and he affirms, that the\nsafety both of the city and empire of Rome must be attributed (as it was\nthen firmly believed at Rome) to the delay of that single day only, on\nwhich Maherbal gave that advice to Hannibal. Appian confirms the\ndistressful situation of the Roman affairs at that juncture, and informs\nus, that including the slaughter at Cann\u00e6, in which the Romans had lost\nmost of their ablest officers, Hannibal had put to the sword two hundred\nand fifty thousand of their best troops in the space of two years only,\nfrom the beginning of the second Punick war inclusive.[241] It is easy,\ntherefore, to imagine how little able the Roman armies, consisting\nchiefly of new levies, would have been to face such a commander as\nHannibal, when supported by the promised re-enforcement of sixty-four\nthousand fresh men, besides money and elephants in proportion. For\nHannibal, though deprived of all supplies from Carthage by the malice of\nthe Hannonian faction, maintained his ground above fourteen years more\nafter his victory at Cann\u00e6, in spite of the utmost efforts of the\nRomans. A truth which Livy himself acknowledges with admiration and\nastonishment at his superior military capacity. From that period\ntherefore, after the battle of Cann\u00e6, when Hannibal was first\ndisappointed of the promised supplies from Carthage, we ought properly\nto date the fall of that republick, which must be wholly imputed to the\ninveterate malice of the profligate Hanno and his impious faction, who\nwere determined, as Hannibal observed before, to ruin the contrary\nparty, though by means which must be inevitably attended with the\ndestruction of their country. Appian insinuates,[242] that Hannibal\nfirst engaged in this war more from the importunity of his friends, than\neven his own passion for military glory and hereditary hatred to the\nRomans. For Hanno and his faction (as Appian tells us) no longer\ndreading the power of Hamilcar and Asdrubal his son-in-law,[243] and\nholding Hannibal extremely cheap upon account of his youth, began to\npersecute and oppress the Barcan party with so much rage and hatred,\nthat the latter were obliged by letter to implore assistance from\nHannibal, and to assure him that his own interest and safety was\ninseparable from theirs. Hannibal (as Appian adds) was conscious of the\ntruth of this remark, and well knew that the blows, which seemed\ndirected at his friends, were levelled in reality at his own head, and\njudged that a war with the Romans, which would be highly agreeable to\nthe generality of his countrymen, might prove the surest means of\ncounter-working his enemies, and preserving himself and his friends from\nthe fury of a pliant and fickle populace, already inflamed against his\nparty by the intrigues of Hanno. He concluded therefore, according to\nAppian, that a war with so formidable and dangerous a power, would\ndivert the Carthaginians from all inquiries relative to his friends, and\noblige them to attend wholly to an affair, which was of the last\nimportance to their country. Should Appian\u2019s account of the cause of\nthis war be admitted as true, it would be a yet stronger proof of the\ncalamitous effects of party disunion; though it would by no means excuse\nHannibal. For Hanno and his party would be equally culpable for driving\na man of Hannibal\u2019s abilities to such a desperate measure, purely to\nscreen himself and his party from their malice and power. But the blame\nfor not supporting Hannibal after the battle of Cann\u00e6, when such support\nwould have enabled him to crush that power, which by their means\nrecovered strength sufficient to subvert their own country, must be\nthrown entirely upon Hanno and his party. It was a crime of the blackest\ndye, and an act of the highest treason against their country, and\nanother terrible proof of the fatal effects of party disunion. Nor was\nthis evil peculiar to Carthage only, but was equally common in the Roman\nand Grecian republicks. Nay, could we trace all our publick measures up\nto their first secret springs of action, I do not doubt (notwithstanding\nthe plausible reasons which might have been given to the publick to\npalliate such measures) but we should find our own country rashly\nengaged in wars detrimental to her true interests, or obliged to submit\nto a disadvantageous peace, just as either was conducive to the private\ninterest of the prevailing party. Will not our own annals furnish us\nwith some memorable instances of the truth of this assertion too recent\nto be denied? was not the treatment which the great duke of Marlborough\nreceived from Bolingbroke, the English Hanno, parallel to that which the\nvictorious Hannibal met with from the Carthaginian, after the battle of\nCann\u00e6? did not Bolingbroke, from the worst of party motives, displace\nthat ever victorious general, desert our allies, and sacrifice the brave\nand faithful Catalans, and the city of Barcelona, in at least as\nshameful a manner as the Romans did their unhappy friends at Saguntum?\ndid not the same minister by the fatal treaty of Utrecht, rob the nation\nof all those advantages, which she had reason to hope for from a long\nand successful war? did he not by the same treaty, give our mortal enemy\nFrance time to retrieve her affairs, and recover from that low state to\nwhich the duke of Marlborough had reduced her, and even to arrive at\nthat power, at present so terrible to us and to all Europe?\n\nTo what can we attribute the late ill conducted war with Spain, but to\nthe ambition of party. How was the nation stunned with the noise of\nSpanish depredations from the press! how loudly did the same outcry\nresound in parliament! yet when the leaders of that powerful opposition\nhad carried their point by their popular clamours; when they had pushed\nthe nation into that war; when they had drove an overgrown minister from\nthe helm, and nestled themselves in power, how quickly did they turn\ntheir backs upon the honest men of their party, who refused to concur in\ntheir measures! how soon did they convince the nation, by screening that\nvery minister who had been so many years the object of their resentment,\nand by carrying on their own war (as I may term it) with the same or\ngreater lukewarmness than what they had so lately exclaimed against in\nthe same minister. They convinced, I say, the whole nation, that the\nwelfare of the publick, and the protection of our trade, had not the\nleast share in the real motives of their conduct.\n\nBut as the Carthaginian history, during this period, is intimately\nblended with the Roman, to avoid repetition, I am obliged to defer my\nfarther remarks upon the conduct of this people, until I speak of the\ndifference between the civil and military polity, and manners of both\nthose nations.\n\n  [197] Arist. de Republ. lib. 2. cap. 9. lit. 4.\n\n  [198] Polyb. lib. 6. p. 692.\n\n  [199] Id. ibid.\n\n  [200] Ibid.\n\n  [201] Polyb. lib 6. p. 681.\n\n  [202] Excerpt. ex Polyb. de virtutibus et vitiis, p. 1426.\n\n  [203] Perses, &c.\n\n  [204] Varro.\n\n  [205]\n\n      Excudent alii spirantia mollius \u00e6ra:\n    Credo equidem, vivos ducent de marmore vultus.\n\n    Virg. \u00c6neid. lib. 6.\n\n   Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento\n   (H\u00e6 tibi erunt artes) pacique imponere morem\n   Parcere subjectis, &c. Ibid.\n\n  [206] Polyb. lib. 1. p. 92...3.\n\n  [207] Polyb. p. 98...9.\n\n  [208] Diodor. Sicul. lib. 20. p. 735...36.\n\n  [209] Livy. lib. 28. p. 58...9.\n\n  [210] Appian, de Bell. Punick. p. 36.\n\n  [211] Polyb. lib. 1. p. 104....5.\n\n  [212] Polyb. lib. 1. p. 115.\n\n  [213] Ibid. lib. 1. p. 115.\n\n  [214] Polyb. lib. 1. p. 115.\n\n  [215] Idem. ibid. 117.\n\n  [216] Polyb. \u1f08\u03b3\u03b1\u03b8\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c4\u03c4\u03b5\u03c5\u03c4\u1f74\u03c2 ibid. p. 119.\n\n  [217] Id. ibid. \u03a0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f31\u03c0\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b5\u03b6\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 p. 120.\n\n  [218] Polyb. lib. 1. p. 119.\n\n  [219] Polyb. lib. 1. p. 119.\n\n  [220] Polyb. Id. ibid. p. 121.\n\n  [221] Polyb. lib. 1. p. 122.\n\n  [222] \u03a4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bf\u03af\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f21\u03bb\u03b9\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03bf\u03c0\u03bb\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 (\u03bf\u1f37\u03bf\u03bd\n  \u1f10\u03c3\u03c7\u03ac\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03c4\u03c1\u03ad\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd) \u1f10\u03be\u03b1\u03c0\u03ad\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u0392\u03ac\u03c1\u03ba\u03b1\u03bd Polyb.\n  lib. 1. p. 122.\n\n  [223] Polyb. lib. 2. p. 172.\n\n  [224] \u039c\u03b9\u1fb7 \u03b3\u03bd\u03ce\u03bc\u1fc3. Polyb. lib. 3. p. 234.\n\n  [225] This will be explained in another place.\n\n  [226] Lib. 3. p. 236.\n\n  [227] Id. ibid. p. 237.\n\n  [228] Polyb. lib. 3. 243....44.\n\n  [229] Polyb. id. ibid.\n\n  [230] Polyb. lib. 3. p. 259.\n\n  [231] Livy, lib. 21. p. 132.\n\n  [232] Ib. p. 135.\n\n  [233] Liv. lib. 21. p. 135. 36.\n\n  [234] Id. ibid.\n\n  [235] Liv. lib. 3. p. 142....43.\n\n  [236] Polyb. lib. 11. p. 888....89.\n\n  [237] Appian. de Bell. Annib. 323. Edit. Hen. Steph.\n\n  [238] Lib. 23 p. 265....66.\n\n  [239] Liv. lib. 30. p. 135.\n\n  [240] Lib. 22, p. 240.\n\n  [241] Appian. de Bell. Hannib. p. 328.\n\n  [242] Iberic. p. 259.\n\n  [243] Appian. id. ibid.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nOF ROME.\n\n\nThough there is a concurrence of several causes which bring on the ruin\nof a state, yet where luxury prevails, that parent of all our fantastick\nimaginary wants, ever craving and ever unsatisfied, we may justly assign\nit as the leading cause: since it ever was and ever will be the most\nbaneful to publick virtue. For as luxury is contagious from its very\nnature, it will gradually descend from the highest to the lowest ranks,\nuntil it has ultimately infected a whole people. The evils arising from\nluxury have not been peculiar to this or that nation, but equally fatal\nto all wherever it was admitted. Political philosophy lays this down as\na fundamental and incontestable maxim,[244] that all the most\nflourishing states owed their ruin, sooner or later, to the effects of\nluxury; and all history, from the origin of mankind, confirms this truth\nby the evidence of facts to the highest degree of demonstration. In the\ngreat despotick monarchies it produced avarice, dissipation,\nrapaciousness, oppression, perpetual factions amongst the great, whilst\neach endeavoured to engross the favour of the prince wholly to himself;\nvenality, and a contempt of all law and discipline both in the military\nand civil departments. Whilst the people, following the pernicious\nexample of their superiors, contracted such a dastardly effeminacy,\njoined to an utter inability to support the fatigues of war, as quickly\nthrew them into the hands of the first resolute invader. Thus the\nAssyrian empire sunk under the arms of Cyrus with his poor but hardy\nPersians. The extensive and opulent empire of Persia fell an easy\nconquest to Alexander and a handful of Macedonians; and the Macedonian\nempire, when enervated by the luxury of Asia, was compelled to receive\nthe yoke of the victorious Romans.\n\nLuxury, when introduced into free states, and suffered to be diffused\nwithout controul through the body of the people, was ever productive of\nthat degeneracy of manners, which extinguished publick virtue, and put a\nfinal period to liberty. For as the incessant demands of luxury quickly\ninduced necessity, that necessity kept human invention perpetually on\nthe rack to find out ways and means to supply the demands of luxury.\nHence the lower classes at first sold their suffrages in privacy and\nwith caution; but as luxury increased, and the manners of the people\ngrew daily more corrupt, they openly set them up to sale to the best\nbidder. Hence too the ambitious amongst the higher classes, whose\nsuperior wealth was frequently their only qualification, first purchased\nthe most lucrative posts in the state by this infamous kind of\ntraffick, and then maintained themselves in power by that additional\nfund for corruption, which their employments supplied, until they had\nundone those they had first corrupted.\n\nBut of all the ancient republicks, Rome in the last period of her\nfreedom was the scene where all the inordinate passions of mankind\noperated most powerfully and with the greatest latitude. There we see\nluxury, ambition, faction, pride, revenge, selfishness, a total\ndisregard to the publick good, and an universal dissoluteness of\nmanners, first make them ripe for, and then complete their destruction.\nConsequently that period, by showing us more striking examples, will\nafford us more useful lessons than any other part of their history.\n\nRome, once the mighty mistress of the universe, owed her rise, according\nto Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the most curious and most exact inquirer\ninto the Roman antiquities, to a small colony of the Albans under the\nconduct of Romulus, the supposed grandson of Numitor king of Alba. That\nthe Albans derived their origin from the Greeks seems highly probable\nfrom the nature of the Alban and Roman monarchical government, which\nappears to be plainly copied from Lycurgus.\n\nThe government first instituted by Romulus, the founder of this\nextraordinary empire, was that perfect sort, as it is termed by\nDionysius and Polybius, which consisted of a due admixture of the regal,\naristocratick, and democratick powers. As this great man received the\ncrown as a reward for his superior merit, and held it by the best of all\ntitles, the willing and unanimous choice of a free people; and as he is\nuniversally allowed to be the sole institutor of their first form of\ngovernment, I cannot help ranking him amongst the most celebrated\nlawgivers and heroes of antiquity. Romulus\u2019s plan of government, though\nformed upon the model of Lycurgus, was evidently, in some respects,\nsuperior to the Spartan. For the executive power in the Roman government\nwas lodged in one man only; the number of the senators was much greater,\nand though the whole body of the Romans was formed into one regular\nmilitia, yet the lowest class of the people were directed to apply\nthemselves to agriculture, grazing, and other lucrative employments; a\npractice wholly prohibited to the free Spartans. The great employments\nof the state were solely confined to the Patricians, or aristocratick\npart; but the Plebeians, or commonalty, had in return the power of\nchoosing magistrates, enacting laws, and determining about all wars when\nproposed by the king. But still their decrees were not final, for the\nconcurrence of the senate was absolutely necessary to give a sanction to\nwhatever the people had determined.\n\nWhether the Romans would have continued the regal power in their\nfounder\u2019s family by hereditary succession, cannot possibly be\ndetermined, because, when Romulus was put to death by the Patricians for\naiming at more power than was consistent with their limited monarchy, he\nleft no children. This however is certain, that their monarchy continued\nto be elective, and was attended with those disorders which are the\nusual effects of that capital error in politicks, until the usurpation\nof Tarquinius Superbus.\n\nAfter the death of Romulus, Numa, a man of a very different genius, was\ninvited to the throne by the unanimous consent of the whole body of the\nRomans. This worthy prince reclaimed his subjects from their savage\nfondness for war and plunder, and taught them the arts of peace, and the\nhappiness of civil and social life, by instructing them in the great\nduties of religion, or piety towards their gods, and the laws of justice\nand humanity, which contained their duty towards their fellow creatures.\nThe long reign of this wise and good prince was the most remarkable, and\nthe most happy period of time Rome ever knew from her foundation to her\ndissolution. For during the whole term of forty-three years, which was\nthe extent of his reign, the harmony of the Roman state was neither\ninterrupted by any civil dissension at home, nor the happiness of the\npeople disturbed by any foreign war or invasion. After the death of\nNuma, who died universally lamented as the father of the people, Tullus\nHostilius, a man of real merit, was legally elected king, but, after a\nvictorious reign of thirty-two years, was destroyed with his whole\nfamily by lightning, according to some authors, but, according to\nothers, was murdered by Ancus Marcius, grandson to Numa by his only\ndaughter, who looked upon his own right to the crown as prior to Tullus,\nor his family. Ancus Marcius however received the crown by a free\nelection of the people, and died a natural death after a reign of\ntwenty-four years, in which he restored such of the religious\ninstitutions of his grandfather Numa as had been neglected during the\nreign of his predecessor. He greatly enlarged the city of Rome itself,\nand made it a seaport by fortifying the haven at the mouth of the river\nTiber.\n\nLucius Tarquinius, a man of Greek extraction by his father\u2019s side, and\nadmitted to the privilege of a Roman citizen under the reign of Ancus\nMarcius, was raised to the throne for his uncommon merit, and showed\nhimself worthy of that high trust, which was reposed in him by the\nRomans. He increased the number of the senators to three hundred,\ngreatly enlarged their territories, and beautified the city; and, after\nan illustrious reign of thirty-eight years, was assassinated in his\npalace by the contrivance of the two sons of Ancus Marcius, who hoped\nafter his death to recover the kingdom, which their father had been\npossessed of. But their scheme was far from succeeding, for Tarquinius\nwas so well beloved by his people, that the persons who committed the\nmurder, were executed, and the sons of Ancus banished, and their estates\nconfiscated. Tullius Servius, who had married the daughter of\nTarquinius, succeeded to the crown by the artful management of his\nmother-in-law, and by the favour of the people, though without the\nconcurrence either of the senate or Patricians. Tullius was certainly a\nman of real merit, and, as I think, superior in point of abilities to\nall the Roman kings, Romulus alone excepted. But as he seemed to affect\na democracy, and was chiefly supported by the people, he was always\ndisagreeable to the Patricians, who looked upon his advancement to the\ncrown as an illegal intrusion. But as he did most signal services to his\ncountry, during a glorious reign of four and forty years, I cannot help\ntaking notice of some of his institutions, without the knowledge of\nwhich it is hardly possible to form a perfect idea of the Roman\nconstitution.\n\nTullius ordered all the Romans to register their names and ages, with\nthose of their parents, wives and children, and the place of their\nabode, either in the city or the country. At the same time he enjoined\nthem to give in upon oath a just valuation of their effects, on pain of\nbeing whipped and sold for slaves if they failed in registering all\nthese particulars. From this register he formed his plan for a regular\nand general militia, which was invariably followed by the Romans, until\nthe time of Marius. To effect this he divided the whole body of the\ncitizens into six classes. The first class consisted of those whose\npossessions amounted to a hundred _min\u00e6_.[245] These he armed in the\ncompletest manner, and divided into eighty centuries; forty of which,\ncomposed of the younger men, were appointed to take the field in time of\nwar; the other forty were assigned for the defence of the city. To these\neighty centuries of heavy armed foot he added eighteen centuries of\nhorse, selected out of those who had the largest estates, and were of\ndistinguished birth. Thus the first class contained ninety-eight\ncenturies. The second, third, and fourth classes consisted each of\ntwenty centuries only, and were composed of citizens, whose effects were\nestimated at seventy-five, fifty, and five and twenty _min\u00e6_; and their\narms were lighter according to their respective classes. To the second\nclass he added two centuries of armourers and axe-men. To the fourth\nclass two centuries of trumpeters and blowers on the horn, which\ncontained the martial musick of the army. The fifth class consisted of\nthose who were worth twelve _min\u00e6_ and a half, which he divided into\nthirty centuries, armed with darts and slings only, and were properly\nirregulars. The sixth class, which was by much the most numerous, was\ncomprehended in one century only, and consisted of the poorest\ncitizens, who were exempted from all kind of taxes, as well as all\nservice in the army.\n\nBy this wise disposition the burthen of the war fell chiefly upon those\nwho were best able to support it. Thus, for instance, if he wanted to\nraise twenty thousand men, he divided that number amongst the centuries\nof the first five classes, and ordered each century to furnish its\nrespective quota. He then calculated the sum necessary for the support\nof the war, which he divided in the same manner amongst the centuries,\nand ordered every man to pay in proportion to his possessions. Hence the\nrich, who were fewer in number, but divided into more centuries, were\nnot only obliged to serve oftener, but to pay greater taxes. For Tullius\nthought it just, that they who had the greatest property at stake should\nbear the greatest share of the burden, both in their persons and\nfortunes: as he judged it equitable, that the poor should be exempted\nfrom taxes, because they were in want of the necessaries of life; and\nfrom the service; because the Roman soldiers served at that time at\ntheir own expense; a custom which continued long after. For the Roman\nsoldiers received no pay, as Livy informs us,[246] until the three\nhundred and forty-eighth year from the foundation of the city.... As the\nrich, by this regulation, were subjected to the greatest share of the\nexpense and danger, Tullius made them an ample recompense by throwing\nthe chief power of the government into their hands, which he effected by\nthe following scheme, too artful for the penetration of the common\npeople.\n\nBy the fundamental constitution of the Romans, the electing magistrates,\nboth civil and military, the enacting or repealing laws, and the\ndeclaring war, or concluding peace, were all determined by the suffrages\nof the people. But as the people voted by their curi\u00e6,[247] into ten of\nwhich every tribe was divided, the meanest citizen had an equal vote\nwith the greatest: consequently as the poor were much more numerous than\nthe rich, they carried every point by a sure majority. Tullius altered\nthis method, assembled the people, and took their votes by centuries,\nnot by curi\u00e6. This artful measure turned the scale, and transferred the\nmajority to the rich. For as the votes of the first class were first\ntaken, the votes of that class, which contained ninety-eight centuries,\nif unanimous, always constituted a majority of three votes, which\ndecided the question without taking the votes of the five succeeding\nclasses, as they were in that case wholly useless.\n\nTullius had married his two daughters to Tarquinius and Aruns, the\ngrandsons of his predecessor, whose guardianship he had undertaken\nduring their minority. But what tie is strong enough to restrain\nambition! his younger daughter Tullia, the most ambitious, and most\ndetestable of her sex, unable to prevail upon her husband Aruns to join\nin deposing her father, applied to her brother-in-law Tarquinius, whose\ntemper was congenial with her own, and offered to be his wife if he\nwould assert his just right, as she termed it, and attempt to supplant\nher father. The offer was accepted, and the incestuous match agreed\nupon, which was soon after completed by the death of her husband and\nsister, who were privately despatched, that there might be no obstacle\nremaining. Tarquinius, now the worthy husband of such a wife, attempted\nin the senate to procure the deposition of Tullius, but failing in his\ndesign, at the instigation of his impious wife, he procured the old king\nto be openly assassinated in the street before his palace, and the\nunnatural Tullia drove her chariot in triumph over the body of her\nmurdered father. By this complicated scene of adultery, murder, and\nparricide, Tarquin, surnamed the Proud, forced his way to the throne,\nand to usurpation added the most execrable and avowed tyranny. The\nPatricians,[248] who had favoured his usurpation, either from their\nhatred to Tullius and the Plebeians, or from the hopes of sharing in the\ngovernment, with which, according to Dionysius, they had been privately\nallured, were the first who felt the bloody effects of his arbitrary\ntemper. Not only the friends of Tullius, and those whom he suspected as\nuneasy under his usurpation, but all who were distinguished by their\nsuperior wealth fell a sacrifice to his suspicion or avarice. All such\nwere accused, by his profligate emissaries, of many fictitious crimes,\nbut particularly of a conspiracy against his person; the common pretence\nof all tyrants. As the tyrant himself sat as judge, all defence was\nuseless. Some received sentence of death, some of banishment, and the\nestates of both were alike confiscated. The greater number of those that\nwere accused, knowing the true motives of the tyrant\u2019s conduct, and\ndespairing of safety, voluntarily left the city; but some of the\ngreatest note were privately murdered by his orders, whose bodies could\nnever be found. When he had sufficiently thinned the senate by the\ndeath, or banishment of its most valuable members, he filled up the\nvacant seats with his own creatures. But as he allowed nothing to be\nproposed or done there, but in conformity to his orders, he reduced it\nto an empty form, without the least shadow of power. The Plebeians, who\nbeheld with pleasure the sufferings of the Patricians, which they\nesteemed a just punishment for their behaviour under the reign of\nTullius, were quickly treated with much greater severity.[249] For the\ntyrant not only abolished all the laws which Tullius had established to\nsecure them against the oppressions of the Patricians, but loaded them\nwith ruinous taxes, and prohibited all their publick religious\nassemblies, that they might have no opportunity of meeting to form\nsecret conspiracies. Proceeding then upon the constant maxim of all\ntyrants, that idleness in the people is the parent of sedition, he\nexhausted them so much by the slavish drudgery, in which he kept them\nconstantly employed at the publick works, that the Patricians rejoiced\nin their turn at the heavier miseries of the Plebeians, whilst neither\nof them endeavoured to put a period to their common calamities. After\nthe Romans had groaned five and twenty years under this cruel and\nignominious bondage, the rape committed by Sextus, the eldest son of\nTarquin, upon Lucretia, the wife of Collatinus, an eminent Patrician,\nand near relation of the Tarquin family, produced a coalition of both\norders, which ended in the expulsion of Tarquin and his sons, and a\nsolemn abjuration of monarchical government.\n\nThe tyranny of Tarquin had made the very name of king so odious to the\nRomans in general, that the Patricians, who were the chief conductors of\nthis revolution, found it no difficult matter to establish an\naristocracy upon the ruins of monarchy.[250] Two magistrates were\nappointed, termed consuls, vested with the regal power, whose office was\nannual and elective. The senate was filled up out of the most eminent\nof the Plebeians, after they had first been created Patricians, and the\npeople restored to their right of holding assemblies, of giving their\nvotes and doing whatever they were entitled to by former customs. But\nthe power of the people was rather nominal than real. For though the\nconsuls were annually elected by the suffrages of the people, a\nprivilege which carried the appearance of a democracy, yet as the votes\nwere taken by centuries, not by tribes, the Patricians were generally\nmasters of the election. It is remarkable that, after the expulsion of\nTarquin, Dionysius constantly terms the new government an aristocracy.\nIt evidently appears too through the whole remaining part of his\nhistory, that there was a selfish and haughty faction amongst the\nPatricians, who affected a tyrannical oligarchy, and aimed at reducing\nthe Plebeians to a state of servitude. Valerius, surnamed Poplicola, the\nmost humane patriot of all those who were concerned in banishing the\nTarquins, introduced some beneficent laws, which, according to\nDionysius, gave great relief to the Plebeians. For by one he made it\ncapital for any person to exercise any magistracy over the Romans,\nunless that office should be received from the people: as he ordered by\nanother, that no Roman should be punished without a legal trial; and\nthat if any Roman should be condemned by any magistrate to be fined,\nwhipped, or put to death, the condemned person might appeal from the\nsentence of that magistrate to the people, and should be liable to no\npunishment until his fate had been determined by their suffrages. A\nplain proof that the Plebeians until that time laboured under grievances\nnot very consistent with their pretended liberty. Another proof may be\ndrawn from the wretched state of the Plebeians, under the cruel\noppressions arising from the avarice and extortions of the Patricians,\nwhich first gave birth to those perpetual seditions, which fill the\nhistory of that republick. For as the Roman soldiers, who were all free\ncitizens, not only paid their proportion of the taxes, but were obliged\nto serve in the field at their own expense during the whole campaign,\nthis frequently obliged them to borrow money at high interest of the\nPatricians, who had engrossed by far the greater part of publick wealth.\nBut as the Roman territories were often ravaged by their neighbours in\nthose wars, which Tarquin perpetually incited to procure the recovery of\nhis crown, the loss fell heaviest upon the Plebeians, who were\nfrequently stript of all their effects, and reduced to the utmost\npoverty. Hence unable to pay the principal of their debts, joined to an\naccumulated load of usury upon usury, they were surrendered by the\njudges to the discretion of their creditors. These unfeeling wretches\nconfined their debtors in chains, tortured their bodies with whips, and\ntreated them with such inhumanity, that great numbers of the Romans were\nin as bad a situation as the poor Athenians when Solon first undertook\nthe administration. The effects of this detestable treatment of people,\nwho had been taught to call themselves free, appeared about twelve years\nafter the erection of their new government. For when the Tarquins had\nraised up a confederacy of thirty cities of the Latins against them, the\nPlebeians peremptorily refused to enlist until a vote was passed for the\nabolition of their debts. As persuasions had no effect, the senate met\nupon the occasion. Valerius, the son of the humane Poplicola, pleaded\nstrongly in favour of the people, but was violently opposed by Appius\nClaudius, a haughty and imperious man, who is termed by Dionysius an\nabettor of the oligarchy, and head of that faction, which were enemies\nto the people. The moderate men amongst the senators proposed, that the\ndebts should be paid out of the publick treasury; a measure which would\npreserve the poor for the service of the state, and prevent any\ninjustice to the creditors. Salutary as this measure must seem, the\nopposition was so great that nothing was agreed to, and the result of\nthe debates was, \u201cthat no decree should be made at present relating to\nthis affair, but that as soon as the war should be concluded with\nsuccess, the consuls should lay it before the senate, and take their\nvote upon the occasion. That in the mean time no debt should be sued\nfor, and that the execution of all laws, except those relating to the\nwar, should be suspended.