{"collection":"myth-cosmogony","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_45645/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_45645","id":"gutenberg_45645","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/45645","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Other","Category: Mythology, Legends & Folklore","Japan -- Civilization","Japan -- History"],"text":"The History _of_ Nations\n\n JAPAN\n\n [Illustration: Emblem]\n\n GHENT\n EDITION\n\n\n\n\n [Illustration: THE JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN COMMANDERS OF\n THE LATE WAR IN THE PENINSULA OF\n LIAO-TUNG, MANCHURIA]\n\n GENERAL NODZU\n _Opposed to General Bilderding at the\n Battle of Mukden_\n\n GENERAL BARON KUROKI\n _Commander-in-Chief of the First\n Japanese Army_\n\n GENERAL KUROPATKIN\n _Commander-in-Chief of the Russian\n Army in the Far East_\n\n GENERAL LIGNIEVITCH\n _Successor to General Kuropatkin_\n\n GENERAL NOGI\n _Japanese Commander before Port\n Arthur_\n\n GENERAL OKU\n _Opposed to General Kaulbars at the\n Battle of Mukden_\n\n MARSHAL OYAMA\n _Commander of the Japanese Field\n Forces. Victor at Liao-yang,\n Sha-ho and Mukden_\n\n _From drawings made by H. W. Koekkoek from photographs_\n\n\n\n\n THE HISTORY OF NATIONS\n HENRY CABOT LODGE, Ph.\u00a0D., LL.\u00a0D. EDITOR-IN-CHIEF\n\n JAPAN\n\n From the Japanese Government History\n Edited With Supplementary Chapters\n by\n\n K. ASAKAWA\n\n Instructor in Japanese Civilization\n Yale University\n\n Volume VII\n\n [Illustration: Emblem]\n\n Illustrated\n\n P \u00b7 F \u00b7 COLLIER & SON\n PUBLISHERS NEW YORK\n\n\n\n\n Copyright, 1907, by\n JOHN D. MORRIS & COMPANY\n\n Copyright, 1910, by\n THE H. W. SNOW & SON COMPANY\n\n Copyright, 1913, by\n P. F. COLLIER & SON\n\n\n Designed, Printed, and Bound at\n The Collier Press, New York\n\n\n\n\n THE HISTORY OF NATIONS\n EDITOR-IN-CHIEF\n HENRY CABOT LODGE, Ph.D., LL.D.\n\nAssociate Editors and Authors\n\nARCHIBALD HENRY SAYCE, LL.D.,\n_Professor of Assyriology, Oxford University_\n\nCHRISTOPHER JOHNSTON, M.D., Ph.D.,\n_Associate Professor of Oriental History and Archaeology,\nJohns Hopkins University_\n\nC.W.C. OMAN, LL.D.,\n_Professor of History, Oxford University_\n\nTHEODOR MOMMSEN,\n_Late Professor of Ancient History, University of Berlin_\n\nARTHUR C. HOWLAND, Ph.D.,\n_Department of History, University of Pennsylvania_\n\nCHARLES MERIVALE, LL.D.,\n_Late Dean of Ely, formerly Lecturer in History, Cambridge University_\n\nJ. HIGGINSON CABOT, Ph.D.,\n_Department of History, Wellesley College_\n\nSIR WILLIAM W. HUNTER, F.R.S.,\n_Late Director-General of Statistics in India_\n\nGEORGE M. DUTCHER, Ph.D.,\n_Professor of History, Wesleyan University_\n\nSIR ROBERT K. DOUGLAS,\n_Professor of Chinese, King's College, London_\n\nJEREMIAH WHIPPLE JENKS, Ph.D., LL.D.,\n_Professor of Political Economy and Politics, Cornell University_\n\nKANICHI ASAKAWA, Ph.D.,\n_Instructor in the History of Japanese Civilization, Yale University_\n\nWILFRED HAROLD MUNRO, L.H.D.\n_Professor of European History, Brown University_\n\nG. MERCER ADAM,\n_Historian and Editor_\n\nFRED MORROW FLING, Ph.D.,\n_Professor of European History, University of Nebraska_\n\nFRAN\u00c7OIS AUGUSTE MARIE MIGNET,\n_Late Member of the French Academy_\n\nJAMES WESTFALL THOMPSON, Ph.D.,\n_Department of History, University of Chicago_\n\nSAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER, LL.D.,\n_Professor of Modern History, King's College, London_\n\nP.W. JOYCE, LL.D.,\n_Commissioner for the Publication of the Ancient Laws of Ireland_\n\nJUSTIN McCARTHY, LL.D.,\n_Author and Historian_\n\nAUGUSTUS HUNT SHEARER, Ph.D.,\n_Instructor in History, Trinity College, Hartford_\n\nW. HAROLD CLAFLIN, B.A.,\n_Department of History, Harvard University_\n\nCHARLES DANDLIKER, LL.D.,\n_President of Zurich University_\n\nELBERT JAY BENTON, Ph.D.,\n_Department of History, Western Reserve University_\n\nSIR EDWARD S. CREASY,\n_Late Professor of History, University College, London_\n\nARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE, Ph.D.,\n_Assistant Professor of History, Harvard University_\n\nWILLIAM RICHARD MORFILL, M.A.,\n_Professor of Russian and other Slavonic Languages, Oxford University_\n\nCHARLES EDMUND FRYER, Ph.D.,\n_Department of History, McGill University_\n\nE.C. OTTE,\n_Specialist on Scandinavian History_\n\nEDWARD S. CORWIN, Ph.D.,\n_Instructor in History, Princeton University_\n\nPAUL LOUIS LEGER,\n_Professor of Slav Languages, Coll\u00e8ge de France_\n\nWILLIAM E. LINGELBACH, Ph.D.,\n_Assistant Professor of European History, University of Pennsylvania_\n\nBAYARD TAYLOR,\n_Former United States Minister to Germany_\n\nSIDNEY B. FAY, Ph.D.,\n_Professor of History, Dartmouth College_\n\nJ. SCOTT KELTIE, LL.D.,\n_President Royal Geographical Society_\n\nALBERT GALLOWAY KELLER, Ph.D.,\n_Assistant Professor of the Science of Society, Yale University_\n\nEDWARD JAMES PAYNE, M.A.,\n_Fellow of University College, Oxford_\n\nPHILIP PATTERSON WELLS, Ph.D.,\n_Lecturer in History and Librarian of the Law School, Yale University_\n\nFREDERICK ALBION OBER,\n_Historian, Author and Traveler_\n\nJAMES WILFORD GARNER, Ph.D.,\n_Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois_\n\nJOHN BACH McMASTER, Litt.D., LL.D.,\n_Professor of History, University of Pennsylvania_\n\nJAMES LAMONT PERKINS, Managing Editor\n\n * * * * *\n\nThe editors and publishers desire to express their appreciation for\nvaluable advice and suggestions received from the following: Hon. Andrew\nD. White, LL.D., Alfred Thayer Mahan, D.C.L., LL.D., Hon. Charles\nEmory Smith, LL.D., Professor Edward Gaylord Bourne, Ph.D., Charles F.\nThwing, LL.D., Dr. Emil Reich, William Elliot Griffis, LL.D.,\nProfessor John Martin Vincent, Ph.D., LL.D., Melvil Dewey, LL.D.,\nAlston Ellis, LL.D., Professor Charles H. McCarthy, Ph.D., Professor\nHerman V. Ames, Ph.D., Professor Walter L. Fleming, Ph.D., Professor\nDavid Y. Thomas, Ph.D., Mr. Otto Reich and Mr. Francis J. Reynolds.\n\n\n\n\nNOTE\n\n\nThe editors of \"The History of Nations\" concluded their work with the\nchronicling of events to October, 1905, and all additions thereafter,\nbringing the histories to date, have been supplied by the publishers.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe present revised edition of the \"History of the Empire of Japan\"\n(compiled, in 1893, for the Imperial Japanese Commission of the World's\nColumbian Exposition at Chicago, by Messrs. K. Takatsu, S. Mikami, M.\nIsoda, and others, and published in T\u014dky\u014d by order of the Department of\nEducation) is not intended to supersede the original edition, the high\nqualities of which are, on the contrary, recommended to all students of\nJapanese history. That work admirably represents what might be termed\nthe orthodox view of the national history, and is free alike from the\nunscientific method of the more conservative historian, and from the\nsuperficial speculations of the more radical, but not more scientific,\nstudent. Were the present editor to write an original work on Japanese\nhistory, however, he would, it is unnecessary to say, change the entire\nmanner of presentation in order to make it accord with his own\nconception of the subject-matter. In this revision, he has not changed\nthe general order of the original work, but has merely corrected a few\ndata which are obviously out of date, omitted those minor facts which\nmay well be dispensed with, and made the general narrative somewhat\nsmoother than it was.\n\nThe fourth part is, however, the editor's own work. The primary aim in\nthis division of the volume has been to supply a popular and accurate\naccount of certain phases of the national progress that has taken place\nsince the \"History of the Empire\" was prepared a dozen years ago. The\nsubstance of chapter XVIII has appeared among the new chapters supplied\nby the editor to the new edition of Brinkley's (edit.) \"Japan,\" (J.\u00a0B.\nMillet Co., Boston, 1905), and has been inserted here with the\npermission of those publishers.\n\nK. Asakawa\nYALE UNIVERSITY\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\n\nThe Empire of Japan consists to-day of a group of islands marshaled in\nthe northwest corner of the Pacific Ocean, off the eastern coast of the\nAsiatic continent. These islands--including Formosa and the Pescadores\nceded by China in 1895, and the southern half of Sakhalin, acquired from\nRussia in 1905--lie between the parallels of 50\u00b0 56' and 21\u00b0 48' north\nlatitude, and the longitude of their extreme eastern and western points\nare 156\u00b0 32' and 119\u00b0 20', respectively, east of Greenwich. The empire\nthus covers 29\u00b0 8' of latitude and 37\u00b0 12' of longitude. On the east it\nfaces the Pacific; on the southwest it looks across the waters of the\nChina Sea to the mainland of China; on the northwest the Sea of Japan\nand Gulf of Tartary separate it from Korea and Siberia. The fiftieth\nparallel divides the Japanese half of Sakhalin from the northern or\nRussian half, and the Kurile Strait intercepts the Chishima or Kurile\ngroup of islands on the north from the Russian peninsula of Kamchatka.\n\nThe whole group includes five and one-half large islands and nearly six\nhundred islets. The large island lying in the center constitutes the\nmainland; the island directly to the north is Hokkaid\u014d (Yezo or Ezo),\nand that to the south, Kiush\u016b; on the southwest of the mainland and east\nof Kiush\u016b is Shikoku; and stretching in a northwesterly direction from\nHokkaid\u014d are the Chishima or Kuriles, while the chain of the Riuki\u016b\n(Loochoo) Archipelago leads to Formosa. Floating, as it were, in the Sea\nof Japan are the islets of Sado, Oki, and Tsushima, the last lying only\nabout fifty miles from the southern coast of Korea. Scattered in the\nPacific Ocean, at a distance of nearly 500 miles from the southwest\ncoast of the mainland, lies the Ogasawara group (Bonins). To these must\nnow be added the recently ceded southern half of the Island of Sakhalin.\n\nOwing to the insular nature of the country, the area of the empire,\nexclusive of the half of Sakhalin, which is perhaps as much as 12,000\nsquare miles, little exceeds 161,000 square miles, or slightly larger\nthan the area of the British Isles. More than half of this superficies\nis comprised in the main island. The coastline of the fourteen larger\nislands and archipelagoes, again excepting Sakhalin, stretches to a\nlength of 13,500 miles. Little indented, the coast along the Sea of\nJapan offers few bays or promontories; but the Pacific and the China Sea\ncoasts are broken into innumerable capes and inlets, and abound in good\nharbors.\n\nThe country is mountainous, and has little flat land. Two systems of\nmountain chains extend north to south and east to west, each having\nnumerous branches. The highlands of the empire are the two provinces of\nShinano and Kai, situated in the center of the main island. At the\nboundary of Kai and Suruga stands Fujisan, or Mount Fuji, capped with\nperpetual snows, its summit rising to 12,300 feet above the sea level.\nIts position as the loftiest peak in the country has been lost by the\nacquisition of Formosa, which contains Mount Morrison, now called Mount\nNiitaka, the altitude of which is not less than 14,200 feet. The\nmountains of the main island are for the most part volcanic, the active\nvolcanoes numbering 170, and the ranges that comprise them stretch\nacross the extent of the country. Mines and mineral springs consequently\nabound. Frequency of earthquakes also results from the abundance of\nvolcanoes. Minor shocks average from thirty or forty to several hundreds\nannually, and of severe shocks history shows that there have been some\ntwo or three in each century, entailing sometimes a frightful\ndestruction of life and property.\n\nFrom the general configuration of the country it follows that great\nrivers with long courses are few, but numerous streams of lesser\nmagnitude traverse all parts of the empire, affording excellent\nfacilities for drainage and irrigation. Many of the larger of these are\neven navigable. The Ishikari River in Hokkaid\u014d, with a length of 407\nmiles, is the longest in the empire, followed by the Shinano, in the\nmain island, about 240 miles long. Nor is the land richer in extensive\nplains than in great streams. Valleys lying deep in the bosoms of the\nhills, plateaus along the margins of the great rivers, gentle slopes at\nthe foot of mountain ranges, or stretches by the seashore, are the only\ncomparatively level places to be seen. The Ishikari Moor, bordering the\nIshikari River in Hokkaid\u014d, is perhaps the most extensive. Its soil is\nrich, and it abounds in timber and verdure. Other well-known plains in\nthe north lie along the course of the Tokachi River and by the seashore\nat Kushiro and Nemuro. Passing to the main island, we find, in the\nnortheasterly section, the \u014csh\u016b plateau, traversed by the Kitakami and\nAbukuma Rivers, and extending over the provinces of Rikuch\u016b, Rikuzen,\nIwashiro, and Iwaki. There, too, the soil is rich, and fruitful lands\ncover a wide area. In the central section the valley of the Tone River\nforms the Hassh\u016b plain of the Kwant\u014d, spreading into the four provinces\nof Musashi, K\u014dzuke, Hitachi, and Shim\u014dsa. Thickly populated and highly\nfertile, this plain is the most extensive in the main island. Next in\norder of magnitude comes the valley of the Kiso River, forming a part of\nthe provinces of Mino and Owari, and making one great cultivated field.\nThe Echigo plain, along the lower waters of the Shinano River, is the\nmost extensive of all the littoral plains of Japan. For the rest, very\nwide plains exist in Kinai, along the banks of the Yodo and Yamato\nRivers; while in Shikoku, the most extensive flat-lands are found along\nthe course of the Yoshino River, and in Kiush\u016b the lands by the banks of\nthe Chikugo down to the Ariyake seabeach give to the provinces of\nChikugo and Hizen a broad area of irrigated fields.\n\nThe main island of Japan, being situated in the temperate zone, enjoys,\nfor the most part, a medium degree of temperature. But the climate of\nthe empire is much varied, owing to the elongated shape of the country,\nwhich extends over nearly thirty degrees of latitude, to the great\ndifferences of altitude that characterize the surface of the land, and\nalso to the action of a warm and a cold current that flow past its\nshores. Thus, in the northern part of Hokkaid\u014d and in the Chishima\nIslands the snow never disappears, the sea freezes in winter, and sleet\nand fogs prevail. On the other hand, in the southern district, as well\nas in the Riuki\u016b and Ogasawara groups, the heat is very great, and\nneither snow nor ice is seen in winter. In the central parts, again, the\ntemperature varies according to the elevation of the land, and the\nconfiguration of the mountains and seas. As for Formosa, it is partly\nsituated within the tropical zone, and the two extremes of the entire\nisland are recorded to be 96\u00b0 and 41\u00b0 Fahrenheit.\n\nThe warm ocean current, known as the Kuro-shiwo or Black Stream, from\nthe deep somber color it displays in cloudy weather, rises from the\ndistant Equator, and possesses an average temperature of 81\u00b0 Fahrenheit\nin summer. Immediately after leaving the Equator it travels along the\neastern coast of China, and thence passing northward, approaches the\ncoast of Kiush\u016b, where it bifurcates. The branch stream enters the Sea\nof Japan, and flows to the north; the principal stream passes by the\nsouthern coast of Shikoku and the main island, until it reaches the\nnorth of Cape Inub\u014d in Shim\u014dsa, where it again bifurcates, a branch\nturning northward, and the current itself traveling in a northeastern\ndirection until it leaves the main island. In consequence, perhaps, of\nthe heat received from this warm current, all the provinces of Kiush\u016b,\nShikoku, Sany\u014d-d\u014d and T\u014dkai-d\u014d seldom see snow. There is also a cold\nstream called the Oya-jiwo, of which the average summer temperature is\nas low as 37\u00b0. Its source is in the Sea of Okhotsk, whence it passes\nthrough the Kurile Islands, and flowing by Hokkaid\u014d and the east coast\nof the northern section of the main island, reaches the neighborhood of\nCape Inub\u014d, where it disappears. Situated in a high degree of latitude,\nHokkaid\u014d and the northern part of the main island, being further exposed\nto the influence of this cold stream, have a severe climate. The snow\nlies there in masses for many days and the winter is long.\n\nThe rainfall is heavy in summer and light in winter. It is greatest\nalong the coasts washed by the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan, and\nleast in the central portions of the country along the two coasts of the\nInland Sea, as well as in the northern end of the main island. Hokkaid\u014d\nhas an average fall.\n\nRich soil, a genial climate, and a sufficient rainfall produce luxuriant\nvegetation. Cultivated fields and gardens succeed each other for wide\nareas. The extraordinary position of the islands stretching from north\nto south also adds greatly to the variety of vegetation. Thus in Kiush\u016b\nand Shikoku are to be seen thick, verdant forests abounding in giant\ntrees. Sugar-canes, tobacco, and cotton, find a soil congenial to their\ngrowth. The cocoa, the banyan tree, the banana and their congeners\nflourish in the Riuki\u016b and Ogasawara Islands. In short, the general\naspect is tropical. Passing thence to the central districts, great\nvarieties of plant life are found. The pine (_pinus densiflora_ and\n_pinus massoniana_), oak (_quercus dentata_), hi-no-ki (_thuya\nobtusca_), sugi (_cryptomeria japonica_), camphor and bamboo grow in the\nwoods; while the mulberry, tea plant, lacquer tree, millet, the five\ncereals, vegetables, and various kinds of fruits are seen in the fields\nand gardens. Finally, even in the cold and little cultivated Hokkaid\u014d,\nits fruitful soil and luxuriant vegetation invite agriculture.\n\nThe forms of animal life are also much varied. Among domestic animals\nare the ox, the horse, the pig, the dog, and the cat; while the more\nimportant wild animals are the hog, the deer, the hare, the fox, the\nbadger, and the monkey. Ferocious beasts and noxious reptiles are\nlimited to the bear of the northern districts and the habu (a kind of\nsnake) of Riuki\u016b. In the waters that lave the Hokkaid\u014d coasts sea-otters\nand fur-seals abound; whales frequent the seas in the north and those\nadjacent to Shikoku and Kiush\u016b; and along all the coasts fish and\ncrustaceans are found in such abundance that they more than suffice for\nthe ordinary food of the inhabitants. Of birds there is great abundance,\nsome possessing beautiful plumage, others melodious notes, and others\nbeing suitable for food. To the last mentioned class belong barn-door\nfowls and ducks. Among insects, the silk-worm is largely reared\nthroughout the main island, the climate and soil being peculiarly suited\nfor the purpose.\n\nAlthough the country has no mountains of exceptional altitude or rivers\nof extraordinary length, the conditions of climate and soil are such\nthat not one of the mountains is without woods nor one of the rivers\nwithout limpid water. So well distributed, too, are the highlands and\nstreams, that places of beauty are everywhere to be found in the\ninterior, and owing to the configuration of the coasts as well as to the\nnumber of islets, gems of scenic loveliness abound by the seaside in all\nthe provinces. Moreover, in addition to wealth of natural charms,\nnumerous shrines and temples of note exist in the choice districts of\nthe main island, so that architectural, glyptic, pictorial, and\nhorticultural beauties supplement the attractions of the scenery. The\nmain island is richest in places of note, and Kinai and its neighborhood\nare the most favored parts of the main island in this respect. From 794\nA.\u00a0D., when the Emperor Kwammu made Ky\u014dto his capital, until the Emperor\nMutsuhito moved to T\u014dky\u014d, a period of over eleven centuries, Ky\u014dto\nremained the imperial seat of government. Hence it offers numbers of\nhistorical relics, and is further happy in the possession of scenic\nbeauties attractive at all seasons of the year. Separated from Ky\u014dto by\na range of hills is the largest lake in the empire, Lake Biwa, noted for\nthe \u014cmi-hakkei which have ever been the theme of poets and the\ninspiration of painters. At a distance of nearly twenty-five miles from\nKy\u014dto is Nara, the imperial residence during a large part of the eighth\ncentury. Nara abounds in things historical, the most noteworthy being\nthe shrine of Kasuga and the Temple of H\u014driuji, places nobly planned\nand naturally lovely. T\u014ddaiji, a large temple erected by the Emperor\nSh\u014dmu, is more than a thousand years old, and contains the celebrated\nGreat Image of Buddha. The cherries of Mount Yoshino and the plums of\nTsukigase, displays of bloom that have no peers elsewhere in the\ncountry, are in the same province as Nara. Farther west the face of the\nInland Sea between Shikoku and Sany\u014d-d\u014d is strewn with hundreds of\nlittle islands whose shining white sands and green pine-trees combine to\nmake a beautiful picture. Among spots renowned for exquisite seascapes\nmay be mentioned Waka-no-ura in Kii, the Sumiyoshi beach in Settsu,\nSuma-no-ura, the Maiko beach, and Akashi-no-ura in Harima, and\nItsukushima in Aki. The last-named place is a small island close to the\nseashore, composed almost entirely of fantastically shaped cliffs and\nstrange rocks. On it stands a gracefully modeled shrine said to have\nbeen built by Taira-no-Ki-yomori of the twelfth century, the hall and\nveranda of which seem to float on the surface of the water. The singular\ncombination of water effect and architecture and the loveliness of the\nwhole view suggests an enchanted abode of fairies.\n\nIn Kiush\u016b, Yabakei is renowned for its landscape, and the Usajing\u016b\nshrine for its architecture. Still more celebrated is Ama-no-Hashidate\nin San-ind\u014d. Here a sandy promontory completely covered with pine-trees\nstretches far into the sea, offering a scene of beauty and making with\nMatsushima and Itsukushima the three most celebrated views in Japan.\n\nAmong places of note in the neighborhood of T\u014dky\u014d is Kamakura on the\nsoutheast coast, which was the seat of the feudal government of Japan\nfor more than a century and a half till 1333, and still offers many\nspots of historical interest. To the north of the capital the most\ncelebrated places are Nikk\u014d and Matsushima. At Nikk\u014d is the mausoleum of\nTokugawa Ieyasu. The beauties of its architectural decoration, the\nfineness of its carvings, and the loveliness of its scenery have\ninspired a popular saying that without seeing Nikk\u014d a man is not\nqualified to speak of the beautiful (_Nikk\u014d wo minai uchi wa kekk\u014d wo\niuna_). Matsushima, one of the three landscapes of Japan, is on the\nseashore of Rikuzen. Here scattered over the face of the bay are\nhundreds of tiny islets, every one of which is clothed in a luxury of\npine-trees. Viewed from the top of the hills, the scene is like a\ncreation of fancy rendered on the canvas of a skillful painter.\n\nJapan proper is divided into nine principal regions according to its\nconfiguration: they are Kinai, T\u014dkai-d\u014d, T\u014dsan-d\u014d, Hokuriku-d\u014d,\nNankai-d\u014d, Sanin-d\u014d, Sany\u014d-d\u014d, and Hokkai-d\u014d. These, again, are\nsubdivided into eighty-five provinces (_koku_ or _kumi_). The province,\nhowever, has little importance in the administrative divisions of the\ncountry. The unit of the latter is either the urban (_ch\u014d_) or rural\n(_son_) district, which, together with the larger divisions, city\n(_shi_) and county (_gun_), constitutes a self-governing entity. Over\nand above these divisions are one board of Hokkaid\u014d (_d\u014d-ch\u014d_), three of\nT\u014dky\u014d, Ky\u014dto, and \u014csaka, and forty-three prefectures or _ken_. At\npresent, there are, outside of Formosa, 638 gun, 58 shi, 1054 ch\u014d and\n13,468 son.\n\nThe city of T\u014dky\u014d was formerly, under the name Edo, the seat of the\nfeudal government for nearly two and three-quarters centuries. To-day it\nis the capital of the empire. It occupies a central position and is the\nlargest city in the country. Its fifteen wards have a total population\nof nearly a million and a half. Ky\u014dto, the old capital, is divided into\ntwo wards and has a population of over 353,000. \u014csaka, the third of the\ncities, was the seat of the Taik\u014d's administration. Possessing\nexceptional facilities for communication by sea and by river, it has\nbeen a trading center from olden times. It is divided into four wards,\nand has a population of 825,000. These three cities constitute the three\n_fu_. Next in order of importance come Nagoya, between T\u014dky\u014d and Ky\u014dto,\nwith a population of 245,000; Kanazawa, in the north of the main island,\nwith a population of 85,000; Sendai, in the northeast, with a population\nof 84,000; Hiroshima, in the southwest, with a population of 123,000;\nKumamoto, in Kiush\u016b, with a population of 62,000. Among the open ports,\nYokohama, with a population of 195,000, and K\u014dbe, with a population of\n216,000, are the two most important, Nagasaki, Hakodate, and Niigata\nfollowing at a considerable interval.\n\nThe total population of Japan proper is nearly forty-seven millions, and\nthat of Formosa about three millions. The distribution per square mile,\nexclusive of Formosa, varied in 1898 from 495 in the western part of the\nmain island to 23.7 in Hokkaid\u014d, with the average at about 300. To-day\nit is approximately 324. The recent national activity of these people\nwill be briefly described in the last division of this volume, and the\ncareer of their ancestors in the earlier parts.\n\nBefore we proceed, however, a few words may be said regarding the\ngeneral nature of the historical account of Japan. In ancient times\nJapan possessed neither literary script nor a regular system of calendar\nand chronology. All events had to be transmitted from generation to\ngeneration by oral tradition. The use of writing was imported from\nChina, probably one or two hundred years before Christ, but the general\nuse of letters for the purpose of recording events dates from the fifth\ncentury A.\u00a0D., while the compilation of the national annals began two\ncenturies later still. But such historical records as were then compiled\nsuffered almost total destruction a short time afterward by fire, and\nthe oral records of remote antiquity must have already been greatly\ndisfigured by omissions, errors, and confusion of facts. Regretting\nthis, and perceiving that unless steps were then taken to correct the\nannals, subsequent generations would be without any trustworthy record\nof remote events, the Emperor Temmu ordered an eminent scholar,\nHieda-no-Are, to prepare a brief chronicle of sovereigns and important\nevents. Unfortunately the death of the emperor, which occurred in 689,\ninterrupted this work. Some twenty years later the Empress Gemmy\u014d\ninstructed \u014c-no-Yasumaro to continue the compilation of Hieda-no-Are's\nannals. The work thus completed in 712 is the \"_Kojiki_\" as we now\npossess it. It must be regarded as the most trustworthy record extant of\nthe events of ancient times. Eight years after the appearance of the\n\"_Kojiki_,\" or in 720, the \"_Nihongi_\" was compiled. We find, on\ncomparing these works, that although, on the whole, they agree, certain\ndiscrepancies exist between them. In these two works, however, is found\nthe chief material for the reconstruction of the history of ancient\nJapan. If curious supernatural incidents figure in their pages, it\nshould be remembered that literature being then in its infancy and a\nlong interval having elapsed since the time of many of the events\nrecorded, the annalists were untrained in the selection of matters\nworthy of a place in authentic history, while, at the same time, in the\noral traditions on which they relied, errors had doubtless been\nincluded, and, ordinary events drifting out of sight, extraordinary\nincidents and supernatural stories had alone survived.\n\nAs regards the ancient chronology of Japan it is recorded that almanacs\nfirst came into use in Japan in 604 A.\u00a0D., although it appears that the\nChinese calendar had been imported about the middle of the preceding\ncentury. The compilation of annals, as already stated, had preceded the\nlatter event by a considerable interval. We may therefore conjecture\nthat some method of reckoning months and years had been practiced from\nan early era, but no certain knowledge of this matter is available.\n\nIn Japan from ancient time chronology was not based on an era.\nOriginally the method pursued was to reckon years after the accession of\neach emperor to the throne. In 645 A.\u00a0D., however, was introduced the\nChinese fashion of using year periods designated usually in two\nfelicitous Chinese characters and changed as frequently as was desired.\nThe change of the name of a year period thus occurred at the beginning\nof each new reign, and also on the recurrence of a cyclical year of\nill-omened designation, as well as on occasions of exceptional good or\nbad fortune, so that there are extreme instances of five or six changes\nof designation within the reign of one single emperor. It results, of\ncourse, that a troublesome effort is required to commit to memory the\nsequence and dates of the various year periods. The Chinese, in the\nreign of the Ming sovereign Taitsu, decided that there should be no\nchange in the designation of a year period throughout the reign of a\nsovereign. A similar ruling was made in 1868 on the accession of the\npresent Emperor of Japan, from which time also the era of Jimmu began to\nbe used as a chronological basis. This latter era is officially fixed at\n660 B.\u00a0C.[1]\n\nAs to the later sources of Japanese history, following the already\nmentioned \"_Kojiki_\" and \"_Nihongi_,\" they are abundant, increasing as\nwe move further from earlier ages. Much of this vast historical\nliterature has been published and edited (though thus far little\ntranslated into European languages), but more has neither been\nextensively circulated nor even seen light. The Japanese Government,\nwhich has been searching for hidden material all over the land, is now\npublishing, through the Imperial University of Tokyo, historical\ndocuments, mostly unpublished hitherto, in two large series[2] of two\nand three hundred volumes, respectively, to be completed in about\nfifteen years.\n\nThe history of Japan does not lend itself to the customary division of\nthe ancient, medi\u00e6val, and modern ages. On the basis of the important\nchanges that have taken place in the administration and politics of\nJapan, her history will, in the following pages, be divided into three\nparts of unequal lengths. Part one covers the long space of time between\nthe founding of the empire and the beginning of the feudal r\u00e9gime toward\nthe end of the twelfth century. During this period, the power of the\ngovernment rested, theoretically, in spite of great fluctuations which\ntook place, in the hands of the sovereign. This was followed by nearly\nseven centuries of military autocracy, which constitutes the second\npart. The third part begins in 1868, since which year administrative\npower has reverted to the emperor, a constitutional r\u00e9gime with\nrepresentative institutions has been established, and the general\naspects of the life of the nation have undergone a profound change.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] It should always be remembered that the historic account of Japan\nbefore the fifth century A.\u00a0D., must be allowed a large latitude in\nregard to its events and their dates.\n\n[2] Called the \"_Dai-Nihon Komon-sho_\" and the \"_Dai-Nihon Shi-ry\u014d_.\"\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n PART I\n FROM THE FOUNDING OF THE EMPIRE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT\n OF FEUDAL R\u00c9GIME. 660 B.\u00a0C.-1186 A.\u00a0D.\n\n CHAPTER PAGE\n I. THE MYTHICAL AGE 3\n II. THE BEGINNING OF THE EMPIRE. 660 B.\u00a0C.-192 A.\u00a0D. 6\n III. RELATIONS WITH KOREA AND CHINA. 192-645 A.\u00a0D. 12\n IV. THE TAIKWA REFORM. 645-708 A.\u00a0D. 22\n V. THE NARA EPOCH. 710-794 A.\u00a0D. 31\n VI. THE HEI-AN EPOCH. 794-1186 A.\u00a0D. 38\n\n\n PART II\n THE FEUDAL AGES. 1186-1868\n\n VII. THE KAMAKURA GOVERNMENT. 1186-1339 65\n VIII. THE TEMPORARY RESTORATION OF IMPERIAL POWER. 1339-1393 83\n IX. THE MUROMACHI PERIOD. 1393-1573 92\n X. INTERNAL PEACE AND EXTERNAL WAR. 1573-1603 109\n XI. THE FOUNDATION OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT. 1603-1651 122\n XII. THE DECLINE OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT. 1651-1837 140\n XIII. THE FALL OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT. 1837-1868 155\n\n\n PART III\n THE NEW JAPAN. 1868-1893\n\n XIV. INTERNAL AFFAIRS. 1868-1893 173\n XV. FOREIGN RELATIONS. 1868-1893 188\n\n\n PART IV\n APPENDIX. 1893-\n\n XVI. THE CONSTITUTION IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE. 1893-1906 199\n XVII. PARTIES AND POLITICS. 1893-1906 213\n XVIII. ECONOMIC PROGRESS. 1893-1906 242\n XIX. THE CHINO-JAPANESE WAR. 1894-1895 252\n XX. JAPAN AND RUSSIA IN KOREA AND MANCHURIA. 1893-1904 275\n XXI. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH. 1904-. 303\n\n BIBLIOGRAPHY 331\n\n INDEX 337\n\n\n\n\n LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS\n\n\n GENERALS OF THE LATE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR (Photogravure)\n _Frontispiece_\n\n FACING PAGE\n AINOS WORSHIPING 28\n ABDUCTION OF GOSHIRAKAWA (_in color_) 60\n THE INVASION BY THE MONGOL TARTARS 76\n THE PROCESSION OF FEUDAL LORDS 124\n A PICNIC ON THE ASUKA HILL IN THE FLOWERY SEASON 156\n\n\n TEXT MAPS\n\n PAGE\n JAPAN BEFORE THE FIFTH CENTURY 10\n JAPAN 61\n NORTHERN JAPAN 85\n SOUTHERN JAPAN 99\n KOREA 117\n CENTRAL JAPAN 124\n JAPANESE PORTS OPENED TO FOREIGN TRADE. 1858 159\n DOWNFALL OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT. 1867-1868 168\n THE INSURRECTION IN THE ISLAND OF KIUSH\u016a. 1877 181\n ISLAND POSSESSIONS OF JAPAN 193\n FIRST ENGAGEMENTS OF CHINO-JAPANESE WAR. 1894 261\n CAMPAIGNS IN KOREA AND MANCHURIA 268\n WEI-HAI-WEI, FORMOSA, AND PESCADORES 270\n FOREIGN SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN CHINA AND MANCHURIA 278\n JAPANESE ADVANCE TO LIAO-YANG 309\n BATTLE OF THE SEA OF JAPAN, RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 315\n\n\n\n\nPART I\n\nFROM THE FOUNDING OF THE EMPIRE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FEUDAL R\u00c9GIME.\n660 B.\u00a0C.-1186 A.\u00a0D.\n\n\n\n\nHISTORY OF JAPAN\n\n\nChapter I\n\nTHE MYTHICAL AGE\n\n\nThe period prior to the reign of the Emperor Jimmu is known as the Age\nof the Deities. From this era strange and incredible legends have been\ntransmitted, some of which follow.\n\nTradition says that in remote times the deities Izanagi and Izanami were\ncommanded by the God of Heaven to form a country out of the islets\nfloating in space. They forthwith descended to the island Onokoro, and\nthere, becoming husband and wife, created the Eight Great Islands of\nJapan. Thereafter were created deities to rule the sea, the mountains,\nthe winds, fire, herbs, and trees. Subsequently the divine pair gave\nbirth to the goddess Amaterasu-\u014cmikami and the gods Tsukiyomi and\nSusano\u00f6. These newly-born divine beings proving themselves greatly\nsuperior to other deities, found high favor with Izanagi. He\ncommissioned Amaterasu to govern Takama-no-hara, or the Heavenly Region;\nTsukiyomi to govern Yo-no-osukuni, or the Land of Night; and Susano\u00f6 to\ngovern Unabara, or the Seas. But this last deity proving unfaithful to\nhis father's commands, Izanagi, in anger, expelled him from his kingdom,\nwhereupon he ascended to the Heavenly Region to convey to his sister the\nnews of his misfortune. The fierce and enraged demeanor of the dethroned\ndeity led his sister to imagine that he had come with aggressive\nintentions, and she hesitated to receive him. But Susano\u00f6 vehemently\ndeclared the integrity of his purpose and succeeded in partially\nreassuring the goddess. Nevertheless, his behavior was so disorderly\nthat Amaterasu, becoming fearful, secluded herself in a cave, with the\nresult that total darkness overshadowed her realm and troubles of\nvarious sorts ensued. The other deities thereupon met in conclave and\ntook measures to pacify the goddess, so that she finally emerged from\nher retreat and light once more shone upon the Heavenly Region and\nNakatsu-kuni (Midland). The deities then inflicted upon Susano\u00f6 the\npunishment of exile. Driven from heaven, he proceeded to Izumo, and\nthere destroyed an eight-headed dragon, obtaining from its body a\nprecious sword, which he later presented to his sister Amaterasu.\nSubsequently, he married the daughter of an earthly deity and settled at\nSuga in Izumo. At a later date, leaving one of his sons, \u014ckuni-nushi, to\ngovern the land, he himself proceeded to Korea. \u014ckuni-nushi had many\nbrothers, who were all engaged in a struggle for the sovereign power.\nThe victory remained with \u014ckuni-nushi, but his realm continuing to be\nmore or less disturbed, Sukunahikona, a son of the Deity of Heaven, came\nover the sea to Izumo and aided in restoring peace. Thenceforth\n\u014ckuni-nushi and his sons administered the realm in tranquillity.\n\nMeanwhile, in the Heavenly Region, Amaterasu, concluding that\nMidzuho-no-kuni in Toyo-ashihara, which is perhaps Japan proper now,\nought to be governed by her son, Amano-oshihohomimi, commanded him to\ndescend and assume authority in the land. Inasmuch, however, as he\nrepresented his proposed realm to be in a very disordered state,\nAmaterasu, by order of the Deity of Heaven, held a council of deities,\nby whom a mandate to restore peace was given to Amano-hohi. He failed to\naccomplish his purpose, and another deity was afterward sent on the same\nerrand. The latter was, however, likewise conquered by \u014ckuni-nushi and\ndid not return to heaven. Once more a council of deities was convened in\nthe Heavenly Region, and Nanakime was dispatched to reconnoiter the\nland. He, however, was killed by Ama-no-wakahiko. Finally,\nTakemikazuchi, being intrusted with the duty, proceeded to Izumo and\ninformed \u014ckuni-nushi of the command given by the Deity of Heaven that\nthe son of Amaterasu should assume sovereignty over the country then\nruled by \u014ckuni-nushi. The command was at last obeyed. \u014ckuni-nushi ceded\nhis kingdom to the son of the goddess, and, with his sons, left the\nregion. Takemikazuchi having carried this intelligence to Amaterasu,\nshe, conforming always with the commands of the Deity of Heaven,\nsummoned her son, Amano-oshihomimi, and informed him that, peace having\nbeen restored in the land below, he must proceed to govern it. He,\nhowever, prayed that his son, Ninigi, might be sent in his stead, and\nthe goddess consenting, gave to Ninigi a mandate to rule over Japan and\nto maintain its prosperity so long as heaven and earth should endure.\nShe further gave him the Yasaka Jewel, the Yasaka Mirror, and the\nKusanagi Sword, saying: \"This mirror is my spirit; regard it as\nmyself.\" Thenceforth the Jewel, Mirror, and Sword, venerated as the\nthree precious relics of the goddess, were transmitted as insignia from\nemperor to emperor through all generations.\n\nThe terrestrial deity, Sarudahiko, receiving news of the approach of\nNinigi and his divine retinue, came out to greet him. Under his guidance\nNinigi passed to Takachiho Mountain in Hy\u016bga, Kiush\u016b, and took up his\nabode at Kasasa Promontory in Ada (now Kaseda port in Satsuma). Ninigi\ntook to wife the daughter of a terrestrial deity, and by her had two\nsons, Hosuseri and Hikohohodemi. These deities fell out and fought, with\nthe result that the younger subdued the elder by the aid of the deity of\nthe sea, whose daughter he had married. The victor's son, Ugayafukiaezu,\nalso married a daughter of the marine deity and had four sons, Itsuse,\nInahi, Mikenu, and Iwarehiko, of whom the fourth and youngest afterward\nbecame the Emperor Jimmu. Inahi went to the dominion of his mother over\nthe waves, and Mikenu to the far-distant Tokoyo, or the Region of\nEternal Night.[1]\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[1] Abridged genealogy of the \"Deities.\"\n\nIzanagi (male) Izanami (female)\n | |\n +------------------------------------------------------+\n | | |\n +-----------+ | +-------------\n | | |\nAmaterasu Tsukiyomi Susano\u00f6\n | |\n +-----------------------------+ |\n | | |\nAmano-oshihomimi Amano-hohi \u014ckuni-nushi\n |\nHikoho-no-ninigi\n |\n +-------------------------+\n | |\nHikohohodemi Hosuseri\n |\nUgayafukiaezu\n |\n +--------------------------------+\n | | | |\nItsuse Inahi Mikenu The Emperor JIMMU.\n\n\n\n\nChapter II\n\nTHE BEGINNING OF THE EMPIRE\n\n660 B.\u00a0C.-192 A.\u00a0D.\n\n\nAccording to tradition, Itsuse and Iwarehiko took counsel together one\nday in their residence in Hy\u016bga, as to the place most suitable for the\nseat of administration, and resolved to proceed eastward. At the straits\nbetween Kiush\u016b and Shikoku they were received by a terrestrial deity,\nand under his guidance reached Usa in the present Buzen, where the\ninhabitants built a palace for them and treated them hospitably. Passing\nnext to Chikuzen, they subsequently crossed the sea to Aki on the main\nisland, and thence journeyed to Kibi, ten years being devoted to these\ntravels. From Kibi they passed over by Naniwa to Tadetsu in the present\nIzumi province. The objective point of the expedition was Yamato, where\nthen ruled a powerful chieftain named Nagasunehiko who, under the\nauthority of Nigihayahi, a scion of a god of Heaven, whom he had\nreceived, had extended his sway over the surrounding region. This\nchieftain, learning of the approach of the deities and their following,\nmarshaled his forces to oppose them. In the battle that ensued Itsuse\nwas wounded by an arrow.\n\nThe invading army therefore turned their course over the sea to Kii,\nwhere Itsuse died of his wound. His brother, Iwarehiko, then advanced to\nthe east coast of Kii, and, having there killed a local chieftain,\npushed on to Yoshino under the guidance of Prince Michiomi (ancestor of\nthe \u014ctomo family) and Prince \u014ckume (ancestor of the Kume family). The\ninhabitants, cave-dwellers, learning that a scion of the god of Heaven\nhad arrived, went out to meet him and made submission. Prosecuting his\ncampaign, Iwarehiko struck down several rebel chiefs, and once more\nplanned an expedition against Nagasunehiko. The latter, however, sent\nhim a message, saying: \"Prince Nigihayahi, son of the Deity of Heaven,\ncame hither in a strong boat, and married my sister, Kashiya, by whom he\nhas a son, Prince Umashimate. I have made obeisance to Prince\nNigihayahi as sovereign of the land. There cannot possibly be two\nlegitimate representatives of the Heavenly Deity. You must have come to\ndeprive us wrongfully of the realm under pretext of celestial origin.\"\nTo this Iwarehiko replied: \"There is more than one son of the Deity of\nHeaven. If your sovereign be in truth the offspring of the Celestial\nDeity, he must possess some proofs. Let me see them.\" Nagasunehiko\nthereupon produced arrows and an arrow-case which Prince Nigihayahi had\nbrought with him. Iwarehiko, having examined them, declared them to be\ngenuine, and showed his own arrows and arrow-case to Nagasunehiko. But\nthe latter, though fully sensible that Iwarehiko was of celestial\norigin, maintained an obstinate mien and would not change his view.\nPrince Nigihayahi, now clearly perceiving his unreasonable disposition,\nput him to death, and passed over with all his men to serve in the\ninvading army. Well pleased by this act, Iwarehiko treated the prince\nkindly and rewarded his loyal conduct. Orders were then issued to the\ncaptains to exterminate all the insurgents in the land, and the Yamato\ndistrict having been brought into complete subjection, the conqueror\nestablished his capital at Kashiwabara in Yamato, and ordained the\ndeities of the various officials of his court, the imperial power being\nthus extended and the administration placed on a fixed basis. This was\nthe opening year of Japanese history. Later annalists fixed the year at\n660 B.\u00a0C., and styled the victorious prince the Emperor Jimmu, the first\nsovereign of the Empire of Japan.\n\nAfter his death his younger son, Prince Takishimimi, sought to usurp the\nsovereignty. The eldest son, Prince Kamyaimimi, suspecting the plot,\nrevealed it to his younger brother, Kannuna-gawamimi, who shot the\nusurper. Thereupon the elder prince waived the throne in favor of his\nvaliant brother, who thus became the second emperor, Suisei. After him\nfollowed the Emperors Annei, Itoku, K\u014dsh\u014d, K\u014dan, K\u014drei, K\u014dgen, and\nKaikwa, whose reigns are said to have lasted 450 years and are\nsingularly bare of recorded events.\n\nIn these primitive ages the life of the people was naturally simple. The\npopulation must have been small, and the communication between different\nparts of the small empire extremely difficult. Boats were propelled by\noars, for sails were unknown. The invaders must have attained to a\nhigher stage of culture than the vanquished natives. The dwellings of\nthe aristocracy, for example, were rudely constructed wooden houses,\nthe simple model of which still survives in the Shint\u014d shrines of the\npresent day, while the autochthons mostly dwelt in pits dug underground.\nOn the whole, however, both classes had partially advanced to an\nagricultural mode of life, and depended for subsistence largely on\nfishing and hunting. Bows and arrows or snares were the chief implements\nused in hunting, and hooks, cormorants, and weirs served for purposes of\nfishing. Methods of preparing food had already been elaborated, and the\nart of brewing _sak\u00e9_ was known. Marked progress had also taken place in\nmatters of dress. From skins of animals or textile fabrics woven from\nhemp and dyed red and green with juices of herbs, were made hats, robes,\nand pantaloons. Ornaments for the neck, arms, and legs consisted of\nbeads of crystal, agate, glass, serpentine and polished gems, shaped\ninto cylinders or crescents and strung together. The arts of mining and\nsmelting ores, as well as of casting metal, were known, for, besides\narrow-heads and other weapons of stone, spears and swords of copper or\niron, together with plows and hatchets of hard metals, were in evidence.\n\n[Illustration: JAPANESE FISHING WITH TRAINED CORMORANTS\n_Painting by A Richter_]\n\nIt is interesting to know that at marriage the bridegroom, contrary to\nthe modern custom, went to the house of the bride. A man also was\npermitted to have several wives, but a woman was never allowed to have\nmore than one husband. Divination was always employed to solve doubtful\nquestions. Music and dancing were already known, the _koto_ and the\nflute being employed as musical instruments. Emotions of grief or joy,\nlove or disappointment, were expressed in song, the most ancient song\nnow extant being attributed to the deity Susano\u00f6. The Emperor Jimmu also\nfrequently commemorated brave deeds of war in song, thus encouraging and\nreviving the spirit of his warriors.\n\nA profound awe and respect toward the national deities, as well as a\nsuperstitious fear of innumerable spirits, seems to have prevailed\neverywhere in all classes of society. If the people submitted readily to\nthe sway of the Emperor Jimmu, it was largely because they regarded him\nas a scion of the gods. The emperor, on his side, firmly convinced that\ngood and evil were controlled by divine will, never neglected to perform\nsacrificial rites. Out of the custom of extreme reverence toward the\ndeities grew abhorrence for impurity in any form, so that separate huts\ncame to be built for the bodies of the dead or for women at times of\nparturition, and if any man came in contact with an unclean object, he\nbathed in a river to purify himself.\n\nNaturally, little distinction existed between religion and government,\nbetween shrine and palace. At the completion of his work of conquest,\nJimmu erected a building at Kashiwabara, in which he deposited the\nthree insignia, and in which he himself resided and personally governed\nthe empire. Each one of his eight successors followed his example. The\ntenth emperor, Sujin, however, fearing that the insignia might be\npolluted, made duplicates of the Mirror and the Sword, and reverently\ndeposited the originals in a shrine at Kasanui in Yamato, where one of\nthe imperial princesses was intrusted with the duty of guarding them and\nperforming due religious rites. Thus, shrine and palace were at last\nseparated. Subsequently, these sacred objects were removed to Ise, and\nplaced in the shrine now existing there. The Sword, however, was\nafterward carried to Atsuta in Owari, where it now lies in the Atsuta\nShrine.\n\nDuring the reigns of Sujin and his successor, Suinin, the agriculture\nand communication of the country are recorded to have been greatly\nencouraged, troubles near the court exterminated, and also the area of\nthe empire largely extended. The extension of the imperial domain,\nhowever, brought it in sharp conflict with the still unsubdued tribes of\nthe north and the south. From the reign of Keik\u014d, Suinin's successor, we\nhear of the story of the conflict. The Kumaso of Tsukushi, Kiush\u016b, rose\nin arms. How seriously this was regarded is seen from the fact that the\nemperor in person conducted a campaign for several years in Kiush\u016b. No\nsooner was peace restored than the southern tribes again rebelled. This\ntime the brave Prince Yamato-dake, who was sent to Tsukushi to subdue\nthe insurgents, had to resort to strategy instead of war. Having\ndisguised himself as a girl, he obtained entry into the house of the\nKumaso chief, where he killed the chief and his warriors while they were\nlying drunk. He also overthrew many other rebellious princes and\nreturned to Yamato in triumph.\n\nIn the meantime the emperor, after his return from Kiush\u016b, had heard\nfrom a special commissioner whom he had sent that in the northeast of\nthe empire there was a strange region named Hidakami, where the people\nof both sexes wore their hair tied up, tattooed their bodies, and\nperformed deeds of valor. They were known as the Emishi, and their land,\nbeing extensive and fertile, the commissioner represented, ought to be\nadded to the imperial domain. These Emishi rose in rebellion shortly\nafter the return of Prince Yamato-dake from the conquest of the Kumaso.\nThereupon the prince boldly offered to undertake the conquest of the new\ninsurgents. After subduing local uprisings on his way, he proceeded by\nsea to the region of the northern rebellion. As his boats drew near the\nshore he displayed a large mirror at the prow of his vessel, and when\nthe rebel chieftains and their followers sighted the ships, they were\nterrified by such evidences of pomp and power, and throwing away their\nbows and arrows, made submission. The prince accepted their homage, and\nenlisting their aid, conquered other rebels who still resisted the\nprogress of the imperial forces. It seems probable that on that occasion\nPrince Yamato-dake advanced as far as the present province of Iwaki. On\nhis return journey, which was again beset with local difficulties, he\nwas seized with a severe illness, which soon proved fatal. The emperor\nbitterly lamented the death of his beloved son, and the story of the\ngallant prince is still dear to the heart of every child of Japan.\n\n[Illustration: JAPAN AS KNOWN TO THE EMPERORS BEFORE THE FIFTH CENTURY]\n\nThe local administration of the empire so materially extended during\nthree successive reigns was now reorganized by the Emperor Sh\u014dmu, son of\nKeik\u014d. The nature of Sh\u014dmu's reform is, however, little known. When the\nEmperor Jimmu established the office of local governor, there were only\nnine provinces, but the number was increased by more than ten during the\nreigns of Kaika, Sujin, and Keik\u014d, and became sixty-three in the time of\nthe Emperor Sh\u014dmu. The imperial sway then extended northward as far as\nShinobu (the present Mutsu), Sado and Noto; eastward to Tsukuba (now\nHidachi); westward to Amakusa, and southward to Kii. Throughout the\nwhole of this district, governors were appointed to administer local\naffairs. Subsequently the process of division continued until, in the\nreign of the Emperor Suik\u014d, the total number of provinces reached 144,\nat which figure it remained until 645 A.\u00a0D., the date of the so-called\nTaikwa Reformation. These local divisions, though here spoken of as\nprovinces, had in fact different appellations--as _kuni_, a province, or\n_agata_, a district--and were not of uniform area. The term _kuni_ was\nemployed to designate an area bounded by mountains or rivers, whereas\nthe _agata_ had no such geographical limits. In general the former was\nthe more extensive, but in consequence of the natural features of the\ncountry the _agata_ was sometimes the larger. The entire subject of the\nlocal government of ancient Japan is, however, one of the most obscure\nsubjects in history.\n\nThe reigns of the first thirteen emperors, from Jimmu to Sh\u014dmu, may be\nconsidered the era of the founding of the Japanese Empire. The main work\nof the sovereigns of this period consisted in the organization,\nextension, and consolidation of their domain. Foreign relations had\nhardly begun, and external influence was as yet slightly felt. The\nfollowing table gives the names of the thirteen emperors, with the\nofficially fixed dates of their reigns:\n\n1. Emperor Jimmu.\n 660-585 B.\u00a0C.\n |\n2. Emperor Suisei.\n 581-549 B.\u00a0C.\n |\n3. Emperor Annei.\n 548-510 B.\u00a0C.\n |\n4. Emperor Itoku.\n 510-475 B.\u00a0C.\n |\n5. Emperor K\u014dsh\u014d.\n 475-392 B.\u00a0C.\n |\n6. Emperor K\u014dan.\n 392-290 B.\u00a0C.\n |\n7. Emperor K\u014drei.\n 290-214 B.\u00a0C.\n |\n8. Emperor K\u014dgen.\n 214-157 B.\u00a0C.\n |\n9. Emperor Kaikwa.\n 157-97 B.\u00a0C.\n |\n10. Emperor Sujin.\n 97-29 B.\u00a0C.\n |\n11. Emperor Suinin.\n 29 B.\u00a0C.-71 A.\u00a0D.\n |\n12. Emperor Keik\u014d.\n 71-131 A.\u00a0D.\n |\n13. Emperor Sh\u014dmu.\n 131-192 A.\u00a0D.\n\n\n\n\nChapter III\n\nRELATIONS WITH KOREA AND CHINA\n\n192-645 A.\u00a0D.\n\n\nJapan's foreign relations naturally began with the neighboring peninsula\nof Korea, which then contained several petty kingdoms at variance with\none another. Political relations of Japan with some of these small\nstates must have begun very early, but the traditional accounts\nconcerning them are meager and untrustworthy. It is probable that some\nof the Korean chiefs were at different times tributary to Japan. The\nrelations with Korea, however, appear to have become serious only when\nit was suspected that the restless tribes of Kiush\u016b had been encouraged\nby Shiragi, the most warlike kingdom in the peninsula, in their repeated\nacts of rebellion against the emperor of Japan. In this light may be\nread the following famous legend of the Japanese expedition to Korea,\nwhich is said to have taken place about 200 A.\u00a0D., under the leadership\nof the valiant Empress Jing\u014d and her minister, Takenouchi.\n\nTradition says that, as the Kumaso of Tsukushi, Kiush\u016b, again rose in\narms, the Emperor Ch\u016bai proceeded thither in person, and, through his\nminister, prayed for the guidance of the gods. Thereupon the latter\ninspired the empress, who had joined the imperial expedition, to declare\nthat if Shiragi was first conquered, the Kumaso would submit without\nfurther resistance. The emperor, however, hesitated to take this divine\ncounsel, and the deities punished his disobedience by death. Awed by\nthis startling event, the empress gave directions that her consort's\ndeath should be kept secret, and having intrusted to his generals the\nduty of guarding the temporary palace at Tsukushi, she sent Takenouchi\nto convey the emperor's remains to Nagato by sea, while she herself\nremained to mourn the death of her husband in his prime. Sacrifices were\nagain offered to heaven, and prayers again addressed to the deities, to\nwhich the reply was the same as before. After subduing several rebel\ntribes, the empress came to a river, where she sought by fishing to\nobtain an omen as to whether the conquest of Korea should be attempted.\nThe indications being in the affirmative, she finally resolved to lead\nan expedition in person across the sea. Sacrificial rites were again\nperformed to all the deities, and the empress, returning to Kashihi Bay,\nordered the people to build ships, and sent sailors westward to\nreconnoiter the land which she contemplated invading. By and by, a lucky\nday having been chosen, the Japanese fleet set out from Wanizu in\nTsushima, and, aided by a favorable wind, soon reached the coast of\nShiragi. Hasankin, the king of Shiragi, was so much alarmed by the\nappearance of the invading force that, without offering any resistance,\nhe came to sue for peace, and made a solemn pledge that he would\nhenceforth serve the ruler of Japan as a groom and send her annual\ntributes. Shiragi, he declared, would abide by his oath, \"till the river\nYalu flowed backward and sands rose to sky and became stars.\" The\nkingdoms of Koma and Kudara followed the example of Shiragi, so that the\nthree principal divisions of southern Korea became tributary to Japan.\n\nIt should be noted, however, that from this time on neither was Korea\nalways obedient nor did the Kumaso cease to be rebellious. In the\nmeantime, however, an important event in an entirely different direction\nresulted from Japan's intimate relations with Korea. It was the\nintroduction through Korea of the Chinese art of writing. Many Koreans\naccompanied the commissioners who brought the annual tribute to Japan,\nand the literature and art of the west were gradually introduced. Annals\nattribute the beginning of Chinese learning in Japan to the reign of the\nEmperor Ojin, son of the Empress Jing\u014d, when in 218 A.\u00a0D. a celebrated\nKorean scholar, Achiki, visited Japan and was appointed by the emperor\ntutor to his son, Wakairatsuko. At the suggestion of Achiki, another\nlearned man named Wani was sent for, who is said to have brought with\nhim blacksmiths, weavers, and brewers, as well as ten copies of the\n\"_Lun-yu_\" (the Confucian Analects) and a copy of the \"_Chien-tze-wen_\"\n(the book of one thousand characters). Achiki and Wani were naturalized\nin Japan and received official positions, and their descendants\ncontinued to hold professorships at court. About 110 years after the\nintroduction of Chinese literature, the Emperor Rich\u016b appointed\nhistoriographers in all the local districts to chronicle the chief\nevents of the locality. This was, so far as we know, the first organized\nattempt to compile regular records. Subsequently, as the administrative\nmachinery grew more complex, the necessity of writing became more\nimperative, and to a service of this kind none were more fitted than the\ndescendants of the naturalized Korean scholars, who kept up their\nintellectual heritage and occupied important posts at the court. Fresh\nscholars also arrived from Korea in increasing numbers. Thus, in the\nreign of the Emperor Keitai, there came from Kudara two doctors in the\nFive Classics, and a little later doctors in medicine and astronomy and\nother _savants_ settled in the country and opened classes to instruct\nthe Japanese in their special branches of study. The introduction of\nBuddhism from Korea, which soon occurred, and the circumstances of which\nwill presently be narrated, gave an added impetus to the learning. Some\nof the gifted men of the court, particularly the wise Prince Sh\u014dtoku,\nbegan to distinguish themselves as accomplished scholars in Chinese\nclassics and Buddhist canons. As yet, however, the native language and\nthe Chinese grammar, which are so radically different from each other,\ndid not begin their long history of struggle to reconcile themselves to\none another. The vernacular could hardly lend itself to expression in\nChinese characters, and histories and inscriptions were written only in\nthe pure Chinese style.\n\nThe coming of Buddhism was an incident which accelerated the progress of\na profound change in the history and civilization of Japan, already\nstarted by her close relations with the continent of Asia. Buddhism was\nfirst introduced early in the sixth century by a Chinese scholar,\nSumatah, who, however, made little progress in propagating the alien\nfaith among the people of Yamato. Afterward, during the reign of the\nEmperor Kimmei, in the year 552 A.\u00a0D., the king of Kudara, in Korea,\nsent the emperor of Japan an envoy bearing an image of Buddha and a copy\nof the Sutras, together with a message that the creed of Buddha excelled\nall religious beliefs, and that boundless happiness in this world, as\nwell as in the next, was insured to its disciples, among whom were\nalready all the nations from India to Korea. The emperor was greatly\nimpressed and summoned his ministers to a deliberation over the proper\nattitude to be assumed by Japan regarding this new problem of the\nwestern civilization. Soga-no-Iname, minister president, counseled the\nacceptance of the foreign faith, saying that Japan should not alone\nstand aloof when all nations in the west had embraced Buddha's doctrine.\nAgainst this view Mononobe-no-Okoshi and Nakatomi Kamako, ministers of\nstate, argued that from the most ancient times the Japanese had\nworshiped the celestial and terrestrial gods, and that if reverence were\npaid now to any alien deity, the wrath of the tutelary gods of the land\nmight be provoked. The emperor approved the latter view, but gave the\nimage of Buddha to Iname with permission to worship it by way of trial.\nIname was greatly pleased with the behest, and lost no time in\nconverting his residence into a temple, where he placed the image. Soon\nafterward a pestilence visited the country, sweeping away numbers of\npeople. The opponents of Buddhism thereupon having represented to the\nsovereign that this was obviously a punishment inflicted by Heaven, the\ntemple was burned down and the image thrown into the canal in Naniwa.\nThe emperor, however, did not altogether abandon his predilection for\nthe worship of Buddha, and Iname sent secretly to Korea for another\nimage. Thus, in the reign of the Emperor Bidatsu, images of Buddha,\ncopies of the Sutras, priests, and manufacturers of Buddhist\nparaphernalia came from the kingdoms of Kudara and Bidatsu. Subsequently\n(584 A.\u00a0D.), Soga-no-Umako, who had succeeded his father, Iname, as\nminister president, built temples and pagodas dedicated to Buddha.\nAnother pestilence came to revive the anti-Buddhist movement, under the\ninfluence of which an imperial edict was issued prohibiting the worship\nof Buddha; all the temples and pagodas were demolished or burned, and\nthe images of Buddha were thrown into the canal. The people's sufferings\nwere, however, not relieved. A plague of boils ensued, and inasmuch as\nthe pain caused by the sores resembled that of burning or beating, old\nand young alike concluded that they were the victims of a punishment of\nburning inflicted by Buddha. From this it may be inferred that Buddhism\nhad already established a hold upon the popular imagination. Shortly\nafterward Soga-no-Umako, having applied for permission, was allowed to\nworship Buddha with his own family.\n\nWhen the Emperor Y\u014dmei ascended the throne in 586, he suffered so much\nfrom bodily infirmity that he felt tempted to worship Buddha. By this\ntime the influence of Buddhists had grown so strong that they, on the\npretext that their opponents were disloyal to the wishes of the throne,\ntook this occasion to destroy the two most powerful anti-Buddhists.\nThen, by the combined energy of Prince Sh\u014dtoku and the minister\npresident, Soga-no-Mako, the propagation of Buddhism made great\nstrides, until the Empress Suiko openly encouraged its acceptance among\nthe people of all classes. In 607, in order to obtain copies of the\nSutras, there was sent for the first time in history an imperial envoy\ndirectly to China, where the Sui dynasty had just unified the long\ndisrupted empire. This was the commencement of intercourse with China.\nThe preamble of the dispatch sent on that occasion from the empress of\nJapan to the sovereign of China was couched in the following words: \"The\nSovereign of the Empire of the Rising Sun to the Sovereign of the Empire\nof the Setting Sun sends greetings.\" Doubtless the name \"_Nippon_\" (Land\nof the Rising Sun) had its origin in this incident. By and by, as the\nnumber of priests and nuns increased, disorders occurred among them, and\nfor purposes of superintendence the offices of _S\u014dj\u014d_ (archbishop) and\n_S\u014dzu_ (bishop) were established. From the introduction of Buddhism in\nthe reign of the Emperor Kimmei to the time of which we are now\nspeaking, seventy-five years elapsed. During the first thirty-two years\nof that period, Buddhism failed to obtain a footing in Japan, but from\n584 it gradually extended throughout the empire, until in 627 there were\nin Japan 46 temples, 816 priests, and 569 nuns.\n\nLet us now observe some features of the life of the nation and the\nprofound influence wrought upon it by the introduction of the\ncontinental civilization and of Buddhism. It is not too much to say\nthat, at least around the seat of the central government, the arts and\nsciences of China and the creed of Buddha greatly changed the simplicity\nof Japanese life and imparted to it a character of refinement and pomp\nhitherto unknown. Chinese literature not only taught Japan the art of\nwriting and composition, but also brought with it an advanced ethical\nsense of fidelity, piety, benevolence, and justice. The Emperor \u014cjin's\nson, who was the first Japanese student of Chinese literature, had\nacquired such an accurate knowledge of the rules of composition and\ncalligraphy that when a memorial was presented to the throne by Korean\nambassadors, he detected the presence of disrespectful ideograms and\nrebuked the envoys. His attainments won for him the favor of his father,\nwho nominated him heir in preference to his elder brother; nevertheless,\non the death of the emperor, this prince resigned his claim in behalf of\nhis brother. For such self-denial his scholarship had prepared him. So,\ntoo, the erudite Emperor Nintoku dwelt for the space of three years in\na dilapidated palace, in order that his people might have relief from\ntaxation during a famine, and know the sense of love and duty his\nlearning had taught him. The prosperity of the nation, he said, was his\nown prosperity, their poverty his poverty.\n\nThe doctrine of Confucius inculcated reverence toward Heaven, respect\nfor ancestors, loyalty to the sovereign, love of the people, and\ndischarge of the duties of filial piety. On the other hand, Buddhism\nproved an ennobling influence upon the mind of the nation. Hitherto the\npeople na\u00efvely attributed every happy or unhappy event, every fortunate\nor unfortunate incident, to the will of the gods, whom they appeased by\nofferings and sacrifices that evil might be averted. The gods looked and\nacted like men. Highest among them stood the celestial and terrestrial\ngods; lowest were certain wild animals and venomous snakes, which also\nwere propitiated by worship. Gods were near men, and some of the latter\nwere conceived as scions of the former. This primitive notion of a deity\nwas not materially affected by the introduction of the Confucian\nphilosophy, the tenets of which offered no contradiction to the ancient\nidea. Buddhism, on the contrary, told of a past and of a future;\nannounced the doctrine that virtue would be rewarded and vice punished\nin a future state; and taught that the Buddha was the supreme being and\nthat whosoever had faith in him should receive unlimited blessings at\nhis hands. No longer were the deities the only objects of fear and\nreverence, for now a being of supreme wisdom and power loomed upon the\nmental horizon of the people. Even the sovereign himself was seen\nworshiping Buddha, whose servant he was pleased to regard himself.\nPrejudices at court against the Hindu doctrine were dispelled by the\ngrowing light shed by the deeper knowledge of Buddhism, while the golden\nimages of Buddha and the imposing structures enshrining them, as well as\nthe gorgeous paraphernalia of the temples and the solemnity of the rites\nperformed therein, allured the common folk into the faith. At the same\ntime, the people's reverence for the ancient gods of the nation remained\nunshaken, so that Shint\u014dism, Confucianism, and Buddhism existed side by\nside, supplying the defects of one another and answering different moral\nneeds of the race.\n\nAlong with learning and religion, various arts of civilized life were\nprofusely supplied from Korea to vivify the general progress of the\nnation. Among the most important was the production and manufacture of\nsilk, which was largely studied by the people and encouraged by the\nEmperor Y\u016bryaku. Many Chinese artisans of the fallen dynasties migrated\nthrough Korea to Japan, where they were naturalized and transmitted\ntheir knowledge of the western arts and sciences. In architecture, also,\nwith the coming of Buddhism a need arose for lofty and large edifices,\nthe erection of which must have greatly changed the appearance of the\ncapital. The art of pottery made a great advance, as did the\nblacksmith's craft of forging swords and other articles of iron. Nor\nwere medicine and the calendar neglected, while the new art of carving\nand decorating as well as drawing the image of Buddha, gave a powerful\nimpetus to painting and sculpture. The collective influence of all these\nand other new changes upon the life of the people, nearer the center of\nthe government at least, must have been very great. With the development\nof the art of weaving, apparel was improved by the addition of silk\ngarments; as agriculture progressed, rice and other cereals furnished\nagreeable aliment; the influence of Buddhism gradually produced a\ndistaste for animal food. The introduction of the science of\narchitecture soon effected a marked change in the dimensions and\ndecoration of dwelling-houses. Transmission of intelligence was\nfacilitated by the imported art of writing, the moral, intellectual, and\npolitical thinking of the ruling classes began to take a more or less\ndefinite shape from the coming of the Chinese classics, while Buddhism\nspread over the nation a charm which was at once captivating and\nennobling. A new era of history had begun.\n\nWe shall now turn our attention to the remarkable political evolution\nwhich followed and was in fact to a large extent occasioned by the\nintroduction of Buddhism. In the earliest days of the empire,\nadministrative posts were transmitted by heredity from generation to\ngeneration. It thus resulted that family names were derived from\nofficial titles, as, for example, the official title for persons\nperforming religious rites was Nakatomi or Imbe, which titles became\nfamily names of holders of that office. Similarly \u014ctomo and Mononobe\nwere family names of officials having control of troops or direction of\nmilitary affairs. Among commoners, also, there were many who performed\ncertain kinds of work for the government, the art of which they\nbequeathed to their children by heredity. Each occupation of this\ndescription was organized into a guild, and each guild was under the\ncontrol of a headman who belonged to some influential family. Not only\nwere public offices and private guilds similarly organized by the\nprinciple of heredity, but also there was no rigid line drawn between\nthe public property and the personal possession of a nobleman. The\nhigher one's position among the aristocracy, the more exalted was his\noffice and the more plenteous his treasury. Under these circumstances,\nit is not strange that the administration of the state gradually fell\nunder the control of the heads of a few powerful clans. Originally,\nduring the reign of the first emperor, the Nakatomi and Imbe families\ndischarged religious functions, and the \u014ctomo, Kume, and Mononobe\nfamilies performed military duties. The influence of these families was\nthen about equal. But subsequent events resulted in the decline of the\nKume, while the \u014ctomo were in the main intrusted with the control of\nKorean affairs. Domestic administration remained chiefly in the hands of\nthe Mononobe and the new family of Soga, descendants of Takenouchi, the\ntactful minister of the Empress Jing\u014d. The Mononobe stood at the head of\nall the noble families bearing the honorary title of Muraji, and the\nSoga, of those likewise designated as Omi. It was inevitable that the\nmutual jealousy of the two leading houses should bring them to a clash\nof interests, while the introduction of Buddhism had the effect of\ngreatly accentuating their hostility. It will be remembered that the\nMononobe family adhered steadily to conservative principles and opposed\nthe spread of Buddhism, which the Soga, on the contrary, zealously\nupheld. So long, however, as both families bowed implicitly to the\nimperial commands, their dispute did not attain serious proportions. But\nwhen, in the reign of Y\u014dmei, not only was the empress dowager a daughter\nof the Soga family, but also the emperor himself inclined to the worship\nof Buddha, the final struggle between the two families could no longer\nbe deferred.\n\nOn the death of the emperor, Mononobe Moriya sought to secure the\nsuccession for a brother of the deceased sovereign, as against another\nprince, son of the empress dowager. His plot was discovered, and he was\ndefeated and killed. The Mononobe being thus overthrown, the supremacy\nrested with Umako, the head of the Soga, and the throne was occupied by\nhis own prince. But the prince could not long bear the arbitrary conduct\nof Umako, who then caused him to be assassinated. The empress dowager, a\ndaughter of the Soga, despite the presence of direct successors in the\nmale line, ascended the throne under the title of the Empress Suiko.\nThis was the first instance of the scepter being held by a female. On\nthe death of Umako, his son, Emishi, succeeded him, and wielded even\nlarger influence than his father. Emishi crushed an opposition offered\nby his own uncle, and placed in succession to the empress a prince of\nhis choice, and under the latter's rule as Emperor Sh\u014dmei, Emishi\nbehaved as he pleased. After Sh\u014dmei's death, his consort ascended the\nthrone under the name of K\u014dkyoku. Emishi's son, Iruka, who now\ndischarged the administrative functions, exercised even greater power\nthan his father. He also designed to obtain the throne for Prince\nFuruhito, a relative of his family. But an obstacle existed in the\nperson of Prince Yamashiro, whose goodness and discretion had won\npopular respect. Steps were taken to have this prince assassinated, and\notherwise Iruka showed himself so arbitrary and unscrupulous that there\nappeared to be danger of his compassing the destruction of the lineal\nsuccessors to the throne and usurping the sovereignty himself. Thereupon\nNakatomi Kamatari, a loyal subject, conferred with Prince Nakano-\u014dye,\nson of the Emperor Sh\u014dmei, as to the expediency of making away with\nIruka. This plot culminated in the killing of Iruka in the throne room\non a day when Korean ambassadors were received at the court. Iruka's\nfather, Emishi, was also killed, and with them the glory of the Soga\nvanished.\n\nThus ended the interesting period of history in which active relations,\nfirst with Korea, and then with China, began to produce in Japan a\ndirect, profound effect upon her society and politics. Agents of the\nadvanced civilization were liberally introduced, and, in the midst of\nthis process, a grave crisis which was about to overcome the central\ninstitutions of the state system was averted only by an anomalous act of\na few patriots. It was these latter who inaugurated in the next period\nthe grand work of reconstructing the entire system of government and\nadministration after the pattern of Chinese institutions. The\ncontinental civilization in all its refinement was then even more\neagerly studied around the capital than before, while the country at\nlarge, under the unforeseen effects of these artificial reforms, passed\ngradually into a still later period of her history. Before taking up the\nstory of the reform period, we as usual subjoin a table of the\nsovereigns of the period which has been under review in this chapter.\n\n\nCHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF SOVEREIGNS.\n\n14. Emperor Ch\u016bai, 192-270 A.\u00a0D. (including the 69 years of the\n regency of Empress Jing\u014d-k\u014dg\u014d).\n |\n15. Emperor Ojin, 270-313.\n |\n16. Emperor Nintoku, 313-400.\n |\n17. Emperor Rich\u016b,--18. Emperor Hansh\u014d,--19. Emperor Inky\u014d,\n 400-405. 405-411. 411-453.\n | |\n | +----------------+\n | |\n Prince Ichinobe Oshiiwa. 20. Emperor Ank\u014d,--21. Emperor Y\u016bryaku,\n | 453-456. 456-480.\n | |\n | 22. Emperor Seinei.\n23. Emperor Kens\u014d,--24. Emperor Ninken, 488-499. 480-485.\n 485-488. |\n 25. Emperor Buretsu, 499-507.\n(Emperor Ojin.)\n |\n(Emperor Nintoku.)--Prince Wakamikenofutamata.\n |\n Prince \u014chito.\n |\n Prince Hikouishi.\n |\n 26. Emperor Keitai, 507-534.\n |\n +---------------+\n |\n27. Emperor Ankan,--28. Emperor Senkwa,--29. Emperor Kimmei, 540-572.\n 534-536. 536-540. |\n +----------------------------------------+\n |\n30. Emperor Bidatsu,--31. Emperor Y\u014dmei,--32. Emperor Susun,--33. Empress\n 572-586. 586-588. 588-591. Suiko,\n | 591-629.\n |\n Prince Oshisakahiko-nushibito.\n |\n +----------+\n |\n34. Emperor Sh\u014dmei, 629-642.--Prince Chinu.\n |\n 35. Empress K\u014dkyoku, 642-645.\n\n\n\n\nChapter IV\n\nTHE TAIKWA REFORM. 645-708 A.\u00a0D.\n\n\nIt was in the year 645 A.\u00a0D. that a small league of supporters of the\nimperial institutions, under the leadership of two true statesmen,\nPrince Naka-no-\u014dye and Nakatomi-no-Kamatari, overthrew the disloyal\nfamily of Soga. For the first time in Japanese history, the Chinese\nsystem of year-periods was adopted, and the name Taikwa (\"Great Change\")\nwas applied to the period which began with this year. No more\nappropriate name could be invented, for the reforms henceforth\nintroduced, known in history as the Taikwa reformation, were of such a\nsweeping character as to transform within a few years all the\nfundamental institutions of the central and local administration. The\nmodel of the changes was found in the system of politics and society of\nChina, which had lately come under the sway of the dynasty of T'ang, the\ncentralized government and refined civilization of which had excited\nemulation in the minds of the Japanese reformers. The memorable year 645\nA.\u00a0D. thus marks the beginning of the exhaustive reformation which was\ncompleted only after fifty-six years, extending over the reigns of six\nsovereigns, for it was not till 701 that the celebrated Taih\u014d code of\nlaws brought the work of state reorganization to a close.\n\nIt would hardly be necessary for us to study the reforms in detail,\nwhich brought profound changes upon nearly all the features of national\nlife. The central institution of the new state may be said to be the\nland system. Formerly, noble families abused the influence of their\nposition and extended their territorial estates so greatly that the\ncommoner was in a state of perpetual eviction. Between the rich and the\npoor had grown a widening gap. Now the reformers, after their Chinese\nmodel, boldly confiscated to the state all the landed estates of private\nindividuals, which they then allotted equally among all the people above\nthe age of six at the rate of two _tan_ for a male and one and one-third\n_tan_ for a female (a _ch\u014d_, or 10 _tan_, at the time being\napproximately equal to two acres), subject to a redistribution at every\nsixth year. Naturally neither the periodical redistribution nor the\nsystem of equal allotment itself could be long maintained, but the\nnotion that the ownership of land was ultimately vested in the state was\nnot abandoned until the present reign, when the people of all classes\nwere at last allowed to own land.\n\nThe economic and financial unit of the nation being thus defined, it was\nalso provided that a national census should be returned at a fixed\nperiod. New taxes were of three kinds, the principal one, called _so_,\nbeing levied upon land. The method of its assessment was to fix the\nannual produce of two _tan_ of rice land at 100 sheaves, 8 of which--4\nlarge and 4 small--were taken as tax, or, roughly, five per cent. of the\ngross produce. Of the other two kinds of taxes one was called _y\u014d_ and\nthe other _ch\u014d_. The former may be regarded as a species of _corv\u00e9e_.\nAfter a man attained the age of twenty-one he was required to perform\nten days' public work annually, which service, however, he was at\nliberty to commute for one piece of cloth (_nuno_). The _ch\u014d_ was levied\non silk, fish, cloth, and generally speaking on objects produced or\nobtained in considerable quantities. The proceeds of the rice-tax were\napplied to defray the expenses of local administration, while the outlay\nof the central government was met by the proceeds of the two other\ntaxes, _y\u014d_ and _ch\u014d_.\n\nAs regards local administration, the old names of local divisions,\n_kuni_ (provinces) and _k\u014dri_ (districts), were retained, while towns,\n_sato_, were organized generally by grouping together fifty houses under\na town-head. Along the principal roads relays of post horses were\nmaintained for public service, and every person traveling in the\ninterior was required by law to carry a hand-bell and a document similar\nto a passport. At important places guard-houses were established, with\nduly appointed lookouts and garrisons for preserving order. Government\nbusiness was transacted in the provinces under the control of officials\ncollectively called _kokushi_, and in the districts under that of\n_gunshi_. The former set of officers were appointed by the central\ngovernment from among the nobler families, while the latter seem to have\nbeen largely supplied by the descendants of old local magnates. In those\ndays the empire comprised 58 _kuni_, over 500 _k\u014dri_, and about 13,000\n_sato_, but subsequent changes resulted in 66 _kuni_ and more than 700\n_k\u014dri_, which numbers continued till the beginning of the present reign.\n\nFinally, as to the central government, its ultimate control was vested\nin the hands of three principal officials, namely, the ministers of the\nleft, of the right, and of the interior; but this organization\nsubsequently underwent considerable modification. The eight departments\nof administration were Department of Records (_Nakatsukasa_), Department\nof Ceremonies (_Shikibu_), Department of Administration (_Jibu_),\nDepartment of Home Affairs (_Mimbu_), Department of Military Affairs\n(_Hy\u014dbu_), Department of Justice (_Ky\u014dbu_), Department of Finance\n(_\u014ckura_), and Department of the Imperial Household (_Kunai_). Each was\ncomprised of three bureaus, between which the functions of the\ndepartment were distributed. Over and above the eight departments stood\nthe two highest offices, grand council (_Daij\u014d-kwan_) and religious\nrites (_Jingi-kwan_).\n\nThe administrative organization having been thus determined, steps were\ntaken to make suitable selection of _personnel_ for the various official\nposts, and in connection with this a body of rules was compiled, fixing\nthe ranks of officials of all kinds. The system of selection by merit\nwas in this manner substituted for that of hereditary succession. But\nthe change did not find complete expression in practice, for noble\nfamilies, though nominally deprived of exclusive official privileges,\nstill benefited by the conservatism of custom. Various ranks of\nofficials were minutely graded, and rigidly marked by means of the\ncolors of garments and head-gear or by patents, but these insignia\nunderwent subsequent changes in minor details.\n\nSuch, in brief, were the principal features of the Taikwa reforms. The\ngovernment, however, did not confine itself to the realm of enactment,\nfor instructions of an admonitory character were issued with a view to\nimproving the manners and customs of the agricultural classes. Diligence\nin the pursuit of their occupations, economy, integrity, exclusion of\nmercenary motives from contracts of marriage, simplicity of funeral\nrites, persistence in habits of industry even during periods of\nmourning--such were the virtues recommended to farmers by official\nproclamation. At the same time, in order to establish contact between\nthe ruling classes and the ruled, boxes were set up at various places\nwherein the people were invited to deposit any statement of grievances\nfrom which they suffered, and it was provided that a man who desired to\nbring a complaint speedily to the notice of the authorities should ring\na bell hung in a public building.\n\nOn the decease of the Emperor K\u014dtoku, after a reign of ten years, the\nprevious empress, K\u014dkyoku, reassumed the scepter under the name of\nSaimei. This was the first instance of a sovereign occupying the throne\ntwice. Prince Naka-no-\u014dye, who throughout both reigns had remained\nheir-apparent, succeeded the Empress Saimei under the name of Tenchi.\nThis sovereign, who before ascending the throne had greatly\ndistinguished himself, is not noted for any conspicuous deeds while in\npossession of the scepter. Throughout his reign the country enjoyed\nprofound internal tranquillity. Its foreign affairs, however, assumed a\ncomplexion worthy of special notice.\n\nSince the conquest of southern Korea, which tradition attributes to the\nEmpress Jing\u014d, its kingdoms not only rendered tributes of valuable\narticles, but also conferred no small benefit on their suzerain by\ncontributing to the latter's material and moral civilization.\nNevertheless, the interval that separated the two countries made\ncommunication difficult, and although Japan established a branch\ngovernment in Korea at a place called Mimana, the Koreans, relying upon\nthe distance of the latter from headquarters, frequently acted in a\nrebellious manner. During an interval of 460 years after the legendary\ninvasion of the Empress Jing\u014d, no less than thirty instances are\nrecorded when the Koreans either failed to send tribute, insulted\nJapanese envoys, or broke into open revolt. On every occasion Japan sent\nembassies to demand explanation and redress, or reasserted her supremacy\nby force of arms. Shiragi, which in those days stood at the head of the\ndistricts into which Korea was divided, rose in 562 against Mimana and\nsucceeded in expelling the Japanese officials and obtaining possession\nof the place. This disaster weighed greatly on the mind of the Emperor\nKimmei, whose last behest uttered on his deathbed was that Mimana should\nbe recovered. A great army was accordingly sent against Shiragi, but\nsuccess did not attend the Japanese arms. Not only was it found\nimpossible to reduce Shiragi, but even the maintenance of the local\ngovernment at Mimana proved a task beyond the military strength of the\ntime. Thenceforth the recovery of Mimana became an object upon which\nJapan's attention was ever concentrated. When in 618 China fell under\nthe powerful sway of the T'ang dynasty, the people of Shiragi, relying\non Chinese assistance, conceived the project of bringing under their\nrule the neighboring district of Kudara. Reduced to extremities, Kudara\nin 660 sent envoys to seek succor from Japan. After considerable\ndiscussion, the Japanese Government resolved to undertake an expedition\nagainst Shiragi on a large scale. Great preparations were set on foot.\nThe sovereign himself proceeded to Tsukushi and oversaw the dispatch\nthence of a fleet of a hundred war vessels under the command of\nAzumi-no-Hirafu, whose instructions were to attack Shiragi and rescue\nKudara. But the latter was found to be in a helpless condition. Invaded\nsimultaneously by the forces of China and Shiragi, it was also torn by\ninternal dissensions, and could not co\u00f6perate in any effective manner\nwith the Japanese navy, which consequently withdrew, leaving Kudara to\nits inevitable fate. The final fall of Kudara occurred in 670, and a few\nyears later the third Korean district of Koma was also defeated by\nChina. Shiragi subsequently sent occasional tribute to Japan, but was\nnever afterward included in the Japanese dominions. The Emperor Tenchi,\nreviewing the history of his country's relations with Korea, seems to\nhave arrived at the definite conclusion that the wisest policy was on\nthe side of abandoning all idea of recovering Kudara, and devoting\nJapan's energies solely to organizing measures of defense against\nforeign attack. He accordingly adopted every possible means of promoting\nmilitary efficiency. It should be remembered that Japan had not only\nlavished money and blood for Korea, but also had outlived the days when\nthe civilizing influence of the continent had to come by way of the\npeninsula and had already been in communication with the source of\nenlightenment, China. It was during the reign of the same Emperor Tenchi\nthat China sent an envoy to the court of Japan, and the latter country\ndispatched an embassy in return, so that the two empires were brought\ninto more friendly relations than before.\n\n[Illustration: THE WORSHIP OF THE BEAR AMONG THE AUTOCHTHONS (AINOS)\nOF EZO]\n\n The curious \"Hairy Ainos\" of northern Japan hold the bear in\n extreme sanctity. They catch the bear when young and bring him\n up on human milk, a nurse being deputed to him. Then he is\n transferred to a cage and, when he is old enough to be slain, on\n the day of sacrifice the whole village turns out armed with bows\n and arrows, the cage is opened and each one strives to send home\n the fatal shaft. The chief prays the bear to pardon the violence\n done him, requests benefits from the now deified carcass, and\n presents offerings. They then behead and skin the bear, and\n begin an orgie which lasts several days.\n\nIf, however, the extent of the Japanese dominions suffered reduction in\nthe west, it in the meantime received an increment in the north by the\nsubjection of some recalcitrant tribes. It will be recalled that the\nuprising of these people, called Emishi, or _Ebisu_, had been suppressed\nby Prince Yamato-dake, but further north in the island of Ezo, the\npresent Hokkaid\u014d;, the imperial sway received only partial\nacknowledgment. There the Emishi not only were restless, but also\ngenerally had the sympathy and support of their kinsmen across the\nwaters, just as in earlier times, the Kumaso, the autochthons of\nKiush\u016b, habitually espoused the cause of Korea in any conflict between\nthe latter and Japan. The government always found itself compelled to\nundertake a dual campaign in times of trouble with the island on the\nnorth or with the peninsula on the west. Because of these difficulties\nforts were built, about 650, at Nutari and Iwafune in Echigo, and\ngarrisoned by the people of that province and of Shinano, for the\npurpose of holding the aborigines of Ezo in control. The unsettled\ncondition of these outlying districts may be further inferred from an\nenactment contemporaneous with the great Taikwa reforms. For whereas a\ngeneral interdict was then issued against unauthorized possession of\narms and armor by private persons, dwellers in the remote parts of the\neast were exempted from this prohibition on the ground of their\nliability to attack.\n\nDuring the years 658-660, in the Empress Saimei's reign, Abe-no-Hirafu,\na distinguished governor of the Koshi provinces (Echigo and Uzen),\nconducted successful campaigns against the autochthons of Ezo, breaking\ntheir power and destroying their vessels of war, and finally invaded\nManchuria at the head of a force composed of subjugated Emishi, and cut\noff the source from which insurgents had usually derived succor. The\nresult of this campaign was that the Emishi were, for the most part,\nbrought into subjection, and functionaries called _Gunry\u014d_; were posted\nat Shiribeshi in the northern island. Frequent insurrections, however,\nfollowed, and finally it was found necessary to build the castles of\nTaga and Akita, where strong forces of soldiers were maintained to\npreserve order.\n\nA few expeditions on a large scale were also organized against them\nunder the command of generalissimos (_sh\u014dgun_) upon whom the duty of\nguarding the northern and eastern marches devolved, but it was not until\n796, during the reign of the Emperor Kwammu, that these autochthons were\neffectually brought into subjection. The campaign against them at that\ntime was directed by a renowned captain, Sakanoue-no-Tamuramaro, who, at\nthe head of a great army, penetrated to the limits of the rebellious\ndistricts, slaughtering all who refused to surrender. This general's\nexploits were second only to those of his predecessor Abe-no-Hirafu. Not\nonly was the sway of the imperial court thus extended to the east and\nnorth, but in the south also various islands--Tokuara, Tane, Yaku,\nAmami, Toku, and others--lying off the coasts of Satsuma and \u014csumi, were\nadded to the Japanese dominions.\n\nLet us now see what important incidents took place during this time\naround the person of the sovereign. In the third year of the Emperor\nTenchi's reign, 670, the celebrated statesman of the Taikwa reformation,\nNakatomi-no-Kamatari died. He had been raised to the position of lord\nkeeper of the privy seal, and had received the family name of Fujiwara,\nin recognition of his meritorious services. Kamatari was a man of\nthorough loyalty and integrity. His zeal in the emperor's service was\nunflagging, and he showed great ability in framing useful laws and\nregulations, so that, after his decease, people spoke of him as a model\nof fidelity. Two years later the emperor himself, formally the leader of\nthe reforms since 645, died, leaving behind him a reputation for good\ngovernment which was held in so grateful a remembrance that when more\nthan a century later the Emperor Kwammu promulgated a law dispensing\nwith the observance of religious ceremonies on the anniversaries of the\ndeaths of sovereigns deceased at remote periods, public sentiment caused\nthe Emperor Tenchi to be excepted from the general rule. Yet he had\nscarcely been laid to rest when a serious disturbance took place with\nreference to his successor. In accordance with the rule of primogeniture\nfollowed in Japan, the scepter was bequeathed to the eldest prince of\nthe blood with almost unvarying regularity during the thirteen\ngenerations from Jimmu to Seimu; and throughout the thirty-two\ngenerations from Jimmu to Sujun no woman held the scepter, for although\nJing\u014d held regency for sixty-nine years, she was never invested with the\ndignity of the title of sovereign.\n\nThe accession of the Empress Suiko was due to exceptional circumstances,\nand did not mark a recognized departure from the old rule. Subsequently,\nhowever, not a few instances occurred of the scepter falling into the\nhands of an uncle or niece of a deceased emperor, and on these occasions\nmore or less disquiet accompanied the event. But no disturbance\nconnected with such a cause attained anything like the dimensions of the\ntrouble that followed Tenchi's death.[1] On the occasion of the\nemperor's visit to Tsukushi to make arrangements for the invasion of\nKorea, he entrusted the administration of affairs during his absence to\nhis younger brother, Prince \u014cama, and caused the heir apparent, Prince\n\u014ctomo, to accompany him to Tsukushi. \u014ctomo, though young in years, had\nalready given evidence of great capacity and was exceptionally learned.\nThe sovereign entertained a strong affection for him, and after\nreturning from Tsukushi raised him to the position of prime minister. On\nthe other hand, the relations between the emperor and his brother,\nPrince \u014cama, were for some unknown reason inharmonious. When the\nemperor, perceiving the dangerous character of his malady, would fain\nhave entrusted the administration of affairs after his death to \u014cama,\nthe latter pretending ill health declined the responsibility. The prince\nimperial was consequently proclaimed successor to the throne, and \u014cama\ntook the priestly order and retired to Mount Yoshino, partly for the\npurpose of praying for the soul of the deceased emperor, but partly also\nto dispel the suspicion with which the public regarded his acts. None\nthe less, it was the common talk of the time that \u014cama's retirement to\nYoshino was as \"the letting loose of a tiger on a moor.\" Twice did the\nministers of state take the oath of allegiance to Prince \u014ctomo, but\nrivalry and evil feeling continued to grow between the partisans of the\nnew sovereign and those of Prince \u014cama. In the end a state of open\nhostilities resulted. Prince \u014cama, rapidly withdrawing to the eastern\nprovinces, obtained possession of all the strategical positions, and was\nfollowed by large numbers of adherents. The emperor dispatched an army\nagainst the insurgents, and engagements took place in Mino, \u014cmi, and\nYamato, but on every occasion the imperial forces were routed, and the\neastern army gradually pushed on to \u014ctsu in Shiga. A final and desperate\nstand was made by the emperor's troops in the Seta district, but the\nbattle ended in their total defeat, and the sovereign himself, escaping\nfrom the field, perished by his own hand at the age of twenty-five,\nafter a reign of only eight months. This emperor is known in history as\nK\u014dbun. Prince \u014cama succeeded to the throne under the name of Temmu. He\nhad obtained the scepter under questionable circumstances, but as a\nruler he showed high qualities, carrying on the administration with zeal\nand ability. He dispatched inspectors to all districts throughout the\nrealm in order to acquire full knowledge of local affairs, and raised\nthe military establishment to a state of high efficiency. On his death a\nprincess, daughter of Tenchi and sister of K\u014dbun, succeeded to the\nthrone as the Empress Jit\u014d. In the third year of her reign the heir\napparent, Prince Kusakabe, died. The empress convoked a council of all\nthe high dignitaries of state to determine a successor to the prince,\nbut they could not come to any agreement until Prince Kadono advanced\nthe principle that when neither son nor grandson was available to\nsucceed to the throne, the scepter should pass to the brothers and\nsisters of the sovereign in due order, since by no other means could\ndisputes be avoided. The outcome was that Karu, son of the late Prince\nKusakabe, was proclaimed heir apparent. He subsequently ascended the\nthrone as the Emperor Mommu, well known in history for his ability and\nthe codification under his direction of the laws of the Taih\u014d period.[2]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] The following is a brief genealogical table of the sovereigns\nof this period of disputed successions:\n\n30. Emperor Bitatsu.--(Prince Oshisakahikohito).\n |\n+---------------------------------+\n|--34. Emperor J\u014dmy\u014d.--38. Emperor Tenchi.--(41. Empress Jit\u014d, consort of\n| | the 40th emperor, Temmu).\n| | |\n| | +----------------------------------+\n| | |\n| | +--(43. Empress Gemmy\u014d, mother of the 42d\n| | | emperor Mommu).\n| | +--39. Emperor K\u014dbun.\n| | +--(Prince Shiki).--49. Emperor K\u014dnin.\n| |\n| 40. Emperor Temmu.--(Prince Kusakabe).\n| |\n| (Prince Toneri).--47. Emperor Junnin.\n+--(Prince Chinu.)--35. Empress K\u014dkyoku.--37. Empress Saimei.\n |\n 36. Emperor K\u014dtoku.\n\n[2] Chronological table of sovereigns.\n\n36. Emperor K\u014dtoku, 645-655.\n37. Empress Saimei, 655-668.\n38. Emperor Tenchi, 668-672.\n39. Emperor K\u014dbun, 672-673.\n40. Emperor Temmu, 673-690.\n41. Empress Jit\u014d, 690-697.\n42. Emperor Mommu, 697-708.\n\n\n\n\nChapter V\n\nTHE NARA EPOCH. 710-794 A.\u00a0D.\n\n\nIn 708 A.\u00a0D. the Empress Gemmy\u014d ascended the throne and two years later\nthe seat of government, which had hitherto moved from place to place,\nwas fixed at Nara in the province of Yamato. The imperial palace, as\nwell as the left and right halves of the city, were built with much\nstate, the place being thenceforth known in Chinese style as _Heij\u014d_\n(\"castle of tranquillity\"). The interval of seventy-five years from that\ndate, comprising the reigns of seven successive sovereigns, is called in\nhistory the \"Nara epoch,\" an epoch worthy of special reference for its\ngreat prosperity and refinement. Under the sway of the emperors Tenchi\nand Temmu the power of the throne had already increased considerably,\nand it was further enhanced by the ability of Mommu and his immediate\nsuccessors, no little assistance being derived from the royal princes\nwho occupied the highest posts in the administration with conspicuous\ntalent. Side by side with the growth of the power of the crown, the\ninfluence of the Fujiwara family, descendants of Kamatair, also steadily\nadvanced, until, as will be seen later, they came to overshadow the real\nauthority of the sovereign. This, however, had not yet become noticeable\nduring the earlier years of the Nara epoch, when the emperor was in\ntheory and in practice at the apex of the grand centralized system of\ngovernment inaugurated by the Taikwa reformation.\n\nAmong the events of this period, none is more worthy of note than the\nmarked spread of Buddhism. This result may be attributed, first, to the\nloyal faith of the imperial court, and, secondly, to the exertions of\npriests of high talent who labored in the cause of their creed with\nremarkable zeal and tact. Ever since the days of the Emperor Kimmei,\nwhen Buddhism was brought to Japan, its progress had been sure and\nstrong, despite all opposition, until there came a time when the Emperor\nTemmu went so far as to order that every private house should have an\naltar for the worship of the Buddha. Subsequent sovereigns caused the\ncanons to be copied and images to be made for all the provinces of the\nrealm; and the Emperor Sh\u014dmu supplemented those measures by an edict\nrequiring that provincial temples (_kokubunji_) should everywhere be\nbuilt for priests and nuns. The ruling classes contributed liberally to\nthe support of these places of worship, it being generally believed that\nby such means individual prosperity and national tranquillity could be\nsecured. A huge image of Buddha, fifty-three feet high, was cast of\ncopper and gold, which survives to this day in the temple where it was\noriginally placed, the T\u014dtai-ji, at Nara.\n\nIt is on record that Sh\u014dmu himself adopted the tonsure and took a\nBuddhist appellation. The mother of that sovereign, Miyako, and his\nconsort, K\u014dmy\u014d,--both daughters of Fujiwara Fubito--were most zealous\ndevotees of Buddhism, and with their co\u00f6peration the sovereign\nestablished in the capital an asylum for the support of the destitute\nand a charity hospital, where the poor received medical treatment and\ndrugs gratis. Measures were also taken to rescue foundlings, and in\ngeneral to relieve poverty and distress. Tradition tells us that the\nempress cared for the sick to the number of nine hundred and\nninety-nine. The thousandth patient was a miserable old man who asked\nher to suck pus from the ulcerated sores of his skin. As she cheerfully\nacceded to his wish, he was transfigured into a Buddha, and ascended\ninto the air, blessing the imperial devotee whose faith he had come to\ntest. Among the great subjects we also find instances such as those of\nKamartari and Fuhito, of whom the former, though a minister of the\ncourt, built a temple and made his eldest son take orders, and the\nlatter erected the temple of K\u014dfuku-ji and endowed it as the place of\nworship of the Fujiwara family. Among the priests of high rank, one\nwhose name has been transmitted to posterity was Gy\u014dgi.\n\nHe became famous in the reign of the Empress Gensh\u014d,[1] and having won\nthe confidence and respect of the next sovereign, Sh\u014dmu, he attained the\nrank of _Dais\u014dj\u014d_ (archbishop) and was subsequently worshiped as a saint\nunder the title of \"Bosatsu.\" It was by this prelate that the doctrine\nof successive incarnations of the Buddha was first enunciated, a\ndoctrine whose skillful application greatly served the cause of\nBuddhism. For though the creed obtained such influence and success in\nthe times now under consideration, its universal acceptance by the\npeople encountered a strong obstacle in their traditional belief that\nthe Shint\u014d deities, not Buddha, had founded the state, bequeathed its\nscepter to their posterity, and prescribed a creed with which the very\nexistence of the nation was bound up. This difficulty, however, the\nBuddhist priests adroitly met by the aid of the doctrine that Gy\u014dgi\ntaught. The goddess Amaterasu had been only an incarnation of\nBirushanabutsu, and all the deities of the land were but the Buddha\nhimself in various human forms. By this skillful reasoning they\ndispelled the inherited prejudices of the people and gave a great\nimpulse to the spread of their creed. Gy\u014dgi, D\u014dsh\u014d, Ry\u014dben, and others\nacquired notable influence with the masses, and, aided by their pupils,\npreached in such manner as to popularize Buddhism throughout the land.\nAbout this era, also, many priests came to Japan from China. It would\nappear, nevertheless, that side by side with the spread of Buddhist\nconviction the doctrine of fate and fortune was taught and the necessity\nof vows and penances inculcated, to the delusion and demoralization of\nignorant folks. In every direction priestly sway made itself felt, even\nthe imperial court being largely under the influence of Gemb\u014d, D\u014dky\u014d,\nand their following.\n\nA notable factor in the development of material prosperity at that epoch\nwas the extraordinary ability of the priests. Many of them made voyages\nto China to study the arts and sciences of that empire, and on their\nreturn traveled up and down the land, opening regions hitherto left\nbarren, building temples, repairing and extending roads, bridging\nrivers, establishing ferries, digging ponds, canals, and wells, and\nencouraging navigation, thus contributing as much to the material\ncivilization of the country as to the moral improvement of the people.\nIt may be truly said that the spread of Buddhism was synchronous with\nthe rise of art and science. Carpenters, from the practice acquired in\nbuilding temples, learned how to construct large edifices; sculptors and\nmetallurgists became skillful by casting and graving idols of gold and\nbronze; painting, decorative weaving, the ornamentation of utensils, and\nthe illumination of missals, owe their expert pursuit to the patronage\nof Buddhism; the first real impetus given to the potter's art is\nassociated with the name of a priest; in short, almost every branch of\nindustrial and artistic development owes something to the influence of\nthe creed. In a storehouse forming part of the T\u014dtai-ji, and in the\ntemple of H\u014dri\u016b, both at Nara, there are preserved a number of household\nutensils, objects of apparel, musical instruments, and so forth, handed\ndown from the Nara epoch, every one of which bears witness to a refined\nand artistic civilization, not surpassed by succeeding generations.\nAmong glyptic artists there have been handed down from these days the\nnames of men famous for their skill in sculpturing images, two of whom\nwere called \"Kasuga\" after the place where they lived, and were held in\nthe highest honor. It is true that architecture, sculpture, dyeing, and\nweaving, introduced originally from China and Korea, had long been\npracticed with considerable success, but during the Nara epoch these\narts were in the hands of men celebrated then and subsequently for their\nproficiency. The same may be said also of the arts of the lacquerer and\nthe sword-smith, which at that time were carried far beyond ancient\nstandards of achievement. It is further worthy of note that the methods\nof manufacturing glass and soap were known in the eighth century. Nara\nand its temples, remaining outside the range of battles and the reach of\nconflagrations, have escaped the destructions that periodically overtook\nother imperial capitals, so that those who visit the place to-day can\nsee objects of fine and useful arts more than a thousand years old.