\u201d This decree did not wholly quiet the ferment\namongst the people. Several of the poorer sort demanded an immediate\nabolition of their debts, as the condition for their taking a share in\nthe dangers of the war, and looked upon this delay rather as an\nimposition. The senate, who, as the event showed, were determined never\nto grant their request, and yet were afraid of new commotions, resolved\nto abolish the consulship, and all other magistracies for the present,\nand to invest a new magistrate with absolute and unlimited power, and\nsubject to no account for his actions. This new officer was termed the\ndictator, and the duration of his office was limited to six months, at\nthe end of which term the consuls were to resume their former authority.\nThe chief reason, as Dionysius informs us, which induced the senate to\nmake use of this dangerous expedient, was to evade that law which\nPoplicola had procured in favour of the Plebeians, which made it death\nfor a magistrate to punish a Roman without a legal trial, or before he\nwas condemned by the people.[251] The senate then made a decree for the\nelection of a dictator, and the Plebeians ignorant, as Dionysius\nobserves, of the importance of that decree, not only confirmed the\nresolutions of the senate, but gave up to them the power of choosing the\nperson who should be invested with that dignity. Titus Lartius, one of\nthe consuls, was nominated by his colleague according to the form at\nthat time agreed upon in the senate. When the dictator appeared in all\nthe pomp and grandeur of his new office, he struck a terror into the\nmost turbulent, and the people, thus tricked out of that law which was\ntheir only protection, immediately submitted. Lartius, who seems to have\nbeen one of the greatest men of his time, ordered in a general register\nof all the Romans, and formed his army after that wise method first\ninstituted by Servius Tullius. When he took the field he persuaded the\nLatins, by his singular address, to disband their forces and conclude a\ntruce, and thus diverted the impending storm without fighting. He then\nreturned home, and resigned his office before the time was expired,\nwithout having exercised any one act of severity upon a single Roman. A\nnoble instance of moderation and publick virtue!\n\nAt the expiration of the truce, which was made for one year only, the\nLatins took the field with a powerful army. Aulus Posthumius was created\ndictator by the Romans, and a decisive battle was fought near the lake\nRegillus, in which the Romans were completely victors. Sextus Tarquin\nwas killed upon the spot, and old Tarquin the father died soon after. As\nsoon as this war was ended, the senate, regardless of their promise,\nordered all those suits for debt to be determined according to law,\nwhich had been suspended during the war. This faithless proceeding\nraised such violent commotions amongst the people, that a foreign war\nwas judged the best expedient to divert the storm which threatened the\naristocracy. The haughty Appius Claudius, and Publius Servilius, a man\nof a very different character, were nominated consuls by Posthumius and\nhis colleague, which seems a manifest invasion of the rights of the\npeople.[252] A war was resolved upon against the Volscians, but the\nPlebeians again refused to obey the summons for enlisting. Servilius\nadhered to the maxims of Valerius, and advised an immediate decree for\nthe abolition of the debts. But he was furiously opposed by the\ninexorable Appius,[253] who called him a flatterer of the people, and\ndeclared that it would be giving up the government to the people when\nthey had it in their power to live under an aristocracy. After much time\nwas spent in these debates, Servilius, who was a popular man, prevailed\nupon the Plebeians, by his entreaties, and raised an army of volunteers,\nwith which he marched against the enemy. The Volscians, who placed their\nchief dependance upon the disunion which prevailed amongst the Romans,\nsubmitted to whatever terms the consul should think proper to impose,\nand delivered three hundred hostages chosen out of their principal\nfamilies, as a security for their behaviour. But this submission was far\nfrom real, and was calculated only to amuse the Romans and gain time for\ntheir military preparations. War was once more decreed against the\nVolscians; but whilst the senate was deliberating about the number of\nthe forces proper to be employed, a man advanced in years appeared in\nthe forum and implored the assistance of the people. Famine sat pictured\nin his pale and meagre face,[254] and the squalid hue of his dress\nindicated the extremes of poverty and wretchedness. This man, who was\nnot unknown to the people, and, according to report, had borne a command\nin the army, first showed several honourable scars in his breast,\nremains of the wounds he had received in the service of his country, and\nthen informed them: \u201cthat he had been present in eight and twenty\nbattles, and frequently received rewards bestowed only upon superior\nbravery: that in the Sabine war his cattle were driven off by the enemy,\nhis estate plundered, and his house reduced to ashes: that under these\nunhappy circumstances he was compelled to borrow money to pay the\npublick taxes; that this debt, accumulated by usury, reduced him to the\nsad necessity of selling the estate descended to him from his ancestors,\nwith what little effects he had remaining: but that all this proving\ninsufficient, his devouring debts, like a wasting consumption, had\nattacked his person, and he, with his two sons, were delivered up as\nslaves, and led away to the slaughterhouse by his creditors.\u201d When he\nhad said this, he threw off his rags, and showed his back yet bleeding\nfrom the scourge of his merciless master. This sight inflamed the people\ngreatly, but the debtors breaking out of their creditor\u2019s houses, most\nof whom were loaded with chains and fetters, raised their fury even to\nmadness. If any one desired them to take up arms in defence of their\ncountry, the debtors showed their chains,[255] as the reward they had\nmet with for their past services, and asked with indignation, whether\nsuch blessings were worth fighting for. Whilst numbers of them openly\ndeclared that it was much more eligible to be slaves to the Volscians\nthan the Patricians. The senate, quite disconcerted by the violence of\nthe tumult, entreated Servilius to take the management of the people.\nFor an express was just arrived from the Latins, with advice that a\nnumerous army of the enemy had already entered their territories.\nServilius remonstrated to the people the consequences of disunion at so\ncritical a juncture, and pacified them by the assurance that the senate\nwould confirm whatever concessions he should make; he then ordered the\ncrier to proclaim that no citizen who voluntarily enlisted should be\nsubject to the demands or insults of his creditors whilst the army\ncontinued in the field. The people now flocked in with cheerfulness, and\nthe levies were soon completed. Servilius took the field and defeated\nthe Volscians, made himself master of their camp, took several of their\ncities, and divided the whole plunder amongst his soldiers. At the news\nof this success the sanguinary Appius ordered all the Volscian hostages\nto be brought into the forum,[256] there to be whipped and publickly\nbeheaded. And when at his return Servilius demanded a triumph, he loudly\nopposed it, called him a factious man, and accused him of defrauding the\ntreasury of the booty, and prevailed upon the senate to deny him that\nhonour. Servilius, enraged at this usage, entered the city in triumph\nwith his army, amidst the acclamations of the people, to the great\nmortification of the Patricians.\n\nUnder the following consulship the Sabines prepared to invade the\nRomans, and the people again refused to serve unless the debts were\nfirst abolished. Lartius, the first dictator, pleaded strongly for the\npeople, but the inflexible Appius proposed the nomination of a dictator,\nas the only remedy against the mutiny. His motion was carried in the\nsenate by a majority of voices, and Manius Valerius, a brother to the\ngreat Poplicola, was created dictator. Valerius, who was a man of great\nhonour, engaged his word to the Plebeians, that if they would serve\ncheerfully upon this occasion, he would undertake the senate should\nreward them by quieting the contests relating to their debts, and\ngranting whatever they could reasonably desire, and commanded at the\nsame time that no citizen should be sued for debt during his\nadministration. The people had so often experienced the publick virtue\nof the Valerian family, and no longer apprehensive of being again\nimposed upon, offered themselves in such crowds, that ten legions of\nfour thousand men each were levied, the greatest army of natives the\nRomans had ever brought into the field. The dictator finished the\ncampaign with glory, was rewarded with a triumph, and discharged the\npeople from farther service. This step was not at all agreeable to the\nsenate,[257] who feared the people would now claim the performance of\nthe dictator\u2019s promises. Their fears were just; for Valerius kept his\nword with the people, and moved the senate that the promise they had\nmade to him might be taken into consideration. But the Appian faction\nopposed it with the utmost virulence, and exclaimed against his family\nas flatterers of the people, and introducers of pernicious laws.\nValerius, finding his motion over-ruled, reproached the senate for their\nbehaviour, and foretold the consequences which would attend it; and\nquitting the senate abruptly called assembly of the people. After he had\nthanked them for their fidelity and bravery, he informed them of the\nusage he had met with in the senate, and declared how greatly both he\nand they had been imposed upon, and resigning his office, submitted\nhimself to whatever treatment the people should think proper. The people\nheard him with equal veneration and compassion, and attended him home\nfrom the forum with repeated acclamations. The Plebeians now kept no\nmeasures with the senate, but assembled openly, and consulted about\nseceding from the Patricians. To prevent this step, the senate ordered\nthe consuls not to dismiss their armies, but to lead them out into the\nfield, under pretence that the Sabines were again preparing for an\ninvasion. The consuls left the city and encamped nearly together; but\nthe soldiers, instigated by one Sicinnius Bellutus, seized the arms and\nensigns to avoid violating their military oath, seceded from the\nconsuls, and after they had appointed Sicinnius commander in chief,\nencamped on a certain eminence near the river Anio, which from that\nevent was always termed the _mons sacer_, or the holy mountain.\n\nWhen the news of this secession was brought to Rome, the confusion was\nso great, that the city had the appearance of a place taken by storm,\nand the Appian faction were severely reproached as the cause of this\ndesertion. Their enemies at the same time making inroads up to the very\ngates of Rome, increased the general consternation, as the Patricians\nwere terribly afraid they would be joined by the seceders. But the\nsoldiers behaved with so much decency and moderation, that the senate\nafter long debates sent deputies to invite them to return, with the\npromise of a general amnesty. The offer was received with scorn, and the\nPatricians were charged with dissimulation, in pretending ignorance of\nthe just demands of the Plebeians, and the true cause of their\nsecession. At the return of the deputies, the affair was again debated\nin the senate. Agrippa Menenius, a man respectable for his superior\nwisdom and thorough knowledge of the true principles of government, and\nwho was alike an enemy to tyranny in the aristocracy, and licentiousness\nin the people, advised healing measures, and proposed to send such\npersons as the people could confide in with full power to put an end to\nthe sedition in the manner they should judge most proper, without\nfarther application to the senate. Manius Valerius, the last dictator,\nspoke next, and reminded the senate, \u201cthat his predictions of the evils\nwhich would result from their breach of promise were now verified, that\nhe advised a speedy accommodation with the people, lest the same evils,\nif suffered to make a farther progress, should become incurable: that in\nhis opinion the demands of the people would rise higher than the bare\nabolition of debts, and that they would insist upon such security as\nmight be the firm guardian of their rights and liberty for the future.\nBecause the late institution of the dictatorship had superseded the\nValerian law which was before the only guardian of their liberty, and\nthe late denial of a triumph to the consul Servilius, who had deserved\nthat honour more than any man in Rome, evidently proved, that the people\nwere deprived of almost all those privileges they had formerly enjoyed,\nsince a consul and a dictator who showed the least concern for the\ninterests of the people, were treated with abuse and ignominy by the\nsenate: that he did not impute these arbitrary measures to the most\nconsiderable and respectable persons amongst the Patricians, but to a\ncombination of proud and avaricious men wholly intent upon unwarrantable\ngain; who by advancing large sums at excessive interest, had enslaved\nmany of their fellow-citizens, and by their cruel and insulting\ntreatment of their unhappy debtors, had alienated the whole body of the\nPlebeians from the aristocracy: that these men, by forming themselves\ninto a faction, and placing Appius, a known enemy to the people and\nabettor of the oligarchy, at their head, had under his patronage,\nreduced the commonwealth to its present desperate situation.\u201d He\nconcluded by seconding the motion of Menenius for sending ambassadours\nto put a speedy end to the sedition upon the best terms they should be\nable to obtain.\n\nAppius, finding himself thus personally attacked, rose up and replied to\nValerius in a hot inflammatory speech full of the most virulent\ninvectives. He denied that he was ever guilty of enslaving his debtors:\n\u201che denied too, that those who had acted in that manner could be charged\nwith injustice, since they had done no more than the laws allowed. He\naffirmed that the imputation of being an enemy to the people, and\nfavouring oligarchy, arose from his steady adherence to the aristocracy,\nand equally affected all those of superior worth, who like him disdained\nto be governed by their inferiors, or to suffer the form of government\nwhich they had inherited from their ancestors[258] to deviate into the\nworst of all constitutions, a democracy. He recriminated upon Valerius,\nand charged him with aiming at tyranny, by courting the most profligate\nof the citizens, as the most effectual and shortest way of enslaving his\ncountry. He termed the seceders, vile, mean wretches, a thoughtless\nsenseless multitude, whose present arrogance had been first inspired by\nthat old man, as he contemptuously called Valerius. He declared\nabsolutely against sending ambassadours, or making the least\nconcession, and advised rather to arm the slaves and send for assistance\nfrom their allies the Latins, than submit to any thing that might\nderogate from the power and dignity of the Patricians. He proposed, if\nthe seceders should appear in arms against them, to put their wives and\nchildren to death before their faces by the most severe and ignominious\ntortures. But if they would submit at discretion to the senate, he\nadvised to treat them with moderation.\u201d This speech produced a violent\ntumult in the senate, and the young Patricians who adhered to Appius\nbehaved with so much insolence, that the consuls threatened to exclude\nthem from the publick counsels, by a law which should fix the age for\nthe qualification of every senator. Nothing was determined at that time,\nbut in a few days, the moderate party, supported by the firmness of the\nconsuls, prevailed against the still inflexible Appius, and ten\nambassadours, at the head of whom were Menenius and Valerius, were sent\nwith full powers to treat with the seceders. After many debates,\nMenenius in the name of the senate promised full redress of all their\ngrievances with respect to the debts, and offered to confirm this\npromise by the solemn oaths of all the ambassadours. His offer was upon\nthe point of being accepted, when Lucius Junius, who affected the\nsurname of Brutus, a bold and able Plebeian, interposed and insisted\nupon such a security from the senate as might protect the Plebeians for\nthe future from the power of their enemies, who might find an\nopportunity of wreaking their vengeance on the people for the step they\nhad taken. When Menenius desired to know what security he required,\nJunius demanded leave for the people to choose annually a certain number\nof magistrates out of their own body, vested with the power of\ndefending their rights and liberties, and protecting their persons from\ninjury and violence. As this new and unexpected demand seemed of too\ngreat consequence to be granted by the ambassadours, Valerius with some\nothers were sent to take the opinion of the senate upon that subject.\nValerius laid this demand before the senate, and gave his opinion that\nthe favour should be granted, and Appius, as usual, opposed it with\noutrageous fury. But the majority, determined at all events to put a\nperiod to the secession, ratified all the promises made by the\nambassadours, and granted the desired security. The seceders held their\nassembly in the camp, and taking the votes by curi\u00e6, elected five\npersons for their annual magistrates, who were termed tribunes of the\npeople. By a law made immediately after the election, the persons of the\ntribunes were rendered sacred; and the people obliged themselves to\nswear by whatever was held most sacred that they and their posterity\nwould preserve it inviolably.\n\nThe erection of the tribunitial-power, which happened about seventeen\nyears after the expulsion of the kings, is certainly the \u00e6ra from which\nthe liberty of the Roman people ought properly to be dated. All the\nneighbouring states were at that time subject to aristocracy, where the\npeople had little or no share in the government, and it appears\nevidently from the Roman historians that the Romans intended to\nestablish the same form of government at Rome after the abolition of\nmonarchy. For the senate, as Livy informs us,[259] gave a loose to that\nunbounded joy which the death of Tarquin inspired, and begun to oppress\nand injure the people, whom until that time they had courted with the\nutmost assiduity. But Sallust is more full and explicit. For he\naffirms,[260] \u201cthat after the expulsion of the kings, as long as the\nfear of Tarquin and the burdensome war with the Etrurians kept the\nRomans in suspense, the government was administered with equity and\nmoderation. But as soon as ever the dread of those impending dangers was\nremoved, the senate begun to domineer over the people and treat them as\nslaves; inflicting death or scourging after the arbitrary manner of\ndespotick tyrants; expelling them from their lands, and arrogating the\nwhole power of government to themselves, without communicating the least\nshare of it to the Plebeians.\u201d Thus the people, before the creation of\nthis magistracy, were amused with the name of liberty, whilst in fact\nthey had only changed the tyranny of one, for the more galling yoke of\nthree hundred. But the tribunicial-power proved an invincible obstacle\nto the arbitrary schemes of the aristocratick faction, and at last\nintroduced that due admixture of democracy, which is so essentially\nnecessary to the constitution of a well regulated republick.\n\nAs a minute detail of a history so well known as that of the Romans\nwould be quite superfluous, I shall only observe, that the democratick\npower in that republick did not arrive at its just state of\nindependence, until the Plebeians were not only entitled to the highest\nposts and dignities, equally with the Patricians, but until the\nplebiscita or decrees made by the people in their assembly by\ntribes,[261] were confirmed to be equally binding as those made in their\nassembly by centuries. This law was first made when the tyranny of the\ndecemvirs was abolished by the second secession of the people to the\nSacred Mountain, but was perpetually violated by the over-bearing power\nof the aristocracy. But an event similar to that which occasioned the\nfirst secession of the people, to which they properly owed the origin of\ntheir liberty, was the cause of the third and last secession, which\nfully completed that liberty, and gave the fatal blow to the arbitrary\naristocratick faction. Veturius, the son of Titus Veturius, who had been\nconsul and died insolvent, borrowed a sum of money of one Plotius to\ndefray the expenses of his father\u2019s funeral. As the father was greatly\nindebted to the same Plotius, he demanded of young Veturius the payment\nof both debts which his father and he himself had contracted. As the\nunhappy young man was utterly unable to satisfy the demand, Plotius\nseized his unfortunate debtor, and confined him to the work of a slave,\nuntil he had discharged both principal and interest. Veturius bore his\nservitude with patience, and did his utmost to please his creditor. But\nas he refused to gratify the detestable passion of the infamous Plotius\nhe treated him with the utmost inhumanity to force him to a compliance.\nOne day he had the good fortune to escape out of the house of his\nmerciless creditor, and fled to the forum, where he showed his back torn\nwith stripes and his body covered with blood, and explained the reason\nof his shocking treatment. The people, enraged at so dreadful a\nspectacle, demanded an absolute security against that law, which gave\nthe creditors such a shameful power over their insolvent debtors. For\nthough that law had been abolished near forty years before upon a like\noccasion, yet the Patricians, by their superior power, had again revived\nit. The consuls reported the affair to the senate, who committed Plotius\nto prison, and ordered all those who were in custody for debt to be set\nat liberty. The Plebeians, not satisfied with these trifling\nconcessions, insisted upon the absolute abolition of that inhuman law;\nbut they were opposed with equal animosity by the Patricians. Despairing\ntherefore of gaining their point by entreaties and remonstrances, they\nretired in a body to the Janiculum, resolutely determined never to enter\nthe city, until they had received full satisfaction. The senate, alarmed\nat this secession, had recourse to their last resource in all desperate\ncases, the creation of a dictator. Q. Hortensius was nominated dictator\nupon this occasion, a man of great temper and prudence, and a real\nfriend to liberty. As he was vested with absolute power by virtue of his\noffice, he totally abolished that law which had given such just cause of\nuneasiness, and notwithstanding all the opposition of the senate,\nrevived and confirmed two laws which had been formerly made, though\nconstantly violated by the Patricians. One was, \u201cthat the decrees made\nby the Plebeians should be equally obligatory to the Patricians:\u201d the\nother, \u201cthat all laws passed in the senate should be laid before the\ncomitia, or assemblies of the people, either to be confirmed or\nrejected.\u201d Thus the liberty, which the Plebeians had acquired by the\nfirst secession, was confirmed in the plainest and strongest manner by\nthe last, which happened about two hundred and six years after. For the\nPatricians, from that memorable \u00e6ra, had scarce any other advantage\nover the Plebeians, except what arose from their superior wealth, and\nthat respect which is naturally paid by inferiors to men of superior\nbirth.\n\nIt is evident, from that sudden change which the Plebeians experienced\nin the behaviour of the Patricians at the death of Tarquin, that if the\nsenate could have supported themselves in that arbitrary power, which\nthey so visibly aimed at, the condition of the people would have been\njust like that of the Polish peasants under their imperious lords. For\nin that detestable aristocracy, the Patricians, not content with the\nwealth of the republick, which centered chiefly in their own body, used\ntheir utmost efforts to engross the entire possession of the lands. The\nsecession of the people, and the creation of the tribunes, defeated the\nscheme they had formed for establishing an aristocratick tyranny. But\nthe frequent attempts to revive the Agrarian law prove undeniably that\nthe Patricians never lost sight of their ambitious views of aggrandizing\ntheir families by an illegal usurpation of the conquered lands. Spurius\nCassius, a Patrician, was the first author of this law, about eight\nyears after the secession, with a view of raising himself to the regal\npower by conciliating the affection and interest of the people. The law\nitself was certainly just, and founded upon that equality in the\ndistribution of the land, which was a part of the constitution, as\nsettled by their founder Romulus. The plea therefore of Cassius, \u201cthat\nthe lands, which had been conquered by the blood and valour of the\npeople, should be taken from the rich and applied to the service of the\npublick,\u201d was founded upon the strictest equity, as well as the\nfundamental principles of their constitution. Even Appius, the most\ninveterate enemy to the people, acknowledged the justice of his\nproposal, since he moved that commissioners should be appointed by the\nsenate to fix the boundaries of the land in question, and sell, or let\nit out in farms for the benefit of the publick. This advice was\nunanimously approved of, and the senate passed a decree, that ten of the\nmost ancient consular senators should be appointed commissioners to\ncarry this scheme into execution. This decree at once pacified the\npeople and ruined Cassius. For as he had proposed to divide two thirds\nof the lands between the Latins and Hernici, whose assistance he at that\ntime courted, the people gave him up to the resentment of the senate,\nwho condemned him for plotting to introduce a single tyranny, and\nordered him to be thrown down the Tarpeian precipice.\n\nThis was the first rise of the famous agrarian law, which occasioned\nsuch frequent contests between the senate and the people, and stirred up\nthe first civil war in Rome, which ended in the murder of both the\nGracchi, about three hundred and fifty years after. For the senate not\nonly evaded the nomination of the commissioners, as they had promised in\ntheir decree, but, whenever that affair was brought upon the carpet,\nthey acted with an insincerity and artifice which are highly\ninconsistent with the so much vaunted probity of the Roman senate.\nUnless therefore we attend to the true reasons, upon which the agrarian\nlaw was originally founded, we can never form a right judgment of the\nperpetual dissensions between the senate and the tribunes upon that\nsubject. For though the chief blame, in all these contests, is most\ncommonly thrown upon the turbulent and seditious temper of the tribunes,\nyet, if the real cause of those dissensions is impartially examined, we\nshall find that most of them took rise from the avarice and injustice of\nthe Patricians. But though the tribunitial power was sometimes made\nsubservient to the interested views of some ambitious tribunes, yet no\nargument can justly be drawn from the abuse of that power against its\nreal utility. For how much it was dreaded as the bulwark of the liberty\nof the people, is evident from this consideration: that it was reduced\nalmost to nothing by Sylla, and afterwards totally absorbed by Augustus\nand the succeeding emperors, who never looked upon the people as\nthoroughly enslaved until they had annexed the tribunitial power to the\nimperatorial dignity.\n\nI remarked before, that when the highest dignities and employments in\nthe republick were laid open to the Plebeians, and the decrees of the\npeople had the same force, and affected the Patricians in the same\nmanner as those which were issued by the senate, the democratick power\nwas raised to an equality with the aristocratick. But as a third power,\nor estate (as we term it) was wanting, capable of preserving the\nrequisite \u00e6quilibrium between the other two, it was impossible from the\nvery nature of the republican constitution, that the equality between\nthe two powers could be long supported. The concessions made by\nHortensius quieted indeed the civil dissensions; and it is remarkable\ntoo, that after peace was restored to the republick, the progress of the\nRoman conquests was so amazingly rapid, that in little more than two\nhundred years from that period they had subjugated the most opulent\nempires in the universe. But the same conquests, which raised the\nrepublick to the summit of her grandeur, threw too much weight into the\ndemocratick scale, and, by totally corrupting the Roman manners, brought\non the final ruin of their liberty and constitution. For as every\nconquered province created successively a new government, these new\ndignities immediately became new objects of avarice and ambition. But as\nthe command of the armies, the government of provinces, and the highest\nposts in the state, were disposed of by the suffrages of the people; the\ncandidates for those lucrative employments left no means unattempted to\nsecure a majority. Hence, as the poor Plebeians were extremely numerous,\nthe man who was able to distribute the greatest largesses, or divert the\nmob with the finest shows, was generally the most successful. When the\ninterest of the candidates was nearly equal, force was frequently made\nuse of to decide the contest; and it was not uncommon to see the\nforum[262] covered with the slaughtered bodies of the electors. The\ngenerals who were elected fleeced the provinces to enable themselves to\nkeep up their interest at home with the people, and connived at the\nrapines of their soldiers to secure their affections. Hence at Rome\nliberty degenerated into the most outrageous licentiousness, whilst the\nsoldiers gradually wore off that parental love for their country, which\nwas once the characteristick of the Romans, and attached themselves\nwholly to the fortunes of their generals. Hence the most succesful\nleaders began to look upon themselves no longer as servants, but as\nmasters of the republick, and each endeavoured to support his\npretensions by force of arms. The faction of Sylla and Marius filled the\ncity alternately with slaughter and rapine, as the fortune of their\nrespective leaders prevailed in the course of that destructive contest.\nAnd Rome frequently felt the calamitous effects of war in her own\nbowels, at a time when her victorious arms abroad were adding new\nprovinces to her dominions. These factions were far from expiring with\ntheir leaders, but broke out again with the same baleful fury under the\nfirst and second triumvirate. Each of these, strictly speaking, were no\nmore than coalitions of the same factions, where three chiefs united\ntheir several parties to crush every other. When they had accomplished\nthis, and satiated their ambition, their avarice, and their private\nresentments, by the most bloody proscriptions, they quarrelled about the\ndivision of power, like captains of banditti about the division of\nbooty, with whom they agreed in principle, and differed only in degree.\nThese quarrels occasioned those civil wars, which gave the finishing\nblow to the Roman republick. The ablest and most dangerous man, in each\ntriumvirate, proved at last the conqueror; and Julius C\u00e6sar first put\nthose chains upon his country, which Augustus riveted beyond a\npossibility of removal.\n\nAll the historians, from whom we have received any account of the Roman\naffairs, agree unanimously in fixing their conquest of Antiochus the\nGreat, as the \u00e6ra from whence we are to date the rise of luxury and\ncorruption amongst them. Livy assures us, that luxury was first\nintroduced into their city by the army of Manlius at their return from\nAsia. They, he informs us, were the first who made Rome acquainted with\nthe finely ornamented couches, the rich carpets, the embroidered\nhangings, and other expensive productions of the looms of Asia, with all\nthose elegant tables of various forms and workmanship, which were\nesteemed so essential a part of that magnificence which they affected in\ntheir furniture. They introduced wenches, who sung and played upon\ndifferent instruments, with dancers of anticks, to heighten the mirth\nand indulgence of the table. To show to what height they carried the\nexpense and luxury of the table, he adds, with indignation, that a cook,\nwho, by their frugal and temperate ancestors, was looked upon, from his\nvery office, as the vilest slave in the household, was now esteemed an\nofficer of mighty consequence, and cookery was erected into an art,\nwhich before was looked upon as the most servile kind of drudgery. Yet\nnew and strange as these first specimens might seem, Livy assures us,\nthat they were but trifles when compared to their succeeding luxury.\nBefore that fatal \u00e6ra the Romans were poor, but they were contented and\nhappy, because they knew no imaginary wants: and whilst their manners\nwere virtuous, poverty itself was honourable, and added a new lustre to\nevery other virtue. But when once they had contracted a relish for the\nluxury of Asia, they quickly found that the wealth of Asia was necessary\nto support it; and this discovery as quickly produced a total change in\ntheir manners. Before that time the love of glory, and a contempt of\nwealth, was the ruling passion of the Romans. Since that time money was\nthe only object of their applause and desire. Before, ambition impelled\nthem to war, from a thirst of dominion; now avarice, for the sake of\nplunder to support the expense of luxury. Before, they seemed a race of\nheroes; they were now a gang of insatiable robbers. Formerly, when they\nhad reduced a people to obedience, they received them as their allies;\nthey now made the conquered nations their slaves. They fleeced the\nprovinces, and oppressed their friends. As the great offices, which\nentitled the possessors to the command of armies, and the government of\nprovinces, were disposed of by the votes of the people, no method was\nleft unattempted to secure a majority of suffrages. The candidates for\nthese employments, not only exhausted their own fortunes, but strained\ntheir credit to the utmost, to bribe the people with shows and\ndonatives. To this infamous period we must fix the rise of that torrent\nof corruption, which so quickly deluged the Roman republick. The\nsuccessful candidates set out for their government, like hungry\nemaciated wolves, to fatten upon the blood of the miserable provinces.\nCicero makes heavy complaints of the rapine and extortion of these\nrapacious oppressors; and his orations against Verres, when accused by\nthe Sicilians, give us a complete idea of the behaviour of a Roman\ngovernour in his province. The complaints of the oppressed provincials\nwere incessant; but every governour had his friends amongst the leading\nmen, whom he secured by a share of the plunder, and the weight of their\nwhole interest was applied to screen the criminal. Laws indeed were made\nagainst this crime of peculation, but they were easily eluded, because\nthe judges, who were chosen out of the body of the people, were as\ncorrupt as the offenders, and were frequently their associates in\nvillany. Thus corruption made its way into the very vitals of the\nrepublick. Every thing was venal, and the venality had made so rapid a\nprogress, even in the time of Jugurtha, which was about eighty years\nafter the defeat of Antiochus, as to occasion the severe sarcasm of that\nprince, recorded by Sallust, which places the corruption of the Romans\nin a stronger point of view, than the most laboured and pathetick\ndescription of their historians. \u201cThat Rome had carried her venality to\nso great a height, as to be ready to sell herself to destruction, if she\ncould but find a purchaser.\u201d When the Romans had beggared the monarchs,\nwhom they vouchsafed to style their friends, and drained the provinces\nuntil they had scarce any thing left to plunder; the same principle\nwhich had induced them to pillage the universe, impelled them now to\nprey upon one another.[263] Marius and Sylla were the first Romans who\nset the fatal precedent, and were the first who bridled Rome with a\nstanding army. The civil power was compelled to give way to the\nmilitary, and from that period we may truly date the ruin of the Roman\nliberty. The state continued to fluctuate between despotism and anarchy,\nuntil it terminated irretrievably under the C\u00e6sars, in the most\nabsolute, and most infernal tyranny that any people were ever yet\ncursed with. Marius opened the bloody scene, and glutted his followers\nwith the blood and wealth of the friends of Sylla. Sylla repaid the\nMarian faction in the same coin with usury. Battles were fought in the\nvery streets; and Rome, more than once, experienced all the horrors of a\ncity taken by storm from her own citizens. Personal resentment and\nrevenge for injuries received, were the pretence on both sides, but\nplunder and confiscations seem to have been the chief motives. For the\nrich were equally looked upon as enemies, and equally proscribed by both\nfactions, and they alone were safe who had nothing worth taking.\n\nIf we connect the various strokes, interspersed through what we have\nremaining of the writings of Sallust, which he levelled at the vices of\nhis countrymen, we shall be able to form a just idea of the manners of\nthe Romans in the time of that historian. From the picture, thus\nfaithfully exhibited, we must be convinced, that not only those shocking\ncalamities, which the republick suffered during the contest between\nMarius and Sylla, but those subsequent, and more fatal evils, which\nbrought on the utter extinction of the Roman liberty and constitution,\nwere the natural effects of that foreign luxury, which first introduced\nvenality and corruption. Though the introduction of luxury from Asia\npreceded the ruin of Carthage in point of time, yet, as Sallust informs\nus, the dread of that dangerous rival restrained the Romans within the\nbounds of decency and order.[264] But as soon as ever that obstacle was\nremoved,[265] they gave a full scope to their ungoverned passions. The\nchange in their manners was not gradual, and by little and little, as\nbefore, but rapid and instantaneous. Religion, justice, modesty,\ndecency, all regard for divine or human laws, were swept away at once by\nthe irresistible torrent of corruption. The nobility strained the\nprivileges annexed to their dignity,[266] and the people their liberty,\nalike into the most unbounded licentiousness. Every one made the\ndictates of his own lawless will his only rule of action. Publick\nvirtue, and the love of their country, which had raised the Romans to\nthe empire of the universe, were extinct. Money,[267] which alone could\nenable them to gratify their darling luxury, was substituted in their\nplace. Power, which alone could enable them to gratify their darling\ndominion, honours, and universal respect, were annexed to the possession\nof money. Contempt, and whatever was most reproachful, was the bitter\nportion of poverty; and to be poor, grew to be the greatest of all\ncrimes in the estimation of the Romans. Thus wealth and poverty\ncontributed alike to the ruin of the republick. The rich employed their\nwealth in the acquisition of power,[268] and their power in every kind\nof oppression and rapine, for the acquisition of more wealth. The\npoor,[269] now dissolute and desperate, were ready to engage in every\nseditious insurrection, which promised them the plunder of the rich, and\nset up both their liberty and their country to sale to the best bidder.\nThe republick,[270] which was the common prey to both, was thus rent to\npieces between the contending parties. As an universal selfishness is\nthe genuine effect of universal luxury, so the natural effect of\nselfishness is to break through every tie, both divine and human, and\nto stick at no kind of excesses in the pursuit of wealth, its favourite\nobject. Thus the effects of selfishness will naturally appear in\nirreligion,[271] breach of faith, perjury, a contempt of all the social\nduties, extortion, frauds in our dealings, pride, cruelty, universal\nvenality and corruption. From selfishness arises that vicious ambition\n(if I may be allowed the term) which Sallust rightly defines, \u201cthe lust\nof domination.\u201d[272] Ambition as a passion, precedes avarice; for the\nseeds of ambition seem almost to be innate. The desire of pre-eminence,\nthe fondness for being distinguished above the rest of our\nfellow-creatures, attends us from the cradle to the grave. Though as it\ntakes its complexion, so it receives its denomination from the different\nobjects it pursues, which in all are but the different means of\nattaining the same end. But the lust of domination, here mentioned by\nSallust, though generally confounded with ambition, is in reality a\ndifferent passion, and is, strictly speaking, only a different mode of\nselfishness. For the chief end which we propose, by the lust of\ndomination, is to draw every thing to centre in ourselves, which we\nthink will enable us to gratify every other passion. I confess it may be\nalleged, that self-love and selfishness both arise from the general law\nof self-preservation, and are but different modes of the same\nprinciple. I acknowledge, that if we examine strictly all those heroick\ninstances of love, friendship, or patriotism, which seem to be carried\nto the most exalted degree of disinterestedness, we shall probably find\nthe principle of self-love lurking at the bottom of many of them. But,\nif we rightly define these two principles, we shall find an essential\ndifference between our ideas of self-love, and selfishness. Self-love,\nwithin its due bounds, is the practice of the great duty of\nself-preservation, regulated by that law which the great author of our\nbeing has given for that very end. Self-love therefore is not only\ncompatible with the most rigid practice of the social duties, but is in\nfact a great motive and incentive to the practice of all moral virtue.\nWhereas selfishness, by reducing every thing to the single point of\nprivate interest, a point which it never loses sight of, banishes all\nthe social virtues, and is the first spring of action, which impels to\nall those disorders, which are so fatal to mixed government in\nparticular, and to society in general. From this poisonous source\nSallust deduces all those evils,[273] which spread the pestilence of\ncorruption over the whole face of the republick, and changed the mildest\nand most upright government in the universe into the most inhuman, and\nmost insupportable tyranny. For as the lust of domination can never\npossibly attain its end without the assistance of others, the man, who\nis actuated by that destructive passion, must, of necessity, strive to\nattach to himself a set of men of similar principles, for the\nsubordinate instruments. This is the origin of all those iniquitous\ncombinations, which we call factions. To accomplish this,[274] he must\nput on as many shapes as Proteus; he must ever wear the mask of\ndissimulation, and live a perpetual lie. He will court the friendship of\nevery man, who is capable of promoting, and endeavour to crush every\nman, who is capable of defeating his ambitious views. Thus his\nfriendship and his enmity will be alike unreal, and easily convertible,\nif the change will serve his interest. As private interest is the only\ntie which can ever connect a faction,[275] the lust of wealth, which was\nthe cause of the lust of domination, will now become the effect, and\nmust be proportional to the sum total of the demands of the whole\nfaction; and, as the latter know no bounds, so the former, will be alike\ninsatiable. For when once a man is inured to bribes in the service of\nfaction,[276] he will expect to be paid as well for acting for, as for\nacting against the dictates of his conscience. A truth, which every\nminister must have experienced, who has been supported by a faction, and\nwhich a late great minister (as he frankly confessed) found to be the\ncase with him during his long administration. But how deeply soever a\nstate may be immersed in luxury and corruption, yet the man who aims at\nbeing the head of a faction for the end of domination,[277] will at\nfirst cloak his real design under an affected zeal for the service of\nthe government. When he has established himself in power, and formed his\nparty, all who support his measures will be rewarded as the friends; all\nwho oppose him will be treated as enemies to the government. The honest\nand uncorrupt citizen will be hunted down as disaffected, and all his\nremonstrances, against mal-administration, will be represented as\nproceeding from that principle. The cant term, _disaffection_, will be\nthe watch-word of the faction; and the charge of disaffection, that\nconstant resource of iniquitous ministers, that infallible sign that a\ncause will not stand the test of a fair inquiry, will be perpetually\nemployed by the tools of power to silence those objections which they\nwant argument to answer. The faction will estimate the worth of their\nleader,[278] not by his services to his country, for the good of the\npublick will be looked upon as obsolete and chimerical; but his ability\nto gratify, or screen his friends, and crush his opponents. The leader\nwill fix the implicit obedience to his will, as the test of merit to his\nfaction: consequently all the dignities, and lucrative posts will be\nconferred upon persons of that stamp only, whilst honesty and publick\nvirtue will be standing marks of political reprobation. Common justice\nwill be denied to the latter in all controverted elections, whilst the\nlaws will be strained, or over-ruled in favour of the former. Luxury is\nthe certain forerunner of corruption, because it is the certain parent\nof indigence: consequently a state so circumstanced will always furnish\nan ample supply of proper instruments for faction. For as luxury\nconsists in an inordinate gratification of the sensual passions,[279]\nthe more the passions are indulged they grow the more importunately\ncraving, until the greatest fortune must sink under their insatiable\ndemands. Thus luxury necessarily produces corruption. For as wealth is\nessentially necessary to the support of luxury, wealth will be the\nuniversal object of desire in every state where luxury prevails:\nconsequently all those who have dissipated their private fortunes in the\npurchase of pleasure, will be ever ready to enlist in the cause of\nfaction for the wages of corruption. A taste for pleasure immoderately\nindulged, quickly strengthens into habit, eradicates every principle of\nhonour and virtue, and gets possession of the whole man. And the more\nexpensive such a man is in his pleasures, the greater lengths he will\nrun for the acquisition of wealth for the end of profusion. Thus the\ncontagion will become so universal, that nothing but an uncommon share\nof virtue can preserve the possessor from infection. For when once the\nidea of respect and homage is annexed to the possession of wealth\nalone,[280] honour, probity, every virtue and every amiable quality\nwill be held cheap in comparison, and looked upon as awkward and quite\nunfashionable. But as the spirit of liberty will yet exist in some\ndegree in a state which retains the name of freedom, even though the\nmanners of that state should be generally depraved, an opposition will\narise from those virtuous citizens, who know the value of their\nbirthright, _liberty_, and will never submit tamely to the chains of\nfaction. Force then will be called in to the aid of corruption,[281] and\na standing army will be introduced. A military government will be\nestablished upon the ruins of the civil, and all commands and\nemployments will be disposed of at the arbitrary will of lawless power.\nThe people will be fleeced to pay for their own fetters, and doomed,\nlike the cattle, to unremitting toil and drudgery for the support of\ntheir tyrannical masters. Or, if the outward form of civil government\nshould be permitted to remain, the people will be compelled to give a\nsanction to tyranny by their own suffrages, and to elect oppressors\ninstead of protectors.\n\nFrom this genuine portrait of the Roman manners, it is evident to a\ndemonstration, that the fatal catastrophe of that republick (of which\nSallust himself was an eye witness) was the natural effect of the\ncorruption of their manners. It is equally as evident from our author,\nand the rest of the Roman historians, that the corruption of their\nmanners was the natural effect of foreign luxury, introduced and\nsupported by foreign wealth. The fatal tendency of these evils, was too\nobvious to escape the notice of every sensible Roman, who had any regard\nfor liberty, and their ancient constitution. Many sumptuary laws were\nmade to restrain the various excesses of luxury; but these efforts were\ntoo feeble to check the over-bearing violence of the torrent. Cato\nproposed a severe law, enforced by the sanction of an oath, against\nbribery and corruption at elections; where the scandalous traffick of\nvotes was established by custom as at a publick market. But, as Plutarch\nobserves,[282] he incurred the resentment of both parties by that\nsalutary measure. The rich were his enemies, because they found\nthemselves precluded from all pretensions to the highest dignities; as\nthey had no other merit to plead but what arose from their superior\nwealth. The electors abused, cursed, and even pelted him as the author\nof a law which deprived them of the wages of corruption, and reduced\nthem to the necessity of subsisting by labour.[283] But this law, if it\nreally passed, had as little effect as any of the former; and like the\nsame laws in our own country, upon the same occasion, was either evaded\nby chicane, or over-ruled by power. Our own septennial scenes of\ndrunkenness, riot, bribery, and abandoned perjury, may serve to give us\nan idea of the annual elections of the Romans in those abominable\ntimes.[284] Corruption was arrived at its last stage, and the depravity\nwas universal. The whole body of the unhappy republick was infected, and\nthe distemper was utterly incurable. For those excesses which formerly\nwere esteemed the vices of the people,[285] were now, by the force of\ncustom fixed into habit, become the manners of the people. A most\ninfallible criterion, by which we may ascertain the very point of time,\nwhen the ruin of the any free state, which labours under these evils,\nmay be naturally expected.\n\nThe conspiracies of Catiline and C\u00e6sar against the liberty of their\ncountry, were but genuine effects of that corruption, which Sallust has\nmarked out to us, as the immediate cause of the destruction of the\nrepublick. The end proposed by each of these bad men, and the means\nemployed for that end, were the same in both. The difference in their\nsuccess arose only from the difference of address and abilities in the\nrespective leaders. The followers of Catiline, as Sallust informs us,\nwere the most dissolute, the most profligate, and the most abandoned\nwretches, which could be culled out of the most populous and most\ncorrupt city of the universe.[286] C\u00e6sar, upon the same plan, formed his\nparty, as we learn from Plutarch out of the most infected, and most\ncorrupt members of the very same state.[287] The vices of the times\neasily furnished a supply of proper instruments. To pilfer the publick\nmoney,[288] and to plunder the provinces by violence, though\nstate-crimes of the most heinous nature, were grown so familiar by\ncustom, that they were looked upon as no more than mere\noffice-perquisites. The younger people, who are ever most ripe for\nsedition and insurrection, were so corrupted by luxury,[289] that they\nmight be deservedly termed, \u201can abandoned race, whose dissipation made\nit impracticable for them to keep their own private fortunes; and whose\navarice would not suffer their fellow-citizens to enjoy the quiet\npossession of theirs.\u201d\n\nIt is not at all strange that Rome thus circumstanced should fall a\nvictim to the corruption of her own citizens: nor that the empire of the\nuniverse, the toil and labour of ages, to which the Romans had waded\nthrough seas of blood, should be destined to feed the detestable vices\nof a few monsters, who were a disgrace even to human nature. The total\nchange of the Roman constitution, the unlimited tyranny of the emperors,\nand the abject slavery of the people, were all effects of the same\ncause, extended in degree by a natural progression. The Romans in fact\nwere no more; the name indeed subsisted, but the idea affixed to that\nname, was as totally changed as their ancient constitution. In the time\nof Pyrrhus the Roman senate appeared an assembly of kings to his\nambassadour Cyneas. When the east had felt the force of the Roman arms,\nthe most despotick princes received the orders of a Roman senate, and\nexecuted them with as prompt obedience, as a slave would do the commands\nof his master. A deputy from the Roman senate made a haughty monarch\ntremble at the head of a victorious army, compelled him to resign all\nhis conquests, and return ingloriously home, by a single motion of his\nwalking-stick.[290]\n\nWhat an elevated idea must this give us of the Roman manners, whilst\nthat haughty people retained their freedom! Nothing is more grand;\nnothing more striking. Shift but the scene, and view the manners of the\nRomans when enslaved. Nothing is so abjectly servile, nothing so\ndespicable. We see the Roman senate deifying the worst of mankind;\nwretches, who had sunk even below humanity, and offering the adoration\nof incense to these idols of their own making, who were more\ncontemptible than the very stone and wooden representatives of their\ndeities. Instead of giving law to monarchs, and deciding the fate of\nnations, we see the august Roman senate run trembling like slaves at the\nsummons of their master Domitian,[291] to debate in form about the\nimportant business of dressing a turbot!! The majesty of the Roman\npeople, which received the tributary homage of the universe, expired\ntogether with their liberty. That people, who disposed of the highest\noffices in the government, the command of armies, provinces and\nkingdoms, were sunk into a herd of dispirited slaves. Their total\ninsignificancy screened them from the fatal effects of the caprices of\ntheir tyrants. They dragged on a wretched being in a state of idleness\nand poverty in the midst of slavery, and the utmost extent of their\nwishes amounted to no more, than bread for their daily subsistence, and\ndiversions for their amusement.[292] The emperors supplied the one by\ntheir frequent largesses of corn, and gratified the other by their\nnumerous publick shows. Hence historians observe, that the most infamous\nof their tyrants were as fond of rareeshows, as the mob themselves, and\nas they were by much the most profuse of all their emperors, their\ndeaths were always most regretted by the people. So striking is the\ncontrast between a state when blessed with liberty, and the same state\nwhen reduced to slavery by the corruption of its people!\n\nAs I have already made some reflections upon that passion for theatrical\nentertainments, which prevailed at Athens, I cannot help observing, that\nafter the introduction of luxury, the fondness for that kind of\ndiversion amongst the Romans, was at least equal to that of the\nAthenians. The Romans seem to have been strangers to every kind of\nstage-plays for the first four hundred years. Their first attempts of\nthat kind were rude and simple, and not unlike the ancient mummery at\nour country wakes, or Christmas gambols. The regular drama was imported\ntogether with the luxury of Greece, but every species of this kind of\nentertainment, whether tragedy, comedy, farce, or pantomime, was\ncomprehended under the general denomination of stage-plays,[293] and the\ndifferent performers alike ranged under the general term of\nplayers.[294] The profession itself was reckoned scandalous, and proper\nonly for slaves, and if once a Roman citizen appeared upon the stage, he\nimmediately forfeited his right of voting, and every other privilege of\na free man. Upon this account Cicero seems to lament the fate of his\nfriend Roscius, when he tells us, \u201cthat he was so superior to all, as a\nplayer,[295] that he alone seemed worthy of appearing upon the stage:\nbut of so exalted a character, as a man, that of all men he deserved\nleast to be doomed to so scandalous a profession.\u201d Suetonius, speaking\nof the licentiousness and insolence of the players, takes notice of an\nancient law, which empowered the pr\u00e6tors and \u0153diles to whip those\nplayers publickly, who gave the least offence, or did not perform to\nthe satisfaction of the people. Though Augustus[296] as the same\nhistorian informs us, exempted players from the ignominy of that law,\nyet he took care to restrain them within the bounds of decency and good\nmanners.[297] For he ordered Stephanio, a celebrated comedian, to be\nwhipped publickly through all the theatres, and afterwards banished him,\nfor presuming privately to keep a Roman matron disguised under the habit\nof his boy. Upon a complaint from the pr\u00e6tor he made Hylas the pantomime\nbe lashed openly in the court of his own palace, to which place the\noffender had fled for refuge; and banished Pylades, one of the most\neminent players, not only from Rome but even from Italy, for affronting\none of the audience who had hissed him upon the stage. But these\nrestraints seem to have expired with Augustus. For we find the pride and\ninsolence of the players carried to so great a height in the reign of\nhis successor Tiberius, as to occasion their total banishment. The\nfondness of the populace for the entertainments of the theatre, and the\nfolly of the degenerate nobility, were the causes of this alteration.\nFor both Pliny and Seneca assure us, that persons of the very first rank\nand fashion were so scandalously mean, as to pay the most obsequious\ncourt to the players, to dangle at their levees, to attend them openly\nin the streets like their slaves; and treat them like the masters,\ninstead of the servants of the publick.[298] Every eminent player had\nhis party, and these ridiculous factions interested themselves so warmly\nin the cause of their respective favourites, that the theatres became a\nperpetual scene of riot and disorder. The nobility mingled with the mob\nin these absurd conflicts;[299] which always ended in bloodshed, and\nfrequently in murder. The remonstrances and authority of the magistrates\nhad so little effect, that they were obliged to have recourse to the\nemperor. Bad as Tiberius was, yet he was too wise to tolerate such\nshameful licentiousness. He laid the case before the senate, and\ninformed them, that the players were the cause of those scandalous riots\nwhich disturbed the repose of the publick: that they spread lewdness\nand debauchery through all the chief families; that they were arrived\nto such a height of profligacy and insolence, through the protection of\ntheir factions, that the authority of the senate itself was requisite to\nrestrain them within proper bounds. Upon this remonstrance they were\ndriven out of Italy as a publick nuisance;[300] and Suetonius informs\nus, that all the frequent and united petitions of the people could never\nprevail upon Tiberius to recall them.\n\nAugustus affected an extreme fondness for all kinds of diversion; he\ninvited the most celebrated players of every denomination into Italy,\nand treated the people, at an immense expense, with every kind of\nentertainment, which the theatre or circus could furnish. This is\nremarked as an instance of that refined policy of which he was so\nthorough a master. For that artful prince was not yet firmly settled in\nhis newly usurped power. He well knew, that if he gave the people time\nto cool and reflect, they might possibly thwart the execution of his\nambitious schemes. He therefore judged that the best expedient to\nprepare them for the yoke of slavery would be, to keep them constantly\nintoxicated by one perpetual round of jollity and diversions. That this\nwas the opinion of thinking people, at that time, is evident from that\nremarkably pertinent answer of Pylades the player to Augustus,\ntransmitted to us by Dion Cassius. Pylades, as I have already observed,\nhad been banished by Augustus for a misdemeanor, but pardoned and\nrecalled to gratify the humour of the people. At his return, when\nAugustus reproved him for quarrelling with one Bathyllus, a person of\nthe same profession, but protected by his favourite M\u00e6cenas; Pylades is\nreported to have made this bold and sensible answer. \u201cIt is your true\ninterest, C\u00e6sar, that the people should idle away that time upon us and\nour affairs, which they might otherwise employ in prying too narrowly\ninto your government.\u201d[301]\n\nI am far from being an enemy to the stage. On the contrary, I think the\nstage under proper regulations might be rendered highly useful. For of\nall our publick diversions, the stage, if purged from the obscenity of\nfarce, and the low buffoonery of pantomime, is certainly capable of\naffording infinitely the most rational, and the most manly\nentertainment. But when I see the same disorders in our own theatres,\nwhich were so loudly complained of in the time of Tiberius; when the\nridiculous contests between contending players are judged to be of such\nmighty importance, as to split the publick into the same kind of\nfactions; when these factions interest themselves so warmly in the\nsupport of the supposed merit of their respective favourites, as to\nproceed to riots, blows, and the most extravagant indecencies; I cannot\nhelp wishing for the interposition of the reforming spirit of Augustus.\nAnd when I see the same insatiable fondness for diversions, the same\nunmeaning taste (so justly ridiculed by Horace in his countrymen)\nprevail in our own nation,[302] which mark the most degenerate times of\nGreece and Rome, I cannot but look upon them as a certain indication of\nthe frivolous and effeminate manners of the present age.\n\n  [247] Romulus had divided the whole people into thirty curi\u00e6,\n  ten of which composed a tribe. At their comitia or general\n  assemblies, the people divided into their respective curi\u00e6 and\n  gave their votes man by man. The majority of votes in each\n  curia passed for the voice of the whole curia, and the majority\n  of the curi\u00e6 for the general determination of the whole people.\n\n  Tullius on the contrary took their votes only by centuries, the\n  whole number of which amounted to one hundred and ninety-three,\n  into which he had subdivided the six classes. But as the first\n  class alone, which was composed wholly of the rich, contained\n  ninety-eight of these centuries, if the centuries of the first\n  class were unanimous, which, as Dionysius informs us, was\n  generally the case, they carried every point by a sure majority\n  of three.... If they disagreed, Tullius called the centuries of\n  the second class, and so on until ninety-seven centuries agreed\n  in one opinion, which made a majority of one. If the numbers\n  continued equal, that is ninety-six on each side of the\n  question, after the five first classes had voted; Tullius\n  called up the sixth class which was composed wholly of the\n  poorest people, and contained but one century, and the vote of\n  this century determined the question.... But this case, as\n  Dionysius observes, happened so very rarely; that even the\n  votes of the fourth class were seldom called for, and thus the\n  votes of the fifth and sixth were generally useless.\n  Consequently when the people voted by their curi\u00e6, where the\n  vote of every individual was taken, the poor who were much the\n  most numerous, might always be secure of a great majority....\n  But when the votes were taken by centuries, according to the\n  new method instituted by Tullius, that numerous body of the\n  poor, which composed the single century of the sixth class, and\n  consequently had but one vote, became wholly insignificant.\n\n  [244] Dionys. Halicarn. cap. 2. p. 137. Edit. Wechel.\n\n  [245] About three hundred pounds.\n\n  [246] Liv. lib. 4. p. 276.\n\n  [248] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 4. p. 182. edit. 1546.\n\n  [249] Dionys. Halicarn. id. ibid.\n\n  [250] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 5. p. 205.\n\n  [251] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 5. p. 247.