\n\nSimultaneously with the progress thus made in art and industry, learning\nreceived a great impetus. The Emperor Tenchi was the first to appoint\nofficials charged with educational functions. A university was\nestablished in Ky\u014dto, as well as public schools in the various\nlocalities throughout the provinces. The subjects chiefly taught in the\nuniversity were history, the Chinese Classics, law, and mathematics.\nThese were called the _shid\u014d_, or four paths of learning. In the\nsucceeding reign, education continued to receive powerful encouragement,\nbut the principal object in view being the training of government\nofficials, instruction for the masses still remained in an\nunsatisfactory state. Learning in that age virtually signified a\nknowledge of the Chinese Classics. Hence, in the Nara epoch, scholars\nversed in that kind of erudition were very numerous, conspicuous among\nthem being Awada-no-Mahito, \u014c-no-Yasumaro, Kibi-no-Makibi and others.\nIntercourse with China being then tolerably close, there were frequent\ninstances of priests and students proceeding thither by order of the\ngovernment, the former to investigate religious subjects, and the\nlatter to study Chinese literature. Even in China some of these men\nobtained a high reputation for learning. The names of Kibi-no-Makibi and\nAbe-no-Nakamaro are best remembered. The former, on his return to Japan,\nwas appointed a minister of state, but the latter never saw his native\ncountry again. Encountering a violent gale on his homeward voyage, he\nwas driven back to China, where he received an important official\nposition and remained until his death, constantly hoping to return to\nJapan but always unable to realize his hope.\n\nJapan in those days possessed many scholars who could write Chinese\nfluently. The composition of Chinese poetry was commenced in the reign\nof K\u014dbun, the first book of verses ever published in Japan--the\n\"_Kwaif\u016bso_\"--making its appearance at that time. It is on record that,\nat an earlier epoch--during the reign of the Empress Suiko--Prince\nSh\u014dtoku, Soga-no-Umako, and others, jointly compiled some historical\nworks, which were, however, almost totally destroyed at the time of the\noverthrow of the Soga family. Subsequently, the Emperor Temmu instructed\nPrince Kawashima and others to write a history, and further directed\nHieda-no-Are to dictate for transcription the annals of the successive\nreigns. Again, in 712 A.\u00a0D., \u014c-no-Yasumaro, by command of the Empress\nGemmy\u014d, compiled a history of the empire from the earliest days to the\nreign of Suiko. This work was called the \"_Kojiki_.\" A year later the\nvarious provinces received imperial instructions to prepare geographical\naccounts, each of itself, and these were collated into the \"_F\u016bdoki_\" a\nfew of which still remain. During the next reign, the Empress Gensh\u014d\ncontinued this literary effort by causing Prince Toneri and others to\ncompile the \"_Nihongi_,\" comprising a historical narrative from the\nbeginning of the empire to the reign of Jit\u014d. In these works, the\n\"_Kojiki_\" and the \"_Nihongi_,\" the most ancient traditions of the\ncountry are to be found. Shortly afterward five other chronicles, known\nwith the \"_Nihongi_\" as the \"Six National Histories,\" were successively\nundertaken, the compilation of which continued down to the reign of the\nEmperor Daigo.\n\nTo the Japanese poetry of the Nara epoch, however, must be assigned the\nfirst place among the literary efforts of the time. While K\u014dgen was on\nthe throne, Tachibana Moroye collected all the poems then extant, and\nthese, being afterward supplemented by \u014ctomo-no-Yakamochi, constitute\nthe \"_Many\u014dshu_,\" a work containing stanzas full of _verve_ and\nimagination, simple yet by no means deficient in taste. The longer\ncompositions are especially admirable, and have ever since served as\nmodels for writers of Japanese verse. Later generations considered the\nwork as a means of studying the ancient language of the country prior to\nthe Nara epoch, and from it they also derived a knowledge of the customs\nand sentiments of early times. Consequently the \"_Many\u014dshu_,\" together\nwith the \"_Kojiki_\" and the \"_Nihongi_,\" came to be regarded as most\nprecious sources of historical information.\n\nThe lavish patronage bestowed upon Buddhism and the artificial wealth\nand refinement of the capital were not without an enervating effect upon\nthe court. From the latter part of the eighth century favoritism and\npartisanship began to cause serious troubles around the person of the\nsovereign, whose conduct was in a measure responsible for them. The\nstory of the rise and fall of various favorites and their cliques is too\ntedious to be retold, but the case of the priest D\u014dky\u014d deserves a brief\nnotice. Holding the post of palace prelate and enjoying undue favor from\nthe empress dowager, D\u014dky\u014d's power assumed such proportions that the\nprime minister, Emi Oshikazu, took up arms against him. The latter's\nforces were, however, completely routed, his adherents exterminated, and\nhe himself killed. With his fall, the emperor, who had ascended the\nthrone by the influence of Oshikazu, was exiled by the dowager, who\nresumed the scepter in 764. This was the first instance of an emperor\nbeing exiled. Many princes of the blood were also either banished with\nhim or killed, with the result that the princely adherents of the\nimperial house were materially reduced in number. Thereafter D\u014dky\u014d\nreceived the posts of prime minister and second prelate of the realm\n(_Zenshi_), ultimately attaining the position of first prelate (_H\u014d-\u014d_).\nHis food, raiment, and bodyguards were similar to those of the emperor,\nand so great was his influence that the entire administration rested in\nhis hands. His partisans went so far as to say openly that were the\nprime minister made emperor, the realm would enjoy peace. Profound,\nhowever, as was the nation's belief in Buddhism at that epoch, there\nwere just men who could not tamely endure such evil doings. Conspicuous\namong them was the brave Wake-no-Kiyomaro, who brought back from the\nshrine of the Shint\u014d deity, Usa-Hachiman, an oracle, saying: \"The\ndistinction of sovereign and subject is fundamental. Never may a subject\nbecome emperor. The emperor must always be of the imperial line. Let\nthe unrighteous subject who would cut off the imperial succession be at\nonce removed.\" D\u014dky\u014d was much incensed by this procedure and caused\nKiyomaro to be banished. But the oracle produced its effect on the\nempress, who at last repented of the things that had been done, and all\nidea of raising D\u014dky\u014d to the throne was abandoned. The next year she\ndied and was succeeded by a grandson of Tenchi, the Emperor K\u014dnin. At\nthis point the descendants of the Emperor Temmu ceased to hold the\nsuccession, and those of the Emperor Tenchi assumed it. D\u014dky\u014d was\nbanished, and Kiyomaro was recalled to court. Posterity regards his\nmemory with almost religious respect.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[1] Chronological table of the sovereigns of the Nara Epoch.\n\n43. Empress Gemmy\u014d, 708-715.\n44. Empress Gensh\u014d, 715-724.\n45. Emperor Sh\u014dmu, 724-749.\n46. Empress K\u014dken, 749-759.\n47. Emperor Junnin, 759-765.\n48. Emperor Sh\u014dtoku, 765-770.\n49. Emperor K\u014dnin, 770-782.\n\n\n\n\nChapter VI\n\nTHE HEI-AN EPOCH. 794-1186 A.\u00a0D.\n\n\nThe Nara epoch had come to an end when in 794 the Emperor Kwammu\ntransferred the capital to Ky\u014dto. The new seat of government being then\nknown as _Hei-an Ky\u014d_, or Citadel of Tranquillity, the interval that\nseparated its choice as capital from the establishment of feudal\nadministration at Kamakura in 1186--an interval of nearly four\ncenturies--is known in history as the Hei-an epoch. A few words may be\nsaid about the significance of the change of the seat of government from\nNara to Ky\u014dto. From ancient times it had been the custom for the emperor\nand the heir apparent to live apart, from which fact it resulted that\nwhen a sovereign died and his son succeeded to the throne, the latter\nusually transferred the capital to the site of his own palace. It\nsometimes happened also that the residence of the imperial court was\naltered as often as two or three times during the same reign. Rarely,\nhowever, did the court move out of the contiguous provinces known as the\n_Go-kinai_, the great majority of the seats of government being in the\nprovince of Yamato. So long as the government was comparatively simple,\nthe transfer of its seat from place to place involved no serious effort.\nAs, however, the business of administration became more complicated, and\nintercourse with China grew more intimate, the character of the palace\nassumed magnificence proportionate to the imperial ceremonies and\nnational receptions that had to be held there. Hence the capital\nestablished at Nara by the Empress Gemmy\u014d was on a scale of\nunprecedented magnitude and splendor. There seven sovereigns reigned in\nsuccession without any thought of moving elsewhere. But when the Emperor\nKwammu assumed the reins of government, he found that Nara was not a\nconvenient place for administrative purposes. He at first moved to\nNagaoka in Yamashiro, but a brief residence there convinced him that his\nchoice had not been well guided.\n\nAt last, in 794, a new capital was built, after the model of Nara, with\nsome modifications introduced from the metropolis of the T'ang dynasty\nin China, at Uda in the same province. This was called Ky\u014dto, which\nmeans capital. It measured from north to south 17,530 feet and from east\nto west 15,080 feet, the whole being surrounded by moats and palisades,\nand the imperial palace being situated in the center of the northern\nportion. From the southern palace gate (_Shujaku-mon_) to the\nsouthernmost city gate (_Rajo-mon_) a long street, 280 feet wide (called\n_Shujaku-\u014dji_, or the main Shujaku thoroughfare), extended in one\nstraight line, separating the city into two parts, of which the eastern\nwas designated _Saky\u014d_, or the left capital, and the western, _Uky\u014d_, or\nthe right capital. The whole city, from east to west, was divided into\nnine districts (_jo_), and between the first and second districts lay\nthe imperial palace.\n\nAn elaborate system of subdivision was adopted. The unit, or _ko_\n(house), was a space measuring 100 feet by 50. Eight of these units made\na row (_gy\u014d_); four rows, a street (_ch\u014d_); four streets, a _ho_; four\n_ho_, a _b\u014d_, and four _b\u014d_, a _jo_. The entire capital contained 1216\n_cho_ and 38,912 houses. The streets lay parallel and at right angles\nlike the lines on a checkerboard. The imperial citadel measured 3840\nfeet from east to west, and 4600 feet from north to south. On each side\nwere three gates, and in the middle stood the emperor's palace,\nsurrounded by the buildings of the various administrative departments.\nThis citadel was environed by double walls, and contained altogether\nseventeen large and five small edifices, every one of them picturesque\nand handsome.\n\nGreat and fine as was this metropolis, it suffered such ravages during\nthe disturbances of succeeding centuries that the Ky\u014dto of to-day, the\n\"Saky\u014d,\" or Western Capital, is but a shadow of the left section of\nancient times. Not even the imperial palace escaped these ravages. Again\nand again impaired or destroyed by conflagrations, it gradually assumed\nsmaller and smaller dimensions until only a trace remained of the\nsplendid edifice that had once stood in the center of the citadel. But\nthe regularity of the streets could not be obliterated. That at least\nsurvives to tell the story of the plan on which the city was\nconstructed. Indeed, Ky\u014dto continued to be the seat of sovereigns for a\nlong period, covering 1074 years, and until the capital was removed in\n1869 to T\u014dky\u014d.\n\nIn the Hei-an epoch[1] were accentuated the virtues and vices of the\nNara epoch. Buddhism now advanced to an even greater extent than it did\nthen, the luxury and pomp of the court were never excelled before or\nsince, and the control of the administrative machinery by the Fujiwara\nfamily became completed. The growth of the Buddhist church was in no\nsmall measure due to two remarkable priests, Saich\u014d and K\u016bkai, both of\nwhom studied in China the profoundest doctrines of Buddhism and gained\nfor themselves a great reputation. Saich\u014d founded the sect called\nTendai, and built the celebrated temple Enryaku-ji, at Hiyei-zan, to\nguarantee the imperial palace against maleficent influences from the\nnortheast. K\u016bkai founded the Shingon sect, and built the not less famous\ntemple of Kongobu-ji, at K\u014dya-san. Other new sects were also founded by\nother priests. The earlier teaching of the identity of Buddha and the\nShint\u014d deities was further extended by Saich\u014d and K\u016bkai, who taught that\nthe Buddha was the one and only divine being, and that all the gods were\nmanifestations of him. On that basis they established a new doctrine the\ntenets of which mingled Shint\u014dism and Buddhism inextricably. It was\nowing to the spread of this doctrine that it became a not uncommon\noccurrence to find Buddhist relics in a Shint\u014d shrine, or a Shint\u014d image\nin a Buddhist temple, and the names of Shint\u014d deities were confused with\nBuddhist titles. Buddhist priests wandered everywhere throughout the\nland preaching their doctrine and founding temples on choice sites, on\nhigh mountains or in deep dells.\n\nTo this propagandism music lent its aid, for the melody of the Buddhist\nchants touched the heart of the people. Devotees constantly grew in\nnumber. Many of the highest personages in the land spent great sums upon\nthe building of temples; the consort of the Emperor Saga, for example,\nconstructed Danrin-ji, and the Prime Minister Michinaga erected H\u014dj\u014d-ji.\nEven in case of sickness, litanies and religious rites took the place of\nmedicine before the science of the latter had been developed, and\nagainst all calamities of nature prayer was regarded as a talisman. It\nis easy to conceive that, under such circumstances, Buddhism came to\nexercise greater sway than even the ordinances of the sovereign himself.\nIt should not be imagined, however, that Shint\u014d was completely\nforgotten. Overshadowed by Buddhism as it was, it did not yet lose its\nsway. Thus we find the Emperor Saga dedicating a fane at the Kamo\nshrine, and the Emperor Seiwa establishing a place for the worship of\nIwashimizu Hachiman at Otoko-yama. Imperial visits to these two shrines\nwere not infrequent. Above all at the celebrated Shingu shrine in Ise,\nthe Shint\u014d rites were kept free from all admixture of extraneous creeds.\n\nFrom the days of Kwammu downward, the sovereigns in succession\nencouraged learning. The university in Ky\u014dto and the public schools in\nthe provinces were in a flourishing condition, and many private schools\nsprang into existence. The patronage of great nobles was munificently\nexercised in the cause of education. Further, great numbers of students\nwere engaged in compiling not only the history of the empire, but also\nmany other works of a general character, so that learning occupied a\nhigh place in popular esteem. But unfortunately the scholarship of the\nage drifted into superficialities of style to the neglect of practical\nuses. Writers of verses applied themselves to imitating Chinese poets,\nand writers of prose thought only of constructing their phrases in such\na manner that combinations of four ideograms should in regular\nalternation be followed by combinations of six--a form of composition\nknown as the _Shirokuheirei_ (four-and-six order). But despite this\nslavish adherence to valueless forms, a notable literary achievement has\nto be placed to the credit of the era; namely, the elaboration of the\nsyllabaries, the _hira-kana_ and the _kata-kana_. The first syllabary\never used in Japan had been the _many\u014d-gana_, in which the Chinese\nideograms were used phonetically with little attention to their original\nmeaning. But to write a Chinese ideogram for each syllable of a Japanese\nword involved much labor, since in many cases a single ideogram was\ncomposed of numerous strokes and dots. The difficulty was gradually\nlessened during the Nara epoch by the simplification of Chinese\ncharacters to such an extent that only a rudimentary skeleton of each\nideogram was symbolically used to represent its sound. The syllables\nthus obtained were arranged in a table of fifty sounds, constituting the\n_kata-kana_. Thenceforth, instead of the pain of committing to memory\nthousands of ideograms, and employing them with no little toil, it\nbecame possible to record the most complex thoughts by the aid of fifty\nsimple symbols. Nevertheless, since the nation had come to regard\nChinese literature as the classics of learning, scholars were still\ncompelled to use Chinese ideograms and to follow Chinese rules of\ncomposition, so that the cursive forms of the Chinese characters became\nthe recognized script of educated men. These cursive characters\npossessed one advantage: they were capable of considerable abbreviation\nwithin certain limits. Naturally, the facility they offered in that\nrespect was more and more utilized, until at length their forms were\nmodified to comparative simplicity. When the great prelate K\u016bkai\ncomposed, for mnemonic purposes, the rhyming syllabary which comprised\nall the necessary sounds without repetition, the forms of the simplified\ncharacters may be considered to have finally crystallized into the\nsyllabary known as the _hira-kana_.\n\nThe invention of these two systems of _kana_ syllabaries gave a powerful\nimpetus to the growth of prose writing. Many varieties of composition,\nfictions, diaries, travels, and fugitive sketches, were added to the\nliterature of the time. But as men who aspired to the title of scholar\ncontinued to write in Chinese ideograms, the domain of Japanese prose\nwas occupied, almost exclusively, by women. It is recorded of the\nEmperor Ichij\u014d (987-1012 A.\u00a0D.) that he boasted that, although his own\nabilities did not entitle him to wear the crown, his reign was not less\nrich in talented subjects than had been the reigns of even Daigo and\nMurakami, historically regarded as the best sovereigns of the whole\nimperial line. The boast was not unwarranted, for in that era flourished\ngreat writers of both sexes, the charm and grace of whose diction have\nbeen vainly imitated by later generations. Of these, Mura-saki-shikibu\nespecially attracts attention, on account of her celebrated work, the\n\"_Genji-monogatari_,\" a romance in fifty-four volumes. Sei-Sh\u014dnagon's\nname is remembered for her \"_Makura-no-s\u014dshi_,\" as peerless a production\nin literary sketches as was the \"_Genji-monogatari_\" in fiction.\n\nEven more energy was expended on the production of verses than on prose\nwriting. In the last part of the ninth century after almost a century of\nthe sway of Chinese poetry, the tide flowed once more in the direction\nof Japanese verses, and they soon engrossed the minds of the noble\nclasses. Beginning with the \"_Kokinsh\u016b_,\" poems compiled by imperial\norder by Ki-no-Tsurayuki, himself a celebrated poet, no less than seven\npoetical compilations were made by order of the sovereigns during the\nrest of the Hei-an epoch, to which were still later added others to the\nnumber of twenty-one. The art of versification made a wonderful\nprogress, but the rustic vigor and grandeur of the poems of the\n\"_Many\u014d-sh\u016b_\" gave place to tricks of phraseology and flowers of speech\nin the later poetry. Nor were poems with many stanzas approved any\nlonger, for it became the pride of the later poets to embody clever wit\nand hidden charm in the space of thirty-one syllables. Thus poetry was\nstunted, and literary terms and the speech of everyday life\nunnecessarily separated each from the other.\n\nAs was so clearly reflected in poetry, the rude and unpolished but\nfrugal and industrious habits of the Nara age disappeared as the Hei-an\nepoch grew older. Instead of vigor and simple strength, luxury and\neffeminate gaud became the fashion. Society grew more and more enervated\nand self-indulgent. The metropolis was the center of magnificence and\nthe focus of pleasure. Reference has already been made to the\nspaciousness and grandeur of the imperial palace. The princes and great\nnobles were scarcely less superbly housed, every aristocratic dwelling\nconsisting of a number of artistically arranged buildings. There had\nalso grown up among nobles and men of affluence the habit of choosing in\nthe suburbs some spot noted for scenic charms, and there building for\nthemselves retreats on which all the artistic and decorative resources\nof the time were lavished. As for the imperial palace, however, from the\ntime when it was destroyed by a conflagration (960 A.\u00a0D.), it suffered a\nsteady diminution in size and splendor, whereas the mansions of the\nministers of the crown grew constantly larger and more magnificent,\ntheir inmates wearing gorgeous garments of rich brocades and elaborately\nembroidered silks. Officials, courtiers, and their families emulated one\nanother in the richness of their apparel. When they went abroad, they\nrode in carriages resplendent with gold and silver. By and by, the\nactive discharge of official and administrative functions began to be\ndespised by the higher classes, military training and the rude exercises\nof arms falling into especial disfavor. Thus it fell out that the nobles\nof the court, having abundant leisure, were enabled to devote their time\nto literary culture, the elaboration of etiquette, and the pursuit of\nluxurious pleasures. In the imperial court, at pleasant times in the\nfair seasons, on fine spring mornings or under the soft moonlight of\nautumn, gatherings were held at which the guests vied with one another\nin making music and composing poetry. There were also specially\nappointed festive occasions: as, for example, entertainments in April\n(third month of the old calendar) when wine-cups were floated down\nstream; or in February (first month of the old calendar) when young\npines growing on the hills or in the fields were pulled up by the roots;\nor in the fall, to view the changing tints of the maples; the most\naristocratic of all these festivities being one in which three\npicturesquely-decorated boats were launched upon some river or lake and\nfilled exclusively with persons who excelled in some one of the \"three\naccomplishments,\" namely, Chinese poetry, Japanese poetry, or music. In\nthe reign of the Emperor Uda five f\u00eate days were established: New Year's\nDay, the third of the third month, the fifth of the fifth month, the\nseventh of the seventh month, and the ninth of the ninth month; to which\nwere also added the festival of the \"late moonlight\" (13th of the ninth\nmonth), and the festival of \"the last chysanthemums.\"\n\nOf games played in-doors checkers (_go_) and a kind of dice\n(_sugo-roku_) were much in vogue; while the favorite outdoor sports were\nfoot-ball, polo, and hawking, together with horse-racing and equestrian\narchery. At wine-feasts, various kinds of songs, some classical, some\npopular, were chanted with dancing, and Chinese and Japanese stanzas\nwere composed and sung. From the end of the eleventh century personal\nadornment was carried so far that even men began to imitate women in the\nmatter of painting their eye-brows and blackening their teeth, much as\nthough they sought to disguise themselves in the likeness of the puppets\nset up at the festival of the third month. Not inaptly did the wits of\nthe time dub these mummers \"lunar courtiers,\" or \"elegants from\ncloud-land.\" On such occasions of festival and sport, men and women of\nnoble rank mixed freely, and laxity of morals ensued. The ceremony of\nmarriage had been duly established, but wives still continued to live in\ntheir own houses, where they received the visits of their husbands. In\nshort, the gratification of the senses was the first object of the time,\nand if men thought of anything more serious, it was only the building\nand endowment of a temple where prayers might be said and litanies sung\nfor the prosperity of themselves and their children in this world and\ntheir happiness in a future state.\n\nAll these circumstances should be viewed only in conjunction with the\nprogress of the political power of the Fujiwara family. The great deeds\nof Kamatari and the scarcely less distinguished services of his son\nFuhito established the renown of the family, and in the marriage of the\nEmperor Sh\u014dmu with a daughter of Fuhito we have the first instance of a\nprocedure which afterward became common, namely the elevation of a\nsubject to the position of imperial consort. A daughter of another\nFujiwara, Fuyutsugu, became the consort of the Emperor Nimmy\u014d, and bore\nhim a son who afterward ascended the throne as Montoku. Thus Fuyutsugu\nbecame the reigning sovereign's grandfather on the mother's side, and\nthe Fujiwara family occupied a position of transcendent power. This\nemperor married the daughter of Yoshifusa, his mother's elder brother,\nand had by her a son, who when only eight months old, was declared heir\napparent, and ascended the throne in his ninth year under the name of\nSeiwa, so that in two succeeding generations one of the sovereign's\ngrandfathers was a Fujiwara. Nor had there been another instance of the\nscepter coming into the hands of such a young ruler. From Yoshifusa,\nalso, began the custom of appointing a Fujiwara to the post of _daj\u014d\ndaijin_ (chief minister of state), a post which not only was the highest\nand most respected under the sovereign, but also as a rule had been\nreserved for an imperial prince of unusual virtue and ability. Failing\nsuch a candidate, it had even been left vacant. Furthermore, owing to\nthe extreme youth of the Emperor Seiwa, his grandfather Yoshifusa was\nappointed regent. The title of regent (_sessh\u014d_) dates from that time.\nThe imperial authority now passed virtually into the hands of the\nFujiwara family. Seiwa abdicated after a reign of twenty-one years, and\nwas succeeded by Y\u014dzei, then in his tenth year only, Mototsune, adopted\nson of Yoshifusa, holding the offices of chief minister of state and\nregent. As the emperor grew older, he became addicted to pleasure and\ngave evidence of vicious tendencies.\n\nMototsune, having taken counsel of all the ministers, deposed the\nsovereign and placed K\u014dk\u014d on the throne in his stead. This was the first\ninstance of an emperor being dethroned by a subject, but evil as such an\nact was in itself, its motive in the case of Mototsune being untainted\nby selfish ambition, he has not incurred censure either from the men of\nhis time or from historians. The Emperor K\u014dk\u014d, being fifty-six years of\nage when he ascended the throne, Mototsune resigned the regency, but the\nsovereign was pleased to make a special rule that all affairs of state\nshould be conveyed to himself through the ex-regent. The latter's office\nwas consequently called _kwampaku_ (signifying one who receives reports\nprior to their transmission to the sovereign), and it became thenceforth\ncustomary to confer this post on a statesman who had resigned the\nregency. In effect, the _sessh\u014d_, or regent, was supposed to manage the\nadministration during the minority of an emperor, while the _kwampaku_\ndischarged the same functions after the sovereign had attained his\nmajority. The difference became nominal when the descendants of\nYoshifusa and Mototsune made these two posts permanent and hereditary in\ntheir line. It seemed, indeed, as though all the highest offices of\nstate had become the exclusive perquisite of that omnipotent family, no\nothers being eligible except princes of the blood. No less marked were\nthe marital relations between the imperial house and the Fujiwara, for\nonly a daughter of the latter could become the sovereign's consort, so\nthat every sovereign had a Fujiwara for his mother.\n\nThe power of the puissant family met a temporary check under the Emperor\nUda (893-898), who selected Sugawara-no-Michizane as minister. Michizane\nwas a descendant of Nomi-no-Sukune, and did not belong to the Fujiwara\nfamily. Reputed for high literary, calligraphic, and artistic skill, he\nalso possessed a profound knowledge of politics. It was his fortune to\nmanage all administrative affairs jointly with the young and keen\nTokihira, son of Fujiwara Mototsune. The Emperor Uda, who took the\ntonsure soon afterward, left instructions to his successor Daigo, then a\nboy of thirteen, to consult Michizane in all important affairs of the\nstate. Tokihira filled the office of minister of the left (the highest\nadministrative post after that of chief minister of state then vacant),\nand Michizane was minister of the right. With the exception of Michizane\nand Kibi-no-Makibi, no man of the middle class had ever held such an\nimportant office. The ex-emperor would have had Michizane raised still\nhigher, and urged the reigning sovereign in that sense. But this design\nprecipitated Tokihira's resolve to contrive the downfall of a man whose\ngreat reputation with the nation and marked favor at court dimmed the\nprestige of the Fujiwara family. Michizane was also an object of keen\njealousy to Minamoto-no-Hikaru, a son of the Emperor Nimmy\u014d, who held\nthe office of _dainagon_ (vice-minister), as well as to\nFujiwara-no-Sadakuni, who like Hikaru, was incomparably superior to\nMichizane in lineage, but inferior to him in official position. These\nmen conspired against Michizane, and conveyed to the sovereign a false\ncharge that the minister of the right was plotting to depose him and\nplace his younger brother, Michizane's son-in-law, Prince Tokiyo, on the\nthrone. Daigo believed the accusation, and reduced Michizane to the head\nof the Kiush\u016b local government, a position which it had become customary\nto fill with disgraced officials of the imperial court. The order\namounted in effect to a sentence of exile. The ex-emperor did everything\nin his power to save Michizane, but in vain. Hikaru succeeded to the\noffice of minister of the right. In all this affair the members of the\nFujiwara family left nothing undone to sweep away every obstacle to\ntheir own supremacy. Treating as opponents all that did not take active\npart with them, they contrived to have them involved in the disgrace of\nMichizane. The exiled minister died after two years of banishment. His\npopularity had been so great that the nation was filled with grief for\nhis unmerited sufferings, and when, after his decease, the partisans of\nTokihira died one after another, and a series of calamities occurred in\nthe capital, people did not hesitate to regard these evils as\nretribution inflicted by Heaven for the injustice that had been wrought.\nSubsequently Michizane received the posthumous honor of the first class\nof the first rank and the post of chief minister of state, and posterity\nbuilt a shrine in Kitano to his memory, where he is worshiped to this\nday as the tutelary saint of learning, under the canonized name of\nKitano-no-Tenjin.\n\nAfter the exile of Michizane, the power of the Fujiwara family grew\nsteadily. During a period of about a century and a half after that\nevent, the administration was virtually in their hands.\nFujiwara-no-Tadahira occupied the post of chief minister of state, while\nhis sons, Saneyori and Morosuke, held the offices of minister of the\nleft and minister of the right respectively, the three highest posts in\nthe administration being thus filled simultaneously by a father and his\ntwo sons. Among the descendants of these three nobles, those of the\nlast-named, Morosuke, attained the greatest prosperity. It has been\nalready noted that the Fujiwara ministers always contrived to have the\nsovereign choose his consort from among their daughters. Nay more, when\na son was born of such a union, they had him brought up in their own\nhouse, and when he ascended the throne, the Fujiwara minister who was\nhis grandfather became either regent or _kwampaku_, was recognized as\nthe head of the Fujiwara family, and received a large grant of state\nland. Under these circumstances the choice of an imperial consort or the\nnomination of an heir apparent being synonymous with the acquisition of\ncomplete control over administrative and financial affairs, the branches\nof the Fujiwara family often intrigued and fought among themselves to\nsecure the great prize. Michinaga, youngest son of Kaneiye, was a man of\nremarkable strength of purpose and tact. He held the office of\n_kwampaku_ during the reigns of three emperors, Ichij\u014d, Sanj\u014d, and\nGoichij\u014d; his three daughters became the consorts of three successive\nsovereigns; he was grandfather of a reigning emperor and an heir\napparent at the same time, and his power and affluence far surpassed\nthose of the imperial house itself. To this great noble every official\npaid court, except Fujiwara-no-Sanesuke, who maintained his independence\nand was consequently relied on by the emperor. It is on record that\nMichinaga once composed a stanza the purport of which was that all the\nworld seemed to have been created for his uses, and that every desire he\nfelt was satisfied as completely as the full moon is perfectly rounded.\nIn truth the power of the Fujiwara family culminated in his days. A\ncontemporary writer described the conditions of the time in a work for\nwhich he found no title more appropriate than \"the Story of Grandeur\"\n(\"_Eigwa Monogatari_\"). With Michinaga the power of the Fujiwara may be\nsaid to have reached its zenith, for although his sons Yorimichi and\nNorimichi became _kwampaku_ in succession and retained immense\ninfluence, the gradual decline of the family really began from that\ntime.\n\nWhy the overwhelming power of the Fujiwara should have waned may only be\nunderstood as we observe the conditions of local administration. Within\nKy\u014dto reigned luxury and pomp, but without it, unrest and\ndiscontentment. The principal cause of this sharp contrast between the\ncapital and country was the inevitable and utter failure of the system\nof equal land allotment upon which the great Taikwa reformation had been\nconstructed. Uncultivated lands, however, were suffered to remain in the\npossession of local officials and farmers who reclaimed them. Originally\nthe term of service for the governor of a province (_kuni_) was fixed at\nfour years, but in the reign of the Empress K\u014dken it was extended to\nsix. Reappointment was generally an object of keen desire to these\nofficials. They employed every possible means to compass it, since to\nremain in administrative control of a province for a long period\nsignified opportunities of appropriating extensive lands and ultimately\nacquiring large territorial possessions. In the case of the headman of a\ndistrict (_k\u014dri_), the office was originally held for life, but even\nthat limit soon fell into neglect, and the post was handed down from\nfather to son through many generations. To check the abuses arising out\nof such a state of affairs, itinerant inspectors were appointed in the\nreign of the Empress Gensho, who were chosen from among the ablest of\nthe provincial governors. In a report addressed by one of them to the\nthrone in 762, it is declared that \"No such thing as justice is now\nexecuted by any provincial governor in the realm.\" From this time on,\nprovincial governors not only continued to tread the old wonted paths,\nbut their selfish arbitrariness became more unbridled in proportion as\nthe prestige of the administration in the capital grew feebler and the\nofficial organization more lax.\n\nNor was the illegal practice of land-appropriation confined to rural\ndistricts, for even in the metropolis men began to obtain territorial\npossessions. As the living in Ky\u014dto grew more and more luxurious, and it\nbecame difficult for the princes and higher officials to maintain their\ndignity by means of their regular salaries and allowances, which were\npaid in kind but seldom in land, they set themselves to reclaim\nextensive tracts of waste lands. Such lands were called _sh\u014dyen_, a term\noriginally limited to lands granted to princes and ministers of state\nfor the purpose of defraying expenditures incurred in connection with\ntheir positions, but now extended so as to apply also to land reclaimed\nand appropriated by these nobles. Even as early as the reigns of Kwammu\nand Saga the area of such estates was very great. The system of\nperiodical redistribution had in the meantime fallen into desuetude.\nPeople were often forced to sell their lands or were evicted for their\ndebts. It was in vain to prohibit by edict after edict the\nmonopolization of land by the wealthy classes. Cunning people even\nevaded the public obligations devolving on landowners by nominally\ntransferring their lands to powerful nobles or to temples, and\nthemselves taking the position of stewards or superintendents. In that\ncapacity they were called either \"intendants\" or \"retainers,\" the\nostensible holders of the land being known as \"landlords.\" By degrees\nall the fertile districts and all the newly reclaimed lands were in that\nmanner absorbed into the estates of the great nobles or of the temples,\nand since they were thus exempted from the control of the provincial\ngovernors as well as from the necessity of paying taxes, not only the\npower of the local authorities, but also the revenues of the central\ngovernment gradually suffered diminution.\n\nDuring the reign of the Emperor Kwammu the plan was inaugurated of\nreducing to the rank of subjects and giving family names to such of the\nimperial princes as were of inferior descent on the mother's side.\nKwammu's son, Saga, who had so many children that the revenue of the\nimperial household did not suffice to maintain them, followed the\nprecedent established by his father, giving the name Minamoto to\nseveral of his sons. Thenceforth the device passed into a custom, and\nimperial princes were frequently appointed to official positions in the\ncentral or local government under the family names of Minamoto or Taira.\nThose who obtained the posts of provincial governors acquired large\ninfluence in the districts administered by them, their descendants\nbecoming military chiefs with great followings of relatives and\nretainers. The Minamoto clan comprised no less than fourteen families,\namong them the descendants of the Emperor Seiwa being the most numerous\nand important. It was from this clan that the great Yoritomo, the first\nfeudal ruler of Japan, subsequently sprang. The Taira, on the other\nhand, consisted of four families, principally descendants of the Emperor\nKwammu. To them belonged the notorious tyrant Kiyomori, of whose career\nwe shall soon be told.\n\nThe significance of the rise of the two clans, Minamoto and Taira, lies\nin the fact that they succeeded in gradually controlling the military\nforces of the nation, on the one hand, and, on the other, holding a\ngreat share of the landed estates of the country. The process of\nland-appropriation was similar to the one already described. The manner\nin which the force of arms passed from the state into the hands of the\nprivate clans must now be explained. Under the elaborate system of the\nTaik\u014d laws, garrisons of fixed strength were stationed in all the\nprovinces, and in the metropolis were guards of five kinds. Men for\nservice in the garrisons and guards were levied by conscription from\namong the people, those upon whom the lot fell being required to join\nthe nearest garrison, while a part were sent to Kiush\u016b to defend the\nwestern coast, and another part, to the guardposts in Ky\u014dto. Equestrian\narchery, the use of the sword, and the manipulation of long spears, were\nthe arts taught to the soldiers, and for the defense of the coasts\ncatapults also were used. The entire military organization was imposing\nand complete, but its real value was questionable, from the beginning.\nThe metropolitan troops grew more and more effeminate as years of peace\nsucceeded each other. Nor were the provincial forces of more service. As\ntime went by, bandits and marauders pillaged the provinces in the\ninterior, while the coasts of Nankaid\u014d and Ch\u016bgoku were infested by\npirates. It was under these circumstances that, early in the ninth\ncentury, a new bureau called the _keb\u00fcshi-ch\u014d_ with extensive police and\nadministrative powers, was created in Ky\u014dto, which soon began to\ndominate over other offices and whose branches were later established\nin every province for local purposes. A century later it was found\nnecessary to appoint inspector-generals, _\u014dry\u014dshi_, for the eastern\nprovinces, which were particularly restless. In the hands of these new\nofficials, then,--the central and local _keb\u00fcshi_ and the eastern\n_\u014dry\u014dshi_,--rested the real powers which neither rank nor title could\nresist. The new, vigorous clans of Minamoto and Taira eagerly sought\nafter these offices, and succeeded more and more completely, as time\nwent on, not only in controlling them, but also in acquiring a military\ninfluence far larger than they at first represented.\n\nAs local unrest grew, people who had armed themselves either for defense\nor for aggrandisement now came with their arms and land under the wings\nof the powerful clans, and became their \"men.\" The leaders of the latter\nreceived them, fed them, and made with them a personal contract of\nmutual loyalty and protection. Either with the chivalrous relations\nbetween master and follower or with the compact and efficient\norganization of their society, the outside world had nothing else to\ncompare. The feudal formation thus created was bound to transfigure the\norganization of the nation. The leaders who possessed large numbers of\nmen and wide tracts of land were called _daimy\u014d_ (\"great name\"), and\ntheir followers, _iyenoko_ (\"servitors\") or _r\u014dd\u014d_ (\"retainers\"). The\ngeneral name for the man of the sword was _samurai_, or \"one who\nserves.\" As the military class increased in numbers, it became expedient\nto distinguish one house from another, and many appellations were\nconsequently formed by suffixing to the name of a clan the name of the\nplace where the person resided or of the hereditary office which he\nheld. In this way originated many of the house names now used in Japan.\nAt the same time, almost all the provinces were parceled out among the\nmilitary class, especially the eastern provinces, which were the\nheadquarters of the Minamoto. It is true that appointment of provincial\ngovernors continued to be made, but their functions were purely nominal,\nthe so-called \"governors\" often idly remaining in the capital. The\ncontrol of local administration now rested with the real holders of the\nland.\n\nA few events illustrative of the conditions we have described may here\nbe cited. In 939 a family of the Taira clan raised arms in the eastern\nprovinces against the imperial authority. Taira-no-Takamochi, a\ngreat-grandson of the Emperor Kwammu, had been appointed vice-governor\nof the province of Kazusa. There his family gradually grew in numbers\nand influence, some of them becoming provincial governors. Among\nTakamochi's grandsons was a daring but fierce soldier, Masakado. Though\nof imperial descent, he obeyed the custom of the time, namely, that\nevery _samurai_ must obtain a livelihood by entering the service of the\nFujiwara. Masakado became a vassal of Fujiwara-no-Tadahira, through\nwhose influence he hoped to obtain the office of _keb\u00fcshi_. But his\naspiration was not satisfied, and being incensed by failure, he returned\nto the province of Shim\u014dsa, gathered a number of disaffected warriors to\nhis standard, and made organized attacks upon the governors of the\nneighboring provinces. He established his headquarters at Ishii, in the\ndistrict of Sashima, nominated certain of his followers to be officers\nof his court, after the model of the governmental system of Ky\u014dto, and\non the strength of being descended from a sovereign, proclaimed himself\nemperor. In the whole course of Japanese history this is the only\ninstance of a rebellion directed against the throne. Simultaneously with\nthis disturbance in the eastern provinces, Fujiwara-no-Sumitomo, who\nheld the third post in the government of Iyo province in the island of\nShikoku, also rebelled. These two rebellions shook the whole empire. Yet\nthe imperial court remained for a long time ignorant of the dangers that\nwere impending. When finally the news reached Ky\u014dto, it caused much\nconsternation. A general was quickly dispatched against the rebels in\nthe east, but before his arrival Masakado's cousin, Taira-no-Sadamori,\nand Fujiwara-no-Hidesato, the \u014dry\u014dshi of Shimotsuke, defeated and killed\nMasakado. In the west, Sumitomo was able for a brief period to retain\nthe ascendency, but he too was ultimately defeated and taken prisoner by\nOno-no-Yoshifuru and Minamoto-no-Tsunemoto, who had been sent against\nhim. Tsunemoto was a grandson of the Emperor Seiwa and founder of the\nrenowned clan of Minamoto. The precedent thus established, namely, that\nof one military clan applying itself to quell the rebellion of another,\nwas followed in after years, with the inevitable result that the\nmilitary clans became the chief factors in the state.\n\nNinety years later, Taira-no-Tadatsune, vice-governor of the province of\nKazusa, forcibly took possession of the provinces of Kazusa and Shim\u014dsa,\nbut was defeated by Minamoto-no-Yorinobu, a grandson of Tsunemoto. Soon\nafterward local chiefs raised an insurrection in the remote northern\nprovince of Mutsu, and maintained their authority for nine years. This\nwas followed soon after by a three-year revolt of the Kiyowara family,\nwhich threw the provinces of Mutsu and Dewa into a state of tumult.\nThese troubles were quelled, respectively, by Yoriyoshi, the son, and\nYoshiiye, the grandson, of Yorinobu. Thus the influence of the Minamoto\nclan became paramount among the military men of the eastern provinces.\n\nAll this while, courtiers and officials of Ky\u014dto despised administrative\nduties, whether civil or military, so that in the event of a disturbance\nor of a feud among themselves, they were driven to rely upon the\nmilitary classes, thus involuntarily but surely strengthening the\ninfluence of the men whom they professed to contemn. Although the\nFujiwara remained in Ky\u014dto and filled all the important posts in the\ngeneral government, their sway was only apparent. The reins of state\naffairs were in reality held by the military classes dispersed\nthroughout the provinces. There were also certain singular circumstances\nat court which not only hastened this revolution, but also brought the\nmilitary forces from the provinces into a clash in the streets of Ky\u014dto.\nThese circumstances, which we shall briefly describe below, were in the\nmain owing to two causes, namely, the undue wealth and power of the\nBuddhist priests, and the struggle for power among different political\nfactions in the palace. The former was largely due to the devotion of\nthe imperial house, particularly the Emperor Shirakawa (1073-1087), who\ngreatly depleted the treasury by erecting thousands of temples and\nimages, and ordering the performance of rites and the giving of alms\nwith unprecedented profusion. The priests, who had already grown rich\nand powerful, began to be engaged in quarrels among themselves and with\nthe outside world, for which purpose the greater monasteries maintained\nconsiderable military forces.\n\nThese sacerdotal soldiers were called _s\u014dhei_. The principle of\nmaintaining them was adopted at many temples, but nowhere did they\nexhibit such truculence as in the case of Enryaku-ji near Ky\u014dto. When\nthe lord high abbot of a temple was appointed, it was the custom that\nthe priests of the temple, if they objected to the appointment, or if,\nsubsequently, they had cause of complaint against his ministration,\nshould appeal to the imperial court for his removal. On such occasions,\nit became customary for the complainants to wear armor and carry bow\nand spear when they submitted their grievance. They did not shrink even\nfrom attacking the residence of the prime minister. During the reign of\nShirakawa, the military priests developed such lawless independence that\non more than one occasion they entered Ky\u014dto in turbulent force,\ndragging with them sacred cars, the sight of which restrained the hand\nof the martial defenders of the court. Not only against the government,\nbut also among themselves, the temples openly used arms and caused\nbloodshed. It was said that there were found among these fighting\npriests men originally belonging to the military class, who, failing to\nobtain promotion in the regular routine of feudal administration,\nadopted the cowl as a means of working out their ambitious designs. This\nstate of things aggrieved the Emperor Shirakawa, but he appears to have\nbeen unable to check it. On one occasion, lamenting the arbitrary\nconduct of the Buddhists, he said: \"There are but three things in my\ndominions that do not obey me: the waters of the Kamo River, the dice of\nthe 'sugoroku' game, and the priests of Buddha.\" Finally, the sovereign\nwas driven to invite the Minamoto clan to defend him against the\nrebellious proceedings of the priests, and from that time dates an era\nof feuds between the followers of religion and those of the sword.\n\nIt was the same Emperor Shirakawa who instituted the peculiar system of\nthe Camera administration (_Insei_), which powerfully tended to break\ndown the last remains of the Taikwa reformation. After a reign of\nfourteen years he resigned in 1087, only to retain the administrative\npower in his hands, with his special court and special ministers. The\nreigning emperor and his government had few functions to discharge, as\nthe entire control of the state affairs rested in the Camera of the\nex-emperor. Shirakawa sat in the Camera till 1130, and was succeeded for\ntwenty-eight years by the ex-Emperor Toba. All this while Buddhist\nsoldiers behaved with the greatest lawlessness, constantly disturbing\nthe peace of the capital, and the military class simultaneously became\nturbulent and vicious.\n\nAmong these scenes of tumult and violence, the court itself was torn by\ndisputes and its corruption became a subject of public scandal. Toba had\nmany female favorites, of whom Bifukumonin enjoyed the largest share of\nhis affections. Being on bad terms with his eldest son, the reigning\nsovereign, Toba took advantage of the birth of a son by Bifukumonin to\nbring about the abdication of the emperor and cause his favorite's child\nto succeed to the throne at the age of two years. This was the Emperor\nKonoye. His uncle, Fujiwara-no-Tadamichi, was appointed regent. The\nex-Emperor Sutoku, being still young, was much incensed at having been\nobliged to abdicate, and when Konoye died after a reign of fourteen\nyears, Sutoku desired ardently that his son, Prince Shigehito, should\nsucceed to the throne. The Regent Tadamichi had a brother named\nYorinaga, and their father's partial treatment of him had produced a\nfeud between the brothers.\n\nYorinaga, active, learned, and able, then held the post of second\nminister of state, and strongly supported the design of the ex-Emperor\nSutoku. Bifukumonin and Tadamichi, on their side, acting in concert with\nToba, opposed the accession of Prince Shigehito, and alleged in\nobjection that the untimely death of the late Emperor Konoye had\nresulted from sorcery practiced by Sutoku. The candidate to whom they\ngave their support was Goshirakawa, brother of Konoye, who was counted a\nyouth of inferior capacity. Sutoku's anger against these proceedings was\nintense. Being informed just then of the death of Toba, he proceeded to\nthe latter's palace, but the guards refused to admit him, pretending\nthat the deceased had desired his exclusion. This insult incensed Sutoku\nbeyond endurance. Repairing to the residence of Yorinaga, he took\ncouncil with him, and finally, retiring to the Shirakawa palace,\ndeclared open war against his opponents, being bravely succored by\nMinamoto-no-Tameyoshi, Taira-no-Tadamasa, and their followers.\nBifukumonin and Tadamichi placed the young Emperor Goshirakawa in the\nHigashi Sanj\u014d palace. They counted among their chief allies Yoshitomo,\nthe eldest son of Tameyoshi, Minamoto-no-Yorimasa, and Kiyomori, the\nnephew of Tadamasa. One sanguinary engagement sufficed to break the\npower of Sutoku. He became a priest, and was ultimately exiled to the\nisland of Sanuki. Yorinaga died of an accidentally inflicted\narrow-wound, and Tameyoshi and Tadamasa, together with many other men of\nnote, were slain. The name of the era being thereafter changed to H\u014dgen,\nthis affair was spoken of by posterity as the H\u014dgen Insurrection. The\nbattle that ended the long struggle lasted for only one day, but its\ncharacter and circumstances can never be forgotten. It was veritably an\ninternecine fight; Sutoku against his brother Goshirakawa; Tadamichi\nagainst his brother Yorinaga; Tameyoshi against his son Yoshitomo;\nTadamasa against his nephew Kiyomori. Men spoke in after years of this\nunnatural contest as the battle that destroyed human relations and\nignored all the principles of morality.\n\nThe H\u014dgen disturbance had not long been settled when fresh troubles\narose. Among the councilors of state at that era, Fujiwara-no-Michinori,\nwho had stood high in the estimation of the Emperor Goshirakawa, was a\nconspicuously able politician. Even after the accession of the Emperor\nNij\u014d, Michinori continued to enjoy the imperial confidence. But he had\nmany enemies. In connection with some private affair he had given deep\numbrage to Fujiwara-no-Nobuyori, an official holding the office of\n_ch\u016bnagon keb\u00fcshi_ (councilor of state and chief police official), who\nhad been a favorite of the Emperor Goshirakawa after the latter's\nabdication. Minamoto-no-Yoshitomo also was disaffected. Believing that\nhis services in the H\u014dgen disturbance had been more meritorious than\nthose of Taira-no-Kiyomori, he nevertheless saw the latter rewarded with\nmuch greater liberality; and having offered his own daughter in marriage\nto a son of Michinori, the proposal had been abruptly declined,\nMichinori choosing Kiyomori's daughter in preference. Nobuyori and\nYoshitomo ultimately raised the standard of revolt, in the first year of\nthe Heiji era (1159 A.\u00a0D.), and having secured the co\u00f6peration of the\nex-Emperor Goshirakawa by intimidation, forced their way into the palace\nand obtained possession of the person of the reigning sovereign.\nNobuyori then procured for himself the posts of chief minister of state\nand generalissimo, promoted Yoshitomo, and caused Michinori to be put to\ndeath. The revolution was short-lived. Nobuyori had not administered the\naffairs of state for ten days before the emperor made his escape to the\nmansion of Taira-no-Kiyomori and the ex-emperor fled to the temple\nNinnaji. Thereupon Kiyomori with his son Shigemori attacked the\ninsurgents and utterly routed them. Nobuyori was captured and slain.\nYoshitomo succeeded in effecting his escape to Owari, but was finally\nput to death by the Taira adherents. All the other leaders of the\nrebellion and those who had prominently participated in it, were exiled.\nThis affair is known as the Heiji Insurrection. The power of the\nMinamoto clan had been greatly broken in the H\u014dgen disturbance, when\nTameyoshi and his followers fell, and the loss of Yoshitomo and his\nadherents in the Heiji trouble brought the great clan almost to\ncomplete ruin. Among the few of its scions who survived was Yoritomo,\nson of Yoshimoto. He was exiled to the eastern provinces, thence to\nemerge at a later date and win one of the greatest names in Japanese\nhistory.\n\nAfter the quelling of the Heiji disturbance, the Taira family attained\npre\u00ebminent prosperity and power. The fortunes of this great house had\nbeen materially advanced by Tadanori, a brave and able captain, who\nenjoyed the favor of the ex-Emperor Toba. His son Kiyomori, also a man\nof daring and decision, raised the family's prestige still higher by his\nservices at the H\u014dgen crisis, and carried it to its zenith by the\nconspicuous ability of his action in the Heiji disturbance. On the other\nhand, the rival family of Minamoto having been reduced to insignificance\nby the death of its chief, Yoshitomo, and by the events that immediately\nensued, the whole military power of the empire came into the hands of\nthe Taira. Kiyomori was promoted to the position of _gondainagon_\n(vice-councilor of state), an event that attracted much attention. The\nTaira family, though of imperial lineage, had been looked down upon by\nthe high court nobles on account of its military career, and it was\nconsidered a notable occurrence that Kiyomori should have been nominated\nto a post of such consequence. This was, in truth, the first instance of\na military noble's participation in the administration of state affairs,\nand it may be regarded as the dawn of an era when they were to fall\nentirely under military control.\n\nA sister of Kiyomori's wife bore a son to the ex-Emperor Goshirakawa.\nKiyomori's favor at court was so great that he succeeded in getting this\nchild named heir apparent, and he ultimately ascended the throne in 1169\nas the Emperor Takakura. Throughout his reign the ex-Emperor Goshirakawa\nwas the actual ruler. Meanwhile, Kiyomori had steadily risen in imperial\nfavor, until in 1167 he became chief minister of state. Shortly\nafterward, however, he resigned that post, and taking the tonsure,\nbecame a priest under the name of J\u014dkai. None the less he remained at\nhis previous place of residence, Rokuhara, in Ky\u014dto attending to the\nmanagement of state affairs as before. From that time dates the custom\nsubsequently followed by the military class of making Rokuhara the seat\nof administration.\n\nWhen the influence of Kiyomori reached its zenith, he conceived the\ndesign of securing permanent official supremacy for himself and his\nheirs by contriving that the consort of the sovereign should be taken\nfrom his family, as had been the habit in the case of the Fujiwara. In\npursuance of that project, he induced the emperor to marry his daughter.\nShigemori, his son, held the important offices of lord keeper of the\nprivy seal and generalissimo of the left, while almost the whole of his\nkinsmen and followers occupied prominent positions in the central and\nlocal government. The number of provinces over which the sway of the\nclan extended was more than thirty, and it came to be a saying of the\ntime that a person not belonging to the Taira family was no one. The\nmembers of the Fujiwara clan could not compete with those of the Taira.\nEven the regent, Motofusa, and the chief minister of state, Motomichi,\nsaw themselves reduced to comparative insignificance. Naturally such\nconspicuous ascendency caused offense in many quarters, and the Court\nCouncilor Fujiwara-no-Narichika, a favorite official of the ex-Emperor\nGoshirakawa, in combination with several others, elaborated a plot to\noverthrow the Taira sway. But the scheme was detected, and its authors\nand promoters were all put to death by order of Kiyomori. Having been\ninformed that the ex-emperor had countenanced the plot, Kiyomori\nconceived for him a strong hatred, which was greatly accentuated when,\non the death of the Taira chief's son Shigemori, the ex-emperor, after\nconsultation with Motofusa, caused the estates of the deceased nobleman\nto be confiscated. Too haughty to brook such a slight Kiyomori set out\nfrom his mansion at Fukuhara, and entering Ky\u014dto, caused the ex-emperor\nto be seized and confined in the Toba palace, and thirty-nine of his\nmajesty's high officials to be dismissed at the same time.\n\nToward the reigning sovereign the demeanor of the Taira was so arrogant\nand his methods so arbitrary, that the emperor finally abdicated in\nfavor of the crown prince, who reigned under the name of Antoku. This\nsovereign was the son of the retiring emperor and his mother was\nKiyomori's daughter, so that the Taira then stood toward the imperial\nhouse in the same relation as that formerly occupied by the Fujiwara,\nwith the tremendous difference, however, that the former also possessed\nthe whole military power of the time, which gave them unprecedented\ninfluence and supremacy. Nevertheless, even among the members of a\nfamily so puissant, there were to be found some feeble nobles who had no\nskill in military exercises nor could boast any accomplishment except\nthe art of composing stanzas, playing on musical instruments, or\npracticing some effeminate pastime.\n\nAmong the members of the Minamoto family at the time of which we write\nwas one Yorimasa, who, incensed by the arbitrary proceedings of the\nTaira officials, persuaded Prince Mochihito, son of the ex-Emperor\nGoshirakawa and brother-in-law of the Emperor Takakura, to form an\nalliance with the priests of Onj\u014d-ji and K\u014dfuku-ji, their object being\nto expel Kiyomori from court and to rescue the ex-emperor from his\nconfinement in the Toba palace. In 1180, the prince dispatched Yukiiye,\nyounger brother of the late Yoshitomo, to the remnants of the Minamoto\nin the eastern provinces, carrying an edict which summoned them to rise\nand overthrow the Taira family. Fortunately for the latter, the plot was\ndiscovered and at once suppressed. But the seed sown by this abortive\nrebellion proved beyond Kiyomori's control, for, in the same year, 1180,\nthe exile, Minamoto-no-Yoritomo, who was destined to become the founder\nof the feudal government of Japan, raised a force of troops in the small\nisland of Izu in obedience to the mandate of Prince Mochihito. Many\npartisans flocked to his standard from Kwant\u014d, the former seat of\nMinamoto influence. Almost simultaneously, another Minamoto chief,\nYoshinaka, also took the field in the prince's cause, his headquarters\nbeing at Kiso, in Shinano, where he collected a large body of soldiers.\nKiyomori lost no time in dispatching a powerful army against the rebels,\nbut his forces suffered defeat and were driven back. Henceforth, many\npuissant warriors of the Hokuriku region threw in their lot with the\nMinamoto, and the force at the latter's disposal assumed formidable\ndimensions. Even the great temples in the vicinity of the capital opened\ncommunications with the insurgents, which so exasperated Kiyomori that\nhe reduced the temples to ashes and confiscated all their lands. These\nextreme measures served to check temporarily the active exercise of\npriestly power, but did not affect the prestige of the Minamoto, whose\nstrength continued to grow rapidly. Kiyomori finally saw himself\ncompelled to relax the ex-emperor's confinement, and even to allow him\nto resume an active part in the administration of state affairs. But in\nthe year 1182 the great Taira chief was stricken by a fatal malady, and\nexpired after a brief illness. He was succeeded by his son Munemori, who\ndid not spare to direct all the strength of the clan against the\nMinamoto. But fortune shone on the latter's arms in several encounters,\nuntil, in 1183, Minamoto-no-Yoshinaka inflicted a signal defeat on the\nTaira forces in a pitched battle, and dividing his own army into two\nbodies, pushed, via the Tosan and Hokuriku routes, as far as the temple\nEnryaku-ji in the immediate vicinity of Ky\u014dto, where he was secretly\nvisited at night by the ex-Emperor Goshirakawa. The Emperor Antoku now\nfled westward, carrying with him the three insignia, and escorted by\nMunemori and the Taira forces. The imperial train reached Dazaifu, in\nKiush\u016b, where the Taira wielded great influence. Munemori was joined by\nall the principal warriors of the locality, and being further reinforced\nby many others from the island of Shikoku, found himself once more at\nthe head of a powerful army. In Ky\u014dto, however, another emperor was\nenthroned, whose coronation was conducted, for the first time in\nJapanese history, without the transfer of the insignia. There were thus\ntwo sovereigns simultaneously ruling, one at Ky\u014dto and the other in\nKiush\u016b.\n\n[Illustration: _THE ABDUCTION OF GOSHIRAKAWA, EMPEROR OF JAPAN,\nBY FUJIWARA-NO-NOBUYORI IN THE YEAR 1159 A. D._]\n\n _The illustrations or rather pictures made for the book \"Heiji\n Monogatari,\" i. e., \"Stories from the Year Heiji,\" are partially\n lost. The picture shown here is an illustration belonging to the\n chapter Sandjoden-Yakiuti (the destruction of the castle of\n Sandjoden by fire.) [At midnight of the ninth day of the twelfth\n month of the year Heiji (1159 A. D.) Fujiwara-no-Nobuyori\n surprised and attacked the castle Sandjoden (where the former\n Emperor Goshirakawa resided) with 500 cavalrymen under the\n General Minamoto-no-Yoshitomo. The Emperor in his fright\n attempted to escape, but Nobuyori, Yoshitomo, Mitsuyasu,\n Mitsumoto, and Suesane forced him to return in his carriage to\n the imperial palace.] Concerning the Monk Keion, who painted\n this picture, we possess very meager information, but it is\n hardly likely that he was born later than twenty years after the\n \"Heiji rebellion.\"\n\n Copied from the 14th number of the monthly \"Kokkura\" (Flora of\n the Land), published by order of the Society Kokkura-sha in\n Tokyo by Yamamoto and translated by Dr. Kitasato.\n\n As Dr. Kitasato adds, the disturbances of the year Heiji\n developed from the following causes: The Emperor Goshirakawa,\n who had reigned since 1156, abdicated the throne in favor of his\n little son Nijo (1159-1166), but as regent retained the\n government in his own hands, living until the year 1192. At this\n time two families of the highest nobility, Shinsei and Nobuyori,\n were in political opposition. Nobuyori, jealous because\n Goshirakawa showed preferences to Shinsei, attacked the\n ex-emperor in his castle of Sandjoden, brought him as prisoner\n into the imperial palace, and murdered his opponent Shinsei.\n This rising is known as the \"Heiji rebellion.\" The author of the\n \"Heiji Monogatari\" is supposed to be Hamura-Tokinaga, who lived\n in the thirteenth century A. D._\n\n[Illustration: JAPAN]\n\nThe forces of the Taira and the Minamoto fought many battles in the\nKiush\u016b and Ch\u016bgoku districts, the gains and losses being tolerably even\non both sides. But by degrees the military magnates along the Sany\u014d,\nNankai, and Saikai lines joined the Taira army, and its strength became\nso irresistible that it marched back toward Ky\u014dto, escorting Antoku.\nThus the Taira saw themselves once more established at Fukuhara, to\nwhich Kiyomori had for a brief period removed the capital from Ky\u014dto.\nThey organized their lines of defense, making Fukuhara their base, and\nIkuta and Ichinotani their eastern and western outposts, respectively.\n\nMeanwhile Yoshinaka, the Minamoto leader, had become so insolent as to\nbe imprecated and dreaded by friend and vassal alike. He also quarreled\nwith Yoritomo, who had hitherto confined his military operations to the\neastern provinces, but who now sent his two brothers, Noriyori and\nYoshitsune, to attack Yoshinaka. The latter was defeated at Seta in Ise,\nand killed in the midst of a rice-field by a stray arrow. The victors\nthen marched on in triumph to Ichinotani to attack the Taira. The first\nconflict was successful for the Minamoto. The Taira lost many a stout\nsoldier. Munemori and the remnant of his troops retreated to Yashima, in\nSanuki, continuing as before to carry with them the child emperor,\nAntoku. Yoshitsune's forces pursued the retreating army to Sanuki, where\na fierce fight ended in the second defeat of the Taira. The latter\nreceded still further to the bay of Dannoura in Nagato. There the\ndecisive battle was fought, and for the third time the Taira were\nutterly routed. Nearly all their warriors were killed.\n\nWhen the issue of the battle had ceased to be doubtful, the\nempress-dowager plunged into the sea with the infant emperor in her arms\nand bearing the sword and seal. Antoku was drowned but the Minamoto\nsoldiers rescued his mother. The seal was afterward recovered from the\nsea, but the sword, which was itself a copy, was irrevocably lost.\nThenceforth the sword called _Hirugoza-no-tsurugi_ was employed for\nceremonial and official purposes. The Taira chief Munemori and his son\nwere captured and subsequently executed. Thus, after some twenty years\nof power and prosperity, the great Taira clan was broken and destroyed.\nOften in subsequent centuries men talked of the meteor-like rise of the\nTaira, of the extraordinary heights of autocracy and affluence to which\nthe illustrious family attained, and of the terrible and tragic scenes\nthat marked its rapid and final fall. \"The vain house of the Taira did\nnot endure\" (_ogoru Heike wa hisashikarazu_), is a familiar Japanese\nadage suggestive at once of the moral import of the tragedy and of the\nswift and extreme vicissitudes of fortune which characterized those\nlawless ages.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[1] Table showing lineage and chronology of sovereigns.\n\n (49. Emperor K\u014dnin, 770-782.)\n |\n 50. Emperor Kwammu, 782-806.\n |\n +--------------------+-------------------------+\n | | |\n 51. Emperor Heizei, 52. Emperor Saga, 53. Emperor Junna,\n 806-810. 810-824. 824-834.\n |\n 54. Emperor Nimmy\u014d, 834-851.\n |\n +------------+----------------+\n | |\n 55. Emperor Montoku, 851-856. 58. Emperor K\u014dk\u014d, 885-893.\n | |\n 56. Emperor Seiwa, 856-877. 59. Emperor Uda, 893-898.\n | |\n 57. Emperor Y\u014dzei, 877-885. 60. Emperor Daigo, 898-931.\n |\n +--------------------------------+--+\n | |\n 6l. Emperor Suzaku, 931-947. 62. Emperor Murakami, 947-968.\n |\n +-----------------------------------+\n | |\n 63. Emperor Reizei, 968-970. 64. Emperor Eny\u016b, 970-985.\n | |\n +--+----------------+ |\n | | |\n 65. Emperor Kwazan, 67. Emperor Sanj\u014d, 66. Emperor Ichijo,\n 985-987. 1012-1017. 987-1012.\n |\n +------------------------------------+\n | |\n 68. Emperor Goichijo, 1017-1037. 69. Emperor Gosuzaku, 1037-1046.\n |\n +------------------------------------+\n | |\n 70. Emperor Goreizei, 1046-1069. 71. Emperor Gosanjo, 1069-1073.\n |\n +----------------+\n |\n 72. Emperor Shirakawa, 1073-1087.\n |\n 73. Emperor Horikawa, 1087-1109.\n |\n 74. Emperor Toba, 1109-1124.\n |\n +------------------------+-----------------------+\n | | |\n 75. Emperor Sutoku, 77. Emperor Goshirakawa, 76. Emperor Konoye,\n 1124-1142. 1156-1159. 1142-1156.\n |\n +----------------+----------------+\n | |\n 78. Emperor Nij\u014d, 1159-1166. 80. Emperor Takakura, 1169-1180.\n | |\n | +----------------+------+\n | | |\n 79. Emperor Rokuj\u014d, 81. Emperor Antoku, [82. Emperor Gotoba,\n 1166-1169. 1180-1186. 1186-1199.]\n\n\n\n\nPART II\n\nTHE FEUDAL AGES. 1186-1868\n\n\n\n\nChapter VII\n\nTHE KAMAKURA GOVERNMENT. 1186-1339\n\n\nThe Taira had fallen, and Minamoto-no-Yoritomo, one of the greatest\nstatesmen Japan has produced, had established his headquarters at\nKamakura, near the present T\u014dky\u014d. The influence of his clan had for\ngenerations been implanted in the eastern provinces, where the robust\nmilitarism stood in great contrast with the effeminate atmosphere of\nKy\u014dto.\n\nThe rule of Kamakura, so far as the feudal forces of the east were\nconcerned, was now almost complete, but Yoritomo aspired to the supreme\nmilitary power of the whole empire. Here in this connection must be\nrelated the tragic story of his half-brother Yoshitsune, perhaps the\nmost gallant and most beloved hero in the memory of the children of\nJapan. He was a mere babe when after the Heiji insurrection, he was\ncaptured with his mother by the Taira soldiers. He would have been\nkilled by order of Kiyomori, had it not been for the intercession of the\nlatter's mother and for the beauty of the young mother of Yoshitsune.\nFor the sake of the lives of her sons, the latter became the concubine\nof Kiyomori, whom she did not love. The pathetic story still excites\nfeeling in the heart of Japanese womanhood. Yoshitsune was assigned to a\npriestly career, but he proved unruly and fond of the arts of the\n_samurai_. Tradition ascribes to the child many a superhuman act of\nvalor and military skill. At length he ran away to the northern province\nof Mutsu, where he was kindly received by the great local chieftain\nFujiwara-no-Hidehira. Yoshitsune grew to be a man of commanding genius,\nand his personal charm attracted to him many loyal _samurai_, the\nromantic careers of several of whom are still remembered. When Yoritomo\nrose in 1180 at the mandate of the late Prince Mochihito, Yoshitsune's\nopportunity came. After the former had routed the first large detachment\nof the Taira forces, a young man with a large head but of small stature\nwas announced to him, and Yoritomo at once recognized his long\nforgotten brother Yoshitsune, whose coming, he said, was to him more\nreassuring than the addition of a million warriors.\n\nHenceforth Yoritomo's brilliant victories were largely owing to the\ngeneralship of his brother. But no sooner had the latter destroyed the\nremnants of the Minamoto's enemy than his own safety was endangered by\nhis very success, for Yoritomo grew jealous of his great renown and\npopularity. As Yoshitsune escorted the captive chief of the Taira clan,\nMunemori, to Kamakura, he not only received no recognition for his\nachievements, but also was refused admission to the presence of his\nbrother. There were not lacking men around the latter to contrive the\ndownfall of the great general. Shortly afterward Yoritomo sent to Ky\u014dto\na man of proved valor and strength, Tosab\u014d Sh\u014dshun, with orders to\ndestroy Yoshitsune, but Tosab\u014d himself fell under Yoshitsune's sword in\nthe attempt. Thereafter Yukiiye, Yoshitsune's uncle, induced the\nex-emperor to authorize them to put down Yoritomo. But Yoritomo\naddressed himself to the ex-emperor with such persuasion that an\nimperial mandate was issued to all the provincial authorities ordering\nthem to arrest Yoshitsune and Yukiiye. Yoritomo thereupon dispatched\nH\u014dj\u014d Tokimasa to Ky\u014dto to quell the partisans and restore order in the\ncapital. Yukiiye was subsequently killed in the province of Izumi, but\nYoshitsune escaped to his friend Fujiwara-no-Hidehira in Mutsu. The\nlatter, however, died soon afterward, and was succeeded by his son\nYasuhira, who received from Yoritomo orders to kill the fugitive. So\ngreat and far-reaching was the authority of the Minamoto chief at that\ntime that Yasuhira had no choice but to comply with the mandate. He\ncaused Yoshitsune to be put to death, and sent his head to Kamakura.\nTradition has, however, been reluctant to admit so ignominious an end to\nthe hero, who, it says, effected his escape to the island of Ezo\n(Hokkaido) and thence to the continent, where he became a great prince\nover nomadic tribes. Nor did Yasuhira's treachery bring fortune upon\nhimself, for Yoritomo, already desirous to bring Mutsu under his direct\nrule, pretended to believe that Yasuhira had been unduly slow in\ndestroying his rebellious brother, and, in 1189, led in person a large\narmy, which succeeded in a brief time in killing Yasuhira and subduing\nthe great provinces of Mutsu and Dewa.\n\nIn the next year, Yoritomo repaired to Ky\u014dto and had his first audience\nof the emperor and the ex-emperor.[1] The latter treated him with great\nconsideration, and after the lapse of a year conferred upon him the\ntitle of _sei-i-tai-sh\u014dgun_, or generalissimo, which has since been the\ncustomary title of the feudal overlord of Japan.\n\nLet us here describe the feudal government organized by Yoritomo at\nKamakura--the first attempt of like kind in the history of Japan--and\nobserve how different it was from the elaborate system of the\ncentralized government which was first organized in 645 and later\ntransferred to Ky\u014dto. One of the first steps taken by the Minamoto chief\nto consolidate his power was to establish the relation of lord and\nvassal between himself and the great local magnates of the eastern\nprovinces who had espoused his cause, and to secure their allegiance by\nconfirming them in the possession of their estates. For the better\norganization of his military forces he created an office called\n_samurai-dokoro_, a species of headquarter staff department, which was\npresided over by Wada Yoshimori in the capacity of _bett\u014d_. Thus all the\nmilitary men throughout the east were brought completely under his sway.\nLater he created a department of public archives (_kumonjo_), and made\n\u014cye Hiromoto its minister, and Nakahara Chikayoshi its vice-minister,\nboth of whom were originally civilians at Ky\u014dto. It was owing to\nYoritomo's sagacity that they had been induced to enter the service of\nthe military government at Kamakura. By this department the\nadministration of civil affairs was chiefly conducted, as was the\nadministration of military affairs by the staff department\n(_samurai-dokoro_). A department of justice (_monch\u016b-jo_) was also\norganized with Miyoshi Yasunobu, another civilian, at its head, its\nfunctions being the hearing of all civil suits, and the management of\nmatters relating to civil law.\n\nThenceforward down to the days of the Ashikaga, the descendants of the\nthree statesmen from Ky\u014dto continued to direct the administration of\naffairs at Kamakura. By 1184, the organization of Yoritomo's central\ngovernment (_bakufu_) was complete, but the local administration had\nstill to be elaborated. Advantage was taken of the general disorder that\nstill existed throughout the land, owing to the disturbance caused by\nthe remnants of the Taira party and by the followers of Yukiiye and\nYoshitsune. On the advice of \u014cye Hiromoto, Yoritomo made such strong\nrepresentations to the ex-emperor that the latter sanctioned the\nappointment of high constables (_shugo_) in the various provinces and\nsuperintendents (_jit\u014d_) of the great estates, the whole being under the\ncontrol of the sh\u014dgun himself. By the energy of these officials numbers\nof the insurgents were arrested in different localities, and order was\neverywhere restored. Furthermore, an edict was issued requiring that all\ncultivators of land throughout the empire should without distinction\ncontribute to the military exchequer a tax at the rate of five _sh\u014d_\n(.256 bushels) of grain per _tan_ (one-fourth of an acre). Thenceforth\nthe power of the former provincial governors and headmen gradually\ndeclined, and the authority of the newly appointed high constables and\nsuperintendents increased proportionally. The sh\u014dgun, of course, took\ncare that the occupants of the new offices should be chosen from among\nhis own relatives and partisans, so that his sway was eventually\nconsolidated everywhere, and the control of the empire virtually passed\ninto his hands.\n\nYoritomo died in 1200 at the age of fifty-three, his eldest son,\nYoriiye, succeeding to the title of generalissimo. But Yoriiye being\nonly eighteen years of age, and having given no evidence of ability, his\nmother, Masako, commissioned her own father H\u014dj\u014d Tokimasa, together with\ntwelve councilors, to assume the direction of the government at\nKamakura. From this time began the dark age of Kamakura, in which\nunbridled ambition ignored all restraints of propriety. When the young\nYoriiye fell ill in 1203, his mother, acting in concert with Tokimasa,\nplanned to relieve him of his office of generalissimo, and to appoint\nhis son Ichihata to be lord and governor general of the twenty-eight\neastern provinces forming Kwant\u014d, and his young brother\nChihata--afterward called Sanetomo--to be lord of the thirty-eight\nwestern provinces forming Kwansei. This plot so incensed Yoriiye that\nthe latter, with his wife's father, Hiki Yoshikazu, planned means to\nexterminate the H\u014dj\u014d family. Tokimasa frustrated the design by having\nYoshikazu assassinated, and then attacking and slaying all his blood\nrelations together with Ichihata. Yoriiye he afterward shut up in a\ntemple, and ultimately caused him to be put to death. Sanetomo,\nYoriiye's younger brother, succeeded him, but exercised no\nadministrative authority, the H\u014dj\u014d holding everything in their own\ngrasp. The sh\u014dgun consequently devoted himself to literature rather than\nto military exercises. Moreover, foreseeing that fortune would not long\ncontinue to smile upon the Minamoto family, he thought to obtain a high\nposition in the central government, and add luster to the family's\nrenown while there was yet time. Hence he was promoted to the post of\nchief councilor of state (_dainagon_), in conjunction with that of\ncommander in chief of the guards of the left, his official rank being\nraised to the first of the second class. Shortly afterward he became\nlord keeper of the privy seal and then minister of the right. But in\n1219, on the occasion of worshiping at a shrine in Kamakura, he was\nstabbed to death by Kugy\u014d, a son of Yoriiye. This event terminated the\ndescendants of the Minamoto family in the direct line. A brief interval\nof thirty-five years, or three generations,[2] from the time when\nYoritomo had risen to the head of the government, sufficed to complete\nthe supremacy of the great clan, the first sh\u014dgun of which had so\nsystematically pruned off the useful members of its own branch.\n\nThe Minamoto were followed by the H\u014dj\u014d as feudal rulers. The H\u014dj\u014d family\nwas of Taira origin, its founder being Taira-no-Sadamori. The name H\u014dj\u014d\nwas derived from the fact that the family's headquarters were at H\u014dj\u014d in\nIzu. During the period of Yoritomo's exile in Izu, he experienced\ngenerous and hospitable treatment at the hands of H\u014dj\u014d Tokimasa, whose\ndaughter he married. All during Yoritomo's campaigns and subsequent\nadministration at Kamakura, Tokimasa, though of the Taira family, proved\na loyal and indispensable counselor. Under Yoriije, being the\ngrandfather on the mother's side, he naturally enjoyed the widest\npopularity and wielded the greatest power of all the military nobles of\nthe time. As has been seen, the H\u014dj\u014d did not even hesitate to\nassassinate the sh\u014dgun in order to further their personal interests.\nTokimasa allowed himself to be controlled by the counsels of his wife.\nAt her slanderous instance he brought about the overthrow of a great\nterritorial noble, Hatakeyama, and by her advice he conceived the\nproject of elevating to the sh\u014dgunate his younger daughter's husband,\nHiraga Tomomasa. The third sh\u014dgun, Sanetomo, then a mere youth, was an\ninmate of Tokimasa's house at the time of this plot. His mother, Masako,\nlearning what was on foot, caused him to be removed to the house of her\nbrother Yoshitoki, with the assistance of the military vassals of the\nMinamoto, and succeeded not only in having Tokimasa and his intriguing\nwife sent back to H\u014dj\u014d, but also in compassing the death of Tomomasa in\nKy\u014dto. These events transferred the territorial and military ascendancy\namong the Kamakura nobility to the Wada family, whom therefore\nYoshitoki, the H\u014dj\u014d chief in Kamakura, formed the design of destroying.\nIn pursuance of that scheme, he prompted Kugy\u014d to assassinate Sanetomo,\nthe last of the Minamoto family. Then Fujiwara-no-Yoritsune, a relative\nof Yoritomo, was summoned from Ky\u014dto to assume the nominal office of\nsh\u014dgun, Masako, the widow of Yoritomo, exercising the controlling power\nand Yoshitoki holding the office of regent (_shikken_, an office\nvirtually corresponding with the _sessh\u014d_ of the central government); in\nwhich capacity he administered all the affairs of the _bakufu_ in the\nname of the young sh\u014dgun. Yoshitoki was thus a _sh\u014dgun_ with the name of\na _shikken_.\n\nIt was about this time that the civil government of Ky\u014dto rose under the\nleadership of the ex-Emperor Gotoba in an attempt to overthrow the\nfeudal administration. Ever since the time of Yoritomo, Gotoba had\ncherished the hope of recovering the control of administrative affairs,\nand with that object had stationed military men of his own choosing in\nthe west, in addition to those already stationed in the north,\nconferring on their leaders swords forged by his own hands, and\notherwise sparing no pains to organize a strong military following. So\nlong, however, as Yoritomo lived, Gotoba's designs could not be\nrealized. But when Sanetomo, the third sh\u014dgun of Yoritomo's line, fell\nunder the sword of Kugy\u014d, the ex-emperor thought that he descried an\nopportunity to attain his purpose. But H\u014dj\u014d Yoshitoki set up a Fujiwara\nas a nominal sh\u014dgun, and himself exercised the administrative authority\nin a markedly arrogant and arbitrary manner. Gotoba then selected a\nvassal of Kamakura, without consulting the H\u014dj\u014d, as warden of the\nwestern marches, and allowed him to reside in Ky\u014dto. Yoshitoki forthwith\nconfiscated all the lands belonging to the warden. Thereupon an imperial\nmandate was issued, directing that the estates should be restored, to\nwhich Yoshitoki paid no attention. A further instance of contumacy\noccurred in connection with an estate which the ex-emperor had conferred\non one of his favorite mistresses.\n\nStung by these insults, Gotoba finally resolved to overthrow the\nKamakura government. In this design he was strongly supported by another\nex-emperor, Juntoku, who had just abdicated in favor of his son, Ch\u016bky\u014d.\nThe third of the three ex-emperors of the time, Tsuchimikado, opposed\nthe project of the other two, urging that its execution was still\npremature. Gotoba could count upon the support of seventeen hundred\nwarriors, so in 1221 an imperial mandate circulated through all the\nprovinces of the empire ordering the destruction of the H\u014dj\u014d family. It\nwas specially addressed to the powerful lord, Miura Yoshimura. But,\ninstead of obeying, he conveyed secret information of the fact to\nYoshitoki, who in turn informed Masako, the widow of Yoritomo. She\nthereupon summoned all the military leaders of the surrounding\nprovinces, and having reminded them of the possessions and ranks\nbestowed by the Minamoto chief on the _samurai_ of Kwant\u014d, said that an\noccasion had now arisen to repay her deceased husband's favors. The\nresult was that none of these captains espoused the sovereign's cause in\nthe struggle that ensued. Meanwhile, Yoshitoki took counsel of his\ngenerals as to a plan of campaign, and finally adopted the proposal of\n\u014cye Hiromoto that the bulk of the forces at the disposal of the H\u014dj\u014d\nshould march against Ky\u014dto, under the command of H\u014dj\u014d Yasutoki and H\u014dj\u014d\nTokifusa, by the three trunk routes, the T\u014dkaid\u014d, the T\u014dsand\u014d, and the\nHokurikud\u014d. On receipt of this intelligence in Ky\u014dto, the imperial\ntroops were divided into two bodies under Hideyasu and Taneyoshi, and\nmoved northward to meet the invaders in the Owari and Mino provinces.\n\nBut the defending forces suffered defeat, and were driven back, so that\nYasutoki and Tokifusa were able to enter Ky\u014dto at the head of a large\narmy. They forced the reigning sovereign to abdicate in favor of\nGohorikawa, and they banished the three ex-emperors, Gotoba to the\nprovince of Oki, Juntoku to Sado Island, and Tsuchimikado to Tosa.\nGotoba's son was also sent into exile. A number of court nobles who had\nassisted and promoted the attack upon the Kamakura government were put\nto death. Three thousand estates belonging to these nobles and to the\n_samurai_ who had espoused the imperial cause were confiscated and\ndivided among the H\u014dj\u014d followers. Yoshitoki then stationed Yasutoki and\nTokifusa at Rokuhara to preserve peace in Ky\u014dto. Even in the days of\nYoritomo, affairs of state had been administered in consultation with\nthe court nobles and the Fujiwara ministers, but the H\u014dj\u014d recognized no\nsuch obligation. So the imperial uprising not only proved a failure, but\nalso served to increase immensely the power of the feudal government.\n\nThe H\u014dj\u014d were aware that, great as was their influence, it had been\nacquired by questionable means, and that their position could be\nmaintained only by their good government. For this reason, the H\u014dj\u014d\nadministration before the days of its decline has come down to posterity\nas a model of feudal rule. Yasutoki, who succeeded Yoshitoki as regent,\ndevoted himself zealously to political affairs, treated the agricultural\nclasses with much consideration, and sought earnestly to win the love of\nthe people. He treated his relatives with uniform kindness, and those\nunder his sway with condescension, never abandoning himself to\npassionate impulses nor ever employing his power wantonly. He framed a\nlaw of fifty-one articles setting forth the principles of administration\nand supplying regulations to guide the discharge of official functions.\nRuling wisely and living uprightly, he died lamented by people of all\nclasses. He was succeeded by his grandson, Tsunetoki, and the latter by\nhis younger brother, Tokiyori. This last, like his grandfather,\npracticed economy in his administration and showed much consideration\nfor the farming classes.\n\nNo one of the H\u014dj\u014d family,[3] however, did more service to the nation\nthan the son of Tokiyori, Tokimune, who saved the country from the\nMongol conquest. This deserves our special note.\n\nIn Mongolia, on the northeast of China, there appeared a conqueror of\nworld-wide fame, Temujin, the great Genghis Khan. Against his armies the\nTatar kings were unable to hold their ground, and ultimately the wave of\nMongol conquest flowed into the dominions of the Sung sovereign in the\nsouth of China. Temujin's grandson, Kublai, possessed himself of a great\npart of Korea, and having concerted measures for overthrowing the Sung\ndynasty and bringing all China under Mongol rule, he conceived the\nproject of subjugating Japan also. His first step toward consummating\nthat design was to send envoys via Korea, who were instructed to\nremonstrate with the Japanese sovereign for his indifferent attitude\ntoward the Mongol autocrat. But the Koreans dissuaded these envoys from\nprosecuting their voyage. Two years later, in 1268, Kublai dispatched\nanother embassy to Dazaifu in Kiush\u016b, with letters to the governor of\nDazaifu as well as to the Emperor of Japan, the ostensible object of the\ncommunications being to establish amicable relations between the two\ncountries. From Dazaifu intelligence of the coming of the embassy and\nthe nature of its documents was forwarded to Kamakura, thence to be sent\nin turn to the court in Ky\u014dto. Considerable anxiety was caused by the\nnews, both in official and in civilian circles. The emperor laid before\nthe shrine of Daijing\u016b an autographic supplication for the heavenly\nprotection of the empire, and caused prayers of a similar purport to be\nsaid at all the shrines and temples throughout the realm. Careful\nmeasures were also taken to guard the coasts, more particularly the\npoints of strategical importance in Hizen and Chikuzen.\n\nA draft reply to Kublai's dispatch was prepared at the court in Ky\u014dto,\nand shown to H\u014dj\u014d Tokimune, who, however, gave it as his opinion that\ninasmuch as the communication from China lacked the forms of prescribed\ncourtesy, Japan's dignity precluded the sending of any answer. Orders\nwere therefore conveyed to Dazaifu for the immediate expulsion of the\nChinese envoys. In March of the following year Korean officials again\narrived in the island of Tsushima escorting Mongolian envoys, who asked\nfor a reply to the dispatch sent by their sovereign the preceding year.\nThese envoys became involved in quarrels with the people of Tsushima,\nand finally took their departure, carrying away two of the latter as\nprisoners. Five months later, Kublai caused these two men to be restored\nto Japan, and made the act an occasion for addressing another dispatch\nto the Japanese emperor. Again Japan refrained from making reply. After\nan interval of two years, the khan sent in 1271 another ambassador, with\na train of a hundred followers, who landed at Imatsu in Chikuzen. The\nambassador's instructions were to present the dispatch of which he was\nbearer either to the imperial court or to the sh\u014dgun in Kamakura. He did\nnot, however, intrust the original document to the Dazaifu officials,\nbut gave them a copy only. This was at once forwarded to Kamakura, being\nfrom thence communicated to the court in Ky\u014dto. On receiving it, the\n_kwanry\u014d_ took counsel of the other ministers of the crown and came to\nthe decision that no reply should be given.\n\nBy this time the people of Japan had acquired full knowledge of the\nimmense power wielded by Kublai Khan and of the vast conquests achieved\nby him in succession to his grandfather Genghis. Hence there was no\nlittle anxiety as to the outcome of these futile embassies. The emperor\nordered prayers to be offered up as before at the shrines and temples\nthroughout the empire. Kublai had now brought almost the whole of China\ninto subjection and established his dynasty of Yuan. He continued to\nsend embassy after embassy to Japan, and Japan on her side continued,\nwith equal persistence, to make no reply to messages which she construed\nas national insults. Enraged by this indifference, the khan finally sent\nagainst Japan a fleet of a hundred and fifty war vessels under the\ncommand of Liu Fok-h\u00eang, at the same time ordering Korea to reinforce\nthis expedition. The invaders arrived at Tsushima toward the end of\n1274, where they killed the governor. Thence they passed to the island\nof Iki and killed its acting high constable, and thereafter directed\ntheir forces against Imatsu in Chikuzen. The military nobles of\nKiush\u016b--Sh\u014dni, \u014ctomo, Matsuura, Kikuchi and others--collected troops and\nmade a stand at Hakozaki. The Yuan invaders, armed with guns, caused\ngreat havoc among the Japanese army, but the Chinese leader, Liu,\nreceived a wound that compelled him to retire, and a heavy gale arising\ndestroyed numbers of the foreign war-vessels. The Korean general's ship\nwas wrecked and he himself drowned. Finally, the remnant of the invading\nforce escaped under cover of darkness. Once again after a few months\nthe Yuan sovereign sent another envoy, but he was sent up to Kamakura\nand there put to death by H\u014dj\u014d Tokimune.\n\nH\u014dj\u014d Sanemasa was now appointed to command at Dazaifu, and instructions\nwere issued for the vigilant guarding of all the coast line in the\nsouth. Further, the imperial guards were temporarily withdrawn from\nKy\u014dto, and drafted into a large army recruited from the east of the\nempire and stationed at Dazaifu as well as at other important positions\nalong the coast. Sanemasa was given the command of this army, and other\nmembers of the H\u014dj\u014d family were dispatched to direct the military\npreparations in Harima and Nagato. Further, the territorial nobles of\nKiush\u016b received orders to construct fortifications along the coast, and\nthis work, being vigorously carried on, was completed in 1279. That year\nthe Chinese emperor again sent envoys, seeking to establish friendship\nand intercourse. They landed at Hakata, but were put to death by order\nof the sh\u014dgun's government. The Regent Tokimune, foreseeing the\nconsequences of these complications, dispatched large bodies of troops\nfrom Kamakura to Kiush\u016b, to repel the renewed attack inevitably pending\nfrom the west. By this time the feudal society of Japan seems to have\nbeen roused to its height of patriotism. It not only was determined to\nresist the invasion of the world-conqueror, but even plans were made to\ninvade the continent and fight with the Khan on his own ground. The\nlatter, on his part, had now completed his conquest of China, and,\nhaving attained the zenith of his power, resolved to gratify his\nlong-cherished desire, supplemented as it was by indignation at the\nrepeated slaughter of his ambassadors in Japan.\n\nAccordingly in the middle of 1281, he assembled a force of 100,000\nsoldiers, whom, together with a contingent of 10,000 Koreans, he sent\nagainst Japan under the command of Hwan Bunko. The invading army touched\nat the island of Iki, and after a cruel massacre of its inhabitants,\nresumed their voyage toward Dazaifu. Thither the Japanese troops flocked\nfrom Kiush\u016b, Ch\u016bgoku, and Shikoku to defend their country. Aided by the\nfortresses that had been erected along the coast, they fought stoutly.\nThe Chinese, however, enjoyed the great advantage of possessing heavy\nordnance, with which they bombarded the forts and slaughtered such\nmultitudes of the Japanese soldiers that the latter were unable to meet\nthem in open contest. Organized tactics as much characterized the\ninvaders as personal valor and individual combat did the defending\nwarriors. Nevertheless, the latter continued to resist so obstinately,\nthat, although the contest waged for sixty days, the enemy could not\neffect a landing. Meanwhile, a rumor reached Ky\u014dto that the Yuan\ninvaders, having borne down all resistance in Kiush\u016b, had pushed on to\nNagato, and were on the point of advancing against Ky\u014dto itself, thence\nto carry their arms into the T\u014dkai and Hokuriku districts.\n\nThe Emperor Gouda, deeply disquieted by these tidings, proceeded in\nperson to the shrine of Iwashimizu Hachimang\u016b, god of war, to pray for\nthe safety of the country, and moreover dispatched an autographic\nsupplication to the shrine of Daijing\u016b in Ise, vowing that he would\noffer himself as a sacrifice to preserve the honor of his empire. But in\nKiush\u016b the contest continued fiercely when, on the last day of the\nseventh lunar month, a northwesterly storm swept down on the Chinese\nfleet and wrecked a number of the ships with immense loss of life. Those\nthat survived the tempest, several thousands in number, took refuge in\nthe island of Takashima off the coast of Hizen, and there, under the\ncommand of Chang Pak--Hwan having fled away in a vessel of exceptional\nstrength--set themselves to cut timber and build new ships to carry them\nback to China. But Sh\u014dni Kagesuke, at the head of a body of the Kiush\u016b\ntroops, followed and attacked the fugitives, killing several hundreds\nand taking over a thousand prisoners, so that, in the end, only three\nout of the hundred thousand Yuan invaders succeeded in escaping alive to\nChina. After this success the Kamakura government redoubled its efforts\nto place the defenses of the country on a strong footing. It was not\ntill 1299 that the Chinese sovereign sent two Buddhist priests to Japan\nwith a peaceful message. The country had been in a state of continuous\ndefense, since the arrival of the first Mongol embassy thirty-one years\npreviously. Never before had the Japanese nation encountered a more\ncolossal struggle with a great conquering foe, nor had she since, till\nthe outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. It is noteworthy that in\nthe former crisis it was the feudal forces which saved the land from\nforeign conquest.\n\nIf by this great service the H\u014dj\u014d placed all Japan under obligation to\nthem, it was also after this crisis that their power began to decline.\nGreat sums of money had been devoted during the thirty years to\nmaintaining constant religious services at the shrines and temples\nthroughout the empire. The expense incurred on that account is said to\nhave been greater even than the outlay in connection with military\naffairs, which in itself must have been immense. Moreover, after the\ninvaders had been defeated and the danger averted, the rewards granted\nto Buddhist priests and Shint\u014d officials far exceeded in monetary value\nthe recompense given to the troops and their leaders. On the other hand,\nthe wardens and territorial nobles, on whom the duty of defending the\ncountry had fallen, found the drain on their resources so heavy that\nthey began to murmur. Thus the popularity of the sh\u014dgunate at Kamakura\ncommenced to wane.\n\n[Illustration: THE INVASION BY THE MONGOL TARTARS]\n\nTokimune was succeeded by his son Sadatoki, and then followed Morotoki\nand Takatoki. During their regency the authority of the H\u014dj\u014d rapidly\ndeclined. Takatoki, being a man of indolent disposition, entrusted the\ncontrol of affairs wholly to one Nagasaki Takasuke, who was betrayed by\navarice into such abuses of power that men's hearts were altogether\nestranged from the government. The fall of the H\u014dj\u014d finally ensued in\n1326, a century and a quarter after the first of those powerful rulers\nhad risen from the position of a rear-vassal to the most puissant office\nin the land.\n\nThe circumstances of the downfall of the Kamakura government will be\nrelated in the next chapter. In the meantime, we shall observe the\ncondition of society during the hundred and forty years of the rule of\nthe Minamoto and the H\u014dj\u014d. In regard to the customs of the upper\nclasses, it is interesting to note that the elegance of the Ky\u014dto nobles\nand the severe simplicity of the Kamakura soldiers, now the one, then\nthe other, according to the varying circumstances, set the fashion of\nthe day. When the warrior element was in the ascendant, its manners and\ncustoms were more or less taken as a model in Ky\u014dto, while, on the other\nhand, Ky\u014dto sometimes impressed its own fashions upon the military. An\ninstance of the latter case is furnished by the story of the Taira\nfamily, whose fighting men gradually fell under the charm of the court\nlife, and succumbed with comparative ease to the misfortunes that\nafterward overtook them. Minamoto-no-Yoritomo, however, fixed his\nheadquarters at Kamakura and did not visit Ky\u014dto except for very brief\nintervals. His habits of life were frugal and simple; he encouraged the\n_samurai_ to adopt a severe military regimen, and he set his face\nresolutely against costly ostentation and enervating excesses.\n\nBut by the time of Sanetomo prolonged peace had produced its usual\neffects: the austerity of military customs underwent relaxation even at\nKamakura, and refinement and luxury began to come into vogue. So, too,\nin Ky\u014dto, when the city passed under military rule after the Sh\u014dkiu\ntroubles and when the power of the civil nobles declined\ncorrespondingly, the customs of the soldier class prevailed over those\nof the courtiers. Speaking generally, however, it may be said that\nKamakura was the nursery of military customs and Ky\u014dto the center of\ncourtly effeminacy. The warriors' ethics at Kamakura prescribed\nfrugality and simplicity, inculcated love of soldierly pursuits and\nencouraged feelings of gratitude and loyalty in the relations between\nlord and vassal. To such a pitch were these latter sentiments carried\nthat a vassal would choose rather to be estranged from his parents or\nfind himself opposed to his own brothers and sisters, than to show want\nof fealty to his lord. Everything must be sacrificed in the cause of\none's lord, death and life alike being shared with him. The rules of\netiquette were strictly obeyed, and the provisions of the code of honor\ncarefully observed. Even when a _samurai_ went into battle, he did not\nset himself to slaughter indiscriminately, but having first recounted\nthe achievements of his ancestors, crossed swords with his foe in a\nleisurely and dignified manner. Were he guilty of any fault, it was\nexpected of him to die by his own hand before the disgrace of lawful\npunishment could overtake him. The obligations of honor were absolutely\nbinding on him in all conjunctures.\n\nAfter the H\u014dgen and Heiji insurrections, even Ky\u014dto itself, the seat of\nrefinement and splendor, became like a deserted battlefield, and when\nMinamoto-no-Yoritomo made Kamakura the headquarters of his military\ngovernment, the science of war absorbed men's attention so completely\nthat little or no heed was paid to literary pursuits. The Ky\u014dto\nUniversity and the provincial schools decayed, and the knowledge of\nChinese classics became the monopoly of Buddhist priests, some of whom,\nparticularly of the Zen sect, had spent years of diligent study in\nChina. Anyone desirous of obtaining education had no recourse but to\nplace himself under the tuition of these priests. It was in this way\nthat the term _tera-koya_ (temple annex) came to be generally employed\nall through the feudal ages to designate a private school. But despite\nthe people's neglect of Chinese studies, Chinese words and expressions\nwere largely in vogue among the higher classes, and Buddhist terms also\npassed appreciably into the language of the time owing to the prosperous\nand influential position occupied by that religion.\n\nThe written language being thus enriched by a multitude of phrases and\nexpressions which had received the indorsement of scholars, the\nvocabulary and literature of the era exhibit marked evidences of change.\nNot only the manner of expression, but also the taste of the people, had\nundergone a decisive change since the close of the Hei-an epoch, and\nthis difference naturally manifested itself in the kind of literature\naffected. Men no longer took pleasure in books treating of the lives and\nadventures of beautiful women or the mental feats of renowned scholars.\nSuch studies seemed incongruous amid the clash of arms and under the\nshadow of the sword and spear. Striking vicissitudes in martial careers,\nthe intrepid deaths or life-long separations of warriors, the rise and\nfall of principalities--these were the themes of which the Kamakura\n_samurai_ loved to read. Of the prose compositions expressive of this\nsentiment, the most noted were the \"_H\u014dgen_\" and the \"_Heiji\nMonogatari_,\" stories, respectively of the insurrections of those eras;\nand the \"_Heike Monogatari_,\" the pathetic epic of the fate of the great\nTaira clan, and the \"_Gempei Seisuiki_,\" the stirring tale of the rise\nand fall of the families of Taira and Minamoto. Other famous productions\nof the period were the \"_H\u014dj\u014d-ki_,\" and the \"_Shiki Monogatari_.\" In\nthese works one finds a skillful blending of graceful Japanese phrases,\nstrong Chinese expressions, and lofty Buddhist terms. At times the style\nhas all the ring of martial onset; at times, it is plaintive and moving;\nnow it abounds in graces of diction, and then its transitions from\npassion to deliberation, from swift terseness to smooth tranquillity,\nare full of force and sentiment. Between the emotional effect of such\nwritings and the gently flowing phraseology and uneventful paragraphs of\nworks like the \"_Genji Monogatari_\" of the preceding period, there is a\nwide interval. Running through the pages of the \"_H\u014dj\u014d-ki_\" the reader\nalso detects a current of discontent and disgust for the transient world\nand its vanity that reflects the growing tendency of educated minds at\nthat epoch. So deeply had the Buddhistic pessimism entered the heart of\nthe people.\n\nOn the other hand, poetry in the Japanese style flourished uniformly in\nKy\u014dto, unaffected by the vicissitudes of the times or the decline of the\nimperial power. Collections of verses were made from time to time and\npublished by imperial direction, among which the \"_Shin-Kokinsh\u016b_\"\ncontains stanzas constructed with so great skill that it remained a\nmodel for the poets of all subsequent generations. In Kamakura, also,\nthe Sh\u014dgun Sanetomo was an accomplished writer of Japanese poetry. The\ngrace and polish of his songs in the old-time style, as well as the\n_verve_ and spirit of their sentiments, reflecting truly the mood of his\nera, find no parallel in the poetry subsequent to the Nara epoch.