\n\n  [252] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 6. p. 255.\n\n  [253] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 6. p. 266.\n\n  [254] I have chiefly followed Livy in his beautiful relation of\n  this affair, as the description he gives of this unhappy\n  object, is not only much more striking than that of Dionysius,\n  but one of the most pathetick I ever met with in history. Liv.\n  lib. 2. p. 92.\n\n  [255] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 61. p. 268.\n\n  [256] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 6. p. 270.\n\n  [257] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 6. p. 276...77.\n\n  [258] It is remarkable that Appius terms the aristocracy, which\n  at that very time was hardly seventeen years standing, the form\n  of government which they had inherited from their ancestors.\n\n  [259] Liv. lib. 2. p. 91.\n\n  [260] Sallust. Fragment. apud Augustin. de civitate Dei. lib.\n  2. cap. 18. edit. Froben. 1569.\n\n  [261] In the comitia tributa or assemblies by tribes the people\n  voted in the same manner, as in the comitia curiata or\n  assemblies by curi\u00e6. The majority of single votes in every\n  tribe constituted the voice of that tribe, and the majority of\n  the tribes decided the question. But the Patricians conscious\n  of their superiority in the comitia centuriata or assemblies by\n  centuries, constantly refused to obey the plebiscita or decrees\n  made by the people in their assemblies by tribes, which they\n  insisted were binding to the Plebeians only. After the\n  abolition of the decemvirate the people obtained a law: ...\n  \u201cthat all laws passed in their assemblies by tribes should have\n  equal force with those made in the assemblies by centuries, and\n  should be equally obligatory to all the Romans without\n  distinction.\u201d\n\n  [262] The place of election.\n\n  [263] Proscriptiones innoxiorum ob divitias, cruciatus virorum\n  illustrium, vastam urbem fuga et c\u00e6dibus, bona civium miserorum\n  quasi Cimbricam pr\u00e6dum, venum aut dono datam. Sall. Frag. p.\n  142.\n\n  [264] Ante Carthaginem deletam ... metus hostilis in bonis\n  artibus civitatem retinebat. Sall. Bell. Jug. p. 80.\n\n  [265] Postquam remoto metu Punico mores non paulatim ut antea,\n  sed torrentis modo pr\u00e6cipitati. Sall. Frag. p. 139.\n\n  ... Rapere, consumere, sua parvi pendere, aliena cupere,\n  pudorem, pudicitiam, divina humana promiscua, nihil pensi,\n  neque moderati habere. De Bell. Cat. pag. 8.\n\n  [266] C\u00e6pere nobilitas dignitatem, populus libertatem in\n  lubidinem vertere. Bell. Jug. p. 80.\n\n  [267] Postquam diviti\u00e6 honori esse c\u0153perunt, et eas gloria,\n  imperium, potentia sequebatur hebescere virtus, paupertas\n  probro haberi, innocentia pro malevolentia duci c\u00e6pit. Bell.\n  Cat. p. 8.\n\n  [268] Ita cum potentia avaritia sine modo, modestiaque\n  invadere, polluere, et vastare omnia, nihil pensi neque sancti\n  habere. p. 81.\n\n  Sibi quisque ducere, trahere rapere. De Bell. Jug. p. 81.\n\n  [269] Eos paulatim expulsos agris, inertia atque inopia\n  incertas domos habere subegit: c\u00e6pere alienas opes petere,\n  libertatem suam cum Republica venalem habere. Sall. Orat. 2. ad\n  C\u00e6sarem de Repub. Ordinand. p. 197.\n\n  [270] Ita omnia in duas partes abstracta sunt: respublica, qu\u00e6\n  media fuerat, dilacerata. De Bell. Jug. p. 80.\n\n  [271] Pecuni\u00e6 cupido fidem, probitatem ceterasque bonas artes\n  subvertit; pro his superbiam, crudelitatem deos negligere,\n  omnia venalia habere edocuit. De Bell. Cat. p. 7.\n\n  [272] Cupido Imperii, id. p. 7.\n\n  [273] Primo pecuni\u00e6, dein imperii cupido crevit, ea quasi\n  materies omnium malorum fuere.... Post ubi contagio, quasi\n  pestilentia, invasit, civitas immutata, imperium ex justissimo\n  atque optumo, crudele intolerandumque factum. De Bell. Cat. p.\n  7.\n\n  [274] Aliud clausum in pectore, aliud promptum in lingua\n  habere, amicitias, inimicitiasq; vultum, quam ingenium bonum\n  habere. Ibid.\n\n  [275] Malitia pr\u00e6miis exercetur; ubi ea demseris, nemo omnium\n  gratuito malus est. p. 200.\n\n  [276] Nam, ubi malos pr\u00e6mia sequuntur, haud facile quisquam\n  gratuito bonus est. Sall. Orat. Philip. contra Lapid. p. 145.\n\n  [277] Pauci potentes, quorum in gratia plerique concesserant,\n  sub honesto patrum, aut plebis nomine dominationes affectabant,\n  bonique et mali cives appellati, non ob merita in rempublicam\n  (omnibus pariter corruptis) sed uti quisque locupletissimus et\n  injuria validior, quia pr\u00e6sentia defendebat, pro bono\n  ducebatur. Frag. p. 139.\n\n  [278] Iidem illi factiosi regunt, dant, adimunt qu\u00e6 lubet;\n  innocentes circumveniunt: suos ad honorem extollunt. Non\n  facinus, non probrum, aut flagitium obstat, quo minus\n  magistratus expetant: quod commodum est, trahunt, rapiunt:\n  postremo tamquam urbe capta, lubidine ac licentia sua pro\n  legibus utuntur. Sall. Or. 2. ad C\u00e6sar. p. 196.\n\n  [279] Divitiis, quas honeste habere licebat, per turpitudinem\n  abuti properabant. Lubido stupri, gane\u00e6, c\u00e6terique cultus non\n  minor incesserat.... Vescendi causa, terra mariq; omnia\n  exquirere; dormire priusquam somni cupido esset: non famam, aut\n  sitim, neq; frigus, neq; lassitudinem operiri; sed ea omnia\n  luxu ante capere. H\u00e6c juventutem, ubi familiares opes\n  defecerant, ad facinora incedebant. Animus imbutus malis\n  artibus haud facile lubidinibus carebat: eo profusius omnibus\n  modis qu\u00e6stui atque sumtui deditus erat. Sall. de Bell. Cat. p.\n  9.\n\n  [280] Ubi diviti\u00e6 clar\u00e6 habentur, ibi omnia bona vilia sunt,\n  fides, probitas, pudor, pudicitia. Sall. Orat. 2. ad C\u00e6s. p.\n  199.\n\n  [281] Itaque omnes concessere jam in paucorum dominationem, qui\n  per militare nomen, \u00e6rarium, exercitum, regnum, provincias\n  occupavere, et arcem habent ex spoliis vestris: cum interim\n  more pecudum vos multitudo singulis habendos, fruendosque\n  pr\u00e6betis, exsuti omnibus, qu\u00e6 majores reliquere: nisi quia\n  vosmet ipsi per suffragia, uti pr\u00e6sides olim, nunc dominos\n  destinatis. Salt. Frag. Orat. Lepid. ad Pleb. p. 160.\n\n  [282] \u0394\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u03b4\u03ae\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5 \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b4\u03c9\u03c1\u03bf\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f51\u03c0\u1f78 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd\n  \u03c6\u03b9\u03bb\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03cd\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c7\u03c1\u03c9\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03c9\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b4\u03b5\u03ba\u03ac\u03b6\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u03ac\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03c1\u03b3\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u1fb3\n  \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ae\u03b8\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd, \u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03ba\u03cc\u03c8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03ac\u03c0\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03bd\u03cc\u03c3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b1\n  \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, \u1f14\u03c0\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b5 \u03b4\u03cc\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1 \u03b8\u03ad\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c3\u03cd\u03b3\u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c0\u03c9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f31\n  \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03b8\u03ad\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2, \u03b5\u1f30 \u03bc\u03b7\u03b4\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ae\u03b3\u03bf\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03b9\u03b5\u03bd, \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1f76\n  \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b9\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03be \u1f00\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03ba\u03b7\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u1f14\u03bd\u03bf\u03c1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03ba\u03b1\u03c3\u03c4\u03ae\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f50\u03b8\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd.\n  Plut. in Vit. Cat. p. 126.\n\n  [283] \u1f1d\u03c9\u03b8\u03b5\u03bd \u03bf\u1f56\u03bd \u1f10\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b2\u1fc6\u03bc\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6 \u039a\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd\u03bf\u03c2, \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03b5\u03bb\u03b8\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2, \u1f00\u03b8\u03c1\u03cc\u03bf\u03b9\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03c0\u03b5\u03c3\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f10\u03b2\u03cc\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f10\u03b2\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03c6\u03ae\u03bc\u03bf\u03c5\u03bd, \u1f14\u03b2\u03b1\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd. Plut. ibid.\n\n  [284]\n\n   Hinc rapti fasces pretio: sectorque favoris\n   Ipse sui populus: lethalisque ambitus urbi\n   Annua venali referens certamina campo.\n\n   Lucan. Pharsal. lib. 1. Edit. 1506.\n\n  [285] Mala sua, quod malorum ultimum est, amant ... et definit\n  esse remedio locus, ubi qu\u00e6 fuerant vitia, mores sunt. Senec.\n  Ep. 39. p. 100.\n\n  [286] In tanta tamque corrupta civitate, Catilina omnium\n  flagitiosorum, atque facinorosorum circum se, tamquam\n  stipatorum catervas habebat. Sall. de Bell. Cat. p. 9.\n\n  [287] \u039a\u03b1\u03af\u03c3\u03b1\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2]\u2014\u2014\u03c4\u1f70 \u03bd\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b5\u03c6\u03b8\u03b1\u03c1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03b7\n  \u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03c4\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ac\u03b3\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd. Plut. in Vit. Cat. Min.\n  p. 241.\n\n  [288] Peculatus \u00e6rarii, et per vim sociis erept\u00e6 pecuni\u00e6, qu\u00e6\n  quamquam gravia sunt, tamen consuetudine jam pro nihilo\n  habentur. Sall. de Bell. Jug. p. 73.\n\n  [289] Adeo juventus luxu atque avaritia corrupta est, uti\n  merito dicatur, genitos esse, qui neque ipsi habere possent res\n  familiares, neque alios pati. Sall. Frag. pag. 139.\n\n  [290] Popilius to Antiochus Epiph. Livy. lib. 45. p. 672.\n\n  [291] Juv. Sat. 4.\n\n  [292]\n\n              ... Ex quo suffragia nulli\n    Vendimus, effugit Curas. Nam qui dabat olim\n    Imperium, fasces, legiones, omnia, nunc se\n    Continet, atque duas tantum res anxius optat\n    Panem et Circenses.\n\n    Juv. Sat. 10. lin. 77.\n\n    Otium cum servitio.\n\n    Sall. Frag. p. 341.\n\n  [293] Ludi Scenici.\n\n  [294] Histriones.\n\n  [295] Etenim cum artifex ejusmodi sit; ut solus dignus videatur\n  esse, qui in scena spectetur: tum vir ejusmodi est, ut solus\n  dignus videatur, qui eo non accedat. Orat. pro Rosc. Edit.\n  Glasg. p. 43.\n\n  [296] Divus Augustus immunes verberum histriones quondam\n  responderat. Tacit. c. 14. p. 42. Edit. Glasg.\n\n  Coercitionem in histriones magistratibus in omni tempore et\n  loco lege vetere permissam ademit. Suet. in Vit. Aug. p. 163.\n\n  [297] Histrionum licentiam adeo compescuit, ut Stephanionem\n  Togatorium, cui in puerilem habitum circumtonsam matronam\n  ministrasse compererat, per tria theatra virgis c\u0153sum\n  relegaverit. Hylam pantomimum querente pr\u00e6tore, in atrio domus\n  su\u00e6, nemine excluso, flagellis verberaverit: et Hyladem urbe\n  atque Italia submoverit, quod spectatorem a quo exsibilabatur,\n  demonstrasset digito, conspicuumque fecisset. Ibid.\n\n  [298] Ostendam nobilissimos juvenes mancipia pantomimorum.\n  Senec. Epist. 47. p. 118.\n\n  [299] Variis dehinc et s\u00e6pius irritis pr\u00e6torum questibus,\n  postremo C\u00e6sar de immodestia histrionum retulit; multa ab iis\n  in publicum seditiose, f\u0153da per domos tentari ... eo\n  flagitiorum et virium venisse, ut auctoritate patrum coercendum\n  sit. Pulsi tum histriones Italia. Tacit. Annal. 4. p. 134.\n\n  [300] C\u00e6de in theatro per discordiam admissa, capita factionum\n  et histriones propter quos dissidebatur, relegavit: nec ut\n  revocaret unquam ullis populi precibus potuit evinci. Suet. in\n  Tib. c. 37.\n\n  [301] \u03a3\u03c5\u03bc\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c3\u03bf\u1f76, \u039a\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b1\u03c1, \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u1f21\u03bc\u1fb6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\n  \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c4\u03c1\u03af\u03b2\u03b5\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9. Dion. Cass. lib. 54. p. 533.\n\n  [302]\n\n    Verum equitis quoque jam migravit ab aure voluptas\n    Omnis, ad incertos oculos, et gaudia vana.\n\n    Hor. epist. 1. lib. 2. lin. 187.\n\n    Tanto cum strepitu ludi spectantur, et artes,\n    Diviti\u00e6que peregrin\u00e6: quibus oblitus actor\n    Quum stetit in scena, concurrit dextera l\u00e6v\u00e6:\n    Dixit adhuc aliquid? nil sane. Quid placet ergo?\n    Lana Tarentino violas imitata veneno.\n\n    Ibid. lin. 203.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE REAL CAUSE OF THE RAPID DECLENSION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLICK.\n\n\nDionysius of Halicarnassus observes,[303] that Romulus formed his new\ngovernment in many respects after the model of that of Sparta, which\naccounts for that great resemblance, we evidently meet with between the\nRoman and Spartan constitutions. I may add too, that we cannot help\nobserving as great a resemblance for some ages at least between the\nmanners of both those people. For we find the same simplicity in their\nhouses, diet and apparel; the same contempt for wealth, and quite to the\nlast period of liberty, the same warlike genius. Publick spirit and the\nlove of their country was carried in both states to the highest pitch of\nenthusiasm; it was deaf to the voice of nature itself; and that amiable\nvirtue wore a kind of savage aspect at Rome and Sparta. But the\nalteration of their manners which alike preceded the loss both of the\nSpartan and Roman liberty, will admit of no kind of comparison either as\nto degree or progress. Luxury and corruption stole in by very slow\ndegrees, and were never carried to any remarkable height amongst the\nSpartans. But, as Sallust beautifully expresses it,[304] the Roman\nmanners were precipitated at once to the depth of corruption after the\nmanner of a resistless torrent. I observe that the destruction of\nCarthage is fixed upon by that elegant historian, as the \u00e6ra from which\nthe rise of this rapid degeneracy is to be dated. He assigns too the\nremoval of the dread occasioned by that dangerous rival, as the cause of\nthis sudden and astonishing change. Because according to his reasoning,\nthey could then give a full loose to the impetuous fury of their\npassions, without restraint or fear. But the cause here assigned is by\nno means equal to the effect. For though it might contribute in some\nmeasure to accelerate the progress of luxury, and consequently the\ncorruption of their manners; yet the real cause of their sudden\ndegeneracy was widely different.\n\nThe Romans founded their system of policy, at the very origin of their\nstate, upon that best and wisest principle, \u201cthe fear of the gods, a\nfirm belief of a divine superintending providence, and a future state of\nrewards and punishments:\u201d their children were trained up in this belief\nfrom tender infancy, which took root and grew up with them by the\ninfluence of an excellent education, where they had the benefit of\nexample as well as precept.[305] Hence we read of no heathen nation in\nthe world, where both the publick and private duties of religion were so\nstrictly adhered to, and so scrupulously observed as amongst the Romans.\nThey imputed their good or bad success to their observance of these\nduties, and they received publick prosperities or publick calamities, as\nblessings conferred, or punishments inflicted by their gods. Their\nhistorians hardly ever give us an account of any defeat received by that\npeople,[306] which they do not ascribe to the omission, or contempt of\nsome religious ceremony by their generals. For though the ceremonies\nthere mentioned, justly appear to us instances of the most absurd, and\nmost extravagant superstition, yet as they were esteemed essential acts\nof religion by the Romans, they must consequently carry all the force of\nreligious principle. We neither exceeded, says Cicero,[307] speaking of\nhis countrymen, the Spaniards in number, nor did we excel the Gauls in\nstrength of body, nor the Carthaginians in craft, nor the Greeks in arts\nor sciences. But we have indisputably surpassed all the nations in the\nuniverse in piety and attachment to religion,[308] and in the only\npoint, which can be called true wisdom, a thorough conviction, that all\nthings here below are directed, and governed by divine providence. To\nthis principle alone Cicero wisely attributes the grandeur and good\nfortune of his country. For what man is there, says he, who is convinced\nof the existence of the gods, but must be convinced at the same time,\nthat our mighty empire owes its origin,[309] its increase, and its\npreservation, to the protecting care of their divine providence. A plain\nproof that these continued to be the real sentiments of the wiser\nRomans, even in the corrupt times of Cicero. From this principle\nproceeded that respect for, and submission to their laws, and that\ntemperance, moderation, and contempt for wealth, which are the best\ndefence against the encroachments of injustice and oppression. Hence too\narose that inextinguishable love for their country, which, next to the\ngods, they looked upon as the chief object of veneration. This they\ncarried to such a height of enthusiasm,[310] as to make every human tie\nof social love, natural affection, and self-preservation give way to\nthis duty to their dearer country. Because they not only loved their\ncountry as their common mother, but revered it as a place which was dear\nto their gods; which they had destined to give laws to the rest of the\nuniverse,[311] and consequently favoured with their peculiar care and\nprotection. Hence proceeded that obstinate and undaunted courage, that\ninsuperable contempt of danger, and death itself in defence of their\ncountry, which complete the idea of the Roman character as it is drawn\nby historians in the virtuous ages of the republick. As long as the\nmanners of the Romans were regulated by this first great principle of\nreligion, they were free and invincible. But the atheistical doctrine of\nEpicurus,[312] which insinuated itself at Rome, under the respectable\nname of philosophy, after their acquaintance with the Greeks, undermined\nand destroyed this ruling principle. I allow that luxury, by corrupting\nmanners, had weakened this principle, and prepared the Romans for the\nreception of atheism, which is the never-failing attendant of luxury.\nBut as long as this principle remained, it controlled manners, and\nchecked the progress of luxury in proportion to its influence. But when\nthe introduction of atheism had destroyed this principle, the great bar\nto corruption was removed, and the passions at once let loose to run\ntheir full career without check, or control. The introduction therefore\nof the atheistical tenets attributed to Epicurus,[313] was the real\ncause of that rapid depravity of the Roman manners, which has never\nbeen satisfactorily accounted for, either by Sallust, or any other\nhistorians.\n\nThe learned, I know, are not a little divided in their opinions about\nEpicurus. But a disquisition into what were, or were not the real tenets\nof that philosopher, would be wholly foreign to my purpose. By the\ndoctrine of the Epicureans, I mean that system which Lucretius has\ndressed up in his poem with all the beauties of poetry, and all the\nelegance of diction. This, like the rest of the atheistick systems,\nwhich are attributed to most of the Grecian philosophers, is pregnant\nwith the wildest absurdities that ever entered into the human\nimagination. Epicurus, if Lucretius has given us his genuine tenets,\nascribes the formation of the universe to the fortuitous concourse of\nsenseless atoms of matter.[314] His master, Democritus, from whom he\nborrowed his system, asserts the same. But Epicurus has exceeded him in\nabsurdity. For Democritus, if we may credit Plutarch, endowed his atoms\nwith a certain living-intelligence, which Epicurus scorns to make use\nof. He boldly deduces life, intelligence, and free-will itself, from the\ndirect, oblique, and other various motions of his inanimate atoms. He\nadmits a sort of insignificant beings, whom he terms gods; but as he\nwould not allow them to have any hand in the formation of his universe,\nso neither will he suffer them to have the least share in the conduct of\nit. He has showed them plainly, that he could do without them, and, as\nhe has made them so egregiously insignificant as to be able to do\nneither good nor harm, he has packed them off at a distance, to live an\nindolent, lazy life, and to divert themselves just as they think proper.\nThus he has got rid of the troublesome doctrine of a divine\nsuperintending Providence. Sometimes he forgets himself, and seems to\ndeny their very existence. For he tells us in one place, that the whole\nuniverse contains nothing but matter and empty space, or what arises\nfrom the casual concurrence of these two principles:[315] consequently\nthat no third nature, different from these two, can possibly be proved\nto exist either by the cognizance of our senses, or by the utmost\nefforts of our reasoning faculty. He teaches, that the soul is composed\nof the finest, and most subtile atoms, consequently discerptible and\nmortal. That the identity of man consists in the union of these finer\ncorpuscles with the grosser ones, which compose the body. That, at their\ndisunion by death, the soul evaporates, and is dissipated in the upper\nregions, from whence it first distilled, and the same man exists no\nmore.[316] Nay he is so amazingly absurd as to assert, that if the\nsoul,[317] after its separation, should still retain its consciousness,\nand, after a length of time, by some lucky jumble of his atoms, should\nhappen to animate another body, this new compound would be quite a\ndifferent man: consequently, that this new man would be no more\ninterested in the actions of the former, than the former would be\nresponsible for the behaviour of the latter, or for that of any future\nman, who might happen hereafter to be produced by another casual\nassemblage of the atoms of the same soul, united to those of another\nbody. This doctrine is plainly stolen from the Pythagorean system of the\ntransmigration of souls; but mutilated, and miserably perverted to the\npurposes of atheism. The absurdities in this wild philosophy are so\nself-evident, that to attempt a refutation of them, would be an affront\nto common sense. Yet, from this source, these philosophers draw their\npretended consolations against the fear of death. That at death the\nidentity of the man absolutely ceases, and we totally lose our\nexistence.[318] Yet, from these excellent comforters, our modern\nscepticks have revived their senseless tenet of annihilation to serve\nthe cause of libertinism. The grand _desideratum_, in libertinism, is,\nto be able to give an unbounded loose to the sensual passions, to their\nvery utmost extent, without any impertinent hints from a certain\ndisagreeable monitor, called conscience, and the dread of an\nafter-reckoning. Now as both these terrors are removed by this system of\nannihilation, it is no wonder that libertines, who abound in a corrupt\nlicentious age, should fly eagerly to so comfortable a doctrine, which\nat once silences those enemies to their pleasures. This is the creed\nintroduced by the sect of Epicurus amongst the Romans, which easily\naccounts for that sudden, and universal revolution in their manners. For\nmanners can never be so effectually, and so speedily depraved, as by a\ntotal extinction of all religious principle; and all religious principle\nmust be necessarily subverted wherever this doctrine of annihilation is\nreceived.[319] I allow that Lucretius gives us some excellent maxims\nfrom Epicurus, and inveighs in many places against the vices of his\ncountrymen. But the cheat is too gross and palpable, and only proves,\nthat he has gilt over the pill of atheism to make it go down more\nsmoothly.[320] For how can a superstructure stand when the foundation is\ntaken away; and of what service is the best system of morality when the\nsanction of future rewards and punishments, the great motive which\nshould enforce the practice, is removed by the denial of a Providence,\nand the doctrine of annihilation? Cicero informs us, that all the fine\nthings, which Epicurus asserts of the existence of his gods, and their\nexcellent nature, are mere grimace, and only thrown out to screen him\nfrom censure.[321] For he could not be ignorant, that the laws of his\ncountry punished every man with the utmost severity, who struck at that\nfundamental principle of all religion, the existence of a Deity.\nCicero therefore, who had thoroughly examined his tenets, affirms him,\nby his own principles, to have been a downright atheist.[322] For in\nreality, a man who should assert the existence of such idle gods, as are\nneither capable of doing good or hurt, must, if he expects to be\nbelieved, be a greater fool than the man, \u201cwho says in his heart there\nis no God at all.\u201d Yet this strange system, though fraught with such\nabsurdities and contradictions as could scarce be palmed upon the genius\nof a Hottentot, has been implicitly swallowed by too many of those\ngentlemen, who affect to call themselves the _esprits forts_ of the\npresent age. These are the atheistical tenets of Epicurus, preserved by\nLucretius in his beautiful poem, which, like poison, conveyed in sweets,\nplease and murder at the same time.\n\nThe Greeks were early infected with this execrable doctrine, and shew\nthe effect it had upon their manners by their violation of publick\nfaith, and contempt for the most sacred ties of religion. Trust, says\nPolybius, but a single talent to a Greek, who has been used to finger\nthe publick money, and though you have the security of ten counterparts,\ndrawn up by as many publick notaries, backed by as many seals, and the\ntestimony of twice as many witnesses, yet, with all these precautions,\nyou cannot possibly prevent him from proving a rogue.[323] Whilst the\nRomans, who, by their various offices, are intrusted with large sums of\npublick money, pay so conscientious a regard to the religion of their\noffice-oath, that they were never known to violate their faith, though\nrestrained only by that single tie. How greatly they deviated from this\nrectitude of manners, after these infidel tenets had taken root amongst\nthem, we may learn from Cicero, in his orations and epistles. Sallust\ntoo will inform us, how extremely common the crime of perjury was grown,\nin that severe reproach, which Lucius Philippus, a patrician, makes to\nLepidus, the consul, before the whole senate. That he neither stood in\nawe of men or gods, whom he had so frequently injured, and defied by his\nvillanies and perjuries.[324]\n\nPolybius gives it as his real opinion, that nothing shows the superior\nexcellence of the civil government of the Romans, to that of other\npeople, so much as those religious sentiments with respect to their\ngods, which they constantly inculcated and supported.[325] He affirms\ntoo his real sentiments to be, that the chief support and preservation\nof the Roman republick arose from that awful fear of the gods, which was\nso much ridiculed, and exploded by the Grecians. I have taken the\nliberty to render \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, the Grecians, who are evidently\npointed at in this passage.[326] For so just and accurate a writer as\nPolybius could not be ignorant, that the Grecians were the only people\nin the world at that time, who had been debauched into atheism by the\npernicious tenets of Epicurus. Polybius firmly believed the existence of\na Deity, and the interposition of a divine superintending Providence,\nthough he was an enemy to superstition. Yet when he observed the good\neffects produced amongst the Romans by their religion,[327] though\ncarried even to the highest possible degree of superstition, and the\nremarkable influence it had upon their manners in private life, as well\nas upon their publick counsels, he concludes it to be[328] the result of\na wise, and consummate policy in the ancient legislators. He therefore\nvery justly censures those as wrong-headed, and wretchedly bungling\npoliticians, who at that time endeavoured to eradicate the fear of an\nafter-reckoning, and the terrors of an hell, out of the minds of a\npeople. Yet how few years ago did we see this miserably mistaken policy\nprevail in our own country, during the whole administration of some late\npower-engrossing ministers. Compelled at all events to secure a majority\nin parliament to support themselves against the efforts of opposition,\nthey found the greatest obstacle to their schemes arise from those\nprinciples of religion, which yet remained amongst the people. For\nthough a great number of the electors were not at all averse to the\nbribe, yet their consciences were too tender to digest perjury. To\nremove this troublesome test at elections, which is one of the bulwarks\nof our constitution, would be impracticable. To weaken or destroy those\nprinciples, upon which the oath was founded, and from which it derived\nits force and obligation, would equally answer the purpose, and destroy\nall publick virtue at the same time. The bloody and deep felt effects of\nthat hypocrisy, which prevailed in the time of Cromwell, had driven\ngreat numbers of the sufferers into the contrary extreme. When therefore\nso great a part of the nation was already prejudiced against whatever\ncarried the appearance of a stricter piety, it is no wonder that shallow\nsuperficial reasoners, who have not logick enough to distinguish between\nthe use and abuse of a thing, should readily embrace those atheistical\ntenets, which were imported, and took root in the voluptuous, and\nthoughtless reign of Charles the second. But that solid learning, which\nrevived after the restoration, easily baffled the efforts of open and\navowed atheism, which from that time has taken shelter under the less\nobnoxious name of deism. For the principles of modern deism, when stript\nof that disguise which has been artfully thrown over them, to deceive\nthose who hate the fatigue of thinking, and are ever ready to admit any\nconclusion in argument, which is agreeable to their passions, without\nexamining the premises, are in reality the same with those of Epicurus,\nas transmitted to us by Lucretius. The influence therefore, which they\nhad upon the manners of the Greeks and Romans, will readily account for\nthose effects which we experience from them in our own country, where\nthey so fatally prevail. To patronise and propagate their principles,\nwas the best expedient which the narrow selfish policy of those\nministers could suggest. For their greatest extent of genius never\nreached higher, than a fertility in temporary shifts and expedients, to\nstave off the evil day of national account, which they so much dreaded.\nThey were sensible that the wealth and luxury, which are the general\neffects of an extensive trade in a state of profound peace, had already\ngreatly hurt the morals of the people, and smoothed the way for their\ngrand system of corruption. Far from checking this licentious spirit of\nluxury and dissipation, they left it to its full and natural effects\nupon the manners, whilst, in order to corrupt the principles of the\npeople, they retained, at the publick expense, a venal set of the most\nshameless miscreants that ever abused the liberty of the press, or\ninsulted the religion of their country. To the administration of such\nministers, which may justly be termed the grand \u00e6ra of corruption, we\nowe that fatal system of bribery, which has so greatly affected the\nmorals of the electors in almost every borough in the kingdom. To that\ntoo we may justly attribute the present contempt, and disregard of the\nsacred obligation of an oath, which is the strongest bond of society,\nand the best security and support of civil government.\n\nI have now, I hope, satisfactorily accounted for that rapid, and\nunexampled degeneracy of the Romans, which brought on the total\nsubversion of that mighty republick. The cause of this sudden, and\nviolent change of the Roman manners, has been just hinted at by the\nsagacious Montesquieu, but, to my great surprise, has not been duly\nattended to by any one historian I have yet met with.[329] I have showed\ntoo, how the same cause has been working the same effects in our own\nnation, as it invariably will in every country where those fatally\ndestructive principles are admitted. As the real end of all history is\ninstruction, I have held up a just portrait of the Roman manners, in the\ntimes immediately preceding the loss of their liberty, to the inspection\nof my countrymen, that they may guard in time against those calamities\nwhich will be the inevitable consequence of the like degeneracy. The\nunpromising aspect of our affairs, at the time of the sudden and\nunexpected alliance between the houses of Bourbon and Austria, gave the\nfirst rise to these reflections. But as the interests and situation of\nthis kingdom, with respect to France, are so greatly analogous to those\nof Carthage with respect to Rome, I shall proceed to compare the\ndifferent manners, policy, and military conduct of those two rival\nnations. By thus comparing the different policy of these warlike people,\nwhose views and interests were as diametrically opposite, and as\nirreconcilable as those of Great Britain and France, we may learn the\nsuperior advantages which each enjoyed, and the different disadvantages\narising from their different policy, which each people laboured under,\nduring their long and inveterate contests. The result, which I most\nsincerely wish from this inquiry, is, that we may avoid those egregious\nblunders on the side of the Romans, which reduced them to the very brink\nof ruin, and those more capital defects on the part of the\nCarthaginians, which terminated in the utter destruction of their very\nbeing as a people.\n\n  [303] Dionys. Halicarn. lib. 2. 65.\n\n  [304] Mores majorum non paulatim ut antea, sed torrentis modo\n  precipitati. Sallust. Fragment. p. 139.\n\n  [305] Nulla umquam res publica sanctior, nec bonis exemplis\n  dititor fuit. Liv. in Pr\u00e6fat.\n\n  [306] Dionys. Halicarn. Lib. 2. p. 61, 62.\n\n  [307] \u2014Tamen nec numero Hispanos, nec robore Gallos, nec\n  calliditate P\u0153nos, nec artibus Gr\u00e6cos.\n\n  [308] Sed pietate ac religione, atque hac una sapientia, quod\n  deorum immortalium numine omnia regi gubernarique perspeximus,\n  omnes gentes nationesque superavimus. Cic. de. Harus. resp. p.\n  189.\n\n  [309] Quis est qui\u2014\u2014cum deos esse intellexerit, non intelligat\n  eorum numine hoc tantum imperium esse natum, et auctum et\n  retentum. Ibid. p. 188.\n\n  [310] Cari sunt parentes, cari liberi, propinqui et familiares:\n  sed omnes omnium caritates patria una complexa est. Cic. de\n  Offic.\n\n  [311] Pro qua patria, mori, et cui nos totos dedere, et in qua\n  nostra omnia ponere, et quasi consecrare debemus. Cic. de Leg.\n\n  [312] That the fundamental principles of the stoicks tended to\n  atheism I readily grant: but as the real philosophers of that\n  sect inculcated a thorough contempt for what are called the\n  good things of this life, and were extremely austere in their\n  morals; their doctrines seem to have had a very different\n  influence upon the manners of the people wherever they were\n  received, from those of the Epicureans.\u2014Brutus and Cato the\n  inflexible champions of liberty, and almost the only virtuous\n  characters in that corrupt period, were rigid stoicks.\u2014Julius\n  C\u00e6sar who subverted the constitution of his country, was a\n  thorough Epicurean, both in principle and practice. His\n  principles we plainly see in his sophistical speech in Sallust,\n  where he urges the total extinction of our being at death, as\n  an argument for sparing the lives of Cataline\u2019s accomplices.\n  For he audaciously affirms to the senate:\u2014\u201cthat death as a\n  punishment was so far from being an evil; that it released us\n  from all our sorrows, when labouring under distress and misery:\n  that it put a final period to all the evils of this life,\n  beyond which there was no longer room either for grief or joy.\u201d\n  Thus as the learned Dr. Warburton justly remarks, \u201che took\n  occasion, with a licentiousness until then unknown to that\n  august assembly, to explain and enforce the avowed principles\n  of Epicurus (of whose sect he was) concerning _the mortality of\n  the soul_.\u201d Divine legation part 2d. pages, 111, 112, last\n  edition. That his manners were notoriously infamous we may\n  learn from the history of his life in Suetonius, where he is\n  termed _the husband of every woman, and the wife of every man_.\n  Omnium mulierum virum, et omnium virorum mulierem. Sueton. in\n  vit. Jul. C\u00e6sar, c. 52. ad finem.\n\n  [313] I here mean the tenets of the _Epicurean atheists_ as\n  they are termed by the very learned Mr. Baxter in his treatise\n  of the immortality of the soul; where he has confuted them at\n  large in the first volume of that admirable work.\n\n  Inquiry into the nature of the human soul. Vol. 1. p. 355.\n\n  [314] It has been remarked; that the disciples of the ancient\n  Greek philosophers have blended so many of their own opinions\n  with the doctrine of their masters, that it is often difficult\n  to distinguish the genuine tenets of the latter, from the\n  spurious ones which have been interpolated by their\n  followers.... Thus Epicurus taught that the summum bonum or\n  supreme good consisted in pleasure. His defenders insist: that\n  he placed it in that refined pleasure which is inseparable from\n  the practice of virtue. His enemies affirm; that he meant the\n  grosser pleasure which arises wholly from the sensual\n  passions.... His friends reply; that this notion was first\n  broached by the dissolute part of his disciples, who most\n  injuriously fathered it upon Epicurus, and then alleged his\n  authority as a plea for their debaucheries; ... they add, that\n  the true Epicureans, who adhered rigidly to the genuine tenets\n  of their master, always treated these spurious disciples as\n  sophists and impostors. But even allowing this to be a true\n  state of the case; yet that the materiality and dissolution of\n  the human soul at death was a genuine tenet of Epicurus, is a\n  truth which the most sanguine of his admirers are not able to\n  deny. As this pernicious tenet therefore was equally held, and\n  publickly taught by both these kinds of Epicureans, a very\n  small knowledge of human nature will enable us to decide, which\n  of the two opposite notions of pleasure was most likely to\n  prevail, and gain the greatest number of proselytes amongst a\n  luxurious and corrupt people.\n\n  The dissolute manners of the Romans in the last period of their\n  republick, prove evidently, in my opinion, that the sensual\n  doctrines of the later Epicureans were almost universally\n  received. And if the evidence of Horace in his humourous\n  description of the manners of those philosophers is to be\n  depended upon, they seem to have engrossed the _name_ of the\n  _sect_ wholly to themselves.\n\n    Me pinguem et Nitidum, bene curata cute, vises.\n    Cum ridere voles, _Epicuri de Grege porcum_.\n\n    Hor. Epist. 4. lib. 1.\n\n  [315]\n\n    Omnis, ut est igitur per se natura duabus\n    Consistit rebus; nam corpora sunt et inane.\n    Ergo pr\u00e6ter inane et corpora tertia per se.\n    Nulla potest rerum in numero natura relinqui\n    Nec qu\u00e6 sub sensus cadat ullo tempore nostros\n    Nec ratione animi quam quisquam possit apisci.\n\n  [316]\n\n    Et nebula ac fumus quoniam discedit in auras;\n    Crede animam quoque diffundi, multoque perire\n    Ocius, et citius dissolvi corpora prima,\n    Cum semel omnibus e membris ablata recessit.\n\n  [317]\n\n    Et si jam nostro sentit de corpore, postquam\n    Distracta est animi natura, anim\u00e6que potestas:\n    Nil tamen hoc ad nos; qui c\u00e6tu conjugioque\n    Corporis atque anim\u00e6 consistimus uniter apti.\n\n  [318]\n\n    Nil igitur mors est, ad nos neque pertinet hilum,\n    Quandoquidem natura animi mortalis habetur:\n    \u2014Ubi non erimus: cum corporis atque animai\n    Discidium fuerit, quibus e sumus uniter apti,\n    Scilicet haud nobis quicquam, qui non erimus tum,\n    Accidere omnino poterit, sensumque movere.\n\n  [319] Epicurus vero ex animis hominum extraxit radicitus\n  religionem, quum Diis immortalibus et opem et gratiam sustulit.\n  Cic. de Nat. Deor. p. 76 and 77.\n\n  [320] At etiam liber est Epicuri de sanctitate. Ludimur ab\n  homine non tam faceto, quam ad scribendi licentiam libero. Qu\u00e6\n  enim potest esse sanctitas, si Dii humana non curant? Cic. de\n  Nat. Deor. p. 78.\n\n  [321] The principles of the new academy, that doubting sect,\n  which Cicero had espoused, led so directly to scepticism, that\n  he keeps us in a state of perpetual doubt and uncertainty as to\n  his opinions. Mr. Baxter in his Inquiry into the nature of the\n  Human Soul, vol. 2. p. 70. complaining of Cicero\u2019s\n  inconsistencies and self-contradictions, observes, that\u2014\u201cas\n  philosophers he teaches men to be scepticks, or to maintain\n  _that truth is not to be perceived_.\u201d And afterwards adds\u2014\u201cBut\n  it is long since it hath been observed of this _great man_,\n  that his _academical writings are at variance_ with his other\n  works; and that he may be confuted out of himself, and in his\n  own words.\u201d\n\n  Dr. Warburton expatiates largely upon the great difficulties\n  there are in getting to Cicero\u2019s _real sentiments_. I shall\n  mention only two of them and in his own words. \u201cA fourth\n  difficulty arises from Tully\u2019s purpose in writing his works of\n  philosophy; which was, not to deliver his own opinion on any\n  point of ethicks or metaphysicks; but to explain to his\n  countrymen in the most intelligible manner, whatsoever the\n  Greeks had taught concerning them. In the execution of which\n  design, no sect could so well serve his turn as the _new\n  academy_, whose principle it was, _not to interfere with their\n  own opinions_, &c. But the principal difficulty proceeds from\n  the _several_ and _various_ characters he _sustained_ in his\n  life and writings; which habituated him to feign and dissemble\n  his opinions. Here (though he acted neither a weak nor an\n  unfair part) he becomes perfectly inscrutable. He may be\n  considered as an orator, a statesman, and a philosopher;\n  characters all equally _personated_, and no one more the _real\n  man_ than the other; but each of them taken up and laid down,\n  for the occasion. This appears from the numerous\n  inconsistencies we find in him throughout the course of his\n  sustaining them, &c.\u201d And afterwards, p. 171, the Dr. adds\u2014\u201cWe\n  meet with numbers of the like contradictions delivered in his\n  own person, and under his philosophical character,\u201d of which he\n  gives us several instances. In the note upon the word\n  personated, p. 169. the Dr. observes, \u201cthat as a philosopher,\n  his end and design in writing was not to deliver his own\n  opinion; but to explain the Grecian philosophy; on which\n  account he blames those as too curious, who were for having his\n  own sentiments. In pursuance of his design, he brings in\n  Stoicks, Epicureans, Platonists, Academicks, new and old, in\n  order to instruct the Romans in their various opinions, and\n  several ways of reasoning. But whether it be himself or others\n  that are brought upon the stage, it is the _academick_ not\n  Cicero; it is the Stoick, the Epicurean, not Balbus, nor\n  Velleius, who deliver their opinions.\u201d See Warburton\u2019s Divine\n  Legation, part 2. book 3. last edition, where the character of\n  Cicero, as drawn by that very learned and able writer, p. 165,\n  &c. is the best clew I know of to guide us through his\n  philosophical works. See also, Critical Inquiry into the\n  opinions and practice of the ancient philosophers, passim.\n\n  [322] Verius est igitur nimirum illud quod familiaris omnium\n  nostrum Posidonius disseruit in libro quinto de natura deorum,\n  nullos esse deos Epicuro videri: qu\u00e6que is de Diis immortalibus\n  dixerit, invidi\u00e6 detestand\u00e6 gratia dixisse, p. 78.\n\n  [323] \u039f\u1f31 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70 \u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f1d\u03bb\u03bb\u03b7\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f10\u1f70\u03bd\n  \u03c4\u03ac\u03bb\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c5\u03b8\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03ad\u03ba\u03b1, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n  \u03c3\u03c6\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u1fd6\u03b4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c3\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ac\u03c1\u03c4\u03c5\u03c1\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u03c0\u03bb\u03b1\u03c3\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03bf\u1f50 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\n  \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd. \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70 \u03b4\u1f72 \u1fec\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03ac \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f70\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03c1\u03b5\u03c3\u03b2\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2\n  \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03cd \u03c4\u03b9 \u03c0\u03bb\u1fc6\u03b8\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c7\u03c1\u03b7\u03bc\u03ac\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03c1\u03af\u03b6\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u03b4\u03b9\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd\n  \u1f45\u03c1\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd \u03c0\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, \u03c4\u03b7\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03ba\u03b1\u03b8\u1fc6\u03ba\u03bf\u03bd.\n\n  Polyb. lib. 6. p. 693.\n\n  I have called \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b9\u03b3\u03c1\u03b1\u03c6\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2, notary publick, because that office\n  answers the idea much better, in my opinion, than\n  _contrarotulator_, from which may possibly be derived our\n  comptroller, which, I think, is by no means what is here meant.\n\n  [324] Te neque hominum neque deorum pudet, quos perfidia et\n  perjurio violasti. Sall. Fragm. Orat. L. Phil. Cont. Lep. p.\n  146.\n\n  [325] \u039c\u03b5\u03b3\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u03ad \u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03c6\u03bf\u03c1\u1f70\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f78 \u1fec\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03af\u03c4\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03b1\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b2\u03ad\u03bb\u03c4\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9. \u03ba\u03b1\u03af \u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b5\u1fd6 \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u1f70\n  \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03ad\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c4\u1f70 \u1fec\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd\n  \u03c0\u03c1\u03ac\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u00b7 \u03bb\u03ad\u03b3\u03c9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd] \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1\u03bd. Polyb. lib. 6. p. 692.\n\n  [326] There is indeed little occasion for an apology for this\n  translation. The judicious critick will easily see, that in\n  this passage there is a plain contrast drawn between the\n  manners of the Grecians and the Romans in the time of Polybius.\n  The cause of that difference this able writer justly ascribes\n  to that \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1, or awful fear of the gods, so strongly\n  inculcated amongst the Romans, and so much despised and\n  ridiculed amongst the Grecians, who were at that time greatly\n  tinctured with the atheism of Epicurus. The instance he selects\n  in proof, drawn from the very different effect of an oath upon\n  the manners of those two people, must convince us beyond a\n  doubt, that by the words \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f40\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03b6\u03cc\u03bc\u03b5\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd,\n  he plainly characterizes his own countrymen. As by \u201c\u03bf\u1f31 \u03bd\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u1fc7\n  \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03c2 \u1f10\u03ba\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70\u201d, they who now (that is, in his time)\n  inconsiderately and absurdly reject those great sanctions of\n  religion, he evidently points at such of the leading men\n  amongst the Romans, as in his time had embraced the pernicious\n  tenets of Epicurus. For though he had stigmatized the\n  Carthaginians immediately before their avarice and lust of\n  gain, yet no man knew better than Polybius, that the\n  Carthaginians rather exceeded the Romans in superstition. That\n  they were sincere too in their belief, is evident from that\n  most horrible method, by which they expressed their\n  \u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b9\u03b4\u03b1\u03b9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03b1, which was their frequent sacrifices of great\n  numbers of their own children (those of the very first families\n  not excepted) to their god Moloch, who, by the Greeks and\n  Romans, was termed Chronos and Saturn.\n\n  I thought this remark might not be unuseful, because as none of\n  the commentators have taken any notice of it, so neither\n  Casaubon, nor any translator I have yet met with, seems to have\n  given us the true spirit and meaning of this remarkable\n  passage.\n\n  [327] \u1f18\u03c0\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03c3\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03ba\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03b3\u1ff4\u03b4\u03b7\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u1fc6\u03ba\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf \u03c4\u1f78\n  \u03bc\u03ad\u03c1\u03bf\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u2019 \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f34\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u2019 \u1f30\u03b4\u03af\u03b1\u03bd \u03b2\u03af\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03ba\u03bf\u03b9\u03bd\u1f70\n  \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03c9\u03c2, \u1f65\u03c3\u03c4\u03b5 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f51\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u03b2\u03bf\u03bb\u03ae\u03bd. Ibid.\n\n  [328] \u0394\u03b9\u03cc\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u03bf\u1f31 \u03c0\u03b1\u03bb\u03b1\u03b9\u03bf\u1f76 \u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03af \u03bc\u03bf\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03b8\u03b5\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03af\u03b1\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n  \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u1f85\u03b4\u03bf\u03c5 \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u1fc7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f61\u03c2 \u1f14\u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03b5\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f70\n  \u03c0\u03bb\u03ae\u03b8\u03b7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b5\u03b9\u03c3\u03b1\u03b3\u03b1\u03b3\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u1f7a \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1fb6\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd \u03bf\u1f31 \u03bd\u1fe6\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03ba\u1fc7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u1f00\u03bb\u03cc\u03b3\u03c9\u03c2\n  \u1f10\u03ba\u03b2\u03ac\u03bb\u03bb\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b1\u1f50\u03c4\u1f70. Lib. 6. p. 693.\n\n  [329] But as soon as Epicurus and his followers began to weaken\n  the foundation and principles of religion, by calling them in\n  question, all manner of immorality came rolling in like a\n  mighty torrent, and threw down the banks of law and sobriety.\n  Lawrence, M. A.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nCARTHAGINIANS AND ROMANS COMPARED.\n\n\nThe origin of both these people seems alike to have been extremely low.\nRomulus, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, could form no more\nthan three thousand foot and three hundred horse out of his whole\npeople, where every individual was obliged to be a soldier. The Tyrians,\nwho accompanied Dido in her flight from her brother Pymalion, could be\nbut few in number from the very circumstances of their escape from an\navaricious and vigilant tyrant.\n\nRomulus, to supply this defect, not only opened an asylum for all\nfugitives, whom he admitted as subjects, but in all his conquests over\nthe neighbouring states, annexed the lands to his own small territory,\nand incorporated the prisoners amongst his own Roman citizens. By this\nmasterly policy, notwithstanding the number of men he must necessarily\nhave lost during a warlike reign of thirty-seven years, he left at his\ndeath, according to Dionysius, forty-five thousand foot and a thousand\nhorse. As the same policy was pursued under the republican as under the\nregal government, the Romans, though involved in continual wars, found\nthemselves not inferior in number even to those nations, who were\nreputed the most populous. Dionysius, from whom I have taken this\naccount, extols the policy of the Romans in this point as greatly\nsuperior to that of the Grecians. The Spartans, says that judicious\nhistorian, were obliged to give up their dominion over Greece by their\nsingle defeat at Leuctra; as the loss of the battle of Ch\u00e6ronea reduced\nthe Thebans and Athenians to the sad necessity of yielding up the\ngovernment of Greece, as well as their liberty, to the Macedonians.\nThese misfortunes Dionysius imputes to the mistaken policy of the\nGrecians, who were, in general, unwilling to communicate the privileges\nof their respective states to foreigners. Whereas the Romans, who\nadmitted even their enemies to the rights of citizenship, derived\nadditional strength even from their misfortunes. And he affirms, that\nafter the terrible defeat of Cann\u00e6, where out of eighty-six thousand\nlittle more than three thousand three hundred and seventy men escaped,\nthe Romans owed the preservation of their state, not to the benevolence\nof fortune, as some, he says, imagine, but to the number of their\ndisciplined militia, which enabled them to encounter every danger. I am\nsensible that the remarks of Dionysius, which have been adopted by many\nof our modern writers, are extremely just in relation to the Thebans and\nAthenians. Because as the former of these people endeavoured to extend\ntheir dominions by arms, the latter both by arms and commerce, both\nstates ought, like the Romans, to have attracted as many foreigners as\npossibly they could, to enable them to execute plans which require an\ninexhaustible supply of people. But the exclusion of foreigners ought\nnot, in my opinion, to be censured as a defect in the Spartan\nconstitution. Because it is evident, from the testimony of Polybius and\nPlutarch, that the great end which Lycurgus proposed by his laws, was\nnot to increase the wealth or power of his countrymen, but to preserve\nthe purity of their manners; as his military regulations, according to\nthe same authors, were not calculated for making conquests and serving\nthe purposes of ambition, but for the defence and security of his\nrepublick. I observe too in proof of my opinion, that the Spartans\ngradually lost their virtue, and afterwards their liberty, only so far\nas they deviated from the institutions of their legislator.... But I\nreturn from the digression into which this subject unavoidably led me.\n\nIn our researches back into the remote times of antiquity, we must lay\nhold of whatever helps we are able to meet with. If Justin therefore is\nto be credited, Dido not only received considerable assistance from a\ncolony of Tyrians which she found settled in Utica, but admitted great\nnumbers of the natives who settled with her in the new city, and\nconsequently became Carthaginians.[330] I may add too in proof of this\naccount, that unless the Carthaginians had long pursued this wise\npolicy, it is scarce possible by the course of nature, that the Tyrians\nalone could have multiplied by propagation to so prodigious a degree,\nas to be able to furnish men sufficient to raise and carry on that\nextensive commerce, and plant those numerous colonies which we meet with\nin the earlier ages of their history.\n\nAs to their constitution, Rome and Carthage were both republicks, both\nfree, and their form of government nearly similar, as far as we can\ncollect from history. Two supreme magistrates,[331] annually elected,\nthe senate, and the people, formed the body politick in each republick.\nThe annual elections of their chief magistrates were a permanent source\nof division and faction alike in both; a defect which Lycurgus guarded\nagainst in the Spartan government, where the chief magistracy was\nperpetual and hereditary. The senate in both nations was composed out of\nthe most respectable and greatest men in each republick. At Rome the\nconsuls chose the senators with the approbation of the people, but at\nlast the censors arrogated that power to themselves. At Carthage, as\nAristotle informs us, the senators were elected; but as he has no where\ntold us who were the electors, it is most probable, that the right of\nelection was the inherent privilege of the people, since he censures\nthat republick as too much leaning towards democracy. At Rome, in the\nvirtuous times of that republick, birth and merit alone entitled the\npossessor to a place in the senate, as well as the chief offices in the\nstate. At Carthage, though birth and merit seem to have been\nqualifications indispensably necessary, yet even these could not\nsucceed,[332] unless the candidate was at the same time master of such a\nfortune as would enable him to support his dignity with lustre.[333]\nThis Aristotle censures as a defect. For he looks upon all that merit,\nwhich was unsupported by the proper proportion of wealth, as so much\nlost to the Carthaginians; and he lays down that maxim in their\ngovernment, as the real cause of that undue respect for wealth, and that\nlust of gain, which prevailed so much in that republick. But the\nsentiments of this philosopher, like those of his master Plato, are, I\nfear, too ideal to be reduced to practice. For he does not seem to\nattend to the different genius of different nations, but aims at\nadjusting the balance of power in his republick by the nice standard of\nphilosophick theory. The genius of nations differs perhaps as much as\ntheir climate and situation, which seem (at least in some degree) to be\nthe natural cause of that difference. The republicks of Sparta and Rome\nwere both military, and military glory stamped the primary character of\nboth these people. The republick of Carthage, like that of their\nancestors, the Tyrians, was commercial. Hence the lust of gain marked\ntheir ruling character. Their military character arose from the\nnecessity of defending that wealth which their commerce had acquired.\nHence military glory was but a secondary passion, and generally\nsubservient to their lust of gain. Unless we attend to the different\nruling passion, which forms the different character of each republick,\nwe shall never be able to make such a comparison as will do equal\njustice to each people. At Sparta and Rome wealth was despised, when put\nin competition with honour, and poverty joined with merit formed the\nmost estimable of all characters. Quite different maxims prevailed at\nCarthage. Wealth with them was the chief support of merit, and nothing\nwas so contemptible as poverty. Hence the Carthaginians, who were well\nacquainted with the power and influence of wealth, required the\nadditional qualifications of an ample fortune in all candidates for the\nsenatorial dignity, and publick employments. For they judged that such\nmen would be less exposed to the temptations of corruption, and at the\nsame time more anxious for the welfare of a state, in which they were so\ndeeply interested by their private property. That this was the real\nstate of the case, at Carthage, notwithstanding the suggestions of\nAristotle and the Greek and Roman historians, may, I think, be fairly\nproved from the behaviour of their senate and the choice of their\nofficers, which ought certainly to be admitted as the best evidence. For\nwe constantly find all their publick employments filled up with men of\nthe greatest families, and (unless when the intrigues of faction\nsometimes prevailed) of the greatest abilities. We find in general the\nsame firm and steady attachment to the service of their country, and the\nsame indefatigable zeal for extending the territories and power of their\nrepublick. Nor does the most partial historian charge any one of them\nwith sacrificing the honour and interest of his country to any foreign\npower for money: a practice which was shamefully common amongst the\nRoman generals in the time of Jugurtha. Hence we may, I think, assign\nthe true reason, why the greatest families in Carthage (as we are\ninformed by historians) thought it no way derogatory to their honour to\nengage in commerce. For as this is most probably to be understood of the\nyounger sons of their nobility, the true motive seems to arise, not from\navarice, as their enemies object, but from a view of raising such a\nfortune, as might qualify them for admission into the senate, or any of\nthe great employments. Hence too it is evident, that a regulation which\nmight be highly useful and salutary in an opulent commercial republick,\nwould be greatly injurious to such military republicks as Rome and\nSparta, by corrupting their manners. We need no other proof than the\nfate of those two republicks, who both owed their ruin to the\nintroduction of that wealth, which was unknown to their virtuous\nancestors. The Carthaginian senate seems to have been much more numerous\nthan the Roman. For at Carthage there was a select standing committee\nestablished, of one hundred and four of the most respectable members, to\nkeep a watchful eye over the great families, and repress any attempts\nwhich their ambition might make to subvert the constitution.[334] To\nthis committee all their commanding officers by sea and land, without\nexception, were obliged to give a strict account of their conduct at the\nend of every campaign. We may therefore properly term it the\nCarthaginian court-martial. Out of this venerable body another select\ncommittee was formed of five members only, who were most conspicuous for\ntheir probity, ability, and experience. These served without fee or\nsalary; as glory, and the love of their country, were esteemed motives\nsufficient to engage men of their superior rank and character, to serve\nthe publick with zeal and fidelity.[335] For which reason they were\nnot chosen by lot, but elected by merit. Their power was very extensive.\nTheir office was for life, and they filled up any vacancy in their own\nbody, out of the one hundred and four, and all vacancies in that grand\ncommittee, out of the rest of the senate, by their own authority and at\ntheir own discretion.