\nIndeed, owing to the great popularity of Japanese poetry in those days,\npeople began for the first time to study it under teachers. Thus there\ncame into vogue men who made a business of giving instruction in the art\nof poetry, the profession being transmitted from generation to\ngeneration in the same family. The result was that canons of style and\ntricks of composition peculiar to special schools of teachers became\nmore or less binding upon students of those schools, inevitable injury\nbeing done to originality and vigor. To these circumstances may be\nattributed a gradual decline of real poetic ability.\n\nHardly less instructive is the change that overtook the nation's\ngreatest religion, Buddhism. It will be remembered that during the\nHei-an epoch, two Buddhist sects, the Tendai, founded by Saich\u014d, and the\nShingon, by K\u016bkai, were incomparably the most influential, all others\nbeing more or less in a state of decline. But toward the close of the\nepoch, some priests, as already related, began to take more interest in\nmilitary affairs than in religious functions. Yoritomo, when he came\ninto power, interdicted the use of arms by priests, and encouraged them\nto devote their attention entirely to literature. The prestige of the\nTendai and the Shingon suffered from these events, and as their\ndoctrines, being far too recondite and lofty to be comprehended by the\nuninitiated, had never satisfied the bulk of the people, there began to\nappear, during the Kamakura epoch, priests who taught a form of the\nfaith radically different from the others but eminently suited to the\nspiritual tone of the new age. This was the Zen sect, introduced in its\nvarious branches from China. It at once attracted men of simple and\nrobust habits by its remarkably vigorous and effective method of\nenlightenment and the great practical value of the latter for the men of\nthe world in those days of continual fluctuations of fortune. H\u014dj\u014d\nTokiyori and Tokimune, as well as many a great warrior, besides some\nemperors, became ardent patrons of the sect, which consequently attained\nprominent popularity among the military men at Kamakura, and developed\nwidespread influence. Its temples, Kench\u014d-ji and Engaku-ji, at Kamakura,\nstood on an equal footing with the Kennin-ji and T\u014dfuku-ji of Ky\u014dto.\n\nWhile the Zen tenet so powerfully appealed to the military class, there\nwas another set of new sects, entirely original to Japan, which by their\nbrief formul\u00e6 and impressive ceremonies attracted large numbers of the\ncommon people. Of these sects, three, namely, the J\u014ddo, founded by Genk\u016b\n(or H\u014dnen); Ikk\u014d or Shin, founded by Shinran (or Hanyen), and Ji,\nfounded by Ippen, all used the same litany, while the fourth sect,\nHokke, or Nichiren, founded by Nichiren, used another. The founders all\nmet opposition from the exponents of the older sects, but spread their\nteachings in the face of serious difficulties, until they won the hearts\nof simple-minded folks whose minds had been in a state of constant\nuncertainty under the violent changes of the time, and who were now\ndelighted to find, at last, doctrines which taught that an unmixed faith\nin the saving power of a Buddha or a canon symbolized in a single word\nof formula would bring them to a blissful calm in this present world.\nNot less attractive were the beautiful harmony of the litanies and the\nimpressiveness of the paraphernalia of the temple of every new sect. It\nappeared as if the spiritual needs of the age were at last answered, and\nthe new tenets spread themselves among the people like a fire in a\nparched meadow.\n\nIn the domain of arts, the most remarkable industrial achievement of the\nera was the progress made in tempering sword-blades. Gotoba, after he\nhad abdicated the scepter and become ex-emperor, freely indulged his\nkeen love for sword-blades. He engaged sword-smiths, whom he kept\nperpetually tempering steel, and did not hesitate even to forge blades\nwith his own hands. Naturally this and the extensive demand for swords\nat the time gave a great impulse to the industry. Much progress was also\nmade in the art of forging armor, helmets, bridle-bits, and the like.\nOther arts were not, however, greatly encouraged by the military\nadministrators of Kamakura, who set their faces against luxury and\ninculcated frugal fashions. Yet not a little progress was made in\nceramics, lacquer, and the carving of Buddhist images and other temple\nfurniture.\n\nIt is interesting to note that under the simple rule of the Kamakura\ngovernment the commerce and trade of this period made a tolerable\nprogress, in spite of frequent interruptions of the peace. At Kamakura,\nwhere merchants from various parts of the empire assembled and made it\nthe commercial center of the country, there existed seven kinds of\nmarkets in which articles were sold at small stores specially designed\nand constructed. The custom of peddling merchandise also existed. For\nbusiness transacted at a distance, bills of exchange had already come\ninto vogue. While Sanetomo administered the sh\u014dgunate, an official limit\nwas fixed for the number of merchants conducting business in Kamakura.\nThis was the origin of hereditary privileges of trade. The prices for\nthe various staples of commerce were determined, according to the custom\nof previous times. Thus in 1193 an imperial notification ordered that\nrice should be sold at one thousand cash (one _kwammon_), or the tenth\nof a _ry\u014d_, that is to say nominally ten _sen_ according to present\ndenominations, but of course representing a much larger sum at that\ntime. Again, in 1253, firewood, charcoal, and other necessaries having\nrisen in price, H\u014dj\u014d Tokiyori proclaimed the rate at which each must be\nsold. Gold was at that time constantly mined in Mutsu, but did not serve\nfor coinage purposes, the common media of exchange being Chinese copper\nand the iron cash of the Sung dynasty and similar Japanese coins of\nearlier days. Grass-cloth was also sometimes used as a medium of\nexchange, and prices were quoted in terms of it. Trade with China, under\nthe Sung dynasty, and with Korea--or Koma, as it was then called--was\ncarried on largely at Hakata in Chikuzen and Bonotsu in Satsuma, both in\nKiush\u016b. Import duties upon foreign goods were levied at the various\nports of entry. The principal imports from China were raw silk, indigo,\nChinese ink, porcelain vessels, mats, and so forth, while the staple\nexports from Japan were rice, other cereals, and timber. In 1254 H\u014dj\u014d\nTokiyori limited the number of ships engaged in the China trade to five,\nand ordered all except the licensed vessels to be destroyed. But the\ntrade continued as brisk as ever. Subsequently, however, during the\ninterval that separated the decline of the Sung dynasty from the\nestablishment of the Yuan, intercourse between Japan and the neighboring\nempire underwent some diminution, and was suspended altogether for a\ntime after the Mongol invasion of Japan.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] Table showing lineage and chronology of sovereigns.\n\n [80. Emperor Takakura, 1169-1180.]\n |\n +-------------------+--------------------+\n | | |\n [81. Emperor Antoku, Gotakakura. 82. Emperor Gotoba,\n 1180-1186.] | 1186-1199.\n | |\n +-------------------+ +-------------------+\n | | |\n86. Emperor Gohorikawa, 84. Emperor Juntoku, 83. Emperor\n 1222-1233. 1211-1222. Tsuchimikado,\n | | 1199-1211.\n | | |\n 87. Emperor Shij\u014d, 85. Emperor Ch\u016bky\u014d, 88. Emperor Gosaga,\n 1233-1243. 1222. 1243-1247.\n |\n +--------------------------------------+---+\n | |\n 90. Emperor Kameyama, 89. Emperor Gofukakusa,\n 1266-1276. 1247-1266.\n | |\n 91. Emperor Gouda, 1276-1288. |\n | |\n +-----+-----------------+ |\n | | |\n96. Emperor Godaigo, 94. Emperor Gonij\u014d, 92. Emperor Fushimi,\n 1319-1339. 1301-1308. 1288-1299.\n |\n +---------------------------------------+\n | |\n 95. Emperor Hanazono, 1308-1319. 93. Emperor Gofushimi, 1299-1301.\n\n[2] Minamoto Yoritomo, 1184-1199; Minamoto Yoriiye, 1199-1203;\nMinamoto Sanetomo, 1203-1219.\n\n[3] The following is the list of the H\u014dj\u014d regents (_shikken_).\nH\u014dj\u014d Tokimasa, father-in-law of Yoritomo, who died in 1215, did not\nassume the title of regent.\n\nH\u014dj\u014d Yoshitoki, 1205-1224.\nH\u014dj\u014d Yasutoki, 1225-1242.\nH\u014dj\u014d Tsunetoki, 1243-1246.\nH\u014dj\u014d Tokiyori, 1246-1256.\nH\u014dj\u014d Tokimune, 1256-1284.\nH\u014dj\u014d Sadatoki, 1284-1300.\nH\u014dj\u014d Morotoki, 1300-1311.\nH\u014dj\u014d Takatoki, 1312-1326.\n\n\n\n\nChapter VIII\n\nTHE TEMPORARY RESTORATION OF IMPERIAL POWER. 1339-1393\n\n\nThe fall of the H\u014dj\u014d resulted in a rehabilitation of the imperial power,\nwhich, however, as quickly relapsed under a new feudal rule. The story\nof this momentary success of the sovereign house must be prefaced by an\naccount of its domestic affairs, which had caused its renewed uprising\nagainst the usurping regent at Kamakura. It will be remembered that, in\n1221, the H\u014dj\u014d exiled three ex-emperors and their partisans, who had\nraised their arms against the all-powerful feudal government. The\ninfluence of the H\u014dj\u014d became so strong in Ky\u014dto after this event that,\nwhen the Emperor Shij\u014d died without heir, in 1242, the Regent Yasutoki\nsucceeded, in spite of opposition, in raising his nominee on the throne\nas the Emperor Gosaga. This naturally further enhanced the power of the\nH\u014dj\u014d. Gosaga abdicated in 1246, and was succeeded by his two sons, one\nafter the other. Of these, the younger and abler, Emperor Kameyama, was\nthe favorite of his retired father, and would have bequeathed the throne\nexclusively to his own descendants, had it not been for the intervention\nof the ex-emperor, who advocated the cause of the elder prince, the\nEmperor Gofukakusa. It was finally decided, during the regency of H\u014dj\u014d\nSadatoki, that the descendants of the two emperors--called, from the\nnames of their respective residences, the Daikaku-ji and the Jimy\u014d-in\nlines--should reign alternately, each for ten years. The Daikaku-ji line\ncame first to the throne in the person of Gonij\u014d (1301-1308), followed\nby Hanazono of the other line. The latter had to abdicate, in 1319, in\nfavor of Godaigo of the first line. It was this last emperor who\nsuccessfully, though for a brief period, restored the power of the\nimperial house, for, being like all other princes of his line, penurious\nand discontented, he was particularly offended at the conduct of the\nKamakura regency, which not only kept him in straitened circumstances,\nbut also alternated his house with the other and richer house favorable\nto the H\u014dj\u014d. Godaigo perceived that, if he would insure his sovereignty,\nhe must do away at the same time with the H\u014dj\u014d rule and the system of\nalternate succession.\n\nSuch an attempt promised greater success in 1325 than in 1221, as the\npower of the H\u014dj\u014d had now greatly declined, particularly under the\nregency of the dissolute Takatoki. Bribery was rife, partiality presided\nat the tribunals of justice, and dissatisfaction with the H\u014dj\u014d rule\nprevailed among the _samurai_. A premature plot of Godaigo[1] to\noverthrow Kamakura was, however, discovered, and he barely saved his\nthrone by falsely professing innocence and goodwill. The time soon came\nwhen a prince of the Jimy\u014d-in line should replace Godaigo, who on the\ncontrary sought to name his own son heir apparent. This project was\nperemptorily opposed by Takatoki, who also provoked the emperor in other\nmatters, until the latter again sought to find means to undo the H\u014dj\u014d.\nThe immense military following of Kamakura, however, rendered hopeless\nall schemes of open defiance. Under the circumstances the emperor\nconceived the idea of having recourse to priestly aid. He placed his\nson, Prince Morinaga, in the post of lord abbot of Enryaku-ji, and\nhimself proceeded to Hieizan and Nara, where he succeeded in winning the\npriests and elaborating with them a scheme for the overthrow of the\nH\u014dj\u014d. But this plan also was divulged. In August, 1331, the regent sent\nthree thousand men to Ky\u014dto with orders to arrest the emperor. Godaigo\nhad escaped during the night, and taken refuge on Mount Kasagi, where he\nmustered his partisans from the neighboring provinces and posted them\nfor the protection of his temporary residence. The siege did not last\nlong, for Takatoki raised a Jimy\u014d-in prince to the throne, captured\nGodaigo, and exiled the latter and his two sons to distant islands.\n\n[Illustration: NORTHERN JAPAN]\n\nThe imperial cause seemed completely lost, but about this time a warrior\ndestined to become a celebrated hero with the loyal sons of Japan,\nKusunoki Masashige, raised the standard of revolt in Kawachi and\ndeclared in favor of the exiled emperor. He constructed a castle at\nAkasaka, and when it was destroyed, retired to Mount Kong\u014d and there\nheld his ground, subsequently developing sufficient strength to restore\nthe fortifications at Akasaka. Meanwhile Prince Morinaga raised troops\nand fought against the H\u014dj\u014d at Yoshino in Yamato, and afterward at K\u014dya\nin Kii. The time had now come for the H\u014dj\u014d to put forth their strength.\nIn February, 1333, a large army was sent from Kamakura against Ky\u014dto,\nbut great numbers of fighting men flocked to the imperial standard in\nSany\u014d and Nankai, and in the following month the exiled emperor escaped\nfrom the Island of Oki and proceeded to H\u014dki, being supported by Nawa\nNagatoshi, who raised troops in the San-in districts. The provinces of\nHizen and Higo were also on the emperor's side, as was the powerful Y\u016bki\nfamily of Mutsu. The H\u014dj\u014d's army which had been dispatched against Ky\u014dto\nsuffered defeat in several engagements. Takatoki now sent Ashikaga\nTakauji to assume charge of the campaign in Ky\u014dto and its neighborhood.\nThis was a fatal choice. For not only was Takauji closely related to the\nMinamoto clan whom the H\u014dj\u014d had overthrown, but he also viewed with\nstrong disfavor the oppressive arbitrariness of the latter. No sooner\nhad he reached Ky\u014dto than he declared for the imperial cause, and, in\nconcert with other loyalists, attacked and destroyed Rokuhara, the\nheadquarters of the H\u014dj\u014d administration in Ky\u014dto. This event occurred in\nMay, 1333. The imperial forces then reoccupied Ky\u014dto. About this time\nNitta Yoshisada, a renowned member of the Minamoto, laid siege to the\nfortress which Kusunoki Masashige had constructed on Mount Kong\u014d,\ncombining the forces of the H\u014dj\u014d for the purpose. But Prince Morinaga\nopened relations with him, and in obedience to the prince's secret\ninstructions he pretended illness, retired to his own province of\nK\u014dzuke, and after consultation with his relatives and partisans, raised\nthe standard of revolt against Kamakura. Events now marched rapidly. All\nthe blood relatives of the Minamoto family in Echigo and Shinano came\ntogether, and marching against Kamakura in great numbers, demolished or\nburned all the offices and public buildings there. The Regent Takatoki,\ntogether with all the members of his family, committed suicide, and the\nrule of the H\u014dj\u014d came to an end.\n\nA month later the exiled emperor re\u00ebntered Ky\u014dto in state and resumed\nthe reins of government. The eastern provinces, some of which were still\nloyal to the memory of the H\u014dj\u014d, were also greatly reduced. No sooner\nwas, however, the imperial prestige assured, than difficulties arose\nwhich might long have been expected. The restoration had been effected\nby warriors of feudal tenure, whose merits had to be rewarded, and whose\nambitions were hardly compatible with a centralized civil administration\nsuch as would naturally follow the return of the imperial government. At\nthis juncture the emperor's conduct was not calculated to perpetuate his\nsuccess. The estates of the late H\u014dj\u014d which he had confiscated were\nrather indiscriminately parceled among his personal favorites, so that\nwhen the case of the warriors who had rendered real service to his cause\nhad to be considered, there was little left with which to reward their\nmerits. Also, private soldiers and landlords of the provinces flocked to\nKy\u014dto to obtain confirmed possession of their holdings or additional\ngrants for the service they claimed to have done to the sovereign. Under\nthese circumstances it was inevitable that discontent and disappointment\nshould be keenly felt in many quarters, and men's minds should once more\nturn from an artificial reign of peace to a period of unrest and\nplunder. Nor was a leader of exceptional ability lacking to take\nadvantage of this state of affairs.\n\nOf the two great soldiers of noble descent, Nitta Yoshisada was\ncomparatively little known, owing to the fact that his ancestor, being\non bad terms with Yoritomo, had lived in retirement at Nitta in K\u014dzuke.\nThe other, Ashikaga Takauji, who was, like Yoshisada, of the historic\nclan of Minamoto, was well known otherwise for the marriage relations of\nhis ancestors with the H\u014dj\u014d. By nature winning and brilliant, he enjoyed\nboth influence and popularity. The emperor himself was highly pleased by\nTakauji's achievements, for which he conferred on him rewards such as no\none else received, and authorized him, among other things, to use for\nthe first part of his name one of the ideograms in the name of the\nsovereign himself, which was likewise pronounced \"Taka.\" Nothing,\nhowever, arouses the indignation of the nation of the present day more\nthan the story of the way in which Takauji attracted the emperor and\nwarriors to his side for selfish interests, and wrought the ruin of one\nafter another of all the truly upright and loyal persons of the day. The\nfirst victim of Takauji's growing ambition was Prince Morinaga, who had\nalready doubted the sincerity of his motives. Takauji so prevailed upon\nthe emperor as to cause the prince to be arrested and confined in\nKamakura, where he was later assassinated. When the remaining partisans\nof the H\u014dj\u014d assembled in Shinano and marched against Kamakura, and\nTadayoshi, Takauji's brother, finding himself unable to defend it,\nretreated to Mikawa, Takauji at once affected a union with Tadayoshi,\ndestroyed the H\u014dj\u014d partisans, reoccupied Kamakura, and bestowed rewards\nlavishly on the captains and warriors who had aided him. Now he threw\naway the mask. Established on the vantage ground of Kamakura, he called\nhimself sh\u014dgun, and under pretense of subduing Nitta Yoshisada, sent\norders throughout the provinces directing that troops should be raised.\nThe emperor, whose eyes were at last opened, appointed Prince Takanaga\nto the chief command of a large army against Takauji, with Nitta\nYoshisada as chief of staff, and at the same time instructed Kitabatake\nof Mutsu to attack Takauji's rear. So began the dramatic campaign, the\nincidents of which still appeal to the hearts of the Japanese people.\n\nIn November, 1335, Yoshisada encountered the forces of Takauji in Suruga\nand Mikawa, and defeated them in successive engagements; but Takauji,\nand Tadayoshi subsequently, established themselves at strong positions\nin the Hakone district, and Yoshisada's army attempting to dislodge\nthem, suffered a signal defeat and was driven westward. This event\ndetermined the various provincial magnates whose position had been\nundefined to declare for Takauji, and the Ashikaga chief found himself\nstrong enough, in the following year, to pursue Yoshisada and push on to\nKy\u014dto itself, where in the face of a stout resistance he gained the\nvictory. The emperor retreated to the temple Enryaku-ji. Meanwhile,\nKitabatake Akiiye, with an army under the command of Prince Yoshinaga,\nfollowed Takauji to Ky\u014dto, and having effected a junction with the\nforces of Nitta Yoshisada and Kusunoki Masashige, succeeded in defeating\nthe Ashikaga chief. Shortly afterward Takauji sustained another severe\ndefeat in Hy\u014dgo, and was compelled to retreat precipitately westward,\nthe imperialists once more occupying Ky\u014dto.\n\nUnder these reverses, Takauji revealed the remarkable resourcefulness of\nhis nature. The restoration of imperial authority by Godaigo had\nresulted in completely thrusting the princes of the Jimy\u014d-in line into\nthe background. Takauji descried an opportunity in this circumstance.\nAddressing himself to the dethroned Emperor K\u014dgon, he obtained a mandate\nto raise an army. With remarkable energy he got together troops from all\nparts of the empire and once more renewed the contest, defeating\nKikuchi, Aso, Akitsuki, and other supporters of the Daikaku-ji princes\nat Tadaranohama. Stationing a trusted general in Kiush\u016b, with\ninstructions to bring the provinces in that quarter under control, he\nhimself advanced eastward by land and by sea at the head of large forces\nraised in the west. Yoshisada and Masahige made a desperate stand in\nHy\u014dgo against the Ashikaga army, but were defeated. It was then that the\npathetic end of Masashige occurred at Minatogawa. He had always been a\nsteadfast and unassuming servant of the emperor, ever since he rose from\nhis retired residence at Kawachi to champion the imperial cause against\nthe H\u014dj\u014d. How with a handful of soldiers he had defended his castle upon\nMount Kong\u014d, and how his example had inspired other warriors in the land\nto take a stand with the emperor, is a story that the Japanese school\nchildren love to tell. To him more than to any other one person had been\ndue the restoration of imperial rule. But his wise counsels were no\nlonger followed when selfish ambition began to divide the sovereign's\nsupporters. Yet Masashige did not complain. Seeing in the last campaign\nthat his end had come, he dissuaded his son Masatsura from following him\nin the battle and exhorted him to grow up to gather the remnants of his\nfollowers and to die for the emperor's cause. He himself gallantly fell\nin battle. After his death the imperial cause, which had already begun\nto wane, could never again master the situation.\n\nTakauji, who had occupied Ky\u014dto, enthroned there a Jimy\u014d-in prince as\nthe Emperor K\u014dmy\u014d, and established his sh\u014dgunate at Muromachi in the\ncapital. The Emperor Godaigo shortly after repaired to Yoshino, about\nfifty miles south of Ky\u014dto. For fifty-seven years subsequent to this\nevent (1336-1393) two emperors reigned simultaneously, one at Ky\u014dto and\nthe other at Yoshino. The former was of the Jimy\u014d-in line and the latter\nof the Daikaku-in line, now known respectively as the Northern and\nSouthern dynasties (_hoku-ch\u014d_ and _nan-ch\u014d_).[2] It was a period of\nperpetual conflict between the supporters of the two imperial houses.\nAmong the partisans of the Southern dynasty the most puissant and\npopular were Nitta Yoshisada and Kitabatake Akiiye, of whom the former\nhad his headquarters in Echizen, where he guarded the heir-apparent of\nthe South, while the latter, under the auspices of Prince Yoshinaga,\nheld Mutsu under control. Soon, however, the armies of Ashikaga overran\nEchizen, and Yoshisada fell in battle. This was followed by the death of\nthe Southern emperor, Godaigo (1339), who on his deathbed summoned all\nthe imperial princes to his side, and laid upon them his earnest\ninjunctions never to rest until the imperial power had been restored. He\nwas succeeded by Prince Yoshinaga, who ascended the throne as\nGomurakami.\n\nA series of reverses now overtook the imperialists. One after another\ntheir armies were defeated in the provinces, until Kitabatake Chikafusa\nalone remained unconquered in Hitachi. But he, too, was soon overpowered\nby the sh\u014dgun's forces. He effected his escape to Yoshino, and the\nemperor issued a summons to the warriors of Chiugoku and Nankai to\nreinforce the imperial army in Kiush\u016b. The southern island was thus once\nmore brought under the imperial sway, and this success encouraged\nChikafusa at Yoshino, who now made one supreme effort. Assembling a\nforce in Ky\u014dto and its neighborhood, he attempted to reoccupy the city,\nand the suddenness of his effort seemed to him a temporary advantage.\nBut Takauji dispatched large forces to attack the temporary palace at\nYoshino, the defenders of which saw themselves utterly outnumbered.\nKusunoki Masatsura, son of the great Masashige, had hitherto guarded the\npalace with stubborn bravery. But now he and his captains bade a final\nfarewell to the sovereign, and, marching out to encounter the foe,\nfought their last battle at Shij\u014dnawate, and fell fighting. After this\nvictory, the sh\u014dgun's army burned the temporary palace at Yoshino, and\nthe emperor escaped to Anau in Yamato.\n\nDespite all these successes, the sh\u014dgun's forces were unable to crush\nthe defense of the dynasty of the South, as his own armies were often\nrent by the disloyalty and mutual jealousy of his immediate followers.\nEven his brother Tadayoshi, to whose stout support Takauji's success was\nlargely due, and his son Yoshiakira, were alienated from him. His\ngenerals and warriors had been attracted to him only from ambition and\nselfishness, and now they readily threw off their fealty. Many a\nsoldier vacillated between the two sovereigns, serving the one who\nsuited his own interested motives the better.\n\nTakauji died in Ky\u014dto in 1357, and was succeeded by his son, Yoshiakira.\nThe latter was followed in 1368 by Yoshimitsu. In the meantime, the\nprestige of the Southern dynasty had further been impaired, until\nfinally, in 1393, the Southern sovereign Gokameyama, handed over the\ninsignia to his Northern rival, Gokomatsu, and the two dynasties being\nthus united, Gokomatsu ascended the throne as the hundredth emperor of\nJapan.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] Reference to the following table will make the genealogical\nissues clear:\n\n 88. Emperor Gosaga, 1243-1247.\n |\n JIMY\u014c-IN LINE. | DAIKAKU-JI LINE.\n +---------------------+\n | |\n89. Emperor Gofukakusa, 1247-1266. 90. Emperor Kameyama, 1266-1276.\n | |\n92. Emperor Fushimi, 1288-1299. 91. Emperor Gouda, 1276-1288.\n | |\n +-----------------+ +--------------------+\n | | | |\n93. Emperor 95. Emperor 94. Emperor 96. Emperor\n Gofushimi, Hanazono, Gonij\u014d, Godaigo,\n 1299-1301. 1308-1319. 1301-1308. 1319-1339.\n\n[2] Table showing genealogy and chronology of the Northern and\nSouthern dynasties.\n\n DYNASTY OF THE SOUTH.\n\n96. Emperor Godaigo, [1319-] 1336-1339.\n |\n97. Emperor Gomurakami, 1339-1368.\n |\n +----------------------------------+\n | |\n98. Emperor Ch\u014dkei, 1368-1370. 99. Emperor Gokameyama, 1370-1393.\n\n\n DYNASTY OF THE NORTH.\n\n(I. K\u014dgon, 1332-1336.) II. K\u014dmy\u014d, 1336-1349.\n |\n +----------------------------+\n | |\nIII. S\u016bk\u014d, 1349-1352. IV. Gok\u014dgon, 1352-1372.\n |\n V. Goeny\u016b, 1372-1383.\n |\n VI. Gokomatsu, 1383-1393 [-1413].\n\nIn the year 1393 A.\u00a0D. the two dynasties became united in the person of\na single sovereign, Gokomatsu.\n\n\n\n\nChapter IX\n\nTHE MUROMACHI PERIOD. 1393-1573\n\n\nThe reason that the Ashikaga sh\u014dguns established themselves at Muromachi\nin Ky\u014dto, the civil capital, was that the seat of the Southern dynasty\nbeing near and the tide of battle sweeping again and again as far as\nKy\u014dto, the exigencies of the struggle made it necessary that the\nimperial city should also be the headquarters of the feudal government.\nTakauji had to intrust the administration of the eastern provinces to\nhis son Motouji, as the regent (_kwanry\u014d_) at Kamakura, and also to\nanother general the control of the southern island of Kiush\u016b. At first\nthe supporters of the Southern sovereign kept busy the regent of\nKamakura and the warden of Kiush\u016b, who remained loyal to the Muromachi\nsh\u014dgun so long as this trouble lasted. It might have been foreseen,\nhowever, that in time of peace the vantage ground occupied by these\nmagnates would be turned against the interests of the overlord. Nor did\nthe central government at Muromachi promise a greater security to the\nwill of the Ashikaga, for its functions were performed by men who,\nunlike several of Yoritomo's counselors, were at the same time the\ngreatest landlords of the country. They might readily defy an effete\nsh\u014dgun and lapse into a bitter quarrel among themselves. Special\ncircumstances were not wanting to hasten the coming of the logical\nconsequences of the careless organization of the Ashikaga feudalism.\n\nIt so happened that the third sh\u014dgun, Yoshimitsu, under whom the rule of\nthe Ashikaga seemed to have risen to its height, was also arbitrary and\nvainglorious. He ceded the sh\u014dgunate, in 1393, to his son Yoshimochi,\nand received for himself the appointment of chief minister of state\n(_daij\u014d daijin_), an unprecedented procedure for a feudal overlord since\nYoritomo. After a brief interval, however, he resigned that post also,\nand having adopted the tonsure, nominally retired from official life.\nAlways prone to luxury, he now more freely than ever gave the reins to\nhis fancy for pomp and splendor. Whenever he moved abroad, he was\naccompanied by an escort large enough for an ex-emperor, and such was\nthe magnificence of his mansion at Muromachi and so great the profusion\nof blossoming trees among which it stood, that men gave to it the name\nof the Palace of Flowers. After his retirement from official life he\nestablished his residence at Kitayama, where he erected a three-storied\nhouse with timbers and stones of the finest quality, contributed by the\nterritorial magnates of the land. Its columns, doors, alcoves, ceilings,\nand floors were decorated with gold dust. Nothing could exceed the\nelegance and splendor of this edifice. The people called it\n\"Kinkaku-ji,\" or the golden temple, and it stands to this day one of the\nmost interesting relics of ancient Ky\u014dto. On the completion of this\ngorgeous mansion, Yoshimitsu--or Tenzan Dogi as he was then called--took\nup his residence there, and thither all the magnates of state had to\nrepair in order to obtain his sanction for administrative measures.\nBanquets were often given there on a sumptuous scale, the illustrious\nhost amusing himself and his guests with displays of music and\ndancing--_Bud\u014d_, _Sarugaku_, and _Shiraby\u014dshi_. The example thus set by\nthe ex-sh\u014dgun was readily imitated by the military men of the time, and\nto support all this luxury, it became necessary to increase the burden\nof taxation. Yoshimitsu had strong faith in Buddhist doctrines, and\ndevoted large sums to the building of temples. The doctrines of the Zen\nsect found special favor with him, and its priests were the recipients\nof much munificence at his hands. He levied contributions on all the\nprovinces for the purpose of erecting for the sect in Ky\u014dto a temple of\nunparalleled magnificence called Sh\u014dkoku-ji.\n\nAmid the exercise of all this pomp and while the power of the sh\u014dgunate\nwas thus supreme from end to end of the country, the seeds of future\nmisfortune were sown. Not long after the death of Yoshimitsu the country\nbegan to fall into disorder. The generals and military partisans of the\nSouthern dynasty supposed that a return to the system of alternate\nsuccession between the two lines of Jimy\u014d-in and Daikaku-ji had formed\npart of the arrangement under which peace was restored, in 1393, and\nGokomatsu raised to the throne. Hence, after the demise of that\nsovereign, they looked to see a prince of the Southern line assume the\nscepter. But the sh\u014dgun's government crowned Sh\u014dk\u014d, of the Northern\nline. Discontented with this act, Kitabatake Mitsumasa of Ise declared\nwar against the sh\u014dgun, and a number of military men in or about Ky\u014dto\nand in Mutsu raised the standard of revolt. Serious disturbance was\naverted on that occasion by the sh\u014dgun's promising that a prince of the\nSouthern line should be the next sovereign. The partisans of the latter\ndynasty imagined, therefore, that at the death of Sh\u014dk\u014d, Prince Ogura, a\nson of Gokameyama, would come to the throne, whereas the Ashikaga\nfamily, disregarding the engagement entered into by its chief, again\nsecured the succession to a prince of the Northern dynasty.[1] This\nbreach of faith led to a renewed demonstration by Kitabatake, who, in\ncollusion with the military men at Kamakura, unsheathed the sword in\nbehalf of the son of Prince Ogura. There rose also another revolt in\nYamato. The supporters of the Southern line, however, never effected any\nmaterial success. But before their energy withered away, combats and\ntumults of the most inveterate character devastated the land. The\nAshikaga sh\u014dguns found themselves perpetually confronted by disturbance\nand disaffection. One, probably the principal, cause of the frequent\ninsurrections, was that the Ashikaga made immense grants of land to\ntheir supporters without, at the same time, elaborating some efficient\nsystem for the control of the territorial magnates thus created. Many\nnobles developed such puissance under these circumstances, and acquired\ncommand of such vast local resources, that they gave themselves no\nconcern whatsoever about any government, whether that of Ky\u014dto or that\nof Muromachi, and sided with whatever party they found most convenient.\nPersonal ambition and individual aggrandizement were too often the\nruling motives of the time. No bonds proved strong enough to secure\nmen's union amid these scenes of tumult. Even brothers, as in the time\nof Takauji and Yoshinori, did not hesitate to belong to opposite camps,\nnor were other family ties considered more sacred. In the days of\nYoshimitsu, a great territorial magnate, Yamana Ujikiyo, whose estates\nextended over ten provinces so that men spoke of him as _Rokubuichi-shi_\n(lord of a sixth of Japan), took up arms against the Ashikaga. So, too,\n\u014cuchi Yoshihiro rebelled because his success in subjugating Kiush\u016b had\ngiven him confidence in his own powers. The regent at Kamakura, also, to\nwhom was entrusted the government of the eastern provinces, became so\npuissant that his influence almost equaled that of the sh\u014dgun, who\nregarded the growth of his relative's power with no little uneasiness.\nSo independent was the attitude of this Kamakura official and so openly\ndid he affect autonomic state, that we find him adopting the precedent\nof the Muromachi ruler and nominating two of the Uyesugi\nfamily--Yamanouchi and Inugake--to the office of _kwanry\u014d_ or regents.\nImmense estates were also held by the branch house of Ogigayatsu\nMitsukane, grandson of the first Kamakura _kwanry\u014d_. Motouji (son of\nAshikaga Takauji), carried away apparently by his wealth and strength,\nsupported the insurrection of \u014cuchi Yoshihiro, mentioned above, but had\nno difficulty in making peace with the Muromachi sh\u014dgun on the defeat\nand downfall of Yoshihiro. Thus feud succeeded feud, and campaign,\ncampaign, arising out of the universal creed that a prize scarcely\ninferior to the scepter itself lay within reach of any noble whose\nterritorial influence and military puissance enabled him to grasp it.\n\nOn the death of the fourth Ashikaga sh\u014dgun, Yoshimochi, in 1428, there\nwas no heir in the direct line to succeed him, his son Yoshikazu having\ndied in childhood. His younger brother, Prince Giyen, but later named\nYoshinori, was supported to the sh\u014dgunate by the _kwanry\u014d_. This\nchagrined the Kamakura administrator, Ashikaga Mochiuji, who had aspired\nto the office, and who now entered into an open warfare with the\n_Kwanry\u014d_ Uyesugi Norizane and the new sh\u014dgun. Mochiuji was defeated,\nand the Uyesugi family intrusted with the sole administrative control in\nthe eastern provinces.\n\nYoshinori, although a man of rare administrative ability and military\nachievement, was vain and profligate, and treated his generals and\n_samurai_ with contempt. An object of his constant dislike was Akamatsu\nMitsusuke, whom he ridiculed because of his short stature and upon whom\nhe put many slights. This Mitsusuke was the grandson of Akamatsu\nNorimura, who, in consideration of conspicuous services rendered to the\nAshikaga in the days of Takauji, had received, and bequeathed to his\nchildren, broad estates. The sh\u014dgun's dislike for Mitsusuke was exceeded\nonly by his affection for a relative of the latter, Sadamura. He would\nfain have deprived Mitsusuke of his domains in order to bestow them on\nSadamura. Mitsusuke was indignant at the notion of such confiscation in\nthe absence of any misdeed to justify it. In June, 1441, he invited the\nsh\u014dgun to his mansion, where a splendid banquet was spread and a new\nkind of dancing was displayed. While the entertainment was in progress,\nMitsusuke killed and decapitated Yoshinori, set fire to the house, and\ncarrying with him the head of the sh\u014dgun, fled to Harima. Thereafter\nYoshikazu, eldest son of Yoshinori, was proclaimed sh\u014dgun by the\n_kwanry\u014d_. Hosokawa Mochiyuki and Yamana Mochitoyo, having received the\nemperor's mandate, marched against Mitsusuke, destroyed his castle of\nShirahata and killed him. Yoshikazu commissioned Mochitoyo to govern the\nthree provinces over which Mitsusuke had ruled, and the Akamatsu family\nwas exterminated.\n\nYoshikazu died in childhood and was succeeded in the sh\u014dgunate in 1449\nby his younger brother Yoshimasa, who thus became the eighth Ashikaga\nsh\u014dgun, the _Kwanry\u014d_ Hatakeyama Mochikuni being intrusted with the\nadministration of affairs and showing great zeal in the service of the\nsh\u014dgunate. As Yoshimasa grew older he gave himself up to sensual\nexcesses, and paid no attention to business of state, leaving everything\nin the hands of favorite officers. Thus by degrees disaffection began to\nappear among the generals and _samurai_. Moreover, the two _kwanry\u014d_\nHatakeyama and Shiba, ceased to work harmoniously and engaged in\ncompetition for the possession of power. Taking advantage of this state\nof affairs, the partisans of the Southern dynasty once more raised their\nheads and Ky\u014dto again witnessed scenes of disorder, while Mochiuji's\nparty renewed their opposition in the Kwant\u014d and the rebellion of the\nSh\u014dni family still continued in the west. Yoshimasa, nevertheless,\ncontinued his life of extravagance, devoting great sums to the\ngratification of his pleasures and to the building of a magnificent\nmansion. Careless of the dilapidated condition of the capital, Ky\u014dto, he\ncaused the celebrated pavilion Ginkaku-ji to be constructed at\nHigashiyama, covering the doors, walls, and ceilings with dust of silver\nin order to rival the golden pavilion (Kinkaku-ji) built by Yoshimitsu\nat Kitayama. In this new building he brought together rare paintings and\ncostly objects of virtu, Chinese and Japanese, and there also, in\nchambers specially planned for the purpose, he inaugurated the tea\nceremonial (_cha-no-yu_), afterward so fashionable in Japan, devoting\nhis days to the practice of effeminate dilettanteism.\n\nOfficial duties received no attention, and by degrees his financial\ncircumstances became so straitened that, finding it impossible to\nprocure money for the indulgence of his whims, he began to lay heavy\nimposts on the people of the provinces and on the merchants of Ky\u014dto\nespecially, who were taxed five or six times in the course of the year.\nUnder these circumstances, great discontent prevailed and riots\noccurred, the poor breaking into the houses of the wealthy, and\ndestroying all certificates of debt that were found there, by which\nmeans the sh\u014dgun himself was simultaneously relieved of his monetary\nobligations. To this device, endorsed in effect, as it was, by the\nauthorities, the people mockingly gave the name of _tokusei_, or the\ngovernment of virtue, and Yoshimasa found it altogether to his taste,\nsince it extricated him from many of his financial embarrassments. The\nsh\u014dgun did not even shrink from sending envoys to China with\ninstructions to prefer requests for money to the Chinese government, and\nthe latter were not unwilling thus to purchase immunity from the raids\nto which their ports were exposed at the hands of Kiush\u016b pirates. Under\nYoshimasa's administration the power and prestige of the sh\u014dgunate\ndeclined sensibly; the affairs of state fell into confusion; the most\ncruel mandates were frequently issued; customs opposed to the dictates\nof humanity and the principles of morality prevailed; the _kwanry\u014d_,\nfollowing the sh\u014dgun's example, subserved the duties of their office to\nselfish ends, and finally this hopeless misgovernment culminated in the\ncelebrated war of the Onin era, marking the darkest age of Japan's\nhistory.\n\nThe proximate causes of the Onin conflict are to be sought in personal\nambition. Yoshimasa, weary of official duties, determined to intrust to\nhis younger brother, Gijin, the task of administering affairs. Gijin had\nentered the priesthood. He was not averse, however, to falling in with\nYoshimasa's plan on condition that in the event of a child being born to\nthe latter, it should be devoted to a life of religion. This compact\nhaving been made, Gijin abandoned the priesthood, and taking the name of\nYoshimi, assumed the direction of the affairs of the sh\u014dgunate, Hosokawa\nKazumoto acting as controller of his household. By and by, however,\nYoshimasa's wife bore a son, Yoshihisa, and being ambitious that her\nchild should succeed to the sh\u014dgunate, instead of retiring to the\ncloister, she took into her confidence Yamana S\u014dzen, a nobleman\npossessing domains as ample and power as extensive as Hosokawa Kazumoto\nhimself, the idea of the confederates being to contrive the abdication\nof Yoshimi. A parallel conjuncture occurred in the family of Hatakeyama\nMochikuni, the _kwanry\u014d_. Having no son, he nominated his nephew\nMasanaga to succeed him, but on the subsequent birth of his son\nYoshinari, he resolved to deprive Masanaga of the distinction. Further,\nthe vassals of the other _kwanry\u014d_, Shiba, became split up into two\nparties, one espousing the cause of Yoshikado, the other that of\nYoshitoki. Yoshikado and Yoshinari allied themselves with Yamana S\u014dzen,\nand Masanaga and Yoshitoshi were supported by Hosokawa Kazumoto.\n\nThe enmity between these rival factions gradually deepened, until in the\nfirst year of the Onin era, 1467, S\u014dzen attempted to remove Hatakeyama\nMasanaga from the office of _kwanry\u014d_, and to replace him by Yoshinari,\nat the same time expelling the partisans of Kazumoto from the Hatakeyama\nhouse. A collision ensued in Ky\u014dto between the parties of Masanaga and\nYoshinari, and the sh\u014dgun gave orders that they should settle their\ndispute by a combat, the guards attached to them alone taking part in\nthe duel. S\u014dzen, however, contrived secretly to render aid to Yoshinari,\nso that Masanaga suffered defeat. This result caused much chagrin to\nHosokawa Kazumoto, who considered that his honor was tarnished by his\nfailure to assist Masanaga. He, therefore, privately assembled all his\ntroops and partisans, to the number of about a hundred thousand, and\nposting them to the east of Muromachi, guarded the residence of\nYoshimasa. S\u014dzen, on his side, mustered a force of some ninety thousand,\nand encamped on the west of Muromachi. Then commenced a long series of\nfights in which victory nearly always rested with Kazumoto's side.\nKazumoto had the countenance of the retired sh\u014dgun, Yoshimasa, and also\nprocured the recognition of the emperor and ex-emperor, while S\u014dzen,\ntaking advantage of the strained relations between Yoshimasa and his\nsuccessor Yoshimi, invited the latter to join him, and also obtained the\nsupport of the former partisans of the Southern dynasty by declaring in\nfavor of the grandson of Prince Ogura.\n\nCombats occurred almost daily, and were accompanied by numerous\nconflagrations. The citizens of Ky\u014dto fled from the city, and the\nstreets were left desolate. In 1470 S\u014dzen and Kazumoto both died, but\ntheir parties continued to fight as fiercely as ever. Not until 1477,\nwhen Yoshimi had escaped to Mino, did the generals abandon the campaign\nand retire to their castles.\n\n[ILLUSTRATION: SOUTHERN JAPAN]\n\nKy\u014dto had then been a battlefield for over eleven years, and during the\ncourse of the fierce fighting, the imperial palace, the mansions of the\nnobles, the residences and warehouses of the people, and many of the\nlargest temples, had been burned to the ground, books and documents\ntransmitted from ancient times and invaluable heirlooms and works of art\nbeing destroyed at the same time. In truth, the once splendid city was\nreduced, after this war, to a state of desolation and ruin. The military\nand civilian classes alike were plunged in poverty. The laws were\ndiscarded; the administration of justice was in disorder. The\nterritorial magnates in the provinces discontinued the payment of taxes,\nclosed their districts against communication from without, and governed\naccording to their own will. The mandates of the sovereign commanded no\nrespect. After the palace was leveled with the ground its inner\nbuildings were later reconstructed, but, inasmuch as the territorial\nmagnates ceased to pay taxes to the central government, the court nobles\nfound themselves without revenues and the administrative officials were\nwithout salaries, so that some of them had no resource but to wander\nabout the country and depend on the farmers for means of sustenance.\nUnder such circumstances the usual court ceremonials were, of course,\ndispensed with. Such was the impecuniosity in Ky\u014dto that the Emperor\nGotsuchimikado was unable to hold the wonted ceremony on the occasion of\nhis accession, and at the time of his death, his funeral rites could not\nbe performed owing to lack of funds for the funeral. It was not until\nthe utmost exertions had been employed that the sum of a thousand _hiki_\n(2500 _yen_) was collected and the burial rites were performed. On the\nsuccession of Gokashiwabara, also, the coronation ceremony had to be\nabandoned for similar reasons, nor could it be performed until\ntwenty-two years had elapsed, when the lord abbot of Hongwan-ji\ncontributed a sum of ten thousand pieces of gold for the purpose. While\nGonara was on the throne, even the daily necessaries of life could not\nbe procured in the imperial court without difficulty, neither could the\npalace buildings be repaired, though they had fallen into a state of\nmuch dilapidation. The court, at that era, experienced the extremity of\npoverty. It is on record that Sanj\u014dnishi Sanetaka, one of the courtiers,\npersuaded \u014cuchi Yoshitaka to provide funds for carrying out the\ncoronation ceremony, which must otherwise have been left in abeyance;\nand that the Emperor \u014cgimachi, under similar circumstances, had recourse\nto the pecuniary assistance of M\u014dri Motonari.[2]\n\nNot less did the sh\u014dgun himself suffer in this period of great\ndecentralization and lawlessness. He was a tool in the hands of the\n_kwanry\u014d_, and the house of the latter was divided against itself. The\nstories of usurpations and murders, which continually disfigured the\nannals of this period, are too tedious to be related. Finally, in 1565,\nthe Sh\u014dgun Yoshiteru was assassinated by a rear vassal, and his brother,\nYoshiaki, fled for life. It was in this connection that the great\nwarrior-statesman, Oda Nobunaga, came to the front, for through his aid\nYoshiaki regained his ground and rose to the sh\u014dgunate. Unfortunately\nthe young sh\u014dgun was unable to brook the overshadowing power of\nNobunaga, and took means to compass his ruin. The contest which followed\nproved too unequal. In 1573, Yoshiaki forsook his office and fled to\nKawachi, thus ending the two hundred and fifty-eight years of the\nAshikaga rule,[3] as well as a century and a half of lawlessness.\n\nHaving briefly sketched the political history of the Muromachi period,\nwe shall now turn our attention to the remarkable history of the foreign\nrelations of this era. After the repulse of Kublai Khan's invasion in\nthe thirteenth century, the sovereign and people of China conceived\nsufficient respect for the prowess of the Japanese to refrain from any\nrenewed onset. But the priests of the two empires continued to\ncommunicate with one another. When the long and bitter struggle between\nthe rival dynasties greatly impoverished the country, some of the larger\nprovincial nobles sought to replenish their exchequers by engaging in\ntrade with China and Korea. The custom of officially recognized trading\nwith China also came into vogue from that time, restrictions being\nimposed on the number of ships engaged and the amount of capital\ninvolved. Perhaps more noteworthy than the trade are the exploits of the\nJapanese pirates, for about this time the Japanese living on the\nsouthwestern coasts began to make raids upon the seaside towns of China\nand Korea, taking advantage of the internal dissensions then prevailing\nin those countries. These raiders were aided by Chinese insurgents, and\nentered the districts of Shantung, Fuhkien, and Sikkong, burning towns\nand putting the inhabitants to the sword. They were in China called\n_wak\u014d_, whose very name struck terror among the inhabitants of the\ncoast. From 1369 the dynasty of Ming, which had just overthrown Yuan,\nsent envoys to Japan urging that steps be taken to prevent the raids of\nJapanese pirates into Chinese territory, but no satisfactory steps were\ntaken. A more serious complication was barely averted when, in 1384, an\nenvoy sent to China by the Southern dynasty of Japan entered into a plot\nin collusion with one of the Chinese ministers, Hu Weiyung, to\nassassinate the father of the Chinese emperor. The plot was discovered,\nand the incensed sovereign would have sent an expedition against Japan\nhad he not recalled the ill success attending the Chinese arms in\nprevious conflicts with the Japanese. He contented himself with the\nissue of an edict forbidding all further intercourse with the Japanese.\nStringent measures were at the same time taken for the defense of the\ncoast.\n\nKorea also had suffered severely from the attacks of Japanese pirates,\nwho engaged in open conflict with the Korean troops, killing their\ngenerals, destroying their barracks, and plundering houses, ships, and\ngrain-stores. In these encounters the army of Korea showed lack of\ncourage, frequently retreating before the Japanese raiders without\nstriking a blow. The earnest requests of the Korean king, in 1367 and\n1375, that measures should be taken to repress the pirates, were only\nmet by the increased audacity of the Japanese raiders. In 1392 Li\nSei-kei, a Korean general who had been commissioned to beat back the\nJapanese, raised the standard of revolt and usurped the sovereignty,\nchanging the name of the country from K\u014drai to Ch\u014dsen. He dispatched an\nenvoy to Japan, seeking to establish amicable relations, and the Sh\u014dgun\nYoshimitsu ordered \u014cuchi, governor of Kiush\u016b, to treat the delegate with\nall courtesy. Thereafter Japan often asked for books of various kinds\nand Buddhist manuscripts, and the Koreans showed the utmost goodwill in\nacceding to these requisitions. Nevertheless the littoral population of\nJapan did not desist from raiding the Korean coasts.\n\nAfter the union of the Northern and Southern dynasties, the ex-Sh\u014dgun\nYoshimitsu frequently sent envoys to China, and on several occasions\ncaused the pirates to be arrested and handed over to the Chinese. Much\npleased at this action, the Chinese emperor sent to Japan, in 1404, a\nhundred tickets (_kango_) of the nature of passports, and from that\ntime, once in every ten years, gifts were forwarded from China to a\nfixed number of ships with a fixed personnel, the articles sent\nconsisting of head-gear, garments, brocade, gold, antiquities, and old\npictures. Even an imperial commission of investiture was also sent, for\nChina habitually regarded other nations as tributary to herself.\nYoshimitsu seems to have condoned the nominal humiliation so long as he\nwas certain of the gifts of the sovereign of the Middle State, but when\nat his death the Ming sovereign dispatched an envoy to confer on the\ndeceased sh\u014dgun the posthumous title of _Ky\u014dken-\u014d_ (the King Ky\u014dken) and\nto offer various gifts, the new Sh\u014dgun Yoshimochi politely, but\nemphatically, declined to receive these marks of favor. This incident\nterminated the official intercourse between Japan and China. Trade\nrelations, however, still continued.\n\nA striking incident occurred in 1419, when a flotilla of thirteen\nhundred ships of war from Mongolia, Korea, and Namban (the countries\nsouth of China) appeared off Tsushima. The Kiush\u016b barons, headed by the\nS\u014d and the Shibukawa families, who held the office of governors of\nKiush\u016b, beat off the invaders and slaughtered an immense number of them.\nThenceforth Korea held Japan in awe and made no attempts against her. In\n1440 the Korean government established amicable relations with the S\u014d\nfamily, sent presents of valuable books and opened commercial\nintercourse. The same year another Chinese envoy arrived with dispatches\ndemanding in a peremptory tone the establishment of amity between the\ntwo empires, but the Sh\u014dgun Yoshimochi declined to entertain the\nproposal. In the time of the Sh\u014dgun Yoshinori, however, official\nintercourse with China was reopened, the emperor sending to Japan two\nhundred tickets in the nature of passports which were placed by the\nsh\u014dgunate in the charge of the \u014cuchi family. The S\u014d family was then\nappointed to control the trade with Korea, that with China being\nintrusted to \u014cuchi. Under the Sh\u014dgun Yoshimasa intercourse with China\nreceived considerable development, and parcels of books as well as\nquantities of copper coin were frequently forwarded to Japan at her\nrequest. The Ming sovereigns always complied with Japan's wishes in\nthese matters, but considerable irregularities occurred in the trade\nbetween the two nations, owing to selfish disregard of the regulations\nissued for its control. Moreover, Japanese from Kiush\u016b and other places\ncrossed over to China, carrying with them not only legitimate articles\nof trade, but also implements of war. They pretended that the latter\nwere gifts from the Japanese government to China, but they did not\nhesitate to use them for purposes of intimidation when they found an\nopportunity to plunder the Chinese.\n\nStill later, in the closing years of the Ashikaga sh\u014dgunate, outlaws\nfrom Kiush\u016b entered China and Korea in constantly increasing numbers for\npurposes of plunder, the provinces on the Chinese littoral sustaining\ngreat injury at the hands of these marauders. On the flags of the\nJapanese piratical ships were inscribed the ideograms _Hachiman-gu_\n(Hachiman, the God of War). The Chinese consequently termed these\nvessels _Papan-sen_, \"Papan\" being the Chinese pronunciation of\n\"Hachiman,\" and regarded them with the greatest apprehension. With them,\ntoo, Chinese pirates were associated, and the people of China suffered\nso much from their raids that the emperor deputed two of his principal\ngenerals to attack and destroy the raiders, but the task could not be\nsuccessfully accomplished. From Korea, too, came a request to the S\u014d\nfamily that they would restrain the Japanese from further incursions\ninto the peninsula, but the head of the family paid no heed, and the\nresult was that the Koreans treated with great cruelty a number of the\ninhabitants of Tsushima who happened to be sojourning in the peninsula.\nThis procedure so enraged the people of Tsushima that, in 1510, they\nattacked Fusan in force, and having destroyed its fortifications,\nreturned unmolested to Tsushima. After this, the pillage of the Korean\ncoast towns by Japanese pirates continued without intermission. It will\nbe seen in the next chapter that this long history of piracy in Korea\nculminated in an organized invasion into the peninsula of large Japanese\nforces under the leadership of their best generals.\n\nThe closing days of the Ashikaga sh\u014dgunate are also noted for the\nopening of Japan's relations with the Europeans. Merchantmen of Portugal\narrived for the first time, in 1542, at the Island of Tanegashima, off\nthe coast of \u014csumi. They subsequently visited Kagoshima, and thence\nproceeded to Bungo, where their captains concluded with the nobleman\n\u014ctomo S\u014drin a convention opening commercial intercourse. Thenceforth\nPortuguese vessels frequently visited Kiush\u016b for purposes of trade, the\npeople competing with each other to purchase the rare and valuable\narticles offered by the strangers. It was then that firearms were for\nthe first time introduced into Japan, and the military class, fully\nappreciating the advantages of such a weapon, set themselves eagerly to\nlearn the method of handling and manufacturing it. With trade and\nweapons came also religious teaching. In 1548 Francis Xavier, a Jesuit\nmissionary, with two disciples, arrived at Nagasaki, and by permission\nof the Shimazu family, began to preach Christianity throughout the\nprovinces of Kiush\u016b. This was the first time since the introduction of\nBuddhism that the tenets of a foreign religion were laid before the\nJapanese people. The alien creed soon began to spread in the island, as\nalso in the neighborhood of Ky\u014dto, and afterward in Kwant\u014d, Mutsu, and\nDewa. The largest number of converts were found in Kiush\u016b, where the\npeople built chapels for the purpose of Christian worship. The great\nnoble \u014ctomo S\u014drin was an earnest believer, while \u014cuchi Yoshitaka, as\nwell as the Sh\u014dgun Yoshiteru, were also converted. So successful was\nChristian propagandism in those early days, that in 1581 the \u014cmura and\nArima families of Hizen sent envoys to Rome with letters and articles of\nJapanese production for presentation to the Pope. Thus in religion, as\nin piracy and trade, this period was characterized by a certain\nunconscious freedom, which stands in great contrast with the policy of\nrestriction and exclusion which was adopted by the Japanese rulers of\nlater ages.\n\nIn the domain of learning and literature, the Muromachi period has left\nlittle to posterity. The continual and widespread warfare and\ndevastation naturally turned men's attention away from intellectual\nrefinement. Sporadic efforts were made by some lords to encourage\nlearning, but the latter had almost completely passed into the monopoly\nof the Buddhist priests, some of whom continued in active communication\nwith the source of enlightenment, China. In short, literature must be\nsaid to have suffered great neglect as compared with the attention\nbestowed on it in earlier ages. But the contrary is true of the fine\narts. During the period of the Southern and Northern dynasties many\nJapanese priests traveled to China for the purpose of studying the books\nand paintings of the Sung and Yuan dynasties. Moreover, from the time of\nYoshimitsu, and especially in the days of Yoshimasa, a general tendency\nprevailed to refined pleasure and artistic display of all kinds, so that\nobjects of virtu and paintings by the old masters were enthusiastically\nadmired and sought after. Under such circumstances art industry\nnaturally made great progress in Ky\u014dto. Imperial patronage was extended\nto painters, an office being established at court, under the name of\n_edokoro_, where affairs relating to pictorial art were controlled.\nDuring the reign of Gotsuchimikado the great painter Tosa Mitsunobu,\nfounder of the Tosa school, flourished. His style was elaborate, his use\nof colors skillful and striking, and his brushwork showed great\ndelicacy and boldness combined. Previous to his time, Chinese paintings\nof the Sung masters, distinguished for refined simplicity of conception\nand execution, had stood very high in Japanese estimation, their vogue\nbeing increased by the widespread popularity of the Zen sect of\nBuddhism, which had been brought from China to Japan during the era of\nthe Sung sovereigns. People's taste had been educated to prefer simple\nwater-color sketches to the more showy and labored productions of the\nYamato school. During the Oyei era (1394-1427 A.\u00a0D.), three celebrated\npainters, Mincho, Josetsu, and Shubun, flourished. Mincho's second art\nname was Chodensu. His skill in painting figure subjects, Buddhas,\nRishi, Arhats, and so forth, was most remarkable. His pictures were\ngenerally of large size and the few that remain are immensely prized.\nJosetsu took for his models the masters of the Sung and Yuan dynasties,\nand developed great skill in depicting figure subjects, landscapes,\nbirds, and flowers. Shubun was a pupil of Josetsu. His favorite subjects\nwere those of his master, and he excelled in lightly tinted\nwater-colors. Among his pupils were the renowned artists Oguri Sotan,\nSoga Dasoku, Sessh\u016b, the priest Shokei, and others. Sotan painted\nlandscapes of the most charming and faithful character, and was also\ngreat in figure subjects, birds, and flowers. Dasoku was conspicuous\nfor the boldness and strength of his touch. Shokei, who is often called\nKeishoki, was famous for his pictures of sacred figures and landscapes,\nand Sessh\u016b excelled even his master in the directness of his methods,\nthe sentiment of his pictures, and the delicacy of his execution. During\nthe Kansei era (1460-1465), he crossed to China in order to study the\nlandscapes and foliage of that country. The journey added to his fame,\nfor in the neighboring empire he found no peer, and the emperor of China\nas well as the people paid him great honor. Sessh\u016b has had few equals in\nthe art of depicting landscapes, figures, floral subjects, dragons, and\ntigers. Students of his style were Sesson, Soyen, and Tokan (called also\nShugetsu), all artists of note. A contemporary of Sessh\u016b, Kano\nOyenosuke, was taken under the special patronage of the Sh\u014dgun\nYoshinori, and his son, Kano Masanobu, who had studied under Oguri\nSotan, was employed in the decoration of the Golden Pavilion, where, by\norder of the ex-Sh\u014dgun Yoshimasa, he painted the eight Siao-siong views.\nHis eldest son, Koh\u014dgen Motonobu, was the initiator of a new style based\non the Yamato school of Nobuzane and the methods of the Sung and Yuan\ndynasties. His colors were applied with the greatest feeling and\ndelicacy, and the facility and force of his brush were evidenced by\nnoble paintings of landscapes, figure subjects, and foliage. He was the\nancestor of the Kano family, and his son, Shoyei, and grandson, Eitoku,\nworked on his lines with conspicuous success.\n\nSculpture and the ceramic industry made progress not less remarkable\nthan that of painting during the Muromachi epoch. Muneyasu of the\nMyochin family stood at the head of workers in metal. He made for the\nSh\u014dgun Yoshimitsu a helmet of extraordinary beauty. Another helmet\nequally remarkable for the grace and fineness of its workmanship was\nforged for Takeda Shingen by Nobuiye, also a Myochin. The era was also\nrich in swordsmiths of note. Of these Got\u014d Sukenori was the most famous.\nA short sword made by him for Yoshimasa was considered a marvel of\nskilled forging. Glyptic work in various metals found masters of the\nhighest craft in the representatives of the Got\u014d family. They took their\ndecorative designs from pictures painted by the artists of the Kano\nschool, and reproduced these charming conceptions on sword fittings with\nextraordinary fidelity, using the chisel as though it were a painter's\nbrush. Aoki Kanaiye and Myochin Nobuiye were specially celebrated as\nmakers of sword-guards, a part of the warrior's equipment on which much\nmanufacturing care was lavished.\n\nThe vogue attained by the _cha-no-yu_ (tea ceremonial) cult under the\nAshikaga sh\u014dguns and owing to the efforts of Sen-no-Rikiu, a celebrated\ndilettante of Hideyoshi's time, had a marked influence in encouraging\nthe development of ceramics, and several experts of the craft made their\nappearance. During the reign of Gokashiwabara, a potter named Shozui\ntraveled to China to study the processes of his art, and on his return\nestablished a kiln in Hizen, where the first Japanese translucent\nporcelain was produced. Shozui adapted his methods to the canons of the\n_cha-no-yu_ cult, making simplicity and purity of style his chief\nobjects.\n\nThe lacquerer's art also made great progress in this era. Its experts\nfound munificent patronage owing to the luxurious and costly tastes\nwhich prevailed at the time in obedience to the example set by the\nAshikaga rulers. Objects of extraordinary richness and delicacy were\nproduced, especially in the line of gold lacquer, where the Japanese\nworkers developed unique skill. Their _chefs-d'oeuvre_ were not more\nvalued in Japan than in China, where they were known as \"_Yatpun\nT'sat-ki_.\" Two other famous varieties of lacquer work had their origin\nin this era, namely, _tsuishu_, or red lacquer, chiseled in high relief,\nand _tsuikoku_, or lacquer laid on in alternate layers of red and black\nand carved deeply, the edges of the design being sloped so as to show\nthe gradation of layers. Despite the continued warfare and unceasing\ndisturbance of the Muromachi epoch, the sh\u014dguns and the great nobles and\ngenerals affected a most luxurious and refined manner of life, and it\nconsequently resulted that the blackest era of Japanese history, so far\nas concerned the preservation of public peace and order and the security\nof life and property, was nevertheless a time of marked artistic\ndevelopment.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1]\n\n100. Emperor Gokomatsu, 1383-1413.\n |\n101. Emperor Sh\u014dk\u014d, 1413-1429.\n |\n102. Emperor Gohanazono, 1429-1465.\n |\n103. Emperor Gotsuchimikado, 1465-1501.\n\n[2] The following is the list of the emperors of this period:\n\n103. Emperor Gotsuchimikado, 1465-1501.\n104. Emperor Gokashiwabara, 1501-1527.\n105. Emperor Gonara, 1527-1558.\n106. Emperor Ogimachi, 1558-1587.\n107. Emperor Goy\u014dzei, 1587-1612.\n\n[3] The sh\u014dguns of the Ashikaga family and the years of their\nrule were as follows:\n\n1. Ashikaga Takauji, 1335-1358. 8. Ashikaga Yoshimasa, 1449-1473.\n2. Ashikaga Yoshiakira, 1358-1367. 9. Ashikaga Yoshihisa, 1473-1489.\n3. Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, 1367-1394. 10. Ashikaga Yoshimura, 1489-1493\n4. Ashikaga Yoshimochi, 1394-1423 and 1508-1521.\n and 1425-1428. 11. Ashikaga Yoshizumi, 1493-1508.\n5. Ashikaga Yoshikazu, 1423-1425. 12. Ashikaga Yoshiharu, 1521-1545.\n6. Ashikaga Yoshinori, 1428-1441. 13. Ashikaga Yoshiteru, 1545-1565.\n7. Ashikaga Yoshikatsu, 1441-1449. 14. Ashikaga Yoshinaga, 1565-1568.\n 15. Ashikaga Yoshiaki, 1568-1573.\n\n\n\n\nChapter X\n\nINTERNAL PEACE AND EXTERNAL WAR. 1573-1603\n\n\nAt the end of the last chapter we left feudal Japan wasted by internal\nanarchy. It is one of the most remarkable phenomena in history that\nwithin two decades after the fall of the Ashikaga the national life not\nonly was restored to its normal peace, but also attained to such\nfullness of vigor as to embark in a warfare of unprecedented magnitude\nfor foreign conquest. The period of thirty years between the fall of the\nlast sh\u014dgun of Muromachi and the foundation of the Edo rule, 1573-1603,\nstands unparalleled in the annals of the Japanese nation for its wealth\nof stories of valor and heroism. The spirit of the time was such as\nbrought to the surface only men of uncommon ability. The era was of\nitself rich in inspiring events, but the latter were in no small measure\ndue to the brilliant achievements of three heroes--Oda Nobunaga\n(1573-1582), Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1583-1598), and Tokugawa Iyeyasu\n(1600-1616)--who rose one after another to rule over feudal Japan.\nDeferring the story of the work of the last statesman, we shall now turn\nto the career of Oda and Toyotomi, who respectively unified the long\ndismembered nation, and organized the great Korean expedition.\n\nThe tendency of the Ashikaga times was to encourage individual ambition.\nMilitary chieftains devoted themselves to organizing armies and\nequipping soldiers in the most efficient manner, in order to overcome\nrivals and establish their own independence. But none of them ever\nsucceeded in introducing order into the provinces they overran or\norganizing their administration on a permanent basis. Probably the\norigin of this defect is to be sought, not in the administrative\nincompetence of these chieftains, but rather in the absence of any\nsupreme head to issue general orders. The power of the imperial court,\nindeed, had greatly declined, but the nation nevertheless regarded the\nsovereign with the utmost respect, and whatever the prowess of military\nnobles or however great the number of their following, it was\nimpossible for them to undertake any decisive campaign against Ky\u014dto,\nbecause, in traversing the interval that separated their bases of\noperations from the capital, they would have found themselves environed\nby enemies ready to protect the court against violence, as well as by\nrivals whom the prospect of any one noble's supremacy would have moved\nto union against him. Nothing remained, therefore, but to establish\nlocal autonomy. Beyond that none of the great nobles succeeded in\nattaining until the Oda family appeared in Owari, and owing to their\nsagacity and valor, as well as to the strategical advantages of their\nposition, accomplished more than any of their predecessors.\n\nThis remarkable family was descended from the family of Taira.\nNobunaga's father, Nobuhide, from his early youth, was an ardent\nimperialist. He made large pecuniary sacrifices to effect the repairs of\nthe emperor's palace and the reconstruction of one of the principal\nshrines in Ise. His son Nobunaga, a man of daring, harbored ambitious\ndesigns, and following his father's example, treated the sovereign with\nthe utmost deference, and constantly revolved plans for the general\npacification of the country and the restoration of order. In his youth\nhe showed a disposition to profligacy, but when his chief vassal\ncommitted suicide to emphasize a protest against these dissolute\ncourses, Nobunaga completely reformed his conduct. An opportunity soon\noccurred to test his military genius. Among the rival lords of that\ntime, Imagawa Yoshimoto, chief of the provinces of Suruga, T\u014dt\u014dmi, and\nMikawa, showed a conspicuous disposition to attack and raid the\nneighboring territories. In 1560 he invaded Owari at the head of a great\narmy, overbearing all resistance and destroying several strongholds.\nPushing on to Okehazama, he rested there, and organized an immense\nbanquet to celebrate his successes. During the progress of these\nfestivities, Oda Nobunaga, in command of a comparatively small force,\nsurprised the Imagawa camp, inflicted a crushing defeat on the invaders,\nand killed Yoshimoto, a disaster from which the Imagawa family never\nrecovered. Soon afterward Nobunaga annexed the province of Mino, the\nlord of which had alienated his followers by his unworthy manner of\nlife. Nobunaga further strengthened his position toward the east by\nentering into marital relations with the families of Takeda and\nMatsudaira. He now watched closely for a favorable opportunity to direct\nhis arms against the military magnates in Ky\u014dto. It will be remembered\nhow one Matsunaga assassinated the Sh\u014dgun Yoshiteru, and how the\nlatter's brother, Yoshiaki, in 1568, succeeded to the sh\u014dgunate with the\nloyal support of Nobunaga. Nobunaga had in the meantime annexed \u014cmi and\nall the Kinai provinces. Nominally a vassal, his influence was greater\nthan that of the sh\u014dgun. Nobunaga built a castle at Nij\u014d, summoning the\npeople of the Kinai and other districts to contribute to its completion\neither in money or labor. This place he assigned as residence to the\nsh\u014dgun, intrusting the duty of guarding him to Kinoshita Hideyoshi,\nafterward Toyotomi. Nobunaga also repaired the imperial palace, and\nrestored it to its ancient and long-forgotten splendor. One of the\nmethods employed by Nobunaga to obtain funds for the preservation of the\nimperial buildings was to lend rice to the people, the interest accruing\non the loans being devoted to the maintenance of the palace. Nobunaga\nreversed the policy of the Ashikaga, not only in thus manifesting his\nloyalty to the imperial house, but also in dealing harshly with the\nBuddhist priests of Mount Hiye, whose great influence had been feared by\ntemporal rulers ever since the ninth century. In his war with the lord\nof Echizen, he found these sacerdotal warriors on the side of his enemy.\nAs soon as Echizen was reduced, Nobunaga, disregarding the remonstrance\nof his vassals, destroyed several of the temples, putting the priests to\ndeath as well as the women and children who lived with them,\nconfiscating their lands, and bestowing them on his vassal Akechi\nMitsuhide. Thus fell the contumacious and powerful priests who, relying\non the authority of their religion, had treated even imperial mandates\nwith contempt. Nothing remained of them but a few of their temples and\nthe doctrines they had taught. Kosa, however, the lord abbot of\nHongwan-ji, fled from one place to another and gathered a body of strong\nsupporters wherever he went, and it was not till eleven years later that\nthe priestly opposition was completely reduced. Meanwhile, the Sh\u014dgun\nYoshiaki grew jealous of the immense power which Nobunaga was acquiring,\nand in spite of the latter's repeated effort to convince him of his\nloyalty, at length in 1573 raised an army to destroy Nobunaga. The\ncampaign, however, ended in the defeat of the sh\u014dgun. He escaped to the\nprovince of Kawachi, and the supremacy of the Ashikaga family came to an\nend. In 1576 Nobunaga built a castle of unprecedented strength at\nAdsuchi in \u014cmi. The keep was a hundred feet in height. It stood within\nseven stone walls of circumvallation, with moats constructed of large\nmasses of granite.\n\nHaving thus fixed his headquarters in Adsuchi, Oda Nobunaga set about\nsubduing those eastern provinces which still remained independent, and\nalso all of the western provinces, where his influence was almost\nunknown. No sooner, however, had the former been reduced under his sway\nand the plans of campaign against the latter matured, than Nobunaga met\nan untimely death in 1582 at the hand of his vassal, Akechi Mitsuhide.\nWith great strategic skill, Nobunaga had combined the faculty of\ndiscovering able men and winning their loyalty. Seldom had so large a\nnumber of great men been found under the control of a single ruler as\nunder Nobunaga. Death prevented him from carrying out his design of\nsubjugating Kiush\u016b, as he had conquered the other districts of the\nempire. Toward the imperial court he had shown unvarying reverence. He\nhad devoted considerable sums to renovating the shrines. He also had\nadopted effective measures for the repair of roads and bridges, and\nfacilitated travel by abolishing military barriers. But his character\nwas austere, and his administrative measures were strict and\nuncompromising. It was by the exercise of these traits that he provoked\nthe anger of Mitsuhide, and thus unfortunately met an untimely end\nwithout achieving the great ambition of his life.\n\nAkechi Mitsuhide, the assassin, proceeded to Adsuchi, and having there\npossessed himself of a large supply of money and other valuables,\nreturned to Ky\u014dto. Hashiba Hideyoshi, who led the western campaign\nagainst the great M\u014dri family, quickly accepted the surrender of the\nlatter, who were ignorant of Nobunaga's death, and hastened back to turn\nhis arms against the rebel general. Mitsuhide sustained a crushing\ndefeat at Yamazaki in Settsu. Fleeing toward \u014cmi, he was assassinated\n_en route_ by a farmer, only thirteen days after he had raised the\nstandard of revolt. The celerity with which Hideyoshi avenged the death\nof Nobunaga had a decisive effect upon the course of events that\nfollowed. Other great vassals of the late Nobunaga also hurried from\ntheir provinces to accomplish the same end, only to find that Hideyoshi\nhad forestalled them all. A consultation was now held between Hideyoshi\nand these generals regarding Nobunaga's successor, his two sons,\nNobukatsu and Nobutaka, being keen rivals for the honor. Hideyoshi,\napprehending that their mutual enmity might prove disastrous if either\nwere nominated, would not listen to the advice of his colleagues, but\ninsisted that Samb\u014dshi, son of Nobutada, the heir of Nobunaga, who\nperished with his father, should be appointed. Samb\u014dshi was then a child\nonly three years of age, so the power of the Oda family devolved upon\nHideyoshi. The other generals, however, refused to endorse this\narrangement. Nobutaka especially was hostile to the influence of\nHideyoshi. Acting in collusion with Shibata Katsuiye and Takikawa\nKazumasu, he attempted to destroy Hideyoshi. But again Hideyoshi's\nvictory was quick and decisive, for not only did the conspirators fall\none after another in battle, but their fiefs were annexed by Hideyoshi,\nwhose prestige was thus greatly increased. The emperor now conferred on\nhim the title of _sangi_ (councilor of state). He established his\nheadquarters in \u014csaka, judging the place convenient for purposes of\ntransportation and administration alike. Instructions were issued to the\nvarious territorial nobles to furnish timber and stones, with which\nHideyoshi caused to be constructed in \u014csaka a magnificent castle.\nMeanwhile, Nobukatsu, the remaining son of Nobunaga, had conceived\nhostility toward Hideyoshi, and in conjunction with Tokugawa Iyeyasu,\nraised an army and occupied a strong position at Komaki in Owari.\nHideyoshi, finding himself unable to overcome these adversaries,\nconcluded peace with them. He also subdued the independent provinces of\nthe north and Shikoku. In Kiush\u016b, where the powerful family of Shimadsu\nhad held sway over the whole island, Hideyoshi reduced their fief to\nthree provinces of Hiuga, Satsuma, and \u014csumi, and confiscated the other\nsix. The H\u014dj\u014d family of Odawara and Date Masamune of the extreme north\nheld out the longest against Hideyoshi, but they also finally yielded to\nthe overwhelming military genius. Further, he recognized as lord of the\nIsland of Ezo, Matsumaye Nobuhiro, whose grandfather had crossed thither\nand subdued the aborigines. For the first time the wars and tumults that\nhad convulsed Japan since the Ojin era were at last brought to an end,\nand the whole country came under the administrative sway of one strong\nruler.\n\nThe story of the rise of Hideyoshi from the humblest to the most\nelevated position in the feudal world of Japan is highly characteristic\nof the man and his times. The son of a foot-soldier in Owari,\nHideyoshi's original name was T\u014dkichi. From early childhood he acquired\namong his playmates a reputation for cleverness. Subsequently,\nattracted by the great renown of Nobunaga, he took service under him,\nwho, pleased with the sagacity displayed by the youth, raised him after\na time to the command of a division of soldiers. T\u014dkichi grew in favor\nwith the Oda chief, who conferred on him the name of Hashiba, deriving\nit from the names of his two ablest generals, Niwa and Shibata. When\nNobunaga was assassinated, Hideyoshi showed remarkable promptness and\nability in destroying the traitorous vassal, a deed that won for him\nhigh popularity among the partisans of the deceased chief. Thenceforth\nhis career was a series of brilliantly conceived and boldly executed\nconquests. Professing always to protect the Oda family, he took\nadvantage of the discussions between Nobutaka and Nobukatsu to overthrow\nKatsuiye and Kazumasu, and showed at once his magnanimity and his\nprowess in the easy terms of peace which he granted to the Shimadsu\nfamily while pushing his operations against the H\u014dj\u014d to their complete\noverthrow. Thus, despite his humble origin, he succeeded ultimately in\ngrasping the administrative reins of the whole empire. His ambition\nprompted him to desire the post of _sei-i-tai-sh\u014dgun_, but custom had\nrequired from time immemorial that the occupant of that high office\nshould be a member of the Minamoto clan. This difficulty Hideyoshi\nsought to overcome by getting himself adopted as the son of the Sh\u014dgun\nYoshiaki, but the latter could not be persuaded to consent. Ultimately,\nhe induced the emperor to appoint him _kwanry\u014d_ or regent, a position\nreally ranking higher than that of sh\u014dgun. On that occasion the\nsovereign conferred on him the family name of Toyotomi. Hideyoshi also\nspared no pains to restore the prestige of the throne, supplying all the\nexpenses required for the imperial household and exacting from the\nnobles an oath that they would reverence the sovereign and make no\nencroachment on the imperial domains.\n\nHideyoshi's administrative organization was remarkable. He created five\n_bugy\u014d_; namely, a mayor of the city of Ky\u014dto, a manager of taxation, a\njudicial administrator, a supervisor of the public works, and a supreme\njudge of civil suits. He also selected Tokugawa Iyeyasu, Uyesugi\nKagekatsu, M\u014dri Terumoto, Ukita Hideiye, and Mayeda Toshiiye to form a\ncouncil of state, called the _gotair\u014d_, five elders, for the purpose of\ndeliberating upon all weighty national affairs. The question of the land\nalso received careful attention at his hands. Perceiving that, owing to\nfaulty administration of the regulations, many irregularities had\narisen, and estates were in many cases wrongly registered, he\ndispatched inspectors to all the provinces and caused accurate surveys\nand returns to be made, severe punishment being meted out to any\nofficials convicted of receiving bribes in the execution of this office.\nThe result was that large tracts of land hitherto improperly exempted\nfrom taxation were brought within the fiscal system. A radical change\nwas also introduced in the manner of registering lands: hitherto they\nhad been classed according to the monetary income obtained from them;\nthenceforth they were estimated according to their produce in kind, and\nthe taxes were calculated on the basis of this new valuation. Speaking\nroughly, about two-thirds of the produce went to the state, the\nremainder to the cultivators of the land. Further, in view of the\ndefective condition of the currency, Hideyoshi caused gold coins of two\ndimensions--_\u014dban_ and _koban_--to be struck, as well as ingots of\nsilver, and coins of silver and copper known as the _tensh\u014d ts\u016bh\u014d-sen_.\n\nIn Hideyoshi's time Christianity had already obtained considerable vogue\nthroughout the country. Oda Nobunaga had sanctioned the preaching of the\nforeign creed, and had built for it a place of worship, called\nNamban-ji, in Ky\u014dto. But when Hideyoshi, in the course of his campaign\nagainst Shimadsu, reached Hakata, the Christian priests showed such an\narrogant demeanor that Hideyoshi, enraged by their conduct, ordered that\nthey should leave Japan by a certain day, and prohibited the people from\nembracing Christianity. He even went to the length of causing Namban-ji\nto be destroyed. Some of the converts, however, managed to conceal\nthemselves and carry on their worship in secret. When the Tokugawa\nsh\u014dguns came into possession of the administrative power, the edicts\nagainst the foreign faith were strictly enforced, and steps were taken\nto restore to Buddhism those who had embraced Christianity. These\nmeasures were unsuccessful, however, and culminated in the Shimabara\ndisturbances in 1637, which will be subsequently described.\n\nWe shall now relate the story of Hideyoshi's Korean expedition. It will\nbe remembered how, during the period of the lax administration of the\nAshikaga, the laws were ill respected, disorders were constant, and the\nlittoral population took advantage of the situation to engage in\npiratical raids against China. These proceedings led to a cessation of\nintercourse between Japan and China, and Korea also, having been\nconquered by China, ceased to maintain friendly relations with Japan. At\nthe same time, on Japan's part, much cause of complaint existed against\nKorea. The Koreans had always assisted the Yuan dynasty of Mongols in\ntheir attacks upon Japan, and had shown themselves her bitter enemies.\nBut owing to the unceasing prevalence of internal disturbances in Japan,\nit was not possible to avenge the hostile acts of China and Korea. So\nsoon, however, as domestic broils were brought to an end and the control\nof the administration rendered effective throughout the empire,\nHideyoshi formed the project of leading an expedition against the Ming\nsovereigns. He had entertained this idea for some time, and had made it\nknown to Oda Nobunaga when preparations were in progress for the\ncampaign against the M\u014dri family. In 1587, after his successful\nexpedition against the Shimadsu in Kiush\u016b, Hideyoshi sent a dispatch to\nS\u014d Yoshitomo, warden of Tsushima Island, directing him to take steps for\ninviting the king of Korea to come to Japan in order to have audience of\nthe Japanese emperor. This invitation was to be accompanied by an\nintimation that unless the king obeyed the summons, the Japanese forces\nwould at once be directed against Korea. Following up this measure, he\ndetermined--in 1590, by which time the country's domestic troubles had\nbeen entirely settled--to insist on presents being sent to Japan by both\nChina and Korea, on pain of being invaded unless they consented to take\nthat step. He dispatched an envoy to Korea with instructions to make\nknown his purpose, and to require that the Koreans should act as\nintermediaries to procure China's consent. In the event of the Koreans'\nrefusing, they were threatened with the punishment of being compelled to\nmarch in the van of the Japanese army to the invasion of China. The\nKoreans, however, declined to accept such a proposition. Hideyoshi\nthereupon gave up the office of _kwanpaku_ to his adopted son, Hidetsugu,\nand assuming the title of _taik\u014d_, he decided to lead an expedition\nagainst Korea. The emperor having given his approval of the step, orders\nwere issued to all the provinces to furnish troops and military\nsupplies, as well as to build a great fleet of war-vessels. In 1592\nHideyoshi appointed Ukita Hideiye commander-in-chief of the army, with\nMasuda Nagamori, Ishida Mitsunari, and Otani Yoshitaka for his staff.\nThe whole force, numbering, it is said, 130,000 men, was divided into\neight corps, and with the van were Konishi Yukinaga and Kat\u014d Kiyomasa.\nThe sailors of the fleet aggregated 9000, and were under the command of\nKuki Yoshitaka.\n\n[Illustration: Korea]\n\nIn March, Hideyoshi left Ky\u014dto, and proceeding westward worshiped at the\nsepulchers of the Emperor Ch\u016bai and the Empress Jing\u014d, passing thence to\nNagoya in Hizen, where the forces from all the provinces were being\nmustered. In April the expedition sailed from the coast of Japan. The\nnumber of ships was so great that they seemed to cover the sea and\nstruck the Koreans with consternation. Konishi Yukinaga and his division\nwere the first to reach Korea. They effected a landing at Fusan, and\ntook prisoner the Korean general who attempted to defend the port.\n\nFrom this point Yukinaga marched confidently on Tokunegi, overbearing\nall resistance and putting the enemy's officers to the sword. Shortly\nafterward Kiyomasa and his corps also reached Fusan, and heading for\nKegushagushu, attacked and took it. Korea's opposition was soon crushed,\nand the whole country submitted to the vast force of invaders.\nMeanwhile, the king, Lien, who had not failed to convey to China\nintimation of the pending danger, sent to the court of the Ming\nsovereigns earnest appeals for succor; and his troops having been\neverywhere defeated by the Japanese, he finally fled from the capital\nwith his son, and took refuge in Hegushagu, having left one of his\ngenerals to defend Kanko. The Japanese troops, everywhere victorious,\npushed on to the capital, which was taken by Konishi Yukinaga, the other\ngenerals subsequently assembling there. Yukinaga now made preparations\nto invade Hei-ando, and Kiyomasa took Hamukyando as the scene of his\nnext campaign. Meanwhile, Hideyoshi, forseeing that a Chinese army would\nbe sent to aid the Koreans, dispatched reinforcements to the invading\ntroops, and conveyed to the commanders messages of encouragement and\nexhortation. He was persuaded that the Japanese army would defeat the\nChinese, and he believed that in the space of two years the conquest of\nChina might be effected, in which event he purposed transferring the\ncapital of Japan to China. He even went so far as to determine the\nroutine to be followed in the removal of the Japanese court to China.\nKiyomasa now marched northward to Hamukyando, where he took a town\ncalled Eikyo. Learning there that two Korean princes were at Kaineifu,\nhe attacked it and took them both prisoners. Continuing his advance, he\ncrossed the northern frontier and entered Orankai, where he destroyed\nthe castle, taking and putting to death a number of Koreans. The\nimpetuosity of his movements and the unvarying success of his arms\nfilled the Koreans with dismay. They gave him the name of \"_Kishokwan_\"\n(_i.\u00a0e._, the demon general), and fled at the mere news of his approach.\n\nYukinaga, in the meanwhile, having conquered Hei-an, the king of Korea\nretired from Hegushagu and would have entered Hamukyan, but finding that\nKiyomasa had already overrun that district, he turned westward to Gishu\n(Wiju). Yukinaga marched against Kuimeigen and took Hegushagu, the\nJapanese troops being everywhere victorious. Things did not fare equally\nwell with the navy, however. The ships sustained several defeats, and\ntheir intention of proceeding from Terura-do to Kanai-do to effect a\njunction with the army was frustrated by the Korean commander Li\nShunshin, who fought with the utmost tenacity and stoutness.\n\nThe emperor of China, having received intelligence of what was going\nforward in the peninsula, had dispatched from Ap-lok-kong a general\nnamed Tso Shingfon at the head of a considerable force, to succor the\nKoreans. Yukinaga encountered this army and completely routed it, the\nChinese general barely escaping with his life, the news of which event\ninspired much alarm in China. Kiyomasa, whose operations had also been\nattended with uniform success, now directed his forces southward, and\nLien, the king of Korea, in his extremity, once more applied to China\nfor aid. The Chinese sovereign thereupon commissioned a minister, Chom\nWei-king, to consult with his colleagues as to the advisability of\nconcluding peace with Japan. But among the Chinese captains there was\none Li Chiu, who, having much confidence in his own prowess, insisted\nthat no terms should be offered, and that the war should be prosecuted\nto the end. Another army was accordingly dispatched to Korea under his\ncommand, and marching with rapidity, he soon reached Hegushagu at the\nhead of a great force. There he encountered the Japanese under Yukinaga\nand defeated them. Yukinaga retired to the Korean capital, whither also\nthe other Japanese generals concentrated their troops, the corps under\nthe command of Kobayagawa Takakage alone remaining to guard Kaijo,\ndespite the urgent advice of the other three generals that he too should\nconcentrate his forces at the capital. Li, following up his victory,\npushed on toward the capital at the head of a large army. Takakage and\nothers encountered the Chinese army at Hekitei-kan, and the divisions of\nTachibana Muneshige and M\u014dri Hidekane fought with such bravery that Li's\nforce was almost exterminated, Li himself barely escaping. Takakage\nhotly pursued the retreating Chinese, great numbers of whom either fell\nunder the swords of the Japanese or were drowned in attempting to cross\nrivers. This blow threw the Chinese into a state of disorganization. Li\nretired into Hegushagu, and remained inactive.\n\nMeanwhile, the victorious career of the Japanese had been checked in\nChiushu, in attacking which place they were repulsed. Moreover, plague\nbroke out in the camp and provisions were exhausted. Under these\ncircumstances the Japanese were not unwilling to listen to proposals of\npeace made by a Chinese envoy, Chom Wei-king. Hideyoshi dictated seven\narticles as the basis of a treaty; first, that in order to secure amity\nbetween the two empires, a Chinese imperial princess should become the\nconsort of a Japanese imperial prince: second, that permits for\ncommercial intercourse should be sent to Japan; third, that the\nministers of the two countries should exchange a friendly convention;\nfourth, that Korea should be divided into halves, one to belong to\nJapan, and the other, including the four provinces and the capital, then\nin Japanese hands, to be restored to Korea; fifth, that Korea should\nplace in Japan's hands, as pledges of good faith, her prince royal and\ncertain ministers of the crown; sixth, that Japan should restore to\nKorea the two Korean princes whom she had taken prisoners; and seventh,\nthat influential Korean subjects should give written promises of\nsubmission to Japan. The Chinese envoy objected to the two conditions\nrelating to the marriage of a Chinese princess with a Japanese prince,\nand to the partition of Korea. Hideyoshi, however, urged him to return\nto China and report the situation to his sovereign. Meanwhile, he\nordered the Japanese generals to send back the two Korean prisoners, and\nto renew the attack on Chiushu, pending the conclusion of peace. But,\nafter some further parleying, the Chinese envoy finally refused to\ncomply with Hideyoshi's suggestion, and no answer to Japan's conditions\nwas received from the Chinese emperor. Hideyoshi, now concluding that\npeace was impossible, began to make preparations for himself leading an\narmy to attack China. At this juncture the envoy who had been sent to\nJapan, as well as other Chinese statesmen, suggested to their emperor\nthat what Hideyoshi really wanted was an imperial commission appointing\nhim king of Japan. The Chinese emperor accordingly dispatched another\nenvoy to Japan carrying a gold seal and a headpiece specially\nmanufactured for the purpose. In 1596, Hideyoshi gave audience to this\nenvoy in the castle at Fushimi, and ordered him to read the documents\nwith which he had come entrusted. The envoy complied, but when he came\nto the clause where it was stated that the Chinese government appointed\nHideyoshi to be king of Japan, the _taik\u014d_ became greatly enraged.\nSeizing the document he threw it and the headpiece on the floor, and\ndeclared that his intention was to become king of China, and that the\nChinese government should learn how little it had to do with the\nsovereignty of Japan. He dismissed the Chinese and Korean envoys, and\nissued orders for a campaign against China. In February of the following\nyear, the Japanese generals assembled at Nagoya in Hizen, Kiyomasa and\nYukinaga being the first to set out for Korea. The Chinese government,\nlearning that the negotiations had been unsuccessful, sent another army\nto the peninsula under the command of Ying Kai and Tik Ho.\n\nMeanwhile, the Korean general Li Shunshin had gained several victories\nover the Japanese forces, and joined by this new army, his strength\nbecame very great. Thereupon Kiyomasa fortified his position at Urosan,\nand there sustained a stubborn siege, the Chinese General Tik Ho's\nrepeated efforts to reduce the place proving abortive. By degrees the\nprovisions within Kiyomasa's lines became exhausted. His men were\nobliged to eat horse-flesh, and being exposed to the bitter cold of\nmid-winter many lost their hands from frost-bite. Hearing of the evil\nplight of their comrades, Toyotomi Hideaki and M\u014dri Hidemoto marched to\nthe relief of Kiyomasa, and the besieging army retired without\nresistance. Kuroda Nagamasa fell on them as they retreated, and being\njoined by Kiyomasa, the two generals attacked the Chinese with great\nvehemence and completely routed them. Shimadsu Yoshihiro also defeated a\nChinese army at Shinsai and Shisen. At this juncture, however, the\n_taik\u014d_ died. On the point of death he issued instructions for the\nrecall of the Japanese army from Korea. This event occurred in 1598, and\nthe news caused great rejoicing in China. The Chinese forces in Korea\nhung upon the flanks of the Japanese troops as they withdrew, but were\nso disheartened by the crushing reverses they had just experienced that\nthey did not dare to make any serious attack. The Japanese ships also\ndefeated the Chinese squadron, and were thus enabled to return to Japan\nunmolested. In the following year, the services of Tokugawa Iyeyasu and\nother Japanese generals were duly considered by the imperial court in\nKy\u014dto, and received adequate recognition. A few years later, in 1607,\nKorea sent an envoy to Japan carrying gifts and suing for peace. The\nSh\u014dgun Tokugawa Hidetada received these overtures favorably and amicable\nrelations were established between the two countries.\n\nDuring the closing years of Hideyoshi's life, his adopted son Hidetsugu,\nin whose favor he had resigned the office of _kwanpaku_ so greatly\nabused his power that Hideyoshi became indignant and ordered him into\nretirement in the monastery of K\u014dya-san, where, shortly afterward, he\nreceived instructions to commit suicide. Hideyoshi bequeathed his rank\nand titles to his son Hideyori, who was a mere child at the time of his\nillustrious father's decease. A few hours before his death the great\ncaptain and administrator summoned all his generals to his side, and\nmade them swear to protect his youthful successor, appointing Mayeda\nToshiiye to the post of guardian. The generals, however, entertained\ntoward each other sentiments of such jealousy and hostility that the old\ndisorders would have been renewed but for the transcendent ability and\nprowess of Tokugawa Iyeyasu.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XI\n\nTHE FOUNDATION OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT. 1603-1651\n\n\nWe have now to speak of the fifth line of sh\u014dguns, the Tokugawa at Edo,\nwho held administrative sway for 255 years from 1603 to the time of the\nimperial restoration in 1868, a period which is not far removed from the\npresent; and during which the feudal organization of Japan attained its\nmost perfect development.\n\nThe original name of the Tokugawa family was Matsudaira. They were of\nthe same blood as Nitta and Ashikaga and of the clan of Minamoto. From\nthe time of the Southern and Northern dynasties their forefathers,\ngeneration after generation, espoused the cause opposed to the Ashikaga,\nand consequently during the Muromachi sh\u014dgunate they were relegated to a\nposition of insignificance. Subsequently, they acquired large\nterritorial possessions and had their seat in Mikawa during eight\ngenerations. But being surrounded by powerful enemies, they experienced\nno little difficulty in maintaining themselves. When Iyeyasu was a mere\nchild, he was confined in various places as a surety for his family's\nconduct. These experiences probably helped to sharpen his naturally\ngreat abilities. At the age of seventeen he succeeded to the headship of\nthe family, and as he grew to manhood he gave proofs of magnanimity and\ncoolness, no less than of strategical skill. Gradually and astutely he\nencroached upon the neighboring provinces, taking clever advantage of\nthe disordered state of the country, until finally he obtained\npossession of all the provinces that had belonged to the Takeda and the\nImagawa and found himself the strongest chieftain in T\u014dkai-d\u014d, lord of\nthe five provinces of Mikawa, T\u014dt\u014dmi, Suruga, Kai, and Shinano. In 1590,\nwhen Hideyoshi had overthrown the H\u014dj\u014d at Odawara, all the eight\nprovinces of Kwant\u014d--Sagami, Musashi, Izu, Kazusa, Shim\u014dsa, K\u014dzuke,\nShimotsuke, and Hitachi--hitherto held by the H\u014dj\u014d, were given to\nIyeyasu, the _taik\u014d_ receiving in their stead the five provinces\npreviously possessed by Iyeyasu in T\u014dkai-d\u014d; an exchange doubtless\nsuggested to the _taik\u014d_ by the comparative propinquity of the latter\nfive provinces to Ky\u014dto, and the advisability of relegating to a distant\npart of the empire a chieftain of such commanding gifts as Iyeyasu\nexhibited. Having come into possession of the eight provinces, Iyeyasu\nmade his headquarters at Edo (now T\u014dky\u014d). A castle had been built here\nmore than a century before by Ota D\u014dkan, a vassal of the Uyesugi, but it\nwas of insignificant dimensions, and the town which it overlooked was\ntouched on three sides by the Musashino plain, its southeastern front\nbeing washed by the sea. The streets, where one and a half million\ncitizens now congregate, were then overgrown with reeds. So soon,\nhowever, as Iyeyasu moved thither, he inaugurated extensive\nimprovements, leveling hills, filling marshes, digging great moats, and\nbuilding colossal parapets, until a site was fully prepared for a great\ncapital.\n\nIyeyasu, though of indomitable courage in war, was a man of gentle\nmethods. His keen perception showed him every aspect of an affair, and\nhis patience in unraveling difficulties never failed. So long as the\nreins of administration remained in his hands, quiet obedience was\neverywhere accorded to his sway. No one opposed him. As for Hideyoshi,\nhe soon appreciated the Tokugawa chief and treated him with all the\nconsideration due to his great gifts. Iyeyasu had large ambition. Coming\ninto possession of the Kwant\u014d provinces, he sat down quietly to foster\nhis strength and bide his time, Hideyoshi, meanwhile, wasting his\nresources in fruitless attacks upon Korea and thus impairing the\nprosperity which his transcendent abilities had obtained for him.\nFinally, before his foreign wars had reached any issue, he died,\nbequeathing his power to his son, Hideyori, then a lad of only seven\nyears. The usual results of a minor's administration ensued. The\ngovernment fell into disorder. Once more the old rivalry sprang up among\nthe feudal chiefs, each struggling for supremacy. Above them all towered\nTokugawa Iyeyasu, for his influence was superior even to that of the\nToyotomi family.\n\n[Illustration: CENTRAL JAPAN]\n\nGradually the various dissentient elements disposed themselves into two\ngreat parties. The one, including Kat\u014d Kiyomasa, Fukushima Masanori,\nKuroda Nagamasa, Asano Yukinaga, and other notables, was under the\nleadership of Iyeyasu, and the other, to which belonged M\u014dri Terumoto,\nUyesugi Kagekatsu, Ukita Hideiye, and forty-three other feudal chiefs,\nhostile to the Tokugawa, was under the real leadership of Ishida\nMitsunari, a favorite of the late Hideyoshi, and under the nominal\nleadership of the _taik\u014d's_ son, Hideyori. The latter party had their\nheadquarters in the \u014csaka castle, and the struggle for mastery was\nfinally concluded in a great battle, fought on September 15, 1600.\nIyeyasu was the assailant. Marching westward at the head of an army of\n80,000, he encountered Mitsunari's forces, numbering 130,000, on the\nSekigahara plain in Mino, the \u014csaka confederates having moved thus far\nto the combat. Swords were crossed at eight in the morning, and the\nbattle waged with the utmost fierceness for six hours, the \u014csaka army\nbeing ultimately defeated with a loss of 30,000. Mitsunari and Yukinaga\nwere among the slain, and tradition says that the whole plain was red\nwith gore. So decisive was this victory that other nobles who had\nespoused the cause of Hideyori and were fighting for it in their own\ndistricts now laid down their arms and hastened to come to terms with\nthe victor. Iyeyasu now set himself to consolidate his power.\nConfiscating, wholly or in part, the estates of the chiefs who had\nopposed him, he made ample grants to his own supporters. The\nadministrative power of the empire came wholly into his hands, and every\npart of the country accepted his control. Three years later he was\nnominated _sei-i-tai-sh\u014dgun_, and thenceforth, through many generations,\nhis family ruled in Edo.\n\n[Illustration: THE PROCESSION OF FEUDAL LORDS]\n\nBut although the administrative supremacy had been acquired by the\nTokugawa, the _taik\u014d's_ son and successor, Toyotomi Hideyori, still\nresided at \u014csaka. Possessing a princely income of 650,000 _koku_ of\nrice, ruler of three provinces, Settsu, Kawachi, and Izumi, old enough\nnow to direct his own affairs, and enjoying the prestige of his renowned\nfather, he wielded a degree of influence which even Iyeyasu could not\nafford to despise. Among Hideyori's adherents there were some who hoped\nto see him restored to the position his father had occupied, and these,\nplotting secretly to effect their purpose, found supporters among the\nfeudal chieftains, who, though they had made act of submission to the\nTokugawa, still remembered the benefits they had received from the late\nHideyoshi and were fain to succor his son. Thus \u014csaka remained a\nconstant menace to the Tokugawa, who, on their side, watched keenly for\nsome act on the part of the Toyotomi that might furnish a pretext for\ntheir overthrow, whereas the adherents of the Toyotomi, bitterly jealous\nof the Tokugawa supremacy and resenting every evidence of it, naturally\ncommitted acts of tactlessness and contumacy.\n\nJust at this time the Toyotomi family caused to be rebuilt a great image\nof Buddha which stood in the temple of H\u014dk\u014dji, in Ky\u014dto. The work was\ncompleted in 1614. A bell was cast to commemorate the event, and in its\nsuperscription there appeared a phrase praying for the tranquillity of\nthe state. Two of the four characters forming this phrase happened to be\nthe ideograms spelling the name of Iyeyasu. The latter pretended to be\nmuch offended at this. He declared that the obvious intention of the\naffair was to invoke the curse of heaven on his head, and being strongly\nsupported in this view by the nobles who espoused his cause, he directed\nthat an inquiry of the strictest nature should be at once instituted in\n\u014csaka. The Toyotomi family refusing to submit tamely to this indignity,\ndetermined to appeal to the sword, and there flocked to \u014csaka from the\nprovinces some 60,000 _r\u014dnin_ (unenrolled military men), who formed\nthemselves into a garrison for the defense of the castle. But the power\nof Iyeyasu was too great for such a movement to develop large\nproportions. Intelligence of the designs of the Toyotomi, so far from\nenlisting the sympathy of the feudal chieftains, led them rather to\nrenew their professions of loyalty to Iyeyasu, and the latter, who had\nanticipated this, ordered them to march to the conquest of \u014csaka. After\nthe castle had undergone a long siege, peace was temporarily restored,\nonly to be broken again in the following year, when rivalry led the\n\u014csaka folks to once more declare war. On this occasion the number of\nToyotomi partisans who assembled at \u014csaka was twice as great as it had\nbeen in the preceding year. They were all brave men, resolved to fight\nto the death. But among such a variously composed host it was difficult\nto secure unanimity of opinion or concert in action. Moreover, the moats\nof the castle having been filled on the conclusion of peace the year\nbefore, it had lost its old impregnability and become useless as a\ndefensive stronghold. Hence, the vast army marshaled under the Tokugawa\nbanners had little difficulty in taking it by assault.[1] Hideyori and\nhis mother, Yodogimi, threw themselves into the flames of the burning\ncastle, and \u014cno Harunaga, together with the principal of those who had\ncounseled war, killed themselves out of respect to their lord. The\nToyotomi family was thus finally overthrown, and the power of the\nTokugawa completely established. Thenceforth the country entered upon a\nlong era of peace.\n\nIn the following year, 1616, Iyeyasu fell ill and died at the age of\nseventy-five. He was interred at Kun\u014dzan in Suruga, but his remains were\nsubsequently transferred to Nikk\u014d in Shimotsuke, where, amid natural\nscenery of the greatest beauty, a mausoleum of unexampled\nmagnificence was erected in his honor.