[336] They were the supreme judges besides in all\ncauses whatsoever without appeal. The institution of this grand\ncommittee, in my opinion, exceeded every thing in the Roman policy. For\nit preserved their state from all those violent concussions, which so\nfrequently shook, and at last totally subverted the Roman\nrepublick.[337] But the power of the committee of five was exorbitant,\nand dangerous to the lives and fortunes of their fellow-citizens. The\nproof is from fact. For at the conclusion of the second Punick war, they\nhad made so arbitrary an use of their power, and were grown so odious to\nthe people, that the great Hannibal regulated that amongst other abuses,\nand procured a law, which made that office annual and elective, with a\nclause forbidding any future alteration. Whether the Carthaginian\nsenators enjoyed their seats for life, or whether they were liable to be\nexpelled for any misdemeanour, and by whom, are points in which history\nis quite silent. At Rome, as the censors had the power of promoting to\nthat dignity, so they had equally the power of expelling any member for\nbad manners, by the single ceremony of leaving out his name when they\ncalled over the list of the senate. I cannot help thinking this a great\ndefect in the Roman polity: since it threw the power of garbling and\nmodelling the senate into the hands of two men, who were liable to be\ncorrupted to serve the ends of faction. A power which ought never to be\nlodged in so few hands in a country which enjoys the blessings of\nliberty. For how serviceable soever it might have been, as a curb to\nlicentiousness in the earlier ages of that republick; yet Cicero, in his\noration for A. Cluentius, inveighs bitterly against the abuse of the\ncensorial power in his time, and gives several instances where it was\nmade subservient to the ends of faction in modelling the senate. And he\nseems to fear that the censors list may bring as many calamities upon\nthe citizens as the late most inhuman proscription; and that the point\nof the censors pen may prove as terrible as the sword of their late\ndictator. C. Nepos, in the life of Hamilcar, takes notice of an officer\nof the same nature amongst the Carthaginians, to whose inspection the\ngreatest men in that republick seem to have been subject. But it does\nnot appear from history, whether his power extended so far as to expel a\nsenator. Should a bad prince, or a wicked minister, ever be invested\nwith the power of weeding the house, and modelling the parliament at\npleasure, there would be an end of our constitution and liberty.\n\nIn the Roman senate all questions were decided (as in our parliament) by\na majority of voices. At Carthage no law could pass, unless the senate\nwere unanimous, like the Polish diet. One single veto from any one\nmember, took the question out of the hands of the senate, and gave up\nthe ultimate decision to the people, who were the _dernier resort_ of\nall power. This Aristotle censures as inclining more towards democracy\nthan was consistent with the just rules of a well regulated\nrepublick.[338] Because the magistrates were not only obliged to open\nall the different opinions and debates of the senators upon the\nquestion, in the hearing of the people, who were the absolute and\ndecisive judges in all these cases of appeal; but any one, even the\nlowest fellow in the mob, might freely give his opinion in opposition\njust as he thought proper. A source of endless discord, anarchy, and\nconfusion! A kind of polity, as Aristotle observes, unknown in any other\nform of republican government.\n\nIn this point, I think the Roman polity far preferable to the\nCarthaginian, except in those abuses of the tribunitial power, which so\nfrequently happened towards the decline of that republick. But when any\none turbulent, seditious tribune, instigated by ambition, or corrupted\nby a faction (which in those times was generally the case) could by his\nsingle veto, stop all proceedings of the senate, and haul the case\nbefore the people; nay when he could drag the supreme magistrates, the\nconsuls themselves, to prison, by his sole authority, and could commit\nthe most outrageous, and most shameful acts of licentiousness with\nimpunity, because their office rendered their persons sacred by law, I\nesteem the Carthaginian polity infinitely more eligible. For that fear\nand jealousy of ceding any part of the authority, which is so natural to\nmen in power, would always be a strong motive to union in a Carthaginian\nsenate; because it would naturally induce any member, rather to give up\nhis private opinion, than suffer an essential part of their power to\ndevolve to the people. But the Roman tribunitial power, which was in\nconstant opposition to the senatorial, drew at last by much too great a\nweight into the democratick scale, and in the last period of their\nliberty was a principal leading cause of the ruin of that republick. For\nas the senate was unsupported by a third power so essentially requisite\nto preserve the balance of government in its due \u00e6quipoise, the tribunes\nperpetually fomented and kept up those terrible feuds, which brought on\nanarchy, and terminated in absolute insupportable tyranny.\n\nThe condition of the Roman populace before the erection of the\ntribunitial power, seems, in my judgement, to have been little better\nthan that state of vassalage, which the peasants groan under in Poland.\nThe relation between patron and client amongst the Romans, seems to be\nsomething analogous to the relation between lord and vassal, with this\ndifference, that the client had the free choice of his patron, which the\nvassal has not with respect to the lord. At least it is certain, if we\nmay credit the Roman historians, that their people were subject to\nequal, if not greater exactions and oppressions from the Patricians. How\nheavy these were, we may learn from the numerous mutinies,\ninsurrections, and that great secession, which compelled the Patricians\nto create the tribunitial office in their favour. This new office\noccasioned a great revolution in their new government, and produced\nthose perpetual conflicts between the aristocratick and democratick\npowers, which fill the history of that republick. The Patricians had\nrecourse frequently to their only resource a dictator with absolute\npower, to defend them from the insolence of the tribunes. But this was\nonly a temporary expedient. The people renewed their attacks, until they\nhad abolished the distinct prerogatives arising from birth and family,\nand laid open all honours, even the consulship, and dictatorship, the\nsupreme magistracy of all, to the free admission of their own body. The\npeople were highly elated with these repeated victories, as they\nimagined them, over their old enemies the Patricians, but they were\nquickly sensible, that in fact, they were only the dupes of their\nambitious leaders. The most opulent and powerful of the Plebeians, by\nserving the high offices of the state, acquired the title of nobles, in\ncontradistinction to those, who were descended from the Patrician\nfamilies, who still retained their ancient appellation. These new\nnobles, many of whom had crept into the senate, sided constantly with\nthe Patricians in all disputes and contests with their former friends,\nthe people, and were generally their greatest enemies. The Patricians,\nstrengthened by this new acquisition of power, were frequently too hard\nfor the tribunes. In those memorable contests with the two Gracchi, who\nendeavoured in their tribuneship to revive the Agrarian law (calculated\nto divide the conquered lands among the poor citizens) the dispute seems\nto have lain wholly between the rich and the poor: for the nobles and\nrich Plebeians were as unwilling to part with their land, as the\nPatricians. This strengthened the Patricians so much, that they were\nable in each of those contests, to quell the efforts of the people by\nforce, and quash the whole affair by the death of both the Gracchi.\n\nIt has been a general remark of most writers, both ancient and modern,\nthat the Roman republick owed its preservation to the firmness and\nwisdom of the senate, and the subordinate obedience of the people: and\nthat the republick of Carthage must ascribe its ruin to that ascendency,\nwhich the people had usurped over the authority of the senate. The\nreverse of this seems to be the truth. We meet with but one instance in\nhistory, where the power of the Carthaginian people over-ruled the\nauthority of their senate, so far as to compel them to act contrary to\ntheir opinion. This was that shameful violation of the law of nations in\nseizing the transports which were bringing necessaries to Scipio\u2019s camp,\nduring the truce he had granted that they might send ambassadours to\nRome to negotiate a peace with the Roman senate. For though they\nthreatened violence to the senate, if they submitted to those hard terms\nwhich were imposed by Scipio after the defeat at Zama; yet they were\neasily reduced to obedience by Hannibal, and resigned the whole affair\nto the decision of the senate. The Roman history, on the contrary, is\none continued detail of animosities, and frequently most bloody\ncontests, between the senate and the people in their perpetual struggles\nfor power. And the frequent elections of that low Plebeian Marius to the\nconsular dignity, in opposition to the Patricians, (the malignant\neffects of the over-bearing power of the people) opened that scene of\nblood and anarchy, which ended only in the utter subversion of their\nliberty and constitution.\n\nThe judicious Montesquieu observes, \u201cthat the Carthaginians grew rich\nmuch sooner than the Romans, and consequently sunk much sooner into\ncorruption.\u201d He adds too; \u201cthat whilst merit alone entitled the\npossessor to the great employments at Rome, every thing which the\npublick at Carthage had the power of bestowing, was venal.\u201d... The\nformer part of this assertion is too general to be admitted without\nproper restrictions; the latter is a plain transcript from Polybius. The\nCarthaginians must have been rich several ages before the Romans. For\nboth Herodotus and Thucydides (who was but thirteen years younger) take\nnotice of them as a very formidable maritime power, a circumstance which\ncould only arise from their naval genius and extensive commerce. Yet we\nfind no instance of their being corrupt, until the conclusion of the\nsecond Punick war, when Hannibal reformed those shameful abuses, which\nhad crept into the management of the publick revenue, and restrained\nthat power which the committee of five had usurped over the lives and\nfortunes of their fellow-citizens. As for the quotation out of Polybius,\nwhose country was at that time a province to the Romans, with whom he\nresided only as a state prisoner; I esteem it as no more than a\ncompliment to the Romans\u2019 vanity at the expense of the Carthaginians,\nwhose very name was odious to that people. Or very probably he might\nbring that charge against the Carthaginians, as a hint to show the\nconsequences of the same species of corruption, which, even in his time,\nhad found entrance amongst the Romans.\n\nAs to religion, both nations were equally superstitious. If many of the\nreligious ceremonies amongst the Romans were absurd and childish, it\nmust be owned that the Carthaginian worship, like that of their\nancestors the Canaanites, from whom they received it, was truly\ndiabolical.[339] But it is by no means candid to judge of the natural\nbent and temper of a people, from effects produced in their minds by\nsuperstition. For the same superstition which enjoins such horrid rites,\nwill naturally place the chief efficacy of the sacrifice in the zeal and\nsincerity of the offerer. Consequently the highest degree of merit in\nsuch oblations, will consist in stifling every human affection, and\nover-ruling nature. Thus in the Carthaginian idolatry, the softer sex,\nas more susceptible of tenderness for their offspring, were required to\nattend in person. They were even compelled,[340] upon this dreadful\noccasion, to affect all the joy and cheerfulness of festivity, because,\nas Plutarch informs us, if a sigh or a tear escaped them, the merit of\nthe offering would be absolutely lost, and themselves liable to a fine.\nThat the Carthaginians were no more void of parental affection than\nother nations, is evident from that pious fraud they had so long\npractised,[341] of secretly buying up poor children, whom they\nsubstituted as victims to their bloody deity instead of their own. But\nafter a great defeat which they received from Agathocles, they\nattributed their ill fortune to the resentment of their god for their\nrepeated sacrilege. They sacrificed two hundred children of the first\nfamilies in Carthage,[342] and three hundred other persons offered\nthemselves as voluntary victims to atone for a crime, to which the\nhighest degree of guilt was affixed by their impious religion. The Roman\nsuperstition must in general be acquitted of the charge of inhumanity.\nThe only tendency towards it, was in the custom of inhuming alive such\nof the vestal virgins, as had violated their vow of chastity.[343] But\nthe bloody and frequent shows of the gladiators, which were the delight\nof the Romans, fix an indelible blot on the character of a brave\npeople.[344] Historians in general brand the Carthaginians with cruelty\nand inhumanity. If the charge is just, it must be chiefly attributed to\nthat execrable custom of human sacrifices, which always prevailed\namongst that people. Nor do I in the least doubt, but that savage\nferocity, which the Romans were so guilty of in war, was in a great\nmeasure owing to those barbarous spectacles, where wounds, and murder in\ncold blood, made the most agreeable part of the entertainment.\n\nAs to publick virtue or love of their country, the Carthaginians were no\nway inferior to the Romans. The intrepid behaviour of the Phil\u00e6ni,[345]\ntwo Carthaginian brothers, who consented to be buried alive to enlarge\nthe boundaries of their country, equals the most heroick instance of\nthat kind of enthusiasm, which the Roman story can boast of. The fate of\nMacheus, Bomilcar, Hanno, and others, afford undeniable proof, that\nneither birth, dignity, nor the greatest services, could screen that man\nfrom the most ignominious death, who made the least attempt to subvert\nthe liberty of his country. I have before taken notice of the _punica\nfides_, or that proverbial want of sincerity, which has been so often\nobjected by the Roman historians: but I cannot help observing with the\nmore impartial Montesquieu,[346] \u201cthat the Romans never made peace with\nsincerity and good faith, but always took care to insert such conditions\nas, in the end, proved the ruin of the people with whom they treated:\nthat the peace they granted was no more than a politick suspension of\narms, until an opportunity offered of completing their conquests: that\nit was their invariable maxim to foment divisions among the neighbouring\npowers, and by siding alternately with either party, as they found it\nmost conducive to their own interest, play one against the other, until\nthey had reduced all equally into provinces: that they frequently\nemployed the subtilty and ambiguity of terms in their own language, to\nfinesse and chicane in their treaties.\u201d Thus they cheated the \u00c6tolians\nby the ambiguous phrase of yielding themselves up to the faith of the\nRoman people.[347] The poor \u00c6tolians imagined, that the term implied\nonly alliance. But the Romans soon convinced them, that what they meant\nby it, was absolute subjection. They destroyed Carthage under sanction\nof the most vile equivocation,[348] pretending, \u201cthat though they\npromised that deluded people to preserve their state, they did not mean\nto grant them their city, which word they had purposely omitted.\u201d Maxims\nwhich the French have steadily and too successfully pursued, and are\nstill pursuing!... Montesquieu very judiciously observes \u201c... that the\nRomans were ambitious from the lust of domination: the Carthaginians\nfrom the lust of gain.\u201d This accounts for the different reception which\ncommerce met with in the two nations. At Carthage commerce was esteemed\nthe most honourable of all employments. At Rome commerce was held in\ncontempt. It was there looked upon as the proper occupation of slaves\nonly, and disgraceful to a free citizen. Thus the one loved war for the\nsake of glory and acquiring dominion; the other looked upon war as a\nmeans of acquiring wealth, and extending commerce. The Romans plundered\nthe vanquished enemy to make a parade with their wealth in the triumphal\nprocession. The Carthaginians fleeced not only their enemies, but their\ntributary provinces, and oppressed their allies, to feed their own\nprivate avarice, as well as that of the publick. The oppressions of the\nCarthaginian generals in Spain lost them all their allies. The wiser\npolicy of Scipio attached those allies unalterably to the Romans. The\nexactions of their rapacious governors in the African provinces, were\nthe sources of perpetual revolts, upon the approach of any invader, from\na desire of changing masters. When Scipio landed, he was joined by all\nthose provinces, who looked upon the Romans as their deliverers. As soon\nas luxury had introduced avarice and corruption amongst the Romans,\ntheir generals and governours pursued the same destructive maxims, which\nwas one leading cause of the final ruin of both the western and eastern\nempires.\n\nThere cannot be a stronger proof of a weak or a corrupt administration,\nthan when indigent and necessitous men are appointed to the government\nof distant provinces, from no other motive than party merit, and with no\nother view than to raise a fortune at the expense of the people. Whether\nthe wretched and defenceless condition in which the French found our\ncolonies at the beginning of this war, ought not to be ascribed chiefly\nto this cause, is a question I shall wave at present. Because the evils\nwe have already suffered from former misconduct, will, I hope, be now\nremoved, by a total alteration of measures under an able and honest\nadministration.\n\nIt is remarkable, that not one of the historians who reproach the\nCarthaginians with corruption, were ever able to accuse them of luxury\nand effeminacy. The Carthaginians, to their immortal honour, stand\nsingle upon the records of history, \u201cthe only people in the universe,\nupon whom immense wealth was never able to work its usual effects.\u201d The\nRomans, corrupted by wealth, quickly lost all pretensions both to\npublick and private virtue, and from a race of heroes, degenerated into\na nation of the most abject slaves. The Carthaginian virtue was so far\nfrom degenerating that it shone brighter in the last period of their\nhistory, than in any of the former. Even the behaviour of their women in\nthat long and brave defence of their city against the whole Roman power,\nequalled, or rather exceeded, that of the Roman matrons in those times,\nwhen they were most celebrated for publick virtue. When the Romans were\nmasters of the city, one small part only excepted, and that part\nactually in flames, the generous wife of Asdrubal the chief\ncommander,[349] closed the scene by as desperate an act of heroick\nbravery, as can be met with in history. After she had upbraided her\nhusband as a coward and a traitor for submitting to Scipio, she declared\nher determined resolution of dying free, and not surviving the fate of\nher country. She first stabbed both her children, and threw them into\nthe flames; then leaped in after their bodies, and buried herself in the\nruins of Carthage.\n\nThe sententious Montesquieu remarks,[350] \u201cthat when Carthage made war\nwith her opulence against the Roman poverty, her great disadvantage\narose from what she esteemed her greatest strength, and on which she\nplaced her chief dependence. The reason, as he judiciously observes, is\nevident. Gold and silver may be easily exhausted, but publick virtue,\nconstancy, and firmness of mind, fortitude and poverty, are\ninexhaustible.\u201d The Carthaginians in their wars employed foreign\nmercenaries. The Roman armies were composed of their own natives. A\ndefeat or two at sea obstructed the Carthaginian commerce, and stopped\nthe spring which supplied their publick exchequer. The loss of a battle\nin Africa, where their country was quite open, and destitute of\nfortresses, and the natives as much strangers to the use of arms as our\nown country people, reduced them to submit to whatever terms the victors\nthought proper to impose. Regulus, in the first Punick war, cooped up\nthe Carthaginians in their capital, after he had given them one defeat\nby sea, and one by land. The Romans, after receiving four successive\ndefeats from Hannibal, the last of which was the fatal battle of Cann\u00e6,\nwhere they lost most of their best officers, and all their veteran\ntroops, would hearken to no terms of accommodation, and even sent\nre-enforcements to Spain and other places, though Hannibal was at their\ngates. The reason is plain. The citizens of Carthage consisted chiefly\nof unarmed, and undisciplined tradesmen. The citizens of Rome, without\ndistinction, composed a regular body of disciplined militia.... A short\ncomparison between the Roman and Carthaginian polity, with respect to\nthe military of each people, will easily point out to us the true cause\nwhich gave the Romans their manifest superiority.\n\nI have already taken notice of some capital defects of the\nCarthaginians, both in their marine and military departments.\nMontesquieu imputes several capital errors to the Romans, but he\nattributes their preservation after the defeat at Cann\u00e6, when they were\nat the very brink of ruin, to the force of their institution. He seems\nto place this force in the superior wisdom and firmness of the Roman\nsenate. A short inquiry into their conduct, during the second Punick\nwar, will show that the cause of their preservation at that time must be\nascribed to a very different principle, and that Montesquieu too hastily\nadopted that opinion from the Greek and Roman historians.\n\nIf we examine the boasted behaviour of the Roman senate, from the first\nattack of Saguntum to the memorable battle of Cann\u00e6, we shall find it to\nconsist of one continued series of blunders, which carry all the marks\nof weak, factious, and divided counsels. The Romans had certain\nintelligence of Hannibal\u2019s design of attacking them in Italy. This was\nno secret in Spain, where every preparation, and every motion of\nHannibal\u2019s was directed to that point of view. The Romans were certainly\njealous of such a design, when they sent ambassadours to Hannibal, to\ninform him, that if he passed the Iberus, and attacked the Saguntines,\nthey should look upon it as a declaration of war. When they had received\nan evasive answer from Hannibal, they crossed over to Africa, and made\nthe same declaration to the Carthaginian senate. When Hannibal laid\nsiege to Saguntum, did the Romans act up to their formidable\ndeclaration, or did they send a single man to the assistance of those\nfaithful allies? just the reverse; they wasted nine months, the time the\nsiege lasted, in useless debates, and fruitless embassies. They\nsacrificed that faithful and heroick people, together with their own\ninterest and character, by their folly and irresolution.[351] For if\nthey had sent a powerful army at first, they might have saved Saguntum,\nor at least confined the war to Spain, and prevented it from penetrating\ninto their own bowels. After Hannibal had laid Saguntum in ashes, did\nthe boasted wisdom and firmness of the Roman senate appear in more\nvigorous, or more politick measures? They again employed a whole winter\nin a wise embassy to Carthage, to just as little purpose as the former,\nand gave Hannibal all the time he could wish to prepare for his\nexpedition. When Hannibal was on his march for Italy, instead of\nshutting up the passages of the Alps, which would easily have defeated\nthat daring enterprise, they ordered the consul Scipio, with his army,\nto oppose his passage over the Rhone. The consul came just in time\nenough to learn, that such dilatory measures would never check the\nprogress of so active and vigilant an enemy, who had already passed that\nriver, and was on his march for the Alps.[352] The consul immediately\nre-embarked his troops, and hastened to meet him in his descent from\nthose mountains. But Hannibal was already near the banks of the Po,\nwhere the consul attacked him, but was defeated and dangerously wounded.\nThe senate, alarmed at Hannibal\u2019s passage over the Alps, which they had\ntaken no precaution to prevent, sent in a great fright for the other\nconsul Sempronius, with his army, out of Sicily. He arrived, and joined\nhis wounded colleague Scipio, who was an able officer, and having\nlearnt, by experience, how dangerous an enemy they had to cope with,\nadvised caution and prudence in all their operations. But Sempronius,\nvain, rash and ignorant, was deaf to all salutary advice, which he\nridiculed as the effect of fear. Hannibal, who never inquired into the\nnumber of his enemies, but studied only the foibles of their commanders,\ndirected all his operations upon that principle. He applied therefore to\nthe foible of Sempronius, which he was soon master of, drew him into a\nsnare, and cut off almost his whole army. The senate was dreadfully\nfrighted at this second defeat; but to mend the matter, they suffered\nFlaminius, a man more vain, more headstrong, and more rash than\nSempronius, to be chosen consul, and sent against Hannibal. As he acted\nupon the same principles, he ran headlong into the trap laid for him by\nhis artful enemy, and lost his life together with his whole army. Though\nthis terrible blow threw the Romans into inexpressible consternation,\nyet it seems to have brought them to their senses. For they at last\ncreated the celebrated Fabius dictator, who was the only Roman commander\ncapable of opposing Hannibal. Yet even here they could not help giving\nanother instance of their folly, by forcing Minucius upon him for his\ngeneral of horse, a man of the same character with Sempronius or\nFlaminius. Fabius acted upon a quite different plan. He knew the danger\nand folly of opposing new raised troops to veterans, flushed with\nrepeated victories, and commanded by so consummate a general. He\ntherefore opposed art to art, watched every motion of his enemy, and cut\noff his foragers. Hannibal, whose army was composed chiefly of soldiers\nof fortune out of different nations, connected to him by no other tie\nthan the hopes of plunder, and their esteem for his personal abilities,\nwas sensible, that such a conduct in his enemy would quickly put an end\nto all his hopes in Italy. He tried therefore every art he was master of\nto bring Fabius to a battle; but the wary Roman convinced him, that he\nknew his trade too well to deviate from that plan, which alone could\nsave his country. Though Hannibal did justice to those fine strokes of\nhis antagonist, yet they were too delicate for the eyes of the Romans.\nThey were disgusted at his conduct, because they wanted capacity to\nunderstand it, and gave credit to the idle boasts of Minucius, though\nthey had already suffered so severely by trusting men of his genius.\nYet, by the most unaccountable folly, they raised Minucius to an\nequality of power with Fabius; and Rome, for the first time, saw two\ndictators vested with unlimited authority. The wiser Fabius, though\namazed at the stupidity of his countrymen, adhered steadily to his first\nplan. He gave up half the army to the command of his new colleague, but\nwas determined to preserve the other moiety at least, upon which so much\ndepended. Hannibal was sensible that the Romans could not have done him\na more essential piece of service, unless they had recalled Fabius. He\nimmediately threw out a bait for Minucius, which that rash, unthinking\ncommander as greedily bit at. He fell into the trap laid for him by the\ncrafty Hannibal; was enveloped by the Carthaginians, and must inevitably\nhave perished, with all the troops under his command, if Fabius had not\nflown to his assistance, repulsed the enemy, and rescued him from the\nmost imminent danger of death or captivity. Though Fabius had been so\nill used by his countrymen in general, and by his colleague Minucius in\nparticular, yet he showed, by this generous action, a greatness of soul\nsuperior to private resentment, and every selfish passion, which he was\nalways ready to sacrifice to the publick welfare. Minucius indeed felt\nthe force of the obligation, as well as of his own incapacity: he nobly\nacknowledged it in the strongest terms, and returned to his former post\nand duty to his abler commander. But this heroick behaviour of Fabius\nseems to have made no more impression upon his countrymen, than his\nmasterly conduct. Two new consuls were chosen, to whom he resigned his\nauthority and army, and retired to Rome neglected and unemployed. The\nnew consuls followed the advice of Fabius, and avoided coming to action,\nwhich distressed Hannibal extremely. But the following year exhibits\nsuch a masterpiece of folly and stupidity in that Roman senate, whose\nfirmness and wisdom are so much boasted of by historians, and such\ninfatuation in the body of the Roman people as would seem incredible,\nif the facts, as handed down to us by their own historians themselves,\ndid not prove it beyond a possibility of doubt or contradiction.\nDetermined to drive Hannibal out of Italy, and put a speedy end to so\nruinous a war, they raised one of the mightiest armies they had ever yet\nbrought into the field, and employed in it every officer of note or\ndistinction at that time in Rome, the great Fabius alone excepted. This\nwas the last stake of the Romans, upon which their all was ventured. But\nwhere does the boasted wisdom of the senate appear in the management of\nthis affair, which was of the last importance? Of the two consuls,\nPaulus \u00c6milius, the one, was a respectable man, and an experienced\nofficer: Terentius Varro, the other, was a fellow of the lowest\nextraction, who, by noise and impudence, had raised himself to the\ntribuneship, was afterwards made pr\u00e6tor, and, by the assistance of one\nBebius, his relation, at that time a tribune of the people, had forced\nhimself into the consular dignity. This wretch, who had but just talents\nsufficient for a captain of the mob, who had never seen an action (nor\nperhaps an army) in his life, had the impudence to censure the conduct\nof Fabius, and to boast in the senate, that he would immediately drive\nHannibal out of Italy. The wise senate were not only so weak as to\nbelieve, but, in opposition to all the remonstrances of Fabius, even to\ntrust such an empty coxcomb with an equal share in the command. They\neven gave the consuls orders to fight the enemy without delay, so great\nwas their confidence in the gasconading Varro. Hannibal at that time\nwas so greatly distressed for want of provisions, that his Spanish\ntroops begun to mutiny, and talked openly of revolting to the Romans,\nand he himself had thoughts of retiring into Gaul for his own personal\nsafety. \u00c6milius, who endeavoured in every point to follow the advice of\nFabius, declined fighting, and was convinced by his intelligence, that\nHannibal could not subsist his troops above ten days longer. But Varro\nwas alike deaf to reason or persuasion. Debates at last run so high\nbetween the consuls, that repeated expresses were sent to the senate by\n\u00c6milius for fresh orders. Had the senate acted with that prudence, which\nhas been so loudly celebrated by historians, they would certainly have\ncreated Fabius dictator at that critical juncture, which would have put\nan end to the differences and authority of the consuls. For how could\nthey reasonably hope for success, whilst the army was commanded by two\ngenerals, vested with equal power, who differed as widely in opinion as\nin temper? But their chief view at that time seems to have been to\nmortify Fabius, and to that favourite point they wilfully sacrificed the\npublick honour and safety.[353] \u00c6milius at last returned to Rome, and\nlaid the whole affair before the senate. But Varro\u2019s party proved the\nmajority, and orders were renewed for fighting, but not immediately.\n\u00c6milius still declined fighting, and followed the advice of Fabius, but\nthe alternate command of the two consuls, which took place every day,\ndefeated all his measures. Varro, on the day of his command, marched the\narmy so close to the enemy, that it was impossible to retire without\nfighting. This imprudent step brought on the famous battle of Cann\u00e6,\nwhere Hannibal, whose whole force scarce equalled the moiety of the\nRomans, gave them the most remarkable defeat we ever read of in their\nhistory. Polybius, and after him the rest of the historians, impute this\ndefeat to the great superiority of the Carthaginian army in horse, and\nthe ignorance of Varro in pitching upon a plain open country for the\nfield of battle, where Hannibal could employ his cavalry to the best\nadvantage. That the Carthaginian horse was superior to the Roman in\ngoodness, is readily admitted. But if we compute the number of the\ncavalry of the Romans, and that of their allies, as given us by Polybius\nhimself, we shall find the difference in each army amounted but to four\nthousand; so small an advantage therefore, in point of number, could\nnever possibly have turned the scale in favour of Hannibal when the\nRomans had such prodigious odds in the number of their infantry, who\nshowed themselves no way inferior to Hannibal\u2019s foot, either in bravery\nor intrepidity. The true reason was, the infinite superiority of\nHannibal in point of generalship. That consummate leader, by a most\nexquisite disposition of his troops, a _man\u0153vre_ much too fine for the\neyes of the Roman generals, caught their whole infantry fairly in a trap\n(though in a plain level country) where they were almost to a man cut to\npieces, or taken. \u00c6milius, and all the other general officers, with\nseventy thousand Romans, lay dead upon the field of battle after a\nbrave and obstinate resistance.[354] The infamous Varro, that base\nminded fellow, as Polybius terms him,[355] who commanded the cavalry of\nthe allies on the left wing, behaved like a true bully in the face of\ndanger. He fled almost at the first attack, and rather chose to live\nwith infamy than die with honour. When the fatal news reached the city\nof Rome, both senate and people gave up all hopes of safety. Fabius\nalone took the lead, and acted with his usual firmness and calmness upon\nthis occasion. He placed guards at the gates to prevent the desertion of\nthe citizens, who were flying in great numbers to escape the conquerors,\nwhom they expected every moment. He confined the women to their houses,\nwho had filled the city with lamentations. He manned the walls and\noutworks, and took every other precaution which the shortness of the\ntime would admit of. All resigned themselves implicitly to his conduct,\nand he acted for the time as sole governor. Many of the senators, and\nprincipal of the Roman nobility, were in actual consultation about\nleaving Italy, and retiring elsewhere for safety. But they were\nprevented, as Livy informs us, by the terrible threats of young Scipio,\nand compelled to stay and share the fate of their country.[356] Hannibal\nhas been greatly censured for not attacking Rome itself immediately\nafter the battle, and is accused of not knowing how to make the proper\nuse of a victory, though he knew so well how to conquer. The candid\nMontesquieu acquits him of this charge. His reasons are, that though\nRome at that time was in the highest degree of consternation, yet the\neffects of fear upon a warlike people, inured to arms like the Romans,\nand a low undisciplined rabble, who are strangers to the use of arms,\nare very different. In the former, who are conscious of their own\nstrength, it almost always changes into the most desperate courage. In\nthe latter, who feel their own weakness too sensibly, it dispirits so\nmuch as to render them incapable of resistance. Hence he gives it as his\nreal opinion, that Hannibal would have failed of success if he had\nundertaken the siege of that city. His proof is, because the Romans at\nthat very time were able to send sufficient succours, drawn from their\nown citizens, to every part where they were then wanted. Thus Rome was\nsaved, not by the wisdom or firmness of the senate, but the prudence and\nmagnanimity of one old officer, whom they despised and hated, and the\nintrepidity of a boy of eighteen, joined, as I observed before from\nDionysius, to the force of that part of their institution, which formed\nthe whole body of their citizens into a militia, ever ready, and capable\nof taking the field as soldiers. All the Roman armies, which were\nopposed to Hannibal, were drawn out of this militia. Nor do we meet with\none instance of cowardice, or ill-behaviour amongst the men, but rather\nof intrepidity even to rashness, which used to be the characteristick of\nthe British nation. Polybius, who was at least as able a judge of the\nmilitary as any man of that age, and who lived very near the time of the\nHannibalick war (as he terms it) is loud in his praises of the Roman\ntroops, whose infantry he prefers greatly to the Carthaginian\nmercenaries.[357] Nor does he once impute any of their defeats to the\nfault of their men, but invariably to the folly and incapacity of their\ncommanders.\n\nUpon the whole, the great defect in the Carthaginian military\ninstitution consisted in the want of a national militia, which, as\nPolybius observes, was the reason of their employing foreign\nmercenaries. The capital defects in the Romans lay in that equality of\npower with which each consul was vested in the field, and the short\nduration of their command, as their office was only annual. Every battle\nwhich the Romans lost to Hannibal except the first, may be fairly\nascribed to the former of these causes. The defeats of Trebia and\nThrasymene were plainly occasioned by the jealousy of one of the\nconsuls, lest the other should share with him in the glory of beating\nHannibal; as the want of harmony, and difference of opinion between the\ntwo consuls, was the primary cause of the dreadful defeat at Cann\u00e6. To\nthe latter cause we may justly attribute the long duration of the\nHannibalick war. When the great man, who entered Italy with no more\nthan twenty thousand foot and six thousand horse, maintained his ground\nabove sixteen years, without any assistance from Carthage, against the\nwhole united force and efforts of the Romans, by the mere strength of\nhis own extraordinary genius. For as every man, who had interest\nsufficient to obtain the consulship, was immediately vested with the\ncommand of an army, however qualified or not, so he was obliged to\nresign his command at the end of the year, before he had well time to be\nthoroughly acquainted with the true method of dealing with his enemy.\nThus every new successive commander, amongst the Romans, had the same\ntask to begin afresh at the opening of every campaign. I know that\npolitical writers ascribe this mistaken policy to that jealousy, and\nfear of lodging so much power in so few hands for any length of time,\nwhich is so natural to all republican governments. And that the office\nof dictator was contrived as a remedy against any abuse, or\ninconveniency, which might at any time arise from the consular power.\nBut the event showed, that the remedy was much worse than the disease.\nWhilst publick virtue existed, the office of dictator was frequently\nuseful. But when luxury had introduced corruption, the _pro tempore_\ndictator soon came to be perpetual, and the perpetual dictator\nterminated in a perpetual and despotick emperor.\n\nAt Carthage their military institution was entirely different. The power\nof the generals in the field was absolute and unlimited; and, if their\nconduct was approved of, generally continued to the end of whatever war\nthey were engaged in. They had no occasion for the dangerous resource of\na dictator. The watchful eye of their standing court-martial, the\ncommittee of one hundred and four of their ablest senators, was a\nperpetual, and never-failing check upon their ambition, or ill behavior\nof their generals.[358] The sacred cohort amongst the Carthaginians,\nconsisted of a large body of volunteers of the richest and greatest\nfamilies of the nation. This wise and noble institution was one of the\nchief supports of the Carthaginian state; and as it was the constant\nseminary of their officers and commanders, might very probably be one\ncause why luxury and effeminacy could never obtain footing in that\nwarlike republick. For we always find this generous body giving the most\nsignal instances of bravery and conduct,[359] and bearing down all\nbefore them.... Nor did they ever quit the field of battle, until they\nwere deserted by the rest of the army, and even then generally retired\nin excellent order.\n\nThe Romans were gradually trained up, from the very infancy of their\nrepublick, in long and obstinate wars with their Italian neighbours, who\nwere masters of the same arms and disciplines, and were no way their\ninferiors in bravery. Nor did they perfect themselves in the art of\nwar, until they learned it by bloody experience from Pyrrhus, the most\nconsummate captain of that age. The Carthaginians were only exercised in\nwar with the wild undisciplined Africans, or the irregular Spaniards,\nnor were they able with their numerous fleets and prodigious armies to\ncomplete the reduction of that part of Sicily, which was inhabited by\nGrecian colonies, who retained their native arms and discipline. Hence\narose the great superiority of the Romans, both in soldiers and\ncommanders. Though the Barcan family produced some great officers, who\nat least equalled the ablest generals Rome could ever boast of.\n\nIt is evident from the course of this inquiry, that the ruin of the\nRoman republick arose wholly from internal causes. The ruin of Carthage\nwas owing remotely to internal, but immediately to external. The\nPlebeian faction reduced Rome to the verge of ruin at the battle of\nCann\u00e6, and a complication of factions completed the subversion of that\nrepublick under the two triumvirates. The envy and jealousy of the\nHannonian faction deprived Carthage of all the fruits of Hannibal\u2019s\namazing victories and progress, and paved the way for the utter excision\nof their very name and nation by the Roman arms. Such are the direful\neffects of faction, when suffered to run its natural lengths without\ncontrol, in the most flourishing and best constituted government!...\n\n  [330] Justin. lib. 18. c. 5.\n\n  [331] Termed consuls by the Romans, _susetes_ by the\n  Carthaginians.\n\n  [332] \u039f\u1f50 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03b4\u03b7\u03bd, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u03c5\u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03b4\u03b7\u03bd \u03bf\u1f34\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd\n  \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2. Arist. de Repub. lib. 2. p. 234. c.\n  11.\n\n  [333] \u0391\u1f31\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c2 \u03b4\u03cd\u03bf \u03c4\u03b1\u1fe6\u03c4\u03b1 \u03b2\u03bb\u03ad\u03c0\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 (\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c0\u03bb\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd, scil.\n  \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f74\u03bd) \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ac\u03bb\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2, \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c2 \u03c4\u03b5 \u0392\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n  \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c4\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b7\u03b3\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2. Ibid. p. 335.\n\n  [334] \u1f1c\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u039a\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b7\u03b4\u03bf\u03bd\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03c0\u03bb\u03ae\u03c3\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u1fc7 \u039b\u03b1\u03ba\u03c9\u03bd\u03b9\u03ba\u1fc7\n  \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u1fb3 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c3\u03c5\u03c3\u03c3\u03af\u03c4\u03b9\u03b1 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f11\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9\u03c1\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c6\u03b9\u03b4\u03b9\u03c4\u03af\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\u00b7 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72\n  \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03c4\u03ac\u03c1\u03c9\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd, \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f18\u03c6\u03cc\u03c1\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2, \u03c0\u03bb\u1f74\u03bd \u03bf\u1f50 \u03c7\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd. \u039f\u1f31\n  \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1, \u1f10\u03ba \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c4\u03c5\u03c7\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u1f76. \u03a4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u03b4\u2019 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03bf\u1fe6\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u1f74\u03bd\n  \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03af\u03bd\u03b4\u03b7\u03bd. Ibid. p. 334.\n\n  [335] \u03a4\u1f78 \u03b4\u2019 \u1f00\u03bc\u03af\u03c3\u03b8\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03ba\u03bb\u03b7\u03c1\u03c9\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u1f00\u03c1\u03b9\u03c3\u03c4\u03bf\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd \u03b8\u03b5\u03c4\u03ad\u03bf\u03bd, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76\n  \u03b5\u1f34\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c4\u03bf\u03b9\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c4\u03bf\u03bd \u1f15\u03c4\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bd. Ibid.\n\n  [336] \u03a4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03ba\u03c5\u03c1\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f54\u03c3\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u1ff6\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03ac\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f51\u03c6\u2019\n  \u03b1\u1f51\u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f36\u03bd\u03b1\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f11\u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03b1\u1f31\u03c1\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9 \u03c4\u1f74\u03bd\n  \u03bc\u03b5\u03b3\u03af\u03c3\u03c4\u03b7\u03bd \u1f00\u03c1\u03c7\u03ae\u03bd. \u1f14\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c4\u03b1\u03cd\u03c4\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bb\u03b5\u03af\u03bf\u03bd\u03b1 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c7\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c7\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd\n  (\u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1 \u1f10\u03be\u03b5\u03bb\u03b7\u03bb\u03c5\u03b8\u03cc\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03bb\u03bf\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2) \u1f40\u03bb\u03b9\u03b3\u03b1\u03c1\u03c7\u03b9\u03ba\u1f78\u03bd.\n  Ibid.\n\n  [337] \u03a3\u03b7\u03bc\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bf\u03bd \u03b4\u1f72 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03c2 \u03c3\u03c5\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c4\u03b1\u03b3\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b7\u03c2, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd \u1f14\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b1\u03bd,\n  \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u1fc7 \u03c4\u03ac\u03be\u03b5\u03b9 \u03c4\u1fc6\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03b1\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03c3\u03c4\u03ac\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd, \u1f45\u03c4\u03b9 \u03b3\u1f70\u03c1\n  \u1f04\u03be\u03b9\u03bf\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd, \u03b3\u03b5\u03b3\u03b5\u03bd\u1fc6\u03c3\u03b8\u03b1\u03b9, \u03bc\u03ae\u03c4\u03b5 \u03a4\u03cd\u03c1\u03b1\u03bd\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd. Ibid.\n\n  [338] \u03a4\u1f78 \u03bc\u1f72\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd, \u03c4\u1f78 \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u1f74 \u03c0\u03c1\u03bf\u03c3\u03ac\u03b3\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03c0\u03c1\u1f78\u03c2 \u03c4\u1f78\u03bd \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd, \u03bf\u1f31\n  \u0392\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9\u03bb\u03b5\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03ba\u03cd\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03bc\u03b5\u03c4\u1f70 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03b3\u03b5\u03c1\u03cc\u03bd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd, \u1f02\u03bd \u1f41\u03bc\u03bf\u03b3\u03bd\u03c9\u03bc\u03bf\u03bd\u1ff6\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c0\u03ac\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03c2. \u03b5\u1f30\n  \u03b4\u1f72 \u03bc\u03ae, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u03bf\u03cd\u03c4\u03c9\u03bd \u1f41 \u03b4\u1fc6\u03bc\u03bf\u03c2. \u1f0b \u03b4\u1f72 \u1f02\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03c6\u03ad\u03c1\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd \u03bf\u1f57\u03c4\u03bf\u03b9 \u03bf\u1f50\n  \u03b4\u03b9\u03b1\u03ba\u03bf\u1fe6\u03c3\u03b1\u03b9 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03bd \u1f00\u03c0\u03bf\u03b4\u03b9\u03b4\u03cc\u03b1\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b4\u03ae\u03bc\u1ff3 \u03c4\u1f70 \u03b4\u03cc\u03be\u03b1\u03bd\u03c4\u03b1 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f04\u03c1\u03c7\u03bf\u03c5\u03c3\u03b9\u03bd,\n  \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03ba\u03cd\u03c1\u03b9\u03bf\u03b9 \u03ba\u03c1\u03af\u03bd\u03b5\u03b9\u03bd \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u1f76\u00b7 \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff7 \u03b2\u03bf\u03c5\u03bb\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u1ff3 \u03c4\u03bf\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03b5\u1f30\u03c3\u03c6\u03b5\u03c1\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03b9\u03c2\n  \u1f00\u03bd\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u03c0\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f14\u03be\u03b5\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd. \u1f4d\u03c0\u03b5\u03c1 \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u1f11\u03c4\u03ad\u03c1\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03c0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03af\u03b1\u03b9\u03c2 \u03bf\u1f50\u03ba \u1f14\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9.\n  Ibid. pag. 334.\n\n  [339] The idol to whom the Carthaginians sacrificed their\n  children was the Molock of the Canaanites, from whom they were\n  lineally descended. This idol was the Chronos of the Greeks,\n  and Saturn of the Latins.\n\n  [340] Plut. de Superstit. p. 171.\n\n  [341] Diodor. Sicul. lib. 20. p. 739.\n\n  [342] Id. ibid.\n\n  [343] This institution has been adopted since, by the Greek and\n  Latin churches. The only difference in the punishment is, that\n  the ancient vestals were buried alive, the modern vestals are\n  immured between four walls.\n\n  [344] Polybius informs us, that when the Romans took a city by\n  storm, they not only put all the men to the sword, but even\n  quartered the dogs, and hewed off the limbs of every other\n  living creature they found in the place.\n\n  \u03a0\u03bf\u03bb\u03bb\u03ac\u03ba\u03b9\u03c2 \u1f30\u03b4\u03b5\u1fd6\u03bd \u1f10\u03c3\u03c4\u03b9\u03bd \u1f10\u03bd \u03c4\u03b1\u1fd6\u03c2 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1fec\u03c9\u03bc\u03b1\u03af\u03c9\u03bd \u03ba\u03b1\u03c4\u03b1\u03bb\u03ae\u03c8\u03b5\u03c3\u03b9 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u03c0\u03cc\u03bb\u03b5\u03c9\u03bd,\n  \u03bf\u1f50 \u03bc\u03cc\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u1f00\u03bd\u03b8\u03c1\u03ce\u03c0\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2 \u03c0\u03b5\u03c6\u03bf\u03bd\u03b5\u03c5\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u1f00\u03bb\u03bb\u1f70 \u03c4\u03bf\u1f7a\u03c2 \u03ba\u03cd\u03bd\u03b1\u03c2\n  \u03b4\u03b5\u03b4\u03b9\u03c7\u03bf\u03c4\u03bf\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03bf\u03c5\u03c2, \u03ba\u03b1\u1f76 \u03c4\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f04\u03bb\u03bb\u03c9\u03bd \u03b6\u03ce\u03c9\u03bd \u03bc\u03ad\u03bb\u03b7 \u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03b1\u03ba\u03b5\u03ba\u03bf\u03bc\u03bc\u03ad\u03bd\u03b1. Polyb.\n  lib. 10. p. 820.\n\n  [345] Sallust. de Bell. Jugurth. p. 126....27.\n\n  [346] Grandeur des Romains, p. 68, &c.\n\n  [347] In fidem populi Romani sese dedere. Vide Polyb. Exerpt.\n  Legat. p. 1114, 15.\n\n  [348] Ibid. p. 1349, 50.\n\n  [349] Appian. de Bell. Pun. p. 82.\n\n  [350] Grandeur des Romains, p. 34.\n\n  [351] When the Roman ambassadours, soon after the loss of\n  Saguntum, solicited an alliance with the Volsicani, a people of\n  Spain, that people seemed astonished at the effrontery of the\n  Romans, and bid them go and seek for allies amongst those\n  nations who had never heard of the destruction of Saguntum,\n  which, as they assured them, would be a melancholy and striking\n  warning to the Spaniards how they ever placed any confidence in\n  the good faith and friendship of the Romans. Liv. lib. 21. c.\n  19. p. 144.\n\n  [352] Polyb. lib. 3. p. 270. et seq.\n\n  [353] It has been asked\u2014for what reason? I answer, Livy\n  will inform us in the 22d book of his history.\u2014\u201cThe studied\n  delay of Fabius (who industriously avoided fighting) which\n  according to that historian, gave such just cause of uneasiness\n  to Hannibal, was treated at Rome with the utmost contempt by\n  the citizens of every rank both military and civil;\n  particularly after the general of the horse Minucius had gained\n  some slight advantage over Hannibal during his absence.\u201d\u2014He\n  adds, \u201cthat two unlucky incidents concurred to augment the\n  displeasure of the citizens against the dictator. One was the\n  artful behaviour of Hannibal; who wasted all the country around\n  with fire and sword, the estate of Fabius alone excepted, which\n  he carefully preserved, in hopes that such a different\n  treatment might be thought the effect of some clandestine\n  correspondence between the two commanders.\u201d\u2014The other was\u2014his\n  settling an exchange of prisoners with Hannibal by his own\n  proper authority, and by the same cartel which had subsisted\n  between the Roman and Carthaginian generals in the first Punick\n  war. By that it was agreed: that if any prisoners should remain\n  on either side, after the exchange of man for man was finished,\n  such prisoners should be redeemed at the rate of two pounds and\n  a half of silver for each soldier. When the exchange was made,\n  two hundred and forty-seven Roman prisoners remained to be\n  ransomed.\u2014But as the senate hesitated greatly at passing a\n  decree for the payment of the stipulated sum, because the\n  dictator had not consulted them upon the occasion; he sold\n  those very lands which Hannibal had left untouched, and\n  discharged the debt due from the publick out of his own private\n  fortune.\u2014Whether these were the only reasons or not; yet, they\n  had evidently such an effect upon the Romans, that Fabius seems\n  to have been at that time the object of their resentment, which\n  they never failed to give proofs of upon every occasion.\u2014Thus\n  when Fabius opened the campaign, his cautious conduct was so\n  disagreeable to the officers as well as soldiers, who listened\n  wholly to the idle boasts of Minucius; that if the choice of\n  their commander had depended upon the voices of the military\n  men, Minucius, as Livy affirms, would undoubtedly have been\n  preferred to Fabius. The same historian tells us; that when\n  Fabius returned to Rome to preside as dictator at their\n  religious ceremonies the tribunes of the people inveighed so\n  bitterly against him in their publick harangues, that he\n  refrained from coming to their assemblies.\u2014Even what he spoke\n  in the senate met with a very indifferent reception, especially\n  when he extolled the conduct and abilities of Hannibal, and\n  enumerated the repeated defeats they had received for the two\n  last years through the rashness and incapacity of their own\n  commanders.\u2014When Fabius returned to the camp he received a\n  much more mortifying proof of their displeasure. For they\n  raised Minucius to an equality with him in the command, an act\n  for which there had been no precedent since the first erection\n  of the dictatorial office.\u2014Nor did their enmity to Fabius\n  subside until after the fatal defeat at Cann\u00e6. For the\n  worthless Varro obtained not only the consulship, but what is\n  still more extraordinary, even the confidence of the greater\n  part of the senate, and almost the whole army by railing at\n  Fabius and Fabian measures, and out boasting Minucius. I have\n  showed above from Polybius what trust the majority of the\n  senate reposed in Varro. But I cannot omit a remarkable\n  instance, which Livy gives us, of the absurd and fatal\n  partiality of the military men to Varro, in opposition to\n  \u00c6milius, who avowedly followed the advice of Fabius.\u2014In a\n  council of war, says that historian, held a little before the\n  battle of Cann\u00e6, when each consul persisted firmly in his\n  former opinion; \u00c6milius adhering to Fabius\u2019s plan for avoiding\n  fighting; Varro to his resolution of engaging the enemy\n  immediately; Servilius one of the consuls of the former year\n  was the only one who joined \u00c6milius, the rest declared for\n  Varro.\n\n  [354] Above eighty thousand, according to Dionysius of\n  Halicarnassus.\n\n  [355] Polyb. lib. 3. p. 370.\n\n  [356] Liv. lib. 22. p. 242.\n\n  [357] Polyb. lib. 6. p. 688.\n\n  [358] Our method of trying delinquents, either in the land or\n  sea service, by a court-martial composed of their respective\n  officers, has been judged liable to many objections, and has\n  occasioned no little discontent in the nation. For as their\n  inquiry is restricted to a particular set of articles in each\n  service, I don\u2019t see how a commanding officer, vested with a\n  discretionary power of acting, can strictly or properly come\n  under their cognizance, or be ever liable to their censure,\n  unless he is proved guilty of a direct breach of any one of\n  those articles. But as a commander in chief may easily avoid an\n  offence of that nature, and yet, upon the whole of his conduct\n  in any expedition, be highly culpable; a court-martial, thus\n  circumscribed in their power of inquiry, can never be competent\n  judges in a cause where they are denied a proper power of\n  examining into the real demerits of the supposed offender. Much\n  has been said about trying offences of this nature, like other\n  criminal cases, by juries: a scheme which, at the very first\n  sight, must appear absurd and impracticable to the rational and\n  unprejudiced.\n\n  As therefore instruction is the true end and use of all\n  history, I shall take the liberty of offering a scheme, drawn\n  from that wise and salutary institution of the Carthaginians,\n  which is,\u2014\u201cthat a select standing committee be appointed, to\n  be composed of an equal number of members of both houses,\n  chosen annually by balloting, with a full power of inquiring\n  into the conduct of all commanders in chief, without any\n  restraint of articles of war; and that, after a proper\n  examination, the committee shall refer the case, with their\n  opinion upon it, to the decision of his majesty.\u201d\n\n  This scheme seems to me the least liable to objections of any I\n  have yet met with. For if the numbers are chosen by balloting,\n  they will be less liable to the influence of party. If they are\n  chosen annually, and refer the case to the decision of the\n  crown, which is the fountain of justice as well as mercy, they\n  will neither encroach upon the royal prerogative, nor be liable\n  to that signal defect in the Carthaginian committee, which sat\n  for life, and whose sentence was final without appeal.\n\n  [359] Diodor. Sicul. lib. 20. p. 739.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nOF REVOLUTIONS IN MIXED GOVERNMENTS.\n\n\nPolybius remarks,[360] that the best form of government is that which is\ncomposed of a due admixture of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. He\naffirms that his assertion may not only be proved from reason, but from\nthe evidence of fact, and cites the Spartan constitution in proof, which\nwas modelled upon that very plan by Lycurgus. He adds too, that to\nperpetuate the duration of his government,[361] he united the peculiar\nexcellencies of all the best governments in one form, that neither of\nthe three parts, by swelling beyond its just bounds, might ever be able\nto deviate into its original inborn defects: but that whilst each power\nwas mutually drawn back by the opposite attraction of the other two,\nneither power might ever preponderate, but the balance of government\ncontinue suspended in its true \u00e6quipoise.\n\nFrom the observance of this nice adjustment of the balance of\ngovernment, he foretells the duration or fall of all mixed governments\nin general. He adds, that as all government arises originally from the\npeople; so all mutations in government proceed primarily from the\npeople also. For when once a state has struggled through many and great\ndifficulties, and emerged at last to freedom and wealth, men begin to\nsink gradually into luxury, and to grow more dissolute in their morals.\nThe seeds of ambition will spring up, and prompt them to be more fond of\ncontending for superiority in the magistracy, and carrying their point,\nin whatever they had set their hearts upon, than is consistent with the\nwelfare of the community: when once these evils are got to a head in a\ncountry so circumstanced, the change must necessarily be for the worse;\nbecause the principle of such change will rise from the gratification,\nor disappointment of the ambition of the chief citizens, with respect to\nhonours and preferments; and from that insolence and luxury arising from\nwealth, by which the morals of the private people will be totally\ncorrupted. Thus the change in government will be primarily effected by\nthe people. For when the people are galled by the rapine and oppression\nof those in power, arising from a principle of avarice; and corrupted,\nand elated with an undue opinion of their own weight, by the flatteries\nof the disappointed, which proceed from a principle of ambition, they\nraise those furious commotions in the state, which unhinge all\ngovernment. These commotions first reduce it to a state of anarchy,\nwhich at last terminates in absolute monarchy and tyranny.\n\nI have here given the sentiments of Polybius (and almost in his own\nwords) from that excellent dissertation on government, preserved to us\nin the sixth book of his history, which I would recommend to the perusal\nof my countrymen. He there traces government up to its first origin. He\nexplains the principles, by which different governments arose to the\nsummit of their power and grandeur, and proves, that they sunk to ruin\nby a more or less rapid progress, in proportion as they receded more or\nless from the first principles on which they were originally founded. He\nsurvived the ruin of all the Grecian republicks, as well as Carthage,\nand lived (as he more than once tells us) to see the Romans masters of\nthe known world. Blest with parts and learning superior to most men of\nhis time, joined to the most solid judgment, and the experience of\neighty-two years; no man better understood the intrinsick nature of\ngovernment in general. No man could with more certainty foretel the\nvarious mutations, which so frequently happen in different forms of\ngovernment, which must be ever in a fluctuating state, from the\ncomplicated variety of the human passions. Nor can any man give us\nbetter hints, than he has done, for guarding against the effects of\nthose dangerous passions, and preserving the constitution of a free\npeople in its full force and vigour. Of all the legislators (which he\nknew of) he prefers Lycurgus, whom he looks upon rather as divinely\ninspired, than as a mere man. He esteems the plan of government, which\nhe established at Sparta, the most perfect, and proposes it as a general\nmodel worthy the imitation of every other community; and he remarks,\nthat the Spartans, by adhering to that plan, preserved their liberty\nlonger than any other nation of the known world.