\n\nHidetada, the second Tokugawa sh\u014dgun, devoted his energies to enforcing\nand observing the laws and precepts of his father. Under him the\ninfluence and prestige of the Tokugawa family increased greatly.\nFurther, the third sh\u014dgun, Iyemitsu, was a man of high courage and\nmagnanimous generosity. In his hands the organization of the government\nwas brought to a state of perfection. This system we shall now describe,\nas it shows the feudalism of Japan at the height of its development.\n\nDuring many centuries it had been customary for the military classes to\nown estates and to govern the people residing on them according to\nfeudal methods. In the closing days of the Ashikaga many military\nfamilies of old standing were ruined, and, on the other hand, not a few\nsoldiers who followed the fortunes of Oda and Toyotomi became the\nfounders of new and opulent families. When the Tokugawa came into power\nthey divided the nobles into two classes. The _fudai_ class comprised\nthe barons who had espoused the Tokugawa cause from the time of the\nlatter's residence in Mikawa and T\u014dt\u014dmi. The second were called\n_tozama_, that is to say, those who did not give in their adherence\nuntil after the decisive battle of Sekigahara of 1600. This distinction\nwas intended to define the intimacy existing between the Tokugawa and\nthe other military chiefs. For the rest, the estates of the nobles were\nfixed according to their exploits at the battle of Sekigahara. In\nconsideration of the vital importance of preserving uninterrupted\ncommunication with the capital, the estates of the barons were so\ndistributed that none of the _tozama_ class held sway along the line of\ncommunications. Further, although the _fudai_ barons were chiefly of the\nsmaller order, they occupied the most important provinces, and were so\ndistributed that they could easily combine if necessary; whereas the\n_tozama_ magnates, though ruling great territories, were separated from\neach other by the _fudai_ barons, and were moreover remotely situated\nfrom important centers of action. For example, Mayeda, the most puissant\namong the _tozama_ nobles, had his territories extended over the three\nprovinces of Kaga, Noto, and Echizen, and his annual revenues aggregated\nover a million _koku_ of rice, while his prestige and popularity were\nvery high. Hence, a number of _fudai_ barons were located in Echigo, to\nact for the Tokugawa in case of emergency, and in Echizen also one of\nthe nobles most closely related to the Tokugawa was placed to block the\nroute of the Mayeda to Ky\u014dto. A similar policy was adopted throughout\nthe empire, so that everywhere, at a given instant, the Tokugawa\npartisans would find themselves in a majority. Places of vantage were\nalso occupied by the sh\u014dgun's adherents. Such was the case with\nNagasaki, the most important port of foreign trade; the Island of Sado,\nwhere valuable gold and silver mines were worked; the shrine of\nDaijin-g\u016b at Yamada in Ise, the headquarters of Shint\u014d worship, and so\nforth. At other places the management of local affairs was entrusted to\nnominees of the sh\u014dgunate, _gundai_ and _daikwan_, all of which\narrangements operated to prevent any effective union among the _tozama_\nnobles.\n\nIn the opening years of the Tokugawa administration an uncompromising\npolicy was pursued. Even such a puissant _tozama_ noble as Fukushima\nMasanori, and such a loyal feudatory as Honda Masazumi, who had assisted\nin the first organization of the sh\u014dgunate, had their estates\nconfiscated by way of punishment for violations of the law, while\nseveral other important nobles were deprived of their territories on the\nground of incompetence to govern them. The principle of succession was\nenforced with especial strictness among the _samurai_. If a man died\nwithout direct male issue his family was declared extinct, and were he a\nnoble, his estate reverted to the sh\u014dgunate. Subsequently the severity\nof this system was modified and adoption began to be permitted, to the\ngreat satisfaction of the feudal chiefs and the military class in\ngeneral. But in the early days the reins of administration were held so\nunflinchingly that even consanguinity with the sh\u014dgun did not save from\ncondign punishment a nobleman who failed in respect for the law.\nDegradations and removals from one province to another were frequent\nforms of punishment for slight breaches of law.\n\nThe autonomy of each individual fief was complete within itself. The\nfeudal barons, whether large or small and whether their relations with\nthe sh\u014dgunate were close or remote enjoyed the privilege of governing\nthe districts under their control in whatever manner they pleased,\nentirely independent of the administration in Edo. This applied to\nfinancial, military, judicial, educational, industrial, and all other\nmatters, the central government reserving to itself only the right of\ndeclaring war or concluding peace, of coining money and of repairing or\nconstructing roads. But while, on the one hand, this principle of\nnon-interference was strictly observed, any dangerous independence that\nit might have developed was effectually obviated by another device,\nnamely, that of requiring the sojourn in Edo of every feudal baron at\nfixed intervals and for a fixed period. This was one of the most\nremarkable measures conceived by the Tokugawa. The policy itself had\nbeen formulated in the time of Iyeyasu, but it did not come into\noperation until 1635, under the third sh\u014dgun, Iyemitsu. Each feudal\nchief was compelled to spend a part of every second year in Edo, the\ndates of setting out from his province and of leaving Edo on his return\njourney being fixed by the sh\u014dgunate. Nothing could have been simpler\nthan this device; nothing more efficacious in establishing and\npreserving the Tokugawa sway. Probably no factor in the Tokugawa system\ncontributed more materially to the unprecedented duration of domestic\npeace throughout two centuries and a half. It was not until 1862, a few\nyears before the fall of Edo, that this astute policy was allowed to\nfall into abeyance. Further, during the first part of the Tokugawa\nsh\u014dgunate the feudal barons were obliged to leave their sons in Edo as\npledges of their own good behavior. This custom was discontinued,\nhowever, in the days of the fourth sh\u014dgun, though the rule that the\nbarons with their wives and children must reside for a given time in the\ncapital every second year was enforced up to within five years of the\nrestoration. One consequence of the rule was that the feudal lords built\nmansions for themselves in Edo, some owning three, some as many as six,\nof such city residences, their inmates varying from hundreds to\nthousands. The effect thus produced upon the prosperity of the capital\nmay easily be conceived. It was also the custom under the Tokugawa\nr\u00e9gime to prevent undue accumulation of wealth in the hands of\nindividuals by ordering conspicuously rich folks to carry out some great\npublic work at their own expense. In fact, no means were neglected to\nprevent the feudal barons from developing inconvenient strength.\n\nIn addition to these rules, exact and rigidly enforced laws--called\n_buke hatto_, or military statutes--were enacted for observance by\nfeudal chiefs and _samurai_ in general. The first body of such laws,\ncomprising thirteen articles, was promulgated in 1615. Subsequently, the\nlaws were repromulgated on the accession of each sh\u014dgun, sometimes with\nmodifications or additions. The principal provisions of these statutes\nwere: that attendance in Edo must be as punctual as possible; that no\nnew castles must be built; that repairs of old ones must not be\nundertaken without special permission; that leagues must not be formed;\nthat marriages must not be contracted without due permission; that\ngarments must be worn and methods of conveyance employed such as suited\nthe rank of the wearer or traveler, and so forth; these vetoes being\nsupplemented by provisions for encouraging the pursuit of military and\nliterary professions, the practice of frugality and other virtues.\n\nThe position of the feudal lords was further lowered and that of the\nsh\u014dgun made more secure when, with a consummate tact, Iyemitsu, the\nthird Tokugawa, annulled the formal distinction between the _tozama_ and\n_fudai_ barons, and reduced the former to the level of the latter. On\nhis accession he summoned to the palace in Edo all the _tozama_ barons,\nand addressed them as follows: \"Our ancestor, having been originally of\nthe same rank with yourselves and enabled to pacify the country through\nyour assistance, was prompted by a sentiment of deference to refrain\nfrom classing you with the _fudai_ barons. But I differ from my ancestor\nin that I was born to the position which he acquired, and am under no\nobligation to preserve any distinction. It is therefore my intention to\nplace you on the same footing as the _fudai_. Should this be displeasing\nto any of you, an interval of three years will now be given you, during\nwhich time you should consider the matter maturely in your own dominions\nand come to a final decision.\" Then, adding that the creed of the\n_samurai_ was to guard with weapons of war the things acquired by such\nmeans, he presented to each of the barons a sword. This injunction, at\nonce so frank and so irresistible, evoked no dissent. The barons\nacquiesced respectfully, but the greater _tozama_ never forgot the\nposition they once held, and their loyalty was often more formal than\nsincere, until after 1860, when some of them turned open enemies of the\nTokugawa.\n\nThe Tokugawa's policy toward the imperial house and the civil nobility\nat Ky\u014dto was not less clever and effective than the control of the\n_daimio_. Theoretically, the sh\u014dgun derived his powers primarily from\nthe emperor, and ruled his vassals under the authority delegated to him\nby the sovereign. The Tokugawa showed deference to this theory by making\nevery effort to enhance the social position and enrich the temporal\ndomains of the emperor. But it was at the same time important for the\nsh\u014dgun that the exercise of his executive power should not be\ninconveniently hampered by interference on the part of the court. Hence,\nin the same year that saw the promulgation of the military statutes,\n1615, Iyeyasu compiled a law of seventeen articles destined chiefly for\nobservance by the court nobles, and entitled \"_Kinch\u016b Jomoku_,\" or\npalace regulations. In this law we find provisions recapitulating orders\nissued by the emperor in the Kwampei era, to the effect that men should\nstudy the ancient poetry of Japan, that the prime minister, the minister\nof the left, and the minister of the right should rank above the princes\nof the blood; that the ranks held by _samurai_ should be considered\nentirely distinct from those held by court nobles, and so forth. Men\nsaid that this law was designed to augment the prestige of the imperial\nhouse, but in reality it set limits to the exercise of the sovereign's\nauthority. The principal official of the sh\u014dgun's government, the\n_shoshidai_, was stationed in Ky\u014dto and intrusted with the duty of\nsupervising the imperial guards. Moreover, strict regulations were\nenacted to control the journeys of the feudal nobles to and from Ky\u014dto.\nIn a word, the policy of the sh\u014dgunate was to preserve the fullest\nsemblance of reverence for the sovereign, simultaneously with the\nfullest administrative independence. The imperial court was organized in\nKy\u014dto with all pomp and circumstance; it had its ministers, vice\nministers, and subordinate officials; it had its five principal, as well\nas more than a hundred ordinary, court nobles; but as for the\nsovereign's actual power, it did not extend beyond the direction of\nmatters relating to rank and etiquette, the classification of\nshrine-keepers, priests, and priestesses, and professionals of various\nkinds--functions of no material importance whatever. Alone the\n_kwanry\u014d_, the _dens\u014d_, and the _gis\u014d_ exercised a certain measure of\nauthority in the sh\u014dgun's government. The control of affairs relating to\nlands, to the army, to finance, and to everything included in the domain\nof practical politics rested absolutely in the hands of the sh\u014dgun.\n\nThis state of affairs greatly mortified the Emperor Gomino\u00f6,[2] a\nsovereign of much talent, who reigned during 1612-1630. He would fain\nhave effected some change in the system, but found himself helpless to\naccomplish anything against the all-powerful Tokugawa. An additional\ncheck to such designs was given by the marriage of Kazuko, daughter of\nthe second sh\u014dgun, Hidetada, to the emperor, the offspring of the union,\na daughter, subsequently coming to the throne as the Empress My\u014dsh\u014d.\nThis close relationship with the imperial family naturally increased the\nprestige of the Tokugawa. Subsequently Gok\u014dmy\u014d, Gosai-in, and Reigen,\nsons of the Emperor Gomino\u00f6, successively ascended the throne and\nGok\u014dmy\u014d cherished the design of achieving his father's ambition. But he\ndied without accomplishing anything and the times remained unfavorable\nto the imperial aspirations until 1868.\n\nWith regard to the organization of the sh\u014dgun's government in Edo, the\ncabinet, called _y\u014dbeya_, held its sessions in the castle, and was\ncomposed of the _tair\u014d_, _r\u014djiu_, and _wakadoshiyori_. The _tair\u014d_\ncorresponded with the prime minister (_daij\u014d daijin_) of Ky\u014dto; it was\nan office sometimes actually filled, sometimes left without occupant.\nThe _r\u014djiu_ were five; their functions were the general direction of\nadministrative affairs, of the feudal barons and of the city of Ky\u014dto.\nThe _wakadoshiyori_, also five in number, assisted in the administration\nand supervised the _samurai_ directly connected with the sh\u014dgunate. The\nposts in the cabinet were given invariably to _fudai_ nobles, the\n_tozama_ barons being entirely excluded. Next in importance were the\noffices of the three governors (_bugy\u014d_), the senior and junior\nsupervisors (_metsuke_) and so forth. One of the three governors was\ncalled the _jisha bugy\u014d_, and was charged with the management of\ntemples, shrines, and Shint\u014d and Buddhist priests. Another, the _machi\nbugy\u014d_, had control of municipal and mercantile matters in Edo; and the\nthird, the _kanj\u014d bugy\u014d_, had to do with all the lands in the direct\npossession of the sh\u014dgunate. These three governors had judicial\nfunctions also, being required to hear and determine all suits connected\nwith matters falling within their respective provinces. In addition to\nduties of general supervision, the _metsuke_ were charged with the\nsuperintendence of special classes, the _\u014dmetsuke_ being intrusted with\nthe function of keeping watch on the feudal barons and on officials\nbelow the rank of _r\u014djiu_, in conjunction with the _r\u014djiu_; while the\n_sh\u014dmetsuke_, similarly co\u00f6perating with the _wakadoshiyori_, had to\nsuperintend the _samurai_ who were direct vassals of the sh\u014dgun, as well\nas the _samurai_ in general. Attached to the above-mentioned principal\nofficials there was a duly-ordered staff of subordinates, the whole\nconstituting the organization of the general government. Posts inferior\nto those of the three governors were generally filled by _hatamoto_\n(bannerets). Turning to local officers, we find the _shoshidai_, or\ngovernor, in Ky\u014dto, entrusted with the supervision of the imperial\nguards, and the _\u014csaka-j\u014ddai,_ or lord warden of \u014csaka castle. These two\nofficials had general charge of affairs in the western provinces, in\naddition to the duties of their special offices. They also were selected\nfrom among the _fudai_ barons, and their post was usually a stepping\nstone to the important position of _r\u014djiu_. Further, in Nij\u014d of Ky\u014dto\nthere was a _zaiban shihai_, or controller of the guards; in \u014csaka, a\n_j\u014dban shihai_, or controller of the castle guards, and in Shimpu, Kofu,\nand so forth, there were _j\u014dban shihai_, or _kinban shihai_, performing\nfunctions similar to those of the Ky\u014dto and \u014csaka _shihai_. Governors,\nwho were regarded as officials of great importance, _gundai_ (headmen)\nof lands under the direct control of the sh\u014dgun, _daikwan_ and other\nprincipal officers, were selected by the sh\u014dgun from among the _fudai_\nbarons and bannerets. In the city of Edo there were _machidoshiyori_,\nor wardmasters, _nanushi_, or mayors, and so forth, while in provincial\ntowns there were five _nanushi_ who managed municipal affairs.\n\nTurning to the foreign relations of Japan during this period, we find\nthat, after the invasion of Hideyoshi's army, which, like the Hundred\nYears' War in France, devastated Korea from one end to the other, the\npeople of the peninsula regarded the Japanese with such aversion that\nthe relations between the two countries were virtually severed. It was\nwith great difficulty that Iyeyasu at last succeeded in convincing the\nKoreans that the Japan of the Tokugawa differed essentially from the\nJapan under Hideyoshi, and that the former's intentions were entirely\npacific. Finally the Koreans, having obtained tacit consent of China,\nsent to Japan a letter from their king together with some presents, and\nthenceforth, on each occasion of a change of sh\u014dgun, Korean envoys came\nto offer their country's congratulations, the Tokugawa, on their side,\ntreating these delegates with all courtesy and consideration. In the\ndays of the Ashikaga family, it had been customary for the sh\u014dgun to\nassume the title of king of Japan in his communications with other\nsovereigns. The Tokugawa discontinued this, on the ground that it was an\ninfraction of the imperial dignity, and adopted instead the title\n_taikun_, or great prince. The S\u014d family of Tsushima acted from\ngeneration to generation as intermediaries between Japan and Korea. They\nhad a monopoly of the trade with the latter country, whither they\ndispatched twenty vessels annually, the total value of the trade being\nlimited, however, to 18,000 _ry\u014d_. But though Korea thus accepted\nJapan's amicable overtures, China would not do so. Nevertheless, the\ninhabitants of her southeastern parts came to Nagasaki in great numbers\nfor purposes of commerce, and many Japanese ships crossed to the\nneighboring empire with the same object. These ships, called\n_shuin-bune_, because of the vermilion-seal permits of the sh\u014dgun, were\nowned by wealthy merchants residing in or near Ky\u014dto, Sakai, and\nNagasaki.\n\nThe Portuguese, who were the first Europeans to establish commercial\nintercourse with Japan, held a monopoly of the trade for some time, so\nthat the Dutch settlers in the Indies were excluded from competing with\nthem. Finally, however, in 1596, the Dutch managed to make their way to\nHirado in the province of Hizen, in order to arrange the preliminaries\nof a commerce destined to continue for a long time. Among the persons\nwho arrived in the Dutch ships were a Dutchman named Jan Joost and an\nEnglishman, William Adams, the latter coming in the capacity of pilot.\nThese two foreigners had an interview with Iyeyasu, who, much pleased\nwith them, conceived the idea of trading with Western countries. Houses\nand lands were given to the two strangers, and they resided in Edo, the\nstreets now known as Yayosugashi and Anjinch\u014d being the places where\nthey are said to have lived. The Dutch, eager to monopolize the trade\nwith Japan, made another visit to Japan in a vessel of war, with a view\nto expelling the Portuguese merchants. They brought with them an\nautograph letter and presents from the King of Holland for the sh\u014dgun,\nand solicited permission to carry on commerce, to which Iyeyasu readily\nacceded. In 1612 the first Dutch merchantman arrived in Japanese waters\nand was soon afterward followed by a British ship, the coming of the\nlatter being due to information furnished by William Adams to his\ncountry with reference to the state of affairs in Japan. Iyeyasu placed\nno obstacles in the way of British trade, but the relations between the\nDutch and the English at Hirado were so inharmonious that at one time\nthey were on the point of resorting to open hostilities. The Dutch\nfinally prevailed upon the sh\u014dgun to impose as many restrictions as\npossible on the trade of the English, and the result was that although\nthe friction between the British and the Dutch was ostensibly removed,\nthe former, finding themselves unable to carry on business profitably,\nfinally took their departure. About this time great numbers of merchants\ncame to Japan from Annam, Siam, Luzon, and other places of the south, as\nwell as from the southern districts of China and from India, while on\nthe Japanese side wealthy traders of Kiush\u016b traveled abroad to a great\nextent for business purposes, and Iyeyasu himself went so far as to\ndispatch people across the Pacific to New Spain in America in order to\nopen commercial relations. The Japanese at that era possessed very\nstrongly constructed vessels, measuring as much as 120 feet by 54, fully\nrigged with three masts, having dark-red lacquered hulls and capable of\ncarrying a great number of passengers. In these ships were exported\ncopper, bronze utensils, lacquered articles, umbrellas, fans, screens,\nsulphur, camphor, dyed textile fabrics, wheat flour, and so forth, and\non their return voyage they brought to Japan silk cocoons, silk fabrics,\nwoolen stuffs, sugar, drugs, incense, vermilion, quicksilver, glass,\ncoral, whalebone and so forth. This list of exports and imports\nfurnishes some clue to the industries and customs of the Japanese of\nthat era. Foreign trade flourished greatly, and a spirit of enterprise\nprevailed throughout the country. Date Masamune, feudal chief of Sendai,\nsent an envoy to Rome who came back eventually to Japan, having devoted\nseven years to studying the state of affairs in Rome, where he was\nreceived in audience by the Pope. Early in the seventeenth century one\nYamada Nagamasa (or Nizayemon), a native of Suruga, crossed to Siam, and\norganizing a force with the Japanese settlers in that country--who had\nalready become sufficiently numerous to people a village, hence called\n_Nippon-machi_--rendered material assistance to the king of the country,\ntwice quelling a rebellion that prevailed at the time. This same Yamada,\nfighting always for Siam, led his troops against an invading army of\nSpaniards and defeated them, an exploit regarded with the greatest\nadmiration at that era when the prestige of the Spanish arms was at its\nheight. The king rewarded Yamada by adopting him into the royal family\nand giving him his own daughter in marriage, so that the Japanese\nadventurer's name became widely renowned. Another example of the\nadventurous spirit of the age was afforded by Hamada Yahei, who led a\nconsiderable force to Formosa, to avenge the plunder of a Japanese ship\nby the natives, and having overrun the island, brought back the son of\nthe chief as a hostage to Nagasaki.\n\nUnfortunately, however, unexpected religious squabbles fatally\ninterrupted the course of the country's foreign trade. The Dutch\nsettlers made a discovery, real or pretended, that the Portuguese and\nSpanish missionaries, leaguing themselves with the native Christians,\nwere plotting to overthrow the Japanese government. Many proofs of the\ntruth of this accusation were submitted to the sh\u014dgun by the Dutch, and\ncolor was lent to the charge by evidence that the missionaries\nthemselves or their converts behaved with much intolerance and\narrogance. The Edo government was moved by these accusations and by the\ndoings of the missionaries to take active steps against them. Several of\nthe principal were put to death and the rest were expelled. Shortly\nafterward an order was issued against the voyages of the _shuin-bune_\nand it was further declared unlawful to construct ships of more than a\ncertain size, while, at the same time, the method of construction was so\nmodified that distant voyages became impossible. Travel to foreign\ncountries was also strictly interdicted, and as a necessary consequence\nthe arts of ship-building and navigation sensibly declined. It was at\nthis epoch, too, that the Christian rebellion of Shimabara occurred,\nculminating in the battle of Amakusa in 1637-1638, which had a decisive\ninfluence upon the foreign policy of the Tokugawa.\n\nAt the time of the first introduction of Christianity into Japan, it\nspread very rapidly throughout the empire, receiving no check until the\narrogance and intolerance of the missionaries provoked the anger of\nHideyoshi and induced him to issue an edict forbidding the propagandism\nof the foreign faith. This law, however, was not rigorously enforced,\nand moreover official attention was shortly afterward diverted to the\nwar with Korea. When Iyeyasu came to power, as has been shown, he\nexpelled the foreign missionaries from Japan and deputed Buddhist\npriests to reconvert the Japanese who had embraced the Christian creed,\nthe efforts of these priests being reinforced by an edict that all who\nrefused to abjure Christianity should be either exiled or put to death.\nBut it appeared that many of the Japanese Christians had adopted the new\nfaith with sincerity and devotion which neither teaching nor threats\ncould alter. In the provinces of Bungo and Hizen, in Kiush\u016b, where even\nthe feudal barons themselves had become converts to the Western creed, a\ngreat majority of the population was Christian, and from them issued the\nforces of propagandism which made themselves felt elsewhere. Shimabara,\nin Hizen, was especially regarded as the headquarters of the foreign\nfaith, and the sh\u014dgun accordingly nominated as feudal chief of that\nplace Matsukura Shigemasa, a bitter foe to Christianity. The latter\nissued proclamations against the profession of the faith, and inflicted\nmost cruel punishments on its votaries. The people suffered in silence,\nfor Shigemasa's military following was so great that resistance was\nhopeless.\n\nOn Shigemasa's death, his incapable and tyrannous son Shigetsugu\nsucceeded him, and popular discontent began to take a concrete form.\nGradually the plan of a combination for open resistance found advocates.\nAmong the generals on the defeated side in the battle of Sekigahara of\n1600 had been one Konishi Yukinaga, an ardent believer in Christianity.\nAfter the battle his principal retainers retired to the Island of\nAmakusa off the coast of Hizen, among whom the most influential\nconstantly sought means to be revenged on the Tokugawa and to promote\nthe spread of Christianity. They found a youth named Masuda Shir\u014d who to\nremarkable graces of person added a mind of great craftiness, and they\npresented him to the people in 1637, alleging that he was the heavenly\nmessenger of whom Francis Xavier had spoken twenty-five years previously\nwhen leaving Japan, and who was destined to establish the supremacy of\nthe Christian faith. They also spread rumors that the sh\u014dgun had died in\nEdo, and the people, much encouraged by these things, assembled in great\nnumbers and openly offered thanksgivings to heaven. The officials in\nShimabara endeavored to disperse this meeting and to arrest the leaders,\nbut in a contest which ensued the Christians were victorious. Now the\ninsurrection spread far and wide throughout Shimabara, Amakusa, and the\nneighboring districts, until the insurgents under the command of Masuda\nShir\u014d numbered over thirty thousand. At first the Edo government\nregarded the rebels as a mere mob of peasants, and dispatched a petty\nbaron, Itakura Shigemasa, to restore order. But the latter's inability\nto cope with the trouble having afforded a gauge of its true dimensions,\nthe commission was given to Matsudaira Nobutsuna, a powerful chief. The\ninsurgents fought with desperate resolution and inflicted numerous\ndefeats on the government's troops, Shigemasa himself falling in battle.\nBut the end came at last. In 1638, the stronghold of the rebels was\ntaken, and its defenders were either burned in the flames kindled by\ntheir own hand or put to the sword.\n\nThis experience taught the government that the spread of Christianity\nwas attended by the gravest dangers to public tranquillity. Strict laws\nwere therefore enacted for its suppression. Foreigners who came to Japan\nfor the purpose of propagating the faith were refused admission, and\nthose who declined to depart despite the edicts were put to death.\nThenceforth Buddhism was adopted as the national religion, receiving the\nallegiance of all classes, high and low. It is interesting to note that\nthe revival of Buddhist influence was not only simultaneous with the\ndownfall of Catholicism, but also due largely to an institution which\nwas now for the first time placed on a religious basis. The system of\ntaking a census at regular intervals, which was introduced by the Taikwa\nreformers, had never been successfully practiced for a long period of\ntime, until the Tokugawa government made the extermination of\nCatholicism an occasion for the restoration of the system. It was\nordered in 1716 that the census should be taken in each fief and the\nresults duly reported every six years. Births, deaths, and marriages\nwere registered in books kept by Buddhist priests, so that no Christian\nshould remain in society under the protection of law. The operation was\ncalled, from its religious character, _sh\u016bmon-aratame_, or examination\nof faith. This of course contributed materially to the influence of the\nBuddhist church, for which the Tokugawa period was an era of marked\nprosperity, the number of temples throughout the empire aggregating four\nhundred thousand. Nevertheless, the government was careful to avoid a\nreturn to the excesses of former days. The building of new temples was\nforbidden, the lands assigned for the support of those already in\nexistence were rigidly defined, and the people were encouraged to study\nChinese literature, so that the corruption which disfigured the Buddhist\npriesthood in earlier ages was, in great part, corrected.\n\nEven more important than the revival of Buddhist influence was the\nbearing of the Catholic extermination upon the almost total exclusion of\nforeign trade from the shores of Japan. The entry of all foreign ships,\nexcept those of China and Holland, into Japanese ports was peremptorily\nforbidden. Neither the Chinese nor the Dutch entertained any idea of\nreligious propagandism, their sole purpose being commercial. The Dutch,\nindeed, having shown a disposition to assist Japan in every way, enjoyed\ngreat credit with the Edo government, as will be more fully set forth in\nthe next chapter. At first no restrictions were imposed on the\ncommercial transactions of the Chinese and the Dutch, but subsequently a\nlimit was set to the amount of trade and to the number of ships engaged,\nand the prices at which imported articles must be offered for sale were\nalso determined officially. These restrictions were suggested by the\nfact that the trade involved a heavy drain of the precious metals.\nIndeed, the quantity of gold and silver exported from Japan during the\ninterval between the inauguration of foreign commerce and the imposition\nof the above restriction was so large that Japan's resources were\nseriously impaired. It was found necessary to strictly interdict the\nshipping away of the precious metals, but there is strong reason to\ndoubt whether the interdict effected much, for foreigners, disregarding\nthe laws of Japan, contrived to carry on clandestine commerce in waters\nbeyond the purview of the government's officials.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] Chronological and genealogical table of the Tokugawa\nsh\u014dguns.\n\n 1. Iyeyasu, 1603.\n |\n +---------------------------+----------------------+\n | | |\n2. Hidetada, 1605. Yorinobu (founder of Yorifusa (founder of\n | the Kish\u016b house). the Mito house).\n +-----------+ | |\n | | |\n 3. Iyemitsu, 1624. Mitsusada. Nariakira (eighth in\n | | descent from Yorifusa).\n +------------+--------------+ +-------------+ |\n | | | | |\n4. Iyetsuna, Tsunashige. 5. Tsunayoshi, 8. Yoshimune, 15. Yoshinobu,\n 1651. | 1680. 1716. 1866.\n | |\n | +-----------+--------------+\n | | |\n 6. Iyenobu, 1709. 9. Iyeshige, 1745. Munetada (founder of\n | | the Hitotsubashi\n | | family).\n 7. Iyesugu, 1713. 10. Iyeharu, 1761. |\n Harunari.\n |\n +------------------------+\n |\n 11. Iyenari, 1787.\n |\n +-------------------+-------------------+\n | |\n 12. Iyeyoshi, 1837. Nariyoshi (head of the\n | Kisuh\u016b house).\n | |\n 13. Iyesada, 1854. 14. Iyemochi, 1857.\n\n[2] Table showing chronology and lineage of emperors.\n\n 107. Emperor Goy\u014dzei, 1587-1612.\n |\n 108. Emperor Gomino\u00f6, 1612-1630.\n |\n +------------------+------+----------+-------------+\n | | | |\n109. Empress 110. Emperor 111. Emperor 112. Emperor\n My\u014dsh\u014d, Gok\u014dmy\u014d, Gosai-in, Reigen,\n 1630-1644. 1644-1655. 1655-1663. 1663-1687.\n |\n +--------------------------------+--------+\n | |\n113. Emperor Higashiyama, 1687-1710. Tadahito (ancestor of Prince\n | Kan-in).\n | |\n114. Emperor Nakamikado, 1710-1736. Massahito.\n | |\n115. Emperor Sakuramachi, 1736-1747. 119. Emperor K\u014dkaku, 1780-1817.\n | |\n +-------+---------+ 120. Emperor Nink\u014d, 1817-1847.\n | | |\n116. Emperor 117. Emperor 121. Emperor K\u014dmei, 1847-1867.\n Momozono, Gosakuramachi, |\n 1747-1763. 1763-1771. 122. The present Emperor\n | (Mutsuhito).\n118. Emperor Gomomozono, 1771-1780.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XII\n\nTHE DECLINE OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT\n\n1651-1837\n\n\nThe period of the third sh\u014dgun, Iyemitsu (1624-1651), perhaps marks the\nheight of the vigor and efficiency of the Tokugawa feudalism. He was\nassisted by able councilors, and his strong administration was emulated\nby many great local barons in their respective fiefs, so that a profound\npeace reigned over the country broken only by the Christian insurrection\nat Shimabara. From the latter half of the seventeenth century, however,\nsigns of the decline of the Edo power began to manifest themselves. At\nthe accession of the fourth sh\u014dgun, Iyetsuna (1651-1680), Yuino Sh\u014dsetsu\nand Marubashi Ch\u016bya, two military captains not attached to any feudal\nbaron, collected a great number of _r\u014dnin_ (\"wave men,\" _samurai_\nattached to no lord) in Suruga and in Edo, their project being to raise\nthe standard of revolt simultaneously in the west and in the east. Their\nattempt was unsuccessful, but its failure did not deter two other\n_r\u014dnin_ from plotting a similar insurrection in Edo the following year.\nThey, too, were discovered and punished before their plans matured.\nThereafter, for a time, owing doubtless to the fact that the feudal\nbarons were too frequently deprived of their estates, their vassals\nfound themselves homeless and resourceless, and the peace of the country\nwas broken here and there by bands of _r\u014dnin_. These troubles, however,\nwere speedily dealt with. Nor was the Edo castle itself free from\ntrouble, for toward the close of Iyetsuna's sh\u014dgunate, the _tair\u014d_,\nSakai Tadakiyo, acquired so much influence that the authority of the\nsh\u014dgun himself was somewhat impaired.\n\nThe next sh\u014dgun, Tsunayoshi (1680-1709), however, returned to the\nvigorous policy of the first three of his predecessors. He dismissed\nTadakiyo, and appointed Hotta Masatoshi, a statesman of great acumen, in\nhis stead as _tair\u014d_. The sh\u014dgun and his ministers alike devoted\nthemselves unwearyingly to promoting the welfare of the country. This\nera is worthy of close attention. We find, among other things, that\nTsunayoshi greatly encouraged the study of literature. Tokugawa\nIyeyasu, though essentially a soldier and statesman, fully appreciated\nthe importance of literature, which he conceived as an indispensable\nfactor in encouraging the pursuit of virtue and promoting the peace of\nsociety. Even while his hands were busy with campaigns and battles, he\ninvited great savants and listened to their lectures on the Chinese\nclassics. He also caused his officers to collect and reprint valuable\nbooks that would otherwise have been lost to the nation. His three\nsuccessors followed his example in this respect, but it was the fifth\nsh\u014dgun, Tsunayoshi, who above all contributed to the spread of literary\npursuits. Devoted from his youth to the study of the Chinese classics,\nhe made a habit, after his succession, of delivering lectures to the\nfeudal barons and vassals, and Shint\u014d and Buddhist priests, and it may\nwell be supposed that this action gave a great impetus to literary\npursuits.\n\nPrior to this time, it had been customary for the military men to\nneglect the study of reading and writing. Such occupations were\nabandoned to the priests, and it resulted that, even after the\nconclusion of the wars, men having a predilection for literature\ngenerally drifted into the ranks of the priests. Such persons, however,\nwere not required to adopt the tonsure or to give up their position as\n_samurai_. The learned family of Hayashi were a case in point. The\nsucceeding sh\u014dguns paid them high respect, and a school founded by them,\nat first in the character of a private establishment, but afterward\ntaken under government protection, grew into an institution of much\nimportance under the name of the _Sh\u014dhei-k\u014d_. The example of Edo was\nwidely followed in various provinces of Japan, and numerous institutions\nof learning sprang up in all the fiefs, from which the most\ndistinguished pupils were selected and sent to the central school,\n_Sh\u014dhei-k\u014d_, for purposes of further study. So far was the study of\nChinese literature carried by the Japanese of the time that some of\ntheir publications in that line elicited admiration of the Chinese\nthemselves. The Edo epoch may thus be described as the golden era of\nChinese literature in Japan, although unfortunately this record is\nsomewhat marred by the acrimonious disputes that sprang up among the\ndifferent schools of philosophy, each considering itself orthodox and\ndenouncing the teachings of others as spurious. The study of the Chinese\nclassics also called forth the revival of Japanese history and _belles\nlettres_. Fiction, dramatic pieces called _kikyoku_, and the popular,\npithy verses known as _haikai_, flourished greatly, particularly during\nthe Genroku era (1688-1703). Education among the masses also at last\nmade its appearance, for in almost every temple there existed a private\nschool, called _tera-koya_, in which the children of farmers, merchants,\nand artisans were taught rudimentary lessons in reading, writing, and\narithmetic.\n\nA few words may be said regarding the literary productions of this\nperiod. Mitsukuni, lord of Mito and grandson of Iyeyasu, himself a\ndistinguished scholar and munificent patron of literature, established\nin his Edo mansion a historiographical bureau, where, under his\ndirection, a number of savants undertook the compilation of the history\nof Japan from the days of the Emperor Jimmu. This work, \"_Dai Nihon\nshi_\" (History of Great Japan), in 243 books, written in the Chinese\nstyle of composition stands at the head of Japanese histories of this\nera, the second in order being the \"_Honch\u014dtsugan_\" (Mirror of Our\nDynasty), in 300 books, compiled under the direction of Hayashi by order\nof the sh\u014dgun's government. In the same category may be placed the\n\"_Fus\u014dshuy\u014dshu_,\" 30 volumes of Mitsukuni, and the \"_Reigiruiten_,\" 510\nvolumes, of the same author. Of other greater works, the \"_Kansei Choshu\nShokafu_,\" in 1053 books, the \"_Ch\u014dya Kyubuniko_,\" in 1083 books, and\nthe \"_Tokugawa Jikki_,\" in 516 books, may be mentioned. There was also a\nlarge work on botany called \"_Shobutsuruisan_,\" in 1054 volumes. Hanawa\nHokiichi, a renowned scholar, though blind, made a business of\ncollecting old rare works, as the \"_Gunsho Ruij\u016b_\" (1821 volumes). Arai\nHakuseki was the author of over three hundred books on classics,\nhistory, and law. The novels of Kyokutei Bakin aggregated more than two\nhundred. And in addition there were numerous works by less prolific\nstudents. On the whole, in the variety and height of literary\ndevelopment the Tokugawa period is unrivaled in the history of Japan.\nThe monopoly of learning of the Buddhist priest was completely broken,\nand the intellectual power of the nation, long held in abeyance under\nthe stress of continual warfare, now asserted itself with tremendous\nvigor.\n\nAt the same time proofs became more abundant that the prime of the real\ngreatness of the Tokugawa had been passed. The same fifth sh\u014dgun who so\nvigorously encouraged learning, and under whom the glorious era of\nGenroku occurred, unduly promoted Yanagizawa Yoshiyasu, a man of humble\norigin, and treated him with unbecoming favor. Peace had then lasted for\neighty years, and both the government and the people had begun to fall\ninto luxurious and extravagant ways, so that, for the first time in the\nhistory of the Tokugawa, the government found itself straitened for\nfunds. The total revenue of the empire derived from land then amounted\nto 30,000,000 _koku_, of which 23,000,000 _koku_ belonged to the feudal\nbarons, and 3,000,000 _koku_ to the bannerets, shrines, and temples, the\nremaining 4,000,000 representing the income of the government. Of this\nlast named sum, 1,400,000 _koku_ were absorbed by the sh\u014dgun's\nhousehold, a paltry sum of 150,000 being considered sufficient for the\nmaintenance of the sovereign, the payment of the civil nobles'\nallowances, and the other expenses of the court in Ky\u014dto. The method of\ntaxation varied according to provinces, but the general rule was that\nthe government, or the feudal lord, took forty per cent., and the\ncultivator sixty per cent., of the gross produce. In the early years of\nthe sh\u014dgunate large reserves of money were accumulated by Iyeyasu,\nHidetada, and Iyemitsu, but Tsunayoshi expended the whole, and found\nhimself reduced to considerable straits. Yoshiyasu prevailed upon him to\nadopt a scheme proposed by one Hagiwara Shigehide, namely, the issue of\na debased currency. The coins issued in the early years of the Tokugawa,\nnamely, the _Keich\u014d-kingin_ (gold and silver of the Keich\u014d era), were\nvery pure, but in the recoinage of Tsunayoshi, gold was alloyed with\nsilver and copper, and copper with lead and tin, so that the cost of the\ncoins was below their face value. Many hundreds of thousands of _ry\u014d_\nwere obtained by this device, and thereby the embarrassed finances of\nthe sh\u014dgun seemed to have resumed their normal state. But the evils\nincidental to currency debasement did not fail to ensue. Prices\nappreciated suddenly and counterfeiting took place on a large scale.\nSubsequently, however, the government corrected these abuses by\nrestoring the currency to its pristine purity, and substituting\nadministrative economy for false finance. The bad example once set by\nthe sh\u014dgun, however, was followed by the feudal barons long after he had\nmended his ways, for they, also, finding themselves in an impecunious\nstate, began to issue fiat paper money, _hansatsu_, for circulation\nwithin their own fiefs. It is a point well worthy of the attention of\nstudents of history, that from the time of their accession to power\nuntil the day of their downfall, the Tokugawa sh\u014dguns never resorted to\nthe device of issuing fiduciary notes.\n\nNeither the sixth nor the seventh sh\u014dgun held his office long enough to\naccomplish much. In 1716 the sh\u014dgunate passed to Yoshimune of the Kii\nbranch of the Tokugawa family. He was gifted with rare administrative\ntalent, and during the thirty years of his rule sought to reform the\ngovernment so as to place it again on a sound and strong basis. At this\nperiod the impecuniosity of Edo, which had been going from bad to worse\nunder succeeding sh\u014dguns, and which resulted chiefly from extravagant\nand useless expenditure in the Tokugawa household, began to be a subject\nof serious embarrassment. Yoshimune had no sooner assumed administrative\ncontrol than he set himself to restore financial order by closing or\ndestroying several of the splendid mansions kept for the sh\u014dgun's\namusement, and dismissing their female and male inmates, while he\nhimself sought to set an example to his people by wearing rough garments\nand faring in the simplest manner. Finally, he issued an edict urging\nthe necessity of economy in all affairs both public and private, and as\nthe nation had practical evidence of this spirit in the conduct of its\nrulers, not alone the ministers of state, but also the feudal barons\nadopting and following the admonition of the sh\u014dgun by the exercise of\nstrict frugality, economy became one of the most marked features of the\nera. Yoshimune not only sought to foster this spirit of frugality, but\nalso endeavored to promote industrial and agricultural enterprise. He\nencouraged the cultivation of Korean ginseng as well as Batavian and\nsweet potatoes; he inaugurated the planting of Japanese sugar cane, and\nat the same time dispatched officials to various parts of the empire to\npromote the growth of other products. Naturally there appeared many\npersons in the different clans who devoted themselves to industry and\nagriculture. Enumerating the principal developments of the time, we find\nthat sericulture was greatly extended and its methods were improved\nthroughout the eastern provinces; that indigo was cultivated in Awa, and\noranges were grown in Kiush\u016b; that the raising of tobacco and the\noperation of drying bonito were considerably encouraged in Satsuma; that\nsalt was manufactured in Shikoku and Chiukoku, and the hardware,\nlacquer, goldsmith's and furrier's trades were greatly developed.\nRegulations were enacted for the protection and encouragement of\nfarmers, providing, among others, that, in the event of a farmer being\nprevented from carrying on the necessary operations of agriculture, his\nnearest neighbors must assist him. Indiscriminate transactions in real\nestate were prohibited. The sale and purchase of land were forbidden;\nmeasures were framed to prevent the undue growth of large estates, as\nwell as to protect the humble classes and obviate their dispersal\nthrough poverty. Further, the sh\u014dgun encouraged the development of\nwater-ways for the transport of goods and for the irrigation of lands.\nThe result of all this beneficent administration was such a marked\nincrease of the production of rice that the people called Yoshimune the\n_kome_ (rice) sh\u014dgun. His policy, so far as concerned the promotion of\nindustry and agriculture, was adopted and pursued by several of his\nsuccessors.\n\nFrom the middle ages of Japanese history taxes on land constituted the\nchief item of state revenue. It will be remembered that during the\nTokugawa period four-tenths of the produce of the land went to the\ngovernment and six-tenths to the farmer. There were two methods of\ncollecting the tax. One was called _kemmi-dori_. According to this\nsystem, the quality of the rice raised from each particular place had to\nbe determined annually and the rate of tax fixed accordingly. As the\nprocedure was tedious, Yoshimune gave preference to the other method,\n_j\u014dmen-dori_, the principle of which was to fix the rate of tax\naccording to the average rice-harvest of the preceding five or ten\nyears, and thenceforth, during the interval of years to which this rate\napplied, the farmers were required to pay the tax thus determined\nwhatever might be the nature of the crops, exceptions being made,\nhowever, in the event of drought, tempest, or floods.\n\nThe industrious hand of Yoshimune extended also to the domain of law.\nThroughout the government of Iyeyasu and his first successors no code of\ncriminal law was specially enacted, the administrative maxim of the time\nbeing that moral doctrines should guide all officials, and that the\njudges should consult the dictates of their own conscience in dealing\nwith criminals. But as popular knowledge increased, it became obviously\nnecessary that uniformity of punishments should be secured by fixed and\nuniversally applicable laws. Yoshimune caused the various old laws to be\ncollated and embodied into a fifteen-volume code, called \"_Hatto-sho_.\"\nAnother volume of law, the \"_Kujikata-sho_,\" popularly called \"_Goj\u014d-sho\nhyak-ka-j\u014d_,\" was prepared after consultation with various jurists and\nofficials. These enactments constituted the complete criminal code of\nthe Tokugawa. From its provisions were expunged all punishments such as\nhad been practiced in times of war; examination by torture was\nrestricted to cases the circumstances of which obviously dictated its\napplication, and on the whole the object aimed at was to lighten the\nscale of punishment as far as possible. These criminal laws were not,\nhowever, made public. The people to whom they applied knew little of\ntheir precise provisions, only the officers charged with the duty of\nadministering them having cognizance of their purport. The object of\nthis system was to inculcate respect for the laws themselves rather than\nfear of the consequences of violating them.\n\nAmong the judicial officers of the time was one \u014coka Tadasuke, whose\nacumen in judging offenses was so remarkable that the people credited\nhim with almost supernatural ability. Many of his judgments were such as\nto be thought worthy of perpetual record. As to the punishments commonly\ninflicted, we find manacling, scourging, and exile, the most severe\nbeing transportation to a distant island and death. The degree of\npunishment in the same class varied with the nature of the crime. There\nwere also other punishments, as branding, public exposure, confiscation\nof property, and the like. In the case of _samurai_, it was assumed\nthat, being sufficiently conversant with the code of etiquette and the\nprinciples of morality, minor penalties were not required for their\ncontrol. Hence the methods resorted to with them were confinement to\ntheir own residences, shutting them off from general intercourse,\ndismissal from office, or compulsory suicide. _Samurai_ who had been\nguilty of an offense were first degraded from their class and then\nsuitably punished. With regard to priests, also, special penalties were\napplied; as, for example, exposure to public view, expulsion from the\ntemple at which they officiated, or absolute suspension from religious\nduties. In all the fiefs care was taken to preserve a close relation\nbetween local penalties and those inflicted by the central government,\nbut differences in the degree of severity exercised made themselves\napparent in the sentences of different judges, and further, since the\njudiciary was not independent of the executive, miscarriages of justice\nwere not infrequent.\n\nAnother feature of the feudal society of the time which Yoshimune deeply\nregretted was the general neglect by the _samurai_ of their military\npractices under a long reign of peace. For this grave fault the sh\u014dgun\nstrongly rebuked his vassals, encouraging them to practice equestrian\narchery, fencing, spear-exercise, swimming, gymnastics (_ji\u016bjitsu_), and\nother martial arts, and reviving the long-discarded pastime of pursuing\ngame with hawks on the Kogane plain. Originally fond of such pursuits,\nhe applied himself to them with added ardor in order to popularize them\namong the _samurai_. Fencing with the sword was the most practiced and\nmost esteemed of all military exercises. Every member of the feudal\nclass, from the sh\u014dgun downward, received regular instruction in this\nart, and regarded his two swords with the utmost love and veneration,\nthe skill and spirit shown by him in their use being justly a source of\npride to Japan. Spears and firearms were also widely employed, and the\npractice of _ji\u016bjitsu_--a species of gymnastics based on the laws of\nbalance and reaction and directed to purposes of self-defense--received\ngeneral attention. Men conspicuous for skill in fencing and other\nmartial exercises built schools and became teachers of their respective\nspecialties. Thus theoretically the military training was very perfect,\nbut as there had been no occasion for the practical exercise of the art\nof war during many years, the _samurai_ became gradually unfit for\nservice in the field, and would doubtless have lapsed into an even worse\ncondition but for the strenuous efforts made by Yoshimune on his\naccession to power. Subsequently, toward the end of the eighteenth\ncentury, Matsudaira Sadanobu, a minister of state, spared no pains to\nencourage the pursuit of martial exercises, but the continued absence of\nany practical need of such attainments told steadily upon the _samurai_,\nand toward the close of the sh\u014dgunate not only had the nation become\ncomparatively enervated, but also its military systems were\nold-fashioned and inefficient from foreign points of view. The\ngovernment then found it necessary to remodel the organization, creating\nsuch offices as _rikugun bugy\u014d_ (minister of war) and _kaigun bugy\u014d_\n(minister of the navy), adopting the European system, adding cavalry,\nartillery, and engineers, to the army, and establishing iron foundries\nand docks for the use of the navy. At the same time, the restrictions\nimposed upon shipbuilding were removed, and official encouragement was\ngiven to the construction of sea-going vessels and to the art of\nnavigation. Thus the foundations of the present army and navy were laid.\n\nIn this connection, a brief description may be made of the regular\nmilitary service of the lord and vassal under the Tokugawa. In the Edo\ncastle, all the officials from the _r\u014djiu_ downward served in time of\npeace in civil capacities, but, in war, held military command, the\nsh\u014dgun himself sometimes taking the field. As to the feudal barons in\nthe country, those whose income did not exceed ten thousand _koku_ of\nrice were required to furnish ten horsemen and two hundred and\nthirty-five foot-soldiers, with full equipment of bows, guns, spears,\nbanners, and so forth; while those who enjoyed a larger revenue were\nunder obligation to furnish more ample contingents in proportion to\ntheir income. The sh\u014dgun himself had a large bodyguard, consisting of\n30,000 men or upward, as well as a powerful standing force, called\n_\u014dbangumi_, which was prepared to take the field first in the event of\nan emergency. The _samurai_ of these troops discharged civil duties in\ntimes of peace. Throughout the various clans a military system closely\nresembling that of the sh\u014dgunate prevailed.\n\nTo Yoshimune's initiative belongs, also, the establishment of a\nfire-brigade in Edo. In earlier times, during the period of the fourth\nsh\u014dgun, Iyetsuna, in January, 1657, a conflagration broke out in Edo,\nreducing nearly one-half of the city to ashes, and entailing the loss of\nmany lives. After this catastrophe, Matsudaira Nobutsuna, who then held\nthe office of _r\u014djiu_, effected great improvements in the division of\nthe city, repaired and widened the streets, removed the great Buddhist\ntemples to the suburbs, created large spaces to which the citizens could\nfly for refuge in the event of fire, and built embankments to prevent\nthe overflow of the rivers, thus greatly augmenting the prosperity of\nthe capital. Prior to this three aqueducts had been constructed in the\nKanda, Tamagawa, and Senkawa districts, by which means immense\nfacilities were conferred in the matter of water supply. After the fire\nof 1657, however, the crime of incendiarism became common, and owing to\nthe high winds so often prevailing in Edo, fires thus kindled proved\nvery destructive, as many as ten thousand houses being sometimes ruined\nat one time. Perpetual exposure to such a destructive agency naturally\nexercised an injurious effect upon the methods of house construction.\nThe citizens contented themselves with flimsy dwellings, in many cases\nthatched, not tiled, and the decoration of the nobles' mansions began to\nbe materially reduced. On the other hand, the prosperity of the city\nincreased so greatly that its area extended over twenty-five square\nmiles and its population aggregated two millions. Conflagrations,\nhowever, continued as frequent as ever. Yoshimune, therefore, encouraged\nthe people to build houses of stone or other fireproof materials, and in\nstreets of prime importance, like those in the Kanda and Nihonbashi\ndistricts, the sh\u014dgun did not hesitate to have the houses pulled down\nin order to widen the thoroughfares. At the same time, \u014coka Tadasuke,\nmunicipal governor, established the fire-brigade system. All these\nimprovements had some effect in reducing the number of fires, but to the\nend of the Tokugawa dynasty their ravages continued to be the curse of\nthe capital.\n\nYoshimune, who in addition to military, financial, and administrative\naptitudes had a strong scientific bias, devoted much of his spare time\nto astronomy, and caused instruments to be constructed for the purpose\nof taking observations. He also ordered surveys to be undertaken for the\npurpose of making a map. The encouragement of medicine and the building\nof hospitals were also within the range of his reforms, and even the\npromulgation of a law of copyright was not neglected, while we find him\nturning to such a matter as the planting of cherry, willow, and peach\ntrees at Asukayama, along the banks of the Sumida River, in Kanda, in\nKoganei, in Nakano, and other parts of the capital, with the result that\nthe citizens are to-day in possession of beautiful pleasure resorts both\nin the suburbs and in the business districts of T\u014dky\u014d.\n\nUnder the influence of these wise and comprehensive reforms, it is not\nstrange that throughout the period of the rule of Yoshimune (1716-1745)\nand his son Iyeshige (1745-1761) the country enjoyed comparative peace\nand order. But the gradual decline of the Tokugawa power which had\npreviously set in could not be checked even by Yoshimune. Under the\ntenth sh\u014dgun, Iyeharu (1761-1787), the influence of his unworthy\nfavorites, the Tanuma family, introduced evils of bribery and\nsycophancy, while the country at large was visited by droughts and\ninundations, such discontent being engendered among the poorer classes\nthat mobs assembled and attacked the residences of wealthy merchants.\n\nFortunately the next sh\u014dgun, Iyenari (1787-1837), and his great\ncouncilor, Matsudaira Sadanobu, reverted to the strict policy of\nYoshimune and the illustrious founders of the Tokugawa sh\u014dgunate. Many\nan able official was appointed for service in the Edo castle, and\nseveral barons in the country vied with the central administration in\nwisdom and efficiency of government. Iyenari's sh\u014dgunate also coincided\nwith the reign of the noble Emperor K\u014dkaku (1780-1817). Iyenari was\npromoted to the second grade of the first rank and to the post of chief\nminister of state, thus enjoying the distinction of reaching the highest\nposition ever attained by a sh\u014dgun of the Tokugawa line while in office.\nHis long rule of fifty years may be said to have effectually stemmed\nthe tide of the decline of the Edo government which otherwise would have\nswept over everything long before it did in the next period.\n\nWe shall conclude this chapter by describing various phases of the\nsociety and the life of the people of this period, beginning with the\nupper classes. Nothing was deemed of greater importance, politically and\nsocially, than to preserve distinctions of birth. Throughout the Edo\nperiod the lines of demarcation were clearly and sharply maintained\nbetween the _samurai_, farmers, artisans, and merchants, the four\nclasses ranking in the order here given. Ky\u014dto was the place of\nresidence of the imperial princes, among whom Fushimi, Arisugawa,\nKatsura, and Kan-in were most closely connected with the imperial house.\nThe civil nobles aggregated over 130 families, including the five called\n_Sekka_ from which the prime ministers were appointed and empresses\nchosen, and the seven _Seika_ from which the ministers of the right and\nleft were selected. The real administration of all the civil and\nmilitary affairs of the state rested, however, under the authority of\nthe sovereign, on the sh\u014dgun, who controlled the feudal barons numbering\nover 360. At the outset large tracts of territory were given to the\ndirect descendants of Iyeyasu, on whose support the sh\u014dgun chiefly\nrelied, but subsequently special treatment was extended to the feudal\nbarons of Owari, Kii, and Mito, who under the name _Sanke_--Three\nFamilies--were authorized to act in the capacity of advisers to the\nsh\u014dgun with reference to the principal political affairs of the realm,\nand they were invested with the right to succeed to the sh\u014dgunate in the\nevent of a failure in the direct line of male descent. Besides these,\nthe two sh\u014dguns Yoshimune and Iyeshige founded three new families at the\nhead of which they placed their own sons, namely, the houses of Tayasu,\nHitotsubashi, and Shimizu, collectively known as the _Sanky\u014d_--Three\nBarons--enjoying the same special privileges and distinctions as the\n_Sanke_. Many other feudal chiefs were also the recipients of\nexceptional, though smaller, favor at the hands of the sh\u014dgun.\n\nAs to the various barons in the land, their classification into the\n_tozama_ and _fudai_ classes has already been explained. If classified\naccording to the extent of their holdings, they fall into the three\ndivisions of _kokushi_, _j\u014dshi_, and _ry\u014dshi_. Lands of varying extent\nwere granted in perpetuity, such estates being classed into four kinds,\nnamely, those yielding 10,000 _koku_ annually and upward; those of\n50,000 _koku_ and upward; those of 100,000 _koku_ and upward, and those\nof 300,000 _koku_ and upward. According to these property qualifications\nthe relative ranks of the feudal nobles were determined, as well as\ntheir ceremonial robes, their treatment at the Edo castle, and the\nplaces assigned to them there. It was prescribed that, whenever the\nfeudal barons repaired to Edo or visited the sh\u014dgun's palace, they had\nto be attended by a fixed retinue of retainers, the number varying with\ntheir rank. On these occasions bows, muskets, spears, and halberds were\nborne by the retinue, several of whom were mounted on horseback. The\nbaggage was carried in handsome cases, called _hasami-bako_, and the\nutensils used _en route_ were also enclosed in ornamented coverings, so\nthat the whole procession formed an imposing and picturesque spectacle,\nwhich was frequently met with on the main roads converging in Edo. As\nfor the _samurai_ at large, they derived their means of support from\nlands granted them for life or in perpetuity by the sh\u014dgun's government\nor the feudal nobles. Their duties were to master all branches of\nmilitary exercises and to devote themselves faithfully to the service of\ntheir lords, and literature was also studied with assiduity. Speaking\nbroadly, they were divided into two classes. Those belonging to the\nhigher class, called _baj\u014d-kaku_, or knightly rank, took the field on\nhorseback and held comparatively high social positions. The second\nclass, _keihai_, or light men, went on foot, and were subdivided into\nvarious grades, as _kachi_, _kobito_, _ashigaru_. The _samurai_ who\ndirectly served the sh\u014dgun's government were called _jikisan_, and\noccupied the most respected position among their class, the highest\namong them being _hatamoto_ (bannerets) and the lowest _kenin_.\n\nIn order to maintain the demarcation between classes and to preserve\nsocial order, strict attention was paid by the government to etiquette\nand conventional observances, and the study of literature by men of\nposition was encouraged. Nevertheless, instances of rude and disorderly\nconduct on the part of the people were not infrequent. During the early\nyears of the Tokugawa period, the memory of the nation being still\nfreshly imbued with incidents of battle and bloodshed, both the\ngovernment and the people regarded the military spirit with the utmost\nreverence and considered its development essential to the well-being of\nthe state. _Samurai_ of the lowest rank wore two swords whenever they\nwalked abroad, and, one and all, these men of war were disciples of a\ncult which placed honor and justice at the head of a soldier's\ncharacteristics and relegated selfishness to the lowest place. It was a\ncommon practice with the _samurai_ of the time to take their own lives\nfor the purpose of expiating some event which they considered injurious\nto the prestige of their feudal lord.\n\nA remarkable example of the vendetta occurred in 1702, when forty-seven\n_r\u014dnin_ killed the enemy of their late lord. The affair had its origin\nin an act of violence perpetrated by Asano Naganori, feudal chief of\nAk\u014d, who, being insulted by a rear-vassal Yoshinaka, drew his sword\nwithin the precincts of the palace and wounded the offender, for which\nbreach of etiquette he was condemned to take his own life, and his\nfamily estate was confiscated, an exceptionally severe sentence, due to\nthe fact that the government of the sh\u014dgun was just then exercising\nevery effort to check the rough-and-ready habits of time. Asano's\nvassals, forty-seven in number, under the leadership of \u014cishi\nKuranosuke, after a long period of patient watching and much hardship,\nsucceeded in forcing their way into Yoshinaka's residence in Edo and\ndecapitating him. Then they surrendered themselves to the authorities\nand were sentenced to die by suicide. But their achievement excited the\nnation's strong admiration, who bestowed upon them the name of _gishi_,\nloyal retainers. Their act was later dramatized into one of the greatest\nof Japanese plays called \"_Ch\u016bshigura_,\" and through all succeeding\ngenerations theatrical representations of their loyal conduct never\nfailed to attract deeply sympathetic audiences. Similar deeds were\nalready on record. Early in the Kamakura period, the Soga brothers,\nSukenari and Tokimune, killed their father's foe, Kudo Suketsune; and\nunder the Tokugawa rule, Araki Matayemon, the renowned swordsman,\ntogether with Watanabe Kazuma, put to death Kawai, the hereditary enemy\nof his family, at Ueno in Iga. These and other achievements, some\nfilial, some loyal, fired the imagination of the nation. It became a\npopular creed that orphans, faithful vassals, and even widows should\ndevote their lives to vindicating the memory or avenging the death of\nparents, chiefs, or husbands, and this conviction was constantly\ntranslated into action during the early years of the Tokugawa rule. It\nwas undoubtedly a custom in some respects worthy only of a military\nfeudalism, but its effect in fostering a spirit of chivalry was beyond\nquestion.\n\nEven the inferior classes and the merchants of that day, living in or\nnear Ky\u014dto, attached more importance to the dictates of integrity and\nhonor than to questions of pecuniary interest. An evidence of the spirit\nthat governed monetary transactions is furnished in the form of\npromissory notes in vogue at the time, which contained such clauses as:\n\"In the event of my failure to repay the money, I shall have no\nobjection to being publicly ridiculed,\" or, \"Should I fail to discharge\nmy obligation at the fixed time, I should be considered as no man.\" In\nfact, displays of courage and resolution and heroic contempt of\ndifficulties were so highly prized that, from the latter part of the\nseventeenth century such a habit of thought naturally degenerated in the\ncase of the unrefined or illiterate into mere truculence and roughness.\nA peculiar class of men called _odokodate_, civilians attired half like\nthe _samurai_ and exercising deeds of chivalry, no less of mere\nroughness, was a product of this period. They roamed about the streets\nin bands, between whom bitter quarrels frequently occurred. The\nproceedings of these affiliations exercised so injurious an effect on\nthe customs and morals of the people that they were strictly interdicted\nby the fifth sh\u014dgun, and their leaders were put to death. The same ruler\nforbade the wearing of swords by merchants and farmers, and by these\nmeans succeeded in correcting the rough habits of the lower orders, but\nit is questionable whether the evils removed were not replaced by others\nstill greater.\n\nAs years went by and the empire continued to enjoy profound\ntranquillity, ostentation, luxury, and effeminate habits began to\nprevail. Against these evil practices not a few of the statesmen and\nnobles of the time earnestly counseled the people. Dissipation and vain\ndisplay reached their height in the time of Iyenari. With this\nirresistible growth of superficial and licentious habits and the\ncorruption and the demoralization of the feudal classes, which arose\nfrom the reign of an unbroken peace and prosperity, and which culminated\nin the days of Iyenari, the definite decline of the Tokugawa sh\u014dgunate\nmay be said to have begun.\n\nTurning to the common people, we find that the great majority of them\nconsisted of farmers, artisans, and merchants. Agriculture being\nregarded as the staple national industry, farmers ranked above both\nartisans and merchants, the low place assigned to the mercantile class\nbeing due to the consideration that they worked in their own interests\nonly. Neither farmers, artisans, nor merchants were permitted to use\nfamily names, so they called themselves simply \"farmer this,\" or\n\"tradesman that,\" but it was possible to acquire the privilege of using\na family name on account of some meritorious public service, and many\nfarmers were so privileged. Lower still than any of the classes hitherto\nmentioned were the _eta_ and _hinin_, who were not deemed worthy to be\nincluded in any of the above categories.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XIII\n\nTHE FALL OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT. 1837-1868\n\n\nIn 1837 the first armed rebellion against the Tokugawa government since\nthe battle of Amakusa, which took place just two hundred years before,\noccurred in \u014csaka under the leadership of \u014cshio Heihachir\u014d. Erudite and\nenergetic, he had found himself unable to use his ability owing to his\nmean birth, and took advantage of the popular discontent caused by a\nfamine to raise the standard of revolt. He with his followers attacked\nthe castle of \u014csaka, but failed, and in consequence died by his own\nhand. The government was yet far too powerful to be shaken by such a\nsmall uprising, but the revolt of \u014cshio has gained its place in history\nas a sign of the growing decay and unpopularity of the Edo\nadministration. A far more decisive event, however, was soon to follow.\n\nOn July 8, 1853, Commodore Matthew C. Perry, envoy of the United States\nof America, entered the Bay of Uraga with a squadron consisting of two\nfrigates, the _Susquehanna_ and the _Mississippi_, and two\nsloops-of-war, the _Plymouth_ and the _Saratoga_, and sought to open\ncommercial relations with Japan. His visit exercised a powerful\ninfluence, entirely unknown to himself, on the domestic affairs of the\ncountry. Ever since the early part of the seventeenth century\nanti-foreign feeling had been so intense that only the Chinese and the\nDutch had been allowed to carry on trade at Nagasaki, and other European\nnations, owing to various circumstances, gave themselves little, if any,\nconcern about Japan. But from the beginning of the eighteenth century\nthe spirit of aggrandizement made itself felt in the Occident, and\nWestern states began to vie with one another in attempts to extend their\nterritories and commerce. Eastward of Japan across the Pacific lay the\nUnited States of America, which had shaken off the yoke of Great\nBritain, and the latter, deprived of this flourishing colony, sought\ncompensation in India and farther eastward, while France also, as well\nas Russia, turned covetous eyes to the Orient. Nine years before the\narrival of the American squadron in Uraga Bay, or in 1844, the Dutch\naddressed a letter to the Tokugawa government advising that Japan be\nopened to all foreign nations, and subsequently they often repeated this\ncounsel, at the same time explaining the conditions of the various\nstates of Europe. Among the Japanese, many who had studied the Dutch\nlanguage and acquired some knowledge of Western affairs were in favor of\na liberal foreign policy, but among the bulk of the nation the\nprejudices engendered by the violent and lawless conduct of the early\nChristian propagandists remained as strong as ever. Moreover, fresh\nreasons for resentment had been furnished by various encroachments of\nthe Russians between the Kwansei (1789-1800) and Bunka (1804-1817) eras,\nand by disorderly conduct of English sailors in Nagasaki. Indeed, the\nTokugawa government had once gone so far as to order that any foreign\nship approaching the coast of Japan should be fired on, and any Japanese\nwhose studies of Dutch led them to advocate the opening of the country\nwere deprived of their official positions or otherwise punished.\n\nIn the last years of the eighteenth century the councilors of Edo\nstrongly advocated complete national seclusion, and at the time when the\nAmerican squadron visited Japan, Tokugawa Nariakira, commonly called\nRekk\u014d, the feudal chief of Mito, a noble of statesman-like qualities,\nardently urged the policy of holding aloof from all foreign intercourse.\nIn 1846 two American men-of-war had come to Uraga and sought to open\ntrade relations, but their proposals were not entertained, and they had\nto leave the country without accomplishing anything. Commodore Perry's\nvisit occurred seven years later; he came with credentials from\nPresident Fillmore, as well as specimens of the products of the United\nStates, and made formal application that commerce be opened between his\ncountry and Japan. The government replied that the matter being of the\ngravest importance, no immediate reply could be given, but that an\nanswer would be ready the following year, whereupon Perry sailed away,\ndeclaring that he would return the next year without fail. Thereafter\nthe Tokugawa government invited a council of the feudal barons,\nincluding the lord of Mito, the matter being at the same time reported\nto the emperor. During the general confusion incidental to this event,\nthe Sh\u014dgun Iyeyoshi died suddenly, his demise taking place in the very\nmonth of Perry's coming. He was succeeded by his son Iyesada. The year\npassed without any definite step being taken, and in February, 1854,\nPerry once more made his appearance at Uraga and urgently asked for a\nreply to the proposals he had submitted the preceding year. All the\nfeudal barons, including the Mito chief, united in advocating a policy\nof seclusion, but the _r\u014djiu_, Abe Masahiro, and other chief officials\nof the Edo castle were astute enough to see that such a policy would be\nimpracticable. They therefore insisted on concluding a treaty of amity\nand commerce, without paying due attention to its terms. Repeated\nconferences were held with the American envoy, and finally a treaty was\nsigned on March 31, providing that all American citizens driven to Japan\nby stress of weather should be kindly treated; that American ships of\nwar should be supplied in Japanese ports with fuel, coal, provisions,\nand other necessaries; and that the two ports of Shimoda and Hakodate\nshould be opened to American vessels. Subsequently ambassadors came from\nRussia, France, and England, and conventions were concluded with them in\nterms virtually the same as those of the American treaty. The government\npretended that they had concluded the treaties merely in order to gain\ntime for warlike preparations, but in truth they had been taken by\nsurprise. Moreover, natural calamities of a most disastrous character\nvisited the nation, to increase the financial embarrassment of Edo. In\nthe year of Commodore Perry's second coming violent earthquakes took\nplace in western Japan, only to be followed in the next year by a\nseverer shock, which overthrew immense numbers of the dwellings of the\nupper and lower classes as well as of the feudal barons, and caused in\nEdo a terrific fire in which 100,000 persons are said to have lost their\nlives.\n\n[Illustration: A PICNIC ON THE ASUKA HILL IN THE FLOWERY SEASON]\n\nIn 1856, Townsend Harris, consul-general, came duly accredited by the\ngovernment of the United States, and proposed that relations of\nfriendship should be established between the two countries, at the same\ntime asking on his own part for an audience with the sh\u014dgun. The _R\u014djiu_\nHotta Masaatsu (Bitchu-no-kami), who had taken charge of foreign affairs\nin place of Abe Masahiro, allowed Harris, after considerable hesitation,\nto repair to the Edo castle. It was, however, decided not to give a\nfavorable answer to the American proposal without the sanction of the\nemperor. Hitherto, despite the great importance of foreign affairs, the\nTokugawa administration had been allowed to take any steps it pleased\nwith reference to them without consulting the sovereign. But despite the\nlarge measure of power enjoyed by the Edo government, it was no longer\nable to effectually control the feudal barons. Hence it resolved to\nconsult the imperial wishes, and also to secure the advice of the feudal\nchiefs. Such a vacillating and dependent method of procedure was\nentirely opposed to the policy pursued by the Tokugawa ever since the\ndays of Iyeyasu. Now they exposed themselves to the criticism and\ninterference of both the court and the people, so that in this question\nof foreign intercourse is to be sought the proximate cause of the\ndownfall of the Tokugawa.\n\nAt that time the throne was occupied by K\u014dmei, father of the present\nemperor, who was in favor of keeping the country closed against the\ningress of foreigners. He therefore withheld his sanction when the\nsh\u014dgun's representative came to Ky\u014dto to seek it. At the same time, the\nAmerican envoy continually pressed the government to sign a treaty, and,\nto make the matter worse, another trouble simultaneously presented\nitself, namely, that, the sh\u014dgun having no son, friction arose about the\nsuccession. Several of the most influential feudal barons desired that\nYoshinobu, son of Nariakira of Mito, who represented the Hitotsubashi\nbranch of the Tokugawa, should become heir in consideration of his high\nabilities; but many of the principal officers and the court ladies were\nopposed to the policy of Nariakira. The sh\u014dgun himself was not desirous\nof making Yoshinobu his successor, but the steadily increasing influence\nof the anti-foreign party in Ky\u014dto, the recognized head of which was\nNariakira, gave new force to the claims of the latter. Meanwhile, as the\nneed of coming to some terms with the United States became more urgent,\nthe sh\u014dgun appointed to the post of _tair\u014d_ the courageous Ii Naosuke\n(Kamon-no-Kami). Ii was not a man to be guided by others whose opinions\nhe did not share. Under his counsel, it was now agreed that the five\nports of Nagasaki, Hakodate, Hy\u014dgo, Kanagawa, and Niigata should be\nopened to foreign trade, a convention in that sense being concluded\nwithout reference to the emperor. This took place in June of 1858, and a\nlittle later treaties of similar import were signed with Russia,\nEngland, the Netherlands, and France, a report being sent to Ky\u014dto,\nafter the event, to the effect that these measures had been unavoidable.\nIn the matter of the succession, Ii overrode the advice of the feudal\nbarons, and Iyemochi, then little more than a child, son of the lord of\nKii, became the fourteenth sh\u014dgun. The Tokugawa government thus disposed\nfinally of the question of foreign intercourse, but the domestic\naffairs of the country grew more complicated than ever.\n\n[Illustration: JAPANESE PORTS OPENED TO FOREIGN TRADE 1858]\n\nThe officials of Edo who were opposed to foreign intercourse claimed\nthat the country had been subjected to the shame of concluding a\ncommercial treaty under duress. The spread of this idea aroused\nindignation against the Tokugawa government, and many of the barons,\nespecially Nariakira of Mito, addressed memorials to Ky\u014dto, complaining\nthat the opening of the country to foreign trade and intercourse was\ncontrary to the best interests of the nation. Under these circumstances,\nthe relations between the courts in Ky\u014dto and Edo were of the least\nintimate character. Presently it began to be alleged against the\nsh\u014dgun's councilors, even by men of Owari, Mito, and Echizen, who stood\nin a position of close relationship and intimacy with the Tokugawa, that\nby concluding treaties with five foreign countries without reference to\nthe emperor, the sovereign had been directly insulted. Loyalty to the\nthrone and the expulsion of aliens became rallying cries of the\nexclusive party, and conflicts occurred in various places between the\npeople who would close the country and those who advocated its opening.\nLoyalty to the throne was no new thought to the nation, but it now\nacquired a new significance under new circumstances. The Tokugawa\nsh\u014dguns had, like all other great military families that acquired\nadministrative control in Japan, asserted their authority largely at the\nexpense of that of the emperor, and the fact had begun to cause keen\nregret to many among the _samurai_. Already, when Iyeshige was sh\u014dgun a\n_r\u014dnin_ named Takeuchi Shikibu, lamenting the decline of the imperial\npower, urged the officials of Ky\u014dto to devote themselves to military and\nliterary pursuits, so as to be able some day to overthrow the sh\u014dgunate.\nHe was exiled by the Tokugawa, who also arrested and put to death\nseveral others of the same party.\n\nWith the growth of a taste for pure Japanese literature reverence for\nthe sovereign was intensified and propagated. Its influence was most\npotent in Mito, the lord of which edited the \"_Dai Nihon Shi_\" (History\nof Great Japan), which as scripture of loyalty was widely read. Another\nwork which exercised a similar influence was the \"_Nihon-gaishi_\" by Rai\nSany\u014d. Various motives so largely contributed to the growth of loyal\nsentiment that ultimately a secret imperial rescript was issued to the\nMito vassals, instructing them to unite with the _tozama_ barons and\nassist the sh\u014dgun to expel foreigners from the country. The _Tair\u014d_ Ii,\nvehemently attacked for exceeding the powers that properly belonged to\nhim, now took another resolute and decisive step. He dismissed all the\nsenior officials who opposed his policy, and retained in office only\nthose in harmony with him. He further announced that any person placing\nobstacles in the way of measures adopted by the government should be\nseverely dealt with, and in pursuance of this declaration he placed in\nconfinement or dismissed from office civil nobles of highest\ndistinction, and inflicted penalties on six feudal barons of the\ngreatest magnitude. An equally drastic course was adopted in the case of\nthe leading Edo officials, and more than fifty prominent retainers of\nnoblemen, as well as _r\u014dnin_, scholars, priests, and even women, were\nseized and sent into exile. These decisive proceedings procured for the\nperiod the name of the \"Ansei Jail,\" but the _tair\u014d_ had at least the\nsatisfaction of knowing that he had shown his courage and competence to\ndeal summarily with his opponents. Great excitement prevailed, however,\namong all classes of the people, above all, the Mito _samurai_. On the\nsnowy morning of the 3d of the third month, 1860, as the _Tair\u014d_ Ii was\n_en route_ for the palace of the sh\u014dgun, he was attacked and killed by\neighteen Mito _r\u014dnin_ under the leadership of Sano Takenosuke, and a\nyear later the _R\u014djiu_ And\u014d Nobumasa, was attacked near the Sakashita\ngate of the castle. In order to restore harmony between the courts of\nKy\u014dto and Edo, the latter now arranged a marriage between the Sh\u014dgun\nIyemochi and the emperor's sister, but though the sovereign sanctioned\nthis union, it brought no peace for the country. Not only did the\nanti-Tokugawa agitation continue in noble and official circles, but also\n_r\u014dnin_, partly in obedience to the exclusion policy, but chiefly\nseeking to increase the embarrassments of Edo, attacked foreigners and\nburned their houses, the sh\u014dgun's administration showing itself\npowerless to check these outrages. By degrees the _samurai_, who had\nseparated themselves from their fiefs in order to carry on the\nagitation, assembled in Ky\u014dto, where were already gathered great numbers\nof influential persons interested in the burning question of the day,\nand where the emperor himself lent the sanction of his indorsement to\nthe doings of the malcontents. To the two most powerful among all the\nbarons, Shimazu Narishige, lord of Satsuma, and M\u014dri Yoshichika, lord of\nCh\u014dsh\u016b, secret commissions were specially given by the emperor. Before\nanything decisive could be accomplished, however, Narishige died and was\nsucceeded by his younger brother, Hisamitsu, who, together with the\nCh\u014dsh\u016b chief, remained in Ky\u014dto at the head of a large force of\n_samurai_, with the avowed intention of restoring tranquillity to the\ncountry. There they were joined by Yamanouchi Toyonobu, lord of Tosa,\nand this triumvirate of puissant barons, Satsuma, Ch\u014dsh\u016b, and Tosa,\nbegan to be spoken of throughout the length and breadth of the land as\nthe certain saviors of the situation.\n\nThe imperial court, in accordance with the advice of these three\npowerful councilors, now dispatched an envoy to Edo conveying a command\nthat the sh\u014dgun should repair to Ky\u014dto, that order should be established\nin the affairs of the administration, and that foreigners should be\nexpelled from Japan. Prior to the receipt of this rescript the Tokugawa\ngovernment had released the persons then in confinement, had dismissed\nall officials of proved incompetence, and had effected various reforms\nin the state organization. After the arrival of the imperial rescript\nthese measures were supplemented by other changes, and punishments were\nmeted out to And\u014d and other officials who had been removed from office.\nAt the same period a most significant step was taken by the sh\u014dgun's\ngovernment: the system that required the presence of the feudal barons\nin Edo was abolished--a step indicative of the marked decadence of the\nTokugawa power. For the first time in two centuries and a half the power\nof the imperial court overshadowed that of the castle in Edo. An event\nnow occurred that tended to precipitate the impending crisis. As the\nSatsuma chief, Shimazu Hisamitsu, was escorting the imperial envoy on\nhis return journey from Edo to Ky\u014dto, a party of four English\nequestrians met the procession near the village of Namamugi in Musashi,\nand attempted to break through its ranks. This violation of Japanese\nofficial etiquette, an act unpardonable in the eyes of the _samurai_,\nwas violently resented. Two of the foreigners were severely wounded, one\nof them shortly afterward falling from his horse and dying by the\nroadside. Incensed by this affair, the British government demanded that\nthe men who had perpetrated the deed and the personage under whose\ndirection it had been carried out should be arrested, and that an\nindemnity of a hundred thousand dollars should be paid as blood-money, a\ndemand that greatly embarrassed the sh\u014dgun's ministers, who knew that,\neven if they had possessed the power to comply in full, the attempt must\nlead to the gravest domestic troubles.\n\nIn 1863 the Sh\u014dgun Iyemochi repaired to Ky\u014dto. This was the first visit\npaid to the imperial capital by a Tokugawa sh\u014dgun since the days of\nIyemitsu, two hundred years previously, and the event naturally produced\na strong impression upon the nation. At that time the numerous and\nconstantly increasing body of _samurai_ whose motto was \"_sonn\u014d j\u014di_\"\n(revere the sovereign and expel the foreigner) were exerting all their\nenergies, going hither and thither to popularize their views, and not\nhesitating even to use the sword against those who opposed them. When\nthe sh\u014dgun arrived in Ky\u014dto they brought strong pressure to bear on him\nwith the object of inducing him to adopt their policy, and after long\ndiscussion he finally agreed to do so. Notice of this important decision\nwas given to the feudal barons on May 15 in the same year (1863). The\nsh\u014dgun then returned without loss of time to Edo, apprehending that his\npresence in Ky\u014dto might lead to fresh complications and being further\nadvised that affairs in Edo needed his presence.\n\nThe Edo government now found itself in a dilemma. At once unwilling and\nunable to give effect to its anti-foreign policy, it had nevertheless\nreceived and accepted the imperial order to that effect. The ministers,\ntherefore, adopted the only course opened to them, namely, conveyed to\nthe foreign representatives an intimation that it would be necessary to\nclose the ports and put an end to foreign commerce, and, at the same\ntime, dispatched ambassadors directly to the Occident to explain the\nstate of affairs in Japan. These measures, however, proved of course\nabortive. The anti-foreign sentiment was still further inflamed a few\nmonths later by openly hostile acts committed by the feudal baron of\nCh\u014dsh\u016b, who fired upon foreign vessels attempting to pass the Strait of\nShimonoseki. Nevertheless, even in Ky\u014dto there were some influential men\nwho boldly espoused the Tokugawa cause and placed themselves in\nopposition to the party working for the overthrow of the Edo government.\nA serious obstacle to the success of that party still existed in the\nfact that no effective union had yet been brought about between the\npowerful fiefs of Satsuma and Ch\u014dsh\u016b. The former advocated\nreconciliation between the courts of Ky\u014dto and Edo, and urged that both\nshould co\u00f6perate for the expulsion of foreigners; whereas the Ch\u014dsh\u016b\nfolks were in favor of more precipitate measures, involving the downfall\nof the Tokugawa. In Ky\u014dto the partisans of the extreme view urged the\nemperor to honor the Ch\u014dsh\u016b chief by visiting him in his own fief,\nsubsequently worshiping at the sepulcher of Jimmu Tenn\u014d, and then, after\na visit to the shrine of Ise, to openly declare war against the sh\u014dgun.\nBut the programme encountered strong opposition in Ky\u014dto at the hands of\na few other barons who regarded with deep regret and apprehension the\nstrong course to which the imperial court seemed in danger of being\ncommitted. These nobles, forming a union with certain princes, zealously\nopposed the court view; and finally succeeded so far as to procure the\nexpulsion from Ky\u014dto of the Ch\u014dsh\u016b lord, who, on his return to his fief,\nwas accompanied by Sanj\u014d Sanetomi, afterward destined to play a\nprominent part in the events of the restoration, and six other court\nnobles. The policy of the court was now directed to the re\u00ebstablishment\nof friendly relations with Edo, and the dissatisfaction engendered by\nthis attitude led to _\u00e9meutes_ by _r\u014dnin_ at Yamato, Tajima, and other\nplaces, but they were speedily reduced to order. In the following year,\n1864, the Sh\u014dgun Iyemochi again proceeded to Ky\u014dto, where his reception\nby the emperor was much more gracious than it had been on the previous\noccasion, various commissions being given to him, with the result that\nharmony was for the time restored between the two courts. Prior to this\na British squadron had proceeded to Kagoshima to exact an indemnity on\naccount of the Namamugi affair, and a sharp engagement had taken place\nbetween the ships and the Satsuma forts. The Edo government, however,\npaid the indemnity demanded by the foreign representatives. The affair\nwas thus brought to an amicable issue, and foreign intercourse continued\nas before, though the policy of the sh\u014dgun's government toward it\nremained apparently as undecided as ever.\n\nIn Mito \"Rekk\u014d\" Nariakira had died, and the _samurai_ of the fief were\ndivided into two parties, one following the late lord's policy and the\nother dissenting from it, which carried their enmity to such an extent\nthat great numbers of persons fell victims to the sword. Finally in\nApril, 1864, some of the ultra-conservative men of Mito renounced their\nservice to their lord, and assembled in arms at Mount Tsukuba, where\nthey were joined by a number of other malcontents, and became the center\nof a widespread disorder. It was quickly subdued by the Tokugawa forces,\nbut while the Tsukuba insurgents were still in the field the Edo\ngovernment found itself involved in an open quarrel with a vastly more\nformidable rival, the fief of Ch\u014dsh\u016b. The lord of Ch\u014dsh\u016b had been\nforbidden to enter Ky\u014dto in consequence of his obdurate hostility to the\npolicy of the Tokugawa, and the issue of such a mandate naturally caused\ngreat umbrage to his lieges. In June, 1864, they presented a memorial to\nthe throne, setting forth their loyalty and praying that the ban of\nexclusion from the capital might be removed from their feudal chief and\nhis son, as well as from Sanj\u014d and the six other court nobles who had\nfled with him to Ch\u014dsh\u016b for refuge. By degrees _r\u014dnin_ from Ch\u014dsh\u016b\nassembled in the environs of the imperial city, and after some\ncollisions they entered Ky\u014dto. But they were totally defeated by the\ntroops of Aidzu and Satsuma, who guarded the city. This act of contumacy\nprovoked an imperial edict depriving the elder and younger lords of\nCh\u014dsh\u016b of their rank and commissioning the Sh\u014dgun Iyemochi to chastise\nCh\u014dsh\u016b. An expedition was organized in obedience to this edict, a very\npowerful army being raised in western Japan. Just at this time a\nsquadron composed of British, American, French, and Dutch vessels of war\nentered the Straits of Shimonoseki to exact reparation from the men of\nCh\u014dsh\u016b who had, as has already been related, fired upon foreign vessels\npassing through the strait. Attempts to avert hostilities by negotiation\nhaving proved abortive, the Ch\u014dsh\u016b forts were bombarded and dismantled\nby the foreign vessels, and a peace was afterward concluded, the Ch\u014dsh\u016b\nfolks pledging themselves to give free passage to foreign ships, and to\npay an indemnity of three million dollars. This large sum, though\nsubsequently paid by the Tokugawa government, was denounced as excessive\nby foreign jurists as well as Japanese statesmen, and the portion that\nfell to the share of the United States of America was returned to Japan\nmore than twenty years afterward.\n\nPending the settlement of this Shimonoseki affair the Tokugawa military\noperations against Ch\u014dsh\u016b were delayed, and as the latter put to death\nthree of the leaders of the disturbance in Ky\u014dto, and made ample\napologies for their offense, the force destined for the invasion of\ntheir fief was disbanded. There were, however, two parties in Ch\u014dsh\u016b;\nthe one in favor of submitting to the sh\u014dgun so as to avert misfortunes\notherwise apparently threatening the fief, and the other advocating\ndetermined resistance to the Tokugawa. At the head of the latter party\nwas Takasugi Shinsaku, and he, having established relations with Sanj\u014d\nand the other court nobles then refugees in Ch\u014dsh\u016b, succeeded in\ncompletely overcoming the pacific faction and obtaining ascendency in\nthe fief. The Edo government now found itself openly defied by Ch\u014dsh\u016b,\nand a strong agitation arose in favor of inflicting summary punishment\nby sending another large expedition. Against this counsel dissenting\nvoices were not unheard, but finally an expeditionary force was\norganized and moved southward, the sh\u014dgun himself accompanying it. A\nmarked incident of this occasion was the refusal of the great Satsuma\nbaron to send a quota of troops for service with the sh\u014dgun. His fief\nand Ch\u014dsh\u016b, whose mutual rivalry had at times amounted to bitter enmity,\nhad concluded at last that in their union lay the only hope of\naccomplishing the purpose of unifying and consolidating the empire.\nForemost among the far-seeing statesmen was Saig\u014d Takamori of Satsuma,\nwho never wavered in his conviction that no lasting amity could be\nestablished between the courts of Ky\u014dto and Edo, and that the only\nsolution of the national difficulties lay in the overthrow of the\nTokugawa. To this view his fellow-clansmen subscribed, and relations\nwere opened with Ch\u014dsh\u016b which finally led to the hearty co\u00f6peration of\nthe two fiefs. _En route_ for Ch\u014dsh\u016b the sh\u014dgun stopped at \u014csaka, where\nhe was approached by the representatives of Great Britain, the\nNetherlands, and the United States, who insisted that Hy\u014dgo should be\nopened for trade according to the provisions of the Edo treaties, and\nthat the treaties should be ratified by the emperor. The sh\u014dgun, after\nreference to the sovereign, declined to entertain this demand, and the\nforeign representatives thereupon threatened to prefer it in person to\nthe throne. The emperor, much incensed at the course events were taking,\nseverely punished the chief officials of the sh\u014dgun who were directly\nresponsible for the treaties, and this having been done without\nreference to the sh\u014dgun himself, placed the latter in such an\nembarrassing position that he laid his resignation at the foot of the\nthrone and asked that Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu, of Mito, be appointed in\nhis stead. He accompanied this document with a memorial praying for the\nimperial sanction to the treaties with foreign powers. The emperor\ndeclined to accept the sh\u014dgun's resignation, but gave his sanction to\nthe treaties, the immediate opening of Hy\u014dgo to foreign trade being,\nhowever, refused. Subsequent to these events the expedition against\nCh\u014dsh\u016b was again put in motion, but the Ch\u014dsh\u016b men inflicted a crushing\ndefeat upon it, inasmuch as this was the first occasion of a sh\u014dgun's\ntaking the field in person since two hundred and fifty years before, the\nconsequences were disastrous to the prestige of the Tokugawa, many of\nthe feudal barons openly renouncing allegiance to them. While the\ncampaign was still in progress the Sh\u014dgun Iyemochi died in the castle of\n\u014csaka, August, 1866, and was succeeded by Yoshinobu in December of the\nsame year. The Emperor K\u014dmei also died shortly after. Owing to this sad\nevent the expedition against Ch\u014dsh\u016b was finally abandoned. Thereafter\nthe sh\u014dgun found himself confronted by such difficulties both at home\nand abroad that further tenure of office became impossible, and finally,\nacting on the advice of the lord of Tosa, resigned the office as the\nfeudal overlord of Japan, and restored the administrative power into the\nhands of the sovereign. This memorable event occurred on October 14,\n1867.\n\nFeudalism, which had for nearly seven centuries controlled the\nadministration of the empire, seemed now to have come to an end, but\ninstitutions so deeply rooted in the life of the nation and so long\nupheld by persons whose vital interests were interwoven therewith were\nnot to die away without a struggle. It was mortifying to the supporters\nof the sh\u014dgun, who had so recently renounced his office from\ndisinterested motives, to see his policy reversed, his old enemies\nraised to the highest posts of the new government, and he and his late\ncouncilors completely excluded from official life. The Ch\u014dsh\u016b baron and\nhis son received the imperial pardon and re\u00ebntered Ky\u014dto, while they as\nwell as Sanj\u014d Sanetomi were restored to their former ranks; the soldiers\nof Satsuma, Ch\u014dsh\u016b, Aki, Owari, and Echizen displaced the men of Aidzu\nand Kuwana as guards of Ky\u014dto; and radical changes were made in official\nposts and emoluments, the offices of _s\u014dsai_, _gij\u014d_, and _sanyo_ being\nnewly established under the presidency of Prince Arisugawa. The first\n_gij\u014d_ were Princes Yoshiaki and Akira, together with Sanj\u014d Sanetomi,\nIwakura Tomomi, and the barons of Satsuma, Echizen, and Tosa. The\n_sanyo_ were \u014chara Shigenori, Saig\u014d Takamori, and \u014ckubo Toshimichi. More\nthan twenty court nobles were removed from office and the administrative\npower was assumed in effect by a government under the direct control of\nthe sovereign.\n\n[Illustration: DOWNFALL OF THE EDO GOVERNMENT 1867-1868]\n\nOn December 10 it was announced to the late sh\u014dgun, by order of the\nemperor through the medium of the barons of Owari and Echizen, that his\nadministrative functions had been transferred to the emperor, and he was\nat the same time privately instructed to resign his post of lord keeper\nof the privy seal and to surrender the provinces hitherto forming his\nfief. The news of these instructions produced great excitement among the\n_fudai_ barons, and the sh\u014dgun, apprehending that they might resort to\nviolence on his behalf, petitioned the sovereign to allow him\ntemporarily to retain the post of lord keeper of the seal as well as to\nhold the provinces of his fief, though he repeated his expression of\nresolve to divest himself of all administrative authority. This course\ndid not, however, entirely allay the umbrage of the _fudai_ barons,\nespecially the lords of Aidzu and Kuwana. The sh\u014dgun himself, suspecting\nthat the order stripping him of his dignities and possessions had been\nissued at the instigation of the chiefs of Satsuma and Ch\u014dsh\u016b, withdrew\nfrom the Nij\u014d palace and shut himself up in the castle of \u014csaka. There,\nhowever, he was urgently counseled by the barons of Owari and Echizen to\nabandon all resistance to the throne and to present himself peacefully\nat the imperial court, and in obedience to this advice he was about to\nenter Ky\u014dto guarded by a powerful escort, when intelligence reached him\nfrom Edo to the effect that a number of Satsuma _r\u014dnin_, having\nassembled at the Satsuma mansion in the city, had fired on a barrack\noccupied by Tokugawa troops, and that the latter had consequently\nattacked the mansion and driven out its occupants, who had taken refuge\nin a warship anchored in Shinagawa Bay. Incensed by this news, the\nsh\u014dgun, on January 3 in the first year of the Meiji era, 1868, issued\norders to the various clans to combine for the purpose of chastising\nSatsuma. He commenced the campaign by mustering the troops of Aidzu and\nKuwana in Ky\u014dto and marching to attack the forces of Satsuma and Ch\u014dsh\u016b.\nBut in the engagements that ensued at Fushimi and Toba the sh\u014dgun's army\nwas completely defeated, and Prince Yoshiaki was formally ordered by the\nimperial court to lead a punitory expedition against Tokugawa, now an\nopen rebel. The latter retired to Edo by sea, accompanied by the forces\nof Aidzu and Kuwana, when they and twenty-seven other feudal chiefs\nwere deprived by the emperor of all their ranks and offices, the duty of\nbreaking their power by force of arms being intrusted to the barons of\nAki, Ch\u014dsh\u016b, and Tosa. Also, special officers were dispatched to the\nvarious provinces to restore peace, and their presence impressed the\nfeudal barons so strongly that no resistance was offered, and the\nprovinces to the west of Ky\u014dto and \u014csaka surrendered without hesitation\nto the imperial government. On February 9 Prince Arisugawa received the\ncommission of commander in chief, with instructions to bring the east\nunder control, and under his orders the imperial forces moved upon\nT\u014dkai, T\u014dsan, and Hokuriku. The prince entered Sumpu on March 5 and made\npreparations for the assault of Edo. Before the attack took place,\nhowever, the sh\u014dgun retired to a temple in Edo, and dispatched \u014ckubo\nTadahiro, Katsu Awa Yoshikuni, and others to open negotiations with\nSaig\u014d Takamori, general of the imperial forces then about to move on the\neastern capital. Both armies, the imperial and the feudal, were animated\nwith an uncontrollable desire to fight to the last, and the imminent\nclash was barely averted by the word of honor exchanged between two\nindividuals, General Saig\u014d of the emperor's army and Katsu, a vassal of\nthe sh\u014dgun. They had met each other only once, years before, but,\nalthough circumstances had placed them in hostile camps, had entertained\nso unbounded an admiration and confidence in each other's noble\ncharacter that now only a few words sufficed for them to pledge, on\ntheir honor as _samurai_, to effect the surrender of the Tokugawa with\ntheir dignity unimpaired, and to save Edo from an unnecessary\ndestruction of the lives and properties of its two million inhabitants.\nOn March 4 the van of the imperial army entered Edo and occupied the\ncastle, the Sh\u014dgun Yoshinobu being granted his life and confined in\nMito. On the 15th the prince entered Edo, and in May a grant of lands\nyielding annually 700,000 _koku_ of rice in Suruga, T\u014dt\u014dmi, and Mutsu\nwas made to the Tokugawa family for its maintenance.\n\nWhen the imperial forces took possession of Edo castle, Enomoto Takeaki,\na naval officer of the Tokugawa government, fled to the northern Island\nof Ezo, taking with him eight war vessels, and \u014ctori Keisuke retired to\nKazusa and Shim\u014dsa. Further, a number of the Tokugawa vassals, calling\nthemselves the _sh\u014dgitai_ (loyal band), took refuge in Uyeno, northeast\nof Edo, and placing Prince Kozenb\u014d, the lord abbot of Kwanyei-ji, at\ntheir head, refused to surrender to the imperial government. They were\nattacked by his majesty's forces and defeated after a sharp engagement,\nwhile \u014ctori and his comrades, routed at Utsunomiya and Nikk\u014d, fled to\nAidzu, the feudal lord of which place had already returned thither, and\nin conjunction with the barons of Mutsu and Dewa had made preparations\nto uphold the Tokugawa cause by force of arms. But the imperial troops,\nadvancing from T\u014dsan, T\u014dkai, and Hokuriku, brought into subjection the\ntwo clans of Sendai and Yonezawa, and entering Aidzu, took the Wakamatsu\ncastle on September 22, thus completely breaking the resistance of the\nrebels and restoring tranquillity throughout the northern regions. In\nDecember Matsudaira Katamori, the Aidzu lord, was sentenced to perpetual\nconfinement, and the fiefs of Sendai, Sh\u014dnai, and Morioka, which had\nmade act of submission after the fall of Wakamatsu, were confiscated,\nand their lords confined. As for the Yonezawa fief, its territory was\nreduced and its lord ordered to surrender the management of affairs to\nhis heir, while the fiefs of Mutsu and Dewa were divided into five and\ntwo provinces, respectively. Meanwhile, Enomoto and his followers,\nalleging the intention of reclaiming lands in Ezo, had occupied the\nfortress at Hakodate and obtained possession of a great part of the\nisland. But they also finally in May, 1868, surrendered to the imperial\nforces. In August the name Ezo was changed to Hokkaid\u014d, and it was\ndivided into eleven provinces. The entire land of Japan thus passed\nunder the sway of the imperial government. Although some of the feudal\ninstitutions still persisted, the Edo rule had in 1868 at last come to\nan end--682 years since Minamoto Yoritomo organized the feudal\ngovernment of the empire.\n\n\n\n\nPART III\n\nTHE NEW JAPAN. 1868-1893\n\n\n\n\nChapter XIV\n\nINTERNAL AFFAIRS. 1868-1893\n\n\nThe organization of the new government had been started and pushed with\nvigor even before the final deposition of the Tokugawa power took place.