\n\nI cannot help observing upon this occasion, that our own constitution as\nsettled at the revolution, so nearly coincides with Lycurgus\u2019s general\nplan of government (as laid down by Polybius) where the monarchy was for\nlife, and hereditary, that it seems, at first sight, to have been formed\nby that very model. For our plan of government intended to fix and\npreserve so just a proportion of the monarchick, aristocratick, and\ndemocratick powers, by their representatives, king, lords, and commons;\nthat any two of those powers might be able jointly to give a check to\nthe other, but not to destroy it, as the destruction of any one power\nmust necessarily induce a different form of government. This is the true\nbasis of the British constitution, the duration of which must absolutely\ndepend upon the just equilibrium preserved between these three powers.\nThis consequently is the unerring test, by which every unbiassed and\nattentive considerer may judge, whether we are in an improving state, or\nwhether, and by what degrees, we are verging towards ruin. But as I aim\nat reformation not satire; as I mean no invidious reflections, but only\nto give my sentiments with that honest freedom, to which every Briton is\nentitled by birthright, I shall just state from Polybius, the means by\nwhich all mixed governments have originally deviated from those first\nprinciples, which were the basis of their rise and grandeur: how by this\ndeviation they tended towards their decline, and that those means\nacquiring additional force from that very decline, necessarily produced\nthose evils, which accelerated the destruction of every free people. As\nthe remarks of this most judicious historian, are founded upon long\nexperience, drawn from undeniable facts, to many of which he himself was\neyewitness,[362] they will not only carry greater weight, but will\nenable us to form a right judgment of our own situation, as it is at\npresent circumstanced.\n\nPolybius observes, that of all the mixed governments ever known to him,\nthat of Lycurgus alone was the result of cool reason and long study. The\nform of the Roman republick, on the contrary, was the production of\nnecessity. For the Romans came at the knowledge of the most proper\nremedies for all their political evils, not by dint of reasoning, but by\nthe deep felt experience of the many and dangerous calamities, with\nwhich they had so long and so often struggled. I do not in the least\ndoubt, but that excellent form of government established by our rude\nGothick ancestors, wherever their arms prevailed, arose from the same\ncause, necessity founded upon experience. Every mixed government\ntherefore, where the three powers are duly balanced, has a _resource_\nwithin itself against all those political evils to which it is liable.\nBy this _resource_, I mean, that joint coercive force, which any two of\nthese powers are able to exercise over the other. But as nothing but\nnecessity can authorize the exercise of this power, so it must be\nstrictly regulated by those principles, on which the government was\nfounded. For if by an undue exercise of this power, any one of the three\nshould be diminished, or annihilated, the balance would be destroyed,\nand the constitution alter proportionally for the worse. Thus in\nDenmark, where the monarchy was limited and elective, the people,\nexasperated by the oppressions of the nobility, who had assumed an\nalmost despotick power, out of a principle of revenge threw their whole\nweight into the regal scale. Frederick the third, (the then reigning\nmonarch) strengthened by this accession of power and the assistance of\nthe people, compelled the nobility to surrender their power and\nprivileges. In consequence of this fatal step taken by the people, the\nmonarchy, in the year 1660, became absolute and hereditary. Lord\nMolesworth observes upon this occasion, in his account of Denmark, that\nthe people of Denmark have since felt by sad experience, that the little\nfinger of an absolute prince is heavier than the loins of a hundred\nnobles.\n\nThe late revolution of government in Sweden, though arising from the\nsame principles, took a very different turn. Charles the twelfth, brave\neven to enthusiasm, and as insatiably fond of glory as the ambitious\nAlexander, had quite tired out and exhausted his people, by his\ndestructive expeditions. But when that fortunate shot from the town of\nFrederickshal gave repose to his own country as well as to a great part\nof Europe, the states of Sweden, no longer awed by a warlike monarch\n(who had usurped a despotick power) and a veteran army, again resumed\nthe exercise of their own inherent powers. Stimulated by a desire of\nvengeance for the evils they had already suffered, and the fear of\nsmarting again under the same evils, they beheaded Gortz, the minister\nof their late monarch\u2019s oppressions, and left the crown no more than the\nbare shadow of authority. For though they continued the monarchy for\nlife and hereditary, yet they imposed such rigid terms upon their\nsucceeding kings, as reduced them to a state of dependance and impotence\nnearly equal to a doge of Genoa or Venice. We see, in both these\ninstances, the revolution in government effected by the union of two\npowers of the government against the third. The catastrophe indeed in\nboth nations was different, because that third power which was obnoxious\nto the other two, was different in each nation. In the former of these\ninstances, the people, fired with resentment against the nobility, and\ninstigated by secret emissaries of the crown, blindly gave up their\nwhole power to the king, which enabled him to deprive the nobility (the\nsecond estate) of their share of power, and bring the whole to centre\nin the crown. Thus the government in Denmark was changed into absolute\nmonarchy. In the latter, the senate took the lead during the\n_interregnum_, which followed the death of Charles, and changed the\ngovernment into aristocracy. For though the outward form of government\nindeed is preserved, yet the essence no longer remains. The monarchy is\nmerely titular, but the whole power is absorbed by the senate,\nconsequently the government is strictly aristocratick. For the people\nwere by no means gainers by the change, but remain in the same state of\nservitude, which they so much complained of before. Thus in all\nrevolutions in mixed governments, where the union of two injured powers\nis animated by the spirit of patriotism, and directed by that salutary\nrule before laid down, which forbids us to destroy, and only enjoins us\nto reduce the third offending power within its proper bounds, the\nbalance of government will be restored upon its first principles, and\nthe change will be for the better. Thus when the arbitrary and\ninsupportable encroachments of the crown under James the second, aimed\nso visibly at the subversion of our constitution, and the introduction\nof absolute monarchy; necessity authorized the lords and commons (the\nother two powers) to have _recourse_ to the joint exercise of that\nrestraining power, which is the inherent _resource_ of all mixed\ngovernments. But as the exercise of this power was conducted by\npatriotism, and regulated by the above-mentioned rule, the event was the\nlate happy revolution; by which the power of the crown was restrained\nwithin its proper limits, and the government resettled upon its true\nbasis, as nearly as the genius of the times would admit of. But if the\npassions prevail, and ambition lurks beneath the mask of patriotism, the\nchange will inevitably be for the worse. Because the restitution of the\nbalance of government, which alone can authorize the exercise of the two\njoint powers against the third, will be only the pretext, whilst the\nwhole weight and fury of the incensed people will be directed solely to\nthe ends of ambition. Thus if the regal power should be enabled to take\nthe lead by gaining over the whole weight of the people, the change will\nterminate in absolute monarchy; which so lately happened in Denmark, as\nit had happened before in almost all the old Gothick governments. If the\naristocratick power, actuated by that ambition, which (an extreme few\ninstances excepted) seems inseparable from the regal, should be able to\ndirect the joint force of the people against the crown, the change will\nbe to an aristocratick government, like the present state of Sweden, or\nthe government of Holland, from the death of William the third, to the\nlate revolution in favour of the stadtholder. If the power of the people\nimpelled to action by any cause, either real or imaginary, should be\nable to subvert the other two, the consequence will be, that anarchy,\nwhich Polybius terms, the ferine and savage dominion of the people.[363]\nThis will continue until some able and daring spirit, whose low birth\nor fortune precluded him from rising to the chief dignities of the state\nby any other means, puts himself at the head of the populace inured to\nlive by plunder and rapine, and drawing the whole power to himself,\nerects a tyranny upon the ruins of the former government; or until the\ncommunity, tired out and impatient under their distracted situation,\nbring back the government into its old channel. This is what Polybius\nterms the circumvolution of governments;[364] or the rotation of\ngovernments within themselves until they return to the same point. The\nfate of the Grecian and Roman republicks terminated in the former of\nthese events. The distracted state of government in this nation, from\n1648, to the restoration of Charles the second, ended happily in the\nlatter, though the nation for some years experienced the former of these\ncatastrophes under the government of Cromwell.\n\nI have here given a short, but plain general analysis of government,\nfounded upon experience drawn from historical truths, and adapted to the\ngeneral capacity of my countrymen. But if any one desires to be\nacquainted with the philosophy of government, and to investigate the\nratio and series of all these mutations, or revolutions of governments\nwithin themselves, I must (with Polybius) refer him to Plato\u2019s\nrepublick.\n\nThe plan of a good and happy government, which Plato lays down, by the\nmouth of Socrates, in the former part of that work, is wholly ideal, and\nimpossible to be executed, unless mankind could be new moulded. But the\nvarious revolutions of government (described above) which he treats of\nin the latter part, was founded upon facts, facts which he himself had\nbeen eyewitness to in the numerous republicks of Greece and Sicily, and\nhad fatally experienced in his own country Athens. The divine\nphilosopher, in that part of his admirable treatise, traces all these\nmutations up to their first source, \u201cthe intemperance of the human\npassions,\u201d and accounts for their various progress, effects and\nconsequences, from the various combinations of the same perpetually\nconflicting passions. His maxims are founded solely upon the sublimest\ntruths, his allusions beautiful and apposite, and his instructions alike\napplicable to publick or private life, equally capable of forming the\nstatesman or the man.\n\n  [360] Polyb. Hist. lib. 6. p. 628.\n\n  [361] Id. ibid. p. 638-9.\n\n  [362] Polyb. lib. 3. p. 223.\n\n  [363] \u0394\u03b7\u03bc\u03bf\u03ba\u03c1\u03b1\u03c4\u03af\u03b1 \u03b8\u03b7\u03c1\u03b9\u03ce\u03b4\u03b7\u03c2. Polyb. p. 638.\n\n  [364] \u03a0\u03bf\u03bb\u03b9\u03c4\u03b5\u03b9\u1ff6\u03bd \u1f00\u03bd\u03b1\u03ba\u03cd\u03ba\u03bb\u03c9\u03c3\u03b9\u03c2. Polyb. p. 637.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\nOF THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION.\n\n\nXenophon observes,[365] that if the Athenians, together with the\nsovereignty of the seas, had enjoyed the advantageous situation of an\nisland, they might with great ease have given law to their neighbours.\nFor the same fleets which enabled them to ravage the seacoasts of the\ncontinent at discretion, could equally have protected their own country\nfrom the insults of their enemies as long as they maintained their naval\nsuperiority. One would imagine, says the great Montesquieu,[366] that\nXenophon in this passage was speaking of the island of Britain. The\njudicious and glorious exertion of our naval force under the present\nministry, so strongly confirms Xenophon\u2019s remark, that one would imagine\ntheir measures were directed, as well as dictated, by his consummate\ngenius. We are masters both of those natural and acquired advantages,\nwhich Xenophon required to make his countrymen invincible. We daily feel\ntheir importance more and more, and must be sensible that our liberty,\nour happiness, and our very existence as a people, depend upon our naval\nsuperiority supported by our military virtue and publick spirit.\nNothing, humanly speaking, but luxury, effeminacy and corruption, can\never deprive us of this envied superiority. What an accumulated load of\nguilt therefore must lie upon any future administration, who, to serve\nthe ends of faction, should ever precipitate Britain from her present\nheight down to the abject state of Athens, by encouraging those evils to\nblast all publick virtue in their unlimited progress.\n\nAs Britain is so confessedly superior to all the maritime powers of the\nancients by the advantages of situation; so the British constitution, as\nsettled at the revolution, is demonstrably far preferable to, and better\nformed for duration, than any of the most celebrated republicks of\nantiquity. As the executive power is vested in a single person, who is\ndeemed the first branch in the legislature; and as that power is for\nlife and hereditary; our constitution is neither liable to those\nfrequent convulsions, which attended the annual elections of consuls,\nnor to that solecism in politicks, two supreme heads of one body for\nlife, and hereditary, which was the great defect in the Spartan\ninstitution. As the house of commons, elected by, and out of the body of\nthe people, is vested with all the power annexed to the tribunitial\noffice amongst the Romans; the people enjoy every advantage which ever\naccrued to the Roman people by that institution, whilst the nation is\nsecure from all those calamitous seditions, in which every factious\ntribune could involve his country at pleasure. And as all our questions\nin parliament are decided by a majority of voices; we can never be\nsubject to that capital defect in the Carthaginian constitution, where\nthe single _veto_, of one discontented senator, referred the decision of\nthe most important affair to a wrong-headed, ungovernable populace. The\nhouse of peers is placed in the middle of the balance, to prevent the\nregal scale from preponderating to despotism or tyranny; or the\ndemocratical to anarchy and its consequences. The equitable intent of\nour laws is plainly calculated, like those of Solon, to preserve the\nliberty and property of every individual in the community; and to\nrestrain alike the richest or the poorest, the greatest or the meanest,\nfrom doing or suffering wrong from each other. This is the wise and\nsalutary plan of power established at the revolution. Would we always\nadhere steadily to this plan, and preserve the just \u00e6quilibrium, as\ndelivered down to us by our great ancestors, our constitution would\nremain firm and unshaken to the end of time.\n\nI have already showed in the course of these papers that, since that\never memorable \u00e6ra, we suffered some breaches to be made in the most\ninteresting part of this constitution, not by the hand of open violence,\nbut by the insidious, and consequently more dangerous arts of\ncorruption. The great increase in our commerce after the peace of\nUtrecht, brought in a vast accession of wealth; and that wealth revived,\nand gradually diffused that luxury through the whole nation, which had\nlain dormant during the dangerous reign of James the second, and the\nwarlike reigns of William and Ann. To this universal luxury, and this\nonly, we must impute that amazing progress of corruption, which seized\nthe very vitals of our constitution. If therefore we impartially compare\nthe present state of our own country with that of Rome and Carthage, we\nshall find, that we resemble them most when in their declining period.\n\nTo the commercial maxims of the Carthaginians, we have added their\ninsatiable lust of gain, without their economy, and contempt of luxury\nand effeminacy. To the luxury and dissipation of the Romans, we have\njoined their venality, without their military spirit: and we feel the\npernicious effects of the same species of faction, which was the great\nleading cause to ruin in both those republicks. The Roman institution\nwas formed to make and to preserve their conquests. Abroad invincible,\nat home invulnerable, they possessed all the resources requisite for a\nwarlike nation within themselves. The military spirit of their people,\nwhere every citizen was a soldier, furnished inexhaustible supplies for\ntheir armies abroad, and secured them at home from all attempts of\ninvasion. The Carthaginian was better calculated to acquire than to\npreserve. They depended upon commerce for the acquisition of wealth, and\nupon their wealth for the protection of their commerce. They owed their\nconquests to the venal blood and sinews of other people, and, like\ntheir ancestors the Ph\u0153nicians, exhibited their money-bags as symbols of\ntheir power. They trusted too much to the valour of foreigners, and too\nlittle to that of their own natives. Thus whilst they were formidable\nabroad by their fleets and mercenary armies, they were weak and\ndefenceless at home. But the event showed, how dangerous it is for the\ngreatest commercial nation to rely on this kind of mercantile policy;\nand that a nation of unarmed undisciplined traders can never be a match,\nwhilst they are so circumstanced, for a nation of soldiers. About two\ncenturies ago a handful (comparatively speaking) of rude irregular\nTartars subdued, and still enjoy the dominion of China, the most\npopulous, and the richest commercial empire in the universe. And a\nneighbouring mercantile republick, by adhering too closely to these\nmaxims, is at this time neither respected by her friends, nor feared by\nher enemies.\n\nThe English constitution was originally military, like that of every\nkingdom founded by our Gothick ancestors. Henry the seventh gave the\nfirst spur to commerce by diffusing property more equally amongst the\ncommons at the expense of the nobility. From that time, the ancient\nmilitary spirit of this nation has gradually dwindled to the low ebb, at\nwhich we now find it. But the great epocha of our marine, as well as\ncommerce, ought properly to be fixed to the glorious reign of Elizabeth.\nThe colonies settled during the peaceful reign of James the first, laid\nthe foundation of our present extensive commerce. The civil wars between\nCharles the first and the parliament, revived and diffused the ancient\nmilitary spirit through the whole body of the people; and the able\nCromwell made the English name more respectable in Europe, than it ever\nhad been under any of our monarchs. Our naval glory seems to have\nreached its summit under that period; for though our marine is greatly\nincreased both in the number and strength of our shipping, yet we have\nby no means surpassed the commanders and seamen of that time either in\nbravery or ability. The reason is evident. Publick virtue then existed\nin its full force, and zeal for the national glory was the great spur to\naction. The commanders sailed in quest of honour, not lucre, and\nesteemed the glory of the capture as an adequate reward for the most\nhazardous enterprises. Luxury was as much unknown to the highest class,\nas spirituous liquors were to the lowest. Discipline, sobriety, and an\nawful sense of religion, were strictly kept up amongst the private\nseamen; whilst the humane usage of the officers taught them to obey from\nlove, and a just sense of their duty, not from the slavish principle of\nfear only. The immortal Blake esteemed five hundred pounds for a ring,\nand the publick thanks of parliament, a glorious recompense for all\nthose illustrious actions, which made Africa and Europe tremble, and\nraised the English flag to the summit of glory. Inferior merit, in\nlater times, has been rewarded with coronets and great lucrative\nemployments.\n\nLuxury with its fatal effects was imported by Charles the second at the\nrestoration. The contagious influence of that bane to publick virtue and\nliberty, corrupted our manners, enervated our bodies, and debased our\nminds, whilst our military spirit subsided, in proportion as the love of\npleasure increased. Charles the second nurtured in the high principles\nof prerogative, was diffident of a militia composed of the whole body of\nthe people. He obtained a standing force of about four or five thousand\nmen under the specious denomination of guards and garrisons; which he\nincreased afterwards to eight thousand, and suffered the militia\ngradually to decay, until it became almost useless. A policy fatal to\nliberty, which has been too successfully copied, since that reign, by\nevery iniquitous minister, who support himself by faction. James the\nsecond, devoted to bigotry, and influenced by the most weak, as well as\nthe most wicked counsels, that ever prevailed in this kingdom, at one\nstroke disarmed the people, and established a large standing army. As\nthe militia were unwilling to act against Monmouth and his followers,\nwhom they looked upon as the protectors of their religion and liberties,\nJames, concealing the true reason, declared to his parliament, that he\nhad found the militia useless and unserviceable by experience, and\ninsisted upon such supplies, as would enable him to support those\nadditional troops, which he should find necessary for his security. And\nhe had actually increased his army to thirty thousand men at the time of\nthe revolution. The whole reigns of William the third and Ann are\ndistinguished by war abroad and factions at home. Yet though we entered\ninto both those wars as principals, the military spirit of our people\nwas not much improved; our national troops composed by a small part of\nthe allied armies, and we placed our chief dependance upon foreign\nmercenaries.\n\nFrequent attempts have been made since that time to revive a national\ndisciplined militia, which have been as constantly defeated by\ncorruption and the malignity of faction. Our late fears of an invasion,\nand the introduction of so large a body of foreign troops, a measure\nhighly unpopular and distasteful, procured at last the long wished for\nact for a militia. Mutilated as it was, and clogged with almost\ninsuperable difficulties by the same faction, who durst no openly oppose\nit at that dangerous juncture, the real well-wishers to their country\nwere glad to accept it. They looked upon it as a foundation laid for a\nmuch more useful and extensive militia; which time and opportunity might\nenable them to perfect. Much has been said, and many assertions boldly\nthrown out of the utter impracticability of a national militia. But this\nis either the language of corruption or of effeminacy and cowardice. The\nRomans, in the first Punick war, found themselves unable to contend\nwith the Carthaginians for want of a marine. Yet that magnanimous\npeople, without any other knowledge of the mechanism of a ship, than\nwhat they acquired from a galley of their enemies, thrown by accident\nupon their coasts, without either shipwright or seamen, built, manned,\nand fitted out a fleet under the consul Duilius, in three months time,\nwhich engaged and totally defeated the grand fleet of Carthage, though\nthat republick had enjoyed the sovereignty of the sea unrivaled for time\nimmemorial. This effort of the Roman magnanimity gives a higher idea of\nthe Roman genius, than any other action recorded in their history. And\nby this alone we must be convinced, \u201cthat nothing is insurmountable to\nthe unconquerable hand of liberty, when backed by publick virtue, and\nthe generous resolution of a brave and willing people.\u201d The difficulties\nand obstacles in either case, I mean of making a fleet or establishing a\ngood militia, will admit of no comparison. The Romans may almost be said\nto have created a fleet out of nothing. We have nothing more to do than\nto rouse and diffuse that martial spirit through the nation, which the\narts of ministerial policy have so long endeavoured to keep dormant.\nGreat indeed has been the outcry of the danger of trusting arms in the\ndissolute hands of the scum and refuse of the nation in these licentious\ntimes. These I consign to the proper severity of the martial discipline\nof an army; for of this kind of people, the bulk of every army in Europe\nis at this time composed. I speak to the nobility and gentry, the\ntraders and yeomanry of this kingdom, to all those who are possessed of\nproperty, and have something to lose, and from the interest of their\nrespective shares, are equally concerned in the preservation of the\nwhole. Of such as these the Roman armies were composed who conquered\nItaly. Every Roman soldier was a citizen possessed of property, and\nequally interested in the safety of the republick. The wisdom of the\nRomans in the choice of their soldiers never appeared in so conspicuous\na light as after the defeat at Cann\u00e6. Every citizen pressed to take up\narms in defence of his country, and not only refused his pay, but\ngenerously gave up what gold and silver he was master of, even to the\nmost trifling ornaments, for the publick service. The behaviour of the\nwomen too, to their immortal honour, was equally great and\ndisinterested. Such is the spirit, which a truly brave and free people\nwill ever exert in a time of distress and danger. Marius was the first\nman who broke through that wise maxim, and raised his forces out of the\nsixth class, which consisted only of the dregs and refuse of the people.\nMarius too gave the first stab to the constitution of his country.\nPeople of property are not only the chief support, but the best and\nsafest defence of a free and opulent country; and their example will\nalways have a proper influence upon their inferiors.\n\nNothing but an extensive militia can revive the once martial spirit of\nthis nation, and we had even better once more be a nation of soldiers,\nlike our renowned ancestors, than a nation of abject crouching slaves to\nthe most rapacious, and most insolent people in the universe. Let us not\nbe too much elated, and lulled into a fatal security from some late\nsuccesses, in which our national forces had no share. Nothing is so\ncommon as unexpected vicissitudes in war. Our enemies have many and\ngreat resources; our heroick ally, in case of a reverse of fortune, few\nor none. Our haughty and implacable enemy, unaccustomed to insults in\ntheir own territories, will think the blot in their honour indelible,\nuntil they have returned the affront upon our coasts with redoubled\nvengeance. Whilst a pretender to this crown exists, France will never\nwant a plausible pretext for invading this kingdom. Their last attempt\nanswered the proposed end so well, that we may be certain, so politick\nan enemy, instigated by revenge, will omit no opportunity of playing the\nsame successful engine once more against us. The French are now\nperfectly well acquainted with our weak side. The violent shock our\nnational credit received by the inroad of a few Highlanders only, into\nthe heart of this country, has taught them the infallible method of\ndistressing us in that essential point. Should therefore our measures\nfor annoying that nation be ever so wisely planned, yet we can never\nhope to execute them with proportionate vigour, whilst we remain\ndefenceless at home. If the bare alarm only of an invasion frightened us\nso lately into the expense, as well as ignominy, of importing foreign\nmercenaries for our own defence, the French know by experience, that an\nactual attempt would compel us to recall our fleets and forces, and\nagain expose our commerce, colonies, and our only ally to their mercy.\nNo man, I believe, is so weak as to imagine, that France will be\ndeterred from such an attempt by the danger which may attend it. For if\nwe reflect upon the number of her troops, the risk of ten or twenty\nthousand men, can hardly be deemed an object worthy the attention of so\nformidable a power. For should they all perish in the attempt, yet\nFrance would be amply repaid by the advantages she would draw from that\nconfusion, which they would necessarily occasion. The traitor who lately\npointed out the proper time, as well as place for an invasion, and the\nfatal effects it would have upon publick credit, whatever success might\nattend it, furnishes us with a convincing proof, that France never loses\nsight of so useful a measure. A consideration which greatly enforces the\nnecessity of national union, and a national militia. The unequalled\nabilities of one man[367] (humanly speaking) have given a turn to the\naffairs of Germany, as happy, as it was amazing; and hope begins to dawn\nupon our late despairing nation. The wise and vigorous measures of our\npresent patriot-ministry have conciliated not only the esteem, but the\nuniversal confidence of the people. Under the present ministry we laid\nthe foundation of this long wished for, though long despaired of,\nmilitia. If we support their administration with unanimity and vigour,\nwe may fix this great national object, upon that extensive and useful\nplan, which was designed and hoped for by every lover of his country.\nThe fate therefore of the militia depends absolutely upon the present\ncrisis. For if we supinely neglect this auspicious opportunity, future\nefforts will be just as ineffectual, as the point we have already\ncarried with so much labour and assiduity. For the same function, which\nhas invariably opposed every attempt for a national militia, are avowed\nenemies to the present ministers, from that antipathy, which private\ninterest and the lust of power for selfish ends, will ever bear to\npatriotism and publick virtue. Should therefore the evil genius of this\nnation again prevail, and the same faction once more seize the helm of\ngovernment, we must give up all hopes of a militia as well as every\nother national measure.\n\nLet us throw but one glance upon the present situation of these once\nglorious republicks, and we cannot help reflecting upon the final and\ndireful catastrophe, which will eternally result from the prevalence of\nambitious and selfish faction supported by corruption.\n\nGreece, once the nurse of arts and sciences, the fruitful mother of\nphilosophers, lawgivers and heroes, now lies prostrate under the iron\nyoke of ignorance and barbarism ... Carthage, once the mighty sovereign\nof the ocean, and the centre of universal commerce, which poured the\nriches of the nations into her lap, now puzzles the inquisitive\ntraveller in his researches after even the vestiges of her ruins.... And\nRome, the mistress of the universe, which once contained whatever was\nesteemed great or brilliant in human nature, is now sunk into the\nignoble seat of whatever is esteemed mean and infamous.\n\nShould faction again predominate and succeed in its destructive views,\nand the dastardly maxims of luxury and effeminancy universally prevail\namongst us ... such too will soon be the fate of Britain.\n\n  [365] Xenophon, de Republ. Athen.\n\n  [366] Esprit des loix, vol. 2. p. 3.\n\n  [367] The king of Prussia.","title":"Reflections on the Rise and Fall of the Ancient Republicks: Adapted to the Present State of Great Britain","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":85411}