\nIn January, 1868, the _daij\u014dkwan_, council of the state, was created,\nwhich was soon divided into seven sections, namely, religion, home\naffairs, foreign affairs, army and navy, treasury, justice, and law. The\nablest men of the various fiefs were selected to fill the posts of\ncouncilors and legislative officials, and by degrees the government was\nso organized as to put an end to the old system of hereditary office,\n_samurai_ of comparatively low rank being nominated for high positions\naccording to their merits. On March 4 of that year the emperor proceeded\nto the Shishinden palace, where, in the presence of the court nobles and\nfeudal barons, he solemnly pronounced the famous oath in five articles,\nwhich has become the foundation of the constitutional government of new\nJapan, that henceforth administrative affairs should be decided by\ngeneral deliberation; that both the government and the people should\nlabor for the good of the nation; that encouragement should be given to\nindustrial pursuits; that the evil customs hitherto prevailing should be\ncorrected; and that the country should be strengthened by adopting the\nsystems of defense employed in foreign lands. Shortly afterward the\nadministrative organization was recast, with the rule that no official\nshould be appointed at the same time to legislative, executive, and\njudicial posts. The term of office was also fixed at four years, and the\nsystem of appointment by merit received further development. Officials,\nhowever, who showed themselves able and obtained popularity were allowed\nto remain in office after the expiration of their first term of service.\nOn August 27 the coronation rites were duly performed at the Shishinden\npalace. In accordance with the custom of changing the year-name on the\naccession of an emperor, the era was called Meiji (enlightened\ngovernment). The emperor removed the capital to T\u014dky\u014d, formerly Edo, and\ntook up his residence in the castle there.\n\nAs regards local administration, the first division of the country after\nthe abolition of the sh\u014dgunate was into 28 _fu_, 273 _han_, and 21\n_ken_, the _fu_ and _ken_ being governed by officials appointed by the\nsovereign. The _han_, however, being still under the government of their\nformer feudal chiefs, no uniformity of administration was possible.\nMoreover, of the total revenue of the state, namely, eleven million\n_koku_ of rice, only 1-4/5 millions belonged to the _fu_ and _ken_,\nwhich were under the direct control of the central government, the\nremainder constituting the income of the _han_. The resources of the\nimperial treasury proved quite inadequate to meet the heavy calls made\nupon them, in spite of the fact that some of the barons contributed\nliberally. Kido Takakoto, a distinguished _samurai_ of Ch\u014dsh\u016b, then\nholding the post of councilor of state, appreciating the fundamental\nnecessity of the time, made such powerful representations to his liege\nlord that the latter agreed to surrender his feudal domains and their\nrevenues to the sovereign. Kido subsequently took council on the same\nsubject with \u014ckubo Toshimichi, a not less distinguished retainer of\nSatsuma, and by the latter's advice the Satsuma lord was induced to\nfollow the course taken by M\u014dri of Ch\u014dsh\u016b. The barons of Hizen and Tosa\nfollowed the example, and on January 20, 1868, these four great nobles\naddressed to the throne a memorial over their joint signatures,\ndeclaring their desire to restore their territories to the sovereign,\nand their conviction that all the lands in the empire should come under\nthe direct control of the central government. Thereafter the various\nother barons signified their wish to follow the same course, and in the\nsequel of a consultation held with all the feudal chiefs, whom the\nemperor summoned to T\u014dky\u014d for the purpose, an imperial edict was issued,\ndirecting that all the fiefs should be restored to the sovereign,\nappointing the feudal lords to the post of governor, and remodeling the\nadministrative organization of the _han_ so as to bring it into\nconformity with that of the _fu_ and _ken_. One-tenth of the revenue\naccruing from the fief lands was apportioned as the salary of the\ngovernors. The distinctive terms of \"court noble\" (_kuge_) and \"feudal\nlord\" (_sh\u014dk\u014d_) were abolished, and all the nobles were included in the\ngeneral appellation of _kwazoku_. Relatives of the _kwazoku_ and\n_samurai_ were all classed as _shizoku_, their pensions being at the\nsame time duly fixed.\n\nAlthough the organization of the local government had been placed on a\nfairly complete footing and uniformity of method had begun to be\ndiscernible, both the military classes and the commoners in the various\nfiefs were still disposed to pay more respect to their former lords than\nto the new officials appointed by the central authorities. Under these\ncircumstances it was suggested by a governor, who had himself been a\ngreat feudal baron, that the military monopoly of the _samurai_ should\nbe abolished and their pensions commuted, and that the army should be\nrecruited alike from the _shizoku_ and commoners. The versatile Kido\nagain recommended that the _han_ (fiefs) should be replaced by _ken_\n(prefectures), so as to thoroughly centralize the administrative power.\nIt is remarkable that the view was at once seconded by many barons, who\nmemorialized the throne begging the latter to reorganize all their fiefs\ninto prefectures. The policy was finally adopted in 1871, when the 263\n_han_ were completely abolished and replaced by 372 new _ken_, and ample\nrewards at the same time given to the few baron-governors who had taken\nthe lead in urging this change. Thus the central government came into\nfull control of the lands and people that had been under the sway of\nfeudal chiefs ever since the Kamakura epoch. Subsequently, various\nchanges of boundaries were made, until in 1890 there were 43 prefectures\n(_ken_) and 3 cities (_fu_), besides one board of administration (_cho_)\nof Hokkaid\u014d.\n\nThe abolition of the _han_ had its grave financial problem, for it now\nbecame necessary for the central government to assume the responsibility\nof the fiduciary notes previously issued by the various feudal lords. To\nmeet this liability the government issued, in lieu of the fiduciary\nnotes, bonds redeemable within fifty years, and for the purpose of\nsatisfying the claims of the _shizoku_ an envoy was sent to England to\nraise a sum of ten million _yen_. This, Japan's first foreign debt, was\ncontracted in 1872. In the following year the system of commuting\nannuities was fixed, those whose incomes ranged from 100 _koku_ downward\nbeing allowed, on application, to commute at six years' purchase, half\nof the commutation money being paid in cash and the remainder in public\nbonds. The system was subsequently extended to larger incomes, and in\nAugust, 1876, the method of commutation was made compulsory, applicable\nto the income of all the _shizoku_, bonds being handed to them in the\nfollowing year. These bonds, carrying interest at different rates, were\nto be liquidated annually by lot, their total redemption to be effected\nin thirty years. At the same time, the _shizoku_, who from ancient times\nhad devoted themselves to military and literary pursuits, despising\nindustry and trade, now found themselves detached from their feudal\nlords on whom they had relied, and deprived of their lands and pensions.\nReceiving sums of money in commutation of their hereditary incomes, many\nof them, without training or experience, turned at once to commerce and\nagriculture, and in numerous instances those who had become merchants\nfell victims to their own want of knowledge and to the craft of others,\nlosing everything they possessed and incurring the contempt of the\nmercantile classes whom they had so long counted their inferiors.\n\nThe overthrow of the feudal tenure naturally affected the military\norganization of the nation. Hitherto soldiers to form the imperial guard\nhad been raised in Satsuma, Ch\u014dsh\u016b, and Tosa, and the remaining force\nhad consisted of five garrison corps (_chindai_), quartered at different\nplaces and recruited from cities and prefectures in the proportion of\nfive men per 10,000 _koku_ of rice crop.\n\nIn 1872 the military department (_hy\u014dbush\u014d_) was replaced by two\nseparate departments of war and the navy, and an imperial ordinance\nprovided that soldiers should be recruited from all parts of the empire\nand all classes of the people, the monopoly of military service held by\nthe _samurai_ being thus abolished and the method existing a thousand\nyears previously restored. At the same time it was clearly indicated\nthat the command in chief of all the forces devolved on the sovereign.\nAll persons of twenty years or upward were liable for conscription, and\nthe army was divided into troops with the colors (_j\u014dbi-hei_), the\nreserve (_k\u014dbi-hei_), and the militia (_kokumin-gun_). Subsequently all\nof the castles in the fiefs were dismantled with the exception of\nfifty-five, which were handed over to the war department, and the number\nof the garrison corps was increased to six, their headquarters being\nT\u014dky\u014d, Sendai, Nagoya, \u014csaka, Hiroshima, and Kumamoto. Various new\nregulations relating to military matters were afterward issued from time\nto time, or revisions of the old effected, a colonial militia for\nHokkaid\u014d being among the new measures. Meanwhile, the naval department\nestablished naval stations, built dockyards and ships of war, and opened\ncolleges, so that the organizations of the two branches of the military\nservice were placed on a satisfactory footing.\n\nAll these changes were radical in nature, and it was inevitable that the\nconservative instincts educated among the people through centuries of\nfeudal training should often burst forth in opposition to the drastic\nsocial revolution. Men conspicuous as advocates of innovation were\nsometimes attacked and assassinated, and armed resistance was\noccasionally planned. Sakuma Sh\u014dzan, Councilor Yokoi Heishir\u014d, and\nSenior Vice Minister of the Army \u014cmura Masujiro all fell under the\nswords of assassins in consequence of their ardent liberalism; while, on\nthe other hand, Kumoi Tatsuo of Yonezawa plotted with the old _samurai_\nof Aidzu and Shizuoka to restore the feudal system by force. But this as\nwell as some minor attempts of a similar character in other parts of the\nempire were quickly dealt with, the nation as a whole being emphatically\nfavorable to the new order of things. It was not so easy, however, to\npacify some of the larger insurrections which occurred in the southern\npart of Japan. In January, 1874, Et\u014d Shimpei, a member of the cabinet,\nbeing opposed by the majority of his colleagues with respect to the\npolicy to be pursued toward Korea, retired from the government and\ngathered about him in Saga, in Hizen, a number of discontented people\nwho were desirous of restoring feudalism and attacking Korea. They\nplundered a sum of 200,000 _yen_ from the Ono Company, and made a\nsuccessful raid upon the prefectural offices of Kumamoto. The garrison\ncorps of the latter place received orders to subdue the rebels--\u014ckubo\nToshimichi, minister of home affairs, being dispatched by the sovereign\nto direct the operations. The insurgents suffered several defeats, and\nwere finally imprisoned in Saga castle, but they managed to effect their\nescape thence under cover of darkness, and to cross the sea to\nKagoshima, where they landed, with the intention of striking a second\nblow by the aid of Saig\u014d Takamori, whose rebellion will presently\nreceive our attention. Failing in their purpose, however, they were\nunable to offer any further resistance. Et\u014d and the other ringleaders\nwere executed in April, and when Prince Yoshiaki arrived, who had been\ndispatched from T\u014dky\u014d at the head of a considerable naval and military\nforce to crush the rebellion, he found that order had been restored. Two\nyears later there were simultaneous uprisings in Kumamoto and in Hagi\nof Nagato, which were quickly subdued by the imperial forces.\n\nNo rebellion, however, proved more serious and more difficult to repress\nthan the revolt of Saig\u014d in Satsuma. The genesis of this insurrection\nmust be traced to complex circumstances under which the leading\nstatesmen of the new government had been split into two factions, one of\nwhich had its central figure in Saig\u014d. The occasion for the rupture was\nthe dispute which arose among the ministers of the crown in regard to\nthe policy to be pursued by Japan toward Korea. Throughout the Tokugawa\nperiod it had been customary for Korea, on each occasion of a coronation\nin that country, to send an ambassador to confirm the friendly relations\nbetween the two states. When the restoration took place in Japan her\ngovernment dispatched an envoy to Korea to convey intelligence of the\nfact and to renew expressions of amity, but the Koreans refused to\nrecognize the envoy or accept his message, owing ostensibly to the fact\nthat the new term \"Great Empire of Japan\" was employed in the imperial\nletter. At a later date the Japanese sent home certain Koreans who had\nbeen shipwrecked on the coast of Japan, and took the opportunity of\nrenewing expressions of friendship by the mouths of the officials who\nescorted the castaways. Korea received the shipwrecked sailors, but\ndeclined to receive the officials accompanying them. The youthful\ngovernment contained men, particularly the Councilors Saig\u014d Takamori,\nSoyeshima Taneomi, Itagaki Taisuke, Got\u014d Sh\u014djir\u014d, and Et\u014d Shimpei, who\ndeeply resented the conduct of Korea, and counseled the opening of the\npeninsular kingdom by force of arms. Other chief officials of the\ngovernment, headed by \u014ckubo Toshimichi, opposed this view, and being\nsupported by the minister of the left, Iwakura, who had just returned\nfrom his travels through Europe and America, the peace party carried the\nday. The advocates of recourse to arms resigned, and a new cabinet was\norganized, under Iwakura and \u014ckubo, which was the first cabinet change\nin Japan since the restoration. The immediate effects of this change\nwere important. The revolt of Et\u014d has already been related, and the case\nof Itagaki and Got\u014d will soon be heard of. The name of Saig\u014d has been\nmentioned as one of the two heroes whose mutual trust had resulted in\naverting the great battle imminent in Edo. A man of overmastering\nsincerity, his position in the T\u014dky\u014d government, in which he was\ncommander in chief of the army, had been unique. When he resigned and\nretired to Kagoshima in Satsuma, and established a private military\nschool, nearly all the ambitious young men of the province flocked to\nthe school. Many came from other prefectures also, for Saig\u014d's\nreputation as the chief agent in bringing about the restoration was\nimmense, and his simple, great personality commanded universal love and\nrespect. These students, little intent on studies, where animated by a\ndesire to raise Saig\u014d to the leadership of a colossal opposition to the\nnew cabinet, whose policy and conduct they honestly abhorred. When the\nHagi and Kumamoto insurrections broke out in 1876 these truculent\nstudents maintained correspondence with the rebels, but refrained from\nopenly imitating their example. By and by, some officials of the\nimperial government who visited the province were seized by the students\nand tortured into a false confession that they had come with a secret\ncommission to assassinate Saig\u014d. The war department, apprehending\ndangerous contingencies, now ordered that the powder stored in Kagoshima\nshould be transferred to \u014csaka, but the powder was seized _en route_ by\nthe students, who also managed to possess themselves of the arsenal and\nimplements of war belonging to the naval department in Kagoshima. Saig\u014d\nearnestly endeavored at first to restore order and discipline among\nthese turbulent disciples, but he finally yielded to the persuasion of\nhis chief followers, who represented that on him devolved the patriotic\nduty of clearing away disloyal and crafty subjects from the foot of the\nthrone, and who showed him, at the same time, the false confession\nextorted by torture from government officials. Saig\u014d thereupon\ncirculated a letter throughout the adjacent provinces explaining the\nnecessity of resorting to arms. News of these events reached the emperor\nin Ky\u014dto, whither he had temporarily gone. He made that city his\nheadquarters, and gave to Prince Arisugawa a commission to quell the\nrebellion, Yamagata Aritomo, minister of war, and Kawamura Sumiyoshi,\nvice minister of the navy, being appointed chiefs of staff. The brigades\ndispatched to the scene of disturbance were commanded by Major Generals\nNozu, Miyoshi, and Miura, and Saig\u014d and his fellow-conspirators were\nstripped of all their ranks and honors.\n\nThe insurgents assembled in Kagoshima now numbered some 15,000 picked\n_samurai_ of desperate courage and great skill in the use of their\nweapons. At the head of this force Saig\u014d set out for Kumamoto on\nFebruary 15, 1876, and on the 22d of that month he sat down with his\nwhole army before Kumamoto castle, an error of strategy which ultimately\nenabled the government to confine the insurrection to the Island of\nKiush\u016b. Major General Tani Tateki, who held command of the garrison,\nmade a stubborn resistance, though many of the _samurai_ among his\ntroops went over to the rebels. The imperial army arriving in the\nprovince of Higo, endeavored to reach Kumamoto from the northwest via\nTakase. Severe fighting look place, but the forces of the government\npushed steadily on. At point after point the rebels made obstinate\nstands, especially in the strong position of Tawara-saka, where a great\nnumber of lives were lost by both sides, and the whole district was\ndevastated. The government troops, though victorious, found themselves\nseriously weakened, and the insurgents fought with undiminished\ndesperation. Shortly before this, Yanagiwara Sakimitsu, a senator, was\nsent by the emperor to Kagoshima to warn Shimazu Hisamitsu, the former\nfeudal chief of Satsuma, and his son, Tadayoshi, against connecting\nthemselves with the insurgents. He was accompanied on this mission by\nLieutenant General Kuroda Kiyotaka, an influential member of the Satsuma\nfief, and the two labored so successfully that the dockyard and arsenal,\nwhich had been dismantled by the rebels, were restored to a defensible\ncondition. It now became possible to advance upon the rear of the\nrebels, and General Kuroda, being appointed chief of the staff, landed a\nbody of troops at Yatsushiro in order to attack Saig\u014d from the south.\nThe insurgents were now assaulted from two directions, but they fought\nso well that the imperial army could not yet effect the relief of\nKumamoto castle, which, having been besieged for over fifty days, was\nbeing reduced to straits for want of provisions. The commander of the\ngarrison now managed to send an officer through the besieging army with\nintelligence of his perilous condition, and on receipt of the message\nGeneral Kuroda set all his troops in rapid motion, and forced his way to\nKumamoto on April 14, the insurgents breaking up into two bodies, one of\nwhich retreated into the province of Bungo and the other into the\nHitoyoshi valley in Higo, where the country offered excellent facilities\nfor resistance. Upon the retreat of the rebels from Kumamoto, Vice\nMinister Kawamura Sumiyoshi was sent to Kagoshima, at the head of 8000\nmen, to attack the rebellion at its root, whereupon Saig\u014d, who was with\nthe Hitoyoshi branch of the rebels, learning that Kagoshima had fallen\ninto the hands of the government's troops, issued orders for a retreat\nin the directions of Satsuma and Osumi. The Hitoyoshi insurgents then\neffected their escape with much adroitness into Hiuga province,\nfollowing three different routes, and the imperial army occupied the\nHitoyoshi position on June 1. The Bungo body of insurgents, meanwhile,\nbeing hard pressed by the government forces, retired to a strong\nposition at Nobeoka, in Hiuga, and opened communications with the other\nbody, which had fortified itself at Miyazaki in the same province.\nSeveral battles and skirmishes ensued, and it was not till the end of\nJuly that Miyazaki was reduced, Nobeoka falling on August 14. The rebels\nnow retreated northward to Enotake, where they were closely besieged by\nthe imperial army, but on the 18th of the same month they succeeded,\nwith extraordinary celerity and address, in effecting a retreat right\nthrough the besieging lines, and pushing rapidly on to Kagoshima, which\nplace they suddenly attacked and took. The imperial forces were now\nconcentrated about Kagoshima, and after a sanguinary engagement, lasting\nten days, the rebels were driven to Shiroyama, where their last fight\nwas fought on September 24. Saig\u014d Takamori committed suicide, and\nToshiaki and the other rebel chiefs fell on the field of battle, the\nrebellion being thus finally crushed. A provisional court was organized\nin Kiush\u016b under the presidency of K\u014dno Tokama, a secretary of the\nsenate, for the trial of those taken in the fighting, seventeen of whom\nwere sentenced to death. In this sanguinary struggle the whole of the\narmy and navy had been engaged, the old imperial bodyguard reorganized,\na band of swordsmen volunteers enrolled, and a company of policemen,\nalso for sword service, sent to the scene of the fighting. The Japanese\nsword was used by both armies with great skill and deadly effect. The\ntotal number of men engaged on the government side was 60,000, and the\nentire outlay involved was 416 million _yen_. At one time, indeed, the\naffair had threatened to assume almost uncontrollable dimensions, for in\nthe early days of the rebels' valiant fighting ominous signs of\ndisaffection made themselves apparent in the prefectures of Yamaguchi,\nK\u014dchi, Fukuoka, and elsewhere. Much as the trouble cost, however, in\nblood and treasure, its national uses were very great. By it the army\nand navy gained invaluable experience, and all the institutions of the\ncentral government were subjected to the test of severe practice, while\nthe people learned, once for all, that armed efforts to disturb the new\norder of things were utterly hopeless, and that adverse opinion must be\nlimited to the channels of speech and pen. The treasury, however, found\nitself seriously embarrassed. It had been obliged to borrow fifteen\nmillion _yen_ from the Fifteenth National Bank, and also, most\nreluctantly, to issue fiduciary notes aggregating 270,000,000 _yen_ in\naddition to those already issued for the purpose of redeeming the fiat\npaper of the _daij\u014dkwan_, the _mimbush\u014d_, and the former feudal barons.\n\n[Illustration: THE INSURRECTION IN THE ISLAND OF KIUSH\u016a 1877]\n\nWhile the rupture of the cabinet had occasioned the immense rebellion of\nKagoshima and the tragic end of the great Saig\u014d, his former colleagues,\nItagaki and Got\u014d, also did not accept the political defeat of their\nfaction without a struggle. Their struggle, however, produced widely\ndifferent results from those of Saig\u014d's uprising. Itagaki and Got\u014d\naddressed to the government a memorial urging the expediency of at once\nestablishing a national assembly in Japan. But the government rejected\nthe memorial on the ground that the time was not ripe for so radical a\nmeasure. Nevertheless, the embryo of a deliberative assembly was in\ntruth formed about this time, for the local governors were all summoned\nto T\u014dky\u014d, and invited to discuss together questions relating to roads,\nrivers, bridges, the relief of the destitute, public meetings, and other\nmatters connected with their jurisdictions. Moreover, in 1875 a senate\n_(genr\u014d-in)_ was organized for legislative purposes, its members being\nappointed from among men conspicuous for merit and capacity. In 1876 and\n1877, owing to rebellious disturbances fomented by the seceding\ncouncilors of state, the local governors were not summoned to T\u014dky\u014d for\nconsultation, but in 1878 they assembled in the capital and discussed\nquestions relating to local reorganization, to city and prefectural\nassemblies--the bases of a future parliament--and to local taxes.\nSubsequent to this meeting rules relating to the organization of towns,\nvillages, districts, and divisions were promulgated, as well as rules\nrelating to the collection of taxes, while in 1879 the system of local\nassemblies was established in each city and prefecture. The members of\nthese assemblies were elected by the people from among themselves, and\nwere invested with extensive deliberative functions in relation to local\nadministration. In the following years the governors were again summoned\nto T\u014dky\u014d for the purpose of deliberating about relief funds and revising\nthe rules discussed at their previous meeting, these rules being\nsupplemented by others relating to the organization of divisions, towns,\nand villages. Meanwhile, the advocates of popular rights increased in\nnumber and influence day by day. A newspaper press had arisen which made\nthis subject a favorite topic of discussion, and political associations\nwere formed agitating the establishment of a diet or petitioning the\ngovernment in that sense. In view of this growing excitement and to\navert contingencies incidental to it, regulations were issued for the\nbetter control of newspapers and political meetings. In 1880 a political\nparty, the _Jiy\u016b-t\u014d_ (Liberals), destined subsequently to play a\nprominent part in national affairs, was organized, under the leadership\nof Itagaki Taisuke, while within the government \u014ckuma Shigenobu, a\ncouncilor of state, advocated the opening of a national assembly without\ndelay. The ministers of the crown, however, adhered to their former\ndecision that the time was not ripe. Not discouraged by this refusal,\nthe advocates of a parliamentary system continued their agitation, and\nspared no pains to injure the credit of the cabinet with the nation. The\nsovereign, therefore, judging it expedient to announce publicly the\nintentions entertained by him, issued with the advice of his ministers,\nin October, 1881, a rescript declaring that in the 23d year of Meiji\n(1890) a constitutional government should be established. \u014ckuma\nShigenobu, together with K\u014dno Hironaka and others, now resigned their\nofficial positions and organized a political party, the _Kaishin-t\u014d_\n(Progressives), which, though occupying a common platform with the\n_Jiy\u016b-t\u014d_ in respect of a national assembly, worked in general\nopposition to the latter. At a much later date a third party, hostile to\nboth of the above, was formed, namely, the _Kokumin Ky\u014dkai_, or National\nUnionists.\n\nImmediately after the issue of the rescript fixing the date for opening\nthe diet, the government set about drafting the constitution, the utmost\ncare and research being brought to bear on this important work. In the\nspring of 1882 It\u014d Hirobumi was dispatched on a special mission to\nEurope for the purpose of investigating the constitutional law of the\nvarious states and its practical applications, and on his return a\nlegislative bureau, charged with the functions of drafting the\nconstitution, revising the laws, and remodeling the official\norganization, was established. In 1884 titles of nobility--prince,\nmarquis, count, viscount, and baron--were created, patents being granted\nto over five hundred of the former territorial and court nobles, as well\nas to officials distinguished for services rendered to the state. In\nFebruary of the following year great changes were effected in the\nadministrative organization. The offices of _daij\u014d daijin_, _sadaijin_,\n_udaijin_, _sangi_, and ministers of departments were abolished, and in\ntheir stead were created ministers of state for home affairs, foreign\naffairs, finance, war, the navy, education, justice, agriculture and\ncommerce, and communications, these ministers constituting a cabinet\nunder the leadership of the minister president and the presidency of the\nemperor himself. Outside the cabinet were the minister of the imperial\nhousehold, the lord keeper of the privy seal, and a number of court\ncouncilors, while in each department there was a vice minister, as well\nas a director and vice directors of each of its bureaus, together with\ncouncilors and secretaries. These changes were much more radical than\nanything previously effected during the Meiji era, all other reforms\nhaving been mere modifications of the old system prescribed in the\nTaih\u014d Code of 701 A.\u00a0D. At the same time regulations providing for the\nappointment of civil officials by competitive examination were\npromulgated, and various new laws and ordinances were issued. One of the\nmost important effects of this great reform was that it put an end\ncompletely to the pernicious system of selecting officials from personal\nconsiderations without regard to competence. No changes of a radical\ncharacter have since that time been effected in the administration.\nCount It\u014d Hirobumi, the chief author of these reforms, became the first\nminister president of state. In 1888 a privy council was established,\nits members being selected from among old and distinguished officials,\nand its function being to advise the sovereign with respect to any\nmatter submitted by his majesty for its deliberation. Count It\u014d became\nits president, resigning his post of minister president of state to\nCount Kuroda Kiyotaka. In the same year a large body of laws for the\nreorganization of cities, towns, and villages was promulgated, to go\ninto effect from the year 1891, and these laws were followed in 1890 by\nsimilar statutes for the organization of prefectures and districts, the\ngeneral purport of all this legislation being local autonomy.\n\nThe 11th of February in the 22d year of Meiji (1889) saw the\npromulgation of the imperial Constitution. On this memorable occasion\nthe emperor delivered from the throne the following speech: \"Whereas We\nmake it the joy and glory of Our heart to behold the prosperity of Our\ncountry, and the welfare of Our subjects, We do hereby, in virtue of the\nsupreme power We inherit from Our Imperial Ancestors, promulgate the\npresent immutable fundamental law, for the sake of Our present subjects\nand their descendants. The Imperial Founder of Our House and Our other\nImperial Ancestors, by the help and support of the forefathers of Our\nsubjects, laid the foundation of Our Empire upon a basis which is to\nlast forever. That this brilliant achievement embellishes the annals of\nOur country, is due to the glorious virtues of Our Sacred Imperial\nAncestors, and the loyalty and bravery of Our subjects, their love of\ntheir country, and their public spirit. Considering that Our subjects\nare the descendants of the loyal and good subjects of Our Imperial\nAncestors, We doubt not but that Our subjects will be guided by Our\nviews, and will sympathize with all Our endeavors, and that,\nharmoniously co\u00f6perating together, they will share with Us Our hope of\nmaking manifest the glory of Our country, both at home and abroad, and\nof securing forever the stability of the work bequeathed to Us by Our\nImperial Ancestors.\"\n\nThe promulgation of the Constitution took place in the throne room of\nthe T\u014dky\u014d palace, the princes of the blood, ministers of state, peers,\ngovernors of cities and prefectures, presidents of city and prefecture\nassemblies, the foreign representatives, and all officials of and above\n_chokunin_ rank being present. The Constitution consisted of seventy-six\narticles contained in seven chapters. It provided for the perpetuity of\nthe imperial succession; defined the imperial prerogatives and the\nprivileges granted to the people; declared the latter's obligation to\npay taxes and serve as soldiers, but guaranteed them against being\narrested, imprisoned, tried, or punished except by the process of law;\ndecreed the inviolability of person and property; granted freedom of\nresidence and conscience, and declared that no man's house could be\nofficially entered without a legal warrant. The law of the houses,\npromulgated simultaneously, created a bicameral diet--a house of peers\nand a house of representatives--to be convened every year, and in this\ndiet was vested legislative power without recourse to which no law could\nbe enacted or altered, and financial authority without the exercise of\nwhich the annual budget could not become existent. The law of election,\nwhich also formed one of the appended statutes of the Constitution,\nprovided for all affairs relating to the franchise and its exercise; the\nlaw of finance regulated fiscal matters; and the imperial house law\ndetermined affairs connected with the succession, the household, the\nprinces of the blood, and the like. The day of the promulgation of the\nConstitution was observed as a grand national f\u00eate, amnesty was\nproclaimed in the case of all political offenders, and largess was\nfreely distributed to the aged and indigent. It was certainly a subject\nfor national rejoicing and congratulation that this advanced stage of\ngovernmental progress was reached in Japan without any of the scenes of\nbloodshed and violence which had disfigured such changes in many other\ncountries.\n\nThe establishment of a constitutional form of government having long\nbeen an object of ardent desire of the people, all classes, official and\nprivate alike, had been preparing themselves for the welcome event. In\naddition to the Liberal and Progressive parties mentioned, Count G\u014dto\nSh\u014djir\u014d had formed a third, the _Daid\u014d Danketsu_ (Great Affiliation),\nwhich, however, after a brief existence, split up into two or three\ninsignificant bodies. When the first general election for the new\nnational diet took place in July, 1890, there were several rival parties\nand much political ardor, but everything passed off in an orderly and\nquiet manner. In view of the assembly of the diet the old senate\n(_genr\u014d-in_) was abolished, most of its members being nominated members\nof the upper house. By imperial edict the two houses were convoked in\nT\u014dky\u014d on November 25 of the same year, and his majesty the emperor\nopened the diet in person on November 29. The house of representatives\nconsisted of 300 members elected by the people in the various\nlocalities; the house of peers, of the princes of the blood, the princes\nand marquises, all of whom sat in their own right, a certain number of\ncounts, viscounts, and barons elected by their respective orders,\nhighest taxpayers elected by the prefectures, one for each, and a\nproportion of members nominated by the sovereign in consideration of\nmeritorious services or proficiency in learning. So with 1890 began the\nnew r\u00e9gime of Japan.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XV\n\nFOREIGN RELATIONS. 1868-1893\n\n\nUnder the Tokugawa rule a treaty was concluded between Japan and Russia\nrecognizing Karafuto (Sakhalin) as a joint possession of the two\nempires. Later the Edo government sent an envoy to St. Petersburg with a\nproposal that the 50th parallel of north latitude should be the boundary\nbetween the two countries. No final decision was arrived at, however, on\nthat occasion, and it was resolved that each country should send an\nambassador to Karafuto the following year to survey the island and\ndetermine the boundary. But domestic embarrassments so beset the\nsh\u014dgun's government that the promised envoy was not sent from Japan. In\n1866 there was talk of dispatching an ambassador for the purpose, but\nnothing was done, while Russia was gradually pushing southward, until\nshe finally encroached upon the region indisputably recognized as\nJapanese territory. The government of the sh\u014dgun was powerless at the\ntime to offer any opposition, and shortly afterward it had to surrender\nthe administration to the emperor. His majesty's ministers now proposed,\nthrough the intermediary of the United States, that the parallel of 50\u00b0\nnorth latitude should be taken as the boundary, but the Russian\ngovernment rejected the proposal. Subsequently, Admiral Enomoto was sent\nas Japanese representative to St. Petersburg, and after much discussion\nit was decided, by a convention concluded in 1875, that the whole of\nSakhalin should become Russian property, Japan receiving in exchange the\nChishima Islands (the Kuriles).\n\nWhen in 1858 the first treaties were concluded by the sh\u014dgun's\ngovernment with five foreign powers, the Japanese plenipotentiaries,\nbeing entirely ignorant of foreign affairs, intrusted the drafting of\nthe articles to the American minister, and merely indorsed the\nprovisions proposed by him. A clause was added, however, providing for\nrevision after the lapse of fourteen years, and when it was found that\nthe treaties contained much which was injurious to Japan's dignity and\nembarrassing to her independence, a strong desire to effect revision\nbegan to be generally felt. Moreover, as a result of the firing upon\nforeign ships by the forts at Shimonoseki, England and France, in\naddition to exacting an indemnity out of all proportion to the injury\nsuffered by the ships, took advantage of Japan's internal dissensions to\nimpose upon her greatly lowered tariff rates. At subsequent dates\ntreaties were concluded, necessarily on the same lines, with Portugal,\nPrussia, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Sweden, Spain,\nAustria-Hungary, and Hawaii, and ministers plenipotentiary were\naccredited to most of these countries. The knowledge thus gradually\nacquired of Western states and of the international usages prevailing\namong them, served to increase Japan's impatience against the unequal\nconventional conditions to which she was herself compelled to submit.\nThe government, not less swayed by this sentiment, did everything in its\npower to remove obstacles which foreigners alleged to be fatal to equal\ninternational treatment of Japan. The penal laws were radically altered,\nand codes consistent with the principles of Western jurisprudence were\npromulgated. Meanwhile, the term of fourteen years fixed by the treaties\nhad elapsed, and the time for revision having arrived it was resolved to\ndispatch an embassy to Europe and America for the purpose of making\nknown Japan's real condition and acquiring knowledge of foreign affairs.\nIn October, 1871, Iwakura Tomomi, minister of the right, was sent upon\nthis mission, together with a number of other prominent officials. In\nthe United States of America he met with a cordial reception, the\npresident promising to consider favorably the question of revision, and\nCongress showing a disposition to return America's share of the\nindemnity unjustly exacted from Japan in connection with the Shimonoseki\naffair. (The indemnity was actually returned twelve years later.) In\nEuropean countries, also, the ambassador was courteously received, but\nfailed to obtain any serious attention for the subject of treaty\nrevision. The embassy returned to Japan in 1873. During the next years\ndomestic affairs engrossed the attention of the government to the\nvirtual exclusion of everything else, and it was not until after the\ntermination of the Satsuma rebellion in 1877 that the government found\nitself in a position to approach foreign powers with the object of\nrecovering tariff autonomy and reserving the coastwise trade. The effort\nagain proved abortive. In 1879, however, an agreement was concluded\nwith the United States of America, the latter agreeing to a revised\ntreaty by which Japan's tariff and judicial autonomy was to be restored\nand her coastwise trade reserved, with the proviso, however, that the\nrevised treaty should not go into force until a similar instrument had\nbeen concluded with the other powers. In 1880 Inouye Kaoru, minister for\nforeign affairs, opened negotiations with the plenipotentiaries of the\nEuropean powers in T\u014dky\u014d, but the proposed revision having been\nimproperly disclosed to the public, the negotiations were suspended.\nRenewed shortly afterward, they were brought within apparent reach of\nconclusion in 1887, after long and weary discussions. But in the\nmeanwhile public opinion in Japan had been growing more and more\nimpatient of the treatment meted out to the empire by foreign states,\nand more and more sensible of the rights appertaining to an independent\ncountry. On the other hand, the rivalry of foreign powers, the diversity\nof their interests and the difficulty of dealing with them all together,\nhad involved the introduction of many irksome and humiliating conditions\ninto the draft of the revised treaty, and when it was published in 1887\nit provoked opposition that caused its abandonment, Count Inouye\nretiring from office. He was succeeded by Count \u014ckuma Shigenobu, who\nreopened the negotiations, but was enabled, owing to Japan's improved\nposition _vis \u00e0 vis_ the outer world, to insist on conducting them\nindependently with each power, thus avoiding the insuperable difficulty\nof simultaneously placating seventeen states all influenced by more or\nless divergent interests. A revised treaty, on lines more favorable to\nJapan than the former draft had been, was now concluded and signed by\nAmerica and Germany. But no sooner were its provisions published than\nthe nation again became excited, especially on account of an article\nproviding that foreigners, as well as natives, should be appointed to\nthe Japanese judiciary. The cabinet decided to again suspend the\nnegotiations, and a fanatic threw a bomb at Count \u014ckuma which wounded\nhim severely, necessitating the amputation of his right leg. Some time\nafterward he retired from office, together with the minister president,\nCount Kuroda, and in 1889 Count Yamagata became minister president,\nViscount Aoki taking the portfolio of foreign affairs. The latter,\ntogether with Count Got\u014d, minister of communications, and Count Saig\u014d\nTsugumichi, minister of home affairs, were appointed joint\nplenipotentiaries for the purposes of treaty revision. But in 1891\nCount Yamagata and Viscount Aoki retired, the latter being succeeded by\nViscount Enomoto, who, in 1892, gave place to Mutsu Munemitsu. It was\nunder the foreign ministry of the latter that, in 1894, Great Britain\ntook the lead of all other powers to conclude a revised treaty with\nJapan, which went into effect on July 17, 1899, and which removed the\nconsular jurisdiction from the open ports of Japan, in return for the\nthrowing open of the whole empire to the travel and traffic of all\nforeigners. Coasting trade was also recognized as properly belonging to\nthe domain where Japan had the sovereign right of making regulations.\nTariff autonomy was largely recovered, and new import duties were drawn\nup, export duties being entirely abolished. Japan thus became, at\nlength, not only a sovereign state free to look after its own internal\nand external affairs, but also a member of the family of nations whose\nlegal status was considered on the basis of parity.\n\nMeanwhile, the intercourse with foreign nations had grown more and more\nintimate. Many princes, nobles, and celebrities came from the West to\nvisit Japan, and many Japanese statesmen and students traveled or\nsojourned in Europe and America. No vestige seemed to remain of the old\nsentiment of national seclusion. It may be interesting to say a word\nhere about some of the distinguished foreigners who visited Japan during\nthe Meiji era. Shortly after the restoration, the duke of Edinburgh,\nsecond son of the queen of England, came, and was followed, in 1872, by\nPrince Alexis of Russia, who was received by the emperor and was present\nat naval and military reviews. In February, 1879, the future William II.\nof Germany came to T\u014dky\u014d. In July of the same year General Grant,\nex-president of the United States, arrived, and was hospitably\nentertained, the citizens of T\u014dky\u014d showing their appreciation of\nAmerica's sympathetic attitude toward Japan by entertaining him at an\nevening party, as well as at a garden-party in Uyeno Park, at which the\nemperor was present and various kinds of Japanese sports were shown. At\nlater dates Japan was visited by the nephew of King Humbert of Italy,\nthe czarevitch, afterward Nicholas II. of Russia, King Kalakaua of\nHawaii, a Grecian prince, and other distinguished personages.\n\nJapan's relations with Asiatic countries were not always as cordial as\nthose with European and American states. In the year 1866, owing to the\nmisconduct of Chinese settlers, it became necessary to enact special\nregulations for their control and to restrict the limits of their\nresidence at the open ports. When the war between the emperor and the\nsh\u014dgun broke out all the foreign powers declared and maintained\nneutrality except the Chinese, who secretly sold arms to the Tokugawa.\nHence their access to non-treaty ports was strictly prohibited. They\nalso contrived to kidnap and sell the children of indigent Japanese, and\ninstructions were consequently issued to local governments to guard\nstrictly against this outrage. In July, 1871, however, a treaty of\nfriendship and amity was concluded between the two empires.\n\nIn the winter of 1872 some inhabitants of the Loochoo Islands were cast\naway on the eastern coast of Formosa and murdered by the natives, and in\nthe following year some shipwrecked sailors from the province of Bitch\u016b\nexperienced the same fate. Soyeshma Taneomi was sent by the government\nas plenipotentiary to Peking to complain of these outrages against\nJapanese subjects, but the Chinese government made no satisfactory reply\nand declined to acknowledge its responsibility for the acts of the\nnatives of Formosa. The Japanese government was thus compelled to take\ninto its own hands the task of exacting reparation. In April, 1874,\nLieutenant General Saig\u014d Tsugumichi was appointed to the command of a\npunitory expedition to Formosa. No serious opposition was encountered\nexcept at the hands of one tribe, which, however, was overcome after\nsome fighting. On the eve of sending this expedition, Yanagiwara\nSakimitsu was dispatched by the Japanese government as ambassador to\nChina, but as he found the Chinese much incensed about Japan's action\nand very anxious that her troops should at once leave Formosa, \u014ckubo\nToshimichi, a leading member of the cabinet, was dispatched as\nplenipotentiary to Peking. Meeting only with procrastination and\ninconsistency on the part of the Chinese, he broke off the negotiations\nand announced his intention of returning to Japan. But at this stage the\nBritish minister in Peking mediated between the two empires, and the\nChinese finally agreed to pay 100,000 taels to the families of the\nmurdered Japanese subjects and 400,000 taels indemnity to Japan for the\ncost of the expedition, undertaking at the same time to prevent the\nrecurrence of similar outrages in Formosa.\n\n[Illustration: ISLAND POSSESSIONS OF JAPAN]\n\nAfter the Formosan trouble another complication arose between Japan and\nChina with regard to the Islands of Loochoo. These had long been a\ndependency of Japan. In the middle of the twelfth century the Minamoto\nleader, Tametomo, driven to the province of Izu, made his way thence to\nLoochoo, and, having quelled a civil war raging in the islands, placed\nhis son Shunten on the throne. Afterward, the Ashikaga sh\u014dgun,\nYoshinori, gave the islands to the Shimazu family as an adjunct of the\nSatsuma fief, but from the time of Hideyoshi's Korean expedition,\nLoochoo having neglected to discharge its duties as a dependency, the\nSatsuma chief sent a force to the islands in 1609, took the king\nprisoner and conveyed him to Edo, whence he was soon after restored to\nhis country. Shimazu then sent officials to superintend the affairs of\nLoochoo, and from that time forth the revenue of the islands was\nincluded in the yearly income of the Shimazu family. In 1873 Sho Tai,\nking of Loochoo, came to Japan and was formally invested with the title\nof feudal chief of Loochoo, a residence in T\u014dky\u014d being assigned to him\nat the same time. Shortly afterward the name of the year period and the\nLoochooan calendar were changed for those in use in Japan, and the laws\nof the empire were declared operative in Loochoo. Finally, in April,\n1879, the feudal title of the ex-king of Loochoo was abolished and the\nislands were turned into the prefecture of Okinawa. The Chinese\ngovernment thereupon advanced a claim that Loochoo had once been a\ntributary of the Middle Kingdom, and that it therefore belonged not less\nto China than to Japan. The weight of evidence was on Japan's side,\nhowever, and by the arbitration of General Grant, ex-president of the\nUnited States of America, who happened to be on a visit to the East at\nthe time, the question was settled in Japan's favor.\n\nTurning now to Korean affairs, it has already been related that an envoy\nwas sent from Japan at the time of the restoration, but that Korea\nrefused to receive him. It was on this occasion that Saig\u014d Bakamari\nproposed that he himself would proceed thither in the capacity of\nambassador, and that if Korea persisted in her unfriendly attitude, an\narmed force should be sent against her. But, as has been related, this\nproposal did not meet with the approval of the cabinet. In 1875 Japan\nsent another envoy, but again Korea declined to open amicable relations.\nAn event then occurred which nearly involved the two countries in war. A\nJapanese man-of-war, _en route_ for China, whither she was carrying a\nJapanese plenipotentiary, called at Chemulpo, in August, 1875, to obtain\nfuel and water, but her boats were fired on by the Koreans and two of\nher men were wounded. Incensed at this outrage, the crew of the vessel\nattacked and burned the Korean fortress. When the matter was reported in\nT\u014dky\u014d, the government sent Lieutenant General Kuroda, a member of the\ncabinet, and Inouye Kaoru to Korea, in the capacity of ambassador and\nvice ambassador, respectively. This mission met with success, Korea sent\na letter of apology to Japan and declared her desire to contract\nfriendly relations. Lieutenant General Kuroda accordingly concluded a\ntreaty of commerce and amity, in which Korea's independence was\nrecognized by Japan, and in May, 1876, Korea sent an envoy to Japan,\nopened the ports of Gensan and Chemulpo, and agreed that each country\nshould be represented at the court of the other. Thenceforth the Korean\ngovernment began to adopt some of the appliances of Western\ncivilization. She improved her administrative organization, established\na military training school where Japanese instructors were employed, and\nsent youths to Japan to be educated. These innovations, however, proved\nvery distasteful to many conservatives in Korea, especially to\nTaiwon-kun, father of the king, who had always been on bad terms with\nthe Bin family, to which the queen belonged, and which was at the time\nfavorable to reform. Affairs were precipitated by discontent among the\nsoldiery with reference to the removal of a minister, and being incited\nby the Taiwon-kun, the troops attacked the palace in July, 1882, and\nkilled many of the Bin family, as well as several Japanese military\nofficers. The same night the Japanese legation was attacked by a mob,\nand the minister, Hanabusa Yoshimoto, had to force his way through the\ncity, escorting the women and children of the legation, and push on\nthrough the darkness to Chemulpo, where he escaped by boat, and being\npicked up by an English man-of-war, the _Flying Fish_, returned to\nNagasaki on board her. He was speedily sent back by his government in a\nvessel-of-war, and entering Seul, demanded an explanation from Korea.\nChina, meanwhile, had dispatched a squadron to the scene, seized the\nTaiwon-kun, and carried him prisoner to Tientsin. Hanabusa subsequently\nconcluded with Korea a convention providing for the punishment of the\nmalefactors, the payment of an indemnity of 50,000 yen to the sufferers\nand their families, and of 500,000 yen to the Japanese empire, the\nguarding of the Japanese legation by Korean troops, and the dispatch of\nan ambassador to apologize for the outrage. (Japan afterward returned to\nKorea 400,000 yen of this indemnity.) China and Japan both stationed\nbodies of men in the Korean capital, and Korea divided her forces into\ntwo bodies, one of which was trained according to Japanese tactics, the\nother according to Chinese. There were then two parties in the\npeninsular kingdom, the Independents and the Conservatives, between whom\na state of strained relations constantly existed. In December, 1884,\nthey resorted to open hostilities, and the king, finding himself in\ndanger, sent an autograph letter to the Japanese legation, asking for\nhelp. The Japanese _charg\u00e9 d'affaires_ thereupon proceeded to the palace\nwith a small body of men. There he was attacked by a combined force of\nChinese and Koreans. During the fighting the king's mother was seized by\nthe Chinese soldiers, and the king having declared his intention of\nplacing himself in the hands of the Chinese in order to be with her, the\nJapanese retired to their legation, which was afterward assaulted by a\nKorean mob and set on fire. The _charg\u00e9 d'affaires_ made his way to\nChemulpo and once more Japan was obliged to demand reparation from\nKorea. This time the task of effecting an arrangement was intrusted to\nCount Inouye Kaoru, who, proceeding to Korea as ambassador, escorted by\ntwo men-of-war, concluded a treaty providing that Korea should send an\nenvoy to Japan to tender apologies; that the Koreans who had injured\nJapanese persons and property should be duly punished; and that an\nindemnity of 110,000 yen, together with 20,000 yen for the rebuilding of\nthe legation, should be paid. In March of the same year Count It\u014d\nHirobumi, a member of the cabinet, accompanied by Lieutenant General\nSaig\u014d, proceeded to China, and concluded Viceroy Li at Tientsin a\nconvention providing that China and Japan should withdraw their troops\nfrom Korea; that neither power should thereafter send a force thither\nwithout giving previous notice to the other, and that the Chinese\nsoldiers who had taken part in the attack on the Japanese in Seul should\nbe punished. Thus friendly relations were re\u00ebstablished between Japan\nand China.\n\n\n\n\nPART IV\n\nCONSTITUTIONAL JAPAN. 1893--\n\n\n\n\nChapter XVI\n\nTHE CONSTITUTION IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE\n\n1893-1906\n\n\nThe \"History of the Empire of Japan\" was compiled in 1893, and it is\nneedless to say that since that time the empire has experienced a\nremarkable development in all aspects of its national activity. The war\nwith China occurred in 1894-1895, the North China campaign in 1900, and\nthe great conflict with Russia in 1904-1905. Through these important\nevents the Japanese nation has undergone an immense change in the last\ndozen years, in the position it occupies in the comity of nations, as\nwell as in its attitude toward the rest of the world. The industrial and\nfinancial life of the people has also made a change hardly anticipated\nin 1893. Their normal national budget, aside from extraordinary war\nexpenditures, has grown 260 per cent. as large as it then was, and their\nforeign trade in commodities alone has increased nearly fourfold. The\nstate of internal politics also has taken an evolution correspondingly\nsignificant. With this last subject we shall begin our brief survey of\nJapan's national life during the thirteen years between 1893 and 1906.\n\nBefore entering into the narrative of the political life of recent\nJapan, it would be well to acquire a fuller view of the formal, or\nconstitutional, side of that life. The reader will remember that the\norganization of the two political parties, the _Jiy\u016b-t\u014d_ (1880) and the\n_Kaishin-t\u014d_ (1881), or, as generally translated, the Liberals and the\nProgressives, preceded the promulgation of the Constitution, which\noccurred in 1889. The latter was not granted by the government until the\nagitation of the parties for its speedy promulgation had run to a\nconsiderable height. From this fact, however, it does not follow, as has\nbeen asserted by some writers, that the Constitution was wrested by the\nenlightened nation from the hands of its reluctant ruler. Such a view is\napt to be easily formed by the superficial observer, but hardly accords\nwith the facts that stand recorded in history. The agitation of the\nparties may, to some extent, have caused the Constitution to appear at\nthe particular time it did, but it is evident that the enlightenment had\ndawned earlier among the authorities than among the parties, for it was\nin 1867 that the famous Five-Article Oath was pronounced by the emperor,\nthe first two articles of which read as follows: \"Assemblies and\ncouncils shall be widely established, and all national affairs shall be\ndecided by public discussion; the government and the people shall be of\none mind and vigorously prosecute the policy of the nation.\" If these\nwords may be proven not to imply exactly the future establishment of a\nregular system of national representation, no student will deny that\ntheir author sincerely entertained the desire of consulting by some\neffective means the intelligent section of the nation at every important\nstep to be taken in the government of the country. Only a detailed\nknowledge of the modern constitutional form of government seems to have\nbeen lacking for the above desire to take a definite shape. Such\nknowledge was, however, soon acquired, as we are told by It\u014d himself,\nwhen the Japanese embassy, of which he was a member, visited the\nprincipal constitutional countries of Europe and America, and saw with\ntheir observant eyes and were convinced that the comparative progress of\nthese nations and the relative backwardness of their own were in a large\nmeasure due to the presence in the former and absence in the latter of a\nregular constitutional machinery of government. The imperial oath\npreceded by at least ten years, and the journey of the embassy by seven\nyears, the inauguration of party life in Japan. Nor should it be\nforgotten that, during the long centuries of its existence, the imperial\nhouse of Japan had seldom proved to be despotic, and, when its real\nauthority was restored in 1867 from the hands of the feudal overlord,\nthe movement had been started, not by a powerful imperial army, which\ndid not exist, but by the combined strength of men rising from all ranks\nof the nation at large. While it is true that without the awakening of\nthe nation the Constitution would never have seen light, it was more\ntruly granted by the emperor and his advisers than wrested from them.\n\nThis fact, that the Constitution was granted by the emperor, may be said\nto be the keynote of that remarkable document. It was hardly the result\nof a compromise between the emperor and the nation. Still less did it\ndelegate to the former a part of the sovereignty of the latter. The\nemperor, in the Japanese Constitution, assumes full sovereignty, and\ngraciously associates with him representatives of the nation in the\ngovernment of the country. The people are, therefore, not givers, but\nreceivers, of certain rights, the concession of which, however, does not\ndiminish the sovereignty vested in the emperor. This fundamental notion\nclearly characterizes from beginning to end this document of 1889,\nwhich, as we shall see later on, otherwise contains ambiguous and\nexpansive passages at a few critical points. \"The emperor is the head of\nthe empire, combining in himself the rights of sovereignty, and\nexercises them according to the provisions of the present Constitution.\"\n(Article IV.) Whence does he derive his power? He is \"sacred and\ninviolable\" (Article III.), as he is--says It\u014d, the framer and\ncommentator of the Constitution--Heaven-descended, divine, and sacred,\nand, though he indeed has to pay due respect to the law, the law has no\npower to hold him accountable to it. \"The rights of sovereignty of the\nstate,\" says the emperor himself in the Preamble of the Constitution,\n\"We have inherited from Our Ancestors,\" who, according to tradition,\ncharged their descendants to reign over and govern the country for\neternity. Upon this peculiar Japanese theory of the divine right of the\nemperor is based the noted Article I. of the Constitution, which merely\nstates in words the principle which has been upheld in history and is\nuniversally and enthusiastically supported by the people, that \"the\nempire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of emperors\nunbroken for ages eternal.\" From his sovereign powers it follows that\nthe emperor sanctions laws and orders them to be promulgated and\nexecuted (VI.), convokes, opens, closes, and prorogues the imperial\ndiet, and dissolves the house of representatives (VII.), issues imperial\nordinances in the place of laws, in case of emergency, even about\nfinancial matters, and also administrative ordinances, which shall not\nalter the existing laws (VIII., XXXI., and IX.), appoints and dismisses\ncivil and military officers (X.), has the supreme command of the army\nand navy, and determines the organization of their peace standing (XI.,\nXII.), declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties (XIII.),\nconfers titles of nobility, rank, orders, and other marks of honor\n(XV.), and orders amnesty, pardon, commutation of punishments and\nrehabilitation (XVI.), and no amendment of the provisions of the\nConstitution shall be attempted by the diet except by imperial order\n(LXXIII.).\n\nIt should be remembered that the enumeration of these extensive\nprerogatives by no means indicates a limitation to the rights of the\nemperor. Whatever rights he does not name he as sovereign may, in\ntheory, exercise. Yet he is assisted by other institutions, the privy\ncouncil, the cabinet, and the diet, to which he has made important\nconcessions. While the emperor controls the appointment, dismissal, and\npayment of officers (X.), determines the organization of the peace\nstanding of the army and navy (XII.), and declares war and makes peace\n(XIII.), how could he exercise these powers if the consent of the diet,\nwhich is required for the expenditure and revenue of the state (LXIV.),\nwere withheld? The diet controls not only the purse, but also\nlegislation, for while it is stated that the emperor exercises the\nlegislative power with the consent of the diet (V.), the residuum of\nthat power vested in him independently of the diet is reduced almost to\n_nil_ when it is said, in Article XXXI., that every law requires the\nconsent of the imperial diet. He may, indeed, if the diet is not\nfitting, issue imperial ordinances for emergency, but they lose their\nlegal force as soon as the diet disapproves them at its next session\n(VII.). As against the article that the emperor convokes, opens, closes,\nand prorogues the diet, and dissolves the lower house (VII.), stands the\nprovision that the diet shall be convoked annually for three months\n(XLI. and XLII.). Nor is the emperor's executive power unlimited, for\nall laws, imperial ordinances and imperial rescripts, that relate to the\naffairs of the state, require the countersignature of a minister of\nstate (LV.). The share of the emperor is least in the business of the\njudiciary, the entire judicature being exercised by the courts of law,\nthe procedure and organization of which are determined by law (LVII.).\nTo these and other principles of the Constitution the emperor pledges\nhimself and his descendants, in the wielding of their sovereign rights,\nalways to conform (Preamble). In law, the full sovereignty is vested in\nthe emperor alone, and yet, also in law, the sovereignty is as divided\nas in the subtle doctrine of the Trinity by his voluntary association\nwith the other great institutions of the state.\n\nBehind these peculiar principles of the Japanese sovereignty should be\ndiscerned the intense loyalty of the nation to the reigning house, which\nduring the last few decades has again and again startled the foreign\nobservers who had not comprehended it. It is not possible for us here to\ndiscuss how this sentiment has developed, and how the emperor has\nproved to be the strongest and the only permanent political institution\nin the past history of Japan. To-day the precise position which he\noccupies in the organism of the Japanese nation may perhaps be defined\nas that of the gracious central figure of the social life and the\ninspiring personification of the profound unity and absorbing ambition\nof the people. It is not difficult to fancy that, but for the presence\nin their midst of this commanding institution of the emperor, the\nnational career of the people would end itself abruptly under the\npressure of the excessive competitions abroad and untrained, blundering\nstruggles at home.\n\nThe new constitutional r\u00e9gime, which began in 1890, has not been without\na few interesting incidents illustrative of the political functions of\nthe emperor as an actual organ of the state. One of these incidents\nfollows: In March, 1901, the house of peers had unexpectedly and for the\nfirst time rejected a bill, already passed by the other house, for\nincreasing the rates of certain taxes in order to meet necessary\nexpenditures of the state. All efforts of persuasion and mediation\nmiscarried, and the house of peers could not, in law, be dissolved. The\ndeadlock was finally removed by the appearance of an imperial word\nintimating that the urgent circumstances of the nation made it desirable\nfor the measures of the proposed bill to receive the concurrence of the\npeers, who now immediately and unanimously passed the bill. Thereupon\nthe opposition in the lower house seized the opportunity to bring\nforward a resolution censuring the cabinet for having thus necessitated\nthe pronouncement of the imperial word. The speeches of the supporters\nof the resolution seemed to imply that the cabinet should be held\nresponsible for creating a situation in which the emperor was obliged to\nresort to a perhaps transconstitutional act on a matter so plainly\npolitical, and thus compromise even in the slightest degree his serene\ndignity, which should stand unsullied and express itself through the\nnormal constitutional channels. The late astute Hoshi, then the house\nleader of the Liberals, who were supporting the cabinet, quickly seized\nupon the carefully guarded implications of the opposition, and\ntriumphantly pointed out that the real issue contained in the resolution\nwas the question whether the imperial word was proper or not. He\nproceeded to say that the Constitution was the manifestation of a part\nof the full imperial sovereignty, the exercise of which should therefore\nnot be obstructed by the Constitution, and that the imperial word had\nissued from the emperor through his special sovereign rights, and was\nproper and legal. No exposure of the opponents' logic could be more\nruthless, nor a bolder enunciation of the emperor's \"special sovereign\nrights\" could be imagined, than the trenchant argument of Hoshi. It\nwould seem that in this debate both parties conceded that the imperial\nact was transconstitutional. Seen in this light, the statement made in\nthis connection by Premier It\u014d to the president of the upper house is\nhighly significant. Although the recent imperial word, said he, should\nnot be regarded as an imperial rescript, as it bore no countersignatures\nof the ministers of state, it had been issued after a personal\nconference between the emperor and the premier. The latter was, Marquis\nIt\u014d went on to declare, responsible for the act of the emperor, for,\nconstitutionally, the premier is held responsible for all the political\nconduct of the sovereign. Coming from the very framer and commentator of\nthe Constitution, these words may be construed as establishing an\nimportant precedent. The emperor is happily relieved of the\nresponsibility for his political conduct, but may he, under\nextraordinary necessity, resort to a transconstitutional measure at\nwill, or, in other words, may the premier request the emperor to employ\nsuch a measure by the simple assumption by the former of the\nresponsibility therefor? The marquis appears to answer the question in\nthe affirmative. The future political development of this point will be\na matter of great interest.\n\nThe fundamental conception of the Constitution being such as we have\ndescribed, it would appear as if the political life of Japan must in a\nlarge measure depend upon the personal views and inclinations of the\nemperor, to say nothing of those of his ministers. Such a conception,\nhowever, ignores two considerations of utmost importance, namely, that\nunder the new r\u00e9gime are being created regular channels through which\nthe life of the state will more and more habitually run, and that the\ntradition, whose force has accumulated through the long history of Japan\nsince her foundation as a state, is the spirit of conciliation on the\npart of the subject and the habit of assuming political impersonality on\nthe part of the supreme ruler. Individual idiosyncrasies of the\nsovereign will probably prove to be the least important factor of the\nfuture political life of the Japanese nation.\n\nNow, passing on to the imperial diet, it is observed that the\ntheoretical view of its legislative capacity is that with its consent\nthe emperor exercises his legislative power (V.), or, in the words of\nthe commentator, that the diet \"takes part in legislation, but has no\nshare in the sovereign power; it has power to deliberate upon laws, but\nnone to determine them.\" This theoretical definition, however, should\nnot be taken as a practical limitation imposed upon the legislative\npower of the diet, for, it will be remembered, every law of the state\nmust have its consent (XXXIII.), and it may disapprove imperial\nordinances issued while it was not in session (VIII.). Over and above\nits legislative faculty, also, the diet enjoys four important rights:\nthe right to receive petitions directly from the people, the right to\nput questions to the government and demand explanations, the right to\naddress the throne over the heads of the cabinet ministers, and, the\nmost effective of all, the right to control the management of the\nfinances. It is needless to say that the practical issue of conflict\nmust always lie, not between the diet and the emperor, but between the\ndiet and the government.\n\nThe diet consists of two houses, namely, of the peers and of the\nrepresentatives. The importance of the bicameral system is strongly\ninsisted upon by the commentator of the Constitution. The house of peers\nis composed of the members of the imperial family and princes and\nmarquises, who sit of their own right; counts, viscounts, and barons,\nwho have been elected by their respective peers; persons who have been\nspecially nominated by the emperor on account of the meritorious\nservices they have rendered to the state or on account of their\nerudition; and, finally, wealthy persons who have been elected, one\nmember for each city or prefecture, by the people of their own class.\nAll hold their seats for life, except the elected members, whose term is\nseven years.\n\nIt would seem that this upper house was created to serve as a powerful\nshield of the government. It contains men of wisdom and weight, and is\ncomparatively free from party affiliations. While no financial bill can\noriginate there, the house is above the fear of dissolution, and its\nactions may be characterized by a greater continuity of policy than\nthose of the other house. \"If the house of peers fulfills its\nfunctions,\" writes Marquis It\u014d in his \"Commentaries,\" \"it will serve in\na remarkable degree to preserve an equilibrium between political powers,\nto restrain the undue influence of political parties, to check the evil\ntendencies of irresponsible discussions, to secure the stability of the\nConstitution, to be an instrument for maintaining harmony between the\ngoverning and the governed, and to permanently sustain the prosperity of\nthe country and the happiness of the people.\" It was an irony of fate\nthat a dozen years after these words were written their author, at that\ntime the premier, should find in this very organ the most stubborn\nopposition to his measures that any constitutional cabinet of Japan has\never experienced. The anomaly of the situation consisted in the fact\nthat these measures had already been passed through the lower house, so\nthat the traditionally pro-government peers were now found opposed to\nthe combined front of the cabinet and the representatives. Nothing of\nthe sort could have been imagined by the marquis when he first framed\nthe great document which brought the house of peers into existence. How\nthe deadlock thus caused was removed by a resort to another anomaly has\nalready been described. As to the reasons for the unexpectedly\ndetermined opposition of the peers, they will be told in the next\nchapter.\n\nThe house of representatives is made up of persons elected for the term\nof four years from the electoral districts in accordance with the law of\nelection, which was originally promulgated simultaneously with the\nConstitution in 1889 and was revised in 1900. The revised law provided\nthat the electoral district should be coextensive with the\nadministrative division, city, or prefecture, and defined the number of\nmembers to be elected from each district. Under the earlier arrangement\nthe city or prefecture had been divided into smaller districts, each of\nwhich returned one, sometimes two, members. The new larger districts\nwere calculated to do away with some of the evils of sectionalism which\nhad previously been unavoidable. The revised law also separated a\ncertain number of cities from rural districts, to which some of the\nformer had hitherto been connected to form single districts, the change\nsignifying the intention of the law to give the urban population a freer\nvoice in the house than was possible under the old system. The aggregate\nnumber of the representatives was also materially increased from 300 to\n369, the cities claiming 61 members, instead of less than twenty, as\nheretofore. Another important feature of the law was the voting by\nballot and the provision that each elector should vote for only one\ncandidate, irrespective of the number of members returnable from the\nsame district. The obvious intention was to protect the rights of the\nelector from the abuses of the political party, whose orderly and\norganized action was also indirectly encouraged by this measure, and to\ngive a chance to the minorities to be represented. Again, while the\nproperty qualifications of the voter and the candidate had been measured\nby the payment of direct taxes of not less than ten yen by the former\nand fifteen yen by the latter, the amount was now reduced to ten yen for\nthe elector and altogether removed from the eligible person. The numbers\nof the electors in the country accordingly rose from some 460,000 to\nabout 800,000. It is curious to note that the original bill of the\nrevised election law introduced by the government was considerably more\nliberal than the amended and finally passed articles of the lower house.\nThus it would appear that the representatives of the people showed\nthemselves reluctant to accept the premium offered by the government\nwhose conservatism they had been wont to attack, but the real situation\nwill be understood only when we come to study in the next section the\npolitical maneuvers of the period. We may simply note here in passing\nthat 800,000 electors among the population of more than 46,000,000\ncannot be considered adequate, even when allowance is made for the still\ncomparatively untrained political condition of the people. Although an\nagitation for an enlarged electorate has not yet assumed a definite\nform, there can be little doubt that progress will be made in this\nrespect in a not distant future.\n\nThe house elects its president and vice president, and submits to the\nimperial decision the names of the three candidates for each position\nwho have received the highest votes for it, of whom the sovereign\ninvariably selects the first. The members then divide themselves into\ncommittees, each with an elected chairman, which transact the more\nimportant part of the business of the house before it reaches the\ngeneral session. The seats are decided by lot and without regard to the\ndivision of parties. Disorderly scenes on the floor are said to be as\nrare as specimens of grand oratory. Thrilling incidents are not,\nhowever, wanting, particularly when an important interpellation of the\ngovernment or an address to the throne is under discussion, or on any\noccasion when the concerted move of a large party is directed by its\nleaders against the government, or against another party. The sentiment\nof the house rises to its height when, as in October, 1894, and on March\n25, 1904, the partisan spirit is for the moment sunk, opposition to the\ngovernment is laid aside, and the members, unanimously and\nenthusiastically, voice the urgent wishes of the entire nation, the\nlatter itself being eminently capable at critical times of standing like\none man. The gallery is on such occasions thronged by interested\nspectators, and the debate and its report arrest the attention of the\nwhole country.\n\nMost of the officers of state, including cabinet members, are eligible\nfor seats in the lower house, but the ministers seldom appear as\ncandidates, and, in one solitary case, when one of them was elected\nrepresentative, he nearly always absented himself from the house. The\ncabinet members may, however, voluntarily or on request make their\nappearance to present the views of the administration on questions under\ndeliberation, and on such occasions they occupy seats assigned for\ngovernment officials. The presence, in this manner, of the various\nministers, as well as premier, is usually a sign of an important, or\nperhaps exciting, session.\n\nIt is unnecessary to say that the representatives are not in theory\nregarded as delegates from their constituencies, and the local interests\nhave not been found particularly engrossing. As to the practical\nposition which the house occupies in the national life of the\npeople--that is, as to the questions: What are the preponderant\ninterests represented therein, and in what way; what have been the\nwatchwords of the opposition, and how are the party lines drawn; how\nmuch has the existence of the house helped or hindered the progress of\nthe nation during the past decade; what have been the effects of the\ncontinual struggle between the house and the government on the tactics\nand discipline of each, and which has shown the higher ability and\ngreater continuity of purpose; and what have been the mutual effects of\nthe action of the house and the more important domestic and foreign\nproblems of the empire--these queries may be only imperfectly answered\nafter the actual political history since the promulgation of the\nConstitution is thoroughly mastered. The more direct and practical\nquestion concerns the relation between the house or the diet in general\nand the cabinet. Is the latter responsible to the former for its\npolitical conduct?\n\nPerhaps nothing in the fundamental law of Japan can be of greater\ninterest and importance than the question just stated, all the more so\nbecause the text of the Constitution and Marquis It\u014d's \"Commentaries\" on\nit, as well as his public utterances, seem, when closely examined,\nsignificantly to leave much room for future development. Nor are the\neight changes of the cabinet which have taken place since the birth of\nthe diet all of a character to decide this momentous question. \"The\nrespective ministers of state,\" says Article LV. of the Constitution,\n\"shall give their advice to the emperor, and be responsible for it.\"\nWhat the last clause signifies is by no means made perfectly clear by\nthe commentator, who says: \"He alone can dismiss a minister, who has\nappointed him.... The appointment and dismissal of them [_i.\u00a0e._, the\nministers] having been included by the Constitution in the sovereign\npower of the emperor, it is only a legitimate consequence that the power\nof deciding as to the responsibility of ministers is withheld from the\ndiet. But the diet may put questions to the ministers and demand open\nanswers from them before the public, and it may also present addresses\nto the sovereign setting forth its opinions. Moreover, although the\nemperor reserves to himself in the Constitution the right of appointing\nhis ministers at his pleasure, in making an appointment, the\nsusceptibilities of the public mind must also be taken into\nconsideration. This may be regarded as an indirect method of controlling\nthe responsibility of ministers. Thus, in the Constitution the following\nconclusions have been arrived at:\n\n\"First, that the ministers of state are charged with the duty of giving\nadvice to the emperor, which is their proper function, and that they are\nnot held responsible on his behalf; second, that ministers are directly\nresponsible to the emperor and indirectly to the people; third, that it\nis the sovereign and not the people that can decide as to the\nresponsibility of ministers, because the sovereign possesses the rights\nof sovereignty of the state; fourth, that the responsibility of\nministers is a political one and has no relation to criminal or civil\nresponsibility, nor can it conflict therewith, neither can the one\naffect the other. Save that all criminal or civil cases must be brought\nbefore the ordinary courts of law, and that suits arising out of\nadministrative matters must be brought before a court of administrative\nlitigation, the cases of political responsibility are left to be dealt\nwith by the sovereign as disciplinary measures.\" The marquis further\nemphatically repudiates the theory of joint responsibility of the\ncabinet as a state of things that can never be approved of according to\nthe Japanese Constitution. The argument here again is that the ministers\nare individually appointed by the sovereign, to whom they are\nindividually responsible for the business of their respective\ndepartments, and that for the same reason the minister president, or\npremier, cannot have control over the post of each minister, nor shall\nthe latter be dependent upon the former. The reader will readily see\nthat the whole line of It\u014d's argument is consistent with the fundamental\ntheory of the Japanese body politic, that is, the full sovereignty of\nthe emperor. No one can, however, fail to perceive between the lines\nhere quoted a great latitude for the future growth of another theory\nwhose gradual expansion might, imperceptibly, perhaps, but none the less\nsteadily, reduce the political responsibility of the minister to the\nthrone to the position of a mere legal fiction. As has already been\nintimated, the past changes of the cabinet have not always been directly\noccasioned by the opposition of the diet, nor has the majority of the\nopposition in the lower house newly elected after its dissolution always\nforced the ministers from their chairs. As will be seen in the next\nchapter, the second Yamagata cabinet (1898-1900) resigned despite its\ncommanding a majority in the diet, and was succeeded by the fourth It\u014d\ncabinet (1900-1901), which also retired for reasons quite independent of\nthe conditions of the legislative chambers, where it had the following\nof an absolute majority of the representatives. On the other hand,\nnearly all of the eight changes of the cabinet have been caused by\ndifficulties more or less financial in nature, and these are, it will be\nremembered, under the effective control of the lower house, so that the\n\"indirect\" responsibility of the cabinet to the diet already bids fair\nto become more logical and perhaps less indirect. Moreover, the\nsovereign has never appointed individual ministers of state at his\npleasure, but at the resignation of a cabinet he invariably summons the\nstatesman whose succession to the premiership is the most logical,\nthough not always desired by the latter himself, and leaves to him the\ntask of forming a new cabinet. It would not be too much to suppose that\nif in the future a cabinet was compelled to resign under the powerful\nand reasonable opposition of a great popular party in the lower house,\nthe leader of the party would receive the imperial mandate to form a new\ncabinet. We feel almost safe in predicting that with the growth of an\nadequate party system, which in Japan is still in its formative stage,\nthe ministerial responsibility to the diet will have become an\nestablished usage.\n\nIt is interesting to note that Marquis It\u014d himself remarked, in his\naddress, in February, 1899, to the delegates from the cities, that the\nEnglish cabinet and party system must be more or less adopted in Japan\nif a harmonious co\u00f6peration were to be secured between the cabinet and\nthe diet, and that the practice of government by party would in no way\nimpair the authority of the throne. The same statesman had an occasion\ntwo years later to declare in the lower house, when an already mentioned\nresolution censuring the cabinet for having caused an imperial word to\nbe pronounced was under discussion, that the passage of a resolution\nwould not shake his position as premier, which he owed to the confidence\nof his majesty. \"If the aim of the resolution is my resignation,\"\nexclaimed he, \"why do you not propose an address to the throne, instead\nof a resolution?\" These statements made by the same framer of the\nConstitution at two different occasions may not be interpreted as\nnecessarily contradictory to one another, for, if in 1901, an address\nhad been made to the throne, and if the throne had seemed still to\nuphold the premier in spite of the diet, it is not impossible to imagine\nthat It\u014d would have quietly resigned. Weighing his statements side by\nside, might it not be surmised that in the mind of the veteran statesman\nthe responsibility of the cabinet to the people must be commensurate\nwith the political training of the latter, especially in the form of a\nwell-organized and trained party system? At any rate, it would seem\ninevitable that the actual state of things under the present r\u00e9gime\nshould move in that direction. As to the state of party politics in\nJapan, to whose development the marquis himself has made a notable\ncontribution, we shall discuss it at length in the following chapter.\n\nFinally, a reference should be made to the privy council, whose members,\ntwenty-five more or less in number, are appointed by the emperor, in\norder to deliberate upon important matters of state. The ministers are\n_ex officio_ privy councilors, but the cabinet is an administrative\nbody, while the privy council is a deliberative one. To the latter is\nassigned the \"task of planning far-sighted schemes of statecraft and of\neffectuating new enactments, by leisurely meditation and calm\nreflection, by thorough investigation into ancient and modern history,\nand by consulting scientific principles\" according to It\u014d's\n\"Commentaries.\" The councilors, therefore, must be men above party and\nof wide experience and knowledge, and so conservative and impartial as\nto be \"the palladium of the Constitution and the law.\" Its opinions are\nnot given publicity, but when they are embodied in an imperial\nordinance, the latter states the fact in its preamble. The emperor in\ntheory may accept or reject at will the recommendations of the council,\nbut in practice has in no case overridden them, nor even shown his\npersonal preferences.\n\nThose who are at all familiar with the political conditions of Japan\ncannot fail to see through this institution of the privy council a group\nof men who have in a large measure molded the destiny of new Japan. They\nare collectively termed _Genr\u014d_, or Elder Statesmen, and include those\nwho were prominent about the time of the revolution of 1868, and also\nthose who have since rendered eminent services to the state. At one time\nthey numbered among them the great Katsu, the most heroic and dramatic\nfigure of the revolution and the most sage-like statesman of modern\nJapan. Marquis It\u014d now stands head and shoulders above the rest of the\nveteran statesmen, and beside him are found Field Marshal Yamagata,\nCount Matsukata, and others of equal note. It is highly significant that\nthe Constitution has created an institution by means of which those very\nmen whose wisdom and energy have tended to make Japan what she is were\nattracted together around the person of the emperor. The ship of the\nstate is piloted by their far-sighted loyalty and patriotism, and the\ninfluence these statesmen exercise over the fundamental policy of the\nempire cannot easily be overestimated. The latest example of this\ninfluence was the advice of the council to the throne to instruct the\npeace envoys at Portsmouth to make large concessions in order\nsuccessfully to conclude a treaty with Russia. These concessions, which\nmade the restoration of peace possible, were radically opposed to the\nwishes of the majority of the people, but were boldly counseled by the\nElder Statesmen regardless of personal consequences upon themselves.\nNeither the diet nor the political parties could, however, effectively\nassail the position of the council as such, for it was no executive\ninstitution, but a purely deliberative organ closely in touch with the\nthrone. When the treaty was signed by the envoys, the council approved\nit and the emperor ratified it, despite a great popular demonstration\nfor its rejection.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XVII\n\nPARTIES AND POLITICS. 1893-1906[1]\n\n\nHaving examined the salient features of the machinery of the new r\u00e9gime,\nwe are now prepared to follow the history of the men and parties that\nhave operated the machinery, and of the issues which have in turn guided\nthe action of these political agents. Law and constitution are products\nof history and legislation, but men and parties, as also issues at\nstake, are the handiwork of mightier powers which can hardly be reduced\ninto syllogisms or molded by mere force of traditions and precedents. Of\nall the political factors of a nation, the progress of the party and the\nindividuality of the man seem the least subject to human artifice and\ncontrol, while the problems, which must largely decide the course of\naction of the different political forces at work, appear continually to\nbaffle one's imagination and forecast. It must then be a matter of great\ninterest to observe the conduct of the most prominent politicians in the\nfield and their eventful relations to the changing parties, and the\nhistory of the issues, domestic and foreign, which have sometimes\nastounded the actors on the scene by their unexpected emergence and\nsometimes wearied them by their persistent and unwelcome reappearance.\nWhat follows is a mere sketch of a period of the most bewildering\npolitical vicissitudes that have ever visited a nation in a decade.\n\nThe period between 1890 and 1904 might be divided into three epochs.\nDown to 1894, when the war with China broke out, the relation between\nthe government and the parties in the lower house was in the main one of\nsimple difference of political theories. With the war the nation\nentered, externally, into the arena of world-politics, while, in the\ndiet, there dawned an era of varied coalitions among the parties and\nalso between them and the government. Desire for power seemed to begin\nto affect the minds of the politicians whose aspirations had heretofore\nbeen comparatively more idealistic. A grand party was finally created\nby the combined influence of Marquis It\u014d, on the one hand, who\napparently aimed at organizing a model constitutional party, and, on the\nother, of an enormous number of men the motives of some of whom were\nanything but a copy of those of their leader. When the whips of this new\nparty, which controlled a majority in the diet, began to manifest\nunwillingness to accept the discipline and to override the wishes of its\nfounder and leader, Marquis It\u014d, the politics of new Japan entered its\nthird stage, in which the controlling factors are found to be even more\npersonal and partisan and a matter of interests and feeling, than in the\nsecond period. As soon as the nation entered upon the war with Russia,\nhowever, the political atmosphere at once changed: the party lines and\nthe traditional differences between the diet and the government were\ntemporarily obliterated, and the nation--the cabinet, the two houses,\nand the people--seemed to think and feel as one mind. The conclusion of\nthe treaty of peace with Russia, the terms of which displeased many\nJapanese, has suddenly terminated this union and alienated the cabinet\nand the privy council from some people, while the dividing lines between\nthe various parties are being again drawn on changed issues. When this\ncritical stage passes away, the political life of constitutional Japan\nmust inevitably enter its fourth epoch, but what its nature will be\nremains to be seen. At this moment the future progress of the party life\nof the Japanese nation appears to be as difficult to forecast as it was\nin 1890, when the first diet was convened.\n\nThe first period, then, opens with the existence of two popular parties,\nthe Liberals and Progressives, led, respectively, by Count Itagaki and\nCount \u014ckuma. The members of the parties who sat in the first lower house\nrepresented an overwhelmingly preponderant interest of the landowning\nclass of the country, so that a revision of land values and consequently\na reduction of the land tax were among their rallying cries. At the same\ntime they aimed at overthrowing the existing cabinet, which they\nconsidered under the exclusive control of men of certain provinces of\nthe south, principally Satsuma and Nagato (Ch\u014dsh\u016b), which had once been\ninstrumental in upsetting the feudal r\u00e9gime and restoring the imperial\ngovernment. It is remarkable that the party men almost identified the\nfuture downfall of sectionalism, as they deemed the foundation of the\nadministration to be, with the cause of the establishment of a\nresponsible cabinet, or a cabinet responsible to the throne as well as\nto the diet. Needless to say that, from the party standpoint, a\nresponsible cabinet was _ipso facto_ a party cabinet. It will be\nrecalled that the Constitution, which had recently been promulgated and\naccording to whose provisions the diet had been called into being,\ndefined, so far as the explicit verbal meaning was concerned, that the\ngovernment was answerable for its political conduct to the emperor. The\ntheory of the full sovereignty of the throne was loyally and\nenthusiastically supported by the entire nation, but the parties did not\nfail to see the apparent possibility of reconciling it with a practical\ncontrol of the cabinet by the diet. It is little wonder that they\nstraightway crystallized their principle into the phrase, \"a responsible\ncabinet,\" which they at once conceived as merely the positive side of\nanother of their mottoes, \"the downfall of sectionalism.\" The government\nand the Elder Statesmen, it is not improbable, possessed a clearer\nvision of the foibles of the young parties, and consequently a more\nconservative but truer foresight of the future progress of the political\ntraining of the nation. The question between the parties and the\ngovernment appears, in the last analysis, to have been largely a\nquestion of time, the former harassing the latter for not giving them at\nonce what they probably knew it would cheerfully surrender when the\nproper time came. Yet, by the law of reaction, the parties rashly\nattacked the government, and the latter not infrequently resorted to\nmeasures of self-defense which appeared to the partisan opponents\nunwarranted and even arbitrary. Bitter feelings were not seldom aroused,\nand the sentiment of the people at large was at times so highly wrought\nthat it was by no means uncommon to see neighbors in a village range\nthemselves according to their sympathy with either the government or the\nparty side in their heated controversies by the fireside. Election\nscenes often presented exciting incidents. It should be noted that the\nmajority of the rural population sided with the anti-government\ncandidates, but that the two parties, the Liberals and Progressives,\nseldom failed to struggle against each other in the election. Things\nwent on mainly in this condition until Count (now Marquis) It\u014d became\npremier of the famous It\u014d cabinet, which lasted for an unusual period of\nfour years, during which, moreover, the victorious war with China took\nplace.\n\nAt first the count found the opposition of the lower house to his\nso-called sectional government so powerful that he even contemplated the\nadvisability of creating a new political party of his own. Early in\n1894 the diet was dissolved; the March election returned a majority of\nthe opposition and was followed by a second dissolution. Under such\ncircumstances it was no wonder that the late Chinese statesman, Li Hung\nChang, is alleged to have fancied at the time that Japan's hands were\ntoo closely tied by the strife between the diet and the government to\nresort to a decisive measure against China over Korea, which was then\nthe bone of contention between the two empires. But the war did come,\nfor the successful conduct of which the nation sank their party\nconsiderations and supported with one mind the government and the army.\nAn account of this important warfare will be found in its proper place,\nand it suffices here to point out its interesting effect on the\nparliamentary politics of Japan. The new position in the comity of\nnations which the world accorded her after the war naturally brought\nwith it new problems of unexpected importance. One of them was an\nenormous increase of state expenditures caused by an increased armament\nand by the plans for the development of the resources of the country.\nHereafter financial questions became the central issue to decide the\nfate of the succeeding houses and cabinets, and their practical and\nurgent character made it impossible for the cabinet to carry out its\nproposed measures without the co\u00f6peration of the one or the other of the\nparties in the house. Naturally an era of political coalitions dawned.\nIt may also be surmised that the parties, at least some of their\nleaders, had been tired of a long fruitless struggle with the\ngovernment. However that may be, no one will deny that henceforth the\ndesire for power began to be manifested by the parties which, whatever\ntheir faults, had in the main fought for a few abstract principles which\nhad originally brought them together. On the other hand, it is only just\nto point out the important fact that the so loudly denounced\nsectionalism had in reality become a phantom, particularly after the\ninception of the constitutional r\u00e9gime in 1890 and the Chinese war in\n1894-1895, both of which had a tremendous influence in arousing the\ninterest of the nation at large in its own affairs. The southern\nprovinces could still furnish men of experience and wisdom, but it was\nless because the so-called sectionalism was still rampant than because\nthese men, who possessed the prestige of service and age, could not well\nbe replaced by the less experienced men of other localities. The Elder\nStatesmen could no longer control the political situation of the\ncountry, nor could they reasonably be charged with being animated with\nany degree of provincialism. It would be no political apostasy for\neither party to support a non-partisan cabinet whose policy appealed to\nits cherished principles. Thus various circumstances seem to have\nconspired to produce an epoch of political coalitions.\n\nThe ninth diet opened early in December, 1895, to which the It\u014d cabinet\nproposed the first so-called _post-bellum_ measures to be carried out\nwithin the ensuing ten years. Briefly stated, the additional\nrequirements on account of \"ordinary\" expenditures of states were to be\nmet by an increased taxation aggregating the sum of more than\nthirty-three and one-half million _yen_; the expansion of the armament\nand the establishment of an iron foundry were to be paid out of the\nChinese indemnity and other \"extraordinary\" items of revenue, which\naltogether amounted to over 365 millions; and the improvement and\nextension of railroads, telephone, and the like were calculated to be\ncovered by the issuance of public bonds. It is essential in our\ndiscussion to keep in our minds the three sources of increased revenue.\nAs to the first, that is, the increased taxation, we must note as a\nmatter of great importance that many of the most interesting features of\nthe political history from this time on have been determined by whether\nit was the landowners or the urban population who were called upon to\nbear the bulk of the added imposition. In the present case the burden\nfell on the latter class of people, and this fact was fortunate for the\nreception of the bill in the house, which consisted almost wholly of\nrepresentatives of the landowning interest. The passage of the measure\nwas, however, entirely owing to the alliance between the government and\nthe Liberal Party. Unfortunately, some of the financial schemes of the\nIt\u014d cabinet were soon found to be falling short of the expectations of\ntheir authors, and a large deficit of the revenue for the next fiscal\nyear, amounting to nearly ninety-three millions of _yen_, brought about\nthe downfall of the cabinet, which had otherwise proved the most\nbrilliant and powerful that had yet guided the affairs of the state\nunder the new r\u00e9gime.\n\nThe succeeding cabinet was headed by the great financier, Count\nMatsukata, and was for a time supported by the Progressives, whose\nleader, Count \u014ckuma, occupied the portfolio of foreign affairs. The\ntenth diet (1896-1897) ran its course smoothly, as there appeared no\nimportant financial measure to stir up the partisan blood in the lower\nhouse, but the next diet, which met in December, 1897, witnessed an\naltogether different scene. In spite of the painful manipulations of the\nitems of the budget, and of the fact that the issues of the recently\nraised taxes had reached the exchequer, a large deficit of over fourteen\nmillion _yen_ stared the Matsukata cabinet in the face, and, moreover,\npromised to rise considerably higher the next year. Count Matsukata now\nresolved to increase the revenue by twenty-five millions by raising the\nrates of certain taxes, one of which, the land tax, was probably among\nthe fairest sources of an increased income, but was destined to arouse a\nstormy opposition of the representatives. No sooner was the count's\ndesign known than the Progressives, with their versatile leader,\ndeserted the cabinet. This was the first time that the lower house, one\nof whose old cries had been to revise land values and reduce the land\ntax, was called upon to discuss a financial measure to which the\ninterest of the constituencies of their overwhelming majority was\ndiametrically opposed. We might perhaps consider the eleventh diet, for\nthis reason, as marking a new stage in which the question of class\ninterests, so promising of ominous consequences, began to manifest\nitself. The determined opposition of the house against the cabinet was\nquickly followed by the dissolution of the former and the fall of the\nlatter.\n\nThe year 1898 witnessed the most surprising political changes that have\ntaken place in any single year since the beginning of the constitutional\nr\u00e9gime of Japan. In January Marquis It\u014d again held the reins of the\ncabinet. The Liberals would not support him, nor would Count \u014ckuma leave\nhis lieutenants behind in order to join the cabinet. The government thus\ndeclaring itself clear of entangling alliances, the parties hastened to\ntheir constituencies to prepare for the general election of March. The\nnation had never seen such peculiar political conditions as then\nprevailed all over the country. The new \"transcendental\" cabinet had\ncommitted itself to no definite policy. There were practically no issues\non which the parties could address themselves to the people, who had not\nbeen without some misgivings as to the conduct of their former\nrepresentatives in the lower house, and who could no longer be blinded\nby the specter of the so-called sectionalism. The election resulted in\ngiving an absolute majority to neither the party members nor the\nsupporters of the government. After the election, however, political\nissues quickly crystallized themselves as soon as it was known that the\ncabinet would propose an increase of taxes, mainly the land tax, by\nmore than thirty-five millions of _yen_. The Liberals and the\nProgressives, hitherto so jealous of each other, joined hands to reject\nthe proposition, for which act the house earned another dissolution, on\nJune 10. With an amazing celerity the two parties voluntarily\namalgamated themselves into the colossal \"Constitutional Party,\" with\nthe realization of a party cabinet as its motto.\n\nIt will easily be seen that this precipitous move had been caused by the\ncommon landed interest which the two former parties represented in the\nhouse, and which had risen to its height of intensity at the repeated\nappearance of the land tax bill, and by the plain fact that power and\nspoil would fall into their hands the more readily by their combined\nwarfare with the authorities. In order to meet this united front of the\nopposition, Marquis It\u014d again had a mind to organize a party of his own,\nbut was strenuously opposed in this desire by the other Elder Statesmen,\nparticularly Count Yamagata, who, together with the majority of the\npeers, were stanch supporters of the literal interpretation of the\nConstitution in respect to its theory of ministerial responsibility.\nNothing could have been more significant and characteristic of Marquis\nIt\u014d than his action at this critical juncture of the history of the\nConstitution and of his own career. The organization of the\nConstitutional Party had been publicly announced on June 22, and on the\n24th the premier tendered his resignation, together with an earnest\nrecommendation to the throne that the leaders of the new party be\nsummoned to form a cabinet. This stroke was natural when we consider\nthat the quick vision of the marquis must have seen the impossibility of\nbuilding between the two fires of the party and the Elders. He, however,\ncould not have foreseen all the momentous consequences of this adroit\n_coup_. The lightning speed of his act stunned friend and foe alike. The\nparty found itself utterly unprepared to grasp the opportunity so\nsuddenly thrust upon it. On the other hand, in the inverse proportion\nthat his conduct gratified the party, it was galling to his numerous\nfriends in the house of peers, in the privy council, and in the\ngovernment and the court, many of whom owed their training and\nadvancement to the veteran statesman, but who must now have felt as if\nthey had been deserted by him at the critical moment. The deep-seated\nresentment against the marquis which was created among the peers, who\nhad always regarded him as the living exponent of the theory of the\nnon-partisan cabinet hereafter must be particularly borne in mind. Would\nit not appear plain that they would oppose him if he should again become\npremier with the aid of a party, and would it not be equally clear that\nif another cabinet should be formed from among themselves, the party\npoliticians would present an obstinate opposition to it? It will be seen\nlater that all these things have since actually taken place. If we may\nregard the first introduction of the land tax question into the house in\n1897 as the beginning of the controlling influence of a class-interest,\nthe abrupt resignation of Marquis It\u014d in 1898 may be said to mark the\ndawn of an era in which human feelings not altogether expressible in\nwords began to play an important r\u014dle in parliamentary politics. When\nfeelings and interests, independent of principles and issues, come to\ninfluence the course of events, the conflicts of their agents must\ninevitably become at times bitter. As to the marquis himself, however,\nJune 24, 1898, was perhaps another of the turning points of his life,\nthrough which he successfully extricated himself from a groove and made\na leap forward.\n\nThe most melodramatic spectacles of the year were yet to come. The new\nJanus-like Constitutional Party, whose political composition was as\nincongruous as its two masters, the idealistic Count Itagaki of the\nLiberals and the nimble-witted Count \u014ckuma of the Progressives, suddenly\nfound itself face to face with an opportunity which had for years been\nits cherished goal, but which it was at this moment hardly prepared to\naccept with alacrity. A mongrel cabinet was at last organized, with\n\u014ckuma as premier and foreign minister, Itagaki as home minister, two\nmore former Progressives and three Liberals receiving other portfolios,\nand, finally, Marquis Saig\u014d and Viscount Katsura as ministers of army\nand navy. It should be noted that the marquis was one of the Elder\nStatesmen, under whose wings the viscount also had shaped his political\ncareer. The party thus failed to form a cabinet of purely its own\ncomplexion, which fact must have been especially disheartening in\nshowing that the powerful military institutions of the empire could not\nbe controlled by the inexperienced politicians emerging from the lower\nhouse of the diet. Such a matter, however, weighed little by the side of\nthe grave internal difficulties that beset the new party from its start.\nThe traditional sympathies of its two component parts proved too\ndifferent from one another, and the individual sense of honor and also\ninterest too little subservient to the common cause, for the members of\nthe new government to hold together for half a year. Moreover, the\nexecutive authorities of the party at large instituted a shameless\nmovement of systematic office-hunting, in which the old Liberals and\nProgressives vied against each other and among themselves. The same\ndisorganized condition characterized the general election of August when\na concerted action of the party could hardly be found anywhere in the\ncountry. What finally precipitated the downfall of the cabinet was a\nspeech of Ozaki, the Progressive minister of education, which roundly\ndenounced the materialistic tendencies of the age, and declared that if\nJapan should become a republic her people probably would not hesitate to\nelect a Vanderbilt or an Astor for president. The former Liberals\nadroitly chimed in with those chauvinists who pretended to have\ndiscovered in the speech a sinister, disloyal motive, on the part of the\nspeaker, against the reigning family. When Ozaki's resignation was thus\nforced, the premier, without listening to the overtures of the Liberals,\nappointed another Progressive to the vacant post. At the end of October\nthe dissolution of the party began openly amid considerable bickerings,\nand the cabinet, which had already been deserted by the non-partisan\nministers of army and of navy, and could no longer maintain itself,\ntendered its resignation. Thus the first attempt at a party cabinet in\nJapan came to an ignominious failure under extremely untoward\ncircumstances. The old parties parted more widely than before, and the\nunfortunate ministry passed out of existence before it could face the\nunfriendly house of peers and tackle the enormous national deficit\namounting to thirty-seven millions of _yen_.\n\nField Marshal Count Yamagata, who received an imperial summons, formed a\ncabinet, on the eve of a new diet, in November, 1898, which consisted\nentirely of Elder Statesmen and their sympathizers. The duty of carrying\nout the _post-bellum_ measures had devolved upon the new cabinet. The\nsupport of the peers could be safely relied upon, but in the lower\nchamber nothing could be effected without the aid of some party. Perhaps\nnothing could show more clearly the possibility of the ultimate\nministerial responsibility to the diet than the conduct of the field\nmarshal at this juncture. He and some of his colleagues, as well as the\nmajority of the peers, had been known as the most persistent believers\nin the non-partisan government and in the responsibility of the cabinet\nto the crown, and yet they could see absolutely no hope of performing\ntheir official duties but by allying themselves with the party which\nonce supported Marquis It\u014d's _post-bellum_ measures. That party was the\nLiberal, which now monopolized the name Constitutionalist. It demanded\ncertain portfolios, not from the spirit of office-hunting, but, as it\nwas explained, for the sake of establishing the principle that no\ncabinet can be \"transcendental,\" or absolutely non-partisan. According,\nhowever, to an agreement arrived at between the cabinet and the\nConstitutionalists, the latter satisfied themselves with a manifesto\nmade by Count Yamagata at a social gathering, to the effect that he\nbelieved the co\u00f6peration of a party or parties commanding a majority in\nthe diet was essential for the discharge of the business of the state.\nIt was significant enough to hear these words from the mouth of the\npremier from whom they could otherwise have been least expected, and yet\nit is not too much to say that no cabinet, not excluding partisan\ncabinets, has succeeded in making a greater use of a party than his. The\nsuccess was in no small measure due to T\u014dru Hoshi, formerly Japanese\nminister at Washington, and at the time under discussion the house\nleader of the Constitutionalists, who, with his wonderful talent for\npolitical tactics, acted for the government as the trustworthy foreman\nof his party. By his skillful maneuvers, an increase of the land tax,\nwhich had, as we saw, failed after causing within half a year the\ndissolution of two successive houses of representatives, was now,\ndespite the preponderant sympathy in the house with the landowning class\nof the country, agreed to by a majority of 161 to 134. But for its\npassage, the deficit of the next fiscal year would have reached beyond\nforty-six millions of _yen_.\n\nLet us pause a moment to examine the nature of the Japanese land tax,\nwithout an understanding of which neither the past nor the future of the\nparliamentary politics will be comprehended with sufficient clearness.\nThe reader will recall how before the fall of feudalism most of the\narable land in the country was held in fief, and how the tenants paid to\ntheir lords onerous rents, ranging between thirty and seventy per cent.\nof the product of the soil. When the imperial government assumed the\ncontrol of the state in 1868, it found itself confronted with the\ncolossal task of reorganizing the machinery of the state in nearly all\nof its parts, and introducing new, urgent measures, some of which were\non a large scale, and all of which demanded a considerable outlay of\nfunds. To do this they were supplied with a miserably small income,\nwhich hardly covered one-tenth of the necessary expenditures. It was\nessential above all to institute a sound system of taxation, whose\nbasis, in those days of an insignificant foreign trade, could not but\nconsist in a reorganized land tax. Nothing could, however, be done in\nthat direction, so long as the local _daimios_ still held their fiefs,\nto which the authority of the new government could not penetrate. It was\nonly when the fiefs were, in the manner already described in a previous\nchapter, surrendered to the state that anything toward the establishment\nof a secure system of taxation could be attempted. Pending the assessing\nof the values of the arable land, which naturally required time, the\ngovernment resorted to the issuance of inconvertible notes and other\nmeasures of purely temporary and irregular nature. The land tax itself\nwas, however, conceived and finally established in the most remarkable\nmanner, its principle being, in the first place, a complete\nnationalization of land, and, then, the transferring of the ownership to\nthe individual holders who were actually tilling it. The duty of the new\nowner to pay a tax to the state for his landed property was evidently\nconceived by the government as a natural consequence of the ownership so\nbountifully and so completely conferred upon him on their initiative.\nWith the land tax securely installed, the main structure of the new\nsystem of national taxation had been finished, for the issue of this new\ntax at its first complete return amounted to more than two-thirds of the\nentire revenue of the state. It now remains to be told how the value of\neach piece of land was assessed and its tax determined. The assessment\nof value consisted, first, in taking the average of the harvest for five\nyears, then converting it into money at the basis of the average price\nof rice ruling in the same period, and, finally, estimating the amount\nof the capital which would be necessary to yield an interest equal to\nthe price just calculated. The estimated capitalization was considered\nthe value of the land in question. The assessment of land throughout the\ncountry was completed in 1881. As to the tax itself, its rate was fixed\nat three per cent. of the official value, and later reduced to two and a\nhalf per cent. It would be difficult to overestimate the benefit that\naccrued to the farmer under the new law. He passed at once from the\nposition of a tenant to that of an absolute owner, his former lord being\nat the same time recompensed by the state with public bonds for the\nfiefs he had surrendered. Thus the emancipation of the cultivator from\nthe feudal bondage of land, which still has a considerable hold upon\nsome of the former feudal communities in Europe, was in Japan definite\nand final. Nor did the new owner find himself under such restrictions as\nhad existed under the feudal r\u00e9gime, either in the alienation of his\nestate or in its utilization to the best advantage by raising upon it\nwhatever crop he liked. In return, his due to the state was only a sum,\nno longer arbitrary or in kind, but fixed and in money, which, as has\nbeen pointed out by some writers, was no more than one and one-fourth\nper cent. of the market value of the land, or equal to a rent assessed\non the basis of an eighty-year purchase, which is less than a quarter of\nthe ordinary tenant's rent.[2] Add to this the important consideration\nthat between the time when the land tax law went into effect and the\nyear 1898 the price of rice rose nearly threefold, so that the real\nburden of the tax lessened correspondingly by two-thirds. The market\nvalue of land, also, had increased, even as early as 1888, on the\naverage of five or sixfold. If it be said that the farmer's quota in the\nexpenditures of the local government had in the meantime considerably\nincreased, there still remains the fact that the increase was hardly\ncommensurate with the growth of cultivated area and general land value\nand the rise in both quantity and price of the crops.\n\nTo say, however, that the land tax was lenient is not equivalent to\nsaying that it was the most reasonable source for an increased\nimposition. That it was so, in the opinion of the fair-minded people,\nremains now to be shown. It should be remembered, in the first place,\nthat although in 1881 the income of the land tax amounted to more than\nfour-sevenths of the total revenue of the government, it had not since\nincreased, but rather fallen from over forty-two millions of _yen_ to\nless than forty, while, on the other hand, the expenditures of the state\nhad risen from seventy-one and one-half millions in 1881 to eighty-five\nand three-tenths in 1895, and then, so rapidly after the advent of the\n_post-bellum_ measures that in 1899 they stood at 254 millions, or more\nthan three and one-half times as large as they were less than two\ndecades before. Such items of taxes as had been created or increased to\nmeet a part of these enormously swollen expenditures had nearly all\nfallen on the urban population. The public bonds which were issued from\ntime to time and could not be much multiplied by fresh issues were also\nabsorbed mainly by the merchants and manufacturers, and the burden of\nthe indirect taxes, which in 1899 brought in the considerable sum of\nsixteen millions, was borne by the consumers of foreign goods, who for\nthe most part lived in the cities. This increased assessment of the\nurban population can be appreciated in contrast with the greatly\nlightened land tax of the landowners, who gained much and lost little by\nthe rapid development of the economic resources of the country. Their\ninterests were further strengthened by the new r\u00e9gime, under which the\nlower house of the imperial diet championed their cause with such a\ndecisive majority of its members that no dissolution could change the\nsituation. Some of the peers may have represented urban interests, but\ntheir voice in financial measures was as small as the control over them\nby the representatives was secure.\n\nBy the magnitude of these difficulties should be measured the signal\nsuccess of the Yamagata cabinet in obtaining the passage in the lower\nhouse of the land tax bill, on December 20, 1898, by the majority of 161\nto 134. It was, however, bought with a heavy cost both to the cabinet\nand to its allies, the Constitutionalists. The former had been compelled\nto relinquish its \"transcendentalism,\" and the latter risked the\ndispleasure of their constituencies. Nor was the bill passed without a\nhard struggle and serious amendments. The original proposition of the\ngovernment contemplated a permanent increase of the tax rate to four per\ncent., but the bill as it was adopted fixed it at 3.3 per cent. (the\nrate of the house land in the cities being, however, 5 per cent.), and\nlimited its validity to the short period of five years, so that the\nestimated increase in the income of the tax, after its going into\nplenary force, was only over eight million _yen_, or less than half the\noriginally intended increase. Even this reduced measure was not agreed\nto until the government yielded to the demands to revise the land\nvaluation in the country in such a way as to cut the total assessed\nvalue by 3,200,000 _yen_, and, what is more, to transfer the charge of\nthe prison expenditures, amounting to four millions, from the local to\nthe central exchequer. The net gain by the increased tax measure would\nhardly rise above four million _yen_ annually, and this slight gain\nwould be temporary, while the losses entailed on the government from the\nreassessment and prison expenditure would be permanent. After the\nexpiration of the five years the government would be left worse off than\nat the beginning of the term.\n\nIn spite of these drawbacks, the credit of raising the income of the\nland, income, and _sak\u00e9_ taxes by forty-six millions of _yen_, and thus\nenabling the _post-bellum_ measures to be carried out to any real\nextent, belongs justly to the Yamagata cabinet. If we add to this\nremarkable success the establishment of the gold standard in 1898 and\nthe passage of the new election law in 1900, and also remember that the\ncabinet possessed a strong unity, it becomes difficult to understand why\nit resigned in September, 1900, at the prime of its success. The reason\nwas probably the characteristic modesty and prudence of the field\nmarshal, who saw that he had attained to a success large enough to\nsatisfy any premier, while the prolongation of his office might involve\nhim in embarrassing relations with the new party just formed by Marquis\nIt\u014d, with which the retiring premier had little sympathy.\n\nThe attitude of Marquis It\u014d toward the Yamagata cabinet during the\nlatter's tenure of office was one of a cordial adviser to a modest\ninquirer. When the late \u014ckuma cabinet fell, the marquis was summoned by\nthe emperor to hasten back from China, where he had been traveling, but\nbefore he touched the shores of the main island of Japan the\norganization of the Yamagata cabinet had practically been completed. It\u014d\nmay have been somewhat chagrined, but it goes to the credit of himself\nand of the field marshal that they maintained all through the twenty-two\nmonths of the latter's administration the utmost mutual respect and\ngood-will that ever could exist between two men of temperaments so\nwidely different from each other. But the time came when It\u014d at last\nfound favorable opportunities to organize a large model party, which the\nformer Liberals (lately styled Constitutionalists) joined in a body. He\nhad seen too well in his tours round the country to what abuses the\nexisting party system had everywhere led, and how far the nation stood,\nmainly owing to the flagrant defects of the present parties, from an\nideal constitutional government, the legal foundation for which he had\nhimself designed. Gradually and with increasing force he seems to have\nconvinced himself that there should exist a party powerful enough to\ncounteract the present evils, sufficiently organized and disciplined to\npossess a distinct unity of conduct, and actuated solely by the best and\nmost logical motives of national progress. The patriotic intention of\nthe marquis himself in these ideas cannot for a moment be doubted: it\nmust have seemed plain to him that his assumption of leadership in a\nparty must mean a radical severance of himself from his past career and\nfriends, and even the silent resentment of the latter, while his\ndisciplinary measures would, even with his imposing prestige and\ninfluence, become less binding on the party as the latter grew in size.\nAs soon, however, as his desires of organizing a new party were made\nknown, on August 25, men of all classes and motives flocked under his\nstandard in irresistible numbers. The public inauguration of the party,\nunder the name Constitutional Political Association (_Rikken Seiy\u016b\nKwai_), took place on September 15, and eleven days later was followed\nby the sudden resignation of the Yamagata cabinet. Upon It\u014d now\nlogically devolved the duty of taking the reins of the state in hand,\nbut it was only after a considerable hesitation and some unexpected\ndifficulties that the fourth It\u014d cabinet was finally organized on\nOctober 19. Who can deny that this was a genuine party cabinet, in an\neven fuller sense than the late \u014ckuma cabinet, and that Marquis It\u014d was\nafter all deeply convinced of the futility of a \"transcendental\"\ncabinet, which owes everything to the crown and nothing to the diet?\n\nThe new cabinet, with its illustrious leader, its absolute majority in\nthe lower house, and its immense following in the country, seems to have\nbeen attended from its beginning by no inconsiderable difficulties, some\nof which, indeed, proved more serious than could have been expected.\nForemost among them stood the financial ghost, which would never down,\nbut which now, with the dispatch of troops to North China, made an\nunusually ominous appearance before the inchoate government. The\nincreased tax measures, mainly in sugar and _sak\u00e9_ taxes and customs\nduties, intended to raise twenty-one million _yen_, readily passed\nthrough the house of representatives, where the landed interest still\noutweighed the urban, but met a different treatment from the peers. That\nthese would be cool toward the cabinet may have been expected, but no\nman had imagined that they would present so stubborn an opposition and\nsuch adroit tactics as they did. Their stand was as determined, when it\nwas taken, as it had previously been unsuspected. Between February 25\nand March 12, 1901, were employed in vain the persuasion of the premier,\nreconciliation by four Elders, and two successive suspensions of the\ndiet. Never before in the history of the Japanese Constitution had the\nhouse of peers so seriously opposed the government, nor had its action\never caused a suspension of the imperial diet. The anomaly of the\nsituation becomes more evident when one recalls that the upper chamber\nwas now wielding its weapons against its creator, who had called it\ninto being as a conservative force to check the radicalism of the other\nchamber. Above the fear of a dissolution, as they were, the peers caused\na complete deadlock. How it was removed by an imperial word, and how\nunprecedented the procedure was, has been described in connection with\nour account of the Constitution. The survival of the It\u014d cabinet through\nthis crisis, and the conduct of the premier in allowing his trouble to\nbe remedied by an aid from the throne, were not unattended by the\nincreased ill-will of the peers and even by some significant whispers\namong the rank and file of his own party.\n\nThe cabinet did not, however, live much longer, as it resigned on May 2\nfrom an entirely unforeseen cause, the like of which it is highly\nimprobable would recur. Within a week after the prorogation of the\nimperial diet, which had passed the increased tax measures, Viscount\nWatanabe, minister of finance, stunned the premier by declaring that the\nonly possible way of forestalling the impending financial dangers of the\ngovernment would be to postpone the public works contemplated for the\nfiscal year of 1901, mainly consisting of the creation or the extension\nof the iron foundry, railroads, telegraphs, and Formosan enterprises.\nHis argument was not without a plausible ground, as it was plain that\nthe issuing of the public bonds to the amount of more than sixty\nmillions of _yen_, part of which had been planned to meet the\nexpenditures of the public works, could not have been effected without\ndrawing upon the too scarce productive capital of the nation. But the\nabrupt proposition of the viscount caused a veritable panic in the\ncabinet, and in the business world, and was agreed to by his colleagues\nafter a considerable discussion. No sooner, however, did the finance\nminister carry his point than he gave everyone a fresh surprise by\nrecommending an entire suspension of public works for the ensuing fiscal\nyear of 1902. The breach thus created in the cabinet was complete, and\nthe enigmatical Watanabe would not listen to the plaint of the premier.\nWhen all the other ministers tendered their resignation it was seen that\nthe viscount alone was holding to his post, although he also soon joined\nthe rest. It does not seem perfectly clear why the obstinacy of a\nminister was deemed a sufficient cause for the downfall of a cabinet\nwhich commanded an absolute majority in the lower house, and which had\nsurvived the deadlock and anomaly of two months before.\n\nHowever that may be, the party cabinet, for such it was in practice,\ndid not recede from the government service without receiving deep scars\non the prestige of the party itself. The internal inharmony of the\ncabinet so unfortunately caused by the inexplicable conduct of Viscount\nWatanabe seriously reflected upon the credit of the leaders then in\noffice. For the cabinet and the party at large, however, perhaps no\nevent was of a more serious import than the immense power, followed by\nthe assassination, of T\u014dru Hoshi. A man of blameless character in his\nhome life and an indefatigable student of the world's new thought,\nHoshi, with undaunted courage and consummate talent for party\nleadership, not unattended by unscrupulous conduct in money matters, had\nbecome within a short time a peerless whip of the old Liberals. He was\nprobably the greatest instrument in their secession from the hasty union\nwith the Progressives. During the Yamagata administration the success of\nthe cabinet was mainly due to his efficient maneuvers in the lower\nhouse, where he was at once the contractor and the foreman of his party.\nWhen the Liberals joined in a body Marquis It\u014d's new party, no man could\nhave been at once more dangerous and more indispensable to its president\nthan Hoshi. The latter's word was as reliable and his success as assured\nas his rule in the party was despotic and his means detested. In the\nproportion that the new association was proclaimed by its founder and\nexpected by the nation to be a model party, the peers and other neutral\npeople deprecated Hoshi for his corrupt deeds and the marquis for\nallowing them to pass under his eye. The politician, on his part, was\ntoo proud to condescend to explain that he retained not a farthing for\nhimself, and that abuses were showered on him some of which should\nbelong to others. The respectable society looked askance at him, but in\nthe political world no one could resist the action of this intrepid and\nclever politician. During the first months of the It\u014d cabinet Hoshi was\nat once minister of state for transportation and a member of the\nmunicipal council of T\u014dky\u014d, but it was not long before he incurred the\nire of the peers and others and resigned his former post. It was mainly\nas a councilor of T\u014dky\u014d, however, that his influence was feared to\ncontaminate the municipal government in all its branches. Finally, on\nJune 21, 1901, he fell victim at the age of forty-one to the dagger of\nan assassin. The latter, S\u014dtar\u014d Iba by name, formerly a fencing master\nand now a man of respectable social standing, and of the same age as\nHoshi, had been actuated by the simple fear of the widespread\ncorruption wrought by this engrossing enemy of the public, on whose\nremoval he staked his life. He was later sentenced to life imprisonment.\nWith the passing of Hoshi, the Constitutional Political Association and\nits president lost their most powerful and most detested figure. Marquis\nIt\u014d was no longer subject to the calumny which had fallen upon him for\nhis close association with the deceased politician, nor could he again\ncount upon the co\u00f6peration of one whose talent and tactics had been the\nbadge of his discipline as leader, and whose concentration of censure\nupon himself had relieved the marquis from the share which would\notherwise have been apportioned him. The political atmosphere was as\npurified, as was the forecast of its immediate future rendered\nuncertain, by the resignation of the It\u014d cabinet and the assassination\nof T\u014dru Hoshi.\n\nIn the meantime the imperial mandate to organize a new cabinet lingered\nbetween Marquis Saionji, Count Inouye, and Viscount Katsura, until\nKatsura succeeded, a month after the fall of the last cabinet, in\nforming its successor. It consisted of younger men of that school of\nstatesmen whose sympathy was with the Elders and peers, who, like their\ntypical field marshal, Yamagata, were known to be skeptical of the\nwisdom of the party government. Hardly a more singular spectacle can be\nimagined than the one afforded by this new cabinet, which was at once as\nlittle respected from outside as internally it was united and tactful,\nand which was as securely supported by the peers as its relation to the\nrepresentatives was precarious. The latter, particularly Marquis It\u014d's\nfollowers, could not have loved the successor who seemed to have stolen\ninto the post vacated by their leader, whose untimely downfall from the\ncabinet had embittered them. Nor could the feeling be suppressed that,\nemerging from the house of peers, the new cabinet now had the use of the\nvery twenty-one millions of increased taxes to which its members were so\nrecently and so stubbornly opposed.\n\nAgain it was through the financial question that the struggle opened\nbetween the government and the diet. The accounts of the fiscal year\n1901 showed a deficit of 44 millions, and the proposed war loan of 50\nmillions to be floated in the United States failing at the eleventh\nhour, the difficulty was tided over by ingenious manipulations. In the\nbudget for the next year, however, it was proposed to transfer from the\n\"extraordinary\" to the \"ordinary\" class of accounts the works to be\ndefrayed by public bonds, representing 18 millions, as well as the net\nincome to the government from the Chinese indemnity, amounting to 38\nmillions. The Associationists opposed this budget on rather unimportant\ngrounds, but, at It\u014d's advice, consented to its passage with the pledge\nof the cabinet to reorganize the official system of the government with\na view to eliminating spurious posts and retrenching administrative\nexpenditures. The marquis had, however, started, on September 18, on his\ntour round the world, leaving an advice to his party that a friendly\nneutrality should characterize its attitude toward the cabinet. He\nattended the bicentennial celebration of Yale University, where he was\nhonored with the degree of Doctor of Laws. Thence he sailed to Europe,\nreceiving warm greetings from the governments of the countries through\nwhich he passed. Shortly before he returned home on February 25, 1902,\nhowever, an event took place which for the time being arrested the\nattention of the whole world--the Anglo-Japanese alliance, agreed on\nJanuary 30 and published February 11.\n\nThe full contents and import of the agreement of this alliance will be\ndiscussed later in connection with the diplomatic history of Japan. In\nshort, it declared unequivocally that the two governments were for peace\nand order and against territorial aggressions in China and Korea; and\nthat, if one of them should be compelled to go to war with a third power\nin order to protect its now vested interests in those countries against\nthe threatening conduct of the enemy, the other party would be neutral\nand make efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities\nagainst its ally; but that if any other power or powers should join in\nwar against the ally, then the other party should come to its\nassistance, and conduct the war in common. It may well be imagined with\nwhat enthusiasm the news was received by both friends and foes of the\ncabinet in the two houses of the diet, as it was there for the first\ntime made known to the world on February 11, when even the peers broke\ntheir usual decorum and applauded. Nothing could have strengthened the\nposition of the Katsura cabinet more than this successful culmination of\na series of negotiations carried on in absolute secrecy with a great\npower whose policy of \"splendid isolation\" had seemed to be traditional.\nIt would be only fair to say, however, that but for the international\nfame which Japan had won for herself in the Chinese war of 1894-1895 and\nlatterly in the North China campaign of 1900, coupled with the tact and\ninfluence of Viscount Aoki and Mr. Kat\u014d, former Japanese ministers at\nLondon, even the increased common interests of the two powers in the\nEast and the combined effort of Baron Komura, the foreign minister, and\nViscount Hayashi and Sir Claude MacDonald, the respective\nrepresentatives of the two governments at London and T\u014dky\u014d, would not\nperhaps have been sufficient to bring about the consummation of the\ngreat diplomatic enterprise. It was even suspected in some quarters that\nGermany also may have been instrumental in promoting the new alliance,\nas her well-known policy of setting England and Russia against each\nother for her own benefit would be best served in the Far East by\nwedding England to the inveterate object of Russia's jealousy. A more\ninteresting question for us here regards the position in this affair of\nMarquis It\u014d, who had recently held conferences with the Russian foreign\nminister, Count Lamsdorf, at St. Petersburg, and had just been honored\nby Edward VII. of England with a Grand Cross of Bath. Whether the former\nfact indicated his preference for a Russian _entente_, or whether the\nlatter was a conclusive evidence of an eminent service he had rendered\ntoward the successful conclusion of the British agreement, has been a\nmatter of much speculation. There exists authoritative evidence to show\nas conclusively that his negotiations with Lamsdorf had been carried out\nwith the full knowledge of the Katsura cabinet, as to prove that, on the\nother hand, the latter's _pourparlers_ with the British government were\nalso continually intimated to the marquis during his tour. Probably his\nnegotiations at St. Petersburg were less successful, while the cabinet's\nagreement with Great Britain was more readily concluded than he had\nexpected. Immediately after his return to Japan the tactful statesman\nsomewhat checked political gossip by intimating his agreement with the\ncabinet in its British policy.\n\nThe formation of the alliance must have had some bearing on the success\nof the Japanese government in floating the fifty million _yen_\n($25,000,000) public bonds at London in the autumn of 1902, which had\nbeen rejected a year before from the financial market of New York. The\nincome of this foreign loan was not devoted to new public works, but\nemployed to refill the deficiencies of the old accounts.\n\nAside from these successes, the path of the Katsura cabinet was thorny.\nIt could count upon no partisan support in the lower house, nor could\nits personnel and prestige command high respect. Its main strength lay\nin its remarkable unity, silence, tact, and apparent fairness. The last\nquality was manifested anew in its impartial attitude during the general\nelection for the seventeenth diet. The previous diet was the first in\nits history that had served its full term of four years without\ndissolution, and the present election saw the first operation of the new\nelection law. Of the 376 elected representatives, the Constitutional\nPolitical Association returned the absolute majority of 192, while the\nProgressives numbered about 80. The house contained entirely new members\nto the number of 227, but aside from this one fact, no particular\nfaction had made any appreciable gain or loss, so that the _status quo_\nof all the parties was in fact maintained. Once convened, however, the\nconduct of the house demonstrated how precarious therein was the\ncondition of the cabinet. The opposition of the house would probably not\nhave been so precipitate had not the interest dear to eight-tenths of\nthe representatives been directly assailed by the government's\nproposition to retain the increased rate of the land tax, which, as will\nbe remembered, had been intended to return in 1904 from 3.3 to 2.5 per\ncent.\n\nInasmuch as this proposition had arisen from the second _post-bellum_\nmeasure of naval extension, it becomes necessary to say a few words\nconcerning the status of the Japanese navy. The first programme as\nplanned by the second It\u014d cabinet in 1895, and agreed to by the diet,\ncontemplated an increase of Japan's naval force, in ten years, from 33\nwar vessels and 26 torpedo boats, aggregating the 63,000 tons'\ndisplacement of the fleet before the China war, to 67 vessels, besides\n11 torpedo-boat destroyers and 115 torpedo boats, with a total\ndisplacement of 258,000 tons, at the end of 1905. Of this tonnage at the\nend of 1902 there was 252,180 tons, representing 72 vessels of all\nkinds. Formidable as these figures would seem, it had long been plain to\nthe statesmen of the empire that deductions must be made for vessels\nbuilt more than twenty years before and for others whose terms of\nusefulness must shortly expire one after another. Even if the present\nforce were maintained, each of the six great naval powers of the\nworld,--Great Britain, France, Russia, the United States, Germany, and\nItaly,--would have completely outrun Japan by the end of 1908; while the\nJapanese, after deducting vessels older than twenty years, would hardly\npossess more than 145,000 tons. Japan's naval ambition was animated, not\nso much by an inordinate elation as a civilized power as by the\nnecessity of maintaining her position in East Asia and guaranteeing her\nown independence. When these matters are considered, the new programme\nof naval expansion, as at last set forth by the Katsura cabinet, rather\nsurprises one with its modesty. It, in short, contemplated the\nconstruction, in the course of eleven years, of three battleships each\nof 15,000 tons' displacement, three armored cruisers each of 10,000\ntons, and two second-class cruisers each of 5000 tons, totaling 85,000\ntons' displacement, besides fifteen torpedo-boat destroyers and fifty\ntorpedo boats. No one could have seriously opposed this programme had it\nnot been for its financial side. The source of the estimated annual\noutlay of 11.5 million _yen_ which the proposed plan entailed upon the\ngovernment could, according to its opinion, be found nowhere but in the\nretention of the increased rate of the land tax, augmented by other\nslight items of revenue. To the seventy or eighty per cent., however, of\nthe members of the lower house, who had pledged their word to their\nconstituencies to restore by all means the old rate of the tax, it was\nno argument to say that the landowners had been inequitably lightly\ntaxed by the side of the urban population, nor to prove the\nimpossibility of raising the necessary expenditure by any other safe\nmeans than the retention of the increased rate. Into their hands no\nsharper weapon against the government could have fallen than the one\nwhich the helpless cabinet gratuitously furnished them under the\npressure of an apparent necessity. Upon this juncture, what was the\nattitude of Marquis It\u014d and his party, which controlled an absolute\nmajority in the lower house?\n\nTo answer this question is again to describe another turning point in\nthe remarkable career of this statesman. It was made known early in the\nseason, and no partisan view could well refute, that the marquis was in\nsympathy with the cabinet so far as its naval programme was concerned,\nwhich he was reported to have deemed even too moderate. As regarded the\nland tax question, however, which he had once in the past years\nconsidered it wise to increase even to four per cent., he now, either\nfrom conviction or from policy, assumed an attitude of unusual\ndeliberation. Nothing could have been more disastrous to the cabinet,\nand more decisive for the termination of his career as a party leader,\nthan his studied reticence about this important problem. The \"whips\" of\nhis party deliberately overrode him, and ordered its long expectant\nlocal branches, soon after the general election, to forward to the\nheadquarters resolutions against both the naval extension and the\nretention of the increased land tax. Resolutions accordingly poured in\nthick and fast. At the same time, the marquis was flooded with personal\nappeals to him to come out squarely against the unpopular government. It\nis plain that the action of his subordinates was calculated to\nintimidate him more than the cabinet. His authority as the president of\nthe Constitutional Political Association had been ignored, and he\nyielded, perhaps in order to save others' and his own dignity. Shortly\nbefore the opening of the diet, on November 26, the marquis, after a\ndeliberation lasting four weeks, conveyed to Premier Katsura his\nopinion, reiterating that the naval expansion was necessary, that the\nburden of the increased land tax was not particularly onerous, but that\nhe did not think it politic at present to prolong the term of the\nincrease, and, finally, that the naval expenditure might be met by\npostponing or suspending some of the less urgent public works. After\nfurther conferences, the premier, on December 3, personally assured the\nmarquis of his sense of gratitude for his counsel, but firmly announced\nthat, inasmuch as the budget had been sanctioned by his majesty, and as\nit would be unwise for the cabinet to resign on the eve of the meeting\nof the diet, it remained for him to make an effort to carry through his\nproposed plan. After this friendly ultimatum was pronounced the outcome\nof the measure could hardly be doubted, for the presence of the common\nenemy speedily brought about a temporary alliance of the Associationists\nand the Progressives. The irresistible coalition found its first\nopportunity to assail the cabinet when the latter made an imprudent but\nsincere move to connect three things--the budget, the navy bill, and the\nland tax measure--declaring the absolute necessity of upholding them\ntogether and the impossibility of an alternative course of action. The\nallied parties in the lower house found herein a justification for\nmodifying Marquis It\u014d's suggestion to carefully study the budget with a\nview to discovering adequate means to balance the naval expenditure\nwithout resorting to the increased land tax. The committee on finance\nstraightway negatived the land tax bill, and in the afternoon of the\nsame day, December 16, when it came before the house, the chair read an\nimperial mandate suspending the diet for five days. This was followed by\nanother suspension, and during this interval Prince Konoye, president of\nthe peers, and Baron Kodama, military governor of Formosa, sought in\nvain to effect a compromise between the truculent lower house and the\ncabinet. The latter, however, having expressed willingness to make\nreasonable concessions, two representatives of each of the opposition\nparties met the premier and the ministers of finance and navy, on\nDecember 25, to discuss the compromise measure proposed by the latter.\nThis compromise reduced the tax rate to three per cent. and agreed to\nmake up the balance by postponing some public works and retrenching\ngeneral administrative expenses. When this new plan was submitted to the\nparties at large, the latter roundly rejected it, Count \u014ckuma, the\nProgressive leader, going so far as to intimate that his party was\nfundamentally opposed to the cabinet, which it considered\nunconstitutional. Under these circumstances it was no longer possible\nfor the government to co\u00f6perate with the house, which was accordingly\ndissolved on December 28.\n\nWhen the year 1903 dawned upon Japan it found her political conditions\nextremely unstable. The alliance of the Associationists and Progressives\nseemed unnatural, and the discipline of Marquis It\u014d over the former\nappeared no longer tenable. The coalition had been based on no positive\npolitical principle, nor could the bulk of the Association be\nsuccessfully controlled by one, however personally respected, whose\ndouble capacity as trusted Elder Statesman and an opposition leader was\never liable to lead him into positions highly repugnant to those who\npreferred an open and relentless warfare with the cabinet. The two\nparties had already parted hands when the eighteenth diet was convened\nfor an extra session in May. As to the impossible situation of Marquis\nIt\u014d, to which reference has just been made, it was not long before it\nwas demonstrated anew and with a decisive effect. The occasion was again\nin connection with the naval extension measure, the urgent character of\nwhich was freshly brought home to the thoughtful people by the partial\nfailure of Russia to effect the second evacuation of Manchuria and her\nsimultaneous pressure upon the Peking court and the Korean frontier. The\ncabinet presented to the house some supplementary estimates to the\nbudget for the fiscal year of 1903, together with eight bills, two of\nwhich related to the navy and the new three per cent. land tax. The\nmanifest hostility of the house again called forth on May 21 a\nsuspension of the diet. On the 23d, at a general meeting of the\nAssociation, Marquis It\u014d made an earnest appeal to his party to accept\nthe compromise measure which he, as an Elder Statesman, and under the\nentreaties of his non-partisan friends, had agreed with the cabinet to\nsupport. Under the terms of this agreement the government was understood\nto reintroduce the land tax bill for show, but to consent finally to\nraise the required annual naval expenditure of eleven and a half\nmillions by a yearly flotation of public bonds for six millions,\nretrenchment in administrative expenses to the extent of one million,\nand deflection from the outlay for railroads and other works to the sum\nof four and a half millions. The appeal of the marquis was not accepted\nby his party without a powerful opposition and a great sacrifice, which\nwe shall presently see. The painful compromise measure was further\nmangled when the house cut the supplementary budget estimates by five\nmillions, covering the cost of a few important undertakings, and, in\nreturn for the passage of the naval programme, exacted from the\ngovernment pledges to effect a drastic reorganization of finance and\nadministration, and to place the railroad accounts under the\n\"extraordinary\" class of national expenditures. The climax was reached\nwhen the defeat of an address to the throne proposed by the Progressive\nmembers, censuring the cabinet, was quickly followed by the passage of a\nresolution of similar censure which was proposed by the Associationists\nthemselves. It is unnecessary to say that the last act was no less a\nblow to Marquis It\u014d than to the Katsura cabinet. The latter had,\nmoreover, to endure the displeasure of its best friends, the peers, who\npassed a petition to the government to desist from the highly unwise\npolicy of resorting to a national loan, and a minority of whom even had\ncontemplated proposing an address to the throne deprecating the same\npolicy.\n\nThe eighteenth diet, which was prorogued on June 5, left the politics of\nJapan in an even more confused state than before its opening. The\nhumiliation of the cabinet was only matched by the internal injuries\nwhich the parties had suffered for their conduct. The former, whose\ndiplomatic duties in Korea and Manchuria were threatening to rise to a\nhitherto unknown degree of difficulty, had been forced by the merciless\ndiet not only to retreat from the stand it originally took in regard to\nthe most important problem of the nation, but also to bear the burden of\nthe imposed responsibility of reorganizing the financial and\nadministrative machinery on an almost impossible basis. The Progressives\ncould scarcely conceal the inharmony of their leaders in regard to the\nimmediate policy the party should pursue. Far more demoralized was the\nAssociation, which had been born under too favorable auspices, and\npossessed too absorbing a desire for power, to maintain its mental\npoise when it found itself as an opposition party. It had then appeared\nto lack the tried perseverance of the Progressives, while its irritation\nhad been greatly intensified by the double position of Marquis It\u014d, who\nwould on the one hand come to an agreement with the cabinet in his\nindependent capacity as an Elder Statesman, and on the other maintain\nhis disciplinarian leadership of the opposition party. Nor can it be\nconcealed that the marquis, dignified statesman and brilliant counselor\nas he is, hardly possesses attributes which appeal to the hearts of the\npeople and inspire the enthusiastic loyalty of his followers. It seemed\nevident that the majority of the party from the beginning respected his\nprestige and influence, which was considered as a political asset, more\nthan either his constitutional ideals or his personality. Since they saw\nthat the shortest road to power would lie in the direction of\nunequivocally upholding the proprietary interest of the country, nothing\ncould have seemed more galling to some of them than a compromise which\nwould deprive their parliamentary warfare of these essential tactics.\nAround this sentiment as a center there seem to have clustered various\nother motives for disloyalty. Some Associationists resented the\nautocratic rule of the president, and advocated a more republican form\nof party organization, and others denounced the marquis for sacrificing\nthe dignity of the party for his position as an Elder. Desertion of\nseveral members, including the late lamented president of the lower\nhouse, Kataoka, and the present mayor of T\u014dky\u014d, Ozaki, was followed by\nthe dissolution of a few local branches. The culmination, however, was\nthe resignation of the president himself, which occurred on July 13. The\nmarquis had at length yielded to the arguments of his fellow-Elders,\nwhich had long been becoming more and more solicitous, that his proper\nmission was rather that of a trusted councilor to the throne than one of\nparty leadership. The Manchurian question was assuming a more serious\ncharacter than before, and the resumption by the marquis of the\npresidency of the privy council appeared to the Elders, and perhaps also\nto the emperor, as the most natural course of events. The appointment\nwas finally made on July 13, after It\u014d had given the matter his\ncharacteristically careful consideration. His severance from the party\nnaturally followed, as no privy councilor might entertain partisan\nconnections. In the leadership of the Association he was succeeded, at\nhis own suggestion, by Marquis Saionji, his friend and also one of the\nmost promising statesmen of the day. Thus after a wandering of nearly\nthree years the prodigal son, with perhaps a valuable experience but\nscarcely an added prestige, returned to the fold of the council and the\ncourt. In accepting the post of the chief councilor, he said to the\nemperor that it was his desire of seeing the perfect operation of the\nConstitution, which he had had the honor of framing, that had induced\nhim to descend to a political party and lead it; but that, as he was\nnow, even before his work with the party had barely begun, graciously\ncalled by his majesty to resume the chair of the council, he convinced\nhimself that it would be as much a contribution toward the realization\nof the constitutional r\u00e9gime to \"stand near the throne and reverently\nanswer imperial questions regarding important affairs of the state,\" as\nto \"move among the people as a party leader.\" No student of the Japanese\npolitics of to-day can fail to observe the large place Marquis It\u014d\noccupies therein as the pilot of the state, and also his full\nconsciousness of the fact. His apparent failure as a partisan seems to\nhave brought him back to his normal position. It will soon be seen that\nhe returned thither in an opportune season. Her foreign affairs were\njust drifting Japan toward an ocean of unknown difficulties.\n\nIn the meanwhile, Premier Katsura had tendered his resignation on the\njust plea that an adequate conduct of the government was incompatible\nwith the slender means in which the diet had left the exchequer. Neither\nthis argument nor the somewhat reduced physical condition of the\nviscount would, however, induce the throne to relinquish its confidence\nin him. Thereupon the premier reminded the emperor, and it was agreed to\nby his majesty, that his retention of the portfolio could mean nothing\nelse than a drastic retrenchment of the administrative and financial\nexpenditures of the state. This colossal task the cabinet set about with\ncharacteristically quiet determination.\n\nThe arduous and cheerless life of the cabinet was somewhat brightened\nwhen it received into its community, in July, General Baron Kodama,\nmilitary governor of Formosa, and latterly the able chief of Field\nMarshal Oyama's staff, and, in September, three other able young men.\nNothing, however, could have been more gratifying to the cabinet than\nthe fact that, while its hold upon the lower house of the diet was next\nto nothing, its apparent patriotism and sincerity, as well as its fair\ndegree of ability, had begun to be appreciated by the throne, the\nElders, and the peers, and perhaps somewhat by the people at large. The\nconfidence with which its general purpose was regarded by the nation was\nbest demonstrated in 1903-1904, during its protracted and otherwise\nexasperating negotiations with Russia regarding Manchuria and Korea. It\nwas remarkable that, in spite of the increasing irritation which one\nreport after another of the Russian aggression in these territories\ncaused in the national mind, the Katsura cabinet appeared so little\ninclined to stray from its policy of a firm but fair treatment of the\nquestion, as did the people to force its hands to a rash action. If this\nremarkable phenomenon was, in part, due to the deeper and more mature\nfeeling which was now inspiring the nation than had been experienced\nbefore, it none the less redounded to the honest purpose of the cabinet.\nNor were its care and precision in all lines of its policy less\nremarkable than its general sincerity.\n\nThe crisis in Korea and Manchuria was, in the meanwhile, advancing with\ntragic certainty, until the apparently insignificant cabinet was called\nupon to lead the nation through the greatest trial of its life. The war\nwith Russia, as we shall see in a later chapter, broke out in February,\n1904, followed by nineteen months of the vast campaign and the brilliant\nvictories of the Japanese army and navy. The existence of the war, of\ncourse, again united the entire nation, and completely changed the\nconditions of Japan's domestic politics, which might otherwise have made\na prolonged life unendurable to the cabinet. Its financial measures were\nsupported by the diet, not without amendments, but on the whole with\npractical unanimity. The 156 million _yen_ of the extraordinary war\nexpenditures disbursed under an imperial ordinance of December 28, 1903,\nwere willingly sanctioned by the twentieth session of the diet in March,\n1904. It also passed the new tobacco manufacture monopoly law\nelaborately drafted by the government, and approved the extraordinary\nwar expenditures for the fiscal year 1904-1905, amounting to 420 million\n_yen_. This last act not only involved the raising of the public and\ntemporary loans and exchequer bonds to the amount of 131 millions, but\nalso an increase in tax rates and the imposition of new consumption\ntaxes on woolen textiles and kerosene oil. The next session of the diet\nalso met the requisitions of the government by further increasing the\ntax rates and creating newer taxes, and approving 571 millions of new\nnational loans and 63 millions to be transferred from funds under the\nso-called special accounts, making the total war expenditures of the\nsecond period 780 million _yen_. The grand total of the war cost\napproved by the diet in the two sessions thus aggregated 1356 millions.\nThis amount became inadequate, as the army in the field, especially\nafter the battle of Mukden, in February-March, 1905, was increased to an\nunprecedented magnitude. A new foreign loan for 30 million pounds\nfloated, in July, in London, New York, and Berlin, brought the figure up\nto 1656 million _yen_. Fortunately, the rice crop for 1904 was unusually\ngood; an early control of the sea held open the highways of Japan's\nEastern trade; the reduction of local impositions and expenditures\ncounterbalanced the rise in national taxes; and the savings and general\nfinancial endurance of the people at large proved unexpectedly great.\nThe unforeseen successes of Japan's arms also contributed to the\ntemporary prestige of the cabinet.\n\nThe spell was broken the moment peace was restored. The broad\nconcessions made through the peace envoys at Portsmouth for the\nconclusion of the Russo-Japanese treaty of September 5 brought upon the\ncabinet (and the privy council) the greatest popular resentment ever\nexperienced by any constitutional government of Japan. Various motives\nand circumstances combined to make the sentiment for a time almost\nunanimous among the nation. The conclusion, on August 12, of the\nagreement of a renewed and much extended alliance with Great Britain,\nwhich was published on September 27, somewhat relieved the strained\nsituation, and the Constitutional Political Association, under the\nleadership of Marquis Saionji, showed an inclination for a moderate\npolicy toward the treaty and the government. The relative position of\nthe different parties was again rendered uncertain, so that their\nconduct in the coming session of the diet could hardly be forecast. As\nto the cabinet, it must either succumb to an attack from the majority in\nthe lower house, or survive it only to be confronted by colossal\nfinancial difficulties.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[1] The editor has been greatly helped in preparing this chapter by I.\nTokutomi's admirable pamphlet on the recent political life of Japan.\n\n[2] Brinkley's \"Oriental Series,\" vol. V. p. 16-17.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XVIII\n\nECONOMIC PROGRESS. 1893-1906\n\n\nOne of the most remarkable features of the economic evolution of Japan\nsince 1868 has been the slow increase of her rural population as\ncompared with the urban--a fact which at once indicates that the\nagriculture of Japan can offer little to compare with the phenomenal\ngrowth of her manufactures and commerce. Nor will a closer examination\nestablish an optimistic view regarding the future status of the Japanese\nfarmer. Although a sedimentary soil admirably suited for the culture of\ncereals abounds in the country, and often yields in warmer regions two,\nthree, or even four different crops during the year, and although Japan\nis blessed with a copious rainfall, it must be remembered that the\narable area is extremely limited, and can hardly be extended\ncommensurately with the fast growth of the population. Of the 94.5\nmillion acres of land of Japan exclusive of Formosa, only 12.4 million\nacres, or thirteen per cent., are under cultivation, while, as is well\nknown, there exists little or no pasture land in Japan. Even if all\nsorts of land under fifteen degrees of the angle of inclination were\narbitrarily considered as reclaimable, they could not add to the arable\narea more than 10.5 million acres. The actual reclamation outside of the\ncolony of Hokkaid\u014d amounts annually to only twenty thousand acres more\nor less. It seems evident that the future increase of the agricultural\nresources of the country may be effected less by extensive breaking of\nthe soil than by intensive improvement. This is well illustrated by the\nrice culture, the area of which has scarcely been increased during the\nlast twenty years but the actual product of which has in the meantime\nrisen nearly eighty per cent. The production of other cereals, beans,\nand potatoes has grown even more appreciably, while the area of the\ncotton, indigo, and sugar culture has, for commercial reasons,\nremarkably declined. No illustration, however, of the limited\nagricultural resources of the country is more impressive than the ratio\nwhich her arable area bears to her population. The _per capita_\ndistribution would fall below half an acre. Under these circumstances it\nis natural that the cultivated lots are diminutive, more than half of\nthe rice fields of the country being each less than one-eighth of an\nacre. The farmer is obliged to exercise the utmost care in utilizing\nevery scrap of his land and every grain of its yield. A great majority\nof the tenants, moreover, lack a sufficient fund, after the high rents\nand interest are paid, even to buy manure, much less to make any\nimprovement on the land. The implements are as meager and primitive--the\noutfit for the cultivation of an acre of field costing probably less\nthan eight and a half dollars in gold--as their wages are low, seldom\nrising above thirty-five cents per day for the male and twenty cents for\nthe female. The government is making efforts to develop the agriculture\nof the country by all possible means of education and encouragement, not\nthe least important of which has been the creation of the central and\nlocal Hypothec Banks and the Credit Guilds. How much, however, these\nmethods will really reach the needy villagers is yet to be seen. On the\nother hand, Japan cannot help realizing that her agriculture, while it\nstill constitutes the staple industry of the nation, has already ceased\neither to supply her with all the necessary raw products for the\nmanufactures or to support the new population, which is growing annually\nat the rate of more than half a million. Probably this serious problem\nlies behind many an event of recent years that characterizes the\nactivities at home and abroad of the Japanese people.\n\nThe difference between the condition of agriculture and that of\nmanufactures and trade not only is clear, but also becomes increasingly\ndecisive as time advances. Until we realize this significant difference\nwe fail to grasp the most fundamental cause, excepting perhaps her\ngrowing ambition as a nation, that impels Japan onward with an\nirresistible force into a controlling position in the Far East. In\nproceeding to explain the situation, manufactures and trade will be\nconsidered together, as their influence is in a large measure mutual.\n\nIt must be noted, in the first place, that when the country was thrown\nopen to the world's trade, her industrial conditions were altogether\ninadequate to meet the marvelously rapid increase of the consumption of\nnew goods. The original five per cent. import duty, which peculiar\ncircumstances made almost equal to no duty, accelerated the impetuous\nadvance of imports over exports. Thus the first decade and more of the\nnew r\u00e9gime found the nation in a state of almost complete economic\ndependence upon foreign countries. Old industries were largely\nparalyzed, while capital and labor were not forthcoming for the new. It\nwas at this juncture that the government began to extend a helping hand,\nby subsidies and by example, to the more important economic enterprises,\nand not until then could the people begin to take an active interest in\nrailroads, industries, and export trade. The fact that the low import\ntariff had been forced by the powers upon the Japanese government, whose\nright of tariff autonomy they had thus ignored, was galling to the\nnation in its ardent desire to regain its economic independence, and\ntended powerfully to confirm its determination to effect a revision of\nthe treaties. These were revised in 1894, and the new treaties which\nemancipated Japan from the consular jurisdiction of the foreign\nresidents and gave her a partial tariff autonomy came into force in\n1899. It is unnecessary to examine the process of this revision, but it\nsuffices here to repeat that while consumption had advanced marvelously\nunder a virtual free trade, production began to grow only after the\ngovernment was compelled to aid it. From this point on trade and\nindustry have helped each other's progress by mutual reaction. The\ntremendous expansion of economic resources thus rapidly opened in the\ntwo great fields, manufactures and commerce, was clearly measured by the\nenormous increase of population, which numbered less than thirty\nmillions in 1830, thirty-four millions in 1875, forty-two and a quarter\nin 1895, and more than forty-seven to-day. At the same time, foreign\ntrade itself has grown from 40 million _yen_ in 1871 to 690 million\n_yen_ in 1904, the _per capita_ share of the people in the growth rising\nmore than twelvefold. During the first half of 1905 the total foreign\ntrade in merchandise amounted to over 429 million _yen_, as compared\nwith 320 millions during the corresponding period in 1904. In other\nwords, Japan is changing from an agricultural to an increasingly\nindustrial and commercial nation, and her commerce is expanding mainly\nabroad, as her domestic market has well-nigh reached its \"saturation\npoint.\" This fact is strikingly illustrated by the rapid growth of the\nexportation of manufactured goods, as well as the importation of raw\nmaterial, as compared with the relatively slow increase in the\nimportation of foreign manufactures. The exports of manufactured goods\nin 1890 amounted to 10 million _yen_ of the total export trade of 55.7\nmillions, while ten years later the corresponding rate changed to 74.7\nout of 193.8 millions. If raw silk, straw-plaits, and the like were\nclassed under agricultural, instead of manufactured, goods, the rate of\nincrease between 1890 and 1900 of different kinds of exports would run\nas follows:\n\n 1890 1900\n Per Cent. Per Cent.\n\nManufactured 18.0 38.0\nAgricultural 51.6 37.8\nFishing 6.6 3.5\nMining 20.0 14.2\nMiscellaneous 3.8 6.5\n\nIf the enumerated goods were transferred from the agricultural to the\nmanufactured list, the rate would be thus:\n\n 1898 1899 1900\n Per Cent. Per Cent. Per Cent.\n\nManufactured 70.9 69.4 66.0\nAgricultural 11.9 11.9 10.5\nOthers 17.2 18.7 23.5\n\nWhile the rate of the manufactured exports seems to have fallen between\n1898 and 1900, their absolute figures show that some new items appeared\nin the list during the interval and that the total volume enormously\nadvanced. On the other hand, the imports, which increased together with\nthe purchasing power of the people, show more rapid growth in raw goods\nand machinery than in manufactured articles. These changes have been\npointed out here in order to indicate the general nature of the economic\ntransition of the Japanese people. They will be found to possess a far\ngreater significance than we have seen when we come to examine further\nthe character of the trade tendencies of Japan.\n\nLet us for a moment consider the qualifications of the Japanese as a\nmanufacturing nation, for upon them must ultimately depend their\neconomic as well as general national success. It would be impossible to\nconceal from our view certain serious disadvantages which confront\nindustrial Japan, particularly in her want of the new form of labor and\nexperience and lack of certain raw materials and of capital. Regarding\nlabor, the old manual dexterity and individual apprenticeship have\nhardly had time to be sufficiently converted into an organized and\nspecialized mechanical training, so that the foreign visitors report\ncontinually the apparent inefficiency and ill discipline of the Japanese\nmill-hand. On the other hand, Japan cannot forever count on the\ncheapness of her labor, whose cost is still low, the average daily wage\nof twenty-six principal classes of laborers being not more than\none-quarter of an American dollar, but it has risen more than twice\nwithin the last fifteen years, and will continue to rise along with the\ncost of living. The shortage of capital is natural when it is remembered\nthat Japan is just passing from an agricultural to a manufacturing\nstage, but none the less constitutes the most serious drawback to her\nindustrial growth. Ingenuity and enterprise are not wanting, but owing\nto the scarcity of capital Japan's exploitation of resources, both at\nhome and in Korea and China, is handicapped to an extent which is\nexasperating. Latterly, however, particularly after the war, foreign\ncapitalists have been seeking investment in Japan, and they may be\nexpected to aid Japanese enterprise on the mainland. The lack of proper\nbusiness experience of the Japanese manufacturers is natural from their\ncomparatively recent appearance. They have been accused of\nover-eagerness to rid themselves of foreign advisers and middlemen, who\ncould have supplied them with a better understanding and control of the\noutside market than they themselves could command. The native maker,\nhowever, will learn deeper by blundering more. A graver charge has\ncontinually been made of the slack commercial veracity of the Japanese,\nwhich is admitted by themselves to be real, but which has for certain\nreasons been unduly magnified, while it is naturally being remedied by\nexperience. Another grave disadvantage of the Japanese manufacturer\nconsists in his want of such important raw materials as cotton, wool,\nand iron. The growth of cotton in Japan is insignificant, while its\nimportation from India, China, and the United States amounts to more\nthan seventy million _yen_ annually. Wool has to be entirely supplied\nfrom abroad, as pastures for sheep do not exist in Japan, while the\ntotal annual output of iron is less than eighty thousand short tons.\n\nReflection will show, as experience has proven, that the enumerated\ndisadvantages are neither permanent nor irremediable. Labor and\npractical wisdom will gain by time, and capital and raw material will\ncome in with greater ease and in larger quantities. Over against these\ndiminishing disadvantages Japan possesses an unrivaled geographical\nposition between the great Pacific on the one hand and the teeming\nmillions of the East Asiatic population on the other, the commercial\nimportance of both of which must grow wonderfully with the development\nof canals and railroads in various parts of the world and the opening of\nnew markets in the yet slightly explored East. This superb\nPhoenicia-like situation of Japan toward the outside world is supported\ninternally by a richly endowed soil and an eager and ambitious race. The\nsoil possesses an abundant water supply and extensive coal beds, the\nlatter already yielding well-nigh ten million tons, and produces tea and\nsilk the peculiar quality of which is hardly matched by the product of\nanother land. The ambition and docility of the people would seem to be\nwell exemplified by the phenomenal growth of silk and cotton textile\nindustries, which have risen twenty-fold in value during the last two\ndecades, and by the creation of certain new, prosperous industries,\nparticularly in matting, lucifer matches, straw braids, and cotton\nyarns. The exportation of the six principal branches of manufactures\nabove enumerated amounted in 1888 to less than 31 million _yen_, and\nnearly 195 millions in 1904. It should be remembered that none of these\narticles have won their position without encountering embarrassing\ndifficulties at home and a sharp competition abroad, and that with a\nrelaxation of effort they would at once sink into insignificance.\n\nConsidering the foreign trade of Japan apart from her manufactures, it\nis seen that its growth during the last eleven years has been rapid and\non the whole regular. During this space of time the exports in 1904\nreached 319\u00bc million _yen_, which means a gain of 256 per cent. over\n1893, and the imports 371-\u00bc millions, or a gain of 320 per cent., while\nthe total volume of trade amounted to 690-3/5 millions, that is, nearly\nthree times as much as it was a decade ago. The figures for 1905 will\npossibly exceed the 850-million mark. This remarkable growth of trade\nhas advanced hand in hand with an even more striking development of\nJapan's shipping industry. At the end of 1891 she owned 607 steam\nvessels with a total tonnage of 95,588, while in 1903 her vessels\nnumbered 1088 and their capacity totaled 657,269 tons, so that Japan\nstood in 1902 in the ninth place in tonnage in the world's merchant\nmarine, and the speed and general improvement of her ships were behind\nonly those of the four greatest shipping nations on the globe. The gross\nincome from freight and passengers in 1902 amounted to 12-3/5 million\n_yen_. Japanese steamboats now ply regularly between her shores and the\nports in Siberia, Australia, India, Europe, and on the Pacific coast of\nAmerica, and, in Korea and China, they play an active part in the\ncoasting and inland navigation.\n\nWe conclude this section by briefly pointing out what appear to be the\nmost significant tendencies of Japan's trade and of her national growth\nin general. The growth of imports, which have risen from 23-1/5 million\n_yen_ in 1874 to 37-3/5 millions in 1904, is mainly due to causes which\nmay be classified as follows: First, the progress of industries,\nresulting in an increasing demand, on the one hand, for machinery, and,\non the other, for raw materials, particularly cotton and iron; second, a\ngreat advance in the standard of living among the people at large, which\ncaused a remarkable growth of the general consumption of imported\narticles, including textiles, woolens, petroleum, and numerous other\nitems; third, the rapid increase of population, coupled with the\ntransition of the new nation from an agricultural to a manufacturing\nstate of industry, which, besides aiding the growth of general\nconsumption, necessitated a marked development of the importation of\nfoodstuffs, such as rice, beans, flour, and sugar. These three classes\nof causes have all stimulated import trade to grow with rapidity, and\nare apt to continue to do so in the future, but, as the figures plainly\nshow, in varying degrees from one another. And it is in this difference\nthat one of the striking indications of Japan's call in the East is to\nbe discovered. The increase of the imports due to the growth of the\ngeneral consumption of foreign goods has not been nearly so fast as\nother classes of imports, as Japan is able to supply her people more and\nmore with the fruits of her own manufacture, which itself is progressing\nrapidly. While the future increase of this class of imports must be\nsteady, it at the same time may not be rapid save in a few exceptional\narticles. Nor may the importation of machinery, excepting the most\nadvanced, such as locomotives, be expected to grow more rapidly, the\nreason for this supposition being again the increasing activity of\nJapan's manufacturing life. The other two classes of imports, however,\nthat is, raw material for manufacture and foodstuff for the growing\npopulation, have shown a wonderful advance, and may be said to command\nthe most assured promise for the future. A glance at the following table\nwill make an elaborate demonstration of our statement superfluous:\n\n IMPORTATION OF RAW MATERIAL AND FOODSTUFF\n (Unit of million _yen_)\n\n 1882 1892 1902 1903 1904\nCotton 0.46 12.32 79.78 69.52 73.42\nPig iron 0.09 0.24 0.98 1.25 2.24\nWool .... 0.30 3.40 4.81 9.97\nSugar 3.84 9.53 14.36 20.96 23.04\nRice 0.21[1] 1.86[1] 13.56[1] 51.96 59.70\nFlour .... 0.27 3.28 10.32 9.62\nBeans .... .... 4.95 6.37 8.12\nOil cakes 0.03 0.82 10.12 10.73 4.66\n\nThis remarkable showing of figures becomes highly significant when we\nconsider further that most of the articles the importation of which\nincreases the fastest come mainly from the East Asiatic countries. India\nfurnishes the bulk of cotton, China supplies some iron, sugar, and rice,\nas well as some cotton, while North China and Manchuria send their beans\nand oil cakes, and Korea is beginning to be a great supply region of\nseveral cereals. Most flour and some iron, however, come from the United\nStates, which, as we shall see presently, occupies a unique relation to\nJapan's trade. We have thus arrived at an important conclusion that\nJapan is obliged to depend in an increasing degree for her most\nimportant articles of importation on East Asia, to which she is\nintimately connected both geographically and historically.\n\nAn analysis of the export figures of Japan leads us to a similar\nconclusion from another direction. It has already been shown that, as\ncontrary to the tendency of her import trade, Japan's exportation\nconsists yearly more of manufactured articles and less of raw goods than\nbefore. Here again a deeper significance is disclosed by an examination\nof the destination of the exports. The time, if ever, seems very remote\nwhen Japan will invade Europe and America with her manufactures and\ncompete with the fruits of their superior machinery and mechanical\nexperience. Her exportation to Western countries already has a clear\nindication of settling down to two main classes of articles; such\nunfinished goods as raw silk, copper, sulphur, and others, which might\nrather be finished abroad than in Japan; and certain goods peculiar to\nthe soil of Japan, as, for instance, tea, _habutai_, and other light\nsilk fabrics, porcelain, matting, camphor, and the like. The exportation\nof these articles must increase in varying degrees, according to the\nstate of the several determining factors that rule the domestic and\nforeign markets, but its future on the whole may be said to be much\nmore limited and inelastic than that of Japan's exports to the East\nAsiatic countries. Her close economic relation to them has become all\nthe more manifest since she began to be a manufacturing nation, while\nthey remained agricultural; she buys from them raw products and\nfoodstuff, and supplies them with her manufactured articles. The demand\nfor these last-named articles, also, by a fortunate combination of\ncircumstances, is at present what the still inferior skill of the\nJapanese manufacturer can supply. The taste of the Eastern buyer is\nstill low and his wants still comparatively few, while their advance\nwill largely coincide with Japan's improvement in industries. Her\nneighbors in Korea, Siberia, Manchuria, North and South China, India and\nFurther India, and the Philippines absorb her coal, matches, marine\nproducts, cotton yarns and coarse cotton fabrics, and other similar\ngoods, to the amount of 134.5 million _yen_ (in 1901) while eleven years\nbefore they consumed 23 millions and in 1882 only 6 millions. From these\ndata, the conclusion seems tenable that her geographical and economical\nconditions render it natural for Japan to interpret the new Occidental\ncivilization for the old Orient, and create new wants in the latter for\nthe fruits of the former, herself reaping an important share of the\nprofits that accrue from the world-wide exchange. This share consists in\nan even closer economic connection of East Asia, particularly Korea and\nChina, with Japan as her grand supply region of raw goods and market for\nmade articles. In comparison with this, Japan's trade with countries of\nWestern civilization may become more and more a mere complement to her\nEastern trade.\n\nThe solitary and striking exception to this general statement is found\nin the Japanese trade with the United States, which is still to-day, as\nshe was twenty years ago, the largest single buyer of Japanese goods,\nnotably tea, raw silk, matting, porcelain, and camphor. In the import\ntrade, while the United States is second to Great Britain, the former\nadvanced in twenty years between 1882 to 1902 from 3 to 48.6 million\n_yen_, and the latter only from 14 to 50.3 millions. The peculiar\nfeatures of Japan's trade with the American nation which are not found\nin her European commerce may be said to lie in the fact that the latter\nbuys a considerable amount of the crude or unfinished Japanese\nmanufacture, and sells increasing quantities of raw cotton and flour and\nother foodstuffs, thus participating in a large measure in the\npeculiarities of the Japanese trade with the East. The United States\nalso furnishes Japan more cheaply certain products of modern industries\nwhich the latter formerly bought from Europe.\n\nWe conclude our survey of Japan's foreign trade by appending a table\nshowing its distribution by the continents, which will speak for itself\nwithout our comment:\n\n(Unit of million _yen_.)\n\n Europe, America, Asia, Australia,\n and Others.\n1881 Exports, 12.5 11.0 0.6 0.9\n Imports, 21.0 1.8 7.6 0.5\n\n1891 Exports, 23.9 31.1 20.9 1.8\n Imports, 30.3 6.8 23.7 1.9\n\n1901 Exports, 59.9 75.6 111.4 5.2\n Imports, 96.7 42.9 109.0 7.0\n\n1903 Exports, 70.3 85.7 126.7 6.7\n Imports, 96.1 46.7 169.1 5.0\n\n1904 Exports, 72.3 104.6 134.5 7.7\n Imports, 120.5 58.9 182.5 9.3\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[1] The average for the past ten years inclusive.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XIX\n\nTHE CHINO-JAPANESE WAR. 1894-1895\n\n\nSeldom does history offer a more dramatic unfolding of international\nrelations than the evolution of the East Asiatic question, of which the\nChina-Japan War of 1894-1895, the Boxer campaign of 1900, and the\nRusso-Japanese War of 1904-1905 are but successive stages of a\ncontinuous and broadening process. The scene of this development now\ncovers those countries which are among the most resourceful in the world\nand which comprise one-third of the human race. The future is unknown.\nThe origin of the drama, however, may at least in part be traced to the\nadoption of a new career by Japan. Having been singularly well trained\nby her long history in the past, and impelled by the dictates of her\nvital interests, Japan had resolutely entered upon the new career, and\nhad step by step committed herself to an open and progressive policy\nfrom which there could be no return, and which had to be carried forward\nagainst all obstacles, if she would exist and grow as a nation. This\nchange of Japan's course of life was a cause of her wars with China and\nRussia; by it the history of the Far East radically changed its\ncharacter and opened its new volume. At first, the determined attitude\nof new Japan immediately caused a breach which continued to widen until\nthe war of 1894-1895 came as a logical result--for it at once appeared\nthat Japan had torn herself away from the ancient East Asiatic\ncivilization, of which China was the mentor and Korea the greatest\npupil, but of which Japan had never been so slavish a disciple as not to\ndevelop her original traits. As soon as Japan proved receptive of\nWestern arts and sciences, there was resentment on the part of China and\nKorea, which felt as if Japan had deserted the historic community of the\nEast and turned a renegade and servile imitator of the inferior\ncivilization of the barbarian. To an equal extent Japan desired, even\nunconsciously, to demonstrate that her new career not only was not\nmisguided, but also was the only possible way to preserve herself and\nsave the East. Conflict with China became acute when Japan desired to\nopen to the world the tightly sealed kingdom of Korea, over which China\nclaimed suzerainty. Japan's attempt to open Korea, then, should be taken\nas the starting point of our account of the war of 1894-1895.\n\nTo complete our general survey, it may again be emphasized that the same\nproblem which caused the breach of 1894 also produced the conflict of\n1904. The interests at stake had, indeed, grown wider and deeper during\nthe ten intervening years, and Russia was a far more powerful and\naggressive power than China, but the fact still remained that, from\nJapan's standpoint, her vital interests were at issue in 1904 as they\nwere in 1894, and, from that of the world, the conflict raged now as it\ndid then between an open and an exclusive policy.\n\nAs has been said above, Japan's attempt to open Korea as an independent\nand sovereign nation was the occasion for the outbreak of the Chinese\nwar of 1894. Why did Japan desire to open Korea? Was it because Japan\nwould apply to Korea the treatment she herself had received from the\nUnited States and other powers? Or was it an expression of the vigor of\na newly regenerated nation? Probably the motives were not so simple, for\nit should be remembered that from the prehistoric ages the career of\nJapan and of Korea had been so vitally entwined that their close\nrelationship of one kind or another was as inevitable as their\ngeographical proximity itself. Moreover, beyond the peninsula stood two\nother powers, China and Russia, whose friendship Japan could not always\ncount upon. In providing against any possible danger from these powers,\nthe entire question seemed to hinge upon Korea, for with the fall of the\nlatter the very existence of Japan would be threatened. It seemed\nessential for Japan, in order to protect her own life, either to annex\nKorea before it fell prey to another power or to insure its effective\nindependence by opening its resources and reforming its rotten\nadministration. Japan chose the latter alternative. But this brought her\nto a conflict with the Koreans themselves, for they were too thoroughly\nimbued with Chinese civilization and too deeply corroded by official\ncorruption not to resent Japan's eagerness to modernize and revivify\nKorea. Korea thus presented the singular spectacle of resisting the\nsuggestion of a friendly nation to insure her independence and power.\nJapan was confronted with the colossal task of overcoming the Korean\nmisapprehension and breaking down the Chinese suzerainty over the\npeninsula.\n\nThis double conflict began almost as soon as the imperial authority was\nrestored in Japan. In 1868 Japan sent a message to Korea with a view to\nopening friendly relations with her. Korea, however, being ill informed\nof the nature of the political change which had just taken place in\nJapan, and acting under the false representation by China of Japan's\naggressive pretensions, resolutely declined to entertain these\novertures. Other similar attempts also miscarried, and, in 1872, a\nKorean magistrate set a placard upon the gate of the residence of a\nJapanese officer at Fusan, in which Japan was stigmatized as the\nlaughing stock of the world for her slavish imitation of barbarous\ncustoms. The taunt ended in saying that Japan had been so insolent as to\nimpose the shameless policy upon Korea also, but the latter had too high\na sense of propriety to be so deluded. It is noteworthy that the\nobjections here raised were characteristically double, that Japan was\nunder the shadow of other powers and was losing her nationality, and\nthat she dared to force Korea to follow her unwise example. The former\nwas sufficiently repugnant, the latter made it unendurable. When in 1873\nJapan demanded China's explanation for the repeated insults made by\nKorea upon Japan in the latter's attempts to negotiate with her, the\nChinese government declared that it was not answerable for Korea's\nconduct, for she was not its dependency. This aroused an outcry in Japan\nthat she should independently force Korea open, but a greater insult\nfrom Korea was still to come. As a Japanese war vessel on its way to\nNiu-chwang stopped at the Kang-hwa Island, not far from Chemulpo, in\nAugust, 1875, it was fired upon by the inhabitants and two marines were\nkilled. The Japanese-Korean treaty, which was concluded as a result of\nthis incident, deserves a special note, not only because it was the\nfirst modern treaty made by Korea with a foreign power, but also because\nit for the first time showed clearly Japan's fundamental policy\nregarding Korea, upon which policy has depended and will for a long time\ndepend many a serious event in the history of the Extreme Orient. By\nthis treaty Korea was declared independent, the two parties binding\nthemselves to treat each other on the basis of equality, and three\nKorean ports were shortly to be opened to foreign trade. This\nepoch-making treaty was concluded on February 26, 1876, at which date\nKorea was at last conventionally independent and partially open to the\noutside world.\n\nWe need not tarry to repeat the story already told of the strong\ninternal opposition that the moderate Korean policy of the government\nhad aroused in Japan, and of its far-reaching consequences in her\ndomestic politics. What mainly interests us here is the question as to\nwhat effect did the treaty produce upon Korea herself, whose sovereignty\nit recognized in unmistakable terms. This conventional independence of\nKorea had hardly altered the state of her political mind. Korea, it\nshould always be remembered, had since prehistoric ages been trained in\nthat school of experience in which she found herself eking out her bare\nexistence between stronger surrounding nations, which she was wont\neither to propitiate or to set one against another for her precarious\nsafety. The Koreans had thus by habit and by conviction grown up an\nopportunist nation. They gratified Japan by complying with her wish to\ndeclare them independent, while, at the same time, they courted China's\nfavor by maintaining their vague dependency upon that empire. As\nindefinitely did China support her contention that Korea at once was and\nwas not dependent upon her.\n\nThe time soon came, however, when China was obliged to define her\nposition toward Korea, for the more apparent Japan's policy of upholding\nKorean independence became to China, the more urgent was it for the\nlatter to reassert her suzerainty over the peninsula. The ambiguous\nphraseology with which China had masked herself was suddenly cast aside\nwhen an acute crisis came. In 1882 Tai-wen-kun, the father of the Korean\nking, assumed the administrative power at Seul, and set about executing\nwith great rigor his anti-foreign policy. The old patriot believed, like\nmany a Japanese before the restoration, that exclusion and independence\nwere synonymous. On April 23 the Japanese legation was attacked by\nKorean troops, its twenty-seven members barely escaping to Japan by way\nof Chemulpo on an English vessel. With unusual rapidity the Peking\ngovernment sent forces to Korea, who captured Tai-wen-kun and carried\nhim off to China, demonstrating in this way the latter's assumed right\nof forcible intervention in Korea. China thus asserted by deed her\nsuzerainty over Korea, and herein is already forecast an ultimate\nconflict between her and Japan, although neither power may have expected\nit as yet. Japan, on her part, contented herself by securing the\npunishment of the guilty, payment of 50,000 _yen_ for the killed and\nwounded, and also an indemnity amounting to half a million _yen_,\nfour-fifths of which were remitted the next year. She was, besides,\nallowed to station troops at Seul for protecting her residents against\nfuture emergencies.\n\nThis Korean trouble of 1882 was followed two years later by a greater\ncrisis, and again the occasion was a political disturbance at Seul. In\n1884, when China was at war with France over Annam, the progressive\nparty in Korea, which had been inspired by the example of Japan, took\nadvantage of the situation and overthrew by violent force the\npro-Chinese, conservative government. Suddenly the defeated party,\ntogether with 2000 Chinese troops, invaded the palace, murdered several\nmembers of the new cabinet, and attacked and burned the Japanese\nlegation. The minister, Takezoye, fled for his life, while many of his\ncompatriots residing at Seul were outraged or killed. The king, who had\nsummoned Japanese soldiers to guard the court, now threw himself on the\nprotection of the Chinese. In Japan the cause of the trouble was\nattributed to the mild Korean policy of the government. In 1885,\naccordingly, an agreement was made with Korea whereby the latter again\npromised to punish the guilty and indemnify the outrage. Korea was\nsettled, and China had now to be dealt with. To allay the censure\ndirected at himself by the nation, It\u014d proceeded in person to China,\nwhere he concluded with the Chinese commissioner, Li Hung Chang, the\nfamous Tientsin Convention of April 18, 1885, which had so much to do\nwith the later breach with China in 1894. It was agreed by this\nconvention that Japan and China should withdraw troops from Korea, that\nthey should not furnish Korea with military instructors, and that if it\nshould become necessary at any future time for either party to send\nsoldiers to Korea, it should notify the other of its intention. It was\nfurther stated, in a supplement, that there existed no definite evidence\nthat Chinese troops had killed Japanese residents at Seul, and\npunishment would be inflicted on the guilty only when sufficient proof\nwas forthcoming. As a matter of fact, no investigation followed and no\npunishment was meted out. On the contrary, the Chinese resident at Seul,\nYuan Shih-kai--now the powerful pro-Japanese viceroy of Chihli, but then\nan astute promoter of China's ascendency over Korea--who was considered\nto have been largely responsible for the conduct of the Chinese forces,\nnot only was not recalled, but was reinstated as Chinese minister at\nSeul. The greatest displeasure of the Japanese nation, however, was felt\nover the clause in the convention abrogating Japan's right, gained in\n1882, of stationing troops in Seul to protect her citizens and their\ninterests. It\u014d was consequently denounced at home now more loudly than\nbefore. China, on her part, equally resented the conclusion of the\nconvention, for she was thereby obliged to treat Japan on an equal\nfooting with herself in Korea. Both countries suffered equally, for\nwhile Japan forfeited the rights she had previously acquired, China's\nclaim of suzerainty was seriously impaired. Things remained in this\nstrained condition until nine years later, in 1894, when an unforeseen\nevent forced them to a breaking point. It was the Tonghak rebellion,\nwhich brought military forces of Japan and China face to face in Korea.\n\nThe Tonghak (or \"Learning of the East\") party was a secret organization,\nwhose doctrines were embodied in a collection of tenets based upon\nConfucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. Both the practical aims and the real\nstrength of the party were then little known. Its conduct in 1894,\nhowever, led to an international crisis of which it could not have had\nthe slightest expectation. In May the society rose in insurrection\nagainst the universal corruption and oppression of the Korean officials,\nwho were then under the powerful control of the family of the queen, the\nMin. The Min, whose safety was thus threatened, despite an opposition in\nthe court against the proceeding, appealed, on their initiative, to the\nassistance of China through the minister at Seul, who had really\nsuggested the move. Here was a long-awaited opportunity for China to\nrecover her lost ground in Korea and once more assert her suzerain\nrights over the peninsula. The Peking government at once dispatched\nforces toward Korea, at the same time notifying Japan, in accordance\nwith the Tientsin Convention, that China had been requested by Korea to\nsend troops to suppress the Tonghak rebellion, and that she had\nconsented to \"protect the tributary state.\" On the same day, June 7,\nJapan replied in two messages, one acknowledging the receipt of China's\nnotice, but declining to admit that Korea was tributary to her, and the\nother announcing that Japan also would send soldiers to Korea. To this\nChina retorted, saying that as Japan had not been requested by Korea to\ndispatch forces, the object of her expedition must be to protect\nJapanese subjects in the peninsula, which circumstances made it\nunnecessary for Japan to send too large forces or to allow them to go\ntoo far into the interior. Japan's answer was that the sending of the\ntroops was in accordance with the Korean-Japanese convention of 1882,\nand that she had the right to determine the number and disposition of\nher own forces. The first detachment of the Japanese soldiers escorting\nMinister \u014ctori reached Seul on June 10, and the Chinese troops landed at\nAsan the next day. If the order had been reversed, China might have\nregained, temporarily at least, her control over the Korean kingdom, and\nJapan's ardent wish to reform and strengthen Korea as an independent\nstate might have remained unfulfilled. From her vantage ground, however,\nJapan made a move which in fact created the critical point of the\naffair, for, on June 17, her foreign minister, Mutsu, proposed to China\nto suppress the Tonghak insurrection by joint forces, and then reform\nthe Korean internal government also by joint action, so as to insure\nstability and peace in the kingdom. It now rested with China to avoid\nall danger by joining hands with Japan in eradicating evils in the\nKorean administration, but she would hardly impede a reform upon Korea\nwhich she would not tolerate at home. On the contrary, the more corrupt\nand feeble Korea was, the more dependent upon China she would be. It is\nlittle wonder, therefore, that the Peking government replied that a\njoint suppression of the insurrection was unnecessary, as the latter had\nalready subsided, while a joint reform would be incompatible with the\nsovereign right of Korea over her own affairs, and that what remained\nfor China and Japan to do was to withdraw their forces from the\npeninsula.\n\nThis reply by the Chinese government may be said to have decided the\nsituation, for henceforth Japan felt obliged to take an independent\ncourse of action in Korea. Thus she wrote to China, on June 22, that\nKorea was constantly troubled by party strifes and disorders and was\nunable to fulfill obligations as an independent state; that this state\nof things seriously affected the interests of Japan, for she was near\nand had important economic relations with Korea; that to discard the\nmatter would be not only against Japan's friendly attitude toward Korea,\nbut also against her own self-preservation; and that, therefore, a\nreform could not be stopped, and evacuation would not be made \"without\nsome understanding which would guarantee the future peace, order, and\ngood government of Korea.\"\n\nThe co\u00f6peration with China having miscarried, Japan proceeded to act\nalone in Korea in the interest of the reform and good administration of\nthe latter. The Japanese minister at Seul, \u014ctori, opened the arduous\nexecution of his policy by putting a direct question to the Korean\ngovernment, on June 28, whether or not it considered the kingdom as\nindependent. This pointed query seemed to have deeply disturbed the\npoliticians at Seul, for they at once found themselves divided between\nthree opinions: namely, first, that Korea was of course an independent\nnation, and Japan was the first power to declare the fact before the\nworld; second, that she was an historic dependency of China; and, third,\nthat the displeasure of both Japan and China might be averted by not\ngiving a definite answer, but by merely referring them to the treaties.\nNothing reveals more clearly the fundamental weakness of the political\nconsciousness of the Korean people than their conduct at this critical\nstage of their existence. A message was sent to Li Hung Chang in China\nasking his instruction as to what answer should be given the Japanese\nminister. The telegraph line toward Wiju was interrupted, and Li's\nreply--recommending again the ambiguous definition that Korea was at\nonce dependent and independent--had not been received before Korea had\nat length to reply after three days' deliberation that she was\nindependent.\n\nThis first question had been asked by Japan in order to clear the ground\nfor all subsequent steps in her diplomacy in the peninsula. Korea had\ntechnically renounced the suzerainty of China, and \u014ctori now suggested,\non July 3, a thorough reform in the official organization and the\nfinancial, judicial, and military institutions. The king and the\ngovernment not only concurred with the Japanese minister, but also\nissued edicts calling for a reform. Suddenly a change came, on the 18th,\nwhen the Seul government declared that the presence of the Japanese\ntroops would hinder the execution of the necessary reform. It was of\ncourse plain that, as soon as these troops left, all hopes of reform\nwould be lost. The change had apparently been caused by the arrival of\nLi Hung Chang's telegram that an overwhelmingly large army was coming\nfrom China to crush the Japanese forces in Seul. \u014ctori at once repaired\nto the Korean foreign office, where he expressed his surprise at the\nsudden breach of faith on the part of Korea, and urged her answers\nwithin three days to the following two demands: an order for the\nevacuation of the Chinese troops from Asan, whose presence had become\nunnecessary since the Tonghak insurrection died away; and a declaration\nthat the existing treaty between Korea and China which contained clauses\nintimating the former's dependence upon the latter was henceforth null\nand void. The three-day limit expired without eliciting any answer from\nthe government. By this time--July 22--the city of Seul was in a state\nof intense excitement. \u014ctori resolved to see the king in person, and,\nearly in the morning of the 23d, started toward the palace in a\npalanquin under the escort of his guard. Korean soldiers fired at him,\nthe Japanese troops responded, and within fifteen minutes the Korean\nguards were dispersed and the city gates were taken, followed in the\nafternoon by a complete control of the entire capital by Japanese\nforces. This was the first bloodshed, and unfortunately it was Korean\nblood that was shed. It is necessary, however, to note that the Korean\nresistance was a result of the extremely unstable politics at Seul which\nhad enabled the pro-Chinese, corruptionist family of the Min temporarily\nto control the situation. With their fall Korea naturally turned about\nand allied herself with Japan against China. The old patriot\nTai-wen-kun, father of the king, who again assumed the grand\ncouncilorship, with his unabated rigor ordered punishment of the Min,\ncommenced a radical official reorganization, nullified the Chinese\ntreaty, and, what was more, requested the Japanese troops to drive away\nChinese soldiers from Asan. This last request at once placed the forces\nof the two empires in certain hostilities with one another. It was\ncarried out on July 29, but before that, on the 25th, the first act of\nwar took place unexpectedly on sea.\n\nBefore relating this sea fight it is important to observe that China\nevidently expected a war with Japan as early as July 16. It appears that\nshe was determined, though at first reluctantly, to resist by force of\narms Japan's efforts to realize the independence and reform of Korea,\nfor in no other light can be interpreted her dispatch by land and by sea\nof large forces destined for Korea. China was resolved to make good her\nsuzerainty over the Korean peninsula by staking a conflict with Japan,\nwhich she had hoped to overwhelm by superior numbers. It was generally\nbelieved in Japan at the time that the Chinese statesmen had been led to\nthis miscalculation of Japan's capacity by the continuous feud which had\nseemed to characterize the relation between the government and the\nnational diet. Li Hung Chang and others were thought to have imagined\nthat Japan's hands were too closely tied by this internal discord to\nembark upon an undertaking which would require an intense concentration\nof national resources. They could not have foreseen that all the\nsuperficial differences would be, as they were, sunk before the national\ncause, and that a profound patriotism would unconsciously and without\npremeditation compel the entire nation--the government, parties, and\nall--to stand like one man.\n\n[Illustration: FIRST ENGAGEMENTS OF CHINO-JAPANESE WAR 1894]\n\nBetween July 21 and 23 ten transports conveying Chinese troops left Taku\nfor Korea. Three Japanese cruisers, the _Yoshino_, _Naniwa_, and\n_Akitsushima_, which had since the 23d been cruising in the Korean\nwaters, met at 7 A.\u00a0M., the 25th, near the Phung-do Island, not far from\nAsan, the Chinese cruiser _Tsi-yuen_ and gunboat _Kwang-yi_. These\nvessels had steamed out of Asan in order to meet another Chinese\ngunboat, the _Tsao-kiang_, which was convoying a transport toward Asan.\nThe two Chinese vessels did not return the salute of the Japanese ships,\nand when the latter turned to the southwest they were fired upon by the\nformer. After a brisk exchange of fire for over an hour the _Tsi-yuen_\neffected an escape, and the _Kwang-yi_ was stranded south of Caroline\nBay, where its powder-magazine exploded. In the meantime the\n_Tsao-kiang_ and a transport, the _Kow-shing_, flying a British flag and\nconveying 1100 Chinese troops and stores, appeared on the scene. The\n_Tsao-kiang_ was captured. The _Kow-shing_ was ordered to follow the\nJapanese cruiser _Naniwa_ to the main squadron, but the Chinese soldiers\non board desired to return to Taku, and threatened to kill the English\ncaptain, Galsworthy, who advised them to surrender and himself wished to\nleave the vessel on a boat which the Japanese would send to him. After\nthe attempt of the _Naniwa_ to save the English mates had failed, it\nhoisted a red flag at 1 P.\u00a0M., or nearly four hours after it had stopped\nthe _Kow-shing_. Thereupon, the captain and the crew jumped overboard,\nand the Chinese soldiers fired at them, killing all but the captain and\ntwo others, who were rescued by the _Naniwa's_ boats. The _Kow-shing_\nwas then sunk. Only a few of those on board her, including a German,\nMajor von Hanneken, escaped by swimming ashore.\n\nOn the very day when the naval victory near Phung-do was won mixed\nJapanese brigades numbering about 4000 men, under command of Major\nGeneral \u014cshima, started from Seul on their march toward Asan, in order\nto carry out the commission of the Korean government to drive away the\nChinese forces stationed there. The large reinforcements which they had\nexpected from China not having arrived, the Chinese troops, 3500 in\nnumber, met the enemy at the strategic point Song-hwan, east of Asan.\nDuring a sharp engagement lasting from 3 till 7.30 A.\u00a0M., July 29, the\nChinese gradually lost their ground, until they fled toward Ping-yang,\nleaving behind 500 killed and wounded. The Japanese losses amounted to\n88 killed and wounded. Asan itself had been completely evacuated by the\nChinese. The victorious army returned to Seul early in the morning of\nAugust 5, where a warm reception by the Korean authorities and Japanese\nresidents awaited its triumphant arrival.\n\nThese hostile acts were followed by the formal declarations of war of\nthe emperors of China and Japan. The Japanese proclamation may be\ntranslated as follows:\n\n\"We, by the grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on a throne\noccupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make\nproclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects, as follows:\n\n\"We hereby declare war against China. We command each and all of our\ncompetent authorities, in obedience to our wish, to carry on hostilities\nby sea and land against China, and to make effort to attain the\nnational aim. We command them, each according to his power, to use all\nthe means at their disposal, consistently with the Law of Nations.\n\n\"During the more than twenty years of our reign, our constant aim has\nbeen to seek the progress of civilization by a peaceful government; and\nbeing sensible of the evils of being involved in complications with\nforeign states, we have instructed our ministers always to labor for the\npromotion of friendly relations with the treaty powers. The relations\nwith those powers have fortunately yearly increased in good-will and\nfriendship. We never expected such a persistent want of amity and of\ngood faith as has been manifested by China in her conduct toward us in\nconnection with the Korean affair.\n\n\"Korea is an independent state which was first introduced into the\nfamily of nations by the advice of Japan. China has, however, habitually\ncalled Korea her dependency, and openly and secretly interfered with her\ndomestic affairs. At the time of the recent insurrection in Korea, China\ndispatched troops thither, alleging that her purpose was to rescue the\ndependent state from its difficulties. We, in virtue of the treaty\nconcluded with Korea in 1882, caused a military force to be sent to that\ncountry, in order to be able to meet possible emergencies. Wishing to\nfree Korea for all time from disturbance and to insure her security for\nthe future, and thereby to maintain the general peace of the East, Japan\ninvited China's co\u00f6peration for the accomplishment of that object.\nChina, however, advanced several pretexts and declined Japan's\nproposals. Thereupon, Japan advised Korea to reform her administration,\nso that order and tranquility might be firmly established at home and\nthe rights and duties of an independent state might be maintained\nabroad. Korea has already consented thereto, but China has\nsurreptitiously and persistently impeded the purpose. She has, moreover,\nput forward various pretenses and caused delays, while at the same time\nshe was making warlike preparations on land and sea. When those\npreparations were completed, China sent large forces to Korea, with a\nview to the forcible attainment of her ambitions, and conducted herself\nso arbitrarily as to open fire upon our ships in Korean waters. It is\nbeyond a doubt that China's plain object is to make it uncertain where\nthe responsibility of preserving peace and order in Korea resides; to\nobscure the independent international position of Korea which Japan\nfirst recognized, as well as the treaties declaring that position; and\nthereby to injure the rights and interests of our empire and to deprive\nthe tranquillity of the East of its permanent guarantee. Carefully\njudging her designs from her action, it must be concluded that China has\nfrom the beginning been bent upon sacrificing peace to the attainment of\nher sinister object. In this situation, ardent as our wish is to promote\nat home and abroad the glory of our empire by strictly peaceful methods,\nwe are obliged openly to declare war [against China]. We rely upon the\nloyalty and valor of our faithful subjects, and hope permanently to\nrestore peace and to complete the glory of our empire.\"\n\nThe Chinese emperor's proclamation was an interesting document, giving\nan inaccurate statement of facts and revealing some of the main features\nof China's warlike plans in the coming campaign. A translation of this\nedict reads as follows:\n\n\"Korea has been under China's suzerainty for more than two hundred\nyears, and has rendered us annual tributes, as is well known at home and\nabroad. For over a decade Korea has been troubled by repeated\ninsurrections. We, in sympathy with our small tributary, have often sent\ntroops to her aid, and suppressed the rebels, and also placed a resident\nat Seul to render protection as needed. In the fourth moon of this year\n[May, 1894] another rebellion took place in Korea, for the suppression\nof which her king made to us an urgent appeal to send troops. We then\nordered Li Hung Chang to dispatch troops to Korea. As soon as they\nreached Asan the rebels scattered. But the _Woj\u00ean_ [a familiar and\ncontemptuous name for the Japanese], without cause, sent their soldiers\nsuddenly into Seul, and reinforced them with more than ten thousand men.\nJapan then forced Korea to change her system of administration, and\nunreasonably made various demands. According to our method of ruling the\ntributary state [Korea], the latter's internal affairs are left to its\nself-government. Japan's treaty with Korea was as one country with\nanother; there is no law for sending large armies to intimidate her and\ncompel her to change her administrative system. The public opinion of\nthe various powers considers the conduct of the Japanese as\nunjustifiable and unreasonable. We exhorted them to withdraw their\ntroops, but they paid no heed and offered no explanation. On the\ncontrary, Japan has continually dispatched more soldiers, until the\nKorean peasants and Chinese merchants were every day more alarmed than\nbefore. We therefore sent more troops to protect them. Greatly to our\nsurprise, a number of the _Woj\u00ean_ ships suddenly appeared and taking\nadvantage of our unpreparedness opened fire upon our transports off\nAsan, thus causing us to suffer from their treacherous conduct, which\ncould not be foretold by us. Japan has observed neither treaties nor\ninternational law, but is running rampant with her false and treacherous\nactions, commencing hostilities herself, and laying herself open to\ncondemnation by the various powers at large. We therefore make it known\nto the world that throughout the whole complications we have observed\nthe utmost benevolence and righteousness, while the _Woj\u00ean_ have broken\npledges and opened hostilities, which passes our patience to bear with.\nHence we command Li Hung Chang to give strict orders to our various\narmies to hasten with all speed to exterminate the foe; to send\nsuccessive forces of valiant men in order to save the Koreans from the\ndust of bondage. We also command the Tartar-generals, viceroys, and\ngovernors of the maritime provinces, as well as the commanders in chief\nof the various armies, to prepare for war and to make every effort to\nfire on the _Woj\u00ean_ ships if they come into our ports, and utterly\ndestroy them. We exhort our generals to refrain from the least laxity in\nobeying our commands in order to avoid severe punishment at our hands.\nLet all know this edict as if addressed to them individually. Respect\nthis!\"\n\nThe second battle on land took place at Ping-yang, on September 15, or\nfifty days after the encounter at Song-hwan, between 13,000 to 15,000\nChinese and 16,000 Japanese. The former had arrived at Ping-yang on\nAugust 4, and had made extensive preparations to defend themselves at\nthis almost impregnable stronghold. The offending force marched against\nthe walled city from several directions, and, finally converging there\non September 15, gallantly attacked it, practically under no cover, from\nthe north and from the southeast. The defense was powerful, but was\nfinally outmaneuvered by the unexpected attack of the Japanese from the\nrear. At 4.30 P.\u00a0M. the Chinese hoisted the white flag, and, taking\nadvantage of a heavy rain and a dark night, they left the city at 8\no'clock, moving toward the coast and Wiju. The Chinese losses were\nestimated at 2000 killed and about twice as many wounded, while the\nJapanese side numbered 102 killed, 433 wounded, and 33 missing. The\nwhole Japanese army entered the city of Ping-yang early on the 16th.\n\nOn the day of this decisive battle the military headquarters of Japan\nmoved forward from T\u014dky\u014d to Hiroshima, the emperor himself transferring\nhis seat thither, and, in his rude temporary quarters, attending to his\nduties as the commander in chief of the imperial forces. It is needless\nto say that the moral effect of this move upon the Japanese soldiers in\nthe field of action was thrilling.\n\nThe battle of Ping-yang had cleared Chinese troops out of Korea. Two\ndays after a naval engagement occurred near the mouth of the Yalu, which\nopened for the Japanese the sea-route along the northeastern coast of\nthe Yellow Sea. Early in the morning of the 17th the Japanese squadron,\nconsisting of the battleship _Fus\u014d_ (3709 tons' displacement), eight\ncruisers (between 4278 and 2439 tons), a coast defense gunboat, and the\nmerchant-cruiser _Saiky\u014d_, having on board Rear Admiral Kabayama,\ndiscovered columns of smoke from twelve Chinese war vessels emerging one\nafter another upon the horizon. These vessels, which had landed troops\nand stores at Ta-tung-kau on the preceding day, consisted of the two\narmored battleships _Ting-yuen_ and _Chen-yuen_ (7430 tons each), the\nbattleships _Lai-yuen_ and _King-yuen_, the coast defender _Ping-yuen_,\nsix cruisers, and a torpedo-boat destroyer. The Chinese fleet excelled\nin tonnage and the size of the guns, while the Japanese had the\nadvantage of the comparatively greater speed of their vessels and a\nlarger number of small rapid-firing guns. Fire was opened by the Chinese\nat 12.45 at a range of 6000 meters, the Japanese replying only at 3000\nmeters, and lasted till near sunset. The Chinese flagship _Ting-yuen_\nhad her flag-pole shattered at an early stage of the battle, and\nconsequently the fleet, stoutly as it fought, could no longer maintain a\nconcerted movement. The cruiser _Chao-yung_ caught fire and sunk, the\ncruisers _Yang-wei_ and _Chih-yuen_ and the battleship _King-yuen_ were\nsunk, and the cruiser _Kwang-chia_ was stranded near Ta-lien-wan; the\nbattleship _Lai-yuen_ also caught fire and barely escaped to Port\nArthur, while one of the two greatest battleships, _Ting-yuen_, was\nseverely damaged. Although the other vessels escaped with less serious\ninjuries, the Chinese commanders reported to Li Hung Chang that not a\nsingle ship was left in a seaworthy condition. The Japanese fleet lost\nno vessel, although damages were suffered by several, all of which were,\nhowever, soon repaired.\n\nAgain to return to the operations on land. After the battle of Ping-yang\nthe First Army Corps was definitely organized of the Fifth Provincial\nDivision from the district of Hiroshima, under Lieutenant General\nViscount Nodzu, and of the Third Provincial Division from the district\nof Nagoya, under Lieutenant General Katsura (now Viscount Katsura,\npremier). The Fifth Division consisted of the Ninth and Tenth Brigades\nunder, respectively, Major Generals Y. \u014cshima, and Tatsumi; the Third\nDivision was divided into the Fifth and Sixth Brigades, under Major\nGenerals \u014cseka and H. \u014cshima. The command of the entire corps rested\nwith Marshal Count Yamagata (later replaced, on account of his illness,\nby Viscount Nodzu, whose position as commander of the Fifth Division was\nfilled by Lieutenant General Oku).\n\nThe First Army Corps advanced toward the northern frontier of Korea. The\nChinese forces offered no determined resistance this side of the Yalu,\nfor they had decided, as did the Russians ten years after, to abandon\nthe indefensible Wiju but to defend Chiulien-cheng on the Chinese side\nof the river. For about ten miles to the right and left of this\nposition, or from An-tung along the stream up to Hu-shan, over a hundred\nredoubts and trenches had been built, behind which forts had been\nconstructed on eminences. General Sung-ching, commanding about 23,000\ntroops, stationed a powerful detachment upon Hu-shan, an important\noutpost across the Ai River, which flows into the Yalu. During the night\nof October 24, however, the Japanese army succeeded, undiscovered by the\nenemy, in throwing a pontoon bridge across the Yalu in front of Hu-shan.\nA severe storming of the outpost, replied to by an able firing, began at\n5 P.\u00a0M., on the 25th, continuing until it was deserted by the Chinese at\n10.30. This strategic point having been captured, the main quarters at\nChiulien-cheng were vacated without further resistance during the night.\nAn-tung was also easily occupied by the Japanese, while Feng-hwang-cheng\nwas set on fire and deserted by the retreating forces. Thus the Japanese\ncrossed the Korean boundary and gained an entry into the Chinese\nterritory with the comparatively small loss of 4 killed and 140 wounded.\nThey organized a provisional civil administration at An-tung to govern\nthe Chinese population in the seized territory. Mr. Komura (now Baron\nKomura, minister of foreign affairs) was appointed the temporary\ndirector of the administration, to be later succeeded by Lieutenant\nColonel Fukushima.\n\nAfter the capture of Chiulien-cheng, the First Army Corps divided itself\ninto two bodies, one under the command of Lieutenant General Katsura\nfollowing the Chinese troops that had fled toward Ta-ku-shan on the\ncoast, and the other pointing toward Mukden. Katsura's army took\nTa-tung-kau and Ta-ku-shan in succession, the latter on November 5, and\nthen turned northward and defeated the Chinese at Siu-yen on the 17th.\nTomu-cheng was captured on December 12, and Hai-cheng on the next day,\nwhile Kang-wa-seh, where 10,000 Chinese had entrenched themselves, was\ncarried on the 18th. Meanwhile, the second division of the First Army\nCorps had swept the enemy from Sai-ma-tsi and other points, and marched\ntoward Mukden in the depth of a severe Manchurian winter.\n\n[Illustration: CAMPAIGNS IN KOREA AND MANCHURIA CHINO-JAPANESE WAR]\n\nBy this time a part of the Second Army Corps, commanded by Marshal Count\n\u014cyama and consisting of the First Provincial Division from the district\nof T\u014dky\u014d, under Lieutenant General Baron Yamaji, and of the Twelfth\nBrigade of the Sixth Provincial Brigade of the Kumamoto district, had\nalready captured the great Port Arthur. Having landed at a point near\nPi-tse-wo, about ninety miles northeast of Port Arthur, on October 24,\nthe First Division had taken Kin-chow on November 6 and Ta-lien-wan on\nthe following day. The entire section then, soon after midnight of\nOctober 21, as soon as the moon rose, opened an assault from the rear\nupon Port Arthur, which was defended by a magnificent physical position\nand strengthened by the powerful forts and guns that had made the port\ncelebrated as an impregnable stronghold. After severe onsets under\nterrific fires, all the important landward defenses, including the\nItsu-shan (Chair Hill) forts, had been carried by the Japanese by noon.\nAmong the shore forts, those on Hwang-chin-shan (Golden Hill) resisted\nmost stoutly, and did not fall till 5 P.\u00a0M. During the night the Chinese\ndeserted all the other forts, leaving behind 57 large-caliber and 163\nsmall-caliber guns. When the Japanese troops entered the city they were\ntreacherously fired upon from the houses, where many Chinese soldiers\nhad hidden themselves and put on civilian dress, so as to be able to\nshoot the enemy unawares. The Japanese, on their part, retorted by an\nindiscriminate search of the houses and killing of many adult males who\noffered resistance, so that the number of the Chinese slain amounted to\nalmost 4000. The Japanese lost 29 killed and 233 wounded. At the same\ntime, the harbor not being defended by Chinese war vessels, the Japanese\nmen-of-war removed mines and entered Port Arthur on the night of October\n24.\n\nThe Chinese made two successive attempts, on the 21st and 22d, to\nrecover Kin-chow, but were repulsed. A part of the Second Army Corps\nthen joined Lieutenant General Katsura's division of the First Army\nCorps at Kai-ping, on December 10, and carried that town by charging it\nover the slippery ice of the Kai-ping River.\n\nThe remainder of the Second Army Corps, consisting of the Second\nProvincial Division from the Sendai district under command of Lieutenant\nGeneral Sakuma and of the Sixth Provincial Division from the district of\nKumamoto (excepting the Twelfth Brigade, which had already gone to the\nLiao-tung peninsula) under Lieutenant General Kuroki, landed, without\nresistance, at Yung-cheng in the Shan-tung province, between January 20\nand 24, 1895. The object of this expedition was to effect a concerted\nattack with the navy upon Wei-hai-Wei, where the Northern Fleet of the\nChinese navy had been concentrated. Leaving Yung-cheng on the 26th, the\nJapanese army marched along two routes, expecting to converge at\nWei-hai-Wei early in February. The two divisions met vigorous resistance\nfrom the Chinese on the way, particularly at Mo-tien-ling on the\nnorthern route, opposite the strongly fortified Liu-kung Island, where\nthe enemy poured fire upon the assailants from the 68 guns planted on\ntwelve land forts and from the war vessels anchored only 2000 meters\naway from the forts. Major General \u00d6dera fell in this battle, and the\nforts were carried only after nine hours of ceaseless fusillade. The\ntown of Wei-hai-Wei was deserted by the Chinese, and was occupied by the\ninvaders on February 2. This completed the work of the army, for the\ntask of reducing the forts on Jih and Liu-kung Islands, as well as of\ndealing with the Chinese fleet, had been assigned to the navy.\n\n[Illustration: MAP SHOWING WEI-HAI-WEI, FORMOSA AND PESCADORES]\n\nThe Chinese fleet at Wei-hai-Wei consisted of 15 war vessels including\nthe iron-clad battleships _Ting-yuen_ and _Chen-yuen_, besides 13\ntorpedo boats, as against 25 men-of-war and 16 torpedo-boats on the\nJapanese side. The Japanese forces not only possessing a numerical\nadvantage on the sea, but also having captured the land forts from which\nthe army could co\u00f6perate with the fleet, a Chinese defeat appeared a\nforegone conclusion. Under these circumstances, Admiral S. It\u014d,\ncommanding the Japanese fleet, sent to Admiral Ting Ju-chang, his\npersonal friend, who held supreme command of the enemy's squadron, a\ntouching letter in which former expressed his regret that the old\nacquaintances had been obliged to meet each other in hostility, appealed\nto the latter's enlightened patriotism by pointing out the retrogressive\npolicy which Ting had been called upon to defend and which could only\nend in disaster, and then counseled him to prevent a certain defeat and\nunnecessary loss of life by capitulating. It\u014d further advised Ting to\nbecome Japan's honored guest till the end of the war, and then return to\nhis native land in order to aid China in setting her policy on a sound\nbasis. When Ting read this message he was visibly moved, and said to his\nattendants: \"Kill me,\" meaning probably that he wished to die alone and\nlet all others surrender. Then he again remarked: \"I am thankful for the\nadmiral's friendship, but I cannot forsake my duties to the state. The\nonly thing now remaining for me to do is to die.\" The Japanese fleet,\nwhich made Yung-cheng Bay its headquarters, began to attack the forts of\nJih and Liu-kung Islands on January 30, 1895, continuing with frequent\ninterruptions till February 7, when a steady general attack began.\nDuring this time, the daring night attacks made by Japanese torpedo\nboats had succeeded in sinking the _Ting-yuen_ and three other vessels,\nand the thirteen torpedo boats of the Chinese fleet which tried to\nescape toward Chifu had had six destroyed and all the others captured by\nthe Japanese. The _Ching-yuen_ was sunk on the 9th; soon afterward Jih\nIsland fell and the eastern forts of Liu-kung Island were silenced. On\nthe morning of the 12th Ching, commander of the _Kwang-ping_, approached\nthe Japanese flagship _Matsushima_ in a small gunboat flying a white\nflag, and delivered a letter from Admiral Ting, containing a formal\nsurrender of all the war vessels in the harbor and the forts and stores\nof Liu-kung Island. Ting requested that the Chinese and foreign\nofficers, troops, and civilians on land and sea around Wei-hai-Wei be\nallowed to depart unmolested, and proposed that the commander of the\nBritish China squadron should guarantee the faithful performance of the\nconditions of surrender on the part of the Chinese. On receipt of this\nletter Admiral It\u014d held a council of his officers, in which many of the\nlatter advised, as was later seconded by the army officers, that the men\nshould not be allowed to leave, but be taken prisoners. The admiral,\nhowever, had so high an estimate of Ting's personality and service to\nhis country and so deep a sympathy with his difficult position that he\ninsisted that Ting's request should be cheerfully granted. In his reply,\ntherefore, It\u014d again advised Ting, for the sake of his own safety and of\nthe future good of China, to become Japan's guest, agreed to release all\nthe men on parole, and declined to accept the proposed guarantee by the\nBritish commander as unnecessary, for It\u014d rested confidence in Ting's\nhonor as a soldier. The admiral also sent a present to Ting and\nCommander Liu of the _Ting-yuen_. The next morning Ching again visited\nthe _Matsushima_, this time with the Chinese flag at half-mast, and\nbrought a reply from Ting, who, Ching sorrowfully announced, had\ndeclined to accept It\u014d's present, and, with Liu and Commander Chang of\nthe Liu-kung Island, had committed suicide. All the arrangements\nregarding the capitulation were then made with the utmost honor to the\ndeceased admiral, and his body was taken ashore in one of the captured\nChinese cruisers. The soldiers in the army and navy who were released on\nparole aggregated 5124 men. The Japanese flag was hoisted on the\nsurrendered battleship _Chen-yuen_, cruisers _Ping-yuen_, _Tsi-yuen_,\nand _Kwang-ping_, and six gunboats. With this pathetic fall of\nWei-hai-Wei the Japanese navy completely annihilated the Northern\nChinese Fleet, and gained an absolute control of the Gulf of Pechili.\nAdmiral It\u014d returned to Hiroshima on March 3.\n\nWith the expulsion of the Chinese from Korea and the capture of Port\nArthur and Wei-hai-Wei, Japan had accomplished the major part of the\nwork which she had proposed to herself. The remainder of the story of\nthe war may be briefly told. Hai-cheng was taken by the Third Division\n(of the First Army Corps) on December 13, and the Chinese made in\nJanuary and February three unsuccessful attempts to retake this\nimportant walled city. The First Division (of the Second Army Corps)\nadvanced from Kin-chow on February 10 toward Ying-kow, or the treaty\nport of \"Niu-chwang,\" while the First Army Corps in two bodies pressed\nnorthward and then westward with the town of Niu-chwang as its objective\npoint, whence it intended to join the First Division at Ying-kau.\nNiu-chwang was seized on March 4 after a sanguinary fight on the streets\nin which more than 1880 Chinese lost their lives. Two days later, the\nFirst Division captured Ying-kau without the co\u00f6peration of the First\nArmy Corps and with no effective resistance from the enemy. The two\narmies then joined in the cannonading of Tien-chwang-tai on the other\nside of the Liao River, which was razed to the ground in order to\nprevent the Chinese from returning to it.\n\nToward the end of March a column of Japanese troops seized the Pescadore\nIslands near Formosa.\n\nThe Chinese government, which had already twice sent abortive peace\nenvoys with insufficient powers, now ordered Viceroy Li Hung Chang to\nsail to Japan and sue for peace. He arrived at Shimonoseki on March 19,\nwhere he was met by the Japanese peace commissioners, Premier Count\n(soon to be Marquis) It\u014d and Foreign Minister Viscount (soon to be\nCount) Mutsu. Li was later joined by his son-in-law, Li Ching Fang, as\nplenipotentiary. Li Hung Chang proposed an armistice, but the conditions\ndemanded by Japan appeared to him too onerous to accept. On the 24th, as\nhe was returning from a conference to his lodging, a fanatic, R. Koyama,\nwho had led himself to believe that Li was the disturber of the peace of\nthe East, shot at him with a revolver and wounded him on the left\ncheek--an incident which plunged the entire nation into profound regret.\nThe emperor now almost unconditionally granted an armistice for three\nweeks. Li soon recovered from his wound, and resumed negotiations on\nApril 10. The Japanese terms for peace had on his request been shown to\nhim April 1, and these with various amendments became the basis of the\nTreaty of Shimonoseki, signed on April 17 and ratified on May 8. By this\ntreaty the absolute independence of Korea was at last assured; China\nagreed to cede to Japan the Liao-tung peninsula, Formosa, and the\nPescadores, and to pay 200 million taels as indemnity; and Kang-chow,\nSu-chow, Sha-shi, and Chung-king were opened to foreign trade, and the\nforeigners were granted the right of engaging in manufacturing\nenterprises in China. The war, which had lasted for more than seven\nmonths and cost Japan nearly 200 million _yen_ and the loss of 1005\nkilled and 4922 wounded (besides 16,866 deaths from disease), now came\nto an end. Japan had placed on the field 120,000 men in two armies and\nfive columns, and carried out the campaign in all its complexity with\nremarkable success.\n\nA few words may be said regarding the effects of the war upon China and\nJapan. The former's reverses were in a large measure a blessing in\ndisguise, for they revealed, as nothing else would, the radical faults\nof her policy and administrative system, and convinced many of her\npatriots of the need for a reform. It was largely due to this fact that\nthe two nations emerged from the war with no ill-will against each\nother. On the contrary, the more thoughtful among the Chinese seemed to\nbe attracted to Japan by her success in the same proportion that they\nbecame alive to the causes of the failure of their own government. In\nsuch a vast and conservative country as China a reform must come slowly,\nbut it is safe to say that some of its seeds were sown as a result of\nthe war of 1894-1895. As for Japan herself, her position suddenly rose\nin the eyes of the nations of the world. Even those foreigners who had\nheard little of her great progress in arts and sciences and still\ngreater hopes of further growth were now forced to admit the foresight,\nendurance, courage, and power of organization manifested by the Japanese\nduring the campaign. The more one knew the practical side of so large an\nundertaking the more he realized the magnitude of Japan's success. This\nappreciation of the world naturally stimulated the Japanese to a larger\nambition for future progress. The stimulus after the war, however, came\nas well from the victory, as from the bitter experience which closely\nfollowed it--the forcible intervention of three European powers against\nJapan, which at once changed the whole aspect of the Eastern question.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XX\n\nJAPAN AND RUSSIA IN KOREA AND MANCHURIA\n\n1893-1904\n\n\nWhen the peace negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese\nplenipotentiaries were in progress at Shimonoseki, Russia and France had\nbeen preparing themselves to intervene, and Germany had for diplomatic\nreasons consented to aid the Russian overtures, while Great Britain,\nwhich had once before made a fruitless effort to bring about a concerted\nmediation by the powers, declared that she had no objections to Japan's\nclaims. The plan of intervention having been matured, the Russian,\nFrench, and German representatives at T\u014dky\u014d called at the foreign office\non April 23, 1895, and on their separate cordial reception, presented\nnotes from their governments in which the latter counseled Japan to\nreturn to China the Liao-tung peninsula of South Manchuria, for its\nretention by Japan would, in their opinion, not only endanger the\nposition of the Chinese capital, but also render the independence of\nKorea illusory, and permanently threaten the general peace of the Far\nEast. While the notes were couched in polite terms, the Eastern\nsquadrons of the three powers manifested such an activity as to\ndemonstrate the determination of the intervening states to enforce their\ndemand, if necessary, by a concerted appeal to arms. At this grave\ncrisis the Japanese authorities agreed among themselves that after the\nexhausting war of the last eight months it would be impossible for Japan\nto fight single-handed with the three European powers. May 10, 1895,\nfound the Japanese nation eagerly perusing the imperial decree which\nreiterated the unalterable devotion of the emperor to the cause of\npeace, for the sake of which the three friendly powers had advised, and\nhis own sense of magnanimity also counseled, the retrocession to China\nof the entire peninsula of Liao-tung. The feeling excited among all\nranks of the people by this memorable incident was intense. It seemed\nplain to everyone that the conduct of the powers in thus depriving Japan\nof what appeared to be a just fruit of her costly war could not have\nbeen animated by a genuine respect for the integrity of the Chinese\nempire. None wished the independence of Korea and the progress of China\nmore deeply than did the Japanese, while, on the other hand, Russia, the\ncentral figure in the intervention, probably had a design upon Port\nArthur and the whole of Manchuria. The fall of this vast territory into\nRussia's hands would eventually threaten the independence of Korea, and,\nconsequently, the safety of Japan herself. The Japanese nation naturally\nawoke to the conviction that, in order to secure the peace of the East\nand the repose of Japan, the latter must strengthen and enrich herself,\nso that the humiliation of 1895 should never recur. The conviction was\nbased, it should be clearly noted, not so much upon a desire for revenge\nas upon the determination to safeguard the common vital interests of\nJapan and the general Far East by means of progress and civilization.\nFrom 1895, therefore, began the most rapid advance in all directions of\nJapan's material power that has ever taken place in any period of the\nsame length in her past history.\n\nIn China, however, the clever diplomacy of Russia entered a new epoch\nafter the intervention of 1895. The first definitely known understanding\nbetween the two powers concerned a Chinese loan of four hundred million\nfrancs, $80,000,000, guaranteed by Russia and raised mainly at Paris in\nJuly, 1895, which was intended for the payment of one-half of the\nindemnity due to Japan. Then, the Russo-Chinese Bank was organized by a\nsyndicate of capitalists of Paris and St. Petersburg, with its\nheadquarters in the latter city, where the intimate friend of the tsar,\nPrince Ukhtomsky, was made its president. An important agreement was\nentered upon on September 8, 1896, between this bank and the Chinese\nminister at St. Petersburg, which has since proved to be the basis of\nmany another striking document. By this agreement and also by the\nRussian statutes based upon it, it was provided that the Russo-Chinese\nBank should undertake to organize the Eastern Chinese Railway Company,\nwhich should construct a branch line of the great Siberian Railway\nthrough the Hei-lung and Kirin provinces of Manchuria and connect it\nwith the South Ussuri branch railway. Only Russian and Chinese subjects\ncould be its shareholders. The Chinese government was to take over the\nroad after eighty years without payment, or with a due payment after\nthirty-six years. It was also agreed that both imports and exports\nbetween China and Russia carried by the new railway should pay only\ntwo-thirds of the regular tariff rates of China.\n\nNo sooner was the first sod of the railway cut on its eastern extremity\nthan events occurred which led to a further extension by the Russians of\nthe railroad toward the most strategic points in the Liao-tung peninsula\nwhich they leased--points which had so recently been retroceded by\nJapan, on Russia's advice, for the peace and independence of China and\nKorea. It belongs to the history of China to recount how, at the murder\nby a mob of two German Catholic missionaries in Shan-tung, the\ngovernment of the kaiser succeeded in March, 1898, in wresting from\nChina a ninety-nine-year lease of the Bay of Kiao-chow and its\nhinterland, together with railway and mining concessions between the\nshore and Tsi-nan-fu. This was a signal for the advent of a remarkable\nseries of territorial demarcations to be made by the rival powers of\nEurope which had been no less eager than Germany to seize the first\nopportunity to carve out their respective \"spheres\" of influence or\ninterest on the soil of the feeble Chinese empire. The act of Germany\ndisturbed the balance of power in the Far East which could not be\nrestored until the aggressive passions of all competing powers should\nhave been satiated. Great Britain obtained in February a pledge never to\nalienate to any other power any portion of the extensive provinces\nadjoining the Yang-tse River. This was followed by the lease to Russia\nfor twenty-five years, subject to renewal, of Port Arthur and\nTa-lien-wan. The Russo-Chinese agreement signed on March 27 declared\nthat the lease constituted no prejudice against the Chinese sovereignty\nover the territory, but was designed for the protection of the Russian\nnavy in the waters of North China. It must be remembered that Russia\nwith her immense dominion of Siberia had up to this time possessed no\nadequate naval station on its shores which was not bound by ice during\nthe winter months. Now at length she secured the almost ice-free Port\nArthur and Ta-lien-wan, of which the former and a portion of the latter\nwere agreed to be used exclusively for naval purposes, while the\nremaining portion of Ta-lien-wan was to be opened to the merchant\nvessels of all nations. The agreement further provided that a branch\nline might be built by Russia from the Manchurian railway to Ta-lien-wan\nand, as was later stipulated, to Port Arthur, and, if necessary, also a\nline from the open port of Niu-chwang to the Yalu River on the Korean\nborder. A special agreement was further concluded on May 7 to supplement\nthe one of March 27, which has been described. The Russian lease on the\ntip of the Liao-tung peninsula induced Great Britain, on July 1, to\nobtain under similar terms on the opposite promontory of Shan-tung the\nlease of the Bay of Wei-hai-wei. This port had still been under the\noccupation of Japanese troops, pending the final payment of the Chinese\nindemnity, but was now cheerfully evacuated by them to be replaced by\nthe forces of the power with which the relations of Japan had already\nbegun to be especially amicable. In South China the rivalry between\nFrance and Great Britain was manifested afresh by the proposed opening\nof the West River and concessions in Yunnan obtained by the latter, and\nthe sphere created on the Kwang-chow Bay by the former. Japan also\nsecured the pledge of non-alienation of the province of Fuh-kien, which\nlies opposite her new territory of Formosa.\n\n[Illustration: FOREIGN SPHERES OF INFLUENCE IN CHINA AND MANCHURIA]\n\nIt is necessary in order to comprehend the situation with any degree of\nclearness, sharply to distinguish the nature of the Russian concessions\nin Liao-tung from those of all the other \"spheres\" in North and South\nChina. It was alone in the former instance that new naval posts of great\nmoment were directly connected by a railroad with the military centers\nof an enormous and contiguous dominion which represented an expansion\nthrough centuries. The creation of naval posts on the strategic points\nof the peninsula would be sufficient, as was avowed by Russia herself\nthree years before, to threaten Peking, render the independence of Korea\nillusory, and continually imperil the peace of the Far East, and its\ndangers must further be measured by the immense pressure which might be\nexercised with the military resources of all the Russias that lay behind\nLiao-tung and were now connected thereto by rail.\n\nThe situation was made worse by an Anglo-Russian railway agreement of\nApril 28, 1899. The origin of this document belongs to the history of\nChina. It suffices here to point out that it provided that Great Britain\nshould not seek any railway concession north of the Great Wall, and\nRussia should observe the same principle in the Yang-tse basin. The\npeculiarity of this agreement consists in the fact that one of its\nsignatories was not, as usual, the Chinese government, but that two\nEuropean powers thereby pledged themselves not to infringe upon each\nother's sphere of railroad concession in China. Diplomatic exigencies\nmight (as they have since done beyond the wall) induce one of the\nparties to interpret the railroad sphere in the light of a political\nsphere.\n\nThe peculiarly favorable position of the United States rendered it both\npossible and desirable for her to maintain in China the principles of\nthe territorial integrity of the empire and of the equal opportunity\ntherein for the economic enterprise of all nations--the latter principle\noften called that of the \"open door.\" Between the end of 1899 and the\nbeginning of 1900 Secretary Hay induced the great powers, though with\nnominal success, to declare anew that they would observe the avowed\npolicy of the \"open door\" in their respective spheres in China. He had,\nhowever, hardly received the replies of the powers when the reports of\nan anti-foreign campaign of an unusually serious character began to\narrive from China. The story of the so-called Boxer uprising, with its\nthrilling episodes, will be told in the volume on China, and here it is\nenough for us to observe its two features, namely, Japan's share in the\nsuppression of the trouble, and the bearing of the latter upon the\nManchurian question.\n\nBy the middle of June, 1900, the representatives of twelve powers, as\nwell as many other foreigners and native Christians, had already found\nthemselves besieged in Peking and gallantly defending themselves against\nthe frequent attacks of the Boxers and imperial troops; Admiral Seymour\nand his twelve hundred marines had already found it impossible to force\ntheir way to the relief of the besieged foreigners. At this juncture\nthe government of Great Britain perceived that no other power could with\ngreater dispatch and success come to the rescue of the legations than\nJapan. The latter, however, had resolved to act only in concert with\nother powers, or, if alone, only at their united and explicit request.\nShe therefore contented herself with transporting 3000 soldiers for Taku\nto move strictly in unison with the forces of the other allies. The\nnegotiation carried on by Lord Salisbury with the continental\ngovernments in relation to the advisability of requesting Japan\nimmediately to mobilize 25,000 or 30,000 troops from her shores had\nresulted, early in July, in evoking from Germany a dissent from the\nproposition so long as the allies could act in harmony, and from Russia\na reply that she deemed it unwise to intrust a single power with the\nrestoration of order in China, but that she would welcome 20,000 or\n30,000 additional troops from any one of the powers which would move in\nperfect accord with the others. Impatient of the dilatory and indefinite\nreplies, the British government went so far as to guarantee on its own\nresponsibility the cost of mobilizing the desired number of troops from\nJapan. This was on July 6, and on the same day Japan at last resolved to\ndispatch, with no condition whatsoever from the other powers, troops\naggregating 22,000. By this time the Japanese Chancellor Sugiyama and\nthe German Minister von Ketteler had been murdered in Peking, the Taku\nforts had been taken by the allies, and the prospect had been that both\nthe British and the German forces would soon aggregate 10,000 men.\nTientsin fell before the allies on July 14, three days before the\narrival of the fresh troops from Japan. After three weeks at Tientsin\nduring which nothing could be done, 15,780 allied forces, of which 8000\nwere the Japanese, began to march toward Peking on August 4. All along\nthe way there were sanguinary encounters with the Boxers and Chinese\ntroops, so that the allies probably lost 800 men before they reached\nPeking on August 14. The Japanese soldiers, after a terrible battle\nlasting for nearly fifteen hours till 9.50 P.\u00a0M., bombarded the eastern\nwalls at two of the gates and rushed into the Forbidden City, while\npreviously a column dispatched by them had led the rest of the allied\nforces toward the British legation through the gate which the Russians\nhad exploded about 5 P.\u00a0M. With what wild burst of joy and enthusiasm\nthe foreigners, who had been defending themselves under unspeakable\ndifficulties within the walls of the British legation, received the\ntriumphant entry of the allied soldiers may better be imagined than\ntold. The siege had at length been raised, the imperial court had fled\ntoward Si-ngan, and the capital of China fell into the hands of the\npowers.\n\nIt is unnecessary to remind the reader that all during this memorable\ncampaign the Japanese soldiers won universal praise for their dash and\ndiscipline. With no less admiration were their commissariat system and\nmethod of transportation regarded by their comrades. Repeatedly was it\nseen by impartial observers that even in orderliness among themselves\nand just and moderate treatment of the non-combatants, the troops of the\nnon-Christian Japan were behind those of no Christian country then\nrepresented in North China. They excelled also in the power of\norganization and control in their dealings with the people of Peking,\nwho had come under the provisional government of the conquering powers.\nAll these merits were externally visible, but only the Japanese soldier\nhimself will know what burning love of his country's name, which he\ncarried deep in his bosom, animated him with courage and patience and\nbridled his animal passion. He marched shoulder to shoulder with the\ntroops of the powers, three of which had five years before treated his\ncountry with indignity and forced her to forsake the price of the blood\nof her sons only to appropriate it for themselves. He could now show\nthem that he had not been forever reduced by them into an insignificant\nposition, but, on the contrary, had advanced beyond his former degree of\nmilitary efficiency, and could vie with any one of them either in the\nart of war or in the moral qualities that constitute the modern soldier.\nHis experience was invaluable both in training his mind and body and in\ndemonstrating anew that, after all, his racial identity was hardly a bar\nagainst his full participation in the arts of civilization. As precious\nfor his country may be regarded the fact that her position in the East\nrose, through the North China campaign, considerably higher in the\nesteem of the powers than even after the Chinese war of 1894-1895.\nOtherwise the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 probably would not have\nbeen so soon formed. Nor could Japan have since proceeded with her\nnational activities with such a calm confidence.\n\nHow far Japan had outrun in the march of national progress her\nneighboring empire of China, whose disciple she once was, was strikingly\nillustrated by the telegraphic messages that the emperors of the two\nnations exchanged both before and after the capture of Peking. Nor can a\nstronger refutation of the oft-repeated theory that one day Japan will\nrevive the moribund China and form with her a pan-\"yellow\" alliance\npowerful enough to exclude the Caucasian influence from the Orient, be\nfound than in the comparison of the Chinese epistles and the Japanese\nreplies in which both emperors faithfully expressed the attitude of\ntheir respective nations. On July 3, or half a month after the fall of\nthe Taku forts, his majesty the emperor of China telegraphed a personal\nmessage to the Japanese emperor in which he laid great stress upon the\nidea that in the present rivalry between the East and the West, the\nformer was supported by only two nations, the Chinese and the Japanese.\nCould it be China alone that the Occidental powers covet with their\ntiger's eye? \"If China should fall,\" said his majesty, \"perhaps your\ncountry would be unable to stand alone.\" On the strength of this\nargument, the Son of Heaven made an earnest appeal to his\nfellow-sovereign to sink minor differences and rescue the Orient from\nthe impending crisis. To this remarkable communication responded the\nemperor of Japan, saying that he considered it incumbent upon China\nimmediately to suppress the internal disorder and save the foreign\nenvoys, whose persons were inviolable, and that after the restoration of\nnormal order by China's own efforts Japan would, during the negotiations\nof the powers, safeguard the interests of the great empire. The author\nof the original message may have thought Japan a renegade of the Orient,\nbut the reply of the latter's sovereign implied her irrevocable policy\nof acting upon the dictates of the most advanced standards of mankind--a\npolicy which is infinitely removed from the defensive position of one\nform of civilization or one section of the earth's surface as over\nagainst another. Nearly three months later, on September 24, the Chinese\nemperor again communicated from Ta-yuan to the Japanese sovereign his\nsense of gratitude for the work of the latter's soldiers, and solicited\nhis persuasion of the other powers to expedite the conclusion of peace.\nIn reply, Japan's ruler suggested that peace would follow if the court\nshould at once return to Peking, calm the minds of the people, and\nmanifest to the powers its sincere regrets for the recent outrages, and\nalso if the reactionary ministers were removed from office and a new\ngovernment was organized of men whose ability was universally\nrecognized.\n\nIt was after a number of conferences that, on November 9, the peace\ncommissioners at Peking came to the final conclusion regarding the terms\nof peace, which were reduced into an identical note two months later.\nThis protracted period of negotiation was mainly due to the difficulty\nof maintaining a strict harmony between the several powers on all points\nunder discussion. We cannot tarry over the details of the discussion,\nfor they properly belong to the history of China. Nor need we point out\nthe exact contributions that Japan made toward the peace settlement,\nwhich were in the main of a moderating character. Of the indemnity,\namounting to 450 million Hai-kuan taels ($333,900,000), Japan shared\nabout 7.73 per cent. Previous to the conclusion of peace an incident\noccurred at Amoy which has caused misunderstanding in certain quarters.\nOn August 24 a mob burned a Japanese Buddhist building in the city, upon\nwhich some Japanese bluejackets were landed to protect the consulate and\nthe resident subjects of Japan. More marines were later landed, and\nstill more were reported to be coming via Formosa. A widespread rumor\nensued that Japan was bent on the occupation of Amoy, and the\nconsternation among the citizens ran so high that the local _taotai_,\ntogether with a large number of _literati_ and wealthy merchants, made a\npersonal appeal to the Japanese consul to evacuate, themselves pleading\nto indemnify the burned building and the landing of the marines. In the\nmeantime a British and a German war vessel had arrived, and the Japanese\nreinforcements bound for Amoy had been recalled from Formosa. The people\nwho had unnecessarily dreaded the presence of the Japanese forces now\nbegan to manifest contempt of the Japanese residents in Amoy, whose\nposition was imagined to have suddenly fallen at the coming of the\nforeign marines. A general evacuation soon followed the restoration of\norder, leaving the status of the Japanese in the city much the same as\nbefore the incident. Although it can hardly be concealed that some of\nthe Japanese residing in Fuh-kien and Formosa were at the time animated\nby a certain degree of chauvinism, the intentions of the government at\nT\u014dky\u014d could not have been but entirely pacific.\n\nPerhaps in no other instance have the powers more repeatedly and\nunequivocally given expression to their avowed devotion to the doctrine\nof the territorial integrity and the open door in China than during and\nafter the Boxer insurrection. Not the least clear declarations came from\nRussia, whose conduct, however, could at least as well be explained by\nanother principle which she has persistently denied. Facts would lead\none to suppose that she at first regarded the trouble in North China as\nslight enough to die of its own inanity or be readily suppressed by the\nassistance of herself alone. Count Muraviev, the Russian foreign\nminister, even prophesied that order would be restored within two weeks.\nThe serious nature of the uprising, however, soon made it evident that\nit hardly was an occasion for any single power thus to ingratiate itself\nwith the helpless Chinese government. Russia hence joined the concert of\nthe powers in the march toward Peking, but at least some of her press\nand authors continued to regard her joint action with the allies as\nrather incidental, for, according to their opinion, the trouble had been\ncaused by the offensive acts of the other powers in China in which\nRussia had had no share. Subsequent events show, however, that, if she\nattached a relatively small importance to the conditions in North China,\nRussia at the same time grasped the Manchurian situation with great\ncelerity and vigor. It is impossible to judge from our present state of\nknowledge whether the aggressive attitude of Russia in Manchuria\npreceded or followed the appearance of threatening signs of danger\nagainst her interests in that territory. Most of the actual troubles,\nhowever, seem to have occurred after Russia had suddenly assumed, from\nJune 26 on, a belligerent movement in Manchuria on a vast scale which\nwas to cost her in the end no less than sixty-two million rubles.[1] In\na few days adjoining regions in Siberia were declared as in a state of\nwar, and troops from Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Blagovestchensk, and the\nTrans-Baikalia, as well as from European Russia, began to press into\nManchuria. It is as unnecessary as impossible to mark at each point of\nthe widespread warfare that followed whether the initiative was taken by\nthe Chinese or by the Russians. It is evident that some strategic points\nin Manchuria had already been infested by the Boxers and their\nsympathizers, who set about from what time is not known, obstructing and\ndamaging railroad construction, attacking the churches, and persecuting\nthe converts in the southern region, and, on July 16, bombarding the\nRussian city of Blagovestchensk across the Amur, the navigation of which\nwas consequently stopped, and a week later murdering some eighty\nRussians in An-tung near the Korean border. Other outrages followed as\nthe Russian aggression excited more resentment among the Chinese. The\nforces of the tsar occupied the open port of Niu-chwang, where on\nAugust 5 they organized a provisional government. The Russian possession\nof Niu-chwang was followed, before the allies entered into Peking, by\nthat of Hun-chun, Argun, Harbin, Aigun, San-sin, and other centers\nscattered over the surface of Manchuria, while in July the dismissal by\nthe Chinese government of the Chinese manager of the Manchurian railroad\nwhich had hitherto been partly under the nominal control of China, left\nthe Russians in full and sole possession.\n\nThus far Russia had no more subdued all Manchuria than the allies had\nrestored order in North China, and the tsar's government surprised the\nother powers, on August 25, only ten days after the rescue of the\nlegations in Peking, by declaring Russia's intention to withdraw her\nminister and troops from Peking. It was thought by observers, and freely\nadmitted by some Russian writers, that this unexpected move by Russia\nwas by no means out of the line of her traditional policy of conferring\nfavor upon the neighbor whose house should as long as possible be left\nin a state of confusion and disorder. The proposition was deemed none\nthe less as acceptable in principle as impracticable in detail at that\nearly date. In regard to Manchuria, the same Russian circular of August\n25 declared that evacuation would occur as soon as peace was permanently\nrestored and measures were taken to protect the railways, and other\npowers threw no obstacle in the way. It was soon seen, however, that the\narmed pacification of Manchuria could not so abruptly stop. On the\ncontrary, the occupation of many strategic points, including Ninguta,\nTsitsihar, Mukden, Kin-chow, and An-tung, was yet to come, until early\nin December the entire three eastern provinces had completely fallen\ninto the hands of the Russians.\n\nIt was doubtless with a grave apprehension of this Manchurian situation\nthat Great Britain had induced Germany to sign, on October 16, 1900, the\nill-fated Anglo-German agreement. It sought to effect a difficult\ncombination of three principles not easily reconcilable with one\nanother: the integrity of the remaining territory of China, an open\ndoor, and equal advantage to men of all nations in the trading ports and\nmarts, and the protection of the interest already acquired in China by\nthe signatories. The strength of the combination was further reduced by\nthe manner in which the first and the third principles were upheld in\nthe agreement, which declared that neither power would make use of the\npresent complication to acquire any territorial advantages, but that if\nanother power should act contrary to this view, then the signatories\nmight consult together as to the measures of protecting their own\ninterests. At their invitation to accept the principles of the\nagreement, Russia, as well as France, cleverly replied that they saw\ntherein nothing other than the same old principles which they had\nrepeatedly advocated, while the United States expressed assent to the\nfirst two of the principles, but deemed the third as not concerning her.\nJapan entered the agreement as a signatory. Judged from the very purpose\nfor which the document had been framed by Great Britain, the agreement\nmay be said to have ended in a failure, for what was the use of\nreiterating the first principle if Manchuria was not considered a part\nof the Chinese territory, whose integrity was thereby respected? Yet\nCount von B\u00fclow, imperial chancellor of Germany, said in the Reichstag\non March 15, 1901, as he again did toward the end of 1903, that the\nAnglo-German agreement had no reference to Manchuria. \"I can imagine\nnothing,\" he was reported to have said, \"which we regard with more\nindifference\" than Manchuria. \"The Yang-tse agreement\" was the name\ngiven to the document by the Germans, who were pleased to interpret it\nas applying with particular force, not to Manchuria, but to the British\nsphere in the basin of the great river which had always been an eyesore\nto Germany. With one of the contracting parties at variance with the\nvery aim of the agreement, it was useless for the marquis of Lansdowne\nto declare, on August 6, 1901, that it \"most unquestionably extended to\nManchuria, which was part of the Chinese empire.\" It is to be doubted\nthat the convention had exerted the slightest influence in staying the\nhand of Russia in the three eastern provinces.\n\nToward the close of 1900 appeared in the London _Times_ a dispatch from\nits Peking correspondent, Dr. George E. Morrison, containing the\ncontents of a secret treaty alleged to have been concluded in November\nbetween Tsang-chi, the Tartar-general at Mukden, and Admiral Alexiev,\nwhich stipulated that Tsang should pacify Manchuria and then report the\ndetail of his administration of the territory to a Russian resident to\nbe stationed at Mukden. This convention was not ratified either by the\ntsar or by the Son of Heaven. This was merely a prelude to a more\nserious development. Early in 1901, when the peace commissioners at\nPeking were discussing the matter of the punishment to be demanded of\nChina for the local officials who had been privy to the Boxer outrages,\nRussia showed signs of isolating herself from the concert of the powers\nand taking side with the Chinese sentiment. This characteristic action\nof the Russians was accompanied by the rumor of negotiations for a\nsecret convention carried on at St. Petersburg between the government of\nthe tsar and the Chinese minister. Of this supposed convention several\nversions were afloat, some of which would have one believe that in its\nscope were comprised, not only Manchuria, but also Ili, the New\nTerritory, Mongolia, and the provinces of Kan-su, Shen-si, and Shan-si,\nas Russian spheres of one sort or another. Either in its truer form or\nafter some concession on the Russian part, the secret treaty, as it was\nmore definitely known, was said to have contained the following eight\npoints, which are worthy of enumeration as showing at least some of the\noriginal intentions Russia had regarding Manchuria: 1, that Russia\nshould continue the military occupation of Manchuria pending the\nrestoration of order and the settlement of the question of war\nindemnity; 2, that China should consult Russia as to where and how many\nChinese troops might be stationed in Manchuria; 3, that China should at\nany time dismiss at Russia's request those Manchurian generals and other\nofficials whose conduct was deemed prejudicial to mutual amity; 4, that\nthe number of the Chinese police should also be determined by consulting\nRussia, and the use of artillery should be forbidden; 5, that there\nshould be organized a special official system for the neutral territory\nalready marked; 6, that no railway or mining concession in Manchuria\nshould be granted to citizens of any other nation without consulting\nRussia; 7, that the railroad indemnity should, through an agreement made\nwith the railway company, be wholly or in part paid by the profit of the\nroads; and 8, that Russia should be allowed to construct a branch line\nfrom the Manchurian railway to the Great Wall. The result of these\ndemands, were they real and had China granted them, would have been a\ncomplete Russian protectorate over Manchuria, for although it was made\nto imply that the military occupation of Manchuria should cease with the\nrestoration of peace, such concessions were demanded as would tend to\nperpetuate the Russian control of the territory. Japan first saw the\ngravity of the situation, and communicated about the matter with the\nUnited States and Great Britain. The last power consulted other powers.\nThe powers thus assumed a united front in warning China of the unwisdom\nof concluding with a single power before she had reached a common\nagreement with all the allies. The protest, however, bore no appreciable\neffect upon Russia, which persisted in avowing that the intended\nagreement was unlike the one reported in the press, but was merely a\nprovisional step toward the evacuation of Manchuria. Before the end of\nMarch, Japan and Great Britain directly communicated with Russia, which\nadroitly retorted to the latter that it was not customary with the\ntsar's government to show to a third power a treaty to be concluded with\nan independent nation. To Japan's request to submit the agreement to the\ndiscussion of the allied powers' commissioners at Peking, with whom all\nmatters concerning the late complication should rest, Russia replied\nthat the intended treaty contained injury to none and might well be made\npublic after conclusion. This reply was dated March 26. On April 5 Japan\nforwarded to Russia her second message, supported by a firm\ndetermination. Russia now suddenly withdrew her demands, declaring at\nthe same time that, owing to the obstruction placed in the way of\neffecting the first move preliminary to the eventual evacuation of\nManchuria, she was obliged to maintain for the present the military\noccupation of its provinces.\n\nIt was again rumored in June that another secret Manchurian convention\nwas afoot, which, if real, however, must have miscarried. No more\nsuccessful was the patriotic effort of the Viceroy Chang Chih-tung and\nthe late Viceroy Liu Kan-yi to create among the peace commissioners a\nsentiment for the opening to foreign trade of the whole of Manchuria.\nToward the last of August Paul Lessar was appointed the Russian minister\nat Peking. The peace protocol agreed upon between China and the allied\npowers was finally signed on September 7, 1901, the imperial court was\nexpected shortly to return to Peking, and the Chinese government began\nto look anxiously for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the realm.\nSeizing this opportunity, Russia proposed a new Manchurian treaty whose\ncomparatively mild terms made it appear acceptable at this moment to the\nChinese commissioners, especially to the pro-Russian, Li Hung Chang.\nAccording to the reported tenor of this treaty, the Manchurian\nevacuation was to be completed within two or three years, the Chinese\ntroops at Mukden were to be trained by Russian officers, and their\nnumbers to be determined by consulting Russia's wishes, and, as in the\ntreaty withdrawn in April, Chinese artillery was forbidden. Considering\nthe feeble attitude of the Chinese commissioners, it would have been\nextremely difficult for Japan and Great Britain effectively to protest\nagainst the acceptance of the Russian demands had not the Viceroys Liu\nand Chang strongly reminded the emperor and the empress dowager of the\ndirect peril to the dynasty which might result from virtually forsaking\nits ancestral home, Manchuria, to a foreign power whose ambition knew no\nbounds. In accordance with the wishes of the court, the dying Li Hung\nChang, on his sick-bed, saw Lessar and appealed to the Russian\nfriendship for China to modify the terms of the proposed agreement. Li\nsoon passed away, on November 7, leaving the gravest problem of China in\na state of extreme uncertainty. Prince Ching presented a\ncounter-proposition, which among other things requested the evacuation\nof Manchuria within one year. Russia's reply to this note arrived in\nPeking the last of January, 1902, and was found to contain a demand for\nan exclusive mining concession to Russia of all Manchuria, which is\nnoted for its untold stores of minerals. Against this the United States,\nGreat Britain, and Japan entered a firm protest. Secretary Hay, in his\nnote of February 3, reminded the Russian and Chinese governments of the\nrepeated assurances made by the tsar's foreign minister of his devotion\nto the principle of the open door in all parts of China, and said: \"An\nagreement whereby China gives any corporation or company the exclusive\nright or privilege of opening mines, establishing railroads, or in any\nother way industrially developing Manchuria, can but be viewed with the\ngravest concern by the government of the United States. It constitutes a\nmonopoly, which is a distinct breach of the stipulations of the treaties\nconcluded between China and foreign powers, and thereby seriously\naffects the rights of American citizens.\" As usual, Russia, in her\nreply, so strongly reinforced her former pledges of the principle of the\nopen door that the government at Washington found it impossible to\ndispute them without questioning Russia's integrity, which Hay was not\ndisposed to do. By this time, however, an important event had taken\nplace in the diplomatic world which was popularly regarded as a virtual\nprotest against what was considered the Eastern policy of\nRussia--namely, the conclusion of the agreement of the Anglo-Japanese\nalliance signed at London on January 30, 1902.\n\nThe fair and open principles of this agreement may best be seen from its\ntext, which was as follows:\n\n \"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by\n a desire to maintain the _status quo_ and general peace in the\n extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining\n the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of\n China and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal\n opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry\n of all nations, hereby agree as follows:\n\n\n ARTICLE I.\n\n \"The High Contracting Parties having mutually recognized the\n independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be\n entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either\n country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of\n which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while\n Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in\n China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as\n commercially and industrially in Korea, the High Contracting\n Parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them\n to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to\n safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive\n action of any other power, or by disturbances arising in China\n or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the\n High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and\n property of its subjects.\n\n\n ARTICLE II.\n\n \"If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defense of their\n respective interests as above described, should become involved\n in war with another power, the other High Contracting Party will\n maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent\n other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.\n\n\n ARTICLE III.\n\n \"If, in the above event, any other power or powers should join\n in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting\n Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in\n common, and will make peace in mutual agreement with it.\n\n\n ARTICLE IV.\n\n \"The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will,\n without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements\n with another power to the prejudice of the interests above\n described.\n\n\n ARTICLE V.\n\n \"Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the\n above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two governments\n will communicate with one another fully and frankly.\n\n\n ARTICLE VI.\n\n \"The present agreement shall come into effect immediately after\n the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years\n from that date.\n\n \"In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have\n notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five\n years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding\n until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of\n the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if,\n when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is\n actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, _ipso facto_,\n continue until peace is concluded.\"\n\nTo the Anglo-Japanese agreement Russia and her ally France retorted in\nthe following declaration of March 16:\n\n\"The allied Russo-French Governments are wholly pleased to discern that\nthe Anglo-Japanese convention supports the essential principles which,\naccording to the reiterated statement of France and Russia, constituted\nand still constitute the foundation of their policy. Both governments\nbelieve that the support of these principles is also a guarantee of the\ninterests of the Far East. They are compelled, however, not to lose from\nview the possibly inimical action of other powers, or a repetition of\ndisorders in China, possibly impairing China's integrity and free\ndevelopment, to the detriment of their reciprocal interests. They\ntherefore reserve to themselves the right to take measures to defend\nthese interests.\"\n\nIn this connection may be related the diplomatic comedy enacted at\nShanghai in October, in which the newly formed Anglo-Japanese alliance\nplayed a part. According to the just wishes of the Chinese authorities,\nGreat Britain proposed on July 31 to Japan, Germany, and France to\nwithdraw the troops the four powers had been stationing at Shanghai,\nwhere peace had been restored. Japan and France cheerfully assented, on\nthe condition, however, that all the parties should agree. Germany\nshowed an inexplicable dilatoriness in giving a definite answer,\nproposing that the four powers should first come to an agreement as to\nthe date of a joint evacuation. Great Britain fixed November 1, to which\nFrance agreed. Japan, however, delayed, as she descried a secret\nmovement being made by one of the parties. Finally, Japan heard on\nOctober 6, and Great Britain on the 8th, that Germany had secured from\nthe Chinese government a pledge that it would give no additional rights\nto any power in the Yang-tse basin, the British influence over which had\nalways embarrassed the German policy in China. The stroke dealt by\nGermany could have been aimed at no other power but Great Britain. The\nformer notified the latter that her intention was to prevent any power\nfrom taking the present opportunity to come to a secret agreement of an\nexclusive nature with China--a possibility altogether incompatible with\nthe terms of the alliance so recently framed. At the same time, the\nChinese government pretended that it had made no special pledge to\nGermany. Great Britain, now fully advised by Japan of the nature of the\ncase, declared that it would be unnecessary and undesirable to bind only\na few powers to guarantee the integrity of a portion of the Chinese\nempire, and that to such an agreement, if any, she would not consider\nherself in any way bound. She also expressed to Prince Ching her\nresentment of his duplicity. In the meantime, the Viceroy Chang\nChih-tung, from whom the German consul had sought a similar pledge to\none that had been given by the prince, flatly refused the demand.\nGermany ended the affair with a clever but unconvincing explanation to\nGreat Britain. Seeing that the sky was clear, Japan evacuated Shanghai,\nalone and boldly, on November 22. The other powers soon followed.\n\nIt will be recalled that the Anglo-Japanese agreement was announced in\nthe midst of the negotiations between Lessar and the Chinese government\nconcerning Manchuria. During the diplomatic flurry attending the\nmomentous declarations made first by Japan and Great Britain and then by\nRussia and France, the Manchurian negotiation seemed to have been\ntemporarily forgotten, until the world was taken by surprise to hear of\nthe conclusion, on April 8, 1902, of a new Russo-Chinese convention\nregarding the three eastern provinces, which went into force\nsimultaneously with the signing of the agreement at three o'clock in the\nafternoon of that memorable day. Not the least surprising feature of it\nwas the remarkable mildness of its terms. Russia promised, upon the\ncondition that China should protect the Russian railways, Russian\nsubjects, and their enterprises in Manchuria, to evacuate the territory\nand restore it to Chinese sovereignty. The evacuation was to take place\nat three different periods within the ensuing eighteen months, as\nfollows: from regions west of the Liao River, by October 8, 1902; from\nthe rest of the province of Sheng-king and the province of Kirin, by\nApril 8, 1903; and, finally, from the Amur (Hei-lung) province, by\nOctober 8, 1903. Pending the evacuation, the number of Chinese troops\nand the sites of their stations in Manchuria should be determined by\nconsultation between the Chinese and Russian officers, but after the\nevacuation those troops might be freely distributed at the direction of\nthe Chinese officers. Then, however, the Russian Government should be\nnotified of every change made in this respect. Suppressing other points\nin the convention which do not concern us directly, it is seen that it\nsays nothing about Chinese territories outside of Manchuria, and, within\nthe latter, contains no new mining or railway demands, while it appears\nto promise an eventually complete restoration of Manchuria to China. The\nmoderate tone of the present instrument as compared with the former\nabortive conventions, and coming so soon after the renewed declaration\nof the Russo-French alliance of its devotion to the principle of the\nterritorial integrity of China, seemed to confirm the sincerity of\nRussia's avowed intention in the East.\n\nThe first period of the Manchurian occupation, according to this\nconvention, was to close on October 8, 1902. Before that date the\nRussian forces had completely withdrawn from that part of the Sheng-king\nprovince lying to the west of the Liao River. Russia had fulfilled her\npledge. It was alleged, however, by several eyewitnesses that the\nso-called evacuation largely meant the withdrawal of Russian troops from\nChinese quarters into the numerous and extensive Russian barracks and\nblockhouses along the Manchurian railway. The most important section of\nManchuria, namely, the rest of the Sheng-king and the whole of the Kirin\nprovince, was, according to the convention, to be evacuated on April 8,\n1903. That day came and passed, without seeing, except in a few places,\neven the nominal evacuation. In the midst of a suspense full of\napprehension the Russians lodged at the Chinese foreign office, as a\nprice for the yet unfulfilled evacuations, new demands in seven\narticles, which astounded the diplomatic world. The demands were in\nsubstance as follows: 1, the non-alienation of any part of Manchuria to\nany other power; 2, the right to construct a Russian telegraph line\nbetween Niu-chwang and Peking; 3, the promise that under no pretext any\nother foreigner should be employed in North China; 4, the sole\nmanagement of the customs tariff at Niu-chwang by the Russo-Chinese\nBank, and the Russian supervision of the quarantine service at the same\nport; 5, the opening of no new port or mart in Manchuria to foreign\ntrade; 6, the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the Mongolian\nadministration; and, 7, the pledge to be made by China that all the\nprivileges that the Russians enjoyed before the late _\u00e9meute_ should not\nhereby be affected. The Japanese minister, Uchida, entered on April 21 a\nvigorous protest at the foreign office at Peking, and was followed by\nthe British and American ministers. The United States, which had already\nbeen negotiating with China for the opening of two new ports in\nManchuria, where she possessed the greatest interest of any nation in\nthe import trade, made a query on April 24 direct to St. Petersburg as\nto the authenticity of the reported demand. She was assured both by the\nRussian foreign minister and Minister Cassini, as was Great Britain by\nthe Russian representative at London, that the published reports of the\nproposed convention were absolutely incorrect. It appeared as if the\nRussian disclaimer were final and a signal diplomatic success had been\naccomplished by Secretary Hay. But to say that the reported articles\nwere incorrect was not the same as to say that they were entirely\nunfounded, or even that every one of them was incorrect. The government\nof the tsar seems to have left sufficient room in its statements for the\ninference not only that there was proceeding a _pourparler_ with the\nChinese foreign office, but also that some of the rumored articles were\nnot to be denied. However that may be, it is noteworthy that the\nknowledge of the Russian demand aroused among the leading classes of the\nChinese people a patriotic ebullition not known even during the Japanese\nwar and the Boxer insurrection. Petitions from all of the eighteen\nprovinces reminded the Peking government in the strongest terms that the\nloss of Manchuria would lead to a widespread uprising in the empire, a\nrepetition of the anti-foreign crusade of 1900, a probable wholesale\npartition of the Middle Kingdom by the rebels and the powers, and an\neventual downfall of the ruling dynasty. In this remarkable upheaval,\nmerchants and students, including those staying in Japan, took no less\nactive part than the officials and literates, who, as the ruling class,\nare usually the most alive to the interests of the government and the\ncivilization of China. Under these circumstances it is not strange that\nbefore May 10 the foreign office at Peking replied to the Russian\ngovernment that the former could assuredly not concede to a demand that\nignored previous agreements, the stipulations of which China had never\nviolated.\n\nThis reply of China to Russia hardly had a greater effect to settle the\ndispute than did the pacific disclaimer given about ten days before by\nRussia to the United States, but on the contrary, was followed by a\nmonth the uncertain and trying nature of which to Prince Ching and his\nforeign office has seldom since been equaled during the whole period of\nthe negotiations. While Pokotilov, the influential Peking agent of the\nRusso-Chinese Bank, was reported to be freely dispensing gifts and\nfavors to win over certain members of the office and of the inner court,\nthe Russian _charg\u00e9_, Plan\u00e7on, demanded an immediate reply to three of\nthe once proposed seven articles, which pertained to the non-alienation\nof the Manchurian territory, the opening of no new ports, and the\nmaintenance of the _status quo_ in Mongolia. Prince Ching, as well as\nthe empress dowager, seemed to waver, or at least to bide time. The\nattempt of some patriots to install in the foreign office the most\nrespected Viceroy Chang Chih-tung fell through, and the attitude of the\nJapanese government was deemed not sufficiently reassuring to encourage\nChina once more to assume a decisive tone. In the meantime the Russian\nminister, Lessar, returned on May 29 to Peking after an absence, and\nseverely reprimanded the foreign office for frequently allowing\ndiplomatic secrecy to be violated. In his conference with Prince Ching,\non June 10, he renewed the demand in each of the seven articles, every\none of which the prince however, was obliged to refuse, as before. At\nLessar's intimation that an indiscriminate refusal would result in\nserious disadvantages to China, and his suggestion that some substitute\nfor the old demand might be devised for mutual benefit, the prince had\nonly to request the minister of the tsar to present his own substitute,\nas the former naturally had none. A new demand was accordingly\npresented, which embodied the first, fourth, and sixth articles of the\nformer convention, the fourth being now stated in two articles. Prince\nChing begged for five days' delay, and temporarily secluded himself from\nthe world, his negotiation with Lessar being in the meanwhile carried on\nby secret correspondence. The protests from the Japanese, American, and\nBritish ministers, as well as the renewed demand of the two former to\nopen new ports in Manchuria, did not avail.\n\nIrritating to Japan as was the Manchurian situation, she was confronted\nin Korea by a still more serious state of things. The diplomatic history\nof the latter country since the conclusion of the war of 1894-1895 may\nnow be briefly recounted. The years between 1895 and 1898 witnessed\nviolent fluctuations of influence between the Russians and the Japanese\nin Korea. The Japanese had been too eager for reform, and, at least on\nthe occasion of the murder of the queen on October 8, 1895, had allowed\nthemselves to be too much influenced by their less responsible element\nto withstand the obstruction and diplomacy of the Russians. It was not\nuntil the departure of Waeber, the astute Russian minister, and until\nthe activity of the Russians in China had become all-engrossing, that\nthe latter's influence was again eclipsed by that of the Japanese.\nDuring this period of struggle Russia and Japan concluded three\nagreements defining their position in Korea, namely, the Komura-Waeber\nmemorandum signed at Seul on May 4, 1896, the Yamagata-Lobanov protocol\nsigned at St. Petersburg on June 9, 1896, and the Nishi-Rosen protocol\nconcluded at Tokyo on April 25, 1898. Some of the more permanent of the\nterms of these agreements deserve notice, as they gave to Japan a\nconventional ground for her negotiations with Russia in 1903-1904, just\nprior to the war. The two governments \"recognized definitively the\nsovereignty and the entire independence of Korea, and mutually engaged\nthemselves to abstain from all direct interference in the internal\naffairs of that country.\" No military teacher or financial adviser\nshould be furnished to Korea by either power without consulting the\nother. In view of the large development of the Japanese commercial and\nindustrial enterprises in Korea, the Russian government agreed not to\nimpede the development of the commercial and industrial relations\nbetween Japan and Korea. In case further definitions of principles\nshould become necessary or other points for discussion should arise, the\nrepresentatives of the two powers should be instructed to negotiate\namicably. The arrangement made in these agreements was from its nature\ntemporary, and would have created fresh complications even if its terms\nhad been strictly observed.\n\nAs soon as her hands were freer in Manchuria, Russia, represented at\nSeul by the ambitious Pavlov, and also by the semiofficial diplomats,\nBaron Gunzburg and Miss Sonntag, employed such means as befitted the\npeculiar situation of Korea in their persistent effort to overthrow\nJapanese and promote Russian influence in the peninsula. For this\npurpose they made to the Korean court propositions of almost every\nconceivable nature, including demands for concessions at Masampo,\nChinhai Bay, and Kojedo Island, in the south, for the right to build\ntelegraph and railway lines in the north, and for the employment of\nRussian financial advisers and military instructors. It was not till\nApril, 1903, however, that, simultaneously with her pressure upon\nPeking, Russia began to work the timber concession which she was said to\nhave secured in 1896, when the Korean king had taken refuge in the\nRussian legation at Seul. Early in May, ostensibly to defend the forest\nland, forty-seven Russian soldiers arrived at Yongam-po on the Yalu,\nwhere, despite protests from the Korean government, an extensive tract\nof land was seized and fortification was begun. Presently, one hundred,\nand then two hundred more Russian troops arrived, while on the\nManchurian side of the frontier fresh troops entered An-tung and\nFeng-hwang-Cheng, so that the pressure of the Russian forces was heavily\nfelt upon the Korean border.\n\nAt length the Japanese government came to the decision that it should\ndeal directly with the government of the tsar in order to establish once\nand for all the integrity of China in Manchuria, as well as the\nindependence and reform of Korea, to define the respective rights and\ninterests in those countries of Japan and Russia, and radically and\nfundamentally to free the general peace of the Far East from the factors\nthat had continually and profoundly threatened it. The decision in its\nmain points had been reached by the press and the entire nation long\nbefore the cabinet ministers and privy councilors met before the throne,\non June 23, and built thereon a definite policy to be pursued in the\ncoming negotiations with Russia. These negotiations were attended by\ntortuous delays on the part of Russia, but the Japanese nation,\nrealizing that never in their long history had they been confronted with\na graver national problem, met it with a remarkable perseverance. The\ngovernment, also, conducted itself with dignity and consideration, for\nnone knew better than it that the immediate peace of the East was\ndependent upon the success of the pending negotiations. The different\nmotives of Russia and Japan for these negotiations and the different\nspirit in which each carried them on may be well seen in the following\nofficial statements made by the respective governments soon after the\ndiplomatic relations between them had been severed. The Russian\ncommunication, issued on February 9, 1904, by the foreign office at St.\nPetersburg, said:\n\n\"Last year [1903] the T\u014dky\u014d cabinet, under the pretext of establishing\nthe balance of power and a more settled order of things on the shores of\nthe Pacific, submitted to the imperial government [of Russia] a proposal\nfor a revision of the existing treaties with Korea. Russia consented,\nand Viceroy Alexiev was charged to draw up a project for a new\nunderstanding with Japan in co\u00f6peration with the Russian minister at\nT\u014dky\u014d, who was intrusted with the negotiations with the Japanese\ngovernment. Although the exchange of views with the T\u014dky\u014d cabinet on\nthis subject was of a friendly character, the Japanese social circles\nand the local and foreign press attempted in every way to produce a\nwarlike ferment among the Japanese and to drive the government into an\narmed conflict with Russia. Under the influence thereof the T\u014dky\u014d\ncabinet began to formulate greater and greater demands in the\nnegotiations, at the same time taking most extensive measures to make\nthe country ready for war.\n\n\"All these circumstances could not, of course, disturb Russia's\nequanimity, but they induced her also to take military and naval\nmeasures. Nevertheless, to preserve peace in the Far East, Russia, so\nfar as her incontestable rights and interests permitted, gave the\nnecessary attention to the demands of the T\u014dky\u014d cabinet, and declared\nherself ready to recognize Japan's privileged commercial and economic\nposition in the Korean peninsula, with the concession of the right to\nprotect it by military force in the event of disturbances in that\ncountry. At the same time, while rigorously observing the fundamental\nprinciple of her policy regarding Korea, whose independence and\nintegrity were guaranteed by previous understandings with Japan and by\ntreaties with other powers, Russia insisted on three points:\n\n\"(1.) On a mutual and unconditional guarantee of this principle.\n\n\"(2.) On an undertaking to use no part of Korea for strategic purposes,\nas the authorization of such action on the part of any foreign power was\ndirectly opposed to the principle of the independence of Korea.\n\n\"(3.) On the preservation of the full freedom of navigation of the\nStraits of Korea.\n\n\"The project elaborated in this sense did not satisfy the Japanese\nGovernment, which in its last proposals not only declined to accept the\nconditions which appeared as the guarantee of the independence of Korea,\nbut also began at the same time to insist on provisions to be\nincorporated in a project regarding the question of Manchuria. Such\ndemands on the part of Japan, naturally, were inadmissible, the question\nof Russia's position in Manchuria concerning in the first place China,\nbut also all the powers having commercial interests in China. The\nimperial government, therefore, saw absolutely no reason to include in a\nspecial treaty with Japan regarding Korean affairs any provisions\nconcerning territory occupied by Russian troops.\n\n\"The imperial government, however, did not refuse, so long as the\noccupation of Manchuria lasts, to recognize both the sovereignty of the\nEmperor of China in Manchuria and also the rights acquired there by\nother powers through treaties with China. A declaration to this effect\nhad already been made to the foreign cabinets. In view of this the\nimperial government, after charging its representatives at T\u014dky\u014d to\npresent its reply to the latest proposal of Japan, was justified in\nexpecting the T\u014dky\u014d cabinet to take into account the considerations set\nforth above and that it would appreciate the wish manifested by Russia\nto come to a peaceful understanding with Japan. Instead of this the\nJapanese Government, not even awaiting this reply, decided to break off\nnegotiations and to suspend diplomatic relations. The imperial\ngovernment, while laying on Japan the full responsibility for any\nconsequences of such a course of action, will await the development of\nevents, and the moment it becomes necessary will take the most decisive\nmeasures for the protection of its rights and interests in the Far\nEast.\"\n\nThe official statement given by the Japanese foreign office on the night\nof February 8 reads as follows:\n\n\"It being indispensable to the welfare and safety of Japan to maintain\nthe independence and territorial integrity of Korea, and to safeguard\nher paramount interests therein, the Japanese Government finds it\nimpossible to view with indifference any action endangering the position\nof Korea, whereas Russia, notwithstanding her solemn treaty with China\nand her repeated assurances to the powers, not only continues her\noccupation of Manchuria, but has taken aggressive measures in Korean\nterritory. Should Manchuria be annexed to Russia, the independence of\nKorea would naturally be impossible. The Japanese Government,\ntherefore, being desirous of securing permanent peace for eastern Asia,\nby means of direct negotiations with Russia, with the view of arriving\nat a friendly adjustment of their mutual interests in both Manchuria and\nKorea, where their interests meet, communicated toward the end of July\nlast such desire to the Russian Government, and invited its adherence.\nTo this the Russian Government expressed a willing assent. Accordingly,\non August 12, the Japanese Government proposed to Russia, through its\nrepresentative at St. Petersburg, the basis of an agreement which was\nsubstantially as follows:\n\n\"(1.) A mutual agreement to respect the independence and territorial\nintegrity of the Chinese and Korean empires.\n\n\"(2.) A mutual engagement to maintain the principles of an equal\nopportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations with the\nnatives of those countries.\n\n\"(3.) A reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in\nKorea, and that Russia has special interests in railway enterprises in\nManchuria, and a mutual recognition of the respective rights of Japan\nand Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of the\nabove-mentioned interests, so far as the principle of article 1 is not\ninfringed.\n\n\"(4.) The recognition by Russia of the exclusive rights of Japan to give\nadvice and assistance to Korea in the interests of reform and good\ngovernment.\n\n\"(5.) The engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual\nextension of the Korean railway into southern Manchuria, so as to\nconnect with the Eastern Chinese [_i.\u00a0e._, Manchurian] and the\nShan-hai-kwan--Niu-chwang lines.\n\n\"It was the intention of the Japanese Government originally that a\nconference should take place between its representatives at St.\nPetersburg and the Russian authorities, so as to facilitate progress as\nmuch as possible in reaching a solution of the situation, but the\nRussian Government absolutely refused to do so, on the plea that the\nTsar planned a trip abroad; and for other reasons it was unavoidably\ndecided to conduct the negotiations at T\u014dky\u014d. It was not until October 3\nthat the Russian Government presented counter-proposals. She therein\ndeclined to engage in respect to the sovereignty and territorial\nintegrity of China, and stipulate the maintenance of the principle of\nequal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in\nChina, and requested that Japan declare Manchuria and its littoral as\nbeing entirely outside of her sphere of interest. She further put\nseveral restrictions upon Japan's freedom of action in Korea; for\ninstance, while recognizing Japan's right to dispatch troops, when\nnecessary, for the protection of her interests in Korea, Russia refused\nto allow her to use any portion of Korean territory for strategical\npurposes; in fact, Russia went so far as to propose to establish a\nneutral zone in Korean territory north of the thirty-ninth parallel.\n\n\"The Japanese Government failed utterly to see why Russia, who professed\nno intention of absorbing Manchuria, should be disinclined to insert in\nthe convention a clause in complete harmony with her own repeatedly\ndeclared principle respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity\nof China. Furthermore, this refusal on the part of the Russian\nGovernment impressed the Japanese Government all the more with the\nnecessity for the insertion of that clause.\n\n\"Japan has important commercial interests in Manchuria, and entertains\nno small hopes of their future development; and politically she has even\ngreater interests there by reason of Manchuria's relations to Korea, so\nshe could not possibly recognize Manchuria as being entirely outside her\nsphere of interest. These reasons decided Japan absolutely to reject the\nRussian proposal.\n\n\"Accordingly, the Japanese Government explained the foregoing views to\nthe Russian Government, and at the same time it introduced other\nnecessary amendments in the Russian counter-proposals. They further\nproposed, with regard to the neutral zone, that if one was to be created\nit should be established on both sides of the boundary line between\nManchuria and Korea, with an equal width, say, of fifty kilometers.\n\n\"After repeated discussions at T\u014dky\u014d, the Japanese Government finally\npresented to the Russian Government its definitive amendment on October\n30. The Japanese Government then frequently urged the Russian Government\nto give it an early reply, but this was again delayed, and only\ndelivered on December 11. In that reply Russia suppressed the clauses\nrelating to Manchuria so as to make the proposed convention apply\nentirely to Korea, and maintained its original demand in regard to the\nnon-employment of Korean territory for strategical purposes, as well as\na neutral zone; but the exclusion of Manchuria from the proposed\nconvention being contrary to the original object of the negotiations,\nwhich were to remove causes of conflict between the two countries by a\nfriendly arrangement of their interests, both in Manchuria and Korea,\nthe Japanese Government asked the Russian Government to reconsider the\nquestion, and again proposed the removal of the restriction regarding\nthe use of Korean territory, and the entire suppression of the neutral\nzone, on the ground that if Russia was opposed to the establishment of\none in Manchuria it should not establish one in Korea.\n\n\"The last reply of Russia was received at T\u014dky\u014d on January 6. In this\nreply it is true Russia proposed to agree to insert the following clause\nin the proposed agreement:\n\n\"'The recognition by Japan of Manchuria and its littoral as outside her\nsphere of interest, while Russia, within the limits of that province,\nwould not impede Japan or any other power in the employment of rights or\nprivileges acquired by them under existing treaties with China exclusive\nof the establishment of a settlement.'\n\n\"But this was proposed to be agreed upon only upon conditions\nmaintaining the clauses regarding a neutral zone in Korean territory and\nthe non-employment of Korean territory for strategical purposes, the\nconditions whereof were impossible for Japan to accept, as had already\nbeen fully explained to Russia. It should further be observed that no\nmention was made at all of the territorial integrity of China in\nManchuria, and it must be self-evident to everybody that the engagement\nnow proposed by Russia would be of no practical value so long as it was\nunaccompanied by a definite stipulation regarding the territorial\nintegrity of China in Manchuria, since treaty rights are only coexisting\nwith sovereignty. Eventually, the absorption of Manchuria by Russia\nwould annul at once those rights and privileges acquired by the powers\nin Manchuria by virtue of treaties with China.\"\n\nBoth the negotiations and the general diplomatic relations between Japan\nand Russia were severed by the former power on February 5. With this,\ndiplomacy passed into war.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[1] A ruble is equivalent to 51.5 cents.\n\n\n\n\nChapter XXI\n\nTHE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 1904--\n\n\nThe first hostile acts of the Russo-Japanese War were, as in the Chinese\nwar ten years before, committed before the war was formally declared by\nthe ruler of either belligerent nation, and were of even more decisive\nnature in 1904 than in 1894. No sooner were the diplomatic relations\nsevered than a Russian force crossed the Korean border and entered the\npeninsular empire. The Japanese were even more active. Knowing that the\nRussian fleet, though its main squadron of seven battleships and several\ncruisers was near Port Arthur, was divided also between Vladivostok,\nChemulpo, and Shanghai, Admiral T\u014dg\u014d led his entire fleet of six\nbattleships and ten armored and protected cruisers from Sasebo directly\ntoward Port Arthur early on February 7, or within thirty hours after the\ndiplomatic rupture. Having captured a Russian merchantman off Fusan, the\nfleet rendezvoused at Mokpo. A squadron of cruisers under command of\nRear Admiral Ury\u016b was dispatched to Chemulpo to act as convoy of the\ntransports carrying thousands of Japanese soldiers to be landed at the\nKorean port, while the remainder of the fleet proceeded toward Port\nArthur. At Chemulpo there were a French, a British, an American, and an\nItalian war vessel, besides the Russian cruiser _Korietz_ and gunboat\n_Variag_, as well as the Japanese cruiser _Chiyoda_. The last steamed\nout of the harbor unnoticed during the night of February 7, and joined\nUry\u016b's squadron, which came in sight of Chemulpo in the afternoon of the\n8th. The _Korietz_, probably in an attempt to get to Port Arthur,\nventured out, and, meeting Japanese torpedo boats, fired at them and\nthen returned into the harbor. She was soon followed by three Japanese\ncruisers and several transports, which, within a striking distance of\nthe Russian vessels, anchored in the harbor until the Japanese troops\nfrom the transports were all landed on the morning of the 9th. A message\nwas then sent to the _Korietz_ by Ury\u016b, saying that if the Russian\nships did not clear the port before noon his squadron would be obliged\nto use forcible measures. The commanders of the neutral vessels in the\nharbor might have agreed to protest against the committing of a hostile\nact in a port which they regarded as neutral, had not the Russians, as\nthey did, cheerfully accepted the Japanese challenge and steamed out. In\nthe exchange of fire which ensued the _Variag_ was seriously injured,\nand, protected by the gallant _Korietz_, returned into the harbor. There\nfire was set to the magazine of the _Variag_, causing a terrific\nexplosion and immediate sinking of the vessel. The _Korietz_ was also\nburned by the Russians and sank, while the transport _Sungari_ was\nscuttled. The Japanese squadron sustained no loss and no injury. By this\nengagement the mastery of Korea by the military forces of Japan was\npractically assured.\n\nThe main section of the Japanese fleet continued its voyage toward Port\nArthur, after Ury\u016b's squadron was sent to Chemulpo. The morning of the\n8th found the sea calm and the temperature unusually mild. Late in the\nafternoon the fleet headed for Chifu, while torpedo flotillas were sent\nto Port Arthur and Dalny. The Russian fleet, which was still outside the\nharbor of Port Arthur, was surprised, toward midnight, by a sudden\ntorpedo attack of the Japanese, who had stolen to the distance of 600\nmeters. The fire returned by the Russians had little effect, while they\nsustained serious injuries on the battleships _Retvizan_ and\n_Cesarevich_ and the cruiser _Pallada_. The main squadron of the\nJapanese, which was not informed of the success of their torpedo craft\nuntil 10 A.\u00a0M., and was not even positive that the Russian vessels had\nnot left for Chemulpo, started early on the 9th toward Port Arthur for a\ngeneral attack. At noon Vice Admiral T\u014dg\u014d signaled to the fleet from the\nflagship _Mikasa_: \"The decision of victory or defeat depends on this\nbattle; everyone will do his utmost.\" The battle lasted nearly an hour\nin the middle of the day, in which the Russian fire again proved\ncomparatively ineffective, while the Japanese shells hit the already\ndamaged _Retvizan_ and injured the battleship _Poltava_ and the cruisers\n_Diana_, _Askold,_ and _Novik_, all below the water-line. This was the\nbeginning of the complete mastery of the Yellow Sea which Japan was soon\nto gain.\n\nOn the following day, the 10th, the emperors of both powers issued\nproclamations declaring the existence of warfare between them. The\nRussian manifesto read as follows: \"We proclaim to all our faithful\nsubjects that, in our solicitude for the preservation of that peace so\ndear to our heart, we have put forth every effort to assure tranquillity\nin the Far East. To these pacific ends we declared our assent to the\nrevision, proposed by the Japanese Government, of the agreements\nexisting between the two empires concerning Korean affairs. The\nnegotiations initiated on this subject were, however, not brought to a\nconclusion, and Japan, not even awaiting the arrival of our last reply\nand the proposals of our government, informed us of the rupture of the\nnegotiations and of diplomatic relations with Russia.\n\n\"Without previously notifying us that the rupture of such relations\nimplied the beginning of warlike action, the Japanese Government ordered\nits torpedo boats to make a sudden attack on our squadron in the outer\nroadstead of the fortress of Port Arthur. After receiving the report of\nour viceroy on the subject, we at once commanded Japan's challenge to be\nreplied to by arms.\n\n\"While proclaiming this our resolve, we, in unshakable confidence in the\nhelp of the Almighty, and firmly trusting in the unanimous readiness of\nall our faithful subjects to defend the Fatherland together with\nourselves, invoke God's blessing on our glorious forces of the army and\nnavy.\"\n\nThe rescript of the Japanese emperor was a formal declaration of war,\nwhich may be read in connection with the similar document issued in 1894\nat the beginning of the Chinese war. The rescript ran as follows: \"We,\nby the grace of Heaven, the Emperor of Japan, seated on the throne\noccupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make\nproclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects:\n\n\"We hereby declare war against Russia. We command our army and navy to\ncarry on hostilities against her with all their strength, and we also\ncommand all our officials to make effort, in pursuance of their duties\nand in accordance with their powers, to attain the national aim, with\nall the means within the limits of the law of nations.\n\n\"We deem it essential to international relations, and make it our\nconstant aim, to promote the pacific progress of our empire in\ncivilization, to strengthen our friendly ties with other states, and\nthereby to establish a state of things which would maintain enduring\npeace in the East, and assure the future security of our empire without\ninjury to the rights and interests of other powers. Our officials also\nperform their duties in obedience to our will, so that our relations\nwith all powers grow steadily in cordiality.\n\n\"It is thus entirely against our wishes that we have unhappily come to\nopen hostilities against Russia.\n\n\"The integrity of Korea has long been a matter of the gravest concern to\nour empire, not only because of the traditional relations between the\ntwo countries, but because the separate existence of Korea is essential\nto the safety of our empire. Nevertheless, Russia, despite her explicit\ntreaty pledges to China and her repeated assurance to other powers, is\nstill in occupation of Manchuria, and has consolidated and strengthened\nher hold upon it, and is bent upon its final absorption. Since the\npossession of Manchuria by Russia would render it impossible to maintain\nthe integrity of Korea, and would, in addition, compel the abandonment\nof all hope for peace in the Far East, we expected, in these\ncircumstances, to settle the question by negotiations and secure thereby\na permanent peace. With this object in view, our officials by our order\nmade proposals to Russia, and frequent conferences were held during the\nlast half year. Russia, however, never met such proposals in a spirit of\nconciliation, but by her prolonged delays put off the settlement of the\npending question, and, by ostensibly advocating peace on the one hand,\nand on the other secretly extending her naval and military preparations,\nsought to bring about our acquiescence. It is not possible in the least\nto admit that Russia had from the first a sincere desire for peace. She\nhas rejected the proposals of our empire; the safety of Korea is in\ndanger; the interests of our empire are menaced. At this crisis, the\nguarantees for the future which the empire has sought to secure by\npeaceful negotiations can now only be sought by an appeal to arms.\n\n\"It is our earnest wishes that, by the loyalty and valor of our faithful\nsubjects, peace may soon be permanently restored and the glory of our\nempire preserved.\"\n\nNight attacks by the Japanese destroyers were repeated several times\nduring the first two months of the war, and succeeded in inflicting some\ndamages on the Russian destroyers and gunboats. The Japanese also made\nthree attempts, on the nights of February 23-24, March 21-22, and May\n2-3, to force a few old stone-laden steamers up to the mouth of the\nharbor, in order to sink them there and thus block the entrance. The\nglare of the Russian searchlights and the fierce fire from the shore\nbatteries and war vessels made it impossible for these heroic attempts\nto be completely successful, and the channel remained partially open to\nlarge vessels at high tide.\n\nThe indirect attacks and the laying of machine mines by the Japanese\nwere, however, much more successful. The former proved so damaging to\nthe Russian warships in the harbor that the lately arrived Vice Admiral\nMakarov, whose spirited discipline had already begun to inspire the\nsquadron with courage and confidence, often steamed out with a few\nvessels, and returned fire with fire. Mines were laid by the Japanese at\npoints where the brave Makarov always moved about. On the morning of\nApril 13 his squadron of seven vessels, including the flagship\n_Peteropavlovsk_, was tempted by Japanese blockaders to a distance of\nfifteen miles from the harbor, where it was suddenly encountered by\nanother Japanese detachment. Turning about and pursued by the enemy, the\nRussian vessels retreated toward the harbor, when the _Peteropavlovsk_\nstruck a mine, at 10.32 A.\u00a0M., and, after a terrific explosion, turned\nturtle and immediately sank. Makarov and 600 men, with the artist\nVereshchagin, went down with the vessel, but the Grand Duke Cyril was\nrescued. The Japanese fleet also lost, on May 15, the cruiser _Yoshino_\nby collision, and the battleship _Hatsuse_ by twice striking Russian\nmines. Other Japanese vessels sunk during the entire period of the war\nby contact with the enemy's mines were: the battleship _Yashima_, the\ncruisers _Takasago_, _Saiyen,_ and _Miyako,_ and two destroyers and\nthree gunboats.\n\nAfter the disaster of April 13 the Russian vessels seldom ventured out\nof the harbor in a large force. Realizing, however, that the Baltic\nfleet might be unable to reach the eastern waters before the gradual\nfall of the land forts at Port Arthur would expose the vessels to the\nJapanese fire from the shore, the Russian squadron made two desperate\nattempts, on June 23 and August 10, to force its way through the\nblockading line and effect a junction with the Vladivostok squadron. On\nthe former occasion the Vladivostok vessels had just started on one of\ntheir raiding expeditions, and torpedoed and sank three Japanese\ntransports, carrying 1400 soldiers. The entire Port Arthur squadron, led\nby the gallant cruiser _Novik_, made a sortie in the morning at high\ntide, and, toward the evening, was met by the Japanese fleet. Returning\ntoward the harbor, and finding that the tide was now too low at the\nentrance for their larger vessels, the Russians anchored them bow out\nand stern to the shore, and, under the protection of the shore\nbatteries, stood at bay over night. Admiral T\u014dg\u014d gave an order for night\nattack to his torpedo boats and destroyers, which, he reported later to\nhis government, \"dashed ahead like a swift wind.\" Balancing themselves\namid the columns of waterspouts raised by the falling shells from the\nenemy, the little boats made charge after charge against the narrow\nfront of the Russian vessels. It was seen the next morning that the\nbattleship _Pereviet_ had disappeared and two other vessels were towed\ninto the harbor.\n\nThe sortie of August 10 proved even more desperate and far more\ndisastrous to the Russians. Rear Admiral Witthoeft led out six\nbattleships and three protected cruisers southward in a hazy, but calm,\nsea, and at noon was nearly thirty miles off the harbor. A little after\none o'clock began the first serious battle of the war, in which modern\narmored vessels met on nearly equal terms. The battle was renewed a few\nhours later, and on each occasion the Russians suffered from the heavy\nshells from the 8-inch guns of the Japanese, aided by the latter's\nsuperior gunnery and highly explosive powder. At 6.40 the flagship\n_Cesarevich_ lost its steering gear, and the commanding Admiral\nWitthoeft was also killed. Then the Russian vessels began utterly to\nlose unity of command and action, and, under the withering fire of the\nJapanese from three different directions, were completely routed and\nscattered. The flagship and two cruisers reached Tsing-tau in battered\ncondition. One of the latter, the _Novik_, was later found off Sakhalin\nand there sunk by Admiral Kamimura's squadron, and the other, the\n_Askold_, and a gunboat reached Shanghai. The _Ryeshitelni_ arrived at\nChifu. The rest of the squadron hastened back toward Port Arthur, where\nthey were subjected to a night attack of the Japanese torpedo craft. Of\nthe vessels which finally retired into the harbor, not one was\nuninjured, while the fire from the advancing land forces of the Japanese\nwas soon to make the position of these ships insufferable. The Japanese\nfleet sustained no heavy injury on any of the vessels, and lost only 170\nin killed and wounded. Of the Russian vessels which found shelter in\nneutral ports, the _Cesarevich_ at Tsing-tau was promptly disarmed at\nthe request of the German governor of Kiao-chow, but those at Shanghai\nneither were disarmed nor left the port for more than two weeks. The\n_Diana_ reached Saigon, French Indo-China, and was there dismantled\nwithout much delay. The _Ryeshitelni_ at Chifu, which was said to have\nsent telegraphic messages to Vladivostok and St. Petersburg, and was\nimperfectly disarmed, was finally forcibly captured by two Japanese\ncruisers, which action caused wide criticism.\n\nFour days after the battle of the Yellow Sea, the Vladivostok squadron,\nconsisting of the splendid cruisers _Rurik_, _Rossia_, and\n_Gromvoi_--for the other cruiser, _Bogatyr_, had run on the rocks near\nthe harbor--which had more than once eluded Admiral Kamimura, were\nfinally discovered by him north of the Tsushima Island. After a lively\nengagement the _Rurik_ was sunk, and the other two Russian cruisers\nnarrowly escaped to Vladivostok.\n\n[Illustration: JAPANESE ADVANCE TO LIAO-YANG]\n\nDuring these six months between February and August, the Japanese army\non land in three different corps had been steadily advancing toward\nLiao-yang. The first corps, under Lieutenant General Kuroki, which\nlanded at Korean ports, had encountered no serious opposition on its\nmarch through the peninsula, until it reached the Yalu River on the\nfrontier. There took place on the last days of April and May 1 the first\nimportant land battle between the contending armies. The Russian forces\nunder Zassulitch were overpowered by the superior artillery of the\nenemy, and, after a desperate fight and disastrous retreat, fell back to\nFeng-hwang-cheng, which again was abandoned on May 6. Then, taking\nSai-ma-tsi on June 7 after several attempts, Kuroki came to the\ndifficult pass of Mo-tien-ling, which he captured on July 4 after a hard\nfight, and which the Russians made a costly, but unsuccessful, effort to\nretake on July 17. Chiao-tow fell on July 19, and Yu-shu-lin-tsu and\nYang-tsu-ling on August 1. From the end of August, Kuroki co\u00f6perated\nwith the two other army corps which had simultaneously been closing upon\nLiao-yang. Of these, the second corps, under Lieutenant General Oku,\nlanding on May 5 at Pi-tsu-wo on the northeastern coast of the Liao-tung\npeninsula, immediately took Pu-lan-tien, and, after a sixteen-hour\nbattle of the most desperate character, had driven the enemy toward Port\nArthur from Kin-chow and Nanshan Hills on May 26. These actions\ncompletely cut the forces at Port Arthur from the rest of the Russian\narmy in Manchuria. General Kuropatkin, commanding the army, however, now\npossessed nearly 100,000 men south of Liao-yang, and, yielding to the\nimpossible request from St. Petersburg that he should make a supreme\neffort to relieve Port Arthur, dispatched General Stakelberg with\nperhaps 44,000 men on this difficult mission. He was attacked on June 13\nat Telissu by General Oku's army of a nearly equal size, and, after a\nsavage battle of artillery fire and bayonet charges, was forced back\nwith heavy losses. Stakelberg's retreating army offered gallant\nresistance to the Japanese at Hiung-yo-cheng on June 21, at Kai-ping\nfrom July 6 to 9, at Taping-ling and Tashi-chiao from July 24 to 29, and\nat Tomu-cheng between July 31 and August 1. At the later stage of these\nengagements Oku's forces co\u00f6perated with divisions of the third army\ncorps, under General Nodzu, which had landed at Ta-ku-shan on May 19,\nand had captured Siu-yen on June 8 and Feng-shui (Wafangao) Pass on June\n27. The fall of Anshan-chan on August 27 to the second corps practically\nopened the great battle of Liao-yang, the military center of southern\nManchuria, to which General Kuropatkin had retired.\n\nThe battle of Liao-yang while not the greatest, was in some respects the\nmost desperate, engagement of the war. The Japanese forces, under the\nsupreme command of Field Marshal \u014cyama (who had arrived at Dalny on July\n20), probably numbered 240,000 men, with 800 guns, and the Russian,\nunder General Kuropatkin, perhaps 200,000 men, with 572 guns. The\ndefenses around and in the city were most elaborate and extensive. The\nJapanese attack was begun a little before its plans had completely\nmatured, and, for nearly a week, a complex series of fierce and\ndetermined fightings raged in front of the walled city. On August 31 a\npart of Kuroki's army crossed the Taitsu River and began its flanking\nmovement, and, against the determined effort of Kuropatkin to annihilate\nthis section of the Japanese, Kuroki succeeded after three days of\naction in sending his entire forces across the stream. On September 4\nKuropatkin set the city on fire, and, by a masterly retreat, extricated\nthe remainder of his army from a threatened closure by Kuroki's\ndivisions, the entire Russian forces reaching Mukden September 20. He\nhad lost nearly 25,000 men, and \u014cyama half of that number.\n\nHeavy rains now intervened. Kuropatkin at Mukden proclaimed that his\nforces were now for the first time strong enough to begin a forward\nmovement against the enemy. With nine army corps he advanced southward\non October 5, easily taking the railway station by the Sha River and\nalso the defenses of Bentsiaputse to the east. The cavalry outposts also\nscored a few minor victories. \u014cyama also now decided to take the\noffensive, and marched forward with a wide front extending over fifty\nmiles from east to northwest to the Hun River. Both sides tried flanking\nmovements, none of which proved decisively successful. In the heavy\nfighting which lasted till the 17th, in which the Russian and Japanese\nlosses probably amounted, respectively, to 69,000 and 13,300, Kuropatkin\nwas definitely forced back, and his original purpose to turn the tide of\nthe war failed. This is known as the battle of the Sha River.\n\nIn the meantime, ever since General Nogi landed early in June and at\nonce began desperate attacks on the outer forts, Port Arthur had been a\nscene of prodigious acts of heroism by both the besiegers and the\nbesieged. Points were taken and retaken, and hundreds lost their lives\nat each explosion of mines or terrific cannonading from the surrounding\nforts. In the midst of this series of engagements, however, officers and\nmen of the hostile armies frequently met together to arrange for the\nrecovery of the dead bodies, always fraternizing in kindly spirit. The\nbesieging army steadily closed in, and, in the outer line of forts\nhaving been reduced, the 203-Meter Hill of the western inner forts was\nat length captured, on November 29-30. From this point Japanese shells\ncould sweep over the harbor. This was followed by the fall of the\neastern forts of Sung-shu and Ki-kwan, on December 19, which were blown\nup by mines laid by the besiegers in tunnels dug directly under the feet\nof the enemy. When ten days later the Erlung fort was taken, the\nposition of the gallant General Stoessel's defending army was no longer\ntenable. He capitulated on January 1, 1905, with his remaining army of\nnearly 25,000 men, and surrendered fifty forts and 546 guns to the\nJapanese army. The war vessels in the harbor had, however, been blown up\nand sunk by the Russians before the surrender of the forts. Officers,\nincluding Stoessel, who wished to return were allowed to depart on\nparole with their side-arms. In their informal meeting, on January 4,\nGenerals Nogi and Stoessel lauded the high qualities of each other's\narmy, the latter visibly moved by the news that Nogi had lost his two\nsons in the war. Stoessel, with his wife and a few officers, left\nNagasaki on January 17 on their homeward voyage.\n\nThe Japanese veterans at Port Arthur, probably 50,000 or 60,000 in\nnumber, were now ready to march northward to join \u014cyama's army. Before\ntheir arrival at the front, however, a severe battle took place in the\nheart of winter, from January 25 to 31, at Hokau-tai, on the Hun River,\nbetween General Grippenberg's second Russian army and \u014cyama's forces.\nThe result was not a decisive gain to either side, but the Russians lost\ntwice as many men as the Japanese, nearly 15,000 of their numbers being\nkilled and wounded. It was after this battle that Grippenberg openly\ndeclared his disagreement with his chief Kuropatkin, and resigned his\ncommand and was succeeded by General Kaulbars.\n\nWith the addition of Nogi's army to the left of Oku's, and of General\nKawamura's to the right of Kuroki's, \u014cyama now commanded five corps in\nsixteen divisions, numbering at least 400,000 men and occupying a front\nof nearly a hundred miles. This colossal army tried conclusions with the\nat least 350,000 men under Kuropatkin at Mukden in what was probably the\ngreatest battle or series of battles in the history of the world. The\nengagements began on February 20 and continued till March 16, resulting\nin a decisive defeat of the Russians. Until March 7 Kuropatkin's left\nwas harassed by Kuroki, and his right was defending itself desperately\nagainst the flanking movement of Nogi, while his center, under Linevitch\nand Kaulbars, together with Rennenkampf's Cossacks, took a determined\nstand against the onslaught of Nodzu and Oku. The retreat was ordered on\nthe night of this day, for a further delay would cause Kuropatkin's\ndivisions to be surrounded and annihilated. The Japanese closely pursued\nthe fleeing enemy, and gave him no time to rally before crossing the Hun\nRiver. The blinding dust storm and the biting cold of March 9 did not\ngreatly detract from the rigor of the pursuit. Mukden was entered by\n\u014cyama early on March 10, and the strong defense and the great colliery\nat Fushun to the east were taken the next day. The Russians now retired\nto Tie-ling, forty miles to the north, in a complete rout, Linevitch's\narmy alone making an orderly retreat. Tie-ling was also taken on the\n16th, the Russians receding further north. Their losses probably\naggregated 150,000 men, or more than forty per cent. of the entire army,\nwhile the Japanese lost about one-third as many in killed and wounded.\nThe tsar at once convoked a war council, and resolved to dispatch to the\nEast another Russian army of 450,000 men. The day after the fall of\nTie-ling, he telegraphed Kuropatkin and, without a word of praise,\ntransferred the latter's command over the Manchurian army to Linevitch.\nKuropatkin retired to Harbin, and then returned to serve under the new\ncommander-in-chief.\n\nThe Baltic fleet of Russia, the departure of which for the East had been\nannounced several times, at last started from Kronstadt in the middle of\nOctober, 1904, under Vice Admiral Rozhestvenski. Having been aroused to\na state of nervous apprehension by the unfounded rumor that Japanese\ntorpedo boats were in European waters, some officers of the Russian\nfleet fancied that they descried two of these small war vessels among\nthe British fishing boats at Dogger Bank in the North Sea, on the night\nof October 21, and fired upon them, sinking a trawler, killing two\nfishermen, and injuring several others. The fleet then proceeded south\nat full speed. It had also attacked, at different times, a Swedish, a\nNorwegian, a Danish, and a German ship. When the news of the Dogger Bank\nincident reached Hull on the 24th, all England was aflame, and the more\nradical people counseled war with Russia. Owing to the calmness of the\nBritish government, however, and also to the assistance of France, the\nmatter was referred to the investigation of an international court of\nnaval experts. The latter published the opinion of its majority, on\nFebruary 25, 1905, that the firing was unjustifiable and unduly\nprolonged, but that it did not impair the military valor and the\nhumanitarian sentiment of the Russian admiral and his staff.\n\nSoon after the North Sea incident the Baltic fleet was divided into two\nsections, one under Admiral Voelkersam going by way of the Suez Canal\nand the other under Rozhestvenski himself rounding the Cape of Good\nHope. The two squadrons reunited in January in the Indian Ocean, and\ndrilled their raw crews near the French Island of Madagascar. A third\nsection, under Admiral Nebokatov, left Libau on February 15, and joined\nthe main squadron before it entered the Chinese waters. The stay of the\nfleet near Saigon and Kamranh Bay, French Indo-China, raised delicate\nquestions as to the rights of the hostile vessel in a neutral harbor,\nbut a friction was averted by the tardy, but definite, action taken by\nthe tsar and the French government in ordering away the Russian fleet\nfrom the French territorial waters. Near the end of May the entire fleet\nwas headed toward its final destination.\n\nAdmiral T\u014dg\u014d had visited T\u014dky\u014d after the fall of Port Arthur, and by his\nnatural modesty and force of character inspired the nation with an\nunbounded confidence in his success in the coming contest with the\nBaltic fleet. He avoided popular ovation, saying he had yet much to do,\nand came and went like a plain farmer. Leaving T\u014dky\u014d on February 6,\n1905, the very day when, a year before, he led his fleet from Sasebo\ntoward Port Arthur, he made every preparation to meet Rozhestvenski's\nships. A few days before the latter's arrival T\u014dg\u014d was convinced that in\ntheir attempt to reach Vladivostok they would make a dash through the\nKorean Straits, instead of going by way of the Tsugaru or La Perouse\nStraits, and kept his entire fleet at and near Masampo. At five o'clock\nin the morning of May 27 T\u014dg\u014d's scouts reported by wireless telegraphy\nthat Russian vessels were sighted near Quelpart Island. Thrilled by the\nnews, all the divisions immediately turned to their assigned missions.\nThe sea was overcast by a heavy fog and the waves were high from a sharp\nsouthwest wind. Two of the Japanese cruiser squadrons advanced toward\nthe enemy, and, between 10 and 11 A.\u00a0M., led him gradually toward the\nJapan side of the straits, and then at 1.30 P.\u00a0M. joined the main\nsquadron. The enemy's vessels were now visible in two main columns, the\nbattleships to the starboard and the cruisers and coast-defenders to the\nport, and headed by the _Jemchug_ and the _Izumrud_, and followed by a\nlong line of smaller vessels, the entire formation extending over\nseveral miles. The vessels were painted black, with the funnels whitish\nyellow and the rims black, so that they were conspicuous on the sea,\nwhile the Japanese ships were light green and gray, and not so easily\ndiscernible as the Russian. Just before two o'clock T\u014dg\u014d signaled to the\nentire fleet: \"The destiny of the empire depends on this one battle; let\neveryone do his utmost.\" The battleship squadron under T\u014dg\u014d's direct\ncommand and the cruisers under Kamimura pressed the enemy eastward, and,\nfrom a distance of 6000 meters, concentrated their terrific fire upon\nthe foremost Russian vessels, while other Japanese squadrons attacked\nthe enemy from the rear. The main issue was decided within an hour. The\n_Oslabia_, the _Alexander III._, and the flagship _Kniaz Suvarov_,\ncaught fire and went out of action, as well as several smaller vessels\nin the rear. The columns of smoke wafted by the wind over the sea\nconcealed the hostile fleets from each other's view, and the firing was\nsuspended by the main squadrons at 2.45. Admiral Voelkersam had been\nkilled, and Rozhestvenski himself wounded and transferred to a destroyer\nin an unconscious state, the command being assumed by Nebogatov. From\nthree o'clock the Russian vessels made a desperate effort to flee\nnorthward, but were so fiercely fired upon that they turned south. Now\nthe battle raged in several sections till sunset. The _Oslabia_, the\n_Alexander III._, the _Borodino_, and the _Kniaz Suvarov_, all\nbattleships, and two special service boats, were sunk. At sundown the\nJapanese torpedo craft, whose work had thus far been secondary, took the\nfield, and succeeded in throwing the enemy into a hopeless confusion,\nsinking the battleship _Navarin_ and incapacitating the battleship\n_Sissoi Veliki_ and the armored cruisers _Admiral Nakhimov_ and\n_Monomakh_. The last three vessels sank the next day.\n\n[Illustration: BATTLE OF THE SEA OF JAPAN RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR]\n\nThe fog lifted on May 28, and the main squadrons under T\u014dg\u014d and Kamimura\nwere near Ulung Island about 5.30 A.\u00a0M., when a Russian fleet,\nconsisting of two battleships, two coast-defenders, and two cruisers,\nwere discovered heading northeast. The different squadrons completely\nsurrounded the enemy near Liancourt Islands about 10.30, and Admiral\nNebogatov soon surrendered, although the cruiser _Izumrud_ alone\nescaped. In the afternoon two Japanese destroyers found and pursued two\nRussian destroyers, one of which, _Biedovy_, carrying the wounded\nRozhestvenski, surrendered, and the other escaped. The cruisers\n_Svetlana_ and _Dmitri Donskoi_, the coast-defender _Oushakov_, and a\ndestroyer, were either sunk or driven aground, making the total Russian\nloss during the two days six battleships, one coast-defender, five\ncruisers, five destroyers, one converted cruiser, and four special\nservice vessels. Out of the 18,000 Russian sailors, nearly 12,000 must\nhave gone down with the sinking vessels. The Japanese lost only three\ntorpedo boats and 116 killed and 538 wounded, but captured two\nbattleships, two coast-defenders, and a destroyer. Of the Russian\nvessels which escaped, the cruiser _Almaz_ and two destroyers reached\nVladivostok, but a destroyer and two special service boats which got to\nShanghai, and the cruisers _Aurora_, _Oleg_, and _Jemchug_, that went to\nManila, were dismantled. Admiral T\u014dg\u014d reported, in his characteristic\nmanner, that the \"miracle\" of his victory was \"entirely owing to the\nillustrious virtues of the emperor, and was beyond all human\npossibility,\" and that he could not but believe that \"the comparatively\nsmall losses were due to the protection of the spirits of the imperial\nforefathers.\"\n\nAs soon as the decisive battle of the Sea of Japan was fought, Theodore\nRoosevelt, President of the United States, who had once before failed,\nin February, to induce Russia to agree to come treat for peace with\nJapan, renewed his effort to bring the belligerent powers together to a\ndiscussion of peace terms exclusively between themselves. In this effort\nhe was supported by the French government and the German emperor. After\npreliminary consultations with Takahira and Count Cassini, the Japanese\nand Russian representatives at Washington, Roosevelt addressed the\nfollowing note to the governments of St. Petersburg and T\u014dky\u014d: \"The\nPresident feels that the time has come when in the interest of all\nmankind he must endeavor to see if it is not possible to bring to an end\nthe terrible and lamentable conflict now being waged. With both Russia\nand Japan the United States has inherited ties of friendship and\ngood-will. It hopes for the prosperity and welfare of each, and it feels\nthat the progress of the world is set back by the war between those two\ngreat nations.\n\n\"The President accordingly urges the Russian and Japanese Governments,\nnot only for their own sakes, but in the interest of the whole civilized\nworld, to open direct negotiations for peace with each other. The\nPresident suggests that those peace negotiations be conducted directly\nand exclusively between the belligerents, in other words, that there may\nbe a meeting of Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries or delegates\nwithout any intermediary, in order to see if it is not possible for\nthose representatives of the two powers to agree to terms of peace. The\nPresident earnestly asks that the Russian Government do now agree to\nsuch a meeting, and is asking the Japanese Government likewise to agree.\n\n\"While the President does not feel that any intermediary should be\ncalled in in respect to the peace negotiations themselves, he is\nentirely willing to do what he properly can, if the two powers concerned\nfeel that his services will be of aid, in arranging the preliminaries as\nto the time and place of meeting. But if even these preliminaries can be\narranged directly between the two powers, or in any other way, the\nPresident will be glad, as his sole purpose is to bring about a meeting\nwhich the whole civilized world will pray may result in peace.\"\n\nThe Japanese government responded, saying that Japan would open\nnegotiations directly and exclusively with Russia regarding terms of\npeace. The Russian reply, at first given orally and then made with some\nreservation, was finally couched in substantially the same language as\nthe Japanese. Japan appointed as her peace envoys Baron Komura, minister\nfor foreign affairs, and Kogor\u014d Takahira, minister at Washington.\nRussia's choice of her chief envoy first fell on Nelidov, ambassador at\nParis, then on Muraviev, ambassador at Rome, but later was changed to\nCount Serge Witte, president of the committee of ministers. The new\nRussian ambassador at Washington, Baron Rosen, was appointed the second\nenvoy of Russia. As for the place of the conference, neither Paris,\nsuggested by Russia, nor Chifu, suggested by Japan, being acceptable to\nthe other party, respectively, the two governments finally agreed upon\nWashington. Because of the excessive summer heat of the American\ncapital, however, it was decided that actual negotiations should be held\nat the navy yard near the quiet historic town of Portsmouth, New\nHampshire. The envoys were announced to arrive by August 1.\n\nIn the meantime, before the end of July, the Russian Island of Sakhalin,\nthe southern half of which had till 1875 been claimed by Japan, was\noccupied by the Japanese forces, which also seized a few points on the\ncoast of southeastern Siberia.\n\nThe envoys of the belligerent powers having arrived, they were\nintroduced to one another by President Roosevelt on the _Mayflower_ on\nAugust 5, and then proceeded to Portsmouth, arriving there on the 8th.\nThey sojourned at the Hotel Wentworth on the small Island of New Castle\nnear Portsmouth, whither flocked many curious summer visitors and more\nthan a hundred newspaper correspondents from various parts of the world.\nThe first informal meeting of the envoys was held at the naval stores\nbuilding at the navy yard, but the actual business of the peace\nnegotiations began on the following day. On that day Baron Komura\npresented, in writing, the entire list of twelve terms of peace, which\nare believed to have covered the following points: 1, Japan's\npreponderant interest in Korea, and the principle of the open door\ntherein; 2, evacuation of Manchuria by the Japanese and Russian armies;\n3, restoration of Chinese administration in Manchuria; 4, China's\nterritorial integrity and the open door in Manchuria; 5, cession to\nJapan of the Island of Sakhalin; 6, surrender to Japan of the lease of\nthe Kwan-tung district, containing Port Arthur, Dalny, and adjacent\nislands; 7, transfer to Japan of the railway between Port Arthur (and\nDalny) and Harbin; 8, retention by Russia of the main Manchurian railway\nfrom Mandchourie to Grotekovo; 9, reimbursement by Russia of Japan's\ncost of war; 10, surrender by Russia of her war vessels interned in\nneutral ports; 11, limitation of Russia's naval power in the Pacific;\nand 12, the rights of the Japanese subjects to fish in the waters of the\nSiberian littoral. To these terms Witte gave a written reply on the\n12th, stating his assent to some points, willingness to discuss some\nothers, and absolute dissent from the rest. Then the envoys discussed\nthe terms one after another, and, within six days, found themselves in\nagreement, in substance or in principle, on the first, second, third,\nfourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and twelfth terms. As regarded the other\nfour points, particularly the cession of Sakhalin and the payment of the\nwar expenditures, the Russian envoy considered them as incompatible with\nthe honor and dignity of the tsar's empire.\n\nThe conference now seemed to be ending in failure, when on August 18\noccurred the visit of Baron Kaneko to President Roosevelt at Oyster Bay,\nfollowed on the next day by the invitation extended to Baron Rosen to\ncome on from New Castle. Kaneko again called on Roosevelt on the 21st,\nwhile Meyer, American ambassador at St. Petersburg, had a long interview\nwith the tsar two days after. The president was urging the two\ngovernments, through these various channels, to arrive at some\ncompromise of their differences for the sake of peace. When Meyer had an\naudience of the tsar, the Japanese government had already accepted\nRoosevelt's suggestion for compromise by intimating its willingness to\ndrop the demands for the surrender of the interned vessels and for the\nlimitation of Russia's naval power, and to allow Russia to repurchase\nthe northern half of Sakhalin, which was in Japan's military occupation,\nfor 1,200,000 _yen_. The tsar, however, unequivocally declined to agree\nto this compromise, for he considered the proposed repurchase as an\nindemnity in disguise, to which he was opposed in principle. Despite\nAmbassador Meyer's repeated appeal, Nicholas II. remained firm,\nalthough--whether by his instruction or on Witte's own initiative is not\nknown--the southern half of Sakhalin was offered to Japan. In the\nmeantime, President Roosevelt appealed to Japan, until the deliberations\nof the privy councilors at T\u014dky\u014d resulted in the emperor's instructions\nto his envoys at Portsmouth to waive their demand for money and to\naccept the southern half of Sakhalin. This final concession, which at\nlength made peace possible, was announced by Baron Komura at the morning\nsession of August 29, and came as a complete surprise to Witte and to\nthe whole world. The articles of the treaty were then drafted, and\nsigned by the envoys on September 5.\n\nThe concessions of the privy councilors greatly disappointed the\nJapanese people, who had been somewhat flushed by their unexpected\nvictories over the mighty foe. The popular dissatisfaction, intensified\nby local conditions, broke out in an open riot on the streets of T\u014dky\u014d\non September 5-7. In Russia, also, the treaty was not received with\nunmixed joy even by the peace-loving peasants, for although peace was\nwelcome, the war and consequently the results of its failure, which were\nembodied in the terms of the treaty, were considered by them as\nunnecessary and ignominious. The sovereigns of both powers, however,\nratified the treaty on October 14. The following is the English version\nof this memorable document:\n\n\"The Emperor of Japan on one part and the Emperor of All the Russias on\nthe other part, animated by a desire to restore the blessings of peace\nto their countries, have resolved to conclude a treaty of peace and have\nfor this purpose named their plenipotentiaries, that is to say, for his\nMajesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron Komura Jutar\u014d Jusami, Grand Cordon\nof the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, his minister of foreign\naffairs, and his Excellency Takahira Kogor\u014d, Imperial Order of the\nSacred Treasure, his minister to the United States, and, for his Majesty\nthe Emperor of All the Russias his Excellency Serge Witte, his secretary\nof state and president of the committee of ministers of the empire of\nRussia, and his excellency Baron Roman Rosen, master of the imperial\ncourt of Russia, his Majesty's ambassador to the United States, who,\nafter having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good\nand due form, have concluded the following articles:\n\n\"Article One--There shall henceforth be peace and amity between their\nmajesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of All the Russias and\nbetween their respective States and subjects.\n\n\"Article Two--The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan\npossesses in Korea paramount political, military and economical\ninterests, engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with measures for\nguidance, protection, and control which the Imperial Government of Japan\nmay find necessary to take in Korea. It is understood that Russian\nsubjects in Korea shall be treated in exactly the same manner as the\nsubjects and citizens of other foreign powers, that is to say, they\nshall be placed on the same footing as the subjects and citizens of the\nmost favored nation. It is also agreed, in order to avoid causes of\nmisunderstanding, that the two high contracting parties will abstain on\nthe Russian-Korean frontier from taking any military measure which may\nmenace the security of Russian or Korean territory.\n\n\"Article Three--Japan and Russia mutually engage:\n\n\"First--To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the\nterritory affected by the lease of the Liao-tung peninsula, and in\nconformity with the provisions of the additional Article One annexed to\nthis treaty, and,\n\n\"Second--To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive\nadministration of China all the portions of Manchuria now in occupation\nor under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the\nexception of the territory above mentioned.\n\n\"The Imperial Government of Russia declare that they have not in\nManchuria any territorial advantages or preferential, or exclusive\nconcessions in the impairment of Chinese sovereignty, or inconsistent\nwith the principle of equal opportunity.\n\n\"Article Four--Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any\ngeneral measures common to all countries which China may take for the\ndevelopment of the commerce or industry of Manchuria.\n\n\"Article Five--The Imperial Russian Government transfers and assigns to\nthe Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of\nChina, the lease of Port Arthur, Ta-lien, and the adjacent territory and\nterritorial waters, and all rights, privileges, and concessions\nconnected with or forming part of such lease, and they also transfer and\nassign to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and\nproperties in the territory affected by the afore mentioned lease. The\ntwo contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the\nChinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation. The Imperial\nGovernment of Japan on their part undertake that the proprietary rights\nof Russian subjects in the territory above referred to shall be\nperfectly respected.\n\n\"Article Six--The Imperial Russian Government engage to transfer and\nassign to the Imperial Government of Japan without compensation and with\nthe consent of the Chinese Government the railway between Chang-chun-fu\nand Kuan-chang-tsu and Port Arthur and all the branches, together with\nall the rights, privileges, and properties appertaining thereto in that\nregion, as well as all the coal mines in said region belonging to or\nworked for the benefit of the railway. The two high contracting parties\nmutually engage to obtain the consent of the Government of China\nmentioned in the foregoing stipulation.\n\n\"Article Seven--Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective\nrailways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes\nand in nowise for strategic purposes. It is understood that this\nrestriction does not apply to the railway in the territory affected by\nthe lease of the Liao-tung peninsula.\n\n\"Article Eight--The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia, with the\nview to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic, will, as soon as\npossible, conclude a separate convention for the regulation of their\nconnecting railway services in Manchuria.\n\n\"Article Nine--The Imperial Russian Government cedes to the Imperial\nGovernment of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern\nportion of the Island of Sakhalin, and all the islands adjacent thereto,\nand the public works and properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of\nnorth latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded\nterritory. The exact alignment of such territory shall be determined in\naccordance with the provisions of the additional Article Eleven, annexed\nto this treaty. Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in\ntheir respective possessions on the Island of Sakhalin, or the adjacent\nislands, any fortifications or other similar military works. They also\nrespectively engage not to take any military measures which may impede\nthe free navigation of the Strait of La Perouse and the Strait of\nTartary.\n\n\"Article Ten--It is reserved to Russian subjects, inhabitants of the\nterritory ceded to Japan, to sell their real property, and retire to\ntheir country, but if they prefer to remain in the ceded territory they\nwill be maintained and protected in the full exercise of their\nindustries and rights of property, on condition of submitting to the\nJapanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan shall have full liberty to\nwithdraw the right of residence in, or to deport from such territory any\ninhabitants who labor under political or administrative disability. She\nengages, however, that the proprietary rights of such inhabitants shall\nbe fully respected.\n\n\"Article Eleven--Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to\nJapanese subjects rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian\npossessions in the Japan, Okhotsk, and Bering Seas. It is agreed that\nthe foregoing engagement shall not affect rights already belonging to\nRussian or foreign subjects in those regions.\n\n\"Article Twelve--The treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and\nRussia having been annulled by the war, the Imperial Governments of\nJapan and Russia engage to adopt as a basis for their commercial\nrelations pending the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and\nnavigation, the basis of the treaty which was in force previous to the\npresent war, the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing of the\nmost favored nation, in which are included import and export duties,\ncustoms formalities, transit, and tonnage dues, and the admission and\ntreatment of agents, subjects, and vessels of one country in the\nterritories of the other.\n\n\"Article Thirteen--So soon as possible after the present treaty comes in\nforce all prisoners of war shall be reciprocally restored. The Imperial\nGovernments of Japan and Russia shall each appoint a special\ncommissioner to take charge of the prisoners. All prisoners in the hands\nof one government shall be delivered to and received by the commissioner\nof the other government or by his duly authorized representative in such\nconvenient numbers and such convenient ports of the delivering state as\nsuch delivering state shall notify in advance to the commissioner of the\nreceiving state. The governments of Japan and Russia shall present each\nother so soon as possible after the delivery of the prisoners is\ncompleted with a statement of the direct expenditures respectively\nincurred by them for the care and maintenance of the prisoners from the\ndate of capture or surrender and up to the time of death or delivery.\nRussia engages to repay to Japan so soon as possible after the exchange\nof statement as above provided the difference between the actual amount\nso expended by Japan and the actual amount similarly disbursed by\nRussia.\n\n\"Article Fourteen--The present treaty shall be ratified by their\nMajesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of All the Russias. Such\nratification shall be with as little delay as possible and in any case\nno later than fifty days from the date of the signature of the treaty,\nto be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia\nrespectively through the French minister at T\u014dky\u014d and the ambassador of\nthe United States at St. Petersburg and from the date of the later of\nsuch announcements this treaty shall in all its parts come into full\nforce. The formal exchange of ratifications shall take place at\nWashington so soon as possible.\n\n\"Article Fifteen--The present treaty shall be signed in duplicate in\nboth the English and French languages. The texts are in absolute\nconformity, but in case of a discrepancy in the interpretation, the\nFrench text shall prevail.\n\n\"In conformity with the provisions of Articles Three and Nine of the\ntreaty of peace between Japan and Russia of this date the undersigned\nplenipotentiaries have concluded the following additional articles:\n\n\"Sub-Article to Article Three--The Imperial Governments of Japan and\nRussia mutually engage to commence the withdrawal of their military\nforces from the territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately\nafter the treaty of peace comes into operation, and within a period of\neighteen months after that date the armies of the two countries shall be\ncompletely withdrawn from Manchuria except from the leased territory of\nthe Liao-tung peninsula. The forces of the two countries occupying the\nfront positions shall first be withdrawn.\n\n\"The high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to\nmaintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria.\nThe number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometer, and\nwithin that maximum number the commanders of the Japanese and Russian\narmies shall by common accord fix the number of such guards to be\nemployed as small as possible while having in view the actual\nrequirements.\n\n\"The commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in Manchuria shall\nagree upon the details of the evacuation in conformity with the above\nprinciples and shall take by common accord the measures necessary to\ncarry out the evacuation so soon as possible and in any case no later\nthan the period of eighteen months.\n\n\"Sub-Article to Article Nine--So soon as possible after the present\ntreaty comes into force, a commission of delimitation composed of an\nequal number of members is to be appointed respectively by the two high\ncontracting parties which shall on the spot mark in a permanent manner\nthe exact boundary between the Japanese and Russian possessions on the\nIsland of Sakhalin. The commission shall be bound so far as\ntopographical considerations permit to follow the fiftieth parallel of\nnorth latitude as the boundary line, and, in case any deflections from\nthat line at any points are found to be necessary, compensation will be\nmade by correlative deflections at other points. It shall also be the\nduty of said commission to prepare a list and a description of the\nadjacent islands included in the cession, and finally the commission\nshall prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries of the ceded\nterritory. The work of the commission shall be subject to the approval\nof the high contracting parties.\n\n\"The foregoing additional articles are to be considered ratified with\nthe ratification of the treaty of peace to which they are annexed.\n\n\"Portsmouth, the Fifth Day of the Ninth Month of the Thirty-eight year\nof Meiji, corresponding to the Twenty-third of August, 1905. (September\n5, 1905.)\n\n\"In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and\naffixed seals to the present treaty of peace.\n\n\"Done at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, this Fifth day of the Ninth Month of\nthe Thirty-eighth Year of the Meiji, corresponding to the Twenty-third\nday of August, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Five.\"\n\nNo less important than the Russo-Japanese treaty is the renewed\nagreement of the Anglo-Japanese alliance concluded between Lord\nLansdowne, the British foreign minister, and Baron Hayashi, the Japanese\nminister at London, on August 12 at London, and published on September\n27 simultaneously at London and T\u014dky\u014d. Its text reads as follows:\n\n\"The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing\nthe agreement concluded between them January 30, 1902, by fresh\nstipulations, have agreed upon the following articles, which have for\ntheir object:\n\n\"A--The consolidation and the maintenance of general peace in the\nregions of Eastern Asia and India.\n\n\"B--The preservation of the common interests of all the powers in China\nby insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the\nprinciples of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all\nnations in China.\n\n\"C--The maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting\nparties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defense of\ntheir special interests in the said regions.\n\n\"Article 1--It is agreed that whenever in the opinion either of Great\nBritain or Japan any of the rights and interests referred to in the\npreamble to this agreement are in jeopardy, the two governments will\ncommunicate with each other fully and frankly and will consider in\ncommon the measures which should be taken to safeguard these menaced\nrights or interests.\n\n\"Art. 2--Should either of the high contracting parties be involved in\nwar in defense of its territorial rights or special interests, the other\nparty will at once come to the assistance of its ally and both parties\nwill conduct a war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with any\npower or powers involved in such war.\n\n\"Art. 3--Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic\ninterests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes Japan's right to take such\nmeasures for the guidance, control, and protection of Korea as she may\ndeem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests,\nproviding the measures so taken are not contrary to the principle of\nequal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.\n\n\"Art. 4--Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns\nthe security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take\nsuch measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find\nnecessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.\n\n\"Art. 5--The high contracting parties agree that neither will, without\nconsulting the other, enter into a separate arrangement with another\npower to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble.\n\n\"Art. 6--As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great\nBritain will continue to maintain strict neutrality, unless some other\npower or powers join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great\nBritain will come to the assistance of Japan, will conduct war in\ncommon, and will make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.\n\n\"Art. 7--The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded\nby either power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the\npresent agreement and the means by which such assistance shall be made\navailable will be arranged by the naval and military authorities of the\ncontracting parties, who will from time to time consult one another\nfully and freely on all questions of mutual interest.\n\n\"Art. 8--The present agreement shall be subject to the provisions of\nArt. 6 and come into effect immediately after the date of signature and\nremain in force for ten years from that date in case neither of the\nparties shall have been notified twelve months before the expiration of\nsaid ten years of an intention of terminating it. It shall remain\nbinding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of\nthe parties shall have denounced it, but if, when the date for the\nexpiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war the alliance\nshall be _ipso facto_ and continue until peace shall be concluded.\"\n\nThe armistice was arranged between the Russian and Japanese armies on\nSeptember 13. During the nineteen months of war between February, 1904,\nand September, 1905, Russia probably sent between eight and nine hundred\nthousand soldiers to the East, and Japan not less than six hundred\nthousand. Never before in the world's history had such large armies been\nsent to the seat of war in so brief a period. The Russian losses\nprobably amounted to more than 350,000, including the killed, the\nwounded, the sick, and the captured, and Japan lost, in deaths alone,\n72,490. Of the latter, 15,300 died of sickness, while the rest either\nfell in battle or subsequently died from wounds--an unusually low\ndeath-rate from the latter cause. Russia lost the major part of her\nPacific and Baltic fleets, while the Japanese navy was increased in size\nby the surrender of the enemy's vessels and by the raising of several of\nthe sunken ships. The war greatly intensified the otherwise strong\nnational sentiment of the Japanese people and enhanced their position\namong the powers of the world, while the moderate terms of peace and the\ncatholicity of national character have served as an efficient check\nagainst an undue expansion. On the other hand, the unexpected exposure\nof the weakness of Russia's bureaucracy has sensibly reduced the\nhitherto overestimated value of her political power. In Europe, as well\nas in Asia, her position in international affairs has already begun to\nshow signs of this change. At the same time, the Russian people have\nrenewed their conviction of the need of a true national administration,\nand the weakened autocracy is compelled to consider popular demands for\nreform. Not the least important result of the war is the fact that it\nhas insured the humane principles of China's territorial integrity in\nManchuria, and of equal opportunity for the trade and industry of all\nnations in that region and Korea. The Treaty of Portsmouth recognized\nthese principles and the Anglo-Japanese agreement has insured them by a\npowerful coalition.\n\n[1] On November 6, 1905, the Order of the Garter was conferred on the\nemperor by King Edward VII. of England, and the British legation in\nJapan was raised to an embassy. The emperor visited the shrine of Ise in\nNovember and there reported the successful conclusion of the war to the\nspirits of his ancestors. The end of the year was marked by a treaty\nwith China which made Japan's position in Korea the same as Russia's had\nbeen before the war.\n\nIn October, 1906, the school board of San Francisco in the United States\nissued an order excluding the Japanese children from the public schools\nof that city and requiring them to attend a separate school for\nOrientals. This action was taken as an affront by the Japanese\ngovernment and a protest was sent by the latter to the United States\ngovernment on October 15. President Roosevelt took prompt action on the\nmatter, sending Victor H. Metcalf, the Secretary of the Interior, to\ninvestigate and report. President Roosevelt also announced that Japan's\ntreaty rights would be enforced at every hazard. Conferences were held\nbetween the State officials of California and the President, resulting\nin the President issuing an order on March 14, 1907, that all Japanese\nand Koreans without passports would be excluded from the United States\nand the San Francisco Board of Education deciding to admit Japanese\npupils up to the age of sixteen to the schools. Sensational newspapers\nboth in Japan and in the United States at this period were filled with\nrumors of war between the two countries and at times during the year\n1907 they would insist that war was imminent.\n\nIn the meantime the Japanese government under the leadership of Viscount\nHayashi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, took measures to enforce certain\nlaws on her own statute books concerning the use of foreign coolies in\nJapan and to limit Japanese emigration to the United States. The visit\nof William Howard Taft, the American Secretary of War, to Japan on his\nway to the Philippines and the friendliness of his reception by the\nJapanese and his own words of assurance did much toward allaying\nwhatever feeling of actual hostility still remained among the Japanese\npeople and the visit of the American fleet of sixteen battleships in the\nnext year ended all talk of a war. In 1907 similar friction occurred\nbetween Great Britain and Japan because certain Japanese merchants and\nlaborers in Vancouver, Canada, were attacked and driven from their\nhouses. This matter was adjusted peacefully by Viscount Hayashi and Sir\nClaude MacDonald, the British Ambassador. As a proof that Japan intends\nto keep her promises to regulate immigration to the United States may be\ncited some immigration figures for 1908: during that year there were\nadmitted to the entire United States only 185 more Japanese of all\nclasses than departed from it, and a great many more Japanese laborers\nleft the United States than entered it.\n\nIn the fall of 1909 a Commercial Commission, sent by the merchants of\nJapan, visited the United States, studying American business and\nindustrial methods and purchasing a large variety of manufactured\narticles which had never found a market in the Orient and buying the\nnewest machinery used in lumber, mining, and milling industries, and\nalso devices for food preservation, and learned many of the labor-saving\nmethods used in banking and commercial offices.\n\nA Franco-Japanese Agreement was signed on June 10, 1907, providing that\nthe most-favored-nation treatment should be accorded the officials and\nsubjects of Japan in French Indo-China for everything concerning their\npersons and the protection of their property, and that the same\ntreatment should be granted the subjects of French Indo-China in the\nEmpire of Japan and that these provisions should hold until the\nexpiration of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded between\nFrance and Japan, August 4, 1896. In regard to the continent of Asia,\nthe two countries agreed to \"respect the independence and integrity of\nChina as well as the principles of equality of treatment in that country\nfor the commerce and subjects of all nations, and having a special\ninterest in seeing that order and a pacific state of affairs guaranteed,\nparticularly in the regions of the Chinese Empire adjacent to the\nterritories where they have rights of sovereignty, protection, and\noccupation, bind themselves mutually to support one another in order to\nassure the peace and security of those regions, with a view to the\nmaintenance of the respective positions and territorial rights of the\ntwo contracting parties on the Asiatic continent.\"\n\nDuring 1907 several Russo-Japanese conventions were signed. The first,\nconcluded on July 28, was a treaty of commerce and navigation in\naccordance with article 12 of the Treaty of Portsmouth; in the second,\nconcluded two days later, each agreed to respect the territorial\nintegrity of the other, the agreements then in force between the\ncontracting parties and China, and the independence and integrity of\nChina, and to uphold the _status quo_ with all the peaceable means at\ntheir disposal; a third convention related to the fisheries of the Sea\nof Japan, the Okhotsk Sea, and the Behring Sea; the fourth provided for\nthe joining of the Russian railways in Manchuria at Kwang-cheng-tsze. In\nAugust the legations at Tokio and St. Petersburg were raised to the\nstatus of embassies by their respective governments.\n\nOn February 5, 1908, Chinese custom officers seized the Japanese steamer\nTatsu Maru in Portuguese waters off Macao, where it had landed to\ndischarge arms shipped from a Japanese port to a Chinese merchant at\nMacao. The Japanese resented the seizure and complained to the Chinese\nauthorities demanding an apology and an indemnity. At first the latter\ndefended their action, but on the receipt of an ultimatum from the\nJapanese on March 5, China apologized and gave assurance that the\nindemnity would be paid and the responsible persons punished. Japan in\nreturn agreed to prevent the trade in arms and ammunition between\nJapanese and Chinese citizens. Thus a friendly feeling was restored\nbetween the two countries but public opinion had been greatly inflamed\nin China and a boycott of Japanese goods had begun. During the year many\nJapanese vessels left Chinese ports without the goods for which they had\ncome. It is estimated that the Japanese lost some $8,000,000 by this\nboycott.\n\nChina also felt embittered against Japan in this same year because of\nthe latter's course in Manchuria, where she had retained the public\nbuildings at Mukden and the Manchurian gold mines, taken possession of\nthe Manchurian post-offices and telegraph lines, occupied a portion of\nthe province of Kirin, claiming it as Korean territory, although it had\nlong been held as part of China, and forbade the building of a railway\nto the west of the Liau River, from Hsenmintun to Fakumen, saying that\nit would compete with the Japanese system. These difficulties were\nadjusted soon. Japan agreed to the building of the railroad on condition\nthat at no point should it come within a minimum distance from the\nJapanese line. On October 12 and November 7, agreements were signed at\nTokio concerning the telegraph lines. China agreed to place special\ntelegraph wires between the treaty ports, Kwant-cheng-tsze, Tie-ling,\nMukden, Liau-yang, Niu-chwang, Antung, and the railroad territory at the\nexclusive disposal of Japan for a period of fifteen years, the service\non the wires to be worked by Japanese clerks in the employ of the\nJapanese government from the Chinese telegraph buildings, but only to be\nused for the exchange of telegrams from or to places under the direct\ncontrol of the Japanese telegraph system. Japan undertook to pass over\nto China all Japanese telegraph lines in Manchuria outside her railway\nterritory, to construct no telegraph or telephone lines in Manchuria\noutside the same territory, and to construct no telegraph or telephone\nlines or erect wireless stations outside her leased territory. She also\nagreed to pay China a small annual royalty on all messages sent over the\nJapanese Manchurian telegraph lines. On September 4, 1909, an agreement\nwas signed at Peking regarding the improvement of the Antung-Mukden\nRailroad and which gave to Japan the advantages in Manchurian trade.\n\nGeneral elections to the House of Representatives were held on May 15,\n1908, resulting in a sweeping victory for the Seiyu-kai. For the first\ntime since the formation of the diet, one party had elected a majority\nof all the members. On July 12, Marquis Katsura was given the imperial\ncommand to form a ministry. As this nobleman was connected with the\nweakest of the political parties, the Daids Club, his appointment as\npremier was a great disappointment to the Seiyu-kai, who had hoped to\nhave one of their own leaders hold that office.\n\nIn July, 1909, twenty-three members of the Imperial Diet were convicted\nfor complicity in a graft scandal. Five directors of the Great Japan\nSugar Company were at the same time convicted of bribing the nation's\nrepresentatives and all twenty-eight received very severe sentences.\n\nIn the meantime Japan's influence in Korea had increased to such an\nextent that by the end of 1907, Korea was for all practical purposes an\nintegral part of the Japanese Empire. Soon after the outbreak of the\nRusso-Japanese War, Japan and Korea signed an agreement, by which Japan\nundertook to insure the safety of the imperial household and guaranteed\nthe independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire, in\nreturn for which Korea agreed to accept the advice of Japan as to\nimprovements in administration. Six months later Korea, in another\nagreement with Japan, pledged herself to regulate her finances in\naccordance with the advice of the Japanese financial adviser and a\nforeign diplomatic adviser, named by Japan, and also to consult the\ngovernment of Japan before making treaties or conventions with other\npowers or granting them concessions. Following the Treaty of Portsmouth,\nanother agreement was entered into by Japan and Korea on November 17,\n1905, which provided that Japan should control and direct the external\nrelations in the affairs of Korea through the Department of Foreign\nAffairs at Tokio; and that Japan should be represented at the court of\nthe Emperor of Korea by a Resident-General, residing at Seoul, and\nshould have the right to station representatives at the several open\nports and at such other places in Korea as it might deem necessary. In\naccordance with this agreement, Mr. Durham White Stevens, an American,\nexperienced in diplomatic service, was chosen by Japan to be Diplomatic\nAdviser at Seoul to the Foreign Office. In spite of these agreements the\nKorean Emperor sent to The Hague Peace Conference in 1907, a delegation\nconsisting of Prince Yi-Ui-Tjyong, Yi-Tjun, a Korean judge, and\nYi-Sang-Sul, former vice-premier of Korea; these men claimed that Japan\nhad committed acts contrary to the agreement of 1884, and had forced the\nKorean Minister of Foreign Affairs to sign the agreement giving Japan\nthe control of Korea's foreign affairs. The conference could do nothing\nfor the delegation as it was understood that the deliberations of the\npeace commissioners should not be concerned with relations between\nnations that had been settled by treaty. As a result of his sending this\ndelegation the Emperor of Korea was forced to abdicate on July 19, 1907,\nin favor of his son, the Crown Prince. The ministry of Korea opposed\nthis abdication and the Abolitionists broke out into riots; therefore\nJapan forced the signing of another treaty on July 25. This (1) placed\nthe administration of all Korean affairs in the hands of the Japanese\nResident-General; (2) provided that the enactment of all laws and\nordinances and the transaction of important state affairs must receive\nthe approval of the Resident-General; (3) decided that a definite line\nof demarcation is to be drawn between administrative and judicial\naffairs; (4) stated that Japanese subjects recommended by the\nResident-General are eligible to office under the Korean government; (5)\nprovided that foreigners may be employed only with the consent of the\nResident-General; (6) agreed that the clause of the agreement of August\n22, 1904, providing for the employment of a financial adviser be\nannulled.\n\nFollowing this agreement and in order to enforce it, the Korean native\narmy was disbanded on August 1, 1907. The new emperor, Yi-Ch\u00f6k, at the\ninstance of Prince Ito, the Resident-General, ordered the punishment of\nThe Hague envoys and of men of his father's court suspected of fostering\nresistance. Japanese forces in Korea were increased and the new\ncrown-prince was sent to Japan to be educated. During 1908 the Japanese\ncolonization of Korea continued; new regiments were sent to Korea, the\nnumber of Japanese officials were increased, radical reforms were\nundertaken in the judiciary, and the imperial assets were transferred\nto the national treasury.\n\nAll this was not done without opposition on the part of the Koreans:\nparties of rebels gathered over the country and there was a continual\nguerilla warfare; plots were formed against Japanese officials, an\nattempt being made to derail Prince Ito's train in the latter part of\nApril, 1908; and the native press became so virulent in its denunciation\nof the Japanese government that the latter promulgated and enforced a\nlaw forbidding the sale of any paper containing matter subversive of the\npublic peace under penalty of fine or imprisonment.\n\nOn October 26, 1909, Prince Ito was shot and killed at Harbin,\nManchuria, by a Korean, who confessed to the police that he had\njourneyed to Harbin for the express purpose of assassinating the Prince\n\"to avenge my country,\" blaming Prince Ito for his countrymen's loss of\npolitical liberty.\n\nThe terrible storms which prevailed all over the world during the latter\npart of 1909 were especially severe off the coast of Japan, and two\nJapanese steamers foundered off Korea and Japan, on November 30, the\nloss of life being very heavy.\n\nManchuria is a center of disturbance in all eastern questions, and Japan\nregistered her protest on January 8, 1910, against the plan proposed by\nthe United States Secretary of State, Knox, for neutralizing the\nrailroads of Manchuria, the Japanese statesmen being utterly opposed to\nsuch a measure.\n\nThe history of Japan within recent years has been a record of marvelous\nexpansion in home industries and in foreign trade. Retrenchments in\nexpenditures for army and navy, a general betterment of labor conditions\nand construction of inland waterways have also materially aided the\nprogress of the nation.\n\nA high protective tariff was enacted in 1910, but provision was made for\nthe reduction of duties in specific cases with foreign countries which\nhad made concessions to Japan. Thus Great Britain's cotton, linen, and\nsteel imports were admitted at reduced rates in return for free entry of\nJapanese goods into Great Britain.\n\nIn August, 1910, Japan annexed Korea and made great progress in the\npacification and settlement of the country.\n\nAn agreement was signed with Russia to maintain with her the _status\nquo_ in Manchuria.\n\nIn July, 1911, the alliance between Japan and Great Britain was renewed\nfor a period of ten years.\n\nThe great Emperor Mutsuhito died in July, 1912. His reign was the most\nglorious in the history of Japan: it saw the creation of modern Japan.\nGeneral Nogi, the conqueror of Port Arthur and Mukden, committed suicide\non the day of the Emperor's funeral.\n\nThe anti-Japanese feeling in the Pacific Coast States of the United\nStates culminated in May, 1913, in the Legislature of California passing\nland laws that barred aliens who were not eligible for citizenship from\nacquiring real estate. Japan made decided protest, claiming that these\nmeasures were aimed directly at her, and that they were contrary to her\ntreaty rights with the United States.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[1] The publishers have supplied the following paragraphs.\n\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n\n\n\nBIBLIOGRAPHY\n\n\nThe following list of books does not represent the sources and\nliterature used in revising the text and preparing the supplementary\npart of the present volume, but is intended solely for the convenience\nof the reader who would naturally confine his attention to works written\nin English.\n\nThere is hardly a work on general Japanese bibliography which can be\ncompared with that great Chinese bibliography, the \"_Bibliotheca\nSinica_,\" by Henri Cordier. Fr. von Wenckstern's \"Bibliography of the\nJapanese Empire,\" London, 1895, gives, with few comments, works written\nonly in European languages, and covers the period between 1859 and 1893.\nIt also contains a facsimile-reprint of L\u00e9on Pag\u00e8s's \"_Bibliographie\njaponaise depuis le XV^e si\u00e8cle jusqu'a 1859_.\" As to articles written\non Japan in the English and American periodicals, \"Poole's Index\" may be\nconsulted with profit.\n\nOf works of general information on Japan, the first eight volumes\n(\"Japan: Its History, Art and Literature\") of Captain Frank Brinkley's\n\"Oriental Series,\" in twelve volumes, London and Boston, 1902-1903,\nperhaps deserve the first mention. The work is eminently free from both\nthe superficiality of the tourist and the well-meaning but not harmless\nprejudices of many a missionary. The author's thorough acquaintance with\nmen and things of Japan, where he has lived for more than thirty years\nand is editor of perhaps the best informed and most fair-minded English\njournal, the _Japan Mail_, has enabled him to give an intimate view of\nthe history and the national life of the Japanese. The facile style of\nthe author also adds greatly to the value of his work for popular\nreading. This work grew out of the author's edition of \"Japan,\"\ncontaining essays on various topics originally written by great native\nauthorities but much revised and rendered into English by Brinkley. A\nnew edition of this latter work (\"Japan,\" Boston, 1905), has been\npublished by J. B. Millet & Co., bringing the account down to the\noutbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Captain Brinkley also has an\nadmirable article on Japan in the twenty-ninth volume of the\n\"Encyclop\u00e6dia Britannica.\" For the student's ready reference, J. J.\nRein's \"Japan: Travels and Researches Undertaken at the Cost of the\nPrussian Government,\" English translation, New York, 1884, and his\n\"Industries of Japan, Together with an Account of Its Agriculture,\nForestry and Commerce,\" English translation, New York, 1889, are very\nuseful. B.H. Chamberlain's \"Things Japanese,\" originally published in\nTokyo in 1890 but now in its fourth edition (New York, 1902), is a\ndictionary of all subjects of interest, and contains bibliographical\nreferences for many of the subjects treated. The work, however, is in\nneed of further revision. The same author has compiled with W.\u00a0B. Mason\na \"Hand-book for Travelers in Japan,\" which is now in its seventh\nedition (London, 1903). W.\u00a0E. Griffis's \"Mikado's Empire\" at first\nappeared in New York in 1876, but, owing to the absence of better works\nof this nature, has been so popular that it is in its tenth edition (New\nYork, 1903). It was once unrivaled in its comprehensiveness, but has\nnever been considered a work upon which the student could rely for\nobjective truths regarding Japan. E.\u00a0W. Clement's little book, \"A\nHand-book of Modern Japan,\" Chicago, 1903, and Henry Dyer's \"Dai\nNippon, A Study in National Evolution,\" London and New York, 1904, are\nboth useful when used critically. Alfred Stead has edited \"Japan by the\nJapanese: A Survey by the Highest Authorities,\" London and New York,\n1904.\n\nIn the field of general history several older works have been superseded\nby newer ones, all of which, however, leave vastly much to be desired.\nDavid Murray's \"Japan,\" New York, 1894 (in the \"Story of the Nations\"\nseries), is more narrative than analytical or interpretative. Max von\nBrandt has a brief survey in the second volume of the \"History of the\nWorld: A Survey of Man's Record,\" edited by H.\u00a0F. Helmolt, English\ntranslation, London and New York, 1904. Among works on different periods\nof history, the present editor's \"Early Institutional Life of Japan,\"\nTokyo and New York, 1903, covers the period between 500 and 900 A.\u00a0D.,\nand James Murdoch and Isoh Yamagata's \"History of Japan during the\nCentury of Early Foreign Intercourse (1542-1651),\" Tokyo, 1904, takes up\nthe important period of Japan's earliest European relations under the\nfeudal r\u00e9gime. For the beginning of the foreign relations in the\nnineteenth century, F.\u00a0O. Adams's \"History of Japan to 1871,\" in two\nvolumes, London, 1874-1875, Richard Hildreth's \"Japan as It Was and Is,\"\nBoston, 1855, and the lives of \"M.\u00a0C. Perry\" and \"Townsend Harris\" by\nW.\u00a0E. Griffis, Boston, 1897 and 1895, may be recommended. I. Nitobe's\n\"Intercourse between the United States and Japan,\" extra volume 8 of the\n\"Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science,\"\nBaltimore, 1891, is useful. Coming down to a later period of history,\nthe accounts of the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 by \"Vladimir\" (the\n\"China-Japan War,\" New York, 1896) and F.\u00a0W. Eastlake and Y. Yamada (the\n\"Heroic Japan,\" Tokyo, 1896) may be mentioned. Brinkley's large work, of\ncourse, covers history, as well as arts, literature, customs and\nmanners, and religion. For a still more recent period, one may consult\nthe present editor's \"Russo-Japanese Conflict: Its Causes and Issues,\"\nLondon and Boston, 1904. As to the progress of the Russo-Japanese War,\nwe have yet to look for its authentic history.\n\nAmong authors on Old Japan, or, that side of the national life in which\nthe old civilization has not been greatly affected by the inroad of\nEuropean influences, no writer has shown a greater aptitude to grasp its\nspirit or has presented it in more charming English than the late\nprolific author, Lafcadio Hearn, in his \"Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan,\"\nBoston, 1894, \"Out of the East,\" Boston, 1895, \"Kokoro: Hints and Echoes\nof Japanese Inner Life,\" Boston, 1896, \"Gleanings in Buddha-fields,\"\nBoston, 1897, \"Exotics and Retrospectives,\" Boston, 1898, \"In Ghostly\nJapan,\" Boston, 1899, \"Shadowings,\" Boston, 1900, \"A Japanese\nMiscellany,\" Boston, 1901, \"Kwaidan,\" Boston, 1904, \"Romance of the\nMilky Way,\" Boston, 1905, \"Japan: An Interpretation,\" New York, 1904,\nand others. Miss Alice M. Bacon's \"A Japanese Interior,\" Boston and New\nYork, 1893, \"Japanese Girls and Women,\" new edition, Boston, 1902, and\n\"In the Land of the Gods,\" Boston, 1905, as well as G.\u00a0W. Knox's\n\"Japanese Life in Town and Country\" (\"Our Asiatic Neighbor\" series), New\nYork, 1904, are recommended. For other sides than are so well described\nby these works, the reader must again turn to Captain Brinkley's great\nwork, and also to articles in the _Transactions of the Asiatic Society\nof Japan_ published at Tokyo since 1872.\n\nThere are a few works interpretative of the moral side of the evolution\nof the Japanese nation, among which again chapters in Brinkley, as well\nas I. Nitobe's \"Bushido,\" Philadelphia, 1900, and New York, 1905, and K.\nOkakura's \"Soul of the East,\" London and New York, 1904, may be\nmentioned. These able authors will admit, however, that the subject\nrequires so extensive and rigorous a training and so naturally refined\nand delicate an intellect, and it is so impossible to pass a final or\neven a definite judgment on the matter, that it seems hazardous to rely\nupon the opinion of any one writer. S.\u00a0L. Gulick's \"Evolution of the\nJapanese, Social and Psychic,\" New York, 1903, is a misnomer, as no work\nof such claim can afford to be more seriously defective in showing the\ndevelopment of a historic nation. The author's notion of social\nevolution, which forms the basis of this work, does not seem to have\nbeen tested by the modern student, and the entire work unfortunately\nbreathes a certain type of mind and training to the exclusion of others.\nIn studying such a subject as is aimed at in this work, no student can\nbe too well trained and too thorough, and no statement can be too\nundogmatic.\n\nOf books written on the politics of New Japan, Count (now Marquis)\nHirobumi Ito's \"Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of\nJapan,\" English translation, Tokyo, 1889, is the authoritative work and\nis indispensable. Chapters in Brinkley, Stead and Clement are\ninteresting. The last writer has also an article on the local\nself-government in the _Political Science Quarterly_ for June, 1892, and\nanother on the constitutional government in the _Annals of the American\nAcademy of Political and Social Science_ for March, 1903. T. Ienaga's\n\"Constitutional Development of Japan\" (\"Johns Hopkins Studies,\" 9th\nSeries, No. 9), Baltimore, 1891, takes up the earlier years of the new\nr\u00e9gime, while K. Kawakami's \"Political Ideas of Modern Japan,\"\nUniversity of Iowa, 1903, brings the account of the theoretical side of\nthe development down to about 1902. An article by H.\u00a0N. Lay on the\npolitical parties of Japan in the _Transactions of the Asiatic Society\nof Japan_, volume 30, No. 3, is valuable.\n\nIn regard to the economic and financial conditions of Japan, the United\nStates _Consular Reports_ and the British _Diplomatic and Consular\nReports_ are very useful. The Japanese Government publishes the\n_Economic and Financial Annals of Japan_. Among other official\npublications by the same government, the \"Report on the Adoption of the\nGold Standard,\" 1899, the \"Post-Bellum Finance,\" 1900, and \"Japan in the\nBeginning of the Twentieth Century,\" 1903, are important. Y.\nKinos[h]ita's \"Past and Present of Japanese Commerce\" (\"Columbia\nUniversity Studies in History, Economics and Public Law\"), New York,\n1902, is an interpretative account of Japan's foreign trade. J. Morris\nhas written a volume on \"Japan and Its Trade\" (\"Harper's International\nCommerce Series\"), London and New York, 1902.\n\nPassing to the matter of literature, W.\u00a0G. Aston has a \"History of\nJapanese Literature,\" New York, 1901, while, for practical studies of\nthe language, one may turn to W. Imbrie's \"English-Japanese Etymology,\"\nToyko, and B.\u00a0H. Chamberlain's \"Hand-book of Colloquial Japanese,\"\nTokyo, 1888, \"A Simplified Grammar of the Japanese Language,\" Toyko,\n1886, and the \"Moji-no-Shirube; a Practical Introduction to the Study of\nthe Japanese Writing,\" London, New York, and Shanghai, 1899.\n\nWe conclude by again recommending Captain Brinkley's \"Oriental Series\"\nto general readers, who may also profitably consult some articles in the\n_Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan_ and of the _Japan Society\nat London_.\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\n\n\nINDEX\n\n\nA\n\nAbe Masahiro: urges signing of treaty with America, 157\n\nAbe-no-Hirafu: his campaigns in the north, 27\n\nAbe-no-Nakamaro: scholarship of, 35\n\nAchiki: introduces Chinese learning into Japan, 13\n\nAdams, William: settles in Japan, 135\n\nAigun: occupied by Russia, 285\n\nAkamatsu Mitsusuke: rebellion of, 95\n\nAkechi Mitsuhide: rewarded with lands of Buddhist priests, 111;\n kills Oda Nobunaga, 112\n\nAkira, Prince: made _gijo_, 167\n\nAkita: built, 27\n\nAlexiev, Admiral: concludes treaty with Tsang-chi, 286\n\nAlexis, Prince: visits Japan, 191\n\nAmakusa: battle of (1638), 137\n\nAmoy Affair, The, 283\n\nAnd\u014d Nobumasa: assassination of, 161\n\nAnglo-German Agreement: signed, 285\n\nAnglo-Japanese Alliance (1902), 231, 289\n\nAnglo-Russian Railway Agreement (1899), 279\n\nAnshan-chan: captured by Japanese, 310\n\nAntoku, emperor of Japan: reign of, 59;\n death of, 62\n\nAn-tung: occupied by the Japanese, 267\n\nAoki Kanaiye: skill of, 107\n\nAoki, Viscount: becomes minister of foreign affairs, 190\n\nArai Hakuseki: sketch of, 142\n\nAraki Matayemon: slays Kawai, 152\n\nArgun: occupied by Russia, 285\n\nArisugawa, Prince: made commander-in-chief of army, 169;\n commissioned to quell rebellion of Saig\u014d, 179\n\nAsana Naganori: story of, 152\n\nAsano Yukinaga: at battle of Sekigahara, 123\n\nAshikaga Motouji: regent at Kamakura, 92;\n joins rebellion of \u014cuchi Yoshihiro, 95;\n revolt of, 95\n\nAshikaga Takauji: his campaign in Ky\u014dto, 86;\n sketch of, 87;\n death of, 91\n\nAshikaga Yoshiaki: sh\u014dgunate of, 101;\n opposes growing influence of Oda Nobunaga, 111\n\nAshikaga Yoshiakira: sh\u014dgunate of, 91\n\nAshikaga Yoshihisa: birth of, 97\n\nAshikaga Yoshikazu: sh\u014dgunate of, 96\n\nAshikaga Yoshimasa: sh\u014dgunate of, 96\n\nAshikaga Yoshimi: assumes the duties of a regent, 97\n\nAshikaga Yoshimitsu: sh\u014dgunate of, 91, 92;\n his relations with China, 102\n\nAshikaga Yoshimochi: sh\u014dgunate of, 92;\n severs official intercourse between Japan and China, 103\n\nAshikaga Yoshinori: sh\u014dgunate of, 95;\n reopens official intercourse with China, 103\n\nAshikaga Yoshiteru: assassinated, 100\n\nAustria-Hungary: concludes treaty with Japan, 189\n\nAwada-no-Mahito: scholarship of, 34\n\nAzumi-no-Hirafu: his campaign in Korea, 26\n\n\nB\n\nBelgium: concludes treaty with Japan, 189\n\nBentsiaputse: captured by the Russians, 311\n\nBitchu-no-Kami: see Hotta Masaatsu\n\nBlagovestchensk: bombarded, 284\n\nBosatsu: see Gy\u014dgi\n\nBoxer Uprising, The, 279\n\nBuddha, The Great Image of: built, 32\n\nBuddhism: introduced into Japan, 14\n\n\nC\n\nChang Chih-tung: attempts to have Manchuria opened to foreign trade, 288\n\nChang Pak: in command of Chinese army, 76\n\nChemulpo: destroyed by Japanese, 194;\n battle of, 303\n\nChiao-tow: captured by the Japanese, 310\n\nChina: early relations with Japan, 16;\n conquests in Korea, 26;\n concludes treaty with Japan (1871), 192;\n relations with Russia, 276\n\nChing, Prince: his negotiations concerning Manchuria, 289, 295\n\nChino-Japanese War, 252\n\nChiulien-cheng: captured by the Japanese, 267\n\nChom Wei-king: attempts to negotiate peace with Japan, 119\n\nChristianity: introduced into Japan, 105;\n sketch of its progress in Japan, 137\n\nCh\u016bai, emperor of Japan: his campaign against the Kumaso, 12\n\nCh\u016bky\u014d, emperor of Japan: accession of, 71\n\nConstitutional Party: organized, 219\n\nConstitutional Political Association: organized, 227\n\nConstitution, The: promulgated, 185;\n in theory and practice, 199\n\nCyril, grand duke of Russia: at siege of Port Arthur, 307\n\n\nD\n\nDannoura: battle of, 62\n\nDanrin-ji: built, 41\n\nDazaifu: battle of (1281), 75\n\nDenmark: concludes treaty with Japan, 189\n\nDeities, Age of the, 3\n\nDogger Bank Incident, 313\n\nD\u014dky\u014d: influence of, 36\n\nDutch: begin trade with Japan, 134\n\n\nE\n\nEdo: rise of, 123;\n taken by imperial forces, 169;\n see also T\u014dky\u014d\n\nEikyo: captured by the Japanese, 118\n\nEmi Oshikazu: rebellion of, 36\n\nEmishi: rebellion of, 10;\n brought into subjection, 27\n\nEngland: begins trade with Japan, 135;\n concludes treaty with China, 277\n\nEnomoto Takeaki: rebellion of, 169;\n sent to St. Petersburg, 188\n\nEnotake: siege of, 181\n\nEnryaku-ji: built, 41\n\nEt\u014d Shimpei: rebellion of, 177\n\n\nF\n\nFeng-hwang-cheng: captured by Japanese, 309\n\nFeng-shui (Wafangao) Pass: captured by the Japanese, 310\n\nFormosa: invaded by Japanese, 192;\n ceded to Japan, 273\n\nFrancis Xavier, St.: preaches in Japan, 104\n\nFujiwara-no-Fuhito: aids the spread of Buddhism, 32;\n services of, to the empire, 45\n\nFujiwara-no-Hidehira: kindness of, to Minamoto-no-Yoshitsune, 65;\n death of, 66\n\nFujiwara-no-Hidesato: defeats Tairo-no-Masakado, 53\n\nFujiwara-no-Kamatari: services of, 45\n\nFujiwara-no-Michinaga: influence of, 48\n\nFujiwara-no-Michinori: influence of, 57\n\nFujiwara-no-Morosuke: minister of the right, 48\n\nFujiwara-no-Mototsune: ministry of, 46\n\nFujiwara-no-Narichika: plots against the Taira sway, 59\n\nFujiwara-no-Nobuyori: rebellion of, 57\n\nFujiwara-no-Sadakuni: conspires against Sugawara-no-Michizane, 47\n\nFujiwara-no-Sanesuke: opposes influence of Fujiwara-no-Michinaga, 49\n\nFujiwara-no-Saneyori: minister of the left, 48\n\nFujiwara-no-Sumitomo: rebellion of, 53\n\nFujiwara-no-Tadahira: chief minister of state, 48\n\nFujiwara-no-Tadamichi: regent for Emperor Konoye, 56\n\nFujiwara-no-Tokihira: conspires against Sugawara-no-Michizane, 47\n\nFujiwara-no-Yasuhira: kills Minamoto-Yoshitsune, 66\n\nFujiwara-no-Yoshifusa: influence of, 46\n\nFujiwara-no-Yoritsune: made sh\u014dgun, 70\n\nFukushima, Lieutenant Colonel: appointed director of Korean\n administration, 267\n\nFukushima Masanori: at battle of Sekigahara, 123;\n his estates confiscated, 128\n\nFusan: attacked by Japanese (1510), 104;\n captured by the Japanese (1592), 117\n\nFushimi: battle of, 168\n\n\nG\n\nGemmy\u014d, empress of Japan: reign of, 31\n\nGenghis Khan (Temujin): plans subjugation of Japan, 73\n\nGermany: treaty with China (1898), 277\n\nGodaigo, emperor of Japan: reign of, 83\n\nGohorikawa, emperor of Japan: accession of, 72\n\nGokashiwabara, emperor of Japan: reign of, 100\n\nGokameyama, emperor of Japan: abdication of, 91\n\nGokomatsu, emperor of Japan: accession of, 91\n\nGok\u014dmy\u014d, emperor of Japan: reign of, 132\n\nGold Standard: established (1898), 226\n\nGomino\u00f6, emperor of Japan: grieves over power of the nobles, 132\n\nGomurakami, emperor of Japan: reign of, 90\n\nGonara, emperor of Japan: reign of, 100\n\nGonij\u014d, emperor of Japan: accession of, 83\n\nGosaga, emperor of Japan: reign of, 83\n\nGosai-in, emperor of Japan: reign of, 132\n\nGoshirakawa, emperor of Japan: accession of, 56\n\nGotoba, emperor of Japan: plots against feudal administration, 70\n\nGot\u014d Sh\u014djir\u014d, Count: counsels war with Korea, 178;\n reforms of, 182;\n attempts to negotiate treaties with European powers, 190\n\nGot\u014d Sukenori: sketch of, 107\n\nGotsuchimikado, emperor of Japan: reign of, 100\n\nGouda, emperor of Japan: at war with the Mongols, 76\n\nGrant, Ulysses S.: visits Japan, 191\n\nGrippenberg, General: at battle of Ho-kau-tai, 312\n\nGunzburg, Baron: represents Russia at Seul, 296\n\nGy\u014dgi (Bosatsu): teachings of, 32\n\n\nH\n\nHagiwara Shigehide: proposes the issue of a debased currency, 143\n\nHai-cheng: captured by the Japanese, 268, 272\n\nHakozaki: battle of, 74\n\nHanabusa Yoshimoto: minister to Korea, 195\n\nHamada Yahei: conquers Formosa, 136\n\nHanazono, emperor of Japan: accession of, 83\n\nHarbin: occupied by Russia, 285\n\nHarris, Townsend: sent as consul-general to Japan, 157\n\nHasankin, king of Shiragi: submits to the Japanese, 13\n\nHashiba Hideyoshi: see Toyotomi Hideyoshi\n\nHatakeyama Masanaga: plots against, 98\n\nHatakeyama Yoshinari: claims regency, 98\n\nHawaii: concludes treaty with Japan, 189\n\nHay, John: his negotiations with the Great Powers, 279;\n his note to Russian and Chinese governments concerning Manchuria, 289\n\nHayashi, Viscount: negotiates treaty with England, 232\n\nHegushagu: battle of, 119\n\nHei-an Epoch: 38\n\nHeiji Insurrection, 57\n\nHekitei-kan: battle of, 119\n\nHieda no-Are: compiles annals of the reigns of Japanese sovereigns, 35\n\nHiki Yoshikazu: plots against the H\u014dj\u014d family, 69\n\nHiraga Tomomasa: plots to obtain the sh\u014dgunate, 70\n\nH\u014dgen Insurrection, 56\n\nH\u014dj\u014d Family: rise of, 69\n\nH\u014dj\u014d Morotoki: regency of, 77\n\nH\u014dj\u014d Sadatoki: regency of, 77\n\nH\u014dj\u014d Sanemasa: commands Japanese army, 75\n\nH\u014dj\u014d Takatoki: regency of, 77, 84\n\nH\u014dj\u014d Tokifusa: his campaign against the imperial forces, 71\n\nH\u014dj\u014d Tokimasa: restores order in Ny\u014dto, 66;\n assumes government of Kamakura, 68\n\nH\u014dj\u014d Tokimune: saves Japan from Mogul conquest, 73;\n puts Chinese envoy to death, 75\n\nH\u014dj\u014d Tokiyori: rule of, 72\n\nH\u014dj\u014d Tsunetoki: rule of, 72\n\nH\u014dj\u014d Yasutoki: his campaign against the imperial forces, 71;\n rule of, 72;\n raises Gosaga to the throne, 83\n\nH\u014dj\u014d Yoshitoki: power of, 71\n\nH\u014dj\u014d-ji: built, 41\n\nHokau-tai: battle of, 312\n\nHonda Masazumi: his estates confiscated, 128\n\nHosokawa Kazumoto: rebellion of, 98\n\nHosokawa Mochiyuki: crushes revolt of Akamatsu Mitsusuke, 96\n\nHotta Masaatsu (Bitchu-no-Kami): attempts to negotiate treaty with\n the United States, 157\n\nHotto Masatoshi: made _tair\u014d_, 140\n\nHu Weiyung: plots assassination of Chinese emperor, 102\n\nHuing-yo-cheng: battle of, 310\n\nHun-chun: occupied by Russia, 285\n\nHu-shan: captured by the Japanese, 267\n\nHwan Bunko: his campaign in Japan, 75\n\n\nI, J\n\nIchij\u014d, emperor of Japan: reign of, 43\n\nIchinotani: battle of, 62\n\nIi Naosuke (Kamon-no-Kami): made _tair\u014d_, 158;\n assassination of, 161\n\nImagawa Yoshimoto: invades Owari, 110\n\nInouye Kaoru, Count: attempts to negotiate treaties with European\n countries, 190;\n vice ambassador to Korea, 194;\n ambassador to Korea, 196\n\nIshida Mitsunari: his campaign against Korea, 116\n\nItagaki Taisuke: counsels war with Korea, 178;\n reforms of, 182;\n leads Liberal Party, 214;\n made home minister, 220\n\nItakura Shigemasa: attempts to crush rebellion of Shimabara, 138\n\nItaly: concludes treaty with Japan, 189\n\nIt\u014d Hirobumi, Marquis: examines constitutional laws of European\n countries, 184;\n made minister of state, 185;\n negotiates convention with China, 196;\n forms a constitutional party, 214;\n first premiership of, 215;\n second premiership of, 218;\n fourth premiership of, 227;\n makes tour of the world, 231\n\nIt\u014d, Admiral: at battle of Wei-hai-Wei, 270\n\nIwafune: built, 27\n\nIwakura Tomomi: made _gij\u014d_, 167;\n visits United States and Europe, 189\n\nJapan, History of: the mythical age, 3;\n the beginning of the empire, 6;\n relations with Korea and China, 12;\n the Taikwa Reform, 22;\n the Nara Epoch, 31;\n the Hei-an Epoch, 38;\n the Kamakura government, 65;\n the temporary restoration of imperial power, 83;\n the Muromachi period, 92;\n internal peace and external war, 109;\n the foundation of the Edo government, 122;\n the decline of the Edo government, 140;\n the fall of the Edo government, 155;\n internal affairs, 173;\n foreign relations, 188;\n the Constitution in theory and practice, 199;\n parties and politics, 213;\n economic progress, 243;\n the Chino-Japanese War, 252;\n Japan and Russia in Korea and Manchuria, 275;\n the Russo-Japanese War and its aftermath, 303\n\nJapan, Sea of: battle of, 316\n\nJimmu, emperor of Japan: founds dynasty, 7\n\nJing\u014d, empress of Japan: her expedition against Korea, 12\n\nJito, empress of Japan: reign of, 30\n\nJoost, Jan: settles in Japan, 135\n\nJosetsu: sketch of, 106\n\nJuntoku, emperor of Japan: plots against the H\u014dj\u014d family, 71\n\n\nK\n\nKabayama, Rear Admiral: at battle of Yalu, 266\n\nKagoshima: battle of (1863), 164;\n captured by Saig\u014d's forces (1876), 182\n\nKaineifu: captured by the Japanese, 118\n\nKai-ping: battle of, 310\n\nKalakaua, king of Hawaii: visits Japan, 191\n\nKameyama, emperor of Japan: reign of, 83\n\nKamon-no-Kami: see Ii Naosuke\n\nKang-wa-seh: captured by the Japanese, 268\n\nKannuna-gawamimi: see Suisei\n\nKano Masanobu: sketch of, 106\n\nKano Oyenosuke: sketch of, 106\n\nKato Kiyomasa: his campaign against Korea, 116;\n at battle of Sekigahara, 123\n\nKatsura, Viscount: made minister of the navy, 220;\n made premier, 230;\n his campaigns in the Chino-Japanese War, 267\n\nKaulbars, Alexander, Baron: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 312\n\nKawamura Sumiyoshi: attempts to crush rebellion of Saig\u014d, 179, 180\n\nKegushagushu: captured by the Japanese, 117\n\nKeik\u014d, emperor of Japan: reign of, 9\n\nKeishoki: see Shokei\n\nKetteler, Baron von: murder of, 280\n\nKibi-no-Makibi: scholarship of, 34\n\nKido Takakoto: persuades the lord of Ch\u014dsh\u016b to surrender his\n feudal domains to the crown, 174\n\nKin-chow: captured by the Japanese, 268\n\nKinoshita Hideyoshi: see Toyotomi Hideyoshi\n\nKi-no-Tsurayuki: compiles the \"_Kokin-shu_,\" 43\n\nKitabatake Akiiye: his campaign against Ashikaga Takauji, 88\n\nKitabatake Chikafusa: his campaign against the H\u014dj\u014d, 90\n\nKitabatake Mitsumasa: declares war against Ashikaga Yoshimochi, 93\n\nKitano-no-Tenjin: see Sugawara-no-Michizane\n\nK\u014dbun, emperor of Japan: reign of, 29\n\nKodama, Baron: becomes member of cabinet, 239\n\nKoh\u014dgen Motonobu: sketch of, 106\n\nK\u014dkaku, emperor of Japan: reign of, 149\n\nK\u014dk\u014d, emperor of Japan: reign of, 46\n\nK\u014dkyoku (Saimei), empress of Japan: first reign of, 20;\n second reign of, 25\n\nK\u014dmei, emperor of Japan: reign of, 158;\n death of, 166\n\nKomura, Baron: appointed director of Korean administration, 267;\n appointed peace commissioner, 317\n\nKomura-Waeber Memorandum (1896), 296\n\nK\u014dmy\u014d, empress of Japan: her devotion to Buddhism, 32\n\nK\u014dmy\u014d, emperor of the North: accession of, 89\n\nKongobu-ji: built, 41\n\nK\u014dnin, emperor of Japan: accession of, 37\n\nKonishi Yukinaga: his campaign against Korea, 116\n\nK\u014dno Hironaka: attempted reforms of, 184\n\nK\u014dno Tokama: forms a provisional court in Kiush\u016b, 182\n\nKonoye, emperor of Japan: reign of, 56\n\nKorea: early relations with Japan, 12;\n conquests of China in, 26;\n relations with Japan under the Edo government, 134;\n refuses to acknowledge the new government in Japan, 178;\n adopts some Western civilization, 194;\n the Chino-Japanese War, 252;\n Russia and Japan in, 275\n\nK\u014dya: battle of, 85\n\nKozenb\u014d, Prince: rebellion of, 169\n\nKublai Khan: his conquests in Korea, 73\n\nKudo Suketsune: death of, 152\n\nK\u016bkai: teachings of, 41\n\nKuki Yoshitaka: commands fleet for invasion of Korea, 116\n\nKumaso: rebellions of (ca. 50 B.\u00a0C.), 9;\n (ca. 200 A.\u00a0D.), 12\n\nKumamota Castle: siege of, 180\n\nKumoi Tatsuo: plots against the new government, 177\n\nKuroda Kiyotaka, Count: his campaign against Saig\u014d, 180;\n made minister of state, 185;\n ambassador to Korea, 194\n\nKuroda Nagamasa: at battle of Sekigahara, 123\n\nKuroki, Itci: his campaigns in the Russo-Japanese War, 309\n\nKuropatkin, Alexei Nikolayevitch: his services in the Russo-Japanese\n War, 310\n\nKusunoki Masashige: revolt of, 85;\n his campaigns against the H\u014dj\u014d, 86\n\nKusunoki Masatsura: death of, 91\n\nKwammu, emperor of Japan: transfers the capital to Ky\u014dto, 38\n\nKyokutei Bakim: sketch of, 142\n\nKy\u014dto: made capital of Japan, 38;\n ruined, 99\n\n\nL\n\nLand Tax Bill (1898), 225\n\nLessar, Paul: appointed minister to Peking, 288\n\nLi Ching Fang: negotiates treaty of peace with Japan, 273\n\nLi Chiu: his campaign against the Japanese, 119\n\nLi Hung Chang: negotiates convention with Japan, 196;\n negotiates treaty of peace with Japan, 273;\n death of, 289\n\nLi Sei-kei: revolt of, 102\n\nLi Shunshin: his campaigns against the Japanese, 118, 120\n\nLiao-yang: battle of, 310\n\nLien, king of Korea: at war with Japan, 117\n\nLinevitch, General: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 313\n\nLiu Fok-h\u00eang: commands fleet for invading Japan, 74\n\nLiu Kan-yi: attempts to have Manchuria opened to foreign trade, 288\n\nLoochoo, Islands of: sketch of the history of, 192\n\n\nM\n\nMacDonald, Sir Claude: negotiates treaty with Japan, 232\n\nMakarov, Vice Admiral: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 307\n\nManchuria: Russia and Japan in, 275\n\nMarubashi Ch\u016bya: attempts to revolt, 140\n\nMasuda Nagamori: his campaign against Korea, 116\n\nMasuda Shir\u014d: leads rebellion, 137\n\nMatsudaira Katamori: rebellion of, 170\n\nMatsudaira Nobutsuna: crushes rebellion of Shimabara, 138;\n makes improvements in Edo, 148\n\nMatsudaira Sadanobu: encourages martial exercises, 147;\n policy of, 149\n\nMatsukata, Count: made premier, 217\n\nMatsukura Shigemasa: made feudal chief of Shimabara, 137\n\nMatsumaye Nobuhiro: recognized as lord of Ezo, 113\n\nMayeda Toshiiye: member of council of state, 114;\n appointed guardian for Toyotomi Hideyori, 121\n\nMeiji Era, 174\n\nMeyer, George von Lengerke: aids peace negotiations between Russia\n and Japan, 319\n\nMikawa: battle of (1335), 88\n\nMinamoto, Clan of: rise of, 51\n\nMinamoto-no-Hikaru: conspires against Sugawara-no-Michizane, 47\n\nMinamoto-no-Kugy\u014d: kills Minamoto-no-Sanetomo, 69\n\nMinamoto-no-Noriyori: at battle of Seta, 62\n\nMinamoto-no-Sanetomo: made sh\u014dgun, 69\n\nMinamoto-no-Tameyoshi: supports plans of Emperor Sutoku, 56\n\nMinamoto-no-Tsunemoto: defeats Minamoto-no-Sumitomo, 53\n\nMinamoto-no-Yoriiye: made generalissimo, 68\n\nMinamoto-no-Yorimasa: supports accession of Emperor Goshirakawa, 56;\n plots against the Taira sway, 60\n\nMinamoto-no-Yorinobu: crushes rebellion of Taira-no-Tadatsune, 53\n\nMinamoto-no-Yoritomo: leads rebellion, 60;\n quarrels with Minamoto-no-Yoshinaka, 62;\n influence of, 65\n\nMinamoto-no-Yoriyoshi: crushes insurrection in Mutsu, 54\n\nMinamoto-no-Yoshiiye: crushes revolt of the Kiyowara family, 54\n\nMinamoto-no-Yoshinaka: leads rebellion, 60;\n defeats Taira forces, 61;\n defeated by revolted followers, 62\n\nMinamoto-no-Yoshitomo: supports accession of Emperor Goshirakawa, 56;\n rebellion of, 57\n\nMinamoto-no-Yoshitsune: at battle of Seta, 62;\n story of, 65\n\nMinamoto-no-Yukiiye: attempts to overthrow the Taira family, 60\n\nMincho Chodensu: sketch of, 106\n\nMiura, Major General: his campaign against Saig\u014d, 179\n\nMiura Yoshimura: duplicity of, 71\n\nMiyako, empress-dowager of Japan: her devotion to Buddhism, 32\n\nMiyoshi, Major General: his campaign against Saig\u014d, 179\n\nMiyoshi Yasunobu: made minister of justice, 68\n\nMommu, emperor of Japan: accession of, 30\n\nMononobe Moriya: feud with Soga-no-Umako, 19\n\nMononobe-no-Okoshi: opposes the acceptance of Buddhism, 15\n\nMontoku, emperor of Japan: birth of, 45\n\nM\u014dri Motonari: provides coronation expenses for Emperor \u014cgimachi, 100\n\nM\u014dri Terumoto: member of council of state, 144;\n at battle of Sekigahara, 123\n\nM\u014dri Yoshichika, lord of Ch\u014dsh\u016b: attempts to restore tranquillity\n to Japan, 161;\n expelled from Ky\u014dto, 163\n\nMorinaga, Prince: made abbot of Enryaku-ji, 84;\n his campaigns against the H\u014dj\u014d, 85;\n fate of, 87\n\nMo-tien-ling: battles of (1894), 269;\n (1904), 310\n\nMount Kasagi: siege of (1331), 84\n\nMount Kongo: siege of (1333), 86\n\nMount Tsukuba Insurrection, 164\n\nMukden: battle of, 312\n\nMura-saki-shikibu: scholarship of, 43\n\nMutsu Munemitsu: negotiates treaty with Great Britain, 191\n\nMyochin Muneyasu: sketch of, 107\n\nMyochin Nobuiye: skill of, 107\n\nMy\u014dsh\u014d, empress of Japan: reign of, 132\n\n\nN\n\nNagasaki Takasuke: power of, 77\n\nNaka-no-\u014dye, Prince: see Tenchi, emperor of Japan\n\nNakahara Chikayoshi: made vice-minister of the public archives, 68\n\nNakatomi-no-Kamako: opposes the acceptance of Buddhism, 15\n\nNakatomi-no-Kamatari: plots against Soga-no-Iruka, 20;\n death of, 28\n\nNara Epoch, The, 31\n\nNavy Increase Question, 233\n\nNawa Nagatoshi: aids Emperor Godaigo, 85\n\nNebokatov, Admiral: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 314\n\nNicholas II, emperor of Russia: visits Japan, 191\n\nNikk\u014d: battle of, 170\n\nNimmy\u014d, emperor of Japan: marriage of, 45\n\nNishi-Rosen Protocol (1898), 296\n\nNitta Yoshisada: besieges Mount Kongo (1333), 86;\n sketch of, 87;\n his campaign against Ashikaga Takauji, 88;\n death of, 90\n\nNiu-chwang: captured by the Japanese, 272;\n occupied by Russia, 285\n\nNodzu Michitsura, Viscount: his campaigns in the Chino-Japanese War, 267\n\nNogi: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 311\n\nNozu: his campaign against Saig\u014d, 179\n\nNutari: built, 27\n\n\nO\n\n\u014cama, Prince: see Temmu, emperor of Japan\n\nOda Nobunaga: aids Ashikaga Yoshiaki to regain the sh\u014dgunate, 101;\n career of, 110\n\nOda Nobukatsu: rebels against Hashiba Hideyoshi, 113\n\nOda Nubutaka: plots against Hashiba Hideyoshi, 113\n\nOda Samb\u014dshi: succeeds Oda Nobunaga, 113\n\n\u014cgimachi, emperor of Japan: coronation of, 100\n\n\u014chara Shigenori: made _sanyo_, 167\n\n\u014cishi Kuranosuke: revenges death of Asana Naganori, 152\n\n\u014cjin, emperor of Japan: promotes Chinese learning, 13\n\n\u014cjin War, 97\n\nOkehazama: battle of, 110\n\nOku, Hokyo: his campaigns in the Chino-Japanese War, 267;\n his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 310\n\n\u014ckubo Toshimichi: made _sanyo_, 167;\n persuades the lord of Satsuma to surrender his feudal domains\n to the crown, 174;\n crushes rebellion of Eto Shimpei, 177;\n opposes war with Korea, 178;\n sent as plenipotentiary to Peking, 192\n\n\u014ckuma Shigenobu, Count: reforms of, 183;\n attempts to negotiate treaties with European powers, 190;\n leads Progressive Party, 214;\n made minister of foreign affairs, 217;\n made premier, 220;\n opposes navy expansion, 236\n\n\u014cmura Masujiro: assassination of, 177\n\n\u014c-no-Yasumaro: scholarship of, 34\n\nOno-no-Yoshifuru: defeats Minamoto-no-Sumitomo, 53\n\n\u014coka Tadasuke: sketch of, 146;\n establishes the fire-brigade system, 149\n\n\u014csaka: siege of, 126\n\n\u014cseka: his campaigns in the Chino-Japanese War, 267\n\n\u014cshima: his campaigns against Chinese, 262, 267\n\n\u014cshio Heihachir\u014d: leads rebellion, 155\n\nOtani Yoshitaka: his campaign against Korea, 116\n\n\u014ctomo, Prince: see K\u014dbun, emperor of Japan\n\n\u014ctomo-no-Yakamochi: aids in the compilation of the \"_Manyoshu_,\" 35\n\n\u014ctori, Japanese minister: his career in Korea, 259\n\n\u014ctori Keisuke: rebellion of, 169\n\n\u014cuchi Yoshihiro: rebellion of, 94\n\n\u014cuchi Yoshitaka: provides coronation expenses for Emperor Gonara, 100\n\n\u014cyama, Count: his campaign in Chino-Japanese War, 268;\n his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 310\n\n\u014cye Hiromoto: made minister of the public archives, 68;\n plans campaign against the imperial forces, 71\n\nOzaki: causes downfall of \u014ckuma's cabinet, 221\n\n\nP, Q\n\nPavlov, General: represents Russia at Seul, 296\n\nPeking: siege of (1900), 280\n\nPerry, Matthew Calbraith: visits Japan, 155;\n concludes treaty with Japan, 157\n\nPhung-do Island: battle of, 261\n\nPing-yang: battle of, 265\n\nPlan\u00e7on: minister to China, 295\n\nPokotilov: his attempts to win Chinese officials, 295\n\nPort Arthur: siege of (1894), 268; leased to Russia, 277;\n battle of (1904), 304;\n siege of (1904), 306\n\nPortsmouth Treaty, The (1905), 318\n\nPortugal: concludes treaty with Japan, 189\n\nPortuguese: visit Japan, 104\n\nPrussia: concludes treaty with Japan, 189\n\nPu-lan-tien: captured by the Japanese, 310\n\n\nR\n\nRai Sany\u014d: influence of his writings, 160\n\nReigen, emperor of Japan: reign of, 132\n\nReligion and Mythology: the mythical age, 3;\n introduction of Buddhism, 14;\n Christianity introduced into Japan, 105\n\nRich\u016b, emperor of Japan: appoints historiographers throughout Japan, 13\n\n_Rikken Seiy\u016b Kwai_: see Constitutional Political Association\n\nRokuhara: destroyed (1333), 86\n\nRoosevelt, Theodore: attempts to induce Russia to treat for peace\n with Japan, 316\n\nRosen, Baron: appointed peace commissioner, 318\n\nRozhestvenski, Vice Admiral: commands Baltic fleet, 313\n\nRussia: in Korea and Manchuria, 275\n\nRusso-Japanese War, 303\n\nRusso-Chinese Bank: established, 276\n\n\nS\n\nSaich\u014d: teachings of, 41\n\nSaig\u014d Takamori, lord of Satsuma: joins lord of Ch\u014dsh\u016b against\n the sh\u014dgun, 165;\n made _sanyo_, 167;\n negotiates treaty for surrender of Tokugawa Yoshinobu, 169;\n rebellion of, 178\n\nSaig\u014d Tsugumichi, Marquis: attempts to negotiate treaties with\n European powers, 190;\n his campaign in Formosa, 192;\n accompanies Count It\u014d to China, 196;\n made minister of the army, 220\n\nSai-ma-tsi: captured by the Japanese (1894), 268;\n (1904), 310\n\nSaimei: see K\u014dkyoku\n\nSaionji, Marquis: made president of the Constitutional Political\n Association, 238\n\nSakai Tadakiyo: influence of, 140\n\nSakanoue-no-Tamuramaro: his campaign against the Emishi, 27\n\nSakhalin: occupied by Japan, 318;\n treaty regulations concerning, 319\n\nSakuma Sh\u014dzan: assassination of, 177\n\nSanj\u014d Sanetomi: accompanies M\u014dri Yoshichika to his fief, 163;\n restored to his former rank, 167\n\nSano Takenosuke: leads plots for assassination of Ii Naosuke, 161\n\nSanuki: battle of, 62\n\nSan-sin: occupied by Russia, 285\n\nSea of Japan: battle of, 316\n\nSei-Sh\u014dnagon: scholarship of, 43\n\nSekigahara: battle of, 124\n\nSessh\u016b: sketch of, 106\n\nSeta: battle of, 62\n\nSeul: uprising of 1884, 256;\n captured by the Japanese, 260\n\nSeiwa, emperor of Japan: reign of, 46\n\nSeymour, Sir Edward Hobart: attempts to relieve foreigners in Peking, 279\n\nSha River: battle of, 311\n\nShanghai: evacuation of, by allied forces, 292\n\nShij\u014dnawate: battle of, 91\n\nShimabara: rebellion of, 137\n\nShimazu Hisamitsu: attempts to restore tranquillity to Japan, 161;\n causes a breach between Japan and England, 162\n\nShimazu Narishigi, lord of Satsuma: attempts to restore tranquillity\n to Japan, 161\n\nShimonoseki Affair, The, 163, 165\n\nShingon: founded, 41\n\nShinsai: battle of, 121\n\nShiragi: revolt of, 25\n\nShirakawa, emperor of Japan: gives influence to Buddhist priests, 54\n\nShiroyama: battle of, 182\n\nShisen: battle of, 121\n\nSho Tai, king of Loochoo: his relations with Japanese government, 193\n\nSh\u014dhei-k\u014d: growth of, 141\n\nShokei (Keishoki): sketch of, 106\n\nSh\u014dk\u014d, emperor of Japan: accession of, 93\n\nSh\u014dkoku-ji: built, 93\n\nSh\u014dmei, emperor of Japan: accession of, 20\n\nSh\u014dmu, emperor of Japan: reign of, 10;\n aids the spread of Buddhism, 32;\n marriage of, 45\n\nSh\u014dni Kagesuke: his campaign against the Chinese, 76\n\nSh\u014dtoku, Prince: distinguishes himself as a scholar, 14\n\nShozui: aids the development of ceramics, 107\n\nShuban: sketch of, 106\n\nSilk: production and manufacture of, introduced into Japan, 18\n\nSiu-yen: battle of (1894), 268;\n captured by Japanese (1904), 310\n\nS\u014d Yoshitomo: invites king of Korea to visit Japan, 116\n\nSoga Dasoku: sketch of, 106\n\nSoga Sukenari: kills father's foe, 152\n\nSoga Tokimune: kills father's foe, 152\n\nSoga-no-Emishi: influence of, 20\n\nSoga-no-Iname: counsels the acceptance of Buddhism, 14\n\nSoga-no-Iruka: influence of, 20\n\nSoga-no-Mako: works for the acceptance of Buddhism in Japan, 15\n\nSoga-no-Umako: builds temples and pagodas for Buddha, 16;\n feud with Monobe Moriya, 19\n\nSong-hwan: battle of, 262\n\nSonntag, Miss: represents Russia at Seul, 296\n\nSotan: sketch of, 106\n\nS\u014dtar\u014d Iba: assassinates T\u014dru Hoshi, 229\n\nSoyeshima Taneomi: counsels war with Korea, 178\n\nSpain: concludes treaty with Japan, 189\n\nStakelberg, General: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 310\n\nStoessel, General: surrenders Port Arthur, 312\n\nSugawara-no-Michizane: influence of, 47;\n disgraced, 47;\n honored, 48\n\nSugiyama, Chancellor: murder of, 280\n\nSuiko, empress of Japan: accession of, 20\n\nSuinin, emperor of Japan: condition of the empire under, 9\n\nSuisei (Kannuna-gawamimi), emperor of Japan: accession of, 7\n\nSujin, emperor of Japan: separates shrine and palace, 9;\n condition of the empire under, 9\n\nSumatah: introduces Buddhism into Japan, 14\n\nSung-ching: his campaigns against the Japanese, 267\n\nSuruga: battle of (1335), 88\n\nSutoku, emperor of Japan: deposed, 56;\n leads rebellion, 56\n\nSweden: concludes treaty with Japan, 189\n\nSwitzerland: concludes treaty with Japan, 189\n\n\nT\n\nTachilana Moroye: collects Japanese poems, 35\n\nTadaranohama: battle of, 88\n\nTaga: built, 27\n\nTaikwa Reform, 22\n\nTaira, Clan of: rise of, 51\n\nTaira-no-Kiyomori: supports accession of Emperor Goshirakawa, 56;\n crushes rebellion of Nobuyori and Yoshitomo, 57;\n influence of, 58\n\nTaira-no-Masakado: revolt of, 53\n\nTaira-no-Munemori: influence of, 60;\n death of, 62\n\nTaira-no-Sadamori: defeats Taira-no-Masakado, 53\n\nTaira-no-Shigemori: crushes rebellion of Nobuyori and Yoshitomo, 57\n\nTaira-no-Tadamasa: supports plans of Emperor Sutoku, 56\n\nTaira-no-Tadatsune: rebellion of, 53\n\nTaira-no-Takamochi: vice-governor of Kazusa, 52\n\nTaiwon-kun: anti-foreign policy of, 195, 255\n\nTakahira, Kogor\u014d: appointed peace commissioner, 317\n\nTakakura, emperor of Japan: reign of, 58\n\nTakanaga, Prince: his campaign against Ashikaga Takauji, 87\n\nTakasugi Shinsaku: leader of anti-Tokugawa party, 165\n\nTakeuchi Shikibu: plots against the Tokugawa, 160\n\nTakezoye: minister to Korea, 256\n\nTakishimimi, Prince: attempts to usurp the throne, 7\n\nTa-ku-shan: taken by the Japanese, 268\n\nTa-lien-wan: captured by the Japanese, 268;\n leased to Russia, 277\n\nTani-Tateki: attempts to defend Kumamoto castle, 180\n\nTaping-ling: battle of, 310\n\nTashi-chiao: battle of, 310\n\nTatsumi: his campaigns in the Chino-Japanese War, 267\n\nTa-tung-kau: taken by the Japanese, 268\n\nTawara-saka: battle of, 180\n\nTelissu: battle of, 310\n\nTenchi, emperor of Japan: plots against Soga-no-Iruka, 20;\n reign of, 25\n\nTendai: founded, 41\n\nTemmu, emperor of Japan: rebellion of, 29;\n reign of, 30;\n aids the spread of Buddhism, 31\n\nTie-ling: captured by Japanese, 313\n\nTien-chwang-tai: destroyed by the Japanese, 272\n\nTientsin: captured by the allied forces, 280\n\nTientsin Convention (1885), 256\n\nTik Ho: his campaign against the Japanese, 120\n\nTing Ju-chang, Admiral: at battle of Wei-hai-Wei, 270\n\nToba, emperor of Japan: intrigues of, 55;\n death of, 56\n\nToba: battle of, 168\n\nTogo, Heihachiro: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 303\n\nTokugawa Hidetada: concludes peace with Korea, 121;\n sh\u014dgunate of, 127\n\nTokugawa Iyeharu: sh\u014dgunate of, 149\n\nTokugawa Iyemitsu: character of, 127\n\nTokugawa Iyemochi: accession to the sh\u014dgunate, 158;\n marriage of, 161;\n visits Ky\u014dto, 162\n\nTokugawa Iyenari: sh\u014dgunate of, 149\n\nTokugawa Iyesada: sh\u014dgunate of, 156\n\nTokugawa Iyeshige: sh\u014dgunate of, 149\n\nTokugawa Iyetsuna: sh\u014dgunate of, 140\n\nTokugawa Iyeyasu: rebels against Hashiba Hideyoshi, 113;\n member of council of state, 114;\n sketch of, 122;\n death of, 127;\n encourages literature, 141\n\nTokugawa Nariakira: urges policy of national seclusion, 156\n\nTokugawa Tsunayoshi: sh\u014dgunate of, 140\n\nTokugawa Yoshimune: sh\u014dgunate of, 144\n\nTokugawa Yoshinobu: his claims to the sh\u014dgunate, 158;\n sh\u014dgunate of, 166\n\nTokunegi: captured by the Japanese, 117\n\nT\u014dky\u014d, formerly Edo: made capital, 174\n\nTomu-cheng: captured by the Japanese (1894), 268;\n battle of (1904), 310\n\nTonghak Rebellion, 257\n\nT\u014dru Hoshi: influence of, 222;\n sketch of his career, 229\n\nTosa Mitsunobu: sketch of, 105\n\nTosab\u014d Sh\u014dshun: sent to destroy Minamoto-no-Yoshitsune, 66\n\nToyotomi Hidetsugu: regency of, 121\n\nToyotomi Hideyori: accession of, to his father's position, 121;\n regency of, 123;\n influence of, 125\n\nToyotomi Hideyoshi: guards the sh\u014dgun, 111;\n crushes rebellion of Akechi Mitsuhide, 112;\n sketch of, 113;\n invades Korea, 116\n\nTsang-chi: concludes treaty with Admiral Alexiev, 286\n\nTso Shingfon: sent to aid the Koreans, 118\n\nTsushima: battle of (1419), 103\n\n\nU, V\n\nUchida: protests against Russian demands (1903), 294\n\nUda, emperor of Japan: reign of, 47\n\nUkita Hideiye: member of council of state, 114;\n his campaign against Korea, 116;\n at battle of Sekigahara, 123\n\nUnited States: concludes treaty with Japan (1879), 190\n\nUrosan: siege of, 120\n\nUry\u016b, Rear Admiral: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 303\n\nUtsunomiya: battle of, 170\n\nUyesugi Kagekatsu: member of council of state, 114;\n at battle of Sekigahara, 123\n\nUyesugi Norizane: crushes revolt of Ashikaga Mochiuji, 95\n\nVereshchagin, Alexander V.: death of, 307\n\nVoelkersam, Admiral: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 314\n\n\nW\n\nWafangao Pass: see Feng-shui Pass\n\nWake-no-Kiyomaro: opposes influence of D\u014dky\u014d, 36\n\nWani: introduces Chinese learning into Japan, 13\n\nWatanabe, Viscount: causes downfall of fourth It\u014d cabinet, 228\n\nWatanabe Kazuma: slays Kawai, 152\n\nWei-hai-Wei: captured by the Japanese, 270;\n naval battle of, 270;\n leased to Great Britain, 278\n\nWilliam II, emperor of Germany: visits Japan, 191\n\nWitte, Count Serge: appointed peace commissioner, 317\n\nWitthoeft, Rear Admiral: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 308\n\n\nX, Y, Z\n\nXavier, St. Francis: see Francis Xavier, St.\n\nYalu: battle of (1894), 266\n\nYalu River: battle of (1904), 309\n\nYamada Nagamasa: career of, 136\n\nYamagata Aritomo, Count: attempts to crush rebellion of Saig\u014d, 179;\n becomes minister president, 190;\n made premier, 221;\n his campaigns in the Chino-Japanese War, 267\n\nYamagata-Lobanov Protocol (1896), 296\n\nYamaji, Baron: his campaign in Chino-Japanese War, 268\n\nYamana Mochitoyo: crushes revolt of Akamatsu Mitsusuke, 96\n\nYamana S\u014dzen: rebellion of, 97\n\nYamano Ujikiyo: rebellion of, 94\n\nYamanouchi Toyonobu, lord of Tosa: attempts to restore tranquillity\n to Japan, 161\n\nYamato-dake, Prince: his campaign against the Kumaso, 9;\n his campaign against the Emishi, 10;\n death of, 10\n\nYamazaki: battle of, 112\n\nYanagiwara Sakimitsu: warns the Shimazu against joining rebellions, 180\n\nYanagiwara Sakimitsu: sent as ambassador to China, 192\n\nYanagizawa Yoshiyasu: rise of, 142\n\nYang-tse Agreement, The: see Anglo-German Agreement\n\nYang-tsu-ling: captured by the Japanese, 310\n\nYellow Sea: battle of, 309\n\nYing Kai: commands army against Japan, 120\n\nYing-kau: captured by the Japanese, 272\n\nYokoi Heishir\u014d: assassination of, 177\n\nYoshiaki, Prince: made _gij\u014d_, 167;\n sent to crush rebellion of Eto Shimpei, 177\n\nYoshino: battle of, 85\n\nY\u014dzei, emperor of Japan: reign of, 46\n\nYuan Shih-kai: minister to Korea, 256\n\nYuino Sh\u014dsetsu: attempts to revolt, 140\n\nYu-shu-lin-tsu: captured by the Japanese, 310\n\nZassulitch: his services in the Russo-Japanese War, 309\n\nZen Sect: teachings of, 80\n\n\n\n\nTranscriber's Notes\n\nVowels \"o\" and \"u\" with a macron diacritic have been replaced with the\nvowels \"\u014d\" and \"\u016b\", respectively. (In the UTF-8 and HTML files, the\ncorrect characters are used.)\n\nThe family trees may not display correctly on small screens.\n\nPage xiii: \"Ogasawara\" was \"Ogaswara\".\n\nPage 6: \"straits between\" was \"straits beween\".\n\nPage 9: \"Kashiwabara\" was \"Kashiwa-brara\".\n\nPage 15: \"Soga-no-Umako\" was \"Soga-no-Mako\".\n\nPages 17, 133, 141: \"Shint\u014d[ism]\" was \"Shinto[ism]\".\n\nCaption of illustration facing page 28: \"AMONG THE AUTOCHTHONS (AINOS)\"\nwas \"AMONG THE AUTOCHTONS (AINOS)\".\n\nPage 39: \"Saky\u014d\" was \"Sakyo\".\n\nPage 47: \"a son of the Emperor Nimmy\u014d\", was \"Nimmyo\".\n\nPage 59: \"its authors and promotors\" was \"it authors and promotors\".\n\nPage 66: \"million warriors\" was \"million warrors\".\n\nPage 67: \"sei-i-tai-sh\u014dgun\" was \"seii-taishogun\".\n\nPage 74: \"thereafter directed\" was \"therafter\".\n\nPage 79: \"Heike Monogatari\" was \"Heike Monogaturi\".\n\nPage 85: \"1333\" was \"1133\".\n\nPage 113: \"original name\" was \"orginal name\".\n\nPage 126: footnote, \"sh\u014dgun\" was \"shogun\".\n\nPage 127: \"a mausoleum of unexampled magnificence\" was \"a mausoleum of\nof unexampled magnificence\".\n\nPage 148: \"bodyguard\" was \"body-guard\".\n\nPage 149: \"T\u014dky\u014d\" was \"T\u014dkyo\".\n\nPage 162: \"unpardonable in the eyes of the _samurai_\" was \"sumurai\".\n\nPage 162: \"increasing body of samurai\" was \"sumurai\".\n\nPage 190: \"no sooner were its provisions\" was \"it\".\n\nPage 222: \"future of the parliamentary politics\" was \"parlimentary\".\n\nPage 231: \"celebration of Yale University\", was \"Universisity\".\n\nPage 256: \"that there existed no definite\" was \"exised\".\n\nPage 261: \"steamed out of Asan in order\" was \"is order\".\n\nPage 328b: \"Tie-ling\" was \"Tieling\".\n\nPage 328b: \"Chinese telegraph buildings\" was \"Chine telegraph\nbuildings\".\n\nPage 332: \"superseded by newer ones\" was \"onces\".\n\nPage 337: \"Anshan-chan\" was \"Anshan chan\".\n\nPage 339: \"Hawaii: concludes treaty\" was \"treay\".\n\nPage 340: \"Jing\u014d\" was \"Jingo\".\n\nPage 341: \"Kannuna-gawamimi: see Suisei\" was \"Kannuna-gau-amimi\".\n\nPage 341, 345: \"K\u014dkyoku\" was \"Kokyoku\".\n\nPage 343: \"M\u014dri Yoshichika, lord of Ch\u014dsh\u016b\" was \"Mori Yosichika\".\n\nPage 343: \"made abbot of Enryaku-ji\" was \"Emyaku-ji\".\n\nPage 343: \"Nimmy\u014d, emperor of Japan, marriage of\" was \"Nimmyo\".\n\nPage 344: \"\u014ctomo-no-Yakamochi\" was \"Otomo-no-Yakamochi\".\n\nPage 344: \"Rikken Seiy\u016b Kwai: see Constitutional\" was \"Rikke\u016b Seiy\u016b\nKwai: see Constitutional\".\n\nPages 337, 341, 343, 345, 347: \"Saig\u014d\" changed to \"Saigo\".\n\nPage 345: \"Sanj\u014d Sanetomi: accompanies M\u014dri Yoshichika\" was \"Sanjo\nSanetomi: accompanies Mori Yoshichika\".\n\nPage 347: \"Wake-no-Kiyomaro\" was \"Wake-no-Kyomaro\".","title":"Japan: From the Japanese Government History","tradition":"myth-cosmogony","translated_text":null,"word_count":137751}